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The personality features of moral types Newitt, Christopher S. 2002

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The Personality Features of Moral Types by Christopher S. Newitt B. A . Simon Fraser University, 2000 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL F U L F I L L M E N T OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE D E G R E E OF M A S T E R OF ARTS in THE F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES (Department of Psychology) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH C O L U M B I A JULY 2002 © Christopher S. Newitt, 2002 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada DE-6 (2/88) Abstract This study explores the personality features hypothesized to underlie, and differentiate, Kohlberg's moral typology. Kohlberg and colleagues proposed a moral typology, based on Weber's notion of ideal types, to describe the development of autonomous moral reasoning. Kohlberg's typology consists of the heteronomous moral type and the autonomous moral type. The typology is considered a developmental construct; for those individuals who do develop autonomous moral reasoning typically make the transition from heteronomous to autonomous reasoning in adolescence or early adulthood. Autonomous moral reasoning is characterized by an intrinsic moral understanding, balanced perspective-taking, and the fundamental valuing of human rights. Theorists have suggested that Kohlberg's moral typology represents pervasive personality styles. In studying the personality features associated with the moral typology, the intention is to develop a more holistic understanding of moral development and functioning than that offered by strictly rational or affective accounts. In the present study, a range of personality features from across the hierarchical structure of personality was assessed with a sample of 102 undergraduates (25 males, 77 females). Participants in the study completed measures of moral maturity, moral type, the Big-Five personality traits, ego identity status, perceived control, personal strivings, and perspective-taking. The data indicate that the autonomous moral type scored significantly higher than the heteronomous moral type on the measure of moral maturity, perceived personal control, and ego identity status. The results of this study suggest that Kohlberg's moral typology does not represent two pervasive and distinct personality types. However, the results do suggest that the two moral types differ on measures related to the active construction of personal moral meaning, as well as feelings of self-efficacy. Table of Contents Abstract 1 1 List of Tables • i v Acknowledgements v Introduction 1 Method 1 4 Results 1 9 Discussion 24 Summary 31 References 33 Appendix (The Measures) 37 ii i List of Tables Table 1. The Criteria that Define the Moral Typology Table 2. Raw and Adjusted Mean T-Scores for the Big-Five Personality Factors Table 3. Raw and Adjusted Mean Scores for the Domains of Perceived Control. Table 4. Frequency of Levels of Perspective-Taking Table 5. Frequency of Identity Status Categorization Table 6. Raw and Adjusted Mean Dimensional Identity Status Scores Table 7. Raw and Adjusted Mean Frequency of Personal Striving Themes iv Acknowledgements This research was supported by a fellowship awarded by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada to the author. The author would also like to thank Dr. Lawrence Walker for his supervision and support of this project. The author would also like to acknowledge the encouragement and support of research assistant Jessica Smits. Introduction This study is intended to illuminate the personality features that underlie, and differentiate, heteronomous and autonomous moral types. By studying Kohlberg's moral typology through the framework of personality, this study represents the confluence of two underutilized research paradigms in moral psychology. Given the emphasis on moral autonomy in Western thought dating back at least to Kant (1785/1948), it is surprising that relative to Kohlberg's cognitive-structural theory of moral development (Kohlberg, Levine & Hewer, 1983), his theoretical construct of moral types has received scant attention. This situation is made all the more surprising when one considers that the few studies that have focused on the moral types have found that the autonomous moral type is a significant predictor of moral judgment and behaviour consistency (Comunian & Gielin, 2000; Gibbs, Clark, Joseph, Green, Goodrick, & Makowski, 1986; Kohlberg & Candee, 1987). The theoretical and pragmatic importance of a potential moral judgment-behaviour link necessitates the further investigation of Kohlberg's moral types. In selecting a framework to investigate the moral types, I have opted to study the personality features that underlie the moral types. The contemporary tendency in moral psychology to narrowly focus on the rational and interpersonal aspects of morality has limited our understanding of the personality and motivational aspects of morality (for a cogent treatment of this issue, see Walker & Hennig, 1997). It is my hope that by focusing on the personality features associated with Kohlberg's moral types, I will further our understanding of these constructs by elucidating the personality, motivational, and developmental aspects that differentiate the heteronomous and autonomous moral types. Kohlberg's theoretical construct of moral types evolved from his efforts to conceptualize the development of autonomous moral reasoning evident in the content of his participants' moral judgments (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983). Through the ongoing structural refinement of 1 Kohlberg's scoring criteria for his Moral Judgment Interview (MJI), a process that emphasized the distinction between the structure and the content of moral reasoning, the aspects of moral judgment content that signified moral autonomy were discarded from the scoring criteria. Kohlberg sought to recapture the concept of moral autonomy by introducing the notion of substages to his structural model. Kohlberg hypothesized that within each stage there were two functional substages that were interposed between content and structure; he referred to these Substages as A and B. According to the substage model, when individuals make the transition from one stage to the next they enter the new stage at substage A with an unequilibrated or heteronomous understanding of the justice structure (Kohlberg et al., 1983). When the justice structure becomes equilibrated, Kohlberg argued that the individual demonstrated autonomous moral reasoning characterized by prescriptive, universalized choices. Kohlberg dropped the substage approach when empirical studies failed to support the developmental trajectory from Substage A to Substage B within stages (Tappan, Kohlberg, Schrader, Higgins, Armon, & Lei, 1987). The theoretical concept of moral types was introduced by Kohlberg to replace the substage model (Tappan et al., 1987). Based on the construct of an ideal type as elaborated by Weber (1949), Kohlberg's more recent conception of moral autonomy contrasts an ideal autonomous moral type with an ideal heteronomous moral type. In keeping with the substage designations, the heteronomous moral type is referred to as Type A , and the autonomous moral type is referred to as Type B. Utilizing Kant (1785/1948), Piaget (1932/1965), and Baldwin's (1911) definitions of moral autonomy, Tappan et al. (1987) identified nine characteristics of the Autonomous moral reasoning that are presented in Table 1. The essence of Kohlberg's moral types is conveyed in Colby's (1978) discussion of the moral substages: Judgments at substage A tend to stress external considerations or literal interpretations 2 of roles, duties, or rules, and tend to be unilateral and particularistic rather than generalized or universal in orientation. Judgments at substage B, while remaining within the same sociomoral perspective, have developed within that perspective toward greater reversibility, universality, and generalizability, and toward a deeper comprehension of the "spirit rather than the letter" of the rules and roles, (p. 94) Although addressing the moral substages, Colby's observations capture the essential features of the heteronomous and autonomous moral types. Though not strictly hard-structural, Kohlberg's moral typology retains the developmental emphasis of the earlier substage model. Data from Kohlberg's American Longitudinal Study indicates that approximately 30% of individuals made a one-time transition from heteronomous to autonomous during adolescence or early adulthood, approximately 25 to 30 % of individuals began as heteronomous and remained heteronomous across the 20-year duration of the study, approximately 25 to 30% of individuals began the study as autonomous and remained autonomous across the duration of the study, and approximately 10% of the participants in the study demonstrated irregular patterns not expected by a developmental model (Tappan et al., 1987). Additional research suggests that culture and education influence the development of autonomous moral reasoning (Logan, Snarey, & Schrader, 1990; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982). 3 Table 1 The Criteria that Define Moral Autonomy Criterion Description Freedom Autonomous moral judgments are made without reference to unilateral external constraints such as laws or authority figures. Mutual Respect Autonomous judgments emphasize mutual cooperation and relationships. Reversibility Autonomous moral judgments involve reciprocal role taking. The autonomous agent considers the perspectives of others. Constructivism Autonomous reasoners recognize that rules and laws are products of people, and that such rules are flexible and adaptive across different situations. Hierarchy Autonomous judgements present a clear value hierarchy wherein moral values and obligations are placed above pragmatic concerns. Intrinsicalness Autonomous moral judgments are based on the fundamental valuing of people; people are seen as ends in themselves rather than as a means to an end. Prescriptivity Autonomous moral judgments reflect moral obligations that are felt from within; they are a matter of conscience and moral necessity. Universality Autonomous moral agents generalize and universalize judgments such that they apply to all people in similar circumstances. Choice Autonomous moral judgments will correspond with the decisions reached by post-conventional moral reasoning. Note. Adapted from Tappan et al. (1987), p. 349. 4 The moral typology has fared much better than Kohlberg's stage theory in the spotlight of empirical scrutiny. Research has validated the existence of Kohlberg's moral typology across a variety of cultures including Israeli kibbutz (Logan, Snarey, & Schrader, 1990), Turkey (Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982), North America (Tappan et al., 1987) and Europe (Comunian & Gielen, 2000). The studies conducted to date suggest that the moral typology is free from the gender bias often attributed to Kohlberg's cognitive-structural model (Tappan et al., 1987). Also, as noted in the introduction, several studies have identified a positive relation between autonomous moral reasoning and moral behaviour (Comunian & Gielen, 2000; Gibbs et al., 1986; Kohlberg & Candee, 1987). Of particular interest in the context of the proposed study is research conducted by Gibbs et al. (1986). Gibbs et al. (1986) sought to investigate certain personality features thought to be associated with the moral types, as well as the connection between moral reasoning and moral behaviour. Gibbs and Widaman (1982) suggested that autonomous moral reasoning might reflect pervasive social cognitive styles such as field independence and internal locus of control. They believed that these traits were associated with the internalized nature of the autonomous reasoning. Gibbs et al. set out to test the hypothesized relationship between these personality features and Autonomous with a sample of high school students. They found that indeed there were significant relations between field independence and moral type; however, the predicted relation between internal locus of control and autonomous was not supported. The former result is not unexpected; it simply reaffirms the conception of autonomous individuals as autonomous reasoners who are resistant to the constraints of social pressure. The latter finding is somewhat unexpected in that one might presume, as did Gibbs et al., that a sense of self-efficacy is a logical necessity for an autonomous moral agent. Due to the limited number of personality features addressed in this research, these findings, though interesting, do relatively little to 5 expand our understanding of Kohlberg's moral types. Yet, contemporary theorists continue to ponder whether Kohlberg's moral typology signifies distinct personality styles (Bergman, 2002). In order to address the issue of whether Kohlberg's moral typology represents pervasive personality differences it is necessary to construct a comprehensive characterization of the personality structure, such a characterization requires the sampling of features from across the hierarchical organization of the personality. In the present study, I focused on a broader constellation of personality features than those addressed by Gibbs et al. Personality theorists such as McAdams (1995) argue that in order to develop a comprehensive characterization of personality a researcher must sample features from across the hierarchical structure of personality. Dispositional traits, according to McAdams, are "relatively nonconditional, relatively decontextualized, generally linear, and implicitly comparative dimensions of personality" (p. 371). In the present study, I employed the Big-Five personality traits to operationalize the dispositional trait level of personality. McAdams argues that personal concerns differ from traits in that they are contextualized in time, space, and social roles. Personal concerns represent the developmental and motivational aspects of the personality; they are both our goals and the skills we utilize in the pursuit of these goals. In the present study, I measured four constructs from the personal concerns domain: personal strivings, perspective taking, ego-identity status, and perceived control. Sampling personality features from both the trait level and the personal concerns level should provide a sufficient breadth to construct an adequate characterization of personality structure. Five-Factor Model of Personality Traits Within contemporary personality psychology, the Five-Factor Model of personality traits (FFM) is the most widely accepted model of the fundamental dimensions of personality. The F F M is the hierarchical organization of five basic personality traits: extraversion, agreeableness, 6 conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience (McCrae & John, 1992). These five traits, known as the Big Five, were derived through factor analytic procedures so they represent discrete elements of personality. Empirical data support the contention that the F F M provides a comprehensive characterization of personality (Wiggins & Trapnell, 1997). Although there is some disagreement among theorists regarding the relative importance of the F F M in characterizing personality (McAdams, 1995), a strong argument can be made that any satisfactory study of individual differences should incorporate some measure of the Big Five personality traits. A recent study by Walker (1999) demonstrated the utility of the F F M in the moral domain. Walker employed the F F M to measure the differences in the perceived personalities of different types of moral exemplars. The framework of the F F M allowed Walker to compare the exemplar types within a meaningful taxonomy of traits, while also expanding our understanding of the personality features that we attribute to moral, religious, and spiritual exemplars. In another recent study, Matsuba and Walker (2002) compared the personality features of young-adult moral exemplars with a comparison group. They found that moral exemplars scored significantly higher on the agreeableness factor than the comparison group. The F F M framework allows for the comparison of personality types across all five traits, as well as comparisons within specific traits. Given the definitions of Kohlberg's moral types, it is possible to formulate several testable hypotheses. First, since the moral autonomy that characterizes autonomous is thought to reflect a more appropriate or morally mature perspective, one could argue that in general the autonomous individual should score higher on the positive poles of each of the Big-Five factors. In particular, I expect to find differences on the dimension of openness to experience. According to McCrae and Costa (1997), "openness is a matter of inner experience, mental phenomena related to the scope of awareness or the depth and intensity of consciousness" (p. 835). In other 7 words, openness to experience reflects permeable cognitive structures. Those who are high in openness are thought to be more open to the thoughts and ideas of others, to have more access to their own mental processes, and to actively seek out novel experiences (McCrae & Costa, 1997). The open and reflective cognitive style and intrinsic motivation associated with openness seem to resonate with Tappan et al.'s (1987) description of the autonomous moral agent. For this reason, I expect the autonomous individuals to score higher on the openness to experience dimension than the heteronomous individuals. Given Matsuba and Walker's finding, i f agreeableness is related to moral behaviour, and moral autonomy is related to moral behaviour, it is possible that moral autonomy could be related to the positive pole of the personality factor agreeableness. Perceived Control Gibbs et al. (1986) included a measure of locus of control in their study of the personality features associated with moral types because they believed that internal locus of control "may be associated with the 'internal' appeal to conscience, values, or standards of integrity in Type B moral reasoning" (p. 186). As noted earlier, the results from Gibbs et al. (1986) did not support the proposed relation. There is the possibility, of course, that the findings from Gibbs et al. (1986) may be attributable to the measure they employed to tap the construct of locus of control rather than the absence of the hypothesized relation. As scholars in the area note, locus of control is a multidimensional construct (Paulhus, 1983). The various measures of locus of control tap very different aspects of the construct. The measure used by Gibbs et al. (1986) was designed by Levenson (1981) to measure the degree of control participants attributed to powerful others, to chance, or to themselves. Paulhus (1983) has argued that such monolithic measures of locus of control cannot accurately characterize an individual because they do not account for the variation in perceived control across the different domains of personal 8 functioning. As such, Paulhus and Van Selst (1990) have constructed a measure called the Spheres of Control-3 (SOC-3) that assesses perceived control in three distinct spheres of individual functioning: personal control, interpersonal control, and sociopolitical control. In this study, I revisit Gibbs et al.'s (1986) hypothesis regarding the relation between internal locus of control and Autonomous moral reasoning; however, I wil l employ the SOC-3 to measure locus of control. I expect to find that in general Autonomous individuals demonstrate more perceived control than heteronomous individuals. I also expect there to be differences between the moral types on the individual scales. Since the personal control items in the SOC-3 appear to tap the self-efficacy concerns that were central in Gibbs et al.'s belief that autonomous individuals would demonstrate high locus of control, I expect to find that autonomous individuals score higher in the domain of personal control than heteronomous individuals; and, given the finding of Kohlberg and Candee (1987) that autonomous individuals were more likely to engage in sociopolitical actions, it is possible that autonomous individuals could score higher than heteronomous individuals on the sociopolitical control scale. Theoretically, there is no obvious reason to expect differences between the moral types on the interpersonal control scale of the SOC-3. Ego-Identity Status The theoretical connection between morality and identity has been the subject of considerable theorizing, but surprisingly little empirical investigation (see Noam & Wren, 1993, for a discussion of the issues related to moral identity). Any attempt to address this relation is immediately faced with predicament of how best to operationalize identity. Amongst those who study identity, there is little consensus on the most valid or efficient means of characterizing identity. For the purposes of the present study, I have chosen to characterize identity through the framework of Marcia's (1966, 1980) Identity Status Model of identity development. I have 9 chosen to work within Marcia's framework because it has previously been applied to the relation between moral maturity and identity (Rowe & Marcia, 1980). Marcia's model assigns individuals to one of four identity statuses on the basis of their exploration of alternative identity structures, and their subsequent commitment to these structures. In this model, exploration and commitment are represented as being continuums from high to low; when the two continuums are crossed, they form four identity statuses. Individuals who have demonstrated a high degree of exploration and high subsequent commitment are referred to as identity achieved, those who are high in exploration but low in commitment are referred to as being in a moratorium, those who demonstrate low exploration but high commitment are referred to as foreclosed, and finally those who are low on both exploration and commitment are referred to as experiencing identity diffusion (Marcia, 1988). Marcia (1988) has argued that cognitive, identity and moral development all occur through the process of interiorization. By this, Marcia meant that development in each of these areas moves from initial reliance on the external world (sensorimotor period, conferred identity, and heteronomous moral stage) to an end state wherein the individual can recreate the external world, and abstract potential external worlds, internally (formal operations, achieved identity, and post-conventional moral reasoning). Rowe and Marcia (1980) sought to investigate the potential relations among these constructs. Of particular relevance to the present study was Rowe and Marcia's finding of a significant relation between post-conventional moral reasoning and the achieved identity status. However, I question whether they were measuring post-conventional moral reasoning or moral autonomy, as presently understood. In their sample, Rowe and Marcia found that 6 of 26 participants were scored as demonstrating post-conventional moral reasoning. Such a high incidence of post-conventional reasoning is far beyond what might be expected from a sample of undergraduate university students (Colby & 10 Kohlberg, 1987). However, the scoring was conducted with an early form of Kohlberg's scoring criteria that failed to fully differentiate the structure and content of moral reasoning. I believe that Rowe and Marcia found a relation between identity achievement and moral autonomy rather than with post-conventional moral reasoning. In the present study, I hope to demonstrate this relation between identity achievement and moral autonomy. However, given that the moratorium status is characterized by an internally directed exploration of identity alternatives, there is reason to believe that it to may be related to moral autonomy, albeit to a lesser extent than the achieved identity status. Matsuba and Walker examined the relationship between ego identity status in a group of young-adult moral exemplars and a comparison group. In their analysis, Matsuba and Walker used the raw identity scores for each of the statuses to compare groups. They found that the exemplars scored significantly lower on the diffusion and foreclosure scores. In the present study, I expect to replicate their findings, with the autonomous moral type scoring lower on the developmentally immature identity statuses and higher on the more mature statuses. Perspective-Taking Perspective reversibility, or the ability to balance the perspectives of others, is a central concept in the characterization of the autonomous moral type. Tappan et al. (1987) argue that autonomous moral judgments are reversible because they involve "reversible and mutual role-taking" (p. 349). The ability to balance perspectives would appear to be a required skill for the development of the mutual respect for others that characterizes the moral reasoning of Autonomous individuals. Colby and Kohlberg (1987) have argued that there are many distinct, but related, forms of perspective-taking. They argued that moral perspective-taking was distinct from social or spatial perspective-taking. Walker's (1980) study of the relations amongst cognitive, perspective-taking and moral development confirms that perspective-taking skills are 11 a necessary, but not sufficient, requirement for moral development. However, the moral perspective-taking discussed by Colby and Kohlberg characterized the stages of their structural model of moral development, and since the moral types represent a distinct formulation of moral maturity, it might be necessary to conceive of a different form of perspective taking that follows from the definition of moral autonomy. Since by definition autonomous moral agents demonstrate reciprocal role-taking and mutual respect while constructing internally oriented moral judgments, their perspective-taking capacity should demonstrate the ability to interpret, evaluate and integrate distinct and potentially discrepant points of view. Although not explicitly a perspective-taking theory, Leadbeater and Kuhn's (1989) analysis of the interpretation of discrepant narratives provides a suitable framework to operationalize the balanced perspective-taking of autonomous moral agents. Leadbeater and Kuhn (1989) were interested in how people interpret and resolve discrepant narratives. Such situations are common in daily life. We are often faced with conflicting information about the same situation. How is it that we reconcile this information to construct our understanding of the real nature of the events? Leadbeater and Kuhn argue that "the problem of constructing an interpretation of what 'actually happened' from discrepant narratives involves a hermeneutic process, and that central to this are the abilities to differentiate and reconcile the dialectic between fact and theory" (p. 177). Through their empirical work, Leadbeater and Kuhn were able to describe the developmental progression of these skills through six levels. The skills measured by Leadbeater and Kuhn reflect the perspective-taking skills required by the autonomous moral agent. As such, I believe that autonomous individuals will demonstrate a higher level of functioning on Leadbeater and Kuhn's task than will heteronomous individuals. Personal Strivings 12 In 1937, Gordon Allport wrote, "the problem of motivation is central to the psychological study of personality" (p. 196). However, in the years that followed, interest in the role of motivation in personality organization waned. Over the past two decades, there has been a resurgence of interest in this field of study. Several new constructs operationalizing motivation have emerged within personality psychology. Among these new constructs is Emmons' (1989, 1999) Personal Strivings approach. According to Emmons (1988), "personal strivings are idiographically coherent patterns of goal strivings that represent what an individual is typically trying to do" (p. 92). These strivings are construed as unifying constructs that "render a cluster of goals functionally equivalent for an individual" (Emmons, 1989, p. 92). Thus, a striving imbues a group of potentially disparate thoughts, behaviours or emotions with a common theme. Emmons (1999) argues that personal strivings represent motivational organizing principles that structure the individual's daily existence as well as their orientations toward the future. Emmons' (1989, 1999) research has focused primarily on the relation between subjective well-being and personal strivings; nevertheless, he believes that the data he has collected over a period of 10 years strongly support his contention that personal strivings, and goals in general, play a central role in structuring one's life. To date, there have been no empirical studies published that explore the relation between personal strivings and moral reasoning. However, in considering the definition of moral autonomy and the coding criteria for the personal strivings list, it is possible to generate several hypotheses for this aspect of the study. The autonomous individuals should demonstrate more personal strivings that reflect themes of self-sufficiency/independence than heteronomous individuals. Also, given Gibbs et al.'s (1986) finding that autonomous individuals demonstrate higher field independence than heteronomous individuals (indicating resilience to conformity pressures), I expect autonomous individuals to report fewer personal strivings with self-13 presentation themes. In addition, the participants' personal strivings lists will be coded for themes of achievement, affiliation, and power assertion because they are classic motivational themes. To briefly summarize then, I expect heteronomous and autonomous moral types to differ in terms of several personality dimensions. First, I expect the autonomous Type B individuals to score higher on the positive poles of the Big-Five dimensions in general, and on the dimensions of openness to experience and agreeableness in particular. M y second hypothesis returns to Gibbs et al.'s (1986) contention that an internal locus of control seems to be a logical necessity for an autonomous moral agent. I believe that autonomous individuals will demonstrate higher levels of perceived control in general; and in particular, I believe that autonomous individuals will demonstrate higher levels of perceived control in the personal and sociopolitical domains. M y third hypothesis concerns the relation between identity and moral autonomy. I expect to find a significant relation between the identity achievement status and to a lesser extent the moratorium status, and moral autonomy. I also expect the autonomous moral types to score lower on identity diffusion and foreclosure statuses. M y fourth hypothesis concerns perspective-taking ability; I expect that the morally autonomous type wil l score higher on Leadbeater and Kuhn's (1989) measure of the ability to interpret discrepant narratives, a reflection of perspective-taking ability, than the heteronomous moral type. And finally, I expect that the morally autonomous individuals will produce personal strivings lists with more goals reflecting self-sufficiency/independence themes and fewer goals with themes of self-presentation. Method Participants 14 Participants in this study consisted of 102 undergraduate psychology students (77 female and 25 male) with a mean age of 20.8 years (SD = 2.91). Participants were recruited through the University of British Columbia voluntary subject research pool and received course credit for their participation. Tappan et al. (1987) suggest that the developmental transition from heteronomous moral type to autonomous moral type occurs in late adolescence or early adulthood for those who experience this transition. As such, the undergraduate population represents the ideal population in which to measure the personality features associated with the moral typology. Procedure Students were recruited for the study with a poster that requested participants for a study on personality styles. Having signed up for a research sitting, and having given their informed consent, participants completed a questionnaire package in groups of up to five people. The ordering of the questionnaires within the package was held constant. Production measures such as the SRM-SF, the Personal Strivings List, and the Fifth Livian War task were completed first to avoid the possibility of participant fatigue. The author monitored each sitting. Measures The measures are presented in the Appendix. Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF). The SRM-SF (Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992) is a pencil-and-paper production task designed to measure moral maturity within the context of the first four stages of Kohlberg's stage model. The format of the SRM-SF is well suited to group administration. The SRM-SF consists of 11 brief contextual statements based on the moral norms from Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) scoring manual. The values reflected in these statements emphasize truth, contract, property and law, affiliation, and legal justice respectively (Basinger, Gibbs, & Fuller, 1995). For each statement, participants must indicate 15 whether the value in the statement is "very important, "important", or "not important". The participants are then asked to justify their evaluations. SRM-SF scores can be reported as the Sociomoral Reflection Maturity Score (SRMS), which is simply the means of the item ratings, providing an index of moral stage maturity. The SRM-SF coding scheme also allows for the scoring of Kohlberg's moral typology. Gibbs et al.'s scoring scheme measures moral type by identifying moral judgments that exhibit balanced perspective taking, fundamental valuing, and aspects of conscience. To be categorized as Autonomous, an individual must demonstrate at least two of the three criteria in their protocols, otherwise they are scored as Heteronomous. The SRM-SF has demonstrated acceptable test-retest and spilt-half reliability (Gibbs et al., 1992). The coding scheme for the SRM-SF has demonstrated high interrater reliability even with inexperienced coders (r = .94) (Gibbs et al., 1992). Basinger et al. (1995) found high concurrent validity between the SRM-SF and the Moral Judgment Interview (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Furthermore, Basinger et al. (1995) found that the SRM-SF was effective in discriminating moral maturity across age groups and between delinquent and non-delinquent adolescents, suggesting sufficient construct validity. In the present study, inter-rater reliability, based on a randomly selected sample of 30 questionnaires, for SRMS scores was r = .91. Inter-rater reliability for Moral Type categorization was K = .86. Interpersonal Adjectives Scales Revised- Big Five (IASR-B5). The IASR-B5 (Wiggins, 1995) is a 124-item adjective checklist that provides ratings for each of the five dimensions of the five-factor model of personality. Participants are asked to rate on an 8-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 {extremely inaccurate) to 8 {extremely accurate), how accurately each of 124 adjectives describes them personally. A complete index of the adjectives and their definitions is provided to each participant to ensure comprehension and consistent definitions. Trapnell and 16 Wiggins (1990) found that the IASR-B5 demonstrated internally consistent scales, as well as adequate concurrent and discriminant validity when contrasted with comparable measures of the Five-Factor Model. The scoring of the IASR-B5 yields T scores for each of the Big-Five personality traits (M- 50, SD = 10). Spheres of Control -3 (SOC-3). The SOC-3 (Paulhus & Van Selst, 1990) is a 30-item self-report measure designed to assess individuals' perceived control in three domains of behaviour: personal control, interpersonal control, and socio-political control. Participants are asked to indicate the degree to which short statements such as, "I can usually achieve what I want when I work for it" (Paulhus & Van Selst, 1990; p. 1033), reflect their thoughts and feelings on a 7-point scale from 1 (totally inaccurate) to 7 (totally accurate). The SOC-3 provides scores for each of the three domains, as well as an overall score. Paulhus and Van Selst (1990) report findings of high internal consistency within the content domains of the SOC-3, and high concurrent validity with comparable measures of locus of control. Expanded Objective Measure of Ego-Identity Status-Second Revision (EOMEIS-2R). The EOMEIS-2R (Adams, Bennion, & Huh, 1989) is a 64-item self-report measure of ego-identity status. Participants are asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree) the extent to which the statements in the measure correspond to their thoughts and feelings. The statements used in the measure are drawn from the interpersonal and ideological content domains. An example of an interpersonal item is "I haven't thought too much about the roles of husbands and wives in marriage" (Adams et al., 1989). The EOMEIS-2R can be coded dimensionally to reflect the participant's continuous scores within each of the identity statuses, or it can be used to categorize participants into a specific identity status. 17 The E0MEIS-2R has demonstrated sufficient internal, split-half and test-retest reliability (Adams et al., 1989). Studies have also revealed reasonable concurrent validity between the EOMEIS-2R and Marcia's Ego-Identity Status Interview (Adams et a l , 1989). Fifth Livian War Task (Perspective-taking). The Fifth Livian War task employed in the current study was derived from the work of Leadbeater and Kuhn (1989). The participants are presented with two divergent written accounts of a fictional war between North and South Livia. Having read the accounts, the participants are asked to describe the fifth Livian War, to explain who won the war and why the war ended, and then they are asked whether there are any significant differences in the two accounts and whether they both accounts could be correct. The participant's responses are coded in terms of their epistemological understanding as defined in Leadbeater and Kuhn's (1989) six-level model of epistemological development. Thus, subjects are scored as demonstrating a particular level of epistemological understanding from Level 0 to Level 5. Inter-rater reliability on Fifth Livian War task scores, calculated with a random sample of 30 questionnaires, was found to be K = .82. Personal Strivings List (PSL). The PSL (Emmons, 1999) is a sentence completion task designed to elicit personal strivings or goals from across the individual's academic, occupational and interpersonal domains of functioning. The PSL includes very detailed instructions that define a personal striving, provide examples of strivings, and encourage the participant to consider strivings from across the domains of their lives. Participants complete at least 10 sentences beginning with the stem "I typically try to...". Personal strivings were coded for five themes: achievement, affiliation, power, self-presentation, and self-sufficiency/independence. The coding criteria for the Personal Strivings List are outlined in Emmons (1999) manual. 18 Analysis of the scoring on a random sample of 30 questionnaires indicated that the inter-rater reliability for achievement strivings was r = .85, r = .89 for affiliation strivings, r = .83 for power strivings, r = 87 for self-sufficiency strivings, and r = .85 for self-presentation strivings. Results Before analyzing the data from the measures, a Chi Square analysis was conducted to ensure that the two groups (heteronomous and autonomous moral types) were equivalent in age and gender; the results indicated that there were no significant differences on these demographic variables. Moral Maturity. Previous research has demonstrated a significant relation between moral maturity scores and moral type with high moral stage reasoning associated with autonomous moral type. In order to identify the personality features associated with moral type, it is necessary to ascertain the relation between moral maturity and moral type such that the influence of moral maturity may be partialled out of any analysis. In comparing the moral maturity scores for the moral types it was found that the autonomous moral type (M= 300.14, SD = 19.19, N = 49) demonstrated significantly higher SRMS scores than those of the heteronomous type (M = 270.81, SD = 21.27, N = 53), t (100) = -7.291,/? < .001. Further analysis revealed a highly significant correlation between moral maturity and moral type, r (101) = .59, p < .01. As such, in all subsequent analyses, the variance in moral type attributable to moral maturity will be partialled out. Big-Five Personality Traits. The participants' scores on the Big-Five personality traits are reported in Table 2. The personality trait data were analyzed with a M A N O V A with the Big-Five traits as dependent variables, moral type and gender were the independent variables, and moral maturity as a covariate. The Pillai's Trace multivariate analysis indicated that there were no significant differences on the trait scores between the two moral types, F (5, 95) = 1.14,/? > 19 .30. Similarly, the predicted differences were not significant for openness to experience, F (1, 99) = 1.83,/? > .10, d = .13, nor were they significant for the agreeableness factor, 99) = J46,p > .30, d = .08. When the variance due to moral maturity is not partialled out, the multivariate analysis indicates a significant main effect for moral type F (5, 95) = 2.86,p < .05. Follow-up univariate analyses revealed that the autonomous moral type scored significantly higher on the measures of openness to experience, F (1, 98) = 8.24,/? < .01, d = .27, as well as the measure of agreeableness, F (1, 98) = 5.00, p < .05, d = .22. Table 2 Raw and Adjusted Mean T-Scores for the Big-Five Personality Factors Heteronomous Type Autonomous Type M SD Madj M SD Madj d adj Op. 47.37 10.38 47.05 52.84 8.82 51.53 .13 Ag. 47.80 9.97 47.86 52.38 10.52 49.42 .08 Co. 48.35 8.92 47.93 51.79 10.86 52.14 .16 Ex. 49.87 10.06 49.60 50.14 9.23 50.81 .0 Es. 48.85 9.84 48.61 51.25 10.12 51.51 .12 Note. Personality factor scores are presented as T-Scores with M of 50 and SD of 10. The variance attributable to moral maturity has been removed from the adjusted means. Perceived Control. The data regarding the participants' perceived control derived from the SOC-3 are reported in Table 3. Differences in perceived control between the two moral types were analyzed with a M A N O V A with the three domains of perceived control as dependent variables, moral type and gender as independent variables, and moral maturity as a covariate. As predicted, the Pillai's Trace revealed a significant main effect for moral type across domains of perceived control, F (3, 97) = 2.707, p < .05, d = .28. Subsequent univariate analysis indicated 20 that there was a significant difference in perceived personal control between the autonomous and heteronomous moral types, F(l, 99) = 7.571,p < .01, d = .26. No other significant differences were detected. Table 3 Raw and Adjusted Mean Scores for the Domains of Perceived Control Heteronomous Type Autonomous Type M SD Madj M SD Madj d adj Personal 45.81 6.69 46.06 50.84 6.59 50.56 .27 Interpersonal 45.98 8.73 47.00 49.69 8.71 48.59 .08 Sociopolitical 36.66 6.32 37.35 39.43 7.27 38.68 .08 Note. Variance attributable to moral maturity is removed from adjusted means. Perspective-Taking. For the Fifth Livian War task, two Heteronomous and one Autonomous participants provided unscorable protocols. The distributions of perspective-taking scores derived from the Fifth Livian War task are presented in Table 4. Table 4 Frequency of Levels of Perspective-Taking Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Heteronomous Type 1 9 36 5 Autonomous Type 0 2 32 14 Note. Figures indicates the number of participants scored at each level of perspective-taking. The data indicates that the majority of the participants scored at Level 3 of Leadbeater and Kuhn's model. Few participants categorized as Heteronomous scored at Level 4 of the model; however, the significance of this result is not clear. It appears that the relationship between moral 21 type and perspective-taking was inflated by the shared variance between moral type and moral maturity. The partial correlation between moral type and perspective-taking, partialling out the variance attributable to moral maturity, was non-significant, pr (96) = .14, p > .10. Identity Status. The scoring procedure for the E0MEIS-2R provides category ratings for the four pure identity statuses diffusion, foreclosure, moratorium and identity achievement, as well as a fifth low-level moratorium status for participants whose scores do not reach the critical level in any of the four primary categories. Since the low-level moratorium status does not correspond to Marcia's model, it was deemed prudent to attempt to combine the two moratorium statuses. A M A N O V A was conducted with these two identity statuses as the independent variable, and all of the outcome variables for the study as dependent variables. The analysis indicated that there were no significant differences, so the two moratorium statuses were combined for all analyses. Table 5 presents the distribution of the participants into the four identity status categories. One autonomous participant was removed from the analysis for failing to provide scorable data. Table 5 Frequency of Identity Status Categorization Diffusion Foreclosure Moratorium Achievement Heteronomous Type 23 2 23 5 Autonomous Type 8 1 31 8 A chi-squared analysis was conducted to compare the two distributions, the analysis indicated that the two distributions were significantly different, X2 (3, N =101) = 8.598,p < .05. Further analysis indicated that the distribution of identity status scores did not differ across genders. In 22 order to identify potential differences in raw identity status scores, a M A N O V A was conducted with raw identity status scores as the dependent variables, moral type and gender as independent variables, and moral maturity as a covariate. The dimensional identity status scores that are used to categorize individuals are presented in Table 6. The Pillai's Trace indicated that the main effect for moral type across the dimensional measure of the identity statuses was nonsignificant, F (4, 93) = 2.124,/? > .05, d = .28. However, since differences were hypothesized within the diffusion and moratorium raw scores, univariate analyses were conducted on these elements. The follow-up analysis revealed that the autonomous moral type scored significantly lower on the diffusion scores than the heteronomous type, F (1, 96) = 6.709, p = .01, d— .25. Table 6 Raw and Adjusted Mean Dimensional Identity Status Scores Heteronomous Type Autonomous Type M SD Madj M SD Madj d adj Diffusion 51.72 8.21 51.98 46.55 9.39 46.29 .25 Foreclosure 38.20 9.87 37.20 31.88 12.34 32.90 .16 Moratorium 54.40 8.75 54.26 52.51 10.62 52.65 .07 Achievement 60.12 9.35 60.60 62.08 8.41 61.59 .04 Note. Variance attributable to moral maturity is removed from the adjusted means. Personal Strivings. The results of the participants' personal striving lists are presented in Table 7. A M A N O V A analysis with the personal strivings coding schemes as dependent variables, moral type and gender as the independent variables, and moral maturity as a covariate was conducted. The Pillai's Trace multivariate test revealed that there was no significant main 23 effect for moral type across the personal strivings themes, F (5, 91) = 1.195,/? > .30. Nor were there any significant differences between the moral types on any of the specific goal themes. Table 7 Raw and Adjusted Mean Frequency of Personal Striving Themes Heteronomous Autonomous M SD Madj M SD Madj dadj Achievement 2.16 1.35 2.23 2.09 1.33 2.01 .06 Affiliation 3.06 1.80 3.06 3.79 1.57 3.78 .17 Power 1.22 1.36 1.20 1.00 1.46 1.02 .05 Self-presentation 2.92 1.70 2.94 2.91 1.84 2.90 .0 Self-sufficiency 1.12 1.09 1.23 0.81 1.11 .77 .17 Note. Means indicate the mean frequency of each type of goal for each participant. Variance attributable to moral maturity is removed from adjusted means. Discussion The results of this study provide mixed support for the hypothesized outcomes. The autonomous moral type did score higher than the heteronomous moral type on positive pole of each of the Big-Five dimensions; however, none of these differences was statistically significant. It was also predicted that the autonomous moral type would score significantly higher than the heteronomous type on the Big-Five traits of openness to experience and agreeableness (nurturance on the IASR-BF). The results indicated that there were no differences between the two groups on any of the Big-Five traits. This finding was quite unexpected given the results of Matsuba and Walker (2002) as well as those of Walker (1999). Perhaps the two moral types do not differ at the trait level of personality. If this is the case, does this finding preclude us from calling any further observed differences in personality structure pervasive differences? To be 24 considered pervasive, surely a difference must transcend the hierarchical structure of personality. However, before leaping to any unwarranted assertions, it is necessary to mention the possibility that the measure employed in this study could have contributed to these findings. Matsuba and Walker employed the NEO-PI-R measure of the F F M in their research; the correlations between the Big-Five trait measures on these two instruments are adequate, ranging from r = .65 to r = .75 (Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990), but certainly not exact. Moreover, using the NEO-PI-R would have allowed for more fine grained analyses of the facets that underlie each personality factor, which could potentially have provided useful information. Potential measurement issues aside, the data do not currently support the notion that Kohlberg's moral types differ at the trait level of personality, beyond that explained by moral maturity level. The second hypothesis of this study predicted that the morally autonomous type would score higher on levels of perceived control, particularly perceived personal control, than the morally heteronomous type. The data indicates that the autonomous moral type demonstrated significantly higher levels of perceived personal control than the heteronomous moral type; however, there were no significant differences between the two moral types in the interpersonal or sociopolitical domains of perceived control. Nevertheless, these results support Gibbs and Widaman's (1982) assertion that locus of control or perceived control is a central feature of moral autonomy. To Gibbs and Widaman, perceived control is manifested in the active and independent thinking of the autonomous moral agent. Of course, the present findings challenge the results reported by Gibbs et al. (1986) that suggested that there was no relationship between moral autonomy and locus of control. The differences in the results can be explained by two factors: the measure of locus of control (perceived control) and the samples employed in each study. As noted earlier, the SOC-3 emphasizes perceived control in different domains of functioning. This specificity allowed the 25 measure to identify the particular domain in which the moral types differed, a level of analysis that was not available to Gibbs et al. Also, Gibbs et al. employed a sample of high school students who presumably would have been beginning the transition from heteronomous to autonomous moral reasoning. The sample in the present study, undergraduate university students, in all probability would have experienced more personal freedom and autonomy than their high school counterparts and they would have had more time, and educational opportunities, to facilitate the transition from heteronomous to autonomous reasoning. The third hypothesis of this study predicted that moral autonomy would be strongly related to the more developmentally advanced identity status categories of moratorium and achievement; and that the autonomous moral types would score higher on the dimensional scores for identity achievement and moratorium, and lower on the dimensional scores for diffusion and foreclosure. The analysis supported the relationship between moral autonomy and the advanced ego identity statuses. Moreover, the present study challenges Rowe and Marcia's finding of a relationship between moral maturity and ego identity status. The correlation between the measure of moral maturity (SRMS) and ego identity status category was nonsignificant, r = .14. Perhaps the developmental progression from heteronomous reasoning to autonomous reasoning better reflects the process of progressive interiorization that Rowe and Marcia sought to capture. The comparison of dimensional identity scores produced mixed results. The autonomous type did score lower on raw diffusion scores, but not on foreclosure scores. The low diffusion scores probably reflect the active and independent thought processes described by Gibbs and Widaman. In general, the theoretical correspondence between the constructs of moral autonomy and identity achievement (as well as moratorium, i f it is considered the path to an achieved identity) seems obvious. Both constructs reflect individuals who actively construct and integrate their own personal values and principles. 26 The fourth hypothesis in the present study predicted that the autonomous moral type would score higher on a measure of perspective-taking than the heteronomous moral type. The results from the study did not support the hypothesis. There were no differences in perspective-taking that were attributable to moral type, beyond that explained by moral maturity. There was however a significant relationship between moral maturity and perspective-taking even when the effects of moral type were partialled out, pr = .22, p < .02. The relationship between moral maturity and perspective-taking is not surprising given the central status of role-taking in Kohlberg's structural theory of moral development, as well as Walker's (1980) empirical data supporting the necessity of perspective-taking in moral development. Nevertheless, given the theoretical correspondence between Leadbeater and Kuhn's model of epistemic understanding and the balanced perspective-taking that characterizes the autonomous moral type, the lack of significant differences between the moral types was surprising. However, a question could be raised regarding the use of Leadbeater and Kuhn's measure in the current study. Originally employed as an interview measure by its creators, I presented the Fifth Livian War task as a questionnaire measure. Perhaps the active probing of the interview format would have garnered more active perspective-taking, and thus provided a more accurate characterization of the differing perspective-taking styles of the two moral types. The fifth hypothesis focused on the personal strivings generated by the participants. It was predicted that the autonomous moral type would generate more strivings with self-sufficiency/ independence themes and fewer strivings with self-presentation concern themes. The data revealed no significant differences in the mean number of strivings, for any of the five types of themes that were coded for, between the moral types. This suggests that there are no differences in the day-to-day motivations of the autonomous and heteronomous moral types. This finding was unexpected to say the least. The scoring criteria for the self-sufficiency themes 27 reflect essence of moral autonomy: a desire to construct and live by one's own standards. The coding scheme for the self-presentation themes reflects the construct of field-independence that Gibbs et al. identified in the autonomous moral type. Yet there were no significant differences. Perhaps these findings are attributable to lack of scoreable strivings generated by the participants; few participants generated more than five scoreable strivings. Regardless, there is no indication that there is any meaningful difference in the motivations that underlie the personal strivings of morally autonomous and heteronomous individuals. The stated goal of this study was to illuminate the personality features that underlie, and potentially differentiate, Kohlberg's moral typology. Ultimately, this research was conducted for two reasons: to determine whether Kohlberg's moral typology represents two pervasive and distinct personality styles and to further our understanding of how Kohlberg's moral typology broadens our appreciation of moral functioning beyond what is given by moral maturity alone. With some certainty we can say that Kohlberg's moral typology cannot be characterized as pervasive and distinct personality styles as they do not demonstrate clear differences across the hierarchical structure of personality. That said, the data from the current study do suggest that some important information is provided by Kohlberg's moral typology. In considering Kohlberg's moral typology, a question arises for many moral psychologists, they ask what information does the moral typology convey beyond what is given by moral maturity scores? As described by Tappan et al. (1987) and Gibbs et al. (1986), the autonomous moral type is characterized by an internal moral orientation wherein the moral agent has actively constructed a personal sense of moral understanding, and is compelled to act on these principles by internal rather than external pressures. Previous research by Gibbs et al. found that the autonomous moral type scored higher on measures of field independence, this suggested that the autonomous moral type was less bound by situational constraints. The current 28 study adds to the empirical exploration of Kohlberg's typology by providing some support for Gibbs and Widaman's (1982) suggestion that the autonomous moral type should score higher on measures of perceived control. Those authors argued that such perceived control characterized the morally autonomous individuals' active and independent reasoning processes. The present studies finding regarding the relationship between moral type and identity status provides preliminary support for the notion that autonomous moral agents actively construct their moral values and principles. Taken together, the empirical data collected to date suggest that the autonomous moral agent constructs their moral values, feels competent in upholding their beliefs, and is less given to situational or interpersonal pressures than the heteronomous moral type. And these characteristics of the autonomous moral type exemplify the information that Kohlberg's moral typology conveys beyond what is given by moral maturity scores. Having presented a character sketch of the autonomous moral agent, we must consider the importance of this construct. What are the implications of moral autonomy, and how do they relate to our understanding of moral development and moral functioning? Perhaps the most important implication of moral autonomy is its hypothesized relation to moral judgement-moral behaviour correspondence. Kohlberg and Candee's (1987) study of moral thought and moral action provided considerable support for the notion that moral type is a better predictor of moral action than is moral maturity. Tappan et al. (1987) suggest that it is the intrinsic qualities of moral autonomy that foster the inner compulsion to uphold and act in accordance with one's moral principles. It is possible that the moral autonomy and moral action link is related to the link between moral autonomy and identity established in the present study. Two different models have been proposed to describe the interaction of identity and moral functioning. Blasi (1993, 1995) has argued that integration of moral principles into the identity structure enhances the correspondence between moral thought and moral action. In his model, 29 Blasi (1993, 1995) proposes that the mental structures of identity and the mental structures associated with moral functioning are discrete entities; in the most morally advanced individuals, however, these two discrete systems can become integrated. When moral principles are integrated into the identity structure, Blasi (1993, 1995) argues that the individual is compelled to act in accordance with their moral principles. In essence, moral thought-behaviour correspondence is strengthened by the inherent threat to self-coherence that would result from failing to act in accordance with the very principles on which the identity is constructed. In light of the current findings it may well be appropriate to ask whether moral autonomy and moral identity integration, as understood by Blasi (1993, 1995), are related processes, or even synonyms for the same process/outcome? More research is necessary to address this question. Davidson and Youniss (1991) suggested an alternative model for understanding the relation between moral autonomy and identity. According to Davidson and Youniss (1991), moral autonomy is akin to identity. They believe that through mutual and reciprocal interactions with others the individual constructs autonomous moral principles; these principles represent the basis of the individual's autonomous identity (Davidson & Youniss, 1991). Davidson and Youniss (1991) construe the autonomous identity as the individual's personality. Unlike Blasi (1993, 1995), for whom rational judgments of responsibility and obligation are central to understanding morality-identity integration, Davidson and Youniss (1991) conceive of moral autonomy as reflexive, habitual moral functioning. Thus, the structure of the autonomous identity influences everyday moral functioning, whereas the cognitive structures emphasized by Kohlberg, and by Blasi (1993, 1995), influence those rare occasions when an individual is required to actively reflect on a moral dilemma. This raises another important question about the relation between moral autonomy and identity, namely, does it represent a distinct moral system? Perhaps there are two moral systems, one habitual and reflexive, and another which is rational 30 and reflective. If so, we must consider in what circumstances each system operates. Clearly, the relation between moral functioning and identity development deserves further attention. Future consideration of these findings is warranted, particularly in respect to findings regarding ego identity status and moral autonomy. The current study's questionnaire format is not ideally suited for measuring moral maturity, ego identity status or perspective-taking skills. A more comprehensive follow-up study would utilize interview measures where applicable. In fleshing out the relationship between ego identity status and moral autonomy it might be prudent to return to the broader questions concerning the relationship between identity and moral autonomy. For example, employing a more comprehensive measure of identity development such as McAdams' Life Narrative Interview (1997), would allow for the study of moral autonomy within the broader context of identity development. Of course, such interview techniques could also be scored to provide measures of ego identity status for comparison. In order to fully conceptualize the role of identity in moral autonomy it wil l also be necessary to study the relations between moral autonomy and Blasi's (1993, 1995) construct of identity integration. It would also be advisable for future studies to return to the relations between moral autonomy and the Big-Five personality traits; the depth of analysis possible with the NEO-PI-R could facilitate the identification of important sub-trait level differences in personality features of the moral types. The current studies findings supporting Gibbs et al.'s (1986) original hypothesis regarding locus of control clearly illustrate the value of replication and instrument choice. Summary This study was designed to illuminate the personality features that underlie Kohlberg's moral typology. The results suggest that Kohlberg's moral typology does not represent completely pervasive and distinct personality types. There were, however, important differences 31 between the autonomous and heteronomous moral types. The data indicates that the two moral types did not differ significantly on measures of the Big-Five personality traits. Nor did they differ in terms of the motivational themes that characterize their personal strivings. Differences that were observed between the two moral types on a measure of perspective taking were attributable to the influence of moral maturity rather than the effects of moral type. On the other hand, significant differences were observed between the moral types on measures of perceived control and ego identity status. It is suggested that these differences characterize the active construction of personal moral meaning and the correspondent feelings of efficacy in acting on these beliefs. The findings of the current study suggest further investigation of the role of identity, and the integration of actively constructed moral principles into the identity structure, in the correspondence between moral thought and moral action observed in those individuals identified as morally autonomous within the framework of Kohlberg's moral typology. The potential influences of identity, identity development, and perceived personal control in moral development and moral functioning illustrate the benefits of moving beyond a purely rational account of moral functioning. Employing the framework of personality has allowed for the development of a broader understanding of the correlates of moral autonomy. 32 References Adams, G. R., Bennion, L. , & Huh, K . (1989). Objective measure of ego identity status: A reference manual (2 n d ed.). Guelph, ON: University of Guelph. Baldwin, J. M . (1911). Thoughts and things or genetic logic. London: Swan Sonnenschein. Basinger, K . S., Gibbs, J. 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Hala (Ed.), The development of social cognition, (pp. 297-327). Hove, East Sussex: Psychology Press. Wiggins, J. A . (1995). The Interpersonal Adjective Scales: Professional manual. Lutz, FL: Psychological Assessment. Wiggins, J. A . & Trapnell, P. D. (1997). Personality structure: the return of the big five. In R. Hogan, J. Johnson, & S. Briggs (Eds.), Handbook of personality psychology (pp. 737-765). San Diego: Academic Press. 36 Appendix: The Measures Social Reflection Questionnaire Instructions In this questionnaire, we want to find out about the things you think are important for people to do, and especially why you think these things (like keeping a promise) are important. Please try to help us understand your thinking by WRITING AS MUCH AS YOU CAN TO EXPLAIN- EVEN IF YOU HAVE TO WRITE OUT YOUR EXPLANANTIONS MORE THAN ONCE. Don't just write "same as before." If you can explain better or use different words to show what you mean, that helps even more. Please answer all the questions, especially the "why" questions. If you need to, feel free to use the space in the margins to finish writing your answers. 37 1. Think about when you've made a promise to a friend of yours. How important is it for people to keep promises, i f they can, to friends? Circle one: very important important not important W H Y IS THAT V E R Y IMPORTANT/IMPORTANT/NOT IMPORTANT (WHICH E V E R ONE Y O U CIRCELED)? 2. What about keeping a promise to anyone? How important is it for people to keep promises, if they can, even to someone they hardly know? Circle one: very important important not important WHY IS THAT V E R Y IMPORTANT/IMPORTANT/NOT IMPORTANT (WHICH E V E R ONE Y O U CIRCELED)? 3. How about keeping a promise to a child? How important is it for parents to keep promises, if they can, to their children? Circle one: very important important not important W H Y IS THAT V E R Y IMPORTANT/IMPORTANT/NOT IMPORTANT (WHICH E V E R ONE Y O U CIRCELED)? 38 4. In general, how important is it for people to tell the truth? Circle one: very important important not important W H Y IS THAT V E R Y IMPORTANT/IMPORTANT/NOT IMPORTANT (WHICH E V E R ONE Y O U CIRCELED)? 5. Think about when you've helped your mother or father. How important is it for children to help their parents? Circle one: very important important not important W H Y IS THAT V E R Y IMPORTANT/IMPORTANT/NOT IMPORTANT (WHICH E V E R ONE Y O U CIRCELED)? 6. Let's say a friend of yours needs help and may even die, and you're the only person who can save him or her. How important is it for a person (without losing his or her own life) to save the life of a friend? Circle one: very important important not important W H Y IS THAT V E R Y IMPORTANT/IMPORTANT/NOT IMPORTANT (WHICH E V E R ONE Y O U CIRCELED)? 39 7. What about saving the life of anyone? How important is it for a person (without losing his or her own life) to save the life of a stranger? Circle one: very important important not important W H Y IS THAT V E R Y IMPORTANT/IMPORTANT/NOT IMPORTANT (WHICH E V E R ONE Y O U CIRCELED)? 8. How important is it for a person to live even if that person doesn't want to? Circle one: very important important not important W H Y IS THAT V E R Y IMPORTANT/IMPORTANT/NOT IMPORTANT (WHICH E V E R ONE Y O U CIRCELED)? 9. How important is it for people not to take things that belong to other people? Circle one: very important important not important W H Y IS THAT V E R Y IMPORTANT/IMPORTANT/NOT IMPORTANT (WHICH E V E R ONE Y O U CIRCELED)? 40 10. How important is it for people to obey the law? Circle one: very important important not important W H Y IS THAT V E R Y IMPORTANT/IMPORTANT/NOT IMPORTANT (WHICH E V E R ONE Y O U CIRCELED)? 11. How important is it forjudges to send people who break the law to jail? Circle one: very important important not important W H Y IS THAT V E R Y IMPORTANT/IMPORTANT/NOT IMPORTANT (WHICH E V E R ONE Y O U CIRCELED)? 41 Directions: Please read each item carefully. Then, indicate the accuracy of each statement by circling a number between 1 (Totally Inaccurate) and 7 (Totally Accurate). 1) I can usually achieve what I want when I work hard for it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 2) In my personal relationships, the other person usually has more control over the relationship than I do. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 3) By taking an active part in political and social affairs we, the people, can control world events. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 4) Once I make plans I am almost certain to make them work. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 5) I have no trouble making and keeping friends. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 6) The average citizen can have an influence on government decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 7) I prefer games involving some luck over games of pure skill. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 8) I'm not good at guiding the course of a conversation with several others. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 9) It is difficult for us to have much control over the things politicians do in office. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 10) I can learn almost anything if I set my mind to it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 11) I can usually develop a close personal relationship with someone I find appealing. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 42 12) Bad economic conditions are caused by world events that are beyond our control. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 13) My major accomplishments are entirely due to my hard work and ability. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 14) I can usually steer a conversation toward the topics I want to talk about. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 15) With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 16) I usually do not set goals because I have a hard time following through on them. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 17) When I need assistance with something, I often find it difficult to get others to help. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 18) One of the major reasons we have wars is because people don't take enough interest in politics. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 19) Bad luck has sometimes prevented me from achieving things. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 20) If there is someone I want to meet, I can usually arrange it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 21) There is nothing we, as consumers, can do to keep the cost of living from going higher. 1 2 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 22) Almost anything is possible for me i f I really want it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 23) I often find it hard to get my point of view across to others. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 43 24) It is impossible to have any real influence over what big businesses do. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 25) Most of what will happen in my career is beyond my control. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 26) In attempting to smooth over disagreements I sometimes make it worse. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 27) I prefer to concentrate my energy on other things rather than on solving the world's problems. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 28) I find it pointless to keep working on something that is too difficult for me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 29) I find it easy to play an important part in most group situations. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 30) In the long run we, the voters, are responsible for bad government on a national as well as a local level. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally Inaccurate Totally Accurate 44 PERSONAL STRIVING LIST One way to describe someone's personality is to consider the purposes or goals that the person seems to be seeking in their everyday behavior. We are interested in the things that you typically or characteristically are trying to do. We might call these objectives "strivings." Here are some examples of strivings: • trying to be physically attractive to others • trying to persuade others that one is right trying to help others in need of help • trying to seek new and exciting experiences • trying to avoid being noticed by others trying to avoid feeling inferior to others Note that these strivings are phrased in terms of what a person is trying to do, regardless of whether the person is actually successful. For example, a person might be "trying to get others to like me," without necessarily being successful. These strivings may be fairly broad, such as "trying to make others happy" or more specific, as "trying to make my partner happy." Also note that the strivings can be either positive or negative. That is, they may be about something you typically try to obtain or keep, or things that you typically try to avoid or prevent. For example, you might typically try to obtain attention from others, or you might typically try to avoid calling attention to yourself. You can see that this way of describing yourself is different from using trait adjectives (friendly, intelligent, honest). We do not want you to use trait adjectives. Since you may have never thought of yourself in this way before, think carefully about what we are asking you before you write anything down. We want you to provide us with a list of your strivings. Please write down at least J_0 strivings in the space provided on the next page. You may list additional strivings if you wish. Please keep your attention focused on yourself. Do not mentally compare the things you typically do with what other people do. Think of yourself and your purposes alone. Be as honest and as objective as possible. Do not give simply socially desirable strivings or strivings you think you "ought" to have. You might find it useful to think about your goals in different domains of your life: work and school, home and family, social relationships, and leisure/recreation. Think about all of your desires, goals, wants, and hopes in these different areas. Take your time with this task; spend some time thinking about your goals before you begin. 45 1. I typically try to 2. I typically try to 3. I typically try to 4. I typically try to 5. I typically try to 6. I typically try to 7. I typically try to 8. I typically try to 9. I typically try to 10.1 typically try to 11.1 typically try to 12.1 typically try to 13.1 typically try to 14.1 typically try to 15.1 typically try to « ; i » INTERPERSONAL ADJECTIVES SCALE Instructions: Below are a list of words that are used to describe people's personal characteristics. Please rate how accurately each describes you as a person. If you feel that a word is an "extremely accurate" description of you, write the number "8" on the blank beside that word. If you feel that a word is an "extremely inaccurate" description of you, write the number "1" on the blank beside the word. If you feel that neither of these extremes describes you, please use the choices "2" through "7" to indicate other degrees of accuracy. Judge how accurately each word describes you using the following scale: 1 2 3 4 5 6 ext remely ve ry quite s l igh t ly s l igh t ly quite inaccurate inaccurate inaccurate inaccurate accurate accurate 7 ve ry accurate 8 ex t remely accurate Important Note: Please be sure to provide an answer for every descriptor. If you are uncertain of the meaning of a word (since some are relatively unfamiliar or are unusual negations), please consult the definitions provided in the accompanying Glossary (green-colored paper). Introverted assertive timid unargumentative organized boastful soft-hearted ruthless kind tense high-strung cheerful unsparkling tricky unconventional inefficient unaggressive unreflective relaxed calculating unmoody anxious abstract-thinking philosophical tender hard-hearted unneighborly 47 worrying literary uncharitable uncunning hypersensitive extraverted unphilosophical at ease orderly cocky planful dominant unsearching 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 extremely very quite slightly slightly quite very extremely inaccurate inaccurate inaccurate inaccurate accurate accurate accurate accurate anti-social jovial self-confident perky domineering unauthoritative forceful neat uncrafty wily unabstract unsympathetic undisciplined tender-hearted charitable sly unworrying cold-hearted systematic unimaginative guilt-prone self-conscious tidy nervous iron-hearted warmthless broad-minded thorough unsly distant untidy enthusiastic forceless unbold firm efficient neighborly impractical fretful unorderly uncalculating overexcitable shy questioning gentle-hearted undemanding accommodating disorganized meek uncheery unplanful reflective uncomplex unanxious inquisitive calm unself-conscious unwily conventional unreliable unsystematic individualistic outgoing self-assured friendly sympathetic dissocial cunning boastless 48 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 extremely very quite slightly slightly quite very extremely inaccurate inaccurate inaccurate inaccurate accurate accurate accurate accurate crafty unnervous self-disciplined unagitated unliterary forgetful stable imaginative cruel persistent uninquisitive unsociable bashful reliable unartistic Please check to make sure that you have provided a response for all descriptors in this questionnaire. 49 The Revised, Extended Version of the Objective Measure of Ego Identity Instructions: Read each item and indicate to what degree it reflects your own thoughts and feelings. If a statement has more than one part, please indicate your reaction to the statement as a whole. Indicate your answer on the line preceding the question number. 1 = strongly agree 4 = disagree 2 = moderately agree 5 = moderately disagree 3 = agree 6 = strongly disagree 1.1 haven't chosen the occupation I really want to get into, and I'm just working at whatever is available until something better comes along. 2. When it comes to religion, I just haven't found anything that appeals and I don't really feel the need to look. 3. My ideas about men's and women's roles are identical to my parents'. What has worked for them will obviously work for me. 4. There's no single "life style" which appeals to me more than another. 5. There's a lot of different kinds of people. I'm still exploring the many possibilities to find the right kind of friends for me. 6.1 sometimes join in recreational activities when asked, but I rarely try anything on my own. 7.1 haven't really thought about a "dating style." I'm not too concerned whether I date or not. 8. Politics is something that I can never be too sure about because things change so fast. But I do think it's important to know what I can politically stand for and believe in. 50 For all the questions on this page, choose from the following responses. 1 = strongly agree 4 = disagree 2 = moderately agree 5 = moderately disagree 3 = agree 6 = strongly disagree 9. I'm still trying to decide how capable I am as a person and what jobs will be right for me. 10.1 don't give religion much thought and it doesn't bother me one way or the other. 11. There are so many ways to divide responsibilities in marriage, I'm trying to decide what will work for me. 12. I'm looking for an acceptable perspective for my own "lifestyle" view, but I haven't found it yet. 13. There are many reasons for friendship, but I choose my close friends on the basis of certain values and similarities that I've personally decided on. 14. While I don't have one recreational activity I'm really committed to, I'm experiencing numerous leisure outlets to identify one I can truly enjoy. 15. Based on past experiences, I've chosen the type of dating relationship I want now. 16.1 haven't really considered politics. It just doesn't excite me much. 17.1 might have thought about a lot of different jobs, but there's never really been any question since my parents said what they wanted. 18. A person's faith is unique to each individual. I've considered and reconsidered it myself and know what I can believe. 19. I've never really seriously considered men's and women's roles in marriage. It just doesn't seem to concern me. 51 For all the questions on this page, choose from the following responses. 1 = strongly agree 4 = disagree 2 = moderately agree 5 = moderately disagree 3 = agree 6 = strongly disagree 20. After considerable thought I've developed my own individual viewpoint of what is for me an ideal "life style" and don't believe anyone will be likely to change my perspective. 21. My parents know what's best for me in terms of how to choose my friends. 22. I've chosen one or more recreational activities to engage in regularly from lots of things and I'm satisfied with those choices. 23.1 don't think about dating much. I just kind of take it as it comes. 24.1 guess I'm pretty much like my folks when it comes to politics. I follow what they do in terms of voting and such. 25. I'm really not interested in finding the right job, any job will do. I just seem to flow with what is available. 26. I'm not so sure what religion means to me. I'd like to make up my mind but I'm not done looking yet. 27. My ideas about men's and women's roles came right from my parents and family. I haven't seen any need to look further. 28. My own views on a desirable life style were taught to me by my parents and I don't see any need to question what they taught me. 29.1 don't have any real close friends, and I don't think I'm looking for one right now. 30. Sometimes I join leisure activities, but I really don't see a need to look for a particular activity to do regularly. 31. I'm trying out different types of dating relationships. I just haven't decided what is best for me. 52 For all the questions on this page, choose from the following responses. 1 = strongly agree 4 = disagree 2 = moderately agree 5 = moderately disagree 3 = agree 6 = strongly disagree 32. There are so many different political parties and ideals. I can't decide which to follow until I figure it all out. 33. It took me a while to figure it out, but now I really know what I want for a career. 34. Religion is confusing to me right now. I keep changing my views on what is right and wrong for me. 35. I've spent some time thinking about men's and women's roles in marriage and I've decided what will work best for me. 36. In finding an acceptable viewpoint to life itself, I find myself engaging in a lot of discussions with others and some self-exploration. 37.1 only pick friends my parents would approve of. 38. I've always liked doing the same recreational activities my parents do and haven't ever seriously considered anything else. 39.1 only go out with the type of people my parents expect me to date. 40. I've thought my political beliefs through and realize I can agree with some and not other aspects of what my parents believe. 41. My parents decided a long time ago what I should go into for employment and I'm following through their plans. 42. I've gone through a period of serious questions about faith and can now say I understand what I believe in as an individual. 43. I've been thinking about the roles that husbands and wives play a lot these days, and I'm trying to make a final decision. 44. My parent's views on life are good enough for me, I don't need anything else. 53 For all the questions on this page, choose from the following responses. 1 = strongly agree 4 = disagree 2 = moderately agree 5 = moderately disagree 3 = agree 6 = strongly disagree 45. I've tried many different friendships and now I have a clear idea of what I look for in a friend. 46. After trying a lot of different recreational activities I've found one or more I really enjoy doing by myself or with friends. 47. My preferences about dating are still in the process of developing. I haven't fully decided yet. 48. I'm not sure about my political beliefs, but I'm trying to figure out what I can truly believe in. 49. It took me a long time to decide but now I know for sure what direction to move in for a career. 50.1 attend the same church/synagogue/temple my family has always attended. I've never really questioned why. 51. There are many ways that married couples can divide up family responsibilities. I've thought about lots of ways and now I know exactly how I want it to happen for me. 52.1 guess I just kind of enjoy life in general, and I don't see myself living by any particular viewpoint to life. 53.1 don't have any close friends. I just like to hang around with the crowd. 54. I've been experiencing a variety of recreational activities in hopes of finding one or more I can enjoy for some time to come. 55. I've dated different types of people and now know exactly what my own "unwritten rules" for dating are and who I will date. 56.1 really have never been involved in politics enough to make a firm stand one way or the other. 54 For all the questions on this page, choose from the following responses. 1 = strongly agree 4 = disagree 2 = moderately agree 5 = moderately disagree 3 = agree 6 = strongly disagree 57.1 just can't decide what to do for an occupation. There are so many that have possibilities. 58. I've never really questioned my religion. If it's right for my parents it might be right for me. 59. Opinions on men's and women's roles seem so varied that I don't think much about it. 60. After a lot of self-examination I have established a very definite view on what my own lifestyle will be. 61.1 really don't know what kind of friend is best for me. I'm trying to figure out exactly what friendship means to me. 62. A l l of my recreational preferences I got from my parents and I haven't really tried anything else. 63.1 date only people my parents would approve of. 64. My folks have always had their own political and moral beliefs about issues like abortion and mercy killing and I've always gone along accepting what they have. 55 Please take your time and read the following passages carefully., After you have read the passages please answer the questions on the attached form. 56 A brief account of the Fifth LivianWar By J. Abdul National Historian of North Livia On July 19 tn 1878, during a period set aside by North Livia to honour one of their national leaders, the ceremonies were interrupted by a sneak attack from the South Livians, beginning the Fifth Livian War. Because the North Livians were caught by surprise, they were unprepared at first and the South Livians won a few early battles. But then the tide turned heavily in favour of the North Livians. Before the North Livians could reach a final victory, however, a neighbouring large country intervened to prevent further bloodshed. Despite their early setbacks, the later sweeping victories of the North Livians showed that they would have won, had the fighting continued. As a result of this war, the South Livians finally recognized that anything they gained from the North Livians would have to be worked out through peaceful negotiations. Thus ended the Fifth Livian Wars. 57 A brief account of the Fifth Livian Wars By N . Ivan National Historian of South Livia In the last war, North Livia had beaten South Livia, taken some of its land and refused to leave. South Livia could no longer tolerate this situation and spent large sums of public funds to strengthen its military defences. On July 20 t h 1878, the Fifth Livian war began. The war took place with rapid dramatic victories for South Livia, resulting in great national celebration. After these dramatic victories, the South Livians suffered some minor losses. But then a neighbouring large country intervened to prevent further bloodshed. Despite their later setbacks, the final victory of South Livia seemed assured because of its overall position of strength. As a result of this war, the South Livians felt a new self-respect. They had always felt embarrassed by their previous defeats, but now they were the equals of the North Livians on the battlefield. Because the South Livians had achieved military respect, they were willing to work out future differences through peaceful negotiations, thus ending the Fifth Livian Wars. 58 P l e a s e a n s w e r t h e f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s . T a k e y o u r t i m e a n d t h i n k a b o u t y o u r a n s w e r s . 1. Please describe what the Fifth Livian War was about and what happened? 2. Who was victorious in this war? 3. Why did the Wars end? 4. Are there important differences in the two historians accounts? 5. Could both of the historian's accounts of the Fifth Livian Wars be right? 59 

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