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Nikon and the sponsorship of Japan’s optical industry by the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1923-1945 Alexander, Jeffrey William Scott 2001

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N I K O N A N D T H E S P O N S O R S H I P O F J A P A N ' S O P T I C A L I N D U S T R Y B Y T H E I M P E R I A L J A P A N E S E N A V Y , 1923-1945 by J E F F R E Y W I L L I A M S C O T T A L E X A N D E R H o n s . B . A . , B r o c k University, 1995 A T H E S I S S U B M I T T E D I N P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T O F T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S F O R T H E D E G R E E O F M A S T E R O F A R T S in T H E F A C U L T Y O F G R A D U A T E S T U D I E S (Department o f History) W e accept this thesis as c o n f o r m i n g to the required standard T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A A u g u s t 2001 © Jeffrey W i l l i a m Scott Alexander , 2001 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of M A ^ T O ^ - M The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date pyje^osTT \M / 2^*=>\ DE-6 (2/88) A B S T R A C T T h i s thesis examines the development o f Japan's optical industry during the 1920s, 1930s, and through the immediate p o s t - W o r l d W a r T w o era, placing particular emphasis u p o n the support given to emergent optical firms by the Imperial Japanese N a v y (IJN). T h e author seeks to trace I J N support for optical munitions development back to the Washington N a v a l L imita t ion Treaty o f 1922 and the subsequent L o n d o n N a v a l Treaty o f 1930 - arguing that the root o f Japan's early optical research and development initiatives is to be f o u n d in Japan's compensatory N a v a l Supplementary B i l l o f 1930. Faced with the limitation o f b o t h the n u m b e r and size o f its capital and auxiliary warships after 1930, the I J N sought to divert the remainder o f its ship construction budget toward the fullest development o f experimental weapons and related systems. T h i s changing attitude toward maximizing auxiliary technologies in lieu o f additional vessels gave a significant boost to such companies as Nippon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha — w h i c h came to be k n o w n in the post-war era as N i k o n . T h r o u g h an investigation o f N i k o n ' s o w n company histories and the U . S . N a v y Technica l M i s s i o n to Japan. 1945. the operational and technical growth o f companies such as N i k o n , Fuj i , C a n o n , and M i n o l t a are examined. Critical technical advances made i n the furtherance o f I J N projects such as optical glass manufacturing, aerial camera design, infrared imaging, rangefinder product ion and periscope lens coating techniques are s h o w n to be at the heart o f Japan's optical design and manufacturing successes i n the post-war occupation period. In building u p o n its significant wartime technical breakthroughs and mass-production processes, N i k o n was able to capture post-war consumer optical markets b o t h at h o m e and abroad by the late 1950s. T h a t chain o f events is herein demonstrated to have originated with the emphasis placed by the I J N u p o n developing auxiliary and experimental weapons technologies fol lowing the L o n d o n N a v a l Treaty o f 1930. ii T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S Abstract ii Table o f Contents — ." iii Lis t o f Tables v List o f Figures v i Acknowledgements vi i D e d i c a t i o n viii S E C T I O N I Introduction 1 S E C T I O N II Ear ly Ef for ts and the Emergence o f Nippon Kogaku. .2 S E C T I O N III Nippon Kogaku and the N a v a l Limita t ion E x p e r i m e n t 5 S E C T I O N I V Related Japanese O p t i c a l Manufacturers 12 S E C T I O N V T h e A m e r i c a n Perspective 13 S E C T I O N V I Nippon Kogaku's E v o l v i n g D e s i g n and P r o d u c t i o n Challenges 17 i) Cameras 17 ii) Range Finders 19 iii) Periscopes and Lens Coatings 22 iv) N i g h t - V i s i o n Technologies 25 S E C T I O N V I I Nippon Kogaku's Corporate D e v e l o p m e n t 25 S E C T I O N V I I I A p p r o a c h i n g the N a d i r 27 S E C T I O N I X P o s t - M o r t e m and Reorganization under the U . S . O c c u p a t i o n . 30 S E C T I O N X T h e Lessons o f Opt ica l M u n i t i o n s P r o d u c t i o n 34 S E C T I O N X I Conclusions 36 S E C T I O N X I I Further Considerations 37 Bibliography 39 i i i A P P E N D I X I Table I - T h e N a v y Supplemental Program, N o v e m b e r 11,1930 41 A P P E N D I X II Figure I - M a p o f Fuji F i l m C o m p a n y , Ashigara Manufactur ing Plant 42 A P P E N D I X III Figure II - M a p o f Fuji F i l m C o m p a n y , O d a w a r a Manufactur ing Plant 43 A P P E N D I X I V Figure III - D i a g r a m o f M i d g e t Submarine Periscope. . . . 44 A P P E N D I X V Figure I V - D i a g r a m o f 10-metre Periscope 45 A P P E N D I X V I T a b l e II - Abbrevia ted List o f Items T a k e n to Indiana H e a d , M a r y l a n d by U S N , 1945 46 A P P E N D I X V I I T a b l e III - Lis t o f F i rms to w h i c h Fuji O p t i c a l Glass was sold, 1941-1945 47 iv L I S T O F T A B L E S T A B L E I T h e N a v y Supplemental Program, N o v e m b e r 11,1930 41 T A B L E II Abbrevia ted List o f Items T a k e n to Indiana H e a d , M a r y l a n d by U S N , 1945 .....46 T A B L E III Lis t o f F i r m s to w h i c h Fuji O p t i c a l Glass was Sold , 1941 -1945 47 v L I S T O F F I G U R E S F I G U R E I M a p o f Fuji F i l m C o m p a n y , Ashigara Manufac tur ing Plant 42 F I G U R E II M a p o f Fuji F i l m C o m p a n y , O d a w a r a Manufac tur ing Plant 43 F I G U R E III D i a g r a m o f Midget Submarine Periscope 44 F I G U R E I V D i a g r a m o f 10-metre Periscope 45 vi A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S I wish to acknowledge the assistance o f the following: D r . Chris topher H o w e , for his advice regarding the published N i k o n c o m p a n y histories; E d w a r d J . L o w , for his excellent I J N web site and his k i n d referral to the U . S . N a v y Operat ional A r c h i v e s ; the staff o f U . S . N a v y Operat ional A r c h i v e s at the W a s h i n g t o n N a v a l Y a r d ; K u r i h a r a Y u k a , N a m i t a Y o k o , and K a w a k a m i M a s a k o , for their patient assistance with the Japanese text - especially the names; and the D e p a r t m e n t o f His tory at the Universi ty o f British C o l u m b i a . v i i D E D I C A T I O N F o r m y family, with thanks for all o f their support. vi i i I) Introduction T h i s paper will explore several aspects o f Japan's optical design and manufacturing industry b o t h prior to and during W o r l d W a r T w o i n an effort to trace the c o n t i n u u m o f Japan's technological development as it carried o n into the post-war era. It will be argued that the financial and motivational support o f the Imperial Japanese N a v y (IJN) for research and design initiatives involving experimental weapons and related military hardware was the primary driving force behind Japan's overall technological progress made i n the field o f optical engineering. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that the IJN's investments i n optical munitions product ion laid m u c h o f the foundat ion for Japan's post-war optical industry - enabling the emergent companies to capitalize directly u p o n designs theretofore p r o d u c e d strictly for use by the armed forces. A s a result, companies such as Nikon, Fuji, Canon, and Minolta were able to retool in the earliest stages o f the occupation and begin directing their designs and manufacturing processes toward the swift capture o f civilian consumer markets. T h e IJN's support, i n turn, will be shown to have originated with the advent o f the naval hmitation conferences i n 1922 and 1930, after w h i c h time Japan's government made determined efforts to p r o m o t e compensatory naval R & D initiatives in the f o r m o f the N a v a l Supplementary B i l l o f 1930. A s a specific m o d e l for examining this p h e n o m e n o n , the innovations made i n the field o f optical weapons design undertaken by the Nippon Kogaku Kabushiki Kaisha, or Japan O p t i c a l Engineer ing C o m p a n y , will be examined together with those o f related optical firms i n order to trace their growth and post-war metamorphoses. A s the foundation u p o n w h i c h the post-war Nikon C o m p a n y was able to rapidly construct its successful, m o d e r n commercial enterprise, the support given and demands made by the 1 I J N will be seen as the most significant accelerator o f Nikon's technical and productive capabilities. It will also be demonstrated that although the investments made by the I J N in these military research projects were the primary force that carried such technological understanding forward into the post-war era, Japan's defeat i n W o r l d W a r T w o d i d not interrupt the process. W h i l e the source o f technological incentive was indeed changed radically, the c o n t i n u u m o f Japan's technical progress nevertheless remained unbroken. II) Ear ly E f f o r t s and the Emergence o f Nippon Kogaku A s a primary source o f this technological incentive, we must first examine the effects o f the First W o r l d W a r and the resultant naval limitation treaties u p o n the I J N c o m m a n d and its attitude toward jikyujisoku; or the goal o f achieving self-sufficiency in critical materials. T o this end, Japan had by 1906 already established an optical research laboratory in T o k y o , and i n 1909 a repair facility was further established i n order to service optical weapons belonging to the Japanese army. 1 C o m b i n e d with the experience gained i n maintaining instruments such as field binoculars and cameras, the facility also began p r o d u c i n g telescopes and microscopes for a variety o f applications. Shortly thereafter, p r o d u c t i o n expanded to include prisms for binoculars and even lenses for photographic cameras. 2 B y the outbreak o f the First W o r l d W a r in E u r o p e , however, the question o f self-sufficiency in optical munitions had yet to be seriously considered. Japan's armed forces were almost entirely dependent u p o n overseas suppliers o f optical 1 Nippon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha - Goiunen no avumi / 50-nenshi henshu senmon inkai henshu Japan Optical Engineering Company - 50h Anniversary Company History (Tokyo: Nihon Kogaku Kogyo, 1967) p. 56. 2 Ibid. p. 56. weapons, and this supply was sharply limited during the war as the combatant powers suspended their exports o f munitions in general. 3 T h e significance o f this over-dependence u p o n foreign suppliers was not lost u p o n the navy, w h i c h made serious efforts after 1915 to address the p r o b l e m o f domestic product ion o f b o t h optical glass and optical munitions. In 1918 navy researchers at the Tsuki j i Arsenal , south o f T o k y o , began to produce seven types o f optical glass in quantities o f up to 300 kilogram melts in an effort to compensate for the interruption o f G e r m a n imports - theretofore Japan's primary supplier . 4 Subsequently, the Nippon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha was founded in T o k y o o n July 25 t h , 1917 as an optical weapons instrument shop in order to meet the needs o f the I J N . T h e c o m p a n y began with ¥ 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 i n operating capital, and was f o r m e d through the consolidation o f three smaller firms: Iwaki Glass Seisaku-sho, Fujii Lens Sei^o-sho, and the optical division o f Tokyo Keiki Seisaku-sho.5 T h e Iwaki Glass Seisaku-sho had been operating since 1881, and had designed 60 c m and 75 c m searchlights for the I J N i n 1914 and 1917 respectively. 6 W a d a K a h e i , the head o f Keiki Seisaku-sho, was selected during the incorporat ion to stand as the c o m b i n e d firm's first president. 7 T h e newly consolidated c o m p a n y began with some 200 employees and p r o d u c e d optical equipment primarily for scientific, military, and industrial uses - remaining virtually u n k n o w n to domestic and international consumer J Aoki Shosaburo. "Kogaku heiki kogyo no kaiko." (Recollections of Optical Weapons Manufacture) Kaiso no Nihon Kaigun - Suikokai hen (The Japanese Navy Recollected) (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1985) p. 437. 4 Grimes, C.G. Captain, USN, ed. "Japanese Optics" U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan - Series X: Miscellaneous Targets - Report X-05 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, U.S. Naval History Division, 1945) p. 9. 5 Nippon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha - Goiunen no avumi pp. 58-59. 6 Ibid, p. 58. 7 Ibid. p. 57. 3 markets until after 1945. 8 Nippon Kogaku based most o f its early optical engineering projects squarely u p o n G e r m a n designs, and in July o f 1919 the c o m p a n y invited eight G e r m a n technicians to w o r k for the fledgling optical f i rm o n a five-year contract. These engineers arrived i n January 1921 and began introducing G e r m a n designs and manufacturing processes into Nippon Kogaku's product ion line, giving the c o m p a n y a development pattern that paralleled the highly successful G e r m a n optical firms Lei tz and Zeiss . 9 T h e c o m p a n y set about p r o d u c i n g a wide array o f precision optical instruments such as telescopes, microscopes, binoculars, range finders and surveying equipment, until operations were halted fol lowing the Great K a n to Earthquake o n September 1 s t 1923. In recognition o f the company's critical importance to the supply o f optical munitions for the I J N , the Japanese N a v y Ministry immediately arranged for the reconstruction and reorganization o f Nippon Kogaku fol lowing the earthquake. 1 0 U n t i l that time, its research had been directed largely toward the refinement o f optical glass manufacture, "mainly i n an effort to duplicate G e r m a n glass and to gain control o f optical constants w h i c h appear to vary markedly f r o m melt to m e l t . " 1 1 A l t h o u g h the earthquake destroyed m u c h o f the company's manufacturing plant, the swift intervention o f the N a v y Minis t ry enabled Nippon Kogaku to rebuild its product ion facilities at O i m a c h i , T o k y o and to continue with its research and manufacture o f optical glass by the middle o f O c t o b e r 1923. Despite the c o m m i t m e n t and the financing extended by the navy, the remainder o f the 1920s p r o v e d to be very challenging for Nippon Kogaku. T h e c o m p a n y hovered o n the brink o f insolvency for m u c h o f the decade, due in large part to the s l o w d o w n in 8 "A Short History of Nippon Kogaku Japan." Nikon Historical Society 04/09/2001. <http://www.nikonhs.org/history.html> 9 Ibid. 1 0 "Japanese Optics" U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan p. 9. " Ibid, p. 9. 4 naval construction following the Washington N a v a l Conference o f 1921. T h e naval limitations agreed to by the chief signatories - Great Britain, the U n i t e d States and Japan - placed a respective 5:5:3 ratio o n capital ship tonnage in an effort prevent a dangerous and costly naval arms race. T h e resulting Washington N a v a l Treaty o f 1922 naturally had a depressing effect u p o n Japan's shipbuilding industry, and affiliated munit ions suppliers such as Nippon Kogaku suffered in turn. O n a technical level, however, the c o m p a n y actually made great strides during the 1920s because b o t h the army and navy munitions research facilities had also been destroyed i n the earthquake. Consequendy , many talented military engineers and research projects were assigned to Nippon Kogaku during its reorganization, expanding b o t h the n u m b e r o f technicians o n staff and the breadth o f the company's research capabilities. 1 2 Financial difficulties notwithstanding, this enhanced role after 1923 as b o t h a military supplier and as an affiliated research and design arm o f the I J N w o u l d be o f particular importance to the company's future. I l l ) Nippon Kogaku and the N a v a l Limitat ion E x p e r i m e n t T h e series o f events that followed w o u l d be key not merely to Nippon Kogaku's expansion and economic turnaround after the financially depressed 1920s, but also to the rapid growth o f its overall design and manufacturing capabilities. T h i s reversal o f fortune began with the L o n d o n N a v a l Conference in the spring o f 1930 - the outcome o f w h i c h was assessed by the I J N to be a disastrous strategic setback and a threat to Japan's maritime security i n the western Paci f ic . 1 3 A t the conference, Japan's negotiators had acted u p o n the orders o f the Prime Minister and agreed to the A m e r i c a n proposal o f 1 2 Nippon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha - Goiunen no avumi p. 62. 1 3 Kobayashi, Tatsuo. "The London Naval Treaty, 1930" (Tiedemann, Arthur E., trans.) Morrow, 5 a less than 10:10:7 ratio in auxiliary vessel tonnage vis-a-vis Great Britain and the U n i t e d States. Because the objections o f the N a v y Minis t ry had not been heeded, Japan's Supreme W a r Counci l lors were initially inclined to support the navy i n its insistence that the government's action had violated the navy's right o f supreme c o m m a n d . 1 4 T h r o u g h a series o f deft political maneuvers and the conclusion o f a semantic compromise , however, Pr ime Minister H a m a g u c h i and Foreign Minister Shidehara were able to persuade the C o u n c i l to agree to the three-power treaty without further investigation o f the views o f the N a v y Ministry . W h i l e the Pr ime Minister had evidently vindicated the principle o f civilian leadership, this victory was tempered by the tacit agreement o f the government not to claim that the treaty had been ratified o n constitutional grounds. In exchange for its silence and its allowance o f the treaty to be ratified by the D i e t o n "strictly procedural grounds" , the navy fully expected that the government w o u l d deliver o n its promise o f a compensatory naval spending bill i n order to maximize the fleet's technological capabilities i n lieu o f additional vessels. 1 5 T h r o u g h a cross-examination o f the correspondence between navy figures as they reflected u p o n the significance o f the treaty, the genesis o f their determination to seek a supplementary naval spending program becomes apparent. A s the controversy over the p r o p o s e d A m e r i c a n compromise offer reached the ears o f the Supreme W a r Counci l lors o n M a r c h 26 t h , A d m i r a l O k a d a Keisuke warned the V i c e Minister o f the N a v y , Y a m a n a s h i K a t s u n o s h i n , as follows: James William (ed.) Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident. 1928-1932 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1984) p. 43. 1 4 Crowley, James B. Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy. 1930-1938 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966) pp. 72-73. Ibid, p. 68. 6 W e will have to swallow the delegates' plan. B u t only o n the condit ion that we make the government promise measures to offset the deficiencies we feel the A m e r i c a n plan imposes o n u s . . . W e must force the government to put its consent to these measures in the f o r m o f a cabinet m e m o r a n d u m . 1 6 Yamanishi , i n turn, sought the approval o f Prime Minister H a m a g u c h i , F o r e i g n Minister Shidehara, and Finance Minister Inoue for the recommendations he p r o p o s e d i n order to offset the kmitations o f the treaty. H e wrote (italics are added): T o mitigate the difficulties in implementing national defense plans that will inevitably arise as a result o f the arms limitation agreement, there must be improvements b o t h i n materiel and i n technical skills. W i t h regard to materiel, the fol lowing must be borne i n m i n d : the maintenance and i m p r o v e m e n t o f the capabilities o f our existing vessels; full provis ion for air power; the promotion and development of experimental research installations, the i m p r o v e m e n t o f defense facilities; the full provis ion o f special types o f surface vessels; the maintenance o f construction skills and productive capacity. . . W i t h regard to the improvement o f technical skills, the fol lowing must be borne i n m i n d : the improvement o f various educational facilities; the rigorous implementation oj every kind oj training exercise... In the past there has been a tendency to h o l d such appropriations tightly d o w n i n order to divert money to ship construct ion. 1 7 In spite o f the objections o f the navy and the reluctant approval o f the Supreme W a r C o u n c i l , the minutes o f the M a r c h 26 t h C o u n c i l meeting reflect the willingness o f 1 6 Kobayashi, Tatsuo. "The London Naval Treaty, 1930" p. 43. 1 7 Ibid, op cit. p. 44. 7 A d m i r a l K a t o to respect the will o f the government. In the d o c u m e n t generated by the C o u n c i l , entitled Future Policy, this attitude is clearly illustrated as follows: E v e n though the government does not heed the navy's policy (or rather, strictly speaking, the opinions o f officers attending various discussions), the naval agencies have, o f course, no right to go b e y o n d the p r o p e r boundaries o f state and military matters. T h e y will , o f course, fo l low official regulations and d o the best they can within the limits set by government p o l i c y . 1 8 A t the same time, however, the obedience o f the navy was tempered by a conscious determination to maximize the defensive capabilities not l imited by the agreement. U p o n hearing o f the government's decision to accept the terms o f the A m e r i c a n offer, Fleet A d m i r a l T o g o reflected positively o n the situation with these words (italics are added): Since the matter has been definitely decided, we have to go along with it. N o w that things have reached this stage, it's silly to grumble. In this situation we must w o r k to unify the navy. In a cheerful spirit we must develop harmony and cooperation a m o n g all ranks. W e must p o u r our energy into three things: the provision of materiel, i m p r o v i n g morale, and rigorously training our personnel. It is important to raise our quality, to concentrate with religious dedication u p o n the intrinsic mission o f the n a v y . 1 9 B y July 1930 the discussion o f a naval supplementary program began i n earnest, and N a v y Minister Takarabe noted that its composi t ion w o u l d ultimately depend u p o n the 1 8 Ibid, op cit. p. 42. 1 9 Ibid: op cit. p. 47. state o f the government's finances. O n July 22 n d , Takarabe reported to the Supreme W a r C o u n c i l as follows: I f there are shortcomings in the military strength needed to support and implement the operational plans drawn up i n conformity with national defense policy, as N a v y Minister I will , o f course, consult fully with the N a v y C h i e f o f Staff and make the best possible effort to ensure that compensations are made for such shortcomings . 2 0 T h e Supreme W a r C o u n c i l , in turn, seized u p o n this opportunity to exploit the N a v y Minister 's compensatory promise. A t its July 23 r d meeting it voted unanimously to submit the fol lowing report to the emperor, w h i c h read, i n part (italics are added): . . . I f the present treaty should c o m e into existence, we must, until 1937, adopt the countermeasures listed below in order to h o l d these shortcomings to a m i n i m u m . 1. Complete utilization o f the strength allotted under the agreement; the maintenance and improvement o f the capabilities o f existing vessels; full development o f the categories o f vessels u p o n w h i c h n o limitations are placed by the treaty. 2. F u l l provis ion o f the air strength necessary to support and implement operational plans. 3. Improvement o f defense facilities; full development of experimental research agencies; i m p r o v e m e n t o f educational facilities; rigorous implementation o f every k i n d Ibid, op cit. p. 103. 9 o f training exercise; improvement and full development o f personnel , materiel, amphibious equipment, etc. 2 1 Clearly the C o u n c i l was not prepared to sit idly by and allow the government to ratify an objectionable treaty without making demands for suitable countermeasures. T h e specificity o f the report illustrates the lengths to w h i c h the navy was prepared to go i n its efforts to maintain its strategic advantage over the U n i t e d States i n the western Pacific. R o o t e d i n this diplomatic setback are the navy's determined efforts to acquire sufficient technological capabilities to compensate for its perceived inferiority i n tonnage. T h e third point o f the Counci l ' s report highlights the navy's top priorities with reference to future defence spending initiatives: the development o f experimental weapons and the expansion o f related training exercises. A s the political basis for the N a v y Supplemental Program passed by the D i e t o n N o v e m b e r 11 t h 1930, these recommendations point to the L o n d o n N a v a l Treaty as the agent responsible for the acceleration and diversification o f Japan's vast military research and development initiatives o f the 1930s. T h e supplemental program allocated ¥ 2 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 for the modernizat ion o f capital and auxiliary vessels, and nearly ¥ 2 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 more for maintenance and the i m p r o v e m e n t o f technical skills (see appendix I) . 2 2 A d d e d to these figures was nearly ¥ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 for the ship replacement and construction that was allowed by treaty, all o f w h i c h meant business for Nippon Kogaku. T h e final version o f the supplementary bill ultimately reduced the previous appropriation o f ¥ 5 0 8 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 for naval construction f r o m 1931 to 1936 by a margin o f ¥ 1 3 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . W h i l e this savings was earmarked for tax reduction, maintaining strategic advantage under the terms o f the treaty necessitated that a greater 2 1 Ibid, op cit. p. 105. 2 2 Mayer-Oakes, Thomas Francis (ed.). Fragile Victory: Prince Saionii and the 1930 London Treaty Issue 10 p r o p o r t i o n o f the monies saved be funnelled specifically into auxiliary technology research. T h e company's expansion throughout the 1930s was fuelled by a combinat ion o f the growth i n naval construction and an expansion o f its product line to include photographic lenses. T h e latter c o m p o n e n t was based u p o n o n g o i n g research conducted by one o f the company's G e r m a n engineers, H e i n r i c h A h u r t , w h o had extended his stay at Nippon Kogaku until 1928. F o l l o w i n g his departure, the photographic lens project was taken over by one o f his understudies, Sunayama K a k u n o , w h o i m p r o v e d u p o n Ahurt ' s 500-millimetre f /4 .8 prototype lens in 1929 and named the final product " T r i m a r " . 2 3 In the same year Sunayama added a second model , a 12 m m f/4 .0 lens named " A n y t a r " , based u p o n a similar lens produced by Z e i s s . 2 4 A s the company's photographic lens design and manufacturing projects became more sophisticated, its role as an optical supply firm became increasingly diversified. W i t h the debut o f its 75 m m , 105 m m , 120 m m , and 180 m m Nikkor lenses i n 1932, Nippon Kogaku began to supply other Japanese optical manufacturing firms with the lenses needed to produce cameras. 2 5 T h u s began the process by w h i c h the selection o f Nippon Kogaku by the I J N as its chief supplier o f optical munitions w o u l d serve, in turn, to fuel the overall growth o f Japan's optical industry. In an effort to trace this evolutionary process through the critical years after 1941, however, we must first examine the early development o f Japan's other major optical firms. from the Memoirs of Baron Harada Kumao (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1968) Appendix III C. p. 311. Nippon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha - Goiunen no avumi p. 108. Ibid, p. 108. Ibid, p. 109. , 11 IV) Related Japanese O p t i c a l Manufacturers In 1928, an entrepreneur w h o had become enchanted with cameras and recognized the potential market for domestically produced optical equipment, T a s h i m a K a z u o , established the Nichi-Doku Shashin Shokai, or the J a p a n - G e r m a n y C a m e r a C o m p a n y . T h e corporate name was changed in 1931 to Molta Goshi Kaisha, and again to Chiyoda Kogaku Seiko Kabushiki Kaisha after the company began photographic lens p r o d u c t i o n in 1937. 2 6 These lenses went by the brand name Rokkor, and it was one o f these lenses that was first used o n an aerial camera produced by the company i n 1940. 2 7 In July 1942 the corporation f o u n d e d the Itami O p t i c a l Glass C o m p a n y near K o b e u p o n the orders o f the I J N - a development pattern that will be seen to repeat itself as the navy pressed for self-sufficiency i n optical munitions after 1941. F o l l o w i n g W o r l d W a r T w o , the company w o u l d change its corporate name to the M i n o l t a Camera C o . , L t d . In N o v e m b e r o f 1933, entrepreneurs Y o s h i d a G o r o and U c h i d a Saburo f o u n d e d the Seiki Kogaku Kenkyusho, or Precision Opt ica l Instruments Laboratory. In its first year the f i rm p r o d u c e d an imitation " L e i c a I I " prototype 35 m m camera n a m e d the Kwanon, and the name given to the final product ion m o d e l was " H a n s a C a n o n " . 2 8 W h e n this camera debuted i n 1935 it was Japan's first 35 m m rangefinder camera with a focal plane shutter, but like all C a n o n cameras made before W W I I , it was fitted with a Nikkor lens manufactured by Nippon Kogaku.29 T h e performance o f the camera and the early success o f Seiki Kogaku were dependent, therefore, u p o n the optical glass and lens manufacturing capabilities o f Nippon Kogaku, w h i c h was fuelled ultimately by the support o f the I J N . In 2 6 "A Short History of Nippon Kogaku Japan." Nikon Historical Society 2 7 Ibid. 2 8 Ibid. 12 2 9 Ibid. 1937, U c h i d a Saburo incorporated the c o m p a n y under the name o f Seiki Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha, and this date has since been listed as the time o f C a n o n Inc.'s official f o u n d i n g . 3 0 Finally, we turn to the c o m p a n y that w o u l d most closely rival Nippon Kogaku i n b o t h its product ion o f optical glass and its receipt o f support f r o m the navy — the Fuji P h o t o F i l m C o m p a n y . Fuji was originally incorporated in 1934 as a manufacturer o f photosensitized f i lm materials such as roll films, m o t i o n picture films, X - r a y films, and photosensitive papers . 3 1 T h e company had two manufacturing plants; one in Ashigara that was originally constructed and equipped by the D a i - N i p p o n Cel lulo id C o m p a n y , and a second in O d a w a r a that was first established to aid its sister plant i n the product ion o f photographic chemicals (see appendices II and III). 3 2 In an effort to increase overall glass product ion after 1942, the Odawara plant also began to produce optical glass for binocular and camera lenses o n the orders o f the navy. V ) T h e A m e r i c a n Perspective T h e degree to w h i c h these primary optical companies were cultivated and fostered by I J N support was documented by the U n i t e d States N a v y during its extensive investigation o f Japan's naval manufacturing and organizational structures after 1945. T h i s investigative mission, w h i c h spanned over 185 subjects i n seven targeted areas, was labelled collectively the U . S . N a v y T e c h n i c a l M i s s i o n to Japan: Reports 1945-1946. T h e purpose o f the mission was: 3 0 Ibid. 32 "Japanese Optics" U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan p. 43. Ibid. p. 9. 13 . . . to survey all Japanese scientific and technological developments o f interest to the N a v y and M a r i n e C o r p s in the Japanese Islands o f K Y U S H U , S H I K O K U , H O N S H U , H O K K A I D O ; in C h i n a ; and i n K o r e a south o f latitude 3 8 ° N . T h i s i n v o l v e d the seizure o f intelligence material, its examination and study, the interrogation o f personnel, and finally, the preparation o f reports w h i c h w o u l d appraise the technological status o f the Japanese N a v y and Japanese industry . 3 3 W i t h respect to Japan's optical industry, the introduction o f report X - 0 5 , entitled "Japanese O p t i c s " , emphasizes the wholly exploitative nature o f the investigation headed by Lieutenant C o m m a n d e r G . Z . D i m i t r o f f , U S N R . It simply states: T h e aim o f this investigation was to exploit optical developments in Japan f r o m the standpoint o f research and manufacture and their application to instruments for naval or military use. T h i s was accomplished by a study of: 1. T h e Glass M a k i n g Industry . . . a. M e t h o d s o f manufacture b. Types o f glass developed c. Information received by the Japanese f r o m G e r m a n y d. Research laboratories or institutions e. T y p e o f raw material f. Special ingredients or substitutions 2. O p t i c a l Designs . .. a. Research in physical optics b. M e t h o d s o f computat ion o f optical systems Grimes, C.G. (ed.) U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan - History of Mission (USN: December, 1945) p. 1. 14 3. A p p l i c a t i o n o f Light and the Opt ica l Arrangements to Special Fields T h e introduction is fol lowed by an exhaustive review o f the state o f Japan's optical design and manufacturing capabilities, with a particular emphasis placed u p o n the chemical formulations involved in optical glass product ion. C o u p l e d with the review, however, is a forensic accounting o f Nippon Kogaku's operations, as well as a detailed review o f the plants operated by the Fuji P h o t o F i l m C o m p a n y at Ashigara and Odawara . Together with numerous interviews conducted with various c o m p a n y directors and design engineers, the report paints a clear, concise picture o f the influence o f the I J N u p o n Japan's overall technical growth in the field o f optics. T h e summary o f the report reads as follows: O n the basis o f study o f the targets listed and examination o f material left intact, the development o f optics i n Japan can be summarized as follows: 1. In the past five years Japan has made a p h e n o m e n a l growth i n optical glass manufacture. 2. Japan has at present, fairly m o d e r n and efficient optical factories. 3. N o spectacular optical developments have been made i n Japan, but rather adaptations and modifications have been made o f the optical systems used i n G e r m a n and U . S . instruments. 4. Japan has capable scientific personnel w h o understand m o d e r n optical requirements and are cognizant o f the shortcomings i n the Japanese processes o f glass manufacture. 5. T h e Japanese exhibited a tendency toward large size (aperture) visual optical instruments, particularly in the field o f binocular telescopes (80, 120, 150 m m 15 apertures). T h i s tendency may represent a futile attempt to offset deficiencies i n their radar d e v e l o p m e n t . 3 4 T h e first section o f the report outlines the early development o f Japan's optical industry, and begins by noting that " d u r i n g the war o f 1917-18, Japan f o u n d herself, m u c h like other countries, completely dependent for optical glass u p o n imports f r o m G e r m a n y . " 3 5 A f t e r tracing the reorganization o f Nippon Kogaku fo l lowing the Great K a n t o Earthquake and its expansion under the w i n g o f the N a v y Ministry , the report focuses primarily u p o n the efforts o f the c o m p a n y to meet the navy's stringent demands for optical glass and munitions. A f t e r interviewing Nippon Kogaku's directors, the report concluded that after the company was chosen i n 1942 to be the primary producer o f optical munitions for the I J N : . . . there occurred a great expansion i n glass product ion. T h i s was carried out, according to N i p p o n O p t i c a l officials, under governmental pressure. N e w buildings, optical shops, machine shops, etc., were started. 3 6 T h u s by 1942 the locus o f control over Nippon Kogaku's key logistical decisions lay with the N a v y Minis t ry and its efforts to satisfy the needs o f the I J N . T h r o u g h an examination o f the company's official fiftieth-anniversary history, entitled Gojunen no ayumi, the overwhelming influence o f the navy over Nikon's early growth becomes visible o n b o t h technical and productive levels. Virtually all o f the company's technical achievements were rooted in specific demands made by the armed forces, and i n particular the navy, for specialized optical munitions. T h e engineering challenges posed by these demands were considerable, and they generated a wide variety o f research 3 4 "Japanese Optics" U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan p. 1. 3 5 Ibid. p. 9. 16 projects aimed b o t h at solving the inconsistencies faced by the c o m p a n y i n its product ion o f optical glass, and the improvement o f technical proficiency in its design and manufacturing processes. A review o f these engineering projects and their related challenges will illustrate the manner in w h i c h the demands o f the I J N furthered Nippon Kogaku's overall technical capabilities. VI ) Nippon Kogaku's E v o l v i n g D e s i g n and Product ion Challenges i) Cameras O f primary importance to Nikon's post-war development is the company's initial interest i n the design and manufacture o f cameras. It must be noted, however, that Nippon Kogaku was initially f o u n d e d as an optical f i rm, and not as a camera manufacturer. U n t i l the 1930s, its product ion line was limited to telescopes, microscopes, surveying equipment, and a variety o f optical measuring devices o f use to science and industry . 3 7 A s noted above, the company's research into photographic lens p r o d u c t i o n was largely an effort to duplicate existing G e r m a n designs and to b e c o m e a supplier o f lenses to camera manufacturers. W i t h the advent o f the L o n d o n N a v a l Conference o f 1930 and the N a v a l Supplementary B i l l o f the same year, however, the navy began to put pressure o n Nippon Kogaku to begin designing cameras for reconnaissance aircraft. A c c o r d i n g to the company's o w n history, the I J N had theretofore depended entirely u p o n the import o f aerial reconnaissance photographic equipment f r o m F r a n c e . 3 8 A f t e r 1930, the company's researchers were encouraged to develop a series o f simple prototype cameras to satisfy the navy's demands for increased self-sufficiency i n the field o f aerial 3 6 Ibid. p. 9. 3 7 " A Short History of Nippon Kogaku Japan." Nikon Historical Society 17 photography. T h e first models ranged f r o m 700 m m to 1200 m m i n focal length and were characterized as simple, unsophisticated structures. 3 9 F o l l o w i n g this project Nippon Kogaku began to manufacture a range o f artillery cameras for land use, a project that was its first foray into the product ion o f photographic m u n i t i o n s . 4 0 Despi te these rudimentary beginnings, however, the significance o f the company's early efforts in the field o f camera manufacturing is rooted i n the source o f the incentive to pioneer such designs. Nikon states categorically " . . .it was primarily in response to the demands o f the navy that [Nippon Kogaku] took up camera research." 4 1 A s a result, the seeds o f the company's post-war design and manufacturing focus were sewn by the navy's plan to reduce its dependence u p o n foreign suppliers o f vital photographic equipment. T h i s forced realignment o f Nikon's manufacturing priorities w o u l d ultimately lay the foundations for its success in post-war camera product ion. F r o m these early beginnings, Nippon Kogaku went o n to produce a variety o f increasingly sophisticated cameras for a wide range o f military uses. A f t e r 1932, the designs had b e c o m e "authentic, full scale" aerial and land-based cameras, and each constituted another level o f technological achievement for the c o m p a n y in its efforts to meet the navy's d e m a n d s . 4 2 In the field o f reconnaissance photography, the first small aerial camera to be mass-produced featured a 180 m m Tessar-type infrared lens and a focal plane shutter. T h e mechanism was sealed in a housing measuring 13 by 18 c m , but these overall dimensions were still considered too large for effective aerial use. Consequently an even smaller design was produced , w h i c h featured a 75 m m Tessar-type 3 8 Nippon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha - Goiunen no avumi p. 67. 3 9 Ibid. p. 67. 4 0 Ibid. p. 67. 4 1 Ibid. p. 67. 4 2 Ibid. p. 67. 18 infrared lens and a spring-driven motor inside a " B r o w n i e " style h o u s i n g . 4 3 Cameras were the most complex and intricate designs p r o d u c e d by the firm to that date, and they represented a determined step forward in the miniaturization o f its optical instruments. A d d e d to the design challenges presented by demands for smaller and smaller optical components , the need for mechanisms such as motors , spindles, gears and shutters further forced the c o m p a n y to broaden its design and manufacturing focus. W i t h the diversification o f Nippon Kogaku's product line came the addition o f a new factory at H o y a m a , and together with the aerial cameras came a series o f designs for land reconnaissance cameras featuring telephoto lenses. T h e first was a three-metre upright periscope-style camera o n a t r ipod mount , w h i c h was later fol lowed by a similar two-metre version i n 1939. In the same year a pair o f massive five-metre telephoto cameras were also p r o d u c e d that required flatbed trucks to transport. A c c o r d i n g to Nippon Kogaku's c o m p a n y history, these five-metre models were most extensively employed during the " i n c i d e n t " at N o m o n h a n versus the Russian army i n 1939. 4 4 ii) Range Finders W i t h the increasing demands being made by the military for optical devices capable o f "seeing" extreme distances or i n specific dimensions, Nippon Kogaku's research was also directed toward the development o f adequate g u n cameras, bombsights , wide-angle lenses, and even infra-red imaging devices. 4 5 A m o n g the most technically demanding o f these projects was the creation o f optical rangefinders, or fire-control directors for the first I J N capital vessels to be built in Japan. In an era before computer-enhanced imaging systems, assessing the range to a target required warships to employ a variety o f 4 3 Ibid. p. 67. 4 4 Ibid, p. 67. 19 purely optical instruments. These devices produced a 'stereo' optical image o f a target for a vessel's fire-control c o m m a n d centre, w h i c h together with corrections for the target's course and speed w o u l d enable the shagekiban, or fire-control computer , to calculate accurate gunsight values for the turret. 4 6 These instruments operated in the same manner as a person's two eyes w h e n determining depth: the m o r e distant the target, the further apart the two optical images were required to be i n order to accurately assess its range. Before the advent o f computer-assisted imaging, targets at great distances naturally necessitated proportional increases i n the scale o f the optical equipment needed to view them. A s the various instruments grew i n scale, so too did their individual optical components , or 'elements', such as lenses and prisms. Larger and more ambitious element designs, i n turn, fuelled the proport ional expansion o f the firm's product ion facilities and equipment. F o l l o w i n g the arrival o f the British-made battlecruiser Kongo i n 1913, w h i c h featured rangefinders p r o d u c e d by maker Barr & Stroud, the I J N began to design comparable fire-control optics for future vessels. 4 7 Kongo was the last o f the I JN's capital ships to be built outside Japan, and during its construction by Vickers & Sons, a series o f three sister keels was laid in Japanese naval yards at Y o k o s u k a , Nagasaki, and K o b e . 4 8 O v e r the next ten years, I J N optical researchers at the Tsukij i Arsenal made considerable progress in the field o f optical engineering, but their efforts were reduced to ashes i n the earthquake and fire o f 1923. F r o m this point forward, the I J N came to rely o n private domestic 4 5 Ibid. p. 68. 4 6 Evans, David C. & Peattie, Mark R. Kaigun: Strategy. Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy. 1887-1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997) p. 253. 4 7 Nippon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha - Goiunen no ayumi p.. 179. 4 8 Jentschura, Hansgeorg & Jung, Dieter & Mickel, Peter. (Preston, Antony & Brown, J.D., trans.) Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy. 1869-1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1977) p. 35. 20 manufacturers for the satisfaction o f its optical requirements, not the least o f w h i c h included rangefinders. T h e optical fire-control contracts awarded to Nippon Kogaku by the I J N w o u l d stretch the company's technical capabilities to their limits and necessitate the expansion o f its research team to include a wider cast o f experts i n the field o f optics. A s Nippon Kogaku's product line diversified, a committee was established to set specifications for the standardization o f products and the minimizat ion o f variation i n optical constants. T h i s committee included professors f r o m T o k y o Imperial University, the T o k y o University o f T e c h n o l o g y , K y o t o University, and the O s a k a Industry Labora tory . 4 9 W h i l e their efforts were directed toward the management o f product ion standards, however, the scale o f the navy's optical requirements continued to grow proportionally with its expansion i n naval construction through 1941. A s the complexities o f calculating accurate firing solutions for heavier naval artillery came to be better understood by the British, A m e r i c a n and Japanese navies i n the interwar per iod , the need for precise optics became more critical. T h e basic rangefinder designs p r o d u c e d by Nippon Kogaku were grouped into two categories — low-angle and high-angle directors. T h e former consisted o f four types: ranging f r o m 2 metre to 4.5 metres i n length, while the latter category consisted o f several types ranging between 1.5 and 15 metres l o n g . 5 0 T h e largest o f the high-angle directors were p r o d u c e d especially for the Yamato class o f superbattleships, plans for w h i c h were drawn up after the failure o f the second L o n d o n N a v a l Limitat ion Conference i n 1936. E a c h o f these 70,000-ton vessels was designed to feature three 18.1-inch turrets, and represented the firm determination o f the I J N to outrange all other navies. Superlative artillery, however, also 4 9 "Japanese Optics" U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan p. 27. 5 0 Low, J. Edward. "Directors" Mechanisms of Imperial Japanese Navy Warships in 3-D 04/29/2001 21 necessitated superlative fire-control optics, and Nippon Kogaku was therefore tasked with the product ion o f eight 15-metre rangefinders capable o f p r o v i d i n g images o f targets at distances o f over 35 kilometres. 5 1 O n e o f the finished devices were affixed to each o f the three m a i n turrets aboard b o t h the Yamato and the Musashi battleships, with a fourth installed o n their forward fire-control towers. T h e creation o f these massive instruments involved such a high degree o f engineering precision that the standard o f accuracy i n their pr ism construction was 60 times greater than that w h i c h had been applied to conventional projects . 5 2 In addition, there were 10-metre rangefinders installed o n the ships' after fire-control towers, and 7.5-metre versions o n each o f their secondary turrets. 5 3 Nippon Kogaku had not only set new design standards w h e n it had furnished the IJN's flagship Yamato with the optics necessary to fight, it had also raised dramatically the technological capability o f the Japanese optical industry as a whole. T h e failure o f the naval limitation treaty system and the ambition o f the I J N to outclass its opponents had stretched Nippon Kogaku's design and manufacturing abilities further than ever before, iii) Periscopes and L e n s Coatings A d d e d to the company's accomplishments in rangefinder p r o d u c t i o n were similar successes made in the field o f periscope manufacturing. Nippon Kogaku's first periscope was p r o d u c e d i n 1918, and had an overall length o f seven metres . 5 4 F o l l o w i n g the First W o r l d W a r , the c o m p a n y began to produce periscopes based u p o n G e r m a n designs, <http://www.ijn.dreamhost.corn/Directors/Directors.htm> 5 1 Evans, David C. & Peattie, Mark R. Kaigun: Strategy. Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy. 1887-1941 (Annapolis. MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997) p. 262. 5 2 Howe, Christopher. The Origins of Japanese Trade Supremacy: Development and Technology in Asia from 1540 to the Pacific War (London, UK: Hurst & Company, 1996) p. 305. 5 3 Hansgeorg et al. Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy. 1869-1945 p. 39. 5 4 Nippon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha - Gojunen no avumi p. 180. 22 manufacturing between 50 and 60 units between 1920 and 1922. 5 5 B y the m i d 1920s, G e r m a n technicians were hired by the c o m p a n y to aid i n the development o f new models , and records indicate that by the beginning o f the S h o w a per iod , large numbers o f 9-metre and 10-metre periscopes were being p r o d u c e d . 5 6 A d d e d to these models , w h i c h were featured aboard most first and second-class I J N submarines, was a series o f smaller periscopes for use aboard the navy's vaunted kaiten, or midget submarines. T h e questionable effectiveness o f these one to five-man submersibles notwithstanding, Nippon Kogaku was called u p o n to make w o r k i n g periscopes for the over 300 units that were p r o d u c e d across their various classes (see appendix I V ) . 5 7 A d d e d to the optical engineering o f the periscopes themselves was an o n g o i n g effort made by Nippon Kogaku to increase the transparency o f their glass surfaces. T h e standard 10-metre periscope p r o d u c e d by the company featured 33 individual optical elements (see appendix V ) , and its complexity resulted in dramatic light losses . 5 8 In the interest o f maintaining their strategic advantage, Japanese submarine commanders wished to use their periscopes at d a w n and in the l o w light o f early evening, but the initial inferiority o f the optics prevented them f r o m d o i n g so without difficulty. T h e s e commanders placed great pressure o n the navy and o n Nippon Kogaku to i m p r o v e the performance o f their periscopes under low light conditions, and the c o m p a n y responded by initiating research into new lens coating techniques aimed at increasing their transparency. A c c o r d i n g to the investigators i n the U . S . N a v y technical mission: . . . two methods were f o u n d for "coat ing" glass surfaces: 1. T h e chemical method, i n w h i c h the glass was treated wi th nitric acid. 5 5 Ibid, p. 180. 5 6 Ibid. p. 180. 23 2. T h e evaporation method , i n w h i c h cryolite is evaporated and deposited u p o n the glass surface, in vacuum. A f t e r treatment, the glass is baked at 1 5 0 ° C for one hour for durabili ty. 5 9 These procedures were evidently conducted at the Nippon Kogaku's optical factory at Y o k o s u k a , i n coordination with the navy's submarine base at Nagaura H a r b o u r . D u r i n g their analysis o f the plant, the U . S . N a v y investigators noted: " E v i d e n c e was f o u n d that lens coatings had been carried o n " and recorded that " a few samples o f apparently experimental coatings and coating material were o b t a i n e d . " 6 0 S u c h experimental w o r k demonstrated the kinds o f subsidiary technologies generated by the company's efforts to deliver o n I J N optical contracts. A s engineers sought new ways to solve these kinds o f design problems, a host o f secondary investigations was inevitably added to their o n g o i n g studies i n the field o f glass product ion. These new tasks included: experimental methods o f glass annealing, the four-stage grinding and polishing o f b o t h lenses and prisms, and a variety o f efforts to enhance night viewing with the aid o f lens coatings and filters.61 T h e company's efforts i n the field o f experimental periscope lens coatings w o u l d be o f particular importance i n the post-war per iod as such coatings were later, f o u n d to have a variety o f optical applications. Periscope p r o d u c t i o n too continued after the war, and Nikon manufactured instruments for construction surveying, as well as a series o f 10 metre periscopes for use i n the railcar maintenance bays o f the shinkansen, or bullet-train railway l i n e . 6 2 Hansgeorg et al. Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy. 1869-1945 pp. 184-185. Howe, Christopher. The Origins of Japanese Trade Supremacy p. 306. "Japanese Optics" U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan p. 31. Ibid, p. 5. Ibid, p. 30. 24 iv) N i g h t - V i s i o n Technologies W h i l e Nikon w o u l d continue to produce periscopes after the war, research into night-vis ion technology was prohibited by the U n i t e d States after 1945. U n t i l the end o f the war, however, Nippon Kogaku pursued a variety o f projects designed to aid the I J N in its prosecution o f nighttime surface combat. These included the development o f powerful binoculars with unusually large 21 c m lenses that had superb light-gathering capabilities, as well as 12 c m and 5 c m models. T h e last o f these was named the " N o v a " - t y p e , and each pair was fitted with detachable night-vision enhancing filters designed to better refract and capture available starlight and moonlight . C o m b i n e d with the navy's considerable training i n night-combat maneuvers and its development o f parachute-suspended star shells, these advanced optics put the I J N far ahead o f its rivals i n its readiness for night surface engagements. 6 3 W h i l e U . S . naval war-gaming at N e w p o r t during the 1930s led the Americans to underestimate the value o f night-combat readiness (with costly results in 1942), radar did indeed prove to be the superior technology, and it soon rendered the IJN's night-vision optics tactically obsolete . 6 4 VII) Nippon Kogaku's Corporate D e v e l o p m e n t Attent ion must also be paid to Nippon Kogaku's financial and logistical development f r o m its rapid expansion i n the late 1930s to its suspension o f operations in A u g u s t 1945. T h e influence o f the N a v y Minis t ry over the company's growth and the diversification o f its research and manufacturing initiatives was o f paramount importance to the Japanese opticaf industry overall. T h e investments niade by the navy iri Nippon Kogaku p r o v i d e d 6 2 Nippon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha - Gojunen no avumi p. 180. 6 3 Evans & Peattie. Kaigun. p. 275. 25 not only the required incentive to develop these technical capabilities domestically, but also the capitahneeded to support such a dramatic expansion i n operations. A t the time o f its f o u n d i n g i n 1917, Nippon Kogaku had approximately 200 employees and a single manufacturing plant, but by the end o f the war it employed 25,000 workers at 24 different facilities. 6 5 Clearly this dramatic growth could not have been fuelled by naval contracts alone, and indeed the navy's influence was crucial to the procurement o f additional bank loans at key points i n the company's development. F o l l o w i n g the passage o f the N a t i o n a l General M o b i l i z a t i o n L a w i n July 1938, the increased control o f the government over product ion, wages, and labour enabled the military to pressure Nippon Kogaku to boost the product ion o f optical weapons. In the same year, a navy investigation determined that the c o m p a n y w o u l d have to increase its annual output between five and six times to ¥ 6 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 per year. 6 6 U n d e r the weight o f such demands, Nippon Kogaku's financing by the Mitsubishi Ginko was b e c o m i n g inadequate, and consequently the c o m p a n y was granted approval by the navy to begin receiving loans f r o m the Japan Industrial B a n k (Nihon Kogyo Ginko) i n 1939. In O c t o b e r o f that year, the c o m p a n y was furnished with a preliminary loan o f ¥ 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 , w h i c h was fol lowed shortly thereafter by an additional ¥ 1 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 for the further expansion o f its facilities and the purchase o f new equipment . 6 7 A s the company continued to g r o w it underwent a period o f corporate and managerial restructuring as new manufacturing plants were opened i n T o t s u k a i n 1940 and Kawasaki i n 1941. Finally, with the outbreak o f war against the U n i t e d States, Nippon Kogaku was chosen to be the navy's chief supplier o f optical weapons, necessitating the appropriation o f an additional ¥ 5 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 loan in 6 4 Ibid, p. 578. 6 5 Nippon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha - Goiunen no ayumi, p. 72. 26 July o f 1942. 6 8 W h e n the company's vast expansion p r o m p t e d the r e f o r m o f its manufacturing systems, mass-production techniques were adopted in order to compensate for the paucity o f skilled labour experienced during the war. Despite the company's continued expansion, however, the measure o f operational control exercised by its directors declined dramatically. W i t h the creation o f the M u n i t i o n s Minis t ry in September 1943 and the subsequent passage o f the M u n i t i o n s Supply C o m p a n y A c t in the same year, Nippon Kogaku became increasingly beholden to the navy's " i m p o s s i b l e " product ion goals and il l -conceived emergency measures. 6 9 VIII) A p p r o a c h i n g the N a d i r U . S . successes i n the Pacific W a r against Japanese shipping had by late 1944 sharply curtailed Japan's supply o f raw materials, and by 1945 Nippon Kogaku's p roduct ion facilities had begun to suffer the effects o f A m e r i c a n b o m b i n g raids. T h e response o f the navy to these threats f r o m the air was to m o v e many vital optical research and product ion plants underground into caves or even to relocate them to M a n c h u r i a . 7 0 T h e U . S . N a v y technical mission discovered several such ad h o c manufacturing facilities in various stages o f complet ion during their investigation o f Japan's wartime optical industry. T h e i r final report highlights some o f the more desperate measures undertaken as follows: O p t i c a l factory at Z U S H I - T h i s factory manufactured mechanical parts for midget submarines. Extensive caves had been d u g into the hills, w h i c h appeared 6 6 Ibid, p. 71. 6 7 Ibid. p. 71. 6 8 Ibid. p. 71. 6 9 Ibid, p. 72. 7 0 "Japanese Optics" U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan, p. 9. 27 to be soft shale, and machines had been m o v e d in , but n o w o r k had actually been done i n the caves. O n e o f the tunnels i n the caves was designated for glass annealing, but was not completed. Machines and equipment for about 400 employees were provided. Plans called for enlargement to about double this size. 7 1 In some cases, optical firms were ordered to relocate entire manufacturing plants in an effort to hide them or put them out o f the range o f U . S . bombers . T h e U . S . N a v y report notes that shortly after constructing a series o f new factories in 1942, Nippon Kogaku was ordered by the N a v y Minis t ry to m o v e them further inland. T h e report states: N o sooner were they completed than the c o m p a n y was ordered to m o v e the., machinery to plants in the interior o f Japan. Shortly afterwards, this order was rescinded. Later it was expected that the plants w o u l d be m o v e d to Manchur ia . In fact, some o f the equipment (film coating machines) o f the F u j i O p t i c a l and Photographic plants i n A S H I G A R A was sent to M a n c h u r i a , but was lost w h e n the ships carrying it were s u n k . 7 2 Fuji's sister plant i n Odawara fared no better, for its role as a producer o f optical glass qualified it too as an industrial target for U . S . air strikes. It is noted i n the report that "the plant increased its product ion to 30 tons o f optical glass per year and was still expanding w h e n it was b o m b e d o n 14 A u g u s t 1945" - the date o f Japan's surrender. 7 3 Based u p o n interviews with the company's directors conducted by the U S N a v y after the war, the plant's ultimate expected product ion capacity had been 120 to 150 tons o f glass 7 1 Ibid. p. 5. 7 2 Ibid, p. 9. 7 3 Ibid. p. 9. 28 per year . 7 4 Addit ional ly , the company had begun construction o f a new plant for the product ion o f materials for safety glass i n July 1943, but it was not completed before Japan's surrender i n A u g u s t 1945. O t h e r factories too, such as the optical research laboratory o f the First A i r T e c h n i c a l B r a n c h Arsenal at Kanazawa, d id not escape the air raids. T h e U . S . N a v y report noted: T h e greater part o f the buildings had been destroyed by b o m b i n g , and most o f the equipment had been removed to K O M A R I Y A , near O S A K A . A display r o o m contained some binoculars, b o m b sights, and g u n cameras and many signs indicating the places where lenses, torpedo cameras, N a v y binoculars, sights, and other material had been arranged for display. 7 5 D u r i n g the first few months after A u g u s t 1945, many such post m o r t e m reports were written about the status o f Japan's optical industry, and U . S . N a v y investigators collected samples o f every device, material, and document relevant to its progress. A m o n g these items were samples o f dozens o f types o f optical glass, together with samples o f the indigenous clay, feldspar, kaolin, etc., used in their manufacture. Ultimately this list o f materials and equipment, including binoculars, bombsights , periscopes, g u n sights, sextants, etc., was shipped to the U . S . N a v y O r d n a n c e Investigation Laboratory at Indiana H e a d , M a r y l a n d for further analysis (see appendix V I ) . 7 6 Exhaustive studies were made o f the physical properties and chemical composit ions o f the optical glass p r o d u c e d by Nippon Kogaku and Fuji, and further forensic accounting by the U . S . N a v y investigators w o u l d yield a comprehensive list o f every optical f i r m to w h i c h that glass 7 4 Ibid. p. 9. 7 5 Ibid, p. 5. 7 6 Ibid. p. 33. 29 was sold between 1941 and 1945 (see appendix V I I ) . 7 7 D u r i n g those years, the Fuji optical c o m p a n y alone sold over 158,000 k g o f optical glass to 19 domestic optical device manufacturers, while retaining another 1,400 kg for the product ion o f lenses i n its o w n manufacturing plants . 7 8 A t the same time, Nippon Kogaku's operations had managed to produce over 5,000,000 kg o f optical glass i n 41 different types - and fully 98 percent o f its sales were to the Japanese armed forces . 7 9 T h e investments made by the I J N and the N a v y Minis t ry i n these two firms had enabled a geometric expansion o f Japan's optical industry with respect to productivity and technical proficiency. A report issued in 1944 by the U . S . W a r D e p a r t m e n t entitled " H a n d b o o k o n Japan's Military F o r c e s " described captured Japanese optics as " o u t s t a n d i n g " . 8 0 IX) P o s t - M b r t e m and Reorganization U n d e r the U . S . O c c u p a t i o n F o l l o w i n g Japan's surrender, Nippon Kogaku's operations were halted and its plants remained idle while the U . S . occupation authorities ( S C A P ) considered h o w the c o m p a n y should be reorganized. U n l i k e Fuji's manufacturing plants, w h i c h had employed a mere 2,100 workers during the war, Nippon Kogaku's massive operations had kept 25,000 employees o n its payroll , and i n the absence o f military contracts, a sharp reduction o f its workforce was inevitable. In the case o f Fuji, S C A P allowed the c o m p a n y to continue o n p r o d u c i n g photosensitive materials with little reorganization because its manufacturing base was determined to be adequate for the product ion targets chosen. (These targets varied little f r o m those set during the war era, and as such the n u m b e r o f employees Ibid. p. 21. Ibid, p. 21. Ibid, p. 25. Howe, Christopher. The Origins of Japanese Trade Supremacy p. 306. 30 retained was not drastically curtailed during the reorganization. 8 1 ) Nippon Kogaku, o n the other hand, was slated to resume only limited operations as the producer o f optical equipment for the civilian consumer market — an exercise i n w h i c h it had had virtually no experience. Undeterred by the layoffs that had cut its workforce to a mere 1,725 employees, the firm's directors set about coordinating a series o f 15 w o r k i n g groups to examine its potential manufacturing options. These groups were essentially tasked with the creation o f a product line that w o u l d enable the c o m p a n y to employ its considerable technical skill to the continued product ion o f existing designs. F o u r key innovations made by Nippon Kogaku during its years as an optical munitions supplier w o u l d later prove to be o f paramount importance to the company's post-war manufacturing success. 8 2 Firstly, the experience gained i n the product ion o f prisms for periscopes and rangefinders was to be o f crucial significance. Nikon w o u l d later f ind itself in a posit ion o f leadership during the revolution o f the photography w o r l d by the reflex camera — o f w h i c h prisms were the vital component . Secondly, the innovative lens coatings designed for submarine periscopes were later f o u n d to i m p r o v e the performance o f photographic lenses. Coatings that utilized as few as four elements were able to increase the transparency o f the glass and reduce light loss, thereby i m p r o v i n g the overall performance o f the opt ics . 8 3 T h i r d l y , the company's o w n wartime systems o f mass-production for such items as binoculars p r o v i d e d the experience needed to begin p r o d u c i n g instruments in higher volumes. Finally, the early experimentation that had been conducted by the c o m p a n y into the rudimentary 1 "Japanese Optics" U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan, p. 52. 2 Howe, Christopher. The Origins of Japanese Trade Supremacy p. 306. 3 Ibid. p. 306. 31 integration o f optics, electronics, and mechanical devices w o u l d enable it to continue o n as a pioneer i n that f i e l d . 8 4 W h i l e most o f these key considerations were not yet evident to the company's 15 w o r k i n g groups in the fall o f 1945, their aim. was to pinpoint Nippon Kogaku's strengthsas an optical manufacturer and assess their potential value to the civilian market. T h e y were tasked, however, with the evaluation o f over 70 possible designs, including cameras, telescopes, surveying equipment, projectors, clocks, spindles, lights, calculators, and even surgical e q u i p m e n t . 8 5 T h e groups began making their assessments o n September 1 s t 1945, and by September 20 t h they had selected 38 o f the designs as the most eligible candidates. T h e most successful items chosen for product ion were the binoculars previously designed for the use o f Japan's military forces during the war — models that featured names such as " G a l i l e o " , " N o v a " , and " O r i o n " . 8 6 M a n y o f these wartime-issue binoculars had already become highly sought-after trophies o f U . S . N a v a l officers, and A m e r i c a n servicemen continued to be the company's most eager customers after product ion resumed in A p r i l 1946. 8 7 B y that date, a mere eight months since the end o f the war, the c o m p a n y began manufacturing a line o f products that included: camera lenses, five types o f binoculars, a pocket telescope, a microscope, a water level, land-use and astronomical telescopes, and several types o f spectrographs. 8 8 Ibid, p. 306. Nippon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha - Goiunen no avumi, p. 77. Nippon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha - Goiunen no avumi, p. 72. Samuels, Richard J. Rich Nation. Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994) p. 308 and; Morrison, S.E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War Two (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1947-1964) vol. 3, p. 24. in Howe, Christopher. The Origins of Japanese Trade Supremacy p. 306. Nippon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha - Goiunen no avumi. p. 77. 32 In September 1945, Nippon Kogaku's C o n s u m e r G o o d s P r o d u c t i o n Subcommittee also p r o p o s e d the p r o d u c t i o n o f a camera, and by N o v e m b e r o f that year the Camera and Projector Commit tee had started its investigation o f the designs. 8 9 Engineers began w o r k i n g with designs for an 80 m m twin-lens reflex camera, as well as a small coupled-rangefinder camera with a focal plane shutter and an interchangeable lens that w o u l d use 35 m m film. T h e 80 m m T L R design was eventually abandoned, however, and the smaller m o d e l was selected and given the name " N i k o r e t t e " . 9 0 Shortly thereafter, the abbreviated version o f the c o m p a n y name, " N i k k o " , was changed to " N i k o n " , and w h e n this name was applied to the firm's prototype 35 m m camera it became k n o w n as the " N i k o n l " . 9 1 T w e n t y prototypes were ordered in 1946, and by early 1947 the first finished N i k o n C a m e r a m o d e l was exhibited within the company. In M a r c h o f that year the company's new name was officially announced, and by O c t o b e r 1947 advertising o f the first m o d e l N i k o n had begun. Finally, i n February 1948, the camera was released. Fuji, meanwhile, had established an optical manufacturing division k n o w n as the Fuji P h o t o O p t i c a l C o . L t d . i n 1944, and S C A P ' s post-war reorganization had allowed it to continue p r o d u c i n g srnall amounts o f optical glass. T h e continuation o f operations at the O d a w a r a lens product ion shop enabled its engineers to produce the company's first still camera, the Fujica-6, w h i c h was released in A u g u s t 1948. 9 2 N i k o n ' s rapid development o f its first 35 m m camera was not without its difficulties, w h i c h s temmed largely f r o m the nationwide shortage o f materials and the overall novelty 8 9 Ito Mikio. "Archivist's Memo No. 1" Nikon Company 02/05/2001. <http://www.nikon.co.jp/main/eng/d-archives/memo/m01_e.htm> 9 0 Nippon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha - Goiunen no avumi. p. 79. 9 1 Ito Mikio. "Archivist's Memo No. 1 "Nikon Company 9 2 "Company History" Fuji Photo Optical Co. Ltd. 30/05/2001. <http://www.fujinon.co.jp/outline/ out02.htm> 33 o f the design. A c c o r d i n g to the N i k o n company web site, the managing director o f the project, Fuketa M a s a h i k o , described the initial setbacks as follows (archivist's translation): F o r the designing department as well as product ion spot, everything was new and they were suffering f r o m troubles and problems. It was, as it were, " to think while r u n n i n g . " In retrospect, we were doing just the opposite o f " M a k e haste s l o w l y . " 9 3 X ) T h e Lessons o f O p t i c a l M u n i t i o n s Product ion T h e experience gained by Nippon Kogaku i n its role as a wartime munitions supplier helped enable the emergent N i k o n company to overcome its initial postwar difficulties and initiate p r o d u c t i o n i n a relatively short time frame. A d d e d to its knowledge base in the fields o f optical glass and photographic lens product ion , prior successes i n lens coating left N i k o n well posit ioned to enter the U . S . and E u r o p e a n camera markets by 1950. In A p r i l 1946, a soft optical coaling was applied to the surfaces o f the lenses inside the barrels o f its N i k k o r lenses to i m p r o v e the transmission o f light through the instruments. Cryolite was initially used, as it had been during the war, but by 1948 the primary ingredient was changed to magnesium fluoride, and the anti-reflective coatings were substantially h a r d e n e d . 9 4 Together these improvements enabled corrections to aberrations i n the optics through the addition o f more optical elements without c o m p r o m i s i n g the transmission o f light. T h e coatings also played a role i n significantly reducing internal reflections or "flares" , w h i c h i m p r o v e d the performance o f the Ito Mikio. "Archivist's Memo No. 1 "Nikon Company "History of Nikon Cameras" Nikon Company 02/05/2001. <http://www.nikon.co.jp/main/eng/d-archives/camera/history_e.htm> 34 company's large aperture and wide-angle lenses. 9 5 A l l told, these chemical coatings o f the internal surfaces o f N i k o n ' s lenses were the key feature that enabled them to surpass G e r m a n lenses i n their optical performance after the w a r . 9 6 T h e c o n t i n u u m o f N i k o n ' s technological research had clearly not been b r o k e n by the company's crash transition to consumer product ion in 1945 and 1946. T h e f i rm was able to capitalize directly u p o n its successes in the war era and m o d i f y them to suit the needs o f its new markets despite the nearly total evisceration o f the company's manufacturing base. B y the mid-1950s, the superior quality o f N i k o n ' s photographic lenses and cameras came to be recognized w o r l d w i d e . 9 7 T h e c o m p a n y points to the "sensat ion" created by the age o f the " c a m e r a m a n " , f r o m w h o m the readers o f Life magazine received such dramatic shots o f U . S . involvement in the K o r e a n W a r . 9 8 W h e n a K o r e a n W a r correspondent for Life w o n the U . S . Camera A w a r d in 1950, his N i k o n camera equipment was described i n the New York Times." T h e article was read with interest by the chief o f the economic and scientific section o f S C A P , G e n e r a l W . F . Marquat , w h o responded in a letter to N a g a o k a Masao , the president o f N i k o n : It was with extreme interest that I read the article i n the New York Times o f D e c e m b e r 10, 1950 o n the superior quality o f the N i k o n camera and the N i k k o r lenses. . . It has been m y contention that Japanese export industry should adjust itself to compete i n the w o r l d markets o n a basis o f quali ty . . . T h e employees o f Howe, Christopher. The Origins of Japanese Trade Supremacy p. 306. Ibid, p. 306. Nippon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha - Goiunen no avumi. p. 83. Ibid. p. 83. 35 N i p p o n K o g a k u may take pride i n making a substantial contribution toward the rebuilding o f the economy o f their c o u n t r y . 1 0 0 A g a i n i n 1955, the New York Times reported o n the substantial progress made by Japan's post-war optical industry: P r o d u c t i o n o f high-grade precision lenses for cameras and other optical goods is w i n n i n g Japan a new and profitable field o f export trade. T h r e e years ago the industry began a drive for a major share o f w o r l d markets. It made rapid and sizeable gains i n exports o f low and medium-pr iced cameras, binoculars and microscopes, particularly in the U n i t e d States, the largest market . 1 0 1 T h e technological superiority o f N i k o n optical products was further c o n f i r m e d w h e n N i k o n ' s optical glass, its camera design, and its various lenses were awarded the " G r a n d -Prix" , " G o l d " , "Silver" , and " B r o n z e " prizes at the 1958 W o r l d E x p o i n B r u s s e l s . 1 0 2 XI) Conclusions N i k o n has described its growth as an optical munitions supplier as an episode o f "increased wealth i n technical efficiency", and cites its p r o d u c t i o n o f optics for the military as key to its emergence as a civilian manufacturer . 1 0 3 I f not for the pressure f r o m the military, it is unlikely that Nippon Kogaku w o u l d have diversified its product line to include reconnaissance aircraft cameras and military use cameras dur ing the war. W h i l e post-war research was indeed required to fashion designs for civilian markets, the origins Nippon Kogaku Kogvo - Yonjunenshi A 40-Year History of Nikon (Tokyo: Nippon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha, 1957) p. 291. in Samuels, Richard J. Rich Nation. Strong Army p. 308. New York Times, 3 October, 1955, in Samuels, Richard J. Rich Nation. Strong Army p. 308. "Nikon Portfolio: Brief History" Nikon Corporation 24/06/2001. <http://www.nikon.co.jp/main/eng/portfolio/history.htm> Nippon Kogaku Kogvo Kabushiki Kaisha - Goiunen no avumi. p. 74. 36 o f the company's understanding o f camera product ion rests with the wartime demands made by the armed forces - and those o f the I J N i n particular. T h e foresight possessed by navy commanders at the time o f the naval limitation treaty negotiations o f 1922 and 1930 clearly enabled the navy to make broad compensatory plans for its cultivation o f domestic technology manufacturers. F o r its provis ion o f technological incentive and its intensification o f the navy's animosity toward naval limitation agreements, the L o n d o n N a v a l Treaty o f 1930 stands as one o f Japan's most significant pre-war diplomatic accomplishments. Furthermore , in tracing the roots o f the extensive naval supplementary program back to the Supreme W a r Counci l ' s report to the emperor, the treaty can be seen to have accelerated and diversified several o f Japan's military research and development initiatives o f the 1930s. G i v e n the determination o f the navy b o t h to achieve self-sufficiency i n critical materials and to maximize the combat effectiveness o f its voluntarily restricted fleet, Japan's optical industry was, a m o n g others, poised after 1930 to reap huge technological rewards. In the case o f Nippon Kogaku, the effectiveness o f the navy's campaign w o u l d carry a small Japanese optical manufacturer very far into the post-war era. XII) Further Considerations A m o n g the questions and potential avenues o f further investigation that arise f r o m this analysis, several deserve particular attention. First o f all, a determination is needed o f the degree to w h i c h manufacturers in other critical industries experienced the same measure o f support f r o m the I J N as a result o f Japan's experiment with voluntary naval limitation. Addit ionally , a wider focus might shed light o n the way these manufacturers interacted with one another and with universities and government research institutions 37 during the prewar period. O n another level, further questions are raised through this singular examination o f the lengthy and comprehensive U . S . N a v a l T e c h n i c a l M i s s i o n to Japan. O f interest are b o t h the political mandate underlying the conscious decision o f the U . S . N a v y to exploit Japan's industrial base, and the impact that exploitation had u p o n America ' s post-war technological development. O f parallel consideration are the efforts o f the Japanese to prevent the post-war discovery o f its most sensitive research projects, a n d / o r the agreement o f the U n i t e d States not to publicize their existence. 38 B I B L I O G R A P H Y A o k i , Shosaburo. Kogaku heiki kogyo no kaiso (Recollections of Optical Weapons Manufacture in, Suikokai. Kaiso no Nihon Kaigun (The Japanese Navy Remembered Tokyo, Japan: Hara Shobo, 1985. Evans, David C. & Peattie, Mark R. Kaigun: Strategy. Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy. 1887-1941 Annapolis, M D : Naval Institute Press, 1997. Fuji Photo Optical Co. Ltd. "Company History" Fuji Photo Optical Co. Ltd. 30/05/2001. <http://www.fujinon.co.jp/outline/ out02.htm> Grimes, C . G . Captain, U S N , ed. "Japanese Optics" U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan - Series X : Miscellaneous Targets - Report X-05 Washington D . C . : U.S. Government Printing Office, U.S. Naval History Division, 1945. Grimes, C . G . Captain, U S N , ed. U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan - History of Mission Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, U.S. Naval History Division, 1946. Ito Mikio. "Archivist's Memo N o . 1" Nikon Corporation. 02/05/2001. <http://www.nikon.co.jp/main/eng/d-archives/memo/m01_e.htm> Jentschura, Hansgeorg & Jung, Deiter & Mickel, Peter. (Preston, Antony & Brown, J .D., trans.) Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy. 1869-1945 Annapolis, M D : Naval Institute Press, 1977. Howe, Christopher. The Origins of Japanese Trade Supremacy: Development and Technology in Asia from 1540 to the Pacific War London, U K : Hurst & Company, 1996. Kobayashi, Tatsuo. The London Naval Treaty, 1930, in, Morley, James William (ed.) Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident. 1928-1932 New York, N Y : Columbia University Press, 1984. Low, J . Edward. "Directors" Mechanisms of Imperial Japanese Navy Warships in 3-D 04/29/2001. <http://www.ijn.dreamhost.com/Directors/Directors.htm> Mayer-Oakes, Thomas Francis (ed.). Fragile Victory: Prince Saionji and the 1930 London Naval Treaty Issue from the Memoirs of Baron Harada Kumao (Detroit, M I : Wayne State University Press, 1968) pp. 17-18. Nikon Historical Society. " A Short History of Nippon Kogaku Japan." Nikon Historical Society 04/09/2001. <http://www.nikonhs.org/history.html> Nikon Corporation. " N i k o n Portfolio: Brief History" Nikon Corporation 24/06/2001. <http://www.nikon.co.jp/main/eng/portfolio/history.htm> 39 Nikon Corporation. "Brief History of Nikon Cameras" Nikon Corporation 02/05/2001. <http://www.nikon.co.jp/main/eng/d-archives/camera/history_e.htm> Nippon Kogaku Kogyo. Gojunen no ayumi / 50-nenshi Henshu Senmon Iinkai henshu (50-year History of Nippon Kogakty Tokyo, Japan: Nihon Kogaku Kogyo, 1967. Samuels, Richard J. "Rich Nation. Strong Army" — National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan Ithaca, N Y : Cornell University Press, 1994. 40 A P P E N D I X I Table I — T h e N a v y Supplemental Program. November 11.1930 1 0 4 Ship construction (6-year program, 1931-36): 1. Cruiser, destroyer and submarine Total Replacement ¥ 2 2 7 , 0 8 0 , 0 0 0 2. Construction in unlimited categories 20.000.000 ¥ 2 4 7 , 0 8 0 , 0 0 0 Aviation replacement and expansion: 1. Activation of 14 Airgroups (8-year program, 1931-38) ¥ 4 6 , 3 4 0 , 0 0 0 2. Maintenance of same (7-year program, 1932-38) 45,510,000 3. Maintenance of carrier-plane Units 6,000,000 4. Experimental aviation construction 4.250.000 ¥ 1 0 2 , 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 Miscellaneous replenishment: 1. Modernization, re-construction of capital ships and auxiliaries (in addition to balance of ¥ 2 3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 from previous appropriation), 1931-36 ¥ 2 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 2. Increase in special ship repair fund 5,000,000 3. Costs incidental to maintenance of ship performance, improvement of training, and adjunct technical skills 19.950.000 ¥ 4 4 . 9 5 0 . 0 0 0 ¥ 3 9 4 , 1 3 0 , 0 0 0 Ship Construction under the Supplemental Program: 1. Cruisers (6-inch 8,500 ton) . . . .4 ships 2. Destroyers 9 ships 3. Submarines 12 ships 4. Vessels of other, unlimited categories 2 ships Sources of Funds for this Naval Supplementary Program: - From the balance in the ¥ 5 0 8 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ship construction fund, appropriated for 1931-36. ¥ 3 7 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 From other sources, appropriated for 1937-39. ¥ 20,000,000 There is, thus, a saving of ¥ 1 3 4 million from the ¥ 5 0 8 million appropriation to be allocated for tax reduction. 104 Mayer-Oakes, Thomas Francis (ed.). Fragile Victory: Prince Saionii and the 1930 London Treaty Issue 41 A P P E N D I X II Figure I - Map of Fuji Film Company. Ashigara Manufacturing Plant ATU6I WNMflrSUOA from the M e m o i r s of Baron Harada K u m a o (Detroit, M I : Wayne State University Press, 1968) pp. 17-18 "Japanese O p t i c s " U . S . Naval Technical M i s s i o n to Japan, p. 56. 42 A P P E N D I X III Figure II — Map of Fuji F i lm Company. Odawara Manufacturing Plant A P P E N D I X I V F i g u r e I I I — D i a g r a m o f M i d g e t S u b m a r i n e P e r i s c o p e A P P E N D I X V Figure I V — Diagram of 10-metre Periscope 1 A P P E N D I X V I T a b l e II - A b b r e v i a t e d L i s t o f Items T a k e n to Indiana H e a d . M a r y l a n d b v U S N . 1945 1 0 9 EQJOTFMENT SHIPPED TO ORDNANCE INVESTIGATION LABORATORY, INDIANA HEAD, MARYLAND NavTeohJap Equipment No. Item No. Shipped JE10-3101 OIJi Type machine gun sight 1 -3102 Typ8 95 gun bombsight 1 -3103 Type 2 Model 1 bombsight 1 -3105 Bubble sextant 2 -3106 Small drift meter 2 -3108 Type 97 drift meter mount 2 -3110 Bombsight bubble levels 1 -3112 Celestial navigation slide rule 4 -3113 Navigational plotting boards 2 -3114 Type IT gun bombsight 1 -3115 Type III gun bombsight 5 -3116 Celestial navigation ealeulator 2 •3118 12am A . A . binooular tripods 4 -3119 Type 90 Model 5 bombsight 1 -3120 Drift meter for night use 1 -3121 Type 97 MK1 Model 4 drift meter 2 -3123 Canada balsam 2 Bottles ' -3124 18om binoculars 2 -3126 8cm binoculars 1 -3127 12om binooular for Type 97 direotor 2 . -3128 Spherioal star maps 2 BZ JE10-4978(l-4) Sextants 4 JE21-3114 Periseopes for suioide torpedoes 10 BX -3105(1-3) Stereosoope viewers 3 -3107(1-3) Sextants 3 -3109-1 12om spotting binoculars (tripod, mount) 1 -3101-1,2 12om spotting binoculars 2 -3110 12am A.A. binoculars 1 JE50-5035 * 5037 Sextants 2 "Japanese O p t i c s " U . S . Naval Technical M i s s i o n to Japan, p. 33. 46 A P P E N D I X V I I T a b l e I I I - L i s t o f F i r m s to w h i c h Fuji O p t i c a l Glass was S o l d . 1941-1945 1 1 0 Table II LIST OF ALL FIRMS TO WHICH OPTICAL GLASS WAS SOLD BY FUJI OPTICAL 00., 1941 to 1945 (Unit: kg) Firms 1941 1942 > 1943 1944 1945 • Total Tokyo Daiiohi Rikugun Zoheisho 3,645 17,688 17,316 26,878 20,572 86,099 F u j i Shashin Koki 9,766 6,492 8,024 9,615 24,131 Tooloka Kogaku 883 9,084 50 400 20,183 Showa Kogaku 265 (Inoue Kogaku) 1,330 2,533 4,128 Okada Kogaku 2,378 84 1,677 4,139 Seiki Kogaku 32 3,424 186 3,642 Nippon Taipu 1,612 530 500 2,642 F u j i Kagaku 2,231 2,231 Konishiroku Shashin Kogyo 1,906 1,906 Asahi Kogaku 260 1,074 1,334 Takachiho Kogaku 1,684 1,684 Shimazu Seisakusho 60 651 200 911 Tokyo Tokei (Tamagawa Koki) 707 185 1,074 1,966 Chiyoda Kogaku 15 1,292 617 1,924 Yaraato Kogaku 1,721 1,721 Riden Kogaku 162 162 Total 4,793 31,929 39,887 41,532 40,662 158,803 Note: Amounts include products of the second and third class sold. 1 1 0 "Japanese Opt ics" U . S . Naval Technical M i s s i o n to Japan, p. 21. 

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