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The causes of the Manchurian Incident : subtitle a non-Marxist interpretation Kitamura, Jun 2002

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THE CAUSES OF THE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT A Non-Marxist Interpretation by KITAMURA, JUN B.Ed., Tokyo Gakugei University, 1982 M A , University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1994 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES T H E D E P A R T M E N T O F A N T H R O P O L O G Y A N D S O C I O L O G Y We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 2002 © Jun Kitamura, 2002 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Anthropology and Sociology The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date ABSTRACT si tu veux la paix, connaisla guerre History repeats itself and war invariably brings tragedy to the world. In contemporary society where powerful weapons are developed one after another and world peace is a matter of ongoing concern, it is important for sociologists to carry out thorough investigation of the causes of war in order to help prevent future armed conflicts. I selected the Manchurian Incident as a subject of my investigation of the causes of war because there is some doubt as to the existing explanation of its causes. After the end of World War II, the economic determinist explanation--that the nature of capitalism caused this imperialistic aggressive war--has predominated in Japanese academic circles. The economic determinists deduce the causes of war from the consequences of war and also disregard military factors, in particular the motives of actors. Consequently, their anti-Weberian explanations are not considered to be accounts of war as such. I believe that war should be understood, not from a socioeconomic viewpoint alone, but also from a military viewpoint. Thus, I constructed my own approach as suggested by Qausewitz's theory of war. My starting point follows Qausewitz in asserting that no one starts a war without a war plan in which the objectives of the war must be clear. I then reconstruct the war plans for the Manchurian Incident through examining the primary sources. I infer the motives of the actors from the war plans, and thereby determine the central causes of the war. My analysis reveals that an important feature of the Manchurian Incident was an ongoing ideological battle between commercial pacifism and militaristic realism. In addition, my study shows that the Tokyo leaders thoroughly opposed the war in order to protect Japanese capitalist interests; but the Kanto Army's leaders decided to go to war exclusively for Japan's national defense. The Manchurian Incident suggests, therefore, that the expansion of capitalist interests does not always precipitate war; rather, ideological factors can be central in making war; in this case, the military defense ideology of Japan. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT (ii) LIST OF FIGURES (vii) NOTE (viii) I N T R O D U C T I O N (1) 1: T H E M A N C H U R I A N I NCIDENT (2) 2: NECESSITY CF A SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION CF THE CAUSES CF THE M A N C H U R I A N INCIDENT (6) 3: T H E ECONOMICDETERMINIST INTERPRETATION (7) 4: PROBLEMS OFTHE ECONOMICDETERMINIST I NTERPRETATION (16) 5: M Y APPROACH (22) PART-I: IDEA OF PEACE AND WAR (29) CHAPTER-1: SHIDEHARA DIPLOMACY (30) 1.1: S H I D E H A R A ' S C O M M E R C I A L P A C I F I S M (30) 1.2: S H I D E H A R A D I P L O M A C Y ' S SUCCESS I N T H E C H I N A P O L I C Y (32) 1.3: T O K Y O ' S P O L I C Y T O W A R D M A N C H U R I A (34) (1) The Imperial Japanese Government (IJG) (2) The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) CHAPTER-2: ISHIWARA DOCTRINE (42) 2.1: S T R U C T U R E OF I S H I W A R A D O C T R I N E (42) 2.2: T H E P R I N C I P L E OF N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E (44) 2.3: W H Y M A N C H U R I A ? (50) 2.4: T H E W A R P L A N FOR T H E CONQUEST OF M A N C H U R I A (54) (1) The Theory of the Conquest of Manchuria (2) Operations against the Northeastern Army (3) The Plans to Govern Manchuria 2.5: T H E P R I N C I P L E OF R A C I A L H A R M O N Y (65) (1) The Manchuria Youth League (2) The Nationalist View of Manchuria (3) The Principle of Racial Harmony 2.6: T H E B I R T H O F I S H I W A R A D O C T R I N E (76) iii 2.7: T H E W A R P L A N FOR T H E M A N C H U R I A N W A R OF I N D E P E N D E N C E (79) (1) The Theory of Manchurian Independence (2) The Significance of the Founding of a New State (3) A General Plan for Establishing the New State CHAPTER-3: ISHIWARA DOCTRINE'S ROOTS (91) 3.1: T H E B I R T H OF T H E J A P A N E S E D E F E N S E I D E O L O G Y (92) 3.2: CONTENTS OF T H E J A P A N E S E D E F E N S E I D E O L O G Y (95) 3.3: T H E T R A N S I T I O N OF T H E J A P A N E S E D E F E N S E P O L I C Y (102) (1) Taiwan Shuppei (2) Seinan War (3) Sino-Japanese War (4) Russian Interference (5) Russo-Japanese War (6) Postwar Period (7) World War I and 1920's Summary 3.4: I S H I W A R A D O C T R I N E A S A N U P - T O - D A T E D V E R S I O N OF T H E J A P A N E S E D E F E N S E I D E O L O G Y (117) 3.5: T H E D I F F U S I O N OF I S H I W A R A D O C T R I N E (120) PART-II: THE EXECUTION OF THE WAR PLANS (122) CHAPTER-4: THE MANCHURIAN MILITARY STRUCTURE IN THE EARLY SUMMER OF 1931 (123) 4.1: T H E M A N C H U R I A N G O V E R N M E N T (123) (1) Currency System in Manchuria (2) Railroad Network in Manchuria (3) Foreign Interests in Manchuria 4.2: T H E N O R T H E A S T E R N F R O N T I E R D E F E N S E A R M Y (128) (1) What is the Northeastern Frontier Defense Army? (2) The Mukden Army in North China (3) Armaments of the Northeastern Army 4.3: T H E K A N T O A R M Y (133) (1) The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) (2) Structure of the Kanto Army (3) The Kanto Army's Ordinary Duties (4) Status of the Kanto Army's Officers (5) The Activities of the Kanto Army (6) Poor Armaments of the Kanto Army iv 5: THE CONQUEST OF MANCHURIA (144) 5.1: T H E M U K D E N I N C I D E N T (144) (1) Ishiwara's Judgment of the Military Situation of Manchuria (2) CaptainNakamura Incident (3) The Formation of a ConspiratorialGroup (4) The Plot at Mukden (5) The Conqueringof Manchuria 5.2: A N T I - W A R P O L I C Y OF T H E IJG (157) (1) The Initial Reaction of the IJ A (2) A Measure of the IJG (3) A Reproof of the Emperor (4) The IJA's order 5.3: F A I L U R E TO CONQUER M A N C H U R I A (165) (1) Lieutenant Colonellshiwara's Miscalculation (2) The Leaders of the Kanto Army versus Tokyo (3) The Kanto Army leaders' decision to give up the Conquest of Manchuria CHAPTER-6: MANCHURIAN INDEPENDENCE CAMP (171) 6.1: M A N C H U R I A N I N D E P E N D E N C E M O V E M E N T S (171) (1) The Manchurian Government (2) City of Mukden and Liaoning Province (3) Jilin Province (4) Special District of Ha'erbin (5) Zhang Haipeng Army 6.2: T H E W E N Z H I G R O U P ' S T H E O R Y OF T H E I D E A L S T A T E (175) (1) The Manchurian Monroe Doctrine (2) The Principle of Renunciation of War 6.3: T H E B I R T H OF T H E M A N C H U R I A N I N D E P E N D E N C E C A M P (178) CHAPTER-7: THE MANCHURIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (181) 7.1: D E C I S I O N OF T H E H I G H C O M M A N D OF T H E IJA (181) 7.2: T H E P U B L I C A N N O U N C E M E N T OF T H E K A N T O A R M Y H Q , (182) (1) The Decision of the Kanto Army HQ (2) Was the "Official Announcement of the Kanto Army HCT Merely Political Propaganda? (3) Tokyo's Reaction to the Kanto Army HQ's Decision 7.3: T H E K A N T O A R M Y HCTS A T T A C K O N S H I D E H A R A P A C I F I S M (191) (1) The Air Bombardment of Jinzhou (2) The Reactions to the Bombardment (3) Tokyo's Reaction 7.4: C R I S I S OF S H I D E H A R A P A C I F I S M (196) (1) An Outbreak of the Manchurian War of Independence v (2) A Crisis of Japanese Capitalist Interests in Manchuria (3) The Dilemma of Shidehara Pacifism 7.5: D E F I N I T I V E CONFLICTS B E T W E E N T O K Y O A N D T H E K A N T O A R M Y HQ (204) (1) Extraordinary Order (2) Impatience with Shidehara Pacifism (3) A Fatal Dilemma of the Leaders of Tokyo (4) The Kanto Army HQys. Tokyo (5) The Kanto Army's Offensive and Tokyo's Counterattack (6) Tokyo's Strong Resistance to the Kanto Army HQ. (7) A Setback of Shidehara Pacifism CHAPTER-8: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE MANCHURIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (226) 8.1:P0LITIC0-MILITARY S I T U A T I O N S A F T E R T H E M A N C H U R I A N W A R OF I N D E P E N D E N C E (226) 8.2: D E S T I N Y OF T H E IDEOLOGIES (232) (1) The Fate of the Principle of Racial Harmony (2) The Fate of Ishiwara Doctrine (3) The Revival of Shidehara Diplomacy CONCLUSIONS (242) GONCLUSION-I (243) CONCLUSION-11 (258) CONCLUSION-III (265) BIBLIOGRAPHY (268) APPENDIXES (282) Appendix-1: Glossary (283) Appendix-2: A ChronologicaLTable (292) Appendix-3: A List of Primary Sources (295) Appendix-4: A List of Telegrams (310) Appendix-5: Maps (315) vi List of Figures chart-1 Japanese Defense Ideology chart-2 Conclusion map-1 map-2 map-3 map-4 map-5 Northeast Asia August 1931 Manchuria - August 1931 Trunk Links in Manchuria - 1931 Military Situation in Manchuria - before 18 September 1931 Military Situation in Manchuria - 30 September 1931 (119) (257) (316) (317) (318) (319) (320) vii NOTE: All Japanese, Manchurian, Chinese and Mongolian personal names are written with surnames first. As a rule, Chinese and Manchurian personal names are spelled by the pinyin system. The following names, however, are spelled by the habitually used spellings. pinyin Chiang Kaisheck Jiang Jieshi Sun Yatsen Sun Zhongshan Similarly, Chinese and Manchurian geographical names are spelled by the pinyin system. The following names, however, are spelled by the habitually used spellings. pinyin contemporary name Mukden Fentien Shanyan Port Arthur Lushun Liishun Finally, the following names are usually spelled in correctly, so that I will use correct Japanese Romanizationspellings. incorrect Kanto Army Kwan tung Army Kanto Province Kwan tung Province The Kanto Army was a garrison of the Imperial Japanese Army stationed in south Manchuria. The Kanto Province was a Japanese leased land in south Manchuria from 1905 until 1945. Thus, both names have to be spelled by the Japanese Romanization system. viii INTRODUCTION 1 1: THE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT The Manchurian Incident, which is usually considered to be the causal event of the Pacific War,1 was triggered by the Mukden Incident on September 18, 1931.2 The Mukden Incident was an armed conflict between the Kanto Army and the Mukden Army of the Northeastern Frontier Defense Army.3 The Kanto Army was the Imperial Japanese Army's 10,500-men garrison stationed in south Manchuria,4 and the Northeastern Frontier Defense Army was a standing army of the Manchurian Government,5 commanded by Zhang Xueliang.6 Launching a well-planned and swiftly executed attack, the Kanto Army occupied Mukden, which was the Manchurian capital, and other strong points in south Manchuria within a few days. The Kanto Army tried to expand the battlefront, but because the Imperial Japanese Government (the IJG) and the Imperial Japanese Army (the IJA) sent no reinforcements to Manchuria, the Kanto Army had to halt its military operations, temporarily, on September 24, 1931. I will call the 1 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East "Majority Judgment", 1948; Hanabusa, 1953; Yoshioka, 1996 2 This armed conflict is called the Ryujo-ko Incident or the 918 Incident. Note: The 918 Incident also signifies the Manchurian Incident. 3 The Northeastern Frontier Defense Army, or the Northeastern Army, consisted of the Mukden Army, the J i l in Army, the Heilongjiang Army, the Jehol Army and other small armies. The troop strength of the Northeastern Army was about 448,000. (The General Staff, 1935a) 4 Kanto Province (a Japanese leased territory) and a part of Liaoning Province 5 The Nanjing Government, the central government of the Republic of China (the ROC), regarded the Manchurian Government as a local government of the ROC; however, the Manchurian Governmentviewed itself as independent of the Nanjing Government. 6 Zhang Xueliang was the Commander-in-Chief of the Northeastern Army and the head of the Manchurian Go\ernment. 2 war between the Kanto Army and the Mukden Army in this period of the Conquest of Manchuria.7 Immediately after the Mukden Army was defeated by the Kanto Army, several Chinese,8 Manchu,9 and Mongolian10 leaders in Manchuria who were against the Zhang Xueliang government launched the anti-Manchurian Government movement. The leaders of the Kanto Army linked up with those rebellious leaders to form a Manchurian Independence Camp, which renewed the attack against the Zhang Xueliang armies. The Manchurian Government and the Northeastern Army were driven out of Manchuria after intermittent battles, and, as a result, a new independent state called Manchukuo was established by the Manchurian Independence Camp on March 1, 1932. I will call the war between the Manchurian Independence Camp and the Northeastern Army the Manchurian War of Independence. Following the aftermath of the establishment of Manchukuo, the IJG and the IJA changed the leadership of the Kanto Army HQ, in August 1932, and began to strengthen the Kanto Army in order to turn Manchukuo into a Japanese puppet state. Tan Yulin, a cabinet minister of Manchukuo and a ruler of Jehol Province, defected to the Nanjing Government of the 7 Note that, despite the occupation of Mukden and several cities in south Manchuria, the Kanto Army did not consider their war to be successful because the Kanto Army merely occupied some cities in south Manchuria. 8 "The Chinese" signifies a culturally defined race. In the early 1930's many Chinese resided Manchuria and Inner-Mongolia. In this dissertation, the term "race" means a culturally defined race instead of a territorially or politically defined race. 9 "The Manchu" signifies a culturally defined race. 3 Republic of China (ROC) in February 1933; consequently, the Kanto Army and the Manchurian Army11 invaded Jehol Province, expelled the KMT Army of the ROC,12 and Manchukuo annexed Tan Yulin's Jehol Province. The IJA named this war, Operation Jehol. The Kanto Army and the Manchurian Army also advanced to Hebei Province, which was the territory of the ROC. The Kanto Army and the Manchurian Army defeated the KMT Army and besieged Beijing in May 1933. On May 31, the Tanggu Cease-fire Agreement was concluded between the Kanto Army and the KMT Army. In this armistice, the Nanjing Government tacitly and temporarily yielded her insistence on sovereignty over Manchuria. The war between Manchukuo and the ROC in this period was named Operation Kan'nai13 by the IJA. The above-mentioned series of battles is usually called the Manchurian Incident in the broad sense. Many historians and researchers,14 however, view the battles occurring between the Mukden Incident and the establishment of Manchukuo as the Manchurian Incident 1 U "The Mongolian" signifies a culturally defined race. In the early 1930's many Mongolians resided in Manchuria. 1 1 A newly established standing army of Manchukuo. 1 2 The KMT (Kuomingtan) was a politico-military organization that formed the Nanjing Government. The KMT Army was a national army of the Republic of China. Its leader was Chiang Kaisheck. 1 3 Kan'nai, or Guannei in Chinese pronunciation, means a land to the south of the Great Wall. 1 4 i.e., Takahashi, 1953; Ogata, 1969; Usui, 1974, 1995; Inoki, 1995. See, in particular, Osugi, 1996, pp.5-7. 4 in the narrow sense.15 Since the narrow sense is in wide usage, the Manchurian Incident signifies the narrow sense in this dissertation. 1 : 5 Whichever sense we may follow, the Manchurian Incident is regarded as a combination of two or four independent wars because there were, depending on the war, different belligerents and battlefields. The following table is a summary of the constituents of the Manchurian Incident. Belligerent (A) = belligerents-attack side Belligerent (D) = belligerents-defense side Battleground = main battlegrounds) I: The Manchur ian Incident in the narrow sense 1: The Conquest of Manchur ia Period: September 18, 1931 - September 24, 1931 Belligerent (A): The Kanto Army Belligerent (D): The Mukden Army Battleground: Liaoning Province of south Manchuria 2: The Manchur ian War of Independence Period: October 6, 1931 - March 1, 1932 Belligerent (A): The Manchurian Independence Camp (The Kanto Army, Anti-Zhang Xueliang armies) Belligerent (D): The Northeastern Army (The Mukden Army, The anti-Jilin Army, The Heilongjiang Army) Battleground: Heilongjiang Province, Jilin Province, Liaoning Province of Manchuria II: The Manchur ian Incident in the broad sense 1: The Conquest of Manchur ia 2: The Manchur ian War of Independence 3: Operat ion Jehol Period: February 23, 1933 - Apri l 30, 1933 Belligerent (A): The Kanto Army and the Manchurian Army Belligerent (D): Tan Yulin Army and the KMT Army Battleground: Jehol Province and the Great Wall 4: Operat ion Kan 'na i Period: May 8, 1933 - May 31, 1933 Belligerent (A): Manchukuo (The Kanto Army and the Manchurian Army) Belligerent (D): The Republic of China (The KMT Army) Battleground: Hebei Province of north China 5 2: NECESSITY OF A SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION OF THE CAUSES OF THE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT Although the Manchurian Incident occurred about 70 years ago, a scientific explanation of the causes of this war is still of great interest. After the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the "Tokyo Judgment"), in which some Japanese leaders were accused as "war criminals" of World War II, most Japanese intellectuals have accepted the Tokyo Judgment's indictment of the causes of Japan's wars that every war waged by the Japanese Empire was an unjust aggressive war. Some Japanese writers16 have recently insisted on their own views of the causes of the Pacific War or of the Sino-Japanese War, views very different from that of the Tokyo Judgment.17 However, as far as the causes of the Manchurian Incident are concerned, there is no scientific explanation that contradicts the Tokyo Judgment's interpretation of the causes of this war as based on anything other than sheer aggression.18 Many Japanese scholars, politicians and the mass media suspect that the real causes of the Manchurian Incident have not yet been adequately explained. However, they avoid investigating and referring to the causes of this war because, whenever one infringes upon the widespread conventional explanation for the causes of this war, Japanese "pacifists" and "liberal 1 6 e.g. Watanabe, 1991, 1994; Kobayashi, 1998 1 7 Note: The Tokyo Judgment concluded that the Manchurian Incident was the flash point of the Sino-Japanese War as well as a remote cause of the Pacific War. 6 intellectuals" and sometimes the Chinese communist government censure such a disputant and stigmatize him/her as a militarist or a 'fascist'. Thus, the majority of Japanese scholars, politicians, and journalists do not even use the word "Manshu".19 The fearful attitude of those Japanese "intellectuals" should be a matter of concern. I believe that social scientists and historians have an obligation to investigate alternative accounts of the causes of the Manchurian Incident, ideally independent of any political biases and ideological values. 3: THE ECONOMIC DETERMINIST INTERPRETATION A widespread scientific explanation of the causes of the Manchurian Incident is offered by economic determinists20 who emphasize the structural factors of Japanese capitalism. According to Inou'e Kiyoshi, an influential Japanese scholar, "Japanese government, military, party politicians and capitalists believed that the Great Depression brought 'the economic national crisis' in Japan, and a severe class struggle produced 'the ideological national crisis' in Japan. ... The Japanese government and military propagated the crisis of Manchuria as a lifeline of Japan; such propaganda stirred up Japanese people's chauvinism. The Japanese government and party politicians including Foreign Minister Shidehara were 1 8 Kobori, 1995, p.46. 1 9 Manshu is the Japanese equivalent for Manchuria. 7 determined to wage an aggressive war against Manchuria before long; thus, they began to prepare for such an aggression and led Japanese people into the aggressive war although the IJG did not know a precise plan for the Manchurian Incident nor intended to launch military actions like the Kanto Army's plan."21 Similarly, Hani Goro, an influential Japanese historian, explained that "Japanese Imperialism created more than two million unemployed Japanese workers At last, in September 1931, Japanese Imperialism began to aggress against Manchuria in order to materialize its contemplated conspiracy."22 Professor Takahashi stressed that the aggressive war was only one available option that Japanese monopolized financial capitalism selected to overcome Japan's serious economic crisis of the early 1930's, and his article23 is considered to be the most influential argument in the economic determinist camp. The mainstream of Japanese academe and journalism has thus far sustained this interpretation, which has now permeated Japanese society. Such an interpretation will be called the "economic determinist" interpretation in this dissertation. (a) A precis of the economic determinist interpretation / u e.g. Takahashi, 1953; Kobayashi, 1985; Wan, 1987; Yi, 1989; Furukawa, 1991; Awaya, 1995. 2 1 Inou'e, 1966, pp. 176-80. 2 2 Hani, 1968, p.170. 2 3 Takahashi, 1953, "The Causes and Responsibilities of the Manchurian Incident." 8 In the economic determinist interpretation, the causes of the Manchurian Incident are explained by the "inevitable law"24 of capitalist expansionism; in this case, that "the development of Japanese capitalism inevitably caused the Manchurian Incident."25 Specifically, the economic determinists insisted that:26 The Great Depression dealt Japanese capitalism27 a fatal blow.28 To the Japanese capitalist camp, policies for construction of a self-sufficient economic bloc were essential. The likeliest economic bloc for Japanese capitalism was the Japanese-Manchurian bloc because Japanese capitalism was in close relationship with Manchurian markets.29 Thus, to Japanese capitalism, Manchuria was the so-called "lifeline" as a market and a resource-supplying place.30 Z 4 Takahashi, 1953. p.229 2 5 Takahashi, 1953. pp.228-9 2 6 The following summary of the economic determinist explanation was developed on the basis of the following publications: A Society for the Study of the Pacific War, 1996; Kobayashi, 1985; Liu, 1986; Muramatsu, 1953; Okumura, 1995; Osugi, 1996; Takahashi, 1953; Uchida, 1953; Uchikawa, 1996; Uno, 1962; Usui, 1974, 1995; Yi, 1989; Wan, 1987. 2 7 In those days, Japanese capitalism was led by several monopolistic financial-industrial combines, or zaibatsu. 2 8 Japanese total trade was down by 47%, from ¥4.7 billion in 1926 to ¥2.5 billion in 1931. Main stock prices sharply fell. The prices of crops fell more steeply than those of merchandise of monopolies. Incomes complementary to rural economy decreased sharply, and the farmers who had been working in urban areas came back to farm villages due to unemployment. As a result, Japanese agriculture, which had a semifeudalistic structure, was also severely affected by the Great Depression. 2 9 For instance, in 1930 Japanese trade with the Republic of China and Manchuria was 18.3% in import and 27.4% in export. Japanese investment in the Chinese Continent accounted for 93.3% of all foreign investments. In particular, investment in Manchuria accounted for 62.9% of all investments in the Chinese continent. On the other hand, Manchuria traded 3.9% with the United State, 2.9% with Great Britain, 10.8% with the Soviet 9 Zhang Xueliang's Manchurian Government, however, allied itself with Chiang Kaishek's Nanjing Government, and attempted to expel Japanese capitalism from Manchuria. It became clear that the "lifeline" of Japanese capitalism would collapse, and that any Union, and 39.7% with Japan. Most of Manchuria's exports were bound for Japan, including the Korean Peninsula. 30 Japan, although a backward capitalist state, held a dominant position in Manchurian trade over the U.K. and the U.S. as advanced capitalist states because Japan had a geographical advantage and had obtained several major concessions in Manchuria. Therefore, to Japanese capitalism, Manchuria was a lifeline. Similarly, to Manchurian capitalism, Japan was a lifeline because Japan was its most important trade partner. In addition, Japan's direct investment in Manchuria was quite substantial. The following statistics show the trade interdependency. (Hanabusa, 1934, pp.311-4) Exports of Manchur ia (unit: 1,000 tael) Year Total to Japan to U.K. to U.S. 1926 370,157 151,344 11,564 12,822 40.9% 03.1% 03.5% 1927 406,036 156,554 12,865 11,826 38.6% 03.2% 02.9% 1928 434,034 166,478 13,752 8,513 38.4% 03.2% 02.0% 1929 422,873 168,859 21,647 10,328 39.9% 05.1% 02.4% 1930 389,990 157,025 10,385 6,990 40.2% 02.6% 01.7% Imports of Manchur ia (unit: 1,000 tael) Year Total from Japan from U.K. from U.S. 1926 277,434 113,680 5,137 17,369 41.0% 01.9% 06.3% 1927 268,914 111,737 4,661 17,584 41.6% 01.7% 06.5% 1928 302,956 122,924 6,760 19,910 40.6% 02.2% 06.6% 1929 322,403 138,750 9,671 25,890 43.0% 02.9% 08.0% 1930 296,694 120,384 10,484 20,753 40.5% 03.5% 06.9% Trade Balance of Manchuria (unit: 1,000 tael) Year Total to Japan to U.K. to U.S. 1926 92,723 37,664 6,427 -4,547 1927 137,122 44,817 8,204 -5,758 1928 131,078 43,554 6,992 -11,397 1929 100,470 30,109 11,976 -15,562 1930 93,296 36,641 -99 -13,763 10 peaceful construction of the economic bloc between Japan and Manchuria would become impossible. Therefore, there was no recourse for the Japanese capitalist camp except to invade Manchuria. In those days, the Japanese state-socialists,31 including officers of the Imperial Japanese Army, thought that corrupt party politicians and powerful capitalists had to be swept away and that a state-socialist structure led by Tenno32 should be established. Some state-socialist officers of the IJA argued that the IJG and the IJA had to aggressively settle the Manchurian Problem.33 On September 18, i X State-Social ism; Japanese political thought in the early 20th century. Famous advocates were Kita I'kki and Dr. Okawa Shumei. Their ideas are often likened to Nazism or Fascism, but such an analogy is not correct. Their central assertions were as follows. (1) Japanese politics dominated by party politicians have to be abolished, and the direct reign of the Emperor should be restored. (2) Excessive economic inequalities must be swept away; that is, the monopolistic capitalists and the landed class should be abolished. (3) Materialism, including capitalism, socialism and communism, must be eliminated from Japan. Instead, Japan should be a state based on virtue. (4) Racial discrimination in the international society should be abolished. As a leader of Asian nations, the Japanese must drive out Western expansionism from Asia. (5) The international society dominated by the Western powers is prescribed by the rule of might. Thus, in order to protect Japan's existence and perform Japan's mission, strong armaments are indispensable. When young army officers attempted to carry out a coup d'etat, Kita I'kki was executed as the mastermind. Afterwards, state-socialism lost its ideological influence. 3 2 The Japanese Emperor. In this dissertation, Tenno will be called the Emperor. Note: The Japanese Emperor system was established in the late 7th century, and the Emperor and the Imperial Court lost its substantial political power in the Jokyu coup d'etat of 1221. After this coup, the most powerful leaders of samurai--Shogunate governments--seized political power in Japan until the Meiji Restoration of 1868, when the pro-Emperor faction overthrew the Tokugawa Shogunate government and established a modern Emperor government--the Meiji Government. The Meiji Government promulgated a Western-style constitution--the Constitution of the Japanese Empire--in 1889. The Constitution of the Japanese Empire specified the following invariable principle. "The Emperor reigns, but does not rule." 3 3 Zhang Xueliang's Manchurian Government advanced various anti-Japanese policies, which caused tension between the Japanese subjects (including the Korean people) in Manchuria and the Chinese people in Manchuria. Those troubles were called the Manchurian Problem and the number of disputes amounted to more than 3,000. The Japanese Ministry of 11 1931, the Kanto Army, led by the state-socialist officers, instigated the Manchurian Incident. While the leaders of Tokyo opposed the Kanto Army's war immediately after it broke out, they began to support the Kanto Army later on in order to expand the interests of Japanese capitalism into Manchuria. Since the Japanese capitalists had envisaged invading Manchuria, it was only natural that they support the Manchurian Incident when the Kanto Army moved to establish a new state in Manchuria. Consequently, the Japanese capitalists and the Japanese militarists worked together to found a puppet state of Japan. As a result of the Manchurian Incident, Japanese capitalists, who had been in serious difficulties, could acquire Manchuria as a promising area for investment capital, markets, and as a supplier of resources. In other words, the Japanese capitalist camp received benefits from the fruits of the Manchurian Incident. Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Consulate General at Mukden protested to the governments of Zhang Xueliang and each province in order to settle these cases. As the response to Japan's protest, the governments of Zhang Xueliang and each province requested Japan to negotiate with the Nanjing Government on the grounds that the local governments had no authority for diplomatic negotiation. Since the Japanese Consulate at Mukden did not have the authority to negotiate with the Nanjing Government, they asked the Japanese Consulate at Nanjing to negotiate with the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Nanjing Government. The negotiations made little progress since neither the Japanese Consulate General at Nanjing nor the Nanjing Government were the parties concerned. As a result, distrust of the Japanese Consulate General and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs permeated Japanese settlement in Manchuria. At the same time, the Manchurian Government, the Northeastern Army, and the Chinese in Manchuria began to be contemptuous of the Japanese because neither the IJG nor the Kanto Army took a tough line against the anti-Japanese policies and movement. 12 For the above reasons, the essential cause of the Manchurian Incident has been interpreted by some as an inevitable outgrowth of Japanese capitalist expansionism. The causal logic outlined by the economic determinists is quite clear: (1) For Japanese capitalism, which had been suffering from the Great Depression, the acquisition of a colony was the only means to survive; (2) Manchukuo, which was created out of the Manchurian Incident, became a substantial colony of Japan; (3) Japanese capitalism quickly made inroads into Manchukuo; therefore, to the economic determinists, the Manchurian Incident served as a classic example of the Leninist theory of imperialistic aggressive war. This economic determinist interpretation does not conflict with the Tokyo Judgment and is merely a complement to it. Since the mainstream of Japanese academics and journalists support the Tokyo Judgment's explanations of the causes of Japan's wars, they also espouse the economic determinist interpretation. Consequently, this interpretation has permeated Japanese society, and it is accepted as common knowledge by many Japanese people. (b) Objections against the economic determinist interpretation Several ex-officers of the Kanto Army or the Imperial Japanese Army, former participants in Manchukuo,34 and the so-called right-wingers, have criticized the economic determinist interpretation, insisting that it was a 13 naive application of the Marxist materialistic view of history to the Manchurian Incident and that it was a mere supplement to the Tokyo Judgment. They point out that:35 (1) Before the Manchurian Incident broke out, Manchuria had been ruled by a Manchurian government that consisted of bosses of warlords. The people in Manchuria, especially the Japanese and the Korean settlers, had suffered under the misrule of the tyrannical warlord government; (2) The Kanto Army resorted to arms in order to overthrow Zhang Xueliang's atrocious government that had been the source of the chaos in Manchuria. Therefore, those critics insist that the leaders of the Kanto Army, who planned and encouraged the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, resorted to war, not for the interests of Japanese capitalism, but for the protection of the people in Manchuria. In addition, it is quite unlikely that those leaders made the war on behalf of the Japanese capitalists because, most of them were state-socialist proponents, who were political antagonists of the Japanese capitalist camp.36 They conclude, therefore, that the Kanto Army's acts should not be regarded as acts of imperialist motivated aggression. •*4 Manchukuo was an independent state in Manchuria established in March, 1932. It was transformed into the Manchurian Empire as Japan's puppet state in March, 1934. 3 5 Nakamura Kikuo, 1965; Katakura, 1967; Kokai, 1967; Inaba, 1972; Hayashi, 1975; Ito, 1983; Takagi, 1985; Takahashi, 1985; Nishiuchi, 1988; Nakamura Akira, 1991. 3 6 e.g., Nakamura, 1965; Katakura, 1967; Hayashi, 1975; Takahashi, 1985; Nishiuchi, 1988. 14 However, few academic studies37 have been undertaken to examine this stance, so this anti-economic determinist view has had little impact. In fact, those critics who justify the Kanto Army's decision to use force do so on the basis of their own personal experiences or sentiment without demonstrating evidence. In addition, they do not provide the history of the outset of the Manchurian Incident because they narrate only fragments of their own experiences or anecdotal hearsay "evidence". In other words, their claim is based upon neither systematic argument nor logical reasoning. Thus, it cannot be regarded as an effective repudiation of the economic determinist stance. (c) Justification of the economic determinist interpretation The economic determinists ignored those critics' anti-economic determinist view, although they acknowledged that the leaders of the Kanto Army were anti-capitalists and had initiated the war. To the economic determinists, however, the reason those leaders instigated the Manchurian Incident was irrelevant to the determination of the causes of this war. In that respect, Professor Takahashi Yuji, one of the leading economic determinists, explained that although the Manchurian Incident was brought about by the leaders of the Kanto Army, who were in opposition to the Japanese capitalist camp, it was the capitalist camp who reaped a great profit as the i.e., Nakamura Kikuo, 1965; Nakamura Akira, 1991. 15 result of this war.38 The Kanto Army's leaders can therefore be regarded as a tool for the Japanese imperialistic invasion of Manchuria. The outbreak of the Manchurian Incident can be fully explained by the "necessary law" that the increasing intensity of conflict promoted by capitalist interests inevitably caused an imperialistic aggression. The "necessary law" is executed regardless of individual motives, if any.39 Therefore, the fact that the direct promoters of this war did not belong to the capitalist camp does not have much bearing on the causes of the Manchurian Incident. 4: PROBLEMS OF THE ECONOMIC DETERMINIST INTERPRETATION The economic determinists' conclusion seems valid when the Manchurian Incident is viewed in hindsight. They seem to have succeeded in demonstrating that the Leninist thesis--the nature of capitalism causes imperialistic aggressive war^-is applicable to the Manchurian Incident. Their explanation, however, is more an account of economic structure than an account of warfare as such. There are no comprehensive discussions about military factors41 in the economic determinist explanation. Takahashi, 1953. 3 9 Takahashi, 1953, pp.180-2, pp.228-9. 4 0 There are some transformed theories in Lenin's theory of the causes of war such as (1) Lenin's original theory of imperialism; (2) the "Orthodox Leninist" theory of the cause of war, which is a widespread Comintern-style theory of war; (3) "Revisionist Leninist" theory of the causes of war, which introduced Lenin's theory of ethnic oppression; and (4) Kaldor's "theory of war and capitalism", which gives a sophisticated explanation for the outbreak of war and the nature of capitalism. In all these theories, the fundamental logic adheres to the basic Leninist thesis—the nature of capitalism causes imperialistic war. 4 1 1. Decision Makers (Who? Motive) 16 I agree with Aron's and Mann's arguments42 that war should be understood not from a socioeconomic viewpoint alone but from a military, or geopolitical, viewpoint.43 In this dissertation, I call their stand the "military view." Although theorists of the military view are in the minority to date, this stand's philosophical basis-political realism-has been supported by many foreign policy planners and military strategists in the world since antiquity.44 Thus, I believe that we, the social scientists of war, must not overlook the military view. The economic determinists, however, ignored the military view; for instance, the economic determinists discounted the motives of the leaders of the Kanto Army-one of the key military factors—because, as Professor Takahashi declared, those soldiers' motives were of no importance in interpreting the fundamental causes of the Manchurian Incident. The problem is that they drew this conclusion without carrying out any empirical studies on the motives of the military leaders as well as the military factors influencing the onset of the war. Such neglect indicates an important methodological omission from the sociological viewpoint. Since the economic determinists ignored the 2. Fighting Forces (Structure, Manpower,Equipment) 3. Military Arts (Philosophy, Strategy, Battle doctrine, Tactics, Logistics) 4 2 Aron and Mann pointed out that (1) the cause of war is not directly related to the nature of capitalism, (2) warfare has been a normal, and often rational, element of the international state system throughout recorded history, and (3) the primary cause of war is the nature of the international state system, that is, the inter-state military rivalry. (Aron, 1973, 1976, 1978; Mann, 1987, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c.) 4 3 Aron. 1976/83. pp.346-71, 400-12; Mann. 1987. pp.55-6, 1988b. p.126. 4 4 Mann, 1988b. 17 military factors, their explanations cannot be considered accounts of war as such.45 I speculate that the main reason why the economic determinists omitted scrutiny of the military factors is that they stood on what Vasquez calls the "Newtonian research"46 that takes it for granted the following Newtonian conception: War is "brought about because a certain set of conditions or variables are in place."47 This analytical approach to study the causes of war observes the following steps. First, it specifies a proposition, or a theory about the causes of war, characterized by a Newtonian model of mechanics—"One or more causes appear and then there is an effect."48 Second, it operationalizes the proposition's concepts. Third, it collects data related to the proposition. Fourth, it constructs a research 4-> Note that many economic determinists seemed to have used the method of regressive probation--a method of demonstration that retroactively deduces reasons or causes from consequences. They deduced the causes of the war from the postwar structural conditions that made it possible for Manchuria to become a substantial colony into which Japanese capitalism could make inroads. Thus, the economic determinists concluded that the Leninist thesis of the cause of imperialistic aggressive war was appropriate for the explanation of this war. Regressive probation, however, should be avoided in the sociological investigation of the causes of war for the following reason. Any war has a victorious camp and a vanquished camp, and they tend to be transformed into right and wrong respectively. There is a possibility that social scientists of war will interpret war on the basis of some value standard if they rely upon regressive probation because most of the historical records of the consequences of a particular war have usually been biased by value judgment. Therefore, although social scientists have the advantage of hindsight, sociologists of war must remove regressive probation from the sociological theory of the causes of war. In order to exclude regressive probation from my study, I mainly employed primary data, which were produced by actors themselves before or during the Manchurian Incident, as the sources of information for my investigation. 4 6 Vasquez, 1993, p.9. 4 7 Vasquez, 1993, p.9. 4 8 Vasquez, 1993, p.42. 18 design that adequately tests the proposition. Finally, it tests the applicability of the proposition to the causes of a given war in particular.49 I infer that the Newtonian research is likened to the structural theories of the causes of war, which presuppose that "war is not made; it comes". Although most of the Newtonian researchers do not rely upon a unifactor explanation, but are grounded in a multifactor explanation, they emphasize a certain factor or a set of factors as the central causes of war.50 4 y Vasquez, 1993, Introduction, Chapter-1, and A Propositional Summary. In this dissertation, social scientists who employ the Newtonian research as their analytical approach to examine the causes of war will be called the Newtonian researchers. 5 0 Major exponents of Newtonian research are the following; (a) Export and war Domke (WilliamK. Domke, 1988, Chapter 4) theorizes that there is a positive relation between the volume of export and the onset of war. According to Domke's theory, exporting states are unlikely to instigate war because it is the exporting states that pay a huge cost whenever they destroy foreign trade by waging war. Contrarily, the states that are not significantly dependent on export need hardly pay significant costs should they enter war. Thus, the more a state depends on export, the less likely that state is to launch a war. (b) Domestic Stress In the light of the economic-sociological viewpoint, Haas (Michael Haas, 1965.) connects domestic stress with war propensities. He demonstrates that states suffering domestic stress caused by urbanization tend to expand their armaments, develop an aggressive foreign policy, and wage war. Specifically, according to Haas, there are correlations between war propensities and the following indicators of domestic stress; unemployment, urban population density, homicide, alcoholism, and suicide. The state with high rates of these indicators, excluding homicide, frequently engages in war. In particular, the rapid growth of urban population plays an important role in stimulating an aggressive foreign policy. (c) Latera l Pressure Choucri and North (Nazli Choucri and Robert North, 1974) show in detail that factors of domestic economic growth are fundamental causes of war. According to their model, population increase, income level, supply and demand of natural and human resources, and technological advance are considered important factors of domestic economic growth. Domestic economic growth produces the mechanism of foreign expansionism--the lateral pressure--such as colonialism, economic expansionism, and the extension of military bases on foreign soil. An increase of the lateral pressure between the great powers increases the probability of conflict. Conflictual interests lead to an increase of armaments and alliances; as a result, armed conflicts are likely outcomes. Thus, the factors of domestic economic growth are a point of departure for Choucri and North's syllogistic model of the onset of war. (d) A l l i a n c e s Several social scientists examine the relation between alliances and war. For example, Singer and Small (J. David Singer and Melvin Small, 1968) point out that there is a positive 19 In the case of Manchuria, the economic determinists' approach to explain the causes of the war is a typical example of the Newtonian research because they employ the Leninist thesis of imperialist war as their proposition for investigating the Manchurian Incident, collect data relevant to that proposition, and examine whether the Leninist thesis was confirmed correlation between the number of alliances and the occurrence of war in the 20th century. Midlarsky (Manus I. Midlarsky, 1975) also finds that the more states enter into alliances, the more they participate in war. Levy (Jack Levy, 1981, pp.581-613) supplements the theory of the correlation between alliances and war with his analysis of extended data. According to Levy's study, there are correlations between military alliances--offensive and defensive alliances or nonaggression treaties--and the onset of war. The rate that states went to war within five years after they entered into a military alliance is about 75% in each century from the 16th century through the 18th century, and about 87% in 20th century. The same rate, relating to alliances between the great powers, is about 90% in the former period and 100% in the 20th century. Therefore, Levy concluded that military alliances did not maintain world peace, but instead promoted the onset of war. (I think that Singer & Small and Levy's arguments are inherently vulnerable for the following reasons. (1) Singer & Small showed that the positive correlation between the number of alliances and the occurrence of war was not found in the 19th century. (2) Levy's data indicates that the rate that states went to war within five years after they entered into a military alliance is about 28% in the 19th century. (3) Levy's data also testifies that the rate that the great powers went to war within five years after they entered into a military alliance is about 29% in the 19th century.) (e) Arms race and war Wallace (Michael D. Wallace, 1982) tests the following two models of the relationship between armaments and the outbreak of war: the preparedness model based on a famous maxim "Who would desire peace should be prepared for war", and the arms race model which insists that arms races intensify hostility and consequently increase the probability of war. His study shows that, although arms races do not directly produce war, they promote serious disputes that can escalate to war. Thus, Wallace concludes that the former model--"peace through strength"--should be abandoned in order to accomplish world peace. On the other hand, Diehl (Paul F. Diehl, 1983) re-tests Wallace's theory, and finds that 77% of wars between major states are not preceded by mutual military build-ups. He also examines the relationship between unilateral military build-up and war, and finds that unilateral military build-up encourages the chances of war. (f) Status Inconsistency Gal tung (Johan Gal tung, 1964) propounds a theory that connects a state's status inconsistency in the international system with its aggressive actions. According to this theory, each state's status, or rank, in the world community does not properly correspond to its actual economic or military power. The state's economically or militarily achieved status is frequently inconsistent with its described status in the international community. Accordingly, even though a state believes that its national power has grown stronger, it is likely that this state's international status and influence in the world community are still underestimated. In this case, such an underrated state tends to employ an aggressive foreign policy, including war, in order to force the international society to accede to its claimed status. 20 by their data. In addition, the Leninist thesis is a typical Newtonian conception because it assumes that an outbreak of war-a dependent variable-is brought about by a certain set of socioeconomic conditions-independent variables. Although the economic determinists seem to have shown that the Leninist thesis was perfectly applicable to the causal explanation of the Manchurian Incident, their analyses were confined to socioeconomic structure. They did not scrutinize factors other than socioeconomic structure, such as actors who participated in the onset of the war, and the specific politico-military conditions and military operations of the war. As a result, their doctrinaire explanation was confined to discussions of socioeconomic conditions without any substantial discussions about the war per se. To Newtonian researchers of the causes of war, the immediate concern is whether their proposition is valid or not. Thus, only the information directly connected to their proposition are the necessary and sufficient data for those researchers. When they employ a Newtonian conception as a proposition, one or several causes described by the proposition appear and there is an effect-the onset of war. Accordingly, as long as we follow the Newtonian research,51 we are likely to omit scrutinizing other factors that are ignored as possible independent variables in this approach. 5 1 Note that, as I have mentioned before, the Newtonian research employs a Newtonian conception as its proposition to be tested. 21 For instance, if we employ the "lateral pressure theory"52 as our proposition and try to explain the causes of the Manchurian Incident, our study must be limited to the socio-economic indicators, and, in the same way as the economic determinists, we also discount the substantial discussions about the war per se. Similarly, if we employ the "theory of arms races"53 as our proposition, our interpretation is confined to the buildup of armaments before and after the Manchurian Incident, and the substantial discussions about the war per se are also overlooked. 5: MY APPROACH It should be clear that we need to develop an alternative approach that does not rely on the Newtonian research in order to avoid a dogmatic explanation of the causes of the Manchurian Incident and, instead, investigate the specific military factors of the Manchurian Incident. Vasquez's model of the onset of war54 gives us a hint of such an alternative approach. * z Choucri & North, 1974; Choucri, North, & Yamakage,1992, Chapter-1. According to their model, domestic economic growth produces colonialism, economic expansionism, and the extension of military bases on foreign soil. They identify those mechanisms of foreign expansionism as the lateral pressure. An increase of the lateral pressure usually leads to armed conflicts. 5 3 Wallace. 1982, "Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses", International Studies Quarterly, 26/March. According to the theory of arms races, arms races intensify hostility and consequently increase the probability of war. 5 4 Vasquez, 1993. 22 According to Vasquez, "the evidence overwhelmingly indicates"55 that a dispute over contiguous territory is most likely to result in interstate war in the modern global system although there are many other issues that menace the state.56 If the territorial dispute is serious and strong anxiety about each state's own national security emerges, the states' decision-makers are likely to adopt certain measures of power politics in their foreign policy. There are several major practices of power politics, and each form is the result of leaders' multiple decision-making. Vasquez contends that, whichever practice is employed, war is likely to result. Thus, he identifies the decision-making processes in power politics as the proximate cause of war. Unlike the Newtonian research, Vasquez's model does not argue that serious territorial disputes necessarily lead to war because the decision-makers' actions lie between territorial disputes and war. Instead, his model's essence is that each individual war is triggered by a certain set of decision-making practices intended to resolve anxiety about each state's own national security. Therefore, the outbreak of war is dependent on the decision-makers' practices. From Vasquez's viewpoint, the Newtonian research exclusively focus on the pre-war conditions, but those conditions per se cannot bring about Vasquez, p. 2 93. 5 6 Vasquez identifies the territorial disputes as the underlying cause of war. (Vasquez, 1993.) 23 war without the decision-makers' will to launch war. Therefore, we have to scrutinize the decision-making process, which aims to eliminate or assuage the anxiety about national security, in order to analyze the causes of a given war in particular. Strictly speaking, the principal independent variable of our investigation should be the motives57 of those decision-makers-why did they choose those certain policies or strategies that brought about war? Such a decision-makers' motive is one of the critical military factors of war, and we need to scrutinize various military factors in order to understand the geopolitical decision-makers' motives in starting a war as their means of foreign policy. Vasquez, however, used his model for his argument of the causes of war in general, and he did not form an approach to examine the causes of a given war in particular. Therefore, we need to construct our own analytical approach of the causes of individual wars that focus on the decision-makers' motives.58 I have constructed my own approach for investigating 5 7 In this dissertation, the word "motive" signifies Um-zu-Motive, or an "in-order-to" motive. It never signifies Weil-Motive, or a "because" motive. Although Schutz criticized that Weber did not distinguish between Um-zu-Motive and Weil-Motive in his concept of social actions (Schutz 1932, S.208, 1962, pp.21-2, 69-71; 1974, pp.123-5), only Um-zu-Motive can be considered to be a real motive since we can retroactively speculate the Weil-Motive. We are not conscious of our own Weil-Motive during our actions. As Weber pointed out, in away that pertains to the Um-zu-Motive, "a motive is a complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor himself or to the observer an adequate ground for the conduct in question." (Weber, 1922/1968, p . l l , p.67; 1978, 99.11-2). 5 8 War is a social action between an offensive side and a defensive side, and there ought to be i l l feeling between them before they make a war. We are able to presume that there are pro-war advocates on each side who prepare for a war or actually begin a war, and they have their own motives for using force. Some historical wars, however, broke out by unilateral attack and the defensive side did not take any substantial position for using force against the enemy. In this case, only the 2 4 such motives,59 suggested by Clausewitz's theory of war as follows: 'No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.'60 Clausewitz calls 'what he intends to achieve by that war' the political objective (Zweck), which defines an objective of a certain foreign policy, and 'how he intends to conduct it' the military objective (Ziel), which delimits the military actions of a particular war.61 According to Clausewitz, the political objective prescribes the military objective,62 and these two pro war advocates of the offensive side had motives for initiating a war. Therefore, before we scrutinize the motives, the historical backdrop at the outset of the war needs to be reconstructed in detail. Then, we have to determine on the basis of our reconstructed history of the outset of the war, whether or not the war to be analyzed was begun by a unilateral attack. 5 9 As mentioned above, the motive to be grasped should be not a "because motive (Weil-Motiv)" but an "in-order-to motive (Um-zu-Motiv)." 6 0 Clausewitz. 1993, edited and translated by Michael Howard & Peter Paret, p.700. 6 1 Clausewitz. 1972, p.952. Note: Although both German nouns Zweck and Ziel are equivalent to the English noun aim, or objective, or purpose, Clausewitz discriminately used these two synonyms in his work. In the most parts of Vom Kriege. (Clausewitz. 1972.) he abbreviated der politische Zweck des Krieges (1972, p.200.) or den politischen Zweck (1972, p.961) as der Zweck. Similarly, das Ziel des kriegerischen Aktes (1972, p.194, 201.) or das Ziel der kriegerischen Handlung (1972, p.201.) was abbreviated as das Ziel. In this dissertation, the former will be called the political objective of war, or simply the political objective, and the latter will be called the military objective of war, or simply the military objective. 6 2 Clausewitz. 1972, p.200. Note: The relation between the political objective of war and the military objective of war is clear because Clausewitz expatiates on the concept of war as follows. 'War is not merely an act but also an instrument of foreign policy. It is a continuation of foreign policy that employs other means than diplomacy in order to carry on foreign policy.' (Clausewitz. 1972, p.210. Note: Howard & Paret translated this part as follows. War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. (1993, p.99)) As Roxborough points out, Clausewitz's usage of the word "Politik" should be interpreted as the 'foreign policy in an elite-dominated political system'. (1994, p.627) 'War is only a branch of the activities of foreign policy; it is in no sense autonomous.' (Clausewitz. 1972, p.990 & 1993, p.731.) 'War cannot be divorced from foreign policy; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, 25 objectives should be clearly indicated in a war plan, which 'covers every aspect of the war'.63 Assuming that every war has at least some semblance of a war plan, we ought to find the central motive of the people responsible for beginning a war embedded in its war plan. Not every war, however, is carried out according to a specific war plan as an individual document;64 nevertheless, it is unlikely that war advocates make a war without any sort of war plan. Thus, we can reconstruct an outline of a war plan by gathering and scrutinizing various records65 bearing on the foresight or preparation of the war. I will, therefore, analyze the motives of the participants at the onset of the Manchurian Incident from the reconstructed war plans. I am going to employ primary sources as the fundamental data for reconstructing history and understanding the motives of actors in order to eliminate prejudgment and to avoid using the method of regressive probation. I will mainly use the primary sources that were formed before or during the Manchurian Incident for the following reasons. As I am going the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.' (Clausewitz. 1972, p.991 & 1993, pp.731-2.) 6 3 Clausewitz. 1972, p.345, p.952. 6 4 The U.S. Navy's 'official contingency plan for war against Japan' was a written war plan called War Plan Orange. (Honan, 1991, p.xiv, 188). This war plan was initially formulated in 1903, and it was revised several times until the Pacific War broke out. War Plan Orange was a well-structured document, and only a few top officers could receive a copy of it. Honan, 1991, pp. 187-97; NHK, 1994, pp.38-56. 6 5 Those records usually consist of not only official documents, such as diplomatic documents, the Diet Record, the minutes of cabinet meetings, plans of military operations, propaganda pamphlets, and propaganda films, but also private documents, such as diaries, interviews and lectures of the pro-war advocates. 26 to describe in this dissertation, the IJG and the IJA never supported the Manchurian Incident until December 1931. Tokyo, however, began to approve the war after December 1931, and Tokyo recognized and praised the Kanto Army's entire military actions beginning 18 September 1931. Accordingly, many official records and private writings formed after the war were unreliable; for instance, because the Manchurian Incident was considered to be one of the most brilliant achievements of the IJA, some military officers insisted in their memoirs that they had taken part in the onset of that war, although they actually had not. Those primary sources are therefore questionable. Thus, I did not employ such data as sources of information. Most primary sources I employed in this study were obtained from several historical data books that were compiled by Japanese military historians and philologists and the Ministry of Foreign Affair's archival books. In addition, several primary sources formed before the Manchurian Incident were examined. I also scrutinized the contents of many primary sources written after the war in order to evaluate their reliability. As a result, I could discriminate between reliable and unreliable information. Thus, I sought to employ only reliable primary sources and the reliable parts of particular sources as the sources of information for my study. (See Appendix-I: A List of Primary Sources) My interpretation of the causes of the Manchurian Incident, following the above-mentioned approach, will demonstrate that (1) the economic 27 determinist explanation of the causes of the Manchurian Incident contradicts the historical evidence, and (2) the leaders of the Kanto Army made the decision to wage war in Manchuria under the influence of the Japanese Defense Ideology66 that had played an important role in Japanese modernization from the mid-19th century until the early 20th century. Thus, my study shows that a thorough investigation of ideological factors is indispensable to a sociological inquiry of the causes of the Manchurian Incident. b b Following Michael Rush's (1992), Terence Ball and Richard Dagger's (1995), and Larry Johnston's (1996) working definitions of ideology, I define the concept and functions of ideology as follows: an ideology is an internally consistent set of ideas that provides its adherents with: (1) a situational explanation--a picture of social, political, and economic conditions; (2) a value judgement--a moral evaluation of the existing conditions; (3) an ideal situation—a picture of ideal conditions to be established; (4) an adherents' mission—its adherents' duty to establish the preferred conditions; and (5) an action program--a practical guide to action in order to establish the ideal conditions. The last function is a key feature that distinguishes an ideology from philosophy because, unlike philosophy, ideologies aim to convert'ideas into social levers.' (Daniel Bell, 1960, p.394) 28 PART-I THE IDEA OF PEACE A N D WAR 29 CHAPTER-1 SHIDEHARA DIPLOMACY Before the Manchurian Incident, Japan's foreign policy had been controlled by Baron Shidehara Kijuro since he was reappointed as the foreign minister in July 1929. Shidehara's basic foreign policy stand was known as Shidehara Diplomacy because, while in the service of the foreign minister from June 1924 until April 1927, he refused to employ any military measures toward China and Manchuria. 1.1: SHIDEHARA'S COMMERCIAL PACIFISM Baron Shidehara maintained three mottoes67 during his service as a diplomat and foreign minister; (1) The creation of world peace without war; (2) Peaceful coexistence with nations; (3) Ou regnela justice, les armes sont inutules.68 Baron Shidehara sympathized with Western democracy and idealistic pacifism and adopted them as his own principles of foreign policy.69 He believed that conflicts between nations were caused by the people who emphasized differences such as race, religion, and language, rather than 6 7 Banba, 1972, pp.85-6 6 8 No arms are necessary in controlling by justice. 30 similarities.70 According to Shidehara, cooperation was essential to international society, and foreign policy was best conducted through diplomatic negotiation by pacific measures through which each state would resolve their joint conflicts;71 thus, he did not consider war a useful means of foreign policy, and he avoided militaristic measures such as the use of force. Shidehara's idea of foreign policy was, therefore, called Shidehara Diplomacy.72 In another aspect, his foreign policy was formulated from economic and commercial viewpoints, which also characterized Shidehara Diplomacy.73 In order to achieve economic objectives, Shidehara did not hesitate to sacrifice matters unrelated to Japan's economy and trade, such as historical sentiment, sense of honor, nationalism, and even political ideology.74 In other words, his practical diplomacy was intended to protect the economic interests of Japanese capitalism by a pacific policy. b y Banba, 1972, pp.85-92 7 0 Shidehara, June 12, 1924, (in a press conference for a foreign press corps) 7 1 Banba, 1972, pp.89-90 7 2 Although Shidehara himself did not discuss Shidehara Diplomacy in detail, we are able to regard Shidehara Diplomacy as a political ideology in the light of our working definition of an ideology. According to his policies and writings, in which he explained his idea, the world order led by the U.S. and the League of Nations was basically stable, and such a capitalist world system should be maintained. Thus, to Shidehara, the current condition was his ideal situation, and it was not necessary to change the world order. He stressed that each state had to avoid using military force to maintain the status quo, so Japanese leaders had to exclusively employ diplomatic negotiations as their means of foreign policy. Judging from what he said, Shidehara Diplomacy is regarded as apolitical ideology. Since Shidehara Diplomacy was an ideology for maintaining the status quo, the action program was not important but quite simple—every one of Japan's disputes with foreign states was to be solved by diplomatic negotiations alone. 7 3 Kobayashi, 1963, p.45; Banba, 1972, p.79 31 His anti-war view was expedient to attain this purpose and it can be regarded as typical commercial pacifism, a familiar tradition of Western liberalism.75 As commercial pacifism undervalues politico-militaristic factors, Shidehara's foreign policy lacked any militaristic measures. He kept private considerations out of public life.76 However, we must not overlook the following facts. His wife was a daughter of the Iwasaki family of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu,77 which was one of the biggest zaibatsu in Japan. Her sister's husband was Prime Minister Kato Taka'aki, and Shidehara's inauguration as foreign minister was in the Kato Cabinet. In other words, he had a strong personal relationship with the Japanese capitalists. 1.2: SHIDEHARA DIPLOMACY'S SUCCESS IN CHINA POLICY When Shidehara was reappointed as the foreign minister in July 1929, he once again executed his pacific policy toward China and Manchuria. He had perfect confidence in this policy because he believed that Shidehara Diplomacy had succeeded during his first term of the foreign minister in the following ways. On May 30, 1925, Chinese students and workers initiated anti-British, anti-Japanese, and anti-French movements in Shanghai, and the 7 4 Banba, 1972, pp.180-1 7 5 Doyle, 1997, pp.205-12, pp.230-50 7 6 Banba, 1972, p.72 32 movements spread to the main cities in southern China. The British Government proposed to the IJG that a united front be formed against the movements. At the same time, Japanese enterprises in the Republic of China requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to put down the anti-imperialism movements by strong measures. Foreign Minister Shidehara replied to the British Government that the IJG would evacuate Japanese subjects from the danger zone instead of using force to suppress the movements. He also advised Japanese enterprises to negotiate with Chinese employees and to compromise over their demands as much as possible. On the other hand, the British Government decided to use force to suppress the movements, which resulted in the Shamian massacre.78 Japanese enterprises settled with their Chinese employees, and the IJG never took military action, so the anti-Japanese movements disbanded. As a result, the anti-imperialism movements were transformed into anti-British movements, which lasted for 17 months and involved 800,000 people in Guangdong and Hong Kong. From January 3 through 6, 1927, a unit of the KMT Army advocating anti-imperialist action plundered and occupied the British concession at Hankou and Jiujiang. Speculating that similar actions might occur in an invasion of Shanghai by the KMT Army, the British Government asked the ' ' zaibatsu (singular & plural): Japanese great financial conglomerates 7 8 One hundred fifty nine Chinese were killed or wounded in the fight with the British Army in Shamian of GuangdongProvince on June 23, 1925. 33 IJG to dispatch troops to Shanghai. Shidehara replied to the British Government that the British misjudged the situation and suggested that an evacuation of residents was a better protective measure than to dispatch troops. The British Government, however, sent troops independently, so that the Chinese anti-imperialist movement became centered on the U.K. Under Shidehara's policy toward China,79 Japanese capitalists traded heavily with the Republic of China and Manchuria.80 Therefore, it was natural that Shidehara and his colleagues had confidence in the pacific policy toward the ROC based on Shidehara Diplomacy. 1.3: TOKYO'S POLICY TOWARD MANCHURIA Neither the IJG nor the IJA had an aggressive policy toward Manchuria in the summer of 1931. (1) The Imperial Japanese Government (IJG) 79 from June 1924 till Apri l 1927 80 "The grand total of trade between Japan and the Republic of China and Manchuria except Kanto Province and Hong Kong year Japan>RC Japan<RC Total rate 1920 229,135,866 141,927,902 371,063,768 1921 210,359,237 172,110,728 382,469,965 +03.07% 1922 231,428,885 157,754,351 389,183,236 +01.76% 1923 220,242,970 198,517,346 418,760,316 +07.60% 1924 234,761,863 201,175,926 435,937,789 +04.10% 1925 299,755,611 186,337,037 486,092,648 +11.51% 1926 339,909,441 211,740,889 551,650,330 +13.49% 1927 293,793,760 208,838,810 502,632,570 -08.86% 1928 319,293,439 228,642,453 547,935,892 +09.01% 1929 323,141,662 256,428,320 579,569,982 +05.77% 1930 327,165,000 216,555,000 543,720,000 -06.19% 1931 295,727,119 264,956,031 560,683,132 +03.12% 1932 151,007,000 114,576,000 265,583,000 -52.63% 34 When Shidehara became the foreign minister in July 1929 for the second time, he stipulated his principles of diplomacy toward the ROC as follows:81 (1) Japan shall never meddle in the internal affairs of the Republic of China. (2) Japan shall make efforts to abolish an unequal treaty and promote friendly relationships with the Republic of China. (3) Japan's economic interests and the Republic of China's shall be respected, and coexistence and mutual prosperity shall be pursued. (4) Japan shall refuse any aggressive policies toward the Republic of China. (5) The commerce between Japan and the Republic of China shall be promoted. In addition to those principles, Shidehara established recognition of the relationship between the Republic of China and Manchuria that was far different from his predecessor's.82 Shidehara supported the ROC's claim The unit of trade amountis Hong Kong taels. (Uchida 1953 p.583) 8 1 Banba, 1972, p.227 8 2 Prime Minister Tanaka Gi'ichi held the post of foreign minister concurrently from Apri l 1927 to June 1929, and Shidehara's diplomacy was terminated. The Tanaka Cabinet employed a hard-line policy toward the Republic of China such as the threat and use of force, which contrasted with Shidehara Diplomacy. It was called a "get tough" policy. The Tanaka Cabinet insisted that Manchuria should be ruled by Zhang Zuolin's Manchurian Government (Zhang Zuolin was the father of Zhang Xueliang) and that the invasion of Manchuria by the ROC led by Chiang Kaisheck should not be approved. (Banba, 1972, p.201) In other words, for the Tanaka Cabinet, the region ruled by the ROC was limited to China--south of the Great Wall. 35 that Manchuria was a part of territory of the Republic of China.83 Therefore, Shidehara's policy toward Manchuria was the same as that toward the ROC. Since he regarded Manchuria as a part of the ROC, any intervention by the IJG in the Manchurian Government's anti-Japanese policies would be an intervention in the internal affairs of the ROC, even if the Japanese people in Manchuria were suffering from Zhang's oppression. He declared his determination to adhere to his diplomatic ideal which he believed to be just and to make every effort to settle the Manchurian Problem between the IJG and the ROC through persevering in negotiations.84 At the same time, Shidehara argued that the Manchurian Problem had been taken up too sensationally. His attitude toward the Manchurian Problem was that only diplomatic negotiations based on his pacifism would be able to settle the problem and to protect Japanese economic interests in Manchuria. He believed that the Manchurian Problem could be settled by peace talks and compromise between the two states, and that diplomatic negotiation was the only measure to safely maintain Japanese capitalist interests in Manchuria.85 Note that to the leaders of the IJG, the Manchurian Problem signaled a dispute about the Manchurian Government's plan to develop a new railway system in Manchuria since new railways would cause financial 8 3 Kobayashi, 1963, pp.45-6; Gaimu-sh6, 1966, pp. 172-180. 8 4 Gaimu-sho, 1966, pp.168-171; Sakai, 1996, p.3. 8 5 Sakai, 1996, pp3-7. 36 havoc to the South Manchuria Railway Company-the central economic interest of Japanese capitalism in Manchuria. While the IJG, and most of the Japanese diplomatic authorities in Manchuria, did not expect to relieve the Japanese in Manchuria of all their difficulty, they tried to protect Japan's big businesses-the South Manchuria Railway Company and its subsidiaries. In other words, Shidehara's pacific policy toward Manchuria aimed to dissuade the ROC and the Manchurian Government from developing new railways in Manchuria.86 (2) The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) The General Staff analyzed the international situation each year, made a report called a "Situation Estimate" and distributed it amongst the units. The "Situation Estimate of 1931" was prepared in April 1931. This report enunciated the three-stage principles of military measures corresponding to the Manchurian situation. Those three stages were normally understood as follows.87 The first stage: In order to promote the establishment of a pro-Japanese government in place of Zhang Xueliang's government, the IJA will carry out a plot, 8 6 Gaimu-sho, 1966, pp.168-171. 8 7 Seki, 1963, pp.389-90. The surviving original document only describes the first stage. The original document of the judgment of the first stage is as follows. "We must make efforts to get out of the situation where our rights and interests, fairly acquired by an agreement or a contract, were blocked by China's betrayal in order to secure and expand those interests." 37 political tactics, or small-scale military action, excepting full-scale military intervention. The second stage: The IJA will develop full-scale military action in Manchuria for the purpose of overthrowing Zhang Xueliang's government and establishing a pro-Japanese government or a puppet state in Manchuria. The third stage: The IJA will take control of Manchuria by force and Manchuria would be ruled under Japanese occupation. Those measures were not the IJA's plan for the settlement of the Manchurian Problem. They were criteria for deciding to what extent military action would be necessary when the IJA chose the use of force for resolving the Manchurian Problem. A draft of the "Outline of the Settlement Plan of the Manchurian Problem" designed in the middle of June 1931 shows that the high command of the IJA judged that the Manchurian situation was the precursor to military actions that would be carried out after Shidehara's diplomatic negotiation broke down. Their basic action program was as follows:88 8 8 "A draft of the Outline of the Settlement Plan of the Manchurian Problem" (Seki, 1963, p.391) 38 (1) The negotiation by the authority of diplomacy shall be mainly conducted for quieting down the anti-Japanese movements. (2) Military action will be necessary if the movement becomes intense. (3) Acting in conjunction with the Ministry of War, the General Staff, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of War shall make careful preparation for measures in the Cabinet. They will inform Japanese subjects and the great powers of the actual situation of the anti-Japanese movements in Manchuria in order to get the backing of public opinion and prevent the great powers from intervening if military action is to be needed. (4) The General Staff will determine how much force of arms will be needed and how they shall be directed in case of the exercise of force. (5) It will take about one year to seek understanding at home and abroad. The draft premised that there was little possibility of success thorough negotiation, so that military action was inevitable in the not-too-distant future. However, the leaders of the IJA did not assume the exercise of force until the summer of 1932. According to Imamura Hitoshi,89 the "Outline of the Settlement Policy of the Manchurian Problem" based on the draft was to be officially tendered by the end of August of 1931, and be authorized in 39 the summit meeting of the Ministry of War and the General Staff in early September. After the official "Outline of the Settlement Policy of the Manchurian Problem" was ratified, the General Staff was charged with devising an operational plan in Manchuria. Thus, from June to August, the central authorities of the IJA were not engaged in preparation of an operational plan.90 In other words, in the summer of 1931, the policy regarding ° y Imamura had been a staff officer of the General Staff until June 1931, and became the director of the strategic section of the General Staff in August 1931. He was a participant in the top-level meeting of the IJA for the settlement policy of the Manchurian Problem. 9 0 There was an empirical reason that the leaders of the IJA did not make any operational plans against the Northeastern Army. Most of them underrated the quality of the Northeastern Army for the following reason. When the Manchurian Government tried to eliminate Soviet economic interests in north Manchuria by force, military tensions between the Northeastern Army and the Far Eastern Army of the USSR mounted. (Mizuno, 1994, pp.247-51) In July 1929, the Soviet-Manchurian War broke out between the two armies and the Northeastern Army was completely defeated. (The General Staff, 1930, pp205-225; Liu, 1992, pp.543-7; Mizuno, 1994, pp.251-5) As a result, the USSR held a dominant position in north Manchuria from the military point of view. The reports written by the Kanto Army officers who had observed the Soviet-Manchurian War had a great impact on the IJA. (The General Staff, 1929 and 1930) According to the reports, the Soviet Army's ability to command and fight was far superior to the Imperial Russian Army's. (The IJA had labeled the Imperial Russian Army as "the strongest army in the world" before the IJA defeated the Imperial Russian Army.) The Soviet officers and soldiers were brave, and military discipline was strictly maintained. (The General Staff, 1930, pp.213-4) In addition, they were far more able to endure the cold than the IJA. (Infantry of the Soviet Army could march 200Km from Manzhouli to Hailar in only four days at a temperature of minus 25°.) Political education in the army was painstaking, and the soldiers were indoctrinated to believe that the Soviet-Manchuria War was a war between a proletarian state and an imperialist state. (The General Staff, 1930, p.213) They also had great skill in controlling aerial bombing. (The General Staff, 1929, 201-2 and 1930, pp.206-13) It was obvious that they would defeat the IJA if the Soviet Army was modernized and further developed education and discipline in the years ahead. The leaders of the IJA were wary of the Soviet Army and decided that the Kanto Army and the IJA should avoid conflict with the Soviet in north Manchuria for a while.(Hayashi, 1974, pp43-5) On the other hand, the Northeastern Army was no more than an undisciplined mob. They were poorly educated and had neither the will to fight nor a cooperative spirit. Most of the soldiers fled when they were attacked by the Soviet Army. The Northeastern Army was particularly weak in a bombardment, so that no sooner had a bombardment started then soldiers fled. (The Imperial General Staff, 1930) The leaders of the IJA had scorn for 40 settlement of the Manchurian Problem by the high command of the IJA was to merely observe diplomatic negotiations as conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while readying conditions for the exercise of force. In sum, the leaders of Tokyo did not have any plans to invade Manchuria in the summer of 1931. Instead of doing such, Tokyo promoted Shidehara's anti-war policy grounded in Shidehara Diplomacy in order to maintain the existing Japanese interests in Manchuria, especially the South Manchuria Railway Company and its subsidiaries. Manchuria's Northeastern Army and were not even interested in devising an operational plan against them. (Hayashi, 1974, pp45-6) 41 CHAPTER-2 ISHIWARA DOCTRINE Even the economic determinists accepted that the Manchurian Incident was directly caused by the leaders of the Kanto Army without the IJG's approval and that lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara Kanji played a leading role in the Kanto Army's scheme of the war. However, by not scrutinizing Ishiwara's motive for making the war, the economic determinists failed to understand the real meaning and background of Ishiwara's idea although it played a vital role in making the war. I will call the Kanto Army's ideological driving force, or the principal ideological factor impelling this war, Ishiwara Doctrine. 2 . 1 : STRUCTURE OF I S H I W A R A DOCTRINE Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara fragmentarily stated Ishiwara Doctrine in writings that are considered war plans for the Manchurian Incident. Those war plans prescribed the course of the Conquest of Manchuria and the so-called Manchurian War of Independence. Thus, I will call the two war plans the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria and the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence respectively. Both war plans were constructed by Ishiwara in order to realize his theory of Japan's defense. This theory, or the Principle of National Defense, 42 was one of the two components of Ishiwara Doctrine. He formed the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria on the basis of the Principle of National Defense alone. The Kanto Army began to execute this war plan, but the Conquest of Manchuria failed. After the Kanto Army's failure in the Conquest of Manchuria, Ishiwara was awakened to the significance of the Principle of Racial Harmony, which had been advocated by the Manchuria Youth League91 before the war. He adopted the Principle of Racial Harmony to fulfill his idea of Japan's defense, and drew up the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence in accordance with both the Principle of National Defense and the Principle of Racial Harmony. Besides devoting his energies to realization of the Principle of National Defense, he made every effort to accomplish the Principle of Racial Harmony. I have labeled the idea composed of those two principles as Ishiwara Doctrine. In summary, Ishiwara Doctrine was set out in his war plans, and it consisted of the Principle of National Defense and the Principle of Racial Harmony. The War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria was prescribed by the Principle of National Defense alone, whereas the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence was prescribed by "complete" Ishiwara Doctrine. A political organization of the Japanese living in Manchuria 43 2.2: THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE Ishiwara's theory of Japan's national security, or the Principle of National Defense was set out in his lectures92 and writings,93 in which he criticized American expansionism and stated the national mission of Japanese subjects. On the basis of his Principle of National Defense, he planned a concrete action program to intercept American expansionism.94 The Principle of National Defense consists of Ishiwara's situational explanation, his value judgment, his preferred picture of East Asia, a mission statement y ^ Before Ishiwara was appointed as a staff officer of the Kanto Army, he had been teaching the history of European war at the War College of the IJA for four years. After he transferred to Manchuria, he sometimes lectured to the staff officers of the Kanto Army on the theory of war and the history of European war. Ishiwara researched the history of warfare in Europe, particularly the Frederican war and the Napoleonic war. He believed that the historical wars in Europe were more intense than those in Asia because the European states had conformed to the rule of might and the Asian states had been based on the rule of right. He wrote a book on the Frederican war, the Napoleonic war, and World War I. In his lecture, he insisted that the inter-state relation was not only cooperative but also competitive. According to his theory, each state usually uses diplomatic negotiations as a basic means to survive the inter-state competition. While such diplomatic negotiations are peacefully carried out, each state uses their military strength as a latent means of negotiation. If diplomatic negotiations fail, military actions are to be likely employed. Therefore, war is defined as the inter-state competition with the direct use of military forces. This definition of war is similar to Clausewitz's definition of war, "war is merely the continuation of foreign policy by other means." (Clausewitz. p.99) Ishiwara was influenced by the theory of a German theorist of war; Delbruck's dichotomy between niederwerfungstrategfe (strategy of annihilation) and ertnattungsstrategie (strategy of exhaustion). On the basis of Delbruck's theory, he divided warfare into war of annihilation and war of exhaustion. He used the annihilation-exhaustion cycle as a basic framework to explain the history of war in Europe. He lectured about the future of war on the basis of his dichotomy of war. According to his prediction, the war of exhaustion would be the likeliest form of warfare in the near future. When the destructive power of the weapon reached the culmination, war should be a titanic war of annihilation--"Very "Wor ld War. This war should occur only once and be the final war for the human race because the ultimate means to fight and the highest technology for warfare would be thrown into this war. (Ishiwara, 1929a) 9 3 Ishiwara, 1926, 1929a,1929b, 1930a, 1930b, 1931a, 1931c, 1931d. 9 4 Ishiwara, 1929-a, 1930-a, 1930-b, 1931-a, 1031-b, 1931-c, 1931-d. 44 of the Japanese subjects, and an action program to accomplish Japan's national security. (1) A situational explanation According to Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara, the most deadly enemy of Japan's was the United States of America,95 although the USSR was still a potential enemy96 on which the IJA had to keep a strict watch. He pointed out that Japan was about to gain a leading position in Oriental civilization from the military point of view because only Japan was strong enough to repulse the Western powers' aggression.97 On the other hand, the U.S. was about to become a leader of Occidental civilization since the European states' power declined following World War I, considerably weakening even the U.K.'s military strength.98 He predicted that Japan would be a powerful obstacle to the U.S., the leader of Occidental civilization who intended to conquer the Oriental civilization. Consequently, an intensive war between the U.S. and Japan should occur in the near future.99 Ishiwara particularly stressed that, although an ^ Ishiwara, 1930-a, 1930-b, 1931-a, 1031-b, 1931-c, 1931-d. 9 6 Ishiwara, 1929-c, 1930-a, 1931-a, 1031-b, 1931-c. 9 7 Ishiwara, 1931-a. 9 8 Ishiwara, 1931-a. 9 9 Ishiwara. 1929-a, 1930-b. Note: Ishiwara enumerated the following three conditions that would lead both states to make a war. (1) Japan completely assumes the leadership of the Oriental civilization. (2) The US completely assumes the leadership of the Occidental civilization. (3) An airplane that is capable of flying non-stop to any point on the globe is developed. 45 economic conflict between Japan and the U.S. would be regarded as a cause of the American-Japanese War, its substantial causes were politico-military and ideological conflicts between the two states.100 (2) A value judgment According to Ishiwara, Oriental civilization was characterized by Odd, or the rule of right, and Occidental civilization was characterized by Hadd, or the rule of might. While Oriental civilization had tried to harmonize with the Occidental civilization, Occidental civilization had been destroying Oriental civilization. If the U.S. defeated Japan, the people in the world would be ruled by the principle of the rule of might. If Japan won, they would be ruled by the principle of the rule of right. In other words, the American victory would bring world peace under military threat; contrarily, the Japanese victory would bring world peace under righteous principle. Therefore, in the American-Japanese War, right and justice would be on the Japanese side.101 (3) An ideal situation Ishiwara provided a clear picture of the preferred future that would be achieved by Japan's victory in the American-Japanese War. He explained that the American-Japanese War would be the final war in the world; no major war would occur after Japan's victory. Since Japan was a champion He named this war the Final World War afterward. (Ishiwara 1940a, 1940b) According to Ishiwara's younger brother, Ishiwara Rokuro, Ishiwara Kanji began to advocate his theory of the American-Japanese War, or the Final War, in 1925. (Ishiwara Rokur6,1972) 1 0 0 Ishiwara, 1930-b, 1931-a. 46 of Occidental civilization, the rule of right would pervade the world following the defeat of the rule of might. Consequently, the world would be at everlasting peace. (4) A mission statement Ishiwara emphasized that every Japanese subject had to make every effort to defeat the U.S., which would be the strongest enemy that Japan had ever encountered. According to his scenario, Japan was bound to wage preliminary wars before the American-Japanese War.102 Since those wars were likely to be protracted wars, not only military and other government authorities but also civil organizations would have to play important roles in them. The American-Japanese War, unlike the preliminary wars, would be an annihilative war that would be a short-term decisive battle. A basic unit of battle would be the individual, and an objective of the offensive would be the entire population of the enemy.103 In other words, the entire nation of both states would directly participate in the war. Therefore, all Japanese subjects had to have an awareness that winning the American-Japanese War was a providential mission of Japan to bring genuine world peace.104 (5) An action program 1 0 1 Ishiwara, 1931-a. 1 0 2 Ishiwara, 1930-a, 1931-a. 1 0 3 Ishiwara, 1929-a, 1931-a. 1 0 4 Ishiwara, 1931-a. 47 Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara believed105 that the final war of annihilation, the American-Japanese War, would inevitably break out.106 In order to win a victory over the U.S., Japan needed to occupy Manchuria and keep this area as a rear base in the event of this war because the geopolitical position of Japan was otherwise too weak to wage a successful war against the U.S. Ishiwara drafted a preliminary action program, which was an outline of the war plan against the United States.107 In this plan, the war between the U.S. and Japan, in the broad sense, called for the Conquest of Manchuria, a war between the ROC and Japan, a war between the USSR and Japan, and the American-Japanese War. He believed that the Conquest of Manchuria and the American-Japanese War were unavoidable wars, but that Japan had best avoid war with the ROC or the USSR108 The Conquest of Manchuria would directly involve the Kanto Army, so that it was necessary for the Kanto Army HQ, to frame a detailed operational plan for the Conquest of Manchuria. According to Ishiwara, after the IJA successfully occupied Manchuria, Manchuria would be controlled under the IJA's military administration, and the occupation army headquarters would observe the following rules: 1 0 5 Ishiwara. 1929-a, 1930-a, 1930-b 1 0 6 Ishiwara labeled the American-Japanese War as the World Final War, or the Final War, afterward. Ishiwara, 1940. 1 0 7 Ishiwara, 1931-c. 1 0 8 Ishiwara, 1931-a, 1931-c. 48 (1) the IJA would not intervene in people's daily life except to maintain public order; and (2) competitive industrial development open to various races living in Manchuria would be promoted.109 Ishiwara rationalized the Japanese occupation on the grounds that Manchuria, historically speaking, was territory belonging to the Japanese, not to the Chinese people.110 He also insisted that the occupation would be preferable for the people of China because China had been unable to maintain peace due to the many conflicts among warlords since the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, but might now be able to restore law and order with the unification of Manchuria.111 In addition, he concluded that the occupation of Manchuria by the IJA would resolve the Manchurian Problem and put an end to the anti-Japanese movement in China.112 This action plan was slightly modified by Ishiwara when he formed the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria, and amended once again when he constructed the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence. Although the contents of the action program were altered, the purpose of the action program was consistent; that is, Japan had to annex Manchuria as a rear base in order to reinforce Japan's defense against the U.S. 1 0 9 Ishiwara. 1929-a, Kanto Army Ha 1930/09 1 1 0 Ishiwara. 1929-a 1 1 1 Ishiwara. 1929-a 49 2.3: Why Manchuria? Lt. Ishiwara took it for granted that Manchuria would be a Japanese logistical base in the event of an American-Japanese War. Judging from Ishiwara's and his comrades' writings and from common knowledge of the then Japanese military leaders, Manchuria was regarded as the best logistical base for the American-Japanese War for the following reasons. First, Manchuria was the only land that directly connected with Japanese soil (the Korean Peninsula). Second, In the early 1930's, the sovereignty of Manchuria was unclear. Although the Nanjing Government of the Republic of China insisted on sovereignty over Manchuria, the real power rested with Zhang Xueliang's Manchurian Government. However, unlike modern Western states, the Manchurian Government was composed of several warlords, and the Western concept of sovereignty had not yet been established in Manchuria. Some Japanese military leaders believed that the sovereignty of Manchuria resided in Japan rather than the Republic of China. They emphasized the historical fact that the Imperial Japanese Army repelled the Russian Army from Manchuria by the Russo-Japanese War . According to those leaders, it was clear that Manchuria had been under control of the Qing dynasty, but it was unacceptable that the Republic of China, which won its 1 1 2 Ishiwara. 1929-a, 1930-c 50 sovereignty from the Qjng Dynasty, could also usurp Manchuria, which was indigenous to the Manchu.113 Third, Manchuria had a geographical advantage. The lay of the land was hard to penetrate, so it could be considered a natural stronghold. The mountains and a large river formed the boundary between northern and western Manchuria and Russia. A mountainous region in northern Manchuria was a strategic point to defend against a Russian invasion of East Asia. Similarly, steep mountains separated southern Manchuria and China. In addition, the Korean peninsula and eastern Manchuria were separated by mountainous terrain. Indeed, the history of the region showed that control over Manchuria was essential to gain hegemony in northeastern Asia.114 Fourth, in addition to geographical reasons, good railroad networks made Manchuria militarily valuable. The East China Railway and the South Manchuria Railway, which were main railway systems in Manchuria, had been originally built by Imperial Russia for a Russian invasion of Manchuria. Similarly, the Jing-Feng Railway had been founded by the U.K. and Japan for military purposes. In the early 1930's, these Manchurian railways had commercial value, but at the same time, they enabled 1 1 3 Sata 1931, Itagaki 1931, Ishiwara 1931a, Nakano 1 1 4 Sata 1931, Itagaki 1931. 51 mobilization and military replenishment of Manchuria where road transportation was very poor.115 Fifth, to fight against the U.S., the biggest industrial power in the world, it was necessary for Japan to develop heavy industry. The land of Manchuria was large and Manchuria was a thinly populated region, so that there was enough space to build heavy industrial structures. It was speculated that Japan could catch up with advanced industrial states by installing a planned economy.116 Judging from a militaristic viewpoint, the dispersal of munitions factories in Manchuria provided a great advantage against an attack on Japan's industrial plants. Finally, an abundance of natural resources in Manchuria, especially coal and iron ore, was necessary for Japanese munitions industries because Japan had relied on the importation of almost all natural resources from abroad. Similarly, cultivated acreage in Manchuria could be increased by reclamation, which would enable Japan to support itself in case of American-Japanese War. Timber growing in the vast mountainous region was also indispensable for Japanese self-sufficiency.117 Some of those military values partially overlapped with the commercial interests of Japanese capitalism. As stated,118 the South Manchuria Railway Company was a principal target of Japanese capitalism 1 1 5 The General Staff Office 1927, 1928, Ishiwara 1929 1 1 6 Ishiwara 1931d, Nakano 1 1 7 Itagaki 1931, Ishiwara 1931 d, Nakano 52 in Manchuria. Not only profits from transportation of farm products, but also coal mines and iron mines belonging to the company's concessions were important interests. Therefore, Japanese capitalism was eager to maintain the operations of the South Manchuria Railway Company. In addition, to Japanese capitalism, the acquisition of natural resources and investment in Manchuria were the best ways to overcome the recession because Japan, as a fledgling capitalist state, was under competitive with the Western powers in Chinese markets. So both the commercial view of Manchuria, which was typical of Shidehara's foreign policy, and the military view of Manchuria, which was advocated mainly by Ishiwara, attached importance to the economic value of Manchuria. However, Shidehara's view had no geo-political aims other than boosting economic strength in order to protect the interests of Japanese capitalism. Therefore, in order to maintain trade with China and Manchuria, Shidehara's foreign policy consented to ROC's insistence regarding sovereignty over Manchuria. On the other hand, Ishiwara's military view regarded Manchuria's economic value as reinforcing a broader geo-political strategy. In fact, Ishiwara was less interested in economic value than military value: however, if Manchuria had not had a viable economic base, that is, if the above-mentioned fifth, sixth, and seventh condition had not applied, would Ishiwara have appreciated the military value of Manchuria? It is 1 1 8 see 1.3 53 questionable because, according to Ishiwara's theory, in principle, an occupied area should bear expenditures for ruling the occupied area.119 Therefore, we can conclude that Ishiwara and his comrades believed that the military value of Manchuria did not exist independent of its economic value, but that they regarded its military value as far more important than its economic value. 2.4: THE WAR PLAN FOR THE CONQUEST OF MANCHURIA Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara thought that framing the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria was the central issue in a strategy of national defense urged by the leaders of the IJA, but they had no intention of drawing up such a plan, so, as the Kanto Army's staff officer in charge of military operations, Ishiwara tried to frame not only the operational plan, but also the war plan, on his own.120 He asked Dr. Sata Kojiro of the Research Section of the South Manchuria Railway Company, which had more data on Manchuria than any other organization, to cooperate with Ishiwara and his aids in drawing up a war plan. His request was confidential; that is, it was not a joint move between the Kanto Army HQ. and the Research Section of the South Manchuria Railway Company. 1 1 9 Ishiwara, 1927, 1929a, 1929c, 1931a 120 There was no institution to draw up a war plan in the Imperial Japanese Army and the Japanese Government. 54 Having similar views121 on Ishiwara's Principle of National Defense, Dr. Sata cooperated with Ishiwara and his comrades and gave them the resources they required to pursue their plan. Besides Dr. Sata, Matsuki Tamotsu, a specialist in international law and a manager of the Legislation Division of the Research Section, and Miyazaki Masayoshi, a specialist in economic policy, cooperated in the venture. As a result, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara and his aids were able to construct a War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria on the basis of his Principle of National Defense. Ishiwara's diary of 1931 and his writings written in the first half year of 1931122 show that his war plan was composed of three parts; that is, the theory of the Conquest of Manchuria, military operations against the Northeastern Army, and the plan to govern Manchuria. The theory of the Conquest of Manchuria focused on the political objective, significance, and policy of the war plan and was the direct application of Ishiwara's Principle of National Defense. Military operations against the Northeastern Army outlined strategies and tactics to accomplish the military objective in the war plan. The plan to govern Manchuria was a blueprint for the occupation and administration of Manchuria by the IJA in order to realize the political objective of the war plan. 1 2 1 Sata. 1931 1 2 2 Ishiwara, 1931a, 1931b, 1931c, 1931d. Note: Since most of the documents descriptive of Ishiwara's war plan are entitled the Manchurian Problem, they are regarded as measures to the settlement of the Manchurian Problem. I think such understanding is inaccurate to grasp the real sense of those documents. Ishiwara's documents and lectures should be considered the componentof the War Plan for the Conquering Manchuria. 55 (1) The theory of the Conquest of Manchuria Ishiwara's original idea of the Conquest of Manchuria was not based on either an empirical investigation into the geopolitical situation of Manchuria or the observation of people's life in Manchuria. It was deduced from his theory of the future war,123 and his view of the righteousness of Japan's possession of Manchuria was based simply on the fact that Japan had defended Manchuria from Russian invasion by the Russo-Japanese war. He, therefore, needed to construct a much stronger theory to justify a war plan. In order to enforce the righteousness of Japan's possession of Manchuria, an exchange of views between Ishiwara and leaders of Daihoyu-kai was held.124 Daihoyu-kai was formed by the Japanese intelligentsia living in Mukden and Dalian, who tried to start Dr. Okawa Shumei's Restoration of the Asia movement125 in Manchuria, and by the members of 1 2 3 Ishiwara. 1929 a 1 2 4 Ito, 1983, pp.842-3 1 2 5 Dr. Okawa Shumei was one of the prominent leaders of state-social i sm He presided over a political study group called Gyochisha,. Dr. Okawa advocated seven principles as follows; (1) the construction of the Restoration Japan (2) the establishment of national ideals, (3) the realization of liberty in the inner life, (4) the realization of equality in the political life, (5) the realization of friendship in the economic sphere, (6) the liberation of the colored races, and (7) the establishment of the moral world. The restoration of Japan entitled reforming a corrupt Japanese society that had lost sight of the state's objective and national ideals to be a "moral state" where liberty in the inner life, equality in the political life, and friendship in the economic sphere would all be realized. According to Dr. Okawa, Japan in the Meiji era, namely from the time of the Meiji Restoration to the victory over the Russo-Japanese war, had the national ambition to make Japan one of the most powerful states in the world. However, since its victory, by which that end was apparently achieved, a new goal had not been established. As a result, Japanese 56 Asahino-kai, which was established at Mukden for the purpose of challenging Zhang Xueliang's government to "ideological warfare" over political ideas, propagating and spreading a nationalist movement among young people and students in Manchuria for the restoration of Asia.126 The aim of Daihoyu-kai was to promote a nationalist movement in order to revive the Asian race; in particular, the liberation of people in Manchuria from the oppression of Zhang's regime was one of their great concerns.127 Unlike the Manchuria Youth League128 with its interest in practical matters, Daihoyu-kai's interest in the Manchuria-China issue was theoretically driven. Therefore, their opinions on the Manchurian Problem, especially regarding the relationship between Japan and China and Manchuria, were taken as advisory to Ishiwara's war plan.129 Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara cultivated his understanding of politics, military affairs, and the inhabitants of Manchuria by investigating the situation of Manchuria for more than two years and by establishing contact national spirit slacked off and Japanese society was corrupted. It was necessary to establish new national ends by ridding the corrupt climate in Japan and turning her into a "moral state". Okawa aimed to liberate the colored races and establish the moral world that would result from the unification of moral states. The establishment of the moral world was the ultimate ideal. Okawa gave priority to the liberation of the colored races as a practical objective; in particular, the emancipation of the Asian race from the Western powers. This had to be achieved at all costs. In sum, Okawa's political activities were to establish Japan as a moral state and make her the leader of the emancipation of Asia. 1 2 6 ltd, 1983, pp.762-76; Yamamuro,1993, pp.100-102. 1 2 7 Ito, 1983, pp.765-76; 1 2 8 A political association organized by the Japanese people living in Manchuria. 57 with specialists in Manchuria.130 Consequently, his understanding of Manchuria became much deeper than it was at the time of his arriving at the Kanto Army. Strengthened by such knowledge, his theory about the Conquest of Manchuria was more developed, and was articulated in "Japan's Present and Future Defense"131 and "Private View on the Manchurian Problem".132 In these two writings, Ishiwara gave his views as follows: Japan needs to gain possession of Manchuria because of the following reasons.133 First, Manchuria will be indispensable as a rear base of Japan in the event of "the American-Japanese War".134 Second, the Japanese, who have been influenced by Western ideas such as communism, socialism, and liberalism, will be awakened and become conscious of "the national polity of Japan" by opening war between the IJA and the Northeastern Army. Third, Japanese occupation of Manchuria will be able to prevent communism from permeating East Asia.135 Finally, Manchuria should be under Japanese control, 1*9 Ito Isojiro, one of the founders of Asahino-kai, gave his view of the relationship between Japan and China and Manchuria in "The History of Manchuria". (Ito, 1983, pp.770-805.) 1 3 0 Ishiwara's Diary, pp.127-52. 1 3 1 Ishiwara 1931 a 1 3 2 Ishiwara 1931 c 1 3 3 Ishiwara. 1931 a, pp.59-60 1 3 4 Ishiwara. 1931 c, pp.76-7 1 3 5 Ishiwara. 1931 a, pp.68 58 maintaining peace in order to promote the political unification of the Republic of China, which is essential for the peace of East Asia.136 Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara thought that acquiring Manchuria was a valuable national project, justified by two key assumptions:137 (1) The annexation of Manchuria by Japan is just. (2) The IJA has the ability to occupy and govern Manchuria. Ishiwara insisted that Japan was justified in occupying Manchuria, while the ROC was not justified in insisting on sovereignty over Manchuria for the following reasons:138 (1) Historically, Manchuria has been controlled by the Manchu and Mongolian peoples, even if the Chinese population dominates Manchuria. (2) The economic development of Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese war was not accomplished by the Qing or the ROC, but by the Japanese people. (3) Historically and anthropologically speaking, the Manchu and Mongolian peoples have a closer relationship with the Japanese than with the Chinese. Thus, Ishiwara concluded: 1 3 6 Ishiwara. 1931 c, p.77 137 "Private View on the Manchurian Problem" 1931/05. p.77 1 3 8 Ishiwara. 1931 a, p.63 59 Compared with the Japanese, the Chinese lack the political ability to construct and maintain a modern state.139 Therefore, Japan must not leave the peace and security of Manchuria to the Chinese, who can neither achieve the unification of China nor keep law and order. The peace and security of Manchuria under Japanese rule will bring stability to the daily life of the people of Manchuria,140 as well as industrial and cultural development.141 Therefore, the occupation and control of Manchuria by the IJA is a justifiable deed.142 Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara was optimistic about external conditions in the event of conflict with the Northeastern Army over the occupation of Manchuria. He speculated as follows143: (1) The armaments of the Soviet Union at the moment are not strong enough to prevent Japan from occupying north Manchuria. (2) The United States Navy at the moment has not sufficient armaments to put pressure on Japan. (3) The occupation of Manchuria will not be costly because Japan will be able to secure finances for war in the occupation Manchuria. Despite these optimistic views, Ishiwara insisted that military action should be executed as soon as possible because conditions favorable to Japan would 1 3 9 Ishiwara. 1931 c, p.77 1 4 0 Manchu, Japanese, Mongolians, Koreans, and Chinese 1 4 1 Ishiwara. 1931 c, pp.77-8 1 4 2 Ishiwara 1931 a. pp.63-4. 60 vanish after the achievement of the Soviet five-year plan and the expansion of the United State Navy.144 In conclusion, the political objective of the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria was to obtain possession of Manchuria as Japan's rear base, and this aim was allegedly justifiable and achievable. In order to achieve this goal, the occupation of Manchuria by the IJA was indispensable and conflict with the Northeastern Army was inevitable. Therefore, the military objective was to expel the Northeastern Army from Manchuria, and it was essential to undertake operations against the Northeastern Army forthwith. (2) Operations against the Northeastern Army Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara considered three measures to begin the Conquest of Manchuria. (I paraphrase those measures described in the "Settlement Plan for the Manchurian Problem"145 as follows.) (1) Orthodox Tactics146 The IJG demands the settlement of the Manchurian Problem of the Zhang Xueliang regime. If this demand is refused, Japan will issue an ultimatum and open war. This measure is the most orthodox diplomatic way. If settlement of the railways problem is the only concern of the IJG, opening war will be out of the question. (2) Taking an opportunity147 1 4 3 Ishiwara. 1931 c, p.78 1 4 4 Ishiwara. 1931 c, p.78 1 4 5 The Kanto Army HQ, 1931 a 61 Taking advantage of conflict between warlords in Manchuria and China, the IJA will carry out military intervention in the struggle in order to support the anti-Zhang's regime movement. In this case, the IJA has to establish a puppet government replacing the Zhang regime in Manchuria prior to the occupation. (3) A Plot*48 Making a pretext for advancing to Manchuria, the Kanto Army and the IJA will overthrow the Manchurian Government by force. Taking this opportunity, the IJA will send a large number of troops and occupy Manchuria. In order to pull off a coup, detailed operational plans are necessary, and the Kanto Army's troops must be highly disciplined. It is also important to arouse public opinion against Zhang Xueliang's Manchurian Government in advance in order that people in Manchuria and public opinion in Japan support the Kanto Army because, at the outset, the Kanto Army will execute a unilateral attack against Zhang's troops. The last measure was the most reliable way to open the Conquest of Manchuria because only in the third scenario could the Kanto Army itself perform an initial action. The first and second measures depended on the IJG and Chinese warlords, whose decision-making was independent of the 1 4 6 The Kanto Army H a 1931 a, p.80 1 4 7 The Kanto Army H a 1931 a, p.81 1 4 8 The Kanto Army H a 1931 a, p.81 62 Kanto Army. However, the third measure, which was intended to instigate a coup, could not be officially acknowledged as the formal decision of the Kanto Army HQ. 1 4 9 (3) The plans to govern Manchuria Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara ordered Captain Sakuma to prefigure and assess the military administration of an occupied Manchuria.150 Captain Sakuma's interim report, "A Study on the Administration of Occupation Manchuria-Mongolia", was submitted to Colonel Itagaki and Lieutenant 1 4 9 Regardless of measures, the same outlines of operations to expel the Northeastern Army were supposed to be employed. Although Lt. Col. Ishiwara did not describe the military operations in writing, we can reconstruct his operational plans by analyzing his writings on national defense and the Kanto Army's actions in the Manchurian Incident. The following scenario is reconstructed mainly on the basis of a "Private View of the Manchurian Problem" and "The Settlement Plan for the Manchurian Problem". (Ishiwara, 193 Id, Kanto Army H a 193 la) The f i r s t stage: The main body of the Kanto Army is called together at Mukden and destroys the Northeastern Army H a the elite troops of the Northeastern Army stationed at Mukden, and the Manchurian Governmentat a stretch. The second stage: The Kant6 Army's detached forces defeats or disarms the Northeastern Army's troops stationed in the strategic points in south Manchuria. The t h i r d stage: The main body of the Kanto Army advances toHa'erbin (the biggest city of north Manchuria); at the same time, reinforcements are dispatched from the Korean Army to the Kanto Army in order to preserve an occupied area in south Manchuria, which had a weak defense, and the Northeastern Army might counterattack from north Manchuria and Jehol Province. The fourth stage: The battlefield expands to north Manchuria with the Kanto Army's advance to Ha'erbin, so that large-scale reinforcements are dispatched from Japan to Manchuria. (Note: There is no doubt that reinforcements would be dispatched from Japan because the Kanto Army's military strength was much weaker than the Northeastern Army's, and there is the possibility that the Kanto Army would be annihilated by Zhang's counterattack. As a result of the dispatch of the reinforcements, the independent action of the Kanto Army comes to an end, and then the IJA comes to be involved in those operations.) The f i f t h stage: The IJA occupies Ha'erbin and aiqiha'er, and disarms the Heilongjiang Army (the Northeastern Army's troops in Heilongjiang Province). In addition, the IJA keeps a strict watch on the area of Manzhouli against the intervention of the Soviet Special Army for the Far East. The f ina l stage: Just after the occupation of the strategic points of three eastern provinces, the main force of the IJA advances to Jehol Province, and defeats the rest of troops of the Northeastern Army; as a result, the IJA occupies Manchuria, and the operations of the conquest of Manchuria are completed. Then, the plan to govern Manchuria is carried out. 63 Colonel Ishiwara in September 1930.151 A summary of the study, "Excerpts from Study on the Administration of Occupation Manchuria-Mongolia"152 is the only document extant on this subject. Sakuma's analysis of the actual situation of Manchuria seems to have been helpful in drawing up Ishiwara's war plan. According to "Excerpts from Study on the Administration of Occupation Manchuria-Mongolia",153 if Japan occupied Manchuria, it would be a prelude to the war between the U.S. and Japan in the broad sense;154 therefore, the IJA would need to control Manchuria for a long period after the occupation. Since the occupation by the IJA would be long-term, it would be necessary to prepare not only a military administration engaged in maintaining public order, but also a civil administration involving legislation, the judicature, police, finances, railways, mail service, communication, industries, education, and religion. In sum, the aim of the military administration was to secure Manchuria as a rear base for prolonged conflict, and the aim of the civil administration was to govern an occupied people and to achieve a mutually prosperous coexistence with all people in Manchuria.155 1 5 0 Tsunoda, 1967, p.52 1 5 1 The Kanto Army HQ, 1930, p.52 1 5 2 The Kanto Army HQ, 1930 1 5 3 The Kanto Army H a ^ 3 0 , p.53 1 5 4 This conflict is not the Final World War. The Final World War should break out at the end of this protracted conflict. 1 5 5 The Kanto Army H a i930, p.53 64 In order to achieve these purposes, Sakuma suggested that it would be necessary to undertake a thorough investigation of the subjects studied in "Study on the Administration of Occupation Manchuria-Mongolia", with specialists in every field.156 2 . 5 : T H E P R I N C I P L E OF R A C I A L H A R M O N Y Following the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria, Ishiwara and his comrades commenced the Conquest of Manchuria on September 18, 1931. The IJG decisively opposed this war, and the central authorities of the IJA followed the IJG's policy. It goes without saying that Shidehara Diplomacy played a leading part in Tokyo's decision. As a result, the Kanto Army's war was halted. Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara, however, did not give up his intention to accomplish the Principle of National Defense because anti-Zhang Xueliang movements-the movements for Manchurian independence-came to the surface after the outbreak of the Mukden Incident. On the basis of his assessment of the movements for Manchurian independence, Ishiwara judged that if the Kanto Army was allied with the anti-Zhang Xueliang camp, the allied forces would be able to expel the Northeastern Army from Manchuria without reinforcements from the IJA. Ishiwara, however, had never considered an alliance between the Kanto Army and the Chinese or 1 5 6 The Kanto Army Ha !930, p.57 65 Manchu politico-military leaders before the Mukden Incident because he had doubts about the those leaders' ability to manage modern politico-military organizations.157 During the Conquest of Manchuria, he withdraw his image of those leaders and decided to forge an alliance against the Zhang Xueliang clique. He realized that, in order to make such an alliance, he had to link his Principle of National Defense with the Principle of Racial Harmony, which had been advocated by the Manchuria Youth League, because the rationale and foundation for the independence of Manchuria could not be explained by the Principle of National Defense alone. (1) The Manchuria Youth League After Zhang Xueliang succeeded to Zhang Zuolin's Manchurian Government158 in 1928, the Manchurian Government's anti-Japanese attitude became conspicuous,159 and the so-called the Manchurian Problem took a turn for the worse.160 The IJG, however, did not take any effective measures to settle the problem.161 The Japanese living in Manchuria became anxious162 that they might soon be expelled from Manchuria.163 1 5 7 Ishiwara 1930-c, 1931-c. 1 5 8 Zhang Xueliang was the son of Zhang Zuolin. 1 5 9 Zhang Zuolin wanted to weaken Japanese influence upon Manchuria in order to strengthen his power. He, however, ostensibly forbade the anti-Japanese movement because he was indebted to the IJA and the IJG. 1 6 0 Mizuno, 1994, chapter 7. 1 6 1 Manchuria Youth League, 1933, pp.4-7, pp.495-7 1 6 2 The Kanto Army Ha 1930-a, 1931-b; Manchuria Youth League, 1933, pp.389-92, pp.429-36, pp.462-4, pp.558-606, pp.610-15. 163 Manchuria Youth League, 1933, pp.2-7. 66 In order to break the existing condition, on November 13, 1928, the Japanese nationalists in Manchuria established the Manchuria Youth League so as to unite and perform some action.164 "Youth" referred to people with aspirations rather than people who are young.165 The Manchuria Youth League was composed of the backbone of the South Manchuria Railway Company and various people working in south Manchuria and Kanto Province. Kohiyama Tadato, a director of the South Manchuria Railway Company, became the first chairman of the board of directors.166 At the beginning, the Manchuria Youth League was considered to have been established by the support of the South Manchuria Railway Company. Some people, therefore, decided to join it simply because they expected some economic returns by participating in a group related to the South Manchuria Railway Company, rather than because they sympathized with the spirit of the Manchuria Youth League. Members counted five thousand before long. However, six months later, the Seiyu-kai167 Cabinet was replaced by the Minsei-to168 Cabinet, and the executives of the South Manchuria Railway Company were reshuffled. Kohiyama Tadato resigned as the chairman of the board of directors and the policy toward the 1 6 4 Manchuria Youth League, 1933, pp.32-40; Ito, 1983, pp.822-25. 1 6 5 Yamaguchi, 1975, pp. 120-1 1 6 6 Yamaguchi, 1975, p.120; Ito, 1983, pp.830-1. 1 6 7 A Japanese bourgeois political party. 67 Manchuria Youth League dramatically changed. The South Manchuria Railway Company no longer supported the Manchuria Youth League. As a result, people who had joined the League with self-interested motives withdrew from it, and only people who had joined it in support of its object remained.169 In other words, the activities of the Manchuria Youth League were now undertaken by "comrades" who deeply sympathized with its original purpose.170 Since they received support from neither the South Manchuria Railway Company nor the IJG nor large enterprises, most of the leading members of the league worked without pay.171 Under the "Prospectus of the Manchuria Youth League",172 Manchuria would be the place where the Japanese people173 and the Chinese people174 would live in harmony. By enhancing their respective cultures, tapping natural resources, and developing industries in Manchuria, both races would be able to not only to seek prosperity, but also contribute to the achievement and maintenance of peace in the Orient. The historical fact that Japan had fought off Russia's invasion of Manchuria and developed an infrastructure in Manchuria would be respected; however, policies toward Manchuria by the IJG and Japan's financial circles that had only aimed at l b S Another Japanese bourgeois political party. 1 6 9 Yamaguchi, 1975, p.120; ltd, 1983, pp.831-2. 1 7 0 Yamaguchi, 1975, p.120. 1 7 1 It is inaccurate to consider the Manchuria Youth League a stable group of the IJG. 1 7 2 Manchuria Youth League. 1933, pp.4-7, pp.35-7. 1 7 3 including the Korean 68 enlarging economic interests under the pretext of this historical fact, resulted in conflict between the Japanese and the Chinese living in Manchuria. Such a Japanese national policy would be contrary to the "Japanese spirit" that had protected Manchuria from Russia's invasion of Manchuria; moreover, Japan would lose her sense of being engaged in a just mission. In order to promote the coexistence of both races, the Manchuria Youth League would make a wider and deeper study of the political and diplomatic issues over Manchuria, and take the initiative in shifting public opinion toward a proper Japanese policy toward Manchuria. Although the Manchuria Youth League was a private organization without any support from Japanese political and military organizations, it fought against the Manchurian Government's oppression in order to settle the Manchurian problems that were resulting from Zhang Xueliang's oppressive policy toward the Japanese. The Manchuria Youth League thus conducted an investigation of recurrent anti-Japanese activities under the Zhang regime.175 They published several investigative reports so as to let the IJG and the Japanese people in Japan know the actual condition of the Japanese and the Korean in Manchuria, as well as the situations that endangered Japanese life and property and damaged Japanese interests and rights in Manchuria unless the Manchurian Problem were settled. 1 / 4 including the Manchu and the Mongolian people 1 7 5 Manchuria Youth League. 1933, pp.195-201, pp.240-243, pp.290-318, 69 They investigated not only the routine anti-Japanese movements176 but also the wider anti-Japanese movement in relation to economic matters. In particular, a plan for the construction of Port Huludao was thoroughly investigated from the diplomatic, legal, and social points of view.177 According to their report, if Port Huludao were constructed, both the South Manchuria Railway and the Port of Dalian would become useless, and most of the people connected with the South Manchuria Railway Company and the Japanese in Manchuria would lose their jobs.178 (2) The nationalist view of Manchuria In addition to trying to mold public opinion so that the IJG would offer a tough settlement plan over the Manchurian Problem, the Manchuria Youth League presented their own settlement plan to the Japanese government agencies, the Kanto Army HQ, and the South Manchuria Railway Company, urging them to reconsider the Manchurian Problem.179 The Manchuria Youth League's insistence consisted of a nationalist view of Manchuria180 along with the Principle of Racial Harmony.181 The nationalist view of Manchuria advocated by the Manchuria Youth League argued that the historical analysis of the relationship between 1 7 6 e.g. assaults, volleys of stones hurled at Japanese students, and a wrongful arrest by the Manchurian Governmentpolice 1 7 7 Manchuria Youth League. 1933, pp.318-351. 1 7 8 Manchuria Youth League. 1933, pp.349-51; Mizuno, 1994, pp.306-7. 1 7 9 Manchuria Youth League. 1933, pp.402-503. 1 8 0 Manchuria Youth League. 1933, pp.408-420. 70 Japan and Manchuria showed that the Nanjing Government of the ROC had no grounds for insisting on sovereignty over Manchuria for the following reasons:182 (1) Over a long period of Manchurian history, Manchuria had been the territory of the Manchu, while the Chinese controlled Manchuria for only a short time;183 (2) Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria had been acquired in the Russo-Japanese War by fair means, and Japan made only minimum demand;184 (3) The so-called Twenty-one Demands185 could be regarded as reasonable demands for the purpose of protecting Japanese interests, in spite of the vociferous protests of the Republic of China;186 (4) The foundation of the government of three eastern provinces, namely the Manchurian Government, had been established and protected by Japan;187 and (5) Industrial and cultural development in Manchuria from 1905 through 1930 had grown under the protection of the IJG with investments of Japanese capital.188 In addition to those arguments, which were considerably familiar to the Japanese nationalists, they incorporated 1 8 1 Manchuria Youth League. 1933, pp.402-7, 464-6. 1 8 2 Manchuria Youth League. 1933, pp.408-23. 1 8 3 Manchuria Youth League. 1933, pp.408-10. 1 8 4 Manchuria Youth League. 1933, pp.410-14. 1 8 5 As one of the Al l ied Forces, the IJA occupied the German colony in China during World War I. After World War I, the IJG pursued Japan's interests in the former German colony, and in south Manchuria of the ROC Japan's demands were called the Twenty-one Demands. Since military power of the ROC was decisively Inferior to that of Japan, the ROC could not but accept many articles of the Twenty-one Demands. The Chinese nationalists strongly criticized Japan's "avaricious" demands, and the Twenty-one Demands became one of the symbols of Japanese imperialism. 186 Manchuria Youth League. 1933, pp.414-16. 1 8 7 Manchuria Youth League. 1933, pp.416-19. 71 the settlement plan suggested by the Chinese members of an anti-Zhang Xueliang group, or the so-called Wenzhi-Group.189 That is where the peculiarity of their settlement plan lies. (3) The Principle of Racial Harmony The Principle of Racial Harmony was originally advanced by Zhang Gu, a Chinese leader of the anti-Zhang Xueliang group and a supporter of the Manchuria Youth League.190 The main points of this theory were as follows.191 The Soviet Union will benefit from the conflict between Japan and the Republic of China over Manchuria-Mongolia issues. Neither Japan nor the Republic of China will achieve her aim by conflict, but in contrast, the Soviet Union will do so. Japan has aims of (1) establishing an economic bloc between Japan and the Republic of China and Manchuria; (2) eliminating infringement by the Manchurian Government and the Nanjing Government on Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria (the settlement of the Manchurian Problem); (3) promoting the preparation and expansion of a societal infrastructure in Manchuria; (4) increasing its economic interests in Manchuria; and (5) establishing friendly relations between Japan and 1 8 8 Manchuria Youth League. 1933, pp.419-23. 1 8 9 Manchuria Youth League. 1933, pp.404-7. 1 9 0 Zhang Gu. "Peace of Manchuria-Mongolia and Eastern Asia." (Manchuria Youth League, 1933, pp.404-6.) 1 9 1 I paraphrased Zhang Gu's original writings. 72 the Republic of China, including anti-Communism and a national defense alliance. The intentions of the Republic of China are to (1) recover consular jurisdiction in Manchuria; (2) recover Kanto Province; (3) eliminate Japanese and Soviet influence from Manchuria; (4) encourage the Chinese to settle in Manchuria; (5) recover the East China Railway; and (6) recover the South Manchuria Railway. It is impossible for Japan and the Republic of China to achieve their goals as long as they are opposed to each other with regard to Manchuria. In addition, it will also be difficult for the Republic of China to attain unification because she can not get Japan's intense support. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has the intentions to (1) infiltrate Communism into Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, China, Korea, and Japan; (2) intensify an anti-Japanese movement in Manchuria and China; (3) block Japan's economic alliance with the Republic of China, (4) obstruct Japanese and Korean economic activities in Manchuria to make them unemployed. It seems that those intentions will be successful unless a Manchurian dispute between Japan and the Republic of China is settled. Therefore, nothing is more irrational than to continue the dispute, and it should be settled as soon as possible. As the best measure of the settlement, which can end the conflict and bring some profits to the Soviet Union, it is necessary to 73 make Manchuria completely independent of Japan, the Republic of China, and the Soviet Union. In other words, it is necessary to establish an independent state in Manchuria based on the collaboration of six principal races in Manchuria, namely the Manchu, Mongolian, Korean, Japanese, Chinese, and Russian. There is no question that the Zhang Xueliang group does not have the intention of establishing such a state, so that the "Manchuria-Mongolia Collaboration Party", which includes the armed forces of six ethnic groups, will be organized, and the warlords, bandits, Chinese Communist Party, and the KMT would be expelled from Manchuria. In this new state, according to the principles of national capitalism, industrial development will be encouraged, and under national socialism, the living conditions of farmers and engineers will be improved. Moreover, the new state will conclude a fair agreement with Japan in regard to an economic alliance and collaboration for national defense. Naturalized citizens will have equal rights and duties, regardless of their races. Zhang Gu*s settlement plan was constructed on the principle of "national defense and public security in Manchuria", or the Manchurian Monroe Doctrine, advocated by the Wenzhi-group,192 and proposed the coexistence 1 9 2 The Kanto Army HQ, 1931-n; The Japanese Consul at Ha'erbin, Telegram #2-467. 74 and mutual prosperity of the six largest ethnic groups, thus, the Principle of Racial Harmony in Manchuria. The Manchuria Youth League wholly accepted Zhang Gu's plan because it was quite similar to the Japanese nationalists' notion of Pan-Asianism,193 and the Principle of Racial Harmony became the central motto of the league. They thought they needed to obtain cooperation from the Kanto Army and the IJA to establish a new state because there were no politico-military leaders in Manchuria which had enough armed strength to banish Zhang Xueliang's military government from Manchuria.194 Thus, the leaders of the Manchuria Youth League began to establish contact with the leaders of the Kanto Army and urged them to cooperate in creating a new state in Manchuria.195 The Manchuria Youth League emphasized that the establishment of a new state by force of arms did not require the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, but rather Japan's assistance in establishing an independent state in Manchuria.196 i y c 5 In a word, Pan-Asianism is equivalent to the idea of an alliance between nations in East Asia. Pan-Asianism originated with Japanese political leaders in the mid- 19th century, and many Japanese politico-military leaders supported this idea in the late 19th century. Although the spirit of Pan-Asianism gradually faded, some Japanese nationalists preserved it. In addition, some Chinese political leaders sympathized with Pan-Asianism. For example, Sun Yatsen was one of the eager advocates of Pan-Asianism, and he cautioned the Japanese politicians to remember the spirit. (The Japan Chronicle, 11/30, 12/02, 12/03 & 12/04, 1924. Chen & Yasui, 1989,) Chiang Kaisheck, Sun's successor, also supported Pan-Asianism. 1 9 4 Manchuria Youth League. 1933, p.466. 1 9 5 Ishiwara, Diary, 1931-August 75 2.6: THE BIRTH OF ISHIWARA DOCTRINE Although Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara was interested in the Manchuria Youth League's insistence on the Principle of Racial Harmony, he did not employ it to devise the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria. After the Conquest of Manchuria was obstructed by the leaders of Tokyo, Ishiwara awakened the importance of the Principle of Racial Harmony, and adopted it to realize his idea of Japan's defense. His reason for adopting the Principle of Racial Harmony is as follows. After the Mukden Incident, many public utilities and arsenals in south Manchuria were shut down because the warlords of the Manchurian Government, who privatized those facilities had fled from Mukden to Jinzhou or northern China.197 Not being paid their salary, employees of those companies were in a difficult situation.198 Moreover, the people of Mukden were faced with serious problems because the Shinhai Railway, which carried the necessities of life, was also shut down.199 The Kanto Army HQ. asked Yamaguchi Juji,200 one of the leaders of the Manchuria Youth League and a dedicated advocate of the Principle of 1 9 6 Manchuria Youth League. 1933, p.402. 1 9 7 Hirajima et. al, 1970, pp.127-8; Yamaguchi, 1975, p.105,123.159. 1 9 8 Yamaguchi, 1975, p. 134. 1 9 9 Yamaguchi, 1975, p.126. 2 0 0 As I mentioned in "Introduction 5. My Approach", most of the published memoirs regarding the Manchurian Incident are somewhat questionable. Thus, I did not employ such dubious memoirs as sources of information. However, I do employ Yamaguchi's book as a source of information for the following reason. This book is not merely Yamaguchi's memoir but an account of the Manchurian Incident that was compiled and edited by a Japanese 76 Racial Harmony, to get the Shinhai Railway back into operation to secure the lives of the people of Mukden.201 Yamaguchi proposed to the Kant6 Army HQ, that the Chinese employees of the Shinhai Railway take the lead in the work of restoration so as not to invite the false impression that the Japanese tried to take over the railway. He also suggested that the Kanto Army and Japanese engineers and businesses should not be deeply involved, but merely assist the Chinese because the Shinhai Railway was a Chinese company.202 The Kanto Army HQ.accepted his proposal, and Yamaguchi began to persuade the leaders of those employees to restore the Shinhai Railway. He pledged that neither the Kanto Army nor the Japanese people in Manchuria would requisition the Shinhai Railway and urged that the Chinese employees manage it without suffering warlords' exploitation.203 Not until the Kanto Army paid back pay to the employees from warlords' his tori an-Grrrinato Yoshihiro of Doshisha University-who tried to impart Yamaguchi and his comrade's ideal to the future generations. Yamaguchi Juji was one of the leading proponents of the Principle of Racial Harmony, and he continued to advocate this principle after Manchukuo was transformed into Japan's puppet state. Therefore, although he distinguished himself in the establishment of Manchukuo, he could not be appointed to an important post in the Japan' puppet state; nevertheless he made a great effort to realize the ideal of the Principle of Racial Harmony. I believe that Yamaguchi's testimony was not a self-justification but his final effort to seek for his unaccomplished ideal. Therefore, I have distinguished Yamaguchfs book from many other memoirs regarding the Manchurian Incident. Some prominent historians also employed Yamaguchi's book as their source of information. For example, Alvin D. Coox, one of the most renowned military historians in the US, uses Yamaguchi's book in his publication (Alvin D. Coox, 1985, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia—1938. item#613). Mark Peattie, an American historian of modern Japanese history, also made use of Yamaguchi's book, drawing on his data (Mark Peattie,1975, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West). In addition, Seki Kanji uses Yamaguchi's book in his article-Pre-history of the Manchurian Incident-that is widely cited by researchers. 2 0 1 Yamaguchi, 1975, p. 127. 2 0 2 Yamaguchi, 1975, p.127. 2 0 3 Yamaguchi, 1975, pp. 134-5. 77 frozen assets seized by the Kanto Army did the Chinese leaders trust Yamaguchi and the Kanto Army HQ. 2 0 4 Then, the Chinese initiated the work of restoration of their own Shinhai Railway. Yamaguchi and his fellows of the Manchuria Youth League acted as a liaison between the Kanto Army HQ. and the employees of the Shinhai Railway. The Kanto Army performed their duties as guards of the Shinhai Railway. Every work was executed by the Chinese employees, and the Shinhai Railway was revived.205 Arsenals, the post office, the telephone exchange and electricity in Mukden were restored in the same manner as the restoration of the Shinhai Railway.206 Yamaguchi told the leaders of the Kanto Army that the successful restoration of those public utilities confirmed the importance of the Principle of Racial Harmony.207 They agreed with him, and Ishiwara was very impressed by those works with the cooperation of the Chinese, the Manchu, and the Japanese people. This experience made Ishiwara an enthusiastic advocate of the Principle of Racial Harmony. At this point, Ishiwara Doctrine was completely formed. As I analyzed in the previous sections, the Principle of National Defense consisted of Ishiwara's situational explanation, value judgment, 2 0 4 Yamaguchi, 1975, p.135. 2 0 5 Yamaguchi, 1975, p.135. 2 0 6 Manchuria Youth League, 1933, pp.659-62; Hirajima et. al, 1970, p.127; Yamaguchi, 1975, pp.122-5, 159-60. 2 0 7 Yamaguchi, 1975, pp. 120-142. 78 ideal situation, mission statement, and action program. Ishiwara Doctrine incorporated those components, minus the action program, because Ishiwara employed the Principle of Racial Harmony as a critical strategy for the action program of Ishiwara Doctrine. It was obvious that the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria-a concrete action program of the Principle of National Defense-was contradictory to the Principle of Racial Harmony because the conquest of Manchuria by the Japanese meant Japanese domination over the various races in Manchuria. Thus, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara changed the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria into the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence.208 2.7: THE WAR PLAN FOR THE MANCHURIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE Ishiwara's new war plan, like the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria, was described in several documents.209 A basic idea of his new plan, which was named "The Settlement Plan of the Manchurian Problem", was submitted to the Kanto Army HQ. 2 1 0 The leaders of the Kanto Army agreed with Ishiwara's proposal because they thought it was possible to wage a war without positive support from the IJA 2 0 8 Kanto Army HQ September 22 1931 & October 2 1931, Ishiwara, 1931 g; Katakura, 1931, pp.189-99 209 They are the following documents. Kanto Army HQ, "The Settlement Plan for the Manchurian Problem" (10/02); Kanto Army HQ, "Official Announcement of the Kanto Army HQ." (10/06); Kanto Army HQ, "The Outline for the Plan to Establish the Manchurian-Mongolian Free State" (11/07) 2 1 0 Katakura, 1931, p. 198 79 and the IJG if the Kanto Army joined hands with the armies of the anti-Zhang Xueliang camp. They employed "The Settlement Plan of the Manchurian Problem" as the formal decision of the Kanto Army HQ, and transmitted their decision to the central authorities of the IJA.211 While the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria was made and arbitrarily executed by Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara and his comrades, the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence can be regarded as an official war plan of the Kanto Army because the Kanto Army HQ officially approved Ishiwara's basic idea of the Manchurian War of Independence.212 As a concrete action program of Ishiwara Doctrine, the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence consists of the following three elements: (1) a theory of Manchurian Independence, (2) military operations against the Northeastern Army,213 (3) a plan214 for an independent state in Manchuria.215 (1) Theory of Manchurian Independence The theory of Manchurian Independence describes the vindication of Manchurian Independence and the Manchurian War of Independence, the 2 1 1 Kanto Army H a October 2 1931; Katakura, 1931, pp.198-99 2 1 2 Kanto Army H a October 2 1931; Katakura, 1931, pp.198-99 2 1 3 Lt. Col. Ishiwara changed the military operations of the Conquest of Manchuria into the operations that would be able to be carried out without the reinforcements from the IJA. Any documentary sources of those operations are not in existence today, but we can reconstruct them to a certain extent by analyzing actual records of battles in Manchuria. 2 1 4 The concrete blueprint of a new independent state in Manchuria, which was a critical element of this war plan, was being constructed while the Manchurian War of Independence was carried out. 80 political and military objectives of the war, an outline of the war, and the difference between Conquering Manchuria and Manchurian Independence;216 that is, the Kanto Army's basic view on this war plan is expressed. In this theory, the objectives of this war based on Ishiwara Doctrine combine with the Wenzhi Group's217 political ideal.218 According to the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence, the purposes of the war were as follows:219 THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE: The Kanto Army and its allied armies are going to establish a new independent state in Manchuria. Japan will maintain Manchuria as her rear base and a land of logistics in order to gain a victory in "The American-Japanese War". THE MILITARY OBJECTIVE: The Kanto Army and its allied armies will expel the Northeastern Army and its allied armies from Manchuria. The leaders of the Kanto Army anticipated that the leaders of the IJG and the IJA would obstruct the Manchurian War of Independence although this 2 1 5 Ishiwara, 1931-d, 1931-f; The Kanto Army HQ, 1931-f, 1931-g. 2 1 6 The Kanto Army HQ 1931-g, 1931-h, 1931-i, 1931-1, 1931-m 2 1 7 The Chinese and Manchu political leaders and intellectuals in south Manchuria who felt an antipathy against Zhang Xueliang and the Manchurian Government of the warlords. (Yamaguchi, 1975, pp.60-1) Most of the leaders of the Wenzhi Group were not either warlords or capitalists but landlords, whereas Zhang Xueliang and his fellows were warlords with capitalist characteristics. As belonging to the "simple" propertied classes, the Wenzhi Group wanted to expel Zhang Xueliang's military government from Manchuria in order to protect their class interests. (Yamamuro.p.88.) 2 1 8 Manchurian Youth League, 1933, pp.4-17,402-7; The Kanto Army HQ, 1931-n. 81 war would be indispensable to Japan's national security because they believed that the leaders of the IJG had lacked military and geopolitical sense, and the leaders of the IJA had misjudged the military situation of Manchuria.220 Thus, the leaders of the Kanto Army did not presuppose the IJA's reinforcements in order to wage this war.221 In addition the leaders of the Kanto Army declared their resolution as follows:222 "If the IJG does not accept our war plan, we the Japanese military officers in Manchuria will defect from Japanese nationality in order to accomplish our ultimate purpose."223 The Kanto Army HO_ specified that the new state in Manchuria would be founded on the following three principles.224 Principle-1: Every race, which composes a nation of this new state, shall be equally treated by the law. This principle, the Principle of Racial Harmony, had been advocated by the Manchuria Youth League,225 and the leaders of the Kanto Army adopted this idea as the principal element of the spirit of Manchurian independence. 219 The Kanto Army H a 1931-g, 1931-h, 1931-1, 1931-k, 1931-i, 1931-m 2 2 0 Ishiwara, 1931-e; Katakura, 1931, p.191, 194; The Kanto Army H a 1931-g, 1931-m. 2 2 1 Katakura, 1931, pp. 191-9. 2 2 2 Katakura, 1931, p. 199. 2 2 3 Clause 7, The Settlement Plan of the Manchurian Problem 2 2 4 The Kanto Army H a 1931-j, 1931-k, 1931-m 2 2 5 Manchuria Youth League, 1933, p.5,p.l6,pp.402-7,pp.464-6. 82 It was declared in the official announcement,226 and became one of the principles of the founding of Manchukuo.227 Principle-2: Japan shall bear the responsibility for the national defense of the new state. This principle was closely related to the political objective of the Manchurian War of Independence. It was also grounded on the Wenzhi Group's political ideal.228 Principle-3: Japan should manage the railroad system of the new state. Railroads were the most important means of transport in those days and the administration of railroads was essential for the IJA who would be responsible for the national defense of the new state in Manchuria. (2) The significance of the founding of a new state The War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence229 criticized the IJA's idea for establishing a puppet government in Manchuria, and stressed the necessity to establish an independent state in Manchuria.230 The war plan pointed out that any puppet government in Manchuria would not be 2 2 6 The Kanto Army HQ, 1931-h 2 2 7 The Kanto Army HQ, 1931-m 2 2 8 The Kanto Army HQ, 1931-n 2 2 9 The basic framework of the new state, the institutional structure of the new state, and the ideal relationship between Japan and the new state were described in "The Draft of the General Principles of Ruling of the Republic of Manchuria-Mongolia" (The Kanto Army HQ, 1931-k.) and "The Draft of the General Principles of the Establishment of A Free State in Manchuria-Mongolia". (The Kanto Army HQ, 1931-m) They were written mainly by Matsuki Tamotsu~a legal advisor of the Kanto Army HQ. 83 able to settle the Manchurian Problem for the following reasons. First, one of the important reasons that the Manchurian Problem had not been settled was the obscurity of the sovereignty over Manchuria. To establish a new regime in Manchuria meant that Zhang Xueliang was replaced with a warlord who was a puppet of Japan. Thus, even if such a new government was formed, the sovereignty over Manchuria would remain indeterminate because the ROC would insist that Manchuria was ROC's territory and the new Manchurian government was one of the local governments of the ROC.231 Second, the characteristics of the new government would be the same as those of the Manchurian Government as long as a warlord was installed as a ruler. Any of the warlords needed a vast military budget in order to maintain their own armies, so that the people of Manchuria again would suffer from heavy taxation and resent Japan as a patron of the new government.232 Third, a warlord's government was inherently unreliable. The top priority of any warlord was to maintain their own armies as a source of their political power. If they had discontent with Japanese policies, they would easily break an agreement with Japan in the same way Zhang Zuolin 2 3 0 The Kanto Army HQ, 1931-m, pp.249-52. 2 3 1 The Kanto Army HQ, 1931-m, pp.249-50. 2 3 2 The Kanto Army HQ, 1931-m, p.250. 84 and Zhang Xueliang did. Thus, there was a possibility that any pro-Japanese warlord's government would become foes of Japan.233 The war plan suggested that the following strategy be the best measure to turn down the ROC's unjustified claim for sovereignty over Manchuria and drive away warlordism from Manchuria.234 The IJA and the IJG are going to give full support to the Manchurian independence movements in order that a pro-Japanese independent state will be established in Manchuria. The war plan emphasized that, when Japan employed this strategy, the Japanese leaders had to keep in mind that the new state would not be a puppet state of Japan but an independent state, although it was a pro-Japanese state. If the new state was founded as a result of independence movements, none of the Western governments would be able to condemn this new state, nor Japan as a backer, because they advocated the principle of self-determination of peoples. The war plan concluded that Japan had to employ this strategy in order to avoid further conflicts with Western states. (3) A general plan for establishing the new state The War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence embraced a blueprint for the independent state in Manchuria that would be established 2 3 3 The Kanto Army HQ, 1931-m, pp.250-1 85 by the Manchurian War of Independence.235 The plan for the independent state according to the blueprint includes not only the institutional structure of the new state236 but also the ideological background of the new state such as the Principle of Racial Harmony, the Manchurian Monroe Doctrine, and the Principle of Renunciation of War.237 According to the plan, the new state would be based on the following principles.238 (a) Warlordism must be abolished to establish civil administration based on the democratic polity. The warlords have disturbed the peace of Manchuria and Northeastern Asia, and distressed the people of Manchuria since the Qing Dynasty collapsed in 1911. Therefore, warlordism, which is based on the rule of might, must be excluded, and civil administration, which is based on the rule of right, must be introduced in the new state. The rule of right in the modern state is equivalent to the democratic polity; therefore, the government of this state should respect and reflect the will of the people of Manchuria.239 (b) Centralization of state administrative power should be minimized, and local autonomy should be maximized. 2 3 4 TheKantoArmy HQ, 1931-m, p.251. 2 3 5 The Kanto Army H a 1931-g, 1931-k, 1931-m 2 3 6 The Kanto Army H a 1931-k 2 3 7 TheKantoArmy H a 1931-1, 1931-m 2 3 8 The Kanto Army H a 1931-m, pp.251-5. 2 3 9 TheKantoArmy H a 1931-m, p.251. 86 The Chinese people, who represent the largest population in the new state, have traditionally developed the system of self-government. Since various states in China had neglected to protect the people, the Chinese people had to protect their life and property by themselves without the state's custody. Thus, the new state will adopt and revise their traditional systems of autonomy to conform to the modern state. If those autonomous systems were to be successfully innovated, the new Manchurian state would be governed by both civil administration as the rule from above and local autonomy as the rule from below. Note that the system of local autonomy in the new state must not be based on the Western model but the Chinese people's traditional systems of self-government; therefore, the Japanese people who are not familiar with Chinese style autonomy should not interfere with the installation of the system of local autonomy in the new state.240 (c) The Open-Door Policy and the Principle of Equal Opportunity should be respected. The open-door policy and the principle of equal opportunity had been advocated by the U.S. so that American capitalists could make inroads into Chinese and Manchurian markets. This was necessary to promote Manchuria's industrial development. Manchuria has rich natural resources but does not have capital, technology and human resources, which need to 2 4 0 The Kanto Army H Q 1931-m, pp.251-2. 87 be imported from various states. If the new state actually supports these policies, Western capital and technology would flow into Manchuria and the Japanese capitalists would feel dissatisfaction with this situation. However, these two policies would ensure industrial development in Manchuria and expansion of the economic infrastructure. The sociopolitical situation would also stabilize. Since the political object of the Manchurian War of Independence was not to protect Japanese capitalist interests but to ensure Manchuria as the rear base of the Japanese military, the stability of the new state was the most important factor, even if the Japanese capitalists would be unhappy with the policy. For the above reasons, the Manchurian new state was conceived to pursue the open-door policy and the principle of equal opportunity.241 (d) The Principle of Renunciation of War is adopted, and the national security of the new state is undertaken by Japan. The Principle of Renunciation of War was an important element of the ideal of the Wangdao State, or the state with the rule of right, advocated by the Wenzhi Group. It is not just a political ideal but also an effective national policy in order to create a firm foundation for the new state for the following reasons. If the new state built its national defense by herself, the greater part of the total budget would be allocated for military expenditure and it would be difficult to build a social infrastructure, promote industrial 2 4 1 TheKantoArmy H a 1931-m, p.252. 88 development, and establish the public welfare. Even if enormous expenditure on national defense could be allotted to organize armies, it is unlikely that the new state's armies would be strong enough to stand up to the Soviet Army, the IJA, the Chinese armies including the KMT Army, the Chinese Red Army, and other warlords' armies. Therefore, the new state was better off spending her budget for other than military preparedness, and leave her national defense to Japan. Japan had to avoid interfering in the domestic affairs of the new state while taking charge of her national defense.242 (e) In principle, the people of the new state have equal rights and duties regardless of their race. This principle is based on the Principle of Racial Harmony advocated by the Manchuria Youth League. The people of the new state mainly consist of the following races;243 (1) the Manchu who is considered to be a native race in Manchuria, (2) the Mongolian who is considered to be a semi-native race in Manchuria because the Mongolian was allied with the Manchu during the reign of the Qing Dynasty, (3) the Chinese who represent the largest population in Manchuria although they originally immigrated from China, (4) the Japanese who began to settle in Manchuria after they had expelled the Russian invading troops in the early 20th century, (5) the Korean who advanced irrigation skills and successfully cultivated Manchurian 2 4 2 The Kanto Army HQ, 1931-m, p.252. 89 wastelands. It was important to avoid conflicts among those races so that they could live together in peace. In order to do so, the Principle of Racial Harmony had to be realized in the new state. When this principle took root among the people of the new state, the new state would become an ideal state for the people in Manchuria.244 2 4 3 Yamaguchi, 1975, pp.56-63. 2 4 4 The Kanto Army HQ, 1931-m, p.255. 90 C H A P T E R - 3 I S H I W A R A D O C T R I N E ' S R O O T S Judging from Baron Shidehara's educational background and professional experience, Shidehara Diplomacy is likely based on his knowledge of Western liberalism.245 There was no ideological predecessor of Shidehara Diplomacy in Japan, and no Japanese leaders had introduced pacifism derived from Western liberalism into Japanese foreign policy before Shidehara did. Therefore, Shidehara Diplomacy is considered a pioneering political stand in Japanese society. Unlike Shidehara Diplomacy, Ishiwara Doctrine did not represent a pioneering thought in Japanese society but was a descendant of Japan's inherent politico-military thought--I will call it the Japanese Defense Ideology-that had been a driving force in Japan's industrialization from the mid-19th century until the early 20th century. * 4 ; > Shidehara graduated from a secondary school that focused on English education for Japanese students, and studied English Law and International Law at the Imperial University of Tokyo. He served about 28 years as a diplomat until he was appointed as a foreign minister in 1924 (his first term). During his tenure of office, he spent many years in the U.K. and the U.S. Unlike most Japanese diplomats, he studied English and Anglo-American political ideology, so his ability in English language was best among Japanese diplomatic authorities. Similarly, his understanding of Western democracy and liberalism was outstanding and thorough. (Shidehara 1951, Banbal972) 91 3.1: THE BIRTH OF THE JAPANESE DEFENSE IDEOLOGY Japan had diplomatic relationships with only the Korean Kingdom, the Qing Dynasty and the Kingdom of the Netherlands from the mid-17th century till the early 19th century, and during that period the Japanese people never experienced any politico-military tensions with those states. In addition, there was neither civil war nor a large scale rebellion in Japan. Japan was such a peaceful state that no idea of national defense was born until the 19th century. Similarly, Japanese armaments had not evolved since the mid 17th century.246 In the late 18th century Russian warships began to make frequent appearances in the adjoining seas of Japan, and British and American warships were often seen within the territorial waters of Japan. Westerners repeatedly urged Japan to open its trade, but the Japanese Government continued to refuse their demands. However, intimidated by the American warships that came to Japan in 1853, the Japanese Government finally decided to accept their demands because at that time Japanese leaders knew that the Qing Dynasty's army, whose weaponry was stronger than Japan's, had been easily defeated by British troops.247 They realized that Japanese armaments were incapable of repelling Western powers' aggression against Japan.248 Exposed to the menace of American power, the central 2 4 6 Izu, 1938. Keegan, 1998. 2 4 7 The Opium War (1840-2). 2 4 8 Furukawa, 1991, pp.47-54; Inoki, 1995, p.3. 92 government of Japan, the Tokugawa Government, reluctantly acceded to the American demand for the crafting of the Japanese-American Treaty of Kanagawa249 although the Tokugawa Government knew it was an inequitable treaty. After this diplomatic defeat, the Tokugawa Government had to sign compromising treaties with several other Western powers.250 As a result, the Western powers set up their concessions in several cities in Japan, at where their garrisons were stationed. In addition, the Japanese authorities had neither the right to determine a tariff rate nor jurisdiction over Westerners. Outraged by the Tokugawa Government's submission to the intimidation of Western powers, the Japanese Imperial Court and some local governments began to advocate exclusionism. Many exclusionists assailed on Westerners, and two powerful local governments independently fought against Western troops.251 After these battles, they found that the Japanese armaments were much inferior to Westerners' and realized that exclusionism was not a realistic measure by which sweep away the Western powers. Thus, they decided to introduce Western weaponry, military technology, and knowledge to make sufficient military preparations for a 2 4 9 1854 250 The U.K., Russia, the Netherlands, France 2 5 1 (1) The Satsuma Government (clan) fought against the British fleet in 1863 --the Battle of Kagoshima. The British fleet of 7 warships bombarded Kagoshima. (2) The Choshu Government (clan) fought against the combined fleet of the U.K., the U.S., France and the Netherlands in 1864. Although Western powers defeated those local governments, they could not occupy any lands of Satsuma and Choshu because Japanese counterattacks were much 93 war with the Western powers. They believed that not only Japan's military system but also Japan's polity should be transformed. The Tokugawa Government also began to make an effort to reinforce armaments, but they did not want to change Japan's polity. Although the Tokugawa Government and the ex-exclusionists' camps had the common political end of strengthening Japan to drive back the Western powers, their opinions on Japan's polity became more and more divergent. At last a civil war broke out in 1867. Since the Japanese politico-military leaders, samurai, of both camps had a common hostile sentiment toward the Western powers, they refused the Western powers' offers of financial and military aid during the civil war.252 In 1868 the Tokugawa Government camp was defeated, and a new central government, the Imperial Japanese Government (IJG), was formed. This political event is called the Meiji Restoration. Since the leaders of the IJG were former samurai of both sides of the civil war and shared the same hostile sentiment toward the Western powers' expansionism, they could work together in order to build up a strong state intent on excluding the Western powers.253 Guided by this hostile sentiment toward Western expansionism, the leaders of the IJG promoted stronger than they had expected. As a result, they realized that it was very difficult to colonize Japan by force. (Hayashi, 1970, pp48-60.) 2 5 2 The French government and the British government proposed offering financial and military aid to the Tokugawa Government camp and the anti-Tokugawa Government camp, respectively. Both camps refused the offer although they wanted to get strong weaponry. 2 5 3 Furukawa, 1991, pp.65-9. 94 the modernization and Westernization of Japan; consequently, unlike many other non-Western states, Japan could then avoid subjugation by the Western powers and maintain her independence. I have labeled such hostile sentiment as the Japanese Defense Ideology. 3.2: CONTENTS OF THE JAPANESE DEFENSE IDEOLOGY As I have analyzed Ishiwara's Principle of National Defense, I am going to examine the Japanese Defense Ideology as a situational explanation, a value judgment, an ideal stiation, a mission statement and action programs to accomplish that mission. (1) A situational explanation Many Japanese political leaders and intellectuals knew that India had been conquered by the U.K. and that many regions of China had been colonized by the U.K., the U.S., and France. They were also aware that Russia tried to invade the northern territory of Japan. In those days, the Japanese political leaders-sarrj urai-were responsible for military affairs and knew that Japanese armaments were much inferior to the Western ones. They concluded that, if the Western powers aggressed against Japan, it would be almost impossible to beat back the invaders by Japanese out-of-date 95 weaponry; as a result, Japan's independence, and the peaceful lives of the Japanese people254 would be jeopardized. (2) A value judgment The Japanese leaders considered the Western powers' ambition unjust and barbaric. Japan was regarded as a holy land and had maintained its independence for more than 2,000 years. During this long period, the Emperor had reigned over Japan by the rule of right. On the other hand, the Western powers had ruled their colonies by the rule of might, ostensibly claiming to stand for philanthropic principles.255 Thus, to protect Japan's polity from Western expansionism was quite a just motive for the Japanese people. (3) An ideal situation The Japanese leaders wanted to maintain Japan's independence and to associate with the Western powers on equal terms. There were two prerequisites for achievement of this ideal. First, Japan's state power had to be strengthened. Second, Western expansionism had to be repulsed. In this optimum situation, the Japanese people would continue to enjoy peaceful lives. (4) A mission statement 2 5 4 In fact, Japan was a very peaceful state. There was neither war nor civil-war in Japan between 1638 and 1863. 2 5 5 Aizawa Seishisai was a typical intellectual who theorized an anti-Christian view. (Furukawa, 1991, p.26) 96 Since Japan's counterattack against the Western powers would be regarded as an act of justice, the Japanese leaders and intellectuals declared a similar "mission statement" as follows. The Japanese had to make every effort to intercept the Western powers' aggression in order to maintain Japan as the state of the rule of right; as such, it was a providential mission. (5) Action programs Before the Meiji Restoration, some politico-military leaders256 had already formed basic strategies to accomplish the providential mission of the Japanese people. One of them was a blueprint for Japan's domestic policy. This strategy is called "Rich State for Strong Army". The other was a fundamental attitude guiding Japanese foreign policy. This strategy is called "Pan-Asianism". (a) Rich State for Strong Army Shimazu Nariakira,257 the most influential founder of the Japanese Defense Ideology, had formulated an outline of Rich State for Strong Army, and zbb most influential precursor was Shimazu Nariakira, the chief of the Satsuma Government. His idea of Japan's national defense was accepted by the leaders of Tokugawa Government and other local governments. Although he had passed away before the new government was established, several powerful leaders of the Imperial Japanese Government, the Imperial Japanese Army, and the Imperial Japanese Navy were his vassals. As a result, his political thought deeply influenced the politico-military leaders of the Imperial Japanese Government. 2 5 7 Some authors (e.g. Yi. 1989. pp.12-4, Furukawa. 1991. Chapter-1.) count Honda Toshiaki, Sato Nobuatsu, Yoshida Shoinand Hirano Kuniomi as the influential founders of the defense ideology. However, I disagree because their publications were not widely circulated in those days, and they did not occupy influential positions in Japanese society. Thus, the number of people who could learn their ideas were limited although we, posterity researchers, have access to their publications today. Unlike those founders, Shimazu Nariakira was one of the most powerful daimyo (feudal lord of the Satsuma Government), and his opinion had an 97 many leaders of the IJG adhered to this strategy. According to Rich State for Strong Army, the Japanese leaders had to adopt the following action program.258 The ultimate purpose: Japan should combat Western powers' aggression in order to maintain her independence. A necessary task: Japan has to build up its armaments to fortify itself against the Western powers' aggression. Actions: (a) Japan has to import state-of-the-art weaponry from the Western states. (b) The Japanese people must acquire knowledge from the Western states in order to manufacture its own up-to-date weaponry. (c) The Japanese leaders have to study the Western military and political system because not only Western weaponry but also Western politico-military institutions should be introduced in order to reinforce state and military power. (d) Japan has to become a rich state because to import modern weaponry and to acquire Western knowledge will prove costly. influence on the central government policies. In addition, as a result of the Meiji Restoration, his confidants and vassals became the leaders of the Imperial Japanese Government. 2 5 8 Shimazu Nariakira, 1853/1969, pp.566-7, 596-608, 657-64, 671-2, 706-11, 742-7; Hayashi, 1975, pp.29-4l; Furukawa, 1991, p.53. 98 (e) Japan has to promote the development of industry and commerce in order to increase Japan's foreign trade because the only measure to enrich Japan is successful foreign trade. (f) When Japan industrializes and makes military preparations, the Japanese people can then expel the aggressive Western powers from Japan. The IJG began to urge Japan's industrialization and Westernization in accordance with Rich State for Strong Army.259 To begin with, the Japanese leaders intensively introduced Western weaponry, military knowledge, military techniques, and science.260 They also realized that not only the development of military system but also the Westernization of political system was indispensable for producing armaments. Accordingly, they eagerly studied the make-up of Western political institutions and introduced them as soon as possible. During the Tokugawa regime, there was no unified Japanese army,261 and only the samurai class was responsible for military affairs.262 The leaders of the IJG realized that Japan had to form a national army with a conscription system because the European states had national armies.263 Consequently, the IJG formed the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial 2 5 9 Inoki, 1995, pp.4-7. 2 6 0 Matsushita, 1938, pp.129-42, 218-25; Furukawa, 1991, pp.77-89. 2 6 1 The central governmentand each local governmenthad their own independent army. 2 6 2 Izu, 1938, pp.91-125. 99 Japanese Navy, abolishing the samurai class in favor of conscription.264 Centralization of the Japanese political system was accomplished in the process of forming the national standing army of Japan although some groups of samurai and a local government265 revolted against the IJG and the very concept of a national army.266 The Westernization of the politico-military system and the transformation of class structure caused a change of Japan's industrial infrastructure. First of all, light industry such as the spinning industry was modernized in order to acquire foreign exchange for importing the latest weaponry and technology. After Japanese light industry was developed to a certain extent, the IJG tried to found heavy industries in order to manufacture weaponry by the Japanese industry itself.267 The Japanese industries rapidly grew under the protection of the IJG.268 In essence, Rich State for Strong Army can be considered one of the most important ideological factors underlying change in the Japanese social structure in the latter half of the 19th century. 2 6 3 Matsushita, 1938, pp. 143-5. 2 6 4 Matsushita, 1938, pp.148-51; Furukawa, 1991, pp.86-9. 2 6 5 Ironically, the Satsuma Prefectural Government--the former Satsuma Government rebelled. 2 6 6 Matsushita, 1938, pp.298-304. 2 6 7 Matsushita, 1938, pp.203-12, 260-265. 268 p o r examples, a Japanese shipyard built a modern cruiser, Hashidate (4,278 tons), in 1891 (Matsushita, 1938, pp.262-3.); a large scale steelworks was established in 1901; and a Japanese shipyard launched a state-of-the-art battleship, Satsuma (19,350 tons), in 1910. (Matsushita, 1938, pp.264-5. Note: A British battleship, Dreadnought (22,194 tons), was 100 (b) Pan-Asianism The Japanese politico-military leaders had been of the opinion that the Western powers should be expelled from East Asia to ensure Japan's national security, but it was impossible for Japan alone to expel the Western powers from East Asia because Japan's own territory was too small to wage such a conflict. The Founding Fathers of the Japanese Defense Ideology, therefore, thought it advisable that Japan form an alliance with the Qing Dynasty,269 which had been considered the most powerful state in East Asia.270 They judged that the Qing Dynasty might refuse Japan's proposal for making an alliance because the Qing had looked down on Japan as her vassal state. Therefore, they concluded that Japan, first of all, had to build strong armaments in accordance with the plan of Rich State for Strong Army and then would make an attack on China, Manchuria, Taiwan and vassal states of the Qing in order to awaken the Qing to the necessity of making an alliance with Japan to fight against the Western powers. Shimazu Nariakira emphasized that the purpose of Japan's invasion of the Qing's territory was not to conquer the Qing Dynasty but to establish a launched in 1906. An American battleship, Michigan (18,186 tons) was also launched in 1906. A German battleship, Helgoland (24,700 tons), was launched in 1909.) 2 6 9 Hayashi, 1975, pp.34-40 2 7 0 A nationalist scholar, Hirano Kuniomi, also stressed the need of making an alliance between Japan, the Qing Dynasty and the Korean Kingdom. (Furukawa. pp.53-4.) 101 military alliance that would be able to expel the Western powers from East Asia.27i Shimazu's strategy was taken over by his successors,272 and it was known as Pan-Asianism.273 The leaders of the IJG tried to realize the plan of Pan-Asianism along with the plan of Rich State for Strong Army. However Pan-Asianism was a double-edged sword. If the successors had been idealists like Shimazu Nariakira, they could have understood the real purpose of Japan's invasion. Unfortunately, many successors were not such idealists; consequently, many Japanese politico-military leaders dismissed the original purpose of Pan-Asianism from their mind in the early 20th century. 3.3: T H E TRANSITION OF THE J A P A N E S E DEFENSE POLICY The Japanese defense policy, from the establishment of Imperial Japan (1868) to the appearance of Shidehara's foreign policy (1920's), may be classified into three generations on the basis of political and military leaders. 1: Saigo Takamori • Okubo Toshimichi (1868-1879) 2: Ito Hirobumi • Yamagata Aritomo (1879-1907) 3: Tanaka Giichi • bureaucrats (1907-1920s) 1 1 9 2 7 1 Hayashi, 1975, pp.36-7. 2 7 2 As I have already discussed, Shimazu Nariakira's political idea exerted an influence on the politico-military leaders of the Imperial Japanese Government. 102 (1) Taiwan Shuppei Shimazu Nariakira died when the Meiji Restoration was close at hand, but his right-hand men faithfully succeeded Shimazu's defense ideology. The military leader of the Meiji Government, a newly established Japanese government, was Saigo Takamori (1826-1877), and the administrative leader was Okubo Toshimichi (1829-1878). Shimazu Nariakira promoted them, although both of them were Samurai of the low rank of Satsuma-Han. They were passionate admirers of Shimazu's defense idea, and they worked tirelessly for him. They did their best so that they might realize the ideal of Shimazu after his death. As a result, the basic defense policy of the Meiji Government, which was led by Saigo and Okubo, was prescribed by Shimazu's defense ideology. The newly established Japanese army was far from a modern army, and it was urgent for Japanese politico-military leaders to promote a plan for building up a Rich State for Strong Army. In order to make other Japanese leaders understand the need of the promotion of Rich State for Strong Army, Okubo embraced the policy of the dispatch of troops to Taiwan. Taiwan had been the territory of the Qing Dynasty since the second half of the 17th century. However, the Qing Government neither actively developed nor governed Taiwan. Although, by the middle of 19th century 2 7 3 Hayashi, 1975, pp.37-8. 103 there was a local agency of the Qing Government, it did not exercise strong authority over the people of Taiwan. From 1872 to 1873, a series of murders of Japanese castaways in Taiwan took place. The Meiji Government tried to settle these incidents through diplomatic negotiations with the Qing Government. An American diplomatic advisor of the Japanese Government suggested to the Meiji Government that if such negotiations took place, the Western Great Powers would send the army in order to occupy Taiwan because the Qing Government would not be regarded as the ruler of Taiwan.274 Okubo thought it was a good opportunity to appeal for prompt military preparations. He dispatched the army led by Saigo Tugumichi, the younger brother of Saigo Takamori, to Taiwan and occupied it in spite of the opposition of the leaders of the government. This military action was called Taiwan Shuppei—the Dispatch of Troops to Taiwan. The Meiji Government concluded an agreement with the Qing Government as follows, and withdrew from Taiwan. (1) Taiwan is the territory of the Qing Dynasty. (2) The Qing Government should pay indemnities. (3) The Qing Government should properly govern Taiwan so as not to provoke such incidents. 2 7 4 Mouri, 1996, pp.19-40. 104 Taiwan Shuppei, which was the first overseas deployment of troops by the Japanese army, made the leaders feel strongly the importance of Rich State for Strong Army. (2) Seinan War Just at that moment, the leaders of the Meiji Government split into two groups on their policy toward a Korean Kingdom. It is usually explained that this dispute was a confrontation between Saigo and his supporters, who insisted that military action should be taken against Korea, and Okubo and his supporters, who insisted that priority must go to the establishment of domestic politics. However, according to Professor Mouri,275 this interpretation is inaccurate, and Saigo himself did not consider an attack against Korea. It is thought, instead, that this dispute was a confrontation between the Okubo faction, including Saigo's colleague, Yamagata Aritomo and Ito Hirobumi, and the anti-Okubo faction. The Okubo faction tried to promote the establishment of the Imperial Japanese Army as a national army based on the conscription system. The anti-Okubo faction insisted that the army should consist of Samurai, which was the old ruling class. The anti-Okubo faction had Saigo Takamori, who was the only general at that time, as the leader of the faction, and Saigo brought about a domestic conflict called the Seinan War. The government forces, a modern army based on the conscription system, defeated the Saigo army composed of 2 7 5 Mouri, 1996, pp.83-116. 105 Samurai. Saigo committed suicide and Okubo was assassinated after the Seinan War. Ito Hirobumi (1840-1909), a right-hand man of Okubo, took over Okubo's duty as the leader of the Japanese government, and Yamagata Aritomo (1837-1922), a subordinate of Saigo, led the Imperial Japanese Army. (3) Sino-Japanese War Ito and Yamagata had to resolve the issue on sovereignty over Korea, a dispute between the Japanese government and the Qing Government. At that time, the Korean leaders split into two factions. One faction wanted to establish relations with Japan in order to achieve the complete independence of Korea. The other faction intended to maintain the status quo by maintaining a relationship with the Qing Dynasty. The Imperial Japanese Government276 insisted to the Qing Government that the Korean Kingdom, which had been subject to the Qing Dynasty over 200 years, should become an independent state. Of course the Qing Government did not take notice. When the confrontation among Korean leaders became critical, the IJG dispatched troops to Korea in order to support the pro-Japanese faction. On the other hand, the Qing Government reinforced their army stationed in Korea. As a result, military conflict occurred in the Korean Peninsula, and Japan went to war with Qing in 1894. / / f c > The Meiji Government enacted the Constitution of the Imperial Japan in 1889. Since then the Japanese governmentwas called the Imperial Japanese Government the IJG). 106 The Japanese war plan regarding the Sino-Japanese war was constructed by Ito Hirobumi, the leader of diplomatic maneuver, and by Yamagata Aritomo, the leader of military strategy.277 Their intention can be explained by the Japanese Defense Ideology, which we have already investigated. The Founding Fathers of the Japanese Defense Ideology had thought that it was necessary for Japan to be allied with the Korean Kingdom and the Qing Dynasty in order to prevent the Western Great Powers from invading. In addition, the Founding Fathers had foreseen that it would be difficult to be allied with Korea and the Qing because they had underestimated Japanese military strength. In order to form an alliance with them, it was definitely necessary for the Japanese leaders to let the Qing Government realize the weakness of Qing's military strength. The Japanese leaders decided to attack the Qing army on the pretext of securing the independence of the Korean Kingdom. The Japanese military objective was not bent on invading the territory of Qing; on the contrary, its intention was to defeat the Qing army stationed in the Korean Peninsula. If this military objective was achieved, the Qing Government would recognize the independence of Korea. Moreover, the political objective of awakening Qing to the weakness of its military strength and of promoting its modernization would also be achieved. Therefore, the 2 7 7 Oyama, 1944, pp.295-330; Oe, 1985, pp.58-76. 107 war plan of the leaders of the Japanese government led by Ito and Yamagata can be thought to exemplify the Japanese Defense Ideology. (4) Russian Interference The Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, which had been significantly westernized, easily defeated the Qing Army and Navy, which lagged far behind Japan. Japan concluded a cease-fire agreement with the Qing Government under the condition that the Qing Government would pay reparations and cede the Liaodong Peninsula of south Manchuria and Taiwan Islands to Japan.278 Immediately after this cease-fire agreement was concluded, the Imperial Russian Government, which had been attempting to invade Manchuria and the Liaotung Peninsula, warned the IJG to return the Liaodong Peninsula to the Qing Dynasty because the cession of the Liaodong Peninsula was an excessive demand; otherwise the Russian government would exercise military forces.279 Recognizing that the Japanese military was not yet strong enough to fight against the powerful Russian army and navy, Ito and Yamagata decided to forego the cession of the peninsula.280 In return for the Russian effort to retake the peninsula, the Imperial Russian Government acquired the leasehold of the Liaodong Peninsula from the Qing Government.281 The Japanese populace as well as the Japanese leaders were furious at Russia's high-handed manner; thus, Ito 278 The Treaty of Shimonoseki. Apri l 17, 1895. 2 7 9 Romanov,1935, pp.112-39. 2 8 0 Inoki, 1995, p.15. 108 and Yamagata emphasized even more strongly the importance of the plans of the Japanese Defense Ideology.282 Rich State for Strong Army, which had been promoted by the Japanese leaders since Okubo, was encouraged more than ever. Acquisition of military skills and development, one of the basic strategies of Rich State for Strong Army, were rapidly promoted. New types of gunpowder and guns were steadily developed. Staff officers in the General Staff established by Yamagata Aritomo devoted their energies to construction of strategies aimed against Russia. In 1900, the Russian Army occupied the whole of Manchuria.283 The Qing Government did not make any serious efforts to recover Manchuria although it was a homeland of Manchu's Qing Dynasty. The Japanese leaders were afraid that the Russian aggression of Korea was about to begin. If the Russian Army occupied Korea, Russia's next target would be Japan. Not only Japanese leaders but also Japanese people were convinced that next target would be Korea followed by Japan. The IJG more and more stressed the necessity of enriching Japan and building up its defenses. The hostile sentiment toward Russian aggression deeply permeated into most of the Japanese people, and the Japanese Defense Ideology solidified in this period, since the enemy was now apparent. 2 8 1 Romanov,1935, pp.179-89. 2 8 2 Inoki, 1995, pp. 16-7. 2 8 3 Romanov,1935, pp.337-415. 109 (5) Russo-Japanese War Ito Hirobumi, who was in charge of foreign policy, succeeded in forming an alliance with the U.K., which had similar diplomatic interests as Japan, in order to contain Russia. Ito, who believed that Japanese military strength was not enough strong to fight against Russia, carefully negotiated with Russia for its withdrawal from Manchuria. Since Russia remained in Manchuria, Yamagata and Katsura Taro (1845-1913), a right-hand man of Ito and Yamagata, insisted that the Imperial Japanese Army should expel the Russian Army from Manchuria before the completion of the Eastern Qing Railways, which were extensions of the Siberia Railways; otherwise, Japan would become the prey of Russia. Ito accepted their view and the Imperial Japanese Government decided to make war against Russia. The Japanese leaders wanted the Japanese subjects to recognize that the Russian aggression of East Asia must be stopped.284 The Japanese subjects met this expectation in the Russo-Japanese War from 1904 to 1905. The Japanese soldiers bravely fought against the Russian troops in the name of the Japanese Defense Ideology, and the well-trained Japanese troops defeated them in Manchuria. The Russian army retreated from Manchuria, and Japan got a leasehold on the Liaodong Peninsula, which was called Kanto Province by the Japanese people, from the Qing Government.285 2 8 4 Inoki, 1995, pp.28-32. 2 8 5 Inoki, 1995, pp.56-63. 110 It is obvious that the war plan written by Japanese politico-military leaders was constructed against Russian expansionism. The political objective of the plan was to prevent Russia from invading Manchuria, the Korean Peninsula, and Japan. The military objective of the plan was to expel the Russian troops from Manchuria. Japan thus achieved the ideal of the Founding Fathers, Rich State and Strong Army, and the war against Russia was the first blow to Western expansionism. In addition, this military objective demonstrated that the Japanese leaders were concerned about Pan-Asianism, the other factor of the Japanese Defense Ideology. Russia invaded Manchuria and the military objective of Japan was to expel Russia from Manchuria on behalf of the Qing Dynasty. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Russia from invading Japan, but the direct purpose was to protect the territory of the Qing Dynasty on behalf of the Qing Government that was not yet a modern state and had not established a modern army. The Japanese government concluded an agreement with the Qing Government on military action of the Japanese Army in Manchuria. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Japanese leaders of the Russo-Japanese war were indirect successors to the Founding Fathers of the Japanese Defense Ideology. I l l (6) Postwar period After the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese defense policy dramatically changed for the following reasons.286 First, Ito Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo, who had been leaders in constructing Japanese defense policies for more than 25 years, retired. Ito became the Inspector General of Korea and was assassinated by a Korean patriot. Yamagata left the administrative work of the Imperial Japanese Army to Tanaka Giichi (1862-1929),Yamagata's right-hand man. Second, many of the Japanese leaders gained confidence by winning the Russo-Japanese War, and soon became overconfident. Most of the leaders of the military authorities in the Russo-Japanese War regarded the Russo-Japanese War as the model of victory and so maintained that system of tactics. As a result of the expulsion of the enemy, most of the political leaders became indifferent to national defense and shifted their interest to Japanese economic development. Third, after Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan controlled the South Manchuria Railway in south Manchuria, and Russia still managed the East China Railway in north Manchuria; meanwhile, the United States was harboring schemes to control a railroad network in Manchuria.287 Thus, Japan formed an alliance with Russia to prevent the 2 8 6 Oe, 1985, pp.117-158; Kurono, 2002, pp.20-77. 2 8 7 Hanabusa, 1934, pp. 100-13. 112 American domination over the Manchurian railroads.288 As a result, the hostile sentiment toward Russian aggression faded away from the Japanese people's minds and the Japanese Defense Ideology lost the imminent enemy that had represented a direct military threat against Japan's national security.289 Fourth, more than twenty-five years had passed since the Imperial Japanese Army had been westernized, and the Imperial Japanese Army came to be directed by military bureaucrats. Unlike leaders in the time of Yamagata, not only Tanaka Giichi, but also most of the military leaders, were educated by the Western-style military academies. The military leaders who received highly standardized education promoted advanced bureaucratization of the military system. Military bureaucrats under the leadership of Tanaka Giichi laid down the general principles of Japan's national defense on the basis of the experience of the Russo-Japanese War. Those documents, or the General Principles, were regarded as virtual canon; that is, no one could be allowed to amend the major parts of the General Principles. As a result, Japanese defense policies prescribed by the General Principles sought to maintain the fruits of the Russo-Japanese War.290 2 8 8 Hanabusa, 1934, pp.91-9. 2 8 9 Kurono, 2002, pp.20-37. 2 9 0 Oe, 1985, pp.117-137; Kurono, 2002, pp.27-37. 113 (7) World War I and 1920's Japan's defense policy during World War I clearly shows the difference between the defense thought of the Japanese leaders before the Russo-Japanese War and that of the Japanese leaders after the Russo-Japanese War.291 When the war began in Europe, the Japanese Government declared war against Germany on the pretext of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The IJA attacked German bases in China and occupied a German colony in China. Unlike the Russo-Japanese War, Japan did not return the German colony to the Republic of China; on the contrary, the IJG tried to transform the occupied territory into Japan's colony. In addition, the Japanese Government refused the Allied Forces' request that Japan should send her troops to European battlefields. Instead of sending troops, Japan dispatched two destroyers and a red-cross ship to the Mediterranean Sea. Such IJG' defense policies during World War I show that Japan's participation in the war was based on not the Pan-Asianism but Japan's own territorial and economic interests. In addition, unlike the Japanese leaders before the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese leaders after the Russo-Japanese War lacked enthusiasm for building a strong army because, if some Japanese troops were dispatched to Europe, Japanese military leaders could learn the latest information about Western military affairs. For the 2 9 1 Kurono, 2002, pp.48-77. 114 above reasons, we can conclude that the Japanese leaders after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, lost the spirit of the Japanese Defense Ideology. Not only the Japanese military leaders but also politicians and Japanese people in general forgot the Japanese Defense Ideology. Between the end of the Russo-Japanese War and the late 1920's, many Japanese intellectuals, including the political leaders, began to appreciate the Western ideas of democracy, liberalism, pacifism, socialism and even communism.292 The majority of the Japanese politicians and mass media supported an arms reduction, so that Japan's military budget and the quota of military personnel were reduced.293 For these reasons, most of the Japanese populace became indifferent to the Japanese Defense Ideology In the 1920's, Japan's politics was controlled by party politicians,294 and universal manhood suffrage was adopted in 1925. As Western knowledge and technology were imported, the Japanese people began to favor Western-made articles. Viewing the situation with alarm, the Japanese nationalists criticized party politicians who had underrated the importance of the national defense and advocated disarmament. They Such a tendency was called Taisho Democracy. The Military Budget (Matsushita, pp.365-377) Year Army Navy 1922 320,908 373,892 1923 323,927 275,144 1924 206,734 248,458 1925 214,805 229,003 1926 196,941 237,307 / y 4 Even Tanaka Giichi became a party politician, and he took office as Prime Minister in 1927. 115 grew worried that the Japanese people would lose their national identity by being attracted by Western culture. They were afraid that Japan's status in the world would decline if the Japanese people lost a sense of the importance of national defense and national identity. Therefore, they tried to revitalize the Japanese Defense Ideology, which was the mainspring of victory in the Russo-Japanese War.295 Those Japanese nationalists with geopolitical insight believed that the Japanese military environment in the late 1920's was highly vulnerable. Some of them warned that the USSR targeted its territorial expansionism in south Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula because it had inherited the earlier Russian imperialistic interests in north Manchuria. Others considered the United States the most dangerous potential enemy because the U.S. Government bluntly expressed animosity against Japan after Russia and Japan had obstructed the American scheme to control the railroads in Manchuria. Those nationalists began to revitalize the Japanese Defense Ideology on the grounds of hostile sentiment toward expansionism of the U.S. or/and the USSR Although those nationalists eagerly propagated their defense^ thoughts, their ideas hardly influenced the Japanese defense policies in 1920's because none of them occupied important posts of constructing Japanese defense and foreign policies. 2 9 5 Otsuka, 1995, pp.85-128. 116 SAIGO Takamori 1826-1877 OKUBO Toshimichi 1829-1878 ITO Hirobumi 1840-1909 I YAMAGATA Aritomo 1837-1922 TANAKA Giichi 1862-1929 Bureaucrats 3.4: ISHIWARA DOCTRINE AS AN UP-TO-DATE VERSION OF THE JAPANESE DEFENSE IDEOLOGY Judging from the comparison of the contents of Ishiwara Doctrine and those of the Japanese Defense Ideology, Ishiwara Doctrine can be considered an up-to-date version of the Japanese Defense Ideology for the following reasons. First, both Ishiwara Doctrine and the Japanese Defense Ideology regard the international situation from a military point of view. Neither ideology is formulated on the basis of a situational judgement, e.g. the viewpoint of commerce, as in Shidehara Diplomacy. Second, Ishiwara's dichotomy between Oriental civilization as the rule of right and Occidental civilization as the rule of might originates from the Japanese Defense Ideology's value judgment.296 He employs this dichotomy to alive at a fundamental justification for Japan's self-defense. 2 9 6 see 3.2(2). 117 Third, both ideologies emphasize that the Japanese people must repel Western expansionism in order to maintain their independence. According to both ideologies, Japanese defensive action was the Japanese people's providential obligation because only Japan could protect the rule of right. Fourth, Ishiwara Doctrine inherits the real intention of Rich State for Strong Army from the Japanese Defense Ideology. Although Japanese society had been industrialized in accordance with Rich State for Strong Army, this strategy's real meaning was twisted when bourgeois party politicians began to take the helm of state in the late 1910's. The Japanese capitalist camp interpreted this strategy as "Strong Army for Rich State"; that is, Japan required strong armaments in order to maintain and expand Japanese capitalists' interests. Contrary to this interpretation, Ishiwara revived the original understanding of Rich State for Strong Army; in other words, he reintroduced a politico-military understanding of this strategy. Finally, Ishiwara Doctrine underscores the founding-fathers' spirit of Pan-Asianism.297 His view on Japanese national security did not exhibit a clear premise of Pan-Asianism until he adopted the Principle of Racial Harmony that had been constructed by the Manchurian Youth League in order to revive the original spirit of Pan Asianism. He began to eagerly advocate Pan-Asianism after he linked the Principle of National Defense with the Principle of Racial Harmony. The Chinese and Manchu leaders of the 2 9 7 see 3.2(4)(b). 118 anti-Zhang Xueliang camp came to realize that not only Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara but also most of the leaders of the Kanto Army truly supported the spirit of Pan-Asianism. Therefore, the anti-Zhang Xueliang camp entered into an alliance with the Kanto Army, and they waged the Manchurian War of Independence. For the above reasons, Ishiwara Doctrine is considered to be an up-to-date version of the Japanese Defense Ideology. Japanese Defense Ideology R i c h State for- S t r o n g A r m y P a n - A s i a n i s m Russo-Japanese War nmmiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiMiiiHiiiiiiiiiimiiiiiH S t r o n g A r m y f o r R i c h State P r i n c i p l e • o f R a c i a l H a r m o n y „ ( P r i n c i p l e o f N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e Conquest of Manchuria ( Ishiwara Doctrine J Manchurian War of Independence Chart-1 119 3.5: THE DIFFUSION OF ISHIWARA DOCTRINE To the IJA, the Russo-Japanese War was one of the principal teaching materials, and the Japanese Defense Ideology, this war's ideological mainspring, had naturally taken root in the officers' mind. 2 9 8 Thus, the officers of the IJA had been indoctrinated with the Japanese Defense Ideology during their military education at the Military Academy or the War College although it had faded away from civilian minds, including the minds of party politicians as well as diplomats.299 In particular, the officers of the Kanto Army were familiar with this military thought because they were stationed in south Manchuria, the main battlefield of the Russo-Japanese War.3 0 0 Since it was a descendant of the Japanese Defense Ideology, Ishiwara Doctrine was readily accepted by the leaders and officers of the Kanto Army. In addition, Ishiwara frequently lectured to them about the Principle of National Defense,301 and discussed Ishiwara Doctrine whenever he inscribed official documents of the Kanto Army HQ. 3 0 2 Therefore, they could appreciate Ishiwara Doctrine as a modern version of Japanese Defense 2 9 8 Ishiwara, 1941/1993. 123-6 2 9 9 Hasegawa, 1983, pp.155-60; Oe, 1985, pp.122-30. 3 0 0 Kojima, 1983, vol.1, pp.22-5. 3 0 1 Ishiwara, 1929-a, 1929-b, 1929-c, 1930-a, 1930-b, 1931-a, 1031-b, 1931-c, 1931-d. 3 0 2 TheKantoArmy HQ 1931-a, 1931-c, 1931-d. 120 Ideology, and it permeated them. Some officers who zealously espoused Ishiwara Doctrine became Ishiwara's comrades.303 3 0 3 e.g. Colonel Itagaki Seishiro, Captain Imada Shintard, Major Hanatani Tadashi, Lt. Colonel Takeshita Yoshiharu, Major Mitani Kiyoshi, etc. (Ishiwara, Diary pp.127-53) 121 P A R T - I I T H E E X E C U T I O N O F T H E W A R P L A N S 122 C H A P T E R - 4 THE MANCHURIAN MILITARY STRUCTURE IN THEEARLY SUMMER OF 1931 Report of the Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations, or the so-called Lytton Report, remarked that 'in Manchuria there are many features without an exact parallel in other parts of the world.'304 In fact, at the time of the Manchurian Incident, the substantial sovereignty over Manchuria was not clear, and several foreign concessions had been established in Manchuria. Thus, I will summarize features of Manchuria in those days, especially those of its military structure, before the analysis of the Manchuria Incident. 4.1: T H E M A N C H U R I A N G O V E R N M E N T In the early 1930's, there were four powerful warlords in Manchuria, Zhang Xueliang, Zhang Zuoxizng, Wan Fulin, and Tan Yulin. Each warlord took office as a governor-general of Liaoning Province, Jilin Province, Heilongjiang Province, and Jehol Province respectively. Amongst them, Zhang Xueliang was the most powerful warlord because he was a son of Zhang Zuolin, who had unified Manchuria with Japan's support.305 In 1928, Zhang Xueliang 3 0 4 Report of the Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations. LN version p.l26/CH version p.248 3 0 5 Mizuno, 1994, pp.97-118. 123 succeeded to his father's position as the ruler of Manchuria.306 Accordingly, the three provinces307 of Manchuria were controlled by Zhang Xueliang, and a ruling committee of those three provinces was called the Northeastern Three Provinces Government, or the Manchurian Government. Although the Manchurian Government was considered to be a central government of Manchuria, its ability to rule was problematic.308 (1) Currency System in Manchuria There was no unified currency system in Manchuria in 1931. Each warlord's provincial government issued their own currency; in addition, some private banks' notes also circulated in Manchuria.309 Warlords constantly overissued their notes in order to meet deficits in their military budget. Consequently, the Manchurian currency system was always unstable.310 Although the Republic of China proclaimed that the Manchurian Government was a local government of the Republic of China (ROC), the 3 0 6 Mizuno, 1994, pp.330-1. 3 0 7 The provinces of Liaoning, J i l in and Heilongjiang. Jehol Province was independent of those three provinces, butTanYulin was closely allied with Zhang Xueliang. 308 The Publishing Group for Manchurian Historiography (PGMH), 1970, pp.47-8, pp.67-78, p.270,pp.284-90. 309 PGMH, 1970, pp.75-7, 284-9. 310 F o r example, value (per ¥100) of Mukden-Note was changed as follows. (PGMH, 1970, p.77) Year Low of the year High of the year Average of the year 1922 149 117 135 1924 194 122 138 1926 570 206 359 1928 3,300 1,510 2,510 1930 11,800 7,900 10,038 124 Nanjing Government of the ROC did not take any measures to stabilize the currency system in Manchuria. On the other hand, Japanese financial circles took part in the Manchurian currency system. Bank notes issued by the central bank of Korea311 (Japan's territory) and the central bank of Kanto Province312 (Japan's leased territory) circulated in Manchuria. Unlike warlords' notes, those Japanese bank notes were stable in Manchuria.313 In addition, Japanese currency was in circulation in Manchuria. (2) Railroad network in Manchuria In the early 1930's, a railroad network in Manchuria commercially and militarily played an important role because road traffic for trucking had not yet been established.314 There were three trunk lines in Manchuria; the East China Railway, the South Manchuria Railway, and the Jing-Feng Railway. The former two lines were constructed by Russia to support their aggression against Manchuria.315 As of the summer of 1931, the East China Railway, which was the main line in north Manchuria, was managed by the USSR, and the South Manchuria Railway, which was the main line in south Manchuria, was owned by a Japanese governmental corporation, the South 1931 17,000 8,200 13,484 3 1 1 Chosen Bank (Hikita. 1985, pp.824-6) 3 1 2 Yokohama-ShokinBank (Hikita. 1985, pp.824-6) 3 1 3 Hikita. 1985, p.828. Chart-10.1 3 1 4 TheGeneral Staff, 1935-a, pp.10-13. 3 1 5 The South Manchuria Railway was originally a part of the East China Railway. The Russian Empire constructed the South Manchuria Railway from 1897 to 1902. 125 Manchuria Railway Company.316 The Jing-Feng Railway was constructed by the Qing Dynasty, the U.K., and Japan for military purposes.317 Although this railway was managed by the ROC, the U.K. and Japan were the railway's creditors. Other minor railways were managed by the Nanjing Government or the Manchurian Government; however, some of them were in debt to Japan.318 (3) Foreign Interests in Manchuria As of the summer of 1931, several foreign states had important interests in Manchuria. Japan had a leased territory in Manchuria, which Japan called Kanto Province.319 Kanto Province was originally a Russian leased territory, where the Russian Empire built a naval port, Port Arthur, with a heavy fortress and a commercial port town, Dalian.320 Because of these two ports, Kanto Province was a strategic area from commercial and military points of view. Japan took over this territory from Russia when 6 l b In 1905, Japan took over the administration of this railway from Russia when Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. 3 1 7 The construction of the Jing-Feng Railway was completed in 1907. 3 1 8 The General Staff, 1927, pp.104-114 3 1 9 Kanto Shu in Japanese. This name of the leased territory was originally named by the Russian people during Russian holding this leased territory. After Japan leased this territory, the Japanese people began to use this name, so Kanto Shu was not a Chinese term but a Japanese term The Chinese people did not like this name. I will describe the name of this territory in its Japanese pronunciation, Kanto, instead of its Chinese pronunciation, Kwantung. 3 2 0 Romanov,Boris Aleksandrovich. 1935, p. 16. 126 Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. The expiration of the lease would be 1997.321 Japan had the privilege of managing the South Manchuria Railway and its several branch lines. This privilege included Japan's concession for using the land pertaining to the South Manchuria Railway322 and Japan's right to protect the railways and annexed lands by the Japanese garrison.323 The USSR had a concession for managing the East China Railway; however, this privilege did not include the right to protect the railway and annexed lands by the Russian garrison. The U.K. was the Jing-Fen Railway's creditor. In addition to the foreign interests related to railways, some public services and big businesses in Manchuria were administrated by the U.K., France and the U.S. For example, the U.K. administered the customs in Manchuria, except for Kanto Province transactions, and earned customs duties.324 France administered the postal service in Manchuria.325 The U.K. and the U.S. jointly operated a tobacco syndicate, and the U.S. monopolized the soda industry in Manchuria.326 3 2 1 The General Staff, 1928, pp.155-6 3 2 2 The General Staff, 1927, p.156. The land included an area of sixty-two-meters wide adjoining the railways, and the Japanese settlements located in 25 towns along the railways. 3 2 3 Fifteen soldiers per 1 km of the South Manchuria Railway. The number of soldiers of the garrison was fixed. 3 2 4 Yamaguchi, 1975, pp.22-3. 3 2 5 Yamaguchi, 1975, p.23. 127 4.2: THE NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER DEFENSE ARMY In the early 1930's, the military authorities dominated the political authorities in Manchuria. As the leader of the Manchurian Government, Zhang Xueliang was also the Commander-in-Chief of the Northeastern Frontier Defense Army. (1) What was the Northeastern Frontier Defense Army? The Manchurian four warlords, or governor-generals, controlled their own army and their allied armies, namely the Mukden Army, the Jilin Army, the Heilongjiang Army, the Jehol Army and other small armies.327 Amongst those armies, Zhang Xueliang's Mukden Army was stronger than any other warlords' armies in both quantity and quality.328 Because Zhang Xueliang formed an alliance with Chiang Kaisheck, who was the leader of the Nanjing Government of the ROC as well as the KMT Army,329 those armies were incorporated into the KMT Army, and called the Northeastern Frontier Defense Army. As Commander-in-Chief of the KMT Army,330 Chiang Kaisheck appointed Zhang Xueliang as Vice-Commander-in-Chief of the KMT 3 2 6 Yamaguchi, 1975, pp.22-3. 3 2 7 Liu, 1992, pp.535-43. 3 2 8 The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.8-9; Mizuno, 1994, chapter 8. 3 2 9 The KMT signifies Guomindang, or the Chinese Nationalist Party, which was the dictatorial political party of the Republic of China. This party's military forces was called the KMT Army, and it was considered to be the national army of the Republic of China. 3 3 0 To be exact, the KMT Army, Navy, Air Force 128 Army and Commander-in-Chief of the Northeastern Frontier Defense Army.331 (2) The Mukden Army in north China In the early summer of 1931, there were three governments in China:332 (1) the Nanjing Government (a government of the ROC formed by the Chiang Kaisheck faction of the KMT in Nanjing), (2) the Guangdong Government (another government of the ROC established by the left wing of the KMT in Guangdong), (3) the Ruijin Government (a government of the Chinese Soviet Republic in Ruijin established by the Chinese Communist Party). The Nanjing Government seized the majority of the KMT Army that had destroyed most of the warlords in China, and Chiang Kaisheck looked upon himself as the successor to Sun Yatsen, the founder of the ROC. Accordingly, the international community regarded the Nanjing Government as the central government of the ROC.333 This government claimed that it had the sovereignty over not only China but also Tibet, Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria. Chiang Kaisheck gave priority to extermination of the Chinese Communist Party, so that the Nanjing Government sent the main force of 3 3 1 In May 1931, the official name of the Northeastern Frontier Defense Army was abolished, but its formation, commanding line, personnel and armaments were not substantially changed. (Liu, 1992. pp.554-64) Thus, in this dissertation, the KMT Army's troops commandedby Zhang Xueliang will be called the Northeastern Army. 3 3 2 Yokoyama, 1997, pp. 184-7. 3 3 3 Yokoyama, 1997, pp.151-2. 129 the KMT Army to southeastern China to annihilate the Red Army.334 He seized the politico-military power of the Nanjing Government in order to annihilate the Red Army; therefore, the Guangdong Government denounced Chiang Kaisheck as a dictator. In addition, taking advantage of the absence of the main-force unit of the KMT Army, several warlords in north China prepared to rebel against the Nanjing Government. Knowing their attempts, Chiang Kaisheck asked Zhang Xueliang to send his troops to north China in order to crush the warlords' maneuvers; Zhang sent his 115,000 men to north China.335 On July 15, Yan Xishan, a warlord of north China, allied himself with the Guangdong Government and raised an army in north China. In concert with him, Shi Yousan, another warlord, launched an assault against the Zhang Xueliang Army.336 Zhang's army started poorly, but after the Nanjing Government issued a warrant for Shi's arrest and Zhang Xueliang also set a price on his arrest, Zhang's army launched a counterattack and Shi's army retreated in late July.337 Zhang Xueliang, however, could not In order to eliminate the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Army, Chiang Kaisheck appointed his right-hand man, He Yingqin, the Chief of the military administration, as a commander of the operation and dispatched 220,000 troops. On the other hand, the Red Army prepared to intercept the attack by the Nanjing Government. On Apri l 1, 1931, the KMT army, led by He Yingqin, marched. (Operation Siege & Destroy III) Although the KMT Army almost defeated the Red Army and He Yingqin's strategy nearly succeeded, the Red Army mounted a fierce counteroffensive and the tide turned against the KMT Army, resulting in a large number of deaths of senior commanders of the KMT Army. It served to increase the possibility of a setback in the Operation Siege & Destroy III. 3 3 5 The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.7-8; Mizuno, 1994, chapter 8. 3 3 6 Su, 1996, pp.138-9. 3 3 7 Mizuno, 1994, pp.329-63. 130 withdraw his troops from north China until Chiang Kaisheck smashed the Red Army. As a result, the strength of the Mukden Army in Liaoning Province was about 55,000, including an elite brigade commanded by Wang Yizhe. (3) Armaments of the Northeastern Army The real nature of the Northeastern Army was not a national army but a mixture of various warlords' private armies, so that a basic unit of the Northeastern Army338 was mainly an independent brigade or regiment, and a commander of each unit was a former warlord or a warlord's confidant.339 Those independent brigades and independent regiments were grouped by their boss; that1 is, the Northeastern Army substantially 338 T n e Northeastern Army as of May 1 1931 ARMY Commander-in-Chief: Chiang Kaisheck Vice Commander-in-Chief: Zhang Xueliang Infantry Division--1, Independent Infantry Brigade--25, Independent Guard Regiment--1, Cavalry Division--1, Independent Cavalry Brigade--6, Independent Artil lery Brigade--3, Independent Artil lery Regiment--2, Engineer Regiment--1, Engineer Battalion--2, Transport Company--1, Tank Company--1, Tankette Company--1, Communication Battalion—1, Traffic Brigade—1, Reconnaissance Company—1, Military Band—1. NAVY Commander-in-Chief: Zhang Xueliang Two fleets for the sea, One fleet for the river AIR FORCE Commander-in-Chief: Zhang Xueliang (Mukden) An aviation corps with 262 airplanes GUARD/MILITARY POLICE Six military police battalions, Three guard companies PROVINCIAL ARMY Independent Infantry Brigade—3, Independent Cavalry Brigade—2 GARRISON Eight garrisons (brigades) 3 3 9 Liu, 1982, 554-564 131 consisted of Zhang Xueliang's Mukden Army, Zhang Zuoxiang's Jilin Army, Wan Fulin's Heilongjiang Army, and Tan Yulin's Jehol Army.340 In the early summer of 1931, the Mukden Army consisted of 15 infantry brigades, 8 cavalry brigades, and 6 artillery brigades; its troop strength was about 170,000.341 The Jilin Army consisted of 8 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade and 1 artillery brigade; its troop strength was about 54,000.342 The Heilongjiang Army consisted of 3 infantry brigades, 2 cavalry brigades and 1 artillery brigade; its troop strength was 29,000.343 The Jehol Army consisted of 4 infantry brigades, 2 cavalry brigades and 1 artillery brigade; its troop strength was 15,000 3 4 4 Amongst those armies, the Mukden Army was the largest and most powerful army with an air force and armored troops.345 After July 1931, about 115,000346 men out of 170,000 men of the Mukden Army were dispatched to north China in order to support Chiang Kaisheck's war against the Red Army, so that the troop strength of the Mukden Army in Liaoning Province decreased to 55,000.347 This deployment showed that 3 4 0 The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.8-9. 3 4 1 The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.8-9. 3 4 2 The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.8-9. 3 4 3 The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.8-9. 3 4 4 The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.8-9. 3 4 5 Liu, 1982, p.552. 3 4 6 The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.8-9. 3 4 7 The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.8-9. 132 the Mukden Army was not afraid of encountering the Kanto Army at that time. 4.3: T H E K A N T O A R M Y The Kanto Army was the IJA's garrison to guard Kanto Province, the South Manchuria Railway and the lands pertaining to it. (1) The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) The IJA consisted of fifteen divisions in Japan and two divisions in Korea.348 In addition to those seventeen divisions, there were two expeditionary troops. One of them was the China Expeditionary Army, whose troops were stationed in north China as a result of the Beijing Treaty of 1902 concluded between the Qing Dynasty and Japan. The other was the Kanto Army. The IJA's troop strength was about 230,000.349 Note that the troop strength of the regular brigades of the Northeastern Army (about 270,000) outnumbered that of the IJA, and that the entire Northeastern Army (about 450,000) was almost double that of the IJA. According to the Constitution of the Japanese Empire, as the Great Field Marshal, the Emperor was the head of the IJA; however, the Minister of War, the Chief of the General Staff and the Inspector General were responsible for military affairs on behalf of the Emperor. The Minister of War was a member of the Cabinet and acted as a liaison between the IJA 348 These divisions were called the Korean Army. 133 and the IJG. The Ministry of War was responsible for accounting, personnel, ordnance, judicature, medical care and mobilization of the IJA. The Chief of the General Staff was the head of the General Staff, which was in charge of the military operations of the IJA. The Inspector General took charge of technical training, tactical training, education and other services that were not directly under the supervision of the Ministry of War.350 A chain of commands of the IJA's military operations was totally independent of the IJA's military administration. The former line of command was based on the Emperor's prerogative of supreme command, and it was called the line of supreme command. The General Staff was primarily responsible for the IJA's every military operation on behalf of the Emperor. The Minister of War, the Ministry of War and any other organization could not interfere in the line of supreme command.351 Thus, only the General Staff could directly interfere in the Kanto Army's military operations. At the time, Emperor Hirohito had been distrustful of the high command of the IJA because they had unfaithfully covered up the Zhang Zuolin Incident of 1929.352 Thus, the IJA's high command was quite 3 4 9 Matsushita, 1938, pp.200-1. 3 5 0 Matsushita, 1938, pp.152-201. 3 5 1 Matsushita, 1938, pp.179-85. 3 5 2 Kojima, 1981, vol.2, pp.61-6, 71-80, 131-4. The Zhang Zuolin Incident: After Zhang Zuolin seized sovereignty over Manchuria in the 1920's, he tried to advance into China. Although north China was under the control of Zhang Zuolin, Chiang Kaisheck's KMT Army tried to unify China; thus, a war between Zhang Zuolin and Chiang Kaisheck was about to begin. 134 inactive. In addition, the Japanese people in general, particularly the mass media, were indifferent to military affairs because Japan had never experienced full-scale war since Japan's victory in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War. The mass media supported the IJG's pacific diplomacy as well as the arms reduction policies in conformity with the international atmosphere of disarmament. Consequently, military officers felt small, and their "bellicose" remarks were strongly criticized.353 Unlike the Imperial Japanese Navy, which was the third strongest navy in the world, the IJA fell behind the Western armies in armaments and battle tactics. Although the real samurai cherished a maxim, 'Don't gloat over your victory', the majority of the leaders of the IJA forgot it after the IJA beat off the Russian Army in 1905. Elated at their victory, they failed to study new tactics and armaments developed in Europe after World War I. Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Gi'ichi supported Chiang's movement. Tanaka thought that China should be governed by Chiang's Republic of China, and that Manchuria should be ruled by Zhang's Manchurian Government. Therefore, Tanaka persuaded Zhang to withdraw from China. Since Japan was a powerful patron of Zhang's warlordism, he reluctantly accepted Tanaka's proposal and decided to return to Manchuria by the Jing-Feng Railway. Meanwhile, Colonel Komoto Dai saku, Senior Staff Officer of the Kanto Army, felt a great antipathy against Zhang Zuolin because Zhang's government tended to disobey the IJG's policies and had been oppressing the Japanese in Manchuria. Colonel Komoto decided to eliminate Zhang Zuolin in order to transform the Manchurian Government into a Japanese puppet government. As a result, Zhang Zuolin was assassinated by Komoto's men on June 4, 1928, on his way to Manchuria, The IJA grasped the truth of this incident. Although this assassination was not an operation of the Kanto Army, the high command of the IJA covered up the real facts of this incident. Komoto and his men were not officially punished. However, the truth became more or less known to the public. Thus, the Emperor looked on the high command of the IJA suspiciously. 3 5 3 Kusaka. 1999, pp. 107-9. 135 As a result, by the summer of 1931, the IJA's weapons and military tactics were outdated.354 (2) Structure of the Kanto Army The troop strength of the Kanto Army by the summer of 1931 was about 10,500 including administrative and medical personnel.355 Its headquarters was situated in Port Arthur. The leaders of the Kanto Army HQ, consisted of a Commander-in-Chief, a Chief of Staff, five staff officers, and four assistant staff officers.356 The Kanto Army HQ, controlled the Port Arthur Fortress, the Port Arthur Heavy Artillery Battalion, the Independent Garrison, the Kanto Military Police, three hospitals, a warehouse, a military jail, and a combat unit.357 The Independent Garrison consisted of six independent infantry battalions and its headquarters was situated in Gongzhuling. Each independent infantry battalion was composed of four infantry companies including a machine-gun unit and an infantry artillery unit, and each infantry company was stationed in fifteen cities along the South Manchuria Railway.358 In order to reinforce the Independent Garrison, a combat unit of the Kanto Army was sent from Japan in shift. In April 1931, the combat unit 3 5 4 O'e, 1985, pp.126-9, 135-7, 142-8. 3 5 5 Hazeyama, 1967, pp.5-7 3 5 6 The Kanto Army HQ.1931-Personnel List. 3 5 7 The Kanto Army HQ. 1931-Personnel List. 136 of the Kant6 Army was changed from the Fourteenth Division to the Second Division of the IJA Since the Second Division was not permanently stationed in Manchuria, some units of this division remained at Japan's home base. Thus, the Second Division at the Kanto Army was not a complete division.359 (3) The Kanto Army's ordinary duties The Kanto Army's ordinary duties were to protect Kanto Province, guard the South Manchuria Railway and the land pertaining to it, and prepare for an emergency situation in south Manchuria.360 The Port Arthur Fortress and the Port Arthur Heavy Artillery Brigade took charge of the defense of Kanto Province, where large standing troops were not necessary for the following reasons. First, unlike Manchuria and China, where many bandits were rampant, Kanto Province was a Japanese leased land and very secure. Second, Kanto Province was a small area in the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula, so that it was easy to protect. Third, the IJA was the only armed force stationed at Kantd Province. Finally, the coast of Kanto Province had been guarded by the Second Expeditionary Squadron of the Imperial Japanese Navy.361 358 The Kanto Army HQ, 1931 -Personnel List; The General Staff, 1935, pp.6-7. 3 5 9 Ha Infantry Regiment-- 4, Cavalry Regiment-1, Artil lery Regiment--1 Engineering Cornpany-1 Of f i cer - -^ ! , Soldier-4,108, Horse-578. <Gendaism-stary«*ll. pp.961-3. The General Staff, 1935, pp.5-6. Hazeyama, 1967 p.6) 360 i n a b a , 1972, p.125. 3 6 1 The General Staff, 1935-a, p.7. 137 The South Manchuria Railway and the lands pertaining to it were guarded by six battalions of the Independent Garrison that were stationed at strong points along the railways. The Kanto Army had to guard such long railways with only a small number of people according to an agreement between Japan and the Qing Dynasty. In addition to the Independent Garrison, the combat division patrolled the railroad line in times of peace. This division would serve as a main combat unit of the Kanto Army should an emergency situation break out. The Kanto Army HQ was in charge of Japanese settlement and interests in south Manchuria, besides the defense of Kanto Province and the South Manchuria Railway. The Kanto Army with a force only 10,500 strong, which had neither a tank unit nor an air unit, was so small an army that it was impossible, without reinforcements, to take a large-scale military action against the approximately 450,000 men of the Northeastern Army or even the 55,000 men of the Mukden Army stationed in Liaoning Province. (4) Status of the Kanto Army's officers Before the Manchurian Incident broke out, few officers in the IJA wanted to transfer to the Kanto Army in Manchuria because a staff officer of the Kanto Army was neither an intriguing position nor a job with many opportunities.362 The climate of Port Arthur, where the Kanto Army headquarters was located, was much more rigorous than that of many parts 3 6 2 Takagi, 1985, p.56. 138 of Japan even though it was the mildest region in Manchuria.363 In addition, if military conflict between the Northeastern Army and the Kanto Army occurred, it was likely that the Kanto Army would be destroyed before reinforcements from Japan arrived, given that the Northeastern Army decisively outnumbered the Kanto Army. In addition to such unfavorable conditions, the staff officer of the Kanto Army had been of low social position in the Japanese community in Manchuria. For example, in the meeting of the Kanto Army and the Kanto Government-General, while the chief and above in rank of the Kanto Government-General could attend the meeting, only a senior staff officer and generals of the Kanto Army could attend it. Besides, staff officers of the Kanto Army could not officially sit in company with young directors of the South Manchuria Railway.364 In summary, to the officers of the IJA, being transferred to the Kanto Army meant virtual demotion.365 (5) The Activities of the Kanto Army The Kanto Army's activities were limited to routine patrol and exercises.366 During that period, an anti-Japanese policy was pursued by the Manchurian Government, and the IJG did not make a firm response toward 3 6 3 The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.12-3. 3 6 4 Takagi. 1985, pp.49-50. 3 6 5 Takagi. 1985, p.56. 366 0 f xhe matters in which the Kanto Army was involved were the ordinary duties related to railway security. 139 them.367 Under such circumstances, many noncommissioned officers and soldiers of the Mukden Army held the Kanto Army in contempt. They despised the Kanto Army's soldiers on patrol and even high officers of the Kanto Army.368 However, no military conflict occurred between the Northeastern Army and the Kanto Army because the Kanto Army HQ, adjured them not to be the first to move no matter how provoked. The Kanto Army was prudent, making an outward show of patience; meanwhile Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, who had been transferred to the Kanto Army as a staff officer in charge of military operations, was formulating a war plan because he took it for granted that the Kanto Army HQ, would prepare for war in Manchuria. The war plan progressed steadily under the leadership of Ishiwara.369 Ishiwara explained his theory and the outline of the war plan to staff officers of the Kanto Army and arranged an inspection tour370 to north Manchuria which would serve as a battlefield of hypothetical military conflict between Japan and the Soviet Union.371 Senior Staff Officer Colonel Itagaki, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara, four other staff officers of the Kanto Army HQ, and a staff officer of the Port Arthur 3 6 7 This policy had been adopted since July 1931 when Shidehara Kijuro was appointed as the Foreign Minister. 3 6 8 Kojima, 1983, vol.1, pp.179-80. 3 6 9 Ishiwara, 1929-a, 1929-b, 1929-c, 1930-a, 1930-b, 1930-c, 1931-a, 1931-b, 1931-c, 1931-d; TheKantoArmy HQ, 1930-b, 1931-a. 370 1929/07/03—07/10 3 7 1 Operations against the Soviet Army were institutionally not the Kanto Army's but the Imperial Japanese Army's operations because it would be impossible for the Kanto Army, 140 Fortress participated in the tour, in which Ishiwara gave a lecture to participants on his war theory and war plan.372 After the tour of north Manchuria, the Kanto Army HQ, carried out a field study with regard to operations of hypothetical military conflict between the Kanto Army and the Northeastern Army in south Manchuria. According to Ishiwara, if the hypothetical military conflict became a reality, the Kanto Army would have to fight against them with overwhelmingly insufficient force until reinforcements arrived from Japan or Korea. Therefore, in order to avoid annihilation, the Kanto Army had to destroy the Northeastern Army by delivering attacks on them and the city of Mukden, where was a base of the Manchurian Government. Ishiwara organized an inspection tour to Liaoxi area to let staff officers understand the Kanto Army's blitzkrieg tactics for military conflict in south Manchuria. As a supplement to this tour, field studies of Mukden and south Manchuria were conducted by staff officers of the Kanto Army in 1930.373 (6) Poor armaments of the Kanto Army As a staff officer in charge of military operations, Ishiwara regarded the poor armaments of the Kanto Army as a serious problem. While the Northeastern Army had four air battalions with 262 air planes, a tank company, a tankette company, and nine artillery brigades with 96 heavy which was nothing more than the railways garrison, to fight against the Soviet Army for the Far East. 3 7 2 Ishiwara, 1929-a, 1929-b, 1929-c. 141 guns, the Kanto Army had no planes, no tanks, no tankettes.374 It owned only 24 guns375 and 8 howitzers.376 Besides, standard firearms of the Kanto Army were outdated;377 on the other hand, the Mukden Army was equipped with weapons of the newest European models.378 As I mentioned above, not only weapons but also the troop strength of the Mukden Army outnumbered the Kanto Army. Thus, in theory, the Kanto Army was at a decisive disadvantage. In addition to the inferiority of armaments, as a result of a thorough inspection of Mukden it turned out that the occupation of Mukden was extremely difficult. The walls of Mukden379 were so strong that it would be impossible for the Kanto Army's artillery to destroy them to break into the town; therefore, more powerful artillery was essential. Ishiwara requested the high command of the IJA to arrange some 240mm howitzers, which had been covered with dust in the IJA's warehouse, for the Kanto Army. 3 7 3 Kojima, 1983, vol.1, pp.71-5. 3 7 4 Liu, 1992, pp.567-75. 3 7 5 Type 38 Field Gun (75 mm) developed in 1905. (Hazeyama. 1967, p.91) 3 7 6 Type 38 Field Heavy Howitzer (150 mm) developed in 1905. (Hazeyama, 1967, p.91) 3 7 7 For example, the infantry rifle was the Model-38 6.5 mm Rifle developed in 1905. It was a manually operated and clip-loaded rifle. The carbine was the Model-44 6.5 mm Carbine developed in 1911. Standard pistols were the Model-26 9 mm Pistol developed in 1893 and the Model-14 8 mm Pistol developed in 1925. The former was poorly manufactured and a replica of the obsolete Smith & Wesson revolver. The Type-11 6.5 mm Light Machine Gun was developed in 1922, and the Type-3 6.5 mm Heavy Machine Gun was developed in 1914. (Hazeyama, 1967, pp.205-13, Forty, pp.113-5,126-9,135-6,147-58) 3 7 8 The Mukden Army was equipped with Mauser Military Pistol (Germany), Renault FT-17 Light Tank (French), Ford's airplanes, and Skoda's artillery and weapons. Note: In those days, Skoda of the Czech produced many superior armament. (Deighton, 1993, p.58, 63.) 3 7 9 In south Manchuria and China, majorcities were surrounded with sturdy walls. 142 Because the IJA did not readily agree to his request,380 Ishiwara repeated his demands, insisting that it would be difficult to carry out any military operations in Manchuria without heavy artillery. In July 1931, two 240mm howitzers were installed in the military base of the Kanto Army at Mukden.381 3 8 0 Nakano, 1965, p.291. 3 8 1 Nakano, 1965, pp.291-5. 143 CHAPTER-5 THE CONQUEST OF MANCHURIA The antagonism between Ishiwara Doctrine and Shidehara Diplomacy came to the surface at the outbreak of the Mukden Incident, which was the first step toward the Conquest of Manchuria by Ishiwara and his comrades. 5.1: THE MUKDEN INCIDENT Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara developed the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria, but had no authority to carry out the plan. Granted that it was officially approved as a plan of the Kanto Army by its Commander-in-Chief, but the Kanto Army had no authority to execute it because the Kanto Army was a mere garrison of the IJA. Since this war plan was made on the assumption that the main body of troops of the IJA would be sent to occupy Manchuria, the outline of the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria should have been approved by the high command of the IJA. As a minimum, they had to consent to the basic framework of the plan.382 (1) Ishiwara's Judgment of the Military Situation of Manchuria Ishiwara and his comrades of the Kanto Army judged that the Conquest of Manchuria should be carried out as soon as possible in the light of Ishiwara's Principle of National Defense, since the Soviet Union would likely 3 8 2 Ishiwara, 1931 f 144 hold back from taking military action against Japan while they were going forward with their first Five-Year Plan, designed, in part, to make the Soviet Army stronger.383 Ishiwara and his comrades concluded that if the Kanto Army carried out a war without delay and without harming the USSR's interests in north Manchuria, the Soviet Army would not invade north Manchuria to obstruct the Kanto Army's actions. Ishiwara and his comrades carefully designed an operational plan against the Northeastern Army. They made a full inspection of Mukden and its vicinity. Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara estimated that if a military collision between the Kanto Army and the Mukden Army occurred in south Manchuria, a 110,000 man force of the Mukden Army advancing into north China to support Chiang Kaisheck would not be able to make a swift return to Manchuria while they were working on the KMT's Operation Siege & Destroy. Similarly, it was impossible for the KMT Army to send reinforcements to Manchuria during Operation Siege & Destroy. Moreover, one hundred and fifty thousand remaining forces of the Northeastern Army and 180,000 irregular troops had been stationed across Manchuria. Therefore, Ishiwara was convinced that the Kanto Army would be able to occupy the main cities in south Manchuria, provided that they could defeat the 7th Independent Brigade under Wang Yizhe stationed at Mukden, which was the well-trained elite unit with modern weapons. He also 3 8 3 The Kanto Army HO_. 1931 c. 145 presumed that the U.K. and the U.S. would not militarily intervene in the dispute in Manchuria because they had to concentrate on resuscitating their own economies which had been exhausted by the Great Depression.384 In the summer of 1931 Ishiwara and others assessed the military situation in Manchuria as follows:385 (1) The disposition of the Northeastern Army in south Manchuria was very thin. (2) There was no possibility that the KMT Army would advance into south Manchuria. (3) There was little possibility that the Soviet Army would intervene. (4) There was no possibility that the U.K. and the U.S. would take military actions against Japan. On the basis of this assessment, Itagaki, Ishiwara and his comrades concluded that the summer of 1931 would be a golden opportunity to carry out a War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria. This "golden" opportunity was also the "last" one because those conditions advantageous to Japan would disappear shortly. When the KMT Army defeated the Red Army and the United States' economy was recovered, the Nanjing Government would encourage American military intervention in Manchuria and north China, which would then jeopardize Japan's dominant military position in south Manchuria. 3 8 4 The Kanto Army HQ. 1931 c 146 (2) The Forcible Investigation of the Captain Nakamura Incident Ordered to investigate the topography of north Manchuria by the General Staff, Captain Nakamura Shintaro of the First Section of the General Staff departed from Ha'erbin on June 8, 1931, accompanied by a Japanese sergeant major in the reserve living in Manchuria, a Russian emigre, and a Mongolian guide.386 On June 25, although the party had proper identification which had been issued by the Manchurian authority of Ha'erbin, they were captured, tortured and finally executed by the Xing'an Army of the Northeastern Army led by Lieutenant Colonel Guan Yuheng stationed at Suegongfu. Lieutenant Colonel Guan commanded his men not to mention the incident.387 On July 10, at Angangxi in north Manchuria, staff of the Kanto Army were informed that a party of Captain Nakamura had been missing.388 The Kanto Army HQ. secretly began collecting information on Nakamura's party and grasped the truth of the incident.389 While the Kanto Army HQ acknowledged the incident, they concealed the fact that they had already arrested those responsible for the incident and had compiled evidence against them. Japanese mass media including 3 8 5 Ishiwara, 1931 c; The Kanto Army HQ, 1931 c 3 8 6 Manchuria Youth League, 1933, p.504; Hirajima, 1970, p.103 3 8 7 Kojima, 1983, pp.121-5 3 8 8 Katakura, 1967, p.29. Katakura was a captain of the IJA and an assistant staff officer of the Kant6 Army HQ.inl931. He was appointed as the chief investigator for the Nakamura Incident by the Kanto Army HQ, 3 8 9 Katakura, 1967, p.30 147 "Asahi Shinbun"390 began to criticize Zhang Xueliang's regime and the Northeastern Army,391 saying that the Captain Nakamura Incident had been nothing less than a Chinese indignity against Japan that was intolerable. As a result, this incident prepared the Japanese people at home to expect Japan to take strong measures in Manchuria although they had not been much interested in the Manchurian Problem before this incident. On the opposite front, the mass media in China and the Chinese media in Manchuria reported that the Nakamura Incident must have been a conspiracy by the Kanto Army and that the Kanto Army HQ.'s announcement was groundless. Those statements revived anti-Japanese sentiment amongst the Chinese.392 The IJG and the Manchurian Government reached agreement on a temporary settlement, but on September 2 Wang Zhengting, the Foreign Minister of the Nanjing Government, declared that the Captain Nakamura Incident was a pure fabrication by Japan.393 Due to this statement, Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment in China became intense.394 At the same time, Japanese 3 y u One of the Japanese leading newspapers and had been against the IJA. 3 9 1 Katakura, 1967, pp.30-1 3 9 2 Seki, 1963, p.352 3 9 3 Usui, 1974, p.34; Kojima, 1983, pp.162-3 3 9 4 Kojima, 1983, p.163 148 sentiment toward the Republic of China and the Manchurian Government became more unfriendly.395 Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara sought an opportunity to execute his war plan in the course of investigating the murder case. According to his strategy,396 one artillery and two infantry battalions would be sent in an armored train to support the investigation of the Nakamura Incident. If the Northeastern Army launched hostile actions, the Kanto Army would quickly occupy Mukden and seize the strong points of south Manchuria according to the war plan. Ishiwara asked the central authorities of the IJA to approve the forcible investigation and readied his strategy with Lieutenant General Tamon Jiro, the Commander of the Second Division. However, deciding that it was too early to use armed force in Manchuria, the Ministry of War and the General Staff denied Ishiwara's plan and gave orders to stop the forcible investigation.397 As a result, the settlement of the Nakamura Incident was negotiated through a formal diplomatic route. The Japanese Consul General at Mukden negotiated with the Manchurian Government and the Northeastern Army HQ. to extract a promise that the incident would 3 9 5 Usui, 1974, pp.33-4 3 9 6 The Kanto Army H a 1931 e 3 9 7 Katakura, 1967, p.30; Usui, 1974, pp.32 149 be properly investigated by the Northeastern Army.398 The investigation, however, made slow progress. (3) The formation of a group of conspirators Realizing that neither the General Staff nor the Ministry of War perceived the summer of 1931 to be a golden and final opportunity to execute military actions in Manchuria, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara and his comrades decided on a pretext for carrying out Ishiwara's war plan.399 They plotted to have the Kanto Army "counterattack" the Northeastern Army. Because this plot, the Plot at Mukden, was not an official plan of the Kanto Army, it had to be concealed not only from the central authorities of the IJA but also from the Kanto Army itself. By the end of August 1931, Colonel Itagaki, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara and their comrades formed a group of conspirators in order to undertake the Plot at Mukden.400 This 3 9 8 Usui, 1974, pp.33-4 3 9 9 I have inferred this from Ishiwara Diary (pp.132-52). 400 Tftg members^ of the conspiratorial group were as follows. (Kojima, 1983, ppl55-6) Colonel Itagaki Seishiro (Higher Staff Officer of the Kanto Army HQ) Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara Kanji (Staff Officer of the Kanto Army HQ) Lieutenant Colonel Mitani Kiyoshi (Commanderof the Military Police at Mukden) Major Hanatani Tadashi (Special Service Agency at Mukden of the Kanto Army) Major Kojima Masanori (Staff Officer of the Independent Garrison 2nd Battalion) Major Nagura (A battalion commanderof the 2nd Division, 29th Regiment) Major Yaszaki Kanju (Military Advisor of the Northeastern A r m y # # ) 150 group began to push forward with preparation for the plot independently of the Kanto Army. (4) The Plot at Mukden On the night of September 18, a small section of the railroad lines of the South Manchuria Railway was blown up by the group of conspirators. Immediately after the blast, several soldiers of the Mukden Army rushed to the scene, and a gunfight took place between those soldiers and a patrol unit of the Kanto Army.401 The Kanto Army HQ. (Port Arthur) was informed of this clash, and at the same time, Colonel Itagaki402 who "accidentally" stayed at Mukden that night, gave the order of the Kanto Army HQ_ to attack the Mukden Army under the name of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kanto Army.403 Consequently, the Kanto Army's Captain Imada Shintaro (Assistant Advisor of the Northeastern A r m y # # ) Captain Ono Masao (A company commanderof the Independent Garrison 2nd Battalion) Captain Kawashima Tadashi (A company commanderof the Independent Garrison 2nd Battalion) Captain Takahashi Kin'ichi (A company commanderof the Independent Garrison 2nd Battalion) #: Each member seems to have told his right-hand man about the plot within the limit of his duty. ##: The Northeastern Army employed several officers of the foreign armies, including the IJA, as military advisors. 4 0 1 The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.13-4; Kawashima/Mori, 1944/1976, pp. 355-7. 4 0 2 He knew that the blast was caused by a plot. 4 0 3 Katakura, 1931, p.182; The General Staff, 1935-a, p. 14; 151 "counterattack" against the Mukden Army that was stationed in the North Barracks404 had begun. At the Kanto Army HQ, Lieutenant General Honjo, the Commander-in-Chief405 Major General Miyake Koji, the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara and other staff officers of the Kanto Army HQ held a meeting to deal with this emergency situation.406 Only Ishiwara Kanji was a member of the group of conspirators. At the meeting, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara asserted that the whole force of the Kanto Army should attack the main force of the Mukden Army stationed in and around Mukden. Lieutenant General Honjo Shigeru hesitated to accept Ishiwara's proposal because there was no precedent for the Commander-in-Chief of the Kanto Army to order the whole force of the Kanto Army to execute full-scale military operations.407 However, when they knew that the Kanto Army's unit in combat was in trouble because of the superior firepower of the Mukden Army at the North Barracks, Lieutenant General Honjo decided to approve 4 0 4 About 10,000 men of the 7th Independent Brigade of the Mukden Army were stationed at the North Barracks. (The General Staff, 1935-a, p.14; Kawashima/Mori, 1944/1976, p.355.) 4 0 5 On August 20, 1931, Lieutenant General Honjo Shigeru arrived at his post, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kanto Army. (Note: The Commander-in-Chief of the Kanto Army was replaced every summer or every other summer.) Colonel Itagaki and Lt. Colonel Ishiwara lectured to Lt. General Honjo on the military situation in Manchuria and the Principle of National Defense, but they never disclosed the Plot at Mukden. When Lt. General Honjo inspected troops of the Kanto Army stationed at several strong points along the South Manchuria Railway, he felt a tense atmosphere in Manchuria. (Kojima, 1983, vol.1, pp.181-2.) The new commander-in-chief expressed his hard-line attitude toward Manchuria during his inspection, and it raised the morale of the Kanto Army. (The General Staff, 1941-c, p.305; Nakano, 1965, pp.296-7.) 4 0 6 Katakura, 1931, pp.182-3. 4 0 7 Katakura, 1931, p.183. 152 Ishiwara's proposal.408 According to the Kanto Army's mission permitted by law409 as the Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General Honjo Shigeru was authorized to launch an attack against the Mukden Army in order to protect the property and the lives of the Japanese people and Japan's interests in Manchuria should a military collision occur between the Kanto Army and the Mukden Army.410 Since the Kanto Army HC1 had to decide on a counterattack against the Mukden Army as soon as possible, they had no time to confirm whether the military clash was caused by the plot or not.411 The Kanto Army HQ. officially ordered all troops of the Kanto Army to take the field in accordance with Ishiwara's plan of operations.412 From this point, the Kanto Army's military actions would be official activities under the 4 0 8 Katakura, 1967, pp. 3 4-5. 4 0 9 Act of the Kanto Army HQ, Apri l 11, 1909, 4 1 0 Inaba, 1972, p. 125. 4 1 1 At present it is verified that the Plot at Mukden was caused by the plotters led by Col. Itagaki andLt. Col. Ishiwara (Inaba, 1972, p.79.). However, at the time of the incident, they never disclosed the truth to anyone, even to the Commander-in Chief, Chief of Staff, and many other staff officers of the Kanto Army. (Katakura, 1967, pp.35-6.) Commander-in-Chief Honjo committed suicide after Japan's loss of WWII and he had never been officially told about the fact. Lt. Col. Ishiwara remained silent on the conspiracy all his life. (Ishiwara/Mori, 1942/1976, pp.309-15. Note: He was a lieutenant general and dismissed from the IJA in 1941 because of serious antagonism between Ishiwara and General Tpjo.) Lt. Col. Mitani and reserve Captain Amakasu confided the secret of the plot to Mori Katsumi, a historian who was asked to investigate the plot by the General Staff. (Mitani/Mori, 1942/1976, pp.359-71. Note: In 1942, Mitani had already retired from service. Amakasu/Mori, 1942/1976, pp.379-84, Note: In 1942, Amakasu was the chairman of the board of directors of the Manchurian Motion Picture Company.) Col. Itagaki and Captain Kawashima revealed a part of the truth to Mori in 1944. (Itagaki/Mori, 1944/1976, pp.293-308. Note: In 1944, Itagaki was a general and the Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army. Kawas hi ma/Mori, 1944/1976, pp.353-8. Note, In 1944, Kawashima had already retired from service.) Their interviews were not published until 1976. (Mori. 1976.) 4 1 2 The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.14-5, 1941-c, pp.306-7; Kojima, 1983, vol.1, pp.181-2. 153 authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kanto Army. The Plot at Mukden was successfully achieved. (5) The Conquest of Manchuria Having given the initial order to troops of the Kanto Army, Lieutenant General Honjo and most of the staff officers of the Kanto Army HQ, departed from Port Arthur to Mukden in a shift of headquarters. They informed the central authorities of the IJA of the military clash from the train and arrived at Mukden at noon of September 19.413 Each soldier of the Kanto Army took the offensive against the 55,000 strong Mukden Army in accordance with Ishiwara's elaborate plans of Blitzkrieg.414 The Kanto Army of only 10,000 men achieved brilliant military results. They occupied 20 cities in Liaoning Province in one day.415 Because the morale of the Mukden Army was very low, they easily disarmed the Mukden Army.416 However, troops in the Mukden and Changchun areas fought vigorously against the Kanto Army and caused many casualties.417 4 1 3 Katakura, 1931, pp.183-4. 4 1 4 Katakura, 1931, pp.182-3. 4 1 5 Liu, 1985, p.143. 4 1 6 The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.26-7. 4 1 7 The Kanto Army's casualties were as follows: Mukden Area: KIA=9 wounded=42 ChangchunArea: KIA=66 wounded=79. 154 The Kanto Army's military actions were stopped the night of September 19.418 Lieutenant General Honjo and staff officers other than the conspirators regarded the Kanto Army's "counterattacks" as nothing more than measures for self-defense because neither Colonel Itagaki nor Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara informed them of their intention.419 On the other hand, to Ishiwara and the other conspirators, those military actions were the first step in the Conquest of Manchuria. According to their plan, the next step was to advance to north Manchuria.420 Ishiwara and Itagaki urged that the Kanto Army should advance to Jilin as well as Ha'erbin, but Honjo hesitated because Jilin was beyond the jurisdiction of the Kanto Army.421 Colonel Itagaki enthusiastically explained to Lieutenant General Honjo the necessity of waging the Conquest of Manchuria on the basis of Ishiwara's Principle of National Defense, with the result that Honjo agreed with the Principle of National Defense and eventually assented to expand the war.422 On the morning of September 21, 1931, the main force of the Kanto Army advanced to Jilin.423 Since the Commander-in-Chief of the Jilin Army resided in Beijing, Xi Qia, the Chief of Staff of the Jilin Army, commanded the main force of the 4 1 8 The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.28-9. 4 1 9 Katakura, 1967, pp.35-6. 4 2 0 Nakano, 1965, pp.527-9. 4 2 1 Katakura, 1931, p.187, 1967, pp.39-40. 4 2 2 Katakura, 1931, pp.187-8, 1967, pp.40-1. 4 2 3 Katakura, 1931, p.188; The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.28-30. 155 Jilin Army.424 Xi Qia was of a Manchu aristocratic lineage and had graduated from the Imperial Japanese Military Academy.425 He had been eager to restore the Qing Dynasty in Manchuria, harboring ill feeling toward Zhang Xueliang's Manchurian Government.426 Therefore, expecting the Kanto Army would defeat the Mukden Army and sweep away the Manchurian Government, he welcomed their occupation of Jilin.427 Pro-Zhang Xueliang factions of the Jilin Army had retreated before the Kanto Army's arrival in the evening of September 21.428 Meanwhile, when the Korean Army HQ received a report about the Mukden Incident, the leaders of the Korean Army HQ decided to dispatch reinforcements to south Manchuria.429 However, they did not have authority to send troops to Manchuria, and the high command of the IJA prohibited the reinforcements from crossing the border between Korea and Manchuria.430 Thus, although the Korean Army's air squadrons arrived in Mukden, the reinforcements were stranded at Shinyishu, a Korean city at the border 4 3 1 4 2 4 The strength of the J i l in Army of the Northeastern Army was about 54,000. (The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.8-9. 4 2 5 Yamaguchi, 1975, pp.92. 4 2 6 Yamaguchi, 1975, pp.90-1; Zhang 1990, pp.29-30. 4 2 7 The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.29-30. 4 2 8 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.317. 4 2 9 The 39th Mixed Brigade and two air squadrons. (The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.308-9.) 4 3 0 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.312. 4 3 1 The General Staff, 1935-a, p.28, 1941-c, p.312. 156 The Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army, nevertheless, decided to send reinforcements without the IJA's approval when the Korean Army HQ, knew that the Kanto Army had departed for Jilin. The leaders of the Korean Army thought that unless they sent reinforcements, the Kanto Army and the Japanese people in Manchuria would be in danger.432 On September 21, the reinforcements of the Korean Army crossed the border and were incorporated into the Kanto Army at that point.433 Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara's scenario of the Conquest of Manchuria took a step forward. 5.2: ANTI-WAR POLICY OF THE IJG Despite the Kanto Army's attacks, the leaders of the IJG and the IJA adhered to Shidehara Diplomacy because they believed that a full-scale war would affect Japan's position in the international community. Thus, they decided not to send any reinforcements to Manchuria. (1) The initial reaction of the IJA Immediately after the high command of the IJA was informed that a military clash between the Kanto Army and the Mukden Army of the Northeastern Army had broken out in Mukden, the top leaders of Ministry of War and the General Staff called a meeting in the name of the central 4 3 2 The General Staff, 1935-a, p.30; 1941-c, p.317. 4 3 3 The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.30-32; 1941-c, pp.317-8. 157 authority of the IJA.434 They concluded that the Kanto Army's attack against the Mukden Army was inevitable because Kanto Army HQ. reported to the IJA that soldiers of the Mukden Army had destroyed railway tracks of the South Manchuria Railway and fired at a patrol unit of the Kanto Army.435 Their main concern was the lack of strength of the Kanto Army; if the skirmish were to become a full-scale military conflict, the Kanto Army, which was but a fraction of the enemy force, might be annihilated. Therefore, the leaders decided to send reinforcements to the Kanto Army.436 However, before the General Staff implemented their plan for reinforcements, the Korean Army HQ, reported that they were mobilizing reinforcements and had already send two air squadrons to Manchuria.437 The General Staff went through the procedure of ex post facto consent for dispatch of the air squadrons, and the leaders of the IJA reached agreement that Minister of War Minami Jiro would ask for a Cabinet decision on sending troops of the Korean Army to Manchuria.438 (2) A measure of the IJG In an emergency session of the Cabinet council, Minister of War Minami asked if the IJG agreed with the dispatch of the Korean Army to Manchuria. Since the detachment of the Korean Army to Manchuria was equal to the 4 3 4 Shimada, 1962, pp.3-4; Usui, 1974, p.46 4 3 5 The General Staff, 1935a, pp.13-5; 1941c, pp.305-7. 4 3 6 Shimada, 1962, pp.3-4 4 3 7 Shimada, 1962, p.6 158 dispatch of troops of the IJA to a foreign state, the IJG had to approve expenditure of the expenses, and the approval of the Emperor was also necessary.439 Prime Minister Wakatsuki, a supporter of Shidehara Diplomacy, and other cabinet ministers strongly protested the spread of the battle and demanded immediate withdrawal. The Imperial Court also supported Shidehara Diplomacy. In addition, information revealed by Shidehara showed that the Mukden Incident had been a conspiracy of the Kanto Army.440 He demanded that General Minami investigate the truth of the incident.441 Minami did not know the details of the plot but had been aware of a rumor of its existence, so he could not insist on sending reinforcements of the Korean Army.442 In the meantime, the IJG was informed that one brigade of the Korean Army had crossed the border to Manchuria on the arbitrary decision of the Korean Army HQ. The leaders of the IJA found themselves in a difficult position. If the IJG did not ratify this arbitrary military action, they were bound to resign en masse because such an operation of the Korean Army would be regarded as an encroachment on the supreme 4 3 8 Shimada, 1962, pp.7-8. 4 3 9 Shidehara, 1951/86, pp.181-2; Shimada, 1962, pp.6-7 4 4 0 Shidehara received this information from the Consulate at Mukden and the South Manchuria Railway Company. (The Japanese Consul General at Mukden, Telegram #1-5) Note: This information was a false report; however, this incorrect story of the Kanto Army's plot coincided with the "real" Conspiracy at Mukden. (Telegram #1-12, The Governor of the South Manchuria Railway Company,Telegram#l-60.) 4 4 1 Shidehara, 1951/86, p.177; Shimada, 1962, pp.12-3 4 4 2 Shimada, 1962, p. 13 159 command of the Emperor.443 Changing his former opinion, Prime Minister Wakatsuki urged that the Cabinet ratify the Korean Army's action and approve the expenditure because the the Korean Army's brigade had been already sent.444 Cabinet members endorsed his opinion; as a result, the Korean Army HQ, was immune from recriminations for encroachment on the supreme command of the Emperor.445 The IJG, however, prohibited the war from spreading and ordered the Kanto Army to withdraw to the land attached to railways. They also declared to the international community that the IJG had no intention to expand the battle line.446 (3) A reproof of the Emperor The Emperor officially had command of all military action of the IJA; however, the Imperial Japan's constitutional law specified that "the Emperor reigns, but does not rule." That is, every prerogative of the Emperor was exercised by political and military leaders under the name of the Emperor. Emperor Hirohito was a stern constitutionalist. Thus, he tried not to express his own political and military opinions, and to unconditionally accept the decisions of his political and military leaders. On 22 September, after the IJG ratified the Korean Army HQJs arbitrary action, Chief of the General Staff Kanaya Hanzo informed the 4 4 3 Shidehara, 151/86, p. 182; Usui, p.48 4 4 4 Ogata, 1964, p.66 4 4 5 Shimada, 1962, pp.23-4 446 The imperial Japanese Government. "Official Statement--foilowing statement was issued after the extraordinary cabinet meeting." September, 24, 1931. 160 Emperor of the decision of the Cabinet on ex post facto consent of reinforcements to Manchuria.447 At that moment, the Emperor expressed his opinion to General Kanaya as follows. "Although this time it cannot be helped, the Army has to be more careful in the future." Historical records show that there were only five times that Emperor Hirohito expressed, officially or unofficially, his politico-military opinions 4 4 8 and the word to General Kanaya was one of them. The leaders of the IJA regarded the 4 4 7 Nara. 1990. pp.340-1. Note: Under the Constitution, the Emperor had the authority to reject the decision of the Cabinet, but conventionality required the Emperor to approve it. 4 4 8 Emperor Hirohito's opinions expressed between 1926 and 1945. (1) When several officers of the Imperial Japanese Army assassinated Zhang Zuolin--the king of Manchuria--in 1928, Prime Minister Tanaka initially reported to the Emperor that no Japanese soldiers had taken part in the incident. Subsequently, Tanaka, informed the Emperor that the incident had been caused by the Japanese officers. Enraged by Tanaka's irresponsible attitude, Emperor Hirohito expressed his dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Tanaka to his chamberlains. (2) On 26 February 1936, some middle-ranked officers of the Imperial Japanese Army carried out a coup d'etat, and several Cabinet ministers and military leaders were killed. Immediately after the news of the incident had reached Emperor Hirohito, he informed the War Minister that the insurgent troops had to be suppressed as soon as possible since such a coup d'etat was a serious negation of constitutionalism. (3) On 6 September 1941, the Japanese military and political leaders met to adopt a state policy that ordered the Japanese military to prepare for the war against the U.S. and the U.K. Emperor Hirohito, who also attended the meeting, expressed his wish to avoid war by citing the famous poem written by Emperor Meiji. (4) After the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the U.S.S.R. breached the Soviet-Japanese nonaggression treaty, on 10 August 1945, the Japanese top-level leaders held a conference in the presence of the Emperor to decide whether to accept the Potsdam Declaration. They could not reach a conclusion. Finally, Prime Minister Suzuki formally asked Emperor Hirohito's opinion--Suzuki's request was the first and the last action under the Constitution of the Japanese Empire. Emperor Hirohito stated that he expected the leaders to accept the Potsdam Declaration in order to protect the Japanese nation. Amongst those four cases, only the last case is regarded as one in which Emperor Hirohito's opinion directly swayed the Japanese state policy. Although such an act of the Emperor was unconstitutional, Emperor Hirohito officially stated his opinion in response to Prime Minister Suzuki's urgent demand. To sum up, Emperor Hirohito had almost always behaved impeccably as a constitutional monarch. (Kido, 1966; Kojima, 1981; Makino, 1990; Nara, 1990;) 161 Emperor's rebuke449 as indicating his opposition to the expansion of the battle line4 5 0 and General Kanaya and War Minister Minami began to make all possible efforts to put the brakes on the Kanto Army HCX's arbitrary military actions.451 In his memoirs, Baron Shidehara devoted a section to--"A man of sincerity, Kanaya Hanzo"- and praised General Kanaya's efforts to stop the expansion of the Manchurian Incident. In the Pulitzer Prize awarded book "Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan", Herbert P. Bix insists that Emperor Hirohito was a dominant decision-maker in the deliberations that led to Japan's wars between 1931 and 1945. I believe that Bix's interpretation of Emperor Hirohito's role in the onset of the Manchurian Incident significantly contradicts to the primary sources that I have employed in this dissertation. According to Bix, Emperor Hirohito could have terminated the war in Manchuria if he had acted as a British-style constitutional monarch.452 4 4 9 Herbert P. Bix interpreted Emperor Hirohito's reaction as follows. "Hirohito accepted the situation as a fait accompli. He was not seriously opposed to seeing his army expand his empire." (Bix, 2000, pp.239-40.) I oppose Bix's interpretation because Emperor Hirohito's words should be grasped as his serious opposition to the IJA. First, as I mentioned in the previous footnote, Emperor Hirohito expressed his own politico-military opinions only five times between his enthronement and the end of the Pacific War. Thus, the words to General Kanaya carried weight. Second, General Kanaya and General Minami themselves reacted to the Emperor's words seriously. That is, they understood his words as an extraordinary warning against the high command of the IJA. Third, to the Japanese, the Japanese nuance of the Emperor's expression was apparently a reproof or a strict warning. For the above reasons, I believe that we would do well to interpret the Emperor's extraordinary expression--the Army has to be more careful in the future—as Emperor Hirohito's reproof (Kojima), or dissenting opinion (Ogata, 1964, p.66 and 1966, p.109.), against General Kanaya. 4 5 0 Inaba, 1953, p.47; Ogata, 1964, pp.66-7. 4 5 1 See Chapter-6 and Chapter-7. 4 5 2 Bix, 2000, p.239. 162 Bix added that "Hirohito knew that the incident had been staged. He knew who had planned it, who had ordered it, and who had carried it out"453; however, Hirohito did not take decisive measures against disobedient military leaders.454 Bix's description of the onset of the Manchurian Incident concluded that Emperor Hirohito, who gave silent endorsement to military actions in Manchuria, was actually a dominant decision-maker in the deliberations that led to Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931. I oppose Bix's interpretation because the primary sources show that Emperor Hirohito merely approved an IJG's decision to ratify the Korean Army HOJs arbitrary action.455 The Emperor never approved the conspiracy at Mukden because he did not know that the Mukden Incident had been staged; he did not know who had planned, ordered, and carried out the conspiracy. There is no evidence to prove that in 1931 Emperor Hirohito knew about the conspiracy. In other words, there is no proof of Bix's interpretation. In fact, Bix does not provide any sources and quotations that prove his insistence. Thus, we cannot but question Bix's key argument-"Hirohito knew that the incident had been staged. He knew who had planned it, who had ordered it, and who had carried it out. "-to be an unfounded statement. Unless Bix specifies the evidence for his assertion, his work cannot avoid some Japanese scholars' strictures such as 4 5 3 Bix, 2000, p.240. 4 5 4 Bix, 2000, p.240. 4 5 5 Nara. 1990. pp.340-1. 163 "Bix superficially criticizes the Japanese emperor system like Japanese naive leftists."456 In addition, Bix criticizes the Emperor Hirohito for not behaving like a British-style constitutional monarch. However, there was no reason for Emperor Hirohito to follow British constitutional law because Japan was an independent state and Japan had its own constitutional law. The Constitution of the Japanese Empire was founded, not on British constitutional law, but on Prussian constitutional law. In addition, although the Constitution of the Japanese Empire stipulated that the Emperor was the head of the state and the armed forces, the Japanese imperial house had to respect the customary hard-and-fast law--the Emperor reigns and does not rule. Japanese history testifies that civil wars occurred whenever Emperors or members of the Imperial Family tried to rule Japan.457 Therefore, the most fundamental rule of the Imperial Japan's constitutional law was that every prerogative of the Emperor was exercised by politico-military leaders under the name of the Emperor. Consequently, as a rule, Emperor Hirohito did not oppose decisions of the government or the high command. For the above reasons, under the Constitution of the Japanese Empire, the Japanese-style constitutional monarch never behaved as a political and military decision-maker. 4 5 6 Irie, Kobori, lnd Takubo, "Shokun" November,2001, p.85. 4 5 7 e.g. Emperor Goshirakawa-- 12th century, ex-Emperor Gotoba--13th century, Emperor Godaigo-14th century. 164 In sum, Bix's argument that Emperor Hirohito was a dominant decision-maker in the deliberations that led to the Manchurian Incident458 stands corrected. As I discussed in this section, Emperor Hirohito, as a Japanese-style monarch, merely approved the IJG's ratification of the Korean Army HCTs action while expressing his firm objection against the expansion of the Kanto Army's military actions. (4) The IJA's order Some of the leaders of the IJA and senior officers of the General Staff insisted that the General Staff should define the occupied area and formally order the Kanto Army to occupy that area because their withdrawal would be dangerous.459 However, faced with the government's firm policy of nonexpansion of the battle line and the Emperor's objection against war, the leaders of the IJA ordered the Kanto Army HQ. to withdraw from the occupied area into the attached land to the South Manchuria Railway.460 5.3: FAILURE TO CONQUER MANCHURIA According to the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria, whenever the Kanto Army was involved in a large-scale military conflict, the high command of the IJA was to order reinforcements to Manchuria in spite of the IJG's objection, but they did not. Consequently, the Kanto Army HQ 4 5 8 Bix, 2000, pp.235-244. 4 5 9 Shimada, 1962, p.25 4 6 0 Shimada, 1962, p.26; Usui, 1974, pp.48-9 165 had no choice but to discontinue waging its attempted conquest of Manchuria. (1) Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara's miscalculation According to Ishiwara's scenario, it was highly likely that the central authorities of the IJA would support the war in Manchuria after the Kanto Army began to fight with the Northeastern Army in south Manchuria. He had anticipated the objection by the IJG's leaders who adhered to Shidehara Diplomacy, but never dreamed that the leaders of the IJA would follow the government's decision. He thought that the hawks of the IJA would agree with the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria after the Kanto Army occupied several strategic points in south Manchuria and that even the doves could not turn their back on Japanese residents in Manchuria and the Kanto Army, which was inferior to the Northeastern Army in number. However, after receiving orders from the central authorities of the IJA to stop the war,461 Ishiwara and the leaders of the Kanto Army realized that the ability of the IJA to judge the military situation fell short of their expectations. The staff officers of the Kanto Army informed the central authorities of the IJA of the purpose of the war and asked their approval to continue hostilities.462 However, they tried to persuade the high command with an unauthentic goal-"the establishment of a new pro-Japanese government in 4 6 1 Katakura, 1931, pp.184-191 166 Manchuria". The real purpose of the war-"the occupation of Manchuria by the IJA"-was concealed because even the hawkish Major General Tatekawa Yoshitsugu of the IJA opposed the occupation, suggesting that the central authorities of the IJA might allow the establishment of a new government.463 To Ishiwara and staff officers of the Kanto Army, the central authorities' consent was indispensable to carry on the war because a large number of reinforcements would be necessary to occupy the entire area of Manchuria in addition to the occupation of the main cities of south Manchuria. (2) The leaders of the Kanto Army versus Tokyo There was already some suspicion that the Mukden Incident had been a Kanto Army conspiracy. If the Kanto Army had participated in establishing a new government in Manchuria, this suspicion would grow stronger and the leaders of the IJA, the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff in particular, would be condemned.464 In addition, the leaders of the IJA knew that the Emperor was against having the military participate in politics. Therefore, adopting Shidehara's anti-war policy, they did not agree to carry on the war and ordered the Kanto Army HQ, not to take any military action or engage in any political maneuvering.465 4 6 2 Katakura, 1931, p.189, p.189 4 6 3 Katakura, 1931, p.184, p.187 4 6 4 Katakura, 1931, p.196 4 6 5 Katakura, 1931, pp. 189-191 167 The leaders of Tokyo strengthened their resolve to stop the Conquest of Manchuria.466 The IJG suspected that the Kanto Army schemed to establish a new government and install Pu Y i 4 6 7 as the head of the new government. They commanded that Pu Yi should be watched lest the Kanto Army transfer him from Tianjin to Manchuria. The Kanto Army HQ. asked the Japanese Navy to cooperate with them to decoy Pu Yi, but their request was rejected. The leaders of the IJA sent watchmen led by Major General Hashimoto Toranosuke to the Kanto Army HQ to keep an eye on staff officers' arbitrary movements.468 On the other hand, staff officers of the Kanto Army persisted in their opinion that they must capture Ha'erbin to carry on their war plan, and that reinforcements must be dispatched at any cost; accordingly, Colonel Itagaki and Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara ordered reserve Captain Amakasu and the Special Service Agency at Ha'erbin to deliberately throw bombs into the Japanese Consulate at Ha'erbin, Japanese-owned banks and newspapers, and to fire pistols at random. The Kanto Army HQ asserted to the General Staff that the Kanto Army should be sent to Ha'erbin to protect Japanese people from unsafe circumstances.469 The Consul General at Ha'erbin also requested of Foreign Minister Shidehara that the Kanto Army should be 4 6 6 Katakura, 1931, p. 195-7 467 i a s t Emperor of the Qing Dynasty. He was protected by the Japanese Consulate at Tianjin after he had been dethroned by the Republic of China. 4 6 8 Katakura, 1931, p. 195 4 6 9 Katakura, 1931, p.191 168 dispatched. Despite their repeated requests, the IJG and the high command never approved the Kanto Army's advance to Ha'erbin. On September 24, a telegram arrived from the Chief of the General Staff to the Kanto Army HQ, saying that they would never approve any dispatch of troops even if the situation in Ha'erbin suddenly changed.470 Another telegram arrived from the Minister of War saying that the Cabinet had decided to withdraw Japanese residents from Ha'erbin and that their decision had been reported to the Emperor.471 (3) The Kanto Army leaders' decision to give up the Conquest of Manchuria The Kanto Army's request to advance to Ha'erbin was rejected, which meant that they could not expand the battle front; at the same time, they knew it was impossible to get the reinforcements from Japan that Ishiwara had expected. Consequently, they gave up their attempted conquest of Manchuria on September 24,1931.472 Although the Kanto Army HQ stopped the war, troops could not withdraw from the occupied cities to the land attached to the South Manchuria Railway for military reasons. In Manchuria and China, it was common for the defeated soldiers to invade and loot cities. In order to 4 7 0 Katakura, 1931, p.191 4 7 1 Katakura, 1931, p. 194 4 7 2 Katakura, 1931, p. 194-5; Gaimu-sho, 1966, pp.181-2. 169 protect Japanese people living in the occupied cities, the Kanto Army needed to continue their occupation of these cities. In addition, if the Kanto Army withdrew, Zhang Xueliang's government would proclaim a victory over the Kanto Army, and the leaders of the Northeastern Army or warlords who had felt an antipathy toward Zhang might scorn the Kanto Army and take sides with him. If they joined hands with Zhang Xueliang and counterattacked the Kanto Army, which had only a force of 13,000 soldiers, it would be annihilated before reinforcements arrived from Japan. For such reasons, the Kanto Army remained in the occupied area even though they decided to stop the war. The leaders of the Kanto Army decided to stop the war, not because they accepted Shidehara Diplomacy, but because their repeated requests for reinforcements were rejected by the leaders of the IJG and the IJA.473 The leaders of Tokyo succeeded in foiling the Kanto Army's attempt to continue the Conquest of Manchuria, but they could not change the view of the Kanto Army's leaders based on the Principle of National Defense.474 Therefore, although Shidehara Diplomacy gained ascendancy over Ishiwara's idea of Japan's defense, a conflict of opinions between the leaders of the Kanto Army and the leaders of Tokyo continued after the war was stopped. 4 7 3 Katakura, 1931, pp.187-97 4 7 4 Katakura, 1931, pp. 197-9 170 CHAPTER-6 THE MANCHURIAN INDEPENDENCE CAMP Although the Conquest of Manchuria failed, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara never gave up seeking to accomplish the political objective of this war. He thought that the Kanto Army could form an alliance with the anti-Zhang Xueliang camp that launched the movements for Manchurian independence after the Mukden Incident. Ishiwara, however, had forged another war plan, the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence, on the basis of Ishiwara Doctrine. Many politico-military leaders of the anti-Zhang Xueliang camp approved of Ishiwara Doctrine and entered into an alliance with the Kanto Army. This alliance will hereafter be called the Manchurian Independence Camp. 6.1: MANCHURIAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS After the Mukden Incident, several leaders of the anti-Zhang Xueliang camp expressed an intention to establish an independent government in their own territory. The theoretical grounds for such Manchurian independence movements were made by the intellectual leaders of the anti-Zhang Xueliang camp, or the so-called Wenzhi Group. 171 (1) The Manchurian Government After the Mukden Incident, the Manchurian Government and the Northeastern Army HQ, fled from Mukden to Jinzhou where was a strategic point near the borderline between the southernmost Manchuria and northern China.475 Zhang Zuoxiang, the Vice-Cornmander-in-Chief of the Northeastern Army, was appointed as the Acting Commander-in-Chief in place of Zhang Xueliang, who remained at Beijing.476 The defeated soldiers of the Mukden Army headed for Jinzhou. Many of them committed pillage, rape, and assaults on the way.477 (2) City of Mukden and Liaoning Province Colonel Dohihara, the chief of the Special Service Agency of the Kanto Army, was appointed as the Acting Mayor of Mukden.478 Under his supervision, the Kanto Army HQ administered Mukden for the time being and maintained public peace and order.479 Their administration was successful because they had studied the previous administration in devising the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria. However, Colonel Dohihara Kenji believed that Manchu or Chinese leaders should administer Mukden 4 7 5 Katakura, 1931, p.193; League of Nations, 1932, p.70; The General Staff, 1935/72, p.33; Usui, 1974, p.60; Kojima, 1983, pp.291-4 4 7 6 Kojima, 1982, p.295 4 7 7 The Kanto Army HQ, 1931.; The Japanese Consul General at Mukden, Telegram #2-431, #2-433; The Japanese Consul at Tiling, Telegram #2-106, #2-154, #2-176; The Governor General of Kanto Province, Telegram #2-108; Foreign Minister Shidehara, Telegram #2-252; The Japanese Consul at Xinminfu, Telegram #2-149; The Kanto Army HQ, Telegram #2-188, #2-202; The Japanese Consul at Niuzhuang, Telegram #2-210, #2-216. 4 7 8 Katakura, 1931, p. 188 172 instead of Japanese military officers,480 so he began to negotiate with those local leaders over the civil administration of Mukden. Several leaders of the Wenzhi Group agreed with Dohihara's idea and formed the Liaoning Maintain Committee, which consisted of Yuan Jinkai as its head, Yu Chonghan, Zhao Xinbo, Ding Jianxiu, and others. On September 28, the committee declared that Liaoning Province would be independent of Zhang Xueliang's Manchurian Government and the Nanjing Government of the ROC 4 8 1 (3) Jilin Province The Jilin Army of the Northeastern Army was disarmed by the Kanto Army immediately after Jilin was occupied; at the same time, pro-Zhang Xueliang factions of the Jilin Army fled from Jilin. 4 8 2 Asa result, Xi Qia, the Chief of Staff of the Jilin Army, took over the reins of the Jilin Government and the Jilin Army. He reconstructed the Jilin Army with the Kanto Army's assistance.483 Xi Qia's Jilin Government declared its independence on September 28.484 4 ? 9 Yamaguchi, 1975, pp. 105-6 480 T h e Japanese Consul General at Mukden, Telegram #2-440. 4 8 1 Yamaguchi, 1975, p.106 4 8 2 The General Staff, 1935, pp.29-30 483 T h e General Staff, 1937, p.330 4 8 4 The Japanese Consul at Jilin, Telegram #2-446, #2-455, #2-456; Katakura, 1931, p.196; Yamaguchi, 1975, p.106 173 (4) Special District of Ha'erbin Zhang Jinghui,485 whose stronghold was Ha'erbin, held consultations with the Kanto Army on politico-military issues in Manchuria.486 He and his collaborators487 formed the Dong-Xing Special District Security Committee,488 and received weapons and ammunition from the Kanto Army in order to secede from the Manchurian Government.489 This committee also declared its independence on September 28.490 (5) Zhang Haipeng Army Zhang Haipeng, the Commander of Tao-Liao Army of the Northeastern Army, was allied with the Kanto Army on September 23, and he disarmed the Xing'an Army of the Northeastern Army at Taonan-a strategic point midway between Mukden and Qiqiha'er.491 However, many soldiers of the Xing'an Army became bandits and began to commit assaults; as a result, Taonan got into a dangerous situation.492 Zhang Haipeng decided to reinforce his army with the Kanto Army's aids for maintaining public order 4 ° ~ ) He was a powerful warlord and Zhang Zuolin's right-hand man; thus, Zhang Xueliang felt that Zhang Jinghui was one of the persons standing in his way, but Zhang Jinghui regarded Zhang Xueliang as a conceited youngster. 4 8 6 Katakura, 1931, p.192 4 8 7 Ding Chao, the Commander of the Garrison of the East China Railway; Li Du, the Brigadier of the 24th Brigade of the Northeastern Army; Wang Ruihua, Police Chief of Ha'erbin Special District 488 The Japanese Consul at Ha'erbin, Telegram #2-442 4 8 9 Katakura, 1931, p. 193, 194, 197. Note: Those weapons and ammunition were stored in the Mukden Army's arsenals and were seized by the Kanto Army. 490 The Japanese Consul at Ha'erbin, Telegram #2-450; Yamaguchi, 1975, p.107 4 9 1 Katakura, 1931, p.192 4 9 2 Katakura, 1931, pp. 192-3 174 of his territory. The Kanto Army HQ. sent war funds, weapons and ammunition,493 and dispatched Captain Imada to Zhang Haipeng Army.4 9 4 Zhang Haipeng declared independence from the Manchurian Government on October l . 4 9 5 6.2: THE WENZHI GROUP'S THEORY OF THE IDEAL STATE Although the above-mentioned independence movements were independently launched, they were based on the same political objective-the expulsion of Zhang Xueliang's regime from Manchuria. Their hope seemed to have been realized by the Kantd Army's offensive against the Mukden Army.496 The Wenzhi Group's goal of establishing a "Wangdao state"-a state governed by the rule of right-in Manchuria supported the movements for Manchurian independence. This theory consisted of the Manchurian Monroe Doctrine and the Principle of Renunciation of War. (1) The Manchurian Monroe Doctrine A political ideal of the Wenzhi Group was to maintain peaceful living of the people in Manchuria on the basis of the spirit of Wangdao (the rule of right).497 In order to do so, the warlords had to be expelled from 4 y 3 Those weapons and ammunition were also stored in the Mukden Army's arsenals and were seized by the Kantd Army. 4 9 4 Katakura, 1931, pp.192-8, 201 4 9 5 Yamaguchi, 1975, p.107 4 9 6 Yamamuro,1993, p.89. 4 9 7 TheKantoArmy HQ, 1931-n, pp.565-6. 175 Manchuria, and politico-military chaos in China had to be prevented from spreading to Manchuria.498 In the early 20th century many warlords in China fought each other since the Republic of China was established in 1911.499 On the other hand, Zhang Zuolin, "King of Manchuria," seized the ruling power of Manchuria and sought to control China as well. He advanced to north China and formed the Beijing Government, which became hostile to the Nanjing Government and the Guangdong Government.500 Zhang Zuolin was succeeded by his son, Zhang Xueliang. Although he was allied with the Nanjing Government, he led his army in an advance on north China so as to intervene in a power struggle among Chinese warlords over politico-military power. As a result, Zhang government's war expenditure soared, and the people in Manchuria were heavily taxed, although there were no serious military conflicts among warlords in Manchuria.501 This is the way military struggles in China spread to Manchuria. The people in Manchuria could not live in peace as long as such ambitious warlords remained in Manchuria.502 The leaders of the Wenzhi Group thought that Zhang's military government and the warlords should be expelled from Manchuria and that 4 9 8 The Kanto Army HQ 1931-n, p.566. 4 9 9 The Kanto Army HQ 1931-n, p.566. 5 0 0 The Kanto Army H Q 1931-n, p.566. 5 0 1 The Kanto Army HQ 1931-n, p.566. 176 the Manchuria-China boundary should be politically and militarily sealed. In other words, they wanted to establish a new state in Manchuria that was completely independent of any other state, any government, and any warlord in China. Such an insistence of the Wenzhi Group was called the Doctrine of Baojing-Anmin,503 or the Manchurian Monroe Doctrine. This doctrine was a basic political ideal of not only the Wenzhi Group but also the anti-Zhang Xueliang camp.504 (2) The Principle of Renunciation of War On the basis of the political history of China and Manchuria, Yu Chonghan pointed out from his experience as a statesman in Manchuria that a dilemma would emerge when an independent state was established.505 If the new state was completely independent, a strong military would be necessary to prepare for invaders such as the KMT Army, the USSR and Japan.506 As a result, domestic administration would be neglected, and the people of Manchuria would suffer from heavy taxes to support the armed forces.507 On the other hand, if the new state did not have to support a strong military, she would be able to concentrate on her domestic administration. Without armaments, however, it would be difficult to 5 0 2 The Kanto Army H a 1931-n, pp.566-7. 5 0 3 Literal meaning of Baojing is to maintain a border, and that of Anmin is to maintain people's peaceful living. 504 -phe Japanese Consul at Ha'erbin, Telegram #2-467. 5 0 5 TheKantoArmy H a 1931-n, pp.565-9. 5 0 6 The Kanto Army H a 1931-n, p.569 5 0 7 The Kanto Army H a 1931-n, pp.568-9. 177 protect her borders, so the new Manchurian state would have to rely on foreign powers for her national defense.508 Yu Chonghan suggested that Japan would be the best state for Manchuria to look to for her national security for the following reasons.509 First, the Japanese armed forces were strong enough to defeat the aggression of the USSR or the ROC. Second, many Japanese and Korean people were living in Manchuria, and a lot of Japanese money had been invested. Third, Japanese politico-military and economic leaders were apprehensive of the ROC's control over Manchuria and the USSR's aggression. To Japan, it was undesirable that Manchuria should be in an unstable and dangerous situation. Yu Chonghan speculated that Japan might willingly take the responsibility for the national security of Manchuria on behalf of the new state.510 He concluded that his idea of forging an alliance with Japan could bring reciprocity. The Manchurian new state would be able to devote herself to its domestic administration and Japan would prevent Chinese and Russian aggression into Manchuria. 6.3: THE BIRTH OF THE MANCHURIAN INDEPENDENCE CAMP The leaders of the Kanto Army put the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence before the leaders of the anti-Zhang Xueliang camp and tried 5 0 8 The Kanto Army HQ, 1931-n, pp.568-9. 509^ T h e K a n t o A r m y HQ, 1931-n, p.569. 5 1 0 The Kanto Army HQ, 1931-n, p.569. 178 to form an alliance with them. Yu Chonghan considered an alliance with the Kanto Army, but he hesitated, probably suspecting that Japan would occupy Manchuria after taking control of the national security of the new Manchurian state. If his misgiving was realized, the Wenzhi Group's intention would be ruined completely. However, Yu realized that his fear was utterly groundless when he conferred with the leaders of the Kanto Army on the future of Manchuria.511 Yu perceived that the political objective of the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence was not related to Japan's territorial and economic designs on Manchuria and that the leaders of the Kanto Army had no intention to aggress against Manchuria.512 He also understood the war plan to be similar to his idea of establishing the new state, the Manchurian Monroe Doctrine and the Principle of Renunciation of War. In addition, Yu Chonghan was deeply impressed by Ishiwara Doctrine and Lieutenant General Honjo's sincere attitude toward Pan-Asianism;513 therefore, as an Asian statesman, Yu placed his hopes on the leaders of the Kanto Army. Consequently, Yu and other leaders of the anti-Zhang Xueliang camp allied with the Kanto Army in order to establish a Wangdao state in Manchuria on the basis of the Manchurian Monroe Doctrine and the Yamaguchi, 1975, pp. 167-8. Yamaguchi, 1975, p.168. Yamaguchi, 1975, p.168; Yamamurq 1993, p.89. 179 Principle of Renunciation of War.5 1 4 The Kanto Army joined the anti-Zhang Xueliang camp's movements for Manchurian independence, and accordingly, the Manchurian Independence Camp was formed. On the basis of the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence, the Manchurian Independence Camp prepared to wage a war against the Northeastern Army. 5 1 4 The Kanto Army H a 1930-m. 180 CHAPTER-7 THE MANCHURIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE Unlike the plan for the Conquest of Manchuria, the Kanto Army HQ. had announced their intention to wage the Manchurian War of Independence before they opened the war.515 Thus, the IJG and the central authorities of the IJA had been making efforts to prevent the Kanto Army from carrying out their plan in order to protect Japanese capitalism as a whole. However, the leaders of Tokyo could not persuade the leaders of the Kanto Army to abandon their resolution. 7.1: DECISION OF THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE IJA The leaders of the IJA, who had tried to prevent the Kanto Army from expanding the Conquest of Manchuria with the leaders of the IJG, made their policies clear in order to suppress the Kanto Army HQ's further arbitrary actions. Based on the fact that the Kanto Army had occupied the strong points in south Manchuria and smashed the Mukden Army in Liaoning Province, the high command of the IJA judged that the situation in Manchuria was equivalent to "the first stage"516 of the General Staffs 5 1 5 The Kanto Army HQ, 1931-h. 5 1 6 see 1.3(2) 181 "Situation Estimate of 1931".517 Thus, they decided to establish a pro-Japanese government in Manchuria according to the estimate;518 however, they did not intend to make war at that point because the IJA had not yet prepared for the war. The leaders thought they should support Shidehara Diplomacy for the moment to stave off intervention by the U.S. and the U.K., and urge political maneuvering for the Guangdong Government to foment the political disruption of China; and when the IJA's preparedness was ready, it was the time for Japan to take military actions in order to establish a new government.519 Therefore, they decisively opposed the Kanto Army's further military actions. 7.2: THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE KANTO ARMY HQ. The high command of the IJA believed that the Kanto Army HQ would follow their plan because the leaders of the Kanto Army expressed their intention to form a new government in Manchuria.520 However, such a notion was not their real intention.521 Before the central authorities of the IJA made the above decision, the leaders of the Kanto Army had already 5 1 7 The General Staff, 1931-c, 1931-d. Inaba, 1972, pp.89-90. 5 1 8 The General Staff, 1931-a. 5 1 9 The General Staff, 1931-e. 5 2 0 The Kanto Army HQ 1931-f. 5 2 1 Ishiwara, 1931-f; TheKanto Army HQ 1931-g. 182 made their official decision to ally with the anti-Zhang leaders to establish an independent state in Manchuria.522 (1) The decision of the Kanto Army HQ, According to the leaders of the Kanto Army, the Kanto Army would not themselves build the new independent state but would cooperate with the anti-Zhang Xueliang camp to establish that new state.523 The movement for the independence of Manchuria was neither for Japanese territorial expansion nor for Japanese capitalist interests but for the people of Manchuria who groaned under the Manchurian Government's tyranny, regardless of nationality or race.524 Therefore, the Kanto Army would protect the Japanese people who were living in conformity with the legitimate right that Japan had in Manchuria, but the leaders of the Kanto Army decisively excluded the Japanese people who tried to seek concessions in the new state.525 Deciding to employ the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence as the Kanto Army's basic strategy,526 the Kanto Army HQ, notified the central authorities of the IJA of the outline of this plan.5 2 7 Over against this, the General Staff ordered them to follow Tokyo's 5 2 2 TheKantoArmy Ha 1931-g, 1931-h. 5 2 3 TheKantoArmy Ha 1931-h, 1931-i, 1931-k, 1931-1, 1931-m. 5 2 4 TheKantoArmy Ha 1931-h, 1931-i, 1931-m 5 2 5 Katakura, 1931, p.208, The Kanto Army Ha 1931-m 5 2 6 The Kanto Army Ha 1931-g. 5 2 7 Katakura, 1931, p. 199. 183 nonexpansion policy.528 The Kanto Army's leaders realized that the central authorities of the IJA would be bound by Shidehara Diplomacy more and more, and that their intention to wage the Manchurian War of Independence might be suppressed by Tokyo once again. Therefore, in order to get the backing of public opinion, on October 4, 1931, they promulgated "The Public Announcement of the Kanto Army HQ,",529 in which their attitude towards the Independence of Manchuria was declared.530 In this official announcement, the Kanto Army HQ. justified Manchurian independence according to the following logic: (1) Many remnants of the defeated Northeastern Army had become bandits and committed pillage, assaults and rape in various places in Manchuria; in particular, many Korean people were killed and assaulted by them. Therefore, Zhang Xueliang's Northeastern Army could not be regarded as an army of the civilized state. Similarly, the Manchurian Government also could not be regarded as a modernized government. (2) There was scarcely any public movement to restore the Manchurian Government after the Kanto Army occupied several strong points in south Manchuria, while several movements for independence arose in Manchuria. 5 2 8 Katakura, 1931, p.200. 5 2 9 TheKantoArmy HQ, 1931-h. Katakura, 1931, pp.200-1. 5 3 0 The Kanto Army HQ, Telegram #2-476; Katakura, 1931, pp.200-1. 184 Such situations indicated that the people of Manchuria had been enraged by Zhang Xueliang and his fellow warlords who lined their own pockets. (3) It would be hopeless for the Japanese diplomatic authorities to conduct negotiations on the basis of "international justice" with the Manchurian Government, which consisted of disordered armies and corrupted officials. (4) Although the Kanto Army maintained public order of the major cities in south Manchuria, the people of Manchuria must be governed by their own government. Thus, as the neighboring state, Japan should support the Manchurian independence movements in order to realize peaceful living of the people of Manchuria. (5) The stability of Manchuria was the key to the establishment of peace in East Asia. Therefore, Japan's support for the Manchurian independence movements would be approved by many states which desired the realization of world peace. (2) Was the "Official Announcement of the Kanto Army HQ." merely political propaganda? The "Official Announcement of the Kanto Army HQ" intrinsically had a feature of political propaganda because it was released to not only the leaders of Tokyo but also the general public in Japan, Manchuria, and China.531 However, we cannot regard it as mere political propaganda, 5 3 1 TheKantoArmy HQ, Telegram#2-476; Katakura, 1931, pp.200-1. 185 which is usually characterized by false information and exaggerations, for the following reasons. In those days, the remnants of defeated armies of Chinese or Manchurian warlords were apt to change into bandits because the quality of warlords' soldiers was extremely low and banditry was the only option for mercenary soldiers in order to eke out a living.532 It was common knowledge in Manchuria that the army remnants turned into bandits.533 To those bandits, Korean farmers who lived in rural areas were easy targets for plunder and many of their lands were pillaged.534 Therefore, the first assertion of the Official Announcement can be regarded as a reasonable argument. The following facts show that the second assertion also seems to be a defensible opinion. First, there was scarcely any anti-Kanto Army movement in Manchuria.535 Only a large-scale anti-Japanese rally under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Ha'erbin.536 This anti-Japanese rally did not insist on the restoration of the Manchurian Government because the Chinese Communist Party was an enemy of the Zhang Xueliang's camp. Thus, the Kanto Army's claim was not a 5 3 2 see, Takashima, 1989; Huang, 1997, pp. 194-8. 5 3 3 Yamaguchi, 1975, p.82. 5 3 4 The Kanto Army HQ, Telegram #2- 202; The Japanese Consul at Jil in, Telegram #2- 206; The Japanese Consul at Andong, Telegram #2-297, The Japanese Consul at Ha'erbin, Telegram #2-305. 535 Wanget.al, 1984/88, pp.182-6; Yi, 1989, pp.244-9; 536 Wanget.al, 1984/88, pp.185-6. 186 fabrication. Second, Zhang Xueliang and the leaders of the Manchurian Government were neither soldiers nor politicians but warlords.537 Since they arbitrarily issued paper money and imposed heavy taxes on the people of their territory, they actually filled their own pockets.538 On the other hand, as state-socialist officers, most of the leaders of the Kanto Army despised the depraved military who pursued concessions. Therefore, it was natural that those state-socialist Japanese officers considered Zhang Xueliang, who owned even a private plane, and his fellows as corrupted and depraved warlords. The third contention of the official announcement was criticism of Shidehara's policy toward Manchuria. Shidehara believed that the Manchurian Problem should be settled exclusively by diplomatic negotiations and any military measures should be avoided. The Manchurian Government utilized Shidehara Diplomacy. Not only the Manchurian Government but also any diplomatic authority must have welcomed Shidehara Diplomacy because it repudiated any military threat, which was usually the effective option of foreign policy.539 While the Manchurian Government deliberately prolonged negotiations, they encouraged anti-Japanese policies in order to eliminate the Japanese J*' see Mizuno, 1995, chapter 8. 5 3 8 Yamaguchi, 1975,p.203. Zhang Xueliang accumulated 24 million dollars in an American bank during his regime from 1928 to 1931. (Machino, 1963.) 5 3 9 In fact, Baron Shidehara's diplomacy had a good reputation for not only the Manchurian and Chinese governments but also the American and British governments. 187 concessions and various interests in Manchuria.540 The Japanese people in Manchuria were aware of Zhang's tactics, and thought that the Japanese diplomatic authorities were incompetent.541 In fact, getting wind of the rumor that the Kanto Army and the IJA were going to attack the Northeastern Army, the Manchurian Government began to respond to diplomatic negotiations seriously.542 It was certain that Shidehara's idealistic policy could not fare well against Zhang's realistic policy.543 Therefore, we can conclude that the leaders of the Kanto Army formed a reasonable estimation of Japanese diplomacy toward Manchuria; so that, the third contention of the Official Announcement was also reasoned critique. The fourth and fifth claims of the Official Announcement represent the Kanto Army leader's ideal and obviously constitute political propaganda. However, viewed in a historic light, Manchuria had been a strategic point and their claims could not be regarded as mere propaganda.544 In fact, after the anti-communist Manchurian Empire 5 4 0 Mizuno, 1995, chapter 7. 5 4 1 Manchuria Youth League, 1935, pp408-443; Ishiwara, 1931-e. 5 4 2 Seki, 1963, pp.357-8; Usui, 1974, p.34. 543 \Ye have to remember that Shidehara Diplomacy was formed by Western political thought based on notions of the modern nation-state and the modern interstate system However, as Lytton Report (see the Chapter-4) pointed out, there was neither a modern nation-state nor a modern government in Manchuria in those days. In addition, sovereignty over Manchuria was quite unclear. Thus, it was unlikely that Shidehara Diplomacy would take root in the Manchurian situation. 5 4 4 For example, with the advantage of hindsight again, the battles in Manchuria had decided the outcome of the civil war between the KMT Army and the People's Liberation Army 188 vanished,545 communism permeated into not only Manchuria but also China,546 the northern part of Korea,547 and even Vietnam.548 Judging from those politico-military experiences, we can regard Manchuria as a place of military importance in those days, and therefore, the fourth and fifth claims of the Official Announcement stood to reason. In conclusion, the Official Announcement of the Kanto Army HQ. was not a simple propaganda document. The leaders of the Kanto Army expressed their basic ideas of the theory of Manchurian Independence in this document, and we can infer their firm decision to devote themselves to the Manchurian independence movements, as well as their justification of the Manchurian War of Independence. (3) Tokyo's reaction to the Kanto Army HQ's decision "The Public Announcement of the Kanto Army HQ" created a sensation among not only the IJG and the IJA but also the Imperial Court and the Japanese mass media.549 To the leaders of the IJG, the Kanto Army's plan to establish a new state in Manchuria was absolutely unacceptable because they thought that the Kanto Army's attempt would be severely criticized by the U.S. and the of the Chinese Communist Party. Similarly, in the early stages of the Korean War, the UN forces were defeated by the Chinese and North Korean armies because Manchuria was ruled by the Chinese Communist Party. 5 4 5 August 20, 1945 546 The People's Republic of China was established in 1949. 5 4 7 The People's Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) was foundedin 1948. 5 4 8 Communist North Vietnam was established in 1954. 189 League of Nations as an aggressive action by Japan. Moreover, they were afraid that it would trigger economic sanctions, which would lead Japanese capitalism into a crisis. Thus, such a plan was perceived as hostile to Shidehara Diplomacy. In addition, there was another reason that the IJG decisively rejected the Kanto Army's plan. Shidehara had implicitly acknowledged that Manchuria was a territory of the ROC. 5 5 0 On the other hand, the leaders of the Kanto Army and their collaborators did not accept the Nanjing Government's claim of sovereignty over Manchuria because this claim was unfounded sophistry in the light of Manchurian history.551 In addition, although Zhang Xueliang had been officially allied with Chiang Kaisheck, the Manchurian Government was an autonomous government and the Northeastern Army was not controlled by the KMT Army. In fact, when the Manchurian Government waged war against the USSR, the Nanjing 5 4 9 Katakura, 1931, p.207. 5 5 0 In the Washington Conference of 1921, the delegation of the Republic of China claimed that Manchuria was a territory of the Republic of China because the Constitution of the Republic of China had specified that the Republic of China had sovereignty over the Eastern Three Provinces and Jehol Province. However, American and British delegations pointed out that the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of China could not be automatically valid in the international community, and they raised a question--what is China? Japan's delegation, including Shidehara, did not dispute sovereignty over Manchuria in order to avoid a conflict between Japan and the Republic of China. After all, the question about the territory of the Republic of China remained undecided in this conference. The Japanese Government tacitly approved the Nanjing Government's claim, although many Japanese Sinologists and political thinkers argued that Manchuria was not considered the territory of the Republic of China because Zhang's Manchurian Government was apparently an independent government of the Nanjing Government, and armies in Manchuria were not controlled by the KMT Army of the Republic of China. Shidehara stated his view of sovereignty of Manchuria to Chen Youren in July 1931. (Gaimush6,1966. pp.172-80.) 190 Government and the KMT Army did not participate in this war.552 Such a difference in the interpretation of sovereignty over Manchuria between the leaders of the Kanto Army and the leaders of the IJG made it difficult to compromise on the Manchurian War of Independence.553 7.3: THE KANTO ARMY'S ATTACK ON SHIDEHARA DIPLOMACY When the leaders of the Kanto Army declared their intention to wage the Manchurian War of Independence, they were expecting that the IJG and the central authorities of the IJA would certainly order them to give up their war plan. Thus, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara developed a plan to discredit the IJG and Shidehara Diplomacy so as to eliminate Tokyo's interference in their war. (1) The air bombardment on Jinzhou Ishiwara planned to bomb Jinzhou, Zhang Xueliang's stronghold, on the grounds that the Manchurian Government in Jinzhou instigated bandits to disturb the public security of south Manchuria.554 It was obvious that the Kanto Army's air bombardment could not strike the Manchurian Government and the Mukden Army because the Kanto Army had only 5 5 1 The Kanto Army HQ 1931-m. 5 5 2 The General Staff, 1929-a, 1929-b; Mizuno, 1994, pp.249-64. 553 The study of sovereignty over Manchuria in this period is out of the domain of our subject matter, but the following remark of the so-called Lytton Report is quite pertinent to this issue: 'In Manchuria there are many features without an exact parallel in other parts of the world.' (Report of the Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations. LN version p. 126/CH version p.248) 191 several reconnaissance planes.555 Nevertheless, he believed this air raid would make strategic sense.556 Having studied at the German Army War College, Ishiwara knew that European people were tremendously afraid of an air bombardment. Thus, if the Kanto Army launched an air raid on Jinzhou, the news of the strike would alarm European and American authorities and weaken the credibility of Shidehara Diplomacy.557 On October 8, an air unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara dropped 75 small bombs on Jinzhou. Since this air unit consisted of 11 reconnaissance planes and 1 passenger plane,558 all bombs were released by hand, which resulted in minimal military achievement; however, as Ishiwara had expected, the U.S. Government and other great powers strongly denounced the leaders of Tokyo.559 (2) The reactions to the bombardment Stimson, the U.S. Secretary of the State, censured the Japanese air raid on Jinzhou, and questioned whether the leaders of Tokyo could control the Kanto Army or not.5 6 0 He also warned that if the Kanto Army's military 5 5 4 The General Staff, 1941, p.346. 555 Type-88 Reconnaissance Plane. Hazeyama, 1967, p.208, 213. 5 5 6 Christopher Thorn points out that the purpose of this air strike was (1) to rout the Northeastern Army from Jinzhou and (2) to obtain the Japanese Government's consent to the Kanto Army's intention. However, Thorn's interpretation of the motivation for this air bombardmentis not correct. 5 5 7 Yamaguchi, 1975, p. 115. 5 5 8 The General Staff, 1941c, p.347. 5 5 9 Peattie, 1975, p.127 5 6 0 Usui, 1974, p.84. 192 actions expanded, the U.S. would resort to appropriate measures.561 Shidehara explained to Stimson that the Commander-in-Chief of the Kanto Army had no diplomatic authority and the air raid was the Kanto Army's arbitrary action that was antithetical to Tokyo's intention.562 However, Stimson decided to contain Japan by the Antiwar Pact.563 Similarly, the British Government remonstrated with Shidehara against the air bombardment.564 They commented that it was an excessive military action because Japan was not in a state of war with the ROC. In addition, Foreign Minister Rening warned that the Nanjing Government might be ruined by the Kanto Army's offensive; if the Nanjing Government collapsed, China would be in a chaotic condition and British interests and concessions in China would be placed in jeopardy.565 He also called Shidehara's attention to the fact that Jinzhou was an important point on the Jing-Feng Railway invested in by British entrepreneurs.566 On the other hand, the British Government demanded that the Nanjing 5 6 1 Usui, 1974, p.85. 5 6 2 Usui, 1974, p.85. 5 6 3 Although Stimson decided to invoke the Antiwar Pact, he did not regard the military conflicts in Manchuria as subject to the Antiwar Pact. His purpose to invoke this pact was not to denounce Japan's violation of the Antiwar Pact, but to prevent future war in general. Usui, 1974, pp.85-6. 5 6 4 Usui, 1974, pp.86-7. 5 6 5 Usui, 1974, p.87. 5 6 6 Usui, 1974, p.87. 193 Government should protect life and properties of the Japanese in China and negotiate a cease-fire with the IJG without condition.567 As a result of the air bombardment, the Board of Directors of the League of Nations was convoked.568 The ROC's delegation insisted that the Japanese military action in Manchuria infringed the Statute of the League of Nations and the Antiwar Pact, and that the League of Nations faced a crisis.569 The Board of Directors was determined to urge the settlement of the conflict in Manchuria and asked the American delegation to participate on the Board as an observer.570 As a permanent member of the Board of Directors, the Japanese delegation opposed American participation in the League of Nations, but this motion was rejected. The Board of Directors took their recommendation to the Japanese and the ROC's delegations that (1) the Japanese troops should withdraw from the occupation area to the Japanese concessions in Manchuria by November 16, 1931, and (2) the Nanjing Government should begin to negotiate with the IJG for the settlement of not only the armed conflict in Manchuria but also the Manchurian Problem as a whole.571 All directors other than the Japanese delegation voted for the resolution 5 7 2 but Japan exercised the power of 5 6 7 Usui, 1974, p.87; Asano, 1996, p.324. 5 6 8 Usui, 1974, pp.89-92; Asano, 1996, p.326. 5 6 9 Usui, 1974, pp.91-2. 5 7 0 Usui, 1974, p.93. 5 7 1 Usui, 1974, pp.92-7. 5 7 2 Usui, 1974, pp.96-7. 194 veto and the resolution was rejected. The IJG was thereafter entirely isolated from the League of Nations. The Japanese press also began to criticize Shidehara Diplomacy. After the air bombardment, the Kanto Army gained support from the Japanese populace.573 In order not to be isolated from such public sentiments, the top executives of Asahi Shinbun, which was a leading newspaper publishing company in Japan and had been taking an anti-war stance, strongly denouncing "The Official Announcement of the Kanto Army HQ", decided to uphold the Kanto Army's military actions, and so did Mainichi Shinbun.574 Consequently, Baron Shidehara and the Japanese diplomatic authorities lost the backing of the Japanese press. (3) Tokyo's reaction As Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara had expected, Shidehara Diplomacy was affected by the air bombardment on Jinzhou. However, Foreign Minister Shidehara tenaciously explained to the American and the British Government and the League of Nations that the IJG firmly opposed the Kanto Army's military actions and would continue to take an anti-war stance.575 The central authorities of the IJA had been complying with the decisions of the IJG since the Mukden Incident, and they took a strong 5 7 3 Military Police HQ, Secret Report #494, #548, #390. 5 7 4 Military Police HQ, Secret Report #658. 5 7 5 Usui, 1974, p.86, 91. 195 stance against the Kanto Army's arbitrary actions. On one hand they officially explained that the air bombardment was the Kanto Army's act of self-defense because the Manchurian Government encouraged bandits to disturb public order in Manchuria;576 on the other hand, they put increasing pressure on the Kanto Army HQ. because the leaders of the Kanto Army had disobeyed their orders and had taken arbitrary military action.577 The antagonism between the leaders of the IJA and the leaders of the Kanto Army became more intense. 7.4: A CRISIS OF SHIDEHARA DIPLOMACY Although the reputation of Shidehara Diplomacy was damaged by the air bombardment, the leaders of Tokyo continued to take an anti-war stance and obstruct the Kanto Army's efforts to expand the war. However, as an army of the Manchurian Independence Camp, the Kanto Army steadily made a move. When the Manchurian War of Independence broke out, one of the crucial Japanese economic interests in Manchuria was put in jeopardy. Shidehara and other leaders of Tokyo were in a dilemma because if they held fast to Shidehara Diplomacy they could not protect the Japanese economic interests in Manchuria. (1) An outbreak of the Manchurian War of Independence 5 7 6 The General Staff, 1941c, pp.347-8. 196 Although Zhang Haipeng declared that his army would secede from the Northeastern Army to enter into an alliance with the Kanto Army,578 his army did not have enough arms, ammunition, and war funds to take military action against the Northeastern Army, so he asked the Kanto Army HQ. to support his army.579 Since the Kanto Army intended Zhang Haipeng's Army to lead the vanguard of the Manchurian War of Independence, they supplied arms, ammunition, and 200,000 Yuan to his army.580 On the other hand, Zhang Xueliang and Wan Fulin5 8 1 appointed Ma Zhanshan, a powerful warlord in north Manchuria, as the Acting Premier of Heilongjiang Province and the Commander-in-Chief of the Heilongjiang Army of the Northeastern Army.582 When the Xing'an Army, which had also defected from the Northeastern Army, joined Zhang Haipeng's Army, Zhang Haipeng took up arms against the Heilongjiang Army to capture Qiqiha'er, the capital of Heilongjiang Province.583 On October 15, the Zhang Haipeng Army and the Heilongjiang Army went to war-the Battle of Nenjian.584 The Xing'an Army 5 7 7 Katakura, 1931, pp.205-7. 5 7 8 Katakura, 1931, p.198; The General Staff, 1941c, p.356. 5 7 9 Katakura, 1931, pp.192-3, 197, 201; 5 8 0 Katakura, 1931, p.206. 581 Premier of Heilongjiang Province 5 8 2 The General Staff, 1941c, p.358; Hazeyama, 1967, pp.22-3. (Note: The Heilongjiang Army was mainly composed of Ma Zhanshan's men after this appointment; thus, the Heilongjiang Army was considered the Ma Zhanshan Army.) 5 8 3 Katakura, 1931, p.211; The General Staff, 1941c, pp.356-7. 5 8 4 The General Staff, 1941c, p.357. 197 betrayed Zhang Haipeng after they were bribed by Ma Zhanshan, and as a result, the Zhang Haipeng Army was defeated.585 Unlike the air bombardment on Jinzhou which was a unilateral air raid, the Battle of Nenjian was a war between the Zhang Haipeng Army of the Manchurian Independence Camp and the Heilongjiang Army of the Zhang Xueliang camp. Therefore, it necessarily follows that the Manchurian War of Independence began at the Battle of Nenjian. This war occurred in Manchuria. Since the leaders of Tokyo regarded Manchuria as a territory of the ROC and followed Shidehara pacifist nonintervention policy, they considered this battle as a domestic matter of the ROC and could not interfere in Zhang Haipeng's actions. In addition, the Kanto Army HQ. did not dispatch any combat unit to the battlefield. Thus, they did not have any reason to stop the Battle of Nenjian, and consequently the Manchurian War of Independence was launched. The Battle of Nenjian shows the following difference between the Conquest of Manchuria and the Manchurian War of Independence schemes. As we observed in the previous sections, the Conquest of Manchuria was a war between the Kanto Army and the Mukden Army. On the other hand, the Battle of Nenjian was a war between Zhang Haipeng Army as a spearhead of the Manchurian Independence Camp and the Heilongjiang Army as an army of the Manchurian ancien regime. Judging from the 5 8 5 Katakura, 1931, pp.213-4; The General Staff, 1941c, pp.357-8. 198 constituents of the belligerent, the Manchurian War of Independence is not Japan's aggressive war because the Kanto Army was nothing more than a part of the Manchurian Independence Camp.586 This war was the war of independence that broke out between the Manchurian ancien regime and the Manchurian Independence Camp, including the Kanto Army. (2) A crisis of Japanese capitalists interests in Manchuria In the Battle of Nenjian, the Heilongjiang Army blasted three railroad bridges587 of the Taoang Railway over the Nenjian, or the Nen River, to prevent the Zhang Haipeng Army and the Kanto Army from moving northward.588 The Taoang Railway was paralyzed by the destruction of the Nenjian Bridge, which caused the following complex issue. The Taoang Railway was constructed by the South Manchuria Railway Company according to a contract between Zhang Zuolin's Manchurian Government and the IJG, and delivered to the Manchurian Government in December 1926.589 However, the Manchurian Government was behind in paying constructing costs, and the arrears as of the summer of 1931 was 38b The Manchurian Independence Camp consisted of the following armies. The Kanto Army: 10,500 strong, reinforcements from the Korean Army: 2,500 strong, the J i l in Army commanded by Xi Qia (the former Chief of Staff of the Ji l in Army of the Northeastern Army): 50,000 strong, Zhang Haipeng Army commanded by Zhang Haipeng (the Former Commander of the Tao-Liao Army of the Mukden Army): 30,000 strong, the Eastern Border Army commanded by Yu Zhishan (the former Commander of the Eastern Border Army of the Mukden Army): 30,000 strong, the Mongolian Independent Army commanded by Kanjuru-zhapu: 3,000 strong. (Katakura, 1931; Liu 1986, p.144) 587 Those bridges are simply called Nenjian Bridge. 5 8 8 Katakura, 1931, pp.213-4; The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.357-8. 5 8 9 The General Staff, 1927,pp.l26-130 & 1928, p.192. 199 about twenty million Yen.5 9 0 Therefore, the Taoang Railway was one of the Japanese economic interests in Manchuria. The South Manchuria Railway Company shipped soybeans from north Manchuria to south Manchuria by way of the Taoang Railway, which conveyance was one of the lucrative businesses. If the Taoang Railway remained paralyzed, the South Manchuria Railway Company would suffer a great loss. The season to ship soybeans was the late autumn, so that Nenjian Bridge had to be repaired as soon as possible. The South Manchuria Railway Company sent engineers to repair the bridges and railway,591 but they could not do their job because they drew fire from the Heilongjiang Army. 5 9 2 The leaders of the South Manchuria Railway Company and the Japanese Consulate General at Mukden were in a hurry for recapture of the Nenjian Bridge.593 They judged that diplomatic negotiations on rebuilding the Nenjian Bridge could not save the South Manchuria Railway Company's heavy loss because they speculated that it would take for long to negotiate with the Manchurian Government. Thus, they decided that the South Manchuria Railway Company would rebuild those bridges under the Kanto Army's covering fire. The Japanese Consul General at Mukden, Hayashi Kyujiro, reported to Foreign Minister Shidehara that reconstruction of the 5 9 0 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.361; Hazeyama, 1967, p.25. 5 9 1 The Consul General at Mukden, Telegram #3-22. 5 9 2 The Consul General at Mukden, Telegram #3-33. 200 Nenjian Bridge was essential for Japan to maintain her economic interests, and requested that the Kanto Army be dispatched to the Nenjian Bridge to protect reconstruction works from enemy attack.594 At the same time, the Japanese Consulate General at Mukden which had been following Shidehara Diplomacy, and the South Manchuria Railway Company which had been uncooperative with the Kanto Army, directly asked the Kanto Army HQ. to dispatch troops.595 (3) The dilemma of Shidehara Diplomacy Foreign Minister Shidehara and other leaders of the IJG wavered in their judgment about dispatching the Kanto Army. If they asked the high command of the IJA to dispatch the Kanto Army's troops to the Nenjian Bridge, the South Manchuria Railway Company would avoid a huge loss; however, there was a strong possibility that the Kanto Army would invade north Manchuria on the pretext of protecting the South Manchuria Railway Company's reconstruction team against the Heilongjiang Army.5 9 6 If the Kanto Army invaded north Manchuria, the international community would strongly denounce the IJG and force an economic blockade on Japan, and then Japanese capitalism as a whole would fall into a crisis. 5 9 3 Yamaguchi, 1975, p.183. 594 The Consul General at Mukden, Telegram #3-34. 5 9 5 Yamaguchi, 1975, p. 183-4. 596 The Consul General at Mukden, Telegram#3-47, Foreign Minister Shidehara, Telegram #3-57. 201 On the other hand, if the IJG refused the request from the South Manchuria Railway Company and the Japanese Consulate General at Mukden, the South Manchuria Railway Company would fall into a serious financial crisis.597 However, there would be no opportunity for the Kanto Army to invade north Manchuria, and Japanese capitalism as a whole would be secure. After much consideration, the leaders of the IJG reached the decision that they would request the leaders of the IJA to dispatch the Kanto Army's troops to the Nenjian Bridge, justifying that decision as follows: Japan retained the right to repair any bridges of the Taoang Railway because this railroad was one of the Japanese legal interests.598 It was completely lawful that the South Manchuria Railway Company try to rebuild the Nenjian Bridge.599 The Kanto Army's activities to protect reconstruction works from the Heilongjiang Army's obstruction were legitimate and within Japan's legal rights in Manchuria. If the Heilongjiang Army attacked the construction sites at the Nenjian Bridge, the Kanto Army could counterattack on the basis of the right of self-defense recognized by the international law. However, the leaders of Tokyo were still apprehensive that the Kanto Army might invade north Manchuria under the pretext of protecting the 5 9 7 The Consul General at Mukden, Telegram #3-34, #3-45 #3-47. 5 9 8 The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.361-2. 5 9 9 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.361. 202 reconstruction works, so they ordered Kanto Army HQ. that their activities must be limited to guard the work of reconstruction of the bridge. The Chief of Staff commanded the Commander-in-Chief of the Kanto Army to observe the following guidelines.600 (1) The Kanto Army's troops are prohibited from going north beyond the construction area. (2) The Kanto Army's troops are prohibited from carrying out any preemptive strike against the Heilongjiang Army. (3) The Kanto Army's troops should return to the original post as soon as reconstruction of the Nenjian Bridge is completed. Similarly, the vice-Minister of War ordered the Kanto Army HQ to obey the following guidelines.601 (1) The Kanto Army's troops should return to the original post as soon as the Nenjian Bridge is rebuilt. (2) A troop withdrawal must be completed by November 14, 1931, at the latest, because the Board of Directors of the League of Nations will be held on November 16,1931. (3) The Kanto Army HQ should make some political maneuver against the Heilongjiang Military-Government (for example, to win Ma Zhanshan over by bribery) in order to avoid war. Therefore, the 6 0 0 Katakura, 1931, p.243; The General Staff, 1935-a, p.45, & 1941-c, p.368 6 0 1 The General Staff, 1935-a, p.45, & 1941-c, p.368 203 Ministry of War will allow the Kanto Army HQ. three million Yen for the maneuvering fund. 7.5: DEFINITIVE CONFLICTS BETWEEN TOKYO AND THE KANTO ARMY HQ The Kanto Army HQ dispatched a unit to protect the repairs of the Nenjian Bridge.602 The Heilongjiang Army opened fire at the construction site as soon as the engineers of the South Manchuria Railway Company began to repair the bridges.603 The Kanto Army launched a counterattack, and then a battle between the Kanto Army and the Heilongjiang Army broke out-the Battle of Daxing.604 (1) Extraordinary Order Although the leaders of the Kanto Army HQ received the above-mentioned strict orders from the high command of the IJA, they decided to fight through until they defeated the Heilongjiang Army and occupied Qiqiha'er, a capital city of Heilongjiang Province.605 They believed that this operation was necessary to accomplish the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence because in Heilongjiang Province there were several pro-Zhang Xueliang factions and communists influenced by the Soviet 6 0 2 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.367; Hazeyama, 1967, pp.29-30. Note: The Kanto Army's unit consisted of one infantry regiment, one artillery battalion, one engineers company and one communication squad. 6 0 3 Katakura, 1931, p.244; The General Staff, 1941-c, p.369. 6 0 4 Hazeyama, 1967, pp.31-2. 6 0 5 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.362, pp.364-6. 204 Communist Party.606 Fearing that those pro-Zhang Xueliang factions could obstruct their intention to establish an independent state, they made a decision to invade north Manchuria on the pretext of the Battle of Daxing.607 Feeling some misgivings about the Kanto Army HQ. when the Battle of Daxing began, the leaders of Tokyo decided to invoke a General StafFs order entrusted by the Emperor, or an Extraordinary Order,608 as their trump. The Extraordinary Order was the second highest authoritative order in the IJA's command system. It was an order issued by the Chief of Staff on behalf of the Emperor; that is, the Emperor delegated a part of the royal prerogative of supreme command to the Chief of Staff who could issue an order of military operations without the Emperor's approval.609 Although the Emperor knew nothing about the concrete contents of an Extraordinary Order, this order had the full force and effect of Hochoku-meirei, the Direct Order of the Emperor, which needed his approval.610 Ignoring an Extraordinary Order would be considered traitorous to the Emperor. Since it was an extremely serious command, only one such Extraordinary 6 0 6 The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.364-6. 6 0 7 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.362. 6 0 8 Rin-san-i-mei in Japanese Mark R. Peattie translated Rin-san-i-mei into a "provisional mandate." (p.131) I think this translation fails to express the rareness, the extraordinariness, the seriousness, and the importance of Rin-san-i-mei. Therefore, I will use the English words "Extraordinary Order". 6 0 9 Inaba, 1972, pp.123-135. 6 1 0 Hochoku-meirei was the highest authoritative order in the Imperial Japanese Army's commandsystem. 205 Order611 had been issued since the General Staff was established in December 1879 6 1 2 (2) Impatience with Shidehara Diplomacy At the Nenjian Bridge, the Heilongjiang Army took the offensive against the Kanto Army, so that the Kanto Army HQ sent reinforcements to the battlefield of Daxing.613 Ma Zhanshan also reinforced his army. The Battle of Daxing became a full-fledged war.614 Accordingly, the General Staff issued the Extraordinary Order that the Kanto Army's troops must not advance to the north of Daxing Station.615 The leaders of the Kanto Army HQ. made a strongly protested the Extraordinary Order and emphasized the necessity of advancing to north Manchuria.616 They believed that an Extraordinary Order should not be applied to the front-line operations because the IJA's command system allowed the front-line commander and his staffs to decide their tactical operations independently.617 Since the Kanto Army HQ did not obey Extraordinary Order #1, the General Staff issued an Extraordinary Order #2.618 In this command, the General Staff advised that they had no 6 1 1 February, 1905 6 1 2 Inaba, 1972, p.133. 6 1 3 Katakura, 1931, p.244. 6 1 4 The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.369-372; Hazeyama, 1967, pp.32-9. 6 1 5 Katakura, 1931, p.245. 6 1 6 Katakura, 1931, pp.245-6; The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.373-4. 6 1 7 Katakura, 1931, pp.245-6; Inaba, 1972, pp.123-135. 6 1 8 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.376. 206 intention of accepting the Kanto Army HQ's protest, and ordered that the Kanto Army must not advance to the 14 km north of Daxing Station.619 After the Kanto Army troops in Daxing were reinforced, the Kanto Army launched a counterattack against the Heilongjiang Army.6 2 0 Ma Zhanshan ordered his army to retreat from Daxing to Angangxi, a strategic point lying 25 km to the north of Daxing and 25km to the south of Qiqiha'er.621 The Kanto Army did not pursue them because the Kanto Army HQ could not disregard repeated Extraordinary Orders.622 Thus, the Kanto Army in Daxing stood face to face with the Heilongjiang Army in Angangxi. The Battle of Daxing came to an end at this point.623 The Chinese press reputed that the Kanto Army could not advance to Qiqiha'er and the Heilongjiang Army had won a victory, and also they exaggeratedly praised Ma Zhanshan as the "Eastern Napoleon".624 On the other hand, the Kanto Army suffered heavy losses in the Battle of Daxing.625 The Japanese press reported the Battle of Daxing in detail, so that the Japanese populace knew that the "invincible Imperial Japanese 6 1 9 Katakura, 1931, pp.246-7;The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.376-7. 6 2 0 The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.374-5. 6 2 1 The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.375-6. 6 2 2 When the Kanto Army HQ.made this decision, Lt. Col. Ishiwara was absent because he was directing the Nenjian Unit in Daxing. 623 x h e general Staff, 1941-c, p.375-6. 6 2 4 Yamaguchi, 1975, pp.187-8. 6 2 5 The Nenjian Unit's rate of loss was about 13%. (KIA: 46, Wounded in Battle: 151) Hazeyama, 1967, pp.40-1. 207 Army" was facing a tough battle.626 Their animosity against the Heilongjiang Army ran very high and they began to criticize Shidehara Diplomacy.627 They became indignant with the Japanese government for weak-kneed diplomacy and encouraged the Kanto Army's military actions.628 Uchida Hiroya, the governor of the South Manchuria Railway Company, began to support the Kanto Army HQ. 6 2 9 Uchida and his top executives recognized the necessity of repulsing the Heilongjiang Army to maintain the company's interests. He discussed the situation of north Manchuria with Hayashi Kyujiro, the Japanese consul general at Mukden, and Ohashi Chuichi, the Japanese consul general at Ha'erbin.630 After this meeting, Hayashi, who had stubbornly opposed the Kanto Army's military actions since the Mukden Incident, reported to Shidehara that Japanese economic interests would be insecure unless Tokyo allowed the Kanto Army to crush the Heilongjiang Army and occupy Qiqiha'er.631 (3) A fatal dilemma of the leaders of Tokyo The dilemma of the leaders of the IJG was getting more and more serious. If they maintained Shidehara Diplomacy, they would be condemned by 6 2 6 Yamaguchi, 1975, pp.186-7. 6 2 7 Yamaguchi, 1975, pp.188-9. 6 2 8 The Military Police HQ, Ordinary Report #324; Yamaguchi, 1975, pp.189. 6 2 9 Katakura, 1931, p.264; The General Staff, 1941-c, p.388. 630 ^ e Governor of the South Manchuria Railway Company, Telegram , #3-190; The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.388-9. 208 public opinion, and the Wakatsuki Cabinet would dissolve. However, they could not accept the Kanto Army HQ's action because if the Kanto Army advanced to north Manchuria in earnest, the U.S. Government and the League of Nations would regard the Kanto Army's action as a Japanese invasion and suspect that Japan harbored territorial ambitions. They were afraid that the Western powers would apply the Antiwar Pact to this case and take economic sanctions against Japan. Therefore, in order to protect Japanese capitalism as a whole, they had to thwart the Kanto Army's intention. The leaders of the IJA were also in a serious dilemma. Unless they repulsed the Heilongjiang Army, the IJA's prestige could be injured. However, they were afraid that the Soviet Army would intervene in this war if they should approve the Kanto Army's intention to wage a war in north Manchuria.632 Therefore, they set the following ambiguous guideline to shirk their responsibility.633 (1) If the Heilongjiang Army advances to the south of Angangxi Station after the Kanto Army withdraws from Daxing because of the completion of the work of repair, the Kanto Army will take an independent action in self-defense. 6 3 1 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.389. 6 3 2 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.379. 6 3 3 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.387. 209 (2) Although the Kanto Army is not allowed to strike Ma Zhanshan's troops first, they can go on the counterattack against the Heilongjiang Army if Ma Zhanshan carries out an attack. (4) The Kanto Army HQ_vs. Tokyo Since the Kanto Army HQ, had a firm resolution to wage war in Manchuria, they tried to provoke Ma Zhanshan to take the offensive because Tokyo had approved the Kanto Army's self-defensive actions. They urged Ma Zhanshan to resign his positions as the Commander-in-Chief of the Heilongjiang Army and the Acting-Premier of Heilongjiang Province. At the same time, they also demanded that the Heilongjiang Army withdraw from Qiqiha'er completely. As General Minami, the Minister of War, was afraid that such severe demands would be taken as a provocation, he ordered General Honjo, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kanto Army, to moderate those demands and negotiate with General Ma. 6 3 4 However, Kanto Army HQ, disregarded General Minami's order, so that the General Staff issued Extraordinary Order #3 as follows:635 (1) The Kanto Army must change the conditions of the demands as follows: (a) The Heilongjiang Army has to withdraw from Qiqiha'er. 6 3 4 Katakura, 1931, p.266; The General Staff, 1941-c, p.389. 6 3 5 Katakura, 1931, p.266; The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.389-90. 210 (b) The Heilongjiang Army has to move to the north of the East China Railway. (c) The Heilongjiang Army has to stop obstructing the Taoang Railway. (2) When Ma Zhanshan acts according to the proposal, the Kanto Army must withdraw from Daxing as soon as possible. (3) If Ma Zhanshan refuses the proposal, or he accepts but does not put the proposal into action, the Kanto Army will take independent actions in self-defense. The Kanto Army HQ. surmised that Ma Zhanshan would not accept the Kanto Army's demand because the Chinese press had set him up as a hero, the "Eastern Napoleon". They, however, forwarded the General Staffs proposal to Ma Zhanshan to save the General Staffs face.636 Just as the Kanto Army HQ had expected, General Ma Zhanshan made no response to the Japanese demands.637 They then informed the high command of the IJA that the Kanto Army's main force638 was going to commence an attack on November 18 to vanquish the Heilongjiang Army to secure the Taoang Railway.639 The leaders of Tokyo could tolerate the Kanto Army's attack itself, but still feared that the Kanto Army would intend to occupy Qiqiha'er and other strong points in north Manchuria. 6 3 6 Katakura, 1931, pp.266-8; The General Staff, 1941-c, p.390. 6 3 7 Katakura, 1931, p.267; The General Staff, 1941-c, p.392. 6 3 8 The Second Division 211 Therefore, the General Staff issued Extraordinary Order #4 to restrict the military operations as follows:640 (1) The Kanto Army may temporarily advance to the north of Qiqiha'er to rout the Heilongjiang Army. (2) The Kanto Army is not allowed to use the East China Railway. (3) The Kanto Army has to avoid battles near the East China Railway as much as they can. (4) The Kanto Army may transiently step into the city of Qiqiha'er for military tactics; however, occupying Qiqiha'er is strictly prohibited. (5) After defeating the Heilongjiang Army, the Kanto Army must withdraw as soon as possible from north Manchuria to the east of Zhengjiatun. The leaders of Tokyo seemed to have somewhat compromised with the leaders of the Kanto Army because they permitted the Kanto Army to advance to north Manchuria. However, their outlook did not substantially change; that is, they maintained the nonexpansion policy grounded on Shidehara Diplomacy. The reason why the leaders of Tokyo permitted the Kanto Army's attack on the Heilongjiang Army was to secure the Taoang Railway to maintain the South Manchuria Railway Company's economic profit through transporting soybeans. It was enough for them to protect the Taoang 6 3 9 The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.392-3. 212 Railway against obstruction; thus, neither occupying Qiqiha'er nor annihilating Ma Zhanshan's troops was necessary. Moreover, they were afraid that if the Kanto Army captured Qiqiha'er, the international community would question the truth of the IJG's announcement, "Japan has no territorial ambition for Manchuria";641 and as a result, the American economic sanction would be applied. Therefore, they had to plainly prohibit the occupation of Qiqiha'er.642 The leaders of the Kanto Army, however, had decided to advance to north Manchuria to expand the Manchurian War of Independence;643 that is, their purpose of an attack on the Heilongjiang Army was to occupy Qiqiha'er. Thus, they had no intention to withdraw from north Manchuria or give up occupying Qiqiha'er. (5) The Kanto Army's offensive and Tokyo's counterattack On November 18, the Kanto Army launched an attack against the Heilongjiang Army stationed at Angangxi-The Battle of Angangxi.644 The Heilongjiang Army was destroyed within a half day, and retreated to Qiqiha'er.645 The Kanto Army followed the retreating troops to annihilate 6 4 0 Katakura, 1931, p.267; The General Staff, 1941-c, p.393. 6 4 1 The Imperial Japanese Government, 1931. 6 4 2 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.396. 6 4 3 Katakura, 1931, p.271. 6 4 4 The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.394-5. 6 4 5 Hazeyama, 1967, pp.74-135. 213 them;646 thus, Ma's troops fled to his base, Hailun.647 On the early morning of November 19, the Kanto Army made a triumphal entry into the city of Qiqiha'er, receiving welcome from the prominent figures of Qiqiha'er.648 On the day subsequent to the Kanto Army's occupation of Qiqiha'er, Lieutenant General Ninomiya, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, arrived at Mukden to persuade the Kanto Army HQ. to obey Tokyo's orders.649 However, informed about the war situation and the conditions of north Manchuria, Ninomiya agreed with the opinion of the Kanto Army HQ, that the evacuation would lead the city of Qiqiha'er to confusion. Thus, Ninomiya proposed to the General Staff that the withdrawal had to be postponed for about two weeks.650 However, the Chief of Staff issued Telegram #163, in which he ordered the Kanto Army HQ. to pull out the troops immediately although a security regiment could remain in the vicinity of Qiqiha'er for two weeks in order to maintain public order.651 At this critical period, Colonel Itagaki conferred with Zhang Jinghui, a powerful Manchurian warlord, on the government of Heilongjiang Province. 6 4 6 The Zhang Haipeng Army and the Ding Chao Army rushed to the battlefields, but the Battle of Angangxi was over before they fought against the Heilongjiang Army. Ding Chao was a commander of the garrison of the Eastern China Railway. His army was a part of the Heilongjiang Army, but he betrayed Ma Zhanshan and allied himself with the Kanto Army. (The General Staff, 1941-c, p.396.) 6 4 7 250 km north of Qiqiha'er 6 4 8 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.396. 6 4 9 The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.399-400. 6 5 0 Katakura, 1931, p.275. 214 The leaders of the Kanto Army wanted Zhang Jinghui to organize a new government, but he declined their proposal for the following reasons. First, the economy of the current Heilongjiang Government was a shambles, and he did not have any sources of revenue to form and manage a new government. Second, Ma Zhanshan still retained his armed forces and had a great deal of influence over north Manchuria, but Zhang Jinghui did not have enough military strength to rule north Manchuria. He proposed to Colonel Itagaki that winning over Ma Zhanshan to their side instead of defeating him would be the best strategy. He also stressed that it was indispensable to continue occupying Qiqiha'er to pressure Ma Zhanshan to agree to their proposal.652 Itagaki assented to Zhang's plan, and promised that the Kanto Army would not withdraw from Qiqiha'er. They began to persuade Ma Zhanshan to secede from the Zhang Xueliang camp and Zhang Jinghui decided to organize a new government.653 The leaders of the Kanto Army could not obey the Chief of Staffs Telegram #163, as well as Extraordinary Order #4, because Zhang Jinghui's government which was the key to the Manchurian War of Independence would be endangered if the Kanto Army troops evacuated Qiqiha'er.654 Realizing that the Kanto Army HQ, gave no sign of beginning the evacuation, the IJA issued Extraordinary Order #5 and strongly urged them 6 5 1 Katakura, 1931, p.275; The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.402-3. 6 5 2 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.401. 6 5 3 Katakura, 1931, p.276. 215 to obey the command of the Emperor and the central authorities of Tokyo.655 Lieutenant General Honjo decided to resign as the Commander-in-Chief of the Kanto Army because on the one hand he could not ignore Extraordinary Orders anymore; on the other, if he ordered the withdrawal, he would have no excuse for his men who had sacrificed themselves in the Manchurian battlefields.656 Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara and Captain Katakura asserted that his resignation would be meaningless if the Kanto Army withdrew from Qiqiha'er because the Manchurian War of Independence would be over; thus they persuaded Lieutenant General Honjo to choose one of the following options.657 (1) The Kanto Army will continue to occupy Qiqiha'er just as it is. That is, the Kanto Army HCi will ignore Extraordinary Order #5 by means of making a plausible excuse or delaying communication with Tokyo. (2) The leaders of the Kanto Army will resign from their positions. That is, the Kanto Army will secede from the IJA, and continue waging the Manchurian War of Independence. (3) Commander Honjo will obey Extraordinary Order #5. That is, he will dismiss Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara from the Staff Officer of the Kanto Army, and reshuffle his staffs. 6 5 4 Katakura, 1931, p.276; The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.401-2. 6 5 5 Katakura, 1931, p.276; The General Staff, 1941-c, p.404. 6 5 6 Katakura, 1931, pp.276-7; The General Staff, 1941-c, p.404. 216 As the Commander-in-Chief of the Kanto Army and a leader of the advocates of the Manchurian War of Independence, Honjo faced a serious dilemma and found himself in a delicate position. When the leaders of the Kanto Army discussed the above-mentioned matter, the Commander-in-Chief of the Tianjin Army6 5 8 asked the Kanto Army HQ. to send reinforcements to Tianjin because an armed clash with the KMT Army began on the night of November 26.659 The Kanto Army HQ decided to dispatch troops on the pretext that the armed conflict in Tianjin would expand. It was inevitable that the Kanto Army troops fight with the Northeastern Army in Jinzhou660 because the Manchurian Government in Jinzhou661 would never let them pass Jinzhou peacefully, which was the halfway point between Mukden and Tianjin. Since the Kanto Army leaders' real intention of sending troops to Tianjin was to wage an assault upon the Northeastern Army, in addition to those troops, they ordered the Second Division in Qiqiha'er to march toward Jinzhou.662 Judging from the departure of the occupation troops, Extraordinary Order #5 seemed to have been carried out; however, this withdrawal did not result from obeying the 6 5 7 Katakura, 1931, p.277. 6 5 8 A Japanese expeditionary army stationed in China on the grounds of the Beijing Treaty of 1901. 6 5 9 Katakura, 1931, pp.277-8. 660 T n e f o r m e r Mukden Army and other troops of the Northeastern Army 6 6 1 The former Manchurian Governmentin Mukden 6 6 2 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.422. Note: A security brigade of the Second Division remained behind to maintain public order of Qiqiha'er, and the main force of the Second Division departed for Jinzhou. (The General Staff, 1935-a, p67.) 217 Extraordinary Order. It was the movement of troops from Qiqiha'er to Tianjin to attack the Northeastern Army. Eventually, the friction between the Kanto Army HQ. and the central authorities of the IJA over Extraordinary Order #5 faded away. Similarly, discord within the leaders of the Kanto Army dwindled, and the crisis of the split among the advocates of the Manchurian War of Independence was over. (6) Tokyo's strong resistance to the Kanto Army HQ. On November 26, the day before the Kanto Army decided to attack Jinzhou, the French Ambassador in Tokyo had informed Foreign Minister Shidehara of the proposal to neutralize the west bank of the River Liao (hereafter, the West Bank) brought forward by Gu Weijun, the Foreign Minister of the Nanjing Government.663 According to this proposal, the Northeastern Army would withdraw from Jinzhou to Shanhaiguan if the IJG accepted the following conditions: (1) The IJA will not invade the West Bank. (2) The IJA and the IJG will not intervene in the administration of the West Bank. (3) The IJG will promise the American, the British and the French Governments to carry out these conditions. 6 6 3 Shimada, 1962, pp.96-7. 218 Inasmuch as the IJG favored Gu Weijun's proposal, they had to prevent the Kanto Army from advancing toward Jinzhou, which was the politico-military center of the West Bank.664 However, the troops departed from Mukden in the early morning of November 27, and one hour later a spearhead clashed with a unit on the front line of the Northeastern Army.665 The Kanto Army defeated them and advanced to the West Bank. Other troops of the Kanto Army also advanced to the West Bank.666 As Tokyo was dismayed by the rapid development in Manchuria, the General Staff issued Extraordinary Orders #6 and #7, in which the high command of the IJA adjured the Kanto Army to cease fire and withdraw from the West Bank.667 It was replied that the troops of the Kanto Army could not withdraw because they had to fight against the fierce attack of the Northeastern Army.668 The leaders of the IJA were furious at the Kanto Army's response, so that the General Staff issued Extraordinary Order #8 to command them to withdraw from the West Bank as soon as possible under any circumstances.669 Since the troops were still encamped in the West Bank on November 28, the high command of the IJA reprimanded the leaders of 6 6 4 Shimada, 1962, p.97. 6 6 5 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.423. 6 6 6 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.423. 6 6 7 Katakura, 1931, pp.278-9; The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.424-5. 6 6 8 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.425. 6 6 9 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.425. 219 the Kanto Army HQ, for their disobedience to the Extraordinary Orders.670 However, the leaders of the Kanto Army HQ, did not acknowledge the IJA's rebuke; on the contrary, they argued that the central authorities of the IJA had been criticizing the Kanto Army's actions without setting any proper strategies.671 As a last resort, the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Kanaya, decided to ask the Emperor to issue a Direct Order of the Emperor, the supreme command. The Emperor approved his petition.672 If the Kanto Army ignored the Direct Order of the Emperor, they would be considered rebellious troops and severely punished. Before the General Staff actually issued the Direct Order of the Emperor, the Kanto Army HQ. themselves had ordered the troops in the West Bank to return to the east bank of the Liao River.673 The reason was that the leaders of the Kanto Army needed to revise their plan of operations against the Northeastern Army in Jinzhou.674 Therefore, the withdrawal was caused not by Tokyo's orders, but by the autonomous decision of the leaders of the Kanto Army. (7) A setback of Shidehara Diplomacy 6 7 0 Katakura, 1931, pp.279-80; The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.425-6. 6 7 1 Katakura, 1931, p.280. 6 7 2 Shidehara, 1951, pp.182-4. 6 7 3 The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.426-7. 220 After the Kanto Army's troops returned to Mukden on November 28, there were no large military conflicts in south Manchuria for a while; on the other hand, the independence movement was progressing steadily. At the same time, the Northeastern Army in Jinzhou was preparing against the Kanto Army's attack. The League of Nations tried to conciliate between Japan and the ROC based on the Nanjing Government's proposal to neutralize the West Bank, but the conciliation had rough going. Finally, Gu Weijun, the Foreign Minister of the Nanjing Government, retracted the proposition because the Nanjing Government was blamed by Chinese public opinion for its weak-kneed diplomacy. Accordingly, the deliberations of the League of Nations regarding the Nanjing Government's proposal ended.675 On December 10, instead of that proposition, the League of Nations proposed that (1) Japan and the Republic of China would cease fire immediately, and (2) a commission of enquiry would be sent to both Manchuria and China to prevent a further conflict. The members of the Council, including Japan and the Republic of China, unanimously adopted this proposal.676 However, the Japanese delegation agreed to it on the condition that the Japanese forces had a right to suppress bandits in Manchuria in order to protect the Japanese people from being assaulted by them. Despite the 6 7 4 Katakura, 1931, p.279. 6 7 5 Shimada, 1962, p.98. 6 7 6 The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.437-8; Shimada, 1962, p.101. 221 objection of the Chinese delegation, the Council of the League of Nations approved Japan's rights to suppress bandits in Manchuria, or the so-called the Right to Suppress Banditry.677 The decision of the League of Nations was agreeable to the leaders of Tokyo as well as the leaders of the Kanto Army HQ. for the following reasons. (1) The approval of the Right to Suppress Banditry meant that the League of Nations considered that the Nanjing Government could not maintain public order although they insisted on sovereignty over Manchuria. (2) In voting a resolution, the Western states' attitudes were favorable to Japan, and unfavorable to the Republic of China. (3) The IJG expected that the Commission of Enquiry would know the real situation of the anti-Japanese movement in China because the Commission was supposed to visit not only Manchuria but also China. (4) Since the decision did not set a time limit for the Kanto Army's withdrawal to their original posts, the leaders of Tokyo had time on their side to recover control over the Kanto Army. (5) The Right to Suppress Banditry was advantageous to the Kanto Army because the leaders of the Kanto Army HQ could expand the Manchurian War of Independence under the mask of the Right to Suppress Banditry. In the context of the decision of the League of Nations on December 10, it appeared that Shidehara Diplomacy won the day.6 7 8 However, 6 7 7 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.438; Shimada, 1962, p.101. 222 Shidehara Diplomacy suddenly lost its hold because the Wakatsuki Cabinet collapsed on December 11. Before this political change, Adachi Kenzo, the Minister of Interior, had insisted that the Wakatsuki Minseito Cabinet had to be allied with the Seiyukai to form a coalition cabinet. He thought that only a coalition cabinet could control the Kanto Army.6 7 9 However, the Prime Minister and other cabinet members believed that they could control the Kanto Army by themselves because the Wakatsuki Cabinet won "diplomatic victory" at the League of Nations. They tried to persuade Adachi to retract his idea, but in vain. 6 8 0 In those days, the Cabinet had to resign en bloc whenever the members of the Cabinet did not reach a consensus. Thus, the Wakatsuki Cabinet was required to resign en bloc.681 Inukai Tsuyoshi, the leader of the Seiyukai, was appointed as the incoming Prime Minister by the Emperor, and formed the Seiyukai Cabinet. As the Emperor asked for recovery of a chain of command in the IJA, Inukai appointed General Araki Sadao as the Minister of War because he believed that only General Araki would be able to control the leaders of the Kanto Army.682 General Araki's primary concern was to enhance the IJA's prestige. In addition, he showed some sympathy for state-socialists because he expected that those state-socialists would be able to rebuild a Japanese 6 7 8 Ogata, 1966, p. 198. 6 7 9 Maejima, 1969, pp.121-5. 6 8 0 Shidehara, 1951, p.186. 6 8 1 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.439; Shidehara, 1951, pp.186-7; Shimada, 1962, p.102. 6 8 2 Ogata, 1964, pp.138-9; Kojima, 1981, pl62. 223 society dominated by corrupt party politicians and capitalists.683 Araki was popular among the state-socialist officers and civilians.684 Although Inukai was not a supporter of state-socialism, he designated General Araki to control discord within the IJA. The sudden disruption of the Wakatsuki Cabinet resulted in the resignations of Foreign Minister Shidehara, Prime Minister Wakatsuki, General Minami, the Minister of War, and Lieutenant General Kanaya, the Chief of Staff. Consequently, most of the advocates of Shidehara Diplomacy, who had been attempting to prevent the leaders of the Kanto Army from carrying out the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence, were gone. As a result of the expulsion of the anti-war advocates, the relationship between the Kanto Army HQ, and the high command of the IJA took a favorable turn. Immediately after the Inukai Cabinet was formed, the high command approved the Kanto Army HQJs "Operational Plan For Attacking Jinzhou" 6 8 5 in which Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara planned to defeat the Northeastern Army in Jinzhou on the pretext of subjugating banditry. Prime Minister Inukai and General Araki did not entirely oppose the use of armed force to settle the Manchurian Problem.686 At the same time, the General Staff issued Extraordinary Order #10 to approve the Kanto Army's 683 Wan, 1989, pp.68-71. 6 8 4 Kojima, 1981, p. 164. 6 8 5 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.439. 224 occupation of Qiqiha'er.687 At this point, the Kanto Army's military operations were carried out as official operations of the IJA; that is, the new leaders of Tokyo came to be involved in the Manchurian War of Independence. 6 8 6 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.440. 6 8 7 The General Staff, 1941-c, p.407. Note: Since the General Staff had prohibited the Kanto Army from occupying Qiqiha'er by the Extraordinary Orders, it was necessary to issue another Extraordinary Order to overturn previous Extraordinary Orders. 225 CHAPTER-8 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE MANCHURIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE After the fall of Shidehara Diplomacy, the Manchurian War of Independence prescribed by Ishiwara Doctrine went smoothly and Zhang Xueliang's armies were expelled from Manchuria. On March 1, 1932, the Manchurian Independence Camp declared the independence of Manchuria. However, despite the great success of the war, the ideal of Ishiwara Doctrine was not achieved because the Japanese capitalist camp snatched the fruits of the war. 8.1: Politico-military situations after the Manchurian War of Independence After the anti-war advocates had disappeared, the Kanto Army advanced to Jinzhou to subdue the Northeastern Army.688 Having lost the will to fight, Zhang Xueliang ordered his army to retreat to north China, without engaging the Kanto Army.6 8 9 The Kanto Army occupied Jinzhou on 6 8 8 The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.449-461. 6 8 9 Katakura, 1932, pp.328-31; The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.461-4. 226 January 3, 1932, and the Northeastern Army as well as the Manchurian Government disappeared from Manchuria.690 As the armies of the Manchurian Independence Camp such as Zhang Haipeng Army, Xi Qia's Jilin Army, and Yu Shishan Army were encouraged by the Kanto Army's occupation of Jinzhou, they took the offensive against the Zhang Xueliang camp's armies.691 In addition, Zhang Jinghui and Colonel Itagaki succeeded in persuading Ma Zhanshan to secede from the Zhang Xueliang camp, and conciliated him to their side.692 Thus, Ma Zhanshan's army overpowered the Zhang Xueliang camp's armies in north Manchuria. In February, 1932, the Kanto Army, the Jilin Army, and the Zhang Haipeng Army defeated the Zhang Xueliang camp's armies one after another, and the influential leaders of the Zhang Xueliang camp fled to the USSR693 Many Zhang Xueliang camp's armies escaped into Jehol Province, which the Kanto Army and other independence armies did not attack because Tan Yuilin, the premier of Jehol Province, expressed his intention to collaborate with the Manchurian Independence Camp.6 9 4 Consequently, the Zhang Xueliang camp's armies were crushed or expelled from Manchuria and many remnants of the defeated armies became bandits. 6 9 0 The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.466-73. 6 9 1 Katakura, 1932, p.332; The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.87-8; 1941-c, pp.487-9, 491-4. 6 9 2 Katakura, 1932, p.332, 340, 345, 352, 359, 278, 379; 6 9 3 Katakura, 1932, p.366, 376; The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.511-20. 6 9 4 Katakura, 1932, p.300, 346, 353-4,358. 227 As military battles in Manchuria were almost over, the following prominent figures in Manchuria held a summit meeting in Mukden on February 16 and 17.695 Cang Shiyi: the Premier of Mukden Province Xi Qia: the Premier of Jilin Province, Ma Zhanshan: the Premier of Heilongjiang Province Zhang Jinghui: the Governor of Dong Xing Special District They discussed the establishment of an independent state, so that this meeting was called the National Founding Meeting. Only a few Japanese attended this meeting because it was not planned by the Kanto Army.6 9 6 Those leaders consented to form an alliance to make a new state as soon as possible, and organized the Northeastern Administration Committee that was a preparatory committee for establishing a central government of a new state.697 Those four leaders composed the committee, and Zhang Jinghui was appointed as its chair; in addition, they invited Premier Tan Yuilin of Jehol Province, Qimotesemupile~a Mongolian leader, and Ling Sheng --another Mongolian leader.698 6 9 5 Katakura, 1932, pp.382-6; The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.521-3 6 9 6 Katakura, 1932, p.383; The General Staff, 1941-c, p.521, Yamaguchi, 1975, pp.308-14. 6 9 7 Katakura, 1932, p.384; TheGeneralStaff, 1941-c, p.521. 6 9 8 Katakura, 1932, p.384; Hirajima, 1970, p.204-5 228 On February 18, the Northeastern Administration Committee announced699 "The Declaration of Independence of the New Manchurian State" that proclaimed that Manchuria had become an independent state, being independent of Zhang Xueliang Government, the Nanjing Government and the Republic of China.7 0 0 According to this declaration, Manchuria as the territory of the new state included the provinces of Fengtian,701 Jilin, Heilongjiang, Jehol, Dong Xing Special District and Mongolian autonomous districts.702 The committee settled the following matters as well:703 The name of the state: Manchukuo The polity of the state: Minben Shuyi704 The head of the state: President The national flag: New Five-Colored Flag The name of era: Datong The capital: Changchun The committee also decided to ask Pu Yi, who was the "Last Emperor" of the Manchu's Qing Dynasty, to be inaugurated as a president of Manchukuo because the Qing's Emperor had been the Emperor of Manchuria, Mongolia oyy The Kanto Army's officers and any other Japanese did not participate in the committee. 7 0 0 Katakura, 1931, pp.385-6; The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.521-2. 7 ° 1 The former Liaoning Province 7 0 2 Katakura, 1931, pp.385-9; Hirajima, 1970, pp.207-8. 7 0 3 Katakura, 1931, pp.391-2. 7 0 4 Japanese and Chinese notion of democracy 229 and China.705 Having dreamed of becoming the Emperor again in the expectation of a restoration of the Qing Dynasty in Manchuria, Pu Yi was disappointed to be asked to become not the Emperor but just a president, and did not readily grant the committee's request. The committee asked the Kanto Army HCito persuade him, and finally, Colonel Itagaki prevailed on him to take office as the president of Manchukuo.706 On March 1, the Northeastern Administration Committee declared the independence of Manchukuo, and "The Declaration of Independence of Manchukuo"707 was officially announced.708 Pu Yi's inaugural ceremony was held on March 9, and the basic laws of Manchukuo, drafted by the Kanto Army's legal advisor, Matsuki Tamotsu, were promulgated.709 At this point, a part of the political objectives of the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence was accomplished. Although the first half of the political objective of Ishiwara's war plan was achieved, the political object was not yet attained completely because Manchukuo was barely born, and it was still unknown whether Manchuria v. would become a logistic base for Japan or not. Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara, Lieutenant General Honjo and the leaders of the Manchuria Youth League believed that the political objective would be accomplished as long as the 7 0 5 Katakura, 1931, pp.387-395; The General Staff, 1941-c, p.522; Yamaguchi, 1975, pp.314-5. 7 0 6 Kojima, 1983, pp.75-83. 7 0 7 Hirajima, 1970, pp.219-221. 7 0 8 Katakura, 1931, p.396; The General Staff, 1941-c, pp.522-3; Hirajima, 1970, p.209. 230 principles of Ishiwara Doctrine were preserved in Manchukuo. However, nearly all leaders of the Kanto Army, who had waged the Manchurian War of Independence, were promoted to higher posts in August 1932 and left Manchuria.710 The leaders of the Manchuria Youth League and other collaborators of Ishiwara were excluded from the substantial management of Manchukuo; as a result, the principles of Ishiwara Doctrine faded out.711 Most of the newly-appointed leaders of the Kanto Army did not understand Ishiwara Doctrine and the political objective of Ishiwara's war plan.7 1 2 They began to pursue Japan's military, economic, and political interests in Manchuria, trying to transform Manchukuo as an independent state into a Japan puppet state.713 The IJG and the Japanese business circles also supported their intention; consequently, Manchukuo was transformed into the Manchurian Empire as a Japan puppet state on March 1, 1934.714 The Kanto Army HQ. was also transformed into a general headquarters to rule the Manchurian Empire,715 and the Kanto Army was expanded into 7 0 9 Katakura, 1932, pp.400-27; Hirajima, 1970, pp.210-26. 7 1 0 The Kant6 Army HQ, 1932-b, 1932-p; General Staff, 1935-a, pp.368-9; Yamamuro, 1993, pp.203-4. 7 1 1 Yamamuro, 1993, pp.205-7. 7 1 2 Yamaguchi, 1975, pp.326-7. 7 1 3 Shimada, 1965, p.117; Ito, 1983, chapterl2; Yamamuro, 1993, chapter4. 7 1 4 Hirajima, 1970, pp.409-16. Yamamuro, 1993, pp.221-30. 7 1 5 Shimada, 1965, pp.116-7. 231 a huge army.716 Although the Kanto Army got power and was expanded, the political objective of the Manchurian War of Independence was never accomplished because the new leaders of the Kanto Army ignored the essence of Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara's war plan. 8.2: DESTINY OF THE IDEOLOGIES Although Ishiwara had failed to accomplish the political objective of the Manchurian War of Independence, he never abandoned the idea of accomplishing an ideal of national defense. On the basis of Ishiwara Doctrine, he formulated a theory of the East Asian League. The IJG, however, obstructed the movements for the East Asian League and tried to foist the idea of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere~a false representation of the East Asian League-on Japanese subjects. Ishiwara's ideal once again failed to materialize. In addition, the spirit of the Principle of Racial Harmony also faded away from most of the Japanese officials' mind. However, some people tried to retain this principle, and its existence in Manchuria was not entirely meaningless. (1) The fate of the Principle of Racial Harmony After the Manchurian War of Independence, the leaders of the Kanto Army who had waged the War of Manchurian Independence were replaced with defenders of Japanese economic interests, and the leading members of the 7 1 6 In 1931, only one division and six independent battalions fought against the Mukden 232 Manchurian Youth League were ousted from the state-building process of Manchukuo by new Japanese administrators.717 Most of the leaders of the reshuffled Kanto Army HQ, and the Japanese administrators of Manchukuo did not understand the original meaning of the Principle of Racial Harmony.718 They regarded it as a mere slogan to integrate various races into Manchukuo, so that the spirit of racial harmony gradually faded.719 Some Japanese people, however, still respected its lofty ideal,720 and the resolution that the Principle of Racial Harmony was officially one of the fundamental national policies of the Manchurian Empire still had some currency. As one historic example, some Japanese military officers and diplomats saved Jewish political refugees on the basis of the Principle of Racial Harmony in Manchuria. Sugihara Chiune, a Japanese acting consul at Lithuania, issued entry visas to Manchukuo for about 6,000 Jewish people without permission of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They could escape to Manchuria, then to the U.S. through Japan.721 Similarly, Major General Higuchi Ki'ichiro, Commander of the Kanto Army's Special Service Agency at Ha'erbin, without permission of the Kanto Army Army. In 1941, the Kanto Army consisted of 34 divisions. Shimada, 1965, pp.153-4. 7 1 7 The General Staff, 1935-a, pp.268-9. 7 1 8 Yamaguchi, 1975, pp.326-7; ltd, 1983, pp. 1004-5 7 1 9 Yamamuro, 1993, pp.167-81, 184-220. 7 2 0 Kokai, 1967, pp.202-3 7 2 1 Sapio. 2000/3/8. pp.89-92, 96-97. Note: An American sociologist Hillel Levine wrote a book, In Search of Sugihara. 233 HQ, the IJA and the IJG, admitted about 20,000 Jewish people who had planned to flee from Poland to the USSR but had been refused their stay in Russia by the Soviet Government. Since Japan had been allied with Germany, the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop722 strongly protested to the IJG that Higuchi's treatment betrayed the friendship between Japan and Germany. Higuchi was court-martialed, but his principle was upheld. "Neither Japan nor Manchurian Empire is a vassal state of Germany. We Japanese are under no obligation to follow the German policy of racial discrimination because the Principle of Racial Harmony was a national policy of the Manchurian Empire. The Jewish people should be protected, from a humanitarian point of view." Asa result, more than 20,000 Jewish people were able to stay in Manchuria, then move on to the U.S. or Canada.723 Although the significance of the existence of the Principle of Racial Harmony in the Manchurian Empire was somewhat affirmed, its ideal was never achieved. Most of the Japanese officials of the Manchurian Empire never respected the spirit of this principle and a racial distinction was tacitly set up. When the Manchurian Empire was destroyed in August 1945, the Principle of Racial Harmony vanished with it. Joachim von Ribbentrop 234 (2) The fate of Ishiwara Doctrine After Colonel Ishiwara724 was "ousted" from Manchukuo, he began to revise his idea of Japan's national defense on the basis of his experiences in the war in Manchuria, and he then constructed a theory of the East Asian League, which was an expansion of Ishiwara Doctrine.725 The theory of the East Asian League stressed not only the coexistence of all races within Manchukuo, but also cooperation with all races and the co-prosperity of all states within East Asia.7 2 6 The main purpose of the East Asian League was to protect the principle of the rule of right from Western expansionism by means of a coalition of Asian states.727 Thus, this idea can be considered a direct descendant in the line of Japan's pan-Asianism.728 However, Ishiwara's idea was somewhat different from Japan's pan-Asianism because of his notion that each state in the East Asian League should be politically independent;729 thus, there would be no puppet states or politically dependent states in the East Asian League. On October 8, 1939, the Association for the East Asian League was established in Japan by adherents of Ishiwara.730 They published a 7 2 3 Sapio. 2000/3/8, pp.93-95. 7 2 4 He was promotedto a colonel in August 1932. 7 2 5 Ishiwara, 1933, 1934,1936-d, 1937-a, 1937-b, 1937-c, 1937-d, 1939. 7 2 6 Ishiwara, 1939, pp.14-23. 7 2 7 Ishiwara, 1939, p.15, 19. 7 2 8 Peattie, 1975, pp.332-3. 7 2 9 Ishiwara, 1939, p.18, pp.20-23, p. 38, pp,48-51. 7 3 0 Katsuragawa. p.306 235 monthly magazine, T6a Renmei (The East Asian League), from November 1939 until October 1945.731 Ishiwara's idea of the East Asian League was accepted by various people732 in not only Japan but also Manchuria and China.733 Even Chiang Kaisheck approved the spirit of the East Asian League.734 According to Ishiwara's theory of the East Asian League, the alliance among Japan, the Manchurian Empire, and the ROC was indispensable for the Asian people in order to carry out the Final War,735 and war against the ROC must be avoided.736 In this respect, Major General Ishiwara737 began to disagree with most of the Japan's politico-military leaders, in particular, Lieutenant General Tojo and his faction. In the end, on March 1, 1941, Lieutenant General Ishiwara738 was dismissed from the army because of his denunciation against Tojo's policies.739 731 Katsuragawa. p.309 7 3 2 "ex-soldiers, farmers, small-businessmen, journalists, and the general public" (Peattie, 1975, p.323) 7 3 3 In Manchuria, Ishiwara's civilian comrades during the Manchurian War of Independence established the Study Group of the East Asian League in July 1940. In China, Miao Bin established the Chinese East Asian League in Beijing in May 1940. 7 3 4 Takagi, 1985, pp.125-7. 7 3 5 He had changed the term "the American-Japanese War" to "the World Final War" or "the Final War". 7 3 6 Ishiwara, 1939, pp.49-54. 7 3 7 He was promotedto a major general in March 1937. 7 3 8 He was promotedto a lieutenant general in August 1939. 7 3 9 Peattie, 1975, pp.322-31; Takagi, 1985, pp.187-90, 197-99, 220-32. 236 After Lieutenant General Ishiwara resigned from the IJA, he devoted his energies to the diffusion of his theory of the East Asian League.740 The movement for the East Asian League was thriving and the Association for the East Asian League claimed nearly one hundred thousand members.741 The IJG and Tojo's military clique742 tried to oppress the movement, but could not openly crack down on Ishiwara and his supporters because he was the IJA's hero. Consequently, in July 1941, the Konoe Cabinet formed an official association for pan-Asianism, the Rise Asia Alliance, and prohibited any political associations to propagate pan-Asianism other than the Rise Asia Alliance. The Konoe Cabinet and its successor, the Tojo Cabinet, tried to oppress the movement for the East Asian League; at the same time, they propagated the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This official idea of pan-Asianism was seemingly similar to the idea of the East Asian League, but they were considerably different in the idea of political independence and equality of each state in the league. According to the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan would be the core state of this sphere. The Manchurian Empire and the ROC would be semi-periphery states, and other Asian states would be periphery states. Unlike the idea of the East Asian League, the official idea of pan-Asianism 7 4 0 Takeda & Sugahara, 1996, p. 145. 7 4 1 Peattie. p.323 237 advocated no principle of equality among nations or mutual respect for other races within the East Asia. In addition, the East Asian League had the political purpose of protecting Asian civilization by winning the Final War; on the other hand, official pan-Asianism did not have such a distinctive end. Therefore, the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was 'actually neither thought nor theory but a mere slogan.'743 After Japan began its war on the U.S. and the U.K. in 1941, the Tojo Cabinet declared that the objective of the war was to establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Unlike Ishiwara Doctrine, Tojo's slogan was not a political ideology that could lead Japan to victory. In fact, the Japanese had no concrete objective in the Pacific War. During the Pacific War, despite Tojo's interference, Ishiwara and his comrades continued conducting the movement for the East Asian League, trying to cease the Chinese-Japanese War, but in vain. Japan lost the Pacific War and the American Occupation Army began to govern Japan. In January 1946, MacArthur's GHC1 terminated the movement for the East Asian League.744 The Japanese Government fully recovered its sovereignty in 1951 and nobody has tried to revive Ishiwara's idea ever since.745 1 4 1 Lt. General Tojo was the War Minister of the Konoe Cabinet. Tojo and his henchmen used military police to oppress the political enemies within and outside the IJA. 7 4 3 Abe. 1989, p.l 19 7 4 4 Katsuragawa, pp.326-7 7 4 5 Ishiwara Kanji passed away in 1949. 238 (3) The revival of Shidehara Diplomacy After Baron Shidehara resigned as a foreign minister in December 1931, he and Shidehara Diplomacy had never played an important role in Japanese foreign policy until he took office as the Prime Minister in October 1945. Under the occupation of the U.S., MacArthur's GHQ, forced the Shidehara Cabinet to accept a draft constitution that was prepared by the American officers. MacArthur's draft was characterized by pacifism through and through. In other words, he demanded a war-renouncing constitution. According to MacArthur's demand,746 Japan should renounce war, military actions and any military force including the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. The Shidehara Cabinet accepted the draft constitution, and the Constitution of Japan was promulgated in 1946. MacArthur's idea of pacifism, which was almost the same as Shidehara's diplomatic ideal,747 / 4 b Mac Arthur Memo Three basic points stated by the Supreme Commander to be "Musts" in constitutional revision. GovernmentSection paper prepared about 4 Feb., 1946. I: Emperor is at the head of the state. His succession is dynastic. His duties and powers will be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and responsive to the basic will of the people as provided therein. II: War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and its protection. No Japanese Army, Navy or A i r Force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force. Ill: The feudal system of Japan will cease. No rights of peerage except those of the Imperial family will extend beyond the lines of those now existent. No patent of nobility will from this time forth embody within itself any National or Civil power of government. Pattern budget after British system. (Eto, 1989, pp. 169-70.) 747 (i) jjje creation of world peace without war; (2) Peaceful coexistence with nations; (3) Ouregnela justice, les armes sont inutules. see Chapter-1 (1) 239 was specified in the Constitution of Japan as the Clause of Renunciation of War.748 At this point, Shidehara Diplomacy was revived. When the Korean War broke out, MacArthur demanded that the Japanese Government should form an army; consequently, a quasi-military organization-the Police Reserve Force-was established in 1950. This organization was not an army; therefore, when Japan fully recovered its sovereignty, the Japanese Government entered into the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which provided that the U.S. was responsible for the national defense of Japan. Ironically enough, the relationship between the U.S. and Japan prescribed by this treaty was quite similar to the relationship between Imperial Japan and Manchukuo. Unlike Germany, a former ally of the Japanese Empire during World War II, Japan has not yet reconstructed the army although a pseudo-military organization-the Japanese Self-Defense Forces749-exists. Since the Clause of Renunciation of War has existed in Japan for more than 50 years, most of the Japanese people, including political leaders, take it for granted 748 ARTICLE-9 of the Constitution of Japan Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 749 The Police Reserve Force was expanded into the Japan Self-Defense Forces that consists of the Ground Self-Defense Force, the Maritime Self-Defense Force and the A i r Self-Defense Force. MacArthur's Constitution of Japan, however, has never been amended and the Clause of Renunciation of War is still valid. Although the Japanese Self-Defense Force possesses various state-of-the-art military equipment, this organization is not an army but a quasi-army because it is unlawful for the Japanese Self-Defense Force to wage a war. 240 that any military action is not a measure of Japanese foreign policy. Consequently, thinking about war or military affairs seriously is considered to be virtually taboo in contemporary Japanese society, which is strongly for peace. Shidehara Diplomacy is alive and well in today's Japan. 241 CONCLUSIONS S O C I O L O G I C A L I M P L I C A T I O N S 242 CONCLUSION-I: The primary cause of the Manchurian Incident was Ishiwara's ideology of Japan's national security—the 1930's version of the Japanese Defense Ideology. My interpretation of the causes of the Manchurian Incident is far different from that of the economic determinists. While the economic determinists concluded that the Manchurian Incident had been caused by the inevitable law of capitalism, my study arrives at the following conclusions: (1) The Kanto Army's leaders decided to make war not for the protection of Japanese capitalism but for Japan's national defense. (2) The basic logic of the economic determinist interpretation is not appropriate for the explanation of the Manchurian Incident. (3) An ideological factor—Ishiwara's idea of Japan's defense-played the central role in fomenting the Manchurian Incident. (1) The Kanto Army's leaders decided to make war not for the protection of Japanese capitalism but for Japan's national defense. According to Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara's Principle of National Defense, the IJA had to occupy Manchuria as a logistic base for Japan's military preparedness for the American-Japanese War. On the basis of this principle, Ishiwara made the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria, but the high command of the IJA was indifferent to his idea of what was required for Japan's national defense. Thus, he and his comrades resorted to the Plot at Mukden, which started with the Kanto Army launching blitz attacks upon 243 the Mukden Army. Thus, they successfully began the planned conquest of Manchuria, but the action was terminated by the central authorities of Tokyo because the leaders of Tokyo opposed this war as one that jeopardized Japanese capitalism; consequently, they did not send any reinforcements to Manchuria. This war was made exclusively by those conspirators who adhered to the Principle of National Defense, a principle that had nothing to do with the protection of Japanese capitalism. In addition, historical data show that most of the instigators actually supported state-socialism and denounced corrupt Japanese capitalists and bourgeois party politicians. During the Conquest of Manchuria, Ishiwara realized the importance of the Principle of Racial Harmony and formulated Ishiwara Doctrine by linking his Principle of National Defense with the Principle of Racial Harmony.750 Thwarted in his intention to accomplish the Conquest of Manchuria, Ishiwara made the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence on the basis of his revised idea of Japan's national defense-Ishiwara Doctrine. The leaders of the Kanto Army and the anti-Zhang Xueliang camp endorsed Ishiwara Doctrine and ignited the Manchurian War of Independence in supposed conformity with that doctrine. ' I should note again that the Principle of National Defense was Ishiwara's ideology for Japan's national defense, and Ishiwara Doctrine was his revised ideology for Japan's national defense. Unlike those ideologies, the Principle of Racial Harmony was one of the strategies of Ishiwara Doctrine's action program. 244 Since Ishiwara was not interested in the protection of Japanese capitalist interests, the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence was not intended to promote Japanese capitalist expansion. On the contrary, according to this war plan, capitalist expansionism should have been eliminated. The ultimate objective of the Manchurian War of Independence was the same as that of the Conquest of Manchuria, although the independence war had the added goal of the establishment of a new state in Manchuria. There is no evidence that the leaders of these two wars intended to expand Japanese capitalist interests. Therefore, I conclude that both the Conquest of Manchuria-the first stage of the Manchurian Incident-and the Manchurian War of Independence-the second stage of the Manchurian Incident-were not wars on behalf of Japanese capitalism but wars waged for Japan's national defense. (2) The basic logic of the economic determinist interpretation is not appropriate for the explanation of the Manchurian Incident. The most important objective of Shidehara Diplomacy was to maintain the healthy growth of Japanese capitalism through diplomatic negotiations, not military force. As a foreign minister, Shidehara applied his political creed to the IJG's policy toward Manchuria. Thus, the IJG's foreign policy toward Manchuria was quite simple because Shidehara's foreign policy contemplated no means other than peaceful talks. It was a supreme directive to the Japanese diplomatic authorities to protect the South Manchuria Railway Company and its subsidiaries' interests, without an 245 appeal to arms. The historical records do not show that Baron Shidehara and the IJG's leaders prepared an aggressive policy toward Manchuria or a war plan in which the ROC or the Manchurian Government was considered an hypothetical enemy. When the Kanto Army made war in Manchuria, the leaders of the IJG who supported Shidehara Diplomacy made every effort to stop the war. They believed that the war in Manchuria would certainly hurt Japanese capitalist interests because the U.S., the U.K. and the League of Nations would condemn Japan's military actions and apply economic sanctions, which would affect Japanese capitalism. Shidehara Diplomacy was the only means to maintain Japanese economic interests without coming into conflict with other world powers. Therefore, the leaders of the IJG made a serious effort to halt the war in Manchuria, and succeeded in forcing the Kanto Army to abandon the Conquest of Manchuria; however, they failed to stop the Manchurian War of Independence. Although the IJG's leaders did not stop the Manchurian War of Independence, it does not mean that they agreed with the Kanto Army's intention to expand the war. On the contrary, primary data indicate that the leaders of the IJG made strenuous attempts to end the war. The leaders of the IJG, including Shidehara, however, went somewhat against Shidehara Diplomacy in the face of the financial crisis confronting the South Manchuria Railway Company. Although they had decisively opposed the expansion of the Manchurian War of Independence and 246 excluded any aggressive military measures from the IJG's foreign policy, they conceded the use of military force as a self-defensive measure to protect Japanese capitalist interests in Manchuria. They believed that such self-defensive actions were different from the Kanto Army's aggressive military actions. Thus, to them, such a breach of Shidehara Diplomacy did not mean that they abandoned their anti-war stance. In fact, they went to great lengths to prevent the Kanto Army HQ. from expanding the Manchurian War of Independence. I conclude that the leaders of the IJG decisively opposed the Kanto Army's wars in order to protect Japanese capitalist interests, although they could not stop the Manchurian War of Independence. This conclusion contradicts the economic determinist interpretation that the Manchurian Incident was forged by the leaders of Tokyo in order to expand Japanese capitalist interests in Manchuria. In addition to the leaders of the IJG, the high command of the IJA endeavored to prevent the Kanto Army HQ. from waging war. When the Mukden Incident broke out, the IJA followed the decision of the IJG, so that the Kanto Army HQ could not but abandon the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria. The leaders of the IJA also cooperated with the IJG and endeavored, without success, to stop the Manchurian War of Independence although the high command repeated their orders sternly. Ultimately, the central authorities of the IJA had to resort to the issue of Extraordinary Orders. 247 The fact that the leaders of the IJA repeatedly invoked Extraordinary Orders is strong evidence of their serious efforts to stop the Kanto Army's war. The economic determinists make no mention of the Extraordinary Orders, but we must not overlook this fact. As long as our research is based on historical records, we can regard the leaders of the IJA as partners with the leaders of the IJG. In other words, the central authorities of the IJA tacitly accepted Shidehara Diplomacy. In conclusion, the leaders of Tokyo endeavored to protect and expand Japanese economic interests in Manchuria, and thoroughly opposed the Kanto Army's military actions, which suggests that the expansion of capitalist interests does not always lead to war. No evidence supports the economic determinist explanation that capitalist imperatives caused the Manchurian Incident to emerge in the manner of a typical imperialistic aggressive war. Therefore, the basic logic of the economic determinist interpretation, or the Leninist thesis of war, is not appropriate for the explanation of the causes of the Manchurian Incident. (3) An ideological factor played the central role in fomenting the Manchurian Incident. There is no evidence that the IJG or the IJA drew up a plan for aggression against Manchuria.751 Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara's requests to reinforce 7 5 1 Shidehara Diplomacy's action program employed diplomatic negotiation as the only means of foreign policy. Thus, it was natural that the leaders of Tokyo, who supported or followed Shidehara Diplomacy, did not consider forming any plans for aggression against Manchuria. 248 the Kanto Army were always rejected by the central authority of the IJA. The only request granted the Kanto Army was that the IJA reluctantly sent two howitzers to Manchuria. Moreover, Ishiwara's proposal for Japan's national defense was ignored by Tokyo. Thus, we must assert that the Conquest of Manchuria was exclusively prescribed by Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara's war plan although the Kanto Army could not accomplish this war plan. The reason that this war plan turned out to be a failure was obvious. Ishiwara took it for granted that, whenever the Kanto Army—a 10,500-man garrison-went to war against the Northeastern Army-a 500,000-man army, Tokyo would send large reinforcements to Manchuria; however, Tokyo did not. Thus, it was impossible for the Kanto Army to continue the war plan although the first stage of the plan had succeeded. After the attempted Conquest of Manchuria was terminated, Ishiwara transformed the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria into the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence on the basis of his observation of a sudden surge of the Manchurian independence movements. Unlike the original war plan, the revised war plan presumed war between the anti-Manchurian Government armies, including the Kanto Army and the Northeastern Army. Since this war plan did not rely upon the IJA's reinforcement, the Manchurian Independence Camp was able to execute the war plan and finally establish an independent state—Manchukuo. As we observed, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara's many writings clearly show that the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria was an action 249 program of Ishiwara's ideology of Japan's national defense-the Principle of National Defense-and that the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence was an action program that I have referred to as Ishiwara Doctrine. Since Ishiwara Doctrine consisted of the Principle of National Defense and the Principle of Racial Harmony, the value judgment, the ideal situation and mission statement of the Principle of National Defense were succeeded by Ishiwara Doctrine.752 At this point, I must recapitulate the reason why Ishiwara amended the war plan. It is possible for us to interpret that the reason why the Kanto Army was allied with the armies of the Manchurian Independence Camp was that the Kanto Army would merely make use of those armies instead of the refused IJA reinforcements. Our observations, however, show that such an interpretation is not reasonable. If Ishiwara had simply utilized such Manchurian armies for the Japanese aggression of Manchuria, it would not have been necessary to accept the Manchuria Youth League's insistence--the Principle of Racial Harmony. In addition, if Ishiwara had been such an opportunist, he would not have needed to add Manchurian independence to the political objective of the war plan. Instead of the above interpretation, it is more likely that the reason why Ishiwara amended the war plan was that his assessment of the ability of the Manchu and the Chinese people to manage their situation had changed during the Conquest of Manchuria. Before the 7 5 2 See 2.2 and 2.6. 250 Mukden Incident, he judged the Chinese and the Manchu to be incompetent to manage politico-military affairs. However, after the Manchurian independence movements were initiated, he realized that he had underestimated their political capabilities. Such a change in his valuation led him to fully accept the Manchuria Youth League's Principle of Racial Harmony. Accordingly, the war plan as the action program of his ideology was amended.753 It is more than probable, therefore, that the Manchurian Incident was prescribed by Ishiwara's ideology. This, however, does not mean that the Manchurian Incident was prescribed by a peculiar ideology created exclusively by Ishiwara Kanji as a unique military thinker. As we observed in this study, Ishiwara's idea was not a pioneering military thought in Japanese society but an up-to-date version of the Japanese Defense Ideology, which had been formed in the mid-nineteenth century. Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara inherited the dichotomous world view-the rule of right versus the rule of might-and the Japanese mission to expel the Western powers' unjust expansionism from the founding-fathers of the Japanese Defense Ideology. Although the military situations around Japan in the 1930's were significantly different from those in the 1850's, both the founding-fathers' and Ishiwara's strategies to maintain Japan's national security were identical in their structure. According to the founding-fathers, Japan had 753 YVe can reasonably infer that Ishiwara must have accepted the Principle of Racial 251 to build a strong military for repelling the Western powers' aggression; Japan also had to become a rich state in order to build a strong military. Ishiwara elaborated a plan that the ability of Japan's defense had to be strengthened for winning the American-Japanese War. Japan also had to enrich its capacity for fighting and manufacturing; to put it concretely, Manchuria should become Japan's "rear base" for prolonged war. Since Ishiwara's war plans embodied the Japanese Defense Ideology, they were excluded from Tokyo's foreign policy because the IJG's foreign policy was controlled by Baron Shidehara, who had a distinct ideology for national security.754 Unlike Ishiwara, Foreign Minister Shidehara did not think that the relationship between Japan and the United States was basically hostile; instead, he believed that Japan had to act harmoniously with every state, in particular the U.S. and the U.K., in order to maintain the interests of Japanese capitalism. In other words, to Shidehara, the national goal to be defended was exclusively the protection of Japanese capitalist interests. In addition, and unlike Ishiwara's idea that Manchuria should become Japan's rear base for the American-Japanese War, Shidehara's idea looked upon Manchuria as a mere market for Japanese and Western powers' capitalism. Accordingly, Shidehara approved the status quo of China and Manchuria-that the Western powers and Japan Harmony before the Mukden Incident if he had appreciated the politico-military abilities of the Chinese and the Manchu before they began their independence movements. 252 divided economic interests in those areas. Therefore, pan-Asianism was out of the question for Shidehara Diplomacy; similarly, the mission statement of the Japanese Defense Ideology-both the original version and Ishiwara's up-to-date version-was unacceptable for Shidehara Diplomacy. Since Shidehara stood firmly against the Japanese Defense Ideology, the leaders of Tokyo strongly opposed Ishiwara's war plans. On the other hand, Ishiwara Doctrine was eagerly supported by various people in Manchuria. The Kanto Army's officers did not hesitate to follow Ishiwara Doctrine as an up-to-date version of the Japanese Defense Ideology because most Japanese military officers were familiar with that ideology. In particular, to the leaders of the Kanto Army, the Japanese Defense Ideology was not armchair theory but a living issue because, in Manchuria, the Northeastern Army, the Kanto Army, the KMT, the Chinese Communist Party and Soviet power had confronted each other, and the Japanese people had been oppressed by the Manchurian Government. Thus, the leaders of the Kanto Army were attracted to Ishiwara Doctrine and decided to carry out Ishiwara's war plan. Similarly, the Japanese activists in Manchuria-members of the Manchurian Youth League, members of Daihoyu-kai, and civilian comrades of Ishiwara-strongly supported Ishiwara Doctrine and took part in waging the Manchurian War of Independence because the Japanese Defense 7 5 4 Before the Manchurian Incident, while Shidehara Diplomacy was an ideology embraced by the Japanese ruling class, Ishiwara's ideology was not supported by the mainstream of 253 Ideology had been mainly advocated by the Japanese nationalist camp and those activists had tried to embody the ideal of the Japanese nationalists in their activities in Manchuria. In particular, the leading members of the Manchurian Youth League were ardent proponents of their version of pan-Asianism-the Principle of Racial Harmony;755 thus, it was natural for them to support Ishiwara Doctrine. Their support in the fields of civil administration was very useful for accomplishing the Manchurian War of Independence. Moreover, the Manchu, the Chinese, and the Mongolian leaders of the anti-Zhang Xueliang camp were also favorable to the purposes of Ishiwara Doctrine because of not only the practical motivations related to their political ambition but also the Wenzhi-group's political ideal to which they had adhered. In particular, Ishiwara's idea of the dichotomy between the rule of right and the rule of might was consistent with the Wenzhi-group's theory of the ideal state. In addition, we must note that the Principle of Racial Harmony had been initially advocated by the Wenzhi-group. To the Wenzhi-group, the political objective of Ishiwara's war plan was ideal for their Principle of Renunciation of War. Finally, the Kanto Army leaders' advocacy of pan-Asianism aroused the leaders of the anti-Zhang Xueliang camp to follow the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence Japanese leaders. 7 5 5 As my study shows, the Principle of Racial Harmony was an important strategy of the action program of Ishiwara Doctrine, whereas Ishiwara's original ideology--the Principle of National Defense—did not employ pan-Asianism within its overall strategy. 254 because they realized that the Kanto Army leaders' pan-Asianism aimed not only to maintain Japan's national security but also to defend East Asia from Western expansionism. Our observations suggest that one of the most critical reasons for the Ishiwara Doctrine's success was that Ishiwara Doctrine revived the idea of pan-Asianism as a fundamental strategy to maintain Japan's national security. Before Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara adopted the Principle of Racial Harmony, he hoped to maintain Japan's national security by the Japanese military alone; but, his attempt-the Conquest of Manchuria—failed. When he realized the importance of pan-Asianism and combined his Principle of Japan's National Defense with the Principle of Racial Harmony, not only the Kanto Army officers and Japanese nationalists living in Manchuria but also the Manchu, Chinese and Mongolian people who held a grudge against the Zhang Xueliang regime, supported and followed his ideology. In addition, militarily speaking, if Ishiwara had not employed pan-Asianism as his strategy, the Kanto Army could not have allied itself with the Manchurian independence armies and could not have fought against the Northeastern Army. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Ishiwara's adoption of pan-Asianism, which had been devised by the founding-fathers of the Japanese Defense Ideology, was a critical factor in the Kanto Army's victory in the Manchurian War of Independence. All these deductions help to clarify that (1) the War Plan for the Conquest of Manchuria was prescribed by the Principle of National Defense, 255 which lacked pan-Asianism-a component of the Japanese Defense Ideology, (2) the War Plan for the Manchurian War of Independence was prescribed by Ishiwara Doctrine as a 1930's version of the Japanese Defense Ideology, (3) Ishiwara's main motive to stage war was his anxiety over Japan's national defense, (4) the Kanto Army officers readily understood and followed Ishiwara's war plan, fearful for the security of Japan (5) Japanese nationalists in Manchuria took part in the Manchurian War of Independence because Ishiwara Doctrine was a successor to the Japanese Defense Ideology, including pan-Asianism, (6) many politico-military leaders in Manchuria who were apprehensive that the KMT Army and the Soviet Army would aggress against Manchuria supported the Manchurian War of Independence because Ishiwara Doctrine included pan-Asianism, (7) in order to maintain Japanese and/or Manchurian national security, those decision-makers decided to wage war, and (8) the Manchurian Independence Camp could accomplish one of the ideals of Ishiwara Doctrine-the establishment of Manchukuo. Therefore, I conclude that ideological factors played the central role in sparking the Manchurian Incident. 256 (Crisis of Japanese Capitalism) (^Pan-Asianism ^) Economic Expansionism Principle of National Defense Shidehara Pacifism Ishiwara Doctrine T Manchurian War of Independence C Manchukuo ") Manchurian Empire Japanese Capitalism's Acquisition of Market 257 CONCLUSION-II: Most of the major theories of the causes of war are not applicable to the Manchurian Incident. The findings that the Leninist thesis is not appropriate to the interpretation of the causes of the Manchurian Incident do not automatically indicate that the Newtonian research is an ineffectual methodology because there is a possibility that some Newtonian conceptions are relevant to the analysis of the causes of the Manchurian Incident. However, the historical data revealed by this study suggest that the major exponents of Newtonian research cannot properly explain the causes of this war because they focus exclusively on pre-war conditions, and do not deal with the decision-making process. In this section, I will briefly discuss the inapplicability of these theories to the explanation of the causes of the Manchurian Incident, (a) Domke's theory of export and war Domke's theory is indeed applicable to Shidehara's foreign policy and the IJG's decision-making for the following reasons. First, the purpose of Shidehara Diplomacy was to maintain Japanese capitalist interests. In particular, Shidehara regarded trade with China and Manchuria as vital, since for Japanese capitalism the Chinese and Manchurian markets were the most active. In order to retain or expand such trade, Shidehara determined that any military options were out of the question because military conflict with China or Manchuria would seriously harm Japanese trade, but also because military threats could stimulate a Chinese boycott of Japanese products. Thus, he did not identify any military options in his 258 China and Manchuria policy. Second, most of the leaders of the IJG stood by Shidehara Diplomacy, so that the IJG also did not fashion any war plans. That is to say, the IJG had no official plan for aggression against Manchuria. Third, Emperor Hirohito strongly supported Shidehara Diplomacy. Accordingly, most of the leaders of the IJA who fancied themselves to be loyal vassals of the Emperor could not but respect the Emperor's pacifist stand. In addition, the Emperor's prerogative to decide about war and peace was entrusted not to the military leaders but to the Foreign Minister. As a result, the high command of the IJA made no operational plans for aggression against Manchuria. For the above reasons, Tokyo did not want to undertake any military actions in Manchuria and China in order to protect Japanese trade with Manchuria and China. Thus, Domke's theory can be applied to the decision-making of Tokyo. There were, however, other decision-makers-the leaders of the Kanto Army-who could ignite a war although they did not have any official authority to make war. According to Ishiwara's war plans, as reconstructed by this study, it is clear that the leaders of the Kanto Army did not care about whether Japanese trade would be hurt because their main concern was to fortify Japan's defenses. In addition, as we have observed, the trade issue was not a matter of great importance to the leaders of the anti-Zhang Xueliang camp because their motive in forming the Manchurian Independence Camp was to maintain Manchurian security and their own political power. Therefore, the known facts indicate that Domke's theory 259 has no connection with the decision-making of the leaders of the Manchurian Independence Camp. Moreover, as long as we focus exclusively on Domke's theory, we cannot direct our attention to the motives of the politico-military leaders, because matters of trade or economic policy had little bearing on their decision-making process, (b) Theory of domestic stress As economic determinists have emphasized, there was serious domestic stress, caused by the Great Depression, in Japanese society before the Manchurian Incident. However, as already shown, Japanese armaments had been constantly reduced before the Manchurian Incident, and the Wakatsuki Cabinet took no aggressive actions toward China and Manchuria. Similarly, as I have discussed, there was also domestic stress in the Japanese community in Manchuria because the Manchurian Government politically and economically oppressed its Japanese population. Nor did the Japanese civil authorities in Manchuria take any measures to address the harsh situation of Japanese people living in Manchuria. Only a small number of Japanese civilians immigrated to Manchuria, and some Chinese intellectuals living in Manchuria urged that the IJA should use force in Manchuria. At the same time, several officers of the Kanto Army secretly constructed a detailed war plan to overthrow the Manchurian Government. The activities of those pro-war parties, however, were not integral to Japanese state decision-making because none of them had authority to shape Japanese foreign policy formation. Thus, the theory of domestic 260 stress is not applicable to the case of the Manchurian Incident, although it is true that the pre-war condition specified by this theory did exist prior to the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, (c) Theory of lateral pressure According to the economic determinist explanation, there was a kind of lateral pressure—economic expansionism—amongst Japanese capitalists before the Manchurian Incident. Although the Japanese capitalists regarded Manchuria as a "lifeline" of Japanese capitalism, they did not develop any aggressive plans, nor associate with the leaders of the Kanto Army. In other words, their idea of economic expansionism never transformed into concrete actions of territorial expansionism. In addition, lateral pressures did not raise the level of military budgets, nor lead Japan into military alliances. Therefore, even though we can acknowledge the existence of lateral pressure in Japan before the Manchurian Incident, it did not relate to the onset of this war. In addition, so long as we uphold the lateral pressure theory, our argument will not refer to the motives of the leaders of Kanto Army and their collaborators because this theory is based only on socio-economic data; in fact, there are no arguments about politico-military actors in Choucri and North's study on Japan's wars,756 in particular the Pacific War. 7 5 6 Choucri, North, and Yamakage, 1992. 261 (d) Theories of alliances and war Contrary to the theories of alliances and war, Japan was forced to abrogate the Anglo-Japanese mutual assistance pact, which was effective from 1902 through 1921, by the United States. After Japan renounced this alliance, Japan did not enter into any alliances until 1936 when Japan and Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact that pledged mutual assistance against the states of the Communist International. In other words, Japan did not have any alliances before the Manchurian Incident. Thus, alliance formation had nothing to do with the Kanto Army leaders' concern about Japanese defense. The pre-war conditions of this theory did not exist before the Manchurian Incident. (e) Wallace's theory of arms race and war As we have observed, the troop strength of the IJA had been reduced before the Manchurian Incident; similarly, the number of the Imperial Japanese Navy's warships was also reduced by the Washington Conference and the London Naval Conference. In addition, the IJA, including the Kanto Army, did not develop and acquire any state-of-the-art armaments in the pre-war period of the Manchurian Incident. On the other hand, the Northeast Army seemed to have increased its armaments; however, there is no reliable data to illustrate the military build-up of the Zhang Xueliang army. Although we cannot explain the arms build-up of the Manchurian Government, we are able to conclude that there were no mutual or 262 multilateral arms races in East Asia and no unilateral military build-up of the Japanese military. Although it is apparent that the onset of the Manchurian Incident had no connection with the Japanese military build-up, this war was somewhat relevant to the military build-up of the USSR. As we have seen, Ishiwara and other leaders of the Kanto Army were concerned about the Soviet arms build-up that had begun in the late 1920's. One of the reasons that Ishiwara launched the war in 1931 was that the Kanto Army had to take action before the Russian armory was fully stocked. Therefore, the military build-up of the USSR did influence the Kanto Army leaders' decision making.757 Wallace's theory, then, does not apply to the Manchurian Incident, while Diehl's theory is applicable to this war in a limited sense. (f) Galtung's theory of status inconsistency Before the Manchurian Incident, in the 1920's, Japan's politico-military power gave it high status in the world community. When the League of Nations was established, Japan was appointed as a permanent member of the Council of the League of Nations. In the Washington Conference of 1922 and the London Naval Conference of 1930, the Imperial Japanese Navy ranked as the third strongest navy in the world. Therefore, it is unlikely that Japanese leaders were dissatisfied with Japan's recognized status in the 263 international community. On the contrary, some Japanese military leaders must have sensed that Japanese military strength was overrated because, as we have observed, the armaments of the IJA were outmoded and the Japanese military had never developed a new battle-doctrine after their victory in the Russo-Japanese War. In particular, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara and his comrades were aware that the Kanto Army was poorly equipped, so that going against Gultung's theory, they would not have wanted to reveal Japan's "achieved" or actual military strength.758 Therefore, this theory also does not apply to the case of the Manchurian Incident. / ; > / This does not mean that Wallace's theory is directly applicable to the Manchurian Incident, because the USSR was a third party in this war. 7 5 8 Such an attitude is quite natural for the leaders responsible for national defense. For example, German armored forces were overestimated by the international community before the German invasion of Poland and France. German leaders pretended that its panzer divisions and the Luftwaffe were strong both in quality and quantity in order to prevent European rivals from realizing German's "achieved" military strength. 264 CONCLUSION-III: The military view is necessary to social scientific study on the causes of war. In this study, I have demonstrated that the economic determinist interpretation of the causes of the Manchurian Incident-a typical example of the Newtonian research to explain the causes of war-employs a methodologically flawed proposition—the Leninist thesis—and utilizes the Newtonian research. However, I am not arguing that the Leninist thesis is invariably wrong. Instead, my study merely shows that it is not appropriate for the interpretation of the causes of the Manchurian Incident. Similarly, I am not asserting that the Newtonian research is a useless methodology to explain a given war in particular. Instead, my study merely demonstrates that the Newtonian research is not applicable to an analysis of the causes of the Manchurian Incident. My study demonstrates that what Vasquez calls the Newtonian research is inappropriate to the explanation of the causes of the Manchurian Incident; however, we can infer from this study, that a basic analytical stance of the Newtonian researchers of war is problematic. To the Newtonian researchers of war, the motives of the actors who participate in the decision-making process at the onset of war are irrelevant because they presuppose that war is not made; it comes. Accordingly, they overlook a set of actions that connect socio-economic conditions with the war—the decision-making process. 265 I presume that the reason why Newtonian researches neglect to scrutinize the decision-making process is that they adhere to a certain Newtonian conception of the causes of war as their proposition. Because the major Newtonian conceptions focus not on the decision-makers' motives but on the pre-war conditions, the Newtonian researchers are indifferent to the decision-making process. In addition, since those pre-war conditions are usually non-military social phenomena, the Newtonian researchers pay no attention to the military factors. As a result, they ignore the military view. I believe that lack of the military view is a critical methodological flaw because war is significantly influenced by actions taken in the military sphere. Since the economic determinists and other Newtonian researchers ignore the military view, they seem to forget the fact that the subject matter of their research is the war per se. In fact, to the Newtonian researchers, the central matter of concern is not to scrutinize war as such, but to verify whether their proposition is applicable to the explanation of the causes of a given war in particular. Thus, unless they employ a theory that address the military view, they barely examine military factors; accordingly, their explanations of the causes of war are not about war per se. Unlike the Newtonian research, my analytical method did not seek to test any specific propositions; thus, I did not presume any pre-war conditions as determinative. The only premise that I observed was that argued by Clausewitz-No one starts a war without formulating a war plan. 266 Thus, I reconstructed the war plans for the Manchurian Incident in order to isolate the motives of actors, and establish the importance of ideological factors in the causes of this war. Presumably, my non-Newtonian research can be applied to any war as long as there are reliable data regarding the decision-making processes that instigated the war, since every war has its own war plan. I would also note that, although my analytical approach does not intend to focus exclusively on military factors, my approach requires scrutiny of military factors because extensive investigation into military factors is essential to the reconstruction of war plans.759 We, the social scientists of war, must not forget that our subject matter is the war per se; that is, the military factors, and in particular, the decision-makers' motives to resort to war, have to be studied in detail in order to produce social scientific insights into the causes of war. 0 In the case of the Manchurian Incident, war plans were exclusively formed by Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara and his comrades. Since the soldiers made the war plans for the Manchurian Incident, I mainly scrutinized the military factors in order to reconstruct the war plans. However, I believe that war plans are normally formulated by the state authority in charge of foreign policy. 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New Haven: Yale University Press. 281 APPENDIXES 2 8 2 Appendix-1: Glossary I: Institutions Chinese/^SA. WkA. m&m The name of a race, or an ethnic group. In this study, the terminology Chinese does not denote the name of the nation. IJA/B#^SI^m Imperial Japanese Army (1872-1945) Imperial Japanese Government (1868-1945) Jilin Army/^ft^ One of the armies of the Northeastern Army After the Mukden Incident, the Jilin Army commanded by Xi Qia became one of the main forces of the Manchurian independence camp. Kanto Army/^3ft^ A gallison of the Imperial Japanese Army The literature on Manchuria in English use the Chinese pronunciation—"Kwantung" Army—instead of the Japanese pronunciation—"Kanto" Army—in order to denote this garrison. I think that, because this garrison was a Japanese military unit, it should be called by the Japanese pronunciation. KMT/SJS^ *mm&% Kuomintang, The Chinese Nationalist Party KMT was not a political party but a politico-military organization. Manchu/mm&m. ffiA The name of a race, or ethnic group. Manchukuo/^ tftHg An independent state in Manchuria established in March 1932. In March 1934, Manchukuo was transformed into the Manchuria Empire—a 283 Japan's puppet state. Manchurian Army/Jg^Hg^ A standing army of Manchukuo. Manchurian Government/jUjIfljgc^ f The Manchurian Government consisted of the Mukden Government, Jilin Government, Heilongjiang Government and Jehol Government. Each government was a military-government like junta. Mukden Army/^^lfr The core force of the Northeastern Army Northeastern Army/^^tS, 3£ttj2BM The armed forces of the Manchurian Government. It consisted of the Mukden Army, the Jilin Army, the Heilongjiang Army, and the Jehol Army. Northeastern Frontier Defense Army/^tBIRCT See the Northeastern Army The Republic of China 1912 Nanjing Temporary Government 1912-1915 Beijing Government 1916-1927 various governments 1927-1949 Nanjing Government 1949- Taipei Government Zhang Xueliang Government/3g j^|.jgEJff See the Manchurian Government II: Places Angangxi/g^ A city in north Manchuria 284 Beijing/ltJR A city in north China. (The current capital city of the Peoples Republic of China.) Changchun/H# A city of south Manchuria. The northern end of the South Manchuria Railway. China/#3 The name of the place. In this study, the terminology China does not denote the name of the state. Chengde/y£i& A capital city of Jehol Province in south Manchuria. Daliang/*g A port city in Kanto Province (Japanese leasehold). The South Manchuria Railway Company HQ. located in this city. Daxing/^ig A city in south Manchuria Fushun/HJIi A city in south Manchuria Gongzhuling/&zE:$i A city in south Manchuria. The Kanto Army 2 n d Division HQ located in this city. Ha'erbin/H&fg i^ The central city in north Manchuria Haila'er/ifc&M A city in north Manchuria Hailun/$H& A city in north Manchuria Ma Zhanshan Army HQ located in this city 285 Hebei Province/fflJI:^ Northern province of the Republic of China Heilongjiang Province/MSta:^ A Manchurian province in north Manchuria. Huludao/Siitii A trading port in south Manchuria constructed by the Zhang Xueliang Government. Hushitai/^-S A city in south Manchuria J i l i n / § # The capital city of the Jilin Province The Jilin Army HQ. and the Jilin Government located in this city Jilin Province/^#3tf A Manchurian province in south Manchuria. Liaodong Peninsula/jg^^ik Japanese leasehold The Japanese called this area Kanto Province. Liaohe/3t$5J a river in south Manchuria Liaoning Province/jf?^^ A Manchurian province in south Manchuria. Liaoyang/}i|& A city in south Manchuria Lushun/flfcjfg see Port Arthur 286 Manzhouli/^ifflM A city in north Manchuria. Mukden/^^ A capital city of Manchuria and Liaoning Province in south Manchuria. The Northeastern Army HQ, the Manchurian Government, the Mukden Army HQ located in this city. Nanjing/it :§( The capital city of the ROC in middle China. Nanling/^H A city in south Manchuria. Nenjian/SKtL" A river in north Manchuria Port Arthur/Jfcji A fortress city in the southwestern tip of Liaodong Peninsula. The Kanto Army HQ located in this city. Qiqiha'er/5f*iftM The capital city of Heilongjiang Province in north Manchuria. The Heilongjiang Army HQ and the Heilongjiang Government located in this city. Rehe Province/UfcM^ see Jehol Province Shanhaiguan/ \liMffl A city in north China. The boundary between China and Manchuria. Shenyang/JgRi see Mukden Suegongfu/&f|5&fg)& A city in north Manchuria 287 Tanggu/Jgft A city in north China. Taonan/ $i A city in south Manchuria Tieling/tfcit A city in south Manchuria. The Kanto Army Independent Garrisons HQ. located in this city. Ill: People —note-Name (Family name First name) Title: as of the beginning period of the Manchurian Incident. Position: as of the beginning period of the Manchurian Incident. Chiang Kaisheck/^^r^ Chair of the KMT—Chinese Nationalist Party President of the Republic of China Supreme Commander of the KMT Army, Navy, and Air Force Ding Chao/TM A Manchurian warlord Commander of the Eastern-China Railway Garrison of the Northeastern Army Doihara Kenji/±mWM~ Chief of the Kanto Army's Special Agency at Mukden (Colonel) Gu Wei)un/mmm The ROC's Foreign Minister He Yingqin/fflj&ifc KMT Army's 288 Hirohito/TBfc. ^M*§tl The Emperor of Japan The Supreme Field Marshal of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy He supported Shidehara Pacifism, and opposed the war. Honjo Shigeru/;fca:i! Commander-in-Chief of the Kanto Army (Lieutenant General) Ishiwara Kanji/ftW^M Kanto Army H.Q's Staff Officer in charge of the military operations (Lieutenant Colonel) Itagaki Seishir6/&jgMfiB Senior Staff Officer of the Kanto Army H.Q. (Colonel) Kanaya Hanz6/#£r$!E: Chief of the General Staff (Lieutenant General) He opposed to the Kanto Army's actions. Ma Zhanshan/$§£ilj A powerful warlord in north Manchuria The Acting Commander and Premier of Heilongjiang Army/Government After the Battle of Qiqiha'er, he joined the Manchurian independence camp. Matsuki Tamotsu/f&*$ A Japanese lawyer specialized in international law Kanto Army's adviser. Minami Jiro/^&gR War Minister of the Wakatsuki Cabinet (General) He opposed to the Kanto Army's actions. Miyake Koji/HSgftft Chief of Staff of the Kanto Army (Major General) He opposed to the Kanto Army's actions. 289 Tatekawa Yoshitsugu/j£lJl|§i#; Major General (Imperial Japanese Army) Chief of the First Division of the General Staff Wang Yizhe/IJ^I© Major General (Northeastern Army) Commander of the Mukden Army Xi Qia/fSB& Chief of Staff of the Jilin Army A Manchu aristcrat When the Mukden Incident occurred, he was allied with the Kanto Army. Manchurian independence camp Yu Zhishan/^itllj A Manchurian warlord Manchurian independence camp Yu Chonghan/^ ptfigt Manchurian statesman One of the leaders of Wenzhi-group Manchurian independence camp Yuan Zinkai/H^IH Manchurian statesman One of the leaders of Wenzhi-group Manchurian independence camp Zhang Heipen/«$?SI| Manchurian warlord, Mukden Army's General Manchurian independence camp Zhang Xueliang/gg^m Field Marshall of the Northeastern Army The Supreme Commander of the Northeastern Army The Head of the Manchurian Government The Vice-Supreme Commander of the KMT Army, Navy, and Air Force 290 Zhang Zuolin/iatf^ The "King of Manchuria", Father of Zhang Xueliang He established the Manchurian Government supported by the IJA and the IJG. After He, however, tried to expand his territory into China 291 Appendix-2: A Chronological Table 1927 04/12 Chinese Civil War (-1949) 1928 06/04 Zhang Zuolin was assacinated by Japanese conspirators 06/19 Zhang Xueliang succeeded 10/10 Lt.Col. Ishiwara was appointed to the Staff Officer of the Kanto Army HQ, 11/13 Manchuria Youth League was established 12/29 Zhang Xueliang allied himself with Chiang Kaishack 1929 05/14 Colonel Itagaki was appointed to the Senior Staff Officer of the Kanto Army HQ. 07/02 Baron Shidehara took office as the Foreign Minister 07/11 Soviet-Manchurian War 1930 09/nn Captain Sakuma's interim report was submitted 1931 01/24 Dr.Sata lectured to the Kanto Army HQ.on the Manchurian Problem 04/14 General Minami was appointed to the War Minister The Kanto Army's combat unit was cahnged 06/27 Capten Nakamura and his party were murdered 07/02 Wanpaoshan Incident 08/20 Lt. General Honjo arrived at the Kanto Army HQ. 09/18 Lt. General Honjo's inspection was completed The Kanto Army attaked the Mukden Army 09/19 The Manchurian Government fled from Mukden The Northeastern Army HQ fled from Mukden The Kanto Army occupied Mukden The Kanto Army occupied Chanchun after fierce battles 09/21 The Kanto Army advanced to Jilin The Korean Army dispatched reinforcements to Mukden Xi Qia accepted Kanto Army's occupation of Jilin 09/22 Tokyo rejected the Kanto Army's request of reinforcements 292 The Kanto Army HQ. halted the Conquest of Manchuria 09/25 Xi Qia organized Jilin Government 09/28 The Liaoning Maintain Committee declared Liaoning Province's independence Xi Qia declared the Jilin province's independence Zhang Jinghui declared the Dong-Xing Special District's independense. 10/01 Zhang Haipeng declared his army's independence 10/02 "A plan of the settlement of the Manchurian Problems" 10/04 "The Public Announcement of the Kanto Army HQ" was declared. 10/08 Air Strike on Jinzhou 10/15 Battle of Nenjian 10/29 The Kanto Army HQ sent troops to the Nenjian Bridge 11/02 The General Staff prohibited the Kanto Army from attacking the Ma Zhanshan Army. 11/03 South Manchuria Railway Company began to repair the Nenjian Bridge 11 /04 Battle of Daxing 11/05 Ma Zhanshan Army's offensive Extraordinary Order #1 11/06 The Kanto Army defeated the Ma Zhanshan Army Extraordinary Order #2 11/10 Pu Yi (The Last Emperor) escaped from Tianjin 11/14 Extraordinary Order #3 11/16 Extraordinary Order #4 11/17 The Kanto Army HQ decided to occupy Qiqiha'er 11/18 Battle of Qiqiha'er 11/19 The Kanto Army occupied Qiqiha'er 11/20 General Ninomiya, Dupty Chief of the General Staff, arrived at Mukden 11/24 Telegram #163 11/26 Gu Weijun, ROC's Foreign Minister, proposed to neutralize the West Bank 11/27 The Kanto Army HQ sent troops to Tianjin Extraordinary Orders #6, #7, #8 11/28 Extraordinary Order #9 The Kanto Army troops withdraw from West bank 12/10 The League of Nations approved Japan's rights to suppress 293 bandits in Manchuria—the Right to Suppress Banditry 12/11 Wakatsuki Cabinet collapsed Shidehara pacifist diplomacy came to an end 12/13 Inukai Cabinet organized 12/16 The Mukden Provincial Government established 12/17 Anti-Japanese riot in Nanjing 12/23 Inukai Cabinet and the IJA approved the plan for attacking Jinzhou 12/28 The Kanto Army took the offensive against Jinzhou 12/29 The Zhang Xueliang Army began to retreat from Jinzhou 1932 01/01 The Zhang Xueliang Army retreated to China The Manchurian (Jinzhou) Government vanished 01/03 The Kanto Army troops occupied Jinzhou 01/05 The Jilin Army commanded by Xi Qia began to attack anti-independence armies 01/29 The Battle of Ha'erbin 02/05 The Kanto Army and the Jilin Army occupied Ha'erbin 02/07 Ma Zhanzhan entered into an alliance with Manchurian independence camp 02/16 The National Founding Meeting 02/17 The Northeastern Administration Committee was organized 02/18 The Northeastern Administration Committee announced "The Declaration of Independence of the New Manchurian State" 03/01 The Northeastern Administration Committee declared the independence of Manchukuo, and announced "The Declaration of Independence of Manchukuo 03/09 Pu Yi's inaugural ceremony 294 Appendix-3: A List of Primary Sources NOTE-MOST, primary sources were obtained from the following data books. GSS07: Gendaishi-shiryo vol.7: Mansujihen (Data of the Contemporary history vol.7: The Manchurian Incident), edited by Kobayashi Tatsuo and Shimada Toshihiko, 1964, Tokyo: Misuzu-shobo. This data book contains seventy-two (504 pages) primary sources of the Manchurian Incident and twenty (365 pages) primary sources related to the onset of the Manchurian Incident. They were formed before or during the Manchurian Incident. GSS11: Gendaishi-shiryo vol.11: Zoku, Mansujihen (Data of the Contemporary history vol.7: The Manchurian Incident, sequel), edited by Inaba Masao, Kobayashi Tatsuo and Shimada Toshihiko, 1965, Tokyo: Misuzu-shobo. This data book contains eighty-six (889 pages) primary sources of the Manchurian Incident and thirty-five (712 pages) primary sources related to the onset of the Manchurian Incident. Most of them were formed before or during the Manchurian Incident. Sensoshiron: Ishiwara Kanji Shiryo: Sensoshiron. (Writings of Ishiwara Kanji: History of War), edited by Tsunoda Jun, 1967, Tokyo: Hara-Shobo. This book contains Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara Kanji's writings, such as his lecture notes for the Imperial Court and for the Imperial Japanese Army War College, monographs on the Napoleonic wars and the modern European wars, and treatises on Japan's national defense. They were written before the Manchurian Incident. Kokubo-ronsaku: Ishiwara Kanji Shiryo: Kokubo-ronsaku. (Writings of Ishiwara Kanji: National Defense), edited by Tsunoda Jun, 1967, Tokyo: Hara-Shobo. This book contains more than one hundred items of Ishiwara's official and private writings regarding Japan's defense policy and his idea of national security. Twenty-three of the items were written before or during the Manchurian Incident, and are closely related to my investigation of the onset of this war. IKS##: Ishiwara Kanji Senshu. 10 vols.. (The Complete Works of Ishiwara Kanji. 10 vols.), edited by Tamai Rei'ichi, 1993, Kanagawa: Tamai-Labo. Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara's entire personal writings are contained in this series of books. SNGS: Shiryo Nihongendaishi: Manshu-jihen to kokumin doin. (Data sources for the modern Japanese history: The Manchurian Incident and national mobilization.) edited by Fujiwara Akira and Kunugi Toshihiro, 1983, Tokyo:Otsuki Shoten. This book mainly contains documents of the secret police and of the IJA's propaganda. 295 I. Sanbo Honbu/#^#3B (The General Staff) 1927 Manshu no tetsudo Railways in Manchuria. GSS11, pp.103-154 1928 Manmo ni okeru honpo seiryoku no gaiyo Japan's influence in Manchuria. GSS11, pp.155-199 1929a Toshi-tetsudo-jiken ni kanshi Sorenpo no okonaeru gunnji-senden narabini inbo ni kansuru kansatsu Observation of the Soviet military propaganda and plot while the East-China Railway Incident. GSS11, pp.200-204 1930a Seibu-kokkyo homen seki-shi ryogun sento shoho A report of the Soviet-Manchurian War in the Western Front. GSS11, pp.205-225 1931a Manshu wo meguru kokusaisen International competitions consenting Manchuria, published by the General Staff in March 1931 reprint: 1986, Tokyo: Howa-shuppan. 1931b Joseihandan 296 ^ I Situational judgment of 1931. GSS07, pp.165-171 1931c Gunjisenryo no han'i ni tsuite The sphere of military occupation. Inaba, 1972, pp.88-89 1931d Manshu-jihen kaiketsu ni kansuru hoshin The policy to settle the Manchurian Incident. Inaba, 1972, pp.89-90 1931e Jikyoku shori hoan The policy to settle a current situation. Inaba, 1972, pp.99-101 1931f Kanto-gun ni dentatsu subeki jiko Commanding matters to be notified to the Kanto Army Inaba, 1972, pp.105-106 1931g Rinsan'imei kiroku [Hokuman kankei] Records of the Extraordinary Orders [north Manchuria] GSS07, pp.436-450 1931h mmm^mm mmmm Rinsan'imei kiroku [Ryosei kankei] Records of the Extraordinary Orders [western Liaoning] GSS07, pp.451-456 297 19311 Chosengun-shireikan Dokudan-shuppei kannkei kiroku Records of the arbitrary decision of the Korean Army HQ. GSS07, pp.428-435 1935a Manshu-jihen sakusen keika no gaiyo 1 Summary of military operations of the Manchurian Incident 1 published by the General Staff in 1935 reprint: 1972, Tokyo: Gan'nando. 1935b Manshu-jihen sakusen keika no gaiyo 2 Summary of military operations of the Manchurian Incident 2 published by the General Staff in 1935 reprint: 1972, Tokyo: Gan'nando. 1941a Manshu-jihen-shi 1 The history of the Manchurian Incident Vol.1 published by the General Staff in 1941 reprint: 1972, Tokyo: Gan'nando. GSS11, pp.276-283 1941b Manshu-jihen-shi 2 The history of the Manchurian Incident Vol.2 published by the General Staff in 1941 reprint: 1972, Tokyo: Gan'nando. 1941c m'rm^mmnm m) Manshu-jihen ni okeru gun no tosui (an) The military command in the Manchurian Incident (draft)) 298 GSS11, pp.299-523 II. Nihon Teikoku Seifu/g##gj&jff (The Imperial Japanese Government, The IJG) 1931 Manshu-jihen ni kansuru Nihon Teikoku Seifu seimei The Official Announcement of the Imperial Japanese Government concerned with the Manchurian Incident Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Manshu Jihen Maki-1, pp.68-72 III. Ishiwara KanjiX^^MM 1927 Nihon no kokubo Japan's National Defense IKS05, pp.133-152 1929a Senso-shi taikan General Outline of the History of War Kokubo-ronsaku, pp.35-39 IKS03, pp.99-108 1929b Koku'un-tenkai no konpon-kokusaku taru Manmo-mondai kaiketu-an A Plan for the Solution of the Manchurian & Mongolian Problems as a Basic National Policy to revolutionize Japan's destiny Kokubo-ronsaku, pp.40-41 1929c Kanto-gun Manmo ryoyu keikaku The Kanto Army Plan for the Occupation of Manchuria Kokubo-ronsaku, pp.42-45 1930a fJiiiSilTil 299 Kowa yoryo The main point of a lecture Kokubo-ronsaku, pp.46-47 1930b Gunji-jo yori mitaru Nichibei-senso The American-Japanese War from a military viewpoint Kokubo-ronsaku, pp.48-49 1930c Yokoyama kun e To Mr. Yokoyama Kokubo-ronsaku, p. 50 IKS09, pp.41-42 1931a Genzai oyobi shorai ni okeru Nihon no kokubo Japan's Present and Future Defense Sensoshiron, pp422-432 Kokubo-ronsaku, pp. 5 8-6 8 1931b Oshu-senshi kowa ketsuron Conclusions from Lecture on European Military History Kokubo-ronsaku, pp.69-70 1931c Manmd-mondai kaiketsu no tameno senso-keikaku taiko An Outline of the War Plan for Settle of the Manchurian-Mongolian Problems Kokubo-ronsaku, pp.70-73 1931d 300 Manmo-mondai shiken (Manmo keiryaku) Personal Opinions on the Manchurian & Mongolian Problems Kokubo-ronsaku, pp.76-79 1931e Nagata Taisa ate shokan To Colonel Nagata Kokubo-ronsaku, pp.83-84 IKS09, p.43-46 1931f Manmo tochi hoan A plan for governing Manchuria Kokubo-ronsaku, pp.86-87 1931g Manmo-mondai no yukue The Manchurian Problems in the future Kokubo-ronsaku, pp.88-89 1932a Shin-kokka nai ni okeru Nihonjin no chii ni tsuite The place of the Japanese officials in the new state Kokubo-ronsaku, p.93 1932b Manmo no kaihatsu ni tsuite A development project in Manchuria Kokubo-ronsaku, pp.94-95 1932c Manmo to Nihon no kokubo Manchurian and the Japanese national defense 301 Kokubo-ronsaku, p.96 1932d Kantogun no jinji ni tsuite Personnel administration of the Kanto Army Kokubo-ronsaku, p. 103 Ishiwara Diary 5K58WBte (H8W3^10H 1 B~6^9J! 18 0) Diary of Ishiwara Kanji (10/01/1928 - 09/18/1931) Kokubo-ronsaku, pp.3-28 IKS09, ppl25-153 IV. Itagaki Seishir6/&gM£B 1931 Gunji-jo yori mitaru Manmo ni tsuite Manchurian conditions from a military viewpoint GSS07, pp.139-145 V. Kanto Gun Shireibu/^llBj^gB (The Kanto Army HQ) 1929b Shubi-kinmu jo heiki-shiyo jiken shirabe A report of the garrisons' using weapons GSS11, pp.226-238 1930a Saikin 4-nenkan ni okeru Manmo-kankei jiken ichiranhyo A list of incidents in Manchuria for the last four years GSS11, pp.239-258 1930b Manmo ni okeru senryo-tochi ni kansuru kenkyu 302 Study concerning the government of occupied areas in Manchuria & Mongolia Kokubo-ronsaku, pp.52-5 7 1931a Manmo-mondai shori-an A draft of a settlement plan for the Manchurian Problems Kokubo-ronsaku, pp.79-81 1931b Saikin 4-nenkan guntai-kankei juyo-shogai-jiken ichiran-hyo A list of the military incidents for the last four years GSS11, pp.259-275 1931c Josei-handan ni kansuru iken An opinion about the Situational Judgment GSS07, pp.162-163 Kokubo-ronsaku, pp.73-74 1931d Tai-shi-boryaku ni kansuru iken An opinion about the Plot against China Kokubo-ronsaku, pp.74-75 1931D n x m r n (mw6*zsB i uvm Kantogun shokuin-hyo (Showa 6 nen 8 gatsu 1 nichi genzai) A personnel directory of the Kanto Army (as of 08/01/1931) GSS11, pp.959-963 1931e Nakamura Tai'i sosaku ni kansuru ken Investigation of Captain Nakamura 303 Kokubo-ronsaku, p. 82 1931f Manmo-mondai kaiketsu-saku'an A draft of the settlement of the Manchurian Problems GSS07, p. 189 GSS11, p.328 Kokubo-ronsaku, p.85 1931g mmmmmmm Manmo-mondai kaiketsu-an A plan of the settlement of the Manchurian Problems GSS07, pp.198-199 1931h mam^mm U O H 6 B ) Kantogun Shireibu Kohyo (10 gatu 6 ka) Official Announcement of the Kanto Army HQ. (10/06/1931) GSS07, pp.200-201 1931i Kondan jiko yoshi The keynote of an informal talk (with the governor of the South Manchuria Railway Company) GSS07, pp.201-203 GSSll,pp.333-335 1931j Jokyo hokoku A report of the situation GSS07, pp2014-220 1931k Manmo-kyowakoku tochi taiko-an 304 A draft of the general principle of the government of Manchurian-Mongolian Republic GSS07, pp.228-229 19311 Chiho-jichi-shidobu secchi yoryo A guideline for establishing the superintendence division for local autonomy GSS07, pp.236-238 1931m Manmo-jiyukoku setsuritu taiko General principles for establishing the Manchuria-Mongolia Free State GSS07, pp.248-256 1931n U Chukan no shutsuro to sono seiken A come back of Yu Chonghan, and his political opinions GSS11, pp.563-570 1931o Kantogun-shireibu kaikaku an A reform plan of the Kanto Army HQ. 1931p Manshu Totokufu kansei Sanko-an A proposal of administrative organizations of the Manchurian Governor-General GSS07, pp287-290 1931q mmmmmm Manmo kaihatsu hosaku-an A plan for developing Manchurian social infrastructure 305 GSS07, pp291-292 1931r ± * Joso Report to the Emperor of Japan GSS07, pp.293-297 1931s Kinshu kogeki keikaku-an An operational plan for attacking Jinzhou GSS07, pp.301-302 1931t Kantogun-tochibu zantei hukumu shishin The office regulation of the Administrative Division of the Kanto Army HQ GSS07, pp.302 1931u Kantogun-sanbobu-dai3ka gyomu gaikyo A report of the general condition of the third staff section of the Kanto Army HQ. GSS07 pp.302-316 1931v H*¥l!*9B£5c (12 ft 16 0) Kantogun Shireibu Kohyo (12 gatu 16 nichi) Official Announcement of the Kanto Army HQ (12/16/1931) GSS07, p.316 1932a rmmnmm mmi^zRiuzim Kantogun shokuin-hyo (Showa 7 nen 3 gatsu 1 nichi genzai) A personnel directory of the Kanto Army (as of 03/01/1932) GSS11 pp.964-978 306 1932b Kantogun-shireibu kotokan shokuin-hyo (Showa 7 nen 9 gatsu 1 nichi genzai) A personnel directory of the Kanto Army HQ. (as of 09/01/1931) GSS11, p.984 VI. Katakura Tadashi/£-#S 1931 mmm^mmm&utt (£-•-• =) Manshu-jihen kimitu seiryaku nisshi (Vol. 1, 2 & 3) Diary of the military secrets and political maneuvers of the Manchurian Incident (Vol. 1, 2 & 3) GSS07, pp.182-326 1932 mmmwsmmBn mm • m Manshu-jihen kimitu seiryaku nisshi (Vol. 4 & 5) Diary of the military secrets and political maneuvers of the Manchurian Incident (Vol. 4 & 5) GSS07. pp.327-427 VI. Manshu Seinen Renmei/?iffl#£pjiSg (Manchuria Youth League) 1928a Manshu-seinen-renmei Sengen Declaration of the Manchuria Youth League 1928b Manshu-seinen-renmei Kiyaku The statute of the Manchuria Youth League 1931 Tohoku Jiyukoku Koryo General principles for establishing the Northeastern Free State 307 GSS11, pp.561-562 1933 Manshu-seinen-renmei shi The history of the Manchuria Youth League VII. Kenoeitai Shireibu/^j£|^Bj^g|5 Military Police Headquarters Secret Report #494 (9/23/1931) mmmmzmt&Eiw Manshu-jihen ni kansuru hankyo Reaction to the Manchurian Incident SNGS, pp.30-4 Secret Report #548 (9/30/1931) Kokubo-shiso fukyu koenkai no jokyo oyobi sono hankyo A situation of the lecture meeting for propagating a national defense ideology and its reaction SNGS, pp.38-43 Secret Report #390 (10/06/1931) Kokubo-shiso fukyu koenkai no jokyo oyobi sono hankyo A situation of the lecture meeting for propagating a national defense ideology and its reaction SNGS, pp.45-51 Secret Report #658 (10/19/1931) Daicho, Daimai ryosha no jikyoku ni taisuru taido kettei Decision of Asahi-shimbun and Mainichi-shimbun against the current situation SNGS, p.96 Ordinary Report #324 (11/17/1931) Manmo-mondai Kokumin-taikai kaisai 308 The National Rally for the Manchuria-Mongolia Problems SNGS, pp.120-25 309 Appendix-4: A List of Telegrams note The following telegrams are contained in the "Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Manshu-jihen: Maki 1. 3 vols. (The Japanese Diplomatic Documents: The Manchurian Incident: Book 1. 3 vols.)", which were published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1977. These books contain the Japanese diplomatic authorities' entire documents related to the Manchurian Incident that were formed from 19 September 1931 through 22 January 1932. There are 2,964 primary sources in the three volumes, and about one thousand telegrams between Japanese diplomatic authorities in Manchuria and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are directly related to the study of the onset of the Manchurian Incident. Note: Each item's numbering—#n-nnn #n: section of Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Manshu-jihen: Maki 1 nnn: item number The Kanto Army Headquarters #2-188 (10/01/1931) To the Ministry of War #2-202 (10/02/1931) To the Ministry of War #2-476 (10/06/1931) To the Ministry of War Foreign Minister Baron Shidehara Kijuro #2-252 (10/10/1931) To the Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. #3-057 (10/31/1931) Coded/Top Secret To the Japanese Consul General at Mukden & the Japanese Consul at Ha'erbin The Japanese Consul General at Mukden (including the Japanese consuls at Mukden) #1-005 (09/19/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #1-012 (09/19/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #1-061 (09/19/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #1-063 (09/20/1931) 310 To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-430 (09/23/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-431 (09/25/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-433 (09/26/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-434 (09/26/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-440 (09/28/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-453 (09/30/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-461 (10/03/1931) Top Secret To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-473 (10/06/1931) Top Secret To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-480 (10/07/1931) Urgent To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-491 (10/09/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-514 (10/17/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-515 (10/17/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #3-022 (10/18/1931) Coded/Urgent To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-516 (10/19/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #3-033 (10/22/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #3-034 (10/23/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #3-045 (10/27/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #3-047 (10/29/1931) Coded/Top Secret To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-534 (11/05/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara 311 The Govenor-General of Kanto Province #2-460 (10/02/1931) Top Secret To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-483 (10/07/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-489 (10/08/1931) Top Secret To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-490 (10/09/1931) Top Secret To the Foreign Minister Shidehara The Governor of the South Manchuria Railway Company #1-060 (09/19/1931) To Foreign Minister Shidehara #3-190 (11/13/1931) To Prime Minister Wakatsuki & Foreign minister Shidehara The Japanese Consul at Jilin #2-446 (09/29/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-455 (10/01/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-456 (10/01/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-206 (10/03/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-564 (12/04/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara The Japanese Consul at Changchun #1-056 (09/19/1931) To the Prime Minister Wakatsuki & the Foreign Minister Shidehara The Japanese Consul at Tiling #2-106 (09/25/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-154 (09/28/1931) Urgent To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-176 (09/30/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara 312 The Japanese Consul at Xinminfu #2-149 (09/28/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara The Japanese Consul at Andong #2-297 (10/17/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara The Japanese Consul at Niuzhuang #2-210 (10/03/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-216 (10/04/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara The Japanese Consul at Ha'erbin #2-432 (09/25/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-442 (09/28/1931) Top Secret/Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-450 (09/29/1931) Secret To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-467 (10/04/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-474 (10/06/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-482 (10/07/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #3-001 (10/07/1931) Urgent To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #3-003 (10/08/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-498 (10/10/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #3-006 (10/10/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-305 (10/19/1931) To the Foreign Minister Shidehara #2-517 (10/19/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara 313 The Japanese Embassy in Beijing #2-526 (10/29/1931) Coded To the Foreign Minister Shidehara 314 A p p e n d i x - 5 : M a p s LEGEND ABBREVIATIONS Approx Approximate Hq Headquarters Arm Armoured Inf Infantry Arty Artillery Kw Kanto Bks Barracks MG Machine Gun Bn Battalion Mxd Mixed Brig Brigade NE North-East Cav Cavalry Pres Preservation Co Company Prov Provisional Cps Corps Reclam Reclamation Def Defence Ry Gd Independent Det Detachment Railway Guard Div Division Regt Regiment Front Frontier Serv Service Gd Guard Tr Training SYMBOLS Unit, Arms, etc. Patrol »— Small Detachment »•— Company «»«n-Battalion « — Regiment Brigade Division Army Headquarters Miscellaneous Unit Infantry Cavalry Artillery Air Independent Railway Guard Unit •MfflHl- Railway guarded by Independent Railway Guards L I Miscellaneous Arm CD Q CD Q • B EP IZI CD Lines (showing places held, unit areas, etc)  Brigade Area — — • » — — . Division Area » Army Area • o — — Areas of Miscellaneous Unit or Arm 3 1 5 NORTHEAST ASIA -- August 1931 316 317 318 (4) Military Situation in Manchuria before 18 September 1931 Kanto Army \ \ \ \ \ \ \ Northeastern Army Situation before September 18, 1931 Prepared for the Report of the League of Nations Commission of Enquiry (Council Resolution of December 10, 1931) 319 (5) Military Situation in Manchuria - 30 September 1931 Kanto Army, Kanto Army's Allies Zhang Xueliang Armies p - i . H q N E Front Def Army / Jinzhoi **** f / 4 Port Arthur MILITARY SITUATION IN MANCHURIA Situation about September 30,1931 Prepared for the Report of the League of Nations Commission of Enquiry (Council Resolution of December 10, 1931) 320 

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