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Strategic environments : militarism and the contours of Cold War America Farish, Matthew James 2003-12-31

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STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTS: MILITARISM AND THE CONTOURS OF COLD W A R AMERICA by MATTHEW JAMES FARISH B.A. Hons., The University of British Columbia, 1998 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF T H E REQUIREMENTS FOR T H E D E G R E E OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in  T H E F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES (Department of Geography) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  T H E UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH C O L U M B I A September 2003 © Matthew James Farish, 2003  In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment  of the  requirements for an advanced  degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department  or  by his or  her  representatives.  It  is understood  that  publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without permission.  Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  -6 (2/88)  copying or my written  11  Abstract This thesis traces the relationship between militarism and geographical thought in the United States during the early Cold War. It does so by traveling across certain spaces, or environments, which preoccupied American geopolitics and American science during the 1940s and 1950s. Indeed, geopolitics and science, understood during the Second World War as markedly distinct terms, came together uniquely to wage the Cold War from the position of strategy. The most intriguing and influential conjunctions were made possible by militarism, not in the deterministic sense of conditioning technologies or funding lines, but as a result of antagonistic, violent practices pervading American life. These practices reaffirmed America's status as distinctly, powerfully modern, while shoring up the burden of global responsibility that appeared to accompany this preeminence. Through militarist reasoning, the American world was turned into an object that needed securing - resulting in a profoundly insecure proliferation of danger that demanded an equal measure of global action and retreat behind new lines of defence. And in these American spaces, whether expanded or compressed, the identity of America itself was defined. From the global horizons of air power and the regional divisions of area studies to the laboratories of continental and civil defence research, the spaces of the American Cold War were material, in the sense that militarism's reach was clearly felt on innumerable human and natural landscapes, not least within the United States. Equally, however, these environments were the product of imaginative geographies, perceptual and representational techniques that inscribed borders, defined hierarchies, and framed populations governmentally. Such conceptions of space were similarly militarist, not  Ill  least because they drew from the innovations of Second World War social science to reframe the outlines of a Cold War world. Militarism's methods redefined geographical thought and its spaces, prioritizing certain locations and conventions while marginalizing others. Strategic studies formed a key component of the social sciences emboldened by the successes and excesses of wartime science. As social scientists grappled with the contradictions of mid-century modernity, most retreated behind the formidable theories of their more accomplished academic relatives, and many moved into the laboratories previously associated with these same intellectual stalwarts. The result was that at every scale, geography was increasingly simulated, a habit that paralleled the abstractions concurrently promoted in the name of political decisiveness. But simulation also meant that Cold War spaces were more than the product of intangible musings; they were constructed, and in the process acquired solidity but also simplicity. It was in the fashioning of artificial environments that the fragility of strategy was revealed most fully, but also where militarism's power could be most clearly expressed. The term associated with this paradoxical condition was 'frontier', a zone of fragile, transformational activity. Enthusiastic Cold Warriors were fond of transferring this word from a geopolitical past to a scientific future. But in their present, frontiers possessed the characteristics of both.  iv  Table of Contents Abstract  "  Table of Contents  iv  List of Abbreviations  v  List of Figures  vi  Acknowledgments  vii  Introduction PARTI Chapter One P A R T II  1 Global Views Between Geopolitics and Science Regional Intelligence  Chapter Two  War on Areas  Chapter Three  Searching for Security in the Social Sciences  Part III  18  86 160  Laboratories  Chapter Four  The Cybernetic Continent  232  Chapter Five  Anxious Urbanism  287  Conclusion: Into Space  340  Appendix One: Figures  355  Archival Sources  392  Bibliography  394  V  List of Abbreviations AAG ADSEC ADTIC AEC AGS AINA ASPG ASTP BASR CATP CCS CENIS  cnviA  DEW DRB FCDA GOC HRAF HRRI IGY  ns  JAMS MS NRC NSRB ONR OSS OWL R&A RDB RRC SAGE SDC SORO SRL SSRC USIA USSBS  Association o f American Geographers A i r Defense Systems Evaluation Committee Arctic-Desert-Tropic Information Center Atomic Energy Commission American Geographical Society Arctic Institute o f North America American Society for Professional Geographers A r m y Specialized Training Program Bureau o f Applied Social Research, Columbia University C i v i l Affairs Training Program Cross-Cultural Survey, Y a l e University Center for International Studies, M I T Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology Distant Early Warning (Line) Defence Research Board (Canada) Federal C i v i l Defense Administration Ground Observer Corps Human Relations Area Files Human Resources Research Institute, A i r University, Alabama International Geophysical Year (1957-58) Institute o f International Studies, Yale University Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies National Intelligence Surveys, Central Intelligence Agency National Research Council National Security Resources Board Office of Naval Research Office o f Strategic Services Office o f WarJnformation Research and Analysis Branch, Office o f Strategic Services Research and Development Board Russian Research Center, Harvard University Semi-Automatic Ground Environment System Development Corporation Special Operations Research Office, American University Systems Research Laboratory ( R A N D Corporation) Social Science Research Council United States Information Agency United States Strategic Bombing Survey  List of Figures 1. "Outward from the U.S." 2. America Encircled 3. "Polar Azimuthal Equidistant Projection" 4. Kitchen Debate 5. Climate Laboratory, World War II 6. Sample H R A F File Slip 7. "The H R A F Laboratory" 8. "OSS Organization" 9. S A G E Air Direction Center, McGuire Air Force Base, New York 10. SAGE Console 11. "Sentinels of the Sky" 12. Systems Research Laboratory, R A N D Corporation 13. "Schematic Diagram of Direction Center Functions" 14. The U.S. Air Force at the Geographic North Pole 15. Operation North Star, Alaska 16. Flying Boxcars, Exercise Yukon 17. Exercise Musk-Ox 18. "The D E W System" 19. "A Typical D E W Line Station" 20. Visitors from the South: D E W Line, Frobisher Bay 21. The Defence Network 22. Nevada Test Site 23. Operation Doorstep 24. Operation Doorstep Family 25. "Field Exercise Participants in Operation Cue. .2 miles from Ground Zero" 26. Danger in Density 27. Concentric Destruction 28. Civil Defence in Action 29. "Make No Mistake" - Civil Defence Poster 30. "Daytime With Warning" 31. Site of Disaster Simulation 32. Past versus Potential 33. "Auger's [sic] Dispersal Program" 34. "Assembling the Ships for the Mars Expedition" 35. "An Unmanned Instrument-Carrying Satellite in its Orbit" 36. Feeding at 'Altitude', Wright Air Development Center  Vll  Acknowledgments The research in this thesis was facilitated by the generous financial support of the Arctic Institute o f North America, Green College, the K i l l a m Trust, the Rockefeller Archive Center, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council o f Canada (Doctoral Fellowship #752-2000-2091), and the University o f British Columbia. Parts o f Chapter Six have been published as "Disaster and Decentralization: American Cities and the Cold War," Cultural Geographies 10.2 (2003), pp. 125-148. Archival work was conducted over the course o f numerous trips around the continent, and during these travels I received the advice o f many superb archivists at the locations listed before the bibliography. Other scholars who gave me their time and encouragement along the way include John Agnew, Simon Dalby, Sharon GhamariTabrizi, H u g h Gusterson, Steven Graham, Gregg Herken, D a v i d Kaiser, Scott Kirsch, Simon Marvin, David Neufeld, Naomi Oreskes, Scott Prudham, Joan Schwartz, N e i l Smith, T o m Stapleford, and Gerard Toal. Friends such as A r i Goelman, Maighna Jain, and Sarah Koch-Schulte made the journeys much more manageable, and Donald and Ellen Farish were the best o f hosts. Derek Gregory introduced me to the many worlds o f geography, and he has assisted and inspired me from the first lecture o f his that I witnessed to his final suggestions for this document. I not only owe him immeasurable scholarly thanks, but I am the better for his friendship as well. Within U B C ' s Geography Department, I am also very grateful for the support, criticism, and company o f Trevor Barnes, Matthew Evenden, Cole Harris, David L e y , Geraldine Pratt, Olav Slaymaker, and Graeme Wynn. A l l , in diverse ways, are consummate teachers and researchers. Conversations and coursework with Richard Cavell, Elizabeth Haiken, and Diane N e w e l l helped me to think beyond disciplinary confines. A n d the Department's staff, especially Elaine C h o and M a r y Luk, came to my rescue more than once. Graduate student colleagues have been a source o f challenge and amusement over the years. A r n Keeling, Andrew Jackson, Johanna Waters, B o b Wilson, and Jamie Winders have provided wise advice and good cheer. A n d Kate Geddie, David Nally, Richard Powell, and A l e x Vasudevan have, additionally, become great friends. Life at two residential colleges, Green and St. John's, has brought me into contact with a list o f impressive individuals too long to list in full, but I would like to single out T i m Dewhirst, Stefanie Doetzer, Mitchell Gray, Aaron Hunter, Maged Senbel, Vanessa Timmer, and my Improv teammates for special praise. M y old mates Patrick G i l l and Peter Orth still know how to make me forget the stresses o f a dissertation. A n d as for my clan, distant and near - particularly my generous uncle Doug, my four extraordinary grandparents, my remarkable parents Jan and B i l l , my brilliant siblings Jill and Paul, and my wonderful partner L i s a Brocklebank - 1 can only say this: to the end of the universe!  A whole history remains to be written of spaces - which would at the same time be the history ofpowers (both these terms in the plural) - from the great strategies of geo-politics to the little tactics of the habitat... - Michel Foucault, "The Eye of Power"  1  Introduction In the summer of 1959, just before a trip to the Soviet Union, American VicePresident Richard Nixon and his family joined Rear Admiral Charles C. Kirkpatrick of the U.S. Navy on the first voyage of the largest 'atomic' submarine fleet in the world. The tour took the distinguished guests past a graveyard of sunken ships, and led one exuberant reporter for the Christian Science Monitor to exclaim that the spectacle was "sheer fun, as though the real purpose of technological achievement, after all, was human happiness." Although the submarine project had been blessed by the U.S. government and aided by General Dynamics, a builder of nuclear reactors, the purveyor of these amusements was not the American military, but Walt Disney. The site was the celebratory Tomorrowland section of Disneyland, the "Magic Kingdom" that had opened in 1955. "Tomorrowland" was also a segment of Disney's popular television program, and in 1957 the show aired a feature titled "Our Friend the Atom," a combination of liveaction and animation, sponsored by General Dynamics, that was a promotional vehicle for President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" campaign. Released as a film in 1958, "Our Friend" explained atomic energy in the terms of household technology, domesticating a science that was more commonly associated with destructive weaponry. This soothing function was exactly what Eisenhower intended, as he came under increased domestic and international pressure to limit atomic testing.  1  Walt Disney, the journalist Eric Schlosser has argued, was  Mark Langer, "Disney's Atomic Fleet," Animation World Magazine 3.1 (1998), www.avm.com/ mag/issue3.1/3.1 pages/3.1 langerdisney.html (December 15, 2002); Lawrence S. Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb, Volume Two: Rebels Against the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). For an early statement of atomic enthusiasm, see R. M. Langer, "Fast New World," Collier's (July 6, 1940), pp. 18-19, 54-55. 1  2 America's most popular exponent of Cold War science. For audiences living in fear of nuclear annihilation, Walt Disney became a source of reassurance, making the latest technical advances seem marvelous and exciting. His faith in the goodness of American technology was succinctly expressed by the title of a film that the Disney studio produced for Westinghouse Electric: The Dawn of Better Living.  But Disney was also deeply interested in propaganda, and his scientific promotions were thus explicitly political. He enlisted former Nazi scientists Wernher von Braun and Heinz Haber, who were advising the United States Air Force, to work on space-oriented television programs and the design of Tomorrowland. Haber was an alumnus of the Luftwaffe Institute for Aviation Medicine, where he experimented on Dachau inmates, and eventually became the "chief scientific advisor to Disney Productions." He also hosted "Our Friend the Atom" and wrote the companion children's book. In 1940, Disney began reporting on Hollywood personalities for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and did so obsessively. His opposition to organized labour in the film industry, his affection for J. Edgar Hoover (a "foster father"), his affiliations with organized crime, and his anti-Semitism are all well known. His relationship with the military was somewhat more contentious. After accepting a contract from the Naval Bureau of Aeronautics for twenty animated training films, Disney grew annoyed with interference from Washington that attempted to use his stock characters in what he believed to be inappropriate ways. Once freed from a formal military presence in his studio, Disney chose a project that resembled his popular propaganda films, but one that he could control completely. This was an animated version of Alexander De Seversky's prominent 1942 book Victory Through Air Power. Although Disney's adaptation was not successful in the United States, it found devotees across the Atlantic, where Winston  3  Churchill apparently used the film to convince Franklin Roosevelt that long-range bombing was an appropriate strategic measure.  3  In this Disney story lie the elements that bind this dissertation together. The conflation of geopolitics and science, set within a rich, if eccentric, cultural landscape, suggests that a productive (if sometimes contradictory) constellation may be brought into view by examining these commonly compartmentalized terms and their spatial histories together. Geopolitics has recently come under critical scrutiny for its representational presumptions, while other scholars have begun to consider the traffic between scientific work, or knowledge, and what is conventionally presumed to lie external to such domains. Both of these important revisionist approaches adopt a loosely cultural approach in the sense that they reject an essential definition of what geopolitics or science 'is', concentrating instead on the practices through which "understanding is articulated and maintained in specific cultural contexts and translated and extended into new contexts."  4  But in the terms of contemporary Geography and International Relations, the Cold War is fast assuming a presence that verges on certainty. Now perceived, and set off, from another present, it is solidifying in time and space, as sets of dates and periods, on the one hand, and lists of blocs, alliances, and rivalries, on the other. This historical and geographical coagulation has been distinctly advanced by the study of a post-Co\d War era and its dimensions. A new world of proliferating insecurities appears to require Eric Schlosser: Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All-American Meal (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), pp. 38-39; Heinz Haber, The Walt Disney Story of Our Friend the Atom (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956). Marc Eliot, Walt Disney: Hollywood's Dark Prince (New York: Carol, 1993), pp. xvii-xviii, 165-168; Alexander P. de Seversky, Victory Through Air Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942). Joseph Rouse, Engaging Science: How to Understand its Practices Philosophically (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 238. 2  3  4  4 the innovations o f post-structuralism, post-colonialism, and related approaches to account for its shifting and deterritorialized alignments. A l l o f this is quite exhilarating, and, i n the nebulous forms o f critical geopolitics, for instance, has introduced a welcome, challenging reflexivity to studies o f political spaces, drawing valuable connections to cultural studies, political theory, and other interdisciplinary fields o f inquiry. There is, undoubtedly, a need to move beyond the overarching metanarrative o f a singular C o l d War, explained solely through a series o f infinitely mobile terms such as 'containment' and 'domino'. But the mutual dependence on theory and a presentist perspective is a hazardous habit. It risks suggesting that the C o l d War has been resigned to the rigidity o f a historical epoch, characterized by a wholly different order o f things, including a secure, simple superpower competition that is made to seem positively, unquestionably realist in comparison to current vertigo. Paradoxically, this framing o f the C o l d War has been both aided and challenged by the rush o f detail that has flooded historical literature as a result o f declassification, including material from the former Soviet archives. To answer the question o f whether these novelties have resulted i n a greater certainty or a heightened, even contradictory complexity is to stake a preliminary position i n the substantial realm o f C o l d War scholarship. Such intellectual differences are matched, intriguingly, by the C o l d War itself; the stark boundaries o f struggle were contested by the very technologies and ideological categories that were used to erect and maintain them.  5  But an awareness o f  this contradiction is limited by a simplistic approach to the geographies o f ' C o l d W a r ' .  Christian G. Appy, "Introduction: The Struggle for the World," in Appy, ed., Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966 (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), pp. 1-8; Tom Englehardt, The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation (New York: Basic Books, 1995). 5  5  Many recent interpretations of American history, some brilliant, that explicitly take the Cold War or parts of it as a period of explanation all too often fail to account for the spatial assumptions built not only into their own reconstructions, but also into the slice of time which they purport to study. What is required to skirt these pitfalls is an approach that is not bounded by disciplinary constraints, heroic biographies, or instrumental depictions of policy, and yet considers the importance of intellectual categories, influential individuals, and the exercise of power. This was, I think, what Michel Foucault had in mind in his discussions of spatial history - a phrase that he never used formally, but gestured to across the entire corpus of his work. His histories of limits, boundaries, and enclosures were addressed through the themes of illness, crime, and sexuality, but also militarism. In a renowned passage from a dialogue with the editors ofthe French geopolitical journal Herodote, Foucault concluded that the formation of discourses and the genealogy of knowledge need to be analysed, not in terms of types of consciousness, modes of perception and forms of ideology, but in terms of tactics and strategies of power. Tactics and strategies deployed through implantations, distributions, demarcations, control of territories and organizations of domains which could well make up a sort of geopolitics.. . 6  In 1976, the same year as the Foucault interview, Yves Lacoste, one of Herodote's founders, argued similarly that geography was "first and foremost a strategic knowledge which is closely linked to a set of political and military practices." Both Lacoste and Foucault were advancing an expansive version of geography that was tied  Michel Foucault, "Questions on Geography," in Colin Gordon, ed., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (New York; Pantheon, 1980), pp. 63-77; the quote isfromp. 77. For the most extended treatment of 'spatial history', see Stuart Elden, Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault, and the Project of a Spatial History (London: Continuum, 2001). Militarism, of course, has also attracted its share of treatments in historical sociology. For one prominent example, see Anthony Giddens, 6  The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique ofHistorical Materialism (Cambridge: Polity, 1985).  6  only partially to forms of academic knowledge. In a less heralded passage from the same conversation, Foucault mentioned a research project he was planning to undertake that would directly address "the army as a matrix of organization and knowledge." While he never completely fulfilled this goal, Foucault's later writings on governmentality, and his already-published discussions of the military and disciplinary power, were clearly concerned with the broader implications of the same subject. Indeed, for all their differences, both Lacoste and Foucault tied geography to military science, but more importantly, to "a knowledge born out of the practical management problems of government, problems addressing the administration, surveillance and control of populations, territories and colonies."  7  In his 1975-76 lectures at the College de France, Foucault inverted Clausewitz to assert that politics was "the continuation of war by other means," suggested that discourse was a struggle or battle, and proposed that war produces a form of truth which operates as a weapon. His references were drawn overwhelmingly from the early modern period, and little reference was made to his own century, or, for that matter, to the United States. While important, in the sense that the long history of strategy as a specific model of power should not be ignored, these absences, like Foucault's minimal references to colonial contexts, are also unfortunate. This thesis attempts to redress that imbalance by taking up the technologies, discourses, and spaces of American militarism during the period between World War Two and the 1960 election of John F. Kennedy. The choice  Gear6id 6 Tuathail, "The Critical Reading/Writing of Geopolitics: Re-reading/Writing Wittfogel, Bowman and Lacoste," Progress in Human Geography 18.3 (1994), pp. 313-332; the quotes arefrompp. 326-327; Foucault, "Questions on Geography," p. 77. On Lacoste and Herodote, see also Paul Claval, "Herodote and the French Left," and Leslie W. Hepple, "Geopolitiques de Gauche: Yves Lacoste, Herodote, and French Radical Geopolitics," in Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson, eds., Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 239-267, 268-301. In the 7  of historical markers is in one sense arbitrary, but it is also a deliberate attempt to address a time of almost unabashed militarism in the United States, a span when the signs, subjects, and structures of violence ran rampant. The Cold War was at once a paradigmatic case of near-perpetual political confrontation and an arena for the control of subjects using techniques derived from the military. In 1953, Edward Barrett actually published a book titled Truth is Our Weapon - a popular study of persuasion, Q  propaganda, and psychological warfare. Specifically, this is a history of how certain Cold War environments were conceived and concretized at the conjunction of geopolitics and science. A genealogy of these two terms does not reveal clean distinctions. Indeed, they merged uneasily, but crucially, in the practices of the social sciences. In promotional material for the Human Relations Area Files, one of the period's most ambitious attempts to forge a 'science of man', the aims of the social sciences are described as attempts to match, in the study of human affairs, the spectacular successes of science in harnessing, conquering, and coming to terms with nature. But the same publication conceded that there were problems that "mastery of impersonal phenomena" could not completely solve. The excesses of science, moreover, had heightened some of these risks and traumas. Pushing the boundaries of science necessitated a turn inward, to "man himself and his own complex cultural and behavioural systems. But as in the case of the research dubbed 9  large and admirable literature on Foucault's relevance for geography, the connection to militarism and its spaces has not been fully drawn out. Michel Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the College de France, 1975-76, trans. Da Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), p. 15; Julian Reid, "Foucault on Clausewitz: Conceptualizing the Relationship Between War and Power," Alternatives 28 (2003), pp. 1-28; Mark Neocleous, "Perpetual War, or 'War and War Again': Schmitt, Foucault, Fascism," Philosophy and Social Criticism 22.2 (1996), pp. 47-66; Edward Barrett, Truth is Our Weapon (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1953). Human Relations Area Files, Laboratory for the Study ofMan: Report 1949-1959 (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1959), p. 3. As Richard Ashley writes, a genealogical attitude permits social inquiry 8  8  science, the far reaches of this social inquiry were not merely metaphorical; there was a distinct, material correlation between intellectual and geopolitical frontiers. The social sciences are pivotal to liberal thought because they construct autonomous objects of knowledge, in the form of social bodies, which provide the targets for social administration and regulation - what Foucault called governmentality. Governmental objects were most powerfully constituted by means of quantification, or related methods that allowed for mobility, stability, and synthesis. The modern scale of government is undoubtedly the national state, but to assert this is to risk indulging a tendency to treat the state as rigid and primary.  10  The territories of American geopolitics  and science were diverse, just as the spatial meaning of 'America' was not fixed. Put this way, society, in turn, becomes a site for critical scrutiny, rather than an explanatory authority. In Truth is Our Weapon, Barrett was concerned to demonstrate the relevance of ideas in a battle for human minds, and, in a much different register, so am I. What follows is an intellectual history of geographies that is inspired by but emphatically not in the shadow of Foucault's provocations. Moreover, it is not a study of spatial metaphors, but of spatial techniques and spatial knowledge. Moving from the global reach of geopolitics to unhomely urban habitats, I trace the revision of the world by American militarism across a series of scales. These levels resemble the lines of a contour map, a cartographic style used frequently during the Cold War to refer to degrees of destruction wrought by atomic bombs. Contours, like scales, are artificial distinctions, but also  "tofindits focus in the posing o f how' questions, not 'what' questions." Richard K. Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics," Alternatives 12 (1987), pp. 403-434; the quote isfromp. 409.  9  boundaries that imply difference. They are, additionally, relational, tied to one another as part of a classification scheme that takes as its point of origin a central site or zone.  11  In  my outline and orientation, this focal space is 'America', at once equivalent to and much more than the territorial expanse of the United States. But unlike the abstract,  systemic  geometries of Cold War strategy and social science, I am less interested in the specific location of a point, the mathematical justifications for the placement of contours, or the connection of all phenomena to a single principle, than I am in the rich, variegated spaces between each line. If militarism is understood, somewhat conventionally, as the promotion, prominence, and pervasiveness of military ideas, objects, and values, or the erasure of boundaries (however artificial) between military and civilian spaces and institutions, then the United States during the early Cold War is a capable candidate for the designation, especially given America's status as a 'liberal' space. Liberal political thought, haunted by the contradictions of violence and reason, is premised on the attempt to remove disorder from within the boundaries of the state, a project that is doomed to fail. Cold War America is a striking example of that failure. While perhaps not a strict 'garrison state', to use a term that has received recent attention from historians, it may have been  Matthew G. Hannah, Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory in Nineteenth-Century America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). See Sally A. Marston, "The Social Construction of Scale," Progress in Human Geography 24.2 (2000), pp. 219-242. Foucault's non-Cartesian maps, Stuart Elden writes, "highlight key features, outline contours, and provide an orientation." Elden, Mapping the Present, p. 115. All social theory req