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Clashing cultures, clashing selves? : an analysis of the self-concept structure and psychological adjustment… Assanand, Sunaina 2003

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CLASHING CULTURES, CLASHING S E L V E S ? AN ANALYSIS OF THE S E L F - C O N C E P T S T R U C T U R E AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ADJUSTMENT OF BICULTURAL P E O P L E by SUNAINA A S S A N A N D B . S c , The University of British Columbia, 1991 M.A., The University of British Columbia, 1996 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE D E G R E E OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Psychology) We accept this thesis as conforming to the-jequired standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April 2003 © Sunaina Assanand, 2003 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of \ y / ( _ - v » , > , , <• < . { The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada -6 (2788) II Abstract The present research was designed to examine the self-concept structure (i.e., the organization of self-beliefs) and psychological adjustment of bicultural people who are exposed to conflicting expectations of the self across their cultural environments. Three features of self-concept structure were examined—self-concept pluralism, cultural compartmentalization, and self-concept unity. Self-concept pluralism was assessed using Linville's (1985, 1987) measure of self-complexity. Cultural compartmentalization was assessed using a measure adapted from Showers' (1992) research on the compartmentalization of positive and negative self-beliefs. Self-concept unity was assessed using (a) a measure of role integration adapted from Donahue et al.'s (1993) research on self-concept differentiation, (b) Campbell et al.'s (1996) Self-Concept Clarity Scale, and (c) a measure of actual-actual self-discrepancies adapted from Higgins' (1987) research on self-discrepancies. Self-concept pluralism, cultural compartmentalization, self-concept unity, and psychological adjustment were assessed among monocultural and bicultural participants. The monocultural participants were Euro-Canadians and Indians living in India. The bicultural participants were Indo-Canadians. The results indicated that the bicultural participants were higher in cultural compartmentalization, lower in self-concept unity, and lower in psychological adjustment than the monocultural participants. Moreover, the results showed that self-concept unity mediated the relationship between cultural exposure (i.e., monoculturalism vs. biculturalism) and psychological adjustment; lower levels of self-concept unity accounted for lower levels of psychological adjustment among the bicultural participants. Self-concept pluralism, cultural compartmentalization, self-concept unity, and psychological Ill adjustment were also assessed for bicultural participants who used one of five strategies to cope with conflicting cultural expectations of the self—assimilation, separation, alternation, fusion, or marginalization. The results indicated that (a) participants who used alternation (i.e., who adhered to different norms and values in different cultural environments) were higher in cultural compartmentalization, lower in self-concept unity, and lower in psychological adjustment than participants who used other strategies and (b) participants who used fusion (i.e., who consistently adhered to a combination or blend of the norms and values of the dominant culture and the norms and values of their ethnic culture) were higher in self-concept unity and higher in psychological adjustment than participants who used other strategies. Moreover, the results showed that self-concept unity mediated the relationship between the strategies that participants used and psychological adjustment; lower levels of self-concept unity accounted for lower levels of psychological adjustment among participants who used alternation, and higher levels of self-concept unity accounted for higher levels of psychological adjustment among participants who used fusion. The implications of these findings for theories of the psychological impact of biculturalism are discussed. iv Table of Contents Abstract ii Table of Contents iv List of Tables vii List of Figures ix Introduction 1 Zajonc's (1960) Structural Characteristics of Cognitive Schemas 2 Self-Concept Pluralism, Psychological Adjustment, and Biculturalism 5 Self-Complexity and Psychological Adjustment 5 Self-Complexity and Biculturalism 7 Self-Concept Unity, Psychological Adjustment, and Biculturalism 9 Self-Concept Differentiation and Psychological Adjustment 9 Self-Concept Clarity and Psychological Adjustment 11 Self-Discrepancies and Psychological Adjustment 11 Self-Concept Differentiation, Self-Concept Clarity, Self-Discrepancies, and Biculturalism 13 Psychological Adjustment and Biculturalism 15 Strategies that Bicultural People May Use to Reconcile Competing Cultural Expectations of the Self 16 Research on Acculturation 16 Self-Complexity and Acculturative Strategies 21 Self-Concept Differentiation, Self-Concept Clarity, Self-Discrepancies, and Acculturative Strategies.. 22 Psychological Adjustment and Acculturative Strategies 23 V The Present Research 25 Study 1 25 Method 26 Participants 26 Materials and Procedure 27 Results 28 Study 2 32 i Method 32 Participants 32 Materials and Procedure 34 Results 42 Relations Among the Measures of Self-Concept Structure 43 Relations Between the Measures of Self-Concept Structure and the Measures of Psychological Adjustment 45 The Self-Concept Structure and Psychological Adjustment of the Monocultural and Bicultural Samples 48 The Self-Concept Structure and Psychological Adjustment of Assimilators, Separators, Alternators, Fusors, and Marginalized Individuals 53 Discussion 66 The Self-Concept Structure of Bicultural People 67 Self-Concept Pluralism 67 Cultural Compartmentalization 69 Self-Concept Unity 70 vi The Psychological Adjustment of Bicultural People 71 Theoretical and Practical Implications 73 Limitations and Future Research 74 Footnotes 79 References 83 Appendix A: Measure of Culturally-Valued Traits 97 Appendix B: Instructions for Self-Complexity Measure 101 Appendix C: Role Integration Measure 102 Appendix D: Self-Concept Clarity Measure 105 Appendix E: Self-Discrepancy Measure 106 Appendix F: Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale 109 Appendix G: Satisfaction with Life Scale 110 Appendix H: Anxiety Subscale from the Symptom Checklist 90 111 Appendix I: Depression Subscale from the Symptom Checklist 90 112 Appendix J: Somatization Subscale from the Symptom Checklist 90 113 Appendix K: Acculturation Questionnaire 114 Appendix L: Validity of the Acculturation Questionnaire 115 Appendix M: The Self-Concept Structure and Psychological Adjustment of the Euro-Canadian and Indian Samples 118 vii List of Tables Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for Selected Traits 29 Table 2: Alpha Reliability Coefficients for Measures of Self-Concept Structure 38 Table 3: Alpha Reliability Coefficients for Measures of Psychological Adjustment 40 Table 4: Correlations Among Measures of Psychological Adjustment (Aggregate Sample) 41 Table 5: Correlations Among Measures of Self-Concept Structure (Aggregate Sample) 43 Table 6: Correlations Between Measures of Self-Concept Structure and Measures of Psychological Adjustment (Aggregate Sample) 46 Table 7: Measures of Self-Concept Structure: Means and Standard Deviations for the Monocultural and Bicultural Samples 49 Table 8: Measures of Psychological Adjustment: Means and Standard Deviations for the Monocultural and Bicultural Samples 51 Table 9: Number of Participants Classified into Each Acculturative Group 54 Table 10: Correlations Between Acculturative Strategy Scores and Self-Complexity Scores 56 Table 11: Correlations Between Acculturative Strategy Scores and Cultural Compartmentalization Scores 57 Table 12: Measures of Self-Concept Unity: Means and Standard Deviations for Alternators, Assimilators, Separators, and Fusors 58 viii Table 13: Correlations Between Acculturative Strategy Scores and Self-Concept Unity Scores 59 Table 14: Measures of Self-Concept Unity: Means and Standard Deviations for Fusors, Assimilators, Separators, and Alternators 60 Table 15: Measures of Psychological Adjustment: Means and Standard Deviations for Alternators, Assimilators, Separators, and Fusors 61 Table 16: Measures of Psychological Adjustment: Means and Standard Deviations for Fusors, Assimilators, Separators, and Alternators 62 Table 17: Correlations Between Acculturative Strategy Scores and Psychological Adjustment Scores 63 Table 18: Correlations Between Measures of Self-Concept Structure and Measures of Psychological Adjustment (Bicultural Sample Only) 65 Table L1: Correlations Between Acculturative Strategies, Mainstream Identification, and Heritage Identification 117 Table M1: Measures of Self-Concept Structure and Psychological Adjustment: Means and Standard Deviations for the Euro-Canadian and Indian Samples 119 List of Figures Figure 1: One-dimensional model of acculturation Figure 2: Two-dimensional model of acculturation 1 Introduction The study of the self has a long history in psychology. Only recently, however, have psychologists recognized the profound influence that culture has on the self. Over the last two decades, research has revealed marked variation in the self-concepts of people from different cultures (see Heine, 2001; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Marsella, DeVos, & Hsu, 1985; Neisser & Jopling, 1997; Shweder& Levine, 1984; Triandis, 1989; Williams, 1995). Presumably, this variation occurs because different cultures value different attributes and, thus, promote different ideas about what constitutes an "appropriate" or "acceptable" self (Oyserman & Markus, 1993). Bicultural people (e.g., immigrants, ethnic minorities) are exposed to two cultures—that of their ethnic group and that of the dominant society in which they live. Often, the attributes that are valued by these two cultures conflict, forcing bicultural people to reconcile competing views about who they should be (Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama, 1997). Research indicates that many bicultural people reconcile these views by incorporating the attributes of both cultures into their self-concepts (e.g., Oyserman, 1993; Rhee, Uleman, Lee, & Roman, 1995; Yamada & Singelis, 1999). Thus, their self-concepts contain seemingly contradictory attributes. Contemporary theory on the self defines the self-concept as a cognitive schema. This definition allows for a distinction to be drawn between the contents of the self-concept and the structure of the self-concept (Altrocchi, 1999). The contents of the self-concept refer to one's self-beliefs and self-evaluations—to how one answers the questions "Who am I?" and "How do I feel about myself?" The structure of the self-concept refers to how the contents of the self-concept are organized. The research reported here was designed to examine the self-concept structure and psychological adjustment of bicultural people. Researchers (e.g., Altrocchi, 1999; Campbell, Assanand, & Di Paula, 2000, 2003) have emphasized two broad features of self-concept structure—self-concept pluralism and self-concept unity. These features closely resemble and are largely derived from Zajonc's (1960) classic work on the structural characteristics of cognitive schemas. Below, I review Zajonc's work and describe the two features of self-concept structure. Then, I review research relating each feature to psychological adjustment and propose hypotheses regarding the self-concept structure and psychological adjustment of bicultural people. Subsequently, I describe five strategies that bicultural people may use to reconcile competing cultural expectations of the self and propose hypotheses regarding the impact of these strategies on their self-concept structure and psychological adjustment. Finally, I report the results of two studies that assessed the self-concept structure and psychological adjustment of one group of bicultural people—Indo-Canadians. Zajonc's (1960) Structural Characteristics of Cognitive Schemas Zajonc (1960) defined four structural characteristics of cognitive schemas— differentiation, complexity, organization, and unity. In order to measure these characteristics, Zajonc had participants read a letter written by one individual to another. Then, he asked participants to form an impression of the writer. The impressions that participants formed served as cognitive schemas for which Zajonc assessed the four structural characteristics that he had identified. 3 The first two structural characteristics—differentiation and complexity—reflect the degree of pluralism in a cognitive schema. Zajonc (1960) measured differentiation by having participants write on index cards the attributes that they believed the writer possessed; the number of attributes that participants generated constituted his measure of differentiation. He measured complexity by having participants sort the attributes that they had generated into like categories; the number of categories to which each attribute belonged, summed across attributes, constituted his measure of complexity. Research on the self has not employed a measure of structure comparable to Zajonc's measure of differentiation—probably because it is not feasible to generate an exhaustive list of attributes in a schema as rich as the self. However, research on the self has employed a measure of structure comparable to Zajonc's measure of complexity. Linville (1985, 1987) developed a measure of self-complexity that is described in detail below. This measure reflects the degree of pluralism in the structure of the self-concept by assessing the extent to which the contents of the self-concept are differentiated into multiple categories. The other structural characteristics that Zajonc (1960) identified—organization and unity—reflect the degree of unity in a cognitive schema. Zajonc measured these characteristics by asking participants to indicate, for each attribute, which other attributes would change if that attribute was changed, absent, or untrue of the writer. He measured organization by assessing the extent to which a single attribute determined the other attributes and, thus, dominated the whole. He measured unity by assessing the extent to which the attributes that participants generated were contingent upon one another. Researchers have paid relatively little attention to organization as a structural feature of the self-concept. Although unity in the 4 structure of the self-concept has been studied, a measure comparable to Zajonc's measure of unity has not been employed—probably because the richness of the self-schema would render such a measure unwieldy. Instead, researchers have developed measures of self-concept structure that are conceptually similar to Zajonc's measure of unity. For example, Donahue, Robins, Roberts, and John (1993) developed a measure of self-concept structure that they labeled "self-concept differentiation" (an inverse measure of self-concept unity). This measure, described in detail below, reflects the degree of unity in the structure of the self-concept by considering the extent to which the contents of the self-concept are correlated across different social roles. According to contemporary theory and research on the self-schema (Campbell et al., 2000, 2003; Sheldon & Emmons, 1995), the degree of pluralism and the degree of unity in the structure of the self-concept are unrelated to one another. Accordingly, an individual who is high in self-concept pluralism—that is, whose self-concept is differentiated into numerous categories—may be high or low in self-concept unity. High levels of pluralism coupled with high levels of unity indicate that the numerous categories that define the self-concept are highly correlated with one another; high levels of pluralism coupled with low levels of unity indicate that the numerous categories that define the self-concept are generally unrelated to one another. It is only when the self is viewed as an amorphous whole—that is, when there is no pluralism in the structure of the self-concept—that the levels of unity in the structure of the self-concept are, by necessity, high. 5 Self-Concept Pluralism, Psychological Adjustment, and Biculturalism To date, the most influential research on self-concept pluralism is Linville's (1985, 1987) research on self-complexity. Below, I describe self-complexity, review the findings of research relating self-complexity to psychological adjustment, and propose a hypothesis regarding the self-complexity of bicultural people. Self-Complexity and Psychological Adjustment Linville's (1985) model of self-complexity assumes that the self-concept is comprised of cognitive categories or "self-aspects." It defines self-complexity in terms of the number of self-aspects that are used to represent the self and the degree of redundancy among these self-aspects: a person who has many self-aspects that are nonredundant in terms of the features that describe them is viewed as high in self-complexity, whereas a person who has few self-aspects that are redundant in terms of the features that describe them is viewed as low in self-complexity. Linville's (1985, 1987) measure of self-complexity requires that participants sort traits listed on index cards into groups that describe "an aspect of yourself or your life." Participants can form as many groups as are meaningful to them, can place traits in more than one group, and do not have to use every trait. On the basis of each participant's sort, the statistic H (Attneave, 1959; Scott, Osgood, & Peterson, 1979) is computed. H represents the number of independent binary attributes or nonredundant dimensions underlying the sort and, thus, provides an index of the participant's self-complexity.1 6 Linville (1987) hypothesized that a high degree of self-complexity buffers against the harmful effects of stress by preventing negative events that occur in one self-aspect from "spilling over" and adversely affecting other self-aspects. Some researchers (e.g., Dixon & Baumeister, 1991; Linville, 1985, 1987; Niedenthal, Setterlund, & Wherry, 1992; Smith & Cohen, 1993) have found support for this stress-buffering hypothesis. For example, Linville (1987) found that people who were high in self-complexity were less likely than people who were low in self-complexity to experience depression and physical symptoms (e.g., stomach pains, headaches, nausea) following a stressful event. However, other researchers (e.g., Morgan & Janoff-Bulman, 1994; Woolfolk, Novalany, Gara, Allen, and Polino, 1995, Studies 5 and 6) have not found support for this stress-buffering hypothesis. For example, Morgan and Janoff-Bulman (1994) found that people who were high in self-complexity were as likely as people who were low in self-complexity to experience a host of psychological symptoms following a traumatic event. In contrast to the stress-buffering effects of self-complexity, a number of researchers have examined the direct relations (i.e., the zero-order correlations) between self-complexity and psychological adjustment. A few studies have produced positive (Campbell, Chew, and Scratchley, 1991) and negative (Woolfolk et al., 1995, Study 1) correlations between self-complexity and psychological well-being. However, the bulk of research (e.g., Campbell et al., 2000, 2003; Gramzow, Sedikides, Panter, & Insko, 2000; Linville, 1987; Smith & Cohen, 1993) has shown that self-complexity is not directly related to psychological adjustment. For example, across three studies, Campbell et al. (2003) found that self-complexity was unrelated 7 to self-esteem and neuroticism. Similarly, Linville (1987) found that self-complexity was unrelated to depression. Self-Complexity and Biculturalism According to Linville's (1985) theory of self-complexity, higher levels of self-complexity result from greater exposure to diverse roles and interpersonal situations. In her description of the theory, Linville stated that: Increased experience in varied roles, relationships, and situations leads to increased differentiation of self-aspects. With an increase in the range of experience relevant to the self... , one not only has the opportunity to ... differentiate more nonredundant self-aspects, but has a functional incentive for doing so. Increased differentiation may allow one ... to discriminate more efficiently among varied demands of roles and interpersonal situations, (p. 99) This aspect of Linville's (1985) theory is reminiscent of early theories of the self (e.g., Gergen, 1971; Goffman, 1959) that viewed self-concept pluralism as an adaptive response to the often conflicting demands of social life. These early theories maintained that individuals who had highly differentiated self-concepts possessed numerous specialized identities that enabled them to respond quickly and flexibly to the demands of different social roles. In contrast to "monocultural" people, bicultural people participate in two cultures—that of their ethnic group and that of the dominant society in which they live. As a result, bicultural people should experience more diverse roles and interpersonal situations than monocultural people. Following from Linville's (1985) theory, this 8 should result in higher levels of self-complexity among bicultural people than monocultural people. Hypothesis 1a. Bicultural people are higher in self-complexity than monocultural people. Moreover, because the attributes that are valued by the dominant culture often conflict with the attributes that are valued by the ethnic culture, it is reasonable to anticipate that bicultural people are more likely than monocultural people to develop "culture-specific" self-aspects—that is, self-aspects that compartmentalize or separate attributes that are valued by the dominant culture and attributes that are valued by the ethnic culture. Hypothesis 1b. The self-aspects of bicultural people are characterized by greater cultural compartmentalization than the self-aspects of monocultural people. Findings that support these two hypotheses would suggest that exposure to competing cultural expectations of the self leads bicultural people to differentiate their self-concepts into multiple, culture-specific self-aspects. Showers (1992, 1995; Showers, Abramson, & Hogan, 1998; Showers & Kling, 1996) has used the term "compartmentalization" to describe the degree to which people separate positive attributes (e.g., hard-working) and negative attributes (e.g., lazy) into separate self-aspect groups. In the present research, I use the term "cultural compartmentalization" to describe the degree to which people separate attributes that are valued by the dominant culture and attributes that are valued by the ethnic culture into separate self-aspect groups. Researchers often assume that compartmentalization is a measure of self-concept pluralism; however, it does not 9 tap, nor is it dependent upon, the number of distinct categories that people use in thinking about themselves. Rather, compartmentalization provides a description of these categories—not in terms of the specific content of the categories, but in terms of the distribution of specified attributes across the categories. Self-Concept Unity, Psychological Adjustment, and Biculturalism To date, several lines of research have measured self-concept unity. These include Donahue et al.'s (1993) research on self-concept differentiation, Campbell et al.'s (1996) research on self-concept clarity, and Higgins' (1987) research on self-discrepancies. Below, I describe self-concept differentiation, self-concept clarity, and self-discrepancies, and review the findings of research relating these constructs to psychological adjustment. Then, I propose hypotheses regarding the self-concept differentiation, self-concept clarity, self-discrepancies, and psychological adjustment of bicultural people. Self-Concept Differentiation and Psychological Adjustment Donahue et al. (1993) defined self-concept differentiation as the degree to which one sees oneself as having different personality characteristics in different social roles. They measured self-concept differentiation by asking participants to rate how descriptive 60 traits were of them in each of five different social roles (friend, romantic partner, son or daughter, student, and worker). A self-concept differentiation score was computed for each participant by correlating the 60 ratings for each possible pairing of the five roles, factor-analyzing the correlations, and subtracting the percent of variance accounted for by the first factor from 100%. The 10 resulting score represented the proportion of unshared variance among the roles and, thus, measured the extent to which participants saw themselves as having different traits across the roles. The term "self-concept differentiation," as it has been used by Donahue et al. (1993), is misleading because "differentiation" is often used as a synonym for pluralism. Donahue et al.'s measure does not assess the number of categories that people use in thinking about themselves and, thus, does not measure pluralism. Rather, it examines the correlations among five categories (i.e., social roles) that are selected by the researcher; the self-concept differentiation score that is produced measures the extent to which people see themselves as having different traits across these categories and, thus, provides an inverse measure of self-concept unity. In two studies, Donahue et al. (1993) examined the relation between self-concept differentiation and psychological adjustment. The first study assessed the relation among university undergraduates and used self-ratings on measures of adjustment. The second study assessed the relation among middle-aged women and used observers' ratings on measures of adjustment. The results of both studies indicated that self-concept differentiation was associated with poorer psychological adjustment. Specifically, Donahue et al. found that self-concept differentiation was positively correlated with depression, anxiety, and neuroticism, and negatively correlated with self-esteem. Similar findings have been produced by other researchers in subsequent studies (e.g., Campbell et al., 2000, 2003; Diehl, Hastings, & Stanton, 2001; Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, & llardi, 1997). 11 Self-Concept Clarity and Psychological Adjustment Campbell et al. (1996) defined self-concept clarity as the extent to which the contents of the self-concept are internally consistent, temporally stable, and clearly and confidently defined. Campbell (1990) measured self-concept clarity using a number of unobtrusive measure (e.g., reaction times, the internal consistency and temporal stability of participants' self-descriptions). Campbell et al. (1996), however, subsequently developed a 12-item self-report measure of self-concept clarity that converged well with the unobtrusive measures used by Campbell (1990). The items that comprise the scale assess the coherence of self-beliefs and, thus, the degree of unity in the structure of the self-concept. Campbell et al. (1996) examined the relations between the self-report measure of self-concept clarity and five measures of adjustment—self-esteem, neuroticism, negative affectivity, anxiety, and depression. The results of their studies indicated that self-concept clarity was associated with greater psychological adjustment. Specifically, they found that self-concept clarity was positively correlated with self-esteem and negatively correlated with neuroticism, negative affectivity, anxiety, and depression. These findings have been replicated in several subsequent studies (e.g., Campbell et al., 2000, 2003; Kernis, Paradise, Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000; Smith, Wethington, & Zhan, 1996). Self-Discrepancies and Psychological Adjustment Higgins' (1987) self-discrepancy theory focuses on the discrepancies that people experience between their self-beliefs. Researchers (e.g., Alexander & Higgins, 1993; Campbell et al., 2000, 2003; Gonnerman, Parker, Lavine, & Huff, 12 2000; Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986; Strauman & Higgins, 1987; Strauman, Lemieux, & Coe, 1993) have assessed the discrepancies that people experience between who they believe they actually are and: (a) who they ideally want to be, (b) who they believe they ought to be, (c) who their significant others believe they actually are, (d) who their significant others ideally want them to be, and (e) who their significant others believe they ought to be. Higgins' measure of self-discrepancies is the Selves Questionnaire (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985; Strauman & Higgins, 1987). Participants generate lists of attributes to describe who they believe they actually are, ideally want to be, and believe they ought to be, as well as lists of attributes to describe who their significant others (i.e., their mother, father, and closest friend) believe they actually are, ideally want them to be, and believe they ought to be. For given pairs of lists, self-discrepancy scores are computed by comparing the attributes across the lists and subtracting the number of attributes that "match" (i.e., that are synonymous) from the number of attributes that "mismatch" (i.e., that are antonymous). Although self-discrepancy scores are derived from the lists of attributes that participants generate, they are based on the number of attributes that are synonymous and antonymous. This number is independent of the specific attributes that are generated; thus, it measures the structure of the self-concept rather than the contents of the self-concept. Higher scores reflect larger self-discrepancies and, thus, lower levels of self-concept unity. In several studies, Higgins has found that specific types of self-discrepancies are associated with specific types of emotional distress (see Higgins, 1987, 1989). For example, he has found that discrepancies between people's beliefs about who 13 they actually are and who they ideally want to be (i.e., "actual-ideal" self-discrepancies) are associated with dejection-related emotions (e.g., disappointment), whereas discrepancies between people's beliefs about who they actually are and who they believe they ought to be (i.e., "actual-ought" self-discrepancies) are associated with agitation-related emotions (e.g., guilt). Although other researchers (e.g., Gramzow et al., 2000; Szymanski & Cash, 1995; Tangney, Niedenthal, Covert, & Barlow, 1998) have not found support for the hypothesis that specific types of self-discrepancies are associated with specific types of emotional distress, they have found that self-discrepancies are generally associated with poorer psychological adjustment. Campbell et al. (2000, 2003) measured the discrepancies that people experience between who they believe they actually are and who their significant others believe they actually are (i.e., "actual-actual" self-discrepancies) and found that this type of self-discrepancy was also associated with poorer psychological adjustment. Self-Concept Differentiation, Self-Concept Clarity, Self-Discrepancies, and Biculturalism The present research tested three hypotheses related to the self-concept unity of bicultural people. Hypothesis 2a. Bicultural people are higher in self-concept differentiation than monocultural people. Hypothesis 2b. Bicultural people are lower in self-concept clarity than monocultural people. 14 Hypothesis 2c. Bicultural people experience greater actual-actual self-discrepancies than monocultural people. The first hypothesis—that bicultural people are higher in self-concept differentiation than monocultural people—assumes that bicultural people respond to more varied demands across social roles than monocultural people. As a result, the role-specific self-conceptions of bicultural people should be less consistent than the role-specific self-conceptions of monocultural people. The second hypothesis—that bicultural people are lower in self-concept clarity than monocultural people—assumes that bicultural people incorporate more contradictory attributes into their self-concepts than monocultural people. As a result, the self-beliefs of bicultural people should be less internally consistent, less temporally stable, and, perhaps, less clearly and confidently defined than the self-beliefs of monocultural people. The third hypothesis—that bicultural people experience greater actual-actual self-discrepancies than monocultural people—assumes that bicultural people respond to more varied demands across interactions with significant others than monocultural people. As a result, the discrepancies that bicultural people experience between who they believe they actually are and who their significant others believe they actually are should be greater than the discrepancies that monocultural people experience. Findings that support these three hypotheses would suggest that exposure to competing cultural expectations of the self leads bicultural people to develop self-beliefs that can not readily be unified or integrated with one another. 15 Psychological Adjustment and Biculturalism Donahue et al.'s (1993) research on self-concept differentiation, Campbell et al.'s (1996) research on self-concept clarity, and Higgins' (1987) research on self-discrepancies indicate that self-concept unity and psychological adjustment are positively correlated with one another. Accordingly, if bicultural people are lower in self-concept unity than monocultural people, as Hypotheses 2a - 2c suggest, they should be lower in psychological adjustment than monocultural people. Hypothesis 3a. Bicultural people are lower in psychological adjustment than monocultural people. Other researchers (e.g., Falcon & Tucker, 2000; Roberts, 1980; Ying, 1988) have compared the psychological adjustment of monocultural and bicultural people. In general, their findings have been consistent with Hypothesis 3a—that is, they have found that bicultural people are lower in psychological adjustment than monocultural people. Researchers have attributed the lower levels of psychological adjustment found among bicultural people to a number of factors, including discrimination, marginalization, and, in the case of immigrants, transition difficulties (e.g., Casado & Leung, 2001; Fernando, 1993; Liebkind & Jasinskaja, 2000; Williams & Berry, 1991). Hypotheses 2a - 2c suggest that the lower levels of psychological adjustment found among bicultural people may be attributed to another factor—lower levels of self-concept unity. Hypothesis 3b. Self-concept unity mediates the relationship between cultural exposure (i.e., monoculturalism versus biculturalism) and psychological adjustment. 16 The research reported here examined the role that self-concept structure plays in mediating the relationship between cultural exposure and psychological well-being. Strategies that Bicultural People May Use to Reconcile Competing Cultural Expectations of the Self Research suggests that there are several strategies that bicultural people may use to reconcile competing cultural expectations of the self. Below, I describe these strategies and consider how they may affect the self-concept structure and psychological adjustment of bicultural people. Research on Acculturation Acculturation refers to the process by which bicultural people reconcile the norms and values of the dominant culture and the norms and values of their ethnic culture (Coleman, Casali, & Wampold, 2001; Rhee et al., 1995; Rogler, Cortes, & Malgady, 1991; Wolfe, Yang, Wong, & Atkinson, 2001). Two distinct models of acculturation have been proposed by researchers—the one-dimensional model and the two-dimensional model. The one-dimensional model (e.g., Cuellar, Harris, & Jasso, 1980; Ghuman, 1998; Montgomery, 1992; Suinn, Rickard-Figueroa, Lew, & Vigil, 1987), also referred to as the "mutual exclusion" model (Rogler et al., 1991), assumes that the degree to which bicultural people adopt the norms and values of the dominant culture is inversely related to the degree to which they retain the norms and values of their ethnic culture. Accordingly, it uses one dimension to describe acculturation—see Figure 1. This dimension defines two extreme acculturative strategies—assimilation and separation. Assimilation describes the acculturative 17 strategy used by those who the adopt the norms and values of the dominant culture but reject the norms and values of their ethnic culture. Separation describes the acculturative strategy used by those who retain the norms and values of their ethnic culture but reject the norms and values of the dominant culture. Adopt norms Retain norms and values of and values of dominant culture ethnic culture ASSIMILATION 4 • SEPARATION Reject norms Reject norms and values of and values of ethnic culture dominant culture Figure 1. One-dimensional model of acculturation. In contrast to the one-dimensional model, the two-dimensional model (e.g., Berry, 1993, 1997; Hutnik, 1986; Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000; Sayegh & Lasry, 1993; Stephenson, 2000; Torres, 1999; Ward, 1999) assumes that the degree to which bicultural people adopt the norms and values of the dominant culture is not related to the degree to which they retain the norms and values of their ethnic culture. Accordingly, it uses two dimensions to describe acculturation—see Figure 2. These two dimensions define four acculturative strategies—assimilation, separation, integration, and marginalization. Integration describes the acculturative strategy used by those who adopt the norms and values of the dominant culture and retain the norms and values of their ethnic culture. Marginalization describes the acculturative strategy used by those who reject the norms and values of both the 18 dominant culture and their ethnic culture. To date, the most influential two-dimensional model is Berry's (1980, 1993, 1997) model of acculturation. It uses questions to describe the two dimensions: "Is it of value to maintain cultural identity and characteristics?" and "Is it of value to maintain relationships with the larger society?" (Berry, 1997). Related models describe the dimensions as "heritage culture identification" and "mainstream culture identification" (Ryder et al., 2000), and "ethnic society immersion" and "dominant society immersion" (Stephenson, 2000). 19 Adopt norms and values of dominant culture INTEGRATION Retain norms and values of -4-ethnic culture SEPARATION ASSIMILATION Reject norms -> and values of ethnic culture MARGINALIZATION Reject norms and values of dominant culture Figure 2. Two-dimensional model of acculturation. 20 A number of studies (e.g., Der-Karabetian, 1980; Hutnik, 1986; Ryder etal., 2000; Ting-Toomey, 1980) have compared the one-dimensional model and the two-dimensional model. These studies have consistently shown that acculturation is better represented by the two-dimensional model than the one-dimensional model. Nevertheless, work by some researchers (Birman, 1992; Coleman, 1995; LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993) suggests that even the two-dimensional model is flawed. Specifically, this work suggests that the two-dimensional model fails to distinguish between two modes of integration that bicultural people may use— alternation and fusion. Alternation describes the acculturative strategy used by those who adhere to the norms and values of the dominant culture when they are in the dominant environment, but adhere to the norms and values of their ethnic culture when they are in their ethnic environment. Fusion describes the acculturative strategy used by those who consistently adhere to a combination or blend of the norms and values of the dominant culture and the norms and values of their ethnic culture. Preliminary research (see Phinney & Devich-Navarro, 1997) supports the distinction between alternation and fusion, suggesting that there are five acculturative strategies that bicultural people may use—assimilation, separation, alternation, fusion, and marginalization. In the sections that follow, I present hypotheses related to the first four acculturative strategies—assimilation, separation, alternation, and fusion. Hypotheses related to the latter acculturative strategy— marginalization—were not generated because of the difficulty associated with predicting the norms and values adopted by those who use this strategy. 21 Self-Complexity and Acculturative Strategies As was noted in a previous section, Linville's (1985) theory of self-complexity maintains that higher levels of self-complexity result from greater exposure to diverse roles and interpersonal situations. Presumably, because alternators and fusors adhere to the norms and values of both the dominant culture and their ethnic culture, they are more likely than assimilators and separators to participate in both cultures. As a result, alternators and fusors should experience more diverse roles and interpersonal situations than assimilators and separators. Following from Linville's (1985) theory, this should result in higher levels of self-complexity among alternators and fusors than assimilators and separators. Hypothesis 4a. Alternators and fusors are higher in self-complexity than assimilators and separators. In contrast to fusors, however, alternators adhere to different norms and values in different cultural contexts—when they are in the dominant environment they adhere to the norms and values of the dominant culture, and when they are in their ethnic environment they adhere to the norms and values of their ethnic culture. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that alternators are more likely than fusors, as well as assimilators and separators, to develop culture-specific self-aspects—that is, self-aspects that compartmentalize or separate attributes that are valued by the dominant culture and attributes that are valued by the ethnic culture. Hypothesis 4b. The self-aspects of alternators are characterized by greater cultural compartmentalization than the self-aspects of assimilators, separators, and fusors. 22 Findings that support these two hypotheses would suggest that alternation and fusion are more likely than assimilation and separation to lead bicultural people to differentiate their self-concepts into multiple self-aspects, and that alternation is more likely than assimilation, separation, and fusion to lead bicultural people to differentiate their self-concepts into culture-specific self-aspects. Self-Concept Differentiation, Self-Concept Clarity, Self-Discrepancies, and Acculturative Strategies In contrast to assimilators, separators, and fusors, alternators adhere to different norms and values in different cultural contexts. As a result: (a) the role-specific self-conceptions of alternators should be less consistent than the role-specific self-conceptions of assimilators, separators, and fusors; (b) the self-beliefs of alternators should be less internally consistent, less temporally stable, and, perhaps, less clearly and confidently defined than the self-beliefs of assimilators, separators, and fusors; and (c) the discrepancies that alternators experience between who they believe they actually are and who their significant others believe they actually are should be greater than the discrepancies that assimilators, separators, and fusors experience. Accordingly, when compared to assimilators, separators, and fusors, alternators should: (a) be higher in self-concept differentiation, (b) be lower in self-concept clarity, and (c) experience greater actual-actual self-discrepancies. Hypothesis 5a. Alternators are higher in self-concept differentiation than assimilators, separators, and fusors. 23 Hypothesis 5b. Alternators are lower in self-concept clarity than assimilators, separators, and fusors. Hypothesis 5c. Alternators experience greater actual-actual self-discrepancies than assimilators, separators, and fusors. Findings that support these three hypotheses would suggest that alternation is more likely than assimilation, separation, and fusion to lead bicultural people to develop self-beliefs that can not readily be unified or integrated with one another. Psychological Adjustment and Acculturative Strategies As was previously noted, Donahue et al.'s (1993) research on self-concept differentiation, Campbell et al.'s (1996) research on self-concept clarity, and Higgins' (1987) research on self-discrepancies indicate that self-concept unity and psychological adjustment are positively correlated with one another. Accordingly, if alternators are lower in self-concept unity than assimilators, separators, and fusors, as Hypotheses 5a - 5c suggest, they should be lower in psychological adjustment than assimilators, separators, and fusors. Hypothesis 6a. Alternators are lower in psychological adjustment than assimilators, separators, and fusors. In considering who is higher in psychological adjustment—assimilators, separators, or fusors—it is instructive to refer to early theories of integrative complexity (e.g., Schroeder, Driver, & Streufert, 1967). These theories suggest that: (a) in thinking about any stimulus, different aspects of the stimulus must be differentiated before they can be integrated into a unified whole, (b) higher levels of differentiation coupled with higher levels of integration result in higher levels of 24 integrative complexity, and (c) higher levels of integrative complexity are associated with higher levels of psychological adjustment. Hypothesis 4a and Hypotheses 5a -5c suggest that fusors are more likely than assimilators, separators, and alternators to differentiate their self-concepts into multiple self-aspects and then integrate these differentiated self-aspects into a unified whole. Accordingly, fusors should have higher levels of integrative complexity and higher levels of psychological adjustment than assimilators, separators, and alternators. Hypothesis 6b. Fusors are higher in psychological adjustment than assimilators, separators, and alternators. Other researchers (e.g., Berry, Kim, Minde, & Mok, 1987; Eyou, Adair, & Dixon, 2000; Farver, Bhadha, & Narang, 2002; Sam & Berry, 1995; Ward & Rana-Deuba, 1999) have compared the psychological adjustment of assimilators, separators, integrators, and marginalized individuals. In general, their findings have shown that integration is associated with higher levels of psychological adjustment than assimilation, separation, and marginalization. In contrast, the present research suggests that only one mode of integration—fusion—is highly adaptive. The second mode of integration—alternation—is hypothesized to result in lower levels of psychological adjustment than assimilation, separation, and fusion. Researchers have attributed the higher levels of psychological adjustment found among integrators to a number of factors, including increased social support and reduced intrapsychic conflict (e.g., Berry, 1997; Sam, 1994; Ward & Kennedy, 1994). Hypothesis 4a and Hypotheses 5a - 5c suggest that differences in the psychological adjustment of assimilators, separators, fusors, and alternators may be attributed to another factor—differences in their self-concept structure. Higher levels of self-25 concept pluralism coupled with higher levels of self-concept unity are hypothesized to result in higher levels of psychological adjustment among fusors, and higher levels of self-concept pluralism coupled with lower levels of self-concept unity are hypothesized to result in lower levels of psychological adjustment among alternators. Hypothesis 6c. Self-concept pluralism and self-concept unity mediate the relationship between acculturative strategies and psychological adjustment. The research reported here examined the role that self-concept structure plays in mediating the relationship between acculturative strategies and psychological well-being. The Present Research Below, I report the results of two studies. The studies were designed to assess the self-concept structure and psychological adjustment of Indo-Canadians, Euro-Canadians, and Indians. Research (see Bond, 1988; Schwartz, 1992, 1994) suggests that Canadian values and Indian values often conflict, making Indo-Canadians an ideal sample to use in assessing the impact of competing cultural expectations of the self on self-concept structure and psychological adjustment. Study 1 The purpose of Study 1 was to identify traits that are highly valued in Canadian culture and traits that are highly valued in Indian culture. The traits that were selected were used to construct the self-concept structure measures that were administered to participants in Study 2. 26 Method Participants The sample was comprised of 44 undergraduate, Indo-Canadian participants who were recruited from the University of British Columbia. Of the 44 participants, 33 were female. All of the participants identified their predominant ethnic background as South Asian. The average age of the participants was 19.93 years (SD = 3.09). In order to ensure that the participants were familiar with both Canadian culture and Indian culture, only first and second generation Indo-Canadians who had resided in Canada for at least 5 years were recruited. Participants were classified as first-generation Indo-Canadians if they were born in India, and as second-generation Indo-Canadians if they were born in Canada and their parents were born in India. There were 4 first-generation participants and 40 second-generation participants in the sample. Among the first-generation participants, the minimum length of residence in Canada was 6 years, and the average length of residence in Canada was 14.75 years (SD = 5.85). The participants were given course credit or $10 in exchange for their participation. Materials and Procedure The measure that participants completed is provided in Appendix A. Using a 9-point scale (1 = not at all valued, 9 = highly valued), participants rated each of 65 traits for the degree to which they believed the trait was valued in Canadian culture and Indian culture. Research suggests that Canadian culture is "contractual" (e.g., Feather, 1998; Heine & Lehman, 1995), whereas Indian culture is "communal" (e.g., Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Radhakrishnan & Chan, 1997; Verma & Triandis, 1999). In contractual cultures, the individual is viewed as an independent, self-contained entity who has rights and freedoms and who relates to others in terms of self-interest and negotiated agreements. In contrast, in communal cultures, the individual is viewed as an interdependent, relational entity who has diffuse interpersonal obligations and who derives significance from participating in social relationships and larger collectives (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). Using data collected across 20 countries, Schwartz (1992) identified 56 values that are promoted in contractual cultures, communal cultures, or both. The 65 traits that were included in the measure administered to participants in this study were drawn from published lists of trait adjectives (e.g., Goldberg, 1990) and were selected to reflect the values that Schwartz (1992) identified. Twenty-six of the traits that were included in the measure reflect values that are promoted in contractual cultures—for example, assertive, competitive, daring, demonstrative, independent, original, and uninhibited. Twenty-six of the traits that were included in the measure reflect values that are promoted in communal cultures—for example, conventional, loyal, modest, obedient, reserved, self-disciplined, and traditional. Thirteen of the traits that were included in the measure reflect values that are promoted in both contractual cultures and communal cultures—for example, ambitious, capable, diligent, enthusiastic, intelligent, persevering, and resourceful. Dictionary definitions were provided for each of the 65 traits that were included in the measure. Participants completed the measure in groups of up to five individuals. The order in which participants rated the traits was counterbalanced. Participants were given 30 minutes to complete the measure. Results For each trait, comparisons were made between the ratings that participants provided for the degree to which they believed the trait was valued in Canadian culture and the degree to which they believed the trait was valued in Indian culture. From those traits for which significant differences were found, 24 traits were selected—12 traits that participants believed were highly valued in Canadian culture, and 12 traits that participants believed were highly valued in Indian culture. From those traits for which significant differences were not found, 6 traits were selected that participants believed were highly valued in both Canadian culture and Indian culture. The traits were selected to reflect as many of the values that Schwartz (1992) identified as possible. Table 1 lists the traits that were selected, together with the means and standard deviations that were obtained for the traits.2,3 These traits were used to construct the self-concept structure measures that were administered to participants in Study 2. 29 Table 1 Means and Standard Deviations for Selected Traits Value of Trait in Value of Trait in Canadian Culture Indian Culture Trait M SD M SD t(43) d Traits Highly Valued in Canadian Culture Adventurous 7.61 .92 3.73 1.59 14.37** 2.17 Broad-minded 7.77 .99 4.73 2.10 7.55** 1.14 Daring 7.09 1.22 3.84 1.88 11.46** 1.73 Demonstrative 7.41 1.23 3.66 1.96 11.25** 1.70 Extroverted 7.89 1.22 4.93 1.81 9.80** 1.48 Frank 7.66 1.26 4.36 1.81 10.48** 1.58 Independent 8.09 .77 4.07 1.89 14.06** 2.12 Original 7.86 1.07 4.52 1.64 11.22** 1.69 Pleasure-seeking 8.11 .87 4.66 1.74 13.45** 2.03 Romantic 8.11 .97 3.64 2.28 12.93** 1.95 Spontaneous 6.86 1.07 3.39 1.70 11.24** 1.69 Uninhibited 6.41 1.47 3.41 1.73 9.84** 1.48 30 Table 1, continued Means and Standard Deviations for Selected Traits Value of Trait in Value of Trait in Canadian Culture Indian Culture Trait M SD M SD 1(43) Collectivistic Conservative Conventional Deferential Devout Dutiful Ingratiating Loyal Reserved Self-controlled Self-disciplined Virtuous Traits Highly Valued in Indian Culture 4.25 1.86 7.86 1.30 3.93 1.77 4.88 4.83 4.36 4.75 4.84 4.77 3.66 4.68 4.97 5.11 1.81 1.82 1.84 1.62 1.71 1.80 1.57 1.79 1.42 1.59 8.41 8.05 8.73 8.16 8.32 7.95 8.45 6.89 7.57 8.02 8.55 .79 .83 .54 1.06 .77 .91 .73 1.60 1.48 1.00 .73 -9.16** -15.64** -10.13** -13.43** -12.85** -13.27** -9.47** -11.76** -8.92** -8.91** -14.64** -13.36** -1.38 -2.36 -1.53 -2.02 -1.94 -2.00 -1.43 -1.77 -1.34 -1.34 -2.21 -2.01 31 Table 1, continued Means and Standard Deviations for Selected Traits Value of Trait in Value of Trait in Canadian Culture Indian Culture Trait M SD M SD t(43) d Traits Highly Valued in Canadian Culture and Indian Culture Agreeable 6.73 1.63 7.09 1.72 -1.27 -.19 Ambitious 7.30 1.32 7.25 1.89 .12 .02 Capable 7.64 1.40 7.84 .94 -1.18 -.18 Courageous 7.45 1.04 7.30 1.53 .64 .10 Intelligent 7.93 .95 8.20 .85 -1.63 -.25 Persevering 7.75 .94 7.43 1.48 1.20 .18 **p_< .001. 32 Study 2 The purpose of Study 2 was to compare the self-concept structure and psychological adjustment of (a) Indo-Canadians, Euro-Canadians, and Indians, and (b) Indo-Canadians who use different acculturative strategies. Method Participants The Indo-Canadian and Euro-Canadian participants were recruited from the University of British Columbia. The Indian participants were recruited from the University of Delhi in New Delhi, India. The participants in the Indo-Canadian and Euro-Canadian samples were given course credit or $10 in exchange for their participation. The participants in the Indian sample were given 100 rupees in exchange for their participation. The Indo-Canadian sample was comprised of 82 undergraduate participants who identified their predominant ethnic background as South Asian. Of the 82 participants, 62 were female. The average age of the participants was 19.48 years (SD = 1.42). In order to ensure that the participants were bicultural, only first- and second-generation Indo-Canadians were recruited. Participants were classified as first-generation Indo-Canadians if they were born in India, and as second-generation Indo-Canadians if they were born in Canada and their parents were born in India. There were 8 first-generation participants and 74 second-generation participants in the sample. Among the first-generation participants, the minimum length of 33 residence in Canada was 4 years, and the average length of residence in Canada was 8.63 years (SD = 5.32). The Euro-Canadian sample was comprised of 81 undergraduate participants who identified their predominant ethnic background as European. Of the 81 participants, 59 were female. The average age of the participants was 19.35 years (SD = 2.25). In order to ensure that the participants were monocultural, only third- or higher-generation Euro-Canadians were recruited. Participants were classified as third-generation Euro-Canadians if they and their parents were born in Canada, and as fourth- or higher-generation Euro-Canadians if they, their parents, and at least three of their grandparents were born in Canada. There were 45 third-generation participants and 36 fourth- or higher-generation participants in the sample. The Indian sample was comprised of 80 undergraduate participants who identified their predominant ethnic background as South Asian. Of the 80 participants, 55 were female. The average age of the participants was 18.59 years (SD = 1.43). Once again, in order to ensure that the participants were monocultural, only third- or higher-generation Indians were recruited. Participants were classified as third-generation Indians if they and their parents were born in India, and as fourth-or higher-generation Indians if they, their parents, and at least three of their grandparents were born in India. There were 2 third-generation participants and 78 fourth- or higher-generation participants in the sample. 34 Materials and Procedure Participants attended two 1-hour sessions, scheduled no more than 1 week apart. During the sessions, participants were tested in groups of up to five individuals. In one session, participants completed measures of self-complexity, cultural compartmentalization, and role integration (an inverse measure of self-concept differentiation). In the other session, participants completed measures of self-concept clarity, self-discrepancies, and psychological adjustment. The order in which participants completed the sessions was counterbalanced. The measures were administered to all participants in English; translation was not required for the Indian students because the University of Delhi provides instruction in English. At the start of the first session, all of the participants provided demographic information. At the end of the second session, the Indo-Canadian participants completed a measure designed to identify the acculturative strategies that they used. The measures that participants completed are described below. Self-complexity. Self-complexity was measured using Linville's (1985, 1987) trait-sorting task. Participants were given 30 index cards, each of which contained 1 of the 30 traits selected in Study 1. Participants were told "Your task is to think about who you are at this point in your life, and then to sort the cards into groups where each group describes an aspect of yourself or your life." Moreover, participants were told that they could form as many groups as were meaningful to them, could place traits in more than one group, and did not have to use every trait. The instructions were similar to those published by Linville (1987) and are provided, in their entirety, in Appendix B. Consistent with the procedure that Linville (1987) used, after 25 35 minutes, participants who had not finished the task were asked to complete the task within 5 minutes. On the basis of each participant's sort, the statistic H (Attneave, 1959; Scott et al., 1979) was computed. As was noted earlier, H represents the number of independent binary attributes or nonredundant dimensions underlying a sort and, thus, provides an index of self-complexity. H is computed as follows: H = log2n - (Z Qi \og2mVD.< where n is the number of traits provided to the participant (in this case 30), and Hi is the number of traits that the participant includes in each of his or her group combinations. Group combinations are defined by the number of self-aspect groups that the participant generates. For example, a participant who generates two self-aspect groups has four group combinations: 1,2,1 and 2, and no group. For this participant, ni takes four forms: ni = number of traits sorted into self-aspect group 1; n2 = number of traits sorted into self-aspect group 2; n3 = number of traits sorted into self-aspect group 1 and self-aspect group 2; and n4 = number of traits not sorted into either self-aspect group 1 or self-aspect group 2 (see Linville, 1987). Higher scores reflect greater self-complexity and, thus, greater self-concept pluralism. Cultural compartmentalization. In addition to H, the statistic p_hi (or Cramer's V; Cramer, 1974) was computed for each participant's sort. Phi is based on a chi-square statistic. It provides an index of the extent to which the distribution of "Canadian traits" and "Indian traits" across self-aspect groups deviates from what would be expected on the basis of chance (cf. Showers, 1992). Phi is computed as follows: where N is the number of traits provided to the participant. In this case, the 6 traits that were valued in both Canadian culture and Indian culture were not included in the computation of rjhi; thus, the value of N was 24. Phi can range in value from 0 to 1; a value of 0 denotes a sort in which the participant distributed the traits randomly across self-aspect groups, and a value of 1 denotes a sort in which the participant distributed the traits into distinct, culture-specific self-aspect groups. Role integration. Role integration was assessed using the measure provided in Appendix C. This measure was patterned after Donahue et al.'s (1993) measure of self-concept differentiation. Similar to Donahue et al.'s measure, participants were asked to use a 5-point scale (1 = not at all descriptive, 5 = highly descriptive) to indicate how descriptive each of the 30 traits selected in Study 1 was of them in each of five different social roles. However, in contrast to Donahue et al.'s measure, participants were not provided with experimenter-selected social roles; rather, they selected their own social roles. This ensured that personally-relevant social roles were used by all participants (see Campbell et al., 2000). For each participant, a role integration score was computed by (a) correlating the 30 ratings for each possible pairing of the five social roles and (b) taking the average of the resulting correlations. Role integration is an inverse measure of self-concept differentiation. Whereas self-concept differentiation reflects the proportion of unshared variance among a participant's social roles, role integration reflects the 37 extent to which a participant's social roles are intercorrelated.4 Higher scores reflect greater integration among the roles and, thus, greater self-concept unity. Self-concept clarity. Self-concept clarity was assessed using Campbell et al.'s (1996) Self-Concept Clarity Scale. The scale is presented in Appendix D. Using a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), participants indicated how much they disagreed or agreed with 12 statements that assessed their self-concept clarity. In each of the samples that was tested, the scale provided a reliable measure of self-concept clarity; alpha reliability coefficients are given in Table 2. The items that comprise the scale were averaged, after appropriate reversals, to provide a self-concept clarity index. Higher scores reflect greater self-concept clarity and, thus, greater self-concept unity. Self-discrepancies. Self-discrepancies were assessed using the measure provided in Appendix E. Using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all. 7 = extremely), participants rated each of the 30 traits selected in Study 1 for (a) the extent to which they believed that they possessed the trait and (b) the extent to which each of five significant others believed that they possessed the trait. This self-discrepancy measure differs from Higgins' Selves Questionnaire (Higgins et al., 1985) in two ways. First, it relies on experimenter-select attributes rather than participant-generated attributes. Although Higgins (1987) has argued that self-discrepancies are best assessed by measures that use participant-generated attributes, Tangney et al. (1998) have found that similar results are obtained with measures that use experimenter-selected attributes. Second, the measure only assesses discrepancies between different actual selves rather than discrepancies between actual, ideal, and ought selves. 38 Using this measure, five self-discrepancy scores were computed for each participant. Each score reflects a discrepancy between who the participant believed he or she actually was and who one significant other believed he or she actually was. Each score was computed by (a) taking the absolute difference between the ratings provided for each of the traits and (b) summing the absolute differences across the 30 traits. In each of the samples that was tested, the five scores provided a reliable measure of the discrepancies that participants experienced; alpha reliability coefficients are given in Table 2. The five scores were averaged to provide a self-discrepancy index. Higher scores reflect greater self-discrepancies arid, thus, lower self-concept unity. Table 2 Alpha Reliability Coefficients for Measures of Self-Concept Structure Self-Concept Structure Measure Sample SCC SDS Indo-Canadian .89 .86 Euro-Canadian .88 .89 Indian .81 .90 Note. SCC = self-concept clarity; SDS = self-discrepancies. 39 Psychological adjustment. Psychological adjustment was assessed using five measures. The first measure was Rosenberg's (1965) Self-Esteem Scale. It is presented in Appendix F. Using a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), participants indicated how much they disagreed or agreed with 10 statements that assessed their global feelings of self-worth. In each of the samples that was tested, the scale provided a reliable measure of self-esteem; alpha reliability coefficients are given in Table 3. The items that comprise the scale were averaged, after appropriate reversals, to provide a self-esteem index. Higher scores reflect greater self-esteem and, thus, greater psychological adjustment. The second measure was the Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). It is presented in Appendix G. Using a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), participants indicated how much they disagreed or agreed with five statements that assessed their satisfaction with life. In each of the samples that was tested, the scale provided a reliable measure of life satisfaction; alpha reliability coefficients are given in Table 3. The items that comprise the scale were averaged to provide a life-satisfaction index. Higher scores reflect greater life satisfaction and, thus, greater psychological adjustment. The third, fourth, and fifth measures were the anxiety, depression, and somatization subscales from the Symptom Checklist 90 (Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973). These measures are presented in Appendices H, I, and J, respectively. For each subscale, participants used a 5-point scale (0 = not at all, 4 = extremely) to indicate how much they had been distressed by a series of symptoms during the past week. In each of the samples that was tested, the subscales provided reliable measures of anxiety, depression, and somatization; alpha reliability coefficients are 40 given in Table 3. The items that comprise each subscale were averaged to provide indices of anxiety, depression, and somatization, respectively. Higher scores reflect greater anxiety, depression, and somatization and, thus, lower psychological adjustment. Table 3 Alpha Reliability Coefficients for Measures of Psychological Adjustment Adjustment Measure Sample SE LSat Anx Dep Som Indo-Canadian .87 .81 .86 .91 .78 Euro-Canadian .89 .78 .80 .88 .76 Indian .79 .82 .89 .89 .79 Note. SE = self-esteem; LSat = life-satisfaction; Anx = anxiety; Dep = depression; Som = somatization. The correlations among the measures of psychological adjustment were assessed for the Indo-Canadian, Euro-Canadian, and Indian samples. The patterns of correlations that emerged across the samples were similar. The correlations for the aggregate sample are given in Table 4. Noting that anxiety, depression, and somatization are inverse measures of psychological adjustment, it is apparent from Table 4 that the correlations among the five measures of psychological adjustment 41 were consistently positive and ranged from moderate to high in magnitude. These findings suggest that there is some conceptual overlap in the constructs that these measures tap. Shared method variance (e.g., identical instructions and rating scales) may account for the greater magnitude of the correlations among the measures of anxiety, depression, and somatization. Table 4 Correlations Among Measures of Psychological Adjustment (Aggregate Sample) Adjustment Measure 1 2 3 4 5 1. SE -- .49* -.47* -.56* -.43* 2. LSat -- -.30* -.45* -.37* 3. Anx -- .72* .61* 4. Dep -- .61* 5. Som Note. SE = self-esteem; LSat = life-satisfaction; Anx = anxiety; Dep = depression; Som = somatization. *p_< .001. Acculturative Strategies. Acculturative strategies were assessed using the questionnaire provided in Appendix K. The questionnaire consists of five paragraphs that describe each of the acculturative strategies that bicultural people may use— 42 assimilation, separation, alternation, fusion, and marginalization. The questionnaire asks participants to use a 7-point scale (1 = not at all descriptive, 7 = highly descriptive) to rate how descriptive each strategy is of how they acculturate. The ratings that participants provide are used to assign participants a score on each acculturative strategy. In addition, the questionnaire asks participants to use a check mark to identify which strategy is most descriptive of how they acculturate. The strategy that participants identify is used to classify participants into groups that use different acculturative strategies. Support for the validity of the Acculturation Questionnaire was obtained in an independent study, the results of which are summarized in Appendix L. Results The results of Study 2 are presented in four sections. In the first section, the relations among the measures of self-concept structure are examined. In the second section, the relations between the measures of self-concept structure and the measures of psychological adjustment are examined. In the third section, the self-concept structure and psychological adjustment of the monocultural and bicultural samples are assessed. In the fourth section, the self-concept structure and psychological adjustment of the bicultural participants who were classified as assimilators, separators, alternators, fusors, and marginalized individuals are assessed. 43 Relations Among the Measures of Self-Concept Structure The correlations among the measures of self-concept structure were assessed for the Indo-Canadian, Euro-Canadian, and Indian samples. The patterns of correlations that emerged across the samples were similar. Accordingly, for the present analyses, the three samples were aggregated. The correlations for the aggregate sample are given in Table 5. Table 5 Correlations Among Measures of Self-Concept Structure (Aggregate Sample) Self-Concept Structure Measure 1 2 3 4 5 1. H ~ -.04 -.09 -.05 -.01 2. Phi — -.32** -.13* .00 3. r Roles — .31** -.38** 4. SCC — -.31** 5. SDS Note. H = self-complexity; Phi = cultural compartmentalization; r Roles = role integration; SCC = self-concept clarity; SDS = self-discrepancies. *p_ < .05, **p_ < .001. Self-complexity was unrelated to cultural compartmentalization. It was also unrelated to the three measures of self-concept unity—role integration, self-concept 44 clarity, and self-discrepancies. In the Introduction, it was noted that self-concept pluralism (e.g., self-complexity) is theoretically independent of compartmentalization and self-concept unity. The present findings provide empirical support for the independence of these constructs and are consistent with the results of previous research that has examined the relations between self-complexity and other measures of self-concept structure (Campbell et al., 2003; Gramzow et al., 2000). Cultural compartmentalization was unrelated to self-discrepancies. However, there was a moderate negative correlation between cultural compartmentalization and role integration, and a small negative correlation between cultural compartmentalization and self-concept clarity. These findings suggest that people who compartmentalize traits that are valued in contractual cultures and traits that are valued in communal cultures tend to view themselves less similarly across their social roles and are somewhat more likely to have inconsistent, unstable, and uncertain self-beliefs than people who do not compartmentalize these traits. On the basis of these findings, some may argue that compartmentalization is an inverse measure of unity. However, the weak correlation between cultural compartmentalization and self-concept clarity and the absence of a correlation between cultural compartmentalization and self-discrepancies are inconsistent with this conjecture. Rather, it appears that compartmentalization reflects a feature of self-concept structure that is not captured by pluralism or unity. The measures of role integration, self-concept clarity, and self-discrepancies were moderately related to one another. Noting that self-discrepancies provide an inverse measure of self-concept unity, it is apparent from Table 5 that the correlations among the three measures of unity were consistently positive, despite 45 the fact that they differed substantially in their focus and in the methodology that was used to calculate them. These findings replicate Campbell et al.'s (2000, 2003) findings and suggest that there is some conceptual overlap in the constructs that these measures tap. Relations Between the Measures of Self-Concept Structure and the Measures of Psychological Adjustment The correlations between the measures of self-concept structure and the measures of psychological adjustment were assessed for the Indo-Canadiah, Euro-Canadian, and Indian samples. Once again, the patterns of correlations that emerged across the samples were similar, and the three samples were aggregated. The correlations for the aggregate sample are given in Table 6. 46 Table 6 Correlations Between Measures of Self-Concept Structure and Measures of Psychological Adjustment (Aggregate Sample) Adjustment Measure Self-Concept Structure Measure SE LSat Anx Dep Som H .01 -.04 .04 .06 .06 Phi -.08 -.09 .121" .121" .05 r Roles .30* .22* -.40* -.35* -.31* SCC .56* .39* -.40* -.47* -.33* SDS -.28* -.24* .38* .34* .26* Note. H = self-complexity; Phi = cultural compartmentalization; r Roles = role integration; SCC = self-concept clarity; SDS = self-discrepancies; SE = self-esteem; LSat = life-satisfaction; Anx = anxiety; Dep = depression; Som = somatization. 07, *p_< .001. Self-complexity was unrelated to self-esteem, life-satisfaction, anxiety, depression, and somatization. These findings are consistent with the results of other studies (e.g., Campbell et al., 2000, 2003; Gramzow et al., 2000; Linville, 1987) that have examined the direct relations (i.e., the zero-order correlations) between self-complexity and psychological well-being. Nevertheless, a more complex relation than the zero-order correlations assessed here remains viable. As was previously 47 noted, Linville's (1985, 1987) theory suggests that self-complexity contributes to psychological well-being by buffering against the harmful effects of stress; the present study did not include a measure of stress and, thus, did not assess the stress-buffering ability of self-complexity. Cultural compartmentalization was also unrelated to the measures of psychological adjustment. Nevertheless, a consistent pattern of correlations did emerge between the measures: Cultural compartmentalization was negatively correlated with self-esteem and life-satisfaction, and positively correlated with anxiety, depression, and somatization. This pattern of correlations suggests that there may, in fact, be a weak negative association between cultural compartmentalization and psychological well-being. The measures of role integration, self-concept clarity, and self-discrepancies were moderately related to the measures of psychological adjustment. Noting that self-discrepancies provide an inverse measure of self-concept unity, it is apparent from Table 6 that each measure of unity was positively correlated with self-esteem and life-satisfaction, and negatively correlated with anxiety, depression, and somatization. These findings are consistent with the results of other studies (e.g., Campbell et al., 1996; Campbell et al., 2000, 2003; Donahue et al., 1993; Higgins et al., 1985; Kernis et al., 2000; Sheldon et al., 1997; Strauman & Higgins, 1987) and suggest that greater unity in the structure of the self-concept enhances psychological well-being. Shared method variance (i.e., self-report scales) may account for the somewhat greater magnitude of the correlations between the measure of self-concept clarity and the measures of psychological adjustment. The positive correlations between the measures of self-concept unity and the measures of psychological 48 adjustment among the Indian participants (average r = .37) suggest that self-concept unity is a concomitant of psychological well-being even in cultures that foster interdependence. This finding is noteworthy given that cultures that foster interdependence encourage malleability in the self—that is, they encourage individuals to change their behaviour across time and situations in order to meet the needs of others and maintain harmonious relationships (Heine, 2001; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Markus atal., 1997). The Self-Concept Structure and Psychological Adjustment of the Monocultural and Bicultural Samples In the Introduction, several hypotheses were proposed regarding the self-concept structure and psychological adjustment of monocultural and bicultural people. In this section, those hypotheses are examined.5 Accordingly, for the present analyses, the monocultural samples—the Euro-Canadian sample and the Indian sample—were aggregated. The means and standard deviations that these two samples obtained on the measures of self-concept structure and the measures of psychological adjustment are given in Appendix M. Although some significant differences did emerge between the two groups, a theoretically consistent pattern of differences was not found. For example, although the Euro-Canadians obtained higher scores than the Indians on the measures of self-esteem and life-satisfaction, they also obtained higher scores than the Indians on the measure of somatization. 49 The self-concept structure of the monocultural and bicultural samples. The means and standard deviations that the monocultural and bicultural samples obtained on the measures of self-concept structure are given in Table 7. Table 7 Measures of Self-Concept Structure: Means and Standard Deviations for the Monocultural and Bicultural Samples Monocultural Sample (Aggregate) Bicultural Sample Measure M SD M SD t(241) d H 3.37 .65 3.44 .62 -.81 -.11 Phi .53 .19 .63 .18 -3.70** -.50 r Roles .50 .18 .44 .18 2.73* .37 SCC 3.20 .69 3.05 .72 1.65+ .22 SDS 21.13 8.24 25.18 9.39 -3.46** -.47 Note. H = self-complexity; Ph| = cultural compartmentalization; r Roles = role integration; SCC = self-concept clarity; SDS = self-discrepancies. fp_ = .10, *p_< .01, **p_< .001. The results did not support the hypothesis that bicultural people are higher in self-complexity than monocultural people. Significant differences did not emerge between the two groups. In contrast, the results did support the hypothesis that bicultural people are higher in cultural compartmentalization than monocultural people. Analysis of the distribution of traits across self-aspect groups showed that the bicultural participants were more likely than the monocultural participants to form self-aspect groups that separated traits that are valued in Canadian culture from traits that are valued in Indian culture. The results also supported the hypotheses that bicultural people are higher in self-concept differentiation and experience greater self-discrepancies than monocultural people. Consistent with these hypotheses, the bicultural participants obtained lower role integration scores and higher self-discrepancy scores than the monocultural participants. The bicultural participants also obtained lower self-concept clarity scores than the monocultural participants, although this difference was marginally significant. The psychological adjustment of the monocultural and bicultural samples. The means and standard deviations that the monocultural and bicultural samples obtained on the measures of psychological adjustment are given in Table 8. 51 Table 8 Measures of Psychological Adjustment: Means and Standard Deviations for the Monocultural and Bicultural Samples Monocultural Sample (Aggregate) Bicultural Sample Measure M SD M SD t(241) d SE 3.89 .59 3.80 .62 1.07 .15 LSat 4.60 1.18 4.40 1.15 1.25 .17 Anx .71 .63 .93 .72 -2.39* -.32 Dep .89 .68 1.13 .80 -2.48** -.34 Som .70 .51 .86 .59 -2.30* -.31 Note. SE = self-esteem; LSat = life-satisfaction; Anx = anxiety; Dep = depression; Som = somatization. *p_< .05, **p_= -01. In general, the results supported the hypothesis that bicultural people are lower in psychological adjustment than monocultural people. Consistent with this hypothesis, the bicultural participants obtained higher scores than the monocultural participants on the measures of anxiety, depression, and somatization. The bicultural participants also obtained lower scores than the monocultural participants on the measures of self-esteem and life-satisfaction, although these differences were not significant. The mediating role of self-concept structure. Hierarchical regression was used to determine if the self-concept structure variables mediated the relationship between cultural exposure (i.e., monoculturalism versus biculturalism) and psychological adjustment.6 Two of the self-concept structure variables were included in the analysis—role integration and self-discrepancies. Self-complexity, cultural compartmentalization, and self-concept clarity were not included in the analysis because (a) significant differences in the levels of self-complexity and self-concept clarity did not emerge between the monocultural and bicultural samples (see Table 7) and (b) self-complexity and cultural compartmentalization were not significantly correlated with any of the measures of psychological adjustment (see Table 6). Both of the self-concept structure variables that were included in the analysis—role integration and self-discrepancies—are measures of self-concept unity. Accordingly, they were entered as a single set of predictors in the analysis. This set of predictors was entered in the first step of the analysis and cultural exposure was entered in the second step of the analysis. The criterion variable was an overall adjustment index that was computed by summing participants' scores on the measures of anxiety, depression, and somatization—the three measures of adjustment for which significant differences were found between the monocultural and bicultural samples (see Table 8). Because anxiety, depression, and somatization are inverse measures of psychological adjustment, the sum of participants' scores were reversed so that higher scores reflected higher levels of adjustment. The alpha reliability coefficient for this adjustment index was .81 for the monocultural sample and .85 for the bicultural sample. 53 The results of the analysis provided evidence of mediation. Role integration (p = .31), t(241) = 4.98, fj < .001 and self-discrepancies (p = -.25), t(241) = -4.10, p_ < .001 accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in psychological adjustment, R2 = .22, F(2, 240) = 33.56, p_ <001; cultural exposure did not account for additional variance after controlling for the two measures of self-concept unity, R2 change = .01, F(1, 239) = 1.42, p_ = .24. The Self-Concept Structure and Psychological Adjustment of Assimilators, Separators, Alternators, Fusors, and Marginalized Individuals Using the Acculturation Questionnaire, the bicultural participants were given a score on each acculturative strategy and were classified into groups that used different acculturative strategies. The number of participants that were classified into each group is given in Table 9. 54 Table 9 Number of Participants Classified into Each Acculturative Group Acculturative Group n Assimilators 3 Separators 2 Alternators 39 Fusors 35 Marginalized Individuals 3 In the Introduction, several hypotheses were proposed regarding the self-concept structure and psychological adjustment of bicultural people who use different acculturative strategies. In this section, those hypotheses are examined.7 The majority of the hypotheses contrasted the self-concept structure or psychological adjustment of one acculturative group (e.g., alternators) with the self-concept structure or psychological adjustment of several other acculturative groups (e.g., assimilators, separators, and fusors). Accordingly, for the present analyses, several acculturative groups were often aggregated and compared to one group of interest. This approach was particularly useful given the small number of participants that were classified as either assimilators, separators, or marginalized individuals. The comparisons were supplemented by correlational analyses that examined the relations between participants' scores on each acculturative strategy and 55 participants' scores on the measures of self-concept structure and psychological adjustment. The self-concept structure of assimilators. separators, alternators, fusors, and marginalized individuals. Due to the small number of assimilators and separators in the sample, meaningful comparisons could not be made to test the hypothesis that alternators and fusors are higher in self-complexity than assimilators and separators. However, the correlations between participants' scores on each acculturative strategy and participants' scores on the self-complexity measure were examined. The correlations, given in Table 10, did not support the hypothesis that alternators and fusors are higher in self-complexity than assimilators and separators; participants' scores on the acculturative strategies were unrelated to their scores on the self-complexity measure. 56 Table 10 Correlations Between Acculturative Strategy Scores and Self-Complexity Scores Acculturative Strategy H Assimilation -.07 Separation .09 Alternation .00 Fusion -.06 Marginalization .08 Note. H = self-complexity. In order to test the hypothesis that alternators are higher in cultural compartmentalization than assimilators, separators, and fusors, the latter three groups were aggregated. Consistent with the hypothesis, the alternators (M = -70, SD = .18) were more likely than the assimilators, separators, and fusors (M = .57, SD = .17) to form self-aspect groups that separated traits that are valued in Canadian culture from traits that are valued in Indian culture, t(77) = 3.36, p = .001, d = .76. The correlations between participants' scores on each acculturative strategy and participants' scores on the compartmentalization measure, given in Table 11, were also consistent with the hypothesis. A moderate, positive correlation emerged between alternation and cultural compartmentalization; participants' scores on the remaining acculturative strategies were unrelated to their scores on the compartmentalization measure. 57 Table 11 Correlations Between Acculturative Strategy Scores and Cultural Compartmentalization Scores Acculturative Strategy Phi Assimilation .02 Separation .01 Alternation .22* Fusion -.13 Marginalization .01 Note. Phi = cultural compartmentalization. *p_ = .05. In order to test the hypotheses that alternators are higher in self-concept differentiation, are lower in self-concept clarity, and experience greater self-discrepancies than assimilators, separators, and fusors, that latter three groups were again aggregated. The means and standard deviations that the alternators and the aggregate sample obtained on the measures of self-concept unity are given in Table 12. 58 Table 12 Measures of Self-Concept Unity: Means and Standard Deviations for Alternators, Assimilators, Separators, and Fusors Assimilators, Separators, Alternators and Fusors (Aggregate) Measure M SD M SD t(77) d r Roles .37 .16 .50 .17 -3.45** -.78 SCC 2.83 .67 3.34 .63 -3.45** -.78 SDS 27.18 9.53 23.04 8.91 2.00* .45 Note, r Roles = role integration; SCC = self-concept clarity; SDS = self-discrepancies. *£< .05, **p_ = .001. Consistent with the hypotheses, the alternators obtained lower role integration scores, lower self-concept clarity scores, and higher self-discrepancy scores than the assimilators, separators, and fusors. The correlations between participants' scores on each acculturative strategy and participants' scores on the self-concept unity measures, given in Table 13, were also consistent with the hypotheses. In contrast to assimilation, separation, and fusion, alternation was (a) negatively correlated with role integration, (b) negatively correlated with self-concept clarity, and (c) positively correlated with self-discrepancies, although this correlation was marginally significant. 59 Table 13 Correlations Between Acculturative Strategy Scores and Self-Concept Unity Scores Self-Concept Unity Measure Acculturative Strategy r Roles SCC SDS Assimilation .24* -.05 .05 Separation .13 .09 -.20 t Alternation -.34** -.29** .20 f Fusion .22* .32** -.32** Marginalization -.03 -.25* .06 Note, r Roles = role integration; SCC = self-concept clarity; SDS = self-discrepancies. f 2< .08, *p_< .05, **p_< .01. As is apparent from Table 13, fusion was the only acculturative strategy that was positively correlated with all of the measures of self-concept unity; it was positively correlated with role integration and self-concept clarity, and negatively correlated with self-discrepancies—an inverse measure of self-concept unity. Indeed, t-tests that compared the self-concept unity scores of the fusors and the self-concept unity scores of the aggregate sample of assimilators, separators, and alternators indicated that the fusors were higher in self-concept unity than the aggregate sample—they obtained higher role integration scores, higher self-concept clarity scores, and lower self-discrepancy scores than the assimilators, separators, 60 and alternators. The means and standard deviations that the fusors and the aggregate sample obtained on the measures of self-concept unity are given in Table 14. Table 14 Measures of Self-Concept Unity: Means and Standard Deviations for Fusors. Assimilators. Separators, and Alternators Assimilators, Separators, Fusors and Alternators (Aggregate) Measure M SD M SD t(77) d r Roles .50 .16 .38 .17 3.22* .73 SCC 3.38 .60 2.85 .69 3.55** .80 SDS 22.08 8.65 27.48 9.37 -2.63* -.60 Note, r Roles = role integration; SCC = self-concept clarity; SDS = self-discrepancies. *e<.01,**fi = 001. The psychological adjustment of assimilators, separators, alternators, fusors, and marginalized individuals. Two hypotheses were proposed regarding the psychological adjustment of assimilators, separators, alternators, and fusors. The first hypothesis—that alternators are lower in psychological adjustment than assimilators, separators, and fusors—was tested by once again aggregating the assimilators, separators, and fusors. The means and standard deviations that the 61 alternators and the aggregate sample obtained on the measures of psychological adjustment are given in Table 15. Consistent with the hypothesis, the alternators obtained lower self-esteem and life-satisfaction scores, and higher anxiety, depression, and somatization scores than the assimilators, separators, and fusors. Table 15 Measures of Psychological Adjustment: Means and Standard Deviations for Alternators, Assimilators, Separators, and Fusors Assimilators, Separators, Alternators and Fusors (Aggregate) Measure M SD M SD t(77) d SE 3.66 .58 3.97 .62 -2.29* -.52 LSat 4.06 1.13 4.77 1.10 -2.83** -.64 Anx 1.12 .75 .72 .65 2.53* .57 Dep 1.32 .78 .87 .72 2.68** .60 Som .98 .54 .70 .58 2.22* .50 Note. SE = self-esteem; LSat = life-satisfaction; Anx = anxiety; Dep = depression; Som = somatization. *p_< .05, **2< .01. The second hypothesis—that fusors are higher in psychological adjustment than assimilators, separators, and alternators—was tested by aggregating the 62 assimilators, separators, and alternators. The means and standard deviations that the fusors and the aggregate sample obtained on the measures of psychological adjustment are given in Table 16. Consistent with the hypothesis, the fusors obtained higher life-satisfaction scores and lower anxiety, depression, and somatization scores than the assimilators, separators, and alternators; the fusors also obtained higher self-esteem scores than the aggregate sample, although this difference was marginally significant. Table 16 Measures of Psychological Adjustment: Means and Standard Deviations for Fusors, Assimilators, Separators, and Alternators Assimilators, Separators, Fusors and Alternators (Aggregate) Measure M SD M SD 1(77) d SE 3.96 .58 3.70 .63 1.91* .43 LSat 4.86 .96 4.06 1.20 3.23* .73 Anx .68 .66 1.11 .73 -2.70* -.61 Dep .80 .68 1.32 .78 -3.14* -.71 Som .61 .55 1.02 .53 -3.35** -.76 Note. SE = self-esteem; LSat = life-satisfaction; Anx = anxiety; Dep = depression; Som = somatization. Tp_= .06, *p_< .01, **fj = -001. 63 The correlations between participants' scores on each acculturative strategy and participants' scores on the measures of psychological adjustment, given in Table 17, were also consistent with the hypotheses. Assimilation and separation were unrelated to the measures of psychological adjustment; alternation was negatively correlated with self-esteem, and positively correlated with anxiety and depression; and fusion was positively correlated with self-esteem and life-satisfaction, and negatively correlated with anxiety, depression, and somatization. Table 17 Correlations Between Acculturative Strategy Scores and Psychological Adjustment Scores Adjustment Measure Acculturative Strategy SE LSat Anx Dep Som Assimilation .05 -.02 -.11 -.02 .01 Separation -.06 .04 .16 -.03 -.06 Alternation -.25* -.17 .31** .33** .18 Fusion .25* .29** -.31** -.27* -.26* Marginalization -.08 -.09 .12 .21* .27* Note. SE = self-esteem; LSat = life-satisfaction; Anx = anxiety; Dep = depression; Som = somatization. *p_<.05, **p_<.01. 64 The mediating role of self-concept structure. Hierarchical regression was used to determine if the self-concept structure variables mediated the relationship between the acculturative strategies that participants used and psychological adjustment.5 Three of the self-concept structure variables were included the analysis—role integration, self-concept clarity, and self-discrepancies. Self-complexity and cultural compartmentalization were not included in the analysis because (a) self-complexity was not significantly correlated with any of the acculturative strategies (see Table 10) and (b) within the bicultural sample, self-complexity and cultural compartmentalization were not significantly correlated with any of the measures of psychological adjustment (see Table 18). 65 Table 18 Correlations Between Measures of Self-Concept Structure and Measures of Psychological Adjustment (Bicultural Sample Only) Adjustment Measure Self-Concept Structure Measure SE LSat Anx Dep Som H -.02 -.05 .00 .01 -.07 Phi -.17 -.12 .08 .08 .06 r Roles 44** .17 -.34** -.34** -.28* SCC .56** .28* -.37** -.41** -.27* SDS -.24* -.21* .36** .38** .26* Note. H = self-complexity; Phi = cultural compartmentalization; r Roles = role integration; SCC = self-concept clarity; SDS = self-discrepancies; SE = self-esteem; LSat = life-satisfaction; Anx = anxiety; Dep = depression; Som = somatization. fp. = .06, *rj< .05, **2< -01. The three self-concept structure variables that were included in the analysis— role integration, self-concept clarity, and self-discrepancies—are measures of self-concept unity. Accordingly, they were entered as a single set of predictors in the analysis. This set of predictors was entered in the first step of the analysis. The acculturative strategies that participants used were converted into a set of dichotomous variables and entered in the second step of the analysis. The criterion 66 variable was an overall adjustment index that was based on participants' scores on the measures of self-esteem, life-satisfaction, anxiety, depression, and somatization—the measures of adjustment for which significant differences were found between the groups (see Tables 15 and 16). Because the scales that participants used to rate their levels of self-esteem and life-satisfaction differed from the scales that they used to rate their levels of anxiety, depression, and somatization, participants' scores on each measure were transformed into z-scores; the anxiety, depression, and somatization scores were reversed so that higher scores reflected higher levels of adjustment; then, the five scores were summed. For the bicultural sample, the alpha reliability coefficient for this adjustment index was .84. The results of the analysis provided evidence of mediation. Role integration (p = .21), t(80) = 1.99, o = .05, self-concept clarity (p = .32), t(80) = 3.01, p_ < .005, and self-discrepancies (p = -.21), t(80) = -2.10, p_ < .05 accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in psychological adjustment, R2 = .32, F(3, 78) = 12.16, p_ <.001; the acculturative strategies that participants used did not account for additional variance after controlling for the three measures of self-concept unity, R2. change = .04, F(4, 74) = 1.01, = .41. Discussion The findings of the present research are discussed in four sections. In the first section, the findings regarding the self-concept structure of bicultural people are considered. In the second section, the findings regarding the psychological adjustment of bicultural people are considered. In the third section, theoretical and 67 practical implications of the findings are discussed. In the fourth section, limitations of the research are identified and avenues of future research are explored. The Self-Concept Structure of Bicultural People Three features of self-concept structure were examined in the present research—self-concept pluralism, cultural compartmentalization, and self-concept unity. The findings that emerged with respect to each of these features are considered in turn. Self-Concept Pluralism Self-concept pluralism was assessed using Linville's (1985, 1987) measure of self-complexity. Two hypotheses were proposed regarding self-complexity: (a) that bicultural people are higher in self-complexity than monocultural people and (b) that alternators and fusors are higher in self-complexity than assimilators and separators. The findings were not consistent with either of these hypotheses. Specifically, the results of Study 2 showed that (a) the monocultural and bicultural participants did not differ in their levels of self-complexity and (b) the bicultural participants' levels of assimilation, separation, alternation, and fusion were not correlated with their levels of self-complexity. Although it may be the case that the levels of self-complexity of these groups do not differ, research findings reported by Woolfolk et al. (1995), Campbell et al. (2003), and Salovey (1992) suggest that H may not be a valid or reliable measure of self-complexity. Accordingly, its use in the present research may have obscured any differences in the levels of self-complexity of the groups. Woolfolk et al. reported 68 findings that suggest that H does not tap a unitary construct. Rather, the results of their research suggest that H taps a construct that is comprised of two distinct components—positive self-complexity and negative self-complexity. Positive self-complexity refers to the complexity of the positive attributes that people use to describe themselves. Negative self-complexity refers to the complexity of the negative attributes that people use to describe themselves. Across several studies, they found that these components were only moderately correlated with one another and had different psychological correlates. Woolfolk et al. also reported findings that suggest that H scores are affected by the number of positive traits that are given to participants for the trait-sorting task. They manipulated the ratio of positive-to-negative traits used in the trait-sorting task and found that higher H scores were obtained when a greater proportion of positive traits was used. Campbell et al. produced a similar finding in a subsequent study. Salovey reported findings that indicate that H is affected by fluctuations in participants' affective states. He found that participants who were in happy or sad moods obtained higher H scores than participants who were in neutral moods, presumably because affective experiences—whether positive or negative—increase self-focused attention. H has consistently been used to measure self-complexity in past research (e.g., Campbell etal., 1991; Dixon & Baumeister, 1991; Gramzow et al., 2000; Linville, 1985, 1987; Niedenthal et al., 1992; Smith & Cohen, 1993); it was for this reason that it was used here. However, given the concerns that the aforementioned studies have raised about the validity and reliability of H as a measure of self-complexity, it may have been more appropriate to use an alternative measure. Alternative measures of self-complexity have been proposed by other researchers 69 (e.g., Gara et al., 1993). However, these measures have not been widely used and further research is needed to assess their validity and reliability. Cultural Compartmentalization In addition to the hypotheses regarding self-complexity, two hypotheses were proposed regarding cultural compartmentalization: (a) that the self-aspects of bicultural people are characterized by greater cultural compartmentalization than the self-aspects of monocultural people and (b) that the self-aspects of alternators are characterized by greater cultural compartmentalization than the self-aspects of assimilators, separators, and fusors. The findings of the present research were consistent with each of these hypotheses, suggesting that bicultural people, particularly those who use alternation as an acculturative strategy, are more likely to differentiate their self-concepts into culture-specific self-aspects. In recent years, there has a been a proliferation of research (e.g., Benet-Martinez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000; Verkuyten & Pouliasi, 2002) on "cultural frame switching" among bicultural people. Cultural frame switching refers to the process by which bicultural people alternate "between mindsets rooted in different cultures" (Hong et al., 2000, p. 710). Theorists have suggested that bicultural people alternate between these mindsets in response to environmental cues that activate culture-specific knowledge structures. The findings of the present research suggest that bicultural people possess culture-specific knowledge structures about the self—that is culture-specific self-aspects. Presumably, these knowledge structures about the self, once activated by 70 environmental cues, guide the motivation and behaviour of bicultural people in different cultural contexts. Self-Concept Unity Two general hypotheses were proposed regarding self-concept unity: (a) that bicultural people are lower in self-concept unity than monocultural people and (b) that alternators are lower in self-concept unity than assimilators, separators, and fusors. These hypotheses were tested using three measures of self-concept unity— role integration, self-concept clarity, and actual-actual self-discrepancies. In general, the findings were consistent with each of these hypotheses, suggesting that bicultural people, particularly those who use alternation as an acculturative strategy, are more likely to develop self-beliefs that can not readily be unified or integrated with one another. Presumably, bicultural people develop inconsistent self-beliefs because they are exposed to conflicting cultural expectations of the self—that is, they are exposed to different ideas about what constitutes an "appropriate" self (Oyserman & Markus, 1993) across their cultural environments. Earlier, it was noted that fusion was the only acculturative strategy that was positively correlated with all of the measures of self-concept unity—that is, it was positively correlated with the measures of role integration and self-concept clarity, and negatively correlated with the measure of self-discrepancies (see Table 13). In contrast to assimilation, separation, alternation, and marginalization, fusion is integrative in nature; those who adopt this acculturative strategy consistently adhere to a combination or blend of the norms and values of the dominant culture and the norms and values of their ethnic culture. Presumably, this combination or blend of 71 norms and values influences the content of the self-concept and the structure of the self-concept, resulting in a unified mixture of attributes that are valued by the dominant culture and attributes that are valued by the ethnic culture within the self-concepts of those who use fusion as an acculturative strategy. The Psychological Adjustment of Bicultural People Three hypotheses were proposed regarding psychological adjustment: (a) that bicultural people are lower in psychological adjustment than monocultural people, (b) that alternators are lower in psychological adjustment than assimilators, separators, and fusors, and (c) that fusors are higher in psychological adjustment than assimilators, separators, and alternators. The findings of the present research were consistent with each of these hypotheses, suggesting that (a) exposure to conflicting cultural norms and values has an adverse effect on the psychological well-being of bicultural people and (b) fusion is the most adaptive strategy for bicultural people to use to reconcile these norms and values, whereas alternation is the least adaptive strategy for bicultural people to use to reconcile these norms and values. With respect to the latter point—that alternation is the least adaptive strategy for bicultural people to use to reconcile conflicting cultural norms and values—the results showed that alternation was associated with lower levels of psychological adjustment than marginalization, the strategy that most researchers and practitioners (e.g., Berry, 1997; Berry & Kim, 1988; Farver et al., 2002; Sam, 1994) assume results in the lowest levels of psychological well-being. The correlations between alternation and the measures of psychological adjustment were consistently lower than the 72 correlations between marginalization and the measures of psychological adjustment (see Table 17). Two hypotheses were proposed regarding the mechanisms by which cultural exposure and acculturative strategies affect psychological adjustment: (a) that self-concept unity mediates the relationship between cultural exposure and psychological adjustment and (b) that self-concept pluralism and self-concept unity mediate the relationship between acculturative strategies and psychological adjustment. With respect to the first hypothesis, the results showed that self-concept unity mediated the relationship between cultural exposure and psychological adjustment. With respect to the second hypothesis, the results showed that self-concept unity mediated the relationship between acculturative strategies and psychological adjustment; self-concept pluralism did not mediate this relationship. Thus, it appears that differences in the psychological adjustment of monocultural and bicultural people and assimilators, separators, alternators, and fusors may be attributed to only one feature of self-concept structure—self-concept unity. A number of theories of the self (e.g., Block, 1961; Lecky, 1945; Rogers, 1959) maintain that self-concept unity is central to psychological health. According to these theories, self-concept unity enhances psychological well-being by providing individuals with continuity and self-integrity across social situations; without it, an individual is "an interpersonal chameleon, with no inner core of identity, fitfully reacting in all ways to all people" (Block, 1961, p. 392). The findings of the present research suggest that it is a lack of self-concept unity—that is, a lack of self-coherence and self-consistency—that results in lower levels of psychological well-73 being among bicultural people, particularly those who use alternation as an acculturative strategy. Theoretical and Practical Implications The findings of the present research have important theoretical implications. First, they suggest that self-concept unity mediates (a) the relationship between cultural exposure and psychological adjustment and (b) the relationship between acculturative strategies and psychological adjustment. To date, this mediating factor has been overlooked by researchers (e.g., Berry et al., 1987; Eyou et al., 2000; Roberts, 1980; Ying, 1988) who have compared the psychological adjustment of monocultural and bicultural people, and the psychological adjustment of people who use different acculturative strategies. Most researchers (e.g., Fernando, 1993; Liebkind & Jasinskaja, 2000; Sam, 1994; Williams & Berry, 1991) have attributed differences in the psychological adjustment of these groups to factors such as discrimination, marginalization, and social support; few researchers, if any, have considered the role that self-concept structure plays in accounting for these differences. Second, the findings indicate that the dominant model of acculturation— the two-dimensional model—is seriously flawed. Specifically, the model fails to distinguish between two modes of integration that bicultural people may use— alternation and fusion. In Study 2, distinct patterns of correlations emerged between these modes of integration and the measures of cultural compartmentalization, self-concept unity, and psychological adjustment. For example, negative correlations emerged between alternation and the measures of self-concept unity, whereas positive correlations emerged between fusion and the measures of self-concept unity (see Table 13). Thus, it appears that there are at least five strategies that bicultural people may use to reconcile competing cultural expectations of the self— assimilation, separation, alternation, fusion, and marginalization. The findings of the present research also have practical implications. Specifically, they suggest that practitioners who work with bicultural people who are confronted by competing cultural expectations of the self should encourage their clients to adopt fusion as an acculturative strategy. In contrast, many existing interventions are designed to encourage bicultural people to adopt alternation as an acculturative strategy. For example, Bicultural Effectiveness Training, an intervention developed by Szapocznik and his colleagues (Szapocznik, Kurtines, & Fernandez, 1980; Szapocznik, Santisteban, Kurtines, Perez-Vidal, Hervis, 1984), is designed to teach bicultural people to adapt their behaviour to the demands of different cultural contexts. In an influential paper on biculturalism, LaFromboise et al. (1993) endorsed interventions of this type by recommending that bicultural people alternate between roles that are sanctioned by the dominant culture and roles that are sanctioned by their ethnic culture. The findings reported here, however, suggest that interventions that are designed to teach bicultural people to alternate between culturally-appropriate selves would not only be ineffective, but would be detrimental to their psychological well-being. Limitations and Future Research The present research has limitations that should be noted. One limitation relates to causality. Throughout this work, the following causal relationships have been assumed: (a) cultural exposure affects self-concept structure which, in turn, 75 affects psychological adjustment, and (b) acculturative strategies affect self-concept structure which, in turn, affects psychological adjustment. The regression analyses that were used were effective in revealing the relationships among the variables; however, they were not able to test the causal direction of these relationships. Thus, it is possible, for example, that self-concept structure is a causal antecedent to cultural exposure or that psychological adjustment is a causal antecedent to self-concept structure. With respect to the causal direction of the relationship between self-concept structure and psychological adjustment, there are some studies that suggest that self-concept structure influences psychological adjustment (e.g., Baumgardner, 1990; Showers & Kling, 1996); however, there are other studies that suggest that psychological adjustment influences self-concept structure (e.g., Campbell & Lavallee, 1993; Salovey, 1992). Given that the causal relationships proposed here are speculative in nature, further research is needed to assess their validity. A second limitation relates to the underrepresentation of assimilators, separators, and marginalized individuals in Study 2. Fortunately, the measure of acculturative strategies that was used allowed for correlational analyses to be conducted to supplement the group comparisons, thereby reducing the impact of the underrepresentation of these groups. Presumably, the small number of participants in these groups reflects the population from which the participants were selected— university students who were first or second generation Indo-Canadians. Indeed, it seems reasonable to expect that the number of participants in each acculturative group would have differed had the participants been selected from a different population. For example, if the participants had been selected from a cultural "ghetto" within the community, a higher proportion of separators may have emerged. Alternatively, if the participants had been selected to include third and fourth generation Indo-Canadians, a higher proportion of assimilators may have emerged. Further research is needed to assess the prevalence of each acculturative strategy in different populations to extend the generalizability of the present findings. In recent years, some researchers have raised concerns about the use of Likert scales in cross-cultural research. Specifically, these researchers (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002; Peng, Nisbett, & Wong, 1997) have argued that the use of Likert scales obscures differences between cultural groups because members of different cultural groups evaluate themselves with reference to members of their own cultural group—for example, Indians evaluate themselves with reference to other Indians, and Canadians evaluate themselves with reference to other Canadians. This effect has been termed "the reference-group effect" (Heine et al., 2002). In the present research, all of the measures of psychological adjustment and three of the measures of self-concept structure relied on Likert scales. However, there are several reasons why it is reasonable to assume that the use of these scales did not compromise the present findings. First, research (see Heine et al., 2002) indicates that self-report measures of psychological adjustment (e.g., self-esteem; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999) are resistant to the reference-group effect, presumably because these measures require participants to introspect rather than compare themselves to others. Second, the measures of role integration and self-discrepancies used the correlations among participants' social roles and the difference scores between participants' self-states, respectively, to assess self-concept structure. Hence, the specific scores that participants provided using the 77 Likert scales were not compared across the cultural groups; only the relationships among these scores were compared across the cultural groups. Third, like measures of psychological adjustment, the Self-Concept Clarity Scale requires participants to introspect rather than compare themselves to others. Therefore, it too should be resistant to the reference-group effect. Consistent with this argument are the results of a number of studies (e.g., Campbell et al., 2000, 2003; Kernis et al., 2000; Smith et al., 1996) that have shown that self-concept clarity and self-esteem are highly correlated with one another. The findings of the present research further our insight into the psychology of biculturalism and suggest several questions for future research. For example, do sociostructural factors determine which acculturative strategy is most adaptive? The present research was conducted in Canada, a country that maintains a policy of multiculturalism. Canada's policy of multiculturalism recognizes the importance of cultural diversity and provides institutional support for the maintenance of ethnic heritage. The present research indicates that, in societies that maintain a policy of multiculturalism, fusion is the most adaptive acculturative strategy for bicultural people to use. However, in societies that maintain different policies regarding cultural diversity and the maintenance of ethnic heritage, different acculturative strategies may prove to be more effective. For example, in societies that maintain policies derived from the melting pot theory, assimilation or alternation may be more adaptive than fusion. Other questions that remain to be answered include the following: How do experiences such as discrimination and marginalization affect the self-concept structure of bicultural people? Do bicultural people experience greater actual-ideal 78 and actual-ought self-discrepancies than monocultural people? Do different bicultural groups (e.g., immigrants, refugees, aborigines) benefit from the use of different acculturative strategies? Do bicultural people tend to use a single acculturative strategy across their life span, or is there a predictable pattern of change in the use of acculturative strategies across the life span? Answers to these and related questions will expand upon the findings reported here and will further enhance our understanding of the psychological impact of biculturalism. 79 Footnotes 1A detailed description of the computation of H is provided in the Method section. 2A series of t-tests using conventional alpha levels of .05 were conducted to compare the ratings that participants provided for the degree to which they believed the traits were valued in Canadian culture and the degree to which they believed the traits were valued in Indian culture. The results of those t-tests are reported in Table 1. Because the purpose of Study 1 was to select traits to be used in Study 2 (rather than test hypotheses), the alpha levels that were used for the t-tests were not subjected to a Bonferroni adjustment. 3An interesting pattern of differences was found in the standard deviations of the trait ratings provided in Table 1. With only one exception, for each of the traits for which significant cultural differences were found, the standard deviation of the ratings was smaller in the culture in which the trait was more valued. For example, for the trait "adventurous," the standard deviation of the ratings was smaller in Canadian culture than Indian culture. This pattern of differences suggests that there was greater consensus among participants about those traits that were highly valued in each culture. 4Donahue et al. (1993, p. 836) noted that the average correlation among a participant's social roles could be used as an inverse measure of self-concept differentiation. The relation between the average correlation among a participant's social roles and the eigenvalue of the first principal component is given by R = (E - 1 )/(N -1), where R is the average correlation among the roles, E is the 80 eigenvalue of the first principal component, and N is the number of variables in the correlation matrix (in this case five). 5A series of t-tests using conventional alpha levels of .05 were conducted to compare the self-concept structure scores and psychological adjustment scores of the monocultural and bicultural samples. The results of those t-tests are reported in the Results section. However, because the measures of self-concept unity were correlated with one another and the measures of psychological adjustment were correlated with one another, MANOVAs were also conducted for these measures. Two MANOVAs were performed; these MANOVAs compared (a) the self-concept unity scores of the monocultural and bicultural samples and (b) the psychological adjustment scores of the monocultural and bicultural samples. Each of the MANOVAs yielded a significant multivariate effect. Follow-up t-tests with alpha levels that were subjected to a Bonferroni adjustment were conducted. Given the directional nature of the hypotheses regarding self-concept unity and psychological adjustment, three one-tailed t-tests using alpha levels of .017 were conducted after the MANOVA related to self-concept unity, and five one-tailed t-tests using alpha levels of .01 were conducted after the MANOVA related to psychological adjustment. The results did not differ from those that were obtained by conducting a two-tailed t-test with an alpha level of .05 for each measure of self-concept unity and psychological adjustment. 6Similar results were obtained when simultaneous regression analysis was used to test for mediation, as has been recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986). 7A series of t-tests using conventional alpha levels of .05 were conducted to compare the self-concept structure scores and psychological adjustment scores of participants who were classified into different acculturative groups. The results of those 81 t-tests are reported in the Results section. However, because the measures of self-concept unity were correlated with one another and the measures of psychological adjustment were correlated with one another, MANOVAs were also conducted for these measures. Four MANOVAs were performed; these MANOVAs compared (a) the self-concept unity scores of the alternators and the self-concept unity scores of the aggregate sample of assimilators, separators, and fusors, (b) the self-concept unity scores of the fusors and the self-concept unity scores of the aggregate sample of assimilators, separators, and alternators, (c) the psychological adjustment scores of the alternators and the psychological adjustment scores of the aggregate sample of assimilators, separators, and fusors, and (d) the psychological adjustment scores of the fusors and the psychological adjustment scores of the aggregate sample of assimilators, separators, and alternators. Each of the MANOVAs yielded a significant multivariate effect. Follow-up t-tests with alpha levels that were subjected to a Bonferroni adjustment were conducted. Given the directional nature of the hypotheses regarding self-concept unity and psychological adjustment, three one-tailed t-tests using alpha levels of .017 were conducted after each MANOVA related to self-concept unity, and five one-tailed t-tests using alpha levels of .01 were conducted after each MANOVA related to psychological adjustment. With one exception, the results did not differ from those that were obtained by conducting a two-tailed t-test with an alpha level of .05 for each measure of self-concept unity and psychological adjustment. The one exception emerged in the comparison of the self-concept unity scores of the alternators and the self-concept unity scores of the aggregate sample of assimilators, separators, and fusors. Two-tailed t-tests with alpha levels of .05 revealed significant differences between the groups for the measures of role integration, self-concept clarity, and self-82 discrepancies (see Table 12). 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Write your ratings in the boxes to the left of the trait. 1 2 Not at all valued 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Highly valued Degree to which trait is valued in Canadian culture Degree to which trait is valued in Indian culture Trait (Definition) adventurous (fond of exciting or unusual experiences) agreeable (pleasant in temperament or disposition) ambitious (seeking a position of high status or great power) assertive (self-confident and bold in expressing oneself) broad-minded (tolerant or liberal in one's views) capable (competent or able) collectivistic (motivated by the interests of one's family, friends, or community rather than one's own interests) competitive (eager to demonstrate that one is better than others) conservative (inclined to maintain ideas and traditions of the past) conventional (conforming to commonly accepted standards of conduct) courageous (able to face and endure difficulties with fortitude and determination) courteous (showing thoughtful attention to the feelings and wishes of others) creative (able to develop original ideas) curious (eager to inquire or explore) 98 1 2 Not at all valued 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Highly valued Degree to which trait is valued in Canadian culture Degree to which trait is valued in Indian culture Trait (Definition) daring (inclined to take risks) decided (firmly attached or adhering to one's own ideas or opinions) deferential (respectful to those who are older or are higher in status than oneself) demonstrative (expressing one's affections freely and openly) devout (devoted to religion or religious duties) diligent (careful and conscientious in completing one's work) diplomatic (careful not to do or say things that will offend others) direct (straightforward or forthright) dutiful (fulfilling one's social obligations by doing what one is expected to do) emotionally-expressive (expressing one's emotions freely and openly) energetic (full of energy or vigor) enthusiastic (motivated or eager to perform one's activities or duties) excitement-seeking (seeking experiences that are arousing or stimulating) extroverted (outgoing and very sociable) fatalistic (accepting life circumstances as inevitable consequences of fate) frank (expressing one's thoughts and opinions freely and openly) humble (not thinking too highly of oneself or one's accomplishments) impartial (fair or unbiased in one's judgments of others) independent (acting according to one's own opinions or wishes rather than the opinions or wishes of others) 99 1 2 Not at all valued 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Highly valued Degree to which trait is valued in Canadian culture Degree to which trait is valued in Indian culture Trait (Definition) industrious (hard-working) ingratiating (inclined to try to please others or obtain their approval) intelligent (able to think, understand, or learn quickly and well) loyal (faithful to those that one is obligated to) moderate (not extreme in one's ideas or behavior) modest (not calling attention to oneself or one's accomplishments) moralistic (conforming to commonly accepted standards of what is right or good) obedient (willing to do what one is asked or told to do, particularly by those who are in authority) original (thinking or acting in a unique or novel manner) peaceable (inclined to try to avoid conflict with others) persevering (persistent in pursuing goals or aims) playful (fun-loving) pleasure-seeking (seeking experiences that are enjoyable or gratifying) polite (following rules for proper or respectable conduct) proud (thinking well of oneself or one's accomplishments) reciprocative (returning kindnesses or favors that one has received from others) reserved (restrained in communicating one's thoughts and feelings) resourceful (skillful in organizing or planning) responsible (reliable and trustworthy) 100 1 2 Not at all valued 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Highly valued Degree to which trait is valued in Canadian culture Degree to which trait is valued in Indian culture Trait (Definition) romantic (interested in love or romance) self-conscious (conscious of how one is appearing to others) self-controlled (suppressing one's impulses and desires) self-directed (governed by one's own will) self-disciplined (restrained in one's behavior) self-reliant (showing confidence in one's own abilities, actions, and opinions) self-sacrificing (giving up one's interests and desires for the sake others) sensible (showing good or reasonable judgment) spontaneous (acting upon one's natural impulses or desires) traditional (adhering to customs or ideas handed down from earlier generations of one's family) uninhibited (unrestrained in one's behavior) virtuous (morally pure and innocent) vivacious (lively in temperament or conduct) 101 Appendix B Instructions for Self-Complexity Measure Each of the cards in front of you contains the name of a trait or characteristic and its definition. Your task is to think about who you are at this point in your life, and then to sort the cards into groups where each group describes an aspect of yourself or your life. You may sort the traits into groups on any meaningful basis— but remember to think about yourself while doing this. Form as many or as few groups as you desire. Continue forming groups until you feel that you have formed the important ones. We realize that this could be an endless task, but we want only what is meaningful to you. When you feel you are straining to form more groups, it is probably a good time to stop. Each group may contain as few or as many traits as you wish. You do not have to use every trait, only those that are descriptive of you. Also, each trait may be used in more than one group, so you may keep reusing traits as many times as you like. For example, you may find that you want to use the trait "ambitious" in several groups. If you wish to reuse a trait—that is, to use a trait in more than one group— you may use one of the blank cards provided. Simply copy the trait and its number on a blank card and then proceed to use it as you would the other cards. The sheet with the boxes is your recording sheet. Use the recording sheet to indicate which traits you have put together. Each box will correspond to one of your groups. Notice the number in the corner of each card. In each box, write the numbers of the traits that form a group—write only the trait's number, not the trait's name or definition, in the box. A natural way to perform this task is to form one or several groups and record them, then mix up the cards and see if there are other groups that you wish to form and then record them. Repeat this procedure until you feel that you have formed the groups that are important to you. Read both the trait and its definition before you sort the trait into a group. Remember to use the blank cards if you wish to use the same trait in more than one group. Ask for an extra recording sheet if you need it. The order in which you record the groups is not important, nor is the order of the traits within a group. We are only interested in which traits you put together. It is not necessary to label the groups unless you wish to. Please be as honest as you can; remember that your responses are strictly confidential. Different people will finish at different times, so take as much time as you need even if others finish. 102 Appendix C Role Integration Measure Each of us occupies several different social roles. For example, all of us occupy the social roles of son/daughter and friend; some of us occupy the social roles of student, worker, romantic partner, church member, and club member. Please select five social roles that are important to you. Write these social roles in the spaces provided at the top of each page; list the social roles in the same order on each page. Then, indicate how descriptive you believe each of the traits in the left hand column is of you in each social role. Read both the trait and its definition before making your ratings. Use the following scale to make your ratings: 1 2 3 4 5 Not at all Somewhat Highly descriptive descriptive descriptive Social Role Social Role Social Role Social Role Social Role A B C D E Trait (Definition) adventurous (fond of exciting or unusual experiences) agreeable (pleasant in temperament or disposition) ambitious (seeking a position of high status or great power) broad-minded (tolerant or liberal in one's views) capable (competent or able) collectivistic (motivated by the interests of one's family, friends, or community rather than one's own interests) conservative (inclined to maintain ideas and traditions of the past) 103 1 2 3 4 5 Not at all Somewhat Highly descriptive descriptive descriptive Social Role Social Role Social Role Social Role Social Role A B C D E Trait (Definition) conventional (conforming to commonly accepted standards of conduct) courageous (able to face and endure difficulties with fortitude and determination) daring (inclined to take risks) deferential (respectful to those who are older or are higher in status than oneself) demonstrative (expressing one's affections freely and openly) devout (devoted to religion or religious duties) dutiful (fulfilling one's social obligations by doing what one is expected to do) extroverted (outgoing and very sociable) frank (expressing one's thoughts and opinions freely and openly) independent (acting according to one's own opinions or wishes rather than the opinions or wishes of others) ingratiating (inclined to try to please others or obtain their approval) 104 1 2 3 4 5 Not at all Somewhat Highly descriptive descriptive descriptive Social Role Social Role Social Role Social Role Social Role A B C D E Trait (Definition) intelligent (able to think, understand, or learn quickly and well) loyal (faithful to those that one is obligated to) original (thinking or acting in a unique or novel manner) persevering (persistent in pursuing goals or aims) pleasure-seeking (seeking experiences that are enjoyable or gratifying) reserved (restrained in communicating one's thoughts and feelings) romantic (interested in love or romance) self-controlled (suppressing one's impulses and desires) self-disciplined (restrained in one's behavior) spontaneous (acting upon one's natural impulses or desires) uninhibited (unrestrained in one's behavior) virtuous (morally pure and innocent) 105 Appendix D Self-Concept Clarity Measure Using the scale below, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. Circle the appropriate number to the right of each statement. 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly disagree agree 1. My beliefs about myself often conflict with one another 1 2 3 4 5 2. On one day I might have one opinion of myself and on another day I might have a different opinion 1 2 3 4 5 3. I spend a lot of time wondering about what kind of person I really am 1 2 3 4 5 4. Sometimes I feel that I am not really the person that I appear to be 1 2 3 4 5 5. When I think about the kind of person I have been in the past, I'm not sure what I was really like 1 2 3 4 5 6. I seldom experience conflict between the different aspects of my personality 1 2 3 4 5 7. Sometimes I think I know other people better than I know myself 1 2 3 4 5 8. My beliefs about myself seem to change very frequently 1 2 3 4 5 9. If I were asked to describe my personality, my description might end up being different from one day to another day 1 2 3 4 5 10. Even if I wanted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm really like 1 2 3 4 5 11. In general, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am 1 2 3 4 5 12. It is often hard for me to make up my mind about things because I don't really know what I want 1 2 3 4 5 106 Appendix E Self-Discrepancy Measure Please select five people who are important to you. These five people should include, (a) one parent (the parent whose opinion is more important to you), and (b) four people who are not members of your family (for example, a close friend, a romantic partner, a co-worker). Write the initials or names of these people in the spaces provided at the top of each page; list the initials or names of these people in the same order on each page. Then, for each trait, indicate (a) the degree to which you believe that you possess the trait, and (b) the degree to which each of the five people that you selected believes that you possess the trait. Read both the trait and its definition before making your ratings. Use the following scale to make your ratings: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at all Somewhat Extremely Trait (Definition) Degree to which I believe that I possess the trait Degree to which Degree to which Degree to which Degree to which Degree to which believes that I possess the trait believes that I possess the trait believes that I possess the trait believes that I possess the trait believes that I possess the trait adventurous (fond of exciting or unusual experiences) agreeable (pleasant in temperament or disposition) ambitious (seeking a position of high status or great power) broad-minded (tolerant or liberal in one's views) capable (competent or able) collectivistic (motivated by the interests of one's family, friends, or community rather than one's own interests) conservative (inclined to maintain ideas and traditions of the past) 107 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at all Somewhat Extremely Trait (Definition) Degree to which I believe that I possess the trait Degree to which Degree to which Degree to which Degree to which Degree to which believes that I possess the trait believes that I possess the trait believes that I possess the trait believes that I possess the trait believes that I possess the trait conventional (conforming to commonly accepted standards of conduct) courageous (able to face and endure difficulties with fortitude and determination) daring (inclined to take risks) deferential (respectful to those who are older or are higher in status than oneself) demonstrative (expressing one's affections freely and openly) devout (devoted to religion or religious duties) dutiful (fulfilling one's social obligations by doing what one is expected to do) extroverted (outgoing and very sociable) frank (expressing one's thoughts and opinions freely and openly) independent (acting according to one's own opinions or wishes rather than the opinions or wishes of others) ingratiating (inclined to try to please others or obtain their approval) intelligent (able to think, understand, or learn quickly and well) 108 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at all Somewhat Extremely Degree to which I believe Degree to which Degree to which Degree to which Degree to which Degree to which Trait (Definition) that I possess the trait believes that I possess the trait believes that I possess the trait believes that I possess the trait believes that I possess the trait believes that I possess the trait loyal (faithful to those that one is obligated to) original (thinking or acting in a unique or novel manner) persevering (persistent in pursuing goals or aims) pleasure-seeking (seeking experiences that are enjoyable or gratifying) reserved (restrained in communicating one's thoughts and feelings) romantic (interested in love or romance) self-controlled (suppressing one's impulses and desires) self-disciplined (restrained in one's behavior) spontaneous (acting upon one's natural impulses or desires) uninhibited (unrestrained in one's behavior) virtuous (morally pure and innocent) 109 Appendix F Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale Using the scale below, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. Circle the appropriate number to the right of the statement. 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly disagree agree 1. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others 1 2 3 4 5 2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities 1 2 3 4 5 3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure 1 2 3 4 5 4. I am able to do things as well as most people 1 2 3 4 5 5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of 1 2 3 4 5 6. I take a positive attitude toward myself 1 2 3 4 5 7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself 1 2 3 4 5 8. I wish I could have more respect for myself 1 2 3 4 5 9. I certainly feel useless at times 1 2 3 4 5 10. At times I think I'm no good at all 1 2 3 4 5 110 Appendix G Satisfaction with Life Scale Below are five statements with which you may agree or disagree. Using the 1-7 scale below, indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding that item. Please be open and honest in your responding. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Disagree Slightly Neither agree Slightly Agree Strongly disagree disagree nor disagree agree agree 1. In most ways my life is close to my ideal. 2. The conditions of my life are excellent. 3. I am satisfied with my life. 4. So far I have gotten the important things I want in my life. 5. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing. 111 Appendix H Anxiety Subscale from the Symptom Checklist 90 Below is a list of problems and complaints that people sometimes have. Please read each one carefully. After you have done so, circle the number that best describes HOW MUCH DISCOMFORT THAT PROBLEM HAS CAUSED YOU DURING THE PAST WEEK INCLUDING TODAY. Circle only one number for each problem and do not skip any items Not at all A little bit Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 0 1 2 3 4 IN THE PAST WEEK (INCLUDING TODAY) HOW MUCH WERE YOU DISTRESSED BY: 1. Nervousness or shakiness inside 0 1 2 3 4 2. Trembling 0 1 2 3 4 3. Suddenly scared for no reason 0 1 2 3 4 4. Feeling fearful 0 1 2 3 4 5. Heart pounding or racing 0 1 2 3 4 6. Feeling tense and keyed up 0 1 2 3 4 7. Spells of terror and panic 0 2 3 4 8. Feeling so restless you couldn't sit still 0 2 3 4 9. The feeling that something bad is going to happen to you 0 2 3 4 10. Thoughts and images of a frightening 0 2 3 4 112 Appendix I Depression Subscale from the Symptom Checklist 90 Below is a list of problems and complaints that people sometimes have. Please read each one carefully. After you have done so, circle the number that best describes HOW MUCH DISCOMFORT THAT PROBLEM HAS CAUSED YOU DURING THE PAST WEEK INCLUDING TODAY. Circle only one number for each problem and do not skip any items Not at all A little bit Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 0 1 2 3 4 IN THE PAST WEEK (INCLUDING TODAY) HOW MUCH WERE YOU DISTRESSED BY: 1. Loss of sexual interest or pleasure 0 1 2 3 4 2. Feeling low in energy or slowed down 0 1 2 3 4 3. Thoughts of ending your life 0 1 2 3 4 4. Crying easily 0 2 3 4 5. Feelings of being trapped or caught 0 2 3 4 6. Blaming yourself for things 0 2 3 4 7. Feeling lonely 0 2 3 4 8. Feeling blue 0 I 2 3 4 9. Worrying too much about things 0 I 2 3 4 10. Feeling no interest in things 0 I 2 3 4 11. Feeling hopeless about the future 0 1 2 3 4 12. Feeling everything is an effort 0 1 2 3 4 13. Feelings of worthlessness 0 1 2 3 4 113 Appendix J Somatization Subscale from the Symptom Checklist 90 Below is a list of problems and complaints that people sometimes have. Please read each one carefully. After you have done so, circle the number that best describes HOW MUCH DISCOMFORT THAT PROBLEM HAS CAUSED YOU DURING THE PAST WEEK INCLUDING TODAY. Circle only one number for each problem and do not skip any items Not at all A little bit Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 0 1 2 3 4 IN THE PAST WEEK (INCLUDING TODAY) HOW MUCH WERE YOU DISTRESSED BY: 1. Headaches 0 1 2 3 4 2. Faintness or dizziness 0 1 2 3 4 3. Pains in heart or chest 0 1 2 3 4 4. Pains in lower back 0 1 2 3 4 5. Nausea or upset stomach 0 2 3 4 6. Soreness of your muscles 0 2 3 4 7. Trouble getting your breath 0 2 3 4 8. 0 2 3 4 9. Numbness or tingling in parts of your body . . 0 2 3 4 10. A lump in your throat 0 I 2 3 4 11. Weakness in parts of your body 0 I 2 3 4 12. Heavy feelings in your arms or legs 0 I 2 3 4 114 Appendix K Acculturation Questionnaire First, read the five paragraphs below. Then, indicate how descriptive each paragraph is of the way that you react to Canadian culture and to Indian culture. "Canadian culture," in this case, refers to the dominant or mainstream culture in Canada. Write the appropriate number from the following scale in the space provided to the left of each paragraph. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at all Somewhat Highly descriptive descriptive descriptive I do things the Canadian way. My attitudes and behaviours are consistent with Canadian norms and values. I think and act like a Canadian when I am among Canadians and when I am among Indians. I do things the Indian way. My attitudes and behaviours are consistent with Indian norms and values. I think and act like an Indian when I am among Indians and when I am among Canadians. I do some things the Canadian way and some things the Indian way. Some of my attitudes and behaviours are consistent with Canadian norms and values, and some of my attitudes and behaviours are consistent with Indian norms and values. The way I think and act when I am among Canadians and when I among Indians does not change—it combines aspects of both Canadian culture and Indian culture. I adapt to which ever cultural environment I am in. When I am among Canadians, I do things the Canadian way—my attitudes and behaviours are consistent with Canadian norms and values. When I am among Indians, I do things the Indian way—my attitudes and behaviours are consistent with Indian norms and values. The way I think and act is determined by the cultural environment that I am in at a given time. I do things neither the Canadian way nor the Indian way. My attitudes and behaviours are not consistent with either Canadian norms and values or Indian norms and values. The way I think and act when I am among Canadians and when I am among Indians does not reflect aspects of either Canadian culture or Indian culture. Reread the five paragraphs above. If you had to select one paragraph to describe the way that you react to Canadian culture and Indian culture, which one would it be? Place a check mark {/) beside that paragraph. 115 Appendix L Validity of the Acculturation Questionnaire The validity of the Acculturation Questionnaire was examined in an independent study. A sample of 46 undergraduate, Indo-Canadian participants were recruited from the University of British Columbia. Of the 46 participants, 32 were female. All of the participants identified their predominant ethnic background as South Asian. The average age of the participants was 19.85 years (SD = 1.48). Participants were classified as first-generation Indo-Canadians if they were born in India, and as second-generation Indo-Canadians if they were born in Canada and their parents were born in India. There were 4 first-generation participants and 42 second-generation participants in the sample. Among the first-generation participants, the minimum length of residence in Canada was 5 years, and the average length of residence in Canada was 8.00 years (SD = 4.08). The participants were given course credit in exchange for their participation. The participants completed (a) the Acculturation Questionnaire and (b) the Vancouver Index of Acculturation (VIA; Ryder et al., 2000). The VIA is a 20-item questionnaire that provides participants with scores on two subscales—a Mainstream subscale and a Heritage subscale. The Mainstream subscale measures the extent to which participants identify with the dominant culture in which they live. The Heritage subscale measures the extent to which participants identify with their ethnic culture. Research (Ryder et al., 2000) has shown that both subscales are reliable and valid measures. Using the Acculturation Questionnaire, participants were given a score on each acculturative strategy. The correlations between these scores and the scores 116 that participants obtained on each subscale of the VIA are given in Table L1. In general, the patterns of correlations that emerged were consistent with theoretical predictions: Assimilation was positively correlated with mainstream identification and negatively correlated with heritage identification; separation was negatively correlated with mainstream identification and positively correlated with heritage identification; alternation was positively correlated with both mainstream identification and heritage identification, although the former correlation was marginally significant; fusion was positively correlated with both mainstream identification and heritage identification; and marginalization was not correlated with mainstream identification and negatively correlated with heritage identification. These patterns of correlations provide support for the validity of the Acculturation Questionnaire as a measure of acculturative strategies. 117 Table L1 Correlations Between Acculturative Strategies. Mainstream Identification, and Heritage Identification Acculturative Mainstream Heritage Strategy Identification Identification Assimilation .42** -.41** Separation -.36* .44** Alternation .27 f .32* Fusion .30* .35* Marginalization -.13 -.44** ^ < .08, *p_ < .05, **p_ < .01. 118 Appendix M The Self-Concept Structure and Psychological Adjustment of the Euro-Canadian and Indian Samples The means and standard deviations that the Euro-Canadian and Indian samples obtained on the measures of self-concept structure and the measures of psychological adjustment are given in Table M1. The Euro-Canadians obtained higher self-complexity scores and lower cultural compartmentalization scores than the Indians. They also obtained lower self-discrepancy scores than the Indians, although this difference was marginally significant. Moreover, the Euro-Canadians obtained higher self-esteem scores, higher life-satisfaction scores, and higher somatization scores than the Indians. Because a theoretically consistent pattern of differences did not emerge between the two groups, they were aggregated to form a monocultural sample. The monocultural sample was compared to the Indo-Canadian or bicultural sample for the remainder of the analyses. 119 Table M1 Measures of Self-Concept Structure and Psychological Adjustment: Means and Standard Deviations for the Euro-Canadian and Indian Samples Euro-Canadian Sample Indian Sample Measure M SD M SD f d Self-Concept Structure H 3.49 .55 3.25 .73 -2.42* -.38 Phi .50 .21 .57 .18 2.15* .34 r Roles .48 .16 .52 .19 1.65 .26 SCC 3.22 .72 3.18 .65 -.38 -.06 SDS 19.88 7.73 22.38 8.59 1.94* .31 Psychological Adjustment SE 4.01 .60 3.77 .56 -2.56* -.40 Lsat 5.03 .96 4.16 1.24 -4.95** -.78 Anx .71 .54 .72 .71 .08 .01 Dep .82 .61 .95 .75 1.22 .19 Som .78 .51 .61 .51 -2.11* -.33 Note. H = self-complexity; Phi = cultural compartmentalization; r Roles = role integration; SCC = self-concept clarity; SDS = self-discrepancies; SE = self-esteem; 120 LSat = life-satisfaction; Anx = anxiety; Dep = depression; Som = somatization. aThe t-test for life satisfaction was adjusted for heterogeneous variances; the adjusted t-test had 149 degrees of freedom. Each of the remaining t-tests had 159 degrees of freedom. fE< .06, *p_ < .05, **p_ < .01. 

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