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Strategic environments : militarism and the contours of Cold War America Farish, Matthew James 2003

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S T R A T E G I C E N V I R O N M E N T S : M I L I T A R I S M A N D T H E C O N T O U R S O F C O L D W A R A M E R I C A by M A T T H E W J A M E S F A R I S H B.A. Hons., The University of British Columbia, 1998 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE F A C U L T Y OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Geography) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 2003 © Matthew James Farish, 2003 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Department of -6 (2/88) 11 Abstract This thesis traces the relationship between militarism and geographical thought in the United States during the early Cold War. It does so by traveling across certain spaces, or environments, which preoccupied American geopolitics and American science during the 1940s and 1950s. Indeed, geopolitics and science, understood during the Second World War as markedly distinct terms, came together uniquely to wage the Cold War from the position of strategy. The most intriguing and influential conjunctions were made possible by militarism, not in the deterministic sense of conditioning technologies or funding lines, but as a result of antagonistic, violent practices pervading American life. These practices reaffirmed America's status as distinctly, powerfully modern, while shoring up the burden of global responsibility that appeared to accompany this preeminence. Through militarist reasoning, the American world was turned into an object that needed securing - resulting in a profoundly insecure proliferation of danger that demanded an equal measure of global action and retreat behind new lines of defence. And in these American spaces, whether expanded or compressed, the identity of America itself was defined. From the global horizons of air power and the regional divisions of area studies to the laboratories of continental and civil defence research, the spaces of the American Cold War were material, in the sense that militarism's reach was clearly felt on innumerable human and natural landscapes, not least within the United States. Equally, however, these environments were the product of imaginative geographies, perceptual and representational techniques that inscribed borders, defined hierarchies, and framed populations governmentally. Such conceptions of space were similarly militarist, not Ill least because they drew from the innovations of Second World War social science to reframe the outlines of a Cold War world. Militarism's methods redefined geographical thought and its spaces, prioritizing certain locations and conventions while marginalizing others. Strategic studies formed a key component of the social sciences emboldened by the successes and excesses of wartime science. As social scientists grappled with the contradictions of mid-century modernity, most retreated behind the formidable theories of their more accomplished academic relatives, and many moved into the laboratories previously associated with these same intellectual stalwarts. The result was that at every scale, geography was increasingly simulated, a habit that paralleled the abstractions concurrently promoted in the name of political decisiveness. But simulation also meant that Cold War spaces were more than the product of intangible musings; they were constructed, and in the process acquired solidity but also simplicity. It was in the fashioning of artificial environments that the fragility of strategy was revealed most fully, but also where militarism's power could be most clearly expressed. The term associated with this paradoxical condition was 'frontier', a zone of fragile, transformational activity. Enthusiastic Cold Warriors were fond of transferring this word from a geopolitical past to a scientific future. But in their present, frontiers possessed the characteristics of both. iv Table of Contents Abstract " Table of Contents iv List of Abbreviations v List of Figures vi Acknowledgments vii Introduction 1 P A R T I Global Views Chapter One Between Geopolitics and Science 18 P A R T II Regional Intelligence Chapter Two War on Areas 86 Chapter Three Searching for Security in the Social Sciences 160 Part III Laboratories Chapter Four The Cybernetic Continent 232 Chapter Five Anxious Urbanism 287 Conclusion: Into Space 340 Appendix One: Figures 355 Archival Sources 392 Bibliography 394 V List of Abbreviations A A G Association of American Geographers A D S E C A i r Defense Systems Evaluation Committee A D T I C Arctic-Desert-Tropic Information Center A E C Atomic Energy Commission A G S American Geographical Society A I N A Arctic Institute o f North America A S P G American Society for Professional Geographers A S T P Army Specialized Training Program B A S R Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University C A T P C i v i l Affairs Training Program C C S Cross-Cultural Survey, Yale University C E N I S Center for International Studies, M I T cnviA Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology D E W Distant Early Warning (Line) D R B Defence Research Board (Canada) F C D A Federal C i v i l Defense Administration G O C Ground Observer Corps H R A F Human Relations Area Files H R R I Human Resources Research Institute, A i r University, Alabama I G Y International Geophysical Year (1957-58) ns Institute of International Studies, Yale University J A M S Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies M S National Intelligence Surveys, Central Intelligence Agency N R C National Research Council N S R B National Security Resources Board O N R Office of Naval Research OSS Office of Strategic Services O W L Office of WarJnformation R & A Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services R D B Research and Development Board R R C Russian Research Center, Harvard University S A G E Semi-Automatic Ground Environment S D C System Development Corporation S O R O Special Operations Research Office, American University S R L Systems Research Laboratory ( R A N D Corporation) S S R C Social Science Research Council U S I A United States Information Agency U S S B S United States Strategic Bombing Survey List of Figures 1. "Outward from the U.S." 2. America Encircled 3. "Polar Azimuthal Equidistant Projection" 4. Kitchen Debate 5. Climate Laboratory, World War II 6. Sample HRAF File Slip 7. "The HRAF Laboratory" 8. "OSS Organization" 9. SAGE Air Direction Center, McGuire Air Force Base, New York 10. SAGE Console 11. "Sentinels of the Sky" 12. Systems Research Laboratory, RAND Corporation 13. "Schematic Diagram of Direction Center Functions" 14. The U.S. Air Force at the Geographic North Pole 15. Operation North Star, Alaska 16. Flying Boxcars, Exercise Yukon 17. Exercise Musk-Ox 18. "The DEW System" 19. "A Typical DEW Line Station" 20. Visitors from the South: DEW Line, Frobisher Bay 21. The Defence Network 22. Nevada Test Site 23. Operation Doorstep 24. Operation Doorstep Family 25. "Field Exercise Participants in Operation Cue. .2 miles from Ground Zero" 26. Danger in Density 27. Concentric Destruction 28. Civil Defence in Action 29. "Make No Mistake" - Civil Defence Poster 30. "Daytime With Warning" 31. Site of Disaster Simulation 32. Past versus Potential 33. "Auger's [sic] Dispersal Program" 34. "Assembling the Ships for the Mars Expedition" 35. "An Unmanned Instrument-Carrying Satellite in its Orbit" 36. Feeding at 'Altitude', Wright Air Development Center Vll Acknowledgments The research in this thesis was facilitated by the generous financial support of the Arctic Institute o f North America, Green College, the K i l l a m Trust, the Rockefeller Archive Center, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council o f Canada (Doctoral Fellowship #752-2000-2091), and the University o f British Columbia. Parts of Chapter Six have been published as "Disaster and Decentralization: American Cities and the Cold War," Cultural Geographies 10.2 (2003), pp. 125-148. Archival work was conducted over the course o f numerous trips around the continent, and during these travels I received the advice of many superb archivists at the locations listed before the bibliography. Other scholars who gave me their time and encouragement along the way include John Agnew, Simon Dalby, Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, Hugh Gusterson, Steven Graham, Gregg Herken, David Kaiser, Scott Kirsch, Simon Marvin, David Neufeld, Naomi Oreskes, Scott Prudham, Joan Schwartz, Ne i l Smith, Tom Stapleford, and Gerard Toal. Friends such as A r i Goelman, Maighna Jain, and Sarah Koch-Schulte made the journeys much more manageable, and Donald and Ellen Farish were the best of hosts. Derek Gregory introduced me to the many worlds o f geography, and he has assisted and inspired me from the first lecture of his that I witnessed to his final suggestions for this document. I not only owe him immeasurable scholarly thanks, but I am the better for his friendship as well . Within U B C ' s Geography Department, I am also very grateful for the support, criticism, and company o f Trevor Barnes, Matthew Evenden, Cole Harris, David Ley, Geraldine Pratt, Olav Slaymaker, and Graeme Wynn. A l l , in diverse ways, are consummate teachers and researchers. Conversations and coursework with Richard Cavell, Elizabeth Haiken, and Diane Newell helped me to think beyond disciplinary confines. And the Department's staff, especially Elaine Cho and Mary Luk, came to my rescue more than once. Graduate student colleagues have been a source of challenge and amusement over the years. A r n Keeling, Andrew Jackson, Johanna Waters, Bob Wilson, and Jamie Winders have provided wise advice and good cheer. And Kate Geddie, David Nal ly , Richard Powell, and Alex Vasudevan have, additionally, become great friends. Life at two residential colleges, Green and St. John's, has brought me into contact with a list o f impressive individuals too long to list in full, but I would like to single out Tim Dewhirst, Stefanie Doetzer, Mitchell Gray, Aaron Hunter, Maged Senbel, Vanessa Timmer, and my Improv teammates for special praise. M y old mates Patrick G i l l and Peter Orth still know how to make me forget the stresses of a dissertation. A n d as for my clan, distant and near - particularly my generous uncle Doug, my four extraordinary grandparents, my remarkable parents Jan and B i l l , my brilliant siblings Ji l l and Paul, and my wonderful partner Lisa Brocklebank - 1 can only say this: to the end of the universe! A whole history remains to be written of spaces - which would at the same time be the history of powers (both these terms in the plural) - from the great strategies of geo-politics to the little tactics of the habitat... - Michel Foucault, "The Eye of Power" 1 Introduction In the summer of 1959, just before a trip to the Soviet Union, American Vice-President Richard Nixon and his family joined Rear Admiral Charles C. Kirkpatrick of the U.S. Navy on the first voyage of the largest 'atomic' submarine fleet in the world. The tour took the distinguished guests past a graveyard of sunken ships, and led one exuberant reporter for the Christian Science Monitor to exclaim that the spectacle was "sheer fun, as though the real purpose of technological achievement, after all, was human happiness." Although the submarine project had been blessed by the U.S. government and aided by General Dynamics, a builder of nuclear reactors, the purveyor of these amusements was not the American military, but Walt Disney. The site was the celebratory Tomorrowland section of Disneyland, the "Magic Kingdom" that had opened in 1955. "Tomorrowland" was also a segment of Disney's popular television program, and in 1957 the show aired a feature titled "Our Friend the Atom," a combination of live-action and animation, sponsored by General Dynamics, that was a promotional vehicle for President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" campaign. Released as a film in 1958, "Our Friend" explained atomic energy in the terms of household technology, domesticating a science that was more commonly associated with destructive weaponry. This soothing function was exactly what Eisenhower intended, as he came under increased domestic and international pressure to limit atomic testing.1 Walt Disney, the journalist Eric Schlosser has argued, was 1 Mark Langer, "Disney's Atomic Fleet," Animation World Magazine 3.1 (1998), www.avm.com/ mag/issue3.1/3.1 pages/3.1 langerdisney.html (December 15, 2002); Lawrence S. Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb, Volume Two: Rebels Against the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). For an early statement of atomic enthusiasm, see R. M. Langer, "Fast New World," Collier's (July 6, 1940), pp. 18-19, 54-55. 2 America's most popular exponent of Cold War science. For audiences living in fear of nuclear annihilation, Walt Disney became a source of reassurance, making the latest technical advances seem marvelous and exciting. His faith in the goodness of American technology was succinctly expressed by the title of a film that the Disney studio produced for Westinghouse Electric: The Dawn of Better Living. But Disney was also deeply interested in propaganda, and his scientific promotions were thus explicitly political. He enlisted former Nazi scientists Wernher von Braun and Heinz Haber, who were advising the United States Air Force, to work on space-oriented television programs and the design of Tomorrowland. Haber was an alumnus of the Luftwaffe Institute for Aviation Medicine, where he experimented on Dachau inmates, and eventually became the "chief scientific advisor to Disney Productions." He also hosted "Our Friend the Atom" and wrote the companion children's book. In 1940, Disney began reporting on Hollywood personalities for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and did so obsessively. His opposition to organized labour in the film industry, his affection for J. Edgar Hoover (a "foster father"), his affiliations with organized crime, and his anti-Semitism are all well known. His relationship with the military was somewhat more contentious. After accepting a contract from the Naval Bureau of Aeronautics for twenty animated training films, Disney grew annoyed with interference from Washington that attempted to use his stock characters in what he believed to be inappropriate ways. Once freed from a formal military presence in his studio, Disney chose a project that resembled his popular propaganda films, but one that he could control completely. This was an animated version of Alexander De Seversky's prominent 1942 book Victory Through Air Power. Although Disney's adaptation was not successful in the United States, it found devotees across the Atlantic, where Winston 3 Churchill apparently used the film to convince Franklin Roosevelt that long-range bombing was an appropriate strategic measure.3 In this Disney story lie the elements that bind this dissertation together. The conflation of geopolitics and science, set within a rich, if eccentric, cultural landscape, suggests that a productive (if sometimes contradictory) constellation may be brought into view by examining these commonly compartmentalized terms and their spatial histories together. Geopolitics has recently come under critical scrutiny for its representational presumptions, while other scholars have begun to consider the traffic between scientific work, or knowledge, and what is conventionally presumed to lie external to such domains. Both of these important revisionist approaches adopt a loosely cultural approach in the sense that they reject an essential definition of what geopolitics or science 'is', concentrating instead on the practices through which "understanding is articulated and maintained in specific cultural contexts and translated and extended into new contexts."4 But in the terms of contemporary Geography and International Relations, the Cold War is fast assuming a presence that verges on certainty. Now perceived, and set off, from another present, it is solidifying in time and space, as sets of dates and periods, on the one hand, and lists of blocs, alliances, and rivalries, on the other. This historical and geographical coagulation has been distinctly advanced by the study of a post-Co\d War era and its dimensions. A new world of proliferating insecurities appears to require 2 Eric Schlosser: Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All-American Meal (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), pp. 38-39; Heinz Haber, The Walt Disney Story of Our Friend the Atom (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956). 3 Marc Eliot, Walt Disney: Hollywood's Dark Prince (New York: Carol, 1993), pp. xvii-xviii, 165-168; Alexander P. de Seversky, Victory Through Air Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942). 4 Joseph Rouse, Engaging Science: How to Understand its Practices Philosophically (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 238. 4 the innovations of post-structuralism, post-colonialism, and related approaches to account for its shifting and deterritorialized alignments. A l l o f this is quite exhilarating, and, in the nebulous forms of critical geopolitics, for instance, has introduced a welcome, challenging reflexivity to studies of political spaces, drawing valuable connections to cultural studies, political theory, and other interdisciplinary fields of inquiry. There is, undoubtedly, a need to move beyond the overarching metanarrative of a singular Cold War, explained solely through a series of infinitely mobile terms such as 'containment' and 'domino'. But the mutual dependence on theory and a presentist perspective is a hazardous habit. It risks suggesting that the Cold War has been resigned to the rigidity of a historical epoch, characterized by a wholly different order of things, including a secure, simple superpower competition that is made to seem positively, unquestionably realist in comparison to current vertigo. Paradoxically, this framing of the Cold War has been both aided and challenged by the rush o f detail that has flooded historical literature as a result of declassification, including material from the former Soviet archives. To answer the question of whether these novelties have resulted in a greater certainty or a heightened, even contradictory complexity is to stake a preliminary position in the substantial realm of Co ld War scholarship. Such intellectual differences are matched, intriguingly, by the Cold War itself; the stark boundaries of struggle were contested by the very technologies and ideological categories that were used to erect and maintain them. 5 But an awareness of this contradiction is limited by a simplistic approach to the geographies of ' C o l d War ' . 5 Christian G. Appy, "Introduction: The Struggle for the World," in Appy, ed., Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966 (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), pp. 1-8; Tom Englehardt, The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation (New York: Basic Books, 1995). 5 Many recent interpretations of American history, some brilliant, that explicitly take the Cold War or parts of it as a period of explanation all too often fail to account for the spatial assumptions built not only into their own reconstructions, but also into the slice of time which they purport to study. What is required to skirt these pitfalls is an approach that is not bounded by disciplinary constraints, heroic biographies, or instrumental depictions of policy, and yet considers the importance of intellectual categories, influential individuals, and the exercise of power. This was, I think, what Michel Foucault had in mind in his discussions of spatial history - a phrase that he never used formally, but gestured to across the entire corpus of his work. His histories of limits, boundaries, and enclosures were addressed through the themes of illness, crime, and sexuality, but also militarism. In a renowned passage from a dialogue with the editors ofthe French geopolitical journal Herodote, Foucault concluded that the formation of discourses and the genealogy of knowledge need to be analysed, not in terms of types of consciousness, modes of perception and forms of ideology, but in terms of tactics and strategies of power. Tactics and strategies deployed through implantations, distributions, demarcations, control of territories and organizations of domains which could well make up a sort of geopolitics.. . 6 In 1976, the same year as the Foucault interview, Yves Lacoste, one of Herodote's founders, argued similarly that geography was "first and foremost a strategic knowledge which is closely linked to a set of political and military practices." Both Lacoste and Foucault were advancing an expansive version of geography that was tied 6 Michel Foucault, "Questions on Geography," in Colin Gordon, ed., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (New York; Pantheon, 1980), pp. 63-77; the quote is from p. 77. For the most extended treatment of 'spatial history', see Stuart Elden, Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault, and the Project of a Spatial History (London: Continuum, 2001). Militarism, of course, has also attracted its share of treatments in historical sociology. For one prominent example, see Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (Cambridge: Polity, 1985). 6 only partially to forms of academic knowledge. In a less heralded passage from the same conversation, Foucault mentioned a research project he was planning to undertake that would directly address "the army as a matrix of organization and knowledge." While he never completely fulfilled this goal, Foucault's later writings on governmentality, and his already-published discussions of the military and disciplinary power, were clearly concerned with the broader implications of the same subject. Indeed, for all their differences, both Lacoste and Foucault tied geography to military science, but more importantly, to "a knowledge born out of the practical management problems of government, problems addressing the administration, surveillance and control of populations, territories and colonies."7 In his 1975-76 lectures at the College de France, Foucault inverted Clausewitz to assert that politics was "the continuation of war by other means," suggested that discourse was a struggle or battle, and proposed that war produces a form of truth which operates as a weapon. His references were drawn overwhelmingly from the early modern period, and little reference was made to his own century, or, for that matter, to the United States. While important, in the sense that the long history of strategy as a specific model of power should not be ignored, these absences, like Foucault's minimal references to colonial contexts, are also unfortunate. This thesis attempts to redress that imbalance by taking up the technologies, discourses, and spaces of American militarism during the period between World War Two and the 1960 election of John F. Kennedy. The choice 7 Gear6id 6 Tuathail, "The Critical Reading/Writing of Geopolitics: Re-reading/Writing Wittfogel, Bowman and Lacoste," Progress in Human Geography 18.3 (1994), pp. 313-332; the quotes are from pp. 326-327; Foucault, "Questions on Geography," p. 77. On Lacoste and Herodote, see also Paul Claval, "Herodote and the French Left," and Leslie W. Hepple, "Geopolitiques de Gauche: Yves Lacoste, Herodote, and French Radical Geopolitics," in Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson, eds., Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 239-267, 268-301. In the of historical markers is in one sense arbitrary, but it is also a deliberate attempt to address a time of almost unabashed militarism in the United States, a span when the signs, subjects, and structures of violence ran rampant. The Cold War was at once a paradigmatic case of near-perpetual political confrontation and an arena for the control of subjects using techniques derived from the military. In 1953, Edward Barrett actually published a book titled Truth is Our Weapon - a popular study of persuasion, Q propaganda, and psychological warfare. Specifically, this is a history of how certain Cold War environments were conceived and concretized at the conjunction of geopolitics and science. A genealogy of these two terms does not reveal clean distinctions. Indeed, they merged uneasily, but crucially, in the practices of the social sciences. In promotional material for the Human Relations Area Files, one of the period's most ambitious attempts to forge a 'science of man', the aims of the social sciences are described as attempts to match, in the study of human affairs, the spectacular successes of science in harnessing, conquering, and coming to terms with nature. But the same publication conceded that there were problems that "mastery of impersonal phenomena" could not completely solve. The excesses of science, moreover, had heightened some of these risks and traumas. Pushing the boundaries of science necessitated a turn inward, to "man himself and his own complex cultural and behavioural systems.9 But as in the case of the research dubbed large and admirable literature on Foucault's relevance for geography, the connection to militarism and its spaces has not been fully drawn out. 8 Michel Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the College de France, 1975-76, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), p. 15; Julian Reid, "Foucault on Clausewitz: Conceptualizing the Relationship Between War and Power," Alternatives 28 (2003), pp. 1-28; Mark Neocleous, "Perpetual War, or 'War and War Again': Schmitt, Foucault, Fascism," Philosophy and Social Criticism 22.2 (1996), pp. 47-66; Edward Barrett, Truth is Our Weapon (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1953). Human Relations Area Files, Laboratory for the Study of Man: Report 1949-1959 (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1959), p. 3. As Richard Ashley writes, a genealogical attitude permits social inquiry 8 science, the far reaches of this social inquiry were not merely metaphorical; there was a distinct, material correlation between intellectual and geopolitical frontiers. The social sciences are pivotal to liberal thought because they construct autonomous objects of knowledge, in the form of social bodies, which provide the targets for social administration and regulation - what Foucault called governmentality. Governmental objects were most powerfully constituted by means of quantification, or related methods that allowed for mobility, stability, and synthesis. The modern scale of government is undoubtedly the national state, but to assert this is to risk indulging a tendency to treat the state as rigid and primary.10 The territories of American geopolitics and science were diverse, just as the spatial meaning of 'America' was not fixed. Put this way, society, in turn, becomes a site for critical scrutiny, rather than an explanatory authority. In Truth is Our Weapon, Barrett was concerned to demonstrate the relevance of ideas in a battle for human minds, and, in a much different register, so am I. What follows is an intellectual history of geographies that is inspired by but emphatically not in the shadow of Foucault's provocations. Moreover, it is not a study of spatial metaphors, but of spatial techniques and spatial knowledge. Moving from the global reach of geopolitics to unhomely urban habitats, I trace the revision of the world by American militarism across a series of scales. These levels resemble the lines of a contour map, a cartographic style used frequently during the Cold War to refer to degrees of destruction wrought by atomic bombs. Contours, like scales, are artificial distinctions, but also "to find its focus in the posing of how' questions, not 'what' questions." Richard K. Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics," Alternatives 12 (1987), pp. 403-434; the quote is from p. 409. 9 boundaries that imply difference. They are, additionally, relational, tied to one another as part of a classification scheme that takes as its point of origin a central site or zone.11 In my outline and orientation, this focal space is 'America', at once equivalent to and much more than the territorial expanse of the United States. But unlike the abstract, systemic geometries of Cold War strategy and social science, I am less interested in the specific location of a point, the mathematical justifications for the placement of contours, or the connection of all phenomena to a single principle, than I am in the rich, variegated spaces between each line. If militarism is understood, somewhat conventionally, as the promotion, prominence, and pervasiveness of military ideas, objects, and values, or the erasure of boundaries (however artificial) between military and civilian spaces and institutions, then the United States during the early Cold War is a capable candidate for the designation, especially given America's status as a 'liberal' space. Liberal political thought, haunted by the contradictions of violence and reason, is premised on the attempt to remove disorder from within the boundaries of the state, a project that is doomed to fail. Cold War America is a striking example of that failure. While perhaps not a strict 'garrison state', to use a term that has received recent attention from historians, it may have been Matthew G. Hannah, Governmental ity and the Mastery of Territory in Nineteenth-Century America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 1 1 See Sally A. Marston, "The Social Construction of Scale," Progress in Human Geography 24.2 (2000), pp. 219-242. Foucault's non-Cartesian maps, Stuart Elden writes, "highlight key features, outline contours, and provide an orientation." Elden, Mapping the Present, p. 115. 1 2 All social theory requires abstraction - "a removal, a drawing out from an original location, and an enforced movement of elements from one level to another." But the abstraction I refer to throughout this thesis is mostly closely aligned with positivism, a naturalized doctrine of "pure perception" which does not recognize its own partiality. This abstraction, divorced from a partial and situated viewpoint, is also a license for violence and demonization. Or, as Henri Lefebvre puts it, "[a]bstract space is not homogeneous; it simply has homogeneity as its goal, its orientation, its 'lens'." See Chris Jenks, "The Centrality of the Eye in Western Culture: An Introduction," in Jenks, ed., Visual Culture (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 1-25; the quotes are from pp. 6, 9; Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford UK and Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1991), p. 287. 10 one by any other name.13 In the decade following the Second World War, the Department of Defense became the largest single patron of American scientific research, and also funded the social sciences generously. Government programs such as civil defence militarized the mundane by positioning the nuclear family as a stalwart institution that could shoulder a burden of survival in partnership with the armed forces. Using the authoritative rhetoric of positivism, disaster scholars argued that every city, and every home, was a potential target, while advocating responses that would contain panic and chaos to certain areas in the event of an atomic attack. The idea of America as the insecure space at the heart of a contour map is thus highly appropriate. Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg neatly, if unintentionally, captured the ubiquitous spirit of Cold War militarism in a 1953 speech to the Advertising Council of New York. Referring to the recruitment of volunteers for the Ground Observer Corps, the army of civilian 'skywatchers' on alert for signs of Soviet planes, Vandenberg admitted that an appropriate marketing campaign meant asking them not merely to be realistic, but to be imaginative; to accept the fact that the nature of war has changed and that because of this change our Nation, at the very moment it has reached a position and influence unparalleled in our history, has become vulnerable as never before. In consequence of this vulnerability, our citizens must now assume responsibilities that are new and strange.14 1 3 Paul N. Edwards, "The Army and the Microworld: Computers and the Politics of Gender Identity," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 16.1 (1990), pp. 102-127; Candace Vogler and Patchen Markell, "Introduction: Violence, Redemption, and the Liberal Imagination," Public Culture 15.1 (2003), pp. 1-10; David Campbell \ Michael Dillon, "Introduction: The End of Philosophy and the End of International Relations," in Campbell \ Dillon, eds., The Political Subject of Violence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 1-47; Michael Sherry, "A Hidden-Hand Garrison State?" Diplomatic History 27.1 (2003), pp. 163-166. Sherry is reviewing Aaron Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). I use 'America' as a necessary form of shorthand, and am aware of the limitations accompanying the term. 1 4 "Remarks by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, Before the Board of Directors of the Advertising Council," January 15, 1953, Box 91, Binder 2, Hoyt S. Vandenberg Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, DC, p. 1. For more on the Ground Observer Corps, see Chapter Four. 11 Militarist forms of logic supported a pervasive condition that was not demobilization or mobilization, but an uncertain, prolonged search for an impossible national security. This was an intellectual project, since "the security imperative produces and is sustained by the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it." Constructing contours, beginning with the safe centre ofthe nation-space, was also precarious. Recent work in international relations and critical geopolitics has convincingly demonstrated that the development of a state's internal identity, solidity, and geography are dependent upon and inseparable from the representation of dangerous others. As Edward Said wrote famously in Orientalism, it "is enough for 'us' to set up these boundaries in our own minds; 'they' become 'they' accordingly, and both their territory and their mentality are designated as different from 'ours'."15 In considering the spaces that the American Cold War was built on, and challenging the resulting division and ordering of the world, not only are representations of 'other' spaces problematized, but the position of 'America' is also questioned as a site of power. Within the creation of national imaginaries we can uncover their performative basis and the geographies of this constitution. The entities placed outside by the suitably named foreign policy, according to Stuart Hall, are, frustratingly, "always slipping back across the porous and invisible 1 5 James Der Derian, "The Value of Security: Hobbs, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," in Campbell \ Dillon, eds., The Political Subject of Violence, pp. 94-113; the quote is from p. 103; Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979), p. 54; David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Rev. Ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics (London: Pinter, 1990). For a useful summary of Campbell's book, see Steve Herbert, "Review Essay," Political Geography 15.6/7 (1996), pp. 641-645. 12 borders to disturb and subvert from the inside." They are what Michel de Certeau called tactics. But while there is no escaping these enemies, since they refuse to disappear from an agonistic representational and territorial horizon, this dissertation attends to a second part of de Certeau's intriguing discussion. Although I will go on to use the term 'strategy' in its Cold War context, a broader definition that unequivocally includes science and other forms of politics is also exceedingly relevant: I call a strategy the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated. It postulates a place that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats.17 There are many Cold Wars, and my version wears its own partiality openly. A history of 'American' spaces is a history of 'American' ideas, and the following text draws substantially from archival and period sources at the confluence of geopolitics and science. Archives are contradictory, incomplete sites, where interpretations are forged and not given, that also require an outside to institute a form of discipline. In the case of the Cold War, security hurdles remain prominent; almost all of the material cited here is unclassified, or has been previously declassified. I have tried to read archival sources against the grain, to set them alongside other texts, and to embrace rather than bemoan contradictions and absences. In addition, certain individuals - although perhaps not always the expected ones - float through the chapters, but do so as vehicles for the Stuart Hall, "When was 'the Post-Colonial'? Thinking at the Limit," in Iain Chambers and Linda Curti, eds., The Postcolonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons (London: Routledge, 1996), 242-260; the quote is from pp. 252. 1 7 Michel de Certeau, '"Making Do': Uses and Tactics," in his The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Randall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 29-42; the quote is from pp. 35-36; Campbell, Writing Security, p. 214. De Certeau goes on to argue (p. 36) that each "'strategic' rationalization seeks first of all to distinguish its 'own' place, that is, the place of its own power and will, from an 'environment'," but the differ