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Frontier Society : perpetuation and misrepresentation of humankind in outer space policy Blomfield, Hugo Dunon 2004

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Front ier Society: Perpetuat ion and Misrepresentat ion of Humankind in Outer Space Pol icy by Hugo Dunon Blomfie ld B.Sc. Natural Resources Conservat ion, The Universi ty of Brit ish Co lumbia , 2000 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN PLANNING in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (The School of Communi ty and Regional Planning) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 2004 © Hugo Dunon Blomfie ld JUBCl THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA FACULTY OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES Library Authorization In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholariy purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. 0 7 / | 0 IloOH Name of Author (please print) Date (dd/mm/yyyy) Title of Thesis: oV- vVw\(V/AfaA^L '\rv f)j\e/C ^ A L O , PS^OJ Degree: ity of British Columbia t ) (\ J /~» 1 _ ^— Department The Universit  Vancouver, BC Canada Abstract In January 2004, President George W. Bush announced a renewal of American space policy that encouraged the United States to return to the Moon by the year 2020 and thereafter proceed to Mars with human exploratory missions. This plan calls for NASA to lead a sustained human presence that would not only explore space, but also facilitate the growth of a burgeoning commercial space-based industry. This announcement was widely supported by the 1 international space community, a loosely affiliated group of people strongly bound by a persistent enthusiasm for the extraterrestrial extension of human settlement. The space environment however, is a peculiar legal and political domain ultimately governed by international treaties written at the United Nations. According to the UN, space is considered a 'global commons' whose use and development should only occur for the benefit of all humanity and future generations. The United States on the other hand, supports a worldview that, similar to its own settling sees the space environment as unclaimed territory whose development is open to whoever can face its challenges. By conducting an extensive literature review of international space treaties, United States civilian and military space policy documents, and the diverse opinions of the space community, this thesis exposes the conflicting worldviews for the use of outer space, ultimately highlighting the dangers to human sustainability of the competitive growth oriented paradigm. Plans for space exploitation expressing this worldview are critiqued using a set of principles developed to reflect the characteristics of more relevant space policy, with long-term human survivability as its fundamental purpose. Based on these principles, three scenarios depicting two possible and one preferable future are presented. These stories give the reader a realistic projection of potential directions that human expansion into space may follow. Ultimately, the preeminence of national sovereignty makes it virtually impossible to guide space activities for the benefit of all humankind and its future generations. Until humanity as an entity can be represented in the formulation of space policy, the regulatory environment of space will allow Earth's most powerful nations to project economic superiority. This expansionist worldview will ultimately undermine the Earth's ability to sustain human civilization. ii Table of Contents Abstract List of Figures and Tables Title 1. Prologue 2. Introduction 3. The Problem 1 4. Methods 2 4.1 Literature Review 2 4.2 Principles 2 4.3 Scenarios 2 5. The Worldviews 2 5.1. The United Nations 2 5.1.1. Founding of UNCOPUOS 2 5.1.2 Outer Space Treaty 2 5.1.3 Moon Agreement 2 5.1.4 The Last Quarter Century 5.2: The United States 5.2.1 Pioneers and the Western Frontier 5.2.2 Expansion and Manifest Destiny 5.2.3 The Spoils of War 5.2.4 The Sputnik Shock 5.2.5 The War of Words and Worldviews • 5.2.6 Shaping the Law 5.2.7. From Star Wars to Ground Forces • 5.2.8. The Doctrines of Preemption and Space Control • 5.2.9. From Ideology to Policy • 5.2.10. The Benefits of Transparency '• 6. The Principles 1 6.1. Sustainability 6.2. Ecological 1 6.3. Economic 1 6.4. Social ' 6.5. Cosmic 1 6.6. Multi-Generational 1 7. The Scenarios i 7.1. The Context i 7.2. Scenario 1: More Probable, Less Preferable ' 7.3. Scenario 2: Less Probable, Less Preferable ' 7.4. Scenario 3: Less Probable, More Preferable ' 8. Conclusions < 8.1. The Inevitability of Economic Hegemony < • 8.2. Game Theory and the Rationality of Cooperation I 8.3. The Paradox of Humankind < 8.3. A Need for Reflection I in List of Figures and Tables Table 5.1. United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space 24 Figure 5.1. Definitions of U.S. Air Force Space Command Mission Areas and Support for Space Control 55 Figure 5.2. Examples of U.S. Air Force Space Command Mission and Sub-Mission Areas for Space Control ..55 Figure 5.3. U.S. Air Force Space Command's Military Space Power Construct for Space Control 56 Figure 6.1. Interaction of Perspectives to Address Long-Term Human Survivability in the Space Industry...66 iv Frontier Society: Perpetuation and Misrepresentation of Humankind in Outer Space Policy By Hugo Dunon Blomfield A Thesis For: The School of Community and Regional Planning, University of British Columbia The International Space University 1 1. Prologue For the past year and a half, I have been in what could be interpreted as an academic limbo. I am officially a student of the School of Community and Regional Planning at the University of British Columbia; however I have spent the majority of my time and effort studying the perceptions and policies for the utilization of outer space at the International Space University, based out of Strasbourg, France. My friends and associates at planning school would ask me what space has to do with planning; while my friends and associates at space school would ask me what planning has to do with space. To me both disciplines are inherently linked, and I am fascinated by the consistent ignorance I have perceived about this relationship in both academic fields. The visions of 'space planners' will shape the direction of human development. However, many of them are unaware of or even unwilling to understand the social, economic, and ecological complexities of human society. Meanwhile, 'Earth planners' are completely oblivious to the influence of space policy in shaping the longer-term visions of human development. Both carry on, unaware of each other, towards a path of unsustainability. The study of space more often than not means the exclusion of Earth. This is the case at the International Space University's (ISU) Summer Session Program (SSP), an intense and valuable program that I have been involved with for the past 18 months, a program that relocates to a different university around the world each year. According to the SSP 2004 Program Handbook, ISU's credo is to be "an institution dedicated to the development of the human species, the preservation of its home planet, the increase of knowledge, the rational utilization of the vast resources of the Cosmos, and the sanctity of Life in all terrestrial and extraterrestrial manifestations" [ISU, 2004]. At the 2004 SSP in Adelaide Australia however, out of fifty-nine mandatory lectures there is not even one covering the topics of human socio-economic development or the evolution and properties of Earth's ecological life-support systems. In training the next generation of space leaders, ISU perpetuates a fundamental flaw prevalent in the space community: the complete omission of any human-ecological context. This misaligned perception means that the space community is completely unsuited to plan for humanity's long-term future, a task it has already assigned itself. This thesis addresses this problem. 2 2. Introduction The purpose of this thesis is to highlight the diametrically opposed worldviews that shape the visions and policies of both the United Nations and the United States for the future development of outer space. I argue that if long-standing human predispositions for mistrust, competition and growth, characteristics deeply ingrained in the American position, are extended to extraterrestrial expansion and development, the survivability of Homo sapiens will be compromised. A shift in perception amongst the space community, especially its leaders and policy-makers, towards one that values cooperation and mutually reliant behaviour would provide the necessary environment for the industry to address more fundamental challenges to human security such as ecological degradation, economic inequity, and social unrest. By leading the expansion into space without such a shift, the United States and its space enthusiasts risk inviting criticism and condemnation from less developed nations whose economies have been burdened by centuries of colonialism and who have minimal hope of competing in the expensive yet lucrative business of space development. Such a fate would only reinforce socio-economic inequity across the world, thus furthering the desperation felt by the world's growing disadvantaged. In an age where some are envisaging human outposts on the Moon and even the manipulation of Mars' hostile environment to render it habitable, others must rely on the crude extraction of resources from increasingly degraded ecological systems on Earth for their mere survival. Not only does this process undermine the globally interconnected life support systems that allow our species to exist and reproduce worldwide, but it forces human beings to resort to even more desperate measures to upset the balance of power and raise awareness of their subjugation. Lately, this has taken the form of international terrorism, a brutally indiscriminate and unpredictable phenomenon that spreads fear and insecurity across the planet. The space community believes it is charged with securing the future for humanity and it often looks outwards for answers; perhaps an introspective approach is needed first in order to address the greatest dangers threatening the survivability of our species. 3 This thesis is written not from the perspective of an aerospace engineer with expertise in the finer details of the space industry, but of a human ecologist educated in resource conservation and community and regional planning, rare credentials not readily found in the space community. My experience in space policy however is extensive, and stems from a long-time personal interest, to Masters-level research under the auspices of ecological planning and economics, and finally to my on-going involvement with the International Space University, where I attended its Summer Session Program (SSP) '03 in Strasbourg, France as a student, and where I returned as the teaching associate for the Space and Society Department at the SSP '04 in Adelaide, Australia. Within the space community I have experienced, a lack of academic diversity and dissenting opinions are increasingly rendering it incapable of addressing fundamental issues of human progress and evolution that should ultimately be the reason for its existence. While the vast majority of the community looks outwards to futures of an interplanetary civilization, very real threats stemming from human behaviour itself are rapidly undermining not only these visions but also the ability of Homo sapiens to productively exist in its current stage of evolution. I see great value in the space industry as it currently stands, but strongly believe in its irrelevancy if these more fundamental issues are not addressed. In fact, with its unique global perspective, its ability to link the planet technologically, and its efforts to increase international collaboration, I would argue that the space industry is an aptly poised institution to lead humanity towards a new worldview of benignity and cooperation. However, as long as it remains dominated by a monoculture of western technocrats and heavily guided and funded by military institutions that rely on mistrustful, competitive, and growth-oriented policies, the space industry will only continue to contribute to the ultimate demise of humanity. I use the terms 'space community' and 'space industry' loosely and interchangeably, referring to the 'community' when speaking of the human perspectives and policies of civilian and military space agencies, private entrepreneurs, and independent theorists, and the 'industry' when speaking of the whole human-technological infrastructure active in the numerous 4 different sub-fields of space-based research, from Earth observation to the search for extraterrestrial intelligence, and all in between. However, it would be inaccurate to suggest that all space-related activities around the world fall under the global coordination of one single space agency. Instead, many countries have many different interests in space ranging from the military maneuvering and planetary exploration prowess of the United States, to the monitoring of sea level rises by the small Pacific nation of Tuvalu. One of these countries however, is obviously more influential and autonomous in the space industry than the other. And so when it comes to approving treaties that form the basis for international space law and thus govern the code of conduct beyond Earth's atmosphere, powerful nations such as the United States essentially dictate the worldview with which these activities will take place. This has resulted in condoning the use of a global common good to serve the national interests of a few already privileged nations, despite objections about the blatant and persistent inequities suffered by developing countries due in much part to the past colonial activities of these same few wealthy nations. This is certainly not a new trend in human history, but one that should be viewed as undermining human security. This example makes it clear that the space industry -and its community - is indeed bound to a certain degree, not just by international law but also by the paradigm and behaviour of its most powerful members. Existing in some ways as a single entity then, the space community can theoretically achieve solidarity and promote a common worldview that better reflects the needs of humanity. I would argue that its relevancy depends on it. In comparison with the lofty and benevolent visions of some well-known space visionaries such as Gerard O'Neill [1977], Carl Sagan [1994], and Robert Zubrin [1999], the space industry is still in its crude infancy. The world's first artificial satellite, Sputnik I, was launched only in October of 1957 and the first human to orbit Earth, Yuri Gagarin, flew in April 1961. Both feats were accomplished by the Soviet Union in a time of escalating military and ideological tension with the United States, following their precarious alliance during the Second World War. The launch of Sputnik I however, was not met with international objection but was instead widely 5 praised, effectively writing into international law the right of satellite overflight of national territories. At this time, the legality of satellite overflight was a policy goal of the United States and the Soviet achievement of this de facto right was a significant step for American space policy towards its aim for satellite reconnaissance of the Soviet Union [Mowthorpe, 2002]. And so began the Cold War space race that serves as the origins of today's space industry, an institution with global reach built on a worldview of mistrust and competition in the name of national interests. The launching of Sputnik I thrust the world into an entirely new kind of international diplomacy, as up to then/outer space was only the realm of science fiction and did not fall under any governing body. Legitimate questions of legality, sovereignty, and the general intentions of nations compelled the United Nations General Assembly to establish an 18 member ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), which was formed to consider various elements such as the ability of the UN to spearhead international cooperation, the resources at its disposal to promote the peaceful uses of outer space, and legal problems that might arise in programs to explore outer space [UNCOPUOS, 2004]. In 1959, the Committee was established as a permanent body of the UN and shortly thereafter, the General Assembly, in a belief that the United Nations should be the focus for international cooperation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, requested that the Committee draft a resolution outlining its mandate. UNCOPUOS's very first move was to recommend the extension of the United Nations Charter to outer space, which was accepted, thus extending human rights and the values of the UN beyond the Earth. Today, the Committee contains 65 members and is one of the largest in the United Nations, tasked with representing the interests of superpowers and nations of third world stature alike. The worldview that UNCOPUOS operates under, although perhaps not representative of all individual member nations, is entirely different from the one that spawned the space industry in the first place. Rather than competition for national interests, the UN believes the realm of 6 outer space to be the province of all humankind and its future generations and that the exploration and use of space should benefit and be in the interests of all countries irrespective of their economic and scientific development [Gehrig, 1967]. Formulating this benign perception of space was vital in order to deal with long-standing inequities that many member nations continue to experience. It was hoped that by creating a future of peaceful international cooperation in outer space, any future wealth and innovation developed from space-related activities would help remedy these socio-economic imbalances. UNCOPUOS would attempt to create this preferable future through a series of treaties designed to legally bind its members to a set of mutually agreed principles that would reflect its peaceful and cooperative mandate. The first and most significant treaty, which still forms the basis for international space law today, was the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, or more commonly know as the Outer Space Treaty (OST). The Soviet Union, United States, and Great Britain served as Depositary Governments for this treaty, with signings occurring simultaneously in Moscow, Washington, and London [UNCOPUOS, 2004]. The OST lays the foundation for the UN's perception of space and could also be viewed as endowing a general legal basis for the peaceful uses of outer space, while providing a framework for the development of outer space law. This perception is based on the premise that all of humanity has a vested interest in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space and that it should be carried out for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development. It is the ultimate belief of the UN that such meaningful international cooperation will "contribute to the development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples" [UNCOPUOS, 1999]. Despite its widespread acceptance, the OST, like many other international treaties, can only go so far in regulating the activities if its signatories. Although the fundamental principles of the treaty were all agreed upon, some delegates felt it did not go far enough to ensure equal opportunity for developing nations. Of 7 specific concern were the private appropriation of extraterrestrial resources, which was not explicitly forbidden under the OST, and the ability of the international community as a whole to influence the activities of individual nations within this newly opened global commons. A future treaty would attempt to address these concerns, but would ultimately fail. This ill-fated treaty would be the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, more commonly known as the Moon Agreement. While the Outer Space Treaty set general perceptions and guidelines of the activities of sovereign nations in space, the Moon Agreement was a substantial attempt to specifically regulate these activities in the interest of all nations. In order to address the issue of unfair competition between established spacefaring countries and developing nations, the Moon Agreement explicitly forbade all appropriation of resources, whether by private, national, or international means, and called for the establishment of an 'international regime' to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies. The specific purpose of this regime would be to ensure the rational management of those resources and the equitable sharing of all subsequent benefits, with special consideration given to the interests and needs of developing countries [UNCOPUOS, 1999]. If widely accepted, this treaty would bring into law a set of guidelines that would support the paradigm of cooperation and mutual reliance so sought after by the United Nations. However, it was not. Specific criticism from the United States that equitable sharing posed a substantial tax on lunar development and rewarded nations that put nothing at risk forced many other nations to follow suit and reject the Moon Agreement. In the end, it received only ten ratifications and five signatures1, and thus does little service to the international community. Aside from a few smaller scale regional agreements, the 1979 Moon Agreement was the last treaty to be drafted by UNCOPUOS. So as it 1 Ratification implies full acceptance of all articles in the Treaty by a nation's governmental authority as well as the legal responsibility to uphold those articles. A signature on the other hand implies that the delegates of a nation agree to the terms of the Treaty but are not legally bound by them, as only their specific branches of government with law-passing authority may accept the Treaty into national law. A signature does not necessarily mean ratification is inevitable. Representatives of a specific nation may sign a Treaty, but the decision-making authority of their government may refuse its ratification. 8 stands, a worldview inspired by competition and growth for the sake of national interests has won precedence in the space industry. Despite its physical weakness and poor adaptation to Earth's variable climate, Homo sapiens has succeeded in becoming the planet's dominant species through the use of technology and unrelenting competitive behaviour. Humans have always been a cooperative species, but only to the extent that cooperation met the needs and wants of localized, self-defined groups. As populations grew and diversified, racial, cultural, or political groups began defending their own interests at the expense of others as well as at the expense of other species and natural environments. Competition often became the only means of survival, and those societies that displayed a greater and more unforgiving ability to out-compete have passed down their behaviour to the present. Competitive growth is now viewed as an entirely legitimate and in fact desired strategy for human success, productivity, and evolution. This neo-liberal economic worldview however, fails to take into consideration the finite resource base on which our increasingly expanding civilization depends. Humanity is wholly dependent on and embedded within a complex hierarchy of self-organizing ecological systems that form a living global structure within which we have evolved and will always rely on for survival. Using a space-related analogy, this network of life, properly known as the ecosphere, can be viewed as humanity's life support system, and just like any other complex system, it has countless inputs, outputs, networks, and cycles that are inherently uncertain and virtually impossible to predict. We have not yet come close to understanding the full extent of its properties and how human activity influences it. A fault of humanity's and certainly that of the space community is a belief in the role of technology in alleviating us from these biophysical constraints. We evolved within Earth's ecosphere and no matter where we live we require its properties to survive. There may indeed be vast quantities of valuable resources in outer space, but there is only one Earth, whose life-supporting ecosphere is by far our most valuable resource. And so, as space enthusiasts look outwards to human outposts throughout the solar system believing them to be a necessity for our expanding civilization, the same growth-obsessed species is quickly 9 undermining the ability of Earth to sustain us all; all before such significant development could even take place. More importantly however, we risk extensively disrupting Earth's life support systems, forcing them to a state that is potentially hostile to human progress or perhaps even basic subsistence, all before we properly understand their properties and our impacts on them; and all in the name of growth. It is thus the purpose of this thesis to expose the dangers to human progress and survivability caused by the competitive and expansionist American-led worldview that perceives outer space as unclaimed territory ripe for development, and argue in favour for the UN supported paradigm of space as common resource in order to better address the more pressing issues of ecological degradation and socio-economic inequity. 3. The Problem On January 14, 2004, the President of the United States, George W. Bush, announced a new vision for that nation's space exploration program, one that has significant impacts on the rest of the world. According to an official White House fact sheet, the fundamental goal of this vision is to "advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests through a robust space exploration program" [White House, 2004]. In support of this goal, President Bush outlined four strategic initiatives, which include: • Implementation of a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond; • Extension of human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations; • Development of innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations for human exploration; and • Promotion of international and commercial participation in exploration to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests [White House, 2004]. To members of the space community, Bush's announcement injects a new sense of purpose and direction into American and thus international space policy, which was in dire need of a boost following the on-going delays and budget overruns of the International Space Station, the tragic disintegration of the Columbia Space Shuttle, and the subsequent grounding of the remaining 10 Shuttle fleet. More recent NASA successes such as the Hubble Space Telescope and the landing of twin rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, on opposite sides of Mars, have reasserted America's role as Earth's preeminent space-faring nation, giving the President the necessary leverage to announce such a bold and ambitious strategy. To space enthusiasts, this new vision finally gives meaningful political support to an old desire to see our species spread throughout the Solar System, whetting their long-suppressed appetite for extending the frontiers of human settlement. The space community is a unique movement that for all intents and purposes has assigned itself the task of planning humanity's long-term future. This is a somewhat hubristic display of its purpose given the disproportionate number of Western technophiles that fill its ranks, hardly an adequate representation of the human species2. The social, economic, and ecological ills of our planet are often glossed over or completely overlooked when drafting plans for these preferred futures. When actually mentioned, opinions are consistently one-sided, dramatically over-simplified, or just plain wrong. Such is the case with the opening sentence of Patrick Collins' article Meeting the needs of the new millennium: passenger space travel and world economic growth, when he states that "without doubt, humans' most urgent need at the start of the new millennium is the continuation of economic growth, which is the only means by which the great majority of the world population can lift themselves out of the poverty in which they live" [Collins, 2002]. Many social, ecological, and even economic specialists would doubt the validity of this statement, yet it is published without rebuttal. Only faint voices of criticism can be heard in the peer-reviewed journals of Space Policy and Advances in Space Research. So when the President of the United States, Commander in Chief of today's only superpower, announces a plan to lead the rest of the world in shaping an inter-planetary Attending the International Space University's Summer Session Program in Strasbourg, France, from July to September 2003, I was the only student pursuing a degree in social and/or environmental studies out of approximately 110 students from over 30 countries. The vast majority of students and faculty were trained in the various disciplines of engineering related to space activities. Although proclaiming to be a truly international university, the majority of faculty derived from the United States, Canada, and Western Europe. Developing nations were truly underrepresented at all levels, from student to administration. 11 civilization, one would expect more meaningful debate beyond the usual financial and technological doubts. It is my intention to initiate this discussion. Perhaps the most fundamental problem facing the space community, and for that matter the international community as a whole, is the lack of an unambiguous and binding set of guidelines that regulate how and why the development of extraterrestrial space should occur. The cornerstone of space law, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), drafted by the United Nations' Committee on the Peaceful uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), also serves as the only internationally recognized plan, if it can be called that, governing how space shall be used. Nearly four decades obsolete, the OST is sufficiently vague to allow maximum freedom for sovereign nations to conduct activities in space. Fundamentally, the OST establishes that these activities should forward 'mankind's' [sic] common interest in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. The central tenet of 'peaceful purposes' however has never been defined and so has been open to interpretation. With only a handful of nations active in outer space, the leeway to interpret the law is almost exclusively used to serve the national interests of these few already fortunate countries. Little consideration is paid to the greater global community. The Soviet Union and the Russian Federation that followed it have traditionally equated 'peaceful purposes' with 'non-military' purposes, whereas the United States has equated it to 'non-aggression' [Arcus, 2003]. This interpretation of what constitutes a peaceful use of outer space is reiterated in U.S. domestic law and policy since the 1950's. The Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 provides that it is "the policy of the United States that activities in space shall be devoted to peaceful purposes" while simultaneously allowing military forces to conduct activities in space with respect to the "the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States" [Arcus, 2003]. The debate as to whether military activities should be permitted in outer space is beyond the scope of this thesis, but what should be clear is the ambiguity of the language drafted to govern the activities permitted in the development of outer space. When considering the potential value of extraterrestrial resources (perhaps as much as $100 billion per each person on Earth, 12 according to space enthusiast John S. Lewis [1996]) and the technological innovation derived from a well-funded space industry, the freedom to interpret international law allows already advantaged nations to gain the economic and security benefits of outer space while leaving indebted nations little opportunity to compete. This lopsided competition merely serves the interests of a few and does little to 'benefit the interests of all countries irrespective of their economic and scientific development', a fact that has considerable socio-economic consequences. It could be argued that the space-related activities of these privileged few nations would generate new technologies and provide access to new resources that in turn would benefit all of humanity, just as military research and war have helped people around the world see in the dark or pinpoint their location in remote areas. This is partially true, however economic competition in space would merely make more wealth and technology available. Policy dictates to whom it is allocated. Therefore, if the development of outer space is inevitable, then the worldview with which it takes place is of the utmost importance. The vast and alien world beyond the Earth's atmosphere has awed and inspired generations of stargazers and expansionists alike. While the former have pondered the origins and extent of life and the universe, the latter have dreamed of immeasurable wealth, adventure, and distant outposts of human settlement. Always guilty of anthropocentricism, humans dream of the possibilities, look up and ask: 'who owns outer space?' According the United Nations, the correct answer is 'all of us'. Perhaps a more appropriate answer would be 'none of us'. Either way, the sad reality is that humans have not always been the best at sharing, a product of an evolutionary trait that binds us to compete for survival. Competition has always been a hallmark of international space policy, especially since its roots are found in Cold War sparring between the Soviet Union and the United States. Much of today's space technology and achievements are a direct result of the competing national interests among the superpowers of the time. More recently, international cooperation led by the United States has become a central principle of activities in space; however, it tends to only include a small number of allied nations that are already privileged in this field to begin with. Cooperation is not 13 extended to the majority of nations that need it the most. Sometimes cooperation is even withheld from nations that truly deserve it, as is the case of China, who recently became only the third nation to launch a human into space. This monumental achievement was met with a degree of suspicion from the U.S. [ISUTALK Digest, 2004]. Despite going as far as building a docking ring on their Shenzhou spacecraft that would allow it to dock with the International Space Station (ISS), the Chinese are perceived as a threat to American supremacy in military, communications, reconnaissance, and tracking satellites, and so an invitation to join the ISS team was not extended to the world's most populous country [ISUTALK Digest, 2004]. With its program under military control and its own ambitious plans for a Moon mission, China is perceived as a competitor, not a collaborator, a distinction that will only fuel future suspicion between the two nations. Considering the vast amount of capital invested in its space programs and the potential gains to be made from extraterrestrial space and its resources, the United States is justifiably exercising its national sovereignty when it decides to exclude China. However, such behaviour, legitimized by the lack of more comprehensive and binding international space treaties, only serves to destine humanity to repeat past mistakes that have resulted in centuries of warfare, inequity, and ecological degradation. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) is also the rule of law when it comes to the sovereignty of nations and private property rights in outer space. Article II of the OST forbids the "national appropriation by claims of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means of outer space, including the moon, and other celestial bodies" [Pop, 2000]. A continued controversy over this Article stems from a clear emphasis on national appropriation, with no explicit mention of the exclusion of private appropriation of extraterrestrial resources3. Many proponents of expansion and development argue that this purposeful omission explicitly legalizes the private appropriation of such resources, and thus they continue to promote a 3 It should be noted that outer space resources are not exclusively restricted to minerals, water, and gases found on the Moon or other celestial bodies; they can also include non-physicat resources such as orbital trajectories and segments of the radio spectrum used for communications. The high altitude perspective from space is perhaps the most valuable space resource of all, allowing detailed observation of anywhere on the planet. This perspective is vital for a wide range of applications, from the tracking of endangered whales to the targeting of satellite-guided weapons. 14 first-come first-serve policy of how development should occur. At the time of its drafting, the chief opponents of this Article were representatives of developing nations, who argued that a commercial space race would exacerbate already deep socio-economic disparities, since only a small proportion of the world's citizens, found mainly in a few developed nations, could actually gain access to such resources in the first place. Many of these opponents blamed Western exploitation for the ongoing discrepancy in global wealth, and sought to promote interventionist and redistributionist economic policies as a means of reducing or eliminating wealth differences between Western and non-Western nations [Reynolds, 1995]. Despite these objections, support for the Treaty was especially strong amongst U.S. and other Western delegates and was thus passed into law. The ambiguous wording of the treaty provided a basis for interpretation that could be used to benefit national and not global interests. Over a decade later and after the world witnessed continued Soviet and American prowess in outer space culminating with multiple Apollo lunar landings, a serious attempt was made to deal with the ambiguity of the OST; specifically, to address the contentious issues of property rights and the overall inequitable nature of space activities. Drafted for ratification in 1979, the Moon Agreement purposely contained strong, unambiguous language to this effect, declaring that: • The Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind; • Neither the surface, subsurface, nor any natural resources of the Moon shall become the property of any state, international, intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national organization or non-governmental entity, or of any natural person; and • States parties to this agreement hereby undertake to establish an international regime to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon [Reynolds, 1995], This treaty's strong tone went even as far as to suggest the rational management and equitable distribution of space capital, specific language that essentially mandated the redistribution of wealth accumulated from space activities from developed to developing nations. The Agreement was widely heralded as a breakthrough in alleviating historic wealth discrepancies, 15 raising hope that the United Nation's governance of the vast wealth of space would finally bring much needed equity to the world. Such a treaty would have constituted more of a sensible plan for the future development of the Moon and beyond for the benefit of all humanity. However, it met strong opposition from the United States, an obvious leader in the space industry. Due to this antagonism, the Moon Agreement acquired only ten ratifications and five signatures and thus cannot serve as a standard for the whole international community [Pop, 2000]. The attempt to strengthen the language of international space law and draft equitable policy for the development of a common good bowed under the weight of national self-interest. The substance of the American argument against the Moon Agreement was that its common heritage principle would serve as a substantial disincentive to development. Most notably, the U.S. was unhappy about the ban on property rights and the creation of a monopolistic international regime that would govern the exploitation of lunar resources for the benefit of all nations. Further concerns were raised about the concepts of 'orderly development' and 'equitable sharing', which were seen as imposing a substantial tax on lunar development [Reynolds, 1995]. After spending decades and billions of dollars to achieve its own prestigious space industry, the United States understandably saw these mandates as benefiting nations that put nothing at risk and thus promoted free-riding on its achievements. The rejection of this treaty and the principles it stood for, dealt a significant blow to the paradigm that space is res communis, communal land whose resources are owned by all members of the world community and its future generations, a paradigm ultimately supported by the United Nations. Left standing is a worldview that has historical significance in the expansion of colonial empires of the past few centuries that saw today's developed nations accumulate great wealth by appropriating the resources of less developed colonies. Reminiscent of perceptions towards Africa, Australia, and the Americas prior to European colonization, this worldview sees outer space as res nullius, or unclaimed territory with no owner whose resources are open for appropriation by whoever arrives and claims them first [Pop, 2000]. This historical expansion 16 and colonization was performed under the auspices of national stature, as well as scientific, security, and economic self-interest, the same justifications for George W. Bush's new space policy. When announcing his new policy, the President invoked nostalgia for this colonial past when he remarked that "two centuries ago, Meriwether Lewis and William Clark left St. Louis to explore the new lands acquired in the Louisiana Purchase. They made that journey in the spirit of discovery to learn the potential of the vast new territory and to chart the way for others to follow. America has ventured forth into space for the same reasons" [NASA, 2004]. But historically speaking, many shortcomings of this policy are blatantly obvious. Significant damage and destruction of Earth's ecological life support systems and deep-rooted economic inequities have left the planet a much less secure place to live, as can be seen with considerable threats from global climate change and social unrest in the form of international terrorism and war. Perhaps this is an opportunity to learn from past mistakes in order to ensure that humanity's next expansion is founded on a paradigm of benign cooperation and not competitive growth, a fate that can only help improve human survivability. With respect to human expansion and the development of extraterrestrial space, we have the power of hindsight that our colonizing predecessors may not have fully grasped. Although a relative few have come out from this era better off, the vast majority of our planet lives in poverty and squalor. Is this the true image of a space-faring civilization? Only by acknowledging and learning from the past can the human species truly plan for the distant future. Herein lies the fundamental challenge facing the space community, and for that matter, humanity as a whole. We have reached a point in our evolution where it is in our rational self-interest to change the worldview on which our civilization has been built, from one of mistrust, competition, and growth to one based on cooperative, mutually reliant behaviour. The visionary prowess of the space community is undeniably valuable. However its concepts are based on an outdated paradigm that is increasingly jeopardizing our own survival. I would argue that the perpetual existence of our species should be the fundamental goal of the space industry, and this means eliminating many deeply ingrained, destructive habits. 17 If Lewis' [1996] suggestions that accessible extraterrestrial resources are valued at $100 billion for each inhabitant of Earth are even remotely reasonable, then developing space may perhaps be a viable avenue to reduce poverty and inequity around the world, but not with competition and economic growth as foundations of international space policy. The undermining of our planet's life support systems, economic inequity, and social unrest are real threats to human survivability, yet the few introspective, albeit limited, space projects such as NASA's Mission to Planet Earth are being scuttled in favour of more adventurous, expansionary plans. In fact, some theorists support expansion into space for this very reason: that conditions on Earth are no longer ideal and thus it is time for a change [Billings, 1997]. Similarly outrageous is the belief that we have accomplished everything we can on Earth, and thus space is our next destination. This is the attitude of Dr. Robert Zubrin, author of NASA's humans-to-Mars mission plan and president of the Mars Society, when he states that "the Earth's challenges have largely been met, and the planet is currently in the process of effective unification. I believe this marks the end, not of human history, but of the first phase of human history... It is not the end of history because, if we choose to embrace it, we have in space a new frontier offering endless challenge - an infinite frontier, filled with worlds waiting to be discovered and history waiting to be made by myriad new branches of human civilization waiting to be born" [Zubrin, 1999]. These are the erroneous and simplistic visions that render the space community impotent in playing a meaningful role in the successful survival and evolution of humanity. There are still fundamental problems that must be solved on Earth before we are even able to begin to coordinate the massive quantity of people, energy, and resources needed to explore the cosmos. We have not even learned to trust one another. Before looking for solutions far beyond our present horizon, leaders and policy makers of national and international space programs as well as private advocacy groups must address the fundamental issues of mistrust, competition, and growth that have shaped our civilization. The space industry already is a model of global cooperation, scientific discovery, and spiritual 18 reflection, all of which can add great value to our species and its futures. This merit should be embraced by the space industry and used as the raison d'etre for its continued existence. Space provides a unique perspective of our home planet and its life in which we are all embedded. It can be used for climate modeling, ecosystem health monitoring, disaster mitigation, treaty compliance, and the coordination of humanitarian efforts, just to name a few. This same perspective however, is also highly effective for prospecting, spying, and conducting warfare. It is time leaders in the space community step forward and profess their commitment towards shifting our collective worldview towards one that sees no value in the competitive and strategic uses of outer space. I admit that this is perhaps a Utopian ambition, but one that is undeniably critical in ensuring a trusting, benign, productive and ultimately lasting civilization. What strikes me the most is the lack of realization that it is in the social, economic, and security interests of the developed world to support this paradigm. Evolutionary habits are not insurmountable but are indeed hard to break. It is the purpose of this thesis to address the following research objectives. The first is to expose the conflicting values that serve as foundations for the United Nations' res communis perception of space and the United States' championed res nullius paradigm, and the dangers the latter poses to human survivability. The second is to argue that it is in our rational self-interest to shift from a worldview dominated by competition and mistrust to one that is founded on cooperative and mutually reliant behaviour, and that the space community should lead this shift. The third and final objective of this thesis is to develop a set of qualities or characteristics that would define a mutually beneficial space program, and broadly how such an institution would differ from what currently exists. 19 4. Methods The methodology I use in this thesis consists of three elements: a literature review, the development of a set of principles by which to judge a space program, and the creation of three scenarios, two possible and one preferred. Using these three methods, I contribute to the thesis a unique variety of information in the form of historical precedence, an analysis of space policy based on my education in resource conservation and human-ecological planning, and possible directions that activities in space may take in the future. This approach will help create a cohesive and coherent argument free of technical jargon that often isolates space-related publications, most of which are written as if only to be read by other space enthusiasts. The aim of this thesis is to be palatable to a wider audience, specifically those within the academic field of planning, but also to the international community as a whole. This methodology will support clear and succinct arguments that will help readers unfamiliar with the space industry and its community to understand the fundamental issues and why indeed change is needed. 4.1 Literature Review When conducting the literature review, I purposely sought three specific classes of information that are especially pertinent to my arguments. The first class is the official space policy of the United Nations and the United States government, a resource that permits a direct comparison of each institution's incentives for the use and exploration of outer space. The second is a historical analysis of American expansionism and competition. This historical outlook, from its initial settlement through the Cold War and to the present, provides an essential perspective of American values and national interests that ultimately influence the formulation of its space policy. Also, by describing the past in detail, future directions can be projected with greater confidence and realism. The third class of information I specifically researched and will use is the perceptions and values of space enthusiasts and their rationales for using space. Although these perceptions certainly vary, there are common themes in the literature that reveal a 20 regular tendency by the space community to omit any human-ecological context within their plans. By highlighting these shortcomings, I will argue that in its current form, the space community can do little to plan for humanity's survival and is in fact ultimately contributing to our unsustainability. Cutting across these three classes of information is the use of nostalgic language that invokes images of historic human expansion, specifically that of the American frontier. By highlighting even the unintentional use of this language, I will stress that even the most progressive members of the space community are still exercising an ultimately unsustainable worldview. 4 . 2 P r i n c i p l e s In order to make criticisms of current space programs as well as suggest what qualities would be desirable in future programs, I will develop a set of principles by which such programs and policies can be judged. These principles will also be an important reference when reading the scenarios of potential future directions the space industry might take, which can found in the following section. These principles will be based on my own personal opinions, reflecting my educational background in environmental conservation and community and regional planning. 4.3 Scenar ios Scenario building is an important tool in the realm of futures studies. The majority of us speak of 'the future' as if there is only one possible future and that it is predictable. According to Jim Dator, renowned futurist and Director of the Alternate Futures Option in the Department of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, Manoa, no one can know with sufficient certainty what the future will be. Thus, we ought to recognize the multiple possible futures that emerge from the interaction of four components: events, trends, images, and actions [Dator, 1996]. Building a variety of scenarios is thus an effective way of exploring a number of potential futures. This method is also commonly used in the planning profession, often referred to as visioning, and can be used to serve a variety of purposes such as decision analysis, crisis management, and the impacts of potential economic, social or ecological changes on cities and 21 communities. Also consistent with planning traditions, another use of scenarios is the development and promotion of one 'preferred future'. By drafting a scenario reflecting this preferred outcome, the normative characteristics of this future can be used to stimulate discussion about what strategies, decisions, or changes in perception would help create this preferred future [Lowry and Kim, 2003]. Bell [2002] sums it up well when he argues that in order for people "to become competent, effective and responsible they need to know what alternative actions they can take and what the probable consequences of their particular acts will be... But they also need some reasonably accurate way of judging the desirability of those probable consequences, both intended and unintended." By building scenarios of both possible and preferable futures, an image of those consequences can be imagined by the reader and judged on their desirability. Then, the actions, strategies, decisions, and ultimately paradigms that shaped each of these consequences can be separated from the final outcome, evaluated within a greater context, and judged independently. I will use this method in order to allow the reader to judge the desirability of different paths the space industry might take by painting images of three very different futures. These three scenarios, two plausible and one preferable, were constructed following a set of tasks outlined in Lowry and Kim [2003]: identify an organizing question; describe the current context; identify driving forces that will help shape alternative futures; and identifying key uncertainties in the change processes. All this is followed by the actual composition of the future 'story'. 5. The Worldviews 5.1. The United Nations 5.1.1. Founding of UNCOPUOS The launching of the first artificial satellite in 1957 by the Soviet Union, Sputnik I, compelled the United Nations General Assembly to hastily establish an 18 member ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) the following year. Since this was an entirely novel situation, the Committee's initial mandate was simple. It was charged with considering 22 three central issues: the ability of the UN to spearhead international cooperation, the resources at its disposal to promote the peaceful uses of outer space, and the identification of potential legal problems that might arise in programs to explore outer space. At this early stage, UNCOPUOS gave oversight to practical proposals for international cooperation that included the exchange of information on space research, the coordination of national space research programs, and the assistance in the realization of such programs [UNCOPUOS, 2002]. In 1959, the General Assembly agreed that the United Nations should be the focus for international cooperation in promoting the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, and thus established UNCOPUOS as a permanent body of the UN, reaffirming its mandate in Resolution 1472 (XIV). The opening statements of this short resolution clearly outline the worldview with which the UN chose to perceive outer space: 'The General Assembly, Recognizing the common interest of mankind [sic] as a whole in furthering the peaceful use of outer space; Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be only for the betterment of mankind and to the benefit of States irrespective of the stage of their economic or scientific development; Desiring to avoid the extension of present national rivalries into this new field; ... Believing also that the United Nations should pro-mote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space" [UNCOPUOS, 2002]. In 1961, the General Assembly requested UNCOPUOS cooperate with the Secretary-General and make full use of the functions and resources of the Secretariat in order to maintain close contact with governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned with outer space matters; to provide for the exchange of such information relating to outer space activities that Governments may supply on a voluntary basis; and to assist in the study of measures for the promotion of international cooperation in outer space activities [UNCOPUOS, 2002]. UNCOPUOS has grown from 24 members in 1959 to 65 members today, and is one of the largest Committees in the United Nations, a testament to the importance many nations place on this issue, regardless of their present prestige in space activities. In order to promote inclusiveness and transparency, a number of international organizations, including both intergovernmental 23 and non-governmental organizations, have observer status with UNCOPUOS. UNCOPUOS also boasts two standing Subcommittees, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee, all of which meet annually to consider questions put before them by the General Assembly, reports submitted to them, and issues raised by individual member states. All three (UNCOPUOS and its two Subcommittees) work on the basis of consensus and can only make recommendations to the General Assembly. Since its inception, UNCOPUOS is responsible for delivering five Treaties, as well as a number of Agreements, all of which form the foundation for international space law. The five most influential Treaties are listed in Table 5.1 below. Table 5.1. United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space, adapted from UNCOPUOS [2004]. Tit le »5®>SiAB6reviated •V^"'' 1 • Entiv»ihtblf6Feel; iSCofrratificationssS t#!bWigh¥turesS Treaty on Principles Governing the Activit ies of States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celest ial Bodies Outer Space Treaty 1967 98 26 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space Rescue Agreement 1968 88 25 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects Liabil i ty Convention 1972 82 24 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space Registration Convention 1975 45 4 Agreement Governing the Activit ies of States on the Moon and Other Celest ial Bodies Moon Agreement 1979 10 5 The inaugural Outer Space Treaty (OST) lays the foundation for the United Nations' perception of outer space while establishing a loose set of guidelines that govern the extraterrestrial sovereign activities of states. Over a decade later, the Moon Agreement attempted to strengthen the language of the OST and tighten these guidelines so that they were more in line with that underlying worldview. Conversely, the Rescue Agreement, and the Liability and Registration Conventions are more precise treaties of lesser importance that deal with specific albeit necessary issues such as the status of astronauts, liability and compensation in the case of accidents, and the registration of spacecraft. As can be seen by the number of ratifications 24 and signatures they received in Table 5.1, the OST, Rescue Agreement, and Liability Convention have all been widely accepted as important components of space law by the international community. The Registration Convention received fewer ratifications simply because a fewer number of nations actually partake in the direct or indirect launching of spacecraft or payloads. More nations are expected to ratify this treaty as they develop their own space-related capabilities. The Moon Agreement's attempt to improve equity both in space and on Earth was mired in controversy and clearly received the least amount of support. Since a Treaty only applies to those that ratify it, the Moon Agreement's ten ratifications and five signatures have virtually no influence on international law. Its defeat is one of the principal examples in the space community of the interests and perceptions of affluent nations prevailing once again at the expense of developing nations. With the widespread rejection of the Moon Agreement, the international community was forced to discard the founding paradigm of UNCOPUOS in favour of a worldview based on competition and the value of national self-interest. 5.1.2 Outer Space Treaty The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), officially called the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, was a pivotal moment for UNCOPUOS and its Legal Subcommittee in the formulation of international rules to facilitate international relations in outer space. Human activities and international interaction in this new environment were still in their infancy but certainly a reality and UNCOPUOS stressed the urgency in securing space as a place for peace and cooperation and not colonialism. Soviet progress in space raised real fears of Soviet communist expansion and dominance and so it can be argued that UNCOPUOS perceived the opening of the space environment as an opportunity to change the course of humanity and instill in it more equitable and cooperative values. It would attempt to instigate this shift through multilateral treaties that would preemptively influence how States would behave in future space activities. 25 The opening preamble of the OST consists of nearly identical statements to those found in Resolution 1472 (XIV), the General Assembly resolution that outlined the mandate for UNCOPUOS. The opening words of the Treaty speak of recognizing the common interest of all humankind in the use of space, the belief that these activities should benefit all peoples irrespective of their development, and that meaningful cooperation will contribute to mutual understanding and the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples [UNCOPUOS, 1999]. The Treaty contains seventeen articles that are broad in scope at first and then become more specific. The opening Articles reveal the most about the UN's underlying perception of outer space. Article I echoes the opening statements mentioned above, reaffirming that the use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development. It continues to state that space is the "province of all mankind" [sic] and that it shall be "free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law" [UNCOPUOS, 1999]. Article II then addresses issues of ownership by stating that outer space, which includes the Moon and other celestial bodies, "is not subject to national appropriation by claims of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means" [UNCOPUOS, 1999]. Article III further solidifies the UN's perception of space by stating that all activities in outer space shall be "in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding" [UNCOPUOS, 1999]. Article IV strictly forbids the placement of nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in space, as well as the establishment of military bases, instillations, or fortifications on the Moon or any other celestial body. The testing of any type of weapon and the conducting of military maneuvers is also forbidden. This Article however explicitly permits the use of military personnel, or any other necessary equipment or facility, for scientific research or any other peaceful purpose. Article V classifies astronauts as envoys of humankind and stipulates that all possible assistance in the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing shall be extended to them. Article VI affirms that States shall bear 26 international responsibility for national activities in outer space, whether carried out by governmental or non-governmental entities, and that these activities must conform to the Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities require authorization and continuing supervision by the State Party to the Treaty. A final statement that completes a detailed description of the UN's operational worldview can be found in Article IX; it reads "in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space ... with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty" [UNCOPUOS, 1999]. With 98 ratifications and 26 signatures, the Outer Space Treaty, and all the principles it stands for, is the most widely accepted Treaty governing the activities of States in outer space. By acceding to this Treaty nearly two-thirds of the planet's nations not only agree to its principles but also agree to be legally bound by them. 5.1.3 Moon Agreement The 1979 Moon Agreement, officially called the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, was an attempt to address a fundamental question left open by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST): the status of private property rights. The OST explicitly forbids the assertion of governmental rights in outer space but makes no overt mention of private property rights. Article II of the OST states that "outer space, which includes the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claims of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means" [UNCOPUOS, 1999]. However, it does not make any specific mention of private appropriation. Initially, some observers argued that the OST indirectly forbade private property rights through Article VI where it states that the activities of non-governmental entities in outer space must require authorization and continuing supervision of the State Party to the Treaty. This argument asserts that a State cannot authorize a private entity to do what it itself is forbidden to do. Legal Analyst Virgiliu Pop [2000] agrees with this argument, asserting that in order to exist, private 27 property needs a superior authority to enforce it, be it in the form of a State or some other recognized entity, and so in banning national appropriation, the OST ultimately forbids all forms of appropriation including private property rights. Wayne White [2002] however, contends that "jurisdictional authority under the OST provides most of the protections traditionally associated with property rights". James Dunstan [2002] agrees, arguing that "customary international law, consistent with the OST, has come to develop a regime for property use that is compatible with private investment". Contemporary evidence he uses to support this position is the practice of states owning Moon rocks, controlling frequency spectrum and orbital slots, doing business on the Russian Mir space station, and providing property rights on the International Space Station [Galloway, 2004]. Looking back at transcripts of the OST negotiation meetings, Pop [2000] admits that it was the intention of at least some of the delegates to give a wider scope to Article II than its actual reading and that there is "evidence that other contracting parties did not wish to foreclose future positions by setting forth precisely the rights of the powers in using the resources of celestial bodies. In that sense the question may still be open". Essentially, a number of States did not want the issue to be resolved at that time in order to protect possible future interests. The Executive Chairman of the National Space Society in 1995, Glenn Harlan Reynolds agrees with this account, stating that a near-consensus quickly emerged around the fact that the explicit mention of national and not private appropriation left the status of private appropriation by individuals and corporations unsettled [Reynolds, 1995]. The presumptive permissibility of the private appropriation of extraterrestrial resources in what was an agreed upon province of all humankind troubled many delegates, most of who represented developing or Third World nations. They feared that a commercial space race would exacerbate already deep socio-economic disparities, since only a small proportion of the world's citizens, found mainly in a few developed nations, could actually gain access to such resources in the first place. Reynolds [1995] contends that many of these opponents were 28 influenced by the theories of the 'New International Economic Order', a school of economics that blamed Western exploitation for the ongoing discrepancy in global wealth, and that in turn, promoted interventionist and redistributionist economic policies as a means of reducing or eliminating wealth differences between Western and non-Western nations. In any case, considerable demand for clarification of the issue of private property rights existed, especially in light of multiple American Lunar landings that occurred at this time. And so in an attempt to address these issues, the 1979 Moon Agreement was drafted. The Moon Agreement opens within a similar preamble to those of Resolution 1472 (XIV) -UNCOPUOS's mandate - and the OST, which stresses the desire for equity and the prevention of international conflict in an area with notable benefits. Recalling the previous Treaties, the final statement of the preamble demands that States take into account "the need to define and develop the provisions of these international instruments in relation to the Moon and other celestial bodies, having regard to further progress in the exploration and use of outer space" [UNCOPUOS, 1999]. The Agreement contains twenty-one Articles, many of which go into considerably more detail than the OST in an attempt to more strictly regulate the activities of sovereign nations in outer space. Article 4 repeats the OST when it states that the Moon and other celestial bodies are the province of all mankind [sic] and that all activities should be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their economic or scientific development. However, it goes a step further, stating that "due regard shall be paid to the interests of present and future generations as well as to the need to promote higher standards of living and conditions of economic and social progress and the development in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" [UNCOPUOS, 1999]. It should be noted that this is the first and only mention of future generations in all UN space Treaties. The Moon Agreement is also the only Treaty that refers to space as a natural environment that may be adversely impacted by human development, and not just a destination or an unnatural void. To this extent, Article 7 states that in exploring and Using the Moon, "States Parties shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its environment, whether by 29 introducing adverse changes in that environment, by its harmful contamination through the introduction of extra-environmental matter or otherwise" [UNCOPUOS, 1999]. This statement makes it clear that this Treaty perceives outer space as being part of the same natural system that gave rise to Earth and all its resources. This belief is truly a unique position in international space law. Another underlying theme of the Moon Agreement, apparent in Articles 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 15 is unfettered access and transparency. States must inform the UN Secretary General, the international scientific community, and the general public the nature and outcomes of all scientific activities as well as the location and purpose of all 'manned' and 'unmanned' [sic] stations placed on the Moon or any other celestial body. The discovery of any natural resources must be universally disclosed as well. All space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and installations are open for visitation and inspection by any other States Parties with advanced notice and precaution not to interfere with their normal operations. All access to and movement across the surface and subsurface of the Moon is permitted as States have the right to explore and use the Moon without discrimination of any kind, on the basis of equality and in accordance with international law [UNCOPUOS, 1999]. It is clear that trust amongst nations and peoples is a central value found throughout this Treaty. Article 11 of the Moon Agreement is undoubtedly the source of much of its controversy and is the major reason why this Treaty was not widely supported. Once again, this Article begins with an identical statement to the OST but then goes substantially further in an attempt to fundamentally alter the historic process of human development. Paragraph 2 repeats that the "Moon is not subject to national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means" [UNCOPUOS, 1999]. In a direct attempt to clarify the issue of private property rights that plagued the OST, the next paragraph states that neither "the surface nor the subsurface of the Moon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become the property of any State, international, intergovernmental, or non-governmental 30 organization, national organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural person" [UNCOPUOS, 1999]. It follows with even more specific guidelines stating that the "placement of personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and installations on or below the surface of the Moon, including structures connected with its surface or subsurface, shall not create a right of ownership over the surface or the subsurface of the Moon or any areas thereof" [UNCOPUOS, 1999]. With such unambiguous language, there could be no disagreement on the status of ownership of any kind, as this Treaty forbids it all outright. Article 11 proceeds with the most progressive yet controversial commitments. It affirms that all States adhering to this Treaty "hereby undertake to establish an international regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible" [UNCOPUOS, 1999]. The Article then proceeds to explain that the main purposes for such an international regime: the orderly and safe development of the natural resources of the Moon; the rational management of those resources; the expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources; and an equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived from those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing countries, as well as the efforts of those countries which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the exploration of the Moon, shall be given special consideration [UNCOPUOS, 1999]. This Article concludes by stating that all activities with respect to natural lunar resources are to be carried out in a manner compatible with the aforementioned principles. This Article is perhaps the most specific and progressive attempt to shape the future of human development both on Earth and in the outer space environment, and is indeed the reason why it was met with so much controversy that ultimately resulted in the Treaty's demise. Reaction to the Moon Agreement was polarized, with the United States leading the voice of opposition. Reynolds [1995] contends that following difficult international situations such as the Vietnam War and the Iranian hostage crisis, the U.S. government was perhaps suspicious of 31 international organizations and in particular the motives of Third World Nations. Furthermore, this time was also marked by the conception within the American space community of plans that substituted private enterprise for government programs as a means of developing outer space. Under this theory, a Treaty that explicitly forbids private property rights and promotes interventionist and redistributionist economic policies is an impediment to development. The substance of the American argument against the Moon Treaty was that its common heritage principle would serve as a substantial disincentive to development. Most notably, the U.S. was displeased with the ban on property rights and the creation of a monopolistic international regime that would govern the exploitation and distribution of lunar resources and other wealth. 'Orderly development' and 'equitable sharing' were perceived to be impediments to efficient and productive lunar growth [Reynolds, 1995]. To this effect, the American position contended that these restricting mandates would benefit nations that put nothing at risk and permit them to piggyback on their hard own earned achievements. The U.S.'s eventual refusal to ratify the Moon Agreement meant that a vast majority of other nations followed suit, resulting in only 10 ratifications and 5 signatures. Although the Moon Agreement has entered into force among these signatories, it is of little significance in international space law. This sequence of events makes it obvious that there can be no meaningful treaty overseeing space and its resources without the approval of the United States. Such a reality leaves limited prospect for the UN supported common heritage worldview that sees that development of outer space benefiting all nations, with special consideration for those most in need. 5.1.4 The Last Quarter Century It has been twenty-five years since the Moon Agreement was entered into force amongst a handful of mostly developing nations, and little progress has been made to persuade more nations to adhere to its principles. Nor has there been much attempt to draft a new treaty that would address the concerns raised by opposing nations. Since the 1979 Moon Agreement, UNCOPUOS has only passed three Conventions, which do not have Treaty status, on to the General Assembly. These are the 1982 Convention Establishing the European 32 Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT); the 1983 Convention for the Establishment of a European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT); and the 1992 International Telecommunication Constitution and Convention [UNCOPUOS, 2004]. None of these has the far-reaching implications that both the OST and the Moon Agreement possess. UNCOPUOS however, still continues to call on its member nations and the General Assembly to ratify the Moon Agreement and take particular account into the needs of developing nations. In 1983, fresh from the controversy surrounding the Moon Agreement and following a report drafted at UNCOPUOS's thirty-ninth session, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries. This declaration is full of the same rhetoric that can be found in both the OST and the Moon Agreement with one specific exception: it calls for the strengthening of the role of UNCOPUOS to include the exchange of information regarding national and international space activities. This declaration, like all others, can only 'encourage' nations or ask them to 'consider' or 'take into account' the recommendations of UNCOPUOS; it cannot force or enforce compliance. UNCOPUOS's most recent report, following its fifty-eighth session in 2003, is a testament to the continued perseverance of the Committee to address issues concerning developing nations. There is much discussion on how space applications can assist these countries in various fields such as disaster mitigation, communications* and distance education. The Committee also expresses the larger opinion that the utilization of space technology had become an efficient way to advance the economic development of developing countries and that it is even possible to "leapfrog stages of development by using space products and services" [United Nations, 2003]. The report also explicitly calls on member States to ratify the Moon Agreement "as that instrument had a low number of ratifications" [United Nations, 2003]. By raising its level of international acceptance, it is felt that the Committee can step towards the implementation of 33 key space law instruments. However, as long as States are free to act upon their own interests the likelihood of the Moon Agreement being ratified, and thus the adoption of a more equitable long-term perception of outer space, is slim. 5.2: The United States 5.2.1 Pioneers and the Western Frontier In order to better understand the worldview of the contemporary American space community, it is important to look back to the settling of that country and the perceptions that drove its westward expansion, ultimately resulting in the birth of a continental power. In 1983, President Ronald Reagan opened an exhibit entitled The American Cowboy', organized by the Library of Congress, at which he made clear his belief that Americans should fcknowledge and embrace the older values that traditionally had been associated with America's pioneering heritage and the myth of the Western frontier. "If we understand this part of our history, we will better understand how our people see themselves and the hopes they have for America. Tales of Wild West men and women...are woven into the dreams of our youth and the standards we aim to live by in our adult lives. Ideals of courageous and self-reliant heroes, both men and women, are the stuff of Western lore...lntegrity, morality, and democratic values are the resounding themes" [Murdoch, 2001]. From the beginning of its colonization, Historian Mark Joy [2003] contends that America absorbed a steady influx of settlers that brought with them a sense of a new beginning, that things in this new land could evolve and develop in new ways, unencumbered by precedent and tradition. Confronted with a territory of unfathomable vastness, these pioneers developed a strong sense of identity based on the necessity of self-reliance, due also in part to the lack of formal authority, which many fled from in the first place. Despite the existing presence of Amerindian communities, it was perceived as an empty continent whose free land offered the opportunity of independence to whoever could seize and use it first. Murdoch [2001] insists that the immense challenges posed by the American frontier were not met by society as a whole, nor by corporate enterprise, nor least of all by government. The mythical West was instead 'won' by individuals. Filled with this spirit of 34 hardiness, the pioneers were forced to rely on themselves. Undoubtedly the pressures of frontier life imposed the need for cooperation within the community. However, only to a degree of the individual's choosing. The frontier therefore gave rise to men of extraordinary stature, men whose courage and skill to confront and overcome danger would pave the way for the advance of civilization. And so even today, the archetypical American hero is the frontier-tamer. Even those who put themselves beyond the law are likely to become folk heroes, "for if authority was arbitrary, law might serve interest, not justice, and so the outlaw appears as just another rugged individualist" [Murdoch, 2001]. Although certainly not outlaws, astronauts are often associated with the historic American pioneer and are heralded for similar qualities such as hardiness, resilience, and self-reliance. In fact, NASA's official vision statement uses these historic metaphors, stating, "as explorers, pioneers, and innovators, we boldly expand the frontiers in air and space" [Billings, 1997]. This metaphor of the 'final frontier' so often referred to in the space community, has taken on both a physical and psychological state. Whether purposely or not, it is used to invoke a sense of nostalgia for an epic era of American heritage and to inspire the minds of enthusiasts to face hardships like so many of the nation's folk heroes did in the past. With such cultural significance, the myth of the pioneer and his frontier has led many in the American space community to see expansion into space as merely a continuation of a historic trend that has defined their nation since its founding. 5.2.2 Expansion and Manifest Destiny In 1839, journalist John O'Sullivan wrote, in the belief that American continental expansion was simply a natural process, that the United States was "destined to be the great nation of futurity...We are all the action of human progress and who will, what can, set limits to our onward march?" [Billings, 1997] The term Manifest Destiny, meaning 'obvious or undeniable fate', was soon coined by O'Sullivan, who wrote in 1845 that it was the United States' "manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federated self-government entrusted to us" [Lasn, 2004]. Historian Norman Graebner [1968] views this 35 historical ideology as expressing a spirit of confidence and a sense of power, implying that the United States was "destined by the will of Heaven to become a country of political and territorial eminence". The probability and even the necessity of the nation's growth was attributed to this Manifest Destiny, driven by certain unique qualities in American civilization -the energy and vigor of its people, their idealism and faith in their democratic institutions, and their sense of mission [Billings, 1997]. Historians Robert Hine and Mack Faragher [2000] note however that Manifest Destiny was not, as many other historians often imply, a deeply held American folk belief. In their argument, it was instead a "self-conscious creation of political propagandists like O'Sullivan, determined to uncouple the politics of expansion from the growing sectional controversy over slavery". Attributing America's territorial growth to something like Manifest Destiny in their belief ignores the purposeful federal policy.and the ruthless power that were necessary prerequisites to the conquest of the continent. Joy [2003] agrees, arguing that America's territorial expansion was no more destined than was its political development, the growth of its military power, or its dramatic economic progress. His contention is that the continental expansion, like all of these other developments, was the result of direct, sustained action by a series of American politicians, statesmen, opinion makers, entrepreneurs, and pioneers over the course of nearly two generations. Similar claims can be made of America's space industry. Billings [1997] points out that materialistic interests played a major role in driving America's continental expansion; and just as profit was a primary motive for conquering America's western frontier, profit is a primary motive for space exploration. And so she urges members of the space community to think more deeply when exercising the frontier metaphor. Referencing Patricia Nelson Limerick, a leading contemporary historian of the American West, Billings speaks of how too many advocates of space development perceive American history as a straight line, a vector of inevitability and manifest destiny linking the westward expansion of Anglo-Americans directly to the exploration and colonization of space. She warns of the dangers of a worldview that sees space exploration as an escape from Earthly problems and colonization as a safety valve for social stresses; a 36 worldview that stems from a historic culture of growth, self-reliance and the mistrust of outsiders. 5.2.3 The Spoils of War During World War II, the German industrial-military complex invested a massive engineering and production effort in a weapon that could strike its enemies' cities with little or no warning, launched from a safe distance without putting its own pilots at risk. The V-2, Vergeltungswaffe zwei or Vengeance Weapon-2, was the name given by Nazi propagandists to Germany's prize 14 metre tall, 12,800 kilogram liquid-fueled missile [DeVorkin, 1992]. Starting in 1944, hundreds of V-2 missiles were fired into Paris, Antwerp, and London, falling silently without warning or possibility for defense. A V-2 strike was far less destructive than conventional bombing raids. However it still created a substantial psychological impact due to the fact that anyone within kilometres of the missile's target had an equal chance of being hit without warning; a result of its less than precise guidance systems [DeVorkin, 1992]. As terrifying as this weapon was, there were some who were fascinated by the new technology. Even before the War was over, many civilian scientists foresaw that the future of the V-2 was in space. Notable British scientist J.B.S. Haldane was quoted as saying that "if fired vertically, the V-2 could reach more than 300 kilometres and could take photographs of the sun and perhaps other heavenly bodies. For the cost of a day of war, it should be practicable to send a series of rockets round the moon and photograph its far side" [DeVorkin, 1992]. Haldane's colleague R.V. Jones agreed when he said, "in no other way can we get free of the earth's atmosphere for astrophysical studies. Sooner or later someone will seriously try to reach the moon and succeed". Jones also warned about the inevitability of its greater military applications. 'They are bound to be made, whatever the limits imposed by treaties" he said, "and we should do well to keep an eye on the possibilities" [DeVorkin, 1992]. As it turns out, the Allies were indeed keeping a keen eye on the German V-2 program. In the summer of 1944, as Allied forces moved into Italy and France, scientific intelligence units 37 swooped in closely behind, searching for information on German science and its wartime products. Civilian specialists soon followed; tasked with identifying, caching, and retrieving scientific and technical plunder. United States Army Ordnance technical teams competed fiercely with their allies to capture what it could of prized V-2 hardware. In March 1945, these units were specifically tasked with recovering enough parts and intact specimens that would quickly result in the successful transfer of 100 V-2 missiles from the battleground to the U.S. so that they could be researched and tested at the newly created White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico. A month later, word reached the Americans that the German V-2 testing facility had been captured and according to DeVorkin [1992], it was "ripe for the plunder". It was also learned that within a few weeks the entire area would be handed over to the Soviet Army. Acting fast, the 144th Amy Ordnance Company removed and transported more than 360 metric tons of V-2 parts to the United States [DeVorkin, 1992]. More importantly however, the Americans specifically sought millions of pages of documentation and many of the high-ranking German expertise that made it all possible. The Soviet Union on the other hand, managed to recover only V-2 parts, not fully intact specimens, and some lower ranking personnel. Essentially, the United States had out-competed the Soviets and its other allies for strategic technology and personnel that would soon propel it to Superpower status. The fledgling American and Soviet space programs were being driven by competition and mistrust, directed under the auspices of technological superiority and military deterrence [Zervos, 1998]. 5.2.4 The Sputnik Shock In the initial aftermath of the War, there was a lack of interest within the American military about outer space. Mowthorpe [2002] argues this is a result of three factors. The first was simply the unknown potential of military space during a time of tightly limited budgets; the second was a widely held belief that a contribution to national security from space-related technologies was many years down the road; and the third was a reluctance to give attention or funding to programs with unclear potential. This all changed however, when it was discovered that the Soviet Union was putting substantial resources into the development of 38 ballistic missile programs. It was thus the primary goal of President Eisenhower's space policy to use space as a tool to open up the reclusive Soviet state through satellite reconnaissance. The next most important policy goal was to instigate the creation of a new international legal regime that would legitimize satellite overflight for 'peaceful purposes' that would include reconnaissance. The third major goal was to develop a program to investigate space for scientific purposes. With an underlying need to develop boosters that would launch satellites or warheads over intercontinental range, a scientific space program would contribute greatly to the development of the necessary infrastructure. But ultimately Eisenhower would perceive space as a sanctuary for peaceful purposes, with satellite reconnaissance being the only justifiable military use. This doctrine would quickly shift following the launch of Sputnik I in October 1957. With Sputnik's launch, President Eisenhower's vision of America's leisurely and orderly entry into space was instantly transformed into a "national obsession to wrest the lead from the Soviet Union" [Stares, 1985]. International reaction to the launch of Sputnik I was positive and by default, legitimized the right of satellite overflight of national territories. This right pleased Eisenhower, however the public supremacy of the Soviet Union did not sit well with the Administration, not to mention the defense implications of a spacefaring Soviet Union. A complete review of U.S. interests, priorities, and goals in the exploration of space was in order. Paul Stares [1985] recounts how the exaggerated fears of Soviet intentions after Sputnik spurred a range of proposals concerning space weapons in order to counter the perceived threat. The Air Force quickly claimed responsibility for U.S. military operations in space. It reinforced its position by releasing its first doctrine on outer space, arguing that space power would prove to be as dominant in combat as air power already was. It also stated that there is no distinction between air and space, thus there is only the one operational medium of aerospace, and that the Air Force should have control over forces within this medium [Mowthorpe, 2002]. These assumptions were in direct conflict with Eisenhower's belief that space should be a sanctuary only for reconnaissance purposes. Early in 1958, in the same year 39 as the formation of UNCOPUOS, President Eisenhower established a special panel known as the Purcell Report, which would reinforce his personal views on the militarization of space. The report's main focus was to investigate the scientific benefits of space exploration, although it did endorse military uses with specific utility, which included reconnaissance, communication, and weather forecasting [Mowthorpe, 2002]. The report's support for these passive military applications however, was accompanied by a rejection of the notion of space weapons. The doctrine expressed in the Purcell Report would thus establish the basic guidelines for the U.S. military's exploitation of outer space until early in the next decade. Later that year, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created, giving momentum to a civil route into space. The creation of NASA was in fact a highly political decision, and was essentially an effective tool of propaganda. Eisenhower saw the value of transparency, and wanted the world to see that the United States, unlike the Soviet Union, conducted its space activities openly and with no apparent military interest. This development would become extremely successful in shaping world opinion of American space activities as representing the values of good nations, leading the way against the threat of communist imperialism. American space policy and legal opinions would soon become the standard of the international space community, setting precedent for all other nations to follow. Eisenhower would thus leave a lasting legacy of military and civil space programs that would eventually reach fruition under future Administrations. His policy on outer space would guide his nation towards becoming the most powerful and influential spacefaring nation; his successor, President John F. Kennedy would make this goal a central focus of his Administration. 5.2.5 The War of Words and Worldviews In the aftermath of the Purcell Report, the Air Force was particularly disappointed with the Eisenhower Administration's decision to not proceed with more robust space military capabilities and the decision to task NASA, a civilian agency, with leading the United States into space. As elections approached, many within the Air Force's ranks hoped that a change in 40 government would bring a change in attitude towards the militarization of space. At the height of his campaign for the presidency, Kennedy stated, "We are in a strategic space race with the Russians and we have been losing. Control of space will be decided in the next decade. If the Soviets control space, they can control Earth, as in the past centuries the nations that controlled the seas dominated the continents" [Stares, 1985]. When Kennedy was elected President, it appeared as if he would appease the concerns of the Air Force when he increased the budget for military space systems and gave the Air Force primary responsibility for their development. With more funds going to all branches of the Armed Forces, the Army and Navy followed the Air Force's lead and developed their own plans for space projects, all of which included anti-satellite weapons. Stares [1985] notes however that the expansion of the military space budget was misleading since these funds could not be used for projects and missions denied by the previous administration. On top of this, the Air Force was particularly frustrated with the priority given to NASA's civilian human space program; a political decision its commanders felt had undermined its own claims to that mission and would jeopardize their national security. New regulations that de-emphasized U.S. military space activities removed any chance of a public appeal. The Air Force staunchly believed that most of the arguments given by this and previous administrations to curb its space plans were no longer valid, and that there was clear evidence of a Soviet threat developing in space. Tension between the two Superpowers escalated dramatically following a Soviet diplomatic offensive at the United Nations in an attempt to prohibit satellite reconnaissance. A succession of Soviet space 'firsts' would also help raise suspicions of their military intentions, which were reinforced by threatening statements that often followed these achievements. For example, after successfully launching yet another human into space, Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev honoured this accomplishment by stating, "you do not have 50 and 100 megaton bombs. We have bombs stronger than 100 megatons. We placed Gagarin and Titov in space and we can replace them with other loads that can be directed to any place on Earth" [Stares, 1985]. This particular statement, obviously directed towards the United States, was all the 41 more ominous after the Soviet Union announced it would break the moratorium on nuclear testing and detonated 30 and 58 megaton bombs in the fall of 1961. Khrushchev further worried the Kennedy Administration when he spoke of these 50 and 100 megaton bombs as "a sword of Damocles that would hang over the heads of imperialists when they decide the question whether or not they should unleash war". Stares [1985] explains how threats such as these were taken extremely seriously, as they were viewed as both a potential source of blackmail in the event of an international crisis and as a source of domestic embarrassment. Kennedy had little option but to reassess Eisenhower's stance that space was a sanctuary, beyond the reach of military escalation. Soviet behaviour did not change the administration's attitudes towards a human military space program, but it did cause a reevaluation of the needs for anti-satellite weaponry. In May 1962 following a year of military development on space systems, Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense to Robert McNamara, was quoted as saying that the United States needs "to be ready to anticipate the ability of the Soviets at some time to use space offensively. We may want to develop satellites or other space systems which could be used to defend the peaceful or other defensive satellites now in operation" [Stares, 1985]. A New York Times article followed, reporting that the Defense Department was "embarking upon a man-in-space program to prevent foreign military control of space as well as its exploitation" [Stares, 1985]. Kennedy was incensed with the apparently unauthorized statements and stressed that there was no change in American space policy. He was also becoming increasingly frustrated with different branches of the Armed Forces and civilian agencies expressing distinct opinions and policies. These competing voices within the American space community contributed to Kennedy's issuing of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 156, directed to the Secretary of State "to establish an inter-agency committee to review political aspects of U.S. space policy" [Stares, 1985]. This committee would do more than just unify American policy; it would attempt to sway international opinion in its favour. This influential committee, which had no official title and was only declassified in 1980, became known as the "NSAM 156 Committee" - the name its members used. It was formally 42 established to create a nationally united and coherent space policy that could be brought to UNCOPUOS and its Subcommittees. Comprised of representatives from the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the White House, and NASA, the NSAM 156 Committee considered issues dealing with the Soviet objections to reconnaissance satellites; sovereignty and rights of passage in space; disclosure of information to the public and U.S. allies; interpretation of current agreements relating to outer space; and also possible arms control initiatives [Stares, 1985]. On the contentious issue of satellite reconnaissance, the Committee took its influence to its closest allies in an attempt to influence their decision and vote in accordance with the United States. It also seems that these intimate briefings were an attempt to convince perhaps undecided allies the validity of their perception of outer space. Stares [1985] quotes an observer of the Committee, as he recalls how the Committee: "decided to embark on a series of briefings to our closest allies. They were briefed quite fully, sometimes by the President on state visits, more often by special teams who talked only to the head of state, foreign minister, or defense minister and gave them a sense of what the scope of our program was, how good it was, and what its relation was to our overall strategic picture which was very intimate. Thus, when issues of this kind arose in the United Nations for example, these people understood the implications of the political issue and were prepared to give U.S. support. This was really quite successful. At the same time we were doing these briefings on the technical side, we began to state the legal position, which was that outer space was not under the sovereignty of any nation. It is like the high seas, and there just is nothing illegal about observing another nation from the high seas...Here was a completely non-territorial regime and, therefore, anything other than an aggressive act from that medium was consistent with international law". The unified space policy developed within the NSAM 156 Committee, which included the belief in the legality of all non-aggressive activities and support for private property rights, would serve as the foundation for future American perceptions of space. The U.S.'s opening remarks at the First Committee of the United Nations in December of 1962 was a statement drafted by the members of the NSAM 156 Committee. It read: "It is the view of the United States that Outer Space should be used for peaceful - that is, non-aggressive and beneficial - purposes. The question of military activities in space cannot be divorced from the question of military activities on Earth. There is, in any event, no workable dividing line between military and non-43 military uses of space" [Stares, 1985]. The amalgamation of American policy ushered in a new era of diplomacy at the United Nations, as a year later General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII) placed a ban on placing nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in outer space, an accomplishment that formed the foundation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The world was indeed a safer place. However, in a sense, the war shifted from geo-political to geo-economic competition; a war the United States was set on winning. 5.2.6 Shaping the Law A fundamental reason for the ban on national appropriation described in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) was a real fear of Soviet space colonialism. With the illegality of both placing weapons of mass destruction in space and laying claim to space territory and resources, the course of space activities quickly shifted away from military escalation towards a competition of socio-political ideologies. In 1969, the United States as it had promised, won the ultimate 'space race' by landing the first humans on the Moon, proving to itself that the capitalist system was superior to communism. The Soviet Union responded by stating that it was never competing with the U.S. and had no intentions of going to the Moon. The Apollo 11 landing was a historic event for humanity, capturing the public's attention worldwide and inspiring a new generation of space enthusiasts. At the time, some people questioned the legality of planting an American flag on the lunar surface, suggesting it could be interpreted as a territorial claim, illegal under the OST. Most people rejected this notion, pointing to Neil Armstrong's statement that the U.S. had come "in peace for all mankind". In any case, the United States had proven to itself and the world the sheer power it could exert both on Earth and in space. And so over the course of nearly a decade, the United States returned to the Moon five more times ushering in an era of unprecedented national prestige. The real value gained from these missions was short-lived, since the driving purpose behind the Apollo lunar program was political and not the beginning of a sustained human presence in space. The impact on the space community however was profound, as America's forays on the Moon inspired a whole generation of enthusiasts to think that the next steps in space would indeed be giant leaps for humanity. In 44 their minds, visions of human planetary exploration, space tourism, grand orbiting hotels, and productive lunar mines were closer to reality than ever. To many in the American space community and beyond, these visions made it clear that governments could not and should not be the sole agent for the development of outer space. After all, the United States was settled and civilized by individuals first, and only then came government. The idea of the corporate development of space excited many and worried some. Within the confines of UNCOPUOS, such grand visions of space development led certain developing nations to question the fairness of a commercial space race. They demanded a more equitable opportunity in pursuit of this potential wealth. It was at this time that the ill-fated 1979 Moon Agreement was first proposed, calling for a ban on private property rights and an international regime to oversee the equitable sharing of space resources. Following over two decades of costly government space programs, the United States was interested in the benefits of allowing the private sector to play a significant role in the development of space. The mounting influence of private corporations within the American space industry became increasingly clear when such industry groups as the American Mining Congress and the Aerospace Industries Association of America as well as private companies such as Kennecott Minerals and United Technologies expressed adamant opposition towards the redistributionist policies found within the Moon Agreement [Reynolds, 1995]. In their belief, ratification of the Moon Agreement would greatly impede the development of near-Earth space and deny the United States of its rightfully earned progress. Such influential resistance was a significant factor in forcing the delay of the ratification vote until after the 1981 Presidential election. Ronald Regan, with his admiration for the pioneering and individualist roots of American identity, was elected president with a mandate to support privatization and free enterprise. The new Administration agreed that the Moon Agreement would impose undue burden on the United States' economic progress and that ratifying it was not in his country's interest. Without the United States' support, a majority of nations followed suit in order to avoid increasing their own competitive 45 disadvantage. This outcome displays America's power within the space industry and its ability to influence international space law to suit its own national interests. 5.2.7. From Star Wars to Ground Forces Following years of civilian triumph under NASA, military space policy once again came to the forefront under the Reagan Administration, more so than under any previous administration. Reversing trends witnessed under Eisenhower and Kennedy, the White House, and not the Department of Defense, set the most ambitious plans for military space under Reagan's presidency [Mowthorpe, 2002]. Reagan placed less emphasis on the ability of international treaties to curtail military activities in space in favour of pursuing American-borne space arms control options. There was also a shift towards developing anti-satellite capabilities that could provide a means of deterring threats to U.S. space systems as well as the ability to deny any enhancement in the capabilities of the space-based forces of potential enemies [Mowthorpe, 2002]. The most infamous of these plans was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), more commonly known as 'Star Wars'. Announced in March 1983, the SDI established a heavily funded research and development program whose task was to investigate the feasibility of utilizing space for strategic defense. This originally meant developing the capabilities to break up a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States that could theoretically consist of thousands of nuclear weapons. In its later stages however, the focus shifted towards protection against more limited strikes from anywhere around the planet. The system would consist of three development phases. The first aimed at denying the objectives of a Soviet initial strike and potentially follow-on strikes, which would complicate Soviet attack options and defeat limited attacks and accidental launches [Mowthorpe, 2002]. The second phase included directed energy systems and active discrimination sensors, essentially space-based laser weapons that could distinguish between nuclear warheads and decoys. The final phase would build on the previous one, deploying advanced energy-directed weapons and support technologies, thus creating a highly effective, multi-layered system of defense [Mowthorpe, 2002]. This defense system is not overtly illegal under the OST, explicitly because it does not contain 'weapons of 46 mass destruction'. The testing of weapons in space is illegal. However their deployment is not. Much relies on ones interpretation of the 'peaceful uses' of space, which is sufficiently vague to allow this type of weaponry as long as it is not used for 'aggressive purposes' - another ambiguous phrase. The development of the SDI had both military and political goals. It was believed that the initial deployment and even the mere planning of such a system would not only contribute to strategic defense but also move the U.S. towards eliminating the strategic nuclear threat all together. Removal of such a strategic threat would add significant leverage to debates about arms control and reductions in offensive weapons. The initiative was indeed controversial and it was unclear as to whether it was even technologically feasible. Meanwhile, the nature of the threat began to change as the Cold War showed signs of waning and the Soviet Union began to disintegrate. This changing reality is visible in revised U.S. space policy, which downplayed the bi-polarity of the Cold War and the impending threat of Soviet attack, in favour of a more broad strategy for American space superiority. Released in January 1988, the policy set out four basic requirements: 1) deterring, or if necessary, defending against enemy attack; 2) assuring that forces of hostile nations cannot prevent our own use of space; 3) negating, if necessary, hostile space systems; and 4) enhancing operations of United States and Allied forces [Mowthorpe, 2002]. The fourth requirement immediately became the predominate focus of future administrations, which saw them use space to enhance American military forces through advanced communications, reconnaissance, imaging, navigation, and targeting. These enhanced forces became visible to the world in 1991's Operation Desert Storm, which McLean [2000] describes as our civilization's first space war, or more accurately, the first space-enabled war. The heavy investment in and reliance on supportive space systems for conventional land, sea, and air forces quickly transformed the American military into the most technologically advanced and overwhelmingly powerful military force in human history. The U.S. is now capable of deploying forces with little notice to engage in combat in multiple 47 locations around the planet. Today, space plays a pivotal role in the projection of this power and in the defense of American superiority. 5.2.8. The Doctrines of Preemption and Space Control In the last decade, space has moved from the periphery to the core of the U.S.'s military activities, thanks in part to the highly visible campaigns in Iraq and Kosovo. However, the pivotal reliance on these space-based systems gives rise to a new threat: the denial of space to the United States. For this simple reason, current U.S. military space policy does not only focus its capacity on using space for military purposes, but also the notion of its control of space [McLean, 2000]. Furthermore, space is now such an integral component of the economic and technological infrastructure of the U.S., as it is with many states, that assured access to this asset is of the highest significance. Assured access to space is now a central tenet in American national security policy, with the military in charge of guaranteeing it. In his book "Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict" Michael Klare [2001] argues that since the end of the Cold War, the maintenance of NATO and other alliance systems has taken a back seat in American policy to more self-interested objectives, specifically ensuring U.S. access to overseas supplies of vital resources. Under the current Bush Administration, space is now perceived, rightfully so, as one of the most valuable natural resources, whose control would provide impressive strategic benefits. In 1997, during the Clinton Administration, a group of influential American conservatives banded together and founded the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). Officially, the PNAC is a "non-profit, educational organization whose goal is to promote American global leadership" [PNAC, 2004]. Unofficially however, the project appears to be a considerable attempt to redefine American foreign policy, shifting it away from Clinton's policy of diplomacy and containment towards Reagan's steadfast projection of American interests and values. This is clearly evident in the PNAC's statement of principles, signed by top Bush Administration officials such as Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald 48 Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, three years before they took office. Part of the statement reads: "America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests. The history of the 20th century should have taught U.S. that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire. The history of this century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership" [PNAC, 2004]. What is declared in this statement is the necessity of a policy of preemption, supported by an ideology of supremacy and moral authority. Only three years later, with an administration containing many founders and affiliates of the PNAC, President Bush adopted such controversial policies. The PNAC's statement of principles also reflects the influence of the Reagan Administration, when it states: "We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration's success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities... Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next" [PNAC, 2004]. It is clear that the PNAC is more than an educational organization, but rather an influential advisor to the Bush Administration's foreign policy. In September 2000, just months before the appointment of George W. Bush to the presidency, the PNAC released an influential document entitled "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century". The significance of this report is even more evident in hindsight, since the Bush Administration has adopted many of its recommendations, including research into the development of low-yield bunker-busting nuclear weapons and most notably the call for regime change in Iraq. Paul Wolfowitz, a principle participant in the drafting of this document, only months later would become Deputy Secretary of Defense and a prime architect of the 2003 war to topple Saddam Hussein. The report's 'key findings' opens by 49 stating: 'This report proceeds from the belief that America should seek to preserve and extend its position of global leadership by maintaining the preeminence of U.S. military forces. Today, the United States has an unprecedented strategic opportunity. It faces no immediate great-power challenge; it is blessed with wealthy, powerful and democratic allies in every part of the world; it is in the midst of the longest economic expansion in its history; and its political and economic principles are almost universally embraced. At no time in history has the international security order been as conducive to American interests and ideals" [PNAC, 2000]. The report proceeds to suggest in acute detail how the transformation of the American armed forces will ensure American military and thus economic supremacy and leadership well into the next century. Included in this policy guide is the role of space in the projection of American power. One of the reports major key findings, visibly highlighted in the opening pages of the document, is the necessity of controlling the "international commons of space to pave the way for the creation of a new military service - U.S. Space Forces - with the mission of space controL.Fulfilling [this] requirement is essential if America is to retain its militarily dominant status for the coming decades" [PNAC, 2000]. The authors contend that the development of a system of missile defenses would be a "divine" way to control the international commons of space. A year later, President Bush withdrew from the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty and is currently in the early stages of developing a national missile defense system. This system, referred to as 'Son of Star Wars' in some media circles, is less ambitious than Reagan's space-based initiative but all the more realistic. Interceptor launch sites are already being developed in California and Alaska, and proposed sites in Australia and Eastern Europe are being negotiated. Many people question whether these are the first steps to truly weaponizing space. The PNAC policy guide also highlights the importance and desirability of protecting commercial space assets, arguing "the complexity of space control will only grow as commercial activity increases. American and other allied investments in space systems will create a requirement to secure and protect these space assets; they are already an important measure of American power" [PNAC, 2000]. This statement could be interpreted as suggesting that commercial space 50 activity is a necessary prerequisite that would justify a strong military presence in outer space. Their argument is logical. Private investment in space will greatly benefit the American economy, reassuring its dominance in world markets; and as is standard American policy, such valuable investments will require a substantial force to ensure their security. The presence of such a force will not only protect commercial interests but also create a favourable and accessible environment for their initial and sustained prosperity. Stressing the importance of unfettered access to space and the vital role of commercial and governmental space assets in securing American military and economic preeminence, the PNAC demands presidential understanding that "the ability to preserve American military preeminence in the future will rest in increasing measure on the ability to operate in space militarily; both the requirements for effective global missile defenses and projecting global conventional military power demand it" [PNAC, 2000]. It is with this ideology that many of the United States' most powerful policy-makers took office; it was not long before many of these principles became official policy. 5.2.9. From Ideology to Policy Mere months before George W. Bush became president, the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, called for the establishment of a "Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization". Donald Rumsfeld, an original signatory of the PNAC's statement of principles, chaired the Commission and was Secretary of Defense by the time its report was released in January 2001. The Commission was charged with assessing the manner in which military space assets may be exploited to provide support for U.S. military operations and more radically, to assess potential costs and benefits of establishing either an independent military service or a corps within the Air Force dedicated to the national security space mission [McLean, 2000]. For the first time in American history, a Congressionally mandated body was tasked to consider whether a separate U.S. Space Force should be considered. This is a clear indication that military space activity has very much become a conventional tool for national security. 51 The opening statements of the Commission's report, which is to be passed into American public law, reveal a unanimous agreement amongst its members that the security and well being of the United States depends on its ability to operate in space. Therefore, it is their overarching belief that it is in the U.S. national interest to: 1) promote the peaceful use of space; 2) use the nation's potential in space to support its domestic, economic, diplomatic and national security objectives; and 3) develop and deploy the means to deter and defend against hostile acts directed at U.S. space assets and against the uses of space hostile to U.S. interests [CAUSNSSMO, 2001]. The Commission continues by stressing the need for leadership by the President in pursuit of U.S. national interests in space as well as the necessity for a revision of its national space policy. In their belief, this policy should provide direction and guidance for the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government to: 1) employ space systems to help speed the transformation of the U.S. military into a modern force able to deter and defend against evolving threats directed at the U.S. homeland, its forward deployed forces, allies and interests abroad and in space; 2) develop revolutionary methods of collecting intelligence from space to provide the President the information necessary for him to direct the nation's affairs, manage crises and resolve conflicts in a complex and changing international environment; and 3) shape the domestic and international legal and regulatory environment for space in ways that ensure U.S. national security interests and enhance the competitiveness of the commercial sector and the effectiveness of the civil space sector [CAUSNSSMO, 2001]. This last recommendation explicitly states what the United States has unofficially done since the opening of the space environment: the shaping of international law in order to use the global commons of space for its own national interests. The recommended revisions to U.S. space policy referred to above also give official mention to the importance of the commercial sector in managing and utilizing space for American national interests. The Commission admits how the U.S. Government is increasingly dependent on the commercial space sector to provide essential services for national security operations, including satellite communications and imaging, both of which are useful to government 52 officials, intelligence analysts and military commanders [CAUSNSSMO, 2001]. Therefore, in order to assure that the United States remains the world's leading space-faring nation, the Commission advises the government to become a more reliable consumer of U.S. commercial space products and services. To reinforce this strategic advantage and meet unique national security requirements, it is recommended that the U.S. Government invest in technologies that would permit it to field systems one generation ahead of what is available commercially. Likewise, in order to extend the U.S.'s economic advantage as well as have access to superior space systems, the Commission encourages the U.S. commercial space industry to field systems one generation ahead of international competitors [CAUSNSSMO, 2001]. It is this incorporation of commercial and military space activity that the Commission's Chairman, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, foresees as the most appropriate and efficient use of space, with the ultimate goal being the security of American national interests. Initially however, the military must create an environment conducive to these activities and their defense. In October 2003, following overwhelmingly asymmetric space-enabled U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) released its "Strategic Master Plan FY06 [fiscal year 2006] and Beyond". This document clearly describes how the U.S. Air Force will grant the secured access to space that is so coveted by American policy makers. It opens with a foreword from Air Force General Lance W. Lord that reads: "The Strategic Master Plan (SMP) describes how we will transform this command into a space combat command. It outlines how we will sustain, modernize, divest and transform our forces in order to maximize our warfighting capabilities. This plan is the command's roadmap to ensure our military remains dominant in space, in the air, on the ground and on the sea" [AFSPC, 2003]. In its background section, the SMP embraces the doctrines of preeminence, superiority, and control that were previously advocated by the Project for the New American Century six years before and three years prior to the appointment of Donald Rumsfeld as head of the Pentagon. "Just as the advent of airpower greatly enhanced military operations of the time, space forces, likewise, greatly enhance modern military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Air Force doctrine views air, space, and 53 information as key ingredients for dominating the battlespace and ensuring superiority. Effective use of space-based resources provides a continual and global presence over key areas of the world - satellites permanently "forward deployed", add another dimension to the capability of our force's ability to quickly position themselves for employment. Military forces have always viewed the "high ground" position as one of dominance and warfare advantage. With rare exception, whoever owned the high ground owned the fight. This capability (Space) is the ultimate high ground of U.S. military operations. Today, control of this high ground means superiority in information and significant force enhancement. Tomorrow, ownership may mean instant engagement anywhere in the world. Planners should consider integrating future development capabilities, such as the capability to deliver attacks from space, into the campaign plan when determining how best to strike adversary Centers of Gravity (COG). Space force application systems would have the advantages of rapid global access and the ability to effectively bypass adversary defenses" [AFSPC, 2003]. The SMP never specifies exactly who the enemy is or could be, or which nations would threaten the U.S. through space, but instead calls for preemptive action in order to ensure that this enemy never has the capability of developing to begin with. This is evident when the plan states how the AFSPC "will organize, train and equip space and missile forces to provide the President with a range of options to deter and defeat aggression or any form of coercion against the U.S., our allies, or our friends" [AFSPC, 2003]. Ultimately, space and the advantages of its perspective and global reach can be used to deter any challenger to American supremacy. Below, Figures 5.1 and 5.2, both copied directly from the SMP, demonstrate the methods by which the AFSPC plans to eventually control space. Figure 5.1 provides definitions for each of the five interrelated methods, while Figure 5.2 provides examples of space missions or sub-missions for each. 54 * Space Force Enhance merit (SFE) - Capabilities that contribute to maximizing the effectiveness of military air, land, sea, and space operations * Counterspace (CS) - Capabilities to attain and maintain a desired degree of space _ superiority by allowing'friendly forces to exploit'space capabilities while negating an adversary's ability to do the same * Space Force Application (SFA) _ - Capabilities lo execute missions with weapon's systems operating from or through space which hold terrestrial targets at risk * Space Support (SS) i -Capabilities to provide critical launch and satellite control infrastructure, capabilities and technologies that enable the other mission areas to effectively perform thBir missions * Mission Support (MS) . '"" * - - Functional areas that cut across all mission areas and provide the required infrastructure „ , Figure 5.1. Definitions of U.S. Air Force Space Command Mission Areas and Support for Space Control [AFSPC, 2003] Space Force Enhancement (SFE) • Positioning, Navkjatiorfahd Timing . (PNT) • Satellite Communications (SATCOM) j • Environmental Monitoring (EM) * " *i • intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (1SR) I • Coimmand apd Control (C2) Counterspace (CS) .* • Space Situation Awareness (SSA) • Defensive Counterspace (DCS) • Offensive Com iter space (OCS) Space Force Application (SFA) » Nudear Deterrence • Missile Defense • Conventional Strike Space Support (SS) • Launch Operations • Satellite Operations • ' A n d advocate for - Modeling, Samiitatton, and analysis - timp Diwlrtpniwit Evaluation(FDE) Mission Support (MS) • CommunleatSons and information (C&l). • ,~ Civil Engineering • •**'Logistics • T.Securitv Forces' • Space i raining, Education, and l;\ Exercise (STEDE) •t .Medical Figure 5.2. Examples of U.S. Air Force Space Command Mission and Sub-Mission Areas for Space Control [AFSPC, 2003] Figure 5.3 is what the SMP calls the "Military Space Power Construct" and it depicts how the methods and missions described above fit together to ensure American access, control, and eventually the full exploitation of space. The Military Space Power Construct, which is similar in appearance to a monument or building of political importance, is rationally introduced as the most direct and logical method towards permanently securing American interests in space and thus on Earth. 55 Figure 5.3. U.S. Air Force Space Command's Military Space Power Construct for Space Control [AFSPC, 2003] "While our ultimate goals are truly to 'exploit' space through Space Force Enhancement and Space Force Application missions, as with other mediums, we cannot fully 'exploit' that medium until we first 'control' it. The needed foundation, therefore, consists of the assured space access and infrastructure provided by the Space Support and Mission Support areas along with the Counter Space capabilities (Space Situation Awareness, Defensive Counter Space, and Offensive Counter Space) required to control space and ensure Space Superiority" [AFSPC, 2003]. It is quite clear that the fundamental foundation of the United States' ability to control space and thus exploit its resources is assured access. This unilateralist ideology is identical to what is described in Michael Klare's [2001] "Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict". And just as Klare argues that the maintenance of alliances has suffered under this policy, pursuing the exclusive exploitation of space for itself and its chosen allies will undermine international space treaties and the principles on which they were founded. The SMP addresses this by admitting, "to fully develop and exploit potential Counter Space and space-based Space Force Application capabilities, some U.S. policies and international treaties may need to be reviewed and modified" [AFSPC, 2003]. 56 5.2.10. The Benefits of Transparency On January 14, 2004, less than three months after the release of the substantially less public Air Force Space Command Strategic Master Plan, President George W. Bush announced a new vision for the U.S. space program that saw him call for a return to the Moon and a human mission to Mars. This was the revision of U.S. space policy recommended by Donald Rumseld and the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization; the same Commission that recommended the President use the nation's potential in space to support its domestic, economic, diplomatic and national security objectives. President Bush's announcement was highly ceremonial and was covered extensively by the world's media. The buildup towards the announcement was immense, with comparisons being made to John F. Kennedy's speeches that inspired the U.S. to reach the Moon over thirty-five years before. Just prior to the announcement, the President was introduced in person by NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe and then via satellite by NASA astronaut Mike Foale, floating aboard the International Space Station. Bush then gave his grand vision of a permanent American-led human presence in space. NASA, only the civilian half of the U.S. space program, was awarded full attention during this historic announcement. The other half, described in detail above, was not mentioned at all. President Bush's official policy document was released in June 2004 and is entitled the "Report of the President's Commission on the Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy: Journey to Inspire, Innovate, and Discover" [President's Commission, 2004]. The Bush Plan, as it has been labeled, although more humanistic, cooperative, and civilian in nature, shares similar strategic initiatives with the recommendations made by the Project for the New American Century, the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, and the U.S. Air Force Space Command. The most significant similarity is how the promotion of international and commercial participation in exploration will "further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests" [White House, 2004]. Despite its 57 calls for greater cooperation, the fundamental purpose of this plan is to sustain the American competitive advantage. The Bush Plan also calls for extensive encouragement of the private sector, in order to share the cost burdens of space exploration and to fuel a new wave of economic growth. It argues its belief "that the commercialization of space should become a primary focus of the vision, and that the creation of a space-based industry will be one of the principal benefits of this journey...Sustaining the long-term exploration of the solar system requires a robust space industry that will contribute to national economic growth, produce new products through the creation of new knowledge, and lead the world in invention and innovation. This space industry will become a national treasure" [President's Commission, 2004]. In order to support this fledgling commercial industry, the Bush Plan demands that the U.S. Congress assure the appropriate property rights for those seeking to develop space resources and infrastructure. Such rights however, would be contrary to the UN principles that space is common heritage for all humankind including future generations, free from private or national appropriation. The President's Report admits that the UN treaty regime may in fact impede the realization of its vision of a productive and sustainable space based industry. Referring to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1979 Moon Agreement, discussed in detail in this thesis, the Report declares that: "The United States is a signatory to the 1967 Space Treaty; it has not ratified the 1979 Moon Treaty, but at the same time, has not challenged its basic premises or assumptions. Because of this treaty regime, the legal status of a hypothetical private company engaged in making products from space resources is uncertain. Potentially, this uncertainty could strangle a nascent space based industry in its cradle; no company will invest millions of dollars in developing a product to which their legal claim is uncertain. The issue of private property rights in space is a complex one involving national and international legal issues. However, it is imperative that these issues be recognized and addressed at an early stage in the implementation of the vision, otherwise there will be little significant private sector activity associated with the development of space resources, one of our key goals" [President's Commission, 2004]. 58 The President's Commission clearly admits that international treaties are obstacles to its vision of the development of outer space, but that efforts should be made to work within the confines of the international community in order to settle these differences. Complete and trusting cooperation however, is not an option that is considered; economic security and competition are still major catalysts driving this latest vision for human expansion into space. Using language nostalgic of the American west and the leadership that was required to tame it, the President's Commission admits "although the era of Sputnik has given way to an age of international cooperation in space, it remains a competitive frontier. The President rightfully indicated that the vision calls for 'a journey, not a race' and he invites 'other nations to join U.S. on this journey, in the spirit of cooperation and friendship.' But with any journey, someone must chart the course.and then lead the way. Other nations, against whom we compete for jobs in the global economy, are also intent on exploring space. If not the U.S., someone else will lead in the exploration, utilization and, ultimately, the commercialization of space, as we sit idly by" [President's Commission, 2004]. Once again, this is an expression of a policy of preemption, transparently projected through NASA's public credibility and palatability. The U.S. Air Force Space Command's plans are just as influential to American decision makers. However they receive virtually no public attention. Forty-five years ago, NASA was created as a political tool to present American space activities as transparent, peaceful, and beneficial to all humanity. Today, NASA's mandate certainly fits these characteristics. However, the institution is still being used as the public front of a much wider American space program, fulfilling policy that has shifted and evolved over many administrations. NASA's role in this latest push for human expansion is clear. "Although NASA clearly assumes the lead for our nation, many government agencies will also contribute. Other nations too will be invited to join the journey. Most importantly, success hinges decisively on purely commercial organizations, and on thousands of university researchers, private sector scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs from around the globe, all committed to the same objective" [President's Commission, 2004]. These other government agencies will certainly include the U.S. Air Force Space Command, cooperating nations will require an invitation, and the fundamental objective 59 is clear: the promotion of American leadership and the security of its national interests. Space is the ultimate resource in the realization of this vision and it is ultimately up to the United States Government to fulfill it. 6. The Principles 6.1. Sustainability This section will briefly discuss the principles by which I judge the policies, plans, and visions of space programs, the space community, and individual enthusiasts; or on which a more relevant space program could be based. The principles I have developed are inherently biased as they form the basis of my own opinionated arguments, reflecting my educational background in natural resources conservation and human ecological planning. An aerospace engineer would certainly develop a much different set of principles, as would a market economist. In my belief however, the complete reliance of humanity on Earth's complex ecological systems for existence lends more influence to my position when discussing our species' long-range survivability. I have mentioned in this thesis how the space community perceives itself to be responsible for planning humanity's long-term future. I have argued that in its current state, this unique community is ill suited for this most complex task, because of its poor representation of human diversity and its apparent reluctance to consider the more Earthly-based problems that threaten human productivity and perhaps even survivability; especially since most of these problems require Earthly-based solutions. I do however, believe that the space environment and human activity within it can play a significant role in providing a better understanding of these problems while providing unique opportunities to contribute to their solutions. In essence, the space industry must align itself with the principles of sustainability or risk becoming perhaps the biggest hindrance in its own right. This all of course hinges on the worldview under which the global space industry operates. 60 The concept of sustainability and the discipline of sustainability planning fundamentally aim for a state of relative permanence; the ultimate goal being the long-term - on the order of centuries and ideally more - existence of human civilization. A sustainable society must therefore purposely act to ensure its own structural integrity, normal functioning, and self-production, and by definition not engage in activities that significantly damage the basis of its own existence [Rees, 2003]. Fundamentally this means pursuing social and economic development that does not undermine the long-term productivity of Earth's ecosphere, within which our society is embedded and wholly dependent on for survival. And so sustainability primarily relies ecological factors, but also on social and economic ones as well, since all three are inherently interlinked. Because I am speaking of a community and industry that looks far beyond Earth's boundaries in space and time, I have introduced a fourth and fifth measure: the cosmic and generational perspectives. Space programs should be judged on these principles; a more relevant one would embrace them. 6.2. Ecological When viewing Earth from space, it should become immediately apparent that individual humans and the societies and economies they have created are biophysical entities, not separate from the planet's ecosphere in any way. The ecosphere would certainly be sustainable in the absence of human societies and economies, but there can exist no human societies and economies without a functional ecosphere [Rees, 2003]. This perspective should enlighten space planners to see that the individual human is a subsystem of the society/economy, and that the society/economy is a subsystem of a finite, life-providing planet, existing in the vast and harsh natural environment of outer space. The hierarchy should be obvious: individual, society/economy, planetary ecosphere, outer space. By realizing this hierarchy, a space planner should understand that humans, Earth, and space cannot be separated, and that all humans already live in space, shielded from the hostile environment by a network of ecological systems within which we evolved. With this understanding, a more relevant space program would accentuate the absolute importance to human survivability of Earth's ecosphere and 61 would thus invest a significant proportion of financial and human capital on its study and preservation. When taking this stance though, space planners must realize that at the planetary level, the behaviour of these complex ecological systems is inherently unpredictable and so holistic approaches would provide better understanding of their inter-relation, their collective life-providing properties, and their reaction to human influences. Space-based perspectives and technologies should play a more integral role in this pursuit of this fundamentally important knowledge. 6 . 3 . Economic The recent history of human economic development should teach the space industry the eventual outcomes of relying on a highly competitive worldview. In the past centuries, a handful of 'developed' nations explored, exploited, controlled, and colonized the territories of people they perceived to be less developed. The rationales behind this disparate stage in human development are nearly identical to the justifications for expanding into space: exploration, national prestige, economic growth and security, and ultimately competition. The colonizing countries were able to expand and build strong economies on the natural capital of their colonies, hindering the ability of these nations to do the same. Instead, these people were forced into a subservient status that today poses great risk to the health, happiness, and productivity of billions worldwide. More crucially however, these people are being forced to exploit increasingly degraded ecological systems to partake in small subsistence economies, a process that undermines the ability of these systems to sustain human societies around the world. A space program should be perceived as a luxury that the majority of nations are not fortunate enough to have. Nations with space programs should also reflect on the historical development of their strong economies and understand past inequities that have shaped a planet of 'haves' and 'have-nots'. This understanding should be framed within the reality that the long-term survivability of the entire species depends on economies that do not significantly damage the basis for human existence, regardless if these are in developed or developing nations. And so economic and technological capital developed from the space industry and the 62 space environment should not only be used to address past inequities, but also as a means to assist the most ecologically destructive economies, both in the developed and developing world, to reduce their impact on the very systems that allow us all to survive. Space programs can no longer afford to perceive unconstrained economic growth as viable policy and the plight of developing nations to be the jurisdiction of other institutions. Economies are merely the ecological activities of human societies and so the space industry, with its uniquely global perspective, needs to influence the sustainability of this behaviour wherever it exists across the planet. 6.4. Social The space industry is often referred to as the peaceful equivalent of war; a massive, concerted human-industrial effort to achieve a specific end-goal. In the case of war it is defeating the enemy, in the case of current space programs, perhaps its sending humans to the Moon. Both require substantial funding, planning, industrial production, coordination, and human capital. This is why many national space programs are closely linked with their governments' militaries. The space industry so far, has been peaceful, leading many to believe that it is indeed the modern day answer to war. They point to the cooperation between Cold War enemies, the U.S. and Russia, as a prime example. And so, the space industry often touts international cooperation as one of the major benefits of its existence, which is true only to some degree. The very nature and cost of the activities that are required to place humans and infrastructure in space, followed by working in that alien environment certainly demands international cooperation. However, the level of cooperation and with who is still the sole decision of the most prominent space-faring countries. This attitude of selective cooperation only shuns nations and furthers animosity towards those with wealth and power. Not only does this bitterness exist at the diplomatic level, but it also affects ordinary people who question why certain nations aim to place humans on Mars while their own governments cannot provide the basic necessities of life. More often than not, the most powerful space-faring nations are blamed for maintaining the inequitable status quo. The leaders of the space industry therefore 63 do not just need to openly cooperate with other nations trying to get a foothold in space, but also cooperate with those nations confined to Earth that feel the most overlooked. It is here that social inequality is felt the strongest, fueling hatred for wealthy developed nations that is often expressed in indiscriminate violence. Cooperation can take on many forms, from actual activities in space to the sharing of information gathered from space to the export of ground-based support industries. More than anything, it's the gesture of inclusion rather than exclusion that is needed in order for the space industry to be a unifying force that positively influences the lives of a more diverse range of people. 6.5. Cosmic All of my principles up to this point have been entirely human and Earth focused, which in my opinion is exactly what is lacking in the space industry, as it currently exists. However, there is certainly a need and a reason to look outwards beyond Earth for knowledge to assist in preserving human civilization. The sheer importance of understanding the history, properties, and ultimate fate of the universe aside, there are very concrete applications for space observation and planetary exploration. The threat posed by a collision with an asteroid or comet although perhaps distant, is very real. As a species, we'd be foolish not map potential threats and research methods of directly avoiding an impact. There is much to learn about the state of Earth's ecosphere by researching such planets as Venus and Mars, which can tell us how planetary environments could shift into different steady state attractors, potentially hostile to human habitation. The search for evidence of life within our solar system will provide fundamental answers and certainly more questions about the origin and prevalence of life in the universe. Not finding a single trace of life will have just as significant an implication, but we must look first. The search for other terrestrial planets in distant solar systems can assist in the understanding of the uniqueness of Earth, while the vastness and odd beauty of the natural universe can serve to inspire and unite its inhabitants. In all, a cosmic perspective can teach humanity much about the rareness of our existence, which in turn would raise awareness of the 64 state of human civilization and its preservation. In this sense, an outward perspective may be of fundamental importance. 6 . 6 . Multi-Generational In their current structure, space programs ultimately serve national interests, but what could be of more interest than the long-term existence of our entire civilization? The time frame under which national governments operate, four to eight years, is not only ineffective in dealing with real issues facing human survivability but also a contributing factor to our unsustainability. The worldviews of mistrust, competition, and growth that pervade the space industry are direct products of the short-term, immediate national individualism that characterize today's governments. The space industry therefore needs to transcend the limited scope of government and embrace holism not just from the ecological, social, economic, and cosmic perspectives but also from the dimension of time. A fundamental principle of sustainability is meeting the needs of today without compromising the needs of future generations. This awareness of individuals who will not yet exist for decades and even centuries is of the utmost importance, since it encourages our present society to critically assess our chosen trends of growth and consumption. Humanizing or even personalizing our future can potentially encourage ordinary people to influence the limited scope of their governments. However, significant change is unlikely. On the other hand, the influence of a knowledgeable and well-respected global space industry that advocates for a longer-term outlook and the needs of future generations might be significant enough to shape, the policies of national governments. This is especially true if these issues are addressed in terms that governments cannot ignore, namely economic security. A relevant space program would be able to provide valuable data to monitor the use of resources and the production of wastes, that could in turn help hypothesize the future impacts to that nation's economy. Once again this would require not only acknowledgement of future generations but also a certain degree of independence from the short-term interests of national governments, unless of course that government is progressive enough to task its space agency to use a long-term perspective to 65 begin with. Figure 6.1 shows a very simple schematic representing the interrelation of all the necessary perspectives mentioned in this section, with the ultimate goal of their interaction being the long-term survivability of humanity. Figure 6.1. Interaction of Perspectives to Address Long-Term Human Survivability in the Space Industry In order to embrace this outlook and provide meaningful direction to the preservation of human civilization, space programs must become truly cooperative international institutions, independent from the shortsighted interests of national governments. 7. The Scenarios 7.1. The Context Assuming that human expansion into space is inevitable, these three scenarios will attempt to address the basic question: under what pretext will a significant human presence in space be commenced? The present is an ideal time to begin these projections, not only because of the recent announcement of a renewed interest in human space exploration but also because of the volatility of the international political climate. Since September 11, 2001, the world has 66 been in a state of flux. National security has become the central policy goal of the United States, with the continued threat of terrorism abroad and at the homeland. The Bush Administration has tested the policy of preemption to mixed success. Saddam Hussein is no longer in power. However, insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan continue to make those countries and American interests unstable. Relations with many longstanding allies, especially in Europe, are at an all time low. The U.S. development of a controversial missile defense shield is perceived to be provocative, and many fear the implications for the weaponization of space. The complete reliance of the American military on space systems means that the future use of space is inherently tied to the security climate of the present and the ideologies with which the U.S. military is guided. The upcoming U.S. Presidential election in November 2004 is perhaps the most decisive in history. The worldview with which international relations are pursued and the U.S. military is commanded in the next four years will have a profound impact on how space will be utilized. The scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They are merely three separate accounts of how the future may unfold. They are labeled on the basis of both their likelihood of coming true and their desirability. How preferable each scenario is, is based on the principles introduced above. 7.2. Scenario 1: More Probable, Less Preferable The threats of terrorism running up to the 2004 U.S. Presidential election are just that, empty threats. The election process, although a heated and emotional battle, occurs without a hitch. John Kerry's platform of strengthening the U.S. while rebuilding international alliances wins him the Presidency, and he immediately leads a much more focused and diplomatic front against terrorism with the conviction of a true war veteran. Accentuating his role as Commander-in-Chief, President Kerry gains much respect amongst the armed forces, and holds true to his campaign promise to expand the general forces. He also invests heavily into covert, special operations forces. Kerry terminates the Bush Administration's internationally unpopular and controversial plans for a national missile defense system, diverting these substantial funds towards space systems that allow complete situational awareness on the battlefield in order to 67 support more mobile and effective Special Operations forces. The intelligence community is overhauled and the establishment of an Anti-terrorism tsar signifies more of a reliance on direct espionage and reconnaissance from space and on the ground rather than unreliable informants. Talks with North Korea and Iran over their nuclear weapons programs are instigated; meanwhile, the development of a new generation of reconnaissance satellites allows precise monitoring of these and other suspect sites. International concern over humanitarian crises in Sudan, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, and other regions of Africa lead to more open use of satellite reconnaissance for humanitarian missions. U.S., NATO, and UN quick reaction humanitarian forces are created in order to stop further deterioration of these humanitarian emergencies and to prevent "failed states" that are havens for terrorism training, arms smuggling and drug cultivation. With the increased publicity of these military units, there is more public admission on the value of and reliance on space-based systems. The Air Force is publicly instructed to research and develop a completely reusable space plane to service vital satellites, and monitor the military space activities of China, Pakistan, and India, to ensure treaty compliance and that their uses of space are peaceful. There is significant international concern and public protests over the development of an American military space plane, but Kerry stresses its importance for international security and assures the international community that he will adhere to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and never place any offensive weapons in space. To rebalance public opinion and regain its moral authority, the U.S. joins the International Criminal Court, which is hailed as a landmark moment for international justice. In Kerry's second term as President, he supports the underlying concept of Bush's Moon and Mars initiative, but delays the timeline until the International Space Station (ISS) is complete and is the fully functional research laboratory it was intended to be. The commitment to complete the ISS fuels increased international cooperation in space activities, but inevitable delays and budget over-runs cause Kerry to rethink the scale and feasibility of Bush's 68 Moon/Mars vision. Kerry delivers an inspiring speech to the UN about the future of humanity in space and the value of space in improving the human condition, but falls short of ratifying the 1979 Moon Agreement, as he believes that private corporations are needed to help burden the cost of space exploration and thus must have an economic incentive to go there in the first place. Proving this theory, NASA begins to privatize certain modules in the ISS, thus recuperating much-needed funds that can be then diverted to further human exploration of space. Meanwhile, the technologies developed in the 2004 X-Prize allow a handful of private corporations to begin regular flights into low Earth orbit, and even dock with the ISS. This is seen as an important factor in driving the new space economy. In 2012, Hillary Clinton becomes the first female U.S. President following 8 years of American reengagement in the international community. Vice President Bill Clinton is the most respected and influential VP in American history, making the pair a leading and respectable force in global politics. The Clintons maintain solid support both domestically and internationally for 2 terms in office. These 8 years sees a surge in the American economy thanks to heavy investment in space technologies and the encouragement of private activities in outer space. Despite the increased security around the world and surges in economic productivity, ecological and humanitarian crises persist in many regions of Africa, South America, and Asia. Representatives of developing countries complain to the UN that the expansion of economies into space by a handful of nations is leaving most developing nations behind. Many representatives from both developed and developing nations disagree, arguing that the trickle down effect of this burgeoning industry will benefit all humanity economically, as it has done scientifically. There is an attempt to draft a new space Treaty at the UN that mimics the ill-fated 1979 Moon Agreement, without going as far. This Treaty stresses the need for the equitable sharing of economic wealth generated from space activities, but does not recommend an international regime to govern this process. The Treaty also demands strict guidelines for the activities of private corporations. Reception is mixed, with the United 69 States, once again being the major opponent, arguing that stunting the growth of this new economy will only hurt the world's poor. In 2020, humans return to the Moon. However, it is achieved completely by a private corporation. The mission is inspiring and carried out tastefully, with a superb documentary as its main output. The crew of three are respected scientists, who spend a short two days on the lunar surface, planting a symbolic flag of Earth (not a corporate logo or the flag of any particular nation), and building a fence around the Apollo 11 landing site, declaring it to be the first extraterrestrial UNESCO World Heritage Site - pending approval from the UN. NASA reveals that it had been in secret correspondence with the private consortium responsible for the lunar landing, and although it provided no material or financial support, NASA agreed to focus its attention on Mars, since the private sector had a good grasp on lunar exploration. Following the lunar landing, the reality that Mars might contain microbial life convinced the UN to ban any private exploration of the planet until an internationally sanctioned mission could explore the planet first. The lunar mission inspires a whole generation of entrepreneurs, scientists, and explorers to venture further beyond the Moon, fueling economic growth in the developed and much of the developing world. Consumption behaviours however have changed little from the turn of the century and it is increasingly apparent that Earth's natural systems cannot support these increased levels of consumption. Fish stocks collapse, persistent droughts reduce once-productive lands to dust, and fire seasons become longer and more destructive. Increasingly erratic weather creates a new wave of ecological refugees, which reinforces a large global underclass of desperately poor and causing security problems around the world. The emerging space industry has expanded the global economy but has done little to improve the living conditions of a large minority of the world's population. 7.3. Scenario 2: Less Probable, Less Preferable Prior to the 2004 U.S. presidential election, a significant terrorist attack in multiple locations on American soil forces the Bush Administration, for the first time in history, to delay the 70 Presidential election. Five simultaneous attacks are launched on 'soft targets' that include a shopping center, a professional sports stadium, a conference, a train station and an underground subway line. One small symbolic attack also occurs at a grocery store in Crawford, Texas, home of George W. Bush's Presidential ranch. These attacks generate widespread fear and anger. The diversity of the attacks and the subsequent delay of the election further divide public opinion. Massive protests both supporting and against President Bush and his decision to delay the election occur across the nation, many of which become violent. The National Guard is dispatched to many major cities to protect businesses and disperse crowds. Many cities impose curfews, furthering a sense of anger, fear, and panic. The election is delayed until the first week of January 2005, until the nation's police forces, National Guard, and emergency services can restore order and the election system reconfigured to deal with heightened security. Investigation reveals that 20 terrorists were directly involved in the attacks, 12 of them Saudi Arabian, 3 Jordanian, 1 Kuwaiti, and 4 Caucasian Americans. The white Americans all had links to far-right anti-government militias, forcing the FBI to step up its operations against domestic terrorists. International solidarity once again swings behind the U.S. However, with Iraq and Afghanistan still unstable, many international leaders publicly call for a different strategy than direct confrontation with Middle Eastern states, especially since the terrorists all came from 'friendly' nations. Bush agrees that a different approach is needed and once again the UN becomes a focal point for discussion. The U.S. however, makes it clear that its first priority is the safety of its citizens and their interests and that this will occur with or without international approval. However, there is significantly more effort on the part of the Bush Administration to take world opinion into consideration and draft an acceptable international strategy. In the end, the terrorist attacks and Bush's restrained response has the opposite affect than the Madrid bombings; the attack solidifies support for the incumbent Bush Administration and 71 the perceived moral strength of the Republican Party. The Bush-Cheney ticket wins the delayed election in 2005, and shortly afterwards a statement is released on a radical Islamic website stating that the reelection of Bush was the ultimate goal of the coordinated attacks, and thus they were a complete success. The aftermath sees American covert operations fan out around the globe, especially into Africa, South-East Asia, and South America, heavily relying on space systems for imaging, targeting, and communications. These operations aren't in revenge for the terrorist attacks, but to preempt any further attacks, or merely to prove that the United States will not tolerate illegal activity, no matter where it exists. Because of the involvement of Caucasian Americans in the attacks, U.S. domestic intelligence is strengthened, and the CIA is granted permission to work domestically, in close conjunction with the FBI. This development increases anger within the U.S. because of its impacts on civil liberties. However, this time around, fewer voices of dissent are heard. The magnitude of the 2004 attacks convinces many that changes and compromises are needed. The Bush Administration continues with the development of its ground-based anti-missile defense system, establishing missile interceptor sites in California, Alaska, Australia, Poland, and Iceland. Mobile interceptors are also placed on submarines patrolling the world's oceans. Security is the major focus of Bush's 2 n d term, and there are results. Terrorist organizations are crippled worldwide, and attacks become scarce. Iraq eventually becomes stable and a NATO force helps secure fair and successful elections in Afghanistan's fledgling democracy. American troops actively patrol around the world, disrupting human, weapons, and narcotics smuggling. The U.S. once again plays a direct role in the Israel-Palestine conflict, as it is seen as the major issue fueling anti-Western sentiment. Bush publicly denounces Prime Minister Sharon, and calls for a dismantling of all illegal settlements and a withdrawal from occupied territories. If the Israeli government does not comply, a U.S.-led NATO force will be introduced to force compliance. Bush believes the world has had enough and this issue must be solved one way or another. In the end, Bush's actions are received favourably around the world, and his ability to 72 forcefully lead the world to a more peaceful state is not exactly heralded but is certainly welcomed. Riding on the favourable security situation during Bush's 2n d term, Republican Senator John McCain wins the 2008 election, with Colin Powell as Vice President. Both are war veterans with centrist attitudes that win over a large number of swing votes. The McCain Administration follows along with the missile defense system in order to contain North Korea and Iran, who received little attention during the previous administration. McCain secretly orders the development of kinetic space weapons to defend vital missile tracking, imaging, and communications satellites from direct attack or accidental collision. These first generation space weapons merely eject inanimate rods that will damage a hostile satellite or alter its orbit. An expanding fleet of these anti-satellite satellites (ASATS) becomes a vital component in protecting the space systems that the U.S. military and economy so desperately depends on. The secrecy veiling this network of autonomous ASATS is lifted in 2013 when the European Space Agency's Mars Express 2 spacecraft containing the Beagle 3 Mars Lander is accidentally destroyed by a U.S. Air Force ASAT when it passes through low-Earth orbit. For months scientists are puzzled by the sudden loss of the spacecraft, until a leaked U.S. Air Force document blows the cover on 8 years of research and development into 'benign' and 'defensive' space weapons. International outrage is expressed at the UN, bringing about an all-time low in American-European relations. The EU accepts the American apology and compensation for the loss of its spacecraft. However, it demands a complete dismantling of all space weapons. The United States responds that these weapons are essential to protect the will of free nations and that they are legal as they are not 'weapons of mass destruction', which are forbidden under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. France and the United States both seek resolutions at the Security Council respectively condemning and supporting the deployment of these weapons, but since both hold vetoes, nothing is resolved. The French ambassador to the UN is overheard coyly suggesting that France might 'go it alone' and 73 purposely dismantle American space weapons. This private comment accidentally caught on tape is broadcasted throughout the United States, allowing the McCain Administration to use this statement to stress its sovereign right to protect its space assets. All this while, funds have been slowly diverted away from the International Space Station (ISS) towards the Bush Administration's Moon and Mars plan, which McCain supports and stresses as the most significant piece of policy to exert American supremacy. The faltering ISS and missions to low-Earth orbit become the domain of NASA while the Moon and Mars missions are given to the heavily funded Defense Department. The Air Force is the major actor in the actualization of these plans because of its budget, experimental technology research, command-structure, and pool of brave personnel willing to face the high risks to further the political and economic interests of their country. When the Moon/Mars plans still fell under the jurisdiction of NASA, the concept of including other nations in the missions had been central. With the recent disagreements at the UN however, President McCain decides, with strong backing from Congress and the American public, to make it strictly an American venture, in the hands of the U.S. Air Force. McCain reassures the international community that there will be global technological, economic, and scientific benefits from these missions and that the role of the U.S. military is simply to expedite the plans, and not to control space or create a new theatre for warfare. There is concern at the UN from representatives of both developed and developing nations that the first steps towards a sustained presence in outer space should be a truly international effort, but the United States argues that such a process would delay these important missions by introducing unnecessary complexity. There is no legal standpoint by which any nation can challenge the U.S.'s unilateral approach or the involvement of its military, as long as they do not conduct military maneuvers or build military bases. The U.S. military legally lands on the Moon in 2024, planting an American flag and cordoning off the Apollo 11 site, declaring it the first extraterrestrial U.S. National Monument. Although 74 the landing generates widespread public fascination, there is a growing sense that American preeminence and superiority are shaping the planet's future, not popular global opinion. 7.4. Scenario 3: Less Probable, More Preferable The 2004 Presidential election is the most emotional and partisan in history, captivating not only the American public but also the world as a whole. Campaign ads attacking both candidates reduce the final month of campaigning to mudslinging, which begins to disgust the average American citizen. Editorials in magazines and newspapers decry the campaigning tactics and the role of independent lobbyist in funding and airing the disgraceful attack ads. There are serious reflections about the state of American politics, and the two-party system. In the end, John Kerry wins the 2004 election, and President Bush graciously accepts defeat vowing to assist in any way to help secure the country they both love. Ralph Nader's candidacy had little effect on the popular outcome. However, he becomes a leading figurehead in a small but vocal movement to overhaul the American political system. Shortly after the election, it is revealed that the FBI had thwarted a significant terrorist attack just days before the election. Although this news could have influenced the outcome of the election, it was unclear as to how, and so rather than politicize the successful operation, it was decided to suppress any information regarding the planned attack until after the election. John Kerry publicly honours the FBI and the work of the previous administration for thwarting the attack, repairing damaged relations and ushering in a new level of cooperation amongst the two rival parties. This cooperation is heightened when Republican Senator and fellow Vietnam War veteran John McCain accepts the position of Secretary of Defense, showing that the Kerry Administration is focusing less on bipartisan politics and more on finding a common strategy to international security. With continuing instability in Iraq, President Kerry reengages the U.S. at the UN, delivering a passionate speech about burying past grudges and the need for the international community to band together and deal with the major humanitarian crises and security threats in the world. At the end of his speech, he asks for UN troops in Iraq. There is 75 widespread support for Kerry's attitude and his request for troops. However, many countries express doubt in the double standards that have characterized American foreign policy up to now. France states that it will veto any Security Council Resolution sending UN troops to Iraq unless the United States adheres to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Following the prisoner abuse scandals in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay, John Kerry believes transparency and adherence to the same standards as the rest of the world is necessary to restore the U.S.'s moral authority around the world. Following much debate in Congress, the notion to sign the ICC agreement passes by a narrow margin. France applauds the move and works diligently to send a UN force to Iraq and bolster the NATO force in Afghanistan, relieving the substantial American burden. The worsening humanitarian crisis in Sudan raises memories of Rwanda a decade ago. Not wanting to repeat past mistakes, the U.S. leads a UN mission to provide vital food, shelter, and medicines to hundreds of thousands of refugees while U.S. Special Forces covertly capture responsible members of the Sudanese government and militias. The coordinated humanitarian and military operation, approved at the UN Security Council, is hailed as a model for morally acceptable interventions in the affairs of sovereign nations. Because of this, the UN increasingly regains its position as the focus for international discourse and decision-making in the world. With the improving diplomatic climate, the Kerry Administration takes the necessary steps to abandon the Bush Administration's controversial missile defense shield, since there is little support from the European Union, Russia, and the UN. Defense Secretary John McCain vocalizes American public opinion when he states that the missile defense system may be viewed as provocative, and that containment and diplomatic dialogue with unfriendly states pursuing ballistic missiles is a better approach. Funding from the defense shield is shifted towards a new generation of reconnaissance satellites helpful for containment and treaty compliance of these unfriendly nations. 76 Late in Kerry's first term, the International Space Station (ISS) is finally completed and the U.S. Shuttle fleet is retired and transported to various museums around the U.S. One Shuttle is donated to the Tsilkovsky Museum in Russia, as a gesture of thanks for strong Russian support and cooperation during the grounding of the Shuttle fleet. Socializing at the donation ceremony in Moscow attended by delegates from all nations involved in the ISS project, President Kerry learns of the European Space Agency's (ESA) 'Aurora' space exploration plans. These extensive plans predate the Bush Administration's Moon/Mars initiative, and Kerry wonders why NASA and ESA have not cooperated more in integrating their policies for the exploration and use of outer space. From this casual encounter, a Committee is established at the UN where the world's space agencies can discuss strategies and integrate plans for the future of humanity in space. It is hailed as a landmark decision in order to spread the financial burden as well as develop strategies that are more representative of the needs of all nations. Even nations without space agencies are invited, not just as observers, but are given some decision making power as well. In its first weeklong session, UNCOSA (The United Nations Council of Space Agencies) hears from a diverse range of nations. A group of Pacific Island nations plead for better observation of their region from space, in order to monitor fish stocks, coral bleaching, sea level rise, and storm surges. Many other remote nations insist that broadband communications are of central importance to them in order to connect them to the world community and economy and stop migration from rural regions to urban centers. African nations believe the most pressing need is a system for water detection in their drought affected areas, as well as close observation of militia activities, refugee movements, and poaching that is undermining their security and economy. Other nations describe the need for the ability to clean Earth orbit from space debris, the desire for radio telescopes on the far side of the moon for deep space observation, or the value of international missions to Mars. UNCOSA's highly publicized first session is an eye-opening experience for the entire international community, and the end product of the gathering is a report outlining the fundamental purposes of the space industry as well as an assessment of the most pressing needs for Earth and all its inhabitants with respect to space 77 activities. It is agreed that the ultimate purpose of the space industry is the long-term survival of the human species, a goal that is fundamentally tied to the use of outer space. It is agreed that only an international gathering of space agencies like this one, could make the appropriate decisions as to how each national space agency should proceed in order to work towards this goal of preserving human civilization. It is also agreed that the most pressing threat to human survivability is human behaviour itself, directly through war and conflict, and indirectly through resource depletion and climate change. The next biggest identified threat is an impact with a Near Earth Object (NEO) - either an asteroid or a comet - and this threat should not be taken lightly. The Council also agrees in the importance of space activities for international cooperation, scientific understanding of our planet's origins, and technological development. It is the belief of all nations involved that an appropriately guided space industry could benefit all humanity, repair past injustices and improve the future for human civilization. The Council's report inspires many nations to invest more funding in the space industry, believing that it is an effort that requires true global cooperation. Through the UN Security Council, treaty compliance from space, military containment, and diplomatic engagement with unfriendly nations is pursued rigorously to improve international security. Earth observation and the dissemination of information in some of the world's most critical ecologically degraded and sensitive areas describe a more accurate picture of the state of the planet's health and guide policy for the more sustainable use of resources. Satellite reconnaissance developed for military purposes is now also used to monitor and regulate resource extraction, waste production, and violations of these. Brazil, Canada, Germany, Kenya, Kazakhstan, and New Zealand undertake a joint effort and build large materially closed artificial ecospheres to study the self-organization of ecosystems. This large experiment will provide further knowledge of Earth's life-support systems and the influences of human activity on them. It will also provide insight into our capabilities of reproducing the conditions necessary for human habitation off Earth. The experiment is designed to have a timeline that stretches into the decades, as it is understood that the complexity of ecological systems will 78 take longer to better understand. The United States, France, China, and Russia take lead on drafting an international plan for a return to the Moon. The group of accomplished spacefaring nations decides on 3 ultimate purposes for a permanent return to the moon: 1) to learn the necessary skills for planetary exploration; 2) to establish an astronomy center free from the constraints of Earth atmospheric distortion and radio pollution to peer deeper into the universe; and 3) to preserve knowledge and culture of human civilization by building an archive that would survive any Earth-bound calamity. The plans take years to finalize but receive solid support from around the world. Every country is instructed to painstakingly reproduce works of art, literature, oral histories, and any other elements of cultural and historical significance, so that they may one day be transported to the Human Lunar Archives for storage. The global space effort is perceived to have direction and purpose, while improving the lives of those most in need and providing a better understanding of humanity's relationship with each other and the Earth. This confidence is translated into increased funding and political support. By 2025, humans have not returned to the Moon. However, there is little disappointment since the international community agrees upon and believes in the direction that is being taken. The final preparations and assembly of construction components are occurring in the gravitationally stable Lagrange Points 4 and 5 as well as lunar orbit, and the first landing, which will start a permanent human presence is expected early in the next year. During this exciting phase, NASA's terrestrial planet finder satellite constellation discovers the first Earth-like planet orbiting a binary star system 7 light years away. Initial analysis detects an atmosphere with nitrogen and oxygen, and the apparent presence of oceans of liquid water. This satellite constellation is unequipped to detect signs of life. However, the discovery has a profoundly positive impact. The entire planet is fascinated and is keenly awaiting the construction of the Lunar Observatory and its ability to provide the first detailed images of this new Earth-like planet. As delegates from around the world ponder a name for this planet, its discovery floods the world with optimism and inspires a real sense of belonging to Earth. 79 8. Conclusions 8.1. The Inevitability of Economic Hegemony This thesis has largely focused on the United States' perceptions and policies for the exploration and utilization of outer space, in comparison with those of the United Nations. The U.S. was chosen as the focus of this thesis because of the sheer influence it exerts over the space industry and international space law. However, the reader should perceive this story in terms of human ecological behaviour. I urge the reader to look beyond the details of space plans and government policies and observe how one proportionately small segment of our planetary population may be able to dictate the path of human development through the control and exploitation of space. At this stage in human history, it is the ideology and actions of the U.S. that exerts this influence; in the future, China is likely to rival this dominance. Both nations have very different social, economic, and political systems. However, both are highly successful at out-competing other populations at appropriating disproportionately large quantities of natural capital. What these nations perceive as success has the potential to undermine the functionality of the ecosphere, thus threatening the long-term survivability of humanity. For this reason, it is the competitive and growth oriented behaviour itself that I am critiquing, not the character or intentions of the United States or any other nation for that matter. It is policy guided by this behaviour, products of its cultural individualism and expansionary heritage that is ultimately responsible for the powerful position the U.S. now finds itself in. John Logsdon [1997], Director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University, supports this point when he argues that American leadership in space is a direct result of the flexibility of the American political and economic systems. 'These systems are designed to accommodate change as it occurs, without the necessity for centralized decisions on the required adaptations. In other words, current U.S. leadership in space is more a result of the strength of the U.S. system than of some 'grand design' for U.S. space hegemony." But it is hegemony nonetheless. 80 In his paper "Development and imperialism in space", Alan Marshall [1995] contends that expansion into space for economic growth, which is the fundamental driving force behind American plans, is destined to take on an imperialistic or hegemonic form. His perspective follows the theories of economic imperialism by Lenin, who viewed imperialistic expansion as the political and military manifestation of the search for economic surplus. Marshall's position however is based on his belief that there are no economically viable extraterrestrial resources to appropriate for the benefit of Earth, and that the only use for these resources would be to perpetuate an expanding presence in space. And so, given the impossibility of the U.S. gaining an economic surplus from the appropriation and trading of extraterrestrial resources, the economic benefits of space activities must lie somewhere else. Marshall believes this to be the revitalization and economic growth of the military industry, which is inherently tied to the space industry. "With the end of the Cold War, those companies that made a living from the supply of military hardware to governments have experienced a drop in demand for their military goods and an associated drop in profitability. Thus they are seeking to extend their interests in the space part of their markets in order to secure more profits from building rockets and space stations rather than missiles and military aircraft" [Marshall, 1995]. Compensating for the lack of actual economic surplus derived from the space environment itself, military expenditure in the form of space hardware and infrastructure plays a significant role in contributing to economic growth. In this sense, the expansion of American activities in space can contribute to the growth of out-dated and sluggish Earth-bound economies that in turn reassert its overarching economic superiority. The actual control of space, as suggested by the U.S. Air Force Space Command, would take this superiority to an unprecedented level that would be virtually impossible to challenge. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, nostalgia for the taming and settling of the American West is a persistent theme in the space community, noticeable by the choice of language that is often used to describe space exploration. The most prevalent image evoked, often combined with elements of national prestige and cultural heritage, is that of the mythical frontier, which 81 is often portrayed as being responsible for America's economic and political greatness. Marshall [1995] however, argues that 'frontierism' is not so much a social or psychological concept, but more of an economic philosophy, emerging from the individualism so entrenched in American political and economic thought. Frontierism involves a belief in the individual's triumph over the challenges of a new situation, a new territory, or a new environment to carve out an existence. Once achieving this significant accomplishment, the individual deservedly calls that territory or environment his or her own. The continuation of this process encourages the growth of the frontier, thus extending the outposts of economic and demographic expansion. Ultimately, this course of action contributes to the wealth of the nation by turning unproductive land into an economic resource. In the historical settlement of the U.S., frontierism was an economic policy designed to tame the wilderness and present it in economic terms as quickly as possible. This is an identical analogy for the justification of more private sector involvement in the exploration and utilization of space. Marshall [1995] stresses that in reality, frontierism is simply a more accepted and socially sensitive word for capitalist imperialism, since it involves the appropriation of economic resources that are considered previously un-owned, which is a fundamental tenet of the res nullius worldview that is supported by U.S. space policy. This paradigm most often portrays space as a merely a destination for human exploration or a source of resources for human consumption in need of development and order, and not the intrinsically valuable natural environment it really is. And so, when the space community casually invokes this frontier metaphor, it inadvertently adopts a worldview that supports the economic expansion of the United States, a process that assists its path to a position of ultimate superiority. Even those that support the more equitable and cooperative principles of the United Nations but still insist on invoking the notion of the frontier and the expansion of human settlement need only look to history to realize the eventual outcome of this policy. Under this worldview, hegemony appears inevitable. 82 8.2. Game Theory and the Rationality of Cooperation Game theory is an interesting mechanism to consider the space industry with, in that it can help us understand the dynamics and logic of cooperation, conflict, and competition [Galloway, 2004]. In game theory, there are two sorts of games: zero sum and non-zero sum. Zero-sum games produce a winner and a loser. The Cold War could be considered a bipolar zero-sum game, which the U.S. won and the Soviet Union lost. In this sense, military conflicts are most susceptible to the logic of a zero-sum dynamic in which there is a winner and a loser [Galloway, 2004]. In a non-zero sum game, there can be winners and losers. For example, in a win-win game, both sides are winners. Galloway [2004] explains that commercial competition could be an example of this, but only if one accepts the 'invisible hand' of the market. On the other hand, a game in which all sides lose would be cutthroat competition or the use of life-providing ecosystems as waste sinks. Ultimately, one hopes that over time humanity will learn to play non-zero sum games in which all participants benefit. The space industry has produced a significant amount of international cooperation, which could in theory result in a win-win game. However, the mere fact that this cooperation is limited means a majority of nations have already lost. This selective cooperation, with the U.S. usually being the ultimate decision-maker, may in fact be nothing more than a side game while the powerful players continue to play a zero-sum game. In fact, it is actually possible that we have reached an endpoint of a zero-sum game in which there remains only one winner: the United States. Galloway [2004] supports this point by arguing that "the outcome of the Cold War and the events since seem to point to a permanent American hegemony in terms of military power, economic wealth, and cultural outreach. Because there is no other player, the 'game' is over and the law is basically what the U.S. says it is or how it interprets existing treaties". This endgame and permanent state of American superiority is exactly what the Air Force Space Command Master Plan aims for, following the ideology of "who controls low-Earth orbit controls near-Earth space. Who controls near-Earth space dominates Terra. Who dominates Terra determines the destiny of humankind" [Dolman, 2002]. The ability of the U.S. to influence international space law to meet its own interests is also an indication that the space industry has reached an endpoint of 83 a zero-sum game, with it as the sole winner. As discussed in the previous section, this hegemony is most likely not the result of an overarching strategy, but more the result of the successful achievements of flexible political and economic systems and the appropriate worldview to match. The wider space community continues to inadvertently support not only this worldview but also the inevitability of American superiority by continuing to perceive space as the final frontier of human settlement. Through the Outer Space Treaty (OST), the UN attempted to divert the hegemonic direction of either the Soviet Union or the United States, and instead usher in a paradigm of mutually beneficial cooperation. In essence, it aimed to get the international community to play a non-zero sum, win-win game. More realistically however, the OST has served more as a detente in a win-lose contest than a redefinition of the game itself [Galloway, 2004]. American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is a sign of this; and it would not be unreasonable to witness their renouncement of the OST as well. In his book 'The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone", Joseph Nye Jr. [2000] likens world politics to a three-dimensional chess game. The top board is uni-polar, the middle economic board is multi-polar, and the bottom board consists of transnational relations with a widely dispersed power structure. In this game he explains how the U.S. simply cannot play bi-polar chess, with an obvious winner and loser. It can chose to dominate the first game militarily, play competitively in the economic market of the second game, but merely recognize the power of non-state actors and forces in the third. Since the latter two games require the most international relations and diplomatic attention, a superpower such as the U.S. concentrates on the first game at its own peril. The ideology of space control focuses on this top-level uni-polar game first, in order to achieve unrivaled superiority over the lower two games. But there is a significant risk that this may upset the diverse power structure at the bottom level by paying too little attention to the interests of the many wielders of that power. For this reason, countries should concentrate on non-zero sum, and especially win-win games rather than win-lose, zero-sum conflicts that will ultimately result in lose-lose situations. The ultimate lose-84 lose situation here is competition for economic growth that ultimate consumes the very life support systems that permit humanity, irrespective of wealth or nationality, to exist. It would thus be a very wise and completely rational decision to play non-zero sum games that would facilitate the long-term sustainability of human civilization. But leadership is needed. Currently, the U.S. is in the ultimate position to provide this leadership. However, the worldview with which it exercises its policy, whether it be economic, military, or space, is ill-equipped to provide the meaningful guidance needed for sustainability. The U.S. should have a keen national interest in keeping world commons secure for future generations, but recent history shows a substantial retreat from providing leadership as a collective good that would ultimately secure the global commons on Earth and in space [Nye, 2000]. Withdrawals and denouncements of the International Criminal Court, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the Kyoto Protocol highlight this consistent retreat from meaningful leadership. In the opinion of Joseph Nye Jr. [2000], from the point of history, playing world politics as if it were a zero-sum game that will end in hegemony is myopic. This current long uni-polar moment is bound to end, as other forces and powers will tend to make the system multi-polar. It would thus be of national relevance to the U.S. to be less unilateral and more multi-lateral and to seek true cooperation, a real win-win situation. This is especially poignant with the growth of China as a powerful economic and space competitor. Fundamentally however, it is in the rational-self interest of humanity as a whole to urge the U.S. to accept more significant and meaningful cooperation since losing the competition means extinction. The relevance of the space community as a meaningful contributor to human survival depends on facilitating this cooperation. 8.3. The Paradox of Humankind In the early competitiveness of the Cold War space industry, the United Nations became the focal point of discussion against this potentially new form of colonialism. The extension of the UN Charter to outer space, guaranteeing human rights, and the reaffirmation of UNCOPUOS's mandate in Resolution 1472 (XIV) were significant political and legal steps in ensuring that the 85 global commons of space was used for the betterment of all humanity. Under the widely ratified Outer Space Treaty (OST), this Common Heritage Principle, or res communis, perceives space as the province of humankind and its future generations and explicitly requires its signatories to carry out peaceful activities that are in line with this worldview. However, this has not been the case. The ambiguity of the language within the OST has legally permitted a few powerful nations, led by the United States, to pursue more self-interested policies in space, with minimal risk of being reprimanded by the UN or the greater international community. Ironically, this ambiguity has allowed the U.S. to directly yet legally oppose the fundamental principle of the OST that activities in space should be in the interests of all humankind. According to the OST, the fact that it has interests at all confirms that 'humankind' possesses a distinct legal personality [Gaggero, 2003]. This personality has been, consistently ignored and has had its rights infringed upon by certain nations seeking their own individual interests. In reference to game theory, space has become a zero-sum game where 'humankind' as a legal entity has consistently lost. The definitive loss for humanity would be its extinction. Herein lies the ultimate paradox. According to the OST, humankind is a subject of law and is recognized to have heritage. Humankind is the owner of the natural environment where 'space activities' take place, is represented there by the astronaut4, and is the ultimate beneficiary of the profits derived from these activities [Gaggero, 2003]. Humankind is therefore obviously the central element of the space community and the actor around which international space law is built, but who on Earth represents it? No one. With the lack of any real representation for the interests of humankind, there is little political will among states to assume new responsibilities and accept the application of the Common Heritage Principle and the res communis worldview. This reality makes it clear that political and legal institutions based on the sovereignty of nation states are inappropriate for the management of what is clearly a transnational domain [Crawford, 1995]. Providing access to vast quantities of intellectual and natural capital aside, the potential to economically and 4 Art ic le V of the Outer Space Treaty classifies astronauts as 'envoys of humankind', thus theoretical ly representing humanity rather than their own national government. 86 militarily control Earth from the space environment makes it a uniquely strategic resource whose inevitable development requires the utmost sensitivity, foresight, and responsibility. It is thus of fundamental importance that some entity or institution is able to legitimately speak for humanity when making decisions about activities in the global commons of outer space. This institution would most certainly have to take the form of a global space agency, with the reach and legitimacy to represent the interests of humanity and its future generations. Crawford [1995] suggests that if now is not an appropriate time for the establishment of such a global institution, at a minimum, its pros and cons should at least be debated. Currently, the United Nations is the nearest thing the world has to global governance. Although national sovereignty remains preeminent, the mere existence of the UN demonstrates recognition on the part of national governments that some kind of global political institution is required for the management of global affairs [Crawford, 1995]. Ecologically speaking, one of the most pressing issues is the rational management of the global commons, which includes the oceans, atmosphere, ecosphere, and outer space. As national governments pursue shortsighted and self-interested policies of economic growth, the ability of these ecological systems to productively support present and future human societies is reduced. Thus the governance structure and scope of the sovereign nation state, based on ideologies that are centuries old, is completely ill equipped to take the long-term interests of humanity into perspective. The UN, although vitally important in this attempt to better manage human infringement on the global life-supporting commons, still only represents individual nation states and not humanity as a whole. The Report of the Commission of Global Governance notes that there is currently a "lack of any consistent approach and oversight of the global commons and that a new need has emerged for trusteeship to be exercised over the global commons in the collective interest of humanity, including future generations" [CGG, 1995]. But with its institutional organs already in place, there ought to be mounting support for the management of human activity in relation to these commons to be brought under the jurisdiction of the UN. Since outer space is legally a transnational domain and considered to be one of these intrinsically valuable global commons, 87 it would be appropriate that all human activities in the space environment also fall under UN authority. Since the UN continues to be the centre for discussion concerning outer space and it was here that the OST, which acts as the foundation for international law governing human affairs in the space environment, was negotiated, it appears that this authority already exists. This is not the case. There exists no UN forum for the formulation of international space policy to exercise the worldview under which the OST was drafted. The lack of any international guidance for space policy thus gives the freedom for national governments to pursue policies out of their own self-interest, at the expense of humankind and future generations. Bringing space within the political jurisdiction of the UN would help address these issues of political and social responsibility. However, in order to be effective, it is essential that the organization be recognized as a legitimate regulator of human affairs at the global level [Crawford, 1995]. The UN currently suffers from a lack of political legitimacy, due in large part to the exclusion of the world's citizens from its councils. Only by finding a way to represent the concerns of the world's citizens, rather than those of national governments, will it be possible for the UN to act legitimately on behalf of humanity in managing global concerns, including human affairs in outer space. Until this can be done, the space industry will be dominated by self-interested policies of economic growth that are not only in violation of the principles of international space treaties, but will ultimately undermine the long-term survivability of humanity. The space community only continues to perpetuate this inevitability by looking outwards for solutions to humanity's problems. An introspective approach would clearly indicate that the most challenging obstacle to humanity's survival lives right here on Earth. 8 . 3 . A Need for Reflection Ultimately, this thesis describes a community whose paradigm is so powerful that it virtually deflects all facts or criticisms contrary to its own beliefs and values. Members of the space community are so enthusiastic about seeing their visions come to fruition that they fail to ask fundamental questions such as why the development of space should occur in the first place or whether the industry's efforts could be better spent focusing on more pressing issues facing 88 human sustainability. Instead, the community is embedded within a self-referencing perspective that dictates that space holds all the solutions to humanity's questions, denying it the ability to reflect on the capacity of that worldview to contribute to a more sustainable future. It is for this reason that I believe the space community is becoming increasingly irrelevant in securing that future and ultimately contributing to behaviour that threatens the productivity and viability of the human species. It is thus imperative that the space community reflects not only on the merit of its policies and plans but also of its values, beliefs, and assumptions that give rise to them. This reflection is especially deficient in the academic and educational realms, noticeable by the lack of any human socio-economic and ecological context in the curriculum at the International Space University. This is where change must start. I have argued that the United Nations is ill equipped to influence space policy that better reflects the needs of humanity as a whole, because it represents the interests of sovereign nations and not 'humankind' that is so often referred to in space law. It is thus imperative that the policy and treaties that form the legal environment in outer space be updated to meet the increasingly desperate needs of all humankind and not just a small privileged segment of it. Change however, must come from the influential people the make policy and lead the industry, not those that merely criticize it. The space community is an international and loosely connected group that only congregates en masse at large gatherings such as the International Astronautical Congress, an annual conference for academics, professionals, and students within the field. The size and format of such conferences do little to change a deeply ingrained collective worldview and serve more as forums for business networking and discussion on ways to make their visions a reality. The International Space University (ISU) on the other hand, is a smaller and more intimate setting conducive to learning and fostering relationships and friendships. It is here where students, ranging from recent university graduates to senior-level professionals, are taught not only to be future leaders in the space industry, but also to be tolerant of each others' cultures and values. It is only here, at the personal level, where 89 national principles are challenged in a truly international setting, that the future leaders of the space industry can be taught not only to respect the values of other cultures but also the needs of humankind and the standards needed to address them. Only through reflection and education will the space community generate leaders and policy makers that will shift away from its powerful self-referencing paradigm towards one that supports the principles put forth by the United Nations almost half a century ago. I am'arguing here that the long-term survival of humanity depends on it. But first, these values must be included in the basic curriculum of the International Space University. 90 References: AFSPC, 2003. 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