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The Fraser Basin Council’s role as a facilitating institution in the consensus-based development of the… Lapp, Laura Mitchelle 2005

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THE F R A S E R BASIN COUNCIL 'S R O L E AS A FACILITATING INSTITUTION IN THE C O N S E N S U S - B A S E D D E V E L O P M E N T OF THE FRASER RIVER MANAGEMENT PLAN b y LAURA MICHELLE L A P P B . S c , McGill University, 2002 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE D E G R E E OF M A S T E R OF S C I E N C E in THE F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES (Resource Management and Environmental Studies) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA May 2005 © Laura Michelle Lapp, 2005 ABSTRACT Facilitated consensus-based processes seek to develop constructive dialogue and collaborative opportunities among stakeholders and thus have the potential to improve problem identification and decision-making. This thesis assesses the ability of the Fraser Basin Council (Council) to contribute to the procedural success of a consensus-based process as a facilitating institution. A "facilitating institution", a concept not documented in the literature, is defined as a non-partisan institution that draws on its membership to facilitate consensus-building on issues related to a common interest. In the case of the Council, it is a unique institution constituted of government, private sector and public representatives that focuses on economic, environmental and social sustainability goals. In the absence of performance measures to assess such an institution, a two-part analytical framework is developed which first outlines six performance measures associated with successful consensus-based processes, with an emphasis on "Agreement on the Facilitator". It identifies several factors that influence the facilitating institution's ability to assist the participants in achieving success. In particular, qualities the institution adds to or detracts from the process, the style of intervention it uses and how its performance compares to a set of strengths and weaknesses of facilitating institutions. The Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission (FRMP) process is used as a case study. A qualitative research approach employs document analysis and semi-structured interviews with a cross-section of FRMP process participants, Council staff and Directors. The participants' assessment of the FRMP process results in performance measure ratings that are highly positive for "Agreement on the Facilitator" and "Representation of Interest", positive for "Interest-Driven Framework" and "Informed Decision-Making", mixed for "Clarity of Process" and negative for "Decision Implementation". Conclusions on the Council's,facilitation of the FRMP process are that (1) the influence of the Council was most positive at the "front end" of the process, (2) the Council has considerable potential as a facilitating institution, not all of which was maximized and (3) the role of the Council as a facilitating institution needs to be defined more explicitly and communicated to the broader public. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ii T A B L E OF CONTENTS '. iii LIST OF TABLES v LIST OF FIGURES vi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS vii PREFACE viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS „. ix 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1 1.1. Research Objectives / 1.2. Rationale . 2 1.3. Scope .v 3 1.4. Conceptual Framework 4 1.5. Organization 4 2. THE FOUNDATIONS OF FACILITATED CONSENSUS-BASED DECISION-MAKING 7 2.1. Overview of Consensus-Based Processes 7 2.2. Overview of Facilitation 11 2.3. Oven'iew of Facilitating Institutions 20 2.4. Summary 26 3. ASSESSING FACILITATING INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR PROCESSES 27 3.1. Framework for Assessing the Facilitated Consensus-Based Process 27 3.2. Framework for Assessing the Facilitating Institution 39 3.3. Summary '. : 43 4. RESEARCH METHODS .'. 44 4.1. Rationale for Qualitative Analysis 44 4.2. Rationale for a Case Study 45 4.3. Data Collection : :.45 4.4. Data Analysis and Presentation 48 4.5. Data Validity and Reliability 50 '4.6. Limitations 51 4.7. Summary •. 51 5. THE FRASER BASIN COUNCIL AND THE FRASER RIVER MANAGEMENT PLAN PROCESS..52 5.1. The Fraser Basin Council 52 5.2. The Fraser River Gravel Reach 57 5.3. The Fraser River Management Plan Process 66 5.4. Summary 79 6. PARTICIPANTS' ASSESSMENT OF THE FRASER RIVER MANAGEMENT PLAN PROCESS 80 6.1. Focus of the Participants' Assessment Analysis 80 6.2. Agreement on the Facilitator 81 6.3. Representation of Interests 94 6.4. Clarity of Process 97 6.5. Interest-Driven Framework 104 i i i 6.6. Informed Decision-Making Ill 6.7. Decision Implementation 120 6.8. Participants' Overall Assessment 125 6.9. Summary and Conclusions 128 7. ASSESSMENT OF THE FRASER BASIN COUNCIL AS A FACILITATING INSTITUTION 131 7. /. Characteristics the Fraser Basin Council Contributed as a Facilitating Institution 131 7.2. The Council's Style of Facilitation :.- 140 7.3. Discussion of the Future of the Fraser Basin Council as a Facilitating Institution 146 7.4. Summary and Conclusions 149 8. CONCLUSIONS : 150 8.1. Summary of Key Findings , 150 8.2. Lessons Learned 153 8.3. Future Research 154 8.4. Recommendations for the Council 155 REFERENCES .'. 156 Appendix 1: Map of Thesis Research Approach 167 Appendix 2: Details on the Interview Methods 168 Appendix 3: The History of Flood Hazard Management along the Fraser River 171 Appendix 4: Quantitative Analysis of the Participants' Assessment of FRMP 179 iv ( LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Basic Steps in a Facilitated Process 14 Table 2. Typology of Meditation 17 Table 3. Literature Sources of Performance Measures 28 Table 4: Performance Measures and Sub-Measures 39 Table 5. Characteristics of a Facilitating Institution as Compared to an A d Hoc Group 41 Table 6. FRMP Committee Members as of November 2000 '. '. 74 Table 7. Participants' Assessment of FRMP 129 Table 8. The Fraser Basin Council's Type of Mediation 144 Table 9A. Performance Measure and Sub-Measure Ratings 181 Table 10A. Performance Rating Categories 184 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Map of Thesis Organization 6 Figure 2. Mental Map of a Facilitation Toolkit 19 Figure 3. Components through which a Facilitation Institution Influences a Process 42 Figure 4. Location of the Fraser Basin in British Columbia 52 Figure 5. Structure of the Fraser Basin Council 54 Figure 6. The Fraser River Floodplain from Hope to Mission 59 Figure 7. Volumes of Gravel Removed from the Fraser River between Hope and Mission, 1964-1998 62 Figure 8. Structure of the Fraser River Management Plan Process 69 Figure 9A: Detailed Overview of the Thesis Research Approach 167 VI LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS A A R C Approving Agency Review Committee A D M Assistant Deputy Minister BC British Columbia B C A L British Columbia Assets and Land Corporation BCRTEE British Columbia Round Table on the Environment and the Economy C C G Canadian Coast Guard C E A A Canadian Environmental Assessment Act C M FRMP Committee Member CORE Commission on Resources and Environment Council/ FBC Fraser Basin Council DFO Department of Fisheries and Oceans F B M B Fraser Basin Management Board FBMP Fraser Basin Management Program FRAP Fraser River Action Plan FRMP Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission Process FVRD Fraser Valley Regional District HADD Harmful Alteration, Destruction and Disturbance JPC Joint Program Committee on Integrated Flood Hazard Management L R M P Land and Resource Management Planning L W B C Land and Water BC MoELP British Columbia Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks M E M British Columbia Ministry of Energy and Mines M S R M British Columbia Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management M W L A P British Columbia Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection NRTEE National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy NGO Non-Governmental Organization RSBC Revised Statutes of British Columbia s. Section ' SC/ SCM FRMP Steering Committee/ Steering Committee Member SDM Shared Decision-Making T C / T C M FRMP Technical Committee/ Technical Committee Member T E K Traditional Ecological Knowledge UBC University of British Columbia WUP Water Use Planning PREFACE Motivations for initiating this research come from an interest in partnerships in river basin management, governance of natural resources and negotiative approaches to resolving conflict, developed through experiences during a Bachelor's degree in Geography. In a search for post-graduate opportunities, I was fortunate to come across work by Professor Tony Dorcey, Director of the University of British Columbia's School of Community and Regional Planning, on institutional arrangements for water resource management that he had been conducting within the Westwater Research Centre at the U B C . Tony encouraged me to look at the various planning processes that had been developed in British Columbia to manage natural resources, as there had been a wealth of local innovation in the preceding decade. Through Tony and Jim Vanderwal, I was sponsored to attend the Fraser Basin Council's State of the Basin Conference in 2002. It was my first opportunity to observe the diversity of people gathered to collaborate on sustainability issues on the scale of the Fraser River Basin. The Fraser Basin Council (Council) intrigued me because of the diversity of representation on its Board of Directors, drawing members from all orders of government, the private sector and the public, and the role it has carved out for itself as a non-governmental organization operating within the British Columbia governance context. I became interested in using the Council as a case study in my research. Tony encouraged me, as he had interest in and knowledge of the Council himself. He was the founding Chair of the Fraser Basin Management Board, the predecessor to the Council. He was able to connect me with people who are currently involved in the Council's operations. I could not find another institution with the same qualities as the Council, in terms of having representation and funding commitments from all orders of government while maintaining autonomy in its operations. I searched the literature and found that there was nothing pertaining to the type of facilitating that the Council does as an institution. Another interesting aspect was that the Council was one of the last undertakings still operating after much innovation in public involvement in processes related to resource management and land use planning in the 1990's. I wanted to know why the Council had survived while others had not. I also began to hear criticisms about the Council's emphasis on process, rather than product-oriented approaches to problem solving, and I wanted to understand how effective the Council's approach was. I felt it was an excellent opportunity to research a unique innovation that is still functioning and developing. This thesis does not contain final answers to all my questions about the Council, but rather serves as a preliminary analysis to inspire further discussions. I was fortunate to be able to talk to an amazing group of individuals who participated in the Council-facilitated Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission (FRMP) process, which became my case study. Their voices tell the story of what the Council was able to contribute to FRMP and where its potential shortcomings lay. They shared their own analyses of the role the Council can play in the Fraser Basin and opened up new questions. There are many opportunities to take further steps in this research to better understand what contributions an institution like the Council can make in the governance of river basins. One conclusion I draw from the experience is that there are people from all walks of life that care deeply about the Fraser Basin's sustainability and greatly appreciate the efforts the Council has made in trying to achieve sustainability in innovative ways. A CKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis was only possible with the help of many generous individuals. My family deserves this Masters more than I do for their unfailing encouragement and faith in my ability to complete it. I could not have done it without their support. Many fellow students and friends have played a tremendous part in this process by sharing stories and advice and providing necessary diversions along the way. I am especially appreciative of my supervisory committee not only for assisting me with developing the thesis, but also for teaching me valuable life lessons as role models. I am thankful for the guidance and support that my supervisor, Tony Dorcey, provided to me for the duration of my studies. His shared enthusiasm in studying the Fraser Basin Council was stimulating. His insight into innovative institutions in British Columbia, their use of consensus and their place in the governance of water resources has led me to learn about all sorts of wonderful things. Tony's diplomacy and adeptness with negotiation are something 1 aspire to develop over time. Les Lavkulich has been indispensable. He has always been there to nudge me to take the next step and to boost my ego when I lacked the confidence to get on with it. He restored my faith in the research process when I felt the most disheartened. Les helped me put this experience into perspective as a learning experience on the value of both qualitative and quantitative research and the importance of integrating multiple perspectives in resource management. Julian Griggs, of Dovetail Consulting Inc., has been fantastic to work with as a bright, positive and grounded individual and a skilled teacher of facilitation techniques. His manual on facilitation and the workshop he conducts through the Hollyhock Leadership Institute were highly influential in how I approached the thesis. Julian also provided crucial advice on research methods and thesis design. I have done my best to learn from him how to address the details while keeping the big picture in sight. Julian's motto of "under commit, over deliver" is still something I am working on, but it has made a life-long impression! I am thankful to all the staff and Directors at the Fraser Basin Council who welcomingly invited me to explore what they are doing in depth. Steve Litke gave me the opportunity to learn a lot about the Council's day-to-day activities by supporting me in an internship. Jim Vanderwal kindly shared, a tremendous amount of information and his honest reflections on the FRMP process with me and was always willing to set time aside to help me out along the way. M y gratitude also goes out to the interviewees, who played an essential role in the thesis development. I wrote it with them in mind, hoping that it would reflect all of their diverse but rational and honest feelings towards management of the gravel reach and the Council's involvement. I hope this research can contribute back to them in some way. IX 1. INTRODUCTION Facilitators began to play an increasing role in the early 1990s assisting groups to reach agreement on resource management decisions in British Columbia (Lizee, 2002). Facilitation has the potential to become a mainstay in the governance of resources by improving decision-making amidst the complexities of overlapping jurisdictions, multiple user groups and interested parties, downsizing governments and demands for transparency. This thesis investigates one distinctive application of facilitation, the use of a facilitating institution to assist a group in resolving a complex resource challenge through a consensus-based process. The thesis explores ways in which the involvement of a facilitating institution might positively or negatively affect a consensus-based process. This chapter introduces the objectives of the research, delineates broad themes applied throughout the thesis, and outlines the framework through which the thesis is presented. Subsequent chapters go into greater depth about the methods used, case study selected, framework applied, analysis and results. They all relate back to the primary research objectives and questions introduced in the following section. 1.1. Research Objectives This thesis seeks to investigate the role of a facilitating institution in the management of natural resources. A case study is used to illuminate the role one facilitating institution, the Fraser Basin Council, plays in facilitating a multistakeholder, consensus-based process to reach recommendations on the interjurisdictional management of a section of the Fraser River. This process is referred to as the Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission process, or simply "FRMP." The objectives of this research are: 1. to develop a framework to assess the performance of a facilitating institution that employs consensus-based processes; and 2. to assess the performance of the Fraser Basin Council. A third objective of the research, used to achieve the second objective, is: 3. to assess the performance of the Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission process. Some creativity is required to tackle the first two research objectives, since there is no ready-made framework to use to assess the Council's facilitation role. Relatively few studies exist that assess what facilitators do and how well they do it, let alone assess what facilitating institutions do and how well they do it. Since the concept of a facilitating institution has not yet been fleshed out in the literature, a set of performance measures selected for their association with successful processes and their relevance to the case is used both to assess FRMP and to scope out aspects of the process which were assisted or hindered by the involvement of the Council. Further assessment of the Council is made by investigating the approach to facilitation it applies to the process and how its performance compares with other permanent groups that apply consensus. 1 are two research questions: To what extent did the Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission process achieve success in a set of performance measures derived for consensus-based processes? What was the influence of the Fraser Basin Council, as the facilitating institution, on the ability of the Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission process to succeed in terms of those performance measures? This thesis qualitatively analyses the case study using an inductive, non-positivist approach. The basis for analysis of the research questions is a synthesis of the literature on performance measures for effective facilitated multistakeholder processes. Three lines of evidence are used in the analysis: 1. published literature; 2. historical analysis of transcripts, minutes and reports; and, 3. semi-structured interviews with a cross-section of those involved in FRMP and/or the Council. Most of the data answers the first research question on the performance of FRMP, the results of which are used to develop the second part of the analysis, investigating the role of the Council as the facilitating institution. 1.2. Rationale The Fraser Basin Council is a non-partisan, non-governmental organization that addresses social, economic and environmental sustainability issues within the Fraser Basin. It has a Board of Directors with members representing all four orders of government (federal, provincial, local and First Nation), the private sector and the public. The Board develops consensus among its members to take action on interjurisdictional, sustainability-related projects. Since its inception in 1997, the Council has been facilitating collaboration on flood hazard management and other river management tools. It is well suited for this role, as the management challenges relate to sustainability and often require both intragovernmental coordination and incorporation of diverse stakeholder perspectives. The Council is an interesting case to investigate in part for the following reasons: 1. The Council is an institutional arrangement that is unique within British Columbia and Canada. 2. The Council takes an innovative approach to assisting in the governance of natural resources by facilitating consensus-based negotiative processes to develop intragovernmental and multistakeholder collaboration. 3. Observers are divided in their perceptions of the effectiveness of the Council's emphasis . on process. An assessment of the participants' perceptions, after having invested time and resources into a Council-facilitated process would shed more light on that debate. 4. There has not been much research conducted on the Council's approach. The Council's predecessor, the Fraser Basin Management Board, has been assessed by Dorcey (1997). Watson (2001) has written two brief articles on the Council, and Council staff members have written articles about specific processes the Council has been involved in (Vanderwal, 2002). During the development of this thesis, the World Bank used the Fraser Basin Council as a case in its world-wide research into institutional and policy analysis of river basin management at the lowest appropriate level (Blomquist et al., 2005). 2 The thesis identifies characteristics that were effective in a process the Council has facilitated, so that they may continue to be practiced in subsequent processes, as well as areas of weakness in the process to which more attention could be paid. Advances in the Council's approach can lead to further success in addressing resource management in the future. The recommendations made in this thesis can contribute to the Council's internal analysis. The recommendations could also benefit government agencies, interest groups, private sector and public representatives who are involved in the Council's initiatives, as improvements to its facilitated processes might make their involvement more meaningful. The Council has facilitated many processes since it began operating, but for the scope of this thesis it was necessary to select one process to use as a case to investigate the Council's facilitating institution role. In 1999, the Council was invited to assist in discussions on the ^management of a portion of the Fraser River referred to as the "gravel reach," located in the Fraser Valley between Hope and Mission. The Council initiated the Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission (FRMP) multistakeholder process and intervened as a facilitating institution. FRMP was designed to be inclusive of the diverse stakeholders along the river by assisting them in developing a management plan which accounts for "protection of communities from flood and erosion hazards, safe navigation in the river, protection of fish habitat and the ongoing maintenance of fishing sites" (Vanderwal, 2002). FRMP continued until December 2002, when another Council-facilitated process relating to the same issues, called the Collaborative Management Group, took its place (FBC, 2003e). The following are some reasons why FRMP has been selected for the purposes of this thesis: 1. FRMP was a Council-facilitated consensus-based process that brought all orders of government, including First Nations, industry and interest groups around one table. 2. FRMP was a high-profile case for the Council. 3. FRMP was more directly related to water resource management than many of the Council's other sustainability-related projects. 4. FRMP was more bounded than other Council-facilitated processes on that section of the Fraser River. In terms of research considerations, FRMP is a good case study because it has already drawn to a close. Also, since FRMP was situated in the Lower Fraser Valley, most of the participants are still living within a reasonable distance to conduct research from Vancouver. 1.3. Scope This thesis highlights aspects of FRMP that excelled in the performance measures and others that did not meet the performance measures and hampered the ability of the process to reach an implementable final agreement, as evaluated by the participants of the process, the Council staff, and other observers. It also assesses how those issues may have been affected as a result of the role that the Council played as the facilitating institution. It offers recommendations on strengths for the Council to build on and weaknesses to address, relating specifically to the FRMP case being examined. Finally, it addresses the role of the Council in the broader context, given what has been learned about its ability to act as facilitator in FRMP. Although it would have'been interesting to do an assessment of the effectiveness of the Council, not just in terms of FRMP but of all its undertakings, this was not possible within the time constraints of a Masters thesis and given the diversity of projects the Council conducts under its broad interpretation of sustainability-related projects. 3 1 The thesis casts a wide net in scoping qualities of the Council as a facilitating institution, since it ventures beyond the theory currently covered in the literature. In addition to assessing the Council's influence within discussions about the performance measures, other insights into its well-designed and not-so-functional aspects were incorporated into an assessment of its role in FRMP and how it may evolve as a result. This thesis focuses on qualities of the consensus-based process and characteristics of the facilitating institution that are captured through the filter of the performance measures. It does not evaluate other dimensions that helped determine the approach and outcome of the case study, such as the broader political context and institutional framework of the governance of natural resources in British Columbia. The thesis also does not evaluate the interaction of this process with other processes relating to the same resources that were occurring in parallel. 1.4. Conceptual Framework A conceptual framework is "the researcher's map of the territory being investigated" (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 20). Chapter 2 goes into the concepts investigated in this thesis in depth. The conceptual framework of this thesis is informed by literature relating to consensus processes, including multi-party negotiation, facilitation, public participation, shared decision-making, collaboration and cross-cultural conflict resolution. The British Columbia Round Table on the Environment and the Economy's two volumes (1991a; 1992) on consensus processes in British Columbia in the early 1990's helped lay the groundwork in understanding consensus processes. The National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy's Building Consensus for a Sustainable Future (1996) was another important reference. The model for group facilitation developed by Schwarz (2002) informed the macro-level analysis of how a facilitating institution could affect a consensus-based process. Schwarz argues that broader political, economic and social context, organizational structure, institutional culture and values contribute in positive or negative ways to a facilitated process. Griggs' (2003a) synthesis of the responsibilities and approaches of facilitators was helpful in establishing specific ways in which a facilitator might influence a process. An adaptation from Moore's typology of mediators in The Mediation Process (2003) is used to illuminate various ways a facilitating institution might choose to engage in a process. In the Consensus Building Handbook (Susskind et al., 1999), a compilation of commentaries designed as a guide to consensus processes, Susskind provides a framework for the assessment of permanent groups using consensus that was indispensable in developing the concept of facilitating institutions. Dorcey and McDaniel's (2001) review of citizen involvement and negotiation-based processes in Canada, and Dorcey's (1997) insights on the role of the Fraser Basin Management Board in collaborating towards sustainability, provide information which helps place the concept of a facilitating institution in the Canadian context. 1.5. Organization This thesis answers two research questions, so it is built around the development and use of two interrelated analytical frameworks.' Chapter 2 provides an overview of the development of consensus processes in British Columbia and rationale for the demand for innovative institutions to apply consensus processes to the 4 governance of natural resources. It outlines theory on consensus-based processes and facilitation and defines the concept of a facilitating institution. Chapter 3 provides the rationale for the two-part analytical framework, which links the assessment of FRMP to the assessment of the Council as FRMP's facilitator. It introduces six performance measures which have been derived from the literature as indicators of successful multistakeholder, consensus-based processes. It also provides an explanation for how the role of the facilitating institution is assessed. Chapter 4 describes the research methods used to develop the thesis. Further detail on the interview process is provided in appendix 2. Chapter 5 introduces the Council, FRMP, and the context in which they operate. It touches on resource management challenges in the gravel reach of the Fraser River, the regulatory framework for those resources and the history of flood hazard management in the region. A brief summary of the Council's structure, operations and mandate as a facilitator is provided. FRMP and its significant milestones are described. Chapter 6 presents an assessment of FRMP based on the six performance measures in the participants' own words. Interview data is grouped by performance measure, sub-measure and questions asked in relation to the sub-measures and other themes developed out of the interviews. In chapter 7 the focus is shifted to the Council and its approach to facilitating FRMP, using the concept of a facilitating institution presented in chapter 2 and the analytical framework developed in chapter 3. The assessment of the facilitating institution uses some of the data collected to assess FRMP in chapter 6, but it emphasizes the role of the Council in the process by investigating aspects of FRMP on which it may have had influence. The Council's strengths and weaknesses as a facilitating institution, influence on FRMP, unique characteristics and speculations on its future developments are discussed. Chapter 8 reflects on the entire thesis and summarizes key findings. It ties these assessments back to the theoretical underpinnings. The implications of the research findings are discussed and recommendations for future research are outlined. ' Figure 1 is a diagram which illustrates the organization of the thesis. A more detailed diagram of the thesis structure, as related to the research approach, is provided in appendix 1. \ 5 Figure 1: Map of Thesis Organization Introduction Chapter One Literature Review Chapter Two -Two-Part Analytical Framework - >^ Profcess Performance Measures Facilitating Institution Assessment, Chapter Three Research Methods Chapter Four Case Study Chapter Five Analysis.and Discussion ^ 1^ Process Performance-Measures ^Facilitating Institution Assessment Chapter Six ~ | ——^-rr • Chapter Seven , ' -~y Conclusions Chapter Eight 6 2. THE FOUNDATIONS OF FA CILITATED CONSENSUS-BASED DECISION-MAKING This chapter sets the stage for the analytical framework that has been designed to assess the role of a facilitating institution in a consensus-based process. It reviews literature on consensus-based processes and their associated tools. It then builds on a description of facilitators to define facilitating institutions. 2.1. Overview of Consensus-Based Processes This section provides an overview of the development of consensus-based processes in British Columbia and a description of key components and techniques used in such processes. 2.1.1. Description of Consensus Processes in British Columbia Until the 1950's, the dominant approach to resolving resource management issues in Canada was expert-based and centralized, commonly referred to as 'command and control' (Nelson, 2003). In 1962, Rachel Carson's "Silent Spring" (1962) sparked a new wave of environmental movements that attracted a broader cross-section of the public than movements of the past (Guha, 2000: 72). The public began to demand more input into decisions that affected them, particularly relating to the environment. The Canadian government began to experiment with various decision-making processes in the late 1960's and early 1970's (Dorcey and McDaniels, 2001). Projects included river basin planning experiments and environmental assessments of mega-hydro projects. Some projects, such as the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, were highly successful at involving the public and drew considerable support for further democratization of decision-making. Non-governmental organizations began to demand a larger role in planning. With the economic slowdown in the early 1980's came criticisms that projects involving public participation were too costly, time-consuming and slow to implement (Dorcey and McDaniels, 2001). The movement slowed significantly. Although there was still a recognition of , environmental challenges, the focus moved to efficiency and economic growth (Nelson, 2003). Still, models for increased stakeholder participation in planning and decision-making on regulations and permitting continued to be developed. When the World Commission on Environment and Development published "Our Common Future" in the Brundtland Report (1987), it prompted greater recognition of the need to integrate social, economic and environmental aspects in resource management. Recommendations made in the Brundtland Report inspired the Canadian government to set up a National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy (NRTEE) to increase the use of multistakeholder approaches in resource management. In the following years, similar round tables were established in each province. The British Columbia Round Table on the Environment and the Economy (BCRTEE) was particularly influential in developing multistakeholder conflict resolution and consensus-based processes to resolve resource management challenges. Many innovative multistakeholder consensus-based processes were initiated to address resource management during the early 1990's. The BCRTEE (1991a; 1991b) was a leader in its publication of two volumes on "Consensus Processes in British Columbia". The BCRTEE's (1992: 2) description of consensus processes in the second volume is applied in this research, Consensus processes encompass techniques that go by a variety of names- negotiation, dispute resolution, mediation, facilitation, getting-to-yes. However, they all have a common basis in collaboration and seeking agreement.... [A] collaborative, consensus-based approach strives to find a common solution that can satisfy most of the needs of all parties. Building on the work that the BCRTEE conducted on consensus-based processes, Canada's NRTEE guided interaction between the provincial Round Tables to work on a nationally accepted definition and set of principles for consensus processes. The two documents created from this collaboration, entitled "Building Consensus for a Sustainable Future: Guiding Principles" (NRTEE, 1993) and "Building Consensus for a Sustainable Future: Putting Principles into Practice" (Cormick et al., 1996), continue to be standard references in the assessment of consensus processes in Canada. The working definition of consensus that is provided in the latter document focuses on sustainable development. It is expressed as follows: A consensus process is one in which all those who have a stake in the outcome aim to reach agreement on actions and outcomes that resolve or advance issues related to environmental, social, and economic sustainability. In a consensus process, participants work together to design a process that maximizes their ability to resolve their differences. Although they may not agree with all aspects of the agreement, consensus is reached if all participants are willing to live with the total package. .... A consensus process provides an opportunity for participants to work together as equals to realize acceptable actions or outcomes without imposing the views or authority of one group over another. Consensus processes should be inclusive, balanced, and fair. They are designed to ensure inclusive representation and meaningful involvement of significant interests, to provide a forum for participants to address each other directly, to allow for significant involvement in process design, and to create opportunities for cooperative solutions and the development of new partnerships (modified from NRTEE, 1993). Aside from incorporating the fundamental aspects of collaboration and seeking agreement, however, there is no generic structure to consensus processes. They can take many forms and tend to develop in response to the specific needs of the issues they are designed to address in each case. There are, however, some common elements among consensus processes, such as (BCRTEE, 1992): • Incentive to seek solutions collaboratively; • Stakeholder and government involvement; • Full mandate as defined by all the parties, not just government; • Accepted process rules; • Time limits for reaching a conclusion and reporting on outcomes; • Government commitment; and, • Fallback alternatives for making necessary decisions i f an agreement is not reached. According to Susskind et al. (1999: 66): Consensus decisions are appropriate when the solution to a problem is not immediately clear to all the affected parties or when people disagree on the best solution or decision. 8 The application of consensus-based processes was further explored by the British Columbia Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE), which conducted large-scale land use planning projects to address conflicts in forestry and other resources. CORE was a progressive leader in recommending various avenues for citizen involvement in British Columbia, particularly through a collaborative approach referred to as shared decision-making. A CORE report (1995: 19) stated: Increased public participation is not merely a privilege granted at the pleasure of government responding to temporary circumstances; it is a fundamental right that in the past has received inadequate recognition. Public participation was believed to improve the linkage between those making the decisions and those affected by the decisions, leading to more informed decision-making. British Columbia's Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP) process, a set of negotiation-based multistakeholder processes designed to develop smaller scale land use plans, developed out of CORE. The Fraser Basin Management Program also began addressing sustainability issues through consensus under the federal Green Plan's Fraser River Action Plan. Later the Fraser Basin Council, which developed out of the Fraser Basin Management Program, also adopted the use of consensus in its processes. In the mid-1990's there was a slow-down in the experimentation with new types of consensus-based processes, in part in response to high profile conflicts in some of the processes, a weakening economy and a changing political scene. There were also excessive demands being placed on participating citizens, some of whom suffered "volunteer burnout" as a result of the demands of time and preparation (Dorcey and McDaniels, 2001). By 2000, one of the few remaining large-scale, consensus-based innovations in British Columbia which had its origins in the 1990's wave was the Fraser Basin Council. However, to this day several processes which strive to reach consensus, but are not necessarily consensus processes, such as the BC Hydro Water Use Planning processes, continue to take place. 2.1.2. Techniques in Consensus-Based Processes The BCRTEE's (1992: 2) definition of consensus processes, as described in the preceding subsection,.has significant implications for this thesis. First, since all consensus processes have foundations in collaboration and seeking agreement, literature relating to these two aspects has been used to inform the analysis of the consensus-based process case study. Second, since a consensus process may rely on several techniques, including facilitation and negotiation, theory from the literature on these techniques is also applied to the analysis. Often the term "consensus-based process" is used rather than "consensus process." It is used in this thesis so that literature on techniques that do not strictly apply to consensus but may be used in processes that work toward consensus are not excluded. Negotiation and facilitation are commonly applied in consensus-based processes, but both developed independently in the last few decades. Negotiation-based approaches first started to be used in Canada because they were expected to reduce the uncertainty and costs associated with government administrative processes and improve their turn around times (Dorcey and McDaniels, 2001). Facilitation, third party assistance in resolving disputes, developed separately through US protest movements in the 1960's (Coover et al. 1985, in Dorcey and McDaniels, 2001). 9 This thesis emphasizes facilitation more than interest-based negotiation or collaboration, but it is valuable to provide a basic explanation of what they bring to consensus-based processes. The use of facilitation is addressed in its own section later in this chapter. Negotiation Negotiation is a bargaining relationship between parties who perceive that they have a conflict of interest. The bargaining relationship may involve educating each other about their interests, exchanging resources, or resolving less tangible issues such as a procedure to resolve a problem or the form of a relationship in the future (Moore, 2003: 8). Interest-based negotiations became more widely applied in resolving conflicts after Fisher and Ury first published their popular book on principled negotiation, entitled "Getting to Yes" (1991) in 1981. They present four fundamental principles of negotiation: 1. separate the people from the problem; 2. focus on interests rather than positions; 3. generate a variety of options before settling on an agreement; and, 4. insist that the agreement be based on objective criteria. One can separate the people from the problem by being "hard on the problem" but respectful towards the other parties. This approach may help parties proceed independently of issues of trust between them. By focussing on interests, time is spent productively exploring what needs to be resolved to satisfy both parties, rather than establishing what the parties' bottom lines are. By generating a variety of options while judgement is suspended, there is more opportunity for creative alternatives to develop. If there are multiple options to choose from when consequences need to be weighed and trade-offs made, there is a greater likelihood of an option meeting more needs. Insisting on an objective-driven process helps drive the parties' preferences towards solutions that are reasoned through objective standards. Principled negotiation assists in developing constructive dialogue in consensus-based processes. Often times the four fundamental principles are incorporated into a set of ground rules established by participants of such processes. Both principled negotiation and consensus aspire to maximize opportunities for mutually agreeable solutions. Collaboration Collaboration is a process in which those parties with a stake in a problem actively seek a mutually determined solution (Gray, 1989: xviii). The purpose of collaboration is to resolve conflict and advance shared visions. It is designed to incorporate multiple perspectives to produce solutions that none of the stakeholders could achieve independently. Collaboration is catalyzed by (1) the need to share information and resources, (2) the desire to exchange perspectives to develop a comprehensive understanding of the issue, (3) the collective responsibility for implementing strategies, (4) to advance a shared vision and (5) motivation for a mutually determined solution (Gray, 1989). Collaboration requires the formulation of new structures to address the problem, detailed planning and communication. Collaborative planning and shared decision-making (SDM) are based on the same general approach; the former being a term used in the United States, while the latter is a term used in Canada. Collaborative planning (Margerum, 2002) is "an interactive process of consensus 10 building and implementation using stakeholder and public involvement." Shared decision-making is defined as "a framework approach to participation in public decision-making in which, on a certain set of issues for a defined period of time, those with authority to make a decision and those affected by that decision are empowered jointly to seek an outcome that accommodates, rather than compromises, the interests of all concerned" (CORE, 1995: 116). Shared decision-making evolved out of mediation planning models (Gunton et al., 2003). Literature on shared decision-making has been used in the development of the analytical framework in this thesis. According to Gray (1989: 21), collaboration can be beneficial because: • broad comprehensive analysis of the problem domain improves the quality of solutions; • the response capability may be more diversified; • the process ensures that each stakeholder's interests are considered in any agreement; • the parties most familiar with the problem invent the solutions; • the potential to discover novel, innovative solutions is enhanced; • the parties retain ownership of the solution; • participation enhances acceptance of a solution and willingness to implement it; and, • relations between stakeholders may improve. Collaborative planning processes have also been found to produce constructive intangible outputs such as skill improvement, increased knowledge and improved stakeholder relations (Day et al., 2003). Two opportunities for the use of collaborative planning processes predominate in British Columbia; the selection of licensing and permits and negotiated rule making, sometimes referred to as "reg-neg" (BCRTEE, 1992). The participants of these processes often choose to strive for consensus in their recommendations and decisions. 2.2. Overview of Facilitation This section describes intervention, the role of a facilitator, common steps in a facilitated process, styles of facilitation and how facilitation fits into consensus-based processes. It lays the groundwork for assessing facilitating institutions, since facilitating institutions are expected to carry out the responsibilities of facilitators as described in this section, but also exhibit additional characteristics. 2.2.1. The Use of Intervention The term to "intervene" means "to enter into an ongoing system" of relationships for the purpose of helping those in the system (Argyrisi, 1970). Interveners may either be invited to engage in a process in a proactive attempt to reach agreement or to assist in resolution when disputing parties can no longer handle a conflict on their own (Moore, 2003: 8). Intervention can be useful when unproductive communication or problem solving prevents a group from accomplishing its members' goals. When the long-term effectiveness of the group is hindered, an intervener can guide the group to reflect on the process and assist in improving the members' process skills (Schwarz, 2002). An intervener in a dispute can have many roles, including opener of communication channels, legitimizer, process facilitator, trainer, resource expander, problem explorer, agent of reality, scapegoat and leader (Moore, 2003: 19). As LeBaron (2003) illustratively expresses, "An intervener is a bridge walked on by both sides." 11 Intervention can occur in numerous forms. Common modes of intervention are facilitation, mediation and arbitration. Both facilitation and mediation are techniques used in consensus processes (BCRTEE, 1992: 2). 2.2.2. The Role of a Facilitator Facilitation is an extension of a negotiation process through the intervention of a third party who enables people to more constructively converse with one another. A facilitator's primary task is to assist stakeholders in resolving their difference more effectively than they could on their own, by improving the process. This can be accomplished by assisting the stakeholders to better define and organize their interests, establish an environment that supports the development of healthy relationships and exchange of ideas, by teaching the stakeholders negotiation skills that allow them to develop more meaningful discussions about interests and values, and by managing the process to help the group progress towards an outcome that will be mutually satisfactory (adapted from Moore, 2003: 18). A facilitator typically does not get involved directly with the content or substantive material under discussion, but only the process involved in addressing that content (Griggs, 2003a: 8). Kaner and Lind (1996: xi) define a facilitator as: ...an individual who enables groups and organizations to work more effectively; to collaborate and achieve synergy. She or he is a 'content neutral' party who, by not taking sides or expressing or advocating a point of view during the meeting, can advocate for fair, open and inclusive procedures to accomplish the group's work. A facilitator can also be a learning or dialogue guide to assist a group in thinking deeply about its assumptions, beliefs and values and about its systemic processes and context. Key characteristics of a group facilitator, identified by Schwarz (2002: 5), are that he or she is: • acceptable to all the members of the group; • substantively neutral; • possesses no substantive decision-making authority; • assists the group in how it identifies and solves problems and makes decisions; and, • increases the group's effectiveness. The scope of the facilitator's responsibilities does not extent to all aspects of a group's effectiveness. As Griggs (2003a: 11) explains: Even when the facilitator is effective in supporting the group's work, the group may not be effective itself due to other factors, such as: • information provided to the group is not accurate, or insufficient; and/or, • the group is not supported by an effective structure, or organizational context (e.g., it has been allocated vague goals, insufficient time and resources, or inappropriate membership). Moore's (2003) characterization of mediators is similar to Schwarz's (2002) characterization of group facilitators. Moore argues that mediation is a "dialogue or negotiation with the involvement of a third party", involving "an acceptable third party who has limited or no decision-making authority", is "impartial and neutral" and who helps participants to "manage or resolve their differences" (2003: 8) and "may also establish or strengthen relationships of trust 12 and respect between the parties" (2003: 15). Cormick and NRTEE (1996) reinforce this interpretation by characterizing a mediator as an independent person, acceptable to all of the participants, whose focus is on the management and shepherding of consensus processes and in assisting participants in finding common agreement. In other literature, the role of a facilitator is differentiated from that of a mediator in that a mediator is more likely to get involved in a process in response to a conflict rather than in a proactive attempt to reach agreement. He or she may be more involved in assisting and persuading participants to reach formal agreement (Dorcey and McDaniels, 2001: 266). A mediator, according to some, would have more confidential interaction with the participants, and may hold private caucuses with the stakeholders and carry messages between them (Susskind et al., 1999: 162). A less commonly held belief is that an effective mediator must have and use substantive knowledge of the issues (Susskind et al., 1999: 163). Most literature suggests that the use of substantive knowledge could be detrimental as a non-neutral facilitator may, either advertently or inadvertently, bias the outcome of the process towards a less stakeholder-derived decision. Throughout this thesis, Moore's (2003) descriptions of mediation and Schwarz's (2002) descriptions of group facilitation will be assumed to apply to the approach referred to in this thesis as facilitation. 2.2.3. Tasks for a Facilitator in a Consensus-Building Model The literature on consensus-based processes does not prescribe a strict set of steps. Facilitators often design processes themselves, building on universal components and adding context-centred features. Suggested formats for processes that use consensus techniques are provided by numerous authors whose articles and texts were reviewed for this research, including Moore (2003) in mediation, Gray (1989) in collaboration, Hammond et al. (1998) in multistakeholder-based decision-making and Griggs (2003a) in facilitation. However, most of these do not delve into the role of the facilitator in the process steps. Griggs (2003a) provides a list of basic steps in a facilitated process that do outline specific tasks for the facilitator, as shown in table 1. Table 1 is self-explanatory, but there are some aspects of the Scoping and Assessment stage and other early stages that could be elaborated on further. During the Scoping and Assessment stage, long before stakeholders begin to meet at the table, it is important for the facilitator to gather as much information as possible about issues that will impact the functioning of the process and the ability of the participants to develop a solution that will be taken up successfully. The facilitator should consider the following issues, developed in part from Thomas (1995) and Dorcey (2002), before embarking on later stages: 1. Is there a clear need for the process? 2. Who are the interested parties? 3. Who holds the authority to implement the agreement? 4. Is there a need for intervention, and how might a facilitator add value to the process? 5. How could the public be involved and the decision-making authority shared? 6. What type of planning process would the stakeholders like to use? 7. How could the process effectively address the stakeholders' interests and inform decisions? 13 Table 1. Basic Steps in a Facilitated Process Step Tasks-for a Facilitator Scoping and Assessment Scoping out of context for the group's work, broader goals, potential objectives for the facilitated session and anticipated follow up. Particularly attention should be paid to expectations for both convenors and group members. What would success look like? What would characterize a failure? Scope of facilitator's role clarified. Expectations regarding interventions need careful attention Background information collated, reviewed. Logistics for session addressed. Clarification of Objectives Development of precise, outcome-oriented objectives for the session. Review and approval by key contacts. Process Design Development of a detailed agenda and discussion framework for the session, including key discussion questions, scope of discussion (what is not included for discussion) and anticipated points of closure. Endorsement of Objectives and Agenda Ideally, objectives and agenda are circulated in advance to participants, and follow up is conducted with each one. Contact in advance also allows the facilitator to develop rapport, identify key issues, and clarify scope of discussions. At minimum, objectives and agenda reviewed at the start of the session. Facilitated Session Engagement with group in facilitated session. Evaluation Can be undertaken in various ways: • on-your-feet at various points during the session, and at the end; • at the conclusion of the session, using written evaluation form; and, • after the session, through interviews, written surveys, etc. Results of evaluations should be made available to the group, for transparency and for shared learning. Follow Up At minimum, informal follow up with convenor or key contact among group members to: • review success/failure; • provide feedback for the group's shared learning • identify key learnings for the facilitator, based on feedback; and, • clarify implementation steps required, and progress to date. May involve preparation of written summary from the session. In order to determine the most effective structure for a process, the facilitator should also make considerations for contextual influences during the Scoping and Assessment stage. Contextual influences include social and cultural factors, legal issues, political dynamics, economic factors and the history of the situation (Carpenter, 1999: 70). Uncovering these influences helps to situate the process within the governance framework, set expectations about how much can be accomplished and over what timeline, and intimate potential challenges that may arise as a result of the stakeholders' differing perspectives. Before settling on a specific consensus-building strategy, key stakeholders must have already defined the problem explicitly, which is why clarification of objectives comes before process 14 design. The objectives for the process should be as specific and well-defined as possible, and reviewed by key stakeholders before the process begins. Only then should the facilitator select a general approach to reaching agreement, identify specific process steps, consider other process components and activities, identify participants, clarify additional roles and work towards agreement on meeting logistics (Carpenter, 1999: 76). 2.2.4. Typology of Facilitators There is a relatively small body of literature that distinguishes the types of approaches a facilitator may adopt in his or her intervention in a process. Since Moore's (2003) discussions of mediators are being interpreted to apply to facilitators in this research, his typology of mediators is particularly helpful. This section looks at common variables across all forms of intervention and explores Moore's five types of mediators. The three main variables in style of intervention, as identified by Moore (2003: 55-56), are: 1. the degree of control an intervener exercises (orchestrator or dealmaker); 2. the degree of content neutrality; and, 3. the focus of effort (relationship builder or problem solver). A fourth variable can be added from Schwarz (2002: 171), which is: 4. the degree of emphasis placed on participant process skill development (basic facilitation or developmental facilitation). These variables, along with the choice of groups and issues a facilitator becomes involved with, help determine the style of a facilitator's intervention. The degree of control a facilitator exercises affects the relative emphasis that he or she places on providing procedural assistance. "Orchestrators" are at one end of the spectrum as interveners who are non-directive in both substantive and procedural issues. "Dealmakers" are at the other end of the spectrum as interveners who are highly directive and controlling of substantive and procedural issues (Moore, 2003: 55). An intervener must decide how much coercion he or she will exercise on the process participants. Closely related to that is the degree of content neutrality an intervener maintains. A brief comparison should first be made of neutrality and impartiality, for clarity. According to Moore (2003: 53), neutrality refers to the relationship or behaviour between the intervener and disputants. For example, a neutral intervener would not expect to obtain special benefits from one of the disputants in return for favours in conducting the intervention. Impartiality refers to the absence of bias in favour of one of the disputants, their interests or the specific solutions they are advocating. Neither neutrality nor impartiality requires that an intervener is totally separate from the people, the conflict systems and the issues in which they are engaged. It is also acceptable for an intervener either to have a personal opinion about the substantive matter or to feel closer to one party than another, as long as the intervener is able to separate that from the performance of his or her duties (Moore, 2003). The ultimate judges of an intervener's neutrality and impartiality are the process participants. In a large proportion of literature referred to in this thesis, facilitators are assumed to be content neutral intervenors. Schwarz (2002: 327-343) refers to non-neutral interveners as "facilitative leaders" rather than facilitators. He defines a facilitative leader as one who is skilled in guiding processes but also participates in the substantive discussions and is involved in the decision-making. 15 The third variable relates to the focus of the intervention. The focus can either be placed more on relationship building or more on problem solving related to the substantive, procedural and psychological aspects of the process (Moore, 2003: 56). The tension between the two extremes is referred to in the thesis as the "process versus product" debate. The fourth variable relates to how much effort the intervener puts into improving the process skills of the participants. If the intervener's goal is simply to help the group reach agreement on a substantive problem, not to resolve the group's ongoing effectiveness, then he or she conducts what Schwarz (2002: 50) refers to as "basic facilitation". Basic facilitation is typically applied i f there is limited time or i f the group has limited autonomy, but some interveners prefer it for all of their processes. If an intervener intends to help the group develop its process skills while solving problems, Schwarz (2002: 50) refers to this as "developmental facilitation". A developmental facilitator may teach the participants to become proficient in the ground rules, monitor their own behaviour, focus on interests, test their assumptions and share their reasoning. He or she will decrease the group's dependency on facilitation over time, while helping them to resolve their substantive problem. Moore (2003: 43) provides a useful typology of mediators, with five broad types; social network, benevolent, vested interest, managerial, and independent mediators. His description of the types of mediators, with characteristic traits of each, has adapted slightly in table 2. A social network mediator places great emphasis on promoting stable, long-term relationships among the parties, with a personal commitment to maintaining harmony between them. He or she has an ongoing relationship with the parties. The parties consider the mediator trustworthy and sincere. Benevolent mediators, managerial mediators and vested interest mediators are all authoritative mediators. A benevolent mediator is particularly concerned with helping to uncover the best solution for all, while serving the wider community's interests in peace and harmony. He or she is seen as a community leader. His or her focus is primarily on procedural interests such as fairness, efficiency, economy, and minimization of overt conflict (Moore, 2003: 48). He or she is also interested in gaining respect from the parties and other observers of the dispute by effectively assisting the parties to resolve their differences. A benevolent mediator has the authority to decide on solutions, but values agreements made between the parties. The benevolent mediator is a role which is more common in the non-West. A managerial mediator maintains an authoritative relationship with those involved, both before and after the process. He or she is interested in jointly developing a solution with the participants. He or she has the authority to implement the solution. A vested-interest mediator may have specific interests and goals regarding all aspects of a dispute, which he or she may push with enthusiasm and conviction (Moore, 2003: 52). A vested-interest mediator may use leverage or coercion to attain his or her goals in the substantive issues. He or she either has a current relationship with the parties or an expected future relationship. An independent mediator is likely a professional. He or she is neutral, impartial, and has no authority to enforce an agreement (Moore, 2003: 52). This type of mediator is good for those who keep aspects of their lives in compartments and where there is a culture of independent judiciary. It is a common North American model of mediation (Lederach, 1987). 16 Table 2. Typology of Meditation Social _* - Network1 "Mediator Benevolent Mediator - Managerial Mediator Vested Interest Mediator Independent Mediator -, Relationship with parties Prior relationship to parties tied into their social network May or may not have a current relationship with parties Generally has ongoing authoritative relationship with parties before dispute is terminated Has either a current or expected future relationship with a party or parties May be a "professional" mediator i lr — "~ ' \ - ~ Goal of process Very concerned with promoting stable long-term relationships between parties and their associates Seeks best solution for all involved Seeks solution developed jointly with the parties, within mandated parameters Seeks solution that meets mediator's interests and/or those of a favoured party Seeks a jointly acceptable, voluntary, and non-coerced solution developed by the parties i * ~ * Neutrality/ Irripartiahty Not necessarily impartial, but perceived by all to be fair Generally impartial regarding the specific substantive outcome of the dispute N/A Has a strong interest in the outcome of the dispute Neutral/ impartial regarding relationships and specific outcomes Degree of authority in | decision-making N/A Has authority to advise, suggest, or decide Has authority to advise, suggest, or decide May use strong leverage or coercion to achieve an agreement N/A Degree of ' involvement with I implemen-tation frequently involved in implementation May have resources to help in monitoring and implementation of agreement May have resources to help in monitoring and implementing of agreement May have resources to help in monitoring or implementation of agreement May or may not be involved in monitoring or implementation 1 Degree of \ - authonty 1 over [ . agreement May use personal influence or peer pressure to promote adherence to agreement N/A Has authority to enforce agreement N/A Has no authority to enforce agreement Schwarz (2002: 41) provides a comparison of facilitators, facilitative consultants, facilitative coaches, facilitative trainers and facilitative leaders that is organized similarly to Moore's (2003) typology, but does not provide as much detail. The characteristics Schwarz investigates are (1) whether the one playing the facilitative role is a third party, (2) how much of a process expert he or she is, (3) how he or she addresses substantive issues during the process (e.g. content neutral, involved in the content, or a content expert), and (4) how involved in the content decision-making he or she is. In this thesis, Moore's typology rather than Schwarz' is applied to facilitators because it is more descriptive. 17 2.2.5. The Influence of a Facilitator on a Process Not only does a facilitator's style of intervention, as described in the preceding section, affect how he or she intervenes, but the facilitator's experiences, culture, training and individuality also affect how she or he intervenes. A facilitator influences aspects of a process as a result of his or her personal style and values, ability to perform scoping and assessment, degree of consideration for context, and approach to process design. A facilitator should reflect on what he or she brings to a process, including his or her own culture, values and worldviews. He or she should continually be asking, "What do I know and how do I know it? What do I value and how do I value it? What are my individual habits of attention, perception and interpretation?" (LeBaron, 2003: 274). This will help the facilitator to uncover culturally bound assumptions and broaden his or her range of choices in how to intervene. As LeBaron (2003) states, "Third parties have a duty to recognise-their role in the relational dance so that their choices are intentional, [and] made with the greatest degree of awareness possible." A facilitator should also reflect on how he or she participates in a process. For example, how does he or she react to conflict, recognise context, handle power imbalances, identify salient points, demonstrate his or her own cultural fluency, and draw on personal experiences (LeBaron, 2003: 95). How does he or she manage the dynamic, multi-layered interplay of choices that goes on? What is his or her preferred style of responding to conflict and does that affect how he or she guides others? What are the tools that he or she brings to a process that can help the participants to increase their decision-making capacity? Figure 2, a diagram developed by Griggs (2003a: 3), represents the ioolkit that a facilitator brings to the facilitated process. It is used in this thesis to examine components through which an individual facilitator's style and values, intervention approach and skills may influence a process. A facilitator's personal style and values influence the process throughout his or her contact with the group. The facilitator's style, as noted in the preceding discussion on typologies, can determine how much he or she helps the participants develop their process skills, advises the participants on substantive considerations and helps the participants build relationships. Each facilitator has individual preferences in terms of the ground rules introduced and the climate for discussions established. A facilitator cannot control the context in which a process is occurring; however, he or she can help determine how external variables are addressed within the process. A facilitator designs a process in light of his or her understanding of the organizational context in which the group functions, so his or her interpretation of how the process fits into a broader system may be significant in how a group's solutions are implemented. 18 Figure 2 . Mental Map of a Facilitation Toolkit Personal Style and Values Knowing your own style of facilitation Managing your own well-being T Mindful facilitation Scoping & Assessment ID of requirements, expectations * i Clarification of role \t Clarification of objectives Process Design Agenda design Discussion framework On-Your Feet Skills Managing discussions Interventions Context Understanding organizational context, boundaries for group function Understanding group dynamics Follow up and implementation Professional Development Evaluation and skill refinement A facilitator's ability to conduct scoping and assessment may be crucial to the success of a process. A facilitator must ensure there is interest in pursuing a process, identify interested parties, and begin to record objectives. This component of a process is often undervalued. A facilitator designs a process to reflect what he or she uncovers during scoping, using input gathered from the convenor(s) and key stakeholders. A facilitator's experience facilitating previous processes may bias him or her towards certain ways of doing things. He or she may preferentially introduce andreinforce certain process structures. This is beneficial when a facilitator's insight allows him or her to design a more resilient process, but can be detrimental i f it reduces the facilitator's flexibility and adaptability. At the table, a facilitator's communication and organizational skills are highly important. There are many "on-your-feet" tasks that a facilitator must juggle. A facilitator must simultaneously manage substantive discussions and diagnose and intervene on participants' effective and ineffective behaviour (Griggs, 2003a: 8). The facilitator's ability to manage discussions and interventions may impact how constructively the participants are able to engage in dialogue with each other. Finally, whether a facilitator engages in ongoing professional development affects his or her ability to contribute to a process. This includes refining his or her skills, assessing the strengths 19 and weaknesses of processes that he or she is currently facilitating and those that are complete, and becoming more aware of his or her own styles and values. A facilitator that undertakes professional development may more easily apply a breadth of process tools and approaches and more readily monitor and acknowledge his or her influence on a process. s 2.3. Overview of Facilitating Institutions This section defines facilitating institutions, identifies a niche in resource management which a facilitating institution might fill, and explains characteristics of a facilitating institution which might contribute to the processes it facilitates. 2.3.1. The Need for Innovative Institutions in the Governance of Natural Resources British Columbia is faced with complex problems relating to resource management. Traditional planning models are inept at handling the conflict and complexity stemming from these issues (Gunton et al., 2003). Resource managers recognise that new models of governance are needed that can analyse trade-offs and seek common ground among the stakeholders' interests. Yaffee and Wondolleck (2003: 66-67) argue that developing further institutional capacity would strengthen collaborative planning in resource management. The consensus-based processes discussed at the start of this chapter go a long way in addressing that need, but a challenge lies in finding ways to apply them. Innovative new institutional arrangements may assist in doing so. Dorcey (1991) recommends several approaches that together would cause a fundamental shift in resource management models, including a greater emphasis on consensus-based decision-making, federation, and intersectoral decision-making. He suggests that future models should emphasize the design of a total governance system. Civic sector institutions have a role to play in governance. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (1997: 9) defines governance as: ...the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes, and institutions, through which (Citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their legal obligations, and mediate their differences. In 1997, the UNDP published "Reconceptualizing Governance" (1997), which argues that three governance domains are involved in working towards sustainability; the state, civil society and the private sector. Proceedings from a World Conference on Governance (Brillantes, 1999) suggest that the civic sector, including non-governmental organizations and not-for-profit groups, can contribute to institutional process aspects of governance by facilitating partnerships, broadening public participation in formal and informal decision-making, enabling innovation and creativeness, and monitoring continuity of program delivery. Civic sector institutions can also influence policy design through powerful networking. They are more adaptable, flexible and fast-acting than the state; however, they have neither the accountability nor the secured funding, so it is important that they work in partnership with public institutions (O'Riordan, 2005). There are great challenges in reorganizing the system of governance to better address interjurisdictional resource management issues and manage the complexity of tasks involved in .planning and overseeing implementation. Day et al. (2003: 21) state that "management for sustainability is a complex political, institutional and educational process...," in which a 20 champion is necessary to drive institutional innovation and sell a process politically. Civic institutions could offer assistance in coordinating collaboration between agencies and help ensure that broad public interests are more easily accessible in the governance of natural resources. The institutional model that is being examined in this thesis, the facilitating institution, may be able to play such a role. Not all facilitating institutions work to address sustainability and natural resource challenges or are part of the civic sector, but a subset, including the Fraser Basin Council in this thesis, are. The following section describes characteristics of facilitating institutions. . 2.3.2. Defining a Facilitating Institution The literature on consensus-building and intervention has little to say about the role that a non-partisan institution may play in facilitating stakeholders to undertake dialogue to improve problem identification and collaborative decision-making. For the purposes of this thesis, such an institution is referred to as a "facilitating institution". Facilitation may only be one of many roles a facilitating institution plays, but it is the one of interest in this thesis. There are other circumstances in which people use the term "facilitating institution," but those are in quite unrelated contexts, such as training, management and resource allocation, so they have been disregarded. An institution is an organization founded and constituted for the promotion of a specific purpose. A "facilitating institution" is an organization that draws on its members to collaboratively address issues of a common interest through dialogue. Its members come together to improve the way problems are identified and addressed. Members of a facilitating institution meet under an established set of guiding principles and procedures. In addition to fostering discussions directly among its members as to how they might act on issues in line with their common interest, the facilitating institution may address its interest through the members' selection of external initiatives for its staff (and sometimes members) to get involved in, including facilitated processes. The institution may offer assistance in the form of facilitation to other groups that its members believe are working toward related interests. The members ensure that each process is conducted in a way that is consistent with the institution's principles. The institution essentially leads by example, practicing the skills that are required to manage a facilitated process between diverse stakeholders. Tasks that a facilitating institution must tackle collaboratively among its members include establishing and adhering to guiding principles and ground rules, selecting effective and committed representatives, clarifying responsibilities, fostering and institutionalizing working relationships, seeking opportunities for joint gains, ensuring sustainable funding and efficient resource allocation, upholding obligations to hinders and members, establishing and maintaining legitimacy, applying prior understandings in process design and communications, and developing as an institution through reflection and adaptation (tasks adapted from Susskind 1999: 35). The institution should aspire to achieve agreement through consensus, as the foundation of all operations. The Fraser Basin Council is an example of a particular type of facilitating institution. It has a broad membership of government, private sector and public representatives as Directors. Though it has government officials in its membership, it has no regulatory authority. Its strength is drawn from its Directors' ability to reach consensus-built recommendations that are persuasive to those with the'power to implement them. The Council focuses on economic, environmental and social 21 sustainability challenges that require a multi-interest or interjurisdictional approach in order to be resolved. When the Council intervenes as a facilitating institution in an external consensus-based process, there are two parallel processes occurring: 1. The operations within the Council (conducted by the Directors and staff); and. 2. The negotiations within the consensus-based process (facilitated by the Council's staff). Although the two processes are never directly coupled, they are connected through the approach that the facilitator, a Council staff member, brings to the consensus-based process. The facilitator acts as a link, bringing the values and style of the Council into the process. The Council staff members have access to the Council's Directors, who represent a subset of the actors in the context within which the facilitated process is operating and who could help identify who the stakeholders are, what their interests are and how the process could be designed to address their needs. The Council has no authority to implement the solutions that are developed in the facilitated process, but it may act as an advocate to promote the consensus-built outcomes of the processes. 2.3.3. Strengths and Challenges for a Facilitating Institution The potential advantages of having a facilitating institution that brings together a diverse group of stakeholders to oversee the facilitation of an external process are numerous; however, with those advantages come challenges. Both advantages and challenges are discussed in this section and are then used to develop the second part of the analytical framework in chapter 3. Susskind (1999: 35) identifies characteristics of "helping a permanent group or organization reach agreement" that are different from those of "helping an ad hoc group". These have been applied to the concept of a facilitating institution, which is indeed a permanent group that works toward reaching agreement. These qualities are also expected to transfer through to the processes that a facilitating institution facilitates. Susskind (1999: 16) suggests that, in contrast to an ad hoc group, a permanent group can: i • expect greater understanding of the prevailing ground rules; • expect greater acceptance of the legitimacy of participants; • expect fewer problems clarifying and allocating responsibilities; • build on prior relationships; • expect commitments to be taken more seriously; • focus on long term relationships; • invest in organizational learning; and, • invest in organizational development. A facilitating institution has a well-established set of guiding principles and a tested procedure for conducting processes and developing dialogue that bridges individual member organizations' cultures. This universal culture is indoctrinated in new members to the institution. Institutional memory can be preserved even i f the rate of membership turnover is high (Susskind, 1999: 49). The members may also share a concern for the well-being of the group itself and want to do what they can to help it succeed (Susskind, 1999: 51). The facilitating institution may appoint a chair, whose role it is to represent the process to the world at large (Susskind, 1999: 41). This chair may give the group a face with which others can 22 associate it as opposed to something more nebulous such as an association among diverse parties. There is likely to be a greater acceptance of the rights of others to participate in the institution's facilitated processes because they have been invited or designated to participate by an institution (Susskind, 1999: 43). The shared interest that brings the diverse members together makes it easier for them to identify common ground and reach agreement. The promotion of long-term relationships is an important task of a facilitating institution. It may have more effective dialogue than more ad hoc groups because of its prior relationships. It has experience applying a multiple-gains approach that appeals to its members' shared interests and the well-being of their group (Susskind, 1999: 49). The members may have enough contact time to foster working relationships that encourage collaboration even on projects independent of the facilitating institution. Future relationships are also taken into consideration. Facilitating institution members have a vested interest "in entering into discussions in a manner which supports the maintenance of long-term relationships among each other because that will help promote the common interest that the group is working towards (Susskind, 1999: 49). The fact that long term relationships are involved fosters confidence that commitments will be honoured, making it easier to reach agreement (Susskind, 1999: 51). The group pressures itself to attain consensus simply because there will be a "next time" (Susskind, 1999: 52). One of the most significant advantages of a permanent group like a facilitating institution is that it is more likely to invest in organizational learning and development (Susskind, 1999: 54-55). Group members can reflect collectively to learn from previous experiences. Lessons may be taken up and converted into opportunities through further training or organizational development in order to build capacity over time. The stability of the group makes it easier for its members to justify devoting resources to improving it. There are further benefits of a facilitating institution that Susskind has not mentioned in his discussion of permanent groups. The group may exist as an autonomous body, operating more consistently outside of political timelines and functioning creatively within the governance framework. Resources, both financial and intellectual, are pooled among members. A permanent group drawing on a diversity of members has a strong networking potential and easily accessible social capital. A very powerful advantage of a permanent group that works towards consensus is that every member effectively has veto power. This veto allows its members to separate inventing from committing. For example, a high-level government official may participate with more ease in uncharted territory that the group is exploring since he or she will not get involuntarily drawn into any initiatives about which his or her constituents raise concerns. However, he or she is still compelled by the consensus-based approach to avoid protecting his or her position and to seek out common ground to move the agenda forward into uncharted territory. A synergy is built up among the group members, pushing each other forward but maintaining the safety of a fallback position. There are characteristics of a facilitating institution that are particularly advantageous in facilitating external processes. One advantage is that, operating from within a facilitating institution, it may be more obvious to a facilitator who the stakeholders are and who can represent them (Susskind, 1999: 38). Preliminary conversations can easily be initiated with key 23 stakeholders, since the members have already developed a network and relationships with many of the stakeholder groups. There may be less difficulty convincing stakeholders to participate because (1) their stakeholder group may already be represented in the facilitating institution, (2) the facilitating institution may be more inclined to stay committed to seeing the process through regardless of the political climate and (3) the stakeholders have the perception that their participation will be taken seriously based on the membership of the facilitating institution. These elements may increase the credibility of the facilitating institution and may reduce the time required to initiate a new process. The facilitating institution brings together members with a rich array of experiences. It has the commitment to develop and adapt its approach based on its members' knowledge. The facilitating institution has a toolkit of jointly designed and broadly agreed to decision-making principles that have been tested by a diverse set of stakeholders. At the start of a new facilitated process, less initial preparation time may be required i f the participants are comfortable with applying the institution's process principles and adopting some decision-making procedures that others from their stakeholder group may have had input in developing. Those who have participated in processes that the group has facilitated in the past will already be familiar with its style of decision-making, so those participants do not need to be trained in certain skills associated with that approach and there may be greater adherence to ground rules. There are also some potential challenges in managing permanent groups. In some cases, a staff member may not be perceived by some facilitating institution members to be an appropriate or acceptable facilitator for dialogue on a given issue or facilitation of a certain component of a process. Those members may come up against resistance to outsource the role to an external professional intervener (Susskind, 1999: 40). Another challenge arises in reaching agreement on the range of issues to be discussed. If the agenda is too narrow, then it may be hard to encourage some members to participate. On-the other hand, i f it is too broad, then members may feel overwhelmed or discouraged (Susskind, 1999: 41). There may be resistance from some members to change from the historically applied top-down management style to a consensus-building approach (Susskind, 1999: 35). On the other hand, once a new approach has been internalized, the group may develop deeply entrenched practices of its own that are resistant to change. The group may be challenged to respond uniquely to each situation, as even "unwritten rules" tend to become accepted as part of the institutional memory (Susskind, 1999: 52). The group must make a conscientious effort to remain flexible and adaptive in order to use the best tools in any given process. One challenge for permanent consensus-building groups such as facilitating institutions requires particular attention. The line between a decision-making and an advisory role (the latter is more commonly granted to consensus-building groups) may sometimes become blurred (Susskind, 1999: 55). The combination of no decision-making authority with the presence of decision-makers in the group may make the distinction especially challenging to discern. It is possible that, i f those with decision-making authority are members of the group, they may feel comfortable endorsing the agreement that the group has achieved. Those decision-makers must make a special effort to make it clear when they are wearing their "group member" hats and when they are wearing their "decision-maker" hats. Finally, the group members have been brought together because of a common interest. Depending upon what that interest is, it may or may not affect the group's ability to facilitate 24 certain external processes. Process participants may have concerns about how the vested interest of the group causes it to be biased in its intervention. It is important that the facilitating institution is clear in its interests and makes sure that it is accepted as a facilitator. 2.3.4. Facilitating Institution Approaches and Influences Members of a facilitating institution must agree on the type of facilitation that the institution will be conducting. The facilitating institution must reach consensus on whether its facilitators may express any of the institution's vested interests or should attempt to remain impartial on the substantive issues in a process, the degree of control it will assume, the degree of focus it will place on problem solving versus relationship building, the amount of effort its facilitators will expend on developing the participants' process skills, and how it will select the groups which it will assist. There are certain characteristics of a facilitating institution that lend themselves to aspects of each of the types of mediator that Moore (2003) outlined. For example, given its diverse membership, a facilitating institution naturally has strength in its social network and has an interest in maintaining ongoing relationships with stakeholders after a process has ended. These aspects are suggestive of a Social Network Mediator. The facilitating institution is likely interested in trying to meet the needs of all of its members. Therefore, it may also lend itself to a Benevolent Mediator role in that it seeks the best solution for all involved. A facilitating institution will most likely facilitate processes that involve issues which appeal to its members' common interests. It may then, similarly to a Vested Interest Mediator, seek a solution that meets its interest as well as those of the process participants. On the other hand, it may try to be impartial about specific outcomes, as an Independent Mediator would be. A facilitating institution, just like any other facilitator, affects a process through its process management style. One can refer back to figure 2, presenting the facilitator's toolkit, to review components of the process through which facilitators have an influence. A facilitating institution brings its own values and style of facilitation to a process; it applies values that have been developed internally through negotiative sequences between its members during the creation of guiding principles and policies. Its values should universally reflect those of its members. The facilitating institution may provide greater opportunities for its members to develop working relationships, thereby actually influencing the decision-making environment within which its processes occur. The scoping and assessment stages may be affected by the fact that the institution has more direct access to the stakeholder groups that are part of its membership than other facilitators typically would, which could either provide it with deeper scoping possibilities or make it develop stakeholder blind spots by inadvertently privileging the input of the stakeholders it knows. The institution may bring elements of process design that it applies internally to the external processes it facilitates; whether this increases efficiency, reduces flexibility or both is something that has been touched on in the preceding section. Finally, a facilitating institution may tend to place greater emphasis on professional development. It can make use of a system of checks and balances established among its members, whose constituents may be involved in some of the facilitated processes. Table 5 in chapter 3 lists many of the characteristics a facilitating institution may bring to a facilitated process through various components of its involvement. There is a great variety of possibilities, which is why it is interesting to investigate them further through the examination of the Council's facilitation of FRMP. 25 2.4. Summary This chapter provides the foundation for assessing facilitating institutions and the processes they facilitate by looking first at the consensus-based processes they are involved in, typical roles and responsibilities of facilitators, and finally unique characteristics of facilitation institutions. Since there is no literature to date on facilitating institutions, it is important that these are thoroughly illustrated to provide background to the second part of the analytical framework discussed in chapter 3. Facilitation, the aspect of consensus-based processes that is of particular interest in this thesis, is a tool that can be interpreted and applied with variations; a set of general tasks are roughly agreed to, but there are many types of intervention that a facilitator might adopt. Facilitating institutions are structured such that some types would be more natural than others. This determines, in part, the degree of influence the facilitating institution may exert on various components of the processes it is involved in. A set of strengths and challenges that facilitating institutions may face is adapted from Susskind's (1999) assessment of the characteristics of permanent groups working to reach agreement. A history of the development of consensus-based processes used in the governance of British Columbia's natural resources reveals that there has been plenty of innovation in the last two decades, but there is still a need for increased capacity, which facilitating institutions may help fulfill. With the understanding of facilitating institutions developed in this chapter, chapter 3 proceeds into outlining ways to assess the role of a facilitating institution in a consensus-based process. ( 26 3. ASSESSING FACILITATING INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR PROCESSES This chapter provides the rationale for a two-part analytical framework designed to assess the performance of a consensus-based process and then the influence of its facilitating institution. First, six consensus-based process performance measures and their sub-measures are introduced. Then steps to assess the role of the facilitating institution in the process are outlined, as developed from theory presented in chapter 2. A n explanation is provided as to how the two parts of the analytical framework relate, and more specifically, how the process assessment provides insight into the role of the facilitating institution in the process. 3.1. Framework for Assessing the Facilitated Consensus-Based Process The first part of the analytical framework sets up performance measures to assess the consensus-based process. 3.1.1. Design of the Consensus-Based Process Performance Measures There are many qualities of a facilitated consensus-based process that can help or hinder its success. However, there is still only modest agreement in the literature on what the core criteria are for a successful consensus-based process. There are many qualities that are considered to be indicative of successful processes, but they do not necessarily have strong causal linkages because each process has its own contextual challenges and external variables which may also affect its ability to succeed. Out of the various process criteria identified in the literature, a few have been distilled as performance measures for assessing facilitated consensus-based processes. The performance measures were chosen because they were mentioned frequently in the literature (indicating some level of agreement among authors on their significance) or they were viewed as pertinent to the characteristics of the case study process. An effort was made to keep the number of performance measures low, with a hierarchy of sub-measures, so that the data capture would be manageable and the various elements could be tied together clearly in the assessment stage. The selection process was aided through the development of a matrix to analyse the incidence of each theme of criteria mentioned in the various sources, as shown in simplified form in table 3. The main sources were Schwarz (2002), Kaner (1996) and Griggs (2003a) for facilitation, Fisher and Ury (1991) and Dorcey (2002) for negotiation, Duffy (1998) for shared decision-making, Gray (1989), Chrislip and Larson (1994) and Margerum (2002) for collaboration, and Cormick and the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy (1996), Susskind (1999) and Innes (1999) for consensus processes. 27 Table 3. Literature Sources of Performance Measures Performance Measure Facilitation Negotiation Shared Decision-Making Collaboration Consensus Agreement on the Facilitator X X Representation of Interests X X X X Clarity of Process X X X X Interest-Driven Framework X X X X Informed Deci sion-Making X X Decision Implementation X X X Based on the review of consensus-based process performance measures, successful processes tend to strive for: 1. Agreement on the Facilitator; 2. Representation of Interests; 3. Clarity of Process; 4. Interest-Driven Framework; 5. Informed Decision-Making; and, 6. Decision Implementation. The remainder of this section describes these performance measures in detail. The theory behind each measure is presented and the literature it was drawn from is identified. Arguments are made for the selection of sub-measures to assist in the assessment of each measure. 3.1.2. Agreement on the Facilitator The performance measure Agreement on the Facilitator addresses whether all of the stakeholders are satisfied with the selection of the facilitator for their process. Agreement on the Facilitator is related to the confidence the stakeholder groups have in the facilitator's skill, the credibility they perceive him or her to have, the trust they have in his or her ability to facilitate the process fairly and the preference they may have for a certain style of facilitation. The stakeholders should feel that the facilitator adds capacity to their process. An important consideration is the skill set that the facilitator brings to a process. As Howard Raiffa (1982) stated in 1982, "It is very rare to find well-trained interveners who can help with serious societal conflicts.... More training is desperately needed in the art and science of negotiating, and in the art and science of intervening." Since Raiffa made that statement there has been increased training, but his comments still highlight the fact that intervention does indeed require skills that are developed over time. This relates back to discussions in chapter 2 about professional development being an element of a facilitator's toolkit that influences the process. The facilitator should be a process expert, knowledgeable and experienced enough to give the group confidence in his or her guidance (Schwarz, 2002). Susskind and Cruikshank (1987: 197) propose that process participants also usually want a person with a substantive understanding of the issues 28 being discussed and a contextual understanding, or a familiarity, with the legal constraints and regulations associated with the particular situation. This is consistent with the argument made in chapter 2 that a facilitator draws on his or her understanding of the context in which a process is operating while he or she assists a group. According to Susskind and Cruikshank (1987: 139), the'competence of a facilitator can be assessed by investigating four criteria- background, affiliation, record and reputation. The credibility of a facilitator is tied to his or her identity; a facilitator with good intentions and expertise may be insufficient (LeBaron, 2003). Perceptions of credibility are particularly affected by the stakeholders' cultural norms and expectations. Culturally diverse stakeholder groups may have different preferences with regards to the selection of a facilitator. Renwick (2004: in LeBaron 2003) reinforces these arguments by explaining that there are five interconnected sources of credibility that an intervener needs to maintain; conferred, inherent, expert and congruent credibility, and credibility tied to results. Conferred credibility relates to the intervener's educational credentials, association with respected mentors and recognition by respected bodies. Inherent credibility is out of the control of the interveners, as it is related to attributes of their identity such as gender, nationality and generation. Expert credibility is process-based; it is established through the demonstration of a broad repertoire of tools and practices that support effectiveness. Congruent credibility requires that "the intervener's values fit with those of the people in the conflict" (LeBaron, 2003). Congruent credibility is also associated with whether the intervener's professed philosophy and behaviours match. Finally, contribution credibility is the credibility tied to actual results, or the facilitator's "track record." It is affected by whether the contributions of the intervener are perceived to have made a difference, and whether that intervener is able to build the capacity of a group during a process. According to LeBaron (2003: Ch. 10), "third parties are only as effective as the relationships that link them to people in conflict." The process itself also needs to maintain credibility and openness in order to be successful (Chrislip and Larson, 1994). The influence a facilitator may have on those to factors, through process leadership, can be significant. Susskind and Cruikshank (1987: 197) argue that above all else, an intervenor should have a reputation for fairness. Chapter 2 identified that the case is frequently made that a facilitator should be substantively neutral, but not process neutral. The argument is that the facilitator should not bias the progression of discussions on the issue of interest, but should be a leader in procedural aspects and assist each stakeholder in maximizing their participation in the process. (A facilitator may level the playing field by advocating for the weaker stakeholders.) In addition, some feel that a facilitator should not have direct affiliation with any of the stakeholders, so that he or she may be more easily accepted by all of the parties (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987: 139). However, these two criteria- substantive neutrality and lack of affiliation- are not necessary. As long as a facilitator maintains the trust of all of the participants, he or she may still be acceptable. It is important that participants do not feel coerced or manipulated (Schwarz, 2002). This gets back to the issue of fairness in the process. If the stakeholders believe that the facilitator conducts the process objectively and the participants are free to reach a decision without unfairly being influenced by the facilitator, this may be sufficient to meet their approval. A facilitator can adopt many different styles of intervention, as outlined in chapter 2, which may affect his or her congruent credibility. A skilled facilitator may not be the right person for a particular process because his or her style is not compatible with the preferences of the 29 participants or the issue being addressed. If the facilitator feels that he or she is not the most appropriate facilitator for the group, he or she should consult the group about stepping down. Susskind and Cruikshank (1987: 140) recommend that an agreement be written up,that spells out the participant's expectations of the facilitator's role and obligations before a final agreement is made on the selection, to avoid misunderstandings at a later point. Four sub-measures can be used to assess this performance measure. In a process that achieves Agreement on the Facilitator, the facilitator: 1. improves the capacity of the group; 2. is perceived to be credible by all stakeholder groups; 3. has an approach is perceived to be fair; and, 4. has a style that is with the participants' preferences. The record and reputation of a proposed facilitator should be reviewed and approved by all of the participants (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987: 139). This means that the convenor's role is continued at least through to the first meeting, to report and receive feedback on the selection of the facilitator. The facilitator should receive broad-based public support and meet the approval of the implementing agencies. 3.1.3. Representation of Interests Representation of Interests is a commonly accepted process criteria across a breadth of literature. For the purposes of this thesis, a process that has Representation of Interests is one that has been designed with an attempt to be inclusive of interests, reach agreement on committee composition, maintain participant commitment and include members with authority. An inclusive process is one in which all parties with a significant interest in the issues are invited to be involved (Cormick et al., 1996). Those parties are given timely notification of the opportunity to participate and the wider public is kept informed of the process (Duffy, 1998). If all stakeholders who are both affected by a decision and interested in participating in the process are included, the chances of reaching an agreement that best meets the expectations of the most people and of getting buy-in during implementation are assumed to be greater. If stakeholders are excluded, then they may work against the outcome. Interested stakeholders generally only feel satisfied once they have been assured that their values will be incorporated into a solution. In being inclusive of interests, it is also important that the individuals selected to participate are effective in representing the interests and concerns of their stakeholder group. The participants should be empowered to represent and make decisions on behalf of their constituents and they should communicate openly between their constituents and the other participants (Duffy, 1998). The participants should also continue to consider the broader public by keeping them informed of the group's advances and polling for their opinions on the decisions being made. It is the facilitator's responsibility; to make sure that an effort is made to address the concerns of those who choose not to participant directly in the process (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987: 150). The participants and facilitator should try to reach agreement on what they feel is an appropriate committee composition for the substantive issue and process at hand. An effort should be made to balance representation between stakeholder groups. The committee should recognise the range and variety of concerned stakeholders (Healey, 1997). The membership should be limited to a size which is just large enough to be inclusive of all the interested stakeholders (Gray, 1989: 68). Each additional member increases the time required to coordinate activities (Schwarz, 2002: 29). Committee size can be regulated through a combination of self-selection and filtering for 30 individuals who demonstrate a significant interest in the issue and an ability to effectively represent a wider stakeholder group. It may be necessary to involve, or at least gain the support of, high-level regulatory authorities and visible leaders, particularly when acceptance of the broader public and governing bodies is required (Chrislip and Larson, 1994; NRTEE, 1993: 11). As NRTEE (1993) states, "When decisions require government action, the participation of government authorities from the outset is crucial." Authorities help to provide reality checks, maintain goodwill, allow for a wider range of practical options, reduce delays, and build confidence in an agreement (Cormick et al., 1996: 101). There is a greater probability that a group can get a sense right at the table as to whether their recommendations are viable, rather than waiting for feedback from authorities outside the process. By having decision-makers involved in reaching consensus with the group, more weight may be placed on an agreement. Those in authority may also be helpful in ensuring that the agreements are adhered to during the implementation stage. However, it may be difficult to attract authorities at the most appropriate decision-making levels to the table. Not only is it important to include the various stakeholders, but also to keep them at the table (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987). In order to maintain continuity of effort, the committee composition should remain reasonably stable, while still allowing for some flexibility (Schwarz, 2002: 29). If there is a high membership turnover, then significant time may be spent introducing new members to the process. To maintain commitment, representatives should be involved voluntarily (Cormick et al., 1996). The facilitator should try to maintain the participants' interest by designing a process that meets their needs, as discussed with the next performance measure. There are four sub-measures used to help assess Representation of Interests in this thesis. In order to achieve Representation of Interests, a successful process: 1. is inclusive of interests; 2. reaches agreement on group composition; 3. involves members with authority; and, 4. maintains participant commitment. A facilitator can assist a process convenor in selecting participants. He or she may even decide how the selection of representatives should occur. This is a task that should be addressed early on, as it may involve quite a bit of scoping to uncover who the stakeholders are, who their strongest representative might be and how some of the stakeholder groups might be interrelated. The facilitator may need to tap into social networks to seek out leaders, gather referrals with those already invited, and then re-evaluate the committee composition iteratively throughout the process. It is better to incorporate more stakeholder groups earlier, so that the process principles and ground rules can be constructed with them in mind and so that the facilitator is not continually introducing new participants to the process. 3.1.4. Clarity of Process It is widely asserted that consensus-based processes require a strong design, with clear purpose, objectives and terms of reference as well as recognition of a common vision (Duffy, 1998; Margerum, 2002; Schwarz, 2002; Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987). The performance measure Clarity of Process assesses whether a process has an unambiguous purpose that is shared by the group and a design that reflects that purpose and is acceptable to the participants. Clarity of Process requires a purpose that is practical, accepted by the group and illuminates the role the participants will play in negotiation and implementation stages of the process. It necessitates 31 clarification of the scope of discussions to be covered so that it is manageable and the participants have an opportunity to contribute meaningfully on issues that are important to them. Clarity of Process also implies that the participants understand and accept the process strategies being applied, such as the use of consensus. Without a clear purpose to which all stakeholders agree, a process may become sidetracked or fail to meet the participants' objectives, diminishing the probability of successful decision implementation. Schwarz (2002) argues that a successful facilitated process requires a clear mission and shared values. It is important to establish these during scoping and early on at the table. The goals need to be designed so that they are feasible within the political, economic and social context which the process is operating. Consideration should thus be made for the degree of political and public support for the process, a viable timeline, accessibility of resources to conduct the process, and the role of the process within the current governance structure. In particular, there must be government support for the process (Duffy, 1998) and the decision-making approach to which it will adhere. An aspect of the process that can become blurred is the type of decision-making that will take place. Dorcey and Reik (1987) define three modes of decision-making in their review of the role of negotiation-based processes within the Canadian environmental governance system. The three main types, which vary in the number of parties involved directly in the decision-making, are referred to as authoritative, consultative and negotiative. Authoritative decision-making occurs when an individual or organization makes the trade-off alone and imposes the decision on others. Consultative decision-making occurs when an individual or organization consults with other individuals or groups before making the trade-off and imposing the decision. Negotiative decision-making occurs when individuals or organization make the trade-off togetherand adopt an agreement. It is not difficult for participants of a consensus-based process in which regulatory agencies participate to become confused about the differentiation of these approaches. Members of advisory committees may struggle to comprehend that they are involved in consultative rather than negotiative decision-making. If a participant's expectation is set to be involved in adopting an agreement rather than simply providing a recommendation, the probability that he or she will be dissatisfied with the outcome becomes greater. The participants should also be aware of the roles and responsibilities of everyone involved (Cormick et al., 1996: 12). In order to be successful, a process should, on balance, satisfy rather than frustrate the personal needs of the group members (Schwarz, 2002). A well-designed process addresses the participants' process needs and fosters their understanding of the process and strategies being used. It recognises the participants' pre-existing, culturally diverse approaches to problem solving and conflict resolution. It seeks to acknowledge and incorporate those aspects of existing or traditional systems that are functional (Barnes, 1991). It also recognises aspects that may be incompatible. A process may have to be designed with sensitivity towards issues of time, pacing, and traditionally accepted standards of dialogue. One way to ensure that the participants agree to the process design and understand what it entails is to include them in a facilitator's iterative revisions of the design. The facilitator can provide a 32 basic structure with fundamental components and preliminary designs for the process, and then participants can add on layers to that framework through identification of process needs and objectives, and means of achieving them. The facilitator, using his or her experience and expertise, can assist the participants by establishing a process that meets the needs that they lay out for him or her. Cormick (1996: 12) takes these recommendations a step further to recommend self-design. He argues that, "an impartial person, acceptable to all parties, can be an important catalyst to suggest options for designing the process, but the ultimate control over the mandate, agenda, and issues should come from the participants themselves." If participants are involved to some degree in the design, the process can be tailored more closely to their needs and they may develop a sense of ownership of it. Development of the process is also a good starting point for negotiations, which can advance into discussions on the substantive material once the ground rules have been practiced and the participants are-more familiar with each other and the approach (Cormick et al., 1996: 12). Another element of the Clarity of Process performance measure is a well-defined scope of issues to address. It is necessary to establish a manageable scope (Duffy, 1998). It should reflect the problem definition and objectives for the process. Setting clear boundaries on what the process will address helps the group to stay on track and make more measurable progress towards the end goal. Having a keystone statement to which the participants can refer back during discussions highly useful, as it allows for flexibility and creativity while providing some structure. The scope of issues can help interested stakeholders decide whether they will be able to contribute to the discussion and thus whether they have a clear reason to participate in the . process. Clarity of Process should not prevent a process from being able to adapt to better incorporate new participants, new information and changing contexts. A process should incorporate adaptive capacity in order to be resilient. Cormick (1996) and Margerum (2002) promote flexibility in a process.. A process should encourage a diversity of routines and styles of organising rather than imposing single ordering principles (Healey, 1997). It helps i f the facilitator is able to draw on a variety of process management tools, so that he or she can adapt to changing demands throughout the process. Thus i f the process is designed one way, and it is found not to be working effectively during a mid-process evaluation, then openness and flexibility to change are maintained. Not only should a process apply strategies that naturally align with the purpose of the process, but the participants should both understand and accept those strategies (Margerum, 2002). Consensus is one of the strategies that most members need to comprehend and accept (Innes et al., 1994: in Margerum 2002). Depending on the group's experience and the nature of the problem, the participants may or may not agree to use consensus to reach agreement. Academics are divided in their opinions of whether it is important to achieve consensus in multistakeholder processes. The facilitator should explain to the group why consensus might be a valuable aim. Common arguments are that consensus-driven processes have better chances of producing win-win solutions, have the potential to "increase the size of the pie," and may develop influential recommendations which garner more support for implementation. It is important that in establishing consensus as a principle of a process, the participants have an understanding of what consensus might look like and how they would work to achieve it. Sub-measures that indicate Clarity of Process find that a process: 1. reaches agreement on the purpose of the process; 33 2. incorporates stakeholders' process needs; 3. defines the scope of issues to be addressed; and, 4. reaches agreement on using consensus. 3.7.5. Interest-Driven Framework A process with an Interest-Driven Framework is one that explores the interests of all the participants and deliberately builds them into the agreement. It is a combination of process design and management that fosters and prioritizes dialogue on the fundamental values of the stakeholders. An Interest-Driven Framework gives each of the stakeholders an equal opportunity to participate and contribute to the development of the group's final product. Each participant should feel that he or she has had an opportunity to express his or her interests and has developed an understanding of the others' interests. Fisher and Ury's (1991) four principles of negotiation, introduced in chapter 2, are important foundations of interest-driven frameworks. A focus on interests rather than positions helps ensure that relevant interests are explored until the root of each is identified (Innes, 1999). This increases the likelihood that the objectives that motivate the stakeholders to participate are informing the development of alternatives and selection of a solution. Often times many of the stakeholders' root interests are found to be compatible. It is important that the participants separate the people from the problem (Fisher and Ury, 1991: 21). They should be guided to disentangle problem identification from blaming individuals with whom they associate the problem. The participants should actively listen to one another, create space for everyone to contribute to the discussion, and suspend judgement until it is time to weigh the alternatives. Adherence to the principles of civil discourse is required (Innes, 1999). Some argue that an attempt should be made to build trust among the participants (Chrislip and Larson, 1994; Cormick et al., 1996). Others argue that trust is not necessary as long as the inter-relational issues between parties are separated from the problem and objective criteria are used. One means of establishing an environment that is conducive to an interest-based approach is to set ground rules early on in the process to which everyone can agree. As Fisher and Ury (1991: 54) state, "be hard on the problem and soft on the people." Fisher and Ury (1991: 73) suggest that participants should try to dovetail interests in order to uncover opportunities for mutual gain. By searching jointly for ways to integrate all the interests in a solution, opportunities are created for a win-win solution, rather than just compromise. The solution may require more creativity or time to develop, but it has the potential to be more successful in achieving all the parties' expectations. The stakeholders should have an equal opportunity to participate effectively throughout the process and contribute to the final solution. Equal opportunity is a guiding principle of consensus building that was introduced by NRTEE (1993). It does not require that all participants speak for the same duration or be given the same degree of responsibilities; the focus is on the opportunity provided. It is related to a sense of fairness and openness (Cormick et al., 1996). This principle is often used to endorse public participation, as it is founded on the belief that those who are affected by a decision should have the opportunity to influence the outcome of that decision (Environment Canada, 1999). NRTEE (1993) also states that all parties should have equal access to relevant information. In this thesis, equal access to technical information and expertise is covered under the performance measure on Informed Decision-Making. 34 An consideration in terms of equal opportunity is that the participants feel that their involvement is meaningful. In order to help ensure that all participants can engage meaningfully, the facilitator must recognise the context in which the stakeholders are participating. Not all of the participants start from the same point in terms of experience, knowledge and resources (Cormick et al., 1996: 13). This may mean that the facilitator has to look at the history of dealings between the various parties, what power imbalances may exist between them, what resources are available to support their participate in the process, and other constraints that may hinder their ability to participate fully. Cormick (1996: 62) provides some suggestions on how resources can be equalized within consensus groups. Meaningful involvement also indicates that there is "assured listening" from the government, that the participants' contribution could influence the regulatory agency's decision and that their concerns are considered seriously in the decision-making process. It entails the aim that the participants know what decision the government ultimately makes and the rationale behind whether their views contributed to that decision (Environment Canada, 1999). There are several sub-measures that one can investigate under Interest-Driven Framework. A process with an Interest-Driven Framework: 1. explores the stakeholders' interests; 2. separates the people from the problem; 3. seeks joint gains; and, 4. allows participants the opportunity to participate and contribute. A facilitator can assist the parties in applying an Interest-Driven Framework by designing a process that incorporates interests-based dialogue and exercises, by demonstrating how certain process principles and ground rules can be applied, and by intervening when an individual or the group goes off track until they are more self-sufficient in monitoring themselves. 3.1.6. Informed Decision-Making The performance measure referred to as Informed Decision-Making assesses whether each participant can reach a decision using the best available information. It relates to whether relevant information is shared among all of the participants, internalized and felt to be sufficient to make a knowledgeable choice. A decision is more likely informed when the information required to assist in decision-making is well-defined, there are adequate resources to research crucial information gaps, the information is gathered in an agreed upon and objective manner, the stakeholders share all of the relevant information they have pertaining to the issue equitably and it is presented in a way that is accessible to all the participants. Informed Decision-Making helps participants generate the best solution given the constraints of the process and the stakeholders' resources. There should be agreement on the nature and degree of information that is required to make a decision before embarking on information gathering. The information on which a decision is based must be valid and high-quality (Schwarz, 2002). The participants should feel comfortable with the manner in which the information is acquired. Participants should agree on an acceptable form of data gathering and presentation, so that there are not concerns of biased information and they can be confident that their decisions are" based on the best available information. Stakeholders with access to more resources may pool together to finance the group's information gathering process. It may be helpful for the participants to agree to use the same experts, rather than each hiring their own. When technical information is required, it may improve the \ 35 participants' perceptions of the credibility of the information if it is peer-reviewed or discussed by a panel of experts. It is important that the participants believe that the information they are provided is accurate (Susskind et al., 1999). The participants should also continually be questioning their assumptions and seeking new information to determine if previous decisions need to be altered (Schwarz, 2002). Participants should feel that they have obtained sufficient information before making a decision (Syme and Nancarrow, 2002). However, processes can fall into the trap of deferring decisions by waiting for the results of studies that are not necessarily required to answer the pertinent questions. Excessive information can slow progress, making the participants lose sight of the key issues that need to be addressed and the value judgements that must take place. It may be helpful to refer back to the group's objectives for the information gathering process to ensure that the requirements are clearly defined and designed to be measurable, i f possible. It is important that there is openness at the table to sharing all the relevant information with the other participants. If information is concealed and hence a decision is made without adequate knowledge of its consequences, then implementation could become very difficult or unsuccessful. Typically certain process participants, often regulatory authorities, can more readily access information about the issues and impacts related to the objectives, alternatives, and consequences they are discussing (Cormick et al., 1996: 12). The facilitator can help participants share information by coordinating the information gathering and dissemination. Not only should the information be shared among all participants, but it should be shared in a way that the others understand it (Schwarz, 2002). For instance, i f a high degree of technical information is being presented to lay people in the group, an extra effort should be made to make that information understandable and accessible to them. Facilitators can assist by organizing additional training sessions or educational materials for the participants. Ideally, all of the participants should be able to engage in an informed debate on the pertinent issues and independently validate the information (Schwarz, 2002). The types of information that are considered relevant to the issue being addressed in a process may be diverse. Processes can draw on technical experts and their academic studies, but also a range of other sources such as local and traditional ecological knowledge. The incorporation of these alternative sources in stakeholder-based decision-making has sometimes been resisted, in part because (1) it may be slower and more costly because the managers need to inform public of issues and accommodate the range of concerns (Jasanoff, 1986), (2) it may involve challenges associated with the incorporation of different methodologies in data collection and analysis and (3) certain constituents are served by the closed door, science-based approach. However, the use of local and traditional ecological knowledge sources is becoming more prevalent. Drawing on a variety of sources of information may appeal to the diversity of participants. Scientists involved in a process as experts may have a different impression of how to establish an informed decision than other participants. Botkin and Keller (1995) have identified several areas in which scientists' and laypeoples' perception knowledge may differ, such as: 1. the requirement for precise and unambiguous information by scientists, when others can tolerate some imprecision; 2. the scientists' demand for evidence and formal proof, while non-scientists are interested in using their own non-validated observations; 36 3. the scientists' use of formal procedures to acquire knowledge, into which non-scientists cannot fit their observations; 4. the scientists' tendency to omit information coming from a source that is 'unreliable' in its approach, even i f others feel that there is still valuable knowledge to be gained from the source; and, 5. the non-scientists' use of discussion to resolve questions, rather than experimentation. These types of preferences should be acknowledged and discussed among the group, and some resolution reached on how to address the approach to gathering information and determining solutions out of it. Processes that are technically intensive but also require prioritization of alternatives based on values may encounter a trans-scientific issue. A trans-scientific issue, as defined by Weinberg (1972), is a problem that needs to be informed by science, but for which studies cannot provide answers to the value-integrated questions that are part of the problem. Trans-science controversies are difficult because the dialogue oscillates between issues of facts and issues of values. They may emphasize scientists' and non-scientists' contrasting approaches to problem solving. Scientists participating in a process about a trans-scientific issue may experience political pressure because they are expected to find solutions that cannot be answered by technical studies. In order to address trans-scientific issues, participants should be encouraged to identify when their contributions are based on science and when they are based on values and beliefs. They should also make an effort to separate their judgements about the validity of studies from their value judgements on substantive matters. That distinction should be carried into the decision-making stages. In terms of sub-measures, in an informed process the group: 1. reaches agreement on information gathering; 2. strives for equitable access to information; '3. insists on accessible presentation of information; 4. incorporates a variety of information types; and, 5. differentiates science-based and values-based arguments. 3.1.7. Decision Implementation Decision Implementation involves the successful production of process outputs and/or outcomes. If the decision that a group of stakeholders has made is not implemented, it may undermine the entire process leading up to that final stage. According to Cormick et al. (1996: 95), commitment to implementation is an essential part of any agreement. In terms of sub-measures, Decision Implementation in a successful process tends to relate to the fact that the process: 1. develops a high-quality written agreement; 2. adheres to a well-defined timeline; and 3. meets or exceeds expectations. Process participants typically postpone and spent too little time figuring out how their agreement will be put into effect (Cormick et al., 1996: 97). In order to make sure a process is designed to meet the participants' expectations, those expectations should be outlined from the beginning. It can be useful for a facilitator to lead the group in an exercise to outline expectations, such as having the participants visualize the end results of the process and discuss what each of them uncovered (Dorcey, 2002). It is also important to discuss how the group's decision will fit into 37 the pre-existing governance system. The process participants need to identify whose support is needed to accept an agreement (Cormick et al., 1996: 98). NRTEE (1993) supports these arguments, stating " A l l parties should discuss the goals of the process and how results will be handled." If a process reaches the point at which the implementation plan is to be agreed to in writing and constraints arise that the group has not yet considered, it can be highly frustrating for those whose expectations of how the process and its products were to be used are not realized. It may be useful to establish some interim goals so that learning and adapting can take place during the process and early successes garner further support for implementation of the final agreement. It is important that the group produces a high quality, explicitly written agreement (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987: 123). A group can fall into the trap of thinking that they have reached consensus verbally when they are actually far from reaching consensus on an implementation plan in writing. Without an agreement in writing, each of the participants could have a different interpretation about which decisions have been reached. The written agreement helps make sure that the participants have indeed heard and understood each other (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987: 123). The written agreement is also useful because it gives the participants something to take back to their constituents for review and ratification. One way to create a written agreement is the "single text procedure" (Fisher and Ury, 1978: in Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987), in which one individual (possibly the facilitator) creates a preliminary draft that is then circulated sequentially between the participants and improved upon by each of them until agreement is reached. Part of the written agreement needs to include commitments made by the stakeholders to work towards upholding the decision. According to Cormick et al. (1996: 100), "The implementation plan must contain a way of ensuring that commitments are being carried out according to the spirit and letter of consensus agreements." It should be explicit about how the signatory's responsibilities will be enforced. Cormick et al. (1996: 79) stress that participants must be held accountable to each other to honour their undertakings and negotiated assurances. Another aspect of that is important to achieving success in Decision Implementation is that both the process and the implementation phase adhere to a timeline. The time restraints may be built around events that no human has any control over such as fish runs, human-related external factors such as deadlines for regulatory changes, or political timeframes such as pressure to implement agreements before elections. They may even be arbitrarily set by the group. A "negotiated sense of urgency" helps the group move beyond pet topics (Cormick et al., 1996: 88). The written agreement should outline the timeline for tasks to be accomplished, a reporting system and monitoring of progress (Cormick et al., 1996: 89-90). It helps reassure the participants that they will indeed reach closure. Publicised deadlines also reassure those who are not at the table and do not know the details of the dialogue taking place, as they may have more difficulty comprehending why a process takes so long. Finally, i f the stakeholders see that their representative did not reach their optimal end goal, they may be more understanding i f they can rationalize it as an acceptable agreement within the strict time constraints. The products of a process should meet, or exceed, the expectations of the participants and other stakeholders (Schwarz, 2002). The products may include tangible outputs, intangible outcomes and second-order effects. Second order effects include shifts in the behaviour of the stakeholder groups, the resulting development of partnerships and collaborative activities, the creation of new practices, and even the development of new institutions, all of which may improve how an issue is addressed in the future (Susskind et al., 1999). The process may have improved the 38 relationships between stakeholders, led to better understandings about each of the stakeholder groups' interests, increased the exchange of information, and advanced cooperative action. The participants are able to discern i f the process met their expectations and whether they would consider the process a success overall based on the results. 3.7.8. Summary of the Performance Measures and their Sub-Measures For each of the six performance measures, there are three to five sub-measures. Table 4 provides an overview of these, which form the basis of the analytical framework used in this research. The interview questions that were used to develop the participants' assessment of the case study were built with these performance measures and sub-measures in mind. Table 4: Performance Measures and Sub-Measures Performance Measures Performance Sub-Measures the facilitator improves the capacity of the group -the facilitator is perceived to be credible by all stakeholder groups the facilitator's approach is perceived to be fair Agreement on the Facilitator the facilitator's style is compatible the process is inclusive of interests Representation of Interests the group reaches agreement on its composition the process maintains participant commitment the process involves members with authority Clarity of Process the group reaches agreement on the purpose of the process the process incorporates stakeholders' process needs the group defines the scope of issues to be addressed the group reaches agreement on using consensus Interest-Driven Framework Informed Decision-Making Decision Implementation the process explores the stakeholders' interests the group separates the people from the problem the group seeks joint gains the process allows participants the opportunity to participate and contribute the group reaches agreement on information gathering the group strives for equitable access to information the group insists on accessible presentation of information the process incorporates a variety of information types the process differentiates science- and values-based arguments the group develops a high-quality written agreement the process adheres to a well-defined timeline the process meets or exceeds expectations 3.2. Framework for Assessing the Facilitating Institution The second assessment made in this thesis focuses on the role of the facilitating institution in assisting a consensus-based process to achieve success in the performance measures. The facilitating institution assessment is conducted by taking the process assessment generated from the first part of the analytical framework, combining it with supplemental interview data and the 39 researcher's interpretation of the results after analysing the case study documents and transcripts in depth, and reworking the information through another filter based on a set of characteristics a facilitating institution may demonstrate when helping groups reach agreement. The use of the first part of the analytical framework helps uncover the influence a facilitating institution has on a process by getting the participants to volunteer examples of aspects of the process that they felt were affected by the style, skill and approach of the facilitating institution. The process assessment may also identify external variables and the behaviour of the participants, which can then be removed from the facilitating institution assessment. 3.2.1. Tools Used to Assess the Facilitating Institution Three main tools are used to investigate the influence of a facilitating institution in its facilitation of a consensus-based process. The first tool, which is actually more descriptive than analytical, is a combination of Griggs' (2003a) "Basic Steps in a Facilitated Process", presented in table 1, and Moore's (2003) "Twelve Stages of Mediator Moves", which is used to clarify what tasks the various members of a facilitating institution are responsible for in a consensus-based process. This helps to determine which individuals have the most influence over each of the tasks. In addition, as explained in chapter 2, when linking the effectiveness of a process to the facilitator's impact, it is important to define the scope of the facilitator's responsibility, so that the facilitator is not held liable for weaknesses in the process that are not his or her responsibility. This first tool helps to distinguish between the influences of the facilitating institution and its individual facilitator(s). Chapter 5 provides a description of the roles and responsibilities assumed by the staff and Directors of the Fraser Basin Council in the Fraser River Management Plan process. The second tool is based on table 5. It is used to compare characteristics of the facilitating institution being examined to a set of characteristics that a facilitating institution is anticipated to demonstrate when helping groups reach agreement. This set of characteristics is synthesized from theory introduced in chapter 2. Figure 3 shows an adaptation of components in Griggs' (2003a: 3) "Mental Map of Facilitation a Toolkit" used to structure the set. The seven components are: the facilitating institution's style and values, scoping and assessment, process design, assistance during deliberations, interaction with the decision-making environment, handling of the context within which the process operates, and undertaking of professional development. Under each of these components, characteristics of a facilitating institution that contrast those of an ad hoc group (adopted from Susskind 1999:16 in section 2.3.3) are listed. The expectation is that a facilitating institution will contribute these characteristics to the processes it facilitates. The combined framework describes the influence that a facilitating institution may have through seven components of a process as a result of the strengths and weaknesses it contributes. The components in table 5 are loosely associated with the process performance measures in the first half of the analytical framework. Some of the facilitating institution characteristics are assumed to be particularly influential on a facilitated process's ability to succeed in certain performance measures. The Facilitating Institution's Style and Values may play a chief role in the ability of the process to succeed in the Agreement on the Facilitator performance measure. Scoping and Assessment might impact both the Representation of Interests and Clarity of Process performance measures. Process Design would also impact Clarity of Process. Assistance in Deliberations could have influence on the process's ability to succeed in both Interest-Driven Framework and Informed Decision-Making. Finally, Interaction with the Decision-Making Environment might have repercussions on the assessment of the Decision Implementation 40 performance measure. Handling of Context and Professional Development could be expected to have wide-sweeping influences on the performance of the facilitated process. Table 5. Characteristics of a Facilitating Institution as Compared to an Ad Hoc Group Components Characteristics In helping a group reach agreement, a facilitating institution may... + apply a jointly designed and broadly agreed to set of guiding principles Facilitating + benefit from the recognition of a widely respected chair Institution + address concerns for the well-being of its members Style and Values — incite concerns about neutrality as a result of its members' common interest — resist improving on a top-down management style + readily initiate preliminary conversations with key stakeholders Scoping and + expect to invest less to initiate new processes Assessment + expect greater acceptance of the legitimacy of diverse participants — struggle to reach agreement on the range of issues to discuss Process Design + use a tested procedure for addressing decision-making + expect some participant familiarity with process principles + expect greater understanding of prevailing ground rules + build on prior relationships Assistance in Deliberations + foster working relationships + pool resources among participants + internally pressure participants to attain consensus — resist seeking external assistance — fail to remain flexible and adaptive Interaction + expect.fewer problems clarifying and allocating responsibilities with the Decision-Making + operate more consistently outside of political timelines + instil confidence that commitments will be honoured Environment — blur the distinction between decision-making and advising Handling of + expect commitments to be taken more seriously Context + foster long term relationships + invest in organizational learning Professional Development + increase capacity over time + build experience applying a multiple-gains approach + invest in organizational development — develop deeply entrenched practices Process participants are not asked to directly assess which characteristics in table 5 they feel have been passed on to the facilitated process though the facilitating institution. It is assumed that they do not know enough about the facilitating institution to evaluate which of the 41 characteristics it applies to its own operations and brings to the process. Some of the transfer is subtle or occurs behind the scenes. Instead, one can draw on the participants' assessment of the process performance, using the loose associations between the components in table 5 and performance measures to start to infer to which components of the process the facilitating institution may have contributed positively or negatively. These hypotheses can be supported with data from interviews with facilitating institution staff and members and the description of facilitator responsibilities clarified with the first tool. Figure 3 is an adaptation of the "Mental Map of Facilitation a Toolkit" (Griggs, 2003a: 3) which shows how the components in table 5 interact. The column on the far left depicts the subtle integration of the facilitating institution's and individual facilitator's style and values. The "Interaction with the Decision-Making Environment" component was added to Griggs' original diagram to aid in investigating the unusual, arms-length relationship that a facilitating institution such as the Fraser Basin Council may have with decision-makers through its membership. Figure 3. Components through which a Facilitation Institution Influences a Process Facilitation Institution Style and Values Facilitator Style and Values Scoping & Assessment Process Design Assistance In Deliberations Handling of Context Interaction with the Declslon--> Making •Environment , | ' ' Profes sional The third tool uses the four variables of intervention and Moore's (2003) typology of mediators, as summarized in table 2, to further analyse the style and type of facilitation the facilitating institution uses in a process. It essentially provides a deeper analysis of the facilitating institution's style than can be conducted using the second tool. The traits of the five types of mediators are compared to the facilitating institution's traits and the most relevant traits from each type are synthesized to describe the facilitating institution's own type of facilitation. 42 3.3. Summary Six performance measures drawn from the literature on techniques used in consensus-based processes are used to develop the first part of the analytical framework. The performance measures are: Agreement on the Facilitator, Representation of Interests, Clarity of Process, Interest-Driven Framework, Informed Decision-Making and Decision Implementation. There are several sub-measures under each of these criteria that help to assess whether each of the measures is achieved. Although these performance measures focus on the qualities of the facilitated process, they also provide an opportunity to start to uncover the influence of the facilitating institution. Further assessment of the facilitating institution is conducted by evaluating what characteristics a facilitating institution brings to a process compared to a set of expected characteristics based on the literature. 43 4. RESEARCH METHODS This chapter provides a description of how the research was conducted, from case selection to data analysis. There are four sections in this chapter; research approach, data collection, data analysis and presentation, and data validity and reliability. 4.1. Rationale for Qualitative Analysis The research being conducted on the Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission (FRMP) process and the role of the Fraser Basin Council (Council) is best addressed using a qualitative approach. Creswell (1994) describes four conditions that make it appropriate to use the qualitative paradigm: 1. The research is exploratory. 2. The number of variables is unknown. . 3. The context is important. 4. There is a lack of theoretical base for the study. In this thesis, these four conditions are met. First, the assessment of FRMP is exploratory; the framework for analysis and research questions are revised as more is learned about the case. The thesis is not designed to be a comprehensive assessment, but rather an overview of interesting characteristics that provide insight into the research questions. Secondly, in a process where many of the factors are driven by context, it is impossible to assess the number of variables that affected FRMP's success. Third, it is important to understand the context out of which the Council evolved and FRMP was initiated, as is described in chapter 5. Since the thesis evaluates qualitative aspects of a process that are inextricably linked to context, it requires an approach that is inductive and non-positivist in orientation (Creswell, 1994; Foddy, 1993). Finally, there is currently no body of literature that adequately characterizes the structure and processes of a facilitating institution, so no precedent has been set. While the boundary between qualitative and quantitative research can only be subjectively defined, the literature has established some commonly agreed to differences between them. In the case of qualitative analysis, certain assumptions are made. The following are some of those assumptions from the literature (Foddy, 1993; Creswell, 1994) which are pertinent to this case: 1. Reality is subjective and multiple as seen by participants in a study. 2. The study is perceived essentially as value-laden and therefore biased by the researcher's perspectives and the value-laden nature of the data provided from the field. 3. The methodology is context-bound and inductive. The way the research questions are framed affects the analysis and the results. The questions establish what issues are addressed and which are outside the artificially constructed bounds of the thesis. In addition, the researcher's perspectives and values are partially integrated into the case study assessment as a result of the inextricable influence her worldviews have on the approach and views she adopts. Acknowledging that reality, the researcher differentiates between the participants' assessment of the consensus-based process (in chapter 6), which has less researcher bias, and the assessment of the facilitating institution (in chapter 7 and 8), which has more researcher bias. 44 4.2. Rationale for a Case Study There are certain conditions in which a case study is an appropriate research method. Yin (2003) explains'that case study research is appropriate when: 1. the research questions are "how" and/or "why" questions; 2. control over behavioural events is not required; and 3. the focus is on contemporary events. Many of the underlying questions in this thesis are "how" questions, as is demonstrated by the interview questions provided in table 9 in appendix 4. Secondly, given the style of qualitative research that is being conducted, there is no need to control the process events that take place. Rather, their occurrence in the context in which they naturally transpire is of interest. Thirdly, the thesis is centred on a process that drew to a close at the end of 2002 and a facilitating institution that is still active. Given that all of these conditions are met,' it is suitable to use a case study to focus the research and collect empirical data. The case study used in this thesis exists on two levels, the facilitating institution level and the facilitated process level, connected through the role of the facilitating institution's staff in the facilitated process. In chapter 5, the various roles of the facilitating institution's members are clarified. The case study also operates as a mixture of an "instrumental case study" and an "intrinsic case study" (Stake, 1995). An instrumental case study is used as a tool to provide insight into an external interest, such as the importance of a facilitating institution's characteristics to the success of a process it facilitates. An intrinsic case study is used when specific information is desired about the case, such as how the Fraser Basin Council contributes to a multi-interest process that addresses the management of the Fraser River gravel reach. 4.3. Data Collection The thesis utilizes a triangulation of data sources to maintain the validity and confirmability of the information. The methods of data collection were: 1. Literature review 2. Document analysis 3. Semi-structured interviews Document analysis informs the description of the case study in chapter 5 and provides supporting information throughout chapter 7. Chapters 6 and 7 contain substantial data from the interviews. Six consensus-based process performance measures and their sub-measures help structure the document analysis and interview data. In addition to collecting data during the interviews based on the performance measures, data was also gathered from certain interviewees to further inform the facilitating institution assessment. The following sections describe how data from the documents and interviews was collected and handled. 4.3.1. Document Analysis Document analysis provides insight into a case study prior to interviews and substantiates information in the assessment (Stake, 1995: 68; Yin , 2003: 81). It is used as a secondary source of information in this thesis. Key documents for this case study include: 1. The Council's "Charter of Sustainability" (FBC, 1997a) 2. The Council's "Directors'Handbook" (FBC, 1997b) 3. The FRMP committees' Terms of Reference and Minutes 45 4. The "Draft Interim Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission" (FBC, 2001 a), "Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission Proactive Strategy" (FBC, 2001b), and other FRMP reports 5. The Council's "Instre'am: Newsletter for the Fraser River Management Plan" publications (FBC, 2000a; 2000b; 2001c) 6. The Council's internal FRMP records 7. Information packages provided to the FRMP participants 8. Ministry briefs, publications and application guidebooks from the government agencies involved ^ 9. Technical reports from engineering consultants and academic research groups 10. Media records The Council provided a considerable number of documents on FRMP for this thesis, including all of its Stakeholder Assembly records and Steering and Technical Committee minutes. Public documents were primarily accessed from online sources and internal documents and technical reports were made available to the researcher by the interviewees. Using the document analysis, the researcher formulated an initial set of hypotheses about what the strengths and weaknesses of FRMP were, to be confirmed or refuted by the interviewees. The hypotheses were structured around the performance measures so that they were useful in constructing the interview questions. The interviewees could thus confirm or reject the hypotheses and explored the issues in greater depth. The documents were also used to build a chronology of events, select potential interviewees who were expected to provide relevant insight and prepare background material prior to meeting with the interviewees. 4.3.2. Interview Preparation There were several objectives for the interviews. The objectives were different for each interviewee, based on the information that they were expected to be able to provide. However, the overall objectives of the interviews were: 1. to gather background information on the context from which the process emerged and a general characterization of the events; 2. to assess what training or experience the interviewees have in facilitated consensus-based processes; 3. to record interviewees' perceptions about how well FRMP met the performance measures and how well the Council staff and Directors were able to support such a process; 4. to inquire about what the interviewees felt were strengths of the facilitated process and ways in which it could have been improved; and 5. to learn about the FRMP participants' perspective on the role of the Council as a facilitating institution. Interviewee Selection The research entailed a purposive sampling strategy, also referred to as judgement sampling or criterion-based selection, in which interviewees were selected for how much they could assist in gathering information about the case (Stake, 1995). Then a referral approach, called a snowballing sampling strategy, was employed to identify additional interviewees. Thirteen individuals were initially approached to participate in interviews. This sample size is justifiable, as a trade-off was made between sample size and depth of interviewing so that rich and detailed data could be gathered from each interviewee (McLeod, 2001). At the end of each interview, a . 46 request was made for the interviewee to recommend other individuals who might be particularly valuable to talk to about FRMP. Once an individual had been recommended strongly by one or more interviewees, that individual was added to the list of potential interviewees. In total, seven additional interviewees were added this way. An objective of the selection process was to ensure that the interviewees represented a cross-section of individuals associated with FRMP; Council facilitators, Council Directors and at least one representative from each of the broad stakeholder groups on the Steering Committee and Technical Committee of FRMP (including government agency representatives, First Nations, industry and interest groups.) However, since theoretically-driven sampling is guided by the research questions, it is not as concerned with representativeness (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The prime objective was to select individuals within the major stakeholder groups who were expected to provide valuable information based on their experience with FRMP and the Council. Some interviewees had much more consistent involvement with FRMP than others, but all of them had some degree of involvement in the process. A conscious decision to limit the scope of the interviews, the perspectives of those who chose to be entirely uninvolved with FRMP were not assessed. Interview Design The interviews were semi-structured and in-depth. They were almost entirely transcribed verbatim. In-depth interviewing provides rich data about what the participants have experienced (Lieblich et al., 1998: 9). By capturing detail during the interviews and including quotations in the assessment, the researcher can develop connections between the stories of individuals affected by the same event. According to Seidman (1998: 44), these connections can supersede concerns about representativeness and generalizability. The interviews involved a mixture of open and closed questions that were all qualitative in nature. Quantitative questions were not used because the researcher believed that it would be hard to define the scale and end points on which the interviewees' responses were based, especially since the interviewees had a range of experiences with consensus-based processes in the past. Quantitative questions would have created a different stylistic atmosphere. They could have stilted dialogue between the researcher and an interviewee, especially at the start of an interview, which might have disrupted the type of interaction that is fostered in in-depth interviewing. An objective during the interviews was to establish a rapport with each interviewee and develop a conversation-like discussion, touching on each of the questions naturally. The responses to the qualitative questions provided sufficient information for the researcher to infer whether the interviewees felt positive or negative about each of the qualities being assessed. The interviews did require some structure in order to minimize the influence of the researcher on the interviewees' responses. As Seidman (1998: 33) states, "Without a thoughtful structure for their work, [researchers] increase the chance of distorting what they learn from their participants... and imposing their own sense of the world on their participants rather than eliciting theirs." An interview script was used both in preparation for the interview, to review what information was required from the individual, and during the interview, as a checklist to confirm whether important questions were covered. Other considerations were also made to try to minimize the influence of the interviewer. These included being aware of dress, facial expressions, verbal cues and other behaviour, as recommended by Seidman (1998: 74). 47 Nevertheless, each interview was still a conversation in which the researcher defined and controlled the situation, no matter how subtly it was attempted to be done (Kvale, 1996: 6). A description of how the interviews were conducted, what ethical considerations were made and how the interview data was handled is provided in appendix 2. 4.4. Data Analysis and Presentation There are two parts to the analysis made in this thesis, corresponding to the two main research questions expressed in chapter 1. The first part is an assessment of the consensus-based process and the second part is an assessment of the facilitating institution that was involved in the process, as described in chapter 3. 4.4.1. Assessment of the Consensus-Based Process The data analysis used a combination of a grounded theory and a case study approach. It was a blended approach because it applied a key aspect of grounded theory, open coding. Coding information is "the process of noting what is interesting, labelling it, and putting it into appropriate files" (Seidman, 1998: 107). In open coding, the researcher codes the data in every way possible, inserting responses into as many different categories as possible (McLeod, 2001). The process requires synchronization of data collection and analysis, such that the researcher is sensitized to the different issues and areas that should be covered in following interviews. Categories may be added while others that are found to have the same meaning are combined. This thesis was consistent with that approach; records were kept of the interviews and questions were modified along the way as a fuller picture of the issues developed. A significant way in which the data analysis was consistent with case study research rather than grounded theory was that the researcher reviewed the literature in advance of collecting the data. Thus several categories in the process assessment were pre-assigned rather than just drawn out of the interview data. The categories were primarily labelled with technical terms drawn from the literature, but some were labelled either using the researcher's own common-sense constructs or the language used by the interviewees (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Thus, the coding process subtly forced the data into pre-conceived models. Another aspect differentiating the approach from grounded theory was that the objective of the coding process was not to capture the meaning of the phenomenon of the whole case study under one main category, but rather to assess multiple categories and recognise multiple meanings simultaneously. There were several steps in the process of data analysis for the first assessment. First, on the advice of those with experience in interview research, it was decided that, with a sufficiently small sample size and themes already structured in the interview script, professional coding software was not required. Instead, the interview transcripts were coded using Microsoft Access. The coding procedure used was a modification of an approach using Microsoft Word developed by Julian Griggs and his associates at Dovetail Consulting (2003b). Categories were created based on the six performance measures, the participants' overall assessment of the process, the context of their involvement, background information on the process and other themes that did not fit under the preceding categories. A l l of the questions from the master interview script, which reflected various themes relating to the sub-measures, were created as sub-categories under those ten categories. Interview transcripts were then sorted through that framework. 48 The researcher reviewed each of the transcripts in Microsoft Word and pasted the relevant responses as individual records under each sub-category. In many cases an interview response would not only answer the question being asked, but also a question in another sub-category. The relevant portion of such a response would be copied under the other sub-category with a note on its source. When original themes arose in the transcripts, new sub-categories were developed. Additional information recorded with each response included the interviewee number associated with the individual who made the response, a note as to whether the response was volunteered, in response to a question, or copied from another question and the researcher's comments. Microsoft Access was programmed to automatically compute additional information for each record, such as the type of interviewee (Council Director, staff, regulator on the Steering Committee, other Steering Committee member or Technical Committee member) based on the interviewee number provided. Once all of the transcripts had been entered into the Microsoft Access database, reports were produced that stated the number of responses in each sub-category, by interviewee type and response type. This helped to filter between sub-categories that had enough responses to be worth analyzing and those that would be omitted. A combination of this process and the researcher's judgement on the relevance of each of the sub-categories to the research questions was used to decide which questions were included in the final assessment provided in chapter 6. Since the research was primarily inductive, there were several iterations in which the performance measures and sub-categories (primarily derived directly from interview questions) were reassessed for their appropriateness and relevance. One significant change to the performance measures was the simplification of a measure called "Stakeholder-Centred Process Design" to "Clarity of Process." In addition, a seventh performance measure, "Equal Opportunity," was re-categorized as a sub-measure of "Interest-Driven Framework." Some sub-categories were regrouped into more closely related themes or omitted if they were found to be irrelevant to the case. With the resultant set of performance measures and sub-categories, reports were designed which grouped the responses hierarchically first by performance measure, then sub-category, and then interviewee type for ease of assessment. The responses were reviewed for the degree of agreement among interviewees on the evaluation of each of the sub-categories and similar responses were grouped. The reports helped identify the issues that arose frequently under the sub-measures. Quotes that were found to be most representative of the interviewees' various sentiments were included in the Participants' Assessment chapter. This qualitative assessment was designed to reflect the participants' voices much more strongly than the researcher's, so the selection of quotes was designed to tell the story and allow the reader to draw conclusions. Quantitative ratings of the performance measures and sub-measures ranging between 1 and 5, from highly negative to highly positive, were derived from the participants' qualitative assessment of FRMP. Table 7 at the end of chapter 6 provides the summary ratings on how well the consensus-based process did in each of the six performance measures, while table 9A in appendix 4 provides the full version of the quantitative assessment. The performance ratings were derived by averaging the ratios of positive to negative responses to each question under a sub-measure and then averaging the ratios of each sub-measure under a performance measure. No specific weightings were assigned to the questions or sub-measures. Ratings were derived from the ratios by dividing the -1 to +1 range into five categories of equal 49 probability of occurrence. Further details on the quantitative assessment are provided in appendix 4. The quantitative assessment is designed for ease of review and to initiate discussion on the findings. It is not meant to be a stand-alone piece, as it incorporates a higher degree of researcher interpretation than the qualitative analysis provided in the participants' own words. It is intended to be a map that accompanies the more in-depth descriptions which tell a fuller story. 4.4.2. Assessment of the Facilitating Institution The second assessment was closely intertwined with the first but relied more on document analysis, the Council facilitators' and Directors' insights and the researcher's observations. The framework for the assessment is explained in chapter 3. The influence of the Council on FRMP's ability to succeed in the performance measures was examined in light of the theories on facilitating institutions explored in chapter 2. The assessment was structured around a set of advantageous and disadvantageous characteristics that a permanent group such as a facilitating institution is expected to demonstrate, in contrast to an ad hoc group, when attempting to reach agreement. These characteristics were assumed to also transfer to the facilitated process. Another part of the assessment investigated in further depth the style and type of facilitation that the Council applied to FRMP. There was less interview data explicitly about the Council as a facilitator than about qualities of FRMP since the participants tended to spend more time describing the elements of the facilitated process that they were most familiar with, concerned about or had already evaluated themselves. 4.4.3. Presentation of Findings The findings for the process assessment and facilitating institution assessment are presented in chapter 6 and 7, respectively. The first assessment is presented in a chapter that draws heavily on quotes directly from the interviewees. The discussion of each performance measure begins with a description of the general distribution of the interviewees' perspectives toward the performance measure and sub-measures. Then there is a description of how well FRMP measured up in the eyes of its participants, exemplified by quotes. Specific comments are highlighted to demonstrate the diversity of sentiments among the participants. The interviewees are referred to according to identity numbers rather than names to attempt to maintain confidentiality. The findings are summarized in table 7. The second assessment presents a higher-level analysis with a stronger voice from the researcher. The chapter draws on theory to investigate characteristics the Council brought to FRMP as a facilitating institution through various components of its involvement and whether the characteristics had a positive or negative influence on the ability of FRMP to achieve success. Some quotes are used to support the assertions made. Table 8 describes findings about the Council's type of facilitation. 4.5. Data Validity and Reliability In terms of validity, an effort was made to present the range of interviewees' views in their own words throughout chapter 6. Triangulation of data sources also aided in maintaining the validity of the research findings by cross-referencing sources. In terms of reliability, the researcher is confident that the number of interviewees sampled was a large enough proportion and good cross-section of the case study participants that the findings 50 would be relatively consistent if the same assessment was conducted with other process participants. However, the reliability of the data is not expected to extend further than process participants. The scope of the thesis requires that not all of the interest groups and organizations that have an opinion about the Council's facilitating of FRMP are represented in the interviews. The thesis excludes the perspectives of members of the public who were not directly involved in FRMP and those who were only invited to be involved in the broader Stakeholder Forums rather than the FRMP Steering and Technical Committees. Although those who chose not to be involved would insightful perspectives on the usefulness of the Council, those opinions are saved for another thesis. The researcher acknowledges that she, like all other researchers, has personal biases that are challenging to disentangle from an interpretation of the results. These required the researcher to make a concerted effort to minimize bias at various stages of the research process, including formulating questions, conducting the interviews, recording and analyzing the interviews. 4.6. Limitations The scope of this research is defined in part by the use of case study approach. The conclusions y drawn on the Fraser Basin Council and FRMP cannot be extrapolated into theory. The empirical data collected in regards to FRMP cannot be generalized to other processes the Council has facilitated, since each process is unique. Nor can it be generalized to other facilitating institutions. That being said, the conclusions are still highly useful, as the assessment and recommendations that are made on the Council's operations in FRMP and how its qualities as a facilitating institution might have been maximized can be considered in future facilitated processes. Although it would have been interesting to do an assessment of the effectiveness of the Council in its entirety, or even across multiple such institutions, it was not possible within the constraints of a Master's degree. FRMP had already drawn to a close when this thesis was initiated, creating three limitations. First, the researcher was unable to personally observe any FRMP meetings. Second, memory is fallible, making it challenging for interviewees to recall precisely the events and their feelings towards the process while it was taking place. Third, other process relating to the same resource have taken place since the end of FRMP, some of which the interviewees and the Council have participated in, so several interviewees had trouble separating their assessment of FRMP from subsequent developments. These drawbacks were mitigated in a number of ways. For example, the Council was observed iri other roles and an internship was undertaken to develop a better understanding of the institution's day to day operations. A simple timeline of events was provided to interviewees who requested it, to tweak their memories of the events which took place during FRMP as opposed to other processes. 4.7. Summary This thesis uses qualitative analysis to investigate a facilitating institution and its facilitated process. It draws on three data.sources, but the most significant data was derived from semi-structured with individuals associated with the Council and FRMP. The two-part analytical framework for the thesis was reviewed iteratively and modifications were made to reflect what was learned during the interviews. Interview material about the FRMP process was coded using the first part of analytical framework and then interpreted in a quantitative assessment conducted by the researcher. The second assessment then built on the first to uncover components of the process through which characteristics of the Council influenced FRMP. 51 5. THE FRASER BASIN COUNCIL AND THE FRASER RIVER MANAGEMENT PLAN PROCESS This chapter introduces the case study used to examine the concept of facilitating institutions. It first describes the facilitating institution being investigated, the Fraser Basin Council. It then provides background on the resources for which the case study's negotiations were facilitated, the diverse stakeholders and the governance context. Finally an overview of the facilitated process, the Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission process (FRMP) is provided. 5.1. The Fraser Basin Council The Fraser Basin Council (Council) is the facilitating institution which is examined in this thesis. The following section introduces the Council's foundations, unique structure, vision for sustainability and guiding principles. It also outlines guidelines for which the Council agrees to facilitate multi-party processes. 5.1.1. The Fraser River Basin The Fraser River, located entirely within the province of British Columbia, flows 1399 km from Mount Robson in the Rocky Mountains to its mouth into the Straight of Georgia at Richmond (FBC, 2003g). The main stem of the Fraser River is supplied by 13 watersheds (FBC, 2003g).The Fraser River's catchment area, the effective drainage area from which all precipitation flows to the rivers mouth, is 233,000 km" (Church and McLean, 1994). This area, referred to as the Fraser Basin, is the shaded area shown in figure 4 (adapted from Rhemtulla et al., 2001). Figure 4. Location of the Fraser Basin in British Columbia First Nations of seven language groups, the St6:lo, Nlaka'pamux, Secwepmec, Stl'atrimx, Tsilhqot'in, Carrier and Okanagan, have been living in the Fraser Basin since the glaciers retreated nearly ten thousand years ago (FBC, 2003g). The Fraser River was first explored by people of European decent when Simon Fraser canoed down it in 1807. European immigrants started to settle the Fraser Valley in mid-1800. Today 2.7 million people live in the Fraser Basin. 52 5.1.2. Foundations The Fraser Basin Management Board (FBMB), the predecessor of the Council, began in 1991 as an initiative to bring together all four "orders of government"1 and non-governmental units to tackle sustainability issues in the Fraser River Basin. Its associated Fraser Basin Management Program (FBMP) was one the initiatives that experimented with innovative consensus-based approaches to resource management in the 1990's. Its multi-party, interjurisdictional approach to decision-making provided a new mechanism to improve the effectiveness of the governance of natural resources (FBMP, 1995b: 101). The federal Green Plan provided five years of funding for the F B M P as a pilot project. As the F B M B drew to a close, it created the Fraser Basin Council (Council) in an effort to fulfil its mandate to develop both short- and long-term plans for the Fraser Basin. An analysis of the F B M B and its collaborative approach has been conducted by Dorcey (1997). The Council was established as a non-partisan, non-governmental organization (NGO) designed to catalyze interjurisdictional projects that work toward environment, economic and social sustainability of the Fraser Basin. Similarly to the FBMP, it has diverse representation on it Board of Directors, including all four orders of government and stakeholders from various sectors and regions in the basin. As a charitable organization, the Council relies on annual funding from the federal, provincial and local governments, which is supplemented by corporate and private donors. The Council works to facilitate problem solving by bringing together the right composition of people necessary to make decisions that balance interests (FBC, 2004). Its use of consensus (which essentially provides each Director with veto power) and its NGO status allow it to develop working relationships between agencies which are sometimes subject to "turf battles" (Blomquist et al., 2005). Its NGO status means that the Council has no legislative or policy-making authority, nor management responsibilities. However, the recommendations developed by consensus among its Directors, though only advisory, are influential within the Fraser River Basin. The regulatory agencies take heed because the Council represents a broad public perspective. 5.1.3. Institutional Structure The Council's Board of Directors, averaging thirty-six members, is designed to represent all jurisdictions, sectors and geographical regions in the Fraser Basin (FBC, 2003i). Figure 5 presents the structure of the Board and its supporting staff. There are fourteen high-level representatives of federal, provincial and local government, eight representatives of First Nations (based on the language groups in the basin), and fourteen representatives based on sectoral, geographical or other criteria. The twenty-two Directors representing the orders of government are appointed to the Council by their constituencies. They are often senior-level representatives such as deputy ministers, directors, chiefs and mayors. The fourteen non-governmental Directors are invited by the Council. Many of them are leaders in their communities. Each Director holds a three-year term, with the possibility of reappointment for one additional term, in order to maintain continuity. (It requires time to teach new Directors about the Council's approach and the types of initiatives it undertakes.) The common interest that draws all Directors together is the goal of sustainability in the Fraser Basin. ' The F B M B referred to the federal, provincial, local and First Nations governments in Canada as the four "orders of government". The Council adopted this terminology, so it is also applied in this thesis. 53 The Board of Directors is lead by a Chair and Vice-Chair. The Council has had three prominent and widely respected Chairs over the span of its existence. The first Chair was the Honourable Iona Campagnolo, currently Lieutenant-Governor of British Columbia. She was followed by Dr. Jack Blaney, a former president of Simon Fraser University, who has been replaced temporarily while he chairs British Columbia's Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform. Patrick Reid, who stepped in for Dr. Blaney, was the former Commissioner-General of Expo 86 and Chairman of the Rick Hansen Man-In-Motion Foundation (FBC, 2003d). Chief Roy Mussell of the Skwah First Nation has been the Council's Vice-Chair since its inception. Figure 5. Structure of the Fraser Basin Council Board of Directors Chair and Vice-Chair. 1 1 1 1 i i Federal Provincial Local/ First Nation Sectoral/ Basin Wide Government Government Regional Bands Geographical (4) (3) (3) Government (8) (10) (8) Executive Director Project Manager, _ "Manager, Manager, Manager, Manager, Coordinators UpperFraser Canboo-* Chilcotin .'Thompsons- Fraser Valley - Vancouver,>• ••Squamish; Pemberton The Council's Board of Directors has sub-committees based in five sub-regions within the Fraser Basin (Upper Fraser, Cariboo-Chilcotin, Thompson, Fraser Valley and the combined regions of Vancouver, Squamish and Pemberton). The Directors also sit on task committees which address basin-wide projects such as flood hazard management. The Council's staff is also organized around the five sub-regions in the Fraser Basin, with an Executive Director overseeing all of the operations. Five staff members manage projects in the sub-regions. They communicate with the Directors in their area and help them to address issues pertinent to both the region and the basin as a whole. Project Coordinators support the regional managers and conduct much of the on-the-ground operationalization of the Council's projects. There are no other organizations in British Columbia or in Canada that have the same institutional structure or mandate as the Council. Watershed management organizations with similar interests exist, such as the Columbia Basin Trust or the Grande River Conservation Authority, but they each differ in terms of organizational type, presence of empowering legislation, roles and responsibilities, membership, rules of conduct and decision-making criteria (Saaltink, 2000). None of them have official representation of all four orders of government and include the public. The Council has shared its model with groups in the Philippians, Russia and Brazil (FBC, 2004). 54 5.1.4. Vision and Values of the Council The Council's vision for the Fraser Basin is "social well-being is supported by a vibrant economy and sustained by a healthy environment" (FBC, 1997a). It sets out to accomplish this vision by understanding sustainability, caring for ecosystems, strengthening communities and improving decision making. The Council uses a "Charter of Sustainability" (FBC, 1997a) to guide all the activities that it undertakes to achieve its vision for the Fraser Basin. The Charter was designed using input the F B M B received at public forums while developing its strategic plan for the Fraser Basin. The twelve Guiding Principles for Sustainability within the Charter were jointly designed and agreed to by abroad spectrum of stakeholders and government representatives. The Charter principles are: • Mutual Dependence: Land, water, air and all living organisms including humans are integral parts of the ecosystem. Biodiversity must be conserved. • Accountability: Each of us is responsible for the social, economic and environmental consequences of our decisions and accountable for our actions. • Equity: A l l communities and regions must have equal opportunities to provide for the social, economic and environmental, needs of residents. • Integration: Consideration of social, economic and environmental costs and benefits must be an integral part of all decision-making. • Adaptive Approaches: Plans and activities must be adaptable and able to respond to external pressures and changing social values. • Coordinated and Cooperative Efforts: Coordinated and cooperative efforts are needed among all government and non-government interests. • Open and Informed Decision-Making: Open decision-making depends on the best available information. • Exercising Caution: Caution must be exercised when shaping decisions to avoid making irreversible mistakes. • Managing Uncertainty: A lack of certainty should not prevent decisive actions for sustainability. • Recognition: There must be recognition of existing rights, agreements and obligations in all decision-making. • Aboriginal Rights and Title: We recognise that aboriginal nations within the Fraser Basin assert aboriginal rights and title. These rights and title now being defined must be acknowledged and reconciled in a just and fair manner. • Transition Takes Time: Sustainability is a journey that requires constant feedback, learning and adjustment. In the short-term, the elements of sustainability may not always be in balance. The Directors make their decisions by consensus, despite the Council's large membership. It requires the Directors to practice applying the Council's values, such as understanding and respecting the opinions of others, accepting all members as peers, valuing balance over extreme positions and creating strong trust among members (FBC, 2003k). Directors are taught how their worldviews can influence their interpretation of "facts" and thus they are encouraged to be sensitive to each others' worldviews and try to open up to developing a broader culture at the table which encompasses everyone. It can take time to develop the skill set necessary to apply this approach, or even an appreciation for its use, so staff members sometimes spend one-on-one time with new Directors. When the Council is unable to reach consensus, its constitution has a 55 clause that provides for mediation (FBC, 2003c). If mediation does not lead to agreement, then a vote can be used. However, this clause has not yet been applied. The "Directors' Handbook" (FBC, 1997b) outlines the mandate, roles and rules by which the Council operates. Other than the requirement of using consensus, the Council is quite flexible in its approaches to decision-making. As stated in the Handbook: The Council encourages the development of new models of co-operative decision-making, while at all times maintaining impartiality on the issues at hand. 5.1.5. The Council's Guidelines as a Facilitator The Council takes on many initiatives outside of the core activities of the Board of Directors. The "Roles for the Council" section of the "Directors' Handbook" (FBC, 2000c) identifies eight roles that the Council ascribes itself: • Catalyst 1 • Educator • Secretariat • Facilitator • Monitor and Reporter • Institutional Coordinator • Conflict and Jurisdictional Resolution Agent • Interim Project Coordinator/ Manager The Council is interested in "facilitating multi-interest processes to work towards sustainability" (FBC, 2000c). It asserts that facilitating on-the-ground sustainability-related action between other groups in the Fraser Basin is a necessary and appropriate role because individual interests are less able to provide an impartial perspective. The role the Council (FBC, 2000c) prescribes for itself in such initiatives is: ...to facilitate dialogue, act as a jurisdictional and conflict resolution agent, seek comprehensive solutions, and move objectives to action... There are strict conditions in which the Council may facilitate a process. Two defining criteria are that the process is consistent with the Charter of Sustainability (FBC, 1997a) principles and that it addresses an interjurisdictional sustainability challenge (FBC, 2000c). Another criterion that helps maintain the distinctiveness of the Council's role is that it must only take on work for which it is uniquely qualified and for which it complements and supports other work being done. There must also be "broad support among a diverse range of key interest for Council involvement" (FBC, 2000c). Other criteria require that the process is within or impacts the Fraser Basin, is conducted with existing core human and financial resources or includes a plan for additional resources, and is able to identify measurable outcomes and possible success in terms of strong communities, vibrant economies, healthy environments and effective institutions. The Council draws on its Charter when it facilitates processes. It promotes the use of consensus-based decision-making and the representation of a range of interests. The Council also promotes "dialogue" as opposed to "debate" to build consensus. Dialogue is collaborative and seeks to create open-minded attitudes, while debate is oppositional and focuses on winning (Study Circle Resource Center, 1993). Using dialogue, one listens to the others in order to understand, find meaning and find agreement, while also being introspective of one's own position. It requires 56 one to temporarily suspend his or her beliefs while searching for strengths in the others' perspectives. It ultimate allows people to bring together different pieces of the answer to create a workable solution. By encouraging dialogue, the Council helps stakeholders develop a shared meaning. According to a recent World Bank study (Blomquist et al., 2005), the Council is recognised for its impartiality, its ability to collect and share information, and network among resource managers. These are all valuable skills as a facilitator. The Council has gone further than many in recognizing First Nations' assertions of rights and title and involving them in resource management planning processes. 5.2. The Fraser River Gravel Reach This section provides an overview of resource management issues that were being addressed in FRMP. It describes the physical aspects of the Fraser River gravel reach, the flood hazard to the surrounding areas, the various stakeholders with interests in the reach and the regulatory backdrop, including the relevant legislation and government jurisdictions. 5.2.1. Physical Aspects of the Gravel Reach A large portion of the Fraser Basin is above 1000m in elevation, so the snowmelt in spring produces the Fraser River's dominant hydrological event. The mean annual flow of the Fraser River at Mission is 3,410 m3/s, while the mean annual flood is 9,790 m3/s (Church and McLean, 1994). The Fraser River is steep for much of its length and is thus capable of eroding and carrying sediment in suspension for considerable distances. The bulk of the material carried by the river is fine sediments such as glacial till, glaciolacustrine silt and silty debris flow deposits. Once the river emerges from the Fraser Canyon downstream of Hope, there is a reduction in the channel slope by an order of magnitude and the river flows over a partially confined, cobble-gravel fan. The river becomes an anastomosed gravel-bed channel with numerous mid-channel islands that are generally cobble overlain with a few metres of sandy flood deposits (Church and McLean, 1994). The river drops the heaviest 1 % of its entrained sediment, "bedload" made up of cobble- and gravel-sized material, before it reaches Mission. The "washload", fine sediment which makes up 99% of the material carried downstream, continues to be suspended in the water column (Rosenau and Angelo, 2000). Even though it only makes up a small proportion of the sediment load, the bedload controls the morphological development of the river between Hope and Mission (Church and McLean, 1994). The section of the Fraser River between Hope and Mission where the gravel is deposited is referred to as the "gravel reach". (A reach is a section of a river with homogeneous characteristics.) The gravel reach is a dynamic system with an irregular pattern of gravel bar deposition and channel island development (Weatherly and Church, 1999). The river experiences irregular channel shifting that is propagated downstream over time. The river begins to erode one site along the bank, entrains gravel and deposits it downstream at a gravel bar. That deposition on the gravel bar initiates an attack on the adjacent bank so that an amount of gravel equivalent to that which has been deposited is eroded and moved downstream. The channel maintains its initial capacity but sediment is propagated downstream. This pattern repeats until the channel has been realigned such that the erosional attack on the bank has reduced (Church and McLean, 1994). In this manner gravel moves through the reach in pulses, with zones of activity shifting over the years in a pattern that is not closely correlated to the magnitude of individual floods. 57 Nearly one million cubic metres of material may be moved within the gravel reach annually (McLean and Mannerstrom, 1984; in Rosenau and Angelo, 2000). There are zones of net accumulation and zones of net depletion. In other words, some sections of the gravel reach increase in elevation as gravel is deposited on the riverbed, while other sections experience a decrease in elevation where gravel is eroded from the riverbed. In the last few decades, the zones of greatest aggradation have been between Agassiz and Harrison River, at an'estimated rate of 1.8 cm/year, and in the ten kilometres adjacent to Sumas Mountain, at an estimated rate of 0.8 cm/year (Weatherly and Church, 1999). The stored material is particularly visible during the winter months when water levels are low and the gravel bars are more exposed. For a river of its size, the Fraser River does not have a high total sediment yield (Church and McLean, 1994). There have been several revisions in the estimates of the amount of bed material that is entering the reach annually, with a recent estimate at 285,000 cubic metres of bulk volume per annum (Church et al., 2001). No bedload gravel has been.detected in measurements at Mission, indicating that no gravel is carried beyond the gravel reach (Church and McLean, 1994: 226). 5.2.2. Flood Hazard in the Gravel Reach The Fraser Valley has a history of floods, with two destructive floods in just over 100 years. Scientists have reported that, statistically, there is a one in three chance that a flood of a magnitude equal to or greater than the largest flood on record will occur in the next 50 years (FBMB, 1996b). The annual spring snowmelt freshet is the principle flood hazard to the Fraser Valley (Environment Canada, 2000b). Figure 6 is a map of floodplain areas at risk in the Fraser Valley, shown in the shaded in areas (Church et al., 2005c). The flood hazard is an ongoing threat to the sustainability of communities on the floodplain and in the surrounding region, as a flood of record would threaten the 300,000 people who live and work on the floodplain, incur approximately $1.8 billion worth of damage to private and public property, sever transportation routes, and debilitate industry and business (FBMB, 1996b). A severe flood on the Fraser River would not only impact those living in close proximity to the gravel reach, but also other British Columbians, through the obstruction of key transportation routes, reduction of agricultural sources and damage of aquatic habitat. Many approaches to managing the Fraser River's flood hazard and river resources have been experimented with over the last 100 years. Managers have tried various flood protection measures, governance structures and funding arrangements. Multiple jurisdictions govern the water resources within the Fraser River Basin; federal, provincial, local and First Nations governments each have their own jurisdiction over different aspects of the resources. Appendix 2 provides a review of how the Fraser Valley flood hazard has been managed in the past, what institutional support there is to address the flood hazard and what progress has been made in recent decades. 58 Figure 6. The Fraser River Floodplain from Hope to Mission 5.2.3. Stakeholders in the Gravel Reach The gravel reach of the Fraser River has multiple stakeholders, including the aggregate industry, river transportation industry, First Nations and other residents, recreational fishermen, conservationists and agriculturalists on the adjacent riparian lands. Significant physical and ecological management challenges are recognised in the gravel reach. The challenges include (1) diking for flood control and for bank protection to reduce lateral erosion, (2) intermittent dredging to maintain sufficiently deep navigation channels and (3) protection of the habitat and migration route of the world's most significant Pacific salmon run (Church and McLean, 1994). A fourth management challenge, the centerpiece of FRMP, is extracting gravel from the main riverbed and side channels, as well as scalping bars, to increase channel capacity for flood hazard reduction. These issues are linked to a broader set of social and economic challenges. Local Government and Residents The Fraser Valley Regional District (FVRD) is located in the eastern Fraser Valley, 100 kilometres east of Vancouver. It is a significant contributor to the provincial economy, with an agricultural sector that generates $700 million in gross farm receipts annually (FBC, 2005). The FVRD also supports the provincial economy through commercial fishing, forestry, tourism and recreation, agricultural processing, service industries and manufacturing. It is a major transportation and utility corridor for urban centers. Communities surrounding the Fraser River gravel reach are developing rapidly. The FVRD is currently home to approximately 240,000 people. Within the FVRD, the City of Chilliwack, District of Kent, City of Mission, District of Abbotsford, Agassiz and Hope all have a vested interest in Fraser River flood protection. Dikes have been constructed since the early 1900's. The flood protection works in British Columbia have been designed to protect against a 200-year flood. A 200-year flood level is a magnitude of river flow that equals or exceeds a flood that occurs, on average, once in 200 years (Ministry of 59 Public Safety and Solicitor General 2004). However, in a few areas the dikes are not sufficiently high enough or require expensive maintenance to be effective. A few sections along the river, in particular along First Nations reserves, are not diked at all. There were also problems with seepage through dikes into farmers' fields during high water events in 1997, 1999 and 2002. Municipal officials are concerned about the safety of their citizens, the deterrent to business development, and the economic crisis that would follow a flood. A representative of the City of Chilliwack (FBC, 2000a) explained: Flood protection is the most imperative and immediate issue on the gravel reach as it involves the protection of the public's health, safety and property... The cost of a flood to local communities would be up to $2 billion, which doesn't include the social impacts of flooding. Rising channel beds in areas of gravel aggradation reduce the flow capacity of the river, making the existing dikes less effective than they were designed to be. Surveys have shown that there have been riverbed elevations changes between +1 metre and -1 metre within the last half century, which is significant enough to reduce the margin of safety such that a smaller flood - discharge level might overtop certain dikes (Church et al., 2005b). Two engineering options to address this concern are (1) to continuously build the dikes higher, which would increase the hydraulic head between the river and the surrounding land, thus increasing the potential destruction should they fail or (2) to increase the channel capacity by extracting gravel from the river in strategic locations. Many local residents believed that the second option is the best way to reduce the flood hazard. They view gravel extraction as a no-net-loss approach^ financially, as opposed to the expensive, perpetual undertaking of raising dikes. First Nations First Nations have both traditional and contemporary uses of the gravel reach. There are many First Nations communities alongside the Fraser River gravel reach. Those that have claimed traditional territory within the reach include the Cheam, Chehalis, Leq'a:mel, Popkum, Scowlitz, \Skwah, Skway, and Seabird Island Band (FBC, 2003f). There are multiple affiliations between the various bands, of which the St6:16 Nation is a predominant one. Of the Nations and bands along the gravel reach, Cheam, Leq'a:mel, Popkum, Scowlitz, Skway and Seabird Island are part of the St6:16 Nation, while the Chehalis and Skwah are not. First Nation communities along the gravel reach have a tremendous stake in its management. The communities are particularly vulnerable to flooding, as a significant proportion of the required dike construction and maintenance is along their reserves (Vanderwal, 2002). A representative of the Seabird Island Band explained (FBC, 2000a): There is not a reserve along the river that has any diking- Seabird has lost 1100 acres over the last eighty years. Reserves aren't that big to begin with. Our population is increasing, and we need to find space for everyone. First Nations communities along the Fraser River have a diversity of opinions on how the gravel reach should be managed, but most share common interests in protecting traditional fishing sites and archaeological sites. A representative of the St6:lo Nation (FBC, 2000a) explained, "Both fishing sites and archaeological sites are regarded as non-negotiable." Several First Nations express an interest in gravel extraction to prevent further erosion of their lands and reduce the flood hazard, as long as it does not compromise sites of particular cultural and spiritual significance. A few First Nations bands, such as the Cheam and Chehalis, are also interested in 60 being involved in gravel extraction projects for economic reasons. Many communities assert the right to royalties i f gravel extraction sites are situated in or accessed through their asserted territories. Members of the St6:15 Nation are active in the debate over gravel reach management. St6:16 means "river" in Halq'emeylem, a Salishan language, and it also is a word used to refer to the Halq'emeylem-speaking people living within the lower Fraser River Basin (St6:lo Nation, 2003). The St6:16 Nation is made up of nineteen bands in the Fraser Valley, fourteen of which are situated along the Fraser River. (There are also five other bands that are not affiliated with St6:16 Nation but consider themselves St6:lo.) Traditional resource procurement areas are among those sites that are of particular cultural and spiritual significance to the St6:16 people (De Paoli, 1999). The St6:16 are concerned about the number of traditional fishing sites they have been losing to erosion and development (FBC, 2000a). The St6:16 Nation is becoming politically strong through advances in control over their heritage sites and other aspects of their life that represent self-determination (De Paoli, 1999). A l l but two of the nineteen St6:15 Nation bands, Cheam and Skway, have been engaged in the-Provincial Treaty Process since 1996 (BC Treaty Negotiations Office, 2003). Various bands associated with the St6:15 Nation are interested in sharing responsibilities with the federal and provincial government in managing river resources, and are increasingly being given opportunities to provide input as a result of the governments' evolving duty to consult. c The recognition and definition of aboriginal rights and title have been evolving since the mid- . 1970's on both a national and a provincial scale. The issue was revived after two centuries of near-dormancy when the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in the Calder v. The Attorney General of British Columbia case (1973) that aboriginal title does exist, in accordance with the Royal Proclamation of 1763 in British North America that states that: ...Nations or Tribes of Indians... should not be molested or disturbed in the possession of such parts of our dominions and territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by us are reserved to them... The Calder case initiated a flourish of subsequent court cases that have redefined aboriginal rights and how governments and third parties should interact with First Nations in the procurement and use of resources in British Columbia. Changes in the rules of engagement for government consultation on aboriginal rights and title have had an impact on the First Nations' participation in resource planning processes such as FRMP. Over the duration of FRMP, there were changes that affected people's interpretation of how FRMP might impact the Treaty process, what the government agencies were required to do in terms of consultation on gravel extraction, and whether the First Nations had a right to veto negotiations. DFO only learned part way through FRMP that according to court decisions such as Mikisew Cree First Nations v. Minister of Canadian Heritage (2001), it not only had a duty to consult with First Nations under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, but it was also required to assess "the current use of lands and resources for traditional purposes by aboriginal purposes" (Vanderwal, 2002). The relatively rapid evolution of duty to consult requirements has increased demands on both the First Nations and regulatory agencies. 61 Aggregate Industry Between 1964 and 1998, the aggregate industry in British Columbia extracted an average of 130,000 cubic metres of gravel annually from the gravel reach for commercial use, as presented in figure 7 (Weatherly and Church, 1999). The gravel was primarily sold for construction of roads and building developments in the Lower Mainland. River gravel is particularly valuable because it is pre-washed and sorted by size by the river. The aggregate industry employs around 2900 workers in BC and contributes $148 million annually to the provincial economy (Spiegelman, 2000). With urbanization and agricultural development in the Fraser Valley and restricted sites in adjacent mountain valleys, the industry's members are finding it increasingly difficult to access gravel sources in the Lower Mainland. Figure 7. Volumes of Gravel Removed from the Fraser River between Hope and Mission, 1964-1998 450000 400000 t 350000 300000 250000 200000 150000 100000 50000 0 Gravel Mined Average Recruitment ti Ijl 1 11 II1J II I 111 1JJJ1J 1IJ I IJJ IJ Navigation Until 1997 the federal government provided capital and operating funds to maintain commercial navigation channels by dredging the Fraser River regularly. The program ended because the federal government decided that waterborne commerce should be more self-sufficient. The Fraser River Port Authority continued to fund dredging for a couple of years after the federal funding stopped, but its financial resources were limited. Naturally-occurring shallow sections of the river, called riffles, occur alternately with deeper pools in the gravel reach. Those in river transportation businesses (primarily log-towing) rely on dredging and site specific gravel extraction to prevent the man-made channels through the riffles from infilling with gravel. The gravel reach is used to transport approximately 660,000 cubic metres of logs to downstream markets annually. The annual expense of transporting those logs by road instead would be approximately $830,000 (FBC, 2003f). Recreation and Conservation Fishermen, fish biologists and conservationists are interested in protecting the aquatic habitat and fish populations in the gravel reach. The reach provides important aquatic habitat to twenty-eight species of fish, ten of which are salmonid species. Four are "blue listed" as species of special 62 concern (coastal cutthroat trout, bull trout, dolly varden, and mountain sucker) and the white sturgeon is "red listed" as endangered (MSRM & M W L A P 2005; Vanderwal, 2002; Church et al., 2005b). The diverse aquatic system is governed under a fisheries management strategy of no net habitat loss. The salmon run is significant, with an annual escapement of chum {Oncorhynchus keta) at 500,000 and a biennial escapement of pink (O. gorbuscha) in odd years at 36,000,000 (Church and McLean, 1994). Both chum and pink salmon spawn within the gravel reach, selecting locations based on suitable gravel and flow, which may.change from year to year. Ideal salmon spawning gravel beds are porous and do not have interstitial spaces chocked with fine sediments. In clean gravel, salmon egg nests, referred to as "redds", experience stream temperature regimes and receive adequate oxygen through the cycling of stream waters (MWLAP, 2004). In-stream works (including gravel extraction) within the Fraser River, i f not conducted using best practice guidelines, can release fine sediments downstream. Fine sediments, in addition to filling in redds, may smother essential prey such as aquatic invertebrates, clog and abrade gills, and reduce water clarity and visibility to the detriment of feeding, mating and escaping predators (MWLAP, 2004). Riffles host rich assemblages of aquatic species and are used by salmon for spawning. A riffle disrupts water as it passes over the shallow section, thereby causing the water to take up more oxygen from the surface. The swift current over a riffle keeps the surface of the gravel bed free of sand and silt. Continuously dredging of riffles to maintain a main channel for navigation reduces the local gradient and current and could cause the river to become constrained into a single, stabilized channelway over time. On other rivers there has been evidence that when significant volumes of gravel have been removed (in excess of replacement rates), the channel morphology has been simplified and biological diversity has been reduced (Church et al., 2005b). Simplification of the river's morphology may isolate side channels that chinook salmon (O. tshawytscha) rely on as rearing juveniles and other species require for clean spawning gravel. The Fraser River gravel reach also has value as riparian wildlife habitat and recreational space. It is also valued for its aesthetic qualities. Although these values are important, they are not described in detail within this thesis. 5.2.4. Regulatory Responsibilities Related to Gravel Extraction in the Fraser River A major focus of FRMP was to recommend ways to approach the process of authorizing in-stream gravel extraction permits. For that reason, this section reviews the regulations which are relevant to gravel extraction and then discusses how gravel extraction permits have been administered. Four orders of government have jurisdiction in the Fraser River gravel reach; the federal government, provincial government, local government and First Nations.2 Relevant Regulations Various legislation, regulations, statues and policies need to be addressed when considering the authorization of in-stream gravel extraction along the Fraser River. There are three provincial and two federal acts to which a project must adhere. 2 First Nations are recognised as an order of government in this thesis because the aboriginal people in British Columbia are working towards self-government and play an important role in the governance of resources through government-to-government negotiations. 63 The three provincial acts that must be addressed are the British Columbia Water Act (RSBC, 1996), Land Act (RSBC, 1996) said Mines Act (RSBC, 1996). The Water Act (RSBC, 1996), original passed in 1909, is one of the most significant pieces of provincial legislation in regards to gravel extraction. The section that is particularly relevant is s.9, authorizing "changes in and about a stream." Changes may include modifications to the morphology brought about by dredging, channelization, diking and bank protection, as well as changes to the riparian land and vegetation. S.7 of the Water Act is also relevant in that it ensures that water quality, fish and wildlife habitat and the rights of licensed water users are not compromised (LWBC, 2004b). The Fish Protection Act (SBC, 1997), being implemented in a series of phases, addresses issues such as protecting and restoring fish habitat and improved riparian protection and enhancement. This Act prevails over the Water Act when they are in conflict and mandates the consideration of fish habitat issues in dealing with applications under the Water Act. Work conducted under the Forest and Ranges Practices Act (SBC, 2002), Forest Practices Code of British Columbia Act (RSBC, 1996) and Mines Act (RSBC, 1996) do not require approval under the Water Act (LWBC, 2004b). The Land Act (RSBC, 1996), originally passed in 1875, gives the provincial Crown the rights to the beds of all streams, rivers and lakes in British Columbia except where previous rights existed (Rueggeberg and Dorcey, 1991: 201). Land Act s.l 1 assesses and recommends tenure and determines royalties through a bid process. The provincial authority does not sell the land, but rather leases it and licences it for extraction of gravel resources. The Mines Act, under s.l 0, ., addresses permitting of gravel extraction because a mine is defined as a place where, "any excavation is made to explore or produce... rock, limestone, earth, clay, sand or gravel." The relevant federal acts are the Fisheries Act (1970) and the Navigable Waters Protection Act (1985). According to the^Fisheries Act, the federal government has jurisdiction over fish that may be impacted by activities that take place either in-stream or in fish habitat. Fish habitat is defined in s.34(l) as including "...spawning grounds and nursery, rearing, food supply and migration areas on which fish depend directly or indirectly in order to carry out their life processes." It may include river beds and riparian lands such as gravel bars, islands and adjacent lands. Following that, s.35(2) of the Fisheries Act demands that: No person contravenes subsection (1) by causing the alteration, disruption or destruction of fish habitat... If an authorization is provided for activity that may destroy habitat in a way that cannot be mitigated, it triggers the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (DFO, 1998). The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) (1992) not only ensures that there is a review of projects that may cause adverse environmental effects before federal authorities take action, but also promotes communication and coordination between the federal authorities and First Nations. According to C E A A , the environmental effects that must be assessed include any change in, "the current use of lands and resources for traditional purposes by aboriginal persons." Aboriginal knowledge should be considered and affected First Nations and bands should be consulted. The Navigable Waters Protection Act (1985) ensures that any significant works within navigable waters, including the excavation of material from the riverbed, do not interfere with navigation. Significant works in navigable waters require approval by federal authorities and must be consistent with the regulations, plans and conditions set out in the approval. 64 The First Nations role in the authorization of gravel extraction is complex and evolving through court cases and interpretations of the recognition of aboriginal rights and title. First Nations are becoming increasingly involved in the activities that occur within their traditional territories. The First Nations' role in management of the Fraser River, though acknowledged in this thesis, is not studied in-depth. Local governments do not have the same rights as provincial and federal governments or First Nations in regards to river management. Their jurisdiction is limited to that which the province has granted them through the Local Government Act (RSBC, 1996), which is only the management of the surrounding riparian lands. The Local Government Act does not consider gravel extraction a land use, so it cannot be subject to zoning bylaws. However, local governments can indirectly influence gravel extraction by zoning where trucking and processing may occur (Rosenau and Angelo, 2000) and through soil removal bylaws on private lands. There are also other mechanisms through which local governments can influence where extraction takes place, such as designating Environmentally Sensitive Areas and Development Permits. The most significant role that the local governments play in authorizing gravel extraction is in the referral process, in which they are given an opportunity to provide comments to agencies on applications for permits arid licenses. Administration of Gravel Extraction Permits The British Columbia Assets and Land Corporation (BCAL) has regulated Fraser River gravel extraction since 1974 (Weatherly and Church, 1999). With the encouragement of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), B C A L instated a policy that a royalty be paid for every cubic metre of gravel removed from Crown land. DFO hoped this would help control the location and volume of gravel extraction. As of 1980, DFO also initiated its own permitting process restricting gravel extraction to address concerns that the extractions might be adversely affect fish habitat. DFO's permitting process covered extraction that was not subject to BCAL's policy, such as private land and gravel reserves established by the BC Ministry of Transport. In the late 1980's DFO also started to request pre- and post-excavation surveys to verify gravel removal volumes. In the 1990's, a referral process was used to review permit applications since they required authorization from multiple government agencies. Applications were received by the Ministry of Environment, Land and Parks (MoELP) and then forwarded on to the other regulatory agencies for comment, including DFO, the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), B C A L and the BC Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM), as well as local governments and First Nations. This was found to be a time-consuming approach, in that MoELP often'had to wait considerable time before receiving responses from the other agencies. In the gravel extraction permitting referral process, MoELP's Water Branch was responsible for the Water Act and its Fisheries Branch addressed the Fish Protection Act. B C A L was responsible for the Land Act. The Ministry of Transport was occasionally involved when permits were required to construct, use and maintain work in highway right-of-ways. DFO, C C G and M E M held the responsibility for the Fisheries Act, the Navigable Waters Protection Act and the Mines Act, respectively. DFO also has a "no-net-loss" habitat guiding principle from its "Policy for the Management of Fish Habitat" (DFO, 1986) to implement. In addition, DFO sets out strict in-stream work windows to prevent operations when spawning salmon and other aquatic species are most vulnerable. 65 In May of 2001, the Liberal Party of BC won all but two seats in the provincial elections, forming a strong majority government. They restructured the organization and mandates of the provincial ministries, which caused significant changes to some of the regulatory agencies that held responsibilities related to gravel extraction from the Fraser River. In particular, MoELP was split into the Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection (MWLAP) and the Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management (MSRM). During 2001, M S R M had the responsibility of permitting under the Water Act. M W L A P provided recommendations related to s.9 of the British Columbia Water Act, the Fish Protection Act, and s.35(2) of the federal Fisheries Act but was not directly involved in the permitting process. In 2002 another shift in ministerial responsibilities took place after a Core Service Review. B C A L , which was already responsible for Crown tenures, was also given the responsibility of managing water licensing and allocation. It was incorporated as Land and Water BC (LWBC), an agency of M S R M with its own service plan (LWBC, 2004a). L W B C took on the responsibility of both the Water Act and the Land Act. Provincial and federal government agencies started experimented with a one-window approach to gravel permit applications in 2001, to try to make decisions in a more timely fashion (FBC,2001a). M S R M first took the lead in the one-window approach. When L W B C was formed, it took over the lead. It took on a strong leadership role than M S R M by setting gravel extraction authorization objectives with which it encouraged other agencies to be consistent. 5.3. The Fraser River Management Plan Process This section introduces the Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission process (FRMP) which is the case study being used to assess the Council's role in a consensus-based process. The events leading up to the initiation of the process are described and then the structure of FRMP is explained. A brief overview is provided of whom in the Council held what responsibilities for the facilitated process. Then the events of FRMP are recounted, with a description of the two strategies the FRMP committees employed to address interrelated interests in the gravel reach. 5.3.1. Catalyzing Events In 1995, a poorly located gravel extraction site on Foster Bar in the Fraser River gravel reach sparked contention about the impact that gravel extraction has on aquatic habitat. The extraction was situated such that new gravel was not recruited to the site after the extraction. Subsequent readjustment of the sediment reduced the bar's surface elevation, simplified the bar's topology and widened the adjacent channel, resulting in poorer quality habitat (Church et al., 2001; FBC, 2003a). A Fraser River habitat biologist responsible for MoELP's role in gravel extraction permitting initiated discussions on the need for further research to assess the impact of gravel extraction on fish habitat. In 1997 there was a higher than average spring freshet on the Fraser River. Water gages at the Harrison Confluence suggested that a 200-year flood would now be at a higher elevation than the dikes were originally designed for in 1969. The newly calculated flood profile was generally higher than the 1969 profile, with a maximum difference of 1.06 m at the mouth of the Harrison River (Shumuk et al., 2000). Concerns about the flood hazard increased and people looked to gravel extraction to reduce the threat. 66 In the February of 1998, members of the Cheam Indian Band extracted approximately 50,000 cubic metres of gravel from Rosedale Bar. They extracted it from the same location where they had extracted 200,000 cubic metres under a permit two years earlier, but on this occasion they did not have authorization. DFO charged the individuals with harmful alteration, disruption or destruction of fish habitat under the Fisheries Act s. 35(1). The accused argued that they had removed the gravel to reduce the flood risk. The R. v. Quipp Douglas and Douglas (2004) court case ensued. The Fraser River Estuary Management Program and the Fraser Basin Council hosted a Fraser Basin Sand and Gravel Forum and Technical Workshop in April 1998 to address growing concerns. The forum assessed the state of knowledge about fluvial-aquatic interactions in the Fraser River and uncovered many uncertainties. Scientific experts proposed that gravel extraction might have negative impacts on the aquatic habitat of salmon, white sturgeon and other key species, but acknowledged that more studies were needed to confirm this theory. After the Forum, the provincial government and the City of Chilliwack agreed to commission studies of the gravel reach. Dr. Michael Church and a team of researchers at the University of British Columbia began a series of Fraser River Gravel Reach Studies which included a review of historical gravel removal, modelling of the annual sediment budget, study of channel characteristics, instability and morphology, study of temporal and spatial aquatic habitat characteristics and habitat mapping (Church et al., 2005a). DFO and MoELP placed a one-year unofficial moratorium on the removal of gravel from bars, riverbanks, and islands within the Fraser River gravel reach while studies were conducted to verify whether in fact the gravel extraction was negatively impacting aquatic habitat. In 1999 there was another high spring freshet. The City of Chilliwack and Districts of Kent and Hope, along with the BC Association of Aggregate Producers, vocally criticised the unofficial moratorium. Furthermore, Year 2 Gravel Reach Studies presented at a Flood Protection Workshop hosted by the City of Chilliwack in 2000, uncovered a $30 million diking deficiency. The studies concluded that an average of 64,000 cubic metres of gravel entered the gravel reach annually, significantly less than the amount extracted, but the results had a high degree of uncertainty and some of the assumptions required further testing because the studies were at the cutting edge of research on sediment transport within large river systems (Vanderwal, 2002). The regulatory agencies decided to fund further studies and extend the moratorium for another two years, except for an experimental removal of 70,000 cubic metres from Harrison Bar. 5.3.2. Gravel Reach Process Design DFO and MoELP managers recognised that something needed to be done to address the mounting tension around the management of the gravel reach. They envisioned a transparent, participatory process to inform science-based decisions in the management of the reach. In 1999, the Fraser Basin Council was approached to facilitate a multistakeholder process that would "assist decision-making related to in-stream activities in a way that reconciles interrelated issues" (FBC, 2000a). The Council and its predecessor, the Fraser Basin Management Board, had been facilitating intragovernmental discussions around flood hazard management since 1994. (These activities are described in appendix 2.) The process was called the Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission process (abbreviated in this thesis as FRMP), based on the anticipated output. The Council assumed responsibility for facilitating meetings, providing secretariat support, and coordinating the 67 drafting of the management plan (FBC, 2000b). One of the Council's Project Coordinators, referred to in this thesis as Facilitator B, was funded through the DFO's Habitat Conservation and Stewardship Program as a Stewardship Coordinator for the gravel reach. In October 1999 the Council began four months of scoping and planning. The staff designed a consensus-based process that would be inclusive of regulatory authorities, First Nations, industry and stewardship groups in the gravel reach. The concept was broader than DFO and MoELP had originally envisioned. The process structure comprised of a Steering Committee, a Technical Committee and Stakeholder Assemblies, as demonstrated in figure 8 (adapted from FBC, 2000b). Two of the Council's staff members, Facilitator A and Facilitator B, were designated to chair the Steering Committee and the Technical Committee, respectively. The Steering Committee was designed to ensure that all interests were considered, to provide guidance and direction at the policy level and to oversee the development of the plan (FBC, 2000b). It would direct the Technical Committee, which was responsible for drafting the plan. The Technical Committee would propose flood protection-related management criteria within the plan by integrating information from commissioned technical studies and feedback gathered from the Stakeholder Assembly. The Stakeholder Assembly would present information to the broader public and provide all interested people with an opportunity to have input into the objectives and content of the management plan. Once a draft of the plan was produced, the Stakeholder Assembly would be given a chance to review and comment on it. By February 2000, the Council had identified potential process participants and conducted individual interviews. An objective of the Steering Committee member selection process, as strongly encouraged by the convenors, was to balance the number of representatives from all interest groups while limiting the overall number of committee members. Groups without direct representation at the Steering Committee could be represented at the Stakeholder Assemblies. The Council's staff and the convenors initially established a six-member Steering Committee composed of managers from the three main regulatory agencies, a representative of the local government, one for navigation and one for conservation. First Nations communities situated along the gravel reach were invited to select a representative. The Technical Committee was composed of scientists and engineers from the regulatory agencies and local governments, as well a few independent scientists. 68 f Figure 8. Structure of the Fraser River Management Plan Process Steering Commitee Technical Committee A V " A Fraser Basin Council Facilitators > Stakeholder Assembly Fraser Basin Council Directors 5.3.3. Roles and Responsibilities within FRMP There were many roles played in FRMP, both at the Council-level and at the facilitated process-level. Each of them has been labelled consistently so that it is clear who is being discussed. The Council's facilitation of FRMP involved: • the facilitating institution Board of Directors Chair, or "Chair"; • the facilitating institution Board of Directors members, or "Directors"; • the facilitating institution Director's constituencies (institution members), or "parallel organizations"; • the facilitating institution staff, or "staff; • the facilitated process facilitators (a subset of the facilitating institution staff), or "facilitators"3; • a professional facilitator, as a "consultant"; • the facilitated process participants, or "committee members"; • the facilitated process participants with regulatory authority, or "regulatory agency representatives"; • the organizations that initiated the facilitated process (a sub-set of regulatory agency representatives), or "convenors"; and, • the facilitated process participants' stakeholder groups, or "constituencies." 3 There is one exception to this label. Steering and Technical Committee members referred to the Council's facilitators as "chairs." The quotes by interviewees in Chapter 6 have not been modified to reflect the "facilitators" label. 69 By distinguishing the roles that each of these actors played in FRMP, one can better assess where various responsibilities lay. The broad categories of tasks in a facilitated process that are outlined by Griggs (2003a) in table 1 aid in identifying who did what. This task is further informed by Moore's (2003) "Twelve Stages of Mediator Moves". Information on each actor's roles and responsibilities was gathered during interviews with Council facilitators and Directors, and FRMP convenors. Most of the Council's responsibilities in FRMP were given to the Council staff who chaired the Steering and Technical Committees, referred to in this thesis as Facilitators A , B and C. However, these staff members received support from other Council staff. Council Directors from the Fraser Valley were consulted at the beginning of FRMP and some individual Directors chose to become more engaged at the end, but the Directors were generally not involved directly in FRMP. Facilitator A explained that they only would have been drawn into the process i f something had gone wrong. Facilitator B led the scoping and assessment. He collected information on the relevant issues, the dynamics of the stakeholders and the regulatory context, with some assistance from Facilitator B and the Executive Director. They identified and contacted key stakeholders. The convenors, DFO and MoELP, along with B C A L , were also involved at this stage. They provided input as to whom they wanted involved and what the objectives of the process should be. The Council's Regional Coordinator and Directors in the Fraser Valley were consulted as to who was important to invite. Facilitators A and B brought key stakeholders together to initiate negotiations. The process participants were then included in a reassessment of the membership of the committees. The facilitators had the primary responsibility of clarifying the objectives and setting the terms of reference. Topic areas were delimited based on the advice of the convenors and preliminary discussions among the process participants. Then they were reviewed once the committees convened. The conceptual design for the process arose out of a funding proposal that one of the Council staff had put forward to DFO. The process design was further articulated by Facilitator B, with the support of the Executive Director. Facilitator B also received advice from other staff and individual Directors. The participants were guided by the facilitators to reach agreement on a set of process principles. The facilitators recommended that the committees adopt consensus to reach agreement, in line with the Council's approach. Once the process design was drafted, the Steering Committee reviewed, revised, and accepted it. Responsibility for endorsement of the objectives and the agenda was split between the Directors, convenors and process participants. The Steering Committee members had to reach agreement first, which entailed consulting with their constituencies. Within the proposed agreement was a recommended sequence of events. The proposal was brought to a Board of Directors meeting and the Directors agreed to the terms of reference and broad objectives. The objectives were also presented at a Stakeholder Assembly for feedback from the broader public. Facilitator A facilitated the Steering Committee for the first year and Facilitator B facilitated the Technical Committee. They were responsible for assisting the committees in at-the-table tasks such as clarifying communications, building trust, establishing a positive tone for dialogue, and exploring interests. Facilitator B also dealt with day-to-day activities away from the table, such 70 V as keeping in contact with the participants, coordinating meetings and writing reports. He gathered studies and other technical material and disseminated them to the group. Whenever Facilitators A or B required direction, they received support from the Executive Director and, in the early stages of the process, a consultant. Facilitator A requested professional facilitation for the Stakeholder Assemblies, so a consultant known as a talented local facilitator was brought in. The consultant coached Facilitators A and B to prepare for the Stakeholder Assemblies: He conducted the lead facilitation of the Stakeholder Assemblies while the Council's facilitators led some smaller break-out groups. The Council's Chair played a role in the process. She introduced the Council at the Stakeholder Assemblies to set the scene on why the Council was involved and why it was important. The Executive Director played less of a role until he took on the Chair's role in the process when she left a year later. The Stakeholder Assembly attendees advised the Steering Committee and facilitators on the objectives of the process, their interests in the gravel reach and how the Steering Committee might measure progress. The Council's Regional Coordinator had only minor involvement in the Stakeholder Assemblies. Directors from the area were invited and some of them attended, but they did not play an active role. In following the Council's own guidelines, during the facilitated session, its facilitators were not permitted to get involved directly in policy making or regulatory tasks. The document "Roles for the Council" (FBC, 2000c) articulates that it would be inappropriate for the Council to take on tasks such as "applying for, holding, or implementing permits", "advocacy of a position" (specifically providing the example of promoting the adoption and/or implementation of a specific position such as gravel removal for maintaining flood hazard protection in the Fraser Valley) and "regulator". The Executive Director became involved as chair of the Steering Committee, as Facilitator C, when the Council recognised the high-profile nature of FRMP. At that time MoELP began to take a greater lead of the Steering Committee because it was interested in ensuring that a process was put in place to deal responsibly with gravel extraction before the moratorium was lifted. The MoELP representative was responsible for developing a work plan and implementation guidebook. In the later part of FRMP, a L W B C took over this lead role. Facilitator B continued to coordinate activities and develop the written agreements for the group. There was no formal evaluation or follow-up to the process. The Steering Committee did informally review its progress on a continual basis and changes were made along the way. The process unofficially disbanded when another process got underway so the participants never met together again to conduct a follow-up. The facilitators did keep in contact with many of the participants and continued to be involved in the issue through the other process. 5.3.4. Developing a Management Plan (2000-2001) The first FRMP Steering Committee meeting occurred in April 2000. The committee agreed to formulate a Draft Interim Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission that would tackle fish and fish habitat protection, flood and erosion hazards, First Nations interests, navigation, recreation, industry and other related land and resource use issues within the gravel reach (FBC, 2000a). The participants, with support from the Council, had broadened the scope proposed by the convenors beyond in-stream activities (such as dike construction, rock placement, gravel removal and shifting and in-river infrastructure) to more comprehensive river management, 71 including the potential development of a river basin authority that would amalgamate the responsibilities of multiple agencies into a "one-window" approach. The Steering Committee's broad vision was (FBC, 2001a): A healthy river that supports fish and aquatic habitat as well as spiritual and traditional values; safe communities that manage their exposure to flood and erosion risks; and vibrant local economies that are supported by the sustainable resources provided by the river. The FRMP Steering Committee also agreed to nine guiding principles (FBC, 2000b): • Open and Transparent: A l l activities and decision-making are conducted in an open and transparent manner. A l l participants will share information and make it available to the planning process. • Cooperative: A l l participants will work together and maintain a forward-looking approach. • Solution-Oriented: Participants will seek to resolve issues. . • Active Participation: Participants will attend scheduled meetings, read materials and communicate to peers. • Informed: Analysis and decision-making are based on the best available scientific data, local and traditional knowledge. • Respect: Participants respect the right of others to hold and express their opinions, values and beliefs. • Consensus: Agreement will be sought through mutual understanding and consensus. • Existing rights: A l l existing rights, legislation, agreements and obligations are recognised. • Aboriginal Rights and Title: The participation of First Nations in the planning process will be without prejudice to Aboriginal Rights and Title. While the Steering Committee finalized its terms of reference in June, it welcomed two representatives designated by the local governments and a First Nations observer. The committee began to discuss substantive issues but process design and objectives were still not settled. A Steering Committee member made an observation that (FBC, 2000c): , We need to make sure that we explain more explicitly what we mean by the "Management Plan." Another committee member questioned whether the Steering Committee would manage the process for handling applications during the implementation stage or whether it would be handled externally by existing agencies. Implementation approaches were discussed at length but not resolved. The first Stakeholder Assembly was intended for wider stakeholder groups and the public to provide feedback to the Steering Committee on objectives, terms of reference for the management plan and management options. The Council published "Instream: Newsletter for the Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission" (FBC, 2000a) to announce the Stakeholder Assembly and inform the public on the proposed decision-making process and next steps in developing the plan. In many cases, this was the first that people had heard about the Fraser Basin Council or FRMP. Facilitator B distributed a discussion paper to the invited delegates, including a diagram of how applications for in-stream activities could potentially be handled with the management plan. The Council decided that facilitating the large Stakeholder Assembly 72 required different skills than its facilitators had, so it solicited a professional facilitator to lead the event. Iona Campagnolo, the Council's charismatic Chair, introduced the event. The event included presentations and breakout groups in order to disseminate information, scope for interest groups and record their various interests. During the event stakeholder groups requested that the Steering Committee membership become more reflective of the composition of the Stakeholder Assembly, for example, by including recreational interests. The First Nations also requested that they participate with three seats, representing the upper, mid and lower sections of the Lower Fraser River. Between June and October the FRMP Steering and Technical Committees prepared the "Draft Interim Management Plan." Council staff and technical experts were given a tour of flood and erosion risks by representatives of the Seabird Island Band and the District of Kent (FBC, 2000b). The Council published the second "Instream" newsletter (FBC, 2000b), updating the public on the FRMP committees' progress, the Gravel Reach Studies and next steps. The first iteration of the "Draft Interim Management Plan" was then distributed to the Stakeholder Assembly members for review and feedback. The Technical Committee noted where it had not reached agreement on certain proposals. As a result of pressure to make progress on gravel extraction, the management plan was focused on selecting sites for gravel extraction, rather than staying consistent with the broader objective of a comprehensive river management plan. A review of watershed management organizations was presented to the Steering Committee, but the discussions on the design of a river basin authority were never completed. In November the Steering Committee membership was strengthened in response to requests made at the Stakeholder Assemblies. The new members included representatives for Scott Paper, Aggregated Producers of BC, Storlo Nation, Seabird Island Band, Sumas First Nation, and MoELP. Even so, requests were made to expand the committee further to include recreational fishing and navigation representatives, which was done by the following meeting (FBC, 2000d). The final 2000 committee membership is shown in table 6 (adapted from FBC, 2000b). The Steering Committee went through growing pains. There were still several gaps in the draft plan; members felt that the scope and strategies needed to be more clearly defined and the section on proposed outcomes of the plan and its implementation needed to be completed. The Council facilitators were asked to clarify how the criteria and requirements would be used to make decisions and how recommended actions would follow from the plan. The members also wanted to clarify the committee roles and improve linkages between the committee members and their constituencies. Two issues were raised that would come back to trouble FRMP. First, two members recommended that the FRMP committees should identify specific gravel extraction sites to put up for tender, as had been done on the Vedder River for several years, rather than just recommending criteria for extraction proponents to consider when making their own applications. The regulatory agencies rejected the suggestion because the Fraser River is a mixture of crown land, private and First Nations property, unlike the Vedder which is owned by BC Assets and Land Corporation (FBC, 2000d). Secondly, committee members recommended that a "lead agency" should be given the responsibility of ensuring that implementation would progress as expected, but no regulatory agency agreed to take on the role because it was perceived to be outside of each of their mandates. 73 Table 6. FRMP Committee Members as of November 2000 Steering Committee Technical Committee Perspective Organization Perspective Organization Land and resource B C A L Land and resource B C A L use use Flood protection District of Kent Flood protection District of Kent and local government issues F V R D City of Chilliwack District of Hope Flood protection and fish habitat MoELP (x 2) Flood protection and fish habitat MoELP (x 2) Fish habitat DFO Fish habitat DFO (x 2) Conservation Central Valley Naturalists Forestry and land use Ministry of Forests Aggregate industry BC Association of Aggregate Producers River morphology and sedimentation U B C Geography Industry and Scott Paper Navigation Canadian Coast Guard navigation Council of Marine Engineers First Nations St6:lo Nation First Nations St6:16 Nation Seabird Island Band Sumas First Nation Recreation Fraser Valley Salmon Society Recreation BC Parks Chair, Facilitator A Fraser Basin Council Chair, Facilitator B Fraser Basin Council In January 2001, the First Nations representatives chose to leave the FRMP process. The reasons they cited were (FBC, 2001): 1. The lack of acknowledgement of First Nations rights to the gravel resource 2. The lack of First Nations participation in the economic benefits associated with the gravel resource 3. The addition of members to the Steering Committee, which would dilute First Nations participation The First Nations continued to be involved in the conflict outside of FRMP and retained interest in incorporating the matter of gravel royalties in their treaty process. The Chair of the Steering Committee, Facilitator A , stepped down in January. He was replaced by Facilitator C, Executive Director of the Fraser Basin Council. A revised "Draft Interim Management Plan" was circulated later that month. The contents included an overview of the management issues, a description of the various users and jurisdictions in the gravel reach, management criteria, strategies and indicators, information tools and a recommended implementation mechanism. The process focussed on establishing criteria for the regulatory agencies to use in identifying gravel extraction applications at sites which would meet multiple objectives. A measure of agreement had been reached between the committee members on criteria for evaluating gravel extraction applications, which included strategies and indicators on "flood and erosion protection", "fish, wildlife and aquatic habitat", "First Nations interests", 74 "gravel resource", "outdoor recreation and tourism", "learning and information sharing" and "navigation" (FBC, 2001a). Regulatory agency representatives committed to making decisions about reach-wide strategies in line with the plan's recommendations. Many of the Steering Committee participants believed that opportunities had been created for several permits under the plan's criteria. ' DFO and MoELP lifted the moratorium after three years of suspending gravel removals and initiated a two-year Test Implementation phase of the management plan. MoELP received extraction permit applications under the Water Act and through the referral process forwarded them on to DFO, B C A L , M E M and .local governments (FBC, 2001a). The regulatory agencies considered objectives and non-regulatory aspects identified in the "Draft Interim Management Plan" in their review. However, they were not bound to the recommendations, as they were required to conduct "unfettered decision-making." The Council suggested that the Stakeholder Assembly should review the proposals against the management plan before the regulatory agencies made their final approvals. The agencies felt that there was insufficient time before the end of the in-stream work window, so the Stakeholder Assembly was postponed. They agreed to conduct Stakeholder Assembly consultation in subsequent years and recommended that application deadlines for the following year occur that summer to allow time to do so. As a result of the review process two of nine applications were approved, conditional upon the outcome of First Nations consultation (FBC, 2001 e). Final approval was given to only one application of 20,000 cubic metres at Hamilton Bar. DFO had applied the "Draft Interim Management Plan" criteria for site selection differently than proponents had intended and anticipated (Vanderwal, 2002). DFO defended its decision by explaining that eight applications had to be rejected due to lack of information, First Nations or fish habitat concerns, lack of positive impacts on flood, erosion or navigation issues or technical infeasibility (FBC, 2001 e). Residents of the Fraser Valley were frustrated that significant quantities of gravel were not removed in areas of increased flood risk (FBC, 2001c). In reaction, some municipal officials made phone calls and went to Ottawa to complain to authorities in the federal government about the limited authorization. With the political pressure applied, two additional applications were considered further. One application of 10,000 cubic metres was accepted at the last minute. Steering Committee members felt that there had been too late a deadline for application submissions and too limited a review period. Not only did the Steering Committee and Stakeholder Assembly not have time to provide input, but some projects that would have been authorized did not make it through the review process before the end of the work window. Another weakness was that applications insufficiently addressed the objectives of the draft plan. The committee members felt that they needed leadership from one agency to provide application guidance, a "one-window" approach and coordinated review of applications. The Steering Committee decided to test out the suggestion made earlier to identify specific sites that met their criteria. The Technical Committee was requested to craft a Proactive Strategy which would define the location, timing and quantity for potential gravel removals to make the applications more successful at advancing the draft plan objectives, develop options to address flood and erosion hazards for high priority sections of the river and allow more time for decision-making and for businesses to conduct the approved work (FBC, 2001c). The April Stakeholder Assembly, which was designed to share the results of the Year 3 Gravel Reach Studies and debrief on the decision-making process, was cancelled because the committees were not ready 75 with the revised approach for the coming year (FBC, 2001 d). Instead, they held a joint Steering-Technical Committee meeting. 5.3.5. Developing A Proactive Strategy (2001-2002) The FRMP Committees maintained the "Draft Interim Management Plan" while creating a "Proactive Strategy for 2002/2003" to improve on what they had learned during the first Test Implementation phase. In an effort to acquire a lead agency and test the "one-window" approach to applications, the Steering Committee asked MoELP to take on the responsibility of leading further development, implementation and monitoring the plan. MoELP began to develop a "Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission Implementation Plan" (MSRM, 2001) and "Application Guidebook" (MSRM, 2001). That task was taken over by M S R M after government restructuring as a result of the BC Liberal Party coming to power in May. A third "Instream" newsletter (FBC, 2001c) updated the public on the Year 3 Gravel Reach Studies. Certain interest groups began to form local coalitions in response to frustrated feelings that FRMP was simply an unnecessary bureaucratic hurdle. The first coalition arose between the District of Kent and the Seabird Island Band when frustration with the progression of FRMP sparked them to politically advocate their shared interest in gravel removal as a method to reduce flood potential. The City of Chilliwack and Skway, antagonistic in the preceding decades, made an agreement in which Chilliwack would assist in funding $10 million worth of dikes on Skway land in return for setting aside a portion of the 600 acres of reserve for city expansion (Morry, 2001) . The FRMP committees learned of revisions that had been made to previous Gravel Reach Studies. The estimated annual deposition of sediment in the gravel reach had been increased significantly, from 64,000 to 285,000 cubic metres. A study of dike construction and revision requirements conducted by Northwest Hydraulic Consultants Ltd. indicated that there was approximately $17.5 million worth of work required, not $30 million, of which $11.5 million of that work was situated on reserves (Vanderwal, 2002). In the summer M S R M distributed the draft "Implementation Plan" and "Application Guidebook" to Steering Committee members for review and the Technical Committee presented a draft of the "Proactive Strategy." The "Proactive Strategy" recommended a target of 350,000 cubic metres of gravel be extracted to address sediment accumulation, to take into account the estimated average inputs of 285,000 cubic metres per annum and experience in other river systems (Vanderwal, 2002) . It provided guidelines for conducting gravel extraction, including detailed in-stream work windows and extraction that mimicked natural river patterns. It provided ratings for six potential gravel removal sites and tentatively suggested additional locations for bar edge scalping and riffle dredging. By emphasizing increased human safety at proposed extraction sites rather than economic returns, certain fisheries-related regulatory agency representatives were more comfortable associating themselves with the document. Still, it was a legislative challenge for DFO to endorse the strategy since it does not officially have a policy of human safety over fish health. In August and September feedback was solicited from First Nations and local government on they "Proactive Strategy" and site surveys were conducted. The Steering Committee and Technical Committee held a joint meeting in September. Then in October the third Stakeholder Assembly (this time called a Community Forum) took place to provide an update on the continuing Gravel Reach Studies and discuss the "Proactive Strategy." The "Proactive Strategy" (FBC, 2001b), 76 "Implementation Plan 2001-2002" (MSRM, 2001), "Application Guidebook" (MSRM, 2001), and BC Assets and Land Corporation's "Invitation to Tender Package" (BCAL, 2001) information packagebecamepublicly accessible. The regulatory agencies began accepting applications for 2002 extractions in October and November. At the same time M W L A P began a more detailed study and mapping of traditional First Nations' fishing sites. An Approving Agency Review Committee (AARC) outside of the FRMP process, chaired by M S R M and made up strictly of decision-makers, including DFO, M W L A P , B C A L and M E M , evaluated the applications in an effort to implement the one-window approach. Managers of all five agencies, supported by their technical experts, had to sign for gravel extraction authorizations to be provided. In December, two sites from the "Proactive Strategy" (at Hamilton and Harrison Bars) were selected as good candidates for removal during the January to March work window, conditional upon the results of First Nations consultation, with the potential for additional sites to be approved for an August-September window. DFO explained that it did not approve the other four sites because ongoing studies on aquatic habitat and river gravel dynamics had to be completed before they could approve a greater volume of gravel extraction. In February, FRMP began to undertake a new "Proactive Strategy for 2002-2003." The Steering Committee also began to discuss institutional mechanisms for long term implementation of the management plan (FBC, 2002a). Chief Roy Mussell of the Skwah Band, who is also the Vice-Chair of the Fraser Basin Council, presented the Steering Committee with his idea of creating a cooperative management body which would involve more First Nations in the discussions around river management. The body, only made up of stakeholders with authority, namely the federal and provincial agencies and First Nations with whom the governments would be required to consult, would meet to make joint decisions on a broad set of gravel reach management projects. Chief Mussell argued that, "we have made good advances scientifically and technically, but until we have also made advances in cultural relations, we will continue to have difficulties" (FBC, 2003g). His proposal intended to address First Nations rights and title issues directly. The Steering Committee met to discuss this idea of a cooperative management mechanism and members researched models of cooperative management on into the summer. Meanwhile, concerns about First Nations traditional fishing sites prevented gravel extraction which had already been authorized by the provincial government at Hamilton and Harrison Bars. DFO was informed by its lawyers that under C E A A it still had the duty to assess "the current use of lands and resources for traditional purposes by aboriginal persons" before authorizing permits at the two sites (Canada, 2000; Vanderwal, 2002). Meetings took place to see i f the issues could be resolved. At Hamilton Bar, the affected First Nation agreed to remove its objections to the application on a one-time basis, in order to reduce the flood hazard. By the time the site was approved, less than half of the approved volume was removed before the end of the work window (FBC, 2003f). At Harrison Bar, no agreement was reached with the affected First Nation because they were not satified with the degree of recognition of their own interests (Vanderwal, 2002). Gravel extraction proponents argued that it was as though the moratorium was never lifted, since only 10,000 cubic metres were extracted in 2002. Exasperated local politicians took the issues into their own hands. While in the House of Commons, an MP called on the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to allow gravel extractions to proceed, threatening to take immediate action i f the Minister continued to "allow his inaction to threaten thousands of people..." (McNally, 2002). In June 2002 there was a flood warning posted by the City of Chilliwack, with particular concern about a breach in one spot along the 77 dike. Frustrated with the inaction on flood prevention projects, a coalition initiated by the City of Chilliwack Mayor and Councillor, District of Kent Mayor and representatives from Seabird Island, Soowahlie, Chehalis, Chewathil, Squiala and Skowlitz bands intended to challenge the power of the provincial and federal governments in managing the Fraser River (Morry, 2002a). The parties all agreed that they, as locals, should be given the power to make decisions on diverse river management issues by consensus. They intended to develop a working document to address fish and wildlife habitat, fishing issues, flood management, erosion, gravel removal, community development, agricultural waste management, water quality and ecotourism (Morry, 2002a). Their progress was reported to the FRMP Steering Committee. This coalition, however, was unable to sign off an official agreement to work together, an event made infamous by a "non-signing ceremony," in which the First Nations members could not sign the agreement out of respect for the Cheam Chief, June Quipp, who at the last minute refused to do so. A strong partnership was formed between Chilliwack, the Skway, Skwah, Squiala and Kwaw Kwaw A Pilt Nations to lobby the federal government to take more rapid action in addressing the flood hazard (Morry, 2002a). Local Members of the Legislative Assembly hosted Minister Stan Hagan, Minister of Sustainable Resource Management, and Minister Joyce Murray, Minister of Water, Land and Air Protection, on tours of potential flood sites that concerned their communities (Morry, 2002b). The politicians also used the media to distribute their message. These political pressures, though outside of the FRMP process, had a significant impact on the regulatory agencies' activities. As discussed earlier in the chapter, L W B C became responsible for both the Land Act and the Water Act in 2002 (LWBC, 2004a). L W B C took over from M S R M as the lead agency on the FRMP plans. Since one of LWBC's imperatives was to generate revenue for the province in an environmentally and economically sustainable manner through gravel extraction royalties, it took a strong leadership role and proactively encouraged other regulatory agencies to authorize larger volumes of gravel extraction. In the summer of 2002, the Council's Directors began to get more involved in the gravel reach issues than they had in the preceding three years. At the June Board of Directors meeting, three of the Directors (Chief Mussell and representatives of DFO and M S R M , LWBC's parent organization), and two of the staff met to decide whether to recommend that the cooperative management concept be discussed further. They knew that a senior manager at L W B C already had a mandate from his CEO and VP Operations to explore such approaches (FBC, 2002b). By the fall of 2002, FRMP had produced a "Proactive Strategy for 2002/2003" which identified five potential gravel extraction sites. With that task completed, it was decided that a Collaborative Management Group (CMG) would meet separately and report back to the FRMP Committees from time to time. However, in January the Steering Committee and Technical Committee of FRMP unofficially disbanded as the regulatory agency representatives shifted over to the C M G with the expectation that the new process would improve on the weaknesses of its predecessor. Since there was no closure, some FRMP members felt uncertain as to whether the process was going to pick up again at a later date; others were disappointed in what they saw as the termination of the process. DFO felt that it was finally making progress in First Nations consultations, so some of its staff were disappointed that they were not given a further opportunity to follow through on the FRMP management plan and proactive strategy. The Fraser Basin Council continued to assist the parties in reaching agreement on management of the gravel 78 reach by serving as an "impartial chair and secretariat on an interim basis, until such time as the C M G establishes a more formal governance structure" (FBC, 2003h). A Steering Committee member shared his reflections on FRMP with his fellow committee members near the end of the process (FBC, 2002b). He felt that the scope of the process should have been expanded to deal with broader issues, such as more general flood protection. He was pleased that discussions with the First Nations were beginning to broaden the scope. He questioned how much progress FRMP had made to date on the larger problems that have to be faced in the Fraser River. He felt that the function of the Steering Committee needed to be reviewed in terms of its focus on process as opposed to outputs. 5.4. Summary The Fraser Basin Council facilitated a consensus-based, multi-stakeholder process, referred to as FRMP, to undertake two strategies to address the management of the Fraser River gravel reach. The Council brought its vision for social, economic and environmental sustainability of the Fraser Basin to its facilitation of FRMP. Participants started out with high expectations of FRMP. The process was designed be representative of interests, but it took the Steering Committee a while to agree on an interpretation of how broad the representation should be, losing First Nations participation in the process. External factors such as conflicting mandates of the regulators in the gravel reach and gradual uptake of developments in the duty to consult with First Nations made it more difficult for FRMP to meet those initial expectations. While the FRMP committees reached agreement internally, FRMP was still criticized by external individuals who did not observe the type or rate of progress they expected. A sense of urgency in dealing with the flood hazard pushed the issue of gravel extraction to the fore, while other considerations that were not as politically driven were lost. The FRMP committees were successful in producing two documents address gravel extraction in the reach, the "Draft Interim Management Plan" (FBC, 2001a) and the "Proactive Strategy" (FBC, 2001b). These documents presented a broad cross-section of stakeholder interests and developed recommendations for mutually-beneficial solutions. In the following chapter, FRMP will be assessed using performance measures developed in chapter 3. The role of the Council as the facilitator of FRMP will be investigated in chapter 7. 79 6. PARTICIPANTS'ASSESSMENT OF THE FRASER RIVER MANAGEMENT PLAN PROCESS This chapter reviews the assessment of the Fraser River Management Plan: Hope to Mission process (FRMP) by interviewed participants, in their own words. It is designed to be descriptive. An attempt has been made to do the least filtering as possible of the responses, aside from the obviously significant filter of the framework on which questions were based. The next chapter builds on the role of the Council in FRMP, which is first touched on in the Agreement on the Facilitator section of this chapter. For the participants' assessment, the responses of eleven Steering Committee members (five of whom represented regulatory agencies), four Technical Committee members, two Council facilitators and one Council Director were compiled. They were not all asked the same set of questions, so in the discussions under each of the criteria importance is place on the relative number of positive, mixed or negative views and the issues themselves, hot the absolute numbers. In cases in which all of the interviewees responded or a large proportion of them volunteered statements, it has been noted. 6.1. Focus of the Participants' Assessment Analysis 6.1.1. Remarks on FRMP-Related Processes Outside of Study Timeline This research is confined to the period during which FRMP was taking.place, between October 1999 and December 2003. Several of the individuals interviewed have also participated in or observed subsequent processes and the evolution of the Fraser Basin Council's role in them. Thus, several of them responded to questions by discussing issues that took place during the Collaborative Management Group process or other incidents after the study period. Those comments have been omitted from the participants' assessment of FRMP, but would be interesting topics of discussion in other studies. 6.1.2. Externalities Embedded in the Assessment of FRMP It can be easy to make the mistake of blaming weaknesses in a process on the facilitator, but in reality there can be many externalities or responsibilities of the participants that cause a breakdown for which one cannot fault the facilitator. The fact that there wasn't clear, consistent and quick... implementation of the work was viewed by some as a problem for the Fraser Basin's credibility and in part that comes from a misunderstanding of what a facilitator is. You know, i f a process breaks down, it is not necessarily at the feet of the facilitator.... From my perspective, where the recommendations... were clearly part of something that the Fraser Basin Council could do, they have done it. (15) There were a few external factors discussed frequently by the interviewees for which the Fraser Basin Council and its facilitators cannot be held responsible. For the purposes of this assessment, the following aspects have been designated as externalities: 1. Jurisdictional disagreements on river management issues, for which the Fraser Basin Council has no authority to delegate a leader 2. Internal conflict the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) faces in authorizing in-stream activities for human safety, in contrast to its "fish first" mandate 80 3. Challenges in addressing the evolving requirements and complexities of First Nations consultation 4. Historic conflicts brought to the fore by a concurrent court case between DFO and Cheam Band members 6.2. Agreement on the Facilitator There were four main questions asked of the interviewees to get at the criterion of Agreement on the Facilitator: Why might the Council have been a good'entity to take on the facilitation of FRMP? Was the role of the Council clear? Did you agree with the Council's selection of facilitators? How objective did you find the facilitation? The first question received a diversity of responses that are grouped into themes. Most Committee members (CMs) 4 were generally positive about the Council as the facilitator of FRMP. There were a few specific issues that arose, particularly regarding the Council's lack of authority to implement the recommendations and the lack of assertiveness of two of the individual facilitators. Two CMs were quite critical of the Council, as they felt that it had a bias in its facilitation, and two more held some reservations. 6.2.1. Why was the Council a good choice, or not, as facilitator? A l l interviewees were asked why the Fraser Basin Council may or may not have been a good entity to take on the facilitation. There were highly positive responses from the majority of interviewees, but a few CMs had considerable concerns which will be identified throughout the section. Themes that came out relating to why the Council was (or in some cases was not) felt to be a good choice include its principles of advocating sustainability and addressing interjurisdictional issues, being inclusive and collaborative, its perceived qualities as an independent, impartial or neutral third party, the value of the people associated with it, its social network with linkages to agencies and interest-groups participating in FRMP, its pre-existing reputation and its ability to attract the right people to the table. Also, it was able to provide additional value through its role as an educator and ability to pool resources to manage the process and funding studies. Principles of the Council In contrast to the approach of many facilitators, the Council actually has a very strong agenda that shapes all processes it gets involved in. One of the facilitators acknowledged this: I think obviously we had an agenda there... We wanted a solution that was consistent with sustainability and that's why we were brought in. (12) The facilitators and the Council Directors interviewed discussed how the Fraser Basin Council's principles and vision were consistent with what people wanted to achieve in FRMP. It was "a natural" for the Council because FRMP addressed an interjurisdictional issue which affected the sustainability of the Fraser Basin. Eight of the CMs explained that the Council's focus on sustainability and appreciation for interjurisdictional challenges fit well with FRMP. Three CMs mentioned that the Council's broad perspective was constructive during FRMP. In addition, one C M and a facilitator pointed out that the Council's principle of "adaptive approaches" was helpful in FRMP, where flexibility had to be built into the process in order to be successful. 4 For brevity, the acronym S C M is used to refer to a FRMP Steering Committee member and T C M is used for a Technical Committee member. When referring to individuals of both groups, the acronym CMs for Committee members is used. 81 The Fraser Basin Council was set up under principles and a vision that sort of would fit with what we were hoping to achieve. (19) The Council's vested interest in achieving sustainability was not disparaged by any of the interviewees. One C M expressed his comfort with it, since he felt it had a clear set of goals and objectives around sustainability. [The Council] are in kind of a unique position because in many facilitated exercises you're finding a neutral, objective facilitator who really is not vested in the outcome... I think what is kind of unique in terms of the Fraser Basin's work is that they very clearly have a set of goals and objectives and a vision for the Fraser Basin area and it's around the whole idea of sustainability... so they are facilitators that very clearly have a purpose and a direction in mind. (15) In spite of the Council's vested interest, many of the interviewees still perceived the Council as a neutral or impartial (terms they tended to use interchangeably) third party. Six CMs and two facilitators stated that this was a strength of having the Council involved. I think their [the Council's] strongest point is that they're a neutral third party... (17) .. .having a kind of a value-neutral group like that, facilitating the process and trying to keep things fair, was really useful... (5) One C M , however, felt that the Council was not neutral because its funding comes in part from local communities. .. .they are beholden to the municipalities.. .they are not a neutral party. People out in the public understand that. Some very high-level individuals understand it. They know that Fraser Basin Council's pay check comes from the local communities... (18)' A frequently mentioned reason why the Council was considered a good choice as facilitator was its perseverance in trying to be inclusive of all the interested parties. Nine CMs, a facilitator and a Director volunteered that they felt the Council made a concerted effort to establish an inclusive process. In addition to this, there were several comments about the Council fostering a collaborative, open and transparent process. .. .1 think they [the Council] did a wonderful job of sort of reaching out and finding all of the concerned parties out there, and secondly, bringing them all to the table. It's a huge undertaking... (4) Six CMs discussed that having an independent third party, which they viewed the Council to be, as the facilitator was important. Two of those CMs stated having the Council at "arm's length" from all orders of government helped to keep the process fair, but one gave the caveat that he felt the Council was still being pushed by its funders in local government to make things happen. I think the most important thing was an independent third party. I think that's really the key element of their [the Council's] involvement... they can talk to anybody and they're not going to be accused of, "Oh well, you've already made up your mind." or, "You're just a mouthpiece for the federal government." (17) 82 Value of the People Involved A number of CMs acknowledged value in being connected to the staff, Chairs and Directors of the Council, even though there was almost no interaction with Directors during FRMP. I don't know who else would be out there with the kinds of talent they've assembled there. (4) The value of the Board of Directors was repeatedly mentioned by a Director, a facilitator and one C M , who discussed how it was representative of all four orders of government, providing support and advice when needed and demonstrating how consensus can work between the different interests. I think the Council is seen to be outside the normal commercial facilitation... It had access to decision-makers at all four levels of government, which no one else had.... It has a different standing overall than anyone who could be either inside government or as a commercial facilitator... (2) They [the Council] are everybody, which is so great. So the province can sit at the table and the feds can sit at the table, even i f they're having a fighting match somewhere else, and the municipalities and everybody sits at that table... they have a thirty-five member Board, which is, from a business standpoint, totally not strong, because how could anybody reach a decision, but i f everyone's committed to a consensual movement, it's like, all those groups are listening and talking, so it's got to work.... I think most people would say, "Oh wow, I didn't think the three levels of government ever agreed on anything. First Nations are there too. Holy cow, I'm impressed." (17) When CMs were asked i f any of the Directors intervened directly in FRMP at any point, the only individual mentioned was Roy Mussell, who had made presentations to the Steering Committee about setting up an alternate process with greater First Nations involvement towards the end of FRMP. However, behind the scenes the Directors may have had more influence than the CMs knew about, as one facilitator explained. I think the Directors for the most part are really good. They understand and work really well with my staff and are really supportive because they recognise that we're in a daily grind and they're there to open doors, give advice and help to take over. (12) Four CMs, as well as the facilitators and Directors, mentioned the significance of having Iona Campagnolo as the Council Chair at that time. The fact that it had had a fairly high profile leader at that point, it was Iona Campagnolo; that gave a lot of credibility to the Fraser Basin Council. (5) Several of the regulator CMs had superiors that sat on the Council as Directors, and the Council had linkages with many interest groups as well. Seven interviewees discussed the connections between the Council Board of Directors and entities involved in FRMP. Positive aspects of the connections, noted by one Director, two facilitators and two CMs, were that (1) the Council is already in touch with interest groups to probe for potential participants and communicate progress, (2) the facilitator did not need to spend as much time upfront building relationships and learning what "strings you can pull", (3) since FRMP had participants from parallel 83 organizations to the Council's membership, trust was developed more quickly and (4) the facilitators had access to decision-makers at all levels of government. This last aspect was a critical one in the mind of one regulator C M , who felt that the connection between the individual facilitator and his superior on the Council Board of Directors gave legitimacy to FRMP and gave him confidence that they were not off base with what high-level decision makers were expecting. .. .because I work for the Council, I have the relationship with the Directors, and the people on the Committee [Steering Committee] know 1 have the relationship with the Directors. You know, Charles Littledale, who works for Land and Water BC, probably reports up the line, at some point to Jon O'Riordan. So Charles knows that I'm working for Jon, and Jon knows about Charles, and i f I need something from Charles, or i f the provincial involvement isn't going the way I want, I can go to Jon and say, "Jon, you know, Charles isn't the right guy. He's sitting at a table but he's not very cooperative," or, you know, "Could we get somebody else or could you talk to him because this isn't going to work if we don't get the province to do things differently," and I could do that with a lot of people, whereas, i f you brought in an independent facilitator, they could do that, but it would take a long time for the facilitator to or you'd have to pick very carefully. It takes a while for the facilitator to kind of get to know, you know, what are the strings you can pull and what are the kind of things you can tweak to influence the people sitting at the table. (11) One of the great things about the Fraser Basin Council is that they have very good connectivity at higher levels in government, politically, because of the nature of the makeup of the Board... so I could work within the system, and tell my director to tell the A D M to tell the D M to tell the Minister, you know, "This is what we think is going well." But then we could go to the Council, and sit around the table and say, "You know, i f you can go up a couple of levels and tell Jon O'Riordan or the Minister that, 'Here's what your staff are thinking,' because it's not that easy to talk four or five levels above. So I think that they sort of, the Council has-the opportunity and used the opportunity in this, to kind of facilitate quicker decision-making and information transmittal within the bureaucratic milieu... the Fraser Basin Council provides another means for communication up and laterally... it was comforting as a bureaucrat to know that [Facilitator C] and others were talking to our Minister at levels that I didn't have easy access to, so you get the feeling that you're not way out in left field. (17) However, two CMs actually considered the connections between the FRMP participating organizations and the Council Board to be ineffective or even detrimental. They both felt that the communication was unidirectional, with information going from the FRMP table, through the individual facilitators to their superiors on the Board, but not coming back to them. One expressed that he found it troubling because he was not informed of the discussions that were taking place, but merely knew that they were occurring seemingly behind his back. Thus, he did not have an opportunity to defend his decisions or actions personally, nor did he receive feedback on whether his superiors were in agreement with how they were being represented. There was also a concern that there was undue pressure being placed on senior decision makers sitting on the Council Board of Directors. .. .what you had was a bunch of technical people, in the case of our Ministry, going and doing a bunch of stuff and they'd kind of link with the Fraser Basin Council guys, and they would go and do a bunch of stuff, and then input would go up to [Facilitator C] or Iona Campagnolo, probably [Facilitator C], and then it would go across to our A D M , and 84 our A D M would talk like that, but our A D M would never talk to us.... So there was this incomplete sort of loop or feedback. ..(18) It got a little bit tricky because maybe some of the Directors were a little defensive and felt that other Directors ganged up on them... (12) Four CMs volunteered the perspective that the Council was good at attracting the right people to the FRMP table. Two expressed that the committee members were valuable and the right level of decision makers or representatives. One of the strengths of the process [is that] the right level of decision makers were sitting at the table, or interest groups' representative. So it wasn't Deputy Ministers and it wasn't people who didn't have decision-making authority. The right people were sitting around the table. (17) Value-Added Services Two services that interviewees felt the Council was uniquely able to provide were pooled resources and education both on the Fraser River and on moving towards sustainability. One facilitator stated numerous times that the Council provides an educational role in processes like FRMP, particularly on sustainability principles and on how First Nations do business. The value of the knowledge the Council has to share was voluntarily confirmed by three CMs. They want us [the Council] to use our skills and experiences.... We're a facilitator, but we're also an educator on sustainability principles... (12) They have a lot of knowledge about the Fraser River basin as a whole, and I think that that is beneficial. They are actively trying to develop, I think, better communication and organization throughout the basin around sustainability principles and 1 think that that also is a good kind of background and foundation for trying to develop this kind of work with various stakeholders. (15) Two CMs, a facilitator and a Director mentioned that the Council was successfully able to pool resources between participating organizations to both run FRMP and conduct studies to inform decision-making. That made FRMP more cost-effective than i f one agency had to bear all the costs and it also fostered cooperation. .. .arguably one of the benefits of the Council was that they brought some money from the various parties and Mike Church and others did a whole pile of studies to try and get the fact on the table.... So that was a value-added piece of work to get these reports done and have a more factual basis around which people could at least discuss the topic. (2) .. .the Feds paid a third, we paid a third, and somebody else paid... it actually fosters that whole thing of cooperation... (17) There was one C M who felt that there was not adequate funding for the studies that needed to be done. He also expressed that his agency had to find the funding for a large proportion of the studies that were conducted. You know there wasn't money coming from any direction to really do certain things. There was money to model and say, "Yeah we're out of," sort of, "We don't have enough 85 freeboard on the dikes," but once that was sort of done there wasn't sort of the next phase to say, "Where can we do it best?" It was like, "Find a bunch of spots, guys, and we're going to take the historical amount out of there." (18) Credibility and Reputation of the Fraser Basin Council The Council was a relatively new entity when FRMP began, but it was known by a few of the FRMP CMs or at least referred to them by their associates. Comments were made by three CMs^ a facilitator and a Director regarding it being "known for good work," its "proven track record," its "credentials," and its "reputation." Well, they had already had a track record and reputation for being a good facilitator.... The people involved were also known at doing good work in terms of facilitating, so there wasn't any question. We were fortunate, I think, personally, to have them running it. (19) I just can't think of another group that sort of has the credentials. (17) During the interviews, eight interviewees were asked about the importance of the Council's credibility to FRMP. Four of CMs and a facilitator discussed their beliefs that the Council had credibility and that that was important in the process. Two CMs felt that credibility was not a consideration in FRMP, whereas political influence or suitability for work was. I think they just have this legitimacy about them that is really important.... It's a bit of legitimacy established when the Council facilitates something, political legitimacy. (17) One Director and one C M felt that some of the credibility of the Council stemmed from the Chair of its Board of Directors. A lot of the standing of the Council depends on the Chair and the profile of the Chair. When Iona was there, which was in the period of time from 2000 to 2002, she had a lot of standing in the provincial and federal government, so she was able to pull us all together. She went out the Fraser Valley Regional District and maintained their interest... (2) Although interviewees were asked specifically how important the credibility of the Council was to the success of FRMP, that question was flipped by several of them, each of whom explained how the Fraser Basin Council's credibility was affected by FRMP. A couple of those felt that their perception of the Council's credibility was positively influenced. However, four CMs and one facilitator stated that the Council's credibility was negatively impacted by FRMP. ...the fact that there wasn't clear, consistent and quick, i f you want, immediate implementation of the work, was viewed by some as a problem for the Fraser Basin's [Council's] credibility and in part that comes from a misunderstanding of what a facilitator is.... Not that it's their fault, but their credibility is greatly questioned by the fact that this didn't work immediately and what goes on from that argument is, "Why should we continue to support the Fraser Basin [Council] i f they're not able to bring about results in a process like this where there's wide agreement between the people involved and this lingering problem with approvals?" Now let me be clear that that's not my position; I'm expressing what is out there at times. (15) 86 A facilitator who was concerned about the impact that people's negative views of FRMP would have on the Council's credibility said that the Board of Directors recognised this and focussed more attention on it, and now he feels that people understand the Council's role better since they are still supportive. .. .the issue was growing in importance and profile so our Board felt that it needed to have the Executive Director's attention on it, so I took over the Chair of the Steering Committee at that time. (12) One facilitator mentioned several times during the interview that he felt confident that the committee members trusted the facilitators. This was affirmed by the voluntary comments by three CMs. I think groups like the people in gravel, in general, would feel that we [the Council] were impartial and we were honest and had integrity and they trusted us and all those sorts of things. Those are all good things. (11) Of course the Chairman, he needs to have the right personality... and he needs to be trusted... it was a difficult job, but [Facilitator C] handled it fine. (6) However, two CMs stated they lost their trust in the Council through the process, related to concerns about its objectivity. My honest answer is that my trust in the Council was somehow eroded through this process. (18) 6.2.2. How Would FRMP Have Been Different if a Government Agency or Other Entity Had Facilitated It? When asked, "How would FRMP have been different if it was facilitated by a government agency or other entity?" all but two of the interviewees stated that the process simply could not have been convened better by a government agency or other entity instead of the Council. I don't know of any other organization or group out, there that would even remotely be qualified to have been an alternative. (4) The two main reasons cited as to why no order of government could facilitate FRMP were that a government agency would be perceived to have a bias in line with its mandate, whether it was the case or not, and no one agency would have had the capacity or resources at that time to see the process through from start to finish. The same general arguments were repeated by many interviewees: the federal or provincial governments would have been perceived as biased and may not have been able to sustain funding on their own. With the changes that took place in provincial government agencies during the time period of this case study, it may not have been possible for a department to maintain FRMP as a file. The local governments and First Nations might not have had capacity to facilitate the process. The Fraser Basin Council was able to draw on existing resources and prioritize FRMP as a project long enough to convene meetings for several years. The process would not have moved ahead without the Council. Could you envision any of the particular stakeholders as being the facilitator? No, not likely... (15) .. .within our ministries, we're subject to changing priorities all the time... a planner could be assigned to a process and then have a commitment that that process is going to 87 take place and then get yanked away to something else, or get a different job description change or something like that and suddenly the process is faltering, whereas with the Fraser Basin Council, there was a better level of consistency. You know, they [the Council] had a job to do and they made sure things got done and it didn't drop off the edge of their desk like it would for anybody in government. (5) In opposition to this commonly held view, one local government representative felt that a government agency should have taken the lead, referring to the perceived progress achieved since Land and Water BC took a lead role in the issue after FRMP took place. I think i f one of the decision-making authorities was taking the lead and taking their responsibilities, then we probably wouldn't have seen it go off track like the way it did... (9) In addition, a First Nations representative would have liked to play a role in the facilitation himself. 6.2.3. How Clear Was the Role of the Fraser Basin Council? There was considerable discussion during the interviews as to what the Council's role was in FRMP, with moderate variation among the interviewees' interpretations. Most of the comments centred on the degree of authority the CMs felt the Council had or should have asserted. Some CMs saw the Council's facilitation as a minor administrative role, while others felt that the Council took a substantial leadership role in FRMP. Some felt the Council should have just been used during the front-end of the process with responsibilities for bringing people together and assisting them in understanding each other's interests, while others were frustrated that the Council did not have more power to guide actual decision-making and ensure implementation. This section addresses concerns about the clarity of the Council's role and reviews the various perspectives. The Council's role was outlined briefly in the FRMP "Draft Terms of Reference for Planning Process" (FBC, 2000b: 4): The role of the Fraser Basin Council will be to facilitate the steering committee, stakeholder assembly, and technical committee. This will include facilitation of meetings, secretariat support, coordination and drafting of the management plan. The Gravel Stewardship Coordinator will provide the majority of the facilitation and secretariat services. Additional support may be provided by other Fraser Basin Council staff as needed. However, some of the terms, such as facilitation, were not further defined which left room for interpretation. A concern expressed by two facilitators and a few CMs was the lack of clarity around the Council's role both during development of the plan and implementation. Some of the misunderstandings originated from outside, but there was some internal confusion among committee members as well. It was unclear what the Fraser Basin Council's role would be... (21) 88 The Fraser Basin Council is not a decision maker... And that seem to be kind of the sort of, the whole key to how it broke down. People can't seem to get it through their heads; the statutory authority is not the Fraser Basin Council. (18) By the end of the process the Council was working on a stronger communication strategy to ensure that that understanding developed outside of the FRMP table as well. One CM's misunderstandings about the Council were resolved during the process. .. .we learned from experience there that when we get involved, we need a strong communication strategy to make sure that people know what our role is... so we're explaining to everybody what role we have, so we're getting less and less of this sort of confusion or criticism. (12) .. .1 think that there was certainly a misunderstanding on my part about the role of the Fraser Basin Council, you know, and whether it would in fact fetter any decision-making. .. but my fears were put to rest during this Fraser Gravel Reach process... (5) Three CMs discussed how they felt the role of the Council was administrative or secretarial. They gave the impression that the Council's role was perhaps low-key compared to that of the government agencies who initiated the process, conducting tasks like coordinating meetings, taking minutes and compiling records. However, all of them acknowledged that it was a critical role that needed to be conducted for the process to be successful. [The Council] also seems to have an administrative infrastructure set up that enables them to get things done.... Those kinds of things are sometimes surprisingly difficult problems when you're trying to coordinate some activities... It's just kind of provision of support services for any kind of activity you need, and the Fraser Basin Council seems to be set up to provide those things. (22) In contrast, two other CMs discussed how the Council's role seemed to be more than that of a facilitator. They felt it had more power, particularly because of its political connections. .. .it seemed that their [the Council's] role had evolved to be more than facilitating... (19) Seven CMs and one Director discussed how they felt that the Council was limited because it did not have any authority of its own and was not designed to be an implementer. This, some suggested, affected how the process was led, what issues got the most air time at the table, or how it was implemented. [Facilitator B] did his level best to facilitate the process but in the end he was hostage to the agencies in the same way that the rest of us were... the agency people basically were claiming that they held the aces and that, "No matter what happened here, we have to go through our permitting process and our policies and regulations will hold sway in the end. We have a legislated responsibility for that," which is almost exactly word for word what I heard more than once from one or another of them when something seemed to be not going quite the way that their Ministry would perhaps condone. (22) The Council doesn't have the authority to say, "Well, this is the way it's going to be," So they [committee members] all have to agree... and I have been, frankly, amazed how little people are willing to give. (6) 89 One C M argued at length that the Council should have had more leadership during FRMP. A facilitator also confirmed that some people were looking to the Council for more leadership, which is why its role evolved in subsequent processes, such as the C M C We learned that, number one, we have to have... leadership with more clout or more authority in the leadership. So, i.e., the Fraser Basin Council has to become an authoritarian body. (20) .. .people were looking to us for leadership... they were looking to the Board for some sort of, I don't want to use the word position, but... leadership, I guess, on what the various parties should do. (12) Two CMs felt that the Council was assuming too much authority during FRMP. .. .1 told them, I said, "You guys [at the Council] aren't entities to vote on things like decisions on how things should happen in the river. Your guys' job is just to bring people together." ...That's all their mandate does. (10) It seems like the Fraser Basin Council has in effect taken over the regulatory authority, and they had taken it over by going over the head of some technical staff that should be making the technical decisions through legislation, policy and regulations, and they've gone straight to the politicians... (18) A facilitator also mentioned that there was some discussion at the Board of Directors level as to whether the Council was getting too close to addressing "on-the-ground" issues. Some people I don't think liked it, because they said the Council was getting too close to actually getting into permitting and kind of real on the ground issues and we shouldn't do that. But that was mostly within the Board of [Directors of the Council], that I think they struggled with that a little bit. (11) One C M discussed how it may have been more appropriate for a government agency to take the lead role in FRMP instead of the Council. Two more CMs discussed how having a leader such as L W B C might have dealt better with some issues of accountability and jurisdictional and legal concerns that the Council did not have authority to address. Overall, for any such multistakeholder process to be effective, there needs to be follow through. This may have been achieved more effectively i f the group leading the process had approving authority (the direct ability to act on the plan). (9) The Council may not have been criticised as much for its role in FRMP i f it had just played a role in facilitating the collection of information on the science and interests related to the gravel reach and then passed off the remainder of the permitting process design and other stages leading up to implementation to a regulatory "lead agency". The Council did in fact try to do this early on in FRMP, but it took a few years for one of the regulatory agencies to agree to take on this role because it seemed to be outside of all of their mandates. 6.2.4. Did You Agree with the Fraser Basin Council's Selection of Individual Facilitators? A l l of the CMs were asked about their impressions of the selection of individual facilitators for FRMP. The majority were highly positive and appreciative of the work the facilitators did. Many 90 of the participants mentioned their respect for the first and second Chairs of the Steering Committee, Facilitator A and C, and for the chair of the Technical Committee, Facilitator B. There were just a few specific concerns that were echoed among the CMs. Personally, I think they [the Council] did a great job... every one of those guys were super... (20) One C M pointed out that the three facilitators, although all from the Council, each had their own approach to facilitating the process. .. .They definitely had different styles though, and strengths. It was quite interesting along the way observing that.... With the new Chair, it did bring in new dynamic... (19) Facilitator A ' s facilitation received highly positive responses from two individuals and three more responded positively. They felt that he started FRMP off on a good footing, encouraging people to get all of their interest on the table openly and handily conducting workshops and meetings. There was one negative response, which was from a First Nations C M whose concerns are discussed in a later section. One C M was neutral and another C M expressed that he did not have a problem with Facilitator A ' s facilitation, but felt some tension was alleviated when he left, perhaps as a result of the strain between him and the First Nations representative mentioned above. [Facilitator A] had a number of these half and one day seminars, and he was tremendously successful with them in as much as he brought a great cross-section of residents of the Valley together... that was sort of [his] forte I think... (4) ...when [Facilitator A] was involved in it... there was a lot of squawking, a lot of dialogue, people from both sides of the coin got to say their piece.... I thought he was doing a good job. (18) Facilitator C was considered a very strong facilitator by many of the individuals interviewed. Three of the CMs were highly positive and four more were positive about the contribution that he made to the process as the Steering Committee chair. He was considered to be experienced, trustworthy, instilled confidence, a good listener, a "consummate politician" and talented at keeping the process moving forward, sometimes using sidebars to keep discussions moving ahead. ; [Facilitator C] listens to everybody. When you're talking, you really get the sense that he's listening.... I would say his strongest suit is that you can speak honestly to him. (17) There was one C M who had mixed feelings and one C M who was negative about Facilitator C's facilitation. Their concerns related to the fact that they felt he might have an agenda that was affecting how he facilitated the process. Even three CMs who were positive about his performance noted that his vision and personal beliefs on the issues being addressed in FRMP were quite apparent. [Facilitator C]'s a professional engineer; he should be pushing it in terms of technical rigour... and quite frankly, I didn't see that.... Maybe he had an agenda of essentially, "Meet the goal of gravel removal." (18) 91 [Facilitator C]'s another good guy who really tried to hold it together and brought direction and tried to keep it on track. He had the management plan... and he wanted to go there with that vision. (20) Conversely, one C M twice stated that he believed Facilitator C did not try to influence the outcome of FRMP. He is dedicated to the process; that there is a result, not what the result is.... I never got the feeling that he was rooting for the provincial government or rooting for the federal government or rooting for the Moratorium. He was rooting for the process. (17) Two of the CMs who were positive about Facilitator C's facilitation pointed out that they would have appreciated it i f he had been more assertive in maintaining the ground rules. One of them commented that Facilitator C did not intervene at times when he felt he was being attacked personally and others also stated that there were times when the facilitators should have intervened but did not when people were not separating the people from the problem. I know a couple of meetings I was at with [Facilitator C] I wanted to be rescued. I felt I was being attacked personally.... I'd be sort of saying, "Okay, ring the bell. . ." but he didn't. (17) Facilitator B received praise for his efforts to keep in contact with the participants, including First Nations, and his ability to "keep people's feet to the fire", coordinate meetings, record minutes, effectively gather and disseminate technical information and develop reports that reflected people's concerns and interests successfully. Two CMs were highly positive about his facilitation, and three more were positive. Five additional CMs were quick to point out that he put in a tremendous effort, was a quick learner, and had great mannerisms, but they had concerns either about his lack of experience or technical background given the challenging role he was placed in. Some CMs felt at times that they would have benefited from someone who was more assertive in keeping the dialogue in check and more experienced in bringing people together. One C M suggested that there needed to be two people doing his role: one to conduct the demanding administrative element and another to be more involved in chairing and intervening to facilitate productive dialogue at the table. I wasn't sure whether [Facilitator B] had the necessary experience and background.... There was a fair amount of learning to be done, but when the reports started coming out.... I was really impressed. I think [Facilitator C]'s skills as a Chair are much more seasoned, but as a Program Manager and coordinator, getting everybody in the right place at the right time, I thought that [Facilitator B] did an excellent job. (17) In hindsight, it probably would have required a very experienced individual. I felt [Facilitator B] was, at times, in over his head given the people we were dealing with. It's not [his] fault at all. He was doing his best in a tough situation, but it really did take a rare individual to try and pull it all together. Somebody who could understand the technical plus have the gift of bringing people together. (21) Four CMs felt that the facilitators' insufficient assertiveness in certain situations was a result of the position that the Council was placed in, in that they had to be polite, keep everyone happy and not be directive. One of them felt that position may have led the facilitators to take a less hard stand on what exactly the Steering Committee would do. ') 92 They [the Council facilitators] were limited. They had to be polite at all times. (20) One of the facilitators recognised this constraint as well. .. .we were so sensitive to the clients in the process, we could only suggest and encourage, and so there's pros and cons. (12) Many CMs expressed that they did not believe the individual facilitators had much bearing on the weaknesses they saw in the process. Six of the CMs raised the matter of "whose fault" it might have been when aspects of the process failed. The majority expressed that they felt it was not the fault of the individual facilitators, and recounted the efforts the facilitators had made to keep it on track. The others stated that it was not possible for them to tell whether the weaknesses were a result of the facilitators' individual approaches or how they were being directed from above. I think [Facilitator B] did a good job.... I think more of the process was just the general going off tracks more than his specific role. (9) 6.2.5. How Objective Was the Fraser Basin Council's Facilitation? Interviewees were asked questions relating to whether they found the individual facilitators or the Council to help ensure objectivity. Of the 11 responses from CMs on how effective the Fraser Basin Council was at ensuring that the process was facilitated objectively, there were five positive responses, two somewhat negative responses, and two negative responses. There were also two CMs that stated they did not know enough about the role of the broader Council to know how much of an influence they had on objectivity, but they both stated that they felt the Council was neutral. Out of five interviewees who were positive about the Council's attempts to keep the process objective, three mentioned that the Council did not seem to try to influence the outcome of FRMP. At no point did I ever get a sense of being, trying to get my arm twisted to one thing or the other by the Fraser Basin Council... (5) Four interviewees expressed uneasiness about the Council's objectivity in FRMP, feeling that the Council seemed to have an agenda beyond sustainability. Three believed that the Council may have been pressured to ensure FRMP satisfied local governments and the fourth felt that the Council intentionally stacked the committees with individuals that would direct the group towards a certain outcome. There might been a sense that there was the Fraser Basin Council agenda.... I felt that the facilitator might have been unduly influenced by some of the municipal government positions. It's just that sometimes it felt a little bit poisonous... (21) Although the Council is funded by numerous sources, termination of local government funding could cause a significant impact. One Director pointed out the importance of all sources of funding continuing for the Council to remain sustainable. The concerns of one C M about the pressure the Council Board of Directors was placing on his superiors may not have been entirely unfounded, as a facilitator discussed how the Directors encouraged some agency representatives to accept a higher gravel extraction maximum. 93 It got a little bit tricky because maybe some of the Directors were a little defensive and felt that other Directors ganged up on them... (12) V 6.2.6. Summary The majority of interviewees were highly positive about the selection of the Council as the facilitator. Strengths of its facilitation included the principles the Council brought to the process, including sustainability, flexibility and inclusiveness, the value of linkages between the participating organizations and the Council Board of Directors, and the value-added services it provided. A l l but two interviewees felt that no other entity was as suitable for the facilitation of FRMP as the Council. There was generally positive feedback about the efforts of the individual facilitators, with minor concerns about experience, assertiveness and personal bias. There were two main weaknesses of this criterion, one being uneasiness with the degree of authority the Council had in FRMP and another being a concern from a few CMs about its neutrality. 6.3. Representation of Interests The feedback from interviewees on whether the process achieved Representation of Interests was quite positive from almost all of the interviewees. There were, however, a limited number of CMs that were somewhat displeased with particular aspects of the issue, such as the participant selection process, the breadth of interests invited, and the committee composition in terms of number of representatives for each interest. The main weakness of this criterion was that they were unable to maintain First Nations participation in FRMP. 6.3.1. Was Everyone Participating Who Should Have Been? A l l but two SCMs and one T C M agreed that, with the exception of First Nations who chose not to participate partway through FRMP, everyone who should have had representation at the committees did. In fact, most CMs were highly impressed with the diversity of interests that the Council attracted to the process. Two CMs even felt that the process was "over inclusive." They [facilitators] almost bent over backwards to make sure that there was adequate interest representation and that no single group dominated. Everyone had a voice at the table who wanted to come to the table. (17) The decision about the number of individuals on the Steering Committee was an issue that caused contention for the first year of FRMP. On one hand, groups such as the First Nations and local government felt they needed more representation at the table. For example, a representative for local government felt that there should be more people representing the interests of 98 percent of the population in the directly affected area, and referred to the fact that there were three First Nations at the table representing a much smaller population. On the other hand, the Steering Committee Chair was trying to keep the committee to a manageable size, and was under some pressure from the government agency representatives who initiated the process to do so. .. .initially some of us at the table fought very hard to keep it under nine... I wasn't actually interested in sitting on a Steering Committee with twenty people and I made that very clear. My time was too valuable. (17) Some interest groups that were not initially invited to join the FRMP Steering Committee, such as the Scott Paper representative, insisted that they be included and were incorporated. Even so, three CMs expressed that they still would have like to have seen more representation of (1) 94 environmental non-governmental agencies, (2) the farming community and (3) "grassroots" people from the Valley. They [facilitators] brought people from Vancouver, Abbotsford and all these other places, but they left out the people from up in the Valley. (10) Some interest groups that were involved in the Stakeholder Assemblies that initiated FRMP had high expectations for continued input. They were told that they did not necessarily need to have a seat on the Steering Committee to have a say in the development of the management plan. In the first year of development of the draft management plan, the Council facilitators consulted with several of these interest groups either individually or in sub-Stakeholder Assemblies and incorporated their feedback. However, with the sense of urgency that the regulatory agencies had for pushing the permitting process along as the process continued, the facilitators were left with less time to consult with these interest groups and other Stakeholder Assembly constituencies than expected. When the individuals selected for the Steering and Technical Committees did not represent their interests as they would have liked and subsequent Stakeholder Assemblies were cancelled, the interest groups felt shut out of the process. They were not given the opportunity to provide feedback on the regulatory agencies' decision-making on permits during the Test Implementation phase. We're sitting there waiting for something to happen, us to have meaningful input, so the real core NGO's like the Sierra Legal Defense Fund, like the Alouette River Management Society, like the BC Federation of Drift Fisheries, the BC Wildlife Federation, the Berk Mountain Naturalists.... I think there were 11 different user groups... and it was very clear in my mind they had no input. At some point, the door was slammed and they had no input. (18) Once the Steering and Technical Committees were established, there was generally a highly positive review by the CMs of the composition. There were some comments made with regards to uneasiness with approach or representativeness of certain CMs, but that not covered in this analysis. Most interviewees mentioned that the process had attracted valuable representatives. I thought the Fraser Basin Council did a good job at bringing key people to the table. (19) 6.3.2. Was Everything Done to Maintain First Nations Representation? Three representatives of First Nations initially engaged in the FRMP Steering Committee, but then decided early on that they could not continue to participate. A l l of the interviewees, except for the First Nations representative, attributed this primarily to issues external to FRMP. They provided reasons related to capacity, internal politics, the uncertainties of the Treaty process and the complexities of consultation between First Nations and government agencies. Ideally you would absolutely want people who call themselves "the river people" to be directly involved in river management issues, but for that to be successful, those groups of people have got to come together themselves and have a vision and a goal and a direction for what their involvement might be in river management in relation to all the other interests that are on the river. (15) Due to internal fragmentation, many representatives would have been required to ensure that the interests of all the diverse First Nations communities were voiced at the table. The facilitators 95 expressed that, on reflection, they should have convinced the agency representatives that in order to be successful they needed to accommodate First Nations in this regard. At least one agency representative was convinced during the process that they should have allowed the First Nations to have been better represented at the table. .. .looking back, we [the Council] would have been better off to try and make a better effort of convincing the Steering Committee members that the only way that we could make this work would be to have every First Nations community on the river and not invite anyone specific. A lot of the people when they come to these processes are not familiar with the way First Nations do business.... I think that that is part of the education process we [the Council] bring to the table. (12) A l l but two CMs expressed that they felt the Council facilitators had done their best to engage the First Nations and disseminate information to them about the process. [The Council] tried a lot of efforts and they always continued to give information to First Nations and invite them to all the meetings and that sort of thing, but we got to a point where we said, "Well, okay, we don't have First Nations participation; we're just going to have to move on." (7) They had every opportunity and were asked to come to the meetings, but they would only come as it served their purpose.^ 13) Of the two CMs who thought more could have been done to maintain First Nations participation, one felt that the committee could have been more flexible and the other felt that there could have been more dialogue with the First Nations. Maybe i f we would've had a good technical dialogue with First Nations and the First Nations person understood what we're saying, they might have been able to get back to their folks and say, "You know, X is X or Y is Y or X is Y , " orwhatever. Maybe that would've helped... (18) In contrast to the other CMs' explanations of the lack of First Nations participation in FRMP, the First Nations C M interviewed explained that the conduct of the Steering Committee Chair and the Council's proactive role in FRMP were a significant impetus for him to stop participating in FRMP. I says, "You folks down there at Fraser Basin Council is voting and things that you do not have a mandate to do." They were doing that right from the beginning [of FRMP]. I got up and I said it a few other times at other meetings.... [Facilitator A] says, "You know," he says, "you're right." I got up and moved back, and [he] was sitting down and chaired and he wouldn't listen to us... [Facilitator A] was sitting down and kind of looked at us, smiled at us, and forgot about us. (10) He expressed concern about the degree to which the Council was getting involved in the gravel permitting process, and by inference, what their involvement on the FRMP committee might mean in terms of consultation. [The Council's] mandate was to bring people together and that's it. If they want to develop policies, they have to come out and deal with us one-on-one. (10) 96 A First Nations representative on the Steering Committee felt the process could have been designed to better meet the First Nations' process needs. The last meeting I went to was probably a little over a year ago [2003] because they were making decisions at the table without us. And I went and sat down with them and everything I said back in 1999, they were putting on the table saying, "This is what we've got to do," but when I said it back in 1999 nobody heard me. (10) 6.3.3. Did the Absence of First Nations on the FRMP Committees Have an Impact on the Process? The CMs ' perspectives on the degree to which the absence of First Nations representatives had an impact FRMP was greatly varied, ranging from the belief that the process outcomes were no different since First Nations would have to have been consulted individually before implementation anyway, to the belief that without First Nations FRMP could not be successful. I think that what I saw was that they [First Nations] didn't feel that they were being represented or something like that, or their concerns weren't being addressed, but i f there are other ways of addressing them then maybe that's fine too. (9) Well, the First Nations wasn't there so [FRMP] was doomed. The process was doomed from the beginning. They had to sit at the table. (17) I liken these processes to a string of Christmas lights. If one light goes out, all the rest do. You have to have all the bulbs to get them to work. (13) A significant catalyst to the transition of the process from FRMP to C M G was to regain First Nations participation. I still believe that the First Nations hadia responsibility to be there as well as a right... that is why we evolved away from the Steering Committing and into this Collaborative Management Group... We went back to the Steering Committee and said, "Would it be okay i f we disbanded this in lieu of that [CMG].. .?" And they eventually said, "Yes, it's probably better to go that way because we're not getting anywhere this way," which wasn't exactly true, but it had its frustrations. (7) 6.3.4. Summary Overall the interviewees' responses regarding Representation of Interests were highly positive. Most interviewees believed that the Council was highly inclusive of interests. A few CMs were critical of the committee size and composition, as well as the exclusion of a couple of interest groups as the process progressed, but they were not in the majority. The greatest weakness cited was the lack of First Nations participation. Most of the CMs felt that the Council did everything they could have to engage them, but a First Nations representative highlighted a number of process concerns that might have made a difference. 6.4. Clarity of Process Clarity of Process was a criterion for which few comments were made spontaneously, but once questions were asked about it there was considerable criticism. At the time of interviewing, this criterion was referred to as Stakeholder-Centred Process Design, but few of the interviewees received a list of the criteria and the questions they were asked were in relation to process clarity. The two interrelated concerns identified by the interviewees were a weakly defined purpose and 97 a scope of issues covered in the process that did not meet some individual's expectations. The fact that the purpose was not well defined led to some frustrations in terms of length of time and direction the discussions took. The interviewees were also asked about the use of consensus to reach agreement, which revealed that participants had a reasonable understanding of the concept, although their perspectives on its applicability were diverse. 6.4.1. How Well Did the Process Design and Preparation Work for You? The first interviewees were asked several questions about the design of the process, such as how involved in it they were, whether the facilitators met separately with them beforehand to see how their process needs could be met, and so forth. The responses were not found to be particularly insightful as some of the interviewees could not recall what had occurred, others entered the process once it was already underway, and others simply did not have much to say on the matter. Seven of ten interviewees did state that they were at least involved in the process design minimally, in terms of reviewing the design that the facilitators presented, discussing the FRMP principles or debating what the process was going to address. As a substitute, the process participants were instead asked to what degree they felt ownership of the process, as their responses were expected to be indicative of comfort with the process design. Three out of six CMs responded very positively, while two had mixed feelings about it and one was negative. Yeah, I think we all felt like we were really part of something, yeah. (4) Well, I had a lot of ownership and not very much at the same time.... I think I was one of the more vocal of the individuals within the process because I felt, you know, for the cause that I was championing, I had a lot to lose. (18) The facilitators explained that they prepared for FRMP by talking to the various interests and structuring the process to accommodate the decision-making environment. I'm sure we spent weeks talking to individuals, trying to figure out who are the different players, how can we cluster them into broad interest groups, what do different interest groups think, what do they agree on, what don't they agree on, what are the sticking points? (11) However, all of the facilitators and three CMs expressed that it would have been valuable to have spent more time upfront clarifying the participant's expectations and reaching agreement on a well-defined purpose. Instead, part of the process was spent "feeling their way along" trying to decide what the process was about, what should the Steering Committee be recommending on, where the information was going to come from and who would have the authority to implement it. I think in that case [FRMP] we could have probably spent a bit more time understanding what people's expectations were and what the mandate was about... maybe clearly defined roles right from the outset as to what the Fraser Basin Council's involvement was, maybe more briefings at Regional Districts and Municipalities in the area as to what we were doing...(12) It was very much an evolutionary thing of what it would look like. We just started out with this huge problem and through discussion and participation the process came up with a model. That was part of, I guess, the problem, is we didn't know what the end 98 would look like. There's an old saying, "Begin with the end in mind." If you don't know what the end is, it makes it a little more difficult to find it. (19) One C M expressed that the Council did their best to outline the role of the committees, but it was hard to determine what they would be in the "politically charged atmosphere." 6.4.2. How Clearly Was the Purpose of FRMP Defined? In the FRMP Terms of Reference (FBC, 2000b: 1), four objectives were outlined: Develop a Management Plan for the Fraser River from Hope to Mission, through a multi-interest planning process, to address flood and erosion protection, aquatic habitat protection, First Nations interests and land and resource use issues. Integrate the emerging results of studies being carried out in the Fraser River with local and traditional knowledge. Facilitate information exchange and improved understanding between all interest on the management of the Fraser River between Hope and Mission, and build support for the Management Plan. Develop options and a preferred option for the implementation of the Management Plan and associated funding arrangements. There was consistency across the responses from the Council facilitators as to what the objectives of FRMP were, but their responses were much more focussed on gravel removal than those provided in the Terms of Reference. I think the primary objective of [Facilitator B] and I was, "If some gravel is going to come out, what are the terms and what's the protocol you'd follow in order to do it in a way that doesn't impact the environment and all that kind of business?" (11) I think we actually had a pretty clear objective, which was "Let's define the terms under which maybe some gravel can come out of the river, where, when, how and all that stuff." (12) The CMs had opinions about what the objectives of FRMP were that were both inconsistent with those of the facilitators' and each other. The main divergence in opinion was around whether the process was intended to design a comprehensive river management plan, to address flood hazard management or to create a process to extract gravel from the river without impacting on other interests. The process was set up to address flooding, navigation, gravel recruitment, but it could have become the Mississippi Floodplain Authority. (13) We all knew that the objective was around flood hazard management and coming up with objective decision-making....Some individuals felt that it was more, "This is a way I'm going to get approval to remove gravel from the Fraser River," as opposed to the bigger flood management benefit. (21) There was also confusion around the role the Steering Committee's recommendations would have to play in the decision-making and implementing stages. Since those with the authority to 99 provide regulatory approval were sitting on the FRMP committees, some CMs expected that the joint solutions they were reaching would directly be followed through in the implementation stage, when in fact the regulatory agencies could only take the solutions under advisement and still had to make their own "unfettered decisions" on permitting outside FRMP. The FRMP Terms of Reference stated: i While the Management Plan will not fetter the existing legislative mandates and responsibilities of all levels of government, the decision-making of government agencies related to in-stream activities will be strongly guided by the Plan... One non-regulatory agency C M said he took it upon himself to make sure that the others were sensitive to the fact that there was a complicated set of rules and regulations that still had to apply to river management, and that people could not overrun what they were technically allowed to do in terms of decision-making. People have difficulty seeing where they sit. It was an advisory board, not a decision-making board; that frustrates people. (13) If you're not clear up front in the planning process, it's going to what I call "swirl and swirl in a black hole forever."...When I came to the table, I saw people were swirling.... They didn't know what the next step should be. They were all talking about, "Well, we got this far, how do we implement?" (14) Two CMs discussed how they believed it was not the Fraser Basin Council's fault that this was entirely not clear. One highlighted the challenge figuring out what needed to be accomplished when there was no lead government agency. The other stated: I don't think it's the fault of anybody. Sometimes processes are just not fully understood [as to] what we want to get as the end result.... The province wasn't very clear, didn't articulate very clearly what they thought should be floored... (14) The interviewees described how they were able to adapt their approach to a new, more focussed strategy after the first Test Implementation phase was deemed unsuccessful. .. .1 think some of our initial stabs at the framework were not as successful as we'd hoped they'd be. I remember the first year... we were trying to get proponents who actually wanted to extract gravel to put forward reasonable proposals... and we just got junk... that was a bit of a wake-up call for us, that we still had a lot of work to do because clearly that wasn't going to work... (11) 6.4.3. Was It Clear to You from the Start of the Process How the Management Plan Was to be Used? CMs had diverse expectations about what was going to be achieved through the development and use of the management plan. According to the FRMP Terms of Reference (FBC, 2000b: 8), the management plan "would organize baseline technical data, articulate a common vision for management, coordinate implementation of policies and best management practices, and monitor progress." Some expected that the document they were creating would detail a comprehensive River Management Program with a central authority, while others expected it to simply inform the 100 regulatory agencies' own decision-making review of applications for gravel extraction so the permitting process would be more science-based and address broader river interests such as navigation and recreation that do not fall under regulatory agencies' mandates. Some took middle ground and anticipated the document would be a guidebook to direct government agencies and proponents of gravel extraction on the protocols of the application review process. I had a dream, a number of us did, that there would be an "institutional mechanism"... basically, that there would be an Upper Fraser Management Board... having maybe a multidisciplinary, multi-government, multi-party agency running that section of the river. (17) My understanding was that they were coming up with a management plan for the river as a whole and gravel was one part of it; a sustainable management plan, under the sustainability principles of the Council. (14) Out of ten responses, five CMs and one facilitator felt that the intended use of the management plan was unclear. In addition, another facilitator explained that he felt it was clear in the first two years but became unclear when the focus narrowed to the gravel issue. I think [Facilitator B] and I probably made some mistakes along the way. One of them was what exactly the [management] plan is going to be and how it is going to be used, and certainly our thinking about what it was going to be and how was going to be used the first year changed quite a bit as we moved into the second year. (11) .. .In fact, we didn't know what to call it. At some point in the process we called it the "Fraser River Management Plan" but there were a number of other things it was called along the way. It was "Gravel Management" and then because it wasn't just about gravel, that was dropped. (19) Just three CMs felt it was clear at the start how the management plan was intended to be used, though even two of those found its actual use held surprises. One additional C M explained that he expected the regulatory agencies to use the management plan in the way that they felt it would benefit each of them the most. Thus, he knew that there might be a difference between how L W B C and DFO incorporated the recommendation into their consideration of gravel extraction application approvals because they had different mandates to address. 6.4.4. How Did You Feel about the Scope of Issues Addressed? One of the regulators explained that when the agencies first began to address concerns about gravel extraction and initiate FRMP, they didn't anticipate how the scope of discussions would evolve into broader river management issues once the Steering Committee was established. .. .It just seemed to get bigger and bigger and bigger. It was like, first of all it started as a fisheries issue, then it turned into a flood hazard issue, and then it turned into a Coast Guard and navigation issue. It did get bigger, but in order to solve it, you need some room for it to evolve as well when you don't know what those are. I don't think when we entered into the initial discussion that we fully understood what the scope would be. (19) From the participants' explanations, it seems that the scope became quite broad, to include many users along the river, when the Steering Committee was initially put together, and models were being looked at to design a River Management Authority. Then later the process retracted to 101 focus primarily on making recommendations on protocols and identifying sites to extract gravel from the river while taking into account the other interests along the river because that was seen by many to be the most pressing matter. In particular, one C M noted that every time an in-stream work window would approach, the entire process would "warp" around the gravel issue and other issues would be set aside. Finally, the scope of issues just settled on gravel. Several CMs were satisfied with the scope of issues during the process, especially those who felt strongly that gravel extraction was a viable flood hazard reduction strategy. A couple that were accepting of the focus on gravel would have liked to have had further review of the impacts, such as an economical analysis and further habitat impact analyses. There were several individuals who were not satisfied with the scope. Those that were not satisfied with the focus on gravel either wanted to see further discussions on the broader set of flood hazard management options or on the conceptualization of a central agency that would manage the Fraser River. It seemed like the world was going to stop i f we didn't solve this gravel issue, and I think this was where some of us became jaded on that because we went in with the intent that we were talking about fish, not gravel. We were talking about Fraser River Management, not gravel. Gravel is only one part of it, but it seemed to me everything just focused on gravel. (20) A couple of these CMs expressed disappointment that the facilitators could not guide the Steering Committee to broaden its scope, despite admirable attempts, because of the "fixation" on gravel. A facilitator acknowledged this challenge. A couple of times I ended the Steering Committee meetings saying, "Okay, we're starting to deal with the gravel issue, now we've got to look beyond that. How do we fully implement the river management plan?" I tried that a couple of times and I didn't get very far and I don't know why. I think it was maybe because they were so focused on sorting out this flood protection/gravel issue. (12) Three TCMs expressed frustration that gravel extraction was being promoted as a flood hazard management measure, but that other integrated floodplain management alternatives were not being discussed. You know, we tried to kind of go there. It always got kind of, "That's way too costly, let's not even bother...." And it wasn't really, in the big scheme of things, a lot of money for this group.... It's like $30 million to upgrade the dikes...? (21) In defence of the scope that was applied, one C M stated: I wouldn't criticize this approach because it wasn't integrated floodplain management.... Here I think they were looking at a much more specific problem and trying to find a consensus approach for dealing with it. (15) One C M felt strongly his participation was not particularly meaningful because the Steering Committee never got to the issues for which he had decided to participate in FRMP. A few other interviewees cited him as an example. \ .. .every time we got to a meeting down in Mission, the very first thing was gravel... but the expectations of those minds around that table was to expand and to really create something... become meaningful, not just rhetoric and B.S. and blowing wind... (20) 102 6.4.5. How Did You Feel about Using Consensus to Reach Agreement? The interviewees appeared to have an average to strong understanding of the concept of consensus. Several interviewees were careful to define their interpretation of consensus and to set parameters on its use. One facilitator made sure to clarify that what they were trying to achieve was not "true consensus" but rather "consensus-based decision-making," the difference, in his view, being that people are required to make some compromises. The majority of interviewees stated that the use of consensus-based decision-making was a reasonable way of reaching agreement on the types of issues in FRMP. Several mentioned that the alternatives were less desirable either because they were not win-win or would not achieve the process objectives. Consensus was very useful in that it allowed an opening for people to take the broader perspective and also provided, in term of more of an interest-based approach, a bigger box so to speak in terms of discussion. (17) One facilitator felt that the flexibility that consensus-based decision-making provides government agencies is invaluable in this type of process. If we had any other form of decision-making, they [agencies] wouldn't be there because in effect they have a veto. But the whole idea of consensus-based decision-making is not to use that veto, it's to work in the best interests of consensus-based decision-making, which is working towards finding common ground and use the benefit of the various attributes that each partner or player has to move the overall agenda forward, not protect interests... (12) A l l of the regulatory agency representatives interviewed were careful to point out that a consensus-based recommendation from an advisory group such as the FRMP Steering Committee had no legal standing and did not assure that the recommendation would be taken up. They were careful to explain that they had the responsibility to conduct "unfettered decision-making." However, several of them recognised that consensus-based decision-making was useful to them and held sway in regards to the political element. If in my estimation I felt I had to make another decision and I could technically defend that decision, I would not be swayed by the consensus of the group.... In reality, having the different groups discuss things and come to some consensus decisions on ways to approach the situation was very useful. I definitely incorporated it into my decision-making. (5) In light of the constraints imposed by the agencies' requirements to make unfettered decision-making, two SCMs and two TCMs questioned the use of consensus-based decision-making. Sager said it quite plain, it didn't matter i f we came to consensus or not. It all boiled down to him and Paterson. That was stated at the meeting! So why do you need consensus? (20) One regulatory agency representatives was quite cynical about the use of consensus, given his past experiences struggling to implement agreements with "consensus words" which appease everyone at the table but are impossible to put into practice. If you write a document... and those words are consensus-built, when we go to implement, that document is worthless... because everybody feels that that word met their agenda.... When somebody goes to try and implement it, they read those words 103 differently.... I think people thought that they got a sustainable management plan and everyone won their agenda. (14) Another regulator did not feel that the management plan had that weakness. We went through a couple of drafts and there didn't seem to be too many weasel words. (17) 6.4.6. Summary There were mixed reviews on the criterion of Clarity of Process. Some interviewees were concerned that the purpose of the process was not clearly defined, which made objective setting and implementation challenging. The responses were split on whether the scope of issues discussed was appropriate, mainly depending upon whether the interviewees were there to address gravel removal and flood hazard management, in which case they were generally satisfied, or to help design a River Management Authority or represent the interests of other user groups along the river, in which case some were frustrated. The interviewees seemed to have a good understanding of the use of consensus and all but a few interviewees accepted that approach for FRMP. Although the regulatory agency representatives had to have unfettered decision-making, most of them still found it useful that the group was working towards reaching consensus on their recommendation. 6.5. Interest-Driven Framework The three main considerations reviewed under the Interest-Driven Framework were how well participants were encouraged to develop an understanding of each other's interests, whether the climate for discussions was conducive to achieving agreement, and whether the participants felt they had an equal opportunity to participate and contribute to the group. Many interviewees were positive about the first two considerations. The third, as to whether there was equal opportunity, received considerable attention by the interviewees. There was an uneasy relationship between some of the agency representatives and the other CMs as a result of the complicated interactions between FRMP and their regulatory role. 6.5.1. How Well Did the Facilitator Guide the, Committee Members to Discuss their Concerns and Interests? The facilitators were positive about what they had accomplished in terms of guiding the committee members to discuss their interests. I think it was a pretty free exchange both at the Committee level and the Stakeholder Assembly level. I don't think there were any secrets about what people's positions were... (H) There was nearly unanimous agreement that the facilitators had guided the CMs to discuss each of their concerns and interests. Most CMs responded immediately and unmistakably. The Fraser Basin Council used that approach as being interest-driven. Let's talk about interests first as a foundation, establish some principles, and then develop the model from there. (19) ...[the Council] got everybody together in a room and kind of brought out all of the people's concerns, which I think was valuable. That needed to be done because there were concerns that some people didn't know about... (9) 104 Two CMs actually thought that too much time was spent discussing interests. We met ad nauseam going over people's gripes... (13) Two of the S C M regulators expressed that they felt that the facilitators could have taken the discussion a bit further by delving into tough issues and ambiguities that were skirted around, but another S C M regulator felt that they had spent too much time discussing interests, so there was no agreement by the regulators in terms of how far the discussions had to go for them to make decisions around the recommendations by the interests later. I thought [the facilitation] was very good, but i f you really have the time and you think about it, you can ask questions of people who are saying things to make sure that you and the group are clear on what those people are saying, but it wasn't a real obstacle. (5) Even CMs who were disenchanted with FRMP as a result of other factors felt that the process had value as a result of the facilitator's ability to draw a diversity of interests together to inform each other about issues that needed to be considered along the river. Many interviewees saw this as an important stepping-stone to processes that have taken place since FRMP. 6.5.2. Did You Have a Good Sense of the Other Committee Members' Interests? One important aspect of the Interest-Based criterion is that everyone develops an understanding of the other committee members' interests. The facilitators expressed that guiding participants to become sensitive to the other people's points of view is an integral part of the Council's approach to dialogue. .. .the fact that there was a willingness, as we evolved, for people to be more sensitive to . the other points of view.... Fisheries and Oceans started to realize that gravel extraction was a key component when it was put in the context of flood protection.... It sensitized Land and Water BC as to why the DFO considers fish habitat important. The educational aspect is huge, which you wouldn't get in a sort of a more vertical type of decision-making process, or non-collaborative. (12) Nine of the ten interviewees who were asked about this aspect of the process were mostly positive in their responses. There was minor dissent from three of those nine, who cited that they were confused as to what the interests and/or motivations of the local government and/or First Nations were, but they did not suggest it reflected negatively on the facilitators' efforts. I think most everybody on the committee was fairly vocal right at the table and most everybody on the committee were pretty good listeners as well, and so that's the two sides of getting the thing done, is expressing your concerns and your views, and for everybody to hear what they are and use it in the decision-making processes. (4) 1 think the municipal governments were difficult to read.... We weren't sure i f the reason they were trying to find a way to rationalize gravel removal was because of flood hazard or because there was a pile of money to be made. (21) The only interviewee who seemed negative about this aspect of the Interest-Driven Framework criterion was the First Nations interviewee. .. .they need to listen to us [First Nations] and they need to have a good understanding of why we're there. They needed to understand what the balance is between the impacts that 105 we're bringing to the river now to the impacts to the river i f we don't do anything now because there are feedbacks coming both ways, and they don't see it. (10) 6.5.3. Could You Describe the Climate for Discussions that the Facilitator Established? Another element that is important to fostering interest-based decision-making is having a positive climate for developing dialogue, where people are tough on the problem, not on each other, ground rules are followed and open dialogue can take place. A facilitator felt that the climate was positive early on in the process. Attack the ideas not the person... Actually I think there was a pretty constructive group of people.... I can't remember any kind of personal attack... (11) Four C M interviewees were also positive about the climate for discussions. As for the Steering Committee, there was virtually no difficulty in people working together... (15) On the other hand, five CMs were at least slightly negative about the climate at times, some describing it to be periodically "poisonous" or "hostile." The criticisms were mostly centred on occasions when people did not separate the personal from the professional, resulting in personal attacks and people becoming too fearful to speak their minds. .. .all of a sudden she got trapped, like it was her fault that these permits were not forthcoming... and I thought, "What's going on here?" but it was almost like the process stopped for a second and everything sort of focused on, "What was [she] doing?" ...I remember that; it sort of stood out... (20) There were at times personal attacks, or well, it may not happen on the committee but it would happen afterwards... some people might have felt they had their hands tied behind their back in terms of what they really wanted to say because they felt that i f they did say it in that particular committee that would be used against them and that did happen. (21) A few CMs suggested that the facilitators should have intervened more aggressively to diffuse these situations, but some referred back to the pressure on the Council to keep all interests happy and two felt they may not have been experienced enough given the tremendous skill that it required. I think there might have been situations in which the facilitator could have taken a bit of a stronger role and said, "Look, we clearly have a problem, an issue here. Let's try and explore that. (21) Two of the CMs were sensitive about interactions at the table resulting from differences between the regulator agency representatives' and other CMs ' responsibilities. One S C M interviewee was especially uncomfortable with the way that one regulatory agency representative was dominating the process, while the other felt that a few agency representatives wielded all the power at the table, such that a collaborative decision wasn't viable. Make sure the discussion around the table is balanced, and [the facilitators] did, so [FRMP] didn't have one faction running off and controlling the dialogue and the discussion. (7) 106 In contrast, a regulator C M felt that the facilitators kept the balance. Another C M felt that the regulatory agencies representatives did their best in a difficult situation. The [regulatory agencies] interacted in a professional manner. The difference for these groups is that they have conflicting objectives in the government. On one hand, they're trying to satisfy their mandate. On the other, i f something goes wrong, they're put through the ringer. (13) One of the other issues that some CMs perceived the process to be hampered by was the positional attitude of some CMs. Criticism was particularly targeted towards fisheries interests . and the First Nations. .. .part of the difficulty was that there were all these imperatives of the major stakeholders... (19) On the other hand, there were also interviewees who were positive about the other CMs' efforts to move away from positional stances. I think as they understood the importance of trying to find this middle ground,... that people became more sensitive to the overall issues... people initially are going to come protecting their interests.... [0]ver time, whether it's [through] one-on-one discussions or group discussions, or both, people start to see the bigger picture. (12) 6.5.4. How Well Did the Facilitator Ensure Everyone Had an Equal Opportunity to Participate and Contribute? In terms of responses to whether all of the CMs had an equal opportunity to participate and contribute, two facilitators and five CMs gave positive responses, four CMs gave mixed responses and one gave a negative response. People at the committee level obviously had lots of opportunity and i f they didn't get enough opportunity, then they only have themselves to blame.... I'd be surprised i f anyone said, "I didn't get a chance to say what I had to say." (11) There were some concerns about the participants' opportunity to contribute to the solutions adopted during the Test Implementation phase. The reduced input non-regulator CMs experienced during the Test Implementation phase was mentioned by a few CMs. In defence of the approach that he took, one regulator explained why not all CMs could have an equal opportunity to contribute to the final plan even though they had an equal opportunity to participate in FRMP." ^ I would say everyone had an equal opportunity to participate. It wouldn't be fair to say everyone had an equal opportunity to have a voice in the decision because we weren't all equal.... [W]e had the Land Act and the Water Act and the Fisheries Act, that some people around the table had a say on and others didn't... (17) A couple of the mixed responses related to concerns about the volunteers' capacity to participate as wholly as those who were paid to be there. That's a small thing, but in one way it's not a small thing, because there are people who look at you like, "Well you're just here as volunteers... you don't really mean anything." (20) 107 Interactions between the Regulatory Authorities and Other Committee Members Five regulatory agency CMs were asked whether they felt that the other CMs understood their role as a regulator. One respondent was in agreement, three were mixed and one disagreed, but explained that that was understandable given the changing roles in the provincial government at that time. We had fairly regular meetings so you got to know each other quite well and it didn't take very long to ramp up to a common understanding of what was and wasn't possible and what influence could or couldn't be exerted. (5) It was mixed. I'm thinking of a couple outbursts at some of the meetings and I think there was really intense frustration with some of the stakeholders, almost as i f we had a hidden agenda.... I think there were people at the table who never fully understood the role of government. (17) One regulator C M mentioned that he had "great confidence" in the process because the Council facilitators did understand what the role of government was. There were several exceptional challenges in terms of the interaction between regulatory authorities and other CMs during FRMP. Interviewees emphasized that (1) there were strained interactions between DFO and some. First Nations as a result of the impending court ruling on the Cheam's unauthorized gravel extraction, (2) regulator CMs were assigned a complicated dual role of fulfilling their agencies' mandates through unfettered decision-making and engaging meaningfully on the FRMP committees, and (3) the regulator CMs from the various agencies had different approaches to using FRMP's outputs. There was little that could be done at the table to address the first challenge, the complexity of adapting to legally governed dialogue between DFO and the First Nations on gravel. Many interviewees tended to be understanding about the second consideration, the dual role of the regulator CMs. A few CMs appreciated how the regulator CMs sometimes had little leeway given the mandate they had to deliver. One facilitator explained that when the DFO representatives did not feel that they had enough information to make a decision one year, the committee just had to try to fill those information gaps in the following year. DFO representatives were actually quite open about that problem because on the one hand they wanted to participate, from an administrative point of view they wanted to be part of the process, but quite separate from that they acknowledged that they had a regulatory jurisdiction issue that they had to take off-line from this integrated committee process. (15) Still, there was considerable frustration around the issue since some regulator CMs would agree with the committee in principle but then could not follow through during their internal agency reviews. This led to unfulfilled expectations on the part of some CMs, including other regulators. I would have felt that when the report was signed off, that one could reasonably expect the decision makers to be looking at that report and making decisions consistent with it.... If you sit at the table for two years and are quiet and at the end a consensus report comes out, you can't exactly turn around and say, "I'm not going to issue the licence." (17) The third challenge was the inconsistency with which the various agencies used the recommendations that the FRMP CMs designed. 108 [Land and Water BC] managed the linkage well between their role as a... land authority and participating in the Committee. DFO clearly was unable to and Ministry of Environment... Their roles and relationships were changing so quickly through the election of a new government and so on, that they eventually moved to a position where they were very much supporting the outcome of the plan. (15) 6.5.5. To What Extent Did Politics Affect the Process? The influence of politics was an issue that nine interviewees raised voluntarily, three alluded to without directly mentioning, and a further one responded to when asked. (Although there was no interview question initially relating to politics, it became obvious that it was a frequent theme, and so volunteered comments were added to a new category and some interviewees were asked about it directly.) It is useful to review how the politics occurring outside the process were dealt with within the process. One C M accused the Council of wanting the process to be political, while another explained that the Council could not have done anything to separate FRMP from it. I don't think the facilitators wanted to separate the politics from the process. I think they wanted it to be political and the reason for that is Fraser Basin Council is beholden to the local politicians. The local politicians in the eastern Fraser Valley, in my opinion, are very tightly linked to the Fraser Basin Council. (18) I don't think [the Council] could have [separated FRMP from the politics] because of the nature of our system. The bureaucracy has a political backdrop, and the bureaucracy has a responsibility to keep the system moving within the bounds of policy and legislation, but our political leaders have some ability to influence that and they did.... And because some of these issues were fairly public issues, like the flood hazard side of it... it does filter through... I think we knew inherently... that there would be a political dimension to it, but we never knew how at times it would flare up the way it did. (19) A facilitator expressed that it is always hard to separate the politics from a process and necessary to be sensitive to it. He suggested that a process has to be designed to make sure that the public servants are kept informed and inform the rest of the group i f their elected leaders have particular sensitivities. ...when you get involved in sustainability issues at the level we're involved in, you're going to have political involvement, but as an organization, [the Council's staff] try to stay impartial and apolitical, so we'll be sensitive to that, and brief politicians when they want to be briefed, and then involve them wherever we can, but we recognise that our mandate is broader than that. (12) There were some CMs that sensed that powerful political interests were being protected by certain FRMP CMs who were pushing to extract gravel. At times it was not clear whether the motivation behind the political pressure was because there was money to be made from gravel extraction or there was a high perceived risk of flooding. ...politicians just basically influenced certain parties that, you know, "I don't care what's going on. You've got to remove gravel because people are coming into my office and complaining about, 'Look at all of that gravel out there. We've got to do something.' " (21) 109 I expected [political interest] at the Steering Committee because you had administrators, managers, people who had more of a mandate-type role that they had to convey, whereas at the Technical Committee you would like to hope that people were there because of their technical skills... (21) A- couple of provincial regulators acknowledged that there was pressure from above for them to sign off on the gravel extraction applications. My mandate was, "Extract the gravel from the river because the province has a concern." (14) A C M representing local government went to the extent of suggesting that perhaps politics should have been used earlier instead of dealing with regulatory agency representatives at the FRMP table. ' Perhaps we would have known that it had to take a political route earlier i f we were told that, "Despite the plan being put together, it wasn't necessarily going to be used." (9) Some CMs felt that politicking outside the process overrode the technically rigorous recommendations that they were trying to provide through FRMP. 1 remember asking the District of Chilliwack this specific question,... "So, i f we went out there and just dug a big hole and removed 300,000 cubic metres of gravel anywhere in this stretch of the river, would that keep you happy?" "Yes." It wasn't anything to do with where... it was just a quantity of gravel had to get removed from the river. (21) Four CMs even expressed that they felt FRMP was either overtaken or too tainted by politics to be effective. We were told the local politicians were flying to Ottawa to basically beat on the Minister of Fisheries, in effect, beating up on us technical guys because we were saying, "You don't have the answers yet," or, "You're stretching the positions," or whatever. So how could you have a well facilitated process...? (18) It appears that politics got the better of one C M after influential people outside the process decided they didn't like how he was contributing to FRMP. .. .tell me that I'm wrong and tell me where the error of my ways is, don't tell me, "We don't want you talking about gravel. We're going to move out of government for 18 months... the local MLA's don't like you talking about floodplain development and they don't like you talking about gravel removal in the Fraser." (18) 6.5.6. Summary Interviewees, for the most part, were positive about this criterion. The facilitators were quite successful in getting the FRMP participants to strive for interest-driven negotiations. People developed a good understanding of the various interests, except for the interests of those who were perhaps intentionally ambiguous, and everyone had an opportunity to participate in the dialogue around gravel. One weakness in the facilitation was that some CMs felt that there was not enough intervention to help the committees maintain their ground rules. In spite of the facilitators' efforts, there were other complications that at times made it much harder for the process to remain interest-driven, including challenges in the roles of the regulator agency CMs 110 and political motivations within the committees affecting the degree to which certain interests were met. 6.6. Informed Decision-Making The interviewees had much to say about Informed Decision-Making. The main interview . questions on this criterion centred on whether the information was intellectually accessible, whether access to the information was equitable, whether there was adequate and the right kind of information, and how well science- and values-based arguments were differentiated. FRMP was a technically-intensive process. Many of the classic challenges that occur at the convergence of science and policy arose. In assessing the FRMP case one must acknowledge that the committees were wading into a challenging area in which there were many scientific unknowns. As one facilitator explained: ...even at the best of times, we always had inadequate information and so I think the whole information collection was just an ongoing challenge that we always had to be looking for more and trying to improve our knowledge. (11) This process was a work in progress.... The information needed to make the recommendations by the various stakeholders was being developed... This constrained our ability to move forward faster than we might have otherwise... Some of the frustration around the table was generated by waiting for studies. (13) 6.6.1. How Accessible Was the Technical Information Presented to the Committee Members? There were many highly p