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Building and burning bridges: a study of social capital and disaster vulnerability in Upper St'át'imc… Bhopalsingh, Lisa Ann 2000

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B U I L D I N G A N D B U R N I N G B R I D G E S A Study of Social Capital and Disaster Vulnerability Upper St'at'imc Territory including Lillooet, British Columbia by Lisa Ann Bhopalsingh B A. Hons., Jesus College. Oxford University, 1992 P.G.C.E., Jesus College, Oxford University. 1993 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES School of Community and Regional Planning We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April 2000 © Lisa Ann Bhopalsingh, 2000 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of 5 C I 4 O O L <oF r.o nt\\)rJiT/ «<- 'iGTno'V/tc Pt^AJlJA— The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date 2 7 ^ Af'UC ZoQO DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT Through the analysis of relationships between aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities in Upper St'at'imcTerritory in British Columbia, this thesis illustrates how bridging and bonding forms of social capital affect vulnerability and cooperation to prepare for disasters in communities characterised by cultural conflict. Social capital is based upon networks of trust and reciprocity, which enable individuals to cooperate to achieve shared goals. In Upper St'at'imc Territory, people are most likely to have close relationships or bonds with those from the same cultural background. The absence of inter-cultural bonds means that bridges linking those less well known to each other (from each culture) are necessary to facilitate cooperation. However, there are few arenas that enable the formation of bridges between aboriginals and non-aboriginals. Pre-existing patterns of social capital between aboriginals and non-aboriginals were played out in BC Hydro's Exercise "Bridge River", a simulation exercise to prepare for a potential dam incident affecting downstream communities. Lack of bridges between the cultures was highlighted by low levels of cultural interaction during the exercise and the establishment of separate emergency operations centers. Nevertheless, the exercise resulted in some aboriginals and non-aboriginals coming into contact with each other and building new bridges. Unfortunately opportunities for strengthening these bridges through regular cultural interaction are limited. This is dWto cultural divisions in membership of emergency preparedness organisations as well as wider social and employment networks. The exercise reinforced the strong bonds that enable non-aboriginal emergency responders to work well together. The benefits of these strong bonds are restricted if they result in excluding aboriginal participation in emergency response organisations. Exercise "Bridge River" organisers were unaware of the strong bonds among non-aboriginal emergency responders. This affected their ability to anticipate how these bonds were used during the exercise and resulted in delaying the process. Social capital is essentially a neutral phenomenon, how it is used determines whether or not it is a destructive weapon or a constructive tool for building disaster resilient communities. Nevertheless, social capital can be easily destroyed and bridges burnt by conflict and lack of trust between cultural groups. Understanding a community's social capital will enhance disaster preparedness and mitigation efforts. Inter-cultural social capital produced in one arena can be used to increase cooperation in disaster preparedness. At the same time, disaster preparedness activities can be used as a foundation to strengthen and build bridges between cultures. i i TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT : " LIST OF TABLES v LIST OF FIGURES vi ACRONYMS vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS viii L INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 OUTLINING THE ISSUES 1 1.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL, VULNERABILITY AND ETHNICITY 5 1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 8 1.4 K E Y RESEARCH QUESTIONS 9 1.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 9 1.6 RELEVANCE OF THIS THESIS TO COMMUNITY PLANNING 10 1.7 ORGANISATION OF CHAPTERS 11 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 12 2.1 INTRODUCTION 12 2.2 DISASTERS AS SOCIAL PROBLEMS 12 2.2.1 Evolution of Social Considerations in Disaster Research 12 2.2.2 Disaster Vulnerability 13 2.2.3 Disaster Resilience and Resistance 14 2.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL AS A F A C E T OF DISASTER VULNERABILITY 16 2.3.1 Social Capital 16 2.3.2 Social Capital and Disaster Vulnerability 16 2.4 TYPES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 18 2.4.1 Horizontal and Vertical Associations 18 2.4.2 Bridging and Bonding Capital 21 2.5 SUMMARY 25 3. METHODOLOGY OF T H E STUDY 26 3.1 INTRODUCTION 26 3.2 QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES 26 3.3 METHODS IN SOCIAL CAPITAL RESEARCH 27 3.4 PRIMARY D A T A COLLECTION 27 3.4.1 Internship with BC Hydro and Planning Assistance for the District of Lillooet 27 3.4.2 Participant-Observation 27 3.4.3 Interviews 28 3.5 SECONDARY D A T A SOURCES 30 3.6 ANALYSIS OF D A T A 30 3.7 SUMMARY 31 4. HISTORY OF VULNERABILITY IN UPPER ST'AT'IMC TERRITORY 32 4.1 INTRODUCTION 32 4.2 HISTORY AND CONFLICT OVER RESOURCES AND TERRITORY 32 4.2.1 "Pap-Shil-Qua-Ka-Meen" - The Place where Three Rivers Meet 32 4.2.2 Water below the Bridge - A Brief History of Settlement of Upper St'at'imc Territory 34 4.2.3 Troubled Waters - Contact and Conflict 34 4.3 POPULATION AND ECONOMY 37 4.3.1 Population 37 4.3.2 The Economy and Employment 38 iii 4.4 T H E GEOGRAPHY OF HAZARDS AND VULNERABILITY 42 4.4.1 Natural Hazards 43 4.4.2 Technological Hazards 44 4.4.3 Physical Isolation 46 4.4.4 Social Isolation 46 4.5 Two CASE STUDIES 48 4.5. lPuver Barricades: The Impact of Hydroelectric Dams 48 4.5.2 Burning Bridges: Conflict Over a Forestry Resource 53 4.6 SUMMARY 57 5. E X E R C I S E " B R I D G E R I V E R " - A S I M U L A T E D D A M E M E R G E N C Y 59 5.1 INTRODUCTION 59 5.2 BACKGROUND TO THE SIMULATION EXERCISE 59 5.2.1 Communication with Exercise Participants 60 5.3 EXERCISE "BRIDGE RIVER" - PREPARATORY MEETINGS 66 5.3.1 Emergency Planning Guide Presentation 66 5.3.2 Table-top Exercise "Lillooet" 68 5.3.3 Simulator's Meeting 69 5.4 EXERCISE "BRIDGE RIVER" 70 5.4.1 One Emergency, Two Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) 72 5.4.2 Simulation Teams 74 5.4.3 Post Exercise Lunch and Feedback Meeting 75 5.5 SUMMARY 75 6. R O L E O F E X E R C I S E " B R I D G E R I V E R " I N B U I L D I N G B R I D G E S A N D R E I N F O R C I N G B O N D S 77 6.1 INTRODUCTION 77 6.2 ROLE OF EXERCISE IN BUILDING NEW BRIDGES 77 6.2.1 Inter-cultural Bridges 77 6.2.2 Inter-departmental Bridges within BC Hydro 78 6.3 T H E IMPACT OF BONDING AMONG LILLOOET'S EMERGENCY RESPONDERS UPON THE EXERCISE 79 6.4 ROLE OF EXERCISE IN BUILDING BRIDGES OF UNDERSTANDING WITH BC HYDRO 81 6.5 SUMMARY 83 7. I N T E R - C U L T U R A L S O C I A L C A P I T A L A N D O C C U P A T I O N 84 7.1 INTRODUCTION 84 7.2 WORKPLACE POTENTIAL FOR BRIDGE BUILDING 84 7.3 VOLUNTEERISM AND CULTURE IN LLLLOOET 86 7.4 SOCIAL INTERACTION AND NETWORKS 87 7.5 BRIDGING ORGANISATIONS 90 7.6 INDIVIDUALS AS COMMUNITY BRIDGES 91 7.7 SUMMARY 92 8. C O N C L U S I O N S A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S 93 8.1 CONCLUSIONS 93 8.2 CONSTRAINTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND MITIGATION 102 8.2.1 Recommendations to St'at'imc Nation and District of Lillooet 105 8.2.2 Recommendations to Outside Agencies and Planners 108 8.3 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH I l l B I B L I O G R A P H Y 114 A P P E N D I X A - I N T E R V I E W Q U E S T I O N S 121 A P P E N D I X B - C A N A D A ' S I N D I A N A C T O F 1867 123 A P P E N D I X C - E X E R C I S E " B R I D G E R I V E R " S C E N A R I O A N D E V E N T S L I S T 125 iv LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Upper St'at'imc Population July 1999 37 Table 2. Labour Force by Industry 1991 & 1996 39 Table 3. Average Income in Lillooet 1996 41 Table 4. Exercise "Bridge River" - Preparatory Meetings 66 Table 5. Organisations Involved in Exercise "Bridge River" and Cultural Membership 85 Table 6. Constraints to Effective Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation 103 Table 7. Goals and Recommendations for Effective Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation 104 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Vulnerability Daisy Figure 2. Horizontal Associations Among Group Members Figure 3. Lack of Inter-Group Cooperation due to Strong Horizontal Relationships in Groups 2 Figure 4. Horizontal and Vertical Relationships 2 Figure 5. Strong Bonds within Groups and Exclusion of Non-group Members 2 Figure 6. Weak Ties between B and C via A 2 Figure 7. External Bridges between Organisations and Individuals 2 Figure 8. Example of Coding Process 3 Figure 9. Upper St'at'imc Territory and Lillooet 3 Figure 10. Bridge River Hydroelectric System 4 Figure 11. Social Interaction among Exercise Participants 6 Figure 12. Interface between BC Hydro's Emergency Plans and Community Emergency Plans 7 Figure 13. Location of Emergency Operation Centers and Simulation Team 7 Figure 14. Communication between the SN and DOL EOCs and Simulation Teams 7 Figure 15. Bridging between the SNTP and RCMP 8 Figure 16. Activities that Bring Exercise Participants into Contact With the Community 8 Figure 17. The Influence of Social Capital and Disaster Vulnerability... 9 vi ACRONYMS BC - British Columbia CP 146 - Cutting Permit Area 146 DFO - Department of Fisheries and Oceans DOL - District of Lillooet EC - Emergency Center EDC - Lillooet Economic Development Commission EOC - Emergency Operations Center EPG - Emergency Planning Guide IDNDR - The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction FN - First Nations LVFD - Lillooet Volunteer Fire Department PEP - Provincial Emergency Program PS - Power Supply PSEP - Power Supply Emergency Plan RCMP - Royal Canadian Mounted Police SN-St'at'imc Nation SNHC - St'at'imc Nation Hydro Committee SNTP - St'at'imc Nation Tribal Police T & D - Transmission and Distribution UN - United Nations vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS It is my pleasure to recognise here the many people and organisations who supported and contributed to my research. I would first like to thank Professor Tony Dorcey, the chair of my thesis committee, who had an important influence on the development of my academic work including introducing me to the concept of social capital. I am also grateful to Dr. Leonora Angeles for her enthusiasm and interest in my research. Her academic support was an essential part of this thesis. I would like to acknowledge Dr. Wayne Greene who provided me with many opportunities to learn about disaster research and practice. His support enabled me to further my own interests in this field. I am greatly indebted to Etusko Ohara (ne Yasui) whose own work on disaster vulnerability in Japan has been inspirational and whose unfailing support has helped me weather many difficulties. My dearest friend Dr. Louise Jackson is credited with providing me with scholarly advice and gentle encouragement throughout this process. Special thanks is due to Dave Cattanach and BC Hydro along with John Carmichael and C & M Consultants for not only providing me with the opportunity to participate in BC Hydro's emergency simulation "Exercise Bridge River" but also making the experience an enjoyable one. I am also grateful to the staff of the St'at'imc Nation Hydro Committee particularly Cathy Narcisse and Shannon Squire for their encouragement, advice, and friendship. Credit is also given to Hedley Crowther and the staff at the District of Lillooet who played an important role in supporting both my research and professional development. Their warmth, laughter, and friendship were much appreciated. Many of my friends played a strong role in supporting my work on this thesis, I would particularly like to recognise the following people: Casey Larochelle for reading drafts, believing in me, and giving me strength and encouragement when I most needed it; Sarah Chandler for her valuable insights, and understanding the "ups and downs"; Trevor Chandler for his reflective and scholarly comments on my research; Barb Everdene for her help with editing, kindness, and enthusiasm that lifted my spirits; my long time friend Nalini Raja who added clarity to my thoughts, listened patiently, and fed me many dinners; and my family in Trinidad and England who were always there for me when I needed them. Last but not least, this thesis would not have been possible without the generous assistance of all those from the St'at'imc and Lillooet communities who gave their time to be interviewed and who contributed to my research. This thesis is dedicated to all of you. Thank you. viii 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Outlining the Issues Disasters' are no longer considered random "Acts of God". Studies suggest that an individual or a community's vulnerability to disaster is determined not only by exposure to physical hazards, but also by pre-existing social conditions. Subsequently, disasters may be more appropriately considered "Acts of Society" (Quarantelli, 1995: 5). An individual or community's vulnerability or resilience to disaster is a complex product of their position within prevailing political, economic and social systems at a particular point in time. Social systems that create inequity in daily standards of living produce differential levels of disaster vulnerability and resilience among individuals and communities. If it is accepted that social, political and economic systems create differential levels of disaster vulnerability in society then it makes sense that disaster mitigation must include social actions. Although individuals and communities may be limited in their ability to reduce the occurrence or intensity of natural events, their actions can influence whether natural events become disasters (Organization of American States, 1990). Without an understanding of the social systems that produce differential levels of disaster vulnerability, attempts to mitigate disaster may be inappropriate and ineffective. The United Nations (UN) named the 1990s "the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction" (IDNDR). In recognition of the fact that natural disasters are linked to sustainable development2, the director of the IDNDR stated that "reducing natural disaster also means working toward sustainable development and better use of land and resources" (Olavi, 1996: 37). Environmental, economic and social sustainability are necessary to long term reduction of disaster losses: Social sustainability, in its own right, seeks to ensure the continuity and protection of social entities and in doing so. ..to protect the vulnerable, respect social diversity, and ensure the fullest participation in decision making... [in short], to build up rather than to destroy, social capital. (Lewis 1999 citing World Bank 1996) 1 Before attempting to define what we mean by "disaster" we must first clarify what we mean by the terms "risk", and "hazard". Risk may be defined as the "probability that a hazardous event may occur and cause significant human and economic consequences" (Stevens, 1988). A hazard may be defined as the potential loss that may result from the risk of a natural event and the susceptibility of human natural resource use to damage (Downing, 1993). While a hazard is the potential to cause damage, a disaster is the result of an actual hazardous event, which has negative impacts on a population to the extent that it is unable to recover quickly without outside help (Stratton, 1989). 2 The term "sustainable development" was popularised in 1987 by the Brundtland Commission Report "Our Common Future" (the United Nations (UN) World Commission on the Environment and Development (WCED)). The Brundtland Report (1987: 43) defined Sustainable Development as "Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." This broad definition has allowed multiple interpretations concerning environmental, economic, social and cultural sustainability. The Commission concluded that environmental problems could be alleviated through economic strategies targeted at poverty reduction and inequity. 2 In order to plan for sustainable communities, disaster preparedness3 and mitigation4 must be incorporated within sustainability goals. Enhancing a community's resilience to disaster involves addressing a range of social problems that contribute to overall social vulnerability. Planning processes that fail to correctly identify and address the root causes of social vulnerability will be limited in their ability to increase resilience (by improving the quality of life) and, may in fact increase vulnerability. Most actions taken to strengthen general sustainability will have a positive effect on resilience against natural disasters. In turn, actions designed to help societies deal with disasters also strengthen sustainability and resilience to other social, economic, and environmental problems. (Miletietal, 1995: 122) Despite increasing knowledge about hazards and the application of mitigation or loss reduction strategies, disaster losses continue to escalate (Mileti, 1999: 4-5). The dominant perspective in disaster preparedness perpetuates the myth that disasters are isolated, out of the ordinary events, divorced from the realities of daily life. Many mitigation strategies fail to reduce disaster losses because they do not address the everyday vulnerabilities of certain individuals and groups within society. This thesis proposes that social structures and relationships determine why some people are more vulnerable to disaster than others. The purpose of this thesis is to link forms of social interaction and organisation (social capital) with disaster vulnerability and resilience in a way that broadens the understanding of why some people are more resilient to disaster than others. Ethnic and cultural groups are among certain sectors of society, (for example, the poor, women, children, the elderly, and the disabled) who are recognized as being particularly vulnerable to disaster. There are many overlapping and controversial definitions of ethnicity and ethnic. For the purposes of this thesis ethnicity or an ethnic group is defined as: Individuals who consider themselves, or are considered by others, to share common characteristics which differentiate them from the other collectivities in a society, within which they develop distinct cultural behaviour. (Marshall, 1998: 201, 546) Disaster preparedness is "preplanned activity to reduce loss of life, injury, and property damage, and to restore everyday routine in the aftermath of disaster" (Gillespie et al, 1993: 36). Disaster preparedness includes both physical and social activities. Physical preparedness aims to minimize damage to physical structures such as bridges, lifelines, buildings etc. Social preparedness aims to minimize social hardship. This includes activities such as individual, household and community awareness and preparedness, establishing emergency plans, notification and evacuation procedures, having insurance and business continuity plans to reduce disruption to social services. Preparedness also involves testing and practicing emergency procedures and plans. Preparedness activities determine the effectiveness of response and recovery. Organisations and communities that are well prepared will be more effective in their ability to respond to disasters (Gillespie et aL 1993). Preparedness is part of the longer range planning activities involved in disaster mitigation. 4 Disaster mitigation is defined in this thesis as any sustained action taken to reduce the impacts and long-term risk to life, property and the environment from disasters of all types. This definition accepts that not all hazardous events can be prevented (e.g. earthquakes) but actions can be taken to minimise their impacts. Newton (1997) points out that there are many definitions of disaster mitigation. For example, in the United States FEMA regards mitigation as actions taken before a disaster while other agencies may consider mitigation as steps to be taken during and after a disaster. Some disaster researchers and managers regard mitigation as rjrimarily involving structural (physical) activities (e.g. building dykes to prevent flooding), while others view non-structural activities as equally important (e.g. increasing community resilience through social programs aimed at poverty reduction). 3 Shared characteristics of ethnicity may include historical origin, close-knit patterns of social interaction, a sense of common identity, culture, religion, and language (Clarke et al, 1984: 14). While ethnicity may encompass culture, not all culture is ethnic (Cosgrove, 1989: 91)5. Culture can be regarded as a shared set of meanings and meaningful actions (rituals). Cultural groups typically have their own distinct forms of social organisation through which culture is transferred to subsequent generations. "Belonging to an ethnic minority6 is an added risk because disaster related deaths are historically higher among ethnic minorities" (Perry et al, 1983: 307). Members of ethnic or cultural groups may have specific characteristics that differentiate their level of vulnerability from the mainstream7 or majority in society. Cultural variations in customs, beliefs, values, knowledge, skills, perceptions and forms of social organisation affect exposure and vulnerability to hazards (Mileti et al, 1995: 123). Disaster vulnerability based on ethnicity becomes further complicated when one looks at its intersection with socioeconomic status8, gender, age and disability. These characteristics combine to produce multiple levels of disaster vulnerability. Mileti asserts that: In many (but not all) instances, gender, race and ethnicity are not the key factors in increased exposure or vulnerability but rather are indicators of lower socioeconomic status and a relative lack of power, which are key factors. (1999: 123) The "Vulnerability Daisy" (Figure 1) illustrates how ethnicity may be combined with other characteristics of vulnerability to create the most "vulnerable of the vulnerable" in a society. Ethnicity is frequently linked to socioeconomic status (although not every ethnic group is poor). Lower incomes and unemployment may restrict choices, and location of housing to more hazardous buildings and locations. This is just one factor that dictates why ethnic minorities with low socioeconomic status are among those who are likely to suffer more when disasters occur (Perry and Mushkatel 1986, Cannon 1994, Wisner 1993, Blaikie et al 1994, Fothergill 1996, Enarson and Hearn-Morrow 1998). 5 The distinction between the terms ethnic and cultural is necessary for this thesis. In this thesis the term "cultural" will be used instead of "ethnic" when discussing aboriginals or First Nations. The term "ethnic" is often associated with immigrant groups and therefore may not be considered appropriate when applied to aboriginal groups like the First Nations of Canada The term "ethnic" is associated with the terms "pagan" and "heathen" (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1991) both of which have negative connotations for aboriginal peoples as well as other minority groups. In this thesis the use of the term "ethnic" is not intended to be derogatory. This term is widely used in academic literature and so is used during theoretical discussions in this thesis. Ideally one would avoid the use of this term given its archaic meanings, however there are few alternatives that capture the full meaning of "ethnic" as outlined in the text 6 The term "minority" goes beyond identifying an ethnic or cultural group based upon its size in comparison to a larger population group and includes a lack of status, power or access to resources. Thus an "ethnic minority" may include a "majority" group demographically (such as aboriginal Fijians) but whose status in society places them in the position of being a minority group. The term "mainstream society" used in this context refers to a group of individuals who collectively dominate political, economic, social and cultural direction in society. Typically (but not always) such a group may constitute the majority of a population (see footnote on ethnic minorities). Socioeconomic status refers to a "category of people who have about the same amount of income, power and prestige" (Mileti, 1999: 123). Figure 1. Vulnerability Daisy 4 The Most Vulnerable of the Vulnerable Until recently, gender has been overlooked in much disaster research. Globally women tend to suffer disproportionately when disasters occur (Mileti, 1999, Fothergill, 1996, Enarson and Morrow 1998). For example, earthquake disaster-related deaths tend to be much higher for women than men (Blaikie et al, 1994, Fothergill, 1996, Morrow and Enarson, 1996). Research in the United States indicates that violence against women increases during and after disasters (Morrow and Enarson, 1996, 1998). Some argue that women tend to have less access to resources and low influence over decision-making processes that affect their vulnerability (Wisner, 1993). Female-headed households tend to be among the poorest and most vulnerable in developed (Scanlon, 1996) and developing countries (Bhatt, 1998). Furthermore, women are highly underrepresented in formal emergency preparedness organisations, particularly at the decision-making levels (Enarson and Morrow, 1998). This often impedes their access to resources for preparedness and post-disaster recovery. Vulnerability increases when gender is combined with ethnicity; in Mileti's (1999: 123) view "women who are members of ethnic/racial minorities are even more likely to experience poverty." Morrow and Enarson (1994) discovered that poor minority women were most at risk to the impacts of Hurricane Andrew (Florida, 1992) because they lacked status, power and resources. As primary caregivers women may increase their exposure to disaster by remaining in unsafe areas to protect and look after the young and the elderly (Fothergill, 1996, Munoza-Carmona, 1997). An example of this phenomenon can be seen in the 1948 Ashkabad earthquake in Russia, where twice as many women died as men due to women's caregiver roles (Rivers, 1982). The higher death rate of women due to natural disasters challenges the myth that men take more risky roles during disasters. When disability and age are factored in as levels of vulnerability in addition to ethnicity, gender and poverty, one finds that the most "vulnerable" of the vulnerable are likely to be the elderly, young or 5 disabled who are also poor, female, and minorities. The following quote discusses some reasons for added vulnerability based on age and disability in the event of an earthquake; the same principles can be extended to other disaster events. The consensus in the literature is that the very young, the elderly and the chronically ill are at somewhat higher risk of death or injury in earthquake disasters. Lack of mobility to flee collapsing structures, inability to withstand trauma, and exacerbation of underlying diseases are all plausible reasons for believing that these groups are more vulnerable. (Stratton, 1989: 17) The majority of those who are disabled and elderly tend to fall into lower income categories. Lack of economic resources thus determines, in part, choice of residential location. Tierney et al (1988) found that residential patterns for disabled people in Los Angeles show concentrations in certain areas. These areas are characterised by high-density older buildings that are likely to experience heavy damage in the event of a major earthquake. 1.2 Social Capital, Vulnerability and Ethnicity This thesis analyses a community's pre-disaster social capital and its impact upon disaster preparedness efforts. Social capital is used as a way of understanding a) how pre-existing social interaction affects a community's ability to prepare for a potential disaster, and b) how preparedness activities can help build social capital. Linkages and ties between groups and individuals (that promote cooperation) are viewed as important components of social capital and disaster vulnerability. Two specific forms of social capital are used to describe the linkages between groups and individuals: 1. "Bridging capital" - this is produced when people who did not previously know each other are brought together (Putnam 1993a, Gittell and Vidal, 1998) and, 2. "Bonding capital" - this is produced where people who already know each other are brought closer together (Putnam 1993a, Gittell and Vidal, 1998). Previous studies (for example, Mileti 1999, Quarantelli 1978) have already applied some of the concepts of social capital or the importance of social relationships to disaster vulnerability and preparedness. This thesis however, contributes to the refinement of the use and understanding of social capital, and the elements of bridging and bonding, to the study of disaster preparedness in communities characterised by inter-cultural differences and conflict over resource use and management. The lack of cross-fertilization between social capital literature and disaster preparedness studies suggests weakness in the linkage of "normal" daily occurrences (which includes social capital processes) to disaster and, indicates a persistence of the view that disasters are rare or uncommon events unconnected from the 6 realities and problems of everyday life. It also suggests the over-emphasis of technical solutions to disaster preparedness, which tend to neglect the social aspects of the precariousness of daily existence. Most disaster researchers first study community and individual responses and recovery to an actual disastrous event (Dynes, 1970, Bolin, 1989, Quarantelli, 1978, 1995). The underlying pre-disaster social context may then be reviewed to explain findings. These studies are invaluable for preparing disaster managers in other areas by highlighting the possible problems they may one-day face. Nevertheless, the social context in which a disaster occurs may be specific to that community, and thus, lessons learned from post-disaster research may not be valid or easily transferred to another social setting. Maskrey (1994: 122) argues that "real disaster mitigation only becomes possible when it takes as its starting point a certain penetration of, and immersion in, the particularities of local realities." One could argue that it is difficult if not impossible to predict how a community or group of individuals will behave or be impacted in a disaster, yet studying the pre-disaster social context provides good indicators of potential problems that may arise either during or after a disaster. For example, Oliver-Smith's (1991: 147) study of the impacts of an earthquake induced landslide that devastated the city of Yungay, Peru showed that after two weeks of initial post disaster cooperation among all strata of society, old social conflicts reappeared worsened by the stresses of disaster. The characteristics that define vulnerable groups in society are also among those that can divide community interaction into segregated social networks and groups (Briggs, 1997b). Ethnic groups tend to be involved in separate social networks and institutions from mainstream society. Ethnic networks may be more informal in nature and therefore may not be as easily identified as more formal organisations or networks in mainstream society. The use of quantitative measures like income level to determine vulnerability may facilitate the view of the poor as a homogeneous mass. This view ignores important individual and group differences, which determine individual levels of resilience and vulnerability to various disasters. Two different ethnic groups may be meshed together based on income levels and deemed to be equally vulnerable to a particular disaster. Using this broad analysis, one may fail to see that one group may have greater access to support and resources from kin or social networks (social capital); moreover, this hastens recovery and improves resilience to disaster. For example, a study of households affected by the 1988 Bangladesh floods showed that households with membership in institutionalized groups performed better in both emergency preparedness and coping ability than non-member households (Haque and Zaman, 1994). One can see that it is not only necessary to distinguish the differences between ethnic groups and mainstream society, it is also necessary to study the differences among ethnic groups. Perry and Mushkatel (1986) summarise some of the ways in which ethnic groups may be different from majority populations: 7 Minority groups differ among themselves and from majority citizens in terms of worldview, socio-economic status, family organisation and structure, and participation in religious and other voluntary associations in terms of political efficacy and trust in social and political institutions. (Perry and Mushkatel, 1986: 1) Ethnically homogeneous social networks or institutions can strengthen and provide positive economic and social benefits for members. For example, social networks often provide information and referrals for jobs that can help minority groups reduce economic vulnerability. Alternatively, ethnically segregated networks can act as a barrier to cooperation with outside groups. Close interaction with members of the same group may limit opportunities for interaction with outsiders and produce distrust of non-members. Failure to include ethnic or cultural groups in emergency planning and response resulted in additional suffering for Central American victims after the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake in California. Phillips (1993) and Bolin and Stanford (1990) discuss the negative psychological impacts that a particular emergency shelter (in Watsonville - constructed after the Loma Prieta earthquake) had on some Central American refugees. Refugees associated the erection of tents in a fenced area and the presence of uniformed National Guard troops with concentration camps and death squads in their former countries. Consequently, emergency management officials were unable to persuade some of these people to vacate their temporary camps to enter this official shelter9. A lack of aid application forms in Spanish and Spanish-speaking emergency workers further compounded difficulty for non-English speakers trying to access government aid (Mitchell, 1990). Vulnerable groups commonly share a lack of power to access resources to increase their resilience to disaster. As demonstrated by the above example, certain forms of institutional social organisation may be a factor in creating or perpetuating disaster vulnerability. Effective mitigation strategies involve changing social structures that make people vulnerable to disasters. Social capital theory — which analyses social networks, norms, and trust among different groups and individuals in society, may be one way to advance our understanding of the underlying causes of disaster vulnerability. Social capital lies in a community's formal and informal organisational structures (Newton, 1997: 583 citing Parry et al, 1992). Absences of shared institutions, values and trust among different sectors of a society may limit potential for cooperation and coordination to mitigate or reduce the likelihood of disaster and may, result in actions, which increase vulnerability to disaster. In ethnically or culturally heterogeneous communities it is important to examine the role of a community's inter-cultural social capital in building resilience to disaster both through established social networks and the creation of new networks. The official shelters provided more sanitary conditions (for example, clean water, toilets, bathing and cooking facilities and refuse disposal) and easier access to food, clothing and medical care than temporary camps. 1.3 Research Objectives 8 The primary objective of this thesis is to analyse the role that bridging and bonding forms of social capital play in creating vulnerability or building resilience to disaster in multi-cultural communities. This will be achieved by exploring and analysing: • social capital and disaster literature for theories and case studies applicable to bridging and bonding capital; • the history of inter-cultural bridging and bonding forms of social capital between the aboriginals and non-aboriginals in Upper St'at'imc Territory; and • the influence of existing bridging and bonding forms of social capital upon a BC Hydro emergency simulation exercise, and the impact of a BC Hydro emergency simulation exercise in building "bridges" and strengthening "bonds". The communities of the St'at'imc Nation (SN) and Lillooet in British Columbia (BC) are used as a case study to analyse the impact of "bridging" and "bonding" forms of social capital upon community disaster vulnerability and resilience. These two distinct cultural groups occupy St'at'imc territory, with roughly equal numbers of St'at'imc First Nations and non-aboriginals10. The history of relations between the St'at'imc and non-aboriginal population has ranged from tolerance to intense political and social conflict. This case study involved my participation (as a student intern), observation, and evaluation of an emergency simulation exercise named Exercise "Bridge River" for a BC Hydro dam (Terzaghi) that presents a hazard to downstream communities and surrounding areas. Exercise "Bridge River" was the first time that BC Hydro involved aboriginal (First Nations) participants in one of their emergency simulation exercises. In the absence of a disaster affecting the whole community, the simulation provided an opportunity to examine issues for disaster preparedness more closely. The ability to take part in, and document the preparation to the simulation exercise also provided deeper insights than might have been gained solely from post exercise interviews and reports. The simulation exercise provided an opportunity to study the impact of pre-existing community inter-cultural bridging and bonding capital upon the exercise as well as the role of the exercise in building new bridges and strengthening existing bonds. First Nations or aboriginal are terms used interchangeably throughout this thesis to refer to individuals descended from the First Peoples of Canada (the Ucwalmicw). Non-aboriginal is used to refer to those descended from colonial settlers in Canada or more recent migrants. In Lillooet, this is mostly white people of European descent. It is recognized that there are other non-aboriginal ethnic groups present in Lillooet such as East Indian, Chinese, Korean and Japanese but due to limitations of this study they are not considered separately. 1.4 Key Research Questions 9 1. What is the history of social capital and in particular bridging and bonding between members of the St'at'imc Nation and non-aboriginals in Lillooet? 2. How did pre-existing bridges and bonds between BC Hydro and the St'at'imc and non-aboriginal communities affect the simulation exercise? 3. What was the impact of pre-existing bridges and bonds between groups and individuals on the preparation and outcome of the simulation exercise? 4. What was the role of the simulation exercise in a) building bridges between different individuals and organisations and in b) strengthening bonds between different individuals and organisations? 5. What are the different arenas in which bridges and bonds could exist between members of the St'at'imc Nation and non-aboriginal exercise participants (e.g. workplace, sports, churches or volunteer associations)? 1.5 Limitations of the Study St'at'imc Nation and Lillooet exercise participants were contacted via a letter followed by telephone calls to arrange interviews. In some cases, it was not possible to interview certain participants due to time constraints of both participants and the researcher. Time limitations further restricted the number of informational interviews conducted. Deliberate efforts were made to appear neutral to BC Hydro, and different interest groups within the community when conducting interviews and in general. Despite this, some interviewees may still have perceived me as being connected with BC Hydro during the research period. Interviewees' interpretation of my relationship to BC Hydro likely influenced comfort levels in discussing certain issues. I was also aware that my appearance as a white female, student from an urban area likely affected some of the responses received. Additionally, the fact that I was an outsider to Lillooet without any connections or ties to individuals or community groups may have also influenced responses I received on certain questions. During observations of community events, my analysis of inter-cultural interaction was limited to those who appeared visibly aboriginal and non-aboriginal. I am aware that there are numerous individuals in Lillooet who are aboriginal or part aboriginal although this may not be apparent in their physical appearance, however I was unable to determine this without directly knowing these individuals. One could argue that an extensive time period is required to fully understand the subtleties of community relationships. I had the opportunity to observe Lillooet for a series of brief visits followed by 10 a more extended period of 4 months over the course of a year. Due to time limitations, I was unable to spend more time in the field. I recognize that further time spent in the community may have brought to light new insights into community relations. In order to deepen my understanding of the community given the limited research period, a variety of research methods (including newspaper sources and interviews) were used in an attempt to discover relationships that were not directly observed during time in the field. 1.6 Relevance of this Thesis to Community Planning This thesis demonstrates the need to integrate disaster planning with planning for sustainable communities. Social organisation through formal and informal institutions and networks can both create and reduce vulnerability to disaster. These structures also determine environmental, social and economic sustainability. The relevance of this thesis to community planning lies in its attempt to understand social networks and processes that can enhance community cooperation and development - in this case building disaster resilience. This thesis stresses the importance of understanding the history of social interaction in a community and shows how planning processes can be affected by failure to anticipate the effects of strong relationships (bonds) between some members of a community or conflict among others. As in many multi-stakeholder planning processes, disaster preparedness and mitigation requires cooperation and coordination among a large number of public and private agencies and groups. These relationships may become further complicated when communities and organisations are culturally divided. Building and maintaining linkages or bridges between organisations and groups is critical to the development of understanding, trust and cooperation - prerequisites to working effectively towards any shared goal. Few emergency or community planners operate in culturally homogeneous environments. Issues of culture intersect many areas of planning from housing equity to economic opportunities. Linguistic and cultural barriers also present specific challenges to planners. This thesis highlights the need for community and emergency planners to understand the potential for certain activities and actions (for example, simulation exercises or sporting activities) to build or break bridges and strengthen or weaken community bonds. This thesis also contributes to the discussion regarding the roles and responsibilities of outside agencies (for example, BC Hydro) conducting emergency preparedness activities in culturally divided communities. Disaster mitigation activities like emergency simulation exercises or training can create "bonding" between individuals within emergency organisations leading to stronger teamwork and thus 11 efficiency in dealing with disasters. The value of a simulation exercise may go beyond disaster mitigation when cultural groups are included and inter-cultural bridges built. These bridges may be used in other areas of community development outside the context of the original exercise. 1.7 Organisation of Chapters Chapter 1 outlines the area of study and introduces the essential research themes of disaster vulnerability and social capital to be addressed in the thesis. Chapter 2 describes the theoretical background of disaster research leading to a discussion of social capital as a component of disaster vulnerability. Social capital relationships of bridging and bonding are outlined as the theoretical framework to be applied to the thesis. Chapter 3 discusses the different quantitative and qualitative methods used in the research. Chapter 4 begins with an introduction to the social history, and hazard vulnerability of the case study area. This is followed by discussion of social capital between BC Hydro and the St'at'imc and non-aboriginal community in Lillooet as well as recent relationships between both communities The next two chapters deal directly with the emergency simulation exercise named Exercise "Bridge River". Chapter 5 details a series of meetings leading up to and including Exercise "Bridge River". Chapter 6 analyses the role of the simulation exercise in building bridges and reinforcing bonds between and within the St'at'imc and non-aboriginal communities and BC Hydro. Chapter 7 Chapter explores the different work and volunteer organisations where exercise participants could interact with each other to form inter-cultural bridges. Chapter 8 is the final chapter, which develops conclusions about the ability of the simulation exercise to build bridges and overcome barriers created by pre-existing social capital. This final chapter also explores further avenues for building inter-cultural bridges to improve disaster resilience and makes recommendations to the communities themselves, planners, policy makers and agencies working in culturally diverse communities. 12 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 2.1 Introduction In this chapter social organisation as a facet of disaster vulnerability is explored. The chapter begins with a brief history of disaster research, leading to recent theories of disaster vulnerability. Vulnerability is conceptualized as a multifaceted phenomenon determined by pre-existing and foundational social, economic and cultural conditions. Social capital (in the form of social networks and organisations) is introduced as one aspect of disaster vulnerability affecting the ability of individuals and organisations to work together to prepare for and mitigate disaster. Social capital in the form of bridges and bonds within and between groups and organisations is presented as a framework to analyse: 1) the effect of pre-existing inter-cultural social capital on an emergency preparedness simulation exercise and, 2) the value of an emergency preparedness simulation exercise in building inter-cultural bridges and reinforcing bonds among participants. 2.2 Disasters as Social Problems 2.2.1 Evolution of Social Considerations in Disaster Research Gilbert White and his colleagues pioneered the formal study of natural hazards in a human context (Winchester 1992, Cannon 1994, and Hewitt 1997). In the 1950's and 1960's, White and other geographers recognised a relationship between humans and their interaction with the natural environment. White and his colleagues saw that the severity of damage caused by natural disasters was in part a consequence of pre-existing social and economic conditions in the populations where they occurred (White, 1974: 13). Prior to White's work, natural hazards were assessed purely in geophysical terms of physical vulnerability11. Building upon White's work, during the 1970's many social scientists questioned the established "hazards" based approach to understanding "natural" disasters. As disaster researchers analysed factors behind increasing loss of life and property, they realised that disasters of similar magnitude had very different impacts according to varying social and economic conditions at different locations. This led to the development of a behaviourist view of vulnerability where proponents argued that in order to develop The term' vulnerability' was first used in hazard research to describe the physical vulnerability of structures such as bridges and buildings. This has led to some confusion when a social definition of vulnerability is used Social vulnerability relates more to social, economic, and political conditions in society (Twigg and Bhatt, 1998:6). 13 effective strategies for disaster mitigation it was necessary to focus on social processes. Therefore, the starting point for understanding natural disasters was to analyse human vulnerability first, rather than the physical nature of natural hazards (Varley, 1994). 2.2.2 Disaster Vulnerability In 1983 Ken Hewitt initiated a radical change in the development of vulnerability analysis by challenging the accepted view that "natural" disasters are the product of exceptional events in nature (Varley, 1994). He believed that there was an: Important extent to which natural disaster, its causes, internal features and consequences are not explained by conditions or behaviour peculiar to calamitous events. Rather they are seen to depend upon the ongoing social order, its everyday relations to the habitat and the larger historical circumstances that shape or frustrate these matters. (Hewitt, 1983: 25) The traditional hazard researcher's use of "extreme geophysical events as a starting point for analysis" was criticised for ignoring that "the vulnerabilities of people are rooted in the precariousness of everyday existence as well as in the rare and extreme event" (Burton et al, 1993: 242). Vulnerability results from the complex interaction between the nature of the hazard and the pre-existing vulnerabilities of the population (Burton et al, 1993). Supporting Hewitt's approach, Blaikie et al (1994: 5) redefine disasters as "events that happen to vulnerable people" where "people's vulnerability is generated by social, economic, and political processes that influence how hazards affect people in varying ways and differing intensities." Disasters are more a consequence of pre-existing "normal" conditions of societal inequality (Oliver-Smith, 1991 citing Hewitt, 1983) or an "extension of everyday life" (Susman et al, 1983: 263). So rather than seeing disasters as "bizarre" or extraordinary events, they should be regarded as being on a continuum of "pre-existing conditions and human roles" (Hewitt, 1983: 16 citing Quarantelli and Dynes, 1972). Researchers have demonstrated that uneven access to power and resources (financial, social and environmental) can create differential levels of disaster vulnerability both within and between societies (Blaikie et al, 1994, Hewitt, 1983, Dahal 1998). Those with less access to power and resources have been shown to suffer more from both the direct impacts of a disaster and the secondary impacts that follow. Those identified as being most vulnerable to disasters include ethnic minorities, the poor, women, the very young and the old and disabled persons (Perry and Mushkatel, 1986, Mileti, 1999). Subsequently, some disaster researchers now call for disaster mitigation to be addressed hand in hand with community development processes (Mileti, 1999: 286). Within disaster research, the term "vulnerability" can be used to describe both the physical environments people inhabit, and the social systems that make individuals and groups vulnerable. Different perspectives of vulnerability shape our identification and understanding about who is vulnerable 14 and what are the underlying causes of their vulnerability. How decision-makers define vulnerability will ultimately affect the appropriateness of mitigation measures (if any) implemented to reduce disaster vulnerability. Vulnerability is the product of dynamic relationships between "root causes" grounded in economic and political environments (Cannon, 1994). These environments produce differential vulnerability and the exposure of vulnerable groups to specific hazards. Some authors argue that "vulnerability is too complicated to be captured by models and frameworks" (Twigg and Bhatt, 1998: 6). Vulnerability has to be understood as a dynamic phenomenon and defined locally because "the definition of disadvantaged and marginal varies from society to society and also changes in time" (Aysan in Merrirnan and Browitt, 1993: 11). This thesis adheres to the following definition of vulnerability: By "vulnerability" we mean the characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural hazard. It involves a combination of factors that determine the degree to which someone's life and livelihood is put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event in nature or in society. (Blaikie et al, 1994: 9) This definition focuses on the human rather than physical aspects of disaster vulnerability and allows for the incorporation of a plethora of social "characteristics" which includes social capital. Social capital is one characteristic, which influences an individual or groups ability to "anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural hazard" (Ibid). Also by referring to "life and livelihood" this definition acknowledges that hazardous events do not have to cause loss of life to be considered a disaster. 2.2.3 Disaster Resilience and Resistance Hewitt (1995) points out that "vulnerability" is an unfortunate term, promoting the view of people as passive victims of disasters. There is a danger of focusing on human weakness and inability to cope with adverse conditions. Many studies of vulnerability ignore the adaptations and responses that vulnerable groups make to cope with adverse situations. Recently, terms like "resilience" and "resistant " have been used by leading disaster organisations (for example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the UN's IDNDR). The concepts of "resilience" and "resistance" are frequently used interchangeably in disaster literature (Mileti, 1999: 264). Yet, there are important differences in the meanings of each term that warrant clarification. A system that is resilient can return to its former state after a major stress like a disaster. The Oxford Dictionary defines a resilient physical element as being able to "spring back or resuming its original shape after bending stretching or compression" and a resilient person is one who can "readily recover from shock" (Oxford Dictionary, 1991: 1024). Disaster resilience can be viewed as the ability to 15 cope with the impacts of a hazard to the extent that a disaster does not ensue. Disaster resilient systems are impacted and undergo changes as a result of major hazards but can adapt and quickly cope with these changes to function effectively. In contrast a resistant system, has "the ability to withstand adverse conditions" (Oxford Dictionary, 1991: 1024) such as the pressures of a disaster. FEMA's Project Impact is aimed at building disaster "resistant" communities. Project Impact's mitigation measures focus on making improvements to physical structures (for example, buildings and lifelines) so that they can withstand disasters (Witt, 1998). Nevertheless the United States National Science and Technology Council (1996) conceives "resistance" differently: The limited attention paid to mitigation encouraged societal resistance to natural hazards-e.g., building levees that would withstand the lesser flooding events but fail during major floods; putting out smaller forest fires but allowing the buildup of forest fuels over time and thus setting the stage for the massive forest fires of recent years. As a result, we now have the same number of natural disasters, but those that do occur are often of greater magnitude. The Nation's Strategy for Natural Disaster Reduction focuses on the transition from policies aimed at resistance to natural hazards to policies that build resilience to natural hazards. (1996, <http://vmw.usgs.gov/sndr/report/exec_summary.html>) Resistant structures are seen to fail during major events i.e. to break rather than bend under the stress of disaster, where as resilient structures and systems can cope with these stresses. There is evidently a need for consensus regarding the meanings of both these terms to avoid conflicting mitigation strategies. Distinguishing between resistance and resilience has important implications for disaster mitigation strategies. For example, resistance may be a more appropriate mitigation strategy in societies that have heavy capital investment in infrastructure (for example housing, roads, and sewer). Disaster resistant mitigation strategies may include floodplain zoning and building codes to enable physical structures to withstand hazards such as floods, earthquakes or fires. Resilience may be more applicable to social systems. For example, strengthening the mental and social coping capacity of a community or group to deal with the impacts of a hazard can enhance disaster resilience. It is perhaps notable that many examples of resilience and resistance to hazards go relatively unnoticed because no disaster results as impacts are successfully dealt with. Disastrous events in today's society catch the attention of the media and are quickly channeled to the public through television, radio and newspapers. Events that are mitigated or show people's strength in coping with disaster rarely achieve such high profile (Chowdhury, 1997: 27). 16 2.3 Social Capital as a Facet of Disaster Vulnerability 2.3.1 Social Capital The concept of social capital briefly introduced in Chapter 1 will be expanded upon here. Social capital refers to features of social organisation such as "networks, norms and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam, 1993a: 1). Social capital involves three main components: • Networks in the form of institutions, groups or associations; • Shared norms, values, and patterns of reciprocity; and • Relationships that build trust among different individuals. These three elements are believed to enable certain actions (for example, cooperation and attainment of community goals). Putnam (1993a: 1) states that "working together is easier in a community blessed with a substantial stock of social capital." Much social capital research has focussed on the economic benefits of social capital (Narayan and Pritchett, 1997). For example, social networks that foster relationships of trust and reciprocity have been shown to reduce the costs of business transactions (Coleman, 1988, Putnam 1993a, 1993b). Putnam (1993a, 1993b, 1995a and 1995b) admonishes that social capital in the form of dense networks of volunteer groups and associations leads to greater democratic engagement and better functioning societies. Social capital is regarded as transferable among different activities where a common goal exists. For example, a community that successfully cooperated to build a school should be able to draw upon the same stock of social capital to undertake a different project like mitigating disaster. Social capital is similar to other forms of capital (for example, financial and human capital12) in that it is productive. Social capital resources can be harnessed to improve the overall well being of a society or group of people that invest or share in it (Putnam, 1995a: 66). Putnam's critics revert back to James Coleman's (1988) neutral concept of social capital - where social capital may allow an individual or group to get things done better but this may not necessarily result in benefits for society as a whole. Access to social capital may not be equally distributed across society and may even be destructive to some while beneficial to others (Foley and Edwards, 1997). 2.3.2 Social Capital and Disaster Vulnerability Mileti (1999) is one of the first disaster researchers to connect the term "social capital" with disaster vulnerability. Mileti (1999: 46-49) uses a hypothetical scenario of Hurricane Sirin to propose the benefits of using social capital as a disaster mitigation strategy. Mileti does not define "social capital", 1 2 Human capital refers to human resources such as labour skills, education, and training. 17 and the scope of his discussion suggests that he uses the term differently from Putnam to describe the general social characteristics of Miami's population. This includes dimensions of poverty, income inequity, unemployment, education, homelessness and other social problems like drug abuse. Mileti's only social capital references that relate to Putnam's social capital theory are the assembling of "interdisciplinary teams" and stakeholders who "tended to cooperate in ways never seen before" to reduce the costs of expensive retrofits. The scenario concludes that "investments in social capital created a population able to participate in important ongoing policy decisions and...better able to recover on its own after hurricane disasters" (Mileti, 1999: 48). Although Mileti's use of the term "social capital" does not directly match the relationship aspects of social capital theory, he describes social "bonds" as "helping (to) determine the preparedness, mitigation and response behaviours undertaken by different people" (Mileti, 1999: 147). Links between organisations are also described as a "major source of information transfer and of access to new ideas and practices" (Ibid). Other disaster researchers and practitioners have long recognized the importance of cooperation and coordination among the different agencies involved in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. Quarantelli (1978, 1995) discusses the need for better understanding of inter-organisational relationships in relation to disasters. Furthermore, Robert Stallings (1987: 1-2) proposes that "as normal daily interaction between organisations increases, the problem of co-ordination in a disaster decreases." More simply put - "those who work together well on a daily basis tend to work together well in disasters" (Auf der Heide, 1989: 83). One can propose that increasing levels of "normal daily interaction between organisations" leads to better communication, understanding, and trust, in a pre-disaster context. Moreover, these conditions lead to better cooperation and coordination in preparing for, responding to and recovering from disaster. The existence of strong social capital within communities can result in the pooling of resources like food and shelter should the community become cut off from outside sources of aid. Pooling and sharing of resources through networks can greatly improve a community's survival of and recovery from disasters. Social networks in Bangladesh enabled better survival and recovery during floods and after tropical cyclones (Haque and Zaman, 1994, Lewis, 1999 citing Rahman, 1991). These social networks were often facilitated by non-governmental community development projects. One such network was created when people formed groups to create small credit networks for the Grameen Bank micro-credit system. This system allowed small loans to be given to members during times of personal hardship and in larger events like disasters. Lewis (1999: 141) points out that "the members of networks formed by the Bank's system of credit availability are informally inclined to help each other in other matters." 18 The Grameen micro-credit system can be seen as addressing the wider issue of vulnerability through a community development strategy. The social capital built by means of this network is used to improve the quality of life of each member in a variety of contexts. Social capital is transferred from one context to another and contributes to building community resiliency. Social capital may also help save lives in communities struck by disaster. During the aftermath of the 1995 Kobe earthquake there was a higher rescue and survival rate in apartment buildings where people knew their neighbours and were able to locate them by calling out their names and knowing their whereabouts (Yasui, 1996: 113-114). The existing relationships between these individuals likely increased the level of compassion, responsibility and obligation to locate and rescue each other. 'Trust" and "cooperation" are two key words underpinning the concept of social capital. Robert Putnam's theory of social capital "presumes that the more people connect with each other, the more they will trust each other, and the better off they are individually and collectively" (Gittell and Vidal, 1998: 15). Following this notion, a lack of networks and opportunities for regular interaction between different groups or organisations involved in or excluded from emergency planning could then be viewed as a form of disaster vulnerability. 2.4 Types of Social Capital Social capital can take many forms and it is important to note that not all forms of social capital are equally beneficial for the community as a whole. The effectiveness of social capital in building trust and connections between groups and individuals depends on the nature of the social capital present. 2.4.1 Horizontal and Vertical Associations 2.4.1. a Horizontal Associations Robert Putnam's (1993) early concept of social capital emphasized the importance of horizontal associations between people. Horizontal associations bring together "agents of equivalent status and power" (Putnam 1993a: 173). Horizontal associations are viewed as necessary to producing a collective sense of identity and purpose within a group or community. Putnam (Ibid.) characterises neighborhood associations, choral societies, cooperatives, and sports clubs as examples of "intense horizontal interaction." Horizontal associations among individuals of equal status allow the formation of reciprocal relationships whereby support and resources can be exchanged or lent in a different context. For example, a relationship between two members of a sports club may be utilised for disaster preparedness when one individual who is also involved in the local volunteer fire department shares information and 19 resources about fire mitigation or preparedness strategies to another. In turn the other individual may supply the fire department member with information about a job opportunity at her/his workplace. Figure 2. Horizontal Associations Among Group Members The collective identity associated with groups facilitates teamwork that can be capitalised upon during disaster situations. For example, some voluntary associations like the Order of Royal Purple in Lillooet are relied upon to help provide food to disaster or emergency victims. On many St'at'imc reserves like Tl'hTkit the Homemakers13 provide important community services by cooking for funerals, fundraising for community projects and those in need. Other organisations like the Lions, Elks, and Rotary Clubs who actively fund raise for charities may be an important funding source for some emergency preparedness and response organisations like volunteer fire departments and hospitals. The same characteristics that foster strong horizontal associations between groups can produce negative side effects for non-members. Negative consequences of horizontal associations include isolation of groups or individuals through being "exclusive", and the encouragement of corruption and protectionism that works against the overall social good. Organised crime groups such as drug cartels for example, may demonstrate strong social capital that produce economic benefits for members while simultaneously creating negative social and economic impacts for society as a whole (Portes and Landholdt, 1996). Ethnically or economically "exclusive" groups may produce economic gains for members but non-members may be disadvantaged by lack of ability to access resources such as information regarding job networks or access to loans. Where members of emergency or disaster preparedness organisations are predominantly from a particular cultural group, benefits of membership (for example, information about hazards, mitigation and preparedness) may be shared with outsiders who are from the same cultural The Homemakers are a more informal volunteer organisation made up loosely of one person from each household on reserve. 20 group. Conversely, those benefits may not be shared with those from different cultural groups who do not have members in a culturally "exclusive" emergency organisation. Strong horizontal associations within groups may promote turf wars and inhibit successful interaction and teamwork between groups. For example strong horizontal associations within emergency preparedness organisations like two neighbouring police forces may inhibit cooperation between the two groups particularly if strong internal relationships increase external rivalry over sources of funding and jurisdiction. Alternately, it could be argued that successful cooperation between groups would be very difficult without first having good internal cooperation among individuals within groups. Figure 3. Lack of Inter-Group Cooperation due to Strong Horizontal Relationships in Groups 2.4.1. b Vertical Associations Vertical associations or relationships occur when "unequal" individuals are linked in "asymmetric relations of hierarchy and dependence" (Putnam 1993: 173). Putnam acknowledges that most networks likely involve a mixture of both horizontal and vertical relationships (or equal or hierarchical relationships) between individuals. Vertical relationships may be used as a form of "leveraging" to improve the socio-economic position of those with less power and resources in the relationship. Vertical relationships may be useful to those wishing to reduce their vulnerability by accessing resources through the use of relationships with more powerful individuals. However, the "unequal" character of the relationship may perpetuate a level of dependency and vulnerability. For example, in a relationship where one party holds information on the nature and risk of a hazard and is not obliged to share this information with other parties. Failure to share information about a hazard may perpetuate vulnerability of less powerful groups by limiting understanding of the hazard, which in turn affects disaster preparedness and mitigation strategies. 21 Figure 4. Horizontal and Vertical Relationships Individual ^ / j| Horizontal Relationships < • Vertical Relationships 'i*— • — #3— — ^ 2.4.2 Bridging and Bonding Capital Gittell and Vidal (1998) build upon Putnam's theory of social capital to distinguish between two types of social capital that can be created or facilitated through certain activities: 1. "Bridging capital" - this is produced when people who did not previously know each other are brought together (Putnam 1993a, Gittell and Vidal, 1998) and, 2. "Bonding capital" - this is produced where people who already know each other are brought closer together (Putnam 1993a, Gittell and Vidal, 1998). Similar to horizontal associations, strong bonds within some groups may effectively "exclude" others. Putnam (1993a: 7) acknowledges this negative aspect of social capital: "the norms and networks that serve some groups may obstruct others, particularly if the norms are discriminatory or the networks socially segregated." In such cases, social capital may create or exacerbate disaster vulnerability among certain groups within a society. For example, strong bonds among members of some organisations may restrict access to information about hazards and risks for non-members. Figure 5. Strong Bonds within Groups and Exclusion of Non-group Members 22 Individual fl / fl Horizontal Relationships/Bonds . 4 The concept of bonds between individuals is linked to Granovetter's (1973) concept of strong or weak ties. The strength of a tie reflects a combination of time, emotional intensity, intimacy and reciprocal services between individuals (Granovetter 1973: 1361). Strong ties are similar to "bonds" and weak ties similar to "bridges". Where a strong tie exists between A and B, and A and C, the only link or "bridge" between B and C is through A (Figure 6). There are no other alternative links. Weak ties form less dense but more extended social networks. Figure 6. Weak Ties between B and C via A A * ^ Source: Granovetter 1973 Ethnic, cultural, socio-economic status, religious, gender, age, educational, and political differences within a community may frequently act as barriers to social interaction across different groups. This is especially likely if a community's social groups reflect these cleavages. Putnam remarks that, "racial and class inequalities" in access to social capital may be as significant as inequalities to financial and human capital (Putnam, 1993a: 5). Associations that cross or bridge social divides (such as culture, ethnicity, religion, class, gender, age and disability) are important to overcoming some of the negative impacts of horizontal associations. 23 Putnam (1993b: 5) asserts that "part of the problem facing blacks and Latinos in the inner city is that they lack 'connections'" to access information and resources like job referral networks. Bridges or "connections" can be linked to the concept of social leveraging — "which is social capital that helps one get ahead" (Briggs, 1997a: 2). Granovetter (1973: 1371) explains this phenomenon — dubbed the "strength of weak ties" — whereby: Those to whom we are weakly tied are more likely to move in circles different from our own and thus will have access to information and resources different from that which we receive. (Granovetter, 1973: 1371) Weak ties connect individuals with a wider range of people and therefore increase access to information. Access to information regarding formal recovery aid is critical to disaster victims. Yet those who may need the most help may not get it because they do not receive information on how to access formal recovery aid from their social networks. Those in poorer economic conditions rely more on strong ties or bonds. These strong ties do not give them as much information as more diffuse weak ties (bridges) to higher-status individuals who have information on getting aid from formal organisation (Beggs et al, 1996). Gittell and Vidal (1998) analyse the capacity of bridge building between community development corporations (CDCs) more advanced "support communities", and other public and private organisations to help cross "racial and class divides." "Interracial and class bridges" are seen as a way for marginalised communities to gain greater access to technical, financial and human, resources. These bridges can also be used to help get information and resources for disaster preparedness and mitigation. Narayan and Pritchett (1997: 2) discuss two forms of association or group; in the first, group membership is "inclusive" and as such does not discriminate in who may belong to the group; in the second, group membership is "exclusive" to a "particular clan or ethnic group". Groups with "exclusive" membership are seen as contributing less to the overall social capital of a community since benefits of membership are not shared universally across the community. Conversely, interaction in "inclusive" groups may cross socio-economic and ethnic divisions by encouraging membership among people of diverse backgrounds. "Inclusive" groups allow interaction among a wider diversity of community members who may not normally interact based upon differences in socio-economic or ethnic background. Groups and social networks that are exclusive to a particular ethnic or cultural group may perpetuate inter-cultural mis-communication. Ethnically or culturally "exclusive" networks may be important arenas for conveying and reinforcing information including stereotypes about other ethnic or cultural groups. Wagner (1974) suggests that looking at a community's cultural institutions provides insight into cultural communication and conflict: 24 Schools, churches, courts, museums, clubs and many other agencies, not to mention fundamental universal human ones as families and peer groups, effectuate a huge amount of cultural transmission, mediation and arbitration and innovation. (Wagner, 1974: 22) Limited inter-cultural communication may lead to differing levels of knowledge regarding hazard awareness, access to information and resources to mitigate hazards, and trust and belief in disaster warnings. The level of communication within and between groups can play an important role in the trust of those giving information on local hazards such as warnings. If a warning comes from a relatively unknown cultural source, individuals from other groups will likely rely upon their intermediary contacts (bridges) to assure them of the reliability of that source. These bridging contacts may also be used to request help or convey information from one group to another. Some individuals and organisations may act as "bridges" (see Figure 7) by developing cross-links between different "exclusive" and "inclusive" groups (Narayan and Pritchett, 1997). An individual who belongs to one group where membership is exclusively middle-class may also belong to another interest group such as a search and rescue organisation where members of different classes are included. Through association and activity in these two distinct groups, this individual may act as a bridge between the different classes. Similarly, an individual who belongs to a particular cultural group but who also participates in multi-cultural social/volunteer groups may also act as a bridge between different cultural groups. Lack of bridging capital between groups and organisations may result in duplication or poor coordination of disaster mitigation activities and failure to share scarce resources. This may subsequently 25 increase the vulnerability of the whole community or specific groups within it. One example of the consequences of weak bridging capital is the Mont Blanc tunnel fire (March 24th, 1999) where the high death toll was blamed on lack of coordination between the French and Italian companies responsible for running the tunnel (Associated Press July 8, 1999). 2.5 Summary In this chapter, connections have been made between the development of social disaster theories of vulnerability and the growing body of literature on social capital. Social capital is discussed as a component of effective disaster mitigation insofar as it facilitates cooperation and coordination of disaster mitigation activities. Ethnicity, culture, and other identifiers (age, class, gender etc.) have been discussed as both characteristics of disaster vulnerability as well as components of segregated social interaction. Strong social capital (bonds between individuals) may exist within each group, benefiting members. However, if there are no "bridges" between different groups, they may find greater difficulty in working together to achieve an overall community goal. Strong social capital within each separate group may work against the development of wider social capital among all groups. "Bridging" capital is suggested as a means of overcoming ethnic or cultural cleavages in society. Creating new or building upon existing social capital is proposed as an important tool in building community resilience by increasing effective cooperation between diverse groups. At the same time, "bonding" capital is recognized as important to effective teamwork within groups. Lack of "bridging" forms of social capital among diverse groups and "bonding" forms of social capital within groups can both create and increase vulnerability by inhibiting cooperation to achieve disaster preparedness and mitigation goals. The next chapter describes the methods of data collection that will be applied to this theoretical framework. 26 3. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 3.1 Introduction The previous chapter described the theoretical framework of bridging and bonding forms of social capital being applied to this thesis. This chapter describes the methods used to research the role of social capital as a component of disaster vulnerability. A variety of information sources and techniques were used to broaden the research. Qualitative techniques were felt to be the most effective for studying inter-cultural relationships. Findings from the qualitative research guided the collection of quantitative data, which was then used to support theories drawn from qualitative data. 3.2 Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches This thesis involves the analysis of organisational and individual relationships. As such, it was felt that qualitative techniques (interviews and participant observation) were the most appropriate way of gaining a deeper understanding of the worldviews and behaviour of individuals and groups (Bouma and Atkinson, 1995: 206-207). A qualitative approach is more "open" and ''unstructured" allowing for the emergence of new avenues of research, this can be particularly important when delving into largely unknown topics. Quantitative data was collected as a means of increasing the breadth of the study by complementing, confirming and seeking contradictions with the qualitative information collected (Creswell, 1994: 175). Information gathered from exercise participants on group membership was used to provide a sample population of organisations and groups to be surveyed. Quantitative data was used to "validate" qualitative analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 19). The purpose of collecting quantitative and qualitative data from a variety of sources using varied techniques was to achieve "triangulation", whereby different kinds of empirical data can be used to support a particular theoretical argument (Cook, 1997 citing Denzin, 1978). Triangulation is one way of strengthening theoretical findings that would otherwise be based primarily on one type of information source (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 19, Creswell, 1994: 174). 3.3 Methods in Social Capital Research 27 Much social capital research focuses on the economic benefits of social networks and relationships. As such many social capital studies focus on quantitative research methods. For example, Putnam (1993a, 1993b) uses census data on newspaper readership, voter turnout, and group memberships as indicators of social capital. Other researchers have correlated data on group membership with income levels (Narayan and Pritchett, 1997). The World Bank, a major proponent of social capital's economic benefits uses primarily quantitative measures of social capital such as group membership along with social development indicators such as income, resources, and health. There have been few studies explicitly studying bridging and bonding forms of social capital. This research follows in part the qualitative approach used in Gittell and Vidal's (1998) evaluation of three community development projects (CDCs) in their ability to build neighbourhood bridges and bonds. Evaluation was based upon observation of the projects and detailed interviews with participants and organisers. Also used is an adaptation of Narayan and Pritchett's (1997) quantitative techniques used to study the influence of group membership criteria on social development indicators, in particular the types of groups or associations that promote economic benefits to members and the wider community. 3.4 Primary Data Collection 3.4.1 Internship with BC Hydro and Planning Assistance for the District of Lillooet My participation and observation of the simulation exercise (Exercise "Bridge River) took place during an internship between December 1998 and March 1999. This was later followed by interviews and other research conducted separate to the internship. During my research in Lillooet I accepted a summer position as an assistant planner for the District of Lillooet (June 1999 until September 1999). This job gave me the opportunity to live and work in Lillooet while pursuing my research. At all stages it was made explicit that the research was a UBC undertaking and not conducted on behalf of either BC Hydro or the District of Lillooet (although the value of their assistance is greatly acknowledged). 3.4.2 Participant-Observation Varying levels of observation, semi-participant observation and participant-observation were used as a means of understanding and observing the Lillooet community while interacting with community members (Cook, 1997: 127-149) through an internship, work, and research. Balso and Lewis (1997: 203) describe observation as one method of discovering "the everyday, commonplace, nonverbal behaviours by which we unconsciously express cultural rules." Given the sensitivity surrounding gaining 28 information on inter-cultural relations during interviews, observation provided a suitable medium for gaining insight into community relations. The distinction between semi-participant and full participant-observation is somewhat blurred and may best be considered as a continuum based on the extent of the researcher's involvement with the observed population. Observation, semi-participant-observation, and full participant-observation were all carried out during the BC Hydro internship. Additional observation and participant-observation was carried out while attending community events, gatherings, and experiencing daily life while working and living in Lillooet. Records of these events were kept in the form of field notes and where appropriate, photographs were taken. During preparatory meetings (for the exercise), I was introduced to participants as a Graduate Student from the University of British Columbia (UBC). I deliberately tied my identity with UBC as opposed to BC Hydro during the pre-exercise and post-exercise period. This was done so that future post-exercise research and interaction with the community would be seen as unbiased towards BC Hydro. 3.4.3 Interviews 3.4.3.a Primary Interviews Primary source data was collected from direct interviews with participants in BC Hydro's Exercise "Bridge River' from the District of Lillooet (DOL) and St'at'imc Nation (SN). Eighteen participants in the exercise were interviewed out of a total participation of twenty-three people from both the District of Lillooet and the SN 1 4 . One BC Hydro manager involved in the exercise was interviewed, as was another manager involved in coordinating the exercise. Two of the three consultants who organised and designed the exercise were also interviewed. The majority of interviews were conducted during a three-week field trip to Lillooet during April 1999. Interviews were arranged in advance, a letter of introduction along with an ethics agreement (see below) regarding the research was mailed or faxed to each participant, this was then followed up by a telephone call to arrange the actual interview. Interviews were conducted usually at the participant's place of work or, volunteer center if they represented a volunteer organisation. There was only one instance where an interview was conducted in an empty office at the local BC Hydro office, as there were no suitable alternatives available at the time. Interviews extended from 45 minutes to 2 hours depending upon the interest and availability of the interviewee. Average interview duration was 1.5 hours (see Appendix A for the schedule of questions 1 4 On the day of Exercise "Bridge River" there were four "last minute" participants who did not attend any of the preparatory meetings leading up to the exercise. These participants were "stand-ins" and so were not counted as part of the total of 23. 29 used). The fact that all the interviewees were already familiar with me from my attendance and help in organising aspects of the exercise probably made both arranging and conducting interviews easier. In some cases, I was aware of an initial lack of comfort that may have been partly due to my appearance as a white female student. Consequently, I usually told interviewees a little about my background before starting the interview. This achieved two aims, one of seeing the interview as a two-way process where the interviewee could feel open to ask questions about the research and researcher and secondly to achieve a higher comfort level or rapport with the interviewee. Al l interviews were taped where possible and later transcribed. 3.4.3.b Ethics Review Prior to conducting the interviews an ethics review of the research and proposed interview questions was approved by the University of British Columbia's Department of Research. An ethics agreement was sent to exercise participants along with the letter of introduction, however few returned the form even though they agreed to be interviewed. Interviewees were asked to read (if they had not already done so) the requirements of the ethics agreement and give their signed approval before the start of the actual interview. Al l of those interviewed gave their approval by signing the ethics agreement. Likewise all interviewees agreed to the tape recording of the interview and all were offered a copy of the tape for their records. Only one of the interviewees was hesitant about signing the ethics agreement and was also wary about having the interview taped. He was the only interviewee who requested a copy of the interview tape. A copy of the interview tape was made and given to him the following day. It should be noted that this interview was the only one conducted at BC Hydro's local office, a factor that likely influenced the interviewees discomfort with the interview. Learning from this experience, I did not conduct any other interviews at the local BC Hydro office unless it was with a BC Hydro member of staff. 3.4.3.C Informational Interviews Nine informational interviews were conducted with those who worked closely with either the District of Lillooet and/or the St'at'imc community and who it was perceived could give insights into community relations. These contacts were made through a "snowballing" technique (where one contact or interviewee recommends another potential interviewee) through either interviews with exercise participants or other community contacts. These interviews were conducted using the same methods and style as used in the exercise participant interviews and were conducted during April, and between June and September 1999. Interviews were also conducted with community group leaders from religious, 30 volunteer and sporting organisations. These groups were selected on the basis of exercise participant membership in them. 3.5 Secondary Data Sources Census and statistical data was obtained from a combination of sources including Statistics Canada, the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (DIAND) and Lillooet's Economic Development Commission (EDC). An extensive literature review of disaster vulnerability and social capital was conducted to build the theoretical framework of this study and to support research findings. A variety of literary sources were used to gain insight into historical and current information pertaining to Lillooet. These sources included books, reports, studies, journals and local newspaper articles. 3.6 Analysis of Data The data from interviews was transcribed and then coded manually. General coding categories were chosen and interview data allocated to them. The data were then reviewed under the general coding categories and further refined into more specific codes as shown by Figure 8 below. Figure 8. Example of Coding Process General Coding Category New Contacts Useful for Emergency Preparedness Coding Sub-category 1 New Contacts Between BC Hydro and Exercise Participants Coding Sub-category 1 New Contacts Between Aboriginal and Non-aboriginal Participants Coding Sub-Category 2 Local Coding Sub-Category 2 External The themes drawn out of the coding categories were then used to develop and support theoretical arguments. Representative quotes were used to illustrate themes in the coding categories. Interview quotes are italicised in the text followed by the interviewee number and group in brackets. 3.7 Summary 31 This chapter described the methods used to address the research questions being applied to this thesis. Data for this thesis was collected from several sources using a variety of techniques. To achieve maximum depth the research included both qualitative and quantitative data from both primary and secondary sources. The majority of data was collected using qualitative techniques. Qualitative research methods were felt to be the best way of gaining insights into the subject being explored, namely the analysis of relationships of trust and co-operation. The next chapter introduces the social history, geography and hazard vulnerability of the study area within the context of social capital. 32 4. HISTORY OF VULNERABILITY IN UPPER ST'AT'IMC TERRITORY 4.1 Introduction Disasters are to be placed within the broader historical context of policy and community and societal changes that resulted in certain human beings being placed in certain locations - both geographic and social - of high risk. (Drabek 1989: 260) Without an understanding of the social, political and economic history that produces different geographies of risk, attempts to mitigate disasters are likely to be inadequate or inappropriate to the needs of a specific community. Failure to understand the history of risk production is akin to treating the symptom without addressing the root cause. In this chapter, the history and geography of settlement in Upper St'at'imc territory (which includes Lillooet) will be outlined within the context of social capital (bridging and bonding) and disaster vulnerability. This chapter shows how events in history — past and recent — influence current disaster vulnerability by impacting the level of trusts between a Crown Corporation (BC Hydro), the St'at'imc Nation, and non-aboriginals. Disparity in socio-economic status between the St'at'imc aboriginals and non-aboriginals create differential levels of disaster vulnerability when overlain with the geography of hazards in the region. Conflict between the St'at'imc, Government and local non-aboriginals over aboriginal participation in resource management, threatens sustainable environmental practices and inter-cultural trust and cooperation. Such conflict impedes the ability of all sides to work effectively together to reduce the area's economic and social vulnerability. This in turn affects disaster vulnerability in differing degrees. The small population base within the area (both aboriginal and non-aboriginal) emphasizes the need for resource sharing and cooperative emergency planning. 4.2 History and Conflict over Resources and Territory 4.2.1 "Pap-Shil-Qua-Ka-Meen'' - The Place where Three Rivers Meet The District of Lillooet lies within the traditional territory of the St'at'imc Nation (SN), in southwestern British Columbia (BC). Lillooet is located between the joining of the Fraser River and the Bridge River to the north, and the joining of the Fraser River and Cayoosh Creek to the south. Lillooet's first inhabitants aptly named the area "Pap-Shil-Qua-Ka-Meen" - the place where three rivers meet (Harris, 1977: 8, Lillooet Historical Society, 1988). Aboriginals occupied this area for at least 10, 000 years prior to the arrival of European settlers in the 1800s. Eleven Bands from the Upper and Lower St'at'imc form the St'at'imc Nation. This study involves five of the Upper St'at'imc bands: Tsafalh (Seton Lake Band); Xwisten (Bridge River Band); Sekw'elw'as (Cayoose Creek Band); Tl'itl'kit (Lillooet Band); and Xaxl'ip (Fountain Band). For the purposes of this study these five bands will be referred to collectively as the St'at'imc Nation (SN). Lillooet is the main service center for Upper St'at'imc bands. Figure 9. Upper St'at'imc Territory and Lillooet " ' l l l l l l l l j M i l l ' " * j i i m » * •ownton Reservoir STL'ATL'IMX NATION Involved in Exercise Chalath (Seton) Xwisten (Bridge River) Sekw'elw'as (Cayoose Creek) Tl'itl'kit (Lillooet) Xaxl'ip (Fountain) Not Involved Ts'kw'aylaxw (Pavilion) UI 'wat(MtCurrie) Xa'xtsa (Douglas) Samahquam N'quatqua (Anderson Lake) Skookumchuk District of Lillooet O Bridge River Q Cayoose O Fountain O Lillooet STL'ATL'IMX NATION BOUNDARY $f$ Generating Station - — Existing Transmission Lines ilium stlatlimx Nation Boundary 0 10 20 kilometres Harrison Hot Springs Source: Stl'atl'imx - BC Hydro Joint Information Advisory on Negotiations, BC Hydro June 1996 34 4.2.2 Water below the Bridge - A Brief History of Settlement of Upper St'at'imc Territory The history behind the settlement of Upper St'at'imc territory plays an important role in defining and understanding both disaster vulnerability and social capital. The Upper St'at'imc (the St'at'imc) are the original inhabitants of the territory which includes Lillooet and the surrounding Bridge River Valley (Smith, 1998: 7, Edwards, 1978:10-14). Prior to European settlement, the St'at'imc occupied several village sites located on the bench lands above the Fraser River and on the shores of Seton and Anderson Lakes. The St'at'imc were semi-nomadic, moving seasonally throughout their territory. The Fraser River provided fish for food and for trading with other nations (Smith, 1998 citing Teit, 1898). Given the importance of trade, the St'at'imc tried to maintain good relationships with neighbouring First Nations (Smith, 1998). St'at'imc control of salmon fisheries along the Fraser "encouraged other nations to cultivate good relations with them" (Smith, 1998: 13-14). Social relations were fostered and maintained as a means of facilitating easier access to resources. Various important activities helped increase bonding among the St'at'imc and surrounding nations. Trust and goodwill was reinforced between the Upper St'at'imc and their trading partners by "intermarriage, feasting and social events that accompanied large trade gatherings reaffirmed and renewed relations between families, villages and nations" (Smith, 1998: 16). Smith (1998: 13) describes the St'at'imc as... "a peaceful, diplomatic people, well versed in the various languages and dialects of their trading partners." These characteristics suggest that the St'at'imc were good at building "bridges" with other nations and may have acted as a "bridge" between different nations. 4.2.3 Troubled Waters - Contact and Conflict During the fur trade era (1808-1840s) the St'at'imc incorporated European fur traders into their trading network. The fur trade was regarded as "a period of reciprocity between Europeans and Ucwalmicw" (Smith, 1998: 23 citing Fisher, 1977). Non-aboriginal settlement of Upper St'at'imc territory followed the discovery of gold inl 858 along sandbars in the lower reaches of the Fraser (Edwards, 1978: 77, Akrigg 1977: 29). During the gold rush migrant prospectors pushed north along the Fraser. By 1860 Lillooet was "the biggest little boom settlement in the Cariboo district" (Lillooet District Historical Society, 1988). The gold rush peaked in 186215, after which miners moved north to richer prospects in the Cariboo and Klondike (Edwards, 1978: 164). The short-lived prospects of gold produced a series of booms followed by downturns for Lillooet At its peak, the gold rush in Lillooet was thought to have swelled the area's population to between four and five thousand in 1860 (Harris, 1977:15). Even when the gold ran out Lillooet continued to be an important service station for those en route to gold further North. Lillooet's fortunes faded further with the closure of the Lillooet Trail. Travelers used the more reliable route north, which bypassed Lillooet between Lytton and Cache Creek. In 1915, Lillooet's connection with the coast was re-established with the arrival of the Pacific Great Eastern Railway (now British Columbia Railroad) from Squamish (Harris, 1977: 25). The advent of the railway provided the opportunity to explore new economic ventures related to exporting agriculture, ranching and even mining. Lillooet also became a service center for the railway, which brought further employment opportunities for migrants. 35 Through the turbulent chain of events surrounding the gold rush, many newcomers settled in Upper St'at'imc territory. Contact with Europeans and other migrant groups permanently altered the lifestyle of the St'at'imc. While ever-increasing contact between the St'at'imc and settlers was not always acrimonious16, the large influx of settlers led to strained relations: "The miners provoked tensions and conflict in every Ucwalmicw territory they invaded" (Smith, 1998: 23). During the gold rush, relatively low-density aboriginal bands accustomed to living lightly off the land found themselves competing for resources with large numbers of miners and entrepreneurs. Exploitation of hunting and plant resources by miners left little alternative food for the St'at'imc and increased their vulnerability, so that when salmon runs failed in 1858 and 1859 starvation was compounded (Smith, 1998. 23-24). As illustrated by the following text, lack of shared views and values between the two groups resulted in tension between aboriginal and non-aboriginal gold miners: Almost as soon as the miners began working the Fraser bars there was trouble with the Indians. The latter still maintained that the country was theirs. They affirmed that the miners should pay them for the claims that they were staking, and that they should pay for whatever gold they took out. The whites regarded the Indian view with derision and, for a while, Indians and whites could be seen working the same bars in a spirit of bitter hostility. Finally, when white miners had arrived in sufficient force, they drove the Indians from the bars. (Akrigg, 1977: 33-34) The tensions in this case resulted in war being waged against the "Fraser Canyon Indians" by miners. The "Indians" gave up when they realised that the miners intended to prevent them from reaching the river during the salmon run (Ibid.). The St'at'imc believed that British fur traders would control the behaviour of the miners and "restore the relationship of mutual respect and coexistence" that, until then had been represented as the "Queen's law". This belief was based upon fifty years of trust built through reciprocal trade with the Hudson's Bay Company (Smith, 1998). 4.2.4 Destroying Social Capital During the period of colonisation, the rights of aboriginal peoples were gradually subordinated through various forms of legislation. One piece of legislation in particular, the Indian Act of 1867, gave the new Canadian government great control over the lives of aboriginal people and created a system of dependency on government. Institutionalised segregation of aboriginals from the rest of society was 1 6 See Smuh (1998) for information on early relationships with European fur traders. 36 facilitated through this legislation that led to the creation of reserves and residential schools17 (see Appendix B). The legislated segregation of the St'at'imc from Lillooet's economic center resulted in geographic, economic and social marginalisation. Land given to the St'at'imc for reserves was usually of a poorer quality in terms of traditional resource availability. This limited the ability of the St'at'imc to live off the land in the manner they had prior to contact with Europeans. St'at'imc participation in new economic systems was restricted both by distance from employment opportunities in Lillooet (still a factor for many of those living on reserve), and legislation that restricted off-reserve employment (see Appendix B). The social isolation of the St'at'imc on reserves and in residential schools further compounded difficulties between aboriginals and non-aboriginals. Interaction between the St'at'imc and non-aboriginals on a daily basis through social, work, and the school environment was restricted, limiting the potential growth of inter-cultural bridges through regular interaction and understanding. In addition to restricting inter-cultural bridging, the residential school system affected bonding between children and their family and bands. "The bonds between hundreds of aboriginal children and their families and nations were bent and broken, with disastrous results" (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996: Chapter 1). The control exerted over aboriginal people and their ability to practice their culture led to great mistrust of government. Destruction of cultural practices involved degeneration of important social networks and skills necessary for healthy communities18. In many respects, the loss of a traditional way of life and means of subsistence may be considered a social disaster. In some cases, there are Upper St'at'imc families where up to three generations have been through the residential school system. Widespread publicity about the impact of residential schools has promoted greater awareness of the detrimental effect this system had upon aboriginal culture and society. The history of these systems affects current community health and disaster vulnerability. Social problems for some aboriginal communities include substance abuse, poverty, unemployment, underemployment, suicide and violence. 1 8 Anthropologists recognise that some forms of social organisation can create resilience to environmental hazards. The North American aboriginal tradition of Potlatch was an important form of wealth redistribution both within and between communities. The richest members of the community throw a feast and give away their material possessions. This custom provided a check in the system of accumulation so that, the richest did not continue to grow disproportionately wealthy compared to other members in the community. The community as a whole is strengthened by this practice. Potlatches also served as a mechanism for exchanging resources between communities in different regions (Carlson, 1997), an important relationship in times of shortage. Potlatches were outlawed in Canada under the Indian Act of 1867. 4.3 Population and Economy 4.3.1 Population The District of Lillooet currently has a population of 3019 (Lillooet Economic Development Commission, 1998)19. The estimated population for surrounding bands of the Upper St'at'imc is 1317 on reserve (Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, July 1999)20. When this figure is added to the District's population the total estimated population for the area is 4336 of which, 50% is estimated to be aboriginal. Table 1. Upper St'at'imc Population July 1999 Band On Reserve Total on & off | Reserve Sekw'elw'as (Cayoose Creek Band) 103 160 Xaxl'ip (Fountain Band) 365 799 Xwisten (Bridge River Band) 193 377 Tl'itl'kit (Lillooet Band) 211 325 Ts'k'waylacw (Pavilion Band) 203 455 ITsafalh (Seton Lake Band) 242 555 j Total Population 1317 2671 Source: DIAND, July 1999 4.3.1.a Population Mobility Population mobility has an impact on overall community stability and the formation of strong social capital. Lillooet's Economic Development Commission (EDC) states that: Unlike many interior communities, Lillooet does not have a high transitory population. Over 70% of the population have lived in the community for over five years. (Lillooet EDC: 1999) 1 9 This figure reflects an increase in population of about 1000 when the original Village of Lillooet incorporated a larger area to become a District in 1996. 2 0 There is no accurate data on what proportion of the District's population are also band members. The total for band members living on and off reserve is 2671 and is it likely that some of those are also accounted for under the District of Lillooet's population count 38 Cultural background affects population mobility in Lillooet — non-aboriginals tend to be more transitory than aboriginals. Many non-aboriginals are first or second-generation migrants (to Lillooet) whose movement in and out of the area is highly influenced by economic circumstances. Strong kinship ties result in lower aboriginal migration out of the area. Population mobility may affect social capital and disaster vulnerability in the following ways: • People who have lived in a community for a long time are usually more aware of the risks of their environment and ways in which to mitigate them. In contrast, new migrants are not as likely to be aware of the hazards and their risks (Pearce, 1997: 281-282). • Social networks are likely to be denser and bonds between people stronger when people have known each other for a long time. Help during times of emergency or disaster is likely to be more easily accessed in a community where people are more familiar with each other. Knowledge about hazards and mitigating disaster may be more effectively spread through the medium of strong social networks. 4.3.2 The Economy and Employment Lillooet's economy is not well diversified — reliance on forestry and public sector employment make the economy vulnerable to fluctuations in global markets and political decisions made outside of the community. The economy dictates employment and income levels, which in turn plays a major role in determining individual and community resilience to disaster. Lower incomes and unemployment affect some groups more than others. For example, aboriginals have higher unemployment rates and lower incomes than non-aboriginals and, women have lower incomes than men. This makes both these groups among the most vulnerable in coping with everyday life (which has direct implications for increased disaster vulnerability). Primary resource extraction has been the underpinning of Lillooet's economy since the start of the gold rush (1850s). Forestry, agriculture, mining and transportation (railway service center) and hydroelectric power generation have all had a major impact on employment. Mining employment has declined since the closure of mines at Bralorne in the early 1970s. Like many BC forestry communities, Lillooet's forest industry has suffered impacts from global competition, market fluctuations and environmental legislation. Despite these trends, the forestry industry continues to be an important source of employment and revenue for Lillooet21. 2 1 Two forest industry companies, Ainsworth Lumber Co. Ltd and Bridgeside Higa Forest Industries Ltd are two of Lillooet's largest employers, employing 100 and 70 people respectively. In addition contractors, truck drivers and other support industries "add another 107 workers whose income is directly related" to the forest industry (EDC, 1997: 12). 39 Table 2. Labour Force by Industry 1991 & 1996 Industry Category Number Employed 1991 1996 % of Total 1991 1996 Primary 110 110 14 11 Manufacturing 105 125 13 12 Tertiary (Service Sector) Industries Construction 80 35 10 3 Trans./Communication/Utilities 80 95 10 9 Retail & Wholesale 130 115 16 11 Fin, Real Est, Insurance, Bus. Serv. 30 80 4 8 Services, Accommodation, Food 115 180 14 17 Health & Social Services, Education 45 205 6 20 Other Government 105 95 13 9 Total Tertiary (Service Sector) 585 825 73 77 Totals 800 1060 100 100 Source: Statistics Canada, 19% In more recent years tertiary or service sector industries have accounted for the greater proportion of the labour market in Lillooet. In 1991 and 1996, 73% and 77% of the labour force was respectively employed in service sector industries. A significant proportion of service sector industry is directly or indirectly reliant upon primary and secondary forestry related industry. Besides the forestry industry there is also a high dependency of jobs in the public sector. A major downturn in either of these sectors would have a large economic and social impact (Lillooet Area Economic Development Strategic Plan, February 1998). 4.3.2.a Cultural Differences in Sources of Employment and Income Sources of employment data are not readily available for the St'at'imc. Data from one St'at'imc band " A " 2 2 (November 1999) shows that of the 44 band members employed (out of a population of 363), 28 or 64% are employed by Tribal administration, 12 or 27% are employed by "band owned enterprise" or company and the remaining 4 or 9% are self-employed. This band may be seen to be fairly representative of other bands in terms of the high proportion of those who are employed working for Tribal administration. Other bands do, however, have more workers in the wider economy. For example, Due to the sensitive nature of this data, it was requested that the name of the band concerned not be mentioned. 40 BC Forestry Fire Protection have a 20 person unit crew formed in 1997 as part of a "Native Initiatives" program through BC Forestry - Tsal7alh won the bid but now hire all local band members. Ts'k'waylacw and Xax'lip both have band members employed at a lime plant located on Ts'k'waylacw (Pavilion) reserve. Likewise, Ainsworth Lumber located on Tl'itl'kit and Cayoose reserves employs members of those bands along with others (Lillooet Area Economic Development Strategic Plan, February 1998). In both instances, agreements were made between the bands and the companies regarding the employment of band members as a condition of leasing reserve land. Despite these initiatives, there is generally a low participation rate of band members in the wider economy outside of aboriginal-related services. Limited opportunities for the integration of aboriginals into Lillooet's economic development is an issue that has yet to be resolved successfully in Lillooet (Urbanics Consultants, 1996: 39). 4.3.2.b Unemployment A recent report on employment defines four main groups of unemployed and under-employed in Lillooet - "youth, Aboriginal, 'multigenerational assistance users', and recently displaced workers" (Young and Michals, 1998: 3). Lillooet's unemployment level based on the 1996 census was 12.3% (Statistics Canada) with a labour participation rate of 70%. However, a recent report gives an unemployment figure of 30% for 1998 (Young and Michals, 1998: 3). There is no official data on unemployment differences between aboriginals and non-aboriginals in the area. Unemployment rates tend to be higher among aboriginals, particularly those living on reserves. Employment and population data collected by one St'at'imc band "A" gave an estimated unemployment rate of 81% (using the 16-65 age category as an employable group) and a 12% labour participation rate23. Band " A " is considered to be fairly representative of other St'at'imc bands in the area in terms of unemployment and labour participation. One exception to the trend of high unemployment of among St'at'imc bands is TTitl'kit whose unemployment is around 20% (80% employment). This is due to the high number of band members employed at Ainsworth mill. Location on reserves is given as a reason for higher unemployment levels among aboriginals. A major reason for not leaving the reserve to find work is "the importance of family connections, particularly within the aboriginal community, which means that many do not want to leave the area and As of November 1999, this band had 363 members of which 236 were in the 16-65 age group. Of those 236,44 were employed. While not all of those in the 16-65 age group may be able to participate in the employment market due to factors such as parenting, disability or involvement in education/training - one can still presume that even with these factors taken into account that the unemployment rate would still be disproportionately higher when compared to non-aboriginals also living in similar communities. 41 break up family ties and their connection to the land" (Young and Michals, 1998:7). Another issue is that income earned on reserve by "registered status Indians" is not taxable whereas ofT-reserve income is. 4.3.2.C Income Employment has a direct relationship with income, which in turn plays an important role in disaster vulnerability. People who have lower incomes are less likely to have resources put aside (for example savings, extra food, insurance etc.) that can help them cope with or recover from disasters. However, having a higher income does not necessarily mean that extra resources will be set aside for disaster or emergencies. There may be important cultural differences towards the accumulation of wealth and putting aside resources between aboriginals and non-aboriginals. Compared to non-aboriginals, aboriginals with higher incomes may not have monetary resources set aside for disaster (Interviewee #28 - non-aboriginal). Conversely more aboriginals than non-aboriginals tend to preserve and store foods that can be used in times of shortage. These practices are important during disasters where food supplies are cut off and having money becomes redundant if there is no food to buy. Unfortunately the practice of preserving and storing food is being neglected particularly by younger generations of aboriginals (Interviewee #30 - aboriginal). Average female income in Lillooet is 60% of the average male income and 41% of average household income24. This indicates that females are likely to have the lowest incomes in Lillooet making them the most vulnerable economically. Subsequently children in female-headed households are also highly vulnerable to poverty and associated social problems. Table 3. Average Income in Lillooet 1996 Characteristics 1996 Census - Lillooet Income Average Household Income $44,398 Average Male Income $30,198 Average Female Income $18,161 Source: Statistics Canada, 1996 There are no official statistics on aboriginal income levels compared to non-aboriginals in the Lillooet area. A national study by the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (DIAND), shows that in 1990, the total income of aboriginals living on reserve was equal to 65% of the income earned by a It is important to note that these statistics are averages and thus do not give us the lowest ranges of income or the number of people in these lowest categories. 42 comparable community resident and 52% of the national average (1997: 31-32). The 1997 report states that community size and location can explain 41.7% of this difference. The remaining 57.6% of the gap in income between aboriginal and non-aboriginal community residents "remains unexplained". The report suggests a few reasons for lower income and labour participation of aboriginals on reserves (when compared to similar communities in mainstream society): • Exemption from Canadian income tax increases disposable income. • Some may benefit from subsidized housing, greater eligibility for government transfer payments and lower food costs if pursuing traditional hunting and gathering lifestyles. These benefits may be tempered by the higher costs of other commodities on isolated reserves (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Summer 1997: 31). Another possible explanation for low income among aboriginals living on reserve is that they lack access to "bridging" forms of social capital with the wider society. Lack of contacts with those who are in positions of power in society (in this case white Canadians) and who control access to jobs and resources limits "leveraging" opportunities for aboriginals on reserves. In the case of Tl'itl'kit high employment rates among band members can be attributed to the land leasing agreements with Ainsworth mill (referred to earlier) that require the employment of band members. These agreements provide Tl'itl'kit members with a formal means of leveraging which helps to overcome lack of social leveraging opportunities. Once band members are employed in the company they can then provide social leveraging opportunities to other band members by informing them about job opportunities. 4.4 The Geography of Hazards and Vulnerability The following section gives a brief overview of some of the geography of hazards affecting the Upper St'at'imc territory and Lillooet. The hazards have been classified as either "natural" where causal agents are climatic or geophysical forces in nature (earthquakes, hurricanes, volcanoes, and floods) or "technological" which are regarded as the negative by-products of man-made technology (e.g. the Bhopal chemical disaster in India and the Chernobyl Nuclear disaster in the Ukraine)25. In reality it is very difficult to define a disaster as either purely "natural" or "technological". As human interaction with the environment becomes more complex, the boundaries between the two classifications become increasingly blurred. An "all hazards" approach to disasters recognises that major disasters, particularly in urban areas, have both natural and technological causes and effects (Parker et al, 1995). Some hazard researchers use the term "na-tech" to describe disasters that are both products of the natural environment and technology. A na-tech event occurs where a natural disaster acts as a catalyst for a technological disaster. For example, a dam breach induced by an earthquake or hazardous materials release due to flooding. 43 4.4.1 Natural Hazards Key natural hazards affecting the Upper St'at'imc territory and Lillooet area include: • Forest fires and drought • Flooding • Snow, ice and wind storms • Mass material movements - landslides, rock falls, mudflows, avalanches • Earthquake Some of the highest temperatures in Canada are found in the Fraser Canyon between Lillooet and Lytton. The area's semi-arid climate is the product of continental air streams. Average winter temperatures are around -2°C to -5°C, with summer temperatures around 21°C. Annual precipitation is just over 30 cm per year (UMA, 1999). Aridity, combined with terrain and vegetation (bunch grass, sage, ponderosa pine, fir and aspen), produces a high fire risk in the region. During dry summer months, forest fires are one of the greatest hazards in the area. Forest fires can be both natural and human-induced. Over a 19-year period between 1979 and 1998 there were 1004 forest fires in the Lillooet Forest Region, of which, 25% were caused by lightning and the remaining 75% were human induced caused by run away camp fires, controlled burns, children playing with matches or arson (Ministry of Forests, 1999). Lillooet lies at an elevation of 250 meters (820 ft.). To the west of Lillooet, increased elevations result in higher precipitation leading to heavy annual snowpacks and high intensity rainfall. Runoff from storm events and snowmelt contribute to flooding of creeks and rivers in the region. However, most settlement is on elevated terraces where there is a lower risk of flooding. There are building restrictions placed on some land with a history of bank erosion (for example, Roshard Acres in South Lillooet) and flooding (for example, on the lower banks of the Fraser River where it meets Cayoose Creek and on the lowlands at the mouth of Cayoose Creek). Hydroelectric dams — originally intended for power generation — have helped to reduce flooding of some lower lying land. However, dams pose a major flooding risk if they should be breached or if large spills occur (hence the purpose of BC Hydro's simulation exercise). Upper St'at'imc territory is characterised by steep glacially-eroded valleys with talus slopes. Mountains, including the Tsilqotin (Chilcotin) Range to the northeast and the Coast Mountain Range to the west fringe the area. Wide flat benches of loose sands and gravel (a by-product of glacial activity) form a dominant feature of the land abutting the Fraser River. The erosion of steep mountainsides together with steep terraces of loose sands and gravel produce conditions ripe for landslides, rock falls, 44 mudflows, and avalanches. Heavy rainfall, snowmelt and earthquakes can all trigger mass movements of rock, ice and soil. Landslides may also cause flooding if streams or rivers become temporarily dammed26. Earthquake risk in British Columbia is highest along a North-South Coastal line, which includes the Queen Charlotte Islands and Vancouver Island. As one moves further east the risk is lowered. Lillooet's interior location places it in a median range for earthquake risk in British Columbia (Geological Survey of Canada, 1999, Pearce, 1997). So while earthquake risk is not high compared to coastal areas it is still significant. 4.4.2 Technological Hazards Key technological hazards affecting the Lillooet area include: • Hazardous materials transportation (including chlorine and propane) via road and rail • Road, rail and air transportation accidents • Bulk oil plant and industrial and domestic fuel storage • Fire • Dams and hydro-electric power generating facilities BC Rail runs from Squamish to Lillooet before continuing further North to Prince George. The railway transports a variety of goods including hazardous materials like chlorine and propane27. The railway passes through the communities of Seton Portage and Tsafalh along the edge of Seton Lake before entering Lillooet. The train runs close to Main Street in Lillooet and crosses the main road access into the town. The proximity of the railway to residential areas (on reserves and in Lillooet) poses a problem for evacuation and exposure to hazards in the event of an accident. Another major concern is the proximity of the railway to the Esso bulk oil station in Lillooet. A combined accident involving hazardous materials from the railway and a fuel spill/explosion at the bulk oil station could be devastating to nearby residents. The railway in itself is also a hazard as sparks from trains may ignite forest fires. Railways were ranked as the fourth highest cause of forest fires in the Lillooet area between 1979 and 1998 (Ministry of Forests, 1999). While the railway does pose a hazard with transportation of hazardous materials and potential to cause fires, it is also a critical lifeline in the event that roads become impassible due to landslides and avalanches. At the same time the railway is itself vulnerable to landslides and avalanches. To mitigate There is evidence that a major landslide during the Holocene period dammed the Fraser River at Texas Creek, 16 km south of Lillooet. This caused the Fraser River to back up, affecting salmon stocks and causing flooding. This may have led to the decline of aboriginal communities around that time. It is predicted that such an event is likely to occur again in the future. For more information, see June Ryder et al "Rock Avalanches at Texas Creek, British Columbia", Department of Geography, University of British Columbia 1990. 2 7 BC Rail has a trained hazardous materials team with members who live in Lillooet. This team is expected to deal with any hazardous material train derailments. 45 the hazard of landslides and avalanches small trucks or "speeders" are sent ahead of trains to spot dangers on the track. Speeders also follow trains to ensure that sparks do not cause forest fires. Fires, floods and earthquakes increase the risk of hazardous materials spills or explosions. Lillooet's major industries such as lumber mills store chemicals and fuels on-site. Other locations such as the hospital store explosives like oxygen, while the recreation center stores chlorine. Lillooet's Volunteer Fire Department is not equipped to deal with hazardous materials. In the event of a hazardous materials emergency, the community may benefit from the expertise of BC Rail's hazardous materials team and their equipment located in Lillooet. There is no natural gas supply to Lillooet, so propane is the major source of heating fuel for Lillooet and surrounding areas and most residences have their own tanks. If electricity is cut off during cold weather, many people could be self-sufficient in terms of heat and cooking by using propane or wood burning stoves. Lillooet's lack of natural gas with propane as an alternate reduces the likelihood of natural gas explosions due to ruptured pipelines, a major cause of fires after a major earthquake. Nevertheless, despite the relative stability of propane containers, propane is still explosive and could either cause or exacerbate a fire. Over the years, fires in buildings caused by electrical faults, vandalism or forest fires have affected Lillooet and surrounding reserves. In 1971 most of the Tl'itl'kit reserve was burnt as a forest fire swept through the reserve. More recently in 1999, an electrical fault was blamed for a fire in a new apartment building on Cayoose reserve. At present, there are some areas within the district such as East Lillooet where there are no fire hydrants and access to a good supply of water to fight fires is limited. Lillooet has a highly respected volunteer fire department (LVFD), with well-trained volunteers. The municipality has agreements with some adjacent rural areas and bands (Sekw'elw'as and Tl'itl'kit) to provide fire-fighting services. Seton has its own volunteer fire department, which serves Tsafalh and Seton Portage. Xaxl'ip is the only reserve that has its own volunteer fire department with equipment. Lack of fire protection services is a weakness for Xwisten and Ts'kw'aylaxw. This is more a function of weak social systems rather than physical infrastructure. Both reserves have fire hydrants and water supply to fight fires but they lack training and equipment to use this physical infrastructure. Furthermore, neither Xwisten nor Ts'kw'aylaxw have agreements with Lillooet to provide fire protection services. BC Hydro operates three dams (La Joie, Terzaghi, and Seton) and four generating stations as part of the Bridge River hydroelectric system. Dams pose a flooding hazard to downstream communities in the event that they are breached. Earthquakes, landslides and flooding are all threats to dam safety in the region. Generating stations and transmission lines can also cause fires. Terzaghi dam is viewed as the greatest hazard to Lillooet and some bands of the SN due to a combination of the size of the reservoir it retains and its position upstream from Lillooet and some St'at'imc reserves (hence its use in the scenario for BC Hydro's simulation exercise). A more detailed overview of this system is presented in Chapter 5. 46 4.4.3 Physical Isolation Despite being only four hours by road from the Lower Mainland and two hours from Kamloops, Lillooet and surrounding St'at'imc communities are easily isolated. Access can be easily restricted when roads and bridges become inaccessible due to snow and/or avalanches, flooding, rockslides, mudslides and fire. Rivers separate the main commercial and residential core of Lillooet (former Village area) from surrounding areas28. Bridges are critical lifelines enabling access into and out of the town center for many outlying communities. The following quote from a ministry of highways worker shows the potential hazards that result in road closures in the area: Well we've been fortunate that we have three or four ways out.... The most that we have been restricted has been this spring (1999). We had all the roads closed except for 99 North and that was open one lane. We had a rockslide on Lytton on Highway 12, which closed the highway down for a couple weeks. We had 99 South closedfor avalanches...and we had road 40 closed due to avalanches... and we had one lane washed out on Highway 99 North and that was fast disappearing because of the water we were getting through there, so we had one lane open to the public and it was restricted. No heavy trucks, no industrial traffic could come through for about four days. (Interviewee #14 - non-aboriginal) The area can also be isolated by political events. For example, Lillooet was almost isolated for several days in 1990 due to rail and road blockades by surrounding St'at'imc bands during the 1990 Oka crisis29. Only highway 12 between Lillooet and Lytton remained open due to the unwillingness of the Lytton band to cooperate in the action. 4.4.4 Social Isolation Even when roads and bridges are passable, some individuals remain isolated if they live out of town and do not have access to a vehicle. Lack of transportation is viewed as a serious weakness for outlying communities — particularly reserves where many people do not have access to private vehicles. To the North the bridge over the Bridge River links Xwisten, the Yalakom and Gold Bridge Communities to the Town via Highway 40. To the South, the bridge over Cayoosh Creek links Lillooet to Sekw'elw'as and access to the Lower Mainland via the Duffey Lake Road to Pemberton and Whistler. There is also an alternate route via gravel roads to Lytton where a ferry is used to cross the Fraser. To the East, the Bridge of 23 Camels crosses the Fraser to give access to East Lillooet, Xaxl'ip, Ts'kw'aylaxw, Cache Creek and Kamloops via Highway 99 or to Lytton to the South via Highway 12. The Bridge of Camels replaced the 'Old Bridge', which crosses the Fraser River further to the North. The 'Old Bridge', is no longer safe for vehicle traffic and is now used only for pedestrian access. The BC Rail line also relies on a bridge that crosses the Fraser to the North of the Town Site. 2 9 The Oka Crisis was the dramatic intensification of three centuries of land dispute between the Kanesatake Mohawks and French and British settlers. Since the 1950s the town of Oka and the Kanesatake Mohawks had been involved in a legal battle over land at the edge of Oka. In the summer of 1990 the town of Oka announced the expansion of a nine-hole golf course into the disputed area, plans included the clearing of a pine forest sacred to the Kanesatake. In response the Mohawks blocked access to the disputed area. Quebec police attempted to storm the Mohawks barricade resulting in the death of one policeman. The Mohawks community of Kahnawake, 60 km away showed their support by blocking highway access through their reserve including the Mercier Bridge. The stand off at Kanesatake lasted 78 days. Quebec asked Ottawa to send in the army and the stand off ended without further loss of life (Dickason, 1992: 343-347). The crisis triggered the Federal Government to order a Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples report, which was released in 1996. In 1997 the Federal Government purchased the land under dispute and gave it to the Mohawks to expand their cemetery (CBC, 1999). 47 The availability of reliable transport (especially public transport) affects access to services and job markets thus impacting the standard of living for those in remote areas. Ability to access social contacts to share or provide regular transport may greatly improve the income and standard of living for those living in isolated areas without transport. Limited telephone or radio communication puts isolated communities at further risk in terms of receiving warnings or requesting help. While most outlying St'at'imc reserves have telephone services not all households own telephones. There is no local radio station in the area at present but the local high school has a project underway to set one up. Local radio stations play a vital role in disseminating warnings or information regarding hazards. Where telecommunications are cut off, or maybe never existed, vehicle transport is critical for raising the alarm, getting help, and evacuating people if necessary. Access to social networks may be a lifeline to those who are isolated by distance and lack of transportation and telephones, particularly in emergencies. Those who have access to social contacts with resources like cars, radios and telephones are likely receive help faster. Having access to social networks outside one's immediate community can greatly affect individual options during a disaster situation. In many cases a disaster may also affect members of an individual's immediate social network. This may limit ability to request help from nearby social contacts, because they too are also affected by the same situation. During the Fountain Valley forest fire of 1998, much of Fountain (Xaxl'ip) reserve had to be evacuated. Evacuation was easier for those who had friends and family living outside the community with vehicles to help move them and their property to safer areas as well as provide them with temporary housing. 4.5 Two Case Studies 48 4.5.1 River Barricades: The Impact of Hydroelectric Dams This first case study reviews BC Hydro's relationship with the St'at'imc and non-aboriginal community. Community perceptions of BC Hydro at the time of the simulation exercise are reflected in reactions to the company's decisions to spill water from their dams without consulting either the St'at'imc or non-aboriginal communities. BC Hydro's relationship with both St'at'imc and non-aboriginal people is discussed within the context of bridging and bonding capital. Social capital is discussed as a factor in BC Hydro's failure to consult with the communities over decisions to release water from their dams. 4.5.1.a The Bridge River Hydroelectric System Lillooet and the surrounding Bridge River environment have been significantly altered by the development of hydroelectric power. The Bridge River hydroelectric system involves three dams (La Joie, Terzaghi and Seton) and four generating stations with a total capacity of 492 megawatts. Water diverted from the upper Bridge River is used three times to generate hydro-electricity. This system produces about 7% of BC Hydro's hydroelectric power. In 1927 BC Electric (now BC Hydro) started work to divert the upper Bridge River through a generating station on Seton Lake. "By 1954 this was the biggest hydroelectric system in the province" (Booking, 1997: 118), and by 1999 the Bridge River system was ranked as the third largest generating system in BC. Built in 1948, the La Joie Dam and 22 megawatt powerhouse are located 105 km west of Lillooet on Highway 40, approximately 90 km from the confluence of the Bridge and Fraser rivers. The 87 m high dam retains a reservoir with a surface area of approximately 2, 400 ha, Downton Lake. Downstream of the La Joie is the community of Goldbridge. Water from Downton Lake enters Carpenter Lake. Terzaghi dam is located 50-km northwest of Lillooet. Terzaghi was built in 1960 at the site of the 1946 Mission dam. The 54m high and 360m long dam retains Carpenter Lake reservoir, which covers a surface area of approximately 4, 900 ha. The creation of Carpenter Lake involved the flooding of an entire valley, which included several small communities. Terzaghi diverts the upper Bridge River through two 5-km tunnels running through Mission Mountain. The diverted water is captured at the Bridge River generating station after which it is released into Seton Lake. Seton dam and canal intake (completed in 1956), is located southwest of Lillooet, 850m below an outlet at the east end of Seton Lake. The intake canal carrying water from Seton Lake runs above part of the Cayoosh Reserve to the south of Lillooet until it reaches the Seton generating station on the Fraser River (BC Hydro, Power Supply, 1980). Figure 10. Bridge River Hydroelectric System 49 4.5.1.b BC Hydro and Social Capital History in Upper St'at'imc Territory The Bridge River system was built during a time when neither environmental nor social impacts were a consideration for major projects. Consultation of local stakeholders (which BC Hydro must now undertake for its projects today) was also not part of the process. The construction and operation of the Bridge River system had a significant impact on the lifestyle of the St'at'imc. BC Hydro's past and present activities are included in aboriginal land claims and treaty negotiations in BC. The following extract provides background to the current sentiment of many St'at'imc towards BC Hydro: 50 I was bom in Lytton, in 1940 and lived my first years in the Bridge-River Valley where the soil was rich and there was game a plenty. It may have been isolated there, but life was great with the wilderness as a setting, life was never dull. BC Electric disturbed the equilibrium of the valley, when they built a hydroelectric dam andflooded part of the valley bottom, as if that wasn't enough they built a second powerhouse and raised the dam still higher. We were forced out when the valley was flooded right up into Minto town which wiped out everything on the valley floor. (Clarence Alexander, an autobiography 1980-1981) Added to the lack of consultation during BC Hydro's construction of the Bridge River system, interpersonal relationships between local BC Hydro staff and the St'at'imc were poor — further adding to their distrust of the organisation. A former BC Hydro employee (non-aboriginal) commented that: The non-aboriginal community in Lillooet and the St 'at 'imc Nation have not got along - Hydro staff may have in the past aligned with the District ofLillooet and exacerbated problems. In Bridge River in the past BCH staff had a poor attitude toward aboriginals... now it is better. (Interviewee #20 - non-aboriginal) A member of BC Hydro's Aboriginal Relations Department also reflected similar views regarding local BC Hydro staff relations with the St'at'imc Nation and added that this was reflective of the general attitude of the company overall (towards First Nations). 4.5.1.C Outcry over Spilt Water - Recent BC Hydro - Community Relations The current level of trust felt towards BC Hydro in both the aboriginal and non-aboriginal community as a whole has been affected by two recent incidents involving releases of water from BC Hydro dams. On July 26, 1991, BC Hydro spilled 3000 cubic feet per second of water at Terzaghi Dam. BC Hydro decided to spill the water into the mouth of the Bridge River to lower the level of Carpenter Lake reservoir, which they forecasted would receive heavy inflow. The spill was to prevent loss of water over the dam in the event that the reservoir became too full (Lillooet News October 7, 1998). The incident resulted in damage to salmon spawning grounds, stranding of salmon fry and overall damage to fish stocks. Some St'at'imc fishermen suffered damage to nets. The spill also caused increased bank erosion resulting in slides and damage to roads. There was no public consultation regarding the proposed spill and the community response towards BC Hydro over the incident was very negative (Ibid.). One exercise participant recounted his experience of the spill: 1991, when BC Hydro opened it up - the dam...people assumed they waited too long... then they had to open the spill gates and they ramped it up so fast -1 was working for a highways contractor and we had wash outs all along the Bridge River, Highway 40 between the Yalakom and the dam, roads along were undercut, in several cases just down to one lane - just from that one incident. (Interviewee #9 - non-aboriginal) Prior to the 1991 spill, the release of water into the dry bed at the source of the Bridge River had been a contentious issue for some community members who want to see salmon and other fish runs re-established. The Lillooet Rod and Gun Club and other people involved with salmon habitat enhancement 51 have been pushing BC Hydro to have a steady release of water into the Bridge River (Lillooet News August 7, 1999: 5). Neither Mission dam, installed in the 1950's, nor its later replacement (Terzaghi) was designed with fish conservation in mind. A steady release of water is a loss of generating power for BC Hydro. A letter to the editor published in the Lillooet News reflects some of the local sentiment towards BC Hydro: BC Hydro is still living in the 1950's when they could do anything they wanted in this province...Hydro still believes that the onus is on the public to find out what Hydro is doing. They do not believe that they have a responsibility to communicate with the public. This highhanded attitude has resulted in extensive damage to the Bridge River system. [The author goes on to express his lack of trust in BC Hydro to deal with the incident] Mark my words - BC Hydro will try, by slick public relations and stalling, to sluff this issue until everyone forgets about it. (Lillooet News, August 7th, 1999: 5) In an attempt to quell the public outcry, particularly from the Lillooet Rod and Gun Club and Lillooet Tribal Council, BC Hydro met with their representatives. One BC Hydro manager said that better communication is needed in the future "between all parties involved on the Bridge River... Once these lines of communication are open, they work very well. We want to be more proactive" (Lillooet News, August 7, 1999:3). Following further spills into Seton River in 1991 and 1992, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) took BC Hydro to court, charging them with damage to fish and fish habitat in the Bridge River and Seton Rivers. A Judge ruled in 1997 that the 1991 spills were "an act of God" and did not find Hydro negligent (Lillooet News, October 7, 1998, The Province, April 25*, 1999). However, in 1998 Hydro agreed to meet DFO demands for a continuous release of water into the Upper Bridge River in return for DFO agreement not to appeal the ruling or pursue charges for the 1992 spill into Seton River. A local BC Hydro employee who has been living in the community a long time reflected that "Hydro is not very popular in this community. " He recounted the story of the spills and of another incident where the local office had changed its telephone number a few years ago without informing the community (Interviewee #31- non-aboriginal). Failure to communicate and to consult with the public and other stakeholders such as DFO prior to the spill likely resulted in higher costs to BC Hydro. This can be measured in time and money for community meetings as well as legal costs. The loss of credibility in the community is much harder to measure, as this will likely affect future community cooperation and trust. It appears that BC Hydro felt no obligation to discuss the spills with the public prior to carrying them out. This may be seen as a reflection of BC Hydro's perception of itself at the top of a vertical power relationship with the communities (both aboriginal and non-aboriginal) and thus in a position to choose whether or not to transfer information down to the communities. Additionally, lack of contact with the local communities may have meant that the managers who decided to go ahead with the spill were out of touch with how they would react to the spill. 52 Communication problems are not new to BC Hydro. The company faced many public relations difficulties during the relocation of communities for the construction of the Arrow dam (Hugh Keenleyside Dam) in the 1960s. Wilson (1973: 36) suggests that his work as a resettlement planner for BC Hydro would have been improved by "feedback of local intelligence, enabling us to deal more sensitively with local feelings and to often anticipate them." One could speculate that better communication and consultation over the spills might have taken place had there been stronger "horizontal" relations — where the relationship between BC Hydro and the communities is seen as more equal and reciprocal. Stronger bonds and bridges between BC Hydro's decision-makers and the communities could have facilitated closer communication. There is likely to be a greater sense of obligation towards people with whom one has close bonds and relations of trust and reciprocity. BC Hydro decision-makers with limited participation in the communities may not have felt that they were risking any interpersonal bonds by failing to communicate and consult with stakeholders. This is an example where stronger social capital could have saved BC Hydro time, money and loss of trust. 4.5.1.d Changing Times? During post-exercise interviews, one of Lillooet's emergency responders felt that through the simulation exercise BC Hydro was becoming more open about sharing information: That hydro meeting kind of helped that way because they have never given us a graph before to tell us how much water you are going to get and how long it's going to take from the dam to here and we've been kind ofpushing that we wanted that because if we get a call that the dam's out we want to know how long. At least it gives us an idea now, before we did not have any idea - I would think that Hydro must have known but sometimes organisations don't always share and I think that the old thinking used to be well keep it quiet but nowadays it's done a flip-flop where everybody wants to know and it's more a case of consultation so everyone knows and I think that is why it is coming up now and it's becoming more open. (Interviewee #15 - non-aboriginal) Similarly two St'at'imc exercise participants said that they felt BC Hydro was "trying to improve " the way they were dealing with First Nations people on issues of consultation (Interviewees #2 and #6 -aboriginal). During the course of my time in Lillooet, BC Hydro held several public information meetings about changes being made to its facilities - in particular changes to Terzaghi that would allow a continuous release of water. It would appear that the increased efforts to communicate and consult with the public were partly driven by the great public outcry over the spills and legal action taken by DFO. Conflicting values and beliefs about ownership or resource rights are the cause of conflicts between many interest groups (for example loggers versus environmentalists or First Nations). How resources are managed impact upon both environmental and social sustainability in terms of regeneration and long term impacts upon ecosystem health and distribution of gains from resource use. 53 Anderson and Duffield (1997) discuss differences in interpretation of ecological signs (indicators of ecosystem health) which lead to lack of consensus about whether or not an area is in a condition of "ecological crisis". This has significant implications when applied to the field of disaster preparedness and the communication of risk. Ecological signs can be used in warnings about hazards. People may decide whether or not they take the warning seriously based upon their appraisal of who is communicating the warning (Ibid.). Even small communities may be divided in their response to evacuation instructions in the event of floods and forest fires. Although the whole community may see the same signs, such as smoke from a nearby fire or rising river levels, Anderson and Duffield (1997: 4) argue that the decision to evacuate is based upon interpretation of the signs and appraisal of those delivering warnings. Lack of trust in an individual or group delivering a warning or even downplaying a hazard is likely to affect risk communication. This is likely to be a factor for BC Hydro, in differing degrees, with both the First Nations and non-aboriginal population in the Lillooet area. 4.5.2 Burning Bridges: Conflict over a Forestry Resource Since May 1998 Tsafalh (Seton Lake band) and Ainsworth Lumber, a local logging and mill operation have been in dispute over Ainsworth's intentions to log an area of land on the south shore of Seton Lake {Lillooet News, November 4 th, 12th 1998). Tsafalh members asserted their rights under the Supreme Court of Canada's Delgamuukw decision (December 1998)30 to be consulted on land use decisions affecting them. In so doing they opposed Ainsworth's proposal to log "Cutting Permit Area 146" (CP. 146). Besides the Tsafalh, the dispute involved Lillooet's Tribal Council, Ainsworth, local contractors (involved in logging and road construction), the Ministry of Forests and the District of Lillooet. A community team-building table had been used since May of 1998 as a vehicle to help all stakeholders reach a negotiated solution to the dispute. However, by October 1998 negotiations stalled as pro-logging stakeholders withdrew their participation in this forum by failing to attend a meeting on October 13th, 1998. In reaction to this, the Chief of Lillooet's Tribal Council was quoted as saying: We're not going to give up on the community committee process - we are committed to it...but we are getting concerned that the Mayor of Lillooet is burning his bridges. (Lillooet News, November 4 th, 1998: 1-2) St'at'imc leaders involved in trying to resolve the CP . 146 issue felt that the mayor of Lillooet's failure to attend the community team building table meeting (Lillooet News, October 13th 1998) showed lack of support for the process and support for Ainsworth. The comment about the Mayor "burning his bridges" The Supreme Court's 1997 ruling on Delgamuukw acknowledges aboriginal title and rights, which apply to lands and resources within traditional First Nations territories. Delgamuukw also states that First Nations must be consulted on land use issues (Persky, 1998). 54 suggests that the Mayor had linkages or bridges with the St'at'imc Nation that he was now putting at risk by appearing to favour the pro-logging side of the dispute. Minister of Forests, David Zirnhelt, and the Yale-Lillooet MLA Harry Lali came to Lillooet in an attempt to resolve the dispute on October 27 th 1998. Subsequently the Minister of Forests offered to provide funding for a mediator to work with the different parties. The level of distrust and lack of communication between both sides was reflected in their inability to resolve the problem face to face. Similar to the meeting held with the Minister of Forests and the Yale-Lillooet MLA, the mediator brought in to help resolve the impasse met with the concerned parties separately between November 30 th and December 3rd. Before the mediator could reach Lillooet, members of the Tsafalh set up a roadblock on November 9 th, 1998 preventing access to CP . 146. The following day the Ministry of Forests had issued Ainsworth a cutting permit without either warning or consulting Tsal7alh. Newspaper reporting on the roadblock voiced pro-loggers concerns about the impact of the roadblock on the Lillooet economy {Lillooet News, November 12, 1998). There was a strong sentiment among pro-loggers that the Provincial and Federal governments should step in to resolve C P . 146 as it was felt that land claims and treaty issues were the main problem. Following reports on the November 9 t h roadblock, the Lillooet News published a letter to the editor complaining about biases on the roadblock reporting: To the editor, I would like to congratulate whoever wrote the News article "Logging Road Blockaded" (Nov. 12) on their recent graduation from the Ainsworth School of Biased Reporting and One-sided Journalism. Not one member of the St'at'imc nation or Seton Lake band was interviewed for this article, a feet that I find staggering even when one considers the News' predilection for pro-industry bias. It looks like Ainsworth has hit another Snag in its desire to take every single last tree in the TSA (Timber Supply Area). That damned Delgamuukw and those pesky Indians sure are a pain in the assets. Imagine! People wanting to protect their territory and cultural heritage as is their right under Aboriginal, Canadian and International law. (Lillooet News, November 25, 1998: 5) The Ministry of Forests issued a stop work order to Ainsworth on December 6 th, 1998 on the C P . 146 cutting permit (issued on November 10th, 1998). The stop work order said that work could not proceed until conditions of the order are adequately met. This included an archeological assessment of CP . 146 for sites of cultural significance and amendments to the cutting plans based upon assessments (Lillooet News, December 9 th, 1998). The stop work order was reported as having repercussions in terms of 16 lost jobs associated with C P . 146 as well as impacts upon Lillooet's economy. 55 4.5.2.a Adding Fuel to the Burning Bridge On December 11th, 1998 the St'at'imc set up informational roadblocks to mark the one-year anniversary of the Supreme Court's Delgamuukw decision. Roadblocks were set up at different access points into and out of Lillooet on Highway 99 at Pavilion, at the bridge on Bridge River on Road 40 and at the bridge over Seton River {Lillooet News, December 16th, 1998). With the history of CP . 146 up to this point, tensions between the St'at'imc and non-aboriginal community in Lillooet were smoldering. The inter-cultural bridge tenuously holding together after the strain of C P . 146 was further damaged when tempers flared and angry words and gestures were thrown out during the roadblocks. A confrontation between loggers and band members at the Bridge River roadblock resulted in the Bridge River Chief being pushed into a ditch. The situation was resolved with the help of the RCMP and a formal apology from the loggers was made and accepted by the Bridge River chief. Lillooet's Tribal Council Chief, when interviewed by the newspaper, said that the roadblocks were planned to celebrate Delgamuukw and were not connected to the C P . 146 situation. The lines of communication between the St'at'imc and non-aboriginals had failed. Given the recent stop work order on CP . 146, many loggers saw the two situations as being connected. One local journalist's comments capture the viewpoint of the logging community: The timing of the road blocks was unfortunate. In the wake of the CP. 146 decision, the contractors who lost half a day's income at the blockades must have felt like salt was being rubbed on their wounds. Chief Leach may not have made the connection between "Delgamuukw Day" and CP. 146, but I'll guarantee you a lot of the log truck operators did.... If violence had erupted, the damage done to relations between the aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities might have been irreparable. While the affair ended with the two sides shaking hands, I'm sure there are people on both sides left with a sour taste in their mouth. (Lillooet News December 16,1998) Bitter feelings still exist over the incidents that took place at the different roadblocks. During separate conversations, two women recounted an incident where a logging truck ran through the roadblock at the bridge over Seton River (this was confirmed in the Lillooet News, December 16th, 1998:3). The St'at'imc woman, who was involved in the roadblock, spoke of her fear as the truck passed inches away from her daughter and expressed anger at the driver's lack of concern for their lives. Meanwhile the non-aboriginal woman justified the driver's actions by saying the driver had no choice as he could not afford to lose money and he needed to work. Neither showed any indication of understanding the other's viewpoint and both displayed strong emotions when giving their versions of the incident. The break down in inter-cultural communication and trust during C P . 146 and the Delgamuukw celebration roadblocks was not a new phenomenon in Lillooet. A former member of Lillooet's Tribal Council described similar situations when St'at'imc bands set up roadblocks to support the Oka crisis in 56 Quebec and when St'at'imc Nation Tribal Police (SNTP) was being set up31. The level of inter-cultural divisiveness differs according to the situation. The most recent roadblocks on December 11th, 1998 however, "caused more of a rift between people... people avoiding each other... wouldn't say 'hi' to each other" (Interviewee #29 - aboriginal). It was evident from interviews, observation and newspaper reports, that many St'at'imc and non-aboriginals are aware of relationship problems between the two communities. A local journalist presents her view of the Delgamuukw roadblocks: Last week's events did nothing to solve two of our community's biggest problems - lack of trust and lack of communication. Trust takes years to build, but there's one thing we could do to improve communications among First Nations, local industry and government. [The author goes on to recommend that the mediator brought in to deal with the CP . 146 impasse be brought back]. It would be a significant achievement if he could get everyone - First Nations, the logging industry and the local truckers —talking AND listening to each other.. .the alternative is more distrust, more yelling past each other instead of talking to each other, more confrontation and more potential for someone to get hurt. (Lillooet News, December 16th, 1998: 4) The community's inter-cultural bridging capital was not strong enough to help solve the C P . 146 issue without outside help. The mediator involved acted as a communication link between the two groups. While the role of a mediator is beneficial during such impasses what is really needed are sustainable bridges using local people from both the aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities. The availability of stronger inter-cultural bridges may have prevented this dispute from reaching the stage where outside intervention was necessary. The incidents surrounding C P . 146 may have created stronger "bonds" within each group by reinforcing a "them against us" attitude. The use of social capital in this way is negative as it further distances shared goals and understanding between the St'at'imc Nation and non-aboriginals. At the same time, it could be argued that had the St'at'imc not been able to "bond" and join forces, then their rights to participate in this resource issue may have been ignored. Preparation for BC Hydro's Exercise "Bridge River" took place during this difficult period for community relations in Lillooet. This background information is key to understanding the observations of aboriginal and non-aboriginal interaction during the meetings leading up to the exercise as well as participant responses during post-exercise interviews. Originally scheduled for November 4, 1998 the exercise was postponed until March of 1999. Had the exercise gone ahead as scheduled, it would have done so amid heightened tension between the St'at'imc Nation and non-aboriginals over CP . 146. The St'at'imc Nation Tribal Police changed from a peace keeping to a formal police organisation in 1991. This entailed amongst other things St'at' imc Nation Tribal Police (SNTP) officers carrying guns. This threatened many non-aboriginals who felt that aboriginals could not be trusted with guns. A petition was set up and signed by many key non-aboriginal leaders. The SNTP was nevertheless instituted and are now recognized as having a positive effect on aboriginal crime. There has been no opposition to them since the initial protest 57 The C P . 146 situation raises the question of whose responsibility it is to build bridges between the St'at'imc and non-aboriginals - the local communities' or other levels of government? A report on employment services in Lillooet acknowledges the different needs for aboriginal and non-aboriginals but then states that "it is beyond the mandate of an Employment Services provider to also be made responsible for bringing together these two solitudes" (Young and Michals, 1998: 3). The question for an organisation like BC Hydro is what responsibility does it have, if any, to build bridges between the two groups? In the case of CP . 146, the Provincial government (Yale-Lillooet MLA and Ministry of Forests) asked the community to resolve the C P . 146 issue themselves but then funded a mediator to assist. The responsibility of uniting aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities may not lie with outside agencies; however, such agencies must be aware of their roles in exacerbating an already sensitive relationship. The actions of the Ministry of Forests in issuing cutting permits without involving the St'at'imc increased the level of mistrust and intensified the issue between aboriginals and non-aboriginals. Government and other agencies involved in the communities must be careful of taking sides. Unfortunately some agencies may take sides in order to pursue their own aims. BC Hydro has not had easy relations with either First Nations or non-aboriginals in the area. The incident of spills provided an opportunity for both groups to unite against BC Hydro - this did not happen, although both complained about the spills. One can see that in some arenas like land claims disputes, it could be in BC Hydro's interests to maintain separate relations between aboriginals and non-aboriginals. As each side's dispute with Hydro may become obscured at times by local inter-cultural conflict. Emergency preparedness is however one arena in which closer inter-cultural cooperation would be beneficial to BC Hydro by simplifying emergency communications. Exercise "Bridge River" provided BC Hydro with an opportunity to build bridges with both the St'at'imc and non-aboriginal community in Lillooet. Information sharing and involvement of community stakeholders during the simulation exercise may have helped BC Hydro start to build trust among some St'at'imc and non-aboriginal participants. Chapter 5 describes the actual simulation exercise and its outcome. 4.6 Summary Since first contact with European migrants, the St'at'imc have been effectively marginalised geographically, economically and socially. Many would argue this is still the case today. The repercussions of events in history influence present levels of inter-cultural cooperation. They are sources of tension and mistrust that exist between the St'at'imc and non-aboriginal population. This has 58 minimised the creation of strong inter-cultural bridges between aboriginals and non-aboriginals. Events in history have affected disaster vulnerability by impeding inter-cultural bridging and bonding between the St'at'imc and non-aboriginals in Lillooet. The two case studies outlined key events in recent history that help build a background to understanding inter-cultural relations at the time of the simulation exercise and, the communities' relationship with BC Hydro. The first case study showed how BC Hydro's relationship with the wider community was negatively affected by failure to consult or notify the community about the spills. It has been suggested that BC Hydro's perception of their own power and lack of interpersonal bonds between BC Hydro decision-makers and the community resulted in the lack of obligation to involve either the St'at'imc or the non-aboriginal community in their decision. The second case study showed how a history of tension and mistrust and lack of strong inter-cultural bridges weakened the ability of the St'at'imc and non-aboriginal communities to deal effectively with a contentious forestry resource issue (CP 146). This had repercussions throughout the communities by worsening communication and distancing social interaction between individuals from each community. Both case studies give insight into the history of relations between the groups involved in BC Hydro's Exercise "Bridge River". The next chapter will show how the exercise was affected by these pre-existing levels of social capital. 59 5. EXERCISE "BRIDGE RIVER" - A SIMULATED DAM EMERGENCY 5.1 Introduction The previous chapter described how past and recent conflict between the St'at'imc and non-aboriginal communities affected their ability to manage resources. The impasse reached over the CP 146 logging dispute had direct implications for inter-cultural cooperation during BC Hydro's preparation and execution of Exercise "Bridge River". Similarly both St'at'imc and non-aboriginal communities exhibited low levels of trust in BC Hydro. This was caused by a long history of infringement of aboriginal rights by BC Hydro — in the case of the St'at'imc — and also for the non-aboriginal community when BC Hydro spilled large amounts of water from their dams. BC Hydro has been making efforts to improve relations with both of these communities. Exercise "Bridge River" was an opportunity for BC Hydro to rebuild trust in the communities. In this chapter, the circumstances that resulted in St'at'imc participation in BC Hydro's emergency preparedness are outlined. Exercise "Bridge River" and meetings leading up to it are described from the viewpoint of social interaction among participants. St'at'imc and non-aboriginal District of Lillooet participants were found to interact more with BC Hydro staff than with each other. This may have been a reflection of ongoing conflict (due to CP 146) between both some St'at'imc and non-aboriginals, as well as a lack of familiarity among individuals. The exercise was used by some non-aboriginal participants from the District of Lillooet as an opportunity to build "bridges" in emergency preparedness with the St'at'imc Nation (SN). 5.2 Background to the Simulation Exercise Exercise "Bridge River" was a simulated dam emergency for a BC Hydro dam (Terzaghi) upstream of Lillooet and some St'at'imc communities32. The simulation exercise was carried out to help prepare BC Hydro and downstream communities in the event of potential dam failure. BC Hydro hired C & M Consultants to design and carry out the simulation exercise. The aim of the simulation exercise was: To practice and evaluate the components of the Bridge River Power Supply Emergency Plan (BR PSEP) related to serious flooding and dam safety; and to ensure that the BR PSEP is effectively integrated with emergency plans of the participating communities. (C&M Consultants, 1998: 1) In order for an emergency plan to be useful it must be regularly tested and updated. The simulation exercise is one way of testing the effectiveness of a plan and ensuring that the people who will be using it are familiar with it 60 The scope of the exercise included practicing "BC Hydro and community communications and liaison" (Ibid.). The exercise involved testing the interface between BC Hydro's La Joie, Terzaghi and Seton Dams Emergency Planning Guide (EPG) and the communities' own emergency plans. The EPG is BC Hydro's community emergency notification procedure which is part of a more technical document -the "Bridge River Power Supply Emergency Plan" (PSEP). The EPG is intended to provide information on notification procedures for downstream communities in the event of an incident at a BC Hydro dam. Prior to this exercise, BC Hydro had conducted thirteen similar exercises at other facilities around BC. Exercise "Bridge River" was unique in that it was the first time that BC Hydro included aboriginal communities in one of their simulation exercises and in their emergency planning in general. Box 1. - Objectives of Exercise "Bridge River" Evaluate and practice the Bridge River PSEP with special emphasis on the public safety warning procedures, the internal notifications and organizational structure required to effectively react to a potential or actual flood scenario; a Dam Incident scenario and a Dam Alert scenario. To provide within the exercise scenario the opportunity for participating communities to evaluate and practice their emergency plans with emphasis on their community public warning procedures, evacuation procedures, and Emergency Social Services (ESS). Evaluate the extent of integration and the degree of interface achieved between the Emergency Plans of BC Hydro and participating organizations affected by a flood; and any need for additional interface or integration. Involve BC Hydro Bridge River Generation crews in emergency activities. Evaluate and practice BC Hydro's Employee and Family Check procedures in a flood evacuation scenario. Develop a realistic damage scenario for a flood situation on the Bridge, Seton, and Fraser Rivers for use by bothBC Hydro and the participating organizations in planning mitigation actions to reduce the potential for loss of life, injuries and damage to property and the environment. Source: C&M Consultants, 1998 5.2.1 Communication with Exercise Participants Participation in the simulation exercise was limited to "major communities that would have a short lead time for such an emergency (i.e. those closest to the dams)" and those "affected by high discharges from the Bridge River dams" (C&M Consultants, 1998). The District of Lillooet and Hope along with five SN bands (who would be most affected by a sudden release of water from Terzaghi) took 1 2 1 4 5 6 61 up the offer to participate in the exercise33. The five SN bands are Tsal7alh (Seton Lake Band), Xwisten (Bridge River Band), Sekw'elw'as (Cayoose Creek Band), Tl'itl'kit (Lillooet Band) and Xaxl'ip (Fountain Band). BC Hydro and C & M Consultants relied on the District of Lillooet and the St'at'imc Nation Hydro Committee (SNHC) to help them communicate with exercise participants. It is interesting to note that BC Hydro did not have access to one contact person who could be used to relate to both aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities in the area. This fact reflects the socio-political separateness of the two groups, which extends into the sphere of emergency preparedness. Emergency preparedness and response activities are undertaken mostly by non-aboriginal organisations with few aboriginal volunteers or staff34. C & M Consultants directly contacted the District of Lillooet and surrounding bands of the SN to sget their support and participation in the exercise. The SNHC were later asked to act as a liaison between the bands and the consultants and BC Hydro. The bands that make up the SN are not homogeneous in terms of their political outlooks. Relationships between some bands are stronger than with others. The SNHC's ability to act as a bridge between the SN bands and BC Hydro made the work of the consultants and BC Hydro easier. One SNHC staff member was given the task of distributing information regarding the exercise to SN participants. This staff member played an important role in keeping SN exercise participants committed to the process, which in part was reflected by consistent attendance at preparation meetings. The District of Lillooet did not have an individual or organisation based in Lillooet to undertake the role of coordinating all the District participants. Neither the consultants nor the BC Hydro staff responsible for the exercise lived in Lillooet. This complicated the distribution of information and likely increased miscommunication. The number of BC Hydro staff and consultants involved in organising the process was also confusing, making it appear that there was no single BC Hydro contact for exercise participants during the exercise process35. Misunderstanding of BC Hydro's internal structure36, which divides certain functions into different departments, further compounded the problem of effective communication between BC Hydro and the communities. The local BC Hydro office falls under Transmission and Distribution and was not involved in the exercise, which was run by Power Supply. One exercise interviewee said that he knew he 3 3 The exercise involved BC Hydro's operations at Bridge River and the communities of Lillooet and Hope, and the St'at'imc Natioa The focus of this thesis is the District of Lillooet and the five bands of the St'at'imc Nation, hence information on the exercise at Bridge River and Hope is kept to a minimum. 3 4 This subject will be further explored in Chapter 6. 3 5 This was worsened by the fact that the BC Hydro project manager responsible for the exercise was in a stage of transition to another department limiting his involvement in the exercise process. 3 6 BC Hydro recently underwent a transition to divide its activities into four major sectors - Power Supply, Transmission and Distribution, Customer Services and Corporate and Financial Affairs, Human Resources, Aboriginal Relations and Environment. In Lillooet there is a local BC Hydro office dealing with Transmission and Distribution services (T&D). Their responsibility is to maintain and operate transmission and distribution lines. The operation and maintenance of the Bridge River system of power plants, dams and reservoirs fall under the responsibility of Power Supply. 62 could get answers from a local BC Hydro manager (prior to the division of the company into separate departments) whereas now "zY is difficult because one person doesn't cover both areas [Transmission and Distribution and Power Supply]" (Interviewee #13 - non-aboriginal). One of the consultants noted that an accessible BC Hydro manager living in the community and involved in the exercise could have helped to improve communication with exercise participants (Interviewee #21- non-aboriginal). The exercise process was initiated in August of 1998 with the simulation scheduled for November 4, 1998. A series of preparatory meetings was held to plan and design the exercise. However, BC Hydro postponed the exercise in October 1998 and rescheduled it for March 24th, 1999. The reasons given by BC Hydro for the postponement included: • The latest draft of the EPG had not reached the exercise participants in time for them to familiarize themselves with it prior to the exercise and; • It was felt that the community needed more preparation and training time to understand the exercise. The delay was partly attributed to "political problems" in the community unrelated to BC Hydro (Interviewees #20 and 21 - non-aboriginal). In addition to these reasons it seems likely that another factor also influenced the decision to postpone the exercise: • BC Hydro was dealing with a series of concerns about the exercise raised by a few participants representing the District of Lillooet's emergency response organisations (police, fire and ambulance) (Interviewees #12, 13, 14, 15, 18 and 21- non-aboriginal). 5.2.1 Aboriginal Participation in Dam Safety The decision to involve the SN in Exercise "Bridge River" was influenced by a combination of events and factors. Some bands of the SN would be affected in the event of an emergency involving any of the dams in the Bridge River System. This is particularly due to the proximity of St'at'imc land to the Fraser, Bridge and Cayoose rivers and the use of these rivers for fishing and other cultural activities. According to BC Hydro's emergency coordinator Doug McLeod, Exercise "Bridge River" was the first time BC Hydro had directly involved First Nations in emergency planning: They have a significant stake, they are right on the river in the summer and some of them live right on Bridge River... We are now looking at First Nations participation in emergency plans with all our facilities in the province. (Doug McLeod, Lillooet News, April 7, 1999) Several factors and events made it difficult for BC Hydro to ignore the SN in their emergency planning for the Bridge River System (see Box 2). How the SN came to be involved in the Exercise "Bridge River" is not clear. Neither the consultants nor the BC Hydro managers interviewed were sure whether or not the decision to involve the SN was driven by the consultants, BC Hydro, or the SN. Furthermore, interviews with a SN exercise participant and the District of Lillooet's Administrator suggest that a combination of factors was likely 63 involved. The District Administrator said that he and the Mayor had requested the involvement of two specific SN bands as a condition of their support and participation in the exercise: It was the goal of the Mayor and I to get the bands involved (in the exercise). Because there was no way to get them involved on the emergency plan unless the need for one was demonstrated at which time the objectives for a plan could be developed. The Hydro exercise put us in a position to do so. (Interviewee #22 - non-aboriginal) The BC Hydro exercise was viewed by the District Administrator as a tangible or "real" example that could demonstrate the need for creating and coordinating plans for emergencies. The District Administrator also recognised the potential value of BC Hydro's exercise in improving relations between the District and surrounding bands. Box 2 - Factors Influencing First Nations Participation in Exercise Bridge River 1989 Change in communication between BC Hydro and the St'at'imc began in 1989 as part of Hydro's desire to build a second transmission line from Kelly Lake, near Clinton to Cheekye, near Squaraish. For the first time, BC Hydro could not go through the Department of Indian Affeirs (DIAND) and had to deal directly with SN comrnunities to get permits for rights-of ways. The SN refused to discuss any new projects until past grievances had been acknowledged and dealt with. 1993 After seven years of limited progress, BC Hydro realised that they had to build a relationship with the SN in order to negotiate effectively to settle past and current grievances before the Kelly Lake Cheekye Project would be considered. In November of 1993 both sides entered into an agreement to negotiate. 1991-1992 Involving the SN in the emergency planning exercise was seen as critical for both BC Hydro and SN who recognized that certain bands in particular would be extremely vulnerable in the event of a sadden release of water from Terzaghi dam. The awareness of this potential threat was heightened in 1991 and 1992 when BC Hydro spilled a substantial quantity of water into the Bridge River (see Chapter 4). This spill resulted in accelerated erosion of riverbanks, destruction of fish habitat and posed a threat to aboriginal fishermen and other people working near the river. 1995 The Squamish-Lillooet Regional District Hydro Advisory Committee refused all Ketry Lake routing proposals. According to BC Hydro the transmission line project was dropped in 1995 due to lack of economic feasibility compared to other options. However, BC Hydro realised the need to stay committed to resolving past grievances with the SN. 19% To facilitate better communication with the SN, BC Hydro funded a St'at'imc Nation Hydro Committee (SNHC) and proceeded to take part in a series of negotiation tables dealing with shared and individual grievances among the different bands that make up the SN. Through the SNHC and negotiations with SN bands, BC Hydro had an established line of rommumcations and contacts to help them involve First Nations in the simulation exercise. Sources: BC Hydro Aboriginal Relations,, 1998,1999; Interviewees # 27 and 20, 64 According to the District Administrator, BC Hydro's consultants readily agreed to involve the SN in the exercise. He was unsure as to whether they had already agreed upon having the SN involved, or had not thought of it, and were willing to do so in order to get the District's support. What we were really pushing for is that Cayoosh and Bridge be involved. But we did not have to push too hard.... (Ibid.) At the same time, a member of the SNHC felt that the SN were initially left out of BC Hydro's emergency planning process and were later included after voicing concerns: We were kind of left out and that is always a big issue of consultation and it seems like they go on their own to develop their flooding plans without thinking about our communities. We let Hydro know that was a major concern of ours. (Interviewee #6 - aboriginal) The BC Hydro simulation exercise was the first time both the District of Lillooet and the SN were actively involved in BC Hydro's emergency preparedness. One question to be asked is why there was no prior cooperation in emergency planning between the District and the SN? The District Administrator felt that part of the reason why the District had failed in past attempts to include surrounding bands in their emergency planning was that the "approach" the local Provincial Emergency Program37 (PEP) coordinator employed did not motivate the bands to become involved. The local PEP coordinator asked surrounding bands for their emergency plans so that they could be coordinated with the District's. As none of the bands had their own emergency plans developed, their ability to tie in with the District's emergency plan may have seemed abstract: A few months after this council was elected the Mayor and I had a meeting with Cayoose and asked if they had an emergency plan - they said no. The municipality said that it would be nice if we knew how we could incorporate you into our plan and vice versa. The Mayor and I then went to [the PEP coordinator] and told him that the band was interested - [he] said that he had tried before and sent them stuff but they were not interested. (Interviewee #22 - non-aboriginal) The local (PEP) coordinator maintains the District of Lillooet's emergency plan. During the course of the exercise, BC Hydro's consultants helped pass on this information to SN band members by asking the District to forward copies directly to some band members. It is unclear whether the local PEP coordinator and/ the District was previously unwilling to give out the emergency plan or whether bands were unwilling to approach the District to ask for it. 3 7 The Provincial Emergency Program (PEP) in BC is responsible for mamtaining "effective awareness, preparedness, response and recovery programs to reduce the human and financial costs of emergencies and disasters" (PEP, 1999). PEP is part of the Public Safety and Regulatory Branch in the Ministry of the Attorney General. PEP has regional offices throughout BC which administer services and coordinate volunteers. Lillooet is covered by the South West Regional office based in Vancouver. Local authorities are required under the Emergency Management Act (19%) to appoint a coordinator to organise emergency management A local authority has responsibility, "to establish and maintain an emergency management organisation to develop and implement emergency plans and other preparedness, response and recovery measures for emergencies and disasters" (PEP, 1999). 65 The District Administrator felt that it was more appropriate for BC Hydro and C & M Consultants to contact individual bands directly because the exercise was organised by BC Hydro. It was thought that the SN would not have been as willing to participate if the District was in charge of coordinating all the local participants, including the SN. BC Hydro's inclusion of the St'at'imc Nation in the simulation exercise gave out a strong message to the non-aboriginal community regarding the recognition of the SN's right to be involved in emergency planning. Had BC Hydro failed to include them in the exercise, "exclusionary" behaviour would have been reinforced. This would have further distanced the development of trust between the two communities. Moreover, the fact that SN exercise participants remained committed to the exercise, despite cancellations and delays, dispelled arguments by some non-aboriginals about the SN not being interested in emergency planning. 66 5.3 Exercise "Bridge River" - Preparatory Meetings Leading up to the simulation exercise, a series of meetings was conducted (including a tabletop exercise) to help prepare participants for the exercise. The table below gives a brief summary of each meeting. Table 4. Exercise "Bridge River" - Preparatory Meetings DATE, TIME, & PLACE MEETING November 17, 1998 7:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. Lillooet Recreation Center Emergency Planning Guide Presentation Presentation involving all exercise participants January 19, 1999 7:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. Lillooet Recreation Center Exercise "Lillooet" -Table-top exercise involving all exercise participants March 17, 1999 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. Lillooet Recreation Center -> Simulators Meeting -Review of exercise scenario and events list - for simulators only March 24, 1999 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. Lillooet Recreation Center, LVFD Hall, SNHC offices and DOL offices Exercise "Bridge River" - , Simulation exercise involving all exercise participants 5.3.1 Emergency Planning Guide Presentation The Emergency Planning Guide (EPG) presentation took place on November 17, 1998. The presentation was part of an ongoing series of meetings to prepare community representatives to take part in the forthcoming emergency simulation exercise, Exercise "Bridge River". The presentation was the first meeting since BC Hydro had decided to postpone the exercise (originally scheduled for November 4 t h 1998). As people began to filter into the room at the beginning of the meeting, they moved toward others they appeared to be familiar with. It was noticeable that those who engaged in conversation with each other while waiting for the meeting to start were interacting primarily with people of the same cultural background. At the start of the meeting, the BC Hydro staff were introduced to the audience. No attempt was made to introduce exercise participants to each other or to facilitate interaction among them. Subsequent 67 meetings also did not involve the use of introductions, nametags or any activities designed to increase interaction among participants. The presentation of the "EPG" was a "one-way" transfer of information from BC Hydro to the exercise participants. There was little direct interaction between the audience and BC Hydro staff during the presentation. At the end of the meeting, both aboriginal and non-aboriginal people lingered to engage in conversation with BC Hydro staff. There was more interaction between BC Hydro staff and both local aboriginal and non-aboriginal individuals than was observed between each group (see Figure 11). Mutual avoidance rather than open hostility was observed between SN and non-aboriginal people at the meetings. Lack of interaction between aboriginals and non-aboriginals may have been due to lack of familiarity with each other. However, both groups had attended previous meetings with BC Hydro and C & M Consultants (prior to the cancellation of the exercise) and would have been visually familiar with each other. Possible explanations for the tendency of both SN and DOL participants to interact more with BC Hydro than each other are: • BC Hydro staff members were seen as an important source of information and/resources for emergency planning for both aboriginal and non-aboriginals groups. • Community tension between aboriginal and non-aboriginals in Lillooet meant that interaction between the two groups was hmited (see Chapter 4 - CP 146 Dispute) — both groups may have felt more comfortable interacting with BC Hydro staff who were outsiders to the area. Tension between the groups could also account for competition for the same resources that are felt to be accessible through BC Hydro. Figure 11. Social Interaction among Exercise Participants 68 Non-aboriginal participants appeared to dominate the time of BC Hydro staff. This observation may be explained by the fact that BC Hydro was aware of dissatisfaction with the exercise process on the part of some non-aboriginal participants. Hence, BC Hydro staff used time at the beginning and end of the meeting to improve relations with those individuals. Non-aboriginal participants generally had more experience in emergency preparedness, and so may have had greater confidence in approaching BC Hydro staff with comments and questions. It is also possible that some BC Hydro staff (all of whom were non-aboriginal) were either more familiar with and/or comfortable interacting with non-aboriginal participants. 5.3.2 Table-top Exercise "Lillooet" On January 19th, 1999, BC Hydro conducted Exercise "Lillooet", a table-top exercise designed to familiarise exercise participants with the EPG. Exercise "Lillooet" provided opportunity for a higher degree of both interaction and participation than the previous EPG presentation. More people were present at the tabletop meeting than at the previous meeting, 24 compared to 17. The exercise resulted in all attendees being randomly divided into three groups (A, B and C). This created small groups with a mixture of both aboriginal and non-aboriginal participants. Each of the three groups sat around a table so participants could clearly see each other. The objective of the tabletop exercise was to familiarise participants with the EPG. Participants were asked to interpret a mock warning from BC Hydro regarding the safety of a dam and, make decisions using the EPG about who to communicate the information to. Participants were then asked to use their own experience and knowledge to think about other hazards where a communication system would be useful. At the end of the tabletop exercise, all participants returned to the main meeting room and made a presentation of each group's results. During these presentations, jokes were made and the atmosphere was livelier than it had been at the beginning of the meeting before the participants were divided into groups. Interaction among aboriginal and non-aboriginals prior to the start of Exercise "Lillooet" was similar to the meeting of November 17th, 1998. However, by the end of the meeting, there was more interaction among all participants, including BC Hydro staff, than at the previous meeting. It was noted that a DOL participant was engrossed in conversation with an SN participant. These two individuals were present at the previous meeting but were not observed interacting. A later interview indicated that prior to this meeting, the two had not spoken and that the DOL participant had initiated the conversation. Higher levels of interaction between all participants during and after Exercise "Lillooet" could be attributed to a variety of factors including: • Division of participants into smaller group sizes (6-8) for the exercise; 69 • Organisation of groups around a table, enabling participants to see each other as compared to the previous meeting (November 17th, 1998) where all participants sat in rows facing the speaker; • The interactive design of the exercise, encouraging greater participation and the ability of all participants to listen to each other's contributions and therefore gain familiarity with each other; • Greater solicitation of feedback from BC Hydro staff leading the meeting (compared with the information meeting of November 17th, 1998); • Different dynamics due to the presence of individual participants not involved in the previous meeting; and • Growing familiarity and comfort among some aboriginal and non-aboriginal participants. 5.3.3 Simulator's Meeting The simulators meeting took place on Wednesday March 17th and involved only the exercise simulators38. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the proposed scenario for the simulation along with the "events list" (Appendix C) that was created during earlier meetings. The meeting gave the simulators an opportunity to review the "realism" of the events and add or alter the list accordingly. The meeting took the form of a discussion led by one of the consultants who solicited the participants' input. Both SN and non-aboriginal participants gave feedback and comments to the consultants. Fewer interactions between SN and non-aboriginal participants were observed during this meeting than at the tabletop meeting on January 19th. This observation could be explained by the nature of the discussion during which SN and non-aboriginal simulators were invited to give feedback on their own roles and scenarios affecting their respective groups. Hence discussion was predominantly between one participant and the consultant rather than among the participants. Interaction between BC Hydro staff/consultants and both SN and non-aboriginal participants appeared to be similar to the first meeting observed — with more interaction among BC Hydro staff/consultants and members of each group than between the groups themselves. It should be noted that the non-aboriginal DOL participant, who attended Exercise "Lillooet" and interacted with one of the SN participants, was not present at this meeting. These are the people who would be helping create the simulation scenario for exercise players - simulators consequently knew more about the contents of the exercise than players. 70 Box 3 - Definition of Roles of Exercise Participants Players and Simulators • Exercise participants were divided into two distinct roles, players and simulators. 1. Players had to react to information and make decisions based on the emergency scenario and events that occurred. Players were located in the Emergency Qperation Centers (EOCs) on the day of the exercise. 2. Simulators were responsible for providing "players" with a realistic experience by conveying information from the "events list" to the players. In turn, the players could use the simulators as contacts to request information, resources, or actions. Simulators were located in the Simulation Team Room in the Lillooet Volunteer Fire Department HalL • Two people from the same organisation took on the roles of player and simulator. For example, Lillooet's Volunteer Fire Department chief was a "player" while his deputy was a "simulator". Sixoruators were issued the final draft of the scenario and the "events" list the day before the exercise and were asked not to disclose this information to players prior to the exercise. Most of the simulators were chosen from the exercise "design team", involved in developing the exercise scenario and "event" list Source: C&M Consultants. 1999 5.4 Exercise "Bridge River" The simulation, Exercise "Bridge River", held on March 24th, 1999 ran for three hours between 9:00 am and 12:00 p.m. The exercise scenario involved an earthquake measuring 6.0 on the Richter39 Scale with strong shaking lasting about 10 seconds. Exercise participants were given a "start state" (see Appendix C) describing the situation during and just after the earthquake. This was followed by a series of events designed to elicit certain responses from participants (see Appendix C). The exercise aimed to test the integration between the communities' own emergency plans, BC Hydro's PSEP for Bridge River Generation, and the fourth draft of the EPG (see Figure 12). The exercise focussed on notification procedures that would be used by BC Hydro when there was a concern for the safety of a dam and when emergency spilling would be required. The District of Lillooet (DOL) had an emergency plan to use for the exercise, but the SN bands involved did not (either individually or collectively), nor were they able to prepare one in time for the exercise. Furthermore, there was no overall plan for the whole regional district (Squamish-Lillooet) which includes both the DOL and SN. Lack of emergency planning was a disadvantage for the SN in terms of their ability to participate in the exercise. "Developed by Charles Richter, this scale is a measure of the size (magnitude) of an earthquake. It is estimated from the amplitude of the seismic waves that are recorded by sensitive instruments called seismographs. This can be used to estimate the energy released at the focus. The Richter scale is logarithmic, so that each whole number represents a tenfold increase in recorded amplitude. A magnitude of 7.0, for example, indicates measured amplitudes that are ten times greater than those of magnitude 6.0 and 100 times greater than those of magnitude 5.0." (PEP, 1999) The exercise involved the activation of two emergency operation centers (EOC)4 0, the District of Lillooet EOC and the St'at'imc Nation EOC. The District's EOC was set up in the District's Council room on Main Street meanwhile the St'at'imc EOC was located in a meeting room at the SNHC office on Tl'itl'kit (Lillooet) reserve. The two EOCs were approximately five minutes by car from each other. All participants had been previously assigned roles either as "players" or "simulators" for the purpose of the exercise (see Box 3). District of Lillooet and St'at'imc Nation players were separated in their respective EOCs. Simulators from both groups were located in a large room in Lillooet's Volunteer Fire Department Hall on Main Street. Figure 13. Location of Emergency Operation Centers and Simulation Team SNHC Office []j SNEOC~j] Tl'itl 'kit Mountain View Road Map Not to Scale Lillooet District Office _j POL EOC j _ DEBRIEFING & LUNCH MEETING Recreation Center -> N Main Sttrpfit SIMULATION TEAMS Complex disasters covering multiple sites of large areas often require an emergency operations center (EOC). The EOC is used to direct disaster response by coordinating response agencies, establishing priorities for acquiring and allocating resources, interacting with outside government and non-governmental organisations and, handling media inquiries and public information about the disaster. The EOC is normally set up away from the disaster scene and may be located in a pre-designated building (AufderHeide,1989). 5.4.1 One Emergency, Two Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) Figure 14. Communication between the SN and DOL EOCs and Simulation Teams 72 SNEQC ^ /** SNSIM SNHC Office / TEAM DOL EOC District D O L S I M T E A M The existence of two EOCs for an area with a small population base reflects the lack of cohesiveness between the SN and non-aboriginal communities. One of the consultants reflected his concern regarding having two EOCs and recounted his efforts to persuade the two EOCs to combine for the exercise: There are some disparate groups within the community. The aboriginal group is not integrated into the community and maybe shouldn't be. But, this creates overlaps or gaps in responsibilities in Junctions like police, evacuation situations, fire. For such a small community where it would make sense to have one person or organisation in charge of certain junctions, there is a split, which divides such responsibility politically. That is a weakness, especially if bridges aren't built between the groups...There is no mechanism to integrate the bands and the community. (Interviewee #20 - non-aboriginal) The consultant said that he and his colleagues deliberately tried to "build a bridge " between the two groups during the exercise. He reflected that "having the two EOCs talking to each other was a start during the exercise. They shared the same space and the same problems... that is a beginning. " However, despite this he was "not confident that things would flow together in the event of a real emergency" (Ibid.). Another consultant also outlined potential problems with communication and resource sharing between the two EOCs but also acknowledged what he felt to be St'at'imc concerns with sharing one EOC with the District: / think that it would better if they were together so they did not have to get the same information twice. Information about a particular resource list given to the District EOC would then have to be given to the First Nations EOC and what if they both wanted the same resource? If they were face to face they could discuss why they felt it was important that it went to the reserve or it went to highways ...but again you have this concern from the First Nations that they have not been involved in this sort of practicing and they don't have any plans to practice and therefore they 73 don't want to be seen or shown up and they would lose face in one form or another. (Interviewee #21 - non-aboriginal) Poor management of resources is a valid concern regarding the existence of two EOCs in close proximity to each other. Auf der Heide (1989: 127) proposes that "it is probably best in most cases to encourage the development of a single EOC, if maximal inter-organisational coordination is to result." Lack of experience and training in both setting up and working together in an EOC was a disadvantage for SN players. SN players needed a higher degree of help with preparation and organisation of their EOC compared to the District players (C&M Consultants, 1999: 6,16). To address this need, the consultant facilitating for the SN EOC held a separate training session with the SN players on March 23, 1999. This was not necessary for the District EOC players who all had experience through their volunteer activity or work related activities dealing with emergencies. For SN participants, the exercise contributed to building skills and improving understanding of how to deal with emergencies. In the case of the District EOC players these skills were strengthened. Interaction of SN players with each other helped to encourage "bonding" among the players who were from different bands. The players were already familiar with each other but had not worked together in an emergency scenario. The shared experience of the exercise allowed the individual players to learn more about situations facing reserves other than their own. The players in the District EOC had previous experience in dealing with emergencies within their own jobs or volunteer positions. Many of the players on the District EOC regularly work together in real emergencies and training exercises - "in the EOC I knew everybody very well, we have trained together" (Interviewee #11- non-aboriginal). The District emergency plan and EOC had been tested recently in the past by exercises (for example BC Rail's emergency simulation during the summer of 1998). Exercise "Bridge River" helped to reinforce existing bonds among the different players at the EOC table. The previous ability of the EOC participants (representing different organisations) to work together as a team no doubt influenced the success of the District EOC in dealing with the events simulated in Exercise "Bridge River". BC Hydro and the consultants' support of having two EOCs (despite their concerns) for the exercise may be seen as demonstrating their awareness of the distinct needs of the two groups, and their varying levels of skills and experience. Alternatively, political pressure from the SN and the desire to keep the SN on board during the exercise might have been another factor. BC Hydro's support of a separate SN EOC was important for securing SN support and participation in the exercise. The District of Lillooet's emergency response organisations preferred to have one EOC, which would include the SN. The advantages of one EOC for both the SN and non-aboriginal communities are more favourable to DOL emergency organisations. They are already in a position to dominate resource 74 allocation and control of the EOC by virtue of their experience and emergency contacts both within and outside of the community (pre-existing social capital). Had the SN EOC players been integrated with the more experienced District players it is likely that SN participation in the simulation would have been reduced. Although a joint EOC may have been a good opportunity for information and skill sharing between the District and SN players, past mistrust and tension between the two groups may have discouraged participation, particularly for members of the SN. The division of District and SN players into separate EOCs limited the exercise's potential for building bridges between individuals from each group. Nevertheless, one could argue that it is important for each group to be well "bonded" among its individual members before attempting to establish bridges with an outside group. At the same time there is a fine line between bonding and bridging when too much bonding within a group may prevent bridging with outsiders. The fact that the exercise did require telecommunications contact between the two EOCs meant that the two EOCs had to coordinate and share information and resources. The consultant who facilitated the SN EOC reported that: Whenever there was a problem and it was felt that the District would have the resource, there was no hesitation in contacting the Lillooet EOC to askfor their assistance. The same went for contacting Hydro (C&M Consultants, 1999: 6). However, on the post-exercise feedback forms, participants from both groups recognised the need for better communication between the EOCs: / feel that there cannot be two EOCs, one for the District and one for the St at 'imc Nation. We didn't know what they were doing, and they didn't know what we were doing (DOL EOC Player, C & M Consultants, 1999). Need better communications between EOCs (SN Simulator, C & M Consultants, 1999). While some DOL participants called for one EOC as the solution to improving communication between the two groups, SN participants never suggested or supported a joint EOC. By having separate EOCs and no face-to-face representation of either group on each other's team, the room for misunderstanding and miscommunication was great. There was no discussion between both groups and BC Hydro before or after the exercise of sending a representative from each group to sit on the other's EOC. 5.4.2 Simulation Teams The simulation teams involved SN and District simulators answering calls from their respective EOCs. Members of each simulation team were seated together rather than intermixed. This arrangement 75 was made for practical reasons of having simulators answering incoming calls from their respective EOCs and passing shared telephones to the simulator who could best deal with the call. Although seating was not broken up among SN and District simulators, the two groups sat near each other around a " U " shaped set-up of tables as opposed to being on separate tables. This set-up was deliberate on the part of the consultants and was aimed at allowing simulators from each group to listen to each other's calls and learn about the issues facing different response agencies and communities. The 3-hour exercise gave time to individuals from each group to observe each other and learn more about the personalities on each team. The atmosphere in the simulation room was more relaxed than at the EOCs and involved some degree of bantering. Although no direct communication or "chat" was observed between the aboriginal and non-aboriginal participants, there was mutual laughter at each other's jokes. 5.4.3 Post Exercise Lunch and Feedback Meeting Following the exercise, feedback meetings were held at each EOC and simulation team locations. The consultants presented the results of the exercise to all exercise participants during a lunch debriefing meeting. The debriefing involved several BC Hydro staff from Bridge River, and BC Hydro managers and observers. This resulted in greater numbers of non-aboriginals compared to aboriginals and a larger group of people in total. During the post-exercise lunch, one might expect more interaction would be likely between SN and non-aboriginal simulation team members because; in effect, they had spent 3 hours together in the same room as compared to physically separated EOC players. However, there was limited interaction between the two groups in general and no evidence of increased inter-cultural contact between either players or simulators. The majority of aboriginal participants (both players and simulators) sat near each other and engaged in conversation. Similar to previous meetings, leading up to the exercise, there appeared to be more interactions among BC Hydro staff and each group than between the groups themselves. 5.5 Summary The separateness of the SN and DOL was reflected in the low levels of familiarity and interaction among aboriginal and non-aboriginal participants during meetings leading up to the exercise and the exercise itself. The exercise was an opportunity for both SN and DOL participants to become more familiar and start building relations with each other. Despite several mixed meetings to prepare for the exercise, there did not appear to be a significant increase in interaction between the SN and DOL 76 participants. The limited interactions between non-aboriginals and aboriginals reflect deep distrust that cannot be easily overcome in a few meetings. There was indication that Exercise "Lillooet", the table-top exercise, promoted higher levels of participation. After the exercise, there was greater social interaction between BC Hydro staff and participants from the SN and DOL. Participant enjoyment of the table-top exercise may have encouraged greater openness towards BC Hydro staff. SN and DOL participants' tendency to interact more with BC Hydro than with each other continued throughout the exercise process. Relations between the SN and non-aboriginals were likely affected by ongoing conflict over CP 146 along with a long history of distrust between the two groups. Nevertheless, there was evidence that at least two individuals from either group engaged in conversation for the first time at one of the meetings. The opportunity for this interaction would have been unlikely without the simulation exercise that put both these individuals into the same physical space. BC Hydro could be regarded as a "bridge" between the two groups - if they used their relationship with each group to transfer beneficial information between groups. Simply interacting with either does not necessarily translate to being a bridge if BC Hydro does not somehow act as a tie to facilitate interaction between the two groups. The separateness of the SN and DOL puts BC Hydro in a position of power, with the potential to manipulate the relationship it has with either group to its own advantage. In some instances, it could be to BC Hydro's advantage to encourage the separateness of either groups to prevent them from uniting against BC Hydro (for example to get compensation from BC Hydro for their use of the area's resources - strategies currently being undertaken separately by each group). However, there are advantages to BC Hydro in having the communities function as one unit when it comes to emergency preparedness (for example, to simplify emergency notification processes). Furthermore, it was clear that the District Administrator used BC Hydro's exercise as a bridge to overcome previous barriers to aboriginal involvement in emergency planning in Lillooet. The next chapter will discuss further interview evidence of the exercise's role in building bridges between the two groups - interactions not observed during the process. It will also explore how bonds between individuals in the exercise affected the exercise process. 77 6. ROLE OF EXERCISE "BRIDGE RIVER" IN BUILDING BRIDGES AND REINFORCING BONDS 6.1 Introduction The previous chapter described the results of participant observation during the simulation exercise and meetings leading up to it. Both SN and non-aboriginal participants appeared to be more comfortable interacting with BC Hydro staff and consultants than they were with each other. This chapter demonstrates that exposure of the SN and non-aboriginal exercise participants to each other resulted in new contacts made during the course of the exercise. The exercise resulted in the formation of new bridges between SN and non-aboriginal participants—bridges that could be used to help prepare for or mitigate the impacts of a disaster. The exercise helped to reinforce existing bonds among the District of Lillooet's EOC team. This undoubtedly led to the team's greater effectiveness in dealing with the disaster scenarios during the simulation. The importance of pre-existing bonds among a group of DOL exercise participants is discussed in relation to its impact upon the exercise process. 6.2 Role of Exercise in Building New Bridges 6.2.1 Inter-cultural Bridges The researcher asked the exercise participants who were interviewed whether or not they had made any new contacts that would be useful for emergency preparedness as a result of the exercise. This question was asked to see if the exercise was a catalyst for building new bridges between SN and non-aboriginal participants - bridges that could be used to strengthen disaster preparedness. A higher proportion of the aboriginal compared to non-aboriginal interviewees (2/3rds and 1/6*) said that they had made new contacts through the exercise. The four SN interviewees who said that they had made new contacts all mentioned the local PEP coordinator, as a new contact. During the exercise process, the local PEP coordinator offered to help some SN participants prepare their emergency plans. According to two SN interviewees, this was the first time that such an offer had been made: / was approached by one of the people [the PEP coordinator] that were involved (in the exercise) offering help in organising something for the individual communities and well I'm thankful that somebody was listening, it's just a matter of time before we can finally get together and talk (Interviewee #4 - aboriginal) / know that even from that exercise there are people involved who want to sit down... I think it is probably one of the first times that offer has been made to us - to help us - at least from an 78 individual [the PEP coordinator]. And I think they are letting us in the door... (Interviewee #6 -aboriginal) The offers of help made by the local PEP coordinator were likened to the opening of a "door", implying that the "door" was previously closed to SN participation in emergency planning. There was some inconsistency between the local PEP coordinator being named as a new contact by four aboriginal interviewees, and his view of the new contacts he made through the exercise. When asked if he knew everyone involved in the exercise he responded - "pretty well -I try to keep in touch with everybody. " However, when asked if he had made any new contacts, he responded "not really" (Interviewee #11- non-aboriginal). The participation of different SN band members in the exercise showed their interest in emergency preparedness and hence may have encouraged the local PEP coordinator to offer help to them. 6.2.2 Inter-departmental Bridges within BC Hydro The division of BC Hydro into separate departments distanced local workers from each other. One BC Hydro Manager from Power Supply mentioned that through the exercise he got to know "even guys within our own system from T&D (Transmission and Distribution) who are really a separate company from us now so that was always a bit of a vague area... " (Interviewee #16 - non-aboriginal). Ironically, the only exercise participant from T&D took part as a member of a volunteer organisation (search and rescue) not as a BC Hydro T&D employee: We weren't called at all for that disaster test. It was mainly put on by Power Supply-Bridge River and we weren't really a part of it. I was still quite surprised that nobody phoned us... They should have had concerns about whether we were shutting power off...My first responsibility (in an emergency) would be here at Hydro... in an emergency situation if Hydro needed me I would be down here first and then Rescue second. (Interviewee #17 - non-aboriginal) The interviewee states that his first priority in an emergency is with BC Hydro work and second, with search and rescue. He was "surprised" that his department was not involved in the exercise, considering the importance of electricity supply during an emergency. Inter-departmental coordination between Power Supply and T&D would be critical in the event of a dam breach at Terzaghi. The T&D building and equipment could be flooded, cutting off power to Lillooet and surrounding areas. Although not one of the aims, the exercise helped facilitate a new relationship between employees from different departments within BC Hydro. Such a relationship could help "lubricate" inter-departmental cooperation in preparing for and responding to emergency situations. 79 6.3 The Impact of Bonding among Lillooet's Emergency Responders upon the Exercise Lillooet's emergency response agencies (police, fire, ambulance, and PEP) showed strong support for each other and solidarity in their evaluation of BC Hydro's and C&M Consultants' conduct of the exercise. Lack of understanding of these close bonds between some leaders of the emergency response agencies added to BC Hydro's and the consultants' difficulties in carrying out the exercise. It was clear from participant comments and other information that this exercise was not received at Lillooet as well as other similar Hydro exercises have been in other communities. (C&M Consultants 1999: 8) The local PEP coordinator (who was also the ambulance chief) was not "on board" early on in the exercise process. The local PEP coordinator used his strong bonds with the leaders of other emergency response agencies to unite with him against BC Hydro and the consultants. A long history of working together, combined with close informal contact and cross-membership among the different response organisations are factors influencing strong bonds between these individuals. For example, several members of the volunteer fire department and ambulance service are also involved in search and rescue. The threat of having all of Lillooet's emergency response organisations pull out of the exercise likely influenced BC Hydro's decision to postpone the simulation exercise. Lillooet's emergency responders are proud of their reputation for working well together in emergency situations. Some of the emergency responders felt that they had adequate experience of working together during real emergencies and through previous exercises. There was a sense that BC Hydro and their consultants did not acknowledge the extent of the local responders' experience, training, and ability to work together effectively. It was also felt that BC Hydro and their consultants were not sympathetic to the amount of time emergency responders (especially those who were volunteers) had to give up to attend the exercise meetings. BC Hydro and the consultants' miscommunication over meeting times further increased the level of discontent. Lillooet's emergency responders felt that Exercise "Bridge River" did not provide them with any new skills for dealing with emergencies: Don't see any great benefit to this exercise. The emergency personnel in this community function well and this exercise did not seem to provide any new techniques or ideas for dealing with an emergency situation. (Exercise Simulator - non-aboriginal, C&M Consultants, 1999) BC Hydro and their consultants were not able to convince some of the emergency responders of the potential benefits to be gained by Exercise "Bridge River" that would set it apart from other emergency preparedness framing and exercises conducted in the community. These benefits included: • Building better communication with a) BC Hydro and b) the SN (Neither BC Hydro nor the SN had been involved with the District in emergency planning or coordination prior to this exercise); 80 • Learning about the nature of the potential flooding impact in the event of a dam breach; and • Practicing response to events that could happen as a result of an earthquake. Despite ongoing criticism of the exercise process, all the leaders of the emergency response organisations participated in the simulation exercise. Furthermore, they all attended the meetings leading up to the re-scheduled exercise. The Mayor of Lillooet's commitment to the exercise was an important influence in keeping the emergency response leaders involved despite their dissatisfaction. The consultants recognised this and suggested that the mayor's inability to attend meetings during the early stages of the exercise affected the level of cooperation from some of the emergency response leaders. Although not stated in the consultant's report, it was evident from both exercise feedback forms and interviews that — compared to non-aboriginal exercise participants — few SN participants criticised BC Hydro or their consultants. This could suggest that SN participants were satisfied with the exercise process and its outcome. Alternately this could indicate reluctance of SN participants to openly criticise the exercise. This could have been partly due to lack of trust in the researcher's use of such information. It is interesting to note that the only aboriginal exercise participant who held similar criticisms (though less strong) of the exercise process to the District of Lillooet's emergency responders was from the St'at'imc Nation Tribal Police (SNTP) (i.e. also an emergency responder). This suggests bonding among individuals from emergency response agencies who share common experiences in organisational culture - including styles of emergency training. Similarities in views could also reflect the close relationship that exists between the RCMP and SNTP chiefs in Lillooet. Figure 15. Bridging between the SNTP and RCMP The SNTP has a non-aboriginal chief who helps to create a strong bridge between his organisation and the RCMP in Lillooet. The chief of the SNTP is an ex-RCMP officer who had a pre-81 existing relationship with Lillooet's RCMP chief (before either was stationed in Lillooet). The chief of the SNTP's pre-existing social capital may be regarded as an effective "bridge" between the two cultures. A shared culture of law enforcement and crime problems provides a source of bonding between officers on each force. Therefore, despite separate police forces for the aboriginal and non-aboriginal community and overlapping areas of jurisdiction, there is a good level of cooperation and interaction between the two agencies. This was confirmed by interviews with members of each force: We are two different forces. They run their outfit and we run ours. We just kind of work hand in hand and back and forth. The chief constable right now, ...is an ex-RCMP member - I've known him for years so it makes for a really good working relationship. We get along well and work back and forth, having coffee daily, well not daily but a couple times a week so it really helps a lot I think on that basis too and pretty straightforward with one another and open and just know where we 're coming from and where we 're going and what we can do and what we can't do. We work back and forth, they cover for us when we're short handed and we cover for them when they are short handed. (Lillooet, RCMP Chief of Police - non-aborginal) We have a really good working relationship with them (RCMP) - we are very fortunate. And our boundaries overlap so we just cover off back andforth. (SNTP officer - Aboriginal) The RCMP Chief highlights that his pre-existing relationship with the SNTP Chief improves the working relationship between the two forces. This is an example of social capital "lubricating" cooperation to attain law enforcement goals. Simply knowing or being familiar with another person does not necessarily make a good working relationship. The RCMP and SNTP Chiefs obviously had a positive relationship prior to them both being stationed in Lillooet. Relative professional isolation in Lillooet may have strengthened the relationship between both men. Had this pre-existing relationship been poor, then it is likely that this would have had negative repercussions for the level of inter-organisational cooperation between the SNTP and RCMP. 6.4 Role of Exercise in Building Bridges of Understanding with BC Hydro Leading up to the exercise, requests were made in two pre-exercise meetings to have a BC Hydro representative with decision-making power in the DOL's EOC. On the day of the exercise, there was no BC Hydro representative in the DOL's EOC. Four DOL interviewees (three from the DOL EOC and one from the DOL Simulation team) criticised BC Hydro for not providing a representative to sit on the EOC team. Three of the four interviewees were District of Lillooet emergency responders who were most critical of BC Hydro during the course of the exercise. They felt that a BC Hydro representative at their EOC was vital to helping them understand the EPG and to keeping them informed about the emergency. 82 The following quote expresses what these four interviewees feel are BC Hydro's responsibilities to the community in an emergency involving BC Hydro facilities: Why wasn't there a Hydro person at the EOC making calls to check on the dam instead of us doing it?... I didn 'tsee anything that they would be doing to help us out in an emergency - just stand back watching. Well they should be involved and in charge of telling us when the power is going to be back on, what's happening - they should have had a representative here. (Interviewee #10 - non-aboriginal) There is evidently a gap in understanding between what BC Hydro and the community feel are BC Hydro's responsibilities to surrounding communities in an emergency involving one of their facilities i.e. dam spills or breaches. This gap in understanding was not bridged by the simulation exercise. The DOL participants felt that BC Hydro should provide a staff member to interpret technical information and act as a liaison to keep the District informed about the emergency. They expect BC Hydro to play a more active part in helping the community deal with any emergency. BC Hydro was negatively compared to other companies like BC Rail and Ainsworth who provided resource lists41 that could be made available to help the DOL in an emergency. It is possible that if the emergency responders had a closer relationship with BC Hydro managers then they would know what resources could be made available to them. Such knowledge and trust between both sides might reduce the importance of a formal list. The priorities for BC Hydro in case of an emergency affecting their facilities are illustrated by the comments of a manager who participated in the exercise: I suspect that it brought out some concerns in the community when they realised that when there is a real emergency that BC Hydro won't be there with cars, trucks and bodies to help them - we will be dealing with our own problems. They ask you if you have a couple of cars available in an emergency... questions like that come up, if there was an earthquake and there were some problems in the Village and somebody was in a lot of trouble I don't know how much we could do for them if our own system was collapsed around our ears. We got to look at the bigger picture... Now you know we 're not going to be too hard hearted about it but, there is a limit and I think they are going to have to realise that -1 hope that is a result of that exercise that they realise that they are on their own more than they believe. (Interviewee #16 - non-aboriginal) When asked if the community could expect help from BC Hydro in an emergency that did not affect BC Hydro, he responded, "of course we are good neighbours but we got to look after our own interest first" (Ibid.). The BC Hydro manager clearly shows his need to give priority to "the big picture," namely, dealing with the impacts of a dam emergency that extend beyond Lillooet. Meanwhile, the Lillooet community wants assurance that BC Hydro will be "good neighbours" during a non-BC Hydro emergency and in the event of a BC Hydro emergency will be pro-active in helping the community deal 4 1 A resource list includes items that can be made, available for use in the event of an emergency or disaster that overloads the resources of local responders. This may include such things as radios, heavy equipment for moving rocks, first aid kits etc. In small communities where emergency responders have limited budgets access to such resources from local private companies can be very important 83 with the impacts. C & M Consultants appear to understand the breakdown in communication between BC Hydro and the DOL EOC when they suggested that a liaison person from another area could be provided if local staff resources are unavailable: There is no doubt that the presence of a knowledgeable Hydro representative with a Hydro portable radio would be of significant benefit. The Plans (both the PSEP and EPG) should address this issue in a way that such a liaison person would be made available at the earliest opportunity in situations where serious evacuation may be necessary. Even if local Hydro people have higher priorities to deal with arrangements could be made to bring someone in from another area. (C&MConsultants, 1999: 8) 6.5 Summary BC Hydro's exercise "Bridge River" faced challenges partly as a result of failure to recognise the strength of bonds among the leaders of Lillooet's emergency response organisations who were dissatisfied with the exercise process. However, the consultants recognised the lack of "bridges" to integrate the SN and non-aboriginal community. BC Hydro's and the consultants' decision to directly contact all participants helped to overcome existing barriers for St'at'imc participation in emergency preparedness. It appears unlikely at the present time that St'at'imc participation in emergency preparedness with non-aboriginals would have taken place without BC Hydro and their consultants facilitating this. At the same time, neither the consultants nor BC Hydro were aware of a bridge between the RCMP and SNTP (facilitated in part by bonds between their leaders). This was a bridge that could have been capitalised upon to help aboriginal and non-aboriginal exercise participants interact with each other during the exercise to form new bridges. The value of the exercise in helping build bridges in emergency preparedness appeared to be greater for aboriginal participants who reported making more new contacts than non-aboriginals during the exercise. The offers of help made to SN participants by the local PEP coordinator is a positive outcome for the exercise in terms of building bridges in emergency preparedness. The question then becomes: how sustainable are these new bridges without the presence of outside organisations like Hydro to regularly bring these participants into regular contact with each other? The next chapter describes the likelihood of SN and non-aboriginal exercise participants coming into regular contact with each other through formal organisations and wider community activities. This was done by analysing workplace and community activities that exercise participants are involved in. 84 7. INTER-CULTURAL SOCIAL CAPITAL AND OCCUPATION 7.1 Introduction Limited interaction between SN and non-aboriginal participants (observed during the exercise meetings in Chapter 5) suggests an absence of bridges between the two groups. In Chapter 6, there was evidence that the exercise process was a catalyst for new bridges to be built between SN and non-aboriginals in emergency preparedness. Sustaining these bridges requires regular contact between each side to help build trust and understanding. This chapter explores the different workplace and organisations where exercise participants could interact with each other to reinforce or form bridges - to strengthen inter-organisational cooperation for emergency preparedness. The workplace and volunteer groups are arenas in which relationships can be established between individuals of different cultural backgrounds. The exercise participants were culturally stratified in the workplace and volunteer groups related to emergency preparedness. This stratification pervades other areas of community interaction. This could be one explanation for the lack of familiarity and distance between aboriginal and non-aboriginal exercise participants. Based upon current patterns of workplace and community interaction; opportunities for aboriginal and non-aboriginal exercise participants to come into regular social contact with each other are very limited. 7.2 Workplace Potential for Bridge Building One might anticipate that aboriginal people would represent the individual bands that make up the SN, as was the case with the exercise participants. This is particularly because membership in a band is "exclusive" in that membership is through aboriginal blood or kinship ties. One might also suppose that given the high aboriginal population in the Lillooet area (about 50 percent of the population), a significant number of the representatives of local and provincial government might also be aboriginal. This was clearly not the case for participants in the exercise. Among the exercise participants there was an evident cultural division of labour. Exercise participants who represented either municipal or provincial government agencies or volunteer organisations were non-aboriginal. The results shown by Table 5 help explain the lack of familiarity among aboriginal and non-aboriginal exercise participants. One question that must be asked is whether or not the exercise participants are culturally representative of their whole organisation. In other words, is it a coincidence that those involved in the exercise happen to be from one particular cultural group? In order to answer this question, the organisations involved in the exercise were surveyed to find out what proportion of their 85 staff were aboriginal or non-aboriginal. Results show that organisations involved in the exercise are culturally stratified and the exercise participants representing them accurately reflect this. Table 5. Organisations Involved in Exercise "Bridge River" and Cultural Membership Group/Organisation Aboriginal Exercise Participant (Total Aboriginal Employees) Non-aboriginal Exercise Participant (Total Non-aboriginal Employees) Total Employees in Organisation District of Lillooet Council 0(0) 2(5) 5 District of lillooet Office Employee 0(0) 1(6) 6 District of Lillooet Public Works 0(0) 2* (4) 4 Provincial Emergency Program (PEP) 0(0) 1(1) 1 Emergency Social Services 0(0) K D 1 RCMP 0(0) 2(5) 5 Tribal Police 1(5) 0(1) 6 Lillooet Volunteer Fire Department 0(0) 2(30) 30 Lillooet Search and Rescue 0(0) 1(10) 10 BC Hydro SNHC 2(4) 0(1) 5 Ministry of Highways 0(0) K D 1 Band Council/Member 7 (All aboriginal) 0(0) All aboriginal Total Exercise Participants 10 13 A local employment outreach worker commented that employment in Lillooet does not reflect the community demographics: "You don't see 50percent aboriginal and non-aboriginal" (Interviewee #30 -aboriginal). Lack of aboriginal representation in different organisations was explained as resulting from few aboriginals living "in town." Furthermore, aboriginals living on reserve may have limited access to transport to get to jobs. 86 There were only two organisations (involved in the exercise) which employed both aboriginal and non-aboriginal staff - - SNTP and SNHC. Both of these organisations are "tribal" based and might be expected to be exclusively aboriginal; however, in each case one of a total of five employees was non-aboriginal. The SNTP's chief is non-aboriginal, as is the SNHC's policy analyst. One explanation for this could be a lack of available qualified aboriginal people for the specific positions, along with the unavailability of support programs and facilities to train aboriginal people for such jobs. Alternately these individuals may have been hired partly because of their ability to understand and work with both cultures. 7.3 Volunteerism and Culture in Lillooet Lillooet's two key volunteer emergency response organisations include the Lillooet Volunteer Fire Department (LVFD) and Search and Rescue. At the time of research, both organisations had a membership of 30 and 10, respectively. Neither the LVFD nor Search and Rescue have any aboriginal members at present. A member of the LVFD when asked about this, responded as follows: They (aboriginal people) have wanted to put firefighters on our table here and we said 'no problem' but they will have to abide by the rules with the training officer before they become a firefighter... and a lot of them are gung ho to start with, like the first meeting but then I never see them again, they have other priorities that's all and to give up a Thursday, every second Thursday, is not for them...But I've never really talked to Mr. (X) or any of those fellows from the reserves but I go through the Mayor and the Mayor says he tries. (Interviewee #13- non-aboriginal) The LVFD member uses the Mayor as his "bridge" to encourage participation in the LVFD. Both he and "Mr. (X)" he referred to were involved in the exercise. Though they were working in different EOCs they were in the same room for the lunch and debriefing, they also both attended meetings leading up to the exercise. Neither named the other as a new contact from the exercise so based on the above quote it appears that these two individuals did not come into contact or if they did, firefighter training was not discussed. The offer to help train firefighters from different reserves was confirmed by an exercise participant from an SN band who said that the LVFD "offered to (train us) but quite often our people are out working somewhere else. " He added "lack of training is a downfall for us " (Interviewee #5 -aboriginal). There is an identified need for firefighter training of aboriginal people living on reserve from both the aboriginal community and LVFD. Both the LVFD member and the SN band member suggest that "other priorities" may be a reason for lack of firefighter training among aboriginal band members. However, there is likely a complex mixture of reasons underlying this, including different cultural approaches to helping in emergencies as illustrated by the quote below: In our community we stay committed if someone is lost, stay committed to find them, whatever, but I guess it depends on resources or their mandate so there are some limitations, RCMP or Search 87 and Rescue, the Fire department or whoever... I have seen a couple of cases where people have been lost in the river or out in the woods and they were there for the short term but not in the longer term.... (Interviewee #6 - aboriginal) The aboriginal interviewee acknowledges the difference in values between the DOL emergency response organisations and the SN community. 7.4 Social Interaction and Networks The organisations involved in the simulation exercise were culturally homogeneous, providing little opportunity for previous interaction between aboriginals and non-aboriginals prior to the exercise. It would be shortsighted to assume that the organisations involved in the exercise are the only arena in which the participants could come into contact with each other to form relationships. Exercise participants may be involved in a range of social and group activities outside of emergency preparedness that could bring them into contact with each other. Putnam (1993a) emphasises the importance of the numbers of volunteer groups and organisations in a community and group membership as a good indicator of a community's social capital. Lillooet has a proliferation of religious groups, sports clubs and social clubs given the relatively small population base. These groups play an important role in community life. However, to what degree are these groups facilitating interactions among different interest groups in the community such as aboriginal and non-aboriginal people? Here, it is argued that high group membership may be a sign of strong social capital, but if group membership is culturally homogeneous, then the broad community benefits of this social capital may be limited and even negative. Figure 16 is designed to show the different arenas where exercise participants could regularly interact with each other and their wider participation in culturally diverse activities. There were limited areas were aboriginal and non-aboriginal exercise interviewees could have met each other prior to the exercise. Committees for negotiating compensation between aboriginal bands and crown corporations like BC Hydro, BC Forests, and committees for aboriginal health and education needs involved both aboriginals and non-aboriginals. Negotiation attempts to bring two conflicting parties to agree upon a solution to their dispute. While negotiations can provide opportunities for bridging, contact has the potential to be more adversarial than social. A local health board (recently disbanded and replaced by a regional board) was another arena where one aboriginal and three non-aboriginal exercise participants were involved. To ensure fair representation, aboriginal participation was a requirement of the board. This forum involved both cultural 88 o U •B % I o O o .3 I w •a U a s e U 2 o a •c o 3 s a. •a S J S OS ii t/5 ft. W ft. 5 -TP HC Z la 0) a « 89 groups working together as one community to access outside resources for health services42. There was one instance of an aboriginal and non-aboriginal exercise participant working for the same organisation, one of the local sawmills. The aboriginal participant (no longer working at the mill) mentioned that he knew the non-aboriginal participant through their work together. The two were not seen interacting during the meetings observed. Nevertheless; it is likely both men would have some information (for example, regarding reliability, skills, and trustworthiness) about each other gained through workplace interactions. Such information could assist them in cooperating in the context of emergency preparedness. Three exercise participants (one-aboriginal and two rKnx-aboriginal) named hockey, baseball and soccer as activities that brought them into contact with many community-members. Soccer was the only sport that both an aborigirtai and non-aboriginal exercise participant played, however the non-aboriginal has not been actively involved for some time. Unlike other non-sporting activities, hockey, soccer and baseball were areas with higher levels of participation by both aboriginal and non-aboriginals43. The quote below outlines some the ways in which sports can build inter-cultural bridges: Oh yeah we got lots of natives who play hockey and the old timers and everything.... that's completely different because that's sports and that's relaxation and that's fun and everybody is just there to have a good time but I think that also helps to build a relationship so that when you are not in a sports facility and you're outside, you know them on a first name basis and you've played with them and hadfun with them so it helps to build a rapport that way, and a relationship ... and I think that makes a big difference. (Interviewee # 15 - non-aboriginal) Hockey is recognized as valuable in helping to "build a relationship" between aboriginals and non-aboriginals. Why are sports "different" to other forms of community interaction? Having fun and relaxation are listed as two ways that sports like hockey can help build bridges between aboriginal and non-aboriginal individuals in Lillooet. Sports like hockey, baseball and soccer can be very competitive so one might also expect that sports could become another arena in which to play out political rivalries. Nevertheless, hockey, soccer and baseball are team games where working together makes a team more successful than not. Team sports may thus have an important role to play in helping disparate groups bridge their differences. The replacement of the local health board with a regional one has reduced the breadth of community participation and removed a legitimate forum for both cultural.groups to interact with each other. Now there is only one community representative sitting on the regional health board compared to about ten people on the local board 4 3 Interviews with key community members also indicate that curling, golf and bowling are also activities with high levels of both aboriginal and non-aboriginal participation. Observation and participation in other sporting activities like swimming, horse riding and ice-skating clubs showed low participation of aboriginals. These areas were not investigated further due to the study's focus on activities undertaken by exercise participants as well as time limitations. 90 Robert Putnam's article "Bowling Alone" regards the decline of league bowling as a sign of social capital decline. Unlike solo bowling, league bowling provides opportunities for "social interaction and even occasionally civic conversations over beer and pizza" (Putnam, 1995a: 68). One could then presume that the social interaction that takes place off the ice or the field further adds to the value of participation in hockey and soccer teams as a form of social capital44. Working as a team is an essential part of emergency preparedness and response. Those who are successfully involved in team sports may be able to transfer their teamwork skills to emergency situations where teamwork is required. In Lillooet, the bridging that takes place in sports like hockey and soccer could be used to improve inter-cultural teamwork in emergency preparedness and response (for example by encouraging joint sporting activities among aboriginals and non-aboriginals involved in emergency preparedness). However, inter-cultural friendships or links may not necessarily be bridges useful for emergency preparedness. For example, the relationship between a non-aboriginal LVFD member who is linked with an aboriginal through joint activity in hockey may not be a bridge unless one or both parties provides a third useful link. If the aboriginal person's social networks involve baseball or soccer contacts, then this may not be as useful as personal contacts with interests in emergency preparedness such as fire protection. The question becomes one of why some sports in Lillooet are more culturally integrated than others and why do some sporting activities in general show a higher rate of aboriginal participation than others? Income levels/wealth could be a possible influence upon participation in some sports like hockey, golf or horse riding where the cost of equipment is high. Nevertheless, hockey is one area where there is inter-cultural mixing takes place despite the high cost of equipment. Sports like hockey and soccer are taught and played in schools. Inter-cultural mixing of sports teams in the school system may encourage a similar pattern for adults when they leave the school environment. The influence of individuals in the "inclusiveness" of some activities should not be overlooked. It is possible that some individuals who organise or participate in some sporting events are more open to aboriginal participation. 7.5 Bridging Organisations The Lillooet Friendship Center is a good example of an organisation that attempts to deliberately bridge between aboriginal and non-aboriginal cultures. The Center has an almost equal mix of aboriginal and non-aboriginal employees, and board members. Despite being a primarily aboriginal organisation, 4 4 It is not known whether or not there was social interaction among aboriginal and non-aboriginal team members in soccer and hockey outside of actual games or taining. Playing on the same team is a "start" in terms of growing familiarity and interaction between the groups and the level of socialising around this would be another sign of the strength of ties between the groups. 91 the current president of the Friendship Center is non-aboriginal. The Center provides a variety of community programs and services available to both aboriginals and non-aboriginals. Programs and services offered at Lillooet's Friendship Center include: Counseling and Referral, Education, Sports and Recreation programs, Cultural programs, Alcohol and Drug programs, Employment Outreach, Stopping Violence Against Women/Choices Program and Victim Assistance Program (BC Association of Aboriginal Friendship Centers, 1997: 17). Two community informants involved with the Center said that there was a perception in the community that the Friendship Center only helps aboriginal people (Interviewee #23 - aboriginal and #28 - non-aboriginal). A recent study of Employment Services Needs for Lillooet/Lytton Area makes the following comment relating to the employment outreach services provided through the Center: Few like to openly discuss the issue, but there is, in Lillooet in particular, a tension between the aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities. This tension has in part led to the perceived inequality in service access available to non-aboriginals through the Outreach programs. (Young and Michals, 1998: 13) In a pro-active attempt to address this perception, the Friendship Center has deliberately moved their employment outreach services out of the current Friendship Center building and into a more visible, centralised location in a small strip mall on Main Street Lillooet. The new director of Lillooet's friendship center believes that part of the Center's role is "to build bridges between the aboriginal and non-aboriginal community in Lillooef (LillooetNews, August 4 th, 1999: 3). The programs and services provided by the Friendship Center are aimed at building community resilience by targeting identified areas of social vulnerability in the community (substance abuse, employment outreach and counseling). Moreover the Center's aim to "build bridges" between the two communities helps increase resilience through fostering better communication and cooperation. 7.6 Individuals as Community Bridges There are examples of individuals who through their roles in the community, friendships and social interactions act as bridges between the aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities. For example, one aboriginal exercise participant often finds herself seeing both sides of a dispute between aboriginals and non-aboriginals and trying to mediate (Interviewee #1 - aboriginal). Another aboriginal community leader felt that her non-aboriginal appearance allowed her to get an understanding of both sides because non-aboriginal people forget she is aboriginal: / get a view of both sides of the fence -1 can sit on top... it's like I can cross... but some people can't go on both sides...some people will never get over and take a look on the other side... (Interviewee #29 - aboriginal) 92 In the workplace, employees from different cultural backgrounds can be useful bridges between cultures. However, employees who are a cultural minority within their organisation may be disliked by their own cultural group particularly if their employer is pursuing goals that differ from that of their own cultural group. For example, a non-aboriginal treaty analyst may find himself or herself caught between the views of both sides, as may an aboriginal person working for a company who logs on land claimed by aboriginals. Being able to move between the aboriginal and non-aboriginal culture may come with a price: "People who walk the bridge between two cultures must be prepared to be shot at from both sides " (Interviewee #28 - non-aboriginal). This powerful quote identifies the risk of isolation from both the aboriginal and non-aboriginal community faced by individuals who attempt to bridge the cultural divide in Lillooet. Individuals who act as bridges between the two cultures may be taking little steps towards increasing trust and understanding between those they interact with. However, for both communities to make progress in learning to cooperate it may be their leaders who encourage more widespread change. Both formal and informal community leaders who participate in and support culturally diverse activities can help "bridge" cultural divisions. 7.7 Summary Cultural divisions found in emergency preparedness in the workplace and volunteer organisations are a reflection of wider social interaction. This chapter showed that opportunities for inter-cultural mixing among exercise participants prior to the exercise were limited. This suggests that opportunities for building upon the new cultural contacts made through Exercise "Bridge River" - through arenas of joint social interaction - will also be limited. While the exercise participants interviewed had few common areas of cultural interaction outside of the exercise, some exercise participants engage in activities that are culturally diverse. Hockey, soccer, baseball and the Friendship Center are all arenas where inter-cultural relationships can be formed. Relationships formed in these arenas may provide useful bridges to those involved in emergency preparedness. The implications for limited forums of shared interaction between aboriginals and non-aboriginals involved in emergency preparedness indicate that planned activities will be necessary to keep up the momentum and to help build better communication between the two groups in emergency preparedness. Successful interaction between the cultures through groups like the Friendship Center or the relationship between the SNTP and RCMP can be used to help improve cooperation in emergency preparedness and response. 93 8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8.1 Conclusions Our knowledge of disasters shows that the most vulnerable people in society are likely to suffer the worst impacts of disasters. This thesis has demonstrated that pre-existing social, political and economic forces produce different levels of vulnerability among aboriginals and non-aboriginals in Upper St'at'imc Territory in British Columbia. The high degree of separation between the two cultures in social, political, and economic systems is worsened by a lack of bridges between cultural groups. This increases disaster vulnerability by limiting collaboration to achieve shared goals such as disaster preparedness and mitigation. Building social capital, which develops new relationships (bridges) between either individuals or organisations can help culturally divided communities to resolve differences and work successfully together to achieve mutual aims in disaster preparedness. Strengthening social capital between individuals already known to each other (bonds) enables members of groups (for example emergency response organisations) to work together more effectively. However, strong bonds among individuals in organisations may prevent the formation of bridges to non-members. This prevents the benefits of group membership from being shared with outsiders. The lack of aboriginal participation in emergency preparedness organisations increases their vulnerability by reducing opportunities to gain knowledge and skills to prepare for disasters and share resources with non-aboriginals. Inability to cooperate effectively to prepare for disasters (for example coordinating emergency plans and exercises) has serious implications for disaster response and longer-term recovery. This thesis has attempted to understand how social capital affects the ability of groups and individuals from different cultures to cooperate in preparing for and mitigating disaster. Figure 17 shows how social capital can have both positive and negative influences on disaster vulnerability. Weak social capital interacts with other vulnerable conditions to produce "unsafe conditions" or high levels of vulnerability. These unsafe conditions help to perpetuate the existence of weak social capital. This thesis analyses the role that social capital in the form of bridges and bonds plays in disaster preparedness in an area with a history of cultural divisions between aboriginals and non-aboriginals. The original research questions posed at the beginning of this thesis will be used to structure the main conclusions. The conclusions are followed by recommendations to improve disaster preparedness. This chapter ends by outlining directions for further research to improve understanding of the connections between social capital and disaster preparedness, mitigation, and vulnerability. 94 95 1. What is the history of social capital and in particular bridging and bonding between members of the St'at'imc Nation and non-aboriginals in Lillooet? Throughout Chapter 4 attempts have been made to understand how historical social, political and economic forces have created different levels of vulnerability among aboriginals and non-aboriginals in Upper St'at'imc Territory including Lillooet. Historical subordination of aboriginal rights legislated by non-aboriginal governments contributed to the break down of cohesive aboriginal communities through resettlement on reserves, residential schools, and prohibition of some cultural practices. The result was a weakening of aboriginal community bonds, which are important to community resilience. These structures served to physically divide aboriginals and non-aboriginals in separate settlements, educational institutions, and places of work. This restricted opportunities for regular daily interaction that could foster the development of social relationships. Furthermore, inequity in standards of living, competition for the same resources and different value systems limited the development of trust needed to build strong bridges between the two cultures. In Upper St'at'imc Territory there are still significant inequities between the aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities in employment, income, and other social health indicators (for example, substance abuse, disability, and poverty). Aboriginals living on reserve are isolated both physically and socially. This limits access to employment and community resources available in Lillooet. Furthermore, some reserves are on poorer quality land that is at risk from flooding, forest fires, and landslides. These factors result in lower resilience among aboriginals to the stresses of daily life and to the impacts of disaster. Nevertheless, despite these differences, both St'at'imc and non-aboriginal communities share the vulnerability of physical isolation from larger urban centers and resources. All communities in the area are easily isolated by road and bridge closures. This fact together with the area's small combined population and limited resources makes cooperation a vital component of disaster resilience. Mistrust between the two cultures is worsened when crown corporations and government agencies (for example, BC Hydro or the Ministry of Forests) appear to take sides with non-aboriginals in community conflicts or favour one group over another. Bridges between a non-aboriginal logging company and the Ministry of Forests were used to collaborate in logging an area of land (CP 146). In this case the social capital between the logging company and the Ministry of Forests enabled them to pursue a shared goal. This form of social capital was to the disadvantage of a St'at'imc band (Tsal7alh) who were not consulted about the proposal to log the land. The Tsal7alh successfully used their bonds with other St'at'imc bands who joined forces with them to fight the logging proposal. The lack of a steady bridge between the logging company, the Ministry of Forests and Tsal7alh made it difficult for the parties involved to resolve the dispute without outside help. 96 This case study showed how social capital was used to unite both sides of the logging dispute against each other. The bridging between the logging company and the Ministry of Forests and, the bonding among the St'at'imc had negative impacts for each side of the dispute. In the end, one could consider the use of social capital in this way was negative for both communities, resulting in lack of communication and information sharing. The dispute had negative repercussions through the wider community affecting other areas of inter-cultural cooperation and interaction. The conflict over CP 146 was ongoing during preparations for exercise "Bridge River". This provided one explanation for the low levels of interaction between aboriginals and non-aboriginals during exercise "Bridge River". This showed that strong social capital among groups does not necessarily generate positive benefits for the wider community and can be negatively transferred outside of the original context in which it is generated. 2. How did pre-existing bridges and bonds between BC Hydro and the St'at'imc and non-aboriginal communities affect the simulation exercise? BC Hydro's Exercise "Bridge River" was the first time that BC Hydro worked with both aboriginals and non-aboriginal communities in preparing for a potential dam emergency. The simulation was designed to improve communication and emergency preparedness in the event of a dam incident affecting downstream communities of the District of Lillooet (DOL) and St'at'imc Nation (SN). BC Hydro provided a bridge between the cultural groups by involving both in their simulation exercise. In turn, BC Hydro's consultants (C&M Consultants) were a bridge between BC Hydro and the communities. BC Hydro has had a poor reputation as an organisation among both the SN and DOL. The SN hold numerous grievances against BC Hydro whose construction and operation of the dams, reservoirs and associated structures in the Bridge River hydroelectric system significantly impacted St'at'imc cultural life. Furthermore, past relations between individual BC Hydro staff and the SN were weakened by a tendency of BC Hydro staff to take sides with the non-aboriginal community in disputes. In the past decade, BC Hydro has had to build bridges with the SN to resolve some of these grievances. Part of BC Hydro's need to build bridges directly with the SN is reflected by the loss of the use of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (DIAND) as a bridge to the SN. Robert Putnam (1993a) suggests that social capital produces economic benefits but here one can consider that economic incentives may drive the creation of social capital between BC Hydro and the SN. BC Hydro has been able to build bridges with the SN through negotiation committees and more recently via the creation of the St'at'imc Nation Hydro Committee (SNHC). The SNHC may be considered a "bridging" organisation between BC Hydro and the SN. BC Hydro was able to capitalise upon the pre-existing bridges it had built with the SN to invite them to participate in Exercise "Bridge River". Moreover, the fact that BC Hydro had established bridges with the SN made it difficult to 97 exclude them from the simulation exercise. BC Hydro was able to use the SNHC to help them coordinate and communicate with different bands during Exercise "Bridge River". BC Hydro's investment in building social capital in one arena with the SN (negotiating compensation for past grievances) helped them to meet their objectives in another - involving downstream communities in emergency preparedness. BC Hydro's credibility was negatively affected with both the SN and DOL when they failed to consult either community regarding large spills from their dams in the early 1990's. Lack of consultation with both communities reflected BC Hydro's position as a party with power who did not feel the need to consult the downstream communities about spills. This shows how more powerful groups who hold "exclusive" information and resources frequently control the decision to bridge between different groups. BC Hydro's distance from the community meant that they were unable to anticipate the negative community reaction towards them after the spills. This resulted from the lack of ties between BC Hydro decision-makers and the community. Higher involvement of BC Hydro management in the everyday life and social networks of the community would have increased BC Hydro's awareness of community sentiment, and provided an avenue to build understanding and cooperation. Neither the consultants nor BC Hydro staff organising Exercise "Bridge River" were from the area. The use of a local BC Hydro employee in organising or helping coordinate the exercise would have helped to bridge between the outside consultants and BC Hydro staff. An accessible local staff member could have prevented breakdowns in communication that occurred (particularly with non-aboriginal participants) during the exercise. Such an individual bridge between BC Hydro and the communities could have helped give the consultants and BC Hydro insights to anticipate some of the problems that arose during the exercise. This shows the potential uses of the social capital of employees involved in community life as a vehicle for communication and cooperation between their employer and communities. 3. What was the impact of pre-existing bridges and bonds between groups and individuals on the preparation and outcome of the simulation exercise? The socio-political separateness of the St'at'imc and non-aboriginal community was demonstrated during Exercise "Bridge River" by; the existence of separate Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), lack of coordinated emergency planning, and limited social interaction between participants from either culture. A lack of bridging between the communities was shown by the limited social interaction between aboriginals and non-aboriginals during the exercise. During the exercise process, both aboriginal and non-aboriginal exercise participants interacted more with BC Hydro staff and consultants than among themselves. Both cultural groups may consider building bridges with BC Hydro 98 of more value than building bridges with each other. The cultural separateness of the two groups could have been used to BC Hydro's advantage by preventing them from uniting against BC Hydro (for example, to make joint demands about dam safety issues). In which case it is to BC Hydro's advantage to deal with each group separately rather than jointly and perpetuate the lack of bridges between the two groups. However, in the realm of emergency preparedness it was to BC Hydro and their consultants' advantage to encourage both groups to cooperate as much as possible. This placed BC Hydro and the consultants in a position as a potential bridge between the two groups. The consultants in particular were not connected to BC Hydro's past activities in the community, nor were they connected with the conflicts between aboriginal and non-aboriginals in the area. As such they could be regarded as neutral to previous and ongoing conflicts. This made it easier for the consultants to interact with each party without being suspected of ulterior motives. The consultants used their "bridge" position to access resources from one group and transfer them to another. For example, when the consultants forwarded the DOL emergency plan to some SN band members. The consultants were aware of a general lack of bridges between the aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities and attempted to address this by persuading the St'at'imc and DOL to combine their EOCs. However, the consultants were not aware that during preparations for the exercise there was ongoing conflict between members of the St'at'imc and non-aboriginal population over an area of land proposed for logging (CP 146). This information could have helped the consultants understand some of the difficulty they had in attempting to join the two EOCs. The consultants were not able to persuade the SN to combine their EOC with the DOL's. Nevertheless, they attempted to facilitate bridging by having joint design teams to develop the exercise scenario and by locating the SN and DOL simulation teams in the same room. BC Hydro and the consultants' support of a separate SN EOC for the exercise likely encouraged greater SN participation. Having a separate SN EOC enabled greater capacity building and bonding among the SN EOC team than would have taken place in a joint EOC with more experienced DOL participants. This demonstrates that bonding may be a prerequisite to successful bridging between groups. The consequence of a lack of bridges between the SN and DOL was demonstrated by communication difficulties between the EOCs during the exercise. Some DOL exercise participants felt that a joint EOC between the SN and DOL is the only way to improve problems of communication and resource sharing. The SN preference for a separate EOC shows that they do not see the benefit of creating such a "bridging" organisation for emergency preparedness. This suggests that in some cases "bridging" may actually create more advantages for one group than another. Bridging with the District EOC could mean greater resources being directed to a joint EOC from federal and provincial sources. However, a joint EOC could result in less control over how those resources are allocated for the SN. 99 Here it is demonstrated that social capital is not always beneficial to all parties involved in a relationship, particularly when the distribution of power between groups is unequal. The separateness of the groups increased the amount of communications and planning required for the simulation exercise. Absence of social capital between cultural groups increases the costs for outside agencies involved in coordinating joint activities involving both groups. Neither BC Hydro nor their consultants were aware of avenues for integrating aboriginal and non-aboriginal exercise participants. For example, the bond between the RCMP chief and the SNTP chief creates an effective bridge between the two organisations. This bridge could have been used to improve inter-cultural cooperation between aboriginals and non-aboriginals during the exercise. Strong bonds that foster effective teamwork among Lillooet's emergency responders were used during the exercise process to alter the course of events. One local emergency responder - dissatisfied with the exercise process - used his influential bonds with others to gain their support. This likely influenced the postponement of the exercise. BC Hydro's and the consultant's lack of ties or bridges into the community meant that they were not aware of the strength of ties or bonds between the emergency responders. Greater knowledge and social involvement in the community would have helped BC Hydro and the consultant's awareness of these social relations. Employees at the local Transmission and Distribution BC Hydro office were not directly involved in the simulation exercise (organised by Power Supply). Furthermore, BC Hydro does not currently have any managers who actively participate in the communities - such contacts could have been used to help the consultants gain insight into community relations between exercise participants. Local employees (non-management) who are involved in the community could also have been used to shed light on community relations as well as local sentiment towards BC Hydro. Being aware of the nature of social capital among participants in a project can help organisers anticipate problems, troubleshoot problems faster and thus save time and money. 4. What was the role of the simulation exercise in a) building bridges between different individuals and organisations and in b) strengthening bonds between different individuals and organisations? Despite low interaction between individuals from each cultural group, there was evidence that new cultural contacts were made among exercise participants - specifically offers of help with emergency planning made by a DOL exercise participant to some SN participants. The exercise provided the DOL with an opportunity to overcome pre-existing difficulties with integrating their emergency planning with that of surrounding SN bands. The exercise increased familiarity among aboriginals and non-aboriginals and, with each other's roles in the community and emergency preparedness. The exercise acted as a catalyst for these interactions. The new contacts or "bridges" built during the exercise may help access 100 resources to improve the emergency preparedness of individual St'at'imc bands. Furthermore, these contacts could help build foundations for future inter-cultural cooperation. BC Hydro and C & M Consultants made a positive step towards building better relations with both the St'at'imc and District of Lillooet simply by including them in Exercise "Bridge River". Exercise "Bridge River" can be regarded as a "success" in that both the SN and the non-aboriginal communities took part in the same emergency preparedness activities. This was a big step forward for inter-cultural cooperation in emergency preparedness. The exercise also helped BC Hydro make progress toward building trust with both the aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities. Building bridges takes time and is not easy particularly when bridges of trust have been broken in the past. The new contacts made as a result of Exercise "Bridge River" show that social capital can be built. The question then becomes what does it take to sustain and reinforce these initial bridges? Regular contact and continued collaboration are important to building upon the relationships developed as a result of Exercise "Bridge River". The last research question addresses this issue. 5. What are the different arenas in which bridges and bonds could exist between members of the St'at'imc Nation and non-aboriginal exercise participants (e.g. workplace, sports, churches or volunteer associations)? This thesis shows that relying on numbers of volunteer groups and members as a sign of strong or weak social capital may be misguided. Lillooet's proliferation of volunteer groups with high membership numbers may indicate strong social capital within groups. However, this does not necessarily mean that these groups can effectively cooperate to work towards a single community goal. If groups are "exclusive" in their membership (for example by culture or class), they may effectively operate as "cliques" that successfully cooperate for the benefit of members - benefits that are not transferred into the wider community. Lack of familiarity between aboriginal and non-aboriginal exercise participants could be explained by the lack of cultural diversity in workplace and community organisations involved in emergency preparedness. There were no aboriginal exercise participants involved in either the DOL EOC or simulation team. Similarly, there were no non-aboriginal exercise participants involved in the SN EOC or simulation teams. Furthermore, with the exception of two SN organisations, the representatives of the organisations involved in the exercise accurately reflected the cultural make up of their organisations. Lack of cultural diversity among the organisations involved in the exercise reduces the likelihood of regular interaction between aboriginals and non-aboriginals. This limits opportunities for building bridges in emergency preparedness between the two cultures. Nevertheless, the non-aboriginal chief of the SNTP provides a bridge between his police force and the RCMP. This bridge is supported by a bond between the two non-aboriginal men, which dates 101 back to when they were in the RCMP together. This bond "lubricates" the close working relationship that exists between the RCMP and the SNTP. The SNTP chief is in a position to act as a bridge between not only the two emergency response organisations but also the wider aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities. This shows the importance of a well-placed individual in building bridges between two different organisations and more widely two cultures. A shared culture in law enforcement increases the trust and understanding between the SNTP and RCMP. Both the SNTP and RCMP have similar goals along with training and work experience. Social capital is easier to build when the individuals and groups involved share common ground in the form of similar goals, values, and experience. Bonds among Lillooet's emergency response agencies (police, fire, ambulance and search and rescue) are also reinforced by a shared culture in emergency response as well as cross-membership among the response agencies. These bonds result in close inter-organisational teamwork and thus greater effectiveness in emergency response. However, strong bonds among non-aboriginal emergency responders may perpetuate the lack of cultural diversity among members of the Lillooet's emergency response agencies. Furthermore, a tendency to fall back on volunteers that they are familiar with (i.e. who are known to be trustworthy and reliable) may preclude the integration of relatively unknown aboriginal volunteers. Social capital requires a certain level of trust in order to allow the establishment of bridges and the inclusion of outsiders into a group. Yet in order for trust to be established there must be a venue where individuals and groups can interact with each other to develop that trust. Exercise participants had separate spheres of interaction in both the workplace and social or volunteer arenas unrelated to emergency preparedness. This limited the likelihood of exercise participants of different cultural backgrounds regularly coming into contact with each other prior to the exercise. Furthermore, this means that opportunities for future interaction among exercise participants outside of emergency preparedness will also be limited, making it harder to reinforce the bridges built during the exercise. One interviewee stated "there is no mechanism for integrating" the two cultural groups. BC Hydro's simulation exercise was one such mechanism albeit a relatively temporary one. The infrequency with which this group of people is likely to be brought together by BC Hydro (every ten years) may mean that the value of the relationships built may be lost. There are however, other mechanisms that do exist in the community where aboriginals and non-aboriginals successfully work arid play together. Some exercise participants are involved in volunteer or workplace groups where membership is culturally diverse (for example, the Friendship Center, hockey, baseball and soccer). Inter-cultural mixing in these forums may help to break down cultural stereotypes and build trust that can be transferred to emergency preparedness. Successful inter-cultural cooperation on the ice or the field can help promote successful cooperation for attaining other community goals such as emergency preparedness. 102 Exercise "Bridge River" showed that social capital can be built between two divided cultures through repeated exposure and contact with each other in emergency preparedness. However, maintaining and reinforcing these bridges is difficult in an environment where tension and mistrust exists over historically burnt bridges. This makes bridge building even more important as an avenue to increase trust. While Robert Putnam (1993a, 1993b, 1995a and 1995b) extols the virtues of social capital, this thesis has shown that bridging and bonding forms of social capital can both negatively and positively affect emergency preparedness and disaster vulnerability. This thesis concurs with James Coleman's (1988) view of social capital as a primarily a neutral phenomenon (Briggs, 1997b). The importance of social capital to emergency preparedness and the long-term reduction of vulnerability is in understanding how it can be used to both build or burn bridges. 8.2 Constraints and Recommendations for Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation The following constraints and recommendations are intended to identify ways of improving disaster preparedness and mitigation in culturally divided communities. A general theme underlying these recommendations is that in order to reduce disaster vulnerability and increase resilience, preparedness and mitigation must be incorporated within overall community development strategies. Table 6 gives a brief overview of key constraints to disaster preparedness and mitigation in Upper St'at'imc Territory including Lillooet, while Table 7 outlines some goals and recommendations to deal with these constraints. Further detailed recommendations are provided for the District of Lillooet and St'at'imc communities, and for outside agencies and planners like BC Hydro and C & M consultants working in culturally divided communities. 103 Table 6. Constraints to Effective Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation CONSTRAINT HOW IT AFFECTS DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND MITIGATION Tension between the SN and DOL communities • Restricted ability to cooperate on other issues affects ability to cooperate to prepare for and mitigate disaster. Lack of coordinated emergency planning between SN and DOL Separate EOCs for SN and DOL • Poor planning leads to poor response and the risk of greater loss of life and livelihoods. • Poor coordination of resources. • Duplication of effort. • Confusion for outside agencies helping in a disaster. • Having two EOC sites may mean that if one site becomes unusable due to a disaster the other may still be safe. Lack of emergency plans for SN Bands • Weakens ability to coordinate emergency planning with DOL and outside agencies. Low SN involvement in emergency preparedness and response organisations (for example LVFD) • Lack of skills and capacity building among SN individuals. • Limited experience of inter-cultural teamwork in emergency preparedness and response. Low integration of aboriginals in the workplace and community organisations • Limited opportunities for individuals involved in emergency preparedness and response to build relationships based upon trust and teamwork in non-emergency contexts. Reliance on outside agencies (for example BC Hydro and C & M Consultants) to facilitate interaction between cultures • Provides a short-term bridge between cultures. • Outsiders may manipulate relationships between the two cultural groups and encourage dependence on their services. • In a disaster outside agencies may not be present to act as a buffer between the two groups. • Limits the development of community "bridges". Limited resources for disaster preparedness • Affects ability to prepare for and mitigate disasters for example, conducting hazard and vulnerability assessments, preparing and testing emergency plans, training staff and volunteers, and communicating risk. Lack of resources leads to heavy reliance on volunteers and donated equipment and funds. Ongoing social crisis -among SN bands (chronic unemployment, poverty, substance abuse etc.) • Emergency preparedness and planning recognized as important but dealing with the immediacy of everyday vulnerability takes time and resources away from emergency planning. 104 Table 7. Goals and Recommendations for Effective Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation GOALS RECOMMENDATIONS Improve relations between DOL and SN as a strategy to improve disaster resilience • Identify and address obstacles to diversity in volunteer group membership and employment. • Build upon existing examples of inter-cultural cooperation such as between the SNTP and RCMP. • Identify and encourage activities that build teamwork between individuals from both cultures (for example, hockey, baseball, curling etc.). Use members of these organisations in emergency preparedness activities. • Encourage bridge-building activities, which allow "exclusive" groups from both cultures to work together. • Identify established community leaders who could be used to communicate and facilitate cooperation between the two cultures. • Look for opportunities to build inter-cultural bridges through overall community development strategies. Improve communication and coordination between EOCs • Regularly practice communication between the two EOCs. • Consider locating the two EOCs in the same building to allow easier communication. • Place a liaison person from each EOC as a representative on the other. • Make joint agreements about responsibilities and coordination of resources during a disaster. • Consider the development of an Incident Command System (ICS) adapted for coordinating the two EOCs. Increase disaster preparedness and training among the SN • Develop emergency plans for each band and the whole nation. • Bands should try to pool resources when developing and testing plans. • Ensure coordination of plans among bands, with DOL, and with other jurisdictions and agencies such as the regional district and BC Hydro. • Involve communities in creating and testing emergency plans. This will help raise awareness of hazards and can be used to improve personal preparedness. • Draw upon traditional knowledge to strengthen emergency preparedness and disaster resilience. Strengthen community resilience by reducing vulnerability • Conduct detailed physical and social vulnerability assessments. • Integrate disaster resilience goals and strategies into existing social programs and planning. • Recognize the role of social capital in community resilience and reinforce existing forms of social capital that increase individual and community resilience. • Use emergency preparedness and mitigation activities to strengthen and build social capital (bonding and bridging). This in turn will improve overall community resilience. 8.2.1 Recommendations to St'at'imc Nation and District of Lillooet 105 1 Develop better cooperation between the two communities Bridge building takes time, relationships built on trust cannot be established overnight. This is particularly true in places where deep-rooted conflict and distrust has been the norm rather than the exception. It is necessary to involve a wide range of aboriginal and non-aboriginal organisations and groups to build trust and encourage cooperation to reducing disaster vulnerability. Reducing vulnerability requires the combined efforts of a range of social services from employment, health services, to land use planning. Existing programs and strategies should be expanded upon, particularly those where inter-cultural and inter-organisational bridges have been successfully built. 2 Build conflict resolution capacity within the community Bringing in or using outside agencies or consultants to help resolve conflicts between the SN and non-aboriginals may be beneficial. However, relying upon these outside agencies as bridges to pull the communities together can be dangerous, particularly if bridges misrepresent each side to the other. Furthermore, inability of the two cultural groups to cooperate weakens their individual bargaining power in conflicts involving outside agencies (for example, BC Hydro and Ministry of Forests). Respected community leaders should be used to resolve conflicts and encourage cooperation on all levels. This may involve investing in efforts to build "bridging" skills among individuals. 3 Create a joint forum for emergency planning There is definitely a need for joint emergency preparedness between the SN and DOL. One avenue for pursuing this could be through a joint emergency planning forum. Existing forums for joint cultural action (for example, in community policing or health) should be looked at to see if they compliment the goals and activities involved in emergency preparedness. The social capital of organisations that have a successful track record of inter-cultural collaboration could be utilised for emergency preparedness. The benefits of collaboration for emergency preparedness must be clearly identified for both sides to encourage participation. Active support of community leaders from each cultural group will serve to increase "buy in" and participation. The influence of such individuals cannot be underestimated. They can help build bridges with outside agencies who can provide funding and support to a joint emergency planning venture. 4 Coordinate St'at'imc Nation and District of Lillooet emergency plans and EOCs DOL and SN need to ensure that their emergency plans are coordinated, this could be done under the auspices of the above mentioned joint emergency preparedness forum. A communications strategy 106 needs to be built between the two EOCs. The DOL and SN could look at adapting an Incident Command System (ICS)45 to coordinate between EOCs and the various agencies involved in a disaster. The ICS allows each agency to maintain some autonomy within an overall unified organisational framework. The ICS was designed to "encourage the close working relationship of diverse agencies while at the same time preventing 'power plays' or 'take overs' by larger or more assertive members" (Auf der Heide, 1989: 138). 5 Develop mutual aid agreements Mutual aid agreements are an important means of accessing resources for small jurisdictions with limited resources. The SN and DOL should look at formalising mutual aid agreements with each other as well as with outside agencies and communities such as Lytton, Pemberton and Cache Creek. 6 Create "bridging" contacts to act as liaison between EOCs In the absence of a joint EOC between the SN and DOL, the provision of "bridging" contacts from either group sitting on each other's EOC could aid communication between both groups. It is imperative that both groups trust and respect the individuals chosen for these positions. 7 Regular practice and training between SN and DOL emergency responders. During the exercise, participants from both EOCs complained that they were not always clear of what the other EOC was doing. Good communication between the two EOCs could have helped to overcome this problem. This was the first time that both EOCs had worked together. It is likely that communication between the two could be improved with continued contact. This could be achieved through increased practice and training which allow opportunities for the members of each EOC to get to know each other. If the two EOCs coordinate their activities then they will be able to have better access and management of disaster resources. 8 Develop emergency plans for individual SN bands Exercise "Bridge River" demonstrated the need for emergency planning. SN bands need to keep the momentum up and develop individual disaster plans for each band and a joint plan for all bands. Emergency plans should be consistent with community plans and vice versa. There is an opportunity to build a stronger relationship with the DOL by taking up offers of help for developing and coordinating plans with the DOL. 4 5 See chapter 7 of Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination (Auf der Heide, 1989) for a more detailed description of an ICS. 107 9 Increased training and capacity building for SN EOC members. Increased practice and training would enable SN EOC members to gain more experience in emergency preparedness and response. This would increase their ability to communicate effectively with the DOL EOC (for example through greater familiarity with emergency terminology and jargon). More training among SN EOC members would increase bonding, which in turn would help facilitate better teamwork and therefore better response in the event of a disaster. Both the DOL and SN should actively encourage greater participation of aboriginals in volunteer emergency response organisations such as the volunteer fire department and search and rescue. 10 Team-building activities between SN and DOL emergency responders. There is a tendency to fall back on those who are personally known to be reliable and trustworthy. Opportunities are needed for trust to develop between aboriginals and non-aboriginals who do not know each other. Continued opportunities for interaction between SN and DOL decision-makers and individuals involved in emergency preparedness should be created. This can take the form of training and preparedness activities as mentioned above as well as social activities where aboriginal and non-aboriginal interaction is already common (for example, team sports such as soccer or curling between the members of each EOC). 11 Increase public awareness and participation in emergency preparedness A major problem for advocates of emergency preparedness and mitigation is the difficulty in keeping public interest and support. The reasons for this are complex, involving a mixture of risk communication and perception. Communities that rarely suffer from disasters or have never experienced a major disaster find it hard to encourage the allocation of resources to prepare for an event that may not happen in a person's lifetime. To tackle this difficulty, many emergency preparedness and mitigation strategies would benefit by being built into complimentary environmental and social sustainability goals. Emergency preparedness exercises should extend beyond the confines of emergency responders and include wider community participation. This will help to greater promote awareness and community interest. Such activities can be doubly beneficial if they are also designed to increase interaction between the aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities. Frequently it will take a disaster to encourage or trigger people to prepare for and put mitigation measures in place. In recognition of this FEMA uses post-disaster periods to implement mitigation measures such as preventing re-building in floodplains and re-relocating buildings. The SN and DOL should develop mitigation plans that can be implemented after a disaster. For example, preventing rebuilding of flood or landslide damaged structures in the same location. 108 8.2.2 Recommendations to Outside Agencies and Planners 1 Understand community dynamics One common dilemma faced by consultants is limited knowledge of issues specific to a particular community. Frequently, consultants spend short periods of time in a community. Furthermore, they may not have access to individuals within the community who can give them insights into the community. Restricted amounts of time make it difficult for consultants to establish trust quickly with community members to get insights into community dynamics. Yet, prior knowledge of community dynamics can have a major influence on the success of the project at hand. Failure to take the time to understand community dynamics may delay a project or permanently derail it. Prior knowledge can help consultants tailor their approach to community needs, anticipate potential problems, and also potential resources available to solve problems. Getting the support and involvement of community leaders is important for a project that involves the participation of diverse groups within the community. These leaders can also provide insight into community dynamics. BC Hydro staff members who live and work in the community are good sources of information on community sentiment towards BC Hydro as well as internal community dynamics. BC Hydro staff and consultants involved in emergency preparedness will be more effective if they can use local staff members as bridges into the community (providing staff have good relationships in the community). Such bridges can help to transfer information about hazards etc. and can effectively relay concerns from the community back to BC Hydro. 2 Understand community capacity The level of individual and group capacity in emergency preparedness may vary among communities. Recognising variations in experience and understanding of emergency preparedness is important. This will alter the nature of preparing a group to work together. If some individuals do not fully understand the objectives of an emergency preparedness project and do not have the skills to fully participate then this will affect the overall success of an exercise. Directing resources to increase the capacity of groups less experienced in emergency planning can help level imbalances in experience and knowledge. 3 Understand the importance of individual personality Individual personalities can be critical to the development of successful relationships between agencies, consulting companies, and communities. In Exercise "Bridge River", C & M Consultants attempted to match their individual personalities and expertise with the different groups involved. The challenge in sensitive situations is to place employees who have strong technical skills and who can also 109 build a rapport with community members. In some cases one employee may be used to build "bridges" by communicating technical information provided or created by another employee whose communication skills are weaker. 4 Getting and keeping the right participants In culturally divided communities it is especially important that bridges are built with the different cultures involved in a project. Consultants should look for existing bridges in the community -either individuals or organisations that can be used to enhance community preparedness and mitigation activities. Ensure that all the necessary participants are contacted and included in the process from the beginning. Leaving out participants from one cultural group can add to ongoing conflict and the perpetuation of "exclusive" behaviour. Part of having an "inclusive" process begins with simply inviting participants to attend at the same time. Obstacles to participation must be recognized and if possible removed. For example, the time and resources required of participants to prepare for the simulation exercise was significant. Participants could have been offered an honorarium to cover travel expenses, time off work, and childcare. 5 Design meetings and workshops to encourage bridge building There are many ways in which meetings can be designed to promote birilding bridges among participants who do not know each other. For example, using nametags, introductions and games to build teamwork. Also allowing sufficient time for breaks helps to encourage social interaction among participants. Consultants and BC Hydro staff could attempt to involve individuals from different cultural groups in the same conversations instead of conducting separate conversations with either group. This could avoid subconscious tendencies to give individuals from one group more attention than those from another. 6 Consistency of contact Try to keep the same members of staff involved in the community so that they can develop a personal rapport with community members. In communities divided by conflict staff with strong interpersonal skills should be used to facilitate between different cultural groups. These staff members should be easily accessible to the community members throughout a project. Providing contact lists with details of the different resources and roles of staff members is particularly useful when several staff members are involved in complex projects. Sustained and regular interaction is necessary to build trust. Coming in and out of the community with long time lapses is not effective when trust is low. This can be done more readily once a high level of trust has already been established. Trust has to be reinforced through actions and takes time to build. 110 It is harder to re-build trust once it has been broken. Efforts should be made to communicate effectively to avoid future breakdowns in trust. Poor communication and inconsistent actions - such as failing to fulfil promises - further distances agencies and consultants from the communities they work with. This makes future dealings with communities difficult and trust harder to establish. Many consultants and organisations find that their work is easier with clients and communities with whom they have already established a level of understanding built on trust. 7 Building social capital Coming into the community from the outside has advantages - if one is seen as neutral - however one may simultaneously face the distrust of being an outsider. Contacts within the community can help to establish credibility by giving introductions into the community. Building bridges through community contacts can help save time and money by increasing ease of access to information and resources. Some companies and consultants forgo the investment of time and resources to encourage building or strengthening bridges with communities they are working with. This is often a shortsighted approach because such an investment will usually save time and money particularly when there is need for a continued relationship between all parties. 8 Solicit and use feedback BC Hydro and C & M Consultants will likely be involved in conducting emergency preparedness planning in other areas of BC with both aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities. There are many lessons that can be learnt from the Exercise "Bridge River" as indicated by the recommendations above. However, one of the most valuable tools is feedback from both the aboriginal and non-aboriginal exercise participants, which should be used to improve future exercises. The post-exercise feedback forms did provide some insights into how future exercise could be improved. However, more detailed interviews with exercise participants would provide more in-depth feedback. For example, one aboriginal interviewee suggested that aboriginal participants would have benefited from mini-exercises to practice the type of skills needed for the simulation or a demonstration of how a simulation exercise would work (Interviewee#3 - aboriginal). This suggestion was not made on the participant feedback forms. The process of soliciting feedback in person could also be used to help improve relations with community members that were unsatisfied with aspects of the exercise and strengthen relations with those who were pleased with its outcome. I l l 8.3 Directions for Future Research A masters thesis is necessarily limited in its scope and content, yet part of the value of doing research is an exposure to areas beyond the scope of the thesis that would benefit from further research. During the course of research for this thesis, several areas were identified as important to furthering understanding into the relationship between social capital (bridging and bonding) and disaster preparedness planning and vulnerability. One major factor affecting cooperation in emergency preparedness is the nature of the relationship between the different cultural groups involved. Bridges between different cultural groups are seen as one way of overcoming divisions to improve coordination in emergency preparedness. While aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities in Lillooet display low levels of social interaction, it is likely that in other communities the nature of inter-cultural relations is different. Further research could be done to analyse and compare how the nature of inter-cultural relations in other communities affects emergency preparedness and disaster vulnerability. Aboriginal and non-aboriginal inter-cultural relationships and their impact upon emergency preparedness were a focus for this thesis. However, there are several smaller cultural groups in Lillooet (for example, Chinese, Indian, Japanese and Korean) who were not considered. The vulnerability and resilience of these groups is likely to be different from aboriginals and non-aboriginals. The relationships between smaller cultural groups and the two larger aboriginal and non-aboriginal cultural groups could bring further insights into understanding inter-cultural bridging and disaster vulnerability. This thesis was not able to include a study of social capital among and within different St'at'imc bands. Each band is a separate political and social entity. The ability of bands to cooperate and work together as one nation may affect vulnerability in terms of effectively working together to prepare for disaster as well as reduce everyday vulnerabilities. Furthermore, within some bands there are kinship groups who may hold more power and control over resources. The impacts of social capital on internal and external relations between bands should be analysed to gain insights into how they affect disaster vulnerability. Several aspects of vulnerability were discussed in relation to St'at'imc and non-aboriginal communities in Lillooet. One area of disaster vulnerability that was not addressed rigorously in this thesis was mental and physical health. Researchers like Kawachi (1999) propose that social capital can have positive effects on community health. For example, life expectancy was found to be longer in communities where there is greater trust and equity among individuals. More research needs to be done on the relationship between social capital and community health issues such as disability, mortality, domestic abuse, violence, teenage pregnancy, suicide, and alcohol and drug dependencies. Aboriginals tend to suffer higher rates of some of these health problems. For example, aboriginal communities have 112 an incidence of disability three times higher than non-aboriginal communities (BC Aboriginal Network on Disability Society, 1999). Besides culture there are other societal cleavages that affect emergency preparedness and vulnerability. For example, women were underrepresented in Exercise "Bridge River" and among the emergency response organisations involved. The role of gender in emergency preparedness and social capital should be explored. Gender participation in formal and informal networks may cross-cut cultural divisions to build bridging forms of social capital. This thesis looked at cultural conflict and social capital, however there are many other areas of conflict that affect social capital and community cooperation. For example, in Lillooet there are conflicts between those with different environmental values. Studying a variety of conflicts between different groups may provide insights into whether or not the nature of the conflict is more important than who the conflict is between. Literature and theories from conflict studies could be used to further expand social capital theories on group cooperation. This thesis looked primarily at the existence of social capital through formal, organised groups. Informal, friendship, kinship and family ties may be equally important sources of social capital particularly among some cultural and gender groups. Informal networks are very important with regard to individual and community resilience to disaster. Informal networks are not as easily identified as formal ones and they are also less likely to be the focus of local based emergency preparedness and social programs to reduce vulnerability. Yet in the absence of diversity in a community's formal group membership, informal groups may be the most effective way of reaching certain sectors of the population. Further study could be undertaken to identify the role of informal relationships in emergency preparedness and disaster vulnerability. It is possible that informal networks may be equal or more important producers of social capital than formal networks and organisations. It has been suggested that risk perception and trust in hazard warnings will vary according to cultural background and trust in those delivering the information. In the United States, researchers have found that both culture and gender determine risk perceptions. Blacks, Hispanics and women were found to be more risk averse than white males (Slovic et al, 1994). A difference in risk perception between aboriginals and non-aboriginals is an area where little research has been conducted. Similarly, the relationship between social capital and risk perception could be researched further. Researchers have documented an altruistic tendency during and immediately after a disaster where people put aside differences to help each other. While it is likely that this will happen in the short term, during recovery phases old patterns of conflict are likely to re-surface and may be exacerbated by the stresses of disaster. More research is needed to look at the effects of social capital in actual disaster scenarios. Furthermore, disasters re-shape old social networks and organisation. As old patterns of 113 organisation are thrown into disarray due to the impacts of disaster, new forms emerge. The post-disaster period may be an important time for the creation of new forms of social capital. Last but not least is the fact that both vulnerability and social capital are dynamic and ever changing. 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If yes - then how? • What organisations or groups would you expect to help (manpower or resources) in responding to an emergency/disaster situation in Lillooet? • What organisations/groups/individuals would you trust to help you in the event of a disaster affecting you and your family? • What do you see as strengths within the Lillooet community in preparing for, responding to and recovering from disasters? • What do you see as weaknesses within the Lillooet community in preparing for, responding to and recovering from disasters? Local Hazards • Are you aware of any hazards that affect Lillooet and the surrounding area? • What kind of hazards do you think are most likely to affect Lillooet in the near future? • Who do you think would be most affected by these hazards? Why? • Are you aware of any measures that have been taken to reduce the risk caused by these hazards? • Have you personally experienced any of these events in your lifetime (not necessarily in Lillooet)? If yes - How were you involved/affected? Can you recall any evidence you saw of cooperative or non-cooperative behaviour between individuals or organisations during this time? • Did your involvement in "Exercise Bridge River" change your perception/awareness of hazards in Lillooet? How? 122 • Do you feel that you as an individual have the ability to influence how the community deals with or is affected by potential emergency/disaster situations? • Do you feel that any of the groups you are associated with have the ability to influence how the community deals with or is affected by potential emergency/disaster situations? Participation in Simulation Exercise "Bridge River" • How did you become involved in the exercise? • How and when were you notified? • Did you understand the information that BC Hydro sent out prior to the exercise? Was BC Hydro's communication with participants clear? In terms of letters, reports (the emergency planning guide), and meeting presentations. • Did you feel able to ask Hydro or their consultants for clarification or approach them with questions? • What did you feel about your opportunity to participate and contribute to the exercise and planning process? • What factors helped/ prevented your participation in the simulation exercise and planning process? • Did you feel that all participants were given an equal chance to contribute to the process? • Did you know all of the other participants involved in the exercise? • If no - did you make any new contacts that would help you in the event of an emergency? • Did you see all the organisations or individuals you expected to be included at the simulation exercise? • If no - who was not there? And why do you think this was? • How valuable did you feel the simulation exercise was in preparing for a BC Hydro dam emergency in Lillooet? In what ways? • Would a simulation exercise be useful in preparing for any other types of emergency? • Has your view of BC Hydro changed since your involvement in the simulation exercise? If so how and why? 123 APPENDIX B - Canada's Indian Act of 1867 A Brief Overview Passed in 1876, the Indian Act has been the main vehicle for Federal jurisdiction over aboriginals in Canada. The Indian Act consolidated a number of existing policies (dating from the early 1800s) affecting aboriginals and outlined Federal responsibilities towards aboriginals. The Indian Act placed stringent controls on almost every aspect of aboriginal life. The underlying motive of the Indian Act was to dissolve aboriginal culture by assimilating aboriginals into Canadian (white) society (Dickason, 1992). The Indian Act: • replaced traditional governing and decision-making systems with simple majority-elected, all-male band councils; • controlled membership and status of "Indians" (this included discriminatory practices like loss of "Indian" status for aboriginal women who married non-aboriginals and their children); • limited the aboriginal land base from vast traditional territories to small reserves (which at present comprises only 0.36 percent of B.C.'s land mass); • eliminated economic development by prohibiting Indians to sell land, agricultural goods or farm animals; • prohibited aboriginal people from investing moneys earned by their communities; • prevented aboriginal people from voting provincially or federally (this was lifted in 1948 and 1960, respectively); • limited the ability of aboriginal people to leave the reserve (written permission from the Minister of Indian Affairs was required); • prohibited aboriginal people from retaining a lawyer or to raise funds with the intention of hiring a lawyer; • banned traditional gatherings and feasts such as potlatches, dances and ceremonies; • removed aboriginal children from their homes and families to attend distant government-funded and church-run Indian Residential Schools; • required aboriginal children to attend Residential Schools until they were 18 years old; and • eliminated diverse aboriginal identities by creating categories of "Indianness" — i.e. status Indians, Inuvialuit, Inuit, Metis (BC Hydro, 1999; Bartlett, 1993; Dickason, 1992; Saskatchewan Indian, 1978). The Indian Act remained effective until it was amended in 1985 when Parliament passed Bill C-31. 124 Bill C-31 brought the Indian Act in line with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom. The amendments sought to change the Act by: • removing gender discrimination; • restoring status and membership rights; and • increasing control of bands over their own affairs including control over membership and community life (Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1995). More details on the Indian Act and its' impact on aboriginal peoples can be gained from the following references: Assembly of First Nations, First Nations Health Commission. 1994. Breaking the Silence: an Interpretive Study of Residential School Impact and Healing as Illustrated by the Stories of First Nations Individuals. Ottawa, Ontario: Assembly of First Nations. BartlettR.H. 1990. Indian Reserves and Aboriginal Lands in Canada - A Homeland. Saskatoon. Sask.: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Center. BC Hydro Aboriginal Relations. 1999. "Common Questions". <http://eww.bchydro.bc.ca/ard/questions.html> BartlettR.H. 1993: Indian Act of Canada. (2nd Ed.). Saskatoon, Sask.: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Center. Comeau P. 1990. The First Canadians. Toronto: James Lorimer and Company. Department of Indian and Northern Affairs. September, 1995. Bill - C31. <http://www.johnco.com/native/bill_c31 .html>. Haig-BrownC. 1995. "Not Vanishing": Implications of Residential School Research for Today's Communities. Vancouver, B.C.: Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University. Venne S.H. 1981. Indian Act and Amendments: 1868-1975 - an Indexed Collection. Saskatoon, Sask.: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Center. Roval Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. 1994. "Stage 3 Displacement and Assimilation." Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services. <http://www.indigenous.bc.ca/vl/VollCh6sl.asp>. Saskatchewan Indian. 1978. "History of the Indian (part 1)." March 1978 Vol8, No.3: 4. <http://vvww.sicc.sk.ca/sasldndian/a78mar04.htm>. 125 APPENDIX C - Exercise "Bridge River" Scenario and Events List START STATE OPENING SCENARIO At 8:00 a.m. today (June 17, 1999) a fault zone ruptured about 5 kilometers under the lower Yalakom River valley, releasing forces that had been accumulating for centuries. The resulting earthquake measured 6.0 on the Richter Scale, and strong shaking lasted about 10 seconds. This came at a time when unusually warm spring weather had melted the heavy interior snow pack quicker than usual, nearly filling both the Downton and the Carpenter reservoirs, and brining the Fraser River to near record high levels. Heavy rainfall in the Interior of the Province over the last 48 hours has added to the Fraser, Thompson and Coquihalla River inflows and has increased the risk of flooding. The earthquake was felt as far away as Kamloops, Yale, Squamish, and Williams Lake. In Lillooet the shaking was so noticeable that people ran out doors, and it was even noticed by some people driving in their cars. Many people in the Lillooet/Bridge River area had taken the precaution of ducking under a desk or table and covering their heads with their arms when they felt the shaking. The local BC Hydro staff at both Lillooet and Bridge River were just beginning their work day, and by 9:00 a.m. some had already begun to look for damage in the Hydro facilities in their area, while others had headed back home or phoned to check on their families. As soon as the shaking stopped a call was made by BC Hydro's manager at Bridge River, Mr. X, on BC Tel to the BC Hydro Civil Engineering inspectors at Hydro's Burnaby offices to notify them of the earthquake. Mr. X asked them to arrange for a helicopter to take them to inspect the three dams in the area (Seton dam at the outlet of Seton Lake near Lillooet, Terzaghi Dam on the lower Bridge River, and La Joie dam on the upper Bridge River near Goldbridge). Also, local Hydro staff immediately headed for the dams to make a local inspection. After the shaking stopped, and after checking on their families' safety, the available District of Lillooet and the St'at'imc Nation emergency response staff went to their emergency center locations to set up their Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs). At 9 a.m. both these centers were staffed and ready to go. At Hope no-one felt the earthquake and as of 9 a.m. no special activity related to the earthquake was yet underway there, although their EOC had been set up and partially staffed for the past week in anticipation of flooding as a result of the spring freshet on the Fraser and Coquihalla Rivers. 126 DISTRICT OF LILLOOET SITUATION No one had to tell the members of the Lillooet EOC that they should assemble at their primary EOC at the District Office, and most had arrived by 9:00 a.m. Fortunately their family members were safe and they were able to start assessing the situation in the District. The situation at 9:00 a.m. was as follows: RCMP: The RCMP Detachment Commander is at the Lillooet EOC, and two Constables who were at court when the earthquake occurred have now returned to the Detachment office and are awaiting assignment along with the other members of the Detachment. (Court was adjourned due to the earthquake.) Constable Matt Hanson is out of town attending an ICS course in Vancouver at the Justice Institute. Fire Department: The Fire Chief is at the EOC and all available volunteers have been called to the hall and asked to stand by. Deputy Fire Chief Robert Hall is out of town attending the ICS course in Vancouver at the Justice Institute. Public Works: Only 3 of the four men on the crew are available (this includes the foreman). At the time of the earthquake the foreman was checking the North Lillooet water intake, one crew member was cutting lawns at Conway Park (using a ride-on mower, and with no radio) and the other was mowing the lawn with a small ride-on mower at the District Office. By 9:00 a.m. the foreman was at the Lillooet EOC and the other two members of the Public Works crew had returned to the yard ready for assignment. Ambulance Services: The 3 Lillooet ambulances are standing by, but as yet no calls have been received. There has been no contact with either the Seton or Goldbridge ambulances. B.C. Rail: Status unknown. Ministry of Highways: At the time of the earthquake the 12-man crew was deployed as follows. One person not available, two person with a grader and a water truck on the Fountain Valley road, and the other 9 person patching near town on the Duffy Lake Highway. The patching crew was contacted by radio after the earthquake and 127 told to report back to the yard and prepare to take the rock plows out, and the Fountain Valley crew was also asked to report back and note any problems along the way. B.C. Tel: Phone service is not consistent, with dial tone difficult or impossible to get. Some calls are getting through. BC Hydro: The Lillooet office of BC Hydro has made telephone contact with the Lillooet EOC and stated that the Hydro crew is about to inspect the Sub station and local distribution feeder lines. They said they would be available by phone, and asked that any trouble reports be phoned into the office. S T L ' A T L ' I M X NATION (SN) SITUATION The situation at 9:00 a.m. was as follows: The building used for the SN EOC was not damaged and the EOC was quickly set up and staffed by 9 a.m., including representation from the Cayoose community. Other than the Cayoose community there had as yet been no contact with the other SN communities. Tribal Police: The Chief Constable is located at the SN EOC. One of the Constables is at present checking on the situation at the Lillooet Band and the other Constable was off duty at the time of the earthquake and as of 9:00 a.m. there has been no contact with this member of the Tribal Police. Cayoose Community: The Cayoose EC has advised the SN EOC that there has been a partial collapse of two of the older homes in their community and that they are investigating a report that an elder is trapped in the basement of one of the homes. They may require rescue assistance. The old abandoned church has completely collapsed but no one was in or near the building at the time of the earthquake so there are no injuries related to this collapse. Fountain, Bridge River, Pavilion, Shalath and Lillooet Communities have not made contact with the SN EOC as of 9 a.m. 128 SAMPLE EVENTS FROM EVENT LIST No. Time Initiated By Event Purpose/Intended Reaction 9 0905 DOL Simulator as local resident, to Lillooet EOC by telephone. The Myazaki House has collapsed and there may be people trapped inside rubble. Need rescue assistance immediately. Need for Light and possibly Heavy rescue capability. May need outside assistance through PEP if further collapse occurs. 30 0930 DOL MOTH Simulator as road inspection crew, to Lillooet EOC by telephone. Their crews advise that the Seton Bridge (on Hwy 99) south of Lillooet) may be washed out if serious flooding occurs. There would be no access to Texas Creek or the Roshard Subdivision if the bridge is lost.... May need outside assistance from Lytton to aid rescue and recovery issues in this area if the bridge is lost. 44 0945 SN Simulator as Bridge River Community to SN EOC by telephone. Slides along Road #40 have partially blocked the Bridge River and will result in much higher water levels if BC Hydro has to release water from Carpenter Lake through Terzaghi Dam. Indication that any potential flooding could result in higher than expected water levels along the Bridge River. Aids in determining extent of evacuations required. Source: C&M Consultants, March 1999 

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