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Japanese Imperialism and civic construction in Manchuria : Changchun, 1905-1945 Sewell, William Shaw 2000

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Japanese Imperialism and Civic Construction Changchun, 1905 - 1945 in Manchuria by WILLIAM SHAW SEWELL B.S., The University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1983 M.A., The University of California at Davis, 1987 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of History) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA January 2000 © William Shaw Sewell, 2000 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of IA [ «*-.' The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date AP&U- TOGO DE-6 (2/88) Abstract This study explores some of the urban visions inherent in Japanese colonial modernity in Manchuria and how they represented important aspects of the self-consciously modernizing Japanese state. Perceiving the northeastern Chinese city of Changchun as a tabula rasa upon which to erect new and sweeping conceptions of the built environment, Japanese used the city as a practical laboratory to create two distinct and idealized urban milieus, each appropriate to a particular era. From 1905 to 1932 Changchun served as a key railway town through which the Japanese orchestrated informal empire; between 1932 and 1945 the city became home to a grandiose, new Asian capital. Yet while the facades the town and later the capital—as well as the attitudes of the state they upheld—contrasted markedly, the shifting styles of planning and architecture consistently attempted to represent Japanese rule as progressive, beneficent, and modern. More than an attempt to legitimize empire through paternalistic care, however, Japanese perceptions of these built environments demonstrate deeper significance. Although Japanese intended Changchun's two built environments to appeal to subject populations, more fundamentally they were'designed to appeal to Japanese sensibilities in order to effect change in Japan itself. Imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries involved policies of dominance and exploitation that included a range of endeavors central to the creation of contemporary societies. It is in part because Japanese believed they were acting progressively in places like Changchun that many Japanese in the postwar era have had difficulty acknowledging the entirety of Japanese activities on the mainland in the first half of the twentieth century. (ii) Japanese Imperialism and Civic Construction in Manchuria: Changchun, 1905 - 1945 Table of Contents Abstract ii Table of Contents iiList of Tables * i v List of Figures v List of Abbreviations v vii Preface viiSelect Chronology ix Terminology xii Chapter One Introduction 5 Aims 11 Contexts 2Chapter Two Envisioning the Modern in Japan and Manchuria 37 The Emergence of Modern Japan 44 Mantetsu's Manchuria 58 Chapter Three Planning a Modern Railway Town 76 The Changchun Fuzokuchi 78 Prewar Japanese Urban Planning 90 Chapter Four Modern Architecture in Japan and Manchuria 99 Meiji Roots of Modernist Japanese Architecture 107 Japanese Architecture in Manchuria 117 Chapter Five Envisioning Manchukuo 134 The Manchurian Incident and Changchun 135 The New State and its Capital 144 Chapter Six Planning Manchukuo's Capital 160 An Imperial Capital 161 A Modern Capital 178 Chapter Seven Manchukuo's Facades 197 An Imperial Style 9 A Modern Style , 22Chapter Eight From Imperialist to Imperial Society 264 Colonial Development 271 Societal Transformations 302 Chapter Nine Conclusions 32Bibliography 35(iii) List of Tables Table 1.1 Transliterated Equivalents xiv Table 3.1 Land Allocation in the Changchun Fuzokuchi 82 Table 3.2 Initial Expenditures for the Changchun Fuzokuchi 86 Table 6.1 Construction in the First Five Year Plan 167 Table 6.2 Proposed Proportions for Land Use in Shinkyo 168 Table 6.3 Shinkyo's Parks in 1939 184 Table 6.4 Shinkyo's Plazas in 1940 5 Table 6.5 Relative Allocations of Urban Green Space 186 Table 6.6 Total Green Space in Shinkyo in 1940 188 Table 6.7 Shinkyo's Parks in 1944 193 Table 6.8 Distribution of Population within Shinkyo in 1942 195 Table 8.1 Japanese Populations in Manchuria 26Table 8.2 Change in Populations for All Fuzokuchi 266 Table 8.3 Demographic Change in the Changchun Fuzokuchi 267 Table 8.4 Populations in the Changchun Area in 1924 268 Table 8.5 Chinese Populations in the Changchun Area 268 Table 8.6 Demographic Change in Shinkyo 270 Table 8.7 Major Foreign Investment in Manchuria by 1929 271 Table 8.8 Breakdown of Japanese Investment to 1929 272 Table 8.9 Summary of Mantetsu Investments (March 31, 1931) 273 Table 8.10 Fuzokuchi Budgets and Mantetsu Aid 27Table 8.11 Mantetsu Expenditures in Select Cities in 1937 275 Table 8.12 Mantetsu Expenditures in Shinkyo, Mukden, and Andong, 1937 275 Table 8.13 Shinkyo's Mantetsu Exports, 1932-33 28Table 8.14 Shinkyo's Manufactures, 1933 286 Table 8.15 Manchukuo Expenditures and Construction Expenses, 1932-1939 29Table 8.16 Official Construction Projects in Shinkyo, 1933-1937 297 Table 8.17 Municipal Construction in Manchukuo, 1932-1938 298 Table 9.1 Neighborhood Organizations in Shinkyo, 1942 343 (iv) List of Figures Figure 1.1 Map of Manchuria 1 Figure 1.2 The SMR and the Willow Palisade 2 Figure 1.3 Kuanchengzi, the Changchun Fuzokuchi, and Changchun 3 Figure 1.4 Map of Xinjing / Shinkyo 4 Figure 2.1 Goto Shimpei as Mantetsu President 75 Figure 2.2 Tokyo Station . 75 Figure 3.1 Schema of the Changchun Area 80 Figure 4.1 Changchun Police Station and Post Office 131 Figure 4.2 Changchun Station 13Figure 4.3 Yamato Hotel, Changchun 132 Figure 4.4 Bank of Korea, Changchun Branch 133 Figure 4.5 Changchun Telephone Company 13Figure 6.1 Schema of Shinkyo's Major Landmarks 174 Figure 7.1 Schema of Datong Dajie and Datong Plaza 209 Figure 7.2 Schema of Shuntian Dajie and Anmin Plaza 212 Figure 7.3 First Government Building 250 Figure 7.4 Second Government BuildingFigure 7.5 Gunjin Kaikan, Tokyo and Kanagawa Prefectural Office 251 Figure 7.6 Aichi Prefectural Office, Nagoya 25Figure 7.7 Hall of State (Fifth Government Building) 252 Figure 7.8 Ministry of Justice (Seventh Government Building) 252 Figure 7.9 Ministry of Public Security 253 Figure 7.10 Ministry of TransportationFigure 7.11 Shinkyo Central Courthouse 254 Figure 7.12 Department of People's Livelihood 25Figure 7.13 Bureau of Mongolian Affairs 255 Figure 7.14 Hall of State Second Floor Stairwell 25Figure 7.15 Monument to National Foundation, Gateway 256 Figure 7.16 Monument to National Foundation, Central Shrine 256 Figure 7.17 Monument to the War Dead 257 Figure 7.18 Central Bank of Manchukuo 8 Figure 7.19 Manchurian Telegraph and Telephone Corporation 259 Figure 7.20 Jilin (Kirin) at Manden Entryway 260 (v) , List of Figures Figure 7.21 Kaijo Building 260 Figure 7.22 Daikyo Building 261 Figure 7.23 Kantogun Headquarters 261 Figure 7.24 Kotoku kaikan 262 Figure 7.25 East Entrance to Kotoku kaikan 263 Figure 7.26 Kantogun Commandant's Residence 263 Figure 8.1 Busses on Datong Dajie 320 Figure 9.1 Manchukuo Postage Stamps 348 Figure 9.2 Manchukuo Currency 349 Figure 9.3 Beijing Central Train Station 350 Figure 9.4 Institute of Geology 350 Figure 9.5 Jilin Provincial Library, Changchun 351 (vi) Abbreviations CCB Capital Construction Bureau (Kokuto kensetsu kyoku) CER The China Eastern Railway DaDe Da De budongchan gufen youxian gongsi (Da De Real Estate Corporation, Ltd.) Bosan Tokubetsu kaisha Manshu bosan kabushiki kaisha (Manchuria Home Construction, Inc.) Kantogun The Kwantung Army (the Japanese military garrison on the Liaodong Peninsula in southern Manchuria) Manden Manshu denshin denwa kabushiki fcazs/za;(Manchuria Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) Mangyo Manshu jilkogyo kaihatsu kabushiki kaisha (Manchuria Heavy Industries Development Corporation) Mantetsu Minami Manshu tetsudd kabushiki kaisha (South Manchuria Railway Corporation; the SMR) MKZ Manshu kenchiku zasshi (The Journal of Manchurian Architecture; also Manshu kenchiku kyokai zasshi) PRC People's Republic of China STKH Shinkyo toshi kensetsu hosaku (Plans for the Construction of Shinkyo) SMR South Manchuria Railway Corporation TK Toshi koron (The City Planning Review) Todai Tokyo University (formerly Tokyo Imperial University) (vii) Preface Assuming that within local contexts lie trends more global in nature, this study began as an investigation of the courses and consequences of imperialism in one corner of the world. While I still think this assumption to be valid, I was only half able to attain my initial goals. What began as a comprehensive consideration of the Chinese and Japanese experiences of imperialism in Changchun has come for the moment to focus almost entirely on certain central aspects of the Japanese plans for the city. My investigation of what life was like under these plans, especially for Chinese, must necessarily await future research. It was only with some reluctance that I made this purely procedural decision—I was a graduate student in Chinese history before I was a doctoral student in Japanese history, and the absence of Chinese voices, like the proverbial silence, is overwhelming. To do justice to the entirety of the imperialist experience in Changchun, however, is for the moment impracticable because of temporal and financial constraints. This dissertation, then, is best considered a work in progress, and I look forward to when I may contrast the experiences of the many who lived in Changchun to the structures and organizations described here. I wish to thank those whose guidance and aid has proven invaluable to this project: Dr. William Wray, Dr. Diana Lary, and Dr. Terry McGee. I' would also like to thank the many helpful librarians arid archivists at the University of Tokyo, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, the Changchun Municipal Library, the Jilin Provincial Archives, and the Asian Library of the University of British Columbia. Last, I must also recognize the enduring patience of my wife, Cheryl, and family. (viii) Select Chronology of Events 1895 April 17 1896 1897 1898 May 1900 1902 January 30 November 1903 1904 February 10 1905 September 5 September 26 November 26 December 22 1906 June 8 1907 April 15 April 1910 August 22 1911 October 10 Russo-Asiatic Bank founded (with French capital) Treaty of Shimonoseki ends Sino-Japanese War Triple Intervention Sino-Russian mutual assistance treaty Formation of the CER company Scramble for Concessions Completion of Shanhaiguan-Yingkou railway with British funds; later extended to Xinmindun Construction of CER begun Russian occupation of Manchuria during Boxer Rebellion Anglo-Japanese Alliance signed in London CER completed between Harbin and Port Arthur CER begins operations in January Japanese Declaration of War against Russia Treaty of Portsmouth between Russia and Japan Japanese form Guandong administration Inaugural meeting of Mantetsu Treaty of Beijing between China and Japan Incorporation of Mantetsu (Imperial Order No. 142) Sino-Japanese treaty on Changchun-Jilin railway Mantetsu's Research Department founded, headquartered in Dalian Japan annexes Korea Chinese Revolution begins in Wuhan (ix) Select Chronology of Events 1912 October 1915 January 1918-22 1924 1926-7 1928 May 3-11 June 4 1931 September 18 December 10 1932 January 28 February 25 March 1 March 9 March 10 March April 1 September 16 October 2 1933 February April 19 May 31 1934 March 1 1935 January Outer Mongolia declares independence Changchun-Jilin railway completed Japanese present "Twenty-One Demands" (signed in May) Japanese intervention in Siberia China and Soviet Union renegotiate CER Chinese Northern Expedition Jinan Incident Zhang Zuolin assassinated Liutiaohu Incident (beginning of the Manchurian Incident) Lytton Commission appointed by the League of Nations Shanghai Incident begins; truce signed May 5 Puyi declares commencement of Datong Era State of Manchukuo proclaimed Puyi named as Regent Changchun renamed Xinjing (Shinkyo) and made guodu Inauguration of Manchukuo's First Five Year Plan Puyi arrives in Xinjing (Shinkyo) Formation of the Capital Construction Bureau (CCB) Lytton Commission Report published League of Nations condemns Japan; Japanese withdrawal Kantogun occupies Rehe Province and Shanhaiguan Pass Shinkyo Special Municipality (Shinkyo tokubetsu shi) Tanggu Truce Puyi becomes Kangde Emperor Soviet Union agrees to sell CER to Manchukuo in March for ¥17,000,000; renamed North Manchuria Railway (x) Select Chronology of Events April-May Puyi's first state visit to Japan August 31 Former CER track adjusted to standard gauge 1936 June 10 Japan renounces unequal treaty rights within Manchukuo December 12-25 Xian Incident 1937 July 7 Marco Polo Bridge Incident September 16 Festivities commemorate Shinkyo's first five year plan 1938 January 1 Inauguration of Manchukuo's Second Five Year Plan November 3 Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro proclaims Japan's 'New Order in East Asia' 1939 April-September Nomonhan Incident 1940 2600th anniversary of Emperor Jimmu celebrated in Japan March 30 Wang Jingwei regime established in Nanjing; recognized by Manchukuo, Japan, Germany, and Italy (and Axis allies) May Puyi's second state visit to Japan September 27 Signing of the Tripartite Pact 1941 December 7-8 Japanese attack Pearl Harbor, Philippines, and Hong Kong 1942-3 Arrests of Mantetsu research personnel 1943 November 5 Signing of Greater East Asia defense pact 1945 August 6, 9 Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki August 8 Soviet Declaration of War against Japan August 14 Japanese surrender 1946 January 5 Guomindang troops enter Changchun 1948 October 18 Changchun liberated by the People's Liberation Army (xi) Terminology While most foreign words in this study are Japanese, some are Chinese, something that is evident from the context. If both are offered the format is to place Chinese words first (according to the pinyin system of transliteration), following the initials "Ch," and Japanese second, following the letter "J," such as in the name of the SMR: Ch, Mantle; J, Mantetsu. All Japanese words are transliterated with macrons, if necessary, to denote long vowels. The only exceptions to this are place names with familiar English spellings such as Tokyo (Tokyo), Kyoto (Kyoto), Osaka (Osaka), and Hokkaido (Hokkaido). The somewhat anglicized 'Manchukuo' ("Kingdom/Country of the Manchus") is used here rather than the pinyin Manzhouguo or the Japanese Manshukoku. This is intended to offer a sense of continuity with the equally problematic term 'Manchuria.'1 Note that although Japanese and Chinese postwar publications typically put 'Manchukuo' inside quotation marks or preface it with the prefix "false," or "fictitious" (Ch, wei; J, gi), that practice is not followed here for the sake of simplicity. For the same reason the name 1 Created by Europeans, 'Manchuria' referred originally to the homeland of the Manchus, the ethnic group that produced imperial China's final dynasty, the Qing. The Manchu homelands, however, only belonged to what could properly be called eastern Manchuria. Western Manchuria belonged entirely to certain Mongol princes, allies of the Manchus in their conquest of China. As many Chinese also immigrated to Manchuria before 1644, the term thus failed its original intent. Today the term is anathema in the People's Republic because it implies possible autonomy and ignores the long history of association with China. Chinese now prefer the term dongbei (J, tdhoku), meaning simply "northeast." In Japan, while not a pejorative the term is antiquated and used most by scholars, occasional rightist agitators, and the generation that experienced the war. Here, prior to 1934, Manchuria refers to what were traditionally the "three eastern provinces" (Ch, Dongsansheng; J, Tosansho) of Heilongjiang in the north, Fengtian (today Liaoning) in the south, and Jilin in the center. After 1934 and the Japanese incorporation of Rehe into Manchukuo, Rehe too is included. Just north of the Great Wall on the Inner Mongolian border, Rehe—the northern half of what was once called Zhili Province— included strategic mountain passes between central Manchuria and Beijing that Japanese strategists knew would be useful for further penetration west and south. (xii) Terminology 'Manchukuo' is not put in quotation marks, nor is the term 'state' when referring to Manchukuo. Place names in Manchuria appear according to their Chinese pronunciations because they are, after all, Chinese. (For Japanese pronunciations see Table 1.1.) Likewise, areas under nominal Chinese authority—the 'commercial zone' (shangbu) and 'national capital' (guodu)— are also rendered in Chinese. The most obvious exception to this rule is the city of Mukden—once called Fengtian but now known as Shenyang, Mukden is used for historical flavor. Japanese pronunciations of particular locales are used only for the railway's 'attached lands' (fuzokuchi)—directly administered by Japanese—and the name of the new capital, Shinkyo—the capital of the puppet state. This is to acknowledge that these two areas were Japanese creations under Japanese control. A more complicated matter is the Kantogun, the Japanese army of Manchuria. The name is based on an alternate Chinese term for Manchuria: "Guandong," meaning "east of (Shanhaiguan) gate."2 Some may more readily recognize an earlier transliterated form of "Kwantung," not that it was rendered according to the once more common Wade-Giles method of transliteration ("Kuantung"). Thus, the Kantogun (gun meaning "army") and the Kwantung Army are one and the same.3 Finally, the names of individual Chinese and Japanese are rendered in the Asian fashion with surnames first, except for those scholars of Asian descent whose work has been published in English and have adopted the European standard of placing their surnames in the final position. All Chinese names 2 The gate at Shanhaiguan is near where the Great Wall meets the Bohai Sea. 3 Note also that what was once commonly called the Kwantung Peninsula is also called the Liaodong (J, Ryoto) Peninsula, meaning the peninsula "east of the Liao (River)." (xiii) Terminology are rendered in roman letters according to the pinyin method of transliteration, including that of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). Table 1.1 Transliterated Equivalents Cities Chinese (Pinyin) Changchun Xinjing Kuanchengzi Jilin Dalian5 Lushun6 Harbin Regions Manzhou7 Manzhouguo Guandong Liaodong Provinces Jilin Fengtian Liaoning Heilongjiang Rehe Zones fushudi shangbu guodu Chinese (Wade-Giles) Changchun Hsinking K'uanch'engtzu Chilin4 Talien Lushun Harpin Manchou Manchoukuo Kuantung Liaotung Chilin8 Fengt'ien Liaoning Heilungkiang Jehe9 fushuti shangpu kuotu Japanese Choshun Shinkyo Kanjoshi Kitsurin Dairen Ryojun Harupin Manshu Manshukoku Kanto Ryoto Kitsurin Hoten Ryonei Kokuryuko Nekka . fuzokuchi shofu(chi) kokuto Sometimes written "Kirin." Dalian was at one time the Russian city of Dalny (7-l3lALHHH). Lushun was at one time called in English Port Arthur. "Manchuria." Sometimes written "Kirin." Sometimes written as "Jehol." (xiv) 1. Introduction Figure 1.1 Map of Manchuria iliii-.RIA // , i l.itpin •& Ai(»nn r % >n A~> /.... 17 i KIRIN P Vi}jlMK.t.il y^WiMiwi) Sea of I dp.in Kl.i.l(SR>V*>> | >.l!!,p.;il.l 'il.l-.l'K! S k'Uf.i .iml \i.i!U'h.ii:.i Source: Beasley, W. G., Japanese Imperialism (1) 1. Introduction Figure 1.2 The SMR and the Willow Palisade Source: Jilinsheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Jilin shengzhi, vol. 43, Wenwuzhi, Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1991. (Changchun is where four roads meet just above the center of the map.) (2) 1. Introduction Figure 1.3 Kuanchengzi, the Changchun Fuzokuchi, and Changchun (3) 1. Introduction (4) 1. Introduction Chapter 1. Introduction As Japanese society was the first, and so far the only, society outside Europe or the European cultural sphere to achieve industrial prominence, Japan's transition from feudal solitude to technocratic and commercial affluence is of global significance. Many scholars recommend the Japanese experience as a developmental or role model for other societies.1 Others promote an innovative Japan as a cultural leader, a "yellow Athena," despite the problematic biases that perspective entails.2 These studies ignore the reality that the development of the Japanese state included political repression, expansionary militarism, racism, and economic hardship, aspects rival interpretations highlight. Although often also biased, these rival interpretations serve as an important reminder: asserting Japan as a cultural leader often naively repeats Japanese wartime formulations defending and urging expansion.3 Typically emphasizing one or the other of these extremes, studies of Japan tend to portray Japanese society as either exemplar or suspect. This is incongruous. A society cannot at the same time be either of these extremes, although, as we shall see, it can be both. 1 While some, such as E. Wayne Nafziger, Learning from the Japanese: Japan's Pre-War Development and the Third World, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, expand upon Japan's prewar experience, others recommend postwar Japanese methods, such as Ippei Yamazawa, Economic Development and International Trade: The Javanese Model, Honolulu: Resource Systems Institute, East-West Center, 1990. An institutional study that at one time was quite popular is Ezra Vogel, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979. 2 David Williams, Japan: Beyond the End of History, London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 1-9,157-70. For a controversial consideration of the inherent racism involved in European interpretations of their Athenian roots, see Martin Bernal, Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, London: Free Association Books, 1987, vol. 1, pp. 1-38 and passim. 3 To illustrate, because many Japanese in the 1930s perceived Japan as the inheritor of the best of both Asian and Western traditions, they thought Japan a crucible for cultural synthesis and advancement. Japan was thus uniquely positioned, and even destined, to expand its influence and lead the world. See, for example, Miki Kiyoshi, "The China Affair and Japanese Thought," Contemporary Japan, Vol. VI, No. 4, March 1938, pp. 601-10. (5) 1. Introduction Japanese or any society is difficult to pigeonhole, but viewed from overseas, the 'imagined community' of Japan occupies an exceptional and mixed conceptual space.4 Geographic, linguistic, and ethnic barriers allow, and perhaps encourage, idolizing and scapegoating, but observers often incompletely perceive Japanese history because of other, more inherent biases as well. For example, theorizing Japanese society as the only non-Western society to join the West affirms a homogeneous "West" and a simplified, oriental "other." Methodological concerns further complicate the matter because reified and rationalist nineteenth century terminology obscures important distinctions.5 Depending upon one's perspective, Japan too easily becomes either dogged hero or Machiavellian upstart—notions too easily transferable elsewhere.6 Properly speaking, Japanese successes were unique, partial, and qualified. They were unique in that the Japanese creation of a modern society depended to an enormous extent upon indigenous developments occurring within Japan before closer integration with the outside world, as well as upon finding particular solutions to contemporary dilemmas compatible with Japanese conditions.7 Japanese successes were partial because transformative change 4 While Benedict Anderson's seminal phrase focused on societies experiencing the development of nationalism, the point here is one step removed: how do people in one society, itself developing a nation-state and attendant nationalism, perceive the formation of another society creating its own nationalism? Cf., Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised and extended edition, London: Verso, 1991. 5 To counter this tendency, Immanuel Wallerstein suggests, for example, replacing the term "society" with "historical system" and developing "complex, dense interpretative schema" rather than "elegant sparse laws." See Immanuel Wallerstein, "Should We Unthink the Nineteenth Century?" pp. 185-91 in Francisco O. Ramirez, ed., Rethinking the Nineteenth Century: Contradictions and Movements, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc, 1988. 6 For example, overly adulatory interpretations of Japan later helped promote similar but equally problematic perceptions of economic excellence among overseas Chinese communities. See Yao Souchou, "The Romance of Asian Capitalism: Geography, Desire, and Chinese Business," in Mark T. Berger and Douglas A. Borer, eds., The Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, pp. 221-40. 7 Rather than applying overly broad theoretical constructs derived from European and American experiences to situations elsewhere, scholars are increasingly assessing other societies on their own terms. See, for example, Gary Hamilton, "Why No Capitalism in China? Negative (6) 1. Introduction occurred in society piecemeal, or segmentally. Successes were qualified because for most of the twentieth century Japan was militarily and economically weaker than most of the rival, affluent societies of western Europe and North America.8 Because history is a politically charged subject, contemporary circumstances also influence historical writing, sometimes subtly. Especially pernicious are the justificatory requirements of the modern nation-state that often underlie historical perspectives—until recently, scholars tended to assume the nation-state as the fundamental unit of analysis or were motivated by concerns for it. Given that the twentieth century witnessed the replacement of empires and other societies by nation-states the world over, the continuing preoccupation with the nation-state is unsurprising. Yet even if theorists are becoming cognizant of its various influences, the nation-state continues to dominate discourse at both the national and international level.9 Noting that histories of nation-states emerged dynamically within coalescing national societies, Prasenjit Duara suggests that such histories tend to assume linear progress towards a contemporary context: "a nationalhistory secures for the contested and contingent nation the false unity of a self-same, national subject evolving through time." In response, Duara constructed "bifurcated histories" that attempted to "grasp both the dispersal of the past and its transmission over time in the same moment." This required a consideration for historical projects that failed to become national narratives. In other words, a Questions in Historical Comparative Research," journal of Developing Societies 1: 2, December 1985, pp. 187-211. 8 Paul Kennedy thought Japan through the post-World War One era was an "industrial and financial lightweight." Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, London: Fontana Press, 1988, pp. 265-9. That relative weakness in many respects has not changed; see ibid., pp. 591-608 and Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, Toronto: HarperCollins, 1993, pp. 137-62. 9 Immanuel Wallerstein, "The National and the Universal: Can There Be Such a Thing as World Culture?" in Anthony D. King, ed., Culture, Globalization and the World System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, pp. 91-105. (7) 1. Introduction useful remedy to nationalist teleology is to consider history as "multiple narratives."10 Alternatively, postcolonial critics like Arif Dirlik suggest a wider perspective, one that explores the milieu nation-states are situated within: One of the fundamental contributions of postmodernism—indeed a defining feature of postmodernity—is the questioning of the teleology of the modern, and of other teleologies imbedded in economic, political, and cultural narratives that have constituted the idea of the modern; so that it becomes possible once again to conceive the past not merely as a route to the present, but as a source of alternative historical trajectories that had to be suppressed so that the present could become a possibility.11 The basic premise of this study is that a wider analytical outlook examining the fuller spectrum of Japanese activities more usefully enhances historical understanding. In practice this means two kinds of awareness. One kind of awareness considers the creation of the nation-state in Japan with an awareness for the more complete spectrum of Japanese history. Processes that many consider to be 'positive/ such as industrialization, could not occur without other, 'darker' processes, such as imperialism. Implicit in either, moreover, is its opposite: just as the 'positive' goal of economic development entailed the repugnant realities of repression and exploitation, the nakedly aggressive goals of militarism and imperialism entailed concerns that policy makers thought at the time to be progressive.12 As such their ideals could appeal to others. In 1U Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 4, 51. 11 Arif Dirlik, The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, p. 3. In this collection of essays, Dirlik's overriding concern is similar to Duara's in that he seeks to replace the accomodating and unrevolutionary perspective of multiculturalism, at heart embodying only manipulable and reified culturalisms, with "multi-historicalism." This perspective "presupposes the historicity of cultures, and different historical trajectories out of different pasts, that provide "outsides" from which to view contemporary structures of power and the ideologies that legitimize them." Dirlik, ibid., pp. 17-18. 12 Terms like "positive," "negative," "darker," and "better" are of course relative. Imperialism was once a "positive," and development today is often a "negative." This study proceeds with this awareness and in the interest of brevity hopes the reader allows such simplifications. (8) 1. Introduction Europe, it should be recalled, despite its various guises fascism spread as a popular and modern phenomenon too.13 The other kind of awareness is global. The transformation of Japanese society is indeed significant, but not simply because of a developmental utility. While Japanese society faced, in the creation of a nation-state, issues common to the entire world, Japanese solutions must be considered as singular. Still, rather than seeking to find potential applicability elsewhere, such solutions are more enlightening when considered as part of the global transition to a modern society. As both latecomers and ethnic outsiders, Japanese benefited from earlier constructions of the modern by using hindsight to manage the transformation of their own society more efficiently. The resulting rapidity in which Japanese society adjusted suggests further that Japanese experienced perceptual shifts of Kuhnian proportions more swiftly than other societies.14 This compacted change within individual mentalites offers much to the historical evaluation of the modern world. Michel Foucault suggested that despite the "shattering...of the Western episteme" at the beginning of the nineteenth century due to the sudden awareness of separate evolutionary histories, "at a deep level, there exists a historicity of man which is itself its own history but also the radical dispersion that provides a foundation for all other histories."15 Japanese history pursued as multiple narratives provides a valuable platform for the coherent study of global 13 See Geoff Eley, "What Produces Fascism: Preindustrial Traditions or a Crisis of a Capitalist State," Politics and Society 12:1, January 1983, p. 71. A useful work showing how average citizens came to support Nazism is William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town, 1922-1945, revised edition, New York: Franklin Watts, 1984. 14 For a discussion of the extent of change involved in what Kuhn called a 'paradigm shift,' see Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, second edition, enlarged, 1970. 15 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York: Vintage Books, 1970, pp. 367, 370. (9) 1. Introduction phenomena and can contribute meaningfully to the reconstruction of a humanistic "grand theory/' something perhaps already in progress.16 Individual communities expressed the fuller spectrum of Japanese history coherently, especially the newer ones on the Japanese periphery. Developments outside the center occasionally even contributed independently to Japanese capitalist transformation at large.17 Moreover, it was in the peripheral regions that Japanese found the freedom to weave social fabrics they thought best, fabrics that reflected the issues and actors most prominent at the political center. The colonization and incorporation of Hokkaido, for example, replicated in miniature the goals and mechanisms that energized the early Meiji state.18 Later undertakings further afield similarly displayed the fundamental motives and means of Japan as a modern, imperialist state.19 The empire advanced as a totality, simultaneously involving a number of diverse, sometimes rival, aspects.20 While certain elements were grim and merciless, others were deemed progressive and benevolent. The Japanese empire blossomed holistically, 16 Quentin Skinner, "Introduction: The Return of Grand Theory," in Quentin Skinner, ed., The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 3-20. Skinner's point is that taken together, the work of Foucault, Derrida, Habermas, Levi-Strauss and others has provided "an unashamed return to the deliberate construction of precisely those grand theories of human nature and conduct which Wright Mills and his generation had hoped to outlaw from any central place in the human sciences." Ibid., p. 13. 17 See, for example, the gradual proto-industrialization of the fishing industry in Hokkaido independent of external influences in David L. Howell, Capitalism from Within: Economy, Society, and the State in a Japanese Fishery, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. 18 John A. Harrison, Japan's Northern Frontier: A Study in Colonization and Expansion with Special Reference to the Relations of Japan and Russia, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1953, p. 142 and passim. 19 Dirlik describes local resistance to the contemporary world order as "repudiation of Enlightenment metanarratives and the teleology of modernity." To Dirlik, these disparate acts are natural and autonomous responses to homogenizing global capitalism. See his "The Global in the Local," esp. pp. 96-102, in The Postcolonial Aura. In contrast, Japanese activities in small enclaves like Changchun are best understood as local initiatives seeking to expand a global paradigm, ultimately seeking to normalize colonial relations of difference. 20 The strongest statement in recent literature to this effect is Louise Young, Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. (10) 1. Introduction including both thorns and flowers. Only through a study of the entirety can sense be made of its separate components.21 Aims This project began with the intention of exploring two important and interrelated themes. One was the examination of imperialism as a local phenomenon in order to assess its operation and evolution in one locality. The other was an analysis of the Japanese creation of modernity in one region of the empire and how it reflected hopes and concerns notable in Japan itself. Although distinct, these two themes are inseparable. For prewar Japanese, just as constructing a modern state and society required the creation of an empire, creating an empire required engendering modernity. A key center in two different eras, Changchun readily demonstrates the range of meanings inherent in Japanese colonial modernity. It is the latter of these two themes—the Japanese creation of colonial urban modernity—that is the focus here. The examination of the life experiences of Chinese, Japanese and others who resided within these two urban milieus awaits 21 Moreover, a holistic approach can more properly aid contemporary understanding. Japanese efforts in places like Changchun were essential to the creation of modern Japan, and any denigration of them involves calling into question fundamental aspects of contemporary society. This goes to the heart of the contemporary textbook controversy in Japan. Until recently, Japanese historians tended to dwell upon the beneficial aspects of their rule in Manchuria and only sketched the unpleasant, thereby misrepresenting both. See Bill Sewell, "Postwar Japan and Manchuria," in David Edgington, ed., Joining Past and Future: Japan at the Millennium, University of British Columbia Press, formcorning. As a pioneer revisionist in a different time and place once suggested, "[a] re-examination of twentieth-century...foreign relations (and the relationship between foreign policy and the domestic economy) offers the most promising approach to...confront [ing] directly what happened. We learn the ideas and the actions of the men who made or influenced policy, and the consequences of those events at home and abroad. ... [A]t the end of such a review of the past, we return to the present better informed...[and] that increased knowledge and understanding may help us to muster the nerve to act in ways that can transform the tragedy into a new beginning." The events to examine, he insisted, included not only the political and economic but also the humanitarian. See William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, revised and enlarged edition, New York: Dell, 1962, p. 9. If stabler relations in Asia are to be established, Japanese too must acknowlege the detrimental consequences of their past actions, including those considered 'progressive.' (ID 1. Introduction future research.22 In no way should this be construed as an attempt to avoid the unpleasant realities of Japanese imperialism.23 It is more an acknowledgment that both themes are worthy of lengthy consideration.24 Changchun lies near the geographic center of what was once called Manchuria and is today the capital of Jilin Province in the People's Republic of China (Figure 1.1). For centuries this region, a plateau encircled by mountains on three sides, was a crossroads for Mongols, Koreans, Han Chinese, and a variety of other peoples emerging from the Siberian steppe 25 The most well-known of these were the Manchus, who became powerful by welding a several of these disparate groups together. After conquering China, the Manchus attempted to keep their sparsely populated ancestral lands for themselves by prohibiting immigration.26 In this they failed. Beginning in the eighteenth century, 22 As the journals examined here only indirectly betray Japanese attitudes towards the native inhabitants of Manchuria, and nothing about the inhabitants' views of Japanese, the exploration of this theme requires a new set of source materials. 23 Some recent discussions of these realities are Jie Xueshi, Wei Manzhouguo shi, Beijing: Renmin chubansi, 1995, revised, and the series Sun Bang, ed., WeiMan shiliao congshu. Jilin: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1993-4. For a discussion of evolving Japanese perspectives of these events since the war see Sewell, "Postwar Japan and Manchuria." 24 Nor is this an attempt to separate the two themes. The increasingly dreadful means of enforcing Japanese rule were obviously related to the inability of Japanese authorities to secure (even at times Japanese) acceptance of new modernist visions. Although this line of argument is suggested below in chapters 7 and 9, it too must await future research for fuller analysis. 25 On the early history of the peoples of this region in English see Juha Tanhunen, Manchuria: An Ethnic History, Helsinki: The Finno-Ugrian Society, 1996, Herbert Franke, "The Forest People of Manchuria: Kitans and Jurchens," in Denis Sinor, ed., The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 400-23, and Henry G. Schwarz, The Minorities of Northern China: A Survey, Bellingham, Washington: Western Washington University, Center for East Asian Studies, 1984. Tanhunen distinguishes nine groups of forest peoples, seven groups of Mongols, and two groups of Manchus present today in the region. See Janhunen, Manchuria, pp. 43-74. A political history focusing on longstanding Chinese linkages is Li Chi, "Manchuria in History," The Chinese Social and Political Science Review, 16:2 July 1932, pp. 226-59. To William Skinner, Manchuria was one of China's nine identifiable macroregions, although he did not examine it in detail. See G. William Skinner, "Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth-Century China," and "Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems," in G. William Skinner, ed., The City in Late Imperial China, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977, pp. 211-36, 281-301. 26 On the history of the Manchus and of Manchuria during the Qing see Robert H. G. Lee, The Manchurian Frontier in Ch'ing History, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, Joseph Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c. 1800," in John King Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge History of China, (12) 1. Introduction Manchuria drew the attention of more distant peoples, ultimately becoming the strategic—in both a military and a conceptual sense—spearhead for first Russian and later Japanese imperialism in China. As the cornerstone for their empire in China, Japanese rushed to endow Manchuria in a manner they thought progressive. Changchun's brief history encapsulates this larger history.27 Located within its boundaries are the vestiges of a nineteenth century Chinese frontier city, a Russian railway outpost, a Japanese railway town, and the one-time, grandiose capital of the puppet state of Manchukuo. Changchun ("Eternal Spring") took its name from a gate in the Willow Palisade28 just east of the city that fenced off hereditary Manchu lands (Figure 1.2).29 Driven by famine, Chinese rural migrants—primarily from Shandong and Zhili—there found Mongols willing to sell land under their jurisdiction in defiance of the Qing prohibitions.30 The Mongol head of the Front Gorlos banner attempted to legitimize such sales by memorializing the throne in 1791 to accept the presence of Chinese tenants at Changchun. To this the Qing acceded, but only because the Jilin garrison commander reported in 1799 that the Changchun Volume 10, "Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part I," London: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 39-47, and Pamela Kyle Crossley, The Manchus, Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1997. 27 The area around Changchun, of course, had long been part of Chinese history. Only some fifty kilometers to the west, for example, lay the ruins of the Liao and Jin dynasty city of Xinzhou as well as a neolithic and bronze age sites. For a discussion of that and other ancient cities in Jilin Province see Jilinsheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Jilin shengzhi, vol. 43, Wenwuzhi, Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1991, pp. 16, 26-7, 76-8 and passim. On the Liao, Jin, Ming, and Qing era road networks from Mukden passing north of Changchun see ibid., pp. 127-37. 28 For a description of the Willow Palisade see Jilinsheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Jilin shengzhi, vol. 43, Wenwuzhi, Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1991, p. 117-20. 29 Unless otherwise indicated, material for this and the following paragraph is taken from Koshizawa Akira, Manshukoku no shuto keikaku: Tokyo no genzai to mirai wo tou, Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyoronsha, 1988. pp. 32-5, Sato Masaru, Manshu zoen shi, Tokyo: Nihon zoen shukei kyokai, 1985, p. 71, and Lee, Manchurian Frontier, pp. 19-20, 73,136,161-2. Early Japanese perspectives are Kuroda Kashiro, Manshu kiyo, np: Mantetsu, vol. 1,1910, Hatori Nobiru, Manshu, Tokyo: Seikyosha, 1913, and Mantetsu chosaka, ed., Manshu gendaishi, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1925. 30 At the same time, however, the Qing at times encouraged Han immigration. On the Liaodong kaikenli of 1653 see Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin congshu bianjibu, Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin, Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1991, vol. 2, p. 340. (13) 1. Introduction poo (J, ho), or walled village, on the right bank of the Yitong river exceeded 3,330 households farming 265,648 mou of land.31 Because there were too many Chinese to remove forcibly, the Qing attempted to confine them the following year by establishing Changchun ting (J, cho), or subprefecture, measuring 230 by 80 Xi, outside of which farming was forbidden.' The court also placed Changchun under the jurisdiction of Jilin ting, based in the city of Jilin, itself founded only in 1747. Another attempt to shore up imperial authority saw the Qing assigning garrisons of soldier-farmers throughout their homeland, but it was too late— Manchuria was spinning out of the Manchus' control. Continuing to grow, by 1806 the Chinese population in Changchun numbered some 7,000 households. In 1825 the subprefecture's offices moved west across the Yitong and the district as a whole shifted to the north. In 1864, in response to bandit raids but without official permission, citizens dug a moat and raised brick walls measuring sixteen feet high and stretching twenty Xi. The court eventually recognized Changchun as its own prefecture in 1889. On the eve of the 1911 revolution, Changchun was the headquarters of one of Jilin Province's four intendencies with jurisdiction over two prefectures, one independent sub-prefecture, one sub-prefecture, and seven districts. In 1912 the new government replaced Changchun fu (prefecture) with Changchun xian (county); in 1925 the walled city became a municipality (shizheng).32 Despite Changchun's swift development, however, until the 1930s the city of Jilin, one hundred kilometers to the east and the traditional seat of Qing regional authority, overshadowed Changchun. The slow reversal of relative significance between the two began with the Russian construction of the China Eastern 31 Traditional Chinese measurements varied, but roughly 6.6 mou comprised one acre. One li was roughly equivalent to a third of a mile, about 570 meters. Another source suggests in 1800 there were only 2,000 households (though 7,000 people) farming 260,000 mou. See Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin congshu bianjibu, Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin, vol. 2, p. 340. 32 Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin congshu bianjibu, Dangdai Zhongguo de Jilin, vol. 2, p. 340. (14) 1. Introduction Railway (CER) in 1898 and the establishment of a maintenance yard a few kilometers northwest of Changchun at Kuanchengzi.33 Seven years later the Treaty of Portsmouth granted all Russian holdings up to and including Changchun (but not Kuanchengzi) to Japan, making Changchun the border between the Russian and Japanese spheres of influence in China. The Japanese immediately built a new settlement between the old walled city and the Russian station, laying it out so that contact between Russians and Chinese was circuitous. Meanwhile, a mercantile district (Ch, shdngbu; J, shofuchi) gradually sprang into being between the new Japanese settlement and the walled Chinese city that served to integrate Changchun into Japan's empire in Manchuria (Figure 1.3). Planned and administered by Japan's largest prewar corporation, the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR), Changchun stood for a quarter-century as the northernmost outpost of a string of railway-run towns stretching from the southern tip of the Liaodong peninsula and the Korean border. Seven hundred kilometers north of the busy port of Dalian, Changchun was the railway's staging area for the penetration of western and northern Manchuria and an important crossroads in its own right. The Manchurian "incident" of 18 September 1931, however, challenged the railway's domination when autonomous elements of the Japanese military seized the whole of Manchuria. Renamed in Chinese Xinjing, in Japanese Shinkyo, "New Capital" in both languages, Changchun became the capital of the new puppet state administered jointly by the Kwantung Army and the SMR (Figure 1.4).34 With the gradual displacement of Mantetsu by the military, the city became the site of the Japanese military's best effort to put 33 One survey of the history of Kuanchengzi is Changchunshi nanguanqu dif ang shizhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Changchunshi Kuanchengquzhi, Changchun: Jilin wenshi chubanshe, 1993. 34 Because this work focuses on Japanese activities, the Japanese pronunciation of the new capital is used. On the significance of the new capital's name, see chapter 5 below. (15) 1. Introduction an acceptable face on their Manchurian activities. Changchun remained Manchukuo's administrative hub until the Soviet invasion in 1945 and the subsequent reversion of Manchuria to Chinese rule. Changchun's history presents four avenues of historical inquiry. First is an attempt to periodize and capture the evolving tone of Japan's prewar empire. Although Changchun's history does not encompass Japanese imperialism before 1905, it does display the style and intent of four later phases of Japanese empire-building. While the Japanese creation of empire before 1905 was initially cautious and calculated, between 1905 and the first world war empire expanded in a more experimental fashioned, though still restrained. Outside of the "Twenty-One Demands" in 1915, Japanese were careful to act as imperialists in ways similar to the other powers. Between the war and 1932, however, reflecting increased capabilities at home and overseas, the Japanese became more confident and assertive. Still, Japanese showed a willingness if not a desire to collaborate with other powers. After 1932, however, with the institution of Manchukuo, the empire demonstrated its most exuberant growth yet as Japanese leapt to the creation of a new and different means of imperialist control. Changchun's role in this was central. Just as Manchukuo served as a model for the wartime incorporation of the Philippines and other former Western colonies into the Japanese empire, Changchun served as a propaganda piece for the creation of a new kind of civilization for all of Asia. In the final phase, between 1937 and 1945 Changchun demonstrated the diminished activity and gradual stagnation that the empire experienced as a whole with the onset of war and military requisitioning. Changchun's evolving fagades and roles reflect these phases concretely, yet within these stages lies a common theme—the Japanese creation of their version of the modern world. This study's second focus is the evolution of Japanese (16) 1. Introduction definitions of modernity in Changchun. Japanese were state-building at home at the same time they were empire-building overseas, and between the two there occurred significant overlap. Japanese in Changchun focused consistently on the creation of a modern society that they perceived to be on a par with, if not superior to, the other imperialist, modern societies of the world. Indeed, as one of several key laboratories for Japanese officials and administrators, creations in Changchun sometimes foreshadowed events in Japan itself. The literature on imperialism often neglects this aspect of empire-building. Generally, discussions of imperialism speak to contemporary purposes reflecting current discrepancies in power and wealth and tend to portray imperialism as either a positive or negative phenomenon. A more practical approach would blend the useful analytical elements of each outside the reverberations of the present and speak more to the historical and global environments. Contributing to the formulation of such an approach is this study's third task. It is more fruitful to study imperialism as an aspect of the creation of modernity. The imperialized regions of the world provided the imperialist cores with more than simply markets, resources, and geostrategic locations. They also provided relatively unrestricted laboratories conducive to the forging of new perspectives, ideas, and images, many of which later became popular and even customary at home.35 In turn, with independence the majority of the imperialized regions of the world appropriated many of these perspectives for themselves. Thus, considering imperialism as inherent in the creation of the contemporary world encourages, as Tani Barlow suggests, scholars to examine instances of colonial modernity in a way that allows for the merging of theories 35 An important statement of this perspective is Gwendolyn Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991. (17) 1. Introduction of discourse and political economy so as to comment constructively on the present.36 In a similar vein, while the literature on imperialism documents the brutal and impersonal aspects of imperialist rule of subject peoples, often missing is an awareness for how governments of the imperialist countries treated their own citizens during the process of creating modern states. Official persecution and harassment of "anti-government" forces was common in not only the colonies but also at home. Of course, the scale and systemization of oppression differed tremendously, but it remains that imperialist governments did not always treat their own citizens well. This is perhaps especially true in the case of Japan37— something that might shed light on why the Japanese in Manchuria proved to be the most injurious imperialist rulers of all. A further consideration, as perhaps implied first by Joseph Conrad in the novel Heart of Darkness, is the relationship between the nature of imperialist rule and the method of modern warfare. Trench and gas warfare did not simply spring into being on Flanders' or China's fields; it was the product of an extended perception of and experimentation on subject lands and peoples. This line of thought recommends a broader treatment of the nature of Japanese rule, one that encompasses issues like the "comfort women" and the formation of organizations like Unit 731 along with the means of economic development and innovative organizations.38 While the Einsatzgruppen and the concentration camps are understandable given the 36 Tani E. Barlow, "Introduction: On 'Colonial Modernity'," in Tani E. Barlow, ed., Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia, Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1997, pp. 3-7,19-20. 37 See, for example, the discussion in Sheldon Garon, The State and Labor in Modern Japan, Berkelely: University of California Press, 1987. 38 The euphemism "comfort women" refers to those women, primarily Chinese and Korean, who Japanese police and military forced into sexual bondage during the Second World War. Unit 731 was one of several bacteriological warfare units of the Japanese Imperial Army. (18) 1. Introduction contexts of Nazism and the modern bureaucratic state, the basic Japanese contexts of the 1930s are only now being meaningfully explored.39 The fourth goal of this work considers Changchun between 1932 and 1945 as the capital of Manchukuo, a period demonstrating a transition in the nature of imperialism. The last official colony Japan acquired was Korea, in 1910. The League of Nations assigned islands in the south Pacific as mandates, and other regions held other statuses. The "puppet state" of Manchukuo was anomalous among Japanese possessions. More important than the legal bases of organization, however, were the means of imperialist integration. Before 1932 Manchuria falls into the category of "informal" empire, but after 1932 it does not exactly merit the appellation "formal." At this point it became something new— a directly administered kind of colony. Or was it? Superficially an independent state, Manchukuo also experienced levels of investment far above the needs of colonial development. Of course, the puppet state was entirely subservient to Japanese authorities and the need for the rapid creation of a complementary trading partner was equally evident, but the means of administering the new "state" are curious. The Kwantung Army wanted something that was more than a colony, something they could use to influence others.40 They thus sought to run Manchukuo in a manner superior to the manner in which they thought the contemporary political system ran Japan. Japanese authorities in Manchukuo did this by organizing and legitimizing their efforts through the pursuit of two basic policies. One rested on reinterpreting Asian traditions to meet 39 Simple categorizations of Japanese as robots or innately aggressive are insufficient to explain Japanese actions. See, for example, the discussion sparked by Iris Chang, The Rave of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II, New York: Penguin, 1997. 40 Although the Japanese occupation of Burma and the Philippines allowed a degree of autonomy, their administrations were based on the Manchukuo model. See Hatano Sumio, Taiheiyo senso to ajiagaiko, Toshidaigaku shuppansha, 1996, pp. 115-6. (19) 1. Introduction contemporary needs; the other promised the grail of development and the creation of a modern state. The military required new sources of legitimacy because Tokyo offered little and the world none. Beyond that, however, was a wider awareness in Japanese society that imperialism was no longer a viable means of forging international relations. Imperialism had entered its twilight. Although the extant colonies would continue for several decades, the forces of independence were already at work, including reappraisals of imperialism within the imperialist core states. A new means of ordering international affairs was necessary, and Japanese planners attempted to legitimize their rule not only through the tentative claims of a bygone tradition but also through implementing progress. In fact, in Manchukuo the latter of the two was the more serious, something reflected as clearly in the design of the new capital as in the policies it issued forth. As such the capital and regime represented goals and attitudes emerging directly out of the general Japanese search for modernity at home. Under the guise of implementing modernity, the means of running Manchukuo suggest something different—a transition from a formal colony of the nineteenth century variety to the indirect means of influence found after the imperialist era. As such, it resembled in some ways the later Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe and American activities in South Vietnam. In both instances, the core powers sought territorial and economic security not through colonization but through implementing the promise of a core-defined vision of future progress. Although still requiring detailed supervision, subject regions did not require wholesale occupation, except in moments of crisis, something less expensive to maintain and more palatable to domestic publics. Neither formal nor informal, these were instances of a more indirect form of imperialism. (20) 1. Introduction These four issues—periodization, imperialism as inherent in modernity, assessing Japanese contexts, and identifying a post-"formal" stage of imperialism—are accessible through local history. Local histories allow for the detailed analysis of one locale over time and, if the site is appropriate, allow for wider reference. One of the three key cities involved in Japan's informal empire in China before 1932 and the model capital of an ideal state after 1932, Changchun's significance to Japanese imperialism and its relevance for global issues is clear. Contexts There are two important contexts to bear in mind when considering Manchuria. One is international. The Japanese were not the first to attempt to reorganize society in Manchuria—the region has a long history of external involvement. Thus, Japanese policies in Manchuria reflected not only the goals of the Japanese state but also the shifting contexts of international influence. First migrating into southern Manchuria en masse during the Ming, Chinese succeeded in recreating their own social and economic dynamics there that appealed to peoples like the Manchus. In the Manchus' view, Mongol control of China during the Yuan Dynasty lapsed because of the Mongols' refusal to adapt to Chinese means of governance. The ultimate Manchu triumph in 1644 was made possible by experimentation and the application of new modes of social organization by a frontier people in competition with others for local dominance. The Manchus failed to retain that dominance, however, because in order to rule China many Manchus (and their allies) migrated south in the seventeenth century, thereby depopulating the region. Subsequent Chinese immigration tilted the demographic balance increasingly in favor of the Han, a development that gained new significance when other foreign societies refused to participate (21) 1. Introduction in the traditional Chinese means of international trade and tribute. The Treaty of Tianjin (1861) and the British establishment of a treaty port at Yingkou (Newchwang) in 1864 opened Manchuria to world commerce, events that would ultimately transform the Manchurian economy. The subsequent introduction of rail transport and the world market encouraged the extension of the traditional portage network. This in turn fueled indigenous commercialization.41 The long distance trade in soybeans especially resulted in rapid economic growth and increased Chinese migration.42 The treaty port system also restructured accepted legal practices and external relations. The product of war and the European desire to access the China market, the treaty port system was designed by representatives of the imperialist powers to facilitate economic exploitation while assuring their personal security.43 Unlike colonial frameworks in preceding centuries, however, it affirmed superiority not only militarily but civilizationally. Deeming Chinese legal and economic arrangements backward, Europeans required the use of their own institutions, and sometimes their own personnel. The treaty port system was thus not simply a legal and economic system but also an implicit expression of European modernity. Although the treaty ports as a whole did not revolutionize Chinese society, over the century-long period of the treaty port system's existence they did help 41 An example of another Chinese city undergoing similar change is William T. Rowe, Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984, and William T. Rowe, Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796-1895, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989. 42 David D. Buck, "Railway City and Utopian National Capitol: The Two Faces of the Modern in Changchun," in Joseph Esherick, ed., Constructing the Modern in the Chinese City, (formcoming). 43 See John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-54, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, two volumes, 1953, and John King Fairbank, "The Creation of the Treaty System," pp. 213-63 in John King Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 10, "Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part I, "London: Cambridge University Press, 1978. (22) 1. Introduction numerous Chinese cities take on new economic and cultural roles.44 Growth was most pronounced in the regions centered on Shanghai and southern Manchuria, the two major hubs of which were Dalian and Mukden.45 Because of rail connections and coordinated Japanese control, Dalian's port and Mukden's factories and financial establishments can be considered as a single unit exercising economic leadership over the whole of south central Manchuria.46 The interplay between hinterland and metropolis is important—even if Chinese handicraft production did not transform into modern manufacturing in this period, growth in the metropolis and its hinterlands occurred as an integrated whole.47 As such the system helped endow regions of China with key institutional arrangements and elements of a modern economic infrastructure. The treaty port system, it should be recalled, appeared briefly in Japan as well.48 Japanese society, however, proved more quickly adaptable to imperialist "civilizational" requirements. Significantly, Japanese were able to adapt politically, economically, and militarily, allowing them to renegotiate the 44 As the system began with the conclusion of the Opium War and ended with the establishment of the PRC, it can be said to have existed roughly from 1842 to 1949. On its economic relevance see Albert Feuerwerker, "Economic Trends in the Late Ch'ing Empire, 1870-1911," pp. 1-69, in John King Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu, eds., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 10, "Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part II," London: Cambridge University Press, 1980, Albert Feuerwerker, Economic Trends in the Republic of China, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977, and Zhang Zhongli, ed., Chengshi jinbu, qiye fazhan he Zhongguo gendaihua (1840-1949), Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kuxueyin chubanshe, 1994. 45 Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth in Prewar China, Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1989. 46 Mukden lies at the north end of the Liao River valley, at the mouth of which sits the port city of Yingkou. Dalian lies near the southern end of the Liaodong (east of the Liao) Peninsula. Rather than share Manchurian trade with other imperialists at Yingkou, the Japanese channeled goods through Dalian. See below], chapter 8. 47 The strongest statement of the need to examine urban development in this way is William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1991. Another study encouraging a regional approach is D. W. Meinig, The Great Columbia Plain: A Historical Geography, 1805-1910, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1968. 48 J. E., Hoare, Japan's Treaty Ports and Foreign Settlements: The Uninvited Guests, 1858-1899, Kent, UK: Japan Library, 1994. (23) 1. Introduction unequal treaties as an equal. A proactive effort, it resulted also in the Japanese becoming imperialists themselves.49 Imperialist designs on Manchuria, however, did not begin with either the British or the Japanese. Nor did China's relations with Europeans begin in a context of inequality. Sino-Russian relations and trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries proceeded initially on a basis of equality. This relationship too the treaty port system challenged. By the middle of the nineteenth century, half of Russia's exports of manufactured goods went to China, and Britain's sudden domination of the China trade in the wake of the Opium War, along with the growing presence of American whalers in the western Pacific, compelled a change in Russian policy.50 The latter half of the nineteenth century thus witnessed the steady expansion of Russian predominance both north and south of the Amur River, to which the Qing responded only weakly.51 Russian expansion eastward inevitably brought conflict with Japan.52 Japanese responded more actively than the Qing, however, securing not only Tsushima but also Hokkaido (formerly Ezo) and the Kuriles, although Japanese needed to acquiesce to Russian control of Sakhalin (Karafuto) in 1875 in exchange for recognition of Japan's sovereinty over the Kuriles.53 This was part of a post-Restoration, concerted Japanese effort to seize all the islands nearest Japan before 4y W. G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 14-40. 50 Joseph Fletcher, "Sino-Russian Relations, 1800-62" in John King Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge History of China, Volume 10, "Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part I," London: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 334-5. 51 In addition to Fletcher, "Sino-Russian Relations," see Rosemary Quested, Sino-Russian Relations: A Short History, North Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1984, pp. 50-89, and John J. Stepban, The Russian Far East: A History, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, pp. 20-90. 52 Astoundingly, under wartime conditions some Japanese asserted that Russian expansion eastward began in 1032, even before the period of Mongol domination of Russia. See Shinkyo tokubetsushi chokan shomuka, Kokuto Shinkyo, Shinkyo: Shinkyo tokubetsushi kosho, 1942, p. 13. 53 See Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, pp. John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974, and John J. Stephan, Sakhalin: A History, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971. (24) 1. Introduction they could fall to any other power. This included the Ryukyus, the Bonins, and the Volcano islands. It also led to Japanese encroachment upon Korea.54 Russians and Japanese then set about consolidating their expansion, the Russians through the construction of a Trans-Siberian Railway, begun in 1891.55 A technological triumph, this project emboldened Russian expansionary designs and fanned Japanese fears. Following the Treaty of Shimonoseki, in 1896 the Russians rerouted the line to cut across Manchuria south of the Amur. This not only cut the length of the new railway by six hundred kilometers but also played nicely into Qing foreign policy attempting to play the various foreign imperialists off one another: Russian expansion in Manchuria intensified Japanese anxieties. The Russian taking of Port Arthur in 1897, after compelling the Japanese return of the city to China, and the completion of a connecting rail line to it from Harbin in 1898 demonstrated Russian designs on Manchuria plainly. The 1897 formation of a Russo-Korean bank also challenged Japanese control of Korea, recently won from China in 1895, setting the stage for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. The Treaty of Portsmouth (September 1905) ending that war, ratified by the Chinese government by the Treaty of Beijing (December 1905), brought the Japanese to Changchun. Japanese claims were tenuous, based entirely on the presence of Japanese guerrillas active behind Russian lines. Japanese thus had little information about Changchun when it became the northernmost point of their empire in Manchuria. Japanese did, however, know the legal context of 54 Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, pp. 41-54, Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960 and Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. 55 Except in the east, the creation of a single railway across Siberia did not so much reflect the creation of an entirely new line as it did a consolidation and linking of a number of other lines expanding east over the course of the entire nineteenth century. Ministers considered seriously plans to lay the eastern end as early as the 1880s. J. N. Westwood, A History of Russian Railways, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1964, p. 108. (25) 1. Introduction their expansion: the Treaty of Beijing approved of the transfer of the rights Russia achieved through negotiation in 1898. These rights included the right to station troops along the railway as well as to establish garrison towns.56 At the same time, Japanese did not enter into imperialism in Manchuria as novices. Many Japanese administrators and architects gained practical experience in Taiwan or Korea previous to joining the SMR. Upon retirement many even elected to stay to help further colonial development.57 Neither was Manchuria's more extreme climate entirely novel—three decades of colonizing Hokkaido provided many in the Ministry of Works the inspiration and experience to use western, especially American, techniques and architecture.58 Japanese arriving in Manchuria were aware they were in a new and different land. Yet more impressive to Japanese planners and architects than Chinese constructions of the built environment were Russian. In Dalian Japanese discovered grand boulevards and grandiose structures reflecting the late nineteenth century monumental tastes of Europe that Japanese found appealing. Moreover, Harbin's assortment of art nouveau structures suggested other architectural avenues to explore. But the most enduring Russian influence on the Japanese in Manchuria was less obvious. Having driven the Russians out of southern Manchuria by force of arms, Japanese feared always a Russian war of revenge. To prevent this, the Japanese not only prepared Manchuria militarily but civilizationally. Through what they considered to be enlightened planning and administration, Japanese attempted to cement Manchuria irrevocably within Japan's grasp. Changchun became one of the premier examples of this effort. 56 Along with Dalian and Shenyang, Changchun was also one of the designated stations for railway firefighters. See Mantetsu no kenchiku to gijutsujin henshu i'inkai and Mantetsu kenchikukai, eds., Mantetsu no kenchiku to gijutsujin, Tokyo: Mantetsu kenchikukai, 1976, p. 49. 57 Nishizawa Yasuhiko, Umi wo watattanihonjin kenchikuka: 20 seiki zenhan no Chugoku tohoku chiho ni okeru kenchiku katsudo, Tokyo: Shokokusha, 1996, p. 100. 58 Dallas Finn, Meiji Revisited: The Sites of Victorian Japan, New York: Weatherhill, 1995, pp. 51-63, and Harrison, Japan's Northern Frontier, passim. (26) 1. Introduction The presence of other Asians and their traditions also influenced Japanese efforts, but not initially. While Changchun was a treaty port, Japanese perceived other Asians in a manner similar to the other imperialists, as colonial others needing paternalist edification. With the creation of Manchukuo, however, Japanese appeared to shift to treating Chinese as allies. As the capital of the puppet state of Manchukuo, Changchun became the showplace of that effort. The reality behind that facade, however, was keenly apparent to any who scratched the surface of that fagade. Changchun was in reality a symbol of dominance and repression, not of pan-Asian harmony. A second important context to consider involves the recorded perceptions of Japanese activities in Manchuria. Manchuria's historiographical record centers on economic administration and development. This is understandable given that the foremost Japanese goal in Manchuria was the creation of a stable trading partner that secured access to raw materials.59 With regard to Changchun in particular this is evident in works as early as Izumi Renji's Choshun no jijo [Conditions in Changchun) and Inoue Nobuo's Choshun enkaku shi (History of Changchun).60 Mantetsu, the Kantogun, and the Japanese Foreign Ministry supplemented these with studies of their own on Changchun and other Manchurian cities, but the focus was invariably chiefly economic.61 The Manchukuo government continued this basic orientation, but added a propagandistic aspect focusing on the creation of a new culture and nation.62 59 See, for example, Mantetsu keizai chosakai, Manshu keizai no hattatsu, 1932, and Kanda Noboru, Manshukoku sangyo gaikan, Shinkyo: Manshu gyosei gakkai, 1937. 60 Izumi Renji, Choshun no jijo, Tokyo: Manshu Choshun Nihosha, 1912, and Inoue Nobuo, Choshun enkaku shi, Dairen: Manmo Bunka Kyokai, 1922. 61 Kantogun shireibu, Minami Manshu juyd toshi keizai jotai, 1924, pp. 359-401, Gaimusho Tsushokyoku, Choshun jijo, np, 1929, and Mantetsu Choshun chiho jimusho, Choshun jijo, Dalian: Mantetsu, 1932. A work that considers all the fuzokuchi is Mantetsu soseishitsu, Mantetsu fuzokuchi keiei enkaku zenshi, Dairen, 1939 (1977 reprint), three volumes. 62 On Changchun as the new capital of Shinkyo see Shinkyo keizai no kihonteki doko, Shinkyo: Mantetsu Shinkyo shisha gyomuka, 1938; Shinkyo no gaikyo, Shinkyo: Shinkyo shokokai, 1942; and Shinkyo tokubetsushi chokanbo shomuka hensan, Kokuto Shinkyo: Kenkoku jushiinen kinan, (27) 1. Introduction Studies of Manchuria in Japanese and English continued this economic emphasis in the postwar era.63 In Japan this made sense because of the orientation of postwar Japanese society towards reconstruction and recovery.64 English language studies often agreed with Japanese studies because of their reliance on Japanese sources and because of their interest in developing a general developmental paradigm.65 Chinese studies, however, differed, affirming the more brutal aspects of the Japanese occupation and downplaying any developmental contributions Japanese made to Manchuria's economy or infrastructure.66 Among more recent Japanese studies of Changchun are popular examinations of daily life during the occupation.67 Others explored Changchun as a means of Shinkyo: Shinkyo tokubetsushik kosho, 1942. On Manchukuo see, for example, Tamura Toshikazu, Manshukoku no rinen tojittai, 1940; Tanaka Tetsuz5ro, Yakushin no Manshu keizai, Shinkyo: Manshu chuo ginko shosaka, 1940; and Umemoto Sutezo, Dai Manshu kenkokushi, 1944. 63 The classic account is Manshikai, ed., Manshu kaihatsu yonjunen shi, Tokyo: Manshu kaihatsu yonjunen shi kankokai, 3 vols, 1964-5. Others affirmed Japanese progressive contributions to Manchuria less statistically, such as Kokusai zenrin kyokai, Manshu kenkoku no yume to genjitsu, Tokyo: Kenkosha, 1975. 64 For an examination of Japanese studies of Manchuria in the fifty years following 1945 see Sewell, "Postwar Japan and Manchuria." 65 The classic accounts in English of the Manchurian economy are similarly inclined: Kang Chao, The Economic Development of Manchuria: The Rise of a Frontier Economy, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, no. 43, Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 1982; Ann Rasmussen Kinney, Japanese Investment in Manchurian Manufacturing, Mining, Transportation and Communications, 1931 -1945, New York: Garland, 1982; Ramon Myers, The Japanese Economic Development of Manchuria, 1932-1945, New York: Garland, 1982; and Kungtu Sun, The Economic Development of Manchuria in the First Half of the Twentieth Century, Harvard East Asian Monographs, no. 28, Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, 1973. 66 Jie Xueshi, Wei Manzhouguo shi, Beijing: Renmin chubansi, 1995, revised, and Zhengxie Jilinsheng weiwenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, ed., Wei Manzhouguo Dashiji, Dairen: Dairen shuppansha, 1990. There is also the series Wei Manshi liaocongshu,.including Sun Bang, ed., Wei Man wenhua, Jilin renmin chubansi, 1993, and Sun Bang, ed., Jingji lueduo, Jilin: Jilin renmin chubansi, 1994. 67 One study is Fujise Takayuki, Choshun-Shinkyo Hagoromomachi, Kagoshima: Fujise Takayuki, 1993. A fictional account based on recollections of former residents is Tani Miyuki, Choshun monogatari, Nagoya: Maruzen, 1989. The investigation of one altruistic man's efforts is Komatsu Noriyuki, "Kyu Manshukoku sekijujisha Shinkyo roa gakuin-shodai gakuin Tashiro Kiyo ni tsuite," Miyagi kyoiku daigaku kiyo: nibun satsu shizen kagaku-kyoiku kagaku, 24 (1989), pp. 127-40. Popular are photographic works, such as Kokubun Hisafumi, Saraba Shinkyo, Tokyo: Kokusho kankokai, 1979 and Kitakoji Ken and Watanabe Manabu, Choshun, Kitsurin, Tokyo: Kokusho kankokai, 1982. (28) 1. Introduction reacquainting Japanese with post-Mao China.68 Among academics the study of Changchun and other Manchurian cities has been pursued most vigorously by Koshizawa Akira. His Manshukoku no shuto keikaku: Tokyo no genzai to mirai wo tou (The Planning of Manchukuo's Capital: An Inquiry into the Present and Future of Tokyo) explores Changchun through a focus on urban planning. His ultimate goal, however, is apparent in the subtitle—Koshizawa is interested in examining urban planning in Changchun because it represents a lost path for Japanese urban planners at home. Through an investigation of Japanese creations on the mainland, Koshizawa sought to demonstrate Japanese planners' potential for creating a more ideal society at home should the focus on economic growth lessen. This work disturbed Nishizawa Yasuhiko because the general impression of Koshizawa's—and too often other works dealing with colonial issues—is that imperialist activities were largely beneficial. In his view, researchers all too often excuse civilians for imperialism.69 For Nishizawa, imperialism was a system that encompassed almost every aspect of Japanese society in Manchuria, including progressive efforts like urban planning and architecture.70 In this a number of contemporary scholars elsewhere, such as Edward Said, would agree.71 So would Gwendolyn Wright, who has emphasized specifically the fundamental linkages between colonial urban planning, architecture, and imperialism.72 68 Kanai Saburo, Pekin, Harupin, Choshun, Shin'yo no tabi, Nagano: Kanai Saburo, 1985 recounts the first return visit of a former resident. Others examine current events, such as Ishige Naomichi and Kenneth Ruddle, "Genkan no Choshun jiyo shiba," Kikan Minzoku Gaku, 10:1,1986, pp. 28-37; Yoshida Fujitake, "Dairen, Shin'yo, Choshun, Harupin no tabi," Fainansu, 24:5, August 1988, pp. 58-69; and Okawa Yoshio, "Choshun no jidosha kogyo," Chiri, 34:6, April 1989, pp. 92-99. 69 Nishizawa Yasuhiko, "Manshukoku no shuto keikaku," Ajia Keizai, No. 38, August 1989, pp. 109-13. 70 Nishizawa, Umi wo watatta, pp. 3-9. 71 Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism, New York: Knopf, 1993. 72 Wright, Politics of Design. (29) 1. Introduction An awareness for this fuller context is one that simply must remain at the forefront of any inquiry into Japanese activities in Manchuria. The construction of model cities in Manchuria involved not only a 'progressive' outlook that encouraged Japanese to build as if no one else was there but also a racist denigration of Manchuria's inhabitants that eventually led to gruesome biological experimentation and mass atrocities. Implementing modernity involved always these darker aspects, and Changchun's role in this too was central.73 English language studies of Changchun are few but tend also to praise Japanese accomplishments. Changchun's architecture and spaciousness impressed one early postwar visitor.74 Fifty years later, the modernity intrinsic to Changchun's urban environment impressed another.75 Both of these works, however, miss a salient point: Japanese imperialist modernity entailed the brutal along with the progressive. While aware that the empire as a whole contained barbaric elements, such studies do not find that implicit in either the planning or the architecture of the capital city itself. Perhaps the most limiting context of studies to date involves the sources. Changchun's—and Manchuria's—contemporary historiographical contexts reflect their sources, the bulk of which are the analyses conducted by the Economic Research Bureau of the South Manchuria Railway.76 This 73 Writing in the communist daily Akahata (Red Flag) Morimura Sei'ichi was perhaps the first to discuss biological experiments publically in Japan. See Morimura Sei'ichi, Akuma no hoshoku, Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten, 1983, revised edition. On some of Changchun's role in this see chapter 9. Some of the atrocities involved in the Japanese occupation are still coming to light only fifty years after the war. Unfortunately, a more detailed examination of this important dimension of Japanese imperialism and the role played by Changchun must at this time must await future research. A brief discussion of evolving Japanese perceptions of this aspect of the occupation is Sewell, "Postwar Japan and Manchuria." 74 Norton Ginsburg, "Ch'ang-ch'un," Economic Geography 23:4,1947, pp. 290-307. 75 David D. Buck, "Railway City and Utopian National Capitol: The Two Faces of the Modern in Changchun," in Joseph Esherick, ed., Constructing the Modern in the Chinese City, (forthcoming). 76 As the exact name of this research organization changed often it is refered to here as simply the Economic Research Bureau. On the history of this fascinating institution see Joshua A. Fogel, (30) 1. Introduction organization's output was enormous.77 The reports that survived the war provided a concrete foundation for postwar study. The Economic Research Bureau's oeuvre, however, resulted in more than simply a large body of quantitative analysis. Consisting of an overwhelmingly economic focus, as a whole it formed not only a backbone but a boundary for scholarly analysis. The research bureau's work thus reveals an underlying and unitary dimension to Japanese imperialist modernity in Manchuria. Kantogun reports and official Manchukuo publications reinforced this narrow view. Together they affirmed the primacy of economic matters and strategic analysis.78 Other sources clarify this mindset. While individual postwar perspectives provide some insight, they cannot but help reflect the knowledge that Japanese endeavors eventually led to disaster.79 Of greater utility are contemporary Japanese journals, especially those that included contributions by both academics and bureaucrats that reflect Japan's 'official mind.'80 With regard to urban development in Manchuria, the most useful are the Toshi koron (usually translated asThe Municipal Review but sometimes The City Planning Review), and the Manshu kenchiku zasshi {The Journal ofManchurian Architecture). The former began publication in 1918, the offspring of Goto Shimpei (1857-1929), a Life Along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Ito Takeo, Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1988 (originally published as Ito Takeo, Mantetsu ni ikite, Tokyo: Keiso shobo, 1964); John Young, The Research Activities of the South Manchurian Railway Company, 1907-1945: A History and Bibliography, New York: Columbia University Press, 1966; Egami Teruhiko, Mantetsu okoku, Tokyo: Sankei shuppan, 1980; Hara Kakuten, Mantetsu chosabu to Ajia, Tokyo: Sekai shobo, 1986; Imura Tetsuo, Mantetsu chosakabu: Kankeisha noshogen, Tokyo: Ajia keizai kenkyujo, 1996; and Kobayashi Hideo, Mantetsu: '"Chi no shudan" no tanjo to shinu, Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1996. 77 In addition to a wide range of independent publications, monthly reports and analyses included the Mantetsu Chosa Geppo and the Manshu Hyoron. In English see the Manchukuo Yearbook and Reports on Progress. 78 Sewell, "Postwar Japan and Manchuria." 79 See, for example, Komai Tokuzo, Tairiku he no higan, Tokyo: Dai Nihon yuben kodankai, 1952, Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Manshu no shuen, Tokyo: Jitsugyo no Nihonsha, 1952, and Hoshino Naoki, Mihatenu yume: Manshukoku gaishi, Tokyo: Diamondo, 1963. 80 Cf., Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism, London: Macmillan, 1961. (31) 1. Introduction significant figure in not only the Japanese development of Manchuria but also the development of the modern Japanese state.81 The Toshi koron included articles by important bureaucrats, politicians, and professors.82 Published by Goto's research facility in downtown Tokyo, this important journal explored new concepts in urban planning gathered from around world. Many articles reported the results of study missions to North American and western Europe. Targeting the issues facing urban planners in the twentieth century that were most prominent, the Toshi koron examined urban density, pollution, transportation, green spaces, and water supply in a global context. As such the journal provided planners with both theoretical knowledge and practical advice as to how to fashion urban society in Japan.83 The Manshu kenchiku zasshi began publication in 1921 under the supervision of Onoki Toshiharu (1874-1932), the head of Mantetsu's Construction Department.84 As with many Mantetsu personnel, Onoki, an 1899 Tokyo Imperial University (Todai) graduate, received his first practical training in Japan's first colony, Taiwan.85 The Manshu kenchiku zasshi embodied an unflagging commitment by Japanese architects to introduce modernity to the Manchurian plains.86 Its pages 81 See Chapter 2. 82 Goto's vice-chairman, for example, at the Toshi kenkyukai was former Home Minister Mizuno Rentaro. The directors included Ikeda Hiroshi (chair of the Home Ministry urban planning department), Sano Toshikata, Watanabe Tetsuzo, and Kataoka Yasushi, all men who played roles of significance in the development of Japanese urban administration. 83 Tokyo's reconstruction in the wake of the disastrous Kanto earthquake of 1923, for example, received significant attention. Elsewhere, Goto congratulated the association, and himself, for becoming so useful to planners outside of Tokyo in Goto Shimpei, "Toshi keikaku to sogoteki seishin," TK 7;6, June 1924, p. 2. 84 The MKZ was originally the Manshu kenchiku kyokai zasshi, but in 1934 the name shortened to Manshu kenchiku zasshi. The association that published the journal was formed in November 1920. For more on the initial impetus behind the journal see Onoki Toshiharu, "Kaikan shinchiku s5ritsu sanshiinen kinengo no hakko ni saishite," MKZ 4:3, March 1924, pp. 2-3. 85 Nishizawa Yasuhiko, "Manshu" toshi monogatari, Tokyo: Kawade shobo shinsha, 1996, p. 116. 86 Playfully experimenting with new styles of kanji (Chinese characters), even the magazine's covers suggested modern reformulations of traditional techniques. See especially the covers for July 1926 (6:7), January 1928 (8:1), and October 1930 (10:10). (32) 1. Introduction included a startling variety of topics, from floor plans and sketches of contemporary constructions to historical discussions of gardens and European architectural symbolism. Some articles explored new technologies for heating and air defense while others examined concepts like the "garden city" and other urban developments. As the Manchurian environment differed greatly from Japan, many articles dealt with residential construction as Japanese wanted to insure that their oversees personnel were well housed. Other articles examined the histories of gardens in Asia and Europe, including their associated architecture, or provided periodic reports on architectural developments overseas in Japan, North America, and Europe. A few offered reports on architecture, gardens, and temples in Manchuria. Legal excerpts also occasionally appeared, such as Manchukuo's 1936 urban planning law.87 In the first issue, Oka Oji (1889-1962), a 1912 T6dai graduate, explained the journal's mission by suggesting that in the wake of the post-World War One depression, the association wanted to encourage development using Western construction techniques only recently introduced to Japan. He saw the need especially to go beyond the traditional Japanese inclination for wood construction. In doing so, however, Oka thought that because it would also improve Chinese construction, such expansion was for the benefit of both China and the empire.88 Other contributors agreed, many going so far to say that they were creating a new culture in Manchuria that embodied the best of several worlds: Japanese, Chinese, and Western.89 87 "Toyu keikaku ho," MKZ 18:9, September 1938, pp. 15-20. 88 Oka Oji, "Manshu kenchiku kyokai no shimei," MKZ 1:1, March 1921, pp. 9-15. 89 See, for example, Seikatsu kaizen domei, "Jutaku no madori oyobi setsubi no kaizen," MKZ 4:4, April 1924, pp. 14-22, and MKZ 4:5, May 1924, pp. 15-24. Elsewhere the journal attempted to bridge the linguistic differences between these spheres by publishing lists of architectural terms in English, Chinese, and Japanese. (33) 1. Introduction Other journals reinforced this perspective, notably the Toshi mondai {Urban Problems), and Kaizo (Reconstruction). Publishers of the latter, well-known journal also published the journal Tairiku (The Continent) that, beginning in 1938, promoted Japanese development on the Asian mainland. Unlike its parent publication, however, Tairiku was more bellicose in its calls for Japanese expansion and reorganization. Journals like these were integral not only to the Japanese development of Manchuria but also to the construction of Japanese perceptions of Manchuria. More intriguing, while insightful about Japanese motives on the mainland, these perceptions also demonstrate how Japanese defined themselves. For John Thompson, the growth of a mass communications industry was as important to the creation of modernity as the role played by national administrations. It redefined the nature and experience of publicness as well as the production and reception of cultural forms, transforming individual lives and realigning relationships of political power. To Thompson this occurred not simply because of the existence of any particular media but also because of the messages media carried. Media content helped define new ideologies, something Thompson considered "meaning in the service of power."90 Integral to mass politicization and the formation of industrial capitalism, the 'mediazation' of cultural forms was a necessary condition for the emergence of a nationalist identity.91 In these journals, the public debate on modernity assumed central stage. What emerges in their pages is a central concern for Japanese progress, usually defined by the manipulation of a Western 'other.' Although the nations of western Europe and North America were diverse, Japanese tended to group thenvtogether under terms like taisei ("the Occident") or rekkyo ("the Powers"). 90 John B. Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990, p. 7. 91 John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, pp. 51, 62-3. (34) 1. Introduction This Japanese perception justifies the use of the term "Western," but its proper meanings here are only two: it can be used in an abbreviated fashion to mean the societies of western Europe, Russia, and North America, or it can be used as a means of designating a foreign conglomeration that Japanese perceived as different from themselves. Around the turn of the century Japanese perceived the West comparatively: the West was 'advanced' while the Japanese were 'behind.' As the process of creating a modernity of their own encouraged Japanese to redefine their views, however, that perspective gradually reversed. Japanese imperialist modernity ultimately manifested itself as Manchukuo, a state Yamamura Shin'ichi described as a "chimera"—the Kantogun was the lion's head, the imperial system the sturdy goat's body, and Puyi the dragon's tail. Japanese supporting one part did not necessarily condone the actions of the others but all lived together as a single organism.92 While a useful description of imperialism, it does not explain. That task requires deeper analysis. The modern world is the product of numerous forces, but a wide number of recent historical actors have shared a common emphasis: a rational means of organizing society. Beginning in the eighteenth century, scientific rationalism replaced revealed faith gradually but steadily as the most common means of legitimating society. This was particularly apparent among the agents of social organization—modern bureaucracies. Crystalizing between 1868 and 1900, the Japanese imperial bureaucracy developed into a standardized institution insulated from the political process and predicated towards manufacturing stability and progress.93 Its singleness of purpose was possible because of the central role of Todai and its graduates. Their dominance of official bureaucracy 92 Yamamura Shin'ichi, Kimera: Manshukoku no shozo, Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 1993. 93 Bernard S. Silberman, Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993. (35) 1. Introduction at home and overseas insured a confluence of mindsets over what constituted progress and how Japanese should set about creating it. Other factors contributed to this confluence of mindsets, the most important of which was a change in institutional arrangements implicit in Japanese society over the course of the Tokugawa era that encouraged a kind of perceptual unity among influential segments of Japanese elites.94 Another factor was the seizure of power in 1868 by some of those elites, an educated group of Japan's "service intelligentsia," and their articulation of institutional changes as a basis for reordering society.95 They subsequently formalized changes so as to preserve their control while denying the fundamental equality for society's constituents that they publicly pledged. This, they assumed, would secure not just the system but their, and their followers', bases within society so that they may continue to direct its course.96 Fukuzawa Yukichi, their earliest, most prominent spokesman, exemplified this best when he explained that equality of opportunity existed as long as individuals knew their proper "place" (bungen).97 The bureaucracy's road to a commanding role in Japanese society resulted in the creation of a particular kind of modern society. The creation of multiple modernist visions in places like Changchun help point to the path the society took to get there. 94 John P. Powelson, Centuries of Economic Endeavor: Parallel Paths in Japan and Europe and Their Contrast with the Third World, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997, pp. 13-41. 95 The trained 'service intelligentsia' cohort thesis can be found in Thomas Huber, The Revolutionary Origins of Modern Japan, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981, pp. 201-31. 96 This is also the argument in J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, The Politics of Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 97 See Earl H. Kinmonth, "Fukuzawa Reconsidered: Gakumon no susume and Its Audience," Journal of Asian Studies 37:4, August 1978, pp. 677-96 and Earl H. Kinmonth, The Self-Made Man in Meiji Japanese Thought: From Samurai to Salary Man, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981, pp. 45-54. (36) 2. Envisioning the Modern in Japan and Manchuria Chapter 2. Envisioning the Modern in Japan and Manchuria The Changchun railway town and the Manchukuo capital were wholly new creations, each on the surface displaying few attributes typically Japanese. Both featured foreign-inspired planning, architecture, infrastructure, and amenities. Both also entailed novel goals. While the railway town was an orderly treaty port intended to integrate a non-Japanese society into Japan's imperial orbit, the puppet capital was conceived as a sprawling metropolis through which Japanese hoped to secure popular approval if not outright submission. Designed as much to impress as they were to function, both urban landscapes were explicitly modern. Neither, however, was entirely novel. Both were the results of careful deliberation over what was appropriate for Japan's evolving needs and status. As such they were distinct products of Japanese society and reflected more than imperialist ambitions: the railway town and the imperial capital demonstrated shifting bases of national identity. Although acquiring certain foreign forms, Japanese chose those forms through a deliberation over specific identities. The reasoning behind their determinations is instructive, involving as it does the dynamic inherent in Japan's transition to a modern society. That dynamic explains not only the process by which Japanese society presented itself, but also the ways it evolved. Integral to Japanese society's ability to transform itself into new integrative frameworks in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries were indigenous developments transpiring over centuries. These included competitive economic endeavors1, negotiated institutional arrangements2, and new intellectual 1 Thomas C. Smith, The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959, William B. Hauser, Economic Institutional Change in Tokugawa Japan: Osaka and the Kinai Cotton Trade, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974, Susan B. Hanley and Kozo (37) 2. Envisioning the Modern in Japan and Manchuria formulations.3 By the middle of the nineteenth century, even if Japan remained economically and militarily weaker than the other imperialist states, Japanese society evolving independently approximated many of the changes that occurred in Europe.4 This allowed Japanese to address relative weaknesses quickly.5 Having also a tradition of consciously utilizing foreign—especially Chinese— practices, Japanese were comfortable selectively borrowing European techniques and concepts.6 Along with latent Japanese capabilities, this capacity to borrow intelligently and develop ideas pragmatically resulted in Japan's joining a second global wave of developing states that witnessed the development of powerful nationalisms alongside industrial capitalism in each.7 Like the ecological crisis Japanese faced during the seventeenth century, contact with the West thus did not induce novel responses so much as it catalyzed already extant domestic capabilities.8 Yamamura, Economic and Demographic Change in Preindustrial Japan, 1600-1868, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, and Thomas C. Smith, Native Sources of Japanese Industrialization, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. 2 Powelson, Centuries of Economic Endeavor, pp. 13-41. 3 Robert Bellah, Tokugawa Religion: The Values of Pre-Industrial Japan, 1957, Tetsuo Najita, Visions of Virtue in Tokugawa Japan: The Kaitokudd Merchant Academy of Osaka, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, and Yamamoto Shichihei, Takeuchi Manabu and Lynne E. Riggs, tr., The Spirit of Japanese Capitalism and Selected Essays, Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1992. 4 Commercialization in Japan may well have been part of a global process. In addition to Howell, Capitalism from.Within, see Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, pp. 104-7 and passim. 5 See the discussion in Moses Abramovitz, "Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind," Journal of Economic History 46:2, June 1986, pp. 385-406 that emphasizes the need for what Abramovitz calls "social capability" in order to make technological catching up possible. 6 See David Pollock, The Fracture of Meaning: Japan's Synthesis of China from the Eighth through the Eighteenth Centuries, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986 and Takeshi Ishida, Japanese Political Culture: Change and Continuity, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1983, pp. 69-86. 7 The Meiji Restoration of 1868 was practically simultaneous with other events that restructured societies elsewhere to be more conducive to the growth of industrial capitalism. These included the creation of constitutional government in Austria (1860) and the Dual Monarchy (1867), the emancipation of Russian serfs (1861), and the unifications of Italy (1870) and Germany (1871). 8 On the ecological imperative and reform measures during the Tokugawa see Conrad Totman, The Green Archipelago: Forestry and Conservation in Seventeenth Century Japan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, and Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 223-79. (38) 2. Envisioning the Modern in Japan and Manchuria Perceiving Japanese initiatives simply as reactions to a Western presence in Asia was a common error among historians in the early postwar era. Another was the attempt to understand Japanese activities as "modernization," an approach that at its most simplistic posited a discoverable developmental road to a teleologically satisfactory end—the West itself.9 Defining 'modern' and 'traditional' as unidimensional, polar opposites of a binary pair, it was a perspective later historians challenged not only for its utility but its validity.10 Japanese initiatives in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, occurred against an identifiable background: a foreign threat defined militarily and civilizationally. Although Japanese actions against this threat depended upon trends implicit in earlier social evolution, with the end of seclusion those efforts took on or were justified by Western forms. Because these forms were of recent vintage and comparable to similar efforts elsewhere in the world, these endeavors can be considered broadly as a group. They can be categorized under the general rubric of 'modernity.' Like 'tradition,' modernity is an invented term that is useful if qualified.11 First, as an abstract, heuristic device, modernity enables a broad classification of events distinguishable from those preexisting by recognizing the galvanizing role of progress.12 Contrasting with 'traditional' views that posit stable societies and concomitant world views antithetical to progress, modernist perspectives nourish individual inquiry and analysis. Marshall Berman defines "modernism 9 This was most evident in the Studies in the Modernization of Japan series published by Princeton University Press. lu See, for example, the discussion in John Dower, "E.H. Norman and the Uses of History," in John W. Dower, ed., Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E.H. Norman, New York: Pantheon, 1975, pp. 3-108. 11 On the uses and misuses of 'tradition' see Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 1-14. 12 See the discussion in Stephen Vlastos, "Tradition: Past/Present Culture and Modern Japanese History," pp.-1-16, in Stephen Vlastos, ed., Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. (39) 2. Envisioning the Modern in Japan and Manchuria as any attempt by modern men and women to become subjects as well as objects of modernization, to get a grip on the modern world and make themselves home in it." Individual motivations occur because "[t]he innate dynamism of the modern economy, and of the culture that grows from this economy, arinihilates everything it creates—physical environments, social institutions, metaphysical ideas, artistic visions, moral values—in order to create more, to go on endlessly creating the world anew."13 Following Berman, modernity is best conceived as multiple mirages—continually changing because successive generations shape and define new visions.14 Generations across geographic and temporal space create varying modernities.15 Second, as a global phenomenon, modern society assumed an array of forms but on the whole it exhibited key similarities. These included the dominance of secular forms of political power and authority, monetized exchange, the replacement of traditional social hierarchies with new class formations, and the 13 Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1988, pp. 5, 288. 14 Anthropologist Lisa Rofel, more sensitive to relations of power, considers modernity in a more complex fashion: "modernity persists as an imaginary and continuously shifting site of global/local claims, commitments, and knowledge, forged within uneven dialogues about the place of those who move in and out of categories of otherness. By opening out the imaginary space of modernity we pay attention to its gaps, fissures, and instabilities, those moments when "others" unsettle forms of domination enacted in the name of modernity. This space is filled with culturally positioned projects formed within intersecting global imaginations." Lisa Rofel, Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China after Socialism, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, p. 3. 15 Jeffrey Herf argues: "(t)here is no such thing as modernity in general. There are only national societies, each of which becomes modern in its own fashion." Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 1. The thesis here is actually not too far from Herf's: modernity does exist as a loose, general era (or stage or concept), but depends heavily on trends within national societies for specific forms. Moreover, modernity depends upon a temporal component, as successive national societies may create different modernities. Prewar Japan and Nazi Germany, for example, each attempted to implement modernities that other, neighboring societies forcibly rejected. Postwar Japan and Germany eventually created alternative modernities that differed in certain fundamental ways but continued key trends implicit in their national societies. For an enlightening discussion of nativist thought that fails to completely disappear in Japan see Harry D. Harootunian, Things Seen and Unseen: Discourse and Ideology in Tokugawa Japan, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988. (40) 2. Envisioning the Modern in Japan and Manchuria decline of a religious world view in favor of rationalist, individualistic, and materialist cultures.16 The application of rationalism to aspects of society as diverse as architecture and administration especially resulted in a broadly shared underlying framework. -This too was integral to modernity—while its rational dimension encouraged people to question fundamentally almost every aspect of the society in which they lived, its cosmopolitan dimension encouraged a confluence of thought and action.17 Despite these common features, however, modernity did not appear as a homogenizing, transnational paradigm. Local societies interpreted modernity variously, conceiving modernity only in manners that met local needs. Thus, although sharing a number of techniques and perspectives, modern societies applied them in differing ways, inevitably resulting in multiple modernities.18 Involving more than the development and extension of industrialism, capitalism, and the nation-state, the appearance of modernity included also a fundamental reorganization of the attitudes and activities involved in social integration. For Anthony Giddens, the "peculiarly dynamic character of modern social life" came from separating perceptions of time from conditions of space, disembedding social institutions through creating systems of symbolic representation and expertise, and regularizing knowledge of human life so that it could be organized and transformed. Through the abstraction of these elements, society gained power over itself. In doing so, however, it did more than, as Berman suggested, make people 'subjects as well as objects' of their own 16 Stuart Hall, "Introduction," in Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert, and Kenneth Thompson, eds., Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies, Maiden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1996, pp. 8 and passim. For an enlarged discussion of modernity and its formation in Europe and North America, see the four volume work from which this book is abstracted, Understanding Modern Societies. 17 As Gwendolyn Wright observed, "[t]he image of modernity seemed necessarily universal, rather than inherently specific to a place and a culture." Wright, French Colonial Urhanism, p. 300. 18 Rofel and Dirlik especially make this point. (41) 0 2. Envisioning the Modern in Japan and Manchuria transformation. It also made human life subject to continual reappraisal and revision. This "reflexivity," writes Giddens, is "not incidental to modern institutions, but constituent of them—a complicated phenomenon, because many possibilities of reflection about reflexivity exist in modern social conditions."19 Reflexivity, especially institutional, provides a third, useful means of interpreting modernity. Indeed, as Duara suggests, when the agent becomes the nation-state, this reflexivity becomes all the more important to understand.20 'Reflexivity' involves comparative considerations of identity. To postcolonial critics like Dirlik, "(d)ifference is important not just as a description of a situation, but more importantly because it shapes language, and therefore, the meaning of identity: every representation of the self carries upon it the trace of the "other." Identity, it follows, is never "essential," but the product of relationships... .(D)ifference and the negotiation of difference becomes crucial to the construction of identity and, by extension, of culture."21 The result of negotiation and hybridity, cultural productions, either linguistic or physical, like art, thus serve as metaphors for all cultural encounters, and provide avenues of inquiry regarding relations of power: .. .the most significant politics is the politics of identity, how identity is constructed at the level of of local encounters and according to local circumstances. Since the individual is not a mere expression of "essentialized" group identity, but an active participant in the formation of group identity in numerous localized encounters with others, these encounters, rather than structures that may confine the "heterogeneity" of the individual must provide the point of departure for analysis—as well as meaningful politics. Indeed, insistence on structures, or master narratives of any kind (from capitalism to imperialism, from nationalism to revolution to ethnicity, class, and gender) implies an essentialism that subordinates the local to imagined and invented 19 Anthony GiddeSjS? 'Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age, Cambridge: Polity Pfets> 1991, pp. 14-20. 20 Duara, Rescuing Bisfdry from the Nation. 21 Dirlik, The Post'c'olbmql Aura, p. 5. (42) 2. Envisioning the Modern in Japan and Manchuria categories that reproduce the categories that hegemonic structures of power have imposed upon the world.22 An uneven process, Meiji Japanese broke with tradition in key ways to establish reflexive, modern identities of their own. Urban studies, a field that began in Japan not long after it did in other countries, is a good example of one such perspective.23 On the whole, secular rationalism and the needs of the Japanese nation-state rather than custom became the primary means of ordering society. And, as time-honored mores and ethics receded, ancient forms and motifs increasingly disappeared. Despite a growing existential angst among many who sought to preserve traditional elements, many Japanese rushed to construct viable Japanese modernities they thought best.24 Japanese too enshrined progress at the new state's core.25 Western modernities emerging in the middle of the nineteenth century could only appeal to Japanese because their own historical evolution prepared them for it. Yet in addition to making Japanese ripe to embrace perspectives of rationalist progress, that evolution also helped Japanese succeed dramatically in creating a modern society of their own, one that entailed a nation-state assuming globally prevailing, modern modes of operation, namely rationalism, industrial capitalism, and imperialism. Japanese proved able to appropriate these modes and apply them usefully to their own circumstances. In that effort, Manchuria played a central role. Given Manchuria's proximity and natural wealth, the imperialist interests of the Japanese state in Manchuria were logical. More significant, Manchuria's relative sparseness of population allowed for the 22 Dirlik, The Postcolonial Aura, p. 6. 23 On the historical development of urban studies see Peter Saunders, Social Theory and the Urban Question, London: Hutchinson, 1981. 24 Marilyn Ivy, Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995. 25 See also the discussion in Robert J. Smith, Japanese Society: Tradition, Self, and the Social Other, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. (43) 2. Envisioning the Modern in Japan and Manchuria untrammeled creation of two, distinct Japanese imperialist modernities, each of which was articulated and embedded in particular moments in space and time.26 The Emergence of Modern Japan The five decades following Japan's opening to the world witnessed the forging of imperial Japan as a modern society. It emerged quickly as a well-integrated society keenly aware of its needs and place in the world. Empire in Manchuria, and the means of administering it, were products of this short interlude. Yet constructing empire's outposts in Manchuria involved more than organizing railways, insuring their security, and integrating possessions into a far-flung empire. Imperial installations included new means of urban organization, architecture, and civic life. In order to understand the diversity of activities apparent in places like Changchun it is necessary first to examine the Japanese approach to the creation of empire in the Meiji era. Moreover, since Japan's becoming imperialist was a means of becoming modern, it is necessary also to consider the perspectives on modernity Meiji society entailed. The Japanese railway town in Changchun depended entirely upon these definitions for its form and content. Perhaps the most obvious motivation in the creation of a modern Japanese state involved national security. This began with concerns for the territorial 26 In making these efforts, especially the second, Japanese assumed the role of a non-Western vanguard promoting cultures and politics of difference long before any in the West suspected that Asia or the Pacific could rival Western hegemonic patterns. Theorists outside Asia and the Pacific have long ignored the potential for innovation and creation within that region, choosing instead to invent their own intellectual constructions of Asia, the Pacific, and later, a Pacific Rim. Indeed, because of the externality of the hegemonic discourse, native discourses tends to appear as resistance. See Rob Wilson and Arif Dirlik, "Introduction: Asia/Pacific as Space of Cultural Production," in Rob Wilson and Arif Dirlik, eds., Asia/Pacific as Space of Cultural Production, Durham: Duke University Press, 1995, pp. 1-14, esp. p. 6. Thoughtful critiques of tropes about the Asia and Pacific regions originating in the West can be found in Arif Dirlik, ed., What is in a Rim? Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea, Lanham; Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998. (44) 2. Envisioning the Modern in Japan and Manchuria security of the home islands. In the face of Western expansion and the withering of Chinese influence, this extended, naturally, to those islands in Japan's immediate vicinity. Enhanced military capabilities were integral to this concern as well, and Japanese leaders were careful to renovate the military accordingly. Initially, Meiji leaders also selected manageable opponents.27 Continued successes, however, encouraged the gradual widening of definitions of strategic interests to include more distant lands. Imperial Japan eventually took part in four wars and a number of isolated "incidents" that, with the important exception of the Manchurian Incident, were not qualitatively different from the actions of any other imperialist power in the previous century. Proving to be a quick study, Japanese successes were impressive. By 1942 the Japanese empire spanned almost a fifth of the globe. Changchun, gained by the Japanese in 1905 through war and diplomacy, remained integral to geostrategic considerations until 1945. Defini