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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Assessing the motivations and implications of US biological warfare policy Warrian, Kevin James 2003

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ASSESSING T H E MOTIVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE POLICY by KEVIN JAMES WARRIAN B.A. Hons., University of Manitoba, 2001 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES (Department of Political Science) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 2003 © Kevin James Warrian, 2003 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada DE-6 (2/88) A b s t r a c t The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was the first international treaty in the history of arms control to successfully ban an entire class of strategic military weapons. Despite its historical precedent however, subsequent grievous violations of the convention by at least two state parties to the treaty revealed its profound weaknesses. In the absence of even the most rudimentary verification mechanisms, the diffusion and advancement of biotechnology resulted in severe violations by both the former Soviet Union and the former government of Iraq. In response to the violations of the international regime banning biological warfare, the state parties to the BTWC began to take steps to repair the regime in the early 1990s by initiating negotiations to create a set of multilateral verification protocols for the convention. In 2001, after have spent seven long years in negotiation, the positions of the state parties to the BTWC had begun to converge on a set of verification instruments that satisfied the vast majority of the participating nations. This progress however, was abruptly undercut by the United States when it not only rejected the draft verification protocols that had been negotiated by the state parties to the convention, but it also went on to reject the very process of strengthening the regime through the creation of multilateral verification mechanisms. To date, the U.S. policy toward the development of verification protocols has effectively prevented the international community from moving forward to strengthen the BTWC, as the U.S. is the world leader in biotechnology and any effective verification protocols would need the support of the United States. While the current U.S. policy toward verification protocols represents a formidable setback in the international community's effort to restore credibility to the BTWC, current illicit research and development by the U.S. military into the creation a new generation of offensive biological weapons has dealt yet another blow to the long standing international norm against biological warfare. In ii order to restore credibility to the international regime banning biological warfare, the U.S. must not only retreat from its polarized position of opposing the institution of multilateral verification protocols, but it must also bring itself back into full compliance with its obligations under the BTWC. iii T A B L E OF CONTENTS Abstract : ii Table of Contents ; iv List of Tables v List of Equations v List of Figures v Preface vi Dedication and Acknowledgements viii Chapter I: The Development and Characteristics of First Generation Biological Weapons 1 Chapter II: The Rational-Material and Normative Factors that led to the 1972 BTWC 14 Chapter III: Violations of the BTWC 1975-2003—The Need for Verification Protocols 23 Chapter IV: Appraising the U.S. Opposition to the Proposed BTWC Verification Regime....36 Chapter V: U.S. Enzymatic Anti-Material Weapons Research—Undermining the BTWC 69 Conclusions 92 Bibliography 93 Appendix I: Text of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 104 Appendix II: U.S. Military E A M Weapons Research Documentation ....108 iv LIST OF TABLES Table 1: BTWC Verification Measures Recommended by V E R E X 32 LIST OF EQUATIONS Equation 1: Gibbs Free Energy Relationship 71 Equation 2: Relationship Between Chemical Reaction Rates & Energy of Activation 72 Equation 3: Calculating Rate Increases Provided by Chemical Catalysis.. 81 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Chemical Breakdown of Acetylcholine : 73 Figure 2: Electron Flow During Chemical Breakdown of Acetylcholine.. 73 Figure 3: Energy Reaction Diagram 74 Figure 4: Protein Structure of Ferredoxin Enzyme 76 Figure 5: Ferredoxin Enzyme 77 Figure 6: Acetylcholinesterase Enzyme 78 Figure 7: Chemical Mechanism of Acetylcholinesterase 80 Figure 8: Comparative Energy Reaction Diagram of Catalyzed & Uncatalyzed Reactions 81 Figure 9: Site Directed Mutagenesis of Anionic Trypsin Enzyme 83 v Preface Chapter I of this thesis outlines the development of "first generation" biological weapons and argues that they were an effective counter-value strategic weapon that had distinctive characteristics.1 Chapter II argues that despite the military success of first generation biological weapons, a series of normative and rational-material considerations stemming from the characteristics of these weapons led to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which bans the production, stockpiling and use of this entire class of weapons. Chapter III argues that in the absence of effective verification protocols for the BTWC, the spread of biotechnology led to the proliferation of first generation biological weapons in the case of Iraq, and the advancement of biotechnology led to the proliferation of a new "second generation" of biological weapons in the case of the Soviet Union.2 Chapter III then describes how the international community responded to the Iraqi and Soviet violations by negotiating the institution of verification mechanisms for the BTWC. The third chapter concludes by identifying the underlying reasons why the United States opposes the proposed verification regime. Chapter IV argues that the U.S. decision to reject the proposed verification regime is not adequately supported by the central arguments the administration has provided as justification for its current policy. The fourth chapter is comprised of a point by point explication and critique of each of the arguments that the U.S. administration has provided in support of its current policy and concludes by arguing that a policy reversal would be in the best interests of the U.S. administration. Chapter V argues that the U.S. government should end the U.S. military's current research program into the development of a new "third 1 Where "first generation" biological weapons refers to biological weapons that are comprised of naturally occurring microorganisms that have not been genetically modified using recombinant D N A techniques. 2 Where "second generation" biological weapons refers to biological weapons that are comprised of naturally occurring microorganisms that have been genetically modified using recombinant D N A techniques to enhance some or all of the following characteristics: survivability, infectivity, lethality or varying degrees of morbidity. vi generation" of offensive biological weapons.3 Chapter V argues that, not only are the efforts of the U.S. military a clear violation of Article I of the BTWC, but that such efforts also represent a serious and unpredictable threat to both the international community, as well as the U.S. public. Finally, chapter five concludes by arguing that since the goal of the E A M weapons program is to make biological weapons usable, the pursuit of such a program has the potential to weaken the international norm against biological warfare. Thus, if the credibility of the international regime banning biological warfare is to be preserved and enhanced, the U.S. government must not only provide its support for the international effort to strengthen the BTWC through the institution of multilateral verification protocols, but it must also end the U.S. military's effort to develop a new generation of offensive biological weapons. Where "third generation" biological weapons refers to biological weapons that are comprised of naturally occurring microorganisms that have been genetically modified for purposes other than endowing them with, or enhancing their ability to, cause disease in biological life forms. vii To my family Lauran, Keith & Allison Warrian. For their unwavering support, encouragement and inspiration. I would like to acknowledge the following groups and individuals: The 2002-2003 Political Science Graduate Student Body for their advice, support and friendship. David McDonough, for his advice and comments while formulating my central arguments. Jennifer Salahab, for her assistance in editing my final draft. Dr. Brian L; Job, for his generous assistance during the year and for his contribution as second reader within my thesis defense committee. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Richard M . Price, both for his mentorship and assistance throughout the academic year, and for his special contribution to this project as thesis supervisor. /VI if Chapter I: The Development & Characteristics of First Generation Biological Weapons First generation biological weapons are strategic mass-causality weapons that possess a set of defined characteristics. These weapons were the product of a collaborative research and development effort between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, as well as information that was acquired from the Japanese military following the end of World War II.4 Following the end of WWII, extensive collaborative testing between these key Western nations focused on both exploring efficient means of delivering biological weapons, as well as efforts to identify naturally occurring microorganisms that possessed characteristics that would make them candidates for subsequent weaponization. By the 1960s, the efforts of these Western nations culminated in the creation of a new and effective class of strategic weapons. By the interwar period in the early 20th century, the scientific community had developed a variety of techniques to identify, isolate and culture many types of microorganisms.5 These advances brought new potential to the weaponization of pathogens and each of the world's major powers established research and development programs to exploit this new technology.6 While World War One saw limited use of biological weapons against livestock, it was not until the Second World War that more serious efforts were made to develop effective biological weapons.7 During the early years of WWII, Great Britain made concerted efforts to weaponize the bacteria anthrax and their program located within the Porton Down Chemical Defense Experimentation Station, was both larger and more 4 It is recognized that several other nations have biological warfare programs that developed first generation biological weapons; however, the limits of space and research material prevented their inclusion within this analysis. 5 George W. Christopher, et al., "Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective," Journal of the American Medical Association 278, no. 5 (August 1997): p. 413. 6 The Soviet Union, Japan, Germany, France, Canada, Great Britain and the United States all undertook serious efforts to ascertain the plausibility of using pathogens as weapons of war. See Jonathan B. Tucker, "A Farewell to Germs," International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): p. 109. 7 George W. Christopher, et al., "Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective," Journal of the American Medical Association 278, no. 5 (August 1997): p.413. 1 sophisticated that those of the other major European powers.8 The United Kingdom had planned to use anthrax against Germany as a retaliatory weapon to both infect German cattle as a form of economic warfare, as well as for use against human targets within German controlled territory.9 Testing of the first prototype anthrax weapons took place in 1942 at Porton Down's 'X-base' facility located on the British Island of Gruinard, which lies just off the coast of Scotland. Initial British testing of a prototype gravity bomb filled with a liquid suspension containing anthrax spores produced an aerosol cloud upon explosion that proved fatal to all exposed test animals within a 250 meter radius.10 The initial success of the prototype anthrax gravity bomb in 1942 led to further research by the British military and was of fundamental importance in initiating a parallel research effort in the United States at Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland.11 In a subsequent joint program proposed by the British, the United States, in coordination with Great Britain, began to mass produce bombs filled with anthrax for the British military in 1943 at Fort Detrick, Maryland.12 The joint US-UK project to produce the anthrax or "N-bomb" was intended to be employed as a retaliatory weapon against the German military had they chosen to use biological weapons against the allied nations.13 However, The U.K. offensive BW program was based on earlier research into biological warfare conducted by the famed Canadian physician Dr. Frederick Banting. After winning the Nobel Prize in 1923 for co-inventing the diabetic drug insulin, Dr. Banting went on to conduct offensive biological warfare research during the early 1940s in laboratories located at the University of Toronto. See, Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom: The history of America's secret germ warfare project (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1999), pp. 22-24. 9 Brian Balmer, Britain and Biological Warfare: Expert Advice and Science Policy, 1930-65 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 39-41. 1 0 Ibid., p. 41. 1 1 Stephen Endicott and Ed. Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp. 30-31. After the success of these initial anthrax dispersion tests, British researchers from Porton Down met with the Chairman of the War Research Service, George W. Merick, president of Merick & Co. pharmaceutical, and were successful in convincing the United States to begin offensive biological warfare research. See, Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom: The history of America's secret germ warfare project (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1999), pp. 24-27. 1 2 Stephen Endicott and Ed. Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 41. 1 3 Biological warfare scientists in Great Britain also developed another offensive biological weapon during WWII. This second weapon was dubbed the "W-bomb" and was designed to disperse the toxin ricin. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington, D . C : US Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 81. 2 unbeknownst to the United Kingdom in 1942, Adolf Hitler had ordered the German military in 1940 to restrict their research and development into biological weapons to defensive preparations.14 In the end, the German military did not employ biological weapons during WWII. While Germany exercised restraint with respect to the development and use of biological weapons during this period, the same can not be said of its war-time ally Japan. During WWII, the Japanese military not only conducted extensive research and development programs that aimed to create biological weapons, but also went on to employ many of the BW agents they weaponized during their military operations in Manchuria.15 It was not until the defeat and occupation of Japan in 1945 that the allied nations learned the full extent of Japan's biological warfare program. Over the course of the Second World War, the Japanese military had developed an advanced biological warfare progranTthat in many ways surpassed the research and development efforts of the allied nations. Under the leadership of Shiro Ishii, Unit 731 of the Japanese military successfully weaponized a wide variety of bacterial pathogens for use against a range of targets, including human beings, animals and plants.16 The activities of Unit 731 were especially important to the development of biological weapons in that they gathered scientific data through illegal experiments involving prisoners of war. In total, Unit 731 conducted over eight hundred experiments on human subjects during the war, which altogether provided scientific data on 24 different 17 pathogens and a variety of prototype weapon-systems. When U.S. intelligence became aware of the activities of Unit 731 at the end of WWII, the U.S. government made the decision not to 1 4 Wendy Barnaby, The Plague Makers: The Secret World of Biological Warfare (New York: Continuum, 2000), pp. 103-104. See Harris, Sheldon H. Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-45 and the American Cover-up. London, UK: Routledge, 1994. & George W. Christopher, et al., "Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective," Journal of the American Medical Association 278, no. 5 (August 1997): p.413. 1 6 Stephen Endicott and Ed. Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 40. 1 7 Ibid., p. 41. 3 prosecute the military officers in command of Unit 731 for their war crimes and instead, chose to offer Japan's scientists immunity in exchange for the detailed scientific information they acquired through their illegal human experimentation.18 In exchange for immunity from prosecution, General Ishii and his senior scientists provided the U.S. government with over two dozen interviews, thirty five reports, 8,000 slides detailing over eight hundred experiments involving human test subjects and three autopsy reports ranging from 350 to 800 pages.19 The information provided by Japan's biological warfare scientists was deemed highly valuable by U.S. biological weapons researchers and the information they provided was utilized to further develop the U.S. biological warfare program. Following the end of the Second World War, the United States, Great Britain and Canada began conducting more elaborate collaborative biological warfare tests in order to both develop more efficient methods of delivering pathogenic agents, as well as to identify additional naturally occurring microorganisms that could be used as biological weapons. Early biological warfare experimentation determined that the most effective means of deliberately infecting large numbers of human beings with pathogenic agents was through inhalation.20 Following these results, researchers in Great Britain, Canada and the United States began advanced experimentation with enclosed steel 'bursting chambers' to develop efficient methods of dispersing pathogens; however, these facilities quickly proved unable to safely deal 21 with toxic agents. In order to develop effective dispersal methods and test the stability of various pathogens upon release, scientists in Canada, the United States and Great Britain began 1 8 Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom: The history of America's secret germ warfare project (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1999), p. 129. 1 9 Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-45 and the American Cover-up (London, UK: Routledge, 1994), pp. 59, 64-65, 188, & 206-207. & Regarding the 8,000 slides see Stephen Endicott and Ed. Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Koreai(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 41. 2 0 Ibid., p. 70. 2 1 Brian Balmer, Britain and Biological Warfare: Expert Advice and Science Policy, 1930-65 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 111. 4 a series of field tests in selected areas that employed test animals and both simulated as well as live BW agents. In order to minimize the danger of contamination, many of these cooperative experiments involving live biological agents were conducted at'sea in the Bahamas during the period 1947-1955.22 Additional inland testing took place at the Canadian Armed Forces Suffield research station in Alberta and at both the U.S. military's Dungway Proving Ground in Utah and at Fort Detrick in Maryland.23 While controlled experiments using animal models, as well as both simulated and live pathogens provided essential information regarding biological warfare delivery, the British, Canadian and American governments also conducted secret experiments on their respective civilian populations in order to better ascertain the feasibility of biological warfare. Although there still remains a veil of secrecy surrounding the full details of these experiments, it is now known that the U.S. military conducted 239 simulated BW attacks over at least 17 different U.S. cities, as well as at least one Canadian city during the period 1947 through 1969.24 The U.S. military used six types of biological warfare stimulants for these experiments: 1) the fungus Aspergillus fumigatus,25 2) the bacteria bacillus subtilis26 3) the bacteria serratia marcescens, 4) the chemical compound zinc cadmium sulfide,21 5) the chemical compound The British military conducted extensive airborne testing of biological agents at sea during the period 1947-1955 under the operational names HARNESS, C A U L D R O N , HESPERUS, and NEGATION. A series of stimulant trials also took place off the coast of Great Britain during the period 1962-63. See citations in Ibid. , pp. 110, 116, 120, 124, & 179. (Respectively). See also Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom: The history of America's secret germ warfare project (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1999), pp. 122-126. 2 3 Ibid., p. 96. See also Stephen Endicott and Ed. Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 31. 2 4 See Wendy Barnaby, The Plague Makers: The Secret World of Biological Warfare (New York: Continuum, 2000), p. 89. as well as United States National Research Council, Toxicological Assessment of the Army's Zinc Cadmium Sulfide Dispersion Tests (Washington, D . C : National Academy Press, 1997), pp. 127-128. The Canadian city subjected to simulated BW attack was Winnipeg, Manitoba. 2 5 Leonard A. Cole Clouds of Secrecy: The Army's Germ Warfare Tests over Populated Areas (New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988), p. 45. 2 6 Ibid., p. 48. 2 7 Ibid., p. 46. 5 sulphur dioxide,2* and 6) soap bubbles?9 Finally, in addition to these secret experiments involving mass dispersals of BW simulants over civilian populations, the U.S. military also enlisted human volunteers from the U.S. military to undergo experimentation with non-lethal biological weapons. From 1954 through to the end of the 1960s, the U.S. military subjected over 2,200 U.S. Army Seventh-day Adventist volunteers to deliberate infection with over nine different infectious pathogens in order to provide conclusive human modeling for their biological weapons development program.30 The extensive animal and human testing conducted by the United States, the U.K. and Canada following WWII ensured that by the 1960s, many of the key principles associated with the effective weaponization and delivery of pathogenic microorganisms had been established. Western biological warfare scientists determined that biological weapons were most effective when employed in specific configurations and under specific environmental conditions. In particular, it was found that biological warfare agents were most potent when dried through a process of lyophilization and then milled into a fine power consisting of particles with a diameter of between 1 and 5 microns.31 The process of drying BW agents through lyophilization was found to be beneficial in that it stabilized and preserved pathogenic organisms for both storage and dissemination. The process of milling dried BW agents into a fine power within the critical 1 to 5 micron range was found to be beneficial for several reasons. First, dispersion testing of BW agents revealed that aerosol clouds consisting of m United States National Research Council, Toxicological Assessment of the Army's Zinc Cadmium Sulfide Dispersion Tests (Washington, D . C : National Academy Press, 1997), p. 116. 2 9 Ibid., p. 116. 3 0 Ed. Regis, The Biology of Doom: The history of America's secret germ warfare project (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1999), p. 168. 3 1 U.S. Congress"^  Office of Technology Assessment. Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington, D . C : US Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 93. & Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002), p. 16. & 203-204. The exception being the weaponization of toxins. Toxins are most stable when stockpiled and delivered in the liquid suspensions within which they were produced. Regarding the process of lyophilization see Thapa, P., A. J. Baillie and H. N. E. Stevens. "Lyophilization of Unit Dose Pharmaceutical Dosage Forms." Drug Development and Industrial Pharmacy. 29, no. 5 (2003): 595-602. 6 particles of a diameter less than 5 microns did not collide with smooth surfaces and were able to travel much father distances in comparison to aerosol clouds consisting of particles with a diameter greater than 5 microns. Second, aerosol testing on animal and human models determined that particles of a diameter exceeding 5 microns are often trapped and expelled by the mammalian upper respiratory tract, while particles with a diameter of less than 1 micron were often harmlessly exhaled.33 These results indicated that only aerosol clouds consisting of particles between 1 and 5 microns had a high probability of causing infection, as they were both able to penetrate into the lower portions of the human lung, and able to remain there long enough to be absorbed into the blood stream through the human lung's alveoli.34 Research into BW dissemination also allowed biological weapon researchers to determine the optimal environmental conditions under which to disperse BW agents for infection through inhalation. Specifically, BW agents proved most effective when released into the air on a clear, cold night, with a relative humidity above 70 percent.35 These conditions proved to be optimum for dispersal for several reasons. First, microorganisms are highly vulnerable to both ultraviolet radiation from the sun and dry environmental conditions.36 By dispersing BW agents at night and during a period of high relative humidity, one can ensure that the maximum number of pathogenic microorganisms remains viable within a disseminated aerosol cloud during its transit to its intended target. Second, atmospheric testing determined that during calm, cool nights, a stable blanket of air forms just above the ground. Importantly, this stable blanket of 3 2 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington, D . C : US Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 96. 3 3 Rex R. Kiziah, "The Emerging Biocruise Threat." Air and Space power Journal. 17, no. 1 (2003): 91. 3 4 Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002), p. 16. <fe 202-203. In addition, particles between 1-5 microns which penetrate into the lower portions of the human lung are far less likely to elicit an immune response, when compared to larger particles that are often trapped in the upper respiratory tract. 3 5 Rex R. Kiziah, "The Emerging Biocruise Threat." Air and Space power Journal. 17, no. 1 (2003): 91. 3 6 Pathgens are also vulnerable to oxygen saturation and atmospheric pollutants. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington, D . C : US Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 96. 7 air, called an "inversion-layer," undergoes limited vertical mixing with other layers of the atmosphere.37 It was determined through testing that when BW agents are dispersed into the inversion-layer of the atmosphere, one can dramatically increase both the number of individuals exposed to aerosolized pathogenic agents, and the number of microorganisms each individual within a target population inhales. While the detailed results of the British, Canadian and American biological warfare dispersion tests remain closely guarded secrets in each respective nation, the results of at least three of these experiments appear in the open literature. First, information from a declassified British experiment during the 1950s involving the air-born dispersal of 300 lbs of the BW stimulant zinc cadmium sulphide, at an altitude of 1000 ft above the North Sea, resulted in over 28 million people living in Great Britain receiving a dose of no less than 100 particles per ' 38 person, When these results were combined with data from subsequent U.S. tests, it is clear that this dosage was more than sufficient to infect all exposed individuals with any of the following highly infective pathogens: Brucellosis, Tularemia, Q-Fever, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis, or Smallpox?9 Second, the open literature also details the results of a similar field trial conducted by the U.S. military in 1950, in which two U.S. Navy minesweepers sprayed a live bacterial warfare stimulant over the city of San Francisco resulting in the effective exposure of over 800,000 individuals living within a 117 square mile area.40 Third, similar results were found when biological toxins were tested for stability and infectivity upon aerial dispersion by the U.S. Air Force. For example, in 1965, a single U.S. Air Force F4 Phantom 3 7 Rex R. Kiziah, "The Emerging Biocruise Threat." Air and Space power Journal. 17, no. 1 (2003): 91. 3 8 Brian Balmer, Britain and Biological Warfare: Expert Advice and Science Policy, 1930-65 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 161. 3 9 Ibid. See also United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, USAMRIID's Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook 4 t h ed. (Fort Derrick, MD: United States Army Medical Research, Institute of Infectious Diseases, 2001), p. 108. 4 0 Eric R. Taylor, Lethal Mists: An Introduction to the Natural and Military Sciences of Chemical, Biological Warfare and Terrorism (Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 1999), p. 147. 8 fighter jet released a live incapacitating BW toxin along a 40-50 mile downwind grid at Johnston Atoll Proving Ground and it was ascertained that this single release covered 2400 square kilometres and would have produced a causality rate of 30 percent among unprotected persons within the affected area.41 When taken together, the results detailed in the open literature concerning biological weapons testing make it clear that biological weapons can be effectively manufactured and dispersed to reliably expose large numbers of unprotected individuals under favourable environmental conditions. When the results of these Western biological warfare dispersion tests are considered in light of many of the microorganisms that were successfully weaponized by nations such as the United States, the characteristics of first generation biological weapons can be firmly established. In the years following WWII, biological weapons development focused on a broad range of microorganisms including bacterial, viral, rickettsial and fungal organisms. In each case, naturally occurring pathogenic microorganisms were selected using several key criteria— namely, survivability, infectivity and various degrees of morbidity and lethality. While a full survey and explication of all the organisms that have been considered for weaponization by various biological warfare programs is beyond an analysis of this size, a more narrow focus on the anti-personnel agents weaponized by the U.S. military provides an adequate foundation to understand the essential characteristics of first generation biological weapons. By 1960, the U.S. military had weaponized seven biological agents for use against human beings, including three lethal agents—anthrax, tularemia and the toxin produced by botulism, as well as four incapacitating agents—Q-Fever, brucellosis, Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) and Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom: The history of America's secret germ warfare project (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1999), p. 206. See also Jonathan B. Tucker, "A Farewell to Germs," International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): p. 112 9 staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB). 4 Z A brief introduction to each of these pathogens is sufficient to characterize first generation biological weapons. 1. Bacillus anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax is a spore-forming gram-positive bacteria that manifests symptoms in human beings anywhere from one to seven days after exposure (depending on the dose) and is nearly one hundred percent fatal in cases of pulmonary infection that are left untreated.43 Inhalation of 8,000 to 50,000 microbes will cause infection in human beings and in the absence of decontamination, these microbes will remain infective in soil for years.44 2. Francisella tularensis, the causative agent of tularemia is a gram-negative bacteria that manifests symptoms in human beings within two to five days of exposure.45 Infection through inhalation produces a pneumonia that is fatal to 30 to 60 percent of untreated individuals.46 Inhalation of fewer than 50 microbes will produce infection in human beings and in the absence of decontamination, tularensis microbes can remain viable in moist soil for months.47 3. Botulinum toxin is the causative agent of botulism (produced by Clostridium botulinum) and is one of the most poisonous substances known to exist.48 This BW agent is over 100,000 times more toxic than sarin nerve gas, produces symptoms within twenty four hours of A i George W. Christopher, et. al., "Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective," in Journal of the American Medical Association 278, no. 5 (1997): pp. 412-417. 4 3 Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002), p. 206. 4 4 United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, USAMRIID's Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook 4 t h ed. (Fort Detrick, MD: United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 2001), p. 21 & 108. Indeed, large areas of the British Island of Gruinard remained contaminated and unapproachable for over 47 years after the British military used the island to test its prototype anthrax gravity bombs during WWII. It was not until large quantities of the island's top soil were soaked multiple times with formaldehyde that the island was finally declared safe and returned to civilian use in 1990. See Wendy Barnaby, The Plague Makers: The Secret World of Biological Warfare (New York: Continuum, 2000), p. 92. 4 5 James A.F. Compton, Military Chemical and Biological Agents: Chemical and Toxicological Properties (Caldwell, NJ: The Telford Press, 1988), p. 347. 4 6 Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002), pp. 204 & 207. 4 7 Ibid., p. 204. 4 8 Ibid., p. 215. 10 exposure and is one hundred percent fatal in all untreated exposures greater than 10 millionths of a gram.49 In the absence of decontamination, botulinum toxin can remain stable in food or stagnant water for weeks.50 4. Coxiella Burnetii is the causative agent of Q-Fever and is a rickettsaie organism that manifests symptoms in human beings within 10 to 28 days of exposure and produces serious incapacitating symptoms that are usually non-fatal, but can persist for several months.51 Inhalation of a single coxiella Burnetii microorganism is sufficient to cause infection in human 52 beings. In the absence of decontamination, burnetii microbes can remain viable for months on media such as wood or sand.53 5. Brucellosis has several causative agents that all produce disease in humans within 2 to 4 days of exposure, and while fatal in less than one percent of untreated cases, the disease often results in permanent organ damage to those infected.54 Brucellosis is considered very stable upon aerosol dispersion and poses a prolonged environmental hazard in the absence of decontamination.55 6. Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE) produces incapacitation though inflammation of neural tissue in human beings, has an incubation period of 1 to 5 days and is fatal in less that M United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, USAMRIID's Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook 4 t h ed. (Fort Detrick, MD: United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 2001), p. 108. 5 1 Warren Levinson and Ernest Jawetz, Medical Microbiology & Immunology: Examination and Boar Review, 6 I h ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 2000), p. 153. see also James A.F. Compton, Military Chemical and Biological Agents: Chemical and Toxicological Properties (Caldwell, NJ: The Telford Press, 1988), p. 384. 5 2 Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002), p. 205. 5 3 United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, USAMRIID's Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook 4 t h ed. (Fort Detrick, MD: United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 2001), p. 108 5 4 James A.F. Compton, Military Chemical and Biological Agents: Chemical and Toxicological Properties (Caldwell, NJ: The Telford Press, 1988), p. 363-364. 5 5 United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, USAMRIID's Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook 4 , h ed. (Fort Detrick, MD: United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 2001), p. 108. 11 one percent of infected persons.3b V E E is considered unstable upon release and does not persist in the open environment for an appreciable duration of time under conditions approximating standard temperature and pressure (STP).5 7 7. Staphylococcal Enterotoxin Type B (SEB) is a toxin produced by staphylococcus aureus and produces incapacitating symptoms within 3 to 12 hours of exposure, but is rarely fatal to those exposed.58 SEB is considered stable upon release and can persist in the environment in the absence of strong light under a range of conditions, including temperatures that fall below freezing.59 When one considers both the BW agents which were weaponized by the United States by 1969, as well as their proven ability to disperse these agents over strategic targets, it is clear that by the late 1960s, biological weapons had been developed into a highly effective strategic weapons system that could kill or incapacitate hundreds of thousands, if not millions of unprotected persons in a single attack. Importantly, this first generation of biological weapons were defined by several key characteristics. First, they were indiscriminate in nature and invariably killed or incapacitated a wide variety of life forms within their target 'footprint.'60 Second, when dispersed into the air at night and under favourable meteorological conditions, these weapons could be effectively deployed from distances exceeding 100 miles upwind from b 6 James A.F. Compton, Military Chemical and Biological Agents: Chemical and Toxicological Properties (Caldwell, NJ: The Telford Press, 1988), p. 212. 5 7 United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, USAMRIID's Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook 4 t h ed. (Fort Detrick, M D : United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 2001), p. 108. 5 8 Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002), pp. 215-216. 5 9 United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, USAMRIID's Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook 4 t h ed. (Fort Detrick, MD: United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 2001), p. 108. 6 0 Jozef Goldblat, "The Biological Weapons Convention: An Overview," in The Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons: 25 Years on (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1997), p. 252. & Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002), p. 8. 12 their intended targets.61 Third, such weapons were virtually undetectable during delivery and could cause fatalities among target populations which were comparable to those provided by thermonuclear weapons, yet they provided this mass-casualty effect without causing the same level of physical destruction which accompanied virtually all nuclear weapons of that age. 6 2 Finally, not only were first generation biological weapons as pernicious as thermonuclear weapons in their effects, but they could be produced at a fraction of the cost making them a rational choice for any state seeking to maximise its military strength for the minimum outlay of capital. 6 3 Indeed, this estimate is conservative as some biological warfare agents can remain infective over distances approaching 125 miles down wind from their point of release. See Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002), p. 197. 6 2 Stephen Endicott and Ed. Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 64. Rex R. Kiziah, "The Emerging Biocruise Threat." Air and Space power Journal. 17, no. 1 (2003): 92. 6 3 Graham S. Pearson, "The Prohibition of Biological Weapons: Current Activities and Future Prospects," in The Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons: 25 Years on (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1997), p. 267. See also U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (Washington, D . C : US Government Printing Office, 1993) p. 8. 13 Chapter II: The Rational-Material and Normative Factors that Led to the 1972 B T W C Despite the fact that by the late 1960s biological weapons had become an effective strategic weapon-system with many advantageous characteristics, the United States unilaterally abandoned its biological weapons program in 1969 and went on to successfully promote the international Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which bans the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons. It is argued here that the factors that determined the U.S. policy change can be divided into two categories. First, normative considerations played a pivotal role in the U.S. decision to both abandon its offensive biological warfare program and to push for the development of the BTWC. Second, rational-material considerations also played a key role in the U.S. decision to abandon its offensive biological warfare program. While various researchers have tended to stress one category of factors over the other, it is argued here that both categories of factors functioned in a complementary fashion to convince the U.S. administration to abandon biological weapons in 1969. Finally, in each case, it is important to recognize that the normative and rational-material factors that led the U.S. government to abandon offensive biological warfare were ultimately dependent upon the characteristics of first generation biological weapons. - Normative Factors Disease is humanity's oldest and most dangerous common enemy. Over the course of history disease has killed and maimed more human beings than all of humanity's conflicts combined.64 Indeed, the single virus smallpox alone has killed more individuals than all of the Ibid., p. 267. For a more comprehensive outline of the influence of disease upon humanity see McNeil, William H. Plagues and Peoples. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1976. & Kiple, Kenneth F. et al. eds. The Cambridge World History of Human Disease. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 14 conflicts of the twentieth century.65 The long history of struggle between humanity and disease has ensured that since ancient times, the use of pathogens in war has been viewed as treacherous.66 By the 20th century, the deliberate use of disease in warfare had come to be viewed as a "barbarous," "inhuman," and "inhumane" act that should be both avoided and regarded with contempt by all 'civilized' nations.67 This view can be traced to the European idea of ius in hello—the notion that there are just and unjust means of prosecuting armed conflict. The ancient view that biological weapons are an unjust form of war was eventually codified in the Hague Convention in 1907 and the first attempts to delimit this form of warfare as unjust through legalization came in 1925, when biological weapons were included in the Geneva Protocol.68 The Geneva Protocol however, was not a ban on biological weapons per se, but rather a 'no first use' pledge between state signatories. In the absence of a prohibition on the research, development and stockpiling of pathogenic agents for the purposes of war, BW research continued within the U.S. military establishment until the desirability of the U.S. BW program began to come under critical scrutiny by members of the American scientific community during the 1960s. In the late 1960s Professor Matthew Meselson, a biologist working at Harvard University, and Dr. Joshua Lederberg, a geneticist working at Stanford, began taking part in public debates over the U.S. government's chemical and biological warfare policies.69 These scientists were critical of the U.S. military's offensive biological warfare program and the fact 6 5 Jonathan B. Tucker, Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001), p. 3. 6 6 Jozef Goldblat, "The Biological Weapons Convention: An Overview," in The Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons: 25 Years on (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1997), p. 251. 6 7 Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 96. 6 8 Graham S. Pearson, "The Prohibition of Biological Weapons: Current Activities and Future Prospects," in The Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons: 25 Years on (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1997), p. 273. 6 9 Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 98-100. 15 that the U.S. government had not ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol, despite the fact that over 40 years had passed since the U.S. had signed the declaration.70 The educational efforts of Meselson and Lederberg ultimately reached the American public through several television documentaries which outlined the horrific nature of biological warfare.71 Importantly, these television broadcasts caught the attention of Congressman Richard McCarthy, who became a powerful advocate for banning biological weapons within the U.S. Congress. Additionally, McCarthy also publicly endorsed U.S. ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and argued that the U.S. refusal to ratify thesconvention damaged America's international reputation because the development of such weapons was simply "immoral."72 McCarthy's efforts resulted in a lengthy congressional debate surrounding the morality of chemical and biological weapons and the debate placed significant pressure upon the incoming Nixon administration, which took office in January of 1969.73 When President Richard Nixon came to office, his administration faced a tremendous political hurdle as it attempted to re-establish governmental legitimacy in the eyes of the American public after years of domestic political turmoil over the Vietnam War. Importantly, the biological weapons issue had become linked to the controversial question of the use of chemical defoliants in Vietnam, which some civilian experts claimed violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The issue linkage between chemical weapons and biological weapons, made possible by the scientific community, as well as the media in 1969, ensured that biological weapons disarmament was a politically salient topic in the minds of the American public. This domestic political climate was also mirrored by an equally critical international criticism of U.S. policy 7 0 Ibid., p. 100. 7 1 Ibid., pp. 101-102. 7 2 Ibid., p. 102. 7 3 Indeed, McCarthy's congressional debates eventually led to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee making the decision in July of 1969 to remove all funding for the U.S. military's chemical and biological warfare programs for the 1970 fiscal year. See, Ibid., p. 107. 16 emanating from the United Nations, in which the U.S. government was increasingly portrayed as a reluctant supporter of the international norm against chemical and biological warfare (CBW). 7 4 Within this political atmosphere, Nixon faced strong motivations to devise a political policy that would allow him to stave off moral criticism over the U.S. military's chemical and biological warfare programs. - The Rational-material Factors In an effort to deal with the political criticism emanating from the American public, Congress and the international community, Nixon's Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird instructed National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to have the National Security Council (NSC) begin a full review of chemical and biological warfare policy.75 The NSC review was to address the issue of ratifying the Geneva Protocol and the implications of abandoning the U S . military's chemical and biological warfare programs. In response to the directives of Secretary Laird, three reports were generated by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group (IMPG), which consisted of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as well as the U.S. intelligence community.76 Importantly, the subsequent debate within the Nixon administration surrounding biological warfare disarmament was defined not only by the content of these reports, but also by many of the arguments that had been put forth by concerned members of the U.S. public. Those in favour of retaining an offensive biological weapons program were represented almost exclusively by members of the uniformed military on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The position of the JCS was supported by seven central arguments: 1) Biological warfare was low cost and retaining 7 4 Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 111. 5 Jonathan B. Tucker, "A Farewell to Germs," International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): p. 115. 7 6 Ibid., p. 117. the capability would not detract from other programs.77 2) Biological weapons could be reliably controlled during deployment and were effective military instruments on the battlefield.78 3) An offensive biological warfare capability needed to be maintained in order to deter the use of such weapons by nations hostile to the United States.79 4) Since biological weapons offered a significant advantage on the battlefield, which could not be redressed using conventional weapons, an offensive BW program needed to be maintained by the U.S. in order to respond "in kind" to states that chose to use them against U.S. forces.80 5) An offensive BW capability should be maintained, as such a capability could not be rapidly reconstituted if it became needed in the future to retaliate against the use of such weapons by states hostile to the United States.81 6) An offensive BW program was needed in order to provide a hedge against strategic surprise by hostile nations that might obtain new military capabilities through 82 continued research into biological weapons. Finally, the military was attracted to the idea of retaining the flexibility afforded by biological weapons as they allowed the military to 'depopulate' a given area while leaving its infrastructure intact. While each of these arguments were offered by the uniformed military as justification for their offensive BW program leading up to the CBW policy review, it soon became apparent that the civilian members involved in the review had a markedly different perspective. In contrast to the position of the JCS, the intergovernmental reports prepared by the civilian representatives from each of the U.S. departments involved in the policy review, as well as prominent experts from the American scientific community, advocated abandoning the 7 7 Ibid., p. 125. 7 8 Ibid., p. 120. 7 9 Ibid., p. 125. 8 0 Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 106-107. Jonathan B. Tucker, "A Farewell to Germs," International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): p. 125. 8 2 Ibid., p. 125. 8 3 Stephen Endicott and Ed. Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 64. 18 military's offensive biological weapons program. Their position was supported by ten central arguments: 1) Since biological weapons might mutate once deployed in the field, they were fundamentally unpredictable and could pose unforeseen dangers upon mass release.84 2) Many biological pathogens are persistent in the environment and could pose a threat to U.S. forces operating in any area in which they were used—one variation of the so called "boomerang effect."85 3) The mass release of a biological pathogen into an ecosystem could find long-term refuge in a naturally occurring animal or plant species and pose a prolonged threat to individuals living within the vicinity.86 4) If the U.S. abandoned their offensive biological weapons program, yet found themselves facing a state armed with a large-scale biological weapons capability in the future, the U.S. could be confident that they could deter the use of such weapons through counter threats of nuclear retaliation.87 5) By abandoning their offensive BW program, the U.S. could send a false, yet potentially useful message to the international community that biological weapons were not viable strategic weapons and discourage hostile states from obtaining a formidable BW capability.88 6) Banning biological weapons would work to prevent humanity from applying future scientific breakthroughs to create more powerful biological weapons that could expose humanity to new forms of disease.89 7) By abandoning their offensive biological warfare program, the U.S. government could remove any risks posed to the American public that could result from an accidental release of dangerous Jonathan B. Tucker, "A Farewell to Germs," International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): p. 119. 8 5 Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom: The history of America's secret germ warfare project (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1999), pp. 10, 20 & 221. The 'boomerang effect' is a term also used to describe a situation brought about by shifting winds, in which a biological warfare aerosol cloud shifts direction of travel upon release and is directed back upon the military force which initiated the BW attack. 8 6 Jonathan B. Tucker, "A Farewell to Germs," International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): p. 119. 8 7 Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002), p. 238. 8 8 Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom: The history of America's secret germ warfare project (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1999), p. 210. 8 9 This argument is attributed to Dr. Joshua Lederberg in Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 100. See also Jozef Goldblat, "The Biological Weapons Convention: An Overview," in The Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons: 25 Years on (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1997), p. 264. 19 pathogenic agents from military facilities. 8) Despite their ability to rival thermonuclear weapons in their ability to kill large unprotected populations, biological weapons ultimately relied on meteorological conditions, which are subject to variation and thus could not function as a reliable strategic deterrent.91 9) All of the biological warfare agents that had been developed by the United States had extended incubation periods and had limited tactical value during military engagements.92 10) Finally, the continuation of an offensive BW program prevented the U.S. government from engaging in diplomatic negotiations involving arms control initiatives.93 On the 25th of November 1969, President Nixon announced that the United States was both unilaterally abandoning its offensive BW program and would submit the Geneva Protocol to the U.S. Senate for its consent to ratification.94 Whether Nixon chose to abandon offensive biological and toxic weapons on primarily normative or rational-material grounds has been subject to competing interpretations; however, it is the assertion of this analysis that Nixon's decision was the product of the complimentary nature of the normative and rational-material considerations that faced the U.S. administration in 1969. It is clear that the Nixon administration faced tremendous political pressure emanating from the ethical and moral status of biological weapons and as long as the U.S. military continued its offensive BW program, the administration would be vulnerable to /domestic and international political criticism. Conversely, abandoning their offensive BW program would not only alleviate the international This argument is attributed to Dr. Joshua Lederberg in Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 100. 9 1 Jonathan B. Tucker, "A Farewell to Germs," International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): p. 127. 9 2 Ibid., p. 127. 9 3 Ibid., p. 125. 9 4 Just four months later the Nixon administration went on to include biologically produced toxins within the U.S.' renunciation. This decision seems to have been less controversial than the initial abandonment of microbial weapons. The lack of controversy surrounding the additional ban on toxin weapons seems to have had two dimensions. First, the U.S. the military believed that biological toxins would soon be able to be produced synthetically and thus, the additional ban on naturally produced toxins would not ultimately limit their capabilities. Second, the additional ban provided the Nixon administration with yet another moral political victory. See Ibid., pp. 137-138. 20 and domestic political pressure on the administration, but would also provide Nixon with an important moral political victory that would boost the image of his administration both internationally and domestically.95 When it came to weighing the rational-material costs of abandoning the U.S. offensive BW program, Nixon was unconvinced by the arguments put forth by the JCS. Nixon believed that biological weapons were unreliable as a strategic deterrent, of limited tactical utility and their use by states hostile to the United States could be deterred by the U.S. nuclear arsenal.96 Thus, in the absence of strong rational-material arguments to continue the U.S. offensive biological warfare program, Nixon seized the opportunity to ban biological weapons to gain much needed political credibility with both the American public and the international community. While negotiations to create an international ban on both chemical and biological weapons had been ongoing within the UN's disarmament forum in Geneva throughout the 1960s, they had become deadlocked near the end of the decade.97 Under these conditions, Nixon's unilateral renunciation of biological weapons provided new legitimacy to the multilateral CBW arms control initiative and helped convince the reluctant Soviet Union to agree to a British proposal made in 1972, which would first ban biological weapons and leave the issue of chemical weapons disarmament for future negotiations.98 To its credit, the BTWC was far more comprehensive than the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the treaty required state parties: 1) Never to develop, produce or stockpile biological agents or toxins of types or amounts that have no peaceful justification (Article I). 2) Never to 9 5 Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 111. 6 Jonathan B. Tucker, "A Farewell to Germs," International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): p. 127. See also Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002), p. 238. 9 7 Jozef Goldblat, "The Biological Weapons Convention: An Overview," in The Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons: 25 Years on (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1997), p. 252. 9 8 Jonathan B. Tucker, "A Farewell to Germs," International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): p. 141. T 21 develop weapons, equipment or delivery methods to use biological or toxic weapons for the purposes of war (Article I). 3) To destroy any existing biological and toxic weapons as well as delivery systems for such weapons in their current possession (Article II). 4) Never to aid other states in any endeavour to acquire or develop biological weapons or toxins or the means to deliver such weapons for the purposes of warfare (Article III).99 These measures made the BTWC a clear precedent in the history of international arms control as it was the first treaty to totally outlaw an entire class of effective strategic weapons.100 For all its success however, the BTWC lacked one important element—verification protocols. While the exact factors that led to the exclusion of verification protocols from the BTWC remain somewhat uncertain, current research points to resistance from both the U.S. and Soviet military establishments, which each believed that effective inspections would compromise vital state secrets.101 What is clear is that had the BWTC , contained verification protocols, the subsequent severe and clandestine violations of the BTWC would have been far more difficult to perpetrate. 9 9 See Appendix No. 1 for the text of the 1972 BTWC. Importantly, the state parties to the B T W C also agreed to meet every five years in order to conduct a Review Conference on each of the Articles in the convention and assess their applicability to any advances that had taken place in the field biotechnology. To date there have been five Review Conferences in Geneva Switzerland: 1) 3-21 March 1980, 2) 8-26 September 1986, 3) 9-27 September 1991, 4) 25 November-6 December 1996, and 5) 7 December 2001 & 11-12 November 2002. 1 0 0 Jozef Goldblat, "The Biological Weapons Convention: An Overview," in The Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons: 25 Years on (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1997), p.256. 1 0 1 Jonathan B. Tucker, "A Farewell to Germs," International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): p. 141. 22 Chapter III: Violations of the B T W C 1975-2003—The Need for Verification Protocols In the absence of verification protocols two factors were essential in motivating states to violate the BTWC. First, the global spread of biotechnology in the years following the creation of the regime allowed many developing states such as Iraq to legitimately acquire the technology necessary to develop first generation biological weapons. Second, advances within the field of biotechnology itself proved to be a pivotal factor in motivating advanced states such as the former Soviet Union, to violate their commitments to the BTWC and create a biochemically enhanced "second generation" of offensive biological weapons. When the activities of Iraq and more importantly the former Soviet Union were uncovered during the early 1990s, the state parties to the BTWC began a cooperative initiative in 1994 to develop verification protocols to bring credibility back to the international ban on biological weapons. - Iraqi Violations of the BTWC The spread of biotechnology over the past thirty years for the purposes of legitimate biotech research in areas such as pharmaceutical research and development, medicine, agriculture and the chemical industries has provided many developing states with the technology to develop first generation biological weapons.102 The former government of Iraq is the archetypal example of a state that has utilized dual-use biotechnology to rapidly construct a biological weapons capability.103 Though Western intelligence agencies had strong suspicions that the Iraqi government possessed a research and development effort aimed at developing 1 0 2 Graham S. Pearson, "The Prohibition of Biological Weapons: Current Activities and Future Prospects," in The Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons: 25 Years on (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1997), p. 269. 1 0 3 For a brief description of how Iraq obtained its biological warfare capability through legitimate technology transfers see Amy E. Smithson, "Man Versus Microbe: The Negotiations to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention," in Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for concern, courses of action (Washington D . C : The Henry L . Stimson Center, 1998), p. 107. & Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002), pp. 11-12. 23 biological weapons during the late 1980s, it was not until four years after the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War that Iraq began to reveal the magnitude of its non-compliance with respect to the B T W C . 1 0 4 Subsequent information obtained through human intelligence and by the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) determined that, since Iraq began its biological warfare program in 1985, it had managed in just five years to develop the capability to manufacture: 1) 8,000 litres of a liquid suspension of anthrax containing a cell count of 109/ml; 2) 20,000 litres of a liquid solution containing an unknown concentration of botulinum toxin; 3) 10 litres of the toxin ricin; and 4) 2200 litres of aflatoxin.105 The Iraqi military used this stockpile of biological weapons to arm 157-400 pound bombs, 25 A l Hussein missile warheads and an unknown number of 122-mm SAKR-18 rockets.106 While these figures are considerable and were clear violations of the BTWC, it is important to recognize that these BW weapon delivery systems relied on explosive ordinance to disperse their biological payloads and this greatly limited their military value.107 Of far greater concern was the uncovering of information that detailed how Iraq had acquired several hundred Italian-made pesticide dispersal systems that could generate aerosols in the optimal 1 to 5 micrometer range 108 for biological weapons dispersal. Furthermore, UNSCOM also collected records which detailed a series of tests carried out by the Iraqi military in 1991 involving a remote-piloted MIG-21 fighter aircraft armed with pesticide dispersal systems.109 Although it was not until 1995 that the UNSCOM inspections managed to verify many of the facts surrounding the Iraqi 1 0 4 Arms Control Association. Iraq: A Chronology of U N Inspections and an Assessment of their Accomplishments, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_10/iraqspecialoct02.asp. 15 April 2003. 1 0 5 Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" in Journal of the American Medical Association. 278, no. 5 (1997): pp. 418-419. Note that the vast majority of these BW stockpiles are believed to have been manufactured during the period 1990-1991. 1 0 6 Ibid., p. 420. 1 0 7 Ibid., p. 421. With the exception of anthrax spores, the vast majority of first generation biological warfare payloads dispersed by chemical explosive are destroyed during delivery. 1 0 8 Ibid., p. 420. 24 BW program, enough information had been uncovered in 1991 to raise serious concerns over the efficacy of the BTWC. - Soviet Violations of the BTWC The advancement of biotechnology over the past three decades has provided many technologically advanced states with the capability to enhance biological weapons through biochemical modification. Indeed, many of the initial breakthroughs in modern recombinant DNA techniques coincided with the creation of the BTWC. For example, in 1972 the first restriction enzymes were used to construct the first recombinant DNA molecules.110 Within one year the first mammalian gene had been introduced into a bacterial life-form, and within five years human DNA had been inserted into bacteria to produce somatostatin and insulin.111 These rapid advances in molecular biology and genetics were a primary factor in the Soviet Union's decision to violate its obligations to the B T W C . 1 1 2 The first signs of Soviet violations of the BTWC came in 1979, when a biological warfare production facility in the town of Sverdlovsk accidentally released a small amount of dried, weaponized anthrax which resulted in the death of 66 people.113 Although the Soviet Union denied that the outbreak was caused by Harry LeVine III, Genetic Engineering: A Reference Handbook (Denver, CO: ABC-CLIO, 1999), p. 83. 1 1 1 Ibid., pp. 84 & 86. 1 1 2 See Anthony Rimmington, "The Soviet Union's Offensive Program: The Implications for Contemporary Arms Control," in Biological Warfare and Disarmament: New Problems/New Perspectives, ed. Susan Wright (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 108-109. Although, it should be noted that several experts including Ken Alibek argue that the Soviet leadership believed that the United States was also violating the B T W C during the 1970s. In support of this argument, U.S. intelligence had been conducting an ongoing disinformation operation which passed falsified reports of advanced U.S. chemical and biological warfare research to the USSR through two Soviet spies, Sgt. Joseph Cassidy and Dmitry Polyakov. See Wise, David. Cassidy's Run: The Secret Spy War over Nerve Gas. New York: Random House, 2000. as well as Garthoff, Raymond, L. "Polykov's Run," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 56, no. 5. (Sept/Oct 2000): pp. 37-40. However, it is argued here that while these events were likely pivotal in encouraging the former Soviet Union to begin violating the BTWC, it is likely that the Soviet military's subsequent success in developing novel BW systems became the primary motivating factor for their continued illicit program. 1 1 3 Ken Alibek and Stephen Handelman, Biohazard (New York: Random House, 1999), p. 75. See also Harris, Elisa D. "Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain: Two cases of Soviet non-compliance?" International Security. 11, no. 4 (1987): 41-95. 25 biological weapons production, Western nations were unconvinced.114 Further evidence of Soviet violations were collected by U.S. intelligence in the late 1980s when American Naval ships and spy satellites began to track a series of abnormal Soviet tests involving Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) re-entry vehicles. The Soviet missile tests were abnormal in that: 1) the re-entry vehicles carrying the warheads were kept cool prior to launch, 2) each 'bus' was designed to keep its payload cool during re-entry into the atmosphere, and 3) upon re-entry into the atmosphere, the decent of each warhead was slowed through the deployment of small parachutes.115 These events were important as nuclear weapons required no such special re-entry conditions and the Soviet Union's abnormal re-entry trials were indicative of preliminary tests in the development of an intercontinental biological warfare delivery system. Further evidence of Soviet violations of the BTWC came in 1989 when Vladimir Pasechnik, a microbiologist and former Director of the Institute of Ultrapure Biopreparations in Leningrad, defected to Great Britain. Pasechnik was debriefed by British intelligence and indicated that he was involved in work for the Soviet military that focused on creating an antibiotic-resistant strain of Yersinia pestis, the causative agent of the plague.116 In response, the United States and Great Britain pressured Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to allow U.S. and U.K. inspectors into the USSR. Despite initial resistance, Gorbachev eventually allowed British and American inspectors to conduct tours of several facilities near Novosibirsk and Obolensk in 1991.117 During their brief inspections, the British and American representatives encountered an elaborate network of deceptions set up by the Soviet government to hide its massive offensive 1 1 4 Mark C. Storella, Poisoning Arms Control: The Soviet Union and Chemical/ Biological Weapons (Washington, DC: Corporate Press, 1984), pp. 32-33. 1 1 5 Richard Preston, The Demon in the Freezer (New York: Random House, 2002), pp. 87-88. 1 1 6 Wendy Barnaby, The Plague Makers: The Secret World of Biological Warfare (New York: Continuum, 2000), p. 107. 1 1 7 Ibid., p. 108. 26 118 biological warfare program. More substantial confirmation of the illicit Soviet program came just one year later in 1992, when Kanatjan Alibekov (now Ken Alibek), the former Deputy Chief of the Soviet's covert biological warfare program, immigrated to the United States and gave briefings to the U.S. intelligence community on the status of the Soviet offensive biological warfare program. According to Alibek, the Soviet Union had not only continued its offensive biological warfare research and development programs after negotiating the BTWC, but it had also expanded its program in 1973 under the cover of a civilian biopharmaceutical complex entitled "All-Union Scientific Production Association Biopreparat."119 At the height of its operations in the late 1980s, Biopreparat is estimated to have employed over 60,000 individuals in over 20 facilities involved in the research, production and testing of biological weapons.120 The size of the Soviet program was immense. Biopreparat was designed to produce hundreds of tons of both viral and bacterial biological warfare agents.121 The Soviet military had also devised a full range of BW delivery systems including a small fleet of medium range bombers fitted with aerosol dispersal tanks, strategic bombers that were equipped with cluster bombs as well as several MIRV-equipped SS-18 ICBMs. 1 2 2 Arguably, the most disturbing component of the Soviet program was the variety and character of the pathogens that were cultivated and enhanced for weaponization. Soviet scientists had used modern biochemical techniques to " y Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002), p. 235. 1 2 0 Ibid. 1 2 1 Anthony Rimmington, "The Soviet Union's Offensive Program: The Implications for Contemporary Arms Control," in Biological Warfare and Disarmament: New Problems/New Perspectives, ed. Susan Wright (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), p. 112. 1 2 2 Ibid. The SS-18 (NATO designation 'SATAN') I C B M had the largest throw weight and greatest range of any operationally deployed Soviet ICBM missile system. The utilization of the SS-18 to deliver BW payloads can be viewed as an indicator of the high level of value that the Soviet military placed on its strategic biological warfare program. Furthermore, Soviet research into other advanced BW delivery technologies included cruise missile dispersal systems and the microencapsulation of pathogens within thin polymer coatings to enhance their survivability during delivery. See Ken Alibek and Stephen Handelman, Biohazard (New York: Random House, 1999), p. 140. 27 create a full range of bacteriological weapons including anthrax, plague, tularemia and glanders which were resistant to multiple antibiotic treatments.123 The Soviet military also weaponized the highly contagious viral pathogen smallpox and a highly lethal strain of the Marburg filovirus.124 Furthermore, by the time Ken Alibek left Biopreparat, Russian scientists were completing the weaponization of the viral pathogens Ebola and Lassa fever, as well as continuing research into genetically enhancing many of the viral pathogens they had already weaponized.125 The objective of these projects was to create a new generation of biological 126 weapons that were medically untreatable. Soviet military strategists had planned to disperse these 'second generation' biological warfare agents over civilian populations in Western nations on a massive scale in order to cause systemic disruption to both civilian and military 127 activities. The justification for this strategy ultimately rested in a bid by the Soviet leadership to redress the perceived superiority of U.S. conventional military strength through an asymmetric strategy of strategic biological warfare.128 The uncovering of the Soviet Biopreparat program and its utilization of advanced biotechnology to create a new generation of enhanced biological weapons was the single greatest blow to the credibility of the BTWC since its inception. 1 2 3 Wendy Barnaby, The Plague Makers: The Secret World of Biological Warfare (New York: Continuum, 2000), pp. 109. (wide-spectrum antibiotic-resistant plague), 142 (wide spectrum antibiotic-resistant anthrax). See also Ken Alibek and Stephen Handelman, Biohazard (New York: Random House, 1999), pp. 159-161. (regarding Soviet efforts to create antibiotic-resistant tularemia and the general trend of this type of research within Biopreparat). 1 2 4 Ken Alibek and Stephen Handelman, Biohazard (New York: Random House, 1999), pp. 107-122 (smallpox), 132-133 (Marburg). 1 2 5 Ibid., p. 133. 1 2 6 Ibid., p. 160. 1 2 7 Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002), p. 234. 1 2 8 Anthony Rimmington, "The Soviet Union's Offensive Program: The Implications for Contemporary Arms Control," in Biological Warfare and Disarmament: New Problems/New Perspectives, ed. Susan Wright (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 109-110. 28 - The International Response In response to the Iraqi and Soviet violations of the BTWC, the international community undertook four initiatives. First, the voluntary export restraint group comprised of Western nations known as the Australia Group extended its export restrictions to cover many additional dual-use technologies that could be used for biological weapons development.129 This response was most likely motivated by the utilization of dual-use biotechnology by the Iraqi government to develop its BW program. Second, following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was created to investigate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and to verify that these programs had been terminated in accordance with the peace agreement signed in 1991.130 Third, in light of the Soviet Union's systemic violations of the BTWC, the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia negotiated a limited set of reciprocal inspections in 1991, and later a larger Trilateral Verification Process in 1992 to verify Russia's compliance with its obligations under the convention.131 The Trilateral Verification Process began in October of 1992 in Russia and involved inspections of both military and civilian facilities by representatives from both the U.S. and the U . K . 1 3 2 This initial exchange was followed by a reciprocal verification envoy of Russian inspectors who toured facilities in the U.S. and U.K. in February-March of 1994.133 Although the exact details surrounding the Trilateral Process are classified, what is know is l z y Jonathan B. Tucker, "Verification Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and their Relevance to the Biological Weapons Convention," in Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for concern, courses of action (Washington D . C : The Henry L . Stimson Center, 1998), p. 100. & The Australia Group. Origins of the A G . http://www.australiagroup.net/origins.htm. 15 April 2003. 1 3 0 David Malone, "Goodbye U N S C O M : A sorry tale in US-UN relations," Security Dialogue 30, no.4 (1999): 393-394. 1 3 1 Ono Kervers, "Strengthening Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention: The Protocol Negotiations," Journal of Conflict and Security Law 7, no. 2 (2002): 280. 1 3 2 Malcolm Dando and Graham S. Pearson, "The Fourth Review Conference and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Issues, outcomes, and unfinished business," Politics and the Life Sciences 16, no. 1 (1997): 114. 133 1 U ; A 29 that the exchanges broke down in 1994 and the U.S. and U.K. currently remain unconvinced that Russia is in full compliance with its obligations under the convention.134 While these three measures were important first steps in attempting to restore credibility to the BTWC during the early 1990s, they did not represent a long-term strategy to address the more fundamental challenges posed to the BTWC regime. Any effective long term strategy that would repair the regime banning biological warfare would need to take into account the two factors that were essential in instigating the Iraqi and Soviet violations— namely the diffusion and advancement of biotechnology. Importantly, when one considers the immense medical and economic benefits that biotechnology can bring to both developing and developed states alike, it would be both impossible and indeed undesirable to restrict the diffusion or advancement of biotechnology as part of any long-term strategy to bring credibility back to the convention. It was in this context that a fourth initiative was undertaken by the international community to restore credibility to the regime by creating an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (VEREX) to consider verification protocols for the treaty at the convention's Third Review Conference in 1991.135 In the absence of any controls over the global spread and development of biotechnology, the institution of multilateral verification protocols within the BTWC was the only realistic measure to allow states to both accrue the benefits of biotechnology, while at the same time work to prevent its use to develop biological weapons. The VEREX committee was charged with identifying measures that could determine: Marie I. Chevrier, "Doubts About Confidence: The Potential and Limits of Confidence-Building Measures for the Biological Weapons Convention," in Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for concern, courses of action (Washington D . C : The Henry L . Stimson Center, 1998), pp. 60-61. 1 3 5 Graham S. Pearson, "The Prohibition of Biological Weapons: Current Activities and Future Prospects," in The Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons: 25 Years on (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1997), p. 275. 30 1. Whether a State Party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining microbial or other biological agents or toxins, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or peaceful purposes; 2. Whether a State Party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.136 The VEREX committee evaluated a wide variety of verification instruments designed to fulfill these two objectives using the following six criteria: 1. Their technical strengths and weaknesses, including the amount and quality of information provided. 2. Their ability to distinguish between prohibited and honprohibited activities. 3. Their ability to resolve ambiguities about activities. 4. Their technology, material, manpower and equipment requirements. 5. Their financial, legal, safety, and organizational implications. 6. Their impact on scientific research, cooperation, industrial development, and other permitted activities and implications for the protection of commercial proprietary information.137 After four meetings during the period 1992 through 1993, the VEREX committee presented its final report in September 1993, which recommended twenty-one verification measures that could be employed to provide greater assurance of state compliance to the BTWC (see Table 1 below for a full listing of the recommended measures).138 The twenty-one verification instruments recommend by VEREX were to be applied to both field investigations and biotechnology facilities. Field inspections would be undertaken in order to investigate suspicious outbreaks of disease that differed substantially from the historically established disease patterns within a given geographical area.139 Facility investigations were subdivided into two general types: 1) routine inspections of "relevant" facilities, which would be chosen randomly and have significant prior notification, and 2) challenge inspections, which would be 1 3 6 BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/8: Summary Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint (Geneva: Fourth Session of the State Parties of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Special Conference, 1993), p. 1. 1 3 7 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D . C : US Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 76. 1 3 8 Ibid. 1 3 9 Ibid., 107. 31 used to inspect facilities suspected of il l icit activity and would have very little prior notif ication. 1 4 0 Finally, while the V E R E X committee argued that its twenty-one recommended verification measures could be utilized to provide additional assurance of state compliance to the convention, the committee also stressed that no single verification instrument would be able to provide such assurance when utilized in isolation. 1 4 1 Table 1: BTWC Verification Measures Recommended by VEREX On-Site Measures Off-Site Measures Exchange Inspections Continuous Information Data Remote Inspections Visits Monitoring Monitoring Exchange Sensing - international - interviewing -by - surveillance - declarations - surveillance - sampling and arrangements. - visual instruments of publications - notifications. by satellite identification inspections -by - surveillance - surveillance - observation - identification personnel. of legislation by aircraft - auditing. of key - data on - ground-equipment transfers, based - auditing transfer surveillance. - sampling and requests and identification production - medical - multilateral examination. information sharing. At the request of the majority of its members, the state parties to the B T W C met in a Special Conference in 1994 and created an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) to consider implementing the V E R E X verification protocols. Over the next seven years the state parties to the convention went through 24 rounds of formal negotiations in an effort to finalize a set of verification instruments that would be acceptable to the treaty's membership. Despite the fact that these negotiations were complicated by various political interests, including a sharp division over 140 Importantly, the routine inspection mechanism would randomly select facilities for investigation from a pre-determined list of sites that are located within the borders of the state parties to the convention. Just which facilities qualify as "relevant" would be determined by the nature of the work carried out at a given facility, as well as the type and quantity of equipment present within a facility. For example, biodefense institutes or sites that are equipped with high containment World Health Organization (WHO) Biosafety level 3 or Biosafety level 4 (BL-3 or BL-4) rated facilities would be placed on the "routine" inspection list. See Kathleen C. Bailey, Why the United States Rejected the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Fairfax, V A : National Institute for Public Policy, 2002), p. 8. 1 4 1 Michael Moodie, The B W C Protocol: A critique (Washington, D . C : The Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2001), p. 10. 32 issues of technology transfer between the so called Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states and many advanced industrial states involved in the Australia Group, a set of draft protocols began to gain a broad consensus at the turn of the millennium. Unfortunately, this progress was ultimately undercut by the United States. At the 25th and final session of the AHG, the U.S. Ambassador Donald Mahley announced that the United States government not only rejected the draft verification protocols that had been developed by the A H G over the preceding seven years, but he also indicated that the U.S. government had decided to reject the very process of negotiating multilateral verification protocols for the B T W C . 1 4 2 In 2001, U.S. Ambassador Mahley outlined the five main reasons why the U.S. had rejected the draft verification protocols in a speech to the AHG. According to Mahley, the U.S. government believed that the draft protocols: 1) would not facilitate the detection of illicit activity,143 2) would put at risk the corporate secrets of U.S. firms engaged in legitimate research and development,144 3) would compromise efforts by the U.S. military to develop effective defences against biological weapons,145 4) were being used by developing states to undermine the Australia Group's export control regime, and 5) would not deter 'rogue' states from violating the convention.146 The current U.S. administration's opposition to the proposed verification protocols is the product of five key factors. First, the U.S. government is of the opinion that the technology required to produce biological weapons is of a type and character that effectively prohibits' detection and identification of illicit biological warfare programs. These sentiments were widely believed to be validated through the experiences of the inspectors operating within the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). As seen through the eyes of U.S. 1 4 2 The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy. B W C Protocol Bulletin, July 25, 2001. United States Rejects Protocol - Jenni Rissanen. http://www.acronym.org.uk/bwc/bwc05.htm. 2 March 2003. 1 4 3 Ibid. 1 4 4 Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002), p. 246. 1 4 5 Ibid. 1 4 6 Ibid. 33 political leaders, years of intrusive multilateral inspections by the United Nations following the 1991 Persian Gulf War were unable to determine whether or not the Iraqi regime was in compliance with its obligations under the BTWC. These facts were tremendously important in convincing the U.S. government that multilateral inspections are of little value in detecting and identifying the activities of those states that are intent on violating the convention. The second factor that led the U.S. government to reject the draft protocols concerns the existence of a strong lobby for the U.S. pharmaceutical industry through the association for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA). The private firms that comprise the multi-billion dollar U.S. biotechnology industry are strongly opposed to the creation of multilateral verification protocols for several reasons, the most important of which concerns the potential loss of corporate and proprietary business information (CBI). Simply put, many U.S. biotechnology firms believe that other states are intent on utilizing the inspection process as a cover for industrial espionage to acquire extremely valuable technical information to benefit their own biotechnology industries. Third, the U.S. government sees export restraint as an important component in their counterproliferation strategy and believes that it will have to make compromises with respect to these policies in order to gain enough political support from the convention's developing states to successfully institute the verification protocols. Fourth, the U.S. military opposes the institution of verification protocols on the grounds that other states could utilize the verification regime as a means to acquire valuable tactical-military information about the U.S. biodefense program, which could then be used against the United States in a future military confrontation. Finally, while each of these four considerations represent sufficient grounds to scrutinize the proposed verification measures, it is also important to recognize that the current U.S. administration perceives three of these four factors to share an inverse relationship with respect to their potential for improvement. Specifically, 34 any attempt to improve the probability that the proposed inspections will uncover illicit activity by making them more intrusive, will bring with them an increased probability of compromising both the legitimate corporate secrets of U.S. biotech firms, as well as the legitimate biodefense efforts of the U.S. military. Faced with the seemingly zero-sum trade off between the protection of U.S. economic and security interests on the one hand, and supporting effective protocols for the BTWC on the other, it seems that the U.S. government has chosen the former over the latter. Central to the issue of U.S. support for the proposed verification protocols is the fact that most state parties to the convention view U.S. participation as essential, not only because of the prominent position of the United States within the international community, but also because the U.S. is the world leader in the biotechnology industry. The categorical rejection by United States of the efforts by the A H G to negotiate a multilateral BTWC verification regime has effectively prevented the international community from rectifying the most fundamental weakness of the regime. In order for the international community to restore credibility to the international ban on biological warfare, a strategy must be devised that will recommit the U.S. government to strengthening the BTWC. 35 Chapter IV: Appraising the U.S. Opposition to the Proposed B T W C Verification Regime Despite its logical appeal, the U.S. position is not without weaknesses. Indeed, it is curious that other advanced industrial states that face the same perceived trade-offs, albeit to a lesser extent, have backed the process of developing multilateral verification protocols. The difference in perception between the United States and other advanced industrial countries is a function of their respective estimates of the costs and benefits of less-than-perfect verification protocols. While the U.S. seems unwilling to accept verification protocols that produce nothing less, than incontrovertible verification of compliance or violation, the United Kingdom, Germany and France see verification protocols as just one part of a larger regime that promotes compliance.147 The U.K. and European state parties see even 'less-than-perfect' verification protocols as an important component in a layered system of verification that not only includes multilateral inspections, but also covert and overt intelligence activities.148 In this view, multilateral BTWC verification protocols would work to increase the probability of detecting violations, while providing legal mechanisms to deal with non-compliance once it has been detected. No arms control verification process can ever be expected to provide near-perfect guarantees of detecting and identifying illicit activity and the development of verification instruments for the BTWC should not be held against such an extreme standard. From this perspective, verification protocols can be crafted in a less stringent configuration in order to both protect the most vital economic and defense-related activities of state parties, while still contributing to a wider multi-layered verification regime. When one considers the current U.S. policy toward the development of verification protocols in this context, it is clear upon critical analysis that each of the five main arguments 1 4 7 Wendy Barnaby, The Plague Makers: The Secret World of Biological Warfare (New York: Continuum, 2000), pp. 170-171. 5 4 8 Ibid., p. 171. 36 that support the U.S. position have critical weaknesses. The following sections will first explicate each of the individual arguments that support the U.S. policy and then provide a critical analysis outlining why each argument, in isolation and in combination, do not provide adequate grounds to support the current U.S. position. Moreover, when one appraises the U.S position in its totality, the critical weaknesses inherent in the current administration's policy toward verification protocols, combined with the benefits that the United States would accrue from the institution of a BTWC verification regime, provide strong grounds for the U.S. administration to reconsider its current policy. - The Proposed BTWC Verification Protocols will not Detect Illicit Activity First and foremost, the current U.S. government believes that the proposed verification instruments will not be able to detect and identify illicit activity.149 This position is the product of two factors. First, since the inception of the BTWC, successive U.S. administrations have been of the view that compliance to the convention can not be verified through inspections due to the dual-use nature of the technology involved.150 This historically consistent perspective has had an enormous impact on the current administration's policy and is based on the characteristics of the technology required to produce first generation biological warfare agents. For example, in its most basic configuration, the development of an offensive biological warfare agent production facility, that is intended to produce first generation biological weapons, requires three basic components. First, seed cultures of pathogenic or toxin 1 4 9 The distinction between the detection of anomalies and their identification as evidence of illicit activity should be recognized as all facilities will have some inconsistencies while pursuing legitimate activities. Furthermore, while the process of identifying illicit activity based on anomalies that have been detected during an inspection can have a quantitative character, it should be noted that such judgements will ultimately be determined by a qualitative judgement that is made by weapons inspectors. This judgement will be based on the character of the detected inconsistencies and the plausibility of any alternative explanations provided by the facility under investigation. 1 5 0 Micheal Moodie, The B W C Protocol: A critique (Washington, D . C : The Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2001), p. 9. 1 37 producing organisms must be obtained. Small seed cultures of such organisms can either be acquired from naturally occurring reservoirs within a state's borders, or can be ordered from over 472 international organizations that are currently based in over 61 different countries.151 Second, growth media is required to develop a seed culture of pathogenic or toxin producing agents into a much larger stockpile of agent in order to arm biological warfare delivery systems. Importantly, media for the growth of microorganisms can either be imported from international suppliers or manufactured domestically. Third, a biological warfare program requires fermentation equipment within which to grow biological warfare agents from growth media and seed cultures. Fermentation equipment, like growth media, can be either manufactured domestically or can be imported from any one of several international manufacturers. Once acquired, seed culture, growth media and fermentation equipment can be utilized to rapidly produce highly concentrated liquid suspensions of biowarfare agents. For example, a 100 litre capacity fermenter filled with the appropriate seed culture and growth media can be used to produce ten thousand million infectious doses of anthrax in just one week.152 Of central importance to verification is the fact that all of the equipment necessary to construct a biological warfare agent production facility is dual-use in nature and its presence at a given location can not be used by weapons inspectors to definitively identify violations of the BTWC. For example, given that seed cultures of pathogenic or toxin producing microorganisms can be used for medical and military biodefense research, as well as to produce offensive biological weapons, their presence alone at a research facility is not a clear 1 5 1 Kathleen C. Bailey, Why the United States Rejected the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Fairfax, V A : National Institute for Public Policy, 2002), p. 9. 1 5 2 United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Countering the Threat from Biological Weapons, http://files.fco.gov.uk/npd/ btwc290402.pdf. 5 June 2002, p. 4. 38 indication of illicit activity. In a similar fashion, since growth media can be used to grow microorganisms for industrial production and legitimate research, as well as for the production of illicit biowarfare agents, its presence at a facility is not necessarily evidence of noncompliance. Finally, fermentation equipment can also be used for both legitimate as well as illicit activity and its presence in and of itself, is not evidence of a treaty violation. In light of the dual-use nature of biological warfare agent production equipment, the architects of the BTWC qualified Article I of the convention. Article I of the BTWC only bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of microorganisms or toxins "of types and quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes." The two caveats contained in Article I concerning "types" and "quantities" immensely complicate the process of verifying state compliance with the convention. For example, it is extremely difficult to establish noncompliance with respect to the "types" of microorganisms and toxins present at a given facility, as all microorganisms have some measure of applicability in medical, defensive military or purely scientific research. On the other hand, one might foresee less ambiguity surrounding the qualification of Article I with respect to the possession or production of "quantities" that clearly have no justification for peaceful purposes. Indeed, at least in theory, one would expect to be able to quite clearly establish a case of noncompliance if an inspection team were able to uncover the production of biological warfare agents at an industrial facility designed to produce large volumes of microorganisms. Unfortunately, large-scale industrial production assemblies that have been manufactured to mass produce microorganisms are designed to be easily and rapidly cleaned in order to ensure high levels of purity within facility production lines. For example, batch 39 fermentation assemblies can be disassembled and manually cleaned in under eight hours. More sophisticated continuous-flow fermentation production assemblies that are equipped with "clean-in-place-technology" can be effectively cleaned within approximately one hour. 1 5 4 This capability to rapidly and effectively clean production facilities makes the acquisition of clear evidence of biowarfare agent production within a large-scale industrial facility highly unlikely. Finally, the most ardent critics of the BTWC verification protocols argue that the ambiguities inherent in Article I warrant the assertion that the convention is fundamentally unverifiable, as any small amount of material evidence that might be uncovered through inspections could never conclusively establish a case of noncompliance.155 The second important factor that led the U.S. government to believe that a state's compliance with respect to the BTWC can not be established through inspections, concerns the various obstacles encountered by UN inspectors when they attempted to determine if Iraq was in compliance with the BTWC following the 1991 Persian Gulf War. While some scholars have argued that the UNSCOM inspections were clear examples of the technical efficacy of biological weapons inspections, these so called 'successes' need to be put in perspective.156 1991 Post-Gulf War Iraq was a defeated state that was subject to a peace agreement which provided UNSCOM inspectors with an extremely high level of intrusiveness that was unlike any other set of verification instruments in the history of arms control. Despite UNSCOM having nearly all the advantages that could be expected in the 'best case scenario' for any 1 5 3 Gillian R. Woollett, "Industry's Role, Concerns, and Interests in the Negotiation of a B W C Compliance Protocol," in Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for concern, courses of action (Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1998), p. 48. 1 5 4 Ibid. 1 5 5 It would seem that for those holding this extreme position, verifying compliance with the B T W C is not a matter of defining and detecting the material conditions that represent treaty non-compliance; but rather, a matter of determining the intent of state parties possessing the technology required to produce biological weapons. 1 5 6 Regarding the 'technical success' of UNSCOM's activities in Iraq following the 1991 Persian Gulf War see Stephan Black, "UNSCOM and the Iraqi Biological Weapons Program: Technical Success, Political Failure," in Biological Warfare, and Disarmament: New Problems/New Perspectives, ed. Susan Wright (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), p. 285. 40 multilateral effort aimed at determining whether a state is in compliance with the BTWC, the unwillingness of the Iraqi government to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors turned the inspection process into a decade-long struggle, which ultimately culminated in a second Gulf War in 2003, complete with an invasion and the removal of the Iraqi government. Indeed, it took over four years of surveillance and investigation before the international community was able to collect enough information on Iraq's BW activities to establish with any credibility that Iraq ever possessed an illicit biological warfare program. More to the point, the information that was eventually brought to light which established the Iraqi violations was acquired through an Iraqi defector and not through the UNSCOM inspections.157 Indeed, despite more than seven years of intrusive on-site investigations, during which time UNSCOM inspection teams used all 21 verification measures recommended by VEREX, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq was never able to either confirm or deny that the Iraqi regime had actually destroyed its stockpile of biological weapons.158 When one considers the tremendous obstacles that were encountered by UNSCOM under the best of conditions, it is not difficult to see why the U.S. government has come to believe that verification protocols for the BTWC would be ineffective in either deterring or identifying violations by state parties that are determined to pursue clandestine biological warfare programs. Hussein Kamel Hassan Majeed, Lieutenant General and son-in-law of Saddam Hussein, left Iraq in 1995 and provided UN. inspectors with information about Iraq's secret biological warfare program. The defection of Kamel led to further disclosures by the Iraqi regime. For a chronological history of UNSCOM's activities in Iraq as well as their inability to provide conclusive evidence that Iraq had destroyed its biological weapons following the 1991 Persian Gulf War see Arms Control Association. Iraq: A Chronology of U N Inspections and an Assessment of their Accomplishments, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_10/iraqspecialoct02.asp. 15 April 2003. 1 5 8 Ibid. & Michael Moodie, The B W C Protocol: A critique (Washington, D . C : The Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2001), p. 18. 41 - Verification Protocols can Provide a Strategically Significant Level of Assurance of State Compliance to the BTWC While it is clear that the verification instruments proposed by VEREX are not able to detect and identify all instances of noncompliance, they are able to provide a 'strategically significant' level of assurance of state compliance to the convention. First, the value of the proposed verification regime should not be measured against its ability to provide absolute and incontrovertible evidence of compliance or non-compliance in each and every inspection. Near perfect verification of compliance is not possible within any international arms control agreement and should not be the standard against which the proposed BTWC verification instruments should be gauged. Rather, the effectiveness of the proposed verification protocols should be evaluated against their ability to provide adequate assurance of state compliance to the BTWC. Just what defines "adequate assurance" is a matter of competing interpretations, yet some common basis may be found when one considers that the fundamental purpose of the convention is to improve the security of the participating states through the cooperative elimination of biological weapons. Commensurate with the primary purpose of the BTWC, each individual state party should first measure the efficacy of the proposed verification instruments in relation to their ability to secure their state from threats of biological warfare. While the proposed verification protocols will not detect and identify all instances of noncompliance, they can detect instances of noncompliance that are significant enough to pose a strategic threat to the United States. With respect to the national security of the United States, a strategic biological warfare threat has three important characteristics: 1) it has the capability to kill or incapacitate a large portion of a major unprotected population under a wide range of environmental and meteorological conditions, 2) it is secured against destruction from a preemptive military attack, and 3) it can not be effectively defended against using active and/ or passive defenses. 42 Such a strategic biological warfare capability could be utilized by a state hostile to the United States in any number of scenarios, ranging from direct attacks on U.S. population centres, to regional attacks on major population centers of states allied with the United States. In any scenario, what is important to understand is that in order to be effective over a wide range of environmental and meteorological conditions, be secure from preemptive destruction and overcome both the active and passive defenses utilized by the U.S. military, an offensive biological warfare program would need to have the ability to produce and stockpile large quantities of both biological warfare agents and BW delivery systems for at least four reasons. First, the ability to produce large quantities of BW agents would be necessary in order to ensure that a potential aggressor would retain maximum'flexibility in their ability to attack the strategic assets of the U.S. at a time of their choosing. While it has been demonstrated that a relatively small amount of BW agent can be used to reliably infect a large number of unprotected individuals under optimal dispersal conditions, BW agents released under less than ideal environmental and/or meteorological conditions are far less effective. Biological warfare agents dispersed by aerosol upwind from their intended target are subject to degradation if exposed to sunlight, high concentrations of atmospheric pollutants, low levels of relative humidity and turbulent air flows.159 In order to effectively conduct offensive biological warfare under less than ideal environmental and/or meteorological conditions using first generation biological warfare agents, a state would need to utilize far more agent in a given attack to 1 5 9 Rex R. Kiziah, "The Emerging Biocruise Threat," Air and Space power Journal 17, no. 1 (2003): 91. While almost all first generation biological warfare agents are vulnerable to adverse environmental conditions (the exception being anthrax spores), the use of appropriate genetic alterations or microencapsulation within a protective, dyed polymer, could be used to enhance the survivability of biological agents upon exposure to adverse environmental conditions. Yet, despite these possibilities, genetic alterations and microencapsulation are unable to overcome the difficulties posed by adverse meteorological conditions, which could prevent adequate amounts of BW agent from reaching their target. Only the use of additional agent can be used to overcome the dispersion effects of turbulent meteorological conditions and provide the greatest probability that enough BW agent will reach its intended target when conducting a BW attack under adverse meteorological conditions. Regarding microencapsulation technology see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D . C : US Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 94. 43 achieve the same effect on a given target, in comparison to the amount of agent that could be used under ideal environmental and meteorological conditions.160 Therefore, any state intent on developing the capability to either conduct or credibly threaten strategic biological warfare against the United States, at a time of their choosing, would need to develop the ability to produce large amounts of biological warfare agents. Second, a state seeking to develop a BW capacity that could pose a strategic threat to the United States would need to possess a large stockpile of both BW agent and BW delivery systems in order to secure their biological warfare capability against preemptive destruction by U.S. military forces. The current operational planning by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has placed a premium on the preemptive destruction of biological weapons.161 Counterforce operations are considered to be the 'first layer' in the U.S. military's operational doctrine designed to deal with threats of biological warfare. According to the JCS, "Every NBC weapon we destroy before it is used is one less we must intercept, protect against or recover from." 1 6 2 In light of U.S.^  military planning, any state seeking to develop an offensive biological warfare capability that could pose a credible strategic threat to the United States would need to take steps to secure their biological warfare arsenal from preemptive destruction by the U.S. military. In theory, planning for the assured survival of an offensive BW capability could involve various measures; however, the protection of a state's BW stockpile, productive infrastructure and BW delivery systems would likely mirror the operational military planning that has been undertaken by various states seeking to assure the survival of their nuclear forces 1 6 0 Graham S. Pearson, "The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the 21s1 Century," in Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for concern, courses of action (Washington D . C : The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1998), p. 18. 1 6 1 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-11: Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Environments. 11 July 2000. Page II-5. Available online: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_ll.pdf . 5 July 2003. 1 6 2 U.S. Department of Defense, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear. Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations (Fort Monroe, V A : U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, 2003), p. 1-3. 44 against similar threats of preemptive destruction. From this perspective, there are several strategies that a state might choose to pursue in an effort to ensure the survival of their offensive BW capability, including policies that rely on the principles of dispersal, mobility and stealth. Yet, in light of the U.S. military's tremendous counterforce capability, any state seeking to provide a high level of assurance that their offensive BW capability could not be destroyed through a disarming first strike, would ultimately need to rely on sheer numbers. Indeed, the larger a state's offensive BW program, the more difficult it would be for the U.S. military to destroy it through a preemptive attack. Thus, states seeking to assure the survival of an offensive BW program from preemptive destruction would require a large stockpile of both BW agents and offensive BW delivery systems. Third, in order to develop a BW capability that could overcome the active defenses available to the United States, a state would need to produce and stockpile large amounts of both biological warfare agents and BW delivery systems. Active defenses against a biological warfare attack concern all measures that can be taken to prevent biological weapons from reaching their intended targets once an attack has been initiated and includes measures such as air and missile defenses.163 Given the proven ability of the U.S military to defend and control air space, any state seeking to develop a strategic BW capability that could pose a credible threat to the United States would need to develop the capability to overcome the active defenses that are available to the U.S. military. Theoretically, there are several strategies that a potential aggressor could use to increase the probability of overcoming the active defenses of the U.S. military. For example, a state might make use of highly complex and meticulously coordinated operational military plans and/ or highly advanced BW weapon delivery systems 1 6 3 Graham S. Pearson, "The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the 21s1 Century," in Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for concern, courses of action (Washington D . C : The Henry L . Stimson Center, 1998), p. 23. 45 such as cruise missiles.104 Despite the increased probability of success that these strategies provide in overcoming the active defense measures employed by the U.S. military, their ability to provide assurance that enough BW agent would successfully penetrate the active defenses available to U.S. military in any given attack, would ultimately depend upon the ability of the attacker to saturate the air and missile defenses of the United States with a sufficiently large attack. In order to ensure the saturation of the active defenses available to the U.S. military and ensure that a sufficient amount of BW agent reaches its intended target to produce the desired effect, any successful strategic BW attack against the U.S. would need to employ a large quantity of both BW agents as well as a large number of biological warfare delivery systems. Fourth, in order to develop an offensive BW capability that can overcome the passive defenses available to the United States, a state would require a large stockpile of BW agents as well as a large number of BW delivery systems. Passive defenses against a biological warfare attack involve all measures that can limit the damage that biological weapons can inflict after they have reached their intended target, and include measures such as physical protection, medical treatment, vaccination programs, quarantine protocols and decontamination procedures.165 In order to pose a strategic BW threat to the United States, a state would need to acquire the ability to overwhelm the passive defenses that are available to the United States. While there is no doubt that the passive defenses that have been developed by the U.S. biodefense program are among the best in the world, they are ultimately vulnerable to saturation when faced with a sufficiently large biological warfare attack. Current and projected stockpiles of vaccines, antibiotics, protective masks and decontamination chemicals are limited and are not able to provide adequate defense for a major civilian population from a major BW 1 6 4 Rex R. Kiziah, "The Emerging Biocruise Threat," Air and Space power Journal 17, no. 1 (2003): 88. 1 6 5 Graham S. Pearson, "The Threat of-Deliberate Disease in the 21 s t Century," in Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for concern, courses of action (Washington D . C : The Henry L . Stimson Center, 1998), p. 23. 46 attack.166 Thus, any state seeking to develop a biological warfare threat that could overcome the passive defenses of the United States would need to produce and develop a large stockpile of both biological agents and BW delivery systems. Given the sheer size of an offensive biological warfare program that has been designed to serve as a strategic threat to the U.S., it is clear that the proposed BTWC verification protocols recommended by VEREX would provide a significant level of assurance of detecting and identifying offensive biological warfare programs that have been designed to pose a strategic threat to the United States. The proposed verification instruments are able to provide significant assurance of detecting and identifying strategic biological warfare threats to the United States for three important reasons. First, while much of the analysis surrounding the debate over the proposed BWTC verification regime has focused on the ability of the proposed verification protocols to detect and identify illicit BW agent production, it should also be recognized that the proposed verification instruments need to be considered with respect to their ability to detect illicit research, development, testing, production and stockpiling of biological warfare delivery systems. Consideration of illicit activities relating to BW delivery systems is important in the context of assessing the proposed verification instruments as such activities, equipment and infrastructure can not be "cleaned up at the push of a button" in the same manner as evidence of illicit BW agent production. Such systems could include aerial dispersion spray tanks for planes and cruise missiles, as well as cluster-bomb units for ballistic missiles and gravity bombs.1 6 7 From this perspective, the large numbers of biological warfare 1 6 6 For a description of the difficulties in responding to a large-scale BW attack upon a major civilian population see Michael T. Osterholm and John Schwartz, Living Terrors (New York: Delacorte Press, 2000), pp. 127-143. 1 6 7 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D . C : US Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 98. This list is by no means exhaustive. For example, the Iraqi military employed concrete within otherwise standard ballistic missile re-entry vehicles to design ballistic missile warheads that were capable of shielding BW agents from the heat of atmospheric re-entry. See Avigdor Haselkorn, The Continuing Storm: Iraq, poisonous weapons, and deterrence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 73. Soviet scientists on the other hand, conducted extensive trials using actively cooled 47 delivery systems that would be required to field an offensive biological warfare program large enough to pose a strategic threat to the U.S., would provide hard evidence of noncompliance that could be detected and positively identified by trained weapons inspectors. Moreover, the research, development, testing, and production of biological warfare delivery systems in quantities that could give a state a strategic biological warfare capability against the United States, would provide multiple avenues through which additional intelligence 'signatures' could be detected and positively identified as noncompliant behavior by the verification instruments under consideration. Second, the proposed verification instruments would be able to detect levels of illicit biological warfare agent production that are designed to pose a strategic threat to the Uniied States for two reasons. First, while critics rightly point out that the proposed verification protocols can not provide perfect assurance of detecting illicit BW production, it should also be recognized that no effort to conceal such illicit BW production can ever be perfect either. Evidence of illicit production will exist in virtually all instances of non-compliance and can be detected by trained weapons inspectors. Take for example the case of Iraq. Critics of the UNSCOM inspections argue that even under the best conditions, UN inspectors were unable to conclusively prove that Iraq was in violation of the BTWC; yet, UNSCOM inspectors were able to uncover multiple inconsistencies that could only be explained by systemic Iraqi violations of the B T W C . 1 6 8 For example, UN weapons inspectors located lyophilization equipment at Iraq's Salman Pak facility that was designed to mill dried cultures of microorganisms into a fine power, consisting of particulate matter within the critical 1-5 re-entry vehicles for the same purpose. See Richard Preston, The Demon in the Freezer (New York: Random House, 2002), pp. 87-88. , . 1 6 8 Marie I. Chevrier, "Doubts About Confidence: The Potential and Limits of Confidence-Building Measures for the Biological Weapons Convention," in Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for concern, courses of action. (Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1998), p. 72. 48 micron range used for biological weapons production.169 This discovery was especially damming as equipment designed to mill cultures of microorganisms into particulate matter of this size has no legitimate commercial purpose. Since this equipment was not declared as part of a legitimate biodefense program, its discovery by UN weapons inspectors provided strong evidence to support the contention that the Iraqi regime was in violation of its commitments to the B T W C . 1 7 0 Third, as the size of an illicit BW agent production program grows, it becomes more difficult to conceal its existence from competent weapons inspectors. Indeed, as an offensive BW agent production program increases in size to produce large quantities of agent, so too do the number of inconsistencies within the deception that must be employed to mask such illicit activity. The greater number and more grievous nature of the inconsistencies that would accompany a large covert BW agent production program would allow weapons inspectors to detect the presence of illicit activity and positively identify the presence of such inconsistencies as evidence of a covert BW production program. The Soviet offensive biological warfare program stands as a testament to this principle. During the reciprocal inspections in 1991, following the defection of Vladimir Pasechnik, U.S. weapons inspectors were readily able to detect and identify strong evidence of illicit offensive biological warfare production. For example, U.S. weapons inspectors were able to identify large steel bursting chambers that were pock-marked by explosive-dispersal testing. When U.S. and U.K. weapons inspectors inquired about the explosive scarring evident within the steel bursting chambers, Soviet scientists denied that it was from BW weapon dispersal tests and claimed that it was l o y Stephan Black, "UNSCOM and the Iraqi Biological Weapons Program: Technical Success, Political Failure," in Biological Warfare and Disarmament: New Problems/New Perspectives, ed. Susan Wright (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), p. 293. 1 7 0 Additional hard evidence of Iraqi non-compliance was obtained by the U.S. military following the 2003 Iraq war when they obtained several mobile biological warfare production facilities. See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Production Plants. 23 May 2003. Published online by the Central Intelligence Agency at http://www.odci.gov/cia/reports/iraqi_mobile_plants/paper_w.pdf. Accessed 5 July 2003. 49 caused by "hammering" during installation.171 Enormous fermenters were also found within research facilities that were of a size so large that they had no justifiable purpose within a commercial pharmaceutical production plant, let alone at a biotechnology facility whose primary focus was on basic research.172 Furthermore, when the U.S. and U.K. inspectors conducted inspections of Vector, one of the Soviet Union's most advanced virology labs, one of the biological warfare research technicians working there simply told the foreign inspectors that he was conducting experiments involving the virus smallpox.173 The Soviet government even neglected to move specialized BW agent production equipment out of plain sight, equipment which had been designed by the defector Pasechnik and described in detail to U.S. weapons inspectors prior to their arrival in the Soviet Union. 1 7 4 It is argued here that these blatant oversights were the inevitable outcome of an attempt to conceal an offensive biological warfare program of such an immense size. Moreover, when viewed from a more comprehensive perspective, the point becomes even more salient. In 1991, the Soviet government had nearly all the advantages that a potential BTWC violator could have in a 'best case scenario,' including: 1) advanced notification of the inspections, 2) the ability to control and limit the timing of inspections at each of the faculties subjected to investigation, and 3) the absence of highly intrusive verification instruments such as biochemical sampling and analysis.175 Indeed, even when the Soviet Union had all the advantages, the difficulties in concealing such a large offensive BW program ensured that multiple signatures of 1 7 1 See, Ken Alibek and Stephen Handelman, Biohazard (New York, NY: Random House, 1999), pp. 199-200. 1 7 2 Ibid., p. 202. 1 7 3 Richard Preston/The Demon in the Freezer (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 90. This revelation was highly suspicious as the variola virus smallpox had been eradicated by 1980 through the World Health Organization's (WHO) global vaccination program. According to the WHO, the smallpox virus only existed in two small, frozen stockpiles located in the Soviet Union at Vector, and at the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States. Under these conditions, there was no plausible and legitimate reason why a Soviet biological warfare scientist should be working on the smallpox virus. 1 7 4 Ken Alibek and Stephen Handelman, Biohazard (New York, NY: Random House, 1999), pp. 203-204. 1 7 5 Ibid., pp. 193-206. 50 noncompliance remained; signatures which could be detected and positively identified by trained weapons inspectors using even the most unobtrusive verification measures recommended by VEREX. Drawing from these three principles, one can begin to reappraise the value of the proposed verification protocols by differentiating between the concepts of uncertainty and risk within the context of arms control verification. With respect to the verifiability of state compliance to an arms control agreement, uncertainty refers the probability that a set of verification instruments can detect and identify treaty violations.176 When a set of arms control verification instruments provide a high probability of detecting and identifying violations, then there exists a low level of uncertainty surrounding the verifiability of state compliance to the treaty under consideration. Conversely, when the verification instruments used to verify compliance to an arms control agreement do not have a high probability of detecting and identifying illicit activity, then there exists a high level of uncertainty with respect to the verifiability of state compliance to the agreement in question. Importantly, when considering the verifiability of an arms control agreement, the concept of uncertainty should be sharply differentiated from the concept of risk. In the context of arms control verification, risk refers to the potential costs that a state party might incur if they continue to adhere to an agreement that limits their armaments, while a potential competitor breaks its commitments to the agreement and clandestinely arms, thereby improving its relative military power in comparison to any state that continues to adhere to the limits of the agreement.177 Clandestine defection of state parties from a collaborative disarmament treaty can represent varying degrees of risk for those states that elect to continue to adhere to the limits stipulated by an arms control agreement. For 1 7 6 For a comprehensive discussion of uncertainty and risk in arms control verification see Stephen M . Meyer, "Verification and Risk in Arms Control," International Security 8, no. 4 (1984): 117-119. 1 7 7 Ibid., p. 118. 51 example, when a state does not stand to loose a substantial level of relative military capability if it continues to adhere to an arms control treaty when other states clandestinely defect, then the arms control agreement entails little risk to its participants. On the other hand, if a state does stand to lose a significant measure of relative military capability if it continues to adhere to an arms control treaty when other states clandestinely defect, then the arms control agreement entails very high risk to its participating states. In the context of the BTWC arms control agreement it is clear that detection and identification of small biological warfare programs is highly uncertain; however, it is important to recognize that such stealthy programs do not pose a serious risk to U.S. national security as they do not represent strategic threats to the United States. On the other hand, the uncertainty surrounding the detection and identification of large biological warfare programs is much lower; yet, the risks posed by larger strategic programs are much greater. From this perspective, the United States would benefit greatly from the proposed verification measures. By supporting the verification protocols, the United States would be far better equipped to detect strategic biological warfare threats as clandestine offensive biological warfare programs have proven to be extremely difficult to detect and identify when relying heavily on covert intelligence. For example, despite its massive size, the United States was unable to detect and accurately identify the clandestine Soviet biological warfare program, despite over fifteen years of intensive covert intelligence surveillance. It was not until the United States was able to send its own inspectors on verification missions inside the Soviet Union's biological research facilities that identification of their clandestine BW program was possible. While critics quite rightly point out that the proposed verification protocols will not be able to detect and identify low levels of cheating reliably, the risks posed by the types of programs that can be effectively concealed from weapons inspections are of marginal concern given the wide range of military 52 defenses and responses that the United States has at its disposal. Indeed, the inability of the proposed verification protocols to detect and identify small violations of the BTWC, which pose marginal risks to U.S. security, are not adequate grounds for rejecting the protocols when compared to the substantial security benefits that the United States can accrue by utilizing the verification protocols to detect and identify large biological warfare programs which represent strategic threats to U.S. security. Thus, from the perspective of the United States, it is clear that the proposed BTWC verification protocols are able to provide an adequate level of assurance of state compliance to the convention and their institution would be an important means through which to secure the United States against threats of strategic biological warfare. - BTWC Verification Protocols Will Compromise the Corporate Secrets of U.S. Firms The U.S. government has been heavily influenced by the U.S. biotechnology industry and believes that the proposed verification protocols will result in the loss of valuable corporate and proprietary business information (CBI) through industrial espionage. U.S. concerns over industrial espionage are considerable as the U.S. biotechnology industry is by far the largest and most advanced in the world. The U.S. pharmaceutical industry alone is worth over $120 billion dollars and produces over 80% of the world's new pharmaceutical and biotechnology products.178 Importantly, the biotechnology industry is also heavily dependent upon research and development and reinvests more of its revenue back into R&D than any other high technology sector including the electronic, aerospace, automobile and computer industries.179 This high dependence upon research and development has led to aggressive 1 7 8 Kathleen C. Bailey, Why the United States Rejected the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Fairfax, V A : National Institute for Public Policy, 2002), p. 14. 1 7 9 Gillian R. Woollett, "Industry's Role, Concerns, and Interests in the Negotiation of a B W C Compliance Protocol," in Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for concern, courses of action (Washington D . C : The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1998), p. 41. 53 industrial espionage within the biotechnology industry and currently costs U.S. firms over 3 billion dollars per year in lost revenues.180 Moreover, industrial espionage within the biotechnology industry is not only highly profitable, but also relatively easy to accomplish. For example, the acquisition of a single genetically engineered DNA sequence can compromise hundreds of millions, or even billions of dollars in research and development investment and can allow a competitor firm to avoid paying the tremendous overhead costs necessary to develop a new biotech product.181 Based on these facts, as well as a strong lobby from the U.S. biotechnology industry united under PhRMA, the current U.S. government has come to believe that BTWC verification protocols should not be endorsed as their implementation would represent a significant risk to the U.S. economy. - Verification Measures can be Designed to Provide Assurance of Detecting Strategically Significant Noncompliance to the BTWC, while Protecting CBIfrom Industrial Espionage While state concerns over the potential misuse of the proposed verification protocols for industrial espionage should be taken seriously, they are not adequate grounds for the U.S. government to withdraw its support for the proposed BTWC verification regime. A verification regime can be designed to effectively limit the ability of state parties to utilize the proposed verification protocols to conduct industrial espionage against other state parties to the convention. In theory, at least four areas of the proposed verification regime can be designed to limit the ability of state parties to utilize the proposed verification protocols for the purpose of industrial espionage. First, the organizational procedures that will govern the authorization of challenge inspections at biotechnology facilities are tremendously important in preventing states from 1 8 0 Ibid., p. 40. 1 8 1 Ibid., p. 44. 54 using the verification protocols to steal the industrial secrets of U:S. firms. In order to prevent the misuse of the challenge inspection system to subject U.S. firms to undue verification for the purposes of espionage, either a high red-light, or a low green-light voting threshold for inspection authorization from the executive council of the proposed BTWC Organization could be implemented.182 In the case of a red-light procedure with a high, voting threshold in the range of a two thirds majority, a challenge investigation would be undertaken by the BTWC unless two thirds of the states that comprise the executive council vote to stop the challenge investigation. Within the high-threshold red light configuration, the United States could be confident that flagrant abuses of the challenge investigation instrument would be stopped by state parties on the executive council that have an interest in securing the continued cooperation of the United States both within, and outside the issue area of biological weapons disarmament. In a similar fashion, a low-threshold green light configuration could provide the United States with protection against flagrant abuses of challenge investigations by requiring a full one third of the BTWC executive council to approve any challenge inspections that state parties attempt to undertake. Under a low-threshold green light system, states would be limited in their ability to utilize the verification protocols to subject U.S. firms to high volumes of challenge inspections as many state parties on the executive would once again, have an interest in ensuring the continued cooperation of the United States both within, and outside the issue area of biological weapons disarmament. Thus, the voting procedures that are implemented to govern the authorization of challenge inspections could be designed to prevent state parties from subjecting U.S. firms to undue verification for the purposes of espionage. Onno Kervers, "Strengthening Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention: The Protocol Negotiations," Journal of Conflict and Security Law 7, no. 2 (2002): p. 287. 55 Second, the proposed BTWC Organization could employ professional, full-time 183 inspectors to conduct both routine and challenge inspections. Professional BW inspection positions could be crafted in a manor that would restrict both the desire and ability of weapons inspectors to utilize their profession to steal industrial secrets from foreign firms involved in biotech research. For example, inspectors could be hired on a long-term basis, adequately compensated for their services and be required to sign non-disclosure agreements that carried criminal penalties for utilizing their position for the purposes of industrial espionage. Third, BW weapons inspectors could utilize the twenty-one verification protocols recommended by V E R E X in a "layered" or "ever-deeper" approach to detect and identify violations of the convention. This type of approach would prevent firms engaged in legitimate research and production from being routinely subjected to extremely intrusive verification 184 measures. Such an approach would first detect anomalies that could be evidence of non-compliance through the application of non-invasive verification instruments such as visual inspections, interviews and auditing. If and when anomalies arise, weapons inspectors could then pursue explanations for such anomalies using ever-more invasive techniques in order to either allow a facility to provide a plausible explanation for the presence of inconsistencies, or to go on to identify and characterize a case of state noncompliance. Furthermore, the use of a graduated verification system that incrementally increases in intensity to account for anomalies found during an investigation would not only minimise the potential loss of CBI, but also Gillian R. Woollett, "Industry's Role, Concerns, and Interests in the Negotiation of a B W C Compliance Protocol," in Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for concern, courses of action (Washington D . C : The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1998), p. 49. 1 8 4 For a description of such an 'even deeper approach' created by industry experts, see House of Cards: The pivotal importance of a technically sound B W C monitoring protocol (Washington, D . C : The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2001), p. 24 56 provide additional assurances against 'false positives' that could inappropriately damage the public image of a firm involved in legitimate activities. Fourth, when adequate explanations can not be found to account for anomalies found during a facility investigation and weapons inspectors require more intrusive instruments to better ascertain the status of a facility under inspection, steps can be taken to protect the CBI of firms subjected to more intensive verification instruments. For example, the taking of physical samples from within a biotech facility has the highest potential for the loss of CBI and private firms engaged in biotechnology research, development and production are particularly adverse to the use of this type of invasive instrument.186 Nevertheless, sampling and analysis techniques can be designed to severely limit the risks associated with the potential loss of CBI. For example, samples could be taken immediately and killed from production assemblies, waste treatment lines, frozen storage vials and air filters at the beginning of both routine and challenge inspections. After such samples had been collected, they could be locked within a 187 sealed container which remains within the facility under investigation. If multiple layers of inspection are unable to clear a facility during an inspection, then weapons inspectors could analyse the samples that were initially collected and characterize them using various established chemical assays designed to detect known biowarfare agents. Such assays could be based on immunological principles that key on the antigenic structures of known biological 1 8 5 False positives were a major concern to the U.S. government after the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense undertook practice inspections during the period 1994-1996. The mock U.S. inspections were conducted at 1) a vaccine production facility, 2) a university medical school, 3) a DoD biological weapons defense laboratory, 4) an explosive test facility and 5) the most advanced aerosol-biology facility in the United States. DoD and the Department of Energy interpreted the results of these inspections as evidence that the proposed B T W C inspections would produce ambiguous data that would neither confirm, nor deny facility compliance with the B T W C . See Kathleen C. Bailey, Why the United States Rejected the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Fairfax, V A : National Institute for Public Policy, 2002), p. 12. 1 8 6 Regarding the resistance of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry to the use of sampling to verify compliance to the B T W C , see Gillian R. Woollett, "Industry's Role, Concerns, and Interests in the Negotiation of a B W C Compliance Protocol," in Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for concern, courses of action (Washington D . C : The Henry L . Stimson Center, 1998), p. 49. 1 8 7 House of Cards: The pivotal importance of a technically sound B W C monitoring protocol (Washington, D . C : The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2001), p. 83. 57 warfare agents and would not need to involve procedures such as genetic characterization, 1 8 8 which could reveal the trade secrets of a facility under investigation. Still, when more conclusive biochemical analyses such as genetic sequencing are utilized by biological weapons inspectors, procedures can be crafted to protect the CBI of firms subjected to such intensive 189 investigation. For example, in cases where genetic mapping is utilized to characterize samples taken from a facility suspected of illicit activity, such samples could be first cut into smaller sequences using restriction enzymes by a qualified third party facility. The reduced DNA samples could then be sent to a fourth facility, which is not privy to the types of restriction enzymes that were used or in what order they were applied to the samples under investigation. This fourth facility could then compare the fragmented DNA sequences against the genetic sequences of known biological warfare agents. The key advantage to such a process would be that no one agency involved in the inspection process at any given time, would have both the necessary biochemical information and the physical samples required to reconstruct the original genetic sequence containing the proprietary information of the facility under investigation. A procedure of this type would provide a high probability of detecting the production of known biological warfare agents at a given facility, while still providing significant protection of CBI to U.S. firms engaged in legitimate activities. Thus, by designing appropriate voting procedures to authorize the use of challenge inspections, in combination with the employment of professional inspectors and the use of appropriate verification methodologies, it is clear that the proposed verification protocols can be crafted to both provide adequate verification of treaty compliance, while at the same time, 1 8 8 Regarding immunological assays, see Richard W. Titball and Graham S. Pearson, "BWC Verification Measures: Technologies for the identification of biological warfare agents," Politics and the Life Sciences 12, no. 2 (1993): pp. 258-260. 1 8 9 Jonathan B. Tucker, "Verification Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and their Relevance to the Biological Weapons Convention," in Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for concern, courses of action (Washington D . C : The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1998), p. 95. 58 protect the CBI of U.S. biotechnology firms involved in legitimate research, development and production. - The Proposed Protocols will Undermine U.S. and Allied Export Restraint Policies The U.S. government is reluctant to support the proposed verification protocols because it believes that, in order to secure the support of many developing nations for the proposed verification mechanisms, it will have to lift many of its export control policies that restrict the export of dual-use biotechnology. This, concern stems from the fact that many developing states that have been involved in the A H G protocol negotiations have argued that the export restrictions of many developed states, harmonized through the Australia Group, violate Article X of the BTWC. The Australia Group member-states currently restrict the export of a wide variety of dual-use biotechnology equipment, including, among others, large fermentation systems, sophisticated continuous-flow production assemblies, complete Biosafety Level 3 & 4 laboratories, large capacity lyophilization equipment and microencapsulation technology.190 In addition, the Australia Group States have also placed export restrictions on a wide variety of pathogenic microorganisms, including 20 viruses, 4 rickettsiae organisms, 19 toxins and 13 bacteria.191 These extensive export restrictions have prompted developing states to argue that the Australia Group states are in violation of Article X of the BTWC, which states that: i y u In June 2002, the Australia Group extended its export control policies to include a wider range of biotechnology production and safety equipment. For a complete listing of the equipment and microorganisms under export restraint within Australia Group member states see The Australia Group. The Australia Group- LIST OF D U A L - USE BIOLOGICAL EQUIPMENT .http://www.australiagroup.net/control_list/bio_equip.htm. 15 June 2003. 1 9 1 See The Australia Group. The Australia Group- LIST OF BIOLOGICAL A G E N T S FOR EXPORT. http://www.australiagroup.net/control_list/bio_agents.htm. 15 June 2003. The Australia Group has also placed export restrictions on a range of plant and animal pathogens, see The Australia Group. The Australia Group- LIST OF P L A N T PATHOGENS FOR EXPORT CONTROLS, http://www.australiagroup.net/control_list/plants.htm. 15 June 2003. & The Australia Group. The Australia Group- LIST OF A N I M A L PATHOGENS FOR EXPORT C O N T R O L , http://www.australiagroup.net/control_list/animal.htm. 15 June 2003., respectively. 59 1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other states or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes. 2. This convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of State Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. The United States on the other hand, views its export restraint policies as an important and effective component in its counterproliferation strategy, which is designed to prevent the international spread of biological weapons. This political tension has led the U.S. government to reject the proposed verification protocols, because it believes that it will have to make concessions in the form of reductions in its export restraint policies in order to secure the cooperation of many developing states. - The Benefits Provided by Verification Protocols Outweigh the Costs Associated with Reductions in U.S. Export Restraint Controls The U.S. concerns over the potential concessions that it might have to make in order secure the cooperation of many developing states are not adequate grounds to reject the proposed verification protocols for at least two reasons. First, the Australia Group export restraint policies are in fact a minor barrier to states determined to develop an offensive biological weapons program. Indeed, most, if not all of the equipment and microorganisms necessary to develop a first generation offensive biological warfare program can be developed or acquired from industries and natural sources within a state's borders. The items or organisms that a determined proliferator is unable to manufacture or acquire from domestic 60 sources can be imported from states that do not have export restraint policies that restrict the international sale of dual-use biotechnology. More to the point however, the Australia Group's export restraint control policies have proven woefully inadequate in their ability to stop determined proliferators in the past from obtaining dual-use technology from firms operating from within Australia Group member states. Take for example, the case of Libya. From the period 1984 through to 1987, the Libyan government employed front companies, false documentation to disguise the end destinations of exports, and elaborate circuitous shipping routes to obtain enough equipment from Australia Group states to construct the largest chemical weapons production complex in the developing world. 1 9 2 By utilizing these various strategies, Libya was able to successfully circumvent the export restraint controls of multiple Australia Group members and acquire equipment, chemicals and engineering expertise from private German, Japanese, Italian, French, Danish and U.S. firms.1 9 3 The ability of the Libyan government to by-pass the export restraint policies of multiple Australia Group states highlights the fact that such policies are not adequate as a means with which to stop states determined to acquire the dual-use technologies necessary to produce illicit armaments. This is riot to suggest that export restraint policies have no value in impeding the international spread of the dual-use technology required to produce prohibited weapons, but rather, to point out that they have substantial limitations. Given the ability of determined proliferators to 1) domestically manufacture or acquire many of the resources necessary to develop a biological weapons program, 2) import the resources necessary to develop a BW capability from states that do not have export restriction on dual-use biotechnology, as well as 3) the substantial 1 9 2 Thomas C. Wiegele, The Clandestine Building of Libya's Chemical Weapons Factory: A study in international collusion (United States: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), pp. 46-47. Although the case of Libya concerns the circumvention of the export restraint policies of Australia Group states to acquire the dual-use technology necessary to develop a chemical weapons capability, the same scenario can be envisioned for the clandestine acquisition of dual-use biotechnology for the development of an illicit offensive BW capability. 1 9 3 Ibid., pp. 107-108. 61 limitations of export restraint policies as a means to prevent the foreign acquisition of dual-use biotechnology, it seems clear that the U.S. government would be well advised to reappraise the value of its current reliance upon export restraint as a central component in its strategy to deal with biological weapons proliferation. Second, is unlikely that the U.S. would be required to compromise significant components of its export restraint policies to secure the cooperation of the developing or 'Non-Aligned Movement' (NAM) states. Despite the strong case that N A M states make with respect to the current U.S. export restraint policies violating Article X of the BTWC, the United States also has a strong case,to make that it has a right to retain many of its export restraint control policies under Article HI of the convention. Article III states that the state parties to the convention are obligated "not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of states or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of this Convention." Indeed, the U.S. government has a strong legal case to make that it has the right to preserve many of its export restraint policies within the verification negotiations as states are in fact obligated to show restraint with respect to the export of dual-use technology that they believe will be used for biological weapons production. Given the strong legal position of the United States based on Article III of the BTWC, it is unlikely that the U.S. administration would be required to abandon the vast majority of its export restraint policies in order to secure the cooperation of the developing states that are party to the convention. Given the tension between Article X and Article III, the end result of political negotiations aimed at securing both U.S. and N A M cooperation will likely rest somewhere between the two extremes of abolishing all of the current U.S. export restrictions that govern the export of dual-use biotechnology, and retaining 62 the current configuration of the U.S.'s export control regime. Within this negotiated 'middle ground' some elements of the U.S. export regime will have to be retracted, but these concessions must be put in perspective. Given the limited role that export restraint policies serve in stopping determined proliferators, it is unlikely that any of the concessions that the U.S. would need to make will have a significant impact upon either the rate or the severity of biological weapons proliferation. Indeed, when one considers the marginal value of the limited concessions that the U.S. would be require to make in order to secure the cooperation of the N A M states, in comparison to the benefits that the U.S. would accrue from a functioning BTWC verification regime, then it would seem that the U.S. once again has strong incentives to reconsider its rejection of the proposed BTWC verification protocols. - The Proposed BTWC Verification Protocols will Compromise U.S. Biodefense Secrets The final major issue that the U.S. government cites in its justification for rejecting the proposed verification protocols concerns the U.S. military's biodefense program. Specifically, the United States government believes that the proposed verification protocols will allow hostile states to acquire tactical military information about the U.S. government's biodefense program, which could then be used against the United States in a future military conflict. Currently, the U.S. biodefense effort is the largest and most sophisticated in the world. In 2003, the U.S. government allocated approximately one billion dollars to the research and development of a range of passive defenses, designed to respond to biological attacks upon both the U.S. military, and the U.S. homeland.194 The U.S. biodefense program is multifaceted and encompasses such activities as basic medical research into infectious disease, the U.S. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year 2003: Research, development, testing and evaluation (R-l) (Washington, D . C : Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, 2002), p. D-19. 63 development of vaccines, physical protection and biological warfare detection equipment.195 Importantly, because of the high containment faculties (BL-3 or BL-4) present at many of the biodefense institutes that comprise the U.S. biodefense effort, such facilities would be liable not only for investigation under the challenge inspection regime, but also subject to investigation under the proposed routine investigation regime. In each instance, both the routine inspection mechanism and the challenge inspection mechanism will require U.S. biodefense institutes to disclose the nature and focus of many of their biodefense projects. The U.S. government is reluctant to disclose even such basic information about its biodefense projects to international inspectors as such information could be used to benefit the clandestine offensive biological warfare programs of states hostile to the United States. For example, states hostile to the United States could use the proposed inspection regime to aid in the development of an illicit offensive BW program by using the BTWC inspections to identify the particular biological warfare agents that the United States government is least able to defend against.196 It is this type of vulnerability inherent in the proposed BTWC verification regime that has led the U.S. government to reject the proposed verification protocols. 1 9 5 While the exact details surrounding the U.S. biodefense effort are classified, several organizations involved in the project are known. The United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases or USAMRID is the main organization responsible for medical, prophylactic and protective research and development. In addition to USAMRID, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has been involved in the U.S. military's continuing efforts to develop mobile technology that can provide advanced warning of a BW attack through the detection and characterization of airborne biological aerosols. See Abelson, Philip H. "Biological Warfare," Science. 286 (1999): 1677. 1 9 6 Kathleen C. Bailey, Why the United States Rejected the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Fairfax, V A : National Institute for Public Policy, 2002), p. 14. This type of tactical-military information would focus on details such as which vaccines the U.S. government is developing, as well as what types and quantities of antibiotics the U.S. government has at its disposal to respond to a biological warfare attack. 64 - The Tactical-Military Costs of Increased Biodefense Transparency are Marginal in Comparison to the Benefits Offered by the Proposed Verification Protocols There can be little doubt that the proposed verification protocols will result in increased biodefense transparency; however, the costs of disclosing tactical information about the U.S biodefense program are clearly outweighed by the benefits that would be provided to the U.S. through the proposed verification regime. When one considers the dynamics of strategic large-scale biological warfare, it is clear that such a conflict is offence dominant. Passive defenses against biological warfare attacks including physical protection, medical treatments and vaccinations do exist, but are of limited value for several reasons. To begin with, physical protection is of limited utility as there currently exists no technical way to provide advanced warning of a biological warfare attack. Biological aerosol clouds are invisible to human senses and no nation currently fields an electronic sensor system that can reliably differentiate a BW aerosol cloud from other "background" biological organisms that are omnipresent within the atmosphere.197 This situation largely excludes the possibility of providing advanced warning to a civilian population that might otherwise take advantage of physical protection such as masks 198 equipped with air filters. When one considers medical treatment and vaccination programs, key weaknesses can also be identified. For example, medical treatments in the form of antiviral drugs are limited and have a narrow spectrum of application with respect to the range of viral infections they can effectively treat.199 In addition, the antibiotic treatments employed to treat l y / Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A comprehensive survey for the concerned citizen (New York, NY: Springer-Verlag, 2002), p. 74. 1 9 8 Military organizations on the other hand are better able to take advantage of physical protection. First, the limited numbers of military personal are more easily equipped and trained to use biological warfare protection equipment in comparison to civilian populations. Modern military forces are also trained to operate within biological warfare defense suits or pressurized vehicles for extended periods of time. These advantages however, are limited to the battlefield as even modern armies can not be "suited up" indefinitely. Armed forces are therefore vulnerable to pre-emptive attack with biological warfare agents during transit to the battlefield and within basing areas located far from the front lines of a military conflict. 1 9 9 Warren Levinson and Ernest Jawetz, Medical Microbiology & Immunology: Examination and Boar Review 6 t h ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 2000), p. 196. 65 those infected with bacterial biological weapons are also of limited utility as biological warfare agents can easily be engineered to be immune to many medical treatments of this type.200 Finally,' vaccinations are also proving to be less effective than traditionally thought. The U.S. biodefense program is currently reliant upon a number of vaccines for several biological warfare agents and has plans to develop over 10 different vaccines by 2016.201 Despite the proven value of vaccinations to combat many natural disease vectors, they are likely to be far less effective against many second generation biological weapons that can be constructed through biochemical engineering. For example, important breakthroughs in civilian viral recombinant DNA experiments have demonstrated that biotechnology can be utilized to create microbial infections that can overcome the immune systems of vaccinated organisms. Given the weakness of physical protection, medical treatments and even vaccinations, it is clear that from a military standpoint, biological warfare is offence dominant. All of this is not to suggest that biodefense does not have an important role to play in damage limitation, but rather, to emphasize that the costs of increased biodefense transparency are limited in comparison to the benefits that the U.S. could obtain through the proposed i u u Even in the absence of advanced biochemical modification, first generation biological warfare agents can be developed to be resistant to multiple antibiotic treatments. For example, biological warfare agents can be grown in the presence of antibiotics in large numbers. These conditions can utilize the existence of natural mutations, along with the natural selection process provided by the presence of an antibiotic, to ensure that antibiotic-resistant forms of the agent in question will eventually emerge. Alternatively, one can grow large numbers of BW agents in cultures containing other microorganisms that are known to be resistant to an antibiotic and rely on various microbial genetic transfer mechanisms to endow BW agents with resistance to antibiotic treatment. These antibiotic-resistant strains can then be isolated and the experiment repeated with a different antibiotic or antibiotic-resistant microorganism to endow the BW agent with resistance to multiple antibiotic treatments. The latter process was utilized by Soviet biowarfare scientists to endow a strain of tularemia with broad spectrum resistance to antibiotic treatment. See Ken Alibek and Stephen Handelman, Biohazard (New York: Random House, 1999), p. 160. 2 0 1 The Counterproliferation Imperative: Meeting tomorrow's challenges (Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D . C : Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, 2001), p. 42. 2 0 2 See Jackson, Ronald L . et al. "Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox." Journal of Virology. 75, no. 3 (2001): 1205-1210. See also, Richard Preston, The Demon in the Freezer (New York: Random House, 2002), pp. 217-228. In addition, viral weapons could be based on retroviruses that can elude detection by the human immune system. See Steven M . Block, "Living Nightmares: Biological Threats Enabled By Molecular Biology," in The New Terror: Facing the threat of biological and chemical weapons, eds. Sidney Drell, Abraham D. Sofaer and George D. Wilson (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1999), p. 48. 66 verification regime. Not only will the proposed verification protocols provide a means with which to detect and identify strategic biological warfare threats, but such information is also highly valuable to the U.S. military should they face a state armed with a significant biological warfare capability in the future. For example, the proposed verification regime would provide the United States with an additional means through which to catalogue and characterize potential biological warfare production facilities in states hostile to the United States.203 Indeed, both the type arid quantity of information that could be acquired by international BW arms inspectors would be highly valuable in identifying BW infrastructure in states hostile to the U.S., information which could then be used for counterforce targeting by the U.S. military in the advent of a future conflict with a determined BW proliferator. Finally, by supporting the BTWC verification protocols, the United States would be far better prepared politically to gather international support to confront future proliterators. The presence of international legal mechanisms through the proposed BTWC Organization, would provide an avenue through which to legitimize a wide range of punitive actions the U.S. might desire to undertake against states determined to develop biological weapons. Thus, given the offence dominated nature of biological warfare, any advantages that states hostile to the U.S. could gain through inspections of U.S. biodefense facilities, would be minimal in comparison to the advantages that the U.S. would gain through the proposed inspection regime. - A Policy Best Reconsidered It is in the best interests of the United States to reconsider its current policy toward the proposed BTWC verification protocol. Each of the central arguments supporting the U.S. 2 0 3 Indeed, it would seem that the U.S. utilized the U N S C O M inspections to acquire targeting intelligence about Iraqi facilities, which was later employed to conduct military strikes during Operation Desert Fox. See Susan Wright, "The Hijacking of UNSCOM," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, no. 4 (1999): pp. 23-25. 67 government's current position have critical weaknesses and do not provide adequate grounds to reject the proposed verification measures, nor does the current policy of the U.S. administration take into account many of the benefits that the United States would accrue through the proposed verification regime. Over time and under pressure from other advanced industrial states, the U.S. may begin to see the value in supporting the development of 'less than perfect' verification protocols and come to see the polarized nature of its current position. Unfortunately, in light of the offensive BW activities currently being conducted by the U.S. military, even a dramatic and progressive policy reversal by the U.S. government on the issue of developing B T W C verification protocols would not be enough to prevent U.S. policy from continuing to undermine the credibility of the BW regime. 68 Chapter V: U.S. Enzymatic Anti-Material Weapons Research—Undermining the B T W C While significant attention should be paid to the U.S. policy toward the development of BTWC verification protocols, considerable attention also needs to be paid to the implications of the U.S. military's current offensive biological warfare research program. Since the early 1990s, the U.S. Defense Department's Joint Non-lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) has been researching and developing a new class of "third generation" biological warfare agents that are fundamentally different than either their first or second generation predecessors. Recent funding proposals uncovered through Freedom of Information Act requests by the Sunshine Project organization have identified several research projects that have each focused on genetically modifying microorganisms to produce enzymatic anti-material weapons (EAM). 2 0 4 While the E A M research project involves several U.S. weapons laboratories, this analysis) focuses on two specific proposals, one originating from the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory in Washington D . C , and the other from Armstrong Laboratory at Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio Texas. Each of these research proposals indicate that they are attempting to genetically modified microorganisms E A M weapons that can break down any desired non-living war material. The war materials specifically listed as potential targets for E A M weapons within these documents include items such as explosives, munitions, fuels, chemical warfare agents, support equipment, vehicles and conventional weapons. While the development of such non-lethal technology would seem to be politically desirable, and even humane, the pursuit of this third generation of offensive biological weapons posses serious rational-material and normative risks to both the United States and the international community. 2 0 4 The following documents were obtained by the Sunshine Project organization through Freedom of Information Act Requests and can be viewed in Appendix II: 1) Enhanced Degradation of Military Material. Naval Research Laboratory (DC). 1998. & 2) Anti-Materiel Biocatalysts & Sensors. Armstrong Laboratory. Brooks Air force Base (TX).1998. Copies of both of these documents are available for downloaded from the Sunshine Project's website (http://www.sunshine-project.org). Accessed 29 July 2003. In addition, funding requests for E A M weapons research from Los Alamos National Laboratory (1994) and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (1994) are also available for download from the Sunshine Project's website. 69 In order to understand the characteristics of E A M weapons and the risks associated with their development and use, this section will provide: 1) a preliminary introduction to the theoretical basis for chemical catalysis, 2) a brief introduction to enzymology, and 3) a description of enzyme modification through recombinant DNA technology. Having properly characterized the essential characteristics of E A M technology, it is argued here that the development of this new class of offensive biological weapons places the U.S. in clear violation of its obligations under the BTWC. Moreover, the development and use of E A M weapons also caries with it serious material risks to both the U.S. public, and the international community. While these legal barriers and material risks are quite real and provide ample grounds to discourage the pursuit of this new class of biowarfare agents, there are also important normative implications that accompany the development of E A M weapons. Specifically, by designing E A M weapons to be 'more usable,' the U.S. military's efforts have the potential to undermine the international normative prohibition on the use of microorganisms for the purposes of warfare. In light of these potential dangers, the manner in which the U.S. government, and indeed the international community as a whole, responds to the U.S. military's pursuit of E A M weapons will be of critical importance if the future efficacy of the international norm against biological warfare is to be preserved. - The Chemical Basis for EAM Weapons Virtually all materials are chemical compounds consisting of various atoms joined together within a molecular structure that is held together by chemical bonds.205 This molecular structure is responsible for the physical characteristics of material compounds. Importantly, the consistency of an object's physical characteristics are the product of the 2 0 5 John C. Kotz and Paul Treichel. Chemistry & Chemical Reactivity. 4 t h ed. (Toronto: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1999), p. 27. 70 consistency of its molecular structure. For example, when the molecular structure of a compound changes due to the making and/ or breaking of chemical bonds, its physical characteristics also change. In this context, the making and breaking of chemical bonds is what defines a chemical reaction, in which one chemical compound is transformed into another. Chemical reactions which transform one chemical compound into another, require energy. The energy required to make and break chemical bonds comes in the form of enthalpy or kinetic energy (heat).206 In addition to the role that enthalpy plays in the making and breaking of chemical bonds, there is an additional factor that governs chemical reactions known as entropy or thermodynamics (a measure of organization).207 At any one point in time, the energy status of a chemical compound is determined by both its entropy (level of organization) and the enthalpy (heat energy) available in its surrounding environment. These factors are related through the Gibbs Free Energy relationship which is expressed in Equation l . 2 0 8 Equation 1: A G = A H - T A S - Where, G = is the Gibbs free-energy term. H = represents enthalpy. T = represents temperature. S = represents entropy. In order for a chemical reaction to occur, a certain minimum amount of energy is required to allow a chemical compound to transit through a higher energy state known as a 'transition state,' before going on to adopt a new molecular structure.209 The minimum amount of energy required to transform one chemical compound into another is called the 'energy of activation,' 2 0 6 Ibid., pp. 258 & 261. 2 0 7 Ibid., p. 919. 2 0 8 Ibid., p. 924. 2 0 9 Marye Anne Fox and James K. Whitesell, Organic Chemistry, 2 n d ed. (Toronto: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 1997), p. 227. 71 and can be conceptualized as a barrier that provides stability to all chemical compounds.210 Most material objects are stable under standard temperature and pressure (STP) conditions, because the vast majority of molecular structures that constitute such objects do not possess the required energy necessary to transit through a transition state and form a more thermodynamically stable product(s) (more disordered). Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the energy within a material object is never equally distributed. At any one point in time, a portion of the molecules within a material object possess the required energy necessary to transit through a transition state, and go on to form more thermodynamically stable products. These facts explain why even material objects that seem to possess an extremely robust character, like concrete for example, eventually break down chemically over long periods of time to form products of a more thermodynamically favoured molecular configuration (less ordered). Conversely, these facts also explain why the addition of energy in the form of enthalpy or heat to an object can dramatically accelerate its break down (i.e. combustion). The relationship between the rate of a chemical reaction and its energy of activation barrier can be expressed in mathematical terms as show in Equation 2. 2 1 1 Equation 2: , , r p -AG/ R T k = k T e - Where, k = the rate of the reaction. h = Plank's constant. k = Boltzmann's constant. AG = the amount of energy required to over come the energy of activation barrier. R = the gas constant. T = temperature. 210 Ibid. 2 1 1 David L . Nelson and Michael M . Cox, Lehninger Principles of Biochemistry, 3 r d ed. (New York: Worth Publishers, 2000), p. 250. 72 What is important to understand about the above equation is the fact that under any give set of conditions, the larger the energy of activation barrier (AG), the slower the rate of the reaction. Consider the chemical reaction outlined in Figure 1. The reactant compounds water and acetylcholine merge through the making and breaking of bonds to form an energetically unfavourable, high-energy transition state. The transitions state presented in Figure 1 is characterized by a tetrahedral geometry containing three oxygen molecules that are each bound by a single covalent bond to the same carbon atom. This electrostatically unfavourable transition state species is short lived and quickly breaks down into the more electrostatically favourable products choline and acetate. The chemical breakdown of acetylcholine depicted three dimensionally in Figure 1, is diagrammed in a two dimensional representation within Figure 2, which displays the electron flow during the making and breaking of chemical bonds. •J '.J H20 Acetylcholine fransition state choline acetate Figure 1 H , 0 i 2 0 + H 3 C C H 3 I/ - N C H , I C H , H , C - D . O H Figure 2 C H 3 - N — C H , I C H , H O -C H , I / - N — C H , + I C H , o H^C' " O H A . 73 In addition, consider the diagram presented in Figure 3, which schismatically plots the relationship between Gibbs free energy (vertical axis) and the each of the reaction species identified in Figure 1 (where the reactants are water and acetylcholine, and the products are « a> Q >« o> i _ a> c LU a> Energy of Activation Barrier (Kinetics) React ion Energy Diagram Transition State Energy Difference Between Reactants & Products (Thermodynamics) I Products Reaction Coordinate F i g u r e 3 choline and acetate). It is in this context that one can understand the military role of chemical catalysts. Chemical catalysts are able to dramatically increase the rates of chemical reactions by lowering the energy of activation barrier present within a chemical reaction refer to the (relationship presented in Equation 2). Catalysts lower the energy required for reactants to transform into products by stabilizing the transition state through which reactant molecules must transit in order to form products. It is this ability to rapidly breakdown the chemical 74 structure of material objects that motivated U.S. weapons researchers to focus on chemical catalysis in their effort to develop a third-generation of offensive biological weapons. - Proteins as Chemical Catalysts Within all cellular organisms, linear strands of the chemical compound deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) contain information which expresses itself through a process of transcription and translation, involving messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA), as well as cellular organelles called ribosomes, to produce chemical compounds called amino acids.212 These amino acids are linked together in a linear sequence by peptide bonds that form the primary structure of a protein. A small segment of such a primary structure from the protein ferredoxin can be viewed in the left hand column and first row of Figure 4, shown below. The interactions of the amino acids forming the primary structure of a protein will determine the various conformations that will make up its secondary structure, which is often comprised of sheets or helical formations.214 Examples of beta sheets and helical secondary structures can be clearly viewed throughout Column 2 of Figure 4, which utilizes 'cartoon representations' of the corresponding primary amino acid sequence of ferredoxin, shown throughout Column 1. A third level of structure is often introduced by further interactions of the protein's primary amino acid sequence.215 Finally, independent proteins sequences can combine to form multimeric quaternary structures. 2 1 2 David L. Nelson and Michael M . Cox, Lehninger Principles of Biochemistry, 3 r d ed. (New York: Worth Publishers, 2000), p. 119. 2 1 3 Brinda, C , et al. "Structure of the Mutant E92K of [2Fe-2s] ferredoxin I from Spinacia oleracea at 1.7 A resolution." Acta Crystallogr D Biol Chrystallogr. 54 (1998): 1353. The PDB coordinate file is available through the Protein Data Bank, http://www.rcsb.org/pdb/. 21 June 2003. Title: "Spinach Ferredoxin." 2 1 4 David L . Nelson and Michael M . Cox, Lehninger Principles of Biochemistry, 3 r d ed. (New York: Worth Publishers, 2000), p. 163. 2 1 5 Ibid., p. 170. 75 Column 1 Column 2 The full configuration of ferredoxin as it 'appears' to other molecules at the molecular level is shown in Figure 5. What is important to understand from this description is that these steps are essential in protein formation and a protein's structure determines its function. One of the most important functions that proteins serve is to act as chemical catalysts or enzymes. Like all catalysts, enzymes can dramatically increase the rate of chemical reactions by stabilizing transition states and lowering energy of activation barriers. Enzymes perform chemical catalysis by first binding the molecule it will interact with (known as its substrate) and then often utilize precisely positioned catalytic residues (alpha amino acids) in its 'active site' to carry out chemical catalysis.217 Pictured below in Figure 6 is a computer generated three-dimensional model of the enzyme acetylcholinesterase, which was obtained through a process of X-ray crystallography.218 The arrow flow within Figure 6 details the representations of: 1) The actual 'appearance' of acetylcholinesterase to other chemical compounds through a space-filling model. 2) A ball and stick representation, which reveals the primary alpha amino acid structure of the enzyme. 3) A ribbon representation that reveals acetylcholinesterase's secondary and tertiary structures and displays the enzyme's catalytic residues in coloured chemical representations for clear viewing. Finally, 4) A close up of the catalytic residues: Glutamine (Glu) 327, Histidine (His) 440, Serine (Ser) 200, and 2 1 7 Ibid., p. 204. 2 1 8 The crystal structure was solved by Raves, M . L. , et al., "Quaternary Structure of Tetrameric Acetylcholinesterase," in Structure & Function of Cholinesterases and Related Proteins, Bhupendra P. Doctor, Daniel M . Quinn and Richard L . Rotundo, eds. New York, NY: Plenum Publishing Corp, 1998. The PDB coordinate computer file is available through the Protein Data Bank, http://www.rcsb.org/pdb/. 21 June 2003. Title: "Acetylcholinesterase." Regarding the process of X-Ray crystallography, see McRee, Duncan E. Practical Protein Crystallography. Toronto, ON: Academic Press, 1993. 77 Figure 6 78 Importantly, the residues within the active site of enzymes such as acetylcholinesterase, have a high level of specificity for their substrates and will only bind molecules that have an appropriate chemical structure that is analogous either its substrate, or the transition state Ho which the active site is finely tuned to stabilize. For example, when acetylcholinesterase binds actylcholine within its active site, it utilizes its four catalytic residues to rapidly catalyze the breakdown of acetylcholine into choline and acetate.219 The chemical mechanism that details the catalytic breakdown of acetylcholine into choline and acetate is diagrammed in two dimensions within Figure 7 presented below. The acetylcholinesterase enzyme is able to reduce the energy required to convert acetylcholine into choline and acetate, by providing an alternative chemical pathway for the break down of acetylcholine in comparison to the uncatalyzed reaction diagrammed previously in Figure 2. In the example presented in Figure 7, acetylcholinesterase is able to provide an alternative chemical pathway for the breakdown of acetylcholine by introducing a low energy intermediate step, involving a covalent bond between Ser 200 and actylcholine. This intermediate step is facilitated through various inter-molecular and chemical forces, including hydrogen and covalent bonding, which are provided by the adjacent catalytic residues Glu 327, His 440 and Trp 84. Following the formation of a covalent bond between the actylcholine and Ser 200, choline separates from the intermediate leaving a functional ester group attached to Ser 200. Finally, the ester group is cleaved from Ser 200 by a water molecule through rapid hydrolysis, which completes the reaction and releases acetate to restore Ser 200 to its original configuration, ready to catalyze the break down of the next acetylcholine molecule the enzymes encounters. The mechanism for catalysis of the hydrolysis of acetylcholinesterase was draw from Mario Brufani and Luigi Filocamo, "Rational Design of Cholinesterase Inhibitors: Physostigmine and its Traditional Synthetic Analogues," in Cholinesterases and Cholinesterase Inhibitors, ed. Ezio Giacobinin (London, UK: Martin Dunitz, 2000), p. 29. 79 His 440 F i g u r e 7 80 The energy differences between the catalyzed and uncatalyzed hydrolysis of acetylcholine are schematically plotted in Figure 8 presented below. The relative difference in rates can be calculated by creating a ratio of the two following equations for the uncatalyzed and catalyzed reactions: Equation 3: Kcat = kTe H -AGcat/ R T Kuncat = k_T e h -AGuncat/ R T A K = e (AGuncat - AGcat)/ R T Reaction Energy Diagram a a >> o> c LU Difference in Energy of Activation Between Catalyzed and Uncatalyzed Reactions Reactants Products Reaction Coordinate Figure 8 81 In this particular example, the catalytic activity of acetylcholinesterase provides a 10 fold rate improvement over the uncatalyzed reaction and provides an excellent example of the power of 220 biocatalysis. What is essential to understand from this example is that since protein structure determines enzyme function, recombinant DNA techniques can be utilized to modify the genetic structure of microorganisms in order to produce enzymes that can catalyze the break 221 down of nearly any material. For example, shown below within Figure 9 are two columns, each with a strand of DNA in the first row. The strand of DNA depicted in Column 1 codes for the synthesis of a natural or "wild type" version of the enzyme Anionic Trypsin, shown within 222 the second row of Column 1. The area of the Wild Type DNA strand coloured yellow codes for the synthesis of the amino acid Arginine (Arg) 96, which is also coloured yellow within the Wild Type Anionic Trypsin enzyme. Importantly, this particular genetic sequence within the Wild Type DNA can be altered through site-directed mutagenesis, using recombinant DNA techniques, to code for the synthesis of a different amino acid as depicted by the mutant DNA sequence coloured green within Column 2. Note that the mutant DNA sequence that has been coloured green and is displayed in Column 2, has been altered in the same location (96) that coded for Arginine in the Wild Type Anionic Trypsin enzyme. The mutant DNA sequence presented in Column 2 now codes for a different amino acid to be placed in position 96, David L . Nelson and Michael M . Cox, Lehninger Principles of Biochemistry, 3r ed. (New York: Worth Publishers, 2000), p. 264. 2 2 1 Regarding recombinant D N A technology see Wu, Ray. ed. Recombinant D N A Methodology II. Toronto, ON: Academic Press, 1995. Regarding the utilization of recombinant D N A to create specific enzymes to catalyze a pre-determined chemical reaction see Uhlig, Helmut. Industrial Enzymes and Their Applications. Translated by Elfriede M . Linsmaier-Bednar. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1998.; Carey, Paul R. ed. Protein Engineering and Design. Toronto: Academic Press, 1996.; Alberghina, Lilia. ed. Protein Engineering in Industrial Biotechnology. Canada: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000.; and Alexander, Martin. Biodegradation and Bioremediation. 2 n d ed. Ithaca, NY: Academic Press, 1999. 2 2 2 The Wild-Type Anionic Trypsin enzyme was solved by R. J. Fletterick & M . E. Mcgrath. The PDB coordinate file is available through the Protein Data Bank, http://www.rcsb.org/pdb/. 21 June 2003. Title: "Anionic Trypsin Wild Type." The mutant Anionic Trypsin enzyme was solved by M . E. Mcgrath, et al. "Structure of an engineered, metal-actuated switch in trypsin." Biochemistry. 32 (1993): 1914. The PDB coordinate file is available through the Protein Data Bank, http://www.rcsb.org/pdb/. 21 June 2003. Title: "Anionic Trypsin Mutant With Arg 96 Replaced By His." v, 82 Histidine (His). This mutant enzyme is displayed in row 2 of Column 2. Note the new amino acid His, coloured green, occupies position 96 within the mutant Anion Trypsin enzyme. Column 1: Wild Type DNA & Enzyme Column 2 : Mutant DNA & Enzyme Figure 9 This type of recombinant DNA technology can be utilized to modify enzymes in structural positions both within, and distant from, the enzyme's active site. These structural modifications can theoretically be used to engineer enzymes to catalyze the breakdown of 223 virtually any known chemical compound. This type of flexibility gives E A M weapons 2 2 3 While recombinant D N A techniques would no doubt be essential in fine-tuning enzymes to catalyze the beak down of selected materials, it should be noted that the process of designing such enzymes would first involve other techniques such as directed protein evolution. See Brakmann, Susanne and Kai Johnsson. Directed 83 applicability over a correspondingly broad range of potential military targets including such compounds as rubbers, oils, metals, and plastics. Moreover, such tailor-made biocatalysts are highly specific and will only catalyze the break down chemical compounds that have the appropriate molecular structure. This extreme, molecular specificity, make E A M weapons one of the most precise and highly discriminatory autonomous weapon-systems yet devised. These facts provide enzyme-based weapons with an unprecedented level of flexibility and specificity, which has ultimately motivated U.S. weapons researchers to develop a new generation offensive biological weapons. - EAM Weapons are a Clear Violation of Article I of the BTWC Despite their non-lethal aims and discriminatory nature, E A M weapons place the U.S. government in direct violation of Article I of the BTWC. Article I states that each state party to the convention "undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, or types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes." The research proposals acquired by the Sunshine Project organization explicitly state that the E A M research projects under consideration here, have been undertaken in order to genetically modify, microorganisms to create offensive biological weapons for use in armed conflict. This is a clear contravention of Article I. Despite these facts, advocates of the U.S. E A M program argue that the legal status of such weapons should reside outside of the BTWC ban, because the convention was only designed to address lethal and indiscriminate biological weapons, not highly discriminatory, non-lethal Molecular Evolution of Proteins: How to improve enzymes for biocatalysis. Germany: Wiley-VCH Verlag GmbH, Weinheim, 2002. 84 bioweaponry/^ Importantly, Article I makes no exception for development of biological weapons that are designed to destroy non-living matter. Moreover, no other Article or text contained within the convention provides an exception to the ban on offensive biological weapons development presented in Article I. Yet, advocates of the E A M weapons program insist that the designers of the BTWC could not have anticipated that future advances in biochemistry and molecular biology would facilitate the creation of nonlethal biological agents that only target nonliving war material. However, what such advocates fail to recognize is that the broadly worded language of Article I, was in fact, specifically designed to ensure that future advances in biotechnology could not allow state parties to circumvent the convention by applying new scientific discoveries to create novel BW agents that could fall outside the conventions parameters.226 Moreover, consensus has been established among the state parties at successive review conferences that genetically modified microorganisms created for hostile purposes are in no way exempted under the B T W C . 2 2 7 Yet, if one sets aside the fact that that E A M weapons research clearly places the United States in violation of Article I of the BTWC, and begins to take seriously the arguments made by advocates of the U.S. military's E A M project, it is possible to evaluate E A M weapons with respect to' the fundamental motivations underlying the BTWC. 2 2 4 John B. Alexander, "Optional Lethality: Evolving attitudes toward nonlethal weaponry," Harvard International Review 23, no. 2 (2001): 67. 2 2 5 Ibid. 2 2 6 Paul DeForest, "The Matrix of Biological Disarmament: Strategy, law, and technology," Politics and the Life Sciences 9, no. 1 (1990): 27. See also, Onno Kervers, "Strengthening Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention: The Protocol Negotiations," Journal of Conflict and Security Law 7, no. 2 (2002): 277. 2 2 7 Graham S. Pearson, "The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the 21s t Century," in Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for concern, courses of action (Washington D . C : The Henry L . Stimson Center, 1998), p. 15. 85 - EAM Weapons and their Challenge to the Fundamental Elements of the BTWC The choice of U.S weapons labs to develop E A M weapons, as well as their plans to make key modifications to the microbes that are to produce them, provide persuasive evidence that the aim of this research is to circumvent the normative and rational factors that form the foundation of the BTWC regime. Five characteristics of these research projects support this thesis. First, the E A M agents under consideration here were to be developed using specific microbes that would be resistant to extreme environmental conditions. This ability would allow them to improve their reliability over earlier generations of biological weapons and allow them to overcome the rational-material arguments that biological weapons are unreliable due to a low tolerance for adverse environment conditions. Second, E A M weapons were being specifically cultivated for their ability to rapidly catalyze the breakdown of their intended targets.229 By designing E A M weapons to destroy their targets at rapid pace, E A M designers are attempting to tailor such weapons to avoid the rational-material criticism that biological weapons lack tactical military value. Third, the designers of the E A M weapons under development at Armstrong Laboratory and at the U.S. Naval Laboratory, aim to use genetic modifications to limit the life span of deployed E A M agents.230 The finite life time E A M agents would allow them to deflect the rational-material criticism that their use might have long-term negative impacts on the environment after dispersal. Forth, these weapons are designed to be exceptionally target specific and are able to discriminate between potential 231 targets at the molecular level. The highly precise and discriminatory nature of E A M weapons are designed to allow them to avoid the rational-material argument that biological 2 2 8 Anti-Materiel Biocatalysts & Sensors. Armstrong Laboratory. Brooks Air force Base (TX). 1998., p. i . see also Enhanced Degradation of Military Material. Naval Research Laboratory (DC). 1998. 2 2 9 Anti-Materiel Biocatalysts & Sensors. Armstrong Laboratory. Brooks Air force Base (TX). 1998., p. 2. 2 3 0 Enhanced Degradation of Military Material. Naval Research Laboratory (DC). 1998., pp. 1 &3. 2 3 1 Anti-Materiel Biocatalysts & Sensors. Armstrong Laboratory, Brooks Air force Base (TX). 1998., p. 2. 86 weapons are indiscriminate weapons that effect everything in their target 'foot print.' Fifth, unlike first and second generation BW agents, E A M weapons are not aimed at maiming or killing human beings or any other life form through infection and disease.232 This characteristic is designed to allow E A M weapons to fall outside the normative basis that was so critical to establishing the age-old international norm against biological warfare. It is for these reasons that both the Armstrong Laboratory, and the U.S. Naval Laboratory state in their research proposals that they believe that E A M weapons should not be banned under the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.233 Despite the best efforts of U.S. weapons researchers, the E A M project is ultimately vulnerable to several of the core criticisms that led the international community to ban biological warfare in 1972. First and foremost, U.S. weapons researchers are unable to rule out the potential impact that mutations might have upon E A M weapons once released into the environment. Various forms of radiation, chemical mutagens and microbial genetic transfers could all result in alterations to the genetic structure of deployed E A M weapons. While the vast majority of these mutations would likely be fatal to microbial E A M agents, the possibility that such mutations might have far more devastating effects can not be ruled out a priori. Indeed, the large numbers of E A M microbes that would need to be employed in order to have a significant effect upon a military target, would provide ample opportunity for a wide range of mutations to occur within a dispersed E A M microbial population. Importantly, U.S. researchers clearly recognize the potentially negative consequences that such mutations could pose and have addressed the issue by proposing that further genetic alterations could be made Enhanced Degradation of Military Material. Naval Research Laboratory (DC). 1998., pp. 1. 2 3 3 Anti-Materiel Biocatalysts & Sensors. Armstrong Laboratory, Brooks Air force Base (TX). 1998., p. 2. see also Enhanced Degradation of Military Material. Naval Research Laboratory (DC). 1998., p. 3. 87 to limit the life time of deployed E A M weapons.234 By genetically engineering E A M weapons to self-terminate after a predetermined length of time, U.S. biological warfare scientists aim to decrease the probability that dangerous mutations might occur within a dispersed microbial E A M population. While U.S. weapons scientists offer this additional genetic modification as a safety measure, they have neglected to consider within their research proposals that such safeguards are vulnerable to the very mutations they are designed to prevent. Within a deployed E A M population, genetic mutations could recode the genetic structure of E A M weapons in a manner that might prevent their self-termination. Given this possibility, it is impossible for E A M weapons designers to rule out the possibility that E A M organisms might find long-term refuge within an ecosystem once deployed and continue to exist within a open environment for an indefinite period of time. Moreover, efforts to eradicate or to control the spread of environmentally persistent E A M microbes in a natural ecosystem would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. These facts are extremely important to consider when assessing the risks associated with E A M weapons, because E A M agents freely existing within an ecosystem would invariably undergo additional genetic alterations. Z M Moreover, the scientists involved in E A M research at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) have also indicated that the end goal of their research is to mimic the biological production of enzymes using synthetic organic chemistry. By using retrosynthetical analysis and synthetic organic chemistry to synthesize synthetic duplicates of E A M enzymes produced by genetically modified organisms, U.S. weapons researchers could avoid virtually all of the problems associated with biological-based E A M weapons. For example, the removal of genetically modified microorganisms from E A M weapons could allow the U.S. to remain in compliance with its obligations under the B T W C , while still retaining the capabilities provided by non-lethal E A M weapons. Furthermore, since catalytic weapons synthesized using organic chemistry would be non-lethal, anti-material-targeting chemical weapons, they would be permitted under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Finally, non-lethal, anti-material chemical weapons would not only be permitted under both the B T W C and the C W C conventions, but would also allow U.S. weapons researcher to manufacture E A M weapons that are not subject to the mutagenic uncertainties that are inherent in all biological weapons. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that synthetic organic chemists will be able to reliably reproduce functioning duplicates of complex biological enzymes on a scale large enough to permit efficient weaponization in the near future. Thus, it is likely that current U.S. E A M weapons researchers will continue to utilize genetically modified microorganisms in their efforts to develop battlefield-deployable E A M weapons. Regarding the end-goal of E A M research to be the production of synthetic E A M weapons see Enhanced Degradation of Military Material. Naval Research Laboratory (DC). 1998., p. 1. 88 While the exact types of additional genetic alternations environmentally persistent E A M weapons might undergo after dispersal is a matter of speculation, the potentially severe consequences of such alternations warrants deeper consideration. For example, random genetic alternations to the DNA structure of environmentally persistent E A M weapons could result in the production of structurally-altered enzymes that catalyze the breakdown of unintended targets. Mutations could also expose a wide variety of life forms to new forms of disease as they might result in the production of protein sequences that are toxic to plants, animals or human beings. While these are but a handful of examples of the potential consequences that are inherent in any effort to deploy E A M weapons, they are sufficient to point out that such weapons are inherently uncontrollable and carry with them tremendous potential for unintended harm. It should also be recognized that the potential hazards associated with E A M weapons are not limited to the areas within which such weapons could be operationally dispersed to attack military targets. Areas in close proximity to facilities involved in the research, development and testing of E A M weapons are also vulnerable to exposure to E A M microbes if they were to be accidentally released from such facilities. While the U.S. military labs involved in E A M research and development no doubt employ strict safety protocols to contain experimental offensive biological warfare agents, no safety protocol can provide perfect guarantees. Ultimately, the U.S. military can not provide absolute assurance that E A M microbes could never escape containment during the various stages of research, development and testing that need to be undertaken in order to design a new weapon system. In light of such considerations, it is clear that the continuation of the U.S. E A M weapons research project carries with it a non-trivial level of risk to plants, animals, human beings and critical 89 infrastructure located within adjacent areas to U.S. biological warfare labs partaking in the research, development and testing of E A M weapons. Finally, the efforts by the U.S. military to create biological weapons that are designed to circumvent the BTWC have the potential to seriously undermine the international norm against biological warfare. When considered from a broader perspective, E A M weapons can be viewed as being just one expression of a broader and deeper philosophy that has evolved within the U.S. military—the so called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). While the concept of an R M A is controversial in it own right, its limited application within this analysis is useful to understand some of the central reasons why the U.S. military is pursuing E A M weapons. Central to the U.S. R M A is the development of high-precision stand-off weapons such as advanced cruise missiles and laser-guided gravity bombs.235 The development of weapons of this character have at least two important advantages. First, they ensure that U.S. military personnel are in minimal danger during military conflicts and this minimizes the domestic political costs to the U.S. government when employing its military abroad.236 Second, while far from perfect, precision guided munitions do minimise the unintended killing of bystanders during military engagements and allows the U.S. government to greatly avoid 237 international criticism. From this perspective, the drive behind the U.S. military to develop special types of weapons that have characteristics that can minimise political risks to the U.S. government are ultimately motivated by the desire to make military force more usable. These same political forces are driving the U.S. military's E A M program and are aimed at making biological weapons more 'humane' and hence, more usable. Given that the long standing international norm against biological warfare holds that such weapons should never be used, 2 3 5 Elinor C. Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and N A T O (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queens University Press, 2002), p. 4. 2 3 6 Ibid., p. 29. 2 3 7 Ibid. 90 the E A M weapons project can be seen as a fundamental challenge to the normative prohibition on the use of microbial life for the purposes of armed conflict. Should E A M weapons be successfully developed and used by the U.S. military, other states might well see justification in the actions of the U.S. to undertake their own offensive biological warfare programs. In this context, the prominent position of the United States within international society should be recognized, as many of its actions can be seen to provide important markers to delineate acceptable and unacceptable state behaviour. Should the U.S. elect to continue its research and development into offensive biological weapons, it would seem clear that such actions would reduce the normative restraints that are an important component in the international regime banning biological warfare. It is for these reasons that the U.S. government would be well advised to end the U.S. military's current E A M research and development program. The U.S. military's E A M weapons program not only places the U.S. government in clear violation of its commitments under the BTWC, but it also represents an unacceptable level of risk to both the international community and the American public. E A M weapons, like all biological-based weapons, remain subject to dynamic biological changes that ensure that such weapons are fundamentally uncontrollable. Once deployed, E A M weapons have the potential to undergo a wide range of genetic alterations that might have severe and unpredictable effects upon a wide variety of infrastructure, plants, animals and human beings. Finally, the very pursuit of offensive biological weapons by the United States has the potential to seriously undermine the credibility of the international norm against biological warfare. Thus, the uncontrollable nature of E A M weapons, in combination with the potential impact that such offensive biological warfare research could have upon the norm against biological warfare make a compelling case that it is in the best interests of United States to end the U.S. military's E A M weapons program. 91 Conclusions Ultimately, active U.S. participation and support for biological arms control is necessary for the international community to restore credibility to the global regime banning biological warfare. In this regard, its closest and most trusted Western allies bear a special responsibility in spearheading any successful initiative that would convince the U.S. to reverse course from its current biological warfare policies. Such efforts need to address the U.S. government's polarized perspective on arms control verifications and it is here that the UK and Germany will be essential in persuading the U.S. to re-enter the Ad Hoc Group negotiations with a more nuanced appraisal of their value. An equally great challenge will be any effort to convince the U.S. to cease its offensive biological warfare program designed to circumvent the BTWC. Once again, since trust is central in the minds of U.S. policymakers when considering issues that involve security and defense, especially in a post-911 world, the best chance for success rests with the U.S. government's closest international allies. Central to any successful strategy will be initiatives that can convince the U.S. that it cannot ultimately achieve security in the area of biological arms control through unilateralism and armament. 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Politics and the Life Sciences. 2. no. 1 (1983): 42-51. 103 APPENDIX I: Text of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Article I: Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstance to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. Article II: Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment. Article III: Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention. Article IV: Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, takes any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. Article V: The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. Article VI: (1) Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible 104 evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council. (2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation. Article VII: Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention. Article VIII: Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925. Article IX: Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes. Article X: (1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes. (2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. 105 Article XI: Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. Article XII: Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of the Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. Article XIII: (1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. (2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its natural sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article XIV: (1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph (3) of this Article may accede to it at any time. (2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments1 of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. (3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention. (4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession. (5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices. (6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 106 Article XV: This Convention, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments of the signatory and acceding States. 107 APPENDIX II: Funding Requests from U.S. Weapons Labs for E A M Research A. Anti-Materiel Biocatalysts & Sensors. Armstrong Laboratory. Brooks Air force Base (TX). 1998. 108 Title Of Strtmastai; Anti Materiel Biocatalysts Proposed Technology Imratracm: Focus area 3 describes the use of non-lethal technology to stop land and sea vehicles and to neurmtiar. facilities and equipment. The common thread to aO these is that they requae fuel to power them or to generate power to operate them. If one could develop a rapidly acting, highly efficient, and environ—rurally safe substance to destroy the hbricants or seize the mechanical pans, then the vehicles or facilities could be "shut down" m a controlled £asnk>n. Armstrong Labonaory M Brooks AFB is wtll on the way to doing just that. Over the past cotrple of years, the Biotechnology Branch of the RadSoirequency Radiation DWakm has been pioneering research to understand the inechaiusms of RFR iritcractiDn and to develop quick, cheap, environmentally friendly way to clean up toxic substances. This work has led to the discovery of a patented process to genetically engineer catalysts specific to a particular substance (explosives, biological or chemical weapons, fuels, etc). Heat, light, lasers, RFR activate the catalyst and initiate the reaction. The reaction creates enough heat to seize the engine ox gunk the hihricants. The reactkm has a unique luminescent signature so the destruction process can be remotely monitored (battle damage assessment) and does not produce airy bwbazards. The substance is exempt from biological warfare restrictions, can tolerate harsh delivery conditions, and is self arnpHfytag (that is, a tittle goes a long way). As an aside, this technology has application as a sensor. Intruders to restricted areas could be sprayed/painted and identiBed later (since the substance would luminesce under low RFR exposure). The technology could also be used to record cumulative exposure to RPR, something potentially useful for operators of high power RFR equipment or the soldier in an Intense electromagnetic battlefield errvironment The technology aim has application in identifying friend or foe at tong distances using the RFR sensitive substance on personnel or equipment insignia. Potential fa Jnint ArolJMtknr The application of this technology is fimidfiss. Catalysts can be engineered to destroy whatever war materiel is desired. AD Services would have an interest. Technical Description; For the past 8 years Armstrong Laboratory has been conducting bbtechnologkal research at the molecular level under AFOSR and, for the past 2 years, under SERDP support. These efforts ted lo the development ofdiazoIurmncrnrJaiun (DALM), a biosynthesized catalyst, which interacts with a broad spectrins of optical and RFR, demonstrating enhanced raductiorMuddation (redox) activity including rapid breakdown of inorganic and organic hydrazines (rocket fuel) without fire or explosion. This comroBed "bum" can destroy high energy materials as well as biologica] materials and plastics and other organic and Mo-pofyrners. DALM has been UosvntiMazed on bacterial rnembranes in connection with existing imbedded enzymes. The work with 109 BALM is a bajcKnc Thta baaclme could extended 10 a a « h other taacarilysu sad conjugaiej to ah—specificity god —actmryof tte redox jeactioas. Akered spectral signatures (ahsorteicc and emissions, in the wia]e and infrared Tuogjei) coald provide ui umuaa] catalyu tha: in—is its awn presence and actJV.tj 3— sensor —d raoniroriog activities. Thii proposal is to adapt time biocauayHS to * K iadaTBioo—baanoo reaction to bring atom *e dcwnicuaji of the engine yam or p o l j T O c r i m i o n of the —brksoiH to render the vebicWcrsft uselts;. far aiiliiary purposes. RttttAreaa: The risk* sac Jrvmimal since wKat has heco teamed far cleanup tpp jsBtion* under the AFOSR no SERDP JKOpants would be extended to NLT app&aucxis. Tbe catalyse synthesis process is wellmowa. The udfcowos ace bow much is needed, to stop and engine, how to riciiveir it, and detonating any enviroaatotal impact. Tinitlne/Coa; FVf9fe S20QK cngfrjeer catalyst that dsstroys facii'sxps combtaiicKi engine (1" aad 2*1 qtr> deterxine specific signature of catalyst fat rncKi i tor ing (3 qtrj detecmiQe reunion spseds and dose fee effect '3* and 4*ctr) conduct sb ceciatKtratian (4* tjtfi FY99: S200K determine er.vuonrneraa; impact of rwsrtsnts and reaction products (1' - 4* qe) develop prototype- for field drauHstraorjo ( l" - qcr) oonduct sauic ftdd deourastrarion (4b qtr) Final report oc processes, efifecrivHiESS, ecvixnioiK—alimoacts, and resuts of daaoKsaztJocs. POC: 830S Hawks. Rd Brooks AFB.TX 78235 wice:| email: 110 B. Enhanced Degradation of Military Material. Naval Research Laboratory (DC). 1998. T TITLE OF SUBMISSION: ENHANCED DEGRADATION OF MILITARY MATERIEL PROPOSED CONCEPT. CAPABILITY AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT: The proposed materials science research project will develop non-lethal systems specifically designed to degrade opposing forces' mobility, logistical support and equipment maintenance programs prior to or during military engagements, in a time frame of days to months. Such systems, patterned after microorganisms and their products, as well as "Sacculations" to protect materiel of friendly forces, will be directed exclusively at non-living targets such as highway and runway surfaces, metal parts and coatings of weapons, support equipment and vehicles, fuels and other supplies and replacement parts. Natural environmental microorganisms displaying relevant degradative capabilities will be identified, and their mechamsms(&) of degradation will be characterized. In addition, non-pathogenic laboratory strains will be genetically modified to express specific focused degradative capabilities. These Genetically Modified Microorganisms (GEM) will be further modified to be self-limiting, either by incorporation of timed "suicide" genes, or other alterations that prevent their persistence in the environment beyond pre-determined limits of space or tune. Ultimately these capabilities will be mimicked chemically, and transitioned into synthetic products that do not require living microorganisms. At the same time, chemical, physical and engineering modifications that can be applied to materiel of friendly forces to "vaccinate" and protect such targets will be investigated. The proposed rmcrobia!-derived systems will be used to accelerate the corrosion, degradation or decomposition of roads and aircraft runways used by opposing forces. In addition, targeted deterioration of metal parts, coatings and lubricants of weapons, vehicles and support equipment, as well as fuels and other supplies, will significantly increase the cost and logistical burden to the enemy of sustaining military operations An important focus area addressed by this proposal includes denial of land areas to vehicles and aircraft by reduction of terrain irafficabilky and vehicle operation. Another focus area is the ability to disable or neutralize equipment and facilities, by degrading fuels and other supplies, and increasing maintenance requirements. POTENTIAL FOR JOINT APPLICATION: All of the armed services in a joint military operation will benefit from technology that degrades the overall ability of the enemy to initiate and sustain combat operations. Degrading aircraft runway surfaces controlled by enemy forces gives an advantage to U.S. Air Forces in controlling the skies over target areas. Degrading road and highway surfaces in enemy territory reduces the mobility of opposition forces' troop and supply transport, reducing the threat to Army and Marine land forces. Degrading fuels, replacement parts and other supplies that support a war effort gives an advantage to all branches of our military by compromising the enemy's logistical support systems. In addition, characterization of degradative mechanisms and development of < r^acanation, strategies will have significant dual use applications in protecting military and commercial materials and materiel from naturally-occurring biodegradation problems, or offensive military and terrorist attacks of this nature. Scientific expertise capable of developing anti-materiel technology patterned after microbial systems unquestionably is already present in the laboratories of potential adversary states, and the likelihood of near-term development of such threats is great Failure to 111 counter tins threat with • focused research program jeopardizes the warfighting capability of the U.S. and its allies. TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION: Nature has provided many examples of natural degradation by rracroorgamutK of metals (1 -4), fuels (5,6) and a variety of synthetic products (7,8), as well as structures and systems that incorporate or depend on such products. An example of a military material that the proposed research would target is the synthetic higb-strength polymer, Kevlar, or novel biomimetjcs of Kevlar based on spider silk. Asphalt is degraded by several strains of bacteria, leading to greatly reduced road surface lifetimes (9). Components of asphalt used for other construction purposes also suffer failure as a direct result of bacterial degradation (10). Cement is subject to rapid, cc«rtponent-specific attack by microbes (11). Most classes of paints and coating j are also vulnerable to degradation by microbial products (12-14). Virtually ail petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) of military relevance are vulnerable to degradation by microbial action (5). Many rmcrcwgamsms also riaturally produce minute granules called inclusion bodies that are made of salt crystals, metals or plastic-like compounds (polyhydroxyaikanates) These particles will quickly clog high efficiency filters, and convert critical lubricants of weapon systems into gums br abrasives, It is the purpose of the proposed research to capitalize on the degradative potential of these and other products from naturaUy-occurring microorganisms, and to engineer additional, focused degradative capabilities into GEM, to produce systems that will degrade the warfighting capabilities of potential adversaries. The out-years goal is to use the knowledge of natural microbial degradation pathways gamed in this study to develop biorrumenc chemical systems that are more robust, less expensive and easily deployed for field use in any warfighting environment. The genetic engmeering techniques to be employed are standard laboratory practices, requiring no special isolation laboratories, and this proposed materials science research is not restricted in any way by the 1972 Geneva Convention on Biological Warfare or any other international agreement. Funding for this proposal will support scientific staff who will develop enhanced materiel-degrading technology for deployment to the field. Previous work by die P.I. (JRC) at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) identified and produced in the laboratory an enzyme from a naturally occurring fungus, which rapidly decomposes polyurethane, a common component of paint for ships and aircraft (IS). This work was subsequently extended at NRL, to create a new GEM that overproduces the polyurethane degrading enzyme (U.S. Patent, Navy CaseNo.75461)(l6) RISK AREAS: The main risk area for this technology lies in the engineering of the GEM to produce or enhance the desired characteristics, and in the robustness of these strains for field deployment. In the hands of skilled molecular biologists these risks will be minimized, because a large selection of DNA vectors and host organisms already exists for engineering purposes, and the literature documents numerous successful techniques for designing and producing stable GEM. NRL and its scientists have an established track record in molecular biology, protein characterization and surface chemistry. Field robustness is a concern, because of the wide variety of environmental conditions that could be encountered by the microbial products when employed in different 112 » warflghting scenarios. However host microbes are available that grow readily, and synthesize degradative products that function weu, under a range of conditions of temperature, pH, salinity and humidity, and NRL Code 6115 employs several microbial eeologists trained and experienced on these issues. Moreover, it is not the irtention of this research to develop strains mat will persist in the errvironmerrt once they have delivered their effects to the target On the contrary, microbial systems will be identified or engineered to produce the desired degradative effects within a rrtatter of days to months, then die off and disappear. This technology will then be transitioned to chemically synthesized systems to improve and extend the desired characteristics. TIMELINE: FY 98 FY 99 1 . 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Conduct survey of military materiel and equip, maint problems related tobiodegrad. Literature search Identify, obtain strains Test strains for degradative capabilities Select for/induce high-prod strains Clone genes for specific degrad. capabilities into GEMs Determine optimum conditions for expressing degrad. features Design protocols for field deploy, of degradative systems Develop ideas for vaccination strategies D D*= deliverable 113 COST; FY98 FY99 |PLD.,CAPT,MSC,USN(25»/.) OK OK |Wi.D.,LT,MSC.USN(25%) OK OK [Ph.D. (25%) 30K 31 5K Technician (100%) 90K 94.SK DNA cloning, sequencing supplies ; 20K 20K Computer, molecular biology software 5K OK Survey costs (travel, data processing): 5K OK TOTAL 150K 146K DELIVERABLES: 1. Bacterial and fungal strains or their purified products, with the ability' to: a. Degrade components of asphalt, cement or other road surfaces, b. Decompose or compromise quality of POL, c. Degrade paints, coatings and lubricants used for military hardware or vehicles, d. Initiate or accelerate corrosion of metal surfaces. * Prioritization of development of specific degradative characteristics will be determined In discussions with sponsors. 2. Targiet-spccific GEMs, and optimum conditions for growth. 2. Recommendations on feasible delivery systems for the products 3 Recommendations on procedures for "vaccinating" materials and materiel of friendly forces to protect them against inadvertent exposure or niilhary/terrorist attacks with the products. 114 TECHNICAL POC: |Ph.D.. CAPT, MSC, USN Nsval Research Laboratory, Code 6106 4555 Overlook Ave., S.W. Washington, D.C. 20375 REFERENCES 1. Magrun, J. et al., (1994) Preparation of porous materials by bacterially enhanced corrosion of FE in iron-ritanium hot-pressed plates. Materials Science and Engineering 189(1-2): 165-172. 2. Little, B. and Wagner, P. (1996) An overview of microbiologically influenced corrosion of metals and alloys used in the storage of nuclear wastes, Can. J. Microbiol. 42(4): 367-374. 3. Little, B. Ray. R. et al., (199S) Fungal-induced corrosion of wire rope. Materials Performance 34(10): 55-58. 4. Wagner, P. and Little, B. (1993) Impact of alloying on microbiologically influenced corrosion, Materials Performance 32(9): 65-68. 5. Atlas, R. And CemigUa, C (1995) Bioremediation of petroleum products, Bioscience 45(5): 332-338. 6. Campbell, I., Regression analysis of feet ors influencing bacterial degradation of BTEX at the Naval Construction Battalion Command, Port Hueneme, California, In: Spargo, B. (ed ) In Situ Bioremediation and Efficacy Monitoring, 1996. 7. Wagner, P., Little, B. et al., (1996) Biodegradation of composite materials. International Biodeterioration and Biodegradation 38(2): 125-132 8. Wagner, P., Ray, R. et al., (1996) Microbiological degradation of stressed fiber-reinforced polymeric composites, Materials Performance 35(2): 79-82. 9. Ramamurti, K. And Jayaprakash, G. (1992) Asphalt stripping bacteria, J. Chemical Technology and Biotechnology 54(2): 171-174. 10. Wolf, M. And Bachofen, R. (1991) Microbial degradation of bitumen matrix used in nuclear waste repositories, Naturwissenschaften 78(9): 414-417. 11. Pendrys, J. (1989) Biodegradation of asphalt cement-20 by aerobic bacteria. Appl. Environ. Microbiol. 5S(6): 1357-1362. 12. Stranger-Johannes sen, M. and Norgaard, E. (1991) Deterioration of anti-corrosive paints by extracellular microbial products. International Biodeterioration 27(2): 157 13. Elsayed, A., Mahirtoud, W. et al„ (1996) Biodegradation of polyurethane coatings by rryorocarbon-degrading bacteria, International Biodeterioration and Biodegradation 37(1-2): 69-116 14. Jones-Meehan, J., Walch, M et al., Effect of mixed suKkte-reducing baaeriai communities on coatings, In: Biofouling and Biocorrosion, Geesey, G. (ed.), 1994. 15. Crabbe, 1, Campbell, J. et al., (1994) Biodegradation of an ester based polyurethane by Curvularia senegalensis, International Biodeterioratiori and Biodegradation 10:22-29. 16. Montgomery, M., Campbell, J. et al., (1995) Pseudomonas Chloroaphis Microorganism, Polyurethane Degrading Enzyme Obtained Therefrom and Method of Using Enzyme. Navy Case No. 75,461. 117 

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