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Getting the ’right’ agreement : how international norms influence the behaviour of international mediators Bluman-Schroeder, Michael 2004

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GETTING THE 'RIGHT' AGREEMENT: HOW INTERNATIONAL NORMS INFLUENCE THE BEHAVIOUR OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIATORS By Michael Bluman-Schroeder A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS In THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA July 2004 © Michael Bluman-Schroeder, 2004 Library Authorization In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Name of Author (please print) Date (dd/mm/yyyy) Title of Thesis: C - ^ M A, V W s o D e 9 r e e : yir,A^ ^ ) V Y T ^ , Year: 2 o o ^ Department of u^OrWV S c W i f l -The University of British Columbia Vancouver, BC Canada Abstract In the Post Cold War, international society has often turned to the practice of mediation to intervene in intrastate ethnic conflicts. Not surprisingly, there has been a growing interest in international relations scholarship on the subject. Within this body of literature, mediation outcome is usually the dependent variable and the independent variables have included (a) the source of conflict; (b) the requisite strategic conditions that make a given conflict 'ripe' for mediation or (c) the characteristics, strategies and resources of the mediator. As a result of this preoccupation with mediation outcome, what is under-developed is an understanding of what shapes the behaviour of mediators. In other words, this thesis makes mediator behaviour rather than mediation outcome the dependent variable. Drawing on a constructivist approach to international relations, it argues that international mediator behaviour is influenced by the social and normative context in which mediators operate. To this end, a more complete explanation recognizes the role of the professional and international norms that constitute the social context. Put another way, mediators may behave in ways that do not maximize the probability of agreement in order to seek peace settlements that meet certain international standards of appropriateness. To support this argument, this thesis attempts to develop a constructivist theoretical approach to international mediation which unpacks the identities and interests of mediators. Moreover, to provide preliminary evidence of the empirical validity of this theoretical approach, this thesis considers how international norms affected the behaviour of Lord David Owen and Richard Holbrooke, both lead international mediators in the Bosnian conflict of the early 1990s. 11 Table of Contents A B S T R A C T II T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S . Il l A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S V C H A P T E R 1: INTRODUCTION .. 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 Dominant Approaches to the Study of International Mediation 5 C H A P T E R 2: D E V E L O P I N G A CONSTRUCTIVIST A P P R O A C H T O M E D I A T O R B E H A V I O U R 12 2.1 International Norms: Constructivist Theories of Structure and Agency 12 2.2 A Theory of Agency: Transnational Civil Society 15 2.3 Extending Agency to International Mediation 19 2.4 Steven Ratner: The Mediator as Normative Intermediary 23 2.5 The Mediator as Normative Intermediary: Identities, Interests and Strategies 28 2.6 Summary 37 2.7 Case Studies: The Mediation of the Bosnian Conflict 38 C H A P T E R 3: O V E R V I E W O F T H E BOSNIAN C O N F L I C T 42 3.1 An Overview of the War in Bosnia 42 3.2 Early attempts at Mediation 45 3.3 Conclusion 47 C H A P T E R 4: DAVID O W E N AND T H E V A N C E O W E N P E A C E P L A N 48 4.1 Introduction 48 4.2 Backdrop to the Mediation: Confronting Divergent Interests 48 4.3 International Society Divided: Differing Visions a Post-Conflict Bosnia 51 i i i 4.4 Translating Norms into Guiding Principles 53 4.5 Selling these principles: Framing, Institutionalizing and Pressuring 56 4.6 Owen's Endgame: Distancing Himself from Washington's Principles 60 C H A P T E R 5: R I C H A R D H O L B R O O K E A N D US M E D I A T I O N E F F O R T S 63 5.1 Overview of the Holbrooke Mediation 63 5.2 Translating Norms to Guiding Principles 65 5.3 Getting Party Buy-In 68 5.4 Holbrooke and the Bosnian Serbs: More Coercive Approaches 73 C H A P T E R 6: C O N C L U S I O N . . . . 77 6.1 The Bosnian Case: General Findings 77 6.2 Conclusions 79 B I B L I O G R A P H Y , 82 i v Acknowledgements The author would especially like to thank Richard Price, who, as my advisor, offered extensive guidance from beginning to end. Our meetings and his comments forced me to strive for greater precision and conceptual clarity in addressing the theoretical issues involved in international mediation. The author is deeply grateful to Brian Job, who not only agreed to act as chair of my committee, but whose support throughout the last six years encouraged me to pursue graduate studies in international relations. In addition, Lesley Burns, Scott Matthews, Phil Orchard and Karen Winzoski provided invaluable formal and informal comments on previous drafts of this paper. Finally, the author owes a debt of gratitude to Miki Fabry, whose insights helped to give shape to an often partially formed set of ideas. This paper is lovingly dedicated to my mother, Barbara Bluman, whose commitment to mediating conflict is the inspiration behind this paper. v Chapter 1; Introduction 1.1 Introduction In the Post Cold War, intrastate conflicts account for the greatest proportion of violent conflicts. Though in the aftermath of 9/11, intrastate conflicts must share (or find themselves secondary on) the security agenda with terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, these conflicts remain a pressing problem for policymakers. In the shadow of the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda and Kosovo (among others), many states face two divergent pressures. On one hand, images of the gross human suffering, particularly in cases of inter-communal violence, puts domestic pressure on many governments to 'do something.' On the other hand, these governments are unwilling to risk exposing their troops to an ongoing civil war. As a result, states want a response that allows them to take an active part in trying to resolve the conflict while minimizing the risk to its soldiers. Mediation, therefore, has become a preferred form of intervention. International mediation is a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own efforts whereby the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance, or accept an offer of help from an individual group, state or organization to change, affect or influence their perceptions or behaviour, without resorting to imposing an outcome on disputing parties.1 Besides domestic pressure to take action, Zartman and Touval note that states may pursue a mediated settlement for multiple strategic and moral reasons. In some instances, states offer to mediate intrastate conflicts in hopes of preventing the conflict from spilling over into neighbouring states, provoking greater regional instability. States may also use mediation as a way of 1 T h i s d e f i n i t i o n is a h y b r i d M o s t o f the d e f i n i t i o n is cons is ten t w i t h the c o m p r e h e n s i v e ( and w e l l - c i t e d ) one o f B e r c o v i t c h a n d R u b i n w h e r e b y m e d i a t i o n i s : " a process o f c o n f l i c t m a n a g e m e n t , re la ted to but d i s t inc t f r o m the pa r t i e s ' o w n efforts w h e r e b y the d i s p u t i n g par t ies o r the i r representa t ives seek the assis tance, or accept an offer o f he lp f r o m an i n d i v i d u a l g r o u p , state or o r g a n i z a t i o n to change , affect o r i n f luence the i r percep t ions o r b e h a v i o u r , w i t h o u t r e so r t i ng to p h y s i c a l force o r i n v o k i n g the au thor i ty o f l a w . " See J a c o b B e r c o v i t c h , " T h e Structure a n d D i v e r s i t y o f M e d i a t i o n i n In terna t ional R e l a t i o n s , " i n Mediation in liternational Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, ed . J a c o b B e r c o v i t c h a n d Jeff rey R u b i n ( N e w Y o r k : St . M a r t i n ' s Press , 1992) . T h u s , the o n l y change is w i t h regards to the f i n a l pa r t .The d e f i n i t i o n used i n this thesis is usefu l because (a) it e m p h a s i z e s h o w med ia to r s seek to change par ty b e h a v i o u r rather than s i m p l y m a n a g i n g areas o f o v e r l a p p i n g interests d u r i n g nego t i a t ions a n d (b) it de l ibe ra t e ly i n c l u d e s cons ide ra t i ons o f l a w and force as part o f m e d i a t i o n s ince m o s t med ia to r s ( e s p e c i a l l y from state or in te rna t iona l o r g a n i z a t i o n s ) see l everage as a c r i t i c a l part o f m e d i a t i o n . C o n s e q u e n t l y , it expands the d e f i n i t i o n to m a x i m i z e the range o f p o s s i b l e resources and strategies that are part o f m e d i a t i o n w h i l e a c c e p t i n g that the o v e r a l l g o a l is no t to e x t e r n a l l y i m p o s e a set t lement , bu t a s s i s t i ng par t ies to a c h i e v e a m u t u a l l y agreeable one . 1 increasing their presence and influence in the affairs of the target state. At other times, they may be motivated by humanitarian impulses. International organizations and other states, particularly certain middle powers, may develop mediation expertise because it allows them to raise the profile and prestige of their foreign policy. Moreover, from the perspective of groups in conflict, mediation is sought or accepted for reasons ranging from a genuine commitment to a negotiated end to hostilities or, more cynically, to buy time to rest weary troops and foster international goodwill for their cause.2 Not surprisingly, there has been a growing interest in international relations with this subject. Much of it has been concerned with identifying the conditions under which mediation efforts would produce lasting peace agreements. Therefore, within this body of literature, mediation outcome is the dependent variable and the independent variables have included (a) the source of conflict;3 (b) the requisite strategic conditions that make a given conflict 'ripe' for mediation4 or (c) the characteristics, strategies and resources of the mediator.5 However, as Bercovitch and Houston noted, what is less developed is an understanding of the factors influencing the behaviour of mediators.6 Put simply, an alternative approach makes mediator behaviour the dependent variable rather than mediation 2 1 . W i l l i a m Z a r t m a n a n d S a a d i a T o u v a l , " In te rna t iona l M e d i a t i o n i n the P o s t - C o l d W a r E r a , " i n Managing Global Chaos, ed . Ches t e r C r o c k e r , F e n O s i e r H a m p s o n , a n d P a m e l a A a l l ( W a s h i n g t o n : U S 1 P , 1996 ) . ;Saad i a T o u v a l a n d I. W i l l i a m Z a r t m a n , International Mediation in Theory and Practice ( B o u l d e r : W e s t v i e w Press , 1985) . 3 F o r e x a m p l e see D a v i d L a k e a n d D o n a l d R o t h c h i l d , " C o n t a i n i n g Fear , " International Security 2 1 , no . 2 (1996) , B a r b a r a F . W a l t e r , " In t roduc t ion , " i n Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention, ed . B a r b a r a F W a l t e r a n d J a c k S n y d e r ( N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1999) , F e n O s i e r H a m p s o n , " T h i r d Par ty R o l e s i n the T e r m i n a t i o n o f I n t e r c o m m u n a l C o n f l i c t , " Millennium 26, no . 3 (1997) , P a u l C o l l i e r , " D o i n g W e l l out o f W a r : A n E c o n o m i c P e r s p e c t i v e , " i n Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, ed . M a t s B e r d a l and D a v i d M a l o n e ( B o u l d e r : L y n n R e i n e r P u b l i s h e r s , 2 0 0 0 ) . 4 T h e theory o f r ipeness is m o s t often assoc ia ted w i t h I. W i l l i a m Z a r t m a n . See for e x a m p l e , I. W i l l i a m Z a r t m a n , Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa ( N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1985) . a n d I. W i l l i a m Z a r t m a n , " R i p e n e s s : T h e H u r t i n g S ta lemate a n d B e y o n d , " i n International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, ed . P a u l C Stern a n d D a n i e l D r u c k m a n ( W a s h i n g t o n : N a t i o n a l A c a d e m y Press , 2 0 0 0 ) . F o r an in te res t ing d i s c u s s i o n o f r ipeness i n interstate c o n f l i c t s , see J . M i c h a e l G r e i g , " M o m e n t s o f O p p o r t u n i t y : R e c o g n i z i n g C o n d i t i o n s o f R i p e n e s s for In te rna t iona l M e d i a t i o n b e t w e e n E n d u r i n g R i v a l s , " Journal of Conflict Resolution 4 5 , no . 6 (2001) . 5 F o r e x a m p l e see J o h n H . B a r t o n a n d M a r g a r e t C . M c G u i n n e s s M e l a n i e C . G r e e n b e r g , Words over War: Medaition and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Commmission on Preventing Deadly Conflict ( L a n h a m , M D : R o w m a n & L i t t l e l f i e l d P u b l i s h e r s , 2 0 0 0 ) , Z a r t m a n a n d T o u v a l , " In ternat ional M e d i a t i o n i n the P o s t - C o l d W a r E r a . " ; H i z k i a s A s s e f a , Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies - the Sudan Conflict ( B o u l d e r : W e s t v i e w Press , 1987) . 6 J a c o b B e r c o v i t c h a n d A l l i s o n H o u s t o n , " W h y D o T h e y B e h a v e L i k e T h i s ? , " Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 , no . 2 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . 2 outcome. Bercovitch and Houston set out to measure the impact of a range of variables concerning the material context of the conflict on the strategies pursued by international mediators. In the end, they find that mediator behaviour is largely consistent with the rational actor model. They argue that leverage is the primary determinant of mediator strategy. Specifically, mediators calculate their leverage vis-a-vis the costs and benefits of continued conflict for the parties. Less intrusive, more facilitative strategies correlate with mediators with little leverage whereas highly intrusive and manipulative strategies are likely where a mediator has significant leverage.8 At first, this conclusion seems generally consistent with the empirical accounts of mediators. To be sure, mediation is to a large extent about managing and manipulating disputant interests. Even a cursory reading of To End a War by the US mediator in Bosnia, Richard Holbrooke, reveals his preoccupation with maximizing leverage. Holbrooke often threatened recalcitrant parties or persuaded parties by recasting their options in terms of the costs and benefits of expected outcomes. Yet, what is equally striking was the extent to which the Dayton Agreement was not solely the result of bargaining processes. Although horse-trading occurred over specific issues like territorial distribution between Bosnia's autonomous regions or the proportional ethnic make-up of a new federal government, the same claim cannot be made about the fundamental principles of the agreement.9 These principles concerned the exercise of sovereignty and human rights in a post-conflict Bosnia. Should sovereign borders be drawn along ethnic lines or should they maintain the previous administrative borders? Do human rights favour claims to self-determination or do they insist on multi-ethnic states with legal protection for minority rights? From the outset, Holbrooke made a multi-ethnic state and the insistence on pre-war administrative borders the guiding principles in subsequent negotiations. And these principles became the measuring stick to evaluate proposals on specific issues such as territorial claims or governance structure. Interestingly, however, these principles were not developed through a mediated negotiation. In fact, Holbrooke refused to make them 7 L e v e r a g e , for the i r purposes is p r e d o m i n a n t l y cons is ten t w i t h m a t e r i a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f p o w e r used b y real is ts o r neo l ibe ra l s . L e v e r a g e i n c l u d e s : s t rategic interests i n the c o n f l i c t , the a b i l i t y to i m p o s e e c o n o m i c sanc t ions or m i l i t a r i l y in te rvene 8 F a c i l i t a t i v e strategies i n v o l v e med ia to r s p l a y i n g a pass ive r o l e , often s h u t t l i n g i n f o r m a t i o n b e t w e e n part ies whereas d i r e c t i v e strategies i n v o l v e d ra f t ing p ro p o sa l s a n d ' p e r s u a d i n g ' par t ies t h r o u g h threats a n d incen t ives . 9 R i c h a r d H o l b r o o k e , To End a War ( N e w Y o r k : R a n d o m H o u s e , 1998) . 3 negotiable. This highlights an interesting puzzle: Why would mediators insist that some of these fundamental issues be imposed rather than the result of bargaining and compromise? To explain why mediators in Bosnia took this position, this thesis challenges the implicit conclusion of Bercovitch and Houston that mediator preferences are solely informed by the desire to maximize the probability of getting an agreement. Instead, it explores how mediator behaviour is influenced by the social and normative context in which mediators operate. It examines the extent to which a mediator is preoccupied by questions of not means and ends, but of 'oughtness.' Put another way, mediators may behave in ways that do not maximize the probability of agreement in order to seek peace settlements that meet certain international standards of appropriateness. Or, short of that, the rational strategies that mediators pursue are rational only within a specific normative context that cannot be reduced to instrumental strategies of pre-given interests. Drawing on a constructivist approach, this thesis argues that a more complete explanation for mediator behaviour includes recognizing the role of professional and international norms in shaping the practice of international mediation. Building on Steven Ratner's 'mediator as normative intermediary,' it demonstrates that mediator interests are at least partially informed by their international identities.10 In turn, these identities are constituted by international norms. These norms, or shared expectations concerning appropriate behaviour, provide the principles that form frameworks for negotiation. Additionally, mediators use them as 'guiding principles' through which to draft their own proposals and evaluate the proposals of others. They seek to disseminate these norms by making them constitutive elements of a peace agreement and using them to frame the discourse of the negotiation. This thesis is divided into three sections. The first section examines the dominant approaches to the study of international mediation. In particular, it highlights two streams of research. The first emphasizes how the success of mediation is determined by the nature of ethnic conflict. The second approach looks at the mediation process, exploring common practices in mediation and how the mediator's organizational affiliation affects mediation outcomes. Overall, this section demonstrates that attempts to incorporate normative Steven R . Ra tner , " D o e s In ternat ional L a w M a t t e r i n P r e v e n t i n g In terna t ional C o n f l i c t , " New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 32 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . 4 considerations or the social context of mediation are limited, if not altogether ignored. The second section hopes to rectify this omission by offering an alternative theoretical conception of the mediator as normative intermediary. Drawing on a constructivist approach to international relations, it examines how a mediator's social identity informs his/her interests. Thus, it helps us to move away from thinking about mediators strictly as rational actors and mediation in terms of negotiation. Instead, it highlights why mediators, as representatives of international society, seek to ensure that peace settlements are consistent with the norms embedded in that society. For the purposes of this thesis, the norms being considered are the territorial integrity norm and norms relating to minority rights. The final section applies the concept of mediators as normative intermediary to the experiences of two of the mediators in Bosnia: David Owen and Richard Holbrooke. In particular, it examines the extent to which mediators insisted the parties accept a settlement that complied with international norms of territorial integrity and minority rights. 1.2 Dominant Approaches to the Study of International Mediation Context-Based Approaches Traditionally, the study of mediation has been preoccupied with how an external third party to a conflict can overcome obstacles that are preventing the groups in conflict from constructively negotiating. This section is art overview of the dominant approaches to studying international mediation in inter-communal disputes. These approaches can be roughly classified into two: Context-based approaches and process-based ones. Context-based approaches take the causes of ethnic conflict as a starting point and identify solutions accordingly. In other words, they begin by asking: What are the root causes of conflict that mediators need to address? Given the strategic environment, what are realistic expectations for mediation? What is an appropriate balance between mediation and more coercive forms of intervention? And what terms should a peace settlement include to reduce inter-group violence? 5 Power-based explanations suggest that ethnic groups in conflict operate in what Posen refers to as "emerging anarchy."11 The resulting self-help system suggests that ending the violence requires a stable balance of forces among the groups. Consequently, more coercive forms of intervention should prove the most useful at reducing (a) security dilemmas and (b) asymmetries in the relative capabilities of the belligerents. Not surprisingly, if it is the balance of capabilities on the ground that determines outcomes, mediation has little value-added.12 An alternative, interest-based explanation takes its cues from an institutionalist tradition. This explanation suggests that it is the preferences of rational actors that sustain conflict, and, therefore, an effective conflict management strategy requires mediators to alter group preferences. For example, Lake and Rothchild argue that international mediators can reduce physical and cultural insecurity among the belligerents by establishing institutions that incorporate power sharing arrangements, confidence building measures and group autonomy (often through federalism). Thus, mediators reduce the cost of peace for belligerents by reducing the uncertainty involved in disarming.13 Others argue that ethnic conflict is predominantly driven by economic incentives accrued by group elites and mediators should use a mix of 'carrots and sticks' to change their incentives.14 Zartman has sought to integrate power-based and interest-based arguments in his well-cited theory of 'ripeness.' He argues that timing is critical for successful mediation of intrastate conflict. In particular, a conflict is 'ripe' for resolution when the warring factions experience a "mutually hurting stalemate" identified by two conditions: (a) Both sides realize that an outright military victory is impossible and (b) both sides face rising costs from continued conflict. Thus, his argument is a highly rationalist one in that the prospects for successful mediation require both favourable structural and economic conditions. Not surprisingly, Zartman's approach initially seems to provide little room for mediator agency in determining outcomes, treating mediation as a variable of secondary importance. However, he does increase the prospects for agency by accepting that mediators can facilitate a mutually hurting stalemate by coordinating a more coercive external intervention. " B a r r y R . P o s e n , " T h e S e c u r i t y D i l e m m a a n d E t h n i c C o n f l i c t , " in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed . M i c h a e l E . B r o w n ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1993) . See a l so W a l t e r ' s i n t r o d u c t i o n chapter i n W a l t e r , " In t roduc t i on . " 1 2 D a v i d Shearer , " E x p l o r i n g the L i m i t s o f C o n s e n t : C o n f l c i t R e s o l u t i o n i n S i e r r a L e o n e , " Millennium 2 6 , no . 3 ( 1 9 9 7 ) . 1 3 L a k e and R o t h c h i l d , " C o n t a i n i n g Fea r . " 1 4 F o r e x a m p l e see C o l l i e r , " D o i n g W e l l out o f W a r : A n E c o n o m i c P e r s p e c t i v e . " 6 Furthermore, given the high levels of uncertainty, misinformation and perceptual biases that plague belligerents, mediators may also help persuade the parties that the conditions are ripe for resolution.15 This body of literature has made important contributions to conflict mediation. Intrastate conflicts are multi-causal and mediators are often required to consider structural, institutional and economic factors that both initiate and sustain violence. In other words, mediators should adopt an integrated approach to understanding the conflict in order to develop an appropriate management strategy.16 The difficulty with context-based approaches is that they offer few answers to the question: "What do mediators do?" Though their insights are useful tools for mediators asked to resolve the sources of conflict, or policymakers responsible for developing a policy that balances mediation with more coercive forms of intervention, it tells us little about the identities, interests and strategies of international mediators which can be crucial to understand mediation. Furthermore, these approaches implicitly assume that mediators are strictly concerned with achieving a settlement that will end the violence. To this end, mediation is about assessing costs and benefits and seeking mutually agreeable arrangements that accommodate all parties. Mediators are also assumed to have a 'carte blanche' with respect to the substantive terms of an agreement. Consequently, they do not recognize that the context not just of the conflict, but also the social context of international society, may include deeply entrenched constraints that limit the range of acceptable agreements. As a result, these approaches would have difficulty explaining why agreements are often shaped by non-negotiable 'guiding principles' that may be external to the direct needs and demands of the belligerents. Process-Based Approaches A second body of literature is less preoccupied with the dynamics of conflict, instead addressing procedural questions concerning the mediation process. As Barton and 1 5 H o w e v e r , there are ser ious c r i t i ques o f the r ipeness a p p r o a c h . F i r s t , from a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l pe r spec t ive , it is seen as t e l e o l o g i c a l as the o n l y w a y to k n o w a c o n f l i c t is r i pe was that it w a s u l t i m a t e l y set t led. S e c o n d , it is d i f f i c u l t to measure the ' c o s t s ' o f c o n f l i c t o n a f ac t i on . O f t e n a w a r r i n g f ac t i on m a y be a c c u m u l a t i n g costs o v e r a l l , but these costs m a y be spread o v e r a large n u m b e r o f suppor ters , w h i l e e l i tes con t i nue to see d i rec t benef i ts . T h i r d , in te rna t iona l in t e rmed ia r i e s and w a r r i n g g roups m a y interpret ma te r i a l c o n d i t i o n s d i f f e ren t ly a n d the other does not r e c o g n i z e w h a t seems l i k e a m u t u a l l y h u r t i n g s ta lemate to one . 1 6 H a m p s o n , " T h i r d Pa r ty R o l e s i n the T e r m i n a t i o n o f I n t e r c o m m u n a l C o n f l i c t . " 7 McGuiness conclude after reviewing twelve cases of international mediation involving both intrastate and interstate conflicts: "The value-added by the mediator was usually procedural rather than substantive." Put simply, process-based approaches have set out to demonstrate that mediators matter by tracing how mediator interests and strategies directly affect the conflict. To this end, much of the literature is concerned with highlighting a set of procedural norms and the development of 'best practices.'17 Process-based approaches are useful because they demonstrate that mediator behaviour and mediated outcomes are not strictly informed by the characteristics of the conflict. Rather, they highlight how the specific process that a mediator introduces helps to stop or reduce the violence and change the relationship between the parties in conflict. Moreover, in identifying collective professional practices and how the organizational affiliation of the mediator influences his/her interests, process-based approaches begin to unpack how aspects of identity inform mediator behaviour. Process-based understandings of mediation, primarily rooted in domestic forms of mediation, have emphasized three guiding principles: (1) Help parties reconcile their interests; (2) ensure disputant 'ownership' of the agreement and; (3) maintain neutrality. The practice of exploring interests is perhaps the most internalized norm in both the practice and theory of negotiation and mediation. Mediation is about helping parties satisfy their interests through bargaining and compromise rather than armed struggle. To do so, mediators may adopt a range of strategies, generally categorized by the level of intrusiveness.18 Overall, it involves filtering out some of the posturing and rhetoric during negotiations in order to uncover shared interests and, where interests conflict, facilitate bargaining and compromise often through the exchange of concessions. More recently, Roger Fisher and William Ury's widely-circulated Getting to Yes developed a more refined 'how to' approach to the practice of interest-based negotiation. They highlight the importance of distinguishing between a party's interests and its positions, in turn allowing mediators to help parties discover the interests that underpin specific positions as a way of broadening the range of possible 1 7 O n m e d i a t i o n w r i t large see F i s h e r a n d U r y , 1991 and G o l d b e r g , Sanders and R o g e r s , 1992 , 103-199 . O n m e d i a t i o n p rocedu re s p e c i f i c a l l y i n in t e rna t iona l c o n f l i c t s see A s s e f a , 1997 , 2 2 - 2 9 ; G r e e n b e r g , B a r t o n and M c G u i n n e s s , 2 0 0 0 ; Z a r t m a n a n d T o u v a l , 1996; Z a r t m a n , 2 0 0 0 . 1 8 B e r c o v i t c h and H o u s t o n a rgue iden t i fy three strategies ( f rom least to mos t in t rus ive ) : F a c i l i t a t i v e , p r o c e d u r a l and d i r e c t i v e . B e r c o v i t c h a n d H o u s t o n , " W h y D o T h e y B e h a v e L i k e T h i s ? . " L i k e w i s e , Z a r t m a n a n d T o u v a l note that med ia to r s c a n act as ' c o m m u n i c a t o r s ' , ' f a c i l i t a t o r s ' and ' m a n i p u l a t o r s ' . T o u v a l a n d Z a r t m a n , International Mediation in Theory and Practice. 8 solutions.19 A second procedural norm of mediation concerns disputant ownership of the agreement. The less mediators become directly involved in resolving specific substantive issues, the more the parties will feel ownership of any agreement. Mediators, therefore, prefer to avoid imposing any proposal. In the end, mediators want parties to feel they have voluntarily come to an agreement, making it easier for individual parties to 'sell' the agreement to their constituencies and improving the chances for successful implementation. Moreover, the norm of 'neutrality,' though its precise meaning is still contested remains an important part of mediation. Barton and McGuinness that mediator neutrality is a critical part of what parties expect from a mediator. They note: "The impartiality of the mediator was the characteristic most prized by the parties to the conflict."21 In fact, the expectation that a mediator be 'neutral' is often explicit in definitions of mediation.22 However, neutrality remains a highly contested norm with respect to its content and its applicability. Zartman and Touval reject the assumption of mediator neutrality by noting that mediators may intervene in conflicts to advance their own self-interests.23 More directly, Bercovitch has argued: "Mediators are not, and cannot, be neutral."24 From this perspective, organizational interests largely inform mediator interests. Zartman and Touval note that mediators representing states are interested in (a) keeping the conflict from spreading, (b) gaining a greater presence in the region or (c) to increase prestige and the state's reputation in international society. Likewise, international organizations seek to expand or maintain their role and their reputation. ' ' S p e c i f i c a l l y , F i s h e r a n d U r y a rgued that b y f o c u s i n g o n interests rather than demands o r pos i t i ons one w o u l d change the nego t i a t i on f r o m a d i s t r i bu t i ve to an in tegra t ive one. Pu t s i m p l y , whereas d i s t r i bu t i ve negot ia t ions l o o k for w a y s to ' d i v i d e the p i e ' , in tegra t ive nego t i a t ions l o o k for w a y s to ' g r o w the p i e ' . T h u s , in tegra t ive-based agreements are m o r e succes s fu l because par t ies increase the i r ga ins in abso lu te te rms . R o g e r F i s h e r a n d W i l l i a m U r y , Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In ( N e w Y o r k : P e n g u i n B o o k s . , 1991) . 2 0 M e l a n i e C . G r e e n b e r g , Words over War: Medaition and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict:. 3 4 4 . 2 1 I b i d . 2 2 C h a r l e s W . M o o r e , The Mediation Process, S e c o n d ed . (San F r a n s i s c o : J o s e y - B a s s , 1996) . : 14; Jay F o l b e r g and and A l i s o n T a y l o r , Mediation ( S a n F r a n c i s c o : J o s e y - B a s s , 1984) . : 7. 2 3 T o u v a l a n d Z a r t m a n , International Mediation in Theory and Practice.: 8-10; Z a r t m a n a n d T o u v a l , " In te rna t iona l M e d i a t i o n i n the P o s t - C o l d W a r E r a . " : 4 4 6 . 2 4 J a c o b B e r c o v i t c h , " T h e S t ruc tu re a n d D i v e r s i t y o f M e d i a t i o n i n In te rna t iona l R e l a t i o n s , " i n Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, ed . J a c o b B e r c o v i t c h and Jeff rey Z . R u b i n ( N e w Y o r k : St. M a r t i n ' s Press , 1992) . 2 5 Z a r t m a n a n d Z a r t m a n a n d T o u v a l , " In te rna t iona l M e d i a t i o n i n the P o s t - C o l d W a r E r a . " 4 4 6 - 4 5 0 . 9 However, a norm of neutrality does not necessarily preclude that mediators have interests. Rather, mediators provide a neutral negotiation process. Thus, recent analyses of mediation have tended to emphasise the neutrality of the mediation process rather than the disinterested motives of the mediator. For example, even while reaffirming that mediators cannot be neutral, Bercovitch has noted that "mediators may be impartial, or better still perceived as impartial."27 In this sense, impartiality means mediators offer a process through which all parties have equal opportunity to express their interests and negotiate. Overall, process-based approaches, which highlight common standards and practices of mediation, provide a useful platform for theorizing about broader issues concerning mediator behaviour. Shared procedural norms and the diffusion of these norms through widely-read handbooks like Getting to Yes provide a set of principles around which a professional identity can form. Identity formation may be even more prevalent in the case of mediators representing states and international organizations that share common diplomatic training.28 The identity of mediators coalesces, therefore, around a collective 'process-expertise.' These procedural norms speak to a broader answer to the question: "Who am I?" A mediator's identity as a 'peacemaker' revolves around the idea that they bring peace by facilitating processes of dialogue and compromise, using their leverage only to overcome structural challenges like security dilemmas, providing political cover for moderates or getting recalcitrant parties to take the political process seriously. This professional identity has important consequences for the preferences of mediators. First, their professional identity makes them reluctant to seek new strategies for approaching conflicts and motivates them to advocate a mediated solution over military intervention or non-interference, often in spite of changing (and unfavourable) conditions on the battlefield. Moreover, it creates important 'frames' through which mediators filter new information. For example, mediators are likely to assess the value of their organization's other policies based on the extent to which it contributes to the mediation process. That said, there are limits on the extent to 2 6 It is impor t an t to note that neu t ra l i ty often does not m e a n the m e d i a t o r to be va lue -neu t r a l . C l e a r l y , w h e r e one s ide seems the v i c t i m o f se r ious abuses, the m e d i a t o r is l i k e l y to h o l d s t rong sympa th i e s . N o n e t h e l e s s , a neut ra l p rocess expec t s that med ia to r s at tempt to treat a l l part ies i m p a r t i a l l y 2 7 B e r c o v i t c h , " T h e St ruc ture a n d D i v e r s i t y o f M e d i a t i o n i n In ternat ional R e l a t i o n s . " 6. 2 8 S o c i a l i z a t i o n m a y i n c l u d e a n u m b e r o f in te r sub jec t ive unders tand ings , ru les , p rocedures i n c l u d i n g , for e x a m p l e , a shared ' d i p l o m a t i c l anguage . " M o r e o v e r , a n u m b e r o f med ia to r s often tend to refer to the same h i s t o r i c a l cases as m o d e l s o f m e d i a t i o n such as Pres iden t J i m m y C a r t e r ' s C a m p D a v i d D i p l o m a c y . 10 which professional identities determines behaviour. The professional identity of international mediators and its constitutive norms are largely informal. As Goldberg, Sander and Rogers have noted, there are few 'mandatory standards' in mediation.29 Thus, this professional identity, though certainly important in terms of the process a mediator is likely to bring to a conflict, cannot be assumed to be the only (or even primary) explanation for mediator behaviour. Moreover, process-based approaches to the study of mediation tend to be prescriptive rather than explanatory. Though they often highlight common practices among mediators, they ultimately are less concerned with answering why a mediator behaves a certain way than in how they should behave. To be sure, it is worthwhile to develop a set of best practices for international mediators, which helps to narrow the gap between the practice and theory of international affairs. However, to maximize the likelihood that these 'best practices' are adopted, it is necessary to identify and address the constraints of the social and material context in which mediators operate. Though these best practices tend to address material constraints (by assuming that mediators have little leverage), they tend to neglect social and normative ones. For example, those concerned with procedural norms implicitly assume that mediators should be neutral regarding the substance of an agreement or at least willing to put aside their personal preferences in pursuit of a peace agreement. However, institutionalizing the practice of neutrality in international mediation demands more than a mediator ensuring that he does not favour one side to the dispute for strategic, historical or even moral reasons. Even if the mediator were indifferent between parties, he/she still has an interest in shaping an agreement that is acceptable to international society. As a result, process-based explanations also have difficulty explaining why mediators may seek peace agreements that meet international standards regardless of whether that agreement is acceptable to the parties. F r a n k E . A . S a n d e r a n d N a n c y H . R o g e r s S tephen B . G o l d b e r g , Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation and Other Processes, S e c o n d ed . ( B o s t o n : L i t t l e B r o w n & C o m p a n y , 1992) . : 160. It s h o u l d be no t ed that o v e r the last decade there have been s o m e at tempts to create f o r m a l s tandards and codes o f c o n d u c t for m e d i a t i o n at the d o m e s t i c l e v e l . H o w e v e r , despi te the g r o w t h o f webs i t e s and e x p l i c i t ' c o d e s o f c o n d u c t ' d e v e l o p e d b y a f e w N G O s (for e x a m p l e , In terna t ional A l e r t ) , o v e r a l l there r ema ins a l o w l e v e l o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n . 11 Chapter 2: Developing a Constructivist Approach to Mediator Behaviour 2.1 International Norms: Constructivist Theories of Structure and Agency Given that traditional approaches to international mediation have difficulty explaining mediator behaviour, this thesis proposes that a more complete understanding should incorporate a social theory of international relations. A constructivist approach may prove useful because it focuses on the role of social structures in explaining the behaviour of international actors. Thus, this section explores how international mediators as agents of international society are influenced by social structures, so-called norms, embedded in that society. To borrow Peter Katzentstein's well-cited definition, norms are "collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity." They involve intersubjective understandings among a given set of actors about rules and practices in an issue-area. The influence of norms offers an alternative explanation for convergent state behaviour that cannot be explained by the international distribution of power or the constellation of largely material interests. Thus, norms may explain international outcomes that do not conform to the expectations of realism or liberalism. Constructivists propose that norms play a significant role in shaping state preferences, challenging realists and neoliberals who 'blackbox' state interests. In fact, norms and the identities of international actors are mutually constitutive: Actors identify themselves and their interests based on the internalization of shared principles and ideas. In other words, this approach suggests that 'who you think you are' or 'who you want to be' 31 partially determines 'what you want.' Moreover, rather than assuming that an actor's behaviour results from some form of cost-benefit analysis, constructivists consider more normative sources of behaviour. As Finnermore proposed, such behaviour is based on a "logic of appropriateness" rather than a "logic of consequences." Actors take for granted the most entrenched norms of international society, essentially removing the thought of behaving any other way. Even among less entrenched norms, high levels of compliance may result because (a) it is consistent with deeply held moral 3 0 Pe ter J . K a t z e n s t e i n , The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics ( N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1996) . 3 1 F o r e x a m p l e see A l e x a n d e r W e n d t , Social Theory of International Politics ( N e w Y o r k : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1999) . See a l so C h a p t e r 1 i n M a r t h a F i n n e m o r e , National Interests in International Society ( I thaca: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1996) . 3 2 F i n n e m o r e , National Interests in International Society. 2 8 - 3 1 . 12 or legal values, (b) longstanding iterated practices or (c) the need to be considered a member of good standing in international society. To be sure, one cannot dismiss that actors may have instrumental reasons for compliance. For example, states may design rules that advance their own material well-being or obey a rule rather than risk punitive sanctions. However, in some cases where initial compliance may be motivated by self-interest, actors may continue to comply over time out of habit in spite of changes to the costs and benefits of compliance. Initially, proponents of constructivism set out to demonstrate 'norms matter' by identifying specific norms in a range of issues-areas and the strength of norm compliance. These norms had both constitutive and regulative effects. Constitutive effects highlight what are the appropriate 'parts' of an actor. For example, Martha Finnemore has demonstrated that maintaining a particular science bureaucracy is important for a state to take active part in international society. Regulative effects, however, are more concerned with appropriate state behaviour and practice. The most obvious examples are international prohibition norms that have included, among others, practices involving slavery and piracy as well as proscribing against the use of chemical weapons and antipersonnel landmines. Other regulative norms offer 'guides of appropriate conduct' such as the treatment of civilians and soldiers during a conflict, as outlined in the Geneva Conventions.34 However, constructivism has not gone unchallenged. Jeffrey Checkel argued that the preoccupation of the early constructivist research agenda with establishing that norms matter had led them to focus on the structure side of the agent-structure relationship, leaving the other side unexplored. Checkel suggests that this "structure-centered approach" had created a "predicament" in that the constructivist "ontology has led them to neglect key issues."35 If international society is mutually constituted, than the constructivist research program needed a more complete theory of agency. In particular, there were few attempts to draw out who 3 3 F o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f g l o b a l p r o h i b i t i o n n o r m s , e s p e c i a l l y c o n c e r n i n g the prac t i ces a s soc ia t ed w i t h s l ave ry and p i r a c y see E t h a n A . N a d e l m a n , " G l o b a l P r o h i b i t i o n R e g i m e s : T h e E v o l u t i o n o f N o r m s i n In t e rna t iona l .Soc ie ty , " International Organization 44 , no . 4 (1990) . R i c h a r d P r i c e offers a c o m p r e h e n s i v e ana lys i s o f bo th the cons t ruc t i on o f a n d adherence to the b a n n i n g o f an t i -pe r sonne l l a n d m i n e s a n d the s o m a t i z a t i o n o f c h e m i c a l w e a p o n s . R i c h a r d P r i c e , " C o m p l i a n c e w i t h In terna t ional N o r m s a n d the M i n e s T a b o o , " i n To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, ed . M a x w e l l A . C a m e r o n , R o b e r t L a w s o n , a n d B r i a n T o m l i n ( T o r o n t o : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1998) . See a l so R i c h a r d P r i c e , The Chemical Weapons Taboo ( I thaca: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1997) . 3 4 F i n n e m o r e , National Interests in International Society.: 6 9 - 8 8 . 3 5 Jef f rey T . C h e c k e l , " T h e C o n s t r u c t i v i s t T u r n i n In te rna t iona l R e l a t i o n s T h e o r y , " World Politics 50 , n o . 2 (1998) . 3 4 2 . 13 qualifies as agents. How do agents constitute and reconstitute social structures such as norms? And how do they diffuse norms across the system? To be sure, earlier work on norms did not completely ignore the role of agency. For example, Martha Finnemore demonstrates how international organizations like UNESCO 37 'taught' states that they needed a properly formed science bureaucracy. Subsequently, some constructivists have also sought to create a generalized model of norm development and diffusion. Florini argued that norms in international society are subject to an ongoing contestation. The likelihood that a norm is accepted is determined by whether the relative systemic position of its proponents, the number of proponents and its ability to solve a pressing problem in international society. Furthermore, Florini argued that 'winners' were norms that 'fit' with higher order norms. Consequently, they could be 'grafted' onto these norms.38 Again, however, there is limited room for agency in this approach. Therefore, Finnemore and Sikkink problematize the idea of a norms inherent 'fit,' allowing for actors to actively make the norm fit through 'framing' how it is presented to international society. They argue that 'norm entrepreneurs,' transnational agents with "strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community," engage in 'strategic social construction' by couching the proposed norm in accepted discourse.39 To this end, norm entrepreneurs could increase the chance of norm adoption by packaging it in a way that resonates in international society because it "speaks to aspect of belief system" and is culturally and historically in-context.40 In the model proposed by Finnemore and Sikkink, agents are most relevant at the earliest stage of norm development, the 'norm emergence' stage.41 In this stage, marked by high levels of contestation, norm entrepreneurs introduce new norms as either an extension of existing values or as a practical alternative to a pressing issue. As Finnemore and Sikkink note: "Efforts to promote a new norm take place within the standards of appropriateness defined by prior norms." Norm entrepreneurs seek to "secure the support of state actors to endorse their norms 3 b I b i d . : 3 3 9 - 3 4 2 . 3 7 F i n n e m o r e , National Interests in International Society.: 3 4 - 6 8 . 3 8 A n n F l o r i n i , " T h e E v o l u t i o n o f In terna t ional N o r m s , " International Studies Quarterly 4 0 (1996) . 3 9 M a r t h a F i n n e m o r e and K a t h r y n S i k k i n k , " In ternat ional N o r m D y n a m i c s and P o l i t i c a l C h a n g e , " International Organization 52 , no . 4 (1998) . : 8 9 6 - 8 9 7 . 4 0 I b i d . 9 0 7 . 4 1 In o rde r to t race n o r m e v o l u t i o n , F i n n e m o r e a n d S i k k i n k in t roduce the idea o f ' n o r m l i fe c y c l e s . ' N o r m s gene ra l l y m o v e t h rough three stages: (a) emergence , (b) c a s c a d i n g , a n d (c) n o r m i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n . 14 and make norm socialization a part of their agenda."42 Once norm entrepreneurs persuade a critical mass of states to adopt the norm, the norm cascades as "an active process of socialization" induces reluctant states to comply in order to maintain their good standing in international society.43 Again, howeyer, despite outlining the role of norm entrepreneurs, more attention was paid to tracing norm evolution and demonstrating norm consolidation and less to the specific identities, interests and strategies of the entrepreneurs themselves. Thus, Checkel's call for a broader theory of agency remained relevant. The constructivist approach to agency was largely ad hoc, where authors selected less systematically from a range of state actors, transnational groups and international organizations. As Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink observe: "Systemic explanations need to be grounded in process tracing if they are to show the mechanism by which norms constrain. That means to see norms in action we have to examine the actions of individuals and groups in historical contexts."44 To this end, the constructivist program lacked a way to classify actors into groups based on specific characteristics and strategies. 2.2 A Theory of Agency: Transnational Civil Society More recently, there has been a greater effort to address the issue of agency by analyzing the activities of a particular type of international actor, namely transnational civil society (TCS). Richard Price has broadly defined transnational civil society as "self-organized advocacy groups that undertake voluntary collective action across state borders in pursuit of what they deem the wider public interest."45 In addition, this literature distinguishes between various groupings of transnational normative agents by analyzing (a) the common motivation around which they coalesce; (b) the strategies they use to diffuse norms and (c) the extent to which they are able to influence domestic and international target audiences. 4 2 F i n n e m o r e a n d S i k k i n k , " In te rna t iona l N o r m D y n a m i c s a n d P o l i t i c a l C h a n g e . " 9 0 0 . 4 3 Pu t another w a y , the n o r m is i n e x t r i c a b l y l i n k e d to iden t i ty , b e c o m i n g part o f w h a t it means to be a state. T h e f i n a l stage, i n t e rna l i z a t i on , is cha rac t e r i zed by n o r m s a c h i e v i n g a ' t aken for g r an t ed ' q u a l i t y . C o m p l i a n c e is a s s u m e d b y mos t states a n d states that v io l a t e the n o r m p r i m a r i l y j u s t i f y thei r a c t i o n out o f necess i ty o r c i t i n g ex t raneous c i r c u m s t a n c e s , rather than c h a l l e n g i n g the l e g i t i m a c y o f the n o r m i tself . M o r e o v e r , the n o r m b e c o m e s i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d i n d o m e s t i c ins t i tu t ions , p a r t i c u l a r l y d o m e s t i c l a w s a n d bu reauc rac i e s . 4 4 M a r g a r e t E . K e c k and K a t h r y n S i k k i n k , Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics ( I thaca: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1999) . : 3 5 . 4 5 R i c h a r d P r i c e , " T r a n s n a t i o n a l C i v i l S o c i e t y a n d A d v o c a c y i n W o r l d P o l i t i c s : R e v i e w A r t i c l e , " World Politics 5 5 , no . 4 (2003) . : 5 8 0 . 1 5 Keck and Sikkink identify two types of agents within transnational civil society: epistemic communities and transnational advocacy networks (TANs). Epistemic communities, first proposed by Peter Haas, were transnational groupings that coalesced around a shared causal belief in a given issue area. In other words, the influence of epistemic communities resulted from a perceived identity as 'experts' for a given policy relevant issue. Couching norms in technical expertise, these knowledge-based groups use their standing to pressure states to adopt the policies they support.46 In contrast, transnational advocacy networks are mobilized around shared principled ideas or values. They "are organized to promote causes, principled ideas and norms and they often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a rationalist understanding of 'interests.'" 4 7 Put another way, they attempt to infuse policy debates with normative discourses concerning how states 'ought' to behave often with the long-term goal of institutionalizing the norm in an international regime. These networks involve a high level of interaction among a range of civil society groups including (among others) international and domestic NGOs, local social movements and societal institutions. Consistent with Finnemore and Sikkink, TANs often act as norm entrepreneurs who introduce and guide norms through the early stages of development. However, Keck and Sikkink extend the role of TANs beyond the norm emergence stage.. Once norms have been institutionalized, TANs may be concerned with getting reluctant parties on-board and deepening international commitment to the norm by widening its scope, making it more precise or establishing more assertive enforcement mechanisms. The strategies used by TANs to frame norms involve a combination of teaching, persuading and pressuring. Teaching is the least coercive method and is employed where the target is committed to the norm but seeks information about how to localize the norm in a specific cultural and institutional context. Persuasion often involves a combination of what Keck and Sikkink refer to as 'information' and 'symbolic' politics. Information politics is the provision of information about the behaviour of states or a characterization of an international 4 6 See Peter M . Haas , " In t roduc t ion : E p i s t e m i c C o m m u n i t i e s a n d In te rna t iona l P o l i c y C o o r d i n a t i o n , " International Organization 4 6 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . E v a n g e l i s t a has demons t r a t ed h o w ep i s t emic c o m m u n i t i e s h e l p e d to change the S o v i e t U n i o n ' s a rms c o n t r o l p o l i c i e s that c o n t r i b u t e d to b roader p o l i c y shifts t owards the e n d o f the C o l d W a r . M a t t h e w E v a n g e l i s t a , Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War ( I thaca: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1999) . 4 7 K e c k and S i k k i n k , Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics.: 8. 4 8 I b i d . 1-38. 16 problem in a dramatic fashion and through channels that will have the most impact.49 Symbolic politics is "the ability to call on symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a situation for an audience that is frequently far way."50 Whereas information politics is concerned with the distribution of the message, symbolic politics focuses on the substance of the message and how it is presented. TANs may also pressure states to adopt a norm by appealing to the associated costs and benefits. As Price notes: "Much of the current generation of research on TCS downplays the alleged rationalist-constructivist theoretical divide, and for good reason in the sense that most case studies demonstrate an eclectic mix of persuasive and instrumentalist tactics."51 To this end, TANs may frame the norm by outlining the economic gains of maintaining a good international reputation and the possible sanctions for violating norms. Where a target continues to violate the norm, TANs may also shame them by publicly exposing evidence of inappropriate behaviour. Moreover, TANs build coalitions among domestic and international actors including state and international organizations. In the case of the norms against the use of anti-personnel landmines, the coalition involved international and domestic NGOs and a group of likeminded states.52 These coalitions help entrench the norm in security discourses, increase state support to move the norm towards a tipping point and institutionalize the norm in an international treaty. Finally, the literature on transnational civil society offers insights regarding conditions when agents are most likely to be successful at diffusing norms. Price, drawing on Keck and Sikkink, argues that the likelihood of success is determined by the characteristics of three variables: (i) activists; (ii) targets and (iii) issue areas. With respect to the nature of activists, their authority is derived from "expertise, moral authority, and a claim to political authority."53 Moreover, activists are successful to the extent that they exploit early opportunities. Price notes that empirical studies have tended to demonstrate that TCS is most effective during 'a prenegotiation phase' when a variety of new ideas and institutional designs are being considered. The nature of the target can also influence the chance of the target adopting a specific norm. For Price: "The key finding is that transnational activism may be insufficient without the opportunity 4 9 I b i d . 18-19 . 5 0 I b i d . 2 2 . 5 1 P r i c e , " T r a n s n a t i o n a l C i v i l S o c i e t y a n d A d v o c a c y i n W o r l d P o l i t i c s : R e v i e w A r t i c l e . " 583 5 2 P r i c e , " C o m p l i a n c e w i t h In te rna t iona l N o r m s and the M i n e s T a b o o . " 5 3 P r i c e , " T r a n s n a t i o n a l C i v i l S o c i e t y a n d A d v o c a c y i n W o r l d P o l i t i c s : R e v i e w A r t i c l e . " 5 8 7 . 17 provided by government leaders who are sensitive to reputation."54 Moreover, where the target is made up of both reformers and hardliners, TCS have sought to diffuse norms by appealing to reformers and isolating hardliners.55 Furthermore, the likelihood of norm localization involves more than the political structure of the target, but also broader socio-cultural characteristics. In particular, target states with domestic groups to which TCS are able to 'link up' can increase pressure on the state and enhance the legitimacy of TCS.56 Equally important is the extent to which the proposed norm inherently fits with a target's culture and basic values. The more 'natural' the fit, the less framing is required and the greater the chance of norm localization. Thus, Keck and Sikkink have argued that TCS influence is strongest in issues involving shared human experiences that transcend cultural and political contexts. For example, TANs have been able to push for new human rights and humanitarian norms because they can be linked to deeply-held transnational values like the protection of vulnerable individuals against bodily harm and values involving legal equality of opportunity.57 Overall, the TCS literature has taken the constructivist project a long way from initial attempts to demonstrate that norms matter. In fact, it has provided critical theoretical foundations from which to explore the role of process and agency in the development and dissemination of norms. The literature on TCS provides important lens through which to examine (a) the key similarities and distinctions between types of international agents; (b) the process and condition under which norms are likely to diffuse and (c) the strategies used to spread norms across international society. However, transnational civil society represents only one type of normative intermediary. To this end, the subsequent section considers the extent to which the conclusions concerning TCS can be applied to other forms of normative intermediaries, particularly international mediators representing states and international organizations in ethnic conflicts. 5 4 I b i d . 5 9 2 . 5 5 H o w e v e r , P r i c e notes the r i sks o f such as a p p r o a c h as ha rd l ine r s c a n seek to e x p l o i t ' s e l l i n g ou t ' the na t i ona l interest. I b i d . 5 9 5 . 5 6 K e c k a n d S i k k i n k refer to the a p p r o a c h w h e r e d o m e s t i c g roups seek c o a l i t i o n s at the in te rna t iona l l e v e l i n o rde r to a p p l y pressure o n a g o v e r n m e n t f r o m a b o v e a n d b e l o w as the " b o o m e r a n g " pat tern. It is m o s t of ten used w h e r e access b y d o m e s t i c g roups to g o v e r n i n g ins t i tu t ions is b l o c k e d . K e c k a n d S i k k i n k , Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics.: 12 -13 . 5 7 I b id . : 2 0 4 . 18 2.3 Extending Agency to International Mediation This thesis is a continuation of the larger project to explore the role of agency in the development and diffusion of international norms. More specifically, it is an attempt to square the theoretical literature on transnational agents such as epistemic communities and transnational advocacy networks with the behaviour of mediators responsible for ending ethnic conflicts. This section tries to answer the questions: What are some new ways to think about what it is that mediators do? And how do they do it? In the broadest sense, it demonstrates that mediators are interested in disseminating international norms across the parties in conflict. To do so, it highlights the mediator's identity as a representative of international society while tracing the strategies they employ to get the parties to adopt the norms. Like TANs, mediators persuade parties to agree to the international norms and then seek to strengthen party commitment to them by institutionalizing them often in peace settlements. Some of these strategies involve more normative processes like framing the norms and discursive practices that appeal to a 'sense of appropriateness.' They may also play on a party's desire to be an accepted member of international society in order to encourage norm compliance. At other times, mediators may apply rational means for normative ends. In this case, they may build international and domestic coalitions to pressure parties and even seek punitive sanctions against those parties resisting the norms. To be sure, this thesis recognizes that international mediators represent a distinct class of normative agents from transnational advocacy networks. The most obvious difference of course is that where transnational advocacy networks are not affiliated with states, the international mediators under consideration in this thesis are mediating on behalf of states or for international organizations whose members are states. In fact, much has been made of this 'insider'/'outsider' distinction. As Audie Klotz notes about TCS: "In practice, these groups and organizations are defined by who they are not: 'non state agents that do not operate on behalf of a national 58 government or intergovernmental organization." To this end, the normative agents responsible for helping to bringing an end to apartheid were largely defined by their 'outsider' identity. A u d i e K l o t z , " T r a n s n a t i o n a l A c t i v i s m a n d G l o b a l T r a n s f o r m a t i o n s : T h e A n t i - A p a r t h e i d and A b o l i t i o n i s t E x p e r i e n c e s , " European Journal of International Relations 8, no . 1 (2002).: 50. 19 These groups clearly felt outside the state system, mobilizing around a principled, societal cause and choosing tactics that reflected their distance from the traditional locus of power.59 To a certain extent, the considerations of organizational differences are important to develop a systematic classification of normative agents. Yet, the distinction can be overstated. Afterall, Price, drawing on Evangelista, notes that in some institutional contexts, such as the scientific community in the Soviet Union, it can be difficult to identify the threshold between 'insider' and 'outsider.'60 Moreover, Klotz's own case studies highlight how movements often incorporate alliances between state elites and social movements.61 As the case of international mediators will demonstrate, normative agents that represent states and international organizations ('insiders') share the goal of spreading norms, may adopt similar strategies and face comparable obstacles. For example, they generally must build coalitions inside and outside their respective organizations in order to get reluctant parties (sometimes including their own organization) to support the norm. A second distinction is that international mediators are more involved in norm implementation than norm entrepreneurship. Whereas, a large part of TAN activities involve proposing and promoting new norms, international mediators seek to localize well-established international norms in societies plagued by ethnic conflict. That is not to say that the norms involved in international mediation are static and uncontroversial. In fact, over the course of mediation, the localization process can take the norm through a renewed period of contestation. It can open up new interpretations of the norm or lead to expand or narrow its scope. At the very least, international mediators attempt to expand the application of norms beyond states to include non-state armed groups. The primary significance of this distinction is that international mediators are less concerned with framing ideas based on universal values and can instead focus on couching the norm in a discourse more familiar to the belligerents. In addition, since the norm is established, the international mediator often has more options regarding potential coalition partners, particularly among the society of states. However, prior to further developing a new framework through which to understand the international mediator as normative intermediary, it is worth exploring the few attempts that have P r i c e , " T r a n s n a t i o n a l C i v i l S o c i e t y a n d A d v o c a c y i n W o r l d P o l i t i c s : R e v i e w A r t i c l e . " 6 1 K l o t z , " T r a n s n a t i o n a l A c t i v i s m a n d G l o b a l T r a n s f o r m a t i o n s : T h e A n t i - A p a r t h e i d a n d A b o l i t i o n i s t E x p e r i e n c e s . " 54. 20 been made to link norms and identities with international mediation. Though traditional approaches to international mediation have largely failed to address the social context in which mediators operate, there are some important exceptions. For one, psychological explanations of inter-communal conflict problematize group interests, highlighting how they are informed by socially constructed ethnic identities. Not surprisingly, international mediation focuses on restructuring how groups interact, reconsidering images of the 'other' or creating new cross-cutting identities. Janice Gross Stein argues that ethnic conflict is driven by constructed 'in-group'/'out-group' identities that in periods of state decline, and resource scarcity are filtered 62 63 through psychological processes that lead to the creation of 'embedded enemy images. ' The key insight from a constructivist perspective is that even if entrenched identities are resistant to change, these identities are not fixed and thus, they can gradually be changed. Put simply, this approach suggests that resolving the conflict requires more than managing violence but actually transforming group identities and societal relationships.64 Thus, intermediaries help mange conflict by (a) increasing the flow and controlling the timing and credibility of information in a way that helps break down dominant frames; (b) offering new understandings about the nature of the enemy65 and (c) designing post-conflict institutions that foster the development of new cross-cutting identities.66 Moreover, advocates of a 'conflict transformation' approach to mediation examine how mediators can help parties establish new norms of peaceful dispute resolution.67 Psychological explanations and conflict transformation expand the scope of the international mediation beyond the material sources of conflict. Instead, they suggest that international mediators should be aware of the social context in which conflict takes place. b Z T w o spec i f i c p rocesses are ' l a b e l i n g ' a n d the d e v e l o p m e n t o f an ' egocen t r i c b i a s . ' L a b e l i n g is the p rocess o f v i e w i n g c o m m o n charac te r i s t i c s o f i n -g roup as v i r tues w h i l e the charac te r i s t ics o f o ther as v i c e s . E g o c e n t r i c b ias causes the g roup to ove res t ima te the extent to w h i c h they are the target o f ac t ions t aken b y other g roups . 6 3 J an i ce G r o s s S t e in , " Image , Ident i ty a n d and the R e s o l u t i o n o f V i o l e n t C o n f l i c t , " i n Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed . Ches t e r C r o c k e r , F e n O s i e r H a m p s o n , and P a m e l a A a l l ( W a s h i n g t o n : U n i t e d States Institute o f Peace Press , 2 0 0 1 ) . 6 4 T h e p rac t i ce w h e r e med ia to r s h e l p part ies ref rame the i r r e l a t ionsh ips is of ten refer red to as ' c o n f l i c t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . ' 6 5 S t e in , " Image , Ident i ty and and the R e s o l u t i o n o f V i o l e n t C o n f l i c t . " 6 6 M i l t o n J . E s m a n , " E t h n i c P l u r a l i s m : Stra tegies for C o n f l i c t M a n a g e m e n t , " in Center for Development Research: Facing Ethnic Conflcit ( C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y : 2 0 0 0 ) . 6 7 F o r e x a m p l e , M i a l l , R a m s b o t h a m a n d W o o d h o u s e ( 2 0 0 0 ) argue that t h o u g h c o n f l i c t i t s e l f m a y be an u n a v o i d a b l e r eac t ion to changes or inequa l i t i e s in the s o c i a l order , it is the ro le o f med ia to r s to assist par t ies to a c c o m m o d a t e change p e a c e f u l l y rather than th rough in te r -group v i o l e n c e . See a l so J o h n P a u l L e d e r a c h , " C o n f l i c t T r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n P ro t r ac t ed Internal C o n f l i c t s : T h e C a s e for a C o m p r e h e n s i v e F r a m e w o r k , " in Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures, ed . J o h n P a u l L e d e r a c h ( S y r a c u s e : S y r a c u s e U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1995) . 21 However, there are limits to what this approach tells us about the normative role of international mediators. First, it is primarily concerned with the social context in which the parties, not the mediator, operate. Consequently, it offers more about party identities and preferences than those of the mediator. Second, proponents of conflict transformation have generally looked at mediation at the societal level, rather than applying it to high-level peace talks. This focus is a deliberate one, as they argue that civil society is ideal for such approaches partly because initiatives receive less publicity than its official counterparts whose talks are hampered by posturing as moderates who agree to negotiate fear being 'outbidded' by extremists.68 Finally, like other context-based explanations, they tend to assume that mediators have a carte blanche from which to develop peace agreements. Thus, they do not consider that international norms may constrain the range of acceptable agreements available to the mediator. In contrast, Oliver Richmond highlights the tension between international norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity on one side and self-determination on the other. Specifically, he argues that warring parties often frame their negotiating positions as consistent with one of these broader international norms. It is then left to mediators to weigh the various normative claims and make the necessary trade-offs. To do so, however, mediators do not assign equal value to all norms. Instead, they privilege normative claims that are most consistent with territorial integrity.69 Consequently, mediators favour governing parties, hurting their credibility with non-state groups making ethnic claims to self-determination and failing to address the root causes of conflict. To overcome this problem, Richmond recommends that in a balanced settlement, mediators give precedence to human rights norms over territorial integrity and self-determination.70 Richmond makes an important contribution by uncovering and making explicit the contested normative environment in which mediation occurs. Moreover, he highlights how mediators actively try to shape the substance of agreements using a hierarchy of international norms. Yet, Richmond's model may not properly capture the interaction between norms and agents. The first problem is that Richmond's model has a reactive mediator acting as an arbiter of norms invoked by the parties. Thus, it incorrectly assumes that it is the parties that bring these F o r d i s c u s s i o n o f o u t b i d d i n g see S t e in , 2001 or L a k e a n d R o t h c h i l d , 1996. 6 9 T h i s a rgumen t is a l so w e l l l a i d out b y M i k u l a s F a b r y w h o l o o k s at the b r e a k u p o f Y u g o s l a v i a . M i k u l a s F a b r y , " In te rna t iona l N o r m s o f T e r r i t o r i a l In tegr i ty ," Global Society 16, no . 2 (2002) . 7 0 O l i v e r P . R i c h m o n d , " M e d i a t i n g E t h n i c C o n f l i c t : A T a s k for S i s y p h u s ? , " Global Society 13, no . 2 (1999) . 22 norms to the negotiations, rather than a more proactive mediator invoking them as guidelines for negotiations. Moreover, despite making a strong case for increasing the salience of human rights norms, he does not discuss how one would go about re-ordering the norms of international society. His prescriptive argument needs to demonstrate that it is possible for mediators to change the structure, particularly given his own admission that the territorial integrity norm remains firmly entrenched. Richmond's prescriptions also assume a problematic dichotomy between norms of territorial integrity and human rights. As the case of Bosnia will demonstrate, international mediators thought that these norms were interdependent. In particular, they sought to diffuse the idea of unitary state that protected minority rights through autonomy and other human rights instruments. 2.4 Steven Ratner: The Mediator as Normative Intermediary Alternatively, Steven Ratner proposes the idea of the mediator as 'normative 71 intermediary.' Ratner's analysis of the OSCE's High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM) draws out how the mediator actively pushes ethnic groups to recognize minority rights norms as a way to prevent inter-communal violence in Europe. As Ratner puts it: "He uses norms to seek solutions and seeks solutions consistent with norms."72 For the mediator, international norms have two functions. First, international norms inform the mandate and interests of the HCNM. To this end, the mediator "also has a normative component of his work... [that]...attempts] to ensure respect for international norms."73 Second, legal norms (so-called soft law) act as an instrument of ethnic conflict prevention. Given that mediators have unreliable access to more coercive instruments, Ratner argues that it is more likely that the parties will.agree to legal norms than 'harder' law. These norms may also improve long-term stability by localizing and legitimizing minority rights rather than relying on external enforcement from the European or international community. Although softer measures like norms initially lack 'teeth', these measures may increasingly harden over time as they are 7 1 R a t n e r def ines a n o r m a t i v e i n t e r m e d i a r y as: " a par ty , a u t h o r i z e d b y states o r an in t e rna t iona l o r g a n i z a t i o n s e e k i n g to p r o m o t e the o b s e r v a n c e o f a n o r m , w h o i n v o l v e s h i m s e l f o r h e r s e l f i n a pa r t i cu l a r c o m p l i a n c e s h o r t c o m i n g o f a state a n d seeks to i n d u c e c o m p l i a n c e t h r o u g h a h a n d s - o n p rocess o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d pe r suas ion w i t h r e l evan t d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s . " Ra tne r , " D o e s In terna t ional L a w M a t t e r i n P r e v e n t i n g In te rna t iona l C o n f l i c t . " 6 6 8 . 7 2 I b i d . : 6 6 2 . 7 3 I b i d . 6 8 7 . 23 gradually internalized and eventually institutionalized in domestic legislation, enforceable by the courts.74 How does the mediator disseminate minority rights norms among the parties? In general, mediators rely on persuasion and the construction of strategic frames. As Ratner notes: "International law and relations do not operate through impersonal written correspondence in which states and international organizations urge other governments to comply with the rules of the regime. The messenger and the method by which he conveys the message may prove critical to the success of that message."75 More specifically, Ratner identifies five strategies commonly employed by the HCNM: translation, elevation, development, dissemination and mobilizing support. The mediator 'translates' norms by suggesting practical policies that are consistent with norms. Likewise, mediators may also persuade parties, especially state ones, to 'elevate' international norms to domestic legislation enforceable by the courts. And where there are no norms to address a specific policy problem, mediators have often 'developed' a second order norm based on pre-existing ones. Mediators may also employ long-term norm socialization processes that 'disseminate' the norm through repeated exposure or re-framing the norm, couching it in terms more familiar to the parties. Finally, where a party is reluctant to endorse minority rights, mediators pressure the party by 'mobilizing' domestic and external support.76 Ratner's study is an important one. For one, he highlights the absence of normative considerations in the study of international mediation. Ratner argues: From the other side of the looking glass, studies of international mediation and other forms of third party intervention have given short shrift to international norms. For them mediation seems to take place in a legal vacuum, where intermediaries do not raise normative arguments and the parties do not respond to them. Their perspective may seem predictable, as they remain principally concerned with solution to conflict and not with compliance to norms.77 In contrast, he draws out the extent to which the work of mediators is inextricably tied to international norms. Moreover, his reconceptualization of mediator as normative intermediary is useful. On one hand, the term refers to a mediator in his traditional sense of moving potential points of agreements between parties. On the other hand, it underscores that mediators are 7 4 I b i d . 6 1 2 - 6 1 7 . 7 5 I b i d . 6 8 8 . 7 6 I b i d . 6 9 0 - 6 9 1 . 7 7 I b i d . : 6 8 6 . 24 concerned with questions of oughtness.' And it recognizes the mediator as an intermediary, moving norms between the international level and domestic one. Furthermore, it avoids the common criticism of constructivism, namely that it lacks a theory of agency. Ratner traces the process by which mediators spread norms, even listing a set of strategies commonly used to diffuse them. Ratner's approach, however, has been critiqued by both Saadia Touval, a proponent of more traditional approaches to mediation, and by Martha Finnemore, a constructivist IR scholar. Touval argues that the activities of the HCNM do not qualify as mediation because (a) it involves the prevention rather than resolution of violent conflict78; (b) the HCNM's substantive interest in a norm-friendly agreement compromises his/her impartiality, making him/her a party to the negotiations rather than a mediator;79 and (c) it understates the extent to which the norms are O A t subject to negotiation. Touval's first point is a fair one, as preventative conflict is less about negotiating a compromise between the interests of two parties, than convincing the governing majority to adopt policies that protects the rights of the minority. Put another way, the HCNM's role can be viewed as advocacy rather than facilitating a negotiation. However, Touval's second critique, that being a mediator means one must be impartial to the terms of the agreement, demands a definition that is too restrictive. Rather than defining away cases that cannot be explained by more rationalist arguments, Ratner's more generic understanding of international mediation allows him to include cases that raise important questions about mediator behaviour and asks why a mediator would be interested in the substantive terms of an agreement. Touval is also partially correct to point out that "negotiating compliance with norms entails compromise" and "involve[s] the exchange of concessions."81 On one hand, his critique highlights that localizing norms is a contested process, where parties challenge both whether the norm applies and how it should be applied. It also suggests that norm contestation requires norms to be localized through both persuasion and often even compromise. On the other hand, this argument need not detract from Ratner's argument. The cases of compromise identified by Touval are limited to the content of the norms, whereas the norm itself remains beyond negotiation. Moreover, Touval implicitly concedes that mediators often use norms as starting 7 8 S a a d i a T o u v a l , " D o e s the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r M e d i a t e ? , " New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 3 2 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . : 7 0 9 - 7 1 0 . 7 9 I b i d . 7 1 0 - 7 1 1 . 8 0 I b i d . 7 1 1 - 7 1 2 . 8 1 I b i d . 7 1 1 - 7 1 2 . 25 points and make the agreement fit rather than starting with the interests of the parties and using norms only when they may maximize the prospect of agreement. Alternatively, Martha Finnemore offers a constructivist critique of Ratner. Finnemore suggests that Ratner artificially separates minority rights as legal norms that are distinct from non-legalized ones. He assumes compliance is at least partially derived from a legitimacy associated with the 'legality' of legal norms rather than exploring the legitimacy of shared values that underpin specific legal norms. Therefore, he privileges legal norms over non-legal ones. Yet, Ratner seems to conclude that appeals to common understandings of 'appropriate standards' have a greater effect on actor behaviour than the perceived legitimacy of the laws and international treaties in which they are institutionalized.83 Moreover, Ratner may encounter further difficulties if one expands his study of conflict prevention to include the mediation of violent conflict. In these cases, the legal dimension should be less relevant where state breakdown (a) decreases the proportion of decision makers that are legal experts vis-a-vis military strategists and (b) where groups are less confident in the 'the rule of law' to provide security. Consequently, his explanation of why a mediator has credibility could be improved by investigating the social context in which mediators operate rather than relying on the inherent 84 legitimacy of law. Finally, Ratner's mediator as normative intermediary might benefit from a clearer understanding of the relationship between international norms and mediator identities and interests. Ratner is predominantly concerned with the mediator's instrumental use of norms to reduce inter-communal conflict. Thus, he does not adequately address more fundamental questions about why mediators use norms. He implicitly gives two reasons: (i) That norms work and (ii) that they are part of the mandate that is controlled by the OSCE. The first explanation fails to explain why mediators would be committed to international norms even in cases where there is strong evidence that norms would be difficult to implement and may even aggravate inter-communal tensions. And the second explanation fails to explain why mediators 8 2 Legal norms are the explicit rules and guiding principles in binding international law, primarily in international treaties. In contrast, non-legal norms are those based more directly on state practice or shared values as articulated in non-binding international declarations. 8 3 Martha Finnemore, "Are Legal Norms Distinctive?," New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 32 (2000). 8 4 For an interesting discussion of the social underpinnings of the legitimacy of international laws see Christian Reus-Smit, "Politics and International Legal Obligation," European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 4 (2003). 26 representing different states and international organizations are equally concerned with seeking agreements that conform to international norms. Yet, the second reason, that their use is mandated by the OSCE, raises a larger issue. Namely, do mediators have agency or are they reflections of the organizational interests they represent? Thus, the challenge is to demonstrate that international mediators have effects independent of their respective organizations. Ratner seems to downplay mediator autonomy, highlighting instead how the mediator acts as an agent of his/her organization: The intermediary's status as an agent... of an organization with whom states and minorities identify contributes to his ability to convince actors to take norms seriously.. .Nevertheless, the construct of the normative intermediary offered here suggests that institutionalists (who explain based on material costs and benefits of compliance) need to address interpersonal linkages between the regime and its members.. .The messenger and the methods by which he conveys the message may prove critical to the success of that message.85 Nonetheless, even if organizational influences reinforce his/her commitment to international norms, an international mediator maintains significant autonomy. For one, international norms often provide generalized prescriptions that cannot be obviously applied to the specific circumstances of a given conflict. Thus, the mediator may decide how to interpret norms, whether a particular norm applies, or how to appropriately localize international norms. More important, the arrows indicating who defines whose interests do not necessarily point in one direction. Mediators may help shape the interests and preferences of their organizations, rather than simply acting as a messenger of exogenous ones. As Finnemore has argued, states and international organizations often do not exogenously know their interests when faced with a specific policy problem. They may be uncertain about the positions of the parties, the nature of the conflict or their appropriate role in the conflict. Divisions among the constitutive members about what are the right answers can also exacerbate such problems. To this end, mediators as intermediaries between the organization and parties can partially construct the interests of an organization. Mediators may help build a consensus among members or provide important information about the conflict and the positions of the belligerents. Ratne r , " D o e s In terna t ional L a w M a t t e r i n P r e v e n t i n g In te rna t iona l C o n f l i c t . " 688. 27 2.5 The Mediator as Normative Intermediary: Identities, Interests and Strategies Identities This thesis suggests that building on Ratner's explanation of normative behaviour requires a further examination of the relationship between international norms and the identities, interests and strategies of agents. This section explores why norms are more than a tool of mediation, but also constitute the social context in which mediators operate. In a previous section, this thesis suggested that mediators share a professional identity that coalesced around a shared 'process expertise.' This section adds that mediators may also share an international one. In other words, to identify oneself as an international mediator means internalizing two identities: One a professional identity, another as an intermediary of international society. This section hopes to unpack the latter, laying bare the international norms that serve to both constitute an international identity and regulate mediator behaviour. It also argues that where professional and international identities conflict, international norms tend to supersede professional ones. Specifically, this section addresses three questions: What are the international norms that constitute an international identity? What impact does this identity have on the interests and behaviour of international mediators? And what strategies do mediators use to diffuse norms? Identity can roughly be conceived in two ways. The first approach is the answer to the question: Who am I not? To this end, international mediators seek to distinguish themselves from other international actors. A mediator's self-identification as an international peacemaker revolves around a causal belief that a consensual, negotiated settlement rather than force is die best way for the international community to help facilitate a lasting peace. This belief differentiates international mediators from other international actors intervening in inter-communal conflicts. They are interveners that end the violence through dialogue and compromise. To be sure, mediators are concerned with leverage and often believe that the use of force by the international community is critical to ending the violence. Such is the case for both David Owen and Richard Holbrooke. However, they argue that military force (or even economic sanctions) should be used to support a negotiation, advocating its use only to overcome structural challenges like security dilemmas, providing political cover for moderates or getting recalcitrant parties to take the political process seriously. 28 The second approach is to consider how an actor would answer the question: Who am I? In this sense, like other international actors, international mediators see themselves as responsible for helping preserve international society by diffusing those norms that order it. Thus, the mediator's identity as normative intermediary is largely informed by the social context in which he/she operates, in this case international society. And the constitutive norms internalized by an international identity are the same as those that constitute international society. In other words, the international mediator as intermediary is responsible for diffusing the constitutive norms of international society among the belligerents. Though international society is constituted by numerous norms, this thesis focuses on two of them: (a) Territorial integrity and as (b) self determination and human, specifically minority, rights. These particular norms were selected because they are often critical issues in the mediation of an intrastate conflict as they concern who can make claims to statehood and what is considered the appropriate exercise of sovereignty. Mark Zacher defines the territorial integrity norm as "the proscription that force should not be used to alter interstate boundaries." Thus, territorial change attained through the use of force cannot be accepted by the society of states as valid. The strength of the norm and the depth to which it is entrenched in international society is demonstrated by two trends. For one, there has been a marked decline in the number of territorial wars that have ended with the redistribution of territory. More important for the purposes of this thesis, the international community also developed a standardized process for delineating the boundaries of new states. This process has been applied equally to states formed during decolonization as those formed at the end of the Cold War. As Zacher notes: "During the postwar period, all of the successor states that emerged from the nine breakups have kept their formal administrative boundaries as * 88 their new international boundaries." Zacher suggests that the norm was initially adopted for both instrumental and normative reasons. On the instrumental side, states adopted the territorial integrity norm as a way of mitigating interstate violence whose costs had risen as a result of nuclear weapons and the burden of holding territory acquired by force. Moreover, new states tended to favour territorial 8 6 For a more comprehensive list of so-called 'settled norms' that constitute international society see Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 8 7 Mark W. Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force," International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001). 8 8 Ibid. 234-235. 29 integrity because it strengthened support for non-interference and delegitimized external intervention in domestic affairs. Territorial integrity was also adopted for normative reasons, namely that it 'fit' with the deeply-held liberal values of most industrialized states. As Zacher argues, territorial aggrandizement was deemed inappropriate because it infringed on the rights of the peoples of conquered territory to self-governance. However, in much of the developing world where liberalism was not entrenched, the norm lacked this normative underpinning. Though these states remained strong advocates of the norm, minority rights were seen as less important than consolidating state power. To some extent, the territorial integrity norm clashed with norms concerning minority rights. In states without a liberal tradition and where multiple ethnic groups made competing claims to sovereignty, territorial integrity has been used to mute calls for secession.89 Second, this thesis is concerned with human rights norms, specifically minority rights.90 Although the internationalization of minority rights can be traced back to before the formal articulation of human rights, norms concerning the protection of minorities were not formally institutionalized until the 1919 Paris Peace Conferences. Newly formed states like Poland were persuaded and pressured to sign special treaties with the Allied Powers that "undertook not to discriminate against the members of the protected minorities and to grant them special rights necessary for the preservation of their ethnic, religious and linguistic integrity."91 Moreover, Woodrow Wilson proclaimed that self-determination, as part of his Fourteen Points, would help shape a new international diplomacy. Despite Wilson failing to'properly define his principle of self-determination or precisely how it should be applied, minority groups concentrated in areas previously controlled by the Axis Powers invoked it to claim independence and statehood. Though Wilson's plan was eventually abandoned, its legacy continued. First, Wilson's norm entrepreneurship helped develop a broad norm that minorities should have some degree of 8 9 I b i d . 2 3 4 - 2 4 2 . 9 0 D e s p i t e s k e p t i c i s m about the s t rength o f the current in t e rna t iona l l ega l f r a m e w o r k to enforce in te rna t iona l h u m a n r ights , th is thesis cons ide r s s u c h h u m a n r ights , i n a b roade r sense o f s o c i a l n o r m s , w h e r e i n spite o f v i o l a t i o n s , states g e n e r a l l y accept some n o r m a t i v e cons t ra in t s a n d j u s t i f y v i o l a t i o n s b y c i t i n g ex igen t c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h u s , it takes a p o s i t i o n cons is ten t w i t h M e r v y n F ros t w h o notes that w h i l e "no t c l a i m i n g that there is in te rna t iona l agreement o n wha t p r e c i s e l y those n o r m s a re . . . there is [ in te rna t ional ] agreement o n a core o f s u c h r ights w h i c h ough t to be u p h e l d . " Fros t , Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory. 9 1 T h o m a s B u e r g e n t h a l a n d D i n a h S h e l t o n a n d D a v i d S tewar t , International Human Rights, T h i r d ed . (St . P a u l : W e s t G r o u p , 2 0 0 2 ) . 9 2 F o r an e x c e l l e n t a ccoun t o f the Pa r i s Peace C o n f e r e n c e a n d W o o d r o w W i l s o n ' s Fou r t een Po in t s see M a r g a r e t M c M i l l a n , Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World ( N e w Y o r k : R a n d o m H o u s e , 2 0 0 3 ) . 30 control over how their lives are governed. Second, minority rights groups like the Bosnian Serbs partially justified their secessionist claims at the end of the Cold War on the grounds of self-determination. Since the end of the Cold War, minority rights norms have also received greater attention from the international community as policymakers singled out nationalism as a primary source of violence and instability, especially in Eastern and Central Europe. To this end, a number of formal international arrangements were signed that focused on minority rights.93 And "even in the absence of legal force, the documents approved by states constitute an international minority rights regime containing basic norms that they are supposed to uphold."94 That said, the extent to which minority rights are entrenched in international society remains a source of debate. Will Kymlicka argues that Western liberal democratic states have not yet successfully exported minority rights norms to developing states, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.95 Nonetheless, at a minimum, the international community does expect that its members do not discriminate against ethnic minorities nor adopt a policy of forced assimilation. These general rules are supplemented by the development of international standards concerning minority rights in a number of issue areas. These emerging norms push states to actively take measures that positively promote identity.96 Overall, these norms offered new ways to address the larger issue of who should govern national minorities. As the territorial integrity norm was consolidated, the society of states moved away from interpreting self-determination as the right for minority groups to choose to which state to belong. Instead, self-determination could be provided within the context of a unitary state by coupling minority rights with some form of autonomy. In the Pos t C o l d W a r , these agreements i n c l u d e , a m o n g others , the 1992 U N G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y D e c l a r a t i o n o n the R i g h t s B e l o n g i n g to N a t i o n a l o r E t h n i c , L i n g u i s t i c o r E t h n i c M i n o r i t i e s and , i n E u r o p e , the O S C E ' s c rea t ion o f a H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r for M i n o r i t y R i g h t s a n d the C o u n c i l o f E u r o p e ' s F r a m e w o r k C o n v e n t i o n for the P r o t e c t i o n o f N a t i o n a l M i n o r i t i e s . See Stewar t , International Human Rights. 10. 9 4 D e o n G e l d e n h u y s a n d J o h a n n R o s s o u w , " T h e Internat ional P r o t e c t i o n o f M i n o r i t y R i g h t s , " ( C a p e T o w n : F W de K l e r k F o u n d a t i o n , 2 0 0 1 ) . 9 5 W i l l K y m l i c k a , " M u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m and M i n o r i t y R i g h t s : W e s t a n d Eas t , " Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, no . 4 (2002) . 9 6 F o r e x a m p l e , these measures often i n v o l v e a l l o w i n g for m i n o r i t y g roups to have s o m e c o n t r o l o v e r the educa t ion c u r r i c u l a as w e l l as enac t i ng p o s i t i v e l anguage l a w s . See G e l d e n h u y s and R o s s o u w , " T h e In ternat ional P r o t e c t i o n o f M i n o r i t y R i g h t s . " 31 Interests Whereas these international norms shaped the mediator's international identity, this identity, in turn, shaped a particular set of interests. Put simply, the mediator's answer to the question of 'who am I?' informs the answer to 'what do I want?' To this end, an international mediator is primarily concerned with negotiating peace agreements that are consistent with international norms. Norms are used to frame both the broad parameters of potential peace agreements and act as measuring sticks to evaluate the claims of individual groups. For example, sovereignty norms like territorial integrity are used by mediators to determine the eligibility of the various claims to statehood made by individual parties. International mediators will work to undermine the claims of groups that challenge the previous administrative borders or who acquire territory through force, particularly when force involves genocide or ethnic cleansing. Likewise, mediators see minority rights norms as an alternative to independence for groups that are ineligible for statehood. They apply minority rights norms to ensure that the post-conflict state provides adequate protection to ethnic minorities. To make the peace agreement self-enforcing, and minimize the need for an international implementation force, mediators not only seek to have parties sign the agreement, but internalize the agreement's constitutive norms. International mediators seek to diffuse norms among the parties, using the mediation process to socialize, persuade and pressure parties. Furthermore, the mediator's international identity also confers resources on the mediator. The mediator's role as a gatekeeper between the parties and international society provides significant influence. However, this influence is not well developed by rationalist approaches that have tended to focus on material resources like the mediator's ability to convince the international community to offer aid or impose military and economic sanctions. Instead, it involves more normative forms of influence and leverage. Barton and McGuinness argue that the moral authority of the Papacy played an important role in successfully mediating the Beagle 97 Channel dispute. Likewise, Eileen Babbitt has argued that Jimmy Carter's international image as a person of "high personal integrity and spiritual belief in conjunction with his high public profile has allowed him to successfully apply moral suasion.98 M e l a n i e C . G r e e n b e r g , Words over War: Medatiion and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict. 9 8 E i l e e n F . B a b b i t t , " J i m m y Car te r : T h e P o w e r o f M o r a l S u a s i o n i n In te rna t iona l M e d i a t i o n , " i n When Talk Works: Profdes of Mediators, ed . D e b o r a h M . K o l b ( S a n F r a n s i s c o : J o s e y - B a s s P u b l i s h e r s , 1994) . 32 However, these examples tend to focus on the idiosyncrasies of individual mediators rather than more generic forms of normative leverage, particularly ones derived from their international identity. For one, mediators can help determine who is at the negotiating table. Consequently, they can increase the profiles of cooperative groups, while isolating others. Furthermore, mediators often act as the spokesperson of the international community in a conflict. This access to global media can prove important. Like TANs, mediators can use the media to shame parties that fail to negotiate in good faith or who challenge international norms. For example, in Dayton, none of the parties were allowed to speak to the media; instead the mediation team's press officer, whose statement was controlled by Holbrooke, would handle the daily media briefing. The mediator's access to media represents one example of a greater resource: The ability to control information between the parties and international society. Mediators may also use the media to frame a particular issue so it is consistent with international norms. Mediators can reframe the nature of a conflict as either a civil war or a war of aggression. As the subsequent case of Bosnia will demonstrate, Owen and Holbrooke framed the issue of whether Bosnian Serb areas should be able to join a Greater Serbia as a violation of territorial integrity, rather than an expression of Bosnian Serb insecurity and self-determination. This approach helped to galvanize Western public opinion against the claims of the Serbs, in turn isolating the Bosnian Serb leadership. The mediator's role as intermediary between group elites and international society also allows them to impose reputation costs and benefits on the parties. Particularly when the international community is divided, the opinion of mediators may offer guidance on whether a party is ready or eligible for statehood. Moreover, where there is no consensus in international society about how to apply a specific norm, mediators may help forge an international position. And how a mediator frames these broader questions confers the claims of certain parties with greater legitimacy than others. Therefore, where there are competing claims to statehood, the mediator may be able to use his influence over who should receive membership as a way to get parties to come to an agreement that is consistent with international norms. 3 3 Strategies Like TANs, mediators diffuse norms across parties using a range of strategies that involve institutionalization, persuasion and pressure. Mediators institutionalize norms in written agreements because it gives explicit recognition to the norms and locks the parties into a commitment to which a mediator can later hold them. It can roughly be conceived as a three-stage process where norms are (a) institutionalized in a set of jointly agreed principles that give form to the subsequent negotiations, (b) embedded in the perambulatory articles of the final peace settlement and (c) eventually form the basis for a post-conflict state constitution. With respect to the mediation outcome, the drafting of a set of 'joint agreed principles' in the pre-negotiation stage is critical. Barton and Greenberg find that "creating, shaping and maintaining a framework and process within which negotiations can proceed... [is one of the]... dominant contributions of mediation."99 In other words, these principles, and the international norms that constitute them, form the framework through which subsequent negotiations take place. These principles act as so-called 'red lines' within which parties must situate their own demands.100 Not surprisingly, this framework for negotiation is the mediator's best opportunity to ensure that an eventual agreement is consistent with international norms. The utility of these 'jointly agreed principles for negotiation' is fourfold. First, given that these principles are developed by the mediator, with party input often limited to wording rather than substance, the mediator is defining what issues will not be negotiated. Second, whereas most issues are independently negotiated or part of a horse trade, the joint principles are generally indivisible and packaged as a whole. Third, it may allow mediators to separate norms from other emotionally charged issues. In Bosnia, mediators preferred to have the norms settled prior to addressing differences over territorial distribution, where the emotions and symbols evoked by negotiations over 'the map' created nearly insurmountable obstacles for the mediators. Finally, there is a timing issue. Mediators help parties ultimately feel a greater sense of ownership by essentially imposing these principles at the outset of the negotiation but then letting parties design the specifics of the agreements in the subsequent negotiation. M e l a n i e C . G r e e n b e r g , Words over War: Medaition and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict. 1 0 0 T h e te rm ' r e d l i n e s ' w a s used b y f o r m e r Secre ta ry o f State W a r r e n C h r i s t o p h e r to desc r ibe w h a t he t o l d R i c h a r d H o l b r o o k e w a s the b o t t o m l ine for a dea l the U S w o u l d suppor t r e g a r d i n g a p o s t - c o n f l i c t B o s n i a . See W a r r e n C h r i s t o p h e r , In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era (S t an fo rd , C A : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1998) . 34 To persuade parties, international mediators often engage in strategic framing. To this end, they seek to frame the norms as the best solution to the most pressing issues. These strategies are consistent with Ratner, as minority rights for example, are presented to state parties as ways to reduce secessionist-based instability. Moreover, mediators may play the agent of reality, reminding non-state armed groups that the international community will not support the break-up of a state, but that minority rights offer adequate autonomy from majority rule and safeguards to protect their culture. Thus, mediators are less interested in framing norms as 'the perfect solution' for parties, but as the best alternative (particularly to continued conflict). Likewise, mediators may couch the norm in discourse more familiar to the party. For example, mediators may frame the norm as consistent with historical claims and experiences of the parties or as an extension of more culturally-specific values of the group. Some strategies employed by mediators attempt to diffuse norms through more subtle forms of socialization. Like Ratner's idea of 'norm translation,' mediators may try to advance norms through the technical terms of a peace agreement. In Dayton, Holbrooke sought to entrench territorial integrity by pushing the parties to accept a central bank and a single currency. To do so, Holbrooke brought in David Lipton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury to negotiate the specific details.101 Thus, the mediator used the technical expertise of an outsider to the negotiations to reduce politicization of the norm and increase the credibility of the resulting policy. International mediators have also tried to entrench the norms by making explicit references in peace settlements to well-established international agreements. Specifically, peace settlements have included terms that commit both state and non-state parties to formal international agreements, especially with respect to individual and minority rights. Initially, such an approach would seem to contradict strategies that localize norms by couching them in more familiar discourses. However, adopting international agreements is seen as not only providing common standards for the parties, but also keeping parties from negotiating the content of minority rights norms. Where parties remain unconvinced, international mediators may adopt a 'hands tied' strategy, where the norm-friendly agreement is presented as the 'bottom line' of the international community. Mediators may threaten that a refusal to accept the principles will have costs with respect to the party's international reputation. And such reputation costs are significant, 1 0 1 Holbrooke, To End a War. 256-258. 35 especially for parties seeking international recognition for their state or parties who require external assistance to prosecute the military conflict.102 Developing international coalitions may also prove critical to getting reluctant parties to agree to the proposed negotiating framework. This coalition can include both states with significant military and economic power, as well as middle powers, international organizations and TANs whose moral clout can mobilize international public opinion. In addition, coalition building includes getting potential spoilers onboard. International mediators may appeal directly to states that have supported the reluctant party, asking them to publicly support the agreement, help persuade the target party or reduce material and moral support. In the case of Bosnia, international mediators frequently made trips to Moscow to enlist Russia's support in pressuring the Serbian Government to force the Bosnian Serbs to give up their demand for reintegration in a greater Serbia. In fact, the mediators made sure that Moscow negotiators had a high profile during the negotiations in return for Russia's support. Mediators may also use rationalist means to achieve their normative ends. They can help coordinate the level and timing of sanctions and, to a certain extent, even punitive military measures to increase pressure on parties who will not agree to international standards or they may lobby the international community to offer assistance to cooperative parties. They may also apply more social forms of pressure, particularly by tarnishing the party's international reputation which reduces international sympathy for its interests. In the most severe cases, mediators have even isolated intransigent groups who will not accept the 'guiding principles.' To this end, they completely cut certain groups out of the mediation and find alternative representatives to negotiate on behalf of the group. In the case of Bosnia, Holbrooke refused to let the Bosnian Serbs lead the Serb delegation, at times altogether excluding them from the negotiation, after their leadership refused to accept that Bosnia would maintain its previous administrative borders. T h i s s trategy is m o s t c o m m o n w h e n the m e d i a t o r ' s r e spec t ive o r g a n i z a t i o n a l m a k e s i n mandate p u b l i c a n d c lea r a n d can demonst ra te c r e d i b l y that to ignore in te rna t iona l n o r m s w o u l d l ead to the in te rna t iona l v e t o i n g the agreement n a m e l y b y r e fus ing to lif t s anc t ions , r e fus ing to r e c o g n i z e d e a l , f i r i n g the negot ia tors o r r e fus ing to i m p l e m e n t the agreement . 36 2.6 Summary In sum, a comprehensive explanation of mediator behaviour requires an understanding of the social context in which he/she operates and how that social context informs his/her identities and interests. The following table summarizes the two identities of international mediators: Identity Coalesces Around Constitutive Norms Interests Strategies Professional identity / mediator Process expertise (a) Substantive neutrality (b) Disputant ownership (a) Immediately end the violence (b) Disputants accept a mutually agreeable settlement (a) Identify overlapping party interests (b) Use of leverage to change party preferences International identity/ normative intermediary Norms of international society (a) Sovereignty norms: Territorial integrity (b) Human rights norms: non recognition of ethnic cleansing; minority rights (a) Seek agreements that are consistent with constitutive norms (b) Diffuse norms (a) Reframe negotiation discourse (b) Norm as 'guiding principles' and measuring stick in negotiations (c) Institutionalize norms in peace settlements However, the mediators multiple identities raise an important question: How do we know which identity is determining behaviour? For the most part, these identities are complimentary and act in tandem. As mediation professionals, international mediators seek a mutually agreeable peace settlement that results in an immediate end to the violence. To this end, as Ratner points out, international norms are sold as objective standards from which to build agreement between the parties. Moreover, these norms may satisfy the interests of both parties. Whereas territorial integrity provides governing parties with a sense of stability, minority rights norms give non-state groups some autonomy and the means to protect their culture and identity. But when they do conflict, we can identify when the international norms take precedence over professional ones, in turn limiting the range of acceptable agreements. This can cause two problems. First, it 37 may cause mediators to reject agreements that would otherwise be acceptable to both sides. To this end, mediators may actually hinder negotiations. Second, consistent with Richmond, it may cause the mediator to favour the party whose interests are closest to the mediators. In this case, the mediator loses credibility with the other party. Ultimately, however, mediators will risk an agreement rather than committing the international community to an agreement that does not meet its own standards. 2.7 Case Studies: The Mediation of the Bosnian Conflict To provide preliminary evidence of the empirical validity of this theoretical approach, this thesis considers how international norms affected the behaviour of international mediators involved in the Bosnian conflict of the early 1990s. The first case study is concerned with EU mediator David Owen, specifically the lead up to and the eventual failure of the 1993 Vance-Owen Peace Plan. The second case study looks at the work of US mediator Richard Holbrooke, the architect of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. The claims of this section are modest, in that they suggest that for these cases, the mediators' international identity significantly influenced their behaviour. Consequently, this thesis should be treated as a stepping-stone to explore other cases. The reasons for selecting the Owen and Holbrooke cases are fourfold. First, the activities of Owen and Holbrooke in Bosnia are well-cited examples of the mediation of ethnic conflict in the Post Cold War.103 Second, both Holbrooke and Owen were lead international mediators in Bosnia, with control over how to approach the parties and how to design potential agreements. Third, by selecting two cases from Bosnia (albeit at different times), the context of the conflict is roughly constant, allowing for a more precise comparison of mediator behaviour. Fourth, from a practical standpoint, there were primary and secondary sources of information about their behaviour available. Both Holbrooke and Owen (and often those they worked with in Bosnia) have (a) written autobiographical accounts of their experiences, (b) submitted regular reports about their activities to their respective organizations that are publicly available; (c) given See for e x a m p l e , M e l a n i e C . G r e e n b e r g , J o h n H. B a r t o n , a n d M a r g a r e t C . M c G u i n n e s s , Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Commmission on Preventing Deadly Conflict ( L a n h a m , M D : R o w m a n & L i t t l e l f i e l d P u b l i s h e r s , 2 0 0 0 ) . O r S a a d i a T o u v a l , Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years 1990-1995 ( N e w Y o r k : P a l g r a v e , 2 0 0 2 ) . 38 numerous media interviews and (d) have been the focus of academic work by both political scientists and historians. The approach to studying mediation in Bosnia presented here, however, differs significantly from much of the literature on international conflict resolution in Bosnia. Most analyses of international intervention in Bosnia set out to identify whether the conditions in Bosnia were ripe for resolution and whether the international community used an appropriate mix of policy tools. More specifically, studies of international mediation in Bosnia have primarily addressed the question of why Holbrooke succeeded in getting an agreement where Owen failed.104 In contrast, this thesis is concerned with explaining the behaviour of David Owen and Richard Holbrooke, rather than the assessing (a) the effectiveness of any particular strategy they used or (b) how the context of the conflict created opportunities or obstacles to an agreement. Put another way, it asks 'Why do they do that?' rather than 'Why did it or did it not work?' The answer to this question is not easily discerned from a realist tradition in international relations. Realism may offer important insights into the question of 'why did it work?' but it has few answers to the question of 'why did they do that?' In fact, the behaviour of mediators seems to turn realism on its head. Rather than presenting possible agreements that accommodated the most powerful party (the Bosnian Serbs), the negotiating principles developed by Owen and Holbrooke favoured the weakest party (the Bosnian Muslims). On this point, several key realists have eagerly conceded that realism does not claim to account for such behaviour. John Mearsheimer argued that the United States should assist the Bosnians build up their armaments in order to create a military stalemate. Moreover, the idea of a single multi-ethnic Bosnian state should be abandoned in favour of using the international community to oversee population transfers and the creation of several states with defensible boundaries.105 Likewise, Kissinger argued that Bosnia had never existed as an independent state and for the international community F o r e x a m p l e see T o u v a l , Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years 1990-1995. M e l a n i e C . G r e e n b e r g a n d M a r g a r e t E . M c G u i n n e s s , " F r o m L i s b o n to D a y t o n : In terna t ional M e d a i t i o n a n d the B o s n i a C r i s i s , " in Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict, ed . M e l a n i e C . G r e e n b e r g , J o h n H . B a r t o n , and M a r g a r e t C . M c G u i n n e s s ( L a n h a m : R o w m a n a n d L i t t l e f i e l d P u b l i s h e r s , 2 0 0 0 ) . ; and S u s a n W o o d w a r d , " B o s n i a a n d H e r z e g o v i n a : H o w N o t to E n d a C i v i l W a r , " i n Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention, ed . B a r b a r a F . W a l t e r and J a c k S n y d e r ( N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1999) . 1 0 5 J o h n J . M e a r s h e i m e r a n d R o b e r t A . Pape , " T h e A n s w e r : A T h r e e W a y Pa r t i t i on P l a n for B o s n i a a n d H o w the U s C a n E n f o r c e It," The New Republic, June 14 1993 . 39 to artificially create a state out of an administrative entity would only protract inter-communal insecurity and violence.106 Consequently, this thesis looks beyond power-based approaches to explain mediator behaviour in Bosnia. Instead, these case studies highlight how international norms of territorial integrity and minority rights provide a better explanation. On one hand, this paper traces the process by which mediators used these norms to develop a negotiating framework. On the other hand, it draws out how international norms constrained the mediators by limiting the range of acceptable agreements. Each case is roughly divided into three sections. First, it explores how each mediator translated imprecise international expectations concerning territorial integrity and minority rights into more coherent principles that would guide subsequent negotiations. In particular, it asks whether these principles were negotiated. And, if not, how did the mediator arrive at them? Second, it identifies the strategies and tactics used by Owen and Holbrooke to get the parties to agree to these negotiating principals. Specifically, it is concerned with how the choice of strategy reflected the resources available to them. If international norms do explain mediator behaviour, we should expect mediators to be more successful when they have more leverage that allows them to impose these norms rather than be forced to compromise and negotiate. However, prior to continuing, it is important to address the methodological question: How can we identify norm-driven behaviour? Or, put another way, how do we know when agents are influenced by norms? One of the challenges of studying social behaviour is that the subject (in this case the mediator) often takes their identity and the norms that constitute them for granted, making it difficult to observe. That said, even if norms and identities are difficult to observe, it is possible to observe their effects. To do so, this paper draws on the five methods outlined by Ian Hurd. The first (and most obvious) indication of normative behaviour is a high level of compliance with the norms among actors. Second, by eliminating alternative explanations of behaviour. In the case of international actors, this involves testing theories that actor behaviour is explained by material preferences or the distribution of coercive capabilities. Third, where an actor has violated a norm, the actor does not challenge the norm but seeks to deny the violation by reframing his behaviour as consistent with it or to claim exceptional Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995). Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," International Organization 53, no. 2 (1999). 40 circumstances. Fourth, actors explicitly refer to the norm as a reason for their behaviour. The final indication is that other influential actors come to the aid of the norm and explicitly reaffirm their commitment to it. The final question is how we can specifically recognize when mediators are pursuing agreements that are consistent with international norms? If we roughly translate Hurd's five methods to the practice of mediation, we may infer normative behaviour when: • A mediator's actions during negotiations seem to decrease the possibility of achieving a settlement by rejecting proposals that both parties would likely accept. • A mediator overtly compromises their neutrality, explaining that behaviour by referring to the norm • A mediator makes direct reference to a norm either at the table or as an explicit 'guiding principle' prior to the negotiations • A mediator makes direct reference to a norm to explain why they submitted a specific proposal • If a mediator does violate the norm, they do not challenge the norm but note exceptional circumstances or necessity • The mediator reframes any agreement (or part of it) that could be perceived as a norm violation, cloaking it in rhetoric consistent with the norm Thus, with this in mind, this thesis now examines the extent to which international norms influenced mediator behaviour in Bosnia. 41 Chapter 3: Overview of the Bosnian Conflict 3.1 An Overview of the War in Bosnia The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was constructed in the aftermath of the Second World War by then-President Josep Tito who brought the region's multiple cultural groups (so-called ethnic groups) together in a single state. To help overcome the mutual suspicions and accommodate each group's sense of identity, Tito had divided Yugoslavia into six constituent republics and granted each republic a degree of autonomy.108 While five of these republics were characterized by concentrations of a particular group, Bosnia's population included a substantial presence of Muslims, Serbs and Croats.109 . Approximately at the time of Tito's death, the fragile balance that he had manipulated to accommodate the constituent groups began to crumble. In particular, nascent nationalist movements in Croatia and Slovenia began to call for even greater autonomy from the central government. In September 1989, the Slovenian Assembly declared its intent to seek greater autonomy and, perhaps, independence. In April 1990, Franjo Tudjman led the Croatian nationalists to victory in Croatian elections on a platform of independence from the SFYR. For many Serbs, who were the largest group in Yugoslavia, such changes seemed threatening. As Mikulas Fabry notes: While the Serbs had accepted the internal borders as long as they, the largest people in the federation, resided in a reasonably centralized states, these attitudes began to change after Tito's death ... [which].. .meant that Serbs in Serbia own autonomous provinces and other republics lived in virtually different countries and were in a number of cases discriminated against by authorities of those republics.110 Consequently, nationalist Serb leaders exploited the sense of uncertainty and anxieties of the Serbian population, invoking past injustices and historical animosities. In January 1991, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic outlined his vision of a Greater Serbia that reunited all of the federation's Serbs. The Serbian Government pushed through legislation curtailing the autonomy 1 0 8 T h e s i x r e p u b l i c s w e r e S e r b i a , Croa t ia , " B o s n i a , S l o v e n i a , M o n t e n e g r o a n d M a c e d o n i a . M o r e o v e r , there we re t w o a u t o n o m o u s p r o v i n c e s i n S e r b i a , K o s o v o a n d V o j v o d i n a . 1 0 9 F o r a c o m p r e h e n s i v e h i s t o r i c a l a ccoun t o f the B o s n i a n c o n f l i c t , see S t even L . B u r g a n d P a u l S. S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention ( N e w Y o r k : M . E . Sharpe , 1999) . Susan W o o d w a r d , Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War ( W a s h i n g t o n D C : B r o o k i n g s Ins t i tu t ion , 1995) . L a u r a S i l b e r a n d A l a n L i t t l e , Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation ( L o n d o n : P e n g u i n , 1996) . 1 1 0 F a b r y , " In te rna t iona l N o r m s o f T e r r i t o r i a l In tegr i ty ." : 148. 42 of Serbia's autonomous provinces and bullied the assemblies of the other constituent republics into accepting a more centralized government.111 These measures from Belgrade sent an alarming signal to the other constituent groups, who perceived them as the start of a Serbian attempt to curtail their autonomy. As suspicion increased from all sides, a security dilemma took hold, as attempts by one group to secure their own autonomy were perceived as a threat to the viability of others. As Walter argues, in this strategic environment, each group began to prepare for the possibility of war, which they felt was necessary to avoid an unwanted fait accompli that would leave them a minority."2 Put another way, Holbrooke quotes of one Yugoslav: "Why should I be a minority in your state, when you can be a minority in mine?" 1 1 3 The actual dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) began to unfold in 1991. In late 1990 and early 1991, Slovenia and Croatia respectively held a referendum on sovereignty. On June 25, 1991, both republics invoked their right to self-determination and declared their independence from the FRY. Subsequently, on December 23, Germany, Belgium and Denmark recognized the independent states of Slovenia and Croatia, with the EC following suit on January 15, 1992. As these republics made explicit their intention to separate, Bosnian political leaders, primarily Muslims who were the largest ethnic group in Bosnia, faced a daunting decision concerning independence. On one hand, secession increased the prospect of war, given that Bosnian Serbs would oppose a sovereign Bosnia in which they would be a minority. Moreover, the FRY National Army (JNA) would likely intervene on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs giving them a significant military advantage.114 On the other hand, delaying a declaration of independence could prove worse. With the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia remained part of a FRY even more dominated by Serbs. They were also concerned that the window on secession was closing. Though the international community supported secession for Slovenia and Croatia on the grounds of self-determination, there was no definitive consensus in the international community about how to proceed and delay may lead the international community to support a status quo federation rather than risk further instability in the region.115 1 1 1 F o r an e legant s y n o p s i s o f the events i n v o l v e d i n the d i s s o l u t i o n o f Y u g o s l a v i a see I b i d . 1 4 7 - 1 5 1 . 1 1 2 W o o d w a r d , " B o s n i a a n d H e r z e g o v i n a : H o w N o t to E n d a C i v i l W a r . " : 8 0 - 8 7 . 1 1 3 H o l b r o o k e , To End a War.: 3 1 . 1 1 4 J N A in t e rven t ion w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e l y g i v e n they h a d done so agains t C r o a t i a i n suppor t o f C r o a t i a n Serbs 1 1 5 B u r g a n d S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 7 0 - 7 8 . 43 Consequently, on October 14, 1991, despite Bosnian Serb opposition, the Bosnian Government declared its sovereignty, asserting its intention to separate if the other republics did not renounce their intention to separate. Furthermore, the Bosnian Government held a referendum starting February 29, 1992 in which 99.4% voted for independence. In response, the Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum, claiming that as a constitutive people of Bosnia, no decision on Bosnia's future could be legitimate without their approval. Moreover, they argued, the norm of self-determination also gave them legal justification to choose to either join in a multiethnic Bosnia or in a Greater Serbia.116 Nonetheless, the Bosnian Government declared its constitutional independence from the FRY on March 3, 1992 and was recognized by the EC and US in early April. Fabry suggests that the Serbian response did not deny the applicability of some form of self-determination but nonetheless rejected independence. In Serbia's view [independence] violated Article 5 of the 1974 constitution prohibiting a change in external SFRY boundaries without the consent of all republics and autonomous provinces.. .and, even more emphatically with the departure of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina with their borders intact... [The Serbs] argued that the republican borders were administrative rather than political and that the right to self-determination belonged to the constituent ethno nations of Yugoslavia, not their territorial republics."117 As a result, the Serbs immediately erected roadblocks across parts of Bosnia and set up the Republic Srpska in eastern Bosnia with a capital in Pale. The subsequent months were marked by a rapid escalation in the level of intercommunal 118 violence. Initially, the Bosnian Serb paramilitaries, who were equipped and reinforced by the JNA, held the military advantage. In contrast, the Bosnian Government was dependent on unreliable external assistance. Arms were primarily supplied by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Brunei and Pakistan, who could circumvent a Security Council arms embargo as long as the US 'turned a blind eye.'119 Moreover, the Bosnian Government was also hampered by frequent incidents of violence between its forces and the Croatian-funded Bosnian Croats, led by Mats Boban, culminating in a Bosniac-Croat war in early 1994. 1 1 6 F o r an e x c e l l e n t d i s c u s s i o n o f the n o r m a t i v e a n d lega l c l a i m s made b y the g roups w i t h i n B o s n i a , see F a b r y , " In te rna t iona l N o r m s o f T e r r i t o r i a l In tegr i ty ." 1 1 7 I b i d . 149. In ea r ly M a y 1 9 9 1 , the S e r b - C r o a t w a r began be tween the n e w C r o a t i a n m i l i t a r y and the C r o a t i a n Serbs pa rami l i t a r i e s o f the K r a j i n a , suppor t ed b y m e m b e r s o f the J N A . 1 1 8 F o r a l onge r d i s c u s s i o n o f the ac tua l c o n f l i c t i n B o s n i a see B u r g and S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. Ml'-188. 1 1 9 I b i d . 3 0 7 - 3 0 8 . 44 By August 1992, the Bosnian Serb offensive had captured nearly 70% of Bosnia 1 90 jeopardizing the viability of a sovereign state. In addition, images of a level of systemic brutality that would come to symbolize the Bosnian conflict were beginning to trickle out. \ Though the Bosnian Serb paramilitaries were responsible for a disproportionate number of the worst atrocities, as one student noted: 'In Bosnia, none of the armed groups wore white hats.'121 The constant shelling of Sarajevo, the fall of the so-called UN safe-haven of Srebenica and images of waves of Muslim, Croat and Serb civilians, forced from their homes became infamous examples of the violence. Acquired territory was secured by 'ethnically cleansing' the area of other ethnic groups through forcible displacement, killing or systematic rape. For the Bosnian Serbs, led by Radovan Karadzic, president of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and Ratko Mladic, head of the Bosnian Serb paramilitaries, the strategy was to capture as much land as possible contiguous with Serbia and remove any non-Serbs. They predicted that as military front lines hardened, the international community, faced with a fait accompli, would not stop the now-homogenous Bosnian Serb lands from either rejoining Serbia or declaring independence.122 The Bosnian Serb military success would continue until 1995 when a Bosnian-Croat Federation undertook a joint campaign against the Bosnian Serbs. By this point, the Bosnian Government had increased its own military capacity. In conjunction with NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic curtailing assistance to Pale, the Bosnian-Croat Federation offensive managed to regain much of the territory that had been captured by the initial Bosnian Serb offensive. Finally, in December of 1995, the Dayton Agreement was signed, establishing a permanent ceasefire and creating a single Bosnian state made up of two highly autonomous entities, the Republic Srpska and the Bosnian-Croat Federation. 3.2 Early attempts at Mediation Mediation in Bosnia began in the early months of 1992 as the Bosnian Government moved closer to its declaration of independence. At this time, the European Community (EC) hoped that its intervention in the dispute could both prevent the conflict from escalating to an 1 2 0 H u r s t H a n n u m , " S e l f D e t e r m i n a t i o n , Y u g o s l a v i a and E u r o p e : O l d W i n e i n N e w B o t t l e s ? , " Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 3 , n o . S p r i n g ( 1 9 9 3 ) . 1 2 1 T h i s quote w a s t aken from a d i s c u s s i o n o n the B o s n i a n c o n f l i c t w i t h a c o l l e a g u e o f m i n e , D a v i d M c D o n o u g h , in June , 2 0 0 3 . See a l so B u r g a n d S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 1 7 1 - 1 8 5 . 1 2 2 I b i d . 175 . 45 armed conflict while demonstrating that the member states of the EC could speak as a single voice in the Post Cold War. Thus, the EC, through the mediation efforts of Jose Cutileiro and Lord Carrington, proposed the Lisbon Agreement which stipulated: "The power sharing arrangement of the coalition should translate into a triune state in which the three ethnic parties divided territorial control among them." This agreement, however, had little success satisfying the divergent interests of the parties and shortly thereafter both the Bosnian Government and the 123 Bosnian Croats violated its terms. This early mediation effort highlighted several pressing questions whose answers would be critical to future mediators: How should international principles be ordered in the case of the former Yugoslavia? And how should each principle be applied?124 Without a more coherent set of principles to guide the negotiations, they had no common points on which to seek agreement between the parties or to assess the various claims made by each party. To this end, under the Chairmanship of Lord Carrington, the Arbitration Commission on the Former Yugoslavia (the so-called Badinter Commission) was established to provide advisory opinions on issues under dispute. In effect, this commission was asked to clarify how international norms such as territorial integrity and self-determination should apply in the case of Bosnia. At the request of Lord Carrington, the Badinter Commission publicly rendered Opinion 1 on November 29, 1991 that concluded that since four republics had already sought independence, the FRY "no longer met the criteria of participation and representativeness inherent in a federal state." This opinion reflected a near-consensus in the international community that the declarations of independence by the republics resulted from the ongoing dissolution of the state, rather than secession from a continuing state. In opinion 3, which considered the administrative boundaries of the republics, the commission determined that "except where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become frontiers protected by international law." Together, these opinions provided more concrete interpretations of the appropriate application of territorial integrity. Furthermore, on January 29, 1992, in response to a request from Carrington, the commission rendered an opinion on how to balance the applicability of territorial integrity with the principle of self-determination invoked by Bosnian Serbs. In its Opinion 2, the commission found that".. .it is well established that, whatever the Greenberg and McGuinness, "From Lisbon to Dayton: International Medait ion and the Bosnia Crisis.":45-47. Fabry, "International Norms of Territorial Integrity." 46 circumstances, the right to self-determination must not involve changes of existing frontiers at the time of independence.. .except where states concerned agree otherwise." Without agreement between the parties the Bosnian Serbs were entitled only "to all the rights accorded to minorities and ethnic groups under international law." Unfortunately, it is difficult to identify the precise influence of the commission on subsequent negotiations. On one hand, its impact seems negligible given the commission's opinions were legally non-binding. In fact, the commission is not cited at all in the autobiographical accounts of future Bosnian mediators David Owen, Richard Holbrooke and Carl Bildt. Yet, these opinions should not be altogether dismissed. Owen and Holbrooke would ultimately take similar interpretations as the basis for their own mediation efforts.126 At the very least, the Commission made explicit what international society would have eventually concluded: That any agreement concerning a post-conflict Bosnia must adhere to the norms of territorial integrity and minority rights. And interpreting these norms would be done by agents of international society, rather than negotiated by the parties. 3.3 Conclusion In sum, the competing claims of the parties and early mediation efforts highlighted the central role of international norms in the Bosnian conflict. For international society, the challenge of the Bosnian conflict was to apply self-determination and territorial integrity in a way that brought stability and security to the region. Initially, EC mediators hoped that international law could provide a definitive interpretation that would be acceptable to the parties. Unfortunately, these early mediations did not persuade the parties to give up their armed struggle. In fact, the lack of an international response to these early failures only hardened Pale's conviction that the international community would not employ more coercive forms of intervention to bring about peace. Consequently, it would fall to David Owen and Cyrus Vance to both translate these international norms into a coherent set of negotiating principles and to convince the parties to agree to them. F o r an exce l l en t d i s c u s s i o n o f these r u l i n g s f r o m the B a d i n t e r C o m m i s s i o n and , m o r e g e n e r a l l y the in te rna t iona l c o m m u n i t y ' s c o m m i t m e n t to the n o r m o f t e r r i to r i a l in tegr i ty see I b i d . 157 -160 . 1 2 6 H a n n u m , " S e l f D e t e r m i n a t i o n , Y u g o s l a v i a a n d E u r o p e : O l d W i n e in N e w B o t t l e s ? . " : 6 3 . 47 Chapter 4: David Owen and the Vance Owen Peace Plan 4.1 Introduction With inter-communal violence in Bosnia raging and the Lisbon Plan dead, EC/EU 1 2 7 mediation duties were turned over to Lord David Owen, a former British Foreign Secretary. On September 3, 1992, Owen joined Cyrus Vance, representing the UN, as co-chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). From a negotiation standpoint, the mediators faced substantial obstacles. First, inter-party hostilities and hatred were increasing each month the violence continued, particularly as the atrocities accumulated. Second, the parties remained fundamentally divided on the form and structure of a post-conflict Bosnia. As Burg and Shoup argue: "From the beginning negotiators recognized that the views of the three parties diverged widely. Whereas the Bosnian government wanted a unitary state with regions possessing only administrative functions, the Serbs wanted three independent states each of these states having its own international legal personality." Additionally, neither side seemed willing to make concessions. The Bosnian Serbs were increasingly convinced that a military victory was possible while the Bosnian Government was confident that international sympathy * 19Q would soon turn to decisive material assistance. 4.2 Backdrop to the Mediation: Confronting Divergent Interests The Bosnian Government, led by President Alija Izetbegovic argued that Bosnia's previous administrative borders were inviolable. Owen notes that Izetbegovic "wanted to be president, by democratic decision, of a Muslim state accepting full multi-ethnic participation in that state."130 Partition, either de facto or de jure was unacceptable. Instead, a just peace defined Bosnia as a single state where Muslims forced from their homes in the eastern Muslim enclaves 1 2 ' In 1 9 9 1 , the m e m b e r s o f the E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y c o n c l u d e d i n M a a s t r i c h t an agreement o n p o l i t i c a l u n i o n . O n O c t o b e r 2 9 , 1993 , the agreement w e n t in to force a n d the E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y ( E C ) b e c a m e the E u r o p e a n U n i o n ( E U ) . 1 2 8 B u r g and Shoup^ The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 2 1 6 . 1 2 9 T h e pe rcep t ions that he lp f r o m the in te rna t iona l c o m m u n i t y were f o r t h c o m i n g w a s s p e c i f i c a l l y d i r e c t e d at the U S , w h e r e sympa the t i c c a m p a i g n rhe to r ic f r o m the n e w C l i n t o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and ca l l s i n C o n g r e s s for a un i l a t e ra l l i f t i n g o f the a rms e m b a r g o in f avou r o f the B o s n i a n G o v e r n m e n t a n d subsequent m i l i t a r y ass is tance (so-c a l l e d L i f t a n d S t r i k e ) r a i sed the B o s n i a n G o v e r n m e n t ' s expec ta t ions a n d e m b o l d e n e d t h e m at the nego t i a t i ng table . See I b i d . 2 1 4 - 2 1 7 . 1 3 0 D a v i d O w e n , Balkan Odyssey ( N e w Y o r k : H a r c o u r t B r a c e & C o m p a n y , 1995) . 3 9 . 48 could return without fear of being a persecuted minority. When the US extended recognition and support for the new Bosnian state, Izetbegovic expected the international community to offer material assistance to repel what they saw as Serbian aggression. Such expectations were reinforced by the US media, who criticized any suggestion that the Bosnian Government make major concessions that could jeopardize the viability of a unitary Bosnian state.131 For the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats, a unitary state not only threatened to isolate them from their 'mother country' but they also argued it was unrealistic given Bosnia's history as an artificial construct. Moreover, leaders in Belgrade and Zagreb shared this position. As Owen highlights: "To both presidents [Tudjman and Milosevic] the Bosnia Herzegovina border was largely theoretical and in political terms did not exist."132 Though some Bosnian Croats (particularly in Sarajevo) supported the Bosnian Government, a large proportion of Bosnian Croats, predominantly concentrated in Herzegovina, wanted to reunite with Croatia. This latter group, led by Mats Boban, looked to Zagreb, particularly President Tudjman, for 133 leadership and guidance. Tudjman's interests were mixed. On one hand, "for Franjo Tudjman, the clash of civilizations is at the core of the conflicts in this part of Europe, thus cultural and ethnic separation is the only possible long-term solution."134 On the other hand, (a) Tudjman wanted to avoid being the spoiler in the negotiations, which would hurt the reputation of his newly independent state and (b) he was wary that agreeing to reconsider Bosnia's borders on ethnic grounds would legitimize calls for secession among Croatian Serbs in the Krajina. Thus, Owen suggests that: "Tudjman had accepted recognition [of Bosnia] within its internationally agreed boundaries as a necessary price for recognition of Croatia, but had never hidden his belief that 135 Bosnia Herzegovina was not sustainable." Consequently, the Croat strategy was to align themselves with the Serbs in opposition to a centralized state, but rather than openly calling for secession, would let the Serbs lead efforts to undermine the Bosnian state.136 1 3 1 B u r g a n d S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 2 3 0 - 2 3 1 . I n pa r t i cu la r , B o s n i a n suppor t i n the U S w a s l ed i n i t i a l l y b y the recen t ly e lec ted C l i n t o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and , m o r e cons i s t en t ly , b y a handfu l o f C o n g r e s s i o n a l leaders . 1 3 2 O w e n , Balkan Odyssey. 3 4 8 . 1 3 3 B u r g a n d S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 197-198 . 1 3 4 C a r l B i l d t , Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia ( L o n d o n : W e i n e n f e l d a n d N i c o l s o n , 1998) . : 4 6 . 1 3 5 O w e n , Balkan Odyssey. 7 3 . 1 3 6 B u r g a n d S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 197. 49 Initially, the Bosnian Serbs demanded that Bosnia remain a constitutive republic within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, following the Bosnian declaration of independence, the Bosnian Serbs maintained that they had the right to secede from Bosnia. Burg and Shoup assert: The Bosnian Serbs focused instead on gaining international recognition for their own state, and its eventual union with Serbia... [ W ] h e n t h i s prospect materialized in fall 1993, the Serbs seemed ready t o make limited territorial concessions i n return for independence, but w h e n the international community refused to consider independence for the Bosnian Serb republic, the Serb leadership reverted to its earlier demands.137 Throughout Owen's tenure as mediator, the Bosnian Serbs denied that Bosnia should be a single state. Despite US and EC recognition, neither President Radovan Karadzic nor General Ratko Mladic accepted the Bosnian declaration of independence as a fait accompli. They repeatedly undermined attempts by the mediators to establish federal structures, couching their actions in the discourse of self-determination.138 The Pale leadership believed that their military advantages, in addition to the reluctance of the international community to militarily intervene, meant they could avoid making concessions. As Mladic proclaimed to Owen: "the existence of the Serb Republic may be disputed, but the existence of its army is indisputable. The Serb republic exists because we have our territory, our people and all the attributes of a state. Whether they want to recognize it or not is their affair. But the army is a fact."139 To Mladic, the international community would eventually be forced to accept the partition of Bosnia as the only viable way to stabilize the region. Like the Bosnian Croats, Pale initially looked to leaders in the 'mother country' for guidance.140 In fact, the Serbian delegation to official peace negotiations was comprised of members from both Belgrade and Pale. However, as the interests of Belgrade and Pale began to diverge, tensions in the Serb delegation emerged. At first, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, who swept to power on a nationalist platform advocating a Greater Serbia, strongly backed the Bosnian Serb claims to self determination and secession. For example, in May 1992, Milosevic supported the deployment of UN peacekeepers along the military front lines in hopes 1 3 7 I b i d . 193 . 1 3 8 O w e n , Balkan Odyssey. 9 9 . 1 3 9 I b i d . 7 7 . 1 4 0 T h o u g h the exac t de ta i l s o f the p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y r e l a t i onsh ip be tween Pa l e a n d B e l g r a d e are unc lea r , it is gene ra l l y accep ted that B e l g r a d e m a i n t a i n e d s ign i f i can t i n f luence o v e r P a l e . 50 that their presence would harden these lines into a de facto partition of the country.141 Yet, his other interests often led him to clash with Pale. Milosevic, who saw himself as a shrewd, respectable statesman and a pioneer of a dynamic new FYR, hoped to put his state in good standing in international society. Therefore, he grew increasingly weary of the intransigence of the leaders in Pale. Moreover, in May 1992, the UNSC passed Resolution 757 that imposed strict economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro as long as the Milosevic regime supported the Bosnian Serb paramilitaries. As a result, he gradually faced mounting domestic problems, particularly when shortages became acute in Belgrade. Consequently, he began to scale back his support for Pale.142 4.3 International Society Divided: Differing Visions a Post-Conflict Bosnia As an additional obstacle for the mediators, key actors in international society were divided over the application of norms in Bosnia. As Burg and Shoup argue: There were as yet no guidelines for dealing with complexities surrounding the collapse of a state. Nor was there any consensus among the great powers or in the United Nations about how to resolve the apparent contradictions between the traditional rights of states to protect their territorial integrity and those of peoples and nations to self-determination... This lack of consensus on basic principles complicated the task of negotiating a political settlement to the conflict in Bosnia.143 In the US, the newly-elected Clinton Administration struggled to develop a coherent policy on Bosnia. On one hand, the administration encouraged the Europeans to lead diplomatic efforts. On the other hand, Clinton faced mounting domestic pressure to 'do something' for the Bosnian Muslims who were seen as the victims of Serbian aggression. To this end, the US advised the Bosnian Government against making any serious concessions to its claim that Bosnia's territorial integrity ruled out any form of partition.144 As Burg and Shoup maintain: "The Bosnian claims were not subjected to critical analysis on their own merits. The tenuous state of the government's control over its territory; competing claims of the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats to statehood; the reluctance of the Muslims to share power after the 1990 elections.. .were 1 4 1 B u r g and S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 2 0 8 . 1 4 2 I b i d . 3 0 9 - 3 1 0 . 1 4 3 I b i d . 190. 1 4 4 G r e e n b e r g and M c G u i n n e s s , " F r o m L i s b o n to D a y t o n : In te rna t iona l M e d a i t i o n a n d the B o s n i a C r i s i s . " 4 0 ; 5 0 - 5 1 . 51 not considered.. .to have undermined their claim."145 To further reinforce this position, the US refused to publicly support or commit its troops to implement any agreement that included the internal division of Bosnia along ethnic lines. For the EC, the best outcome was a high profile peace settlement for which they could take credit.146 The EC, however, was not indifferent to the form of a post conflict Bosnia. Nor was the EC about to let the parties negotiate just any mutually acceptable agreement. The EU made it clear that any agreement needed to explicitly recognize territorial integrity and minority rights.147 The EU position differed from the American one by its willingness to partially accommodate the Bosnian Serbs. Whereas the US supported a more centralized state that denied the Bosnian Serbs an internal division along ethnic lines, the EC accepted that some form of federalism would be necessary. Put simply, the EC pursued a greater balance between territorial integrity and self-determination.148 That said, there was little consensus among EC members about where to find that balance.149 Though they all reaffirmed the importance of territorial integrity and minority rights, member states could not agree on how they should be applied.150 Most of the members of the European Community argued that the territorial integrity of Bosnia meant that its administrative border were inviolable. Consistent with Badinter Commission, the Bosnian Serbs did not have the right to redraw international frontiers. Yet, on July 13, 1991, the Dutch, which held the presidency at the time, submitted a memorandum: [T]he option of agreed changes to some of the international borders between the Yugoslav republics might be explored.. .The presidency feels that it is necessary to reconcile the various principles of the Helsinki Act and the Charter of Paris which may apply to the situation in Yugoslavia. It considers it especially important that selective application of principles be avoided. The principles of self-determination, for example, B u r g and S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 195. 1 4 6 O w e n , Balkan Odyssey. 2 7 . F o r E C / E U interests i n m e d i a t i n g i n B o s n i a see T o u v a l , Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years 1990-1995.: 8-9. 1 4 7 T h e E u r o p e a n a rgument for t e r r i to r i a l in tegr i ty was th ree fo ld : (a) that it a v o i d e d o p e n i n g up a P a n d o r a ' s b o x o n secess ion ; (b) that it w a s t aboo to d r a w in te rna t iona l borders a l o n g e thn ic l ines and (c) it w a s i m p r a c t i c a l g i v e n that there we re subs tant ia l p o c k e t s o f m i n o r i t i e s w i t h i n each g r o u p ' s areas. O w e n , Balkan Odyssey. 3 1 . 1 4 8 B u r g and S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 80 . 1 4 9 T o u v a l , Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years 1990-1995. 2 9 - 3 4 . 1 5 0 F o r a longer d i s c u s s i o n o n d i v i s i o n s i n the E C o v e r wha t t e r r i to r i a l in tegr i ty meant see O w e n , Balkan Odyssey. 3 1 - 3 8 . 52 cannot be exclusively applied to the existing republics while being deemed inapplicable to national minorities within those republics.151 After highlighting the pitfalls of various solutions the memorandum concluded by noting that: "The foregoing seems to point in the direction of a voluntary redrawing of internal borders as a possible solution."152 Therefore, when Vance and Owen assumed their co-chairmen roles, the EC and the US remained divided over how to interpret international norms. To make matters worse, the UN Security Council was also split over Bosnia. In particular, Russia, a historical Serbian ally, argued that the claims to secession of the Bosnian Serbs should be given due consideration. Russia was also sensitive about being sidelined in negotiations, demanding they have a visible presence at the negotiating table.153 These tensions in the UNSC only exacerbated international divisions. As a result, one of the early challenges for Owen and Vance was to derive a coherent set of principles around which to build a consensus in international society. 4.4 Translating Norms into Guiding Principles In August 1992, Vance and Owen were given some direction when the ICFY agreed on thirteen principles that would act as a mandate for subsequent mediations on Bosnia.154 Several of these principles directly addressed the norms of territorial integrity and minority rights. On territorial integrity, Principle (VIII) called for the "respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.. .and respect for the inviolability of frontiers." Principle (III) provided for "non-recognition of advantages gained by force" while Principle (IX) stated that "a final settlement on all questions of succession.. .be reached by consensus or by arbitration." With respect to minority rights, Principle (IV) demanded, "Respect for the highest standards of individual rights." Finally, Principle (V) called for "implementation of constitutional guarantees of the human rights.. .of persons belonging to ethnic and national minorities.. .and the right to self determination."155 1 5 3 T o u v a l , Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years 1990-1995. 180. 1 5 4 B e t r a n d de Rossane t , Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Nijhof Law Specials ( T h e H a g u e : N e t h e r l a n d s : K l u w e r L a w In te rna t iona l , 1996) . 6 0 - 6 1 . 1 5 5 I b i d . 5-6. 53 Though Vance and Owen considered this mandate binding, these principles lacked precision, particularly on how to apply them. The problems caused by this ambiguity were twofold. First, as Burg and Shoup argue: "This lack of consensus on basic principles complicated the task of negotiating a political settlement to the conflict in Bosnia, as each of the warring parties and their supporters viewed the conflict differently, and turned to different principles to justify their claims."156 Second, as Owen succinctly put it: "General principles sound wonderful but solutions lie in the details."157 Mediators were left to answer a number of key questions: Did self-determination apply to the Bosnian Serbs? If so, to what were they entitled? And, under what conditions, if any, should mediators facilitate a negotiation on redrawing Bosnia's international frontier? 1 5 8 Consequently, Vance and Owen's initially set out to translate these norms into a set of principles that would guide the negotiations. They immediately ruled out the creation of a strong, centralized state or the division of Bosnia into three sovereign states. They feared that a strong centralized state in which the Bosnian Serbs and Croats were minorities would perpetuate their insecurities. Conversely, dividing Bosnia into three separate states would be even more problematic. First, to redraw Bosnia's international boundaries without violating territorial integrity required the consent of all of the parties including the Bosnian Government. Second, pressuring the Bosnian Government to agree to such terms was equally inappropriate as the prerequisite boundaries could only be accomplished through forcible population transfers.159 Instead, Vance and Owen interpreted the norms in a way that that largely mirrored the opinions of the Badinter Commission. They argued that since the FRY was in the process of dissolution, territorial integrity dictates that the Bosnia should retain its previous administrative borders. Moreover, self-determination entitled the Bosnian Serbs to the full protection of minority rights under international and European law, rather than the right to secede from Bosnia.160 In other words, Owen envisioned a single, multi-ethnic Bosnian state that granted 1 5 6 B u r g and S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 190. 1 5 7 " T h e Fu tu re o f the B a l k a n s : A n I n t e r v i e w w i t h D a v i d O w e n , " Foreign Affairs, no . S p r i n g ( 1 9 9 3 ) . 8. 1 5 8 B u r g and S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 2 1 4 . 1 5 9 O w e n , Balkan Odyssey. 6 2 - 6 7 . 1 6 0 I b i d . F u r t h e r m o r e , i n an i n t e r v i e w i n F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , O w e n a rgued : " S e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n is a q u a l i f i e d r igh t . It is a q u a l i f i e d r igh t i n the U N C h a r t e r a n d it has been a q u a l i f i e d r igh t t h rough m o s t o f in te rna t iona l d i p l o m a c y . W e have to r e m e m b e r that there are other in te rna t iona l c r i t e r i a as w e l l - sove re ign ty , t e r r i to r i a l in tegr i ty a n d h u m a n r igh ts to n a m e o n l y th ree . . . . I do not t h i n k that there is a genera l p r i n c i p l e o r doc t r ine w h i c h one c a n a p p l y as to w h e n se l f -de t e rmina t ion b e c o m e s the o v e r r i d i n g p r i n c i p l e . " See " T h e Fu tu re o f the B a l k a n s : A n I n t e r v i e w w i t h D a v i d O w e n . " 8. 5 4 autonomy to the Serbs and Croats. In a post-conflict Bosnia, autonomous sub-state entities would be delegated special status to establish their own legislative, administrative and judicial institutions. Since these principles rejected Pale's demand for separation, it follows that Vance and Owen would ultimately need to make serious compromises to get Bosnian Serb support. However, Owen never made the issue negotiable. Instead, in October 1992, the co-chairmen presented to the ICFY, UNSC and the parties the 'Proposed Constitutional Structure for Bosnia and Herzegovina' that offered a detailed set of principles that would be the parameters for subsequent discussions. After reviewing a set of options, Owen "chose" a federal state for post-conflict Bosnia even though he was well aware that imposing these principles would hinder the likelihood of agreement. As he notes, these principles were a "straitjacket" that "greatly inhibited compromises" by precluding him from accommodating the Serbs, whose military strength gave them a de facto veto on any settlement.161 Owen asserts that: In retrospect, the biggest mistake, and the one that made the continuation of the war inevitable was not premature recognition but, as I have argued in chapter 2, the rejection by EC foreign ministers on 29 July 1991 of the suggestion made by the Dutch presidency in a COREU telegram sent 13 July. If the EC... had openly been ready to see an orderly and agreed secession of separate states in revised borders, then in conjunction with NATO a credible call could have been made for an immediate ceasefire.. .The unwarranted insistence on ruling out changes to what had been internal administrative boundaries within a sovereign state was a fatal flaw in the attempted peacemaking in Yugoslavia.162 Moreover, it contradicted conventional mediation practices by (a) preempting the possibility of the parties coming to a mutually agreeable solution; (b) undermining their neutrality and (c) risking the impartiality of the process. Yet, in spite of these serious drawbacks, Owen does not appeal to the EC to reconsider his mandate. On the contrary, he generally argues that these principles were the right ones. Even before becoming the EC mediator, he advised Vance to take the UN mediator position on the condition "he was sure he would not be made a prisoner of policies that involved accepting Owen, Balkan Odyssey. 32-33; 62. Ibid. 342. 55 the status quo, partitioning Bosnia-Herzegovina and acquiescing in a Greater Serbia." Owen later states that it was the idea of a single multi-ethnic Bosnian that: "Enjoinfed] Cyrus Vance and me to try to keep the citizens of this newly recognized state together in one state. Despite the cynics, in 1992, it was a task I genuinely believed to be desirable and achievable."164 4.5 Selling these principles: Framing, Institutionalizing and Pressuring On January 2, 1993, Owen incorporated these principles into a comprehensive peace agreement, the so-called Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). The VOPP proposed that the federal structure of Bosnia include ten cantons - three with a Muslim majority, two with a Serb majority, one with a Croat majority and four where no group held a majority.165 The next step, therefore, was to get the parties to agree to these constitutional principles. In the case of minority rights, all of the parties accepted that minority rights would be a part of a post-conflict Bosnia and any outstanding issues were technical ones. As Paul Szasz, a legal advisor to the ICFY, maintained: As a matter of fact, the human rights provisions of these proposals have in general never been considered controversial by any party and at most minor adjustments have been demanded. This does not mean that all parties are actually devoted to human rights, but that on the one hand all see a tactical advantage in such a pretense (and a severe public relations danger in appearing opposed to them), and on the other that they are genuinely interested in seeing their own people protected in situations where these people must or prefer to live within a territory controlled by another party or ethnic group.166 Nonetheless, Vance and Owen constantly sought to exploit new opportunities to lock-in the parties. As De Rossanet observed: "[Vance and Owen] continued to use the combination of behind-the-scenes entreaties and public pressure upon the leadership of the warring parties to get them to comply with international norms of human rights." The VOPP explicitly committed the parties to nineteen international human rights agreements and established a Court of Human Rights (and a Constitutional Court) to enforce these agreements. Of these nineteen agreements, several directly addressed minority rights 1 6 3 I b i d . 2 0 . 1 6 4 I b i d . 3 8 . See a lso " T h e Fu tu re o f the B a l k a n s : A n I n t e r v i e w w i t h D a v i d O w e n . " 1 6 5 In the r e m a i n i n g four can tons , the Serbs had a p l u r a l i t y in one , the C r o a t s i n t w o a n d the M u s l i m s i n one . See B u r g and S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 2 1 9 - 2 2 1 . 1 6 6 P a u l C . S z a s z , " P r o t e c t i n g H u m a n a n d M i n o r i t y R i g h t s i n B o s n i a : A D o c u m e n t a r y S u r v e y o f In terna t ional P r o p o s a l s , " California Western International Law Journal 2 5 , no . S p r i n g ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 2 3 7 - 2 3 8 . 1 6 7 Rossane t , Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. 2 3 . 56 including the 1992 Declaration on the rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic or National Minorities and the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. In explicitly including entire international agreements (rather than just their provisions), the mediators (a) reinforced to the parties that these provisions were international standards and (b) pre-empted the parties from negotiating over individual provisions. 1 6 8 In contrast, no such consensus existed on the guiding principles proposed by Owen concerning territorial integrity and self-determination. On one side, despite concerns about how territory was allocated in the VOPP, the Bosnian Government was in general agreement. Likewise, the Bosnian Croats reluctantly agreed with the principle that Bosnia's administrative borders were inviolable, primarily because Croatia was still opposing separation for the Krajina Serbs. On the other side, the Bosnian Serbs rejected the fundamental premises of the VOPP. 1 6 9 To obtain Serbian support, Vance and Owen separated discussions on the constitutional principles from negotiations over canton boundaries. Conducting the territorial negotiations without already securing Serbian agreement to the constitutional principles would be difficult. Negotiation on the allocation of territory between cantons (which were characterized by more conventional bargaining and trade-offs) was a politically sensitive issue for the parties as each territorial concession could be taken as the abandonment of ethnic kin in the conceded area.170 Moreover, if Vance and Owen could get the parties to accept the principles, they could act as parameters in territorial negotiations while building momentum for future negotiations. To convince the Bosnian Serbs, Vance and Owen's strategy was to frame the principles as a reasonable accommodation of their interests. Though they could not accept Pale's demand for partition, they hoped to appeal to the values underlying that demand, namely the need for security. To persuade the Serbs, the mediators argued that the principles maximized (a) protection for the cultural identities of Bosnia's minority Serbs and (b) autonomy for the provinces so minority groups concentrated in specific areas could "express their nationhood in 171 day-to-day living." As Owen notes: " In presenting our constitutional proposals to the Bosnian Serbs we felt the key would be to demonstrate that we had taken the process of I b i d . 2 1 - 3 4 . F o r a d e t a i l e d l is t o f b o t h V O P P m i n o r i t y r igh ts p r o v i s i o n s as w e l l as a l i s t o f in te rna t iona l a n d d o m e s t i c h u m a n r igh ts m e c h a n i s m s i n the V O P P a n d other I C F Y p r o p o s a l s see S z a s z , " P r o t e c t i n g H u m a n a n d M i n o r i t y R i g h t s i n B o s n i a : A D o c u m e n t a r y S u r v e y o f In te rna t iona l P r o p o s a l s . " 1 6 9 O w e n , Balkan Odyssey. 6 3 . 1 7 0 T o u v a l , Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years 1990-1995. 118. 1 7 1 O w e n , Balkan Odyssey. 4 0 . 57 decentralization as far as we could without creating states within a state." The language they used was critical. In discussions with Pale, the mediators referred to the proposed institutional structure as a "decentralized" state rather than a "centralized federal" one.173 Despite their efforts to couch the principles in a more familiar discourse, they failed to persuade the Serbs to drop their opposition to the constitutional principles. Consequently, Vance and Owen looked for ways to put more pressure on both Belgrade and Pale. In November 1992, Owen argued to the UN Security Council: "The principles of the international community will stick through steady, persistent pressure applied day in and day out to any intransigent party that fails to negotiate constructively."174 In particular, Owen's strategy was to target Milosevic, who, in turn, could compel Pale to agree. To this end, Owen wanted to marginalize Pale's role in international negotiations by meeting less frequently with its leadership while putting greater emphasis on his discussions with Milosevic. Owen made it clear that if Belgrade wanted the UN-imposed economic sanctions reduced, Pale would have to agree to the VOPP without changes.175 He contended that the VOPP adequately safeguarded Bosnia's Serb minority while affirming that the international community would never tolerate a Greater Serbia. To push for a redrawing of international borders would be futile, resulting only in Serbia's continued subjection to international sanctions. To a certain extent, the strategy worked. Milosevic did bully Karadzic into signing the VOPP by insisting that its principles were reasonable while its rejection would unfairly jeopardize the well being of Serbs outside Bosnia.177 To increase the pressure, Owen attempted to build a coalition both inside and outside Bosnia. He encouraged civil society groups that advocated for a multi-ethnic state to appeal to 178 the Pale leadership. Furthermore, he sought unify international society around these principles. Although Owen maintained that his primary task was to develop a consensus among 179 the twelve member states of the EC, he hoped that a broader base of international support 1 1 2 I b i d . 6 3 . 1 7 3 I b i d . 6 2 . 1 7 4 U N S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l D o c u m e n t S / P V . 3 1 3 4 , p . 3 1 . 1 7 5 T o u v a l , Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years 1990-1995. 121 . 1 7 6 O w e n , Balkan Odyssey. 124. 1 7 7 I b i d , B u r g a n d S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 2 2 5 - 2 2 7 . See a l so O w e n , Balkan Odyssey. 144 -152 . 1 7 8 O w e n u l t i m a t e l y concedes that they f a i l e d to e m p o w e r a peace cons t i t uency at the c i v i l soc i e ty l e v e l . O w e n notes: " W e t r i e d to ra ise the p r o f i l e o f the m u l t i - e t h n i c c i v i c g roups , but the i r v o i c e , w h i l e c h a m p i o n e d b y a f e w ab road , w a s d r o w n e d out b y the p r o p a g a n d a o f the w a r . " See O w e n , Balkan Odyssey. 123 . 1 7 9 I b i d . 2 7 . 58 would make it possible to draw on external military power. Consequently, it was critical to obtain US support; since NATO intervention required its approval and US participation would be necessary to implement the VOPP. However, the US was divided on whether to support the principles of the VOPP. Some opinion leaders in the US, including members of the Clinton Administration, argued that the ethnic-basis for the cantons legitimized the territorial gains of ethnic cleansing.181 In response, Owen began a concerted campaign to rebut what he called an "ill informed attack."182 He tried to establish a counter-frame of the VOPP in order to shift public opinion in his favour. Specifically, he began an extensive public relations effort where he appeared on numerous news programs, talk shows and print publications from popular magazines to academic journals.183 The US viewed the war as the result of Serbian aggression in which Bosnian Muslims were the victims. Consequently, he couched his argument in this discourse, stressing that the VOPP marked major gains for the Bosnian Government and major concessions by the Bosnian Serbs. He argued that the VOPP satisfied Bosnian Government demands by establishing a single multi-ethnic state that guaranteed Bosnia's territorial integrity. Furthermore, it reduced Bosnian Serb territory to 4 3 % (six percent lower than what the Serbs would get at Dayton) and reversed most of what the Bosnian Serbs gained through ethnic cleansing. Ultimately, he asserted, only peace would bring about the end of ethnic cleansing.184 However, Vance and Owen's efforts fell short. Just days after Karadzic signed the agreement, the Bosnian Serb Assembly voted against ratifying it. At the core of the Assembly's rejection was its continued opposition to the constitutional principles of the agreement. The Bosnian Serbs still believed that a separate state (or joining a Greater Serbia) was desirable and possible. To Pale, there seemed little reason to concede their fundamental claim, that self-O w e n a rgued that: " I have a l w a y s b e l i e v e d that success fu l d i p l o m a c y needs m u s c l e b e h i n d it, and th roughou t m y tenure as c o - c h a i r m e n I w a s a r g u i n g fo r a p p l y i n g force s e l e c t i v e l y , s e n s i b l y , but i n suppor t o f a spec i f i c se t t lement ." I b i d . 2 7 1 . 1 8 1 B u r g a n d S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 2 3 0 - 2 3 1 . 1 8 2 O w e n , Balkan Odyssey. 100 -104 . In pa r t i cu la r , O w e n s ing les out the N e w Y o r k T i m e s , w h o s e ed i to r i a l s , he b e l i e v e d , h a d t aken an f ac tua l ly incor rec t and " e m o t i v e " p o s i t i o n agains t the V O P P . See " T h e Fu tu re o f the B a l k a n s : A n I n t e r v i e w w i t h D a v i d O w e n . " 1 8 3 O w e n , Balkan Odyssey. 111 . 1 8 4 I b i d . 9 2 - 1 0 9 . F o r an e x a m p l e o f f r a m i n g for U S aud iences , see O w e n ' s 1993 i n t e r v i e w i n F o r e i g n A f f a i r s " T h e Fu tu re o f the B a l k a n s : A n I n t e r v i e w w i t h D a v i d O w e n . " 59 determination meant secession, given their military superiority and the reluctance of the international community to militarily intervene.185 Part of the failure was that the mediators were unable to convince Pale that the principles were non-negotiable. Imposing the principles required leverage that Vance and Owen did not possess. As Owen discouragingly concedes: "This was the daily discomfort that we lived with - my weapon was words and beyond them there was no prospect of international power being exercised."187 Although the international community condemned Serb intransigence, they were unwilling to bolster economic sanctions with punitive military measures. On one hand; the US was still reluctant to deploy troops. Not only did they fear the political risks of losing troops, but military officials feared 'mission creep,' namely that their mandate would gradually expand without clear political objectives or an exit strategy.188 On the other hand, Europe alone did not have the military capacity to carry out a large-scale ground campaign. Nor did the Europeans support NATO air strikes out of concern that Pale would respond to military action by retaliating against the largely European UNPROFOR peacekeeping forces.189 4.6 Owen's Endgame: Distancing Himself from Washington's Principles With the VOPP dead, the international community (led by the US) began to look for alternative solutions. On May 22, 1993 the US along with the UK, France, Russia and Spain agreed to the Washington Joint Action Plan. This plan strengthened the humanitarian aid efforts while allowing for a "freeze" of the military frontlines. Put another way, the plan accepted the partition of Bosnia into larger ethnic-based entities, with a Bosnian Serb one contiguous with Serbia. Given that the US had attacked the VOPP as too generous to the Bosnian Serbs, the Joint Action Plan ironically conceded that the Great Powers would not devote the necessary resources to push back the Bosnian Serbs.190 Using the Joint Action Plan as a basis for negotiation, Milosevic and Tudjman negotiated the Union of Three Republics (UTR) proposal that created a de facto confederation between 1 8 5 B u r g a n d S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention:. 2 4 6 - 2 4 9 . 1 8 6 T o u v a l , Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years 1990-1995. 1 2 2 - 1 2 3 . 1 8 7 O w e n , Balkan Odyssey. 122. 1 8 8 T h i s res is tance g r e w acute i n the af termath o f S o m a l i a that ended w i t h i m a g e s o f d e a d U S so ld i e r s b e i n g d r a g g e d t h r o u g h the streets o f M o g a d i s h u . 1 8 9 S u c h conce rns w e r e w e l l f o u n d e d as later N A T O a i r s t r ikes d i d resul t i n peacekeepers b e i n g t aken hos tage . B u r g a n d S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 2 1 1 - 2 1 4 . 1 9 0 I b i d . 2 6 4 - 2 6 5 . 60 three constituent republics. Under the UTR, most of the powers resided in the republics and each republic could establish an international personality by applying for membership in international organizations. Moreover, it listed a set of terms that allowed a republic to separate from the confederation.191 The response of the Bosnian Government to this proposal was surprisingly muted. Though the Bosnian Government publicly opposed the partition of Bosnia, it was also facing a changing US policy and renewed cooperation between the Croats and Serbians leading some members of the Bosnian Government to reconsider the inviolability of Bosnia's borders.192 Even Izetbegovic, as Owen notes, was privately "moving towards a separate Muslim republic and that realistic talk of keeping Bosnia Herzegovina together was over."193 Though it would violate Bosnia's territorial integrity, he believed that a negotiated partition (rather than militarily imposed one) might at least result in a rump Bosnian state with defensible borders. One would expect Owen to capitalize on these changes, which loosened the normative constraints of the territorial integrity norm. And initially Owen did reluctantly use the opportunity to explore an alternative set of negotiating principles. In the spring of 1993, Owen privately suggested to Douglas Hogg, the British Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs that the ICFY agree to reopen the international borders question if the Bosnian Serbs offered substantial territorial concessions and a compromise on Sarajevo that favoured the Bosnian Government.194 However, Owen did not pursue this proposal beyond preliminary discussions. Nor did he encourage the Bosnian Government to accept these changes. Afterall, these new principles undermined the principles of the VOPP. The VOPP took a thicker definition of territorial integrity by attempting to avoid creating a 'state within a state.' In contrast, the Joint Action Plan and Serb-Croat Plan intended to redefine territorial integrity in thinner terms. This plan not only established three separate entities large enough to act independently, but each entity would possess key attributes of statehood including its own military and its choice of currency. To Owen, this proposal would, at the very least make the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb areas 1 9 1 I b i d . 2 6 5 - 2 7 9 . 1 9 2 T h e reasons for this change w e r e t w o f o l d . F i r s t , the U S seemed re luctant to bo ls te r the i r m o r a l suppor t w i t h m i l i t a r y ass is tance. M o r e o v e r , it b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y c l ea r that the in t e rna t iona l c o m m u n i t y (pa r t i cu l a r l y the U S ) w a s u n l i k e l y to suppor t s u c h an agreement that w o u l d requi re m a s s i v e n u m b e r s o f g r o u n d t roops to i m p l e m e n t it. S e c o n d , the B o s n i a n G o v e r n m e n t forces c o n t i n u e d to face a two- f ron t w a r agains t the B o s n i a n Serbs and the B o s n i a n C r o a t pa r ami l i t a r i e s . 1 9 3 O w e n , Balkan Odyssey. 2 0 9 . 61 dependent on Belgrade and Zagreb and could even result in the dissolution of the Bosnian state.195 Consequently, Owen began to distance himself from the entire mediation process. He played a less active role in shaping possible agreements and left the negotiating to Milosevic and Tudjman.196 Though Owen continued as Chairman of the ICFY with Thorvald Stoltenburg (who was Vance's replacement as UN mediator), he saw his new role as an "intermediary" between the parties and international society rather than the designer of peace proposals. He agreed to present the Croatian-Serb UTR proposal to the EU but he was "not taking a position." In addition, Owen repeatedly rejects dubbing the UTR as the Owen-Stoltenburg Plan, stressing 197 instead that it was a "Serb-Croat" proposal. Overall, these actions suggest that Owen was reluctant to abandon the principles of the VOPP even if it improved the likelihood of agreement. In the end, however, the Bosnian Government vetoed the Union of Three Republics, and its subsequent offshoot, the Invincible Plan. Though Izetbegovic's may have seen partition as unavoidable, he feared that public opinion was not yet ready to support such an agreement. Consequently, he opposed both these agreements on the grounds that (a) they violated Bosnia's territorial integrity by dividing it along ethnic lines and (b) they inadequately reversed the 198 * territorial gains of ethnic cleansing. With the VOPP dead and the ICFY making little progress, David Owen resigned in 1995 as ICFY co-chairmen. I b i d . 192 -209 . B u r g a n d S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 2 6 5 . O w e n , Balkan Odyssey. 191 -197 . I b i d . 194; 2 1 7 - 2 2 0 . 62 Chapter 5: Richard Holbrooke and US Mediation Efforts 5.1 Overview of the Holbrooke Mediation On August 14, 1995, with negotiations stalled, Richard Holbrooke was assigned chief US mediator in Bosnia. Holbrooke's appointment marked the pinnacle of US diplomatic involvement and leadership. When violence first erupted in 1992, the Bush Administration avoided becoming engaged in the conflict. Secretary of State James Baker stated "it is the hour of Europe"199 and "we don't have a dog in this fight."200 In the subsequent presidential campaign, then-Governor Clinton criticized the Bush Administration for failing to curb the atrocities in Bosnia (particularly those perpetrated by the Bosnian Serbs) and promised to take a 201 more active role. However, there was a clear gap between rhetoric and action in President Clinton's early Bosnia policy. Though the administration argued that protecting the Bosnian-Muslims from Serb aggression was a moral imperative, they did not offer much military or diplomatic assistance. Despite pressure from key members of congress, the Administration felt it had few policy alternatives. In the shadow of the failed Somali mission, the Clinton administration (and particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff) was against sending in ground troops to Bosnia while hostilities continued. Though many in the Administration favoured air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, some of its NATO allies, whose troops on the ground were vulnerable, opposed them. Finally, the US did not want to commit the significant military resources necessary to implement the VOPP, which required peacekeepers in multiple cantons.202 Thus, the US struggled to establish a more coherent Bosnia policy. Holbrooke noted that until August 1995: "High level meetings on Bosnia had a dispirited, inconclusive quality."203 In 1994, the Clinton Administration pressed a small group of powerful states to develop an alternative forum to the ICFY for generating possible solutions to the conflict.204 Though proposals put forward by this new Contact Group failed, it did highlight a new assertiveness in 1 9 9 B a k e r q u o t e d b y B u r g a n d S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 2 0 1 . 2 0 0 B a k e r q u o t e d b y G r e e n b e r g and M c G u i n n e s s , " F r o m L i s b o n to D a y t o n : In terna t ional M e d a i t i o n a n d the B o s n i a C r i s i s . " 4 7 . 2 0 1 H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 3 9 - 4 3 . 2 0 2 G r e e n b e r g a n d M c G u i n n e s s , " F r o m L i s b o n to D a y t o n : In terna t ional M e d a i t i o n a n d the B o s n i a C r i s i s . " 5 0 - 5 1 . 2 0 3 H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 8 1 . 2 0 4 G r e e n b e r g a n d M c G u i n n e s s , " F r o m L i s b o n to D a y t o n : In terna t ional M e d a i t i o n and the B o s n i a C r i s i s . " 4 9 . 63 the US policy. US envoy Robert Frasure tirelessly shuttled between the parties exploring the possibilities for a peace agreement. On March 10, 1994, the US brokered a Framework Agreement between the Bosnian-Muslims and the Bosnian Croats that ended much of the violence between these groups. In addition, the US coordinated limited NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs on two separate occasions.206 The reasons for increased US activism are twofold. First, televised images of the atrocities taking place as well as Bosnian Serb attacks on UN safe areas increased domestic pressure on the administration.207 Second, in July, the French and the British were considering pulling their troops out of Bosnia, which, under NATO, obligated the US to send in ground troops to help with a UN withdrawal. Consequently, US officials had two options: Support a humiliating UN retreat that subjected US soldiers to a violent conflict or take responsibility for negotiations that, if successful, would use US troops in 208 a peacekeeping capacity. Thus, in August 1995, Holbrooke began an intense shuttle diplomacy campaign.209 On September 8, he brought together the foreign ministers of Croatia, Bosnia and the FRY in Geneva where they agreed to the Joint Agreed Principles (JAP). Five days later, he mediated an end to the siege of Sarajevo by getting the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw most of their artillery surrounding the city. Finally, on September 26 in New York, the foreign ministers signed the Further Agreed Basic Principles. On November 1 Holbrooke abandoned his shuttle diplomacy efforts in favour of convening proximity talks amongst the parties at Wright Patterson Air Force T w o m o n t h s later, P re s iden t C l i n t o n p r e s ided o v e r the s i g n i n g o f the W a s h i n g t o n A c c o r d s that e s tab l i shed a (a lbe i t s h a k y ) B o s n i a n - C r o a t F e d e r a t i o n that a m a l g a m a t e d the te r r i to ry o f the t w o g roups in to a s ing le ent i ty . 2 0 6 T h e te rm ' p i n p r i c k s ' has of ten been u s e d to desc r ibe the fu t i l i t y o f these a i r s t r ikes . T h e l i m i t e d a i r s t r ikes are p a r t i a l l y the resul t o f the ' d u a l k e y ' d e c i s i o n m a k i n g a p p r o a c h that gave U N o f f i c i a l s a ve to o v e r N A T O a i r s t r ikes , w h i c h they u s e d out o f fear o f Se rb re ta l i a t ion agains t U N O P R O F O R t roops . In fact, f o l l o w i n g these a i r s t r ikes , M l a d i c d i d retal iate b y t e m p o r a r i l y h o l d i n g U N t roops hostage. 2 0 7 T h i s pressure b e c a m e acute i n J u l y l 9 9 5 w i t h the f a l l o f the U N safe area o f S r e b e n i c a i n w h i c h B o s n i a n Serbs a t t acked the M u s l i m e n c l a v e w h i l e D u t c h peacekeepers w e r e f o r c e d to w a t c h the mass e x p u l s i o n a n d massacre o f the res idents a n d refugees. 2 0 8 T h e B o s n i a n Se rb at tack o n S r e b e n i c a (and the i n a b i l i t y o f peacekeepers to s top it) i n a d d i t i o n to the B o s n i a n Se rb tac t ic o f t a k i n g peacekeepers hostage h a d demons t r a t ed to B r i t i s h a n d F r e n c h o f f i c i a l s the fu t i l i t y o f U N O P R O F O R w i t h o u t s t ronger U S suppor t . Susan Roseg ran t and M i c h a e l D . W a t k i n s , " G e t t i n g to D a y t o n : N e g o t i a t i n g an E n d to the W a r i n B o s n i a , " i n Kennedy School of Government Case Program ( C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y J o h n F . K e n n e d y S c h o o l o f G o v e r n m e n t , 1996) . : 12 -13 . 2 0 9 In fact, o n H o l b r o o k e ' s first t r ip to Sara jevo as lead med ia to r , one o f the U N a r m o r e d pe r sonne l car r iers in w h i c h h i s t e am w a s t r a v e l i n g s l i p p e d o f f the s ide o f M t . I g m a n a n d e x p l o d e d . T h i s t r agedy r e su l t ed i n the deaths o f three o f the t e a m ' s core m e m b e r s : N e l s o n D r e w , J o s e p h K r u z e l a n d R o b e r t F rasure ( w h o h a d been the p r i m a r y U S e n v o y i n B o s n i a p r i o r to H o l b r o o k e ) T h i s t ragedy bo th gave the m i s s i o n a deeper sense o f u r g e n c y for the s u r v i v i n g m e m b e r s as w e l l as deepened H o l b r o o k e ' s d i sgus t w i t h P a l e (and M l a d i c i n pa r t i cu l a r ) , w h o s e refusal to guarantee safe passage to Sara jevo b y a i r h a d f o r c e d the team to take the t reacherous M t . I g m a n r o a d . 64 Base in Dayton, Ohio. These talks, largely modeled on Jimmy Carter's Camp David Accords, would continue until November 21 when the parties agreed on a 'comprehensive' peace settlement. The high profile Dayton Agreement, often characterized by Holbrooke's bullying tactics, napkin diplomacy, threats of shutting down' and navigating three dimensional maps of Bosnia, remains the cornerstone of most accounts of mediation in Bosnia.210 To be sure, it was at Dayton that key breakthroughs occurred, including an elusive agreement on a map delineating the boundaries between the two sub-state republics. However, the negotiations at Dayton were the endgame in a much larger mediation process under Holbrooke. Dayton could have taken place only after he had gotten all of the parties to commit to a set of principles that would guide future negotiations. 5.2 Translating Norms to Guiding Principles From the outset, Holbrooke recognized that developing a coherent set of guiding principles would be critical. Moreover, the peace agreement had to comply with international norms. Prior to negotiating a comprehensive agreement, Holbrooke had to operationalize territorial integrity and self-determination in the Bosnian context. He argued: "There was no easy answer to this crucial question: To divide Bosnia Herzegovina into two independent parts would legitimize Serb aggression and ethnic cleansing.. .on the other hand trying to force Serbs, Muslims and Croats' to live together, after the ravages and brutality of war, after what they had done to one another, would be extraordinarily difficult."211 Given that the VOPP had failed partially because the Bosnian Serbs vetoed it, the lesson Holbrooke could have drawn, from a conventional mediator's standpoint, is that these principles needed to better accommodate Pale's interests in order to get their support. To a limited extent, Holbrooke's interpretation of territorial integrity was more favourable to Pale because it internally partitioned Bosnia and retained the Republic Srpska as 2 1 0 See for e x a m p l e R o s e g r a n t a n d W a t k i n s , " G e t t i n g to D a y t o n : N e g o t i a t i n g an E n d to the W a r i n B o s n i a . " ; G r e e n b e r g , B a r t o n , a n d M c G u i n n e s s , Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict.; T o u v a l , Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years 1990-1995. 1 5 6 - 1 6 5 . M o s t o f these accoun ts d r a w o n H o l b r o o k e ' s o w n accoun t o f D a y t o n : H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 2 1 1 Roseg ran t a n d W a t k i n s , " G e t t i n g to D a y t o n : N e g o t i a t i n g an E n d to the W a r i n B o s n i a . " , H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 96 . 65 one of two sub-state entities.212 Yet, this looser understanding of territorial integrity was neither the result of a bargaining process nor a reconsideration of the Bosnian Serb claim to self-determination. Instead, it was the result of political expediency. The international community had finally conceded they were not prepared to devote the resources necessary to implement an agreement that would avoid an ethnically divided Bosnia. By dividing Bosnia into two larger entities, boundaries could be more easily patrolled. Moreover, Holbrooke maintained the same position on international frontiers as the Badinter Commission and Owen, namely that Bosnia's previous administrative boundaries were inviolable. In other words, he refused to consider Pale's primary claim that the Bosnian Serbs had the right to secede or join in a Greater Serbia.213 On this point, Holbrooke argued that the international community needed to stand firm rather than trying to accommodate Pale. Even when Pale softened its position on secession, asking for the right to hold a referendum on secession after two years, Holbrooke refused to compromise. Though he did not deny the right of separation at some future date, he contended that including an explicit date would inevitably doom the Bosnian state. Two years was not adequate to carry out "fair elections," which required an overall reduction in violence; gave communities a chance to start healing; and an opportunity for ultra-nationalist parties to be replaced by more moderate ones 2 1 4 Nonetheless, in refusing to compromise further on territorial integrity, Holbrooke risked having his own mediation efforts scuttled by Pale as was the case with the VOPP. Burg and Shoup argue that sovereignty and territorial integrity "presented the greatest stumbling block to 215 an agreement." So why was Holbrooke so committed to these principles? Afterall, he wrote to President Clinton: "... [N]o vital national interest of the United States was directly affected by whether Bosnia was one, two or three countries." Certainly organizational constraints offer a partial explanation. Secretary of State Warren Christopher had outlined a set of "red lines" within which any peace settlement must stay. One of the red lines was "preserving the territorial • 217 • • integrity of Bosnia." However, similar to Owen's EC mandate, Holbrooke was given 2 1 2 H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 121 . 2 1 3 B u r g a n d S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 3 4 9 . 2 1 4 H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 3 6 5 . 2 1 5 B u r g a n d S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention.: 3 5 1 . 2 1 6 H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 3 6 5 . 2 1 7 C h r i s t o p h e r , In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era.: 3 4 9 - 3 5 0 . Fu r the rmore , C h r i s t o p h e r ' s o p e n i n g r e m a r k s at D a y t o n m a d e p u b l i c l y c o m m i t t e d H o l b r o o k e to ensure that: " B o s n i a had to r e m a i n a s ing le state w i t h i n its t e r r i t o r i a l l y r e c o g n i z e d bounda r i e s a n d w i t h a s ing le in t e rna t iona l p e r s o n a l i t y ; . . . the 66 significant autonomy in translating these ambiguous 'red lines' into concrete proposals. As Holbrooke noted: "They gave us the parameters...but left the details to us."218 Holbrooke's priorities when determining how to apply these norms were twofold. First, to immediately end to the violence by bringing certainty to the parties about the international community's 'bottom line'. Consequently, he made the international boundaries of Bosnia non-negotiable in hopes of removing any lingering expectations among the Serbs that separation could be achieved by force. That said, he also maintained that extending the interpretation of self-determination beyond minority rights guarantees to include internal partition would, at the least, buy Belgrade's support. Second, he felt the conditions of a post-conflict Bosnia should, in the longrun, encourage a truly multi-ethnic state. As Rosegrant and Watkins argue: "Holbrooke hoped to cobble together an agreement providing structure, incentives and international support to allow a new Bosnia - encompassing Muslims, Serbs and Croats - to emerge."219 The challenge, therefore, was to design an agreement where Bosnian sovereignty was defined more substantively than its internationally recognized boundaries. To Holbrooke, there was: "...[T]he need to avoid letting Bosnia become another Cyprus - that is allowing a temporary cease fire line to harden into a permanent one."220 To this end, he decided that the long-term territorial integrity of Bosnia was best served by maintaining two entities that would not claim sovereignty but would carry out the daily functions of government. In return, the central government in Sarajevo would be responsible for foreign policy, customs, immigration as well as establishing a single central bank and a single currency.221 As he states: "[A] single country needed a single currency and a central bank - otherwise it would be a fraud from the outset."222 At Dayton, Holbrooke hoped to advance these principles through the technical terms of the emerging agreement. Specifically, he tried to de-politicize the issue by introducing David Lipton, then a Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, to the negotiations. Holbrooke correctly contended that Lipton, an outsider to the mediation team with a recognized expertise in agreement h a d to i n c l u d e h u m a n r igh t s . " C h r i s t o p h e r , In the Stream of History: Shaping. Foreign Policy for a New Era. 3 6 2 . 2 1 8 R o s e g r a n t a n d W a t k i n s , " G e t t i n g to D a y t o n : N e g o t i a t i n g an E n d to the W a r i n B o s n i a . " 3 7 . 2 1 9 I b i d . 15. H o l b r o o k e a l so notes: " W e c o u l d not ignore the p o s s i b i l i t y that th is [Serb and C r o a t separat ion] m i g h t e v e n t u a l l y h a p p e n . B u t not at D a y t o n - a n d not under A m e r i c a n l eade r sh ip . " H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 2 3 2 . 2 2 0 H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 133 . 2 2 1 H o l b r o o k e w a s a l so re luc tant to a l l o w the B o s n i a n Serbs a n d F e d e r a t i o n to m a i n t a i n the i r o w n m i l i t a r i e s and , o f equa l impor t ance , he notes that "the U n i t e d States w o u l d neve r agree to M i l o s e v i c ' s des i re to use ' u n i o n ' o r c o n f e d e r a t i o n ' " as part o f the t i t le o f B o s n i a H e r z e g o v i n a . " I b i d . 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 . 2 2 2 I b i d . 2 5 6 . 67 converting communist economies to free-market ones, could appeal to Milosevic, who fashioned 223 himself a banking expert. In contrast to the development of principles concerning territorial integrity and self-determination, Holbrooke devoted little time to minority rights issues. To be sure, he recognized the need for the parties to protect minority rights. For example, the principles presented in Geneva and New York affirmed the parties' commitment to international human rights standards.224 Yet, in Dayton, Holbrooke, who was preoccupied with territorial issues, did not facilitate discussions on minority rights. Instead, he was .content to let the Europeans address any outstanding issues. For representatives of the European Union, it was critical that they design Bosnia's minority rights regime since, as EU mediator Carl Bildt argued: "It was important to have a mechanism that was more European than American by design."225 However, Holbrooke's hands-off approach was less an indication that minority rights were unimportant than an indication that the mediators and the parties had taken for granted that any peace agreement would explicitly commit the parties to minority rights. There was little risk that minority rights could sink the negotiation. By the time he became lead mediator, the parties had previously agreed that a comprehensive peace settlement would reference a detailed list of international human and minority rights agreements. Remaining questions on the application of minority rights were technical ones in which the Europeans claimed expertise.226 5.3 Getting Party Buy-In Incremental Institutionalization Although Holbrooke had translated international norms into guiding principles, it was still uncertain that he could get the parties to accept them. To do so, Holbrooke's meta-strategy 2 2 3 A s H o l b r o o k e notes, M i l o s e v i c f a n c i e d h i m s e l f an e x p e r i e n c e d banker , w h i c h inc reased h i s respect for L i p t o n ' s presenta t ion . In fact, H o l b r o o k e reports that M i l o s e v i c stated about L i p t o n : "I l i k e th is g u y . Y o u d i p l o m a t s t a lk b u l l s h i t , but th is g u y ta lks sense. H e is a rea l banker . I c a n ta lk to h i m . " U l t i m a t e l y , L i p t o n was ab le to c o n v i n c e M i l o s e v i c to accep t a s i n g l e cen t r a l bank . See I b i d . 2 5 6 - 2 5 8 . 2 2 4 T h e s e in te rna t iona l h u m a n r igh t s s tandards, as e v e n t u a l l y de t a i l ed i n the D a y t o n A g r e e m e n t referred to in te rna t iona l agreements w h o s e te rms i n c l u d e d m i n o r i t y r igh ts . H o w e v e r , at G e n e v a a n d N e w Y o r k , m i n o r i t y r igh ts w e r e i m p l i e d to be part o f h u m a n r igh ts a n d , therefore, we re not e x p l i c i t l y m e n t i o n e d . 2 2 5 B i l d t , Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia. 9 8 . 2 2 6 T h e D a y t o n Peace A g r e e m e n t e x p l i c i t l y c o m m i t t e d the par t ies to s ix teen in te rna t iona l h u m a n r igh ts agreements . T h e s e agreements i n c l u d e d the 1992 E u r o p e a n C h a r t e r for R e g i o n a l o r M i n o r i t y L a n g u a g e s a n d the 1994 F r a m e w o r k C o n v e n t i o n for the P r o t e c t i o n o f N a t i o n a l M i n o r i t i e s as w e l l as the E u r o p e a n C o n v e n t i o n fo r the P r o t e c t i o n o f H u m a n R i g h t s and F u n d a m e n t a l F r e e d o m s a n d its P r o t o c o l s . T h e D a y t o n A g r e e m e n t a l so i n c l u d e d the es t ab l i shmen t o f a H u m a n R i g h t s C o m m i s s i o n , H u m a n R i g h t s O m b u d s m a n , a H u m a n R i g h t s C h a m b e r and C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t to enforce h u m a n r ights p r o v i s i o n s . 68 was to get the parties to individually agree to these principles prior to convening a more conventional negotiation on outstanding issues like the map. As Bob Owen, a member of Holbrooke's team explained: "We knew the map was going to be a horror, and we didn't think we could make much progress on the map until we had other things straightened out, so we 227 worked on these basic principles first." These principles would be presented as a single text to the parties, who could offer input on the language, but whose substance was essentially non-negotiable. Chris Hill, another member of Holbrooke's mediation team, noted: "We started with the idea that we'd get a few principles, lock them in place, go announce them to the world, and begin to build up some momentum." In other words, Holbrooke pursued a strategy of incremental institutionalization. The first agreement came in Geneva where the foreign ministers signed the Joint Agreed 230 Principles (JAP). The significance of this agreement, as Holbrooke notes, was that Milosevic finally recognized that Bosnia's administrative boundaries would be its international ones.231 Principle 1 stated: "Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue its legal existence with its present borders and continuing international recognition." In addition, Principle 2 asserts that "Bosnia and Herzegovina will consist of two entities" with each entity entitled to maintain their own constitution or establish relationships with neighbouring countries so long as it neither violates other basic principles or the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia. With respect to minority rights, Principle 3 reaffirmed the parties' commitment to international human rights standards and the need for legal mechanisms to enforce them. Following the agreement in Geneva, Holbrooke sought to reinforce the principle of one-Bosnia by getting agreement on the powers of the central government. As Rosegrant notes, the next set of principles addressed: "How [Bosnia] would be made whole by defining governmental superstructures to bind the two entities together." On September 26 at the US Mission to the UN in New York, the parties agreed to the 'Further Agreed Principles.' Again, 2 2 7 B o b O w e n q u o t e d b y Roseg ran t and W a t k i n s , " G e t t i n g to D a y t o n : N e g o t i a t i n g an E n d to the W a r i n B o s n i a . " 2 3 -2 4 . 2 2 8 In fact, H o l b r o o k e notes that the p r i n c i p l e s agreed to i n G e n e v a were " . . . w o r d for w o r d wha t B o b O w e n h a d draf ted ." I b i d . 2 2 9 I b i d . 2 1 . 2 3 0 T h e agreement w a s e v e n t u a l l y s i g n e d b y the three fo r e ign min i s t e r s - M a t s G r a n i c for C r o a t i a / B o s n i a n C r o a t s , M i l a n M i l u t i n o v i c for S e r b i a / B o s n i a n Serbs a n d M u h a m e d S a c i r b e y for the B o s n i a n G o v e r n m e n t 2 3 1 Roseg ran t a n d W a t k i n s , " G e t t i n g to D a y t o n : N e g o t i a t i n g an E n d to the W a r i n B o s n i a . " , H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 129. 2 3 2 R o s e g r a n t a n d W a t k i n s , " G e t t i n g to D a y t o n : N e g o t i a t i n g an E n d to the W a r i n B o s n i a . " 3 2 . 69 Holbrooke's team drafted the text, limiting changes by the Bosnian Serbs only to the 'softening' of the language.233 The Further Agreed Principles contained significant gains for the Bosnian Government by preserving key attributes of statehood for Bosnia Herzegovina. In addition, the JAP and the Further Agreed Principles cumulatively established a negotiating framework that would guide the Dayton negotiations. Their importance was twofold. First, the signing of two agreements helped build momentum going into Dayton. Second, these principles were used to assess proposals made by the parties. As the legal adviser on Holbrooke's mediation team, Bob Owen asserts: "One side or another would start arguing for a proposition that was inconsistent with the general principles, and we would say, 'no you can't do that.. .it's already been agreed to 934 in the three pages [of Basic Principles].'" Persuasion and Pressure Holbrooke employed varying levels and combinations of pressure and persuasion to get the parties to accept the guiding principles. The Bosnian Croats required little persuasion, as Tudjman had much to gain from a post conflict Bosnia based on these principles.235 In contrast, the Bosnian Government had serious reservations about what it perceived to be a thin interpretation of territorial integrity. Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbey initially refused to accept the ethnic partition of Bosnia into two entities that, he argued, compromised the viability 236 of a single Bosnia. The problem would resurface as the parties closed-in on an agreement in Dayton when Izetbegovic began reconsidering the foundations of the agreement. In response, Holbrooke framed the principles as not the 'ideal' but the best possible alternative for the Bosnian Government. These principles reflected the 'bottom line' of the international community, who would not devote the resources necessary to implement a thicker definition. Furthermore, these principles were the best way to (a) end an uncertain military contest; (b) achieve recognition of Bosnia's international boundaries and (c) give key attributes of statehood to the central government. When the Bosnian Government still threatened to veto the principles, 2 3 3 H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 177. 2 3 4 R o s e g r a n t a n d W a t k i n s , " G e t t i n g to D a y t o n : N e g o t i a t i n g an E n d to the W a r i n B o s n i a . " , H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 4 2 . 2 3 5 In fact, H o l b r o o k e agrees w i t h the a n a l y s i s o f M i s h a G l e n n y w h o s e N e w Y o r k T i m e O p - e d p r i o r to the N e w Y o r k m e e t i n g no ted that these p r i n c i p l e s w o u l d m a k e B o s n i a "u t t e r ly dependen t o n C r o a t i a e c o n o m i c a l l y . . . . T h e c h a m p a g n e c o r k s c a n be o p e n e d i n Z a g r e b . " H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 170 . 2 3 6 I b i d . 1 2 9 - 1 3 1 . 70 Holbrooke responded by threatening that the US would adopt a policy of 'Lift and Leave' that would leave the Bosnian Government's more vulnerable militarily.237 With respect to the Serbs, Milosevic did support the Geneva principles in spite of the condition that the Bosnian Serbs relinquish their secessionist claims. Specifically, these principles offered more to the Bosnian Serbs than the VOPP, which Milosevic had previously endorsed. As a result, Holbrooke's discussions with Milosevic focused on persuading and pressuring Milosevic that Pale's intransigence was unfairly burdening the region's other Serbs. As Greenburg and McGuinness observe: "The strategy was to keep drumming into Milosevic's head the devastating effects of the economic embargo against the FRY and to try to convince him to exert some control over the leadership in Pale."238 This tactic hinged on the assumption that Serbia's domestic preferences were shifting. Initially, the Serbian population was highly committed to the Bosnian Serbs and the vision of a Greater Serbia. However, support for the Bosnian Serbs weakened for two reasons. First, as part of a recent agreement between Serbia and Croatia, both parties accepted that the Krajina Serbs would remain part of Croatia, essentially putting an end to the dream of a Greater Serbia. Second, the impact of international financial sanctions, particularly oil sanctions, had taken their toll. Consequently, a growing number of Serbs (including influential ones like Milosevic) felt that the Bosnian Serbs were pursuing their interests without due consideration for the costs they imposed on Serbia. To be sure, Milosevic could not completely abandon the Bosnian Serbs, but changing political conditions would allow him to at least pressure Pale to recognise Bosnia's territorial integrity.239 To increase international support for his efforts and avoid the emergence of potential external spoilers, Holbrooke wanted to build a diverse international coalition.240 First, Holbrooke wanted to consolidate support within the US and among its traditional European allies. Second, he persuaded key non-state actors like the World Bank to publicly commit I b i d . 2 1 6 - 3 1 2 . T h i s p o l i c y w o u l d u n i l a t e r a l l y r e m o v e the a rms e m b a r g o agains t the B o s n i a n G o v e r n m e n t , but not p r o v i d e any m i l i t a r y ass is tance , l e a v i n g t h e m v u l n e r a b l e to b o t h the B o s n i a n Serbs a n d the i r s t i l l s h a k y a l l i e s , the B o s n i a n C r o a t s . 2 3 8 G r e e n b e r g and M c G u i n n e s s , " F r o m L i s b o n to D a y t o n : In ternat ional M e d a i t i o n a n d the B o s n i a C r i s i s . " 6 0 . 2 3 9 H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 7 2 - 7 3 ; 8 7 - 8 8 ; 159. 2 4 0 H o l b r o o k e u l t i m a t e l y r e a l i z e d that E u r o p e w o u l d be necessary to i m p l e m e n t an agreement at D a y t o n a n d p r o v i d e e c o n o m i c ass is tance to a r econs t ruc ted B o s n i a . T o this end , he kept t h e m i n f o r m e d a n d gave t h e m a presence at a l l mee t ings . Tha t sa id , he often ci tes the E u r o p e a n representa t ives as nu i sances too caught up i n bureaucra t i c p rocedure . F o r e x a m p l e see e x c h a n g e b e t w e e n h i m a n d U K ' s P a u l i n e N e v i l l e Jones . I b i d . 2 0 1 . 71 assistance to the parties if they came to an agreement. Finally, he targeted states that had 'special relationships' with the belligerents. He appealed to Turkey to press the Bosnian Government to accept the division of Bosnia into two entities. Likewise, he met repeatedly with the Russian envoy to the Contact Group as Russian support would be critical to getting Belgrade 949 and Pale to accept the Geneva principles. The Russians, though generally supportive of the principles, had opposed NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs and were arguing in the Security Council that sanctions against the FYR should be gradually reduced. Holbrooke was concerned that if Pale believed that more Russian support was forthcoming, its leaders would have little incentive to compromise. To avoid this problem, he ensured that Russia had a highly visible presence throughout the mediation in return for its support.243 As the international community's spokesperson, Holbrooke was eager to use the media spotlight to his advantage. As one US official quipped: "With Holbrooke.. .the new diplomatic initiative was assured high visibility."244 Holbrooke considered the media a critical medium for framing his principles. Every day, Holbrooke and his team planned a media message.245 As Holbrooke told Newsweek: "The press is a very important part of building momentum towards peace."246 Bob Owen went even further, recounting that: "... [I]f you got a piece of the mosaic in place, then announced it, it couldn't be taken away."247 The media could also be used to signal his intentions to the parties (particularly the Pale leadership that he refused to meet) as well as build support in the US and among key international actors.248 For example, in preparation for the Geneva meeting, Holbrooke did interviews with NBC's Meet the Press and the Los Angeles Times where he clearly implied that NATO would respond if Pale continued to oppose the principles to be presented in Geneva249 2 4 1 I b i d . 2 5 8 . 2 4 2 H o l b r o o k e c i t ed the i m p o r t a n c e o f ge t t ing these actors o n - b o a r d in a pe r sona l note to W a r r e n C h r i s t o p h e r o n A u g u s t 2 3 . See I b i d . 84 . 2 4 3 In G e n e v a , N e w Y o r k and D a y t o n , M o s c o w ' s e n v o y t o o k center stage at p u b l i c events a n d H o l b r o o k e agreed to h o l d a m e e t i n g be tween the par t ies in M o s c o w . 2 4 4 R o s e g r a n t and W a t k i n s , " G e t t i n g to D a y t o n : N e g o t i a t i n g an E n d to the W a r i n B o s n i a . " 2 1 . 2 4 5 I b i d . 3 7 . 2 4 6 T o m Pos t a n d M e l i n d a L i u , " B u t E n o u g h A b o u t M e : U . S . N e g o t i a t o r R i c h a r d H o l b r o o k e M a k e s Peace ~ a n d E n e m i e s , " Newsweek, S e p t e m b e r 2 5 1995 . 2 4 7 Roseg ran t a n d W a t k i n s , " G e t t i n g to D a y t o n : N e g o t i a t i n g an E n d to the W a r i n B o s n i a . " 2 1 . 2 4 8 F o r a d e s c r i p t i o n o f H o l b r o o k e ' s press strategy see H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 1 0 8 - 1 0 9 . 2 4 9 H e is care fu l to note that the International Herald Tribune and the New York Times a l so p i c k e d up these i n t e r v i e w s , thus i n c r e a s i n g the l i k e l i h o o d that they w o u l d r each Pa l e . I b i d . 9 0 - 9 1 . 72 After the signing of the JAP in Geneva, Holbrooke held a press conference to publicly lock-in the parties then sent assigned members of his mediation team to meet with journalists "to 9 SO be sure the story was properly reported." Namely, he wanted to disseminate the message that the Geneva principles reflected the first recognition of Bosnia's territorial integrity by Belgrade, while the next step would be to bolster these principles by agreeing to the powers of a central government. More specifically, he wanted to avoid the media framing the Geneva principles as US attempts to partition Bosnia, a frame that would undermine his support in the US and among the Bosnian Government's international allies.251 5.4 Holbrooke and the Bosnian Serbs: More Coercive Approaches Holbrooke argued that overcoming Pale's opposition to the principles required more coercive tactics than framing and persuasion. The Western mistake over the past four years had been to treat the Serbs as a rational people with whom one could argue, negotiate, compromise and agree. In fact, they respected only force or an unambiguous and credible threat to use it.252 Broadly, Holbrooke's strategy vis-a-vis Pale was twofold. First, he sought a sustained military campaign against the Bosnian Serbs to raise the costs of continued conflict. Second, he wanted to alienate Pale's representatives to the negotiations, instead making Milosevic responsible for the entire Serb delegation. Holbrooke contended that the Bosnian Serbs would accept the principles only if the perceived costs of continued conflict outweighed the costs of compromising. NATO air strikes, in conjunction with a successful Muslim-Croat Federation offensive, could roll back Pale's territorial gains and make its leaders more eager to seek peace. Therefore, Holbrooke constantly sought to remind Pale of the presence of US military power from threatening Pale with NATO intervention to the symbolism of holding the negotiations at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. To Holbrooke, US power (or the credible threat of its use) was necessary to force the Bosnian Serbs to abandon hope that they could overturn the guiding principles on the battlefield.253 2 5 1 I b i d . 141 . 2 5 2 I b i d . 152. 2 5 3 Roseg ran t a n d W a t k i n s , " G e t t i n g to D a y t o n : N e g o t i a t i n g an E n d to the W a r i n B o s n i a . " 19; H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 9 2 - 9 3 , 2 0 4 , 2 4 4 , 2 8 6 73 Therefore, on August 27, just days before the Geneva Meeting, Holbrooke used press interviews to publicly threaten punishing NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs if they did not cooperate. And, the following day when the Bosnian Serb paramilitary lobbed a mortar shell into a crowded Sarajevo market, Holbrooke implored NATO to respond with a sustained air campaign targeting key Serbian military installations.254 As Rosegrant notes: "Holbrooke had been careful to deny publicly any direct link between the bombing and the negotiations. But, in fact, he believed NATO's actions to be critical to his own effectiveness." In fact, when some US officials considered turning a temporary cessation of bombing into a permanent one, Holbrooke responded, "You must get the bombing resumed in order to give us the best chance for 9 SS negotiations." Not only would military setbacks diminish Pale's bargaining capacity, but they would also make it possible to impose a set of non-negotiable principles that rejected Pale's demand to secession. As previously noted, Holbrooke also pressed Milosevic to take responsibility for the entire Serb delegation. Whereas the Pale leadership maintained that it could not sign any agreement that recognized Bosnia's territorial integrity, Milosevic believed that the Geneva principles, though not ideal, protected the Serbs' core interests.256 Holbrooke gradually phased Pale out of the mediation process. Holbrooke never visited Pale, instead meeting with Milosevic in Belgrade.257 When Milosevic argued that this would make negotiations more difficult, Holbrooke retorted: "That is your problem."258 Publicly, Holbrooke stated that he could not meet with Karadzic and Mladic because the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia had indicted them for war crimes.259 Though Holbrooke's moral convictions were important, it is worth considering the strategic benefits of excluding Pale. After all, Holbrooke was also refusing to meet with other, unindicted members 2 5 4 T h e subsequent a i r c a m p a i g n w a s m u c h la rger than p r e v i o u s ' p i n p r i c k s , ' t a rge t ing B o s n i a n Se rb m i l i t a r y ins ta l l a t ions i n E a s t e r n B o s n i a as w e l l as near Sara jevo a n d T u z l a . H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 8 9 - 9 3 . 2 5 5 R o s e g r a n t a n d W a t k i n s , " G e t t i n g to D a y t o n : N e g o t i a t i n g an E n d to the W a r i n B o s n i a " : 2 1 - 2 2 . 2 5 6 H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 1 3 4 - 1 3 5 . 2 5 7 H o l b r o o k e met w i t h the P a l e l eadersh ip o n l y once to arrange an e n d to the s iege o f Sa ra jevo . A c c o r d i n g to H o l b r o o k e , the m e e t i n g w a s u n e x p e c t e d , t a k i n g p l ace ju s t ou t s ide B e l g r a d e d u r i n g a m e e t i n g w i t h M i l o s e v i c . H o l b r o o k e insis ts that K a r a d z i c and M l a d i c are not c o n s i d e r e d a separate de l ega t i on , bu t are nego t i a t i ng as part o f . M i l o s e v i c ' s de l ega t ion , m a k i n g M i l o s e v i c r e s p o n s i b l e for the i r conduc t . M o r e o v e r , he refuses to d i scuss any matters bes ides the s iege o f Sa ra jevo . I b i d . 152. 2 5 8 I b i d . 107. 2 5 9 I b i d . 107-108 . 74 of the Pale leadership. In fact, Holbrooke asserted that negotiating with Pale was "dangerously unproductive." Even by late September, Holbrooke noted: ... [T]he Pale Serbs had not really accepted the general concession to which Milosevic had committed them at Geneva - that Bosnia would remain a single state. Karadzic demanded the right to vote for secession...and attacked every provision [Bob] Owen's draft designed to create national structures... insisting that the Bosnian Serbs have a separate foreign policy a n d their o w n embassies.261 In late August, Karadzic made two back-channel attempts to meet directly with Holbrooke. Holbrooke rejected both invitations, noting: "Had we opened any of these doors, the course of the next three months would have been significantly different."262 Holbrooke's efforts to isolate Pale culminated on August 30, when Milosevic presented him with the so-called Patriach Paper. In it, Pale officially recognized Milosevic as the lead negotiator of the Serbian delegation giving him the authority to cast the deciding vote in the case of deadlock.263 To further isolate Pale, Holbrooke designed a negotiating table in Geneva and New York that could accommodate only a single member of each delegation, forcing the Bosnian Serb delegates to sit to the side.264 At Dayton, Holbrooke did allow the Republic Srpska to send representatives (as long they had not been indicted by the ICTY) as part of the Milosevic delegation. However, after an early meeting with Momcilo Krajisnik, then-Speaker of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, revealed his continued opposition to the single state, Holbrooke stated: "Krajisnik and his Bosnian Serb colleagues were truly nonpersons at Dayton."265 In the end, Presidents Izetbegovic, Tudjman and Milosevic initialed a General Framework Agreement, the so-called Dayton Accords, on November 25, 1995.266 Consistent with the principles established in Geneva, Bosnia would remain a single multi-ethnic state, albeit divided into two republics, the Republic Srpska and the Bosnian-Croat Federation. The Dayton Agreement was the culmination of weeks of hard bargaining. The map issue was particularly 2 6 0 I b i d . 9 8 . 2 6 1 I b i d . 177. 2 6 2 I b i d . 9 9 . 2 6 3 T h e Pa t r i a r ch Pape r was s i g n e d b y ( a m o n g others) M i l o s e v i c , K a r a d z i c , M l a d i c and w a s w i t n e s s e d b y P a t r i a r c h P a v l e the head o f the S e r b i a n O r t h o d o x C h u r c h . A s H o l b r o o k e no ted : "the d e c i s i o n to negot ia te w i t h B e l g r a d e and t ry to isolate P a l e h a d p r o d u c e d its first success . " 105-106 . 2 6 4 R o s e g r a n t a n d W a t k i n s , " G e t t i n g to D a y t o n : N e g o t i a t i n g an E n d to the W a r i n B o s n i a . " 24 . 2 6 5 H o l b r o o k e , To End a War. 2 4 3 ; 2 5 6 . 2 6 6 T h o u g h the B o s n i a n Se rb delegates ( fu r ious that they had been s i d e l i n e d ) i n i t i a l l y refused to i n i t i a l the agreement , M i l o s e v i c d e l i v e r e d the s ignatures o f the P a l e l eadersh ip ( i n c l u d i n g K a r a d z i c ) sho r t l y thereafter. See I b i d . 3 1 0 - 3 1 1 . 75 thorny and on several occasions almost caused the negotiations to collapse. Not surprisingly, most accounts of Holbrooke's mediation have focused on how he pushed the parties to make last minute territorial concessions. However, such accounts fail to adequately recognize the extent to which pre-negotiation efforts both shaped (a) what took place at Dayton and (b) the final peace settlement. In fact, without a coherent set of negotiating principles, Holbrooke would not have convened proximity talks at Dayton. To this end, these principles (and the international norms that constitute them) are integral parts of the mediation narrative in Bosnia. 76 Chapter 6: Conclusion 6.1 The Bosnian Case: General Findings As a plausibility probe, these cases demonstrate that mediators in Bosnia were concerned with ensuring that peace settlements conformed to international norms. In particular, the mediation experiences of Owen and Holbrooke highlight four similarities. First, Owen and Holbrooke maintained that a set of principles should be agreed to prior to formal negotiations as (a) a framework for subsequent talks and (b) to ensure that any peace settlement would be acceptable to international society. Second, there is surprising continuity in the principles developed by Holbrooke and those of Owen. On some points, the mediators remained firm throughout the conflict. In fact, Burg and Shoup argue that: "In the end, [Holbrooke] produced an agreement that closely resembled earlier European and Contact Group proposals."267 Broadly, both Owen and Holbrooke envisioned a single Bosnian state constituted by a multiethnic population and a federal structure. In particular, both Owen and Holbrooke took the position of the Badinter Commission, translating the international norm of territorial integrity into the condition that Bosnia's previous administrative boundaries are kept as its international ones. Likewise, they shared the view that self determination for the Bosnian Serbs would be realized through international minority rights guarantees and a decentralized state. To this end, what differentiated the Dayton Accords from the VOPP was less the design of constitutional principles for a post-conflict Bosnia, but the degree of decentralization. Put simply, Holbrooke had moved from a proposal for a decentralized to a proposal for an extremely decentralized one. As Touval argues, Holbrooke had the advantage of having most of the 968 'formula' already in place. The creation of a single Bosnian state, the recognition of minority rights, the federal structure of Bosnia and the internal division of Bosnia were all rooted in earlier plans. Some of the principles, particularly the need for minority rights, were generally uncontroversial, having already achieved a 'taken for granted' quality. Other principles like territorial integrity were the source of contention throughout the process. However, by the time Holbrooke had assumed mediation responsibilities, the previous ICFY agreements had B u r g a n d S h o u p , The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. 3 1 8 . T o u v a l , Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years 1990-1995. 153 -154 . 77 demonstrated to the Serbs that even if the international community would soften their interpretation of territorial integrity, secession violated the 'bottom line.' Third, Owen and Holbrooke defined these principles outside the negotiation. To determine what these principles should be, the mediators took direction from the normative context of international society. The principles were shaped by a mix of international precedent, organizational mandates and moral convictions rather than attempting to identify some middle-ground compromise between the parties. Furthermore, despite appeals from the parties (particularly Pale), the mediators refused to make these principles negotiable. On several occasions, Pale had signaled that they would make significant territorial concessions if they were permitted to secede. Nonetheless, the mediators ruled out this alternative. In taking this position, mediators were essentially dismissing Bosnian Serb claims without considering the merits of those claims. Not surprisingly, this compromised the perceived neutrality of the mediators and undermined their credibility among the Bosnian Serbs. In fact, Owen pursued these principles even though he admits that his insistence on the inviolability of Bosnia's boundaries would preclude getting an agreement. This behaviour suggests that mediators reduced the chances of agreement to ensure that the peace settlement was consistent with international norms. Finally, there are important parallels in the strategies used by the mediators to get party support for the negotiating principles. They both argued that, ideally, institutionalizing the principles in agreements and persuading the parties through strategic framing would legitimize these norms. These cases also demonstrate that where one or more of the parties cannot reconcile their interests with international norms, leverage is critical since mediators must essentially impose the principles on the reluctant party. To this end, they supported economic sanctions and even punitive military strikes to force Pale to concede its secessionist demands. As Saadia Touval points out: "It was obvious that achieving a settlement would require pressuring the disputants to accept the terms that fell short of their ambitions."269 The variation between the leverage available to Owen versus that available to Holbrooke largely explains (a) why Holbrooke was able to get the Serbs to ultimately concede their interest in seceding from Bosnia and (b) why Holbrooke was less flexible than Owen when it came to compromising on how to interpret the norms. However, such a conclusion is consistent with the constructivist 2 6 9 Ibid. 103. 78 approach (rather than a vindication of realism) since the application of rationalist means by mediators cannot be reduced to exogenous interests. Rather, these interests are constructed by the normative context of international society. In other words, the use of leverage by the mediators only makes sense because they took for granted that international society had expectations about what is an appropriate peace settlement. In sum, the Bosnian case not only suggests that international norms shape a logic of appropriateness for mediators, but is a useful microcosm for observing how mediators as agents diffuse international norms across parties in conflict. That said, the cases of Owen and Holbrooke provide only prima facie evidence in support of this approach. As such, it is worth extending this theoretical approach to other cases to see if the theory holds true. Adding further cases reduces the likelihood that a feature unique to the Bosnian conflict could explain the preoccupation of successive mediators with international norms. 6.2 Conclusions In conclusion, this thesis argues that mediators may behave in ways that do not maximize the probability of agreement in order to seek peace settlements that meet certain international standards of appropriateness. Such a conclusion, though not entirely new, has generally been ignored as a subject worth studying in traditional approaches to international mediation. For example, Zartman has casually noted that: "While most mediators work toward any solution that the parties to a conflict will accept, they usually have some guidelines of appropriateness and 270 some notions of stability." However, Zartman fails to elaborate on this point. In doing so, he significantly understates the significance of such restrictions. These restrictions on what is acceptable can concern the fundamental issues in dispute. Thus, it is important to understand why mediators impose these restrictions on themselves. This thesis, drawing on a constructivist approach, has suggested that a more complete explanation for mediator behaviour includes recognizing the role of professional and international norms in shaping the practice of international mediation. On one hand, their professional identity differentiates international mediators from other international and state actors. On the other, an international identity differentiates international mediators from domestic mediators. Building on Steven Ratner's 2 7 0 1. W i l l i a m Z a r t m a n , " T o w a r d the R e s o l u t i o n o f In te rna t iona l C o n f l i c t s , " i n Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, ed . I. W i l l i a m Z a r t m a n a n d J . L e w i s R a s m u s s e n ( W a s h i n g t o n : U S Institute o f Peace , 1997) : 6-7 . 79 'mediator as normative intermediary,' it demonstrates that mediator interests are at least partially informed by this international identity. In turn, this identity is constituted by international norms. These norms, such as territorial integrity and norms of minority rights, are translated by mediators into principles that underpin frameworks for negotiation; evaluate the proposals of the parties others; frame the negotiation discourse and make up the constitutive elements of a peace agreement. The goals for this thesis are modest ones. It does not seek to supplant traditional approaches to international mediation that focus on the material context in which mediation takes place nor the process that mediators bring to the conflict. It neither provides a definitive answer to what determines a mediator's probability of success, nor how we can improve the record of international mediation. Instead it complements traditional approaches by giving us a more complete understanding of international mediation. By making mediator behaviour rather than mediation outcome the dependent variable, we can gain a better understanding of the constraints that mediators face. Specifically, the scope of our investigation can move beyond negotiation theory and conflict studies to include more social theories of international relations. By understanding what motivates mediators and the normative constraints they face, we can better tailor prescriptions to realities. Additionally, this theoretical approach has ethical implications. If normative considerations are important for mediators, should the international community develop ethical guidelines for mediators, a so-called Code of Conduct? It is also my hope that this thesis has also offered some general insights into the most pressing issues for students of international relations concerned with the role of international norms. The work of international mediators provides a microcosm through which we can study the way norms spread in international society shedding more light on (a) the process of norm contestation, (b) norm diffusion among non-state groups, (c) how norms move through the system, (d) what strategy agents use to spread and norms and (e) how the actions of 'norm intermediaries' can change the content of the norm. In the end, my primary purpose is to implore students interested in constructivist approaches to world politics, to continue to refine our understanding of how specific types of agents can help move norms back and forth between the domestic level and international society. At the same time, it will undoubtedly leave a number of questions unanswered and maybe even raise new questions for further inquiry. This thesis has opened up a number of 80 avenues for future research. First, it is worth exploring the behaviour of international mediators operating in different social contexts. Such an investigation could focus on mediation across cultures or across organizations. For example, how do international mediators representing Thailand differ from European mediators? Are mediators working for NGOs specializing in conflict resolution as likely to push international norms as their state and IGO counterparts? In more general terms, if there is varying levels of internalization of norms across mediators what impact will this have on their behaviour? Finally, if agents and structures are mutually constitutive, then it is worth looking at feedback processes whereby mediators affect international norms. In the end, the widespread use of international mediation could help us move away from a realist outlook in which violent conflict is mediated only by the relative power of adversaries. 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