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Thirsty downstream : the provision of clean water in Jakarta, Indonesia Argo, Teti Armiati 2000

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THIRSTY DOWNSTREAM: THE PROVISION OF CLEAN WATER IN JAKARTA, INDONESIA by: TETI ARMJATi ARGO B.Sc. Institut Teknologi Bandung, Indonesia, 1988 M.E.S. York University, Canada, 1993 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE STUDIES School of Community and Regional Planning We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA DECEMBER 1, 1999 © TETI ARMJATI ARGO, 1999 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date D*C SUV 1^1 DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT The challenge of water provision in third world cities is to maintain the supply in the context of inadequate and inefficient piped water infrastructure and dimMshing raw resources. In order to exajnine the role of governance in this, I utilize a range of theoretical positions: the welfare orientation, rational choice paradigm, common goods theory and regime theory, and present them as ways to explore the subjective dimension of water provision. Using the city of Jakarta, Indonesia as a case study, this dissertation explores the issues using different perspectives on a single principal focus, the roles of the government and its relations to non-governmental actors. This research used data from secondary materials such as management reports, policy and academic reports, and scientific studies. The major source of primary data were interviews conducted with about 40 key actors. Qualitative analysis used a system of information coding and trianggulation. The conclusion reached is that the approach to managing clean water provision needs to be redefined in relation to the water management regimes found in situated research. In Jakarta, one may define three regimes: piped water, surface and shallow groundwater, and deep groundwater. Accessing water from greater urban watershed, treatment plants and a "manufacturing process" results in the delivery of a product. Such a system reduces the possibility of the tragedy of the commons, that is, the over-extraction of groundwater by individuals. But a more inclusive and enforced regulatory system must be established for groundwater, as it remains a needed source of supply. Local and low-technology solutions, international agency assistance, the policies of privatization and decentralization, and better land use planning, all hold out the promise of movement towards a solution. But, as the case study demonstrates, success has so far been mixed. Many options do not address water scarcity at the city level and problems of inequitable service. It is only the prospect government reform towards a better allocation of roles, new management ideas and greater co-operation within and among the water regimes that will lead to better provision of clean water. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ii LIST OF TABLES , vii LIST OF FIGURES • viii GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS ix ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. . . . xii 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Background 1 1.2 Problem Statement 6 1.3 A Conceptual Framework 6 1.3.1 Dimensions of Water Provision in the Urban Environment 7 1.3.2 Provision of Clean Water as a Part of Production Relations 12 1.3.3 Creations of an Urban Water Regime, Government Influences and Power Relations 13 1.3.4 Framework of the Study 16 1.4 Research Objectives and Research Question 19 1.5 Importance of the Study 20 1.6 Method of Research 22 1.6.1 Approach to Research and View of Planning... 22 1.6.2 The Case Study 27 1.6.3 Research Process 30 1.7 Organization of the Text ; 32 2 PROVIDING W A T E R IN T H E OLD JAKARTA: A N HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 36 2.1 Subjugating Water: Securing Trade in the Graveyard 37 2.2 Marketing Java and the Splash of Wealth in Batavia 41 2.3 The Pride of Public Sendees in Improving Native Welfare 46 2.3.1 Directing Urban Development and Water , 46 2.3.2 Disseminating Hygiene inKampung 51 2.4 Urban Living in the Era of Power Struggle 55 2.5 Exercising Democracy and Clean Water as a Free Service 56 2.6 Curbing or Allowing Urbanization: Dilemma for Water Supply 63 2.6.1 Controlling Urban Growth by "Closed City Policy" 64 2.6.2 Expansion and Limitation of Current Patterns of Water Supply 70 2.7 Conclusion .' 72 3 URBANIZATION, T H E W A T E R REGIME AND T H E FLOW OF WATER SUPPLY FOR JAKARTA 75 3.1 Urbanization and Clean Water Provision 76 3.1.1 Economic Development, Urban Policies and Commitments to Clean Water Provision 76 3.1.2 Redefining the Welfare Approach to Basic Service in Urban Areas 82 iii 3.1.3 The Workings of Water Market and Maturity of the Water Economy 83 3.1.4 The Water Regime and Rules of Institutions 85 3.2 Policies on Water Supply in Urban Areas 88 3.2.1 National Policies in the Urban Water Sector 88 3.2.2 National Policies at the City Level 93 3.3 Water Supply of Jakarta: From Upstream to Downstream 95 3.3.1 Surface Water: From the River Basin to the City 96 3.3.2 Groundwater in Jakarta 98 3.3.3 Environmental Protection of the Distribution System 100 3.4 Institutional Arrangements for Protecting Water: A Linkage of Regional-Urban Areas.....„ 101 3.4.1 For Surface Water 101 3.4.2 For Groundwater 102 3.5 Characteristics of Jakarta 103 3.5.1 Population Growth and Expansion in Jakarta 103 3.5.2 Urban Physical Expansion 106 3.6 Water Withdrawal. 107 3.6.1 Water from Outside of the City: Between Agriculture and Urban Uses.... 108 3.6.2 Water from Inside of the City: Water Withdrawal and Water Consumption 110 3.7 Situating Problems of Water Availability 112 3.7.1 Surface Water: The Curtailing of Abundance 113 3.7.2 Groundwater: Overextraction and the End of Extraction 114 3.7.3 Water Quality: Contamination that Induces Scarcity 116 3.7.4 Tracing the Problems 117 3.8 Conclusion 119 4. A L L O C A T I N G W A T E R LN T H E CITY (I): T H E R O L E OF A CENTRALIZED W A T E R SUPPLY SYSTEM 120 4.1 A Conceptual Framework 120 4.1.1 A Paradigm of Collective Provision in Urban Water Supply. 121 4.1.2 A Centralized Water System in the City: From Productivist Logic to Conservationist Logic 125 4.1.3 The Roles of the State: Promoting Equitable Services and Environmental Protection 128 4.2 Shaping the Future of Jakarta 131 4.2.1 Toward a Productivist City: Guidelines from Jakarta 2005 131 4.2.2 Policies of Expansion of Piped Water Service 134 4.2.3 The Flow of Water in Jakarta 135 4.3 Characteristics of Centralized Water System: Constraint of Expansion 137 4.3.1 PAM Jaya as a Quasi-Private Enterprise 137 4.3.2 Current Production of Water Supply: 139 4.3.3 Constraints to Supplying Piped Water 142 4.4 Intervention from the Central Level: The Nature of Centralized Authority 144 4.4.1 Intervention in Improving the Service of Urban Water Supply 144 4.4.2 Creating a Financial Web of Support for PAM Jaya 145 4.5 Implication of the Level of Service 147 iv 4.5.1 The Pattern of Piped Water Service 147 4.5.2 Serving the Customer 149 4.5.3 Serving Low-Income Groups 151 4.6 Support from the Public 155 4.7 Conclusion: Creation of Mechanism of Exclusion 156 5 A L L O C A T I N G W A T E R IN T H E CITY (II): TAKING A D V A N T A G E OF NON-PIPED, W A T E R SOURCES 158 5.1 A Theoretical View: A Common Pool Resource and the Tragedy of the Enclosure 159 5.1.1 The Character of Non-Piped Water as a Common-Pool Resource 159 5.1.2 The State Takes Over the Responsibility of Common-Pool Resources 163 5.1.3 The Tragedy of the Enclosure 165 5.1.4 The State's Attempts to Solve the Tragedy 167 5.2 Surface Water and Shallow Groundwater in Jakarta 170 5.2.1 Legal Framework and Utilization 170 Utilization of Surface Water 172 Utilization of Shallow Groundwater 174 5.2.2 Responsible Agencies at the Local Level 177 5.2.3 Water as Resources or a Sink? 178 Surface Water 179 Shallow Groundwater 182 5.3 Use of Deep Groundwater 184 5.3.1 As Regional Resources 184 5.3.2 Regulating the Withdrawal 185 5.3.3 Utilization of Deep Groundwater 187 5.3.4 Lowering Water Table and Land Subsidence 190 5.3.5 Contamination of Deep Groundwater: Seawater Intrusion 191 5.4 The Tragedy of the Enclosure 193 5.4.1 Surface Water:The Case of Marginalized Use 194 5.4.2 Shallow GroundwatenThe Tragedy of the Enclosure 195 5.4.3 Deep Groundwater:Free Riders 196 5.5 Conclusion 198 5.5.1 Is There Any Turning Back? 199 5.5.2 Rules, Regulations, and Collective Action 200 6 T H E QUEST FOR C L E A N WATER: T H E W A T E R REGIME OVERCOMING SCARCITY 202 6.1 A Theoretical View: Institutional Approach and a Water Regime 203 6.1.1 Institutional and Economic Dynamics: Motives and Constraints for Expansion of Water Supply Service 203 Motivation for the Expansion 204 Constraint to the Expansion 207 6.1.2 Inter-Institutional Relationship Defining the Provision of Water 208 6.1.3 Water Regime in Urban Clean Water Supply 212 6.2 Centralizing the Clean Water Supply: P A M Jaya and Government Involvement. 216 6.2.1 The Expansionist Commitment of P A M Jaya: Support and Conflict 216 v 6.2.2 Protecting the Supply Capacity or Expanding the Supply? 222 6.2.3 A Piped Water Supply Regime: Progressive or Caretaker? 224 6.3 Non-Piped Water Regime 227 6.3.1 Institutional and Economic Dynamics of Non-Piped Water 227 6.3.2 Responsibility for Surface Water and Shallow Groundwater 232 6.3.3 Responsibility in the Deep Groundwater Regime 234 6.4 Conclusion : 23 4 6.4.1 Water Regime: Prospects of Collaboration 234 6.4.2 Environmental Cost and Services for Low-Income Groups 237 7 PROMOTING R E F O R M IN T H E PROVISION OF C L E A N W A T E R 240 7.1 Theoretical View: Introducing the New Logic of Water Provision 241 7.1.1 Government's Failure in Urban Water Provision 241 7.1.2 Water as an Economic Good and the Introduction of Water Market in the City 244 7.1.3 The Government as Enabler and the Private Sector in the Creation of a Water Market..... 247 7.1.4 Creating an Urban Water Regime 251 7.2 Institutional Supports for Preparing the Market 252 7.2.1 Privatization and Relinquishing the Roles of Execution 252 7.2.2 Promoting a Water Market: Delineating Rights 254 7.2.3 Protecting Public Interests 256 7.3 The Introduction of a Market Mechanism in Jakarta 256 7.3.1 Privatization in Piped Water 257 7.3.2 Introduction of Market Practices in Non-Piped Water 259 7.3.3 Is Privatization Working? 261 7.4 Implications for a Unifying Water Regime and for Urban Development 263 7.4.1. Toward a Unifying Water Regime 263 7.4.2 Implications for Urban Spatial Development 265 8 CONCLUSION: FINDING A PATHWAY TO REFORM 267 8.1 Abundance and Thirst: Reorientaiton of Clean Water Provision in Urban Areas. 268 8.2 Revealing the Reality of Water Supply: Roles of Non-Piped Water Regimes 271 8.3 Breaking the Barrier: Local Solutions and the Structural Conditions 274 8.4 International Trends in the Expansion of Clean Water: Reform 277 8.5 Towards a Creation of Good Governance: Regime Theory in Sight. 279 REFERENCE 284 APPENDIX A: M E T H O D OF RESEARCH 296 APPENDIX B: QUALITY OF D A T A 303 APPENDIX C: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 308 vi LIST OF TABLES 1.1 Dimensions of Water in Urban Areas and Values Promoted 7 3.1 The Expansion and Mature Phases of a Water Economy 84 3.2 Linkages between Rules and Levels of Analysis 87 4.1 A Comparison between Productivist and Conservationist Logic in the Centralized Water Distribution System in Urban Areas 128 4.2 A Comparison of Utilization of Water Sources for Households, Commercial and Industrial Purposes 154 vii LIST O F FIGURES 1.1 Geographical Orientation of Jakarta, Indonesia 3 1.2 Positions of the Government in the Top-Down and Partnership Approaches in the Water Provision Sector 14 1.3 Framework of the Study 17 1.4 Perspectives of Analysis 24 1.5 Location of the Study Area 29 2.1 Population Growth in Jakarta, 1941-1961 58 2.2 Diagrams of The Expansion of Built-Up Area in Jakarta, 1619-1980 70 3.1 Growth Management as Planned in Jakarta 2005.. 84 3.2 Flow of Surface Water to Jakarta 98 3.3 Hydrological Cycle of Groundwater in Jakarta Groundwater Basin 100 3.4 Population Growth Rate in Jabotabek, 1961 -1990 104 3.5 Population Growth within the Five Administrative Areas of DKI Jakarta, 1971-1997 :.. .'. 106 3.6 Proportion of Water Produced and Consumed in Jakarta 1995, based on Sources Ill 4.1 An Ideal Concept of Water Flow in DKI Jakarta 135 4.2 Locations of the Treatment Plants in DKI Jakarta, 1995 141 4.4 Proportion of Use of Water Sold by PAM Jaya, 1995 149 4.5 A Model of Piped Water Services for Households in Jakarta 152 5.1 Water Consumption from Shallow Groundwater in Jakarta, Based on Volume, 1995 176 5.2 Water Consumption from Deep Groundwater in Jakarta, Based on Volume, 1995 188 5.3 Use of Deep Groundwater in Jakarta, Based on Volume, 1995 190 viii G L O S S A R Y O F T E R M S A N D A C R O N Y M S AKAINDO AKPAI Bapedal BBLH Botabek black water polluted water or contaminated water DGTL DKI Jakarta domestic use gray water Ha Jabotabek JICA kampung KL? KPPL Led L/s m m3/s MME MPW NGOs Ommelanden P^WJaya POJ PP Asosiasi Kontraktor Air Bersih Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Water Contractors) Asosiasi Kontraktor Penggalian Sumur Air Tanah Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Groundwater Contractors) Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan (National Environmental Impact Assessment Agency) Biro Bina Lingkungan Hidup (Environmental Bureau ) Bogor - Tangerang - Bekasi (urbanized/urbanizing areas around DKI Jakarta) waste water: discharged from bathtubs and toilets water that contains microorganisms, chemicals, industrial or other wastes, or sewage so that it unfits for intended uses. Direktorat Geologi Tata Lingkungan (Directorate of Environmental Geology) n Daerah Khusus Ibukota (Special Capital of) Jakarta water consumed in a household for the purposes of drinking, cooking, bathing, washing waste water discharged from cooking, cleaning, and laundry. Hectare(s) an acronym of Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi—often referred to as the Greater Metropolitan Jakarta Japan International Cooperation Agency Literally means "village"—are low-income, largely residential areas which grew up in an unplanned way and which are reached by footpaths off the roads (Abeyasekere 1985:5). During the colonial period it was an exclusively non-European living quarter. Kampung Improvement Program Kantor Pengkajian Perkotaan dan Lingkungan (Urban and Environmental Research Office of DKI Jakarta) Liters per capita per day Liters per second meter(s) Cubic meter per second; Ministry of Mining and Energy Ministry of Public Works Non-Governmental Organizations, voluntary or charitable Organizations (but always excluding private companies) areas surrounding Batavia (the colonial-era name of Jakarta) Perusahaan Air Minum Jaya (Water-Supply Enterprise owned by the government of DKI Jakarta) Perum Otorita Jatiluhur (Jatiluhur Authority Agency) Peraturan Pemerintah (Government Regulation) is a level lower in authority than UU. ix Provider Repelita Rp. UFW uu WALHI water retention areas water detention areas WTC Water-borne disease Water-washed disease YLKI Those who arrange for the provision of clean water Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five-Year Development Plan) Rupiah (Indonesian currency) Unaccounted-for-Water - is the amount of water lost during distribution either through faulty connecting pipes and pipe-leakage, or because of under-registration, and billing errors. Undang Undang (Act), the highest level of law after the National Constitution of 1945. Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia water-storage areas which temporarily withhold water, but sooner or later will return it to the run-off process water withdrawal from the earth surface is permanent which may be lost to evaporation or absorbed into groundwater aquifers West Tarum Canal disease, carried through a medium of water that cause infection, such as typhoid and cholera disease caused by a lack of washing which affects skin or eyes. It includes scabies and trachoma. Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia (Consumer Group of Indonesia) THE HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT IN INDONESIA The hierarchical structure of governments in Indonesia is divided into three tiers. The first tier is the central government which consists of ministries, boards and administrative authorities. The second tier consists of provincial governments, Special Regional governments (Daerah Istimewa) and a Special Capital government {Daerah Khusus Ibukota). The latter only exists to administer the capital city of Jakarta. The third tier is either district level, responsible to govern rural areas, or municipalities, responsible for urban areas. In the case of Jakarta, which is an urbanized area, only municipalities exist as the third tier. First Tier: Central Government Second Tier Provincial Governments (Propinsi) Special Regional Governments (Daerah Istimewa) Special Capital Government (Daerah Khusus Ibukota) Third Tier District Governments (Kabupateri) Municipalities (Kotamadya) x THE CURRENCY USED IN INDONESIA Rupiah is the currency used in Indonesia. The value of Rupiah (symbolized as "Rp.") for one US Dollar was presented in the table below. Since 1990, the exchange rate to the US Dollar was maintained in a range of Rp. 2.000,- for US$ 1,00 through a fixed exchange rate measure. It was after being hit by the Asian financial crisis that enforced a changing measure of exchange rate, the value suddenly depreciated to about Rp. 5.700,- in the end of 1997 (see the Graph below). Rupiah continued to be devalued significantly throughout the year of 1998. The Table below presents the average price of rupiah in exchange for one US dollar. The price presented for each year was recorded as an average during the last week of December. Year The Price of Rupiah for US$1,00 (Rp.) 1988 1,737 1989 1,805 1990 1,905 1991 1,997 1992 2,074 1993 2,118 1994 2,205 1995 2,305 1996 2,385 1997 5,700 1998 8,100 The Average Price of Rupiah In Exchange for one US Dollar, 1988-1998 9,000 8,000 7,000 ra 6,000 '5. £ 5,000 ~ 4,000 £ 3,000 -f 2,000 1,000 0 co CO co co CO CO o co co CM co co CO CO CO co CO IT) CO CO CD O) O) co CO CO co CO Year Source: Central Bureau of Statistics. 1998. p.38. MEASUREMENT: 1 cubic meter (m3) = 1,000 liters xi ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Maybe the world needs a water shock similar to the oil shock in 1973. I emerge from my dissertation research believing that such a neo Malthusian, message is needed, as the case of clean water provision continues to be unsolvable. Water scarcity and poor quality are as much a product of cultural values, social contexts, economic activities and power relationship, as they are of biophysical forces and conditions. Thus, a consistent tension emerges in human organizations to develop a democratic participation in water management decisions while attempting to sustain local biological and cultural life. I here acknowledge the people who helped as I explored these ideas. Many thanks goes to the professors at the School of Community and Regional Planning and elsewhere at UBC. Prod Laquian opened the opportunities to study here and became, and will continue to be, an important mentor. For Michael Leaf, I thank you for refreshing, interactive discussions that were essential bringing my recent work on planning to its final culmination. For Terry McGee and Geoff Hainsworth, thank you for being open minded and accommodative, and more importantly for promoting the Asians to be scholars of their own countries. I also thank the people at Centre for Human Settlements, especially Karen Zeller and Christine Evans, for ensuring the best environment to accommodate my learning process. I owe this process very much to the family and friends in Indonesia and Canada. The biggest debt is to my parents, who quietly and fully support the efforts to pursue my dream. Both passed away while I was studying in Vancouver. I thank all my sisters who are together keeping the family strong and solid. They form a nest to where I can still go home. I also thank Alec, whose endless and steady efforts, energy and time are so heartening and reassuring. Without him, the path to this dissertation would have been less enjoyable. To Don and Helen, I cannot thank enough because their full, incomparable supports which have become an endless source of motivation. Thank you also for close-knitted and sincere friendships offered by Indonesian and Canadian friends in Vancouver who I cannot mention one by one, and who have taken me into their hands and have become my adopted family. To the lecturers and alumni from the Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Indonesia, who encourage me to go through this stage and refresh me with their stimulating discussions especially on the internet, thank you so much. Needless to say, the above people made my time as a Ph.D. student and candidate a lot easier. xii 1. I N T R O D U C T I O N This dissertation focusses on the planning challenge of promoting change in the provision of clean water in one large city: Jakarta, Indonesia. In particular, it concentrates on the roles the government plays, or could play, in developing a water allocation system. 1.1 Background "Thirsty cities" is the catch phrase to describe the high demand and water shortages confronting many cities in developing countries. Despite a general improvement in human living standards at the global scale, approximately 40 to 60 percent of urban dwellers in the developing world have little or no access to potable water (Conger 1997:13). Attempts to develop technically-based solutions through building infrastructure and improving the technical skills of providers have failed to keep up with increasing demand. It is also estimated that some 50 percent of the water that enters the piped water distribution system in these cities does not reach its intended customers due to a mixture of pipe leakage, illegal usage, and the under-recording of consumption (Serageldin 1994:11; Rosegrant and Meinzein-Dick 1997:40)/ Nor do technical and financial support from multinational agencies, meant to increase the capacity of public management in water provision, capture the many local dimensions of the delivery of clean water and the dynamic interactions within the Third World urban water market. These attempts, instead, seem to sustain the growing condition of water-stress in these cities. 1 Water loss i n cities of the developing wor ld is so h igh that, i f the water were ut i l i zed and properly used, i t could benefit whole populations i n other areas. Unaccounted-for-Water (UFW) i n Lagos, N ige r ia is so h igh that i t could supply enough water to meet demand i n the second-largest city, Ibadan. System losses i n M e x i c o C i ty are estimated to be 30 percent, w h i c h may explain the generous standard of provision of more than 300 Liters per capita per day (Led), wh ich approaches standards i n the United States (Lee I994b:245). 1 In the past decade, reform in the provision of clean water for cities in the developing world has been recognized as a priority (World Bank 1995:3; Neutze 1997:9; Rosegrant and Meinzein-Dick 1997). The conventional approach that treats water as a "free good" has failed to overcome the disparity between water supply and demand. A new approach to water provision, as declared by the United Nations in 1990, treats water as an "economic good" and allows market mechanisms to be the principal means of allocating water. This new logic puts priority on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the existing system before expanding it. The means deployed are somewhat less technologically dependent. It implies the need to remove constraints and contradictions within the system. Government intervention in the provision of clean water has been described as excessive in today's market-driven environment, because the government is involved, not only in regulating and monitoring, but also in operating the distribution systems for clean water (Stokke 1997:438). A reworked program of government involvement would include more supervision of provision, but the state role in operating water-delivery systems would be saved for areas where the market mechanism cannot efficiently deliver a cheap and reliable supply. In this system, the government remains an indispensable source of social solutions to critical problems (Mulgan and Wilkinson 1992:346), but it reinvents its involvement in the provision of clean water (Stokke 1997:439) to create new types of relationships with other actors in the water economy. 2 Figure 1.1 Geographical Orientation of Jakarta, Indonesia DKI Jakarta is the capital city of Indonesia.2 It is also a coastal city with relatively high annual rainfall (see Figure 1.1). Thirteen rivers flow through this megacity3 providing fertile soil and flat river banks. The city housed close to ten million people in 1995. Yet, despite past economic progress and success at harnessing nature's gift, Jakarta suffers from chronic, inefficient utilization of water sources. One would expect piped water to be the usual source, but although it is consumed for the most diversified purposes from domestic to commercial and industrial, its provision is limited by the quantity available and insufficient service coverage. Surface and shallow groundwater dominate domestic usage and deep groundwater dominates industrial usage, 2DKI (Daerah Khusus Ibukota) Jakarta or Special Capita l Region of Jakarta is a first-tier administrative status given only to Jakarta w h i c h has a specific geographical boundary. 3Megacity, a term first used by the United Nations (1987), refers to a city wi th a population of ten m i l l i on or more (Richardson 1989:356). 3 but these sources are being extracted at a rate that threatens availability. Using a single-water source has become unreliable, as about 40 percent of the population use water from combined sources such as piped water and shallow groundwater (Kirmanto 1995:3). Unless there is a change in the current distribution system, piped water is not expected to catch up with demand. The water being sold in the market either in a form of bottled water or through informal vendors currently works only on a small scale. For all these reasons, clean water in Jakarta is becoming increasingly inaccessible. Furthermore, most sources are now contaminated. The Urban and Environmental Research Office of DKI Jakarta (KPPL) has reported positive counts of fecal contamination in groundwater, rivers, and piped water (Government of Indonesia 1994:88; Yenny 1998). Measures to dispose of solid waste are lacking, which is also blamed for worsening annual floods. Competition is evident between the use of water bodies as a source of clean water and as a sink for waste. With the limited supply of clean water, a water market becomes a viable, even essential option. It might force consumers to conserve, and it can reduce the degrading effects of inefficient non-market allocation. However, a market will not be sufficient to solve all the problems related to social and environmental impacts. In the social sphere, the existence of a water market tends to create inequitable practices in allocating clean water, as it burdens low-income or disadvantaged groups who often pay a higher absolute and percentage-of-income price to satisfy this basic human need. In reality, non-market systems in the developing countries also warrant the charge of often increasing inequity in their coverage choices. In the environmental sphere, a water market is not equipped with an effective mechanism to charge for negative externalities to prevent 4 producers or providers from using extraction practices that cause serious environmental damage, such as sea-water intrusion and land subsidence. Currently, changes taking place in the provision of clean water that might address chronic social inequity and environmental deterioration are incremental and fragmented. Government institutions remain slow to reconfigure their mandates and to allocate tasks among their institutions to execute much-needed reforms. This could be due to many factors. First, there is no single entity or coordinating institution responsible for clean-water provision. Responsibility is dispersed among several institutions, separated by the disparate and often conflicting interests of their superior ministries. In executing their tasks relating to the provision of clean water, they represent differing interests and pursue distinctive aims (Bryant and Bailey 1997:11). Second, governments have not articulated a clear water market policy that aims to provide effective and efficient service while being sensitive to equitable service delivery and environmental protection. They shy away from using the water market as a catalyst for larger, far-reaching programs that would include the dynamic participation of all actors within the system. Third, structural pressures on government constrain public-sector investment and the execution of new policies. Power to manage the use of water is still centrally located; the local level has little discretion. Central-level management results in many policy decisions that are insufficient or unresponsive to local needs and situations. For successful implementation of water reform, the provision of clean water in Jakarta must be understood in the context of the historical record of government intervention. Government 5 institutions must incorporate current realities into their structures and mandates, such as the power relations that surround the provision of clean water. This study will look at the main actors in the executive branch of governments, and their actions in the public sphere, as represented by the private sector and communities. The aim is to promote a system of "good governance"4 that is supportive of an efficient, effective, equitable, adaptive, and ecologically sound water market, and that encourages new partnerships between actors. Only with a more open, cooperative, enabling system of governance can a city improve urban productivity, secure environmental sustainability, and support healthy living standards. 1.2 Problem Statement The provision of clean water in the city of Jakarta, Indonesia continues to be unreliable, inaccessible, and competitive. This situation threatens living standards, urban productivity, and the ecological integrity of the city. Current attempts at solving these problems are driven by the logic of a welfare orientation and by quick-fix, piecemeal approaches and have failed to expand the provision of clean water in Jakarta.. For reform to be implemented, there is a need to identify and interpret the current mandates and practices of various government institutions as well as the actors involved. Structural barriers to change must be understood before they can be dismantled. 1.3 A Conceptual Framework The conceptual framework presented next elaborates on the dimensions of water provision in the urban environment, then expands into the context of "production relations." This includes a look 4 Governance is a more inclusive notion of government: the general manner i n w h i c h people are governed. The idea can be applied to both the formal structure of government and the myriad institutions and groups that compose c i v i l society i n any nation (McCarney, Ha l fan i et al . 1995:94). Lofchie (1989) (cited i n McCarney, Hal fan i et a l . 1995:96) argues that studying governance, as opposed to concepts encumbered w i th long-standing definitions such as "government" or "leadership," lets one v iew the locus or character of real decisional authority. 6 at the classes of institutions and actors dealing with the issues. A framework for the study as a whole is then presented. 1.3.1 Dimensions of Water Provision in the Urban Environment It has been argued that the existence of a city is bound up with the successful mastery and engineering of its water delivery (Swyngedouw 1996:79). As cities grow, their dependence on the natural environment becomes less visible and more dependent on technological advances and human organizations. In the twentieth-century urban environment, water is produced, becomes embodied, and is transformed, manufactured, and delivered in a way that makes it less necessary for cities to be adjacent to water sources. Las Vegas demonstrates that rapid growth and economic expansion are not prevented by the aridity of its southwest United States location (see Worster 1985). Today, water in cities is conceptualized in three ways for the purposes of a modern city: as a collective good, as collective consumption, and as a natural resource (see Table 1.1). Table 1.1 Dimensions of Water in Urban Areas and Values Promoted Dimension: Water As: Based on the Idea Of: Approach Used Value/s Promoted Collective good Water as a "right" Public welfare Equitable service Collective consumption Water as a flow Techno-managerial Efficiency, effectiveness Natural (renewable) resource Water as a material Economic, environmental Environmental Conservation 7 It was only at the end of nineteenth century that medical science and sanitary engineering conclusively attributed good health to the provision of clean water (Blake 1956:248; Goubert 1989:252; Hamlin 1990:106). As hygiene and public health became recognized public benefits, the dominant normative position became that clean water should no longer be the privilege of a minority—that water is a "good" that should be provided to all regardless of income, race, or location of residence. Access to clean water becomes the right of every city inhabitant (Mulgan and Wilkinson 1992:343). Equitable service becomes defined as insufficient water quantity provided at safe, minimum standards to each resident of the city regardless of income, race or location of residence in order to minimize the health risk of each resident and ensure the protection of public health. Equitable service also means that water should be provided through several alternative options so that its provision will not create or perpetuate disparity in accessing water between groups of residents based on income, race or location of residence. To ensure equitable access, the government is held responsible for providing water collectively, hence the term "collective good." However, water's availability can decrease if there is overuse. In other words, use can impact on availability and overuse can result in exhaustion. Thus, this "collective good" has subtractibility as one of its characteristics. Experience has shown that collective provision by the government often mitigates the water market's tendency to provide service only where it can produce profits. It thus serves low-income residences and such needs as fire hydrants, street cleaning and parks (Blake 1956). But experience also shows that where governments are the only provider, they fail to achieve technological and financial efficiency and effectiveness, which inhibits equitable provision. Technical innovation and changed economic circumstances have made it possible for the private sector to involve itself in 8 the effective supplying of clean water. A government with a mandate to supply clean water can allow a group of households, or a private sector firm to extract, treat, and distribute it, while retaining the responsibility of ensuring that any new system serve the public evenhandedly. The consideration of water in terms of "collective consumption" grew out of the fact that water provision, together with health, education, and highways, is an area of vastly increased government involvement. In order to improve urban standards of living, the government aims to guarantee provision of clean water at a fixed level, of quantity and quality (Lemer 1992). This implies that to expand consumption, water in urban areas must be seen as a flow, and hence, should be treated and distributed, aided by construction of a physical infrastructure and a management system. Water becomes part of the field of provisions defined as "the network of services in a society which are essential for its cohesion and for the efficient functioning of the economy" (cited inNeutze 1997:17). kifrastructure to deliver clean water is planned and designed on the basis of techno-managerial assessments, which then determine the level of investment needed for construction, maintenance, and repair. In the 1990s, in a majority of countries new infrastructure is needed to support increases in demand; at the same time as decaying infrastructure requires vital investment. The needed scale of public investment is often beyond the public purse (Serageldin 1994:11; Rosegrant and Meinzein-Dick 1997:42). Thus, there is a strong attempts to improve efficiency and effectiveness of present infrastructure before investment is put into new infrastructure. Efficiency, in this case, can be defined as the ability of the management to utilize the infrastructure to its intended capacity in order to distribute water continuously at a standardized quality, and to 9 eliminate waste and non-intended consumption. Effectiveness is denned as the ability of the management to direct and deliver water at the intended rate and with the desired affect. Viewing water as a natural resource reflects concerns regarding the available quantity and quality of clean water. In terms of quantity, water has historically been viewed as a renewable resource. However, in Jakarta, as elsewhere, the level of groundwater consumption is higher than that of its natural replenishment. Deterioration in water quality results from the use of water bodies as "sinks"—that is, as receptacles for waste. Third World cities generally do not have an adequate system for processing sewage, effluent, and waste water from households and industries. Once contaminated, water bodies, especially rivers and shallow wells, cease to be sources of clean water. Knowing how water is consumed and how water bodies are used is central to understanding water flow in a city. Creating a "healthy city" entails planning this flow as a cycle, in which water is discharged back to water bodies in as clean a condition as possible. Thus, environmental conservation can be defined as extraction that does not exceed recharge capacity as well as efforts to protect sources of water so that they are of sufficient quality to be used as planned. "Water is only a renewable resource if people respect the ecological processes that maintain the stability of the water cycle" (Bandyopadhyay cited in Postel 1992:36). The three dimensions of water—as collective good, as collective consumption, and as natural resource—are complementary. It is unworkable to have one without the others. The values promoted through these dimensions become a basis in guiding the policies and implementation of the clean water provision in urban areas. 10 Social equity is the value promoted when water is treated as a collective good. Increasingly, equitable service is defined by equal opportunity of access (Neutze 1997:31), thus focussing on options for and constraints to obtain clean water. Equitable service has come to be measured by a certain proportion of households' incomes paid for satisfying minimum clean water needs, rather than by a city-wide low price charged for all piped water. From the collective consumption perspective, values of efficiency and effectiveness are upheld, but they are increasingly measured in economic rather than engineering terms (Saliba and Bush 1987:49). Exclusively focussing on engineering efficiency leads to particular patterns that represent unproductive expenditures. Economic efficiency, instead, addresses the value of water in one use in comparison with the value of water in an alternative use. The measure of efficiency is also based on pragmatic concerns, such as whether water reaches intended consumers and whether leakage and unproductive use are minimized. Effectiveness is measured by whether the management system encourages the consumers to utilize water in socially responsible, "productive," and environmentally acceptable ways. The concept of water as a natural resource promotes the value of conservation. As is true of most resources, supply is not unlimited and it can absorb only a small degree of waste without jeopardizing quality. Improving access to clean water is essentially connected to understanding limits and improving sanitation, sewerage, and solid waste facilities. The need to promote the three dimensions and corresponding core values suggests that a water mechanism following "pure" market principles alone will not work (Saliba and Bush 1987:27). 11 Such a water market would exclude those who cannot pay the going price. Furthermore, the water market has not been able to provide accurate information on water quality, availability, and cost of supply so that providers can determine the risk to be carried, or to prevent negative impacts on third parties. Since the provision of water in a city has the aspect of a "natural monopoly," the provider can make a profit at the expense of consumers without improving efficiency and effectiveness. To deal with these problems of the water market, the regulatory involvement of government is necessary (Saliba and Bush 1987:255; Neutze 1997:197). 1.3.2 Provision of Clean Water: As a Part of Production Relations The provision of clean water through the water market does not mean water should only be treated as a commodity by producers and as a scarce resource by consumers; to an extent it remains a collectively provided good. Dowding et al. (1995:274) suggest using the "production relations model" for clean water, which divides human activities into: 1) production, 2) provision, 3) consumption, and 4) disposal. To paraphrase his presentation: 1. Clean water production is often called "appropriation," as it involves withdrawing water from sources in the ecosystem such as rivers, wells, aquifers, or lakes, and from man-made sources such as reservoirs or artificial wells; 2. The provision of water to the intended consumers entails arranging for treatment, distribution, and repair of infrastructure; 12 3. As regards consumption—the utilization of water by consumers—what is important are the patterns of consumption according to income group, location of residence, etc. (these indicators let one judge whether production leads to conservation or to deterioration); and 4. Disposal of solid or liquid waste often involves the use of water as a medium—for example, sanitation facilities at the household level and treatment facilities at the city level. Each of these four activities has its own variations in design, technical demands, financial concerns, and rules and regulations governing execution. Although this study will specifically deal with item 2, the provision of clean water, this is not to say that the other three activities are not important, nor will they be neglected. In fact, the provision of clean water will be seen through the eyes of the providers, who are concerned with securing water to be sold to the consumers and, usually, with the availability of clean water to support the city in the long term. The government becomes the essential actor in securing this long-term availability. 1.3.3 Creation of an Urban Water Regime, Government Influences, and Power Relations Reform in the provision of clean water calls for fundamental changes. No longer can the government plan universal clean-water provision in a top-down fashion on behalf of the population. There is a call for new forms of relationships that allow for more balanced interaction between the government and the public (see Figure 1.2). The public is recognized as a diverse group that includes formal and non-formal actors, the private sector, community groups, 13 households, and individuals. Such partnerships are aimed at a single goal, in this case, the provision of clean water through a new "water regime." The Government Tie Public The Government Collaboration / Coalition \ f Individuals Cornmunities NGOs Private Sector Top-Down Approach New Partnership Approach Figure 1.2 Positions of the Government in the Top-Down and Partnership Approaches in the Water Sector Regime theory suggests that a water regime forms and operates without a hierarchy, and assumes that the participants do not have comprehensive control over water resources (Stoker and Mossberger 1994:196). This form of organization is in accordance with worldwide changes in the style of governing that consist of: 1) the shifting of responsibility from the central government to local levels, especially for matters that require adaptation to local needs such as urban issues, housing, water infrastructure, and taxes; 2) replacement of the roles of governments as operators by roles as enablers or catalysts; and 3) public-private partnership in which governments cooperate with others to achieve a range of policy goals. Participation among actors in the urban water regime becomes more balanced and, hence, actors develop a response toward change that is more sensitive to local variations. Stone (1987:5) recognizes that structural constraints are embedded in the urban water regime. Thus it is essential to understand the current and desired future of the water regime so that 14 policies can be understood and preferences of actors within the regime be recognized. Dowding et al. (1995:276) point out that it is not the regime that has the power, but the actors bargaining to achieve their aims. The urban water regime is stressing a measure of the "capacity to self-organize and act"; what is needed is an understanding of power, relations (Bryant and Bailey 1997:10). Power, denned as "the control of one party over the environment of another party" (Adam cited in Bunker 1985:14), is owned when actors control access to particular resources. Rydin (1998:179), adopting a rational choice method, identifies five resources used by actors to gain power: 1) the use of conditional and unconditional incentives to get someone to act in the desired way; 2) the legitimacy of actors; 3) the resources of authority that they hold; 4) the information held by an actor; and 5) the reputation of the actor, whereby the expectation of actors involves the ability to act and influence others' decision-making. With power based on the above resources, actors build "nodes of control," creating particular activities in order to maintain "social order" but possibly also maintain inequitable services or environmentally degrading activities. On the other hand, "nodes of resistance" are created, especially at the level of the local community and social organizations. The latter become tools for the poor to counteract powerful actors. Reform in the water sector toward equitable service and ecologically protective goals, in essence, entails transformation of power relations from the current status quo to a progressive form of governance. 15 1.3.4 The Framework of the Study This dissertation explores the patterns of service in the provision of clean water in Jakarta according to the diagram in Figure 1.3. Three major sources of water are examined: piped water from the municipal water system, surface water and shallow groundwater, and deep groundwater. Two issues are explored. The first is the efficiency and effectiveness of services, which is measured by looking at the time lag between the production, or extraction, of clean water and its consumption. This method of measurement seems ideal: since water cannot be stored for long, looking at the wait between extraction and consumption is crucial to detennining whether the product is being wasted. But in reality such measures are not easy to obtain, particularly in a quantitative sense. Therefore a proxy approach is used here to represent this condition. This issue is also measured by the ability of water providers to transfer water: basically, how much will reach consumers? Legal and institutional aspects often determine whether the process of water transfer will take place. The second issue explored here is the prospect of servicing the public in an equitable sense, and in an environmentally sound manner. In the course of this study the legal and actual right to water is examined. Water quantity and the population served by each source are also examined. Most important, clean water provision issues are related to two others. First, the quality of water and factors that influence it are considered. Second, third-party effects are examined. This can be caused either by the activity of water provision or by disposal of waste to the water bodies that change the living conditions of those not directly involved in providing and using the sources. 16 Sources of Wat r t - i n J a k a r t a Mun ic ipa l Water System Surface Water & Shallow Groundwater Deep Groundwater > « Pat te rn of Service Eff iciency & Effectiveness Equitable Services & Environmental Conservation Gap Between Production & Consumption Transfer of Water (Legal & Actual) Rights to Water Water Quantity & Population Coverage Water Quality T h i r d -Party Effects > > * s 9 P I P E D W A T E R R E G I M E S U R F A C E & S H A L L O W G R O U N D W A T E R R E G I M E D E E P G R O U N D W A T E R R E G I M E Central Government Min is t ry of Put l ie Works Minist ryo f Public Works Ministry of Mining & Energy V - < Principal Actor; Local Ckivernment P A M Java Pubhc Works Section i Mining Section Rules and Regulations it Business Associat ion NCOs Consumers N G O s Consumers Consu-mers NGOs Business Assoc ia -tion 1 i— i Oi perational Problems Rent-Seeking Collaboration Confl ict of Use Th i rd Party Effect Non-Renewabi l i ty Third-Party Effects 3 i Prospect of Reforms Market Mechanism Government Intervention I Conclusion Figure 1.3 Framework of the Study 17 The patterns of the services that are explored are related not only to the capacity of providers to supply clean water, but also to their interaction with consumers and other water supply actors. It will be seen that, unfortunately, the rules and regulations developed for each source conform to the hydrological or technical nature of those water sources only. Little is being done in terms of an integrative effort to provide clean water simultaneously, so actors in the field tend to behave like separate "communities." For example, there are business associations and interest groups, and each water source type has its own consumers who dominate use. Thus, this means there are three water regimes: piped water supplied by the municipal water system, surface water and shallow groundwater, and deep groundwater. The interactions between actors within each regime are concentrated on efforts to maintain or expand the provision of clean water. In each regime two major issues hinder or expand these efforts. In the case of the piped water regime, rent-seeking and collaboration between actors are major issues. In surface water and shallow groundwater, conflict of use between water as resource and water as sinks and third-party effects dominate. In the deep groundwater regime, the issues of non-renewability and third-party effects strongly influence provision. Thus, the prospect of expansion for each source is different. The market mechanism, in fact, can only be introduced in the municipal system, principally because of the need for well-defined property rights. For the other two sources, issues of third-party effects greatly limit any implementation of the market mechanism. 18 After examining the existence, nature, and pattern of interaction in Jakarta's three water regimes, this investigation draws on several conclusions related to practice and the theories explained in each chapter. 1.4 Research Objectives and Research Question This study examines the prospect of improving the provision of clean water in Jakarta by considering the various roles that the government can and does play. It will focus on institutional structural arrangements that can support reform. The government needs to rearrange and restructure the mandates and the domains of internal authority to accommodate non-governmental components which can actively participate in the provision of clean water. The principal research objective is thus to produce an analysis that will help in the process of restructuring. The research question is: How is the provision of clean water in Jakarta shaped by government agencies and its interaction with various non-governmental actors? This question lead to a normative inquiry on how the government cannot only encourage the provision of clean water in Jakarta with regard to efficiency and effectiveness, but also ensure that this is done in an equitable and environmentally beneficial manner. Sub-questions are: 1. What are the characteristics of the water economy in Jakarta? 19 2. What are the current implications of government intervention that lead to inequitable service and environmentally destructive withdrawal and distribution of water in Jakarta? 3. What are the constraints and contradictions within the policies and practices of the government that hamper the refinement of Jakarta's water market, and perpetuate inequitable service and environmental degradation? 4. What is the relationship among water regimes and how does this situation promote or hinder the success of water market in the provision of clean water? 1.5 Impor tance of the Study This study is a contribution to the field known as political ecology. Studies in that field document the alteration of land quality, such as deforestation or soil erosion, as a means of understanding the relationship between "nature" and human organization. Here, political ecology directs my examination of water provision as it functions relative to unequal power relations within the context of water scarcity. This thorough examination of water service in Jakarta is one of only few studies that look at water issues through the lens of political ecology (Bryant 1997:193). This study is also important because of its focus on a city in the developing world. Provision of clean water in urban areas in the First World has long been explored from various points of view, such as the history of health and hygiene (Goubert 1989), political struggles (Blake 1956), and the influence of natural science on the policies of clean water (Hamlin 1990). Inquiry into the struggle 20 to access clean water in the context of the Third World is less diverse. To date, most research and policy debate has been based on a techno-managerial view such as geological studies (Yong, Turcott et al. 1995), river basin studies (Bukit 1995), infrastructure-related work (Neutze 1997), financial capability debate and privatization (Anton 1993 and many United Nations and World Bank studies); studies of environmental issues (Crane, Daniere et al. 1997), and rational choice investigations (Lovei and Whittington 1993; Easter and Nickum 1994). Bennett (1995), Swyngedouw (1995; 1997) and Riley et al (1998) are among the few who look at Latin American development through a political ecology perspective. In the context of Asia, such studies are almost non-existent. A third reason this study is important is that it questions the assumption that bureaucracy has independent influence in its efforts to allocate scarce resources. Although bureaucrats can be gatekeepers who, through the rules and procedures of allocation, maintain a level playing field that is supportive and competitive, their decisions are influenced by their superiors, their own interests, and, through the workings of power, other policies that use water as an tool for social control. A fourth reason—-and this is a function of the previous one—is that "government" is no longer seen as a single entity with a single interest. Governments create many institutions that serve different goals and interests. The policies laid down by one institution may directly or indirectly contradict those of other institutions. First World literature recognizes this aspect of government, but this it is less common in the study of Third World regimes. 21 Finally, this study shifts away from the statist perspective, which focusses on improving administration and management in a purely bureaucratic sense. The government is no longer asked to follow a strict civil service code of affective neutrality and non-political practice by employing the notion of instrumental rationality a la Weber. Neither is the government seen as "withering away" (Pierson 1984:566). Instead, this study concludes by proposing a system of governance in which the state is not seen as the only player in policy formulation and some aspects of implementation and controlling impacts. It is, however, put into a position in which the actions, strategies, tactics, and policies of its various branches are under public scrutiny and open to improvement. 1.6 Method of Research One's approach to planning cannot be separated from the goal of the dissertation, which is to present a conclusion that is future-oriented. Accordingly, this section describes the research choices made. 1.6.1 View of Planning and Approach to Research Instead of offering generalizations as to why a phenomenon exists, this study attempts to understand a particular Third World city in terms of historically bound experiences, judgments, particularities, and practices rooted in the local context and practical ethics. Peattie (1995:391-2) suggests that Third World urban research should attempt a close analysis of the situation in order to contribute to action or illuminate actual policies. The result of this type of research is a focus 22 on the identification of localized patterns that can guide action in this case, and serve as a model for analysis and for analysis-guided policies in other cases. In a climate where unpredictability and uncertainty dominate the provision of clean water, efforts to respond to the most pressing issues of scarcity, to take action, and to plan for the future of clean water cannot be made solely on the basis of generalized knowledge adopted from other contexts. Analyzing the realities of clean-water provision requires "phronesis" (Flyvbjerg 1990:13-14). According to the "intellectual virtues" described by Aristotle, there are three different kinds of knowledge: 1) episteme, knowledge that can be demonstrated as eternal and universal, and can be proven to be true such as pure science; 2) techne, knowledge of the arts or the craft of bringing something into being; and 3) phronesis, or knowledge of what to do in particular circumstances. The first two helped found "modern" knowledge on the basis of instrumental rationality. The third is drawn from value rationality and is concerned with the conduct of particular actions. It focusses more on constraints and practical possibility, and shapes action as an exploratory process within modern knowledge (Flyvbjerg 1990; Hillier 1995). What is important today in planning for the future is not the ability to make plans for twenty years from now; as Friedmann (cited in Lauber 1993:486) puts it, planning "should emphasize processes operating in actual or real time." This is in accordance with Flyvbjerg (1990) who emphasizes the need to understand progressive phronesis, which assesses the context on the basis of dependent knowledge related to a particular value to be protected. Research on planning for clean water in Third World cities looks for a pragmatic mix of solutions from technical, managerial, and financial 23 points of view, and speculates on what steps need to be promoted and initiated in order for such solutions to be implemented. Analysis is guided by literature from a field of study cafieE) political ecology; in particular third world political ecology. This field is emerging in response to the inability of mainstream theories and concepts to explain the interrelation between conflicts in natural resource use and socio-political forces. Third world political ecology encourages a complex understanding of how local decision making and local politics mediate environmental conflicts and access to resources. In doing so, it focusses research attention on the roles of actors and the state and views them in relation to larger political and economic forces (Bryant and Bailey 1997).5 The field is relatively new and does not yet constitute a tightly formatted body of theory. Thus, a diversity of theoretical literature is drawn on here in an attempt to situate the findings of localized empirical research in a theoretical and comparative perspective. This approach is intended to facilitate the applicability of the research findings beyond the locality from which they are derived. Pluralism / Regime Theory Rational Choice State Intervention Management/Financial Physical/Hydrological/Ecological Figure 1.4 Perspectives of Analysis 5 Scholars i n the f ie ld of pol i t ical ecology commit to move away f rom structuralism and towards a fu l l appreciation of the roles of actors and agencies as the very essence of understanding environmental conflicts (Watts and Peet 1996:260-1). 24 availability, but should include the socio-political relations that help create the limited availability in the first place (Watts and Peet 1996:261). In other words, the theories and literature used to analyze the case study collectively lead to the treating of water issues both as tangible and as the creation of interacting relations. Access to water is used as a means to direct and possibly dominate people and the ecosystem. First, the perspective of physical, hydrological, and ecological aspects, including technical-engineering issues, is adopted in order to understand the physical evidence of water availability, current levels of extraction, and their implications for the ecosystem. There are no specific theories being used, but some models are adopted and technical explanations are employed to explain the current state of water availability, water withdrawal, and the geological and ecosystem results of extraction. From this point of view, the prospect of expanding the physical use of water is examined. This perspective is presented in chapters three, four and five. Second, the management/financial perspective is used to explain the structural conditions that set the pattern of hmited clean water availability. This perspective maps actor hierarchies based on policies, laws, regulation and interviews with administrators within agencies of central and local government. This perspective provides an explanation of government commitments to the expansion of service or regulation of withdrawal of clean water in Jakarta, and the supports that have been and are given to these commitments. This perspective is elaborated in chapters three and four. 25 Third, the perspective of state intervention is adopted to explain the current pattern of water agency management, especially for piped water. The following theories and concepts are looked at to explain the assumptions and forces behind current patterns of clean water provision: modernization theory, neoclassical economic theory of underdevelopment, Keynesian welfare orientation approach, and productivist logic. From this perspective, the constraints that cause inefficient and ineffective services, inequitable services, and environmental degradation are explored. This perspective is presented in chapters three and four. Fourth, the perspective of rational choice is used to understand particularly the rights and duties of the water rights owners, the role of the government as protector and gatekeeper, and the possibility of involving more actors. Theory of common goods, governing the commons, tragedy of the enclosure, and literature on normative regulations applied to groundwater extraction are reviewed in order to explain current use. This perspective grounds the presentation in chapter five. Fifth, the perspective of pluralism, particularly from regime theory, is used to explain institutional, economic and political motives embedded in government institutions in their attempts to expand clean water provision. The theory also helps explain coalitions and cooperation between actors in their efforts to expand provision of, regulate, or replenish clean water. The debate between government intervention and the devolution of powers to the private sector is the way chosen to frame prospects of future expansion. Privatization is specifically explained using this perspective as part of reform in clean water provision, and to link problems of local water provision with the global governance forces. This perspective is very much a part of chapters six and seven. 26 1.6.2 The Case Study As has been mentioned, this study will rely on the intensive use of a single case, that of modern Jakarta. In accordance with the study of progressive phronesis, the idea is to create a dense-data case-study as the basis for exploring and carefully recommending action or praxis. This method is important for two reasons (Peattie 1995:394). First, by concentrating on a single case study, a researcher can focus on a specific terrain of struggle. Second, a focus on "actual practices" is important for intervention, since reform is implemented in an social world structured by institutions. Moving beyond this approach, however, my analysis concludes by consolidating the findings into a conceptual framework, which, it is hoped, can inform the use of the framework for the analysis for other cities in the Third World. While the findings from local empirical research cannot be easily extrapolated to other cities, the theories and concepts can be further modified and used to analyze water provision elsewhere. Many Third World cities have a dual water allocation system: regulated and non-regulated. The use of the theories and concepts in this study represent the assumptions and understandings that help explain the dual water allocation system and how to go about analyzing the actors and institutions that interact to create the dual system. Second, the "terrain of struggle" regarding limited water availability and its outcomes represented in Jakarta has compatibility to other cities in Indonesia and can likely be used to inform policy. The geographical area of this research is not limited to the administrative boundary of Jakarta. The 652 km2 of DKI Jakarta is urban-oriented, capital-intensive, and not very resource-based. 27 Yet, the urban activities of DKI Jakarta are tightly connected to resource extraction, industry, housing, and other labour-intensive activities in the fringe areas. For this reason, the case study is of greater Metropolitan Jakarta. In relation to the production relations model, the geographical area studied further expands to include geography covered by related river basins, and upstream river areas. This is represented in (see Figure 1.5): 1. Areas that are parts of watersheds and river basins of the Citarum and of Cisadane rivers that support the supply of clean water to Jakarta. These areas are under the jurisdiction of districts of Cianjur, Bogor, Tangerang, Bandung, and Purwakarta in the province of West Java; 2. Areas that are hydrologically connected and that support the availability of groundwater in Jakarta. These areas are primarily located in the upstream areas of Jakarta rivers which are under the jurisdiction of the districts of Cianjur, Bogor, and Tangerang; 3. Areas surrounding the administrative boundary of DKI Jakarta which have strong economic, transportation, and social ties to Jakarta. These areas are formally called Botabek, a region named after the three districts (Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi) and two municipalities that comprise it. 28 29 1.6.3 Method of Research This research was based on the approach of phenomenology which helps interpret and frames the roles and views of actors in a social world structured by institutions (Matbison 1993:57). Two major protocols or forms for recording information were used to obtain the data/information. The first protocol is secondary materials collected mainly from written documents either published or unpublished, academic or policy-oriented, and scientific or popular.6 The second protocol is primary data inquiry done mainly through interviews and personal observation. The collection of written materials was continuous since early 1996 using letters, faxes, libraries, and electronic data bases. An intensive survey, collecting written materials as well as conducting interviews, was done in the summers of 1996 and of 1997. An initial framework using categories of data/information to be collected was developed in order to guide the process. As this research is in regard to the roles of the government, collecting data started with government agencies, including those at the central level as well as those at provincial and local levels. Written materials are comprised of studies, reports and statistical records. Actual policies, laws and regulations were also collected. Data/information from non-governmental institutions such as universities and research agencies, and from the media such as newspapers and popular magazines, were also collected. The data/information from the media complemented other written material. 6 The other secondary materials collected were maps, photos, and some drawings. 30 Data/information from the written material were coded according to the framework, (see Appendix A for details on coding). The second protocol relates to the interview research, which was conducted in order to understand the viewpoint of actors and, by inference, the institutions they, work or worked for; to identify constraints in the water sector; and to discuss views and visions regarding the clean water provision. The interviews also aimed at confirming the condition of data/information presented in the written material.7 Interviews were done face to face using semi-structured questionnaires. In all, 43 interviews were conducted with persons representing the government institutions as well as the non-governmental actors (see Appendix C for the List of Interviewees). The results were rewritten from notes and/or tape recordings into the computer in order to be coded according to the framework. Data collected from both protocols were interpreted and compared, particularly in order to increase reliability and validity. Some checks, rechecks, and follow-ups were done. First, data/information on the same issue were compared between documents particularly to establish how they were generated and whether or not the documents presented adequate explanations. Second, checks were done by going back to the institutions or the contact persons from which the information was gathered. Third, checks were done through data trianggulation, in which data from the written materials were compared with that from the interviews and that from the media. This cross-referencing was aimed at finding convergence on the issues being compared. When this did not occur, data were treated as representing divergent or conflicting views. This is important 31 as phenomenology allows for the understanding that people see things very differently based on such things as their life experiences or position in the bureaucracy (see Appendix B for a detailed explanation of the Quality of Data used in this dissertation). This collection and checking process generated some re-categorization of data/information into the three regime split: piped water, surface water and shallow groundwater, and deep groundwater. The data/information coding framework was revised in order to support an in depth treatment of issues in each of these regimes. Case study and policy research were then compared with the theories, and conceptual and literature reviews already started on and around the topic. Rumination on the use of theories, concepts, and literature reviews to support the analysis of data/information and researcher judgment was used to develop the theory-informed case framework of the study as presented in Figure 1.2 and the outline of the dissertation, (a detailed explanation of the Method of Research is given in Appendix A). 1.7 Organization of the Text The dissertation consists of eight chapters. This chapter, Chapter 1, outlines the boundaries of the research following substantive, procedural, and geographical orientations. The exploration of the provision of clean water is aimed at understanding planning for a public service in the Third 7 Such approach is often called "members' checking" i n wh ich the interviewees are asked to help verify the data/information. 32 World context, and the roles of the government in providing an environment conducive to reforming water provision. Chapter 2 presents the historical experiences in "conquering" water in Jakarta, starting from the early colonial period in the seventeenth century through the post-colonial period and finishing in the 1980s. It describes the origins of the government's involvement in clean-water provision, and demonstrates that urban water provision cannot be separated from policies of racial segregation. Attention is then turned to the early post-colonial period under the first president, Soekarno. His legacy is the neglect of instrumental rationality and techno-managerial change, yet it rests on a compelling ideological and political stance. The chapter ends with observations on the emergence of the current situation, in which the provision of clean water has become centralized, formally dependent on the government, and often neglectful of popular trends. Chapters 3 to 7 each begin with a conceptual or theoretical overview, which is then used as the basis of the analyzing the case study in that chapter. Chapter 3 presents an overview of the water economy in Jakarta. It traces the production process from the watersheds to piped water and from the conservation areas to groundwater, and also outlines the institutional arrangement created to protect such production linkages. The many mechanisms and avenues of water access used by urban dwellers, and their effect on levels of hygiene, environmental deterioration, and development potential are detailed. This chapter concludes that the scarcity of clean water, in terms of quantity and quality, means that the water economy in the city has reached a level of considerable stress. 33 Chapter 4 focusses on the provision of clean water executed by the formal, regulated, government-run entity. It explores the mechanisms of water provision, the institutions that influence decision-making, and patterns of service and their impacts on urban development. Furthermore, it explores efforts to reform the water sector through improving service to the poor and the disadvantaged, reducing activities that are environmentally degrading, and improving sanitation efforts. Chapter 5 focusses on the alternative, non-formal mechanisms of providing water that exist in the city. It evaluates the positive contributions of these mechanisms. It also explores their negative effects. Governmental efforts to reduce these effects are then described. The chapter concludes that the government has to better regulate these mechanisms. Chapter 6 examines the complex web that is the three-part water regime in contemporary Jakarta, blending formal and non-formal market mechanisms. Policies at the local and at the national level are mapped, since, as will be shown, several institutions within the government are responsible for dealing with protecting, testing and supplying clean water. Contradictions in policy are highlighted. Also examined are the more varied and strategic responses of local governments toward water scarcity in the city. Chapter 7 explores the application of rational choice theory in reform of Jakarta's system, and especially in strengthening the role of the government within the context of a move away from direct provision. Programs related to reform, such as privatization, the delineation of property 34 rights, and the creation of a coordinating agency, are the focus. The chapter ends with a discussion of the implications for planning public services and how specific public services must be treated. Chapter 8 presents conclusions on efforts to expand the provision of clean water in Jakarta. First, it presents the structural barriers that cause a strained expansion of the piped water regime and the important role, but uncertain future, of non-piped water sources. Then it presents the prospect of initiatives to break the structural barriers of the dual water supply system. Finally, it presents the contribution of regime theory in analyzing interaction in order to contribute towards understanding the governance. 35 2. P R O V I D I N G W A T E R IN O L D J A K A R T A : A N H I S T O R I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E Water has been critical to the making of human history. It has shaped institutions, destroyed cities, set limits to expansion, brought feast and famine, carried goods to market, washed away sickness, divided nations, inspired the worship and beseeching of gods, given philosophers a metaphor for existence, and disposed of waste. To write history without discussing water is to leave out a large part of the story. Human experience has not been so dry as that (Worster 1985:19). As history proves, the transformation of cities and their survival has been reflected, at least in part, in their attempts to secure access to water. Water is extracted, purified, utilized, disposed of, and circulated in cities by human institutions. The processes of "nurturing" water perpetuates socioeconomic changes and social power relations. The historical accounts of water supply in cities often refer to the fact that movements of population are closely related to where water could be found. This chapter gives an account of the struggles of urban settlers in the geographic location of Jakarta, Indonesia. Persevering or defending the political interests of colonial imperialism and later on capitalism, the battle for "nurturing and securing" water is guided by the desire to create economic wealth, the politics of empowering and disempowering groups of people, and ideologies of emancipation between groups of residents. This chapter, organized chronologically, shows that each period emphasized specific policies influencing how settlers lived and benefited from water supply, and how the spatial arrangement of the city channeled the needs of urban residents seeking a better environment. The chapter concludes by presenting the paradox of modern efforts to secure water amid growing forces aligned to pollute that water. 36 2.1 Subjugating Water: Securing Trade in the "Graveyard" Shortly before the settlement of Europeans, the mouth of the Ciliwung River became a permanent settlement with the fortress of Jacatra. Policies imposed by Jan Pieterszoon Coen, the Governor General of Dutch East Indies Trading Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie or VOC), was aimed at monopolizing the trade of spice. He targeted, took over, and made the fortress the centre of the Dutch trading empire (Vlekke 1965:157). In 1619, he bumed and rebuilt it with stone walls, and named it Batavia. Using the same principle of draining the soil as had been applied in green polders in the Low Countries of Europe, the Dutch proceeded to build a system of canals to penetrate and encircle the town. The town's main river was straightened to reduce the potential for flooding, and was connected to the canal system. The Dutch recreated a network of neat, geometrical patterns of streets and canals, and tightly packed two-storey houses, mimicking the built form that Amsterdam's bourgeoisie was accustomed to (Fischer 1959:6; Blusse 1986:23; Abeyasekere 1987:14-15). In 1718 one British sailor described the beauty of Jakarta in the following words: Large canals run through several streets of Batavia whereby it is rendered both neat and cool. On each side of this canal [sic] is planted a row of fine trees that are always green, which, with the beauty and regularity of the buildings, make the streets look very agreeable so that I think this city (for the bigness) one of the neatest and most beautiful in the whole world (cited in Vlekke 1965:18). The canals were the focus of economic and social life. They were used to transport goods from inland regions and from the sea. Homes were built along them with access to the public bathtubs that lined the canals (Jayapal 1993:25). For the residents, the Ciliwung provided a strong and endless source of drinking water. An attempt by native rulers to blockade the flow of drinking water by building a dam upstream failed (Vlekke 1965:142). 37 With the many roles assigned to the newly engineered river and canals, the social and physical development of the city was expected to detach itself from nature's limitations. The Dutch population remained relatively small, and the building of Batavia attracted, among others, many Chinese from surrounding port towns and China. Recognizing their industriousness and unwarlike nature, and their ability as traders, the VOC allowed them to monopolize local, small-scale trading (Jayapal 1993:37). The Dutch, meanwhile, monopolized the inter-island and large-scale trade, and collected taxes and fees from trade conducted by the Chinese. As the threat posed by Bantanese vagabonds was reduced, after 1639, the Chinese quickly established themselves as farmers in Ommelanden, the land outside the walled town. Their produce provided a ready food supply. The Ommelanden continued to expand and its land use diversified. The indigenous forests were felled, not only to provide land for sugar plantations but also to supply firewood for its processing plants (Blusse 1986:27). Engineering of the water system continued as the Ciliwung River was diverted to irrigate the plantations. The soaring price of sugar on the world market encouraged sugar owners to expand production, and the period between 1680 to 1720 represented a sugar boom (Vlekke 1945:67). Production increased to such an extent that sugar flooded the market and the price fell. In response, the VOC imposed a quota on sugar production, which forced many plantations to close. These closings, however, were not sufficient to stem the serious ecological damage caused by sugar production. Forest clearing increased soil erosion and polluted the rivers upstream (Blusse 1986:27). Sugar processing led to the silting of the river and canals. 38 By 1700, the muddy coast was reported to be the source of "evil" smells. Yet the deteriorating quality of water was not immediately blamed for worsening health. In these earlier times, the ideas regarding health in Batavia were different, particularly among Europeans. Frequent bathing was not equated with cleanliness. An order was even put out to reduce bathing to once a week for health reasons (Vlekke 1965:188). Growing river and canai siltation was ignored and even accelerated by the disposal of solid waste and sewerage, although such action was in defiance of government regulations (Cobban 1971 cited in Jayapal 1993:24). When conditions got worse in 1718, the VOC decided to employ one hundred slaves to take the mud from the canals (Vlekke 1945:103). This task turned out to be endless. The Inspector of Public Works in Batavia specifically forbade women and children from bathing in the canals.1 In 1732, a long canal called the Moorkevaart (main stream) was dug to provide a better water source for the town. But though the water supply increased, the stagnant pools remained, and suddenly the death toll from water-borne disease soared, not only in the Ommelanden, but also in Batavia's native settlements (Vlekke 1965:212; Blusse 1986:29). At this point, the task of taking up the mud was deemed too costly, and too dangerous for the slaves, and thus was abolished (Blusse 1986:28). Batavia began to be known as the "Graveyard of the East." Many who emigrated died shortly after arriving (Vlekke 1965:189). Batavia had turned into an unhealthy, disease-prone region, a condition that would last for more than a century.2 ^ i n c e the Raffles period (1809-1811), the post of Inspector of Publ ic Works i n Batav ia was an appointed one. The Inspector also acted as a superintendent and advisor to the residents outside Batavia (Furnival l 1944:89). 2 H a r s h conditions inspired a German professor at the beginning of the nineteenth century to predict that unless repairs were made, Batavia would not exist for long (V lekke 1945:110). 39 The problems of the canal system were complicated by the fact that the water table was so close to the surface that well water was often undrinkable (Abeyasekere 1987:39). Thus the first generation of water vendors was born, with people bringing water from the south of Batavia to be sold along the canals. Wealthier residents imported famous spa or seltzer bottled water from Europe for drinking (Vlekke 1965:212). Others took to drinking gin three or four times a day because they believed it could prevent malaria (Vlekke 1965:188). Those who persisted in using canal water often ended up catching dysentery, typhoid, or malaria, the cause and cure for which were unknown at the time.3 The slow response to the public health problems owed much to the fact that the VOC acted as sole manager of the city. The so-called private citizens (Europeans who were not working for the VOC), Chinese, and natives were excluded from involvement in social affairs, despite their civic attachment to the town (Vlekke 1965:189). Efforts to make town governance more open by giving the city more political representation and economic independence were denied by the Council of the Colony in the Netherlands. They saw the interests of such a city council, or vroedscap, as potentially in conflict with those of the VOC (Blusse 1986:25; Nas 1990). They insisted that Batavia's function as the headquarters of the VOC was more important than its function as a locus of trade and settlement. Throughout the era of VOC rule, efforts to create a vroedscap were continually frustrated. When G. W. Van Imhoff, Governor General of VOC (1743-1750), proposed establishing a vroedscap as a solution to the sabotage of VOC's trade by smuggling (Blusse 1986:31), the Council of the Colony imposed more rigid rules by prohibiting 3 V l e k k e (1945:109) documented that i n 1732 only Europeans had a sudden, h igh death to l l f rom malaria, Chinese and Indonesians being less affected by the disease. The practice of clustering the red-ti led houses close together along the canal banks, so simi lar to what was done i n Ho l land , was considered to be the cause (Jayapal 1993:24). 40 private trading. Van Irnhoff s successor, Jacob Mossel (1750-1761), who was also in favour of private trading, was partially successful in expanding it in Batavia. He saw that the VOC's monopoly of too many commodities worked against profitability and gains from trade. Unfortunately, after Mossel, the V O C reverted to non-reform leadership. Slowly but surely, Mossel's predictions became reality. For its final seven years, V O C was unable to pay dividends to its shareholders, which led to its ultimate dissolution. 2.2 Marketing Java and the Splash of Wealth in Batavia Batavia's problem did not end with the bankruptcy of the V O C in 1798. Economically, the engagement of V O C officials in smuggling and private trading had eroded what was left of the VOC's income. The Dutch government took over not only their assets, but also their debt. Now in favour of trading in "selected commodities," they decided that the principle of "self-interest" should be implemented in Java. They made it clear that any reform should still reflect that "the colonies exist for the mother country and not the mother country for the colonies" (Furnivall 1944:59). Interested almost exclusively in trading activities, the Dutch government did not establish a system of administration for all of Java. In many respects, the island had not even been fully conquered or assimilated. Thus, in the midst of reform, money had to be diverted to wars with the natives. Such a task had not been taken seriously by any previous governor generals until Herman W. Daendels was appointed (1808-1811). He was an outsider who broke completely with traditions held over from V O C times. For the most part, to bring prosperity back to the mother country, he wanted to ensure efficiency and saw the inherited administrative system as a major obstacle. He reduced the dispersion of colonial 41 forces in Java and selected outer islands and centralized it in Batavia. He also tightened financial and administrative controls, which successfully reduced corruption and deficits (Sutherland 1979:7; Carey 1980:55).4 He moved the capital from the walled town to Weltevreden (well-content), which was about two miles south, connected with the walled town by wide roads running along the canal system. In contrast to the living conditions in the old walled town, new building styles were introduced in Weltevreden to increase hygiene and health facilities. Spacious houses were built with extensive gardens, inspired by Javanese mansions. The layout of the town followed pre-Dutch patterns, with a wide square space fonning the centre and broad main streets traversing each other at right angles, leaving plenty of room for secondary roads. Behind trees and bushes were the town's kampung settlements—relatively high density, rural-like settlements— where the natives lived. The kampung settlements were situated all over the outskirts, but mostly concentrated along the riverbanks. Meanwhile, the poorer natives, especially those who depended upon seasonal labour, remained in the largely deserted old town. In the years following the relocation of Europeans to Weltevreden, the application of hygiene and medicinal discoveries contributed to a lower death rate. In 1843, groundwater became the new source of supply, and wells dug in Weltevreden provided better-quality water than elsewhere in the region. However, public health remained a serious problem, and the death rate among Europeans still exceeded the birth rate (Abeyasekere 1987:81). The general provision of drinking and bath water was still unsatisfactory, and issues such as a lack of street lighting led the Dutch citizenry to renew demands for management to be taken over by a local authority Government servants were not to be paid on the basis of gifts and arbitrary taxes levied from the indigenous population, but on the basis of fixed government salaries. Daendels' reforms, however, were important as a blueprint for a new era in Indonesia of modern bureaucracy based on rationality and predictability than/in reality. 42 "o (Nas 1990:91). Efforts to improve the water supply also extended to the old town. However, this did not prevent the decay of the once-stately mansions. Europeans continued to relocate, while Chinese and Arabs took over the residences close to the old town, living among warehouses and offices. The old town became dormant and empty, with Europeans visiting only in the morning to conduct business (Jayapal 1993:24). As Batavia was not under regency governance, urban native affairs were conducted directly by the Dutch East Indies government. By 1854, the government had set limits on what social issues were to be addressed. A policy of noninterference towards native affairs was adopted, allegedly to preserve native traditions. Government Regulation (Regeerings Reglement) of 1854 Art. 54 confirmed that the administration of the indigenous population and its welfare were the exclusive responsibility of the native officials and chiefs (Fasseur and Kolff 1987:39). This implied that the government was not required to engage financially in non-European public issues. Housing and water provision arrangements were to be organized by the natives themselves through a regent. At best, the government—interested only in securing social peace through armed force—ignored the living conditions of the native people. Kampung settlements were often located on swampy land, with few or no sanitation facilities. Despite the high death toll, the natives had no choice but to resort to the canals for their water supply. During the dry season, they were forced to spend their meager incomes on water, as water from the canal was unavailable or unacceptable especially for household consumption. 43 Increasing Dutch involvement in wars in Europe and in Java caused a sharp rise in the national debt. It was only after the conclusion of the Java War in 1830 that the Dutch government could consolidate its efforts in exploiting its colony. An early plan anticipated that free cultivation and free trade would grow alongside state cultivation and state trade. This was soon discarded as demands on the treasury forced the Dutch to introduce the Forced Cultivation System (Cultuurstelsel). Government monopolies of trade and of production were secured (Furnivall 1944:119) and farmers were mobilized to plant high-value crops that had to be sold at low fixed prices. The system brought material gains to the Netherlands beyond expectations (Vlekke 1945:273), but it did not result in higher transfer of funds to the colony (Furnivall 1944:172). The Dutch East Indies government depended on forced labour instead of taxes to cover expenditures. This put a strain on the colonial government when it had to expand and introduce modern methods of production, and communications networks such as telegraphy, postal services, railways, and steamships (Carey 1980:94). As early as 1850, a major deficiency in the system became apparent in the form of declining welfare and rising discontent among the natives. Their lands and other possessions were often confiscated to cover costs for benefits they did not have access to. In the form of a lobby organized by Dutch Liberal politicians, who opposed the system as inconsistent with principles of economic liberalism, the Dutch government was made aware of the natives' plight. In 1870 the Liberal Democratic government took power in the Netherlands and the Forced Cultivation System was finally dismantled. 44 The Liberals still regarded the colony as a business concern, where no systematic or comprehensive plan was necessary, and it now decided that all restrictions of trade and commerce should be removed (Furnivall 1944:175). The development of Java would be left solely to market forces. The Dutch government attempted to extract commercial profits by encouraging increased participation of the private sector, while allowing the native population to freely pursue their own livelihoods. Entrepreneurs and individual traders took over economic activities once controlled by the government, such as sugar, coffee, and indigo industries, and were even allowed to lease "waste land" that was once farmed by the natives. Twenty years later, these measures had not effectively improved the material living standards of the colony. Although more money remained in the colony, it was spent mainly on modernizing infrastructure, in experiments to find the best crops, and to reduce the death rate from tropical diseases. Soon, the production of export crops increased to such an extent that it created oversupply. When depression hit in 1889 many banks that had supported the export boom collapsed. The colonial government was on a brink of bankruptcy. Native wages fell even lower than they had been earlier (Penders 1977:60; Carey 1980:95). Many observers noticed that the population of Java was increasing more rapidly, giving rise to fears of "overpopulation" (Arndt 1980:465; Boomgard 1986:59). The colonial government also noted that native prosperity had not increased. This lowest strata of society continued to suffer water shortages and there was increased consumption of cassava and maize, inferior substitutes for rice. Meanwhile, Dutch and other European residents increased rapidly in numbers and wealth, as did the Chinese business community (Vlekke 1945:100). 45 2.3 The Pride of Public Services in Improving Native Welfare Among the Dutch, the laissez-faire policies towards the natives were being criticized as increasingly unjust. Rice consumption plummeted, and the price of export and food crops fell. The Dutch East Indies government was faced with the gigantic task of administering a vast, expanding island empire (Atjeh was appended in 1907). When the Calvinist-Catholic coalition rose to power in the Netherlands, the colonial administration's policies towards the natives began to change. In 1901, the Ethical Policy was proclaimed as an expression of moral obligation towards improving the welfare of colonial subjects. Instead of being viewed as objects of exploitation, the natives were to be helped to achieve a higher material and spiritual level of existence. In 1905, the sum of 40 million guilders was disbursed to the colonial government to improve "the economic condition of the Indies" (Vlekke 1945:175). In 1912, for the first time since 1877, the Dutch East Indies government recorded a budget surplus; no remittances had to be made to the Netherlands. The money could be used to increase official commodity production (especially from outside Java), for education and infrastructure development, and otherwise to increase material welfare in the colony. 2.3.1 Directing Urban Development and Water With this approach came a set of administrative reforms under which local rulers of all races were granted a higher degree of self-government through the creation of a legislative body to decide on 46 local policies.5 In 1905, Batavia was among the first urban centres to form a municipal council (Milone 1966:28; Nas 1990:98-99). Two years later, Batavia was elevated to the status of a Gemeente, or municipality. A Gemeente, however, had a limited measure of autonomous power, dealing principally with such issues as roads, public works, parks, and gardens (Penders 1977:121); important matters such as police, public health, and education remained under the control of the Dutch East Indies government. Many decisions of municipal council were still in effect steered by the central government (Abeyasekere 1985:108). Meanwhile, in the economic sector, the liberalization of the economy attracted large numbers of European entrepreneurs, triggering a building boom of warehouses, factories, banks, and offices.6 The planning of road, railway, and water transportation systems and other infrastructure greatly facilitated the delivery of export commodities to European markets. Furnivall, an American historian (cited in Vlekke 1945:189), wrote in 1929 that the second decade of the twentieth century saw the Dutch East Indies reaching a degree of prosperity and economic expansion they had never experienced before. 5In 1903, the colonial administration slowly began to restore elements of actaunistrative power to native rulers. A program called detutelization or ontvoogding was aimed at increasing the number of educated natives and transferring to them direct power that had previously been exercised by the Dutch. Although the program was designed to ease the workload of the Dutch, it was resisted by Dutch bureaucrats who refused to give up their authority. Though in operation for 20 years, the program failed dismally (Fasseur and Kolff 1987:45^ 17). It also resolutely excluded Christian missions from working in regions with picturesque local cultures and thus preserved the legal distinction between Europeans and natives as found in the Indies' law (Cribb 1985:227). ^he Dutch were proud of the "open door" policy, which allowed all other nations to access trade and industrial enterprises in the Indies. Many other imperial countries limited their colonial commercial and industrial interests by levying high fees on imports. 47 Despite reforms, income for the natives still came from selling agricultural and natural resources in the world market, the profits from which went chiefly to private enterprise, not to the labourers or even to the Dutch East Indies government. Soekarno, a prominent native political activist who later became the first president of Indonesia, saw clearly that Dutch imperialism still exemplified "finance capitalism," extorting the Indies' natural and human resources and seeking outlets for investment capital to maximize the flow of private profits back to the Netherlands (Arndt 1980:465).7 As a result of the expansion of government functions under the Ethical Policy, construction projects such as the Tanjung Priok seaport were undertaken, and the process of "filling up" was accelerated due to massive population growth in Java, and increased migration to Batavia. Up to this time, Batavia had been only a medium-sized city, as the persistent unhealthy conditions and high mortality rate retarded population growth (Hugo 1980:113; Abeyasekere 1987:88-91). In contrast, between 1905 and 1930, Batavia's population tripled, making it the biggest city in the Dutch East Indies—a distinction it still holds.8 In an effort to manage urban settlement in a way that supported the political views of the government, the Gemeente formalized a three-tiered sociopolitical system based on racial-economic distinctions: first, there were the Europeans, a class that included those given the legal status of Europeans such as the Japanese; second, there were foreign Orientals, mainly Chinese, 7 The Dutch did not seek markets for their goods or to expand their colonial empire l i ke the French or the Br i t ish . They faced a demand-side problem i n investing the accumulated f inancial capital. Transport and other irifrastructure were developed, not to suit the people's needs, but to facilitate profitable trade. The E th ica l Po l icy was essentially paternalistic, directed at specific sectors, and left l ittle room for po l i t ica l emancipation. 8 M i l o n e (1966) reported that the Jakarta's population increased f rom 173,000 i n 1905 to 253,000 i n 1920, and 435,000 i n 1930; w i th the proportion o f natives increased f rom 71 percent i n 1905 to 83 percent i n 1930 Qhigo 1980:114). 48 Arabs and Indians; and third, there were the natives, who made up the lowest stratum of society (Milone 1966:22). The system was enforced through differential treatment regarding access to public services including, for example, an initiative to introduce a drinking water system to the natives was resisted by local water distributors, and the fact that water now had to be paid for (while before water from wells and rivers had been free of charge) was widely resented. Water issues worked to worsen political relations between the groups. The city became more segregated than before (Wertheim 1956:180; van Niel 1980:118;Nas 1990:106). In 1905, 9 percent of Europeans resided on 50 percent of the residential land, while the 71 percent who were natives lived on 20 percent (Hugo 1980:114-5). The natives were crowded into compounds, in houses of semi-rural construction, often located in the backyards of the European quarters. Kampung arrangements in the latter communities were expected to curb diseases originating outside the European quarters (Sadikin, Ramadhan et al. 1992:164). Kampung settlements were crowded (Cobban 1992:330), lacked adequate drinking water, air, and light, and were subject to frequent flooding. The digging of wells in the north half of Batavia only accessed brackish water (Government of Indonesia 1994:85). Absence of proper facilities for piped water, sanitation, and sewerage, combined with malaria, cholera, tuberculosis, and other illnesses, again took their toll. This time the natives were hit hardest (Wertheim 1956:188-9; Abeyasekere 1987:94-95).9 At best, the municipality provided a few public toilets or wash places, but it refused to maintain them or provide the necessary land. 9Abeyasekere (1987:94) cited that the death to l l was alarmingly high: i n 1935-1936, 30 percent of native infants, 15 percent of Chinese infants, and 6 percent of European infants died. Jakarta had the worst record o f any city i n As ia . The death to l l among natives i n Batavia between 1910 and 1920 was considerably higher (28-30 per thousand) than i n the later period (25 per thousand). B o t h are considered h igh , and de Haas (cited i n Werthe im 1956:188) concluded that such a to l l i n the 1920s was the result of undernourishment and overcrowding. 49 Urban growth in Batavia was, in part, well planned, particularly in European quarters. Privately run real estate companies were brought in to design and execute housing development. Unlike in the past, where European houses were built along major roads, development was concentrated in particular enclaves, giving a sense of isolation and homogeneity (Abeyasekere 1985:90). Such developments required urban services to be interconnected with other neighbourhoods. Along with electricity, roads, and telephone, water distribution was among the first services to be developed into a network. An initiative to introduce a uniform drinking water system to the residents of Batavia was proposed as part of a plan to increase egalitarian services to households. It was resisted by local water distributors, who benefited from the sale of water to the European and Chinese quarters (Abeyasekere 1987:94). In 1918, however, the government proceeded with the establishment of Water Leidingen Bedrijf van Batavia (Local Water Supply Enterprise of Batavia) to administer a newly installed piped water distribution system using water sources from local rivers. In 1922, the enterprise constructed a pipeline to transport clean water from nine artesian wells, located in Ciomas-Ciburial, Bogor—64 kms south of Batavia—with a total discharge of 89 litres per second (Lis), a volume considered enough to fulfill the demand of the European and foreign Oriental residents (Sidharta, Pramono et al. 1991:43).10 During the 1920s and 30s, efforts to take care of water demand went further. The water system was improved to include the management of floods, a problem existed since the establishment of Batavia. The so-called Banjir Canal—a triumph of engineering and a landmark whose cleared t r a n s m i s s i o n pipelines could move water at 500 L / s to Batavia using the gravity system (M in ing Section o f D K I Jakarta 1995:45). In Batavia, a pressure system was installed that would ensure the distribution of water. 50 paths in Batavia provided signs of modernization—was built to carry surplus water from the Ciliwung River to the sea.11 2.3.2 Disseminating Hygiene in Kampung The role of municipal councils in planning for kampung settlements was minimal. As the natives were underrepresented in the decision-making process, there were too few political voices to point out the contradictions and injustices in the administration of city affairs. A Dutch scholar, Tillema (1913 cited in vanderHeiden 1990:69), proposed in the Netherlands the need for measures to curb the high death rate among natives, but the Dutch colonial government refused, saying the municipality had no right to interfere in kampung management. Furthermore, the Dutch typically blamed the natives' lifestyle for their inability to deal with urban public health issues. the Dutch felt that the natives should be discouraged from migrating to the city, for it was an unnatural way of life for them. If once there, however, they should be left to continue the style of life that they had in the village. (Milone 1961:555 cited in Hugo 1980:115) The municipality did promulgate some building ordinances, and set building lines, but money and adequate enforcement of regulations were not forthcoming (van der Heiden 1990:71). Moreover, regulations were based on European housing standards, and were thus largely irrelevant. In 1927, under pressure from native representatives at the municipal council, the Dutch East Indies government finally agreed to pay half of the total cost towards Kampung Improvement (kampong verbetering) (Abeyasekere 1987:121). Because funds were very limited in comparison n T h e curbing o f flooding was more important for the Du tch than securing d r ink ing water for the natives. Prof. Ir. 51 (kampong verbetering) (Abeyasekere 1987:121). Because funds were very limited in comparison to the size of the settlements, improvements were restricted to constructing roads and sewerage systems (van der Heiden 1990:72). In contrast, infrastructure for improved water delivery in the European parts of the city was funded out of the municipality's budget, so that the increasing numbers of Europeans enjoyed improved water supply. The new Banjir Canal brought abundant water from a large, clean, distant river, and reduced the Moorkevaart from a "clean" water canal to a needed drainage channel. The Water Leidingen Bedriff van Batavia extended the artesian well system to some kampung settlements. However, in 1929, Europeans on average still received four times as much water as the native residents (Abeyasekere 1987:90). The latter were served by hydrants and were charged higher prices. Canals built in the seventeenth century remained in use for laundry and bathing. It is true that the quality was somewhat improved: the water looked brown but was apparently relatively safe. Twice a day, the sluices above were opened and tons of water poured down through the canals, ridding them of impurities (Penders 1977:151). Purified water, and its positive benefits for public health in the kampung, was increasingly associated with reducing or eradicating tropical diseases. Public Health Service (Dienst der Volks Gezondheid), which was established in 1905, set out to apply a policy of preventive measures in place of curative ones (Boomgard 1986:73). This came after long research and massive investment had clarified an understanding of tropical diseases.12 The basic idea regarding 1 2 I n this issue, the Dutch colonial government had been successful. Cholera had virtual ly disappeared by 1921, and smallpox, beriberi, and malar ia were under control. On ly bubonic plague, originating i n rice storehouses, appeared i n 1905 i n Sumatra; it stayed unt i l 1942, and cost about 30 mi l l i on guilders i n publ ic health outlays (Vlekke 1945:322; Boomgard 1986:74-75). 52 prevention was that "in order to change the behaviour of many people, one must first change their attitudes, to cause them to question traditional practices." This was promoted through campaigns using films and pilot projects, as well as integrative measures. The ultimate aim was to stimulate self-help initiatives in local communities, on the premise that hygiene could be significantly improved even with cheap, locally available materials. The initiatives included construction of latrines to reduce the incidence of malaria (Boomgard 1986:73), and collective action, supervised by the government, was encouraged at the kampung level to generally improve living conditions. By the end of 1936, the death toll among natives began to decline (Abeyasekere 1987:36). Over the period 1901-1942, the Dutchrefined the agricultural and plantation sectors,13 promoted intensive research on tropical issues, improved basic education and standards of hygiene of the colony,14 and above all established greater discipline under modern administration. The desire to transform the native social relations in directions that benefited the rulers at least led to an interest in learning more about native society. This was reflected in voluminous reports of officials and commissions, a growing Dutch literature on the subject, and periodicals devoted to the topic (Furnivall cited in Fasseur and KolfF 1987:55). In this effort, the Dutch considered themselves to have rights like those of the natives, but thought the latter had to be "educated." They thus assumed a paternal role, convinced that their own 1 3 Before the Second W o r l d War, the Dutch East Indies was estimated to have supplied 90 percent o f the wor ld 's production of quinine, 86 percent of the world 's pepper, 75 percent of its kapok, 37 percent of its rubber, 28 percent of its coconut pa lm products, 19 percent o f its tea, and 17 percent of its tin, as we l l as sugar, coffee, o i l , and most of the world 's cigar wrappers (Grant 1964:18). 1 4 Prof . Chr ist iaan Eyckman discovered the cause o f beriberi, an i l lness that had caused many deaths since the arr ival of the Dutch. He noted that those who ate polished r ice as their normal food caught i t easily, whi le those who consumed crude rice remained free of it. Th is research later earned h i m a membership i n the Nat ional Academy of Sciences i n Washington, D.C. and a Nobel Pr ize for medicine i n 1929 (Vlekke 1945:322). 53 government was proud of having established such an efficient administration and taken care of the interests of the people (Vlekke 1945:74). It conducted itself like a "bureaucratic state," with an apolitical administration ruled by a strong, confident, and well-entrenched officialdom fixated on the maintenance of law and order. The administration worked very well in regard to public health, as often civil administrators made "heroic" efforts to improve hygienic conditions and educate the natives about epidemic diseases. With the success of research on tropical ailments, the role of European experts was important, but the role of local, traditional healers was not ignored. The mtertwining of modern hygiene, supervised by civil administrators, and traditional healing—a knowledge embedded in the native culture—helped improve and integrate native public health. Partly as a result of the 1930's world depression, when the colonial budget was abruptly cut, reliance on such an integrated approach at the local level was greatly increased. This cooperation, however, which sowed the seeds of community development at the local level, did not automatically raise the material living standards of the native people. This was especially true because of laws that limited native ownership of land, and professional education institutions and the civil service that required fluency in Dutch, both strongly impeded upward mobility. After the Dutch left in 1942, only a few industries survived, and a only tiny number of educated natives were qualified to smoothly run the public administration. who consumed crude r ice remained free of it. Th i s research later earned h i m a membership i n the Nat ional Academy of Sciences i n Washington, D.C. and a Nobe l Pr ize for medicine i n 1929 (Vlekke 1945:322). 54 2.4 Urban Living in the Era of Power Struggle During the Second World War, efforts to improve native welfare came to a standstill. Batavia became the centre of power for the Japanese occupying forces. One of the ways they signified this was to change the name of Batavia to Jakarta and terminate the nominal connection with the Netherlands. The Japanese treated their new colony as a source of wealth and raw materials. Oil to scrap metal, art and cultural objects, and other resources were shipped to Japan. Little or nothing was reinvested in productive sectors or other local activities. Consequently, basic infrastructure, including water services, almost ceased to operate (van Niel 1980:162). At the community level, government administration in Jakarta was streamlined to serve only as a centre of power in the capital city, which amounted to power over the whole country. Pragmatically, the Japanese employed groups of native city officials to serve as advisory committees regarding local issues, but decisions were dominated by the goal of winning the War. The occupiers did not attempt to further a stable or civilized local community. Nevertheless, tonarigumi15—hierarchical community-based organizations—were created to control the communities with minimal involvement of the Japanese. With the surrender of the Japanese in 1945, the struggle for independence that had begun to form before the war continued, as the Dutch attempted to take back control of the country. Resisted by l5Tonarigumis, introduced in 1944, were comprised of 20-30 households, each supposed to send a representative to regular meetings that organized defense against fire and air raids, and helped spread information from the government (Abeyasekere 1987:142). 55 the natives, Batavia was thus in effect controlled by two governments: the Dutch and the Indonesians. The Dutch confidently set about ruling the city, and saw the urban population increase while the housing stock remained dilapidated. They brought in urban experts and sought to improve municipal management. Under the Central Planning Bureau (Centraal Planologisch Bureau) in the Department of Public Works, urban planners set about drawing up the first Master Plan to organize the development of Batavia once postwar fighting was over. J. P. Thijsse, the chief urban planner, worrying that rapid population growth would trigger massive urban sprawl, decided planning was needed at the regional and national level. In 1948, the first Town Planning Ordinance (Stadsvormingsordonnantie) came into force in several towns, and the first City Plan for the expansion of Jakarta was created. Under competing rule, Batavia was under direct control of a new post-colonial central government (Nas 1990:104). The Indonesian government of Jakarta, headed by Suwiryo, was more concerned with political rather than planning issues, especially with its need to gain international recognition. The Dutch at one point captured Suwiryo and his aides and occupied city hall; however, more of Jakarta's population aligned themselves with the Indonesian government, and mobilized to demonstrate their political and military support. By the time the Dutch recognized Indonesia's sovereignty in 1949, the wreckage of war and its consequence had damaged seriously the water network, along with other parts of the infrastructure. Canals were clogged, pipes were broken, and no maps had survived to help repair the system. The system had been manufactured in Germany, and, in the aftermath of that country's defeat, parts were nowhere to be found (Cribb 1985:102). Furthermore, experts in city 56 administration and sanitary engineering, who had been mostly Europeans, had departed. To compensate for the lack of service in piped water, by 1950, the number of registered wells used for as water sources grew to about ninety (Soenarto 1992). Unofficially, the number was higher as groundwater started to increase in importance. Yet, as the capital of the newly formed nation of Indonesia moved back to Jakarta, population growth accelerated, especially after 1945 (see Figure 2.1). The Indonesian government responded by expanding the administrative boundary of Jakarta to be three times that of the prewar city (Abeyasekere 1987:171). One reason for rapid population growth was economic: low production levels, as well as the limited goods available in rural areas, drove people to urban areas. Kampung settlements continued to become more crowded, and illegal squatter settlements proliferated. As there was no formal measures aimed at limiting urbanization, the population flow could not be curbed. 57 £ 1500000 o h 1000000 a 500000 Year Source: Statistical Office of DKI Jakarta cited in Rahardjo, 1987 p.29.16 Figure 2.1 Population Growth in Jakarta, 1941-1961 2.5 Exercising Democracy and Clean Water as a Free Service After Indonesia's independence was ratified by the United Nations in 1949, the whole development process was reconfigured, and it included measures to abolish differential treatment of native people. Greater emphasis was placed on cultural and political development, seeking to build a new Indonesian identity thus strengthening national unity. A Western-style parliamentary system was adopted to accommodate the existence of multiple factions in the legislative assembly. This model was selected partly to win international support, and partly to attract Dutch sympathizers. 1 6 A m o n g researchers, Rahardjo (1987) provides an intensive evaluation of the numeration of Jakarta's population for the period of 1941-1980; Hugo (1980) provides an excellent review for the period of 1870-1930; and M i l o n e (1966) is a good source on other urban areas i n Indonesia. Rahardjo attempted to consistently use the data collected by the Statistical Office o f Jakarta w h i c h counted population at the household level w i th some consistency i n method. However, he mentioned that the changing administrative boundaries and governmental structures influenced the data. 58 Not only did the building of an Indonesian identity find sanctuary in this system of national government, but also it was reflected in city planning. The rhetoric of freedom from imperialism, and resurrected myths relating to pre-Dutch heroes and achievements, found expression in monuments, statues, and public buildings. The "city beautiful movement" expressed a vision of national greatness and reflected determined efforts to realize it. According to Geertz (1963 cited in Crouch 1980:185), Jakarta benefited greatly from the traditional Javanese idea "that the welfare of the country proceeds from the excellence of its capital, the excellence of its capital from the brilliance of its elite, and the brilliance of its elite from the spirituality of its ruler ..." . The attempt to implement a Western-style parliamentary system turned out to be disastrous. Parties tended to stay in power for only a short periods of time, particularly as a result of the inability of politicians to work out stable cooperative arrangements among themselves (Crouch 1980:174). Politicians and bureaucrats engaged in fierce rhetoric and excessive use of power, giving emphasis to the short-term goal of acquiring or holding political support at the expense of long-term goals such as promoting economic development and creating an effective administrative system. No group felt it could afford to lose political ground by identifying itself with unpopular policies, no matter how necessary and obvious these might have been (Crouch 1980:188). Government efforts to advance economic development were minimal, and often driven by nation-building concerns, as is the case when they nationalized Dutch-run enterprises and public institutions. By the early 1960s, this climate had had a ruinous impact on national policies and plans. 59 Beyond nationalistic political systems and monument-building, a city plan for Jakarta was prepared in 1953 with the help of international scholars.17 However, the plan was abandoned (Forbes 1990:112; Tambunan 1996:50). First, it was not a priority in a situation dominated by political rhetoric; second, urban dwellers at the time represented less than 20 percent of the Indonesian population (Milone 1966:91). So urban housing shortages remained chronic, in spite of the fact that housing stood abandoned by former European owners. Moreover, in Jakarta most new houses were not properly served with urban amenities. Solid waste disposal and sewerage were still at or below prewar levels, with additional waste being dumped on open land and into rivers and canals. In 1957, only 6 percent of Jakarta's budget was allocated for mamtaining basic services such as schools, roads, bridges, and other public facilities (Hanna 1960:6), in spite of the fact that Jakarta, as the capital city of Indonesia, enjoyed better access to central funds than any other Indonesian city. In this period, a Drinking Water Sub-Section was created in Jakarta's Public Works Section. To most Indonesians, freedom from colonial ties meant emancipation from rigid Dutch rules and regulations, and getting access to free basic services. Many urban dwellers were not willing to spend money to pay for such services. On the other hand, the cash-strapped national and city governments had only limited capacity to improve these services, and this is most clear in relation to water supply. People chose to use water that was still abundant at open wells. The canal systems built in the seventeenth century, and patched up after the war, still served a main site for bathing and laundry. "Kenneth Watts was sent by the United Nations to help Ir. R. D. Danunegoro, director of Public Works, and Ir. L. O'Brien, head of Urban Development, to finish the outline of the master plan 1957-1977 for Jakarta. This outline was ratified by the Local Assembly through Regulation No. 13/7/DPRD/59, but it was never developed into a master plan (Tambunan 1996:50). 60 Finally, in 1957, a substantial investment in a modern water supply treatment system materialized. In addition to the intake of raw water from the Ciliwung and other smaller rivers, construction of a new water filtration plant in Pejompongan improved the level of coverage in Jakarta to 12.5 percent of the population (Sadikin, Ramadhan et al. 1992:117). However, the distribution system relied on a combination of old and often corroded pipes and new city mains for which customers were obliged to pay a fee. For the rich neighbourhoods the small fee was not a problem; for houses with meager incomes, however, it was: many, although connected to piped water, could not afford to use it (Fischer 1959:184). Consistently, kampung settlements were excluded from the service, and the residents had to make do with open wells and the sluggish canals. Embarrassed by these conditions, an Indonesian official insisted: "Jakarta is not Indonesia. We got stuck with a run-down Dutch-Chinese city for our capital" (cited in Hanna 1960:2). Water supply provision continued to depend upon a combination of the centralized piped system inherited from the Dutch East Indies government and open, decentralized types of extraction from rivers, canals, and open wells that were relied on by most of the population. Despite the fact that basic services could not meet the demand during the 1950s and 1960s, most people viewed Jakarta as the most economically dynamic city in Indonesia and thus it was the prime destination for most rural-to-urban migrants. Jakarta, designed by the Dutch to accommodate 600,000 people, was in 1966 home to 3.6 million. Also during this year Jakarta was declared a metropolitan district with a status roughly equivalent to that of a province (Noe 1991:225). 61 The situation did not improve substantially even as the government invested more in basic services.18 In the water supply sector, it was beyond the capacity of the local and even central government to replace old infrastructure such as pipes (Sadikin, Ramadhan et al. 1992:117). During the 1960s, the only major investment in the water supply sector was a major new dam (Jatiluhur) constructed to the southeast of Jakarta and aimed at irrigating prime agricultural land to the east of the city and, to some extent, augment the water supply in Jakarta. Limited urban services, however, were rationalized by the government as a means to curb excessive urbanization. By the mid-1960s, the economic situation was out of hand. Over three years, the citizens saw charges for electricity, water, and communications (post, telegraph, and telephone service) go up by 400 percent (Grant 1964:87).19 Income from exports was barely adequate to pay on the national debt, let alone finance local public services, leaving the country with meagre foreign exchange reserves. As the economy spiraled downwards, the rhetoric of politics dramatically sharpened the divisions between political factions, and heightened friction between those who supported the authority of the president and those who opposed it (Crouch 1980:192). Bloodshed could ultimately no longer be prevented, and in the ensuing chaos the government of President Soekarno crumbled. 1 8As recorded by Selo Soemardjan in his book Social Changes in Yogyakarta, poor Indonesians often asked "When will this merdeka (independence) period come to an end? I work harder than I did before but I have less rice and fewer clothes" (Hanna 1960:16-1; Grant 1964:81). Many urban poor referred to the post-colonial period as zaman svsah (difficult period) and the colonial period as zaman normal (normal period) (Abeyasekere 1985:119). The term zaman normal was not used by other native groups. From a political point of view, the era was not "normal," as a huge population was under colonial power. They referred it as tempo dulu (nostalgic period), as it conjured up sentimental memories for many. 1 9As real wages fell, the scale of conspicuous consumption in Jakarta seems to grow, which highlighted widening socioeconomic disparities (Casties cited in Arndt 1980:472). 62 2.6 Curbing or Allowing Urbanization: Dilemma for Water Supply In the late 1960s, President Suharto took power and introduced the New Order government, promoting a "clean government bureaucracy" and redefining national development goals as synonymous with economic-oriented development. This change of priorities marked a shift in the balance of influence towards "entrepreneurial bureaucratic capitalism" whose hallmark was large investments in import-substituting industries (Forbes 1992:16-2). In brief, the development strategy became more market-oriented. Commitments to planned development were made along orderly paths in Five-Year Development Plans (Repelita). The first two Plans (Repelita I, 1969-1974 and Repelita JJ, 1974-1979) gave particular emphasis to promoting family planning and agricultural development in order to reach national food self-sufficiency, and to developing a secure basis for industrial transformation. In the water sector generally, the policy focussed on the development of infrastructure in order to support irrigation for agriculture and strategic agro-industrial development. In the urban water sector, the goal of water sector policy was to expand production facilities in major cities in order to serve the population at a level of 100 litres per capita per day (Led). In general, the policies were reactive: a massive expansion of the housing program, increasing kampung improvement efforts, and a new program to develop sewerage works in major cities. To achieve the economic goals as rapidly as possible, the government introduced a few carefully planned programs that were intensively pursued (Cribb 1993:225). Top-down approaches were chosen, to accelerate the implementation process and to minimize economic disruption. In the water sector, priorities were set up as to which cities facilities expansion would be concentrated. 63 The advantages of this project-specific approach were soon found to be short-lived. Demand for project development funds grew far more rapidly than financial resources. Within the urban water supply program, more projects were identified than could feasibly be undertaken in several five-year planning periods. And those projects already completed tended to favour the more affluent urban residents rather than members of all urban income groups (Berry and Sierra 1978:2). It was predicted that by the end of Repelita II in 1979, water production would have increased, yet about two-thirds of urban residents would remain without access to piped water (Berry and Sierra 1978: 1). While the first prediction was not quite met, the second was. In Repelita HI (1979-1984) the policies of urban water development were emphasized only for smaller cities. This left the problems of expanding water supply in big cities, including Jakarta, unsolved and access by the poor remained low. 2.6.1 Controlling Urban Growth by "Closed City" Policy Under the New Order government, Jakarta was no longer just a place for impressive state structures and monuments. As an administrative entity, its many roles were expanded to make it attractive to foreign investment. The city became known as the gateway for trade and industrial development—a status not accorded other cities. Jakarta became the centre of administration, commerce and finance.20 2 0In 1980, Jakarta, with 3.8 percent of Indonesia's total population, was the source of 48 percent of Indonesia's extended bank credit (McGee 1992:14). 64 To meet the need of attracting investors, infrastructure work in Jakarta increased rapidly. Between 1966-1976, the length of the road network doubled, while the number of motorized vehicles increased fourfold. Jakarta attracted 63 percent of foreign direct investment in the manufacturing sector (Abeyasekere 1987:217). Such results owed much to the initiatives of an innovative, military-bred governor of Jakarta, Ali Sadikin (1966-1977). Although often labeled dictatorial, he is credited with being a sensible, action-oriented administrator. His strategy was to transform Jakarta into a world-class city with impressive high-rise buildings, as well as a well-maintained and integrated systems of urban physical and social services. The first step he took was to bring Jakarta's Master Plan 1965-1985 to the Local Assembly to be ratified so that he would have a legally binding ordinance with which to direct the city's growth.21 He immediately restructured the local tax system, and fiercely implemented change, providing land for industrial purposes, regulating entertainment sectors, and initiating many urban services projects to cope with the demands of rapid population growth and a diversifying economic structure. Between 1961-1971, the growth rate of Jakarta's population reached 4.5 percent annually, increasing total population by more than 50 percent (Rais 1996:4). This population growth greatly expanded the spread of quickly and poorly built kampung into flood-prone areas, as well as along the banks of rivers. In 1968, Sadikin reintroduced the Dutch-invented Kampung Improvement Program (KIP), which aimed to leave the kampung social arrangements undisturbed but enable their physical environment to be upgraded. Lacking support or guidance from the central government, Sadikin executed these plans through local financial and technical sources. In the kampung settlements, the improved water supply and sanitation facilities were seen to be a 21The Plan was ratified through the decision of DPRGR DCI Djakarta No. 9/DPRGR/P/1967. In essence, it attempted to direct physical development concentrically, to a radius of 15 km (Abimanyu and Sujarto 1994:24). 65 success, and in the years that followed, the central government and even international financial institutions began to pour support into the program.22 Between 1969-1985, 400 kampung settlements comprising four million people and covering 9,200 hectares were upgraded at the very low cost of US$37 per capita (Clarke 1985:37).23 But while kampung got attention, the needs of urban residents as a whole were far from being carefully planned. Jakarta's Master Plan 1965-1985, which initiated grants for public services, fell far behind the needs of the growing population. Sectoral plans were prepared for transport, water supply, sewage, railways, and toll roads, but the level of coordination between departments responsible for these activities was very inadequate (Castles 1989:235). Lack of adequate telephone, gas, and electric services were most visible, but there was also a lack of water services that manifested itself in filthy well water, which the poor were forced to use for lack of alternatives. For the most part, the Governor seemed genuinely concerned to expand water supply services to the poor. "Water is a basic service that nobody can live without," Sadikin said. In 1972, the Master Plan of Water Expansion and Sewerage was produced to improve the system for all Jakarta. The Plan was not executed immediately. The Government of Jakarta still relied on the central government to set priorities in water development and largely neglected the sanitation sector. The construction of a number of water production facilities was supported financially and technically 2 2 S i n c e 1969, after seeing the early success of K I P i n Jakarta, the central government has been involved implementing K I P at the national level. The W o r l d Bank began to support K I P i n 1974. 2 3 Overa l l , K I P has been funded 50 percent by the W o r l d Bank, 15 percent by the government of Jakarta, and 35 percent by the affected population. Gotong royong (community spirit) provided much o f the human capital needed. 66 by the central government. However, the construction of secondary mains and distribution networks was left to the city government, and they lacked both the technical capabilities for planning and the necessary financial resources (Berry and Sierra 1978:11). In 1975, the capacity of the water supply system was increased to 2,300 L/s,24 and about 225 km of pipes were added and improved, which increased the service to 25 percent of the population (Johan 1987:115). Increased demand in kampung still had to rely upon local sources such as rivers, shallow wells, and the still rare public water tap. Some observers suspected that, despite the money poured into KIP, the priority assigned to the provision of safe drinking water and disposal of rubbish and sewage was relatively low (Abeyasekere 1987:225). By the mid-1970s, the improvement of water services was prioritized and addressed by increasing the number of filtration plants in various locations. But by the end of the Sadikin era in 1977, the population coverage of piped water remained at 15 percent, with little reaching low-income areas (Abeyasekere 1985:16). The inability of infrastructure development to keep up with rapid population growth worldwide supported belief in the thesis of "overurbanization." There were those who recognized that a rational solution to such problems would be to curb the flow of rural-urban migration. This led Sadikin in 1970 to announce an unpopular and much-criticized policy of "closing Jakarta" to the rural poor so as to discourage jobless settlers from burdening urban social services. Immigrants into the city had to have secured jobs and housing. The results of this campaign were disappointing, as many ignored the policy.25 24This number is based on water supplied from Pejompongan, 2,000 L/s, and from spring wells in Ciburial, Bogor, 300 L/s (Sadikin, Ramadhan et al. 1992:152). 25The failure of the policy to close Jakarta is explained by its intent to have only a psychological, rather than a physical, effect (Critchfield 1971). In 1970, two years after the implementation of the policy, the city's population increased by 450,000, of which about three percent or 13,500 were migrants. Only about 2,500 people were actually registered as migrants (Abeyasekere 1987). 67 The flow of new irnmigrants was very problematic for as, in addition to problems of clean water supply, Jakarta increasingly had to deal with floods. Banjir Canal, built in 1918 and used to divert water from upstream Ciliwung, became inadequate; every year, more people were victimized by floods that spread to roads, residential areas, and industrial sites. Incremental efforts were made, such as straightening and clearing the river, putting in more pumps, building more dams, and expanding water ducts, but resources were strained and slums continued to grow in disaster-prone areas and along the banks of rivers. It was not only lack of funding that imperilled the flood prevention program; the rate of urban expansion was too robust and unregulated. With population growth came not only increased flooding, but also pollution from both residential and industrial sectors. While stepped-up investment in the water supply systems increases the health of households, settlement areas without adequate sanitation facilities remain prone to serious diseases. Although attempts to increase investment in water supply have been made since the 1970s, the realization of investment projects, especially in sanitation facilities, has been very slow. During the 1970s and 1980s, fewer and fewer people were drinking water from rivers, canals, or their own shallow wells, though they still used these sources for laundry and sanitation purposes. With the changing purposes of water from a source for drinking to a medium of waste disposal, particularly in canals and rivers, water bodies continued to become more contaminated. The problems of sanitation interfered more and more with the problems of clean water. People could hardly find drinking water that was not contaminated. The private sector's response to this reality 68 has been to create a new business. The first local bottled water company, Aqua mineral Water, began to package water from the Ciburial Spring in Bogor in 1990. The growth since then has been enormous. For Jakarta Water Supply Enterprise (PAM Jaya), water had to be supplied from farther-away places. Now, Jatiluhur Dam, whose original purpose was mainly to irrigate land in the surrounding region and generate electricity, has a small but increasing amount of its water specifically diverted to Jakarta for urban purposes. With expanding problems facing the city, efforts to curb urbanization through jirniting in-migration were now seen as unfeasible. The cost of controlling urbanization was economically and politically unrealistic, particularly as many migrants were involved in informal-sector activities— activities to which government control has limited reach. Kampung settlements where these migrants set their feet first, were growing to be highly populated. As shown in Figure 2.2, the expansion of built-up areas can no longer be controlled to only within the administrative boundary of Jakarta. This expansion blurred the distinction between urbanized areas mainly located in Jakarta and rural areas in its surrounding areas. The policy of "Closing Jakarta" was relaxed in 1976, and the urban policy focus shifted to expanding the administrative boundary of the city by claiming urban areas in surrounding jurisdictions in exchange for rural areas.27 More important, an integrated approach was devised to manage the city's expansion into the surrounding area. The region encompassing Jakarta and adjacent districts is known as Jabotabek (Jakarta-Bo gor-Tangerang-Bekasi) and was created to facilitate broader urban planning projections, planning, and administration. 2 7 In 1976, the administrative boundary of DKI Jakarta was changed from 462 km2 to be 654 km2 (Rahardjo 1987:47). 69 LEGEND: pt l j Java Sea | Built-Up Areas Source: Special Capital Government of DKI Jakarta. 1991. p.2. J Figure 2.2 Diagrams of The Expansion of Built-Up Areas in Jakarta, 1619-1980 2.6.2 Expansion and Limitation of Current Water Supply As the economy of the city became more complicated, new sectors such as industry made greater demands on water supply. The Master Plan of Water Expansion was general and technical, but did not provide adequate guidelines in practice. Above all, the Master Plan required huge amounts of investment capital, as well as user-payment schemes and administration. With the city unable to meet the growing demand, industries, commercial operations, and households had to find privately owned sources. Since the 1970s, the volume of water extracted from canals and rivers in Jakarta substantially increased. At the same time, groundwater pumps began to be intensively utilized. Between 1968-1975, the number of registered wells increased to about 1,200, of which 60 percent were constructed as a result of industrial development (Tirtornihardjo 1996). Initially, there were no laws to limit the expanding use of pumps for extracting groundwater. This implied that groundwater was free and could be extracted indefinitely. In fact, the government viewed groundwater extraction as a way of compensating for the inadequate piped water services provided by the municipality. On the other hand, because Jakarta authorities predicted that industries would move out of the city as land prices increased, industrial use of deep groundwater wells was left unregulated. No effort was made even to measure or estimate the amount of water extracted. The formal water distributor, PAM Jaya, unable to keep up with the rapid population growth and lacking funds for capital spending, is far from having a monopoly on water distribution. PAM Jaya has recognized that they are better situated to serve well-established, formal areas comprising concentrated groups of users rather than newly developed and widely scattered areas. The 1972 Master Plan for Jakarta Water Supply was only partly and unsatisfactorily implemented.27 When it was reevaluated and revised in 1985, much of the plan materials from 27The only construction occurring during the 1970s was the Pejompongan U treatment plant in 1970 with a capacity of 1,000 L/s, expanded in 1973 to 2,000 L/s (Sidharta, Pramono et al. 1991:48). 71 1972 had to be put back into place to be executed. Since then, a more consistent implementation of the revised plan has occurred, and capacity expansion of treatment plants has been intensively pursued. However, expansion of service coverage is still far from satisfactory. For the majority of residents, PAM Jaya is just one of several players involved in water supply. It is an attractive option, charging water tariffs lower than the cost of extracting groundwater, but is unreliable in terms of water quality and flow (Hadad 1992:99). 2. 7 Conclusion The separation between those who consume piped water and those who consume water from non-piped sources is inherited from the supply service created by the colonial government. Such an inheritance is so embedded that the post-colonial governments have not successfully broken it. In the colonial period, the advancement of piped water service, together with electricity and roads, was as an urban services offered to attract Europeans to the Indies. The Dutch needed the increased number of Europeans in order to maintain support for their political existence. Instead of becoming a venue for democratic public participation, the formation of the Municipal Council was a formalization of the politics of European domination. The Europeans thus maintained their voices in the Council through exclusionary rules related to payment of taxes and ability to speak Dutch, in the face of the fact that the natives comprised three-quarters of the population. Justification for piped water service in kampung settlements was caused by the fear that crowding and unhealthy conditions would lead to epidemics spreading into the European quarters. This led to selective extension of service to some kampung settlements. Political impetus such as the non-interference policy and the majority of the populations inability to pay taxes were restrictive forces 72 that prevent residents from demanding or benefiting from piped water and other services. The quality and quantity of drinking water in Batavia was managed so as to maintain the interests of the Europeans. In the post-colonial period, the piped water service has increasingly been justified by the economic logic. Despite government intervention to expand service, such logic excludes the majority, who cannot pay for it. This indicated that the government did not change the assumptions made during the colonial socio-political system. As a result, the service of piped water continues to belong to and serve those who live in or close to areas that have traditionally been served by the Dutch government. What seems to be a colonial matter, persist today. Interestingly, the pattern of selectively improving service to the poorest, closest kampung settlements in the city (for health, economic, and urban pacification reasons) also persists. In the early 20th century, Batavia was once called "the eastern town,...a town in which the western spirit exists as something from the past" (Abeyasekere 1987:124). This depicts Batavia as increasingly showing its native character, but the colonial, uprooted legal and political system remained the driving forces behind the structure of society. In the case of piped water, access to it was denned by the socio-political system, legitimized by the legal system, and then justified by the economic system. In the post-colonial period, that socio-political system was not redefined in order to increase the service to the whole population. Thus the legal system was created with assumptions that there was no disproportionate benefits created by the previous policies. As a result, economic logic tended to dominate the determination of the service expansion. The traditional elite groups continued to benefit even when kampung improvement was prioritized. 73 Piped water supply has always lagged behind demand. The town, which was transformed as a result of rapid migration and expansion of settlement, did not pair population growth with the need to facilitate it. In the Dutch period, planning concentrated on the expansion of the Dutch settlements. During the Soekarno years, planning was still top down and used mainly as an instrument for rallying around political causes that absorbed the bulk of the government's budget. It was during the Suharto years that a more realistic planning for urban services began, steeped in a techno-managerial approach. This chapter provides lessons that the economic justification for the expansion of piped water cannot be used as the only determining factor for creating services. There needs to be an understanding of the socio-political history and systems, including the fact that rapid, unplanned, non-designated growth makes problematic the planning environment in modern developing world cities. The legal system and the economic logic will have to follow the dynamics and interaction of the residents in the city if equitable service is to be pursued. 74 3. URBANIZATION, WATER REGIME AND THE FLOW OF WATER SUPPLY FOR JAKARTA After a generation or more of excessive water use and reckless discharge of municipal and industrial wastes, the situation of the world's major cities is appalling and getting worse. (The Dublin Statement, Conference on Water and the Environment, 1992, cited in Black 1994:1). "Water scarcity" has become the most pressing urban issue in developing countries. The road chosen by these countries to development in general, attempting to "catch up" with the developed world, has led to a vicious circle in which pollution produced as a result of industrialization poisons the cities (Sancton cited in Kolo 1991:213). The natural environment, of which freshwater is a part, deteriorates. Water is sometimes protected in order to sustain human lives, but is just as often harmed as it receives people's waste. Inconsistency in determining where and when to protect water and where and when to allow it to be degraded leads to mixed results. Experiences show that without firm guidelines for action, a destructive pattern tends to ensue. This chapter describes the issue of water scarcity: the extraction and transfer of clean water to, and the distribution of clean water within, Jakarta. In terms of water extraction and transmission, a comparison between a potential supply of clean water and the current capacity to withdraw water is presented. Opportunities and constraints caused by different uses of water and of water bodies are detailed. A second area detailed examines current water distribution in Jakarta and the implications of maintaining the mechanisms of production. 75 3.1 Urbanization and Clean-Water Provision In a period where many judge "development" on indexes of manufacturing output, productivity, high technology, education, and level of employment, the provision of clean water as a basic service falls into a different category. Water supply issues belong to a trajectory connected less to industrialization and more to fallacious ideas about abundant water availability. Today, the capacity to provide clean water is determined by methods of water withdrawal and institutional arrangements to monitor water availability. Most important, the provision of clean water should be studied in relation to government commitments and the prospect of acting on the basis of these commitments. 3.1.1 Economic Development, Urban Policies and Commitments to Clean-water Provision Many researchers have conclusively demonstrated that the robust economic performance experienced in the developing world is essentially driven by the large cities (Kelley and Williamson 1987; Brennan and Richardson 1989:121; UNDP 1990:18; Rondinelli 1991:794).' Large cities facilitate the creation of "economies of scale" that accommodate increased economic and sectoral productivity. On the other hand, large size generates additional demand for a variety of basic services. In general, these have not been successfully accommodated (Richardson 1989:367; Drakakis-Smith 1995:667).2 Beckermah (1992:493). shows that rising per 1 Large cities i n the Developing countries can contribute up to 70 percent of G D P of their respective countries and 8 0 % of the growth i n its added value Q?ugh 1996:1053). In L a t i n Amer ica , the contribution of large cities to their national income typical ly far exceeds their proportional population share. 2 Such a statement discards the cause o f basic service deficiency that ' i n almost a l l cases the heart of the problems lies i n the failure of investment to keep pace wi th population growth.' Increasing numbers of researchers agree that control l ing city size is not viable option w i th in the debate on city size and the improvement o f basic services (Misra and D u n g 1983:55; Richardson 1989:367). 76 capita income at the national level does not produce a similar rise in access to potable water, satisfactory sewerage and sanitation arrangements.3 Potable water and other basic services are seen as having social values. Investment decisions tend to be made on the basis of "sentimental intuition" and "judgment," and not a mechanical least-cost analysis. Lack of these basic services can have implications for economic growth. A study by the World Bank shows that production costs for goods and services were as much as 30 percent higher in some cities of the developing world because firms had to provide their own water and power supply (Lee et al. 1986 cited in Stren 1993:127). Lack of access to these services imposes a high cost on private investment, and can result in loss of competitive advantage in the global chase for capital. In Indonesia, as in many other countries in the developing world, the lack of a link between concern about basic services and concern about development can be traced back to national development policies adopted in the early 1970s. Development was interpreted as poverty alleviation, and was to occur in tandem with economic growth. Infrastructure investment and policy levers were selectively directed to the so-called "productive infrastructure sector;" mainly education, transportation, and housing, (World Bank 1994:4). As well, policies were created to support import substitution and other protectionist measures. These policies assumed a bias towards urban development (Pugh 1996:1046); though the government did try to stem the rural to urban population flow. Unfortunately, even within the few macroeconomic and agricultural policies that were specifically structured to support living conditions in urban areas, urban water 77 supply was rarely considered.4 Public investment in basic services directed to urban areas was seen as "counterproductive since it reinforces a well-established urban bias to the detriment of rural areas" (Lipton cited in Stren 1993:126). A good urban water supply was seen as a factor that triggered further migration to urban areas, rather than as infrastructure necessary to support urban development. This atmosphere of "anti-urbanism" linked to water supply planning was slowly overturned in the mid-1970s with a change in policy direction. This new direction prioritized the improvement of urban infrastructure in relation to the wider economy (Pugh 1996:1053). The urban water supply sector became part of bigger urban programs, such as housing projects involving sites-and-services schemes, and slum-upgrading designed to improve the conditions in which the urban poor lived. Urban clean water supply, together with sanitation, were seen as essential "basic needs" to be met before upgrading efforts and community investment (Choguill 1994:940). While these local projects were seen as successful in introducing access to clean water and sanitation, urban service deficiencies that existed at the city scale continued to be ignored. A further change of policy direction in the 1980s—towards rural-urban development in which cities were seen positively as generators of growth in an effort to reduce regional disparity (Pemia 1991:118)— only triggered limited attempts to connect the problem of water supply and demand. Furthermore, the provision of clean water was not well considered in interventive policy options such as decentralization, investment incentives to lagging regions, and control of industrial zones. These policy changes only strengthened the view that problems could wait until economic progress 3 Consequenuy, access to clean water is rarely used as an indicator of successful economic development. 4 The low priority of urban programs relative to rural ones and a lack of material improvement in lending for urban projects is evident from the amount of aid provided by international aid agencies (Jones and Ward 1994:36). 78 granted the central government the financial, technical and human capital resources for construction of advanced potable water and sanitation services. Yet the widespread push to prioritize access to clean water is not new. The United Nation's Mar del Plata Action Plan in 1977 stated that access to water is a basic right of a person in order to pursue "a quality of life that is consistent with human dignity" (Easter and Nickum 1994:3). To support the implementation of water-related agenda issues, the UN declared the period of 1981-1990 as the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD) and set up the aggressive goal of providing 100 percent of the world's population with access to clean water by the end of 1990. Many developing countries were urged to launch policies in order to reduce levels of illness and diseases as well as lost productivity. The suggestion was that they set aside 10 percent of their budgets for executing the policies (UN Chronicle 1987:50).5 Unfortunately, the global outlook was not satisfactory: by 1990, the percentage of the people having adequate water supply and sanitation services in urban areas had either increased somewhat or at worst had remained the same, though the progress in rural areas was much better (Biswas 1992:71). One lesson learned was that increased access to clean water in rural areas was created not by introducing standardized technology, but by utilizing low-cost technology and involving user communities as active participants (Black 1994:11; Howlett 1995:217). In contrast, urban managers and planners contended that access to clean water should be provided through a standardized physical infrastructure, such as water piping and sewer networks to increase the level of service. Such a uniform, standardized level of service demands the use of high technology and increases the cost of service to a point where national governments cannot afford to implement 79 plans. In large cities of Asia, in addition to limited technical capacity and financial resources, rapid urban population growth is a major factor that constrains increasing access to clean water (United Nations 1989; Easter and Nickum 1994:3). It is not a surprise that during IDWSSD, Asia's large cities could only increase their populations' access to clean water by four percent (Christmas and de Rooy 1991:129). In 1994, at least 170 million urban dwellers lacked a source of potable water near their home and nearly 350 million lacked access to basic sanitation (World Bank 1994:12). The decade ended with a Global Consultation on Safe Water and Sanitation for the 1990s in New Delhi in 1991, which emphasized the principle of "some for all rather than more for some." This encouraged policy makers to think in terms of mass coverage and unserved population. By the early 1990s, multinational aid agencies had been able to fund less than 10 percent of the work towards the new goal of 100 percent coverage by the year 2000 (Christmas and de Rooy 1991). Given circumstances, it is highly unlikely that that goal can even be approximated. It is predicted that national governments can only contribute 20 percent of the cost. This crisis in funding necessitates restructuring the way existing funds are used, and the rethinking of conventional methods of public health engineering and their economics. A unanimous formal agreement was eventually arrived at to explore ways to deliver water and sanitation services using low-cost, people-centred approaches (Black 1994:11). Funds would be directed towards the poor, whose access to the government-sponsored water supply is most restricted and whose demand is least fulfilled. If the successful experiences in rural areas are any indication, by using only 30 percent of the annual capital investment predicted as needed to meet 5 A s contarninated water was blamed for up to eighty petcent o f a l l human illness and disease OHowlett 1995:216). 80 the year 2000 goal, many cities can increase their population coverage up to 80 percent (Christmas and de Rooy 1991:134). The Mar del Plata Action Plan also recognized that access to clean water could only be improved if water provision is integrated with improved sanitation. Yet while access to clean water generated international commitments and action, this was not the case in the sanitation sector where little change was implemented. By 1990, 65 percent of the Southeast Asian urban population had access to clean water; only 35 percent were served by proper sanitation (Lee 1994Z>:24). This figure does not account for problems of inadequate drainage, sewerage and industrial waste treatment. Service deficiencies mean waste is dumped into water bodies. High concentrations of population, rising urban consumption levels and large industrial parks perpetuate the use of water bodies as waste sinks, which reduces the capacity of water bodies to "produce" clean water. Sanitation and water-borne pollution results, according to one estimate from the early 1990s, in an annual environmental cost of US$ one billion and US$ two billion in Jakarta and Bangkok respectively (Brandon and Ramankutty 1993:6). This environmental cost reflects the losses incurred by the economies of these cities to maintain economic activity at the current rate. The high economic, health and environmental cost leads scholars and multinational aid agencies to promote pragmatic, community-based, action-oriented approaches. These are often grouped under the term the "brown environmental agenda," which is specifically aimed at improving sanitation, sewerage, solid waste and drainage systems at the neighbourhood level, and improving access to clean water. Other international programs, such as the Metropolitan Environmental 81 Improvement Program sponsored by the World Bank, promote the sharing of best practices regarding urban environmental management. The problem of integrating environmental protection into the urban water supply sector practices does not reduce the importance of treating the issue of water scarcity on its own. Water availabUity and delivery demands specific, intensive attention in order to integrate planning into an increasingly complex web of issues. 3.1.2 Redefining the Welfare Approach to Basic Service in Urban Areas Until the 1980s, a welfare approach to water production and provision in the urban context assumed a "public good" dimension. The consumption level per capita was considered constant and this forced the providers to determine the level of availabUity (Shmanske 1991:100-101). In order to secure availabUity and to provide equitable service, this approach dictated that clean water be provided collectively so that it could be jointly consumed. This provision embraced the notion of non-rejectibility, which means that once a good is provided it must be equaUy consumed by all, even those who do not wish to do so. As a basic urban service, the provision of water to its citizens was the responsibility of the government. In the 1990s, the notion of improving the welfare of the city is no longer adequate as a basis for providing service. This decade saw a new view: that planning for the provision of clean water entails setting realistic goals based on different criteria. Infrastructure investment, while keeping many equity concerns, should now be directed to supporting urban productivity, investment and environmental integrity. Universal, free or almost free access to clean water can lead to users 82 consuming water in non-conserving ways. This new view coincided with the 1992 pre-Earth Summit International Conference on Water and the Environment.6 Key principles of water declared at the conference were: water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good; and, water should be allocated at a market price where the cost of providing it is covered, with some method for subsidizing delivery to the poor. For water, being seen as an economic good means that it is considered scarce and that emphasis is put on increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of current supply. Using the market mechanism for allocating water is also seen as a direct means of encouraging conservation (Winpenny 1994:43). It can reduce the long standing problem of inefficient use triggered by subsidized pricing, unbalanced funding between the poor and the rest of the population, and the environmental costs of water conservation. 3.1.3 The Workings of a Water Market and the Maturity of the Water Economy The introduction of market principles to the water supply sector seems to be a breakthrough: an attractive mechanism to formally allocate water in urban areas. Indeed, the introduction is largely a product of inevitable pressure from the water market that has developed to handle non-formal water allocation in many cities in developing countries (Saliba and Bush 1987:8). The idea has been practised in cities such as .Mexico City, Bangkok, Jakarta, and Tegucigalpa, Honduras. 6In 1991, the International Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin concluded that the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD) would be extended to the year 2000. The commitment from the Dublin conference found a forum in a special chapter of Agenda 21 from the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro with the slogan "Water and Sanitation for Al l . " In 1994, a follow-up conference on "Implementing UNCED Agenda 21: Drinking Water and Environmental Sanitation" was held in Noordwijk, the Netherlands. 83 "Conimodifying" water is especially prevalent among consumers whose access to state-provided sources is most restricted. Working outside of the regulated system, non-formal markets arise from a "traditional law," in which those who own or can access water sources have a right to transfer the water. Long term availability is limited by hydrological capacity rather than legal and institutional means. The market will continue to exploit water sources as long as clean-water demand exists and clean water is available. The emergence of the water market usually indicates the condition of scarcity. To identify the extent of such scarcity, the water market can be seen as a part of the overall water allocation system, often called the "water economy." Young (1982 cited in Saliba and Bush 1987: 44) distinguishes two phases of development of the water economy, the expansionary phase and the mature phase. Table 3.1 summarizes the characteristics of each. Table 3.1 The Expansionary and Mature Phases of a Water Economy Expansionary Phase Mature Phase Supply of Water Elastic Inelastic Demand for Water Expanding Rapidly Expanding more Slowly Social Cost of Subsidy for Increased Water Used Low Rising Physical Condition of Water Facilities New Many old Facilities Competition between Different Uses Low High Type of Externalities Drainage Aquifer Depletion; Water Pollution Source: (Randall 1981 cited in Nickum and Easter 1994:7). In the expansionary phase, the cost of providing new water supply facilities remains relatively constant, in real terms. The supply of clean water is elastic, as ample undeveloped water resources are still available to meet or drive demand. The distribution of clean water is supported by the 84 new, under-utilized facilities. Extensive development of high water consumption activities, particularly irrigated agriculture, is taking place. The mature phase reverses these characteristics. Water producers have fully developed the inexpensive options of supply. New options cost significantly more, which makes supply inelastic in relation to demand. Such a mature phase usually begins during a shift from the primary economic sector to higher-value sectors, such as manufacturing or commerce. The shift results in rapidly rising water costs and greatly increases interdependencies between water users. Conflicts between users cannot be avoided; the consequences are usually pollution and environmental degradation. A mature water economy is not seen as a "true" end state (Nickum and Easter 1994:4). Neutze (1997:9) argues, rather, that it reflects a cycle that occurs in public expenditures as people and politicians swing between periods of inefficiency in the public sector and periods when urban environment and amenity issues are addressed intensively. Responses to the mature phase can be varied. From the perspective of increasing the water supply, cities usually invest heavily in the physical infrastructure to bring more water into the city. From the perspective of maintaining water demand, cities create a demand management scheme for reducing consumptive use in all sectors, installing proper water meters, recycling water, and introducing water-balance audits. 3.1.4 The Regime of Water and Rules of Institutions Reaching the mature water economy means that the problems of clean-water provision go beyond the physical or hydrological availability of water. Technological supports to fulfill water demand are no longer the simple answer. Concern regarding water availability expands to include concern 85 about pollution, inefficient and ineffective distribution, and conflicts between users. Logic dictates that relying on technological advances alone to address these many concerns will be too expensive. With this in mind, the problem definition shifts and issues related to water are analyzed from the point of view of institutional choices and policy options under which transfer of clean water is implemented. The principal actors involved in such an effort are those who govern, determine the rules, develop policies, or otherwise become influential in resolving problems. Ostrom (1990:51) presents an elaborate but strong definition regarding institutions for managing water. Institutions are defined as "a set of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make decision in some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what information must or must not be provided and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions." "A set of working rules" means rules that permit, forbid, and require some action or outcome. They can be formal or informal, but they must be actually used, monitored, and enforced when individuals make choices about their actions. These rules can be derived from: 1) a country's constitution; 2) collective choices that are usually formal or common and operate specifically to deal with particular issues; and 3) the practice of operators and those who attempt to reduce the gap between written rules and the facilitation of common goals. Table 3.2 shows the relations between institutions and rules. To understand the roles of institutions and prospect of institutional change when a mature water economy is reached, it is essential to recognize levels of rules created by different institutions. Ostrom (1990:53) uses the above split to distinguish three levels of rules. At the first level are constitutional choice rules which affect operational activities by determining specific frameworks for crafting collective choice rules. At the second level are collective-choice rules, which 86 indirectly affect operational choices as they are used by-officials and external authorities in policy-making. Finally, at the third level are operational rules or practice rules that affects day-to-day decisions and actions concerning when, where, and how to extract resources, exchange information, offer rewards, or deliver sanctions. . Table 3.2 Linkages between Rules and Levels of Analysis Rules: Constitutional Collective Choice Operational Level of Analysis: Processes: Constitutional Choice - Formulation - Governance Collective Choice - Policy Making - Management Operational Choice - Provision - Monitoring - Enforcement Source: (modified after Ostrom, Tiebout et al. 1961:53). In the provision of clean water in urban Indonesia, constitutional rules and rights are assumed to be fixed and essentially "good." Constitutional rules are often general statements, which are interpreted further for the purpose of clean-water provision. An evolving process of interpretation takes place as broader rules are applied to practice. The current worldwide reform of the water supply sector will not be driven at the scale of practice. It is the government, as principal facilitator of collective choice, that needs to recognize not only the changing nature of water provision problems, but also the fact that past solutions are no longer suitable. The government is expected to develop new relationships with the public they serve. Securing new goals depends on cooperation with non-governmental actors and organization that are also involved in efforts to provide clean water. A modified water regime will be comprised of various players and users. This chapter will present the rules in place at the constitutional and collective-choice levels. The rules at the level of practice will be presented in the chapters that follow. 87 3.2 Policies on Water Supply in Urban Areas In many cities in the developing world, water supply policies are highly influenced by the commitments of government institutions. Issues of water supply have been integrated into specific infrastructure developments as well as broader urban development policies. As water increasingly becomes a source of conflict, policy development becomes more complex and the implementation of policies depends upon explicit political and international commitments to take actions. 3.2.1 National Policies on the Urban Water Sector Since its conception, Indonesia has followed a social orientation for managing its resources. This is represented in the State's position on resource ownership rights, which are used as a base for estabhsbing principles and policies of water management. The National Constitution of 1945, article 33 section 3, sets forth the status of water: "The land, water and natural riches contained therein [such as minerals and oil] shall be controlled by the State and utilized in order to achieve the maximum welfare of the people." The meaning of "control by the State" is expanded on in the Basic Agrarian Act No.5 of 1960 article 2 section 8 to include the State's right to: 1) regulate the allocation, use, provision, and sustenance of the resources; and 2) to determine and regulate legal relations between persons and legal actions pertaining to the resources. The government's right is essentially binding at all scales and locations. These rights can be exercised, for example, as part of partnerships in the partially State-controlled extraction of oil, coal, gas, mineral resources, forests, and, increasingly, clean water. These rights establish the 88 government as the dominant player in determining patterns of extraction, transmission and distribution. The Water Resource Development Act No.11/1974 (C777No.il/1974) establishes the duty of the State to develop basic water management guidelines, planning, and project designs, which are to be in accordance with established priorities set out in national, regional and local policies.7 The Ministry of Public Works (MPW) is responsible for the management of surface water, and the Ministry of Mining and Energy (MME) for the management of underground water. UU No. 11/1974 also delineates mandatory roles for the community, corporations and individuals who benefit directly from water resource developments. They are to participate in some areas of operations, maintenance and repairs. Generally, the right of a population to use water resources is denned as "collectively recognized access to water resources under specific conditions such as point of diversion, season, location, purposes of use, and quantity of withdrawals" (Saliba and Bush 1987:1). UU No. 11/1974 defines the population's right to utilize water, while retaining for the government the right to unutilized water. The right to utilize water is a "traditional right" and resides with the owner(s) of land in which, or over which, water sources are located.8 Water utilization rights are only available to those who own the land, and water may not be diverted to any other lands. Only the government has the right to transfer water. 7 F r o m the viewpoint of hydrology, the meaning of water is the water that fol lows the natural no rm or hydrological cycle. There are atmospheric water, sea water, and land water. UU No . 11/1974 only covers land water, and does not cover sea water w h i c h is already i n land (Japan International Cooperation Agency 1996d:2-5). 8 UU No . 11/1974 does not recognize r iparian rights, i n wh ich the right to ut i l ize water resides wi th the owners of the land adjacent to a watercourse. 89 Unlike the regulations regarding the rights to land, C/f/No. 11/1974 does not define or regulate an individual or collective groups' property rights to water; neither does it allow right holders to form secure expectations regarding benefits stemming from their rights. Without clear definitions, private water rights are insecure.9 Water bodies could be accessed without umit and irresponsibly, since no person or institution could be held accountable for the degradation caused. In 1982, this started to change with the Basic Act regarding the Environment (t7c7L/Y No.4/1982). It proclaims the right of all Indonesians to a healthy environment and mentions their responsibility to prevent and abate pollution. Several laws were then ratified to further delineate the rights and duties of those whose activities cause water pollution. As the sole holder of water rights, the government is forced to take a stand in a difficult attempt to balance the interests of the affected and those of the polluters. Since 1969, the provision of clean water in urban areas of Indonesia has been an issue in development policies. At the national policy level, Water Supply and Sanitation is a sub-sector under the category Housing and Human Settlement. The experiences of the first two Five-Year Development Programs (Repelita I 1969/70-1974/5 and Repelita II 1974/5 - 1979/80) showed a constant inability to increase supply to fulfill intended goals. The policy of clean-water provision concentrates on delivering raw, clean water at or above the lowest permissible standard of clean water suggested by World Health Organization. Until the end of Repelita II, the goal was production increases rather than attention to distribution. In the sanitation sub-sector, the attention was limited, following the established precedent that urban sanitation is the responsibility 9 Government Regulation (PP) No.22/1982 regarding Water Resource Management, and PP No.23/1982 regarding Irrigation are the only ones which regulate the rights and duties involved in the transferring of water between the government and the members of society who gain from distribution. 90 of the local government. A lesson from the Kampung Improvement Program is that cities that attempt to improve water delivery at the same time as sanitation, solid waste disposal and drainage show the best results. Since Repelita III (1979/80-1984/85), the Government of Indonesia has recognized this and has begun to direct funding towards urban sanitation as well as urban clean water supply. Despite this, the main target of Repelita HI was to expand potable water service to 60 percent of the urban population (Asian Development Bank 1990:12; Government of Indonesia 1994; Japan International Cooperation Agency 1996d:l-31). In the sanitation sub-sector, the target was less clear, purportedly to allow flexibility in prograrnming and implementation. The emphasis was on preliminary sewerage master plans, equipment investment, and the rehabilitation of existing drainage systems. Over the course of Repelita IV (1984/85-1989/90), the population with access to piped water increased two-fold: from 9 million to 18 million. The coverage target of 75 percent, however, was not achieved (World Bank 1993:46). Despite the declaration of IDWSSD, the most concrete result that Indonesia can point to is the setting up of policy directives. These were formulated for Repelita IV. The directives were: 1) decentralization of the central government's mandate; 2) development of cost recovery; 3) integration of sanitation and infrastructure planning; and, 4) retention of technical development and guidance at the national level (Asian Development Bank 1990:16). 91 During Repelita IV, the policy emphasis was still firmly on expanding supply through the construction of new water facilities. Some attention was paid to improving efficiency, such as reducing losses, improving quality, increasing revenue collection, and identifying user-demand and institutional needs at the local level; but these areas were only prioritized in Repelita V (1989/90-1994/95). Also during 1980s, the approach to water and other services swung from being compartmentalized toward integrating the components into a policy package. Beginning in Repelita V, water supply, distribution and sanitation, together with road, electricity, and telecommunication, were consolidated under the Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Program (IUIDP).10 IUIDP requires that local governments initiate and administer the planning, design and implementation of multi-year programs for the integrated development of most local infrastructure. The central government provides the financial and technical support that is not available at the local level. By the early 1990s, the government of Indonesia had increased the funding for urban water supply and sanitation to about 0.6 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. In real terms, however, the government investment allocated to the water sector declined from Rp. 300 billion a year (1989 prices) in 1987/1988 to Rp. 175 billions in 1990/91 (World Bank 1994: 146). Repelita VI (1994/95-1999/2000) calls for 40 percent of total development expenditures to be allocated to infrastructure needs, of which 11 percent is to come from direct government spending and the rest from international sources and the domestic non-public sector. The financial crisis of 1997 has made Repelita VI planning somewhat less meaningful. 1 0 RJIDP is a larger scale version of KIP which is applied to city-wide scale. The key components in IUIDP are: 1) urban planning, 2) drinking water; 3) drainage; 4) sewerage/human waste; 5) solid waste; 6) flood control; and 7) housing. 92 3.2.2 National Policies at the City Level In Metropolitan Jakarta, policies on water supply and sanitation have historically been adapted from the policies developed at the national level. Details are made explicit and the policies are made more technical. The urban problems of Jakarta are complex and programs in the water supply sector were and are well-planned and well-designed compared to other Indonesian cities. Programs are not as well-advanced in the sanitation sector. When the national government proposed integration of water supply and sanitation under KJIDP, Jakarta found it could not comply. Instead, Jakarta was allowed to develop two separate programs. Jakarta Sanitation and Sewerage Program (JSSP) was launched in Repelita IV (World Bank 1993:60). It is aimed at providing 31 percent of the population with sanitation facilities. The first choice is to equip the population with on-site technologies at the household level. In the implementation of JSSP, it was found necessary to build off-site, collective treatment facilities, particularly in densely-populated areas. At the city level, urban spatial planning plays a significant role in how policy-makers reconcile policies on water supply and sanitation with other urban activities. Since the 1970s, Jakarta realized that the availability of freshwater would constrain urban development. The protection of water sources became a strong factor influencing planning. The master plan of Jakarta, known as Jakarta 2005,n and related policy documents promoted, and still promote, the integration of land use planning and environmental concerns. Growth management is imposed through controlling development and restricting urban expansion to the south of Jakarta, where there are 11 Jakarta 2005 was ratified as the Regulation of the Government of DKI Jakarta No. 5/1984. 93 environmentally sensitive areas and natural amenities. Urban expansion is promoted on an east-west axis (see Figure 3.1). DKI JAKARTA Figure 3.1 Growth Management as Planned in Jakarta 2005 In reality, north-south sprawl has not been stopped and is now taking place beyond the administrative boundary of DKI Jakarta, as is some development to the east and west. This forces planners to devise alternative solutions and try to extend the geographical area covered by plans. In 1976, the entity of Jabotabek was introduced to include Jakarta and the surrounding regions, 94 called Botabek (Giebels 1986).12 Jakarta 2005 is more restrictive toward new land development and only accommodative to intensified development within the existing envelope. Land development restrictions in South Jakarta are re-emphasized and new controls and restrictions have been introduced for Northeast and Northwest Jakarta.13 Most areas of Botabek have less restrictive growth policies. 3.3 The Supply of Water to Jakarta: From Upstream to Downstream The dependence of Jakarta on its surrounding, upstream regions for clean water has been taken for granted since the colonial era. The downstream flow has fed the community, replenished fertile soil and transformed land into green paddy fields. The extraction and transmission of water and, as important, the protection of upstream water sources has become essential for the survival of Jakarta. The connection of Jakarta with its surrounding regions can be identified by the hydrological cycle of water that supplies the city's demand. First, there is surface water, which is collected in bodies such as rivers, lakes, ponds and canals usually located in the upstream areas to the south. Surface water flows towards sea level from land in a river basin bounded by watersheds that forms a strong natural unity called a "river basin unit." This river basin unit supplies renewable freshwater to the city, transmitted through rivers, shallow groundwater, and human-made viaducts and canals before it reaches the consumers in the city, directly or indirectly through water treatment plants. ^Presidential Instruction No. 13/1976 ratifies the establishment of Jabotabek as a Greater Jakarta metropolitan region and the management of Jabotabek under a coordination of several ministries (Home Affairs, Public Works, and Industry), Provincial Government of West Java and the National Planning and Development Board. 1 3 Restriction of new physical development to the Northeast and Northwest areas is also to reduce encroachment to the coastal zones and agricultural rich areas in the north. 95 The second source is groundwater or subsurface water which, is often called "invisible water." This is present under every point of land, though not always in a quantity, quality or depth suitable for withdrawal and use. This water is usually collected within a particular groundwater basin. Groundwater has become a significant, local source of water for Jakarta, extracted by pumps from drilled wells. In reality, the two types of water, surface and groundwater, are linked and always on the move, though with greater speed at the surface than underground. Through natural springs, groundwater can become surface water. Through seepage, surface water can become groundwater. During a drought, the only water flowing through a river is from groundwater. Upstream areas to the south of Jakarta are important for these springs as well as for surface water catchment reasons. 3.3.1 Surface Wa t e r : F r o m the R i ve r Basins to the C i t y Jakarta is connected to two river basins: the Cisadane-Ciliwung, which runs to the west of Jakarta, and the Citarum to the east of Jakarta (see Figure 3.2). The Citarum basin is one of the largest on the island of Java, covering about 5,960 km2 and producing 189.1 m3/s(Bukit 1995:1). The greater part of it is highly productive land, fed by the abundant availability of water from its main river, Citarum. The flow of water, however, is so intermittent that the locals say: "During the rainy season, we cannot sit on our toilet. During the dry season, we cannot use it to cleanse ourselves." Since 1963, there has been an ongoing effort to reduce the fluctuation between dry and rainy seasons, particularly for the benefit of irrigation. The result has been three major dams: Jatiluhur, Saguling and Cirata. Today, these dams irrigate more than 56 percent of the basin (Bukit 1995:1), the country's most fertile agricultural land. 96 DKI Jakarta has benefited from the construction of these dams. Jakarta's Water-supply enterprise (PAM Jaya) obtains its water supply mainly from the Jatiluhur Dam, transmitted through a conveyance system called West Tarum Canal (WTC). WTC carries to Jabotabek approximately 30 m3/s of water for industrial and municipal purposes (Government of Indonesia 1994:30). In terms of water quality, a Government of Indonesia report (1994:50) shows that the water released from the Jatiluhur Dam is considered sufficiently clean to drink. In WTC, however, water from the Jatiluhur reservoir is joined by water from other sources such as natural runoff and agricultural use. Water is also siphoned off for use along the way. Only about 50 percent of the water that reaches Jakarta is originally from Jatiluhur (Government of Indonesia 1994:50). As the Citarum river basin is already well-utilized as a water source, there is an increasing amount of extraction taking place on the west side of Jakarta. The west-side is where the Cisadane -Ciliwung river basin is located, with a size of 3,456 km2 and run water of a volume of 97.9 m3/s (Japan International Cooperation Agency 1996d:5). Flow from this basin fills the rivers and canals that run into the city. The major river, Cisadane, together with two smaller rivers, the Ciujung and Cidurian, partially supply water to Jakarta. During the dry season, about 20 percent of water from upstream is used for municipal and industrial purposes and 40 percent for agriculture (Japan International Cooperation Agency 1996a: 34). Flow in the lower section of the Cisadane river is an important source of water for industrial zones and in new, privately developed towns in Botabek. 97 0.2 m3/s* J a v a S e a ' D K I .1 A K A R T A Ciburial-Ctpraas 2.8 mr/s I 8.5 m3/s* ^95 m3/s jatiluhur Dam Use for Powerplan mi1 * surface water supply for piped water in Jakarta the water goes to the rivers and canals in Jakarta Figure 3.2 Flow of Surface Water to DKI Jakarta 3.3.2 Groundwater in Jakarta DKI Jakarta is located above the Jakarta Groundwater Basin. It is delineated by the Cisadane river system in the west, the Bekasi/Cikeas rivers in the east, and Java Sea in the north. The southern boundary is approximately near the town of Depok in Bogor, partially due to low permeability and the thin aquifer (Soetrisno, H et al. 1997:2).14 The water in the basin—considered a deepwater basin—is a mix of mainly freshwater, which seeps in through ground cover or flows from the south, and occasionally brackish water, which flows from the north. The geological setting of Jakarta is considered complex, a separation between shallow and deep groundwater is not easily delineated (Hoogeven and Van Leeuwen 1995:91).15 So-called shallow groundwater is 1 4 Geological survey done by the DGTL has not been able to establish the exact, southern boundary of Jakarta Groundwater B a s i n (Tirtomihardjo 1996:1). 1 5 The geological and hydrological settings are too complex to be separated between aquifers and aquitards. However, i n the Jakarta basin, i t is better to use terms l i ke aquifer zones ind icat ing combinations o f smal l sand lenses, w h i c h are found i n a certain depth range (Government of Indonesia 1994:83). 98 preserved in an unconfined aquifer situated at depths up to 40 m. The circular flow of shallow groundwater, from recharge points to the drainage canals or stream, is mostly local. The replenishment of freshwater in the unconfined aquifer usually depends on the existence and the size of the recharge areas, such as natural reservoirs, ponds and green space. The size of the groundwater reserves is due to high precipitation levels, with long term mean annual rainfall between 1,500 mm and 3,000 mm (Tirtomihardjo 1996:1). In the Jakarta groundwater basin, about 25 to 35 percent of precipitation reaches the underground tables (Mining Section of DKI Jakarta 1995:47).16 Only about 1 percent absorbed reaches deep groundwater (see Figure 3.3). The rest flows as run off water and fills up surface water bodies. Deep groundwater is generally defined as water found in semi-confined or unconfined aquifers at a depth more than 40 m. The use of deep groundwater is determined by the type of pumping technology used. Most deep groundwater is extracted using drilled wells or artesian wells. In the case of Jakarta, data shows that drilled wells rarely produce water from a depth less than 60 meters (Government of Indonesia 1994:86). Thus, the flow of freshwater in deep aquifers originates from geological evolution over the period of 60,000 years. The replenishment rate is low and the availability of fresh water can be considered constant. 1 6 This calculation and the numbers presented in Figure 3.3 is based on the simulation model done by Schmidt and Tirtomihardjo (1986). 99 Precipitation EARTH SURFACE ^ j ^ j , ^ water run off =(65-75)% As / K A I I Evapo Transpiration TOP SOIL SI I A l I OW ( JROIJNDWA i walei absoibed by I! j , ' '=-(25-35)% e.g. rivers, canals, marsh, bogs, ponds shallow 3)% The numbers in percentage were originated from the model developed for Jakarta Groundwater Basin by Schmidt and Tirtomihardjo (1986). Source: Mining Section of DKI Jakarta. 1995. p.47. Figure 3.3 Hydrological Cycle of Groundwater in Jakarta Groundwater Basin 3.3.3 Environmental Protection of the Distribution System For the past 20 years, industrialization in Jakarta has accelerated and so has pollution growth. The 2,500 industries located in the basin of the Citarum river employ over one million people and are major polluters (Bukit 1995:3). Research done by Mahbub (cited in Bukit 1995:2) shows that direct discharge of wastewater into surface water is common practice for over 50 percent of companies. An industrial wastewater treatment plant was not built in the upstream Citarum river area until 1997. A biological wastewater treatment plant has also finally begun operations there. It only accommodates domestic wastewater for a population of 600,000. So far, only the high flow of the Citarum river during the rainy season can flush the wastewater to reduce the level of pollution, enabling the three dams to receive relatively clean water. 100 3.4 Institutional Arrangement for Protecting Water: A Linkage of Regional -Urban Areas The protection of water after it is extracted is not only done by constructing safe intake areas, canals and reservoirs. Government institutions have taken on responsibility to ensure further protection. But in the present era of decentralization, mandates are delegated to regional and local institutions. Strong linkages to the central government and between these institutions is the key. 3.4.1 For Surface Water Based on UU No. 11/1974, the definition of surface water includes water that is located in bodies such as rivers, canals, ponds, lakes and reservoirs and shallow groundwater. This is in deference to the fact that shallow groundwater can become surface water rather easily. MPW has delegated the authority for planning, allocating, licensing and monitoring shallow groundwater extraction to its provincial branch. As regards river basin management, policies and programs originate at the national level and are developed in order to coordinate planning and management between river - basin units. Management of river basins in Jakarta and the surrounding region is currently under MPW. For well-established dams such as Jatiluhur, a special governing authority, Penan Otorita Jatiluhur (POJ) has been created to handle the many aspects in their operation. The high level of physical development upstream has begun to impact downstream areas in the form of increased flooding. In Jakarta,1 floods top the agenda of water management and disaster prevention as every year the flood-prone area expands. Yet there is no organization responsible for predicting and preparing for the problem; it is handled through crisis management. The only programs established to partially prevent floods relate to the management of upstream national parks and nature reserves by the Ministry of Forestry, whose main responsibility is to look after 101 the diversity of flora and fauna in an attempt to maintain biomass volume for water retention. Flood control is monitored and governed by locally based agencies who sometime coordinate the removal of solid waste blockages. Biro Bina Lingkungan Hidup (Environmental Bureau or BBLH) of DKI Jakarta also claims authority to monitor water and ensure that the flow of rivers is not constrained by solid waste. As the Ciliwung - Cisadane rivers are often the source of floods in Jakarta, the Ciliwung - Cisadane River Basin Development Project has been established to address the issue. For other rivers in Jakarta, the flood prevention program is executed by the provincial branch of MPW. 3.4.2 For Groundwater UU No. 11/1974 assigned the MME responsibility for monitoring the hydrologjcal and geological cycle of water, and regulating, planning for, and managing the use of deep groundwater. Within the MME, this mandate is handled by the Directorate of Environmental Geology (DGTL). As a thinktank for scientific research, DGTL is responsible for providing hydrological evaluations of proposals for the extraction of deep groundwater. With the intensive level of deep groundwater utilization and the potential harm of exploitation, the government of Indonesia introduced in 1992 a regulation that requires industries to register before they extract deep groundwater, and to pay levies based on volumes used. In 1996, the mandate of regulating, licensing and monitoring the use of deep groundwater was delegated to the Mining Section of DKI Jakarta. BBLH in DKI Jakarta, which accepts complaints from the public about the impacts of extraction, also plays a major role in monitoring and enforcing extraction permits. 102 3.5 Population Growth and Urban Expansion in Jakarta Jakarta is at the highest rank in the Indonesian urban system—functioning as the hub of government (national, regional, municipal), industry, commerce and transportation. In 1995, approximately 62 percent of private investment and 12 percent of public investment was located in Jakarta. The city accounts for 7 percent of the 12 percent that Jabotabek contributes to the national Gross Domestic Product (Henderson, Kuncoro et al. 1996:73). In recent decades, the city's economy has grown rapidly and it has solidified its rank as the national centre of service and financial activity. 3.5.1 Population Growth Jakarta is also one of the world's fast-growing cities. Since the late 1940s, its population growth has been constantly above the average national urban population growth. Between 1980-1990, the city's population grew 2.4 percent annually, two-thirds of which was from natural increase and one-third from migration (Government of Indonesia 1994:1). The city's prominence as a growth area was, however, overturned in the 1980 when fast growth shifted to the fringe areas of DKI Jakarta. Due to its social, economic, and planning connections to Jakarta, Botabek since 1976 has been legally designated as a spillover region to accommodate population and urban growth.17 Figure 3.4 shows that population growth in Jakarta has slowed down to only 2.08 percent annually between 1990-1995, while Botabek's growth has increased to 1 7 The inclus ion o f Botabek as a part of a metropolitan strategy for Jakarta was ratif ied by Presidential Decree No. 13/1976. However, masterplan for Jabotabek although was made several times, beginning the one i n 1980, was never ratified i n order to be implemented. Thus i t remains a series of recommendation without power. 103 6.40 percent annually, led by areas directly to the west (Bekasi) and to the east (Tangerang) of the city of Jakarta. In contrast, population growth in the Regency of Bogor, to the south of Jakarta, shows signs of slowing down. There is likely residential saturation in the Municipality of Bogor as, in 1995, it reached a density comparable to that in Jakarta. Jabotabek Botabek Regency of Bekasi Regency of Tangerang Regency of Bogor Municipality of Bogor Jakarta ID 1980-1990 • 1971-1980 m1961-1971 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Annual Population Growth Rate Q?ercent per Year) Source: Government of Indonesia. 1994. p.5. Figure 3.4 Population Growth Rate in Jabotabek, 1961-1990 The slowing down of Jakarta's growth cannot be separated from the housing needs that DKI Jakarta can no longer accommodate. Since the 1970s, Bogor (the municipality as well as the regency) was the destination of many Jakartans, as the region has better transportation links to Jakarta than the areas to the east and west. By the late 1980s, new land on the east - west axis 104 became a destination for expansion, hosting the new commuter towns for Jakartans. Today, efforts are mobilized to address continued need, particularly through the participation of the private sector. Twelve new towns and many smaller scale real estates projects have recently or are being developed (Rais 1996:8). Jobs have been slower in disseminating to Botabek, as evinced by the fact that in 1997 the population of Jakarta during the daytime reaches almost 11 million, compared to a night-time population of only 9 milUon (Royat 1996:1). Looking at the internal political geography of Jakarta, the city is divided into five administrative areas: South Jakarta, East Jakarta, Central Jakarta, West Jakarta and North Jakarta. During the period of 1980-1990, the development of an east - west axis outside Jakarta influenced high population growth on the east - west axis inside Jakarta, as shown by the high growth rate of East Jakarta and West Jakarta (see Figure 3.5). This trend has continued through the 1990s. In contrast, the population actually declined in Central Jakarta as land changed from housing to other uses, most noticeably government and corporate office towers. Conversely, North Jakarta has become favoured for higher density residential, commercial and trade zone activities that need to be close to central Jakarta and the region's major seaport. 105 i S 8.00 7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 -1.00 -2.00 South East Cqjjjal B1971-1980 H1980-1990 • 1990-1997 West North DKI : — Jakarta-Administrative Area Source: Central Bureau of Statistics. 1997. Figure 3.5 Population Growth within Five Administrative Areas of DKI Jakarta, 1971-1997 3.5.2 Urban Physical Expansion As a result of population growth, the physical growth of Jakarta has been expansive. The availability of land for development in Jakarta has become umited, leading to soaring land prices. Landowners are persuaded to sell to the highest bidder or to speculate on the price. Higher density use followed many land exchanges. The strongest argument for keeping some land unbuilt, in fact, is the need to maintain and improve publicly accessed open space, such as parks, ponds and grassland. In 1997, only approximately ten percent of Jakarta's land can be considered as open space, protected under government regulations. That figure includes one-third of south 106 Jakarta that cannot legally be built on in order to retain its function as. a recharge area (Special Capital Government of DKI Jakarta 1991). There are areas that need to be reclaimed such as riverbanks, right of ways of railway lines, and areas that are considered disaster-prone, unsanitary and unsafely occupied. There are ample privately owned vacant lands scattered within the city, but they cannot be used for social purposes and are under pressure to be developed. With increased automobile ownership, more open land is paved every year, affecting water penetration and drainage. Jakarta has always wanted to be identified as the urbanized area compare to its surrounding areas. Thus, the urban expansion has to be accommodated within the city limit. The pattern of physical urban expansion in Jakarta has been and is still largely centripetal. The most intensive land development takes place in Central Jakarta where the governmental and corporate activities are concentrated. Central and West Jakarta are mostly residential, with some commercial facilities constructed to serve the populations of these areas. South Jakarta has traditionally been the preferred place for residential expansion, but it is now considered saturated. North Jakarta is the least built up, though it contains the Tanjung Priok seaport. The revitalization of North Jakarta is a new economic opportunity, a "waterfront city" is being planned and includes reclaiming 2,700 ha of land along the coast of Jakarta Bay (Soetrisno, H et al. 1997:1). Since 1973, Jakarta has consolidated land for industrial use. The bulk can be found in North Jakarta close to the port and in the Jakarta Industrial Estate in East Jakarta. 3.6 Water Withdrawal Water withdrawal indicates the amount of water delivered into the city (in the case of piped water) or extracted (in the case of non-piped water) in order to be consumed in the city. The 107 current state of water withdrawal reveals the characteristics of water use in Jakarta. The piped water system in Jakarta is highly dependent on the surrounding region to fulfill its demand and gets almost half of its water directly from outside its boundaries. The first sub section below discusses the collection and transport of water from outside of the city and how the demand for urban use is connected to the demand for agricultural use. The second sub section discusses the characteristics of water withdrawal inside the city and the corresponding potential for conflict between uses and users. 3.6.1 Water from Outside of the City: Between Agriculture Use and Urban Use Surface water for Jakarta flows mostly from Jatiluhur Dam and Cisadane and Ciliwung rivers. From the dam, about 90 percent of water outflow, however, is allocated to irrigating approximately 230,000 ha of double-crop rice fields (Bukit 1995:5). The water is diverted through the West Tarum Canal, Central Tarum Canal and East Tarum Canal. Farmers can obtain water free of charge. In contrast, PAM Jaya gets about 8.5m3/s of clean water from Jatiluhur (Elisawati 1997). Although POJ secures water for agriculture, there is little pressure placed on farmers by POJ to use the resource efficiently. Any pressure, in fact, comes from the "climatic situation," in particular the dry season. A low level of rainfall can possibly result in the loss of a rice planting season, Thus, POJ has to prioritize water allocation to land that is already cultivated and introduce scheduled water allocation to uncultivated land. In the district of Bekasi, water pumping is used to divert water as needed. A program of adjustment also applies to the choice of crops. During the dry period, non-water consumptive agriculture is encouraged. Conservation techniques such as sprinkler technologies and water valves are not extensively used as yet. 108 The nature of agriculture is that, after a significant portion of the water supply has been used, wastewater—often containing fertilizers, pesticides, fungicides as well as organic waste—is discharged into canals and rivers. Today, agriculture and animal husbandry contribute up to 30 percent of the pollution in the Citarum River (Bukit 1995:3). Residential and industrial uses of land in the upstream Citarum river basin also add to pollution and the fluctuation of river flows. All sources have led to the levels above accepted water quality standards (Government of Indonesia 1994:11). In the dry season, oxygen depletion occurs which jeopardizes the plant and animal life in the river. Water from the Citarum River diverted to the Jatiluhur Dam mixes with water already in the reservoir and lowers the quality. Though as mentioned earlier, water is considered to meet the lowest standards of usability, deteriorating conditions at Jatiluhur have necessitated the addition of a treatment facility to de-pollute water before it is diverted to WTC. PAM Jaya, which obtains 85 percent of its water from WTC, is also reported to have increased the use of chemical agents to treat their water due to concern over high pollution levels (Elisawati 1997). From the east side of Jakarta, the Cisadane river contributes roughly 2.8 m3/s to Jakarta's water supply (Government of Indonesia 1994). Agriculture is not as well-established in this region and the practices used are not as water intensive. For this reason, the farmers adjust more easily to the local climatic situation. The upstream areas of the river basin are not densely populated so the water debit between the dry and wet seasons is less. However, the challenge of keeping the Cisadane River relatively free of pollution depends on the practices of wastewater disposal in upstream areas, which now include activities such as a geothermal power plant, a gold mine and a 109 new nuclear research station. Safety efforts are essential to maintaining water quality in the Cisadane River. 3.6.2 Water Inside the City: Water Withdrawal and Water Consumption Comparing water withdrawal and water consumption for the three sources of water is not an easy task mainly because the data represents an approximation to the current condition.18 However, the data presented in Figure 3.6 is an indication of the character of water use in Jakarta. Inside Jakarta, PAM Jaya is designated the sole provider of clean water for the whole city. The existence of piped water from PAM Jaya is expected to prevent water users from extracting groundwater that is increasingly dangerous and uncontrollable. Today, PAM Jaya only supplies approximately 8. 42 m3/s or about 35 percent of total water withdrawn for the city. The rest is withdrawn through local extraction of groundwater; 11.30 m3/s or 47 percent comes from shallow groundwater and 4.20 m3/s or 18 percent from deep groundwater. Surface water that is extractable from local rivers and canals is generally sub-standard. The amount of water taken from these sources is very low and thus goes unmonitored. An elaborate explanation of the data is presented in Appendix B: Quality of Data, Table B. l . 110 1 12 -r 10 8 6 4 2 0 • Water Withdrawal • Water Consumptio S t * BP * * l 11 p 5 o r <5 Source: 21. The Sources of Clean Water • • • — • -" idopted from PAM Jaya 1997 and Japan International Cooperation Agency 1996d p.2-J Figure 3.6 Proportion of Water Withdrawn and Consumed in Jakarta 1995, based on Source Of the water entering the piped water system, not all reaches the consumers. Only about 4.92 m3/s or 60 percent of the total water withdrawn for PAM Jaya is recorded as delivered. The rest is lost in the distribution network. It can be lost either through physical network problems, such faults in in-plant facilities, pipe leakage and faulty connections; or through institutional network problems such as under-registered uses and billing errors. From leakage, piped water may still be consumed, however the amount of consumption has not been estimated. This drops the 34 percent of water withdrawn for PAM Jaya to 24 percent of the total consumption. For groundwater extraction, the distribution network that connects extractor and consumer (often by the same person) is short so leakage is minimal. Three-quarters of the water consumption in Jakarta is obtained from groundwater aquifers: shallow groundwater being the prime source of clean water for many of Jakartans. This prime position in the past belonged to surface water extracted directly from rivers 111 and canals. Despite decades of effort and policies to expand piped water services, many water users still confide in the decades-old tenet that it is better to rely on clean water extracted from the local sources. The data on water withdrawal from deep groundwater sources is obtained from the Mining Section of DKI Jakarta. There are two types of data available. First are data obtained as recorded from their monitoring of wells located in areas close to where the registered wells are extracting water. Second are data recorded based on mandatory registration done by each extractors. The data from the second source is not usually considered a good source as the real extraction is estimated to be three times higher than the registered use (Government of Indonesia 1994:86). The data used to draw Figure 3.6 above have been modified to reflect this reality.19 Like shallow groundwater, the assumption is that there will be little leakage or unused water as most deep groundwater extraction takes place close to where it is consumed. The only issue to note is that sometimes water is "delivered" to the surface though pressure and more may be extracted than needed due to problems regulating flow. Deep groundwater is only extracted in limited locations and is not considered a cheap source. 3.7 Situating the Problems of Water Availability The gap between water withdrawal and water consumption does not adequately indicate how far water can be consumed from each source. The next section discusses the problems that are caused, not by consumption, but by factors influencing the water sources and thus decreasing the availability of water for consumption. 1 9 See Appendix B.2.3, for elaborate explanation. 112 f 3.7.1 Surface Water: The Curtailing of Abundance Surface water is the most promising source for Jakarta from an environmental point of view. It is one of the most renewable and its circular flow is the most immediate of the sources. The thirteen rivers that pass through Jakarta carry enough water to meet demand in the city (Sidharta, Pramono et al. 1991). Yet the ecosystem destruction upstream causes water to be polluted. Sludge, contaminants and solid waste accumulate as the water passes by industry and housing and through river bank settlements. The water courses become sites of wastewater and solid waste disposal, and can no longer be expected to be sources of clean water. The conflict of water bodies between being sources of clean water and sinks has led to the designation of many rivers as parts of the drainage system. Lack of trucks and facilities for solid waste collection contribute to the use of rivers. Of the 1,350 tons of garbage per day that are dumped in Jakarta, 25 percent is taken to designated disposal areas, 42 percent is washed into the sea, and 28 percent is deposited in canals (van Ellen 1996:14). The width of all of Jakarta's rivers has narrowed and they have become increasingly shallow, particularly close to the estuary. The colour of the water has darkened. The solid waste in the rivers and canals has diminished the assimilative capacity of these water bodies and contributes to the high discrepancy of water levels between the dry and rainy seasons. Flooding has become frequent and hazardous to the population of Jakarta. Currently, there is a centralized sewage system that serves 9 percent of the population, mainly those who reside in Central Jakarta (Clarke, Hadiwinoto et al. 1991:22). It has the capacity to serve 500,000 users with a mechanical/biological treatment plant that discharges into the Banjir 113 Canal and a pond. In the sanitation sector, more than 60 percent of households use septic tanks with leaching pits, 17 percent use pit latrines or toilets that discharge directly to the drain; and 6 percent rely on public toilets (World Bank 1993:26). Most households discharge their gray water (water from kitchens, bathroom sinks and laundry) directly to the drain. The situation in 1998 brought competition for water to a head (Kompas, 5 January 1998). Water in the Jatiluhur Dam reservoir was reduced to a critical level due to an extended dry season. Some scheduled irrigation was taking place, but most water was needed by the power plants. The situation forced planners and policy makers to recognize the already existing need to reduce system inefficiency. As well, the rehabilitation and protection of surface water is a necessary first step to restoring the assimilative capacity of water bodies and the ecosystems contained therein. 3.7.2 Groundwater: Over-extraction and the End of its Extraction Not only is there a crisis in terms of surface water, groundwater extraction in DKI Jakarta is a serious problem. About 95 percent of the annual rainfall absorbed into the ground becomes shallow groundwater and just over one percent filters down to become deep groundwater (see Figure 3.3). However, there is a problem regarding absorption. For water to penetrate into the soil, and then move down to the aquifer, there have to exist open areas that are not built-up or paved. Jakarta increasingly lacks such areas. Since the hydrological cycle of shallow groundwater is mainly local, absorption depends on the locally available open space. It is particularly important in South Jakarta where about 30 percent of all groundwater absorption is taking place (Tirtornihardjo 1996). Managing growth there and elsewhere in Jabotabek is essential. 114 Aside from getting a small amount of water from the rainfall, deep groundwater also gains from a slow intake cycle from the areas south of Jakarta to fill up the deep aquifer under Jakarta. The Mining Section of DKI Jakarta calculates that even with this slow recharge capacity, the availability of deep groundwater for extraction is low. Since its extractions are concentrated in East and West Jakarta, there has been some reports and indications of an overdraft of deep groundwater. Groundwater extraction exceeding the recharge capacity has led to environmental degradation. The most serious of this is seawater intrusion under North Jakarta. The flow of brackish seawater into the aquifer is reported to have reached Central Jakarta. Worse, the seawater contaminates mainly the shallow groundwater, a source that the majority of the population is dependent on. A second major consequence is land subsidence. In the period 1974/5-1993/4, an average of 4-9 cm of land annually subsides in various place in North, East and West Jakarta (Special Capital Government of DKI Jakarta 1995a:49; Soetrisno, H et al. 1997:1). Land subsidence has resulted in structural damage to buildings and a considerable expansion of the area prone to yearly flooding,20 and a threat to the drainage capacity of water pumping stations 2 1 Furthermore, this condition transforms the hydrological function of north Jakarta from a discharge to a recharge area (Government of Indonesia 1994:87). 2 0 The areas in Jakarta that are risk to flooding increased ten percent within ten years. Now it covers more than 50% (30,000 ha) of the Jakarta land size (Van Ellen 1996). 2 1 Contrary to popular understanding, land subsidence often does not threaten the foundation of buildings with a depth of less than 40-50 meters. The major parts of the subsidence takes place in layers below these depths (Government of Indonesia 1994:14). 115 3.7.3 Water Quality: Contamination that Induces Water Scarcity Securing good quality water is probably the hardest task for cities in developing countries. Tightening up on industry is only a partial solution, as domestic waste—untreated sewage, drain water and solid waste—contributes to roughly 75 percent of all contamination (Rais 1996:15). The Ciliwung river is typical in this respect. Contamination from domestic sources such as from toilets harms underwater plants and animals. Domestic contamination also affects groundwater. Increasingly, groundwater extracted from the backyards of housing lots shows signs of fecal and chemical contamination. Research done by KPPL in 1989 showed that up to 90 percent of shallow groundwater used by households as their sources of clean water was contaminated by E. coli (World Bank 1993:35; World Bank 1994:69).22 Yet, collective sewage treatment facilities have not been popular or widely promoted by real estate developers and are low priority items with the state. Sampling at stations on some rivers which are used as intake for PAM Jaya presents a deteriorating picture. The treatment plants that do exist are only designed to treat low levels of biological traces and elements in water. Concentration of E. coli and detergents as well as heavy metals are increasingly found in rivers and this has caused PAM Jaya to have to use chemicals in their treatment plants. As a result, many households do not resort only to a single source of water, up to 40 percent of Jakarta's households use more than one source of water (Kirmanto 1995:8). : See Appendix B.4 for further elaboration on contamination of E. coli in the wells. 116 3.7.4 Tracing the Problems Can Jakarta survive based on current extraction rates and potential water availability? The pattern of water withdrawal in Jakarta shows that the city is still supported by water withdrawn from local sources. Locally available groundwater is the main source, particularly for domestic and industrial purposes. Deep groundwater withdrawal, as the most reliable source, is practiced under conditions where the level of water extraction potentially exceeds the recharge capacity. In many areas, this is also the case for surface water and shallow water aquifers. This "local water deficit" is compensated by water imported from outside of the city. PAM Jaya complements groundwater extraction, though its official mandate is to replace other forms of service. At present, the local deficit is not successfully compensated for by imports of water from regional sources. In Jakarta, the stage has been reached where the demand for water is not easily filled; supply becomes inelastic. Urban activities that require a high amount of water will be less competitive or unwelcomed. This shift is expected as the consumption of water changes from low valued uses to high value uses. At the regional scale there is a shift in terms of allocation towards an increase in water supply for urban uses. This is particularly in response to continuing expansion of Jakarta into Botabek. The consequence is that key sources such as the Jatiluhur Dam are strained, leading to competition for water between the various urban uses (residential, commercial and industrial), and between urban uses and power generation and agriculture. A possible result is to put the fertile rice fields in jeopardy. The agricultural sector would again have to depend on seasonal rains to determine then-cultivation season and POJ would have to take action in times of water shortage. Likely a type of "crisis management" will become more common as depletion to the minimum water level in the 117 Jatiluhur Dam reservoir is a more common occurrence. Some forms of water conservation have become popular among farmers. These range from traditional approaches, such as re-cultivating local varieties of rice seeds instead of fast growing, high production varieties that require more water, to modern ones, such as the introduction of groundwater as a source for agriculture. The use of groundwater in the city has resulted in many negative externalities. The lowering water table is the principal sign of the competition among extractors. Wells must continually be dug deeper as there is less water available to fulfill the same level of demand. In environmentally sensitive areas, high extraction levels have led to seawater intrusion and destructive land subsidence. All these externalities contribute to increasing the ecological and pricing costs of water withdrawal. They also increasingly burden the public as the cost of water provision to new settlements is expensive. There are problems related to insufficient quantity, quality and management. Water from PAM Jaya is also sometimes not suitable for drinking, as they face supply and quality problems with their sources. It has to be recognized that current extraction is a product of how water rights are determined. The government has assigned rights to water based on hydrological characteristics. Every institution is expected to develop plans regarding water extraction, transfer, and usage in order to prevent serious conflicts among users% Surface water, excluding shallow groundwater, has the most well-defined rights. Jatiluhur through POJ own water rights in their reservoir and have a right to transfer this water to the agriculture sector and PAM Jaya. PAM Jaya owns the rights of water in their own reservoirs, canals, pipes and treatment plants, though a lot is "lost" from these conduits. In the case of shallow groundwater, the definition of rights is less clear than that of 118 piped water. It is assumed that the landowner has a right to the water underneath his or her land. Furthermore, it is assumed that their extraction will not jeopardize the future availability of water. In reality, these assumptions have led to over-extraction. The government institutions, though ultimately the protectors of this resource, have not moved to recognize reality. There has been little in the way of concrete moves against over extraction. 3.8 Conclusion This Chapter has reviewed evidence that the water economy in Jakarta has reached a mature phase. Inexpensive water sources (surface and shallow groundwater) are of poor quality or fully developed, and expansion of the water supply can now only increase the cost of providing clean water. As economic growth shifts from low value economic activities to high value economic activities, it fuels the increasing demands for water. The mature phase of the water economy calls for changing the current methods of water extraction in order to develop a water supply that is elastic to the demand. It is by reducing the consumption of water from local sources and improving sanitation and waste treatment facilities that the flow of water in the city will improve. 119 4. ALLOCATING WATER IN THE CITY (I): THE ROLE OF A CENTRALIZED WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM Serving the urban population with piped water is the archetype for basic service: an archetype established in developed countries. As in many developing countries, the government of Indonesia adopted the model of state ownership of piped water provision in major urban centres. A centralized system for extracting, transmitting, and distributing water and treating wastewater was considered the best model to service demand in a city. The evolution of clean water provision in developing countries has just started. But the assumptions supporting the model chosen— homogenized consumption patterns, a standardized level of supply, and predictable growth— contradict the defining characteristics of cities in developing countries, such as rapid urbanization, disparity between income groups, and the prevalence of informal, unregulated economic activities. As implemented, the centralized water-distribution system actually becomes a mechanism that creates a structural constraint to water supply and symbolizes a strained relationship between the government and the people. This chapter will explain the steps taken toward establishing a centralized water-distribution system in Jakarta and the constraints and opportunities that arise as the mandate that goes with such a system is maintained. 4.1 A Conceptual Framework The current piped water provision system is strongly ingrained in the welfare approach to basic services. Such an approach has produced a pattern of provision that is productive-oriented, technical in nature, and dependent on massive financial backing. It is the pattern of provision that 120 should be changed in the reforms of water provision, including the redefinition of the concept of equitable provision of basic services to be correlated with critical and normative positions on how the government serves different groups of people. The newer concept also includes environmental conservation as a criteria. This section elaborates on the changing approaches. 4.1.1 A Paradigm of Collective Provision in Urban Water Supply The emergence of the centralized water-distribution system is philosophically grounded in the welfare-Keynesian approach, in which the state is the major actor in the provision of many collective goods. The state is considered capable of bringing about improvements on a mass scale. In the water-supply sector, a distribution system is formed to counter problems caused by private firms. As a neutral, non-profit-seeking entity, the state should represent the interests of the majority. Thus, a sound decision-making process is essential in directing the service of the goods. Within the welfare-Keynesian view, there are two interlocking perspectives: public choice1 and the Weberian approaches (Pinch 1985:32). According to the public-choice perspective, decisions should be made by representatives who act according to the interests of the society. Public control of the goods is in the hands of politicians who represent the preferences of the voters and make decisions regarding the allocation of services, including clean water (Pinch 1985:32-34). Using tools such as taxes, laws, and the ability to issue bonds, spend public funds, and offer subsidies, these representatives direct the public support of infrastructure plans. The pressure to make decisions that support equality of service comes from a wide range of groups within society. 'The public choice theory applies an idea of the economics of collective goods that recognizes the incentive structure in the public sector is not motivated by efficiency and profits. 121 The Weberian perspective suggests that decisions regarding service allocation should be made by officials who sit in permanent government bureaucracies. This, the perspective argues, minimizes discretionary decision-making and ensures that service provision is not too adversely affected by changes in political direction (Pinch 1985:36). Weber argued that reality is complex, and to create an ideal society, it is essential to impose order and to sort out—remove from politics and the free market—the services offered by the government. Bureaucracies thus are established under an overarching rational-legal and moral authority, and their approach to the allocation of service is technocratic. Such an approach is predicated on policies that are standardized and, thus, cost-effective. The public choice and Weberian perspectives work together in democratic-oriented countries because the views of political representatives are incorporated into the collective decision-making that the bureaucracy executes. In developing countries, the bureaucratic perspective is particularly dominant because these countries are drawn into socioeconomic reconstruction in their desire to "catch up" with the level of progress already reached in the developed countries (Fitesimmons, Glaser et al. 1994:212). The failure of the welfare approach begins when the state is unable to satisfy a growing, almost limitless demand for resources. Rapid increases in productivity, the introduction of new technology, and the emergence of new markets cannot be accommodated by traditional forms of state intervention, which then fail in the face of increasingly complex pressures. The state bureaucracy has to either employ strict technical criteria in the interests of "fairness," or admit that it simply does not have the resources to service demand (Mulgan and Wilkinson 1992:343). 122 Across the globe, demand for services such as clean water have helped cause a fiscal crisis for the welfare state: a crisis caused as the high costs of building and rebuilding infrastructure become unaffordable in the face of stagnant revenues and international competitive pressures. Furthermore, the subsidized pricing of resources that generally accompanies state provision does not always lead to efficient distribution. In some cases it leads to rather perverse effects (Demirovic 1994:254-55). By implication, the crisis of the welfare state leads to a changing perspective on the provision of basic services in the city. The city is no longer seen as a net drain on resources or a consumer of investments and subsidies (Jones and Ward 1994:38). As large cities in developing countries create wealth and an enormous number of jobs, the policy focus shifts to increasing productivity. Urban plarining and state intervention are mobilized through a broad range of measures designed to improve the efficiency of the urban economy. There has been recognition that the survival of the urban poor is constrained under a welfare-oriented approach that has become moribund. Improving the public-private investment climate that allows for the provision of low- and high-technology infrastructure becomes paramount, and is now more closely linked to the need to develop administrative, financial, and technical means to create a market for basic services (World Bank 1990:4). The call to improve clean water provision and sanitation cannot have come at a better time. It is being separately pursued in a number of international commitments in the 1990s, and the approach recommended is to treat water as an "economic good." This approach calls for the creation of urban water markets that emphasize "demand management" that promotes efficient 123 use. The reasoning is that, first, a water market will make people realize and pay, on a cost-recovery basis, a "true price" for operating, maintaining, repairing, innovating, and expanding services; second, with higher prices will come the incentive to conserve and recognize that clean water is not a free, abundant good. The introduction of water as an economic good lessens the polemical debate on the provision of collective good by the government. Instead, water can be defined, planned for, and priced through the simultaneous use of human needs and economic and ecological criteria. Water should be provided collectively and must be provided in such a way that poorer consumers with fewer resources are not denied access. Collective provision of clean water is the path to protecting public health from water-borne diseases. Sanitation is important in preventing the public nuisance and the environmental damage that result from households and firms discharging effluents. This is especially an issue when upstream-downstream equity is considered. In addition to quantity and quality issues, access to water, in terms of proximity and price, is important. Finally, the new reality in developing countries is that services must be connected to economic development due to the fact that fewer financial and technical resources are available in the 1990s and beyond. Collective provision of clean water still leads to a natural monopoly. Essentially, this means that it is more expensive to give individual consumers a choice of suppliers than it is to have a single monopoly supplier responsible for all consumers in a particular area (Neutze 1997:29). The cost of giving consumers a choice by having a number of parallel water mains installed in each street is unthinkable. Also, collective action recognizes the economies of scale involved in building and operating infrastructure such as dams, canals, water treatment plants, and sewage treatment 124 facilities. A third reason is that a centralized system can serve different kinds of users using a single network. For example, residential water demand is heaviest outside working hours, and commercial demand is heaviest during working hours. Providers are usually granted a monopoly for a particular service area. In return, they are obliged to meet all demand from within that area. As the state retains the water rights and provision responsibility, its role becomes to ensure that any monopoly is not misused by the provider. 4.1.2 A Centralized Water System in the City: From Productivist Logic to Conservationist Logic The welfare approach to basic services prompted governments in many countries to take steps to provide clean water at an acceptable quality and cost to citizens. To do this, many governments in developing countries choose to create state-owned water-distribution enterprises. In other cases, the state delegates responsibility and the necessary authority to a private firm, subject to checks and balances against monopoly abuse. The Republic of the Ivory Coast, since 1960, has successfully secured clean water in the capital, Abidjan, by granting a concession to a private firm, Sodeci, to operate the water-distribution enterprise (World Bank 1993:65). With a move to a more market-oriented system, there is a trend toward this shift in responsibility. The direct involvement of governments in the provision of clean water has tended, in almost all cases, to lead to the creation of centralized water-distribution systems. Based on technology, engineering, and standardized practices, the centralized system supplies clean water and the accompanying infrastructure as suggested by demand. This pattern of response to water demand is what Swyngedouw (1995:399) calls "productivist logic" (see Table 4.1) As also noted above, 125 action taken according to this logic almost always runs a "structural deficit" (Swyngedouw 1995:393). The systems in developing countries face particularly large servicing deficits despite the fact that public spending for clean water and sanitation has been increasing (Serageldin 1994:1). In addition, due to concentration on the supply of clean water, fewer resources are available for managing wastewater. A key critique of the situation takes aim at the techno-engineering perspective that gives the well-planned, well-organized, well-regulated settlement areas priority in service. Purported equity goals are usually not evident in how the systems operate, despite the fact that low-income, unplanned, disaster-prone, or informal settlement areas are included on the water provision agenda as long-term goals. In these areas, unfulfilled demand is met by the involvement of the private sector, either through private vending operations or water wholesalers. Unlike piped water, actors in the private sector often operate in an unregulated environment. They do not get a subsidy to help them implement equity goals, nor do they get a monopoly or state support to help them plan, initiate long-term borrowing or achieve economies of scale. Fees charged reflect the full cost of providing clean water to their customers. Left with few choices, the consumers are obliged to pay higher rates than the consumers of piped water. Swyngedouw (1997) records a situation in which an unregulated private-sector firm gained a de facto private monopoly over water provision in Guayaquil, Equador. The firm charged high prices, then used influence to support regulations that strengthened its monopoly. In any new public-private paradigm, equity concerns that are poorly integrated into current developing-country models have to be addressed. 126 Reforms that treat water as an economic good generally arise from conservationist logic, or conservationist ideology, being introduced to guide the operation of a water-distribution system (see Table 4.1). There is a shift in focus toward internal operations, maintenance, and innovation. Efficiency and effectiveness measures, such as water-saving devices, leak detection and repair, and regular water audits, are encouraged (Postel 1992:158). Efforts to conserve are not only supported within the system but also extended to water producers and water consumers. Measures to increase conservation by non-state actors include increased water tariffs, setting up efficiency standards for water use, quotas on consumption, education campaigns, and fines for excessive use. The driving force beriind conservationist logic is not, however, the many small moves made within the current state system. It is the move to expand the involvement of the private sector and the community in the provision of clean water. These non-governmental entities are encouraged to contribute to local planning, management, and infrastructure development. In the modern, complex, and often chaotic urban systems in large cities, demand for water is diverse; therefore, it is increasingly recognized as overly ambitious to expect a centralized management and distribution system to meet all needs. Expanded involvement and more players breed a better understanding of the challenges to water availability. 127 Table 4.1 A Comparison between Productivist and Conservationist Logics in the Centralized Water Supply System in Urban Areas Productivist Conservationist Ideological Bias Water is unlimited. Water is a natural resource and is physically limited. Perspective of Service Provision Technocratic; technical-engineering. Sociopolitical; environmental justice perspectives in the context of growing scarcity. Demand is: A given. Something for which choices have to be considered. Issue of Management of Scarcity Not addressed. Addressed as part of natural or technical or distribution systems that include admmistrative, financial and other issues. Financing Dependence on international financing. Dependence on local revenue of water provision. In the Circulation of Water Water Supply is prioritized over demand. The protection of water bodies is essential in the consumption and disposal of water. Emphasis Production and transmission of potable water, sometimes accompanied by the negligence of maintenance, accounting, distribution and consumption. Improving the current operation of water distribution by reducing leakage, emphasizing administrative discipline, and adopting financially conservative principles; also encouraging consumers to conserve. Roles of Private Sector Operate to fulfill demand. They consolidate their power in water speculation and monopoly rent extraction. Accommodated in the production, operation, maintenance, and disposal aspects of clean water. Positive contribution of the private sector to potentially induce service in efficient, effective wavs. Facilities for Sanitation, Sewage and Solid Waste Remains inadequate and under-invested. Must be planned alongside water provision in order to preserve sources of clean water. Source: adapted from Swyngedouw (1995:399-401). 4.1.3 The Roles of the State: Promoting Equitable Services and Environmental Conservation Welcoming the participation of the private sector and the community does not remove the need for government involvement in the provision of clean water. Rather, the government is challenged 128 with new roles and responsibilities, most notably those related to ensuring equity and environmental conservation. These two goals should not be pursued separately. A holistic environmental ethic concentrates on the integrity of all biotic systems: "No one group can long be isolated from the effects of its own, or anyone else's assaults on the environment" (Westra and Wenz 1995:2). Thus, environmental degradation is connected to issues and policies regarding the inequitable treatment of people or groups of people. Inequitable services and environmental deterioration become signs that negative externalities created by the market (or, as we have seen, the state) are out of control (Martinez-Alier 1997:91). Such an understanding of the complex interdependencies of management, human needs, and ecology calls for the government to examine the sources of inequitable services and environmental degradation. On the basis of studies done by Bullard (1995), two aspects of decision-making within the government can be identified as part of the problem. The first is procedural inequity— governing rules, regulations, evaluation criteria, and enforcement measures that are in some way discriminatory. Inequitable services may result from exclusionary practices, conflict of interest, and other actions of the government and the private sector. One example is the mechanism for gaining access to piped water. The high cost of installing piped water excludes low-income groups, because this institutionalized mechanism is designed based on cost-benefit analyses and scientific standards that favour certain types of development. The second aspect of decision-making working against equity is geographic in nature. Inequitable service of clean water may result from not serving areas that are zoned for future development or nonresidential use or that are classified as unsuitable for human settlement. Yet the fact is that many people live in these areas and are forced by state inaction to use higher-cost options to access water. These decision 129 making working against equity can be mainly caused by the differing levels of influence on decisions that actors and interest groups have on the basis of class, culture, lifestyle, or other forms of political power. It is essential to look at the political nature of the "decision-making" that creates and sustains inequitable services. Here Buttel (1995:188-200) directs this look at three defining issues. The first is that the economic weakness of the poor or displaced makes them easy targets for injustice. Low income usually negatively affects political influence. The second is that the government and the private sector emphasize economic benefits when expanding infrastructure. More direct, tangible benefits can come, as is often argued, from servicing new industrial, commercial, and high-end residential development or redevelopment. The third is that political economic power shapes the professionalized planning process. Zoning plans and their enforcement let neighbourhoods resist unwanted land uses and preserve quality of life and public service benefits already gained. The existence of professionally drawn up plans that clearly include service infrastructure expansion to poor areas of the city give decision makers an escape, but these plans are often framed as long term goals. The government has to redefine a course of action and embrace a vision in which equitable services and environmental protection are guaranteed within an economically feasible regime. The government can no longer apply a cause-and-effect relationship as defined by traditional epistemology. Any expectation that a simplistic move to a market or fully community-based approach will succeed is also wrong. Initiatives must start with the government that must lay the groundwork for "fair, equitable services, and environmental conservation." 130 4.2 Shaping the Future of Jakarta Rapid change in Jakarta runs ahead of any official understanding of how the city works. This is the case for the government of DKI Jakarta as much as for citizens and academics. Against the challenge, equipped with the latest, innovative approaches to urban planning, policy, law enforcement, and new technology, the state tries to take a proactive role in managing urban growth. Public documents, such as Jakarta's master plan and the master plans for water supply, at best inform the public about how far the government is willing to commit public funds to addressing problems. In Indonesia, a policy is created by agents within the state, but policies adoption depends on the implementing capability of the government. Thus, the government of Jakarta seeks means of implementation within their capacity. 4.2.1 Toward a Productivist City: Guidelines from Jakarta 2005 During the 1980s and 1990s, Jakarta's economic growth has been rapid, primarily fuelled by increasing flows of private investment from national and international sources.2 High levels of investment have contributed to a shift in the urban economy from labour-intensive industry to capital-intensive activities, triggering the concentration of an educated labour force in Jakarta. Realizing such potential, the Policy Guidelines and Repelita VI of DKI Jakarta outline commitments to improve the image of Jakarta as an "international service city," the centre of trade and distribution and of financial activities and tourism. Committed to sustaining the trend and the city's inclusion among important world cities, the government of DKI Jakarta has been improving services to the public and attempting to protect amenity items such as open space and 2Currendy public investment in Jakarta only accounts for 6 percent in 1994-1995 (Rais 1996:11). 131 urban forests. It has cornmitted resources to acquire public land for expanding basic services (Douglass 1996:15). However, intensive investment flows have also rapidly altered the pace and use choices of physical development. In the face of rapid growth, the master plan of Jakarta: Jakarta 2005 carries little weight in directing urban development (Henderson, Kuncoro et al. 1996:79).3 Jakarta has become a city with a fragmented spatial form and no clearly demarcated central business district (Forbes 1990:118). Rapid change, unfortunately, has resulted in deficient investment in urban services. Poorly defined property rights, and unsophisticated land market and lending institutions, have hampered orderly planning. Jakarta 2005 makes a firm step toward redirecting land development in accordance with set broad goals, ownership, and planning permits. The costs of providing urban services and of relocating the urban poor to healthy, habitable settlements have been the major reasons for taking this step. Limiting population growth is still a core concern, particularly as the government cannot deny those who already reside in the city access to basic services. The Plan commits the city to creating habitable neighbourhoods, reducing densities in overpopulated areas, and securing social welfare, including housing and clean water, for the poor. This is a shift in focus from land expansion during 1960s and 1970s to environmental sustainability during the 1980s and 1990s. 3The failure of the Master Plan in directing urban land development can be attributed to (1) ill-founded assumptions about the capacity of the governments to enforce the plan in situations where other stakeholders either ignore the plan or otherwise gain special exemptions from it (Douglass 1996:15) or (2) unpreparedness of local officials to deal with rapid economic shifts and other unexpected events (Henderson, Kuncoro et al. 1996:79). However, some would cite the lack of laws and regulations to accommodate, for example, development proposals that do not conform with the plan or other major changes that require preparation. The Master Plan alone is inadequate and too rigid for directing urban land development unless there are anticipated outcomes based on administrative standards that help the local officials implementing the plan. 132 Jakarta 2005 is not, however, directly oriented toward equity planning or planning based on the protection of the natural environment. Instead, it is oriented toward allocation of productive economic activities on the basis of preferences and the dynamics of the land market. It is more pragmatic and realistic in terms of goals, and likely to be implemented because of this. Commitment to a harmonious, ecological balance between human-made and natural environments is articulated in the context of cultural development and employment generation. Explicitly, environmental protection is linked to the protection of groundwater and the restriction of new development. The Strategic Plan of Jakarta 1992-1997, which was designed as a guideline for implementing the prioritized programs set forth in Jakarta 2005, is dominated by policy on creating employment, improving neighbourhoods, improving clean water supply, and river-cleaning programs for flood control. The Master Plan assigns PAM Jaya the task of expanding the service of piped water to a majority of the population with a standard of 150-200 litres per capita per day, allowing less population to rely on groundwater (Special Capital Government of DIG Jakarta 1991:48). Piped water is considered the most sustainable source of water to fulfill demand, particularly to serve the mega developments in north Jakarta and high-density, water-scarce areas on the east-west axis. River-cleaning programs remain prioritized in an effort to create a cleaner natural environment for Jakarta. The programs are a commitment to mobilize community action to reduce domestic wastewater and solid waste. The problem is not, however, approached as a commitment to develop city-scale collective treatment facilities and wastewater networks. The Master Plan mentioned very little about the socialization of such ideas, the responsibility of the urban citizens, 133 and the ways the citizens can participate in the provision of basic services. Instead, it defines duties to be executed by the governments involved. 4.2.2 Policies of Expansion of Piped Water Service PAM Jaya'5 expansion is part of the historic commitment to fulfill the demand for water that has resulted from urbanization and industrialization. In 1985, the second Master Plan of Water Supply for Jakarta was prepared. Unlike in the 1972 master plan, water demands for industrial and commercial uses were added as needs to be met, and the problems of water withdrawal and environmentally degrading conditions caused by these uses were incorporated into planning. To date, implementation has been uneven. Funding and institutional support have been set up only recently, and the plan covers only part of the installations planned: the expansion and rehabilitation of some treatment plants and the construction of more transmission pipelines and main trunks. A compromise with water demand came in 1994 when it was realized that implementation is concentrated too much on the construction of extensive treatment plants and pipelines and not enough on the distribution networks (Sidharta, Pramono et al. 1991:24). The priority then shifted to expanding the number of residents being served (Special Capital Government of DKI Jakarta 1991:50). The introduction of piped water to a wider consumer base is expected to improve public health and hygiene and to prevent some of the widespread and often destructive effects of withdrawal of water from other sources. Also, efforts are now directed toward improving the safety, reliability, and quality of the water supply through giving priority to the improvement of supply facilities, such as pipelines and water meters within the existing service area. 134 4.2.3 The Flow of Water in Jakarta Ideally, the provision of clean water in the city should be viewed as a part of a circular flow, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. Raw water, either brought in from outside the city or extracted from local water sources, is transmitted to treatment plants and processed in order to standardize quality. Then, it is distributed through piped connections to the consumers in the city. After being consumed, the wastewater is again transmitted to the treatment facilities before being discharged into rivers, canals, and ponds or absorbed to the aquifers. Raw Water: - rivers - canals - dams - other reservoirs Water Treatment Facilities Distribution System Consumption Waste Water Treatment Facilities Sewerage System Waste Water Figure 4.1 The Ideal Flow of Municipal Water System Since Jakarta is a high-density urban area, it has become necessary to treat wastewater before it is discharged. But unlike other water-supply enterprises, PAM Jaya is not involved in treating wastewater. Though an attempt was made to widen the company's responsibility to include the management of wastewater treatment plants, PAM Jaya lacks the requisite funding and administrative capacity (World Bank 1993:89). This, combined with preexisting difficulties in 135 supplying piped water, has made an expansion of service organizationally problematic. Instead, a separate water institution called Wastewater-Treatment Enterprise or PDAL Jaya was created. To date, the two enterprises do not have an intensive inter-institutional relationship that can integrate, even at the planning stage, water provision and wastewater treatment. Therefore, PDAL provides an extra service, and, since the company's operations are Umited to Central Jakarta, for many it is an optional service. Disposal of wastewater from most residences in Jakarta follows the old model in which wastewater is discharged into the drainage system connected to rivers and canals. During the rainy season, when the volume of drainage increases, it helps to flush the rivers and reduce the level of contamination of waste water. However, during the dry season, when flow is heavily contaminated, these water bodies cease to be utilized for purposes other than drainage. Contamination forces PAM Jaya to utilize more expensive chemicals to treat raw water, particularly that extracted from local rivers to the east of the city. Even with chemicals, the current treatment plants are only capable of dealing with turbidity and organic and bacteriological pollution. The Urban and Environmental Monitoring Agency of DKI Jakarta (KPPL) is the government institution which has to track contamination of rivers, canals, and ponds. However, it is the BBLH which has a mandate to develop policies and to enforce laws and regulations regarding the prevention of pollution, and by imposing sanctions on water producers. At this stage, pollution prevention is not aimed at protecting the water bodies as clean water sources but rather at 136 1 preventing them from becoming worsejP^4M Jaya is no longer involved in pollution prevention, Qand the flow of water in Jakarta is not handled in an integrated fashion, j 4.3 Characteristics of Centralized Water System: Constraint of Expansion The hydrological cycle is only one factor that plays an important part in shaping the expansion of piped water service. In this section, other constraints, particularly organizational and structural ones that play dominant roles in shaping the effort to expand services, are presented. 4.3.1 PAM Jaya as a Quasi-Private Enterprise PAM Jaya is an enterprise that operates as a profit-making body, yet it also has to work toward socially defined goals. It is jointly owned by the government of DKI Jakarta and the Government of Indonesia. The former is the majority shareholder, so the administration of PAM Jaya is under direct supervision of the government of DKI Jakarta, which sets policies regarding expansion and also monitors the performance of PAM Jaya. Because PAM Jaya is a local government-owned enterprise, profits from operations are shared with DKI Jakarta. Based on the Government Tax Law No. 7/1983, in a condition of profit, PAM Jaya should transfer 35 percent of net income before tax to the city (World Bank 1993:52). The government of DKI Jakarta treats such shares as local revenue: an essential budget component usually used for executing programs initiated at the local level. As a government-owned enterprise, PAM Jaya has a hierarchy that is heavily influenced by government intervention. It is managed by a board of directors appointed by the Governor of DKI Jakarta. The board directs day-to-day technical and administrative aspects of operation and 137 develops policies with regard to these aspects. The directors work under a supervisory board comprising the head of the Economic Department of DKI Jakarta, the head of the Health Section, and the head of the regional chamber of commerce. The supervisory board is expected to look after any discrepancy between policies and performance to ensure public interests are not forsaken. Since it is a government-owned enterprise, the performance of PAM Jaya is also assessed regularly by the legislative system sitting as the Local Assembly. The Local Assembly usually acts as "watchdog," sohciting comments from the public on water servicing issues, questioning them, and putting pressure on the government of DKI Jakarta and PAM Jaya to respond. However, its role as a legitimate control group has been minimal; particularly under the Suharto's government, its role has been cut to assessing and approving regulations initiated by the government. In accordance with new national priorities that include improving urban productivity and socio-environmental equity, the central government has increased their influence on PAM Jaya. As a significant infrastructure-implementing agency, improving the performance of the enterprise is critical to improving the health of Jakarta's economy and population. In addition, the performance of PAM Jaya does not compare favourably to the national urban average in terms of population coverage, the numbers of public standpipes, and the level of Unaccounted-for-Water (UFW). UFW is defined as " the difference between the volume of water delivered into the network and the volume of water that can be accounted for by legitimate consumption, whether metered or not" (Japan International Cooperation Agency 1996d:3-140). Thus, it is under more scrutiny than any other water supply enterprise in Indonesia. 138 The Ministry of Public Works, representing the central government, works closely with PAM Jaya to assist in operation and management. They also help oversee the formulation of supply policies and help with technical assistance to expand and improve performance. However, the scarcity of national financial resources for PAM Jaya means that international and private financing has to be sought. International funding by the 1990s had reached about 70 percent of the total capital financing (Japan International Cooperation Agency 1996d:2-l 13). From the private sector, financing has been rather slow particularly since the local private sector has not had experience or expertise with financing such public service. 4.3.2 Current or Planned Production of Water Supply The Master Plan of PAM Jaya, drawn up in 1985, has been used to guide the expansion of service in Jakarta. The Plan also recognizes that current water supply is short of the appropriate level of consumption. Even with promotion of efficient consumption, water supply needs to be expanded. Moreover, it is predicted that the future growth of Jakarta will be determined not only by population growth but also by economic growth; PAM Jaya must anticipate the rising demand. The Plan specifically lays out technical expansion in terms of construction of treatment facilities, distribution pipes, and coordinating and monitoring systems. First, the capacity of treatment plants is expanded, particularly to treat raw water from the Jatiluhur Dam. In 1996, the planned capacity of treatment plants in Jakarta reached 15.2 m3/s, about 14.6 m3/s of this to be handled by six major treatment plants located in Central Jakarta and East Jakarta, mainly serving North, Central, and East Jakarta. 139 The plan, however, has not addressed the problems of old equipment and declining raw-water quality (Sidharta, Pramono et al. 1991:28-32). The oldest treatment plant, Pejompongan I, no longer produces at its optimal capacity. This also true of Pejompongan II. Water pumps function poorly and sand filter systems are increasingly clogged by solid waste carried by raw water. In Pulo Gadung, actual production capacity is lower than planned capacity partly due to poor maintenance. Only mini treatment plants which are newer and cheaper to build and operate, perform at full capacity (Sidharta, Pramono et al. 1991:50). There is no concrete plan to repair the plants, particularly in cases where the difficulties are caused by raw water problems. Instead, more maintenance is used to deal with waste problems. In the case of old equipment, repair and replacement is done incrementally. The emphasis is clearly on building new treatment plants, such as Buaran III and Cisadane Treatment Plant II & III, located outside the city, for a total of 10,000 L/s (Japan International Cooperation Agency 1996d:29). Second, water from the treatment plants goes to the consumers via pipe networks designed to allow for connection between the plants. If one plant fails, others can take over. In areas where a circular system is not always feasible (such as PAM Jaya, whose area is large), a branch system must be used. While this is not as reliable, it is at least less costly to set up. In the near future, expansion of the system will be made in West Jakarta to extend service from Pejompongan I and II, in South Jakarta to extend service from the Cilandak plant, and in East Jakarta to extend 140 service from Sunter plant. Cost factors will determine whether and how these systems are going to be connected. Third, coordinating and monitoring systems are operated by PAM Jaya's staff. There are two levels: the branch-office level, located in five administrative units, and the "rayon" offices, which directly deal with customers. The latter have a significant function in serving the public such as assisting with new connections, administering bill payments, and receiving customers' complaints. DKI JAKARTA. : = = \ s £ ^ = ^ ^ v Java Sea ttx^ Sunterfm) Muara Karang (m) >s^>_ ^^ p^ s^^ ^^ g^ ^^  50 L/s 1 ^ ^SL7"^^ .C k^ungfm) TamanKotafnV) 1 . ^ ^ " ^ AK^j / 25 L/s 200 L/s ? / W E S T \ 5 ^ _ T > X p L ^ f _—^r"JCENTRAl/w-J f_^Pulo Gadung Peiomponean \8d\/^f^^ r-W^^ j — " f"~J"~~*~4,000 L/s 5,600 L/s y f e f S - *\ \ ^ S T r i -X} > \ J> / / ) Buaran I & II Peiaten(m)XK^--^-- -^ - SOT* f / (  5 ' 0 0 0 L / s N / \ ( — J ; Condetfnri Cilandak Y— ^^nf^l /  5 0 U s 200 L/s | //IlyvfJ^ / %\ L E G E N D : / |S\t^ L/s = Litres per second; m = miniplant . * J § Scale 1:500,000 Source: Special Government of DKI Jakarta 1990. Figure 4.2 Locations of the Treatment Plants in DKI Jakarta, 1995 141 4.3.3 Constraints to Supplying Piped Water PAM Jaya recorded that in actual performance, only about 5.37 m3/s of water was sold to consumers in 1995 (Japan International Cooperation Agency 1996d:3-28). The rest is considered to be UFW. UFW is caused either by physical water lost in the distribution network through leakage, or by water consumed but not recorded by water meters because of illegal connections, tapping, and underestimation of water use due to unchecked or ill-functioning meters. This latter omission is referred to as "non-physical loss" or "unpaid use." No data exist on what the ratio is between physical and non-physical losses. Since 1985, PAM Jaya has kept the level of UFW at about 50 percent, which is one of the highest rates among water-supply enterprises in medium and large Indonesian cities (World Bank 1993: 39). With the UFW at that level, revenue generation suffers considerably and the price to the consumer reflects the "double payment" needed to cover the UFW. As a part of the policy of financial self-sufficiency, PAM Jaya was allowed to increase water tariffs every three years to cover operating expenses and to catch up with inflation.4 In a way, this has discouraged efficient and effective management and operation. Usually, in the first year, after the tariff is increased, PAM Jaya can record enough profit to carry the cost of operation for the first and following year. However, by the third year, the budget of PAM Jaya has incurred a deficit, requiring a financial boost through increased tariffs. In 1995, PAM Jaya could no longer cover about 40 percent of its operating costs (Japan International Cooperation Agency 1996d). Expenses have increased due to inferior water quality forcing PAM Jaya to purchase more chemicals for treatment. Also, the cost of raw water purchased from Jatiluhur Dam and of potable water purchased from other water supply 142 enterprises has increased. Since PAM Jaya intends to implement the technical expansion of its major infrastructure, international funding is still available. However, funding for maintenance of the existing infrastructure, for distributing the water supply, and for efforts at reducing UFW cannot rely upon such funding. Analysis of performance is often limited to measuring UFW and noting the differences between costs and tariffs. UFW is likely caused in part by administrative "leakage" (Hadi 1996:interview). Billing procedures and meter readings are particularly susceptible to manipulation for personal financial gain, and internal monitoring of personnel was minimal proceeding the transfer of these functions to private sector firms. Minimal, too, is the attention paid to the productivity of employees. The structure of promotion at PAM Jaya has been stagnant and has discouraged improvement of performance efficiency. In one case, one-third of employees had remained in the same position for over ten years (Japan International Cooperation Agency 1996d:2-109). Employees rarely receive training, either in technical issues or in customer service. Job descriptions, which are not monitored or changed, have led to tasks being assigned to wrong levels in the company and, generally, to administration not evolving with changing needs and responsibilities. In addition, proper approval from higher-level officials is required for undertaking many tasks. Such centralized decision-making leads to over-concentration of policy-making at the top and to the neglect of the importance of employee performance. The weak control system gives employees the opportunity to manipulate the system for personal benefit. For example, during the dry season, the volume and distribution of piped 4 This is outlined in the Regulation of Ministry of Home Affairs No. 2/1998 on guidelines to Tariff in Drinking Water on local Water-Supply Enterprises. 143 water service can be manipulated in exchange for personal gain by the official orchestrating the shifts (Lovei and Whittington 1993:1280). 4.4 Intervention from the Central Level: The Nature of Centralized Authority The involvement of the central government has been essential in determining the expansion of service. Infrastructure expansion and service plarining and operations of local governments reflect, either explicitly or implicitly, the centralized nature of the government system in Indonesia. This section explores the depth of this involvement and its impacts. 4.4.1 Intervention in Improving the Service of Urban Water Supply In establishing water-supply enterprises, the central government puts the mechanisms in place that assign responsibilities to both local government and the central government. Mechanisms to increase performance and to determine water tariffs are also established. The central government initiates feasibility studies of water-supply enterprises at the national scale, compares performance between these enterprises, and promotes an association of water-supply enterprises (Persatuan Perusahaan Air Minum Seluruh Indonesia or PERPAMSI). All these roles contribute to improving the performance of water service in Indonesia. The active involvement of the central government was even expanded in Repelita VI (1993/94-1998/99) with efforts to mobilize water-supply enterprises around national policy. The national focus in the short term is to increase the number of people with access to piped water. PAM Jaya eased off the process of connecting new pipes and prioritized connections for communal use, a 144 non-capital-intensive measure often involving hydrants, pipe stands, or water tankers. National policies also indicate priorities: the commercial CBD, fast-growing fringe areas, areas that are water-scarce such as most of North Jakarta, and kampung areas in Central, East, and West Jakarta particularly those where legal ownership of land is not an issue. As a result, since 1990, the proportion of the population being served by piped water has increased from 25 to 40 percent (Susena 1995:20). Increasing water delivery to a growing urban population is not, however, a straightforward policy issue for the national government. Conflict is evident regarding how much water from the Jatiluhur Dam and Cisadane River should be supplied to Jakarta and how much should be used for agriculture in the surrounding region. Current policies supporting agriculture dictate that there be no charge to farmers for water used to irrigate their land. Urban areas such as Jakarta have to pay a fee for raw water. Economic logic dictates that water be directed toward urban use due to the higher economic multiplier effect of "global city" urban activities. This is not an easy decision, because the infrastructure and management of the Jatiluhur Dam and Cisadane River are mainly designed and planned to serve irrigation. As well, there are also political, social and economic arguments for protecting some of the country's most fertile agricultural land. 4.4.2 Creating a Financial Web of Support for PAM Jaya One newer form of support that the central government promotes is private-sector involvement. Through Presidential Decree No. 21/1989, water supply was removed from the list of restricted sectors, and Ministry of Home Affairs' Regulation No. 4/1986 facilitates cooperation between local government and the private sector. These changes did not instantly produce results. PAM 145 Jaya and the central government were not ready with their own legal and administrative framework for mutual cooperation. The public sector lacked professionals who could evaluate private-sector proposals and assess performance. Additionally, the government remained concerned about loss of control over decisions affecting public welfare. Despite the fact that PAM Jaya is expected to be financially self-sufficient, the central government, through MHA, retains regulatory control over the determination of water tariffs. It defines the tariff structure—generally determined progressively depending on the quantity of water consumed—then cross-subsidizes it to achieve social objectives. This structure is based on the assumption that piped water connection is strongly correlated to urban household income (World Bank 1993:27). The current tariff structure of PAM Jaya, set in 1995, implements a progressive tariff structure, in order to cross-subsidize the low-income groups. In other words, the higher-income groups, assuming a water consumption of higher volume, pay a higher tariff per unit of volume. Low-volume consumers, presumably poorer, pay a lower tariff. Complicating any assessment of how this arrangement is working is the fact that many households in both groups use a mix of piped and non-piped water. In comparison to clean water service in other cities of Southeast Asia, such as Bangkok, Manila, Kuala Lumpur, Seoul, Ho Chi Minh City, Beijing, Bombay, and Karachi, PAM Jaya serves the lowest proportion of population but charges substantially higher water tariffs (Japan International Cooperation Agency 1996d:3-179). This is despite the fact that cities such as Singapore and Hong Kong have considerably higher per-unit production costs because they have to pay more for raw water than Jakarta. 146 Such high tariffs in Jakarta are resented and resisted by consumers. In 1995, when a new water tariff was imposed, the level of consumption at first decreased by 15 to 20 percent (Japan International Cooperation Agency 1996d:2-21). Consumers had responded by reusing water and reducing unnecessary use. However, this did not last long. In a hot climate like Jakarta's, high water consumption is seen as necessary by many people to maintain their routine, which might include twice-a-day showers, a lot of drinking water, daily laundry, and daily watering of gardens. In the end, PAM Jaya still gets the predicted revenue. For PAM Jaya, increasing the water tariff is not meant to promote more efficient water use, but to increase profits; they attempt to continue selling water at the current volume but at a higher price. It is particularly important for PAM: Jaya in order to continue to provide interests to the government of DKI Jakarta. 4.5 Implication of the Level of Service This section explores the current level of service that PAM Jaya has been able to achieve, and addresses the issues of equitable service and environmental conservation. 4.5.1 The Pattern of Piped Water Service Currently, PAM Jaya is able to serve approximately half of the total area of Jakarta (PAM Jaya 1996). The main serving area is the North and Central part of the city, with parts of North, East, West, and South Jakarta also covered. In North Jakarta, piped water service is concentrated around seaport areas where there are industrial and commercial zones. The rate of piped connection directly to households is equally high in this area as other sources of clean water are not very accessible or appropriate. The rate of residential connection is high in Central Jakarta where public provision to households has a long tradition. In East Jakarta, the service is mainly to 147 industrial areas. In West Jakarta, the service is directed toward residences and water-scarce areas. In South Jakarta, only areas close to Central Jakarta are well served by piped water. In the southwest and southeast parts of South Jakarta, PAM Jaya has built several mini plants, but these serve only a small portion of the population. PAM Jaya was slow to anticipate development of this area. Unfortunately, southward expansion is limited by high land prices that prevent the construction of new treatment plants and other infrastructure. In terms of population coverage, PAM Jaya serves some portion of the water demand of 43 percent of the population, or about 3.7 million people (Kirmanto 1995:3). These people consume about 57 percent of the total volume of water sold for domestic use (see Figure 4.3). About 31 percent of the water sold is consumed by either small-scale or large-scale establishments in the commercial sector; stores, restaurants, hotels, motels and office buildings. High consumption volumes are registered particularly in water-scarce areas such as Central Jakarta and West Jakarta. In contrast, industries are less likely to invest in piped water connection and thus only use about 3 percent of the total water sold. Consumption labelled as "social and special" includes water used by government offices, places of worship, orphanages, and foundations, and special agencies such as the Tanjung Priok seaport located in water-scarce areas of north Jakarta. Despite high levels of consumption, the piped water system in Jakarta is considerably less extensive than in other Indonesian cities (Crane, Daniere et al. 1997:1500). 148 Soc ia l & Spec ia l Funct ion 9% Industry 3 % Commerc ia l 3 1 % Domest ic 5 7 % Source: PAM Jaya. 1997. Figure 4.3 Proportion of Use from Water Sold by PAM Jaya, 1995 4.5.2 Serving the Customer In order to protect public health and welfare, individual direct connections are the most socially efficient way to control against unsuitability and irregularity of water availability (Ward 1997:6). The quality of piped water is often better than that of groundwater because there is regulated quality control. Many connected Jakarta residents view the service of PAM Jaya as necessary, especially since they live in high-density areas or in areas where other sources are scarce. Most household customers recorded by PAM Jaya subscribe through a direct connection; only a few subscribe through indirect connection. World Bank (1993: 34) reported that in the case of Jakarta, each indirect connection such as though public hydrants, can serve up to 250 people as opposed to direct connection that only serve in average 7 persons. With the current pattern of subscription for domestic use, it is calculated that households in Jakarta use about 180 Led, which is higher than the expected standard use of clean water in Indonesia. However, this number cannot reveal anything about consumption patterns, for example if it is being used for drinking 149 and what proportion of its use is cleaning particularly because it does not tell anything about the quality of water Aside from the characters of household connections, the commercial sector consumes approximately 3 m3 per day per connection (PAM Jaya 1996). The highest per-user rate is in the industrial sector where the average connection uses 14 m3 per day (PAM Jaya 1996). This high-volume demand makes tariff rates less affordable, and pushes the sector toward use of deep groundwater, particularly if the well is communally operated in an industrial park. The commercial sector is also increasingly being relocated outside of the city. Only in select locations is PAM Jaya constructing treatment plants to serve demand from the industrial sector. The variety of service connections available to households does not exist for commercial and industrial sectors. Urilike the household sector, the latter sectors are charged on the basis of the actual cost of distribution. PAM Jaya only gives a price break, for small-scale commercial and business activities that consume less than 30 m3 (PAM Jaya 1996) Other than that, the price reflects the high cost of production and distribution and aims to discourage the excessive use of water. Inadequate or "absent" enforcement of urban planning pushes the overhead cost of piped water provision even higher. The water infrastructure network tends to follow rather than guide physical development patterns. In some unplanned areas, urban development has been almost spontaneous, which raises the cost of piping water in "after the fact." In other cases, such as South Jakarta, PAM Jaya's delivery capacity has simply fallen behind steady population growth. 150 4.5.3 Serving Low-Income Groups Households that cannot afford direct connections, or who live in areas not served by piped water, have to rely on other sources. For low-income groups unable to invest in mechanical or electrical wells or whose houses are located in water-scarce areas, this situation has led to the emergence of a private market where they purchase clean water through either standpipes or vendors. In 1993, about 20 percent of households in Jakarta relied on such sources (World Bank 1993:29). Most of these households live in kampung, along the riverbanks, beside railways, and on unoccupied state and private lands.5 Since the mid-1980s, PAM Jaya has participated in the water market to deliver piped water to non-connected households. It is aimed at expanding the service of piped water to the low-income groups and to provide alternative sources. Lovei and Whittington (1993) present a model in which PAM Jaya attempts to serve households in Jakarta (see Figure 4.4). Aside from direct delivery to household consumers shown at the bottom of the figure, there are two ways of supplying clean water to low-income groups: standpipes and tankers. PAM Jaya constructs public standpipes particularly in densely populated areas. There are two types: the most numerous are ordinary hydrants (for which PAM Jaya is directly responsible), followed by example hydrants, managed by individual operators. The latter type of hydrant is new and growing in number as the community is actively involved in its management. 5About 217 kelurahan (82 percent) of the total kelurahan have slums with a total areas of 2855.2 ha or 4.8 percent and occupied by 891,880 people (9.72 percent) O a^is 1996:6). 151 PAM Jaya Public Distributing Hydrants Vendors Households Example Distributing without Piped Hydrants Vendors Connection Water Water Tanker Water Distributing Station Trucks Terminals Vendors Households with Large Water Tanks Households with Piped Connection direct connection indirect connection Source: Lovei and Whittington 1993. p. 1967. Figure 4.4 A Model of Piped Water Service for Households in Jakarta In areas where public standpipes are not feasible due to lack of space or for other reasons, PAM Jaya uses tankers to deliver clean water, either directly to households or through vendors. PAM Jaya owns 70 tanker trucks. The trucks are also convenient for serving areas that face seasonal drought or are hit by natural disasters. Low-income groups also predominantly occupy a district in North Jakarta called Kepulauan Seribu (Thousand Islands). This is an area in were PAM Jaya has not been involved. In these islands, the provision of clean water is managed by individuals or community groups. Local sources, whether of shallow or deep groundwater, provide water that is not suitable for drinking or cooking but only for bathing or laundry. The households have to buy water from North Jakarta 152 or district of Tangerang at a price of Rp. 1,000 per litre, making it one of the highest cost areas in Jabotobek (World Bank 1993). There is no organized seller or market serving this community yet. Serving the low-income groups by the above methods means that PAM Jaya can serve a larger population without major investment in the piped network. Overall, PAM Jaya serves about one million people this way and delivers 280 L/s through hydrants and water tankers. On average, these groups only consume about 21 Led, which is used for drinking, cooking, and sanitation. The benefits of obtaining water from vendors are convenience and billing flexibility (for example, daily payment or prepayment and, in some cases, credit). For clean water and reliable service, vendors may charge as much as 30 times the price of piped water. The price varies according to a number of factors: the quality of the water, level of competition, locality, season, distance of transporting water, and vendor-client relationship. As piped water is the main source for vendors, PAM Jaya officials have been and continue to be involved. Until recently, the mechanism worked as a monopoly. Vending seeks to maximize the difference between the official and the market price of water. Lovei and Whittington (1993: 1968) report that a cartel developed among water operators using public taps deliberately to limit the competition and standardize prices. The cartel maintained a price just high enough that consumers did not decide to connect to piped water or build their own well. During the dry season, some PAM Jaya officials helped these cartels to direct piped water to vendors at the expense of direct-connection service. The cartels were largely broken up by deregulation in the 1990s that allowed directly connected households to sell their water. The move also signaled recognition that there 153 were insufficient public standpipes in the city and that the price of water sold by vendors was skyrocketing. Despite the intervention by PAM Jaya, the prices of clean water charged by vendors for domestic purposes remains the highest (see Table 4.2). Piped water is considered less expensive although it still poses some problems (such as irregular flow) for securing domestic use. Shallow groundwater is the least expensive source, but the sustainability of the supply—in terms of both quality and quantity—is in question. On the other hand, for commercial and industrial uses, the cost of piped water is considered high, water tankers are the highest, and deep groundwater is generally preferred. Table 4.2 A Comparison of Utilization of Piped Water for Household, Commercial and Industrial Connections Water Tariff High Low Household Connection Water Vendors Water Tankers Hydrants Piped Water Shallow Groundwater Commercial Connection Water Tankers Piped Water Shallow Groundwater Deep Groundwater Industrial Connection Water Tankers Piped Water Individual Deep Groundwater Communal Deep Groundwater Shallow Groundwater Source: Personal Observation 4.6 Support from the Public PAM Jaya is unable to service Jakarta's water needs and will never catch up to demand, even with the complete success of proposed improvements and demand management. The private sector's response to this reality has been to create a new business. The first bottled water 154 company, Aqua Mineral Water, began to package water from the Ciburial Spring in Bogor in 1990. The growth since then has been enormous. There is currently an active debate over the causes and degree of servicing problems in the PAM Jaya system. In many cases, PAM Jaya has tried to lay the blame for unrehability on "picky" consumers who do not understand the problems involved in serving the whole community of Jakarta. But public complaints are increasing. The Association of Consumer Groups—Indonesia (YLKI) was formed in 1976 to represent piped water consumers. As a "watchdog" over PAM Jaya's operations, YLKI has continually opposed the company's decisions on water tariff increases and has been an advocate of more reliable services (Media Indonesia 1998). YLKI's lobbying has brought home to PAM Jaya that concerns and complaints from customers are legitimate and demand some form of response. In the 1970s, when PAM Jaya operated without the involvement of the central government, the public company was relatively free of criticism or able to ignore it. Today, PAM Jaya cannot do as it pleases. The tariff increase every three years is routinely opposed as onerous for many consumers, especially when faced with worsening service. Others charge that the tariff increase only sustains unreliable practices and mismanagement, without the new revenue being used in efforts to improve delivery. The mass media also have become more involved and ready to criticize PAM Jaya. Since 1996, when the issue of private-sector involvement in the formal public water sector arose, PAM Jaya has often been in the headlines. Allegations of corruption and the cooptation of officials have been 155 rampant, and this has pushed politicians toward the belief that improvements can only come through the private sector. The intensity of media coverage has brought issues into public debate that consumers had not been not aware of. For example, why cannot the floods be transformed into useful clean water? As the debate has developed, the media have consistently raised environmental concerns that Jakartans must understand in order to improve the situation. 4.7 Conclusion: Creation of Mechanism of Exclusion Records during the 1990s shows that PAM Jaya has attempted to change its goals, direction of expansion, and approach. Improving the distribution system in order to serve a larger number of people is now a key objective. A modest, more responsive approach is taken by shifting the priority of service expansion toward high-density, low-income areas in which clean water consumption is low. Each new public tap or hydrant added can serve up to 250 people a day (Lovei and Whittington 1993:1970). In addition, PAM Jaya has made it easier for households to get new piped connections by offering credit schemes and a relatively low water tariff. As a result, the number of households subscribing continually increases. Subscriptions from the commercial sector are also increasing despite the fact that commercial customers are charged 4 to 4.5 times the rate of households. Only in the industrial sector are customers reluctant to subscribe. Aggressive steps taken by PAM Jaya to attract new consumers have been supplemented by actual improvements to the level of piped water service. But not all moves have been positive. The growing recognition of the scarcity of water has led to a rent-seeking attitude on the part of company officials. Some officials see their service as bestowing a privilege to which only particular people can have access, in particular those who can bribe the officials to speed up the 156 process of installing pipe connections or service their source of vending water. Despite some positive steps being taken, the inability or ineffectiveness of PAM Jaya to directly serve the vast majority of the low-income population in Jakarta has resulted in the poor paying a higher price for clean water than most. They are caught in the monopolistic squeeze of officials and a water cartel of vendors, with only limited relief provided in the 1990 deregulation of water sources. Total revenue from water sales by vendors in 1995 is approximately four times higher than that of direct piped connection. If this revenue can be strategically allocated to the distribution service, as directed by new PAM Jaya policy, more water will reach the poor. Overall, PAM Jaya can only be self-sufficient and self-supporting if it sells more water. Profit-making is sought to cover the cost of production and operations. However, focussing only on this goal means that little attention is paid to administrative and management difficulties, which contribute to such things as the high level of UFW. A more balanced agenda should be (and to a certain extent is being) formed that includes: internal reform, public participation, attention to equity concerns, careful moves to private sector inclusion, and attention to environmental issues. The central government is helping in this expansion of scope. The campaign for water conservation is also under way and is being undertaken in conjunction with DKI Jakarta, who are worried about conflicts over water use and possible increased occurrences of floods. Though the technocratic approach is still a strong force, PAM Jaya is taking small steps to transform itself from productivist to conservationist logic. 157 5. ALLOCATING WATER IN THE CITY (ll):TAKING ADVANTAGE OF NON-PIPED, WATER SOURCES Whiskey is for drinkin' and water is for fightin'. (Mark Twain cited in Anderson and Leal 1991:99) The water supply most used by Jakartans is clean water drawn from local sources, which, though often no longer the cheapest or best-quality, is the most accessible and reliable. The reluctance of the government to fully recognize these sources of non-piped clean water stems from fears that its accessibility might cause future scarcity. Nowadays, two major sources remain locally available: clean water found in shallow groundwater and surface water; and deep groundwater, located in huge, permanent, and relatively impermeable underground aquifers. This chapter will explore theoretical positions on water as a common good and the role of a water regime in creating a mechanism of allocation through water rights. As in many developing countries, non-piped sources are legally pronounced a collective good for which the government holds the rights. The government has acted as the principal actor in most water regimes. But patterns of current extraction and use;—particularly free-rider issues and overexploitation— endanger the availability of these sources. The problem of declining availability is made worse by the dual use of surface and groundwater to draw clean water from and to use as a sink to dispose of waste. This chapter concludes that current non-piped water use trends, and the inability of government agencies to counter them, is resulting in a scarcity of clean water and perpetuating rapid environmental degradation and resource depletion. 158 5.1 A Theoretical View: A Common Pool Resource and the Tragedy of the Enclosure The following theoretical review of the extraction and use of non-piped water explores the various forms of property ownership and management arrangements. It presents how overuse of the sources affects equitable services and environmental conservation. 5.1.1 The Character of Non-Piped Water as a Common-Pool Resource Non-piped water has a long history as a resource freely extracted and consumed. "Help yourself was the byword. The extractors were left to arrange their affairs as they saw fit and were not called to account as long as there was no danger of overexploiting the resource. As demand for water increases due to population growth, mining development, and advances in irrigation, water extractors more aggressively pursue their private interests. Abuse and exploitation of these sources become common. The result is congestion, conflicts, and inequitable use. This condition leads to a necessary, but voluntary cooperation between extractors in order to regulate the extraction of water. They develop rules to be applied among themselves that compromise personal interests for the common treatment of water. Water becomes a communally owned resource, that is, a "common-pool resource." Extraction and use is locally managed by community members through a self-organizing, user-directed system. This "common-pool regime" is responsible for denning who can extract and use water, establishing the rules, and enforcing them. The oldest rule to determine the level allowed for each extractor is related to "beneficial use" (Saliba and Bush 1987:61; Anderson and Snyder 1997:79). In essence, beneficial use is interpreted as the amount needed for "the fullest enjoyment 159 and usefulness of land." A person can only extract water if it will be used in accordance with this standard. The regime determines a list of uses considered beneficial, such as domestic use, stock-watering, irrigation, and mining. Considerations such as the extent of use, and "necessity" relative to other uses, are also factors that determine beneficial use. As demand for surface and groundwater increases, the rights and duties of extractors become territorially bound.1 A water law becomes necessary, not only to regulate the types of use but also Overt ^ o w ^ who can extract water and the mechanism of water usei'The oldest law determining the rights and duties with regard to water, borrowed from English common law, is riparian water rights (Saliba and Bush 1987:57; Ostrom 1990:107; Anderson and Snyder 1997:32). Riparian water rights are granted to those whose land is adjacent to water sources, such as those who own property abutting riverbanks or whose land is overlying groundwater. These rights are virtually inseparable from the lands to which they are attached, and water extracted can generally only be used on the land where it is extracted. The extractor cannot transfer the water to be used on other land. Use is only limited if extraction causes "injury to others," whether through discharge on the surface or extraction that interferes with adjacent owners' exercise of their rights (Emel and Brooks 1988:243). As the mechanism of water use is still minimally and ambiguously defined, the effectiveness of these rights is told by the absence of congestion or conflicts. Water that is ineffectively used or wasted, but does not cause conflicts or congestion, goes unchecked. In response to some of the problems with riparian rights, a second type of water rights has developed based on comprehensive management statutes that recognize rights accrued to Establishment of property rights does not depend on formal government as evidenced by the evolution of water institutions on the American frontier O^ emzets 1967 cited in Anderson, 1997). 160 property owners and their pattern of use. The most important deviation is that the rights accommodate extraction for the purpose of transferring water to other locations (Saliba and Bush 1987:57). These appropriative rights are managed under a priority system. They can be based on a "first in time, first in right" principle. A priority to extract is established by their history of use, such as the date when the extractors initially drew water, the amount of water extracted, and whether its use is continuous. Despite the fact that the right-holders can transfer their water, they are held responsible for the use. This usually means that they too are subject to the standard of beneficial use in order to prevent waste. The definition of waste is based on a number of criteria. A brief list includes: extracting more water than needed for a period of time, failure to plug abandoned wells, improper distance between wells, losing water in transfer, and polluting water. Appropriative rights can alternatively be based on a "use it or lose it" principle. The right-holders are required to use the rights, beneficially, within a certain period of time. Otherwise, they will lose their rights or face reduction in the quantity of water associated with their rights. The regime may apply sanctions or penalties to those who disobey beneficial use and other guidelines. In the case of groundwater, appropriative rights have evolved further into at least two different types of regulatory models. The first is a water-permit system wherein permits are issued for specific use of groundwater, such as for the purpose of fish farming. With such permits, the users are not necessarily subject to beneficial-use limitations or a priority system. The permits are non-transferable to other holders. The second is an allotment system that divides water resources among various users according to a formula established through an agreement between users. The basis of this system is contractual, to deliver a certain quantity of water per unit per time, though 161 extractors are prevented from inflating agreements as a way of speculating if this leads to unproductive use. With such diverse water rights being developed to accommodate interests, the common-pool regime is constantly evolving. Regimes have to acknowledge the changing nature of water quantity, quality, and use; they also have to respond to such changes by redesigning the rules and regulations, and enforce them. Despite efforts to protect and better use water sources, some critics do not support the common-pool regime as a model for water institutions, since these institutions have to regulate an increasingly complex extraction and use of non-piped water (Emel and Brooks 1988:666). In a common-pool regime, the rules and regulations produced may reflect the fullest benefits for community members, but this may be achieved at the expense of adjacent communities or future generations. The former is particularly the case when the problem of upstream and downstream communities is looked at. Furthermore, a common-pool regime often does not recognize problems caused by non-members of the community affecting their sources of water through pollution and overexploitation. The regime cannot internalize costs from outside, as those in charge have no authority to impose their rules and regulations upon non-members. Finally, common pool management can lead to insularity. Without the capacity of community members to tap innovations, new technical findings and "expert" opinion, the regime becomes inflexible. It faces more difficulties dealing with conflicts and disputes, especially those caused by innovation. An example is the traditional, common-pool irrigation systems in Bali that were sent into flux with the introduction of fast-growth rice seeds which led to chaotic irrigation scheduling and water 162 shortages (Hughes 1996:143). The extent, pace, and interconnectivity of Third World population growth, agricultural change, and industrial development mean that new water management regimes must be developed with a regional and a community component. 5.1.2 The State Takes Over the Responsibility of Common-Pool Resources The involvement of the state as the guardian of water rights begins when non-piped water is acknowledged as a good destined for collective consumption. Although the nature of its extraction and use gives it the characteristics of a private good, non-piped water is considered a good in a natural resource system "sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use" (Ostrom 1990:30). The state, replacing the roles and functions of a common-pool regime, assumes the authority to develop rules and regulations that its citizens are required to comply with. Blackstone, a US legal commentator, asserts the right of citizens in the following quote: "Water is a moving, wandering thing and must of necessity continue to be common by the law of nature, so that I can only have a temporary, transient, usufructuary property therein" (cited in Anderson 1997:49). The citizens can only have usufructuary rights, or the right to use but not own water, which also means that it is often not traded in well-functioning markets. The state, acting on behalf of the collective, retains regulatory powers, and brings to its role in the regime the rational expertise and scientific knowledge to develop administration and planning systems for non-piped water extraction and use. The state defines more precisely the meaning of beneficial use, and does so for a territory that is larger than that in a common-pool regime. Thus, it is able to acknowledge different interests from various communities. In decision-making, the 163 state tends to look at ecological and human-interest aspects related to a watershed: from upstream to downstream, groundwater recharge area to retention area, and so on. The state regime is seen as "a vehicle for social change guided by reason, expertise, and vision" (Pincetl 1990 cited in Emel and Roberts 1995:666); The state is not only expected to guide water management toward rational extraction and use, but also to facilitate efforts at resolving conflicts and disputes through a formal system. The state employs a judiciary system where claims can be legally examined in accordance with current rules and regulations. Standards, rules, and regulations develop in tandem with court decisions and/or new findings based on research. The interpretation of rules and regulations opens opportunities for restructuring the non-piped water management structures and mechanisms. Innovation in the regime is not necessarily a policy aim, as the intention is to promote uruformity and stability, reduce arbitrariness in the imposition of rules and regulations, and protect right-holders from contradictions. However, heavy emphasis on these tasks may backfire. Local conditions and history are often ignored as extractors seek case-specific justice. Standards, rules, and regulations may promote a broad sense of efficiency and standardized equitable services, but cannot accommodate individual or local-level changes. The rigidity of the state and protection of the status quo by important stakeholder may perpetuate the threat of scarcity. 164 5.1.3 The Tragedy of the Enclosure When the state is uncertain how to manage the threat of scarcity, the administrative approach tends to tighten rules and regulations for controlling resource development. Rigidity that is expressed in standards, rules, and regulations often works against innovation and provides little room for including issues external to the management of water supply sources. For example, environmental protection and recreational demand are not well incorporated in most current management plans. The state may be aiming for stability and protection of the right-holders, while the public demands a change that would allow them to use their own knowledge and skills to overcome conditions of scarcity. Such divergence can reach a level where trust and cooperation between the state and its public sours. The result is sometimes the disengagement of the state from protecting the right-holders, who, without protection, may no longer comply with the rules and regulations and act out of individual interest. When there are people who extract water without regard for duties and rules, the phenomenon of the free-rider occurs. Those extractors who do comply are left to carry the costs of extraction, while the benefits are shared by all extractors. Large-scale enforcement by the state in an area such as surface and groundwater extraction is very difficult given the resource implications. As free-riders increase, the ability of the state to manage the use of non-piped water sources grows less and less. Competitive exploitation of resources occurs until the resources reach levels where no water can be extracted. The condition where there are state rules but also too many free-riders is known as "the tragedy of the enclosure" (Ecologist 1993), which has characteristics similar to those of the famous 165 "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968). The tragedy of the enclosure takes place when the state fails both to enforce the right of holders to extract within a set of reasonable limits and to allow the right-holders to carry only short-term costs of negative externalities. Such an occurrence leads to open access use. Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975:714-15) carefully define open-access resources as ones for which there are no limits on who can extract, the amount extracted, the time period, and the mechanism of extraction. Clearly, in most countries around the world, the state has set limits on water extraction. However, when a state is not able to enforce them, an extraction race is promoted by practically "no limits." Water extractors adopt strategies that resemble open-access resource use (Ostrom 1990:108-9). The "rule of capture" governs how they act: they draw water immediately, fearing that if they wait, they will not reap the benefits of getting the water. Additionally, the condition of non-piped water scarcity is not only caused by non-compliance with state rules and regulations and free-riders issues; it implicates negatively on third parties, those who are neither the extractors nor the government. The so-called third-party effect, particularly in the form of negative externalities, can impede the availability of clean water (Anderson and Snyder 1997:20). In short, calling for the state to act is different from implementing effective policies. With Weberian bureaucratic rules, the state agency dealing with non-piped water sources cannot regulate negative externalities. The state agency that does deal with pollution and waste disposal does not always, or is not well equipped to, protect water-sources. Within the state, agencies pursue diverse, often opposed interests that are not integrated by the intersection of the domestic 166 political order. As a result, the tragedy of the enclosure theory posits that the state cannot deal adequately with clean-water issues in the non-piped water sector. 5.1.4 The State's Attempts to Solve the Tragedy If it hopes to reduce extraction to the level of recharge capacity, the state has to re-involve itself in a more pragmatic fashion than contemplated in the overly ambitious Weberian model of top-down state administration that has led to the tragedy of the enclosure. Supported by rational, technical expertise, the state must redesign and implement realistic levels of rules and regulations, and aim at reducing flexibility and ambiguous interpretation in order to eliminate potential contradictions. Beyond that, however, the state has to rebuild credibility with and win back the confidence of the water extractors and the public, and deal appropriately with site-specific conditions. There are at least three viable mechanisms for rebuilding the state's credibility as a protector of resources. The first is dubbed the "leviathan" solution, the second is privatization, and the third is a type of user-participation regime. The leviathan solution is recommended by the survivalist school, who hold onto the belief that the rights and duties defined by the state should be enough to motivate individuals to act with self-restraint. There seems to be no other way to check overexploitation and assure that competent direction is taken than to enforce rules strictly. Hardin notes: "if ruin is to be avoided in a crowded world, people must be responsive to a coercive force outside their individual psyche: a 'Leviathan', to use Hobbes's term" (Hardin 1978 cited in Ostrom 1990:9). The leviathan solution calls for stronger government control of most natural resource systems; even an "iron government" may be justified. Such thought has a certain theoretical force 167 if one views the state as a sovereign actor holding a monopoly on the means of coercion within a given territory (Bryant and Bailey 1997:51). Critiques of this solution point out that the state is often less than clear in their resource management goals and on how action taken protects the public's interest. Centralized management tends only to provide a basis for an elite to control the resource in question. Such total management "from above" is considered unworkable by many and can turn out to be oblivious to equity and social justice (Enzenberger 1974 cited in Bryant and Bailey 1997:51). Finally, the cost of enforcing such a leviathan-like doctrine would be difficult for the state to justify. Privatization is the opposite of the leviathan solution. Although both solutions mistrust the common-pool regime, proponents of privatization blame the common-pool system for overexploitation. The state is seen mimicking the performance of the common-pool regime, so its role should be reduced (Goldman 1993:54). The "invisible hand" of the market will work to address overexploitation. A system of full private-property rights, they urge, should be developed in order for each extractor to determine is own extraction rate, consumption, and protection of sources. There is no need to invest in monitoring and sanctioning extractors for sub-optimal extraction. Each extractor will be motivated to acknowledge ahead of time the climate, availability of water, and future use in order to properly assess optimal current and projected extraction. However, defining individual property rights over nonstationary resources such as clean water or fisheries is not as easy as defining them in resources such as land (Ostrom 1990:13). This fact becomes a constraint to privatization. Even when an individual's rights can be more or less established on a specific parcel of land, in the wider context of the overall resource system, such 168 as the hydrological cycle, river basin, or groundwater basin, the rights cannot be seen as individually owned. The last proposed solution is for the state to develop relations not only with actors involved in extracting water, but also with consumers. The idea is that if users get more directly involved in water management decisions, there will be greater incentives to improve water use (Easter and Feder 1997:277). Such interrelations would then be used to mobilize efforts to protect water sources. This approach radiates outward from the core concern, so it hinges on the success of the state in educating and promoting the rights of citizens to welfare, public health, amenities, and a minimum living standard. While such "entitlements" are not directly satisfied by the state, the citizens seek their own ways to obtain their rights (Mulgan and Wilkinson 1992:344). They realize that to achieve a higher standard of living they must sacrifice their individual interests to those of the public in general. They voluntarily take action to protect water sources for themselves and future generations, as the resource is recognized as essential to public health and welfare. Capitalizing on citizens' awareness, the state brings attention to micro or individual-level actions and expects cumulative results alter the consumption pattern. Possible actions contributing to accumulative efforts to protect water sources range from the conservation of forests and parks, to appropriate practices of waste disposal, to wastewater reuse, to simply allowing some land to be open space. An example of this third solution is provided by the 1976 drought in the British Isles, which had forced planners to restrict water supply several times. This was seen at first as an admission of failure (Ward 1997:94). However, when restriction of supply later became necessary again, the 169 "Save It" campaign was initiated to urge citizens to limit consumption. It was successful; citizens felt the need to reduce for conservation purposes. More recently, when drought hit in 1995, the citizens were not so compliant; water was no longer seen as a common-pool good but as an economic good that they were entitled to use as they pleased. Thus, conservation was not part of the consumers' agenda anymore unless it too was put into economic terms. This shows how important it is for the state to increase public awareness that decisions regarding water consumption are beyond the issue of ability to pay. 5.2 Surface Water and Shallow Groundwater in Jakarta Surface water and shallow groundwater are the oldest clean-water sources in Jakarta. The pattern of extraction and use of these sources has evolved around settlement expansion. This section explains the current pattern of consumption, the responsible agencies that deal with the extraction and use, and conflicts of use that have become problems of these sources. 5.2.1 Legal Framework and Utilization Surface water and shallow groundwater in Jakarta are considered to be goods mainly regulated and controlled by the central government. The utilization of this clean water as a basic service, however, is the responsibility of the,municipal level of government. The government of DKI Jakarta has committed to making these sources available to all. Assuming that these sources will be "beneficially used," the government has not allowed any restriction of surface water or shallow groundwater use without good reason. In the case of surface water, sources are virtually open to the public. The government even facilitates access by constructing, in designated areas, facilities 170 for extracting from rivers, lakes, reservoirs, and canals. In the case of shallow groundwater, shallow wells have also been built for servicing residential areas. The legal right of extractors to use surface water is not clearly drawn. The most common interpretation, based on the National Law on Water Resource Development No. 11/1974, is that water rights belong to the state, but that the residents of Jakarta should use this resource to its fullest benefit. Usufructuary rights are thus applied. No agency is directly responsible for monitoring or controlling the extraction and use of surface water. The Ministry of Health is, however, responsible for setting up minimum standards of safe, clean water and monitoring the quality of water bodies, and has input on siting the extraction facilities.2 More concern for rivers began in 1990 when the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) passed a regulation to delineate the basins for all river systems in Indonesia, develop policies, and integrate the management of rivers. The MPW delegates the authority for river management to the provincial level and only retains the authority to manage river basins whose location is marked by trans-province boundaries. The earliest regulation to deal with maintaining the quality of surface water and shallow groundwater was Government Regulation No. 20/1990 regarding control of pollution. The regulation was in response to the growing contamination of rivers and spring wells. It was designed to protect surface water from further deterioration. Since it was introduced in the early 1990s, more regulations, rules, and standards regarding pollution have been actively developed and followed in order to guide practical implementation of the regulations. ^he minimum standard of clean water is based on the Decision of the Ministry of Health No. 01/B1EHUKMAS/Per/1/1975. 171 Concern over protecting surface water and shallow groundwater by the Ministry of Environment and Population cannot be separated from the fact that these sources serve multiple functions. The Special Capital Government of DKI Jakarta through Decision No. 1608/1988 has designated the use of rivers into categories: A) can be used for drinking, B) can be used as a source of raw water, C) is suitable for fishing, and D) mainly help with flood control. Each category requires different standards of water quality and quantity in order to function as designated. However, the categories merely refer to an ideal condition; in reality, the same rivers may be used for clean water and to control floods. When there is high precipitation and thus high flows, all rivers and canals are flushed of much pollution and debris, to the detriment of Jakarta Bay. The situation today is that in many cases, surface water has deteriorated to such an extent that categories A to C are not currently achievable. Utilization of Surface Water As a coastal city in a tropical country, Jakarta has abundant sources of surface water. There are 13 rivers, several canals, and 11 large natural ponds occupying 111 ha, all within the administrative boundaries of DKI Jakarta (Tirtomihardjo 1996:1). Because Jakarta is in a low-lying area, the rivers tend to develop deposits downstream, which make the city prone to flooding. Over the past two decades, the use of surface water as a source of clean water has become increasingly limited. Water is of such low quality that most rivers are no longer used, even for cleaning. Surface water bodies, however, still have an important role to play in flood control and drainage. While limited use is the general rule, some segments of Jakarta's rivers and canals do have surface water that can be used carefully as a source of clean water. In East Jakarta, Local Water Supply 172 Enterprise (PAM Jaya) owns water intakes in the Ciliwung River, and other Rivers in order to tap water flowing from the West Tarum Canal.3 This water is transferred to local water treatment facilities before being distributed as piped water. In South Jakarta, and West Jakarta, when the river dries out, local residents can acquire clean water from spring wells located in the middle of the Ciliwung River (Santosa 1997). Because urban agriculture is recognized as an important activity, especially for the poor, people do utilize low-quality water for watering plants. In Central Jakarta, farmers have successfully cultivated 12-13 ha of vacant land adjacent to the Ciliwung River (Daniel 1996). The food produced, mainly vegetables, is sold to local markets and revenues support about 100 people. In South Jakarta, urban agriculture utilizes privately owned but underused land for dry agriculture, fisheries (catfish and carp), and cottage industries. Farmers in South Jakarta can choose between extraction from rivers or from shallow groundwater. Also, as a result of the Clean River Campaign, a segment of the Ciliwung River in Central Jakarta is increasingly used for fisheries, harvesting pollutant-susceptible species such as carp for human consumption. However, the use of surface river water, even for urban agriculture, is small scale and still limited due to continued pollution. ' The last source of surface water in Jakarta is ponds. By mitigating surface water runoff, ponds are particularly important for flood control. Particularly during the rainy season, they act as reservoirs for rainfall and river overflow. Ponds also balance the flow of surface water in rivers between seasons. The Act (UU) No. 10/1990 regarding Protection of Natural Resources and the Ecosystem recognizes the importance of ponds in the interests of protecting them and their 3In these segments of the rivers, a specific program to counter prospective pollution has been initiated. Garbage containers are located along the side of the rivers, and a "parallel side drain system" has been constructed to separate the flow of wastewater from river water. 173 surrounding basin and habitat. In Jakarta, however, the protection of these areas has been quite limited due to development pressures in almost all parts of the city. Some ponds, especially those in Central Jakarta, have been filled to be used as sites for residential or office buildings. Protection has been more successful in South Jakarta, where pressure to develop is less intense. Here, some ponds are being preserved due to the role they play in well-known fruit production areas where many local, sometimes endangered, varieties are harvested. Utilization of Shallow Groundwater Unlike surface water, shallow groundwater remains a significant source of clean water. It is a source that is relatively accessible to all residents of Jakarta except those who live in North Jakarta and parts of Central Jakarta. It is particularly an important source in areas not serviced by the piped water system. Even where there is piped water service, ground water is an alternative often drawn on as it can be more reliable, especially during the dry season. The Regulation of the Government of DKI Jakarta No. 2/1994 maps out how extensive extraction and use of shallow groundwater is to be. This regulation stipulates that no fee will be charged and no water meter needed.by those who extract groundwater from a depth of less than 40 m, have an extraction rate of less than 50 m3/s, and use water %drawn for domestic or social purposes. If any of these conditions is not met, extractors must register and a graduated fee is charged. Extractors are expected to use their own discretion to determine how they are affected by this regulation. The government of DKI Jakarta monitors the use of these mainly domestic wells in a passive manner. 174 This regulation highlights how shallow groundwater is treated as a free resource to those who can access it on a small-scale basis. Access is connected to land ownership or the holding of land title. Those who do not have access to the land do not have access to the aquifer below it. On state-owned land, shallow groundwater can be extracted with a special permit obtained from the Public Works Section of DKI Jakarta. It is expected that extractors will only consume for personal use. Water transfer for profit would not be economically justifiable on this scale. Thus, there are no regulations defining water transfer for the extractors of shallow groundwater. The devices used in the extraction of shallow groundwater are usually uncomplicated and do not require expensive, hard-to-operate technology. In areas where the water table is high, wells can be dug and a water bucket used. In areas where the water table is deeper, extractors use easy-to-operate manual or electrical pumps. These pumps are readily available in the market to individual households or groups of people. Most extractors pump from wells that are close to the location of use. This makes shallow groundwater a convenient and relatively reliable source of clean water. 175 Industries 1 = I Source: Adopted from Government of Indonesia. 1994. p.87.4 Figure 5.1 Water Consumption from Shallow Groundwater in Jakarta, Based on Volume, 1995 Figure 5.1 shows that the main use of shallow groundwater is for domestic purposes (about 78 percent of total volume extracted). This volume supplies parts or all of the water demand of approximately 5 million people (53 percent of the total population) (Special Capital Government of DKI Jakarta 1995b: 34). With regard to quality, shallow groundwater can provide only raw water as there are very few "pure" aquifers. Thus, for drinking, residents tend to boil it before use. Water quality of shallow groundwater is left to be judged by the users. As with the pumps, testing kits are available in the marketplace. Shallow groundwater is also a chosen source of clean water for commercial activities particularly restaurants, small hotels and motels, and stores taking about 18 percent of the total volume. 4 For farther explanation of how this data is collected, see Appendix B.2.2: Quality of Data. 176 Industries are also the users of shallow groundwater, but they only extract about 4 percent of the total volume extracted. Such low usage is related to the high quantity, quality, and reliability standards demanded by industries such as garment-making, printing, food processing, and craft-making. However, in some areas, shallow groundwater is no longer extractable in sufficient quantity and quality to be of use by any sector. This is the case in most of North Jakarta; in Central Jakarta; and in West Jakarta. 5.2.2 Responsible Agencies at the Local Level How to manage and protect non-piped clean water, and who has the responsibility to do this, has been debated extensively by the government of DKI Jakarta. The Health Section has been the major player assessing the feasibility of water bodies as sources. The Public Works Section is responsible for the general management of surface water, especially flood control. However, authority regarding monitoring, evaluating, and planning for the flow of rivers and canals lies with central-level agencies specifically established to handle particular functions of rivers. These agencies undertake initiatives such as the Ciliwung-Cisadane River Rehabilitation Project. For shallow groundwater, implementation and monitoring of Regulation No. 3/1994 regarding the use of shallow wells is under the Public-Works Section of DKI Jakarta. However, when water extractors have to register and pay fees for using shallow wells, they deal with PAM Jaya. The only responsibility that remains part of the mandate of the central government is the protection and management of ponds—and, in practice, the government of DKI Jakarta has been involved in the actual planning and management. 177 As rivers and canals in Jakarta help control floods resulting from upstream overflow, the Public Works Section of DKI Jakarta has taken special responsibility for monitoring potential flood situations. The difficulty is that limited funding and expert skills mean programs related to flood control, such as the Jakarta Drainage and Flood Control Project, fall short of planned implementation. A limited number of projects are initiated at the national level. The main current one is the Ciliwung-Cisadane River Basin Development Project, which seeks to maximize the capacity of the main river to carry water through the city. The National Centre of Irrigation Research and Development is looking at ways to address the relation between rainfall in the upstream Citarum River Basin and floods downstream. The National Agency of Meteorology and Geophysics monitors rainfall, but it is not directly involved in flood control activities. Flood control remains a key area needing more, and more coordinated, work. Since the 1980s, pollution has become the main cause of the deteriorating quality and quantity of surface water and shallow groundwater in Jakarta. The Office of Urban and Environmental Research (KPPL) was established by the government of DKI Jakarta in 1987 to conduct research and develop programs for improving the quality of these sources. This office has become a pioneer not only in laboratory research, but also in promoting programs to improve rivers, canals, and shallow groundwater. 5.2.3 Water as Resource or Sink? Aside from being sources of clean water, surface water and shallow groundwater can be used to treat waste. When they are used as disposal locations, they have a natural assimilative capacity to "neutralize" and dissipate waste so that the water quality can be maintained. A problem emerges when the volume and the toxicity of the waste rises beyond their assimilative capacity. 178 Surface Water Surface water in Jakarta is heavily relied upon as a location for the disposal of urban waste. Rivers, ponds, and canals in Jakarta function as a sink for those who cannot, or will not, pay to have their waste disposed of at designated waste facilities. Recognizing this growing problem, DKI Jakarta initiated a solid waste scheme in 1990, but the improved waste management is still only capturing, at most, 83 percent of waste (Rais 1996:7). About 10 percent of the solid waste goes into rivers and canals. It comes not only from households, restaurants, and hotels, but also from hospitals, supermarkets, and industries. Industrial effluent often requires special treatment, but treatment levels vary greatly. The solid waste piles up to clog rivers and canals, reducing the depth and width of these water bodies. The unpredictability of flow this causes makes flood control using dams and water gates more difficult. The contamination caused by sewage and liquid waste is even greater than that caused by solid waste. It is estimated that 90 percent of the population rely on individual septic tanks and/or they drain their sewage into local drains without treatment (Special Capital Government of DKI Jakarta 1995b: 30). Insufficient septic and local sewage treatment means that shallow aquifers, rivers, and canals are the end receivers pf much of this household waste. Research done by KPPL points to the fact that most of river and canal pollution is organic contamination originated from residential sewage (Government of Indonesia 1994:46). The combination of various solid and liquid wastes kills off water ecosystems (fish, plants, and even bacteria) and lessens the ability of surface water to regenerate waste and help control floods. 179 Lack of control of water flow is the product of a combined failure to plan infrastructure and land use. Regarding infrastructure, since the 1980s Jakarta has realized that solid waste disposal improvements should be prioritized as a program in order to reduce the danger of frequent flooding. Piped-water delivery and groundwater extraction were also prioritized. But these decisions were made at the price of neglecting separate pipe networks for drainage and sewerage, and planning for the final disposal of waste water. Many buildings in Jakarta still use the Dutch-inherited model in which drainage and sewage outflow in the same pipe network, to be discharged untreated into rivers and canals. Such a model works if the amount of water drainage is sufficiently higher than the amount of sewerage that it can neutralize it. However, for many years now, the ratio has not been at this level, and the wastewater that enters Jakarta's rivers and canals is of very low quality. As mentioned, rivers and canals in Jakarta are natural conduits of water flow from upstream rivers and overflow from the land. In this respect, river/canal size choices and land use planning choices have contributed to the current flood-prone situation. Most of the human-engineered water paths in Jakarta are narrow and relatively shallow, either because they were initially designed to handle less water or because of siltation and solid waste buildup. During upstream water outflow Jakarta becomes a natural flood plain on which overflow water is captured temporarily. The magnitude of these flash floods in Jakarta is a function of the capacity of the city's plain to absorb the upstream water runoff. This is where land use planning has failed to aid the situation. Water flow depends on how much rainwater is initially retained through saturation and how much immediately becomes runoff. Since the 1960s, upstream river areas have been attractive to many Jakartans due 180 to climate and natural landscape. Intensive physical development has taken place in these areas and many residences occupy flood plains and water recharge areas. As lots are built on and paved, areas for water to absorb into the soil and the storage capacity of the soil are reduced. More water runoff through rivers and canals is the result, and flooding in Jakarta has become more frequent and severe. For example, heavy rainfall in 1996 caused the worst flooding in Jakarta since records began in 1942 (van Ellen 1996:12). Flooding caused by upstream runoff is most severe in the Ciliwung River, which mainly affects the northeast and central areas of Jakarta. Runoff from the Cisadane River basin has been the cause of recent floods in the northwest of Jakarta. Central and North Jakarta have flatter terrain and thus more prone to hazardous floods. While upstream flow is historically blamed for causing floods, the latest research shows that it only causes 30 percent of the floods in Jakarta (van Ellen 1996:3). With an increase in population and economic activity, the built-up area of the city and region has encroached tremendously on the flood plains and water retention areas within the city. Rainwater formerly absorbed has to find new retention areas or, more often, ends up in the rivers and canals. Since 1973, flood-prone zones in Jakarta have increased (Japan International Cooperation Agency 1996a). For example, North Jakarta, was identified as a flood-prone zone in 1996. In Central Jakarta, the piling of solid waste in the Banjir Canal is blamed as the cause of recent disasters. Overall, the current situation is that heavy overnight rainfall is adequate to cause overflow affecting many local settlements across Jakarta and paralyzing the transportation network. The growing severity, frequency, and cost of flooding is a "wakeup call." 181 Shallow Groundwater Despite the fact that more than half of Jakartans depend on shallow groundwater as a source of clean water, its quality is deteriorating. Because of the facts presented above, there is less rainwater penetrating through the soil to the aquifer, and some of the water that does make it is polluted. There is now considerable concern about the quality of shallow wells. Since 1983, KPPL has monitored shallow groundwater taken from aquifers in various locations. In 1995, it was found that more than 90 percent of shallow wells do not meet accepted national standards for safe, clean water (Rais 1996:12). The bacterium E. coli (caused by high fecal counts) has contaminated 73 percent of all wells; other organic material has contaminated 35 percent of the wells; and about 90 percent of the wells are contaminated by detergents. Saltwater intrusion is an additional concern in shallow wells in North Jakarta. These wells are the most contaminated of all, and use of water is restricted to cleaning only. Wells in Central, East, and West Jakarta and parts of South Jakarta are also not supposed to be used to draw drinking water. Only in parts of South Jakarta is water drawn from shallow wells considered safe and healthy (Government of Indonesia 1994:96). The existence of E. coli in shallow wells is of great concern since based on the Ministry of Health clean water should contains no trace of E. coli from fecal count.5 Poor-quality water has a yellowish colour and increased nitrate concentrations. There are indications that water extractors are contaminating their own sources through leaks from, or inadequate, septic tanks. Many people dig their wells too close to their own or a neighbour's septic tank. Depending on the type of soil and the depth of water table, the minimum safe distance between well and tank is 10 meters 5 It is based on the Decision of the Ministry of Health No.416/1990. 182 (Special Capital Government of DKI Jakarta 1995a: 10).6 Houses, especially newer ones, occupy smaller lots, which means the minimum distance cannot be applied. Or extractors, faced with scarce water because of depletion, may decided to move their well, accidentally placing it closer to a septic tank. The existence of detergents in almost all aquifers reached by shallow wells is the result of wastewater from laundry and other cleaning being dumped on the ground untreated and seeping through. Since only about a small amount of the population has access to sewerage treatment facilities, the contamination to shallow wells cannot be avoided. On the other hand, "green" household washing products are not readily available or accepted in the marketplace. While contamination by organic materials and household cleaning detergents is most common, industry is to blame for polluting groundwater in certain areas of the city. Some shallow wells located in South Jakarta, and in West Jakarta, are contaminated by chemical and electronic waste containing inorganic materials such as ammonia, nitrate and nitrite. Industrial areas in West Jakarta have polluted shallow groundwater with heavy-metal contaminants such as mercury, cadmium, and lead (Government of Indonesia 1994:94). The effect on human health of many of these elements is hard to assess, and can be measured, if at all, only after accumulation takes place and after a long period of time. As a result, such contamination is less often reported. The response also is less clear, as boiling and simple filtering (through stones and palm fibre) cannot be relied on to treat such contamination; industrial effluent requires special treatment. 6 The safe minimum distance of 10 meters is not well-founded if the soil is porous and swampy. 183 Of most concern, however, is rapid depletion of shallow groundwater. Information regarding the characteristics of shallow groundwater use, such as amount used, replenishment rates, and so on, lead people to assume that their low rate of extraction will not affect the extraction of other users. In reality, overuse and contamination is the result of a huge number of small actions. Availability diminishes. There is not enough seepage of new water through the earth into the aquifer to dilute pollution and replace what is extracted. 5.3 Use of Deep Groundwater Unlike surface water and shallow groundwater, the extraction and use of deep groundwater is more regulated. This section presents its regulation, operational efforts to regulate and its implication on conserving the sources. 5.3.1 As Regional Resources Deep groundwater is found in confined aquifers: water reservoirs delineated by unconsolidated rock layers that have low permeability. A confined aquifer is usually large, often having an area larger than a city. Although the hydrological flow of deep groundwater cannot easily be traced even by scientific research, the geological formation of impermeable or semi-permeable layers suggests that deposits of freshwater may occur in a faraway geographical setting. Deep groundwater is thus considered a resource at a regional scale, with the potential to serve both rural and urban needs. Deep groundwater, if extraction does not exceed the natural replenishment rate, is considered a resource system with a substantial quantity of flow (Ostrom 1990:30). Deep groundwater is sometimes called "fossil water," because it may have been stored in the aquifers for millions of years. The natural rate of recharge, when recharge occurs at all, is very low, due to 184 the depth of confined aquifers and the impermeable rock layers that usually exist between them and the surface. In fact, recharge is so low that deep groundwater, though a huge source of clean water, is considered a nonrenewable resource—one whose stock will diminish even at moderate rates of extraction. Thus, for practical purposes, the aquifers are not recharged and any extraction is irreversible. Jakarta is located over the Jakarta Groundwater Basin, which occupies an area twice the size of the city. Like most groundwater basins in Indonesia, it lies beneath two provinces. As a result, responsibility for the basin and water extraction cannot be kept at the local level. It is handled at the central level under the authority of the Ministry of Mining and Energy (MME). This agency negotiates interregional interests and addresses conflicts before some of the management authority is delegated to the regional governments. 5.3.2 Regulating the Withdrawal Since deep groundwater is practically a non-renewable resource with a mechanism of extraction that requires a high level of technical capability (e.g. drilling, industrial pumps), its extraction is analogous to the mining of resources such as mineral, oil or gas. As has been mentioned, MME is the central-level agency charged with the regulation and supervision of extraction.7 Within this Ministry, the task of managing deep groundwater is under the Directorate General of Geology and Mineral Resources and the Directorate of Environmental Geology (DGTL). The former is responsible for most of the supervisory and administrative tasks; the latter conducts research related to deep groundwater. 7Law No. 11/1974 (para. 2 art. 5) and Government Regulation No. 22/1982 (art. 6) are the two key pieces of legislation governing regulation. 185 With decentralization being a policy imperative since 1992, MME has delegated to regional-level governments the authority to supervise, monitor, and evaluate the extraction and use of deep groundwater for non-mining- and non-energy-related activities.8 Decentralization has been done in such a way that monitoring is created in areas where groundwater has been intensively exploited. In DKI Jakarta, the government has established a Mining Section specifically to deal with extraction permits. The issuance of permits is aimed at restricting illegal, and thus unmonitored, extraction. Government Regulation of DKI Jakarta No. 2/1994 regulates the charges imposed. In deciding to issue a permit, the Mining Section integrates various recommendations: from technical recommendations of DGTL, to an evaluation of land use planning from the Spatial Planning Section of the government of DKI Jakarta. The Mining Section also authorizes their field officers to regularly check on the location and the rate of extraction in order to enforce the adherence of extractors to their permits. Monitoring data is then shared with the Directorates. The "appropriate level" of extraction conferred on this resource is determined through a self-checking process. Potential users of deep groundwater themselves determine the availability, the potential level of use, and the period of use planned. An application for a permit to do location-specific research has to be made to the MME, with a carbon copy to the regional government. If permission is granted, research can be conducted and the results evaluated by the MME and the regional government. These bodies will then issue a technical recommendation regarding the issuance of a permit to extract. If the application is successful, a special permit, valid for three 8It is legitimized in Decree of the Ministry of Mining and Energy No. 02P/101/M.PE/1994 on Administrative Management of Deep Groundwater. 186 years and renewable, will be issued by the regional government that states the mechanism of extraction, the number of wells, and the extraction rate. Regulations in Indonesia allow deep groundwater to be extracted only by those who have title to the land on which the well is drilled, either through ownership or use title. They can extract water only for their own purposes. If there is an excess, they are not allowed to transfer it to other potential users. But there is "selective enforcement" of these rules, and water transfer is largely accepted, particularly when it is justified as a public use such as supplying local piped-water companies. However, there have been cases where the personal-use rule was enforced and extraction has been stopped. PAM Jaya is no longer allowed to extract water from deep-groundwater-fed spring wells in Bogor and transfer the gains to Jakarta. Use of this natural resource is now under the responsibility of the Water-Supply Enterprise of the city of Bogor. 5.3.3 Utilization of Deep Groundwater Extraction of deep groundwater is considered a cheap option for heavy water users. It is economically justified for utilization that can give profits in accordance with investment. Since drilling is expensive and capital costs related to pumping are high, many extractors of deep groundwater are involved in high-profit-making activities, such as agriculture, manufacturing, and mining. The only domestic users of deep groundwater are residents in real estate projects that do not have access to piped water and can collectively afford a deep well. 187 Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency. 1996. p. 2-21.9 Figure 5.2 Water Consumption from Deep Groundwater in Jakarta 1995, Based on Volume In Jakarta, the use of deep groundwater by industry is dominated by food, chemical, and electrical companies that require large, reliable amounts of water for processing activities. (See Figure 5.2.) Use of deep groundwater for commercial and social activities (38 percent) is dominated by firms that consume large quantities of clean water and demand reliability, such as upscale restaurants and hotels, and high-rise buildings. These are concentrated in Central and South Jakarta. In terms of quantity, industrial complexes in East Jakarta draw the most deep groundwater, followed by South Jakarta, an area poorly served by piped water. Based on the hydrological model developed by Schmidt and Tirtomihardjo (cited in Mining Section of DKI Jakarta 1995:46) the extraction of deep groundwater is still within replacement 9 For further explanation about the data representation, see Appendix B.2.3, Quality of Data: Deep Groundwater. 188 levels. Replacement is a product of horizontal inflow from adjacent aquifers across the "hinge line" and of vertical seepage from the shallow aquifer. The amount of rain that eventually becomes deep groundwater is estimated as 5 percent of yearly precipitation, though this figure is likely decreasing, for reasons detailed earlier. These two sources, horizontal and vertical, account for a 2.44 m3/s infusion into the groundwater basin under the Jakarta region. A safe level of extraction is set as 70 percent of this estimated infusion, so the maximum is 1.52 m3/s (Mining Section of DKI Jakarta 1995:47). In 1993-1994 the rate was about 1.05 m3/s. The prediction is that there is an increase in water use of 0.05 m3/s, and thus the expansion of deep groundwater as a renewable source of clean water can only happen over the next ten years (Mining Section of DKI Jakarta 1995:47). Interestingly, the Mining Section of DKI Jakarta's data show that legally approved deep groundwater extraction is only 0.57 m3/s (see Figure 5.3). According to hydrograph monitoring done by the DGTL, the extraction rate has reached about 1.05 m3/s. Thus, there is about 0.47 m3/s extraction that is unregistered, representing the same amount of registered volume extracted and two-thirds of the registered numbers of wells (World Bank 1993:32; Soetrisno 1995:4). The data on the registered volume of extraction from the Mining Section is likely to be underrepresented. While there are few reports regarding the extractors not being able to extract water at a rate that they expect, implication of non-registered use emerges in the form of environmental degradation. 189 Precipitation 1.24 m3/s* ,' i j i i i f Registered Extraction /K Unregistered Extraction Flow from the South 1 2 m3/s • 111 DEEP GROUND WATER 2.44 m3/s 0.57 m3/s 0.47 m.3/s *based on the highest peak of annual rainfall Source: Mining Section of DKI Jakarta. 1995. p.47.10 Figure 5.3 Use of Deep Groundwater in Jakarta, based on Volume, 1995 5.3.4 Lowering Water Table and Land Subsidence Despite aggregate deep groundwater availability in Jakarta due to safe yields, there are indications that in several locations deep groundwater has been overexploited. In other words, extractors have experienced a dropping water pressure (piezometric level). The DGTL has detected the largest water table drop in East Jakarta, where it is decreasing on average 2.76 m/year (Soetrisno 1995). In North Jakarta, the drop is about 0.76 m/year; and in South Jakarta is 0.80 m/year. In Central Jakarta, there is a relatively even drop over the whole area of about 0.40 m/year. The lowest rate of water table drop is in West Jakarta, about 8 cm/year. Currently the deep aquifer is located between 20-40 m below sea level. When underground water can no longer fill up the full area of the aquifer, hollow spaces result. The water table drops mentioned above cause local pockets of air. Normally, water held in groundwater basins is under pressure. This keeps the land above the aquifer intact and helps bring 1 0 See Appendix B.2.3 on Quality of Data for Deep Groundwater. 190 water to the surface. As pressure drops, not only does pumping become more difficult, but an underpressurized groundwater basin is unable to support the land above it and land can subside into the empty area. Such a pattern is causing serious problems of land subsidence in Jakarta (Soetrisno 1995:5). Geotechnical model calculations strongly support the hypothesis that groundwater extraction is the main cause of this increasingly destructive phenomenon (Tirtomihardjo 1996). Land subsidence has been recorded in North Jakarta at the rate of 24.5 to 34 cm/year between 1989 and 1991, and in Central Jakarta at an annual rate of 2.3 to 4.3 cm between 1971 and 1981 (Rais 1996:4). The fastest subsidence has occurred in East Jakarta, at 34 cm/year; the deepest occurred in West Jakarta, there was a rapid 100 cm drop. A 1995 report predicted that even if no further extraction of deep groundwater occurred, the problem would continue until 2025, with subsidence of land by 200 cm (Mining Section of DKI Jakarta 1995:49). The dropping water table and increasing problems of subsidence call into question the current claims of renewable and safe use. 5.3.5 Contamination of Deep Groundwater: Seawater Intrusion Disturbances to the hydrology of deep groundwater caverns have special implications in North Jakarta. Because the area is next to the Java Sea, the emptying process of unconfined aquifers has resulted in the intrusion of seawater. Although water in this part of the basin is naturally somewhat brackish (Government of Indonesia 1994), recent seawater intrusion has had more widespread consequences. The intrusion has significantly diminished the water quality not only in shallow groundwater but also deep groundwater especially in areas close to the coast. 191 Seawater intrusion also contains chlorine that can corrode the foundations of buildings, so that new construction in Central Jakarta requires casing—drilled wells using cement. Exposure to seawater has necessitated shifts in the locations of planned buildings in Central Jakarta. Overextraction of deep groundwater in North Jakarta has changed the hydrologic functions of the area. In the past, North Jakarta was able to channel overflow using carefully engineered gravity drain canals, drainage pumps, gated weirs, and tidal gates at the entrance to the sea. In this fashion, flooding was controlled. Today, flooding cannot be avoided. Water flow is impeded by pollution and siltation, which has interfered with the system. Land subsidence has changed elevations. Parts of North Jakarta capable of quickly absorbing water into the subsoil quickly reach their saturation level. Too many areas are now covered with hard surfaces. As a result, flooding is the norm in North Jakarta in the wet season. Another problem is more recent. The confined aquifer where Jakarta and region's deep groundwater is stored is increasingly becoming contaminated. In the past, the amount of pollution reaching this source was low and diluted into the large volume of water contained in the basin. Today, the Research Centre of the Ministry of Health reports that groundwater in West Jakarta is especially contaminated by heavy metals and bacteria. How commercial and industrial waste found its way into deep groundwater is still unknown. The government does not yet have a response to this type of contamination. In fact, Biro Bina Lingkungan Hidup (BBLH), the agency responsible for water pollution, has no specific agenda regarding protection of deep groundwater in North Jakarta (Aboeprajitno. 1996: interview). 192 The proposed land reclamation in North Jakarta, backed by a strong political will at the central level, is being given a high priority. It is seen as part of the economic revitalization of North Jakarta. Several studies have been conducted to determine the best form of reclamation, especially to prevent seawater intrusion. The type of fiUing-in of Jakarta Bay and the type of pumping mechanism for the reclaimed land have consequences for the current hydrostatic balance between salt and fresh water, create new expansive zones of floods, and increase downward injection of water from shallow to deep aquifers. This last may endanger the existence of fresh-deep groundwater in the Jakarta Groundwater Basin. 5.4 The Tragedy of the Enclosure Exploitation to the limit has characterized the use of non-piped water. It functions as an adequate but diminishing source of clean water. Despite the government's efforts to step in, as parts of the regime it has not sufficiently been able to establish itself as a respected manager. The task of protecting these sources becomes harder as resource depletion has to be dealt with beyond just governing the behaviour of water extractors. The ability of the government to protect clean water from threats such as pollution, sewage, saltwater intrusion, flooding, and the lack of open land for rainwater absorption requires different policies affecting different segments of the public and administered by different branches of government. By allowing the current patterns of extraction to continue largely unchecked, a "tragedy of the enclosure" is developing. Interestingly, it is happening in three different ways. 193 5.4.1 Surface Water: The Case of Marginalized Use Surface water is no longer an important source of clean water. This is not because surface water has been overexploited, but because its use for waste disposal has spoiled it for human consumption. In other words, negative externalities in surface water have reduced the opportunity cost for water extraction. The government, which has benefited from the multiple functions of the surface water, has slowly taken on the role of securing surface water for the eventual purpose of clean-water provision. But population and urban growth produce an overwhelming volume of waste that cannot be accommodated in the available treatment facilities. Within their means, the government has consistently implemented partial solutions to the problems of waste management. However, such solutions do not change the status of surface water. Clean water may be a long-term goal; for now, however, the government is prioritizing management of the flood control function of rivers, canals, and ponds. As for the legal status of surface water, it is treated as a common resource; extractors or users are merely expected to use it in good faith. The potential extractors are those who live beside or can get physically close to the water, either through trespassing on other people's land or through the government-owned land. They can then claim usufructuary rights. Without knowing who has the rights to surface water as clean water, it is more costly for the government to exclude people. Unfortunately, surface water has lost its use as clean water without the extractors ever having had an opportunity to "fully" extract it. The condition of overexploitation has become a "tragedy of the enclosure" due to too many counting on the assimilative capacity of this resource. As water rights for polluters are even less well defined than those of clean-water users, their participation in 194 reducing pollution has to be obtained by enforcement of rules and regulations. These efforts may share the same fate as waste control. But the government can develop cooperation and institute incremental improvement, especially with those who live adjacent to the overexploited source. In Jakarta, this is what is happening where those who live on the riverbanks voluntarily participate in the Clean River Program. 5.4.2 Shallow Groundwater: The Tragedy of the Enclosure The extraction and use of shallow groundwater is open only to those who hold title to land overlying this resource. Although the extractors gain the individual rights to extract and use due to their right to the land, they extract from shallow groundwater, supposedly held in common. Thus, in order to prevent the tragedy of the enclosure, rules and regulations are required. They have not been forthcoming, however; the few regulations in place exclude those who extract at a low rate and draw water only for domestic and social purposes. Shallow groundwater extractors are largely not monitored or controlled, lending this source the character of a common-pool resource. The extractor perceives that her/his right to water is an individual right and has little incentive to consider the interests of other extractors or conserve for the future. A race ensues where the "rule of capture" dorninates. The government may contend that letting only land title holders extract is adequate to raise awareness among themselves, as per common-pool theory, but the reality is that more must be done to stave off the tragedy of the enclosure. The government must concentrate on public efforts to protect shallow groundwater. Although there are some targeted initiatives aimed at encouraging individual households to take action, 195 more general action has been slow, as the government lacks the information, skills, and resources needed to address a city-wide public. For example, the Public Works Section of DKI Jakarta is promoting the need to construct seepage wells to maintain the recharge capacity of shallow groundwater, but few households have voluntarily constructed wells. Thus, the benefits of public action have not been widely felt. In addition to the limited response by the government to overexploitation, problems are now being compounded by negative externalities such as E. coli and industrial effluent contamination. The Health Section of DKI Jakarta can only give recommendations on the danger of using such water. The Human Settlement Section of DKI Jakarta, in charge of promoting health issues, has made some policy suggestions, but is not acting specifically to protect shallow groundwater. Thus, without action taken by the Public Works Section, extraction and use of this source will become more problematic. 5.4.3 Deep Groundwater: Free Riders Of the three non-piped sources of clean water, access to deep groundwater is the most restricted. Not only is its access determined by land ownership overlying the deep groundwater basin, but it is also regulated and monitored by the Mining Section of DKI Jakarta. A n application to become a registered extractor is complicated, as each case must be submitted with research reports and recommendations. The high cost of entry and of pumping limits the access to those who can monetarily justify their investment. Despite restrictive entry into the deep groundwater basin, the government still lacks the ability and resources to track down illegal extraction. The difference between the registered volume that is supposed to be extracted and findings from monitoring wells shows that a free-rider problem 196 exists. Free-rider problems cause those who obey the rules to carry the cost of those who benefit. Public or corporate reluctance to pay duties in accordance to benefits make the monitoring of deep groundwater's extraction less effective. As deep groundwater is treated as a non-renewable resource, monitoring extraction has allowed scientists to determine a safe level of extraction, especially as a reference for the future. But legal and illegal extraction seems to be occurring faster than predicted and externalities are beginning to cause problems (most notably, pollution and land subsidence). One difficulty faced is that of understanding patterns of deep groundwater basin change. Exceeding the "safe amount of extraction" may or may not cause drops in water table and pressure. Different results occur depending on geographical location and geological forms. Extraction in North Jakarta has caused seawater intrusion, while in South Jakarta, such extraction is considered safe. Negative externalities such as land subsidence also do not directly affect the availability of deep groundwater. They do, however, affect those who are not themselves extractors, and the extractors have to be made accountable, especially for land subsidence. In terms of rights, deep groundwater is not considered an essential source of water for the purpose of welfare. Its nature resembles mineral deposits rather than ubiquitous resources; thus, restricting access to it is not considered to jeopardize the basic needs of the people. It is a natural resource that caters to economic development and urban growth. Overexploitation of deep groundwater can only be reduced with continued supervision from the government and regulations that encourage extractors to act in ways that respect its nature and availability. 197 5.5 Conclusion This section concludes the presentation by answering questions regarding the prospect of non-piped water availabUity. 5.5.1 Is There Any Turning Back? The extraction of clean water from non-piped sources has reached the level of overexploitation: a condition in which continued extraction can only result in the tragedy of the enclosure. In the current state of affairs, every additional extraction puts the future of the sources at risk. Although overexploitation is seen as inevitable in the face of increasing demand, realistic, enforced restrictions in combination with public education is one possible solution to the problem. The government, as the owner of these resources, is equipped with rules and regulations aimed at restricting the extraction of non-piped water. However, they are rarely enforced. The opinion of the public and lack of resources are often cited as reasons for ignoring the challenges. The public tends to go against restrictions, particularly as non-piped sources are counted on by the majority. As a result, the government and the public postpone preventive action. The failure of the government mechanism to prevent overexploitation may open the possibUity of the price mechanism taking control. In the case of shallow groundwater, the cost of extraction is often too great in relation to its quality when considered for drinking; extractors/users tend to find other sources such as bottled water or bulk water sellers. The price system seems to be a "natural mechanism" to restrict the extraction of non-piped water sources. 198 Due to the trends noted in this chapter, opportunities to restore non-piped water sources may shrink unless the interests of the public are harnessed to the view of conservation and proper use. Restoration will need commitment by all extractors as well as water polluters to be consistent with the protection of non-piped sources. The case of deep groundwater is the hardest. Can the trends be stopped? With the intensive pressure put on natural resources by population and urban growth, the use of these sources is not likely to be stopped, but it might be incrementally shifted to wiser patterns consistent with availability. Otherwise, overexploitation will still be seen as the "optimum" course due to the simple fact that it is the course of "least resistance". To begin to treat surface water and groundwater as an economic good is not seen as a wise move at this time, although, where water can be transferred to match demand, a market may allow efficient use. To make non-piped water tradable would only spur increased extraction, perpetuate unhealthy competition with piped water, and accelerate the "tragedy of the enclosure." This will happen because, first, there is no knowledge base for extractors to understand capacity and guide extraction at a sustainable level and thus be accountable for their actions. Without such knowledge, extractors are not induced to conserve sources for long-term use. The existence of a water market only cannot promote efficient extraction and conservation from within. Conservation will reduce the demand for water, and thus reduce profits in water provision. Second, the water market only promotes negotiation between two parties, the extractors and the users, without considering the effect on any third party. The falling water table, seawater intrusion, and land subsidence all have serious third-party or inter-generational equity effects. 199 5.5.2 Rules, Regulations, and Collective Action Without the existence of a water market, to prevent destructive extraction of non-piped water the government has to take a command-and-control-approach in which the rules and regulations are tightened and enforcement is prioritized. Occasionally, when the choice of using piped water is limited, the government might wisely relax restrictions on non-piped sources. It is the order, not lawlessness, that determines allocation of non-piped water (Anderson and Snyder 1997:13). In the long term, non-piped sources cannot be predictably utilized without degrading their sources. The government should therefore implement strict measures to prevent further destructive extraction and use. Strengthening rules and standards will likely fail if enforcement is minimal. Public education alone also does not guarantee a change in behaviour. However, the essence of rules, standards, and education must not be exclusion. They will have greater effect if they are aimed at generating usage that is accountable, with clearly understood reasons why certain types of extraction are being restricted. The role of rules and regulations should be to clarify "good" and "bad" behaviour, and promote behaviour that protects the sources. With changing conditions, the rules and regulations should be able to accommodate the extraction of non-piped water. And education remains a key component. It is the awareness of the public that their actions are protecting a common-pool resource that leads to attitudinal change. Artificially recharging shallow groundwater through artificial wells and continually discharging rainwater to the subsoil will be easier if the public takes the initiative. The big task will be to increase collective action. Most importantly, the discussion of non-piped water use has to turn 200 from an emphasis on extraction to efficient use, from the need to provide for demand to the need to reduce demand. In Jakarta today, non-piped water is an unsustainable source of clean water, and talk of demand management has to begin. 201 6. THE QUEST FOR CLEAN WATER: THE WATER REGIME OVERCOMING SCARCITY Failure to meet escalating demand for clean water is one of the many examples in developing countries of a losing battle to provide well-functioning public services. The centralized system of piped water in Jakarta is inefficient and crippled by the unsatisfactory performance of the water-supply enterprise. The decentralized mechanisms in place for drawing water from non-piped sources are failing to protect these resources in order to sustain their continued use. The government is reluctant to recognize that both mechanisms ignore third-party effects. Urban water management is fractured; structured around formal, discrete policies on water protection; executed by a disengaged water supply institutional arrangement. Inevitably, the piped water supply enterprise and the institutions responsible for non-piped water become parts of a water supply regime whose problem, increased water scarcity, is similar. An interesting question develops: To what extent is scarcity a product of institutional arrangements, policy-making, and interaction between actors? This chapter will look at the roles of water-supply institutions in their attempt to expand service. Specifically, it will look at institutional motives, the way change is implemented in the bureaucracy, and the embodiment of change in law. Regime theory helps describe actions taken by each institution in response to demand for clean water, and the institutions' relations with the public and other non-governmental actors. The chapter concludes that the current pattern of interactions among actors—characterized by a reluctance to cooperate with each other and with 202 third parties to coordinate a response to issues outside the narrow scope of clean-water provision—are perpetuating scarcity in Jakarta. 6.1 A Theoretical View: Institutional Approach and a Water Regime To expand basic services is the intuitive step to take when population and economic conditions show a pattern of positive growth. This section explains the pattern and policy dynamics inside the institutions responsible for clean-water provision, and the possibility of creating a regime based on these dynamics and interrelations. 6.1.1 Institutional and Economic E)ynamics: Motives and Constraints for Expansion of Water Supply Service In Third World cities, the current need to expand the provision of clean water service is in part due to population and economic growth. But the urgency of the needed expansion is due also to "bottlenecked" service that runs the risk of compromising the city's public and economic health. It is not that there is a lack of a pro-economic growth orientation within the local government or among private-sector water providers, or in policies and implementation (though borrowing and/or budget restrictions do limit expansion). These actors generally support economic growth, as their water sales are boosted by most forms of economic and/or population expansion (Harding 1994:358). High, insatiable demand has always opened opportunities. Yet expansion and improvements in service are uneven. In almost all cities of the developing world, consumers receive inequitable services. This raises the question of government-directed infrastructure growth vis-a-vis public health and welfare: whether or not expansion necessarily confers equal benefits or 203 counteracts the inequality of present service. The expansionist orientation of the public- and private-sector water usually does not adequately address issues of inequitable service and water conservation. Motives for the Expansion Walker and Williams (1982:106-07) explore the motivations behind water supply and delivery policies and actions based on the expansionist orientation. There are two main motivational frameworks that relate to clean-water provision: institutional and economic. Within the institutional framework, the need for expansion is motivated by the political mandate to increase the level of public services; sometimes this agenda includes addressing equity issues. There is inequitable service in terms of quantity and quality delivered to different income groups. The "class hypothesis" refers to the idea that economically disadvantaged groups are discriminated against (Stone 1993:19-21). They receive a lower grade of service, or their demand is simply disregarded. These groups may be impersonally oppressed by the logic of situations as well as by the directed application of power by others (Dowding, Dunleavy et al. 1995:208). Institutional urban service provision can be unequal in terms of how it deals with the built-up areas and physical structure of the city. Those who live in sparsely populated areas are not targeted for expensive infrastructure, while it is very hard to add infrastructure to densely populated areas with access only to pedestrian streets. Those, who out of necessity have established themselves on flood plains, riverbanks, and steep lands may not receive permanent access to the established supply system for safety or legal reasons. 204 These aspects of inequitable service raise specific issues. Expanding provision using uniform service outcome measures cannot be relied upon due to the diversified nature of demand and socio-physical layout of the city. The measurement of "good" service should not be the amount of water volume distributed per person (aggregate) per day, but the accessibility of people to clean water. It means that water is available when demanded and is safe to use The expansion of water service can thus be targeted; redirecting effort to reaching those most in need. The concern is that the current growth agenda is too concentrated on "easiest option" expansion of geographic coverage, increasing water quantity, and improving water quality, to the detriment of equity issues presented above. Still within the institutional framework, there are growth motives related directly to a player's positioning within the water regime (Anderson and Snyder 1997:50-51). First, there is a sense of competition or rivalry. The local water-supply enterprise is usually assigned the responsibility to provide piped water to the whole city. They gain authority from being assigned this "natural" monopoly. The position, thus granted, is a lucrative deal for them financially, politically, and even socially. Despite service provision that is often inefficient, inequitable, and non-conserving, the opportunities gained from "main player" status allow the local water-supply enterprise to push aside potential rivals. On the other hand, privately run water providers gain competitive advantage by developing operations based on demand. The common explanation for this rivalry is self-interest (Blake 1956:232-4; Walker and Williams 1982:110). Most employees, especially executives, prefer to working for organizations that "move ahead." Growth brings promotions and the status of work in an expanding, dynamic enterprise. Unfortunately, competition drives expansion in directions that often work against conservation and equity. 205 The other institutional worry is that competition leads to incautious expansion. A common problem in developing countries is the ambiguous definition of water rights (Winpenny 1994:30). In the absence of city-wide piped water service, the right to clean water is bound up with access. Where clean water is abundant, extractors gain the benefits of use. Where water is scarce, the use of appropriative rights (in the vernacular, "first in time, first in right" or "use it or lose it") leads extractors to secure water provision that is in advance of need and/or unsustainable. Institutional motives are insufficient to explain the desire for the expansion of water provision. Direct economic motives play a part (Walker and Williams 1982:107), hence the economic theoretical framework. First, for many extractors, profit motivates expansion. While this is most noticeable in the behaviour of private-sector water providers, profit is now a guiding principle with many managers of public water systems. In an era of government cuts, state-run companies pursue strategic expansion in order to compete and politically "offer profits to the public purse." However, in cases where water providers operate in a monopoly where the goal of expansion is not clearly defined or enforced, the profit motive may only lead to price increases rather than better or more extensive service (Blake 1956:233; Easter and Feder 1997:269). Second, in cities in the developing world, the economics of external subsidies make expansion possible (Serageldin 1994:3). Bureaucrats and politicians face different incentives to determine the expansion of water provision. More importantly, service expansion is often contingent on foreign grants or loans. Once secured, long-term economic costs are not carefully weighed in planning decisions as players assume that the cost of operating and managing new infrastructure will be recovered from the actual operation. This has not always been the case. 206 There is a considerable degree of overlap between institutional and economic motivational frameworks. The distinction is somewhat artificial and expansionist behaviour has to be understood as a combination of both. Below is the explanation of constraints that limit expansion. Constraints to Expansion In looking at constraints, it is best to start at the top of the bureaucratic structure. Expansion can V be constrained when execution is poorly caried out, which encourages rent-seeking measures. At the executive level, there is often an inability to draw up clear goals and directions. Senior appointments of unsuitable personnel leads to preferential treatment of certain types of users, even when economic returns would dictate different areas of concentration (Easter and Feder 1997:268). This leads to sub-optimal performance. Unproductive costs related to the politics of being involved in a public service field, such as the cost of lobbying for monopoly status (for example, favours or bribes to government officials), leads to discouragement of rent-producing activities (Lovei and Whittington 1993:1965). It is also important to look at the bottom of the bureaucratic/management ladder. Many policy decisions are implemented on the basis^ of field worker discretion and office staff in direct contact with consumers'or specific client groups. These are the "street-level officials" (Pinch 1985:45) The degree of discretionary freedom they have depends largely upon their relative autonomy within the structure of the agency. Considerable discretion may be given to lower-level personnel because the agency is uncertain about its overall objectives and thus avoids the formulation of 207 explicit goals. Street-level officials have to employ their "hidden" code of practice for dealing with difficult circumstances (Lovei and Whittington 1993:1973). This is especially true when work is done in an often-hazardous environment with inadequate resources and minimal supervision. Some street-level bureaucrats, such as building and well inspectors, have greater ambiguity of outcomes than, for example, garbage collectors or water meter readers or floodgate control operators. For most government theorists, street-level discretion is not incompatible with regular decision rules and predictable outcomes. But for this to be the case, clear organizational goals have to be in place, as do strictly enforced rules against the use of discretion for personal gain. 6.1.2 Inter-Institutional Relationships Defining the Provision of Clean Water Despite the expansionist orientation taken in most cities toward water supply services, the efforts of water providers to expand are not made in isolation. In fact, their capability to transfer water is dependent on policies set up for water resource development and management. Constraints may come from the fact that water supply is regulated by an elected/appointed government and an often fractious, large, multilevel bureaucracy. Despite attempts to extricate and demarcate service provision (which itself leads to some undesirable outcomes), the local water agency cannot be free from political and "macro-political" influences (e.g., decentralization, neo-conservatism, the fluctuating political will to debt finance infrastructure) (Walker and Williams 1982:112). Politics are involved in direction-setting by local and national politicians who need to accommodate particular pressure groups. Policy decisions that are the product of such influences are presented in the language of rational technical criteria, with the political reasons not formally stated (Rydin 1998:177). Thus, there is a need to understand the inter-institutional relations in which the local 208 government, which usually has autonomy over water provision in urban areas, and the central government, whose influence is more subtle but important, operate. So management of the provision of clean water is part of an often-complicated set of relationships between, at minimum, the local and the central government. For example, a higher-level government gets involved if water has to be transferred across political jurisdictions. Since river basins, drainage patterns, and aquifers do not recognize administrative boundaries, even cities whose water sources are local face regional issues and have to define the relationship between government levels. Thus efficiency and inter-institutional arrangements must be dealt with in structuring water management. Execution of clean water service is in part a measure of the capability of local government. Yet local bureaucrats in public or semi-public water delivery companies act either effectively or ineffectively from a position within a national government hierarchy. They are charged with improving the water supply network on the ground. They can rarely plan and act without political, administrative, technical, or financial support from the central government. This ensures that local governments, and the water companies and water extraction regulators within, cannot stand as sectoral autarkies, or as single-purpose, self-contained units of government, even though they are often designed in that fashion. Legitimacy is derived from a legal framework that demands concern for the larger geographic and governmental context. With regard to how local decisions are made, there are at least three common patterns of inter-organizational arrangements and influence (World Bank 1995:37). The first is one in which there 209 is, by most standards, "overcontrol" of local government. This pattern can be the result of either a situation where a very high proportion of total public expenditure is made directly by the central government, or a situation where the local government functions largely as an administrative arm of the central government (for example, where the central government appoints the municipal executive and dictates virtually all expenditure and revenue decisions). Overcontrol may derive from an attempt to structure bureaucracy according to Weber's classic model of the centralized, vertically integrated, and efficient bureaucracy. By increasing control, the central government can avoid abuse of power at the local level and make regional resource decisions based on regional analysis (Pinch 1985:35). On the negative side, this course of action hinders attempts by local governments to become accountable in the exercise