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Royal representation, ceremony, and cultural identity in the building of the Canadian nation, 1860-1911 2001

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R O Y A L REPRESENTATION, CEREMONY, AND C U L T U R A L IDENTITY IN THE BUILDING OF THE CANADIAN NATION, 1860-1911 by WADE ANDREW HENRY B A . (Hons), The University of Manitoba, 1992 M.A., The University of Manitoba, 1993 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF T H E REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in T H E F A C U L T Y OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of History) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard T H E UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 2001 © Wade Andrew Henry, 2001 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Wistor y The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date ^^JfT^i^k^-^y />( DE-6 (2/88) 11 Abstract The process of nation-building in nineteenth century Canada involved the production of national symbols which could transcend sub-national loyalties, such as class, gender, ethnic, and religious identities, and unite the residents of the Canadian nation. While the symbols were many and varied, in this study I analyse the manner in which the Canadian state and civil society used royal ceremonies and representations to define and unify the Canadian nation between 1860 and 1911. The study focusses on the Canadian observances of Queen Victoria's Golden and Diamond Jubilees, her Memorial Services, the Coronation and Memorial Services of Edward VII, the Coronation of George V, and the royal visits of the Prince of Wales (Edward VII) in 1860 and the Duke of Cornwall and York (George V) in 1901. Regarding society and social relations as neither static nor fixed, but multiple and contradictory, I use the concept of cultural hegemony combined with elements from the "new" cultural history to examine the complex nature of power, identity, and royal representation in the nation-building process. Specifically, I argue that male members of the middle class articulated representations of themselves, women, the upper and lower classes, and the monarchy in order to legitimise their social authority and consolidate themselves as a cultural hegemony in the new national society. In turn, women and the upper and working classes resisted these representations with images of their own designed to empower themselves. The traditional elite claimed public and royal affirmation of their leadership; women and the working class sought an equal place in the nation. Complicating matters, however, were ethnic and religious identities which impinged upon class and gender loyalties and further altered the nature of royal Ill representation and the formation and negotiation of a cultural hegemony. French Canadians, Irish Catholics, Jews, African and Asian Canadians, and the Peoples of the First Nations added their voices—and imagery—to the process of nation-building as each articulated representations of the monarchy in order to counter the dominant interpretations emanating from Protestants and whites. By doing so, they sought to either negotiate themselves a place within a wider hegemony or demand that their rights—and their place within the Canadian nation—be respected. Royal ceremonies and representations, then, were not trivial events in Canadian history. They comprised a fundamental feature in national imagery and played a vital part in the building of the Canadian nation. I V Table of Contents Abstract ii Table of Contents iv List of Figures v Acknowledgements vi CHAPTER I: Introduction 1 PART ONE: CLASS, GENDER, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY CHAPTER II: The Royal Tour of 1860 33 CHAPTER III: Queen Victoria, 1861-1901 98 CHAPTER IV: The Edwardian Era, 1901-11 148 PART TWO: RELIGION, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY CHAPTER V: Protestantism, Irish Catholicism, and French Culture, 1860-1901 240 CHAPTER VI: Religion and Ethnicity During the Edwardian Era, 1901-11 306 CHAPTER VII: Aboriginal Tradition and Royal Representation, 1860-1911 348 CHAPTER VIII: Conclusion 426 Bibliography 431 Curriculum Vitae . 472 List of Figures 2.1: Map of the route of HRH the Prince of Wales through British North America and the United States, 1860 58 2.2: Albert Edward, Prince of Wales, ca. 1860 77 2.3: The Grand Ball given by the Mayor and citizens of Montreal in honour of the Prince of Wales, 27 August 1860 83 2.4. Grand finale of fireworks in honour of the Prince of Wales and the successful completion of the Victoria Bridge, 1860 87 3.1: Queen Victoria with her second daughter, Princess Alice, ca. 1862 107 3.2: Queen Victoria, 1896 . 131 3.3: Attending Funeral Service of Queen Victoria, Greenwood, BC, 2 February 1901 . 146 4.1: Map of the route of the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York's tour of the British Empire, 1901 179 4.2: School children await the arrival of the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York at Moose Jaw, 27 September 1901 . . . 188 4.3: Letting the people see (?) the Duke—The official idea of how to encourage a hearty Canadian welcome, 1901 196 4.4: Presentation of addresses at the Royal Pavilion on Parliament Hill, Ottawa, 20 September 1901 . . . . 200 4.5: Sir Wilfrid Laurier presents an address to the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York at the Royal Pavilion on Parliament Hill, Ottawa, 20 September 1901 . 202 5.1: The Prince of Wales in Canada—The Orangemen's Arch at Toronto 290 7.1: The Duke of Cornwall and York replies to an address at Shagannapi Point, 28 September 1901 403 7.2: Natives assembled at the "Great Pow-wow," 28 September 1901 . 412 vi Acknowledgements The completion of this dissertation would have been impossible without the assistance and support of a number of different people and organisations. Before I had even contemplated my doctoral program, Barry Ferguson, Peter Bailey, James Muir, and others during my Undergraduate and Master's studies at the University of Manitoba cultivated my interest in the issues I explore here. Ed Rea's superior research seminars prepared me for the rigorous work ahead. In conducting my research, I was aided by the knowledgeable and always accommodating reference staffs at the National Archives of Canada, the National Library, the Archives of Ontario, the British Columbia Archives and Record Service, the Provincial Archives of Manitoba, the City of Toronto Archives, the Vancouver City Archives, the Vancouver Public Library, and the University of British Columbia Library's Humanities and Social Sciences Division and Special Collections. The staff of the UBC Library's Interlibrary Loan Department deserves singular thanks for their unfailing assistance in fulfilling my countless requests for diverse and, sometimes, obscure material. I also must acknowledge—not due to any formal obligation, but by an honest appreciation—the financial support of the John S. Ewart Memorial Fund in providing financial support for my research trips to the National Archives. At the National Archives, I consulted, amongst so many other records, the papers of the 5th Marquis of Lansdowne for which I gratefully acknowledge the permission of the 9 th Marquis of Lansdowne. Similarly, Sir William Gladstone afforded me permission to refer to portions of the 5th Duke of Newcastle's correspondence copied from the Glynne-Gladstone MSS at the Flintshire Record Office, Wales. V l l In the arduous process of transforming raw research and partially formed theories into a coherent dissertation, Bob Kubicek and Joy Dixon, as members of my Supervisory Committee, provided me with much valuable advice and encouragement for which I am indebted. Bob McDonald provided me with a new appreciation for the complexities of "class," although the explanation I provide in the following pages, no doubt, still does not conform to his better judgment. In this and, indeed, in all of the other shortcomings found in this dissertation, I am alone to blame. Helping me to minimize such faults and flaws every step of the way has been Allan Smith, my Supervisor, who transformed my garbled sentences into coherent prose and saved me from many an embarrassing mistake. I am indebted for his wise consul, superior copy- editing skills, and encouragement. For encouragement, of which I needed much, I am also grateful to my former co- workers—and continuing friends—at V.I. A. Canada Customs who, with their constant prodding, ensured that I would finish what at times seemed unfinishable. I incurred yet another debt—to which I am thankful—in the final stages of my work when Brygida Cross, Chief of the Vancouver Documentation Centre, Immigration and Refugee Board, decided to hire and then accommodate the constant leave requests of a doctoral student heavily involved in the demands of finishing a dissertation. Making this final, stressful period less burdensome has been Kaoru Sakazaki who has been a welcome distraction from my work. Finally, and certainly not least, I wish to thank my parents and family for their love and support. It is to them that I dedicate this work. 1 C H A P T E R I Introduction In recent years the Canadian historical profession has come under increasing criticism from within. Prominent historians such as Michael Bliss, Jack Granatstein, and Doug Owram have complained of the "sundering" of Canadian history and the sinking of the profession into a "malaise," developments they largely attribute to the rise and ascendency of "limited identities" in Canadian historical scholarship and the subsequent abandonment of a nationally coherent vision of the country's past.1 Coined originally by Ramsay Cook, but popularised by J.M.S. Careless in his influential article of the same name, "limited identities" signified those other identities besides the nation which impinge on the Canadian experience, such as class, ethnicity, and region.2 The study of these identities by some historians in many ways marked a reaction against the emphasis on the nation and national unity, the dominant perspective among Canadian historians until the late 1960s. While acknowledging that the study of labour, women, Natives, and other groups had been long overdue, some scholars express the concern that the study of these other identities one at a time has turned into too much of a good thing, much to the detriment of "national history." The limited identities perspective, Jack Granatstein argues, was "almost openly anti-nationalist: it was not the nation that mattered, but 'smaller, differentiated 'Michael Bliss, "Privatizing the Mind: The Sundering of Canadian History, the Sundering of Canada," JournalofCanadian Studies 26, no. 4 (1991-2): 5-17; J.L. Granatstein, WhoKilled Canadian History? (Toronto, 1998); Doug Owram, "Narrow Circles: The Historiography of Recent Canadian Historiography," National History 1 (1997): 5-21. 2J.M.S. Careless, "Limited Identities in Canada," Canadian Historical Review 50, no. 1 (1969): 1-10. 2 provincial or regional societies'; not Canadians as a whole, but the components of the ethnic mosaic; not Canadians as a society, but Canadians in their social classes." In response to this perceived fragmentation of Canadian history, he advocates a return to considering "Canada as a nation, as a whole, as a society, and not simply as a collection of races, genders, regions, and classes."3 Despite its seeming image of grandeur in analysing Canada as a whole, Granatstein's call for a return to the study of Canada as a nation is actually very narrow in its scope.4 His definition of "national history" is limited to the political, diplomatic, and military events which purportedly united Canadians and his approach downplays the diversity and divisions in the Canadian past uncovered by the new social history. Far from a truly "national history," Granatstein advocates a return to a study of his definition of the nation. Yet, "the nation" is not a static unit which can be taken for granted. Indeed, as illustrated by the significant differences in opinion between Granatstein and the historians of the new social history, the nation is open to interpretation. Nevertheless, the suggestion for a return to a national perspective should neither be dismissed simply as a step backwards nor as a revocation of recent Canadian social and cultural history. While the decline of the nation-state's power in the days of globalisation 3Granatstein, Who Killed Canadian History?', 72, 77. 4For critiques of Granatstein's argument see: Graham Carr, "Harsh Sentences: Appealing the Strange Verdict of Who Killed Canadian History?" American Review of Canadian Studies (1998): 167-176; Chris Lorenz, "Comparative Historiography: Problems and Perspectives," History and Theory 38, no. 1 (1999): 23-39; A.B. McKillop, "Who Killed Canadian History? A View from the Trenches," Canadian Historical Review 80, no. 2 (1999): 269-299; Brian D. Palmer, "Of Silences and Trenches: A Dissident View of Granatstein's Meaning," Canadian Historical Review 80, no. 4 (1999): 676-686. 3 has influenced the demise of the nation as the central focus in Western historiography,5 the nation as a category of historical analysis remains relevant by the mere fact that it had been a central characteristic of the historical imagination and a fundamental feature of politics and society from the early nineteenth century to the 1960s. Accordingly, if any understanding of the "national era" is to take place the nation as a distinct historical category needs to be taken seriously and studied assiduously. The calls by nationally-minded scholars should be accepted as a challenge to historians to reconcile and integrate what have come to be regarded by some as two diametrically opposed perspectives into a "New National History." That is, a national history not in the narrow sense of merely the political evolution of the nation-state nor in the fragmented terms of limited identities, but in a history in which all cultural identities are examined together in relation to the development of the nation.6 As Doug Owram has suggested, historians need to move beyond the analysis of a specific identity to look at the interplay between several and their relationship to the nation as a whole.7 Identities should not be regarded as "limited" and separated, but as multiple and interconnected. People hold many identities, any one of which may supercede the others at any given point in time depending upon the context.8 Furthermore, 5Lorenz, "Comparative Historiography," 23-39; McKillop, "Who Killed Canadian History?" 285. 6For an example of such an approach to national history see Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven, 1992). 7Owram, "Narrow Circles," 18. "Allan Smith, "Introduction: The Canadian Mind in Continental Perspective," in Canada—An American Nation? Essays on Continentalism, Identity, and the Canadian Frame of Mind (Kingston and Montreal, 1994), 9; Ramsay Cook, '"Identities Are Not Like Hats,'" Canadian Historical Review 81, no. 2 (2000): 260-265. 4 the fact that Canadians hold an array of different identities does not necessarily mean that they have been incapable of sharing a sense of national identity. "It is simply not the case," Phillip Buckner points out, "that most Canadians have seen a conflict between a sense of national identity and their regional, provincial or local loyalties...."9 Indeed, since at least the mid- nineteenth century Canadians have recognised that their community was divided by class, ethnicity, gender, religion, and other identities and they have tried to cross these so-called "limited" identities and divisions with a national vision which could unite them. Lacking cultural uniformity, but requiring a consensus to survive, the Canadian state sought ways to encourage its diverse peoples to identify with the national political entity. In addition to the implementation of a series of "national" economic and political policies, such as John A. Macdonald's "National Policy" of tariff reform and railway building, the process of nation-building in nineteenth century Canada also involved the production of national symbols and metaphors which could transcend other loyalties and unite the residents of the Canadian state.10 While the national images constructed were many and varied, perhaps no other symbol received more attention as an instrument to consolidate the state and unify the nation than the monarchy. Indeed, from the first royal tour of British North America by a Prince of Wales in 'Phillip Buckner, "Whatever Happened to the British Empire?" Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 4 (1993): 20-21. 10Sean Purdy, "Building Homes, Building Citizens: Housing Reform and Nation Formation in Canada, 1900-20," Canadian Historical Review 19, no. 3 (1998): 492-523; Allan Smith, "Metaphor and Nationality in North America," in Canada—An American Nation?, 127- 158; Idem, "National Images and National Maintenance: The Ascendancy of the Ethnic Idea in North America," in Canada—-An American Nation?, 159-194; William Westfall, Two Worlds: The Protestant Culture of Nineteenth Century Ontario (Kingston and Montreal, 1989), 3-4; Randy Widdis, With Scarcely a Ripple: Anglo-American Migration into the United States and Western Canada, 1880-1920 (Kingston and Montreal, 1998), 15-16. 5 1860 to the Dominion's observance of the Coronation of George V in 1911, royal ceremonies and regal representations figured prominently in the efforts of the state and civil society to define and unify the Canadian nation during this period of dramatic growth and sometimes turbulent development. Placed at the centre of a process of self and national definition, however, royal representations and ceremonies became more than mere national symbols. Reflecting the attitudes and values of their producers, the articulation of royal imagery was also a means of attaching a particular interpretation of social relations, status, and authority onto the nation. Using the concept of cultural hegemony combined with elements from the "new" cultural history, then, this dissertation will examine the complex nature of power, identity, and royal representation in the nation-building process. While, specifically, the dissertation focusses on this process in the Canadian experience between 1860 and 1911, the methodology laid out later in this introduction and applied in the following chapters offers a method of exploring the issues of power, representation, and national identity in other contexts as well. Historiographical Analysis Although it has not received adequate attention and analysis, the view that the monarchy has acted as a symbol of Canadian national unity in order to ameliorate social divisions and achieve social and political cohesion is not a new one. In large part a response to Quebec separatism and the Americanisation of the Canadian economy and culture in the 1960s and 1970s, scholars such as Frank MacKinnon, Jacques Monet, and W.L. Morton promoted the monarchy as a symbol of Canadian democracy, freedom, and unity.11 They argued that allegiance uFrank MacKinnon, The Crown in Canada (Calgary, 1976); Jacques Monet, "The Canadian Monarchy: 'Everything That Is Best and Most Admired,'" in The West and the Nation: 6 to the Canadian Crown permitted cultural pluralism in ways in which the covenant ideology of the United States and its pressure for uniformity could not provide. In return for their allegiance, the monarchy respected the rights of its subjects and thus allowed a diversity of cultures, in particular English and French, to flourish in a single nation united by a common loyalty to the Crown. "In the Crown," Jacques Monet argued, "are symbolized the permanent aspirations of all Canadians...First among these has been and must continue to be a belief in the equal dignity of each individual person, regardless of class, religion, or ethnic origin." "The Canadian Crown is thus the living strength and majesty of this plural society. It is the sign and cause of our allegiance to each other... ." 1 2 In comparison with the American Republic's imposition of cultural conformity to achieve national cohesion, the attainment of Canadian unity came through the monarchy's recognition of cultural difference and respect for freedom. Despite their recognition of the importance placed on royal symbolism by the state in realising Canadian national unity, the work of MacKinnon, Monet, and Morton has been clouded by their motivation to justify the relevancy of the Crown in the 1970s and their open expressions of affection for the institution.13 The end result has been a scholarship which emphasises Essays in Honour of W.L. Morton, eds. Carl Berger and Ramsay Cook (Toronto, 1976), 321- 335; Idem, "La Couronne du Canada," Journal of Canadian Studies 11, no. 4 (1976): 27-32; Idem, The Canadian Crown (Toronto, 1979); W.L. Morton, The Canadian Identity, 2d ed. (Toronto, 1972). For similar arguments, see John Farthing, Freedom Wears a Crown (Toronto, 1957); Eugene A. Forsey, Freedom and Order: Collected Essays (Toronto, 1974); Ralph Heintzman, "The Meaning of Monarchy," Journal of Canadian Studies 12, no. 4 (1977): 1-2, 115-117. 12Monet, "The Canadian Monarchy," 324, 334. j 1 3More recent studies of the monarchy in Canada have also been marred by sentimentality. See, for example, Arthur Bousfield and Garry Toffoli, Royal Observations: Canadians andRoyalty (Toronto, 1991); Tom Macdonnell, Daylight Upon Magic: The Royal 7 sentimentality and downplays analysis.14 Furthermore, these studies have not recognised historical context nor contestation. Not only do they suggest that the Canadian Crown is inherently a guarantor and symbol of freedom and pluralism, but they contend that it has always been regarded, by nearly everyone, as such. Yet it is misleading to assert that the monarchy has any innate meaning and that the symbols that may be connected to the Crown at one particular time have always been related to it.15 As Ewan Morris points out in the Australian context, "the monarchy has no inherent meaning. The meanings attached to it are social constructions which vary widely across space and time and between different groups in society."16 The idea that the monarchy permitted a unity in diversity to develop, for example, was not born in the 1960s, but had antecedents in the nineteenth century. At that time the concept was understood differently by various ethnic and religious groups and was developed and used in very different contexts to Tour of Canada, 1939 (Toronto, 1989); Robert M . Stamp, Kings, Queens, and Canadians: A Celebration of Canada's Infatuation with the British Royal Family (Markham, Ont, 1987). 1 4For example, MacKinnon's analysis of royal ceremonial does not go much beyond defending it as a cost effective public relations measure. He does not recognise that it means anything besides preventing public business from being "boring" and giving politicians' wives "something to do and talk about." MacKinnon, The Crown in Canada, 138-144. 15Canadian scholars have not been the only ones to make such assumptions. In their well- known analysis of the Coronation of Elizabeth II, the sociologists Edward Shils and Michael Young concluded that "the Coronation was the ceremonial occasion for the affirmation of the moral values by which society lives." However, they offered no discussion of how these moral values were arrived at nor what makes them shared. For similar conclusions, and problems, see J G . Blumer, J.R. Brown, A.J. Ewbank, and T.J. Nossiter, "Attitudes to the Monarchy: Their Structure and Development During a Ceremonial Occasion," Political Studies 19, no. 2 (1971): 149-171; Philip Ziegler, Crown and People (London, 1978). 16Ewan Morris, "Forty Years On: Australia and the Queen, 1954," Journal of Australian Studies, no. 40 (1994): 2. 8 serve sometimes diametrical interests.17 To understand the relationship between the monarchy and nation-building, then, consideration has to be given to how and why the monarchy came to symbolise national unity for some groups in society, what was the nature of this royal representation, and how and why did this symbolism vary between different groups and change over time. Since the advent of the "new" cultural history in the 1980s, historians have paid greater attention to these questions. Influenced by literary theory and anthropological models, cultural historians have interpreted symbolic practices as "texts" permeated with multiple and contested meanings to be read and deciphered. Representation is no longer taken as a given, but as convoluted and inseparable from its context.18 Considering the position royal ceremonies hold at the centre of power, their age, and the variety of rituals involved in their staging, regal activities have excited some of the greatest interest from cultural historians. Scholars examining the workings of the monarchical state prior to the French Revolution have focussed on the "symbolics" and "theatre" of power articulated through royal ritual. Regarded as fundamental to the monarch's exercise of power, royal imagery presented the ruler as supreme and vested with sacral qualities in order to legitimise his or her right to rule.19 In their study of the 1 7The association of the monarchy with the concept of unity in diversity in nineteenth century Canada is examined in Part Two below. 18LynnHunt, ed,, TheNew CulturalHistory (Berkeley, 1989); Raphael Samuel, "Reading the Signs," History Workshop Journal, no. 32 (1991): 88-109; Idem, "Reading the Signs: II. Fact-grubbers and Mind-readers," History Workshop Journal, no. 33 (1992): 220-251. 1 9For example, see Peter Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV (New Haven, 1992); David Cannadine and Simon Price, eds., Rituals of Royalty: Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Societies (Cambridge, 1987); Linda Ann Curcio, "Saints, Sovereignty, and Spectacle in Colonial Mexico" (Ph.D. diss., Tulane University, 1993); Clifford Geertz, "Centers, Kings, 9 nineteenth century, however, historians note that growing class and ethnic divisions within states arising out of industrialisation, urbanisation, and the spread of nationalism prompted a shift in the nature of royal ceremonial to emphasise the monarch as a symbol of national unity. From analysing states and empires from Japan to Britain, scholars have concluded that the governing elites invented and manipulated royal ceremonies to represent the monarchy as a symbol of national identity in order to cultivate reverence for the institution, arouse respect for the social order, and unite the people.20 The well-known work of David Cannadine and Eric Hobsbawm provides a case in point. Hobsbawm explains that dramatic social changes in the late nineteenth century "called for new devices to ensure or express social cohesion and identity and to structure social relations... This required new methods of ruling or establishing bonds of loyalty." One of these "new methods" was to use royal ceremonial to make the monarch the focus of his people's unity—a symbol of the country's greatness and permanence. As Cannadine put it, the monarch and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power," in Culture audits Creators: Essays in Honor of Edward Shils, eds. Joseph Ben-David and Terry Nichols Clark (Chicago, 1977), 150- 171; Richard S. Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy. Volume One: From Peter the Great to the Death of Nicholas I (Princeton, 1995). 2 0David Cannadine, "The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the 'Invention of Tradition,' c. 1820-1977," in The Invention of Tradition, eds. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge, 1983), 101-164; Linda Colley, "The Apotheosis of George III: Loyalty, Royalty and the British Nation, 1760-1820," Past and Present, no. 102 (1984): 94-129; Idem, Britons; Takashi Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan (Berkeley, 1996); Freda Harcourt, "Gladstone, Monarchism and the 'New' Imperialism, 1868-1874," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 14, no. 1 (1985)20-51; Eric Hobsbawm, "Mass-Producing TraditionsEurope, 1870-1914" mThe Invention of Tradition, 263-307; William M . Kuhn, Democratic Royalism: The Transformation of the British Monarchy, 1861-1914 (New York, 1996); James Shedel, "Emperor, Church, and People: Religion and Dynastic Loyalty During the Golden Jubilee of Franz Joseph," Catholic Historical Review 76, no. 1 (1990): 71-92. 10 "was no longer, as his predecessors had been, just the head of society, but was now seen to be the head of the nation as well."21 The purpose of this enterprise was to keep the old hierarchy of power intact through the advancement of deference which an increasingly visible monarchy—presented as above class and party and embodying the interests of the nation—could supposedly accomplish. In demonstrating that royal symbolism is neither static nor innocuous, but pliant and political, the work of Hobsbawm and Cannadine influenced a series of studies examining the relationship between ceremonies and national identity. Despite its value in emphasising the relationship between ceremonial, power, and national identity, however, their work as it relates to the nature of nation-building has two serious limitations—shortcomings which can be found to some degree in most of the scholarship on the modern British monarchy. First, their analysis of nation-building is too narrowly focussed. Since the groups they argue to have been served by royal ceremonial are limited to the upper and middle classes, they ignore other collective cultural identities besides class which also impinge on the construction of the monarchy as a symbol of national identity. Anthony D. Smith points out that the nation "draws on elements of other kinds of collective identity, which accounts... for the way in which national identity can be combined with these other types of identity—class, religious or ethnic... A national identity is fundamentally multi-dimensional...."22 It is this consideration of multi- dimensionality that is required in studies of national identity because, according to Denise Riley, "most commonly, you will skate across the several identities which will take your weight, relying 21Hobsbawm, "Mass-Producing Traditions," 263, 282; Cannadine, "The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual," 122, 133. 22Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno, 1991), 14. 11 on the most useful, for your purposes of the moment...."23 It is erroneous to give priority and precedence to one cultural identity, such as class or gender, and to subordinate all other categories to it since, as Joy Parr explains, "there are times when the relative positions of class and gender relationships are reversed, times when racial, ethnic, or national identities assume greater prominence with respect to both gender and class."24 Unfortunately, most historians of the modern monarchy, such as Cannadine and Hobsbawm, have not taken into account the possibility that other identities outside of class have played a part in the way in which the monarchy was presented as a symbol of national identity.25 Likewise, Canadian historians have been slow to follow Parr's lead in applying these considerations to their work, in particular to the study of the formation of Canadian national identity where little work has been done on the relationship between national identity and other collective cultural identities.26 Another problem with Cannadine's and Hobsbawm's work, again, characteristic of most 23Denise Riley, "Am I That Name? "Feminism and the Category of "Women " in History (Minneapolis, 1988), 16. 2 4 Joy Parr, The Gender of Breadwinners: Women, Men, and Change in Two Industrial Towns, 1880-1950 (Toronto, 1990), 10-11. 2 5In recent years a few studies have considered the gendered representations of British royalty, Queen Victoria in particular. See Anna Clark, "Queen Caroline and the Sexual Politics of Popular Culture in London, 1820,"Representations, no. 31 (1990): 47-68; Margaret Homans and Adrienne Munich, eds., Remaking Queen Victoria (Cambridge, 1997); Margaret Homans, Royal Representations: Queen Victoria and British Culture, 183 7-1876 (Chicago, 1998); Gail Turley Houston, Royalties: The Queen and Victorian Writers (Charlottesville, 1999); Adrienne Munich, Queen Victoria'sSecrets (New York, 1996); VictoriaR. Smith, "Constructing Victoria: The Representation ofQueen Victoria in England, India, and Canada, 1897-1914," (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1998); Dorothy Thompson, Queen Victoria: The Woman, the Monarchy, and the People (New York, 1990). 26Phillip Buckner drew attention to this gap in his presidential address to the Canadian Historical Association. Buckner, "Whatever Happened to the British Empire?," 3-32. 12 of the literature on the modern monarchy, is that they associate the "invention" of royal ritual, and the version of national identity it presents, with falsity. In their analysis of the formation of royal ritual from the 1880s to the First World War, Hobsbawm and Cannadine claim that these ceremonies were designed as "invented traditions" in order to portray the monarchy as a "unifying symbol of permanence and national community" According to Hobsbawm, '"Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past." Moreover, he adds that "the peculiarity of 'invented' tradition is that the continuity with [a historic past] is largely factitious." Cannadine underscores this point as he asserts that "the continuity which the invented traditions of the late nineteenth century seek to largely illusory."27 Cannadine, Hobsbawm, and others have associated royal ceremonies with falsity largely because they interpret their representations as having been consciously contrived by a dominant culture in order to "deliberately" manipulate the attitudes and behaviour of subordinates. According to this view, the governing elite constructed royal ceremonial "to control and indoctrinate" the masses and legitimise their privileged position in the social order.28 2 7Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in The Invention of Tradition, 1-2; Cannadine, "The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual," 122, 161. 28Hobsbawm, "Mass Producing Traditions," 263, 265, 270, 282; Cannadine, "The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual," 122, 124; N. Birnbaum, "Monarchs and Sociologists: A Reply to Professor Shils and Mr. Young," Sociological Review, n.s., 3, no. 1 (1955): 5-23; Robert Bocock, Ritual in Industrial Society: A Sociological Analysis of Ritualism in Modern England (London, 1974); Colley, Britons; Use Hayden, Symbol and Privilege: The Ritual Context of British Royalty (Tucson, 1987); Tom Nairn, The Enchanted Glass: Britain and its Monarchy (London, 1988); David Sinclair, Two Georges: The Making of the Modern Monarchy (London, 1988). 13 While there is evidence to support this conclusion, there is also reason to believe that many historical actors did not use royal ceremonial to consciously manipulate the public's behaviour.29 Royal representation reflected the way in which cultural producers imagined their nation and their place within it. According to Benedict Anderson, "communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined." That is, the modern nation requires people to create an "imagined community" because "the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion."30 Identities, whether class, gender, or national, are not fixed, but socially constructed and contextually defined. Consideration has to be given to the historical circumstances which produce and transform these categories in different situations and over time. The formation of identity is a process in which representations, such as in royal ceremonial, are used to articulate the sense of belonging 29Specifically in regards to "invented traditions," an added criticism of Cannadine and Hobsbawm is that there is substantial reason to believe that many large-scale popular royal rituals were not "invented" in the late nineteenth century as they claim. Walter Arnstein points out that royal ceremonies were not lacking in the beginning of Queen Victoria's reign and work by R O . Bucholz and Linda Colley confirms that royal ceremonial was used to gain the loyalty of the public long before the Victorian period. Also, William Kuhn's study of key figures involved in the planning of Victorian and Edwardian royal ceremonial demonstrates that they were "obsessed with adhering to precedent." From this perspective alone, then, it can be misleading to assume that modern royal ceremonies have been "invented" or "fabricated." Royal "traditions" have been altered over the years with changes implemented to impress different values and to meet new expectations in society, but they were also often based on some precedent and demonstrated a certain amount of continuity. Walter L. Arnstein, "Queen Victoria Opens Parliament: The Disinvention of Tradition," Historical Research 63, no. 151 (1990): 178-194; R.O. Bucholz, '"Nothing but Ceremony': Queen Anne and the Limitations of Royal Ritual," Journal of British Studies 30, no. 3 (1991): 288-323; Colley, "The Apotheosis of George III"; Idem, Britons; Kuhn, Democratic Royalism, 1-14. 30Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (London, 1991), 6. 14 amongst the people of an imagined community and to mediate social relations by defining who does not belong or is excluded from the nation.31 At issue is not whether the representations are true or false, but, as Richard White explains, "what their function is, whose creation they are, and whose interests they serve."32 Certainly, conscious actions are involved in this process, but so are unconscious ones. "Shaped by ideologies and social processes of which they were not fully aware," Ian McKay writes, "cultural producers did not conspire to falsify the past."33 The version of the nation they imagined may have reflected their social identities and, accordingly, served their class and gender-based interests and concerns, but their use of royal representation in building the nation cannot be reduced to simply a social control conspiracy. Indeed, as William Kuhn suggests in his examination of a few of the organisers of Victorian and Edwardian royal ceremonies, image-makers and organisers directed the ceremonies and their symbols at themselves as much as at the masses.34 Nation-building involves more than the moral regulation of the working class, women, and ethnic minorities, but also consists of a process of self- definition on the part of the cultural producers, generally white, male, and upper and middle 31Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the EnglishMiddle Class, 1780-1850 (Chicago, 1987), 29,450; Parr, The Gender of 'Breadwinners, 6-8; Idem, "Gender History and Historical Practice," Canadian Historical Review 76, no. 3 (1995). 354-376; Joan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (New York, 1988), 42-49; Mariana Valverde, The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885-1925 (Toronto, 1991), 9-11. 32Richard White, Inventing Australia: Images and Identity, 1688-1980 (Sydney, 1981), viii. 33Ian McKay, The Quest of the Folk: Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in Twentieth Century Nova Scotia (Kingston and Montreal, 1994), 40. 3 4Kuhn, Democratic Royalism, 1-14. 15 class. Furthermore, the representations produced by this elite to unify the nation, consolidate themselves as a bloc, legitimise their status and power, and regulate and control other social groups did not go uncontested as implied by the social control theorists.35 Racial and religious minorities, women, and the working class were not duped by, nor powerless to resist, the elite's regal representations, but countered them with images of their own and other forms of resistance. The current theoretical frameworks on the study of royal ceremonial and national identity provided by the social control theorists, such as Hobsbawm and Cannadine, and those who are oblivious to the influence of cultural politics, such as Monet and Morton, have thus led to an "interpretive dead-end."36 Some recent studies, however, have pointed to new directions for the study of royal ceremonial. Works by Gail Turley Houston, Margaret Homans, Adrienne Munich, and Victoria Smith have focussed on the complexity of Queen Victoria's representations. By incorporating gender into their analyses, these scholars have demonstrated that the Queen has "meant different things to different groups"; specifically between middle class men and women. Despite the Queen's own agency in projecting her image, Homans and Munich note that Victoria's image was so malleable and open to contradictory representations that her image was "created even as it is read." Moreover, Houston points out, as a symbol of both majesty and female domesticity, Queen Victoria became situated in a site "at which British cultural capital was exchanged, contested, and represented." According to these studies, then, the Queen's image became involved in a complex web in which her gendered representations served to 3 5 Jane Connors, "The 1954 Royal Tour of Australia," Australian Historical Studies 25, no. 100 (1993): 371-382; Morris, "Forty Years On," 1-13. 3 6McKay, The Quest of the Folk, 16. 16 support and challenge power relationships. As useful as these studies are in this respect, however, they still lack an appreciation of the ethnic and religious dimensions of royal representation. In exploring primarily the role of class and gender in the relationship between royal representation and power, these scholars conclude that the Queen's image was one of duality (constitutional ruler and domestic woman) when, in fact, it was one of multiplicity. Taking Victoria Smith's examination of the Queen's representations in Britain, India, and Canada as an example, she does examine the representation of the Queen by nationalists in India and, in doing so, addresses the issue of ethnicity, but does so within the same narrow perspective of "duality" applied to her analysis of the Queen's representation in Britain. As well, in exploring the Queen's image in Britain and, especially, Canada, Smith focusses entirely on Anglo-Saxon Protestants and neglects the different perspectives of Catholics, French Canadians, and other groups. The result is a study which, while more appreciative of the gendered and class nuances of royal representation and its relationship to power, still falls short of appreciating its ethnic and religious dimensions.37 Unlike these studies of Queen Victoria, H.V. Nelles' examination of the Quebec Tercentenary in 1908, in which the Prince of Wales was the centre of attention, pays significant attention to the "multivocality of the experience" and, in particular, to the different perspectives of French Canadians, British Protestants, and the Peoples of the First Nations in this spectacle of nation-building. Nelles, however, does not regard the ceremony and its varied representations as a site in which power relationships were asserted, negotiated, and challenged in any real sense. 37Homans, Royal Representations; Homans and Munich, Remaking Queen Victoria; Houston, Royalties; Munich, Queen Victoria's Secrets; Smith, "Constructing Victoria." 17 Instead he understands the representations as mere "reflections" of the social structure in Quebec at a particular point in time, "The primary importance of the event," he argues, "lay not in how it affected things, but rather in how it reflected the world around it." Since multiple meanings and competing interests struggled for control at the Tercentenary, he asserts that no hegemony could be achieved and, therefore, the concept of "reflexivity—the capacity to reflect upon and change behaviour as a result of participation in cultural performances"—seems to be limited. To Nelles, representation is not power, it only "reflects power."38 A close examination of the concept of cultural hegemony, however, when combined with Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities" and an appreciation of the multiplicity of social experience demonstrates that representations, including royal ones, are more actively involved in the struggle for power and the related process of enhancing collective identities than Nelles gives credit for. In addition, such an approach would address the shortcomings of the recent studies of Queen Victoria by incorporating the study of ethnic and religious identities into the analysis and, thus, offer a method of understanding the role of royal representation in the process of nation-building in its class, gender, ethnic, and religious dimensions.39 More than just reflection of power or involving just class and gender groups, then, royal ceremonies should be understood as hegemonic sites involving multiple social groups and interweaving a variety of representations. 38Nelles, The Art of Nation-Building: Pageantry and Spectacle at Quebec's Tercentenary (Toronto, 1999), 12, 154-158, 171, 317-318. 3 9For similar formulations see McKay, The Quest of the Folk, 4-40; Patrick Brantlinger, Crusoe's Footprints: Cultural Studies in Britain and America (New York, 1990), 102-106. 18 Hegemony and Royal Representation The traditional definition of hegemony refers to political rule or domination in state and class relations. The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, however, made an important, and influential, distinction between "rule" and "hegemony." Equating "rule" with political coercion, he interpreted "hegemony" as a process by which a social group acquires and maintains leadership through the consent of other, subordinate groups in a society.40 The dominant culture attains this political legitimacy not merely by imposing its rule through the apparatus of the state, but "by weaving its own cultural outlook deeply into the social fabric."41 "As Gramsci understood," Jackson Lears explains, "the hegemonic culture depends not on the brainwashing of'the masses' but on the tendency of public discourse to make some forms of experience readily available to consciousness while ignoring or suppressing others." The dominant culture seeks to legitimise its power, ratify the contemporary social order, and achieve social cohesion by validating its ideas, values, and experience in public discourses.42 Furthermore, in addition to serving to maintain its hegemony, the dominant culture's representations also give it an awareness of its members as a culture, that is, an identity. The establishment of approved social identities, and the necessary denial of alternatives, plays as critical a part in the formation and 40Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford, 1977), 108. 41Walter L. Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory (Berkeley, 1980), 149; Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Smith (New York, 1971), 5. 4 2 T . Jackson Lears, "The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities," American Historical Review, 90, no. 3 (1985): 577, 574. 19 maintenance of a hegemony as economic relations.43 While Gramsci emphasised that class served as the basis of the dominant culture's identity and stood at the root of the hegemonic struggle, scholars such as Stuart Hall and R.W. Connell have recently demonstrated that race and gender are also entwined in the hegemonic process. Just as one class is culturally exalted over another so too are race, religion, and not only men over women, but also within each gender category one form of masculinity or femininity over another.44 Due to scholars' recognition of the significance of these other identities in building hegemony, Stuart Hall explains that "th