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Institutional arrangements for improved governance of community watersheds on the Sunshine Coast of B.C. Shay, Heather Marie 2003

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INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPROVED G O V E R N A N C E OF COMMUNITY WATERSHEDS O N T H E SUNSHINE COAST OF B . C . BY  HEATHER MARIE SHAY  B.A., The University of Guelph, 1997  A THESIS SUBMITTED I N PARTIAL F U L F I L M E N T O F T H E REQUIREMENTS FOR T H E D E G R E E O F MASTER OF ARTS (PLANNING) in T H E FACULTY O F G R A D U A T E STUDIES (School of Community and Regional Planning) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  T H E UNIVERSITY O F BRITISH C O L U M B I A September 2003 © Heather Marie Shay, 2003  In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department  or by his  or  her  representatives.  It  is  understood  that  copying or  publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  Department The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  Date  DE-6 (2/88)  0,4-  \0  Abstract There is a growing recognition that watersheds are important physical units for implementing sustainability. Many communities and policy makers are recognizing the benefits to adopting a watershed-based approach for problem solving and resource management. What many researchers ignore, however, are the institutional arrangements and governance structures needed to implement a new, participatory, community based process.  This research analyzes the institutional arrangements involved in the historical management and planning of the Chapman and Gray Creek watersheds, on the Sunshine Coast of British Columbia. Drawing from principles of institutional analysis, multistakeholder decision making, cornmunity based watershed management and public participation, the thesis concludes that an institutional analysis and development framework is a useful tool for ecosystem-based practitioners, and provides useful techniques for determining gaps and strengths in watershed governance efforts. The emphasis on community attributes is a strength of the framework; one which is readily apparent in analyzing the nature and history of watershed management on the Sunshine Coast. Additionally, the consideration of transaction costs, including those related to information access and sharing, coordination and collaboration; and strategic costs such as rent seeking and turf protecting, was essential to understanding the nature of interorganizational dynamics, rule systems, and decision making patterns over the history of the management of the Chapman and Grey Creek watersheds. Understanding these dynamics is crucial in identifying areas that show potential for future conflict, as well as areas that should be strengthened and built upon.  This case study also demonstrates that governments must move away from stakeholder involvement that seeks to primarily legitimize government decisions or the interests of a selected group, to processes that involve the stakeholders in identifying the issues and proposing possible answers. Additionally, there needs to be a movement away from "closed door" decision making to a more participatory, democratic approach, where the public and affected stakeholders have an opportunity to truly participate and influence government decision making.  111  Table of Contents Abstract Table of Contents  " '..  iv  List of Tables  v  List of Figures  vi  Acknowledgements  vii  1. Introduction 1.1 Overview 1.2 Thesis goals and objectives 1.3 Significance of research 1.4 Thesis organization  1 1 3 4 5  2. Conceptual Framework: Towards Improved Watershed Governance 2.1 Watershed Management 2.1.1 A definition 2.1.2 Historical evolution of watershed management 2.1.3 Current legal and regulatoryjurisdictions •2.1.4 Current trends in watershed management 2.2 Collaborative Decision-Making in Watershed Management 2.3 Community Based Watershed Management — 2.3.1 Watershed based initiatives 2.4 Institutional Arrangements for Improved Watershed Governance 2.4.1 The needfor a new watershed governance approach 2.4.2 Institutional analysisfor improved watershed governance  8 8 8 10 13 17 18 18 20 25 27 31  3. The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework 34 Approaches to Public Policy: The IAD Framework and neo-institutionalism n the context ofpublic policy 35 3.1 Institutional Analysis and the IAD Framework 38 3.2 The IAD Framework 40 3.2.1 Action arena 40 3.2.2 Three levels of rules 42 3.3 Criteria for Examination of Institutional Arrangements 43 3.4 Applying the Framework 50 4. Methodology 4.1 Research Approach 4.1.1 Qualitative research 4.1.2 Introduction to the researcher 4.1.3 Institutional analysis of the data 4.2 Primary Research  51 51 51 53 55 '.  56  iv  4.3  4.4  4.2.1  Key informant  4.2.2  Participant  4.2.3  Historical  interviews  observation approaches  56 and public  and primary  meetings document  58 research  Secondary Research 4.3.1  Use of interview  4.3.2  Data  58  59 data  validation  Scope and Limitations to the Research  59 60  60  5. Introduction to the case study: T h e C h a p m a n and Gray Creek Watersheds on the Sunshine Coast of B . C 62  5.1 5.2 5.3  The biophysical context: The Chapman and Gray Creek Watersheds The institutional context: Stakeholder roles and responsibilities An historical analysis of watershed management on the Sunshine Coast  6. T h e Institutional Analysis and Development Framework Analysis  6.1 6.2 6.3  6.4  62 66 72 83  Physical Boundary Issues 83 Community Attributes 84 Transaction Costs 87 6.3.1 Information costs 88 6.3.2 Coordination costs 95 6.3.2.1 Process/team composition related 95 6.3.2.2 Institutional relationships related 106 6.3.2.3 Power and decision-making authority related. ....116 6.3.2.4 Other coordination costs 119 6.3.3 Strategic Costs 121 Institutional performance and policy outcomes 129  7.  F i n d i n g s o n Institutional D e s i g n from the Case Study and Literature  141  8.  Conclusions  193  References  204  v  List of Tables Table 1. A Taxonomy of General Approaches to Public Policy  36  vi  List of Figures Figure 1. Map of the Sunshine Coast of B.C  63  Figure 2. The Chapman and Gray Creek Watersheds  64  Figure 3. Chronology of Events- Chapman and Gray Community Watersheds  73  Acknowledgements  I would like to acknowledge first and foremost the participants in this study, and all of the community members on the Sunshine Coast who were so helpful in assisting me throughout this process. Thank you to Kari, Ryan, and Robert for the inspiration, and for housing and feeding me while I conducted my research. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their support and encouragement; particularly to Nancy 'who believed in me' and Erin for the 'thesisation sensation kit' that made it that much more fun. Thank you also to Steph, Layla, Jenn, Diana, and all the other SCARPIES who served as my sounding board and support group. Immense thanks to my roommates, and my brother Cam, for putting up with me throughout this challenging experience. Finally, I am indebted to Tony Dorcey, for his valuable insights, and to Peter Boothroyd, for his wisdom and support.  viii  Chapter 1: Introduction  /. / Overview  There is a growing recognition that watersheds are important physical units for implementing sustainability. Scientists have advocated managing natural resources on a watershed level for many years, as the natural boundaries of drainage basins or watersheds define a largely contained natural system (Kenney, 1997). Many communities and policy makers are increasingly recognizing the benefits to adopting a watershed-based approach for problem solving and resource management.  Since the 1980's, watershed-based initiatives have gained popularity throughout North America. The term "watershed-based initiative" is commonly used to describe any collective effort aimed at improving the status or management of the water resources (as well as other natural resources) within a localized catchment basin (Kenney, 1997). Many of these new watershed initiatives have grown out of a desire from local communities to have an increased say in how their resources are managed, particularly their water supplies. Previous mismanagement by a fragmented top-down agency approach to watershed management has, in many cases, led to a degraded ecosystem, resulting in poor water quality in a number of communities across British Columbia (Koop, 2000). Particularly in areas where watershed reserves are the primary water supply for a community, watershed management has gone from being a bureaucratic, scientific concern to one that is of critical importance to the general population.  As concern for water quality and ecosystem health grows, so too does the demand for a local say in how resources are managed. Improving public participation in decision making, as well as partnerships and collaborative efforts with local community l  members, is increasingly the priority of a number of sawy politicians, as it is apparent that the old way is no longer working. Much of the focus of new watershed initiatives has been on improving collaborative decision making among various stakeholders in the community (Kenney, 1997). Many of the new watershed efforts constitute a broad and ambitious experiment in governance, where some of the most basic assumptions of traditional water and natural resource management are being challenged. Some of these challenged assumptions relate to who should be involved in decision-making, at what geographic scale these decisions should be based, and what processes would be the most appropriate to determine water uses (Natural Resource Law Centre, 1998). All of these questions concern "environmental governance," defined as the inter-related set of processes within which individuals in varied roles make decisions about the biophysical environment (Dorcey, 1999).  Much of the research and practical emphasis has focused on collaborative decision making processes and ways to improve community participation (Imperial, 1999). What many researchers ignore, however, are the institutional arrangements and governance structures needed to implement a new, participatory, community based process. Much time and resources can be spent on creating innovative collaborative watershed planning processes that never get implemented because no consideration is given to the weak institutional arrangements that were in place. "Institutional arrangements" represent the structure of the relationships between the institutions involved in some type of common endeavor (Ibid, 1999).  As each watershed is unique in its biophysical, social, cultural and economic characteristics, so too are the institutional arrangements necessary for successful  2  action and implementation. Water managers are increasingly recognizing that no one perfect solution exists for all watersheds, and criteria for successful initiatives vary widely. One useful tool that has developed to assist watershed managers in assessing their organizational capacity is the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework. Developed by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues in the early 1990's, the IAD framework is gaining popularity as a useful tool that helps identify the strengths and weaknesses of an organization's capacity to implement environmental decision making (Imperial, 1999). Based on principles of scientific ecosystem-based management, collaborative decision making and institutional design, the framework considers the strengths and weaknesses of individuals, community attributes, rules, information flows, efficiency, equity, accountability, adaptability, institutional performance and policy outcomes that constitute an environmental governance effort.  1.2 Thesis goal and objectives  The goal of this thesis is to analyze institutional arrangements for collaborative decision making in community watershed governance. The objectives are: •  To create an analytical framework drawing on literature related to ecosystem governance, community-based watershed management, collaborative decision making, and institutional analysis.  •  To illustrate the application of this framework to a relevant case study in British Columbia, and to discuss its value for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional arrangements involved in the governance of a community water supply watershed.  •  From the analysis, to discuss learnings for improved governance of community water supply watersheds, based on the application of the institutional analysis.  3  To address these objectives, I have chosen to apply the IAD framework to a case study on the Sunshine Coast of British Columbia. The case involves previous integrated-use strategies on two watershed systems, Chapman Creek and Gray Creek, which have resulted in significant public mistrust over government management of the watersheds (Lewis, personal communication, 2001). Residents have been concerned about their water supply for many decades, and  have recently been seeking local control over the community watershed reserves. The Sunshine Coast Regional District and the Sechelt Indian Band have agreed to work together to lobby the provincial government to divest the watersheds to their control. Lessons learned from the institutional analysis will greatly assist this attempted experiment in governance in ensuring that collaboration and strong institutional arrangements will lead to successful implementation and desired outcomes for ecosystem health.  /. 3 Significance of this research  Research into institutional arrangements in watershed management istimely,as public mistrust for traditional governance of water supplies increases, particularly in Canada. Additionally, new watershed initiatives are emerging at a rapid pace across the province, and indeed all around the world. This study is significant in that it addresses what many researchers and policy makers tend to ignore, yet what constitutes an essential element to successful implementation of collaborative environmental decision-making efforts: institutional arrangements. Applying the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework to an analysis of an emerging experiment in watershed governance should provide policy makers and community members with lessons that may be applied to watersheds across the province, and  4  beyond.  1.4 Thesis Organisation  Chapter 2 of this thesis provides an introduction to the concepts of watershed management, collaborative decision making in environmental management, and the range of institutional arrangements in watershed governance. It begins with an historical account of the evolution of the conditions that have led to the popularity of watershed-based initiatives, particularly in the province of British Columbia. It also discusses how public participation in environmental decision making has grown over the years, and why policy makers are now looking towards collaborative efforts with many relevant stakeholders to manage public natural resources. The chapter then goes on to argue that many of these collaborative efforts remain unsuccessful due to weak and fractured institutional arrangements, resulting in poor watershed governance, and in many cases, threatened watersheds and community water supplies.  Chapter 3 discusses the Institutional Analysis and Development framework. Stemming from the problems discussed in Chapter 2, this section emphasizes the potential usefulness of this approach to watershed managers and community members in strengthening their institutional arrangements. Drawing on work from Ostrom (1993), Imperial (1999) and others, it provides an overview of the criteria used in the analysis, as well as a discussion of how strongly ecosystem-based decisions as well as effective collaborative decision making are emphasized in the framework.  Chapter 4 describes the methods used in this study, including the rationale for using qualitative research in this analysis. The methodology was primarily based on Ostrom's IAD framework and Imperial's application of it to ecosystem-based  5  initiatives, in addition to previous institutional analysis work on river basin initiatives in Australia. Data collecting techniques commonly used in this study include in-depth one to one interviewing, primary document research, and participant observation of local political meetings. Analysis of the data involved an historical analysis, along with an investigation of inter-organizational relations and functional relationships through coding and ^angulation of the data. This section also describes the scope of the study along with the limitations of the research methods. Chapter 5 represents an introduction to the cases studied: the Chapman and Gray Creeks on the Sunshine Coast of British Columbia. The chapter begins with a physical description of the case, as well as a brief introduction to the main actors and stakeholders involved in watershed management of the Chapman and Gray Creeks over the years. The section also offers an historical analysis of previous attempts to manage the community watershed reserves that supply the majority of Sunshine Coast residents with drinking water. It concludes with a description of the current biophysical, social and institutional problems that now face the water managers on the Sunshine Coast, as well as opportunities that exist for improved collaboration and institutional management of their community water supplies.  In Chapter 6, the Institutional Analysis Framework is applied to the case study, detailing the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional arrangements on the Sunshine Coast. The criteria outlined in Chapter 3 are applied and discussed in detail. This chapter represents a discussion of the findings of the analysis, including outcomes of interviews, documentation research, and organizational analysis.  Based on the findings in the previous chapter, Chapter 7 presents lessons learned from applying the IAD framework to the Sunshine Coast Case Study. This section  6  includes a discussion of what policy makers and community members on the Sunshine Coast and elsewhere can take away from applying this tool. Chapter 8 offers concluding remarks and areas for future research. To highlight the significance of institutional arrangements to improved watershed governance, conclusions are developed according to the themes of barriers to collaboration and weak institutional arrangements, drawing on criteria from Chapter 3. By placing the research findings back into the theoretical context of institutional analysis and collaborative watershed management, this study contributes to the theory of improved watershed governance. By developing lessons learned and implications for practitioners on the basis of research findings, it is also hoped that this research will contribute to the enhanced practice of community-based watershed management in British Columbia.  7  Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework- Towards Improved Watershed Governance This chapter provides an introduction to the concepts of watershed management, collaborative decision making in environmental management, and the range of institutional arrangements in watershed governance. It begins with a definition of watershed management, and outlines the historical evolution of the conditions that have led to the popularity of watershed-based initiatives, particularly in the province of British Columbia. The chapter also discusses the current regulatory framework for watershed management in B.C.. It then describes how public participation in environmental decision making has grown over the years, and the reasons policy makers are now looking towards collaborative efforts with many relevant stakeholders to manage public natural resources. The chapter goes on to demonstrate that many of these collaborative efforts remain unsuccessful due to weak and fractured institutional arrangements, resulting in poor watershed governance, and in many cases, threatened watersheds and community water supplies. It concludes with an argument for new approaches to watershed governance.  2.1  Watershed Management  2.1.1 A definition  A watershed is an area of land from which all the water drains to the same location, such as a stream, pond, lake, river, wetland or estuary. Watersheds, also called river basins or catchment areas, can vary in size, and may embrace numerous tributaries that are fed by other rivers and streams. As a result, watersheds exist at many levels (Powell, 1983).  8  Ecologically, watersheds provide critical habitat for many aquatic and terrestrial plant and animal species. They serve as transport paths for sediment, nutrients, minerals and a variety of chemicals. Watersheds also provide water to human communities for drinking, cleaning, recreation, navigation, hydroelectric power, and manufacturing (Bonnell and Baird, 2000). Human activities on the land and in the water can have a great impact on these watershed functions. Construction of buildings and roads, draining of wetlands, mineral exploration, deforestation and agricultural activities can all alter the quality and quantity of water that flows over and mfiltrates into the ground. Additional se<iiments, chemical runoff, and the elimination of critical water shortage sites also alter watershed functions. Human activities may eliminate critical natural habitat sites, Hmiting the biodiversity in the watershed (Bonnell and Baird, 2000).  While initially the human impacts of such activities were managed as a series of isolated problems, today there is a greater recognition that interrelated problems should be managed as a system, or ecosystem (Doppelt, 2000). Because the natural boundaries of drainage basins or watersheds define a largely contained natural ecosystem, scientists have advocated managing natural resources on a watershed level for many years (Powell, 1983). Indeed, managing resources at a watershed level was first suggested over a century ago, but was abandoned in favour of a checkerboard pattern that focused on land ownership (Natural Resources Law Center, 1998).  Wriile today's political administrative units seldom conform to watershed boundaries, many communities and policy makers are recognizing the benefits to adopting a watershed-based approach to problem solving and resource management (Kenney, 1997). Watershed management consists of those coordinated human activities aimed  9  at controlling, enhancing, or restoring watershed functions (Bonnell and Baird, 2000). It represents more than a single strategy, and recognizes the interconnectedness of all the physical and biological components of the landscape, including human communities. 2.1.2 His torical evolutio n o f waters hed management The closest and most widespread association of past human activity with the hydrological balance of the drainage basin has been achieved through the operation of irrigation systems (Smith, 1969), which goes back thousands of years. Mesopotamia and ancient Egypt were two important river basin civilizations, where agriculture and flood control were formally managed (Newson, 1992).  The first time the term 'watershed management' was used was by the Tennessee Valley Authority, a comprehensive independent agency established by the US government in 1933, to manage the Tennessee River Basin in the southeastern region of the United States (Newson, 1992; Miller and Reidinger, 1998). It has gradually gained popularity in North America and elsewhere to refer to what may alternately be known as river basin or catchment basin management.  In the recent past, watershed management was viewed largely as the responsibility of government agencies and conservancy districts. The focus of the efforts was primarily on controlling the flow of water through the construction of dams and levees to protect human communities from flooding, to store water for times of drought, and to provide opportunities for water-related recreation (Bonnell and Baird, 2000). This emphasis on structural solutions to water storage and flooding problems has given way to new approaches that recognize the multiple functions of a  10  watershed, and the need to meet multiple objectives for a variety of users. Increasingly, as previous mismanagement has led to water quality and quantity problems, watershed management is becoming more complex, where it is now viewed as being beyond the sole responsibility of government agencies and conservancy districts. In Canada, 'management' of natural resources was dominated by the private use of public land and resources, up to and including the 1800's. As the population grew and demographics shifted, local individuals were increasingly abusing this common land, leading to what Hardin (1968) has described as the "Tragedy of the Commons", whereby a collection of individual decisions has aggregated and reinforced each other into a major problem, the consequences of which extend far beyond the individuals first involved. As a result, to counter the abuses made by a few private commodity users, the 1900's saw a shift towards increasing scientific management of public land by supposed 'neutral' administrators. During this era, citizen participation was for the most part overlooked, while water management was left to the "experts" (Griffin, 1999).  By the late 1960's and throughout the 1970's, citizens became increasingly frustrated with private commodity interest groups that seemed to have been granted 'carte blanche' access to public natural resources. Growing concern over water quality, air quality, pollution and deforestation led to the creation of a large number of environmental groups in North America, advocating for change to the way resources were being managed. Partly as a result of public outcry, governments made efforts to improve citizen participation in the process and procedures of administrative efforts (Griffin, 1999). The Canada Water Act was created in 1970 to attempt to provide integrated planning between federal agencies and the provinces. Up to that point,  il  beyondfisheries,the federal government was primarily interested in land issues, while the provinces controlled water development. One aim of the Act was to improve public consultation and awareness, as the enormous scale of Canadian Water projects such as dams and irrigation schemes made this necessary (Newson, 1992). By the end of that decade, governments were formally mandated to include public participation in major decision making (Griffin, 1999).  With the release of the World Commission on the Environment and Development Report entitled 'Our Common Future' in 1987, the second half of the 1980s saw environmental issues resurface as major public concerns in Canada (Dorcey, 2003). Governments were establishing new approaches to environmental decision making processes, based on multistakeholder participation and consensus- oriented processes. Examples of these new approaches included the National Task Force on the Environment and the Economy, and the B.C. Round Table on the Environment and the Economy (Dorcey, 2003).  Today more than ever before, informed citizens are demanding to be directly involved in environmental decision making. Decades of mismanagement under a complex and fragmented bureaucratic system , described below, have further contributed to ecosystem degradation, where resource extraction has led to poor water quality and quantity, destroyed habitat, and threatened the integrity of many community water supplies. As public mistrust over governmental management of watersheds continues to grow in the wake of contaminated water supplies, so too does demand for more 'democratic' and local watershed management processes (Griffin, 1999). The traditional top-down regulatory approach to environmental governance can no longer be applied to today's highly dynamic and complex watershed conservation and management needs (Doppelt, 2000).  12  That said, the context in which watershed management occurred in the early 1990's in the case study on the Sunshine Coast was much different then than it is today (see Chapter 5 for an in-depth introduction to the case study). Governments were much more open to negotiation techniques of dispute resolution, consensus building and multistakeholder processes to enhance involvement (Dorcey, 2003). The Integrated Watershed Management Planning process was a process instigated and driven by the Ministry of Forests in this era. Since then, government has backed off considerably from these initiatives, where citizen involvement has become less of a government priority (Dorcey, 2003). This represents a significant impediment to watershed management processes in the present.  2.1.3 Current legal and regulatory jurisdictions The current regulatory and legal jurisdictions over watershed management in British Columbia represent a complex system of unclear responsibilities and overlap of duties. The following summary of federal, provincial and municipal legislative powers over water courses demonstrates some of the problems with the current governmental and institutional framework for watershed management. A more detailed discussion of jurisdiction related to water supply areas in British Columbia is presented in Chapter Five.  Jurisdictional concerns  Jurisdiction over matters relating to the environment, watershed management, and stream protection is divided among the various levels of government, where each has been delegated certain legal powers through the British North America Constitution Act (1867), the Canadian Constitution Act (1982), and various associated Acts. The  following represents a brief overview of current federal, provincial and municipal powers as they relate to water and stream protection. When assessing the current institutional framework and the powers of local governments to manage their water supplies, it is important to consider this basic legal structure, and challenges to coordinating action between various levels of government.  Federaljurisdiction  1  Federal powers to protect watersheds are derived from its jurisdiction over "sea coast and inlandfisheries"in the Constitution. The Federal Fisheries Act is the primary federal Act affecting rivers and streams, where Sec. 35 prohibits altering and destroying fish habitat, and Sec. 36 prohibits emitting deleterious substances into waters frequented by fish. This allows Fisheries and Oceans Canada to authorize certain projects, as the policies and regulations in the Act merely require habitat compensation so that no net loss of fish habitat occurs. Section 36 is akin to an antipollution law, and has been used more frequently to prosecute offenders than any provincial legislation (Nowlan, 1996).  Provincialjurisdiction  2  Through Section 109 of the Constitution Act, the provinces are granted ownership of all crown lands and natural resources that are not privately owned. Provincial legislative responsibility for natural resources has resulted in the formation of provincial environment departments, and statutes relevant to water resources and environmental protection (Gardiner, Thomson et al, 1994).  All legislation in this document is accurate as of 2002. . All references to provincial government policy names in this document relate to existing regulations at the time of the Integrated Watershed Management Planning process, during the 1990's. In June 2001, the Liberal Party of British Columbia was elected to power, and consequently restructured the provincial ministries. Some of these Acts have since been reworked and renamed. 1  2  14  The province has the widest powers to protect the environment in British Columbia, as it has primary jurisdiction over property and civil rights. It also has the power to delegate authority to municipalities. Major laws applicable to watershed protection under provincial jurisdiction include the Fish Protection Act, the Water Act, the Land Act, the Wildlife Act, the Local Government Act (formerly the Municipal Act), and the Waste Management Act.  The Water Act has its historical underpinnings in regulating quantities of water, rather than quality. It authorizes the license allocation system, which does have important implications for watershed protection. However, the Act is outdated, and does not allow protection for instream flow uses. Under the Water Act, fish do not technically have the right to water. The Water Act also offers very limited protection to riparian zones, the land beside the water body (Nowlan, 1996). Under the provincial Lxind A.ct, some community water supply areas may be designated as Watershed Reserves or Community Watersheds, which restricts certain activities and stipulates forest practices beyond what is required in the Code.  Forest Practices  The Water Management Branch of the provincial Ministry of the Environment  has the responsibility to review activities and development 'in or about a stream' and in floodplains. They are also responsible for protecting water quality, quantity and timing of flows; minimizing flooding and aggregate erosion; ensuring flows for downstream fisheries; and approving forest development plans.  The Waste Management Act is the main anti-pollution law under provincial jurisdiction, as it prohibits emitting wastes without a permit, among other protective measures. However, this Act regulates sources of pollutants from single points only, so that pollutants coming from activities over a broad area are not controlled. This  15  means that activities and materials from construction, logging, mining, farming, land clearing and industrial use cannot be controlled under this Act (Nowlan, 1996).  Municipaljurisdiction  Municipal powers are delegated from the province, and are stipulated in the Local Government Act (LGA). The L G A does not give power to municipalities to control natural resources. However, if a municipality has environmental protection as its priority, there are a number of legal tools available at its disposal to encourage and regulate stream protection (Nowlan, 1996).  Ijocal Government optionsfor watershedprotection  Watershed protection measures available to local governments range from the broad to the specific. As mentioned above, these tools must integrate with federal and provincial laws in order to be effective. Municipalities have many legal tools at their disposal to protect urban watersheds, such as Official Community Plans, zoning bylaws, liquid waste management plans, development permits, land development and stream protection guidelines, conservation covenants, and stewardship bylaws. Many of these tools however are difficult to apply to water supply areas or Community Watershed Reserves, as they are often outside of the jurisdiction of the municipal government and are the domain of the provincial government.  Authority  over community water supplies  Local governments, such as Regional Districts, may retain water licenses from the provincial government to supply their communities with drinking water. Local water purveyors must be in accordance with the Health Act, the Water Act, the Park Act and the Canadian Drinking Water Standards (1992). This regulatory framework  16  applies to all local governments involved with policy planning within a community watershed (IWMP, 1998). While obtaining a water license makes the local government legally responsible for providing high quality water to its residents and consumers, local government does not have legal jurisdiction over the initial quality of the raw water. Local government is also mandated to minimize risk to life and property from floods, erosion and debris torrents, yet does not have jurisdiction over land use activities that may exacerbate such events. This gap in responsibility has placed local governments in difficult and costly situations, where water quality has been negatively impacted by resource extraction and development activities beyond their direct control. Concerns over water quality arising from residents have created animosity across all levels of jurisdiction across the province, and many local governments are calling for local control over water resources (Bonnell and Baird, 2000).  2.1.4 Current trends in watershed management  The number of other groups with vested interests in how watersheds are managed has grown far beyond the federal, provincial, and local governments. Throughout the years, as the number of parties interested in water use grew, so too did institutional complexity. "Every major set of competing interests in the use and management of water resources has fashioned institutions to advance those interests" (Western States Water Council, 1997). This list can include:  a) Private interests, including private rights holders to property or resources. This group can range from individual landowners to logging tenure holders.  17  b) Non governmental and special interest groups, which possess little formal authority but are important for representing the public interest. This can include environmental groups, educational organizations, and community groups. c) First Nations governments, whose rights have not yet been fully determined, 1  much less secured, adding great uncertainty to all other rights holders. First Nations governments may have jurisdiction over other aspects of local governance, such as economic activity. (PFRCC,  2000).  All of these groups have a stake in management outcomes. For this reason, they are often called 'stakeholders'. As a result of growing pressures from the demands of stakeholders, governments are recognizing the need to bring people together that have a stake in water management as a means of reducing conflict and coming up with decisions that fulfill common interests. Previous conflicts, mistrust, and poor public consultation mechanisms have led policy makers to conclude that open, inclusive and collaborative processes are critical to decisions that will have a reasonable shelf life. Such processes assure there will be a search for alternative solutions that will provide mutual gains whenever possible (WWPRAC, 1998). Over the past two decades, the popularity of using collaborative processes in watershed management has grown significantly, and is being implemented by governments and the professional community (Imperial, 1999).  2.2 Collaborative decision making in watershed management  Collaborative watershed management refers to shared decision making and implementation by public and private sector partners who share the common goal of  18  conserving or enhancing hydrologic resources (Michaels, 2001). Collaborative decision making involves focusing on the issues, an adequacy of representation, a solid locus of decision making authority, and adequate processes of decision making. These are all questions of governance (WWPRAC, 1998).  2.3 Community-based watershed management  Community-based watershed management is a collaborative approach to waterresource protection that enables individuals, groups, and institutions with a stake in management outcomes to participate in identifying and addressing local issues that affect or are affected by watershed functions (Bonnell and Baird, 2000). Proponents of CBWM maintain that involving local stakeholders in the decision making process results in more locally relevant solutions that consider the community's unique social, economic, and environmental conditions and values. Stakeholder participation is also thought to create a sense of local ownership of identified problems and solutions, thus ensuring long-term support for resulting management plans (Bonnell and Baird, 2000).  As local communities participate more actively in watershed management, the roles and relationships of resource managers and stakeholders will change. Traditionally, water managers were viewed as experts who were uniquely qualified to identify and implement-watershed strategies. CBWM recognizes that all stakeholders have a critical role to play in the management planning process, and can contribute in many different ways. To do this requires a collaborative effort to understand and address watershed issues.  19  A community-based approach to watershed management also moves beyond the traditional focus on biophysical components. The goal of CBWM is to protect and restore watershed functions while considering the variety of social and economic benefits of those functions. While watershed management decisions should be based on sound scientific information, resource managers have learned that decisions made on scientific evidence alone often fail because they conflict with a community's economic or social values (Bonnell and Baird, 2000). Community-based approaches attempt to incorporate a wide range of views into the management process by involving a diverse cross section of the community.  2.3.1 Watershed based initiatives A popular approach to attempting to integrate some of these collaborative CBWM principles is through watershed based initiatives. Collaborative watershed initiatives have become more popular out of necessity to break the gridlock in decision making, and as a method to improve public participation (WWPRAC, 1998).  On a community level, watershed based initiatives can take on various forms, but for the most part they encompass voluntary individual or community action to assess, protect, or rehabilitate local ecosystems. Many groups make a commitment to ongoing voluntary work, and often include educational, recreational and communitybuilding efforts. Watershed stewardship is a focus of many watershed based initiatives; it usually involves the responsibility, authority and accountability for the effects of community actions on the environment, as well as cooperation and sharing of decision-making (FBMP, 1997).  20  Watershed based initiatives have generally evolved in an ad hoc manner, each one tailored to the unique institutional and physical qualities of a particular region (WWPRAC, 1998). The activities are as varied as the individual groups, and can range from one-day stream clean-ups to ongoing projects aimed at the management of entire watersheds. Some of the types of watershed activities include: watershed planning and management; education and awareness raising of the natural world and environmental issues; research or assessment; monitoring of environmental conditions; surveillance work to support prohibition or regulation of ongoing or proposed activities; restoration or enhancement of damaged or degraded habitats; and preservation of valued places (PFRCC, 2000). They may also play roles in protection and compliance, integrated resource planning, research, public consultation, information and education, habitat improvement and habitat monitoring (DFO, 2000). Some groups perform very hands-on stream rehabilitation work, while others are strong advocates for improved legislation and decision-making processes, working with government agencies and business to plan, monitor, and restore the productivity of their watershed (DFO, 2000). As a result, watershed based organizations exercise varying levels of political clout and decision-making authority, depending on their goals and activities. While some groups may be formed of school children interested in planting trees along a stream bank, others have lobbied for significant changes to current management practices and have had considerable influence on land planning decisions that are under the legislative authority of their respective municipal governments (PFRCC, 2000).  Benefits of watershed based initiatives  Managing water at a regional, watershed basin level has a long history and a strong theoretical basis. Community watershed organizations play a very important role,  21  both in hands on stream rehabilitation work, as well as effective community organizing, public education and awareness building, partnership building, and political lobbying. In British Columbia, watershed based initiatives have become increasingly popular as concern increases over water quality, and salmon and fish habitat. In the Lower Mainland alone, it is estimated that there are about 100 watershed-based organizations (PFRCC, 2000). These groups range in size from under a dozen people to large coalition groups such as the Langley Environmental Partners Society and the Alouette River Management Society, which represents over twenty different interest groups (Ibid, 2000).  While some groups were formed out of concern for the need to address specific problems, others were created through various government initiatives. As governments continue to downsize and devolve powers to local communities, watershed groups are becoming popular with senior government as they are cost effective, and can be more adaptive and innovative than large agencies (PFRCC, 2000). Some examples of government initiated watershed based initiatives include the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Salmonid Enhancement Program, Habitat and Enhancement's Streamkeeper initiative, as well as the Fraser River Action Plan and the Fraser Basin Management Board. Local watershed based groups may be effective at improving long term environmental health due to their personal links and knowledge about the habitat resource in their own back yards. This personal knowledge allows the groups to integrate scientific data with historical observations and local values. Additionally, local groups are effective in organizing programs, facilitating problem solving at the local level,  22  identifying opportunities, integrating and coordinating efforts, communicating with the public, partnering with community members and businesses, and monitoring environmental variables (DFO, 2000).  The influence of community stakeholder and watershed groups in managing, protecting and restoring water quality and fish habitat has been significant. However, due to increased community involvement and years of experience, many new watershed based organizations have started to affect significant political change as well (Griffin, 1999). Habitat protection is primarily a political exercise, and advocacy by watershed groups is critical in maintaining watershed health in the face of growing populations and habitat degradation (PFRCC, 2000). Many academics attest that small, flexible institutional units are the best suited for the adaptive learning that is necessary to achieve sustainable resource management. A local watershed initiative offers the appropriate scale of social organization for governance decisions, as it ensures that beneficiaries share in paying the costs of management (Lee, 1992).  Criticism of watershed based initiatives  Although watershed groups can be effective in improving ecosystem health and community participation in governance issues at a very localized level, they possess very little authority over resource management decisions that occur within the watershed. Federal and provincial governments have jurisdiction over water resources and water courses, and may delegate some authorities to local governments, while private landowners also have significant impacts on ecosystem health. To affect change, watershed groups must build partnerships with all of these groups, and more (FRMP, 1997).  23  However, intergovernmental factors discourage an integrated approach such as watershed-based initiatives. Government decision-making authorities occur at the legislative and judicial levels, and at all three levels of government. In addition, responsibilities have been further delineated among the public and private sectors. Trends to shift former federal responsibilities to provincial and then on to local authority, and from public to private, have created a more fragmented decisionmaking authority than ever before. As well, B.C.'s system of resource and land use governance hinders the establishment of effective citizen-based planning processes. Williams, Day and Gunton (1998) attest that currently, most government efforts to support watershed based initiatives arise from the personal commitment of individual agency representatives rather than institutional design. Although community watershed initiatives may be an attempt to attack the 'gridlock' of current management schemes, interagency coordination and devolution of power is extremely difficult to accomplish (Kenney, 1997), particularly when institutional arrangements are weak.  Watershed based initiatives are evidence that new institutional problem solving tools are infiltrating traditional governance arrangements for water resources (WWPRAC, 1998). Experience with a multitude of watershed based initiatives has shown that there are no panaceas for all problems of resource governance, and that institutional arrangements must be specifically adapted to local political, cultural and biophysical factors (WWPRAC, 1998). To assess the impact of these initiatives, it is therefore imperative to conduct an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional arrangements that exist between all of the governing parties and the relevant stakeholders.  24 7  In summary, watershed management has evolved over the decades from a sciencebased, top down administered approach to one that is becoming more collaborative and community-based. While many experiments in governance have had some success in terms of process outcomes, many have failed to lead to implementation of decisions as they overlooked fundamental questions of watershed governance related to institutional arrangements. The result is that good, collaborative plans that seek to reduce conflict are not being implemented due to complex jurisdictional matters and poor institutional arrangements. It is not sufficient to 'graft' community based watershed management techniques onto traditional administrative structures (Ewing, 1999). To improve planning effectiveness, policy makers and researchers need to analyze the relationships that exist among decision makers and stakeholders. Identifying the strengths and weaknesses of existing institutional arrangements will greatly assist practitioners to close the gaps that lead to lack of implementation.  2.4  Institutional arrangements for improved watershed governance  Watershed Governance and Institutional  Arrangements  A governance system can be described as "a complex package of policies, programs and institutions which, in concert, are intended to provide a specific outcome" (Doppelt, 2000). Fundamental governance decisions determine: who the decision makers are; how and why decisions get made; the type and scope of information flows; the responsibilities of the private, public and community sectors; and the development, monitoring and enforcement of activities.  A.n ecosystem-based approach to watershed governance  Watersheds are complex, dynamic ecosystems that change over time. This creates conditions of extreme uncertainty and presents unique challenges for the design and  25  management of governance systems (Hollick, 1993). As a result of this dynamism, a wide variety of ecosystem-based management approaches have been attempted. Some consensus is beginning to emerge on the common characteristics of an ecosystem based approach. Slocombe (1993a) argues that the common characteristics of an ecosystem based approach are that it is "holistic, inter<disciplinary, goal-oriented, participatory, and aimed at getting people to realize that people are a part of the ecosystem, not separate from it." Grumbine (1994) identified several common themes found in most approaches: a strong emphasis on data collection and monitoring, working across administrative boundaries, adaptive management, public participation, interagency cooperation, organizational change, and a strong focus on maintaining ecological integrity.  Thus, while an ecosystem-based approach is still emerging, it appears to have a strong administrative and institutional orientation. It emphasizes redefining management units and building on the best ecosystem science to improve the management and coordination of resource management institutions (Slocombe, 1993b). "To be successful, an ecosystem-based management program must develop a new institutional arrangement capable of integrating environment and development considerations in a manner acceptable to society".  The ecosystem based approach has been used in a variety of settings, such as terrestrial habitat systems,fisheriesmanagement, estuaries and river basins. Much of the research stemming from these efforts argues that the use of collaborative decision making, strong public participation, and incorporating scientific knowledge into decision making appears to enhance program success. While the concepts of ecosystem based management and collaborative decision making have appealed to many practitioners, they are subject to a wide range of institutional and administrative  26  challenges that have largely been ignored in the literature (Imperial, 1999). 2.4.1 The need for a new watershed governance approach  There are a number of approaches to watershed governance, ranging from simple voluntary actions to highly coordinated regulatory approaches (Hooper, 1998). Watershed governance systems differ from other governance systems in a number of ways. They often give priority to non-human beneficiaries, such as plants and animals. They also seek to redistribute environmental benefits to future generations of people. As well, unlike many other policy arenas, they typically give science a strong voice in policy creation. Finally, as watershed health is typically threshold bound, watershed governance approaches tend to require more comprehensive and integrated responses (Doppelt, 2000).  The primary environmental governance system for many decades has been the command-and-control approach, administered by a set of fragmented institutions. Since then, recognition of the scale and complexity of environmental issues has changed dramatically, along with the public's views of how resources should be managed. Yet most of our watershed governance institutions and systems have remained relatively unchanged over the decades (Doppelt, 2000).  Why the needfor a new governance approach  As changing governance systems is significantly time and resource intensive, it is important to understand the forces that have spurred the search for new forms of governance. Researchers have identified the following arguments for a new approach to watershed governance:  27  a)  Environmental issues have grown more complex:  Previous environmental policies were created in response to specific, localized pollution problems, and regulatory agencies reflected this 'single issue' approach. Most of today's watershed problems, however, involve complex integrated ecosystem issues, resulting from cumulative effects from many sources over long time periods (Doppelt, 2000). There is now an evident need to manage on a watershed basis for ecosystem health (WWPRAC, 1998). In order to better manage complex ecological issues, we must search for a better integrated governance system.  b)  LMWS  and programs target the effects rather than the causes:  Most watershed programs seek to resolve in-stream problems such as water pollution and endangered fish. Most assessments and interventions are thus focused on the end result, or the symptoms of the problems occurring in the watershed. Our current governance approach fails to address the root causes that lead to such symptoms (Doppelt, 2000). A new approach that encompasses a bottom-up expression of values, goals, and commitments driven by concerns over local resources would better address these root causes (WWPRAC, 1998).  c)  Changing population and developmentpressures:  Demographic shifts in many areas generate a new mix of demands that may compete or replace traditional uses of resources. Laws enacted for historical uses may conflict with these new users and demands (Doppelt, 2000). Particularly, there is an increasing need for high quality municipal water supplies (WWPRAC, 1998). Governance approaches that better balance the old and new have been sought to reduce these tensions.  d)  The public is growing more sophisticated and demanding.  28  As awareness about environmental issues and the interconnectedness of our actions on our ecosystems increase, so too does public awareness (Doppelt, 2000). This is evidenced in the tremendous increase in the number of local watershed-based organizations, and the energy they bring to resolving problems (WWPRAC, 1998). The public expects their governments to make the transitions needed to address these problems effectively and efficiently.  e)  Economies are rapidly changing.  The regulatory system has not been able to keep pace with the speed of change in today's economies. Production of goods and services has changed dramatically with new technologies, yet the current system of monitoring, permitting and enforcement is extremely slow and inefficient. A new governance system needs to better manage and respond to changing economic conditions (Doppelt, 2000).  f)  Public resources are declining.  Currently the existing governance system has the primary responsibility to conserve the environment, and yet the public resources to provide these services are declining (Doppelt, 2000). The need to effectively establish priorities, coordinate and leverage funds in the face of diminishing budgets is another argument for changing current watershed governance practices (WWPRAC, 1998). Watershed programs are seeking ways to be more effective with fewer resources.  g) Legal, management and governance structures have grown more complex:  Elmore (1985) observed that policies and programs tend to accumulate around problems over time. For example, over the past 25 years, a sophisticated institutional framework for managing environmental problems has developed, consisting of various programs at the federal, provincial, regional and local level. As each new  29  environmental problem arose, a new layer of legal, bureaucratic and institutional structures was created. This often created conflicting legal requirements and competing incentives, resulting in the current complex multi-jurisdictional system (Doppelt, 2000). This creates a number of problems, in that each program tends to rely on the policy instruments over which they have direct control, for example a regulatory agency would tend to seek a regulatory solution. This interlocking system of parochial solutions rarely results in desired policy outcomes (Ibid, 2000).  The resulting governance problems are numerous. The fragmentation and duplication of responsibility and authority is particularly problematic. Changing the allocation of roles among the branches and agencies of government has further contributed to this fragmentation. According to the Western Water Policy Review and Advisory Commission (1998), efforts to force divergent agencies and political jurisdictions to work on regionally integrated resource management efforts have often failed, due to lack of support and a strong urge to nurture and protect the status quo. Additional governance problems include poor use of existing information and resources; and the inconsistency of policies across and between levels of government. Because of these governance problems, some environmental problems are not addressed adequately, while other more complicated problems such as poor water quality require numerous agencies to coordinate their efforts (Imperial, 1999).  This twin governance problem of a decision making gridlock and the fragmentation of government requires the skillful development and application of a variety of problem solving tools (WWPRAC, 1998). To address some of these governance problems, there is an increasing need for partnerships to manage collaboratively and to avoid legal gridlock. As well, there is a need for efficient planning processes and conflict resolution tools to address issues that involve many interests across many  30  jurisdictions (WWPRAC, 1998). Recently, general shifts in watershed governance approaches have occurred, from 'interest group governance mode', representing a substantively narrow and geographically broad focus; to civic governance mode, incorporating a substantively broad yet geographically situational focus (WWPRAC, 1998). A more effective governance system may require an entire restructuring of our current legal and management frameworks.  2.4.2 Institutional analysis for improved watershed governance Many researchers have found that while it was important to understand how ecological systems function, it was equally important to understand the "ecology of governance"; that is, the tradeoffs among environmental problems, and how institutions that address those problems function and interact with one another (Imperial and Hennessy, 2000). When viewed from an institutional perspective, ecosystem-based management can be seen as an explicit attempt to build, manage, and maintain interorganizational networks; in other words, to develop an institutional ecosystem (Imperial, 1999). From this perspective, the goal of ecosystem-based management is to improve resource management by changing institutional arrangements and improving coordination between the organizations.  "The adrninistration of a watershed management effort is a complex endeavor requiring a formidable set of professional skills to manage activities and coordinate intergovernmental relationships. In short, effective watershed management is an exercise in advanced governance." (Imperial and Hennessy, 2000). In order to address the causes of environmental degradation, institutional arrangements, policies and relationships between organizations must be altered. Governance issues such as program leadership, staffing and recruitment, personnel management, budgeting,  31  contracting, and grants management all influence the planning and implementation process. Researchers have largely ignored the institutional challenges to implementing many of the innovative ecosystem management plans. Knowledge of organizational structure and behaviour is essential to developing and implementing effective programs, and yet environmental policy researchers have overlooked these significant factors to successful watershed governance. Research on institutional design and performance can assist practitioners in understanding the challenges confronting the implementation of a collaborative, community-based watershed management program.  As each watershed is unique in its biophysical, social, cultural and economic characteristics, so too are the institutional arrangements necessary for successful action and implementation. Water managers are recognizing that no one perfect solution exists for all watersheds, and criteria for successful initiatives vary widely. One useful tool that has developed to assist watershed managers in assessing their organizational capacity is the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework. Developed by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues in the early 1990's, the IAD framework is gaining popularity as a useful tool that helps identify the strengths and weaknesses of an organization's capacity to implement environmental decision making (Imperial, 1999). Based on principles of scientific ecosystem-based management, collaborative decision making and institutional design, the framework considers the strengths and weaknesses of individuals, community attributes, rules, information flows, efficiency, equity, accountability, adaptability, institutional performance and policy outcomes that constitute an environmental governance effort. The following chapter offers a detailed description of the Institutional Analysis and  32  Development Framework.  Chapter 3: T h e Institutional Analysis and Development Framework  As discussed in the previous chapter, many environmentalists, water managers and academics are becoming increasingly supportive of collaborative watershed-based approaches to natural resource management. However little attention has been paid to the important administrative and institutional challenges surrounding watershed based management (Imperial, 1999). Institutional arrangements include rules, laws, policies, economic incentives and disincentives, and plans of action to achieve natural resource management outcomes (IRMR, 2000). There are a number of institutional arrangements that have been used to implement watershed management. These range from cost-sharing programs, tradable discharge permits and voluntary actions (e.g. Landcare in Australia) to more regulatory practices such as environmental regulation, zoning laws, and meeting environmental standards for best practice (Hooper, 1998). No perfect institutional arrangement exists, as every watershed has unique biological, physical, social and institutional characteristics. This makes comparing experiences difficult, as there is no normative organizational structure to ensure success. However, researchers are beginning to realize that an analysis of the relationships between the institutions involved in watershed management can greatly assist practitioners in identifying gaps in their current management frameworks (Hooper, 1998).  To identify and address these gaps, some practitioners and researchers have developed a tool to identify strengths and weaknesses in current institutional arrangements. The tool is called the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework. Developed by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues in the early 1990's, the IAD is gaining popularity among ecosystem based management researchers. The 34  framework was designed to better understand the institutional arrangements used to implement ecosystem-based management programs. It was created to help practitioners analyze institutional design and performance, and to improve understanding of the relationship between science and human values in decision making. The analysis also helps practitioners avoid faulty policy recommendations, and improve the implementation of watershed based programs (Imperial, 1999). This chapter explains institutional analysis, and emphasizes the usefulness of this approach to watershed managers and community members in strengthening their institutional arrangements. Drawing on work from Ostrom (1993), Imperial (1999) and others, it provides an overview of the criteria used in the analysis, as well as a discussion on how strong ecosystem-based decisions as well as effective collaborative decision making are emphasized in the framework. The framework for this analysis is later applied to a case study on the Sunshine Coast of British Columbia (see chapters 5 and 6).  Approaches to public policy: The IAD framework and neo-institutionalism in the context ofpublic policy  Policy science emerged as a relatively recent discipline primarily in North America and Europe after the Second World War, as scholars of politics searched for new understandings of the relationship between government and citizens (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). Public policy definitions vary, but generally the term applies to a complex phenomenon consisting of numerous decisions made by numerous individuals and organizations. Analysts have alternately focused on examining the organizational nature of the political regime; the causal variables in public policymaking; policy content; or policy impact or outcomes. There are a number of very  35  separate traditions and literatures of inquiry into public policy, which has. burdened public policy analysis with a bewildering complexity. While the scope of this research does not allow for an in-depth discussion of public policy theories, the general approaches to analyzing political phenomena are summarized here, in order to place Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development Framework within a public policy paradigm.  Howlett and Ramesh (1995) offer six categories of theories, differing on whether their insights are derived in an inductive or deductive manner, and whether they focus their attention on individuals, groups, or institutions. Table 1. A Taxonomy of General Approaches to Public Policy  Method of Theory Construction Deductive  Inductive  Fundamental  Individual  Public Choice  Welfare Economics  Unit of Analysis  Group  Marxism  Pluralism/Corporatism  Institutions  Neo-Institutionalism  Statism  Adapted from Howlett and Ikamesh, 1995.  Deductive theories include public choice, Marxism, and neo-institutionalism. The public choice approach theory believes that individual political actors are guided by self-interest in choosing the course of action that is to their best advantage. The criticism of this analysis is that it is a simplification that is not supported with empirical reality, and that this traditions' theorists are unwilling to recognize fully the durability of institutions and the pervasive impact they have on public policy (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995).  36  Class theories such as Marxism accord primacy to collective entities in their analyses, but tend to define their units of analysis in objective terms, such as observable characteristics of individuals. The difficulties with this analysis are that it is difficult to determine what exactly is 'class' and what is not, and that they reduce social and political phenomena to an economic base (Ibid, 1995). Neo-institutionalism distinguishes itself from the above approaches by recognizing the limits to individual and group based theory, and acknowledges the crucial role of institutions in political life. The basic unit of analysis is related to the 'transaction' among individuals within the confines of institutions (Ibid, 1995). Institutions are defined by Robert Keohane as 'persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activities, and shape expectations. Peter Hall described an 'institutionalist' analysis as one which 'emphasizes the institutional relationships, both formal and conventional, that bind the components of the state together and structure its relations with society'. In this way, institutions affect actions by shaping the interpretation of problems and solutions, and by constraining the choice of solutions and the extent to which they can be implemented. While this approach has been criticized for being both limited and vague in its application to public policy making, its strength is that it does not presume that any one set of factors is more important than others in explaining public policies, and considers a range of factors that may be important, leaving them to be revealed through empirical research (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995).  Unlike deductive theories that attempt to apply universal maxims to the study of political choice, inductive theories depend on the accumulation of empirical studies to extract generalizable theories. They are, by their very nature 'always under  37  construction', and include theories such as welfare economics, which is concerned with market failures; pluralism and corporatism, based on the assumption of the primacy of interest groups in the political process; and statism, which sees the state as the leading institution in society and the key agent in the political process. All of these theorists have their detractors, stating that none of them adequately address the multifaceted empirical reality of public policy making (Ibid, 1995). Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and the IAD Framework represents an analytical framework that permits consideration of a large range of factors affecting public policy. Although it emerges from the neo-institutionalist tradition, the framework permits an empirical analysis of the reality political analysts are attempting to describe and understand. Attempts are made in the modification and application of this framework in this study to follow the trend towards broadening the analytical framework of policy studies to include both conflict and learning, and towards a greater emphasis on incorporating the results of empirical analysis on a policy domain into the process of theory-building in policy science. The framework proposed in this study takes into account consideration of the characteristics of policy actors, institutions, and instruments, which allows for a valuable theory construction in political analysis.  3.1 Institutional Analysis and the IAD Framework  Several attributes make the Institutional Analysis and Development framework a useful approach to analyzing such institutional arrangements.  First, it recognizes the full range of transaction costs associated with implementing policies. These 'costs' represent the net cost of a process, in non-economic terms.  38  Second, it draws attention to the contextual conditions, such as the relevant physical, biological, social, economic and cultural features that can influence institutional design and performance. Third, it contains no normative bias with respect to the institutional arrangement used to implement these programs, and does not presume that one structure, whether it be hierarchical or decentralized, is better than another. Researchers have argued that hierarchical organizations are too rigid to allow for informal dialogue or creative interdisciplinary problem solving; while others state that less structured organizations may lead to disorganization and ambiguity over roles and responsibilities (Bentrup, 2001). As appropriate institutional arrangements will vary with every watershed, the IAD approach suggests using a variety of criteria to identify the strengths and weaknesses in the different institutional arrangements that can be used to implement policies.  Finally, the analysis is broadened from focusing on policies to looking at the rules, so that a much wider range of organizational relationships can be considered.  The IAD framework defines institutions as "enduring regularities of human action in situations structured by rules, norms, and shared strategies, as well as by the physical world. The rules, norms, and shared strategies are constituted and reconstituted by Human interaction in frequently occurring or repetitive situations." (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). Families, churches, local governments, government agencies and most organizations are all institutions, as they are defined by rules, norms and shared strategies (Ostrom, 1993). Institutions promote socially beneficial outcomes by helping stakeholders resolve 'social dilemmas' that result from individual rational  39  actions that produce socially irrational outcomes. Therefore, institutional arrangements provide a means to avoid Hardin's (1968) "tragedy of the commons" and resolve collective action and common pool resource problems (Ostrom, 1990).  Institutional analysis differs from other forms of organizational analysis in its focus on rules. Rules are an implicit or explicit attempt to achieve order and predictability among Humans. They are prescriptions that forbid, permit, or require some action or outcome and the sanctions authorized if the rules are not followed. Rules can be formal, for example laws, policies, regulations, etc.; or informal, for example behavioural norms. They are not self-formulating, self-determining or self-enforcing, and are subject to problems of lack of clarity, misunderstanding, and varied interpretations. The stability of rule-ordered relationships depends upon the development of a shared meaning of rules, which requires building trust, and monitoring and enforcing those rules. Again, enforcement can be formal (e.g. civil penalties, criminal penalties, etc.) or informal (e.g. a verbal comment or facial expression demonstrating displeasure).  Institutional analysis is therefore an attempt to examine a problem that a group of individuals (or organizations) face, and how the rules they adopt address this problem. This requires an understanding of the nature of the problem, the nature of individuals or culture, and the institutional setting that the individuals are embedded within.  3.2 The IAD Framework 3.2.1 Action  Arena  An analysis of individuals and organizations that make resource management decisions begins with identifying the 'action arena', or the patterns of interaction and  40  decision making processes used by a set of actors which impact the health of an ecosystem. Institutional analysis thus begins with identifying this set of actors.  The pattern of interactions between the organizations in an action arena is influenced by three basic categories of variables, under the IAD framework. The first is that interactions are influenced by the explicit and implicit assumptions about the rules used to order relationships. The structure of the rule system in an action arena greatly influences interorganizational relationships. Understanding the rules-in-use is important, for they can place important constraints on the adoption of future rules.  Second, to be effective, the rules must also be compatible with the underlying physical and biological setting. As physical and biological systems vary considerably, it is a better strategy to "develop an institutional arrangement that lets participants develop, monitor, enforce, and alter rules in response to changes in environmental conditions" (Imperial, 1999). A challenge for current management institutions is to redefine jurisdictional boundaries and agency mandates based on watershed delineations. Currently, many agencies typically target narrow aspects of watersheds, such as salmon or tree harvesting, and actions are not always well coordinated within and between governmental levels (Litke and Day, 1998). However, efforts must be taken to ensure that the defined watershed or sub watershed management area is of a manageable size (Chess et al, 1998).  Rhoads et al. (1999) assert that, as watershed management is fundamentally a social process, scientists and technical experts must develop an understanding of the placebased social worlds of local communities. The community in which the actors are located will greatly influence interorganizational relationships. This bundle of variables is often referred to as 'culture', and includes accepted norms of behaviour,  41  the level of common understanding about the action arena, the homogeneity of individual preferences, and the distribution of resources among members of an action arena (Imperial, 1999). The action arena likely extends beyond the geographic boundaries of a watershed, as differing political and cultural boundaries mean that interacting institutions make decisions that affect the management of the ecosystem. The IAD framework also recognizes that action arenas are linked, in that different sets of rules impact how one institution interacts with related institutions (Imperial, 1999).  3.2.2 Three levels of rules  Different levels of rules cumulatively affect the outcomes in any action arena. The IAD framework distinguishes between operational rules, collective-choice rules, and constitutional-choice rules (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982). Operational rules include "decisions about when, where, and how to do something; who should monitor the actions of others; how actions should be monitored; what information should be exchanged or withheld; and what rewards and sanctions will be assigned to combinations of actions and outcomes" (Imperial, 1999; p.452). At this level, the processes of appropriation, provision, monitoring and enforcement occur.  Collective-choice rules "influence operational activities and outcomes by determining how operational rules can be changed and who can participate in these decisions" (Imperial, 1999; p.452). Activities such as policy making, management and the adjudication of decisions occur at the collective-choice level.  42  Constitutional choice rules "influence operational rules and outcomes by determining who is eligible to participate and the rules used to develop and change collectivechoice rules, which in turn affects the set of operational rules" (Imperial, 1999; p.452). Constitutional level actions include governance and modification of constitutional decisions and collective choice rules. 3.3 IAD categories for examining institutional performance Researchers other than IAD proponents have identified a number of criteria to examine the "success" of interorganizational policy implementation. Frequently cited criteria, according to Imperial (1999) include compliance, feasibility, effectiveness, level of effort, policy outputs and policy outcomes. However, Imperial states these criteria are often hard to measure, and fail to capture the interorganizational nature of the implementation process. The IAD Framework represents a non-evaluative lens through which to analyze institutional relationships, which does not propose normative 'key factors' for success. It recognizes that these factors will be different based on each individual context, and so allows for an objective way to determine strengths and weaknesses of an arrangement.  1. Transaction costs The IAD framework differs in that it focuses on transaction costs associated with interorganizational relationships. Transaction costs represent the net benefits to a process, and do not represent merely the monitary costs of an endeavour. As well, a variety of categories are used to understand the strengths, weaknesses, and overall performance of an institutional arrangement. This approach has the advantage of avoiding implicit or explicit biases towards how policies should be implemented.  43  Interorganizational policy implementation is associated with three interrelated sets of transaction costs in the IAD framework. These include: information costs; coordination costs; and strategic costs. As the number of bargaining partners and the number of routine interactions increase, transaction costs are likely to increase. They can also increase where there is inequity in information, knowledge and power. Where actors' interests are heterogeneous and jurisdictional complexity increases, so do transaction costs. A consideration of transaction costs does not ignore consequent benefits. For example, a process may take a long time, which would traditionally increase its transaction costs. But if the process participants deemed that amount of time necessary to a fruitful conclusion, or gained a large degree of educational value, then the net transaction costs would be favourable. The three types of transaction costs are summarized below.  a) Information costs Ewing (1999) states that there needs to be a shift from an emphasis on policy and management planning to establishing relevant preconditions for information gathering and problem framing. Information costs result from searching for and organizing information. Poor information resulting in errors also creates information costs. Additionally, ecosystem based management programs will include both scientific and time and place information. Scientific information costs can relate to basic research on how the ecological system functions, or the effects of contaminants on the system. Time and place information refers to local social, physical and environmental characteristics identified by individuals who know the nature of the setting.  b) Coordination costs  44  The costs invested in negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing agreements about the development and implementation of a resource management plan constitute coordination costs. Coordination costs may escalate due to a number of factors. Actors may lack flexibility in allocating agency resources. As well, institutional factors may discourage some actors from participating in collaborative decision making. Management of an ecosystem through interagency collaboration is often fraught with disincentives to cooperate, share information, and develop consistent policies (Imperial, 1999). A previous history of animosity or adversarial views can also impede collaboration.  Power differences among the participants can also serve as impediments to interorganizational coordination (Imperial, 1999). Some resource industries may have many organizational resources to draw upon for support and influence, such as professional negotiators, technical staff, and information systems. They may also have more influence on government policy as a result of media campaigns and direct political lobbying (Williams, Day and Gunton, 1999). Another concern related to power differences is gender stereotyping, particularly of leadership positions. Some watershed based initiatives have sighted this power imbalance as a serious management issue (Curtis and Lockwood, 2000). While power imbalances are difficult to eliminate, coordination costs can be reduced by providing equal access to funding, training and information resources for all stakeholder groups involved in watershed based initiatives (Williams, Day and Gunton, 1999), as well as acknowledgement of the existing power imbalances. All of these threats to collaboration can be difficult to overcome when: i) conflict is the result of basic ideological differences; ii) one or more stakeholders has the authority to take unilateral action; iii) constitutional issues or precedents are sought;  45  iv) past decision making efforts were unsuccessful; and v) issues are threatening because of previous conflict (Imperial, 1999). The barriers to effective management are numerous, particularly in efforts to improve watershed sustainability, as agencies and individuals may lack the knowledge, technical expertise, credibility or financial resources for effective watershed management. c) Strategic costs Strategic costs result when asymmetries in information, power or other resources result in one group of actors obtaining benefits at the expense of others. Two common strategic costs involve 'free riding' and 'rent seeking'.  Free riding  occurs  when actors benefit from a group decision making process without contributing to the effort by participating or devoting resources.  Kent seeking results  when a  collaborative process yields unearned benefits to some participants, by advancing their individual interests. An example of rent seeking would be a government agency advancing recommendations for an initiative they would like to undertake, but only if some other agency provides funding. It can be difficult to discern the true motives and preferences of the negotiating parties, which makes identifying strategic costs a challenge. This behaviour can also exacerbate information and coordination costs.  Turf  As agencies and actors are interested in securing strategic positions and enhancing their long term survival, protecting 'turf can also have significant transaction costs. Turf refers to the exclusive domain of activities and resources over which an agency has the right to exercise operational or policy responsibility (Imperial, 1999). Government programs are subject to different statutory and budgetary  46  responsibilities. This can lead to competitive constituencies, priorities, and objectives. Each program may have different capacities for action, such as regulatory authority or technical expertise. Accordingly, changing responsibilities and priorities while altering the capacity for action will often require institutional changes that can create political conflicts (Imperial, 1999). Conflicts over turf are bound to occur in new watershed based management programs, as new policies, programs and changes in interorganizational relationships are inevitable. While turf is defined here in institutional terms, institutions are some measure of the people who work and operate within them. Some individuals may be more concerned with 'winning or losing' than they are about their turf, and view collaboration as a threat to their self worth, job security, professional expertise, accountability, or level of responsibility (Imperial, 1999). Policy changes required to implement an ecosystem-based management program might be inconsistent with the present interests of the implementers. Changes may represent a great political or economic cost to the organization, and they therefore may be very reluctant to implement policy changes that run counter to their interests.  Another factor that may contribute to the reinforcement of existing inequities and narrow self-interest are small task forces and advisory groups, as the time commitments required from a task force can narrow participation to only the most cornmitted and interested, i.e. those with the greatest stakes. Over the life of the task force, representatives may become isolated from their communities (Chess et al, 2000). All of these factors must be considered when analyzing strategic costs.  Moreover, in our efforts to improve collaborative decision making, nongovernmental stakeholders such as private firms and nonprofit organizations are often viewed as  47  partners in these efforts, rather than their more traditional roles as opponents and advocates. As a result, Grumbine (1994) and Slocombe (1993) suggest many authors and practitioners underestimate the problems associated with changing organizational arrangements and incorporating human values into decision-making processes.  Estimating transaction costs of an interorganizational network provides a useful way to examine the performance at different points in time. The IAD framework also includes criteria to examine overall performance over a sustained period of time.  Overall  institutionalperformance  In addition to transaction costs, the IAD framework suggests four interrelated criteria for assessing overall institutional performance. These include efficiency, equity, accountability, and adaptability. These criteria help to evaluate the relative strengths and weaknesses of an institutional arrangement.  a) Efficiency  One way to view efficiency is in terms of the effect the institutional arrangement has on the market with respect to wealth generation or productivity. The second way is to evaluate administrative efficiency and the costs of administering the regulatory program (Imperial, 1999).  The amount of time invested by agencies and stakeholders will greatly affect efficiency (Griffin, 1999). Time is required to develop trust among participants and commitment to the planning process, which can be a significant stumbling block to many collaborative processes. However, if the process produces a policy that serves  48  the interests of most people, then many policy makers would conclude that speed and efficiency are secondary to equity (Griffin, 1999).  b) Equity An efficient program is not necessarily a fair program. The principle of fiscal equivalence holds that those who benefit from a service should bear the burden of financing it. Another perspective is to look at redistributional equity, which is concerned with structuring program activities based on differential abilities to pay. The IAD framework proposes that the equality of the process is equally important to the equality of the results. Often there are considerable trade-offs between efficiency and equity, as different resource allocations may be less efficient but more equitable. c) Accountability  In a democratic society, accountability is an important principle. Particularly as government agencies often have the paradox role of developer and protector of the environment, Ewing (1999) asserts that there must be a mechanism to ensure that there is a fair balance between competing interests. Related to accountability is having diverse demographic and geographic interests represented in the governance arrangement. Lower income areas and people living in different parts of a watershed (for example upstream as well as downstream) must be included in equitably accountable representation (Chess et al, 2000).  d) Ada ptability  49  The final evaluative criterion is adaptability. Because our understanding of ecosystems is imperfect, our interactions with nature should be experimental (Chess et al, 2000). Institutional arrangements must have the capacity to respond to the dynamic nature of ecosystem based management. Adaptive management of natural resource systems that encourages learning and institutional innovations has been touted by an increasing number of researchers and practitioners. An iterative process of review and revision requires a willingness to learn through experience (Curtis and Lockwood, 2000). Processes that stress flexibility in organizational structure and problem solving approaches are commonly cited as conditions for success for watershed based initiatives (Kenney, 1997).  Finally, attention to all of the above factors must include an assessment of the effectiveness of the process. The process may have been efficient and equitable, though if it was ineffective, then the policy outcome is considered to be a failure. One must take in to account a balance of the benefits in addition to the costs of the above factors.  3.4 Applying the framework  In addition to identifying the strengths and weaknesses related to the above criteria, the goal of institutional analysis is to identify the gaps between policies and resulting actions, to determine why the gaps exist, and to examine how to bridge them (IRMR, 2000). The goal of this study is to apply this analysis to a watershed governance case study on the Sunshine Coast of British Columbia. This analysis will assist practitioners in strengthening the relationships and rule structures they have with other institutions, to minimize their transaction costs, to improve efficiency, equity, accountability and adaptability, and to tailor their institutional arrangements to their biophysical and cultural milieu.  50  Chapter 4- Methodology '"Knowledge is within the meanings people make of it; knowledge is gained through people talking about their meanings; knowledge is laced with personal biases and values; knowledge is written in a personal, up-close way; and knowledge evolves, emerges, and is inextricably tied to the context in which it is studied." Creswell, 1998.  4.1  Research Approach  The research was designed to document and analyze the institutional relationships that surround past and present watershed management on the Sunshine Coast, and to demonstrate through an analysis of these arrangements, ways that watershed governance may be improved.  This study adopts the methodological approach of previous applications of institutional analysis to river basin initiatives in Australia (Hooper, 2001) and the United States (Imperial, 1999). The approach includes a range of qualitative methods, including data collecting techniques such as in-depth one-to-one interviewing, primary document research, and participant observation of local political meetings. From the data, an analysis of inter-organizational relations and functional relationships is possible (Hooper, 2001).  4.2 Qualitative research  Qualitative research is a form of inquiry that produces descriptions, accounts and interpretations about the ways of life of the writer and those written about (Denzin, 1999). While it does not represent a unified set of techniques or philosophies, qualitative research has grown Out of a wide range of intellectual and disciplinary traditions (Mason, 1996).  51  Qualitative research is multi-method in focus, which involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter. Qualitative researchers study tilings in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of them, or interpreting them based on the meanings people bring to them. It involves the use and collection of case studies, personal experience, introspection, life stories, interviews, as well as observational, historical, interactional and visual texts, which describe routine and problematic moments and meanings in individuals' lives (Denzin, 1999). It is thus an interdisciplinary approach that cuts across the humanities, the social and the physical sciences. In its present, postmodern phase, qualitative research privileges no single methodology over another (Denzin, 1999). It has no theory or paradigm that is distinctly its own. Paradigms can include constructivism, cultural studies, feminism, Marxism and critical theory, logical positivism, and ethnic models. This research was conducted within the constructivist paradigm, which presumes multiple realities, and contends that the researcher and those studied create understandings about the world and its meanings (Denzin, 1999).  Qualitative research should be strategically conducted, yet flexible and contextual (Mason, 1996). This means that qualitative researchers should make decisions on the basis not only of a sound research strategy, but also with sensitivity to the changing contexts and situations in which the research takes place.  This study required a certain amount of reflexivity, based on the belief that a researcher cannot be neutral, or detached, from the knowledge and evidence they are generating (Mason, 1996). Throughout the study, the researcher sought to understand  52  her role in the research process by posing difficult, reflexive questions on any biases she may be carrying. Qualitative research should also be conducted as an ethical practice, and with regard to its political context (Mason, 1996). Ethical issues described by Creswell (1998) such as seeking consent, maintaining confidentiality, and protecting the anonymity of individuals with whom we speak were all considered. This study underwent a review by the University of British Columbia Ethics Review Committee, where the research methodology, approach, and interview questions were assessed.  Introduction to the researcher  My interest in conducting thesis research on watershed management on the Sunshine Coast came from a number of individuals, experiences and inspirations. It began with a post-undergraduate internship in Nepal, where I conducted local environmental planning meetings with villagers in the Himalayan foothills. Their desire for more political and economic control over their resources, as well as their distrust for higher level government officials, stuck with me. It also became apparent that there was a desperate need for improved management of water resources for Human health reasons, in both urban and rural settings. This sparked a desire to learn more about water management and environmental planning, which led me to pursue graduate studies at the School of Community and Regional Planning at the University of British Columbia.  At UBC, I became involved as a Research Assistant on a Community Based Watershed Management project in Santo Andre, Brazil, with the Centre for Human Settlements. As part of my research I looked at how to improve participation in the project by marginalized groups such as women, youth, the elderly and the disabled, as  53  well as methods to foster environmental stewardship of watersheds in urban informal setdements. Through course work, I also helped to develop workshops and a source book for the Brazilian participants related to the linkages between gender analysis, environment and urbanization. I found this research to be challenging and exciting, and recognized its application to a number of watershed regions around the world experiencing similar stresses. That winter, I was also fortunate enough to participate in a conference put on by the Consortium on Sustainable Development, in Chapala, Mexico. There, with another graduate student from UBC, I presented a session on Community Based Watershed Management, based on my experience with the Brazil Project.  As I was further defining my thesis research interests related to watershed management, some friends on the Sunshine Coast kept mentioning that their situation was an ideal case study. Community interest in the management of the creeks was high, and there were numerous newspaper articles and local discussions about the relatively recent rejection of the Integrated Watershed Management Plan (IWMP). For a course project related to research methods, I conducted an ethnographic study of some of the community members involved in the Land and Resource Use Planning process, as well as advocacy around the IWMP, and I had found the case study to be fascinating. As I had always felt'a special bond to the place that is the Sunshine Coast, it seemed a natural fit to research further into the history of watershed management of the Chapman and Gray Creeks, as well as to attempt to assist the community to move towards the future.  It should be stated that although I feel a strong connection to this community, and have a number of good friends that live there, I am not a resident of the Sunshine Coast. For this reason, my lens in attempting to understand the politics and dynamics  54  that underpin this issue is that of an outsider. Because of this, my reflections on contextual matters may be vasdy different from an interpretation that would arise from a person who was directly or indirectly involved in the outcomes of this study. Additionally, although I strived throughout this process to be value-neutral, as a researcher this is a near impossible state to attain. For this reason, I attempted to present the voice of the study participants as much as possible in this thesis, to let them give their own meanings to the issues researched.  Institutional analysis of the data  The data were analyzed using systematic qualitative techniques. The analysis was guided by the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework developed by Ostrom (1986, 1990) and her colleagues (e.g. Blomquist, 1992; Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Imperial, 1999). The IAD framework, described in the previous chapter, has been used to examine institutional arrangements managing groundwater, common pool resources, metropolitan organizations, rural infrastructure development, coastal resources management, and river basin initiatives (Imperial, 1999).  The IAD framework is a theoretical framework that is used to guide the analysis of an institutional arrangement's structure and performance (Imperial, 1999). Institutions are defined by rules, norms and shared strategies. Institutional analysis differs from most forms of organizational analysis because of its focus on rules, which represent prescriptions that forbid, permit or require some action or outcome (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). Institutional analysis is therefore an attempt to examine a problem that a group of individuals (or organizations) face, and how the rules they adopt address a problem (Imperial, 1999).  55  The IAD framework does not advocate a particular type of institutional arrangement; rather, it draws attention to the various factors that influence institutional design. These include the physical characteristics of the ecological system and the nature of the problems, the culture of the individuals or organizations trying to solve the problem, and the institutional setting that individuals are embedded within (Ostrom, 1990). 4.3  Primary Research  4.3.1  Key informant interviews  Key informant interviews, also known as focused in-depth interviewing, involve the identification of a problem area of inquiry prior to undertaking the research (Olesen and Clarke, 1993). Individuals who are actors in the problem area are then recruited for interviews. The research focus is on articulating the perspectives taken by the respondents.  In this study, one-to-one interviews were conducted with key actors involved in the IWMP development, and with the current management of the Chapman and Gray watershed systems, located on the Sunshine Coast of British Columbia (see map in chapter 5). The complexity of ecosystem initiatives that cross many jurisdictions and involve a wide variety of interested parties often results in an overwhekriing number of individual stakeholders (Olsen, 1999). Due to the limited scope of the research, not all of the stakeholders involved in the problem area could be interviewed. Efforts were made to identify every 'group' of stakeholder, based on document analysis and informal discussions. Participants were then selected based on the degree to which they 'represented' that category of actor, their availability, and willingness to participate in the study, under the pretenses of informed consent.  56  For this study, in-depth interviews were conducted with a representative from the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans; a representative from the provincial Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks; two representatives from the provincial Ministry of Forests; a representative the provincial Coast/Garibaldi Health Unit; a representative from the Sechelt Indian Band; a representative from the Sunshine Coast Regional District; a representative from International Forest Products Limited; and a representative from the Sunshine Coast Conservation Association. Additionally, informal discussions were held with a staff person and a Board member from the Sunshine Coast Regional District; as well as members of the Water First Committee and the Forest Coalition.  Interviews were conducted over the course of a few weeks, in various locals on the Sunshine Coast and the lower mainland. Research questions were structured, yet open-ended, to avoid leading the responses. The thrust of the questions related to the stakeholders' perceptions of the process. Participants were generally very enthusiastic and eager to tell their stories, despite the number of years that have elapsed since the IWMP. Most interviews went well over an hour; two of them were two hours long. Participants for the most part seemed relaxed and reflective, rather than angry, defensive, or argumentative. In general, the interviewees were very open, enthusiastic, and genuine, and were often more than willing to offer additional documentation and information pertaining to the IWMP before, during, and after the interviews. No monetary compensation was given to the research participants, although the author did bake and provide cookies to the interviewees as a small compensation for their time.  Frequently, when research results and publications become available, participants express a sense of betrayal. Historians, anthropologists and political scientists often  57  face accusations that they 'got it all wrong' (Whittaker, 1999). In an effort to mitigate this possible problem, every interview was taped and subsequently transcribed word for word, and preliminary transcripts of interviews were returned to the participants for their comments before being included in the analysis. Participants had the option to turn off the tape at any time to speak 'off the record'. After transcripts were sent out, only one participant expressed a concern about potentially being misquoted; this data was omitted from the raw data analysis.  4.3.2  Participant observation and public meetings  Participant observation refers to methods of generating data which involve the researcher becoming immersed in a research setting, and systematically observing dimensions of that setting, including the interactions, relationships, actions, events and so on, within it (Mason, 1996).  The author was involved as an observer at local political meetings, where the proceedings were recorded and transcribed. Data derived from these meetings was used for contextual purposes. Participant observation is useful in this kind of study as it allows the researcher to observe interactions involving large numbers of people (Mason, 1996), including those who may not have been identified as key participants. It also allows for a conceptualization of interactions in their 'natural' setting, which can inform the researcher on the institutional rules and interactions that are more 'informal'.  4.2.3  Historical approaches and primary document research  An historical qualitative approach may include many forms of data, such as oral life histories, written biographies, documents of an organization, and archival materials of many kinds (Olesen and Clarke, 1993). One central focus is to grasp the flow of  58  events (chronology) and to grasp what may have influenced that flow of events (Olesen and Clarke, 1993). In addition to many types of documents, contemporary qualitative historical analysis uses interviews with individuals who have been key actors or observers within the phenomenon under study. An historical approach was undertaken in this study to understand the evolution of watershed management on the Sunshine Coast. This included an analysis of research publications, government reports, newsletters, memoranda, newspaper articles, minutes of meetings, and consultant reports; as well as in- depth interviewing of key historical actors.  4. Secondary research  The study also involved an analysis of secondary accounts of the IWMP process, the actors' roles and responsibilities, and the institutional arrangements that exist on the Sunshine Coast. Data sources included newspaper articles, plans, websites, pamphlets and other documents.  Use of interview data:  After organizing and storing the data, an analysis was undertaken by coding the names of the respondents and by trying to make sense of the data. The respondents were coded as follows:  FO=> Department of Fisheries and Oceans representative MOE=> Ministry of Environment representative MOFl=> First representative from the Ministry of Forests MOF2=> Second representative from the Ministry of Forests HO=> Coast/Garibaldi Health Unit representative  59  SI=> Sechelt Indian Band representative RD=>Sunshine Coast Regional District representative FI=>Forest Industry representative CA=> Sunshine Coast Conservation Association representative Interview transcripts were all at least twenty pages long, single spaced, and all data was analyzed by hand, using colour coding. The data was examined inductively from particulars to more general perspectives, such as themes or categories, as proposed by Creswell (1998). Several readings were undertaken, as Hammersley and Aliinson (1993) suggest, to see whether any interesting patterns could be identified; whether anything stood out as surprising or puzzling; how the data related to official accounts or previous theory; and whether there were any inconsistencies among the views of various groups or individuals. The data was then systematically coded, categorized and analyzed by hand (ie without the assistance of a computer program), in terms of the categories contained in the Institutional Analysis and Development framework. Data validation  Respondents' interviews were triangulated for validation. As proposed by Hammersley and Atkinson (1993), inferences drawn from one set of data sources were compared with data relating to the same phenomenon but deriving from different sources, phases of the research study, or accounts of different participants. Triangulation involves checking the links between concepts and indicators with recourse to other indicators (Ibid).  Scope and Umitations  to the research  As this case study reflected a dynamic, highly political and ever-changing group of involved institutions, the research design was flexible and adaptive to the  60  circumstances. A change of provincial government and sigrrificant shift in the political climate over the course of this study created challenges in identifying and assessing the existing institutional relationships between all of the stakeholders. As these relationships are likely to evolve, this study represents a snap shot of the previous and current roles and rules, as of  2002.  Summary  The analytical framework adopted in this study of watershed management of the Chapman and Grey Creeks on the Sunshine Coast of British Columbia is adapted primarily from previous applications of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework. The research approach is qualitative. Data collection techniques involved in-depth informant interviews with key stakeholders of a watershed management planning process; participant observation at public meetings; historical analysis of primary documents and secondary data sources such as newspapers and pamphlets. Interview responses were tape recorded and transcribed, coded and organized according to IAD themes, then checked for consistency in accounts through triangulation. Throughout the process, the author made every attempt to be reflective and ethical in the research process, and to recognize her values and biases in conducting this research.  61  Chapter 5- Introduction to the case study The Chapman and Gray Creek Watersheds on the Sunshine Coast of B.C. " O u r watershed is a case history of what not to do- it is one of the worst in the country" (Williams,  1996)  The IAD framework draws attention to various factors that influence institutional design: the physical characteristics of the ecological system and the nature of problems, the culture of the individuals and organizations trying to solve the problem, and the institutional setting that the individuals and organizations are embedded within (Imperial 1999).  Before delving into the analysis of the ruled relationships, the decision situations and policy outcomes, this chapter begins with a brief contextual description of the biophysical environment being studied, and the related problems that provoked a need for collective action. It also offers a description of the actors involved in the case study, as well as a description of community attributes and culture that affect the institutional arrangements and historical evolution of the problem at hand. Finally, a brief historical evolution of watershed management on the Sunshine Coast is given for contextual purposes. This descriptive portrayal will assist with the analysis in Chapter 6.  The biophysical context-.The Chapman and Gray Creek Watersheds  The Chapman and Gray Creek watersheds are located within the temperate marine climate of the Sunshine Coast of British Columbia. They are located within the boundaries of the Sunshine Coast Regional District (SCRD), approximately 45 km northwest of Vancouver. Both community watersheds are located within the Sechelt Provincial Forest, and contribute to the Sunshine Coast Timber Supply Area (TSA). 62  Figure 1. Map of the Sunshine Coast of B.C. EGMONT  SUNSHINE COAST MAP  EAHL-s'covtf  FROM HORSESHOE BAY TO EARL'S COYE  rERRVTOPOY/ELI.Rn£R PENDER HARBOUR  mil  101  HALFM0ON  BAY* TRMLISLJIMO* \  •ALMOf  SECHELT OAYG BAY HY/V 10) LANGDALE ROBERTS CREEK  Copvrl«ian«iineco*l\wior\Gui<*l9»  S  QBSONS HORSESHOE BAY MY/?  1  .JFVa*'*"*^ VANCOUVER  Chapman Creek is 27 km long and has a drainage area of~6450 ha (64 km2). Gray Creek is about 18 km long has a drainage area of -4030 ha (40 km2) (IWMP, 1998). The creeks flow through steep, ice carved valleys that are flanked by unstable sedimentary deposits. The headwaters for both watersheds originate in the Tetrahedron Plateau, an area now contained within the Tetrahedron Provincial Park. The plateau is characterized by many small lakes and wetiands in the flat depressional areas, with adjacent peaks rising to 1500 metres (EBA Engineering Consultants Ltd, 2000).  63  Figure 2. The Chapman and Gray Creek Watersheds.  Source: IWMP,  1998.  The Chapman and the Gray represent the community water supplies for the District of Sechelt and surrounding areas, including the town of Gibsons.  The primary  community water supply comes from Chapman Creek, which flows south from its source at Chapman Lake in the Tetrahedron Plateau, and discharges into the Georgia Strait at the small community of Wilson Creek. Gray Creek, the back up water supply, also originates in the Tetrahedron Plateau, but flows west into Sechelt Inlet (SCRD, 1998). Gray Creek provides approximately 4% of the total potable water supply to the main distribution system, and is primarily used during summer months to augment the Chapman Creek supply (Patrick, 2002). It is estimated that the two watersheds supply approximately 21,000 residents with their drinking water (SCRD, 1998). The forecasted demand by 2020 is expected to increase to 45,000 (RD, SCRD public meeting, April 4,1998).  The Chapman and Gray Creek watersheds are strategically located in relatively close proximity to the population centres of Gibsons, Sechelt and Pender Harbour. No other watersheds within the vicinity offer sufficient water quality, quantity or timing of flows to service communities in the long term. The watersheds have also historically been used for other resource activities such as logging, and more recently for recreation (Water First, 1998).  Drinking  water quality  Drinking water quality of the Chapman and Gray watersheds has been a concern on the Sunshine Coast for forty years (Bouman, personal communication, 2002). Drinking water from both creeks is often 'tea coloured', particularly after heavy rainfall events (EBA Engineering Ltd, 2000). Colour values appear to be above those of many other coastal creeks because of the high elevation sphagnum bogs and poorly  65  drained soils (IWMP, 1998), however many residents believe the problem is exacerbated from landslides and erosion related to poor logging practices (Bouman, personal communication, 2002). The SCRD recently received funding approval to build a water filtration project for the Chapman supply; Gray Creek water will likely not be treated from this plant (Patrick, 2002). Besides colour reduction, other water quality concerns for the creeks include bacteria, turbidity, and acidity. Chlorination is used to control bacteria, though many believe chlorination levels to be beyond those considered safe for regular Human consumption (Bouman, personal communication, 2002). Discrete slope failures resulting from old culvert or logging road failures have produced extremely high but short -lived turbidity events in the past (Carson, 1999). The Chapman Creek watershed has seen a decline in turbidity events between 1995 and 2000, which may be a result of a logging moratorium (Patrick, 2002). Acidity levels of Gray Creek drinking water are regularly above the acceptable range, and are considered corrosive to household plumbing. The addition of chlorine further increases the water's acidity. Health risks include lead and cadmium ingestion from corroded household plumbing (Patrick, 2002). Concern over long-term exposure to such contaminants has led many residents to believe they have seen, or will see elevated numbers of cancer and other health risks in the future (Council of Canadians meeting, 2002).  The institutional context: Stakeholder roles and responsibilities  To understand how the Chapman/Gray is managed, one must understand how the rules (for example, the statutes, regulations, policies, zoning ordinances, and permit decisions, etc.) of various government programs interact with one another. Interactions between actors are influenced by assumptions regarding the rules used to  66  order their relationships. The structure of the rule system can be subject to problems of lack of clarity, misunderstanding, and varied interpretations. There are three levels of rules: operational choice rules, collective choice rules and constitutional choice rules. Operational rules include the processes of appropriation, provision, monitoring and enforcement. Collective-choice rules include activities such as policy making, management and the adjudication of decisions that occur at the collective-choice level. Constitutional choice rules include governance and modification of constitutional decisions and collective choice rules (Imperial, 1999). The rule-ordered relationships on the Sunshine Coast can be discerned from the actions and historical involvements of the key actors, described below.  Sechelt First  Nation  Historically, Sechelt represented a gathering location for thousands of indigenous people living in five dominant villages in the surrounding region. In 1921, these five communities amalgamated, resulting in what is today known as the Sechelt First Nation.  Located on the Sechelt Peninsula, the Chapman and Gray Creek watersheds were of great importance to the First Nation, as the Sechelt people relied on the fresh drinking water, as well as harvesting of fish, game, timber, roots, berries, and herbs. As most of the Chapman and the entire Gray Creek watersheds lie within traditional Sechelt Indian Band territory, the Sechelt people place a high value on the watersheds and their resources, from the estuaries to the headwaters.  In recent history, the Sechelt First Nation has been involved in the management of the Chapman and Gray Creek systems through a consultative, multistakeholder 67  process, but has had no legal tenure to the land. The Band is involved economically in the watershed, as fishing and small logging operations are a form of local economic development for them. Today, while the Sechelt people are still in the process of a treaty negotiation with the federal and provincial governments, the Band is currently negotiating a form of de facto co-management of the watersheds with the Sunshine Coast Regional District (Bob Patrick, personal communication, 2002). As the province has yet to divest control to the community, it remains uncertain what the management structure between the two local governments might look like.  Sunshine Coast Regional District  Upon its inception in 1967, one of the first acts of the Sunshine Coast Regional District (SCRD) was to actively plan for a regional waterworks system. That same year, it acquired the water system established by Union Steamships in 1929, which had a water license for Chapman Creek representing 1.14 million litres a day.  Over the last twenty -five years, the regional waterworks system has grown from adequately serving 2000 people, to the current system that provides water and fire protection to 21,000 people in most rural areas of the Sunshine Coast. The combined, permitted water diversion is approximately 7510 x 10-6 litres/year for Chapman Creek and 1240 x 10-6 litres/year for Gray Creek (IWMP, 1998).  The Sunshine Coast Regional District, along with the Water Management Program of BC Environment (BCE), and the Coast Garibaldi Health Unit, is primarily responsible for managing water quality, quantity, and timing of flows (IWMP, 1998). As the local water purveyor, the SCRD is legally required to provide high quality water for its residents and consumers, and is responsible for distributing water licensed by Water  68  Management. To meet this demand, the SCRD must rely on the initial quality of the raw water, as well as the level of treatment the water receives before reaching the consumer (IWMP, 1998). They are also mandated to minimize risk to life and property from floods, erosion, and debris torrents.  The District is responsible for being in accordance with the the  Park Act  Health Act,  the  Water Act,  and the Canadian Drinking Water Standards (1992). It is within this  regulatory framework that the SCRD is involved with all policy planning within the community watersheds of Chapman and Gray Creek (IWMP, 1998).  Ministry of Forests*  The Chapman/Gray watersheds have served as important wood supplies to the Sunshine Coast, in part because of their close proximity to Sechelt and Gibsons. Both watersheds are within the Sechelt Provincial Forest and represent part of the Sunshine Coast Timber Supply Area. The entire drainage area is designated Crown Forest, where 49% of this represents productive Crown forest land. A n additional 5.4% has Managed Tree Farm designation. Extensive road networks provide access to managed second growth timber, and are now also used for recreation. International Forest Products (FI) and Canadian Forest Products (Canfor) both maintain contract logging operations in Sechelt.  The Forest Practices Code (FPC) regulates how forests are managed in British Columbia. It consists of the Act, Regulations and Field Guides that collectively or individually govern forest practices. In community watersheds such as the Chapman and Gray, the FPC requires watershed assessments, in accordance with the Coastal 3  All titles of departments and corresponding policy apply to the period up to June 2001.  69  Watershed Assessment Procedure (IWMP, 1998). The FPC also gives community watersheds special status, which in the past required joint approval of all forest development plans by both the M O F and BCE (Water Management). The current Liberal government is presently reviewing the Forest Practices Code to make it more 'results based'; many expect the regulations to be relaxed (personal communication, 2002). Under the FPC, M O F also has responsibility for managing recreational resources on Provincial Forest Lands (IWMP, 1998). A Recreation Resource and Use Management Department was created within the M O F to enhance the public enjoyment of wild land recreation through management of roads and trail accesses, as well as building and maintaining outdoor recreation facilities. While the headwaters of the Chapman/Gray lie within Tetrahedron Park, and are thus the jurisdiction of BC Parks, recreational access to the rest of the watersheds falls under M O F (IWMP, 1998).  Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks  The Water Management Program of BCE fell under the Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks (MELP) , and is concerned with the benefits of a clean, reliable 4  supply of fresh water from the Chapman and Gray Creeks. Water Management issues water licenses for domestic and municipal drinking water purposes. As there are Municipal Waterworks Licenses on the Chapman/Gray, the watersheds are designated as community watersheds. Under the Forest Practices Code, Water Management has a joint responsibility with the Ministry of Forests for approving forest development plans in community watersheds (IWMP, 1998).  4  Since renamed the Ministry of Water, Air and Land Protection  70  Water Management's mandate also includes reviewing activities and development 'in or about a stream' and in floodplains. Their objective is to protect water quality, quantity and timing of flows, and is the basis for approving forest development plans and other types of development proposals. Ensuring adequate flows for downstream fisheries is also a consideration, along with minimizing flooding and aggragate erosion. The Fish and Wildlife Branch of M E L P also has jurisdiction over wildlife and wildlife habitat in the watersheds, including some fish species (see below.) The remaining oldgrowth forests in the watersheds provide a high diversity of unique wildlife species, and for this reason the Tetrahedron Plateau area has been designated a Class " A " provincial park with a "protected wilderness" emphasis. Guidelines shaping the management of wildlife include Deer Biodiversity Guidelines Marbled Mum lets Habitat  and Elk Management Guidelines  (1995), the Interim  (1991), and the luxnd  (1990), the  Forest Management Recommendations to Conserve Development Guidelines for Protection of Aquatic  (1992) (IWMP, 1998).  Hunting is a minor activity in the watersheds, and two registered traplines are currently inactive (IWMP, 1998).  Ministry of Employment and Investment, Energy and Minerals  Division  The Energy and Minerals Division has jurisdiction over subsurface exploration and development that ensures the protection of water quality and water quantity. The Mineral Tenure Act, Mines Act, Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, Geothermal Resources Act, Coal Act, Mine Development Assessment Act, and Health, Safety and Reclamation Code  the Ministry's authority. As well, the Mineral  Exploration  Code  express  stipulates policies and  71  guidelines for exploration in community watersheds, and is consistent with the ForestPractices Code  (IWMP, 1998).  Fisheries and Oceans Canada  The federal department Fisheries and Oceans Canada has joint responsibility with the provincial B C E Fish and Wildlife Management Branch for the protection of fisheries resources in Chapman and Gray Creeks. Under the federal  Fisheries Act,  FOC is  required to protect fish and fish habitat in "waters frequented by fish". Through an inter-governmental agreement, Pacific salmon are federally managed, while steelhead, trout, char and other freshwater species are managed by the province. FOC and Fish and Wildlife Management use the  Coastal Fisheries Forestry Guidelines  Development Guidelines for Protection of Aquatic  Habitat  along with  Land  for reviewing land development  proposals adjacent to waters containing fish or fish habitat (IWMP, 1998).  Chapman Creek supports a wild catch and release fishery for steelhead, as well as a small sport fishery for anadromous cutthroat trout. FOC has ranked the Chapman Creek as first or second in both social and economic importance of all salmon bearing watercourses on the Sunshine Coast. Gray Creek supports a minor sport fishery for wild steelhead, sea-run cutthroat, and rainbow trout.  An historical analysis of watershed management on the Sunshine Coast  The Royal Society of Engineers first surveyed Chapman Creek for long term community water supply to Sechelt and the vicinity in 1910. In 1929, Chapman Creek was established as watershed reserve in the New Westminster Land Recording District for long term water supply until June 3, 9999. That same year, The Union  72  Steamship company obtained a water license on Chapman Creek for their steamship service and their recreational tourism development.  Upon the incorporation of the Sunshine Coast Regional District in 1967, the Water Rights Branch licensed the rights on all of the water flowing from Chapman Creek and its tributaries to the SCRD water utility, in the form of a Water Reserve (Bouman, 1997). The following year, the SCRD was incorporated with the mandate to develop the regional water supply for the Lower Sunshine Coast, and purchased the Union Steamship Co. water works. (BCTWA, 2001). Please see Figure 4: Chronology of events, Chapman and Gray Community Watersheds. Figure 3. Chronology of Events- Chapman and Gray Community Watersheds Year  Chronology of Events- Chapman and Gray Community Watersheds  1915  The Royal Society of Engineers survey Chapman Creek for long-term community water supply for Sechelt and vicinity. The Chapman Creek Watershed Reserve is designated for long-term water supply until 9999. The Union Steamship Co. is granted a water license on Chapman Creek A 10 year Timber Sale Harvest License on Chapman Creek is issued to Jackson Bros. Logging Co. Order-in-council gives effect to a Water Reserve on all the water flowing from Chapman Creek and tributaries in favour of the Sunshine Coast Regional District (SCRD) water utility. The SCRD is incorporated with the mandate to develop the regional water system for the lower Sunshine coast and purchases the Union Steamship Co. water works. The District Forester expresses concerns to the Chief Forester about the effects of logging on water quality in Chapman Creek. SCRD Planning Director raises concerns about the effects of logging in the Community Watershed to the SCRD Planning Committee The SCRD Board calls for a moratorium on logging in Chapman Creek until necessary studies are done.  1929  1967  1968  1970 1972 1973  73  1974  1975  1981 1987 1989  1990  1991 1992  1993  SCRD requests Order-in-Council Watershed Reserve to restrict watershed use to water provision under the authority of the SCRD. The Chapman Creek Integrated Resource Management Study is initiated by the Ministry of Forests. The Chapman IRMS is completed and recommends limiting logging and conducting sedimentation studies to address necessary infrastructure repairs and maintenance. On the advice of the Health Department, the SCRD petitions Water Resources Services for assistance in applying to Crown Lands for a Watershed Reserve in favour of the SCRD water utility. A Section 12 Land Act Watershed Reserve in favour of Water Management Branch is placed over Chapman Creek and other community watersheds in response to escalating public concern. Gray Creek is developed by the SCRD for community water supply and begins to serve Sechelt residents. A Section 12 Land Act Watershed Reserve in favour of M E L P Water Management Branch is placed over Gray Creek. In response to deteriorating water quality and timing of flows, the SCRD agrees to participate in an Integrated Resource Management Plan for Chapman and Gray Creek community watersheds, initiated by Water Management Branch and the Ministry of Forests. Jackson Bros. Logging Co. is sold to International Forest Products. The Chapman/Gray creeks Integrated Watershed Management Plan is initiated. Because of escalating opposition to logging in the high elevation catchment areas, the M O F initiates the Tetrahedron Local Resource Use Plan (LRUP). The SCRD files a statement of claim in BC Supreme Court which causes the M O F to fund critical maintenance and restoration work. The M O F states that there are no specific M O F files relating to the Chapman Creek Watershed Reserve and that the reserve status is simply to "red flag" the water resource. A Tenure Inquiry to Crown Lands discovers that administrative authority for the watersheds is vested in MELP, Water Management Branch. In the first case of its kind in BC, the SCRD proceeds with legal action against the M O F and FI seeking an injunction to stop logging and road building during the IWMP process. Three M O F hydrologists attribute 90% of the over 800 landslides in the Chapman and Gray to logging and road building. The SCRD applies to M E L P for a lease of Crown Lands over the Chapman Watershed Reserve in favour of the Sunshine Coast Water Utility, and is  74  1994  1995  1997 1998  2001  2002  rejected. Just prior to going to court, a deal is reached between the SCRD, the MOF, and FI on a moratorium on logging and road building pending the IWMP. After only 10 years of service, Gray Creek is relegated to a back-up system when water quality plummets due to extensive logging. The Watershed Reserve Subcommittee of the Tetrahedron LRUP requests documentation from both the M O E and M O F to clarify administration of the watershed reserves. The M O F would "neither confirm nor deny the existence of the documentation" confirming M O F as the legal administrative authority. The first draft IWMP is released to the public for review and comment. A 2000 person signature petition is collected over a four day period which rejects any further industrial activity in the community watersheds and supports the SCRD in seeking local control. The Tetrahedron LRUP is shut down prior to the Provincial Cabinet decision regarding the LRUP study area. A multi-million dollar watershed restoration project for Chapman/Gray is approved. The entire Tetrahedron Study area, including the upper Chapman, is designated a Class " A " Provincial Park by Provincial Cabinet. The M O F and M E L P "sign-off the Chapman/Gray IWMP. The Sechelt First Nation, FI, and the SCRD do not. The SCRD holds a referendum on whether or not the community supports the Integrated Watershed Management Plan for the Chapman and Gray Creeks. 88% voted no to the plan. The SCRD informs the provincial government of its intention to seek community control over the watersheds. Three months prior to the provincial election, then Minister of Forests Gordon Wilson announces at a public meeting that control over the community watersheds will be divested to the SCRD and the Sechelt First Nation. He also promises to do everything he can to make this happen prior to the election. Gordon Wilson is not re-elected, and the Liberals gain power over the province without control having been divested. Following the election, despite the objections of the SCRD and the public, a ten-year moratorium on logging in the Chapman Watershed is lifted by the Ministry of Forests District Manager when he approves more logging in the community watersheds. The Sunshine Coast Council of Canadians, the Sunshine Coast Conservation Association, and the Sunshine Coast Water First Committee initiate a community petition to prohibit all industrial activity within the community  watersheds, and to transfer control of the watersheds to the community for the purpose of protecting the domestic water supply. Modified from the Sunshine Coast Council of Canadians/ SCCA Volunteer's Guide, 2002; Sunshine Coast Community Watersheds petition fact sheet, and Chronology of Events-Chapman and Gray Community Watersheds.  In the early 1970s, concerns over the impacts of logging in the watershed led the SCRD to request an investigation, which confirmed that logging and road building had caused a deterioration in water quality in the Creek. In 1973, the SCRD Board called for a moratorium on logging in Chapman Creek, while the Ministry of Forests conducted the Chapman Integrated Resource Management Study (IRMS). The IRMS was intended to be a planning model that would guide watershed management in other communities in the region.  The Chapman IRMS called for extreme restraint on slide prone areas of the watershed, and recommended that the upper catchment basin (now in the Tetrahedron Provincial Park) be protected (Bouman, 1997). The IRMS also recommended limiting logging and undertaking a sedimentation study to address necessary infrastructure repairs and maintenance. The plan was never implemented (Bouman, 1997).  In response to public concern over water quality, a provincial Task Force planning process was initiated by the Environment and Land Use Committee of Cabinet in 1975. It was evident that the watershed was in need of additional protection, and the Chapman drainage was designated as a Watershed Reserve under Section 12 (since renamed Section 15 and 16) of the Land Act. This designation was intended to stop poor forestry practices that were affecting water quality in environmentally sensitive community watersheds. The designation took authority over the watershed from the Ministry of Forests, and gave it to the Ministry of Environment. Under the  76  designation, any road construction not related to the provision of water was prohibited. In 1981, Gray Creek was developed as a community water supply, and was designated a Watershed Reserve in 1987 (Bouman, 1997). Despite its protected status, the Ministry of Forests began reissuing cutting permits within the Watershed Reserves in the late 1970s. Logging proceeded until the late 1980's; much of it on the slide-prone lands identified in the 1974 Chapman Study (Bouman, 1997).  Chapman and Gray Creek Integrated Watershed Management Plan  In response to continuously deteriorating water quality and timing of flows, and in an attempt to accommodate all resource interests, the Ministry of Forests and the Water Management Branch of BCE initiated an Integrated Watershed Management Plan for the Chapman and Gray Creek community watersheds. The planning process began in 1989, and took eight years to complete. It was one of the first IWMP processes in the province.  Around the same time, a separate planning process was initiated by the Ministry of Forests. The Tetrahedron Local Resource Use Plan (LRUP) was focused on the upper watershed of Chapman and Gray Creeks. The initial impetus for the LRUP was local recreation, however participants expanded the scope to include water supply and other resource values (Koop, 1998).  Throughout the IWMP and LRUP processes, the Ministry of Forests continued to manage the Chapman/Gray community watersheds. In 1992, M O F claimed that the reserve status was merely to 'red flag' the water resource, and that no specific M O F  77  files existed that related to the Chapman Creek Watershed Reserve designation. A Tenure Inquiry to Crown Lands showed that the Creeks were indeed Watershed Reserves under the  Land Act,  and that administrative authority rested with the Water  Management Branch of MELP. This led the SCRD to proceed with legal actions against M O F and FI to stop logging and road building during the IWMP process. A Statement of Claim was brought to the Supreme Court of British Columbia in October of 1992, but a moratorium on logging and road building was attained prior to going to court. The case was the first of its kind in British Columbia (Bouman, 1997).  Meanwhile, the Tetrahedron LRUP Water Subcommittee Final Report found that current conditions in the community watersheds were deplorable, and that the 1974 Chapman IRMS recommendations were blatantly ignored. A Watershed Reserve Subcommittee was struck to look into policy, procedures, and administrative authority in the watershed reserves (Bouman, 1997).  In 1994, a community petition was gathered that called for the end to any further industrial activity in the community watersheds, and that supported the SCRD in seeking local control over the watersheds. The same year, the Tetrahedron LRUP was shut down prior to the Provincial Cabinet decision regarding the study area, and the first draft of the Integrated Watershed Management Plan (IWMP) was released to the public for review and comment (Bouman, 1997).  While no definition of integrated watershed management planning exists in the IWMP, it was defined in another Ministry of Forests publication as "a process which identifies and considers all resource values, along with social, economic' and environmental needs. This process assigns resource use and management emphasis  78  based on present uses, the mix of benefits produced, the continued capability of the land to produce benefits, and social preference." (Ministry of Forests, 1990). The Chapman/Gray IWMP called for continued industrial use within the Community Watersheds, including expanded logging and mineral exploration. This continued 'multiple use' plan was unacceptable to stakeholders concerned about water quality (Koop, 1998). On release of the plan, a group of citizens became concerned that it did not go far enough to assure a safe drinking water supply to the communities on the Sunshine Coast, nor give them a voice in the management of the resource. They formed a registered non-profit society called the Water First Committee to educate the public about the plan, and to lobby for a community referendum on whether or not to accept the IWMP. Many Committee members had been active in the Tetrahedron LRUP process, and had made attempts to be included in the IWMP process. Well researched and armed with supportive documentation, Water First was a significant factor in rallying negative sentiment towards the IWMP (Personal communication, 2001).  The Ministry of Forests and the Ministry of Environment signed off on the Chapman/Gray IWMP in 1997. The forest licensees were not happy with the plan, and did not sign, as they thought that restricting forest development activities above what was required under the  Forest Practices Code was  inappropriate given the economic  outlook at the time (Ohlson, 1999). Additionally, although the Sechelt Indian Band were one of the stakeholders on the planning team, they did not sign off on the plan as they were uncertain of the potential impacts that signing might have on long term land claim negotiations (Ohlson, 1999). In response to growing public concern, the  79  SCRD also did not sign the plan, and demanded more public consultation. With pressure from the Water' First Committee, the SCRD decided to hold another first in B.C.: a public referendum on whether the community supported the IWMP for their community watersheds. On May 2,1998, approximately 88% of Sunshine Coast voters rejected the IWMP, and denounced future logging and mining plans in the community watersheds. Fed up with maintaining merely an advisory role in resource management in its own watersheds while being legally and financially responsible for providing clean, potable water, the SCRD further requested the provincial government give them administrative control over resource use activities in Chapman Creek (Koop, 2000). Given the storied past and previous mismanagement of the Chapman/Gray systems by various provincial ministries, the Sunshine Coast Regional District continued to question the overall land tenure for the watersheds, and eventually took the Ministry of Forests to court. The frustration and anger from Sunshine Coast residents led to a push for acquiring local control of the watersheds.  Given that consensus was not reached with the plan, the Chapman/Gray IWMP was elevated to the provincial ministerial level for final review (Ohlson, 1999). The plan has never been implemented.  Divested local control over community watersheds  In their documentation calling for a rejection of the IWMP, the Water First Committee called for a new approach: a "negotiated... management structure which is locally controlled and accountable". The group also called for a new process where  80  the community determines what is appropriate in the coirimunity watersheds (Water First, 1998).  In early 2001, Minister of Forests Gordon Wilson announced that management of the Chapman and Gray Creek Community Watersheds would be divested to the Sunshine Coast Regional District and the Sechelt First Nation. That June, Gordon Wilson, running in a Sunshine Coast riding, was not re-elected, and the Liberals gained power over the province. Divesture had not occurred by that point. Following the election, despite the objections of the SCRD and the public, a ten-year moratorium on logging in the Chapman Watershed was lifted by the Ministry of Forests District Manager, when he approved more logging in the community watersheds in his timber supply review of August 2001. In the winter of 2002, The Sunshine Coast Council of Canadians, the Sunshine Coast Conservation Association, and the Sunshine Coast Water First Committee initiated a community petition to prohibit all industrial activity within the community watersheds, and to transfer control of the watersheds to the community for the purpose of protecting the domestic water supply.  In November of 2002, the SCRD released a statement saying they had signed an agreement with the Sechelt First Nation to agree to work together to gain local control over the watershed. The proposed management structure is still being debated. For this reason, an analysis of the institutional arrangements at play is timely in that it may offer insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the past and present management structures, in order to improve watershed governance in the future. The following chapter represents an assessment of the gaps in the institutional  81  arrangements, drawing on analysis of interviews with the major stakeholders and actors outlined in this chapter.  82  Chapter 6- The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework Analysis Institutional analysis is a method for examining a problem that a group of individuals (or organizations) face, and how the rules they adopt address this problem. It is based on understanding the nature of the problem, the nature of individuals or culture, and the institutional setting that the individuals are embedded within. The previous chapter provided an insight into the action arena (the physical setting, actors involved and the laws and legislation that guide their actions). This chapter represents an analysis of the subsequent rule-ordered relationships among the parties involved in the Chapman/Gray IWMP. The analysis helps to identify gaps in the current management framework that could be filled in any future endeavours to manage the watersheds. Physical boundary issues  The rules of any institutional interactions in ecosystem management must be compatible with the physical and biological setting of the problem at hand. The setting proves to be the first in many limiting factors to the success of the Chapman/Gray IWMP, as the watershed boundary used by the planning team was defined by the Ministry of Forests, and excluded the lower reaches of the watershed according to the Ministry of the Environment. This creates problems for management, as many of the issues related to urban development, fisheries and flood plain management occur at the lower reaches of the watershed.  "The biggest problem that I've got with the whole IWMP... it's got nothing to do with the watershed. It basically goes from the top of the mountain to the  83  intake and stops there. So there's absolutely no concern down below the intake, so I can log it to the rock... so they're basically not looking at a holistic picture of the watershed like they should be doing.. .so the whole bottom end is being trashed, because of all the logging and the impacts of the past, and yet everybody's focusing all the activities at the top of the watershed." (FO)  Community attributes  The place-based social worlds of local communities have a tremendous impact on the institutional relationships that exist in the management of the watersheds. Partially because of what had occurred in the past, and increasing concerns over water quality, there is a strong divide between those in the community who want to see the watersheds preserved for water quality only, and those who focus on the economic importance of the Creeks to the communities. This dichotomy between "greenies" versus "foresters" is a simplified tension, but one that exists in many rural communities throughout British Columbia. This has a large implication for the ruleordered relationships between and among institutions involved in watershed management- particularly for elected members, representing the views of their constituents. Community attributes including previous history, mistrust, and antagonistic personal relationships can be significant impediments to successful design and implementation of multistakeholder plans.  Much of the current 'culture' surrounding the watersheds stems from previous management- and mismanagement -attempts. Some view this as being "hung up on the past":  84  "The other thing too is that, I can say in honesty, is that a lot of people on the committee are hung up on what happened in the past. We're there not to talk about what's happened in the past, but to say that we're learning from those, and let's see what we can do now, in order to make those changes. So that we don't repeat those mistakes. " (FI) Others maintain that previous management efforts, occurred under inadequate scientific evidence, different regulatory mechanisms, and technological capacity. Disruptions from logging that occurred in the watershed happened a long time ago, when there was a lack of regulatory control, and of knowledge on what kind of issues there would be in the future. Whereas in the past, there was minimal planning to road construction, now there is a sophisticated process of engineering and permitting. (HO)  The Ministry of Forests also claim that attitudes towards resource extraction were different in the past. Logging and road construction were done at atimewhen resources were thought to be inexhaustible, and there was no intent to damage the water resource or the land resource. For this reason, it is considered 'unfair' to attribute today's values to yesterday's practices (MOF1).  "Attitudes of the logging companies, and society in general, have changed over this period of time. Environmental awareness grew, and forestry was more receptive to what the public's concerns were.. .This community has changed from one that used to be heavily resource-based.. .and now they are not as sympathetic to those issues." (HO)  85  Concerns over past management practices may hamper the \villingness of the community to work together towards solutions, and many are concerned about rising infrastructure costs: ".. .they have concerns that harvesting that was done in the past will affect their water quality and way of life. And I certainly wouldn't want to go home and turn on my tap and have a bunch of mud coming out of my tap. They also believe that the harvesting activities up there add cost to their infrastructure, and... but certainly in my opinion I disagree..." (FT) Some of this historical concern has led to conflict, and was partially what instigated the IWMP in the first place. In the 1970s, there was a process to map all of the unstable terrain, where the Ministry of Forests "refused to recognize these risks" and continued to log on unstable slopes (CA). Concerns mounted over past harvesting practices, road building practices, water quality, and the pace of development in the area (MOF2). Many communities throughout BC began to see the pace of logging in the 1970's as the cause for the hundreds of landslides and roads collapsing (MOF1, CA). This led to protest, and there have been instances of name calling and :  equipment being damaged, as well as some conflicts that eventually led to court appearances (SI).  From this conflict came the recognition that there was this controversy, and in order to solve it, the notion was to create a resource management planning process, which brought the players to the table to discuss the issue (MOF1). The community wanted to be involved, as ".. .they saw some evidence that the provincial agencies didn't do a great job in the past, and maybe don't have the confidence level that, unless they're involved at some level, that they're not going to have the same problems there."  86  (MOF1) The watershed had been a source of conflict going back many years, so the process was viewed as necessary to try to get at the heart of that and create some plan to go forward. (MOF1)  In short, the community attributes and previous dealings with one another contribute significandy to the institutional arrangements at play on the Sunshine Coast. A lack of regulatory control, planning, and different perceptions and understandings of the effects of logging on water quality led to what some define as 'mismanagement' of the watersheds. This also creates a sense of mistrust in the community of the ability of government agencies to oversee and manage their resources. Another perspective raised by the SCRD was that the policies and mandates that did exist were 'made outside this community' by politicians in Victoria. This proves to be a major frustration for the community, as rules and laws were seen to not reflect the placebased reality and community culture that exists on the Sunshine Coast.  T R A N S A C T I O N S COSTS  According to IAD researchers, there are many interrelated sets of transaction costs associated with interorganizational policy implementation. Transaction costs are likely to grow as the number of stakeholders increases, along with the number of routine interactions among them. They also increase if there is an inequity in information, knowledge and power. When there are heterogeneous interests among the bargaining partners, costs will increase. Additionally, jurisdictional complexity will add to transaction costs (Imperial, 1999).  Transaction costs include information costs, coordination costs, and strategic costs.  87  Information  Costs  Information costs occur as a result of searching for and organizing information. Costs can also result from an ineffective blend of information. Participants in ecosystem based planning require both scientific time and place- based information. While science-based information includes research on basic ecological systems, time and place information refers to knowledge acquired by individuals who know the nature of the particular physical and social setting. This would include knowledge on the nature and extent of particular environmental problems (Imperial, 1999).  The IWMP was a very science-based process. In general, participants think that the information gathered by the team was of very good scientific quality, and that there was sufficient information on which to base good decisions. Hydrological data is up to the Water Survey of Canada and the Ministry of Environment Resource Inventory Committee standards. The forest inventory is "as good as you're going to get anywhere" (MOE), and the geological mapping is up to provincial standard (MOE). The fish and wildlife inventory was also done by a "very experienced biologist" (MOE), and the people that were brought in were all recognized as very good scientists. (HO)  88  For the IWMP process, the team actually gathered much of the information together, and submitted joint proposals to FRBC for funding. Through the efforts of the team, they were able to access two million dollars in Forest Renewal B.C. (FRBC) funding for watershed restoration work in the Chapman/Gray. Some believed they would not have had access to the funding if they had not acted as a group. (MOE) "It was actually useful having the team behind the information gathering processes because when you made application for funds, having an interdisciplinary, interagency team making the application rather than an individual gave that a little bit more clout, a bit more importance." (MOE) While everyone contributed what they could to the process, the Ministry of Forests had more resources at its disposal, and was able to contribute more information than the rest of the stakeholders; particularly mapping resources. The Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Petroleum Resources contributed mineral mapping. The Ministry of Environment was able to provide some in-kind resources, although this represented a much smaller portion than the other co-chair. The Health Unit and the Regional District brought "whatever information they could as individuals to the process", and "each of the agencies actually contributed in-kind."(MOE)  One participant acknowledged that gathering of extensive information increased the costs of the process: "In terms of resources invested,.. .it was a very expensive process, but the information that was collected was pretty good, so.. .you know a lot of people have done work on it and it's because the information is there. So, is that use of that information a waste then? I don't think so, I think a lot of people are continuing to get good use out of it, so it's a hard judgment call." (MOE) The same participant acknowledged that collecting information likely lengthened the process,  89  but had the process shortened, it may have led to significant information gaps that could increase the risk of making bad decisions. (MOE)  While scientific information may have been a strength of the IWMP, place based information was not given as much weight. While traditional use of the watersheds by the Sechelt band was acknowledged, no significant status was given to their historical knowledge and use of the watershed. Additionally, some participants felt that knowledge that was not derived by the process chairs was not included in the process: "It was technical information, that was largely controlled by the Ministry of Forests, and the Ministry of Environment.. .they were co-chairs on that. There were even points where we'd bring in information that we'd want, and we brought it to the group to put in to the technical text. The Ministry of Forests would disagree with that, and didn't even want us to put it into the appendix, and adopt it." (RD)  There was, however, some creative sharing of information that was very place-based in nature. To ensure that their locally elected representatives "understood the history of the watershed", civil society banded together to make presentations to directors and councilors on "what has happened in the watershed, and what our vision for the future is". This was deemed to be "... fabulously successful, in that there has been 40 people that have served as elected people on the Sunshine Coast that have a very detailed knowledge of what happened in the watershed, why it happened, and how to go forward, and that's been an overwhelmingly powerful asset." (CA)  Although the Ministry of Forests may have contributed the bulk of the technical. information to the process, there did not appear to be any 'hoarding' of information.  90  Sharing and access were deemed to be satisfactory, for the most part. There did not appear to be an agenda not to share information, to most participants (SI). Access of this information to the public was also deemed to be acceptable to most, given the available technology. All of the information was put on an information database that was paid for by the FRBC watershed restoration program and given to the Sunshine Coast Regional District. They in essence became "guardians of tens of thousands of dollars worth of data" (MOE), in the hopes that the information would then be accessible to the community. As a sort of precursor to modern Geographic Information Systems, the interactive watershed and photographic images were very popular at an open house during the IWMP (MOE). Some participants mentioned that while today you could share information easily over the Internet, they did the best they could for the era (MOF2).  Civil society was also able to access the information for the most part, but used the information for different purposes. CA described a "love" of freedom of information legislation, as it allowed his group access to a great deal of study that was commissioned by the M O F for the IWMP. They in turn used this information in their court case against the MOF. A few participants raised the issue that with increasing government cut backs and changes to freedom of information legislation, access to information is going to be a critical issue (MOE). As offices are closed and provincial staff is 'decimated', the impact will be a dramatic reduction in public access to information. "Obviously we can't put out multi million dollar contracts to do habitat evaluations on our own."(CA)  Along these lines, some participants felt that information sharing and access didn't go far enough, or that the emphasis on scientific information over place based  91  information was a detriment to solving the problem (RD). CA felt that the Ministry of Forests intentionally withheld information from him, in order to deter him from using it in court: "Um, [information sharing]... is [fairly smooth and accessible] from the other ministries. From the MOF, they always try to hold me up. They'll say 'we can't actually give this to you but we'll allow you to be in a room for 15 minutes to view all this stuff. I have a 500 page freedom of information package waiting for me in Surrey, and the M O F has delayed the release of it for nine months now. It was very deliberate, they knew they could hold this information so that we wouldn't be able to use it in court, but I wouldn't be able to challenge the withholding of information in time to use it in our Supreme Court case. We won our case anyway, so... Yeah, they [the MOF] constantly try to cut off our access to information."  Despite differential resources and abilities to access information, CA describes that political lobbying can be effective with limited resources. He described that while the forestry company would spend $20,000 mounting publicity drives in the community, his group would spend fifty cents on a stamp to send a letter to the newspaper, and 'completely destroy' their campaign. He states, "We've often found that forestry coalitions and logging companies can outspend us 100 to one, but they need to be aware.. .to outspend us 500 to one!"  To summarize, information costs for the Chapman/Gray IWMP are considerable. While the quality and quantity of science-based information is considered excellent, gathering this information was very expensive and time consuming, which may have led to extending the process by a number of years. There was also an emphasis on  92  technical data over place-based information, which some believe led to improperly dealing with the problems at hand. While access to and sharing of the information was generally satisfactory, some parties felt that the co-chairs were purposefully dominating and withholding access of various interest groups to certain documents; particularly civil society and the community. Information Asymmetries Information asymmetries can increase information costs, and may result in disagreement over the nature of the problems and the associated management actions. This occurred in the Chapman/Gray. Although there is a general agreement that previous logging practices had contributed to the present conflict, there is disagreement over the extent to which logging is solely to blame for water quality problems in the watersheds. This led to a major debate over whether the IWMP process should focus on a single-use approach, where the watershed would solely be used for water supply, or a multiple use approach that includes forestry and other resource based activities.  The Ministry of Forests maintained that it was not in the Terms of Reference of the IWMP to negotiate a single-use approach (MOF1). Though no definition of integrated watershed management planning exists in the IWMP, it is defined in another Ministry of Forests publication as "a process which identifies and considers all resource values, along with social, economic and environmental needs. This process assigns resource use and management emphasis based on present uses, the mix of benefits produced, the continued capability of the land to produce benefits, and social preference." (Ministry of Forests, 1990). Others firmly believe there  93  should have been a discussion around whether the watershed plan could be single use (CA, RD). For this reason, problem framing contributes significantiy to the overall transaction costs of the IWMP. Many felt that ".. .we should have spent more time up front understanding what it was we wanted to accomplish, and maybe having those discussions with elected officials...," (MOF2) as the process would end up being more about political control over the watershed than scientific resource management practices. This is discussed in greater detail, later in this chapter. To reduce information asymmetries, many ecosystem based programs give a high priority to public involvement and education activities. This is not the case in the Chapman/Gray. As the SCRD was considered to be the stakeholder representing the general public, other forms of public participation were, by most accounts, kept to a minimum; although this appears to be a subjective view, as others claim "there was a fair amount of public debate" (HO).  Public input was solicited at the beginning of the plan, on two occasions. There was a public review period after the first draft, and an open forum that included a discussion on health issues (HO); although there were many complaints that concerns expressed at these meetings were never reflected in the plan (Koop, 1998; various letters to SCRD). Much of the input reflected fear that there were no concessions to the water licensee, the SCRD. (CA)  The public was encouraged to submit written comments (Ohlson, 1999); however, contrary to original statements, the public was excluded from observing meetings throughout the IWMP process (Koop, 1998). Many residents felt that the plan did  94  not reflect local values and interests, but those of the Ministry of Forests and resource extraction companies. "The IWMP was entirely designed to fence out both the public and the public interest... It was all consensus between industry and government, it had nothing to do with the people." (CA) Information asymmetries further increased transaction costs, as the stakeholders disagreed over the nature of the problem to be solved in the first place. An attempt to frame the problem in terms that all parties could agree on would have greatly improved the collaborative effort. Additionally, public involvement in the plan was considered insufficient, and this oversight would be a significant factor in contributing to the plan's rejection by the community.  Coordination costs Watershed based management programs can create a wide range of potential coordination problems, which may create opportunities for conflict. Coordination costs represent threats to collaboration, and include the sum of the costs invested in negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing agreements (Imperial, 1999). There are a number of factors that can increase coordination costs; all of which appear to be present during the development of the IWMP.  a) Process/team composition related coordination costs  i)  Who was at the table  Coordination costs will, by nature, increase as the number of actors or participants involved increases. While the Chapman/Gray IWMP had a reasonably sized team of nine, the team fluctuated at times to up to fifteen participants (MOE). The turnover  95  of the participants was frustrating for many, and led to the process taking longer than initially anticipated, which increased the costs of coordination. "As it was, the group at its largest.. .it fluctuated over the years, but there were times when there were fifteen people around the table, and that's pretty well pushing the maximum number of people you can have on a planning team environment before things start to fall apart.... You also always look back and wonder what you would do differently, and one of the things that we would do differently, I would probably put an end date on the process rather than leaving it open-ended..., because if it starts into ten years like it did, people come and go and you do lose something, you lose that continuity, whereas.. .you have less of a chance of participants' turn over in a shorter time period..." (MOE) H O explains that the individuals representing the forest companies, FI and Canadian Forest Products, changed almost annually, and that this was a factor in the plan taking so many years, as they had to continuously revisit issues with the new team members.  In addition to the number of actors at the table, institutional factors may discourage some participants from engaging in collaborative decision making. This too bears a cost, as the plan may not have the support of the non-participants. In the case of the Chapman/Gray IWMP, this would lead to the plan being rejected. These impediments to collaboration will be expanded upon below.  Public representation in the process amounted to one person, who represented the SCRD to the IWMP process. This created what SI described as leading to fear that there wasn't enough community representation on the board. RD describes:  96  "It was a pretty quiet process at the beginning.. .eventually the community wanted to have more and more involvement in it.. .ultimately the community said it wasn't enough to have just myself on there, different community groups, conservation groups, that should be wider and more representative of it- that's when it all started to collapse..."(RD) The participants all acknowledged that having elected representatives at the table may have helped, because in reality there were more issues at stake than the technical ones they were discussing, there were political issues. It was also believed that the process may have been more expedient with elected representatives' participation, as it would have satisfied public perception that their views were being represented. (HO) Civil society was particularly frustrated by this exclusion: "Well we never had a seat on the IWMP process. So it was an out of reach process for us. Now the regional district had a paid staff to participate with. Basically all the participants of the IWMP were paid staff. It was 100% professional representation.. .not that that helped them reach any reasonable conclusions, they obviously never did." (CA)  ii)  Terms of reference  Another process-related impediment to collaboration was the terms of reference for the IWMP. Some felt that the terms of reference were exclusionary to begin with.  The terms of reference were drafted by the Ministry of Forests and the Ministry of Environment, and they extended invitations to the stakeholders who were at the table.  97  It was viewed that the two ministries would chair the process 'by default' because they had the area of "the keenest interest". (MOE) "It was the Ministry of Forest's land tenure, and yet the purpose of the IWMP was to create a plan for making water the priority, according to the guidelines that were there at the time, so it was felt that the two of us, Forests and Environment had the greatest interest and motivation... that we would be the ones that would chair it."(MOE)  No interest groups were represented, and there were no elected officials at the table. /  The Ministry of Forests kicked off the first selection of invitees by looking at the resource interests that were within the watershed, and chose a team with representatives from each one of the sectors. The focus of the membership was on the people who had either a statutory responsibility for decision making in that watershed, or a group that was going to be directly affected by events in the watershed, such as the Sunshine Coast Regional District (MOE). One participant claimed, "Basically it was the bigger kid coming in to the process and trying to push the local people around in the community.. .it was a faulty planning process right from the start. If you look at how the terms of reference were started, how decision making was started, and the positions that people came in with, they [the community] didn't have the freedom to do stuff." (RD) As time went on and the IWMP planning group was formed, the group's membership changed slightly; notably to include the Sechelt First Nation. Although they were invited to participate in the beginning of the process but declined, they chose to take on a more active role as the process progressed due to increased interest in land title issues (SI).  There were differing views on the imposed membership of the planning team:  98  KD thought the planning team wasn't particularly well balanced, as there was a strong 'skewing' of Ministry of Forests and forestry representatives on it. There was only himself as the community representative, which frustrated civil society as this one seat for the public did not allow them much access to the process (CA). H O explained the group's makeup in that they were trying to keep it to a technical team, and did not want to have interest group participation, although he also acknowledged that the two forest industry seats could be viewed by some as representing an interest group.  iii)  Facilitation  An additional process-related barrier to collaboration stemmed from the belief of some of the IWMP actors that the facilitation of the process was one-sided. Facilitation was shared by the Ministry of Forests and the Ministry of Environment representatives at the table. The facilitators were technical staff, and had not had much experience facilitating large planning processes when the plan began (MOE).  It was acknowledged by H O that the chairs were scientists and did a good job, given the controversial issues; although having different chairs that were inexperienced at facilitating was deemed frustrating. Some participants also became frustrated in that they felt their views weren't being heard or being addressed (FI). They also felt that the co-chairing led to a situation where the chairs led the process, perhaps to the exclusion of interests outside their own mandates:  ".. .Well we felt like we were being directed through a process in a way. It was an integrated watershed management plan, which is a planning process of the Ministry of Forests, we couldn't really come up with our own planning process, it was their co-chairs that were doing that, chaired it all, that was another thing  99  that controlled it all, so the group to a degree felt like we were just participants in their process, not really part of it. Right from the beginning, even the terms of reference were theirs, we couldn't really make changes, and then ultimately it came down to fighting word by word what the terms of reference meant." (RD) The chairs themselves felt that sharing facilitation was fine, although not ideal: "We had a good relationship, a good team relationship.. .1 would say that looking back on it, it would probably have been better if neither of us had been chair, and there would have been an independent facilitator, because one of the things about being a chair is that you're supposed to be value neutral, and so you can't... advocate your own position as strongly as you'd like." (MOE) In addition to having defined the terms of reference and the participants, another aspect that led to a power imbalance was the authority to actually write the document, which lay with the two co-chairs. Some participants felt this swayed the process in their favour:  "Well they were the co-chairs.. .they just kept at you and at you until they got the solution they wanted. Once they got a particular point or chapter or section, that was put in the document and there, laid out and almost locked in.. .and of course it came down to the point where no one went away, because as soon as someone went away, that's when they would say, or did say in fact, 'well you stepped away from the planrdng process so we went ahead and wrote it'. It's kind of like the old adage that the last person in the room writes the document." (RD)  100  iv)  Consensus  Another factor that has been seen to increase process-related coordination costs in the short term is having a consensus-based decision making process, and the extra time and effort this entails (Kenney, 1997). The IWMP process began when consensus decision making was relatively new in watershed management, and the team had varying opinions on the merits of this approach. A participant describes their approach to decision making:  ".. .So usually what would happen is that issues would be brought forward to the discussion and there would be a good, intelligent discussion.. .usually the discussion would be led on a particular issue by somebody for whom that issue was significant, and people would react to the position that was brought forward by the individual, and information, or issues would be tabled if more information was required, and that's how a lot of studies got done. And so a lot of the decisions really were negotiated decisions over a period of time. It's not like somebody made a presentation, and then there was a rebuttal, and then all of a sudden 'put up your hand if you agree with it and put up your hand if you don't and let's count the yays and nays'. It wasn't like that at all. It was more an evolution of mutual views that usually ended up in an acceptable Best Management Practice, and it did involve pretty complex negotiation." (MOE)  This complex negotiation contributed significantly to the amount of time the process took; a factor which the M O F blamed on the SCRD. They attributed at least three years of the process to trying to bring the SCRD on side. "And you look back and think, "Why did we waste our time on that?" so I think the planning- you know, it can  101  be acrimonious, but usually that's not where the real delays come in. It's usually when it gets beyond the actual planning table, the behind the scenes kind of stuff, trying to break down some barriers."(MOF2)  Although no definitions of consensus were given in the IWMP, the participants claimed to have spent a long time discussing different definitions of consensus (HO). While the team made an effort at the beginning of the process to reach a consensus on all the small details of the plan, eventually consensus broke down:  "... I mean you try to get consensus but at some point you say, "Hey you know listen, we've been at this for ten years, we're not going to get further in the interest in good management until we sign off this plan." And there's some down sides to doing it because you are going to go unilaterally, but in not going forward, you really-1 wouldn't say abandoning, but you're shelving a huge amount of work.. ."(MOF1)  Some attribute the differences in power and legislated authority among the players at the table to the breakdown of the consensus-based decision making on the IWMP:  'We're not in control of the writing of the reports, we only get to review content and debate it... so was there a full consensus? Well that's really pie in the sky stuff. It doesn't really happen in real life, so... if it was consensus based, then why did we have this so called.. .referendum? If it was consensus based, what was that all about?" (FI)  As the IWMP process began more than ten years ago, the participants have had a lot of time to reflect on what they were trying to accomplish, and admitted to an  102  experimental approach when they began. At the time, in 1988, few people were attempting consensus based decision making in resource management. While there were theories emitting from universities, practitioners were very much learning-bydoing'. (MOE) ".. .The whole idea of having that kind of stakeholder-based advisory committee on plan-development was quite a new idea in the province. I mean it's easier to look back on it now that we've had a few other examples of where it's been used, and we've seen what works and what didn't, but back in those days we had some great lofty ideas of how we wanted to proceed and that we were going to try to seek a consensus, and .. .how easy this process was going to go, and we didn't realize that some of those ideas, although great in theory, really don't hold up when rubber hits the road, when you've got the reality of people and positions and things like that, sometimes you do run into difficulties that can drag the process on. You run into information short falls, and it can go on and on.. ."(MOE)  Some participants became very jaded with consensus decision making after the IWMP process:  "And another thing too is that the consensus decision making model is faulty in itself. It works as a goal, it's not an end outcome. And I think people needed to realize that.. .is that consensus shows you where you agree, but what's more important is it shows you where you don't agree, and then what you do with that.. .well obviously you have to ship it up to the powers that be that make the decision, so, in the Chapman creek watershed planning process, consensus was a good place to go, but it needed to be said from the very beginning, 'okay this  103  is where we agree and where we don't agree, and within a time frame that we're going to give ourselves to make these decisions." (RD)  v) Working relationships  The nature of working relationships can gready increase coordination costs. In general, the IWMP participants described the working relationships to be congenial on a personal level, and adversarial on an agency level. The group, by most accounts, was very technical (HO, MOE), and individuals were respectful of everyone's interests (RD). As the process progressed, some relationships grew stronger as participants let go of their 'polarized positions' to share information, exchange ideas (MOE), and develop a mutual respect  (MOF1).  However, one of the challenges the team faced over the ten year process was a turnover in personnel, so working relationships were reestablished continuously (MOE).  On an agency level, relationships were described quite differently. Mostly stemming from a history fraught with conflict, some agencies had better rapport with one another. There existed, at times during the process, friction between: the SCRD and the M O F (FO), the SCRD and D F O (FO), M O F and SCCA (CA), M O F and the community, and others. R D states, "At a personal level there was trust, at an agency level there wasn't trust. There were very good professional, quality people that cared for one another. But at the agency level there wasn't that trust there."  Despite the friction that occurred at times between agencies, the working relationships established during the process did have some positive benefits for some of the participants. Most recognized that although they may share different views,  104  there was a benefit to the process in that they were talking to one another; which is always better than the alternative, which in the case of the Chapman/Gray represented going to court (MOF1) They also recognized that, as this was a small community with a limited number of people interested in the same issues, the relationships formed during the IWMP would carry over into other processes. This could be a positive or a negative, depending on the nature of the individual relationship. One participant commented that the contacts made during the Chapman/Gray IWMP were useful when initiating another rWMP in a neighbouring community (MOF2). Other tension-fraught relationships would also carry over into other community issues.  vi) Leadership  Much of the literature on institutional relationships comments on the power an individual leader may bring to a process (Kenney, 1997). A strong leader can reduce coordination costs by motivating participants and improving commitment to collaboration. When asked if there were any powerful individual leaders on the IWMP, the respondents replied that solid, mature leadership was not apparent:  "I haven't seen any [leaders]. Haven't seen any yet. If I had some powerful individual leaders, we would have this thing solved. But we haven't really seen anything" (FO)  One participant guessed that this might have been due to a 'fear of being polite', where leadership was seen as not being 'wishy washy' and being willing to 'be  105  positional at times' (MOE). Therefore taking on a leadership role was seen as creating tension among the group. The civil society organization commented that the opposite was true in the community, as it was a few individuals that really stepped up to the plate to educate the public about the IWMP, and to 'have an enormous influence on the public' to garner support for the referendum. While community leaders were said to 'always materialize somehow', a few key active residents, though not 'public speaking champions', apparently held a variety of skills, including research and leaderships skills, which 'would be hard to replace with one individual'. (CA)  In summary, there were a number of process-related coordination costs associated with the IWMP, including: the number of stakeholders involved in the process; high participant turn-over; the lack of elected representatives and civil society participation; imposed terms of reference for the process; the lack of neutral facilitation; the break down of an all-or-nothing consensus approach; adversarial working relationships on an agency level; and a lack of visionary leadership guiding the process. However, personal relationships were congenial, and there appeared to be strong community leaders that would prove to be important in gathering support for the rejection of the Chapman/Gray IWMP.  b) Institutional relationships and related coordination costs i) history of animosity  There were a number of disincentives to cooperate that dramatically increased coordination costs for the IWMP. Experience with ecosystem based management  106  programs has shown that a history of animosity can increase coordination costs, as efforts to negotiate an agreement will be substantially higher than among parties with a history of amicable cooperation. Additionally, past attempts at decision making around the watersheds had been unsuccessful, and the issues were threatening due to previous conflict; two factors which are difficult to overcome (Imperial, 1999). As the IWMP process was born of conflict, coordination costs were higher in this domain.  The participants had been given a course in conflict resolution to try to decrease some of the animosity between agencies: "I remember we had a couple of lawyers come in and talk about how to resolve disputes, find some common ground or build on those common areas .. .or you may not be able to deal with anytliing.. .it was interesting. You gain a little bit more knowledge.. .but it didn't solve anytliing... [the participants] just dug in their heals a little bit deeper! [laughs]" (SI)  ii)  Trust  This history fraught with conflict also affected trust levels, a factor that would greatly contribute to coordination costs. RD observed that: "You can't plan if you don't have trust.. .and if a major plan is going to be in place for several years, and remove things that can't be there for 300 years, you have to have a lot of trust before that happens." Apparently, that trust at an agency level was not there. "And so there was a lot of discussion about, you know: 'trust us, we're the government, let us get on with it, these watersheds will recover,' and the sense of what's 'recover', that was just too uneasy and unthinkable for me. So that was one thing about the planning process.. .it  107  kind of threw off the planning process, we were in a watershed that needed 25 years to stabilize itself." (RD) There was also a lack of trust around the commitment of the implementing agencies to budget for the necessary work that needed to be done: ".. .but in terms of implementing the strategy, implementing budgets for the plan, that never really happened. It was, 'Trust us, it will be there. We can't make that statement because we don't know what our budgets will be.' That was a real problem for us in local government, because we didn't have the trust factor there that they were going to go ahead and do that... For example the Ministry of Forests was going to plan to take control of a lot of the roads that needed to be reclamated and what not, so how are you going to do that when your budget for roads was $100,000 a year, so they said we'll plan to do that, but their budget at the Ministry of Forests for road restoration was nothing. If one bridge washed out, or one culvert washed out, they couldn't even afford to replace that, so it sat there for a year, this big hole in the road way, washed out, because they had no budget. So if they're saying that, where's the money to take care of it? And there's hundreds of culverts up there." (RD)  FO went on to explain that the agencies trust one another to look after their own interests, but ".. .we certainly don't trust them to look after ours. That's our responsibility, not theirs."  iii) Entrenched positions  108  One of the major complaints was that the majority of participants came in with entrenched positions. FO saw the whole process as "we've said our position, they've said their position.. .nothing's happened". SCRD blamed the break down of the process on the fact that ".. .we couldn't come up with solutions that the co-chairs wanted, that's really what it was.. .the Ministry of Forests." (RD) Both the Ministry of Forests (RD) and the SCRD (FO) were singled out as having entrenched positions: "and it was well locked in the watershed being over harvested and the Ministry of Forests not wanting to move in their management style." (RD)  The people representing the Sunshine Coast environmental community were also accused of having an entrenched position: "There's a handful of people on the Sunshine Coast with a really strong agenda, and they really pushed a position. You know often the way they ran it is to actually involve people like that in the process, but that didn't even work in this case. The feeling of this group on the Sunshine Coast was, We don't want any logging, we don't want any access, we don't want anything,' and they were very very firm, and were pushing an agenda that we didn't have a mandate to proceed, I mean we couldn't deal with that. Where that pressure should have been applied was at the political level. But we were dealing with a technical plan. So that's where I tiiink was the biggest obstacle.. .had that not been coming from the community, just the technical staff sitting at the table probably would have appreciated the technical value of the plan. And now, what they're stuck with is something less." (MOE)  Similarly, some stated that some groups came in with hidden agendas, and that representatives came expecting to leave getting everything they wanted. They claimed  109  it was frustrating to go through the process for four or five years and have hidden agendas emerge. (MOF2) Much of the entrenched positioning came from the perception of mandates, and the lack of perceived flexibility around them: "the problem was that the representatives that were there came with positions that they had to defend, and support. And it was kind of funny because the Ministry of Forests criticized myself for being too positional in my view, you know protecting water and the need to do that, yet they themselves were positional in the view on the need to be allowed in there, and that's what the bottom line is, you know." (RD)  iv) Murky legislation  The perceptions of so many different interests, interest groups and mandates led to the Ministries "clashing" (CA). Some viewed that the process was skewed because the mandate of the Ministry of Forests is to produce revenue from crown lands, not to protect water, and so they were 'dismissive' of water issues (CA). While the other agencies within the government, particularly the Water Management Branch, had referral status to the Ministry of Forests, the M O F "was not obligated in any way, shape, form or matter to actually deal with the concerns that people who had concerns for water quality were bringing forward" (CA). The understanding by some was that the Ministry of Forests had the final word, and that the concerns of people in Water Management were not accurately reflected in the plan because of 'fancy rationales' that the M O F "doesn't have management authority over the land, but they do have management authority over the trees, and that they never took management authority of land away from these other agencies, they just exercised their mandate to  no  remove trees." (CA) FI saw the M O F mandate as being more complex, as they had to manage for all forest resource values, not just water or timber.  There was also confusion about who actually held management authority for the watershed reserve, the M O E or the MOF. The M O E maintains that the reserves established under Sections 15 and 16 of the luindAct  (previously Sections 11 and 12)  are just map notations that do not represent a legal authority of management control on their part: "Okay, so that's why there's an awful lot of confusion about this particular issue, and I know that there are some people on the Sunshine Coast who have fixated on this idea that somehow the Ministry of Environment somehow has the responsibility for these Watershed Reserves, and dropped the ball, and that is absolutely not the case. What this is.. .Section 15: 'The Lieutenant Governor and Council may, for any purpose that he considers advisable in the public interest, by notice signed by the Minister and published in the Gazette, reserve Crown land from disposition under the provisions under the Act.' .. .Disposition means selling it. So what this means... is that if the Lieutenant Governor and Council feels that it's in the public interest, he can establish a reserve over a land, so that it will not be sold for whatever purpose. So if somebody wanted to put a ski hill, or he wanted to sell the land.. .if someone wanted to put a development... putting a reserve on that land for whatever purpose, it would prevent it from being sold. And that reserve is actually a map notation on the Crown land map.... the part two of it just talks about how to amend or cancel any part of the reserve... Section 11 [15]deals with the establishment of a reserve. And then Section 12 [16] states: "The Minister may, for any purpose that he considers advisable in the public interest,  in  temporarily withdraw... Crown land from disposition under this Act." He may amend or cancel such withdrawal. So, Number 11 talks about reserves, establishing reserves and saying, well, on our map we're going to consider this a reserve. And number 12 says, okay, forget the reserves, we're going to... this land is going to stay Crown forever and ever, it's not even going to be reserved, it will never be sold, so a park or something like that. Okay, so that's what these Sections say, there are no other Sections attached to this legislation, this is it."  The Ministry of Environment explained that the reserves like the ones placed on the Chapman and Gray watersheds were established by examining maps of all the community watersheds, and telling Crown Lands which ones they'd like to establish reserves on in order to let them know that that watershed is being used for water supply purposes. If a developer were to approach Crown Lands, they would refer to the map, and see the indication that it was being used for water supply purposes. Crown Land may, at that point, say, "Go talk to Ministry of Environment.", but according the Ministry of Environment, they have no legal authority under anything right now to manage that land. As the land is Crown forest, it's under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Forests, as is most of the Crown land in the province. While the M O E , having an interest in water, has the right to say which areas are being used for water supply, and that there will be a lot of problems if the quality of that water is compromised, they claim to have no mechanism with which to manage the land within a watershed reserve (MOE).  There have been other interpretations of the Land  Act  legislation however; and the  batde eventually wound up in the Provincial courts:  112  ".. .the same issue came up in the Kootenays, and there was a legal, a court case that actually tested it, and the court case again came out and reaffirmed what I just told you, is that just having a reserve on a watershed does not impart any management responsibility on behalf of the statutory decision makers. It's an alienation of land from disposition, and that's all it is. So there are no management requirements involved. So, in terms of confusion over mandates, there's really.. .in absolute legal terms there is no question about who's mandate the management of that land is, it's the Ministry of Forests. There is no question, you know, it's in the Crown forest, and the management of Crown Forest is the Ministry of Forest's responsibility (MOE)." The M O E also pointed out that new legislation in the  Drinking  Water Protection Act  may change  this management authority structure (please see Chapter 7).  Despite the court case, civil society on the Coast maintains that the legislation cannot be interpreted that clearly.  "And that's a big question that's still out there today. We say they {MOF} don't have management authority, that under the existing land use designations they have absolutely no authority to do what they're doing, and what they're doing is offensive to the Land  Act.  Because of the watershed reserve status,  which is under Section 12 of the Land  Act.  Now they deny that, but in the  course of the IWMP process, they presented the management structure as a comanagement thing.. .like when we brought this issue forward, suddenly they started saying, 'Well, oh actually, it is a co-management tjhing, and we managed to gather [together with the MOE], and it just so happens that the Ministry of Environment and Water Management Branch always do exacdy what we ask them to do, it's just pure coincidence.'" [chuckles] (CA)  113  In addition to the battle over interpretation of the legislation, many of the conflicts were attributed to the fact that the people with the responsibility for water don't have any authority, and the people that have that authority don't have any obligations to water. (CA) The general assessment was that legislation that did exist was "murky", and that the roles and responsibilities of each agency were either unclear or in the hands of the wrong authority.  "Weak legislation quite often is the thing that makes you feel good but .. .it doesn't have the strength to result in successful implementation. If you have strong legislation you don't have legal challenges, going on for years and years. .. .Now of course, you could argue in unique cases that the law is perfectly adequate, if implemented. .. .In the case of the watershed, I think it's pretty obvious that there is extremely weak legislation that does not protect water, and there has been disregard of existing statutes. You know the auditor general has addressed water issues in B.C., on a number of occasions, and he says the same thing. He says that authorities are spread out over so many agencies that there's no wonder that the desired result hasn't happened." (CA)  Others agreed with CA, in that the legislation that did exist was not properly implemented in the past. RD accuses the Ministries of Environment, Health, and Fisheries, respectively, of sitting quietly on a number of issues "because they knew that ultimately the Regional District would be responsible for how the water was treated." Although the Ministries had very strong provincial mandates, they were perceived as not asserting that responsibility. (RD)  114  The Department of Fisheries and Oceans viewed the problem as a lack of definitive authority, as every agency has a completely different responsibility. Along with this comes a shurking of responsibilities that are deemed to be under someone else's authority. CA agrees: "You know when you get into this thing about who is responsible for what, and if you're looking at wildlife habitat, what we see is that all the players claim that some other player is responsible for wildlife habitat, for example a logging company will say 'designating wildlife habitat, that's entirely a government thing and until they aren't we don't have any responsibilities here whatsoever'. Somebody else has responsibility. So then the district manager weighs in, and he says that the positions that have the authority to designate wildlife habitat are the chief forester and the deputy minister of water land and air protection.... So they pass the buck."(CA)  Questions of agency trust, historical animosity, positioning, and confusion over mandates contributed significandy to the success of coordinating the IWMP process.  In short, like process-related costs, the nature of the relationships between the institutions involved in the Chapman/Gray IWMP led to significant coordination costs. As the process was born of conflict, the history of animosity between the agencies was difficult to overcome, as there was a significant lack of trust on an agency level. There were numerous accusations of entrenched positioning by both the Ministry of Forests and the Sunshine Coast community. There were also accusations that parties held hidden agendas, which didn't emerge until later in the process. Finally, the apparent lack of clear understanding around respective agency mandates and legislation, and how they pertained to one another, led to a lot of  115  confusion around agency roles and responsibilities. The fact that this discussion had to go to the courts demonstrates the extent to which the costs of murky legislation can increase coordination costs, and threaten collaborative processes.  c) Power and decision-making authority related coordination costs In addition to process and relationship related coordination costs, another impediment to collaboration that increased coordination costs was the issue of the power of the individual stakeholders to make decisions. Like the accusations that the process was led by the two co-chairs, the Ministry of Forests was deemed by three of the participants as having the ultimate decision making power. There is even debate today over whether the M O F can implement the plan, without the consent of three of the non-signing parties (Patrick, personal communication, 2002). [A similar debate was taken to court, again in the Kootenays, which confirmed that an IWMP is not legally binding, and represents a 'feel good' document. (MOE)]  Conversely, the Ministry of Forests saw the issue of ultimate power differendy, where the Regional District was seen to possess the leverage, and that much of the process was "designed to try to bring them on side.. ."(MOF2) :  "The extra time frames, the additional consultations with the public, all those sorts of things were primarily to accommodate the Regional District's interests, and you know, probably rightly so, they were representatives of the people that live in the community.. .So.. .the folks that create the plan certainly have some power just by saying, 'This is our terms of reference'. I think if you asked the Regional District they would say, "Well, it was controlled by the province".  116  But in terms of planning, I think most of the efforts went into trying to find some accommodation for the concerns of the Regional District." (MOF2) Another important factor to consider when assessing coordination costs was that none of the participants at the table actually held the power to make decisions- they all had to confer with their bosses and 'higher-ups'. This represented a major coordination cost, as the participants were limited in the amount of flexibility and creativity they could display. This proved frustrating for the participants: "Where the problem is in the decision making if I were to look at a big flaw, is that maybe the right people were not at the table. The ones that didn't have the authority to actually make decisions.. .they might have been more junior but higher technical staff who are more knowledgeable of the technical issues present hammering things out, but they couldn't represent the political agenda of whatever agency they were representing. So that was probably a big problem." (MOE)  The issue was compounded for the Regional District, as they had to go back to elected officials, whereas most of the other participants would refer to their bureaucratic structures. The Ministry of Forests acknowledged that asking a publicly elected Board to sign off on the draft plan was much different than seeking their Minister to sign off.  Civil society felt they had absolutely no authority, and that the statutory decision makers, particularly in the MOF, didn't recognize them in any way whatsoever. However, they also mentioned that they "try not to have much to do with the M O F " either, because they recognize that although the district manager has statutory  117  authority to approve logging plans and the like, he is not a policy maker, nor does he work in the realm of implementation. "It's the legislature that makes law, not the district managers, and its cabinet that establishes land use designations. So we've been more interested in affecting the top levels of the bureaucratic structure and the government, not in having an argument with the local district manager." (CA) Additionally, because the SCRD was the water purveyor, they were legally bound to deliver potable drinking water, yet had no authority over the water body that supplied the drinking water. Because they are accountable, they were seen as feeling that they were the best agency to make decisions around the watershed, and as 'really wanting the power' (MOF). This represents a disincentive to cooperate on a plan that would not give them the authority they were asking for. CA claims that water users were treated as a 'junior stakeholder', as there weren't even any promises to stop road building, let alone divesting management authority to the community.  Part of this was attributed to a belief that water is not recognized as a priority resource:  "I've found this over the whole history... of working in watershed management, was that it [water] was always looked at as the very last thing to get considered. In a forested watershed, you know forestry.. .there was never any question that forestry would take place. And we always felt like the poorer cousin coming for a hand out, like well, "Gee you know, once you've done your forestry, could we please have the water protection." Because it was always considered an afterthought, because the tenures that were awarded for forestry were just so solid and so clearly defined." (MOE)  118  d) O t h e r coordination costs i)  Adaptability  The degree to which a plan is flexible or not can increase coordination costs, as built in mechanisms to learn, reflect and implement lessons learned can decrease negotiating costs in the future. The IWMP process was deemed to be adaptable by most: " The plan was a working document. If the plan wasn't working, everyone agreed that they were prepared to revisit the plan to adapt it." (HO) FI maintained that they, as well as the government, are committed to reviewing their practices continually, and are always looking for ways to improve their practices.  ii)  Efficiency  Efficiency can be defined in administrative terms and includes the costs associated with administering a management program (Imperial, 1999). For this reason, coordination costs greatly effect how efficient a process was. Given the extensive costs associated with the IWMP, it can be determined that the process was not efficient.  The IWMP process was deemed by all participants to be incredibly inefficient. The process took 10 years, and was never approved or implemented. This had a toll on all participants, and many stated that 'burn out' was definitely a factor. As the Sunshine Coast is a small community, there were complaints that the process did not optimize good resource people with extensive commitments:  119  "There aren't that many of us interested in community issues, we're not a big community. If you tie up one or two of these people here, you're tying up people that have multi values in all kinds of issues here. So the process was faulty, ineffective, and a huge waste oftime...there's a lot of other issues in this community we could have been spending time on. I'm sure you heard that from.. .others... incredibly resourceful people. You know there's other critical issues that I put aside for this, that I didn't need to. It was a massive waste of time, by the Ministry of Forests, that they took those resource people out of our community..." (RD) RD also went on to say that the same people would never get involved again in a sirnilar process, unless there was significant change and discussion. "I couldn't do it again- it's like going to war." (RD)  One participant also observed that it is harder to get government representatives to engage in similar dialogue now, as they were jaded by the IWMP.  ".. .it's much easier for the Ministry of Forests and the other agencies to say well, if they aren't going to welcome our planning efforts as we see fit, then we'll go to some other community that does. And that's what's happening now.. .it's hard to get them [the MOF} involved in that kind of stuff now... And now there's a position in the community, and there's positions that are there with the agencies, are there, are probably more polarized now. In December of '89, there was the interest in working together with the agencies at that point. The community was interested in seeing what could happen with it, and now what's happened is the agencies are probably more polarized now,  120  more positional now, and the community's probably more fearful now, more uncertain now. But as a result everyone's less interested in working together, and putting more resources and time into it." (RD) Civil society also worked incredibly hard to educate the public and their elected members. According to CA, about twelve people volunteered as much as twenty hours a week over periods of months and even years to get the work done, ".. .so it made for a mountain of effort." Although the plan had built in mechanisms to be adaptable, the process was still inefficient as it took years of people's time, a mountain of effort, and considerable resources. The coordination costs in this instance will trickle over into other future processes, as the participants and, to some extent, agencies involved are even less likely to engage in collaborative efforts in the future.  Strategic costs  The final set of transaction costs to be examined is strategic costs. Strategic costs arise out of an asymmetry in power, information or other resource that results in one group obtaining benefits at the expense of others. Examples of strategic cost include free riding, rent seeking and turf domain. Like information and coordination costs, strategic costs for the Chapman/Gray IWMP process contributed significantly to the overall transaction costs of the process.  a) Turf  121  Those agencies with stronger mandates appeared to create a power imbalance that increased strategic costs. As the Ministry of Mines and Natural Resources had the right to subsurface exploration, they essentially held ultimate authority over the land use. Although the representative only occasionally took part in the meetings, he continually served to remind the group of who held ultimate power: ".. .and then occasionally there was one rep who would show up only once in a while .. .basically, he could go in there and take the entire thing to mine. So then, it puts everything in perspective: 'Holy cow, they can just go in there and mine. They can just go in. there and start digging away.' So with all of this.. .it makes all of the issues around forestry seem miniscule, compared to going in there and blasting.. .a large vein of gravel or something, not to mention if there was ever gold and the byproducts associated with gold or something like that.. .the environmental damage..." (HO).  This example demonstrates the tendency for an organization to protect its turf; a form of strategic behaviour that can significandy increase transaction costs. Turf refers to the exclusive domain of activities and resources over which an agency has the right to exercise operational or policy responsibility. Organizational preference tends towards maintaining or increasing turf, as it secures the agency's strategic position and can be seen to enhance longer-term survival. As ecosystem-based management programs are likely to recommend new policies and changes to inter-organizational relationships, conflicts over turf are common (Imperial, 1999). The Chapman/Gray IWMP was no exception to this observation.  Common threats to an agency's turf include threats to job security or career enhancement; challenge to professional expertise; and loss of policy direction. In the  122  Chapman/Gray process, two additional threats to turf were major sources of conflict: undermining traditional priorities, and anxiety over accountability.  Looking at the history of the Creek's management, it appears as though entrenched positions on a local and provincial level have resulted in a high level of traditional agency priorities. Collaboration leading to new responsibilities may represent a welcome addition to 'turf by some agencies, notably the SCRD; though the same might be viewed as unwelcome competitors for existing resources or more highly valued priorities to other agencies. Some of the participants maintained that traditional priorities were particularly entrenched with the Ministry of Forests:  ".. .Well it was pretty obvious that the Ministry of Forests just historically had never respected water without some kind of change in the structure of authority. Why would anyone ever believe that they'd behave any differently in the future? Usually in civilized countries, you have a marriage between authority and responsibility, so if you're responsible.. .if you want to have authority over a harbour, for example, you would have responsibilities for the harbour as well. The two justify each other. But in this case, we have the one agency who has responsibility for the quality of the water, and that's the Regional District. But another agency has control over land use activities. So this just, basically right there, just can't possibly work... .My experience has been that the Ministry of Forests always act to deny any authority to anyone else but themselves... "(CA)  123  In terms of accountability, collaborators could demand increased accountability from one another, which would infringe on their historical turf By most accounts, although generally unspoken, participants claimed to be accountable with one another, as there were unspoken mandates and larger provincial policies that "hung over" them (RD). FO saw the matter of accountability differendy, in that agencies would ultimately be held accountable for their actions in court, as had occurred on numerous occasions on the Coast in the past:  "Court. That's where we decide everything, in court. It's as simple as that. And all this other talk back and forth and up and down and meetings etc, etc,.. .It all ends up going to the courts. Because nobody can agree. I don't think you can find a watershed in B.C. that everybody's going to agree in... what happens is all this ends up going to court." (FO) Another factor exacerbating problems over turf includes the personalities and egos of the individuals involved in the process. As institutions are some measure of the people who work and operate within them, individuals who perceive collaboration that results in changes to their organizations as a threat to their self worth may create some struggles. Participants concerned with the perception of winning or losing may override actual concerns over turf.  There was some measure of this occurring in the Chapman/Gray:  ".. .There's that egotistical thing in the Ministry of Forests that no one wants to give up the authority of their agency no matter how compelling the argument is, they'd rather have it happen under somebody else's shot.... We know that a district manager would never give up any of the statutory authority of his  124  position. But that's essentially what we need. So there's no point in talking to him." (CA) B) Rent Seeking  When the results of collaborative decision making yield unearned benefits to some participants, this is called rent seeking. An example of rent seeking would be a government agency advancing recommendations for initiatives that they would like to undertake, but only if some other agency provides funding. A few participants mentioned that the M O F were gleaning unearned benefits from the IWMP process, as many of the lessons learned on the Coast were used to develop and refine the Forest Practices Code, which was being developed at the sametimeand came into play in 1995:  "We were in a way, I thought, kind of rats in a cage. They [the MOF] were experimenting with us.. .when they were developing the Forest Practices Code. So they would drop in all these ideas and stuff, and have us debate them, and then magically modifications of them would turn up in a draft of the Forest Practices Code, so the Chapman creek watershed was a bit of discussion place to float ideas for the Code, I think, when it was being developed. And.. .1 bet they developed the Community Watershed Guidelines from it... from that exp erimentation." (RD)  The Ministry of Forests themselves acknowledged that they did use lessons from the Chapman/Gray to write the Forests Practices Code, but saw this as a very worthwhile thing: ".. .a lot of those things that were worked on for the Chapman/Gray end up...  125  there was quite a bit of research, actually, that was going on at the same time, so a lot of that ended up being at the forefront of where we went with the Code, and other planning processes and stuff like that.. .."(MOF) Another variation of rent seeking observable on the Sunshine Coast was participants pressuring other agencies to exercise their mandates: "I mean, heck, when we were managing watersheds, through most of my career, we would actually rely on DFO to exercise their authority in the watershed because their mandate was very strong, and we thought, 'Well, if the water is going to be clean for fish, then it will be gready improved for human consumption.' So when you think about it, that was absolutely ridiculous, to have to use Fisheries legislation to protect water for drinking water consumption. So that's sort of the way that we did it, because Fisheries' legislation is really strong, Forestry legislation is strong, the Mines legislation is strong.. .it's stronger than Forestry.. .you know it's very strong legislation.... it was really a matter of environmental agencies using persuasion and education to try to get water protected, rather than using some kind of legislated clout." (MOE)  CA describes an interesting strategic cost, where government agency staff were very cooperative in providing information to civil society, in an attempt to advocate a strong position: "Now in other areas [besides the MOF] we get very enthusiastic cooperation from people in government that are anxious to give us information, scientific information, habitat evaluations, etc etc. And will often alert us to impacts of proposed forest development plans. Those people are not in the MOF, they are in other ministries, and recognize that as public advocates we have a latitude that they  126  don't have, i.e. I can stand up in public and say anything I want, whereas a person who is actually employed in the government is often under constraint." (CA) In terms of personal benefits derived from the process, opinions varied. SI stated he personally benefited from the knowledge that was shared among the participants. However, many of them expressed frustration that the plan was never recognized as a good technical document, and were never recognized for their contribution to the process:  "But you know, in terms of a planning document, and the subcommittee stuff that came with it, it's real good work, and the thing that I leave with that bothers me... was all the parties should have said, 'We really did a good job putting that technical work together. We still have big problems over here, but that's not the issue. This is good stuff, and we really think they did a good job of pulling that stuff together, and there's some work that ended up being used elsewhere.' .. .And I'm sure even the planner for the Regional District walked away after six or seven years and said, 'That was really unsatisfying, because all I did was get in shit over what I produced.' He worked like hell just like everybody else." (MOF1)  Like personal benefits, views on agency benefits varied. While SI and H O viewed the process as beneficial for bringing certain things to the attention of their respective institutions, others viewed the process as actually detrimental to their agency's interests:  "Actually there was no benefit to participating in the experience, you know, for [our forestry company]. From the participants, yeah, you interact and you learn  127  and you carry forward but how can we say we've benefited when we've had absolutely no opportunities at this point in time, and we still have the same conflicts. Basically they wasted their time and their money.... How would I describe that? Well it's been a failure, so in terms of a cost/benefit, it's zero." (FI) Despite feeling that the process was somewhat beneficial, H O also explained that there was a period of time when his agency was not at the table: "... and this was about half way, three quarters of the way through where it was just felt that we were spending way too much time for the benefits. We just had so many other obligations and mandated programs and issues that we had to deal with, we just couldn't afford the time anymore." (HO) Some participants recognized the challenges to separating the individual from the agency they represent. CA states:  "When we stand up in public and start discussing the decisions that the M O F have taken in the watershed... you know there's definitely a defensive sort of reaction that comes from the upper levels of the Ministry of Forests. And there's also a lot of shame. There's always that guy on the bottom, that guy who's on the ground, he's the dirt sampler.. .and when he sees the Ministry of Forests tarred as this dinosaur operation that can't make an intelligent view, well you know he feels really bad about that. They don't like it, even though these guys will often agree with what we say, they know that the ministry that they work for is rigid and backward, and still to them walking down the street, you know it's tough, it's not nice.. ..I always focus my comments and my attention on the statutory decision makers, not on the bush grunts that have to  128  live with but don't actually have authority over the decisions that are actually made." (CA) ".. .1 can tell you that at the lower level of government, individual personalities and individual agendas really start to.. .really push the agenda. Whereas when you're dealing with more senior levels of government, that decision makers are more removed from the immediate influences of the community, that creates a different perspective as well. Each one has got its advantages and its disadvantages." (MOE) Protecting individual and agency turf, along with deriving unearned benefits from a collaborative process are strategic costs that contributed to the overall transaction costs of the Chapman/Gray IWMP. It is apparent from talking to the participants that there were a tremendous number of impediments to successful collaboration, including expensive and lengthy information gathering, and extensive costs associated with coordinating the participating agencies. Overall transaction costs for the IWMP were considerably high, and reflect a number of challenges for successful watershed management.  After examining the transaction costs associated with any ecosystem based institutional arrangement, it is important to assess the policy outcomes and repercussions of the collaborative process to analyze the effectiveness of the process. The following sections are devoted to this assessment.  Institutional performance and policy outcomes At this stage in the IAD framework, an evaluation of the overall institutional  129  performance would look at policy outcomes, and assess whether implementation of the plan had been successful. As the IWMP was never implemented, it is easy to conclude that institutional performance in this case study was extremely weak, and that direct policy outcomes were negligible. The IWMP was signed off by the Ministry of Forests, the Ministry of Environment, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and the Coast Garibaldi Health Unit. It was not signed off by the Sechelt Band, as they were uncertain of the potential impacts that signing might have on long term land claim negotiations (Ohlson, 1999). The forest companies ".. .didn't sign because obviously they were giving away some of their rights, and they weren't very keen on that. And the Regional District didn't sign because of the political direction that had been given to the staff person at the table, and I guess they were feeling the plan didn't go far enough. They always wanted to have no resource activity within the watershed." (MOE)  There were a few major tensions that were never resolved during the IWMP process that many of the participants cited as the main reason for its failure. A primary conflict was that the plan was really a debate about land use, which was deemed to be a cabinet decision (MOF1), and out of the control of the participants at the table:  "But really, when you get into discussions around philosophy of logging in the watershed, or those types of things, it's really a debate about land use that needs to take place at a government to government type of approach, nothing that a planner can deal with or a District Manager can deal with.. ."(MOF1)  The other major contributing factor to the plan's demise, according to the  130  participants, was the contention over legal authority to manage the watershed, and the desire by the community for local control of their water supply. Many thought that without this control, the plan would never be acceptable to the community. In the words of one participant: "It wasn't really technical flaws. You really got to the end and it was two issues: it was local control, and whether or not logging- any development, actually- should go on in the watershed.. .and even today, all parties will grudgingly admit that the plan was fine, but there's those other issues out there." (MOF1)  The referendum  The desire for local control ultimately led to the SCRD going to a public referendum on whether to support the IWMP or not. Public support for the plan was decreasing, thanks largely to the work of a local civil society group called the Water First Committee, who had doubts about the plan and didn't believe there had been sufficient public input. They campaigned on the 'no' side, stating: " ..'. we should hold out for community authority in the watershed."(CA)  Opinions on the referendum varied. While civil society and the SCRD thought it was a necessary method of garnering public support, the chairs found it to be "profoundly disappointing" (MOE). M O E thought the referendum was "not well worded, because what the choice was really was, 'Do you support the IWMP, with its stronger resource protections, or do you want to maintain the status quo, and that status quo is regular logging, under the Forest Practices Code.' Because there was no other.. .there was never the option of that, that third option which was not to do anything in the watershed. We never had any option to do that, there was no legal authority to do that."  131  Others found the vote to be ".. .an absolute joke. You take a technical document like that and ask the public the question as to whether or not they believe that the practices that are outlined in that plan are sufficient for managing their resources, the timber, the water, the wildlife, the culture, all of these things, ask them that question? Get real. They're not going to give you an answer."(FI) MOF1 resented that a scientific, technical document was turned into a political exercise: ' Y'eah, there's a real dichotomy between science and planning, and politics. And the two, quite often, don't meet." (MOF1)  The outcome of the referendum was an overwhelming public rejection of the IWMP, with 8 8 % voting not to sign. SI saw this as an inevitable outcome to the referendum, given community culture on the Sunshine Coast: "Well.. .you could see that there wasn't going to be support for the plan because it still allowed harvesting in the watershed... just for the pure fact that there was going to be any harvesting in there, you wouldn't get community support" (SI).  Management under the Forest Practices Code  The resulting policy outcomes of the plan not being implemented are complex, and are still being debated today. One point of debate is whether the forested watersheds now revert to management under the Forest Practice's Code. In CA's words: "Well, herein lies a critical argument. The Chief Forester's opinion is that, in the absence of the IWMP, management does revert to the FPC. It's interesting  132  to note that during the period the Regional District was considering whether to bring the IWMP into a referendum, the M O F showed up to speak to the [Regional District], and the regional manager.. .and the District manager.. .were both there, and basically they threatened the regional board. They said, 'Sign this document, or face up to the consequences of management under the Forest Practices Code'. So in this case we see the Code being used as a weapon. But we dispute the argument that management reverts to the Forest Practices Code because it is a watershed reserve under section 12 of the  Land  Act. And the terms of its designation do not allow for alienation of the land, therefore industrial activities... so it seems to me in the absence of the higher level plan, the previous land use designation stands, and that should be the governing document, and that is one of the key points that we would like to see tested in court." (CA)  The M O E and M O F see these views on the Forest Practices Code differendy:  "So what happened was that, when the IWMP was defeated... the fallback position was, "Okay, well, I guess we're going to have to manage these watersheds just like we would any watershed under the Forest Practices Code." So, now, the Ministry of Forests is actually in the position to start to approve forestry within those watersheds, and they are going to, because they've been sitting for probably 12 or 11 years, they've been sitting without any kind of forest management, and they're running out of wood in the timber, so they have to go in there, and the company has got the authority to do that. So that was a great disappointment to me, that the people on the Sunshine Coast did not understand that the fallback position was.. .you know, just because you didn't vote for the IWMP doesn't mean that there isn't going to be logging, the  133  fallback is that there will be more logging, and it will be according to the Practices Code, Code"  and the IWMP goes far beyond what the.. .the  Forest  Forest Practices  (MOE)  The M O F called the Chapman/Gray IWMP a "Forest Practices Code Plus" document. H O stated that rejecting.the IWMP didn't resolve anything, because it took ".. .an excellent plan, an objective plan that can be derived out of the present political situation, and legislation governing the land. And there were compromises in there to achieve what we considered to be Forest Practices Code or Code Plus conditions. And now, in retrospect, we're looking at a new government that's looking at watering down the  Forest Practices Code...  so what are you left with? You're left with  something that, right now, at present, we don't even have.. .we have the Code  Forest Practices  that's in question, so the standards are much much less than what we've written  up in the IWMP." (HO) CA describes that IWMPs themselves are not legally binding documents. He describes a court case by the Rocky Mountain Rate Payers Association in the Kootenays showed that, although the Ministry of Forests did not live up to the terms of reference for their IWMP, ".. .the judge stated that there is nothing compulsory about the recommendations of an IWMP, that it was just a 'feel good' document. So we know that IWMPs are not compelling, and we know that in the absence of a compelling force of law, that the Ministry of Forests manages for a short term dollar value."  Water quality and community health  Another important policy outcome of the failure of the IWMP is its implication for  134  water quality and community health. Much of the dialogue in garnering community support for local control has included references to the Walkerton tragedy, where a number of people died after drinking contaminated water supplies in a rural Southern Ontario town. While many admitted that the situation on the Sunshine Coast wasn't entirely comparable to that in Walkerton, the fear from that incident is fresh on people's minds. And CA claims that the impact of the current management structure on the creeks has been "dead people".  "Now this isn't a Walkerton type situation, where you have a sudden contamination resulting in a widespread sickness and sudden death of a variety of people. I don't think that's the situation, I don't think that would ever be the situation. But, we've encouraged some pretty high risk factors, and you don't see people suddenly dropping dead but what you do see is elevated rates of cancer in the community, you see compromised immune systems, so on and so forth. And in fact, I believe people have died, from drinking water out of Chapman Creek over an extended period of time. I believe that there were many times there should have been boil water advisories and there were none. And I think that the use of chlorine to disinfect turbid waters was completely out of hand for years and years. I think that's why we have such tremendous public support. I think people know these things are occurring." (CA)  There are diverging opinions on whether water quality has been impacted by logging, however. The Health Authority maintains that forestry's impact on water quality and human health issues relate to contamination by parasites in an affected area, and that a few loggers aren't going to create a problem in that regard. Ironically, recreational activities such as dog walking and campers' waste disposal are "in some respects a greater issue."(HO) Indeed, despite these large threats to water quality, many of the  135  recreational access issues that the IWMP were going to deal with "kind of got thrown out" (MOF2).  That said, the health authority maintains that overall, water quality for the Chapman/Gray system has dramatically improved since the start of the IWMP process. "... there's been dramatic improvements in water quality.. .if you go back then, the turbidity levels in the water were much higher than they are today. So there's been a big improvement in water quality, and those improvements are continuing today, and will continue with the new filtration system... There's never been a reported water-borne illness associated with this water supply. We don't have issues like they do in the Interior, where they have cattle grazing in the watershed.. .in terms of public health, I think we're pretty good. The possibility of a Walkerton-like scenario is blown way out of proportion.. .it's really really remote. There's just not that kind of contamination up there. And the other thing is the water is disinfected, and the other thing is that the water system is well managed." (HO)  It is hard to say whether many of these improvements in water quality can be attributed to the moratorium on logging in the watersheds, or whether technological improvements have led to the increase in quality. This is still a highly contentious issue between the institutions managing the creeks and the local community that have litde faith in the quality of their drinking water.  The push for local control  136  Besides the implications for forestry, water quality and health concerns, a major outcome of the demise of the Chapman/Gray IWMP is the large push for community control by the SCRD, the Sechelt First Nation, and the communities on the Sunshine Coast. The push eventually garnered the support of the then Minister of Forests, Gordon Wilson, who was also the Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) for the Sunshine Coast. In May of 2001, just prior to the provincial elections, Mr. Wilson announced to the gathered audience that authority of the Creeks would be divested to local control, which would be co-managed by the SCRD and the Sechelt First Nation. Despite assurances that this would be put into place prior to the election, divestiture never occurred, and Gordon Wilson and the New Democrat Party (NDP) were not reelected to provincial government. There is still tremendous resentment that the Minister did not do more for his constituents prior to the election:  "Well I think Mr. Wilson was more interested in his career than in doing sometiiing for the people of the Sunshine Coast. I think if he'd wanted to get this together, he. could have done it easily. There were lots of points in time where he had all of the necessary clout to get it done. It would have been very easy for him. But he was more interested in courting the support of the PWA for his leadership aspirations, etc" (CA)  The community felt betrayed and angry at Wilson's broken promise:  "... he said it in our longhouse, in the traditional customs of the Sechelt people, when you speak at the longhouse, that's our customs and practices, and I'm sure our Chief will let the government know that.. .even the courts have said that oral practices and traditions spoken by the elders are held up in the courts. Again with Gordon Wilson making those kinds of comments in our  137  tea&tional Sechelt manner.. .you have to be accountable. I think that really helps stimulate where the Band and the SCRD are coming from, in forming that accord to manage the watershed." (SI)  Summary  From this analysis, it is apparent that there are numerous problems in the current management framework in the Chapman and Gray watersheds. Institutional arrangements related to the action arena on the Sunshine Coast- that is, the physical boundary of the watershed, community attributes, and participant actors- created circumstances that hampered the successful implementation of the IWMP process from the very beginning. Historical dealings created a culture that pitted industrial/logging interests against environmental interests. A lack of regulatory control and proper planning, along with previous efforts by various government agencies that were viewed as 'mismanagement' of the watersheds, led certain factions of the community to become incredibly distrustful of the government's ability to manage their water supply safely.  Information costs were also high. While the quality and quantity of science-based information was considered excellent, gathering this information was very expensive and time consuming, which may have led to extending the process by a number of years. There was also an emphasis on technical data over place-based information, which some believe led to improperly dealing with the problems at hand. While access to and sharing of the information was generally satisfactory, some parties felt that the co-chairs were purposefully dominating and withholding access of various interest groups to certain documents; particularly civil society and the community. Information asymmetries further increased transaction costs, as the stakeholders disagreed over the nature of the problem to be solved in the first place. An attempt  138  to frame the problem in terms that all parties could agree on would have gready improved the collaborative effort. Additionally, public involvement in the plan was considered insufficient, and this oversight would be a significant factor in contributing to the plan's rejection by the community. In terms of coordination costs, there were a number of process-related coordination costs associated with the IWMP, including: the number of stakeholders involved in the process; high participant turn-over; the lack of elected representatives and civil society participation; imposed terms of reference for the. process; the lack of neutral facilitation; the break down of an all-or-nothing consensus approach; adversarial working relationships on an agency level; and a lack of visionary leadership guiding the process. However, personal relationships were congenial, and there appeared to be strong community leaders that would prove to be important in gathering support for the rejection of the Chapman/Gray IWMP.  Institutional relationship-related coordination costs were also considerable. As the process was born of conflict, the history of animosity between the agencies was difficult to overcome, as there was a significant lack of trust on an agency level. There were numerous accusations of entrenched positioning by both the Ministry of Forests and the Sunshine Coast community. There were also accusations that parties held hidden agendas, which didn't emerge until later in the process. Finally, the apparent lack of clear understanding around respective agency mandates and legislation, and how they pertained to one another, led to a lot of confusion around agency roles and responsibilities. The fact that this discussion had to go to the courts demonstrates the extent to which the costs of murky legislation can increase coordination costs, and threaten collaborative processes.  139  Protecting individual and agency turf, along with deriving unearned benefits from a collaborative process are strategic costs that contributed to the overall transaction costs of the Chapman/Gray IWMP. It is apparent from talking to the participants that there were a tremendous number of impediments to successful collaboration, including expensive and lengthy information gathering, and extensive costs associated with coordinating the participating agencies. Overall transaction costs for the IWMP were considerably high, and reflect a number of challenges for successful watershed management.  As the policy outcomes from the failure of the plan are still being debated, it is apparent from the IAD analysis of institutional arrangements that the rule systems, information sharing, collaborative efforts and institutional relationships in this case study need to be restructured. In their documentation calling for a rejection of the IWMP, the Water First Committee called for a "negotiated... management structure which is locally controlled and accountable". The group also called for a new process where "the community determines what is appropriate in the community watersheds"(Water First, 1998).  140  Chapter 7- Findings on Institutional Design from the Case Study and Literature "On a larger level, I would say that... the Sunshine Coast and the Chapman Creek watershed... have a unique opportunity to present model watersheds that can be used as examples of what can be done to successfully... manage resources more wisely in community watersheds." (RD1)  "Communities that lose control over their water probably willfail in trying to control much else of importance... " Helen Ingram, 1990.  Building on thefindingsin the previous chapter, this chapter offersfindingsand lessons learned relating to institutional design, from applying the IAD framework to the Sunshine Coast Case Study and drawing on related literature.  Action Arena  It is evident from the discussion in the previous chapter that institutional arrangements related to the action arena on the Sunshine Coast- that is, the physical boundary of the watershed, community attributes, and participant actors- created circumstances that hampered the success of the IWMP process from the very beginning. Historical relationships created a culture that pitted industrial/logging interests against environmental interests- a community culture that is highly dichotomous and wrought with animosity. A lack of regulatory control and proper planning, along with previous efforts by various government agencies that were viewed as 'mismanagement' of the watersheds, led certain factions of the community to become distrustful of the government's ability to manage their water supply safely.  Finding # 1: Divested control of the Chapman and Grey watersheds has the support of the community  141  Support from Sunshine Coast residents for community control is overwhelming, as has been demonstrated by the IWMP referendum results, and by the current campaign by the Sunshine Coast Conservation Association (SCCA) and the Council of Canadians to garner signatures for a petition to gain control. Currendy there are five ways in which community water supply areas are held or managed across British Columbia: ownership of watershed lands;  •  fee simple  •  long-term lease from the provincial government under the  Land  Act;  •  watershed reserve status under the  •  community watershed designation under the Forest Practices  Land  Act;  Code; and •  no designation, tenure or management regime at all.  The most secure way to have control over land use activities that may affect water supply is fee  simple  ownership of the watershed lands, such as is the case in greater  Victoria. (WCEL, 1999) At least four communities in B.C. have long term leases from the provincial government, under the  Land Act.  The Greater Vancouver  Regional District holds 999 year leases for three water supply watersheds. The potential for land use conflicts with water quality are minimized in this form of tenure, as it grants control of most land use activities to the water district. The lease also ensures that the "highest priority in the management of the lands.. .must be given to water supply purposes.. .and that the provisions of the forest management plan must be secondary to this objective." Some activities, such as the construction of a  142  natural gas pipeline through a watershed, may be outside of the control of the leasee (Ibid, 1999). The form of land tenure that could be granted to the community on the Sunshine Coast is not entirely clear, as leases such as those held by the G V R D "no longer exist" (MOE): "What was always difficult with the Sunshine Coast situation was that the tenure was not.. .there does not exist that kind of tenure.. .it doesn't exist anymore. And it is something we concentrated on with the new Water Protection] Act,  [Drinking  like should we create a tenure again that allows for  management of source waters, and I don't know, I guess it is a possibility, but right now it doesn't exist, and so, okay we don't have that tool anymore, so.. .how are we going to get management of activities done in this watershed to not impact drinking water, given the fact that the people who are operating within the watershed have a legal right to be there.. .well, what we did was an IWMP, which was maybe not to totally restrict activities, but to manage them in a way that wouldn't impact drinking water, and that was based on the tenure issue." (MOE1)  Creative dialogue and perhaps new legislation would have to be created for the community to gain legal control over their watersheds. The M O E claims that the debate around the Chapman/Grey did "catch the ears of the decision makers" (MOE1), and that a discussion around creating a new form of land tenure for community water supply watersheds was held during the development of the DWPA. While the mechanism does not currendy exist, that is not to say it could not in the near future.  143  Regardless of what legal form it takes, most of the participants in the IWMP process agreed that having the community control the watershed to some extent would alleviate a number of the institutional and political problems that they've seen in the past. Fisheries and Oceans Canada saw this as 'the logical thing to do', while the Health Unit proclaimed that community control would 'ideally be great'. Even the Ministry of Forests stated that ".. .most people would say that the community should have a pretty big say in what happens to their watershed."  The participants identified a number of benefits to community control, including that it would give the public the perception that their water was being protected. HA1 thought community control would provide some kind of reassurance to people drinking the water, and that there might be more public process on where and if logging were to occur, under local government management.  Many researchers are in agreement that local governments have certain strengths not shared by the provincial and federal levels, which lend themselves to effective resource management at the local level. These include:  1) Political accountability: the municipal politician is accountable to their constituents  on a daily basis, rather than every four years 2) Financial integrity:  municipal governments are often the only levels of  government not operating on a deficit, as the knowledge that expenditures must be related to income are more readily apparent at this level of government 3) Executive limitations:  the average elected member actually has an effective say in  the formation and implementation of policies  144  4)  Quality of members:  municipal governance attracts those community leaders who  run on their own merits, not on the strength of their advertising budget or party affiliations. Members are actively engaged in community debates, including council meetings; comparing with the provincial and federal legislatures where members may be absent for entire sessions, the strength is apparent. (Powell, 1983)  Additionally, small, flexible institutional units such as those found at the local level are said to be the best suited for the adaptive learning that is necessary to achieve sustainable resource management. A local watershed initiative offers the appropriate scale of social organization, as it ensures that beneficiaries share in paying the costs of management (Lee, 1992). As the Sunshine Coast community no longer trusts government agencies to protect their water sources alone, this is the only feasible solution to working together to safely monitor the water supply.  Divesting control of the watersheds to the local Regional and First Nations governments also allows for the community-based watershed management approach advocated in Chapter two. This allows for a collaborative approach to water-resource protection that enables individuals, groups, and institutions with a stake in management outcomes to participate in identifying and addressing local issues that affect or are affected by watershed functions (Bonnell and Baird, 2000).  Putman and others (1993) suggest that a community's history and tradition of civic engagement is the most powerful explanatory variable of the performance of institutional arrangements (Michaels, 2001). Community based watershed management efforts usually evolve where local concerns led to a mobilization of social capital to address problems. It can only evolve, however, if there is sufficient  145  interest and financial support from local residents. The Sunshine Coast is a perfect place for CBWM to occur, as the tradition of community mobilization is strong and the history of management warrants this approach.  Finding  #2. The community desires the opportunity to come up with their  own, creative solutions  CBWM allows stakeholders in the decision making process to come up with more locally relevant solutions that consider the community's unique social, economic, and environmental conditions and values (Bonnell and Baird, 2000). Locally based watershed institutions may be more effective at improving long term environmental health, due to their personal links and knowledge about their own back yards. This personal knowledge allows the groups to integrate scientific data with historical observations and local values. Additionally, local groups are effective in organizing programs, facilitating problem solving at the local level, identifying opportunities, integrating and coordinating efforts, communicating with the public, partnering with community members and businesses, and monitoring environmental variables (DFO, 2000).  This organizing at the local level was apparent with the efforts of the community leaders on the Sunshine Coast who fought to gain a public referendum on the IWMP. It was their efforts to mobilize and educate the community, as well as elected leaders at the SCRD, that forced the plan to go to referendum. The local group was much more effective at the community level than the large, expensive campaign led by the forest industry, or by the respective provincial ministries; none of which emanated from the Sunshine Coast.  146  Most of the IWMP participants were advocates of a new approach that allowed the stakeholders to come up with creative, community-driven solutions to the decadeslong conflict, rather than relying on government officials from outside their community to drive the process. Even the forest industry exclaimed that by putting their heads together and being innovative, there are some opportunities for the community which they could all benefit from, and that wouldn't add costs to the infrastructure. (FI1)  Community control does not mean community forestry  The Ministry of Forests has already tried to engage the Regional District in a discussion around coming up with some alternative approaches, such as community forestry schemes, but senses that the anti-logging sentiment within the community is prohibiting much innovative dialogue around solutions that would include forestry activities:  ".. .Community forest type scenarios, as long as they're framed in a rational way, I'm a big supporter of that.. .so one of the solutions that was tossed out there going way back was, let's make this a community forest over the watershed, and I think .. .that's a way for the community to have a say in how it's managed, and still have some economic opportunity in there. You can make sure the primary objective is water quality, and that would work, but that's not exactly what the folks are going for. But I would like to see that. I do buy the argument that if you are going to do some management of that community watershed, it probably shouldn't be some big forestry company that's doing the planning there, it should be the community, but there's got to be some kind of commitment to a common set of objectives, and as long as there is than it can work." (MOF1)  147  The communityforestlicense has been a successful compromise to watershed management conflicts in other areas of B.C., and was also proposed as the solution to the impasse over the IWMP. Both the SCRD and the Sechelt Indian Government District were urged to apply for one of these new types of tenures by both the Ministry of Forests and by the forest industry. This idea was rejected by the community and by both governments, as the community forest license is a legal contract that would commit the SCRD to log an annual allowable cut established over an area determined by the MOF, and not by the community (Water First, 1998). Water First goes on to say that, ".. .it must be remembered that there are no successful examples of multiple use watersheds used for community water supplies." (1998)  The M O F stated that there were many ways in which the District could gain more control besides attaining a community forest license, and various options had already been discussed during the IWMP. There were apparendy provisions in the IWMP where the Regional District would become more involved in areas including planning review, inspection, and water quality monitoring. The Ministry advocated a more incremental approach, where changes would occur 'in baby steps' through cooperating and working together (MOF). The M O F goes on to say that by rejecting the IWMP and withdrawing from the process altogether, the local government has closed a number of doors to coming up with innovative solutions, as they have adopted 'an all or nothing' approach to logging the watersheds. MOF1 concedes that some SCRD directors notionally think they could probably agree to some logging in the watersheds, as long as it was well structured and had all appropriate controls in place, including such things as water testing or on site monitoring. Others, however, cannot support that, ".. .even if you had numerous studies in front of them.. .the issue  148  is more philosophical.'' (MOF). And political. Even if they were to agree that the watersheds could support some industrial activity, many of the directors' constituents are wholeheartedly against logging of any kind in a drinking supply watershed (MOF1).  Regardless of whether logging occurs or not, the residents of the Sunshine Coast believe that should be their decision. "... Yeah I think that's it, in a nut shell, at the end of the day who the decision makers are, because obviously the community has to live with the results of making that decision." (FN1) Some participants believe that opportunities to incrementally gain more responsibility and place more emphasis on the local government are favourable now, particularly "with the province trying to divest themselves" (MOF). With that might come some costs and liabilities, but the M O F considers now a good time for local government to push for more local control.  While not all of the liability and responsibility issues have been ironed out, most everyone agrees that, as the IWMP failed, there is room for an improved, creative solution to the decades-long conflict that is community-driven. SCRD1 maintains that the answers are attainable, and within the community, if only they were to be given the 'freedom and luxury' to come up with local community watershed solutions. SCRD1 questions why the watershed plan has to be up to standards set out in the Forest Practices Code, if the community can come up with a better solution.  "Why should somebody from Victoria come up with a better solution than what we could come up with? Now that might seem perhaps a little absurd, but  149  we should almost have that freedom to generate those kinds of solutions. Or to engage or disengage in any activity whenever we want to." (SCRD1) However, SCRD1  believes that the primary stakeholders- forestry, environment, and  health- have to provide the support to let the people in the community come up with these solutions. "Provide the information, let them come up with a watershed plan that works for that watershed." (SCRD1) Because our understanding of ecosystems is imperfect, our interactions with nature should be experimental (Chess et al, 2000). Institutional arrangements must have the capacity to respond to the dynamic nature of watershed management. Adaptive, community based management of natural resource systems that encourages learning and institutional innovations has been touted by an increasing number of researchers and practitioners. An iterative process of review and revision requires a willingness to learn through experience (Curtis and Lockwood, 2000). Processes that stress flexibility in organizational structure and problem solving approaches are commonly sited as conditions for success for watershed based initiatives (Kenney, 1997). Allowing the community the authority to come up with their own solutions would allow for this flexible, locally based organizational structure.  Finding # 3. Problem framing and identifying fundamental community and objectives is critical to successful watershed planning processes  goals  The lack of place based information and attention paid to community attributes during the IWMP process created an information asymmetry, which led to an improper framing of the problem to be addressed. This lack of adequate problem framing contributed significandy to the transaction costs of the IWMP. Many of the participants felt they should have spent more time up front understanding what they  150  wanted to accomplish, and should have also included elected officials in these discussions. The outcome would have been a process addressing the issue of political control over land use in the watershed from the outset, rather than a lengthy process addressing scientific resource management practices that did not meet the goals, attributes or needs of the community. Additionally, the desire to have the watershed made single-use, i.e. for water supply, should have been made explicit from the outset, and a discussion held with the appropriate legislative bodies that had the mandate to have that discussion. The lack of a forum for this discussion not only dragged the process on for ten years, but also led to a series of conflicts, and in some cases, court battles. As the stakeholders disagreed over the nature of the problem to be solved in the first place, an attempt to frame the problem in terms that all parties could agree on would have greatiy improved the collaborative effort.  SCRD1 stated that one of the main problems with the IWMP was that they lacked a strategy for how they were going to work together; and that the plan itself was too lofty a goal, given the history of animosity and lack of trust among those agencies represented. In this sense, S C R D 1 is referring to a 'plan on how to plan', and argues that a strategy or an approach on how to engage in the watershed would have been a first good step to addressing permitted uses in the area of concern. This strategy would have addressed how to carry out activities in the watershed, and the actions or accomplishments they wanted to attain or forbid. "I think an interim strategy on conduct would have been a good success..."  (SCRD1).  Along with an effort to define the problem at hand and take it to the appropriate political arena, a new community model should incorporate longer term planning horizons. The strategy for the first few years would be to develop stronger working relationships and to rebuild decades of eroded trust among the various agencies  151  involved in the management of the watersheds (SCRD1). SCRD1 goes on to say:  ".. .We might as well just start over again, and start meeting with the community, and start listening to the community, and start a process of corning up with a creative strategy or approach, and start to build trust. With trust we can ultimately get to a plan that will have people responding in the most mature way that protects their water source." Decision scientists are concluding the same thing. All too often processes neglect the importance of systematically identifying the goals and objectives and the assessment of the relative merits of alternative ways of achieving them (Dorcey and McDaniels, 2001). Critics such as Hammond, Keeney and Raiffa (1999) point to the problems that result from not anticipating the well recognized tendencies of individuals and groups to ignore or misconstrue complexity and uncertainty, and from neglecting the well developed techniques for aiding decision making through techniques such as "value-focused thinking" (Keeney, 1992). To responsibly address complex environmental risk management questions, human beings need help in identifying and defining goals, and in clarifying fundamental individual or social objectives. This also involves a need for structuring the decision tasks so they are meaningful and witiiin the capabilities of those involved (Dorcey and McDaniels, 2001). This relates back to the transaction costs seen with the Chapman/Grey IWMP, in that the participants at the table did not hold the decision making power to sign off on the plan themselves, or the authority to make concessions. Identifying the process goal at the very beginning would have ensured that the discussion was being held with the appropriate decision makers, i.e. the legislators. At the same time, the goals and tasks must be useful for making responsible choices in the given decision context (Dorcey and McDaniels, 2001). In a new approach to managing the Chapman/Grey, the  152  community would identify their primary goals for the use or uses of the watershed, and include appropriate decision-making bodies in structuring the decision-tasks. A community-based approach to problem framing at the local level would move beyond the traditional IWMP focus on biophysical components. The goal of CBWM is to protect and restore watershed functions while considering the variety of social and economic benefits of those functions. While watershed management decisions should be based on sound scientific information, resource managers have learned that decisions made on scientific evidence alone often fail because they conflict with a community's economic or social values (Bonnell and Baird, 2000). Proper problem framing would ensure that those values would be taken into consideration when developing a management plan for the watersheds.  Finding  #4. Meaningful  information gathering and sharing are essential to  effective decision making and environmental  governance  Criticism of previous experiments in environmental governance has focused on their deficiencies in generating and structuring information to aid decision making by the participants (Raiffa, 1982; Hammond, Keeney and Raiffa, 1999). While the IWMP process generated a wealth of good quality scientific information, a community model would have to place an emphasis on technical in addition to place based information. This would include having access to the use of agency resources, experts, and information:  "We have to look at where we need specific information where we're making decisions, you know policy, the science, it changes every year, information changes ... and we have to have the ability as managers to use the best experts that are available when it's time to make decisions or when certain decisions  153  have to be made, and what the risks may involve, or the risk of not doing anything." (FN1) Technical information has been used in both responsible and irresponsible ways, in processes like the IWMP (National Research Council, 1996). The difficulties posed for elected officials by scientific uncertainty are widely recognized (Dorcey and McDaniels, 2001). Dealing with technically complex issues involving uncertainty appears to be an ongoing difficulty for elected and non-elected governance processes, one which leads some writers to argue that facilitators need to be substantively knowledgeable about the issues to be resolved (e.g. Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987). Additionally, community based processes add equal weight to place-based knowledge, which can be essential to resolving conflicts. Another concern raised by the participants was the eroding of access to information laws in the province. One participant had to rely upon government bureaucrats to provide him with information, as he claimed the Ministry of Forests continuously 'delayed' delivering information to him. (CAI). The recendy elected BC Liberals appear to be continuing this erosion of confidence in disseminating information, something which was expressed as a serious concern by some of this study's participants. This has also been observed from the ignoring or undermining of transparency and accountability commitments, such as that provided in legislation for the Freedom of Information Commissioner, the Ethics Commissioner and the Auditor General (Dorcey, 2003), and the 'watering down' of the Forest Practices Code. As efficient and equitable information sharing is crucial to effective interorganizational collaboration, efforts to ensure ready access to information must be protected and enshrined. The Walkerton tragedy demonstrated the importance of disseminating water quality and public health data to the community. Particularly in  154  this era of Internet access, information should be made more readable to taxpayers, not less so. This conclusion was also derived from the recent Review Panel on the Protection Act  Drinking  Water  (the act is discussed in further detail, below). Many submissions to the  panel spoke of the public's basic right to information about the quality of their drinking water. Some contributors to the review spoke of frustrating experiences trying to get information. In the words of the review panel, "The public has a right to know about the state of their water, and the ability to compel authorities to act to protect water quality. Water purveyors should provide local authorities and the public with easy access to information about water quality." (DWRP, 2002).  While power imbalances may be more difficult to eliminate, information costs can be reduced by providing equal access to funding, training and information resources for all stakeholder groups involved in watershed based initiatives (Williams, Day and Gun ton, 1999). Additionally, there must be an equal emphasis on technical and local place-based information gathering and sharing.  Finding # 5. Meaningful public involvement is essential to a community control model  To resolve information asymmetries, watershed based managers need to develop lowcost mechanisms to facilitate communication, make decisions, and resolve conflicts among the actors. Collaborative approaches to decision making, including a high priority on public involvement, are useful in this regard (Imperial, 1999). Public involvement and participation in decision making is thought to create a sense of local  155  ownership of identified problems and solutions, thus ensuring long-term support for resulting management plans (Bonnell and Baird, 2000). Examining the documentation and letters sent to the SCRD during the IWMP process revealed that public involvement in the IWMP was considered weak, and largely ignored, by the Sunshine Coast community members: "The public's involvement has been systematically deflected, subverted and ignored. A two week review and comment period was advertised for an issue with twenty five years of documentation..." (Williams, 1996). Any new community model would have to allow for direct public involvement in watershed governance, as the community has explicidy demanded a direct say in how their water supply is managed.  Adopting this approach to public involvement would also help to diffuse a highly contentious issue on the Sunshine Coast- the view that forest-industry interest groups dominated the agenda of the TWMP, and opposing environmental interest groups 'killed the plan'. Interest groups are deemed necessary in an institutional framework by some academics, especially in an era of highly diffused power, because the political system depends on them to articulate, implement and monitor the general will (Pross, 1992). "Pressure groups contribute vitally to the life of policy communities. They perform functions that other institutions cannot perform. They are necessary." (Ibid, 1992). At the same time, pressure groups can sometimes threaten to substitute sectoral representation for the geographically based representation upon which our legislative system depends, which can cause a problem in democratic representation. Pressure groups must therefore be contained and other institutions strengthened (Dorcey and McDaniels, 2001). Widening public involvement beyond interest groups to offer community members a direct say in the management of the Creeks will help  156  to ensure representativeness of community values, and the end of the 'greenies versus loggers' debate. Finding  # 6. A co-management  the strong support  of the  arrangement  with the Sechelt First Nation  has  community  To mitigate any further coordination costs, a new institutional governance model for community control of the Chapman/Grey watersheds must include a mechanism for meaningful First Nations involvement. During the IWMP process, the Sechelt First Nation did not take part at first. As the study progressed, Calvin Craigin of the Sechelt Indian Band stated that in short, the band was looking for greater recognition of its role in the watershed, and for historical recognition of the importance of the Creeks to the Band. He also asked for an acknowledgement of the Band's cultural presence and their traditional uses of specific areas within the watersheds. The Band didn't sign off on the plan largely because it wanted to safeguard those areas, and demanded a continued say in decision making about the future of the watersheds (Sloan, 1995). Throughout the process the Band continued to build a relationship with the local government, resulting in a signed accord between the Sechelt Band and the SCRD. The accord asks the provincial government for divestiture of the Creeks to both local governments, through a form of co-management over the watersheds. The specifics of this agreement have not been worked out, but the participants of the IWMP agreed that co-management between the two local governments would be the most applicable model for the Sunshine Coast: "I think it's positive. I think it's workable for the Band and the SCRD to reach a watershed agreement. Our people are always going to be here, we rely on  157  that...we have relied on that system or creek for thousands of years, and it flows right into one of our Band lands.. .1 think again it gets back to who's in control of the plan. Not so much the politic around the plan.. .1 think it gets back to who's making the final decisions, and again that should include the Band as one of the key.. .decision makers."(FN 1) While the limited scope of this research does not allow for an in-depth discussion on the merits of First Nations co-management in community watershed management, there is abundant literature to attest to the success of these types of efforts. After reviewing experience in Canada and abroad, the National Round Table has recommended that co-management should be a central element of sustainability strategies (National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, 1998). Comanagement is described as just one of the types of partnerships that have been seen as central to successful sustainability governance initiatives. It is also viewed as a way to implement community-based management using multistakeholder processes and consensus principles (Dorcey, 2003).  The opportunity for successful co-management of the Chapman/Grey is considerable. The relationship between the Sechelt Band and the SCRD is described as being very positive, and both recognize the authority granted in each of their respective governing agencies to manage the watersheds. In fact the SCRD is the only local government in Canada with a duly elected Indian government director. The willingness of both parties to work together ".. .demonstrates that we have the right people making the decisions" (FN1).  The co-management model being discussed by the Band and the SCRD would have to be tailored to the community, and may not be appropriate for areas experiencing  158  similar dilemmas, due to the community attributes and historical reality of watershed management on the Coast. FN1 concludes that the community model set out by the Band and the SCRD is designed for two government bodies that can work together, but, "What's right for Sechelt might not be right for our neighbouring tribes..." (FN1). Even the Minister of Forests recognized the value in a co-management model, and in 1999, Forests Minister Zirnhelt gave support to the District Manager on the Sunshine Coast to have further discussions with the SCRD on this topic: "The possibility of a transfer of land or land lease is not an option.. .the SCRD's suggestion of a new study or management plan for the Chapman/Grey is not an option.. .the M O F and M E L P do not have the time or resources to commence a new process, and no information has been provided to convince me that the IWMP is technically flawed. If an approach could be worked out that involved the SCRD on a co-management model, then I am of the view ,  that the provincial government should explore this option..." (Zirnhelt, 1999)  In the unlikely event of a new study or management plan for the Chapman/Grey creeks, the SCRD also expects to be involved in the preparation and approval of the study terms of reference, which was a large bone of contention during the IWMP process. "Unless the SCRD and the Sechelt Indian band are jointly involved and can approve the TORS for future studies, there is unlikely to be consensus or consent to any future plans that dictates the future of a community watershed without community involvement in the scope of work to be studied." (Baldwin, 1998). Whatever model the community comes up with, it is apparent that the SCRD and the Sechelt Indian Government will be working closely together.  159  Finding  #7. The community supports elected representation on a community  water board in a new management  framework  One important criterion for legitimacy of governance experiments is representativeness (Dorcey, 2003). Public representation during the IWMP process amounted to one person, who was an unelected official representing the SCRD. Many in the community found that this did not suffice in terms of community representation. Additionally, the participants acknowledged that having elected representatives at the table would have allowed those present to deal with the political issues at stake, rather than just the technical ones. Just as improved public participation would be essential in a new model, local elected representation would ensure the public that their views were being advocated. This would also be a necessary step in rebuilding the public's confidence and trust in elected officials to manage their resources. Within standard governance in Canada, the public elects representatives to make policy on their behalf. In so-called consensus processes like the IWMP, ideally there is representation of all affected parties. Yet, those who are most direcdy affected by a decision, and who will reap concentrated benefits or bear concentrated costs, have a strong incentive to organize a power base and participate in consensus processes, in order to affect the outcome (Olson, 1965). This was reflected in the IWMP process by the skewed participation of the forest industry representatives. T,he broader public, which may bear the largest share of the benefits or costs, but for which these impacts are more diffuse generally has far less incentive to participate, as the costs per capita are lower (Olson, 1965). Hence, the interests of important but more diffusely affected parties, ranging from the public at large, to future generations, are not direcdy represented in consensus-based governance, unless facilitators take special steps to  160  ensure the sponsors and other participants address this concern (Dorcey and McDaniels, 2001). As the facilitators on the IWMP process were not value-neutral, it could be argued that diffuse public interests were not sufficiendy advocated. A n elected representative would assist in proper representation of the public interest, rather than industry or interest-group interests. Researchers have identified a number of requirements for effective local control of watershed basins, including elected representativeness. Powell (1983) defined that direct election of watershed board members is a political requirement, to improve accountability to the public. Some of the participants mentioned the notion of having a community water board with elected representation, which would operate at an arm's length from the Regional District and the Sechelt First Nation. The water board's mandate would define that the sole purpose of the watershed is water supply, so that newly elected members wouldn't 'come in and decide they want to go logging the watershed' (CA1). This would ensure that the mandate of the water boardquality water supply- would be protected through both 'good and bad governments' (CA1).  Many of the participants anticipated that any form of community control would also have to include involvement by the various levels of government. One of the participants at the public meeting in the longhouse in Sechelt expressed that the province would still have to be involved in any community control model, as the local governments ".. .do not have the technical or financial resources to go it alone, that is, the necessary hydrologists and biologists.. .and that they don't have the tax base to support the need for a seven million dollar filtration system". This illustrates the need to build a co-management water board with a mechanism for participation from certain provincial agencies. While the community wants local control, they certainly do not want to 'go it alone': 161  "I think you want to keep them [higher up government officials] onside, you want to be able to demonstrate that you are effectively managing the best interests of the community and the people of Canada, that you're taking a leadership [role]... (FN1) All of the participants recognized that the provincial government has a role in public health and quality of life, and that clean water is enshrined as a right to people. But they also felt that a co-management elected water board should not have to report to the Ministry of Forests, but rather to the Ministry of Health. This latter ministry taking on the lead responsibility for water quality is another recommendation stemming from the Drinking Water Review Panel, discussed below. It was felt that the Ministry of Health would provide a broader management perspective than any other provincial ministry, with the appropriate focus on water quality and human health.  Interestingly, there is some debate on the Coast over the desire and necessity to have the Ministry of Forests involved in any co-management water board model. The first statement released by the SCRD on their desire for local control stated:  " A management structure which we believe would ensure that water quality, quantity and timing of flows has the highest priority would include a comanagement team made up of the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Health, the Sechelt Nation, and the SCRD" (SCRD, 1994).  The Ministry of Forests responded with a request to ".. .please provide written assurance that the Ministry of Forests is on the SCRD's proposed list of co-  162  management team members" (MOF2). The SCRD soon cleared up the matter with a letter to the Minister of Environment, dated later that year, that stated: "The Regional District would like to receive your support in principle for development of a co-management community watershed lease. The primary focus of such a lease would be to consider all integrated watershed management opportunities proposed, but only those proposals which can at least confirm that all natural biophysical functions and ecological processes widiin community watershed are managed to confirm water quality, quantity, and timing of flows. The Regional District perceives that a co-management community watershed lease would be held equally by the Ministry of Health, the SCRD, the Ministry of Forests, the Sechelt Indian Government District, and the Ministry of Environment..." (SCRD, 1994).  The original non-inclusion of the M O F reflects again the community's lack of support for forestry in the watershed. Regardless of what form the water board takes, the members would be elected, and would provide opportunities for key actors to monitor each other. An elected water board would also ensure that they would be held accountable for their actions, including compliance to current environmental guidelines and legislation (Hooper, 1998). Finding#  8. Skilled facilitation and conflict resolution techniques are critical  to a successful watershed planning  process  Watershed based managers need to develop low-cost mechanisms to facilitate communication, make decisions, and resolve conflicts among the actors.  163  Collaborative approaches to decision making, including skilled facilitation and conflict resolution techniques, are useful in this regard (Imperial, 1999). An additional process-related barrier to collaboration stemmed from the belief of some of the IWMP actors that the facilitation of the process was one-sided.  The  facilitators were technical staff of the co-chairing ministries, and had not had much experience facilitating large planning processes when the plan began (MOE). Participants felt that the co-chairing led to a situation where the chairs led the process, perhaps to the exclusion of interests outside their own mandates. Even the chairs themselves recognized that it would have been better had there been an independent, value neutral facilitator, guiding the process. In a community based watershed model, it will also be essential to view conflict resolution as part of a process for reaching consensus, and not just focusing on the resolution of disputes once they arise. In this larger context, techniques of negotiation, facilitation and mediation developed during processes like the IWMP in the 1980s and '90s need to be recognised as being central to each of these processes. In these multistakeholder negotiation processes, assistance by facilitators and mediators is critical to success in reaching consensus (Dorcey,2003). A facilitator is defined as "an individual who enables groups and organizations to work more effectively; to collaborate and achieve synergy. She or he is a 'content neutral' party who, by not taking sides or expressing or advocating a point of view during a meeting, can advocate for fair, open and inclusive procedures to accomplish the group's work. A facilitator can also be a learning or dialogue guide to assist a group in thinking deeply about its assumptions, beliefs and values, and about its systemic processes and context" (Kaner et al. 1996). Similarly, given the history of conflict in the Creeks, conflict resolution techniques will also be an essential component of skills needed by a new co-management body. 164  Finding  # 9. A new co-management model would need to use improved  consensus decision making  processes  A new co-management model would do best to learn from the learnings around consensus decision-malting processes over the past decade. While the concept was relatively new at the beginning of the IWMP process, studies abound on the merits of this approach in resolving environmental conflicts.  A consensus process is: "one in which all those who have a stake in the outcome aim to reach agreement on actions and outcomes that resolve or advance issues related to environmental, social, and economic sustainability" (Cormick et al, 1996). Kaner et al (1996) describe consensus as a participatory process by which a group diinks and feels together en route to their decision. Unanimity, by contrast, is the point at which the group reaches closure. Many groups that practice consensus decision making use unanimity as their decision rule for reaching closure- but many do not. Also, consensus processes frequendy employ the processes and techniques of negotiation and facilitation, and sometimes mediation (Dorcey, 2003).  There were numerous problems with the consensus approach taken during the IWMP process, which are outlined in greater detail in Chapter 6. One participant sums up the problems:  ".. .when you've got different levels of legislated authority, you're really not playing on a level playing field. That's where some of these consensus-based processes start to really fall down. I used to really embrace this idea of consensus, and now I realize that I was kind of living in dream world. It's a great thing to shoot for, but you're not always going to get it. Recently I  165  worked in an advisory process that had different scales of consensus.. .it had endorse, accept and reject, at three different levels of making a decision, and so the endorsement is, "Yeah, I totally support this idea," and accept is, "Well, I'm not really totally happy with all aspects of this deal but I can live with it," and then the alternative reject is just, "No way, I just cannot deal with.tiiis." So if people are willing to take any of those first two, then that constitutes acceptance of consensus. Where we ran into some problems with this IWMP, is that we really didn't lay out those parameters, it was either going to be all or nothing, and so people spent ridiculous amounts of time on little tiny details that you didn't really need to spend so muchtimeon. Whereas if we had adopted those three layers I think that would have expedited the process a lot more." (MOE)  Numerous watershed based initiatives have cited processes that stress voluntary cooperation, consensus decision making, and flexibility in problem solving approaches as necessary conditions for success (Kenney, 1997). A new co-management model would necessitate a structured consensus-approach that worked for the participants, based on some of the lessons learned during the IWMP (see Chapter 6) and other land-use planning processes.  Finding planning  # 10. Strong community leadership is key to successful  watershed  processes  Another issue that is related to all of the transaction costs associated with the IWMP is the degree of leadership that individual advocates and organizations possess. There will always be a wide range of decision-makers, multiple jurisdictions, and competing players in a watershed. A strong leader who can advocate for watershed-based  166  management, mediate conflict and build strong relationships between disparate players will greatiy reduce transaction costs (Hooper, 1998). Indeed, after a review of seventy-six western watershed initiatives, the Natural'Resources Law Center cited leadership as one of the five qualities "instrumental to success in watershed initiatives" (NRLC, 1998). The apparent lack of leadership during the IWMP process may have been an ultimate factor in its failure as a planning process. A new model would necessitate visionary leadership by someone within the community.  Finding#  11: Issues  around  downloading  and  liability  muddy  institutional  relationships  The tragic deaths from the failures of the community water supply system in Walkerton have become a symbol of the risks created by the retreat of governments (Dorcey, 2003). More generally, local governments have become vociferous about their inability to respond to the downloading of responsibilities, and the historical neglect of municipalities by the senior governments that have been unwilling to provide them with adequate independent legal or financial capacity or share of revenues. In British Columbia, the failure of a decade of treaty negotiations to produce agreements and the regressive policy stance of the new Liberal government have resulted in all of these concerns becoming acute, in and around First Nation communities in particular (Dorcey, 2003). This concern around the costs of downloading the responsibility to the local government is significant on the Sunshine Coast. While everyone concurred that the community should have some say in how its water resources are being managed, not everyone agreed on a management structure that would see this happen. Even though the local government continues to push for divested control, some of the IWMP participants believe that the liability of being fully responsible for the  167  watersheds would be too cosdy for the SCRD to manage, and is a factor that is not being fully explored in the current campaign for divestiture.  One question about liability is that if the community were to take control, who would hold ultimate responsibility for what has occurred in the watersheds in the past? At the time of the IWMP referendum, the Board of the Regional District immediately approached the provincial government to ask for a lease over the watershed so that they would be in a position to govern any land use activity. The ruling N D P government ".. .just absolutely flat out refused to deal with this, but they did initiate some facetious arguments like.. .you can only have management authority if you are also willing to assume all of the liabilities of past management." (CAI). Considering that the watersheds had seen over 300 landslides, and that more could occur at any time, then the Regional District, under this proposition, could easily spend a couple of million dollars moving machinery in and out to deal with destabilized slopes (CAI). For these reasons, liability has become a very significant issue.  The Ministry of Environment also raised concerns about liability issues surrounding security to protect the water supply:  '  "I know that the local community on the Sunshine Coast has expressed a desire to have control over the whole watershed, and basically put gates on the watershed and keep everybody out like the G V R D does. I'm not sure they realize that liability that would be associated with managing that land base.. .if you have control over the watershed, you're responsible for a lot: security, managing forests.. .1 mean the G V R D has a million dollars a year security, that's how much it costs them to keep their security guards up and maintain their gates and things like that. And the Sunshine Coast sure doesn't have that  168  tax base to be able to do that. And what happens when there's a forest fire in the watershed? The G V R D hires.. .their own staff, every year, that's part of their agreement to their tenure management, and they do fire control. So would the Sunshine Coast be willing to do that? That's part of the responsibility of managing the land. It's not a straightforward thing. You can't say that you want to do something, have some control, but not the full responsibility.. .1 don't know if that discussion has been fully explored on the Sunshine Coast. " (MOE1)  Even the SCRD recognizes the liability risks involved in community control. The chair of the SCRD board in 1994 stated: "The cost of maintaining the watershed on our own would be horrendous. Cooperation of all those involved is essential to the conservation of our water quality." The Sunshine Coast is not alone in their fears around liability. For this reason, the provincial health officer's report (2001) suggests that ".. .if companies or groups degrade the source water quality, they must bear the responsibility and cost of remrning water to its original state." Following this line of argument, the Ministry of Forests and forest industry representatives with land tenure would bear the brunt of the liability associated with water quality issues pertaining to landslides.  The Drinking Water Review Panel found that funding was the biggest obstacle raised by the public when they were asked about the implementation of the Protection Act.  Drinking  Water  The public also raised fears about ongoing cost cutting within  government and privatization of water supply systems, warning that both threaten the safety of drinking water. The Panel states:  169  "At present, fees paid by water users are not adequate to cover ongoing infrastructure costs or the costs associated with ensuring that drinking water is safe. Additional resources will be required to overcome existing shortfalls in funding available for infrastructure and to support implementation of the DWPA. A comprehensive program of infrastructure funding is required in the province. A cost sharing formula to fairly distribute the costs of providing safe drinking water should be carried out- sources would include the provincial government; resource users; water license holders; and residential water users. An additional mechanism to raise funds would be to add a surcharge on fees charged to those who make use of water, or are engaged in activities that may adversely affect drinking water. Examples of this could include stumpage fees for logging crown land in drinking water supply areas, mining licenses or fees; outdoor recreation fees; and water license fees for surface water." (DWRP, 2002).  Implementing the above suggestions would gready assist the SCRD/SIGD comanagement board in accepting legal authority and associated liabilities for the management of the watershed.  Finding# legislation  12. The new Drinking  Water Protection Act and associated  would improve institutional arrangements on the Sunshine Coast  The auditor general of the province of British Columbia concluded in 1999 that "the province is not adequately protecting drinking water sources from human related impacts, and that this could have significant cost implications in the future for the province, for municipal and regional governments, and for citizens in general". At the beginning of 2001, the provincial government held a series of eleven workshops and  170  public meetings throughout the province to listen to public views on a drinking water protection plan. This plan and the results of the corresponding consultation formed the basis of the  Drinking  Water Protection Act  (DWPA), part of which was passed in  April 2001- just two weeks prior to the calling of the provincial election. The newly elected Liberal government thought the legislation was "... was very hastily put onto the floor of the Legislature" (Hansen, undertake a thorough review of the  Drinking  2002),  and made a commitment to  Water Protection Act  ".. .those important sections of it" (Ibid, 2002). In September  before proclaiming 2001,  the Ministers of  Environment and Health established an independent panel to review the DWPA.  At an open cabinet meeting in June 2002, the provincial legislature had a discussion about the DWPA and the review panel's recommendations, and established an 'action plan for safe drinking water' in the province. Amendments to the Protection Act  Drinking  Water  were slated to be approved in the fall of 2002, but to date have not been  approved. The goal of the action plan was to have regulations developed by that point as well (Hansen, 2002). While the action plan was approved in June, the corresponding regulations have not been made public to date.  The Act generally has some very good suggestions in it, something that Coast residents concur: ".. .What would be right.. .if the  Drinking  WaterProtection  Actcomes  out and it becomes implemented, it's got some very powerful tools that might cause us to rethink the way that we manage risk water areas. But we have to see that plan come to fruition."(MOE)  CA believes that the corresponding recommendations made by the review panel, if implemented intelligendy, would be beneficial to the community. Highest priority  171  recommendations in the review panel included introducing the amended DWPA in spring 2 0 0 2 legislative session; creation of a single drinking water protection agency reporting direcdy to Minister of Health Planning; strengthening of drinking water source protection measures; province-wide screening; risk assessments of water systems to identify and prioritize critical drinking water supply areas; creation of a dedicated drinking water protection surcharge applying to a range of user fees; and development of a comprehensive infrastructure funding program.  In the view of the Liberal cabinet, the action plan builds on and reflects the majority of the recommendations from the Drinking Water Review Panel. (Hansen,  2002)  One of the key recommendations from the panel and supported by the cabinet was the need for a single lead ministry with a clear mandate and function to provide safe drinking water, namely the Ministry for Health Services.  L\ead agency  The review panel also called for the creation of a drinking water protection agency that would report to the Minister of Health Planning to integrate the skills, resources and authority of all provincial ministries with responsibility for drinking water protection. The panel envisions that the agency will be run by a CEO and a board of directors, which will be composed of provincial government appointees from forests, environment, health, and community/aboriginal services; one First Nation representative; two water purveyor representatives including Union of BC municipalities; two public representatives reflecting health and environmental interests; and two watershed resource industry representatives reflecting forestry and agriculture. The board would provide strategic direction to the agency. This model of shared decision making should contribute toward ending the legacy of resource use conflicts. Board members will elect their chair, and adopt decision making and dispute resolution processes. 172  While the action plan makes no reference to this independent agency, the Liberal government is still advocating an integrated approach to drinking water protection: "Although Health Services will be the lead ministry on drinking water, we will continue to work closely with the other ministries to maintain quality drinking water from source to tap. To ensure this occurs, we are establishing an interministry committee to identify emerging issues and develop appropriate integrated policy. Resource ministries will continue to fulfill their obligations for source protection, with the Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection playing a primary role in protecting surface and groundwater quality. The Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and Women's Services will continue to play a key role in working with communities on their infrastructure needs... It is through this integrated approach that we will ensure British Columbia always has a comprehensive drinking water plan that is meeting current and future needs in this province." (Hansen,  2002).  In terms of specific roles, the Liberals maintain that the Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management has a mandate to carry out land use planning in the province, though "these planning activities recognize the importance of protecting drinking water and are designed to work with communities to help make the best environmental, social and economic choices." (Hansen,  2002).  In addition, where additional protection of drinking water is required, Sustainable Resource Management will work with the Ministry of Health Services and the Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection to evaluate the situation and determine if a formal drinking water protection plan is needed. In such cases, "the planning  173  expertise of the Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management will be an integral part of the development of such a drinking water protection plan." (Hansen, 2002) The review panel states that an independent lead agency would enhance coordination in the management and protection of drinking water, and would reduce duplication and conflict between those responsible for water quality. "A single agency that makes use of existing resources and provides one window for drinking water will increase efficiencies, in addition to protecting sources, will prevent costly water quality problems." While the Liberal's interministerial committee could enhance cooperation, it is apparent from this study that an independent agency is preferable in terms of trust, hidden agendas, and resource extraction interests dominating those of local communities.  Source protection  In addition to proposing that Health Services be the lead agency to better coordinate institutional efforts, the review panel recommended including a purposes section of the Act, which would include: to protect water from source to tap; to protect humans against water borne disease and long-term adverse health effects; and to give drinking water priority over other resource uses in critical or high risk watersheds. Source protection would come about through a series of assessments, where communities would develop drinking water protection plans to address how best to protect sources. The stated goal of the action plan by Minister Hansen, however, is to "avoid the need for unilaterally imposed drinking water protection plans."  Under this plan, powers will be increased to protect drinking water sources where necessary to protect human health. When other measures fail to address a health concern, the Minister of Health Services, on the recommendation of the provincial  174  health officer, will recommend to cabinet that a site-specific drinking water plan be imposed, giving human health protection the very top priority. In the rare instances in which such a plan would be required, a socioeconomic analysis would be performed to assess and advise on the full impact of the plan to affected communities. Source protection does not include limiting resource extraction activities in the Act. "On the forestry side, the new results-based forest code must ensure that water quality is considered when conducting forest and range activities near water.. ..these source protection measures undertaken by the resource ministries add up to an important first line of defense in protecting our drinking water." (Hansen,  2002).  While source protection measures in the Act are generally good, they do not go far enough to ensure that logging activities do not impinge upon community water supplies.  Local control  The review panel recommend improving local government's influence and authority in relation to drinking watersheds, including issues related to public access, recreational activities, and land use decisions that affect water quality in source areas. The panel would also place the onus on resource users to plan and prove that their activities have no significant impact on source water quality in critical and high risk water supply areas.  <  In support of local solutions, the review panel also calls to decentralize the proposed drinking water protection agency and focus activities in the regions. This agency would also administer conservation, financial and technical assistance programs for local governments and small water service agencies. The agency is to remain open and transparent to the public and involve the public in planning and decision making  175  when appropriate. The review panel also called for the allowance for public and First Nation involvement, and community right to know to the DWPA to make it complete (DWRP,  2002).  While Minister Hansen made no comment about local control over water supply areas, he did advocate that "locally developed solutions, including a better integration of local land use planners, health officials and other key groups, will reduce the need for these formalized drinking water protection plans." (Hansen,  2002).  Interestingly, the debate over the Chapman/Gray did come up during the discussion of the Act in the legislature, appropriately enough by the Minister of State for Intergovernmental Relations: "My larger question is really around community watersheds. I guess 50 or 100 years ago, when most communities developed their sources, the land was Crown land, and they put in a piping system from streams and lakes and this sort of thing. It really wasn't that much of an issue, but as Crown land has developed — either for urbanization, forestry or public recreation — we've now got potential conflict and, in some areas, conflict in terms of land use between the communities and the Crown land that their watershed is in. Some examples.. .there's the Sunshine Coast, and you mentioned Port Edward, usually around logging and resource-extraction industries. Because they are provincial Crown resources and controls and the local government doesn't have any control over that sort of activity, the local government reaction.. .is to put in ozonization, chlorination, nitration - you know, to go to prevention downstream in terms of water quality — which is very expensive as opposed to addressing the issues that go on in their watershed." (Halsey-Brandt, 2002).  176  Halsey-Brandt then goes on to ask whether a dispute resolution mechanism for these issues is included in the action plan. He states, "When you have these two different levels of government and different activities and very big dollars involved, often the communities can't get together with users of the watershed, which are generally under the control of the province, to sort that business out...."  Minister Hansen replied by stating that the action plan was intended to address these historical conflicting pressures placed on our water sources. He goes on to say, "There are some that would say there should be no activity at all in a watershed area that is providing drinking water. I guess, given the nature of our province, that's simply unrealistic. We're not turning the clock back 100 years and trying to pretend there can't be any kind of activity." The Minister of Health Services also stated the need to create a financial framework that local communities can work within. He reiterated that the action plan was flexible enough that it did ".. .not represent a one-size-fits-all solution to this, yet we recognize the importance of standards. I appreciate that principle but would hope that people impacted in that way would certainly have an opportunity to participate."  In summary, the new Drinking Water Protection Act has some very positive mechanisms in place to help ensure safe drinking water for communities, and should be implemented, along with its associated regulations, as soon as possible. Creation of a single lead agency with responsibility for drinking water should help reduce coordination and strategic costs for future interorganizational collaborative efforts. Additionally, mechanisms to protect source waters, and to support local solutions through a sound financial infrastructure system, are all positive steps. That said, there  177  are a number of ways to strengthen the Act, many of which were put forth by the review panel, and were not discussed by the Liberal cabinet. The lack of an independent agency, C E O and board opens up the risk to a managing of community watersheds that is status quo, that is, dominated by forestry and resource extraction interests rather than human health.  Finding  #13: Inter-ministry  decision  "The IWMP  turf struggles hamper effective  (  environmental  making  is essentially a process which signifies the capitulation of the Ministry of Environment  to the Ministry of Forests following an 80 year turf war"  (Water First, 1998)  A common form of strategic behaviour observed on the Sunshine Coast was the tendency for an organization to protect its turf. Turf refers to the exclusive domain of activities and resources over which an agency has the right to exercise operational or policy responsibility. Organizational preference tends towards maintaining or increasing turf, as it secures the agency's strategic position and can be seen to enhance longer-term survival. As ecosystem-based management programs are likely to recommend new policies and changes to inter-organizational relationships, conflicts over turf are common (Imperial, 1999).  The capacity for turf wars in watershed management in B.C. is significant. Responsibility for drinking water is currentiy shared between at least ten provincial ministries. Management of drinking water in B.C. has been criticized for having a history of inter-ministry turf wars, confusion and conflicts. There have been calls from the Auditor General (1999), the provincial health officer (2001), and participants in the drinking water protection plan consultations (2001) for better coordination  178  amongst all players, clear responsibilities and accountability, and a single point of contact for the public. Many of these voices have suggested the creation of a single lead agency to take on this role, discussed above (DWRP,  2002).  Conflicts over turf are bound to occur in new watershed based management programs, as new policies, programs and changes in interorganizational relationships are inevitable. Policy changes required to implement an ecosystem-based management program might be inconsistent with the present interests of the implementers. Changes may represent a great political or economic cost to the organization, and they therefore may be very reluctant to implement policy changes that run counter to their interests. This fear that the current Liberal government would be unwilling to give up their 'turf over the watersheds out of fear for precedent-setting was abundant on the Sunshine Coast.  Political will for creating a new community based approach  Protecting individual and agency turf, along with deriving unearned benefits from a collaborative process are strategic costs that contributed to the overall transaction costs of the Chapman/Grey IWMP. It is apparent from talking to the participants that there was the belief that the change in provincial government to the BC Liberal Party after the N D P promised divestiture of the watersheds does not bode well for community control of the Chapman/Grey. Most concurred that the provincial Liberals would not want to establish a precedent of allowing community control over a watershed:  "But the realities of that, from a provincial political point of view, you have huge ramifications. I don't think that the provincial government would want to set that kind of precedent for community control over watersheds. The  179  analogy is that the Fraser River is a watershed, and lots of communities get their water from there. But if you were to give the community control over that watershed, then communities would have control over every watershed in B.C., there would be virtually no land left for resource extraction, which is vital to the economy of the province." (FIA1) There are conflicting views about the motivation for keeping the watersheds in the forest land base.. One forest industry representative thought the provincial government would be ".. .insane to give up all those logging rights and set up that precedent", and that "a hell of a lot of wood" would be lost in terms of the forest land based. He goes on to say: " .. .when you start looking at all the different watersheds all over the province, it would be a nightmare to open up that one. So they'll fight that one tooth and nail." (FOl).  Others see it purely as a precedent setting case, as the value of the actual timber supply in the Chapman/Grey is negligible:  "Well what they're [the BC Liberals] afraid of, they're afraid a precedent will be set. And that will impact timber supply across the province. There really is piss all for timber left in the watershed .. .there's not much there. This is all precedent stuff. I guess there's future access, but it's hard to imagine anyone in the future undertaking the kind of risks that were normal in the past." (CAI)  Most participants felt that the only way the BC Liberals would divest control was if logging were allowed to continue.  180  ".. .it's definitely not in the best interest of the provincial member to give it [community control] to them, not a chance in hell, because once it's done, everybody will want it, so you know it's very very difficult to do. The only reason I can see Gordon Campbell and the Liberals doing it is to offload some of the responsibility and save some money. But they say, well you can have the watershed but we still want the ability to log.. ."(FR1)  "I think the provincial government is receptive as long as the approach is realistic. If the approach is, "we're going to get it, gate it, and shut everything down," then the provincial government is going to say 'well hold on here'. Because the Regional District at the same time are saying this about the Chapman/Gray, they're also saying they don't want logging in any community watershed, or watershed reserve, and for a lot of people that also means every creek, and you can imagine what that looks like.. .imagine, if they start thinking, 'Well geez, if this is the way we're going, all economic opportunities [are] going to cease.' ... The reality is we've got a litde debt to pay off.. ."(MOF1) Concerns over entrenched positioning and the lack of willingness of the Ministry of Forests to give up 'turf were abundant during the N D P governed IWMP process, but have taken on new prominence as a result of the provincial Liberal Party sweep in the last election, which left only two members of the 79-person Legislature in opposition (Dorcey, 2003). This predicament was worsened by Premier Campbell's refusal to accommodate the two opposition members in any way (e.g. denying them the recognition and resources of an official opposition because they are less than the required four in number). Adding to the disenchantment with governments has been their failure to deliver on their policy promises, the most recent example being the volte-face  of the B.C. Liberals on their electoral commitments. Apathy and cynicism  have become the inevitable consequences, and have not done much to improve the 181  community's trust in their government to protect their water supply (Dorcey, 2003). This is the turbulent context for considering the likelihood and potential for experimental development of watershed governance innovations on the Sunshine Coast. "But obviously we have a big problem now in that we've had a change in government at the provincial level. The new provincial government isn't interested in any kind of historical perspective. In fact they're not interested in talking to us at all. They just see us as a pressure group and they don't want to talk to us. So when you can't get people to look at the history of the coast, it's hard to make a compelling case.. ..[pause] I think they're incredibly naive. They're new to government, they see themselves as being incredibly powerful, and they don't see themselves as having to make rationales or account for themselves, they don't see themselves as having to respond to what's happened in the past. And they don't believe that we have any way to hold them accountable, so.. ."(CA1)  CA1 believes that the attitude of the provincial Liberal government is that with technology, all problems can be fixed. "So they think that, okay, there's a lot of organic debris and sediment in the water but we have technical solutions. And we'll just employ those technical solutions, and there's no problem. Now that works for them, it doesn't work for us. The solutions come out of our pockets. Even if the provincial government handed over six to eight million dollars for a technical solution, that's all our money, it's all taxpayer money." (CA1)  Generally, the mood of the participants was that the political will to hand over control to the local community no longer exists within the provincial government:  182  ". .'.I think local government's pursued that at various times, but I think the answer is for successive provincial governments has been pretty consistendy, We're not prepared to go there'." (MOF)  Finding #14. Current power balances do not allow local communities to feel they have a say in the management and protection of their local water basins t  Successful institutional arrangements must involve a critical mass of individuals and interest groups that are committed, and who are willing to look beyond the narrow jurisdiction or 'turf of their own constituency. Individuals and governments must step out of their traditional adversarial and self-interest functions to embrace more long term sustainability principles (Williams, Day and Gunton, 1998). Critical to vigorous and productive innovation in institutional arrangements is a mechanism for providing leadership in designing and assessing potential innovations, facilitating their experimental implementation, evaluating the results, and fostering adaptation in light of the findings (Dorcey 2003). The mechanism needs to avoid being dominated by partisan politics while benefiting from the wisdom of experienced politicians and bureaucrats; to reach beyond the entrenched interests in the existing system while developing an appreciation of their perspectives; and, to be inclusive of diverse citizen views while being productive and cost effective (Ibid, 2003). However, intergovernmental factors discourage an integrated approach such as watershed-based initiatives. Government decision-making authorities occur at the legislative and judicial levels, and at all three levels of government. In addition, responsibilities have been further delineated among the public and private sectors. Trends to shift responsibilities from federal to provincial to local, and from public to private, have created a more fragmented decision-making authority than ever before. As well, B.C.'s system of resource and land use governance hinders the establishment 183  of more effective citizen-based planning processes. Currently, most government efforts to support watershed based initiatives arise from the personal commitment of individual agency representatives rather than institutional design (Williams, Day and Gunton, 1998). Although community watershed initiatives may be an attempt to attack the 'gridlock' of current management schemes, interagency coordination and devolution of power is extremely difficult to accomplish (Kenney, 1997), particularly when institutional arrangements are weak. Government must be willing to restructure the current power balances so that local communities feel they have a say in the management and protection of their local water basins.  Restructuring the power balance away from government-control to locally implemented, outcome based processes moves management of the Chapman/Grey down the continuum of five prevailing approaches to watershed governance (Doppelt, 2000). Each addresses 'the commons' in different ways, places government in different roles along a continuum, and affects stakeholder groups in different ways. According to Doppelt (2000), these approaches include:  /) Total Government Control Over Environmental Policy  At this end of the spectrum, the government has total responsibility for environmental protection and management. Decisions are made by a few at the top, and command flows downward while information and results flow upwards. Government sets the environmental standards and its agencies enforce these standards, making it both the supreme sovereign and owner of the environment.  2) Government Controlled "Standards and Enforcement" with Local Implementation  In this system, senior government sets the standard for 'acceptable' environmental impacts and communicates this down the organizational hierarchy. Provincial and  184  local governments then adopt the rules and enforce these standards. In short, command flows downwards from the decision makers and information flows upwards, but implementation decisions are left to those lower in the governance hierarchy.  3) Outcome-Based within a carefully monitored and enforcedframework  This system reflects a newly emerging middle ground that seeks to balance the tensions between freedom and constraint, empowerment and accountability, top down decision making and bottom-up creativity, and experimentation and efficiency. Rather than the government holding primary responsibility, this system assumes that environmental decisions must be incorporated into the every day decisions of companies, landowners, citizens and governments. Government changes its primary role from setting standards and ensuring compliance to creating clear goals for environmental sustainability along with measurable objectives and progress indicators. It also supports planning efforts of each of the major contributors to watershed problems, approving the plans through binding legal agreements. Government also monitors and enforces the self-generated plans through the traditional regulatory process.  This system follows the European Union's "principle of subsidiarity", which identified that tasks should be taken by the lowest unit in society by which they can be effectively managed. This requires devolving decision making authority to an appropriate level, providing greater democratization and empowerment to local levels (Ewing, 1999). This approach requires an effective communication and information flow, partnership building, flexibility, and adaptation. Many of the more effective and efficient emerging watershed programs fall somewhere into this category.  185  Based on the findings of the IAD analysis, a new community model of watershed governance on the Sunshine Coast would lie somewhere between this approach, within a context of provincial and federal water quality standards and enforcement legislation.  The remaining approaches include: 4) Market and/ or voluntary approaches with some government controls  Here government is involved in environmental management only to establish a tax or other monetary measure to encourage polluters to limit their environmental effects. This approach may have adverse and unintended consequences, as appropriate environmental costs are very difficult to calculate.  5) Complete voluntary and/ or market-based approach  This approach relies on individual self interest and volunteerism to protect 'the commons'. One approach is to establish property rights on public property, giving individuals a stake in the appropriate management of the now private resources. Forest management is a common example of this 'privatization' approach. Similarly, many watershed restoration efforts rely completely on the volunteer efforts of local landowners. Any effective watershed governance system will include self-initiated activities, as government cannot regulate all of the potential ways to impact watershed health. However, full environmental costs are rarely internalized in market prices, and government subsidies and other market distortions often encourage environmentally harmful practices. Decades of experience around the world demonstrate that the free-market and volunteer approach alone are not reliable solutions to environmental problems (Doppelt,  2000).  186  This continuum provides a framework for assessing existing approaches and for developing improved watershed governance systems. There is no perfect approach, as different combinations may work best depending on the geography, ecology, history, politics and issues relevant to the particular region or community (Doppelt, 2000). To accomplish the combination of approaches suitable for the Sunshine Coast, higher levels of government must be willing to give up some of their control, and political will must be ensured.  A component of achieving this new approach is overcoming apathy, cynicism and disengagement from governance processes (Dorcey, 2003). The citizens of the Sunshine Coast believe that public will will prevail: "So part of our strategy is to take our statement of the public will we hope to get, to use that to argument with government to give us authority over land use in the watershed. But the strategy always rests on two things: the first thing is the technical scientific situation, and the second is the public will. So with the recent campaign, we're going to define what the public will is. And we have all this technical information, we have all that we need on the scientific side, so we just have to bring these two perspectives together, and getting the government to do what we want it to do. I have to believe that no matter how fascistic they get, and no matter how much people hate them and no matter how much people are frustrated with them, that they are still an elected government, and there are ways to get them to respond." (CAI) Finding  #15: The Ministry  of Forests  held a Status Quo Bias  The best alternative to a negotiated agreement, as seen from the viewpoints of the various parties, is widely recognized as a huge influence on the final outcome of a  187  negotiation process (Fisher and Ury, 1981). The alternative to a negotiated agreement in a consensus process is often the status quo (Dorcey and McDaniels, 2001). In such situations, interests favoured by the status quo have a strong incentive to only accept alternatives that are substantially similar to the status quo. Collaborative, consensus processes can in such situations be said to have a status quo  bias.  As is described in Chapter 6, one of the policy outcomes of the rWMP is the debate over whether management reverts to the status quo, i.e. the Forest Practices Code, in the absence of a higher level plan or divested community control. Michael McCloskey, former head of the Sierra Club in the United States, has questioned the role of stakeholder processes in locally based land use decisions in the United States, in which the status quo favors resource extraction activities (McCloskey, 1997). Key stakeholders who are only interested in changes that differ significantiy from the status quo may choose not to participate in the consensus process and pursue other opportunities such as the courts, lobbying or civil disobedience (Dorcey and McDaniels, 2001), as was observed on the Sunshine Coast. Solutions which would allow those stakeholders to avoid going to the courts are described above, and would include divested local control, increased public involvement and decision making powers, and the opportunity to come up with creative solutions in the watershed. Another solution, put forth as a recommendation by the Drinking Water Review Panel, includes source protection of headwaters.  Finding # 16. Improved problem framing would likely have led to source protection, and a single-use designation for the Chapman/Grey water supply watersheds  In his 1999 report, the auditor general concluded that "the province is not adequately protecting drinking water sources from human-related impacts." The report also  188  suggests it is cheaper to protect water sources than to treat contaminated water. The DWPA introduced new measures to assist with source protection, for example assessments, assessment response plans, drinking water protection measures, and drinking water protection plans. However, many of the submissions to the review panel suggest that source protection is not strong enough in the act, particularly in relation to multiple uses. Some suggest that drinking water should have primacy over other uses, and others thought that some watersheds should be designated exclusively for drinking water use (eg watershed reserves).  There must be management and protection of the water source through effective controls over land uses and pollution sources to prevent contamination. While part five of the Act allows for development of drinking water protection plans and the ability to restrict land uses that may compromise water quality, in the words of Adrienne Carr, leader of the B.C. Green Party, ".. .the Water Protection Act doesn't mention stopping logging in drinking water watersheds- you have to go there if you want to protect water sources." (Adrienne Carr, 2002).  While this may perhaps be something that needs to be resolved on a case by case basis, it is evident from this analysis that the community strongly desires their drinking water supply watershed to be made single use, where no resource extraction activities would be allowed to occur.  The recreation dilemma  The majority of mountainous West Coast domestic watersheds have not regulated human access to the water supply for recreation. An exception is the Greater Vancouver Water District watersheds, which have had restrictive access policies for the past seventy years, primarily to maintain high microbiological quality and excellent  189  chemical characteristics in the source waters (IWMP, 1998). Implementing a total public ban in the Chapman/Gray systems would prove difficult, given the current and historical multiple uses of the watersheds, and the very popular Tetrahedron provincial park, which forms the headwaters for both Chapman Creek and Grey Creeks. However, many of the IWMP participants thought that recreational activities posed a larger risk to human health than logging in the watersheds:  "You've already got recreation going in there- the biggest hazard in the watershed is recreation, let alone forestry. We never really talked about recreation much." (RD1)  The Coastal Health Authority claimed that activities in the watersheds such as dog walking and campers' waste disposal are in some respects a greater issue for water quality than logging. However, it was thought that preventing access for these types of activities would have to be worked out in the community:  "And lots of watersheds in the states and in Europe, they have recreation going on all the time, it's a matter of having partoerships and trust and working on those things, and we're not there." (RD1)  Summary Applying the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework to the Sunshine Coast case study clearly demonstrates that institutional challenges confronting the creation and implementation of a watershed based management plan should not be left as an afterthought to the end of a planning process. The challenges are often too daunting (Imperial, 1999).  190  To summarize the learnings that stem from the application of the analysis to the case study, the primary learning would be that divesting control over the watersheds to the community would appear to address a number of the issues discussed in Chapter 6. The history of animosity and conflict between the agencies has been drawn out over at least five decades, and has been peppered with numerous court batties, failed planning processes, strained or severed individual and agency relationships, and conflict. Allowing the community to come up with its own solutions, with technical assistance from government agencies, would allow for improved local knowledge and community involvement in the decision making around land use on the Coast. Management of the water supply watersheds could be shared by the Sunshine Coast Regional District and the Sechelt Indian Government District; a first in the province. This could be accomplished through an elected community water board.  To clear up a number of the institutional problems related to entrenched positioning and merky legislation, another learning was that a number of the Drinking Water Review Panel recommendations affectively address weaker aspects of the institutional arrangements among the varying local and provincial water and resource managers in B.C. EstabHshing one lead agency responsible for drinking water in the province, under the jurisdiction of the Health Authority, would gready improve coordination costs. This agency would provide technical assistance, quality information, and access to shared resources, so that the costs and liabilities for the local water purveyor would be defrayed.  Finally, the purpose of the Chapman and Grey watersheds should be expressly stated for the sole purpose of supplying clean drinking water to residents of the Sunshine Coast, and that no resource extraction activities be allowed to occur. Source  191  protection is a much more effective method of ensuring water quality than expensive, reactive, technical solutions down the road.  192  Chapter 8- Conclusions "  Trust us to experiment a little bit, as a community. You know the Berlin wall's come and gone,  Russia's collapsed, things are crawling around on Mars, and we still haven't solved our community watershed issues. It's ridiculous whenyou think about it." (CAY)  The goal of this study was to analyze institutional arrangements for collaborative decision making in watershed governance, using the Chapman/Grey Creek watersheds on the Sunshine Coast of B.C. as a case study. The objectives were:  •  To create an analytical framework drawing on literature related to ecosystem governance, community-based watershed management, collaborative decision making, and institutional analysis.  •  To illustrate the application of this framework to a relevant case study in British Columbia, and to discuss its value for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional arrangements involved in the governance of a community water supply watershed.  •  From the analysis, to discuss learnings for improved governance of community water supply watersheds, based on the application of the institutional analysis.  In addition to the summary and findings in the preceding chapter, there are a number of broader conclusions that can be drawn, both from the application of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework to the Sunshine Coast case study, and from its findings.  193  Value ofIAD  framework  The institutional analysis and development framework is a useful tool for ecosystem based practitioners, and provides useful techniques for determining gaps and strengths in watershed governance efforts. The emphasis on community attributes is a strength of the framework; one which is readily apparent in analyzing the nature and history of watershed management on the Sunshine Coast. Additionally, the consideration of transaction costs, including those related to information access and sharing, coordination and collaboration; and strategic costs such as rent seeking and turf protecting, were essential to understanding the nature of interorganizational dynamics, rule systems, and decision making patterns over the history of the management of the Chapman and Grey Creek watersheds. Understanding these dynamics is crucial in identifying areas that show potential for future conflict, as well as areas that should be strengthened and built upon.  It should be clear from this analysis that 'institutions matter' (Imperial, 1999). It is estimated that of the water issues around the world, only 10% are technical, while the remaining 90% are institutional; however most of the money and resources goes towards scientific research and technological answers, rather than social science research that looks at water institutions (McDonigal, 2001). Clearly, this case study demonstrates that the design of governance and institutions is critically important to watershed management.  It is also important for practitioners to recognize that developing effective institutional arrangements can be a complicated and time-consuming task. Practitioners and researchers should recognize that watershed management is as much a problem of governance, involving multiple organizations located at different levels of government, as it is a question of science and designing effective water resource  194  management policies. Accordingly, practitioners must appreciate the complexity and difficulty of the institutional challenges surrounding watershed management, or the result can be faulty recommendations, unimplemented plans, conflict, court battles, and possibly even problems with environmental and human health. The needfor community empowerment and democratic governance of water supply watersheds  It has been demonstrated time and time again that regulatory, scientific-based watershed management has not been successful (BCRTEE, 1994). Traditional methods of informing the public such as those used during the Chapman/Grey IWMP suffered from a lack of credibility, as many people felt their input had little effect on policy outcomes. This frustration was expressed in apathy, stonewalling, disruptive behaviour, community uprising, court battles, and in some cases anger culminating in civil disobedience. Governments are slowly realizing that community members may be more knowledgeable than government about certain issues, due to their own experiences and valuable 'local knowledge'. The public is much more informed in this day and age, and a greater variety of values are being expressed by increasing numbers of groups and interests (BCRTEE, 1994). This application of the IAD framework to the case study demonstrated that governments must move away from stakeholder involvement that seeks to primarily legitimize goverment decisions or the interests of a selected group, to processes that involve the stakeholders in identifying the issues and proposing possible answers (BCRTEE, 1994). Additionally, there is a movement away from "closed door" decision making to a more participatory, democratic approach, where the public and affected stakeholders should have an opportunity to truly participate and influence government decision making (Imperial, 1999).  195  It has been recognized by non-government agencies, by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and by Section 12 of the provincial Fish Protection Act that local governments are in the /w/position to protect urban watersheds (DFRCC, 2000). Additionally, local governments are in the best position to regulate and prioritize environmental protection of community water supplies. While enforcement struggles, compensation, and liability issues all must be addressed, local governments should be supported and encouraged by developers, the public, and senior government for efforts to protect community watersheds. The institutional complexity of the current legal framework regarding watershed management requires improved institutional arrangements and a new form of community-based watershed governance. Missing legal tools  Efforts to protect water quality and quantity through legislation at all levels of government have been in place for decades, however there remains confusion over jurisdictional authority between the various levels of government: federal, provincial, and municipal. Quite often, there is a redundancy in legislation, not only between the levels of government, but within particular governments as well. The province of British Columbia, for example, has at least ten provincial ministries responsible for forty pieces of legislation related to water management. This is compounded by the fact that there are at least ten federal departments responsible for twenty federal statutes that have relevance to water management (Gardiner, Thomson and Newson, 1994). This confusion has created what many consider to be a very reactive, ineffective mechanism to protect valuable water resources. While senior levels of government have been regarded as the 'environmental protectors' in the past, local communities can and must now play a crucial role in managing their water resources. However, while many welcome the devolution of power and the era of partnerships and  196  coalitions between various levels of government, there is still some reluctance on the part of some municipalities in creating and enforcing environmental regulations. Some municipalities feel they do not have the knowledge or competence, while others simply don't want the responsibility, extra cost, or the legal liability. Local governments resent having to bear additional responsibility for watershed protection without adequate resources, or adequate delegated authority. Questions of legal responsibility at different levels and within branches of government have created a lack of accountability, where many of the stream protective measures have become voluntary and unenforceable (Nowlan, 1996).  Additionally, while municipal efforts to protect watersheds are important and needed, province wide standards for water protection are still weak. The implementation of The Drinking Water Review Panel recommendations to strengthen the DWPA would go a long way to improving these provincial standards. Additionally, while groundwater protection legislation has recendy been introduced, wedand protection, endangered species, non-point pollution control and a comprehensive River Act have all been neglected by the province to date (Nowlan, 1996). Better provincial legislation will better enable the ability of local governments to protect watersheds. On a national level, Canada still does not have any national enforceable water quality standards, such as the U.S. Clean Water Act. Additionally, the laws in existence use discretionary language, for example 'may' instead of 'must'; in addition, there is 'dismal enforcement' of the laws we do have (WCEL, 2002). Our laws are already 'behind the times scientifically', and brutal cuts to government departments will only exacerbate this problem (the federal government departments responsible for water quality experienced 30-40% cuts during the 1990's) (WCEL, 2002). Additionally, in Canada we are experiencing a trend towards voluntary enforcement of environmental standards, but "all studies show that it doesn't work" (Ibid, 2002; p.5). Unlike in the 197  U.S., where citizen enforcement allows for citizens to take violators to court, Canada historically does not favour civic engagement in environmental protection. There remains a tremendous shortage of opportunities for the public to get engaged in environmental governance, as even consultation is often limited, discretionary, and unenforceable (WCEL, 2002). Further deregulation and downloading without appropriate public involvement, and concerns for liability are deeply troubling, particularly in the wake of events at Walkerton, Ontario and other water supply tragedies across the country.  Local governments and watershed based groups would like to have improved decision-making power over their local areas, and in many cases advocate a community-based approach. However, due to regulatory restrictions, government bodies are limited in delegating certain authorities to local citizens. While most parties would like to see improved collaboration and a clear, seamless management structure and planning framework that protects and renews community watersheds, government agencies are reluctant to hand over any decision-making powers to local communities. Even where local groups had decision-making processes that involved various levels of government, were consensus-based and reflected accommodation and compromise among stakeholders, litde power sharing has been evident from government agencies (BCRTEE, 1994). This was apparent during the multistakeholder IWMP process on the Sunshine Coast case, where the Ministry of Forests appeared to be unwilling to compromise any of its 'turf, and delegate land use decision making powers to the local community.  Many watershed initiatives have had a limited scope of effectiveness because they cannot operate at a scale necessary to solve some broad problems or mobilize necessary resources (WWPRAC, 1998). Critics of these efforts have raised  198  participation and the relative lack of collaboration from government agencies as an issue affecting the success of these initiatives (Ibid, 1998). Despite government funded efforts to encourage local stewardship of natural resources, there has been very littie effort to devolve power and to build capacity of these community-based groups (Stacey and Plummer,2000). Resolving some of these legislative and strategic 'turf costs is essential to a new community based management model.  Areas forfuture research  Thus far, the application of the Institutional Analysis and Development framework has not addressed the question of whether institutional changes actually improve the health of the ecosystem in question (Imperial, 1999). While improved management of an ecosystem may result from changing institutional arrangements and interagency collaboration, often, the determination of a plan's 'success' was related more to institutional performance, rather than to the knowledge that the resulting policies actually 'worked'. This is a question that remains in the literature around institutional arrangements and ecosystem governance, and is an area for further research.  For example, many watershed based institutions feel they are improving the current management processes by increasing public participation, and by playing a role in monitoring the health of their local ecosystems. They have identified a number of criteria for successful watershed management efforts, however these are primarily focused on process rather than outcome. Although the popularity of watershed based groups continues to grow, there has been very little analysis on how successful these groups have been, in terms of improving environmental health or the decision-making processes that contribute towards it (Kenney, 1997). Additionally, there is considerable variability in terms of goals, their effectiveness, stakeholder composition, their involvement in the 'real' decision making process, types of allowed participation, 199  leadership, financing, and efficiency. As it is difficult to establish whether these groups are improving environmental health, it is also hard to ascertain if community based watershed-initiatives offer a better alternative to traditional management structures. There is a significant need for academic analysis on whether watershed based organizations offer an improvement over traditional methods of watershed governance (Griffin, 1999). This finding also demonstrates the focus on procedural goals during the previous decade, rather than outcome goals. While outcome goals relate to desired  consequences  of citizen involvement and collaborative processes, procedural goals focus on who is involved, when, how and where. The innovations in environmental governance in the 1980s and 90s were strongly oriented to addressing procedural goals (Dorcey, 2003). Future research on the value of analyzing institutional arrangements in watershed management must be based on explicit theoretical models of democratic governance, linking outcome goals to procedural goals, and explicating a hierarchy that relates ideology through to the particular techniques employed (Ibid, 2003). Interest in these questions has catalysed a remarkably diverse and interdisciplinary literature, much of which has been developing in isolation and needs to be cross-fertilised (e.g. comanagement, civic engagement, deliberative democracy, empowerment, and communicative planning) (Ibid, 2003). Accompanying this has been a recognition of the severe limitations of attempts to assess experiences only after the processes have concluded, and the critical need for real-time observation and feedback using participatory evaluation approaches. While an historical analysis of watershed management on the Sunshine Coast should certainly assist current managers in establishing suitable rules and procedures together, as IWMP participants have had many years to reflect on their experience, future research might attempt to further assess the current legal options available;  200  particularly with all of the recent, significant changes at the provincial government level.  Contribution to the body of literature  The overall purpose of this thesis is to analyze institutional arrangements for collaborative decision making in watershed governance, using the Chapman/Grey Creek watersheds on the Sunshine Coast of B.C. as a case study. Through this research study, a better understanding of the importance of assessing the institutional arrangements can be gained by water and land use managers, community members and activists, government officials and bureaucrats in their efforts to maintain a safe and clean water supply. Through this research, the importance of considering the community culture, history and relationship norms in particular becomes readily apparent.  This study contributes to the body of literature around institutional arrangements in watershed governance. It goes beyond a sterile, academic analysis of the rule structure, norms and procedures guiding a watershed planning process. By allowing the participants to speak at length in their own voice and bring their sense of vision and meaning to the analysis, a richness and depth is added to the research. The study also shows that applying the IAD framework and analyzing institutional arrangements can be useful to managers not solely for evaluating a completed ecosystem management process, but to create a guide and framework for future collaborative efforts. By bringing together concepts from bodies of literature on watershed management, community-based watershed initiatives, public involvement, activism, environmental policy, current laws and regulations, First Nations co-management, and democratic governance, this study represents a true cross-fertilization of academic  201  discussion that will hopefully guide us towards a new era of environmental decisionmaking. Summary  The development of rules and policies to manage watersheds- particularly those that represent water supply catchments for human consumption- is a complex human endeavour constrained by limits on human abilities, imperfect information, risk and uncertainty. The physical characteristics of the ecosystem and the nature of the problem can also impose constraints on the policy choices available to decision makers. Additionally, political, cultural, and economic conditions can influence which policies are preferred and whether they operate as intended. In this respect, all attempts at watershed governance involve policy experiments. For this reason, innovation, adaptation, and learning often mark the success of institutional design (Imperial, 1999).  It is important for practitioners and researchers to recognize that ecosystem-based management is as much a problem of 'governance' involving multiple organizations located at different levels of government as it is a question of science and designing effective water resource management policies. Accordingly, the failure to appreciate the complexity and difficulty of the institutional challenges surrounding ecosystembased management can result in faulty policy recommendations that decrease the effectiveness of these programs. (Imperial, 1999)  It is hoped that through this research study will come the inspiration to be bold and innovative in our watershed governance initiatives, based on a solid understanding of science, history, relationships, and community values.  202  "No matter where I was, I always thought the power was elsewhere... but the power is in communities and in activists and that's where we have to work..."  (Joan S a w i c k i , 2002)  203  REFERENCES Baldwin, P.. 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