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A script theory of intentional content Guirguis, Mazen Maurice 2003

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A Script Theory of Intentional Content  Mazen Maurice Guirguis M. A.. I inivorsity of Waterloo. 1995  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL F U L F I L L M E N T O F T H E REQUIREMENTS OFT H E D E G R E E OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  itt T H E F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES  Department of Philosophy  Wc accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  T H E UNIVERSITY O F BRITISH C O L U M B I A  April 2003  © Mazen Maurice Guirguis  In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment  of the  requirements for an advanced  degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department  or  by his  or  her representatives.  It is  understood  that  copying or  publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  Department The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  DE-6 (2/88)  Abstract  Fred Dretske (1981) claimed that the essence of the kind of cognitive activity that gives rise to Intentional mental states is a process by which the analogue information comingfroma source-object is transformed into digital form. It is this analogue-to-digital conversion of data that enables us to form concepts of things. But this achievement comes with a cost, since the conversion must involve a loss of information. The price we pay for the lost information is a proportional diminishment in our ability to discriminate the source-objectfromothers that may be similar to it. I argue that this fact underlies an important distinction between what a mental state may be about and to what the state may be directed,  Aboutness and directedness are two of four Intentional dimensions on which this project concentrates. The other two are aspectual shape and misrepresentation. The distinction between aboutness and directedness is a part of a proposed approach to Intentionality based on the script theory of Roger Schank and Robert Abelson (1977). Scripts are schemata—organized knowledge structures that guide our understanding of the world around us. Schank and Abelson's basic ideas are extended to yield four different script-types: episodic (related to situations and events), instrumental (related to procedural knowledge), personal (representing an agent's goals and plans), and definitional (involved in objectrecognition). The relationship between scripts and the Intentionality of thought is the main focus of this dissertation. An important secondary concern is the viability of externalism and internalism. It is argued that neither of these attitudes is independently adequate to provide a full account of Intentional content. Rather, the proper approach is to confine externalistic influences to aboutness and then characterize directedness in a manner that captures the world-according-to-the-agent. This strategy is implemented in the following way: aboutness is construed causally-evolutionarily; directedness is constructed with the help of the notion of an equivalence class; aspectual shape is shown to be a function of the kind of information a script provides; and an account of misrepresentation is given by comparing the different extensions generatedfromaboutness and directedness respectively.  ii  Table of Contents  Abstract  11  Table of Contents  n i  List of Tables  v i i  List of Figures Acknowledgements  bt  Dedication  x  I  Introduction Project Purpose and Scope  •  1.1 Intentionality and its Significance 1.2 Intentional Instrumentalism i. Carnap ii. Quine iii. Dennett iv. Comments • Inference to the Best Explanation 1.3 Externalism and Internalism 1.4 Objectives 1.5 Overview n  1  1 3 3 4  5 7  9 1° 12 15  Intentionality An Extended Definition  17  2.1 Two Distinctions i. Intentional States and Mental States ii. Intentional States and Consciousness  17 18 19  2.2 Four Intentional Dimensions i. Aboutness ii. Aspectual Shape iii. Directedness iv. Misrepresentation  20 20 23 25 29  HI Skin, Boundaries and Authority Locating Intentional Content  31  3.1 Background to Externalism 3.2 The Role of the Environment  31 37 iii  i.  Physical Furniture: A d a m and Adam e  3  ii.  Sociolinguistic Conventions: "Arthritis" and "Tharthritis"  39  iii. Causal History: Swampman  40  iv. Evolution: A Matter o f Biofunctional Propriety  41  3.3 Consequences of Externalism  43  i.  Type-Identity Must be Abandoned  ii.  Token-Identity M u s t be Abandoned  43 44  iii. Weak Supervenience Fails  44  iv. Strong Supervenience Fails  44  • Global Supervenience  45  Mind-Brain Reductionist Programs are Out o f Reach  46  v.  vi. Mental Causation is Jeopardized  46  vii. N o Privileged Access to First-Person Mental States  46  3.4 Three Individualist Offerings  49  i.  Fodor  50  ii.  Searle  53  iii. Segal  56  • Natural Kinds and Social Externalism  56  • Two-Factor Accounts  59  • Radical Internalism  60  3.5 Descriptions, Motleys, and Neologisms  IV  7  t  61  Scripts I: Foundation and Structure And a Word About the Game  6 6  4.1 The Game  66  4.2 Conceptual Dependency  69  i.  The Research Methods o f A l and Psychology  69  ii.  The Axioms o f C D  7  iii. Primitive Acts  72  iv. Numeric Values and Scales v.  1  74  Representing Causation  4.3 Scripts: Episodic, Instrumental, Personal  7  4  7  6  i.  Long-Term Memory ( L T M )  79  ii.  Episodic Scripts  8  iii. Instrumental Scripts  0  85  iv. Personal Scripts  89  4.4 Definitional Scripts  9  0  i.  manimate Objects  90  ii.  Animate Objects  92  • Animal Scripts  D  92  • H u m a n Scripts  D  93  • Is There a " M e " Script ?  97  D  4.5 The Basic Structure of Scripts  98  i.  Headers and Primes  99  ii.  Tracks  99  iv  iii. Frames and Default-Values iv. Scripts, Habits, and Roles  V  100 102  Scripts II: Evidence from A l and Psychology 5.1 Computer Task Modelling i.  ii.  104  SAM  105  • • • •  107 109 109 Ill  The English Analyzer and the Script Applier The Summarizer The Question-Answer Mechanism The English Generator  FRUMP  Ill  iii. T A L E S P I N  112  • ELIZA  117  iv. Modelling Cognition  118  5.2 Support from Psychology  119  i. The Semantic-Episodic-Procedural Dissociation in L T M ii. Schemata and Scripts  VI  104  119 123  Thoughts on Physical Implementation And Another Word About the Game  133  6.1 The Informational Origins of Thought  134  6.2 Naturalizing Scripts  138  i. ii. iii. iv.  Object Recognition and Simple Definitional Scripts On the Precarious Existence of Water-Stains Complex Definitional Scripts Scripts , Scriptsi, and Scripts  139 142 144 145  • A Hierarchy of Physical Events  146  E  P  6.3 Priming by Autoassociation i.  149  The Hebb-Marr Model of the Hippocampus  ii. Priming by Description  149 153  6.4 Original Intentionality, Holism, and the Frame Problem  157  6.5 Summary  163  VII A Script for Intentionality  164  7.1 Aboutness, Directedness, and Aspectual Shape i. Intentional Aboutness ii. Intentional Directedness  165 166 168  • Designatory and Indicatory Rigidity • Fictional Objects • Privileged Access iii. Aspectual Shape  170 172 173 174  • Twin-Earth Cases  174 v  • Fregean Cases 7.2 Misrepresentation i. Conditions for Eliminating Script-Based Error ii. Types of Scriptal Misrepresentation • Overgeneralization • Misprimes • Overspecification • Misidentification • Mirages, Optical Illusions, Hallucinations iii. Misrepresenting Hypotheticals 7.3 Consequences for Externalism i. Physical Environment and Linguistic Usage ii. Causal-Evolutionary History • Stalnaker's Externalism • Notional Attitude Psychology • The Problem of Functional Indeterminacy • Back to the Swamp 7.4 Radical Individualism VTA PostScript  176 178 178 180 180 180 181 182 182 182 183 183 187 187 188 189 192 194 196  8.1 Where Have We Been? 8.2 Where Shall We Go?  196 199  Bibliography  2 0  VI  l  List of Tables  Table 4.1  A list of the D-goals used by Schank and Abelson (1977)  87  Table 4.2  A list of the planboxes associated with each of the five D-goals  88  vii  List of Figures  Figure 2.1  Figure 2.2  Figure 4.1  A representation of the relationship between mental states, conscious states, and Intentional states  20  A summary diagram stressing some of the points covered in chapter II  30  A Conceptual Dependency representation of the explicit and implicit causal connections in a script-based story  77  Figure 4.2  A Conceptual Dependency representation of the generic RESTAURANTES  Figure 4.3  An example of a cognitive association between two scripts  95  Figure 4.4  A schematic summary of script theory  103  Figure 5.1  Overview of SAM's Question-Answer mechanism  110  Figure 5.2  Anatomical regions of the brain  120  Figure 5.3  A substructure of "The Czar and His Daughters "  130  Figure 5.4  Examples ofpictures in simple and complex forms as  D  81  used by Pezdek and Chen (1982)  131  Figure 6.1  A representation of the ACQUISITION® hierarchy  148  Figure 6.2  A schematic of an event memory as a pattern of cell activations in the neocortex A representation ofMarr's model of the hippocampus  Figure 6.3  viii  150 152  Acknowledgments  I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of my supervisory committee—Dr. Steve Savitt (Chair), Dr. Paul Bartha, and Dr. Mohan Matthen. Their comments and suggestions have made the final draft of my dissertation much more refined than it would have been otherwise. I am also grateful to Dr. Philip Hanson, who has helped to shape the initial stages of this project. My sincere appreciation must also go to Dr. Manal Guirguis-Younger, Dr. Alastair Younger, Mohab Guirguis, and Michael DeSousa, who all have, in their own way, contributed to my studies. Mohab and Manal have especially been generous with their time, and have lent support and encouragement whenever it was needed. Derek Walker has read every bit of this work and has made many corrections. I am not unmindful of the difficulty of editing a several-hundred page document and am happy to acknowledge his efforts. Finally, I owe much to Wahba Ramzy, my grandfather, who has been there form the very beginning, and who has made himself familiar with every university campus I have ever attended.  IX  CforWyCparenh '^Maurice and J^ai/a Quirguis  I Introduction  Fortunate are they who can perceive the causes of things... but more fortunate still are they who can bloody well perceive what to do about them. Philip J. Davis, Thomas Gray: Philosopher Cat, p. 82.  1.1 Intentionality and its Significance ur lives contain many activities. Some of these activities are non-mental; others are mental. An example of a non-mental activity is opening a door; an example of a mental activity is thinking about opening a door. In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Franz Brentano set out to distinguish mental and physical acts, and to devise a proper method of investigating the former. He first considered the following proposal: It would be possible for us to characterize physical phenomena easily and exactly in contrast to mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which appear extended and localized in space. Mental phenomena would then be definable with equal exactness as those phenomena which do not have extension or spatial location. (1874:84)  1  Brentano was not wholly satisfied with this analysis, however. His chosen distinction was that, unlike physical phenomena, "every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself (1874: 88). He called this "something" the Intentional in-existence of an object. As a preliminary formulation, then, we might say that Intentionality is that property of some mental states by which these states are represented as being directed toward, or about, or of objects, events, or states of affairs. The difference between Intentional aboutness and Intentional directedness is a crucial one, and will be discussed in some detail in the next chapter. For now, we just note that any mental state with an Intentional character takes something specifiable as its object. I interpret "Intentional object"—or simply, "object"—broadly to include living organisms, inanimate items, events, states of affair, etc. If, for example, I have a belief, it must be a belief that such-and-such is (was, will be) the case; if I have a fear, it must be a fear of something, someone, or some circumstance; if I have a desire, it must be a desire for someone, something, or that some event should come to pass. And so on through a large number of cases. 2  1  In Principles of Philosophy, Descartes goes as far as equating material objects with extension or space. "The nature of  body," he claims, "consists not in weight, hardness, colour, or the like, but simply in extension" (II: 4); and a little later, "there is no real difference between space and corporeal substance" (II: 11). One thing should be noted immediately: "intending" and "intentions" in the sense of someone planning to take a certain action, or the road to hell being paved with good intentions, is just one among many types of mental states that are  2  1  Chapter I  Introduction: Project Purpose and Scope  2  This initial definition suggests that at least some mental acts—such as those involved in believing, fearing, desiring, and deciding—depend on a subject matter or content. Hence one cannot decide unless one has some content to decide upon; one cannot believe or desire unless there is something to believe or desire. Brentano was not only aware of this fact, but took it as the basis for differentiating the mental and the physical realms. Yet the exact nature of the content in question— what it means for a psychological state to have a subject matter—has been elusive. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that contemporary philosophy of mind has been preoccupied with delineating what Intentional content amounts to, without achieving much consensus on the matter. The quest for an adequate theory of Intentionality is not just a popular pursuit; it is a vitally important one. And indeed, much of the literature on the topic has an unmistakable tone of urgency to it. Thus Jerry Fodor tells us that producing a naturalistic theory of Intentionality is an essential step in vindicating common-sense psychology, for "if common sense Intentional psychology really were to collapse, that would be, beyond comparison, the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of our species" (1987a: xii). Fred Dretske, speaking more broadly of the special insight people seem to have into why they do the things they do, claims that to give up such authority would be to "relinquish a conception of ourselves as human agents. This is something that we ... will not soon give up" (1988a: x). These are harsh warnings, indeed. Why all the fuss? There are many reasons why people might want a theory of Intentionality, but among these various motives one stands out: concern about irrealism with respect to the mental has been a central theme in the philosophy of mind, and producing an adequate theory of Intentionality is seen to be a crucial step in the debate. Fodor claims that for many people the most worrisome fact about Intentionality is its ontological oddness: [T]he deepest motivation for Intentional irrealism derives not from ... relatively technical worries about individualism and holism ... but rather from a certain ontological intuition: that there is no place for Intentional categories in a physicalistic view of the world; that the Intentional can't be naturalized. (1987a: 97)  We are nothing more than physical creatures, and this simple fact raises a genuine problem for Brentano's enterprise. His thesis—which Dennett (1978: xvii) calls the "workhorse" of the philosophy of mind—alleges that while all mental phenomena are Intentional, no physical phenomenon exhibits that property. This has been traditionally taken to be an irreducibility hypothesis: the mental, in virtue of its Intentionality, cannot be reduced to the physical. But now consider: if mental states are just certain sorts of activities occurring in certain kinds of brains, then a mental act is no more than a physical act, and one of much the same type as that involved in opening a door, sneezing, or swallowing a bit of beef. Brentano's "Intentional inexistence"—the basis of his mind-body division—turns out to be as much a physical property as mass, volume, and heat conductivity. Since only some physical states are "Intentionally blessed," as one might say, the problem now shifts from separating mind and body to producing a theory of what makes certain physical (e.g., brain) states Intentional. In the above citation, Fodor is expressing what has come to be known as the ontological problem. More generally, he is expressing concerns regarding the success of post-Darwinian reductive approaches to the mind, and about what a failed reduction of Intentionality might entail for the integrity of folk psychology.  characteristically Intentional. "Intentionality" in its more common usage ought not be confused with the technical sense we are employing here. In order to distinguish the technical sense from the ordinary sense, I shall follow Searle's convention of capitalizing the technical occurrences throughout this work (including quoted passages).  Chapter I  Introduction: Project Purpose and Scope  3  What makes the ontological problem unsettling is that we do know one possible consequence of an unsuccessful reduction: folk psychology might be declared a false theory, a relic of an old, unsophisticated conception of the mind, retainable only for the sake of convenience. Instrumentalist arguments of this kind have already been proposed, most famously by Rudolf Camap, W. V. O. Quine, and Daniel Dennett. To get a better idea of what mental realists are up against, a small detour to consider such views seems warranted.  1.2 Intentional Instrumentalism According to William Lyons, "to suggest... that the new reductionist approaches to Intentionality ... were simply the result of the behaviourist victories over Cartesianism in both philosophy and psychology would be an oversimplification ... At least as important as the rise of modern behaviourism was the retooling of nineteenth-century positivism by the Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle" (1995: 9). Positivism is the doctrine that the only genuine empirical knowledge is scientific knowledge, and the only genuine means of gaining knowledge is the scientific method of producing and testing causal hypothesis by means of observation and experimentation. Positivism was thus a "hymn to natural science," extolling it as the sole repository of facts, while, at the same time, repudiating metaphysics and all its works. The logical positivists were the obvious offspring of this movement. An important part of what was new to this logical version of positivism was its belief that logic was the chief tool of philosophy, just as mathematics was the chief tool of science; and the idea that the task of philosophy was to work on the logical and conceptual foundations of science. This task was held to comprise the reduction of the language of the human sciences to the language of physics. With respect to psychology, the sought reduction entails the translation of folk psychological language into physical language: initially into neurophysiological or behavioural language, but with the expectation that ultimately it would be possible to translate neurophysiological statements and statements about behaviour into statements couched in the language of physics. One of the central figures involved in this program was Rudolf Camap. i. Carnap  In "Psychology in Physical Language," one of Carnap's background doctrines is that any true science must ultimately be expressible in physical language, for only a language made up of terms for observable objects, properties, and events will be truly universal and intersubjective, and so truly scientific. Because (strictly speaking) there are only physical events, only statements about physical events could be literally true or false. In the context of psychology, this means that in the absence of a mature neurophysiology, we must fall back on behaviouristic physical idioms. As Camap (1933: 165) put it, "all sentences of psychology describe physical occurrences, namely, the physical behaviour of humans and other animals. This is a sub-thesis of the general thesis of physicalism to the effect that physical language is a universal language, that is, a language into which every sentence may be translated." 3  Interestingly, Carnap's outlook did not start out that way. He initially sought to reduce all knowledge to what he called phenomenalistic language: "I believed that the task of philosophy consists in reducing all knowledge to a basis of certainty. Since the most certain knowledge is that of the immediately given, whereas knowledge of material things is derivative and less certain, it seemed that the philosopher must employ a language which uses sense-data as a basis. In the Vienna discussions my attitude changed gradually toward a preference for the physicalistic language" (1963: 50). 3  Chapter I  Introduction: Project Purpose and Scope  4  Carnap does not demand that psychology reformulate each of its sentences in physical terminology. On the contrary, he encourages psychologists to use whatever vocabulary they like, just as long as the production of definitions through which psychological language is linked to physical language is possible. In this case, the generalized sentences of psychology would be translata6/e into physical vocabulary, and the laws of psychology would be physical laws. So, "now it is proposed that psychology, which has hitherto been robed in majesty as the theory of spiritual events, be downgraded to the status of part of physics" (1933: 168). 4  Carnap was setting an agenda for philosophical psychology in which only questions of language would be featured. Viewed through an even more widely angled lens, Carnap was suggesting that traditional philosophy rid itself of all metaphysics and concentrate fully on the logical analysis of the language of science (1932: 60-1). ii. Quine  While Carnap did not leave an account of Intentionality as such, his views on how philosophical psychology ought to proceed had significant impact on modern discussions of the subject. Among the many who were influenced by Carnap was W. V. 0. Quine. Even though Quine has never embraced the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle—and in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" has expressly rejected the analytic-synthetic distinction embedded in the logical positivists' verification principle^—Quine's view of psychology is surprisingly close to Carnap's. Like Carnap, Quine believes that physics is the fundamental science, and only what is sanctioned by physics is part of the true and ultimate structure of reality. Quine argues that his ontology—what he takes to be bedrock reality in the universe—precludes mental or Intentional items such as beliefs and desires. Of course, we mayfindit useful in our ordinary lives, even indispensable in practice, to talk in terms of beliefs, desires, intentions, and the rest, but we should not be misled by the utility of Intentional idioms into thinking that they describe what is really there. As Quine himself put it in Word and Object (which, incidentally, was dedicated to Rudolf Carnap, "teacher and friend"): One may accept the Brentano thesis either as showing the indispensability of Intentional idioms and the importance of an autonomous science of Intention, or as showing the baselessness of Intentional idioms and the emptiness of a science of Intention. My attitude, unlike Brentano's, is the second ... Not that I would forswear daily use of Intentional idioms, or maintain that they are practically dispensable. (1960:221)  Quine sometimes puts his views about psychology in terms of a difference between intentional (with-an-s) and extensional language. The extension of a term is whatever real object, property, or relation—or in general what fact of the matter, if any—is usually (that is, conventionally) picked out, or referred to, or individuated, or selected by the use of a sign or symbol "This neutral attitude toward the various philosophical forms of language based on the principle that everyone is free to use the language most suited to his purpose, has remained the same throughout my life. It was formulated as 'principle of tolerance' in logical Syntax and I still hold it today . . . " (Carnap 1963:18). 4  A simple version of the verification principle claims that a statement (or sentence) is literally meaningful or significant i f and only if it is either empirically verifiable (or falsifiable) or it can be seen or shown to be true (or self-contradictory) simply by means of the analysis of the conventional meanings of the signs or symbols used in the statement. The meaning of all terms and phrases is thus anchored to checkable facts about either language or the world. Something like this version of the verification principle is found in Carnap (1963: 45) and Ayer (1946: 35). 5  Chapter I  Introduction: Project Purpose and Scope  5  of a language. The intension of a term is its meaning, or sense, or significance for any user of the term. Thus for Quine the correct language or notation for fundamental natural science is extensional, because an extensional language homes in directly on what is real without an intervening subjective understanding or viewpoint. iii. Dennett  Perhaps the clearest version of Intentional instrumentalism in the Carnapian-cum-Quinean mode is that of Daniel Dennett, whosefirstbook, Content and Consciousness, contains the following revealing passage: The content one ascribes to an event, state or structure is not, then, an extra feature that one discovers in it, a feature which, along with its other, extensionally characterized features, allows one to make predictions. Rather, the relation between Intentional descriptions of events, states or structures (as signals that carry messages or memory traces with certain contents) and extensional descriptions of them is one of further interpretation. If we relegate vitalist and interactionist hypotheses to the limbo of last, desperate resort, and proceed on the assumption that human and animal behavioural control systems are only very complicated denizens of the physical universe, it follows that the events within them, characterized extensionally in the terms of physics or physiology, should be susceptible to explanation and prediction without any recourse to content, meaning or Intentionality. (1969:78)  One can certainly hear the echo of Carnap and Quine in these remarks; for Dennett is telling us that what is really there—bedrock reality, as it were—can be captured fully by an extensional vocabulary. Any deployment of Intentional idioms arises in answer to some felt need for "further interpretation," or a heuristic overlay of some kind upon the facts. Dennett develops his account of Intentionality in Brainstorms, where he seemed to embrace a kind of functionalism. Ned Block (1980a) identifies three senses of "functionalism": analytical functionalism, where a system is explained in terms of the capacities of its parts and the way the parts are connected to one another; computation-representation functionalism, a special case of analytical functionalism that emphasizes the "computer-as-mind" analogy; and metaphysical functionalism, the hypothesis that mental states simply are functional states. Seen against the background of Block's distinctions, Dennett's functionalism seems somewhat idiosyncratic. It is driven only by pragmatic considerations: in a way that produces useful predictions about how humans will behave in given circumstances, Dennett believes that we can attribute Intentional functional states to them. But in so doing, he warns us to resist any inclination to think that we are thereby picking out or individuating real, detectible brain states or processes. It is a mistake to expect that attributing similar beliefs to two or more people would lead to ourfindingsimilar brain states or processes operative in the persons concerned; for we attribute functional states to individuals, not on the basis of neurophysiological knowledge, but on the basis of how they behave in light of what they can be supposed to have perceived in the environment. Dennett argues that our Intentional descriptions of human behaviour can be seen as a particular attitude or stance, the Intentional stance, which people take up to their fellow humans, to other animals, and at times even to machines. We deliberately view our neighbours (our pets, our cars) as functioning in terms of a belief-desire system; and we do so because taking up the Intentional stance is a useful and economical way of predicting what humans will do. But there are other stances beside the Intentional. For instance, we might consider a machine from the point of view of its design—that is, we might adopt a design stance. In taking up this  Chapter I  Introduction: Project Purpose and Scope  6  attitude one is considering an object from the point of view of what it has been designed to do (or not do), not from the perspective of what it might think or want. Alternatively, we might contemplate a thing from a physical point of view. To take up the physical stance is to consider something insofar as it is made up of certain materials with certain properties. Accordingly, to adopt the physical stance in regard to humans is to investigate their physiology, their chemistry, or—at a more basic level— their physics. For Dennett, a migrationfromcommon-sense Intentional explanations and predictions to the more reliable design-stance explanations and predictions (and eventually to the explanations and predictions of the physical stance) is the "proper direction for theorists to take whenever possible" (1978: 12). Dennett describes his next book, The Intentional Stance, as "a series of post-Brainstorms essays in which I attempted to revise, re-express, and extend my view" (1987fc: ix). The result is a work with a markedly increased emphasis on the pragmatic nature of Intentionality, and on the assertion that its value lies almost wholly in its power to predict behaviour. "The perverse claim remains: all there is to being a true believer is being a system whose behaviour is reliably predicted via the Intentional strategy" (1978: 29). 6  On this more uncompromising view, a thing can be said to have Intentional states only in the sense that, when we attribute information-carrying or content-containing states to it, these attributions enable us to predict what behaviour will be produced by such a system. Beyond this, the mind has no Intentionality for the simple reason that there is no mind, and the brain has no Intentionality because it has neither states nor processes with content. Intentionality is merely a feature of our language: it just so happened that our ancestors (through a process of trial and error) evolved an Intentional way of talking about one another that enabled them to predict behaviour with success. Dennett seems to have followed Quine in holding that either we naturalize Intentionality by a downward reduction of folk psychology—first to behaviourism, then to neurophysiology, and finally to physics—or we take the view that it will be impossible to succeed in this downward reduction and acknowledge thefictionof Intentional language. If reduction is possible, then it would have to be a total reduction—including those phenomenal or subjective features of our mental lives—in the context of a materialism akin to what Galen Strawson refers to in the following statement: Serious materialists must hold experiences to be physical phenomena in every respect, and hence even in respect of their having the experiential character they have... It follows that they cannot talk of the physical as opposed to the mental or experiential at all... The distinction that concerns them when it comes to the mind-body problem cannot be a distinction between the mental and the physical, because it is a distinction that must be drawn entirely within the realm of the physical. If one is a materialist, to say that there is a fundamental distinction between mental and experiential phenomena, on the one hand, and physical phenomena, on the other hand, is like saying that there is a fundamental distinction between cows and animals: that on the one hand there are cows, and on the other hand there are animals. (1994:71)  The difference between total reduction and full-blown elimination is that, in the former case, it is expected that some future "scientific" psychology would reduce the common-sense conception of mentality if a sufficient number of statements licensed by the scientific psychology meshed with, or matched up with, or correlated with statements licensed by the common-sense view; otherwise the common-sense conception would have to go. The kind of reduction involved would be an instance of 6  See Dale Jacquette's (1988) review.  Chapter I  7  Introduction: Project Purpose and Scope  what Ernest Nagel (1979) called heterogeneous reduction. If we let T (reduced theory) designate the theory or set of experimental laws to be reduced, and T (basic theory) designate the theory to which the reduction is effected or proposed, T would, in the present context, be folk psychology and T would be physics. R  B  R  B  Nagel argues that in cases of heterogeneous reduction, the distinctive traits that are the subject matter of T sometimes demonstrably fall into the province of a theory that has been initially developed to handle qualitatively different materials, and so may not include some of the descriptive terms or concepts of the to-be-reduced theory in its own set of theoretical statements. The basic theory might thus appear to eliminate distinctions familiar within the reduced theory, thereby producing a sense of mystification, especially if T deals primarily with macroscopic phenomena, while T deals primarily with microscopic phenomena. R  R  B  As far as the reduction of folk psychology is concerned, however, Nagel observes that no sense of mystification is warranted, since a successful heterogeneous reduction would only remove the need for folk psychological idioms; it would not eliminate folk psychological categories. He explicitly makes this point using headaches as an example: ... the reduction of one science to a second ... does not wipe out or transform into something insubstantial or "merely apparenf the distinctions and types of behavior which the secondary discipline [i.e., TR] recognizes. Thus, if and when the detailed physical, chemical, and physiological conditions for the occurrence of headaches are ascertained, headaches will not thereby be shown to be illusory. On the contrary, if in consequence of such discoveries a portion of psychology will be reduced to another science or to a combination of other sciences, all that will have happened is that an explanation will have been found for the occurrence of headaches. But the explanation that will thus become available will be essentially of the same sort as those obtainable in other areas of positive science. (1979:366)  Viewed in this way, the (heterogeneous) reductionist position is that the linguistic representational classifications of folk psychology will have no place in a mature theory of human action. So if we use the label "cognitive science" as a catchall for the various scientific disciplines that will play a role in the explanation of human behaviour, then what the reductionist is claiming is that the Intentional vocabulary of folk psychology will be expunged from a fully developed cognitive science. The stronger elirninativist position is that our common-sense mental states do not exist: there are no such things, just as there are no such things as phlogiston, caloric fluid, and witches on broomsticks. Essentially, eliminativism denies that our folk psychological categories have the reality required for any sort of reduction to take place. Reductionism and elirninativist do not therefore entail one another. It is perfectly consistent to simultaneously be a reductionist and a realist with respect to the mental. Carnap, in concerning himself only with reducing the sentences describing human behaviour to the language of physics, may be viewed as a reductionist in the heterogeneous sense. On the other hand, one can be an elirninativist by rejecting the reality of the mind without thereby endorsing reductionism—without, that is, rejecting the practical utility of folk psychological talk; this we see in Quine-cum-Dennett instrumentalism. iv. Comments  A few remarks are in order. First, I think the threat to folk psychology from theories that deny the reality of Intentionality accounts for much of the urgency on the part of mental realists to find a workable account of Intentional content. Even those who promote irrealist viewpoints  Chapter I  Introduction: Project Purpose and Scope  8  (Dennett included) understand why their arguments are unpalatable. Folk psychology is well engrained in all of us, and is not likely to vacate the philosophical premises without a quarrel. Moreover, some believe that folk psychological explanations are probably the best we can hope for. Thus Stephen Pinker remarks, I call an old friend on the other coast and we agree to meet in Chicago at the entrance of a bar in a certain hotel on a particular day two months hence at 7:45 P.M. I predict, he predicts, and everyone who know us predicts that on that day at that time we will meet up. And we do meet up. That is amazing! In what other domain could lay people—or scientists, for that matter—predict, months in advance, the trajectories of two objects thousands of miles apart to an accuracy of inches and minutes? And do it from information that can be conveyed in a few seconds of conversation? (1997:63-4) 7  It is this predictive power which is most problematic for instrumentalism. Dennett maintains that all there is to being a true believer is being a system whose behaviour is reliably predictable via the Intentional strategy. But that our Intentional talk gets predictions right, though it is just a useful story with no hold on the real facts of the matter, seems just too improbable to be true. It seems too fortuitous for credibility that the folk psychological account of the sources of human action is not merely neat and comparatively easy to understand, but also possessed of enormous predictive power, yet at the same time cannot be said to be a true, factual picture of anything. It is not helpful to claim that "the fact that we are products of a long and demanding evolutionary process guarantees that using the Intentional strategy on us is a safe bet" (Dennett 19876: 33). Though an appeal to evolution might explain why we use the Intentional stance— presumably because it has served us well in the past—it does not explain why the Intentional stance works; it does not shed any light on why there should exist any predictive strategy that is at once powerful, successful, and unrelated to the facts at issue. Something is missing, for evolution could not produce successful predictions based on any stance unless it had also brought it about that the stance in question had some causal connection to actual states of affairs—some kind of causal relation, proximate or distant, to the behaviour one is trying to predict. This is why no matter how many adjustments we make, no variation on, say, the astrological stance—which lacks the requisite connection to human behaviour—will ever produce a predictive strategy that has anything more than chance accuracy. The success of the Intentional stance thus suggests that there must be more to the matter than a blend of pragmatism and blind luck. There is also a question of whether Dennett's instrumentalism can avoid the implication that human heads have real contents. When we talk about some person or organism via the Intentional stance, we attribute to the person or organism a belief that so-and-so, or a desire that such-and-such. It is the "so-and-so" and "such-and-such" that are at the heart of our Intentional talk and ultimately what gives it predictive power. So, for instance, if I see a man in front of a restaurant, pacing back and forth, looking intermittently at his watch then down the street, I can say, with reasonable confidence, that the man is waiting for someone to join him, that he believes that the person who is to join him is not in the restaurant and is late, that he is annoyed by his friend's tardiness. What is interesting is that I have interpreted the man's behaviour in terms of what information he himself seems to have gathered by means of his senses, and the behavioural response that he has made to that information. Generalizing this observation, we can say that the interpretations we make about someone, and the subsequent predictions we form regarding how that person will behave, depend on our 7  See also Guirguis (1999).  Chapter I  Introduction: Project Purpose and Scope  9  knowledge of his or her information—that is, on what we can learn about the perceptual information in that person's "input slot" and his or her forward planning as revealed by relevant signals and reactions. Putting our folk psychological descriptions in this way makes it clear that they imply acceptance of the claim that the human brain is an information-processing or content-utilizing system. Folk psychological predictions are successful because ordinary folk got it right: between input and output the human brain operates as a device that processes information. I do not offer these criticisms as decisive, but I think they help to clarify our options: we can either accept instrumentalism and live with the apparent conclusion that the predictive power of folk psychology is merely an evolutionary piece of good fortune—perhaps brought about by a parallel evolutionary process in theory construction—or we can reject instrumentalism as it stands. The former option, though possible, seems to me unlikely: the chance of any progressive process of constructing theories hitting upon a successful method of predicting human behaviour—a method that bears no relation to actual facts—seems remote. So, committed to the claim that there is more to Intentional content than pragmatic utility and coincidence, I choose to reject instrumentalism as it stands. Inference to the Best Explanation Some of the comments I have made may be taken as invoking a version of the so-called inference-to-the-best-explanation argument, which has often been urged in the debate between scientific realism and constructive empiricism. This debate was initiated by Bas van Fraassen, whose critique of scientific realism reached a wide audience with the publication of his book, The Scientific Image. Roughly, a scientific realist holds that (i) science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like, and that (ii) the acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is at least approximately true. Van Fraassen espouses a version of antirealism that he calls constructive empiricism. Essentially, this view substitutes "empirical adequacy" for "truth" in the realist definition. It holds that (a) science aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate, and (b) acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that the theory is empirically adequate. A scientific theory is "empirically adequate" if it gets things right about the observable phenomena in the world, where the content of the predicate "observable" is to be fixed relative to our sensory abilities. Realists have countered by arguing that scientific realism provides the best explanation of the power to predict phenomena with which science provides us. This power would be a highly improbable cosmic coincidence if the theories were not true, or if the entities posited by those theories did not actually exist. A related position is convergent realism, the thesis that although any particular theory may be partially true, successive theories provide better approximations to the truth. Convergence realists see the history of science as one of progress toward real facts. Some antirealists—e.g., van Fraassen—criticize inference-to-the-best-explanation by pointing to the underdetermination of theories by evidence: different incompatible theories may enable the same predictions. Where one is successful, so will be its empirical equivalents. He also argues that in the predictive success of science generally, there is no miracle to explain: our best theories are successful because we systematically reject those that are not. In a similar vein, Larry Laudan (1981) has attacked the convergence argument by stressing that the truth of a theory is not a good explanation of its predictive success, for there have been many past theories that were successful in their time—e.g., the phlogiston theory of combustion and the caloric theory of heat— that we now know to be false and referentially empty. Even when intertheoretic retention takes place, it only occurs with regard to a few selected elements of the older theory. Laudan concludes from his inspection of the evidential record that, far from supporting realism, the history of science supports  Chapter I  Introduction: Project Purpose and Scope  10  the opposite induction: the falsity of previously successful theories provides good reasons to think that presently accepted theories are also likely to be false. This is but a brief sample of the debate. I do not have anything significant to add, but I do want to make the following brief points. Suppose Q= {p\,pi,p3, ... , p } is a set of phenomena for which we need an account, and T is a theory that provides our best explanation of Q. I doubt that in practice either scientists or laity infer the truth of T only on the basis of 7"s constituting our best explanation of Q, since we can imagine situations where T may fall short of accounting for all the phenomena in Q; for example, T may account only for R, where R = {p\,p ,pz, ... , p }, m<n Jn such cases, any reasonably rational individual would consider T to be at best incomplete, and would not be satisfied until T was somehow altered or augmented so as to a achieve a "betterfit"with the data. We do, however, tend to infer the truth of a theory when it is (to put it in van Fraassen's terms) empirically adequate—that is, when the theory accounts for all the phenomena or data that need explanation (i.e., when T accounts for all p e Q; that, I take it, is what "empirically adequate" means). But then the truth of a theory is inferred from its ability to explain the entire data set, and not just from its being the best explanation we have at a given time. n  s  2  m  x  It is here that van Fraassen's point about the underdetermination of theories by evidence becomes important, for there may be a number of theories, incompatible with T and each other, that are nevertheless empirically adequate with respect to Q. There is no question that this sort of underdetermination is relevant to the realist-antirealist debate, but how much does it impact folk psychology? Not very much, I think. Right now, folk psychology is a theory without a rival: we currently have nothing on offer which comes close to folk psychology's accuracy, power of prediction, and simplicity. Nor, for the same reason, do I think that Laudan's pessimistic induction is especially threatening: not only does folk psychology presently have no rival, but we have good reason to suppose that the theory has been around since pre-recorded history without undergoing significant changes. It was there, in its full bloom, while other theories came and went, and it is still here today. In fact, folk psychology might just be the most successful theory we have ever had. So the question of intertheoretic retention (or lack thereof) has simply never been an issue. None of this suggests that constructive empiricism is untenable, nor is it meant to. Even if constructive empiricism turns out to be true, the consequences for folk psychology will be negligible. We must keep in mind that constructive empiricism is a hypothesis that affects all theories which posit unobservable entities (in van Fraassen's sense of "unobservable"), and this covers just about all of the natural sciences. So if itfinallyrums out that folk psychology is merely "empirically adequate" rather than "true," so be it. It will be in good company. As to how things stand right now, we are still left with the original choices: we can accept instrumentalism along with the conclusion that folk psychology is a pleasant coincidence of evolution, or we can reject instrumentalism as it stands. I still choose the latter course.  1.3 Externalism and Internalism In light of the above discussion, I shall proceed on the assumption that Intentionality is a real property of some brain states—a property that, in my opinion, still needs a naturalistic explanation 8  That is, R may be a proper subset of Q.  Chapter I  Introduction: Project Purpose and Scope  11  that will do it justice. Accordingly, one of the questions which concern my project is the viability of two rival approaches to Intentional explanations: externalism and internalism. Psychological externalism is a thesis that has its roots in semantic externalism. On classical theories of meaning— e.g., those of Frege and Russell—the semantic properties of some words are at least partly determined by the internal states of a speaker, by concepts or descriptions in the speaker's head: for Frege, the sense of a word was so determined (see below, § 3 . 1 ) ; for Russell, it was the meaning of universal terms and the constituents of descriptive propositions. Russell argued that in addition to our acquaintance with particular things, we are acquainted with universals or concepts, and that every complete sentence must contain at least one universal. He believed that "we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths" (1912: 25). This was the basis for what he characterized as the "fundamental principle" in the analysis of propositions containing descriptions: "every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted" (1912: 32). Keeping in mind what Russell meant by "acquaintance," his principle comes down to the claim that, every proposition understood by an agent is composed wholly of constituents whose meanings are directly understood by the agent, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths. In short, Russell held that we  must attach meaning to the words we use if we are to speak significantly and not utter mere noise, and that the meaning we thus attach is something with which we are directly aware.  This familiar picture, which was the target of Kripke's famous Naming and Necessity lectures, eventually found a strong opponent in another picture of meaning as determined by external contextual conditions. On this new model, the reference of names and natural-kind terms (e.g., "marmoset") is determined by external facts and states of affair. In using a name n, for example, a speaker^ refers to x in virtue of the fact that n traces back, through one speaker after another, to the individual x. It was quickly alleged that these externalist considerations could not be confined to language alone, and eventually, semantic externalism gave rise to psychological externalism: the doctrine that the Intentional character of mental states also cannot be independent of environmental determinants. 9  Drawing a spatial boundary between two categories of physical events and states—those located inside an individual's skin and those taking place outside the skin —we can say that psychological externalism is the thesis that the Intentional content of an agent's mental states is not independent of the conditions in the agent's environment; that Intentionality partly depends on physical states, or circumstances, or processes, or principles, or conventions located outside the agent's body. In contrast, internalism—or individualism, as it is sometimes called—is the view that the Intentionality of states of mind depends on the intrinsic physical state of the agents possessing them. 10  11  9  1 0  The evolution of externalism is briefly reviewed in Stalnaker (1993). This is not the same sort of boundary on which Ryle's "official doctrine"—or, as he somewhat more abusively calls it,  the "dogma of the ghost in the machine" (1949: 15-16)—is based: it isn't a boundary separating the "physical" and the "mental," where the former is supposed to be located in space and time, but the latter is supposed to exist in time and not space. Rather, the bifurcation I have in mind is completely within the physical domain (for there exists nothing else), and the boundary in question is the outermost limits of our bodies. A much more detailed analysis of the internalist-externalist debate is given in chapter III, where it is explained just how Intentionality is thought to be dependent on environmental conditions by the externalists and independent of such conditions by the internalists. 11  Chapter I  12  Introduction: Project Purpose and Scope  In my judgement, neither of these two views is independently satisfactory, for neither takes account of facts that strongly suggest the plausibility of the other. What is required is a treatment of Intentionality that is sensitive to all Intentional dimensions. This, in a nutshell, is the task I have set for myself.  1.4 Objectives My objectives are not independent of my motivations and some strong intuitions I have about Intentionality. I am dubious about the kind of reasoning that regards agent-environment relations as the determinants of Intentional content. External relations, while constituting an important part of cognition, do not tell the whole story. What is missing is the point of view of the agent—what is "in the agent's head," if you prefer. I suggest that narrow content is at least as important in determining the Intentionality of a given mental state as any external relations that state might bear. But, as we shall see, one gets different results depending on whether one chooses to individuate Intentional states by agent-environment relations (externally, broadly, or widely) or by reference to the agent's perspective (internally, individualistically, or narrowly). 12  I intend to show that Intentionality is multidimensional—that it has both a wide or external dimension and a narrow or internal dimension—and that, rather than being an expression of one or the other, it encompasses them both. That is not to say that both components are equally important. They aren't: Intentionality does not require that there always be a relation between an agent and an external object, but it does seem to require that the agent have a point of view or perspective in virtue ofthe mental state (s)he is in. I call the broad dimension of Intentionality Intentional aboutness and the narrow dimension I take it that the most plausible naturalistic explanation of the former is an evolutionary one, such as has already been proposed by Dretske and Millikan. But evolutionary explanations have their limits, the most important of which is their inability to account for the directedness aspect of Intentionality. Consequently, giving a naturalistic account of Intentional directedness is an important goal of my work. I propose to accomplish this goal by combining Dretske's information-processing approach with some basic resources from script theory as developed by Roger Schank and Robert Abelson in Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding: An  Intentional directedness.  13  Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures.  Ifirstencountered scripts in a cognitive psychology seminar and immediately realized that they had the potential to coherently combine all my intuitions: that mental states supervene on physical states, that physical doppelgangers must (therefore) be psychologically indistinguishable, that Swampman is not a zombie, that the perspective of the agent contributes essentially to his or her psychology. The key to seeing all this is to separate the agent's point of view from his or her relationship to the environment—to acknowledge, in other words, that Intentional states have a directedness as well as an aboutness. Even though the theory of scripts has been somewhat underutilized by philosophers, I believe that it can be developed to answer my basic goals. Ultimately, then, I wish to promote a Narrow Content, which is supposed to capture the agent's perspective or point of view, is here contrasted with wide content, see chapter II for details. 12  1 3  We will discuss Millikan's account in chapter III, Dretske's in chapter VI.  Chapter I  Introduction:  Project Purpose and Scope  13  script theory ofIntentional content, which, as far as I know, has some claim to originality. The ideas I borrow from script theory will befirstdelineated and then reworked into an information-processing mould. Here are some highlights of the position I intend to defend: i.  I uphold the sense-reference distinction for Intentionality, which is to say that Intentionality has both an aboutness (reference) and a directedness (sense). Whereas an Intentional state may not be about anything, no Intentional state is undirected.  ii.  Aboutness and directedness are mutually independent Intentional dimensions, in that neither determines the other. The former isfixedby a causal relation, C, in which an Intentional state stands with an object. This relation may be mediated just as long as the aetiology traces back to an actual item. Directedness, on the other hand, isfixedby the indicatoryidentificatory function of scripts.  iii.  Scripts can be grounded in a Dretskean information-processing theory. In particular, scripts emerge as a result of the transformation of information from analogue to digital form.  iv.  Whether or not an Intentional state is about an exclusive object depends on what lies at the other end of the C relation. But whether or not a mental state is directed toward an exclusive object depends on what the agent, as an information-processing system, is capable of discriminating under a specific script. Aboutness and directedness can therefore give rise to different extensions. What goes into the aboutness extension (E ) of an Intentional state is what stands in C to the relevant representation; what goes into its directedness extension (E ) is determined by the primed script and the discriminatory resources of the informationprocessing system whose script it is. By comparing the aboutness extension and the directedness extension of an Intentional state, we can account for many common types of error or misrepresentation. a  d  v.  The question of whether Intentionality is to be defined internally (as a property of brain states and their relations) or externally (as a relation between agents and world) can be answered as "neither" or "both," depending on one's point of view. Intentionality is not homogeneous; it has multiple facets that demand different analyses. Thus the aboutness component of Intentionality is externalistic and relational and ought to be treated as such, whereas the directedness component is likely to resist such treatments. If this is correct, any attempt to account for Intentionality exclusively in one way or the other—in terms of either individualism or externalism—can attain partial success at best.  vi.  I want, nevertheless, to leave the door open for relativizing the manner in which we individuate Intentional states to specific theoretical aims and objectives. Without denying the Intentional dimensions outlined above, I see no reasons why one cannot focus on a single Intentional feature (and ignoring others), if by so doing a certain theoretical question or avenue of investigation is highlighted. Under specific conditions, then, the decision of how to individuate Intentional states may be a pragmatic one. I talk a bit more about this in §2.2.iii.  vii.  One must be wary of the word "script," since it can be misleading. Scripts are not linguistic models, at least not necessarily linguistic. For the purposes of this project, I shall adopt a relatively broad interpretation of "script," one that is consistent with the mainstream psychological conception of a schema. This means that insofar as schemata can be nonpropositional, scripts can be so as well. In fact, scripts represent many different knowledge  Chapter I  Introduction:  Project  Purpose and Scope  14  domains. There are scripts for personal stereotypes and roles, scripts for goal oriented actions and common event sequences. There are scripts for spatial scenarios, personal habits, objects, animals, and persons. Moreover, scripts may—and, as we shall see, often d o — include visual and acoustic information, olfactory, gustatory, and other "purely phenomenal" data. In all cases, the content o f a script w i l l be highly structured, not simply a list o f features or properties. viii.  In chapter IV, several distinct types o f scripts w i l l be introduced, most o f which w i l l not be based on verbal information (though they may be primed by words and sentences). A n d in chapter V , the fact that many scripts are non-linguistic will be supported by brain-imaging studies revealing the relative autonomy and non-semantic nature o f the long-term memory systems housing various kinds o f script-based knowledge. Several terms have been given to name these structures: "schemata," "stereotypes," "themes," "macrostructures," "models," "frames," and "memory organized packages." A n y o f these designations would do for our purposes, but I use "scripts" to preserve continuity with Schank and Abelson's (1977) research in which that particular name was used.  ix.  M a n y scripts, but not all (especially those representing people; see §4.4.ii), are generic in that they provide general information about the components, attributes, and relationships that typically occur in their exemplars. This makes the generic script for, e.g., eating at a restaurant different from the specific memory trace constructed when an individual eats at a particular restaurant at a particular time. The relationship between generic scripts and specific memory traces is laid out by the script-copy-plus-tag (SC+T) hypothesis in §5.2.ii.  x.  It is convenient to view scripts as having "slots"—or frames, as I shall say—which are filled as the script guides the processing o f a specific input (Minsky 1975). F o r example, the frames o f a restaurant script include characterframes(customer, cook, waitress, hostess); objectframes(tables, chairs, food, menus); and action, plan, or goal frames (the customer orders food, the cook prepares the order, the waitress serves the food, the customer eats). These frames are filled with contextually specific information when someone comprehends a particular restaurant experience.  xi.  A distinction w i l l be made between two stages o f script utilization: script identification and script application. During the identification process the comprehender "searches" for the script that provides the best fit for the input. This is essentially a process o fpattern recognition. A s information accrues in a data-driven fashion, the information matches the components, attributes, and relationships o f one script better than others. Once a script has been "identified" or invoked, the application stage starts, during which the script guides processing in a conceptually-driven manner. Several phenomena occur during script application. First, the script influences the perception and interpretation o f the input material; experiences would be ambiguous or difficult to understand i f no script provided background knowledge. Second, the script governs the attention that is allocated to the elements in the stimulus. In most conditions more attention is devoted to information that deviates from the script than information that is relevant to the script (this is also explained by the SC+T hypothesis). Third, scripts play an important role in inference generation, a process that (normally) occurs when frames are filled by default. Finally, scripts provide the knowledge base for formulating expectations about subsequent events during comprehension.  Chapter I  xii.  Introduction: Project Purpose and Scope  15  How scripts licence inferences, despite the fact that they are (or could be) non-propositional, is a matter that depends on what we mean by "inference." There is no question that the process of comprehension benefits greatly from non-verbal information, and that numerous assumptions—based entirely on extra-linguistic facts—are being constantly made: a man comes infromoutside with a dripping umbrella, and immediately we assume that it has been raining. What is the nature of that assumption? If it is an inference, then clearly it is one that is made without any linguistic cues. On the other hand, if we insist that an inference is strictly a relation between sentences, then (trivially) many scripts cannot be said to generate inferences, in which case we shall have to give another name to the kind of assumption made from the wet umbrella (the reader isfreeto use his or her imagination here). But I prefer a more inclusive interpretation. We normally assume in a restaurant setting that a cook prepared the food we ordered, even though we never see this task. I consider this kind of assumption to be an inference, and will call it so, without thereby committing myself to the claim that the script which licences it is a linguistic construct.  1.5 Overview There are many approaches to Intentionality. Other than the instrumentalist approach discussed above, wefind:the linguistic approach derivedfromthe work of Noam Chomsky (1968) and exhibited most fully in the work of Jerry Fodor (1975, 1987a); the teleological approach developed by Ruth Garrett Millikan (1984, 1993) and Colin McGinn (1989); the informationprocessing approach embodied in the work of Fred Dretske (1981, 1988a); the Junctional role approach of Brian Loar (1981); and the more recent developmental approach recommended by William Lyons (1995). Although these different perspectives are all important, only some of them are directly connected to my position. I shall, therefore, restrict the next two chapters to presenting only the background necessary to the exposition of my thesis. In chapter II, I provide a somewhat extended definition of Intentionality. The distinction between Intentional states and mental states, on the one hand, and Intentional states and consciousness, on the other, will be discussed. The multidimensional character of Intentionality will also be emphasized—including such Intentional dimensions as aspectual shape, aboutness, directedness, and the possibility of misrepresentation. The controversy concerning the notion of privileged or direct access tofirst-personmental states serves to focus some of the motivations behind individualism and externalism, along with various specific positions these two stances have inspired. This is the target of the third, largely expository chapter. Special attention will be given to the different ways in which the environment has been claimed to influence Intentional content, including physical furniture and background (Hilary Putnam), social and linguistic practices (Tyler Burge), causal history (Donald Davidson), and evolutionary development (Ruth Garrett Millikan and Colin McGinn). These views will be contrasted with the internalist doctrines of John Searle, (early) Jerry Fodor, and Gabriel Segal. Included in my discussion are the implications of an externalist psychology to psychophysical supervenience, mind-body identity, and the causal efficacy of the mental. As scripts are discussed almost exclusively in psychology and artificial intelligence circles, a basic introduction seems to be an appropriate theme for chapter IV. I start by outlining Conceptual Dependency, an ancestor of script theory. I then go on to differentiate various types of scripts— episodic, instrumental, personal, and definitional—and define the meaning and function of headers, frames, priming effects, default values, and other related notions.  Chapter I  Introduction:  Project Purpose and Scope  16  Chapter V is where I survey some of the most important evidence for scripts gathered in the last two decades. The chapter will be divided into two sections. In the first, I take up the kind of support which involves task modelling in the field of artificial intelligence. The power and versatility of script-based computer programs like SAM, FRUMP, and TALESPIN become obvious as these systems are contrasted with non-script-based programs like ELIZA. In the second part of the chapter, I turn to the psychological evidence, starting with neurological support for the semantic-episodic-procedural distinction in long-term memory, and ending with a description of some experiments that directly test the predictions of script theory in social settings. I intend scripts to account for the directedness dimension of Intentionality. But in order to do so in a non-question-begging way—that is, in order for scripts to ground the Intentional property of directedness in a manner that does not itself presuppose Intentionality—they must be shown to have a non-Intentional foundation. Accordingly, chapter VI outlines the details of Dretske's informationprocessing theory, and shows how Dretske's notion of analogue-to-digital data conversion (which he uses to explain concept formation) provides the requisite foundation. In chapter VII, the scriptal approach will be tested against the characteristics of Intentionality outlined in chapter II: aspectual shape, aboutness, directedness, and error or misrepresentation. I deal with scriptal misrepresentation by first defining for a given Intentional state an aboutness extension and a directedness extension; the two extensions are then compared. In this way the most common types of error can be explained: mispriming, overgeneralization, overspecification, misidentification, and errors involving mirages, optical illusions, and hallucinations. Accounting for the misrepresentation of hypothetical entities will require a different strategy. The implications of my scriptal approach to traditional externalistic and individualistic views of the mind are then examined. I concentrate on externalism, since the consequences for individualism are relatively less serious. I conclude, in chapter VIII, with a summary of what has been accomplished and a cautious look forward. Each of the chapters to follow is meant to address one specific topic, eventually culminating in chapter VII where, hopefully, all the central issues will coherently converge. I shall do my best to express the relevance of each of the topics discussed, but where this expression is judged lacking, I must beg for the reader's patience and indulgence. The scope and limitations of this project should be well understood at the outset, however. I do not intend my work to provide a comprehensive theory of Intentionality, but to illuminate only a specific type of Intentional mental states—vis., those states that have underlying scripts (see chapter IV). Many non-scriptal Intentional states exist, and about these I shall have nothing to say. It is important to keep this in mind, if my proposals are to be judged fairly. It will become apparent that I owe a great deal to many who have written on the issues I take up here. But none have influenced this work more than Roger Schank, Robert Abelson, and Fred Dretske.  Intentionality A* &*Xi+MJL Deleft** How many evils could be remedied, both on the individual and social level, by the correct psychological diagnosis, or by knowledge of the laws according to which a mental state can be modified! Franz Brentano, Psychologyfroman Empirical Standpoint, p. 22.  3  n the previous chapter, we described Intentionality as a property of some mental states by which these states are represented as being directed toward, or about, or of something or another. Alternatively, every Intentional state was said to take something as its object. But it is not difficult to see that this description will not take us very far. Here is another offering: Intentionality covers those characteristics of mental activities on account of which those activities are said both to have a content that contains information about something beyond the content and the activity, and to involve a particular sort of attitude towards that content. Moreover, it is a peculiarity of mental content that it is necessarily 'perspectival.' (Lyons 1995:1)  A little better, perhaps, but still not very clear. We may wonder, for instance, in what sense does an Intentional state have content containing information that goes beyond the content itself? Does this "going beyond" necessarily (regularly, occasionally) involve a real external object? And what does it mean to say that mental content is perspectivall The literature on Intentionality contains many definitions of this sort. Each is normally followed by a lengthy explanation of the definition's various components, an explanation that is designed to bring out important elements not explicitly mentioned in the original statement. I propose something similar. It is the purpose of this chapter to provide an extended definition of Intentionality, which will afford the basis required for upcoming business. To that end, two basic distinctions and four Intentional dimensions will be introduced.  2.1 Two Distinctions Strictly speaking, the two distinctions I have in mind are not part of the extended definition we are developing, but are meant to counter, and hopefully do away with, potential confusions and misapprehensions. The distinctions of interest are between (i) Intentional states and mental states, and (ii) Intentionality and consciousness. Let us start with the former.  17  Chapter II  Intentionality:  An Extended  Definition  18  i. Intentional States and Mental States  One cannot accept Brentano's thesis—that a given state is Intentional if and only if it is mental, and that mental states are distinct from physical states—unless one is also willing to accept a kind of dualism. If the statement is taken to be an expression of irreducibility, then minds are not just physical brains; they are something above and beyond. So the Brentano thesis suggests at least two fundamental sorts of things in the universe, mental and physical, which is a general statement of dualism. If the threat of dualism is not enough to at least render suspicious, if not completely dislodge, the Brentanian conception of the mind, the following consideration might take us a little further in that direction: it turns out that not all mental states are Intentional. Some mental states have Intentionality; others do not. Searle gives the following clue to the difference: If I tell you I have a belief or a desire, it always makes sense for you to ask, "What is it exactly that you believe?" or "What is it that you desire?"; and it won't do for me to say, "Oh I just have a belief and a desire without believing anything or desiring anything". My beliefs and desires must always be about something. (1983:1)  In determining which mental states have Intentionality and which do not, then, we might find the following heuristic helpful. If M is Intentional, there must be answers to the questions: 'mat is M about?" "What is M of or for?" "What is it an M that?" "Toward what is M directed?" Beliefs, desires, fears, hopes, hunches, and intuitions are Intentional in this respect, but other mental states are not so focused. "Raw feels" like pains, itches, and tickles are normally considered nonIntentional. There are also forms of elation, depression, and anxiety where one is simply elated, depressed, or anxious without being elated, depressed, or anxious about anything specific. On the other hand, one can be elated that something has occurred, or depressed and anxious at the prospect of one thing or another. On the present distinction, focused elation, depression, and anxiety are Intentional; the unfocused cases are not. Thus it appears that as far as human cognition is concerned, every Intentional state is mental, but some mental states are not Intentional. In other words, Intentional states constitute a proper subclass of mental states.  1  As mentioned, Brentano himself did not distinguish between Intentional and non-Intentional mental states. He believed that "feelings [including pains, itches, and tickles] undeniably refer to objects" (1874: 90); but in the case of such "raw feels," the mental state and its Intentional object— the object to which the state Intentionally refers—are somehow conjoined or united: "Even in cases where I hear a harmonious sound, the pleasure which I feel is not actually pleasure in the sound but pleasure in the hearing. In fact you could say, not incorrectly, that in a certain sense it [the auditory experience] refers to itself... that the feeling and the object are 'fused into one' ... Still [mental states] retain a mental in-existence, a Subject-Object ... and the same thing is true of these feelings" (1874: 90).  Also relevant is the recent revival of representationalist views. For instance, according to Dretske's (1995) representational thesis, although not all representations are mental, all mental facts are representational facts; hence all mental facts are Intentional in one way or another. But I do not want to uphold the representational thesis in any form that renders "mental state" and "Intentional state" coextensional. Rather, I prefer the flexibility of Searle's conception of Intentionality, the view The qualification is important because one can easily extend the notion of Intentionality to include non-intelligent systems; see Dretske's (1995) discussion of natural and conventional Intentionality. Unless otherwise stated, my discussion will concern human Intentional systems. 1  Chapter II  Intentionality:  An Extended  Definition  19  that traditionally takes Intentional content to be expressible by "thaf'-clauses. We shall later see (the details are in §2.2.ii) that these linguistic representations often fail certain tests of substitution and existential generalization. ii. Intentional States and Consciousness  A further distinction must be made between Intentionality and consciousness. "Intentional states" and "conscious states" are not coextensive, because many Intentional states are nonconscious. The idea of non-conscious Intentionality must seem unintuitive at some level. It certainly seemed that way to Brentano, who remarked as follows: For any given use of the word ["consciousness"], we shall have to decide whether it may not be more harmful than helpful. If we want to emphasize the origin of the term, doubtless we would have to restrict it to cognitive phenomena, either to all or to some of them ... I prefer to use it as synonymous with "mental phenomenon," or "mental act." For, in the first place, the constant use of these compound designations would be cumbersome, and furthermore, the term "consciousness," since it refers to an object which consciousness is conscious of, seems to be appropriate to characterize mental phenomena precisely in terms of its distinguishing characteristic, i.e., the property of the Intentional in-existence of an object. [So]... no mental phenomenon exists which is not, in the sense indicated above, consciousness of an object. (1874:102)  Brentano understood "consciousness" to mean consciousness of something, and since this "of something" is precisely the property that the Intentional in-existence of an object is supposed to capture, he took "conscious state" to mean exactly the same thing as "Intentional state." Moreover, since, on his account, the mental is uniquely defined by its Intentionality, he also took "mental state" to be coextensive with "conscious state." We have already stipulated that some mental states are not Intentional; we can see that Intentionality also differsfromconsciousness by taking belief as an example and observing that we are not aware of all the beliefs we hold at every given moment in our lives. For instance, before now I have never considered my belief that my grandfather lived most of his life west of the Nile Valley; and undoubtedly I have many other beliefs, about a multitude of different topics, that I am not thinking about at present and have never thought about in the past. But these beliefs are just as attributable to me when I am not thinking about them as when I am. So what we might call dormant beliefs still constitute Intentional states in the sense that they are beliefs that such-and-such is the case. The fact that we might not be always aware of them affects neither their content nor the fact that they are contentful. The same reasoning applies to all the other kinds of Intentional states as well. 2  The upshot is that while the class of conscious states and the class of Intentional states overlap, they are not identical, nor is one included in the other (see Figure 2.1).  In "The Problem of Logical Omniscience, I" Stalnaker considers this to be the basic point of what he calls the Sentence Storage Model of Belief. "To a first approximation, the idea is that to believe that P is to have a sentence that says that P stored (to use the fashionable idiom) in one's belief box . . . The explicit beliefs are those in the set of sentences stored in the belief box." Beliefs outside the box are implicit. Fodor (1978) adheres to this picture, and assumes the sentences in question to be literally encoded in a language of thought (see below, §3.4.i). 2  Chapter II  Intentionality:  An Extended  Mental states  Conscious states  20  Definition  Figure 2.1: A representation of the relationship between mental states, conscious states, and Intentional states. As far as human cognition is concerned, the class of mental states (oval) encompasses both the class of conscious states (left circle) and the class of Intentional states (right circle). Area 1 represents conscious mental states that are not Intentional—e.g., the unfocussed elation, depression, and anxiety mentioned in §2.11 Area 2 represents those mental states that are both conscious and Intentional—e.g., explicit beliefs and desires of which an agent is aware. Area 3 represents non-conscious mental states that are nevertheless Intentional—e.g., the "dormant" or "implicit" beliefs discussed in §2.1 .ii. Area 4 represents the class of mental states that are neither conscious nor Intentional—e.g., an agoraphobia-related general anxiety that a victim mistakes for a work-induced bad mood.  2.2 Four Intentional Dimensions  Now we turn to a survey of the four Intentional dimensions on which we shall focus in this project. They are: aboutness, aspectual (or perspectival) shape, directedness, and misrepresentatio (or error). It is worth mentioning that these four characteristics may not be exhaustive; but aboutness, aspectual shape, directedness, and misrepresentation are surely the most important Intentional characteristics, and a reasonable account of them will take us a long way. i. Aboutness  Many mental states have the power or capacity to refer to particular objects in the environment of the agent whose mental states they are. Eva sees Adam, hears him, has thoughts about him and desires for him. These are things Eva normally cannot do unless she occupies states that have Adam as their object, as what they refer to, as what they are thoughts about. Dretske points out that even the simplest measuring instruments exhibit this level of Intentionality: In representing the pressure in an intake manifold, a pressure gauge "says" something about the manifold. It is not only about the manifold (an object), it is about the pressure in it (a property) and, therefore, about the manifold's having that pressure (a condition or state). If pressure gauges were conscious, if their Intentionality was original rather that conventional, the manifold... would be the object the gauge was conscious of, having a pressure of [e.g.] 14 psi would be the property the gauge perceived it to have, and its having a pressure of 14 psi would be the condition, state of affairs, or fact the gauge was aware of. (1995:29)  We shall say that the reference of a representation is the object(s) whose properties or relations the representation designates, and the sense of a representation is the properties or relations the representation indicates the object(s) as having. The difference between represented objects and represented properties, between the reference and the sense of a representation, is what Nelson Goodman (1976) had in mind when he contrasted a picture of a black horse ("black horse" here specifying the object the picture is a representation of) and a black-horse picture ("black-horse" here specifying what the picture depicts the object as). Some pictures of black horses do not represent the 3  3  Goodman's preferred term for representational reference is "denotation."  Chapter II  Intentionality:  An Extended  Definition  21  black horse as a black horse: the picture may depict the animal as, say, a blackish spot in the distance, or perhaps the black horse had been disguised to look like a ferocious brown cow! In neither case do we have a black-horse picture: in thefirstinstance we have a blackish-spot picture; in the second instance we have a brown-cow picture. But in both cases they are pictures of a black horse, perhaps even the same animal. Clearly, then, the sense of a representation does not determine its reference. Nor does the fact that the representation is of a given object determine how that object may be represented. So reference does not determine sense. In Explaining Behavior, Dretske makes the same point by distinguishing the comment of a representationfromthe topic of a representation. A pressure gauge hooked to the right front tire of your car might register the pressure as 45 psi. This is the comment of the gauge's representation: it is "telling" you that the pressure is 45 pounds per square inch. But pressure gauges do not indicate which tire pressure (if any) they are representing. If you want to know which tire pressure the gauge is representing, which topic the gauge is commenting on, you have to look, not at the gauge, but at the external connections between gauge and world. In much the same way that the sense of a representation (e.g., a brown-cow picture) does not determine the reference of a representation (e.g., a black horse disguised to look like a brown cow), the fact that the gauge is registering the pressure as 45 psi (the comment) does not tell us which tire pressure the gauge is representing (the topic). "If causal theories are right," says Dretske, the reference of such representations will be determined by [their] causal relations: that object, condition, or situation which is ... causally responsible for the properties possessed by the representation. (1988a: 73) 4  In Naturalizing the Mind, Dretske designates this relation by " C . " What determines the topic or reference of a representation, then, is not how an object is represented, but a certain external causal or contextual relation, C, so that the object (if any) which is the reference of a given Intentional state will be that object which stands in C to the Intentional state in question. Dan Lloyd (1989: 14) draws similar conclusions by contrasting explicit content and extensional content. Extensional content is the represented object; explicit content is the manner in which the object is represented. The represented object is not determined by the properties that object is represented as having—that is, not by the explicit content of the representation, for nothing guarantees that black-horse pictures are pictures of black horses. Many Intentional states are like pictures in this regard; they are de re modes of representation (Burge 1977; Recanati 1993). So 5  Although Dretske is critical of causal theories (especially of perception; see Seeing and Knowing: ch. 1), he seems to accept an account of mental-state reference (or Intentional aboutness, as I shall say), which depends on a causal relation or connection between a representation of a thing and the thing represented. 4  There is a purported difference between de re ("of things") and de dicto ("of words") Intentional states. De re beliefs are relations between agents and real objects—e.g., the belief that Anwar Sadat was president of Egypt—and are said not to be individuated solely in terms of the mental content of subjects, because the object itself (re) has to be part of the principle of individuation of the belief. De dicto beliefs, on the other hand, do not connect the agent with any real objects—e.g., the belief that Santa Claus comes on Christmas Eve—and can therefore be fully individuated by content alone, by what is "in the agent's head." It has been customary to draw the distinction in terms of a substitutiviry criterion. In attributing a de re belief about a given object, one is free to substitute any correct description of the relevant object. If Adam believes de re that his car is green, then we could characterize Adam's attitude by substituting any correct description of his car regardless of whether or not Adam would describe his car in that way. By contrast, if we say that Adam believed de dicto that 2 cubed equals 8, we may refuse to say that Adam believes that the cube of the only even prime number is 8, because Adam may not know that 2 can be so described. Burge criticizes this manner of expressing the distinction on the grounds that there are sentences where substitutivity fails at the surface level, but which are nevertheless de re. His alternative is to express the distinction in terms of the logical form of descriptions of belief: "purely de dicto attributions make reference to complete propositions—entities whose truth or falsity is determined without being relative to an application or interpretation in a 5  Chapter II  Intentionality: An Extended Definition  22  looking at a faithful representation of a black horse, one is likely to believe that (s)he sees a black horse. But one can have the same type of belief, a "black-horse" belief, without it being a belief that refers to (is about) a black horse or, indeed, any object at all. The aboutness of an Intentional state is here being understood in terms of the reference, or topic, or extensional content of that state. And if we find that some Intentional states—particularly those pertaining to imaginary or fantastic objects—do not refer to any actual thing, either directly or by means of a Kripkean causal chain, then we shall say that these states are not about anything. If we include, as does Dretske (1995: 172-3, fn. 20) represented properties as part of what an Intentional state may be about, then an Intentional state will always be about something: when there is no object (a round square, to use Dretske's example), the state will be about the properties (roundness and squareness) it represents the non-existent "object" as having. But we shall not follow this practice, since people not only experience and think about objects, they experience and think about their properties as well, and the two must be kept separate. If I believe that I saw Adam crossing the street one busy morning, then, if Adam was indeed in relation C to my representation of the street-crosser—i.e., if Adam was the person I saw—my belief will be about Adam. If it was not Adam I saw, if Adam was not in relation C to my representation of the street-crosser, then my belief will not be about Adam (or any Adamish properties). Rather, it will be directed toward Adam (more on directedness shortly). On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent a mental statefrombeing about a specific property or relation if the mental state is focused on that property or relation, not on the object(s) whose property or relation it is. In this case, if the property or relation in question bears relation C to the representation, then the representation will be about that property or relation. If it does not, then the representation will not be about anything: we shall not say, for instance, that the representation is about the properties it is representing the property or relation as having. Ultimately, then, what determines the aboutness of an Intentional state is what enters in relation C with that state. Note that C need not be direct; it can be (and often is) a long, tortuously complex causal chain mediated by physical evidence, memory, verbal or written report, etc. What is important for Intentional aboutness is that the aetiology of C traces back to a real object o, in which case, the relevant Intentional state will be about o. The absence of aboutness does not mean that a mental state is not Intentional, since aboutness, as it is understood here, is not a necessary component of Intentionality. To say that aboutness is not necessary for Intentionality is merely to say that one can truly believe that Santa Claus is fat and jolly, that one can have a genuine desire to meet the Tooth Fairy, that one can be really fearful of the Wolfman; and the Intentional status of such beliefs, desires, and fears is not in any way compromised on account of their aboutlessness. Nor does the claim undermine the importance of aboutness as an Intentional property. The capacity of mental states to refer to things in the environment is not just a happy twist of fate. Aboutness allows all living creatures to function at the basic level of identifying sources of food and danger, of navigating their surroundings and coping with unexpected conditions. In this respect, human are in no more need of aboutness than any other animal: all organisms must be able tofindtheir way in a manner that is conducive to their continued existence, and no organism can do so without a robust way of representing its actual environment. particular context. De re locutions are about predication broadly conceived. They describe a relation between open sentences (or what they express) and objects" (1977: 343). Searle (1983: ch. 8) also rejects the traditional manner of making the de relde dicto distinction, but for a different reason. He believes (contra Burge) that all Intentional states are entirely constituted by their content and their psychological mode, both of which are "in the head," and that de re Intentional states are only a subclass of de dicto Intentional states.  Chapter II  Intentionality:  An Extended  23  Definition  These considerations suggest two things. First, Intentional aboutness cannot be ignored. Any account of Intentionality that omits aboutness will have failed to shed light on the connection between human cognition and the world. Second, an explanation of the aboutness dimension of Intentionality is likely to be an evolutionary one. If it is not just a coincidence that mental states have the power to refer to things outside an agent, a power that Is crucial for the survival of that agent, then an account of this power is likely to be found in the evolutionary history of the agent in question. The question of why aboutness, important as it is, is not necessary for Intentionality is rather complex and must await the expository work of the next few chapters. But we can offer the following clue: the answer lies in the manner in which the brain structures whose function is to indicate the presence of external objects do their job. 6  ii. Aspectual Shape  The Intentionality of mental states is often said to have an aspectual or perspectival dimension, because the information contained therein is necessarily slanted or from one "point of view" rather than another. Lyons explains: If my beach bucket contains [a] football, then it contains it in a simple and straightforward way. The whole of the football, rather than one aspect of it or perspective upon it, is contained in my bucket. However, if I think about the football, only a certain perspective on or view about the football will be in my thoughts. If I am only 2 or 3 years old, then, because of the limitations of my knowledge, I may only be able to think of the football as 'thing to be kicked that my brother got as a Christmas present'. If someone asked me whether I had just been kicking a football, I may sincerely deny that I had. For, while I had indeed been kicking a football, I was only able to think of the activity under the one and only aspect or description I knew, namely kicking the funny thing my brother got as a Christmas present. The perspectival or aspectual parameter of Intentionality is also true of all thinking, whether of an adult or a child. No matter how much I know about something, it is still limited to certain descriptions or perspectives or slants or aspects. (1995:2-3)  Dretske also acknowledges the aspectual nature of Intentionality: "In thinking about a ball," says he, "I think about it in one way rather than another—as red not blue, as round not square, as stationary not moving. These are the aspects under which I think about the ball. I can desire an apple, yes, but in desiring an apple I desire to eat it, taste it, throw it, hold it, look at it, or simply have it. These are the aspects ... under which I desire the apple" (1995: 30-1). Most of our mental states not only have reference, aboutness, objects that constitute their topic or extensional content, but they also represent these objects in one way rather than another. Even when there is no object, there may still be an aspect: think of mirages, dreams, optical illusions, hallucinations, and so on. Fodor speaks of the opacity of Intentional states rather than aspectual shape, but the basic point remains largely the same. He considers it a condition upon any acceptable account of the propositional attitudes that it should explain why Intentionality seems to operate under definite descriptions; he calls this "Frege's Condition" (1978: 504). Let us say Samson believes that his penpal is coming to pay him a visit next week. His having this belief does not imply that—since his penpal is in fact a 25 year-old blond, blue-eyed woman called Delilah—be thereby believes that a 25 year-old blond, blue-eyed women called Delilah is coming to visit, for he may not know that his penpal's name is Delilah, that she is 25 years old, or that she is blond and blue-eyed. In fact, Samson may not know that his pen-pal is a woman at all. What he believes is that his pen-pal is coming to  6  See the advertisement for L A S C H in §6.3.ii and the discussion of Intentional aboutness in §7.1 .i.  Chapter II  Intentionality:  An Extended  24  Definition  stay next week, and that is about the extent of it. Thus if someone were to tell him, "I hear Delilah is paying you a visit," he may well deny it, and do so sincerely. Sirnilarly, Oedipus wanted to marry Jocasta, but his desire to do so does not entail a desire to marry his mother, even though Jocasta is his mother. In fact, Oedipus contemplated a mother-son union with all the repugnance one might naturally expect. Fodor believes that examples such as these show the opacity of our Intentional states. We can expect Oedipus' desire to marry Jocasta to have different causal powers (including motivational force in regard to his action) and different explanatory roles (including making sense of his actions to himself) under different descriptions of his chosen bride, descriptions that may well be opaque or blind to one another. 7  I take the aspectual nature of Intentionality to be a rather unremarkable fact, a mere recognition of the obvious limitations to which any thinking entity is confined. Again, these limitations are by no means extraordinary, and they are not restricted to human psychology. As Lyons points out, every contact between any two things in the universe must be ... 'aspectual' or 'from a particular point of view". When one billiard-ball bumps into another, the first ball hits or scratches or at least bumps into just one side of the other billiard-ball. When we first catch sight of a friend in the street, we see the front or side or back of her. So it should be no surprise that when we find our way in the world or act in regard to the world or make plans in regard to the world ... then all these activities will be aspectual. So it should be no surprise that when we believe or desire something, then we do so in an aspectual way, or with a limited point of view. (1995:62)  It is precisely because of this "limited point of view" that there is a difference between Samson's believing that his pen-pal is coming to visit and his believing that his visitor is a 25 year-old blond, blue-eyed woman named Delilah. And we know there is a difference between the two beliefs because having one does not entail having the other. Similarly, wanting to marry Jocasta does not entail wanting to marry mom, believing that a pitcher contains water does not entail believing that it contains H 0, believing that Kofi Anan is of African ancestry does not entail believing that a previously elected Secretary General of the United Nations is of African ancestry ... 2  We can put the same point in information-theoretic terms. If a signal carries the information that 5 is F, it does not necessarily carry the information that s is G , despite the extensional agreement of F and G. Even though F and G are true of exactly the same things, the information that s is F is different from the information that s is G (Dretske 1981; Israel and Perry 1990). The extensional equivalence of F and G is a further datum that is not contained in the original signal. Dretske described this fact as the essence of informational Intentionality. The same opacity is also manifest in language, in the sentences which describe what someone believes, desires, intends, fears, etc. In the case of language, however, we call the corresponding phenomenon intemionality (with-an-s). One of the ways a sentence can qualify as intensional is if the replacement of predicate expressions by coextensive predicate expressions alters (or can alter) the truth-value of the sentence as a whole. So, for example, "He believes that s is F is an intensional sentence (and the attitude or state it describes is an Intentional state) because even if " F and "G" are coextensional (true of exactly the same things) one cannot substitute "G° for " F in this sentence withoutriskinga change in truth value. That is, "He believes that s is G" Upon hearing from the oracles that he would kill his father and marry his mother, Oedipus left Corinth in the hope of avoiding this fate. Eventually, when the true nature of the marriage was discovered, Jocasta committed suicide and Oedipus blinded himself in grief and became a wandering beggar. See Sophocles' Oedipus the King. 7  Chapter II  Intentionality:  An Extended  25  Definition  may be false even though everything that is F is G and vice versa ... The sentences that describe what a person intends, believes, knows, hopes for, wishes, plans, and imagines are all intensional in one way or another. (Dretske 1981:75-6)8  Another way a sentence may qualify as intensional is if it does not permit existential generalization as a valid form of inference. For example,fromthe truth of the sentence, "The sheriff believes that Mr. Holland is an honest man," we cannot validly infer that (3x)(the sheriff believes that x is honest), since x (Mr. Holland) can just be afigmentof the sheriffs imagination. On the other hand,fromthe truth of the «o«-intensional sentence, "Mr. Holland is an honest man," we can validly infer (3x)(x is honest) and we can substitute coextensional expressions for "Mr. Holland" without changing the truth-value of the sentence. What all of this shows is that there are many distinct perspectives or aspects to things, and that Intentionality is sensitive to these aspects. If Dretske is correct (as I believe he is) in observing that the information that 5 is F is differentfromthe information that 5 is G even though F and G are coextensional, then the aspectual nature of Intentionality can be captured by information theory. We will return to this issue in chapter VI. iii. Directedness  We said that knowing that a certain picture is a picture of a black horse does not tell us whether it is a black-horse picture, a blackish-spot picture, a brown-cow picture, or any sort of object-picture at all. The same is true of Intentional states. Knowing that Eva has a belief about Adam does not tell us what she believes, for she may have mistaken Adam for the milkman, the postman, the pizza delivery boy, or any one of many other objects we can easily imagine. In such cases we shall say that Eva's belief is about Adam, but is directed toward the milkman, the postman, or the pizza delivery boy, as the case may be. Whereas aboutness is meant to capture the topic, or reference, or extensional content of an Intentional state, the directedness of an Intentional state is meant to capture the state's comment, or sense, or explicit content. Another way to say more or less the same thing is that aboutness is fixed widely whereas directedness isfixednarrowly. It follows that a mental state may be about x (have x as its wide content) but be directed toward y (have y as it narrow content), where x^y. It was also said that an Intentional state need not be about anything, but that all Intentional states are directed. Having seen someone whom I believe to be Adam crossing the street, whether or not my belief is about Adam depends on whether or not Adam bears relation C to my representation of the street-crosser. If Adam bears that relation, then my belief is both about Adam and directed toward him; if Adam does not bear that relation, then my belief is about whatever object bears relation C to my representation, and no object means no aboutness. But regardless of whether or not anything bears C to my representation, or what (if anything) that object may be, my belief is still directed toward Adam, since it is Adam whom I believe to have crossed the street. 9  Notice that according to the substitutivity test of determining de re and de dicto Intentional states, this means that the propositions expressing de re Intentionality will always be non-intensional, while the propositions expressing de dicto Intentionality will always be intensional; see note 5. 1 want to keep things simple for now. More complex cases—e.g., "Samson is stronger than Adam," and "I saw Mommy kissing Santa Claus"—will be dealt with later. 9  Chapter II  Intentionality: An Extended Definition  26  Aboutness focuses on an object exclusively: given an Intentional state m that is in relation C with an object o, for all p, if m is about p, then p is identical to o. But, though I have so far spoken of the directedness of an Intentional state as if it likewise focused on an exclusive object, directedness (unlike aboutness) is very much dependent on whether or not the agent is able to discriminate o from other objects; and the ability of the agent to discriminate o from other objects is a function of the kind of information the agent receives from o and the manner in which this information is processed. My mental state is about Adam only if Adam stands in C to my experience, and if Adam stands in relation C to my experience, my mental state cannot be about any object that is not Adam. But whether or not my mental state is directed toward Adam in a similarly exclusive way depends on the resources of the information-processing system that I am, on whether or not these resources are sufficient to differentiate Adamfromother superficially similar objects. If not, then my mental state will still be directed toward Adam, but not exclusively. 10  The intuition here is that if an information-processing system (agent) neither has the capability nor the resources to distinguish certain objects, then we should not look to the directedness of that system's Intentional states to do the job. Rather the opposite: we should expect this kind of liberality to manifest itself in the directedness of the system's Intentional states precisely because the system is incapable of making the relevant distinctions. The reason for this will become clear following our discussion of scripts. Since it is possible for an Intentional state to be about x but be directed toward y (x * y), a question now suggests itself. How should Intentional states be individuated? If we choose to individuate Intentional states by their aboutness, the sense-reference distinction becomes irrelevant; the only thing that counts is reference. Thus the difference between believing that Delilah is coming to visit and believing that Samson's pen-pal is coming to visit would be ignored: the two beliefs are identical because they have the same topic. Wanting to marry Jocasta is wanting to marry mother, since the reference in both cases is to the same object. And it does not matter that you think you see a brown cow and I think I see a blackish spot; our beliefs are the same because they are both about a black horse. This is obviously inadequate. Believing that Delilah is coming to visit and believing that Samson's pen-pal is coming to visit are not the same Intentional state, since Samson can be in one without being in the other. And even though Oedipus wanted to marry Jocasta, he certainly had no desire to marry his mother. Further, while it is true that your belief and mine are about the same black horse, it is also true that you believe you see a brown cow and I believe I see a blackish spot: the two beliefs are different in content. So if someone wanted to know what you and I believe, individuating our mental states by aboutness will be of little use. Ultimately, differences in sense make for differences in Intentional states, but differences in sense (where the reference remains constant) are impossible to capture if Intentional states are individuated by aboutness. There is the further fact that some Intentional states have no aboutness at all. Eva believes that there is a colony of Leprechauns living inconspicuously in a forest 60 miles northwest of Dublin. She is worried that the Leprechauns will be found before she gets the opportunity to see them and (according to legend) share in their riches. How shall we treat Eva's belief? There are no Leprechauns, no colony, and (we may suppose) no forest 60 miles northwest of Dublin. Accordingly, Eva's belief with regard to the existence and location of the colony, her wish to see it, and her The word "discriminate" is meant to be neutral as to the manner of discrimination.  Chapter II  Intentionality:  An Extended  27  Definition  anxiety that it may be discovered before she gets her wish are Intentional states that are not about anything. But they are Intentional states nonetheless, which need to be individuated like the rest. The same is true of Eva's beliefs that Robinson Crusoe was lonely, that David Copperfield worked in a blacking factory, that dragons spitfireand unicorns fly. Because aboutness is not a necessary condition for Intentionality, it makes for a poor method of individuating Intentional states. I do not mean to suggest that individuating Intentional states by aboutness is never appropriate. If I decide to organize my picture album by theme, I am more likely to do so by sorting the pictures by topic rather than by comment. A blackish-spot picture and a brown-cow picture would then be judged "the same" relative to theme or category //they were both pictures of a black horse. Similarly, if for some reason someone wanted to categorize all objects capable of producing Intentional states in humans, (s)he might choose to do so by individuating Intentional states by aboutness (which, by the way, would be the best way to proceed). So one need not deny circumstances where individuation by aboutness may be more appropriate or efficient than individuation by directedness. What should be kept in mind, however, is that the former method is much more broad-grained than the latter, that in choosing to individuate Intentional states by aboutness we risk overlooking genuine differences between these states and missing a host of others. 11  Individuating Intentional states by their directedness seems like a better strategy, one that has the advantage of not requiring that the states thus individuated be about anything. So Eva's beliefs with regard to Leprechauns, her desire tofindtheir colony and share their riches, her fear of not doing so in time, etc. can now be recognized as full-fledged instances of Intentionality in a manner that would have been impossible if Intentional states were individuated by aboutness. Our ability to individuate Intentional states either by aboutness or by directedness (at least in principle) suggests that we can create two extensions for any given Intentional state relative to these two dimensions. Thus Eva's belief that Leprechauns exist has 0 as its aboutness extension (E ) and {/1 / is a Leprechaun} as its directedness extension (Ed)—which is just another way of saying that Eva's belief is not about anything but is directed toward Leprechauns. Similarly, Eva's mistaking Adam for the milkman is a belief that has {a \ a is Adam} as its E and {m | m is the milkman} as its E. a  a  d  But notice the following difference between the two cases: Eva's belief about Leprechauns does not involve a real object, which is why it is aboutless and is directed toward an imaginary entity. Her mistaking Adam for the milkman, on the other hand, is both about a real thing (Adam) and directed toward a real thing (the milkman). The difference between the two cases raises the following concern: The set {/1 / is a Leprechaun} just is the empty set, since there are no Leprechauns; the identity of sets, after all, is determined by their members. So it isn't very clear how the aboutness and directedness extensions of Eva's Leprechauns-belief differ. 12  " Actually, individuating by aboutness is not always more broad-grained than individuating by directedness. We can have two Intentional states directed identically but with different aboutness (Dr. Paul Bartha has reminded me of this possibility in personal correspondence; see the discussion of "Twin-Earth Cases" in §7.1.iv). Nevertheless, my point still stands. I suggest that the number of unique Intentional states capturable by a directedness-based individuation method is significantly higher than the number of unique Intentional states capturable by an individuation method based on aboutness. 12  The point was raised by Dr. Steve Savitt in personal correspondence.  Chapter II  Intentionality:  An Extended  28  Definition  The same criticism seems to apply to any Intentional state involving a fictitious object. To answer it, we need to backtrack and take stock of what we know with respect to the Intentional status of Eva's belief. We know that (i) Eva's belief that Leprechauns exist is an intentional state that is somehow connected to the imaginary objects, Leprechauns; and (ii) Eva's belief that Leprechauns exist is not about anything because Leprechauns do not exist. Now (i) and (ii) imply that whatever it is that makes Eva's mental state Intentional need not be an actual thing in the real world, that Intentionality need have no reference, or topic, or extensional content. In chapter VIII shall argue that what makes Eva's mental state Intentional is that it has directedness toward a specifiable object (not necessarily a real one) as determined by a primed definitional script (script^). The trick is tofinda way of defining the directedness extension of an Intentional state that renders irrelevant the (in)existence of its members. One way to do so is to conceive of the object(s) of directedness counterfactually, not by the items that do answer to or satisfy the definitional script in question, but by any (actual or possible) item that would satisfy the scripto. Defining a directedness extension in this way still allows us to say definitely what does and does not go into the directedness extension of an Intentional state; so we can say that Eva's belief is directed toward Leprechauns but not toward baboons, television sets, or the third-world economy. It does not matter that Leprechauns do not exist; what matters for directedness is that an object o can exist and that o would satisfy the corresponding definitional script if it did exist. The difference between Eva's directedness extension being {/1 / is a Leprechaun} and her directedness extension being 0 can now be seen as the difference between saying that the possible object Leprechaun would satisfy Eva's script and saying that there is no possible object that could do so. In any case, directedness does not always involve abstract entities—as when E = Ed for some Intentional state (see §7.2.i for more details)—and so separating E and E seems well in order. Such a separation will also figure importantly in our later account of misrepresentation (more on this in chapter VII). 13  14  D  a  a  d  Returning to the main point, there is reason, then, to believe that individuation by directedness is at least morefine-grainedthan individuation by aboutness. Yet individuating Intentional states by directedness may not be wholly unproblematic. It is not clear, for instance, how this method can preserve the aspectual shape of Intentional content. There is no special problem with cases like Eva's mistaking Adam for the milkman, where the aboutness and directedness of a mental state have different extensions. But what about Oedipus' desire to marry Jocasta and not his mother? The milkman is a different person from Adam, not some aspect or description of him; so we may account for Eva's mistake by comparing the aboutness extension of her belief, E = {a \ a is Adam}, with the directedness extension of her belief, E = {m \ m is the milkman}. Oedipus' mother, however, is an aspect or description of Jocasta; so it seems that the aboutness extension of Oedipus' desire just is the directedness extension of his desire: both contain the same single object. a  d  Notice also that we can positively deny that Eva's belief is directed toward the Seven Dwarfs, the Keebler Elves, or the Smurfs, even though all of these "creatures" are physically similar to Leprechauns, and none of them is real. 13  Needless to say, my speaking of Leprechauns, Elves, Smurfs, and similar fictions does not commit me to the claim that such creatures exist, either here or in some other possible world. My speaking as if they do exist is only a pedagogical convenience, and I shall continue to refer to them more or less definitively in order to facilitate discussion. 1 4  Chapter II  Intentionality:  An Extended  Definition  29  Asserting that Oedipus' desire is directed toward Jocasta but not toward his mother requires an account of how directedness can focus on different aspects of the same object. This is not an extra problem with which we shall have to contend. The aspectual or perspectival parameter of Intentionality has already been acknowledged; and in showing how our scriptal approach captures this Intentional feature, we will have also shown how Oedipus's Intentional state can be directed toward Jocasta as a lover, not as a parent. iv. Misrepresentation  Intentional misrepresentation wasfirstpointed out by Chisholm (1957), and later stressed by Dretske (1986) and Lyons (1995). In fact, we have been talking about misrepresentation throughout this chapter. Beliefs and desires sometimes represent their Intentional objects as such-and-such when they are not such-and-such; that is, an Intentional state can "say" that s is F when s is not F: Eva mistakes Adam for the milkman, her goldfishfor a silver dollar, a bottle of beer for a bottle of cider; Oedipus misrepresents his mother as his lover, and his lover as not his mother; while Samson can mistake virtually anyone for his pen-pal. 15  The fact that Intentional states can misrepresent the world in this manner is the best support we have for the difference between Intentional aboutness and Intentional directedness. That an Intentional state can be directed toward an object that is distinct from that which stands in relation C to it is the most basic and straightforward way in which error can be generated. Thus Eva's perceptual experience of Adam, her standing in relation C to him, may not depict who it is her experience is an experience of; after all, she might see him on a foggy night and believe that she sees someone else. But if Adam stands in the right causal relation to her experiences, then Eva's belief is about Adam. Because she thinks she sees someone else, her belief is false. Echoing Goodman, Eva's belief need not be an Adam-belief in order to be a belief about Adam. What we are after here is simply a recognition that error goes hand in hand with Intentionality, that a representation of an object o can represent o as something other than it is. Having achieved that much, we defer a detailed discussion of the subject until chapter VII. Figure 2.2 summarizes our discussion so far.  Notice just how difficult it would be to see this //"Oedipus' representations were purely linguistic. In this case, it would be very confusing to say that Oedipus misrepresents his mother as his lover and his lover as not his mother, since his mother and his lover are the very same object to which the name "Jocasta" rigidly refers. But Oedipus' representations of the object whom he considers to be his mother and the object whom he considers to be his lover are very different, partly because these representations are not linguistically-based (see §4.4.ii), and partly because they do not designate rigidly (see §7.1.iii). 15  Chapter II  Intentionality:  An Extended  Definition  30  Figure 2.2. A summary diagram stressing some of the points covered in this chapter. Intentional states are differentiated from mental states and conscious states. Four dimensions or characteristics of Intentionality are also represented: aboutness, aspectual (or perspectival) shape, directedness, and misrepresentation (or error).  Intentional States  Four Dimensions  Two Distinctions  1 Aboutness: the reference, topic, or extensional content of an Intentional state; whatever stands in relation C to a state with Intentionality.  Aspectual Shape: Intentional states impart information that is slanted—i.e., from one perspective rather than another.  Directedness: the sense, comment, or explicit content of an Intentional state. An Intentional state may be about an object, x, but be directed toward an object, j> (either real or invented), where x *y. Although Intentionality may be aboutless, no Intentional state is undirected.  Misrepresentation: Intentional states can indicate that 5 is F when s is not F. Misrepresentation constitutes fairly strong evidence for the aboutness-directedness distinction.  Intentional States vs. Mental States  Intentionality vs. Consciousness  Mental States  Intentional States  Conscious States The class of mental states encompasses the class of conscious states and the class of Intentional states. Area 1 represents conscious mental states that are not Intentional, e.g., the unfocussed elation and depression mentioned in §2.1 .i. Area 2 represents those mental states that are both conscious and Intentional—e.g., explicit beliefs and desires. Area 3 represents non-conscious mental states that are Intentional—e.g., the "dormant" beliefs discussed In §2.1.ii. Area 4 represents the class of mental states that are neither conscious nor Intentional, such as an agoraphobiarelated general anxiety that a victim mistakes for a work-induced bad mood.  i Skin, Boundaries  Authority  By 'intuition' I do not mean the fluctuating testimony of the senses or the deceptive judgement of the imagination as it botches things together, but the conception of a clear and attentive mind, which is so easy and distinct that there can be no room for doubt about what we are understanding. Alternatively, and this comes to the same thing, intuition is the indubitable conception of a clear and attentive mind which proceeds solely from the light of reason. Rene Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, p. 14.  How can I tell what I think till I see what I say? E. M. Forster, Aspects of the Novel, p. 108.  3.1 Background to Externalism he internalist-externalist controversy is really a dispute about psychological boundaries and authority, and it goes back at least to Descartes. Descartes believed that we know some o f our prepositional mental events in a direct, authoritative, non-empirical manner, and that the paradigm of this self-knowledge is the cogito. H e famously held that the occurrence o f thought guarantees the existence of a thinker. A version o f this insight appears in the canonical slogan, cogito ergo sum: I am thinking, therefore I exist {Discourse IV: 127). A s illustrated early in Meditations II, the purported insight has it that while the existence o f a body may be subject to scepticism, the existence o f a person—qua thinker—looks to withstand even the most hyperbolic doubts. Thus Descartes confidently proclaimed: though the E v i l Genius may "deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something" {Meditations II: 17)—i.e., the very attempt to doubt one's own existence is paradoxical, since every such effort is an occurrence o f thought and the occurrence o f thought requires a thinker. 1  Descartes maintained that since we can know what we tbink authoritatively, the nature o f our thoughts must be independent o f the material world. A parallel inference is proposed in his distinction between mind and body in Meditations VI, and in Principles ofPhilosophy (I: 60):  A l l page references of Descartes' work are to Cottingham, Toothoff, and Murdoch's (1984) two-volume set, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. The slogan "I am thinking, therefore I exist" has inspired a number of classroom witticisms, of which Lyons (2001: 6) mentions one: "You can't, of course, substitute T am, therefore I think', ... for that would be to put Descartes before the horse." See Guirguis (2002) for a review of Lyons' excellent book, Matters of the Mind. 1  31  Chapter III  Skin, Boundaries, and Authority  32  ... from the mere fact that each of us understands himself to be a thinking thing and is capable, in thought, of excluding from himself every other substance, whether thinking or extended, it is certain that each of us ... is really distinct from every other thinking substance and from every corporeal substance. 2  Descartes observed that he had "clear and distinct ideas" of his thoughts, and then reasoned that since he can separate thought from corporeal existence, the process of thinking must be independent of his physical environment and of other beings. Tyler Burge suggests that "this line of argument guarantees the truth of individualism" (1988: 113). Putting individualism aside for the moment, the troubles with Cartesian dualism are formidable and all too familiar. In the fifth set of objection to the Meditations, Pierre Gassendi asks: "How can there be effort directed against anything, or motion set up in it, unless there is mutual contact between what moves and what is moving? And how can there be contact without a body... ?" (Objections and Replies: 237). Writing to Descartes in 1643, Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia expresses a similar concern. She requests an explanation of "how man's soul, being only a thinking substance, can determine animal spirits so as to cause voluntary action" (Wilson 1969: 373). At her urging, Descartes published The Passions of the Soul in 1649 to clarify these matters. But his reply— that the body causes the soul to have passions, and the soul causes the body to move through an inexplicable causal union—did not satisfy the Princess. Descartes' conception of the mental and physical as metaphysically separate invited difficult problems which he seemed unable to resolve. 3  4  A former professor of mine once remarked that to call someone a dualist now is considered an insult, that Cartesian dualism—with all its attributions of privileged access, incorrigibility, infallibility, etc—has hindered real progress in the philosophy of mind for decades. I doubt both statements: the first seems unduly excessive, while the second ignores important facts about the evolution of philosophy as a process and the role of the dualist program in shaping how we currently think about and investigate the mental. To be sure, there are few living dualists today. The confrontation between dualism and standard physics has been endlessly discussed ever since Descartes' own time, and is widely  2  See also Rules for the Direction of the Mind, 8: 29-30.  Descartes apparently thought very highly of Princess Elizabeth, enough to dedicate the Principles ofPhilosophy to her. In his dedicatory letter, Descartes praises her "incomparable" powers of understanding, and declares her to be the only person to have completely understood all his published works. "And when I consider that such a varied and complex knowledge of all things is to be found not in some aged pedant who has spent many years in contemplation but in a young princess whose beauty and youth call to mind one of the Graces rather than gray-eyed Minerva or any of the Muses, then I cannot but be lost in admiration" (Principles ofPhilosophy, Dedicatory Letter: 192). 3  One of the most blunt criticisms of Descartes—the "knot"—came from "a group of philosophers and geometers" at the end of the sixth set of objections: "The knot is this. We perceive very well that three and two make five and that if you take equals from equals the remainders will be equal; we are convinced of this and numerous other matters, just as you find yourself to be. But why are we not similarly convinced on the basis of your ideas, or our own, that the soul of man is distinct from the body, or that God exists? You will say that you cannot graft this truth into us unless we are prepared to meditate along with you. Well, we have read what you have written seven times, and have lifted up our minds, as best we could, to the level of the angels, but we are still not convinced. We do not believe you will allege that our minds are in a grip of a brutish stupor and are wholly unfitted for metaphysical subjects, when we have had thirty years practice in them! Surely you will prefer to accept that your arguments derived from the ideas of the mind and of God do not have the kind of weight or strength that could or should conquer the minds of learned men . . . " (Objections and Replies: 283-4). But by far the most heated exchange—containing numerous ad hominem attacks and personal insults—was between Descartes and the Jesuit, Pierre Bourdin; see the seventh set of Objections and Replies and Descartes' Letter to Father Dinet. 4  Chapter HI  Skin, Boundaries,  and  33  Authority  regarded as the inescapable and fatal flaw of any dualistic approach to cognition (Dennett 1991: 35). Nonetheless, it does not require much imagination or a great deal of philosophical acumen to endlessly pick on, criticize, disparage, belittle, blame, or plain bad-mouth an admittedly problematic view without taking the time to think about its place in intellectual history. At the very least, we can credit Cartesianism—as a clear expression of a longstanding model of the mind—with having provoked the critical analysis requisite for theoretical progress; that is how philosophy evolves.  5  6  Even though dualism has been largely abandoned, an offspring sentiment still lingers, an ideal that likens the relation between a person and his thoughts to seeing, where vision is taken to be a kind of direct, immediate experience. On the most unqualified versions of this picture, a person's inspection of the contents of his thoughts is infallible; the notion of incompletely understanding them has no application whatsoever. This model fastens on to the facts that we are generally good at identifying a wide variety of our own Intentional states, and that we have at least a prima facie authority in reporting them. The notion of our having direct or privileged access to some of our thoughts has been variously expressed, invoked, or presupposed in the theorizing of many contemporary philosophers. For instance, it seems to be implicitly operative in Frege's distinction between the sense of a name and the reference of a name. The following passage, taken from a letter Frege wrote to Philip Jourdine in 1914, is striking. Let us suppose an explorer travelling in an unexplored country sees a high snow-capped mountain on the northern horizon. By making enquiries among the natives he learns that its name is 'Alpha'. By sighting it from different points he determines its position as exactly as possible, enters it in a map, and writes it in his diary: 'Alpha is at least 5000 meters high'. Another explorer sees a snow-capped mountain on the southern horizon and learns that it is called Ateb. He enters it in his map under this name. Later comparison shows that both explorers saw the same mountain. Now the content of the proposition 'Ateb is Alpha' is far from being a mere consequence of the principle of identity, but contains a valuable piece of geographical knowledge. What is stated in the proposition 'Ateb is Alpha' is certainly not the same thing as the content of the proposition 'Ateb is Ateb'. Now if what corresponded to the name 'Alpha' as part of the thought was the meaning [i.e., referent] of the name and hence the mountain itself, then this would be the same in both thoughts. The thought expressed in the proposition 'Ateb is Alpha' would have to coincide with the one in 'Ateb is Ateb', which is far from being the case. What corresponds to the name 'Ateb' as part of the thought must therefore be different from what corresponds to the name 'Alpha' as part of the thought... An object can be determined in different ways, and every one of these ways of determining it can give rise to a special name, and these different names then have different senses; for  Ryle (1949:12-13) puts the matter this way: "Even when 'inner' and 'outer' are construed as metaphors, the problem how a person's mind and body influence one another is notoriously charged with theoretical difficulties. What the mind wills, the legs, arms and the tongue execute; what affects the ear and the eye has nothing to do with what the mind perceives; grimaces and smiles betray the inind's moods and bodily castigations lead, it is hoped, to moral improvement. But the actual transactions between the episodes of the private history and those of the public history remain mysterious ... They could not be reported among the happenings described in a person's autobiography of his inner life, but nor could they be reported among those described in someone else's biography of that person's overt career. They can be inspected neither by introspection nor by laboratory experiment. They are theoretical shuttlecocks which are forever being bandied from the physiologist back to the psychologist and from the psychologist back to the physiologist." O f course, mind-body interaction is also a problem for materialism. The difference, however, is that the materialist expects questions related to mental causal efficacy to disappear once we have a mature physical theory and/or cognitive science. The same cannot be said of substance dualism, which seems to generate difficulties that are unsolvable in principle (unless, that is, there is a wholesale revision and significant expansion of what we call "physics," which is now limited only to the material universe). 5  Beyond philosophy, Descartes' "two world" view had important ramifications for the development of psychology. Not only did it enabled psychologists to claim that they had a science of their own, quite independent of physiology, but it also stirred psychologists to create unique investigative methods especially tailored to their newly discovered discipline (Lyons 2001: 18-19).  6  Chapter III  Skin, Boundaries,  and  34  Authority  it is not self-evident that it is the same object which is being determined in different ways. (Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence: 80) 7  In other words, someone who hears and understands an utterance of a sentence containing the singular term "Alpha"—such as "Alpha is at least 5000 meters high"—must think of the mountain. But, as Dretske remarks, it is not possible to think of a mountain (or a ball, or an apple, or anything else) save in a particular way (1995: 30-1). If one gives the way in which our subject was dunking of the mountain, one would be giving what Frege calls the sense the subject attaches to the name "Alpha." It is that sense, or aspectual shape, to which the subject has direct and privileged acce Russell also makes explicit use of the idea of direct access: Whenever a relation of supposing or judging occurs, the terms to which the supposing or judging mind is related by the relation of supposing or judging must be terms with which the mind in question is acquainted. This is merely to say that we cannot make a judgement or a supposition without knowing what it is that we are making our judgement or supposition about. It seems to me that the truth of this principle is evident as soon as the principle is understood. (1917:160) We have acquaintance in sensation with the data of our outer senses, and in introspection with the data of what may be called the inner sense—thoughts, feelings, desires, etc.; we have acquaintance in memory with things which have been data either of the outer senses or of the inner sense. Further, it is probable ... that we have acquaintance with Self, as that which is aware of things or has desires towards things. (1912:28)  For Russell, acquaintance is direct, infallible, and non-propositional; and because it is nonpropositional, being acquainted with x does not imply having knowledge about x, since Russell believed that knowledge about is essentially propositional in nature. Moreover, because acquaintance is direct, it does not come piecemeal; it is an all or none achievement. 9  Along with logical positivism's effort to reduce all folk psychological idioms to statements couched in the language of physics, last century's most conspicuous attempt to dispel the notion of direct Intentional access camefromthe behaviourist faction. Most forms of behaviourism claim that mentalistic attributions can be analytically defined, or given strict meaning equivalences, purely on non-mental grounds. Gilbert Ryle, for instance, stoutly maintained that there is no distinction 7  See thefirstchapter of Evans (1982) for a good introduction to Frege's sense-reference (or sense-meawmg) distinction.  Frege also wrote the following to Russell in 1902: "The thought that all thoughts belong to Class Mare true is different from the thought that all thoughts belong to class N are true; for someone who did not know that M coincides with N could hold one of these thoughts to be true and the other to be false" (Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence: 153). The same idea is being expressed here once more: even though class M and class N are identical, the thought that all thoughts belong to Class Mare true is different from the thought that all thoughts belong to Class N are true, and for exactly the same reason that the thought Alpha is Ateb is different from the thought Alpha is Alpha: the senses of the two thoughts are not the same—which is why only one of the propositions about the mountain "contains a valuable piece of geographical knowledge." Compare this to Dretske's (1981) claim that if a signal carries the information that 5 isF, it does not necessarily carry the information that 5 is G despite the extensional agreement of F and G. 8  "Acquaintance," says Russell, "which is what we derive from sense, does not, theoretically at least, imply even the smallest 'knowledge about,' i.e. it does not imply knowledge of any proposition concerning the object with which we are acquainted. It is a mistake to speak as if acquaintance had degrees: there is merely acquaintance and non-acquaintance. When we speak of becoming 'better acquainted,' as for instance with a person, what we must mean is, becoming acquainted with more parts of a certain whole; but the acquaintance with each part is either complete or non-existent. Thus it is a mistake to say that if we were perfectly acquainted with an object we should know all about it. 'Knowledge about' is knowledge of propositions, which is not involved necessarily in acquaintance with the constituents of the propositions" (1914: 151). 9  Chapter III  Skin, Boundaries, and  Authority  35  between first-person and third-person access to Intentional states. In both cases the process is essentially the same: ordinary inspection of workaday behaviour gives rise to the discovery of patterns which lead to the imputation of appropriate propositional attitudes. Hence we know our own minds in exactly the same way we know the minds of others: by observing what we do and what we say (1949: 155).  B. F. Skinner, to take a more extreme example, had a passionate disdain for Intentional descriptions, especially those positing a "little man or homunculus": Primitive origins are not necessarily to be held against an explanatory principle, but the little man is still with us in relatively primitive form. He was recently the hero of a television program called "Gateways to the Mind," one of a series of educational films sponsored by the Bell Telephone Laboratories and written with the help of a distinguished panel of scientists. The viewer learned, from animated cartoons, that when a man's finger is pricked, electrical impulses resembling flashes of lightning run up the different nerves and appear on a television screen in the brain. The little man wakes up, sees the flashing screen, reaches out, and pulls a lever. More flashes of lightning go down the nerves to the muscles, which then contract, as the finger is pulled away from the threatening stimulus. The behavior of the homunculus was, of course, not explained. An explanation would presumably require another film. And it, in turn, another. (1964:80)  Positing homunculi to aid psychological explanations need not be objectionable, just as long as those "little men" are properly discharged (Dennett 1991: 14). Skinner knew this. His objection to folk psychology was in fact more profound than the above criticism suggests. To put it bluntly, the folk psychological way of talking about and explaining human behaviour was for him utter nonsense; and so was any attempt to analyze human behaviour using the categories of folk psychology. What Skinner despised most of all was the view of the mind that assigns a certain measure of privacy to Intentional states, the appeal to which from a third party was consequently assumed to be inferential. In particular, internalism was decried, for it has "the effect of diverting attentionfromthe external environment" (1971: 195). Skinner's strategy for dealing with the "privacy" of thought was to advise that an adequate science of behaviour must consider events taking place within the skin of the organism, not as physiological mediators of behaviour, but as part of behaviour itself. A science of behaviour can deal with these events without assuming that they have any special nature or must be known in any special way. "The skin is not that important as boundary," says he, "private and public events have the same kinds of physical dimensions" (1964: 84). He based his explanation of human behaviour on the simple (and somewhat simplistic) reinforcement of operants model: We change the relative strengths of responses by differential reinforcement of alternative courses of action; we do not change something called a preference. We change the probability of an act by changing a condition of deprivation or aversive stimulation; we do not change a need. We reinforce behavior in particular ways; we do not give a person a purpose or an Mention. (1971:94; my emphasis)  This passage suggests that there is no place for "consciousness" or "awareness" in a science of human behaviour, and as far as Skinner was concerned, there wasn't. He argued that an organism learns to react discriminatively to the world around it under certain contingencies of reinforcement. "Thus a child learns to name a color correctly when a given response is reinforced in the presence of the color and extinguished in its absence ... So far as we know, the same process of differential reinforcement is required if the child is to distinguish among the events occurring within his own skin" (1964: 85). This makes "consciousness" and "awareness" social products: "We learn to see that we are seeing only because a verbal community arranges for us to do so" (1964: 88). There are some surprising ramifications of this position: because the verbal community cannot reinforce selfdescriptive responses as easily or effectively as it can teach a child to call one pattern of stimuli  Chapter III  Skin, Boundaries, and Authority  36  "red" and another "orange," Skinner concludes that "a person cannot describe or otherwise 'know' events occurring within his own skin as subtly or precisely as he knows events in the world at large" (1964: 85).  Skinner published "Behaviorism at Fifty" in order to commemorate the 50 anniversary of the behaviourist movement and to provide a "restatement of radical behaviourism." The paper was read to an audience, some of whom had questions after the presentation. One listener asked, th  What is Professor Skinner's behaviouristic account of the high intellectual activities reflected in his paper?  Skinner's answer: May I say first that psychology needs to leam one very important lesson, and that is that it cannot answer every question which is asked of it. We cannot, now, give a very adequate account of intellectual activity—probably the most complex behavior of the most complex organism which has yet appeared on the face of the earth. (1964: 99)  One gets the sense that behaviourists have learned the lesson to which Skinner refers better than anyone else; for there has to be something seriously amiss with a theory that, after fifty years of growth andfine-tuning,has still virtually nothing to say about higher cognition. Though psychology is still far from giving an adequate account of human intellectual activity, a lot of progress has been made in this area over the past two decades; and the progress was made despite behaviourism, not because of it. Behaviourism in general—and the Skinnerian brand, in particular—is now as defunct as Cartesian dualism, in part because (and here comes an amusing piece of irony) it could not explain one of the most conspicuous aspects of mentality: the fact that contentful states are generally known to the subject who has them without appeal to behaviouristic or otherwise external evidence (Davidson 1987: 95; Boghossian 1989: 152). The trouble is not merely that behaviourism runs counter to all the relevant appearance; the trouble is that, for much of what we do know about our thoughts, behaviourism can offer no explanation at all. I think lam thirsty and I know, immediately upon having this thought, that I am thirsty is what is going through my mind. Skinner's reinforcement model has nothing to offer here, and Ryle's denial of a difference betweenfirst-personand thirdperson access to mental states seems simply wrong. My knowledge of my occurrent thought could not have been inferred from any premises about my behaviour, because it could not yet have had any traction on my behaviour. Appealing to my verbal community—especially in light of Skinner's admission that society cannot properly reinforce private events—seemsflimsyat best. Sometimes I feel thirsty instantly upon waking up, and sometimes I wake up because I feel thirsty; in both cases I know directly what I am thinking. Having been sleeping for a number of hours prior, there seems to be no behavioural facts upon which my self-knowledge can be based. 10  11  1 0  See Dennett's "Skinner Skinned" (1978: ch. 4), and Davidson's "Mental Events" (1970: 216-17).  Two works which should be cited here are Charles Siewert's The Significance of Conscious Experience and Roger Moran's "The Authority of Self-Consciousness." The first is an appeal to have first-person phenomenal experience occupy a central place in our conception of mind and Intentionality, and the second does the same for first-person warrant and authority. See also Dretske's (2001) comments on Siewert's book. 1 1  Chapter III  Skin, Boundaries,  and  37  Authority  3.2 The Role of the Environment It is reasonable to construe behaviourism as a kind o f anti-individualism, since it sought to identify mental states using external criteria. But though behaviourism is no longer in vogue, externalism still has a wide following. The role that behaviour was supposed to play in identifying Intentional states has now been taken over by "the environment." Externalism implies that Intentional content is not fixed exclusively by what is going on inside someone's skin or by what is accessible to a person by reflection. F o r the externalist, mentalistic attribution does not presuppose that the subject has fully mastered—or even is capable o f fully mastering—the content o f his or her mental states. In fact, since the environment is said to play a role in determining the Intentionality o f the mental and no one can know everything about the environment, the externalist expects that there w i l l be cases where the subject w i l l not know what (s)he is thinking. Just what role the environment plays in determining Intentional content depends on what one means b y "environment." Different intuitions have produced different arguments.  i. Physical Furniture: Adam and Adam  te  One way to think of the environment is in terms of the things or objects that surround us. In the context o f externalism, this means that the physical furniture o f our lives contributes to the identity o f our Intentional states. This is brought out nicely in Putnam's (1975) now famous thoughtexperiment, in which we are to conceive o f a near duplicate o f our planet Earth, called " T w i n - E a r t h . " Except for certain features about to be noted, Twin-Earth resembles Earth in every detail. The physical environments look and largely are the same. M a n y o f the inhabitants o f one planet have counterparts on the other, with identical microphysical, phenomenal, and dispositional states and histories. It just so happens that on Twin-Earth there is no H 0 . The liquid that runs in rivers on the twin planet, that fills bathtubs and falls from the sky looks, tastes, and feels like H 0 , but is i n fact a different compound with a very different chemical structure, X Y Z . The inhabitants o f Twin-Earth call X Y Z "water," but twin-water (water ) is not water: water is H 0 . The year is 1750, when no one on Earth is yet aware o f the molecular composition o f water, and scientists on Twin-Earth have not yet discovered that water is X Y Z . 2  2  1 2  te  2  te  W e now suppose that A d a m is an English-speaking native o f Earth and that A d a m is his physiological duplicate on T w i n - E a r t h . When A d a m and his doppelganger simultaneously form beliefs that they express by saying, "There is water in the pitcher," what they say is different, since their respective utterances have different truth-conditions. The twins' beliefs w i l l also be different, since their beliefs pick out different objects in their respective environments: A d a m ' s belief picks out te  13  Some may doubt that Twin-Earth inhabitants could be physiologically identical to their Earthian counterparts if the liquid called "water" on the far off planet is not H 0 . Segal (2000: 24-5) voices this objection, and constructs a parallel example using topaz and citrine, two elements not found in the human body. See also Owens (1994) for a similarly motivated reconstruction using the metal aluminium. 12  2  By "physiological duplicate" I mean that we have two individuals who are microstructurally identical. But the twins are still different at least in one respect: when they are counted, they will be assigned different numbers. That is to say that the twins occupy different points in space, and will therefore have different spatial relationships to any given external object (e.g., Earth or Twin-Moon). So at least in one sense of "physical"—a broad sense that includes external relational properties—Adam and Adam are not physically identical. But this is irrelevant to the present point: the premise is that the twins are physiologically or molecularly indistinguishable, and this says nothing of the distal relations they might or might not have with the objects around them. 13  te  Skin, Boundaries,  Chapter III  and  38  Authority  water, H 0 ; A d a m ' s picks out X Y Z , twin-water. So the M o r a l o f Putnam's story is that the physiological identity o f the twins does not guarantee the identity o f their propositional attitudes. 2  te  15  The Twin-Earth story was meant to show the incompatibility o f two different mind-sets. Putnam holds that many philosophers have wrongly assumed that psychological states like belief, desire, and knowing the meaning o f a word are both (i) "inner" in the sense that they do not presuppose the existence o f any thing or any one other than the subject to whom they are ascribed, and (ii) that these are the very states we normally identify and individuate and call the propositional attitudes. Since, as the Twin-Earth story shows, the individuation o f propositional attitudes and meanings must involve relations to objects and events other than the individual, Putnam believes (i) and (ii) come apart. In his opinion, no state can satisfy both conditions. H e calls psychological states satisfying condition (i) narrow, and those properly called "propositional attitudes" (i.e., those that are sensitive to agent-environment relations), wide. So a believer is not necessarily the best judge o f what his own belief is about, because what a belief is about is what it " m a p s " or "hooks on t o " in the world, facts o f which the believer could be ignorant. "It is a bit like a fisherman casting his line into the river, successfully, and thinking he has hooked a trout when it is only a pike" (Lyons 1995: 84). T o put the matter another way, A d a m sees a pitcher o f H 0 and says to himself, " H e r e ' s a pitcher o f water;" back on Twin-Earth, A d a m utters the same words when he sees a pitcher full o f X Y Z . Each speaks the truth, since their words mean different things, and since both are sincere, it is natural to suppose that each believes different things: A d a m believes that there is a pitcher o f water in front o f him; his twin believes that it is a pitcher of water he sees. But do they know what they believe? O n the one hand, we seem to have a case where the twins are in identical narrow psychological states, but on the other, i f the meanings o f their words—and thus the propositional attitudes expressed by using these words—are partly determined by external factors about which the agents are ignorant, their propositional attitudes and meanings are not narrow in Putnam's sense. There is therefore nothing on the basis o f which either speaker can tell which state he is in, for there is no internal or external clue to the difference. W e ought, it seems, to conclude that neither speaker knows what he means or thinks. 2  te  te  16  This conclusion has been drawn explicitly by Putnam, who declares that he "totally abandons the idea that i f there is a difference in meaning ... there must be a difference in our concepts (in our psychological states)" (1975: 164-5). O n Putnam's view, part o f what makes it true that A d a m has thoughts involving water is that it is typically in re H 0 that he tokens those thoughts; A d a m , who grew up on Twin-Earth, would not have the concept water but some other concept, water^. T w o individuals can therefore be in all relevant physical respects the same, and yet mean different things by their words and have different propositional attitudes (as these are normally identified). 17  2  te  Notice that, in the terminology I have introduced in the previous chapter, the difference between Adam and Adam 's beliefs is one of aboutness, not directedness. So if, as I have suggested, it is better to individuate beliefs by directedness rather than aboutness, the twins' beliefs are identical. The externalist does not see it that way, however, insisting that (in the context of the present argument) the physical furniture of one's environment makes a difference to the Intentional content of one's mental states. I am here trying to present the argument from the perspective of this type of externalism. 1 4  te  1 5  For a similar treatment, see Owens (1994), Heil (1994), and Stich (1992).  Barring, of course, a full chemical analysis of the compounds, which, given the stipulated time-frame and state of technology of the two planets, could not be performed. 16  1 7  By "psychological states" Putnam means narrow psychological states.  Chapter III  39  Skin, Boundaries, and Authority  Those who are convinced of the external dimension of Intentional content as ordinarily identified and individuated have reacted in different ways. One response has been to make a distinction between the contents of thought as subjectively and internally deterrnined, and ordinary beliefs, desires, and intentions as we normally attribute them on the basis of outward signals and connections. Typically, this position regards the physical state of the agent as supervenient upon the agent's narrow psychological state. It seems to me that this is the trend of Putnam's argument. ii. Sociolinguistic Conventions: "Arthritis" and "Tharthritis"  The social and linguistic practices of a community are as much a part of one's environment as any physical object. So if we allow the "environment" a foothold in shaping one's mental states, it would appear that sociolinguistic conventions have an equal claim to define this role as do the things around us. Adopting this interpretation, Tyler Burge (1979)firstargues that Intentional states are typically specified by subordinate sentential clauses, that-clauses, which may be judged as true or false; and that in an ordinary sense, the noun phrases that embed sentential expressions in mentalistic idioms provide the content of the mental state or event in question. Accordingly, he calls thctt-c\a.uses and their variants, "content clauses." Burge then offers a three-step thought-experiment, with the usual externalist conclusions. In thefirststep, we are to suppose that a given person has a large number of attitudes commonly attributed with content clauses containing "arthritis" in oblique occurrence. For example, he correctly thinks that he has sufferedfromarthritis for years, that his arthritis seems most painful in his knees, that certain aches are characteristic of arthritis, that arthritis comes in different types, etc. In addition to these attitudes, he thinks, incorrectly, that he has developed arthritis in his thigh (arthritis is exclusively an inflammation of the joints). 18  The second step consists of a counterfactual supposition involving a situation in which the patient proceedsfrombirth through the same course of physical events that he actually does. He goes through the same motions, engages in the same behaviour, has the same sensory intake and dispositions to respond to stimuli, and participates in the same interactions with linguistic expressions. But whereas in the actual case "arthritis," as used by the patient's community, does not extend beyond joint ailments, in the counterfactual case the supposition is that "arthritis," as used by the patient's community, does include and encompass his misuse. In short, the counterfactuality in step two touches on the patient's social environment: he might have had the same physical history and non-Intentional mental phenomena, while the word "arthritis" was conventionally applied, and defined to apply, to rheumatoid disorders that include the one in his thigh. Burge presents thefinalstep as an interpretation of step two. According to him, the patient in the counterfactual situation lacks all of the attitudes, with content clauses containing "arthritis" in oblique occurrences, commonly attributed to the patient in the actual situation: he lacks the occurrent thoughts or beliefs that he has arthritis in the thigh, that he has had arthritis for years, that stiffening joints and aches with a specific character are symptoms of arthritis, and so on. This is because when, in the counterfactual case, the patient utters "One can develop arthritis in the thigh," the sentence is true, and the belief the patient expresses by his utterance is correct. But in the imagined case, neither the sentence nor the corresponding belief is correct. Switching between one linguistic community Burge's use of "oblique" is the same as our use of "intensional" in §2.2.ii. Thus "water" is oblique (or intensional) when it functions in a content clause so that it is not freely exchangeable with extensionally equivalent terms without threat of changing the truth-value of the expression in which it appears.  Chapter III  Skin, Boundaries,  and  Authority  40  and the other, the patient's belief would change accordingly, since the meaning of the content clause in the relevant sentence expressing his belief would likewise change. Because the patient would have no reason to suppose that the content of his belief changed, he could not be said to have known what he believed in the first place. The differences seem to stem from differences "outside" the patient considered as an isolated social organism, causal mechanism, or seat of consciousness. The difference in his mental contents is attributable to differences in his social environment. In sum, the patient's internal qualitative experiences, his physiological states and events, his behaviourally described stimuli and responses, his dispositions to behave, and whatever sequences of states (non-lntentionally described) mediated his input and output—all these remain constant, while his attitude contents differ, even in the extensions of counterpart notions... [S]uch differences are ordinarily taken to spell differences in mental states and events. (Burge 1979:28-9)  Burge maintains that part of what makes it true that some of my thoughts involve the concept arthritis is that I live in, and defer to, a community in which that concept is used in a certain way. Were I to have grown in an identical community, except that in it "arthritis" covers all rheumatoid ailments, I would not have the concept arthritis but some other concept, tharthritis. Putnam has reached similar conclusions, but, as we have seen, Putnam's reasoning does not depend on the idea that social linguistic usage dictates (under more or less standard conditions) what speakers mean by their words, nor, of course, what their narrow psychological states are. On the other hand, not everyone has been persuaded that there is an intelligible distinction to be drawn between narrow psychological states and psychological states identified in terms of external facts (social or otherwise). Burge denies that there are, in any interesting sense, psychological states satisfying Putnam's condition (i), in part because Burge assigns a certain primacy to language over thought. Thus, he thinks it profitable "to see the language of content attribution as constituting a complex standard by reference to which the subject's mental states and events are estimated, or an abstract grid on which they are plotted. Different people may vary widely in the degree to which they master the elements and relations within the standard, even as it applies to them all" (1979: 79). iii. Causal History: Swampman  So far we have considered the environment as understood in terms of physical furniture and sociolinguistic habits. But the environment does not just include things and conventions; it includes the causal history or aetiology of events. And depending on how this history unfolds, an externalist may offer reasons purporting to show that causal-historical facts can function to define Intentional content. But the word "history" is another variable here, for it can signify different durations, ranging from the entire evolutionary development of a species (see the following subsection) to the experiential lifespan of a single organism; in fact, anti-individualist arguments have been put forth based on both extremes. In "Knowing One's Own Mind," Davidson assumes a relatively local timeframe, and argues—with the aid of yet another (famous) thought-experiment—that the Intentional content of thought dependsfirstand foremost on the causal context in which thought is produced in an agent. Little or no causal context means little or no Intentional content: Suppose lightening strikes a dead tree in a swamp; I am standing nearby. My body is reduced to its elements, while entirely by coincidence (and out of different molecules) the tree is turned into my physical replica. My replica, The Swampman, moves exactly as I did; according to its nature it departs the swamp, encounters and  Chapter III  Skin, Boundaries,  and  41  Authority  seems to recognize my friends, and appears to return their greetings in English. It moves into my house and seems to write articles on radical interpretation. No one can tell the difference. But there is a difference. My replica can't recognize my friends; it can't recognize anything, since it never cognized anything in the first place. It can't know my friends' names (though of course it seems to), it can't remember my house. It can't mean what I do by the word 'horse', for example, since the sound 'horse' it makes was not learned in a context that would give it therightmeaning—or any meaning at all. Indeed, I don't see how my replica can be said to mean anything by the sounds it makes, nor to have my thoughts. (Davidson 1987:91)  Davidson agrees with Putnam and Burge that the Intentional content of ordinary propositional attitudes cannot be accounted for in terms of physical, phenomenal, causal-functional, computational, or syntactical states or processes specified now-Intentionally and defined purely on individuals in isolation from their physical and social environment. For Davidson, the issue depends simply on how the basic connection between thoughts and things is established. He holds that it is established by interactions between people and parts or aspects of the world. Dispositions to react differently to objects and events are therefore central to the correct interpretation of a person's thoughts and speech; otherwise we would have no way of discovering what others think, or what they mean by their words. "The principle is as simple and obvious as this," says Davidson, a sentence someone is inspired (caused) to hold true by and only by sightings of the moon is apt to mean something like There's the moon'; the thought expressed is apt to be that the moon is there; the thought inspired by and only by sightings of the moon is apt to be the thought that the moon is there. (1987:100)  Davidson does not claim that all words and sentences are directly conditioned by what they are about; we can learn to use the word "moon," for instance, without ever seeing the actual celestial body. The claim, rather, is that all words and thoughts must have a foundation in historical causal connections, and these connections constrain the Intentional contents of thought and language. On this account, Swampman's problem becomes obvious: he has no causal history to speak of, which means that he—at least at the moment of his creation and presumably for some indeterminate time thereafter—has no Intentional states at all. Familiar externalist conclusions are then easily drawn: "we are ... free," says Davidson, "to hold that people can be in all relevant physical respects identical while differing psychologically" (1987: 104). iv. Evolution: A Matter of Biofunctional Propriety  In the mid 1980s, a new theory emerged that was motivated in part by the belief that the manner in which the environment influences Intentional thought reaches far beyond the physical furniture of our surroundings, sociolinguistic customs, or local event history. This position—which seems to interpret "environment" very broadly to include the entire evolutionary heritage of a species—is associated with Colin McGinn, but more so with the work of Ruth Garrett Millikan in her book, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, and subsequently in a series of collected articles under the title, White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. 19  For Millikan, Intentionality is a real, non-linguistic, biological phenomenon. It has been produced in humans in exactly the same way in which hearts, lungs, and kidneys have been produced (hence the subtitle of her 1984 book: "New Foundations for Realism")—that is, as a tool that performs specific tasks. Just as any tool may be used in ways other than those for which it was designed, or may in time lose the ability to perform its function adequately, so too a bodily organ See the Reviews by Jay Rosenberg (1987) and Peter Godfrey-Smith (1988).  Chapter III  Skin, Boundaries,  and  Authority  42  may, through misuse or damage, fail to perform the tasks it was designed to carry out. In general, we must look to the effects a tool or a device is designed to have in order to understand its proper Junction. In the case of both human and non-human organisms, the design in question will be that which has been brought about by evolution through the process of natural selection. Millikan suggests that we should look upon our ordinary Intentional acts in the same way we look upon the activities of our organs and limbs: we should look upon them as the activity of biological devices whose intended effects define their proper functions. Believing, for instance, is the activity of a device (the brain), which is designed by evolution to have the effect of producing true beliefs in the believer. A true belief is one that is an accurate "map," or in some sense an accurate account, of how the world is, which in r