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The elusive quest for statehood : fundamental issues of the state, political cultures and aliran politics… Lanti, Irman G. 2004

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THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR STATEHOOD: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF THE STATE, POLITICAL CULTURES AND ALIRAN POLITICS IN INDONESIA by IRMAN G. LANTI S.IP., Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia M.A., The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF T H E REQUIREMENTS FOR T H E D E G R E E OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in T H E FACULTY O F GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Political Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard T H E UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA March 2004 © Irman G. Lanti, 2004 ABSTRACT This thesis discusses the difficulties faced by the Indonesian state in its attempt to achieve a stable statehood. Three fundamental and unresolved issues have vexed the Indonesian state since the inception of the nationalist movement at the turn of last century: the state foundation (the choice between a secular arrangement or an Islamic state), regionalism (a governmental arrangement dominated by the center or a devolution of power to the regions/districts), and the degree of political competition (an authoritarian state or an open political system). Indonesia is a plural society, with hundreds of ethnic groups, speaking hundreds of languages and dialects. But throughout its history, the ethnic fault line has generally been drawn between the Javanese and the (seberang) outer islanders. The geographic distinction between the agricultural Javanese and the maritime seberang, coupled with the different extent of influence of Hindu-Buddhism, as well as Islam later on, have created divergent politico-cultural traits among these groups. These ethno-religious groups eventually manifested themselves into political groups. Earlier scholars of Indonesian studies, such as Clifford Geertz and Herbert Feith, called these groups the political aliran. There are three major aliran in Indonesia: the nationalists (Javanese-based nominal Muslims), the modernist Muslims [seberang-b&sed purist, reformist Muslims), and the traditionalist Muslims (Javanese-based pious Muslims). Each of these groups has a major political party, supported by a network of mass social institutions, and each holds a distinctive view on the fundamental issues of statehood. Indonesian history has seen the ebb and flow of the aliran. After the heyday of "aZzranism" in the 1950s, Sukarno and Suharto carried out "de-aZiranization" measures in the name of "national unity", which lasted until the outbreak of Reformasi. The reform movement that helped push Suharto from office brought about a resurgence of aliran politics that had been in a state of hibernation for almost four decades. All of the important political parties that have arisen since 1998 have had an aliran cast or shape. The resurgence of the aliran has also marked a return of the debates on the three fundamental issues of the state mentioned above. This thesis has found some reasons why the resurgence of these aliran has complicated the efforts at democratization in Indonesia. All three aliran and their parties profess to want "democracy". But their respective understandings of democracy are different when it comes to the three key issues that have vexed Indonesia throughout its history. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. L is t of Figures , Graphs , a n d Table v i 2. L i s t of Abbrevia t ions a n d A c r o n y m s v i i i 3. Tr ibu tes x i i 4. Chapte r 1: I N T R O D U C T I O N : P O L I T I C A L C U L T U R E , T H E R E V I V A L O F ALIRAN POLITICS, A N D Q U E S T I O N S A B O U T F U N D A M E N T A L I S S U E S O F T H E S T A T E 1 The Purpose of the S tudy ^ Hypotheses a n d Research Ques t ions 2 Wha t Are the Aliran and W h y Are They Important? 4 W h y the Aliran A p p r o a c h Has B e e n Cr i t ic ized? ^ W h y F o c u s on the A l i r a n to Unde r s t and Indones ian Poli t ics Today 21 F u n d a m e n t a l Issues of the State 25 Democracy a n d Democra t iza t ion 30 The Aliran a n d Thei r Pol i t ica l Cu l tu r e Antecedents 3 7 Cr i t i c s of Pol i t ica l Cu l tu r e 44 Pol i t ica l Cu l tu r e M u l t i p l i c i t y W i t h i n One Polity ^ Q Research Methodology Thes is Organiza t ion ^4 Chapte r 2: CONTINUITY A N D C H A N G E IN I N D O N E S I A N POLITICS: P O L I T I C A L C U L T U R E , E X T E R N A L I D E A S , A N D T H E P R I M A C Y O F ALIRAN POLITICS 6 6 Cont inu i ty : Aliran i n Indonesian Pol i t ics 67 C o n t e n d i n g Pol i t i ca l Cu l tu r e s 71 Selective Eclecticism ' x Javanese Political Culture 72 Seberang Political Culture 75 7Q Islamic Influence Cata lys ts for Change: The Ex te rna l Ideas 8 4 Nationalism 8^ Marxism ^ Capitalist Developmentalism 96 Democracy 100 Aliran Ins t i tu t ional Con t inu i ty and Change The Sukarno Era (1945-1965) 1 0 3 The Early New Order Period (1967-1990) 1 1 0 The Late New Order Period (1990-1998) 1 1 6 i i i 6. Chapter 3: REFORMASI M O V E M E N T IN INDONESIA: DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE R E S U R G E N C E OF ALIRAN POLITICS 121 Growing Discontentment: The Failure of the Policies of Political Openness and Economic Deregulation 122 Prelude to The Storm: Currency Crisis and Suharto's Crony Cabinet 133 The Storm Finally Hit: Reformasi Movement And Suharto's Resignation 141 Habibie's Interregnum 152 "New" Political Structure: The Resurgence of Aliran Politics 159 7. Chapter 4: T H E NATIONALISTS: T H E AUTOCRATIC PLURALISTS 176 The Issues 180 The Politico-Cultural Roots of the Nationalist Aliran 181 Leadership and Political Competition 187 Regionalism and Centralization 198 State Foundation 208 8. Chapter 5: T H E MODERNISTS: T H E EGALITARIAN, MAJORITARIAN ISLAMISTS 220 Leadership and Political Competition 225 Regionalism and Centralization 237 State Foundation 246 9. Chapter 6: THE TRADITIONALISTS: T H E F L E X I B L E HYBRIDS 263 Leadership and Political Competition 268 Regionalism and Centralization 279 State Foundation 286 iv 10. Chapter 7: CONCLUSION: ALIRAN POLITICS, POLITICAL CULTURE, DEMOCRACY, AND T H E STATE 300 The Aliran and Fundamental Issues of the State 304 The Primacy of Political Culture i n Indonesia's Aliran Politics 318 Reformasi, Democracy, and the Return of Aliran Politics 326 The Relevance of the Aliran Approach in the Study of Indonesian Politics 336 Afterthoughts: An Erosion of Aliran Politics? 344 The Future of Democracy in Indonesia 348 11. BIBLIOGRAPHY 352 Textbooks 352 Articles, Reports, Newspaper Articles, Speeches and Others 361 List of Interviews 373 v LIST OF FIGURES, GRAPHS, AND TABLE 1. Figure 1: INDONESIAN POLITICAL ALIRAN (1945-1965; FEITH REVISED) 104 2. Figure 2: INDONESIAN POLITICAL ALIRAN (1971 - 1990) 104 3. Figure 3: INDONESIAN POLITICAL ALIRAN (1990 - 1998) 160 4. Figure 4: INDONESIAN POLITICAL ALIRAN (1998 - ...) 160 5. Graph 1: Distribution of PDI-P Seats According to Region (Result of 1999 Election) 166 6. Graph 2: Distribution of PNI Seats According to Region (Result of 1955 Election) 166 7. Graph 3: Distribution of the Modernist Parties Seats According to Region (Result of 1999 Election) 166 8. Graph 4: Distribution of Masyumi Seats According to Region (Result of 1955 Election) 166 9. Graph 5: Distribution of PKB Seats According to Region (Result of 1999 Election) 166 10. Graph 6: Distribution of NU Seats According to Region (Result of 1955 Election) 166 11. Graph 7: Faction Composition of Members of Parliament (DPR) 167 11. Graph 8: Political Aliran Affiliaton of Members of Parliament (DPR) 167 12. Graph 9: Voting Pattern According to Political Aliran Coalition 168 v i 13. Graph 10: Voting Pattern According to Political Aliran Coalition 168 14. Graph 11: Voting Pattern According to Political Aliran Coalition 168 15. Graph 11: Voting Pattern According to Political Aliran Coalition 168 16. Graph 12: Voting Pattern According to Political Aliran Coalition 169 17. Table 1: Islamic Political Orientations among Indonesian Muslims 259 18. Table 2: Orientations among Indonesian Muslims toward Islamic Parties 261 19. The Political Platforms of the Aliran Concerning the Three Fundamental Issues of the State 304 vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ABRI Bakorstanas Banser Baperki Barnas BPPN BPUPKI B U CIDES CPDS CSIS DDII DKP DPR F K M S J Fordem Forkot Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) Badan Koordinasi Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional (Coordinating Body for the Maintenance of National Stability) Barisan Serbaguna (Auxilliary Force), NU's youth organization Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body) Barisan Nasional (National Front) Badan Penyehatan Perbankan Nasional (Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency) Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Indonesian Independence Preparatory Studies Body) Budi Utomo Center for Information and Development Studies Center for Policy and Development Studies Centre for Strategic and International Studies Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication) Dewan Kehormatan Perwira (Officers' Honor Council) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives; parliament) Forum Komunikasi Senat Mahasiswa Jakarta (Communication Forum of Student Senates of Jakarta) Forum Demokrasi (Democracy Forum) Forum Kota (City Forum) vm G30S/PKI Golkar HMI ICMI IPKI IPTN Iramasuka ISDV KAMMI KISDI K K N KPU Kodarn Jaya Kopkamtib Kostrad MAR Masyumi MPR Gerakan 30 September / Parted Komunis Indonesia (September 30 t h Movement / Indonesian Communist Party) Golongan Karya (Functional Group) Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic Students Association) Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Musl im Intellectuals Association) Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia - Association of Indonesia's Independence Supporters) Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (Nusantara Aircraft Industry) Irian Jaya, Maluku, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereniging (Indies Social Democratic Association) Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (United Action of Indonesian Musl im Students) Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World) Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme (Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism) Komisi Pemilihan Umum (General Elections Commission) Komando Daerah Militer Jakarta Raya (Greater Jakarta Regional Military Command) Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban - Command for the Restoration of Security and Order Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Reserve Command) Majelis Amanat Rakyat (People's Trust Council) Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Musl im Consultative Council) Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly) ix MPRS Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (Provisional People's Consultative Assembly) Nasakom Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis (Nationalism, Religion, Communism) NU Nahdatul Ulama (The Ulemas Awakening) P4 Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Guidelines for the Comprehension and Application of Pancasila) Parkindo Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party) PAN Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) PBB Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent and Stars Party) PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party) PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle) PK Partai Keadilan (Justice Party) PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) P K U Partai Kebangkitan Umat (Muslims Awakening Party) PMP Pendidikan Moral Pancasila (Pancasila Moral Education) PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party) PPKI Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia - Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) PRRI/Permesta Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/ Piagam Perjuangan Semesta (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia/ Charter of Common Struggle) PSI Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party) RCTI Rajawali Citra Teleuisi Indonesia (Indonesian first private television station) SI Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union) TGPF Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta (Joint Fact-Finding Team) x TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Military) TPI Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia (Indonesian Educational Television) x i T R I B U T E S O mankind! *We created you from a single (pair) of a maCe and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise (each other). The Quran 49:13 I'CC6e there someday, I can go the distance I wiCCfindmy way, if I can be strong I know every miCe wiCC6e worth my whiCe 'When I go the distance, TCC6e right where I belong Go the (Distance, 9d. <3oCton This thesis is a product of four long years of research. It has undergone various challenges and tribulations. Numerous drafts have been written before it came to its present form. Insights, discussion, and criticism abounded, but the most critical insights probably came from the "tyranny of events." These were especially harsh, coming from a polity undergoing tremendous, rapid, change such as post-Suharto Indonesia. This study has attempted to demonstrate that despite all the turbulent changes that have rocked Indonesia during the last six or seven years, the underlying current of the Indonesian polity has remained the same. Indonesia is a plural society with various groups competing for space in a limited political sphere. These groups, termed the aliran in this research, have shown tremendous resilience. They have survived despite many attempts to subdue, coopt, or even suppressed them. This research has also tried to argue that many issues that have divided the country since the inception of the movement for national independence in the 1920s remained debated unti l nowadays. Should the republic's founding parents be reincarnated, they would not be too far behind in the current public discourse. This is of course a sad phenomenon for an Indonesian like myself. The country seems to have been vexed by the differences in viewing the state's fundamental issues: what ideology should the state be based, should it be a semi-secular ideology known as Pancasila or should it be Islam, the religion of the majority of its people, should it be run as a free country or should political aspirations be tamed, and should it be governed as a unitary state controlled by the center or should the local aspirations be allowed to exert themselves, and to what extent? xii Looking back to history, we are able to reflect that these questions remained unsolved because the a/iran-based groups have not been given the appropriate time and avenue to evolve, coalesce, and eventually achieve an equil ibrium. B u t of course, we can also speculate that the aliran are sufficiently self-interested, so that allowing them to roam unchecked i n the political wilderness would only h a r m Indonesia. These difficulties aside, I marvel at the ability of m y compatriots to overcome these tribulations a n d reaffirm their conviction i n the "Indonesian dream" to achieve a true, working nationhood. The present report would not have come to fruition h a d it not for the kindness of so many people. First and foremost is Professor Diane Mauzy , the research supervisor. She h a d spent many hours reading, revising, and commenting on this thesis. Time that I realize, she would have preferred to spend on doing something else. I am eternally grateful for the efforts and especially the confidence that she has bestowed u p o n me. I am equally grateful to Professors J o h n Wood and Br ian Job, members of supervisory committee, who have provided comments and consistent encouragement, especially when times were hard. I would also like thank the Department of Political Science, University of Bri t ish C o l u m b i a for providing me support for the duration of six years that I have been its graduate student, i n the forms of tuition scholarship, entry scholarship, a n d the m u c h needed teaching assistantship. The opportunity to serve as T A has, I believe, also enriched my professional capability. Countless thanks should be conveyed to the wonderful, articulative individuals , w h o m I met i n Jakarta, Singapore, or Vancouver, who have spent their precious time to express their thoughts on the various subjects related to this research. I have been honored to be able to spend a significant portion of m y field research at institutes i n Singapore a n d Indonesia. I would like to express highest appreciation to Mr . Barry Desker and Professor Amitav Acharya , Director a n d Deputy Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore for granting me with a one year, eight months visiting research fellowship 2001-2002 , dur ing which period the b u l k of this report was written. I am also grateful to colleagues at the institute, especially Dr . Leonard Sebastian, for insights, comments, a n d most of all, friendship that have accompanied me all the while. In 2000 , I spent the summer months at the Institute of Southeast A s i a n Studies (ISEAS), Singapore. D u r i n g the period, I wrote a working paper, which would become the foundation of this study. I am thankful to Professor C h i a Siow Yue, former director of the Institute, for granting me the opportunity. B a c k home, I a m grateful for the opportunity to spend a few months dur ing the fall of 2002 at the Habibie Center, Jakarta, where I will be returning to after the end of this C a n a d i a n sojourn. The appreciation especially goes to Dr . A . Watik Pratiknya, executive director and Dr . Dewi F o r t u n a Anwar, director of research and program. xiii Back in Vancouver in 2003-2004, I have been greatly aided by the Centre for Southeast Asian Research at the UBC's Institute of Asian Research that has provided me with a comfortable space to work and toil many nights away. I am especially grateful to the Centre's director, Professor Michael Leaf. During the last six years, I have been shuttling back and forth between three points on the Pacific Rim: Vancouver, Singapore, and Jakarta. But I always felt at home in all three places. This would not have been possible had it not for the camaraderie, friendship, and willingness to provide continuous moral support of all the wonderful people. In Singapore, I am proud to become a member of a small community of graduate students at the Nanyang Technological University. In Vancouver, many friends, especially among the small but closely-knitted Indonesian community have accompanied my days. The kindness of the staffs at the consulate general of the republic of Indonesia has helped tremendously. I am in debt to consul generals Ibu Binarti Fajar Sumirat and her predecessor, Bapak Marlis Syamsuddin. Last but not least, my family back home has been the most reliable support system that I have had. Mamah, Papap, and the whole Lanti family, as well as Mami, Papi, and the Jusuf Supardi family have always been there for me and would jump to my aid whenever I cried for help. My wife, Mayang, has been an endless source of inspiration. Her love, friendship, and constant encouragement have been a gift that I always treasure. My daughter Kalista Maharani and son Andhika Reyhan have become my foremost reasons to exist. I always admire their cheerfulness and resilience, despite the constant absence of their father. The last six years must have been painful for them for all those nights and days that I was not on their side, and be a proper father and husband. Hopefully, the struggle would bring its prize. Many people have contributed in many different ways to the completion of this study, as well as to the enrichment of my life for the last six years. The fallacies contained in the pages to follow, however, remain mine. This thesis is dedicated to thepearCs of my heart: Mayang, %atista, and ftndhika I am coming home! Vancouver, March 2004 xiv CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL CULTURE, THE REVIVAL OF ALIRAN POLITICS, AND QUESTIONS ABOUT FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF THE STATE This chapter provides information about how this study is to be conducted. It defines the subject matter, discusses the theoretical approaches, formulates the research questions, identifies the choice of research methodology, and lays out the organization of the thesis. THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY The phenomenon of political change in Indonesia is interesting to observe both for practical and academic purposes. More than fifty years after independence, three important issues critical to governance and the nature of the state in Indonesia remain unresolved and contentious. These issues concern, first, the state foundation. Should Indonesia remain a secular Pancasila state or should it become an Islamic state? Second, should Indonesia remain a unitary state with highly centralized powers and an emphasis on national unity, or should power be devolved so that the regions would have more authority in handling their own affairs? Third, should Indonesia be governed as a strong, autocratic developmental state, or a polity in which open political competition is the norm? The rise of the Reformasi movement and the dramatic fall of President Suharto after more than three decades of oligarchic rule, opened the doors to more open political competition and in so doing revitalized the debate over these 1 crucial political issues once again. Although surprising to some, this critical juncture also witnessed the return to dominance of aZzran-based politics, despite four decades of effort by former Presidents Sukarno and Suharto, in the name of national unity, to suppress aliran segmental allegiances and divisions. In terms of attempts to implement democratic institutions, norms and procedures, there are some striking similarities between the political situation now, and that of the first years of independence in the 1950s. Despite fifty years of national unity efforts and economic development that has led to the creation of an educated middle class, the potential for turmoil in Indonesia today remains high. HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS The focus of this thesis rests on explaining these important issues of governance in terms of the beliefs and political goals of the major aliran1 networks. Hence this thesis proposes the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 1: The political scene in Indonesia is once again dominated by aZiran-based group identities. Consequently, the debates over the state foundation, state institutions, regional arrangements, and type and form of governance are being delineated, shaped and waged by the elites of the three major aliran segments. In this thesis, the term "aliran" is used both as a noun, e . g . , indicating "streams" of thinking and beliefs of the major a l i r a n , and as an adjective, e . g . , a l i r a n affiliations, networks, segments, groups, politics, allegiances, institutional manifestations, etc. 2 Hypothesis 2: The key to understanding the political positions, beliefs and goals of the aliran-based groups reside in their respective political cultures. Hypothesis 3: While the Reformasi movement and the fall of Suharto have contributed to a climate and spirit favorable to democratization, the outcome of the process is endangered because of the different views held by each of the aliran groups as to what democracy actually means when it comes to governing a state like Indonesia. These hypotheses will be tested by exploration of the following questions: 1. What are the political aliran? What are their ethno-cultural bases? How do the politico-cultural traits of the ethnic groups comprising them affect their political behavior? What are the institutional manifestations of the political aliran and how have these changed over time from the beginnings of the independence movement unti l the Reformasi era? 2. What was the Reformasi movement all about? Was it pro-democracy or just anti-Suharto? Did the open political competitive structure created by the Reformasi movement lead to the revitalization of aZiran-based politics? 3. What was the relationship between aliran affiliation and the platforms and the support bases of the major political parties in the 1999 general election? What similarities can be observed with the 1955 general election held during the previous democratic period? 4. How have the aZiran-based parties and institutions, their elites and their representatives in state bodies viewed the fundamental political issues of the state foundation, regionalism, and political competition since the 3 beginnings of Indonesia's Independence movement? Has there been a resurgence of conflicting discourse among the aZzran-based segments on these issues during the Reformasi era? How have the positions of the major aliran in terms of these issues evolved over time? 5. What is the impact of free elections and more open politics on the political stability of the state? What are the prospects for Indonesia's future? WHAT ARE THE ALIRAN AND WHY ARE THEY IMPORTANT? In the Indonesian setting, the groups that make up Indonesia's important political segments are known as "aliran." The definitions of aliran are usually divided into two large clusters. The first definition is used more often in anthropological and cultural studies of Indonesia, since the concept was first coined in an anthropological study by Clifford Geertz in the 1950s. The focus of Geertz's study was on the divergent socio-religious practices in the Javanese community, between the syncretic abangan, the pious santri, and the aristocratic priyayi.2 Political scientists Herbert Feith and Lance Castles expanded the concept of the aliran as political parties encircled by a number of social organizations, which are linked through formal or informal networks. 3 A number of studies have been undertaken using the political aliran perspective, especially in the 2 Clifford Geertz (1960) The Religion of Java, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 3 Herbert Feith (1970) "Introduction," in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, eds. (1970) Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 4 1960s and 1970s. 4 A further definition of aliran reflects its anthropological roots but contains political elements. For example, Benedict Anderson refers to a unique, integral cultural outlook adhered to by a number of people with a similar world-view who are either organized or unorganized (but potentially organizable) in socio-political groupings. 5 In fact, the utilization of the aliran concept by political scientists could be perceived as an extension of the anthropological perspective, as an attempt to gauge the saliency of the divergent socio-cultural groupings in the political arena. The political science use of the aliran could therefore be defined as structural, as it focuses more on the aliran organizations and institutions, such as major political parties and associated major social organizations, whereas the anthropological use is more strictly cultural, as it focuses on the ideational aspects and socio-cultural practices. However, it should be noted here that this division is not, by any measure, neat or clear-cut. Analyses of political issues, such as the relations between religion and state, were given considerable attention even in Geertz's, The Religion of Java. 6 Feith's "streams of political thinking" also dealt with some ideational analysis, albeit not to a great extent. And then of course, Anderson's Language and Power was perhaps the best work l inking both the 4 See for example, the analysis of the influence of the aliran on the elite bureaucracy in Donald K. Emmerson (1976) Indonesia's Elite: Political Culture and Cultural Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. On the operation of aliran politics in the local level, see William R. Liddle (1970) Ethnicity, Party, and National Integration: An Indonesian Case Study, New Haven: Yale University Press. 5 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson (1972) "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," reprinted in Benedict R. O'G. Anderson (1990) Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, fn. 85. 6 See ibid., especially Chapters 13 and 15. 5 political and the cultural in the Indonesian analytical setting. Nevertheless, there is yet to be a systematic effort at mapping out the relationship between the structural, embodied in political aliran groupings, and the cultural, in terms of general group perceptions, on statehood matters. Anderson's work could actually be perceived as a beginning in this direction. However, primarily it covered only one facet of the segmented society, albeit of the majority and dominant group, the Javanese political culture and its manifestation in Indonesian politics. While significant and important, Javanese political culture is but one subset of Indonesian society. It shares the same political space with other groups. These other groups who, for lack of a better term are known collectively as the seberang peoples, are spread throughout the archipelago (including the non-heartland of Java), which partly explains the difficulties in mapping out their political culture. However, they do share some common traits that eventually give rise to a discernible pattern of politico-cultural perceptions. It is important to note here that the role of Islam and its different modes of reception by different peoples of the archipelago, as well as its interaction with local tradition, also significantly influenced the politico-cultural traits of the aliran groups. This thesis identifies three major aliran groups. 7 The nationalists draw support from the abangan heartland of Java (occupying the fertile land in south-central parts of the island). Javanese society is agrarian, with a long 7 Also known as "aliran politik" (streams of political thinking). Clifford Geertz introduced this concept to academic circles in The Religion of Java. Subsequent efforts to map out and analyze the aliran were carried out by several Indonesianists. The most prominent of these were included in the Herbert Feith and Lance Castles edited book (1970), Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 6 history of encounters with foreign influence. Unity and harmony are among the most cherished values. One of the hallmarks of Javanese culture is syncreticism. The Javanese have adapted a succession of foreign influences into their own indigenous cultural traits. The arrival of Islam, therefore, did not wipe out the previous Hindu-Buddhist civilizations. They tended to be complementary, so as to create a socio-religious practice that was quite different from any of the religious beliefs practiced elsewhere. The term "abangan" reflects the relaxed, syncretic outlook of the Javanese. 8 The modernist Muslims have roots in the seberang culture. Many of the seberang societies, especially the more assertive ones, such as the peoples of Sumatra and Sulawesi, are maritime-based. These societies tend to be more competitive and less obsessed with ideas of unity and harmony. The Hindu-Buddhist influence in these societies is also relatively less than in Java, except in the notable case of the Sriwijaya Empire. Islamic influence is thus more significant in these societies. The seberang generally practice Islam in a more pure, orthodox way than their Javanese brethren. In Indonesian political lexicon, they are known as the santri (pious Muslims). The traditionalists are the hybrid aliran group. Most of the traditionalists hail from the eastern part of Java, out of the direct influence of the courts of the Javanese heartland, but still significantly influenced by the Javanese outlook. They are also santri in terms of Islamic practice, while at the same time are also syncretic. Elsewhere in this thesis they are also referred to as the Javanese santri. The traditionalist socio-educational institutions are known as the pesantren, whose history predates the arrival of Islam. With the arrival of Islam, 8 For abangan religious practices, consult Geertz, op.cit., part 1. 7 Islamic teaching merely took over the theological content of these educational institutions, while keeping most of the rituals and societal structure of the past civilization. Indonesia is perhaps the best instance of what J .S. Furnivall termed a "plural society." Politics in plural societies have always been an interesting phenomenon, particularly because ethnicity tends to divide people and these divisions gain saliency when ethnic groups compete for scarce resources. Furnivall defines a plural society as "one in which ... different sections of the community live side by side, but separately, within the same political unit." 9 Such a society is marked by the presence of multiple ethnic groups in a geographical locale under common political administration. These communal segments are psychological communities possessing a collective identity based on similar cultural traits. 1 0 The various ethnic groups interact with each other in temporal affairs. However, in some of these societies, each of the ethnic groups develops its own institution, regulates its own affairs, maintains its own culture, and carries out education and political socialization in separate institutions. As a result, while living in proximity with occasional interaction, the separateness of socio-cultural and political traditions and institutions means that the relationship between these groups has the potential for conflict. Being confined to a single political unit with limited resources, these segments of the political system may conflict as they interact. In some instances, these groups live side-by-side peacefully for quite an extended period of time. But it is 9 J.S. Furnivall (1948) Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 304. 1 0 Ted Gurr (1993) Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace. 8 the state or other external parties that often inadvertently or otherwise bring these groups into actual conflict. There are also instances where cooperation among the segments to achieve common goals is possible and indeed becomes the norm, as in the case of Malaysia's ruling multiethnic coalition, the Barisan Nasional. Such cooperation is especially possible when there is sufficient commonality in cultural values and/or a coincidence of interests. Conversely, when these are lacking or minimal, a conflictual relationship among the segments often predominates. Since the advent of a nationalist movement in Indonesia early last century, the task of nation-building has been considered a daunting one. An amalgamation of more than 300 ethnic groups, speaking 365 local languages and dialects, living in a territory of 13,660 islands that make up the largest archipelago i n the world, the "nation" of Indonesia came into existence only by external intervention rather than through a natural internal process. Consequently, there is a multifaceted nationalism in Indonesia. According to Anthony D. Smith, there are two types of nationalism as movements, i.e., territorial and ethnic nationalism. The former refers to the creation of states based on certain definable territories. Usually these states include several ethnic groups living within the territory. What binds these disparate ethnies together is the idea of "a community of laws and institutions with a single political w i l l . " 1 1 As a movement, territorial nationalism seeks to achieve self-determination by opposing foreign colonial rulers, at least in the cases of Asia and Africa. As a state, it seeks to integrate divergent ethnic and religious 1 1 Anthony D. Smith (1991) National Identity, Reno: University of Nevada Press, pp. 9-11. 9 components into a political community through the use of symbols and creation of a new national culture. 1 2 Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, is bound by the conception of ethnic and ascriptive commonalities. A nation of this type is defined by the properties and symbolism belonging to the single or predominant ethnic group that make it up . 1 3 As a movement, ethnic nationalism tends to give rise to secessionist movements when an ethnic group seeks to establish a nation based on its own ethnicity or 'pan' movements (when an ethnic group seeks to achieve nationhood by incorporating the ethnic kinsmen living in the territories of another state).1 4 Smith's typology might explain the difficulties faced by many plural societies such as Indonesia in their nation-building efforts. It is plausible to assert that had the European colonial powers not carved up the region according to their own political and economic exigencies, the region of Sumatra, for example, would possibly have been united with Peninsular Malaysia (Malaya), since the two regions historically had been situated in the sphere of influence and control of the ancient kingdoms of Srivijaya and Malacca. Likewise, Java, with its long tradition, would probably have been established as a separate nation-state. 1 5 In the words of Benedict Anderson: 12 Ibid., pp. 79-84. 13 Ibid., pp. 11-13. 14 Ibid., pp. 82-83. 1 5 For a succinct historical account of Indonesia's ancient kingdoms and their consequences for modern Indonesia, consult Nicholas Tarling, ed. (1992) The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, especially chapters 3-5, and David J . Steinberg, ed. (1987) In Search of Southeast Asia, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, chapters 10, 17-18. 10 Some of the peoples on the eastern coast of Sumatra are not only physically close, across narrow Straits of Malacca, to the populations of the western littoral of the Malay peninsula, but they are ethnically related, understand each other's speech, have a common religion, and so forth. These same Sumatrans share neither mother-tongue, ethnicity, nor religion with the Ambonese, located on islands thousands of miles away to the east. Yet during this century they have come to understand the Ambonese as fellow-Indonesians, the Malays as foreigners. 1 6 As probably expected, maintaining such a diverse archipelago under a single political entity is a difficult task indeed. Throughout its history, Indonesia has always been plagued by secessionist claims. This was especially true in the outer islands (non-Java) regions. The provinces of Aceh in Sumatra, Irian Jaya (West Papua), the Maluku, and later on East Timor in the eastern part had a long history of struggle for self-determination. Most of the ethnic separatist movements were quelled by the use of force by the central government. However, while ethnic nationalism at various times posed a threat to the territorial integrity of the Indonesian state, power and politics tended to be concentrated overwhelmingly in the center or at the national level. This was due to two reasons. The first reason has to do with the politico-cultural traits of the dominant majority group, the Javanese. The Javanese conception of power necessitates that power be concentrated in one individual or group located at the center. A dispersion of power is regarded as a sign of weakness on the part of the power holder. 1 7 The second reason was the emulation of the colonial 1 6 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso, pp. 120-121. 1 7 For a discussion of the Javanese conception of power, see Benedict R.O'G. Anderson (1972) "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," reprinted in Benedict R.O'G. Anderson (1990), Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. This subject and its implications for Indonesian politics will also be discussed in Chapter 2. 11 example. While the Dutch ruled the East Indies indirectly for the good part of their 350 years of colonization, from the beginning of the 20 t h century, coinciding with the territorial consolidation of the archipelago, their rule became more direct and controlled from the center. It was at this period that the nationalist movement began to blossom and the form of governance that the nationalists learned from the Dutch entailed a high degree of centralization. As a result, the idea of territorial nationalism was significantly stronger in determining the system and structure of Indonesian politics than were particular ethnic and regional aspirations. The presence of European colonial powers eventually created among the local population a sense of nationalism and anti-colonialism that the elites molded into a powerful nationalist ideology. The nationalist ideology was born out of a reaction against the perceived common sufferings produced by colonialism. Being brought together under one colonial administration, that of the Dutch, these local peoples shared similar experiences of exploitation, then experienced rising expectations due to some educational privileges, and eventually experienced discrimination in both public and private spheres of life. The consolidation of Western rule in the territory also brought about increased mobility for the local population. This was the result of introduction of the means of modern transportation. Roads and railways connected regions of Java, thus reduced traveling time significantly. The same happened in parts of Sumatra. The outer islands were connected to Java and to each other by steamships, which traveled faster than the wind- and human-powered vessels 12 traditionally used by the peoples of the archipelago. The increased mobility facilitated more intense contacts among the peoples and created a sense of common identity, being inlanders18 in the Netherlands East Indies. The nationalist impulse that started at the outset of the 20 t h century was driven by an overwhelming sense of purpose: decolonization. During the last couple of decades of Dutch colonial administration, it appeared that the divergent peoples of the archipelago were united behind the idea of achieving independent statehood. Every organization established by peoples of different socio-cultural backgrounds aspired to the creation of an independent Indonesia, while at the same time confirming particular identities. Thus, the first modern organizations in Indonesia, such as Budi Utomo, Sarekat Islam, and Jong Java were based on ethnicity or religion but at the same time were nationalist in orientation. Despite the strong nationalist orientation of the political organizations, segmental politics divided the country along ethnic or religion lines. The aspiration of the segments, however, did not resemble ethnic nationalism as defined by Smith. The main political segments operated within the strict framework of territorial nationalism. Ethnicity in this sense took a different form. The segments based their views of what should comprise Indonesia or how Indonesia should be politically organized based on the politico-cultural traits from which they emanated. Their views sharply differed from one another This refers to native peoples. Generally, the Dutch colonial administrations divided and ranked people into three classes with different privileges. The Dutch and other Europeans occupied the highest rank, next came the Chinese, Arabs, Indians and other Asians. The inlanders occupied the lowest rank. 13 and at various times have led to a conflict-ridden and divisive political system, albeit still in the framework of a national state. Aliran politics surfaced almost immediately after independence. This was first apparent from debates surrounding the issue of the state foundation of the newborn nation. The Islamic parties and organizations strongly advocated Islam as the state religion and ideology, while the nationalists and Marxists were in favor of a secularist ideology. In the face of the Dutch effort to re-colonize the territory after the proclamation of independence in 1945, the issue was resolved momentarily as the political segments recreated a common front against the Dutch. However, soon after statehood appeared to be secured, this divisive ideological issue resurfaced again. For the good portion of the republic's life, this issue has tormented the Indonesian state. Throughout the course of Indonesian politics, the three political aliran segments have dominated its landscape. Over periods of time, the patterns of political relationships among the segments have been i n a state of constant flux. The extent of power and influence exerted by the segments has also ebbed and flowed. During the debate on the state foundation, the traditionalist and the modernist Muslims were united in advocating Islam uis-d-vis the nationalists, backed by the communists and other leftist groups on the other side. The political competition after the 1955 election in both the Parliament and the konstituante19 was lively, and because none of the aliran groups could dominate, created a stalemate in the constitution-drafting process. In the face of growing regional rebellions, Sukarno issued the Presidential Decree in 1959. 1 9 The Constituent Assembly, was a high state body tasked with drafting a new constitution. It was set up as a result of the 1955 election. 14 As a result, Sukarno and the nationalist aliran dominated the political landscape and the other aliran fell almost into oblivion. The ascendancy of the New Order regime, controlled by the Army, reflected another phase in the domination of Javanese political culture, although a decline in aZiran-based politics. While the relationship between the nationalist civilian politicians and Army officers was estranged at times, both actually shared many commonalities in terms of political culture. The birth of the Reformasi movement in 1997, which helped topple the New Order regime, recreated an open and competitive political system. Almost by default, aliran politics regained ascendancy and became tangled again in political competition. The history of the Indonesian political system has been marked by oscillation between two poles, authoritarianism or closed/controlled political order, and democratic or open political competition. The period of relative openness lasted for nine years (1950-1959) followed by Sukarno's authoritarianism (1959-1965). In contrast, Suharto's autocratic New Order regime persisted for 32 years before crumbling in 1997. As a result, no established system of governance has been consolidated in Indonesia. Instead, the route has been volatile and precarious. 2 0 WHY THE ALIRAN APPROACH HAS BEEN CRITICIZED The aliran model is not without its critics. While many Indonesianists find the model quite useful in explaining the country's political dynamics, especially on electoral matters, some Indonesians see the model as 2 0 Clifford Geertz (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books, pp. 311, 315. 15 oversimplifying Indonesian governance issues, processes and players. This critique is correct on two counts. First, while the aliran segments are significant, they do not constitute the total landscape of groups. There are other non-aZzran political entities, such as the minority groups, organized in political parties or otherwise. These groups include the Christian minorities, which in the past established important medium-sized parties, the Partai Katolik (Catholic Party) and Parkindo (Partai Kristen Indonesia - Indonesian Christian Party). 2 1 The results of the 1955 election showed how important these parties were. They came in the sixth and seventh positions, almost right after the what was then four major aliran parties of the nationalist PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia - Indonesian National Party), the modernist Masyumi (Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia - Indonesian Musl im Council), the traditionalist NU (Nahdatul Ulama - The Ulemas Awakening), and the communist PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia - Indonesian Communist Party). They made a more significant presence regionally. In the same election, Parkindo came in as a close runner-up after Masyumi in the Maluku electoral district, while Partai Katolik won the election overwhelmingly in East Nusa Tenggara. 2 2 Both parties survived the Guided Democracy era, but during the New Order they were forced to merge with the PNI and other nationalist-based parties to form the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Indonesian Democratic Party). 2 1 On these parties, consult Paul Webb (1978) Indonesian Christians and Their Political Parties, Townsville, Queensland: South East Asian Monograph Series, No. 2, James Cook University. 2 2 The results of 1955 election and its analysis can be found in Herbert Feith (1957) The Indonesian Elections of 1955, Ithaca, New York: Interim Reports Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University. 16 The other important group are the ethnic Chinese. This group played an active socio-political role, especially prior to the communist-attempted coup in 1965. The largest Chinese socio-political organization that made an impact on Indonesian politics was the Baperki (Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia - Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body). Formed in 1954, Baperki participated in the 1955 election, albeit acquiring only one seat in the parliament. But perhaps the most important step in the Indonesian Chinese political history was the strategic decision of Baperki's leaders to align themselves with the PKI, which was on the ascendancy in the 1960s. Baperki enjoyed its alliance with the communists for it was able not only to dominate the Chinese community but also to steer the course of public debate with regards to the Chinese issues, although this alliance proved fatal later on after the communist purge in 1966. But perhaps due to the overwhelming majority of pribumi (indigenous) Indonesians and of nominal and devout Mus l ims , 2 3 these two important groups have not been able to rival the major aliran segments in terms of significance on the national political landscape. These two minorities have therefore followed a flexible strategy vis-d-uis the major aliran segments in order to survive in Indonesian society. In the period leading to Guided Democracy, the Catholics maintained a good rapport with Masyumi figures. The leader of Partai Katolik, I.J. Kasimo, was known to have a close, mutually respectful relationship with the Masyumi's leader, Natsir. While both parties differed significantly in the 2 3 Statistics vary from one source or one time period to another, but it is generally believed that the Chinese in Indonesia consist of fewer than five percent of the total population. For comparison, in Malaysia, for example, the percentage of Chinese population is around 35 percent. Indonesia's nominal and devout Muslims are believed to be around 85 percent of the total population. 17 discourse on the state foundation, they shared a common perception with regard to Sukarno's autocratic tendency. In response to Guided Democracy, the leaders of Masyumi, Partai Katolik, and Parkindo formed the Liga Demokrasi (Democratic League) in 1960, with the aim of advocating a return to parliamentary democracy. 2 4 But during the nationalist New Order, especially during its early period, the Christians and the modernists appeared to be in completely opposite camps. The modernists were vehemently against the so-called "Kristenisasf (Christianization) that they alleged was being conducted by Christians closely associated with the regime. Conservative modernist organizations, such as KISDI (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam -Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity) and DDE (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia - Indonesian Islamic Dakwah Council), were at the forefront of this anti-Kristenisasi movement. The Chinese, by contrast, have never shared the political views of the modernists to any extent. While it does not mean that there is a permanent similarity of interests, the Chinese have traditionally been closer to the nationalists and to a lesser extent to the traditionalists, than to the modernists. This is perhaps because the Javanese have tended to be more ethnically tolerant. The nationalists' insistence on having the state based on a secular ideology that would maintain pluralism, has led the Chinese to view them as an attractive alternative to the modernists' insistence on having Islam as the state ideology. But during the New Order, the reasons for Chinese acquiescence to and support for the regime might have been somewhat different. The authoritarian regime made it difficult for any group to maintain a dissenting 2 4 Webb, op.cit, pp. 78-81. 18 position. As a result, the Chinese communities proximity to the regime could be seen as an effort to survive, especially after its previous fateful association with the communists that ended in the 1966-1967 pogroms. Additionally, the regime also needed the Chinese to assist in development efforts. Traditionally, the Chinese ran much of the economic activity of the country, so the New Order provided incentives for Chinese businesses to set up joint ventures with some pribumi entrepreneurs, or with family members of the ruling elite. As a result, many Chinese business people became close associates of the regime. The second criticism of the aliran approach is also worth examining. The major groups coalesce into their aliran networks mostly only on a limited range of issues relating to statehood. These issues include those to be examined in this study, namely the state foundation, degree of centralization or regional autonomy, and degree of political openness and competition. On these high-political issues, the stance of some aliran, especially the nationalists and to a lesser extent the modernists, tend to be consistent over time, while the traditionalists have shown their flexibility. But the aliran organizations rarely develop any significant platforms on non- or low-political issues, even those that have some direct relevance to public policy, such as development and economics, let alone issues considered new for the public discourse in developing nations, such as the role of women and the environment. The aliran elite tend to draw on foreign ideas, such as capitalist developmentalism or Marxism, to set up policy frameworks should the need arise. They also tend to measure their position relatively to those adopted by the others. So, if there is a change in the outlook of a rival aliran on a certain issue, the others tend to amend their positions accordingly. This is apparent from the 19 comparison of economic platforms of the nationalists and the modernists over time. In the 1950s and 1960s, the nationalists adopted a state-based, command economy. The ideology of Marhaenism driving the nationalists at the time was even dubbed as "socialism a la Indonesia." The modernists at this time were widely recognized as representing the entrepreneurial spirit of the nation, and quite vigorously advocating a market-based economy. The positions could be perceived as reversed during the New Order. The nationalist administration adopted a rigorous policy of capitalist developmentalism, opening up the economy to the world market system. 2 5 The modernists on the other hand, turned increasingly to being more pro-state intervention and less market-oriented during this period. The ekonomi kerakyatan (people's economy) initiative launched by some prominent modernists looked very much in design like the heavily state-sanctioned Barisan Nasional's New Economic Policy in Malaysia. Another example that might be construed as evidence of the aliran organizations' lack of platform coherence on issues that are not strictly or solely political, is on the subject of the role of women. In the earlier period (from before independence unti l the late New Order), women's representation in politics usually came from the fold of the nationalists and the non-aliran groups. Some modernist women politicians were also apparent. But women were practically absent from the public space on the traditionalist side. 2 6 2 5 Albeit also still heavily state-sanctioned, according to Kunio Yoshihara (1988) The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in South East Asia, Singapore: Oxford University Press. 2 5 This is in spite of a very active role played by the NU's women organization wing, the Muslimat and the Fatayat. But in the early period, their focus was mainly on the domestic functions of women. 20 However, during the New Order period, women's nationalist representation became significantly less. Under the nationalist regime of New Order, women's organizations turned to be state-sanctioned. The traditionalists on the other hand, especially under the tutelage of liberal kyai such as Abdurrahman Wahid, made exponential progress with regard to enhancing the role of women in public life. Many of the young traditionalist intellectuals now came from the NU's women's organizations. WHY FOCUS ON THE ALIRAN TO UNDERSTAND INDONESIAN POLITICS TODAY The attempts by both Sukarno and Suharto to bury aZzran-based politics resulted in significantly fewer numbers of studies of Indonesia's politics conducted using the aliran model. Indeed to study the aliran during the New Order period risked losing relevance due to the virtual "non-existence" of the aliran in public and political discourse. The New Order was especially adamant in "de-aliran-izing" Indonesian politics as divisive. Despite the fact that the New Order regime also hailed from one of the aliran segments, the notion of the aliran became increasingly associated with a sense of "primordialism," and hence signified backwardness. Various efforts were carried out to root out aliran politics and to "modernize" Indonesian politics, for example with the "simplification" of the political party structure in 1973 and the introduction of the azas tunggal (sole foundation) policy in 1985. 2 7 As a result, studies on the 2 7 Douglas E. Ramage (1995) Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance, London: Routledge, esp. chs. 1 and 6; R. William Liddle (1973) "Modernizing Indonesian Politics," in R. William Liddle, ed. (1973) Political Participation in Modern Indonesia, Monograph Series No. 19, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. 21 aliran politics disappeared from the body of Indonesian scholarship for quite a long t ime. 2 8 As this study will point out, the aliran did not die off but instead were simply in a state of hibernation during the authoritarian periods under Presidents Sukarno and Suharto, and have since resurfaced as political openness has been reestablished. Indonesian politics since the fall of Suharto appears like dejd vu from the era when political competition was in earnest. Many of the characteristics of the parliamentary democracy period of the 1950s have reappeared. These include political divisiveness, seemingly irreconcilable differences on some of the most fundamental questions of state, as well as conflicting tendencies between continuing open political competition and increasing efforts to reassert more elite control. Even the regional voting pattern in the 1999 election resembled that of the elections of 1955, with the nationalists winning mostly in Java and Bali , and the modernists in the outer islands. Questions about democracy that besieged the nation in the 1950s, and which were previously thought to have been resolved under the political control of Guided Democracy and the New Order, are now once again in the limelight of public discourse. The way political debate is being shaped for the most crucial questions concerning the state, and the way political groups are being organized, it will be shown, reveal that the most salient political divisions in the country for this debate are the aliran segments. A number of new books have been published since the fall of Suharto. While some books have dealt mostly with accounts of events leading to the 2 8 A succinct review of the pre-Reformasi major works on Indonesia is provided in Damien Kingsbury (1998) The Politics of Indonesia, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, pp. 256-263. 2 2 demise of the New Order and the rise of the Reformasi movement, 2 9 others have focused on an analysis of socio-political transformations that have accompanied the regime change. A number of studies have focused on the institutional-structural aspects of political change. Among this genre is Jacques Bertrand's Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia. 3 0 Bertrand analyzes the resurgence of ethnic conflict in Indonesia toward the end of Suharto's rule, which was further intensified after Reformasi. He argues that ethnic conflicts in Indonesia were not dependent solely on cultural factors, such as ethnic identity or group fear. Analyses of ethnic conflicts should also take into account structural-institutional factors, such as the role of elites, socio-economic disparities, group opportunities. Bertrand, using a "critical junctions" theoretical approach, examines the tensions between the national unity dream of the Indonesian founding fathers and the multicultural, sometime conflictual, realities of the plural nation. Bertrand provides a very useful and detailed analysis of the troubled regions in Indonesia as well as the friction between religious groups. However, he focuses mainly on the issues of regionalism and ethnicity, and the tension between the regions and the center, rather than on political divisions and competition in the national arena. 3 1 2 9 For instance, Kees van Dijk (2001) A Country in Despair: Indonesia Between 1997 and 2000, Leiden: KITLV Press; Kevin O'Rourke (2002) Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Suharto Indonesia, Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin. 3 0 Jacques Bertrand (2003) Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3 1 Similar issues of regionalism are also the main theme of another recently edited book by Damien Kingsbury and Harry Aveling (2003) Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia, London: RoutledgeCurzon. 23 The authors in the edited book by Donald K. Emmerson 3 2 have looked at various aspects of change in Indonesia, from politics, society, the economy, to a description of the transition process. As a book that was meant to be published before Suharto's downfall (but in fact was published after Reformasi], the book offers a comprehensive view of the state of the republic in the final years of the New Order regime. Many of the articles serve as an evaluation of the more than thirty years of Suharto's rule. This being the case, it is quite understandable that discussion of a/iran-based politics is not included in the book. As mentioned above, owing to repression and control, the aliran were not a political factor during the New Order. One of the major and influential recent works on Indonesia is Robert Hefner's Civil Islam. 3 3 This study analyzes the positions of different political groups in Indonesia in terms of civility and democracy. Of particular importance is Hefner's effort to compare and contrast the two main Islamic groups in Indonesia. He adds another typology to the characterization of Indonesia's Musl im groups: what he calls "civil" and "regimist" Muslims. Hefner actually refers mainly to the traditionalists when he discusses the civil Muslims, and he labels some modernists as regimists. In this book, he clearly makes a value-judgment by favoring the traditionalists' pluralist traits and at time appears to be much less positive towards the modernists' majoritarian stance. As such, while not discussing the aliran at length, the study employs some of the aliran model, including some politico-cultural arguments. However, 3 2 Donald K. Emmerson, ed. (1999) Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 3 3 Robert W. Hefner (2000) Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 24 because of Hefner's focus on Islam in Indonesia, there was much less discussion of the nationalists. It should be noted here that, in fact, one of the issues discussed in this thesis, the state foundation, resembles Hefner's focus of study. Other recent studies focusing on the 1999 election have been more disposed toward the aliran approach. Dwight King's Half-Hearted Reform,34 for instance, has used statistical methodology to measure the correlations between the voting patterns of the 1999 and 1955 elections. While the book does not at the outset explicitly mention the aliran, either as an approach or as the Indonesian political groupings, the objects of study are unmistakably the major aliran parties.3 5 This is evident from the classification of the major parties in 1955 and their "heirs" in 1999 in order to measure the continuities in the bases of party support. The nationalist PNI is clustered with the PDI-P, the modernist Masyumi with the parties of Poros Tengah, and the traditionalist NU with the PKB.se FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF THE STATE The basic requirements of statehood include reasonably secure and recognized borders, the establishment of a governmental structure with the 3 4 Dwight Y. King (2003) Half-Hearted Reform: Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia, Westport, Conn.: Praeger. 3 5 Likewise, Leo Suryadinata's book also demonstrates the adaptation of the aliran approach to analyzing the 1999 election. See Leo Suryadinata (2002) Election and Politics in Indonesia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, especially ch. 10. This is the case despite his assertion made at the beginning of the book that Geertz' and Feith's aliran models "are no longer valid." See ibid., p. 25. 3 6 See the book's summary and conclusion in King, op.cit., pp. 133-134. 25 institutional capacity to provide at least some key services a n d maintain some semblance of law and order, and the ability to generate revenue. B e y o n d these, there are a n u m b e r of options as to what form, type, system or model of government should be instituted, how the state should be structured, a n d how power should be dispersed in the state. S h o u l d the state have a presidential or parliamentary system, or perhaps a monarchical one? S h o u l d it be a unitary, federal, or confederal state? S h o u l d power ideally be concentrated at the center or dispersed? S h o u l d it be a secular or religious/ theocratic state? S h o u l d it be democratic to some extent, consociational, authoritarian or autocratic, communist , socialist, fascist? S h o u l d minorities have special protection? Resolving these issues about the structure and nature of the state to the satisfaction of most of the people is critical to its legitimacy. It allows the government of the day to perform its various functions without having the quality of its performance bringing into question the state's legitimacy. In m a n y former colonial states, these critical issues, w h i c h one would have hoped to have been amiably resolved at Independence, were papered over with imposed political systems, often embodied i n constitutions, put i n place by the departing colonists or hurriedly cobbled together by nationalists facing the demands of imminent Independence. In some cases, a viable consensus favoring the system i n place emerged; i n others, the issues remained contentious. M a n y of these states have since undergone "readjustments" to the original form or system of government, often by force of arms, and some of these are still struggling to resolve these fundamental issues. Indonesia is one of these states. 26 1. A Secular Pancasila State versus an Islamic State Most states in the world today are secular. The secular state calls for the separation of church and state, and civic law. The concept of secularism was advanced by the Enlightenment scholars as a way of preventing rulers and officials from imposing their religious views and practices on society as a whole, and engaging in religious wars. Secularism is not anti-religious per se, although it is sometimes perceived as substituting moral values for civic virtues. Conversely, a religious state (such as Ireland or Saudi Arabia) is one that promotes and defends religious values and prohibitions. It need not be a theocratic state ruled by the religious clergy (such as in Iran). Under the secular Pancasila state in Indonesia, only "Belief in God" is enshrined as a pillar, Islam is not specifically mentioned or given priority. There are disagreements among Musl im intellectuals as to what constitutes an "Islamic State". However, basically, with an Islamic state, the barrier between religion and politics and religion and the state is dropped; Islam becomes the official and state religion (although religious freedom may be permitted), and, importantly, Islamic (syariah) law replaces civic law. The issue of an Islamic versus a secular state is perhaps as old as the idea of Indonesia itself. As will be seen in the following chapters, this issue has occupied the center of contention over the nature of the Indonesian state. From the advent of the nationalist movement in the early decades of the twentieth century unt i l the 1950s, aZzran-based elites have debated this issue, but could not come to any agreement. This issue was muted during the forty years of authoritarian rule of Sukarno and Suharto, giving the impression that the question of Islam versus Pancasila had been resolved. But the political 27 openness that has come with Reformasi has changed such an impression. The issue once again has come into the limelight of the debate on the nature of the state. The aZzran-based elites have resumed the debate but, as shall be demonstrated, the positions of some of the aliran organizations have changed quite considerably. 2. A Centralized Unitary State versus a Decentralized State with Power Dispersed With unitary states, the powers of government are held by the central authority. Examples of unitary states include the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Iceland, Japan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and of course, unti l now, Indonesia. Local or regional governments may exist, but whatever powers they possess have been delegated to them by the central government and can be withdrawn by the central government. Unitary states can be highly centralized (France) or decentralized (Great Britain, the Netherlands, Paraguay since 1992). There are also unitary states that allow specific regions a certain amount of political and cultural autonomy (e.g., Spain, France, Italy, and Great Britain). Regardless of the degree of decentralization or amount of regional autonomy, devolved powers, theoretically at least, can be taken back by the central authority in a unitary state (as opposed to a federal state with divided sovereignty). The issue of a unitary state versus a federal state is distinct from the issues of decentralized versus centralized power, and democratic versus authoritarian systems. There is no necessary link between these issues. For example, Sweden is a unitary state with a constitutional monarch that is highly decentralized and allows for considerable local-level democracy; Malaysia is a federal state with strong central powers and no local government. In the Republic of Indonesia, a 28 geographically large state with many islands and regional minorities, the unitary arrangement that was adopted is due at least partly to the bad experience Indonesia had with a federal system imposed on it in 1949-1950, and also due to the fact that one island, Java, has a clear majority of the population and historically has almost always been the site for most of the power in the archipelago, especially during 350 years under Dutch colonial rule. As wil l be seen, the issue of a centralized unitary state versus some form of federalist arrangement with power decentralized has been one of the most contentious issues facing Indonesia. The debate was especially at its peak in the 1950s as the aliran segments with outer island bases of support tended to believe that the country should be managed along a federalist line, whereas those with Javanese support maintained that a unitary centralized system should remain the form of the state. Again as in the issue of the state foundation, the debate was temporarily and rather forcefully resolved during the authoritarian rule of Sukarno and Suharto. But the issue once again has come to the forefront of the public discourse in the Reformasi period. As shall be described in the following chapters, Indonesia today is trying to implement an extensive decentralization of power and responsibility from the center to the regions. 3. An Authoritarian-type State versus a Democratic-type State The Asian developmental model has been the strong quasi-authoritarian state that constrains and minimizes "politics," represses the opposition, minorities and regional unrest in the name of national unity and stability for the sake of the overriding goal of attaining rapid economic growth. 29 Unfortunately, in Indonesia it has also led to a state plagued by rampant corruption that wasted and mismanaged state resources under Sukarno and found its economic modernization turning into a "house of cards" under Suharto. But before being turned into an authoritarian state, Indonesia had an experience with an open, albeit rather chaotic, political system practiced during the period of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s. The struggle between authoritarian rule and open political competition became one of the contending issues in Indonesian political management. As this thesis shall attempt to demonstrate, the various aliran segments tended to favor one these forms of political management over the other. So, despite the bad experiences of weak, immobilized government in the 1950s, the Reformasi movement and subsequent fall of Suharto has renewed considerable interest in an open and competitive political structure. D E M O C R A C Y AND DEMOCRATIZATION Given the confusion surrounding definitions and requisites of democracy, the complexities of the process of democratization, and the importance of these concepts to this thesis, some additional introduction is necessary. The most intractable question in the current discourse on democracy seems to be how it should be defined. Various scholars seem to have different ideas in mind when they are discussing "democracy." This difficulty is reflected in the observation by Chan Heng Chee of the different classifications for Singapore made by Samuel P. Huntington in The Third Wave of Democratization, the Freedom House 1991-1992 annual survey, and Francis Fukuyama's The End of History 30 and the Last Man, as non-democratic, partly democratic, and democratic, respectively.37 Since democracy is best viewed on a spectrum, with various countries arranged along the spectrum, ranging from being fully democratic, to more or less, and ending at not very democratic, much of the debate concerned with democratization in the developing world revolves around the questions of what minimally constitutes a workable democracy, and how to consolidate and enhance these democratic practices. Joseph Schumpeter and Samuel Huntington offer minimalist (delegates or elite model) definitions: Citizens have the right to choose and authorize governments to act on their behalf. They exercise this right through free, fair, regular, and competitive elections.3 8 Larry Diamond refers to this as electoral or procedural democracy, as opposed to liberal democracy at the other end of the spectrum. Diamond explains that a liberal democracy consists not only of elements found in the procedural definition, but also of values, rights and institutional safeguards that enhance individual freedoms. These include the protection of individual civil and political rights, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, a free press and media, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of belief, freedom from fear, and other liberties normally associated with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 3 7 Chan Heng Chee, "Democracy: Evolution and Implementation; An Asian Perspective" in Robert Bartley, et.al. (1993) Democracy and Capitalism, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 3 8 Joseph Schumpeter (1947) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York: Harper, Samuel P. Huntington (1993) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, pp. 5-9; Diane K. Mauzy, "Democracy, Asian Values and the Question of Governance in Southeast Asia," in Amitav Acharya et.al. (2001), Democracy, Human Rights and Civil Society in South East Asia, Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, pp. 107-122. 31 In addition to these rights and values is the principle of protection of minority rights and guaranteed access for the minority groups to state services, as well as protection of the minorities' own cultural autonomy.39 Furthermore, Diamond argues that a political culture conducive to liberal democracy is necessary for its achievement and consolidation. Such a political culture values moderation, cooperation, bargaining, and accommodation among political elites, as well as tolerance, pragmatism, trust, willingness to compromise, and a certain civility in political discourse.40 However, the difficulty with this is that the political culture deemed conducive to democracy seems to come out of Western political culture. As Diane Mauzy succinctly puts it in a study of democracy in Southeast Asia, "(t)here are several key value differences between Asia and the West that contribute to their different political cultures. The West puts a high premium on individualism, rights and freedoms, political competition, and contention. Asian political culture values communitarianism, duty and obligations, consensus and order, harmony and balance."41 Other political scientists have argued about the prerequisites for democratization. In addition to a supportive political culture, Seymour Martin Lipset argues that social equality is a key condition for the growth of democracy and that it can only be achieved through industrialization. Therefore, democracy is not likely to grow in poor countries. Economic development gives 3 9 Larry Diamond (1999) Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 11-12. 4 0 Larry Diamond, ed. (1993) Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, p. 10. 4 1 Mauzy, op.cit., p. 116. 32 rise to the growth of the middle class and the strengthening of the working class. As a result, a strong civil society that is independent from and curbs state power emerges. Thus, democracy is a product of capitalist development. 4 2 Yet, despite strong performances in industrialization as shown by decade-long dynamic economic growth, a number of East and Southeast Asian countries seem to disprove the economic development thesis of democratic growth. Donald Emmerson asserts that the Southeast Asian region has shown recalcitrance toward liberal democracy due to the lack of liberal traditions in the political culture, and to the different kind of middle class arising in the region. The middle class in Southeast Asia has not developed independently of the state. Rather, its very existence relies on the opportunities and benefits rendered by the state. 4 3 This might explain why the middle classes in this region seem primarily concerned with the creation of wealth and tend not to object against infringements of their civil and political rights. The performance of the government is also valued for its effectiveness to function in ways that, according to Mauzy, "promotes prosperity and security, general happiness, freedom from ordinary crime, human dignity, and economic advancement." 4 4 Similarly, Robert Dahl argues against positing a direct, almost automatic, correlation between modernization and democracy. He maintains that due to different political cultures in different regions, there are divergent 4 2 Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," in American Political Science Review, March 1959; Larry Diamond and Gary Marks, "Seymour Martin Lipset and the Study of Democracy," in Gary Marks and Larry Diamond, eds. (1992) Reexamining Democracy, Newbury Park: Sage Publications, pp. 5-8. 4 3 Donald K. Emmerson, "Region and Recalcitrance: Rethinking Democracy through Southeast Asia" in The Pacific Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1995, pp. 223-248; see also Mauzy, op.cit, pp. 115-117. 4 4 Mauzy, op.cit, p. 117. 33 ways political change from a non-democracy to a democracy can take place, and that modernization will not necessarily create the conditions conducive to democracy. 4 5 Some of the new literature on democratization seems to abandon the notion that democracy needs prerequisites. In The Third Wave of Democratization, Samuel Huntington argues that there have been waves and reverse waves of democratization throughout the 20 t h century, and that between 1974 and 1990 a third wave took place. His study focuses on the role of political and strategic elites in pushing for democratization. It is based on the assumption that a growth in democracy does not simply emerge given certain socio-economic and politico-cultural conditions. Huntington argues that since the domestic societal bases are not the keys to democratization, such a process can actually be crafted or engineered by elites. For that matter, democratization can occur even in places where the economic conditions and political culture are deemed hostile. The crafting of democratization requires strategic elites. The most successful formula, according to Huntington, seems to be negotiating pacts among elites. 4 6 While the recent focus on strategic elite interaction makes democratization seem easier to begin, 4 7 the task of consolidating the newborn democracies is more formidable. In a more recent article, Huntington 4 5 Robert A. Dahl, "Development and Democratic Culture," in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien, eds. (1997) Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 34-38. 4 6 Huntington, op.cit.; Doh Chull Shin, "On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research, in World Politics, No. 47, October 1994, pp. 135-170. 4 7 In The Third Wave of Democratization, Huntington even produced a number of "guidelines for democratizers." 34 acknowledges that the threat to democracy comes not from its usual enemies, such as the military, but rather from the participants in the democratic process itself. 4 8 The problems of consolidation are related to the difficulty of institutionalizing the rules of democracy, including elections and associated freedoms. According to Juan Linz, democracy is likely to endure if the institutionalization of those rules creates a situation "in which none of the major political actors, parties, or organized interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is any alternative to democratic processes to gain power. ... To put it simply democracy must be seen as the 'only game in town'." 4 9 In another article, Linz and Alfred Stepan identify five conditions that must be present to ensure the consolidation of democracy, e.g., a lively and free civil society, an autonomous political society of political actors and parties, the rule of law, a state bureaucracy that can be employed by the new democratic regime and an institutionalized economic society. 5 0 Guillermo O'Donnell argues that formal institutionalization of democratic rules might be difficult in many of the non-Western countries where individual leaders are perceived to be more important than institutions. He then suggests the importance of informal rules that are agreed upon by the political elites in these countries. 5 1 4 8 Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy for the Long Haul," in Diamond, et.al, eds., (1997) Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, p. 8. 4 9 Juan J . Linz, " Transitions to Democracy," in Washington Quarterly, Vol. 13, 1990, p. 156. 5 0 Juan J . Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," in Diamond, et.al, eds. (1997), pp. 17-23. 5 1 Guillermo O'Donnell, "Illusions about Consolidation," in Diamond, et.al, eds. (1997), pp. 43-47. 3 5 Another important problem related to the consolidation of new democracies is the quality of performance of the nascent democratic regime. If the task of the institutionalization process is successfully coupled with the effectiveness of the new regimes in delivering stability and prosperity, then the chances of these regimes being perceived as legitimate, and thus consolidating the democratic system, will significantly increase. 5 2 In a review of Indonesian democratization three years into the transition process, where the socioeconomic and political efforts have been intensely racked by instability, Olle Tornquist criticizes the Huntingtonian thesis and political recipe of a 'crafting of instant democracy.' According to Tornquist, respect for civil and political rights has not changed a great deal since Reformasi was launched in 1998. The social and political institutions were far from adequate in coping with the rising public expectations and demands for accountability. After almost four decades under the tight control of the Sukarno and Suharto regimes, the civilian political leadership was not accustomed to negotiations and bargaining associated with open political competition. Low or non-existent interpersonal trust among elites as well as the public created a predatory atmosphere where politics were regarded in zero-sum terms. 5 3 As this research will attempt to demonstrate, even after the pro-democracy forces successfully toppled an authoritarian regime and instituted some democratic practices, consolidation of the new system has not been easily 5 2 Larry Diamond, Juan J . Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset, eds. (1990) Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 52-57. 5 3 Olle Tornquist (2002) "What's Wrong with Indonesia's Democratisation?" in A s i a n J o u r n a l of S o c i a l S c i e n c e , Volume 30, Number 3, September 2002, pp. 547-569. 36 accomplished, and the danger exists that it might create a situation of instability that leads to questions about the efficacy of the whole democratic arrangement. This is especially true in developing states like Indonesia where deep segmental cleavages, as found in the aliran divisions, make the potential for conflict exceptionally large, and where most of the necessary conditions for democratic consolidation are not present. THE ALIRAN AND THEIR POLITICAL CULTURE ANTECEDENTS The differences among the aliran, stemming from cultural beliefs and practices, have had a significant impact on their political views and subsequent behavior. Many observers of Indonesia, both from within or outside of Indonesia, cite the importance of understanding Indonesia's culture in order to make sense of the volatility of its politics. Not everyone, however, asks the right questions. According to Clifford Geertz, it is unquestionable that a country's politics reflect the design of its culture. But the most important task is how to demonstrate the connection between culture and polit ics. 5 4 Furthermore, many Indonesian observers base their analyses on an incorrect assumption. A common mistake lies in attempts to understand Indonesian politics exclusively through the prism of the cultural traits of the majority group, the Javanese. The fallacy of such a conjecture lies in the presumption that Indonesia equals Java. Although the Javanese are the largest ethnic group in Indonesia (comprising 41.71% of the total population in 2000 5 5) and their influence on state matters is 5 4 Geertz (1973), op.cit, The Interpretation of Cultures, p. 311. 5 5 Leo Suryadinata, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, and Aris Ananta (2003), Indonesia's Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape, Singapore: Institute of 37 therefore substantial, they do not have a hegemonic predominance either constitutionally, such as the constitutional privileges enjoyed by the Malays in Malaysia, or politically, such as the preponderance of male Caucasians in U.S. politics. At the very least, the Javanese position has always been balanced by the non-Javanese ethnic groups, known as the seberang.56 That being said, the fallacy is understandable. Most of Indonesia's half-a-century history has been dominated by the political system amenable to Javanese politico-cultural traits, i.e., authoritarianism. Open political competition, often associated more with the seberang's traits, has prevailed only intermittently. Nonetheless, even during the heyday of Java-centered oligarchic rule, the seberang political groups did not perish completely. They merely went into the state of political hibernation, waiting for the opportunity to reassert themselves. One of the most significant links between culture and politics are institutions. To what extent have the cultural values become institutionalized in the social organizations established by the populace? The social organizations are tasked with socialization of politico-cultural values among their members, as well as articulation of group interests vis-a-vis those of others. 5 7 In order to delineate the influence of cultural factors on politics, a distinction must be made between socio-cultural organizations and formal state institutions. In Indonesia, political socialization has generally been carried out through a set of Southeast Asian Studies, p. 32. This book offers a detailed breakdown of the comprehensive 2000 Indonesian population census data. 5 6 The word "seberang" (or in the old Malay known as "sabrang") means "the other side." However, it can also be construed as "out there," signifying the centrality of the Javanese culture and the mutual alienation between the two political cultures. 5 7 Geertz (1973), op.cit., pp. 314-315. 3 8 aliran-b&sed social institutions. The Muhammadiyah, for instance, is widely regarded as the social organization of the modernist Muslims. Many of its leaders were trained by this organization. Similarly, the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) has many branch organizations which cover almost every facet of social life of the traditionalist Muslims, such as women, youth, students, scholars, education of all levels, business and economic development, and so on. These aliran organizations even maintain paramilitary organizations, tasked with maintaining the security of the respective group's properties as well as ensuring the safety of its leaders. 5 8 These social institutions coexist with the formal state institutions. While the government institutions, such as the educational system and the bureaucracy, operate within the norms of modern state organizations and are widely regarded as truly national organizations, the aZircm-based institutions function in accordance with the cultural traits of the respective organizations. These organizations are the vanguards of the political segments and the values they espouse. Since they command the allegiance of a large number of people, the social institutions are generally very powerful. Despite the aspiration of the government to be the ruler of the land, its activities remain merely official and routine. Even during the New Order regime, where the government was deemed as possessing sufficient coercive power to carry out its programs, the cooperation of the social organizations was still sought, not only because it 5 8 One of these organizations, the Banser (Barisan Serbaguna - Auxiliary Force), commonly associated with the NU, was reportedly very active in the pogrom against communists and their sympathizers in the aftermath of 1965 failed communist coup attempt. 39 made implementation more cost-effective, but also in order to ensure the participation of the publ ic . 5 9 Additionally, the l ink between culture and politics can also be traced through the extent that ideas, norms, and habits prevalent among a particular community have implanted themselves in the state structure. The more intrusive the cultural impact, the stronger the l i nk . 6 0 In Indonesia, because of the enormous mass level support for the aliran networks, not only do the aliran strongly influence the state structure, but also most, if not all, of the members of the political elite, past and present, can be identified with one or another aliran. Sukarno, for example, had a Javanese nationalist background. So did Suharto. B . J . Habibie, who replaced Suharto in 1998, came from the seberang modernist Musl im tradition, while former president Abdurrahman Wahid was a scholar of the NU, the traditionalist Musl im organization. Megawati Sukarnoputri, the current President, like her father, has a Javanese nationalist background. Each leader has ruled in ways that were/are consistent with the politico-cultural traits from which they emanated. As a result, the sociopolitical structure of the country has largely been the product of the aliran structure and the segmental politics borne out of their interactions. 6 1 5 9 The most significant example was the Keluarga Berencana (Family Planning) program to ease population pressure. The government actively pursued the cooperation of the organizations belonging to the NU and the Muhammadiyah, among others. 6 0 A similar argument about the autonomy of the state, or lack of, from ethnic influences is made in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (1985) Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6 1 Geertz (1973), op.cit, pp. 316-317. 4 0 The political culture approach, although not always appreciated, is one of the most important perspectives in political science. It aims at explaining political behavior through the investigation of the individual's fundamental values, sentiments, and knowledge that give form and structure to political processes. 6 2 It refers to the cognitive, affective, and evaluative processes that the individuals perform in order to view, comprehend, assess, as well as eventually act upon political institutions and processes. 6 3 The study of political culture was influenced by developments i n other fields of social sciences, most notably in psychology and anthropology. 6 4 Political culture can be understood in two ways. The first concerns the political orientation of the individual. Here, the focus lies in the psychological outlook of the subject individual. The puzzle in this level is individuals' perception of the political order and institutions. The second concerns the collective orientation of the society. Its focus lies in the political outlook of a group of people, either in the forms of national, ethnic, or sub-ethnic groups. 6 5 The latter, anthropologically-influenced analysis appears to have influenced the study of political culture more profoundly than the former, psychologically-based one. Political scientists are interested in studying the cultural traits that are widely 6 2 Lucian W. Pye, "Political Culture" in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed. (1995) The Encyclopedia of Democracy, Congressional Quarterly, p. 965. 6 3 Harry Eckstein, "Culture as a Foundation Concept for the Social Sciences," in Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1996, p. 489; Harry Eckstein, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change," in American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 3, September 1988, pp. 790-791. Eckstein drew his postulate from Talcott Parson's "action-theory." 6 4 Pye, op.cit, p. 966. 6 5 Walter Rosenbaum (1975) Political Culture, New York: Praeger, p. 4. 41 shared by a substantial number of people, assuming that they wil l have a more significant bearing on political processes and eventually political outcomes. 6 6 Connecting the individual to the social is the notion of political socialization. Citing Talcott Parsons, Eckstein argues that: culture is shared and thus a collective phenomenon; culture is a social heritage transmitted from generation to generation; and that culture is socially learned. 6 7 Political socialization shapes a person's political orientations. It constructs the framework whereby an individual thinks, feels, evaluates, and acts upon political institutions and processes. There are various agents of political socialization, such as home, school, friends, neighborhood, social organizations. Political socialization can be carried out by the state through educational curricula, control of mass media, as well as direct indoctrination training. It can also be carried out by segments of the population. In Western democracies, political socialization tends to take place in families, as well as in schools. In communist countries, by contrast, party organizations are responsible for socialization from a very early age. In many nations, religious organizations are also engaged in shaping political perceptions of their followers. 6 8 There are also cases where political socialization is carried out by multiple agencies. Indonesia is one such case. In the formal educational system, the state was responsible for political socialization of the general public. The state ran a network of state schools from elementary to tertiary, and oversaw the curricula in private schools, including religious ones. Political 6 6 Ibid., p. 7. 6 7 Eckstein (1996), op.cit. pp. 490-491. 6 8 Rosenbaum (1975), op.cit., pp. 14-15. 4 2 socialization by the state was also carried out through other measures. During the New Order, Indonesians of virtually all walks of life had to undergo ideological "training," known as the Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (P4 - Upgrading Course on the Directives for the Realization and Implementation of Pancasila). As observed by a scholar, the aim of P 4 "... is to provide an accepted framework to contain politics within defined boundaries. Pancasila, as propounded by P4 , is the clearest and most self-conscious articulation of this ideological vision and, by implication, of the competing visions that the government is not willing to tolerate." 6 9 In other words, the political socialization carried by the Indonesian state, especially during the New Order but also during the Sukarno era, aimed at creating a unified Indonesian identity as defined by the state, and at eradicating what were considered remnants of parochialism, such as those embodied within the political aliran. However, the state was not the only agency carrying out this socialization. Even as all school-age children were required to attend the formal state schools, many, especially at the grassroots level, received "extra" education from their families and from the organizations that their parents belonged to. Many of these organizations, such as the pesantren and madrasah schools, to varying degrees, shared similar beliefs with the aliran, if not a straightforward aliran identity. Furthermore, while the state oversaw the curricula taught in these non-state educational institutions, they were still allowed to impart some values deemed uniquely specific to the particular 6 9 Michael Morfit, "Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government" in Asian Survey, Vol. XXI, No. 8, August 1981, p. 838. 4 3 institutions, such as Muhammadiyahism or the teaching of the Kitab Kuning (the traditionalist revered religious texts). Political socialization did not only take place in schools. The strongest value socialization usually occurred in families and neighborhoods. In many villages, especially in Java, such socialization took place through traditional entertainment media, such as the wayang (puppet) show that told moral stories and imparted values in a fairly consistent form from generation to generation. Thus, political socialization following aliran networks remained alive and well, despite the efforts by the state to create a unified national identity and eliminate parochialism. CRITICS OF POLITICAL CULTURE The political culture approach is not without its critics. In fact, the earlier studies of political culture that made cultural factors the key explanatory tools for evaluating political behavior are considered unconvincing by many contemporary scholars. The main problem with this approach seems to be its inability to provide systematic evidence of the explanatory centrality of culture and its failure to explain how culture affects political outcomes. The "newer literature" on the study of political culture seeks to evaluate the explanatory centrality of culture relative to the other factors, such as structure and institutions and political economy. David Elkins and Richard Simeon assert that cultural-based explanations are persuasive only after the structural and institutional explanations have been exhausted. They argue that examination of a phenomenon where two countries differ should first look at the structural and institutional differences between the two countries. Such differences may be examined in terms of relative proportions of groups, the 44 income levels and social class arrangements, ethnicity, age, and gender proportion in each country. If the differences can be explained by examination of the structural factors, then analysts can conclude that it is the structure rather than culture that matters. If the structural conditions are comparably similar, then a look at cultural factors is necessary to explain the variations. In short, culture is a second-order explanation. Culture is therefore residual, according to these authors. 7 0 Ronald Inglehart contends that while political culture may explain the stability of democratic political arrangements, it is formed, shaped, and influenced by political and economic factors. Employing large-n cross-national studies, he identifies three important factors in political (civic) culture that explain the durability of democracy, i.e., interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, and support for revolutionary change. It seems that if the analysis stops here, it could be conclusive that culture does produce political outcomes, and therefore it is the explanatory variable. However, Inglehart goes on to argue that his statistical study shows a strong correlation between civic culture and the society's economic level. Higher levels of interpersonal trust and life satisfaction along with a lower support for revolutionary change, tend to be commensurate with the more developed stage of economic development. Therefore, it can be inferred that culture occupies a position of intervening rather than explanatory variable in explaining political outcomes. 7 1 7 0 David J . Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon (1979) "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?", in Comparative Politics, January 1979, pp. 127-145. 7 1 Ronald Inglehart (1988) "The Renaissance of Political Culture," in American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 4, December 1988, pp. 1203-30. For similar work in assessing the impact of culture on political outcome relatively to economic and social factors, employing a large-n positivist methodology, see Jan-Erik Lane and 4 5 These newer studies certainly address some of the concerns about the difficulty in measuring culture as the explanatory variable. Whether or not culture affects political outcomes can be evaluated if the relationship between culture and other factors, such as institutions, is made explicit. The relegation of culture to a secondary position, however, may or may not be useful in explaining political outcomes. The role of institutions and economic development (industrialization) in producing a democratic political structure in the West may surpass the importance of political culture. For instance, as shown by Barrington Moore, the presence of a bourgeois class and its relative strong position vis-d-vis the crown (a structural relationship) coupled with industrialization, explain the growth of liberal democratic systems in Western Europe. Another type of structural relationship is between the urban masses and the state, in which the state is relatively stronger than the society, and when combined with industrialization this produced fascism in Germany and Japan. 7 2 Structural institutional factors and rapid industrial growth, however, cannot convincingly explain why the interaction between these similar factors does not yield similar outcomes in non-Western societies. For example, the growth of a large middle class and rapid industrialization in Singapore could have been expected to produce liberal democracy in this country, as was the case in Western Europe. This has not been the case. One of the main reasons for this anomaly seems to be a potent cultural trait of Singaporean society, Svante Ersson (2002) Culture and Politics: A Comparative Approach, Hants, England: Ashgate. 7 2 Barrington Moore (1966) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of Modern World, Boston: Beacon Press. 46 especially its Chinese majority, as embodied in Confucian belief, of strong deference to effective leaders. The Japanese case also seems to demonstrate the primacy of culture in explaining political outcomes in the non-Western states. Even though formally democratic institutions have existed in J a p a n for more than half a century, democratic competition in politics and an open economy are not the best descriptions of the Japanese society. Unti l it lost power briefly, the L D P (Liberal Democratic Party) had been the only political party in the developed world that ruled a country for more than forty years continuously. Capitalist development in J a p a n has also never been independent of the role of the state. The role of Japanese conglomerated companies both in politics and in the economy, marked by the so-called zaibatsu system before and during the World War II, remained strong even after General Douglas M a c A r t h u r attempted to reform this system and changed the designation of these companies into keiretsu.73 The cultural impulses seem to be stronger in these cases than in the Western ones. Donald E m m e r s o n argues that despite dramatic economic growth, liberal democracy has not flourished in Southeast Asia. M a n y countries in this region have time and again demonstrated recalcitrance towards democracy . 7 4 This fact is mainly due to cultural factors. He points to the following reasons, among others, for the "illiberal" governmental systems found in Southeast Asia: first, they lack a liberal tradition of democracy; second, the common thesis of modernization and democratic theories that the more prosperous and wealthy a 7 3 William H. Overholt, "Japan's Economy: At War with Itself," in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, January-February 2002, pp. 134-147. 7 4 Emmerson (1995), op.cit, pp. 223-248. 4 7 country, the more likely it will become democratic because of the demands of the rising middle classes, does not fit the Southeast Asian case. The middle classes in this region are the products of what Kunio Yoshihara called "ersatz capitalism": state-sanctioned capitalist and industrial development. In this environment, the middle classes in Southeast Asia do not develop independently of the state. Rather, their very existence relies on the opportunities and benefits created by the state.75 Another criticism of the political culture approach is its static tendency. This approach assumes that the core values of any society are enduring and relatively immutable, at least in the short term. Such a criticism comes mainly from scholars of rational choice persuasion. They argue that political culture research tends to focus on values and symbols, which take generations to develop and consolidate, and be less attentive to other more dynamic factors, such as the economy. As a result, scholars of political culture are perceived to be quite weak conceptually in dealing with political change, and political cultural explanations of change are not very convincing.76 Political cultural theorists respond to this criticism by pointing out that in political culture "(c)ontinuity is the inherent ... expectation and so, therefore, is resistance to change of motion."77 Eckstein further argues that a theory of political change can be derived from the political culture perspective. Change, according to this perspective, is contextual, occurring within the framework of a general set of 7 5 Yoshihara, op.cit., passim. 7 6 See for example, Ronald Rogowski (1974) Rational Legitimacy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 7 7 Eckstein (1988), op.cit, p. 793. 48 patterns. This pattern-maintaining change allows for cultural flexibility but remains skeptical about revolutionary transformation. According to Eckstein, "... in the longer run, attempts at revolutionary transformation will tend to be regressive or at least have quite unintended outcomes." 7 8 More recently, there have been some works attempting to span the rational choice and political culture divide. One such work is authored by Lisa Wedeen. 7 9 She questions the validity of political culture's "essentialism," especially the tendency of some political culture theorists to regard culture as a given phenomenon that affects political outcomes. Wedeen seeks to explore the conditions in which culture actually becomes meaningful to the people dwelling in a society. This practice of "meaning-making" of the symbols inherent in cultures (what she calls "semiotic-practices") should take into account the historical circumstances and power relations in which people and their culture evolve. Culture is thus a product of social and political, as well as economic, relations that develop over time and are given meaning by agents or elites and understood by that society according to circumstances arising from such relations. As this research shall demonstrate, while the political platforms of the aftran-based segments are derived from the politico-cultural traits of their respective constituents, they arrange their platforms according to their relative positions to each other. The aliran segment's positions are also continuously 7 8 Ibid., p. 801. 7 9 Lisa Wedeen, "Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science," in American Political Science Review, Vol. 96, No. 4, December 2002, pp. 713-728; see also Lisa Wedeen, "Beyond the Crusades," in Items & Issues, Social Science Research Council, Vol. 4, No. 2-3, Spring/Summer 2003, p. 1-6. 49 evolving, as products of historical circumstances as well as the changing power relations among them. However, these changes are hardly revolutionary, even in cases where they seem so, such as the position of the traditionalists in the issue of state foundation (discussed at length in Chapter Six). Instead, they reflect Eckstein's "pattern-maintaining change," as these changes can be viewed as modifications of position according to changing historical circumstances or power relations, but still take place within the larger framework of politico-cultural beliefs derived from the cultural roots of the respective aliran segments. POLITICAL CULTURE MULTIPLICITY WITHIN ONE POLITY In addition to the explanation of variations among states, political culture is particularly useful in explaining variations among groups within one state. The explanatory power of culture might be apparent when two or more different groups behave differently under similar constraints and opportunities imposed by the common state structure. In such cases, while structural institutional and economic factors remain important, the role of culture cannot be relegated to a second-order explanation. As this research shall attempt to demonstrate, Indonesia is one such case. A number of scholars have pondered the notion of variation in political cultures within one polity as encompassing two dimensions. One is ethno-geographically-based. This refers to a situation of multiple political cultures where the segments are derived from ethnic or religious groups cultivated in different regions of the polity. The groups have grown along separate development paths throughout their histories, induced by different internal geographical factors as well as by external influences. As a result, they have 50 developed different cultural traits. The creation of national states, in many cases, has produced an incongruence between ethnic and national boundaries, resulting in such a multiplicity of political cultures. National governments have not been able to assimilate these different cultural traits, albeit many have aimed to create a "national culture or identity," and this has been the source of conflict among these segments. Such a phenomenon does not solely belong to the decolonized countries of Asia and Africa. Many of the more developed countries of the West are also plagued by similar problems. A more often cited example of a dual political cultural system is Italy. In one of the most persuasive research efforts showing the salience of political culture, using Italy as its case study, Robert Putnam has contended that in this country there are two separate regions with different historical and cultural traits resulting in distinct societal and institutional features. The Northern culture is influenced by the cultures of middle Europe while the Southern one resembles those of the Mediterranean. The South is generally perceived to be predominantly rural society with strong agricultural economics, while the North is more urban and industrialized. As a result, the political cultural traits of the South and the North are markedly different from each other. The role of familial lineage is much more influential in the South and significantly less so in the North. Paternalism and patronage are among the most salient factors defining political behavior in the South while similar behavior in the North is highly influenced by institutions. 8 0 Civic tradition and norms, social capital, and interpersonal trust are also generally higher in the North than in the South. In 8 0 Joseph Lapalombara (1965) "Italy: Fragmentation, Isolation, Alienation," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds. (1965) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 303-306. 51 such different settings, democratic institutions function and perform more effectively in the "civic culture" North than in the parochial South. 8 1 The other dimension in the variation of political culture within one polity is social class-based. Such variation occurs between different social classes in the society, i.e., between the masses and the elite. The study by Lucian Pye and Sydney Verba on the effects of political culture on political development demonstrates such differentiation. According to the study, those who are in power or responsible for the decisions of the government tend to develop a different outlook and orientation toward politics from those who are marginally positioned in terms of policy-making. Such differences are not only caused by different rates of exposure to the complex issues surrounding the decision-making process, but also by separate socialization processes between the two classes. 8 2 A n excellent example of this variation can be found in India in the 1960s. There were two political cultures operating at different levels of this country. One was in the districts. It covered the local politics, both urban and rural and local administrations. The other was concentrated in the nation's capital, New Delhi. It would be quite misleading to suggest that the former was traditional and the latter modern, since even at the local level there were many modern components and at the federal level certain aspects of traditionality remained preserved. However, the two political cultures were derived from different processes of socialization carried out by and through different sets of social 8 1 Robert D. Putnam (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, passim. 8 2 Lucian W. Pye (1965) "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development," in Pye and Verba, eds., op.cit., pp. 15-17. 52 institutions conveying different values. Political socialization in the districts was carried out mainly through various traditional ethnic and religious institutions. Here, traditional variables such as caste, ethnic ties, and religious affiliations in some parts of the country played a significant role. On the other hand, the elite political culture was devised and maintained through a process of political socialization highly influenced by the legacy of Brit ish colonial administration. The process was carried out by and through modern educational institutions both in Britain and in India, and was immersed not only in the English language, but also its traditions and practices. As a result, the ideas of modernity and secularism were generally perceived to be the norms of sociopolitical life among this elite. 8 3 The above two classifications of political culture multiplicity may be logically extended into some additional variants. For instance, the ethno-geographical classification can also be viewed as the social class one. This happens in cases where the ruling elites are predominantly derived from one ethnic group. The perpetual rule of the minority Alawis in Syria over the majority Arab groups might be perceived as an example of this congruence. 8 4 Perhaps the most engaging question in the political culture literature is the correlation between tradition and modernity. This is particularly true of the developing nations, most of which are plural societies and non-Western in tradition, but are under strong influence from the West, historically for many 8 3 Myron Weiner (1965) "India: Two Political Cultures," in Pye and Verba, eds., op.cit., pp. 199-244. 8 4 Oded Haklai (1999) When A Minority Rules Over A Hostile Majority, M.A. Thesis unpublished, Vancouver: Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia. 53 through a long period of colonization and contemporarily through a world system dominated by the West. As a result, modernity, understood as a product of the Western civilization, often collides with, influences, overtakes, or is being fought by local traditions. In many cases, modernity and tradition accommodate and moderate each other, yielding a sort of eclectic new culture embraced by the local populations as if it is emanating from their own native cultural traits. Socialization agents of many local cultures seek to moderate the influence of modernity through a process of selection, by leaving out the unwanted elements and embracing the desired traits. They also attempt to adapt modernity to traditions by translating the demands of modernity into languages and practices familiar to the local populations. As a result of such an eclectic selective and adaptive process, the idea of modernity seems highly appealing, especially to the aspiring individuals seeking to explore the idea of promoting a single nationhood out of the disparate local cultures brought together only by the presence of foreign powers. For many of these individuals, the idea of a local culture for specific local people is less attractive, not only because it reminds them of the parochialism that has led to the defeat of their civilization by the West in the period of colonialism, but also, according to their view, it denies them the opportunity to reap the material benefits supposedly offered by modernity. However, the socialization and internalization of social, cultural, and political values that these individuals have experienced in their respective traditional institutions prior to their exposure to elements of modernity, leaves traditional values deeply embedded. Consciously or otherwise, they filter modern ideas through traditional lens. The consequence of such a process is 54 the desire to broaden their political thinking beyond the confinement of ethno-geographical parochialism. These individual elites appear to claim that the ideas they espouse are national in scope but indigenous in origin. However, few of them readily acknowledge that the ideas actually originate from the particular ethnically-defined indigenous political culture from which they find their roots. But, while speaking in what seems to be national and modern terms, it is evident that their ideas and goals resonate better and find greater support from those of their own specific ethno-geographical group than from the other groups. The present research argues that the makeup of Indonesian political culture belongs to this modified classification of multiple political cultures. The major political groups, namely the nationalist, the modernist Islam, and the traditionalist Islam, are derived from the political cultures of the ethno-geographical groups. Both the nationalists and the traditionalists have roots in the Javanese culture. The nationalist aliran is the manifestation of the culture of the Javanese heartland of the southern part of central Java, while the traditionalist Islam is derived from the culture of eastern Java. The proponents of modernist Islam mainly come from the outer islands (seberang) and the coastal northern area of central Java. The culture of the nationalist and the traditionalist Islam is based mainly on agriculture, while that of the modernist is based on maritime commerce. The nationalist movement in Indonesia, which is different from nationalist aliran, was strongly tied to the quest for modernity. Such a quest was felt widely, especially among the elites. The overwhelming sense of purpose at the advent of the nationalist movement was directed at achieving nationhood 55 as an integrated people. There was a consciousness at that time that the particular local cultures signified feudalism and primitiveness, and therefore, in a quest for modernity, had to be abandoned. 8 5 Indonesia was to be modernity itself. Thus, being integrated as one people, as opposed to being identified with the local cultures, was seen as the foundation of modernity. This precept provided for a very powerful impetus for the establishment of the Indonesian nation. 8 6 The process, in which the idea of Indonesia as a community was imagined, in many ways was shaped by the educational system installed by the Dutch colonial administration. At the turn of the century, due to an increasing need to staff the administration of its newly consolidated colony, the colonial administration opened the gates to education for native Indonesians. While many primary and secondary schools were set up in the regions, tertiary education was concentrated in Batavia (now Jakarta) and Bandung. Both cities had become the Mecca for aspiring indigenous elites from all over the archipelago. In these schools, they found a common identity of being the inferior inlander, as well as coming to realize that there was a common lingua franca other than Dutch that most of them spoke (the Malay language). These 8 5 Ruth McVey (1996) "Building Behemoth: Indonesian Constructions of the Nation-State," in Daniel S. Lev and Ruth McVey, eds. (1996) Making Indonesia: Essays on Modern Indonesia in Honor of George McT. Kahin, Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, p. 14; also see the accounts of young nationalist leaders in the Boven Digoel camp, especially Sjahrir in Rudolf Mrazek (1996) "Sjahrir at Boven Digoel: Reflections on Exile in the Dutch East Indies," in Lev and McVey, eds., op.cit., pp. 59-60. 8 6 The Oath of the Youth in 1928, an all important milestone of the foundation of the Indonesian state, carried the message of "One Fatherland, One Language, and One Nation." 56 students thus invented the identity of an Indonesian nat ion. 8 7 Through this process, not only was the Indonesian identity created, but it was also made finite. 8 8 Therefore, the Malays in Malaya were not considered as compatriots by the Sumatrans, even though the two groups had many commonalities, but the Papuans were, despite all the differences. After proclaiming independence in 1945, the Indonesian founding fathers, led by Sukarno, strove to create a national identity for the new nation by inventing a number of symbols and traditions. In a classic work on the subject of inventing traditions, Eric Hobsbawm argues that many state elites have been engaged in inventing traditions for the purposes of establishing or symbolizing social cohesion, establishing or legitimizing institutions, and/or for political socialization. The source of many invented traditions indeed came from ancient materials, in the forms of symbols, mottos, songs, or rituals. But they were clearly employed for novel purposes. Inventing traditions was especially important for new nation-states, as they themselves were novel historical innovations. 8 9 This was even more important for a plural society like Indonesia, where there was little or no prior precedent to the claim of statehood in the form of and to the extent that the modern Indonesian state would adopt. The symbolism for the new Indonesian state invented by Sukarno and others was largely derived from the old kingdoms of Sriwijaya and Majapahit (especially the latter). The national colors, red and white, were said to be the 8 7 Anderson (1991) op.cit, pp. 121-123; 132-134. 8 8 One of the features of imagined communities, according to Anderson, lies in the limitation of the communities. See ibid., p. 7. 8 9 Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., (1983) The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 57 battle flag used by the Gajah Mada (the prime minister of Majapahit) during wars to enlarge the kingdom's area of control. The national symbol of the Garuda bird was also said to be the sacred bird of the old kingdom. Many mottos of the state or state's bodies used Sanskrit words that were deemed to be used by the ancient kingdoms. But perhaps more than mere symbolism, tradition was invented to lend credence to Indonesia's claim of statehood. It was argued that since the span of control exerted by both the Sriwijaya and Majapahit kingdoms encompassed the area that became part of independent Indonesia, the claim of statehood was therefore a valid, legal, and natural one. However, while Majapahit's rule indeed reached to many parts of the archipelago, including Serui in the western tip of New Guinea island (present day Irian Jaya), the extent of control was at best only tributary and indirect. Furthermore, most of Majapahit's area of control only extended to small coastal towns, and rarely touched the interior areas, except in Java. Almost immediately after the establishment of the nascent state, it became obvious that there was a deep politico-cultural divide between the main political aliran groups. The new republic soon became entangled in prolonged, indeed continuous, debates on a number of fundamental issues, i.e., the state ideology between Islam as propagated by the Musl im forces or a quasi-secular ideology advocated by the nationalists; the nature of state power and political competition between a high degree of authoritarian paternalism as believed by the Javanese and an egalitarian and open political competition consistent with the traits of the outer islanders; and the issue of centralization, sought by the 58 dominant Javanese versus a decentralization of power, wanted by the outer islanders. Indonesian politics, thus, can be defined as encompassing conflict and cooperation between the major political aliran segments, which owe their existence to the ethnically divided political cultures, constrained and modified by the structure of modern nationalism. Such an interaction between tradition and modernity leads to the observation of a prominent Indonesianist, William Liddle, who concludes that at "the most general level, to be Indonesian is to be modern and indigenous at the same time." 9 0 Along with the other fundamental issues regarding the state mentioned above, this study particularly seeks to explore the divergent ideas of the political cultures of the aZzran-based groups in Indonesia toward democracy. It aims to discover whether or not there are different meanings attached to the concept of democracy as a result of different segmental politico-cultural traits in Indonesia. If there are, it also aims to determine the implications for the state of different interpretations of democracy, and to ascertain whether or not this is an impediment to democratization and the process of democratic consolidation in Indonesia. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY In its current development, the field of comparative politics is enmeshed in theoretical and methodological controversy. At one end of the spectrum, postmodernist scholars argue against any sort of theoretical approach as an 9 0 R. William Liddle (1996) Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, p. 68. 59 avenue to understanding issues, and even in some cases against causal explanations altogether. At the other end, adherents of the rational choice approach, inspired by quantitative analysis of microeconomics and game theory, claim that all aspects of political behavior can be understood by employing rational deductive logic and modeling. Attainment of knowledge about the particulars is therefore unnecessary. 9 1 However, the majority of comparative politics scholars remain in between the two poles, the so-called "eclectic messy center." According to Paul Evans, a research that falls within this category "draws on general theories whenever it can but also cares deeply about particular historical outcomes. It sees particular cases as the building blocks for general theories and theories as lenses to identify what is interesting and significant about particular cases." 9 2 In the methodological spectrum, the position of the present study can be considered as a part of the eclectic messy center. It is informed by theories of political culture, democratization, and segmental politics. In return, it also seeks to contribute to our understanding of political culture, political change and democratization. It is also concerned with the particulars of the case study at hand - Indonesia - and seeks to address questions that may be of interest to scholars specializing in its study or practitioners involved with this country. One of the most renowned methodologies in studying political culture is Clifford Geertz' "thick description." 9 3 He argues that in order to understand the 9 1 Atul Kohli, et.al, "The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium," in World Politics, Vol. 48, October 1995, pp. 1-2. 9 2 Ibid., p. 4. 9 3 Geertz (1973), op.cit; see also a collection of Geertz' essays in (1983) Local Knowledge, New York: Basic Books; for a succinct analysis of Geertz 60 culture of any given society, analysts have to make detailed analyses of the symbols, belief systems, and other components of the culture, and interpret them so as to make intelligible. The analysis should not attempt to gain parsimony common in theorizing activity among scholars of the positivist tradition, especially if it is done at the expense of a detailed understanding and a cogent interpretation of the object of study. This research may not attempt to gain an in-depth understanding of the multiple political cultures of a complex polity of Indonesia, at least not in the way that Geertz has done in his case study of the Balinese culture. 9 4 It does, however, intend to rely on the local knowledge of the researcher to make a somewhat detailed analysis and a rather thick description of how politico-cultural traits of major ethnic groups translate into political actions. In an article on comparative politics methodology, Arend Lijphart identifies several ways that research in the discipline can be carried out. These can be grouped into four methods: statistical, experimental, comparative and case study. For the purpose of the present research, the last two methods are considered here. As its name implies, the comparative method refers to comparison between a few but at least two cases (the statistical method is usually suitable for large-n research) with the purpose of discovering empirical relationships among variables. The case study method deals with one case. But it is closely connected with the comparative method in that it possesses the potential to be expanded to cover two or more comparable cases in further epistemological position, see Stephen Welch (1993) The Concept of Political Culture, Hampshire: St. Martin's Press, pp. 104-108. 9 4 Clifford Geertz (1980) Negara: The Theater State in Nineteenth Century Bali, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 61 studies. The advantage of the case study method is the intensive examination of the case. While many scholars have criticized this method and questioned its contribution to theorizing, in certain instances the case study can be useful to theory-building in the discipline. 9 5 Lijphart points out six categories of case study: atheoretical, interpretative, hypothesis-generating, theory-confirming, theory-infirming, and deviant case studies. The first two types are descriptive, less theoretically informed, and aspire less toward theory-building. The studies of these types are mainly interested only in the single case. The latter types are more theoretically-conscious. The first of this type begins with a possible hypothesis and attempts to formulate a more definitive hypothesis that in turn is to be tested in studies involving a larger number of cases. Both theory-confirming and theory-infirming studies have direct theoretical relevance in that they seek to approve or disapprove parts of established generalizations. Deviant case analyses are studies of cases that are presumed to deviate from general theoretical propositions. 9 6 The present study can best be described as falling within the categories of interpretive, theory-confirming, and perhaps hypothesis-generating studies. Further research on different comparable cases can be carried out using the findings of this study as a basis. But this research also aspires to add to the theoretical understanding of theories of political culture, democratization, and segmental politics by pointing out several strengths and weaknesses of these relatively more established theories. 9 5 Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method" in American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, September 1971, pp. 682-683, 691. 96 Ibid., pp. 691-693. 62 One of the problems in comparative political analyses, especially the large-n ones employing statistical methods, is the assumption that all nations are solid and unitary entities. Referring to an earlier study by Stein Rokkan, Lijphart asserts that such a "whole nation bias" is the result of practicality because it is relatively easier to collect data on the national rather than subnational level. The comparative method can help correct such a bias. By reducing the number of cases, an analyst can expand on the subnational variables. 9 7 Viewed through this methodological perspective, the present research can also be classified as comparative. While the case study is one nation, it is concerned with comparing and contrasting the subnational groups on comparable variables, i.e., the politico-cultural antecedents of the groups, their views on politics, the state, governance, and democracy, which are eventually translated into political behavior. This study employs a combination of research techniques aimed at answering different parts of the research questions, i.e., library research and field research. Library research in the form of scholarly books, journals, newspapers, and other types of publications has been carried out, using the libraries of the University of Brit ish Columbia and Simon Fraser University, and other libraries in North America, as well as the libraries of several research centers in Southeast Asia, including the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Habibie Center in Jakarta, Indonesia; and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) in Singapore. This research has also made use of much of the 9 7 Arend Lijphart, "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research," in Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, July 1975, pp. 167-169. 63 recent literature in the Indonesian language that has been published in great numbers since Reformasi, a testament to the explosion of creative impulses in the country during the last five years, with the aim of introducing them to the broader international audience. Field research is intended to gain information from primary or quasi-primary sources. In addition to using written materials, such as official journals and newspapers, party documents and publications, a series of interviews with figures from the major aliran groups identified in this research have been conducted. These figures include political persona, scholars and observers. Some interviews have also been carried out with prominent student political activists, members of the press, and activists of nongovernmental organizations. A list of interviewees may be found after the bibliography. THESIS ORGANIZATION This study is organized into seven chapters as follows. After this chapter, the historical background of Indonesian politics is discussed in Chapter 2. The time frame covered is from the wake of the nationalist movement during the Dutch colonial period (1908) to the late New Order (Suharto's last Development Cabinet - March 1997) era. The discussion will revolve around the issue of Indonesia's contending aZiran-based segments and their ethnic or religious antecedents. Another point of discussion is the political interaction between these groups that led to the adoption of authoritarian government as well as the experimentation with democracy. Chapter 3 describes the events that led to the resignation of Suharto in May 1997 and the subsequent transfer of power to Habibie. It starts with the 64 description of the Asian economic crisis that struck Indonesia early in the year and led to the multitude of crises facing the old regime. Then, it discusses the ensuing political crisis marked by students and a mass Reformasi movement demanding Suharto's resignation. Of particular importance, this chapter aims to delineate the extent of support given to the Reformasi movement, or possibly the lack thereof, shown by the leaders of the political aliran. Furthermore, it seeks to explore the ideas underlying the variations in elite behavior. As such, this chapter serves as the departure point for discussion in the ensuing chapters. Chapters 4 through 6 attempt to address the following issues: the ethno-locational roots of the main political aliran in Indonesia, namely the nationalists, the modernist Muslims, and the traditionalist Muslims, the socio-cultural traits of each aliran, and their respective views on matters of statecraft, including the three critical issues of state foundation, regionalism, and democratization described earlier, giving particular attention to comparing and contrasting the politico-cultural views of the segments on their respective understandings of what democracy means and what political form it should take. The concluding chapter analyzes the findings in the preceding chapters in light of the theoretical approaches identified in this chapter. It also evaluates the usefulness of the perspective of aliran politics to understanding Indonesian studies today. Close examination is directed to the analysis of the different perceptions of the aliran political segments towards the critical issues of the state and interpreting what this means for the future of Indonesia. 65 CHAPTER 2 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INDONESIAN POLITICS: POLITICAL CULTURE, EXTERNAL IDEAS, AND THE PRIMACY OF ALIRAN POLITICS This chapter seeks to outline the elements of continuity and change in Indonesian politics from the advent of the nationalist movement unt i l just before the outbreak of the Reformasi movement. In discussing change, it focuses on the external and internal factors that influence the socio-cultural as well as the political makeup of Indonesian society. In particular, this analysis will be directed toward the interaction between "Western" ideas, such as nationalism, Marxism, capitalism and democracy, and traditional values. The discussion of continuity focuses on the geographical and sociological roots of Indonesia's contending political segments, especially the Javanese and seberang (outer islanders). Also discussed is the centrality of the influence of Islam in producing the streams (aliran) of political thinking, i.e., the abangan, the santri and the Javanese santri. Particular attention is paid to the institutional manifestation of these political segments in the forms of political parties, mass and religious organizations. 1 The discussion of the politico-cultural traits of the political segments and their ethnicity antecedents serves as the foundation for the analyses of the different perceptions of the respective 1 In this chapter as in throughout the thesis, the terms streams, aliran, segments, and groups are used to mean the same thing, i.e., the division of Indonesian politics into several prominent groups whose political behaviors are primarily defined by their respective politico-cultural roots and are supported by a web of socio-political organizations with identifiable constituents. The terms are therefore used interchangeably. 66 aliran segments in viewing the issues of the state, which can be found in the chapters 4-6. CONTINUITY: ALIRAN IN INDONESIAN POLITICS Analyses of Indonesian politics from the 1950s onward have revolved around the issue of the "aliran." Indonesian politics are organized around aliran networks, and therefore easier to interpret through this concept. In general, there are two definitions of aliran, as asserted by Clifford Geertz. One is "a political party surrounded by a set of voluntary social organizations formally or informally linked to it." The other is "a comprehensive pattern of social integration." 2 Political analysts tend to use either one of these definitions or a combination of the two. In a widely read article among students of political culture, Benedict Anderson has argued that he is more comfortable with the latter definition of aliran. According to him, aliran constitutes "a distinctive, integrated cultural outlook, together with its organized and unorganized (but potentially organizable) adherents."3 On the other hand, Herbert Feith in the introduction to his classic book that he co-edited with Lance Castles, Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965, demonstrated the use of the concept of aliran as in the first definition. He defines aliran in terms of "streams of political thinking." 2 Clifford Geertz (1959) "The Javanese Village," in G. William Skinner, ed. Local, Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia: A Symposium, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 37-41. 3 Benedict R.O'G. Anderson (1972) "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," reprinted in Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. (1990) Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, fn. 85. 67 Within each stream can be found a political party. These aZiran-based parties are supported by various social groups, representing youth, labor, women, students, intellectuals, artisans, etc.4 This thesis tends to support both definitions. The aliran, as shall be demonstrated in the ensuing pages, represent a distinctive politico-cultural set of beliefs, represented in the public sphere by a number of social organizations, and in the political sphere by a political party. A n aZiran-based party is usually distinguishable from the other aliran and non-aliran parties by the level and kind of mass organizational support that it receives both in elections and in the society generally. Such mass support can be discerned for the most part according to geographical locality, for instance between Java and the outer islands, coastal and agricultural areas in Java, and rural and urban areas. The above definition of aliran seems to fit the definition of ideology in modern political science literature: a coherent set of ideas and beliefs geared towards political action. 5 The aliran, similar to ideology, represent a world-view adhered to by their followers. Each has its own set of values, political attitudes, moral views, and empirical beliefs. However, even though throughout the course of Indonesia's history the aliran have been influenced by a number of "Western" ideologies, 6 their adherence to these ideologies has been less dogmatic and more relaxed and flexible. A number of aZiran-based political 4 Herbert Feith (1970) "Introduction" in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, e d s . (1970) Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 5 See among others, David Robertson (2002) A Dictionary of Modern Politics, London: Europa Publications, pp. 232-233. 6 Referring to "Western" ideologies, such as Marxism, nationalism, democratic socialism, democracy, and capitalism. 68 parties did try to demonstrate that they were the vanguards of certain ideologies. For example, PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia - Indonesian Communist Party) for Marxism-Leninism, PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia -Indonesian National Party) for nationalism, PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia -Indonesian Socialist Party) for democratic socialism, and Golkar (Golongan Karya - Functional Groups) for capitalist developmentalism. However, as shall be argued in this chapter, these affinities have had less to do with winning mass support for their ideas than with presenting political platforms for purposes of waging political competition with the other parties. To say it from the perspective of the voters, the number of electors who vote for a certain party due to its ideological choice is significantly less than those who base their votes on the politico-cultural outlook of the party. This shows itself most clearly in cases where the aliran parties have shifted their ideological orientation, and such a shift has not resulted in the alienation of their constituents or disruption of their traditional core values. The concept of aliran is also different from that of class. Although the PKI was notable for its Marxist-Leninist jargon that promoted a class struggle, the localized support that it received came mostly as a result of the ability of its leaders to communicate effectively with a certain cultural group, (the Javanese), rather than just with workers and peasants. Hence, each aliran segment can enjoy the support of its respective cultural group without regard to the class differentiation within such group. However, it should also be noted that in the past, both class and ideology were still important in aliran politics, especially in trying to win the support of the majority group, the Javanese. Two aliran parties, the PNI and the PKI, 69 competed in the electoral race for Java. Here, the issue of class and ideology came forward. The PNI appealed to the middle and upper classes with a more conservative outlook, while the PKI gained more support from the more radical lower classes. Such a race also happened in some other areas, albeit not to the extent as in Java. In the contemporary setting, the growth of the middle class and increasing exposure to the outside world, as a result of economic development during the New Order era, has made class and ideology more salient in Indonesian politics. Nevertheless, such a phenomenon has by no means supplanted aliran politics. Feith and Castle's edited book is the first systematic effort to map out the a/iran-based political segments in Indonesia. As an illustration and as a basis for ensuing analyses, Feith's diagram of political parties and streams of political thinking is presented below: 7 7 Feith, op.cit, p. 14. 70 Legend: 8 PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party) NU Nahdatul Ulama (The Ulemas Awakening - Traditionalist Mus l im party) Masyumi Majelis Syura Musl imin Indonesia (Indonesian Musl im Council -Modernist Musl im party) CONTENDING POLITICAL CULTURES Selective Eclecticism The richness in natural resources and the strategic position of the archipelago now known as Indonesia have attracted many civilizations to its islands to interact with its population. As a result, many of the world's major religious beliefs, i.e., Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity, have come and influenced the way of life, world-view, and philosophy of the people. Of equal importance in shaping the Indonesian culture are the animist beliefs developed by the indigenous people prior to the arrival of the major religions. Probably due to the openness of the territory and waves of external exposures, the people of this archipelago tend to be flexible in accepting external influence and adapting the new influence to the old. As a result, many facets of the local cultures are eclectic and syncretic in nature. Such eclecticism, however, is not uniformly applied across various ethnic groups in Indonesia. In general, it can be said that there is an inner selective mechanism found in each of these groups that filters which external influence 8 These four parties were the "big four" parties with the largest vote both in the parliamentary and the Konstituante elections in 1955. 71 is deemed acceptable and which not. Usually, such selection involves the suitability or compatibility of the external ideas to the existing pattern of social and power relationships of the indigenous population. This might explain why certain Western ideologies are more popular with certain ethnic groups than for the others. The belief system and worldview of the various ethnic groups are the result of such "selective eclecticism," which involves a long process of selection, internalization, syncretization and adaptation, articulation, and eventually value socialization among the people. In much of the early literature on Indonesian politics, two political cultures appear to stand out. They are the Javanese and the seberang (outer islands) political cultures. The following is the discussion of the central assumption of the organization of society, and conception of power and politics held by these political cultures. Javanese Political Culture Javanese political culture has been much more widely explored by social scientists than the seberang political culture. This is probably due to the fact that the Javanese are the largest Indonesian ethnic group and that theirs is one of the ancient civilizations in the world. 9 Given their long history, the Javanese have built a culture that is complex, intricate, and rich in spiritual life. The cradle of Javanese civilization is the fertile agricultural land in central Java around the present day cities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Historically, it has been an agricultural society. As in many such societies, the Javanese developed an inward-looking, insular, communitarian, status-conscious, and hierarchy-9 In the words of Geertz, Java "has been civilized longer than England." See Geertz, Clifford (1960) The Religion of Java, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, p. 7. 7 2 minded culture. 1 0 Such cultural features are also due to the heavy influence of Hindu-Buddhism in Java, which had been the predominant beliefs of the Javanese prior to the arrival of Islam in the 15 t h century. The caste system of Hinduism created significant social differentiation and stratification, which became deeply embedded within the Javanese psyche. 1 1 Due to its emphasis on hierarchy, the concept of Javanese leadership makes a clear distinction between gusti (lords) and kawula (subjects).1 2 The idea of power in Javanese culture is rather peculiar. It runs against the common perception of power in the West. Anderson argues that for the Javanese, power is concrete and finite, and holders of power are expected to be able to demonstrate power through the possession of certain objects deemed to have supernatural powers. 7 3 Power is also homogeneous. It means that there is no differentiation of types of power. It is also regarded as constant in terms of total quality. It means that an increase of one's power must happen at the expense of others. Thus, the quest for power is perceived as zero-sum. Lastly, power is detached from moral questions. It is neither good nor bad, nor does it 1 0 R. William Liddle (1996) Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, pp. 65-66. 1 1 R.M. Koentjaraningrat (1975) Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Indonesia and Malaysia, Menlo Park: Cummings Publishing Company, pp. 58-60. 1 2 T. Mulya Lubis (1992) "The Future of Human Rights in Indonesia," in Harold Crouch and Hal Hill, eds. (1992) Indonesia Assessment 1992: Political Perspectives on the 1990s, Political and Social Change Monograph 17, Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University, p. 297; Anders Uhlin (1997) Indonesia and the "Third Wave of Democratization": The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in A Changing World, Surrey: Curzon, p. 52. The word "gusti" is also used to refer to God, which signifies the deep reverence toward the leaders. 1 3 Known as "pusaka" or sacred things. These can be in the forms of certain kris (dagger), spears, carriages, musical instruments, etc. See Anderson (1972), p. 27. 73 matter how it is achieved. What does matter is whether one has power or not. 1 4 In terms of accession to power, the Javanese believe that power is either received from inheritance or from a divine favor (wahyu). Such favor is believed to be bestowed upon rulers of relatively humble origins, coming to power after a period of turmoil and bloodshed. 1 5 In the Javanese conception, power is closely associated with "concentration" and "oneness." Conversely, diffusion of authority means an impurity in power, and therefore should be avoided by all power holders. Thus, for a Javanese leader, diffusion of power within the state is regarded as a sign of weakness. A Javanese leader will always strive to unite different segments of the society under his rule and try to mold different - sometimes opposing -ideas believed by different groups into a single new idea that can be accepted by a l l . 1 6 The search for harmony is the keyword in understanding Javanese social life, including statecraft.1 7 The Javanese have a profound ability to absorb new ideas, select parts of the new ideas suitable to their way of life, merge them with the existing culture, and thus rejuvenate the old culture as well as creating a new, syncretic one. Therefore the Javanese are known to be tolerant to the ideas of others, so long as these ideas do not contradict the central assumptions of their social lives. 1 4 Anderson (1972), pp. 22-23. 1 5 Koentjaraningrat (1985) "Javanese Terms for God and Supernatural Beings and the Idea of Power," in A. Ibrahim, S. Siddique and Y. Hussain, eds. (1985) Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p. 290; Anderson (1972), pp. 38-39. 1 6 Anderson (1972), pp. 24-25; pp. 28-33. 17 Ibid., pp. 28-33. 74 Another important facet of the Javanese concept of power is the idea of pamrih18 to explain the ruler's downfall from power. A ruler is said to have pamrih in his leadership if he refuses or hesitates to carry out his duty to the state because of sympathy or empathy for his friends or family members. A pamrih is also said to exist if the ruler carries out a certain act in his personal favor (usually involving material benefits) or in the favor of his close associates or family members, or in other words corrupt and nepotistic practices. 1 9 Pamrih is a sign that the power of the ruler is weakening and that a change of power is imminent. Seberang Political Culture As opposed to the vastness of scholarship on Javanese political culture, the outer islands political culture is rather inadequately covered. It is perhaps due to the fact that, in contrast to the Javanese, there are various groups living in these islands, and they tend to be spread out all over the archipelago. A relative lack of communication among them, unlike in Java, has rendered the creation of a single civilization among these groups unimaginable. Hence, it is quite difficult to define accurately the presence of an outer islands (seberang) political culture. Nevertheless, there are some common qualities shared by many of these non-Javanese ethnic groups, or at least among the larger, more assertive and articulative ones. Among these groups are the Acehnese, Batak, and Minangkabau of Sumatra, and the Bugis and Makassar peoples of Sulawesi, as 1 8 The approximate meaning is "concealed personal motive." 19 Ibid., pp. 51-53. 75 well as the people of the Maluku islands. The people living in coastal towns in the northern parts of Java (pesisir Javanese) can also be classified within this group, as well as the people of Banten (the westernmost part of Java island.) 2 0 According to Koentjaraningrat, there are two categories in the socio-geographical feature of these peoples. First, the majority of these ethnic groups live on the coastal areas. This is the case of the Minangkabau, Acehnese, Buginese, Makassarese, the many groups of Maluku, and the pesisir Javanese. Second, others of the seberang ethnic groups live in remote interior areas. Prominent examples of this category are the Bataks, Toraja and Minahasa of Sulawesi, and Dayaks of Kalimantan. 2 1 These two categories of ethnic groups share a common feature concerning the extent of influence from Indie religions, Hinduism and Buddhism. Compared to the vast Hindu-Buddhist influence in Java (and Hinduism in Bali), the presence of these two religions in the outer islands was much less prevalent. 2 2 As a result, social stratification did not become the main The classification of the Sundanese of West Java is rather difficult. Due to the historical rivalry with the Javanese kingdoms, the Sundanese always insist that they are non-Javanese. However, to classify them as seberang is quite problematic, because the extent of Hindu influence is equally extensive in the Sunda land as in Central and East Java, especially in the eastern part where the courts of the old Sundanese kingdom of Padjadjaran was located. It is important to note here that some interior seberang ethnic groups were still living in a fairly simple, secluded style, and still practice certain kind of animist beliefs (usually in combination with the practice of major religion, most notably Christianity). This is especially true in Papua (Irian Jaya), as well as some ethnic groups in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. Being situated in the margins of the country's social and political relations, they are relatively less significant in shaping up what is being considered here as the seberang political-culture. Koentjaraningrat (1975), pp. 57-60. The high level of influence of Hinduism in Bali rendered its people share many similarities in political culture with the Javanese. Historically, the royal families of Bali originated from the Majapahit court fleeing from Java during the power struggle with the Islamic sultanate of Demak. 76 rule of the societies. While in many, if not all, of these groups there was a functional differentiation, especially the existence of the rulers and the followers, in general the differentiation was not as complex and intricate as in the Javanese model. In many of these ethnic groups, especially in the coastal communities, the rulers were less shrouded in an aura of mysticism and secrecy, and generally were more accessible. The decision-making process in the seberang communities was also generally more open and commoners were usually involved. The rulers frequently consulted the public for decisions regarding the societies in consultation meetings (musyawarah).23 The socio-geographical difference between the coastal and the interior non-Javanese societies did not amount to significant differences in their world-views about statecraft. While in the interior outer-island tribes there was a significant degree of mysticism developed around the idea of power, the lack of Indie influence rendered a relatively more relaxed social stratification. The coastal communities were traditionally engaged in commerce and seafaring activities. As traveling merchants, they tended to possess the qualities of being culturally open, direct, and individualistic. This was due to the relatively small amount of time that they spent on land in their home villages, which did not enable them to contemplate or devise elaborate social customs and traditions. As a result, one's fortune was usually determined by individual rather than Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin (1996) "Masyarakat Aceh dan Demokrasi" (The Aceh Society and Democracy), in Muhammad Najib, ed. (1996) Demokrasi dalam Perspektif Budaya Nusantara (Democracy in the Perspective of Indonesian Cultures), Yogyakarta: LKPSM, Indonesia, pp. 40-47; Tadjuddin Noer Effendi (1996) "Demokrasi dalam Perspektif Budaya Batak" (Democracy in the Perspective of Batak's culture) in Najib, op.cit, pp. 83-87; Sjafri Sairin (1996) "Demokrasi dalam Perspektif Kebudayaan Minangkabau" (Democracy in the Perspective of Minangkabau's culture) in Najib, op.cit, pp. 142-146. 77 collective effort. Additionally, the lingua franca of the seafaring merchants in the archipelago in the 17 t h or 16 t h century was Malay. As opposed to the complex Javanese language, the Malay language was comparatively egalitarian and less stratified.2 4 For these qualities, the Javanese have often regarded the seberang people as "kasar."25 Compared to the Javanese, the cultures of the seberang communities are less structured and elaborate. This is due to the small agricultural surpluses and high rate of mobility of the people. 2 6 In some instances, the effort to develop classes of civil servants and nobility was interrupted by the strengthening of colonial rule. Such was the case of the Bugis, where the direct rule of the Dutch colonial administration made the use of symbols of nobility decline rapidly. 2 7 Being maritime-based, seberang cultures generally promote a greater sense of individuality than the agriculturally-based Javanese culture. As opposed to Javanese inclusive and assimilative traits, the seberang cultures tend to be more exclusive and rigid. The sense of "we-they" is more prevalent in the seberang cultures than in the Javanese one. As an illustration, a Javanese would likely approach a difference of opinion by attempting to reconcile the differences by finding a middle ground or a syncretic solution, whereas a typical seberang person would likely approach similar situation by recognizing the 2 4 The variant of the language used as the lingua franca was the Melayu pasar (market Malay). A different variant is used among the Malay aristocracy, which is a more stratified one. But even the extent of stratification of the latter variant is not as complex as the Javanese language. 2 5 The literal translation is "rude." However, it may also be read as "uncivilized." See Koentjaraningrat (1975), pp. 58; Anderson (1972), pp. 50-51. 2 6 Liddle (1996), p. 66. 2 7 Koentjaraningrat (1975), pp. 94-95. 78 differences while maintaining each individual's position or suggesting a competition between the different ideas. Islamic Influence The differences between the Javanese and seberang political cultures are more apparent in the different reactions of the two cultures towards the influence of Islam. Islam came to the archipelago in the 13 t h century, brought by merchants from southern India and Persia. 2 8 It first arrived in the archipelago in Aceh, the northern tip of Sumatra, where the first Islamic sultanate i n Southeast Asia was formed, known as the Samudera Pasai. It then spread to Malacca, where a powerful sultanate dominated the busy strait separating Sumatra and peninsular Malaya. From Malacca, Islam spread to the coastal towns of Sumatra, which were under Malacca's sphere of influence. Islam next was brought to the northern coastal towns of Java, where a new sultanate of Demak was formed. During the 15 t h century, the rising Demak state challenged the power of the declining interior Javanese kingdom, Majapahit. After a series of power struggles, which involved a mix between peaceful and conformist proselytization of the local people and the use of force, Majapahit fell. In its place, a new Javanese sultanate of Mataram was established. The next stage was the Islamization of the peoples living in the other islands of the archipelago. This was primarily conducted by the Islamic Sumatra, Malacca, and Javanese sultanates. Before the arrival of European 2 8 More recently, there has been a speculation that Islam also came to Indonesia from China, brought by some of the Muslim Chinese envoys, the most popular of whom was Admiral Cheng Ho, and that it came directly to Java. However, a systematic study of this claim has yet to be undertaken. 79 traders, Islam had become the predominant religion of the land. Its strongest foothold can be found all over Sumatra except in the interior of northern Sumatra, the whole of Java, the coastal areas of Kalimantan, all over Sulawesi except in the interior of South Sulawesi and the northern tip of the island, northern Maluku islands, and western Lesser Sunda islands. 2 9 However, there was a significant difference in the reception to Islam in Java from that in seberang. Such a difference resulted in different forms of Islam being practiced in Indonesia. In Java, Islam won adherents among the people primarily due to the cultural approach taken by the Islamic proselytizers, known as the "wall"30 After the northern coastal towns of Java became Islamized through trading contacts with Sumatra and Malacca merchants, the effort to introduce Islam to the interior Javanese was carried out primarily by the Javanese wall In an effort to convey the message of Islam to the Javanese masses, these wali employed the symbols, folklore, legends, and rituals of the old Hindu culture, such as wayang and gamelan.31 Such a strategy proved highly successful, for in a relatively short period of time, Java was Islamized. 2 9 Koentjaraningrat (1975), pp. 20-22. The Western Protestant and Catholic missionaries, who later accompanied the traders, converted the peoples in areas where Islamic influence was weak. Such peoples were primarily the interior peoples of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua, as well as the coastal people of southern Maluku, and the eastern part of the Lesser Sundas. Until today, the Protestant and Catholics of Indonesia, who make up around 10 percent of the whole population, come primarily from these ethnic groups. 3 0 There were nine prominent Wali, affectionately known to the Javanese as "Wali Songo." Each of these wali were said to possess supernatural abilities. Many stories surrounding the wali and their proselytization efforts were imbued with tales of mysticism. These myths, as well as the use of local folklore in conveying religious messages, greatly facilitated the spread of Islam in Java, as the Javanese felt that they could relate easily to the new religion. 3 1 Anderson (1972), p. 68. 80 The message carried by the wali through the conformist strategy led most Javanese to find Islam suitable to their way of life. This was aided by the fact that Islam came to Indonesia from Persia and southern India, where it had already been patrimoniahzed. 3 2 Hence, in the interior of Java Islamic practices were mixed with the existing Hindu cultural attributes. In many cases, Hindu practices were more dominant than the Islamic rituals. From time to time, the Javanese would engage in Hindu ceremonies glossed over by some Arabic words said to be derived from the Koran. However, most Javanese would claim that they were Muslims, even though they would rarely execute the Islamic rituals as defined by the "Five Pillars of Islam." 3 3 The people who practice this variant of Javanese nominal Islam are known as the abangan.34 In fact, the religious practices of the interior Javanese, signifying a balanced syncretism between animistic, Hinduistic, and Islamic elements, are so different from Islam, so as to create a new religion altogether. 3 5 3 2 Ibid., pp. 68-69. The version of Islam that arrived in Southeast Asia might have been infused with sufism that had previously taken root in the subcontinent where it came from. This appeared to facilitate its compatibility with local existing religions. 3 3 These consist of belief in one God - Allah, performing prayer five times daily, fasting during the Ramadhan month, giving alms (zakat) according to Islamic law, and performing the Haj to Mecca if financially viable. 3 4 This means "red." The term was introduced into academic circles by Geertz in "The Religion of Java." The term came from the color of the cloth (actually the color was red earth) that these Javanese wore, as opposed to the white cloth worn by the more pious Javanese Muslims (putihan). 3 5 Geertz, op.cit., p. 5; Liddle (1996), p. 65; Koentjaraningrat (1975), p. 21 called this belief as "Agama Jawi" or "Kejawen." After the failed communist coup in 1965, there was a fervor for religions, partly induced by the government. Hence all Indonesians had to declare faith in one of the five officially recognized religions (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism). Most of the Javanese claimed Islam as their religion. However, in the 1970s, there was a movement to get the Kejawen recognized as a religion. Later it was acknowledged as the "Kepercayaan atas Tuhan Yang Maha Esa" (belief in the one God). Although it was not officially acknowledged as a religion, it acquired 81 In East Java, which was considered as a hinterland of Java, outside of the sphere of influence of "proper" Java but still heavily influenced by the interior Javanese values, Islam was practiced more piously. Islam in this part of Java was developed through a complex schooling system, known as the pesantren and its followers known as the santri. Historically, during the height of Hindu Javanese kingdoms, religious and intellectual powers were not held by the ruling class residing in the kraton (palaces) in the heartland of the Javanese culture (Yogyakarta and Surakarta). Rather these powers were possessed by the kyai (teachers) living in the eastern coastal and interior areas of Java. As opposed to the decadent lifestyles of the urban kraton ruling class, the kyai built, taught in , and led a frugal lifestyle in the pondok (boarding schools), located mostly in the villages. 3 6 As in the other parts of Java, Islam was also welcomed and generally took over the social institutions in eastern Java. And as in the kraton, the pondok also embraced Islam syncretically. For the most part, the teaching styles and rituals in the pondok did not abandon the previous Hinduistic practices. Islamic teachings basically just glossed over the Hindu recitations. Additionally, the patrimonial worldview of the kyai toward power and leadership remained similar to that held by the Javanese kraton. But in contrast to the kraton, in most pesantren the relationship between the kyai and the santri was rather informal. Most kyai were relaxed and casual when they related to their equal legal position with the religions. For a concise account of Kejawen practices, see Koentjaraningrat (1975), pp. 112-119. 3 6 Benedict R.O'G. Anderson (1966) The Languages of Indonesian Politics, reprinted in Anderson (1990), pp. 126-129; Andree Feillard (1999) NU vis-a-vis Neqara: Pencarian Isi, Bentuk, dan Makna (NU vis-d-vis the State: The Search for Content, Form, and Meaning), Yogyakarta: LKIS, pp. 3-5. 82 santri. Nonetheless, this interaction was marked by the most stringent rule, namely that the kyai were to be respected and the santri were to follow the creeds laid out by the kyai at all times. The santri were also expected to protect and defend the honor and dignity of the kyai from outside criticism. It did not mean, however, that criticisms were not allowed to be uttered within the pesantren. In fact, in some pesantren the learning atmosphere could get very lively. But when it came to the interaction with the outside world, all santri were behind their kyai without any reservation. In essence, therefore, the presence of Islam did not alter the existing political culture and institutional power relations in Java. Islam took the purest form in the outer islands. Due to the lack of powerful Hindu kingdoms when it entered, Islam was embraced without any major resistance. Many local rulers in Sumatra and later on in Sulawesi, and Maluku perceived that Islam was the religion of the merchants. Because of the flourishing trade with Islamic Malacca, the major trading power in the region at that time, the peoples of the outer islands quickly embraced Islam in order to facilitate their businesses. They also did not have any major cultural objections to Islam. Islam seemed to fit the egalitarian lifestyle and simple social structure that these maritime trading societies have developed over centuries. Furthermore, Islam was seen as an alternative to the Hinduism then embraced by the Javanese. When Islamic reformism entered the archipelago in the early 20 t h century by way of Malaya, the seberang peoples were the first to welcome it. Islamic reformism was then a new movement propagated by the Egyptian Muhammad Abduh, aimed at purifying the teaching of Islam from local mystical practices. 83 Reformist Muslims called for the return to the Koran and Hadits/Sunnah Rasul37 as the sole guidance of Islamic teaching. The teaching also intended to rationalize Islam and update it to the needs of the contemporary era, through the concept of "ijtihad."38 Hence, it was also called "Islamic modernism." Again, the more straightforward seberang peoples accepted this movement wholeheartedly because it seemed to suit their cultural traits. 3 9 Therefore, the type of Islam developed in these communities was different from the Javanese variants. As will be shown later, such differences brought about a separate development of social and political institutions as well as distinct political ideas. But before that, the influence of Western ideas on the indigenous political cultures and the interaction between the two should be assessed. This interaction has resulted in the establishment of the streams of Indonesian political thinking and their institutions, known as the aliran. CATALYSTS FOR CHANGE: THE EXTERNAL IDEAS Contacts with the outside world have occurred since the 4 t h century. The earliest evidence of the existence of a state in Indonesia indicates the presence of external influence, i.e., inscriptions on stone denoting the presence of a Hindu kingdom in Kutai, Kalimantan. The early external ideas adopted by the Indonesians were taken from Hinduism and Buddhism. In that regard, Islam, 3 7 The words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, which deal mainly with social and political issues. 3 8 "Interpretation" or "reinterpretation" of the Islamic texts. 3 9 Anderson (1972), pp. 69-70; Koentjaraningrat (1975), p. 45; Feillard, op.cit, pp. 6-7; Feith and Castles, eds., op.cit., pp. 201. 84 which came later, could also be regarded as one of the external influences. However, the influence of these eastern religions has been deeply embedded in the psyche of the various ethnic societies. So this form of external influence has been by and large indigenized in the belief system and practices, as well as in the social institutions of the local people. 4 0 The external ideas being considered here, then, are those coming from the Western world, i.e., nationalism, Marxism, capitalist developmental!sm, and liberal democracy. Indonesians began their acquaintance with these Western ideologies with the advent of Ethical Policy, which was introduced by the Dutch colonial administration. The policy provided education for the local people as well as career opportunities for positions in the growing colonial administration. These opportunities, however, were only granted to the members of the ruling class (priyayi). The policy was officially intended as a form of compensation to the Indonesians for the benefits accrued from the colony. But the policy could also be read as a means of winning the legitimacy of the local population after the Netherland's territorial possessions in the East Indies had been consolidated. The Dutch were also in dire need of manpower to administer their vast territory. 4 1 In any case, the Ethical Policy gave the Indonesians the first look at the whole range of external Western ideas, which later on in an interaction with the local cultural traits created the streams of political thinking and the political segments (aliran). However, the influence of the various external ideas was 4 0 For a critique of the indigenousness of Indonesian ideologies, see D.N. Aidit (1962) "Which Ideology is Native?" in Feith and Castles, eds., op.cit., pp. 310-313. 4 1 Anderson (1966), pp. 96-97. 85 gradual and almost continuous, becoming a constant factor in Indonesian history. The idea of nationalism was dominant early on, as well as communism and liberal democracy. Liberal democracy died in the end of 1950s, but was resurrected in the 1980s. Communism died in the later half of 1960s, and has never made a comeback. The idea of capitalist developmentalism became the dominant paradigm in the 1970s and although weakened is still very much adhered to. Nationalism As in many other colonized countries, the idea of nationalism was the first and most popular idea to influence the local population of the Netherlands East Indies. Creating a state in a territory comprising more than 13,660 islands where more than 300 ethnic groups speaking 365 local languages and dialects is indeed a tremendous and daunting task. Without a powerful ideology to unite all these peoples, a nation-state is difficult to imagine. 4 2 Yet, Indonesia was established and has thus far stood the test of time. At many junctures in its history, the integrity of the state has come to the brink of collapse, only to rebound and be reconfirmed. Here, once again, Anthony D. Smith's typology of nationalist movements might be of benefit in order to understand the problem of Indonesian nation-building. As has been described in the previous chapter, according to Smith, a nationalist movement can be perceived either as territorial or ethnic nationalism. Territorial nationalism seeks to create states based on certain 4 2 Anderson argues that a nation-state is indeed a community imagined by its populace to exist. See Benedict R.O'G. Anderson (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso. 86 territories with definable borders, while ethnic nationalism is b o u n d by the conception of ethnic commonali t ies . 4 3 A s the following description will show, there should be no doubt that due to its nature as a plural society and as a successor state to the colonial Netherlands East Indies, Indonesian nationalism is a territorial type. However, it is also a nationalism spurred by an insatiable drive to achieve modernity by creating a new identity of nationhood, a n d not just statehood. That new identity is Indonesian, which is perceived to be synonymous with modernity. O n the other h a n d , the idea of ethnic parochialism is portrayed as backward and, therefore, undesirable. While this idea seems to be shared by all Indonesians, how to achieve the new identity of nationhood is a subject of contention. There are differences of opinion among the larger ethno-cultural groups in the country on what comprises nationalism. To be sure, without the presence of a colonial power, Indonesia would not have existed. For example, culturally, the Sumatrans are closer to the Malays i n Malaysia than to the Papuans i n Irian Jaya, and the Papuans are closer to the Melanesians of the South Pacific than to the Javanese. What ties these disparate peoples i n a c o m m o n b o n d is what the first vice-president of the Republic M o h . Hatta once said is "perasaan senasib sepenanggungan" (the feeling of sharing a common fate and common plight). In this sense, therefore, nationalism can be seen as a reaction to the perceived sufferings produced by colonialism. A s an ideology, nationalism aspires to create a unified political and territorial entity. It may also seek a cultural identity. The new identity usual ly signifies a break from the past, but is also inspired by the old one. In some 4 3 Anthony D. Smith (1991) National Identity, Reno: University of Nevada Press. 87 cases, the new identity merely reflects a change in symbolism while the structure remains largely the same. Indonesian nationalism was born out of a long history of struggle against the colonial rule launched sporadically but continuously by the various ethnic groups in the archipelago. Such struggle brought about a feeling of bitterness and strong resentment among Indonesians toward Dutch colonialism. As a result, nationalism in Indonesia was marked by the abandonment of symbols of Dutch rule. This was reflected in the adoption of Malay instead of Dutch as the national language, and subsequent relatively quick abandonment of Dutch as a social language.44 Governmental symbolism was also rejected. Independent Indonesia adopted a presidential system instead of the parliamentary system as in the Netherlands.45 The plan to create a Dutch commonwealth similar to the British one was rejected outright. Even later, in the 1950s, the remaining Dutch economic interests in the archipelago were frozen and nationalized.46 However, the aspiration of nationalism was very much tied to the model and examples brought by the colonial power. Ruth McVey argues that the struggle to achieve freedom and nationhood was strongly associated with the 4 4 In just one generation, Dutch ceased to be spoken or understood by most Indonesians. This is different from in Suriname, where Dutch continues to be the national language to this day. 4 5 Between 1950-1959, a parliamentary democracy was in effect. The prime minister functioned as the chief administrator of the government, while the president presided over symbolic functions as a head of state. But, at the same time, the president also had significant power as the supreme commander of the armed forces as well as having the power to declare a state of emergency, by which the president would have the authority to dissolve the parliament and other state bodies. Sukarno used the latter power through Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959. The decree reverted the governmental system back to a presidential one. 4 6 The nationalization of Dutch companies was carried out amidst growing tension between the two countries over the West New Guinea (Irian Jaya) question. 88 idea of achieving modernity. The growing contact with the outside world - the fruit of the Ethical Policy - brought about a collective awareness among the Indonesians of the virtues and strengths of modernity. They were aware of the fact that their civilizations had been defeated by the European wealth, power, and mastery over nature. 4 7 Similarly, Anderson asserts that the adoption of Malay as the national language instead of Javanese, the language of the majority, might have to do with the desire to emulate the "egalitarian" way of speech of the Dutch language without having to adopt the language of the oppressors. The Javanese language is stratified in a complex manner, while Melayu pasar (bazaar Malay), being the common language of the merchants, knows no strata. 4 8 The quest for modernity was felt widely, especially among the educated Indonesians. The overwhelming sense of purpose at the advent of the nationalist movement was directed toward achieving nationhood as an integrated people. There was a consciousness at that time that the particular local cultures signified feudalism and primitiveness, and therefore in the quest for modernity, had to be abandoned. 4 9 The concept of Indonesia signified Ruth McVey (1996) "Building Behemoth: Indonesian Constructions of the Nation-State," in Daniel S. Lev and Ruth McVey, eds. (1996) Making Indonesia: Essays on Modern Indonesia in Honor of George McT. Kahin, Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, p. 12. Anderson (1966), p. 139. However, it should be noted that in Malaysia, the use of the Malay language is tied to the aristocratic social structure. Words are organized according to one's aristocratic rank. In Indonesia, especially during the New Order, some words were introduced from the local languages to indicate individual's societal rank. Nonetheless, this has not altered the comparatively egalitarian nature of the Malay language. McVey, op.cit., p. 14; also see the accounts of young nationalist leaders in the Boven Digoel camp, especially Sjahrir in Rudolf Mrazek (1996) "Sjahrir at Boven Digoel: Reflections on Exile in the Dutch East Indies," in Lev and McVey, eds., op.cit., pp. 59-60. 89 modernity. Thus, being integrated as one people, as opposed to identification with the local cultures, was seen as the foundation for modernity. This precept provided for a very powerful impetus for the establishment of the Indonesian nat ion. 5 0 The legacy of nationalism as a quest for modernity runs strong throughout the history of the republic. Even though after the end of revolutionary struggle it soon appeared that the archipelago was too diverse to be controlled from the center without risking imbalances, the idea of a federal state propagated by the Dutch was shortlived. 5 1 The rejection may have been due not only to the colonial overtone of the idea, having been put forward by the Dutch, but also due to the strength of the nationalist integrative idea. McVey even contends that the regionalist movements of 1950s did not have secessionist aspirations. Rather, they can be perceived as having been an effort to change the dominantly-Javanese leadership in Jakarta with the non-Javanese. 5 2 As nationalism became socialized and institutionalized, it appeared that it was more suitable for the Javanese political culture and less for the seberang's. The integrative notion of the ideology fit nicely with the Javanese political culture's tenet of efforts to achieve harmony and oneness (manunggal), 5 0 The Oath of the Youth in 1928, the most important milestone of the foundation of the Indonesian state, carried the message of "One Fatherland, One Language, and One Nation." 5 1 After the recognition of independence by the Dutch in 1949, Indonesia took the form of a federal state, in which the Republic of Indonesia was one of the members. However, in 1950 the Republic of the United States of Indonesia ceased to exist after its constituent states disbanded themselves and merged with the Republic of Indonesia. 5 2 McVey, op.cit, p. 19. 9 0 while it was estranged from the seberang's individualist quality. This type of nationalism was further developed by the Javanese leaders as a credo of nation-building and as a foundation for authoritarian rule. Sukarno, for instance, declared that he was a nationalist, a Musl im, and a communist at the same time. This statement signified an embodiment of all political forces in the one body politic that he symbolized. 5 3 Hence, nationalism can be understood in two senses. First, in the sense of identity bound by the perceived common sufferings in the past and by the continuous goal of achieving modernity in the future. This idea is felt strongly all over the archipelago by the majority of the people regardless of ethnicity. Second, in the sense that it is a Javanese trait to achieve social and political integration by eradicating all the existing parochial characteristics and creating a new integrative one, where the whole process is maintained through strong control from the center. Such an idea is popular among the Javanese, and apparently less so among the non-Javanese. Marxism The impulse of the Indonesian nationalist movement was generally inspired by Marxism. It was through Marxist analysis of class relations and oppression that the movement for independence initially found its raison d'etre. The Marxist tenet of colonialism as an extension of capitalism produced a widely popular perception that the indigenous people were of the oppressed working and peasantry classes, while the Dutch were the capitalist oppressors. This was true throughout the struggle for independence period, despite the fact that most of the nationalist leaders were from the priyayi (aristocrat) class. 5 3 Anderson (1972), pp. 35-38. 91 Rather similar to nationalism, Marxism influenced all political forces from diverse political cultures in Indonesia. In the later periods of the country's history, the communists were at loggerheads with the Muslims. But the seeds of communism in Indonesia was actually sown in Sarekat Islam (SI), the first Muslim nationalist movement in the 1920s.54 However, as with nationalism, Marxism proved more popular with the Javanese and less so with the seberang. The nationalist leaders came to be acquainted with Marxism through the presence of Dutch socialist and labor movement leaders in the colony, the most renowned of whom was H.J. Sneevliet. He and other Dutch socialists formed ISDV (Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereniging - Indies Social Democratic Association) in 1914. It is important to note that the first leftist party in the Netherlands East Indies, which later would emerge as the PKI, was actually dominated by the Dutch. 5 5 After a number of measures taken by the colonial government against the ISDV, this party decided to look for greener political pastures. At that point of history, SI was the largest nationalist movement and naturally attractive to the ISDV. SI was then dominated by the urban merchants, pesisir santri. The presence of a modern rationalist idea such as Marxism attracted many SI followers. Initially, Marxism was not portrayed as antithetical to Islam. There was even a conscious effort on the part of some SI 5 4 The first PKI leaders, such as Alimin and Semaun, came from the splinter group within SI, known as the faction of "SIMerah" (Red SI). For the history of the PKI, see Ruth T. McVey (1965) The Rise of Indonesian Communism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Justus M. van der Kroef (1965) The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its History. Program, and Tactics. Vancouver: University of British Columbia. 5 5 McVey (1965), pp. 14-15. 92 leaders to synthesize socialism with Islam.56 However, when the power base was sufficiently secured and as education process to be proper Marxists appeared to be successful, the leftist SI leaders joined ISDV's leaders in setting up the PKI in 1920.57 Beside the nationalist and Islamic movements, the idea of socialism was also popular among the young Indonesian students studying in the Netherlands (the Perhimpunan Indonesia - Indonesian Association, of which Hatta and Sjahrir were the leaders) and in Bandung, where Sukarno was studying. So, the influence of Marxism was widespread. Marxist vocabulary was commonly spoken by all nationalist leaders during the pre-independence period.58 However, in the post-independence period, the proponents of Marxism appeared to have been divided into two contending camps. First, there were the social democrats. Their main vehicle was the PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia -Indonesian Socialist Party). This party was dominated by seberang intellectuals led by Syahrir, a Minangkabau. While there were also quite a number of Javanese in the party, such as Sumitro, Sujatmoko and Subadio, they were urban intellectuals trained in the West. Hence, they shared with the seberang the traits of being straightforward and open. Even though the PSI was not an Islamic party and their proponents were secularists, on a number of issues 5 6 Ibid., p. 20. Marxism/socialism were popular among many anti-colonial movements in Asia and Africa. At the same time, these movements also aspired at rejuvenating indigenous values vis d vis western values propagated by the colonial powers. As a result, there were similar efforts to synthesize socialism with local culture and religion, such as U Nu in Burma (with Buddhism) and Jawaharlal Nehru in India (with Hinduism). 5 7 Van der Kroef, op.cit., pp. 10-12. Initially PKI stood for Persarekatan Kommunist di India (Communist Association of the Indies). 5 8 Anderson (1966), p. 137. 93 there was an affinity between this party and Masyumi, another seberang party, especially on the issues of central control, communist ascendancy, and Javanese domination. While the PSI's role as an influential party came to an end after the 1955 election, where it did not perform well, their functionaries remained active. Sumitro and Sujatmoko 5 9 continued to be revered as Indonesia's leading intellectuals. Sumitro was to be the chief architect of the New Order's economy through a network of economist proteges that he developed at the University of Indonesia. 6 0 The second force was the PKI. As opposed to the PSI's appeal among the urban intellectual bourgeoisie,61 the PKI was much more popular among the abangan rural masses in heartland Java. Its geographic sphere of influence was identical to that of the nationalist PNI. The difference was in the social-economic class. The PKI received more support from the lower-class abangan, while the PNI from the priyayi abangan.62 How could the PKI, which professed egalitarianism, modernity and rationality, be followed by the status-conscious, mystical Javanese? The answer perhaps lies in the ability of its leaders to use Javanese symbolism and common language in conveying their message to the 5 9 Soedjatmoko once served as the Rector of the United Nations University in Japan. 6 0 Ironically, as will be shown in the next part, most of the ideas associated with him could be categorized as capitalist, instead of socialist. 6 1 Thus, PKI leaders cynically nicknamed the PSI as " s o s k a " ( s o s i a l i s k a n a n - rightist socialists). 6 2 Here Geertz' typology of a b a n g a n , s a n t r i , and p r i y a y i might be useful. See Geertz (1960). The typology actually received many criticisms because it seemed to lump class and cultural differences together, a b a n g a n and s a n t r i are cultural distinctions, whereas p r i y a y i is a class or status term. See Donald K. Emmerson (1976) Indonesia's Elite: Political Culture and Cultural Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 23-24, fn. 6. 94 relatively uneduca ted m a s s e s . 6 3 The PKI leaders also effectively por t rayed themselves as leaders free from pamrih.64 B u t the strongest reason seems to be the re laxed att i tude of the PKI toward rel igion a n d rel igious obl igat ion. The syncret ic a n d tolerant abangan found refuge i n the "netral agama" (neutral of any religion) att i tude amids t the vehement cal ls for p u r i s m by the reformist M u s l i m s . Conversely, as the PKI grew to become more Javanese a n d ant i - Is lam, the level of suppor t that it received from the seberang became m i n i m a l . The mi l i t a ry suppress ion of the PKI after the failed coup attempt i n 1 9 6 5 6 5 fundamenta l ly wiped out the PKI as a pol i t ica l force. M o s t of i ts supporters appeared to have shifted their allegiance to the na t ional i s t party or the government party, Golkar (Golongan Karya - F u n c t i o n a l Groups) . Some social is t ideas were p icked u p late i n the New Order era w i th the advent of the so-cal led "ekonomi kerakyatan" (the people's economy) concept. However, it is doubtful that the communi s t s were responsible for this , because the idea appeared to be propagated by the modernis t M u s l i m s . 6 6 In any case, even though there are some scattered remnants , M a r x i s m , w h i c h was one of the powerful ideas i n Indonesian history, ceased to exist i n any notable form after the pogrom of 1965-1966. 6 3 Anderson (1972), pp. 36-37; Anderson (1966), p. 146. 6 4 Anderson (1972), p. 53. 6 5 In 1948, the communists also launched a rebellion in Madiun, East Java. While the Madiun rebellion was followed by military suppression, the PKI was able to rebound as one of the largest parties in the 1955 election. 6 6 The functionaries of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia - Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association), such as Adi Sasono and Dawam Rahardjo, were the chief proponents of this idea in the 1990s. 95 Capitalist Developmentalism The rise of General Suharto to power in 1967 marked the end of leftist policies in Indonesia. Attention shifted from political struggle against the Western powers to economic development. The role of communist and leftist politicians, which was growing in importance in the final years of Sukarno's rule, was supplanted by economists and technocrats. Many of these experts received training in the West. The economists who laid down the foundation of the New Order development policies were the proteges of Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (former PSI leader) of the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia (FE-UI). Most of them underwent training in the University of California, Berkeley; thus they received the nickname, the "Berkeley Mafia." 6 7 On the political side, the New Order saw the rise of the Indonesian military (TNI/ABRI - Tentara Nasional Indonesia / Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia)691 to power. While the military had been influential during the Sukarno era, where officers occupied several government posts, in the initial stage of the New Order there was a massive intrusion of officers into "civilian" positions. Posts such as ministers, governors, regents, ambassadors, and others were held by ABRI. The justification for such moves seemed to be to maintain vigilance against the threats to national security, i.e., the communists. Included in these economists were Widjojo Nitisastro, Emil Salim, Ali Wardhana, Subroto, Moh. Sadli, even though the latter two actually went to Stanford and MIT respectively. All of them held several cabinet portfolios during the New Order. Acronyms for Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Defense Force) and Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia). 96 Thus, the platform of Indonesian development was crafted through the cooperation of the military and the economists/technocrats. Such cooperation was fostered by close relationships between the economists and the Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat (Seskoad - Army School of Staff and Command), which started in the early 1960s. The economists taught in the school and often held discussions with the then ascending officers that included General Suharto. As a result, the platform was a mixture between development economics and security priorities. The main notions of this idea are related to the modernization thesis. Basically, the idea was to achieve high economic growth through export-oriented industrialization. The modernization of the country's infrastructure was deemed necessary to achieve this objective. A major transformation from commodity/ agricultural production, which had been the backbone of the economy, to manufacturing needed to take place. In order to realize this, capital was needed. There were two sources of capital — development aid or loans from Western states, and foreign direct investment (FDI). The strong anti-communist stance of the regime in the Cold War environment was perceived as an asset to win the favor of the Western states. The previous policy of economic nationalism was abandoned and serious efforts were launched to attract foreign investment. 6 9 This idea asserted further that in order to achieve economic development, there needed to be a favorable political environment. For Indonesian foreign policy, this was translated into cessation of confrontation 6 9 Richard Ro bison (1990) Power and Economy in Suharto's Indonesia, Manila: Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, pp. 86-87. 97 politics with the neighboring countries and the establishment of a cooperative framework, which later turned out to be A S E A N (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), established in 1967. In domestic politics, political order was given priority, even if it meant repression. The party political structure was simplified through the merger of political parties. While elections were held regularly, the regime made sure that Golkar would always win overwhelmingly. The press was put under strict control, and opposition efforts were suppressed. Richard Robison calls such combination of economic development and political control created by an alliance between technocrats and the military, "repressive developmentalism." 7 0 The results of such an approach were quite mixed. On one hand, the technocrats were able to revive the Indonesian economy that had been in terrible shape as a result of the mismanagement of the Sukarno era. Economic development no doubt resulted in more material prosperity and also improvements in standards of living, a better education system, improved health standards and sanitation, etc. Development of infrastructure also facilitated the mobility of the people throughout the archipelago. However, on the other hand, political life became monotonous. The political forces that embodied people's aspiration became inactive. As a result, not only was communism extinct, but also Islamic modernism and traditionalism were seemingly on the verge of extermination. The reactions of the divergent aliran segments towards "repressive developmentalism" varied. Aside of the different appearance at the surface, the New Order regime actually reflected a continuation of the previous one. If Sukarno tried to integrate the diverse political forces in Indonesia through the 7 0 Ibid., p. 36. 98 concept of Nasakom (Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis - Nationalism, Religion, Communismj, the Suharto regime sought to achieve a similar objective through Golkar.71 Being the political vehicle of the military, Golkar also embodied many Javanese traits. 7 2 For the other aliran segment, especially the seberang Muslims, the New Order clearly caused disappointment. After being banned by Sukarno in the early 1960s, Masyumi had hoped to make a political comeback. But the continuation of abangan rule dashed this hope. Simplification of the party system then further reduced the political role of the modernists, at least in the first two decades of the New Order. The fruits of economic development were certainly welcomed by all. However, there was a discontentment also on this score, especially among the seberang. Traditionally, the outer islanders and the pesisir were the merchant class in Indonesia. Ever since the colonial period, they have been in fierce competition with the overseas Chinese. 7 3 In the independence period, some military officers reportedly maintained mutually beneficial relationships with some Chinese entrepreneurs. Such cooperation almost became the norm of business transactions during the New Order. Consequently, the Chinese and military joint ventures soared as the main economic actors. This was considered detrimental to the economic interests of the indigenous Indonesians (pribumi), and contributed to the growing tension between the two groups as 7 1 David Reeve (1985) Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 264-265. 7 2 Leo Suryadinata (1989) Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's Golkar, Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series No. 85, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University. 7 3 In fact, one of the rationale of Sarekat Islam was to organize the Muslim indigenous merchants vis a vis the Chinese. 99 well as dissatisfaction with the regime. As a result, a number of racial riots exploded in various places during the New Order era. 7 4 Furthermore, the stress on manufacturing was also perceived to have created an economic imbalance between Jakarta and Java on one hand and the outer islands on the other. Factories were set up mainly in Java, which already had good infrastructure. The growth of the service sectors also benefited Jakarta, where there was a concentration of professionals. 7 5 Such regional disparity exacerbated the seberang's dissatisfaction with capitalist developmentalism. Notwithstanding the deficiencies, this approach has been very influential in the last three decades of Indonesian history, and continues to be so, especially because of the growing interconnectedness of the economies among states. Indonesia's active participation in the global economy is the logical consequence of the capitalist development that had been carried out throughout the New Order era. Democracy The influence of the idea of democracy is perhaps the most puzzling of the external ideas in Indonesian history, partly because of the many definitions of democracy itself. Social scientists have debated the meaning of democracy. The debate revolves around the question of what constitutes a democracy. There are the procedural and liberal definitions of democracy. The former, usually refers to the holding of regular elections and alternation of people in 7 4 Robison, op.cit., pp. 16-19, pp. 23, pp. 51-52. 7 5 For an account of the uneven regional growth in Indonesia, see Hal Hill (1996) The Indonesian Economy Since 1966, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 229-235. 100 office as conditions for being democratic. 7 6 The latter view posits that a liberal democracy consists not only of elements known in the procedural definition, but also of values of governance and society beyond elections. These values include protection of individual civil and political rights, and protection of the minority groups, including access for these groups to a share of state resources, as well as a guarantee of some degree of the cultural autonomy for minorities. This condition necessitates a tolerant attitude by the majority group. 7 7 Democratic values initially were generally alien to most Indonesians from all political cultures. This was then perpetuated by the colonial legacy. The divide-and-rule tactic employed by the colonial power rendered a sense of deep mutual distrust among different peoples of the archipelago. As a result, the tolerance needed for a functioning democracy did not exist immediately after independence. As has been described above, the Javanese are inherently more tolerant than the seberang. However, such a quality is at times overshadowed by their assimilationist tendencies, which means that toleration is rendered only after sufficient commonalties are achieved. Diversity is generally not considered as positive. Nonetheless, the Javanese are at least potentially more tolerant than the seberang. The idea of democracy was in a state of hibernation during the Guided Democracy and most of the New Order eras. It made a comeback as a result of exposure of the increasing numbers of tertiary-educated younger generation to the outside world in the latter New Order period, facilitated by the economic 7 6 Samuel P. Huntington (1993) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, pp. 5-9. 7 7 Larry Diamond (1999) Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 11-12. 101 globalization and the revolution in communication and transportation technologies. In sum, while the idea of democracy had influenced different political cultures in Indonesia to varying extents since the beginning of independence, it was not unt i l the latter part of the New Order, when economic and social development had reached a more advanced stage in terms of material attainment and global exposure, that democracy penetrated into the urban modern society. As the urban population grew exponentially during the last decade of the New Order, the idea of democracy won more adherents in Indonesia. However, it is quite important to note here that the growing popularity of democracy might be due to the association of the concept with the impression of material attainment. The middle class in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, was composed of "ersatz capitalists," which was dependent upon rather than developed independently of the state. 7 8 ALIRAN INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY AND CHANGE Each of the groups mentioned above, the abangan Javanese, the Javanese santri, and the santri seberang, have articulated their own political thinking and established various social institutions where their ideas can be disseminated and further developed. These have become known as aZzran-based segmentation. The abangan Javanese manifested themselves as the nationalists, while the Javanese santri as the traditionalist Muslims, and the See Kunio Yoshihara (1988) The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in South East Asia, Singapore: Oxford University Press. 102 seberang santri as the modernist/reformist/purist Mus l ims . 7 9 In different stages of Indonesian political history, each of these groups has been exposed to foreign ideologies, and through a process of selection has decided which ideology or which parts of a particular ideology were most compatible with its cultural traits. The result was a new eclectic form of political platforms that they associated themselves wi th . 8 0 In Indonesian socio-political life, these political aliran manifested themselves into contending social and political organizations. The ensuing analysis is based on Feith's classification of the political aliran that was discussed earlier. It aims at revising and extending this classification. As will be shown, the aliran segments have exhibited remarkable resilience and flexibility over time, as demonstrated by the adaptability of their organizations amidst political change. Figures 1 and 2 contain the description of the institutional manifestation and change of the major aliran encompassing the two periods covered in this chapter: early independence to the end of the Sukarno era (1945-1965), and the early New Order (1967-1990). The Sukarno Era (1945-1965) Figure 1 shows that there were six forces whose salience grants them the status of political aliran during the period of early independence unt i l the end of Sukarno era. These were the PNI, Masyumi, the NU, the PKI, the PSI, and the TNI/ABRI. 7 9 From this point on, the discussion of the aliran will use this more popularly known terminology. 8 0 The political platforms of the aliran, especially those relating to state issues will be discussed in Chapters 4-6. 103 Figure 1 &2 INDONESIAN POLITICAL ALIRAN (1945-1965; FEITH REVISED) w I N E F S L T U E E R N N C E T Hindu-R Javanese A D 1 Islamic 1 T Seberang 1 (Outer O Islands) N S W N E F S L T U E E R N N C E T Hindu-R Javanese A D i Islamic i T. Seberang 1 (Outer O Islands) N S INDONESIAN POLITICAL ALIRAN (1971-1990) 104 Different from Feith's classification, the PSI and the TNI/ABRI are included in this figure. Feith actually acknowledged the centrality or at least the potential of both forces to become aliran-type organizations. But he either dismissed them as being inconsequential due to the lack of mass support, as in the case of the PSI, or incoherent in terms of political thinking, as in the case of the TNI/ABRI .s i Feith acknowledged that as time went on during this period, the TNI/ABRI became more united and also tended to create a distinctive political thinking of its own. However, he stopped short of describing such thinking. In general, it can be inferred that the military was heavily influenced by abangan values. 8 2 While members of the TNI/ABRI came from all over Indonesia, and initially the seberang people such as Nasution, Simbolon, etc., played important roles, by the end of this period most of its senior staff positions had become increasingly occupied by the Javanese abangan. Hence, the doctrine developed during this period resembled that of Sukarno, i.e., nationalism and restricted political party competition. However, different from Sukarno, who translated the Javanese concept of power into the alliance of Nasakom, the military tended to be suspicious of the political parties, especially the communists. In Figure 1, the PKI is located high on the Western influence scale. This is apparent from the efforts of the party leaders to educate their followers about communism. Even though most of its followers came from the lower-class abangan, the goal of the PKI elite was to bring modernity to its followers si Feith (1970), p. 17. 8 2 Suryadinata, op.cit., p. 21. 105 through Marxism. Its aim was to replace ethnic and religious affinities with class affiliation. 8 3 Having the support mostly from the priyayi abangan, the PNI was more entrenched in Javanese values. Sukarno, who was also the founder of the party, exacerbated this situation further. The PNI was also influenced by democratic socialism, especially on the symbolic level. Its purported ideology was Marhaenism84. Despite the controversial elitist lifestyle of its leaders, the party's image as the protector of the "wong cilik" (commoners) remained strong even today through its successor party. While it is true that the urban-based PSI was unable to win sizable support from the rural masses, its influence in the Indonesian polity during the Sukarno era was more significant than is generally credited. The PSI was known as the party of intellectuals. In a newborn state where not too many intellectuals existed, the PSI's elites were actively involved in the government and the parliament, at least until the 1955 election. 8 5 Support for the party came mainly from the bureaucrats, who were responsible for day-to-day governance. Even after the eclipse of the party, individual PSI elite remained influential. The involvement of some of its functionaries in PRRI/Permesta rebellion also demonstrated its resilience as a political force. Most importantly 8 3 Anderson (1972), p. 30. 8 4 This is a class-based ideology strongly influenced by Marxism. Sukarno once said that Marhaenism was "Socialism a la Indonesia." For a description of Marhaenism, see the statement of the PNI principles, "The Aims of the Party" in Feith and Castles, eds., op.cit., pp. 160-164. 8 5 For instance, Syahrir, the PSI leader, served as the first prime minister of the republic during the revolutionary armed struggle period. Many PSI members also served in the various cabinets during the 1950s. Prior to the 1955 election, there were 15 members of parliament from the PSI. After the election, however, this number was reduced to a mere five. 106 perhaps, the idea of democratic socialism that it espoused remained alive all throughout this period, and, albeit transformed, gained increased saliency in the later periods. In the early independence period, Masyumi became one of the major parties. Its history went back to the Japanese occupation period. In order to be able to maintain control of society more effectively, the Japanese promoted a merger of several Musl im organizations, modernists as well as traditionalists, which resulted in the establishment of Masyumi. Such an alliance of the two different Islamic aliran, however, proved short-lived. After 1949, there was an increasing modernists' grip on the party, led by Mohammad Natsir. Such a development made the traditionalists perceive that they were being marginalized. As a result, in 1952 the traditionalists in Masyumi left the party and declared the NU, the traditionalist organization formed in 1926, to be a political party. 8 6 Subsequently, the two Islamic parties developed different orientations. The period of Sukarno's rule can be divided into three parts. First is the struggle for independence period (1945-1950). This period was marked by a situation of relative unity facing a common enemy. But, there were also political conflicts. The most notable was the communist rebellion in Madiun, 1948. The rebellion was swiftly crushed by the TNI and the country rallied strongly behind the leadership of Sukarno and the republic's first vice president Mohammad Hatta. Second is the parliamentary democracy period (1950-1959). In this period, political competition was in earnest. This was most apparent from the Feillard, op.cit, pp. 44-46; Feith and Castles, eds., op.cit, pp. 201-202. 107 debates on the state foundation that took place in the Konstituante.87 At that juncture of Indonesian history, the nation was faced with two options concerning the state foundation, whether it would be an Islamic or a secular arrangement. The Islamic parties (the largest of which were Masyumi and the NU) argued that since around ninety percent of the population claimed to profess Islam as their religion, it was only natural that Islam should become the state foundation. On the other hand, the proponents of secularism, spearheaded by the nationalist PNI and the communist PKI, rejected such a claim by pointing out that not only were there a number of regions where Muslims were in the minority (mainly in the eastern part of the archipelago), but also Islam in Java, where a large number of Indonesians lived, was practiced in a relaxed and syncretic way, blending with existing local traditions, and not amenable to an Islamic state. The heated debate was resolved by force when President Sukarno intervened by dissolving the Konstituante and decreeing a return to the 1945 constitution, within which the state foundation was stated as Pancasila, the rather secular arrangement. It marked a victory for the abangan. The seberang parties demonstrated their opposition to Sukarno's authoritarianism by launching regional rebellions. Most of the top echelon members of Masyumi and of the PSI fled to West Sumatra and established the PRRI [Pemerintah Reuolusioner Republik Indonesia - Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) led by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara of Masyumi. The Sumatran movement was also met with enthusiasm in Sulawesi, where some 8 7 A state body set up as a result of 1955 election whose task was to draft a new constitution. 108 eastern Indonesian military officers, dismayed by the growing Javanese control, declared the Piagam Perdjuangan Semesta (Permesta - Charter of Common Struggle) led by Lieutenant Colonel Sumual of Minahasa. 8 8 Sukarno relied heavily on the military to suppress the rebellion. Additionally, during this period Indonesia was engaged in a struggle to wrest West New Guinea (Irian) from Dutch hands. 8 9 As Sukarno grew more anti-West, he carried out a military confrontation policy (konfrontasi) against the creation of Malaysia, which in his eyes was the British puppet to further Western interests in Southeast Asia. A l l these military operations enabled the TNI to gain more leverage in national politics. As Sukarno's policy turned more leftist, this period also saw the rise of the PKI. As a result, the period of Guided Democracy was a period dominated by abangan institutions, Sukarno and the nationalists, the TNI, and the PKI in a fragile balance. This balance was complemented by the inclusion of the NU, the traditionalist institution, in Nasakom. Due to the similarity of Javanese politico-cultural roots to the nationalist Sukarno, the NU did not have difficulty coping with the growing abangan power in the Guided Democracy period, while the seberang Masyumi felt estranged. 9 0 This period marked the almost complete domination by Javanese institutions. Seberang institutions were sidelined, while the similarity in 8 8 Partai Katolik (the Catholic Party), which had many supporters in the eastern part of Indonesia, also initially opposed Sukarno's growing authoritarianism. But it stopped short of supporting the regional rebellions. See an interview with Frans Seda, the Partai Katolik leader in the 1960s in "Lebih Jauh dengan Frans Seda (Interview with Frans Seda) in Kompas, October 6, 1996. 8 9 The Mandala military operation to "free Irian" was under the commanded of then Maj.Gen. Suharto, who would later become the president of Indonesia. 9 0 Feillard, op.cit., pp. 46-52; Feith and Castles, eds., op.cit., p. 202. 109 political culture between the Islamic Masyumi and the secular PSI actually brought them closer. The development in this period demonstrated the dominance of political culture over ideology. The Early New Order Period (1967-1990) The hallmark of this period was the rise of the TNI/ABRI to power after the failed communist coup in 1965. 9 1 The power transfer actually went through a prolonged struggle. The political structure built by Sukarno during the Guided Democracy period was gradually replaced by a new structure. It was not unti l 1973 that the new party political structure was firmly in place. General Suharto himself became president only in 1968, although he had effectively run the country since 1967 after being appointed by the MPRS (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara - Provisional People's Consultative Assembly), the highest state organ, as the President "ad-interim," while Sukarno remained the formal president. The repression of the communists after the G-30S/PKI [Gerakan 30 September - the September 30 Movement) was thorough. Even though the number of victims varies from one source to another, it is clear that many of the rank-and-file of the PKI, and the elite were eliminated. Its remaining followers were reeducated and after being released were kept under close scrutiny by the security apparatus. As a result, communism as an ideological movement ceased to exist, or at least to be influential, throughout the New Order period. There was a glimpse of hope among the party leaders, especially those of the seberang party of Masyumi and the urban-based PSI, which had previously 9 1 In official terms, it is known as the Gerakan 30 September/Partai Komunis Indonesia (G-30S/PKI - September 30 t h Movement/Indonesian Communist Party). 110 been banned by Sukarno, that their parties would be reinstated. However, such optimism proved false. Suharto rejected the formal reinstitution of both parties on the grounds that they had been involved in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion. From this point, it became apparent that the political platform of the New Order government was based on a tight control of the party political system. A close association between a number of officers and some PSI leaders in the aftermath of the failed 1965 coup, especially Prof. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, resulted in the inclusion of the PSI into the fold of Golkar and the New Order. Prof. Sumitro and his proteges in the Economics Faculty of the University of Indonesia (FE-UI) became the main architects behind the success of the New Order's economic development. It was a different story for the other seberang party. While the modernist Muslims were allowed to establish a new party, Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia - Indonesian Muslims Party), the new quasi-military government banned the participation of Masyumi's old leaders from the party. 9 2 The leadership of the new party was basically hand-picked by the government. This practice was also followed for the PNI, and the other parties. 9 3 Along with controlling of party leadership, the New Order regime also developed a strong alternative political force, called Golongan Karya (Golkar -Functional Groups). Historically, Golkar was set up by the TNI/ABRI as an 9 2 On the establishment of Parmusi, see K.E. Ward (1970) The Foundation of Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Interim Report Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York; Allan A. Samson (1973) "Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesian Islamic Modernism," in R. William Liddle, ed. (1973) Political Participation in Modern Indonesia, Monograph Series No. 19, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. 9 3 Julian M. Boileau (1983) Golkar: Functional Group Politics in Indonesia, Jakarta: CSIS, p. 53; Reeve, op.cit, p. 278. I l l alternative to the political aliran system. Hence, Golkar officially does not belong to any aliran. However, since it was created by the military, at least during the early New Order period, its political values reflected the Javanese traits. The TNI/ABRI has been active in politics since the latter half of the 1950s. General Nasution inspired the creation of IPKI (Ikatan Pejuang Kemerdekaan Indonesia - Association of Indonesia's Freedom Fighters) after the end of the revolutionary war of independence. However, the military's real involvement in politics coincided with the desire of Sukarno to minimize the role of political parties and to make the functional groups, such as peasants, farmers, laborers, fishermen, youths, women, etc., more visible in politics. Sekber Golkar (Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya - Joint Secretariat of the Functional Groups) was formed in 1964, largely driven by the military. Golkar became the main political vehicle of the quasi-military New Order regime unti l the late New Order period. During the run up to the 1971 election, Golkar played the role of a "bulldozer." Through its networks of civil servants, who since 1969 had to pledge a "monoloyalty" to Golkar , 9 4 and aided by the military apparatus, whose presence had obtruded to the village level, Golkar came out as the winner of the election by a significant margin. It received 62.8% of the votes, while the other former major parties failed miserably. The NU, Golkar's closest contender, won 18.7%; PNI 6.9%; and Parmusi 5.4%.9s Another political restructuring measure taken by the regime was the "simplification" of the party system. The idea was congruent with the suspicions 9 4 Reeve, op.cit, pp. 286-288. 9 5 Boileau, op.cit., pp. 54-57. 112 about political parties long held by some military officers that resulted in the creation of Golkar . 9 6 Even though the seed of such thinking had been expressed during the Second Army Seminar in 1966, 9 7 it was not until the parliament from the 1971 election was formed that the idea was turned into reality. In the parliament, the Islamic parties were persuaded to unite in one faction, known as Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan (Development Unity faction), and the nationalist, socialist, and Christian parties in another, known as Fraksi Demokrasi Pembangunan (Development Democracy faction). In 1973, both factions announced the merger of their constituent parties into two new political parties, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP - Development Unity Party) made up of the NU, Parmusi, Serikat Islam, and Perti; and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI - Indonesian Democratic Party), which comprised the PNI, Partai Kristen Indonesia (Protestant party), Partai Katolik,98 Murba (socialist party), and the IPKI. From that point on, the party system in Indonesia officially acknowledged only the two parties and Golkar . 9 9 The depoliticization policy of the New Order created a general malaise among the aliran networks. While political activities still existed, they were limited to the power struggle within the parties, and rarely touched on the national political issues. In the PDI, there was the consensus of the merged 9 6 Reeve, op.cit, pp. 266-280. 9 7 In which the political parties were classified into five groups, i.e., Islamic, Christians, nationalists, "Pancasila" socialists, and Golkar. 9 8 On the history of Indonesia's Christian parties from their establishment during the colonial Dutch period until prior to the parties merger during the New Order, see Paul Webb (1978) Indonesian Christians and Their Political Parties, Townsville, Queensland: South East Asian Monograph Series, No. 2, James Cook University. 9 9 The new structure was made into a law in 1975. See Reeve, op.cit., p. 290, Boileau, op.cit., p. 71. 113 parties that the PNI was primus inter pares. A l l PDI chairpersons during the New Order came from the PNI. The choice of the party leaders required government approval. In the PPP, the inclusion of both the modernists and traditionalists brought about an uneasy coexistence. Like in Masyumi, the NU felt that it was being gradually marginalized. This culminated in the declaration of the NU in 1984 to depart from the PPP and stay out of politics. Under Abdurrahman Wahid, the NU aimed to return to social, economic, cultural, and educational functions that were initially envisaged for the organization when it was established in 1926. 1 0 0 However, the separation of the NU and the PPP was not complete. Many NU activists remained in the PPP and later were even successful i n taking control of the party. Different from the traditionalists, the continuous political malaise among the modernists that had existed since Guided Democracy meant that the social, economic, cultural and educational functions of Muhammadiyah, the largest social organization of the modernists, received more attention. Different from the NU, Muhammadiyah's schools, universities, hospitals, women and youth centers expanded to many parts of the archipelago. In the spectrum of Western/traditional influence, nothing much changed during this period from the previous one. The new dominant political force, Golkar, was the most exposed to Western influence. This was due to the inclusion of the PSI-inclined professionals in the organization. The training of these economists underwent in the West served to introduce a new external idea, development economics. Additionally, the significantly better relations that 1 0 0 Feillard, op.cit., chs. VIII and X. 114 Indonesia had with the Western states in this period meant that the government was able to translate the idea of capitalist development into reality. Development aid poured in from donor countries, both individually and through a multilateral grouping, known as Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), 1 0 1 as well as from multilateral financial organizations, such as the IMF (International Monetary Fund), the World Bank, and UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). Golkar's domination of the bureaucracy also made it virtually the only organization professionally capable of establishing and maintaining contacts with the increasingly interdependent outside world. Among the other organizations, Muhammadiyah, which had already been accustomed to modern ideas, was more exposed to Western influence than the others. Even though the NU's modernization program was launched in the latter half of this period (since Abdurrahman Wahid's chairmanship in the early 1980s), for the most part, it remained highly traditional. The rise of the military in Indonesian politics during this period marked the supremacy of abangan culture. 1 0 2 Even though the role of another abangan institution, the PNI, was demoted along with the other political parties, Javanese cultural traits flourished during the New Order regime. The similar cultural roots between Sukarno and Suharto rendered their beliefs in political control as an underlying assumption of governance. Despite differences in their methods, both were consistent with Javanese conceptions of power. Sukarno 1 Later changed into Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI). 2 Robert Hefner called it "the victory of Javanism." See Robert W. Hefner (1995) ICMI dan Perjuanqan Menuju Kelas Menengah Indonesia (ICMI and the Struggle toward an Indonesian Middle Class), Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, pp. 5-8. 115 unified differences in a political system revolving around himself, while Suharto simply tried to eradicate those differences. As for the santri, both Javanese and seberang, this period was marked by decline in their political efficacy. However, the maintenance and development of their politico-cultural traits were still carried on in their mass social organizations, the NU and Muhammadiyah. This explains why, despite the political drought, the aliran persisted, and resurfaced quickly in the later periods when political control was more relaxed. The Late New Order Period (1990-1998) This period was marked by significant and interesting political changes. Such changes were the result of a relaxation in political control, the growth of the middle class as a result of economic development, and related to these two factors, increased accessibility of the public to the outside world. Additionally, political changes also took place as Suharto saw increasing opposition from the nationalists, especially from the military. Since the last few years of the 1980s, a number of prominent military officers discreetly voiced concerns over the ever-expanding business activities of Suharto's sons and daughters. Suharto sought to balance such growing opposition by co-opting the modernist Muslims, in the hope of creating a new power base should the old one become unreliable. 1 0 3 There was not so much change, however, in the political parties or at least in the structure of the formal party system, where the parties were still 1 0 3 A risky balancing game was also played by Sukarno during the Guided Democracy period (between the military and the communists). As was his predecessor, Suharto would eventually be overwhelmed by this game. 116 under strict control. But outside of the formal system, this period witnessed the ascendancy of the modernist Muslims, and competition between the abangan and the santri-seberang. At the same time, there was also a significant change in the ideological orientation of the traditionalist Muslims. The revival of the modernists was apparent from the establishment of the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI - Indonesian Musl im Intellectuals Association) in 1990. Even though its name carried a scholarly tone, ICMI was actually an amalgamation of scholars, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, student and NGO activists, professionals, as well as underground and establishment politicians. Although initially intended as an umbrella organization for Muslims of all stripes, most of ICMI's members came from the modernist persuasion. Additionally, many of its members also came from the younger Indonesian generation of middle-class families. Most of them were the "New Order generation," growing up in urban areas and in an environment where aliran-based identities were not the main theme of politics. ICMI's appeal seemed to lie in the atmosphere of openness within the organization, its aspiration for more political openness, as well as its role as a mediator between modern and religious values. Through its think-tank, the Center for Information and Development Studies (CIDES), ICMI carried out a number of studies, conferences and dialogues touching on a number of issues that were deemed as "sensitive" by the regime, such as human rights, sustainable development, and an equitable economy. At least during the first year of its establishment, ICMI's appeal as a movement to build a civil society in Indonesia was quite strong. But ICMI could also be viewed in terms of its relations with Suharto. Its establishment was perceived by some analysts as an effort by Suharto to gain 117 new mass-based support after a series of rows with some military officers critical of the first family's involvement in business. The appointment of B . J . Habibie, Suharto's protege, seemed to confirm such a notion. ICMI's establishment was openly opposed by some officers. A number of traditionalist Muslims, including Abdurrahman Wahid, also opposed ICMI, apparently because it had too much of a modernist flavor in i t . 1 0 4 Despite the opposition and its non-political pronouncements, ICMI's political influence grew quickly. In 1993, only three years after its establishment, ICMI was able to penetrate deeply into Golkar. The appointment of Harmoko, a civilian close to the modernist circle, as Golkar's chief, and the subsequent "greening" of Golkar was seen as a major blow to the nationalist military. As a result, many modernist Muslims came to the 1993-1998 parliament on Golkar's ticket and many perceived that the cabinet of the same period was an ICMI Cabinet . 1 0 5 As a result of ICMI's rise, interesting changes also occurred in the internal composition of the TNI/ABRI. In this period, there arose a new faction within the TNI/ABRI. This faction was led by a number of Mus l im officers with modernist inclinations, such as Prabowo Subianto (the son of the PSI's Sumitro and Suharto's son-in-law), and the two Sumatrans, Feisal Tanjung, and Syarwan Hamid. They grew closer to the modernist Muslims. At the same time, the Javanese officers with nationalist inclinations, such as L .B. Moerdani and On ICMI and its opposition, consult among others Hefner, op.cit; Adam Schwarz (1994) A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. Despite the appointment of Try Sutrisno, a nationalist military officer, as the Vice President, Habibie was given the opportunity to form the cabinet. 118 Try Sutrisno, appeared to lead the other faction. Such factions within ABRI were known as the "Red-White" 1 0 6 and the "Green" factions. Another interesting phenomenon in this period was the modernization of the NU. Under Abdurrahman Wahid, the NU came closer to accepting some of the liberal ideas, for example the protection of minority rights as well as civil and political rights. This was the fruit of the educational process undergone by young traditionalist scholars in Western educational institutions. Also responsible for this "advancement" was the close relationship that Gus Dur enjoyed with the NGO communities, both at home and abroad. As a result, the image of the NU, especially of Gus Dur himself, shifted from that of rural santri advocating an Islamic state to a cosmopolitan and accommodating one with a strong leaning toward the protection of minority groups. However, it should be noted that not all kyai and santri welcomed Gus Dur's position. Many, especially the NU elements in the PPP, chose to hold on firmly to their traditionalist Islamic beliefs. In this period, there was a leveling of exposure to Western influence among the political groups. Greater openness to the outside world and growing global interconnectedness facilitated by the revolution in information technology were the primary factors behind this change. NU especially made significant leaps forward, leaving behind Muhammadiyah in this respect. 1 0 7 Signifying the national colors, it also has a nationalist connotation. Despite the political progress that the modernist Muslims made, Muhammadiyah was said to have undergone an intellectual stagnation during this period. For a collection of critiques of the organization, see Nur Achmad and Pramono U. Tanthowi, eds., (2000) Muhammadiuah "Diguaat": Reposisi di Tenqah Indonesia Vang Berubah (Muhammadiyah "in Question": Repositioning in the Changing Indonesia), Jakarta: Penerbit Kompas. 119 The three major aliran groups were i n the competitive mode d u r i n g th is per iod. W h i l e the formal p o l i t i c a l system r e m a i n e d f ixated o n the quest for economic prosper i ty a n d pol i t ica l stabil i ty, real pol i t ics experienced a h i g h rate of d y n a m i s m . The rift w i t h i n the abangan i n s t i t u t i o n , as exemplif ied by the t e n s i o n between S u h a r t o a n d the T N I / A B R I generals, rendered a decl ine i n its relative p o s i t i o n uis-d-uis the modernis ts , a l t h o u g h it r e m a i n e d p r e d o m i n a n t i n absolute terms. The tradi t ional is ts t ransformed their p lat form s u b s t a n t i a l l y a n d were also vy ing for power. After being d o r m a n t for quite some t ime, a l l three aliran segments were about to engage i n a d r a m a t i c power struggle that eventual ly led to the creat ion of a n e w structure i n Indones ian pol i t ics . 120 CHAPTER 3 REFORMASI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA: DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE RESURGENCE OF ALIRAN POLITICS In the final years of the past millennium, Indonesia underwent another period of change in its political system. Similar to the changes of political structure in 1945 and 1965, this period was marked by bloody conflicts, confusion, and uncertainty. Indeed, many observers were baffled by the speed and extent of change that swept the country. Just like analysts thought previously about Sukarno, Suharto's power appeared to them so deeply entrenched in the Indonesian polity that only "an act of God" (mortality) could remove h im from power. Suharto, however, not only stepped down from power, but the political structure he had built for three decades crumbled. From the perspective of Javanese political culture, Suharto's downfall was due to his practice of pamrih1. This pamrih took the form of corruption and cronyism that had become endemic especially in the final years of his rule, with the increasingly predatory first family business practices. The practice of pamrih by rulers usually resulted in the loss of wahyu,2 as was the case with Suharto's downfall as well as Sukarno's previously. 3 1 Approximately this means a "concealed personal motive." 2 This means "divine favor for power holders." For an explanation of Javanese concepts in this section, consult Chapter 2, especially the discussion on Javanese political culture. 3 Franz Magnis-Suseno (1999) "Langsir Keprabon: New Order Leadership, Javanese Culture, and the Prospects for Democracy in Indonesia," in Geoff Forrester (1999) Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?. Singapore: ISEAS. 121 GROWING DISCONTENTMENT: THE FAILURE OF THE POLICIES OF POLITICAL OPENNESS AND ECONOMIC DEREGULATION The seeds of reformasi, and in fact the very term itself, started to appear at the end of the 1980s. The politics of keterbukaan (openness) undertaken by the New Order regime in the latter half of its reign was responsible for the sowing of these seeds. Such a policy was initially meant as an effort to vent some of the steam that had been putting pressure on the system as a result of economic development and globalization. Economic development, a cornerstone of the regime, had vastly improved the standard of living. Combined with a markedly better educational system which had provided mass education, a new burgeoning middle class arose. This new class was composed of intellectuals, business entrepreneurs, and students. Most, if not all, of them belonged to the New Order generation in that they were the products of the New Order economic development and education system. As an integral part of its economic development policy, the New Order regime actively sought participation in the global economic system. As a byproduct, the increasing interdependence in the global economy and the revolution in communications technology had exposed the new middle class to a plethora of ideas emanating mostly from the western world. Among these ideas was democracy. Despite the apparent deficiency in understanding comprehensively the concept of democracy, many in the middle class grew increasingly critical of the regime's authoritarianism. The politics of keterbukaan was aimed at gradually opening up the political system so as to avoid a sudden outburst of mass political participation. Among other things, 122 the opening up policy entailed the relaxation of press censorship, the granting of permits to set up privately-owned TV stations, and probably most important, the dissolution of the Kopkamtib (Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban - Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), the all-powerful security body responsible for the suppression of "subversive" activities. 4 However, the policy of keterbukaan was perceived as half-hearted at best. While Kopkamtib was disbanded in 1988, a new body was established in its place. The Bakorstanas (Badan Koordinasi Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional -Coordinating Body for the Maintenance of National Stability) functioned similarly to its predecessor. Even though there was a relaxation of the tough security measures, it was meant merely for social activities. Nothing fundamental changed in terms of security clearance for political activities. In spite of the relaxation, the political structure remained the same. No new political parties were allowed to be established. Only the three acknowledged by 4 Kopkamtib was established in the aftermath of the communist coup attempt in 1965. It was initially tasked with finding and prosecuting the remnants of the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia - Indonesian Communist Party) membership or its "symphatizers." Later on, its function was widened to include screening and background checks of candidates for the civil service. If any of the extended family of a certain candidate had any form of communist link, this body would declare the candidate not "bersih lingkungan" (social environmentally clean), which meant that he/she was not eligible for work in the public sector. During its heyday, any public activity that involved more than five people required permission from the Kopkamtib. Suharto headed the body during the first years of its inception. Later on, this task was given to the Chief of the Armed Forces. Some analysts view the disbandment of Kopkamtib as signaling a power struggle between Suharto and some military generals who were said to be disillusioned with Suharto's rule at the end of the 1980s. The most powerful of these generals was General L. B. Murdani, who was then the Chief of the Armed Forces. For a brief description of this power struggle, see Michael R.J. Vatikiotis (1998) Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order (Third Edition), London: Routledge, ch. 3 and ch. 6. 123 the government were allowed to exist, and control over the leadership in all three parties was as gripping as ever. This was apparent during the struggle for leadership in the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Indonesian Democratic Party), one of the three official parties, the result of the 1973 merger of nationalist and Christian parties. Growing public disenchantment with the New Order regime had increased the popularity of the Sukarno family. The PDI, in which the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia - Indonesian National Party, Sukarno's party) was the most prominent among the five merged parties, took advantage of this by courting Sukarno's daughters and sons to run for election on the party's ticket. As a result, the number of votes the PDI received in the 1988 and 1993 elections increased dramatically, although the totals remained far below those received by Golkar, the government's party. Aiming to gain even more votes, and probably to finally defeat Golkar, the party sought to make one of Sukarno's daughters, Megawati Sukarnoputri, its chairperson. The move was successful in 1994, but it was met with stiff opposition from the government, which later supported an effort by a number of the party's functionaries to set up a rival leadership in the party, led by Suryadi, the previous party chairman. 5 The dual leadership problem was then solved by an iron fist approach supported fully by the government's security apparatus. A number of members of the police and other branches of the armed 5 Ironically, in the previous party congress in 1993, Suryadi, whom the government considered to be too successful in managing the PDI's performance in the two previous elections, was toppled from the leadership of the party. Such a move actually paved the way for Megawati's election. For details of the PDI affair, see Robert W. Hefner (2000) Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 180-184. 124 forces, clad in the PDI's tee-shirts, stormed the party's headquarters in Jakarta, which was occupied by Megawati's supporters. The attack resulted in a number of deaths, injuries, and missing persons, and was dubbed the "tragedy of Ju ly 27, 1996." The tragedy signified that there was no significant change in the government's policy on political liberalization, despite the policy of keterbukaan. Additionally, the use of force also marked a decline in the ability of the government to cope with political dynamics through the power of persuasion. In the economy, despite the good performance in terms of economic growth, the latter half of the New Order administration saw an increase in corruption, collusion, and nepotism 6 in government projects and businesses. This was especially true of the first family businesses, which involved the sons and daughters, as well as the grandson, of President Suharto. The policy of keterbukaan had its counterpart in the economic sphere, known as "kebijaksanaan deregulasf (deregulation policy). But, unlike its political counterpart, deregulation was executed with fervor, partly because the opening up of the economy and privatization of several sectors benefited the businesses of the palace cronies, most notably those belonging to the president's family. 7 In their business operations, the sons and daughters of President Suharto set up conglomerate-type companies. 8 Each of them supposedly 6 This is known in Indonesia by its acronym "KKN" (korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme). 7 On the effects of deregulation on economic ownership, consult, among others, Ahmad D. Habir (1999) "Conglomerates: All in the Family" in Donald K. Emmerson, ed. (1999) Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 8 A number of underground reports, as well as those published in foreign media were circulated during the Suharto era on the businesses and wealth amassed by the first family. Consult, among others, George Aditjondro (1998) Guru Kencinq Berdiri. Murid Kencinq Berlari: Kedua Puncak Korupsi Kolusi, dan Nepotisme Rezim Orde Baru dari Soeharto ke Habibie (The Teacher Urinates Standing, the 125 concentrated on certain sectors as his or her core business, so as not to conflict with the others. The most prominent among them were Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (Tutut), Bambang Trihatmodjo, and Hutomo Mandala Putra (Tommy). Tutut's group of companies was known as Citra group. Its core business was the construction and operation of toll roads. Bambang's group of companies, Bimantara, was engaged in automotive industries as well as trading. Tommy's Humpuss group initially did not have any clear core business but later was known for its automotive industries and clove business. The "no-competition rule" among the members of the first family was broken when Tommy was granted the license to develop the first national automobile industry, known as Timor, in cooperation with Kia automotive industry of South Korea. Bambang, who had been in this business for quite some time, reportedly was annoyed by the government's decision, but then decided to seek cooperation from Kia's Korean rival, Hyundai, to set up its own brand of national car, Bimantara. The sibling rivalry continued in the media business when Tutut set up a TV station, TPI (Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia - Indonesian Educational Television), rivaling Bambang's RCTI (Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia), the first privately-owned TV station in Indonesia. The business behavior of the first family created resentment among the public, largely because of the government licenses and facilities they relied on Student Urinates Running: The Two Peaks of Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism Under the New Order Regime from Soeharto to Habibie), Jakarta: Masyarakat Indonesia untuk Kemanusian (MIK) and Pusat Informasi Jaringan Aksi Reformasi (PIJAR); Soesilo (1998) Monopoli Bisnis Kroni dan KKN Keluarqa Cendana: Asal Usui Kiprah Akhir Kejatuhannua (The Business Monopolies of the Cronies, Corruption, Corruption, and Nepotism of the Cendana Family: Causes of Its Fall), Depok: Permata-AD. For recent accounts, consult Stefan Eklof (1999) Indonesian Politics in Crisis: The Long Fall of Suharto, 1996-98, Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, pp. 8-13; Kees van Dijk, (2001) A Country in Despair: Indonesia Between 1997 and 2000, Leiden: KITLV Press, ch. IV. 1 2 6 and the predatory business behavior they frequently showed. Such resentment grew even stronger when Suharto's grandson, Ary Sigit, decided to go into business. Ary was infamous for his notorious habit of calling up provincial governors, summoning them to Cendana (Suharto's private residence). The governors, under the impression that there was urgent government business, rushed to Cendana, only to find that it was the grandson rather than the president who was calling them, usually for business-related purposes. Ary was also reportedly involved in drug trafficking during the last few years of his grandfather's rule. At this point, the storm of political change was brewing in the horizon. Tensions escalated considerably in the 1990s; the number of mass actions and demonstrations, especially those related to land ownership issues grew significantly. ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia - Indonesian Musl im Intellectuals Association), 9 which was established partially due to Suharto's desire to embrace the modernist Muslims in an effort to counter-balance growing criticism from the military, became increasingly critical under Secretary General Adi Sasono, who was elected in 1995. Through its think-tank, the Jakarta-based Center for Information and Development Studies (CIDES), of which Adi was the director, ICMI made a number of bold statements in its seminars and conferences. The topics covered by CIDES' activities included issues deemed "sensitive" by the regime, such as human rights, sustainable development, and an equitable economy. Among the statements made in one of CIDES' seminars and later published in one of its journals, Sintesis, was that by M . Amien Rais. Amien, the chairman of ICMI's board of 9 About ICMI and its aliran background, see the Chapter 2. 127 experts (dewan pakar) and a member of O D E S ' board of advisors, as well as the chairman of Muhammadiyah (the modernist organization and Indonesia's second largest Musl im organization), said that in the run up to the 1997 general election, Indonesians needed to think about presidential succession. 1 0 Such a statement raised the eyebrows of both observers and political players, Indonesians and foreigners alike, who used to be certain that given the nature of its establishment as Suharto's political vehicle amidst growing criticisms from the nationalists, especially the Army, ICMI would never dare to criticize the regime, let alone suggest a presidential succession when Suharto was still alive and in good health. 1 1 For this and Amien's other blunt statements in opposition to the regime, 1 2 Suharto pressured ICMI's chairman, B . J . Habibie, long considered Suharto's protege, to censure Amien. As a result, Amien was stripped of his position in ICMI's board of experts, but retained the O D E S ' position. Yet, aside from a few disturbances and actual actions against the government, there was no organized mass movement to demand change. Such relative tranquillity had, in fact, led the outside world in general to believe that Indonesia was stable and that Indonesians were happy as a result of excellent economic growth performance. A number of analysts, such as Robert Hefner, 1 0 M. Amien Rais (1994) "Suksesi 1998: Suatu Keharusan" (Succession in 1998: A Must), in Sintesis, No. 9, Vol. 2., June-July 1994, Jakarta: Center for Information and Development Studies. 1 1 For details on the presidential succession debates, consult Bilveer Singh (2000) Succession Politics in Indonesia: The 1998 Presidential Elections and the Fall of Suharto, Hampshire: MacMillan Press, Ch. 1. 1 2 Among Amien's other "sins" were first, his fierce attack on the first family cronyism, especially involving the Busang mining project that involved the Canadian-based company, Bre-X, and second, his declaration that he was ready to run in the election in 1997 as a presidential candidate. 128 argue that the key behind Suharto's success in holding off any meaningful opposition during the last decade of his regime may have been due to the Islamic card he was playing. Facing growing criticism from the nationalist faction of the military (the so-called Red-White faction), Suharto courted the modernist Muslims for support. His blessing and active support for the establishment of ICMI in 1990, as well as the choice of his protege, Habibie, to head the new organization, could be seen in this l ight. 1 3 However, there was a contending explanation for such a move. It is the cherished ideal for a Javanese person like Suharto to retire from the world of the mundane after reaching a certain age and to concentrate on "preparation" for the afterlife.1 4 The fact that he had been counseled by a modernist religious teacher from the Army since 1987 strengthened this notion. As Suharto became more pious in religious practice, the modernist community was at the height of a search for an alternative institutional affiliation from that which existed at the t ime. 1 5 The modernists realized from the beginning that in an autocratic set-up like the New Order regime, there needed to be a patron from the government circle for the new association if it was to be possible at all. The result from the ensuing interaction between the modernists and the regime that followed was positive Hefner, op.cit. See also Douglas E. Ramage (1995) Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance, London: Routledge, ch. 3. Known in its Javanese idiom as "lengser keprabon, madeg pandhito." Suharto reiterated this intention on many public occasions from 1993 oh. Prior to ICMI's establishment in 1990, there had been a number of efforts by the modernists to set up similar institutions throughout the 1980s. See Hefner, op.cit., pp. 129-131. 129 for the former, not only because the regime approved of such an institution, but also because the approval came from the paramount holder of power. 1 6 Whatever Suharto's true initial intention regarding the approval for ICMI might be, subsequent events proved that he did use ICMI as a political platform to support his rule. As ICMI and CIDES grew more critical of the regime, funding for CIDES' activities were cut-off. Additionally, an alternative ICMI-oriented think-tank was set up. Known as the Center for Policy and Development Studies (CPDS), the think-tank adopted a staunch pro-Suharto line amidst growing calls for reform. This think-tank was founded with the help of the president's sons and daughters. At this time, Tutut (the most politically active among the siblings) and her brothers and sisters became increasingly suspicious of the modernists in ICMI, especially the CIDES-affiliated ones. They were also known to be not too fond of Habibie. At this juncture, Habibie had become the most senior minister in Suharto's cabinet. In such a position, he was not particularly easily swayed by requests for projects or licenses that came from first family businesses. They also envied Habibie's "strategic industries empire," which gave him the power to control a number of state-owned technology-intensive corporations, with assets amounting to trillions of Rupiah. Approaching the 1997 election, the CPDS became more like a political operative seeking to undermine Suharto's opposition. Slowly but surely, ICMI was split into two camps: the loyalists led by the CPDS, and the increasingly critical camp led by CIDES. In the meantime, although now separated institutionally, Amien Rais maintained contact with a number of ICMI/CIDES activists. In Suharto's final days, Amien, together with other modernists such 1 6 Hefner provides the details surrounding ICMI's establishment. See ibid., pp. 128-138. 130 as Adi Sasono, and M . Dawam Rahardjo (a respected modernist scholar), played a very important role behind the Reformasi movement. 1 7 If the relationship between some nationalist exponents, especially the civilian nationalists in the PDI, and the regime in this late New Order period could be described as adversarial, and between the modernists and the regime initially marked by a reconciliation then becoming increasingly hosti