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An allied history of the Peloponnesian League : Elis, Tegea, and Mantinea Caprio, James Alexander 2004

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An Allied History of the Peloponnesian League: Elis, Tegea, and Mantinea By James Alexander Caprio B.A. H a m i l t o n C o l l e g e , 1994 M.A.  T u f t s U n i v e r s i t y , 1997  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL F U L F I L M E N T OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE F A C U L T Y OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Classical, Near Eastern, and Religious Studies)  T H E UNIVERSITY O F BRITISH C O L U M B I A  J a n u a r y , 2005  © J a m e s A. C a p r i o , 2005  Abstract  Elis, Tegea, and Mantinea became members o f the Peloponnesian League at its inception in 506, although each had concluded an alliance with Sparta much earlier. The initial arrangement between each city-state and Sparta was reciprocal and membership in the League did not interfere with their individual development. B y the fifth century, Elis, Mantinea, and Tegea had created their own symmachies and were continuing to expand within the Peloponnesos. Eventually, the prosperity and growth o f these regional symmachies were seen by Sparta as hazardous to its security. Hostilities erupted when Sparta interfered with the intent to dismantle these leagues. Although the dissolution o f the allied leagues became an essential factor in the preservation o f Sparta's security, it also engendered a rift between its oldest and most important allies. This ultimately contributed to the demise of Spartan power in 371 and the termination o f the Peloponnesian League soon thereafter.  11  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Abstract  ii  Table o f Contents  iii  List o f Maps  iv  List o f Abbreviations  v  Acknowledgements  viii  Introduction  •  1  Chapter One: Elis  20  Chapter T w o : Tegea and southern Arkadia  107  Chapter Three: Mantinea and northern Arkadia  181  Conclusion Bibliography  231 ,  234  iii  Maps  Map Map Map Map Map Map  1: Elis 2: Tegean Territory 3: The Peloponnesos 4: Phigalia 5: Mantinea and Tegea 6: Mantinea and its environs  21 108 109 117 182 182  Abbreviations A m i t , Poleis  M . Amit, Great and Small Poleis, part 3, (Brussels: Latomus, 1973).  Cartledge, Agesilaos  P. Cartledge, Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta. (London: Duckworth, 1987).  Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia  P. Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 2  n d  ed. (1979:  reprint, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 2002). CPCActs  Acts o f the Copenhagen Polis Centre  CPCPapers  Papers from the Copenhagen Polis Centre S. Dusanic, The Arkadian League of the Fourth Century  Dusanic, Arkadian League  (Belgrade: Belgrade University Press, 1970). W . G . Forrest, "Themistokles and Argos." CQ n.s. 10  Forrest, "Themistokles"  (1960): 221-241. W . G . Forrest, A History of Sparta. (New Y o r k : W . W .  Forrest, Sparta  Norton and Company, 1968). G . Fougeres, Mantinee et 1' Arcadie Orientale. (Paris:  Fougeres, Mantinee  A . Fontemoing, 1898). M . N . Tod, ed., Greek Historical Inscriptions, 2 vols.,  GHI  (1946, 1948: reprint, Chicago: Ares, 1985). C D . Hamilton, Sparta's Bitter Victories, Politics and  Hamilton, Bitter Victories  Diplomacy in the Corinthian War. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979).  Hamilton, Agesilaus  C D . Hamilton, Agesilaus and The Failure of The Spartan Hegemony. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).  HCT  A . W . Gomme, A . Andrewes, and K . J . Dover. HistoricalCommentary on Thucydides. 4 Volumes. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950-6).  Hodkinson, Mantinike  S. Hodkinson, and H . Hodkinson, "Mantinea and Mantinike: Settlement and Society in a Greek Polis," ABSA 16 (1981): 242-6.  Kagan, Outbreak  D . Kagan, The Outbreak of The Peloponnesian War. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969).  Kagan, Archidamian War  D . Kagan, The Archidamian War. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974).  Kagan, Peace  D . Kagan, The Peace ofNicias and the Sicilian Expedition. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981).  Lazenby, Peloponnesian War  J.F. Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War. (London: Routledge, 2004).  LSAG  L . Jeffery, Local Scripts of Archaic Greece, 2  n d  Edition,  revised by A . Johnston, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). ML  R. Meiggs, and D a v i d Lewis, eds. A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).  vi  M o g g i , I sinecismi  M . M o g g i , I sinecismi interstatali greci (Pisa: M a r l i n , 1976).  Nielsen, "Dependent Poleis "  T . H . Nielsen, " A Survey o f Dependent Poleis in Classical Arkadia." CPCPapers 3 (1996): 63-105.  Nom.  H . , V a n Effenterree, and F . Ruze. Nomina. Recueil d inscriptions politiques et juridiques de I'archaisme grec. 2 Volumes. (Rome: Collection de l'Ecole francaise de Rome, 188 1994 -1995).  Pritchett, Greek Topography  W . K . Pritchett, Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, part 2, (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1969).  RE  A . Pauly, G . Wissowa, and W , K r o l l . RealEncyclopddiea des klassischen Altertumswissenschaft. (Stuttgart: A , Druckenmuller, 1894 - ) .  Robinson, First Democracies  E . W . Robinson, The First Democracies. Historia ism. 107(1997), 108-11.  Roy, "Perioikoi"  J. Roy, "The Perioikoi o f E l i s , " CPCActs 4 (1997): 282-320.  de Ste. Croix, Origins  G . E . M . de Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War. (London: Duckworth, 1972).  Wickert, peloponnesische Bund  Wickert, K . Der peloponnesische Bund von seiner Enstehung bis zum Ende des archidamischen Krieges. (Diss. U . Erlangen-Niirnberg, 1962).  vii  Acknowledgements  I wish to extend my thanks to my advisor, Dr. Phillip Harding, whose patience, guidance, and constant support have made this work and my whole graduate career at The University o f British Columbia possible. I would also like to thank Dr. Hector Williams and Dr. Fracno De Angelis for their prompt and insightful remarks and corrections. I am also extremely grateful to the entire Department o f Classical, Near Eastern, and Religious Studies at U B C for providing me with their valuable time and energy and for allowing me to continue my studies. Thank you to D r . E d Kadletz for being a great friend and colleague while I was at B a l l State University, and to Dr. Walter Moskalew for all o f his assistance and guidance. To my friends at U B C , in Bellingham, San Francisco, and Vancouver, thank you for your trust, understanding, hospitality, and patience. I would like to thank my father, Tony, who never stopped believing in me, and I would like to remember my mother, Rosemary, who never let anything get in the way o f my pursuits. I cannot express in words my gratitude to my wife, Megan, who supported and encouraged me, waited patiently, and sacrificed so much so that we could be together. This dissertation is as much hers as it is mine. Jim Caprio, 2004  viii  Introduction The Evolution and Structure of The Peloponnesian League  Sparta's decision to prohibit its allies from maintaining individual regional alliances while they were members o f the Peloponnesian League was a failure o f Spartan policy and eventually led to the Peloponnesian League's demise. B y limiting the expansion o f its Peloponnesian allies and their regional leagues, Sparta alleviated a significant threat to its safety within the Peloponnesos. Rather than bolstering Sparta's alliance, however, this policy of limiting the existence o f leagues within the Peloponnesian League led to dissension among League members. During periods o f peace, the members o f the Peloponnesian League were not restricted by their membership in the League or by their alliance with Sparta from expanding and developing their own alliances and leagues. After the inception o f the League in 506 B C E , city-states pursued their own interests despite growing Spartan supremacy in the Peloponnesos. A s long as the basic agreements o f the League were met and Sparta's safety at home was secured, an ally's regional symmachy could and did exist. This consociation changed, however, during the latter half o f the fifth century. The proliferation o f these leagues and the threat Sparta believed they would eventually pose to its security prompted Sparta to take a much more aggressive approach and it began to dissolve the regional symmachies. Until now, there has been little emphasis placed on the presence o f these smaller, regional leagues within the larger alliances and not enough examination o f how these smaller symmachies operated within the larger. coalitions o f ancient Greece. This dissertation  1  focuses, therefore, on three small, yet important regional leagues within the Peloponnesian League: the Elean League, the Tegean League, and the Mantinean League. This study investigates the origins o f each regional symmachy and their relationships with Sparta and traces the development o f these smaller regional alliances as they existed under the larger system o f the Peloponnesian League from its inception in 506 B C E to its dissolution in 369 B C E . This approach  illuminates the  importance  o f the  smaller  communities in the Peloponnesos and how they were united by local and regional concerns.  1  The three city-states studied herein shared common characteristics in respect to their development and relationship with Sparta. Elis was the first o f the three to develop its own symmachy and to incorporate unwilling communities into its alliance. Although the Mantineans and Tegeans constructed their alliances much later, by 420 all three states had established regional alliances and acted as hegemons o f their respective leagues. N o previous study has placed significant emphasis on the importance o f these leagues within the politics o f the Peloponnesos and Sparta's Peloponnesian League. N o r has any study demonstrated the extent to which the smaller communities were able to influence Spartan policy by forming their own leagues. This dissertation, therefore, is a study o f leagues within leagues, or more specifically, three regional Peloponnesian alliances within the Peloponnesian League. A n d so, it seems appropriate, to begin with an explanation o f the larger organization and the circumstances under which each state developed its own regional symmachy.  Malkin also adopted what he called a polis approach when he studied the connection between the myths of Sparta and its colonization in the Mediterranean. Rather than look at a set of myths, he chose to focus on one city-state and its foundation myths. See Malkin, I. Myth and territory in the Spartan Mediterranean, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 8ff. Like Malkin, I have taken this individual polis approach. The political situation within the Peloponnesos included more than just the larger coalitions; the smaller 1  2  The complete history o f the Peloponnesian League, previously examined by several scholars, is difficult to ascertain due to the indeterminate nature o f the sources. E v e n though Herodotus refers to "The Peloponnesians" more than thirty times and Thucydides clearly notes the existence o f the Peloponnesian League, including its bicameral character, documentary  evidence regarding the League's origins exists.  Furthermore, the  2  no  precise  relationship between each member and Sparta is insufficiently represented. F o r example, the only extant Classical Spartan treaty inscribed on stone is not only fragmentary and difficult to date, but also includes an unknown partner, the Aitolian-Erxadieis. This lack o f evidence has 3  prompted scholars to dispute whether or not the League existed prior to the Peloponnesian War and i f it had, at any time, any formal constitution. M y own opinion, based upon the work o f numerous scholars, is that the League did exist prior to 432 B . C . , that it began with a series o f alliances between individual states and Sparta i n the sixth century, and that in 506 it  regional leagues were prominent and influential despite the fact that they have not, until now, been examined in detail. Relevant passages from Thucydides include the following: the Megarians leaving the Spartan alliance in 457/6 B.C. (1. 103); the Spartan symmachy and its members (2. 9. 2); the assemblies and the voting procedure for war (1. 67-87); the 'old oaths' of the allies (5. 30). Herodotus' use of the term "The Peloponnesians" was in reference to the Peloponnesian League (see Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 36-40). Wickert (38) thought that the members of the Peloponnesian League may have, prior to 480, decided in their congress how to defend against the Persians. Cawkwell, on the other hand, questioned whether Herodotus' use of the term "Peloponnesians" is synonymous with The Peloponnesian League. According to him, the term was used as a geographical division of the Hellenic League (G. Cawkwell, "Sparta and her Allies in the Sixth Century," CQ 43 [1993]: 375-376). Contrary to his thesis, the League was already formed by the time of the Persian Wars, since the speech of the Spartan delegates at Athens in 479 (Hdt. 8. 142), in which the Spartans try to dissuade the Athenians from going over to the Persian side, is delivered on behalf of the "Lakedaimonians and the allies." See also Hdt. 7. 139; 7. 157. 2; 9. 19. 1; 9. 114. 2; for examples of the use of "Peloponnesians" in reference to the League. Cf. Hdt. 7. 137. 1; 9. 73. 3 for "The Lakedaimonians and their allies." The text of the treaty has been included in the addenda to ML, p. 312. Cf. SEG xxvi 461; xxviii. 408; xxxii. 398. The restoration was first completed by W. Peek, "Ein neuer Spartanischer Staatsvertrag," AbhSdchsAkad, Phil. HistKl 65.3 (1974): 3-15. See also,.F. Gschnitzer, Ein neuer spartanischer Staatsvertrag (Verlag Anton Hain: Meisenheim am Glan, 1978). The restoration of these lines was accepted by P. Cartledge, "A new fifth century Spartan treaty," LCM 1 (1976): 87-92; and by D.H. Kelly, "The new Spartan Treaty," LCM 3 (1976): 133-141. The date of this treaty is questionable. The proposed dates range from c. 500-475 (Peek and Gschnitzer), to 388 (Cartledge and Kelly). The editors of GHI accept a date no earlier than 426 when the first known diplomatic activities between the Aitolians and Spartans took place (Thuc. 3. 100). Kelly's argument for a date in the fourth century, in 388, after Agesilaos'firstAkarnanian expedition (Xen. Hell. 4. 6. 14) but before the King's peace in 387/6 may be correct. 2  3  3  developed a common allied assembly.  There was a constitution which, although rudimentary  at the outset, progressed to include some rules that were developed on an ad hoc basis.  5  Whether these rules were strictly adhered to or enforced often depended upon, as Kagan noted, the political and military realities at the time.  6  The name o f the Peloponnesian League was formally "The Lakedaimonians and their allies." D u r i n g the first half o f the sixth century, Sparta formed a series o f alliances with 7  dozens of poleis and by 540, it involved the entire Peloponnesos, with the exception of Argos and A k h a i a .  8  The  agreements were o f an indefinite  duration  and  secession  was  not  All dates are B.C. The origin, nature, and mechanics of the League have been discussed by many prominent scholars. The most thorough discussion of the origin and history of the League is that of Wickert. J. Larsen provided the first discussion for an established League in 506 and its basic constitution, "Sparta and the Ionian Revolt: A study of Spartan foreign policy and the Genesis of the Peloponnesian League," CP 27 (1932): 136-150; "The Constitution of The Peloponnesian League," CP 18 (1933): 256-276; The Constitution of The Peloponnesian League II," CP 19 (1934): 1-19. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix has provided an extremely detailed account of the League's nature and mechanics (de Ste. Croix, Origins, 101-123). Cawkwell's more recent article presents the view that no League existed prior to the First Peloponnesian War, op. cit. n. 1. D. Kagan has also provided an excellent account of the League's nature, his points are considered below (Kagan, Outbreak, 9-30). Other important works include: G. Busolt, Die Lakedaemonief und Ihre Bundesgenossen (Leipzig: Teubner, 1878); U. Kahrstedt, Griechisches Staatsrecht I: Sparta und seine Symmachie (Gottingen: Vanderhoeck and Ruprech, 1922); Hans Schaefer, Staatsform und Politik: Untersuchungen zur griechischen Geschichte des sechsten und filnften Jahrhunderts (Leipzig, Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung,1932), 63ff.; L.I. Highby "The Erythrae Decree," Klio 36 (1936): 59-102; G.L. Huxley, Early Sparta (London: Faber and Faber, 1962), 65ff.; A.H.M. Jones, Sparta (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), 44-47; W.G. Forrest, A History of Sparta (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1968), 76ff; Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 29-31; J. Rhodes, "Demes, Cities and Leagues," in M.H. Hansen, ed., The Ancient Greek City-State (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1993), 166; J.E. Lendon, "Thucydides and the 'Constitution' of the Peloponnesian League," GRBS 35, n.2 (1994): 159-177; Nielsen, "Dependent Poleis," 63-105; P. Cartledge, "The Origins and Organization of the Peloponnesian League," (henceforth "Origins") reprinted from Agesilaos (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1987) in Whitby, M., (ed.) Sparta, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 223-229; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 126ff.; The Spartans (Woodstock, NY: Regina Books, 2003), 84-85. Kagan, Outbreak, 21. Ste. Croix disagreed (de Ste. Croix, Origins, 101-102), citing Thuc. 5.30.1 as proof that some rules must have existed. Cf. HCT IV, 25-26. Consequently, Kagan softened his stance: "I would merely emphasize that the rules were few and the occasions when they were ignored or overridden many" (Kagan, Peace, 41, n.21). Lendon, "Constitution," defended Kagan's view and argued that there was no constitution despite the references to allied assemblies and oaths. Instead, according to him, the Spartans often needed to gauge allied support for a campaign or persuade them to vote along the same lines as Sparta, and any agreements were made before a campaign or war and were not part of a constitution ("Constitution," 171-173). See Thuc. 1. 115. 1; 5. 18. 5. At Thuc. 2. 9. 3 the coalition is called a symmachy; auxri |_IEV AaKe8aip.ovicov f,uuuaxia. Hdt.l. 68. See also, de Ste. Croix, Origins, 96-96; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia 139; Forrest, Sparta, 74; Kagan, Outbreak, 11. 4  5  6  7  8  4  permitted. Since the alliances were between Sparta and each individual polis, no direct 9  obligations existed amongst the numerous allies. Sparta agreed to defend each ally with " a l l its strength i n accordance with its ability," and i f Sparta were attacked, the same was expected from the a l l y .  1 0  The relationship was, in this respect, reciprocal.  11  Despite Herodotus' statement that c. 550 the majority o f the Peloponnesos was "already subjected" to the Spartans, an alliance with Sparta did not mean a complete loss o f autonomy.  12  In theory, each ally was able to pursue its own domestic policy, choose its own  political constitution and government, form its own laws, and dispense justice without Spartan interference.  13  In fact, there is good reason to believe that i n the sixth century, a  clause protecting the autonomy o f city-states was included in the terms o f these alliances.  14  de Ste. Croix, Origins, 107. Cf. Larsen, "Constitution I," 265-276. The treaty between Sparta and the Aitolians (see Cartledge, Gschnitzer, and Kelly, op. cit. n.2), includes this typical clause offifth-centuryalliances, "rravxi OOVEVI K C U T O BuvaTov. Similar forms are found in the Spartan-Athenian alliance of 421 and the hundred year treaty between Mantinea, Elis, Argos and Athens; du S U V C O V T C U i o x u p o T d T c p ' K a x c t T O S U V C T T O V (Thuc. 5. 47. 2). See Thuc. 1.44.1. Cf. de Ste. Croix, Origins, 112-3; Cartledge, "Origins," 225. For the obligations of these sort of treaties, see T. Pistorius, Hegemoniestreben und Autonomiesicherung in der griecheschen Vertragspolitik klassicher und hellenistischer Zeit (Frankfurt, 1985), 87-93; 120-5. Hdt. 1. 68; f|or] 5e 091 KCU fj TroAAf] T f j s TTEAoTrovvfjoou rjv K c c T E O T p a u u E v r i . The use of KCX T E O T p a Li LIE vr| is too harsh and is not appropriate to the situation at this time. Cawkwell is correct that the allies, "could only be termed 'subject' by the stretch o f thefifth-centuryimagination," "Sparta and her Allies," 373; cf. G. Crane, Thucydides and Ancient Simplicity, (Berkeley, 1998), 77. Membership in a symmachy was not in itself the limiting factor on autonomy. See P.J.Rhodes, "Demes, Cities and Leagues," in M.H. Hansen, ed., The Ancient Greek City-State (Copenhagen, 1993), 166-7; Nielsen, "Dependent Poleis," 77-78. de Ste. Croix, Origins, 98-9. For a discussion of autonomia see M.H. Hansen, "The Autonomous City-State: Ancient Fact or Modern Fiction?" CPCPapers 2 (1995): 21-43. R. Sealey, Demosthenes and His Time, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); 242-4, notes that almost always context determines the meaning of autonomia. According to him, it is often contrasted with another condition, is always the more preferable choice, and is best translated as "self direction." According to Bosworth, autonomy was strictly, "the capacity to enact and implement one's own laws, (A.B. Bosworth, "Autonomia: the Use and Abuse of Political Terminology," Stud. Ital 10(1992): 123). Cawkwell, "Sparta and her Allies," 373. The Spartan-Argive treaty of 421 includes  9  10  11  12  13  14  Tag  8E TroAias  T a g EV  rfEAoTrovvdocp',  KCU  niKpds  KCU  UEydAas, auTovoncos  (Thuc. 5. 77. 5). Thefinalterms have: ' K a T T d S E  rJnEv  -rrdaag  T0T5 A a K E S a i n o v i o i s K C U ' A p y E i o i g oTTOvSdg KCU £up.uaxt'o:v r j p E V T r e v T r i K o v T a ETTI, ETTI T0T5 '10015 KCU 6|_ioiois SiKag K a n a T r d T p i a - T C U 8E dAAai TT6AIE$ T O U E V TTEAoTrovvdacp K O L V Q V E O V T C O T Q U oTrovSav TrdTpia  K a n a  ESO^E  SISOVTOLS  5  Herodotus' observation is more pertinent to the end o f the century when, indeed, allied freedom was becoming "subjected".to Spartan p o l i c y .  15  More pervasive than any infringement on autonomy was the requirement that allies swear "to have the same friends and enemies and follow the Spartans whithersoever they might l e a d . "  16  A consequence o f this military practicality was the limitation o f the allies'  freedom to follow an independent foreign policy {eleutheria)} This became apparent when, 1  in 506, Kleomenes, the Spartan king, gathered an army "from the entire Peloponnesos"  Ken T S S ^unuaxicts a u x o v o L i o i K C U O U T O T T O A I E S , x d y auTcov E X O V T E S , K c t T T a T r d T p i a (5. 79. 1). Nevertheless, there is some validity to the notion t h a t allied freedom w a s limited by Sparta i n t h e sixth century, and certainly i n the last half of the fifth century and during Sparta's supremacy (404 to 369). Although i n theory the states w e r e autonomous, as t h e alliances progressed it became apparent t h a t Sparta did interfere i n the internal affairs of its allies. Sparta w a s careful to preserve the original oligarchies, or at least t h e pro-Spartan governments, of its allies. Although this interference w a s a limitation a n d infringement upon autonomy, it was also part of the moral agreement between aristocratic governments to help o n e ' s friends a n d harm o n e ' s enemies. See Cartledge, "Origins," 224. There w e r e e v e n Spartan sympathizers living i n other states a n d Sparta w a s most likely careful to ensure the safety of these laconizers. See T. Braun, " X P H 2 T O Y Z TTOIEIN," CQ  44 (1994): 44-45. Cartledge writes t h a t i n t h e alliances with Sparta, Sparta eventually infringed upon the freedom a n d autonomy of a polis because it n e e d e d to be sure that an ally would comply with its wishes (Spartan Reflections [London: Duckworth, 2001], 370. These w e r e the terms presented t o Athens after it had b e e n defeated a n d forced t o terms by Sparta i n 404: T O V auTov EX0p6v K C U 91'Aov V O U I ^ O V T O S AaKE5ai|_iovioi$ ETTECJOCU K C U K O T O y f j v K C U K a r a S d A a T T a v 1 5  1 6  OTTOI d v r i y c o v T a i  (Xen. Hell 2. 2. 20). The Spartans did not swear to these same terms, and  in  this way the  relationship w a s not reciprocal. According to Herodotus, Kleomenes swore i n the Arcadians (c. 492) with the following terms; &AAou$  TE  6pKous  091 rj [lkv E^EoSai  Trpoodycov  C K p E a s O U T G O xfj d v E £ r i y E r ) T o u  (Hdt.  6.71). The terminology is s o similar to t h e formula found i n Xenophon that it w a s most likely current i n t h e late sixth century (de Ste. Croix, Origins, 110). terminology  w a s  not reserved  f o r  The Spartan-Aitolian treaty, see note 3, confirms t h a t - s u c h  those who had  b e e n  restored following:!.. 3"4]vp.ovos  UOV[T.  1-2.  /7ETTO][[U]EVOS  ydv]|![K]ai Ka8dAa9av T [ 6 V auTov]|9i'Aov [KCU  conquered  in w a r .  Lines four through t  to 776-rrui Ka  KCU T O W  OUT[6V  EXOVTES  rjoov  have  h  A O [ K E 8 O I U 6 V I ] I [ O ] I ^ a y i o v x a i KCU  Ex8p6v]I  t e n  b e e n  e  KO[TO  Trep  AaKEMSainovioi.  'Cooperative measures w e r e needed i n times of war, a n d for practical reasons certain rules w e r e developed (Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 26-33). It seems likely that the most powerful military state, Sparta, would either assume or be given the leading position. In the fourth century, this requirement became a burden o n the allies because Sparta used it to promote its supremacy. In 389 B.C., the Akhaians i n Calydon w e r e besieged by t h e Arkadians a n d i n response sent ambassadors to Sparta. They began their speech with the following: 'HLIETS M E V y d p , I < p a a a v , u | i i v , c o av8pES, OTTGOS d v OHETS T r a p a y y £ A A r | T E o u o T p a T E u o n E 9 a KCU ETTOUE 6a  OTTOI d  v  riyfjoOE (Xen. Hell. 4. 6. 2). During the peace conference of 371 B.C., Autokles accused the  Spartans of interfering with a n d not allowing for autonomia a n d noted the formula of allied oaths to Sparta: U E V y d p Trpos T & S ounuaxiSas T T O A E I J T O U T O T r p c o T o v , O K O A O U O E T V OTTOI d v UHETS riyfja8E.  OUVTIOEOSE  (Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 7). Finaly, before t h e invasion o f Laconia i n 369, Lykomedes spoke to the Arcadians a n d said: ETV  ocbv oco9povDTE  VE015 U K O A O U 6 O C O V T E S  T O C O U K O A O U S E C X V O T T O I U V T15 E'KEEVOUS  TrapaKaAS  9EEOEO0E-  fjs  TrpcpTEpcpv TE  AOKEBOIHO  ricb^cbaaTE, (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 24). See also Bosworth, "Autonomia," 125ff.  6  without disclosing the purpose o f the campaign to the allies.  18  The Korinthians came to the  conclusion that the purpose o f the campaign was not "just," and consequently refused to follow Kleomenes any further. After the withdrawal o f the Korinthians, the other allies also 19  returned home and the expedition never reached Athens.  20  The following year, the Spartans  decided to plan another Athenian campaign but instead o f first levying troops from the allies, they invited delegates to Sparta for a conference. According to Herodotus, the Spartans 21  sought a "common decision" (KOIVO$ A o y o c ) in order to launch a "common campaign" (KOIVOC O T O A O S ) . The input from the allies had a profound effect on the Spartan plan in that 22  the campaign never happened. 23  What began as a loose association o f allies was now a bicameral system.  I f Sparta  wanted allied support for any external wars, it would now have to consult the allies in advance. The most appropriate and efficient way to do this was to provide a common assembly where the allies could discuss and vote on Spartan proposals. 1 8  1 9  d  24  The League  Hdt. 5.74. KopsvGioi [ikv  TrplToi  i / T r a A A ' i o o o v T o (Hdt.  09601  5. 75.  a c o T o q o i 8COVTES  Acpyov " 5  o c b TTOIOCCEV T T S E K C U O : H E T E P ' I A A O V T C O T E K a  1).  The actions of the Korinthians and other Peloponnesians show their independence from Sparta but this freedom was consequently limited when the allies agreed to the join in an alliance with Sparta and to the terms of the Peloponnesian League. Despite the fact that the Korinthian envoys knew in advance about the plan to install Hippias (Hdt. 5. 92), it is uncertain whether the delegates were mandated. See also, A . Missiou-Ladi, "Coercive diplomacy in Greek Interstate Relations," CQ 37 (1987): 336-345. The passages from Herodotus are the following: KCU T C O V dAAcov auwadxcov dyysAous E A s y o v 0 9 1 i T r a p T t f j T c u T a 8 E - " A v S p E S a u p . p . c ( X > o u y y i v c b a K O U E V auToToi f)pTv ou T r o i r | o a a i 6 p 8 c o s . . . KOIVGO T E Aoycp' K C U K O I V C O O T O A C O ' E o a y a y o v T E S a u T o v E$ T a g 'AOvrjvas a T r o S d b n E V KCU d i T E i A o u E S o : ( 5 . 9 1 ) . 2 0  2 1  2 2  O L  ra  According to Forrest, "when we next hear of a Spartan proposal for joint action with her allies there is no question of the king leading out an expedition ignorant of its purpose. There is a meeting of delegates, a debate and in effect a vote, the first hint that the Spartan alliance had become a League," (Sparta, 87-88). According to Larsen, this allied congress was an innovation and as such was the first "regular" meeting of the assembly of the Peloponnesian League. Larsen stated that this meeting, "set an example that was followed later until finally the assembly became a recognized institution; or else the first meeting may mean that something like a definite constitution for a league was adopted . . . (143). . . symmachies follow patterns and their example favors the belief in the adoption of constitutions. . . why should one suppose that it alone failed to adopt its constitution formally at some definite time and instead believe that it just grew?"("Genesis," 136-144). 2 3  2 4  References to allied meetings where votes were taken are the following: in 440 (Thuc. 1. 40. 5, 43. 1); in 432  7  assembly provided Sparta with the means to gauge allied support for future campaigns and 25  provided the allies with the means to participate in the decision-making process. In addition to the formation of an allied congress, there arose the obligation that a majority vote of the allies be obtained to approve any Spartan proposal that involved them in an external war. Furthermore, the allies swore an oath that any passed proposal was binding upon all allies. The requirement that allies abide by a majority vote was created by the 26  Spartans in response to their concession to gain the assembly's approval for any foreign campaigns. The creation of the allied congress came first, followed closely by these 27  agreements. The Peloponnesian League officially came into existence when the assembly 28  (Thuc.l. 119-25); in 404 (Xen. Hell. 3. 5. 8). A decree of the allies (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 37) must have come from a vote. For other meetings, see Hdt. 5. 91ff; Thuc.l. 67.-72; Thuc. 3. 8-15; 4. 118. 4; 8. 8. 2; Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 2; 5. 2. 11-23; 5. 4. 60; 6.3.3-10). Cf. Lendon, "Constitution," 17Iff. The oath is found in Thuc. 5. 30; E i p r i p e v o v K u p i o v ETVCU OTI dv TO TrAfjOos TGOV f,uwjdxcov y r | 9 i ° r | T a i , f\v \xr\ TI 9ecbv f\ ripcbcov KcoAuna de Ste. Croix stated, "the oath subjecting the foreign policy of each ally to Sparta's dictation and thus depriving the ally of an essential part of its freedom (eleutheria) led to the adoption of that feature of the League constitution which I regard as the hallmark of League membership in the fifth and fourth centuries." The moment when the allies first took the oath (see Thuc. 5. 30) was, in his opinion, the inauguration of the Peloponnesian League, c. 505 to 501 (de Ste. Croix, Origins, 109,116-119. 2 5  2 6  Lendon argues that Sparta's right to go to war and levy troops from the allies was not limited, there was not a majority vote, and the allied assembly was convened only when it was convenient for Sparta ("Constitution," 159-177). I agree with Lendon that Sparta chose whether or not to convene an assembly; in fact only Sparta could call the allied synod together (see also de Ste. Croix, Origins, 110-111). But the majority vote benefited Sparta more than the allies because it provided Sparta with a means to unify the allies before a campaign. As Lendon notes, Sparta could persuade or coerce allies into voting ("Constitution," 171-173). So, the majorityvote rule was not on most occasions a limiting factor for Sparta but a tool to solidify allied support. Second, Lendon's main argument is that there was not a majority vote rule for all members; instead the reference from Thucydides to "old oaths" (Thuc. 5. 30) refers to a pre-Peloponnesian War agreement ("Constitution," 159165). But even Kagan admits that the "old oaths" are "well before" the outbreak of the war (Kagan, Peace, 41). The proofs that Lendon cites to show that Sparta did not have to consult its allies are the campaign to install Isagoras in 507 (Hdt. 5. 74ff.) and Agis' march to the Arkadian border in 419 (Thuc. 5. 53) are not persuasive. In 507 no League assembly existed yet (see below), and in 419, Agis was marching against two revolting allies, Mantinea and Elis, and did not need to call an assembly (de Ste. Croix, Origins, 112-115). Although Lendon is correct that Sparta used the assembly for its own advantage, the evidence suggests that there were rules such as majority vote and that in theory, the majority vote was binding. In fact, the majority vote became a tool to secure the participation of the allies who were not always reliable. Perikles noted about the allies; "each strive to accomplish their own ends" (1. 141. 6). For the unreliability of the allies, see Hdt. 9. 77; Thuc. 3. 15. 2; 8. 9.  2 7  I; Xen. Hell. 2. 4. 30; 3 .2. 25. Larsen stated that the allies who "realized that at times common action would be desirable," were also those who had disagreed with Spartan policy at that time because Kleomenes was acting inappropriately. These were the allies who were the major influences on the development of the League. Larsen attributed this initiative to 2 8  8  was formed and the oaths were taken. The inception o f the League began when the allies refused to follow Kleomenes c. 506 and the League itself proceeded to take shape in the years that followed so that by the end o f the century, there was an assembly o f allies with a 29  rudimentary voting and decision-making procedure. The League congress provided the allies with protection against being committed to an external war that was decided for them solely by the Spartan authorities. O n the other hand, Sparta provided the allies with a level o f involvement adequate to secure their 30  willingness to follow and acknowledge Sparta as the hegemon (leader) o f the League.  The  allied synod (assembly) was egalitarian in that each ally, regardless o f the size o f the polis, had one v o t e .  31  The allies were involved in the decision-making process, but Sparta's  influence still outweighed that o f the allies; only Sparta could call a League assembly, it was usually held in Sparta, and a Spartan presided over the assembly. Once a proposal was the Korinthians. The failed attempt to place Hippias back in Athens was the second setback for Kleomenes. A third setback followed when the allies refused to follow Sparta in the assembly meeting, "it was clear that a power that had been so humiliated could not count on a general support of the Peloponnesos for a venturesome foreign policy." In order to gain support in the future, Sparta would need allied consent (Larsen, "Genesis," 146-148). Cf. Cartledge, "Origins," 226. See also Ehrenberg who stressed that in these types of alliances, a duality between the allies and the hegemon was a fundamental feature and this duality "rested on oaths and on treaties concluded by the leading state with each of the allies," The Greek State, 112. Larsen was the first to propose that in 506, with the formation of the congress, the League came into existence. De. Ste Croix agreed with Larsen, but emphasized that it was a process that happened over the years 505 to 501. According to him, the reason for this was that the true origin of the League was not the formation of the assembly, but the oath (found in Thuc. 5.30) that resulted from the allied congress. Those who agree with this view are: Andrewes, HCT IV, 26; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 139; Jones, 44-47; Highby "The Erythrae Decree," 59-102; Huxley, Early Sparta, 65ff. and most recently J. Rhodes, "Demes, Cities and Leagues," 166. For a completely different view, see Hans Schaefer, Staatsform und Politik: 63ff; and more recently Cawkwell "Sparta and her Allies," 364-376. Both Cawkwell and Schaefer deny the existence of a League in the sixth century. Cawkwell, for example, placed the inauguration in the First Peloponnesian War, between the land battle between the Epidaurians and Korinthians (Thuc. 1. 105. 1) and the sea battle between the ships of the Athenians and the Peloponnesians (Thuc. 1. 105). As shown above in note 1, the League was in existence by 480, and both Schaefer and Cawkwell are incorrect to believe that the League was a product of the period after the Persian invasions. See Highby for a detailed rejection of Schaefer's arguments (op.cit. supra). 2 9  According to Rhodes, the Peloponnesian League was one of the first examples of a specific type of alliance; an hegemonic symmachy. He also noted that the hegemon maintained its position and control over other communities in a manner that was accepted by the dependents (Rhodes, "Demes, Cities and Leagues," 166167). Thuc. 1. 141. 1; Cf. de Ste. Croix, Origins, 116; Cartledge, "Origins," 226. 3 0  31  9  approved by the League assembly, Sparta levied troops from the allies and assumed the 32  supreme command o f all forces. In these matters, Sparta possessed executive power. Despite the dominant position o f Sparta in the League, the allied assembly was able to refuse Spartan proposals that would involve the League in a foreign war. O n the other hand, i f the allies were in favor o f a foreign campaign, the assembly could assist in convincing Sparta to decide to go to war. For example, in 376/5 the allies addressed the conflict against Athens that began in 378 and convinced the Spartans to man sixty triremes under the command o f P o l l i s .  33  Similarly, the majority decision o f the allied assembly was  needed before the League could conclude a peace treaty.  34  Although the majority decision was binding upon all allies, there was an exception that allowed an ally to remain exempt from the consequences o f League decisions. If, "some impediment to the gods or heroes," was applicable to either the terms o f a peace or a situation of war, then an ally was freed from any obligation that was required by its membership.  35  Aside from this, there was no legal justification for abstaining from a League enterprise. This was also true regarding secession; no ally was allowed to leave the League or act against i t .  36  If an ally acted contrary to the League (for example, by allying with the enemy), it was considered an insurgent city and Sparta could, without having to call an assembly,  3 2  de Ste. Croix, Origins, 109-112.  33  Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 60.  The peace of 446/5, for example, was made by the "Lakedaimonians and their allies." Cf. Cartledge, "Origins," 227; de Ste. Croix, Origins, 115. Lendon shows that Sparta alone was recognized as having the right to make peace on behalf of the League ("Constitution," 168-169, n.23). In 421, the Korinthians applied this exemption-clause (Thuc. 5. 30. 1). Agreeing to the terms of the Peace of Nikias would have forced them to break their existing treaties with allies in Thrakia, which would have created a conflict with "the gods." Since oaths and treaties were religious in nature, it is safe to conclude that this was taken seriously as a legitimate reason to abstain from League obligations, de Ste. Croix noted that there were different contexts in which this oath could be used: an oracle from Delphi, an unfavorable sacrifice, a bad omen, a festival or sacred truce, or a reason accepted by a majority (de Ste. Croix, Origins, 118-121). 3 4  3 5  3 6  Larsen, "Constitution I, " 268-270; de Ste. Croix, Origins, 114-115.  10  muster a League army and use force to coerce the ally back into the League.  In reality, the  relative powers o f the dissenting member and Sparta, as well as changes in circumstances, were taken into consideration before Sparta chose to act. For example, Sparta was in no position to force Elis back into the League in 421, but in 400, after its victory in the 38  Peloponnesian War, was free to launch an invasion and, "bring the Eleans to their senses." The same situation applied i f an ally failed to uphold its oath and any obligations required by the alliance. In these instances, the Spartans made the decision themselves whether or not to go to war with a delinquent ally with the use o f a League army. The allied assembly was not convened. While the relationship between the allies and Sparta concerning foreign wars was bicameral (there were two assemblies that decided whether or not to go to war, the allied synod and the Spartan assembly), it was not the case regarding internal conflicts. For the most part, the Spartans led and the allies followed. A n alliance with Sparta also required that each ally provide aid to Sparta in the case of a Helot revolt. This was either stipulated separately in the terms o f a treaty, as was the case with the Spartan-Athenian alliance in 421, or it was assumed under the "having-the-same-  de Ste. Croix, Origins, 112-115; Larsen, "Constitution I," 268-270; Kagan, Outbreak, 15; Cawkwell, "Sparta and her allies," 366. Cf. Xen. Hell. 2. 4. 30; 3. 5. 5-7; 4. 6. 1-3. In 400, Sparta did not call an assembly to deal with Elis, Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 21-25; The Phliasians and Mantineans were also dealt with in a similar manner in the 380s, Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 1-11. The Boiotians, on the other hand, were not treated as harshly in 420, Thuc. 5. 39. For more on Sparta's leniency toward some allies, see Cartledge, Agesilaos, 274-313; 242-73. Sparta did concede at times to some allies. For example, in 432 Korinth threatened to enter another alliance if Sparta did not decide to go to war against Athens, Thuc. 1.71.45. A similar threat was made by the Akhaians in 389, Xen. Hell.4.6.2. 3 7  3 8  11  friends-and-enemies" clause.  This concurs with the basic principle set forth by Thucydides  that "most Spartan institutions have always been designed with a view to security against the Helots."  40  of power  The League was used by Sparta to preserve this important and vulnerable source  4 1  The Spartan alliance with Athens in 421 specifically required Athenian assistance in the case of a Helot  3 9  revolt;fiv  S E T\ S O U A E I O  E T r a v i c r r f i T a i ETTIKOUPETV  'A8r|vaious AaKESaipoviois  T T O V T I O9EVEI K O T O : T O  5 u v a T O V . (Thuc. 5. 23. 3). Cf. Thuc. 4. 118. 7. Lines fourteen to sixteen of the Spartan-Aitolian alliance have been restored by W. Peek: 9EuyovTa$ p i OEKE0oJ[]/*av  KEKOIVQVEK[6TCC5 d 8 i K ] [ n a T o v .  Cartledge agreed with  this restoration and with the identity of the "exiles who have participated in illegalities" as Helots who had escaped from Laconia or Messenia, or more likely, those who had been settled at Naupaktos. Cf. Thuc. 1. 103. 3; ML 74. In Thucydides' statement, also y a p i a TroAAd AaKEoaiiaoviois Trpos Tfis 9uAaKfJs  TOUS  EiAcoTas  uaAiOTa Ka8EiaTf|K£i (Thuc. 4. 80. 3), "Taking precautions" could include requirements  TTEpi  in treaties for allies to aid Sparta if the Helots revolted. In the terms of the Tegean-Spartan treaty of c. 550, the Tegeans were required to expel all Messenians: MEOOEvious Xpn  O T  °us  (3or|8Eia5  TTOIETV. E ^ r i y o u p E v o j X ° P  I  V  T  O  L  S  ouv 6  AaKcovi^ouoi  'APIOTOTEAUS  TCOV  EK(3O:AETV EK  TOUTO  TEysaTcov (Rose,  Quaest.Graec.5 = Mor. 292b). Jacoby interpreted  xprpTOUS  Tfis  X " P  q>r\ai SuvaoBai Aristoteles,  A  S  KCU  T O \XT\  Nr.  592  nn.  E^Eivai  aTroicnvvuvai  apud  Plutarch  ("useful") to mean "citizen," and this view has  been accepted by some scholars, cf. Forrest, Sparta, p.79; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 138. F. Jacoby,  " X P H I T O Y I " TTOIEIN," CQ 38  (1944): 15-16; Cf. V . Ehrenberg, "An Early Source of Polis-constitution,"  CQ 37 (1943): 16. For a different translation and interpretation, see Thomas Braun, " X P H I T O Y I " TTOIEIN," CQ 44 (1994): 41. Although the date of this treaty is disputed, the sixth century, c. 550, is the most plausible. Cawkwell argues for a later date, "Sparta and her Allies," 369-370. The traditional view is that the policy of the Spartans, in the sixth as well as the fifth centuries, was dominated by its preoccupation with the Messenians, "Spartan policy throughout the sixth century was dominated by the fear of a Messenian or Helot revolt being instigated by one or more of her neighbors," (Cartledge, Agesilaos, 13). See also, Cartledge, Spartan Reflections, 36-37. According to him, this view requires a sixth-century date for the Spartan-Tegean treaty. On the other hand, Cawkwell has argued that the treaty is a fifth-century document, and feels that there is no other sufficient evidence to prove that in the sixth century Sparta was preoccupied with the fear of a Helot revolt in Messenia. In fact, he points out that, on two separate occasions, Sparta was either ready to send or had sent a considerable army from Lakonia without fear of Helot revolt. See Hdt. 1.83; 3.56.1. Cawkwell believes that after the Second Messenian War the Helots remained quiescent and were not a problem or concern ("Sparta and her allies," 369). Cawkwell is erroneous in thinking that the Helots were "quiescent" in the sixth century. Prior to 490, there is evidence that there had been considerable encounters between Helots and Spartiates, and that the Spartans did realize the potential threat. In his study of the Helot system, Ducat interpreted Herodotus as having portrayed an open state of war between Sparta and the Messenians before 465. J. Ducat, "Les Hi\otes,"Bulletin de Correspondance Hellenique Supplement X X [Paris: Boccard, 1990], 141-3). In 470, the Spartan king Pausanias was accused of collaborating with the Helots, and it seems probable that there were other Helot troubles prior to this, (cf. Thuc. 1.123). In his speech to the Spartans in 499, Aristagoras mentioned the fact that the Spartans were at war with Messenia, "But here you are fighting for land that is neither large nor fertile but of small bounds. Ought you to risk such a fight? It is against the Messenians, who are as good men as you" (Hdt. 5.49). Cf. Wallace, "Kleomenes, Marathon, the Helots, and Arkadia." JHS 74 (1954): 32-35. Wallace believes that Kleomenes' intrigues in Arkadia involved a Helot revolt in addition to an Arkadian insurrection. 4 0  41  Thuc. 4. 80. 3.  C f . Cartledge, "Origins," 229; Agesilaos, 160-79; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, chapter 10.  12  In return for its allegiance, a member o f the League could expect that i f it were attacked by a non-member, Sparta would, without having to call an assembly (which took time), raise a League army and come to its defense. Unlike the members o f the Delian League, allies were not forced to pay a yearly tribute to Sparta. Instead, once a war was 42  decided, allies were required to respond to the Spartan levy by providing their proper contingent to the League force, as well as the proper supplies needed to support troops on a campaign.  4 3  Later, due to the decimating effect that prolonged years o f war had on  populations, this system was altered so that allies could provide money to support mercenary troops.  44  When the League was not at war, the allies were freed from any o f these  obligations. The League itself did not interfere in the autonomy o f the members (though, as shown above, Sparta d i d ) .  45  When the League was at peace, allies were permitted to pursue their  own external wars and foreign policy, but Sparta was not required to support them in these endeavors.  46  For example, during the armistice o f 423/2, Tegea and Mantinea fought against  one another in southern Arkadia, each with its own set o f allies. nor had it been asked by either party to send military support  47  48  Sparta did not involve itself I f an ally was attacked as a  See W.T. Loomis, The Spartan War Fund: IG V.I.I, and a New Fragment, Historia Ein. 14 (1992): 81-83. An ally was required to provide two-thirds of its total army with supplies (Thuc. 2. 10). Later this was revised, Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 20. See Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 37 for evidence that the allies were required "in accordance with oaths" to supply troops. Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 20. Hamilton noted that from the time of the League's inception there were two major principles: "cooperation of interest in foreign policy under Spartan leadership, and preference for oligarchic constitutions within individual states," (Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 29-30). Sparta interfered at times to ensure that governments acted according to Spartan interest. See G.E.M. de Ste. Croix "The Character of the Athenian Empire," Historia 3 (1954): 20, n.5 for situations where Sparta replaced a government with oligarchies. See also, Thuc 1. 19, 144. 2; 4. 126. 2; 5. 31. 6; Powell, Athens and Sparta, 101-2; Cartledge, "Origins," 224. According to de Ste. Croix, an ally could not call upon other members to come to its defense, de Ste. Croix, Origins, 114. Thuc. 4. 134. Thuc. 4. 134. Kleitor and Orchomenos also were fighting when Agesilaos called out the ban in 378. They were ordered to cease all fighting and hand over their troops until his campaign was over (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 36-  4 2  4 3  4 4 4 5  4 6  4 7  4 8  13  consequence o f its actions outside o f the League, Sparta was not obligated to defend the member.  49  In addition to pursuing their own policy during times o f League quiescence, allies did quarrel amongst themselves. In the case o f an inter-allied dispute, there is no evidence that Sparta had to be appointed as arbitrator.  50  Soon after the establishment o f the allied congress, there arose a distinction among the allies. There were those who belonged to an inner circle o f allies, who were invited by Sparta to vote in the allied assembly and who were bound by League rules and decisions. These states were the official members o f the League. The other allies were those who had 51  bilateral alliances with Sparta and were not members. Together they made up the larger organization, the Spartan A l l i a n c e .  52  But even amongst official members o f the League, there  were differences between the allies based on their relative strength and proximity to Sparta. For example, Korinth was able to maintain more independence from Sparta than the states o f Tegea or Phlious as a result o f its strength and influence, and also because o f its maritime  38). After this, a League rule was adopted to ensure that whenever a League force was in the field, no allies were warring. Elis, for example, had involved itself in the first Korinthian campaign against the Kerkyraians, and in return was attacked by the Kerkyraians and its harbor, Kyllene, was burned (Thuc.l. 27. 2; 1. 30. 2). Sparta was not involved even though Elis was an allied member of the League. The phrase "Korinthians and the allies," (Thuc.l. 105. 3) does not include the Spartans (cf. Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 62), and the Korinthians were often seen acting independently from the League. Sparta did not give aid to Korinth in any of these instances. See also Thuc. 2. 83. 2; 3. 114. 4. An ally could not count on Spartan support unless it was attacked, and judged the victim, not the aggressor. de Ste. Croix, Origins, 122. It is not clear what the prerequisites were to be included in this "inner circle." Power and importance, most likely, were the deciding factors. de Ste. Croix, Origins, 101-104. This sort of system was more apparent in the Second Athenian Sea League where there were definite members, such as Thebes, who was distinguished from the bilateral allies, such as Jason of Pherae, whose alliance with Athens was very short-lived. See J. Cargill, The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981): 83-96. De Ste Croix's approach is related to an earlier one advanced by G. Busolt and H. Swoboda in Griechische Staatskunde II (1926), 1330, who stated that any state that had concluded a treaty with. Sparta was automatically an ally and part of "die lockere Organisation." This "looser organization" was partly based on treaties between Sparta and each state, but also governed by "gemeinsamen," decrees made in common. Together, the decrees and the treaties made a League constitution, or what Busolt-Swoboda called, the "Bundesrecht." In addition, only those poleis that 4 9  50 51  52  14  connections. Although the League had established rules and an egalitarian voting system, geography and individual allied strength were more influential in dictating how the League operated and how Sparta treated the different allied members.  53  Korinth, for example, had the  largest system o f maritime connections among Peloponnesian League members and it must have had more leverage among allied members because o f this naval preeminence.  54  League memberships were based on the pre-League, sixth century alliances.  55  The  first alliance was with E l i s around 600, shortly after the final capitulation o f the Messenians. B y allying with E l i s , or more precisely with the Elean aristocracy, Sparta gained influence at O l y m p i a and a friend in the W e s t .  56  Afterward, Sparta suffered a few defeats at the hands o f  the Arkadians, until it ended hostilities and formed an alliance with the major, southern Arkadian power, the Tegeans, around 5 5 0 .  5 7  Other Arkadians became allied to Sparta  contributed to discussions and operations were part of the League. D. Kagan agreed with the view previously put forth by Kahrstedt in Griechisches Staatsrecht I (1922), 81-82, that the League was a set of separate alliances with the same city, Sparta. But he stressed the need to abandon the search for constitutional law. Kagan believed it was not according to legal structure that Sparta carried out its function as hegemon of the league, rather, "the truth is that Sparta interpreted her inevitably conflicting responsibilities in accordance with her needs and interest" (Kagan, Outbreak, 19). It was political and military realities, therefore, that were the decisive factors in the affairs of the League, not federal regulations. Thus, poleis were not all treated the same by Sparta or by the League, and the League consisted of three distinct classes of so-called members; those small and relatively weak poleis close to Sparta and easily disciplined (such as Tegea, Phlious, and Orchomenos), those states who were either strong or remote enough to have some clout but not enough to escape immediate punishment (such as Mantinea, Elis and Megara), and finally those who were strong enough to maintain a certain independence in respect to foreign policy (such as Korinth ). Kagan, Outbreak, 15-22. Cf. Cawkwell, "Sparta and her allies," for a similar view of the League in the sixth and early fifth century. See also, Lendon, "Constitution," 59-77, who defends Kagan's view. 5 3  Korinth's allies included, Kerkyra, Sicily, Epidamnus, Anaktorion, and Potidaia. Most of Korinth's connections were in the West, and it traded with Italy, Africa, and Sicily. Korinth was by far the greatest maritime power among the Peloponnesian League allies. For more on Korinth's maritime connectiosn, see J. B. Salmon, Wealthy Corinth : a history of the city to 338 BC. (Oxford : Clarendon Press 1984), 27-280; 390-396; 95ff. Larsen stated, ". .'.when the League was organized, the old treaties connecting individual cities merely with Sparta were replaced by treaties embodying the constitutional law of the League." Larsen, "Constitution I," 260. For the reception of new members, see de Ste. Croix, Origins, 340-1. Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 15. Wickert was right to point out that Elis had been making treaties with other communities in the sixth century, cf. IvO 9 (the Elean-Heraian Treaty, also ML 17). The treaty is traditionally believed to be between the Heraians of Arkadia and Elis, but a more recent interpretation has shown that the treaty may be between Elis and an unknown Elean community (J. Roy and D. Schofield, "IvO 9: A New Approach," Horos 13 [1999]: 155-165). The sixth century treaty with Tegea, c. 550, (apud Plut.Mor. 292b) proves that Spartan influence in the 5 4  55  5 6  5 7  15  following Tegea.  The Arkadian poleis were important allies to Sparta not only because o f  their geographic location along the the main route north out o f Lakonia, but also because they shared a border with Argos, Sparta's chief rival in the Peloponnesos. In 545, the Spartans defeated the Argives i n the region o f the Thyreatis, and the area was incorporated into Spartan territory.  59  W i t h Argos defeated and a majority o f the  Peloponnesos subdued, Sparta concluded alliances with Korinth i n 525/4 and Megara, probably by 5 1 9 .  60  Other northern Peloponnesians may have also become Spartan allies  during the sixth century.  61  In addition, the island o f Aegina was by 491 allied to Sparta via  the aristocratic oligarchy that ruled the island. In 494 Sparta again defeated its old rival in 62  the Peloponnesos, Argos. The Peloponnesos and its gateway, the Isthmus, were now secured.  63  Around 481, with the threat o f a pending Persian invasion, the Peloponnesian League was replaced by the need for a united, defensive front from all Greek states. Sparta was chosen as the commander o f operations, but as the nature o f the war effort shifted from defensive to offensive, Sparta's strong position became threatened by a new power, Athens.  southern Peloponnesos was made possible by diplomacy and that alliances were made between Sparta and other Peloponnesians during the sixth century. For a sixth-century date, see Highby, "The Erythrae Decree," 73; Forrest, Sparta, 76. For afifth-centurydate, Schaefer, p.203; G. Cawkwell, " Sparta and her Allies," 43 (1993): 364-376; Braun dates it to the end of the Second Messenian War, when Messenian exiles were still frequent (Braun, "XPH2TOYI"," 42-43). The treaty should come on the heels of a Spartan-Tegean conflict and at a time when Sparta was concerned about fugitive Helots. The best possible date is c. 550 and is accepted here. See Forrest, Sparta, 74-78 for the dating of Chilon and his association with this treaty. Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 11-12; 29. The other Arkadians were the following; Mantinea, Orchomenos, Kleitor, Heraia, and the communities in the Parrhasia and Mainalia. Hdt. 1.82 For Korinth see Hdt.3. 48. 1; Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 15-6, J.B. Salmon, Wealthy Korinth, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 240,248-9; de Ste. Croix, Origins, 97, Forrest, Sparta, 74. Will, Korinthiaka, (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1955), 626-7. For Megara see Jones, Sparta, 49; Legon, 137-5; Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 19-20. For Sikyon and Phlious, see Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 15-19. Sikyon was likely an ally, but the evidence for Phlious is inconclusive. T.J. Figueira, "Aiginetan Membership in the Peloponnesian League," CPh 76 (1981): 1-24. Cf. Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 23-26. Hdt. 6. 74-82. Sparta was concerned with securing the northern road to the Isthmus and it sought to control or 5 8  5 9  6 0  61  6 2  6 3  16  Argos was simultaneously regaining some o f its former power.  In 446/5, the Thirty Years'  peace restored stability to Greece and the threat to Spartan power was removed.  65  This  stability would last for around fourteen years until the outbreak o f the Peloponnesian War. The events o f the Peloponnesian War and the subsequent Spartan supremacy revealed both the strengths and weaknesses o f the League. Membership in the League provided members with protection against Athenian aggression. Sparta was given, or at first assumed, the position o f hegemon complete with executive powers. This relationship between the allies and Sparta was made possible because the benefits for all parties involved outweighed the obligations. After the Peace o f Nikias in 421 the situation changed, however, and it became clear that the relationship became less useful for the allies. The threat that the League presented to their eleutheria and autonomia became more evident and as a result, between 421 and 371 various allies disputed with Sparta and attempted to remove themselves from the alliance. In 369, after the battle o f Leuktra, two o f the most important and long-standing 66  allies o f Sparta, Elis and Tegea, planned an invasion o f Lakonia, with the help o f Thebes, in order to topple the Spartan power. A s a result, Sparta's influential puissance over its allies was weakened to the point that the Peloponnesian League officially dissolved. Sparta's ability to force states to "follow withersoever it might lead," had vanished. It is against this brief outline o f the evolution and structure o f Spartan dominance in the Peloponnesos that the following study w i l l trace the relationships o f Elis, Tegea, and Mantinea with Sparta and the Peloponnesian League. In this study, I w i l l argue that these three Peloponnesian city-states were able to develop their own symmachies (leagues) that coally with those poleis that were situated on this north-south axis (Amit, Poleis, 121). 6 4 65 6 6  Thuc. 1. 107. 1. Thuc. 1. 115. 1. Elis and Mantinea, for example. See Thuc. 5. 18-47.  17  existed with the Peloponnesian League. This was possible because the rules that governed the Peloponnesian League were most often created on an ad hoc basis, and also because the initial arrangement between all three o f these city-states and Sparta was reciprocal. Hence, each city-state was not restricted by its membership in the Peloponnesian League or its alliance with Sparta from expanding and developing its own alliances and symmachies. These small leagues were able to operate independently o f the Peloponnesian League. In an examination o f each city-state's relationship with Sparta, I w i l l contend that after the inception o f the League in 506, each city-state pursued its own interests, and despite growing Spartan supremacy in the Peloponnesos, developed its own regional league. In the following investigation o f these small, regional leagues (such as the Elean symmachy), I w i l l argue that as long as the basic agreements o f the League were met and Sparta's safety at home was secured, an allied symmachy could and did exist between each o f these city-states and Sparta. This changed, however, during the latter half o f the fifth century, specifically in 420, when Sparta began the dissolution o f these symmachies by supporting the autonomy o f the dependent communities o f Tegea, Elis, and Mantinea. In the following investigation o f these city-states and their history with Sparta, I w i l l demonstrate that the growth o f these leagues and the potential threat Sparta believed they eventually posed to its security, prompted Sparta to take a much more  aggressive,  preponderant, and controlling attitude toward its allies. Consequently, Sparta felt the need to dissolve those leagues that were a threat to its safety in order to preserve its dominant position in Greece. Tension between these states and Sparta was evident by the early fifth century, but it was not until the Peloponnesian War that the demands made by Sparta on these allies caused  18  a rift between the Spartans and both the Eleans and Mantineans. E l i s and Mantinea sought support from other allies to help preserve their independence and consequently, they defected from the Peloponnesian League. Tegea, on the other hand, was not a perceivable threat to Sparta until after 371. Finally, I w i l l assert that with the additional support o f larger allies such as Argos, each city-state was temporarily able to remain independent from Sparta.  67  But when this  allied support waned and each polis was left to tend to its o w n foreign policy, Sparta was able to eliminate the threat to its security and bring the defectors back into its alliance. Eventually, Sparta emerged as the victor o f the Peloponnesian W a r and adopted an /TO  even more aggressive approach to maintaining its security and safety.  Both the Elean and  Mantinean symmachies were dismantled. Oddly, only Sparta's immediate neighbor, Tegea and its league, remained unscathed by Spartan aggression. Eventually, though, all three citystates supported the invasion o f Lakonia in 370/369 and the subsequent destruction o f Sparta's supremacy.  69  On the power of foreign allies to disrupt hegemonies, see B. Strauss, "The art of alliance and the Peloponnesian War," in Charles D. Hamilton and Peter Krenz, eds., Polis and Polemos, (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1997), 130-132. Cf. Cartledge, Spartan Reflections, 37; Bosworth, "Autonomia," 124ff. Regarding the sources, most of the supporting materials are the literary works, and those works we do have do not originate within the Elis, Tegea, or Mantinea. Because of this and the late nature of many of these sources, the history of the Peloponnesian states is difficult to ascertain. But by relying on an examination of all the sources that are extant, it is possible, I believe, to reach an informed speculation of the events that led up to the formation of the Peloponnesian League and the origin and development of the regional leagues. In addition, because of the silence of the sources for certain events and periods, it is at times difficult to discern precise relationships, whether states were friendly or hostile, or what the precise nature was of each of these regional leagues. For the events during these periods, we can only surmise what seems reasonable from an investigation of all the sources. In regard to choice of texts and translations, I have provided the Greek text where I believe that it is important for the reader to see the terminology and where it is necessary to see the correlation between the regional leagues and the other larger coalitions of ancient Greece. Where the Greek is not necessary, I have provided English translations so as to provide a quick and easy reading of the text. Finally, in a few special cases where scholars differ in their reading of the text, I have provided both the Greek and an English translation. 6 8  6 9  19  Chapter One Elis  The Development of the Elean State  Bound by A k h a i a in the north, Arkadia in the east, Messenia in the south, and the Ionian Sea in the west, the large and fertile area o f the western Peloponnesos was, in antiquity, called Eleia ('HAEIOC). The area is now known as Elis because the Eleans, those 70  who lived in the northwest on the Peneios river, came to dominate the rest o f the region. The entire territory was divided into four districts: Koile Elis ("Hollow Elis"), Akroreia, Pisatis, and Triphylia. During its greatest period o f prosperity and expansion, E l i s ' borders reached north to Akhaia, east to Psophis, and south to the Neda R i v e r .  71  The land was very fertile with large, flat plains and an abundance o f rivers and, as a result, was known for its agricultural potential and ability to support cattle. Small villages, 72  unfortified communities, and farms occupied a major portion o f the territory.  These rural  communities became connected to the major city, Elis, which served as the political, economic, and religious center for the entire region.  Cf. Strabo 8. 3. 33; Thuc. 5. 31. Cf. Swoboda, Elis, in RE 5.2 (1958): 2368-2437; Meyer, Pisa, in RE (1964): 1732-1755. See also articles in Der Kleine Pauly (Stuttgart: A, Druckenmuller, 1864-1975), 2.249-251 (Elis); 4.866-867 (Pisa); 5.962-963 (Triphylia). N. Yalouris, "The City-state of Elis," Ekistics 33 no. 194 (1972): 95-96. Eleia was estimated to be around 2660 sq. km: Koile Elis occupied 1160 sq. km., Akroreia 405 sq. km., Triphylia 540 sq. km., and Pisatis 555 sq. km. Cf. Roy, "Perioikoi," 298. Yalouris, "Elis," 96. This is supported by both Strabo and Diodorus who state that before the synoikism of Elis in 471, the people of this region lived in small poleis, villages, and demes. See Strabo 8. 3. 2 and D.S. 11. 54. 1. According to Yalouris, there were forty-nine communities mentioned by the ancient sources as belonging to the country of Elis ("Elis," 95). Polybius (4. 73) stated that in the second century, Elis was a larger territory that was more thickly inhabited by slaves and farm stock than the rest of the Peloponnesos, and that many Eleans never took part in urban affairs, such as politics and law. 7 0  71  7 2  7 3  20  M a p 1: Elis*  'From James Roy, "The Frontier between Arkadia and Elis in Classical Antiquity," in P. Flensted-Jensen, T.H. Nielsen, and L . Rubinstein, eds., Polis and Politics. (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000), 134.  21  B y the end o f the sixth century, this polis had formed alliances with these communities and was the hegemon o f an Elean symmachy.  74  75  Although the literary tradition does not date the synoikism o f E l i s until 471, evidence that suggests the site was occupied as early as the late-eleventh century.  76  there is There is  also evidence o f a large, sixth century public building and an inscription that has been dated to the first half o f the sixth century, indicating that there was some form o f a j u d i c i a l process present in the city o f E l i s .  7 7  This information leads us to believe that by the end o f the sixth 78  century, Elis may have served as a political center for the entire region. The Eleans extended their control over the rest o f the territories, either by force or by concluding alliances. Elean expansion began with the communities neighboring the city o f The Copenhagen Polis Centre has collected an inventory of Archaic and Classical poleis in an attempt to define what the ancient Greeks thought a polis was. The word polis, according to the Centre, has several meanings. The predominant meanings are "town" and "state" with "territory," and can be easily rendered as "city-state." The Lex Hafniensis de civitate was written by the director of the Centre, M.H. Hansen, to ensure that these two meanings, "town" and "state," would not describe different objects: "in Archaic and Classical sources the term polis used in the sense of 'town' to denote a named urban center is not applied to any urban center but only to a 'town' which also was the center of a polis in the sense of political community. Thus, the term polis has two different meanings: town and states; but even when it is used in the sense of town its reference, its denotation, seems almost invariably to be what the Greeks called polis in the sense of a koinonia politon politeias and what we call a city-state" (for bibliography and discussion, see the recent article by M.H. Hansen, "Was Every Polis State Centered on a Polis Town," CPCPapers 7 (2004): 131-132). The main evidence for the synoikism comes from Strabo 8. 3. 2 and D.S. 11. 54. 1. Strabo clearly states that there was no settlement on the site of Elis before the synoikism and Diodorus implies this as well. Homer (//. 11. 672) referred to a settlement there. Pausanias (5. 4. 3) reported that the synoikism of Elis occurred under the legendary king Oxylos, and although Pausanias' account may be largely based on legend more than fact, it does, as Roy notes, indicate that people believed that there were several communities which unified to become the city of Elis. For a complete and recent discussion of the synoikism of Elis, see J. Roy, "The Synoikism of Elis," CPCPapers 6 (2002): 249-264. Although Roy concludes that nothing definite can be said about the synoikism, his work shows that the city of Elis began as a group of separate communities that united and developed over a long period of time, and eventually extended its influence over the whole country. Roy, "Synoikism," 253-5; Yalouris, "Elis," PECS (1975): 299; B. Eder and V. Mitsopoloulos, "Zur Geschichte der Stadt Elis vor dem Synoikismos von 471 v. Chr." JOA 68 (1999): 1-40. Cf. C. Morgan, Athletes and Oracles, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 48-9. P. Siewert, "Inschriften und Geschichte der Stadt Elis," in V. Mitsopoulos-Leon (ed.), Forschungen in der Peloponnes. Akten des Symposions zur 100-Jahr-Feier des Osterreichischen Archaologischen Instituts Athen, Athens 5-7, March 1998 (Athens: Osterrreichisches Arhcaologisches Institut, 2001): 245-52. See also,. B. Eder and V. Mitsopoloulos, "Zur Geschichte der Stadt Elis," 1-6. See C. Morgan, Early Greek States Beyond The Polis (London: Routledge, 2003):75-6; 80-1. Cf. C. Morgan, "Politics without the Polis. Cities and the Achaean Ethnos, c. 800-500 B.C.," in R. Brock and S. Hodkinson, eds., Alternatives to Athens. Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 189-211. There is also evidence of the existence of other communities around 7 4  7 5  1 6  7 7  7 8  22  E l i s i n " H o l l o w E l i s " and then continued east to the area o f the Akroreians. Beginning in the eighth century and continuing into the sixth century, Elis extended its influence south toward the Alpheios R i v e r valley, the territory o f the Pisatans.  79  Furthermore, the two port towns o f  K y l l e n e and Pheia, were also incorporated into the Elean state, probably during the sixth century.  80  A c c o r d i n g to  R o y , both  Kyllene  and  Pheia were not perioikoi but  were  incorporated directly into the Elean state because o f their maritime importance and proximity to Koile E l i s .  81  E l i s also founded three colonies i n Epirus: Bouchetion, Elatria, and Pandosia.  Hammond has dated the foundation o f the colony at Bouchetion to the seventh century, and Elatria and Pandosia to the sixth century.  82  A l l three were relatively close to the sea.  83  the area of Elis prior to the fifth century (see Roy, "Synoikism," 253-254). Roy, "Perioikoi" 282. It is uncertain when Elis expanded into Akroreia, but certainly by the sixth century it had moved south into the Alpheios River valley and the area around Olympia. It is reasonable to conclude that by the time Elis conquered the Pisatans, it had already secured the loyalty of the communities north of the Alpheios. According to Xenophon (Hell. 3.2.30), the Akroreians, Letrinoi, Amphidolians, Marganians, and Lasionians were all perioikoi c.400. Unfortunately, he did not provide any dates for when they became perioikoi of the Eleans. Strabo (8. 3. 4.) noted Kyllene was located north of cape Araxus. It served as the naval station of the Eleans and was connected to Elis by an established road which separated them by a distance of 120 stades (24 Km, or approximately 14 miles). Pausanias mentioned that Kyllene, "faces Sicily and affords ships a suitable anchorage. It is the port of Elis . . ." (Paus. 6. 26. 4). Homer also mentioned Kyllene; when Polydamas was running among the Greek ships, he killed, "the Kyllenian, Otos, a captain of Epeians," (II. 15. 518). The second harbor at Pheia (Strabo 8.3.12) was 120 stades from Olympia. As will be shown below, Olympia became a political and commercial center for Elis. Roy, "Perioikoi," 301-5. There is no literary evidence that provides a date for the Elean colonies in southern Epirus, but Bouchetion, Elatria, and Pandosia all pre-dated the arrival of the Korinthians in the area. According to Hammond, Bouchetion was an ideal location for a colony. Its port was close to the Gulf with a hill nearby that could offer a good position for defense. Furthermore, a river from its port was easily navigable. Hammond dates the colony of Bouchetion to the seventh century, and those at Elatria and Pandosia to the sixth based upon pottery found at the sites. See N.G.L. Hammond, Epirus. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 427; 481-2; 723. Hammond notes that the colonies had a close connection with both Olympia and Dodona and similarities between dedications at Dodona and Olympia help prove that these colonies continued their close relationship with Elis via Olympia. An inscription found at Olympia commemorating Apollonia's victory over Thronium was written in an Elean script but not, according to Jefferey, the normal Elean script used at Olympia (LSAG 228). Hammond states, "Apollonia probably employed a craftsman from one of the Elean colonies in Epirus, which had regular contacts with Olympia but individual characteristics" (433). 7 9  8 0  81  8 2  See N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Greece to 322 B.C. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 498; C. Falkner, "Sparta and the Elean War, c. 401/400 B.C.," Phoenix 50 (1996): 19. The colonies were, from Elis, about 200 km. See also, C. Morgan, "Corinth, the Corinthian Gulf and Western Greece during the eighth century B.C." ABSA 83 (1988): 313-338. 8 3  23  But it was the southern expansion into the Pisatis that was especially important to the development o f Elis and its regional league since it provided Elis with the supervision o f the 84  Olympic Games. The Olympic sanctuary served the Elean state in three influential ways. First, it was used to guarantee the terms o f laws and treaties. Second, Olympia was used as 85  a means to express Elean dominance over other communities. For example, the treaty between the Ewaoioi and the Eleans used Olympia as the guarantor o f the treaty with fines payable to the god. Since Elis was at that time in control o f the shrine, the fines would have been more damaging to the Ewaoioi than to the E l e a n s .  86  In another inscription, two  unknown communities, the Anaitoi and Metapioi, concluded a fifty-year treaty and the Olympic officials ensured that the terms o f this alliance were adhered to. Elis was in control of the sanctuary at the time and as a result, may have had some influence over this treaty and, subsequently, over these communities. Third, control o f Olympia provided the Eleans with 87  direct contact with the neighboring communities and states, including Sparta. During the sixth century, around the same time that Elis was solidifying its control o f Olympia, an Elean alliance was developing. The existence o f this Elean symmachy in the 88  sixth and early fifth centuries and the presence o f formal alliances between Elis and other M . H . Hansen notes that Elis was unusual because it had a political center both at Olympia and Elis; he applied the term "bicentral" to denote this ("Kome. A Study in How the Greeks Designated and Classified Settlements Which Were Not Poleis," 59-60). See also Roy, "Synoikism," 257. C. Morgan does not believe that Olympia played a greater role in Elean politics than the city Elis (Early Greek State, 76; 242, n. 113). C. Morgan, Early Greek State, 80-1. The sanctuary guaranteed sacred laws, such as those concerning xenoi and the protection of theoroi, rules of conduct during the games, and the terms of treaties between foreign states. See Nom. I. 36; 4; 108, respectively. For state decisions that were protected by Olympia, see Norn, I. 23 and 24. See below, pages 26-27, for the discussion of this treaty and how it subordinates the Ewaoioi. 'IvO 10, c. 475-450. B . Virgilio's analysis of the treaty has shown that Olympic officials played a role and ensured that the terms of the treaty were upheld by both parties ("A proposito della f p d x p a tra Aneti e Metapi e alcuni uffici publici e religiosi ad Olympia," Athenaeum 50 [1972]: 68-77). IvO 16 with Paus. 5.6.4; 6.22.4, dated c. 450-425, suggest that Skillous was also subordinate to Elis at the time since payments to Olympian Zeus were required. From the dialect, script, and content of bronze inscriptions, Siewert has shown that the Eleans were dominant in Olympia by the sixth century, "Triphylien und Akroeia. Spartanische 'Regionalstaaten' in der westlichen 8 4  8 5  8 6  8  8 8  24  communities in  Eleia  is supported by the epigraphic evidence. The first inscription, dated  c.500, concerns rules for the Olympic Games. Elean symmachy: [ ai  U.EV  fei86c  OUT  VCCTTOtlV  89  Lines five and six provide evidence of an  ccvBpcc FOCAEIOV  dv]5pa faAsiov  KCC]I TCCC  KCU TUC.  oupccxiccs OUTE yuvalka.  aupaxias OUTE  KOPJCCAOC. O P Y . '  The T O I f aAeToi KCU aupaxia refers, as Siewert notes, to a collective of communities that was allied to and dominated by Elis. The common designation for the Peloponnesian 91  League and Delian League were, respectively, A O . K E 8 C U U . 6 V I O I and 'A0r|vaToi KCU oi auppaxoi. This oi  H A E T O I KOCI  clause  may  KCU  be  oi auu.u.axot the  equivalent  of  oi ouppaxoi, and in this case the situation that Thucydides described for the 92  late-fifth century was also true for the sixth century. According to Thucydides, Elis did complete treaties and alliances for its allies. For example, in 420, the Eleans joined The Hundred-Year treaty and concluded it, u T T E p apxouoiv  EKOtTEpoi  CKpeov  auTcov  (Thuc. 5. 47. 5). It is reasonable 93  KCU TCOV  to  ^uppaxcov cbv  conclude that a hegemonic  symmachy led by Elis began during the sixth century and continued until its dissolution in  Peloponnes," Peloponnesiaka Supp. 13 (1987-8): 7-12. Line one of the inscription forbids an Olympic wrestler from breaking his opponent's fingers, line two orders the referee to penalize a wrestler if he does this, lines three and four concern the readmission of a delinquent to the games, lines five and six forbid the people of the Elean state and its alliance to do or suffer anything, and lines seven and eight mention fines. Text taken from Siewert "Symmachien," 257-258. Ibid., 260-1. See Thuc. 1. 108. 1; 2. 7. 1; 1. 109. 1; 3. 90. 3; de Ste. Croix, Origins, 102. For a discussion of Thuc.5.47.5 see Nielsen, "Dependent Poleis, " 82. Like Sparta, Elis was the leader of an alliance that deprived allies of part of their freedom in return for their membership in a larger organization. Further proof of this unequal relationship is found in the terms of peace between Sparta and Elis c. 400 where the Spartans demanded that the Eleans restore autonomy to the perioikoi. (Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 23). Cf. Nielsen, "Triphylia," 140-142. According to Siewert, the perioikoi were also symmachoi of the Eleans ("Symmachien," 260-261). It seems that both the perioikoi and the symmachoi were deprived of part of their autonomia by Elis. A symmachy can be defined as any military alliance or comradeship in arms. For certain types of these organizations, there was a decisive hegemon (leader) who had all the executive power. In this way, the hegemon maintained its position and control over other communities. This control was accepted by the dependents 89  9 0  91  9 2 93  9 4  25  A sixth-century alliance between Elis and the Elean community of the Ewaoioi, provides further evidence that Elis concluded treaties of alliance with other communities in the sixth century. The exact circumstances under which the treaty was concluded are unknown, but the treaty has recently been dated to c. 500, well after Elis had gained control of the shrine.  95  This is the covenant between the Eleans and Ewaoioi. There shall be an alliance for a hundred years, and this (year) shall be the first; and if anything is needed, either word or deed, they shall stand by each other in all matters and especially in war; and if they stand not by each other, those who do the wrong shall pay a talent of silver to Olympian Zeus to be used in his service. And if anyone injures this writing, whether private man or magistrate or community, he shall be liable to the sacred fine herein written. 96  If either party failed to uphold their obligations, afinepayable to Olympian Zeus was levied. As previously mentioned, this penalty was more detrimental to the Ewaoioi and seems to put them in a subordinate position. This is not difficult to accept seeing that the Ewaoioi were most likely the inhabitants of a small, neighboring community. Aside from this, the alliance was reciprocal in that both sides agreed to provide aid to one another, especially in matters of war. Alliances with the neighboring communities were the formal means by which Elis enrolled communities into its symmachy and unified the whole of Eleia under its leadership. In this light, Elis' motivation to conclude a treaty with the Ewaoioi c. 500 is understandable. Elean expansion continued into the fifth century during which time Elis stretched its territory as far south as the Messenian border. Allies became members of the symmachy because the hegemon extended involvement and influence in the decision-making process of the larger organization to them. (Rhodes, "Demes, Cities and Leagues," 166ff.). The original connection to Heraia has been removed and instead the treaty is believed to be between Elis and a small unknown community of the Ewaoioi, not the Arkadian city. The treaty was originally believed to have been concluded around 571, which would make it contemporary with the final Elean defeat of Pisa. But Jeffery lowered the date to the end of the sixth century, and Roy (see note above) shows that it belongs to c. 500 (LSAG 219,no.6). Translation taken from ML 17. The most recent discussion of this treaty is J. Roy and D. Schofield, "IvO 9: A 9 5  9 6  26  through alliances with the city o f Elis that were likely written in a fashion similar to the treaty with the Ewaoioi. Some o f the allies were considered to be perioikic in status, while others were incorporated directly into the Elean state. The former were assigned subordinate roles, while.the latter were granted full Elean citizenship. Elis clearly claimed control over 97  both types o f communities, but the obligations that the allies agreed to when they entered into an alliance, either by force or voluntarily, remain unclear. I f there were obligations o f membership, military and financial support were the most likely demands that Elis would have made o f its allies. The Lepreans once offered half o f their land to Elis in return for military aid against some Arkadians. They were allowed to keep their land and instead required to pay one talent o f silver a year to Olympian Z e u s . In 98  addition, the imposition o f a tribute is attested to by Strabo who notes that the Eleans destroyed several poleis and then imposed tribute on those that showed a desire for independence.  99  Aside from these two examples, there is no convincing evidence that Elis  exacted tribute from all o f its dependent allies. The evidence supporting the existence o f military requirements or obligations is slightly stronger. Military support was a requirement o f the treaty between the Ewaoioi and the Eleans, and the use o f the term sym(m)achia in the sixth-century inscription published by Siewert implies a military alliance. A s noted above, this inscription, c.500, provides proof that the relationship described by Thucydides during the fifth century was also present during the sixth. In 420, the Eleans signed a military alliance with the Argives, Athenians, and  New Approach,"Horns 13 (1999): 155-165. See also Roy, "Perioikoi" 293;ML 17 (GHI5) =IvO9. Roy has established that the following were perioikic in status: Triphylia, Akroreia, Letrinoi, Amphidolia, Margana, and Lasion. Pisatis was treated differently and, like Pheia and Kyllene, was incorporated directly into Elean territory (Roy, "Perioikoi," 282-283; 293ff). See Thuc. 5. 31. Strabo 8. 3. 30; Cf. Roy, "Perioikoi," 292-295. According to Roy, Elis may have expected some sort of financial return for the thirty talents it spent to buy Epion (Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 30-31). 9 7  9 8  9 9  27  Mantineans, "for itself and on behalf o f its a l l i e s . " Elis in return for military support.  100  Lastly, Lepreon had become an ally o f  101  There is no further evidence that the allies were required to provide troops, even 102  though the perioikoi and other Elean towns clearly did have troops to supply.  Lepreon  supplied enough troops during the Persian Wars to be included on the war memorial dedicated after the victory at P l a t a i a .  103  A t the battle o f Nemea in 394, troops from Triphylia,  Akroreia, Lasion, Margana, and Letrinoi fought for the Spartans.  104  But when Elis was  invaded by Sparta in the years 402 to 400, Elis failed to organize any defensive force from its perioikoi, and according to Diodorus' account o f the invasion, the Eleans had to hire one thousand mercenaries from Aitolia to help defend the c i t y .  105  Although, there was military  potential among the various allies o f Elis, there is little evidence that Elis took advantage o f it. Although Elis was successful at maintaining its dominance over the rest o f the region for at least a century,  106  the precise means by which this was achieved remain obscure. One  possibility is through the use o f religious officials as managers and enforcers o f treaties. Elis might have also extended citizenship to perioikic communities in order to secure their Thuc.5. 47. Thuc.5. 31 .2. In addition to supplying troops, some places, such as Lasion, also had fortifications to defend against invasion (Roy, "Perioikoi," 295). ML 27. Xen. Hell. 4.2. 16. Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 21-31; D.S. 14. 17. 4-12. The territories such as Akroreia and Triphylia contained many individual poleis and small communities. Individually these did not pose a threat to Elis, however, they formed associations with each other and fostered a collective identity (Roy, "Perioikoi," 289). Akroreia formed an independent community after the Elean War of c. 400, Xen. Hell. 4. 2. 12, and dedicated a bronze bowl to Olympia in the 360s, SEG 32.411. The Triphylians and Pisatans were other communities. See Nielsen, "Triphylia" and Roy, "Perioikoi," 289-230 for the emergence of these states after c. 400. When Sparta invaded Elis c.400, many of the southern communities joined the invading force rather than support the city of Elis (Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 25-31). As Strauss notes, the desire for freedom and competition obstructed a polis' quest for hegemony (Strauss, "The Art of Alliance," 128132). 1 0 0  101  102  103  1 0 4  105  106  28  loyalty.  107  A third possibility is through the use o f f o r c e .  108  It seems likely that given the size  o f E l i s ' military vis-a-vis the rest of the country, it could and did use force to keep some o f its allies under its control. Despite the lack o f information concerning the mechanics o f the Elean League, it is clear that the Elean government was prepared to use force i f necessary to maintain the solidarity o f its symmachy. The early Elean government was a narrow oligarchy. A c c o r d i n g to Aristotle, a group o f ninety gerontes ("elders") ruled within the o l i g a r c h y . however,  the  Eleans developed  109  During the late-sixth  their government with more democratic  century,  tendencies.  110  Although the literary evidence supporting a late-sixth or early-fifth century democratic Elis is lacking, the epigraphic evidence suggests that by the end o f the sixth century, the Eleans may  For a discussion of both see Roy, "Perioikoi," 296. The evidence that Olympia was used in managing Elean territory comes from two fragmentary texts. Thefirst,between the Anaitoi and Metapioi, was a treaty that was to last fifty years; IvO 10, c. 475-450 B.C. Cf. B. Virgilio, "A proposito della fpaxpa tra Aneti e Metapi e alcuni uffici publici e religiosi ad Olympia," Athenaeum 50 (1972): 68-77. The second text, IvO 16 with Paus. 5. 6. 4; 6. 22. 4, dated c. 450-425, suggests that Skillous was subordinate to Elis at the time and payments to Olympian Zeus were required from one party for crimes committed. The granting of citizenship is far less certain. Lepreates who won at the Olympic festival were called Elean, (Paus. 5. 5. 3; 6. 7. 8 with IvO 155). This does not prove that they were Elean, only that they were called Elean at the Games by Elean officials, perhaps in order to promote Elis. If it were not for the arbitration of Sparta in 421, Lepreon would not have been able to resist the Eleans who were prepared to use force to coerce Lepreon to resume payments to Olympian Zeus. Furthermore, much of southern Eleia, for example the Pisatis, was taken by force. l07  1 0 8  109  Arist. Polit. 1306a 14ff. Aristotle also described the government of Elis as one where, "the husbandmen and those who have moderate fortunes hold the supreme power and the government is administered according to law . . . where the citizens being compelled to live by labor have no leisure, and where therefore they set up the authority of the law and attend assemblies only when necessary (Arist. Pol. 1292b. translated by H. Rackham. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, vol. 21 [Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; 1944] ). A.H. Greenidge described Elis in similar terms as, "a democracy consciously preserving aristocratic elements, and still more aristocratic in practice than in theory from the fact that it was based not on a close civic but on an open country life" (A Handbook of Greek Constitutional History, [London: MacMillan, 1928], 213). The Elean synoikism of 471 described by Diodorus and Strabo may have been one step in this transition, but there is no evidence to suggest a close association between a democratic revolution and this event. Roy has shown that although the proposal for a synoikism had to have been a political issue, there is no evidence that in itself the synoikism was closely linked to a change in the political constitution ("Synoikism," 258). For more on the association between the synoikism and constitutional development of Elis, see H. Gehrke Stasis. (Munich: 1985), 52-4; 365-7; U. Walter, An der Polis tielhaben, Historia Einz. 82 (1993), 116-125. For views against any connection between democracy and synoikism in Elis, see J.L. O'Neil, "The Exile of Themistokles and Democracy in the Peloponnesos," CQ 31 (1981); 339-40; 345-6; The Origins and Development of Ancient Greek Democracy (Lahnam, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995); 32-3; 38-9; Robinson, First Democracies, 108-11. 1 1 0  29  have adopted a democratic constitution.  Nevertheless, when Elis began to expand into the 112  east and south, the elite families still made up the ruling class. The elite Elean corps were known as the Three Hundred. These were logades ("picked troops") and were most likely an aristocratic unit composed of members from the leading families of the state. Stratolas, one of the oligarchic leaders of the 360s, died in 113  See Robinson, First Democracies, 108-11. Three treaties from Olympia all make reference to the damos. The treaty between the Ewaoioi and Elis (IvO 9 = Nom. I. 52, discussed above) mentions that the sacred fine will be imposed upon the transgressor of the treaty, whether it be a man, magistrate, or the damos. In another inscription, IvO 3 (DGE 410), the term zamon plathyonta appears next to a boule, and in a third inscription, IvO 11 (Nom. I. 21), a man named Deukalion was granted Khaladrian citizenship and only the damos could change any punishment that violators of this decree incurred. According to Jeffery, the letter forms of these inscriptions suggest a date c.500 or perhaps the first quarter of the fifth century (LSAG, 217-20). Furthermore, according to Pausanias (5.9.4), the Eleans raised the number of Olympic judges (Hellanodikai) from one to two in 580 (at the 50 Olympiad). One of theses Olympic inscriptions (IvO 2 = Nom. I. 23) mentions only one Olympic judge, and so this inscription and those similar to it, i.e. those with references to the damos as a ruling body, are dated to the first quarter of the fifth century. Although the other dates are possible, I accept the dates suggested by Jeffery and supported by the editors of Nomina. These inscriptions show that the demos was a ruling body in Olympic decrees at the end of the sixth andfirstquarter of the fifth century. See also Roy and Schoefield, "IvO 9," 162-4. As Robinson notes, Elis was in control of the Olympic sanctuary at the end of the sixth century, and therefore the government of Olympia was Elean. According to the literary sources (D.S. 11.54.1; Strabo 8.3.2) the Elean synoikism took place in 471. During the Peloponnesian War, it seems that some sort of popular government was in place in Elis (Thuc. 5. 47. 9 with Andrews HCT IV, 60-1). Some scholars have tried to connect the rise of democracy with this synoikism. One idea is that Themistokles after his ostracism from' Athens in 470, helped to stir up democratic governments in the Peloponnesos. But the main problem with this is that the epigraphic evidence, dated to c. 500, would have to be dated much later and it does not seem realistic that any pan-Peloponnesian, democratic movement was engineered by Themistokles. For example, see O'Neil, "Exile of Themistocles," 335-46; Robinson, First Democracies 111. As Roy points out, the references to damos in these inscriptions are not only indicative of a move towards a democracy, but also show that a move away from an oligarchy began before 471 ("Synoikism," 258). 111  lh  Thucydides (5. 47. 9) provides the most detailed outline of the hierarchy of Elean magistrates. According to him, when the Eleans agreed to the terms of the hundred year treaty in 420, it was sworn, "at Elis by the demiurgi, the magistrates, and the Six Hundred, the demiurgi and the thesmophylakes administering it" (See also IG i 86 [GHI 72] ). The title of the magistrates, oi TOC TE\T\ E X O V T E S (Thuc.5. 47. 6) was the same as in former times (see Aristotle Pol. 1306a; Greenidge, Constitutional History, 214). The demiurgi may be a "survival of the old aristocratic constitution," (Greenidge, 214). Aristotle (Ibid.) also said that demiurgi and theoroi were two examples of "ancients magistrates" who, in the 'old days', held their positions for long periods of time and had the potential to form tyrannies. The Six Hundred was a general council and the thesmophylakes were probably in charge of preserving the law code of the city. If anti-Spartan actions were any indication of the presence of democracies, then an early-fifth century, democratic Elis is plausible. The late arrival to Plataia and the story of Hegistratus help place doubt on Elean loyalty to Sparta. From 420 to 400, Elis and Sparta were not on favorable terms and this may also suggest a democratic Elis, although Thucydides nowhere explicitly says so. During the Spartan invasion of c.400 the democratic party, under Thrasydaios, successfully defeated a revolt by the oligarchs and their leader, Xenias. See Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 27. The fact that Xenias had to lead his party in a revolt in order to hand the city over to Sparta indicates that the Elean democrats may have been in power during this period. Although Elis showed signs of a democratic constitution, according to Greenidge, "it never developed an extreme democracy" (Ibid.). 112  2  113  Meyer, Elis, in RE 2428. Thuc. 2. 25. 3; Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 13;16.  30  364 fighting as the commander o f these Three H u n d r e d .  114  Furthermore, the Three Hundred  seemed to have been used for special, military assignments.  115  In addition to this elite force,  the Elean cavalry may have also been garnered from the leading families. In 365, Andromachos, another leading statesman, was the hipparchos and led the Elean cavalry against the A r k a d i a n s .  116  The Elean military was the most powerful force in Eleia; only  Lepreon seemed to have had a comparable force during the Persian W a r s .  117  Elis and Sparta  Sometime during the early period o f Elean expansion, from the middle o f the eighth century to c.500, Elis formed an alliance with Sparta. Unfortunately, the exact nature o f their early alliance is obscured by a lack o f detail and, at times, conflicting reports. The terms o f the treaty between Elis and Ewaoioi stipulate, "and i f anything is needed, either word or deed, they shall stand by each other in all matters and especially in w a r . "  118  These "other  matters" may be a promise to recognize Elean control o f Olympia. I suggest that the same agreement might have existed between Elis and Sparta. What began as friendly associations between aristocrats developed into a more formal agreement based upon a general pact to help one's friends and harm one's enemies. Olympia provided the setting for the Elean and Spartan aristocrats to form friendships. Olympia had political significance both within and without the western Peloponnesos. In the eighth century, in addition to being a local sanctuary, Olympia appears to have served  " Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 31. See Thuc. 2. 25. 3; 3. 22. 7; 4. 70. 2; 4. 125. 3. There was also another "picked" force, the Four Hundred, though less is known about them Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 13. Xen. Hell 7. 4. 19; D.S. 15. 85. 7. Lepreon was able to send two hundred men to Plataia (Hdt. 9. 28. 4) and was included on the serpentine 4  115  1 1 6  117  31  as a place for the elite o f other emerging states to meet and conduct business and p o l i t i c s .  119  A t the Olympic festival, Elis and Sparta fostered connections via their aristocracies, both o f which were very influential in their respective state's foreign policy.  A s Ehrenberg notes  in his study o f Greek states, "noblemen and aristocratic ways o f life found correspondents in 121 other areas and formed relations." Gabriel Herman echoed this sentiment and stated that "the elite o f the ancient world were not confined to their immediate communities . . . O n the contrary, they participated at one and the same time both in [foreign] networks and in their immediate communities."  122  Recently, Stephen Hodkinson has pointed out that Spartiates were thoroughly involved in "guest-or ritualized friendship," known as xenia. In fact, almost a quarter o f the known guestrelationships in the classical world involved Spartiates.  123  Closely related to xenia was the institution of proxenia. Here, a local person acted as the "diplomatic representative for another state,"  124  and Herodotus (6. 57) noted that the  appointment o f a proxenos was made by one o f the k i n g s .  125  In the sixth century, there is  column of 479 (ML 27). M I 17. Through a detailed study of the archaeological evidence, Catherine Morgan has shown that wares from Messenia, Argos, and Arkadia were used as votive offerings in Olympia in the pre-eighth-century sanctuary and that in the eighth century, Olympia developed this dual role (Morgan Athletes, 49-96). See also Morgan's third chapter for Peloponnesian Wares in Olympia and Appendix 1 for the Iron-Age material from Elis. See also Roy, "Synoikism," 257. See de Ste. Croix , Origins, 94 - 101; Cartledge, Agesilaos, 116-178; 242-274. 1 1 8  1 1 9  1 2 0  1 2 1  V. Ehrenberg, The Greek State, 103.  G. Herman, Ritualized friendship and the Greek city. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 8. Moreover, later in the spring of 378, Archidamos, son of Agesilaos, approached his father on behalf of Klenymos, the son of Sphodrias, who stood accused of military misconduct. S. Hodkinson has shown that in this episode Sparta, "is thus revealed as a place in which patron-client relationships played an essential role" (S. Hodkinson, Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta [London: Duckworth, 2000], 335). Hodkinson, Property and Wealth, 337-7; table 14, p. 338. Some of these relationships were perpetuated through their descendants, so that individual families could control the political relations between Sparta and other states. Ibid. 339. Usually a state chose the proxenoi but according to Mosley, the choice of the king was meant to supplement, not replace, the choice of the state (D.J. Mosley, "Spartan Kings and Proxeny," Athenaeum 49 [ 1971 ]:433-5). 1 2 2  123  1 2 4 125  32  proof that there were proxenoi in Sparta who represented Elis: Gorgos i n 550 and Euanios in 500.  126  In addition to proxenoi in Sparta, citizens o f other states acted as proxenoi for Sparta in their respective communities. Xenias, for example, was a proxenos for Sparta in Elis c.400.  127  The proxenoi were usually those who had prior relations (xenid) with leading  citizens o f the polis that they represented.  128  Hodkinson concludes that proxenoi "were  frequently employed by their native polis to conduct the diplomatic negotiations with the foreign polis whose interests they represented."  129  One o f the benefits to this system o f foreign connections was the influence it allowed over decisions and foreign p o l i c y - m a k i n g .  130  For example, the campaign against Polykrates  of Samos c. 525 was most likely the result o f the relationship between Spartiates and their aristocratic xenoi i n Samos.  131  With respect to the Peloponnesian League, xeniai between the  elite Spartans and the aristocracies o f other states often formed the backbone o f the political relationships between the Spartan government and the governments (which tended to be oligarchies) o f the allied states.  132  It was through the interaction o f the elite Spartiates and the  aristocracy o f Elis that the relationship between Sparta and Elis most likely began, and the 133  Olympic Games provided the perfect venue.  SEG xi. 1180a; xxvi.476. See also Hodkinson, Property and Wealth, 340. Xen. Hell. 3.2.27; Paus. 3.8.3. See also, Cartledge, Agesilaos, 256. Herman, Ritualised friendship, 138-2. Property and Wealth, 341. Hodkinson has also convincingly shown that wealth was an integral part of these relationships (Ibid. 342-4). Ibid., 348-352. See P. Cartledge, "Sparta and Samos; a special relationship," CQ n.s. 32 (1982): 243-65. Cartledge, Agesilaos, 243-6; cf. 139-159. See also C.J. Tuplin, "The Athenian Embassy to Sparta 372/1," LCM2 (1977):51-6; Hodkinson, Property and Wealth, 345-348. Cartledge, Agesilaos, 248; The Spartans, 84-5. 126  1 2 7  1 2 8  129  1 3 0  131  1 3 2  133  33  But the Eleans were not the original superintendents o f Olympia; this was originally the jurisdiction o f the local inhabitants, the Pisatans.  134  The Pisatans resisted Elean expansion  and were at times successful in maintaining their independence and control o f the Olympic shrine. When the games were first recorded in 776, the Elean influence in Olympia was underway and the Pisatan control was w a n i n g .  135  During these early struggles, Pheidon o f  According to Pausanias (5. 4. 5; 5. 8. 2; 6. 22. 1.), the Eleans were the original supervisors of the games. Cf. Hdt 2. 160. But Xenophon (Hell. 7. 4. 28) mentioned that the Pisatans were the first to administer the Olympic games and that at some undetermined time, Elis had taken control of them. See also Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 31; Strabo 8. 3. 31;. D.S. 15. 78; Pindar, Olympian Ode 10; Phlegon FGrH II. F 257. Grote suggested that logical notion that geography was the important factor and assigned to the Pisatans the original presidency of any Olympic games, for the site of Olympia was in the middle of the Pisatid and "with its eight small townships is quite sufficient to prove that the inhabitants of that little territory were warranted in describing themselves as the original administrators," (G. Grote, Greece [New York: Peter Fenelon Collier, 1899] 317. Despite the discrepancy in the sources concerning the original jurisdiction of the games, we can deduce that the inhabitants of Elis were not the original presidents of the first Olympic games. The traditional date for the founding of the Olympic games is 776 B.C. This was not the first celebration of the games, but rather the first year the games were recorded. Previous games were celebrated, but they were small, local events. The games might have existed before the first victor was recorded but they did not carry the prestige and fame that the later games carried. Cf. Paus. 5. 8. 5-6. Pausanias source was Hippias of Elis whose Olympic victor list has been preserved by Eusebius (cf. Eusebius Chron. 1.194 (Schone, ed.). Eusebius and Phlegon of Tralles both attest that Koroibus was merely the first victor to be recorded, and Eusebius noted that there were twenty-seven victors before him. See H. M. Lee, "The 'first' Olympic Games of 776 B.C.," in W.J. Raschke, The Archaeology of the Olympics, (Madison, 1988), 112-113. Lee demonstrated that Pausanias' version of the games developing over time and gradually gaining significance is plausible. See also C. Morgan, Athletes, 48-65. 1 3 4  Although the history of the Pisatans before the Persian Wars is not reliable, one common feature can be accepted; early Pisatan history was dominated by struggles over the control of the Olympic games. For Pisatan struggles with Elis, see Paus. 6. 22. 1-4; Strabo 8. 3. 30-33. See also J. Roy, "Pisatis," especially p.240; Meyer's article Pisa in RE (1950), 1747-1752. The Eleans may have seen the Olympic games as the key to the unification of Eleia under its leadership. The use of a religious center for political purposes was not new. The Argive intrigues in the western Peloponnesos, for example, displayed, according to Tomlinson, the use of religion and festivals for political aggrandizement (R.A. Tomlinson, Argos and The Argolid (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972], 201). See also K. Adshead, Politics of the Archaic Peloponnesos [Hampshire: Avebury Publishing Company, 1968. 34); J. Bury, The Nemean Odes of Pindar (London, 1890), Appendix D. According to Strabo (8. 3. 30) the Eleans controlled the games from the victory of Koroibos in 776 until 676, when the Pisatans gained control of the games continuously until the fall of Pisa, c.571. The fall of Pisa is, however, uncertain, and there is a great amount of confusion over when all of the Pisatans were finally defeated by the Eleans. Pausanias (6. 22. 3-4.) described that in 588 the Eleans, fearful of a Pisatan offensive, invaded the land of Pisa and returned after receiving "oaths and entreaties" (dTTEAOElv O'I'KC<8E aTrpcticrous ETTEIOE SEr]Eai T E KCU 6 p K o t $ ) . Years later, the Pisatans invaded Elis and were joined by other communities that were described as o u v a T T E c r r r i a a v 5E acpiaiv euro 'HAsicov. Elis defeated these communities and also conquered the communities of Macistos, Skillous, Triphylia, Dyspontium, and Pisatis. According to Pausanias (6. 22. 2) this was c. 572. Cf. Eusebius Chron. 1. 198, 206. But not all of Pisa was conquered at that time. Pausanias states, "the temple and the image of Zeus were made for Zeus from the spoils, when Pisa was crushed in war by the Eleans, and with Pisa such of the subject peoples as conspired together with her" (Paus.5.10.2). Jacquemin has recently shown that the Temple was begun in the 470s and was finished c. 457, hence the with the Pisatans ended prior to the 470s (A. Jacquemin in M. Casevits, J. Pouilloux, 3 5  34  Argos may have usurped the presidency o f the games with the support o f the Pisatans.  136  H a v i n g recently been defeated by the Argives at Hysiae, the Spartans allied with E l i s to force 137  Pheidon out o f Eleia and Olympia. According to Strabo (whose source was Ephoros),  it  was at this juncture that E l i s and Sparta formed an alliance: . . .and the Lakedaimonians cooperated with them, either because they envied them the prosperity which they had enjoyed on account of the peace, or because they thought that they would have them as allies in destroying the power of Pheidon, for he had deprived them of the hegemony over the Peloponnesos which they formerly held (Strabo 8. 3. 33). 138  Strabo reveals here that E l i s was becoming "prosperous" because o f its association with Olympia.  1 3 9  Sparta recognized the economic and political potential o f allying with E l i s . Over  the next ninety years, the Pisatans regained control o f the shrine intermittently. During this  and A. Jacquemin, Pausanias. Description de la Grece V. [Paris: Bude edition, 1999], 147. See Roy, "Synoikism," 249-264. Elis continued to expand in the south even before all of the Pisatis was firmly Elean. The confusion over the precise territory of the Pisatans and the existence of a city Pisa may have lead to the confusion regarding the dates of its official fall. The term Pisa most likley refers to the whole area around and including Olympia. As Roy notes, there is no reason to suppose that a town of Pisa existed ("Pisatis," 233). Meyer's opinion (RE 1736-43), accepted here, is that the area of Pisatis did not extend far from Olympia. Its southern boundary was the river Alpheios and its eastern border was either the river Eurymanthos or the Arkadian border. Its western and northern limits are not as easy to determine, but it seems that the Pisatis extended to the area just west of Olympia and north to the area near Mt. Pholoe. See Map 1 and Roy, "Pistais," 229-232 for more on the area of Pisa and the controversy. According to Strabo (8. 3. 31-2), there were eight communities in this area (although he mentions only four by name). Roy provides a discussion on the other possible four communities that made up the Pisatis and a map of the local of these communities ("Pisatis," 233238,231). The most suitable period for Pheidon to have taken control of the games was the seventh century, c. 668. By this time, Argos had most certainly become involved in Olympia (Morgan, Athletes, 49-56; 85-88). For some views about Pheidon and his dates, see A. Andrewes, "The Corinthian Acteon and Pheidon of Argos," CQ 43 (1946): 71-73; T.Kelly, "The Traditional Enmity between Sparta and Argos: The Birth and Development of a Myth," AHR 75 (1970): 971-1003; "Did the Argives defeat the Spartans at Hysiae in 669 B.C?" AJPh 91 (1970): 31-42; A History of Argos to 500 B.C. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 112ff; Tomlinson, Argos, 70ff. According to Pausanias, the Pisatans asked for Argive help and presided with Pheidon over the games (Paus. 6.22.1). Pheidon had forced his way into Olympia and it may have been with the Pisatans that he was able to act as president, since, as Strabo (8.358) notes, the Eleans refused to recognize him and the games as official (just as they also refused to recognize the other Pisatan games as official Olympics). Pheidon seems to have tried to exploit religion as a means to Peloponnesian political dominance. It may have been at Olympia that Sparta first realized the importance of religion and, like Pheidon, recognized the political significance of the Olympic Games. Later, during the sixth century, Sparta also began to use religion as a means to further its position in the Peloponnesos through the Bones of Orestes campaign (Hdt. 1.67). 136  Ephoros is cited by Strabo at 8. 3. 33. All Strabo translations by H. L. Jones, The Geography of Strabo (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 1924). 1 3 7  1 3 8  35  same period, Sparta completed its conquest of Messenia, most likely with the help of their new "friends," the Eleans and in return (see below for this discussion), the Eleans may have hoped for help in securing southern Eleia  as part of their league.  In the Second Messenian War, Elis and Lepreon supported Sparta while Pisa,  140  Argos, Sikyon, and Arkadia supported the Messenians. Meyer explains that the inclusion 141  of the Pisatans with the anti-Spartan grouping of the Second Messenian War (cf. Strabo 8. 355) as an addition by later writers to help legitimize Sparta's aid to Elis against Pisa.  142  But  it is not historically impossible for the Pisatans to have fought in the Second Messenian War, especially i f it lasted until 600 and ended on the Elean border, near the Pisatis.  143  Prior to the  annexation of Messenia by. Sparta, Messenia did have extensive relations with Olympia.  144  If  the Messenians were active in Olympia prior to the seventh century, then they would have come in contact with the Pisatans during their years as supervisors. At the end of the seventh century Messenian resistance to Sparta ended. Thirty years later, Pisatan resistance to Elean control of Olympia also came to an end, and c. 571, the  See also, Strabo 8. 3. 30; Polyb.4. 73. Apollodorus, FGrH 244 F 334 (apud Strabo 8. 362). Strabo 8. 4. 10 (8. 362) writes: TT\V 5e S s u x s p a v K a 0 ' f|v E A O H E V O I auup.dxous 'Apysious T E KCU ' H A E I O U S K C U TTtadTas K C U ' A p K a S a j aTTEOTrioav. Pausanias (4. 15 .7) also noted that the Eleans fought on the side of the Messenians, M E O O E V I O I S p i v O U V 'HAETOI K C U ' A p K d S E g . But Forrest states that Elis was not part of the anti-Spartan coalition (Sparta, 70), and Meineke changes the name Eleans to Arkadians. I follow Forrest here in thinking that there is no reason to believe that Elis was part of the anti-Spartan coalition. Although Both Strabo (8. 4. 10) and Pausanias (4. 15. 7) allege that Elis fought on the side of the Messenians during the Second Messenian War, I prefer Forrest's analysis of the sources and his assertion that Elis was not part of the anti-Spartan group. The literature supports a friendly Elean-Spartan relationship, but there is no indication that the Pisatans and Spartans were ever friendly. In fact, when Sparta defeated Elis c. 400, it allowed the Eleans to keep the presidency of the games, rather than hand this job over to the Pisatans whom the Spartans believed were unfit for this duty. Spartans were active at Olympia during the time of Pisatan control and must have had some contact with the Pisatans, but they chose to befriend the Eleans instead. According to Apollodorus, the Pisatans fought against the Spartans during the Second Messenian War. If this is not true, as Meyer believes, then it is an example of how later generations believed that the two states were unfriendly toward one another from the early Archaic period (Elis, in RE 1751). See Chapter Two for a discussion on the dates of the end of the Second Messenian War. For a discussion of the sources see Morgan, Athletes, Chapter 3. 13S 140  141  142  143  1 4 4  36  Eleans gained, permanent control o f the games. They held this distinguished position continuously until 3 6 4 .  145  The epigraphic evidence indicates that the sanctuary might have  served as a political center for the settlements in the Alpheios River valley and the rest o f the communities o f southern Eleia.  146  Elis had expanded to the Alpheios River valley and  acquired Olympia, but it had not yet succeeded in controlling Triphylia, the region in southern Eleia that stretched to the Messenian border.  147  It is reasonable to conclude that the  Eleans were able to gather Spartan support prior to the conquest o f Pisatis and Triphylia. Strabo's account (8. 3. 33) that the Spartans helped Elis conquer Pisa and Triphylia following the fall o f the Messenians fits nicely into their pattern o f mutual support. In return for E l i s ' aid in the Messenian Wars and against Argos, Sparta helped Elis conquer the Pisatans and gain control o f the area south o f the Alpheios River, known in the fourth century and afterward as T r i p h y l i a .  148  M a l k i n , in fact, has argued that the Spartans colonized the area  just south o f Triphylia earlier than the sixth century and that the intention was to provide protection along the Messenian border.  149  Hence, following M a l k i n , it would have been  beneficial to Sparta that Elis, its friend, controlled the area long the Messenian border and not the Triphylians.  150  B y the end o f the sixth century, Olympia, Pisatis, and its environs were securely in Elean control. A l s o , Messenia was firmly controlled by Sparta, and Argos was no longer a  Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 28. R. Osborne, Classical Landscape with Figures, (London: G. Philip, 1987), 124-6. Herodotus (4.148) stated that the conquest of many of the Triphylian towns (which he calls "Minyan") of Lepreon, Makistus, Phrixa, Epion, and Noudion happened during his lifetime. Elean expansion into Triphylia may, however, have started as early as the sixth century and continued into the fifth. See Roy, "Synoikism," 260; Roy, "Perioikoi," 282-283. For the conquest of Triphylia, see Roy, "Perioikoi," 282-285; "Synoikism," 259-262; "Frontier," 139-146; and T.H. Nielsen, "Triphylia," 131-144. For the Spartan involvement, see Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 13. Nielsen, "Triphylia," 133-44; cf. Strabo 8. 3. 30; 33; N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Greece, 136-7. Malkin, Myth and territory, 86-87. 1 4 5  1 4 6 1 4 7  1 4 8  1 4 9  37  rival o f Sparta or a threat to the western Peloponnesos. W i t h A r g i v e influence removed and the power o f Pisa diminished, the only threat to Elis came from its eastern neighbor, Arkadia.  151  Conflicts between Elis and Arkadia indicate that Elean growth and the expansion  o f its league was not only an infringement upon communities in the south-eastern part o f Eleia, but upon Arkadian communities as well. Tension between E l i s and Arkadia may have been present long before the fifth and fourth century.  152  This tension was yet another burden on the Elean state and proved to be  problematic when it tried to preserve its symmachy. In addition to maintaining control o f its dependent allies, it also had to cope with border issues  and problems with Arkadia.  A c c o r d i n g to Herodotus (1. 68), Sparta also had problems with Arkadia, and it was not until the middle o f the sixth century that conflicts with Arkadia, specifically Tegea, were brought to an end. A n early friendship between the two enabled Elis to remain in control o f Olympia, pursue its hegemony i n Eleia, and call on Sparta for support and military aid when needed.  Ibid., 88. Malkin also argues that the Triphylians may have been Arkadian, thus this identity would have given the Spartans another reason to support Elean control of Triphylia (My'hj'and territory, 86). Although both the Eleans and Arkadians were allies of the Spartans and members of the Peloponnesian League, they rarely cooperated. In the fourth century, the Arkadians joined together with the Pisatans and gained control the Olympic Games (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 28). The Arkadians may have also provided support to the Pisatans against the Eleans prior to the fourth century (see Paus. 5. 4. 7). Describing the sanctuary of Eileithyia and the etymology of the god Sosipolis Pausanias (6. 2. 20) wrote that the Eleans defeated certain unnamed Arkadians, and Pausanias even recorded their burial site (who these Arkadians were and when this occurred, Pausanias does not specify). Roy noted that the use of cults institutionalized the tension between the Arkadians and the Eleians ( Roy, "Frontier," 146-7). In addition, most quarrels between the two regions of Eleia and Arkadia concerned possession of border towns and rights to these communities. For example, during the Elean War Xenophon reported that Arkadia claimed a right to the community of Lasion. Lasion changed hands during the fifth, fourth, and third centuries (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 12; D.S. 14. 17, 15. 77; Strabo 8. 338. Cf. Roy, "Frontier," 138). Recently, Roy has documented the border conflicts between Eleans and Arkadians and specified seven communities, such as Lepreon, that changed allegiances from Elean to Arkadian or vice-versa. The seven were, Heraia, Phrixa, Epion, Lasion, Alipheira, Psophis, and the area of Triphylia. According to Roy, the border between Elis and Arcadia was not firmly established. It was, in fact, a series of frontiers between city-states, and when a polis changed its allegiance the border consequently changed. (Roy, "Frontier," 133-156. The Triphylians, for example, proclaimed themselves to be Arkadians and the Arkadians in 369, opposed the Eleans on their behalf (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 26; Strabo 8. 337. Cf. Polybius 4. 77). 1 5 0  151  1 5 2  Even Homer (//. 7. 133-6) made a reference to Elean-Arkadian conflicts.  38  Sparta, in return, gained as a friend the president o f an important religious center, as well as another source o f military support and security along the north western Messenian border.  153  Elis had succeeded in becoming the hegemon o f Eleia and, with Olympia, had become a prominent Peloponnesian state. But with its position came the pressure to preserve its symmachy and signs that an alliance with Sparta could interfere with this became apparent during the fifth century.  The Persian War In the autumn o f 481, Sparta and the other loyalist Greek states (those that had not medized or remained neutral)  154  "The  This was a different  Hellenic League."  Peloponnesian L e a g u e .  1 5 5  met at the Isthmus o f Korinth and formed what is known as alliance from  the  already  existent  156  From Herodotus' narrative o f the events, the Hellenic League was both a defensive and offensive alliance. Sparta was recognized by the other Greeks as the leader and it held supreme command o f the allied forces, on land and at s e a .  157  The position o f Sparta as  commander o f the Greek forces is proven by the fact that when Athens, Argos, and Gelon o f Syracuse all asked for either joint or total command in return for their involvement, their claims were rejected by both Sparta and the other allies.  In this way, the Hellenic League  See also Cartledge, Agesilaos, 248ff. See Hdt. 7. 138. 2. See 8. 73. 3 for Herodotus' view that remaining neutral was the equivalent to medizing. Cf. 8. 142. 2. See Hdt. 7. 205.3. Cawkwell, "Sparta and her allies," 375-376. Unfortunately, Herodotus did not provide details, but there does seem to have been some sort of understanding or agreement among the Greeks. For example, the Greeks collectively decided to suspend any inter-Hellenic disputes and to send ambassadors to Argos,, and Crete to ask these states to join the alliance (see Hdt. 7.145). See Hdt. 1.69.2; 141.4; 152. 3; 5. 49. 2. Cf. Thuc. 1. 18.2. Hdt. 7. 145. 1 5 4  1 5 5  156  157  158  39  did resemble the Peloponnesian League, but there is no further information regarding the requirements and responsibilities o f these a l l i e s .  159  Although the Spartans supported the decision to defend Greece by making a stand at Thermopylae, the defense o f the Peloponnesos was still a primary concern to t h e m .  160  In fact,  Sparta may have been compelled by the situation i n the Peloponnesos to adopt this narrow, Peloponnesian p o l i c y .  161  There is evidence that there was trouble between Sparta and the rest  of the cities in the Peloponnesos and that Sparta's system o f alliances was stressed. For  See also, Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 173-174. The decision to defend Thermopylae was made, according to Herodotus, because it was a narrower pass than the one at Tempe and because it was relatively close to the Greeks' own country (Hdt. 7. 175. 1). Hignett notes that there is no indication that the Greeks thought that Thermopylae was not defendable by a small army. In fact, Thermopylae was thought to be impregnable by a direct attack if defended properly (C. Hignett, Xerxes' Invasion of Greece, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963), 114-115. Herodotus (7.175) did record that there were some Greeks who did not agree with sending their forces so far north and instead believed that the Isthmus of Korinth was a much more suitable place to make a stand. The Spartans were not among those dissidents (Hignett, Xerxes' Invasion, 115). Furthermore, Herodotus noted that if the Greeks were beaten at sea, then the positions at either Thermopylae or the Isthmus would be turned by landing forces behind Greek positions (Hdt. 7. 139. 2-4). Herodotus stated more than once that this policy to defend the Isthmus may not have been successful against the Persian navy (see Hdt. 7. 139; 7. 235. Cf. Thuc. 2. 73 .4). So long as the Greeks could hold their position at sea, Thermopylae was a good tactical position. See also Hignett, Xerxes' Invasion, Chapter 2; Appendix 4; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 171-180. Still, the number of Spartan troops sent north does seem small (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 176-7; Hignett, 116-126). According to Herodotus, the entire force numbered 3,100 and was composed of 500 hoplites from Tegea, 500 from Mantinea, 120 from Orchomenos, 1,000 from the rest of Arkadia, 400 from Korinth, 200 from Phlious, 80 from Mykenai, and 300 Spartiates. Simonides described in an epigram that the force numbered 4,000 (apud Hdt. 7. 228. 1), and Diodorus added one-thousand Lakedaimonians (D.S. 11. 4. 5). Hignett noted that Herodotus must have forgotten some contingent, perhaps the Eleans, "but they (the Eleans) may have delayed to send their contingent until the Olympic festival was over" (Xerxes' Invasion, 116). But as Hignett and Cartledge both have shown, the Spartan force sent to Thermopylae under King Leonidas was sufficient. In fact, 4,000 men seems to have been sufficient to defend the pass since it was not until Xerxes learned about the back-door (the path of Anopaia) that the Greek position was compromised. Hignett even proposes that the Spartan King, Leonidas, was counting on help from the northern and central Greeks and because of this took only a small contingent with him (Ibid. 117-118). He also notes that Herodotus' account does not suggest that the Greeks failed because lack of troops. The Greek leaders knew the positions at Artemesium and Thermopylae were inextricably linked and that one could not be abandoned without the other (119-121). Consequently, it would have been a waste to not wholeheartedly defend one and not the other. The mistake, if a one was made, was assigning the defense of the path of Anopaia to untrustworthy troops, the Phokians, whose failure eventually led to the defeat of the Greek troops at Thermopylae. See also, Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 175-176. But regardless of the intention to defend Thermopylae, Hignett states that whatever the Spartans said later, they could never have intended to send their entire League so far north; the Isthmus was closer to their base and as long as the fleet held its position, as a good a position as Thermopylae (Hignett, Xerxes' Invasion,126). In regard to the position at Artemesium, Hignett (141) has shown that Artemesium was vital because it provided protection against a Persian landing in northern. Only when Thermopylae was lost did the fleet leave Artemesium. See Hignett, Xerxe's Invasion, 1524; 255-7; 189-92. 1 5 9 l60  161  See also, Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia , 176-177.  40  example, Tegea was hostile to Sparta sometime during the 4 8 0 s , taken a step towards democracy, a possible affront to Sparta.  163  162  and in 471, Elis may have  Another indication that some  people in Elis were inimical to Sparta is that c. 491 K i n g Demaratos chose to flee to Elis after his exile from Sparta.  164  It is likely that he had friends in Elis that could help h i m while in  exile. Lastly, according to Vitruvius, the Periokic community o f Karyai had already medized before Xerxes' i n v a s i o n .  165  This unrest in the Peloponnesos is supported by Herodotus who  (see 9. 35) reports that around fifteen years after the victory o f Plataia, Sparta was fighting to preserve its hegemony against the other Peloponnesians at the Battles o f Tegea and D i p a i a .  166  These battles were the result o f tension that had been growing in the Peloponnesos even before the battle o f P l a t a i a . during this p e r i o d .  167  Even the Helots o f Messenia presented Sparta with trouble  168  E l i s ' late arrival at Plataia (see below) may indicate that either its generals or its government were not in favor o f supporting the Spartan-led forces.  169  The government o f Elis  may have been democratic by the end o f the sixth and beginning o f the fifth centuries, and it  '  Hdt. 9. 37. 4. See pages 49ff. for a discussion on the Elean synoikism of 471. Hdt. 6. 70. 1. 1. 5. See Cartledge, Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 176. Huxley discusses the medism of Karyai, and argues that this was a certain sign of trouble in the Peloponnesos ("The Medism of Caryae," GRBS 8 [1967]: 29-32). See also, Moggi, I sinecismi, 134-135. Andrewes dates these battles to the year 465 (A. Andrewes, "Sparta and Arcadia in The Early Fifth Century," Phoenix 6 (1952): 1-5). The crisis in the Peloponnesos is referred to by Herodotus when he described the character of Teisamenos, the Elean seer. Teisamenos predicted five victories for the Spartans, "one - and the first - was the win here at Plataia. Next, that at Tegea, a victory over the Tegeans and Argives; then the victory at Dipaia over all the Arcadians except the people of Mantinea; then that over the Messenians at Ithome; and the last one at Tanagra, over the Athenians and Argives." Tegea, for example, was hostile to Sparta around 480 (Hdt. 9. 37). See Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 176179. The Helots were, most likely, always a thorn in the side of the Spartans. There is a good possibility that before Marathon they had even tried to revolt. See Plato Laws 698 D-E. Cf. Hdt. 6. 106-7; Ducat, "Les Hilotes," 141-3. See above, Introduction. See also Powell, Athens and Sparta, 99-101; de Ste. Croix, Origins, 91; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 184; 185-191 (on the earthquake and Helot revolt and secession to Mt. Ithome in 465). Other excuses can be thought of, such as poor organization and planning. This was what the Elean authorities wanted the rest of the Greek World to think, since it exiled the generals after the fact. Nevertheless, I bl  163  1 6 4 1 6 5  1 6 6  167  1 6 8  1 6 9  41  is known that Sparta generally opposed democracies.  170  Although there is no concrete proof  that the synoikism o f 471 brought an Elean democracy, there must have been some political change due to the population becoming more concentrated and communication more easily facilitated. A c c o r d i n g to Powell, while the Spartans were distracted with a war against the 171  Tegeates (see Hdt. 9. 35), the Eleans seized the opportunity to change their government. Because o f this change towards democracy, Elis has been connected to the anti-Spartan movement o f the early fifth century.  172  Although the evidence is not overwhelming, the  possibility does exist that some Eleans were not supportive o f Sparta's leadership during the Persian w a r s .  173  A t Thermopylae (c. 480),  the Spartans initially sent off only an advanced guard,  intending to reinforce it with their regular army once they had finished their celebration o f the Carnean festival. According to Herodotus: . . . the rest of the allies had similar thoughts and were minded to do just the same themselves. For in their case there was the Olympic festival which fell at just the same agree with Cartledge that their actions were "suspicious" (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 176). Thuc 1. 19; see also A. Powell, Athens and Sparta, 2 ed, (London: Routledge, 2002), 101-2. Cf. Thuc. 4. 126. 2. Powell, Athena and Sparta, 108-9. Forrest, for example, believes that Elis formed an alliance against Sparta with Argos (Forrest, Sparta, 100); Cf. Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 185. There is reason to suspect that the anti-Spartan movement in the Peloponnesos was assisted by the Athenian Themistokles. Ostracized from Athens, he stayed in Argos during the early 460s (though the dates are controversial) and according to Thucydides, made, "frequent visits to the rest of the Peloponnesos" (1. 135. 3). Sparta coerced Athens to persecute Themistokles and he eventually was forced out of the Peloponnesos to Persia (Thuc. 1. 135. 2-138). See also de Ste. Croix, Origins, 173-8; 378f; Powell, Athens and Sparta, 109- 110; O'Neil "Themistokles," 335-46; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 185-6. On the chronology of his flight from Athens. The reaction of Sparta indicates that Themistokles was thought to be working against Spartan interests. This is supported by the fact that Themistokles was based out of Argos, the rival of Sparta in the Peloponnesos. His "frequent visits," to the Peloponnesos," may also have been intended to stir up anti-Spartan sentiment among the Peloponnesians. Herodotus noted that the Tegeans, Argives, and Helots fought against the Spartans between 479-465 (9. 35). These battles coincided with Themistokles' visits to the Peloponnesos. See also Tomlinson, who notes that Themistokles was not merely "sightseeing" on his visits to the Peloponnesos (Argos, 201). In addition, according to Strabo (8.3.2) the synoikisms of Mantinea and Elis were brought about by Argos. The date of Elis' synoikism is c. 471, and if this was when Elis adopted a democratic constitution, then it is possible that Themistokles played a part in the rise of democracies in the Peloponnesos, such as at Elis. (The Tegean and Mantinean connections with Themistokles and Argos are discussed in chapters two and three, respectively). Cf. Adshead, Politics, 95-101; Forrest, "Themistokles," 227-232. 1 7 0  nd  171  1 7 2  1 7 3  Cartledge notes that the whole history of Elis and Sparta was "chequered," (Agesilaos, 249).  42  time as this outbreak of war. They never dreamed that the war at Thermopylae would be decided so quickly, and so they sent off their advanced guards (7. 206). 174  Unlike the other Peloponnesians who sent off their advanced troops, the Eleans did not send any. The Eleans might have used the Olympic festival as an excuse for not participating since they were the supervisors o f the event.  175  The religious excuse for the Elean absence was one  which the Spartans might have respected.  176  It is, on the other hand, possible that Elis was  not in favor o f the Spartan-led defense o f Greece. For example, Demaratos, the exiled Spartan king, had initially fled to Elis, and after being chased out o f E l i s by Sparta, went to A s i a where he was well received by the Persian K i n g Darius and became an advisor to Xerxes.  177  H i s choice to seek refuge in Elis must have been based on personal ties he had  with certain E l e a n s .  178  It is very possible that the Elean government was reluctant to help  Sparta before Demaratos fled to Persia. Furthermore, the Eleans, it seems, may not have shared the same opinion that Thermopylae was a suitable place to defend against the Persian invasion. Herodotus did not mention the Elean contingent at Thermopylae, because they had not sent one. When the Greeks began to fortify the Isthmus, on the other hand, the Eleans supported this effort (see below).  Herodotus' citations translated by D. Greene, The History, Herodotus (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987). The Eleans were exempt fromfightingduring an Olympic year in order to supervise the games. According to Phlegon (A.D. 138), a freedman of Hadrian who wrote an Historical Introduction to the Olympic register, the Eleans had received instructions from the Pythia at Delphi, " 'strictly keep to the law of your fathers, defend your country, keep away from war, treating Greeks with impartial friendship whenever the genial quinquennial arrives.' Due to this oracle they refrained from going to war and devoted themselves to the Olympic Games." FGrH 257 fr.l. For a more detailed account of the Olympic truce see, E. N. Gardiner, Olympia, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), 73-76; 83-90; 112. Herodotus writes, " . . . the Lakedaimonians thought God rated higher than men" (Hdt. 5. 63. 2). Also, the Spartans told the Athenians that they could not march to Marathon right away because of a religious obligation (Hdt. 6. 106). They tried to use a similar excuse before Plataia (Hdt. 9. 11). Hdt. 6. 70. 2; 7. 104. 2; 7.235. The leading Spartiates, such as the kings, were frequently involved in xenia (guest-friendship) with the elite persons of other states. States such as Sparta often used these personal relationships to carry out diplomacy and form their foreign policy (Hodkinson, Property and Wealth, Chapter 11, especially pp. 345-8). 1 7 4  1 7 5  1 7 6  1 7 7  1 7 8  43  In the same year, the Lakedaimonians furnished ten ships at Artemesion, but the Eleans were also not mentioned by Herodotus.  179  The total number o f ships at Artemesion  180  was two hundred and seventy-one. A  month later, at the battle  o f Salamis, Herodotus  reported  that from  the  Peloponnesos came, "the Lakedaimonians with sixteen ships, the Korinthians, with the same as at Artemesion, the men o f Sikyon with fifteen ships, the Epidaurians with ten; the Troezenians with five, the men o f Hermione with three . . . These came with the armament as Peloponnesians."  181  Elis was either not present at Salamis, or they were included in the  sixteen "Lakedaimonian" ships. When compared to the sixteen ships furnished by the large, maritime city o f Korinth, it does seem plausible that the Eleans were included in the Lakedaimonian contribution. Although this also could have been the case for the first sea battle at Artemesion, it is unlikely since the total number o f Lakedaimonian ships at Artemesion numbered ten, a fourth o f the Korinthian contingent. Furthermore, Herodotus used the term "Lakedaimonian" over two hundred and thirty times and never used it to refer 182  to anything more than the Spartiates, their own perioikoi, and helots.  It seems safe to  conclude that Elis was not part o f either sea battle. Once word reached the rest o f the Peloponnesians that the Greek troops  at  Thermopylae were dead, the Peloponnesian poleis rallied to defend their land: Those who came forward to the isthmus in full force on the Greek side were these: The Lakedaimonians and all the Arkadians, and the Eleans, Korinthians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Troezenians, and men of Hermione. The rest of the Hdts. 8. 1-2. Presumably, the Lakedaimonian ships were manned by Perioikoi and Helots (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 177). It seems natural for Spartiates to be used in hoplite warfare not waste their training on naval warfare. Hdts 8. 44. The Helots and Perioikoi (three thousand hoplites) were part of the Spartan army that went to Plataia (Hdt. 9. 10-11), and at 9. 19, are referred to as, "The Lakedaimonians." See also, Hdt. 9. 29; 9. 61. The allies of Sparta were designated collectively as either "Peloponnesians" or "allies". For example, see Hdt. 9. 19 quoted above on page 30. See Hdt. 7. 137 for the use of "allies" to designate those at the Isthmus, including the Eleans. l79 l80  181  1 8 2  44  Peloponnesians gave it never a care, and now their time for the Olympian and Camean celebrations had passed them by (Hdt. 8. 72). The Eleans were now included as part o f the force. Provided that the Greek fleet held its 183  position, this policy to defend Greece at the Isthmus was a real and legitimate strategy. There is even evidence that Eurybiades, the commander o f the Greek fleet, considered withdrawing from Artemesium before the pass at Thermopylae was lost and, according to Herodotus, remained only after being b r i b e d . Spartan view to defend the Isthmus.  185  184  Most likely, though, he also shared the  Herodotus stated, "those who were in the Isthmus  were engaged in such labor because they were running the risk o f losing their all, and they had no further hope o f distinguishing themselves with the fleet" (Hdt. 8. 74). The Eleans were not part o f the Greek fleet at Artemesium or Salamis, but they were part o f the forces that fortified the Isthmus. Elean work at the Isthmus was due to the fact that like the other Peloponnesians, Elis recognized the danger o f the Persian host making its way 186  past the Isthmus, especially since it had not given "earth and water" to the Persians. Herodotus  criticized  this policy  o f defending  Peloponnesian preoccupation with i t .  187  the  Isthmus  and made  note o f the  For Elis, however, the fortification o f the Isthmus  may have seemed like a worthy plan: Elis and Olympia were without walls or fortification, there is no evidence that Elis possessed a great navy or army that was large enough to defend  Hignett states, "the Isthmus position was their last line of defense, nearer to their base and with a better claim than Thermopylae to be regarded as impregnable, provided that the Greek fleet was able to hold its own against the enemy" (Xerxes' Invasion, 126). Hdt. 8. 4. 2; 8. 5. 1. Later, he voted to fight at the Isthmus (8. 49 .1; 8. 56) but was persuaded to stay at Salamis (8. 64. 1). Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 177. Hdt. 8. 40. 2; 8. 71. Those who medized were required to make this symbolic gesture, see Hdt. 7. 138. The Peloponnesians had been reluctant to join the other Greeks and fight at Salamis (Hdt. 8. 75.-79); were insistent upon building the wall across the Isthmus (Hdt. 9. 8. 1); and even showed a reluctance to march north beyond the Isthmus (8.40.2). At 7.139-140, Herodotus criticized the strategy of defending the Isthmus. 183  1 8 4  1 8 5  1 8 6 1 8 7  45  all of Eleia,  188  and the Isthmus was narrow enough to defend effectively. Herodotus noted  that this may not have been the best policy,  189  but leaving the Isthmus unfortified left the  entire Peloponnesos more vulnerable to the Persian invasion. Furthermore, the Greeks had shown at Thermopylae that given the proper defensive position, they could repel the Persian land force. The Spartans immediately sent out at night the normal contingent of two-thirds of their entire fighting force, or five-thousand Spartiate warriors, under the command of Pausanias. The army went to the Isthmus where it waited for the other Peloponnesians. 190  When the Spartans marched north to Plataia in 479, Herodotus stated: the rest of the Peloponnesians - those who were for the better cause - seeing the Spartans gone out upon their expedition, did not think fit to stay behind them. And so, having sacrificed, and with favorable results, they all marched from the Isthmus and came to Eleusis (Hdt. 9. 19).  Shame, fear, and, possibly, their oaths to protect Greece prompted their action. The Eleans 191  did send troops, but unfortunately these troops arrived too late for the battle. The Elean army 192  subsequently returned home and the leaders were banished. There is no documented explanation as to why the Eleans were late. Before the decisive battle of Plataia, the Eleans were fortifying the wall at the Isthmus. Here, the Eleans would have been among those who were stirred to action when they witnessed Pausanias' In the fifth century, Elis did have its own force of hoplites and they commonly fielded three thousand of them (Thuc. 5. 58. 1; 75. 5; Xen. Hell. 4. 2. 16). Thucydides (2. 10. 2) said that allies were required to provide two-thirds of their entire force to the League army. If Elis adhered to this same requirement regarding the antiSpartan alliance, then the entire Elean forces in 420 were around 4,500. At the battle of Nemea, the Elean dependents of Margana, Letrinoi, and Amphidolia supplied four hundred light-armed men (Xen. Hell. 4. 2. 16). Hdt. 7. 235. Hdts. 9. 9-12. Herodotus said, "when all the Greeks who were of better persuasion assembled together and exchanged their judgements and their pledges with one another, their first resolution was that they would utterly do away with all enmities and wars with one another . . . they determined to send spies into Asia . . . messengers to Argos, to form an alliance against the Persian . . . the thought behind all this sending was that the entire Greek people might somehow unite and take common action, since the invaders threatened all Greeks alike" (7. 145). Hdts. 9.77. 1 8 9  1 9 0 191  1 9 2  46  army march north, but for some reason, they left later than the others. It seems that the Elean generals (or their government) may not have supported the war effort, and their late arrival is indicative o f this. Additional proof that some Eleans were not eager to support Spartan leadership during the fifth century is found in the story about Hegesistratos, a seer from Elis who was eager for Sparta's defeat and so had hired himself out to the Persian a r m y .  193  H e had been  incarcerated by the Spartans for what Herodotus stated were "the many grievous wrongs" he had done to the Spartans. H e escaped to Tegea and from there entered the service o f the Persian general M a r d o n i u s .  194  Hegesistratos was an important and influential person, "the  most notable o f the Telliadae" (Hdt. 9. 37), and perhaps others within the Elean oligarchic government shared similar, anti-Spartan views. In regard to their participation at Plataia, the Eleans either deliberated too long about whether to send their troops north o f the Isthmus, marched too slowly once en route, or else deliberately waited to survey the outcome o f the battle.  195  Herodotus reported that after the victories at Plataia and M y k a l e c. 479, the allies dedicated thank-offerings to Poseidon at the Isthmus, to Zeus at Olympia, and to A p o l l o at Delphi. A t Delphi they dedicated a gold tripod resting on a bronze stand that represented three intertwined serpents.  196  The total number o f states commemorated at Delphi were  thirty-one, while according to Pausanias, the list at Olympia was twenty-seven. Elis was  Cartledge says that he traded his service to help free his own city of Elis from Spartan domination (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 179). Herodotus clearly noted Hegistratos' hatred for the Spartans but unfortunately did not explicitly say that Hegesistratos, according to Cartledge, "put the liberation of his own city from Spartan domination before the 'common good of Greece,' and so hired himself out to the Persians" (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 179). Certainly Hegesistratos' prophesying on Zakynthos to the Eleans was anti-Spartan, for which he was captured and executed. Hdt. 9. 37-38. See also, Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 185. Hdt. 9. 81. 193  1 9 4  195  196  47  included on both lists. The war memorial seems to have been a dedication for all those who fought during the war, not just at Plataia where the booty was acquired.  197  For example, the  Tenians, who were not part o f the battle, were included because they had deserted the Persian 198 armada and reported their whereabouts to the Greek generals before Salamis. The Mantineans arrived at the battle o f Plataia before the Eleans, but were also too late and, like the Eleans, had worked on the wall at the Isthmus.  199  Unlike Elis, Mantinea had  sent troops to Thermopylae but they were not included on the m e m o r i a l .  200  Their exclusion  has been explained by both their absence at Plataia and their troops having left Thermopylae before the final battle.  201  Their work on the defense o f the Isthmus d i d not provide the  Mantineans the honor o f being included on the memorial any more than it had the Eleans. Instead, the Elean position as the supervisors o f the Olympic Games provided them with a place on the memorial, especially since this was where one o f the memorials stood. But the decision to include Elis and not Mantinea may also have been an attempt by Sparta to antagonize the relationship between its Peloponnesian a l l i e s .  202  In an effort to  maintain its dominant position, Sparta adopted a 'divide and rule' policy and engineered resentment amongst the allies. Combined with the Elean-Arkadian tension over border issues and ethinic differences,  2 0 3  this policy also helped to prevent the Eleans from working  together with their Arkadian neighbors. Despite Sparta's effort to maintain E l i s ' loyalty, Elean support o f Sparta during the Persian wars remains suspect. In fact, Elis showed few signs o f wanting to be part o f a larger Cf. ML 27, p. 59. Many of the island states, for example, were not part of the battle but were included on the memorial. Hdt. 8. 82. 1. Hdt.8. 72. Hdt. 9. 77. See ML 27. A. Powell, Athens and Sparta, 107. 197  1 9 8  1 9 9  2 0 0  2 0 1  2 0 2  48  organization, whether it was the Hellenic or the Peloponnesian League. Rather, it responded to the threat to the Peloponnesos, and not necessarily the threat to Greece. Moreover, Sparta's role in the Persian invasions does not seem to have had any prohibitive effect on the development o f the Elean League, and Elis continued to expand within Eleia and increase its symmachy.  204  In the years following the Persian Wars, Elis continued to show independence from Sparta. In 471, Elis may have changed its constitution or developed a government with democratic features. But the Eleans were not yet so discontent with the Spartans to risk war with them as the Arkadians and Argives d i d .  205  After the Persian Wars, while the Spartans were pre-occupied with Helot troubles and conflicts with the Arkadians and Argives, the Eleans continued to increase their control over the other western Peloponnesians.  206  It was also at this time that the synoikism o f Elis  occurred. Diodorus recorded that, "when Praxiergus was archon at Athens (471/0) . . . the 207  Eleans, who dwelt in many small cities, united to form one state which is known as Elis." Strabo also recorded this synoikismos: " A t some late time they came together into the present  See Roy, "Frontier between Elis and Arkadia," 13 3ff. If the growth of the Elean symmachy was in response to Sparta's leadership during the Persian Wars, there is no direct evidence of this reaction. Elis did, indeed, continue to expand, but this was not in reaction to Sparta's role during the Persian War but rather the continuation of its sixth century growth. Hdt.9. 35. For Helot troubles, see Thuc.l.lOlff; XenHell.5.2.2. For troubles with the Arkadians, see Hdt. 9.35, Paus.8. 6. 6; Isok. .6. 99. For conflicts with Argos, Hdt. 9. 35, Paus. 1. 15.If. See also, J.H. Schreinder, Hellanikos, Thucydides, and the Era of Kimon (Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 1997), 30ff. According to Forrest, Elis joined Argos in 470 (Forrest, Sparta, 100). If Elis was so interested in seizing opportunities to break away from Spartan domination, then joining the combined forces of the Arkadians and Argives at the battle of Tegea (or with the Arkadians at Dipaia) would have been an opportune time to do so. If the Eleans were allied to the Argives and "the bulk of the Arkadian cities," as Forrest postulated (Sparta, 100), then where were the Eleans at these battles? Forrest does not say, but the likelihood is that they were not allied to Argos or the Arkadians. Instead, the Eleans simply capitalized on their remote location and focused on domestic issues. D.S. 11.54.1 See also Gomme's note on Thuc.5.47.9 for the rise of Elean democracy at this time. 2 0 3  2 0 4  2 0 5  2 0 6  2 0 7  49  polis E l i s , after the Persian Wars, from many demes" (8. 3. 2).  R o y has recently surveyed  the evidence i n an attempt to discern the nature o f this synoikism and has found that there were many settlements in the vicinity o f the city Elis before  471; according to the  archaeological proof, the synoikism created nothing new. The synoikism d i d not create a more defensible town or bring a l l o f the political and economic activity to E l i s ; O l y m p i a remained an important political center and Elis remained without w a l l s .  209  N o r was military  expansion a result o f or reason for the synoikism, since the war with Pisa and the subsequent Elean expansion i n the south happened over a period o f time and began before the fifth century. Finally, there is no evidence that the synoikism itself brought about a change i n the Elean constitution.  210  Despite the lack o f details concerning the synoikism, E l i s d i d expand  into the south so that i n the fifth century, its territory stretched a l l the way to the River Neda. It acquired more perioikoi and, i f the two were different, symmachoi.  2U  This expansion and  extension o f its league undoubtedly affected E l i s ' relationship with Sparta. Herodotus wrote that most o f the following southern towns, M i n y a e , Lepreon, Makistos, Phrixa, Pygrus, Epion, and N u d i o n were, " i n m y time sacked b y the Eleans" (Hdt.  Cf. Ps.- Skylax 43; Leandrios, FGrH 492 F13. Roy, "Synoikism," 256-261; Roy, "Perioikoi," 300-2. The act of synoikism, nevertheless, must have been preceded by an active, political decision. For a discussion of what the synoikism may have included, see Roy, "Perioikoi," 256-258. On the constitutional development of Elis, see also U. Walter, An der Polis teilhaben: Burgerstaat und Zugehorigkeit im archaischen Griechenland. Historia Einz. 82(1993): 116-125. Greenidge wrote, "with union came the impulse to popular government which usually accompanied it . . . this union must have involved some alteration in the original constitution, but when the latter assumed a form that could justly be described as popular, we do not know" (Constitutional History, 214). Phormio of Elis was described by Plutarch as a reformer who, much like the Athenian Ephialtes, limited the power of the Elean aristocratic council (Plut.Praec. ger. Reip. 10). Because he was known as a reformer, Phormio was associated with a major change in Elean history, the synoikismos, and consequently the synoikismos was associated with political change and the rise of Elean democracy. But as shown above on page 30, evidence for Elean democracy predates 471, the year that the synoikism occurred. The evidence for democracy in Elis comes from the inscriptions (LSAG, 218-219).The reference to a Sfjuos TrXr|9ucov and a BouAfj of 500 resemble the Athenian model. Adshead sees the similarity as evidence that the Elean democracy was modeled on the Athenian, and therefore was the result of Themistokles' interference (Adshead, Politics, 96). It is very likely that Themistokles visited Olympia and Elis during his 'visits' to the Peloponnesos, but he was not responsible for brining democracy to Elis. Siewert, does not believe that the two are different (Symmachien, 260-1). 2 0 8  2 0 9  2 1 0  2 1 1  50  4. 148). He did not specify any exact times, but it seems likely that they were conquered prior to 4 3 2 .  212  The most prominent o f these towns was Lepreon, and as later events show,  Lepreon was an important acquisition. In 479, Lepreon was not under Elean control and was certainly an independent polis.  2n  It was included on the serpentine column (the war  memorial) o f 479 and was able to send two hundred men to P l a t a i a .  214  Thucydides recorded  how, but not when, Lepreon became an ally o f Elis, "Some time previously Lepreon had been at war with some o f the Arkadians, and had gained the alliance o f Elis by promising them half their l a n d . "  215  In addition to Lepreon, the remaining southern communities were  also made Elean dependents. Unfortunately, we cannot date with precision the inclusion o f these states into the Elean symmachy except to say that by 432 they were part o f the Elean League. There is no indication that Elis suffered any threat to its autonomia during the period prior to the outbreak o f the Peloponnesian War. It maintained control o f the Olympic shrine and continued its leadership o f what had become a large region, Eleia. It had also developed its own regional league with its own allies and possibly collected tribute from some o f its members. In addition, there are no indications that Elis, despite its own position as hegemon o f the Elean symmachy, did not maintain its alliance with Sparta and its enrollment in the Peloponnesian L e a g u e .  2 1 2  2 1 3  2 1 4  216  N o r is there any evidence that Sparta prohibited Elis from  Lepreon, for example, had certainly become an ally of Elis by 432 (Thuc. 5.31). Nielsen, "Triphylia," 143. ML 27 (GHI19); Hdt. 9.28.4  Thuc. 5. 31. 2. Forrest states, "by 460 the old Peloponnesian alliance was more or less restored" (Forrest, Sparta, 104). In 459, the so-called First Peloponnesian War began. The Athenian fleet engaged the Peloponnesian fleet off of Kekryphalia (Thuc. 1. 105. 1). Later, Thucydides mentioned the Peloponnesian League when he recorded the battle of Tanagra ( c . 457): Y E V O U E V T I J 8E udxns T c c v & y p g Tfis BoicoTias EVIKCOV AaK£8aip.6vioi K C U oi ^ U H H O I X C H KOCI (p6vo$ E y d v E T O a p c p c T E p G o v T T O A U S (1.108.1). The fighting force was made up of ten thousand allied hoplites (Thuc. 1. 107. 2), though Thucydides had not specified the states. In 446, the Athenians concluded the Thirty-Year Peace with "The Lakedaimonians and the allies" (Thuc. 1. 115. 1). Elis was certainly 2 1 5  2 1 6  51  expanding its league to incorporate other communities, even those that had fought during the Persian Wars as independent cities, such as Lepreon.  Elis, Korinth, and Kerkyra  Elean activity in the Ionian Sea and the region around the Ambrakian G u l f brought Elis and its symmachy into contact with Kerkyra. Pausanias recorded that the Eleans built a portico in their marketplace from the spoils o f a war with the Kerkyraians: "The Eleans call it the Kerkyraean, because they say the Kerkyraians landed in their country and carried off part of the booty, but they themselves took many times as much booty from the land o f the Kerkyraians, and built the portico from the tithe o f the s p o i l s . "  217  Pausanias did not provide a  date for these conflicts and it is impossible to determine i f he was referring to the same 218  Kerkyraean affair that Thucydides recorded as having taken place in 435.  There is no  mention in Thucydides o f the Kerkyraians doing anything more than destroying Kyllene, the port o f Elis, and Thucydides does not suggest that Elis retaliated and stole enough booty from 219  the Kerkyraians to build the portico described by Pausanias (quoted above). Most likely, the Kerkyraean victory over the Korinthians and their allies in 435 near Epidamnus, and in 433 at the battle off Sybota, provided them with the command o f the Ionian Sea. During this time, the Kerkyraians raided the lands o f the Korinthian allies, and an ally of Sparta, but the first Peloponnesian War did not concern Elis. The fighting concerned Sparta's northern allies, as well as Megara and Delphi. If Elis was part of this war, then it supplied troops to the League forces. For more on Sparta and the first Peloponnesian War, see Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 194-195; Forrest, Sparta, 106-7; A.J. Holladay, "Sparta's Role in The First Peloponnesian War," JHS 97 (1977): 54-63; de Ste. Croix, Origins, 211-224. Paus.6.24.4 and mentioned again at 6. 25. 1. Thucydides wrote that after the battle off Leukimme; "Defeated at sea, the Korinthians and their allies returned home and left the Kerkyraians masters of all the sea. . . . and they (the Kerkyraians) burnt Kyllene, the harbor of the Eleans, because they had furnished ships and money to Korinth" (1. 30. 2). See also HCTl, 65. It is not possible to say when the portico was built. See R.S Yalouris, "Finds from the bay of Pheia in Elis," 2 1 7  2 1 8  2 1 9  52  sacked the Elean port o f Kyllene in 435, just as Thucydides reports. It is possible that Elis reacted to the burning o f Kyllene (described by Thucydides) by attacking Kerkyra and carrying off enough goods and treasure to build the portico, just as Pausanias described. The second possibility is that these conflicts between Kerkyra and E l i s occurred before 435 and Thucydides made a mistake i n placing the burning o f Kyllene in the period soon after the initial quarrel between Korinth and Kerkyra in 435. The references to Kerkyraean dominance of the Ionian Sea and the destruction o f Kyllene (sometime between 471 and 435), suggest that Elis did not have sufficient means to defend against or confront Kerkyra and obtain by plunder enough money to build the portico after 435. Second, there is no proof that the synoikism o f Elis in 471 led to a new building program, but in the 450s, the Eleans completed the temple o f Zeus and it seems reasonable that other buildings, such as the Kerkyraean Portico, might have been built during the same period. It is possible then that these confrontations occurred after 471 and before 435. Before the outbreak o f the Peloponnesian War, Elean and Korinthian foreign policies were driven by similar interests. L i k e Korinth, Elis opposed Athenian support o f Kerkyra and expansion into the western waters.  220  The strategic location o f Kerkyra was stressed i n the  debate at Athens prior to the outbreak o f the Peloponnesian W a r .  221  In addition to Kerkyra,  AEph (1957): 31-43; "Excavations at Ancient Elis," AEph (1973): 113. Forrest, Sparta, 108. After the Korinthian speech before the outbreak of the war (see Thuc. 1. 43), the Athenians held a second assembly that concluded the following about Kerkyra: ". . . the island seemed to them admirably situated for a coasting voyage to Italy and Sicily" (Thuc. 1. 44. 3). During their speech to the Athenians, the Kerkyraians reminded the Athenians of their strategic location, adding that the island's military potential had the capacity to, "bar the passage of naval reinforcements from there to the Peloponnesos and from the Peloponnesos to there" (Thuc. 1.36.2). If Athens could add Kerkyra to its list of allies then it would be in a strong position to control the western trade routes and check the movements of the Peloponnesian navy. See G.B. Grundy, Thucydides and the History of his Age. (Oxford, 1948): 324-6. The Peloponnesian navy had already fought the Athenians in The First Peloponnesian War (Thuc.l. 105. 1). There is also proof that the Athenians seriously considered expanding into the western waters long before they launched the Sicilian expedition in 415. In his Life of Perikles (20.4), Plutarch wrote; "but there were other instances when he would not give way to the Athenians' more reckless impulses. He refused to be swept along with them, when they became intoxicated with their 2 2 0 2 2 1  53  the islands o f Kephallania and Zakynthos were crucial locations for western endeavors. They were located south o f Kerkyra, due west o f the entrance to the Korinthian Gulf, and, as previously noted, close to the Elean dependent town o f Kyllene. A n y vessels sailing from the gulf would have passed by one o f these islands before heading either north to the Ambrakian G u l f or west to S i c i l y .  223  In 435, the citizens o f Epidamnus, a Kerkyraean colony were beset by civil strife, and after being refused aid by Kerkyra, sought aid from Korinth. Korinth immediately organized a relief force and asked for volunteer colonists to increase Korinthian influence i n Epidamnus: Megara prepared to accompany them with eight ships, Pale in Kephallenia with four, Epidaurus furnished f i v e , Hermione one, Troezen two, Leukas ten, and Ambrakia eight. The Thebans and Phliasians were asked for money, the Eleans for unmanned hulls as well as money; while Korinth herself furnished thirty ships and three thousand hoplites (Thuc.l. 2 7 . 2 ) . 2 2 4  Thucydides later (cf. 1. 29) provided the total number o f ships at seventy-five, o f which Elis provided seven. This was a Korinthian enterprise which Elis assisted with the provision o f ships and money, a considerable contribution. Elis might not have supplied rowers and troops in an attempt to maintain that it had not made war upon the Kerkyraians. Another possibility  power and good fortune, and talked of recovering Egypt and attacking the sea-board of the Persian Empire. Many people, too, even, as early as this, were obsessed with that extravagant and ill-stared ambition to conquer Sicily." See also, HCT\, 171. Kerkrya was essential to any Athenian policy that intended to involve Athens in the west. In addition, triremes sailing to Sicily would need to take a coastal route by which they could adequately set into port every night. Merchant ships, on the other hand, could sail directly to Sicily from Greece via Kerkyra. See Gomme HCTl, 19-20, and Dem. 32. 5-8. See also, Thuc. 6. 42, 44; Plut. Dion. 25. 1-2. See Thuc. 6. 42 and 6. 44 for the use of Kerkyra as the last anchorage for the ships that headed to Sicily. From Kerkyra it was a direct voyage across the Ionian Sea to Italy and Sicily. There was not much room for sleeping or even carrying supplies on triremes (Thuc.l. 52; 4. 26; 6. 44), and because of special circumstances, Thucydides needed to explain how the Athenians made the voyage to Mytilene without stopping (3.49). See also Thuc. 2. 7. 3 and 2. 9. 4. For the Peloponnesians, the Ionian Sea was crucial for the importation of grains from Sicily, and any port city on the west coast would have been an important, commercial harbor. Cf. Thuc. 3.86.4; pseudo-Xen. Const. Athen. 2.3. All translations of Thucydides by R. Crawley, revised and edited by Robert Strasller, The Landmark Thucydides. (New York: The Free Press, 1996). 2 2 2  2 2 3  2 2 4  54  is that Elis had the cash to donate, possibly acquired from the tributes taken from its dependent allies, but not the rowers to offer. This fleet and the second larger armada (see below, and Thuc. 1. 46) are the only two references in Thucydides to Elean warships, which may indicate that Elis did not have a large navy. E l i s ' position on the west coast, its two good harbors, and the fact that it had founded colonies in Epirus indicate that it was a sea-trading state. Most o f its ships may have been merchant vessels and not triremes.  225  Before 435, Korinth was the most powerful influence in the western waters. A n alliance with Korinth would help Elis to expand further its activity in the Ionian Sea and possibly as far north as the Ambrakian Gulf. Elis founded several colonies that were close to Kerkyra.  226  It may have been in order to facilitate communication with and to secure the  safety o f these colonies that Elis had originally decided to ally itself to K o r i n t h .  227  Elean  membership in the Peloponnesian League did not prevent Elis from becoming an ally o f Korinth, and hence it was not in violation o f any oath to Sparta.  228  The Kerkyraians defeated the Korinthian armada near Epidamnus. In the same year, they attacked Elis: ". . . and they burnt Kyllene, the harbor o f the Eleans, because they had furnished ships and money to Korinth" (Thuc. 1. 30. 2). This retaliation by the Kerkyraians supports the possibility that Elis was either an ally o f Korinth by the time it had joined in this  It was not possible to change the hull of a merchant ship into a trireme because the dimensions greatly differed, see Gomme, HCT I, (note on 1. 27). Thus, even if Elis had several merchant vessels, they would not have been useful for battle. These were located in Epirus at Boucheta, Elatria, and Pandosia (in Cassopaea). See note 83, above and, N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Greece , 498; C. Falkner, "Sparta and The Elean War, ca 401/400 B.C." Phoenix 50 (1996): 18-19. These were not heard of after the outbreak of the war and this may have been a result of the destruction of the Elean port of Kyllene and the dominance of the Kerkyraean navy in the western waters. According to Hammond, Elis supported Korinth because Kerkyra's actions affected Elean colonies (Hammond, Epirus, 498-9). We cannote, unfortunately, date the alliance with any certainty, but it is probable that the alliance was initiated by the Korinthians and began in the period just prior to the affair concerning Epidamnus, c. 435. Nevertheless, Sparta must have been concerned over these alliances. The larger Peloponnesian League members, such as Korinth, could use their preeminence within their own alliances with these smaller members, such as Elis, to coerce them and thus influence League policy. 2 2 5  2 2 6  2 2 7  2 2 8  55  expedition or else had its own interests to look after. Sparta and the Peloponnesian League did not come to Elis' aid because this had not been a League enterprise, nor did Elis appeal for i t .  229  After the sea battle near Epidamnus in 435, the Kerkyraians were masters o f the Ionian Sea and harassed the allies o f Korinth, including Elis. Eventually, Korinth became involved: At last Korinth, roused by the sufferings of her allies, sent out ships and troops in the fall of the summer, who formed an encampment at Ac\ktium and about Chimerion, in Thesprotis, for the protection of Leukas and the rest of the friendly cities (Thuc. 1. 30. 1).  W i t h these camps, Korinth was able to provide aid to Elis by patrolling the waters around the G u l f o f Ambrakia and between Kerkyra and K y l l e n e .  230  I f Kerkyra attempted another raid on  Elean territory, it would now have to engage Korinth's navy. Kerkyra became alarmed by the new Korinthian movements and sent envoys to Athens to ask for h e l p .  231  Korinth, meanwhile, began preparations for a second expedition  against Kerkyra. The fleet was twice as large as the first and Elis furnished ten out o f the one hundred and fifty ships. Korinth was the leader o f the force but this time, Elis sent its own troops and commanders.  232  The armada sailed from Leukas to Chimerion which was, "in the  territory o f Thesprotis, above which lies the city o f Ephyre in the Elean district."  This area  Sparta was not required to defend members should they act outside of League decisions (de Ste. Croix, Origins, 114-5). See also Introduction, pages 11-12. Sparta could, however, involve itself if it thought its own interests were at stake. Interstate relations were very arbitrary and often decided more by personal interest than by legal considerations. States could interpret rules and act according to their own interests (Holladay, "First Peloponnesian War," 55). See also de Ste. Croix, Origins, 16ff. A camp was essential for naval activity since it allowed vessels to patrol waters daily and provided refuge for ships. This is the Kerkyraean Debate recorded by Thucydides in 1. 32 - 44. "Each of these contingents had its own admiral, the Korinthian being under the command of Xenokleides son of Euthykles, with four colleagues" (Thuc.l. 46. 1). Thuc.l. 46. 4. The area was centered around a city called Elaea, not to be confused.with Elis. See HCT I, 178-182. 2 2 9  2 3 0  2 3 1  2 3 2  2 3 3  56  lay just to the north o f Elis' colonies and, as Thucydides reported, just across from Kerkyra. After the subsequent battle, both sides set up trophies.  234  The Peloponnesian League was still  not involved, for this was a Korinthian enterprise that involved its own group o f allies, including the Eleans.  235  The Archidamian War and the Invasion of Elis  Pausanias recorded that the Eleans participated in the Archidamian war, but he added that they had done so against their w i l l .  2 3 6  During the opening years o f the war, Elis suffered  more from the war than the other members o f the Peloponnesian League and Pausanias' comment may be a reflection o f E l i s ' later dissatisfaction with the war and  Sparta's  leadership. In the first year o f the war, the Athenians sent a fleet around the Peloponnesos and invaded Elis. This invasion was a significant campaign, designed to put fear into the 237  members o f Sparta's alliance and force the withdrawal o f Archidamos' army from Attika. Thucydides reported that the fleet set sail from Athens while the invading Peloponnesian force was still in A t t i k a .  238  Diodorus' version explicitly provides a reason why the Athenians  sent off a fleet while the Peloponnesian land force was in A t t i k a . (12.42.7) Perikles promised that he would dveu 240  KIVBUVCOV  239  According to Diodorus  eKPjaXeTv  TOUC  Thuc. 1. 50-54. Korinth had operated independently from Sparta and The Peloponnesian League in the past. In 459 a force of Korinthians and Epidaurians fought the Athenians near Halieis and Thucydides referred to KopivSioi |_i£Ta T c o v ^uundxcov. This does not include the Spartans. Cf. Thuc. 1. 105. 3. See also, Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 62. Later, in 429, the K o p i v 0 i o i K C U oi £u|_iuc<xoi operated independently from the League in the Korinthian Gulf (Thuc.2. 83. 2). See also Thuc. 3. 114. 4. Paus. 5. 4. 7. See Kagan, Archidamian War, 352f. Thuc. 2. 23-25. Because Diodorus equated the Roman consular year (which began in March) with the archon year, he often 2 3 4  2 3 5  2 3 6  2 3 7  2 3 8  2 3 9  57  Aa.KE5cupoviouc EK Tfjc ' A T T I C S . A force o f one hundred ships was dispatched under  Karkinos which TroAAr]v xfjc u a p a S a A a T T i o u xcopac, Trop6f)aavTEc TCOV  9poupicov  EAOVTEC  KaTETrAri^avTO Toug AaKeBaipovioug.  KCU T i v a  8 1 6 K C U T r | V EK  Tfis  A T T i K f i s Buvapiv Taxecog H E T a 7 T E | - i y d u E v o i TroAAfiv d a 9 d A A E i a v TOIC. TTEAoTrovvriai  oug TrapEi'xovTO (D.S. 12. 42. 7 ) .  241  This explanation for the expedition makes sense.  242  The actions o f the fleet show that disruption o f the Spartan alliance and its ability to function were also important objectives o f Perikles' strategy. Plutarch's version, although brief, concurs with that of D i o d o r u s .  243  The fleet that set sail from Athens was a large armada and was augmented by the allies. One hundred Athenian ships were reinforced by fifty Kerkyraean ships. Thucydides did not specify what places were damaged by the armada before it arrived on the west coast; instead he merely noted, d A A a  TE EKOKOUV  TTEpiTrAEovTEc.  244  Once the fleet rounded the  Peloponnesos, it attacked Methone. Thucydides recorded that Methone's walls were weak and that there was no garrison. The Athenian army was not totally focused on Methone, however. It may have, as Gomme suggests, quickly turned its attention towards plundering the countryside and simply bypassed the fort in order to do t h i s .  245  When Brasidas arrived, he  has the dates wrong. Regardless, his version still carries merit. Diodorus obviously used Thucydides for his account of the war, but he also mentions (12.41.1) that he used Ephoros as well. Gomme assumes Ephoros as the source but acknowledges that there may have been other sources. Diodorus' version has Perikles addressing the youth of Athens, and for this reason Gomme believes it is possible that this came from a lost comedy or speech. See HCTTI, 85. This strategy was not a novel approach, since Demaratos had proposed a similar strategy to Xerxes in 480. Demaratos focused on taking the island of Kythera, but his point was that when the Spartans feared invasion at home, they would not help the rest of Greece in defense of the Isthmus or places north. See Hdt. 7. 235. Plut. Perikles, 34. According to Diodorus, the fleet attacked the territory of the Peloponnesians, in particular Tr|v KaAouyfivriv 'AKTTIV. Diodorus, therefore, provided the valuable information that the Athenian fleet did attack the coast between Argos and Lakonia first. Thus, the west coast was not the only target, but it was an important one. See D.S. 12. 43. 1. HCT II, 83. 2 4 0  241  2 4 2  2 4 3  2 4 4  245  58  had an easy time cutting his way through the Athenians and making it into the fort because the Athenians were scattered throughout the countryside (Thuc. 2. 25. 2).  246  It was through  the valiant effort of Brasidas and his one hundred men that Methone was saved. The Athenian force was much larger, but a force of a hundred men, especially the battle-hardened Spartans, were capable of defending even a poorly-walled fort or town. In addition, the 247  Athenians may not have expected Brasidas to show up, since the fort was without a garrison when they arrived. Regardless, Methone was not the sole object of the Athenian strategy. Next, the Athenians struck at Elis. They spent two days ravaging the land around Pheia  in  the  Trpoo(3oTi8r|aavTa$  Pisatis,  where • a  T C O V E K Tfjs KOI'ATIS  CCUT69EV E K T f J 5 TTEpioiKi'Sog ' H A E I C O V  defensive  "HAiSoc  i-iaxr)  force  TpiccKooiouc.  EKpccTriaav.  of  Eleans  AoydBac.  arrived:  KCU TCOV  These were not perioikoi from  Pheia but the aristocratic, elite corps of Elean troops, The Three Hundred. The Athenian 248  fleet had to depart due to stormy weather, and those who could not make it back to the ships in time marched on foot and captured Pheia. The actions of the Athenian fleet support what Diodorus and Plutarch both mentioned as the purpose of this expedition: to raid various places along the coast in order to instill fear into the Peloponnesians and to weaken their alliance.  249  The initial raids on Lakonia and Methone were significant objectives, but I believe that the destruction of the western ports was much more important to the Athenian  SeeGomme,//CYII, 83. Fifth-century siege tactics were simple, relying for the most part on direct assaults with no siege-craft. See Thuc. 3. 22. 7; 4. 70. 2; 4. 125. 3. Gomme agrees that the expedition did not intend to hold any permanent post, rather it was intended to weaken the Peloponnesian morale (HCTll, 84). See also Kagan, Archidamian War, 59. 2 4 6  2 4 7  2 4 8  2 4 9  59  strategy.  250  First, these ports provided access to the Korinthian G u l f and to the trade routes to  Sicily. Destroying these ports would hinder access to Sicily and the western waters and thus threaten the economic security o f any community whose economy relied on or benefited from this maritime activity. Second, these ports belonged to the Eleans and not the Spartans and the Athenians, i f they hoped to sow resentment among Spartan allies, would accomploish this much quicker i f they attacked allied ports and not Spartan, and thus remove the productivity and usefullness o f these ports. Attacking the west coast, specifically the Elean ports, would have accomplished both o f these objectives. The only other action left to the Athenians would have been to establish their own outposts along the coast to continue the harassment o f the Peloponnesian fleet and threaten the economic stability o f the Eleans and the other communities along the west coast. But holding a permanent post on the west coast o f the Peloponnesos was not a possibility that the Athenians considered at this point. Hindsight shows that even when Athens did occupy forts within Peloponnesian territory, the results were not as effective as one would expect. Demosthenes, for example, set a few forts within Messenian territory in an effort to provide places o f refuge for Messenian Helots and in order to cause alarm in Sparta and deprive it o f its slave force.  251  The strategy, epiteichismos, did not have the intended  result as few Messenian Helots left their positions and country in exchange for freedom. It is safe to conclude that the objective o f the coastal raids was not necessarily to occupy territory, but to attack and disrupt.  252  Furthermore, it seems that the focus o f the attack was not  The attack on Methone may have been an attempt to disrupt the Spartan annex of Messenia and, perhaps, disturb the security of Sparta's Helot system. See Thuc. 5. 56; 7. 26. 2. Sometime after the Battle of Tanagra, the Athenians sailed around the Peloponnesos and set fire to the Spartan dockyards (D.S. 11. 84. 6; Strabo 8. 5. 2; Thuc. 1. 108. 5). Diodorus dated this to the year 456/5 and noted that the Athenian Tolmides led the expedition. According to Diodorus, Lakonia and Messenia had never been invaded before and certainly this had an averse affect on Spartan morale and its prestige. Cartledge states , 2 5 0  251  2 5 2  60  Lakonia but the west coast of the Peloponnesos, specifically Eleia. The allies were, as Perikles noted, rarely unified, and the Athenian strategy to increase the disunity of the 253  League, starting with Elis, was a good one. It is possible that Kerkyra influenced the movements of the Athenian fleet. As mentioned above, Elis clashed with Kerkyra sometime prior to 435 and supported the Korinthians in 435 and 433 against the Kerkyraians. Kerkyra, on the other hand, had concluded an alliance with Athens that is explained by Thucydides as defensive in nature (cf. 1. 44. 1). Also, despite there being no indication that Kerkyra was obligated to join the armada that sailed against Elis, it contributed fifty ships to the expedition. Although this was not as many as it had contributed in 435 and 432, it was twice as many as it supplied later in 427.  254  It is true that the Athenians had sent embassies to places such as Kephallenia,  Zakynthos, and Kerkyra prior to this invasion  255  so it is possible that Athens could have  negotiated a change of its alliance with Kerkyra that obligated them to send ships along with this expedition. More likely, though, Kerkyra contributed heavily to the raiding of the 256  '  2  5  7  Elean coastline for its own reasons.  "though Diodorus does not draw the conclusion, (such an exploit would) further 'destabilize' the tottering Peloponnesian alliance" (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 196). The tactic of epiteichismos (the occupation and fortification of a position within enemy territory) was, according to Cartledge, first realized by Tolmides and was an effective way of "exploiting the antagonism between the Spartans and the Helots" (ibid.). The same can be said about the situation at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. In order to increase the tension between the Spartans and their allies, the Athenians once again sailed around the Peloponnesos and threatened to fortify positions within Spartan or allied territory. Although the actual occupation of territory was very expensive, the mere threat of this could and did, I believe, increase the tension between Sparta and its allies. Thuc. 1. 144. 6ff; Lendon, 71-73. See Thuc. 3. 77. Gomme suggests that the number of ships in 435 was 60, (HCTll, 82). Thuc.2. 7. 5. At 2. 9. 4. the relationship that Thucydides implied is a symmachy but at 3. 70 .2, 6 the relationship is still called an epimachy. Kerkyra sacked Kyllene and may still have seen Elis as a potential threat. 2 5 3  2 5 4  2 5 5  2 5 6  2 5 7  61  Both Diodorus and Thucydides record that Kephallenia joined the Athenian alliance.  258  W i t h Kephallenia, Athens and its allies had more control in the Ionian Sea and  the Elean coast and its harbor was threatened. The closest Peloponnesian threat to Kephallenia and Kerkyra was the Elean port o f Kyllene which provided the Peloponnesian fleet the ability to move effectively off the western coast and challenge Athenian presence in the area.  259  The invasion o f Eleia quite possibly had a significant effect on the Eleans. Following the invasion o f Eleia, Thucydides no longer referred to E l i s ' naval force, only to its port o f Kyllene. E l i s ' support o f Korinth from 435 to 433 and the burning o f its harbor Kyllene by Kerkyra must have decreased the number o f Elean ships. W e also know that Lepreon ceased payments to Olympian Zeus when the war began. Although there is no explicit evidence, these loses would have deprived Elis o f some o f the cash needed to produce triremes and pay for supplies while its troops were on campaign. The threat to E l i s ' security at home was increasing and dissension within its symmachy began toappear.  Thuc. 2. 30. 3; D.S. 12.43.5. See Falkner, "Sparta and The Elean War," 19-22.  62  During the third year o f the war, in 429, Kyllene served as an important naval port for the Peloponnesian fleet.  260  The fleet, perhaps using Kyllene as a base, attacked Zakynthos,  which had recently made an alliance with Athens, but failed to bring the inhabitants over to the Peloponnesian side. In the same year, the Ambrakiots and Khaonians, inhabitants o f the Ambrakian Gulf, invited the Peloponnesian League to j o i n them in an attack on the coastal Akarnanians. They argued that i f the Akarnanians were removed from the Athenian Confederacy, then the islands of Zakynthos and Kephallenia would be easier to conquer, "and the  cruise around the  Athenians."  261  Peloponnesos  would no  longer be  convenient  for  the  Clearly this policy was in the best interest o f the Eleans, especially since their  armada and harbors had suffered the most since 435. The League immediately sent Knemus as the admiral o f the Peloponnesian fleet and orders were given to the allies to equip their fleets as quickly as possible. Ships (with rowers) were supplied by Korinth, Sikyon, and others " i n the neighborhood," and from Leukas, Anaktorium, and Ambrakia. While these were being prepared, Knemus and his navy slipped past the Athenian general Phormio and into the Korinthian G u l f in order to commence the land part o f the campaign. Knemus and his army were defeated at the battle of Stratus while the Peloponnesian fleet was driven from the Krisean gulf by Phormio. The rest of the fleet and Knemus then sailed to Kyllene,  T O ' H X E ( C O V ETTIVEIOV,  to regroup.  262  Knemus was met by three commissioners dispatched  by the Spartan authorities: Brasidas, Timocrates, and Lycophron. Kyllene is the only western port mentioned by Thucydides and was most likely the base o f naval operations for the  2 6 0 261  2 6 2  See Thuc. 2. 66. Thuc. 2.80.2 Thuc. 2.84.5.  63  Peloponnesians, since the entrance to the Korinthian G u l f and the islands o f Kephalania and Zakynthos were securely under Athenian control. The following year was an Olympiad. The Athenian blockade o f Mytilene had compelled the Mytilenians to send for help from "the Spartans and a l l i e s . "  263  The Mytilenians  first went to Sparta where they obviously thought the decision would be made. Instead, they were  directed  OTTCOS K C U  by  the  o i ccAAoi ^ u p p a x o i  authorities  there  to  c c K o u a a v T E c (3OUAEUGGOVTO:I.  go 2 6 4  to  Olympia:  Sparta most likely had  briefed the allies on this matter in advance and knew what the allied reaction would be since allied representatives would not have had the proper authority to vote on such matters i f they had not first discussed them with their respective governments.  265  Most likely, Sparta had  made its own decision and then made this known to the allies in order to persuade allies to vote according to Spartan policy (and perhaps, in addition, to discover which allies were still  Thuc.3.9-14. Thuc.3.8.1. See A. Missiou-Ladi, "Coercive diplomacy in Greek Interstate Relations," CQ 37 (1987): 336-345. MissiouLadi shows that envoys were usually given specific instructions before leaving their home government. It follows that the allied governments had already discussed the issue. Sparta could have, therefore, discovered the decision of some of its allies before hand. At first Sparta acted slowly, since having the envoys travel from Sparta to Olympia would have taken time and the Olympic games were held in 428 during August 11 to 15. If the envoys reached Sparta in June, as Gomme has shown, then there was a considerable delay (HCT II, 259). During this period, Sparta could have presented its proposal to its allies. Contrast this to Sparta's haste after the decision when there was no need to talk with the allies. Lendon, "Constitution," 171-712. Ste. Croix noted that the usual format gave Sparta the power to call a League assembly (de Ste. Croix, Origins, 110-111). But the Olympic festival served as such here and Sparta did not need to call one. This was surely a convenient situation for the League.  2 6 3  2 6 4  2 6 5  2 6 6  64  After hearing the Mytilenian plea, the allies accepted them into the alliance and the Lakedaimonians told the allies who were present to march as quickly as possible to the Isthmus with two-thirds o f their f o r c e . however: o i 5E  dAAoi f,unuaxoi  F,uyKoui8fj rjaav  KCU  PjpaBEcoc.  dppcooTicc  Not all the allies responded enthusiastically  267  T E ^UVEAEYOVTO  T O U OTPOCTEUEIV.  2 6 8  KCU  EV  KccpTToO  Thucydides provided a telling  picture o f the League dynamics; most o f the Peloponnesians were not interested in this long, protracted war with A t h e n s .  269  It was not bringing any direct benefit to them and their  support for the war was beginning to fade.  270  Following Sparta whithersoever it might lead  was clearly becoming a burden for certain allies, although Thucydides did not specify which ones. Perhaps they were the allies that came into conflict with Sparta a few years later. Elis was a useful ally in the opening years o f the war. Its strategic position gave the League access to the Ambrakian G u l f and the islands off the northwest coast o f Greece. It possessed Pheia and Kyllene, two good harbors that provided the Peloponnesian navy with a place to equip and regroup, as well as to access the western coastal waters. The Elean land force was also a formidable opponent. Though the Athenians and their allies succeeded in destroying part o f Kyllene and other places along the coast, this campaign was more indicative o f the difficulty o f defending a long coastline rather than o f the inadequacies o f the Elean military. During the campaign, the Elean navy and its port o f Kyllene suffered defeats and destruction while Elean coastal regions were looted and raided. The signs o f allied  Thuc. 3. 15. 1. Thuc. 3. 15. 2. Kagan notes even Perikles understood that the allies were ill-equipped to deal with this sort of war and the decision by Sparta must have been received with mixed feeling (Kagan, Peace, 141) See Thuc. 1. 141 .4.  2 6 7  2 6 8  2 6 9  65  dissatisfaction with the war were becoming apparent, and by 421, Elean dissatisfaction with the Peloponnesian League, and more specifically Sparta, was obvious. The League did not protect E l i s ' league, nor did it help protect the coastline o f Eleia. One ally, Lepreon, ceased payments to the Elean government. This was a sign that dissatisfaction with Elean leadership was present among the dependent allies.  The Peace of Nikias and Elis' quarrel with Sparta  In 421, Sparta and Athens worked toward a peace treaty. Sparta summoned the allies 271  and the majority agreed to the terms. Korinthians, Megarians, and the E l e a n s .  The dissenting minority included the Boiotians, 272  Thucydides explained why the first three allies  did not sign the treaty but he did not provide a reason for E l i s ' rejection o f it. He later alluded to the dispute over Lepreon, which had taken place before the peace treaty.  273  The chronology o f the dispute over Lepreon is not entirely c l e a r .  274  Thucydides  provided the terms o f the peace with Athens first, followed by the Athenian-Spartan alliance, and then the meeting in Argos and the formation o f the anti-Spartan alliance between Argos, Mantinea, Korinth, and Elis. Thucydides then described the affair o f Lepreon to explain the reason why Elis chose to enter into an alliance with Argos, the enemy o f Sparta. This was  Perikles had foreseen this, see Thuc. 1. 141. 3-3. Thucydides did not specifically indicate that a majority voted in favor of the terms, but he did list the four members who objected. Since the terms were followed by a treaty and then an alliance, we can conclude that the majority voted in favor of the terms of the peace. Sparta, however, reminded Korinth alone that it should abide by its oath: "it had been explicitly agreed that the decision of the majority of the allies should be binding upon all, unless the gods or heroes stood in the way" (cf. Thuc. 5. 30. 1). See Introduction, page 6. Cf. de Ste. Croix, Origins, (116-117). Thuc. 5. 17. 2. Thuc.5. 31. 1-5. See also Gomme, HCT III, 266. For a discussion about book five see, H.D. Westlake, "Thucydides and the Uneasy Peace - A Study in Political Incompetence," CQ 65 (1971): 315-25; HCTV, 375-79. 2 7 0 271  2 7 2  2 7 3  2 7 4  66  also the reason why Elis chose not to sign the peace treaty and therefore, the affair with Lepreon must have preceded the peace. Thucydides explained that, "some time back there had been a war between the Lepreans and some o f the Arkadians; and the Eleans being called in by the former with the offer o f half their lands, had put an end to the war" (Thuc. 5. 31). The Eleans allowed the Lepreans to keep the land that was promised and instead levied a tribute. This tribute was paid annually, but during the Peloponnesian War, the Lepreans did not pay, using the war as an excuse.  The case was submitted to Sparta but the Eleans, suspecting that the Spartans  would not rule in their favor, abandoned the process and ravaged the territory o f Lepreon in an effort to secure its loyalty by force.  The Spartans  continued their arbitration,  nevertheless, and judged that the Lepreans were autonomoi and that the Eleans had acted as the aggressors. When Elis continued to march on Lepreon, the Spartans sent a garrison o f hoplites into Lepreon. and Elis, "put forward the agreement providing that each allied state should come out o f the war against Athens in possession o f what it had at the beginning, and considering that justice had not been done them, went over to the Argives ." (Thuc. 5 . 3 1 . 5 ) . Unfortunately, Thucydides has provided only a compact summary o f the events. The date o f Lepreon's request to Elis for assistance against the Arkadians could be anywhere between the battle o f Plataia in 479 and 43 2 .  2 7 7  The extent o f Lepreon's territory and its  economy is not known, although in order to pay one talent a year, it must have had a stable economy and sufficiently fertile l a n d .  278  Elis clearly believed that Lepreon belonged to the  See Siewert, "Symmachien in neuen Inschriften," 257-261. Andrewes stated, "this record of aggression would suggest that Elis was in the wrong" not Sparta or Lepreon, (HCTYV, 27). See also Kagan, Archidamian War, 335.  2 7 5  2 7 6  2 7 7  For evidence that Lepreon was independent, see Hdt. 9.28.4 and ML 27. See also, Caroline Falkner, "Sparta  and Lepreon in the Archidamian War (Thuc. 5. 31. 2-5)," Historia 48 (1999): 385-394. Cf. Andrewes, HCTIV, 27. 2 7 8  67  Elean state and the alliance between the two placed Lepreon in the subordinate position o f a tribute-paying polis. E l i s initially agreed to submit to Spartan arbitration,  279  but abandoned the arbitration  process at the last minute in anticipation o f an unfavorable decision. Once they were certain that they did not have Spartan support in the case, the Eleans sent their delegates to Korinth and Argos. E l i s ' actions clearly reveal that it could and did act according to its own interests. In order to maintain its regional hegemony over its own allies, it would have to find the support from another state. Nevertheless, Elis could have signed the peace treaty and still fought for the control of Lepreon. There was nothing in the peace terms that forbade intra-league disputes. Lepreon was not an Athenian ally nor was it a neutral territory. In fact, since Sparta settled its 280  Neodamodeis and Brasideioi in Lepreon, it had become Spartan territory.  A n Elean dispute  with another ally or with Sparta over the control o f a once-Elean dependent could have been feasible, even i f it had signed the treaty. But the Spartan position was clear and the threat to E l i s ' symmachy too much for it to risk, and so although Thucydides did not mention that Elis ceased to be a member o f the Peloponnesian League, once it ignored Sparta's decision and prepared to form an alliance with the enemy, its position was clear. There may have been more to the situation than Thucydides presented. A s noted long ago, before the outbreak o f the Peloponnesian War, the members o f the Peloponnesian League agreed that each ally was promised to come out o f the war with at least the same territories it had when the war began (see Thuc. 5 . 3 1 . 5 ) .  281  This is what Elis later claimed in  According to de Ste. Croix, there is nothing to suggest that members of the League had to submit disputes to Sparta (de Ste. Croix, Origins, 122). Cf. Thuc. 1. 28. 2; Oxy. Hell. 18. 4-5. Cf. Thuc. 5. 34. Gomme noted that the Peloponnesians had made this agreement prior to the war (HCT, IV. 27-8). Also,  2 7 9  2 8 0  2 8 1  68  its dispute with Sparta over Lepreon. According to this view, not only was Sparta interfering in Elean affairs but, by settling newly-enfranchised Helots in Lepreon, it was violating its oaths and this agreement. According to Andrewes, this was not an agreement that was made prior to the war, but an actual term o f the Peace of Nikias that was omitted by Thucydides. 283  According to this theory, Sparta was violating the actual terms o f the peace.  Either way,  the Peloponnesian League did not protect E l i s ' right to its territories. After the Spartans began carrying out their obligations as stipulated i n the peace, they asked those allies who had not accepted the treaty to reconsider and agree to the terms o f the ^84  peace."  The allies refused, "unless a fairer one than the present was agreed upon" (Thuc. 5 .  2 2 . 1 ) . Sparta, however, did not amend any terms o f the treaty and the reasons for the allies refusing a second time were the same as the first. Sparta wanted to avoid having its allies absent from the peace, and after it failed to persuade them a second time at Sparta, needed to provide some sort o f arrangement so that its security at home was ensured.  285  Gomme said that it, "presupposes a quite extraordinary distrust between the members" (Ibid.). O f course, there is another explanation; the distrust resulted solely from Sparta's inability or unwillingness to stick by its original goals. Lendon's view, accepted here, is that the pre-war arrangement was intended to solidify the allies before the war (Lendon, "Constitution," 165ff.). There is good reason to believe that only one text of the treaty has been presented here, probably the Spartan copy since the Spartans are named first at the end of the treaty. Each of Sparta's allies were to have taken the oath separately (according to Thuc. 5.18.1) and surely the names of those taking the oath would have been recorded on the treaty, just as the names of the Spartans and Athenians were. Athens swore on behalf of its allies and there was no need to have separate copies of this from each of the Athenian allies. Furthermore, that the Athenians agreed to having each of the Spartan allies sign the treaty indicates that even the Athenians knew there were those who might not accept the terms of the treaty and therefore required each of Sparta's allies formally to accept the terms. 2 8 2  Andrewes also noted that it might not have been an actual term of the treaty but, "the (surely much discussed) principle on which it was supposed to be based . . and (the Eleans) are giving this principle a fresh twist by attempting to apply it between the allies of their own side" (A.W. Gomme, A . Andrewes, and K.J. Dover, HCTW, 29). Cf. Thuc. 5. 18. 5; cf. 5. 26. 2. Hamilton who notes that Sparta was no acting with plenipotentiary powers for all its allies (Hamilton, Bitter  2 8 3  2 8 4  Victories, 31). 2 8 5  See Kagan, Peace, 20; HCTW, 691.  69  With the absence o f states such as Korinth and Elis from the treaty, Sparta formed an alliance with A t h e n s .  286  Thucydides noted that Sparta believed that with this union, the entire  Peloponnesos, including Argos, would not be able to resist Spartan policy. Thucydides wrote that immediately after the alliance was formed "the Korinthians and some o f the cities in the 287  Peloponnesos tried to disturb the settlement and immediately agitated against Sparta." Because o f its dispute with Sparta over Lepreon, Elis was most likely among the agitators. The relations between those who did not accept the treaty and Sparta were becoming more strained. Argos, at the advice o f Korinth, began building its own alliance and Mantinea and its allies were the first Peloponnesians to join them "out o f fear o f the Spartans" (Thuc. 5. 29. 1). Elis' enmity arose from the fact that its independence and symmachy were now threatened by Sparta. The territories and dependent allies that it had acquired prior to the war were now able to circumvent Elean authority because Sparta was ready to interfere forcefully and dismantle smaller, regional alliances such as the Elean symmachia. Elis'  fears  were  substantiated  when  Sparta  allied  with  Athens.  The  other  Peloponnesians, Thucydides wrote, grew even more concerned because o f the terms o f this new treaty: the rest of the Peloponnesos at once began to consider following its (Mantinea's) example . . . they were angry with Sparta among other reasons for having inserted in the treaty with Athens that it should be consistent with their oaths for both parties, Spartans and Athenians, to add or take away from it according to their own discretion. It was this clause that was the real origin of the panic in the Peloponnesos . . . any alteration should properly have been made conditional upon the consent of the whole body of the allies (Thuc.5.29.2-3). The terms o f both the peace (see Thuc. 5. 18. 11) and the alliance (see Thuc. 5. 23. 4) used similar terminology regarding the procedure for the signatories to change any o f the terms at  2 8 6  2 8 7  Kagan did not think that this alliance was a threat (Kagan, Peace, chapter 2). Thuc.5. 25. 1. '  70  their w i l l . Thucydides claimed that the allies feared the ability o f Athens and Sparta to dictate foreign policy without allied consent. After forming an alliance with Athens, Sparta sensed the trouble that was beginning to rise in the Peloponnesos. In response to Spartan pressure to abide by its ' o l d oath,' the Korinthians referred to the clause that was presumably part o f the allied oath: "unless the gods or Heroes stand in the way." Korinth alleged that it had indeed sworn, "upon the faith o f the gods to her Thracian friends," and i f it gave up Sollium and Anaktorion to Athens (cf. Thuc. 5. 30. 3) as stipulated in the Peace, then it would have violated its oaths to its Thrakian allies. Thus, the gods did stand in the way and Korinth was freed from its obligation to adhere to the majority decision to sign the peace treaty. Perhaps due to the fact that it was feuding at the time with E l i s over Lepreon, Sparta did not admonish Elis as it had Korinth. In response to the Spartan warning, Korinth gave its defense and did so in front o f "her allies who had, like her, refused to accept the treaty, and whom she had previously invited to attend . . ." (Thuc. 5. 30. 2). Because the Eleans were quarreling with Sparta over the freedom o f Lepreon, their Elean embassy to Korinth arrived a little later. The Eleans first made an alliance with Korinth, then "went on from there to Argos, according to their instructions, and became allies o f the Argives . . . " (Thuc. 5. 31. I).  288  The Elean ambassadors had been given instructions by their home government prior to  their departure, and there should be no doubt that the quarrel with Sparta over Lepreon influenced E l i s ' decision to make an alliance with Korinth and Argos. In conclusion, the reason for E l i s ' refusal to sign the peace treaty was that it feared Spartan interference in its own regional league; such fears were substantiated by the dispute  Elis, according to Kagan, was being manipulated by Korinth. According to him, Korinth wanted the war to continue in order to cover its losses (Kagan, Peace, 34ff; 43).  2 8 8  71  with Sparta over Lepreon and the obvious threat to its league. Elis was ready to vehemently resist this Spartan interference and go to war with its former ally. First, it needed support from another major polis. Proof that E l i s ' regional league was an issue is found i n the terms o f the one-hundred year treaty. In 420, Elis sent a delegation to Athens, along with Mantinea and Argos, after being convinced by Alkibiades to create an anti-Spartan alliance (see Thuc.5. 44. 2). The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans "acted for themselves and the allies in their respective empires, made a treaty for a hundred years . . . " was prepared to contend with Sparta.  290  2 8 9  Kagan notes that the new Argos  Elis now had the proper support it needed.  291  420 B.C. The Olympic Games and Lepreon  The loss o f Lepreon and the role o f Sparta in this affair were threatening to Elis, and although the union with Argos was a serious move by Elis against Sparta, Elis took even more extreme actions; the Eleans denied the Spartans access to the temple o f Zeus and the Olympic Games, alleging that they had refused to pay a fine. According to Thucydides, i n the summer o f 420, the Eleans accused the Spartans o f attacking Fort Phyrkos during an Olympic truce and placing one thousand hoplites in Lepreon. The Spartans were fined two thousand minai "specified in the Olympic law imposed upon them by the E l e a n s . "  293  Sparta did not deny having conducted military  Thuc. 5. 45-47. Cf. Plut.Mc. 10. Kagan notes that the new Argos was prepared to contend with Sparta (Kagan, Peace, 73). So, Elis now had the proper support it needed. Kagan, Peace, 73. For the new league, see H.D Westlake, "Corinth and the Argive Coalition," AJPh 61 (1940): 413-421; D. Kagan, "Corinthian Diplomacy after the Peace of Nicias," AJPh 81 (1960), 291-310. See Thuc. 5.49.-50. Thuc. 5.49. 1. 2 8 9  2 9 0  2 9 1  2 9 2  2 9 3  72  operations that were aimed at liberating and fortifying a newly acquired ally, Lepreon. They claimed, however, that they had not known about the Olympic truce when the hoplites were deployed. Thucydides stated that the Eleans were accustomed to proclaiming the usual Olympic truce amongst themselves, after which it was in effect. This seems to have been the normal procedure (see below for more). The Spartans argued that i f the Eleans believed that the Spartans had committed a crime, they should not have announced the truce after the alleged transgression. The Eleans remained firm but did propose that i f the Spartans were to restore Lepreon, they would give up part o f the fine and pay the rest to Zeus themselves for the Spartans.  294  After the Spartans refused this offer, the Eleans offered a second proposal that i f  the Spartans should swear at the altar o f Zeus to pay the fines at a later date, then the Eleans would allow them access to Olympia. The Spartans again refused to oblige them, whereupon the Eleans denied the Spartans access to the games and the sacrifices to the G o d . Fearing a Spartan invasion, the Eleans guarded the games with a heavily-armed contingent that was joined by a thousand Argives, the same amount o f Mantineans, and some Athenian cavalry. The Spartans, however, made no attempt to force their way into the games, even after a Spartiate named Lichas, who had entered into the games and w o n the chariot race, was beaten by those who assisted the Hellanodikai ("judges").  295  The Mantineans, Athenians, and  Argives supported the Eleans after Sparta was barred from the games, but this only proves that they remained faithful to the anti-Spartan coalition, not that they condoned E l i s ' actions.  The fine included two payments, one to the Temple of Zeus and one directly to the Eleans. Thucydides wrote, "they (the Eleans) would give up their own share of the money and pay that of the god for them" (5. 49. 5). This insult was a certain blow to Sparta's prestige (Kagan, Peace, 76). Furthermore, the presence of Lichas at the games proves that individual Spartans were not barred from competing in the games. The Spartan state as a whole was, however, prohibited from coming to perform their religious duties. 2  2 9 5  73  It may have also been a display o f force serving to reassure the Eleans that their allies were supportive and to warn Sparta that the new coalition had the man power to defend its allies.  296  From the account provided by Thucydides, it is difficult to acknowledge the •  297  allegations put forth by the Eleans as valid.  Although there is confusion as to whether an  Olympic truce was the same as a general Greek armistice, the Eleans clearly believed that the Spartan actions qualified as infractions and that the Spartans had to pay a fine.  298  The Spartan  argument that they were unaware o f the truce at the time is convincing, however. Thucydides' account clearly states that the Eleans announced the truce after the aggressive acts by the Spartans were committed. Furthermore, the Spartans' claim is supported by the fact that they did not commit any further military actions against Elis once the truce was officially announced in Sparta.  299  Due to the decision made in 421 regarding Lepreon's autonomy, Lepreon was not entirely Elean at the time. The Spartans could have reminded the Eleans o f their decision the previous year (cf. Thuc. 5. 31); they had not placed unwanted troops in the once Elean dependent, they had been i n v i t e d .  300  A l s o , in 421, Sparta had settled the Brasideioi (the  Helots who had served with Brasidas) in Lepreon with the Neodamodeis.  301  It is clear that  some Eleans were living in the area o f Lepreon, or the neighboring environs, for "the aggression o f the Spartans had taken them by surprise while they were living quietly as in a 2 9 6  ibid  297  Roy notes that Thucydides' wording could be interpreted to mean that only the movement of troops into Lepreon occurred during the truce. If this were the case, there would have been no grounds for the Eleans to charge the Spartans with attacking the fort (J. Roy, "The Quarrel between Elis and Sparta," Klio 80 [1998]: 361). Roy, "Quarrel between Elis and Sparta," 361 and n. 4. It may have been that Sparta obtained what it had come for, but there is no indication of what the purpose for the attack against Fort Phyrcus was or what exactly it accomplished. Andrewes, HCTIV, 65. 2 9 8  2 9 9  3 0 0  74  time o f peace" (Thuc. 5. 49. 4). It is possible that, at this point, the territory o f Lepreon was divided. Part o f it was still controlled by Elis, even after the earlier arbitration by Sparta, and some o f it belonged to the Lepreates who, in turn, were supported by the Spartans. Fort Phyrkos may either have lain en route to the portion o f Lepreon that was freed from Elean control by Sparta or been situated on the point o f demarcation between pro-Spartan Lepreon and Elean-Lepreon. Despite the confusion over the legality o f both arguments, it is clear that Elis was prepared to use its control o f the Olympic shrine to maintain it its right to Lepreon and independence from Sparta. The Eleans offered two different proposals: either pay the fines or hand back Lepreon. Elis, not Sparta, seems to have been the instigator here. According to R o y , the position o f Elis seems tenuous and the charges against Sparta fabricated. A l s o , the Olympic court seems to have been an instrument o f Elean policy that it was now exploiting to further its own interests.  303  This view does have merit. First, there is  no mention that the Spartans took part in any judicial process and they obviously did not present their case to the tribunal. The Spartans did object to the charges but even i f Sparta had offered its position in court, it is unlikely that they would have had a fair hearing, seeing that the Eleans were most likely dominant in the Olympic court.  304  Thuc. 5. 34. Kagan writes, "the Eleans clearly used the Olympic games to achieve their political ends," (Kagan, Peace, 75). Roy has shown that Thucydides' purpose when he narrated these events was to show how Elis abused its control over the Olympic shrine. See Roy's article, "Quarrel between Elis and Sparta." It is possible that Thucydides had notfinishedthis book, and the confusing narrative here might have been a reflection of this. The Spartan envoys might have been present at the trial (a fact that was not mentioned by Thucydides), and then later repeated their argument to the Eleans, as Roy thought (Roy, "Quarrel between Elis and Sparta," 365). Or, Thucydides did not mention the trial, which had occurred first, and instead decided to fit the Spartan objections into a later part of his narrative.  i m  3 0 2  3 0 3  3 0 4  75  According to Thucydides: 'HXeToi KaTeSiKdoavTO against the Spartans. commented that this verb meant "to w i n a court verdict in one's f a v o r . "  306  Gomme  I f that is the  correct translation, it is possible that the Eleans were represented at the tribunal but not necessarily also the j u d g e s .  307  But Elis was in charge o f the temple during this period and  had been since 457 (at the latest), the year that the temple was finished.  Considering this, it  is likely that the judges all may have been Elean citizens. Furthermore, R o y has previously shown that there is nothing to suggest that any other Greeks were on the Olympic tribunal.  309  Thucydides presented the following process: the Olympic court, possibly composed o f Elean judges, held a trial at which the defendants, the Spartans, were absent or not invited, the verdict was passed in favor o f Elis, the Spartans were informed later and were then offered terms to settle the affair. If indeed Thucydides had finished this section, then the events do seem to convey that the Eleans were exploiting their position and using the Olympic shrine and court as political tools. After the verdict, the Spartans did not act as the Eleans and others feared they might, yet they did not remain idle either. When the Argives and their allies (presumably with the Elean representatives among them) arrived at Korinth to invite the Korinthians into their alliance, they found that there were already Spartan envoys present.  310  The Spartans likely  sent their ambassadors ahead to Korinth in anticipation o f further anti-Spartan action, an obvious conclusion given the events o f these Olympic Games. The Spartans were not unaware that their League was in jeopardy and that their position in the Peloponnesos  See Thuc. 5. 49. 2. This is similar to the meaning found in the LSJ. Although the Eleans composed the court which delivered this sentence, it was still "according to the custom of all Greece and by general consent" (Gomme, HCTW, 64). Jacquemin has shown that the Temple was begun in the 470s and finished c. 457 (Jacquemin Pausanias, 147).  3 0 5  3 0 6  3 0 7  3 0 8  76  311  threatened by the defections o f both Elis and Mantinea to the new Argive coalition.  An  earthquake occurred though and the envoys from each state left Korinth without concluding any alliances. It may seem as though Elis acted disproportionately to the events, since Sparta did not deprive Elis o f its entire alliance, only Lepreon. More importantly, the idea that Sparta could defend the freedom o f Elean dependents may have been most threatening to Elis. If they allowed Lepreon to become independent, then perhaps nothing could prohibit Spartan support o f other Triphylian and Elean towns and their claims for independence. In 418, Sparta still supported Lepreon and Elis was consumed with the desire to w i n it 312  back (see Thuc. 5. 62). But by 414, Aristophanes could claim there was a Lepreon in Elis. Moreover, when Sparta attacked Elis in the Elean war, in the years 402 to 400, Lepreon is reported to have revolted and joined the Spartan side (see Xen.Hell 3. 2. 25). Lepreon was, in 402, one o f E l i s ' dependents, so between 421 and 402, the opportunity must have arisen for Elis to w i n back all or part o f it. E l i s ' concern was for the security o f the regional hegemony that it had developed prior to the. outbreak o f the war. The danger that this would be dismembered by Spartan interference, beginning with Lepreon, was imminent, but the alliance with the new coalition provided Elis with the proper allied support it needed to preserve its symmachy.  3 0 9  3 1 0  3 1 1  3 1 2  Cf. Roy, "Quarrel between Elis and Sparta," 363. Thuc. 5. 49. 1-50. 5. See also, Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 21. Kagan, Archidamian War, 345-346. Arist, Aves. 149.  77  The Battle of Mantinea  In the summer o f 419, Alkibiades led a small force o f Athenians and other allies around the Peloponnesos and "settled matters connected with the alliance" (Thuc. 5. 52. 2). A n Athenian general leading what used to be Peloponnesian troops may have been intended 313  as a show o f force.  Alkibiades hoped to continue the fragmentation o f the Peloponnesian  League as well as secure the support o f Sparta's former allies such as E l i s .  3 1 4  In 418, Elis was able to field three thousand hoplites to reinforce the Argive army 315  prior to the Battle o f Mantinea,  but after being surrounded by the Spartan army, the  Argives came to a truce with the Spartan K i n g Agis. The Athenians then arrived with one thousand hoplites and three hundred cavalry. The Athenians, through their ambassador Alkibiades, declared that the Argives had no right to make a truce without coalition consent, and to the approval o f the allies, the truce between the Argives and A g i s was cancelled and the allies marched to Orchomenos. After Orchomenos was secured, the allies, "consulted as to which o f the remaining places they should attack next. The Eleans were urgent for Lepreon, the Mantineans for Tegea. The Argives and Athenians gave their support to the Mantineans" (Thuc. 5. 62). The Eleans were angered by this decision and went home. From their perspective, the choice to attack Tegea seemed just as parochial as an attack on Lepreon. Since Mantinea had a long-standing quarrel with the Tegeans,' an attack on Tegea would benefit Mantinea and its position within A r k a d i a .  316  But an attack on Lepreon would  Thuc. 5.61.-5.62. See also J.K. Anderson, "A Topographical and Historical Study of Achaea," in BSA 49 (1954): 84; ?M.Alc. 15.6. As noted in the introduction, the allies were not always reliable. Cf. Lendon, "Constitution," 165ff. Thuc.5. 58. 1. Cf. Kagan, Peace, 81. See Thuc. 5. 65. 4 and Chapter Three for the quarrel.  3 1 3  3 1 4  3 1 5  3 1 6  78  not have been beneficial to the coalition,  317  and it would have left Mantinea and Orchomenos  susceptible to Spartan counter-attacks while the coalitions forces were in Eleia. Conquering Tegea, however, would gravely weaken Sparta and provide the anti-Spartan coalition with an important strategic l o c a t i o n .  318  This Elean preoccupation with Lepreon is a clear indictment  against Elean sincerity in the new coalition.  319  A short while later, the allied army met the Spartan army at Mantinea, but the Eleans were not there.  320  They did send troops (three thousand hoplites) after the battle but this did  the allies little good, as the Spartans had already w o n .  321  These troops then proceeded to  assist the Mantineans and with other reinforcements from Athens, encircled Epidaurus.  322  The Elean change o f mind must have been the realization that a Spartan defeat anywhere would benefit it, but unfortunately their selfishness had already cost the coalition too much; the addition o f the Eleans at the battle would have made the allied army larger than the Spartan, perhaps by as many as three thousand troops.  323  In the following year (c. 417), Sparta made a peace with Argos. Consequently, Mantinea also signed a treaty with Sparta, since without Argive support, it was powerless against Sparta. Mantinea had to give up its rule over its dependent cities, as stipulated by an autonomy clause in the peace agreement.  324  Thuc.5. 62. See Andrewes HCTW, 88, who has also noted that an attack on Lepreon would not do much for the anti-Spartan cause. See also Kagan, Peace, 106. Tegea was the first main city that the Spartans passed when they marched north out of Lakonia. Kagan, Peace, 110. The disunity of this coalition was a major factor behind the loss at Mantinea and the resurgence of Sparta (Lazenby, Peloponnesian War, 118ff). The Battle of Mantinea is discussed more in chapters two and three since the Eleans did not participate. For the battle see H. Singor, "The Spartan army at Mantinea and its Organisation in the 5 Century B.C.," in J. Jongman and M. Kleijwegt, eds., After the Past (Leiden: Brill, 2002), esp. page 275, n.l for full bibliography on this battle. For a good description and analysis of the battle, see Lazenby, Peloponnesian War, 129ff. Thuc. 5. 75. Gomme commented, "their momentary pique (c. 62) cost the allies much and perhaps saved the day for Sparta. Their repentance now served the allies very little" (HCTW, 128). Kagan, Peace, 110-11; Singor, "Spartan Army," 251. Thuc. 5. 79-5. 81, see also D.S. 12. 80. 3 1 7  3 1 8  3 1 9  3 2 0  lh  3 2 1  3 2 2  3 2 3  3 2 4  79  Without the support from Argos and Mantinea, Elis was unable to protect itself against Sparta. When Elis refused the Spartans entrance to the Olympic shrine in 420, the Argives and Mantineans were there to provide military support. But Elis had sent its contingent late to Mantinea (as it had at Plataia) and, in doing so, had shown itself unreliable to the allies. Fortunately for Elis, the war shifted away from the Peloponnesos and until 402, the Elean symmachy remained intact.  After the Sicilian Expedition  After the Athenian disaster in Sicily, Sparta returned its focus to Greece: N e u t r a l s n o w felt that e v e n i f u n i n v i t e d t h e y no l o n g e r o u g h t to stand a l o o f f r o m the war, but s h o u l d v o l u n t e e r to m a r c h against the A t h e n i a n s , w h o , as e a c h city reflected, w o u l d probably have c o m e against t h e m if the Sicilian c a m p a i g n had s u c c e e d e d . . .M e a n w h i l e the allies o f the S p a r t a n s felt all the m o r e a n x i o u s than e v e r t o s e e a s p e e d y e n d t o t h e i r h e a v y l a b o r s ( T h u c . 8. 2. 1).  A g i s gathered contributions from the allies for a fleet and also exacted money from the Oitaians, "by carrying off most o f their cattle in reprisal for their old hostility" (Thuc. 8. 3. 1). In addition, he forced parts o f Akhaia Phthiotis and other Thessalian subjects to give him money in an attempt to bring the people o f the region into the Confederacy. The Spartans also issued a requisition to its allies to furnish their quota o f s h i p s .  326  The dispute over Lepreon and the events that happened at the Olympic Games o f 420 indicate that Elis was no longer a member o f the Peloponnesian League. Elis was, quite  Elis was not on favorable terms with Sparta and cannot be considered a member of the League when the war shifted to Sicily. When Korinth delayed the Athenian ships at Naupaktos, thereby giving the transports time to reach Sicily, Elis was not mentioned as playing any part (see Thuc.7.-21. 5; 7. 31), nor were the Eleans part of the forces sent to Dekelea (see Thuc. 7. 20). One of the most obvious reasons behind a lack of Elean participation in the war was the nature of the war at this point. Once the war had shifted to Ionia, the Great King and his satraps become more financially involved and the need for Sparta to levy troops and ships from the Peloponnesians became less important (See Xen. Hell. 1. 5. 1 where Cyrus bestowed upon Lysander ships and money. See also, 2. 1-5; 3. 4. 1; 3. 4. 25-26.). 3 2 5  80  possibly, one o f those "neutrals" referred to by Thucydides (see quote above, Thuc. 8. 2. 1). A g i s had coerced some Thessalians into the Peloponnesian League, but he did not make any effort to retrieve the Eleans back into the League. Although we do not know how, by 414 Elis had recovered Lepreon from Sparta.  327  For some reason, E l i s ' recovery o f Lepreon does  not seem to have been an issue for Sparta since in 402 (see below) Lepreon was still under Elean c o n t r o l .  328  In 412, the war shifted to the east and to the coast o f A s i a M i n o r where the navies o f the two powers fought. The Peloponnesian League proceeded without one o f its first and longtime members, and the other allies were relied upon to supply ships and troops to the League's forces.  329  During the period following the Peace o f Nikias, the Eleans were not part  o f the Peloponnesian League. In fact, Thucydides' version o f the events clearly shows that Elis was acting aggressively against Sparta. The use o f the Olympic court to further its own political agenda is indicative o f this antagonism, as is E l i s ' alliance with Argos. Elean interests (namely Lepreon and the security o f the Elean symmachy) led to the conflict with Sparta and its desire to recover Lepreon led to its half-hearted backing o f the anti-Spartan coalition. A s was likely the case in the Persian Wars, Elis had its own personal interests and motives and was ready to act, even against a powerful polis such as Sparta, in order to preserve them. After Elis lost its support from the Argive coalition following the battle o f Mantinea, it still pursued an aggressive anti-Spartan attitude. In 404/3, the Eleans, led by the democratic  Thuc. 8. 3. 2. Aris.,^ve5. 149. Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 25. See Xen. Hell. 1. 1. 36; 3. 5. 7, where Elis was not involved in the Peloponnesian army.  81  Thrasydaios, provide two talents to help the Athenian democratic exiles.  This support for  the exiles was i n direct opposition to the Spartan proclamation that anyone caught providing aid to the exiles was liable to a f i n e .  331  It is not surprising that a few years later, in 402, the  Spartans exacted their revenge by marching against E l i s , dismantling its symmachy, and 332  replacing its government with a pro-Spartan oligarchy.  The Elean War of402 to 400 B.C.  After the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans delivered an ultimatum to the Eleans to liberate their dependent allies. When the Eleans refused, the Spartans invaded Elis and forced it back into the Peloponnesian League under the terms o f the u l t i m a t u m .  333  There are three  extant accounts o f this war between Elis and Sparta: Xenophon (Hell. 3. 2. 21-31), Diodorus (14. 17. 4-12; 14..34. 1), and Pausanias (3. 8. 3-5; with references at 5. 48; 5. 20. 4-5; 5. 27. 11; 6. 2. 2-3; 7. 10. 2). Due to the various, and, at times divergent, narratives o f this war, there are several problems concerning the conflict, beginning with the precise chronology o f  Plut.Mor. 835f. D.S. 14. 6. 2. Cartledge writes that this happened at the time when Elis refused to settle its debts for the cost of the Peloponnesian War. In this light, the payment of two talents to Sparta's enemies was an even greater insult to the Spartans (Agesilaos, 247). Unfortunately, we do not know how much Elis owed Sparta. Only Diodorus (see D.S. 14. 17. 5) mentions this in'connection with Sparta's ultimatum to Elis before the first invasion in 402. According to him, the Spartans asked the Eleans to pay their portion of the war costs. Nothing more is said concerning this payment. See also, Roy, "Perioikoi," 299. Cartledge notes that the main reason behind the invasion was to place a pro-Spartan government in power and remove the democratic regime (Agesilaos, 88ff.). Evidence of this is comes from Xenophon's version where he stated, "the ephors and assembly were angry, and they determined to bring the Eleans to their senses (ococppovioai auTous)" (Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 25). The word ococppovioai has oligarchic connotations (Thuc. 8. 64. 5) and when considered together with the presence of a pro-Spartan party (Xenias' followers) that wanted a revolution, it does seem probable that this was also a cause for the invasion. As I discuss below, there were many reasons to invade Elis. According to Kelly, Elis had reverted back to the Peloponnesian League at the end of the war: "at the eleventh hour before the final defeat of Athens," D.H. Kelly, Sources and Interpretations of Spartan History in the Reigns of Agesilaos II, Archidamus III and Agis III (diss. Cambridge, 1975), 22. There is nothing in the sources, however, to suggest that there had been a break in hostilities between Sparta and Elis. In fact, when the Elean war broke out, all the sources indicate that the quarrels from 421 and 420 were still unresolved. Elis was 330  3 3 1  3 3 2  3 3 3  82  it. F o l l o w i n g Xenophon's narrative, I accept that the war occupied three years and prefer the dates suggested by Tuplin, 402-400. When the O l y m p i c Games o f 400 were Sparta was allowed to participate in the games and the Elean W a r was o v e r .  celebrated,  334  The sources agree that there were several causes o f the war. A c c o r d i n g to Xenophon, who provided a more detailed account than the others, the causes o f the war were the following: the Elean alliance with Argos, Mantinea and Athens, the Spartan exclusion from the O l y m p i c Games, the insult to the Spartan athlete Lichas, and E l i s ' refusal to allow A g i s the right to sacrifice to Zeus in accordance with an oracle. The first three charges are also found i n Thucydides' description o f the events following the Peace o f N i k i a s i n the years 421-420, but a date for this last insult or the reason why the Spartans had been given an oracle to sacrifice at the temple o f Zeus was not provided by X e n o p h o n .  335  Xenophon listed  not a member of the League when Agis invaded. The Elean war and its chronological problems have been dealt with by G.E. Underhill, "The Chronology of the Elean War," CR 7 (1893): 156-58; R. Unz, "The Chronology of the Elean War," GRBS 27 (1986): 29-42; C. Tuplin, The failings of Empire: a Reading of Xenophon Hellenika 2.311-7.5.27, Historia Ein. 76 (1993): appendix 4. See also, Roy, "Perioikoi," appendix, 299-304. I accept the premise laid out by both Unz and Tuplin that Xenophon and Diodorus presented two different events. Xenophon described the campaigns of Agis and Diodorus described the invasion of Pausanias. The two authors, though offering disparate versions of the war, complement rather than contradict one another. Tuplin disagrees with Unz's dates (401-398) and proposed that the war occurred in the 400s, either 403-401 or 402-400. Tuplin offers the following sequence of events: the first (abortive) invasion of Agis; second invasion by Agis; Pausanias' invasion followed by wintering at Dyme; then the Elean surrender after the winter. Thus, according to Tuplin, Pausanias' invasion happened very soon after the disbandment of Agis' army either in 402 or 401, although Tuplin leans toward the three years of 402-400. Tuplin's reconstruction of the chronology allows for the celebration of the Olympic games in the summer of 400, since neither source accounts for these. If, for example, Unz's chronology is accepted and the war ended in 399, then there is a need to explain why the Olympic truce of 400 did not bring a cessation of hostilities or why no source even mentioned them. According to Unz, the announcement of the upcoming games is what persuaded Agis to depart during the first invasion. Unz does think it unusual that neither Xenophon nor Diodorus mentioned the games, "the interruption of wars or campaigns by regularly scheduled truces for athletic competitions are almost never mentioned by even our most thorough sources," (39, n. 23). But an Olympic truce would have provided Elis with suitable time to gather allies and, if it had sent envoys to Korinth and Boiotia, it is likely that it would have also sent envoys to the other Greek states to announce the Olympic truce. The war then had to have been over by 400 and Tuplin's dates are correct. The war lasted from 402-400 and involved three campaigns, two led by Agis and one by Pausanias. There is no indication in the sources that Sparta's resources were so low that three succesive campaigns were a great burden to the state. In fact, since no allies were initially involved we can assume that Sparta still had enough to contend with the Eleans alone. When it was obvious that more than one campaign would be needed, the Spartans levied troops from their allies. 3 3 4  3 3 5  Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 21-22; Thuc. 5. 49-50. Xenophon did not relay which of the Greeks Agis was at war with,  83  first the Elean participation in the anti-Spartan coalition while the specific charges came second. This explains the general enmity o f Sparta toward Elis; E l i s had broken away from the League and entered into an alliance with Sparta's enemy, Argos. Diodorus, although he did report that there were numerous charges, did not mention the anti-Spartan coalition as a reason behind the war. Instead, he mentioned that the Elean refusal to allow Agis to sacrifice and the exclusion o f the Spartans from the Olympic Games were the main causes. Pausanias' account is similar to that o f Diodorus'; there were many grievances that led Sparta to invade Elis, but most o f all, it was the fact that Elis had refused Sparta the right to take part in the Olympic Games. A l l three authors mentioned the Olympic Games and Xenophon and Diodorus both discussed the affront to Agis, but only Xenophon referred to Elis and its alliance with Mantinea, Argos, and Athens. Not one author noted the abuse o f the Olympic tribunal o f 420 and the fines that the Eleans placed on the Spartans as causes o f the war. It is uncertain i f the oath o f membership sworn by the Eleans to the Peloponnesian League was an issue for this war. According to de Ste Croix and Larsen, two o f the principle features o f the League were that membership was forever and that the minority had to abide by the majority decision.  When Korinth entertained the idea o f allying with Argos, Sparta  but this must refer to the period of the Peloponnesian War and certainly not to a more recent affair that happened after the capitulation of Athens. The first three charges are listed chronologically, so the affair with Agis came either shortly after the affair with Lichas or was part of the events of 420. The importance of the slight against Agis is crucial only for Xenophon's account, for it explains the choice of commander: Agis was insulted by the Eleans when they prohibited him from offering a sacrifice to Zeus, so Agis would have welcomed the opportunity to lead the campaign against Elis. In addition, Xenophon did relate that the Eleans claimed an ancient precedence that forbade any Greek to consult an oracle or sacrifice to Zeus for a future victory against other Greeks. This could have been an excuse used by the Eleans to explain why they would not allow the Spartans to sacrifice in 420. Cf. Thuc. 5. 49. 1-4. - de Ste. Croix, Origins, 109. Cf. 116-119; Larsen, "Genesis," 146 -148. See also Introduction above, pages 67. 3  36  84  reminded it of its oath,  337  but at no time did Sparta reminded Elis of this same oath when it  too sought an alliance with Argos. The absence of discussion by two of the sources regarding this matter supports that there were other reasons for the invasion. The personal insult to Agis may have been one of these. Spartan kings could influence foreign policy.; specifically the decision about who led campaigns and against whom they were directed. Hence, it is possible that Agis, having been insulted by the Eleans, advocated an invasion. Not surprisingly, he led the expedition.  338  On the other hand, it does seem unlikely that Agis would not have used as  a pretext for invading Elis the allegation that Elis had broken its obligation to the League and its oath of membership. Consequently, there were several reasons why Sparta invaded Elis and I believe that the root of Sparta's enmity was the current size of the Elean League and the independence from Sparta Elis was now asserting. Proof for this notion comes in the terms 339  of the ultimatum. A l l three writers agree that before the war began, the Spartans issued an ultimatum to the Eleans to leave the perioikoi autonomous.  340  Diodorus added that the Spartans demanded  money from the Eleans to pay for the cost of the Peloponnesian War. In his study of the Spartan War Fund and a new fragment of the inscription regarding it (IG V 1. 1), Loomis shows that the Spartans were not dependent on cash to support their war effort.  341  It is also  Thuc. 5. 30. 1-2. Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 110; Cartledge, Agesilaos, 25Iff. Xenias was aproxenos of Sparta and xenos of Agis (Paus.3. 8. 4). At this time, during its greatest period of prosperity and expansion, Elis' borders reached north to Teichos Dymion, east to Psophis, and south to the Neda River and it controlled all communities and poleis within this terrirtory (N. Yalouris, "The City-state of Elis," Ekistics 33 no. 194 [1972]: 95-96. Eleia was estimated to be around 2660 sq. km: Koile Elis occupied 1160 sq. km, Akroreia 405 sq. km., Triphylia 540 sq. km., and Pisatis 555 sq. km. See also Roy, "Perioikoi," 298). Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 23, 30; Paus. 3. 8. 3; D.S. 14. 17. 5. There was no regular or established method to raise money (such as the Athenian tribute system), although Sparta did on occasion accept contributions. Sparta may have canvassed for funds but the majority of the time, those who contributed did so for their own reasons (to rid themselves of Athenian domination). Otherwise, contributions from states came in the form of ships and soldiers (W.T. Loomis, The Spartan War fund; IG V 1.1, a New Fragment. Historia Einz. 74 (1992): 82-83). See also, ML 67. The most popular date for this treaty 3 3 7  3 3 8  3 3 9  3 4 0 3 4 1  85  uncertain what Elis would have been paying for since it had surely removed itself from the Peloponnesian League once it joined with Athens, Mantinea, and Argos. Perhaps Sparta saw that Elis had gained some wealth during the war and fabricated this demand.  342  Another  possibility, alluded to in Diodorus' and Pausanias' narratives, is that the Eleans were not going to accept any Spartan terms and that it was the intention o f the Spartans, by asking for back payment for war costs, to ensure that there would be a war through which they could dismantle the Elean s y m m a c h y .  343  The version o f the ultimatum presented by Pausanias  includes a reference to the independence o f Lepreon. This is reminiscent o f the quarrel between Elis and Sparta in 421 which led to E l i s ' refusal at the time to sign the Peace o f Nikias. It is not clear what occurred in Lepreon between 420 and 402, but in 402, it was once again an Elean c o m m u n i t y .  344  Perhaps, during the last fifteen years o f the war, the Spartans  withdrew their troops from Lepreon to augment their forces in Sicily and A s i a and left the defense o f Lepreon to the Lepreates, who may have been unable to resist Elis on their own. Freedom for Lepreon and the other perioikoi was a prime objective o f the Spartan ultimatum and it is possible that Lepreon and the others may even have requested Spartan interference.  345  This hypothesis is supported by the fact that many poleis quickly deserted to  Sparta during A g i s ' second invasion; the first to do so, according to Xenophon, was Lepreon. Xenophon reported that Elis rejected the ultimatum because it had won its dependent allies in war, ETnAr)i8as y a p EXOIEV ®S TTOAEIC (Hell. 3. 2. 23). The poleis are T  called  ETnAr]i8ac, which shows that Elis was bold enough to declare its right to these communities  is the period of the Archidamian War, c. All according to Loomis. D.S. 14. 34. 1-2. Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 27. For example, Elis had been collecting tribute from Lepreon before the war and the events of the Elean war show that it did have cash on hand to buy one thousand Aeotolian mercenaries, fund triremes, erect walls, and pay for public works. See Paus. 3. 8. 3-5; D.S. 14. 17. 4-12. 3 4 2  3 4 3  344  Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 25.  86  even against the victor of the Peloponnesian War.  In Pausanias' version, the Eleans even  claimed the same right as the Spartans did over their Lakedaimonian perioikoi. According to him, there was no indication that Sparta expected Elis to agree to the ultimatum. Diodorus' version accused the Spartans of using the ultimatum as a, "specious pretext for themselves and as an opening for war" ( T a u T a 5' TTiSavdc  Greece.  347  ctpxds  C l r  T O U V T e  ETrpccTTOv  S TroAspou) and the  Trpo9daEic, ai/ToTs EuAoyouc. KCU  Eleans accused  Sparta  of enslaving  The issue is clearly a state's right to act as hegemon of a league and acquire and  maintain dependent allies. According to Xenophon, the Spartans under King Agis invaded Elis (c. 402) from the north via Akhaia along the Larisus River. Soon after, an earthquake occurred and Agis left the country and disbanded his army.  348  This first invasion was intended as a warning to Elis,  and it is possible that Agis may have used the earthquake as a religious excuse to disguise this tactic.  349  Agis' army was most likely not very large, since Xenophon did not mention the  presence of other allies (as he did for Agis' second invasion), and the assumption is that the Spartans invaded alone without asking for allied support. This would have been a risky endeavor for Sparta, so instilling fear in Elis was, most likely, the intended strategy. Agis' choice of routes supports this conclusion. He chose to invade from the north and through Koile Elis. This allowed for the Spartans to display their army to the city of Elis and its  The presence of a pro-Spartan group that had tried to hand the city over to Agis also suggests that Sparta had been asked to interfere in Elis or that it had contacts with Elis that would cooperate and coordinate efforts. ETTiAr)is from Asia, "pillageable property," and according to the authors of the LSJ, was used to refer to property that can be pillaged with impunity, cf. entry under Aeia. The accusation of enslaving Greece was a natural response by the Eleans (who had disagreed to the terms of the Peace of Nikias and the alliance between Athens and Sparta). By contrast, when Agesipolis invaded the Argolid in 388, he also experienced an earthquake, but rather than turn back, decided that it was a favorable sign and did not disband his army. See Xen. Hell. 4. 6. 2-5. Agesipolis' men expected to retire from the country, remembering the campaign of Agis. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, Archidamos had taken a similar course of action when he invaded Attika. Thuc. 2. 18. See also, Unz, "Chronology," 30-33. 4  346  3 4 7  3 4 8  3 4 9  87  citizens, instead o f to the perioikoi and allied poleis which were mainly in the southern portion of Eleia. This invasion did not intimidate the Eleans into accepting the Spartan terms. Rather, A g i s ' departure emboldened them. While his army was disbanded, Elis sent embassies out to the cities it perceived as being unfriendly to the Spartans. A g i s ' first invasion merely warned the Eleans o f Sparta's intent and provided them with time to organize a suitable defense and gather allies from outside Eleia.  250  The call to its allies reveals that Elis was prepared to face  Sparta but that it did need some allied support in order to do so. Despite the fact that no one 351  sent aid to the Eleans, the Eleans did prepare to resist the Spartans. The next year, Agis invaded from the south by way o f A u l o n . H i s forces included all o f the allies, with the exception o f the Boiotians and the K o r i n t h i a n s .  352  This expedition was  more than just a mere show o f force; its intention was to gain the objectives o f the ultimatum. A s soon as A g i s was in Triphylia, the Elean symmachy began to dissolve, "the Lepreans at once revolted from the Eleans and came over to him, the Makistans likewise, and after them the Epitalians. A n d while he was crossing the river, the Letrians, Amphidolians, and •  353  Marganians came over to h i m " (Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 25). There is no mention in the sources that any o f these peoples resisted A g i s or that Elis used, at the very least, its typical force o f three thousand to defend its perioikoi and allies in In 421, Korinth, Boiotia, and Elis refused to sign the Peace and Elis would have been wise to remind these cities that the reasons for resisting Sparta now were the same as before: fear of Spartan interference. See Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 23-25. The democratic, anti-Spartan party in Thebes was most likely a powerful enough minority to persuade Leontiades and the pro-Spartans not to send troops to help in the invasion (Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 152). But since the Thebans may have been led by a pro-Spartan party, they did not help the Eleans either (P.R. McKechnie and S.J. Kern, Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, (Warminster : Aris & Phillips, 1988), 163. See also Hamilton who notes that the decision not to send aid to Elis was due to the presence of a proSpartan party in Thebes, led by Leontiades (Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 152). Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 35. All Translations of passages of Xenophon's Hellenica taken from C L . Brownson, Xenophon. Hellenica. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 3 5 0  3 5 1  3 5 2 3 5 3  88  the south.  354  N o r is there any indication that Elis tried to raise forces from its allies and  perioikoi in the country o f Eleia, even though military support would have been one condition o f an alliance between Elis and its dependent a l l i e s .  355  Elis had gained many o f its  dependents through force, though Epion was purchased and Lepreon had initially entered into an alliance willingly. Lepreon's quarrel with Elis and the quick desertion o f Elis by many o f the towns show the widespread dissatisfaction with the Elean  hegemony.  Furthermore, Elis gave no indication that it would defend its southern communities. A g i s next went to Olympia where, "no one undertook to prevent h i m , " and he sacrificed without interference.  356  Agis had achieved two o f the objectives: he sacrificed at  Olympia and liberated the perioikoi o f Elis. He was now in " H o l l o w " Elis and all that remained was the total submission o f the Elean government.  357  A g i s proceeded toward the city o f Elis, "laying the land waste with axe and fire as he went, and vast number o f slaves were captured in the country" (Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 26). He did not encounter any resistance from the Elean military, though he must have calculated that they would defend Elis as they had in the past.  358  Once it was clear that the Elean forces were not going to march beyond the environs o f the city to protect their lands, the neighboring Akhaians and Arkadians also joined in the plundering o f E l i s ' fertile lands (see X e n . Hell.3. 2. 2 6 ) .  359  For The Three Thousand, see above page 31. See also, Roy, "Perioikoi," 299-304. Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 26. If Diodorus' version of the ultimatum is accepted, then the Spartans also needed to obtain the payment for war costs. The manner in which Agis carried out the invasion was reminiscent of the Archidamian war, but here it was successful. When Agis reached the city, he damaged some of the suburbs and the gymnasia, which were described by Xenophon as "beautiful" (Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 27). From Xenophon's description of Agis' invasion, Elis was a fertile and prosperous city. After the battle of Mantinea in 418, Elis had chosen to pursue its own domestic concerns rather than take an active role in the war in Sicily or Asia. It also administered the treasury of  3 5 4  3 5 5  3 5 6 3 5 7  3 5 8  3 5 9  89  A g i s had succeeded in liberating the perioikoi and, with this, had destroyed the Elean hegemony. When he reached the city o f Elis, he did not immediately attack it. Xenophon recorded that, "as for the city itself (for it was un-walled) the Lakedaimonians thought that he (Agis) was unwilling, rather than unable, to capture it" (Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 27). Xenophon may have been alluding to the fact that within the city, a pro-Spartan faction existed which may have contacted A g i s prior to his arrival in " H o l l o w E l i s " .  Whether or not this was true,  3 6 0  Agis decided not to spend time trying to capture the city by force, and he continued his march past the city to the port town o f Kyllene. He may have thought that by taking this important port and disrupting its contact with Elis, he could force Elis to agree to terms. Prior to marching toward Kyllene, Agis may have been assured that the pro-Spartan faction would take control o f the city o f Elis and hand it over to h i m peacefully. In fact, the leader o f the pro-Spartan party, Xenias, was a friend o f A g i s and proxenos o f the Spartans in Elis. A g i s had every reason to believe that he would have help from within the c i t y .  361  Xenophon recorded a story to describe the dissension o f the Elean government and the presence o f Spartan sympathizers among the Eleans. A man named Xenias, "who measured out with a bushel the money he had received from his father," armed himself and his party and began a slaughter. Xenias was among the more wealthy o f the Elean citizens and according to Xenophon "wanted to receive credit" for handing the city over to the Lakedaimonians. He began the slaughter o f Eleans and killed a man "who resembled  Olympian Zeus and the collection of tribute from allied cities such as Lepreon. Xenophon's credibility on this point is certain, for he was a friend of the Spartan government and of the future King Agesilaos (Agis' brother), his boys were raised in the Spartan system, and he even lived on an estate given to him by Sparta in Skillous, an Elean town. See OCD 1628-1629. See G.L. Cawkwell, Xenophon: A History of My Times. (New York: Harmondsworth, 1979), 12-5. See also, J.K. Anderson, Xenophon. (New York, 1974); J. Dillery, Xenophon, A History of his times. (London, 1995). But it is admitted that Xenophon did present the reasons for the war in a way to exonerate his friends (Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 1 lOff; Cartledge, Agesilaos, 252ff.). Paus. 3. 8. 3; Cartledge, Agesilaos, 256. 3 6 0  M  3 6 1  90  Thrasydaios, the leader o f the commons."  362  The people believed that their leader had been  killed, as did the followers o f Xenias, but, "it chanced that Thrasydaios was still asleep at the very place where he had become drunk."  3 6 3  The demos rallied around their leader  Thrasydaios, who avenged the slaughter and expelled the Spartan sympathizers who then found refuge with the L a k e d a i m o n i a n s .  364  Meanwhile, Agis crossed the Alpheios and  returned home after leaving a garrison under Lysippus at Epitalion. There are four possible reasons for A g i s ' decision to leave Eleia. First, the end o f the agricultural summer season was at hand and by disbanding the Spartan army, A g i s avoided any further discontent from allied members who had already gone through a lengthy war. Second, the Spartan army was not prepared for siege warfare and the towns o f Kyllene and Pheia were both walled. Third, though not in control o f the city, the pro-Spartan faction was still present there. W i t h a garrison close to Elis in the countryside, A g i s was assured that pressure would continue to be put on Elis. A n d fourth, by leaving a garrison in the vicinity o f Elis, he had assured Sparta o f access to Olympia and convinced the Pisatans, Triphylians, and Akroreians that they were liberated from E l i s .  3 6 5  For the rest o f the summer, the Spartan troops under Lysippus continued to plunder the area. According to Xenophon, the Elean leader Thrasydeaus was left with no alternative but to come to an agreement with the authorities at Sparta. Before this happened, however, there was a third invasion, this time by Pausanias. This campaign was not mentioned by  Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 27-28. Ibid. Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 27-29. If Elis were without fortifications, then it is possible that Agis could have marched directly into the city and installed his own government. Either there were some fortifications that were sufficint enough to dissuade Agis from doing this, or he chose to force the Eleans to comply with the Spartans demands without any more conflict. 3 6 2  3 6 3  364  3 6 5  91  Xenophon but by Diodorus, whose account lacks any mention o f the expeditions by Agis that were described by X e n o p h o n .  366  In Diodorus' account, Pausanias led an army o f four thousand men, including contingents from all the allies, except Korinth and Boiotia.  Pausanias first took Lasion, a  town that bordered Arkadia, and then captured four other towns: Thraistos, Halion, Epitalion, and Opos. Afterward, he headed north and captured Pylos en route to Elis and encamped across the Peneus River. Elis, however, had recently acquired one thousand mercenaries from A i t o l i a and was prepared to defend itself. Pausanias' attack on Elis was disorganized and the Lakedaimonians suffered a defeat when the Elean and Aitolian mercenaries sallied forth from the city. Pausanias concluded that the city was too strongly defended and so plundered the countryside instead. Since it was wintertime, Pausanias set up fortified outposts and left to camp for the season at Dyme, in northwestern Eleia. Diodorus broke off his narrative at this point and did not mention the Elean war again until he recorded the Elean surrender to the Spartans. The nature o f this invasion differed from the first two by K i n g A g i s . Pausanias invaded from the west, through Arkadia, and the first place he captured was Lasion, a border town.  368  Lasion was mentioned separately in the peace terms and was, like Lepreon, an  Tuplin and Roy agree on this order of events. Unz, however, would place the invasion under Pausanias in the next season and the peace in the year after that. But also, Unz's view that the war did not end until 399 does not account for the Olympic games of c. 400. Tuplin, however, assigns Pausanias' invasion right after Agis' second, and although it squeezes a lot into one season, it is still feasible. The only difficulty with this interpretation is that Xenophon had Agis leaving posts and garrisons and there is no mention in Diodorus that Pausanias collected the troops that were already stationed in Eleia. Diodorus' differs from Xenophon's and it may have been taken from the anonymous Oxyrhnchus historian since it concerns years covered by this historian (see Unz, "Chronology," 32; Roy, "Perioikoi," 320, n. 119). See also, I.A.F. Bruce, An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, (Cambridge, 1967), 20-22. According to Xenophon, Elis was supposed to leave Lasion independent. But when Pausanias invaded Elis, Lasion was the first town that he captured. Elis must not have, therefore, given up Lasion. It is possible that the aim of Pausanias' campaign was to reinforce the terms of the treaty that Elis had obviously violated, such as the independence of Lasion. 3 6 6  3 6 7  3 6 8  92  important objective.  The acquisition o f the Aitolian mercenaries indicates that Elis was  expecting a Spartan attack; Elis would not have paid for such a force otherwise. also the possibility that Elis was walled by the time o f Pausanias' invasion.  371  370  There is  But even i f the  existence o f walls is rejected, the army o f Pausanias still had to cross the river and reckon with Elean and Aitolian forces, something that Agis did not have to face. Thus, the defensive position o f Elis during the time o f Pausanias' invasion was stronger than when A g i s invaded. Furthermore, with the exception o f Pausanias' capture o f Epitalion, the majority o f Pausanias' efforts were, according to Diodorus, in Akroreia and Koile Elis. A g i s , on the other hand, had focused on liberating the south and gaining access to Olympia. It seems likely that the campaign o f Pausanias continued where A g i s ' had left off. The final difference is that when Agis left Elis, he had garrisoned Epitalion, a community fourteen kilometers west o f Olympia. It has to be assumed that the Eleans recaptured Epitalion at some point, since Diodorus' version mentions that Pausanias also captured it. It is likely that Pausanias 372  marched south o f his initial entry point to regain this city and the other communities. The terms that Elis eventually agreed to were much harsher than the original ultimatum. There were three general conditions o f the final agreement: freedom for the perioikoi, the dissolution o f the Eleans' naval potential, and Spartan access to the Olympic Games. The sources all agree that the Eleans agreed to leave the perioikoi autonomous. Xenophon listed the following communities: the Triphylian towns o f Phrixa and Epitalion,  369  Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 30.  As Unz noted, at three obols a day this force would have cost Elis two and a half talents per month, ("Chronology," 33 note 11). The Eleans later agreed to tear these down in the peace terms. Another possibility is that Xenophon had attributed to Agis' campaign something that belonged to Pausanias' since both set up garrisoned forts. 3 7 0  3 7 1  3 7 2  93  the Letrinians, Amphidolians, Marganians, Akrorians, and the town o f Epion.' Xenophon also noted Lasion, which the Arkadians subsequently claimed. Elis desperately tried to hold onto 373  some o f its towns, such as Epion, claiming that it had purchased them. Diodorus' narrative records the terms that the Eleans actually agreed to, while Xenophon's version lists the Spartan demands. Diodorus added that the Eleans were to surrender their triremes. There seems to be little doubt that E l i s ' potential as a maritime city was checked and its fleet and ports opened to Sparta.  374  In Xenophon's version, Elis was required to destroy the walls o f Pheia and Kyllene. Although this was not part o f the original ultimatum reported by our three sources, there is 375  good reason to believe that Sparta demanded this prior to the final surrender o f Elis.  The  demolition o f the walls provided Sparta with freedom to use the Elean ports and not be prevented from doing so by the Eleans. Falkner proposes that when Sparta forced war upon the Eleans, it did so in order to gain access to these and there is sufficient support for this view.  376  Prior to the Elean War, the ports were valuable for the Spartan naval strategy and,  after the war, Sparta once again needed access to the west coast and its reliable harbors inorder to provide aid to Dionysos o f Syracuse.  377  The terms of the treaty and what they reveal about the status of the perioikoi of Elis has recently been discussed by Roy, "Perioikoi," 299-304. The Peloponnesian League, as Loomis has shown (op.cit. page 90), depended less on cash payments than on troop and ship contributions. Thus, the ships could have served as payment for the Peloponnesian War costs that Sparta had, in Diodorus' account, demanded. According to Missiou-Ladi's study of Greek interstate diplomacy, plenipotentiary ambassadors carried out diplomacy in wartime in regard to terms such as Elis agreed to here ("Coercive diplomacy.") Falkner, "Sparta and the Elean War, c. 401/400 B.C.: Revenge or Imperialism," Phoenix 50 (1996): 22-24. For the importance of Kyllene and Pheia, see above pages 55ff. During the Syracusan campaign, the Spartans utilized Tainaron to transport troops to Sicily (Thuc. 7. 19. 4), Gylippos met with the Korinthians to discuss how to quickly transport troops there and used Asine as an anchorage (Thuc. 6. 93. 2-3). The route to Sicily began at Leukas (Thuc. 6. 104. 1) and the ships took the same route home (Thuc. 8. 13. 1). Thus, the Korinthians and the entrance to the Gulf were crucial for Spartan interests in Sicily. Elis' ports would have removed the necessity for the Gulf and Asine or Tainaron.  3 7 3  3 7 4  3 7 5  3 7 6  3 7 7  94  The need for a western port to assist the Syracusan tyrant Dionysios could have, as Falkner proposed, been one o f the causes o f the Elean War. A t the end o f the Peloponnesian War, the Syracusans had asked both the Korinthians and the Spartans for aid against Dionysios, whose brother had gone to directly to Sparta with the intention o f hiring mercenaries.  378  379  Dionysios, according to Plutarch, had previously received help from the Spartans. A l s o , a rift between Sparta and Korinth was developing,  380  and in Sicily, Korinth was now  supporting the democratic faction against Dionysios. W i t h Korinthian support o f the opposition, it is unlikely that Spartan vessels would have risked sailing from Leukas to Sicily.  3 8 1  Another port that was closer to Sparta and provided access to Sicily would,  according to Falkner, be the impetus for the Spartan invasion into Eleia.  3S2  Once Elis was  forced to surrender, Thrasydeaus made the concession that agreed "to dismantle the fortifications o f Pheia and Kyllene, and to leave the Triphylian towns o f Phrixa and Epitalion independent. . ." (Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 30). The dismantling o f walls was a common demand by Greek states when they defeated another city and the walls around the two ports were destroyed, regardless o f whether or not this was an intention o f the Spartan expeditions. Although Xenophon does not explicitly say that the city was fortified, there is a possibility that the city o f Elis had walls. I f so, it is not  D.S. 14. 8. 1-2; Poly. 5. 8. 2. Aretas, a Spartiate, sailed to Syracuse in 403 to help Dionysios and a while later Lysander, the Spartan admiral, also sailed there. Korinth had refused to assist the Spartan campaign under King Pausanias against Athens and thought that Sparta wanted only to control the territory of Athens for itself. See also Xen. Hell. 2.4.30; see Justin 5.10.12-13, where it is recorded that the Korinthians and Thebans wanted to share the war booty but that Sparta would not permit this. They had used Leukas earlier when Gyllipus sailed to Sicily. Although Leukas was situated outside of and north of the Korinthian Gulf, it was often used by the Korinthians. See Thuc. 7. 31. 1; D.S. 14. 10. 3-4. Falkner, "Sparta and the Elean War," 22. 3 7 9  3 8 0  3 8 1  3 8 2  95  surprising that the Eleans were required to dismantle them.  In regard to this only Pausanias  unequivocally recorded that the Eleans agreed to "tear down their walls." The text of Xenophon  regarding  this  is  a<pEac, T E T O T E T X O C TTEPIEXETV K C U  Opi^av UTCCI$  KCCI  'EiriTdAiov  problematic.  KuAAriv'riv  KCCI A E T P E V O U C KCCI  Kai 'AKpcopEiouc, K O I Aaaicova  TOV  (Hell. 3. 2. 30). The problem begins with  The  KOC\ TOCC  text  TpicpuAiBac  'AiicpiSoAouc  KOC\  in  question  is:  d9Elvai  TTOAEIC.  MapyavEccc, Trpoc 8 E  TO  uTr"ApKd5cov avTiAsyonEVov  acpEccs.  If this is the proper reading, then it could  mean that either "they (the Eleans) should dismantle the walls and release Kyllene and the Triphylian communities . . ." or "they should destroy the wall and Kyllene . . ." If Kyllene were destroyed, the Eleans would have been left with Pheia, the other important harbor. It seems more likely that both harbors were intended and the emendation o f spheas to Pheas is, therefore, correct. Nowhere else does Xenophon use the form spheas, and clearly the destruction o f only one port's walls would not entirely limit the E l e a n s .  384  Furthermore, a  walled city o f Elis contradicts the statement by Xenophon (see Hell. 3. 2. 27) that Agis found the city without any walls to defend it. But regardless o f the textual problem, there has been an attempt to show that Elis may have been fortified. According to Cawkwell, Xenophon's statement (cf. 3. 2. 27) was a reference to the acropolis, indicating that the city was fortified. He argues that Agis could possibly have taken the city, but not the acropolis.  385  This does not, however, seem to be the  most likely scenario. Xenophon's wording was meant to show that Agis was unwilling, not unable. Another possibility, argued by U n z , is that there were no walls when Agis invaded  See Xen. Hell. 2. 2. 22 (Sparta's demand on Athens in 404); Thuc. 4.51.1 (Athens' demand on Chios in 425/4); Thuc. 4. 133. 1 (Thebes and Thespia in 423); Thuc. 5.83.1 (Sparta and Argos in 418/7). For more on the textual problem, see "Perioikoi," 300-301. G.L. Cawkwell, "Agesilaos and Sparta," CQ 26 (1976): 75 and n.48. 3 8 3  3 8 4  3 8 5  96  but by the time o f Pausanias' invasion, the Eleans had built some fortifications. Diodorus' 386  narrative, according to U n z , requires that there were w a l l s /  0 0  This view, however, requires  that significant time elapsed between the second campaign o f Agis and the invasion under Pausanias. Krentz, following U n z , suggests that the walls could have been built during the war, a sort o f ad hoc fortification.  387  According to U n z , "Pausanias was approaching from the 388  north and most o f the city lay south o f the Peneus," and only part o f the city was walled. Tuplin, however, has shown that Diodorus' wording (poliorkein and poliorkia to describe Pausanias' attack on the city) does not imply that the city had walls, for the same words were used by Dionysos to describe the Theban attacks on Sparta in 3 6 9 .  389  I believe that the city  did not have any fortifications when Agis attacked. But after A g i s left Elis, the Eleans erected fortifications so that when Pausanias invaded, there were walls. Because there was not much time separating the invasions o f Agis and Pausanias, these fortifications had to have been erected h a s t i l y .  390  Although Elis was one o f the few Greek cities without  significant walls or fortifications, the use o f the city's buildings and houses could have been used as part o f the perimeter fortifications in emergencies.  391  Jurisdiction over Olympia was not mentioned in the original ultimatum, although Agis did sacrifice there during his second invasion. In addition, the exclusion o f Sparta from the Olympic Games is mentioned by all three sources as one o f the main causes for the war. Unz, "Elean War," 33. P. Krentz, Xenophon Hellenika II.3-IV.2.8. (Warminster, 1995), 175. Unz, "Elean War," 32-33. Tuplin, The Failings of Empire, 202-3. Winter has noted that the Peloponnesian War taught the Greek the importance of fortfications and that by c. 400 Greek cities were better fortified than before the war broke out (F.E. Winter, Greek Fortifications [Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1971], 308). In 321 foreigners seized the Elean acropolis and built walls within a month (D.S. 19. 87. 2-3) See also D.S. 14. 17. 12 for walls built within a short period of time. The wall across the Isthmus in 480 was also built quickly (Hdt.8. 71. 2; 9. 7. 1). 3 8 6 3 8 7  3 8 8  3 8 9  3 9 0  97  Xenophon recorded that the Spartans allowed the Eleans to maintain supervision because the local inhabitants, the Pisatans, were incompetent. Most likely, control o f Olympia was not 392  part o f the terms o f the original ultimatum; instead it was a post-war development.  Perhaps  the pro-Spartan faction in Elis was able to broker the continuance o f control over the religious center. Deprived o f its symmachy, tribute, navy, and fortifications at its ports, Elis maintained its city center and control over the Olympic G a m e s .  393  E l i s ' losses highlight the extent to which it had grown. The surprise is how easily it seemed to fall to the Spartans. The reason for this was the way in which Elis had built its hegemony. Most o f the, cities had been taken by force and were not enthusiastic about Elean leadership. The Elean failure to secure their loyalty cost the Eleans greatly since they was left to defend their entire region with their own troops (and some mercenaries). A s previously stated, without allied support Elis could not stand against Sparta. In addition to its former dependent allies, it had .now (c. 400) become a member o f the Peloponnesian League. It must have sworn at this time the same oath that Athens had in 404: "to have the same friends and enemies and follow the Spartans wherever Sparta leads."  The Road to Leuktra  In the years following the Elean War, Elis remained a quiet participant in the Peloponnesian League, while Spartan power in Greece continued to flourish. The other city  See A.W. Lawrence, Greek Aims in Fortification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) 126ff. Lawrence notes that Sparta too was without walls, but when attacked used the natural terrain and its own buidlings as make-shift fortifications. Xen.//e//. 3.2. 31. This may have been due to the lenient policy of Pausanias (Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 11 Off). Contrast this 3 9 1  3 9 2  3 9 3  98  states, specifically Korinth and Athens, grew increasingly apprehensive about the emerging Spartan empire. These fears eventually led to the outbreak o f the Korinthian War between Sparta and the Confederacy o f Korinthians, Athenians, Argives, and Thebans in 395/4.  394  Elis supported the Peloponnesian League forces at the Battle o f Nemea in 394, as did its former symmachoi, " A s for hoplites, there had gathered together o f the Lakedaimonians about six thousand, o f the Eleans, Triphylians, Akroreians, and Lasionians almost three thousand . . ."(Xen. Hell. 4.2.16). Sparta eventually succeeded in keeping the Isthmus open but due to the losses it incurred during the war, suffered damage to its reputation as the premier military p o w e r .  395  But in 387, Sparta was the beneficiary o f what is now known  asthe K i n g ' s Peace. The terms o f this peace were that the Hellenic cities in A s i a were to be subjects o f the K i n g and that all other cities in Greece were to be left autonomous.  396  Along  with this, Sparta gained the support o f Persia and with it, the necessary means to be able to enforce the terms.  397  A s long as the autonomy clause was upheld and enforced, Elis would  never be able to regain its former dependent states and the regional hegemony it once enjoyed. The K i n g ' s Peace, c. 387/6, ended the hostilities o f the Korinthian war and offered autonomy to all Greek communities.  398  It did not, however, provide any mechanism to deal  with alleged transgressions o f the terms o f the peace nor did it designate who would enforce  with the dioikism of Mantinea in 385 (Xen. Hell. 5.2.27). See S. Perlman, "The Causes and Outbreak of the Korinthian War, " CQ 14 (1964): 64-81. Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 219ff. For the Spartan use of the autonomy clause in the fourth century, see Bosworth, "Autonomia," 127ff. Xen. Hell. 5. 1.31. The terms of the peace were proposed by a Spartan, Antalkidas, and the aim was to break up this new confederacy. Xenophon (Hell. 5. 135) wrote: "Now while in war the Lakedaimonians were no more than holding their own with their antagonists, yet as a result of the so-called Peace of Antalkidas they gained a far more distinguished position. For by having become champions of the treaty proposed by the King and establishing the independence of the cities they gained an additional ally in Korinth, made Boiotian cities independent of the Thebans, a thing which they had long desired, and also put a stop to the doings of the Argives in appropriating 3 9 4  3 9 5  3 9 6  3 9 7  99  the peace. So, Sparta chose to interpret the terms of the peace on its own and to enforce them by itself if necessary. Sparta used this opportunity to re-established its control of the Peloponnesos: "Now while in war the Lakediamonians were nomore than holding their own with their antagonists, yet as a result of the so-called Peace of Antalkidas (the King's Peace), they gained a far more distinguished position" (Xen.  Hell.  5. 2. 1). Sparta first checked the  growth of Mantinea by forcing it to tear down its walls, then it went after Phlious and Olynthus. The culmination of the policy was the seizure of the Theban Kadmeia in 383 by 399  a Spartan general, Phoebidas.  400  Despite the signing of the King's Peace, Sparta's aggressive atttidute towards the other Greeks, epitomized by the antagonistic interference in Thebes, led to more hostilities between it and the other Greeks. In 371, the major states convened in Sparta to sign another treaty. The refusal of Thebes to sign this peace led to the Spartan invasion of Boiotia and the battle at Leuktra. This treaty was based upon the main principle of the King's Peace, autonomy for all Greek cities  4 0 1  But it also included a clause stipulating that the cities were no longer required  to provide aid to others if they chose not to.  402  This clause absolved the members of the  Peloponnesian League from the requirement to supply troops and other aid to the Peloponnesian forces. Nevertheless, Elis still supported the League at the battle of Leuktra in 371. I believe this was due to Elean fear of the repercussions from Sparta should they not  Korinth as their own . ..." For more on the King's Peace, see note 677. Xen. Hell. 5.2ff. For a detailed account of Sparta's campaings against Mantinea, Phlious, and Olynthus, see Agesilaus, 129-150. See also, D.S. 15.12, 20. Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 25-36; Plut. Ages. 23. 3-7, 24. 2; D.S. 15. 20-1-3; Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 141 ff. Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 2-3; Plut. Pelop. 20. 1; D.S. 15. 50. 4; Ryder, KoineEirene, 63-65; "Athenian Foreign Policy and the Peace-Conference at Sparta in 371 B.C." CQ, n.s. 13 (1963): 237-41; Agesilaus, 200ff. Xcn.Hell.6. 3. 18-19. 3 9 8  3 9 9  4 0 0 4 0 1  4 0 2  100  offer their support. Even though the clause provided Elis with a choice, in reality, Spartan might undermined it.  403  The Spartan army was soon overwhelmingly defeated at the Battle of Leuktra and the Peloponnesian League finally came to an end. The Athenians, "taking thought of the fact 404  that the Peloponnesians still counted themselves bound to follow the Lakedaimonians, and that the latter were not yet in the same situation to which they had brought the Athenians, invited to Athens all the cities which wished to participate in the peace which the King had sent down" (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 1). One would expect the Eleans to have been pleased at this since it would have released them from Spartan control; however, they were not: "all the others were pleased with the oath; the Eleans only opposed it, saying that it was not right to make either the Marganians, Skilluntians, or Triphylians independent, for these cities were theirs" (6. 5. 1). This is evidence that Elis still retained hopes of rebuilding the regional hegemony it had lost in the Elean War, and any peace that recognized the autonomy of Greek towns would only hinder its plans. And so, the Eleans were the only ones, according to Xenophon, left out of the peace of 37 1  4 0 5  Even though the cities were to be autonomous, Sparta took the oath for itself and its allies. This shows that Sparta was still in charge of concluding treaties for its allies and that the allies were not wholly independent.  4 0 3  404  For the battle of Leuktra, the ancient sources are the following: Paus. 9. 13, D.S. 15. 52-56, Plut. Pelop. 23, and Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 6-17. Scholarship on the battle of Leuktra includes: G.Busolt, "Spartas Heer und Leuktra," Hermes XL (1905): 387-449, esp. 444-449. Pritchettt, Greek Topography, 49-58. N.G.L Hammond A History of Greece (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 161. M . Cary, "Notes on the d p t o T E i a of Thebes," JHS 42 (1922):184-191. J.K. Anderson Military Practice in the Age of Xenophon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 192-220. H. Delbruck A History of the Art of War, transl. by W.J. Renfroe jr., (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975). G.L. Cawkwell, "Epameinondas and Thebes," CQ 22 (1972),"The Decline of Sparta," CQ 33(1983): 385-400; 254-78. J.F. Lazenby The Spartan Army (Chicago: Bolchazy-Carducci, 1985), Ch.9. See also Cartledge, Agesilaos, 236ff; 382ff; Hamilton, Agesilaus, 236ff.; Buckler, The Theban Hegemony (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 49-69; C.J. Tuplin, "The Leuctra Campaing: Some Oustanding Problems," Klio 69 (1987): 72-107; V.D. Hanson, "Epameinondas, the Battle of Leuktra (371 B.C.), and the 'Revolution in Greek Battle Tactics," CA 7 (1988): 190-207. Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 2-4. Cf. Hamilton, Agesilaus, 216-17 for a narrative of events. 4 0 5  101  The Invasion of Lakonia and the end of Spartan Supremacy  After the battle o f Leuktra, almost all o f the Arkadians formed a Pan-Arkadian union, finally realizing that it was only possible to defeat Sparta i f they combined forces.  406  Elis also  realized this fact and when Mantinea began building its new walls as a result o f the Peace o f 371, Elis contributed three talents to help defray costs.  407  B y cooperating with Mantinea, Elis  gained a friend with similar goals for regional supremacy and freedom from Spartan interference. In addition, the fact that two former allies and neighbors o f Sparta were working together to solidify their independence was threatening to Sparta  4 0 8  Sparta opposed the Mantinean wall program and eventually marched against them. The Eleans once again supported the Mantineans with both troops and c a s h .  409  The Spartans  marched forth under K i n g Agesilaos to force Mantinea to destroy its walls. Elis and Mantinea  continued  their  resistance,  and  soon  the  Theban  army  arrived, led by  Epameinondas. The Eleans and Mantineans eventually persuaded h i m to invade L a k o n i a , and in 369, Sparta was invaded for the first time in over five hundred years.  411  410  The Eleans  were, according to Diodorus, important factors in convincing the Thebans to invade, and once the decision was made, the Eleans were also an important part o f the actual invasion  4 1 2  This aggressive attitude was reminiscent o f the period after the Peace o f Nikias when Elis seceded from the League. But this time, Elis would not make the same mistake by focusing  Mantinea and Tegea were two of the leading states, and most Arkadians joined, willing or not, by 369. Orchomenos and Heraia were two states that were forced into this new coalition (Dusanic, Arkadian League, Arkadian League, 290-293). See also, Nielsen, "Dependent Poleis, " 93-95. 4 0 6  4 0 7  Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 3.  4 0 8  The importance of a walled Mantinea and the specific threat to Sparta is considered in Chapter Three.  4 0 9  Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 19.  4 1 0  Hamilton, Agesilaus, 220-223. See Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 19.  4 1 1  Plut.Mor. 194b; Cf. Plut. Ages. 31. D.S. 15. 62. 3; 64.1 ff. Xen. Hell. 6. 9. 15; Cf. Hamilton, Agesilaus, 216ff; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia,  4 1 2  253ff.  102  on local interests. Instead, the Eleans valued the threat to Sparta's  position in the  Peloponnesos that was offered by a joint Theban-Peloponnesian invasion o f Lakonia. Spartan domination in the Peloponnesos came to an abrupt end; and as a result, the Peloponnesian League also ceased to exist. Afterwards, Elis struggled to recover its dependent allies and to try again to become the hegemon o f Eleia.  413  In 369, Elis was ruled by an anti-Spartan government but by 365, the pro-Spartans were once again in p o w e r .  414  A year later, in 364, the Eleans feuded with the Arkadians over  the rights to the former Elean dependent region o f Triphylia, the cities o f which Arkadia had admitted into their confederacy  4 1 5  Elis had not given up its hope to regain the symmachy it  worked hard to achieve and that Sparta destroyed in 400. The final proof o f this stubborn w i l l to resurrect its former hegemony is that in 362, because o f its feud with Arkadia over Triphylia and its fear o f Theban interference in the Peloponnesos, E l i s fought alongside Sparta at the Second Battle o f Mantinea in 3 6 2 .  416  • Theban power and interest in the Peloponnesos. faded away when their leader, Epameinondas, died in the battle. Although the Eleans were on the losing side at the battle, after the departure o f the Thebans from the Peloponnesos, Elis did not suffer any immediate repercussions. The Elean support o f Sparta at this Second Battle o f Mantinea in 362 was not an indication that Elis had rejoined any league. Instead, it was a sign that Elis did change its allegiances for its own political purpose: the preservation o f its symmachy in Eleia. In 362/1,  Elis clearly saw that with Sparta no longer backing the independence of the southern communities, such as Lepreon and the other Triphylians, it could achieve its goals. In 367, the King of Persia once again issued an order to Greece after the Greeks had decided to send envoys to Susa. In these terms, Elis was given control of Triphylia, although once the letter returned to Greece, the Arkadians refused to adhere to it and kept Triphylia. See Xen. Hell. 7.1.26; 35-38. See also Ryder, Koine Eirene, 80-82, 136 for a discussion of these terms. Cartledge, Agesilaos, 255. See Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 18; 7. 2. 5 for anti-Spartan activity. For pro-Spartan activity, see Xen. Hell. 7.4. 13,15). Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 13-32; D.S. 15. 77.1-4. For a discussion on the changes of policy in the Arkadian Confederacy, see also W.E. Thompson, "Arcadian Factionalism in the 360's," Historia 32 (1983): 149-60.  4 1 3  4 1 4  4 1 5  103  Elis entered into an alliance with Athens, Arkadia (not all o f the Arkadians, but the Mantineans and their allies), Phlious, and Akhaia. The alliance promised mutual defensive aid and that i f attacked, each polis would control coalition forces within their territory.  417  Summary  B y the end o f the sixth century, Elis had extended its influence south into the territory of the Pisatans where it took control o f the Olympic sanctuary. A s I have shown above, around the same time that the Eleans gained control o f Olympia in the sixth century, they also began to develop their own symmachy within Eleia. Some o f its allies were forced into this symmachy, but others concluded treaties o f alliance with E l i s . B y the time the Peloponnesian League was formed, c. 505, the Elean symmachy was already functional. Despite its long-standing alliance with Sparta, Elis tended to focus on its own local issues, particularly the preservation and expansion o f its symmachy. During the Persian wars, for example, the Eleans responded to the threat to the Peloponnesos and their own territory and did not support the Spartan-led war effort to the best o f their abilities. After the Persian wars, they continued their expansion up to the Messenian border and secured the allegiance of the remainder o f the communities in southern Eleia. Elean dissatisfaction with Sparta's leadership followed soon after the start o f the Peloponnesian War. Discontentment among the allies o f Elis, exemplified by the refusal o f Lepreon to pay its tribute to Elis, sparked a feud between Elis and Sparta. In 421, Elis refused to agree to the terms o f the Peace o f Nikias. Sparta's garrisoning o f Lepreon threatened E l i s '  4 1 6  Xen. Hell. 7. 5. Iff.; Hamilton, Agesilaus, 244.  104  autonomy and authority. This episode, I have argued, was indicative o f the Elean-Spartan relationship; E l i s ' symmachy had grown too large and Spartan fear for its own security prompted it to interfere in Eleia. Elis, on the other hand, fought for its right to control Eleia and allied itself to Argos, Mantinea, and Athens in 420. Elis'  focus was not, however, the perpetuation  o f this new alliance but  the  preservation o f its own symmachy. In particular, it hoped to regain Lepreon. This shortsighted and selfish approach became apparent in 419, when the allies agreed to attack Tegea instead o f Lepreon and the Eleans removed their support o f three thousand troops. The Eleans arrived too late at the battle o f Mantinea in 418 and soon thereafter, E l i s lost its allied assistance. Without the proper support, the Eleans were, in 400, forced to dissolve their symmachy and were re-enrolled into the Peloponnesian League. But in 370, after Spartans had been defeated at Leuktra, Elis once again found the support it needed to remain free from Spartan leadership and interference. This time the Eleans supported the other Peloponnesians with the foresight to invade Lakonia and end Spartan domination in the Peloponnesos. Elis controlled a large area o f the Peloponnesos, and although it did not share a border with Sparta, the growth o f its symmachy was alarming to the Spartans. I have shown that the initial loose structure o f the Peloponnesian League allowed a state such as Elis to expand within a region and develop its own set o f allies. The Elean symmachy could and did exist alongside Sparta's.Peloponnesian League. Furthermore, Elean allegiance was to any ally that helped them to maintain their freedom and allowed them to preserve their Elean symmachy. The actions o f the Eleans at Plataia, after the Peace o f Nikias, at the First Battle o f Mantinea  Harding, P. From the end of the Peloponnesian War to the battle oflpsus, translated documents of Greece and Rome, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) no.56. See also Dusanic, Arkadian League,  4 1 7  105  in 418, and during the invasion of Lakonia in 370/369 are indicative of Elis' preoccupation with its own symmachy. Its shortsightedness, unfortunately, prohibited it from achieving this goal of maintaining its position in Eleia. A combination of Spartan fears and the Elean desire to maintain its symmachy led to a rift between Sparta and Elis, one of its oldest Peloponnesian allies. Elis was not the only Peloponnesian city-state to conclude an alliance with Sparta prior to c. 505. Tegea, Sparta's closest neighbor, was also a Spartan ally as early as the midsixth century (c. 550). Like Elis, Tegea had its own allies and its own regional symmachy that coexisted with its involvement in the Peloponnesian League. But as long as the Tegean government was ruled by a pro-Spartan oligarchy, the Tegean symmachy was never a threat to the Spartans. The development of the Tegean symmachy and the Tegean-Spartan alliance is the subject of the Chapter Two.  128-135.  106  Chapter Two Tegea and Southern A r k a d i a  Tegea and Southern Arkadia A r k a d i a occupied the central region o f the Peloponnesos. T . H . Nielsen has identified sixty-eight  settlements within A r k a d i a .  4 1 8  Twenty-two  o f these were members o f the  Peloponnesian League, including Orchomenos and Mantinea in the north, and Tegea in the south. Tegea was situated i n a wide, open plain on top o f a plateau with the Parthenion mountains to the east and Mount Mainalos to the west. Herodotus referred to the Tegean plain as: T O T T E S ( O V T O T C O V Teyer)TEcov (Hdt. 1. 66. 4 ) .  4 1 9  The Pythia at Delphi, according  to Herodotus, called it a K C C A O V TTEBI'OV and stated: E O T I T i g ' A p K a 5 i r i s TsyEr] Aeupcp EVI X ^ p k p (Hdt. 1. 6 7 ) .  420  Herodotus (8. 124 .3) also noted that Tegea bordered L a k o n i a in  the south. In the north, Tegean territory was bordered by Mantinean l a n d s ,  421  and by A r g i v e  T . H . Nielsen, "Arkadia," (forthcoming), in M.H. Hansen and T.H. Nielsen, eds., in Inventory of Poleis in Arkadia in the Archaic and Classical Periods. See also, Nielsen, "Arkadia. City-Ethnics and Tribalism," CPCActs 3 (1996): 117-163; Nielsen, "Dependent Poleis," 63-105. Nielsen believes that all Arkadian communities were members of the Peloponnesian League by the end of the sixth century (Nielsen, "Dependent Poleis, " 104; 87). Some of these were enrolled as independent poleis while others entered the league via their membership in tribal organizations (Ibid, 103). For example, Dipaia's membership is assumed by Nielsen because of its affiliation with the Mainalian tribe which was a member of the Peloponnesian League (Nielsen, "Dependent Poleis," 87). In actuality, only six of the sixty-eight communities identified by Nielsen are substantiated by the ancient sources as members of the League. These were the following: Heraia (Thuc.5. 67. 1); Kleitor (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 36-37); Mantinea (Thuc. 5. 29. 2; Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 3); Orchomenos (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 37; Thuc.5. 61. 4; 6. 3. 2); Tegea (Thuc. 2. 67. 1; 5. 32. 3; 57. 2; Xen. Hell. 4. 2. 13); Oresthasion (Hdt. 9.11.2; Thuc. 5. 64. 3). For the rest, either the evidence is lacking or their membership is assumed because of their affiliation with tribes or larger poleis that were members of the Peloponnesian League. Cf. Thuc.5. 64. 1-4. Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 6, 15. 418  4 , 9  Cf. Simonides, 123, 122 (E. Diehl, ed.). See also, Paus.8. 44. 8-8. 54. 5; Strabo. 8. 8. 2; A. Philipson, Die Griechischen Landshaften (Frankfurt, 1959), vol. III. 1, 257; Hiller v. Gaertringen, Tegea, in RE (1934): 107118. See also Strabo 8. 8. 4. For Mantinea, see Hodkinson, Mantinike, 242-6. For the borders of Tegea with Mantinea, Orchomenos, and Pallantion, I have followed Forsen's model, see map 3 (Forsen, "Population and Political Strength of Some Southeastern Arkadian Poleis," PCPC 5 (2000): 49-51).  4 2 0  4 2 1  107  territory in the east. To the southwest was Messenia, but to the west was more Arkadian 422  territory, known later as the plain of Megalopolis. This area was occupied by the Mainalian tribes and included what Pausanias called the Manthuric plain  4 2 3  ORCHOMENOS ^  I  THIS0A  -  /  . ' ' ,.„.,.,,..  MANTINEA  i  TEUTHIS •  \|. Mount  ^  Rapounl  I  ^  -  I  EUTRESIA '  .  •  -  -  ,K  s  -MAINALIA  /  ACTION/  v . ; ^ <  S  L E U K T R O f  l  M A L E A ' ' ' ' / ^ *  1  \  I  N  r"-'" c ^EUTAIA  ^ORESTHASION  x  vV*  U  .  " " " " "  » • ^V'°,»TEGEA  ^ PERAITHEIS ^ \.„„ :„,.;-.ASEA - . '•HAIMONIAI • "•T,::,™..  s  V  '  PARRHASIA  -~$£Z»  . •" y  • . . j , /  » "V 1  v  ""H  * BELMINA  Map 2: Tegean Territory* 422  Strabo 8. 8. 3. Paus.8. 44. 5-7. See also Forsen, "Population and Political Strength," 46. The major Mainalian communities were Eutaia, Asea, Oresthasion, Haimoniai, and Pallantion. * From B . Forsen, "Population and Political Strength, 47.  4 2 3  108  M a p 3: The Peloponnesos and A r k a d i a  H. Kiepert. Atlas antiquus; twelve maps of the ancient world. Boston, Leach, Shewell, & Sanborn, 1899.  Herodotus (Hdt. 7. 202, 204) implies that Tegea was a polis as early as c.550 and according to Nielsen, Herodotus' use o f the toponym Tegea (Hdt. 1. 66. 3) may indicate that by 550 it was a polis.  424  different demes.  425  Strabo recorded that a synoikism occurred that included nine  Unfortunately, there is no indication as to when this took place or i f it had  any political significance or effects. Furthermore, there is no documentation that reveals the archaic and classical constitutions o f the Tegeans. Nevertheless, a l l indications support the notion that an oligarchic government existed and governed Tegea until the democratic revolution o f 3 7 0 . by an o l i g a r c h y ,  427  426  The Tegean government was acceptable to Sparta because it too was run  and Tegea's oligarchic government facilitated associations with Sparta.  Tegea was one o f the major Arkadian poleis and was significantly larger than its nearest Arkadian rival, Mantinea. Forsen, using three different demographic methods, has shown that the population o f classical Tegea was between from 15,000 to 2 0 , 0 0 0 .  428  This was  Nielsen, "Arkadia," 45; "Arkadia. City-Ethnics," 128-129. See also, C. Morgan, Early Greek State, 38 ff. Strabo. 8. 3. 2. See also Pausanias 8. 45. 1 where the names of the demes are given. In 370, Xenophon (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 6-9) reports that there was a civil stasis in which eight hundred oligarchs were expelled from the city and the demos came to power. Consequently, Tegea joined Mantinea and the Arkadian Confederacy and became a leading influence in the foundation of Megalopolis. This subsequent foundation of Megalopolis was a certain blow to Sparta's hope of regaining its hegemony in the southern Peloponnesos. Hamilton, Agesilaus, 223f.) The presence of a democratic faction is also supported by the events which occurred earlier, shortly before the Battle of Mantinea in 418. When the new, anti-Spartan coalition of 421, which was composed oi poleis with democratic constitutions, approached Tegea in 418, there were some Tegeans within the city, most likely democratic supporters, who were ready to betray their own city (Thuc.5. 62. 2). They did not succeed. During the sixth century, Tegea resisted Sparta's attempt to conquer southern Arkadia and, in the early fifth century, Tegea fought Sparta at the battles of Dipaia and Tegea. But these were most likely attempts to resist Spartan expansion, not indicators of a democratic government in Tegea (See Hdt. 9. 35).  4 2 4  4 2 5  4 2 6  Thucydides (1. 19) noted that Sparta set up oligarchies in other governments in order to maintain their loyalty and cooperation. Democratic governments were generally not well received by Sparta and when a democratic faction did take control of a Peloponnesian polis, it often acted contrary to Spartan policy. See also Chapter One, pages 14 to 16, for xenia and early political associations. See also, Thuc. 1. 19, 144,1; 5. 31. 6; Cartledge, "Origins," 224; Powell, Athens and Sparta, 101. Forsen, "Population and Political Strength," 35-55. Forsen used the following three methods to calculate the populations of ancient Tegea and Mantinea: historical statements, the size of urban centers, the capacity of territory. A fourth, alternative, method was used to compare the collected data with how many people were supported by the area at the end of the nineteenth century. In regard to Mantinea, Forsen found that its population could have been, at most, 10,000 to 18,000. Hodkinson and Hodkinson estimated Mantinea's population at 11,500 to 14,500. Orchomenos, another eastern Arkadian polis, had an estimated population of 6,000 to 8,000 (Hodkinson, Mantinike, 274-77; 286). Tegea, therefore, was the most populous Arkadian city.  4 2 7  4 2 8  110  substantially larger than M a n t i n e a ' s .  42y  In addition, the size o f Tegea's urban center was  much larger than Mantinea's. According to Forsen, the areas within the walls o f Tegea and Mantinea were, respectively, 190 ha. and 124 h a .  430  Strauss writes that competition and not unity was a typical feature o f inter-state relations in ancient Greece,  431  something that is especially true o f the history o f Tegea and its  closest neighbor, Mantinea. The most common source o f conflict between Mantinea and Tegea, Thucydides said, was the direction o f "the water," and the extensive damage it did in whosoever fields it f l o w e d .  432  Chrimes has shown that in antiquity, rivers and water were  often used to delineate the border between two states. Hence, the 'water' was most likely on the border and both peoples had access to it  4 3 3  The water i n question has been identified  three miles south o f the plain o f Mantinea, where the plain becomes narrow. Approximately two miles wide, the area is enclosed by two mountain ridges, Mytikas on the west and Kapnistra on the east. passages).  435  434  Here there were several depressions and katavothrai (underground  Near Tegea a stream, the Zanovistas, emerges and runs north into a katavothra,  near the western edge o f Mytikas. Another larger stream, the Sarandapotamos, also flows north o f Tegea and also empties into the sinkholes (katavothrai) on the border.  436  Concerning  these, Pritchett concludes that the Mantineans habitually dammed up the katavothrai so that the water flooded the Tegean plain, while the Tegeans would typically try to keep the channels opens so that the water would run through their fields and flood the Mantinean plain  See, for example, Thuc. 4. 134. Forsen, "Population and Political Strength," 40-41. Strauss, "The Art of Alliance," 132. Thuc. 5. 64. 5. K.T. Chrimes, Ancient Sparta, 56-83. For the topography, see Loring, "Ancient routes," 25-89; Fougeres, Mantinee, 39-52; 572-596; HCTW, 94ff. See also Kagan, Peace 11-133 and Pritchettt (cited below). Pritchettt, Greek Topography, 43.  4 2 9  4 3 0  4 3 1  4 3 2 4 3 3  4 3 4  4 3 5  Ill  instead.  But Kagan argues that since the plain o f Mantinea was lower, by about one  hundred feet, than the plain o f Tegea, the natural tendency would be for the plain o f Mantinea to become flooded, even i f the sinkholes were stopped u p .  438  Only by creating a  dike across the border large enough to prevent water from running into Mantinean territory did the Mantineans flood the Tegean land. According to Kagan, the Tegeans were most often the aggressors i n the 'water-war,' since it was an easier task for them to either divert the Sarandapotamos into the Zanovistas (see the accounts o f the battle o f Mantinea below), or as Pritchett believes, by keeping the sinkholes o p e n .  439  This issue caused the rivalry alluded to by Thucydides. Hodkinson and Hodkinson's research in Mantinea has shown that the surfeit o f water in the Mantinean plain (and the close-by Nestane plain) was problematic in antiquity; the issue in Mantinea was not a lack o f water but the excess o f water and the danger o f f l o o d i n g .  440  The threat o f flooding was,  therefore, serious to the economies o f Tegea and Mantinea. The issue over the water was a local one, and it may explain the general pattern o f Tegean-Mantinean political movements in the fifth and fourth centuries. Generally, but not always, whenever Tegea was friendly with Sparta, Mantinea was not, and whenever Tegea fought against Sparta, the Mantineans either remained neutral or provided aid to the Spartans. The contentious relationship was, I believe, apparent to Sparta. Since both Tegea and Mantinea were situated on the north-south axis o f the eastern Peloponnesos, Sparta needed at  Fougeres, Mantinee, 4Iff; Pritchettt, Greek Topography, 43ff. HCTW, 98. See also, C. Morgan, Early Greek State, 38ff. Ibid., 41-43. Pritchettt (42) does not think that the Sarandapotamos was the 'water' Agis diverted in 418 (Thuc.5. 65. 4). Lazenby thinks that it was the Sarandapotamos (Lazenby, Peloponnesian War, 120). For the course of the Sarandapotamos River, see Pritchettt, Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, part 1, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), 122-130. Kagan, Peace, 116-117. Ibid. Hodkinson and Hodkinson, "Mantinea," 266-267.  4 3 6  4 3 7  4 3 8  4 3 9  4 4 0  112  least one o f the cities (preferably both) as an ally in order to secure passage out o f Lakonia and into the Isthmus and central Greece.  441  This road was essential to Sparta's economy,  security, and safety. In order to secure the loyalty o f one, Sparta risked losing the friendship o f the other by adopting a 'divide-and-rule' p o l i c y .  442  In this way, the Spartans promoted the  antagonism between the Tegeans and Mantineans to ensure that they would not join together and confine the Spartans within Lakonia  4 4 3  The proximity o f Tegea to Sparta may have been  the reason why it and not Mantinea was usually Sparta's friend. But it w i l l be shown below that Tegea's rivalry with Mantinea was not confined to irrigation issues; it included conflicts over territorial rights that eventually erupted into armed conflict in the fifth century (see Thuc. 4. 131). Evidence suggests that Tegea was an early military power. It was able to defeat Sparta during the sixth century, supply hoplites at Thermopylae, and it fought valiantly during the Battle o f Plataia. Herodotus also recorded that during the first half o f the fifth century, the Tegeans had fought against the Spartans on two different occasions  4 4 4  The size  of their city and population provided the Tegeans with the resources to form a strong military, but it was its location that was most influential in its political development and expansion into southern Arkadia. Tegea was positioned at the intersection o f two important ancient routes: the northsouth route led from Argos to Sparta (through Mantinea) and the east-west route led to eastern Arkadia and the A r g o l i d and to western Arkadia and Elis. Adshead notes that Tegea  Cartledge, Agesilaos, 257; Amit, Poleis, 121; HCTYV, 97-98. See Powell, Athens and Sparta, 107; Cartledge, Agesilaos, 257. Incidentally, when the two did finally join together, an Arkadian Confederacy was started, Lakonia was invaded, and the Peloponnesian League was dissolved. Hdt. 9. 35.  4 4 1  4 4 2  4 4 3  4 4 4  113  was in fact, "the end o f the classical highway."  This location, especially its access to  Sparta, was beneficial for Tegea. I f Spartan forces needed to head north, they would ultimately pass through T e g e a .  446  Tegea's location was also influential in its expansion into  the southwestern region o f Arkadia. Some o f the communities in this area would later become part o f the Tegean symmachy. A s Tegea expanded in this area it conflicted with Mantinea. A s Forsen has shown, the population o f classical Mantinea was much smaller than Tegea's but because it needed to maintain its independence from Tegea as well as protect its lands, especially against Tegean influenced flooding, Mantinea did posses a strong military. This military may have been capable o f deterring any Tegean threat. W i t h Argos to the east, Lakonia to the south, and Messenia to the southwest, the only possible direction, for Tegean expansion was to the west where the Mainalian communities w e r e . communities and populations were much smaller than Tegea  4 4 8  447  The Mainalian  In fact, Tegea's urban center  alone was most likely fifteen times larger in area than the three largest Mainalian communities o f Asea, Oresthasion, and H a i m o n i a i .  449  B y the middle o f the fifth century,  Tegea was the leader o f a regional symmachia that most likely included all o f these Mainalian tribes. Tegea began to expand in southern Arkadia during the sixth century and  Adshead, Politics, 13. The road north from Tegea joined the main road that headed north through Mantinea and Orchomenos and eventually to the Isthmus of Korinth. There were two roads that led to the west. The northwestern route was arduous and passed beneath Mt. Mainalos and into northern Eleia. The other route headed directly west through Messenia and into southern Eleia (Ibid.). The same can be said concerning Mantinea and Orchomenos. Orchomenos was smaller than Mantinea but was strong enough to resist Mantinean expansion. For Mantinea, its only choice of expansion was the same as Tegea's, to the southwest into Mainalian (and Parrhasian) territory. See also Forsen, "Population and Political Strength," 51-55. The other large communities of Pallantion and Asea could have supported, at a most, about 2,000 to 3,000 people respectively (Forsen, "Population and Political Strength," 50-51). The areas of the Mainalian communities are the total community area, not the urban center enclosed by walls, which, according to Forsen, would have been even smaller (Forsen, "Population and Political Strength, 39-40). 4 4 5  4 4 6  4 4 7  4 4 8  4 4 9  114  continued this in the early fifth century, when it solidified its control over the Mainalian tribes.  450  Prior to gaining control of the southern communities o f Arkadia, Tegea would have  to resist Sparta's attempt to conquer Arkadia as it had Messenia.  Conflict with Sparta  Herodotus reported that prior to 550 Sparta fought numerous wars with its Arkadian neighbors, specifically Tegea, but that by the time Kroisos considered allying himself to the Greeks (c. 5 5 0 ) ,  451  Sparta was considered to be the "master o f the Peloponnesos."  Herodotus mentioned that the Tegeans were the only Arkadians to resist Spartan expansion. But the famous Tegean war that he placed during the reign o f Hegesicles and Leon (c. 580 to 560) was part o f a much larger conflict that had begun during the Second Messenian War and may have included other southern A r k a d i a n s .  453  After the final defeat o f the Messenians, Sparta became involved in Arkadia. The Arkadian town o f Phigalia was a close neighbor to the Messenian citadel o f Hira; both were situated on the upper part o f the Neda River where the only natural boundary between Arkadia and Messenia was the river. Phigalia was isolated from the other Arkadian towns by Mount Lykaion and was the only southwestern Arkadian town outside o f the Alpheios River valley. In fact, there is reason to believe that, at one time, it may have been a part o f  1 discuss the formation of the Tegean symmachia, which included Mainalia, below. On the development of a Mainalian tribe in response to Tegean pressure, see T.H. Nielsen, "Arkadia: City-Ethnics and Tribalism," CPCActs 2 (1996): 132-43); on the ability of Mainalians to form political unions and organizations, see Nielsen,  4 5 0  UoXXav EK TToAicov. The Polis Structure of Arkadia in the Archaic and Classical Periods, (Unpublished  Ph.D.-diss, University of Copenhagen, 1996), pages 147, 188-90; on the Mantinean and Tegean Leagues and the domination of Mainalia, see also, Nielsen, "Dependent Poleis, " 79-86. Forrest, Sparta, 73. Hdt. 1. 65 - 1. 68. Hdt. 1.65. 1. 4 5 1  4 5 2  4 5 3  115  Messenia and not A r k a d i a .  4 5 4  Not only did the two share a similar geographic location and  possibly a common heritage, but the early history o f Phigalia was closely related to that o f Hira. Pausanias stated that in the thirtieth Olympiad, c. 659, the Lakedaimonians attacked the Arkadians and captured P h i g a l i a .  455  Although Pausanias' dates for the fall o f both H i r a  and Phigalia are too early, he did preserve the close chronological connection between the fall o f the two towns, the former in 668 (cf. 4. 23. 5, and 4. 27 .9 where it is dated to c. 657) and the latter in 659 (8. 39. 3-5). The Messenian resistance ended when H i r a fell to Sparta c. 600,  456  and shortly thereafter, the Spartans captured the Arkadian town o f Phigalia  4 5 7  The  SIG , 183 (c. 350 ) where Phigalia was not part of Arkadia. However, later evidence indicates that it was considered part of Arkadia, see SIG , 239,col. Ill, line 45; 434 lines 26 and 39, (c. 266). The Phigalians, however, were soon aided by the people of Oresthaion and reclaimed their city (see Paus. 6. 39. 3-5). The fall of Hira did not actually occur until the end of the seventh century, c. 600, and was separate from the Tyrtaean war (H.T. Wade-Gery, "The 'Rhianos-Hypothesis'," in E. Badian, ed., Ancient society and institutions: studies presented to Victor Ehrenberg on his 75th birthday [Oxford: Blackwell, 1966], 289-302). The anecdote about the Theban general Epameinondas and how he boasted that he had founded Messene after 230 years of subjugation indicates that there was a major event c. 600, such as the fall of Hira. See Plut. Mor. 194B. See also Aelian V.H. 13. 42. The history of the Second Messenian War and the events that followed are obscured primarily by the lack of contemporary evidence, but also by the differing accounts of the authors (See L. Pearson, "The Pseudo-History of Messenia and its Authors," Historia 11 (1962): 397-426). In the First Messenian War (c.735 to 715), the Spartans invaded the central region of Messenia, conquered the Messenians, and reduced them to the status of Helots. This ended with the Messenians' last-stand at Mt. Ithome. In the Second Messenian War, the Spartans finished the total annexation of Messenia and the subjugation of the population by c.600. Pausanias (4. 23. 5) placed the beginning of the Second Messenian War c. 685 and believed that it was fought during the rule of the Spartan king Anaxidamus, and that it ended with the fall of Hira in the middle of the seventh century. (Paus. 4. 6. 2-5, 15. 1-3, 23. 5, 27. 9.) Rhianos, on the other hand, placed the war during the reign of the Spartan King Leotychides and refers to a different war than the Tyrtaean war. Pausanias, because he knew of only one king named Leotychides (c .491-469) corrected Rhianos by stating that the king was, in fact, Anaxidamas (Paus. 4. 15. 2). The problem is Pausanias' failure to recognize the existence of two Spartan kings with the same name (Leotychides) and that the fall of Hira was not part of the war that Tyrtaeus took part in. The first Leotychidas ruled from, according to Forrest, 625 to 600 (Forrest, Sparta, 21). Cartledge does not offer a date for the end of the Second Messenian War but seems to indicate that it was over by 625 (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 117). For the chronological problems, see the following: P. Treves, "The Problem of a History of Messenia, "JHS 64 (1948): 102-106; L. Pearson, "The Psuedo-History of the Messenia and its Authors," Historia 11 (1962): 389-424; W. Den Boer, "Political Propaganda in Greek Chronology," Historia 5(1950): 162-177; C. Starr, "The Credibility of Early Spartan History," Historia 14 (1965): 257-271; T. Kelly, "The Traditional Enmity Between Sparta and Argos: The Birth and Development of a Myth," AHR 75 (1970): 471-1003. 4 5 4  3  3  4 5 5  4 5 6  Forrest, although he placed the capture of Phigalia in 659, believes that it belonged to the same "context" as the Second Messenian War (Forrest, Sparta, 71); Wade-Gery agrees with this reckoning of the capture of the two and places the capture of Phigalia "soon after" that of Hira (Wade Gery, "Rhianos-Hypothesis," 297).  4 5 7  116  capture o f Phigalia was part o f the Spartan effort to secure the Messenian frontier after the Messenian War. 458  Phigalia would have been a suitable place o f refuge for the inhabitants o f Hira. Situated to the west, it was across the Neda River and downstream from Hira. Phigalia was isolated from the rest o f Arkadia, but not from the northern border o f Messenia, and therefore would have been a convenient spot for any Messenian in the vicinity o f H i r a to flee to. Following the river downstream would have led one out o f Messenia, away from the mountains, and into the environs o f Phigalia.  Cr*.*sk St-J<li»  M a p 4: Phigalia  The alternative spelling of Hira is Eira. R.E. Wycherley, ed., Pausanias. Description of Greece, vol. 5, Maps, Plans, Ilustrations and General Index, (reprint: 1935, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).  117  There is sufficient proof that the Arkadians did indeed provide aid and refuge to the Messenians.  459  A fragment from Kallisthenes suggests that fugitives from Messenia found  safe haven in Arkadia after the Second Messenian War. A stele was set up in the precinct o f A p o l l o Lykaios, in southwestern Arkadia, and a four-line epigram inscribed on it thanked Arkadia for its help i n bringing to justice the "traitor k i n g " (a reference to Aristokrates, the Orchomenian K i n g who had betrayed the Messenians at the Battle o f the Great Trench): TTdvTcoc 6 x p d v o c eupe 5IKTIV OCSI'KCI (oaaiAfji, eupe B E Meaarivrig auv A n T O V T T P O 5 6 T T | V priiBicoc- X C C A E T T O V 8E Aa9sTv 6E6V d v 5 p ' ETriopKov. XccTpE,  Z E U PJCCOIAEU, K O I  adco ' A p K a S i a v  (Kallisthenes, FGrH 124 F23 apud Polybius 4. 33)  4 6 0  Kallisthenes explained that the Messenians had good reason to thank the Arkadians: they had given them safe haven, granted them citizenship, and even married their daughters to those Messenians who were old enough.  461  The granting o f citizenship to an entire group o f  refugees was not a common practice among the G r e e k s ,  462  but it is possible that these  Messenians could have claimed a common heritage with the southern Arkadians. A s Roy has  Aristotle, for example, noted that the Spartan men lacked control over their women because the men were often engaged in military endeavors: e'^co y d p Tfj$ o'lKEiac; 8id T a j o x p a T E i a j d n E ^ s v o u v T O T T O A U V xpdvov, T T O A E U O O V T E S T O V T E Trpog 'ApyEious T T O A E U O V K C U TrdAiv T O V Trpos 'ApKa8as K a i Mear|vious (Pol. 1269b 39). The preposition Trpog governs both the Arkadians and the Messenians and this seems, therefore, to be a reference to the Messenian Wars. Strabo also mentions the Arkadian support for the Messenians during wars with Sparta: K a i T C O V 'ApKd8cov ounTroAEuriadvTcov T O I S M E O O E V I O I C ; (8.355). Kallisthenes' Hellenika covered the years 386 to 356, and his sources may have been influenced by the surge in Messenian national pride and Arkadia's role in the liberation of Messenia in 369. Cf.Poly. 4. 33. There are very few examples of this and those instances where a group was provided with citizenship en masse, are all special circumstances. For example, Athens granted citizenship to the 212 Plataians who fled after its destruction in 427 (Dem. 59. 104-6; Isok. 12. 94; 14. 51-2; Lysias 23. 2. Amit, Poleis, 78ff. See also G. Busolt, GS I (Munich, 1920), 224-5. According to Thucydides, the two states shared over ninety years of friendship (Thuc. 3. 68. 5), and the Plataians were some of the only Greeks to have sent help to the Athenians at the Battle of Marathon in 490 (Hdt. 6. 108; GHI'n 204, line 35). Thus, the Plataians had a very special and longstanding relationship with the Athenians. After the sack of Selinus by the Carthaginians in 409, the Ephesians granted citizenship to the Selinuntines, though there may not have been very many left alive (Xen. Hell. 1. 2. 4 5 9  4 6 0  461  4 6 2  118  shown, the border between Arkadia and its neighbor Elis was often dictated by the regional identification o f the poleis and several o f the poleis changed their allegiance during the classical period. For example, Lasion was a dependent perioikic state o f Elis but in 400 was claimed by the Arkadians because they believed that the inhabitants o f Lasion shared the same ethnic identity with themselves.  463  So, it was possible for neighbors o f different states  to claim similar ethnic identities, i f convenient, and the Arkadians at Phigalia and Messenians at H i r a may have been among those who did. Aristomenes, the Messenian hero o f the Messenian wars, and his descendants, also provide evidence o f a close connection between the Messenians and the Arkadians i n the southwestern Peloponnesos. According to Pausanias (4. 24. 1), two o f Aristomenes' sons-inlaw and his brother-in-law were all from the western Peloponnesos. These were Theopompos of Heraia, Damathoidas o f Lepreon and Tharyx o f P h i g a l i a .  464  Wade-Gery has shown that  Theopompos o f Heraia was a member o f a family distinguished for its Olympic victories.  465  A man with the same name (whom Wade-Gery believes was the grandson o f Theopompos I, Aristomenes' son-in-law) was alive soon after Epameinondas invaded Lakonia i n 3 6 9 .  466  10). Roy, "Frontier between Elis and Arkadia," 138-141. The first son-in-law, Damothoidas, was from Lepreon, which became an Elean ally in the fifth century. Unfortunately, he has been dismissed as an invention because his name does not fit the hexameter verse in which Pausanias' source, Rhianos, wrote (Pearson, "Pseudo-History of Messenia," 420 note 54). Cf. L. R. Shero, "Aristomenes the Messenian," TAPA 69 (1938): 519; Wade-Gery, "Rhianos-Hypothesis," 292-3; 300, and note 5. The lineage of the Diagorids, who were famous Olympic victors, was given by Pausanias (4. 24. 3; 6. 7. 3): Diagoras was the son of Damagetos, son of Doreius, son of Damagetos: this Damagetos was the son-in-law of the hero Aristomenes by his youngest daughter. The second son-in-law, Theopompos, may have been the descendant of later Heraian families who were also distinguished for their Olympic victories. For example, a man named Damaretos won Olympic victories (in the hoplite race) in 520 and 516. His son and grandson, Theopompos I (in the pentathlon), and grandson, Theopompos II (wrestling) both won victories during the fifth century. Although their exact dates are uncertain, Wade-Gery shows that Theopompos I was contemporary with the Olympic victor Damagetos (of the Rhodian family of the Diagorids), and Theopompos II with Diagoras. Diagoras and Damagetos were bothfifth-centuryfigures and also descendants of Aristomenes ("RhianosHypothesis," 292-293).  4 6 3  4 6 4  4 6 5  4 6 6  Paus. 4. 24. 1  119  Aristomenes' sister, Hagnagora (the only wife mentioned by name), married Tharyx o f Phigalia.  467  M u c h later, i n the fourth century, there lived a "Tharykidas, son o f Damaretos,"  whose victor-statue was mentioned by Pausanias (6. 6. I ) .  4 6 8  It is very possible that the later  descendents o f Tharyx and Theopompos were contemporaries o f Epameinondas, the liberator of Messenia and Rhianos, the epic poet.  469  Their families in Heraia and Phigalia could have  supplied Epameinondas and Rhianos with tales o f the fall o f H i r a and the leadership o f the Messenian hero, Aristomenes.  470  Phigalia was a neighbor o f Heraia and Lepreon and was also close to O l y m p i a , so marriage between the prominent families of these towns (who shared an interest in athletic competition and the O l y m p i c Games) and the Messenians was l i k e l y .  471  U n t i l the invasion  and liberation o f Messenia by the Theban general Epameinondas in the fourth century, no other writer had expounded on such stories because they were local tales and restricted to the  Paus. 4. 2; 4.1. Rhianos mentioned this marriage, see FGrHist. 265, F40. Among the victor statues at Olympia was Narcidas, a Phigalian, whose statue was built by Daedalus of Sikyon. Fragments from the base of this statue remain and four lines of verse end with: ap]uKi5as <piy[a]\eu<;. Pausanias thought that the name began with a nu. Regarding this, Pausanias seems to have been wrong since in the inscription, Daedalus is called ]oios, not a [Sikyo]nian. Wade-Gery is certain that [Phlia]sian is correct. Pausanias may have, then, also been wrong about the nu in the first name, and following Hiller's proposal, the nu can be changed to a ^eta.-Thus, Tharykidas may have been the name on the statue. Wade-Gery has shown the connection with another inscription in which eight Phigalians served as ambassadors to Messene c. 240. The first ambassador named was Tharykidas and the last was a man named Damaretos. Wade-Gery concludes that the winner whose statue Pausanias recorded as having seen and the fragment from the base was Tharykidas. The date is not certain but based on the sculptor's name, the early-fourth century is likely. This Tharykidas was either a descendant or at least claimed a connection to the husband of Hagnagora, Tharyx (Wade- Gery, "Rhianos-Hypothesis," 293). 4 6 7  4 6 8  Tharykidas was active c. 380 and so could have been a contemporary of Epameinondas. Similarly, there was a Heraian Olympic victor named, A]r||-io:pa[T]o[s], the same name as one of Theopompos' descendants. See SIG 3 1056 =IG 2 2 2326, FGrH 416 F6. Two Phigalian envoys, Damaretos II and Tharykidas II, were alive c. 240 and were contemporaries of the poet Rhianos. For more on this topic, see Wade-Gery, "Rhianos," 289-302; A. Andrewes, "Sparta and Arcadia in The Early Fifth Century," 6 (1952): 1-5; D. Leahy, "The Spartan Defeat at Orchomenos," Phoenix 12 (1958): 141-165. The name Damaretos (one of Aristomenes' sons-in-law) appeared in both Heraia and Phigalia, and a possible solution is that the mother of the Phigalian Demaratos was the daughter of a Heraian woman, and both families preserved the lineage of the Messenian rebel Aristomenes through patronymics (Wade-Gery "Rhianos,", 2945). 4 6 9  4 7 0  471  120  southwestern corner o f Arkadia. The events o f the Second Messenian W a r were also likely to have been restricted to this part o f the Peloponnesos. The Second Messenian War was not a pan-Peloponnesian affair, but a local conflict confined to northern Messenia and southwestern Arkadia. In this region, Sparta attempted to preserve and secure its newly acquired territory.  472  The aid given to the Messenians by the  Arkadians during the Second Messenian War confirmed that southwestern Arkadia was indeed a threat to the Spartan control o f M e s s e n i a .  473  The connection between the  Messenians and the Arkadians was most evident in the southwestern portion o f Arkadia, and since the mountains were not as obtrusive there as they were in the north and northeast, the inhabitants o f the region could have had close relations. After the fall o f Hira, Sparta began incursions into southwestern Arkadia in an attempt to push the Messenian frontier further west, and perhaps even to pursue those Messenians who had fled. A s a result, Phigalia became a target. Although it was well defended, as Pausanias noted (8. 39. 3), Phigalia eventually fell to Sparta, whether because the fortifications were breached or a pro-Spartan party in the city facilitated the conclusion o f a truce.  474  Not all Phigalians, however, accepted this truce but  with the help o f one hundred Oresthasians, they regained their city. Phigalia was the first Arkadian city to be attacked by Sparta but it was not alone in its resistance to Sparta's  See T. Kelly who showed that the enmity between Argos and Sparta was a later invention and that Argos did not take part in the Messenian Wars. It was not until Tegea was conquered that Argos and Sparta came into conflict. So, Kelly's theory concurs with the premise that the conflicts with Messenia at the end of the seventh century were local and not pan-Peloponnesian ("Traditional Enmity," 975-6). Later evidence reveals that the tendency of Spartan foreign policy in Messenia was to keep the Messenians isolated and remove any possible threat to the confinement and subjugation of them. Without the fertile lands and vast numbers of Helots, Sparta's entire social, military, and economic system would, and eventually did, suffer. The Spartans were not known for their siege capabilities. In the fifth century, the Messenians were able to hold out at Mt. Ithome for ten years and even then, the Spartans came to terms with them, rather than continue their siege (Thuc. 1. 101; 1. 103. 1).  4 7 2  4 7 3  4 7 4  121  aggressive actions. This Spartan expansion began in Messenia and after spreading into southwestern Arkadia, eventually extended into the area near Tegea. Although Herodotus claimed that Sparta intended to conquer all o f A r k a d i a ,  475  I  believe that the evidence shows that the Spartans intended only to annex the southern half o f Arkadia, starting in the area near to where the end o f the Second Messenian War took place. In the southern portion o f Arkadia, Tegea was the dominant polis and offered the greatest resistance to Sparta. Herodotus recorded that the Spartans intended to annex Arkadia as they had Messenia, but when they consulted the oracle about conquering Arkadia, the Pythia responded, "you ask Arkadia o f me; 'tis a great thing" (Hdt. 1. 66. 2). The Pythia's advice led Sparta to concentrate its efforts on Tegea instead and so they made their assault, carrying with them fetters to enslave the Tegeans. But the Spartans were defeated and some were even taken as prisoners and forced to wear the same chains they had brought to T e g e a .  476  More  battles against Tegea were to come before Sparta was victorious. Herodotus stated: they (the Lakedaimonians) had escaped out of great troubles and at this moment (during Kroisos' inquiry) had proved themselves masters of the people of Tegea in a war. For when Leon and Hegesicles were kings at Sparta, the Lakedaimonians, for all that they were successful in other wars, whenever they encountered the people of Tegea would always fail (1.65) . . . So in all that former war the Lakedaimonians had steadily wrestled in vain against the people of Tegea; but in the time of Kroisos and the kingship of Anaxandrides and Ariston in Lakedaimonia the Spartans won the upper hand in war (Hdt. 1.67).  These Tegean-Spartan wars are dated to the middle o f the sixth century (c. 580-550),  477  twenty years after the fall o f Hira and the attack on Phigalia.  Although a plan to capture all of Arkadia fits well with the story of Spartan expansion, I do not believe that Sparta was so ambitious. In order to conquer all of Arkadia, Sparta would ultimately have had to reckon with Orchomenos, Mantinea, and Kleitor as well. Hdt.l. 66-68. Forrest, Sparta, 73ff. See also Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 118-119.  4 7 6 4 7 7  122  Tegea controlled a much greater portion o f Arkadia than just the Tegean plain and Herodotus' narrative notes that there were two wars against T e g e a .  478  According to  Herodotus (1. 66), the Pythia had advised the Spartans to "bring home the bones o f Orestes, son o f Agamemnon," and after the bones o f Orestes were returned to Sparta, the Lakedaimonians enjoyed complete mastery over the Tegeans and a leading role in Greece (Hdt. 1. 68. 6). In advising the Spartans to search out the bones o f Orestes, the Pythia provided them with the necessary link to the original rulers o f the Peloponnesos, something which until that time only Argos had been able to c l a i m .  479  Although the military victory over Tegea was  essential, with this propaganda Sparta could assert a right o f succession from the Atreids and use this as leverage to obtain a leading position in the Peloponnesos.  480  Sparta's final victory  over Tegea, in addition to removing the threat to Messenia and Lakonia from southern Arkadia, provided Sparta with a legitimate claim to rule the Peloponnesos. It was with this religious propaganda that the literary tradition recorded Sparta as having finally brought down Tegea.  481  The events at the end o f the Second Messenian War, centered around northern Messenia and southwestern A r k a d i a .  482  The subsequent incursions into Arkadia, such as the  capture o f Phigalia and the Battle o f Fetters, confirm that Sparta's intentions were to control  Wade-Gery notes that Herodotus referred to two Arkadian wars, the first sometime between 575 and 550 and the second, between 550 and 545. But Herodotus' narrative can be interpreted just as easily to refer to more than two wars, perhaps even a continuous struggle. See also Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 10-12. Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 10. Cf. Paus. 3. 19. 6 where Agamemnon and Orestes were inhabitants of Amyklai, one of the first Lakonian conquests of Sparta and long-time Lakonian center. Such a connection to the Atreids was strengthened also by the poets Stesichoros and Simonides (Schol. Eur. Or. 46). Herodotus also linked the Spartan hegemony to Agamemnon. See Hdt. 7. 159. Adshead believes that Tegea and Arkadia had isolated themselves from the rest of the northeastern Peloponnesians by concentrating their efforts in the south. Adshead states that the northern Peloponnesians were unmoved by these events (the recovery of Orestes' bones) and politically removed from the southern  4 7 9  4 8 0  4 8 1  123  the southwestern plains o f Arkadia. In the beginning, the Spartans were intermittently defeated  by  Orchomenians.  the 483  Arkadians,  specifically  the  Phigalians,  Oresthasians,  and  the  But Herodotus revealed that prior to their ultimate defeat in 550, the  strongest resistance came from the Tegeans  4 8 4  The history o f the Tegeans and Spartans was highlighted by conflict and by Tegea's resistance toward the expanding Spartan state. M u c h later, during the Peloponnesian War, Tegea was a loyal ally o f Sparta. This transformation o f attitude began when an alliance was formed around 550.  The Tegean-Spartan Treaty  The evidence supports that Sparta came to terms with Tegea in 550 and that from then on, the two were close allies. The Tegeans joined Kleomenes' campaign in 510 and were also part o f the first meeting o f allies that led to the formation o f the Peloponnesian League.  485  The alliance between Tegea and Sparta is often associated with the treaty recorded  by Aristotle (see below)  4 8 6  Although the evidence that the treaty dates to the sixth century is  equivocal and the 460s is another possible period for it, some sort o f an alliance was undoubtedly formed in the 550s.  487  The terms o f the treaty are, I believe, applicable to both  periods and are indicative o f the relationship between the Tegeans and Spartans beyond their military alliance.  Arkadians (Politics, 13, 22, 26-28). Tegea could not expect, therefore, any help from the north. See Forrest, Sparta, 70ff; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 117ff. For the battle near Orchomenos, see Theopompos FGrH 115 F. 69, apud Diogenes Laertius 1.115 (Life of Epimenides). Eventually Sparta was victorious over Phigalia, and Herodotus may have been referring to this when he said, "for all that they were successful in other wars" (1.65). The evidence for other Arkadians is considered in Chapter Three. See Introduction and, for example, Schaefer in Staatsform und Politik 66. For example, Forrest, Sparta, 79. 4 8 2  4 8 3  4 8 4  4 8 5  4 8 6  124  In his Greek Questions, Plutarch preserved a fragment from Aristotle that Rose believes was taken from The Constitution of the Tegeates: TIVEC  o i Trapd 'ApKcxai  KCU  AaKESaipovioic  xpn^Toi;  TEyEccTcuc BiaAAayEVTEs ETroifiaavTO ouv0r|Kac, 'AA9EIC0  Koivfiv dvEOTriaav,  EV  rj U.ETCC  TCOV  KCCI  ACCKEBCUHOVIOI  cnr)Ar)v  ETT'  dAAcov yEEypaTTTai  W E ^ E T V O I xpri S TTOIETV. EfxiyoupEvoc ouv 6 'ApiaTOTsAris T O U T O cpriai 8uvaa0cu T O [xt\ ccrroKTivvuvai (3or|0Eiac, x&P S AccKcovi^oucu T C O V T s y E a T c o v (Rose, Aristoteles, N r . 592 apud Plutarch Quaest.Graec.5 = Mor. 292b). M E O O E V I ' O U C EKJSOAETV E K  Tfjc. x&PVS lv  K C U  aTOU  T O l  Who are the xpnoToi among the Arkadians and Spartans? The Spartans on being reconciled to the Tegeates made a treaty and set up on a stele in common on the bank of the Alpheios, in which was written among other things 'to expel the Messenians from the land, and it not be permitted to make xpnoToi. Aristotle in explanation says this means not to kill for the sake of help to the pro-Spartan party of the Tegeates.  To explain "who are the x p T l  a T O  488  ' among Arkadians and Spartans," Plutarch referred to a  auv6r]Kr) (treaty) between the Tegeans and Spartans. He did not say when it was placed on the Alpheios, but he did provide the one provision that answered his question: "to expel the Messenians from the land, and that it not be permitted to make (them)  XPTIOTOUS."  In order  to explain what this meant, Plutarch quoted Aristotle's explanation o f the word, x p T l "not  to k i l l  for the  (6 'ApiaTOTsAris  Xapiv  TOIS  sake  of help  9^01  8uvao0ai  T O U T O  AaKcovi^ouai  TCOV  to the pro-Spartan T O  party  of the  a T O U  S  :  Tegeates"  pf] ccrroKTivvuvai P>or)0Ei'as  TEyEaTcov.) Plutarch repeated Aristotle's statement i n his  Quaestiones Romanae: Kai y d p 'ApiOTOTEAris (fr. 5 9 2 ) E V TCC\C 'ApKctBcov Tfp6c A O : K E 5 C U U . O V ( O U C aTOV auv0fiKais y £ y p a 9 0 a i <pr\o\ pr|5Eva xpri TTOIETV (3or|0Eiac. x ° P °>S L V  T  Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 119-120. Translated by T. Braun, " X P H I T O Y I TTOIEIN, CQ 44 (1994): 40. Braun explains that "not to kill for the sake of help to the pro-Spartan party," means that the pro-Spartans and their friends were protected by the terms of this treaty (Braun, 44).  488  125  AaKcovi^ouor TCOV  TeyeaTcbv, o i T E p  ETVOCI  ur|5Eva  (Quaest.  aTTOKTivvuvai.  Rom.. = Mor. 277bc).  "Aristotle says that in the treaty with the Spartans it is written to make no-one xPHOTOug for the sake of aid to the pro-Spartan party of the Tegeates, which (he says) means not to kill „ 489  anyone. For  Aristotle,  (oiTEp  ETVOU U X | 8 E V C C  the  term  diTOKTivvuvai).  "useful"  was  associated  Jacoby, however, interprets  mean "citizen," and many have accepted this interpretation.  490  with  xP l r  O T O ,  JS  death  (useful) to  Jacoby bases his conclusion  on a seventh-century law from Dreros, where a kosmos who had taken office within ten years of his first appointment was declared dxpn,OTOc, "useless." Jacoby believes that this meant he lost his citizenship, thus the opposite, XP 1° °S would mean, " c i t i z e n . " T  T  491  This  interpretation has been accepted because it fits well into the general pattern o f Spartan expansion in the Peloponnesos and its Messenian endeavors: to maintain the Messenians as Helots and prevent their inclusion in any neighboring community. T. Braun has since challenged this interpretation and has shown that a common valediction on Greek gravestones was x p n ° £ X ^P > *d that this was a way to honor the a  T  dead.  492  E  ar  In addition, Plutarch would not have added Aristotle's comment i f it did not pertain  to and answer the question o f who the x p T l  O T O  ' were. A s a result, according to Braun, it is  hard to dismiss Aristotle's statement as Jacoby has done, and instead, Aristotle's explanation, found also in the second passage from Roman Questions, needs to be taken into a c c o u n t  493  Ibid. See also W.R. Halliday, The Greek Questions of Plutarch, new edition, (New York: Arno Press, 1975), 50-51. For example, Forrest, Sparta, p.79; P. Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, (1979), 138. F. Jacoby, "XPHITOYI T70IEIN," CQ 38 (1944): 15-16; Cf. V. Ehrenberg, "An Early Source of Polis-  4 8 9  4 9 0  491  constitution," CQ 37 (1943): 16. T. Braun states, "there are few instances where it means no more than that the dead had been more useful in life . . . it is clear that people are thought of as having become revered and x p n ' by virtue of their death" 492  aT01  ("XPHITOYI TTOIEIN, 41). 4 9 3  If one accepts Jacoby's statement, then Aristotle's explanation is ignored. Jacoby solved this by saying,"  126  Furthermore, the treaty first stipulated that the Messenians be expelled, but i f this had happened, then there would have been no Messenians around to extend citizenship t o . According MEOOEVEOUC  to Braun,  in the  first passage taken  from  Plutarch's  494  Greek Questions,  is not the object o f both infinitives (as Jacoby's interpretation has it). Instead,  those who laconized were the understood object o f u.n,  E ^ E T V O I X P T I G T O U C , TTOIETV;  no Spartan  sympathizers should be put to death. This, Braun believes, was made explicit by Aristotle who explained that nfj meant: ur)8Evcc  EF^ETVCCI  xpna °vs  X P T I O T O V TTOIETV  T  TTOIETV  [3ori0Eia$ x&P  lv  S  TO[  AaKcov(£ouai  TCOV  TEYECCTCOV.  4 9 5  Although this interpretation is novel and may be correct, it must be admitted, however, that the passage from the Greek Questions does not connect the  Spartan  sympathizers with the actual treaty. In fact, it seems that the Messenians are the only concern. Aristotle's explanation o f xpn °vS does not necessarily imply that the proOT  Spartans were included in the actual terms o f the treaty, only that Plutarch used Aristotle's explanation o f the term "useful" (which pertained to Tegean laconizers) to explain the same term as it pertained to the Messenians. But i f Braun's interpretation is correct, then the treaty states that the Messenians were to be expelled from Tegea and that it should be illegal to k i l l anyone who provided aid to the pro-Spartan party; not, as Jacoby's version has it, to expel the Messenians and that it should be illegal to make any Messenians citizens. Furthermore, i f Braun's interpretation stands,  nobody will believe that the Spartans were so solicitous of the welfare of their hated enemies as to enjoin on the Tegeatans not to kill them, while insisting on their being driven from the town" (Jacoby, " X P H I T O Y I , " 1516). Braun, " X P H I T O Y I , " 48. Although unlikely, there is the possibility that the refugees would have been made citizens en masse before they were expelled from Tegea. Since there were very few instances of such events in the entire Greek world, this does not seem to have been likely. See Braun, " X P H I T O Y I TTOIEIN," 40-1. 4 9 4  4 9 5  127  then the Spartan apprehension over Messenians gaining citizenship in Tegea was replaced by the need to protect Spartan sympathizers in foreign cities. If, on the other hand, Jacoby's interpretation stands, then the Messenians did indeed find refuge in Arkadia and inclusion in society and Sparta wished to bring an end to this. The one certainty is that the Messenians were to be expelled from Arkadian s o i l .  496  So, with either interpretation, it is evident that the  topic o f the Messenians was an important one between Sparta and its Arkadian neighbor, Tegea. In addition to the terms o f the treaty, the place where it stood is also uncertain. Plutarch noted that this treaty was set up ETT' 'AX9EIC0 ("on the Alpheios R i v e r ) .  497  Bolte was  the first to suggest that the stele was put up on what was the frontier between Tegea and Sparta, the Vurvura River, since this is where the treaty would have had the greatest influence.  498  But Pausanias had noted that the natural boundary was, "the river Alpheios"  (Paus. 8.54.1-3), exactly where Plutarch said the stele stood. The Vurvura stream, a natural boundary between Tegean territory and Lakonia, is not part o f the Alpheios river, so Bolte's argument does not agree with Pausanias' testimony. The only place where the Alpheios is a boundary lies further upstream, in the area later known as the plain o f Megalopolis, which has not been considered to be part o f Tegean territory. There are three possibilities regarding this problem: Pausanias made a mistake and thought that the Vurvura was the Alpheios, and that this was the natural Tegean-Spartan frontier, or the stele was on the Alpheios but not on the boundary between Tegea and Sparta (in contrast to Bolte), or the stele was set up on the  Paul Cartledge notes that there is a difference between the sixth century military alliance between Tegea and Sparta and this stele erected on the banks of the Alpheios River, which may or may not have been set up in the sixth century, (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia [1979], 138-139). See also, for example, O. Murray, Early Greece, 2 edition, (London, 1993), 263; A.Toynbee, Some Problems of Greek History, (Oxford, 1969), 182. Plutarch Quaest.Graec.5 = Mor. 292b. Sparta in RE 1308.  4 9 6  nd  4 9 7  4 9 8  128  Alpheios, but further upstream where it did indeed form a natural boundary between the Tegea and Sparta (in territory that was not necessarily Tegean). Pausanias recorded that the Alpheios River began in Phylace, was joined at Symbola by another stream, and was known to disappear underground in many places and emerge at others. It emerged from the ground at Asea, sank into the earth where it joined the Eurotas, flowed underground beneath the Tegean plain, and emerged again at Pegae and then entered Elis.  4 9 9  Polybius, whose father was from Megalopolis and was most likley familiar with the  area, wrote that after travelling ten stades from its source, the Alpheios emerged and passed through the territory o f Megalopolis above ground. Pritchett has proven that in antiquity the Sarandapotamos, which emerged next to the Vurvura stream, was believed to have been the A l p h e i o s .  Pausanias mistakenly called the  500  Vurvura the Alpheios and so, according to Pritchett, he had the right place but the wrong name. Pritchett believes that the stele must have been set up along the ancient TegeanSpartan road where it crossed the Sarandapotamos; "otherwise," he wrote, "we must extend the Tegean territory far to the west o f its attested l i m i t s . "  501  Contrary to Pritchett, this is  exactly what must happen and Pausanias was correct to say that the natural boundary was the Alpheios and that here the stone was set. Tegea did control this area o f Arkadia, which was later called the plain o f Megalopolis. It was situated between Leuktron and Oresthaion, where the Eurotas valley and Megalopolis plain merged.  502  A n d it was here on the boundary  Paus.8. 54. 1-3. Pritchettt. Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, part 1, 122-130. A bronze water bucket with the inscription AXcpios was found near the springs which issue forth to form the Sarandapotamos River. This may suggest that someone in antiquity also believed that the Sarandapotamos was the Alpheios River. Pritchettt, Greek Topography, 125, n.16. Wade-Gery, "Rhianos- Hypothesis," 297-298.  4yj  5 0 0  5 0 1  5 0 2  129  between Spartan and Tegean territory that the stele stood.  Placing this treaty on the  fronitier may have, as Leahy suggests, dissuaded Messenians from finding refuge in T e g e a .  504  The two commonly suggested periods for this treaty are the sixth century, after the Tegean Wars, c. 550, and sometime during the fifth century, either in the 490s or 460s. The treaty could be applicable to any o f these. Furthermore, the treaty could have been first set up in the mid-sixth century, after the wars referred to by Herodotus, and continued to be functional into the 460s. Conversely, the treaty could have been set up in the 460s and reused terms that were applied to the earlier fifth-century agreement. Unfortunately, the testimony o f Plutarch and a quick reference by Pausanias are the only sources we have that attest to this treaty, and neither specifies a date or even a general period for when it was established. For the treaty to make sense there must have been a conflict between Spartans and Tegeans which necessitated a treaty, and this conflict must have happened at a time when Messenian refugees were in Arkadia. The major Messenian-Spartan conflicts were the First and Second Messenian Wars in the eighth and seventh centuries respectively, the fall o f Hira c. 600, a possible revolt in 490, and the major revolt recorded by Thucydides in the 460's.  505  The Tegean-Spartan conflicts were the Tegean Wars in 580 to 560, and the battles o f Tegea and Dipaia in the 460s.  Leahy was, I believe, the first to propose this idea, followed by Wade-Gery. Leahy, "Spartan Defeat," 163, note 68; Wade-Gery, "Rhianos-Hypothesis," 298. Ibid. According to Plato, (Laws 698D-E) the Lakedaimonians were at war with the Messenians when Darius' troops invaded at Marathon. Cf. Hdt. 6.106-107. See Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 132-133, for discussion of the evidence for a Helot revolt in the 490s. Among those who believe in the revolt of 490 are: Wallace, "Kleomenes, Marathon, and the Helots;" 32-3; Forrest, Sparta, 91-92; J. Ducat, "Les Hilotes," 141-3. Cartledge cautiously notes that although the evidence is not overwhelming, "they do at least add up to an arguable case" (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 133). 5 0 3  5 0 4  5 0 5  130  C a w k w e l l has recently argued for a later date, specifically after the Messenian revolt of 490 but before the 460s. According to him, the treaty was contemporaneous with a wellknown Messenian refugee. Before the 460s, Mikythos, the slave o f Anaxilas o f Rhegion and later the regent and steward o f his property, returned to the Peloponnesos and settled in Tegea, where he dedicated offerings to O l y m p i a .  506  Fragments o f them have been restored  and C a w k w e l l believes that with these dedications he "flaunted his flouting o f the clause o f the Spartan Tegean treaty."  507  After all, he was a former Messenian refugee who had returned  to Greece, lived in Tegea, and was not forced to leave as he would have been required to do according to the terms o f the treaty. Furthermore, according to C a w k w e l l , since there is no record o f a large Helot revolt around 550, the possibility that a mid-sixth century treaty dealt with individual Messenian refugees is dubious, and the fifth century is a better choice for a treaty that concerned both Messenians and Tegeans.  508  There is some evidence to support Cawkwell's theory. Herodotus noted that sometime before 479, the Spartans and the Tegeans were not on friendly terms. The Tegeans had harbored the seer Hegistratus, who had previously been caught by the Spartans and put in bonds. The Spartans were about to put him to death for the "many grievous wrongs" he had done to them, when he broke free o f his bonds and escaped to Tegea: "which was then not friendly to the Lakedaimonians."  509  Herodotus does not say why they were unfriendly to  Hdt. 7. 170. 4; D.S. 11. 66. 1-3; Paus. 5. 26. 4-5. Anaxilas, of Messenian decent, was tyrant of the Sicilian town of Rhegion from 494 to 476. In the 490s, he captured and renamed the town of Zankle in Sicily to Messana, and may have provided refuge to Messenians who revolted from Sparta when the Persians invaded at Marathon. Thucydides (6.4), on the renaming of Zankle, stated, "and not long after this Anaxilas, the tyrant of Rhegium, drove out the Samians, colonized the city with people of mixed races, and renamed it Messana after his own home country." See also Paus. 4. 2. 3; E . G . Robinson, "Rhegion, Zankle, Messana, and the Samians," JHS66 (1946): 13-21; I.G. 5 1562. 5 0 6  1  Cawkwell, "Sparta and her Allies," 369-370. There is little evidence that small groups and individuals defected; when there was a recorded Helot revolt, it was en masse (Ibid., 369). 5 0 7  5 0 8  131  Sparta, but did state that this affair and Tegea's enmity occurred before the Battle o f Plataia. In addition, according to Plato, the Messenians had been problematic in 490 (before the Battle o f Marathon) and as a result, caused the Spartans to refuse to send troops immediately to M a r a t h o n .  510  Messenian problems continued after Marathon and during a time when the  Tegeans were also at war with the Spartans. Finally, the Spartan king Kleomenes had been exiled shortly after the Ionian Revolt in 494 and was stirring up resistance to Sparta in Arkadia. Kleomenes was recalled to Sparta, where he went mad and died by self-mutilation, and thereafter the Arkadians remained quiet.  511  Another plausible fifth-century date for this treaty is the 460s, during which time Sparta fought against the Tegeans at the battles o f Tegea and Diapaia. Concurrently, the Messenians had revolted following the great earthquake o f 465. I discuss the possibility that the treaty belongs to the 460s below together with the synoikism o f Tegea in the 470s and the battles o f Dipaia and Tegea in the 460s. The traditional view is that the policy o f the Spartans during the sixth, as well as the fifth centuries, was dominated by its preoccupation with the Messenians: "Spartan policy throughout the sixth century was dominated by the fear o f a Messenian or Helot revolt being instigated by one or more o f her neighbors."  512  This sentiment was echoed by Thucydides:  "the majority o f Spartan institutions with regard to the Helots have always been concerned with defense" (Thuc. 4. 80). According to Cawkwell (see comments above), the traditional view is dependent upon dating the treaty to the sixth century, and there is not sufficient  Plato stated: "This account — whether true, or whatever its origin — struck terror into the Greeks generally, and especially the Athenians; but when they sent out embassies in every direction to seek aid, all refused, except the Lakedaimonians; and they were hindered by the war they were then waging against Messene, and possibly by other obstacles, about which we have no information, with the result that they arrived too late by one single day for the battle which took place at Marathon (Laws 698D-E). Hdt. 6. 74-75. See also, J. Roy, "An Arcadian League in the Earlier Fifth Century B.C.?" Phoenix 26 (1972): 5 1 0  5 1 1  132  evidence to prove that Sparta was preoccupied by the fear o f a Helot revolt in Messenia during that time. He notes that on two separate occasions, Sparta was either ready to or did 513  send a considerable army from Lakonia without fear o f Helot revolt.  Although the  possibility that the Helots posed a major problem in the sixth century is questionable, C a w k w e l l is wrong to place the emphasis on this part o f the debate. The Helots did not have to revolt en masse in order to be problematic for the Spartans, or for Sparta to include a clause regarding them in any treaty with bordering cities such as Tegea. The Messenians were a continual problem, and were never entirely quiescent. So, an agreement with a neighboring state that prohibited the protection o f slaves quite possibly could have been made during a period when there was no great Messenian War or revolt in progress. For example, in the Spartan-Athenian alliance o f 422/1, the Athenians agreed to help the Spartans in the event that the slave population rose up against t h e m .  514  The revolt o f the  460 's was the last great Helot war and yet forty years later, Sparta saw it fit to include this in an alliance with Athens. Hence, a similar situation could have arisen c. 550. The Messenian War had ended over fifty years earlier, but Sparta was still concerned with controlling the slave population, especially along the Arkadian border. Aristotle's explanation o f a sixth-century phrase  xpwrous TTOIETV  audience (for example, a late fourth-century reader) supports this hypothesis.  515  to a younger In addition, it  was in the middle o f the sixth century that Sparta had rescued the bones o f Orestes, gained 334 -341. Cartledge, Agesilaos, 13. Hdt. 1. 83; 3. 56. 1. Cawkwell believes that after the Second Messenian War, the Helots remained quiescent and that there was not any fatal weakness inherent in the Spartan system that Croesus, Maiandrios, or Aristagoras were made aware of. He states, "perhaps it is Herodotus who was ignorant," ("Sparta and her allies," 369). Thuc. 5. 23. 3. Plutarch had cited Aristotle in another passage where Aristotle explained other sixth-century terms (Babyka and Knakion which appeared in the text of the seventh-century 'Great Pdietra.' See Aristotle fr. 536 [Rose, ed.] 5 1 2  5 1 3  5 1 4  5 1 5  133  mastery over the Tegeans, and dominated a greater part o f the Peloponnesos. Highby's conclusion sums up the argument for the sixth century: "The inscription seems to harmonize better with the conditions o f the earlier time, when we consider how natural it would be for the Spartans to stipulate in connection with the first treaty which they made with a neighboring state that it should cooperate in the matter o f controlling the Messenians."  516  The fall o f Hira brought Sparta into conflict with the following Arkadians: Phigalia, Oresthasion, and possibly Orchomenos. These conflicts led to subsequent Tegean Wars, which ended fifty years after the fall o f Hira. A treaty signed after these wars, while the memory o f Messenian conflicts was still alive, seems plausible.  517  The other party addressed in this treaty, "those who were Spartan sympathizers," could also be pertinent to all three dates. Although there is no evidence o f any internal' discord i n Tegea, war and internal stasis were often connected with one another, even in the 518  seventh century. Due to the indeterminate nature o f the sources, all three dates are plausible for this treaty.  519  M y own opinion is that the proposal for the 490s, argued by Cawkwell, is not  apud Plut. Lyk.6.) to a fifth century audience. Highby, Decree, 73. See also Adcock CAHW 72, where such a stipulation became a regular requirement of Spartan treaties, such as in Thuc. 5. 23. 3. But this comes after the Pylos affair, where Thucydides noted the potential for Helot desertion and revolt. Braun may be correct in believing that a post-Second Messenian War period is likely: "All the cities of Arkadia are supposed to have helped the Messenians in the third year of the war, but to have been bought off just before the battle of the Trench" (Braun, "XPH2TOYI," 42-43). A fragment from Tyrtaeus in which references to Arkadians and a trench are found confirms the possibility of a treaty soon after the Second Messenian War (P. Oxy. 3316, apud West, 23a, lines 15-19). There is no mention of Tegeans and the reference to the Arkadians could refer to those who were closer to the Messenian border, such as Heraians and Phigalians (Braun, " X P H Z T O Y Z , " 42-43).Braun did not rule out a fifth century date either; he advocated that the treaty could have been set up in the sixth or fifth centuries (Ibid., 43f). 5 1 6  5 1 7  5 1 8  Braun, " X P H Z T O Y Z , " 44.  L.I. Highby, "The Erythrae Decree," Klio 36 (1936): 73; 66-74. Cf. U . Karhstedt, Sparta und seine Symmachie (Gottingen, 1992), 109; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia (1979); 138; Meyer G . d. A . II, 766. For a fifth century date see: Schaefer, p.203; Hiller von Gaertringen (IG V , 2,2p.3); G . Cawkwell, " Sparta and her Allies,"Cg 43 (1993): 364-376; Forrest, Sparta, 76. Braun dates it to the end of the Second Messenian War, when Messenian exiles were still numerous (Braun, "XPHZTOY2," 42-43). 5 , 9  134  persuasive. Since the terms found in the treaty are indicative of the relationship between the Tegeans and Spartans in the 550s and the 460s, both periods are credible. But I believe that the actual treaty, as I discuss below, should be considered part of the settlement between Sparta and Tegea in the 460s. Just as the Spartan alliances contained terms that were utilized throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, an early alliance with Tegea could have provided 520  later generations with terms that were repeated from an original, sixth-century agreement. The early history of Tegea and Sparta is very different from the history between Elis and Sparta. Instead of cooperation, the Tegean-Spartan relationship was filled with conflicts. An early alliance with Tegea in 550 and its membership in the Peloponnesian League at its inception in 505 led to Tegea's friendly relationship with Sparta. Nevertheless, Tegea still displayed some signs of anti-Spartan activity in the early fifth century. In the 480s, for example, 5 2 0  the Elean  seer Hegistratus  escaped  to Tegea  The alliance with Athens in 420 stipulated that r | V 8E r\ SouAeia  AaK£5aiiaoviois  which,  Herodotus  e u a v i a T f J T a i , ETriKOupedv  said;  'A6r|vaious  (Thuc. 5. 23. 3). Likewise, during the truce between  T T O V T I OOEVEI K O T O T O S U V O T O V .  Sparta and Athens in 423, neither side was to provide haven for refugees (Cf. Thuc. 4. 118. 7). Furthermore, lines fourteen to sixteen of the Spartan-Aitolian alliance of c. 387 (see addenda to ML, page 312, have been restored by W. Peek to read: 9 E u y o v [ T a $ p i BEKsOoJI^av  KEKOIVC(VEK[6TC(5  d8tK]IndTov. (The text of the  treaty has been included in the addenda to Russell Meiggs and David Lewis (eds.), Greek Historical Inscriptions (Oxford, 1988), p. 312. See also W. Peek, "Ein neuer Spartanischer Staatsvertrag," (1974). P. Cartledge agreed with this restoration and with the identity of the, "exiles who have participated in illegalities" as Helots who had escaped from Laconia o r Messenia, or more likely, those who had been settled at Naupaktus (see Thuc. 1.103.3; ML 74); P. Cartledge, " A new 5 -century Spartan treaty," LCM 1 (1976): 87-92; D . H . th  Kelly, cdei  "The  y d p T d  new  Spartan  Treaty,"  TroAAd AaK£8ai|iovioi$ irpos  LCM  TOU$  3  (1976):  133-141.)  Fi'AcoTas Tf)s 9uAaKfJs  Trepi  Thucydides  stated:  udAioTa  KaGeioTriKEi (Thuc. 4. 80. 3). "Taking precautions" could include the insertion of a clause in treaties that gave Sparta added protection against possible "exiles." These two examples are similar to the terms of the SpartanTegean treaty, and all three concur with Thucydides' statement. The typical oath that Sparta expected allies to swear is provided by Xenophon, who recorded the terms given to Athens in 404 upon its capitulation to Sparta: K C U T0O5 9 u y d 8 a s K O O E V T O S T O V a u T o v ExQpov K a i 9iAov v o y . i £ o v T a s AaKE8ai|_ioviois ETTEoOai K a i KOTO  yfjv  Ka\ KOTO  BdAaTTav  OTTOI  dv  riycbvTai  (Xen. Hell. 2. 2. 20). Cf. Hdt. 6. 71, which refers  to  the  490s; Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 7; 7. 1. 24. See also the text of the Spartan fourth-century treaty with the Aitolians in ML addenda p. 312, lines 4-10: [.. 3-4jvpovo$ p a v [ T . 1-2. r7ETro][[[u]Evo<; 776TR/1 K a Aa[KE8ai|_i6vi][[o]i ^ a y i o v x a i K a i Ka[Td  y a v M M a i Ka0dAa0av T [ 6 V auTov][J9iAov  [ K a i AaKE][8aiLi6vioi.  K a i TOV OUT[6V  EX0p6v][  EXOVTES  rjov m p  Spartan oaths, it seems, used typical terminology in the fifth and fourth centuries, and  it is probable that characteristic features were present in the sixth as well. See appendix 6 for more details o n typical Spartan oaths.  135  eoOoccv OUK dp6nir|V AccKESccipovioioi TOUTOV TOV x p d v o v (Hdt. 9. 37. .4). Andrewes proposes that the death o f Kleomenes who had fled to Arkadia and stirred up trouble amriong the Arkadians and Helots, upset those Arkadians who had agreed to follow h i m in the 490s (see Hdt. 6.74-5). Consequently, the Tegeans were still unfriendly toward the Spartans in the 521  early 480s. ' But i f this were the case, it was not long before the Tegeans were 'friendly' once again with Sparta and fought valiantly beside their Lakonian neighbor.  The Persian Wars  U n l i k e their Elean neighbors to the west and the other Arkadian communities to the north, the Tegeans supported Sparta throughout the entire Persian Wars. A t Thermopylae, the Tegeans sent five hundred hoplites, number o f psiloi in the field. greatest number o f hoplites.  524  522  and at Plataia they put 1,500 hoplites and the same  O f all the Greek forces, the Tegeans supplied the sixth A t the final, decisive land battle o f Plataia, the Tegeans fought  valiantly beside the Spartans.  525  According to Herodotus, the Athenians were given the  command o f the left wing and the Spartans appointed the position next to themselves, "to the Tegeans, on account o f their courage and o f the esteem in which they held them" (Hdt. 9. 28). Before the battle o f Plataia, the Tegeans argued with the Athenians over the right to command the left wing o f the Greek army (the Spartans commanded the right wing). The Tegeans reminded the Spartans that when Hyllus, son o f Herakles, returned to the  5 2 1  5 2 2  5 2 3  5 2 4  Andrewes, "Sparta and Arcadia," 2. Hdt. 7. 202. Hdt. 7. 202; 9. 28. 3; 9. 61. 2. There was one light-armed man for every Tegean hoplite, Hdt. 9. 29. Hdt. 8. 43-8; 9. 28-30; 77.  136  Peloponnesos, the Tegean king Echemus defeated h i m in combat, thus deciding who should remain in the Peloponnesos: For that deed we have had from the Peloponnesians among other great privileges of honor the right of leading the other of the two wings when there is a common expedition of the Peloponnesians forward. Of course, men of Lakedaimon, we will not oppose you in any way; we will concede to you whichever of the two wings you choose to command; but we claim that the command of the other wing comes to us as it always has in the past. And apart from what we have related, we are worthier than the Athenians to have this post. For we have had many glorious conflicts with yourselves, you men of Sparta, and many with others also (Hdt. 9. 26).  Although the Tegeans displayed deference to Sparta, the speech revealed that the Tegeans were worthy o f distinction in any Peloponnesian or Spartan a r m y .  526  Tegea, though willing to  concede to Spartan leadership in the field, did not consider itself inferior. According  to  Herodotus,  whenever  there  was  a  Peloponnesians, the Tegeans were employed on the left w i n g .  "common 527  expedition" o f  But in those battles where  the formations were recorded, the Tegeans were not placed on the wing. Instead, they were 528  stationed next to the Spartans at the battles o f Mantinea in 418 and Korinth in 394.  In  addition, at the Second Battle o f Mantinea in 362, the Tegeans (grouped among the Arkadians) were next to the Theban forces and their elite troops.  529  It seems that at least in  the classical period, the Tegeans were always positioned next to the corps o f the leading troops. According to the Tegean' speech in Herodotus, the successful stand against the Heraklidae, combined with the reputation o f the legendary Tegean general Echemus, Hdt. 9. 61-62; 70. Wickert doubts that the Tegeans were defeated in a single battle and believes that Herodotus 1.68 is misleading for he was not thinking about one particular war, but the constant state of war between Sparta and Tegea. Wickert concludes, "Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen, DaB er schon an der hier besprochen Stelle an diese Kampfe gedacht hat," Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 11. I am in agreement with Wickert that Tegea and Sparta had fought numerous battles and through the various battles with Sparta, Tegea won their respect and recognition. 5 2 5  5 2 6  The right wing always belonged to the Spartans, so it is the left wing that is open for debate. See Hdt. 9. 28; Thuc. 5. 71; Xen. Hell. 4. 2. 19 for the Tegeans posted next to the Spartans on the right. Cf. Thuc. 5. 71; Xen. Hell. 4. 2. 19. 5 2 7  5 2 8  137  provided Tegea with the proper credentials to command the important left wing o f the army whenever the Peloponnesians fought together. speeches, Spartans.  530  Regardless o f the historicity o f the  531  the evidence shows that the Tegeans enjoyed a favorable relationship with the  532  The reason for such a friendly relationship was due, I believe, to two factors.  First, the Spartans had come to respect the military prowess o f the Tegeans and had experienced their abilities in hoplite warfare. Second, like the Eleans, the Tegean aristocracy fostered relations with the Spartan authorities.  533  During the battle o f Plataia, when the Greek army repositioned itself, the three thousand Tegeans became isolated with the Lakedaimonian a r m y .  534  The Tegeans led the  attack against the Persian army. The Persian commander, Mardonius, was soon killed by a Spartan and the Persians fled. The Tegeans were once again i n the front and were the first to enter the encampment.  535  They had remained beside the Spartan army and fought as bravely  D . S . 15. 85. 2. Besides the invasion of the Heraklidae, the battle of Plataia and defense of Greece against the Persian Invasions were the only other pan-Peloponnesian affairs. The campaigns of Kleomenes were pan-Peloponnesian affairs, but there were no battles fought. The first campaign ended prematurely and the second never left Sparta (Hdt. 5. 74-7; 5. 94). It is uncertain to what pan-Peloponnesian War the Tegeans were referring. See W.J. Woodhouse, "The Greeks at Plataia," JHS 18 (1898):41-43. It was the Spartans, the recognized military leaders, who decided that the Athenians were the most deserving troops to be stationed on the other wing. The tactical reality supports this view, as the Tegean troops were too few to command a wing, while the Athenian contingent of eight thousand men plus archers would have been the better, strategic choice. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the Korinthians, who fielded five thousand men, were not offended by the notion of being moved from the place of honor (next to the Spartans) in order to make room for the Tegeans. Instead, the speeches may have been, as Woodhouse suggests, fabricated. Hdt. 1. 68. The words used to describe why the Spartans placed the Tegeans next to them, Tiufjs E'I'VEKO K a i d p E T f j s , show that the Tegeans had previously won the respect of the Spartans. The intention of this remark may have been to lessen the insult of losing the position on the wing, but if the speech was solely for the benefit of the