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Private security companies and human security : assessing the impact of new actors on a new process Spearin, Christopher Robert 2003

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PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES A N D H U M A N SECURITY: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF N E W ACTORS O N A NEW PROCESS CHRISTOPHER ROBERT SPEARIN B.A.Sc, McMaster University, 1995 M.A. , Carleton University, 1997 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF T H E REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY THE F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES (Department of Political Science) by in THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA March 2003 © Christopher Spearin, 2003 U B C Rare Books and Special Collections - Thesis Authorisation Form Page 1 of 1 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree that permission f o r extensive copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by h i s or her r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n permission. Department of folibcc,! Science The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date file://C:\Documents%20and%20Setting 3/24/2003 A B S T R A C T This dissertation assesses the presence of internationally oriented private security companies (PSCs), a form of modern-day mercenarism, upon the promotion of human security. This assessment is a considered response, employing multiple cases, PSCs, and services, to those who espouse the use of PSCs. It is also fitting given the holistic nature of human security with its emphasis upon multiple actors and diffused responsibility. Using two human security characteristics of organized force, good conduct and good governance, the dissertation examines PSCs in terms of their application of armed force, their work in security-sector training, and their interaction with humanitarian endeavours. Accompanying this analysis is a consideration of the present state of regulation and the degree to which it does, and might in the future, respond to the need to promote human security. The dissertation makes four findings with relevance both for PSCs and the promotion of human security. One is that firms, on their own merits, have a relatively positive direct impact upon human security. The second finding, however, is that their indirect impact is less promising. The third finding is that potential regulators, whether they are international or regional organizations or supplier states, are not yet ready, or perhaps even willing, to implement human-security-centric regulation of PSCs. The fourth and more general finding of this dissertation is that the promotion of human security must be seen as a process rather than an end goal. This is due to the indirect effects and negligent character of various actors' conduct both on their own and in ii combination with those of others. In sum, the PSC is a "neutral" instrument to be employed in a variety of ways. But given the nature of the marketplace, client relations, regulatory standards, and in some cases the poor judgments of the PSCs in response to client demands, human security promotion is not always at the fore. iii T A B L E OF CONTENTS Abstract ii Glossary viii Acknowledgments xiii CHAPTER ONE Introduction 1 1.1 The Guiding Question 1 1.2 Seeking the Answer 3 CHAPTER TWO State of the Industry, State of the Literature 16 2.1 Introduction 16 2.2 Services Offered by PSCs 16 2.3 Comment on Terminology 18 2.4 Problems in Assessing the Size and Scale of the PSC Industry 19 2.5 About This Study - Company Selection 22 2.6 Location/Hubs of the Industry 23 2.7 About This Study - Home State Selection 25 2.8 About This Study - Case Selection 26 2.9 About This Study - Human Security Considerations 29 2.10 About This Study - The PSC and Traditional Theory 30 2.11 About This Study - Approach Towards Data Collection 32 . 2.12 Issues and Themes 32 2.13 Place of the Dissertation in the Literature 38 CHAPTER THREE Mercenary Activity 51 3.1 Introduction 51 3.2 "The Mercenary" - Definition 55 3.3 French Revolution 60 3.4 Post-French Revolution Mercenarism 63 3.4.1 Foreign Enlistment - French Foreign Legion 64 3.4.2 Foreign Enlistment - Gurkhas 67 3.4.3 Secondment and "Retirees" 69 3.4.4 Sale of Standing Forces 71 iv 3.5 The Soldier of Fortune Mercenary 74 3.5.1 Type of Individual 75 3.5.2 Soldier of Fortune Methods 76 3.5.3 Driving Motives, "Principles", and Resulting Effects 81 3.6 The Private Security Company 84 3.6.1 Causal Ingredients 84 3.6.2 Comparisons and Distinctiveness 90 3.7 Conclusion 95 CHAPTER FOUR Human Security and Organized Force 111 4.1 Introduction 111 4.2 National Security 112 4.3 Human Security 117 4.4 Human Security and the State 122 4.5 Roles and Responsibilities of Various Actors 127 4.6 Organized Force 130 4.7 Human Security Characteristics for Organized Force 135 4.7.1 Good Conduct 136 4.7.2 Good Governance 138 4.8 Conclusion - Turning to "Private" Goals and "Private" Means 140 CHAPTER FIVE Application of Violence 151 5.1 Introduction 151 5.2 EO Background 152 5.3 Angola 155 5.3.1 Angola, Foreign Support, and the Cold War 155 5.3.2 EO's Activities 162 5.4 Sierra Leone 166 5.4.1 Sierra Leone's Problems and Lack of Foreign Assistance 166 5.4.2 EO's Activities 171 5.5 EO and Good Conduct 174 5.5.1 The PSCs Conduct 174 5.5.2 Problematic Good Conduct Issues 179 5.6 E O and Good Governance 186 5.6.1 Common Concerns 186 5.6.2 Angola and Good Governance 189 5.6.3 Sierra Leone and Good Governance 192 5.6.4 Shared Good Governance Concerns 193 5.7 Conclusion 196 v CHAPTER SIX Security-Sector Training 210 6.1 Introduction 210 6.2 Traditional Security-Sector Training and PSCs 212 6.3 Private Security Company Training Presence and Bosnia 215 6.3.1 Background for MPRI 215 6.3.2 Train and Equip Program in Bosnia 219 6.3.3 Implementation and Ingredients 222 6.3.4 Good Conduct 224 6.3.5 Good Governance 227 6.4 Private Security Company Training Presence and Papua New Guinea 230 6.4.1 Background for DSL 230 6.4.2 Background for Sandline International 232 6.4.3 Nature of the Security Sector in Papua New Guinea 235 6.4.4 Papua New Guinea and Australia 239 6.4.5 Port Moresby and the PSC option 240 6.4.6 Good Conduct 246 6.4.7 Good Governance 249 6.5 African Crisis Response Initiative 251 6.5.1 Background 251 6.5.2 ACRI Ingredients and Actors 253 6.5.3 Good Conduct 255 6.5.4 Good Governance 258 6.6 Conclusion 261 CHAPTER SEVEN Humanitarian Interactions 281 7.1 Introduction 281 7.2 PSC Security 283 7.2.1 Background • 283 7.2.2 Micro Level: Deterrence 292 7.2.3 Micro Level: Conflict Dynamics/Privatization of Security 297 7.2.4 Macro Level Considerations 301 7.3 Private Security Companies and Humanitarian Demining 309 7.3.1 Landmines - A Human Security Threat 309 7.3.2 The Private Response 311 7.3.3 Humanitarian Demining and Good Conduct 316 7.3.4 Humanitarian Demining and Good Governance 320 7.3.5 Problematic Issues: Mine Action and Image 323 7.4 Conclusion 329 vi CHAPTER EIGHT Human-Security-Centric Regulation 343 8.1 Introduction 343 8.2 Point on "Recipient" States and Regulatory Flight 344 8.3 Ingredients for Human-Security-Centric Regulation 345 8.4 The United Nations 350 8.5 A Regional Response Towards Regulation - The AU? 360 8.6 Home or Supplier-State Regulation 364 8.6.1 South Africa 364 8.6.2 The United States 368 8.6.3 The United Kingdom 371 8.7 Appropriateness of Supplier-State Regulation 373 8.7.1 Licensing and Qualifications 373 8.7.2 Assessment of the Country/Situation 375 8.7.3 On-going Assessment of PSC Operations 378 8.7.4 Assessment of PSC Goals and Means 383 8.7.5 A Consistent Supplier-State Approach? 387 8.7.6 PSC Regulation and Humanitarianism 391 8.8 Conclusion 393 CHAPTER NINE Conclusion 405 9.1 Final Assessments 405 9.2 Directions for Future Research 415 9.3 Epilogue: Private Security Companies Post 11 September 2001 417 BIBLIOGRAPHY 428 vii GLOSSARY A C O T A Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance ACRF African Crisis Response Force ACRI African Crisis Response Initiative ACSS African Center for Strategic Studies ADF Allied Democratic Forces ADFL Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire A E C A United States Arms Export Control Act AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council A N C African National Congress APC All People's Congress APMS Assistant Professor of Military Science A U African Union BHG Branch Heritage Group B M A T T British Military Advisory and Training Team BP British Petroleum BRA Bougainville Revolutionary Army CAS3 Combined Arms and Services Staff School C C M A T Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies C C W United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons CDF Civil Defence Force CFE Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty CIDA Canadian International Development Agency DCP Defence Cooperation Program D H A United Nations Department for Humanitarian Affairs DIA Defence Intelligence Agency DPKP United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo viii DSD Defence Systems Colombia DSL Defence Systems Limited DTAP Republic of Croatia Democracy Transition Assistance Program D T C Defense Trade Controls DTI United Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry E C O M O G Economic Community of West African States' Monitoring Group ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council E O Executive Outcomes E U European Union E U C O M United States European Command FAA Angola Armed Forces FAF Federation Armed Forces FAPLA Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola FAR Federal Acquisitions Regulation FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office EMS Foreign Military Sales Financing Program FNLA National Front for the Liberation of Angola FSTA Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft GDP Gross Domestic Product GSG Gurkha Security Guards HDZ Croatian Democratic Union HRFOR United Nations High Commission on Human Rights Operations in Rwanda HRW Human Rights Watch H V Croatian Armed Forces ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IDA Institute for Defence Analysis IFOR Implementation Force IGO International Governmental Organization ix IMET International Military Education and Training Program IMF International Monetary Fund ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations IWG Interagency Working Group JCET Joint Combined Exchange Training JNA Yugoslav National Army KFOR Kosovo Force K L A Kosovo Liberation Army LOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation Program LRMP Long Range Management Program MAP Military Assistance Program M D M Medecins du Monde M O N U C United Nations Observer Mission in the Congo MPLA Movement for the Liberation of Angola MPRI Military Professional Resources Incorporated MSF Medecins Sans Frontiers N A T O North Atlantic Treaty Organization N C A C C National Conventional Arms Control Committee N C O Non-commissioned Officer NGO Non-governmental Organization NORAD North American Aerospace Command NPRC National Provisional Ruling Council NSEP National Security Enhancement Plan OAS Organization of American States O A U Organization of African Unity OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ONUC Operations des Nations Unies au Congo ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PDD Presidential Decision Directive x PFP Partnership for Peace PL Patriotic League PMC Private Military Company PNG Papua New Guinea PNGDF Papua New Guinea Defence Force POI Program of Instruction POW Prisoner of War PSC Private Security Company PTF Police Tactical Force QRF Quick Response Forces R D U Rapid Deployment Unit RIP Rapid Intervention Police ROTC United States Army's Reserve Officer Training Corps RPNGC Royal Papua New Guinean Constabulary RSLAF * Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces RUF Revolutionary United Front SADF South African Defence Force SAIC Science Applications International Corporation SANDF South African National Defence Force SAS Special Air Service SAS* Special Advisory Services SFOR Stabilization Force SFU Special Forces Unit SLDF Sierra Leone Defence Force SRC Strategic Resources Corporation SSD Special Security Division TSE Toronto Stock Exchange U A E United Arab Emirates U N United Nations U N AMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone U N A V E M United Nations Angola Verification Mission UNDP United Nations Development Program xi UNHCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola UNITAF Unified Task Force UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia UNSECOORD United Nations Security Coordinator UPDF Ugandan Peoples Defence Force USAREC United States Army Recruiting Command UXO Unexploded Ordinance WFP United Nations World Food Program xii A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr. Michael Wallace and Dr. Brian Job, for their ongoing guidance and encouragement throughout my time at the University of British Columbia. Their efforts are much appreciated. Thanks should also be extended to Dr. Paul Marantz for his constructive advice that contributed to the strengthening of this dissertation. Finally, Dr. Allen Sens deserves recognition for helping me deal with the many demands and requirements of being a doctoral student. With respect to "doctors" beyond the University of British Columbia, three individuals should be recognized. My thanks is offered to Dr. Ivan Baggs of the University of Alberta for his computing expertise and equipment that allowed for this dissertation to be written in many parts of the country. Also of great importance were the efforts of Dr. Harald von Riekhoff of Carleton University and Dr. John Maxwell (retired) of the Geological Survey of Canada. Their helpful support and assistance throughout the entire process was very helpful indeed. Generally, thanks should go to the friends I had the good fortune of meeting through Green College, the Department of Political Science, and the Institute of International Relations. In particular, two people deserve special recognition. One is my flatmate, Jen Baggs, who helped me greatly with her support and friendship. The other is Margaret Blenkhorn who, despite the often great distances apart for long periods of time, offered her patience and love. They proved to be inspirational. Thanks goes to my parents, Donald and Jean Spearin. They provided with me their strength and shared with me their enthusiasm and desire for learning. Additionally, special thanks should go to my father for his helpful advice and tireless efforts which led to the improvement of my writing. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to extend my thanks to the kind folks at the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada and the Security and Defence Forum of the Department of National Defence. During the dissertation process, I held the Security and Defence Forum Ph.D. Scholarship (2000-2001) and the Dr. Ronald Baker Doctoral Scholarship (2001-2002). This assistance was invaluable in the completion of this research project. xiii CHAPTER ONE - Introduction 1.1 The Guiding Question H o w and under what conditions does the presence o f internationally oriented private security companies (PSCs), a form o f modern-day mercenarism, promote human security? 1 One might think that an immediate negative response to this question is necessitated for two reasons. First, over the past two hundred years, only states are thought to possess and are expected to have the necessary capacity and expertise pertaining to organized force. 2 States have security sectors, consisting o f police forces, military services, and other agencies, that have access to substantial resources, that receive constant training and drill ing, and that have an ongoing ability to collect and assess information. It is presumed that the state has the monopoly over organized force both within its borders and projected beyond them. 3 Second, coupled with the fact o f mercenarism's reduced presence, thinking is also informed by the negative activities o f some mercenaries since the end o f World War Two. Here, individuals known as soldiers of fortune are caught in the spotlight. They have distinguished themselves not only by being largely ineffective but also by basing their comparative advantage on the fact that they do not feel bound to follow humanitarian laws or to respect human rights. Collectively, they are infamous for their lack of loyalty and moral scruples. I f post-W o r l d War Two mercenarism is to be equated simply with the activities o f these soldiers o f fortune, then linking the use of mercenaries to the promotion of human security would seem to be highly inappropriate. 1 Yet in spite of this thinking, there are equally two important reasons why looking at the PSC, a largely post-Cold War mercenary development, and asking this question is appropriate. One reason rests with the concept of human security itself which is a new approach towards security that stresses the individual as the primary referent rather than the state.4 In this formulation of security, all individuals have a right to be treated with respect, with the utmost regard to their human rights, and as ends rather than means. Similarly, all actors, meaning individuals, groups, states, or other organizations, possess a responsibility to ensure that these needs are given their due recognition and are observed. This, in other words, is a diffused responsibility.5 This concern for various responsibilities and implications obviously must apply to PSCs if the all encompassing nature and scope of human security is to ring true. Ignoring the PSC, even if it is a type of mercenarism, is unwarranted. Furthermore, identification of the implications of the presence of PSCs is apt because it reveals both how PSCs affect human security in their own regard and how their conduct affects or fits into the calculations of other actors. The second reason is that supporters of PSCs emphasize the positive human security effects of the firms. David Shearer directly makes the link between human security and PSCs and the positive effects the firms might have. He contends in his report issued by the Royal Institute of International Affairs that the use of mercenaries would be an ethical act, a view "shared by a growing and diverse group of aid workers, journalists, human rights advocates and even the higher echelons of the British and US armed forces".6 Others implicitly present the assertion of a seemingly positive relationship between PSCs and human security.7 Simply put, firms were there in the past situations of turmoil and despair and they were willing to "make a difference". Thus, those that support the PSC alternative indicate how these firms can bring peace not only in the negative sense, meaning an end to fighting, but also in a positive sense, meaning the setting and the advancement of conditions that promote human betterment. As noted by Kevin O'Brien, the PSC alternative under the right conditions might achieve several valuable tasks: • the return of peace • the protection of refugees • the facilitation of humanitarian assistance • the setting of conditions for reconstruction and development • the training of security sector actors.8 Analysis such as this picks up on two salient themes in human security discourse: the satisfaction of basic human needs, particularly physical safety, and the need for progressive change so that individuals can meet their full potential. 1.2 Seeking the Answer What is required is a range of analysis that deals with a number of PSCs and the different types of services they have offered to several clients. In other words, one must inquire into the following: "What have been the effects of the presence of PSCs across cases and in the delivery of different services?" Put differently, to what degree does Adam Smith's "invisible hand" direct the international private security marketplace so that it actually leads to beneficial outcomes pertaining to human security? Thus, the hypothesis guiding this study is a testing of the assumption that there is a positive relationship, in light of current regulation, management, and capability, between the presence of an internationally oriented PSC industry and the promotion of human security. For the sake of a more exacting human-security-centric assessment, the hypothesis is sub-divided and dealt with in two parts: There is a positive relationship, in light of current regulation, management, and capability, between the presence of an internationally oriented PSC industry and a) good conduct and b) good governance. Good conduct, as this study will show, pertains to the means and methods employed by firms and those parties that they interact with while good governance concerns the motives that provide the backdrop to the application or operation of organized force and the actual outcomes, intended or not, produced. This two segment hypothesis is applied to several PSCs providing services both to state-security sectors and to humanitarian organizations. It is also applied to various PSC activities: the application of armed force, the provision of security-sector training, and the offering of protection and demining expertise for humanitarian endeavours. Without a doubt, looking at how PSCs interact with state-security sectors and humanitarian actors is this study's focus because although all actors have a responsibility to promote human security, it is particularly common for these two types of actors to be seen as, and expected to be, key players in the promotion of human security.9 Testing this hypothesis by looking into good conduct and good governance aspects can be performed by seeking the answers to several questions: Security for whom? What values, directly and indirectly, are being made secure? How much security is being provided by these actions? Security is being achieved from what threats? Security is being achieved through what means?10 One can then consider whether or not the current milieu is in fact conducive for PSCs to have a positive impact 4 in terms of human security. If not, or if changes need to be made, one can contemplate the appropriate structures and guidelines to be developed in which PSCs should operate. Indeed, it is here argued that although the PSC is potentially a highly effective instrument in the human security toolbox, it is one that cannot be largely left to market forces. It requires appropriate guidance and structure given its operating procedures and the contexts in which it is employed for outcomes related to human security to be achieved.11 The promotion of human security is very much dependent on the conditions under which PSCs are employed. On the one hand, PSCs, on their own merits, are generally effective actors in terms of good conduct and good governance. PSC personnel are adequately trained and they follow human rights and humanitarian obligations in the course of their operations. Firms are also not directly linked to exploitive or discriminatory agendas that they or their clients might assumably have.12 PSCs, in other words, indicate that they wish to emulate developed world standards and they more or less do so. In this way, they dispel conceptions developed since the French Revolution, and especially after the rise of soldiers of fortune, regarding the suitability and appropriateness of the mercenary alternative. On the other hand, if the expertise and capabilities of the PSC are held as constants, the mere presence of an international marketplace with the unhindered buying and selling of security expertise does not automatically determine beneficial outcomes. Under current market conditions, it is the client and the environment into which the PSC expertise is injected that are the determining factors regarding either the promotion or denial of human security. 5 Attention, therefore, rightly turns to the issues of improved management and regulation. In this regard, the human security analysis makes plain the elements necessary for effective and appropriate regulation. The United Nations and regional organizations, particularly the African Union (AU), however, are found to be not up to the task given their own intra-organizational problems and the resulting inability to make the needed distinction between PSCs and soldiers of fortune. Moreover, the actors deemed most relevant and competent for undertaking this task, supplier states (i.e., the states in which PSCs are based), are not currently up to it. Partially this is due to current regulatory qualifications which might be alterable, but, more importantly, it concerns a lack of an overall and consistent human-security-centric focus. The study, as a whole, outlines the current state of the PSC industry vis-a-vis human security and state-security sectors and humanitarian actors. It reveals the manner and the degree to which human security is promoted by PSCs in terms of good conduct and good governance and it points out the inherent limitations of the PSC industry as currently regulated, managed, and endowed. While there is no denying that the PSC may be a positive development in terms of human security, the international practice on the whole has not developed to the point that this is guaranteed. To facilitate this argument, Chapter Two offers a consideration of the state of the industry and the state of the literature. As indicated above, this study is limited to a human security assessment of PSCs and how firms might be regulated in order to promote human security. To this end, this chapter sets out the methodological reasoning employed in the selection of PSCs, cases, and services. The chapter recognizes the 6 study's important organizational characteristics: analysis strongly featuring PSCs based in the industry's hub states, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of South Africa, attention directed towards the weak state environment, and the provision of PSC services to those actors generally thought of as responsible in the first instance for the promotion of human security - state-security sectors and humanitarian organizations. After presenting the rationale behind the study's organization, the chapter indicates the directions taken and issues stressed by other authors: individual case studies; privatization trends in security; cost-effectiveness and economic analyses; exploitation, development, and the global economy relationships; and regulation and accountability matters. Finally, the chapter presents the place of the study in this body of literature and the contribution it makes to it. To provide background and for the sake of comparison, Chapter Three places the PSC into the larger context of contemporary mercenarism. It documents mercenarism since the time of the French Revolution, an approximate temporal division point at which mercenarism became less common and accepted and more limited and saddled with pejorative baggage. The chapter reveals that even with mercenarism circumscribed after this historical time period, it has existed in various forms over the past two centuries, albeit on a smaller scale. While the PSC shares some of the characteristics of its mercenary brethren, this chapter shows that this particular development has its own unique characteristics fitting for the post-Cold War marketplace which it serves. In particular, the identification of similarities and differences makes plain that PSCs stand apart from soldiers of fortune, the most notorious form of contemporary mercenarism. 7 Therefore, this chapter reinforces the importance of the question guiding this study. From one standpoint, the fact that PSCs cannot be simply equated to soldiers of fortune indicates that the question should not be discarded in the first instance. From another standpoint, because PSCs deal in the management of violence, the effects of their presence are different from those of a normal business transaction; this chapter makes it evident why analysis is important.13 Chapter Four provides the human security framework for assessing the impact of organized force generally and PSCs specifically. The issue of organized force vis-a-vis human security, on its own merits and in terms of how it plays, directly and indirectly, into the activities of actors, has often been overlooked. The chapter, therefore, makes the intellectual and policymaking rationale for assessing the PSC industry, its activities, and its relationships in terms of promoting human security. It also indicates how organized force may contribute to or detract from the promotion of human security by identifying its role and developing concepts for assessment. These concepts pick up on the two main ingredients of human security^ the freedom from fear and the freedom from want, and spells them out in terms of elements directly related to organized force: good conduct and good governance. This chapter recognizes that because the promotion of human security should be viewed as a process and different structures or patterns of behaviour determine who enjoys the freedoms from fear and want, the perfect use of organized force, whether it be through public or private means, is an unreachable ideal. Nevertheless, some cases are obviously more positive than others in terms of human security promoted directly and indirectly and assessments can and should be made. 8 Chapter Five examines Executive Outcomes (EO) in Angola and Sierra Leone and the PSCs actual use of force within the borders of these two states. After considering background factors, the chapter assesses the effects of EO's presence in terms of good conduct and good governance. With respect to the company and its personnel, the human security determinations are generally positive, especially when juxtaposed against other actors present in these two African cases. However, it is when one considers other effects stemming from the PSC presence that things become more problematic in terms of good conduct and good governance. Indeed, the chapter argues that how E O conducted its affairs in terms of its interaction with other security-sector actors and the tasks to which its respective employers put the firm's personnel were together not positive developments for human security. In other words, market conditions and business practices saw that the PSC partially abdicated human security responsibilities in deference to client demands. Accordingly, this chapter only partially agrees with those that advocate the PSC alternative. Though the PSC might be a valuable and potent tool, EO's presence, in light of regulatory and managerial practices, did not lead to an outcome totally benefiting human security. Chapter Six expands upon interaction between PSCs and state-security sectors to analyze the implications of training provided by PSCs. The two main cases under consideration are the American PSC Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) in the Muslim-Croat federation of Bosnia and the British firms Defence Systems Limited (DSL) and Sandline International in Papua New Guinea (PNG). In the first case the PSC served as an official instrument of American policy abroad, whereas in PNG a 9 series of governments in Port Moresby went to the international marketplace to purchase PSC expertise. Using these two cases, this chapter makes a human security assessment that considers the appropriateness of the training goals, whether or not they are achievable, direct and indirect outcomes/implications, and the contextual characteristics that both affect and are affected by PSC activity. The chapter also employs the results of this assessment to consider an evolving case of PSC training: MPRI as a key contributor to the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), an American peacekeeping training enterprise. Though determinations of actual outcomes of externally provided security-sector training, whatever its source or ownership, are admittedly somewhat nebulous, this chapter makes clear the merits of direction and leverage applied or held by oversight actors in the promotion of human security. Chapter Seven shifts from security-sector actors to humanitarian organizations and the relationship they have with PSCs. In this chapter, emphasis is placed not so much on individual companies or clients, but rather upon the different PSC services from which humanitarians derive benefit. Particular emphasis is placed on two services and their direct and indirect impacts in terms of human security: physical protection of humanitarian personnel and their resources/operations and humanitarian demining. The evolving and expanding humanitarian/PSC interaction is driven by the changed context in which humanitarian assistance is now delivered. The environment is intra-state conflict. Actors on the ground view humanitarians as having a political impact, and thus, for political reasons, the intentional targeting humanitarians and the civilians they assist is a prominent aspect. The chapter makes the case that PSCs, given their competency 10 and availability, fare well directly in terms of good conduct and good governance. However, indirect concerns do exist that could affect the promotion of human security and prove detrimental to humanitarian operations. Furthermore, the humanitarian/PSC relationship perpetuates humanitarianism as an "alibi" for effective political action taken by developed world states and international organizations. The relationship also poses image problems for the humanitarian sector. Chapter Eight rounds out the main body of the text by considering the issue of regulation that would recognize and improve upon current practices, thus leading to more human-security-centric outcomes. Matters of importance are determining what is sold, to whom, under what conditions, and who should be responsible for interfering in the marketplace. To expand, three attributes of human-security-centric regulation are important: 1) the regulation of PSC attributes and standards; 2) the regulation of objectives assigned to PSCs and the means and methods employed to achieve them; and 3) the regulation of PSCs regarding the actual outcomes of their activities. After considering how the United Nations and regional organizations might respond to this challenge, and discovering inherent limitations with these actors, the chapter focuses upon the importance of supplier-state regulation in line with human security guidelines. Emphasis is placed upon the regulatory activities of the three "hub states" - the United States, the Republic of South African, and the United Kingdom. On the one hand, analysis of American and South African regulations and those proposed by the United Kingdom reveal promising characteristics that correspond to the above criteria. The chapter also makes clear how certain elements might be improved upon. On the other 11 hand, the chapter recognizes the barriers still present for full human-security-centric regulation. These barriers are largely erected in order to use PSCs as an element of developed world statecraft, whatever the proposed objective, to the detriment of acting upon human security responsibilities. The resulting limitations prevent the creation of an international marketplace that promotes human security, develops a level playing field, and is governed by a supplier-state regime. At present, state actors and those from civil society are not sufficiently organized nor motivated to reverse this situation. Finally, the task of Chapter Nine is threefold. First, it provides the conclusions of the study as they relate to the presence of a PSC industry and the consequent direct and indirect impacts upon human security. These conclusions apply to PSCs and their use of armed force, their training activities, their interactions with humanitarian actors, and their regulation by supplier states. Taking these together, one gets the sense of the degree that PSCs, their clients, and the states in which they are based have or have not embraced their human security responsibilities as laid out by the universal and cosmopolitan character of human security. Second, it suggests avenues one might pursue in terms of future research endeavours. Attention is placed on the continued need to consider ongoing regulatory endeavours and the different ways PSCs might be employed in the future. Three, it considers the implications of the events of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath upon the PSC industry. 12 E N D N O T E S F O R C H A P T E R O N E 1. Though this study does not use the term "Private Military Company" or PMC, it does recognize its presence in the literature. For a further expansion, see the terminology section in the following chapter. 2. Organized force refers to entities that possess, or are thought to possess, expertise in the management and application of violence. 3. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Translated by A . M . Henderson and Talcott Parsons. New York: Free Press, 1947; Robert Dahl, Modern political analysis. Fourth Edition. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1984; Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism. Volume 2, The Nation-State and Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 4. Note that this study is limited to a focus upon human security considerations. While intriguing topics, this study does not consider how PSCs might fit into traditional security studies themes such as balance of power. Also, the study recognizes not only that the exact dimensions of what constitutes human security are variable, but that human security sits alongside the more traditional schools of thought in security studies. While human security is now a legitimate paradigm within the security literature, it has not displaced other approaches. For a snapshot of the various human security viewpoints, see Fen Osier Hampson, Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002. Arguments that dispute the benefits and value of the human security approach include William W. Bain, "Against Crusading: The Ethic of Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy," Canadian Foreign Policy 6 (Spring 1999), pp. 85-98; William W. Bain, "National Security, Human Security, and the Practise of Statecraft in International Society." Paper Presented at the Conference on Global Governance and Failed States, sponsored by Purdue University, Florence, Italy, 6-10 April 2000; Barry Buzan, "Human Security in International Perspective," in Mely C. Anthony and Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, eds., The Asia Pacific in the New Millennium: Political and Security Challenges. Kuala Lumpur: ISIS Malaysia, pp. 583-596. As human security finds its contemporary intellectual home in critical security studies, criticism of this school of thought should also be noted. See, for instance, Mohammed Ayoob, "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective," in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, pp. 121-146 Stephen M . Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," International Studies Quarterly 35 (June 1991), pp. 211-239. 5. This is a point made in Emma Rothschild, "What is Security?" Daedalus 124 (Summer 1995), pp. 53-98. 13 6. David Shearer, "Privatising Protection: Military Companies and Human Security," World Today - The Royal Institute of International Affairs (August/September 2001), ( 7. Note that in 2000 a wide range of newspapers from around the world published a series of arguments and analyses as to the appropriateness and even to the necessity of employing the PSC alternative. The igniting sparks for this outburst were the chaos which befell the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in spring 2000 and the problems encountered by the United Nations Observer Mission in the Congo (MONUC). See, for instance, the following newspaper articles, editorials, and op-ed pieces: Peter Fabricius, "Stop Havoc. Let Loose the Dogs of War," Johannesburg Star (12 May 2000), (; Frederick Forsyth, "Send in The Mercenaries," Wall Street Journal (15 May 2000), (; Marcus Gee, "Mercenaries cheaper, faster," Globe and Mail (12 May 2000), (; Christina Lamb and Philip Sherwell, "Sandline boss blames Blair for carnage in Sierra Leone," Sunday Telegraph (14 May 2000), (; Paul Lashmar, "Peace mission reopens mercenary debate," The Independent (16 May 2000), (; "Not all the world's messes can be sorted out by sending in the Blue Berets," Wall Street Journal (11 May 2000), (; Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, "Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone Could Be Privatized," Washington Post (15 May 2000), (; William Shawcross, "Send in the mercenaries if our troops won't fight," The Guardian (10 May 2000), ( In 2001, Gareth Evans, the former Australian Foreign Minister and now head of the International Crisis Group, asserted that non-state forces may be useful for some peacekeeping and enforcement operations. Paul Daley, "Evans sees positive role for mercenaries," Sydney Morning Herald (5 March 2001), ( In 2002, Jack Straw, the current Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, commented that a strong and reputable private security sector could have an important role in helping the United Nations respond to international crises promptly and effectively. United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation 2001-02." London: Stationery Office, 12 February 2002, p. 4. 8. Kevin O'Brien, "Privatizing Security, Privatizing War? The New Warrior Class and Regional Security," in Paul B. Rich, ed., Warlords in International Relations. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1999, pp. 76-77. 9. This is something one notes in a reading of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect; Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001. 10. These questions can be found in David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," Review of International Studies 23 (January 1997), p. 6, pp. 13-17. 14 11. Others argue that more the importance of market oriented regulation and accountability. See, for instance, Jeffrey Herbst, "The Regulation of Private Security Forces," in Greg Mills and John Stremlau, Eds. The Privatisation of Security in Africa. Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs, 1999, pp. 107-127; Kim Richard Nossal, "Global Governance and National Interests: Regulating Transnational Security Corporations in the Post-Cold War Era," Melbourne Journal of International Law 2 (October 2001), pp. 459- 476. Note, however, that these authors were not concerning themselves directly with the issue of human security. 12. In particular, note that in Chapter 5, Executive Outcomes went out of business due to cash flow problems stemming from its contract in Sierra Leone. In this regard, Executive Outcomes cannot be seen as the sharp end of recolonization and corporate dominance feared by some as monies leading for the PSCs continued operations would surely have been forthcoming. 13. The fact that the implications of PSCs go beyond those of normal commercial transactions is identified in Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Private Military Companies," p. 20. 15 CHAPTER TWO - State of the Industry, State of the Literature 2.1 Introduction This chapter provides the methodological justifications for the study and, in doing so, examines the current state of the PSC industry and the current state of the literature on the subject. There are several key questions. Why were these particular firms, cases, and clients chosen? Also, what themes or issues are stressed in the literature on PSCs? In what ways does this study contribute to knowledge on this largely post-Cold War phenomenon? How was the information collected in order to make a human security assessment of the PSC industry? By providing the answers to these questions, this chapter not only situates the study in a larger body of literature, it also provides an outline of the contemporary industry. To make this presentation, the chapter first offers a description of the industry and a point on terminology. It then focusses upon the reasons why the various PSCs, cases, and clients were selected, and, finally, it considers the current state of the literature and this study's contribution to it. A general point underlying this chapter is that while the PSC industry may be somewhat nebulous, this study, through its selection of cases, clients, and companies, has endeavoured to clarify to the greatest degree possible the phenomenon under consideration. 2.2 Services Offered by PSCs The international PSC is a corporate body with expertise in organized force garnered through the previous military service of its personnel that offers its services overseas. In other words, it is a company that sells internationally policing and military 16 services to a variety of state and non-state clients.1 While PSC contracts may come with stipulations for the purchases of arms and equipment, PSCs do not represent a certain manufacturer of these products. Also, while firms may overlap in the types of services they provide in any given contract and not all firms offer all services, and, as this study will show, not all services are provided to all clients, the different services can, nevertheless, be placed in three categories. One type of service is advice and assessment. State and non-state clients alike often wish assistance in their procurement strategies or an outside assessment or audit of current practices and procedures. A second type of service is training, which itself can be divided into two levels. On one level, PSCs offer training at the staff level for state-security sectors. This deals with such things as the organization of forces, the development of Western-style civil-military relations, and the enhancement of leadership and strategic capabilities of senior commanders. On another level, PSC training also pertains to the provision of expertise in a more active hands-on manner. For state clients, this refers to the actual training of soldiers in tactics and in the use of military equipment. For non-state clients, it refers to the development of procedures and security awareness. And finally, a third type of service is the actual presence of PSC personnel in the direct service of their client's endeavours. An example is the operation of specialized pieces of equipment or the application of certain skills in the field not readily held by the employer. The list of examples also includes protection/guarding for a wide range of clients: embassies, commercial producers of goods and services, and humanitarian organizations. And finally, some firms offer their clients, specifically states, personnel for active combat engagements. Here the PSCs 17 provide logistics, intelligence, communications, and in some cases, they "pull the trigger". Past operations have taken place on the ground and in the air and some firms even advertise a competency in water-based activities. 2.3 Comment on Terminology It is important to note that this study employs the term "private security company", or PSC, to designate the main actor of concern. Other literature dealing with this type of mercenary activity often instead uses the term "private military company" (PMC). This term is used either to denote generally all the international firms that together form the post-Cold War marketplace or to identity specifically those companies that provide their clients with combat capabilities. Nonetheless, the term PSC, rather than PMC, is employed here for a variety of reasons. First, as Kim Richard Nossal rightly recognizes, all the companies "are in the business of providing security" (italics in original).2 Put differently, the end goal in all cases is for the company's activities to make something or someone more secure. Second, it is true that some firms provide services which are more military in orientation while others concern themselves with protection and more passive duties that are the realm of the police and commercial security. But there is considerable overlap as companies frequently provide both military and non-military services. Third, of particular and prominent interest for this study, is the interaction between companies and the security sectors of states. As the military is but one actor that constitutes this sector and is often deployed in internal operations in many countries, thus integrating it into domestic security matters, it is fitting that a 18 similar approach be used when referring to private actors in this context. Indeed, PSCs provide services related to both policing and military functions. Finally, this study is not alone in using the term PSCs. Other analysts have recognized the importance of employing this term in their descriptions of this phenomenon.3 The term PSC, therefore, is not only recognized, it also takes into account the full scope of these companies' operations, the objectives of their usage, and the conditions and situations in which they are applied. 2.4 Problems in Assessing the Size and Scale of the PSC Industry This study recognizes that it is somewhat difficult to determine the expanse of the industry. Indeed, the problems in determining an exact value or an exact number of firms go beyond the usual difficulties of coming to terms with mergers, closures, and new actors entering the industry either as start-ups or through a diversification of product offerings. Rather the problem exists because, as clear in the work of Peter Singer, PSCs are difficult to differentiate within the larger trend of the private sale of security expertise overseas.4 For instance, a general statistic often cited in the literature is one generated by the Equitable Services Corporation. Its evaluations indicate that the growth of PSCs is a contributing factor in the expansion of a much wider global international security market that is expected to rise in value from US$55.6 billion to US$202 billion by 2010.5 Similarly, PSCs were amalgamated into the Pittsburgh Post Gazette's contention in February 2000 that private security providers with publicly traded stocks grew at twice the rate of the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the 1990s.6 Given the nature of these 19 observations, the depth of the PSC industry remains unclear.7 It is evident, as the following chapter will describe, that though PSCs are based largely in the developed world, they do have a worldwide presence in terms of their home states or bases of operations. Security-sector downsizing with the end of the Cold War created a bulk of excess manpower in states ranging from Canada to Zimbabwe that led to the development of the PSC industry as it stands today. Yet, the actual numbers of firms are unknown, even in developed states. This lack of certainty applies even to those seemingly engaged in the field: academics, government analysts, and PSC personnel themselves. For example, none of the wide variety of witnesses appearing before the United Kingdom's 2002 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee meetings on the subject of privatized security was willing to state conclusively how many PSCs had their base of operation in the United Kingdom.8 There are several reasons why the PSC has been lumped into wider categories and, in a partially related way, why the qualitative boundaries of the PSC industry are indistinct, a factor which contributes to the lack of quantitative exactitude.9 These reasons are in addition to the general uncertainty arising from the simple newness of the actor. Flexibility, for instance, in descriptive criteria and changes in contemporary security sectors lead to an inability to devise an exact count. Commercial security companies that at one time offered their services domestically have increasingly developed an international business posture. Companies like the Pinkerton Organization, the Wackenhut Corporation, and the Securicor Group now employ thousands worldwide and offer clients a variety of security services (e.g., guarding, cash transportation, and 20 alarm installment and monitoring).10 Also, from one standpoint, these firms are sometimes confused with PSCs even though they do not offer services which are military in nature and their expertise is not rooted in military matters. Confusion exists because though PSCs are more military oriented, they, or their subsidiaries with which they often share personnel and managerial staff, frequently perform policing duties similar to those of commercial firms. A further complication is that PSCs often operate in countries, particularly in the developing world, where the distinction between policing and military functions is unclear. From another standpoint, the non-military distinction for commercial security companies has also been somewhat fluid. Though it is an example from an earlier time, during the American Civil War the federal government employed Allen Pinkerton and his company as a secret service to counter Confederate espionage and to provide intelligence.11 Hence, the facts that PSCs provide services linked to policing and military activities and that the operations of commercial security firms have taken on international and sometimes even military characteristics together have served to make a numerical estimations problematic. Another factor making this estimation difficult is the increased blurring of the line between the accepted use of non-soldiers in military activities and the more controversial use of mercenaries.12 There are documented cases, dating back to the 1500s, of civilians providing the logistics requirements of armies: maintenance, supply, and transportation.13 Over time, civilians organized themselves into commercial structures in order to provide these requirements and take advantage of the economic opportunities posed by war. Though the fulfilment of logistical requirements is 21 obviously essential for successful military operations, civilian contractors developed a i status different from armed combatants. These civilians are permitted to be on the battlefield to the degree that they receive special mention and protections in Hague Law and the Geneva Conventions. However, in recent years, firms that provide logistic services have become more crucial to the success of operations as a high degree of technical expertise is needed to operate modern weapons systems. Because these firms are active in the field, given the lack of organic capacity in a state military, they are increasingly taking on attributes that might be deemed as combat-oriented. Similarly, the scale of the logistic contribution in other fields is such that this type of firm is becoming indispensable for military operations, thus blurring the line even more.14 Finally, yet another problem limiting the ability to differentiate is that many PSCs themselves offer clients logistics assistance, either by itself or in a combination of other services. In sum, the evolution of the once benign field of military logistics and the participation of both PSCs and other companies in this field collectively prevent definitive classification. 2.5 About This Study - Company Selection The text above is meant to focus, to the greatest extent possible, upon the phenomenon that is under examination for this study - the PSC. However, the lack of absolute certainty regarding the PSC industry needs to be noted in the first instance, a matter reflected in the general inability to determine the overall value and size of the PSC industry. Yet a human security assessment, rather than sorting out exactly what is or is not a PSC, is the primary task of this study. Therefore, the PSCs analyzed in great 22 depth in this study, EO, Sandline International, DSL, and MPRI, have been selected because they are all firms that are well-known and definite PSCs. 2.6 Location/Hubs of the Industry Though, as mentioned above, the PSC industry is a global phenomenon with numerous home states where firms are based, it does feature what have been described as "hub states"; the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of South Africa. 1 5 While, again, it is difficult to determine the exact number of firms based in these states, it is clear, for instance, that the firms in these countries receive the most press attention and their operations have been more numerous and of a larger scale. The caveat is that although there are a number of potential reasons why these states have received hub status, it is important to note that none is conclusive in the sense that they apply only to these three states, or that they are uniform amongst the three states, or that they are important to the same degree in the three states. One possible variable, then, is the shared language of English. A further variable may be the longstanding tradition of the United Kingdom and South Africa as suppliers of mercenaries, whatever their type.16 Another matter may be that as many countries wish to upgrade their armed forces to the standards of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in anticipation of membership, purchasing services from a PSC based in a N A T O country seems appropriate. Also, some clients may think that hiring a firm from a certain country provides it with links to that particular government; in this matter, the United States and the United Kingdom are two prominent international powers while 23 South African is a regional power. Additionally, other clients may feel that they are buying the proven expertise of a country if they purchase the services of particular firms with former military personnel filling the firms' ranks. Thus, the numerous international activities and muscular policies of South Africa in the 1980s and of the United States and the United Kingdom in the 1990s serve as good advertisements. Also, while somewhat lessened by the levelling factors of global communications and transportation, South Africa specifically has the advantage of being located near potential clients, developing states in Africa, and relatedly of having the distinction of being "African". In this vein, the United Kingdom has its colonial ties and the United States has had a considerable military presence the world-over during the past half century. While these variables may be plausible reasons, their actual weight is uncertain. One can equally make only observations rather than definitive determinations about why other countries have not attained the status of hub state. For example, Russia, aside from aspects like language and the lack of N A T O membership, would seemingly be a likely hub. Its security sector experienced considerable downsizing at the end of the Cold War, many individuals have military experience due to national service requirements, and many security-sector officials with high levels of expertise face the prospect of continued low pay in comparison with what can be earned in the private sector. However, Russian PSCs do not have the same international presence.17 This may be because, during Soviet times, there was not a strong "mercenary" tradition given the dominance of the state and Cold War restrictions on movement. The market may be limited for Russian firms due to potential tinges of failure in the minds of potential 24 clients resulting from the end of the Cold War. Similarly, the prowess and power displayed by former Cold War adversaries in conflicts such as the Persian Gulf War may lead to unfavourable comparisons with contemporary Russian operations in places such as Chechnya. Finally, the size of the domestic security industry may be such that Russians with minimal start-up funds or with an eye to lucrative opportunities are choosing to concentrate their efforts within Russia's borders. One estimation is that since the end of the Cold War, 9,000 private security firms have been formed in Russia comprising approximately 115,000 individuals. Others have calculated that the ratio for those employed in private security compared with public security stands at 10:1.18 In sum, while perceptions and approaches may change with time, Russia is not as prominent a player when compared with other states.19 2.7 About This Study - Home State Selection The specific cases of this study centre upon PSCs based in each of the three main home or hub states: EO (South Africa), Sandline International and DSL (United Kingdom), and MPRI (United States). Because of the size of the industry supported by these states, analysts and policymakers alike from these states are engaged in matters regarding PSCs to a high degree. Thus, the quality of their insights and contributions, let alone the sheer volume of these considerations, proved to be invaluable in the production of this dissertation. Also, by dealing with a number of home states, and specifically with the hub states, the study was able to look at the different ways in which different states with particular interests concerning the PSC industry structure their interactions with 25 their "own" PSCs through regulation. In total, while the previous section makes the case that non-marginal companies were selected for analysis, the assertion here is that the selection of non-marginal home countries was also of importance. 2.8 About This Study - Case Selection In this study, the recipient states or the states in which PSCs have offered their services can generally be described as weak states. Weakness here does not refer simply to calculations of power in terms of military or economic strength. Similarly, weakness, in this respect, does not refer to the division of powers between executive, legislative, and judicial state actors, a matter of analysis in comparative politics. Instead, weakness refers to a combination of factors, or lack thereof, identified by Barry Buzan: the physical basis, the institutional expression, and the idea and legitimacy of the state.20 Generally, most states, weak ones included, have a physical basis, meaning that they have borders, populations, and an international presence through United Nations membership and diplomatic representation. Weak states, however, often rate poorly in terms of their institutional expression. They may not have the capacity to create and run governmental institutions and agencies in an effective and responsible way. In fact, some governments may not want them to run in an effective or responsible way and rather wish them to serve the particular and discriminatory interests of the governing elite. This in turn has an impact upon the idea of the state amongst the populace. If the state cannot provide for the citizenry, if the government in charge cannot or will not use the levers of the state appropriately, then this will affect the legitimacy of both the government and even the 26 utility of the state itself. Emphasis is placed in this study upon weak states as an operational environment for PSCs partially by default and partially by design. O n the matter o f default, strong states, meaning largely those o f the developed world, generally have security sectors with considerable resources and they have substantial control over the activities o f security sector actors. Issues o f downsizing aside, this, as a result, does not necessitate the need for PSCs to be operating within the borders of these states. While PSCs may have a domestic presence within their own home states or within other strong states, their tasks are not frontline; they are generally limited to advisory roles and administrative undertakings. What is more, the civil-military divide common in the developed world also precludes a robust domestic presence. Therefore, i f strong states are to use PSCs as a frontline vehicle for policy, then generally the firms w i l l mostly likely be operating overseas in the weak state context. A s a result, the cases where PSCs have operated within the weak state environment are much more plentiful. Also, on the matter of design, the involvement of PSCs in weak states is much more interesting in terms of the promotion of human security for four reasons. First, in these situations there is a perceived need because one aspect of a state's institutional expression, its security sector, lacks the w i l l and/or the capacity to tackle the problems associated with weak statism. To reiterate, security-sector actors and the governing officials that guide them often, intentionally or unintentionally, bring about these problems. A s the human security o f the citizenry is threatened by these problems, this has an impact upon the legitimacy citizens accord their political leaders and the state 27 apparatus which they direct. Therefore, it is interesting to see how PSCs act in this weak state context and whether or not their activities will mitigate human security ills and thus, perhaps promote the strengthening of the state. This applies to situations where PSCs have been hired by state clients. Second, the consideration of weak states allows for an examination of instances where non-state actors such as humanitarian organizations have hired PSCs in order to facilitate their response to the negative human security effects frequently brought on by weak statism. Indeed, outside of the world wars and extreme natural disasters, humanitarian organizations have generally not responded to problems within strong states. Third, an examination pertaining to weak states presents a rich variety as different political-security milieus are evident. Studies have been made which outline the attributes of various kind of weak states.21 For this study, one sees the case of Bosnia, a new country in the process of (re)structuring itself following a bloody ethnic conflict. As for Angola and Sierra Leone, they were two states that were in the midst of civil conflicts when PSC services were called upon. As for PNG and the variety of African states with ACRI membership, they all possessed characteristics of weakness ranging from poor governance to civil strife. Finally, weak states and the range of phenomena that occur within them also allow for a display of the different types of services offered by the PSC industry. This ranges from the application of force to the provision of training and expertise to the involvement in humanitarian endeavours such as demining. 28 2.9 About This Study - Human Security Considerations As noted above, the PSC industry provides a range of services to a variety of actors. For instance, many states from the developed world employ the services of PSCs to guard their embassies and other diplomatic offices in unstable countries. Also in this same environment, international corporations, particularly in the field of resource extraction, use PSCs for security assessment and protection in order to guard their property, their fixed assets, their equipment, and their personnel. This study, however, purposely focuses primarily upon PSC interaction with the security sectors of states and with humanitarian organizations. This is not to say that PSC interaction with other types of clients will not have a human security impact or that the issues of social responsibility and corporate citizenship for extraction companies are moot.22 Certainly, as stressed at the outset, the provision of a human security assessment is the goal of this study and the promotion of human security is a "diffused responsibility", meaning it is a responsibility for all. But how and under what conditions PSCs interact with state-security sectors and humanitarian organizations are of particular importance because unlike other recipients of PSC expertise, it is more common in the first instance for these entities to be seen as, and expected to be, key players in the promotion of human security.23 In this regard, the study focuses upon concrete examples in which PSCs have provided services or interacted with these kinds of clients. In other words, attention is directed at how PSCs have operated in the past in order to reveal the potential and real positive and negative aspects of their activities and, with this evidence in hand, to best take into account factors that might lead to a mitigation of the negative effects. 2 9 Therefore, emphasis is not placed upon advertising why PSCs should be used and for what purposes, either as stand-alone service providers, or through integration into larger endeavours. For instance, while there is the assertion that PSCs may be used as "private peacekeepers", this prospect is not investigated here because this activity has not occurred.24 Instead, while this study's examples may have some characteristics similar to United Nations peacekeeping, key is the fact that PSCs have actually interacted with actors, state-security sectors and humanitarian organizations, seemingly engaged in the promotion of human security. 2.10 About This Study - The PSC and Traditional Theory The reader will note that the dissertation does not view the PSC phenomenon through the lens of traditional international relations theory. While the long-time dominant school of thought, realism/neorealism, is mentioned in Chapter Four, this is done only to juxtapose the realist-informed national security paradigm alongside the human security paradigm. Additionally, the lack of reference to the dominant school of thought is due to its inherent inability to incorporate into its purview non-state actors like PSCs and the context in which they operate. Specifically, one reason for the dominant school's "theoretical" blind-spot is because realists and neorealists focus much of their attention upon states, and, in particular, upon the great powers. As well, non-state actors, for these analysts, are of a lesser importance and are seemingly only relevant to matters of "low politics", namely non-security affairs. PSCs, however, are non-state actors with expertise 30 in the management of violence, a "high politics" matter, and their effects are mostly felt in the developing world context.25 A second reason is that this school of thought is wedded to Weberian notions of the state. In other words, traditional theorists expect that the state possesses the monopoly over the legitimate use of force; the state is able to suppress, or at least control, all private forms of violence. This approach is evident, for example, in the work of Kenneth Waltz who asserts that a state "has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and legitimate here means that public agents are organized to prevent and to counter the private use of force".26 Thus, followers of the dominant school do not concern themselves with how this monopoly is produced, nor do they acknowledge that their approach is representative of a reified conception of the state, one that does not take into account the historical variance of the state's relationship to violence.27 Yet, as we shall see, these are all important matters concerning the rise and importance of the PSC phenomenon. The final, and related, reason is that the dominant school largely concerns itself only with interstate affairs.28 As such, it does not possess a theory of the state. This, however, is a critical omission because much of the strife in the world today can be linked to the weakness of state structures. Certainly, it is within this milieu that PSCs ply their trade. In short, these three reasons expose the dominant school's lack of applicability to contemporary security matters and to contemporary non-state actors such as the PSC. 31 2.11 About This Study - Approach Towards Data Collection To facilitate the collection of evidence, the study relies upon a number of different sources. Analysis is made of primary documents concerning the state of domestic and international regulation of PSCs and attitudes towards the firms. Also, as mercenarism, whatever its form, is generally both a colourful and controversial issue, the study takes advantage of insights generated in numerous media reports issued over the past decade. In addition, in order to make a human security assessment of PSCs, the study takes into account the evidence and arguments presented in secondary academic sources. The array of viewpoints and matters of concern in this collective body of work is noted in the following section. Finally, over the development of this study, the author relied upon material gathered through interaction, interviews, and correspondence with stakeholders and those with expertise regarding the PSC industry: PSCs, NGOs, and government officials. Note that because of the sensitivity of the subject matter and some concerns regarding propriety information, interviews were mostly granted on the condition of total anonymity. The wishes of these individuals have been followed and the cases in which consent for recognition was granted are identified in the endnotes. 2.12 Issues and Themes Even though the PSC is a relatively new phenomenon, a group of analysts has produced reports and academic analyses on the subject. It is possible to identify and then categorize the issues and themes that are presented in this literature. There are six main categories in which to place these efforts: descriptive/developmental projects; individual 32 case studies; privatization trends in security; cost-effectiveness and economic analyses; exploitation, development, and the global economy relationships; and regulation and accountability matters.29 Descriptive/developmental projects form a large portion of the work on the subject and generally consider the international supply and demand factors that led to the development of the PSC industry, its growth, and its perpetuation. Within this category, one sub-division can be made. One camp consists of studies that examine these factors on their own in order to indicate how the PSC rose to be a matter of attention.30 The other camp consists of studies that additionally place the PSC in the larger and longer running historical patterns of mercenarism.31 This latter body of work serves to draw out the similarities and differences that both identify PSC activity as mercenal and make clear the PSCs distinguishing characteristics within this larger "family". After descriptive/developmental projects, case studies represent a significant segment of the work on PSCs. 3 2 In some instances, the focus is upon a particular company, in others it is upon a certain country or conflict, and in additional ones it is a combination of these. The studies deal with a number of issues: the particular demand factors leading to the employment of the PSC, the conditions in the client state before, during, and after the PSC presence, the contractual goals of the PSCs and the means used to attain those goals, and the relationships the PSC had or developed with other actors during the course of the contract (i.e. security-sector actors, foreign governments, international organizations, mining/extraction companies, humanitarian organizations). More often than not, these examinations have an emphasis on Africa, a not surprising 33 fact given that a good deal of PSC activity occurs in Africa and it was the continent in which E O engaged in its most publicized operations. Viewpoints put forth in these case studies range from support to a listing of positives and negatives to outright hostility. With respect to the latter point, this hostility either is based upon the actions of the PSC itself or, more often, is rooted in the pejorative notions pertaining to mercenarism and developed largely in response to the conduct of soldiers of fortune during the previous century. In this way, the case studies, when collected and assessed together, present a depth of information and opinion related to country specific conditions and PSC activity. A section of the literature also exists that places the PSC in the larger examination and debates on the "destating" or the privatization of security.33 This body of work suggests a reversal or a degradation of the notion based in Weberian thought that the state is to have the monopoly on the legitimate use of force.34 The Weberian ideals have come to be seen as pertinent both within and beyond state borders.35 Yet today this literature suggests that such ideas are no longer a given, especially in the weak state developing world or post-Communist context. The other actors and activities that contribute to the trend of destating are several: the rise of warlord activity and its comparison with that of earlier times (i.e. pre-Communist China), the use of national armies for private political and economic purposes, the increase in mafia-like and vigilante activity, and the creation of private armies/parallel forces by state leaders.36 PSCs specifically are somewhat of an anomaly in this trend; they are foreign based and operate abroad, whereas most of the "privatized" actors have sprung from and manifest themselves within states.37 Another difference is that PSCs are incorporated into the 34 ideas of "privatization" in the traditional sense, the passing of public responsibility into private hands, albeit seemingly under the guidance and direction of state officials, in return for financial remuneration. As for the other types of phenomena, legal or governmental sanction are somewhat slight or more tenuous. This body of work looks at arguments of how, from one angle, PSCs promote "destating" and exacerbate the situation either by complementing the activities of other privatized actors or by combatting them. The alternative angle also informed by this literature is that PSCs, though private actors, may instead help to reverse the trend of destating and help the state regain its monopoly over violence. Hence, the PSC, in relation to the state's monopoly on violence, is viewed as a catalyst for change; the direction and nature of this change, however, is in dispute. Whereas the destating literature deals largely with the weak state in developing world or post-Communist contexts, the volume of work falling under the category of cost-effectiveness and economic analyses pertains mostly to changes in developed world states.38 Furthermore, whereas the descriptive/developmental category consi