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Rewriting third world security : a comparative study of nuclear discourse in Pakistan and India Nizamani, Haider Khan 1997

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REWRITING THIRD WORLD SECURITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NUCLEAR DISCOURSE IN PAKISTAN AND INDIA by HAIDER KHAN NIZAMANI M.Sc, Quaid-I-Azam University, 1989 M.A., University of Kent at Canterbuy, 1990 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Political Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA December 1997 C) Haider Khan Nizamani, 1997 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of POLITICAL Sue^cQ The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date D-o- ^ , '997 DE-6 (2/88) 11 Abstract •Retaining the nuclear option has become an article of strategic faith and a symbol of national sovereignty in Pakistan and India. There is widespread belief among security analysts of South Asia that the popularity of the nuclear issue among the Pakistani and Indian masses makes it impossible for any government in Islamabad or New Delhi to tamper with the existing policies of nuclear ambiguity. In spite of the domestic roots of the nuclear politics in the subcontinent, existing literature does not tell us how an issue which requires considerable scientific knowledge has assumed such political salience. This study attempts to redress this gap by offering an explanation and analysis of the gradual ascendance of the nuclear issue in the dominant security discourse of Pakistan and India. This study employing the methodology of the discourse analysis accounts for the dynamics that propel the politics of the nuclear issue in the subcontinent. As the overwhelming majority of studies of the nuclear issue approach the matter with theoretical lens of Political Realism, scant attention is paid to the question of the discourse on national identities and imperatives of domestic politics in which the nuclear issue is firmly embedded. Political Realism's assumption of states as undifferentiated entities forecloses possibility of looking inside the state to account for its security policies. The "weak state" perspective attempts to rectify this theoretical limitation by emphasizing the internal characteristics of the Third World states. However, this dissertation argues that the "weak state" framework concerns itself with symptoms rather than Ill processes underway in the Third World. Given these analytical limitations, this study using insights of Critical Security Studies explains how and why the nuclear issue has assumed such an important place in the security discourse of Indian and Pakistan. Comparing the two discourses, the dissertation shows how the politics of the nuclear issue can be meaningfully understood by locating it in the broader context of national identity formation processes in the both countries. This objective is achieved by critically analyzing the works and words of leading politician, strategic analysts, and opinion-makers of Pakistan and India. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract Table of Contents List of Abbreviations Acknowledgements INTRODUCTION Chapter One A Road Map A Note on Sources and a few Disclaimers Rewriting Third World Security I The Third World and Traditional Security Studies Nuclear Weapons: Who Should or Should Not Have Them? Obsolescence of War and Peace Through Democracy A Distinct Third World Security Problematic Distinct Problematic or Security Orientalism? Of Unstable Regions and Weak States Of Historical Insights and Historical Fallacies A Unique Milieu or Latent Historical Determinism Conclusion 11 iv V"L vi-i 1 11 14 17 19 25 32 35 42 44 46 51 54 Chapter Two Rewriting Third World Security II Critical Security Studies and the Third World What if not the State? Discourse of Threats and Appropriate Responses Colonial Legacy and Postcolonial Discourses Conclusion 57 61 64 69 81 87 Chapter Three Nukespeak in Pakistan I: 1960s-1977 91 Ayub and National Strategy 93 Z. A. Bhutto and Nuclear Weapons 97 Imperceptible Shift 102 Traumatic Interlude: 1970-1974 108 Explosion of Device, 120 Explosion of an Issue V Nukes in the Public Domain 131 Chapter Four Nukespeak in Pakistan II: 1977-1995 135 Get Rid of Bhutto but 13 6 Keep His Nukespeak: 1977-79 Zia's Pakistan: Islam's Fortress! 144 Forgotten Resistance 155 The Post-Zia Period 159 Crusaders' Bomb 165 Diplomats' Ambiguous Bomb 170 Dissenting Narratives 174 Conclusion 183 Chapter Five Nukespeak in India I: From Celibacy to Explosion India and Its Neighbours 'Nuclear Celibacy': 1947-1964 Nukespeak on Political Margins Nukespeak in Academia The Road to Pokhran Reaction to Pokhran Conclusion 189 191 199 203 213 217 223 227 Chapter Six Indian Nukespeak Today Islam, the Bomb, and Pakistan Grand Conspiracy Versus National Autonomy Evil Designs Versus Noble Intentions Nukespeak in the 1990s Dissenting Narratives Conclusion 228 231 235 241 254 264 274 Chapter Seven Summary and Assessments Siblings of the Same Theory Different Histories, Different Scopes Of 'New' but Unused Theories Revisioning Nuclear Discourse 279 282 291 294 295 EPILOGUE 301 Selected Bibliography 308 VI List of Abbreviations AEC Atomic Energy Commission (India). AEE Atomic Energy Agency (India). AIML All India Muslim League. AL Awami League. BARC Bhabha Atomic Energy Research Centre. BJP Bharatiya Janata Party. CBM Confidence Building Measures. CSDS Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (Delhi). CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. DRDO Defence Research and Development Organisation (India). IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency. IDSA Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (New Delhi) INC Indian National Congress. IPS Institute of Policy Studies (Islamabad). IRS Institute of Regional Studies (Islamabad). ISI Inter Services Intelligence (Pakistan). ISS Institute of Strategic Studies (Islamabad). KANUPP Karachi Nuclear Power Plant. LoC Line of Control. MRD Movement for Restoration of Democracy (Pakistan). NAM Non-Aligned Movement. NIAS National Institute of Advanced Studies (India). NNWS Non-nuclear Weapon States. NPT Non-proliferation Treaty. NWFZ Nuclear Weopon Free Zone. NWS Nuclear Weapon States. PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. PML Pakistan Muslim League. PNE Peaceful Nuclear Explosion. PPP Pakistan Peoples Party. PTB Partial Test Ban. RAW Research and Analysis Wing (India). SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. TIFR Tata Institute for Fundamental Research (India). VI1 Acknowledgements Brian L. Job, without his encouragement and excellent supervision I could not have finished this project. John R. Wood, working with him in different capacities has been of immense intellectual value. Ayesha Haider, my friend, critic, and proof-reader, who chose to put up with me with all my faults during these years. Tahir Suhail, for reading and commenting on an earlier draft; and Scott Pegg, who read parts of an earlier draft. The Awards Office of the University of British Columbia and Waseem Nizamahi for providing financial assistance at crucial times. Adal Bha, for his unconditional love. Ali and Ahmad who distracted me with their laughter from the chores of research and writing. Mariam Aftab, who insisted that her name be included. Fermina Daza and Saleem Sinai, who through their characters helped a great deal to face the life and its absurdities. And finally, Lili, my mother, who has always been there for me. I thank you all. INTRODUCTION 1 Pick any writing on the nuclear issue in the subcontinent, and it will say the matter is too sensitive for any government of India or Pakistan to tamper with because of the overwhelming public support that nuclear programmes enjoy in these societies. Nuclear programmes have assumed the role of the guarantors of national security and symbols of national power. This study is a search for how the nuclear issue has assumed such importance in Pakistan and India. If the opening statement conveys the crux of how scholars and practitioners perceive the salience of the nuclear issue in the subcontinent, it implies a number of inter-related theoretical and practical assumptions. In practical terms it suggests a consensus within India and Pakistan on matters pertaining to the nuclear issue which is considered strong and clear enough not to permit any government to dramatically depart from the existing policies. Secondly, given this consensus, the demarcation between the external and internal realms disappears, and the nuclear policies of the two are considered intricately enmeshed in domestic politics. Thirdly, strategic relations between India and Pakistan marked by the nuclear ambiguity and a legacy of three conventional wars in the last half century make the region prone to a nuclear exchange. The last assumption, however, is most common among security analysts of the West and is usually not shared by their Indian or Pakistani counterparts. Theoretically, once the distinction between the external and internal spheres is questioned, conceptual lenses offered by 2 mainstream deterrence strategies, premised upon an assumption of a neat division between the domestic and foreign realms of policy-making, are rendered obsolete in terms of their utility to analyze the issue at hand. Second, pointing toward domestic pressure as the key determinant of the nuclear policies of Pakistan and India, the answer to 'why is the nuclear issue so important?' is simple: ...because of domestic reasons. A preoccupation with the 'why' questions marginalizes the equally important 'how' queries about the same issue. This study, then, is an effort to grapple with the crucial 'how' questions concerning the nuclear issue. Hence, the focus is on: How has the nuclear issue assumed the importance it enjoys in the political discourses of Pakistan and India? Existing literature on the nuclear issue in the subcontinent lacks a comparative account that explains the rise of the nuclear issue as a symbol of sovereignty and security in the subcontinent. There are either accounts of developments of nuclear policies and installations in the two countries, or a barrage of accusations against each other or by Western analysts sold in the name of history.1 Why should we have yet another story about the nuclear 1 For a history of India's nuclear programme see Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New York: Praeger, 1976); for a history of Pakistan's programme see Akhtar Ali, Pakistan's Nuclear Dilemma: Energy and Security Concerns (Karachi: Economic Research Unit,1984); and for a sensational analysis of the nuclear issue in the Third World see, Steve Weismann and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb (New York: Times Books, 1981); and for a recent work on the dynamics of nuclear strategy in the subcontinent see, Ziba Moshaver, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the Indian Subcontinent (London: Macmillan, 1991). 3 politics in' Pakistan and India and a critique of the Third World security studies? Simply because the myths in both areas need to be partially broken down. At least, an effort in that direction is not untimely at this juncture. Both the 'new' Third World security studies and the nuclear discourse in Pakistan and India play the game of difference. 'New' approaches claim to be different from the 'traditional' perspectives, and security analysts in the subcontinent emphasize the difference from the Other as a key to understand and empathize with their positions on the nuclear issue. A critical look, in fact, points towards commonalities between the 'new' approaches to the Third World security studies and the now 'old' perspective of Development Studies prevalent in the 1950's and the 60's. Similarly, there is a lot that Pakistani and the Indian security analysts share when it comes to depicting the national dangers faced by the two countries. This study, then, questions what is taken for granted in Third World security studies and the nuclear discourse in the subcontinent. An attempt is made to answer the following questions. How has the nuclear issue acquired over the years the political salience it has today? How and in what forms has it assumed a life of its own? And finally, in what ways and to what extent does the politics of the issue serve the interests of defining the Self as distinct from the Other/'enemy'; i.e, its close relationship with the politics of identity and security? Rather than compartmentalizing my answers, I will try to address the points raised in the above questions in a holistic manner by situating the nuclear issue in the wider context of efforts to 4 carve out distinct Pakistani and Indian identities in the postcolonial subcontinent. By realizing the limitations of the existing frameworks aimed at dealing with Third World security issues (see Chapter One), my pursuit of appropriate lenses led me to the body of literature termed as Critical Security Studies by Keith Krause.2 Examination of the works of non-International Relations (IR) scholars like Michel Foucault and Tzetvan Todorov, and by Simon Dalby, David Campbell, and Richard Price in the subfield of security studies, have certainly influenced my reading and writing of Third World security and the nuclear discourse in the subcontinent. In the end this study may not be able to come up with satisfactory answers, but the salience of questions cannot be overlooked, and the attempt to search for answers to these questions justifies undertaking this project. Added to it is the methodology of going beyond the disciplinary confines of strategic/security studies that have led me to tread this potentially hazardous path. The route I have followed involves two distinct, although mutually constitutive emphases. Before answering the xhow' questions about the nuclear discourse in the subcontinent, I critically evaluate theoretical considerations that bear on the writings of Indian and Pakistani authors on security issues. The first relates to analytical frameworks regarding nuclear 2 Keith Krause, "Critical Theory and Security Studies," YCISS Occasional Paper Number 33 (1996); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). 5 deterrence with a special reference to the applicability of this literature to the issue in the Third World. Political realism holds sway over the conceptual lenses of this field and of late has been criticized for the limited applicability of its assumptions in the Third World context. As a response, an identifiable subfield in the security studies has emerged dealing with the distinct Third World security problematic. The Third World security studies models claim to be 'new' approaches and, in an oversimplified manner, they 'bring the state back in' and look inside its workings to analyze the security policies of these countries. Their answer to the 'theoretical disarray' is that there are two types of states in the international system, i.e, the strong states and the weak states, and each is qualitatively different from the other when it comes to security policy-making. I question the usefulness of these approaches by evaluating difficulties attached to their operationalization. The focus will be on the politics of the nuclear discourse in India and Pakistan. The appendix in George Orwell's novel Nineteen Eighty-Four is a good place in which to find some clues to understanding and deciphering the nuances of nuclear politics in Pakistan and India. For traditional security analysts, who seek the help of theorists like Hans Morgenthau or Barry Buzan to analyze the security issues of the contemporary world, Orwell's novel may appear an unlikely reference because he was no expert on nuclear weapons or security studies. But Orwell understood the value of symbols and language to sustain certain types of thinking and suppress others. One form of it he ingeniously described as 6 Newspeak.3 How he described that language and the principles of its usage has a striking resemblance to the nuclear discourse in Pakistan and India. Newspeak was the official language of Oceania and had been devised to meet the ideological needs of Ingsoc or English Socialism. In the year 1984 there was not as yet anyone who used Newspeak as his sole means of communication, either in speech or writing. The leading articles in The Times were written in it, but this was a tour de force which could only be carried out by a specialist.4 Newspeak was meant to serve two purposes: first, xto provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc', and second, xto make all other modes of thought impossible'. To meet these ends, the words were assigned special meanings. Offering a synopsis of Newspeak vocabulary, Orwell concludes that 'in Newspeak the expression of unorthodox opinions, above a very low level, was well-nigh impossible'.s Under such circumstances, views diverging from the endorsed form become heresies. For discourses exhibiting elements of the above characteristics, Orwell's phrase led to the coining of terms like 'doublespeak' and xnukespeak'. xNukespeak' was given currency in Paul Chilton's edited volume Language and the Nuclear Arms 3 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (London: Penguin, 1984) 4 Ibid. p. 257. There is no substitute for reading the appendix and the novel itself to appreciate Orwell's critique of the totalizing effects of the language forms which rely on dualism to condone certain types of views as true and condemn the other forms as false and dangerous. 5 Ibid., p. 266. 7 Debate: Nukespeak Today.6 Authors in this volume critically analyze the Newspeak tendencies during the cold war years in the mainstream writings and political assertions on the nuclear issue in the West. However, the manner in which the politics of the nuclear issue is conducted in the subcontinent makes the notion of nukespeak relevant for the purposes of this study. Put simply, nukespeak refers to an analysis of discourse about nuclear weapons in the contemporary world. Inspired by Michel Foucault's notion of discourse, Gunther Kress suggests that Discourses are systematically sets of statements which give expression to the meanings and values of an institution. Beyond that, they define, describe and delimit what it is possible to say and not possible to say (by extension possible to do and not to do) with respect to the area of concern to that institution.7 As the term nukespeak captures the dynamics of the nuclear discourse in the subcontinent, nukespeak and the nuclear discourse are used interchangeably in this study. The question arises as to which segments of the societies in Pakistan and India constitute the core of the nukespeakers? The notion of "epistemic communities" is a useful starting point in this regard.8 The basic argument here suggests that 'control 6 On Nukespeak see, Paul Chilton, ed., Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today (London and Dover: Frances Pinter, 1985). 7 Gunther Kress, "Discourses, texts, readers and the pro-nuclear arguments," in Ibid, p. 68. 8 The term "epistemic communities" is, like all other social constructs, a contested concept. I have relied on the definitional aspects discussed in Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Cooperation," International Organization, 46:1 (Winter 1992) pp. 1-36; and, 8 over knowledge and information is an important dimension of power' and that 'networks of knowledge-based experts-- epistemic communities--' play an important role in defining the rules of the game in a given issue area. Peter M. Haas describes an epistemic community as 'a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain or issue area.' Such a community may consist of 'professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds', who share a set of common characteristics. They include: (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity--that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise--that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed.9 Other likely characteristics of an epistemic community can be a shared 'patterns of reasoning' and 'a policy project drawing on shared values'. Usually the number of members in epistemic communities is relatively small by virtue of the same world-view (or episteme) .10 As the above account suggests, inclusion in an epistemic community goes hand in hand with the exclusionary criteria Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," Ibid, pp. 367-390. 9 Peter M. Haas, 1992, p. 3. 10 Ibid., p. 27. 9 inherent in such a notion. Terms of inclusion are set through subjective understandings rather than referring to any 'objective' or 'scientifically proven' tests. This becomes abundantly clear in the following chapters when we discuss the nuclear discourse in the subcontinent. Two surveys of the Indian elite's opinion on the nuclear issue, conducted in 1969-70 and 1994 respectively, identify groups who constitute the core of dominant discourse.11 Ashis •Nandy in 1969-70 termed such groups "the strategic elite" of India. It comprised 'political ultra-elites, counter elites, interest group elites, opinion leaders, scientists in power and specialists in international relations, strategic studies and military affairs'.12 David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, while soliciting the views of the Indian elite on the nuclear issue almost a quarter century later, divided the elite into eight categories, i.e, arts and sports; academic and science; bureaucrats and diplomats; businesspersons; journalists; lawyers; medical doctors; and armed forces and police personnel.13 As a companion to the Indian volume, Samina Ahmed and David Cortright 11 The survey in 1969-70 was conducted by the eminent Indian scholar Ashis Nandy and the findings were published in, Ashis Nandy, "The Bomb, NPT and Indian Elite," Economic and Political Weekly, Special Issue, VII:31-33 (August 1972), pp. 1533-1540; 'and Ashis Nandy, "Between Two Gandhis: Psychological Aspects of the Nuclearization of India," Asian Survey xiv:11 (November 1974), pp. 966-970. The 1994 survey was commissioned by the Fourth Freedom Forum and Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. Results and analyses of the survey are published in, David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, eds., India and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options (Notre Dame,IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996). 12 Nandy, 1974, p. 966. Cortright and Mattoo, 1996, p. 117. are preparing a similar survey of the Pakistani elite that was commissioned by the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace in 1996. The scheme used to divide the Indian elite was also used in Pakistan's case.14 However, Mattoo's apt observation that the nuclear 'discourse is controlled by a handful of scholars and former military and government officials, who, until recently did no more than a justify official policy' is equally true for Pakistan and crucially important for the purpose of this study.15 This study focuses primarily on the words and works of a handful of individuals constituting the respective epistemic communities which have appropriated the nuclear discourse in Pakistan and India. A clarification of the multiple roles that may be assumed by the same individual in the dominant discourse •of each state is called for. Unlike in North America, where a division of intellectual labour is the norm, the intellectual scene in the subcontinent is markedly different. Individuals assume multiple roles which blur the lines between various groups specified as the dominant elite in Pakistan or India. For example, the undisputed champion of contemporary Indian nukespeak, Krishnaswami Subrahmanyam, has served as an official in the ministry of defence (a bureaucratic post), was the 14 Preliminary results of this survey are available in a special report by coordinators of the project as, Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, A Study of Pakistan's Nuclear Choices, (A Report Sponsored by The Fourth Freedom and the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, August 1996). 15 Amitabh Mattoo, "India's Nuclear Status Quo," Survival, 38:3 (Autumn 1996), p. 46. 11 director of a leading think tank (the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses) from where he contributed regularly to the Indian newspapers (a media position) and contributed as a defence expert to academic journals. If, on the one hand, a few individuals in each country have appropriated the nuclear discourse by assuming multiple roles; on the other some groups mentioned by Cortright and Mattoo have played little public role in shaping the contours of the nuclear discourse. Foremost among them are sports figures, medical doctors, and business persons who have largely been silent on the issue. Therefore, people from these backgrounds are conspicuous by their absence in this study. A Road Map This study is divided into seven chapters. The first two chapters discuss theoretical issues, followed by two chapters each on the nukespeak in Pakistan and India. The final chapter summarizes and assesses the key themes that emerge during the study. Chapter One offers a critique of (neo)realism with special reference to the salience of this theoretical perspective for the nuclear issue. The general assumptions of (neo)realism inform not only the nuclear deterrence literature in general, but also enjoy a near intellectual monopoly over the discussion of the nuclear issue in South Asia. I draw examples from the works of leading American, Pakistani and Indian authors in the field to demonstrate the paramountcy of political realism as a guiding 12 theoretical light of mainstream studies. Then I offer a critique of the (neo)realist framework by analysts who argue that it lacks adequate theoretical tools to help us analyze the xdistinct Third World security problematic'. Here the focus will be on the works of scholars like Mohammad Ayoob, Barry Buzan, and Kal Holsti who have emphasized the above point in their works. I term this literature as vnew' approaches to Third World security. A critique of the new approaches that highlights the not so new assumptions prevalent in the above framework concludes this chapter. The second chapter outlines the possible alternative approach to the Third World security issues inspired by works of Michel Foucault, Tzetvan Todorov, Partha Chatterjee etc. Such a project is situated within the Critical Security Studies framework as outlined for example by Keith Krause. Scholars like David Campbell, Richard Price and Simon Dalby have analyzed and interpreted specific issues with a critical perspective in the security studies subfield. The chapter discusses at length the value of the methodology of the genealogical approach and discourse analysis in understanding the nukespeak in Pakistan and India. Chapter Three discusses the dynamics of nukespeak in Pakistan from the 1960s to 1977. It traces the emergence of the nuclear issue from its absence in the strategic discourse to the new vigour it achieved during late Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's regime (1971-77). The discussion starts with the centrality of the Indian threat invoked by General Ayub Khan (Pakistani head of the state during 1958-69), and the absence of the nuclear option as a 13 means to deter this threat. This brings us to the 1971 Bangladesh civil war and the war with India as decisive events both in terms of the unresolved identity issue of Pakistan and Islamabad's inability to deter India. The issues of identity, security, and threat were fused in this period. This is followed by an examination of Z.A. Bhutto's thinking on the nuclear issue, and the way the nuclear factor entered into the dominant political discourse of Pakistan. The story of the first phase of nukespeak in Pakistan concludes with the analysis of Pakistani reaction to the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion, and the transformation of the nuclear issue by the military regime after 1977 into a litmus test of patriotism. Chapter Four analyzes how the nuclear issue was utilized by Zia-ul-Haq's military regime to boost its legitimacy by portraying it as a means to consolidate Islamic identity for Pakistan against Hindu India. The chapter ends with a survey of the nuclear discourse in contemporary Pakistan and a discussion of the anti-Bomb voices as they exist in present day Pakistan. The fifth chapter tells the story of Indian nukespeak from its inception in the late 1940s to the nuclear explosion in 1974. By focussing mainly on Jawaharlal Nehru's views on independent India's status in the world and the importance, or lack of it, attached to the nuclear option in determining India's position in the world community, the stage will be set for analyzing later developments in Indian nukespeak. As far as nuclear weapons were concerned, Nehru did not see any role for them in India, and during his rule (1947-1964) New Delhi practised xnuclear celibacy'. However, celibacy slowly gave way to ambiguity in the 14 late 1960s. The chapter ends with a discussion of the nuclear discourse that followed in the wake of the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974. Chapter Six focuses on the present stage of the Indian nukespeak. We will see how the nuclear option became an integral part of the discourse that identifies India as a major power. In today's India, the nuclear option has become a credible means to ward off immediate geo-strategic threats and a symbol of India's independence and autonomy in international affairs. This is a complete U-turn from the policies pursued during the Nehru years. The discussion will also show how Pakistan has become a more credible source of threat for the Indian strategic elite' as compared with the Chinese threat. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of counter-narratives in the Indian nuclear discourse. The final chapter consists of the summary and assessment of the themes discussed in the preceding pages. The aim is to test whether the methodological insights of the Critical Security Studies have helped in understanding the nuclear discourse in the subcontinent. This is done by comparatively highlighting the similarities and differences between the nuclear discourse in •Pakistan and India. Keeping in mind the exploratory objective of the study, I attempt to show how the reading offered in this dissertation contributes to a better understanding of the dynamics of the nuclear issue in the subcontinent. A Note on Sources and a few Disclaimers This study has three distinct, although not mutually exclusive, 15 parts to it, i.e, two theoretical chapters, and two chapters each on the Pakistani and Indian nuclear discourses. Selection of the sources is determined by availability and importance of the material in each case. Literature covered in the theoretical chapters relies heavily on the writings of a select group of individuals whose works are widely used in theoretical treatment of Third World security issues. In the case of Indian nukespeak, the words and works of Nehru and Homi Bhabha are extensively used in discussing the nuclear discourse up until 1965. In the absence of an identifiable community of security issues experts, these two individuals held sway over the nature and direction of the early nuclear discourse. From the late 1960s onward, an embryonic community of security experts started to take shape in India. Over these years K. Subrahmanyam has consistently and prolifically written about the nuclear issue, and is rightly considered by friends and foes alike as the leader of the nukespeakers in India. His works, therefore, are cited extensively, along with those of other leading nukespeakers, in the chapter on the modern Indian nukespeak. Most material in the Indian case cited in the study, barring the 1990s, relies on books published in India. Most of the relevant sources are compilations of newspaper and research journal articles written by leading members of India's strategic community. The source material to study the Pakistani nukespeak is, much to the dismay of students and analysts, scattered because little effort has been made to compile it into book-length studies. Therefore, I had to scan through academic journals and 16 archives of the leading English daily of Pakistan, Dawn, to narrate the story of the Pakistan nukespeak. Unlike Subrahmanyam in India, in Pakistan's epistemic community of nukespeakers no one can claim or be credited with the status of the flag-bearer. These differences in sources give the two case studies a distinct character. In both case studies I have tried to limit the discussion of the works of non-resident Pakistani or Indian authors writing on the nuclear issue to a minimum level for the simple reason that such writers do not operate within confines of the power relations that drive the nukespeak in the subcontinent. Their influence in terms of shaping the contours of nukespeak in Pakistan or India is also non-existent. This, however, does not imply that such works should not be taken seriously. Some disclaimers are called for. I have tried to be empirical but not empiricist. At best, I have attempted a detached look at the interplay of forces that have played a constitutive role in the present shape of the nuclear discourse in the subcontinent. This, then, is a study about the creation and use of threats to consolidate particular 'national' identities in the subcontinent. The salience of the nuclear issue is explored in the matrix of creating national identities by invoking the theme of internal and external enemies. Chapter One 17 REWRITING THIRD WORLD SECURITY I In the heyday of the cold war, diehard communists in the subcontinent were derided for wearing parkas on hot and humid .summer afternoons because the weather in Moscow demanded such a dress. It signified the dependence of one section of Indian or Pakistani societies on the intellectual categories devised in the West but sold to the rest in the name of universalism. The situation, even today, is not much different in the realm of activities and studies conducted in the name of national security. Demonstrating this is like opening up a Russian doll, because security analysts in the subcontinent use conceptual lenses of the Western security analysts; the majority of the latter in turn are influenced by tenets of political realism prevalent in the field of International Relations. It is hardly surprising that given the power-centric and policy-oriented nature of modern security studies, debates have been dominated by American scholars and largely exist within the ambit of temporal interests defined by the American state.1 In such an intellectual environment, a critical analysis of issues 1 For a brief overview of the American influence on the theoretical activity in IR see, Steve Smith, "Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science," in, Hugh C. Dyer, and Leon Manga sari an, eds., The Study of International Relations: The State of the Art (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, In association with Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1989), pp.3-27; Ekkehart Krippendorff, "The Dominance of American Approaches in International Relations," in Ibid., pp. 28-39. 18 affecting the Third World has always been a problematic enterprise. One is always confronted with questions such as: Are the theoretical lenses meant to explain the trends in the Western world fit for analyzing the issues facing the non-Western world? Is the Third World a unique category which merits a separate analytical framework? Can the West-centred tools of analysis be modified and used to answer security questions specific to the Third World? These questions become relevant to the meaningful achievement of the objective of this study, namely, to explore the dynamics of the politics of the nuclear issue in Pakistan and India. An appraisal of the relevant theoretical perspectives dealing with these questions will help to set the stage for the reading I offer regarding the dynamics of the nuclear discourse in the subcontinent. Starting the survey with the dominant assumptions prevalent in the West and South Asia about the nuclear issue, I then turn to the alternative frameworks offered by scholars specifically aimed at analyzing the Third World security problematic. The latter's raison d'etre lies in the apparent analytical limitations embedded in the dominant theoretical assumptions of national security studies. Due to the influence of the assumptions of the traditional security studies on writings concerning strategy emanating from South Asia, and the way experts on South Asian security in the West, primarily the U.S., see the region, this chapter starts with an overview of this perspective. This is followed by a critique of neorealist assumptions by the new models presented as alternative conceptual lenses to explain Third World security problematic. Most works of 19 this genre are not primarily concerned with the nuclear issue, but they locate the salience of it in the broader framework of a distinct Third World security problematic. At first glance, the discussion of this perspective may appear of little value for a study concerned with the nuclear issue; however, once the analytical limits of the traditional security studies become evident, turning to alternative models claiming to offer better explanations become necessary. The last part of the chapter discusses theoretical limitations of the above perspective, and serves as a background in order to outline a conceptual solution in the next chapter to grapple with the dynamics of the nuclear discourse in Pakistan and India. The Third World and Traditional Security Studies •Theoretical activity in International Relations in general, and in the sub-field of security studies in particular, remains overwhelmingly West-centric, while the non-Western world constitutes a theoretical outpost.2 The Dependency perspective created some theoretical ripples in the 1970s but the water settled again by cautiously giving this perspective its due place, i.e, on the margins.3 2 K. J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1985) ; Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance in Security Studies," International Studies Quarterly 35 :2 (1991), pp. 211-239; Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991); David A. Baldwin, "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War, Review Article, " World Politics 48 (October 1995), pp. 117-41. 3 See Holsti, 1985, pp. 61-81. 20 Traditional security analysts, until quite recently, wanted to remain immune to the changes taking place in the world 'out there'-- changes both spatial and conceptual, that might have decisive implications for their subject matter.4 The Soviet Union's collapse had an unsettling effect on security studies and Third World studies. With the second world gone, the rationale for the separateness of Third World studies became questionable.5 With the peaceful demise of a great power and the eruption of a plethora of intrastate conflicts in the former Eastern bloc and Third World, the focus of security studies as outlined by Stephen Walt became inadequate to answer the challenging questions posed by changing times. A call went out 4 Stephan Walt, in "The Renaissance of Security Studies" (1991) emphasized the phenomenon of war as the main focus of security studies and defined it in terms of the study of the threat, use, and control of military force among states. Use of force and its effects on individuals, states, and societies were considered the principal focus of security studies, and efforts to broaden the notion of security by studying 'nonmilitary' sources of threats was equated with the act of destroying intellectual coherence of the field, pp. 212-213. 5 The term Third World is an elusive term like many others used in International Relations. It is used in political, economic, and geographic terms to denote a variety of countries and societies. The principle of elimination was used to define Third World. Politically it referred to the countries which did not belong to either the Warsaw Pact or NATO during the cold war. Economically, it applied to countries where industrialization occurred later than in the Western world. Geographically, most of these countries were situated in the southern hemisphere. The reason I use Third World to define the non-Western and the post-colonial world is because it lacks the pejorative connotation compared with other terms like 'developing countries' or 'less developed countries'. For a recent rationalization for retaining the terms see, Mehran Kamrava, "Political Culture and a New Definition of the Third World," Third World Quarterly 16:4 (December 1995), pp. 691-701; Leslie Wolf-Philips, "Why 'Third World'?: Origin, Definition and Usage," Third World Quarterly 9:4 (October 1987), pp. 1311-1319; Mehran Kamrava, "Conceptualizing Third World Politics: The State-Society See-saw," Third World Quarterly 14:4 (1993), pp. 703-716. 21 for a better understanding of nonmilitary issues in order to enable security analysts to grapple with the post-cold war world.6 Another group of scholars within the present community of security analysts, although numerically quite small, made the distinct security problematic of the Third World countries focus of their studies.7 Amid such theoretical pluralism, the 'disarray' in IR theory that Kal Holsti observed in 1985 has further deepened, and ten years later, the search for theory still remains van elusive quest'. Although devoid of any reigning paradigm in the Kuhnian sense, neorealist theoretical assumptions have dominated the sub-field of security studies. Issues concerning nuclear weapons have predominantly been a forte of analysts using political realism as a theoretical lens.8 Kenneth N. Waltz is indisputably the most 6 Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will it Resemble the Past?," International Security 16:3 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 3-37; Edward A. Kolodzieg, "Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!," International Studies Quarterly 36 (1992), pp. 421-438. 7 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and International System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," Survival 36:2 (Summer 1994), pp.3-21; Barry Buzan, Peoples, States, and Fear (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, Second Edition,1991); Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century," International Affairs 67:3 (1991), pp.431-51; Barry Buzan, and Gowher Rizvi, eds.,South Asian Security Insecurity and the Great Powers (London: Macmillan, 1986) ; Steven R. David, "Why the Third World Still Matters," International Security 17:3 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 127-59; K. J. Holsti, "War, Peace, and the State of the State," International Political Science Review 16:4 (1995), pp. 319-339; Brian L. Job, ed., The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992); Yezid Sayigh, Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries, (Adelphi Paper 251, 1990) . 8 However, there have been exceptions where efforts have been made to analyze the salience of nuclear weapons' politics beyond the narrow confines of Realism. For different approaches see, Paul influential and eloquent contemporary proponent of this theoretical perspective, and we start with a summary of assumptions, as outlined by Waltz, central to contemporary neorealism.9 In contrast to traditional Realism, termed 'reductionism' by Waltz, in which international outcomes were explained through elements located at the national or sub-national level, neorealism emphasizes the factors in play at the international level, i.e, the systemic forces that states are subject to.10 The term system refers to a group of parts or units whose interactions are significant enough to justify seeing them in some sense as a coherent set. A group of states form an international system when 'the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the other'." A system comprises a Chilton, ed, Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today (London: Frances Pinter, 1985); Timothy Luke, ""What is Wrong with Deterrence" A Semiotic Interpretation of National Security Policy," in, James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro, eds., International/Intertextual Relations (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989) pp. 207-229. Both volumes successfully show that there is more to nuclear weapons than simple deterrence value. These shall be discussed in due course in the thesis. 9 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979). Since its publication this volume has become a common referent for both adherents and opponents of modern Realism. However, Waltz calls his theory 'structural' and other variants of Realism as 'reductionist' theories. But the Waltzian theory is better know as 'neorealism', a term coined by Richard Ashley. See, Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in, Robert 0. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 255-300. Citations of Waltz's works are reproduced from the above volume. 10 Waltz, in, Keohane, ed., 1986, pp. 34-47. 11 Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 29. 23 structure and interacting units. Waltz's theory is based on the assumption that states are the basic units of the international system. Structure in the Waltzian sense refers to two things. One, it is a compensating device that works to produce a uniformity of actions despite a variety of inputs; two, it is a set of constraining conditions.12 In order to develop a parsimonious and elegant theory of international politics, Waltz argues that states need to be assumed as unitary actors.13 Therefore, an international structure is defined by the arrangement of states in global power structure rather than problemaitizing characteristics of the constituting units. Three criteria are used by Waltz to differentiate the international system from the domestic system,i.e, an ordering principle, functional differentiation, and the distribution of capabilities. Hierarchy is the ordering principle in a domestic system. Constituting units in such a system tend to specialize in their respective functions. The international system differs fundamentally in its ordering principle because it is an anarchical system. Given the anarchic nature of the system, units(states) have to rely on the dictum of self-help to ensure their survival. By virtue of this, all states are functionally alike in the international system. Because of the above characteristics, states in the international system are distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser 12 Waltz, 1986, p. 62. 13 Ibid., p. 71. capabilities' .14 Due to the anarchic nature of the system and the consequent functional alikeness of units, the international system is defined by the arrangement of its parts; and only the changes of arrangement are structural changes.15 Existence in such a system of self-help requires constant balancing on part of the units. The result is the balance of power principle as the pillar of neorealism. In such a system, cooperation is hampered by the dictum of 'relative gains' which guides states in their coping with other units in the system.16 By his own account, Waltz's theory was not aimed at explaining every outcome in international politics, but only a few important parts of that reality. Concerned with capabilities defined in terms of power, neorealism is meant to be a great power politics theory. In spite of being a theorist of great power politics, Waltz's ideas on the role of nuclear weapons as war-preventers on the global scale have profoundly influenced the writings on the nuclear issue in the subcontinent. 14 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Political Structures," in, Robert 0. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 81-92. 15 Ibid. , p. 72. 16 Relative gains can be defined as a situation in which 'a state worries about a division of possible gains that may favour others more than itself.' Waltz, Ibid., pp. 102-3. For more on this see, Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization 42:3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-507. 25 Nuclear Weapons: Who Should or Should Not Have Them? A study of the causes of war and conditions of peace comes close to what can be termed the research agenda guiding the majority of intellectual endeavour in IR. The neorealist argues that peace --understood in terms of the absence of a major war among great powers-- in the post-World War II era has prevailed because of the bipolar international system and advent of nuclear weapons as a means to deter the enemy.17 The effectiveness of nuclear weapons in ensuring peace between the two superpowers during the cold war was almost taken as an article of faith among realists.18 What made nuclear weapons qualitatively different from other weapons systems? If these weapons could lead to peace between the enemies in the Western world, could they have a similar effect in the non-Western world? These questions continue to cause vigorous debate among South Asianists. With territorial security as the key objective in a system of self-help, each state pursues deterrence policies best suited to its circumstances. Security, like most terms used in IR, is an ephemeral concept. Realists minimally define it as 'the protection of the homeland from military attack', whereas they define deterrence as a means to stop someone from doing something 17 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18:2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-47. 18 It will be nearly impossible to list all the major names and their works in the present context. Along with Waltz, Robert Jervis' works neatly summarize this argument. See, Robert Jervis, The Meaning of Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989). 26 by frightening them.19 Waltz argues that 'deterrence is not a theory. Instead, deterrence policies derive from structural theory'.20 The stabilizing role of nuclear weapons is due to the political effects their introduction have produced on statecraft.21 Given their immense destructive capacity which can be inflicted in a very short span of time, the use of force between two nuclear powers lies in preventing the out-break of war rather than the traditional preoccupation with winning the war.22 This makes nuclear weapons effective deterrents. Since the costs of risking a nuclear retaliation are very high, 'states are not likely to run major risks for minor gains'.23 In a world of conventional weapons, according to Waltz, adversaries usually resort to war through miscalculations. Nuclear weapons make deterrence transparent because one vis uncertain about surviving 19 Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Technology, Strategy, and the Uses of Force,", in, Robert J. Art, and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy, Second Edition (Lanham: University Press of America, 1983), p. 4 and 10. However, these definitions are functional at the best and vary from author to author even among those adhering to the same theoretical perspectives. For a recent attempt to clarify and adequately explicate the concept of security, see, David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security, " Review of International Studies 23 (1997), pp. 5-26. 20 Scot D. Sagan, and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.W.Norton, 1995), p. 112. This brief volume is an excellent companion for the understanding of current debate within mainstream U.S. academia on the stabilizing role of nuclear weapon with special reference to the spread (proliferation) of nuclear weapons to the Third World. Waltz and Sagan succinctly present their views which have evolved over the years in 150 pages. 21 Robert Jervis, "The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons," International Security 13:2 (Fall 1988), pp. 80-90. 22 Ibid. 23 Sagan and Waltz, 1995, p. 5 27 or being annihilated'.24 Given the certainty that the losses will invariably outweigh the gains of fighting, nuclear powers desist from waging war with each other. These statements appear rational as a result of the universal nature of the assumptions of neorealism. Taken to their logical conclusion, it is not difficult to see that if the thermonuclear weapons made miscalculation next to impossible in the East-West strategic interaction, then these weapons will serve the same purpose if applied in the context of the non-Western world. However, this point fundamental differences emerge between the vast majority of strategic analysts of the West, especially the U.S., and most of their counterparts in South Asia. In the light of a close liaison between self-proclaimed objective analysts and the policy-makers in the respective countries, Waltz's contention that deterrence is a policy and not a theory is worth remembering. As happens to be the case with most problem-solving theories, the policy-prescriptions provided by most scholars are echoes of their states' policies on the nuclear issue. Here, the same theoretical framework,i.e. neorealism, often leads to contradictory suggestions. Waltz becomes almost a solitary voice in the U.S. when he suggests that the spread of nuclear weapons in the Third World would lead to the same results as it did in the Cold War world. The majority of realists find faults with this position and consider the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Third World 24 Ibid. p. 7 28 countries as an ominous prospect.25 The West, especially the U.S., fears that unstable regimes in the Third World sometimes led by 'rogue' and 'authoritarian' leaders may resort to the nuclear option to settle unresolved questions. No wonder then the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan have attracted considerable interest in the U.S. The perceptions can range from outright sensational accounts based on historical inaccuracies to exploring serious policy alternatives to make sure that nuclear weapons are not overtly acquired by India or Pakistan. As an example of sensationalism William Burrows and Robert Windrem declare that 'the Indian subcontinent is the most dangerous place on Earth'.2S Discounting the plausibility of the argument of ensuring deterrence as the main objective behind Pakistan and India's nuclear programmes as 'elaborate excuses for developing nuclear weapons', Burrows and Windrem suggest that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent is genocide. These observations are based upon alleged incidents in 1990 when Pakistan and India came close to a nuclear confrontation.27 Even a scholar like George Perkovich who does not yield to sensationalism argues that in the aftermath of the Cold War 'the chance of local nuclear conflict among undeclared nuclear weapon 25 For a representative sample see, Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will it Resemble the Past?," International Security 16:3 (Winter 1991-2), p. 26. Jervis sees the prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons as a major threat to U.S. security in the post-Cold War period. 26 William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 351. 27 Ibid. powers has grown'. Considering the relationship between India and Pakistan as 'fraught with uncertainty', he thinks 'the danger is especially acute in South Asia'.28 Similarly, the Study Group of leading South Asianists of the U.S noticed 'the dangers of continued nuclear developments in the subcontinent' and called for American 'efforts to discourage and deter Indian programs to produce and deploy nuclear weapons' .29 An overwhelming majority of studies of the nuclear issue in South Asia conducted by American scholars are more concerned with serving the U.S. policy goals in the region rather than undertaking disinterested analyses. Stephen P. Cohen, renowned South Asian security analyst, best sums up the above point by maintaining that 'one would be foolish to advocate a policy which did not serve one's country's interests'.30 However, there have been exceptions to this rule and recently Devin Hagerty, critically examining the dynamics of nuclear deterrence in South Asia, went beyond the dictates of policy goals. Analyzing the strategic relations between Pakistan and India in light of the 28 George Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia," Foreign Policy 91 (Summer 1993), p. 85. For a more recent views of Perkovich on the subcontinent and the likely role of the U.S. see, George Perkovich, "India, Pakistan, and the United State: The Zero-Sum Game," World Policy Journal XIII:2 (Summer 1996), pp. 49-56. 29 See, Selig Harrison, and Geoffrey Kemp, India and America After the Cold War (Washington,D.C: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), p. 36. For a complete list of members of the Study Group, which comprised academics and practitioners, see, Ibid., pp. 57-62. 30 Stephen P. Cohen, "Preface",in , Stephen P. Cohen, ed., Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms Control (Boulder: Westview, 1991), p. xiv; also see, Stephen P. Cohen, ed., The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspective (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987). various perspectives for and against the value of nuclear weapons as stabilizers, Hagerty concluded that the presence of the nuclear factor has prevented inter-state war between the two countries .31 Barring occasional voices like Hagerty's, it is certainly ironic that the nuclear policy-related views of the most influential modern theorist of great power politics, namely Kenneth Waltz, will find their most vocal adherents in the world of lesser powers. Waltz favours the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, including Third World states, on the grounds that the historical evidence shows that only states with specific security needs have kept the nuclear option open. As long as the nuclear option remains an effective deterrent, they are unlikely to abandon it. This is accepted by advocates of nuclear deterrence in principle but they argue that due to the unstable nature of regimes and leaders in the Third World the probability of the use of nuclear weapons increases manifold in such regions. Waltz discounts this argument by maintaining that as far as the rationality of leadership is concerned, doubts about the sanity of Third World leaders are indicative of 'the old imperial manner' rather than a statement of truth.32 This view has become a standard argument for proponents of the nuclear option in South Asia. A detailed discussion of the South Asian scholars' viewpoints will be the focus of the 31 Devin T. Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," International Security 20:2 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 79-114. Sagan and Waltz, 1995, p.13. relevant chapters, here I will just draw attention to echoes of the Waltzian views in the subcontinent. Jasjit Singh, director of the New Delhi based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, outlines survival and prosperity as India's fundamental security goals. Bordered by declared (China) and undeclared (Pakistan) nuclear weapon states, the only viable option to ensure Indian security is through acquiring nuclear weapons.33 Noor A. Husain, former head of the Islamabad-based Institute of Strategic Studies, emphasizes the need for Pakistan to keep the nuclear option open in the wake of the Indian threat.34 In sum, the mainstream nuclear discourse in the subcontinent is heavily influenced by the Waltzian theory where other contending approaches of IR have exercised little or no influence. However, Waltz's theory has led to a voluminous response from different quarters, both critical and complimentary. Although it is not in the purview of this study to summarize the variety of responses to Waltzian theory, however, criticism emanating from two different perspectives regarding the key assumption of neorealism is relevant in this context. The assumption that all states are functionally alike and the organizing principle, namely anarchy, of the international system 33 Jasjit Singh, "India's Strategic and Security Interests," in, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, ed., Indo-US Relations in a Changing World: Proceedings of the Indo-US Strategic Symposium (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers in association with Institute for Strategic Studies and Analyses, 1990), p. 95; Also see, R. R. Subramanian, India, Pakistan, China: Defence and Nuclear Tangle in South Asia (New Delhi: ABC Books, 1989). 34 Noor A. Husain, "India's Regional Policy: Strategic and Security Dimensions," in, Stephen P. Cohen, ed., The Security of South Asia, p. 44. 32 compels them to be so is questioned both by scholars studying the Third World security issues, as well as those primarily interested in international relations of the West. I will briefly discuss the 'democratic peace theory' and 'obsolescence of war' perspective which have become the Western liberals' way of countering neorealism.35 This will be followed by an in-depth look at the sub-field of Third World security studies. Obsolescence of War and Peace Through Democracy Neorealism assumes that the anarchic nature of the international system makes all states functionally alike, and the concern with relative gains makes balancing against adversaries imperative for states. The introduction of nuclear weapons became the standard explanation of the 'long peace' that existed since 1945. Although neorealism did not deny that states differ significantly in their characteristics, it assumed them to be unitary actors in order to construct an elegant and parsimonious theory of international politics. This explanation of the 'long peace' has been challenged in two ways. First, John Mueller advanced the argument that war among modern Western nations had become obsolete because revulsion at destruction from conventional violence in total war has changed attitudes toward organized violence among states. And since wars start and end in peoples' minds the peace 35 Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Part 1, Summer 1983), pp. 205-35, (Part 2, Fall 1983), pp.323-53; John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989) . 33 among Western nations would have prevailed even without the introduction of nuclear weapons.36 Secondly, critics brought the 'state back in' and argued that one can ensure peace by encouraging certain types of states rather than weapon systems. Liberal democratic states came to be seen as unlikely to fight with each other.37 Mueller's thesis is based upon the idea that just as some of the other common practices of the past have been rendered redundant by changing attitudes toward them, war among modern nations has met the same fate. He cites the vanishing of the institution of duelling and institutionalized slavery as examples. Slavery became a controversial institution first, then peculiar, and ultimately an obsolete practice.38 He argues that attitudes toward war have changed too. Before World War I, there were few voices against the war; but the colossal human costs of war resulted in a change of attitude toward it.39 Simply put, unlike Waltz who thinks that nuclear weapons have played a restraining role, Mueller suggests that since wars start in the minds of people, their end also occurs there. And the decision-36 John Mueller, .Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989). 37 This argument was forcefully presented by Michael W. Doyle in 1983. This hypothesis sparked off a chain reaction of responses which continue to take up pages of research journals to date. My concern here would be to present the central argument rather than an overview of the debate. See, Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,". 38 Mueller, 1989, pp. 11-12. 39 For a good critical discussion of Mueller's ideas, see, Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay," International Security 14:4 (Summer 1990), pp. 42-64. 34 makers in the 'modern' states have realized that since war is a non-profitable and repulsive activity, they are unlikely to wage it. The democratic peace 'emphasizes the pacifying effects of democratic political institutions'.40 Drawing heavily upon the ideas of Immanuel Kant expounded in Perpetual Peace, this theory argues that representative regimes are less likely to resort to war because people in such entities oppose it mainly to avoid personal suffering and economic losses. Since political leadership is accountable to people, it is unlikely to impose war on them. Michael Doyle conducted an empirical analysis of the past two centuries and concluded that there has never been a war between two liberal democracies. So the logical conclusion was that the best recipe for peace lies in promoting and consolidating liberal democracy around the world rather than suggesting a further spread of nuclear weapons. I have tried to sum up two important critical responses to the Waltzian views on the dynamics of the international systems and the reasons behind the absence of a major war in the Western world during the past half century. However, these theories and models did not deal primarily with politics in the non-Western world. They had indirect, if any, relevance for analysts of Third World security who were increasingly pointing to the distinct security problematic of the Third World and suggesting conceptual lenses to come to grips with it. The remainder of the 40 Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence," in, Philip E. Tetlock, et. al.,eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 268. 35 chapter takes a critical look at the burgeoning sub-field of Third World security studies. A Distinct Third World Security Problematic Neorealism locates the causes of war in the anarchic nature of international system and explains peace (defined as absence of war between major powers) in terms of bipolarity'and the introduction of nuclear weapons. The 'democratic peace' theory is more concerned with the conditions of peace in the Western world and offers a state-centric explanation that liberal democracies are inherently more peaceful than other kinds of political systems. Analysts concerned with the causes of war and conditions of peace in the post-colonial world argue that the above frameworks are of little explanatory value for understanding the security dynamics of a world where war is mostly intra-state rather than inter-state. Problematizing the nature of the Third World state, this perspective deviates from the second tenet of neorealism, i.e, the functional similarity of all states in the international system. The result is a body of literature with two recognizable strands. Barry Buzan and Kal Holsti's works represent the first trait which conceptualize the international system in terms of 'strong' and 'weak' states where peace prevails in the former and the latter is the venue of societal disintegration and warfare. They raise important conceptual questions by offering a provocative reading of the security dilemmas of the post-colonial world. I argue that this perspective runs the risk of becoming the IR version of Orientalism due to its circular logic, symptomatic approach, and latent ahistoricism.41 The second trait is found in the works of Mohammed Ayoob, who emphasizes the qualitatively different milieu in which the state-building process is taking place in the post-colonial world. Ayoob's work is grounded in the historical context in which the post-colonial world operates. However, there is an implicit historical determinism in his project. The remainder of this chapter examines these perspectives starting with a critique of the 'weak states' model. 'Weak state' is a relative term and a state is denominated as such in comparison to the 'strong state' of the West. Third World security analysts generally perceive it as an entity containing 'various combinations of the following characteristics'.42 First, 'the ends or purposes of governance are contested...(and) the lines separating the state from civil society are blurred'. This exacerbates regime legitimacy. Second, 'there are two or more nations within the state'. Of these, 'one or more are commonly constructed as minorities not equals'. Third, the government apparatus may be "captured" or held by one group, which systematically excludes others. Fourth, 'the 41 My use of term is based upon Edward W. Said's thoughts. See, Edward W. Said, Orientalism (Penguin Edition, 1978). 'O r i e n t a l i s m is the generic term...to describe the Western approach to the Orient. It is the discipline by which the Orient was (and is) approached systematically, as a topic of learning, discovery, and practice', p. 73. The project is based upon creating binary opposites where 'the Orient is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, "different"; thus the European (in our case the Western) is rational, virtuous, mature, "normal", p. 40. 42 K. J. Holsti, "War, Peace, and the State of the State," International Political Science Review 16:4 (1995), pp. 331-2. 37 government is "captured" by a family or clan for the primary purpose of personal enrichment'. Fifth, 'major communal groups or ideological groups or nations identify with, or are loyal to, external states and/or societies; or significant segments of the population owe primary or exclusive loyalty to primordial groups'. Sixth, 'the state is incapable of delivering basic services or providing security and order for the population'. Seventh, 'the government relies primarily on violence, coercion, and intimidation to maintain itself in power'. Eighth, and considered by Holsti to be the fundamental distinction, 'the state lacks legitimacy', i.e., the authority of the ruler is not unquestioned. Holsti argues that the post-colonial nationalist leaders' right to rule 'was seldom validated by elections or plebiscites'. As a result, 'many of the new states are "weak"--not militarily, but in the sense that significant sectors of the population do not identify strongly with the post-colonial state'.43 This situation leads to isolation, disenfranchisement, and often brutal persecution of large sections of population in these societies. Consequently, what a 'weak state' regime portrays as 'national security' priorities may not be shared by large segments of the population. Buzan also consider the distinction between 'weak' and 'strong' states as a vital factor to any analysis of national security.44 His list of characteristics of a 'weak' state 43 K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 55. 44 Buzan, People, States, Security, p. 97. Buzan can be rightly credited with popularizing the notion of the 'weak states' in the security studies. However, in Holsti's recent works 'weak states' includes 'a high degree of state control over the media', and 'a conspicuous role for political police in the everyday lives of citizens' as hallmarks of a 'weak' state.45 Imagine something exactly opposite to the above narrative and what we have is a 'strong' (read Western) state. Therefore, 'strong states contain characteristics opposite of those found in weak states, as well as others'.46 Hence, 'in most modern industrial societies...there is a consensus that the purpose of the governance is- to help provide "the good" life for the individual', where power rotates among different social groups, 'and no group faces systematic persecution or denial of civil liberties and political office',47 However, one must take the above assertion with a pinch of salt. Even if the existing practices of the Western societies were taken as fixed givens, the historical discriminatory exclusion of significant communities-- for instance Blacks in the U.S., gays and lesbiana in many Western societies-- provide a marked contradiction to the above claim. However, the point is not to find faults with what are ideally described as 'strong states' characteristics. It suffices to say that the yardstick of measuring is firmly fixed with reference to the assumed practices of the contemporary concept is discussed in greater length. 45 Ibid. p. 100. 46 Holsti,"War, Peace, and the State of the State," p. 332. For a detailed discussion of the concept of the 'strong state' see, Kalevi J. Holsti, The States, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 82-98. 47 Ibid. p. 333. Western states.48 For the purposes of this study, I will concentrate on the reasons given by these authors to explain the relative 'weakness' of the post-colonial states and their consequent security dilemmas. Buzan is of little help in this regard, because assuming the unproblematic nature of these characteristics, he concludes rather desperately that 'whatever the reasons for the existence of weak states, their principal distinguishing feature is their high level of concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the government'.49 Such a conception, according to Simon Dalby, is a result of 'dehistoricizing the state' in which, Buzan , 'renders them(states) permanent, tying his analysis to the structural presumptions of an unchanging anarchy and the permanence of state security problems'.50 Holsti goes beyond just observing that regions of 'weak and failed states' are a prime location of war, and offers a tentative explanation of the 'weakness' of the post-colonial world. According to him, the modern Western states are based on two different 'foundations of legitimacy: historic-civic (examples, France, Spain, Sweden) and "natural"(Finland, Hungary, and the Baltic states)'. In the former, the state moulded the modern territorial nation, and in the latter the nation (as defined and, even created by elites) helped create the 48 The term 'Western' is quite problematic as well. Here, it refers to the countries of Western Europe, U.S.A., Japan, and white settler colonies,i.e, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 49 Buzan, Peoples, States, Security, p. 90. 50 Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse," Alternatives 17 (1992), p. 106. 40 state'.51 States based on the "natural" foundations refer to 'nations based on consanguinity and/or language and religion'; as against those which are based on the principle of history and territory(contiguity)." In Europe two 'hybrid' states,i.e, Yugoslavia and Czchekoslavia, were creations of diplomats 'not the results of some "natural" community to sovereign statehood'. These 'fictions' could not be turned into civic or "natural" communities by seventy years of the iron control and 'we are now seeing the results'.53 The above model is constructed without taking into consideration varied forms of state formation processes in the post-colonial world, and Holsti concludes that 'this is exactly the problem faced by many contemporary post-socialist and Third World states'. They did not meet the 'civic' nor 'natural' criteria of state legitimacy at the time of independence.54 Such a situation arose because the ex-colonies' claims for statehood were based primarily upon the negative priciple, i.e, 'liberation from colonialism'.55 National liberation movements were colored peoples rise against Western or Soviet domination, rather than programmes 'to build something new'.56 Hence, postcolonial states were not based on the positive achievements of a 51 Holsti, "War, Peace, and the State of the State," p. 327. 52 Ibid. , pp. 325-6. 53 Ibid., p. 327. 54 Ibid. 55 Holsti, 1996, p. 72. 56 Ibid. 41 historical community and its citizenship or on the "natural" bonds formed through history, consanguinity, language, and/or religion'. These states were carved out by bureaucrats or diplomats in London or Paris drawing straight lines on maps.57 Thus, at the time of independence, these states lacked the requisites of statehood, namely a defined territory, skills and organizations to administer a permanent population, and capacity to enter into treaty relations.58 An important reason for this was that colonial regimes failed to build the foundations of statehood. Lacking any positive grounds to demand independence, when the leaders of national liberation movements spoke of "self-determination" they hardly did so in the name of a "people", because no such "people"-- meaning a "natural" community-- existed. There were, rather, congeries of communal-religious groups, ethnicities, tribes, clans, lineages, and pastorals who wandered freely. Lacking "natural' communities or a national history of uniqueness which might legitimate their claims to statehood, they had to rely on the territorial creations and concoctions of the colonialists to define their hoped for communities.59 Hence, post-colonial states 'owe their creation more to the international community than to their own artificial communities'.60 As a result, the security policy of these states are not a response to external threats, but a weapon to quell threats that are rooted within the spatial boundaries of the 57 Holsti, 1995, p. 327. 58 Ibid. , p. 329. 59 Ibid. , p. 328. 60 Ibid., p. 329. Robert H. Jackson argues that most states of Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, not only owe their creation to the international community but survive mainly due to the 'sovereignty' norm propounded by the international community. See, Robert H. Jackson, "Quasi States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World," International Organization 41:2 (Autumn 1987). 42 respective state.61 My critique of the above formulation is guided by what I call its reliance on the epistemology of security orientalism, and its use grand generalizations and worst case scenarios which do not necessarily accurately depict either the history or the present of all post-colonial societies. In what follows, I rely on the subcontinent's encounter with colonialism and its post-colonial dilemmas to ascertain the relevance of the 'weak state' model, especially vis-a-vis South Asia. Distinct Problematic or Security Orientalism? For Buzan the "weak states' are perceived as fixed entities in the global system. This conception of the state system itself lacks a 'historical contexualization of the emergence of the modern state system' of which the Third World is a part'.62 While Holsti does give a historical explanation, his portrayal of the contemporary post-colonial world bears a striking resemblance to that of Buzan's. Hence what is defined as a 'weak' state turns out to be more of a symptomatic mixing of causes with effects rather than an analytical tool. Ironically, the analyses of Third World security since Buzan's pioneering work have assumed this dichotomy without critically examining it, thus reifying a questionable assertion. 61 Steven R. David, 1991, pp.233-42. 62 Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse," Alternatives 17 (1992), p. 102. In defining a 'weak' state, Buzan and Holsti mix causes with effects without clearly defining their relationships.63 For example, a weak state is where the question of legitimate use of force is unresolved (an effect); and the colonial demarcation of boundaries is to be blamed for a number of problems faced by these states(a cause). Such a mapping exercise is good as a categorizing tool but of a limited value as an analytical framework. Buzan tries to overcome this analytical limitation by introducing another ambiguous term , 'strong power'. For example, the Pakistani state is classified as a 'strong power' because it wields considerable coercive power, but remains a 'weak' state due to unsettled question of political legitimacy. Others echo this concern by arguing that 'legitimacy-- that authority which rests on the shared cultural identity of ruler and the ruled-- is the most precious resource of any regime' and states are 'weak' in the Third World because regimes there are constantly faced with legitimacy crises.64 In my view, dichotomizing states into binary opposites on the basis of such characteristics is indicative of 'logocentrism', which in this specific context becomes security orientalism.65 Logocentricism views the world in practical oppositions such as 63 The point of mixing causes with effects is made in another context by Yael Tamir, "The Enigma of Nationalism: Review Article, " World Politics 47:3(April 1995), pp. 418-40. But such confusion is common in the perspective of 'weak states' model. 64 Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler,eds., Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era, pp. 23-4. 65 On 'logocentrism' see, Richard K. Ashley, "Living on Borderlines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War," in, James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro, eds., International/Intertextual Relations, pp. 261-2. domestic/international, core/periphery'. Encountering such oppositions, 'the logocentric disposition inclines a participant in the regime of modernity to impose hierarchy,... (in) which one side can be conceived as a higher reality'. A model based on 'logocentric procedure' divides countries on the basis of their characteristics and establishes dichotomies of (us' and 'them', 'good' and 'bad' etc. The 'other' is judged and classified to be 'weak' in the context of how much different it is from 'us', i.e, the 'strong' West. The more striking the differences are, the weaker that state is. Hence, the difference itself becomes an explanation. This, in short, is security orientalism which juxtaposes the mature West with the infantile non-West and subordinates the latter into perpetual contrast with the former. The Pakistani state acts the way it does because it is 'weak', and its weakness is based upon its differences from the 'strong'/ West. That is nothing novel if we look at the 'modernization' model where differences between societies of the West and the non-West were juxtaposed as the difference between the 'developed' and the 'underdeveloped'." Of Unstable Regions and Weak States The interplay of weak states and regional security complexes further demonstrates the cyclical nature of the 'weak' states 66 For an overview of the Modernization and Dependency frameworks, see, Ted C. Lewellen, Dependency and Development: An Introduction to the Third World (Westport: Bergin & Garvey, 1995), pp. 50-138. 45 model. A 'region', in security terms according to Buzan, refers to a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity. The pattern of amity and enmity is the defining feature of a regional security complex in which the national security concerns of comprising states cannot be considered apart from each other. By amity, Buzan means, "relationships ranging from genuine friendship to expectations of protection or support; and enmity refers to 'relationship set by suspicion and fear'.67 'Weak' states, he argues, lead to regional instability, because the existence of 'weak' states in a region mean 'leaderships and ideologies are unstable,domestic turbulence spreads beyond their own borders, insecurity is endemic, and no state can rely on consistent patterns of attitude and alignment'.68 This model raises more questions than it answers on the following grounds. Rightly giving primacy to threat perceptions as the key variable in determining a regional complex, the lens is blurred by tying it with the weaknesses of the states in a region and the shape of a regional security complex. Rather than conducting rigorous case studies of the evolution of threat perceptions and danger portrayals in a given area, the argument becomes circular by asserting that the weaker the states are, the more unstable a regional security complex. It is implicitly assumed that an unstable regional security complex will most certainly be 67 Buzan, Peoples, States, and Fear, pp. 188-90. 68 Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," p. 16. 46 composed of 'weak' states and that two or more 'weak' states forming a security complex will inevitably lead to an unstable region. Buzan and Rizvi selected South Asia as the simplest 'regional security complex' with the Indo-Pakistan amity/enmity at its centre. But, what is unclear is whether it is the 'weakness' of the Indian and Pakistani states that results in a high level of enmity among them, or is it their bilateral 'enmity' which prevents these states' movement toward the 'stronger' end of the continuum. Furthermore, enmity defined in terms of suspicion and fear of one another is an ever changing process conditioned by political forces in respective societies, rather than a predetermined condition. Processes and practices which contribute to the creation and sustenance of suspicion and fear need to be closely and critically analyzed rather than viewed as objective conditions in search of documentation. Looking at the Pakistani example, it is not an amazing discovery to observe its animosity with India; more interesting would be to see how the Indian threat is projected to consolidate the foundations of a Pakistani identity. But Holsti does offer an historical explanation. However, the next section argues that methodology of security orientalism is evident in his reading of history too. Of Historical Insights and Historical Fallacies Going beyond the epitaphs of a symptomatic approach toward the contemporary post-colonial world, Holsti argues that the 47 weakness of Third World states emanates from their being neither based on 'historic' nor 'natural' foundations of nationhood, but 'fictions' created by diplomats and bureaucrats. Holsti takes the track of logocentricism in which complexities and specificities of colonial expansion and responses to it are sacrificed in order to pit the post-colonial experiences against vtrue' Western forms of statehood. Such readings of the non-Western world are a result of what T. N. Madan has aptly termed as three deceptions. First, they have had their traditions tampered with, eroded and invented, often with the help of anthropologists and historians... Second, they are deceived societies as they have their present transformed into a permanent transition: the developing societies will forever remain developing societies if they are to catch up with the so-called developed but, in fact, runaway societies. The seven industrialized countries (G-7) are even like the constellation of seven stars that point to the fixed pole star, but the goals of development do not remain fixed, they recede further away. Finally, these societies are deceived the third time over because their future has been pre-empted.69 A critical appraisal of Holsti's views regarding strategies of colonialists, forms of nationalism in the colonial world, and finally its effects on the postcolonial world is relevant in the' context of this study for the following reason. Once the analytical limitations of the traditional security studies to study post-colonial world become obvious, the 'weak' states model appears as a viable theoretical alternative. As the assumptions of this framework are based upon a particular view of nationalist movements in the former colonies, it is necessary to cast a 69 T. N. Madan, "Anthropology as Critical Self-Awareness," in, D. L. Sheth, and Ashis Nandy, eds., The Multiverse of Democracy: Essays in Honour of Rajni Kothari (New Delhi,Thousand Oaks, London: Sage, 1996), p. 263. critical look at that reading of history before using 'weak' states model's prescriptions for analyzing the security dilemmas of the post-colonial world. My critique is not based on privileging one form of nationalism over the other, and is more in line with Benedict Anderson's idea that 'communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but the style in which they are imagined'.70 Although examples primarily come from the Indian subcontinent, the objective is not to come up with a parallel history of the Raj but draw attention to possible problems with Holsti's generalizations about the security predicament of post-colonial states' based on a particular reading of anti-colonial nationalisms. The roots of the 'weakness' of a Third World state, according to Holsti, can be traced to their creation by diplomats and bureaucrats in London or Paris and the colonialists' avoidance of building the foundations of statehood. A cursory look at Indian history does not necessarily attest to such assertions. The colonial in India expansion was not simply an outcome of bureaucratic meetings in London, but a result of multi-faceted strategies and encounters with complex set of political systems prevalent in the subcontinent. It was a lengthy, gradual and intricate process.71 The colonial form of 70 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised Edition(London,New York: Verso, 1991) p. 6. 71 One of the best depictions of this process is a film by prodigious Satyajit Ray, Bengali film-maker, titled Shatranj ke Khilari (The Chess Players) which painstakingly documents the ultimate take-over of the kingdom of Oudh in the mid-nineteenth century. The film is based upon a short story by Munshi Prem Chand, well known Hindi/Urdu writer of Northern India. See, Satyajit Ray, 49 rule evolved a complex set of procedures to consolidate one of the three elements of statehood as described by Holsti, i.e, 'skills and organizations to administer a permanent population', as early as nineteenth century. The British parliament allocated funds in 1813 to promote a particular form of native education in Bengal.72 These efforts culminated in 1834 with the publication of the now famous Macualay Minute on Education which proposed the introduction of a thoroughly English education system to 'create a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals and in intellect'.73 Proceeding on the basis of the questionable assertion that colonialism did not create institutions of statehood, Holsti argues that the idea that 'fictions called colonies' could become independent states emerged only after WWI. And independence movements were based on the negative ground of anti-colonialism rather than positive foundations of 'civic' or 'natural' nationalism. The demand for home-rule is certainly a twentieth century phenomenon, but that is a restrictive reading of nationalism in India. As Partha Chatterjee convincingly argues, 'we have all taken the claims of nationalism to be a political movement much too literally and much too seriously'.74 He shows Sh'atranj ke Khilari (Calcutta: D.K. Films Enterprise, 1977) . 72 Anderson, 1991, p. 90. 73 Ibid. p. 91. 74 Partha Chatterjee, Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1993) p. 5. Chatterjee's works are a valuable reading for a better understanding of India's encounter with colonialism and its 50 that social and spiritual nationalism established its sovereignty well before the political nationalism's battle against the imperial powers. Chatterjee demonstrates how nineteenth century Bengal augmented its national identity in the cultural and linguistic realm well before the political national movement. Suffice it to say that politics (of which sovereign statehood is one form) is an integral aspect of nationalism but not the only one. However, even if we accept the exclusively elite-centred notion of nationalism, the national liberation movement(s) in India belie Holsti's claim that these were neither based on 'natural' nor 'historical' grounds and their leaders hardly spoke of a 'people' because no such 'people' existed. In fact, two forms that anti-colonial movement in India took, i.e, All India Muslim League's (AIML) demand for a separate state for the Muslims of the subcontinent and Indian National Congress' (INC) secular view of the Indian nation, distinctly resemble 'natural' and 'historical' grounds of community respectively. The Two Nation theory of the (AIML) was a successful manifestation of a nationalism based on 'consanguinity'. According to the AIML, Muslims in India constituted a separate community with religion as the ultimate defining and distinguishing characteristic. The overwhelming support by Muslims of the subcontinent for the idea and the creation of Pakistan was based upon what Holsti terms the principle of 'natural community'. The Indian National Congress (INC), on the other hand, imagined the Indian nation in postcolonial predicaments. 51 a 'historic-civic' fashion. Rather than relying 'on the territorial creations and concoctions of the colonialists to define their hoped for communities'75, leaders of the INC envisioned India as a civilizational entity which had a distinct identity. A cursory look at the writings of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, to name just two, would prove that they indeed spoke of self-determination in the name of people.76 By way of summation I argue that the 'weak' states model--premised upon security orientalism-- is certainly a step ahead of traditional West-centred security studies by virtue of trying to locate the security prbolematic of the Third World states in a broader framework, but it falls short of becoming a viable alternative due to the points raised in the preceding pages. A Unique Milieu or Latent Historical Determinism The significance of Mohammed Ayoob's contribution lies in grappling with limitations of the 'weak' states model by emphasizing the drastically different milieu in which most of the Third World countries strive for nation- building and state-formation. Rather than juxtaposing the non-West with the West, he emphasizes the context in which 'new states' are undergoing the state-building phase and concentrates on this process. Relying on 75 Holsti, "War, Peace", 1995, p. 328. 76 When I argue that the two form of anti-colonial movements in the subcontinent represented what Holsti terms as 'civic' and 'natural' forms of nationalisam, . it does not imply that these forms were successfully implemented in the postcolonial period. 52 the work of Charles Tilly77 to demonstrate that the process of state formation in Western Europe was turbulent, violent and time consuming, Ayoob argues that Third World states are trying to replicate the European model within a shorter time span and amid pressure of international norms concerning democracy. This process is taking place in the context of a "highly troubled inheritance of colonialism'.78 The primary objective of the Third World elite is *to reduce the deep sense of insecurity from which Third World states and regimes suffer domestically and internationally'.79 For a better understanding of a Third World state's security predicament, Ayoob puts the state-building process at the centre with emphasis on four inter-related political factors outlined by Tilly. The first function in the state-formation concerns war making (elimination of external enemies) activities of an independent entity; the second function is the elimination or neutralization of internal enemies which is termed state making,- the third relates to the protection of the population; and the fourth is extraction of resources.80 Ayoob defines the concept of security in political terms and in relation to * the challenges to the survivability and effectiveness of states and regimes'. In accord with Buzan and Holsti the question of disputed legitimacy in these societies is 77 See , Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 3-83. 78 Mohammed Ayoob, 1995, pp. 21-47. 79 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 0 See Tilly, 1975, pp. 3-81. 53 given prominence. However, he asserts that elites in the Third World concentrate more on accumulation of power than creating popular legitimacy. Ayoob maintains that this preoccupation of elites leads to the security predicament of Third World countries which are in the early stages of state-making.81 Colonialism further compounded the state-making efforts by installing administrative apparatuses with no regard to local population, stifling economic transformation, and its use of traditional centres of authority to perpetuate alien rule.82 This approach is a step forward in the 'weak' state model because it contexualizes the Third World security problematic in a global framework, and concentrates on process rather than the symptoms associated with the state-making and security policies of non-Western countries. Its emphasis on the violent and lengthy process which the national states of Western Europe had to undergo alerts us against any notion of states as fixed entities frozen in the time-frame. However, in its bid to provide us an all-encompassing explanation of the security predicament of the Third World countries, it hits the same dead end as the 'weak state' model on several fronts. First, attributing a wide variety of problems to the common denominator of the colonial legacy overlooks the different routes taken and the different results achieved by the post-colonial state-managers. Blaming colonialism for ills afflicting the contemporary Third World absolves some of the most 1 Ayoob, 1995, pp. 11-28. 2 Ibid., pp. 34-37. 54 corrupt postcolonial elites of the responsibility they must share for the unpleasant outcomes in these societies which are a direct outcome of their acts rather than limits imposed by the colonial legacy. For example, the overwhelming reliance on force by the Pakistan army to suppress the Bengali movement for autonomy ultimately turned out to be an exercise in state-destruction rather than state-building. Second, the claim that the Third World state is a late entrant in the international state system somewhat undermines the definition of what constitutes the state-building process. For example, at the time of independence, the Indian state was equipped with fairly efficient administrative and extractive apparatuses. What most of these states lacked were political authorities at the helm of affairs enjoying popular legitimacy over a population with an agreed upon political identity. Therefore, what is implied in the Ayoobian model by state-making is somewhat similar to the principal element by which the Buzanian model divides states into the 'weak' and 'strong', i.e, the legitimacy crisis. Conclusion A meaningful avenue to approach and analyze the lack of legitimacy is offered by conducting historically-specific studies of attempts in the post-colonial societies to create new selves. That is the subject-matter of the next chapter for which Holsti's following observation is a take-off point: 55 The attempts to create "nations" where none existed before drive secessionist and irredentist movements, most of which take a violent form under the rubric of the inherent right of self-determination. Without a nation, a state is fundamentally weak.83 Before proceeding to the next chapter, answer to a crucial question would contextualize the preceding discussion. The question is: What does the discussion conducted in this chapter have to do with the study of nukespeak in the subcontinent? At the beginning of the chapter, I indicated that postulates of neorealism remain dominant theoretical framework for a vast majority of writings regarding the nuclear issue in the subcontinent. Neorealism's analytical potential, however, is severely constrained when it comes to look inside the workings of the state to understand and explain security policies. This is because neorealists assume that the state is a unitary actor and security policies are devised in the wake of external threats. As the politics of the nuclear issue in the subcontinent is firmly rooted in the domestic politics of Pakistan and India, I had to seek theoretical alternatives to explain dynamics of the nuclear discourse. That is why I cast an indepth look at the Third World security studies, especially the *weak states' model, because it promised to look inside the state to explain security problematic of the non-Western world. In the preceding pages I have tried to demonstrate conceptual problems inherent in the 'weak states' model which make it incapable of explaining dynamics of Third World Holsti, "War, Peace", 1995, p. 330. 56 countries. The discussion was in part a review of literature and in part a preventive measure to become cognizant of trappings of security orientalism embedded in the 'weak states' model. However, there are grounds where intellectual agenda of Critical Security studies (the focus of the next chapter) and the 'weak states' model converge. First, both question rather than assume the unitary nature of the state while analyzing a security issue. Second, as they look inside the state to understand security policies, they acknowledge that demarcation between foreign and domestic affairs is not as rigid as neorealists would have us believe. In spite of these similarities, intellectual agenda of critical security studies is quite different from the 'weak states' model, and I believe, more promising to offer a better understanding of the Third World security issues. * * * * * * Following views of Ashis Nandy will serve as a prelude to the next chapter and constitute epistemological guidance for this author. Writing about his own works he maintains they are 'not historical reconstruction of the past; they are part of a political preface to a plural human future'.84 His inspiration is works of non-Western intellectuals who knowingly or unknowingly 'are trying to ensure that the pasts and the presents of their cultures do not survive in the interstices of the 84 Ashis Nandy, The Savage Freud and Other Essays On Possible and Retrievable Selves ("Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) p. x . *6A contemporary world as a set of esoterica',85 Hence a concern that I share with such people These intellectuals implicitly recognize that for the moderns the South is already, definitionally, only the past of the contemporary West and the future of the South is only a glorified term for the present of the West.86 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. Chapter Two 57 REWRITING THIRD WORLD SECURITY II The discussion in the previous chapter suggests that the issue of legitimacy is at the heart of most of the societies termed as 'weak' states. The dynamics of this process are conditioned by differing historical contexts in the Third World. The 'weak states' model offers a neo-orientalist explanation of the security predicament among post-colonial countries, and the Ayoobian reading indirectly proposes a historical determinist explanation of these societies. Though a step ahead of neorealist theories, these perspectives are of little help to explain issues such as the dynamics of the nuclear discourse in the subcontinent. In this chapter, I put forward a new theoretical framework to tackle the politics of the nuclear issue in Pakistan and India through a two step strategy. First, I seek an alternative to the prevalent state-centered conceptualization in security studies by viewing the state as an integral part of the society. Second, I outline the salience of discourse analysis and genealogical methodology to offer an unorthodox perspective designed to highlight aspects of the politics of the nuclear .discourse that have been overlooked by existing studies of the issue. The moment the word discourse crops up in a study conducted within the ambit of security studies, it usually suggests the author's disenchantment with what are considered to be authentic theories of the sub-field. Out of this dis-satisfaction arises 58 the need to look elsewhere, to take a consumer analogy, to shop for other conceptual tools. In this regard, the works of social and cultural theorists like Michel Foucault and Tzvetan Todorov can be of significant assistance in sharpening our analytical tools while seeking to explain the observation stated in the introduction that no government in Pakistan or India can reverse or tamper with existing nuclear policies because these policies enjoy overwhelming popular support. A clarifying note is called for before the theoretical discussion. Security studies are not immune to the influence of Foucault and Todorov as their works have already influenced security scholars to conduct empirical studies using such methodology.1 However, studies in this genre almost exclusively centre on the security policies of the West. With appropriate modifications there is room, indeed need, to use the methodology of discourse analysis to help us to better explain the dynamics of nuclear politics in the subcontinent. The ideas discussed in this chapter are methodological tools intended to deconstruct what are generally taken as xfacts' in the dominant nuclear discourse in Pakistan and India. As a result, the whole issue is 1 For example, David Campbell has analyzed the U.S. security policies of the cold war era by incorporating Todorov's work in Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). See also James F. Keeley, "Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes," International Organization 44:1 (Winter 1990), pp. 83-105; Richard Price's work on the issue of chemical weapons is also influenced by Foucault's ideas. See, Richard Price, "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo," International Organization 49:1(Winter 1995), pp. 73-103. For an excellent overview of various strands of Critical Security Studies see, Keith Krause, "Critical Theory and Security Studies"(YCISS Occasional Paper Number 33, 1996), 26 pp. 59 'seen in a new way'.2 My reading of the politics of nuclear discourse in India and Pakistan falls squarely within the body of literature termed "Critical Security Studies" by Keith Krause. The justification for going beyond the traditional theoretical prescriptions and and incorporating critical theory in explaining a Third World security matter are found in the restrictive traits of mainstream IR theory. Yosef Lapid identifies three such interrelated limitations of International Relations theory in general, and by implication Third World security studies also, which necessitate the use of critical perspectives in analyzing security issues.3 First, the subject's 'fascination with sovereign statehood has greatly decreased its ability to confront complex issues of ethnic nationalism and political otherhood'. By and large, the existing accounts of the nuclear issue in the subcontinent show this fascination and tend to ignore the wider context in which nuclear discourse takes place. The new wave of scholarship in Third World security studies acknowledges this limitation and does suggest ways to address it. Gazing inside the workings of the 'weak' state becomes the benchmark of this perspective. Second, IR scholarship's overriding concern with predictability and 2 Ken Booth, "Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist," in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (Minneapolis ,MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 98. 3 Yosef Lapid, "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory," in Yosef Lapid, and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 10-11. 60 manipulability usually leads it to turn words into fixed and immutable objects. Hence, the focus is primarily on 'entities rather than processes'. In this regard, the literature on the nuclear issue remains tied to notions like national interests and international anarchy without acknowledging the spatio-temporal context of such categories. Even the xweak states' model, despite its claim to concentrate on processes rather than entities, is heading in that direction.4 The Ayoobian framework, by concentrating on the processes of state-building in the Third World, does avoid the entity-centric approach but implicitly advocates historically deterministic explanations. Lastly, IR's infamous propensity to intellectual isolationism and parochialism remains a well-entrenched problem that makes mainstream security analysts wary of trying un-conventional means of analysis. These limitations can be overcome by focusing on the issues of a twin-edged process of identity formation in which the defining of dangers/threats blurs the line between the external and internal realms of affairs; and the means by which identities are to be preserved. Through a critical reading of the nuclear discourse in the subcontinent, I offer not only a better understanding of the politics of the nuclear issue but also show that critical methodology can be used to expand the narrow horizon of existing perspectives. To begin with, I outline the contours of critical security studies. This is followed by an exploration of the analytical utility of discourse analysis and genealogical method for a 4 See Chapter One for more details. 61 critical reading of nuclear discourse in the subcontinent. In the final section I discuss distinct historical factors of the subcontinent that ought to be kept in mind while reading the subsequent chapters. Awareness of these factors enables the reader to appreciate the different dynamics in which dominant discourses on security take place in the subcontinent as compared with 'modern' Western societies . Critical Security Studies and the Third World A critical approach starts with the premise that "theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have perspectives. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space'.5 On this basis, Robert Cox divides theories in two broad categories, namely, problem-solving theories and critical theories. A problem-solving perspective takes the world as a given framework for action, whereas critical theorizing strives to keep a distance from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about. Concerned with a continuing process of historical change, critical theory calls institutions and ideologies of the existing order into question. Acknowledging the social nature of theoretical activity, a critical perspective does not pretend to be an objective rendition of reality. Critical theory also attempts to show how various problem-solving perspectives serve 'particular national, sectoral, or class 5 Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory," in Robert 0. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 207. 62 interests' in spite of their claims to being value-free theories.6 This distinction serves as the dividing line between the approach I adopt in this study and the existing literature on nuclear discourse in the subcontinent. I attempt to show the problem-solving ethos and subjective nature of the rhetoric on patriotism and security in which the nuclear issue is wrapped in Pakistan and India. The critical approach can help immensely, in undertaking such a study, by enabling the analyst to rise above the narrow confines inherent in the problem-solving perspective. However, critical security studies is far from a unified field. It is an umbrella term with quite varied groups of analysts in terms of the intellectual influences and emphases of their studies. Despite such differences, which are often seen as irreconcilable by some, what sets critical theories apart from the mainstream perspectives is the way in which the former view the activity of theorizing and the social and political role which theories and theorists play. Krause lists six 'foundational claims at the core of critical approaches to International Relations'.7 These are First, 'the principal actors (subjects) in world politics--whether these are states or not-- are social constructs, and products of complex historical processes'; second, 'these subjects are constituted (and reconstituted) through political practices that create shared social understanding; this process of constitution endows the subjects with identities and interests (which are not "given" or unchanging); third, 'world politics is not static or unchanging, and its "structures" are not determining', since they are socially constructed; fourth, 'our knowledge of the 6 Ibid., p. 209. 7 Keith Krause, 1996, p. 5. 63 subjects, structures and practices of world politics is not "objective"; fifth, 'the appropriate methodology for social sciences is not that of the natural sciences. Interpretive methods that attempt to uncover actors' understandings of the organization (and possibilities) of their social world are the central focus of research; and finally, 'the purpose of theory is not prediction (control) or the construction of transhistorical, generalizable causal claims; contexual understanding and practical knowledge is the appropriate goal.8 According to Krause, critical scholarship in the field of security studies can be divided into three categories by virtue of their subject-matter. First, there are 'studies of the construction of "objects" of security' which depart from the dominant neorealist object of the security, i.e, state, and cover issues like environment and migration. Second, there are studies of 'evaluation of the possibilities for amelioration or transformation of security dilemmas'. Scholarship in this area looks at hitherto unconventional means to overcome the security dilemma. The final category relates to 'examination of the construction of threats and appropriate responses'.9 The focus of the present study is concerned with an examination of the construction of threats (in this regard how Pakistan and India are portrayed by each other) and appropriate responses to such threats. The nuclear option thus arises both in India and Pakistan as one of the appropriate means suggested to ensure national sovereignty. The study also discusses a web of factors in which the above issue is intertwined. It attempts to 8 Ibid. Krause expands the above points in pp.5-10 to clarify some common stereotypes associated with various strands of critical theory activities in IR. 9 Ibid. p. 10. 64 explain the manner in which the nuclear issue in Pakistan and India has assumed the power of bringing down governments which might contemplate deviating from the existing stance. A critical look at the nuclear discourse in the subcontinent not only offers a new explanation of that specific issue but, if looked in holistic terms, would address four aspects described by Ken Booth as areas where critical security studies can make a valuable intellectual contribution. These are to provide critiques of traditional theory, to explore the meanings and implications of critical theories, to investigate security issues from critical perspectives, and to revision security in specific places.10 This study is a step in the above direction. The previous chapter offered a critique of the prevalent perspectives on Third World security. This chapter explores how critical security studies can facilitate a better understanding of the dynamics of nukespeak in the subcontinent. By shattering the established * truths' prevalent in the nuclear discourse in Pakistan and India through critical security studies, I intend to offer a better explanation of the issue and further stimulate contestability rather than supplant one existing paradigmatic orthodoxy with another--foreclosing the possibility of contending views on the issue. What if not the State? Security analysts have explicit or implicit theories of the state 10 Ken Booth, 1997, p. 108. 65 which exercise significant influence in available accounts of security policies. According to the neorealist version of world politics the international system is composed of monolithic entities called states which have survival as their key imperative. Critics, especially the Third World security analysts, argue that there two types of states in the international system, namely, weak and strong, rather than undifferentiated entities as neorealists would have us believe. The first step toward a better understanding of Third World security in general and nuclear discourse in the subcontinent would be to move away from grand theories of the state and to conceptualize the state as part of a society. Foucault, somewhat polemically, refrained from the theory of the state xin the sense that one abstains from an indigestible meal'." This observation is based on the understanding that the state has no inherent propensities or essence, and the nature of the institutions of the state is rooted in an ever-changing societal fabric. The shape and character of a society is weaved in an inherently historic process, in which society is continually tearing itself apart and thereby at the same time endlessly remaking its own fabric. The activity of government, as an organic component of the evolving social bond, participates in this historic passage through a range of distant, consecutive social forms.12 Such a conception of society and its attendant power relations 11 Colin Gordon,"Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," in, Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality: With two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 4. Ibid. p. 22. 66 contexualizes the security policy of a given state as responses to the constant making and remaking dynamics of the societal fabric in which the internal and external realms are intertwined. This view shuns the teleological tendencies of the 'weak states' model which implicitly suggests that 'others are now what we were before'.13 Avoiding fallacies of grand generalizations and historical determinism, one is required to familiarize oneself with the histories of the societies in question, knowing full well that history neither 'obeys system, nor that its so-called laws permit deducing the future' .14 Moving beyond the theories of state and considering states as un-finished entities in constant need of reproduction, I situate the nuclear discourse in the subcontinent within the contours of the dominant discourses regarding the national identities of Pakistan and India. This methodology is in line with what David Campbell identifies as the logic of interpretation which 'acknowledges the improbability of cataloging, calculating, and specifying 'real causes,' and concerns itself instead with considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another'.15 This mode of thinking conceptualizes security discourses as a means through which the constant articulation of external dangers is used to carve-out and maintain a particular version of national identity for a 13 Tzvetan Todorov, The Morals of History, Alyson Waters,trans., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), p. 6. 14 Todorov, 1992, p. 254. Campbell, 1992, p. 4. 67 state. Therefore, neither the sources of the danger nor the identity which it supposedly threatens is static. They keep changing, depending on an ever-shifting political milieu. For example, the kind of identity the Shah contrived for Iran never projected the United States as a danger. But the Iran of the Ayatollahs considers the United States as the greatest Satan and evil, hence a danger to the new republic. The same can be said of the United States' security policy in which Islamic fundamentalism has become one of the new threats to the U.S. in the post-cold war period. This, however, does not imply trivialization of the effects of issues portrayed by states as threats. Mainstream perspectives in security studies sanctify balance of power theories which fail to recognize the shifting and subjective nature of threat projections in conditioning countries' foreign policies. The 'weak states' model runs the same risk by deciding a priori that threats to the post-colonial states are primarily internal rather than external. As we shall see, the methodology based on discourse analysis neither assumes the objectivity of external threats nor reduces the security policies of the Third World countries to the single factor explanation of internal threats. Tensions between what is termed the genuine national identity of a state by the dominant discourse and its heterogeneous reality are ever-present because 'in no state is temporality and spatiality perfectly aligned'.1S This dilemma and the efforts to resolve it are one of the key driving force 16 Ibid. , p. 144. 68 behind the security policies of states across the globe. In other words, this is a common denominator of security policies that is characteristics of a 'strong' state like the U.S. and a 'weak' state like Pakistan. Evolving a national identity by resorting to the use of external dangers is often based upon some conception of an 'imagined community' ., In the process, security policy accounts of the so-called realist policy-makers and policy-analysts become imbued with moral issues. As a result, the U.S. security policy becomes a moral crusade of freedom against the 'evil empire', India's nuclear stance becomes a symbol of resistance to an unjust and unequal international system, and Pakistan's nuclear option becomes an expression of the will of Islam against expansionist India. The goal of negotiating and striking a delicate balance between the imagined community and the reality of existing heterogeneity often propels security discourses. In the process, externalizing the danger to the imagined community becomes one common feature of security policies. But this is never a linear or evolutionary process in which heterogeneity with its attendant troubles is ultimately destined to lead toward 'contrived monoliths' .17 Eschewing the desire to create a distinct theory of a proto-Third World state we turn to discourse analysis for a more meaningful way to understand the nuclear discourse in Pakistan and India. 17 Contrived monoliths is Ayesha Jalal's term for the present-day India and Pakistan. See, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 201-46. Discourse of Threats and Appropriate Responses 69 Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times .18 Construction of the self in the wake of external dangers becomes a common way to build national identities. In the following section, the uses of genealogical methodology and discourse analysis as an alternative way to understand nuclear discourse in India and Pakistan are outlined with a focus on the dynamics by which defining external dangers becomes a means of constructing an imagined national community in the two countries. An important activity of governments in the Third World, as well as in first world countries like the United States, has been efforts to forge a national identity by means of externalizing dangers.19 Critical security studies focuses on how threats are defined and constructed, along with the appropriate responses devised to meet such threats. According to Keith Krause, a critical reading of security policies would ask: 'how, from the welter of information and interaction among states and their 18 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in The Foucault Reader, Paul Rabinow, ed.,(London: Penguin, 1984),p. 76. 19 Empirically rich accounts of the use of external dangers to legitimize the U.S. foreign policy are provided by works of Noam Chomsky. For an example see, Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy, Seventh Print (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995). As Chomsky is viewed as an 'outsider' in IR academia, for works within the disciplinary confines of IR see, David Campbell's Writing Security. Keith Krause's overview of critical security studies is an excellent place to tap sources that offer studies on the above lines. See Keith Krause, "Critical Theory and Security Studies," 1996. 70 representatives, are threats constructed, and mobilized against?'20 This is a markedly different approach from the dominant neorealist view of the world in which threats and interests xin a self-help system arise from the material capabilities of possible opponents'.21 A critical view contests the objectivity of threats and considers them a result of constructs which are ever-changing and are determined by history, culture, ideologies and related factors. The study of threat construction is a well defined research area that is best complemented by an analysis of the possible responses put forward as security policies. As Krause concisely puts it, 'this literature has drawn attention to "nukespeak"-- to the linguistic construction of the nuclear debate, and the ways in which weapons were "normalized" or opponents trivialized in order to promote particular nuclear deterrence policies'.22 At this point, the relevance of genealogical methodology cannot be overlooked. Genealogy is not a theory making claims of an encompassing explanation of varied historical situations,- it is, at best, a methodological tool which helps to unravel the artificiality of statements that are presented as objective truths. It is a method that xrequires patience and knowledge', and which 'demands relentless erudition',23 Rather than sanctifying the historical origins of an issue xthe genealogist 20 Keith Krause, 1996, p. 16. 21 Ibid. , p. 15. 22 Ibid. , pp. 17-18. 23 Foucault,"Nietzche, Genealogy", p. 77. 71 needs history to dispel the chimeras of the origin'.24 As such, it closely examines the conditions in which some facts assume the role of truth and define rules of conduct in an issue area. Foucault has termed this to be an analysis of 'regimes of practices'.25 Practices in this context are understood to be places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted, meet and intersect. An analysis of 'regimes of practices' questions how things come to be seen as natural and self-evident. The following account of nuclear discourse in Pakistan and India attempts to dispel the chimeras of origins regarding the contemporary truths of nukespeak in the subcontinent. Regimes of truth are mostly based upon a certain form of rationality.26 And subcontinental nukespeak, as we shall see, functions with its own form of rationality. By employing genealogical method one tries to shake the foundations of self-evidence of the 'regime of practices' by 'making visible not its arbitrariness, but its complex interconnection with a multiplicity of historical processes, many of which them (are) of recent date' .27 Recent intellectual projects undertaken by critical security analysts have made a creative use of genealogical method and discourse analysis to re-vision the security policies and issues 24 Ibid. p. 80. 25 M. Foucault, "Question of Method," in, Graham Burchell,et al., The Foucault Effect, pp. 73-86. 26 Ibid., p. 79. 27 Ibid., p. 75. 72 of the contemporary world. Along with David Campbell, Simon Dalby, James F. Keeley and Richard Price have respectively analyzed different aspects of the security discourse in the U.S., international regimes and the chemical weapons taboo .28 These analysts have not confined themselves to criticizing the mainstream perspectives only, but have also tried to offer postmodern readings of the issues that have traditionally been a forte of strategic studies. All of them see the utility of discourse analysis in offering a better and improved interpretation of the security issues which are the focus of their respective studies. I contend that this methodology has the potential to further our understanding of nuclear discourse in the subcontinent as well. In his analysis of international regimes, James Keeley takes the notion of discourse to mean statements which define a phenomenon; provide a basis for analyzing, assessing, and evaluating it; and provide guidance for action with respect to it in terms of both ends and means.29 A key dynamic of a discourse (regime of practices) lies in endorsing 'certain language, symbols, modes of reasoning, and conclusion'.30 Simon Dalby also uses the term discourse in a Foucauldian sense and argues that 'social life is understood in and through language, and hence the structure of language reflects and 28 Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics (New York and London: Guilford and Pinter, 1990) ; James F. Keeley,"Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes," 1990; and Richard Price, "Chemical Weapons," 1995. 29 Keeley, 1990, p. 91. 30 Ibid. 73 creates social life'.31 In this context he highlights the socially constructed nature of discourse whereby language becomes a vehicle of furthering particular discourses. As he puts it, Discourses are much more than linguistic performances, they are also plays of power which mobilize rules, codes and procedures to assert a particular understanding through the construction of knowledges within these rules, codes, and procedures... they provide legitimacy, and indeed provide the intellectual conditions of possibility of particular institutional and political arrangements.32 Once understood in terms of discourse, the language employed by security analysts and policy-makers becomes more than an objective analysis or representation of a state's national interest. Such statements by decision-makers and analyses by experts are seen by discourse analysts as expressions of particular interests and justifiers of a distinct regime of practices or truth. Using the discourse analysis methodology, a critical appraisal of security discourse will help us to unravel the subjectivity of statements which are presented as objective truths. The myth of objectivity regarding 'truth' is challenged by conceiving truth xas a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint'." In line with Foucault, my analysis attempts to contextualize socio-cultural limitations and specifications of statements circulated as truths of the nuclear issue. As this discourse is conducted within the context of the respective societies, we have to keep in mind 31 Dalby, 1990, p. 5. 32 Ibid. 33 Foucault, "Truth and Power," in The Foucault Reader, p. 73. 74 Foucault's following obervation: Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.34 As I show in the following chapters, nuclear discourse in the subcontinent has its xgeneral politics of truth' in which certain types of statements are made to function as true and thus serve as informal rules by which some statements are designated as accurate reflections of national interests and others as anti-national viewpoints. In other words, this general politics of truth sanctifies certain means and topics of inquiry and dismisses others. This in turn, creates the Pundits and Dalits (Untouchables) in the nukespeak hierarchy of the subcontinent. The question of truth is not isolated from issues of power and rights. In the triangle of truth, power, and right Foucault observed a close relationship where 'there can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of association'.3S To put it simply, xwe are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the 34 Ibid., p. 73. 35 Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in, Michael Kelly, ed., Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), p. 31. Foucault delivered "Two Lectures" in 1976 and they offer a very good overall view of his research strategies. 75 production of truth'.36 Therefore, the discourse of truth is not a mere linguistic construction but an engine of power whose effects can be felt at different levels. As such it is through discourses of truth that We are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a function of the true discourse which are the bearers of the specific effects of power.37 Nukespeak in the subcontinent is couched in terms of truth and it is necessary to appraise its effects of power. I illustrate this in the following chapters by problematizing assertions which are ususally considered to be axiomatic. As a general rule, an analysis of a regime of discourse, in this case the nukespeak in Pakistan and India, questions the objectivity of so-called self-evident truths regarding a subject-matter by viewing them as products of specific historical circumstances and statements that are subject to manipulation. However, these discourses once in place have the capacity to manipulate the participants in it, as well as influence the shape of things to come in that area. Hence, it is a mutually constitutive process where both the agency and the structure shape and re-shape each other. That makes the discourse analysis a suitable methodology to undertake projects aimed at writing histories of the present. It is the topical nature of nukespeak in the subcontinent that warrants the study of the underlying rules, both formal and informal, that enable nukespeakers to prescribe the forms of 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. p. 32 76 thinking, writing, and policy-making possible on the issue. Such an effort is a history of the present because it tackles an issue which preoccupies the political agendas of contemporary Pakistan and India. A history of the present is neither purely theoretical nor purely historical. It does not try to capture the meaning of the past, nor does it try to get a complete picture of the past as a bounded epoch, with underlying laws and teleology.38 Beginning with an issue that concerns analysts and practitioners of the present era, a history of the present seeks to trace how such rituals of power arose, took shape, gained importance, and affected politics in the discourse under analysis. Words such as danger and threat fascinate security analysts. What, however, is generally overlooked by traditional security analysts is the fact that, in the security discourse of states, events and factors which are identified as dangerous become so only through an interpretation of their various dimensions of dangerousness. This interplay results in a political discourse, i.e, the representation and constitution of xreal' where some statements and depictions come to have more value than others.39 Seen in this context, the nuclear discourse in Pakistan and India can meaningfully be viewed as political practices central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of their national identities through the invocation of themes of threats and dangers. 38 Campbell, 1992, p. 4. 39 Ibid. , pp. 2-6. 77 The contrivance of monolithic identities in hybrid societal realities plays a pivotal role in what we call the security policy of a Third World country. As Todorov outlines in the case of the conquest of America, this process of discovering and defining of the Self can only take place by defining it against the Other.40 Read in conjunction with Foucault's notion of discourse, Todorov's case study of the encounter between Europeans and native Americans helps significantly to contextualize the nukespeak in Pakistan and India. The combined themes explored by Foucault and Todorov strongly resonate in the nuclear discourse of Pakistan and India. According to Todorov, the Other can be conceived as an abstraction-- other in relation to myself; or else as a specific group to which we do not belong. This group can be interior to society: Blacks during the apartheid regime in South Africa or women in modern societies; or it can be near or far away from the territorial delimitations of the country in question. For the United States during the Cold War danger emanated from the geographically distant Soviet Union, which was considered to be an xevil empire'. Similarly, for Pakistan it is India that becomes the main danger to its independent identity. Todorov's study of two forms of relationship between the colonial and the colonized as a model to understand the dynamics of one's relationship with the Other can further help us in contextualizing nukespeak in the subcontinent. On the one hand, 40 Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other, Richard Howard, trans. (New York: HarperPerennial, 1992 edition). 78 the colonizer saw the colonized as a human being, having the same rights as himself. In that case, the colonized was not seen as an equal but rather identical, which led to assimilation. For example, native Americans were seen as an equal by the European missionaries provided they embraced Christianity and became the same as enlightened Europeans. Or else the colonizer started from difference, which was immediately translated into terms of superiority and inferiority.41 In both forms, what is denied is the existence of a human substance truly other, something capable of an independent being, not merely an imperfect state of oneself. When the Europeans started from difference the Other was perceived and portrayed as an inferior. Once the difference was cast in terms of inferiority and superiority, the feeling of superiority engendered a paternalistic behavior.42 The dominant security discourse in post-colonial India and Pakistan exhibits this trend whereby the Other is portrayed as an inferior. An expression of this in the case of Pakistan's dominant discourse is equating all Indians with Hinduism, a religion which they consider inferior to Islam. On the other hand, for the state-managers of India, in contrast to their democracy, Pakistan is seen as the outcome of a parochial idea based on religion which serves as a fertile ground for dictatorships. In Pakistan and India these two forms discussed above become two edges of the same sword. These contrived monoliths suppress difference within their territorial limits in 41 Ibid., pp. 3-42. 42 Ibid. , p. 38. 79 the name of Islam and secularism respectively, and deny any similarity with what is considered as external/dangerous/inferior. Nuclear discourse is an integral part of this gamut of the dominant discourse in Pakistan and India. As the following chapters illustrate, nuclear politics cannot be divorced from the issue of identity in both countries. However, the task of turning the dominant episteme into a normal and unquestioned world-view of the constituent populations is seldom accomplished smoothly. For proponents of the dominant discourse in Pakistan, the self implies an identity based upon Islam as a unifying religion and Urdu as the national language of the country. Heterogenous societal reality asserts itself to defy such a national identity. Dynamics of these contradictions enmesh internal and external in two ways. On the one hand, by portraying India as a danger to the Pakistani identity-- read Urdu and Islam-- India is projected as a monolithic Hindu entity primarily interested in destroying Pakistan. Therefore, any internal resistance to the national identity based upon Urdu or Islam as the sole defining factors is interpreted as the doings of India. This scheme denies the fact that where there is a use of power (which is often coercive) to forge an identity, resistance to it is immanent in the process. This denial results in marginalizing, isolating, and in some cases violently suppressing movements or voices which do not fall within the orbit of the dominant lore about national identity. In this process, internal dissent is invariably tied to the external enemy. A Pathan secessionist becomes an Afghan agent, and a Sindhi separatist an Indian agent. The same can be said of India 80 in its relations with Pakistan. The latter is equated with difference. Difference is equated with 'theocracy' as compared to the pluralist and secular basis of India. These Pakistani characteristics become a danger to the secular Indian identity. Kashmiri militancy is attributed to the malicious designs of Pakistan rather than resistance to the failure of Indian identity to correspond with the Kashmiri reality. The nuclear discourse in the subcontinent, especially that of Pakistan, is closely tied to this process. The nuclear option is portrayed as a guarantor of the independent identity of an Islamic Pakistan against the evil designs of heathen India. The dominant Indian nuclear discourse strives to use the official policy on the issue as a sign of India's assertion as a regional power capable of resisting the global power structure. As a result of this, those sections of the intelligentsia who do not subscribe to the dominant discourse within both countries are portrayed as either actual or potential agents of external powers or as novices who do not comprehend what is in the national interests. Thus far I have outlined the analytical relevance of the methodology of discourse analysis and the value of the construction of the Other as a means to tackle the issue of the nuclear discourse in the subcontinent. Some of the literature cited in the preceding pages show how these methods have been used by critical security analysts to offer alternative interpretations of issues like U.S. security policy during the Gulf War or of taboo regarding use of chemical weapons. Moreover, I have indicated how this methodology could be relevant to 81 offering a better interpretation of the nuclear discourse in Pakistan and India. It is imperative at this juncture to ask the crucial question: can discourse analysis as employed by scholars to study the security issues of the First World be taken as a package deal and applied to the nuclear discourse in the subcontinent? I would exercise extreme caution in recommending or adopting such a strategy. This is because nuclear discourse in post-colonial Pakistan and India takes place in a different context conditioned by the distinct legacy of colonial rule. Before proceeding to the case studies, I outline distinctive features of this legacy in order to be cognizant of these factors while reading the account of the nuclear discourse. Colonial Legacy and Postcolonial Discourses To analyze the nuclear discourse in Pakistan and India, the issue needs to be situated in the broader framework of the politics of security in the two countries. In order to do so, it is necessary to outline briefly the salience of colonialism in influencing post-colonial discourses. Pakistan and India, like most post-colonial states, owe their present form to administrative apparatuses created by colonial powers. At the time of political independence both states were equipped with a reasonably well-developed bureaucratic and other institutions of the state. Benedict Anderson has aptly described the elements of this inheritence in the following way. New rulers inherit the wiring of the old state: sometimes functionaries 82 and informers, but always files, dossiers, archives, laws, financial records, censuses, maps, treaties, correpondence, memoranda, and so on. Like the complex electrical system in any large mansion when the owner has fled, the state awaits the new owner's hand at the switch to be very much like its old brilliant self again.43 The postcolonial leaderships in Pakistan and India tried to consolidate their respective national identities to correspond to the administrative and territorial realities. National liberation movements for an independent Pakistan and India were respectively based on what Holsti terms as 'natural' and 'civic' nationalisms. Both nationalisms were primarily political expressions of two 'imagined communities'. However, the tenuousness of these national imaginations became obvious immediately after gaining political independence.44 In this regard, India and Pakistan were not much different from a vast majority of the post-colonial regimes who were faced with the task of contriving a new unifying identity amid contending versions of self-hood. Sri Lanka as an independent state could rely on the administrative legacy of the Raj to consolidate coercive and extractive institutions, but defining what constituted a Sri Lankan in the post-colonial era was a daunting task. Hence, rather than concentrating on what Mohammed Ayoob calls 'state formation'-- which in some respects had been taking place during the Raj-- to understand the security problematic of 43 Anderson, 1991, p. 160. 44 In the case of the anti-colonial movement in India the cleavages appeared in a decisive manner before the political independence in 1947. The Indian National Congress' version of the Indian nation was effectively undermined by an altogether different view of the Muslim nation championed by the All India Muslim League's demand for Pakistan. 83 these countries it would be more fruitful to write genealogies of identity formation efforts in these countries. Study of these processes will acknowledge the specificity of individual cases and avoid any grand but doubtful explanations for the whole post-colonial world. At this stage one has to be on guard against the intellectual fallacy of security orientalism, i.e, of creating a set of binary opposites in which one group of societies are claimed to have reached the stage of self-identity while others are lacking it. This process is underway in a variety of ways all over the globe. For example, in ethnically homogenous Algeria the battle over Algerian identity is fought between Islamists and secular autocrats; in economically properous Canada one encounters English versus Francophone nationalism; and in ethnically and religiously heterogenous India we come across contending versions of identities ranging from secular pan-Indian nationalism to Islam inspired Kashmir insurgency. It is in the above context that Foucault's notion of 'regimes of truth' becomes relevant. Regimes of truth in modern Western societies are expressions as well as conditions of societies in which power is exercised in the name of the whole population and war is fought for the life and values of the citizenry. This form of the exercise of power, according to Foucault, crystalized in the late 16th and early 17th century when the government did not exclusively concern itself with 'imposing law on men', but assumed the role of 'disposing 84 things'.45 Conditions of relative peace, the age of expansion, economic growth, abundance of money, and demographic expansion all facilitated the development of this new art of government. Power no more dealt with legal subjects alone, but with living beings,- taking charge of life, more than the threat of death.46 In such societies, norms take precedence over law in the exercise of power. Therefore, Foucault conceived modern power as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a netlike organization.47 Partha Chatterjee sums up the Foucauldian notion of modern power as something which no longer has a center and that older forms of political authority, radiating outward from singular institutions or zones, or even bodies of sovereignty, are dissolved and dissipated by modern disciplinary practices into capillary forms of power.48 However, the nature of regimes of truth in the post-colonial subcontinent is markedly different from the modern Western societies due to the unique legacy of colonialism. Discussion of this legacy becomes relevant for the study of nukespeak in Pakistan and India because colonial expansion was based upon the 45 Foucault, "Governmentality," 1991, p. 97. For a detailed discussion of the Foucauldian concept of moder power see, Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. I, Robert Hurley, trans., (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), pp. 135-57. 46 Foucault, 1990, pp. 142-44. 47 Foucault, 1994, p. 36. 48 Partha Chatterjee,"The Disciplines in Colonial Bengal," in, Texts of Power: Emerging Disciplines in Colonial Bengal (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), p. 8. 85 introduction of the modern institutions of government by colonial authorities on the one hand, but the end or the purpose of the colonial government was to maintain a clear distinction between the ruler and the ruled. Results of this blend have plagued the post-colonial discourses on security in the subcontinent. Although colonial powers introduced institutions of the modern disciplinary power in the colonies, the project of 'modernity was insurmountably limited by the nature of the colonial rule itself .49 According to Partha Chatterjee Whereas the superior reach and effectiveness of modern power would justify the introduction into colonial governance of appropriate disciplinary institutions and practices, they would at the same time be compromised, and even subverted, by the need to maintain a specifically colonial form of power. Since it could continue to exist only by reproducing the difference between colonizer and colonized, the colonial state was necessarily incapable of fulfilling the criterion of representativeness-- the fundamental condition that makes the modern power a matter of interiorized self--discipline, rather than external coercion.50 This reading of the colonial regime offers a valuable link between the colonial state and the political practices of the post-colonial regimes. A lasting legacy of colonialism is still playing quite an important role in the political experiences of post-colonial societies. This is because the colonial state 'was not just the agency that brought the modular forms of the modern state to the colonies; it was an agency that was destined never to fulfill the normalizing mission of the modern state'. As such, the 'premise of its power was a rule of colonial difference, 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 86 namely, the preservation of the alienness of the ruling group'.51 The post-colonial state managers continued to rely on, more or less, the same methods employed by the earlier masters. As Chatterjee rightly maintains The post-colonial state in India has after all only expanded and not transformed the basic institutional arrangements of colonial law and administration, of the courts, the bureaucracy, the police, the army, and the various technical services of government.52 The above observation is equally valid for the post-1947 Pakistani state. For example, the Indian state is armed with institutions like a census bureau, a significant pool of experts to analyze scientifically different aspects of an individual's life, a complex bureaucracy with elaborate rule books and so on; but the security forces continue to take citizens' lives with impunity in the name of protecting national interests. In Pakistan and India the modern institutions of the state and regimes of truth about the national identity, hallmarks of what Foucault considers modern disciplined societies of the West, exist simultaneously with reliance on the extreme coercive practices of power employed by these states. This results in the distinct dynamics that security discourse, of which nukespeak is a part, assumes in the subcontinent. However, as the preceding pages suggest, the task of a capillary form of power exercised through modern institutions was 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. p. 15. For a detailed discussion of the nature of the colonial rule see the chapter "The Colonial State," pp.14-34 in The Nation and Its Fragments. 87 inhibited by the very nature of the colonial regimes.53 The legacy of retaining a difference between the ruler and the ruled introduces an element of violence still prevalent in the security discourse of Pakistan and India. For example, the worst manifestation of this aspect was massive use of violent means by the Pakistani forces to deal with the Bengali population of the country in 1970-71. Recent policies of the Indian ruling elite in Kashmir are a variant of the same attitude to deal with the .question of difference. This, however, does not imply that coercion has totally vanished from the security discourse in the West. McCarthyism in the U.S. remains a poignant reminder that coercion can be used to suppress dissent in the West as well. Neither do I suggest that dissident voices within respective nuclear discourse in Pakistan and India face an imminent danger of being forcefully silenced by the state authorities. Yet, given the propensity of the adherents of the dominant discourse to resort to violence to settle the issue of difference, the proponents of counter-narratives have to tread a very fine line. This element will be fully illustrated in the following chapters. Conclusion The analytical value of Foucault's idea of the regimes of truth, Todorov's notion of the construction of the Self by defining the 53 For an interesting encounter of the three modern institutions, i.e, census, map, and museum, of power in the colonies see Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities 1991 revised edition, pp. 163-186. 88 Other, and Chatterjee's observations regarding the distinct blend of 'modular forms of the modern institution of the state' with the nature of colonial rule based upon the principle of difference have been delineated here to help answer the following important questions regarding the nuclear discourse in Pakistan and India: Who decides what is in the national security interests of Pakistan and India? How are external threats used to define the Self? How is the liaison established between internal dissent and external dangers? How has the nuclear option emerged as a means to cope with threats to national security? The following interpretation of nukespeak in Pakistan and India considers it as an integral part of the process of identity formation in the two countries. Foucault's idea of discourse analysis and its use by security analysts to revision some aspects of the security policies of Western countries helps to depart from the mainstream, state-centred, problem-solving approaches in order to conduct a critical reading of nukespeak in the subcontinent. This perspective's key value lies in unravelling the subjectivity and arbitrariness of the way in which the rules of the game for participation in the nuclear discourse are defined in the name of truths about national interests and the position of Others. Todorov's work complements Foucault's ideas to enrich the interpretive account of nuclear discourse. And finally, Chatterjee's ideas warrant us to be aware of the historical context in which security discourse operates in post-colonial Pakistan and India. As the following chapters show, the dominant security discourse in general, and the debate on the nuclear issue in 89 particular, is conducted by a small epistemic community in both countries. It is this select group of individuals who play a key role in defining as to what constitutes as national interests. Articulation of national interests and responses to them is premised upon a notion, existing or ideal, of a national community whose interests are to be safeguarded. Therefore, the following interpretation tries to locate the eventual rise of the contemporary nukespeak in the subcontinent in the broader framework of national identity formation processes underway in India and Pakistan. For example, Hindu India becomes a danger, or is portrayed as a danger, by the Pakistani nukespeakers only when Pakistan's national identity is conceived in terms of an Islamic entity. And the nuclear option is put forward as a legitimate deterrent only when India is perceived as an expansionist power striving to undermine Pakistan. Similarly, in the Indian dominant discourse, Pakistan appears as a theocratic and artificial state. This conception of the Other, in turn, defines India as a democratic and natural entity with a long history. Such national imagination views the post-1947 India as a genuine functioning nation state which was wrongly partitioned in 1947. The shadow of partition looms large in the dominant security discourse in India, which by implication results in permeation of the Pakistan factor in the debate about India's security. On the other hand, India is also portrayed as a nation whose rightful place in the international hierarchy is that of a great power and the authentic voice of the Third World. The nuclear option acquires importance as a means to consolidate the above imagination regarding the national identity. The retaining of the nuclear 90 option not only makes India safe from the powerful China and unpredictable Pakistan, but it is also used to assert India's position as an independent centre in the international hierarchy. My choice of representative voices of the dominant discourse in general, and nukespeak in particular, is guided by the following reasons. In the case of India's dominant security discourse during the Nehru years (1947-64) when the nuclear weapons were not considered as a means to ensure India's security, my focus on relevant works of Nehru attempts to show -the contours of the dominant discourse. Most other writers of that era essentially echoed what Nehru uttered. The same criterion has been used throughout the study. Therefore, the focus has been to closely look at works and words of those select group of individuals who are acknowledged to be champions of either the dominant or dissident discourses in the both countries. In the same vein, although the nukespeak's rise is accounted for in historical terms, but the focus has been on the defining moments and texts at the expense of strict chronological order. Chapter Three 91 NUKESPEAK IN PAKISTAN I: 1960s-1977 It does not matter what types of weapons exist, human beings will fight with each other. Totally disarm them and they will fight with their fists. Ayub Khan in 1961.x Pakistan is a small country facing a great monster...(who is) determined to annihilate Pakistan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1965.2 Nukespeak is an integral part of the strategic discourse in today's Pakistan. Reference to the national consensus on this issue of vital importance is frequently invoked by advocates of the nuclear option in the wake of threats to the security of the •country. The validity of such threats at face value may not be shared by Western analysts, but consensus over the issue is hardly questioned by them either. Doomsdaysayers in the West busily predict dire consequences of a likely nuclear catastrophe in the region. This chapter reconstructs a history of nuclear discourse in Pakistan from the 1960s to 1977 with the help of tools of genealogical methodology and discourse analysis discussed in the previous chapter. A look at the dominant strategic discourse of the 1960s will make it clear that the nuclear factor was conspicous by its 1 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, Volume IV, July 1961-June 1962, np, nd, p. 56. These volumes are published by the Government of Pakistan but they do not state so. 2 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Reshaping Foreign Policy: A collection of articles, statements and speeches: Politics of the People Series, Volume I, 1948-1966, Hamid Jalal and Khalid Hasan,eds., (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d), p. 222. 92 absence in that decade and gradually became an integral part of Pakistan's strategic discourse in the 1970s. These different positions are best personified by the two important political figures at the helm of Pakistan's state affairs during the 1960s and 1970s, namely, Ayub Khan and Z.A. Bhutto respectively. Ayub Khan, the head of the military clique that ruled Pakistan from 1958 to 1969, never considered the nuclear factor as an effective deterrent or politically useful. Bhutto, who ruled the truncated Pakistan from 1972 to 1977, methodically turned this dormant issue into a symbol of national identity.3 I start with a focus on the thoughts of these two men followed by the discourse on security during the 1971 civil war in Pakistan and interstate war with India in the same year. This is followed by a look at the impact of India's nuclear explosion in 1974 on the security discourse in Pakistan. The chapter ends with the discussion of the way into which Z. A. Bhutto wove the nuclear issue in the web of popular patriotic rhetoric in the wake of the controversial elections of 1977. A brief discussion of the period in which the nuclear option was absent from the dominant strategic discourse of Pakistan will show the relevance of the methodological tools suggested in the previous chapter. Two interrelated points are emphasized at this juncture. First, the politics of the nuclear option is of recent origin in the body-politic of Pakistan. In spite of invoking of 3 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1927-79), led Pakistan after 1971 defeat up until he was removed in a military coup d'etat in 1977. He served as a foreign minister during the 1960s under Ayub Khan. He also played a key role in bringing the nuclear issue in the political arena of Pakistan through his word, works, and patronage of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. 93 external threats to consolidate a fragile Pakistani identity since its inception, the nuclear option as a means to deter such threats entered relatively late in the political discourse. Second, the above point makes it necessary to examine the changing political context in which an issue hitherto condsidered outside the realm of national security issue eventually becomes a symbol of an independent national identity. Looking in this way at an issue which is enmeshed in patriotic rhetoric requires perspectives that go beyond narrow confines of national security, and the neorealism and deterrence literature associated with these frameworks. Intellectual detachment necessary to demystify the objectivity of threats to national identity and means to secure it can be achieved through theoretical lens discussed in the previous chapter. Insights of Critical Security Studies are utilized to rewrite the history of the nuclear discourse in a fundamentally different way than what has been offered in the standard available accounts. Rather than being just a set of testable hypotheses, critical security studies facilitate looking at the familiar narratives in a radically different way. And hopefully, the following reading of the nuclear discourse in Pakistan would illustrate that point. Ayub and National Strategy Since its de jure inception in 1947, efforts to evolve a separate Pakistani identity have been intricately tied to the portrayal of the Indian threat in the dominant political discourse in the country. The political salience of the nuclear issue can be 94 meaningfully understood in this context. A closer look at the writings and speeches of Ayub Khan enable us to see that the nuclear option was conspicuously absent in Pakistan's strategic discourse during the 1960s. However, the Indian threat and the construction of a Pakistani identity to counter it continued to be the central theme of the dominant political discourse. Ayub Khan's thoughts could be described as a blend of a soldier's reliance on 'political realism' as the guiding light with which to look at the world, and a periodic recourse to the malleable notion of the ideology of Pakistan to legitimize the regime's politics and policies. He was an arch realist with an unshakeable belief in the dictum of self-help as the basic principle of international politics. He maintained that in an anarchic international system xnobody gives you freedom: you have to fight it for yourself .4 In such a system, the principal objectives of foreign policy are security and development. Security 'embraces preservation of our ideology'.5 However, the definition of that ideology is situational and closely linked to the identity of the country and nature of threats to it. Because the General was fully aware of the fact that in a world of competing ideologies, Pakistan had to fight to preserve its ideology as the ultimate basis of its national existence. The question arises what obstacles he saw in the way of establishing an independent Pakistani identity? Foremost among 4 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (London, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 114. Ibid. 95 them was 'India's inability to reconcile herself to our existence as a sovereign, independent state'.6 But why is it that India can not reconcile itself to the independence of Pakistan? The explanation offered by Ayub Khan is both instructive and quite relevant even in the 1990s. He argued that the 'Indian attitude can be explained in pathological terms. The Indian leaders have a deep hatred for Muslims...(and) from the beginning, India was determined to make things difficult for us'.7 India's 'occupation' of Jammu and Kashmir region, the only Indian state with a Muslim majority, is offered as an irrefutable example to substantiate the above claim. Of special interest in the above portrayal is defining the Pakistani identity with exclusive reference to its 'difference' from India. Also, the difference between the two entities, i.e, India and Pakistan, is seen as something which goes beyond the dictates of the realpolitik and into the realms of religion and Hindu pathology which cannot come to terms with the idea of an independent Pakistan. Given these circumstances, the Pakistani rulers had to be clear regarding the ultimate motives of India and the likely ways to counter them. The former was easy to comprehend because India wanted 'to absorb Pakistan or turn it into a satellite'.8 The nature of relations between the two countries is seen as a zero sum game in which the 'prospects of normal relations do not 6 Ibid., p. 115. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 96 appear to be in sight', therefore, we must 'accept the situation of implacable Indian hostility and learn to live with it'.9 Ayub Khan ruled out utilizing nuclear weapons as a means to deter the Indian threat in spite of the fact that such weapons were considered an effective deterrent by the then superpowers. The General, however, had no doubts regarding the lasting nature of hostile future relations between the two countries. 'Indian nationalism is based on Hinduism and Pakistan's nationalism is based on Islam. The two philosophies are fundamentally different from each other, and cannot combine'.10 This representation of Pakistan and India is a classic example of relying of binary opposites to envisage two diametrically opposite, yet monolithic entities devoid of internal differences. By implication, any shade of (sub)nationalism within Pakistan based on any reference point other than Islam would constitute treason. And in all likelihood any deviance from the dominant view as to what constitued a Pakistani identy would be attributed to the Indian designs to undo Pakistan. India, on the other hand, was portrayed as no more than a Hindu entity with ill-will against Pakistan as its key characteristic. Without going into further details of Ayub Khan's works, one can safely make a few statements regarding the contours of the dominant discourse of Pakistani politics during the 1960s as examplified by the man at the helm of affairs. First, the discourse was characterised by attempts to forge a separate 9 Ibid., p. 117. 10 Ibid., p. 128. 97 Muslim national identity for the newly formed state. Second, the centrality of 'Hindu India' as the real threat played a pivotal role in these efforts. Third, the nuclear issue was missing in this strategic matrix. The salience of the nuclear option to counter the Indian threat, and by implication strengthen the Pakistani identity, was one of the hallmarks of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's politics. A closer look at his thoughts will enable us to trace the origins of the nuclear politics in Pakistan. Z. A. Bhutto and Nuclear Weapons Z. A. Bhutto's role in contributing significantly to Pakistan's security discourse is acknowledged by his supporters and opponents alike. He can be rightly credited for introducing and popularizing the politics of the nuclear issue in Pakistan. Because of Bhutto's pivotal role in laying the foundations of the nuclear discourse in Pakistan, considerable space has been allocated to the analysis of his views on the issue. His writings (in the shape of a collection of speeches, articles, and book-length studies)on the nuclear issue are divided into three periods. First, there is the Bhutto of the 1960s, when he served in Ayub's government in different capacities including as a foreign minister. This period also includes the Bhutto of the late 1960s and 1970 when he parted ways with Ayub and organized the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) into a mass movement. Second, there is his stint in power in the wake of the dismemberment of Pakistan and humiliating defeat at the hands of India from 1972-98 1977. Lastly, from 1977-79 there is the period in his death-cell where he managed to produce a book discussing in some detail his views and role in Pakistan's nuclear programme. This chapter focusses on the first two periods while sparing the third for the next chapter for the sake of keeping a chronological order in the story. The Bhutto of the 1960's was a young man in Ayub's cabinet and later a mass mobilizer against the regime on the basis of its 'alleged failures in foreign policy issues, especially Ayub's role in reaching an agreement with the Indians at Tashkent after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. Citing the Tashkent Treaty as an act of compromise of national interests by the Ayub regime, Bhutto chose to amplify the anti-India theme to discredit the military regime. By conveying to the West Pakistani masses, especially in Punjab, that he was more anti-India than Ayub Khan, Bhutto managed to become a credible voice of the dominant discourse in Pakistan. Bhutto was an opinionated man and never hesitated to air his views with his exceptional oratorical skills. His speeches during the 1960s contain comments on the key aspects of international politics which are helpful in understanding his role in influencing the security discourse in Pakistan. As early as 1961, Bhutto was convinced that the major threat to Pakistan's security emanated from India. However, he did not stipulate the nuclear course for Pakistan,to deter conventionally superior India. Overlooking the prevalent view in the Western strategic circles which considered nuclear weapons as effective deterrents, Bhutto tied the survival of mankind with disarmament and argued that the arms race was heading towards an accelerating 99 crisis and the world leaders lacked the political and moral courage to lead the world toward disarmament.11 The inconclusive 1965 war between India and Pakistan and the consequent debate in Pakistan regarding means to deter India was marked by the absence of exploring the strategic utility of the nuclear option. Addressing the UN general assembly in September 1965, Bhutto described the security dilemma of Pakistan in no uncertain terms by asserting that it was a small country xfacing a great monster, a great aggressor always given to aggression'.12 The ultimate objective of 'the monster', that is how India was referred to, was to 'annihilate Pakistan'.13 Bhutto's ideas regarding Pakistan's identity and the relationship between domestic and foreign spheres were spelled-out in detail in a marathon speech in March 1966 while commenting on the 1965 war in the national assembly of Pakistan. He had no doubt that 'foreign affairs emanate and originate from internal conditions', but he also knew that the foreign policy of a country also affects its internal affairs.14 And to determine the interaction between the two, he posed such important questions as: What is Pakistan itself? What is our state and our status? What are our objectives? What are our motivations? His answers are a good synopsis of Pakistan's dominant security discourse. Pakistan was 11 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Reshaping Foreign Policy: A Collection of articles, statements and speeches, Politics of the People Series, Volume I, 1948-1966, Hamid Jalal and Khalid Hasan, eds., (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, nd.), pp. 140-41. 12 Ibid., p. 221. 13 Ibid., p. 222. 14 Ibid., p. 287. 100 declared 'a great idea', an idea which was 'progressive, concrete, and beautiful'.15 Who could turn a blend of the above characteristics into physical attributes of a country? No one but God was Bhutto's answer. Bhutto emphatically claimed that Pakistan vis not a man-made country... it is a blessing of Allah...a God-made country'.16 An entity which is portrayed as a work of the divine has xnothing ugly about' it.17 By introducing this divine element in the process of state-management, Bhutto was addressing foreign as well as domestic opponents in the same breadth. This implied that only the evil could find faults with the existing structure of the state, and any attempt to challenge the state authorities (which were presumably sacred as well because they were ruling a God-made country) had to be considered an act defying the divine will. Such a conception of the country gave Bhutto another belief regarding the future of the country. He was convinced that 'Pakistan is never to be amputated or merged'.18 Coming at the end of the war with 'the monster' whose ultimate aim was xto annihilate' Pakistan, and faced with dissidence (which would blow up later) in the then East Pakistan, the above stance was a warning message with two targets in mind, i.e, to India and to opponents of the existing political structure within the country. Such assertions were also a reassurance to the remaining 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. , p. 288. 18 Ibid. , 101 countrymen who were not presented with the much promised victory against India in 1965. However, in this grand narrative against the Indian threat, we still do not see nuclear weapons being presented as effective deterrents. Reference to the Indian threat became integral to the vision of Pakistan based upon religious identity at its centre and the challenges mounted by the contending identities, i.e, linguistic, ethnic, or even class in those days, at its periphery. The contentious issue of Kashmir became the symbol of the two contending versions of postcolonial state identities in Pakistan and India. Bhutto's two comparisons of Kashmir amplify the salience of the issue in Pakistan's quest for a distinct identity and how India assumes a cardinal position in defining that identity. Addressing Pakistani students in London in August 1966, Bhutto claimed that 'without Kashmir Pakistan is a body without a head and it is a very beautiful head'.19 It was during this speech that he also metaphorically pledged a thousand years war with India over Kashmir. Five years later, amid turmoil in the then East Pakistan, Bhutto (who was the undisputed mass leader of the Punjab at that time) was still harping on the above theme and impressing upon the West that 'Kashmir is to Pakistan what Berlin is to the West' .20 A distinct Pakistani identity presumably guaranteed by God, 19 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Awakening the People: A collection of articles, statements, Politics of the People Series, Volume II, 1966-69 (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), p. 708. 20 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Marching Toward Democracy: A collection of articles, statements and speeches, The Politics of People, Volume III, 1970-71 (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications,n.d.), p. 192. 102 and the centrality of the Indian threat to it emerge as the two main themes in Bhutto's world-view during the 1960s. Both themes are closely connected for him whether he is playing role of a mass mobilizer or addressing the UN general assembly. Despite the centrality of India as a major factor in the political discourse in Pakistan, we still do not see the presence of the nuclear factor in the public domain. Pakistani strategic analysts were equally oblivious to the possibilities of the nuclear option as a viable deterrent against India. Pakistan Horizon, the oldest journal on international affairs published in Pakistan, of the 1960s echoed the same themes expressed by Bhutto. The journal carried hardly any articles on the nuclear issue. Even after the signing of the NPT in 1968 and its subsequent ratification in 1970, contributions do not suggest any urgency regarding the long-term implications of the Pakistani decision not to become the party to the treaty. Imperceptible Shift Z. A. Bhutto's 1969 book titled The Myth of Independence contains the earliest and somewhat systematic discussion of the utility of the nuclear option to thwart the Indian threat.21 It is noteworthy that the first serious discussion regarding the nuclear option by the man who is singularly credited with introducing the issue in Pakistan's security discourse takes place in the form of a book written in English. In a country with 21 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London, Lahore, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969). 103 less that 25 per cent literacy rate and only a fraction of it in a position to read English, the very medium (English) and the form (a book) suggest the elitist origins of the issue. Later on, however the nuclear matter became enmeshed in the popular culture and will be closely tied to the nation's survival as an independent entity. His book does"not jump at the nuclear option without setting a stage for it. However, in the process of setting that stage, Bhutto's makes contradictory assertions which remain unresolved. It is important to note that these contradictions are also an integral part of the security discourse in Pakistan based on defining the Self through what it is not. Bhutto starts the story by restating the nature of the threats faced by Pakistan, followed by the reasons behind such threats. It is as the remedy to meet these threats that the nuclear option is introduced. He starts with one of the most commonly ascribed observations regarding the paradoxical relationship between India and Pakistan, i.e, 'India and Pakistan have so much in common that the rest of the world sometimes finds it hard to understand why they are in a state of perpetual confrontation'.22 Answering his own rhetorical question, Bhutto outlines the list of reasons behind this animosity. They include, 'the legacy of history, superstition, and prejudice'.23 On all these fronts, the opponent is held responsible for harbouring such vices. The issue of historical legacy is settled by claiming 22 Ibid., p. 162. 23 Ibid. 104 that, xit is India not Pakistan that harbours ill will because of 700 years of Muslim rule'.24 And of course this historical legacy comes with its own psychological baggage for the respective communities. Here, x the Indian mentality is troubled with historical complexes and the obsession of defeat' at the hands of Muslims.25 In the above instance, appropriation and allocation of identities is quite instructive to the understanding of the common strategies employed in Pakistan's security discourse. Invoking seven hundred years of different dynasties' rule in North India, who happened to be Muslims by religion, Bhutto considers the post-1947 Pakistan as an extension of that rule. Secondly, when he is talking about vthe Indian mentality', it is interchangeably used with the Hindu mentality. The overlapping is seen to be so obvious that he does not even find it fit to dilate upon the apparent heterogeneity of the contemporary Indian socio-political mosaic. This has little to do with Bhutto's lack of knowledge about the Indian society, and more with the logocentric logic whose objective is to create two easily distinguishable monolithic identities at the expense of their complexities in order to consolidate a fragile Pakistani identity. The depiction of the past is of no intrinsic value. A particular reading of history is a prerequisite to justify and serve the needs of the present. Pakistan's security discourse is no exception when it offers the above reading of the Indian 24 Ibid. , p. 163. 25 Ibid. , p. 164. 105 history. Given the centuries of Muslims' rule resulting in deep psychological scars between Hindus and Muslims of the subcontinent, Bhutto asks what would be the ultimate objective of .the post-1947 Indian, which is considered exclusively of Hindus, leadership? According to the dominant discourse in Pakistan, ' I n d i a ' s p r inc ipa l objective i s to o b l i t e r a t e Pakis tan ' . 2 6 However, the very existence of Pakistan flies in the face such Indian objective. Here, we must be told of reasons behind India's failures, which in turn are considered Pakistan's triumphs. 'Indian leaders have come to tolerate Pakistan because they do not have the power to destroy it'.27 Along with the India's lack of power to destroy Pakistan, another explanation is the Pakistani resolve to resist the Indian hegemonic moves. The Pakistani resolve manifested itself in 'two wars to establish a separate identity',28 However, India still remains firm in its mission to 'bring Pakistan back to mother India'.29 Faced with this catch-22 situation of history where India seems unwilling to genuinely acknowledge the existence of Pakistan and the latter jealously guards its separate identity, what are the likely ways-out? Bhutto goes back to the Kashmir issue as the key bone of contention. He maintains that Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, believed that the resolution of the Kashmir problem will not put an end to Pakistan-India hostility, because it was just 26 Ibid. , p. 173. 27 Ibid. , p. 170. 28 Ibid. , p. 180. 29 Ibid. , p. 113. 106 a symptom of the bigoted attitudes of theocratic and reactionary Pakistan to secular, progressive India.30 Bhutto rather conveniently forgets his own account in which animosity between Pakistan and India was portrayed as the most recent phase of centuries old adversarial relations, and argues that, "there is no such thing as eternal enmity, and Kashmir is the key problem'.31 At this juncture, Pakistan has to have its priorities set. As to setting these priorities, the dominant security discourse has hardly been ambivalent. Bhutto, being one authentic voice of this category, outlines these priorities in the following way. First of all 'Pakistan's security and territorial integrity are more important than economic development'.32 By implication, any group (let us not forget the unease of Bengalis of East Pakistan) seeking to challenge that hierarchy of priorities cannot possibly be a true Pakistani. And a different version of priorities would be equated with a lack of patriotism at the least, and colluding with the external enemy(India) in general. As has been argued in the dominant discourse in Pakistan, the principal challenge to Pakistan's security and territorial integrity emanates from India, therefore, 'we have to find an effective deterrent' against it.33 It is here that Bhutto brings up the nuclear option issue by suggesting that 'our 30 I b i d . , p . 162 . 31 I b i d . , p . 1 6 3 . 32 I b i d . , p . 152 . 33 I b i d . 107 plans should include the nuclear deterrent'.34 It is in this assertion that we find the first political uses of the nuclear option in the broader security discourse in Pakistan. Being an avid student of international politics and its attendant power relations, Bhutto was aware of the hurdles lying in exploring the nuclear path. Foremost among them was the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which he described as 'an international treaty limiting this deterrent to nuclear powers'.35 Making Pakistan's attitude toward the NPT conditional upon India's nuclear ambitions, Bhutto argued that Pakistan should not 'allow herself to be deceived by' that treaty because India will proceed with its nuclear programme in spite of the treaty. However, at that stage Bhutto was not cognizant of the future political magnitude of the issue and the subtleties of choosing the right kind of words to describe Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. He bluntly stated that 'our problem is how to obtain •such a weapon in time before the crisis begins, because India can choose that timing due to technological advantage'.3S Therefore, given India's interest in nuclear technology, he opined that Pakistan should not lag behind in the nuclear sphere.37 That is how the seeds of a nuclear discourse were sown in Pakistan. Like many other issues, it remained politically dormant for quite some time. Bhutto's book neither provoked an 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. , p. 153. 108 international outcry, nor did it unleash a charged debate over the nuclear option within the country. Yet it contained elementary arguments which would eventually turn into dogmas of the dominant ..security discourse. Traumatic Interlude: 1970-1974 The election in 1970 was a watershed event in the checkered history of Pakistan. It was the first party-based election held on the basis of adult franchise. Contrary to expectations of the military regime led by General Yahya Khan, the landslide victory of the Bengali nationalist party, the Awami League in the then East Pakistan, and the subsequent refusal of the West Pakistani rulers to hand over power to the majority party, led to a fratricidal civil strife which ended with the formal break-up of the country in December 1971. Nine months of bloody turmoil in the East Pakistani streets in 1971 and an ideological warfare over the contending versions of Pakistani identity was a set-back to the dominant discourse which viewed Islam as the ultimate unifying force among the disparate social groups of Pakistan. This section will recount the ways in which the dominant discourse was conducted in the leading English daily of Pakistan, namely, Dawn.2* Such a focus is important for several reasons. 38 Dawn is the leading and the oldest Pakistani daily newspaper published in English from Karachi. Founded by the founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the daily is seen as the credible voice of Pakistan. Pages of Dawn are a useful site to look into dynamics of the identity discourse as expounded by 'true Pakistanis'. Dawn is not owned or operated by the government of Pakistan. However, it is considered the national daily of the country. The paper enjoys similar clout in Pakistan 109 First, an event of the magnitude of the Bengali uprising against the Pakistani state forced the society to confront the critical question of defining oneself and one's opponents. The way Bengali dissidents were portrayed in the Pakistani media could be best contextualized as a discourse about the conception of the Pakistani identity at that time. Second, civil turmoil in the 1971 was the ultimate manifestation of a quarter century's failed efforts by Pakistan's dominant discourse to evolve a stable Pakistani identity. However, the mode of discourse continued on the same lines in the post-1971 truncated Pakistan vis-a-viz the identity question. Third, as we shall see, the centrality of the Indian factor in drawing the battle lines about the Pakistani identity will become obvious. Fourth, those months were marked by intra- as well as an inter-state wars, hence the questions regarding creating an effective defence against the 'enemy' were paramount. Study of the identity discourse in those nine months would enable us to set the stage for the strategic discourse of the 1970s in which the salience of the nuclear deterrent underwent a significantly increase. This discussion of the above issues is conducted in light of the methodology of the discourse analysis stipulated in the second chapter. But the Pakistani state authorities resort to extreme violence to quell the Bengali identity movement is also indicative of the limits of regime of truth based on maintaining a difference between the ruler and the ruled. Unsurprisingly, along with the formal state authorities, as The Globe and Mail in Canada and The Times of London have in the United Kingdom. 110 other proponents of a monolithic Islamic identity of Pakistan whole-heartedly endorsed the use of force against Bengalis. By March 1971 'threats to the integrity' of the country were being voiced in the media. Yet the belief in a united Pakistan's existence was quite strong. By way of further strengthening that belief, Dawn reminded the citizens in its Pakistan Day editorial on March 23 that Pakistan was xa unique phenomenon and an unprecedented experiment in modern times'.39 Condemned were those who based their identities on ethnic lines(read Bengalis), with an added warning that such groups were likely to play in the hands of the enemy (read India) who was xfully alive' to exploit such opportunities. Three days later, Mujib-ur- Rehman, leader of the Awami League, was charged with treason by Pakistani authorities. Yahya Khan accused Mujib and the Awami League of insulting the national flag and defiling the photograph of the Father of the Nation, Muhammad Ali Jinnah.40 The Awami League leader was also held responsible for insulting the armed forces. In the light of these charges, it was not difficult for Yahya to reach the conclusion that 'Mujib and his men (were) enemies of Pakistan'.41 The next day's headlines accused India of gross interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. By that time, pro-Mujib rallies had started taking place in New Delhi and the Indian state of West Bengal. In such sensitive times, Dawn set its priorities quite 39 Dawn, 23 March 1971. 40 Jinnah is officially addressed as Quaid-I-Azam in Pakistan. The term roughly translated means the Univeral Leader. 41 Dawn, 27 March 27 1971. Ill unambiguously. In an editorial of March 28, it put 'the dictates of the country's integrity and survival' over 'all other considerations'. Since the 'Awami League's movement of civil disobedience was bound to bring wheels of the government to a stop' the paper suggested dealing firmly (which meant violent suppression of the agitation) with 'them 'in that 'grave time for the nation's life'. Arguing on these lines, the paper did not find it fit to mention grounds which had led to a total alienation of Bengalis within the existing structure of the Pakistani state. Neither the fact of the Awami League's massive victory in the general election, nor the reluctance on the part of the military junta and other influential segments of the West Pakistani society to transfer power was brought in to contexualize the situation. Meanwhile, the Indian Lok Sabha, the lower house of parliament, passed a resolution offering unanimous support to the 'freedom fighters' in East Pakistan.42 Declaring the resolution as a 'shameful' act, Dawn blamed India of playing an 'ignoble part', supporting 'treason and secession in Pakistan'. While the Bengalis' disenchantment with Pakistan was nearing an irreversible point, the Pakistani media was relying upon a three pronged strategy to cope with the situation. First, any uprising in the Eastern wing, and of those not many were reported, was considered the handiwork of the Indians. Second, rather than acknowledging the mass support that the Awami League had achieved among the Bengalis, the party and its supporters (which meant an Dawn, 30 March 30.1971. 112 overwhelming majority of Bengalis) were portrayed as stray elements working on Indian instructions. Finally, the Pakistan army's actions were unquestionably supported and any opposition to them was taken as an act of treason. The movement for the independent state of Bangladesh was viewed as no more than a pipe-dream, and the role of India in fuelling the separatist fire was equated with 'brazen-faced hypocrisy' which was guided by the desire to destroy Pakistan. West Pakistan's leading politicians of all shades were passing joint resolutions condemning the Indian intervention.43 Bhutto considered the Indian intervention in the Eastern wing as a way of distracting the Pakistani leadership from extending moral support to the Kashmiris.44 Interestingly, the popular leadership of the Eastern wing, exclusively comprised of the Awami League, did not view the situation in the same light. However, a tiny section of the East Pakistan population led by leaders like the Jamait-I- Islami's (Party of Islam) Ghulam Azam and Muslim League's Khwaja Khairudin remained firm supporters of a unified Pakistan and relied on slogans such as, Pakistan Zindabad (Long live Pakistan), Quaid-I-Azam Zindabad, Yahya Khan Zindabad, Tikka Khan Zindabad (General Tikka Khan led the Pakistan Army deployed in the East Pakistan which carried out the military operation against the Awami League), and 'Down with India and its agents'. Such rallies made headlines in the West Pakistani media without any reference to the lack of popularity 43 Dawn, 2 April 1971. 44 Dawn, 3 April 1971. 113 of their cause among ordinary Bengalis. Supporting Pakistan and the personality of Jinnah by that time was not isolated from supporting Yahya Khan and Tikka Khan. Yahya Khan was an unelected military ruler whose legitimacy was very much in doubt among Bengalis. Tikka Khan's position as the head of the Pakistan army's contingent in the East Pakistan symbolized the West Pakistani ruling elite's dictatorial view of Pakistan among the Bengalis. No wonder that the supporters of these symbolic personalities saw all pro-Bangladesh demonstrations as manipulated by Indian agents on Pakistani soil. The support for the military action and its perpetrators was not confined to the coterie of politicians in East Pakistan; Dawn expressed the same confidence in the policies pursued by Yahya Khan and generalized that feeling for the whole nation in the following way The nation looks up to President Yahya, the soldier-statesman, with the confidence and hope that he will adequately meet this challenge from without just as he firmly faced the threat of disintegration from within when Awami League's obduracy and adamant unreasonableness left no other course open.45 In such circumstances every true patriot was given the duty of praying for the security and solidarity of Pakistan. The solidarity of the country was defined the way the military regime perceived it. Since the Awami League's ideas regarding Pakistan stood in marked contrast with the West Pakistani elite, the majority of the country's population, as Bengalis numerically were, was declared to be agents of a hostile power. And those 45 Dawn, 4 April 1971. 114 within West Pakistan who questioned that equation risked being dubbed traitors as well. Champions of the dominant discourse were in the forefront of outlining the defining criteria of a genuine Pakistani identity and traits that would help in identifying enemies within the country. Justice Hamud Rehman, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who later headed the commission to look into the reasons for Pakistan's debacle, presented the blue print of a true Pakistani identity in a detailed article which merits a closer look.46 The central theme was to chart out the ways to 'infuse national love in citizens'. Needless to say the section of the population lacking that spirit were the Bengalis, therefore, they became the target to be infused with national love. Crucial importance was given to indoctrination at an early age, and the idea was to start each school day with the singing of the national anthem and xappropriate readings emphasizing the concept of the Pakistani nation'. This was to be done with the 'important task of defining ideology of Pakistan' in their minds. The raison d'etre of the ideology of Pakistan lies in the 'brutalities committed by the Congress governments in the Hindu majority provinces against Muslims'. Since the Congress has continued to rule India after the independence, it is reasonable to assume, according to the Justice, that the contradiction between Hindus and Muslims have taken the form of rivalry between two sovereign states, i.e, India and Pakistan. Therefore, flourishing of Pakistani nationalism was made dependant upon the 46 Justice Hamud Rehman, "Steps to Strengthen Ideology of Pakistan," Dawn, 14 October 1971. 115 depiction of the differences between Hindus (also India) and Muslims (also Pakistan). In this play of interchangeability of words, Pakistani distinctiveness could not exclusively survive by relying upon anti-Congress historiography of the pre-partition days. The next step 'should be to develop a sense of nationhood'. Since Pakistan's idea was realized by rallying the Muslims of India around the Two Nation theory (dividing the Indian population into two nations on the basis of Hindu and Muslim religions) the idea of asserting a non-religious basis of identity (especially by Bengalis) eroded the very foundations of Muslim Pakistan. Justice Rehman's reasons to establish grounds for a distinct Muslim nationality in the subcontinent also take a racist turn. He argues that 'not all Muslims are descendants of converts. Many are descendants of Arabs, Turks, Afghans, Persians etc'. This echoes the common theme among adherents of Muslim nationalism in India that most Muslims in the subcontinent are ethnically descendants of Muslim rulers who came from far flung areas some of which are mentioned by the Justice. And the argument goes that, coming from different ethnic stocks, Muslims are physically distinct from their Hindu countrymen. According to the Justice, 'there are many in Sylhet (a Bangladesh district) who are of light complexion, tall and well-built with sharp features and aquiline noses'. The validity of such claims may be doubtful but the implications are quite clear. The difference in the physical attributes implies a superior/inferior, and us/them dichotomy. If Muslims are fair, well-built, tall and with sharp features; Hindus are considered 116 dark, short, and with dull features. Had there not been any superiority attached with the former features there would be no need of mentioning these factors. But the story does not stop at physical difference alone. It must translate in genetically determined behavioral variations between the two communities too. Hence Muslims have common dress and cuisine and they "never eat off a banana leaf. But he laments the fact that despite such similarities among Muslims, 'false propaganda' unleashed by India regarding the lack of commonalities between Bengali Muslims and the rest of Pakistan seems to be working among the former. However, there is one difference, that of language, which even worries Justice Rehman. Ideally he would like to overcome that difference by making it compulsory for Bengalis to learn Urdu and for the rest of Pakistanis to learn Bengali. However, in order to make Bengali acceptable for other Pakistanis he suggests to change the script of Bengali from Devanagari to Arabic. This brief exposition of the views regarding roots of Pakistani ideology and conditions in which it can flourish enables us to locate the centrality of India in defining Pakistan and the salience of suppressing difference within the country as only prerequisites for the sustenance of the new identity. In November 1971 the break-up of Pakistan in its existing shape had become an ominous reality. Faced with the unthinkable situation of the country's dismemberment, and with it a big blow to the role of Islam as a unifying factor for the country, the guardians of the dominant discourse in Pakistan tried to shift the total blame for the scenario on India. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto headed a delegation to China in November to seek diplomatic and 117 strategic support against India. It was agreed that 'the present situation was a result of India's wilful violation of the principles of peaceful coexistence' .47 Accusing India of duplicity in its behaviour, the Pakistanis maintained that, although India wanted independence for East Pakistan, it had 'destroyed the freedom of the Kashmiri people and (which) exploits and oppresses Indian Muslims, the Mizos, the Nagas, and the Sikhs'.4S Such references by Pakistanis to the obvious heterogeneity of the Indian society and the inability of India's dominant identity discourse to bring disparate groups under one umbrella is rather paradoxical. On the one hand India is portrayed as a Hindu entity out to destroy Pakistan, but on the other it is also viewed as a problem-ridden multi-ethnic society where religion has not been able to quell all differences. As we shall see later, India will harp the same tune vis-a-vis Pakistan in order to justify its violent suppression of different identity movements. When Yahya Khan imposed an Emergency in the country in late November, Dawn claimed that the action was welcomed by all(italics mine) segments of the population.49 Presumably, Bengalis were effectively not considered a part of the whole which welcomed the move. Now the battle was between the 'foreign enemy' (India) and the 'resolute nation... which wore a rock like expression of unity'. Bengalis in this contest were mere agents 47 Dawn, 9 November 1971. 48 Ibid. 49 Dawn, 23 November 1971. 118 of India. Millions of them who had taken refuge in India were a result of 'India's conspiracy to instigate, organize, and support the secessionist rebellion in (Eastern) Pakistan'. The 1971 war formally started on 3rd of December 1971 and lasted for about two weeks. Until the day of the ignominious surrender, Dawn was full of stories about the crushing defeats which the Pakistani army was imposing on the Indians to save the country. The demand for Bangladesh was still considered a figment of a few miscreants' imagination. Pursuing that state of denial, the paper told readers in the middle of the war about the 'valiant nature of the armed forces due to the Islamic spirit', and claimed that 'every citizen of Pakistan is determined to defend his country'.50 The Pakistan army formally surrendered on December 16, 1971. The following day's Dawn symbolizes the intransigence of the dominant discourse in West Pakistan in coming to terms with the failure of the twenty five years of Islamic narrative regarding the identity of Pakistan. The lead headline of the paper was 'War Till Victory'. On the same page, the story of the humiliating defeat in Dhaka was euphemistically termed as a cease-fire 'agreement between the local commanders of India and Pakistan' reached in East Pakistan. Yahya Khan termed it as a temporary setback in a long struggle. The armed forces were praised by the President and the paper for having 'written new chapters of glory in defending their country'.S1 The future was still seen in 50 Dawn, 12 December 1971. 51 Dawn, 17 December 1971. 119 terms of a united Pakistan. The political ostrich-likeness was evident in the fact that the defeat was not even mentioned in Dawn. As Bangladesh became an irrevocable reality, what remained of Pakistan had to pick up the strands of the story of Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent. Dawn in its editorial of December 25, 1971 (the birth anniversary of Jinnah) called for a rededication xto the task of rebuilding Pakistan according to the ideals which inspired the movement for the emancipation of the Muslims of the subcontinent'. A detailed account of the dominant Pakistani discourse on its identity during the decisive days of the movement for a separate country on the basis of ethnic identity is of crucial importance for a number of reasons. First, nine months of 1971 as depicted by Dawn tell us a lot about the version of Pakistan that was being vehemently opposed and assertively resisted by the Bengalis. Second, the salience of the Indian role in defining the parameters of Pakistani identity become obvious during this narrative. And lastly, the nuclear factor had not emerged yet as an effective deterrent to fend off the Indian threat. The last point reveals the political significance of the nuclear issue as against the strategic value attached to it by a wide range of analysts of South Asian security. Nuclear weapons had been on the global scene as an effective deterrent for over a decade. However, the thought of considering the nuclear option prior to the 1971 disaster did not appeal to the Pakistani leadership. Such thinking defies the logic of deterrence because access to the nuclear option would have favoured Pakistan against 120 conventionally superior India. This anomaly minimizes the relevance of the deterrence theory as an explanatory tool. For a more meaningful explanation we ought to look at the wider context of the security discourse and the use that the nuclear option is put into within that framework. With the preceding discussion of Pakistan's security discourse in mind, we now turn to the mid-1970s when India exploded what it termed a xpeaceful nuclear device' and its effects on the security discourse in Pakistan. Explosion of a Device, Explosion of an Issue The dismemberment of the country did not put an end to the unresolved identity question in what remained of Pakistan. Societal heterogeneity posed a considerable challenge for the unifying discourse based on Muslim nationalism. Changes like the transfer of power to the civilians headed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the promulgation of a new constitution in 1973 were significant breaks from the past, but the lessons from the failure of the centralizing discourse to co-opt Bengali Muslims were anything but learnt in the truncated Pakistan. Preoccupation with the Indian threat continued to play a key role in setting the contours of the security discourse in Pakistan. The Indian explosion of a nuclear device on May 18, 1974 opened a new chapter in that narrative. This section is a brief assessment of that event. Two weeks before the Indian explosion, Z. A. Bhutto, prime minister of Pakistan, had a wide-ranging interview with the New 121 York Times. Little had changed in terms of views on India which was accused of wanting to see its 'shadow all over us' (Pakistanis).S2 Adversarial relations between the two countries were given an aura of eternity. We have been the oldest adversaries in the world, much older than anyone else. There have been thousand years of antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims. From the vantage point of history, therefore, this is too old a situation for it to settle down quickly. Entangled in interactions perceived by its neighbours in the above manner, India surprised the world by conducting what it euphemistically termed a 'peaceful nuclear explosion' (PNE) on May 18, 1974. Not surprisingly the news item hit the headlines in the Pakistani media. Pakistani foreign office's spokesman was quick to dub it as a development which 'cannot but be viewed with the degree of concern matching its magnitude by the world and more especially by India's neighbours'.53 The issue would certainly become one of the important symbols in India-Pakistan antagonism and their relations with other nuclear powers, especially the United States. However, other neighbours of India, including China, did not accord the same urgency and importance to the Indian explosion that it assumed for Pakistan. The Pakistani foreign office's reaction was more of shock than surprise. It assured the public of the measures, especially those of Z.A. Bhutto, taken by the government to face such a challenge. They included Bhutto's pleas 52 The transcript of the interview was published in Dawn, 6 May 1974. 53 Dawn, 19 May 1974. 122 to Ayub in securing Karachi Nuclear Power Project (KANUPP), and his direct supervision of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) since assuming power in 1971.54 Such a statement was more like a routine business of the foreign office in response to any act by the Indian government which did not please Pakistanis. However, there was no pressure by the opposition politicians, foreign policy analysts nor the Pakistani public on the government to outline the Pakistani response on the issue. Prime Minister Bhutto seized the political initiative in the wake of the Indian explosion and emphasized the magnitude of the issue and critical importance of his efforts to cope with any likely eventuality, i.e, a threat to the existence of Pakistan. His thoughts on the issue had three dimensions. First, he claimed that his predecessors were criminally ignorant of the importance of the nuclear option despite his repeated efforts to correct their strategic myopia. Second, he conveyed to the Indians that the nuclear issue was more of a political card than a technical subject. Hence, the nature and direction of the matter would be determined by public enthusiasm regarding the nuclear option. Lastly, he tied the issue to the fragile national security theme and became xthe sole spokesman' to represent what constituted the national interests of Pakistan. The objective was to sideline his political opponents. In the process, he undeniably laid the 54 Ibid. The PAEC was established in 1956. It remained an under-funded institution for quite some time. The KANUPP was the result of Pakistan-Canada cooperation in the nuclear field. Canada agreed to provide maternial and technical support for the project. The construction of this project started in 1966 and was completed in 1971. For details see, Ziba Moshaver, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the Indian Subcontinent (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 100-101. 123 foundations of Pakistan's acrimonious nuclear discourse. Two of his public pronouncements on the subject shed light on the embryonic form of nuclear discourse in the country at that time. The Indian evil designs and the near criminal negligence of his predecessors to counter them were the main points of Bhutto's first public reaction to the explosion. Terming the Indian explosion as a form of 'nuclear blackmail', Bhutto pledged not to succumb to the pressure.55 The explosion was blended with the outstanding issue of Kashmir and Pakistan's resolve to jealously guard its independent identity in the subcontinent. He pledged to 'move in all fields to meet the threat posed by the explosion'. Since giving up the Kashmir issue surmounted to accepting Indian hegemony, which negated the whole concept of a Muslim nation-state in the subcontinent, yielding to the 'nuclear blackmail' would amount to undermining the existence of an independent Pakistan. Bhutto was aware of the fact that nuclear weapons were unlikely to be used for military purposes and they were primarily political weapons. Recalling his earlier statements of waging a thousand years war with India, he added that Pakistanis would 'eat grass to ensure nuclear parity with India'. And in the process, he expected 'brave and patriot' Pakistanis to respond 'magnificently to the new development'. A connection was established between 'patriotism' and support for the nuclear option where any disagreement would be equated with cowardice and lack of patriotism. The dichotomy of Us/Them both within the country and externally was established by 55 Dawn, 20 May 1974. 124 asserting that, 'if we were to become fearful over India's test it would indicate we have already succumbed to the threat. This would be disastrous for our national determination'.ss The conscious use of 'we' to depict the resolve of the nation implies the exclusion of those from the community who question the above version of national identity and its requisites for survival. Secondly, any reservations against the quest for nuclear parity was interpreted as an act of cowardice as well. In such a scheme of things, a lack of enthusiastic opposition to India's nuclear explosion carried risk at two levels. Politically it meant likely exclusion from the community referred to as patriotic Pakistanis, and socially such behaviour signified a coward. The latter term carries a certain weight in a predominantly patriarchal society with feudal norms to judge others. A combination of the two would certainly be 'disastrous' for the nation. Bhutto's touchstone statement would intricately enmesh Pakistan's nuclear programme in the web of national identity challenged by the Indian enemy. In the same statement, Bhutto thrashed previous governments, especially Ayub Khan's, for their strategic naivety in not paying due attention to the nuclear option. He accused them of 'the grossest and the most appalling negligence in this respect'. Ayub Khan was particularly picked for demonstrating the above traits by recalling personal experience. In 1963, when young Bhutto had pressed Ayub Khan 'to embark on a peaceful nuclear programme', the latter had rejected the advice by saying 'if India went nuclear we would buy a weapon off the shelf somewhere'. Bhutto Ibid. 125 retroactively dubbed Ayub Khan's attitude as 'fatal to our national survival'. Under new circumstances, Bhutto comes out, through personal claims, as a true saviour to thwart the challenges to Pakistan's integrity. By accusing a former general, who ruled Pakistan for more than a decade, of committing fatal errors in ensuring national survival, Bhutto was also establishing a link between past and future attitudes on the issue. That would continue to guide the proponents of the nuclear option in the nuclear discourse in Pakistan. A debate was held in the Pakistani parliament in June 1974 to discuss the implications of the Indian explosion for Pakistan's security.57 In concluding the debate Bhutto used the nuclear issue to castigate political opponents as less patriotic. The Opposition in the parliament had boycotted the debate for reasons not related to the issue. Bhutto equated the boycott with playing into the hands of India. Since the act of not participating in the debate amounted to telling the world that the Indian explosion did not threaten Pakistan's security, the 'irresponsible' act of the Opposition was xin complete conformity with that of the Indian government'. The Indian explosion and the consequent boycott of the Opposition not only made them Indian agents, but the explosion laid to rest, according to the government, any charges they had previously levelled against Bhutto of entering into a clandestine deal with the Indian government. This was an allusion to Bhutto's role in reaching the Simla accord with India, which was dubbed by the Opposition as a 57 Dawn, 8 June 1974. 126 sell out of Pakistani interests. The Indian explosion came in handy for Bhutto to counter that charge. As the explosion was an 'intimidation against Pakistan', it sealed the lips of "sinister-minded individuals... who tried to mislead the people by saying he (Bhutto) had made a secret deal with India'. The connection between the two, i.e, the explosion and the sealing of lips, might appear tenuous, but given Bhutto's cardinal role in Pakistan's nascent nuclear programme, the government claimed that patriotism of Bhutto was unquestionable. The nuclear issue had entered into the matrix of Pakistan's security discourse by 1974 and the initiative was firmly in the hands of Bhutto. The Opposition leaders did issue statements condemning the Indian act, but little was done by means of either accusing the government for not doing enough to ensure Pakistan's security, or dispelling the impression created by the government that by not loudly agreeing with the government on the issue they lacked the spirit of patriotism. Opinion-makers were either ignorant or made sparse comments on the matter. Editorials of Dawn following the explosion allocated only one space to the issue in a span of six weeks. Understandably, the paper condemned the blast as 'fateful' and called it 'a minatory sign which Pakistan could ill afford to ignore', but interestingly, it demanded a nuclear umbrella from the nuclear weapon states(NWS) to meet the challenge. The issue was not considered pivotal enough and could be left to foreigners to take care of. However, two signed articles in that period were somewhat different in attitude. Hamid S. Rajput, a political commentator, repeated what Bhutto had already stated, and 127 concluded that 'India has tested her device, it is bound to have a chain reaction, especially among her neighbours'.58 Mehrunisa Ali, a security analyst, critically evaluated different options available to Pakistan.59 The Indian blast was considered as a bid by New Delhi to settle the Kashmir issue on its terms. Pakistan had the options of seeking international guarantees, entering into a security pact with China, achieving self-sufficiency in the nuclear field, or accept the Indian hegemony. Since the last meant negation of the Pakistani identity, and the plausibility of the first two was in doubt, the only real option to ensure the sovereignty of the country was to strengthen the national nuclear programme. However, Mehrunisa Ali made it clear that the nuclear programme could not be divorced from other domestic issues besetting the country. Lack of internal unity was considered the most important among those issues. We can see that the nuclear issue was now blended with questions of unity and identity by the analysts as well. However, the intensity surrounding the nuclear debate had hardly attained a critical importance as yet. Pakistan Horizon, Pakistan's oldest quarterly journal concerned with foreign policy issues, in its 1974 and 1975 volumes did not publish any analysis by a Pakistani scholar regarding implications of the Indian blast. However, Bhutto continued to draw attention to the nuclear issue in the context 58 Hamid S. Rajput, "Indian Nuclear Test: Threat to Peace," Dawn, 30 May 1974. 59 Mehrunisa Ali, "Implications of Indian nuclear blast," Dawn, 24 June 1974. 128 of Pakistan's security needs up until his removal in 1977. The media had also slowly started to look at the global dynamics of the nuclear politics and contexualize Pakistan's role in it in an embryonic form. The first NPT review conference was held a year after the Indian explosion and Pakistan decided not to take part in it because rules prevented observer states from making a full contribution in strengthening the nonproliferation regime.60 The politics of the nuclear issue in Pakistan was not isolated from the dynamics of general politics of the country. Pakistan's central authorities were again faced with a crisis of legitimacy due to turmoil in two of the country's four provinces, namely, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The provincial coalition governments led by Baluch and Pashtun nationalists were dismissed on the grounds of alleged conspiracies against Pakistan. The spectre of ethnic nationalism was once again looming large over the Pakistani horizon. Baluchistan, the largest but the least inhabited province of the country, had slipped into a civil war with armed forces chasing semi-trained tribal guerillas in the hilly terrains. Echoes of the 1970 chorus concerning a Pakistani identity and threats to it once again began resounding in the country. Bhutto, the armed forces, and an overwhelming majority of the media instantly 60 Pakistan's role during the creation of the NPT is best summed up by Agha Shahi, who was representing Pakistan at the security council. Pakistan, according to Shahi, maintained that the NPT was a flawed treaty because it did not offer any security guarantees to states willing to renounce the nuclear weapons option. See, Agha Shahi, "Extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty," Nuclear Issues in South Asia (Islamabad: Islamabad Council of World Affairs, 1995), pp. 4-5. 129 dubbed the proponents of sub-national identities as Indian and Afghan agents. Their actions were considered challenges to Pakistan's sovereignty.61 Veteran Pashtun leader Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan, also known as the Frontier Gandhi, was termed as the ring-leader of Indian agents. Establishing a connection between the Bengali nationalists and the recent generation of the disillusioned Baluchs and Pashtuns was one way of legitimizing the dominant discourse concerning a monolithic Pakistani identity. Bhutto claimed that the six points of Mujib-ur- Rehman (referring to the six points autonomy manifesto of the Awami League) was drafted in India, and the insurgents in Baluchistan and the NWFP were of the same stock.62 The discussions regarding the NPT and Pakistan's role in it were determined by the other facets of political discourse in the country. Guardians of the Pakistani identity portrayed failures of the unifying discourse as a result of a deep rooted conspiracy of the sub-national movements which were fuelled by the external elements. This totalizing discourse left little room for dissent. Any disagreement was quickly construed as yet another example of anti-Pakistan forces at work. Faced with these dilemmas, Dawn's analysis of the proliferation issue and Pakistan's role in it was seen in the context of the 'frightful possibilities' presented by the Indian blast and the Israeli admission of carrying on a clandestine nuclear programme. Reiterating the Pakistani proposal to declare South Asia a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ), the 61 Dawn, 15 April 1975. 62 Dawn, 17 April 1975. 130 paper condemned India for being "hostile to the idea'." Concerns about the Israeli nuclear programme as a security threat to Pakistan had made their way into the Pakistani discourse about the issue. They gained prominence during the subsequent years. The West's failure to agree upon any meaningful disarmament measures was mentioned but not yet construed as a deep conspiracy against Pakistan. The nature and direction of relations with India were not divorced from the currents of politics within Pakistan. The nuclear issue was an irritant but still not a major bone of contention to derail any efforts to normalize the relations between the two countries. The dominant Pakistani political discourse was undoubtedly based on anti-Indianism but the nuclear issue had not yet become an emotional shield to protect the Pakistani identity. However, India's official stance on the non-proliferation issue was seen by analysts in Pakistan as a part of New Delhi's overall aim to play a hegemonic role in South Asia. A. T. Chaudri, a leading commentator on Pakistan's foreign policy, argued that 'Mrs. Gandhi had relapsed in bellicosity' thwarting any efforts to normalize Indo-Pak ties.64 For Chaudri, India's hegemonic aspirations were evident in xits obdurate stand on the matters of fundamental importance to this 63 Dawn, 7 May 1975. Pakistan initially proposed the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia (SANWFZ) after the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974. The matter was originally raised in the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean in 1973. Pakistan has periodically raised the issue in spite of India's categorical rejection of the SANWFZ idea. See, Ziba Moshaver, 1991, p. 119. 64 A. T. Chaudri, "The Deadlock at Delhi," Dawn, 25 May 1975. 131 region'. He argued that the Pakistani offer to declare South Asia a NWFZ was overridden by India because it wanted to have a 'veto on denuclearization of South Asia'. He called upon all smaller neighbours of India to 'take serious note of India's desire to keep the option of setting free its nuclear genie'. A small number of politicians had taken up the nuclear cause of Pakistan. Dr. M. Shafi, a PPP parliamentarian, called for giving priority to achieving nuclear capability.65 He did mention the Indian nuclear capability as a reason to speed up Pakistan's nuclear programme, but the key concern was to use the technology for industrial purposes and not as an effective deterrent. Nukes in the Public Domain The politics of the nuclear issue took a decisive shift immediately after the controversial general election in Pakistan held in March 1977. Officially, Bhutto's PPP had won a landslide victory in polls for the National Assembly. The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), an alliance of assorted political groups led by religious parties, disputed the election results and boycotted the provincial polls and decided to launch a mass movement against the Bhutto regime. Allegations and counter-allegations about opponents' patriotic and religious credentials filled the air. Bhutto linked the movement against his regime to a U.S. ploy to remove him in the wake of the nuclear reprocessing plant deal 65 Dawn, 15 June 1975. 132 his government had struck with France.66 Once again, the floor of the National Assembly reverberated with claims of protecting national sovereignty against external threats. This time however, the alleged threat emanated from the U.S., not India, and revolved around the ambitious Pakistani nuclear programme rather than 'aggressive' Indian nuclear capability. Bhutto argued that the U.S. had sponsored the agitation against his patriotic government because Washington did not want Pakistan to benefit from the French nuclear plant deal. The acquisition of the nuclear plant was projected as the prime national interest at the time, and the nation was called to be on guard against joining of .hands by the external and internal enemies of the nation. Bhutto warned the Americans that 'the party is not over and will not be over till my mission is complete for this great nation'.67 The reference to the party was made after an alleged remark by the U.S. ambassador in Pakistan that Bhutto's party was over. And the mission was to enhance Pakistan's nuclear capability, which in turn would signify stability in the country. Surely a party revolving around the nuclear programme would only swell in the times to come. The adversary, the Americans in this instance, was termed 'white elephant' and 'bloodhounds' who were after Bhutto 66 France in the mid 1970s had agreed to assist Pakistan in the Ultracentrifuge Enrichment Plant at Kahuta near Islamabad. The U.S. was against any such cooperation and continued to pressurize both Pakistan and France to refrain from cooperation in the nuclear field. For details see, Naeem Ahmed Salik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Programme: Technological Dimensions," P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Iftekharuzzaman, Nuclear Non-Proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives (New Delhi: Monohar, A Publication of Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colomo, 1996), pp. 87-102. 67 Dawn, 29 April 1977. 133 to destabilize Pakistan. The nuclear genie as a political force entered the popular domain on April 29, 1977 when Bhutto addressed a huge public rally in Rawalpindi in connection with the nuclear programme and the anti-PPP designs of the Americans and its Pakistani allies. Waving the letter of the U.S. secretary of state to Bhutto asking for a quiet dialogue on the nuclear issue, he vowed not to compromise on national interests. He pledged to keep the nation's interest supreme in the wake of all kinds of pressures. Pakistan's nuclear programme was portrayed as a symbol of resistance by an independent Islamic state against the U.S and Indian hegemonic designs. The official media depicted the PNA's lack of support for Bhutto's nuclear stance as sign of disregard for national interests. Contestations over the site of patriotism would continue to mar the political discourse in Pakistan, but the totalizing tendencies embedded in the politics of the nuclear issue would make it one of the litmus to pass Pakistan's dominant identity test. It would become a rallying point with which to demonstrate one's affiliation with Pakistan and opposition to it would carry the stigma of being branded as an outsider. In the wake of Bhutto's confrontation with Washington over Pakistan's nuclear programme, the government used the nuclear issue as a means to delegitimize the Opposition's movement. Statements issued by the Pakistani foreign office during that period were addressed as much to the U.S. and India as to the domestic audience. If the U.S. was accused of exerting pressure to abandon the nuclear programme, India was accused of vicious propaganda against the peaceful character of the Pakistani 134 programme. But the Foreign Office drew a line by claiming that 'Pakistan is committed to build the plant and no government can go back on it' .68 While the government was trying to come out of troubled waters through highlighting the critical importance of the nuclear programme for the nation's sovereignty, and condemning the external as well as internal impediments as dangers to Pakistan's sovereignty; the Armed Forces were devising the plans to do away with the Bhutto regime. On July 5,1977, General Zia-ul-Haq, the then chief of the Pakistan army, declared martial law and promised to hold new general elections in ninety days and handover power to duly elected legitimate representatives of people. He, however, remained in the saddle of power for the next eleven years till the day he died in a mysterious air crash in 1988. The next chapter is the story of how the nuclear issue became all-pervasive in the dominant security discourse in post-1977 Pakistan. Dawn, 26 June 1977. Chapter Four 135 NUKESPEAK IN PAKISTAN II: 1977-1995 The Christian, Jewish, and Hindu civilizations have nuclear capability along with communist powers. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but the situation was about to change. What difference does my life make now when I can imagine eighty million of my countrymen standing under the nuclear cloud of a defenceless sky? Z. A. Bhutto in 1979.x Pakistan's brief encounter with parliamentary democracy came to an abrupt end in July 1977 when the military, led by General Zia-ul-Haq, resumed its eleven year spell in power through a coup. The idea of a "nation in danger' was pursued with an intesified vigour by the un-elected junta. The military regime of Zia could not have survived for eleven years merely on the basis of naked force; it drew its sustenance from monopolizing, manipulating, and creating forms of truth which became a part of the security discourse in the country. The process was never always easy or entirely peaceful. It was a mix of demagogy, censorship of some views and promotion of others, and resort to judicial and extrajudicial powers to execute and imprison opponents. The boundaries between the external and internal, which have always been muddy in Pakistan's dominant security discourse, became even more blurred. In some important respects, security discourse during the Zia period relied on the themes already present in the dominant. 1 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, If I am Assassinated (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), p. 138. 136 o This account is confined to the politics of nukespeak as one of the sites utilized by the dominant discourse to legitimize the military regime and consolidate a particular form of the Pakistani identity. It starts with a look at the way in which the new regime kept the essential ingredients of Z. A. Bhutto's nukespeak while physically eliminating him through a controversial death penalty in 1979. This is followed by an analysis of the formation of an epistemic community of Pakistan's strategic experts on the nuclear issue in the 1980s. The narrative continues with an examination of the nuclear discourse in the post-Zia era. The discussion ends with a look at the contours of the nuclear discourse in contemporary Pakistan including dissenting voices in the discourse. By 1977 the nuclear programme of Pakistan had been infused with patriotic zeal. In the 1950s and the 1960s the dominant discourse paid scant attention to the political slience of the nuclear issue. Thanks largely to Z. A. Bhutto's use of the nuclear programme as a symbol of national sovereignty, now the nuclear issue was used as a litmus test to prove one's love for Pakistan. Get Rid of Bhutto but Keep His Nukespeak: 1977-79 The physical presence of Bhutto as the most authentic voice on the nuclear issue put the new regime in a dilemma. The populist image of Bhutto was a spectre that haunted the military regime from the very beginning even though he was incarcerated. Maligning his image initially and ultimately getting rid of him 137 physically were deemed necessary for the continuity of the military regime. However, the new regime was quick in making political capital from Bhutto's emotionally-charged nationalist stance on foreign policy matters, especially on the nuclear issue, in its drive for legitimacy. Dawn, which had become one of the key sites of the dominant discourse on Pakistani identity, treaded the above fine line as well. Bhutto managed to voice his views from gaol amid the deafening voices of his opponents through a book that he chronicled in the death-cell. What follows is a reconstruction of those days with nuclear weapons and question of the Pakistani identity as a focus. Arthur Hummel Jr., the U.S. ambassador in Pakistan, had a midnight meeting with Bhutto two days prior to the imposition of martial law.2 On July 6, 1977 newspapers splashed the headline of Bhutto's unceremonial removal and assumption of the military rule after an interregnum of five years of civilian administration. The Jamait-I-Island, the most organized religious party in Pakistan and one of the leading opponents of Bhutto, was the first political party to assure Zia of all cooperation. Reports from Lahore, capital of the Punjab province and a bastion of Pakistani nationalism, suggested jubilant crowds were celebrating army rule. Dawn did not waste any time in endorsing the army act. In its view/ 'after stumbling from deadlock to deadlock, the nation is now able to look forward to the future without trepidation'.3 2 Dawn, 4 July 1977. 3 Editorial, "A Bridge Over an Abyss", Dawn, 7 July 1977. 138 Conversely, those who had expressed any hesitation, dismay, or disapproval about the martial law could be considered out of bounds with the imaginary nation which was demonstrating 'a tranquil mood'. Given the past record of political ambitions of the Pakistan Army, the pledge of Zia to transfer power to civilians in ninety days should have been taken with a pinch of salt. But not so by the leading newspaper of the country, which argued that 'the role the army has assumed now was forced upon it by circumstances'. The ban on political activities, which was a euphemism for a crackdown on the PPP, was justified on the grounds of creating 'a proper atmosphere for a political debate'. Hence the initial response of a leading voice of Pakistan's dominant discourse commended the coup d'etat. A week later, the military authorities were credited with moving at a 'brisk promptitude' to pave the way for general elections-- which were to be held on 3rd October.4 By September 1977 the political intentions of the Zia regime to remain in power became evident when Bhutto was jailed on charges of being an accomplice in the murder of a political opponent. If Yahya was praised by Dawn in 1971 for discharging his professional duties in the East Pakistan crisis, Zia was absolved of any 'involvement' in the case against Bhutto. Furthermore, the courts were declared free of any pressures, and sceptics were told that Bhutto 'will be tried under the established criminal procedure', therefore, the judicial process should be allowed to take its course without adversely affecting 4 Dawn, 16 July 1977. 139 the political process.5 In fact, the military regime was applauded for acting responsibly in the contentious issue. Meanwhile, the new regime used the nuclear programme as one of the precious national possession which needed to be saved from hostile powers. Statements of the Pakistani delegation in the UN General Assembly became headlines confirming continuity in the foreign policy of the country despite its regime change. The solution of the Kashmir issue and acquisition of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes were declared as the cornerstones of the policy objectives.6 As the promised election date (October 1977) was fast approaching, the champions of the view which saw Pakistan as the monolithic Islamic society were faced with the dilemma of an incarcerated Bhutto capable of undermining the legitimacy of the military junta. While foreign policy matters were given prominence in the dominant security discourse, the holding of election was put as a choice between accountability and representative rule. Needless to say, the former was considered a pressing need of the time, whereas the latter only a luxury until the political spectrum was cleared of any potentially dangerous people. Not doubting the partisan character of the new regime, 'elections without sorting out the accountability issue' were seen as a recipe for trouble. Dawn categorically stated that the armed forces assumed power with a simple mandate of holding free elections. Now that 5 Dawn, 5 September 1977. 6 Dawn, 29 September 1977. 140 the former prime minister was believed to be involved in a murder, good Pakistanis should shudder at the thought x of allowing people suspected of murder to participate in the elections'.7 Hence, the postponement of the election was suggested which the ruling Generals wholeheartedly accepted. Bhutto became the new demon which would continue to haunt the narratives of the dominant discourse even when he would be dead. Meanwhile, his writings from the death-cell would shed light on the salience of the nuclear programme as a potent force in the game of proving one's patriotism and others' lack of it. The nuclear issue was, at least for Bhutto and his new adversaries, firmly situated in the jargon of Pakistani nationalism, especially in the wake of the U.S. pressure to abandon the programme. The theme of a foreign hand and its local allies who harm the national sovereignty was the hallmark of Bhutto's statements on the nuclear issue while he was in gaol. He accused the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) and the military junta of openly joining hands to 'dislocate and destroy Pakistan's nuclear programme'.8 Alluding to the U.S., he argued that this anti-national alliance was taking place in compliance with the interests of a foreign power. Using the political realism's dictum of self-help as the key principle of international politics, he suggested that xforeign governments will follow their own policies', but lamented that 'only we, in 7 Dawn, 29 September 1977. 8 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, If I am Assassinated, ( New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), p. 107. This book is based on Bhutto's notes while in the death-cell. 141 Pakistan, have regimes which follow the policies of foreign governments'.9 Here, Bhutto's statements after the Indian explosion in 1974 are worth recalling. At that time he accused the then opposition of playing into the enemy's hands by not supporting what he perceived to be the key national interests. Ironically, this time it was the government of the day and its informal allies he was blaming for fiddling with national interests. Controversy surrounding the deal with France to acquire nuclear reprocessing plant was high on Bhutto's mind when he tried to impress upon the countrymen that the agreement which his government had finally signed in March 1976 after three years of intense negotiations was being squandered by the Zia regime. The French government's suggestions to modify the original agreement were portrayed by Bhutto as Paris' preference for a civilian government in Pakistan.10 Since Zia had repeatedly failed to honour promises he had made to his own citizens-- of holding elections-- the French government was reluctanct to take his word regarding the nature of the nuclear programme. This line of argument explicitly suggested that the best way to ensure transfer of nuclear technology to Pakistan would be to have Bhutto at the helm of affairs. The Zia regime was accused by Bhutto of adopting a 'flippant and callous approach' on the 'issue of the nation's life and death'.11 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. , pp. 135-36. 11 Ibid. , p. 136. 142 Although no more in power, Bhutto still emphasized that he was an uncompromising patriot and the group at the helm of affairs in the new regime was a coterie of external agents. What he apparently overlooked was the fact that it is nearly impossible to prevent other actors from assuming the role of custodians of truths hitherto considered to have been discovered by Bhutto. The Zia regime adopted Bhutto's views on the nuclear issue as a cornerstone of the new regime's security discourse. Essentially, there was a continuity in the nature and direction of the discourse but with different faces. The new regime's ironic dependence on Bhutto's views on the nuclear issue became most obvious when Bhutto's thoughts on the matter chronicled in a book written while in the prison eventually became a primer for the new regime in its discourse on nuclear issue. By declaring the nuclear programme a matter of life and death for the nation, Bhutto warned that by losing the uranium reprocessing plant acquired through a deal with France, Pakistan would be vat the mercy of those who are professionals in the art of nuclear blackmail'.12 In the new equation, India and the U.S. had joined hands with the Pakistani junta to derail Bhutto's efforts. In the future, Indo-U.S. cooperation to frustrate Pakistan's nuclear programme would remain a 'truth' but the Zia regime's complicity in the process, as alleged by Bhutto, would become a non-issue. Faced with the death-penalty in a controversial and politically motivated trial, Bhutto did not confine himself to the role of a mere patriot; he turned the nuclear issue into a Ibid. 143 manifestation of his life-long dream. The dream was not only about strengthening Pakistan's security against India in the geostrategic realm, but represented a qualitative strategic shift in terms of civilizations. Crediting himself for working 'assiduously and with granite determination' to 'acquire nuclear capability' for Pakistan by sending 'hundreds of young men to Europe and North America for nuclear science training', he was not focussing on the narrowly defined interests of Pakistan. In this context Bhutto penned his now widely cited quote which has turned into an article of faith in the dominant security discourse of Pakistan, i.e, 'the Christian, Jewish, and Hindu civilizations have nuclear capability along with communist powers. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but the situation was about to change'.13 No wonder Pakistan's nuclear hawks came to see the country's nuclear programme not only as an effective deterrent against Hindu India, but as a shield to protect the Muslim world against Zionist Israel. On the other hand, the Americans and others would see such sentiments as definite grounds on which to deny Pakistan's bid to acquire nuclear capability. The programme would also become a sacred site for the proponents of religious identity in Pakistan. However, amid the uncertainty, or rather certainty of facing the gallows, Bhutto would put the country's key interests well above his physical existence in the following way: 'What difference does my life make now when I can imagine 80 million of my countrymen standing 13 Ibid. , p. 138. 144 under the nuclear cloud of a defenceless sky?'14 By deciding to send him to the gallows, 'the sovereignty and security of the nation have been mounted on the gallows'.15 What Bhutto did not realize was the fact that the regime and other sections of the dominant discourse in Pakistani politics would not abandon his ideas on the issue. It would be expedient for the Zia regime to rally behind the nuclear issue as one way to further an Islamic Pakistan's discourse and counter domestic and external enemies. Bhutto was hanged in the middle of the night of April 4,1979 but his legacies on the nuclear issue continued to unfold in hitherto unknown forms. Zia's Pakistan, Islam's Fortress! The Zia years are equated with the Islamization of the Pakistani society. The security discourse during this period was characterized by familiar themes of external dangers and their domestic allies. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 enabled the dominant security discourse to invoke images of a Pakistan sandwiched between hegomonic Hindu India and expansionist communist Russia. At this stage a new kind of player entered the nuclear discourse in Pakistan by 1979: a retired soldier turned strategic expert. Abdul Qayyum was a soldier turned strategic commentator 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 145 who would analyze the nuclear issue with patriotic zeal.16 He would be joined by other high-ranking soldiers in the days to come. A closer look at Qayyum's article in Dawn is called for because it is a good example of totalizing tendencies which have become a hallmark of the nuclear discourse. To draw lines in the discourse as to what is true and what is false, Qayyum relies heavily on the logocentric logic of creating dichotomies of Us and Them. Furthermore, these dichotomies are based on historical amnesia to lend credence to the new people at the helm of affairs in the country. His article starts with the statements of two events which prompted the author to write. The first was a recent uranium shipment to India by the Americans: a self-explanatory cause of concern for Pakistanis. The second emanated from the U.S. decision to suspend aid to Pakistan.17 The combination of the two was seen as serious enough to force an inquiry into the dynamics of national politics to determine what should be the best response of the nation in such a crucial situation. The resolve of the military and civil bureaucracy, the direct rulers of the country at that time, to defy any external pressure is never doubted in Qayyum's account. Qayyum then turns to what he calls xthe national press' and its strong support for x the nuclear programme being pursued by 16 Abdul Qayyum, "Nuclear Power and US Dual Standards," Dawn, 26 April 1979. 17 The United States suspended aid to Pakistan after Bhutto signed the deal with France to cooperate in the nuclear field. The aid remained suspended in spite of the regime change in Pakistan. 146 Pakistan'. By implication, any segment of the press which lagged in strongly supporting the Government at that time put its status of being 'national press' in jeopardy. The national press was not credited with just supporting the programme, it was lauded for urging 'the nation to face this cut-off of aid with patriotic courage'. If the shock of Bhutto's hanging dampened many Pakistanis' enthusiasm on the nuclear issue, it just showed their lack of patriotism. Even worse, those who contemplated to -challenge the government for its hanging of an elected leader and opposed martial law at that time must have been hand-picked agents of external adversaries. Amid all this the nuclear programme was considered 'a matter of consensus in this country and the Government will not make any compromises on this fundamental issue because the entire nation is behind it'. The myth of consensus was assumed and imposed on the issue. Any attempts to force Pakistan to give up its programme were doomed to fail 'for the simple reason that our programme is supported by •consensus in Pakistan'. A new epistemic community came into being in the Zia years which now constitutes the core of the nukespeak in Pakistan. It mainly comprised of retired armymen, former diplomats and few academics. The basic guiding principle of the new pool of experts would be a reference to the national consensus on the nuclear issue. The presumed consensus could only be envisaged with the help of historical amnesia. Qayyum's account, written while Bhutto's death was still fresh in peoples' minds, would conveniently forget to mention the role played by the former prime minister in the history of the nuclear issue in Pakistan. 147 Whenever Generals would write about the nuclear programme and its history, Bhutto would usually become a victim of selective amnesia. However, the issue itself would regularly adorn the front pages of newspapers to keep the nation aware of the importance of Pakistan's nuclear programme, and would reaffirm the 'truth' of consensus on the matter. Research journals in Pakistan also became sensitive to the salience of the nuclear issue for the country's security and Pakistan Horizon's 1979 volume published a two part research article by Samina Ahmad, well regarded security analysts associated with the Islamabad-based Institue for Regional Studies, discussing the Pakistani proposals of declaring Indian ocean and South Asia as a peace zone and nuclear weapon-free zones(NWFZ) respectively.18 The articles trace the history of the Indian nuclear programme, and the Pakistani apprehensions after the 1974 explosion. Less charged than the emotional analyses offered by Qayyum, the articles opened up the space of academic journals to justify Pakistan's nuclear programme. The military regime of Zia persistently ducked the question of holding elections. However, Zia usually pledged to hold elections and often deferred the promised date on grounds that the national security had priority over electoral politics. In May 1979, Zia was once again pledging to hold elections in November. By now, Islam, stability and national security became not only the most favourite causes pursued by the regime, but 18 Samina Ahmad, "Indian Ocean Peace Zone Proposal," Pakistan Horizon xxxii: 1-2 (1979), pp. 98-141; "Pakistan's Proposal for Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in South Asia," Ibid., xxxii:41 (1979), pp. 92-130. 148 they increasingly became mutually dependent on each other in the dominant security discourse. Pakistan's nuclear programme became an integral part of the security discourse and a symbol of national unity and sovereignty. These connections were duly made by higher ups in the Foreign Office. Agha Shahi, the then foreign secretary, would assure the world of the peaceful nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme; and Akram Zaki, ambassador to the Philippines, would demand a nondiscriminatory attitude by the Americans toward Pakistan on the nuclear issue.19 The American media's negative portrayal of Pakistan's nuclear programme became a rallying point for the proponents of the dominant security discourse in Pakistan to infuse the issue with patriotism and an independent identity for the country. Commenting upon a news report on Pakistan's nuclear ambitions by the American television network Columbia Broadcasting Services (CBS), Dawn viewed the Western propaganda as a part of 'the smear campaign' which had 'degenerated into a vilification campaign'.20 The nuclear issue was no longer one concerning the differing views on non-proliferation measures, but one which put v the Pakistan government's credibility at stake'. Interestingly, neither the Zia government's credibility-- while it continued to break the promise of holding elections during the past two years-- nor the questionable way in which Bhutto was tried and later hanged were questioned. By now Zia was well aware of the legitimizing potential of 19 Dawn, 9 June 1979. 20 Dawn, 6 July 1979. 149 the nuclear issue. He ordered the foreign office machinery to 'refute propaganda against Pakistan's nuclear programme'.21 Those efforts appeared as headlines in the 'national press' to forge a closer link between external and domestic dimensions of the programme. Any news item in the Western media contemplating a commando action against Pakistan's nuclear installations would easily find its way into Pakistani headlines and a spate of commentaries would follow preparing the nation to safeguard its cherished programme. One such report appeared in the New York Times in the middle of August of 1979, and a Pakistani analyst, Qutubudin Aziz, wrote about an alleged 'Zionist conspiracy' against Pakistan which reflected the standard argument used in the dominant discourse.22 The new-found zeal in the U.S. against the Pakistani nuclear programme was seen as a result of the anti-Pakistan campaign by the Israeli lobby in the West. According to Aziz, 'international Zionist hostility' against Pakistan was manifested in 'pro-Jewish New York Times' and 'the Zionist influenced CBS'. Such views were eerily reminiscent of Bhutto's thoughts from the death-cell in which he talked of Jewish, Hindu, and Christian bombs. Gradually, Pakistani strategic experts, retired generals, former ambassadors, and religious ideologues would turn the Pakistani nuclear programme into a bulwark against Zionism along with a shield against Hindu India and a symbol of defiance against the United States. As the date of the promised polls in November 1979 drew 21 Dawn, 7 July 1979. 22 Qutubudin Aziz, "International Zionism and Pakistan's Nuclear Programme," Dawn, 18 August 1979. 150 closer, so do did the hype surrounding Zia's patriotic rhetoric to safeguard the nuclear programme. In a country-wide address on August 30, 1979, Zia stipulated his vision of the country in some detail. This speech offers a good synopsis of the currents of the dominant discourse, and therefore, merits a closer look. The nuclear programme ranked top among the items mentioned. Repeating what Bhutto had said in his book, Zia termed the bid for 'the acquisition of nuclear energy...a matter of life and death for the country'." There was a double edged warning, one aspect of which was addressed to the domestic audience and the other to external enemies. Countrymen were told that *unholy plans are being promoted to destroy our research programme'. Firmly locating the nuclear programme in the context of sacred versus profane values, the politics of the issue were no longer seen as a contestation over strategic options but rather as a jihad (Islamic holy war). Once the nature of the issue was cast in terms of religious beliefs, it became incumbent upon patriotic Pakistani Muslims to lend support to the regime in its 'holy' endeavour. The external adversaries were warned that by contemplating such 'unholy' plans they were showing a lack of understanding about 'the true mettle of the Pakistani nation and its spirit of self-respect'. Zia maintained that 'the Pakistani nation is convinced that acquisition of atomic technology... is its basic right, which can not be denied by any foreign power nor can any government in Pakistan surrender it'. Now that Zia and the nation had become synonymous, according 23 For the full text of the speech see, Dawn, 31 August 1979. 151 to him, he knew what the nation would choose in case of an emergency, i.e, 'this nation will prefer death with honour to domination by others'. But the nation, whose course of life and death was so convincingly defined by the words of Zia, had something else in mind too, namely, an election. After a lengthy sermon on the delicate nature of the nuclear issue and delineating lines of holy patriotism, Zia turned to the issue of holding the promised election. It was stated at the outset that the election was a 'divisive' issue. Turning to unsubstantiated -requests by 'ulema(religious leaders), intellectuals and worried citizens' not to hold elections in the country, he not only readily agreed, but suggested that 'national integrity demands that steps should be taken before elections'. Hinting at a possible postponment of election, the stories of Zia's steps in the direction of fulfilling the demands of national integrity frequently appeared in the media.24 Zia finally declared electoral democracy and Pakistan's security incompatible in the following words. 'The security and solidarity of the country and the protection of Islamic ideology in any case was much more important than plunging the nation into the electoral exercise'.25 By now he had assumed the guardianship of safeguarding the country's needs, especially through his efforts 24 In the first week of September 1979, Zia raised the issue of nuclear technology transfer at the Non-Aligned Movement meeting held in Havana. See, Dawn, 3 September 1979. While in a meeting with S.N. Mishra, the head of the Indian delegation at the NAM meeting, , the nuclear issue is on top of the agenda. See, Ibid., 5 September 1979. Throughout September 1979, news regarding the nuclear programme and Zia's patriotic duty to safeguard it continued to hit the head-lines. 25 Dawn, 27 September 1979. 152 to ward off any pressure against the nuclear programme. Having portrayed the electoral process and the country's security as diametrically opposite poles, the announcement of an indefinite postponement of the promised election was made on October 1, 1979. We should keep in mind that the Zia regime not only considered itself capable of safeguarding the security and ensuring the solidarity of the country, but had assumed the responsibility of protecting 'Islamic ideology' as well. The term 'Islamic ideology' became a politically expedient tool with which to confront the particular challenges faced by the regime. By late 1979, the new regime prided itself for defending Pakistan's nuclear programme in international forums. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 proved to be the life-line of the Zia regime. The Islamic identity of Pakistan came to be threatened by Hindu India on the eastern side and the communist threat was knocking at the door from the western side. The Soviet invasion had a lasting impact on security discourse in Pakistan. First, it provided the pretext of an external threat to suppress dissidence within the country. Second, efforts to Islamize Pakistani polity were pursued with renewed vigour. •Third, it opened the floodgates of U.S. aid to Pakistan because of the latter's frontline status against the Soviet Union. The march of totalizing efforts to unify Pakistan on the basis of Islam received a blow in 1983 when the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy(MRD), a political alliance led by the PPP, gave a call for street agitation against the regime. Rural Sindh, the home province of the Bhuttos and their political stronghold, became the epicentre of the movement. The agitation 153 which started with voluntary arrests by political activists soon turned into violent encounters between the security forces and Sindhis. A month before the MRD agitation, Zia claimed to have uncovered an Israeli plan to destroy Pakistan's nuclear installations.26 At the heels of these claims came the MRD movement and violence in Sindh. The regime initially categorized the situation as * regrettable but not disquieting'.27 They were considered the work of a handful of "anarchist elements' with the possibility of foreign support. Construction of reality on these lines overlooked the limits of the dominant discourse to effectively bring the whole population of the country under its umbrella. Furthermore, it invoked the role of external powers to explain what was essentially a home-grown phenomenon. Increasingly, the movement became a nationalist uprising against the dictatorial rule of Islamabad. The guardians of the Pakistani nationalism were quick to dub the procession of protestors as 'looting mobs'.28 All 'right-minded people of Pakistan' were expected to oppose these 'mobs'. In line with the past tradition in the country, A. T. Chaudri, a leading political analyst, drew analogies between the Bangladesh movement and the 'violent, rather terrorist' elements in Sindh who were 'bent upon enacting the 1971 gory drama'.29 Needless to say, for this group of people the debacle in the then East Pakistan was a result of 26 Dawn, 4 July 1983. 27 Dawn, 24 August 1983. 28 Dawn, 24 August 1983. 29 Dawn, 27 August 1983. 154 the Bengalis' intransigence rather than a failure of the basis of Pakistan's national identity. The foreign hand which Zia had suspected earlier was now considered a reality and the Pakistani government officially lodged complaints with the Indian government for meddling in the internal affairs of Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan's geostrategic location became the much discussed source of vulnerability among experts on strategy in the 1980s, and the nuclear issue became a rallying point for the new epistemic community's regime of truth. Hasan Askari Rizvi, one of the leading security experts of Pakistan, justified Pakistan's defence spending on the grounds of external threats faced by the country.30 The 1974 nuclear explosion of India was considered one such threat which necessitated Pakistan to boost up its nuclear capability.31 These views were incessantly echoed in conferences and seminars organised by the government-sponsored thinktanks during that period.32 Increasingly, Pakistan's nuclear programme was portrayed in strategic terms with little or no mention of earlier arguments about its uses for the purposes of meeting the country's energy needs. Mushahid Hussain represented a new generation of experts who viewed Pakistan's programme as xa response to India's nuclear 30 Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan's Defence Policy," Pakistan Horizon xxxvi:1 (1983), pp. 32-56. 31 Ibid. , p. 53. 32 See the special issue of Strategic Studies, Nos-2 and 3, (Winter-Spring 1982-3) which contains papers presented at the First International Conference on the Strategy for Peace and Security in South Asia. In 1987, Strategic Studies, X:4(Summer-Autumn 1987) was devoted to the issue of Nuclear Non-Proliferation in South Asia. This journal is published by the Institute for Strategic Studies, Islamabad. 155 ambitions'.33 The main objective of Pakistan was vto seek a credible nuclear deterrent against its principal adversary, i.e, India' .34 Gone were the days when experts tried to wrap their argument in the context of energy needs. The teachings of nuclear deterrence prevalent in the West had become staple arguments of Pakistani experts. Conventional weapons were considered incapable of allaying the 'deep historical fears' of Pakistanis. Under the changed circumstances, the nuclear deterrent was seen as xthe best guarantor of Pakistan's security against India'.35 Zia and Hussain had identical views on the nuclear issue. Responding to a question as to why Pakistan wanted a bomb, he said xto.ensure security, to create a deterrent' .36 Forgotten Resistance Foucault's adage that 'where there is power there is resistance' has validity in the Pakistani context too. A minor text published in 1984 authored by a relatively unknown author, Akhtar Ali, tried to question the dominant discourse on the nuclear 33 Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan and the Changing Regional Scenario: Reflections of a Journalist (Lahore:Progressive Publishers, 1988), p. 223. Hussain presently (Decemberl997) serves as minister for Information in Nawaz Sharif's government. Previously he worked as the editor of Islamabad-based English daily The Muslim. Hussain is one of the leading syndicated columnists in Pakistan. 34 Ibid. , p. 224. 35 Ibid. , p. 226. 36 As quoted in Mushahid Hussain, 1988, p. 1. 156 option.37 The basic argument of the book, i.e, Pakistan's security is not enhanced by retaining the nuclear option, continues to guide, as we shall see later in this chapter, the dissidents' views in the 1990s. Ali's book remains one of the pioneering efforts to voice that concern in the 1980s. Ironically, the foreword to the volume was written by Lt.Gen.(Retd.) A. I. Ikram, the former president of a state-run thinktank, namely, the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, who does not seem to have read the draft of the book. Genernal Ikram maintains that a 'vicious international campaign' against Pakistan was started by an all powerful Zionist lobby in the U.S. which controls 'the entire Western media'.38 India joined hands with the Zionists in a witch-hunt against Pakistan.39 These views are an integral part of the dominant security discourse in Pakistan, but Ali attempts to question the truth value of such statements. Ali's thesis deviated from the dominant discourse in several key respects. In the process, he expects the reader to accept another set of myths as alternative 'truths'. He questions the Pakistani analysts' belief that the nuclear capability would deter a conventionally superior India from attacking Pakistan. According to Ali's understanding of the theory of nuclear deterrence, only nuclear symmetry can achieve the objective of 37 Akhtar Ali, Pakistan's Nuclear Dilemma: Energy and Security Dimensions (Karachi: Economic Research Unit, 1984) . 38 Ibid., p. xi. 39 Ibid. 157 stable deterrence.40 As Pakistan cannot achieve nuclear symmetry, he argues, it stands to make strategic gains by joining the non-proliferation regime. Secondly, what Ali considers to be threats to Pakistan's security is fundamentally a different set of issues than what is perceived by the adherents of the dominant discourse as challenges to the country's security. Rather than accepting the prevalent assertion of viewing India as the main threat to Pakistan's security, Ali locates the threat in the domestic society, manifested in economic underdevelopment and regional disparities. Due to the different location of the 'threat', Ali does not think that India is 'intent on annulling' Pakistan.41 This view is in total contrast with the dominant discourse regarding the aims and objectives of India vis-a-vis Pakistan. As the threats to Pakistan are situated in the domestic realm and India is absolved of any grand conspiracy to undo Pakistan, Ali goes a step further and claims that 'the majority of Indian population would oppose the bomb-making',42 Wedded to the above assertion in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Ali discounts the predominantly pro-nuclear theme in the Indian discourse as 'writings or statements of the bomb-lobbyists (who) do not represent Indian government's policy' or peoples' perceptions.43 Finally, he establishes a causal relationship between poverty and the nuclear ambitions of 40 Ibid. , p. 7. 41 Ibid., p. 15. 42 Ibid., p. 22. As we shall see in chapter six, the Indian public, especially its elite, does not subscribe to such views. 43 Ibid. , p. 80. 158 Pakistan, suggesting that the solution of Pakistan's security problem lies in education and economic development, which in turn are hampered by the nuclear ambitions.44 These postulates guide the leading figures of the anti-nuclear bomb section in Pakistan. A detailed discussion of the contending versions of truth will be offered in the section on •post-Zia nuclear discourse in Pakistan. Suffice it to say that Akhtar Ali's book won an endorsement from an adherent of the dominant discourse in Pakistan who apparently overlooked the main thesis of the author. But the book opened a new chapter in the discourse in which the dominant discourse was challenged by invoking themes of security and progress. However, the book did not create any ripples at the time of publication, nor did it earn the author the title of xan Indian agent'. Retrospectively it would seem that Ali's views were considered too marginal to merit any serious consideration. Later on, adherents of similar views would face allegations of lacking a patriotic spirit. In sum, it was during the Zia regime that the nuclear issue became the domain of experts who would continue to dominate the debate in years to come. Zia's version of Pakistan was based upon a militarily strong, politically and socially homogenized Pakistan with 'Islamic ideology' as the ultimate test of patriotism, and the nuclear option as the best available sword to deter India and convince the nation of the regime's patriotic credentials. A week before his accidental death in a mysterious plane crash in 1988, Zia asked the people of Pakistan 'not to 44 Ibid. , p. 123. 159 grudge defence allocations... as no price is too big for national independence',45 He expressed pride in the fact that the Armed Forces were his constituency who 'were defending the sacred soil of the country at great sacrifice'. In that endeavour they (the Armed Forces) had the full support of the nation. If Bhutto brought the issue into the security discourse of Pakistan, Zia continued to make use of it to consolidate an independent Islamic identity for Pakistan by invoking the image of an Indian threat. The 1980s saw the birth of an epistemic community of strategic experts in Pakistan which continued to flourish in the post-Zia period. The nuclear issue would no more remain tied to the people in power alone. It also became power of the people with knowledge about the issue to determine how patriotic different rulers were. The next section discusses the nature and direction of the nuclear politics in Pakistan in the post-Zia period. The Post-Zia Period The Pakistani nation is to be indoctrinated as to the need for positive thinking and action for its very survival. The indoctrination must begin in the cradle and should be an integral part of education. It must also be preached in mosques, offices, factories, and agricultural fields. We should know that if we resolve to stay free and are prepared to die for truth and honour, with God's blessings, no aggression can deprive us of our sovereignty. Air Chief Marshal (Retd) M.Anwar Shamim46 We will not allow any country, any power, to take a look at our Kahuta plant. If anyone gives foreigners right to 45 Dawn, 11 August 1988. 46 Air Marshal (Retd.) M. Anwar Shamim, '"Pakistan's Security Concerns," Dawn, 2 November 1988. 160 inspect our facilities, he could not be termed patriot. M .K. June jo, former prime minister47 Election campaigns often provide a good opportunity to assess the salience of various issues among different sections of a society. Qualitative shifts in the discourse become transparent in the public assertions of politicians, writings of analysts, and reactions of people to the statements of truth and counter-truth. The party-based November 1988 polls centred upon patriotic credentials of the key contenders. The shadows of Z. A. Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq loomed large over the election campaign of Benazir Bhutto, leader of the PPP and Nawaz Sharif, a close associate of Zia and the leader of the newly formed Island. Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) or Islamic Democratic Alliance. What issue could have served better than the nuclear issue to measure the contenders' love for national sovereignty! During the post-1977 election agitation, Z. A. Bhutto had accused the U.S. and its Pakistani allies of pressuring him to give up Pakistan's nuclear programme. Eleven years later, the Bhutto ladies (Benazir and her mother Nusrat) were being depicted by the IJI as the United States' stooges for allegedly promising Americans access to the nuclear facilities of Pakistan if they came to power. So close were the connections between the enemies of Pakistan and the anti-Pakistan Bhuttos that, according to the IJI, the 'Jewish and Hindu lobby was working for PPP's campaign. The objective of Jewish and Hindu lobby was to bring in a 47 Dawn, 5 November 1988. 161 government which suits their designs'.48 For Nawaz Sharif, then leader of the IJI, if India was the external enemy, the PPP was the internal enemy bent upon harming the national sovereignty of the country.49 To counter these charges, the Bhuttos offered what they thought was an incontrovertible evidence: the fate of the late Bhutto who faced the gallows to protect the nuclear plant of Pakistan. If Z. A. Bhutto could die for the country, doubts about the Bhutto ladies' patriotism were unfounded. Interestingly, all the allegations regarding the sell-out of the Bhuttos and counter-narratives were taking place in the cities of the Punjab. The province had traditionally been the bastion of the dominant discourse in Pakistan, and during the Zia regime the discourse regarding Pakistan's geostrategic security and Islamic ideological frontiers had taken deep roots in the politics of the Punjab. The IJI knew that the people of Punjab would not accept a politician or group of politicians who would jeopardize Pakistan's nuclear programme. Rather than being a handy tool for the party in power, the nuclear issue by now had assumed a life of its own and could jeopardize future prospects of politicians in the most populated province of Pakistan. While Benazir Bhutto played up the theme of democracy versus autocracy in Pakistan as personified by two martyrs, Bhutto and Zia respectively, the IJI went on the offensive on the issues of nuclear policy and the threat posed by Benazir to the Islamic identity of Pakistan. The continuation of the nuclear programme 48 Dawn, 2 November 1988. 49 Dawn, 13 November 1988. 162 without yielding to external pressures was one of the cardinal principles outlined in the election manifesto of the IJI.50 Benazir won the elections with a slim majority and vowed to safeguard the nuclear programme of Pakistan despite proclaiming to be a non-proliferationist. It was not the pressure of her political opponents alone that forced her to stick to a policy she was uncomfortable with; the mandarins of Pakistan's security community were not far behind in espousing nuclear aspirations. Members of the security epistemic community deemed it their duty to highlight the threats to Pakistan's identity in uncertain political times. The centrality of. the Indian threat had become an article of faith in such writings, and they argued that the centuries-old rivalry between Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan was unlikely to subside due to the hegemonic designs of India. Pakistan should be prepared to safeguard its 'national independence and territorial integrity' at any cost.51 There was no better way to ensure the above two essentials than a 'suitable deterrent...mix of the nuclear and conventional forces', where nuclear forces would 'act as a bulwark against Indian designs'. It was for these purposes that the Air Marshal was suggesting indoctrination measures quoted at the beginning of the section. As a result of the 1988 election, Benazir Bhutto became the prime minister of Pakistan heading a minority government. 50 For the full text of the IJI's election manifesto see, Dawn, 14 November 1988. 51 Air Marshal(Retd.) M. Anwar Shamim, "Pakistan's Security Concerns," Dawn, 2 November 1988. Similar views were expressed by yet another member of this community with a civilian background. See Afzal Mahmood, "Priorities in Foreign Policy," Dawn, 14 December 1988. 163 Coincidently, on the Indian side, the valley of Kashmir slipped into a violent uprising against New Delhi. Ethnic turmoil in the urban centres of Sindh, especially the port city of Karachi and Hyderabad, was in full-swing as well. American aid to Pakistan remained suspended due to the latter's alleged nuclear programme. The dominant security discourse in Pakistan was rife with anti-India assertions and in favour of Pakistan's nuclear programme. In spite of the U.S. displeasure, France decided to renew its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. This development was portrayed as a key triumph of the new regime to ensure Pakistan's security.52 Meanwhile, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 followed by the U.S. victory in the Gulf War had visible effects on the security discourse in Pakistan. At the onset of the Gulf War, the political scene in Pakistan was torn with the dilemma of massive anti-Americanism on the one hand and closer ties with the U.S. ally in the Gulf, i.e, Saudi Arabia, on the other. Although Pakistani troops were deployed on Saudi soil to defend the kingdom, General Aslam Beg, the then chief of the Army Staff, was talking in terms of 'strategic defiance' to ward off what he believed to be American hegemony in the region. The dominant discourse in Pakistan questioned the U.S. sincerity in liberating Kuwait, because Washington did not show the same enthusiasm for Kashmir's right to self-determination. The continuing pressure against Pakistan's nuclear programme and threats to put Pakistan on the list of countries supporting terrorism militated public 52 Dawn, 22 February 1990. 164 •opinion against the United States. Increasingly, the myth of a tripartite Indo-Jewish-American informal alliance against potentially nuclear Islamic Pakistan was gaining credibility. Now Pakistan's nuclear programme was not only a shield against the 'expansionist India', but a symbol of the iron-will of the Muslim world to resist the U.S.-Jewish led march of the new world order. Ironically, in the 1990s, Z. A. Bhutto's dream of the Muslim civilization having nuclear capability was vehemently pursued by some of his sworn enemies, i.e, the Jamait-I-Islami and retired generals. In today's Pakistan, Islam, security, patriotism and the bomb are fused together in the dominant security discourse. For the sake of simplicity, there are two shades of views in the dominant discourse regarding the nuclear issue. There are, what I term, crusaders who think that Pakistan by virtue of being founded in the name of religion is duty-bound to develop the bomb to further the Islamic cause, and there are adherents of official ambiguity who acknowledge the stabilizing role played by the nuclear factor in India-Pakistan relations and are content' with the status quo. These two positions intersect, coexist and compete in the same space with each other. The contours of the contemporary security discourse and the position of the nuclear issue in it can be meaningfully understood by asking questions like: Who is threatening whom? How will nuclear weapons meet those challenges? We will start with crusaders' bomb followed by their moderate allies who are more in line with the official government line. Crusaders' Bomb 165 Even a single person on the streets of Pakistan would not say that we should abdicate our nuclear option. Professor Khurshid Ahmad53 Professor Khurshid Ahmad's thinking is reflective of an identity carved out for Pakistan on the basis of Islamic nationalism. His views manifest tensions that can be expected in a narrative which invokes such diverse strands as pan-Islamism, territoriality, denial of domestic heterogeneity, and principles of modern realist theory of IR to validate a particular version of discourse about Pakistan's security needs. In the classical mode of forging an identity through outlining threats, Ahmad's Pakistan is an entity threatened by a host of elements. To lend his views an air of objectivity on the one hand and prescribe Islamic solutions on the other, the portrayal of the threatening entities takes place in a mix of the mundane and divine. States in the international system are seen as a projection of the individual (who is always male in his narrative) in the state of nature. Like man in the state of nature, the states also have an inbuilt instinctive defence system.54 This world-view of international politics leaves little room for ideological rationale to justify or propose a 53 Khurshid Ahmad, "Summation: Capping the Nation," in, Tarik Jan, ed., Pakistan's Security and the Nuclear Option (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1995), p. 148. Professor Khurshid Ahmad is a leading ideologue of the Jamait-I-Islami, Pakistan's most organized religous party. He is the director of the party's thinktank the Institute of Policy Studies(IPS), Islamabad. He also served as a senator. 54 Khurshid Ahmad, "Introduction," in, Ibid., p. 17. 166 mode of action in international arena based on ethics. Ahmad fuses his realism with divinity to make room for the conduct of international affairs by an ideological entity. We are informed that 'the leading countries of the West...in seeking power and its attendant pleasure, have reached a stage where they are doomed to meet disaster'.5S It is clear that the West (which generally means the United States in this account) is a giant heading toward an imminent disaster, but on its way would surely like to devour Pakistan. The West and its partners are out to harm Pakistan, in the above scheme. In the 'predatory world... Pakistani Muslims' correctly understand the nature of threats. The first threat comes from 'the Indian mentality (whose characteristics we now know through many authentic Pakistani voices) and their frenetic arms build-up'.56 A second threat emanates from the 'Zionist entity' called Israel which is no more than a 'European colony' grafted in the heart of the Muslim world.57 Pakistan is the country of its Muslim citizens and they are the only ones' who can correctly understand the nature of these threats. This version of Pakistan practically excludes all religious minorities from the fold of the threatened citizenry. Second, although an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis (about ninety six per cent) are Muslims, they do not all concur concur with the idea that religion is the only basis of identity in the country. Proponents of ethnic and 55 Ibid., p. 18. 56 Ibid. , p. 19. 57 Ibid., p. 20. 167 other identity-based movements put their patriotic credentials in jeopardy in the above discourse. In the same vein, Gen.(Retd) K. M. Arif, a close associate of Zia and now a prolific commentator on Pakistan's security, warned the nation of unified moves by 'the Indo-Jewish lobby' to "defame and malign' Pakistan.58 Guided by dictums of realpolitik, Gen. Arif argues that Pakistan can not rely on any other country's assurances to ensure its national security, especially in the face of the 'enduring danger' posed by India.59 Amongst the crusaders, the threat to Pakistan's territorial integrity and ideological boundaries is multi-faceted. Retaining the nuclear option becomes a pressing necessity to thwart such threats. The nuclear option can only be understood in the context of threats it is supposed to ward off. As the adversaries are not only militarily powerful but also involved in 'evil designs' against Pakistan, Ghani Eirabi, one of Pakistan's leading security analysts, regards the U.S. pressure on the Pakistani governments to give up the nuclear programme as a package deal which would also include betraying 'the Kashmiris and revise our (italics mine) commitment to Islam'.60 Therefore, retaining the 58 Gen.(Retd.) K. M. Arif, "Expanding Indo-Israeli Nexus," Dawn, 17 June 1993. 59 Gen. K. M. Arif, "Retaining the Nuclear Option," in, Tarik Jan, ed., Pakistan's Security, p. 122. 60 Ghani Eirabi, "Blackmailing Can Backfire," Dawn, 18 April 1993. Prof. Khurshid Ahmad also gives two reasons for retaining the nuclear option. First, the country is in danger of losing its territorial integrity at the hands of a wrathful India. Second, Israel is a major ideological threat. The nuclear shield will safeguard both the territory and ideology. See, Prof. Khurshid 168 nuclear option symbolizes Pakistan's twin commitments to Islam and Kashmir. The two are the pillars of the ideological foundations of the state; reneging on the nuclear issue would certainly result in crumbling of the other two. Any hope of the U.S. playing an impartial role in this context is ruled out because it has helped 'India and Israel build substantial nuclear arsenals while penalizing Pakistan'.61 Jafar Wafa, another prominent political commentator, remains convinced of the Israeli 'wickedness' in brokering an Indo-U.S. nexus against Pakistan.62 Such a nexus has ominous implications for Pakistan, especially when 'there is hardly any sanity left in the body-politic of India'. This insanity blocks any chances of reconciliation between the two countries because the 'Hindu psyche' wants to build a 'Hindu empire' in the rest of the subcontinent.63 In a world marked by such inequities and intrigues, a nonproliferation regime in the shape of the NPT is viewed as no more than a 'technological apartheid' aimed at tightening the noose around Pakistan's neck.64 Therefore, the Pakistan of Prof. Khurshid Ahmad needs a nuclear deterrent not only for its safety and independence but for the security of the Muslim Ummah as well.65 Dr. S. M. Koreshi, a former ambassador, argues that Ahmad, "Introduction," in, Jan(ed.), pp. 17-26. 61 Ibid. 62 Jafar Wafa, "Our Security Option," Dawn, 3 August 1993. 63 Ibid. 64 Prof. Khurshid Ahmad, "Summation," in, Jan, ed., Pakistan's Security, p. 147. 65 Ibid. , p. 149. 169 compromising such a vital programme to meet the requirements of the NPT would constitute an act of treason.66 Air Chief Marshal(Retd.) Zulfiqar Ali Khan argues that signing of the NPT by Pakistan should not be conditional upon India's denial to abide by the treaty. For him, Pakistan's nuclear programme is tied with the Kashmir problem and unless it is resolved to Pakistan's satisfaction, acceding to the NPT would be against the national interests of Pakistan.67 Disenchantment with the NPT is an integral part of the crusaders nukespeak. Seen as no more than an obstacle in ensuring Pakistan's and the Ummah's security, it is termed a dead and outdated treaty. The solution, according to Shireen Mazari, lies in Pakistan declaring itself a nuclear state. This is a course which she thinks will further endear the Pakistani state to the masses of the country.68 Abida Hussain, a politician from Punjab who briefly served as an ambassador to Washington and now is a minister in Nawaz Sharif's cabinet, was so frustrated with the U.S. pressure on Pakistan in connection with the NPT that she 66 Dr. S. M. Koreshi, "The Method in American Duplicity," in Jan,ed., Pakistan's Security, p. 132. 67 Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan, "Pakistan's Security and Nuclear Option," in, Nuclear Issues in South Asia, Islamabad Council of World Affairs (ICWA), Spring 1995, pp. 14-15. Khan consistently reiterates his views in Pakistani newspapers and academic journals. ICWA is a thinktank based in Islamabad and founded by former foreign minister Agha Shahi. It mainly comprises of former foreign office officials, retired military men and some serving professors. 68 Shireen Mazari served as the chairperson of the Department of the Strategic Studies, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad. She presently edits her own weekly paper Link which promotes a similar point of view. Shireen M. Mazari, "NPT: An Unfair Treaty that Pakistan must not sign," in, Jan,ed., Pakistan's Security, pp. 32-35. 170 'seriously thought of going back(to Pakistan) and joining the Jamait-I-Islami' .69 This brief synopsis of the pro-bomb crusaders' nukespeak in contemporary Pakistan demonstrates that the Pakistani 'imagined community' for this group is conceived as a Muslim nation devoid of any internal heterogeneity. Any indication in that direction is taken as the work of external enemies and their domestic allies. The external enemies are guided by 'evil designs' against the sacred concept of Pakistan. Pakistan in turn is duty-bound to be the vanguard Muslim state with a nuclear shield protecting its territorial boundaries and safeguarding the ideological frontiers of the Muslim world. There is a significant section of adherents of the pro-nuclear option whose views vary slightly in some respects from the above perspective. A look at the contours of that view would show that the ambiguity in their nuclear stance is reflective of ambiguity in their notion of the Pakistani identity. Diplomats' Ambiguous Bomb The role of Pakistan's foreign office in this genealogy has already come under discussion in an indirect way. Career diplomats came into contact with the intricacies of nuclear diplomacy in the 1960s, and realized the political subtleties of the issue during Z. A. Bhutto's era. Pakistan's diplomats also 69 Syeda Abida Hussain, "Don't Give Up What is Yours and the World will Come Around!," in , Ibid., p. 110. Although she has not joined the Jamait but has turned into a nuclear hawk after her stint as an ambassador. 171 played a pivotal role in providing ideological and diplomatic ammunition to General Zia in his bid to use the nuclear issue as a mean of gaining regime legitimacy and strengthening a militant Islamic political discourse in the country. The writings of two former diplomats, Agha Shahi and Abdul Sattar, typify the ambiguous position adopted by the Foreign Office in the nuclear discourse in Pakistan.70 Their writings are in marked contrast with the crusaders in terms of style and understanding of conceptual aspects of the deterrence literature. A good sample of Shahi's views can be found in articles in the special issue of Islamabad Council for World Affairs (ICWA) journal on "Nuclear Issues in South Asia".71 Shahi is less concerned with defining what Pakistan is and focuses more on the threat posed by India to the territorial integrity of the country. As the threatened is not perceived in terms of the manifestation of a divine power, the threat is not considered an incarnation of evil. The rivalry between India and 70 Agha Shahi served as Foreign Secretary during the Zia period. He led the Pakistan delegation during the NPT negotiations during the 1960s. Since his retirement in the late 1980s he has been vocal in expressing his views on Pakistan's foreign policy, especially with reference to the country's nuclear programme. He founded Islamabad Council of World Affairs, a think-tank comprised of senior people from different walks of life. Abdul Sattar briefly served as foreign minister during 1993. He served in India as High Commissioner for a substantial time. Since his retirement, he frequently contributes in the national media on issues of Pakistan's foreign policy with special reference to relations with India. 71 Agha Shahi, "Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Security Dilemma," pp. 1-11, and, "Preservation of Deterrence for Security," pp. 63-66, ICWA Journal, Islamabad, Spring 1995. Also see his "Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Security Dilemma," in, Jan, ed., Pakistan's Security, pp. 39-54. 172 Pakistan is understood in terms of the dictums of a Realist world view in which historical factors have led the two countries to pursue zero-sum bilateral relations. Faced with the superior conventional forces of India, keeping the nuclear option is seen as a viable way to deter India from launching a conventional attack on Pakistan. Situating the salience of nuclear option in this context, Shahi's thinking is in line with the Waltzian notion regarding the superior deterrent and stabilizing value of nuclear weapons in the contemporary world. Shahi's views on the NPT are low on rhetoric but rooted in the oft-repeated and widely agreed stance among strategic experts in Pakistan that the treaty is discriminatory and incapable of addressing the security needs of developing countries in its present form. Adopting the moral high ground against the NPT, most of the Pakistani security analysts express identical views with their Indian counterparts. Munir Ahmad Khan, former chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission(PAEC), holds similar views on the NPT and the security dilemma faced by Pakistan.72 Abdul Sattar is equally sceptical about the success of the NPT in achieving meaningful disarmament.73 Pakistan's decision to retain the nuclear option is justified in the light of the Waltzian notion of deterrent value of nuclear weapons. Sattar argues that the end of the cold war did not alleviate Pakistan's 72 Munir Ahmad Khan, "Issues in NPT Extension," in Nuclear Issues in South Asia, ICWA Journal, pp. 19-25. 73 For a detailed discussion of Abdul Sattar's views see, his "Nuclear Stability in South Asia," in Nuclear Issues in South •Asia, ICWA Journal, pp. 36-62; and also, "Nuclear Issues in South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective," in, Jan, ed., Pakistan's Security, pp. 55-90. 173 security concerns which are based upon 'India's recurrent use of force to impose "solutions" of its own preference upon less powerful neighbours'.74 Living next to the bigger and hostile neighbour, the nuclear option for Pakistan works as a means of self-defence in a system without a dependable collective security system. The efficacy of the nuclear factor in stabilizing Indo-Pakistani strategic interaction is considered a self-evident fact. In sum, the crusaders and the diplomats portray India as a 'threat' to Pakistan's security, but the latters' language is couched in diplomatic jargon. Both view the NPT as a discriminatory treaty. The crusaders point to a grand conspiracy aimed at depriving the Muslim world behind the nonproliferation regime, whereas diplomats refer to the limitations of the NPT by virtue of its selective emphasis, preventing vertical proliferation. Diplomats see merits in Pakistan's policy of nuclear ambiguity and the crusaders want an open declaration of going nuclear to consolidate the independent identity of Pakistan. However, there are new 'kids on the block' in the nuclear discourse in Pakistan whose views differ fundamentally from the above visions of Pakistan's security. The following section is a look at dissenting narrative of unilateralists and sceptics who would like Pakistan to forego the nuclear option. 74 Sattar, in ICWA Journal, 1995, p. 42. Dissenting Narratives 174 Counter-narratives based on different lineages have always been an integral part of the political discourse in Pakistan. Ethnic nationalism has been the most prominent one and continues to shatter the totalizing effects of the dominant discourse. In the 1990s, the security-oriented, bomb-centric, and Indo-phobic view evoked a parallel discourse in which unilateralists questioned the utility of the nuclear option to ensure security and development of Pakistan. This position is based upon different conceptions about the identity of Pakistan and new notions of security. This section analyzes these contending views in the nuclear discourse of the contemporary Pakistan. I will enumerate shades of the dissenting voices in the nuclear discourse of today's Pakistan to conclude this genealogy which started with the historical phase when nuclear weapons were absent from the strategic discourse of the country, and traced how the issue has become a litmus test for judging the patriotic credentials of citizens. This discussion will show how the presumed consensus over the nuclear issue is being challenged by the dissenting voices. The dominant security discourse about the utility of the nuclear option is questioned by a small, but gradually growing, number of people. A number of scientists turned social commentators, a few well known journalists and academics, and a rare breed of ex-soldiers have made it their mission to voice dissenting opinions in the nuclear discourse of Pakistan even at the risk of earning the title of 'traitor'. . 175 It should be made clear at the outset that I do not consider this position either more pious than that of their counterparts nor less patriotic than the pro-option analysts. The argument is that the narratives of unilateralism or scepticism toward the dominant view are reflective of a different vision of Pakistan's identity and security needs. Since the country is imagined in a different way, security priorities undergo change as well. The objective is to outline the themes in the dissenting voices based on a different notion of what constitutes as genuine threats to Pakistanis security, and how the country can repel these threats. Employing the same method of selecting some representative voices from this ensemble, I will look into the pacifist camp. Khaled Ahmed, a well known journalist who regularly questions Pakistan's security doctrine; Dr. Zia Mian, a late entrant on the intellectual horizon but the key organizer of an anti-bomb group; Pervez Hoodbhoy, a MIT educated physicist and veteran pacifist; are included in this group.75 As the idiom of the dominant discourse is wrapped in the language of patriotism, any deviation from it opens the door to allegations of treachery. No one is more aware of this than anti-bomb intelligentsia in Pakistan. Most writings in this category 75 Khaled Ahmed is a prolific commentator in this group. In the past he has served as the editor of two English language dailies, namely, The Nation (Lahore) and The Frontier Post (Lahore). At present he writes in the Lahore-based weekly The Friday Times and is the editor of the Urdu version of this paper. Dr. Zia Mian is a physicist by training and works as a Research Fellow at a thinktank, i.e, the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad. He is also a founding member of an anti-nuclear group called the Campaign for Nuclear Sanity. Pervez Hoodbhoy teaches physics at the Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad and writes and comments frequently on social and political issues. 176 start with the customary disclaimer that by not adhering to the dominant position they are not indulging in any act of treason. Conduct of the nuclear discourse in the dichotomy of Us versus Them is viewed as a ploy to foreclose any meaningful debate on the issue. Given the popularity of Pakistan's nuclear programme, dissenters argue that 'any appeal to common sense or common reason is immediately dubbed as unpatriotic' .7S Dr. Inayatullah, former chairman of Department of International Relations at Islamabad's Quaid-I-Azam University, argues that the present consensus 'was imposed from the top' during the Zia regime, and over the time it has become 'an article of nationalist faith'. Critics, of whom Inayatullah is one, who questioned the dominant logic had to face the 'unfounded allegations and insinuations' of being Indian or American agents.77 Since the dominant rationale is considered a manifestation of 'manufactured consent', the dissenters had to look elsewhere for foundations upon which to rationalize their position. Liberal rationality bestowed by enlightenment has become the dissidents' weapon to demystify the dominant myth, and create 'rational' and 'scientific' grounds to conduct the debate. While the pro-nuclear option people are dubbed as guardians of emotionalism, the 76 Lt.Gen(Retd.) Mujib-ur-Rehman, "A False Sense of Security," in, Zia Mian, ed., Pakistan's Atomic Bomb and the Search for Security (Lahore: Gautam Publishers,A publication for the Campaign for Nuclear Sanity and the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad), p. 32. This volume is probably the only book-length collection of articles written by dissidents on the nuclear issue. Contributors to the book regularly voice their views in the national media. 77 Dr. Inayatullah, "The Nuclear Arms Race and Fall of the Soviet Union: Some Lessons for Pakistan," in, Mian,ed., Pakistan's Atomic Bomb, p. 83. 177 dissidents claim to be custodians of 'objective thinking.' Arguments of harbingers of reason are grounded in a moral milieu which envisages security in a fundamentally different way. The combination of the two, as argued by this group, makes their position more in line with the fast-changing reality of world politics and better placed to further the true national interests of Pakistan. Dissenters argue that going nuclear is counter-productive and an indication of a false sense of security. At worst the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Pakistanis can be dangerous for the international order as well. Opponents to the existing contours of nuclear politics draw their intellectual inspiration from different sources. Khaled Ahmed's thinking is more in line with the dominant American view that nuclear weapons in the hands of leaders of developing countries is a dangerous prospect because of the latters' tendency to decide matters on whim rather than reason. Scientists such as Pervez Hoodbhoy and Zia Mian concur with that section of their counterparts in the West who are against the possession of nuclear weapons in general because of their being prone to accidents and accidental usages.78 Finally, sporadic dissent comes from the ranks of former soldiers who argue that reliance on the nuclear option to ward off external threats undermines and erodes a conventional defence system which is more reliable. Khaled Ahmed's suspicion of the Pakistani leadership's 78 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is in the forefront of analyzing scientific, social and economic fall-outs of nuclear weapons. The Bulletin's influence is evident in writings of these Pakistani writers. 178 capability to handle nuclear weapons emanates from his belief in the embedded 'irrationality' of the non-Western world.79 The West is credited with developing reason as van intellectual tool for survival' over the past ten centuries. The non-Western world, meanwhile, is considered a realm of 'primitives', 'irrational', 'suicide-bombers', in which nationalists and dictators act 'at some animal level'. Third World leaders tend to think 'if you have the bomb, you are a 'big power' perched permanently in the UN security council, vetoing what you do not like'. This vituperative rendering of the world which Ahmed himself comes from is not without its own myths about the relative superiority of the West and the absolute inferiority of the rest. Based on the above vision of world, Ahmed argued that the effects of nuclear weapons vary in two fundamentally different worlds. In the West, the bomb had a 'sobering' impact; and the will of the non-West to acquire similar technology is 'irrational' because it is not backed up by scientific and economic advances. Third World countries' reiteration of basic principles of modern deterrence thinking does not convince Khaled Ahmed to consider them fit for handling the nuclear weapons because the leadership here suffers from 'personality disorders'. Fears of the state-level irrationality are not the only concerns that guide Ahmed; the alarmism leads him to argue that nuclear devices can land in the hands of splinter groups who would not 79 Khaled Ahmed, "After Hiroshima, why do we still love the bomb?," The Friday Times, Lahore, 17-23 August 1995. A detailed analysis of this article is of paramount importance to understand the alternative narrative. 179 hesitate to annihilate their enemies.80 This mode of thinking is applied to analyze the dynamics of nuclear politics in South Asia, and we need not say that Pakistan and India are seen as inherently incapable of tackling the tricky weapons meant only for the descendants of "Age of Reason'. Khaled Ahmed's analysis of Pakistan's conduct of foreign relations, especially its Kashmir policy and relations with the U.S. over the nuclear issue, helps to understand the alternative vision of Pakistan's identity and its security needs. Pakistan in its existing shape is seen vas a corrupt and politically divided state' which has the 'potential to become the cockpit of international terrorism'.81 Under these circumstances, Pakistan's bid to acquire nuclear capability is an 'adventurism' which appeals to its disenchanted public' .82 A select group of Pakistani scientist claiming enlightened social consciousness also oppose the existing parameters of nuclear politics, but for somewhat different reasons than those expounded by Khaled Ahmed. Zia Mian relies heavily on graphic details of destruction caused by radioactivity in the areas where superpowers conducted their nuclear tests as a warning for 80 In this regard he names Altaf Hussain, leader of Pakistan's Urdu speaking ethnic group and it party the Muhajir Quomi Movement(MQM), as the kind of non-state actor who might acquire such weapons and use them against his rivals. 81 Khaled Ahmed, "Pakistan's America Problem: Crisis of Defiance." The Friday Times, Lahore, 24-30 March 1994. 82 Khaled Ahmed, "NPT: More Troubles Ahead for Pakistan," Ibid., 1-7 December 1994. 180 Pakistan to desist from the nuclear path.83 He considers the nuclear option a risky way to ensure security and a path fraught with dangers to meet energy needs. He gives examples of accidents that led to terminal illnesses of workers and residents affiliated with nuclear sites in the relatively safety conscious West. If mishaps can not be prevented in the advanced Western countries, Mian considers it a moral duty to enlighten the Pakistani public of the dangers of the nuclear option. Pervez Hoodbhoy has been drawing attention to the likely dangers of an unsafe nuclear programme and the tenuous grounds on which security analysts justify the programme.84 Hoodbhoy's concerns are based upon what is commonly termed as C3 (command, communication and credibility) related problems inherent in any situation where nuclear deterrence is at work. He argues that prestige may be a paramount factor in shaping India's nuclear ambitions. However, he dismisses it as the thinking of a bygone era when nuclear science was equated with scientific excellence. Today's bomb can be assembled with good engineering, competence and dedication, none of which requires scientific genius. The above discussion of the three representative figures shows that the nuclear myths in Pakistan are challenged by parallel myths about developing countries' inferiority and the horrors of nuclear accidents. Implicit in their accounts is a 83 Dr. Zia Mian, "Cost of Nuclear Security,", in Pakistan's Atomic Bomb, pp. 39-82. 84 For a good overview of Hoodbhoy's views on the issue see, Pervez Hoodbhoy, Nuclear Issues Between India and Pakistan: Myths and Realities (Washington D.C: Henry L. Stimson Centre, Occasional Paper No.18, July 1994); and also "Nuclear Myths and Realities," in, Mian, ed., Pakistan's Atomic Bomb, pp. 1-30. 181 counter-vision of Pakistan's identity. Let us see what they have in mind as 'their' Pakistan, and how best its security needs can be addressed. Zia Mian is sceptical of the notion that nuclear programme is an effective and cheap deterrent. Given the steadily high defence spending in Pakistan, he thinks the argument for cheap security is less valid. What he is concerned about are 'the hidden social and human costs of the lost opportunities for building schools, hospitals, water and sewage system'.8S This assertion implies a zero-sum relationship between the nuclear programme and other issues highlighted by Mian. Dispelling the overriding concerns of an Indian threat as a tool for the tiny ruling clique to bolster their narrow interests in the name of national security, Mian thinks that 'true' security can only come with good education and proper health-care. This vision of Pakistan's security pits it squarely against the dominant discourse in which protection of 'territorial integrity' and 'ideological boundaries' takes precedence over material gains that can be accrued by giving up the present strategic policy. Similar views are expressed by I. Hassan, a prominent political commentator, who thinks Pakistani peoples' pressing needs are shelter and education. Sticking to the present nuclear policy 'impoverishes' the masses of Pakistan.86 Rather than equating the NPT as a mean of undermining sovereignty of Pakistan, Hassan 85 Dr. Zia Mian, "Costs of Nuclear Security," in Pakistan's •Atomic Bomb, p. 61. 86 I. Hassan, "Seizing the Nuclear Moment," in, Ibid., p. 126. 182 argues for renouncing nuclear ambitions by signing the NPT and relying on the U.S. to pressurize India to do the likewise.87 The same unilateralism is obvious in Inayatullah's account who calls for signing of the NPT. Khaled Ahmed is not overtly concerned with the well-being of downtrodden classes, but acutely aware of the poor state of Pakistani economy. He sees a close connection between Pakistan's refusal to sign the NPT and the devastated state of its economy. Rather than proposing a unilateral course on the proliferation issue, Ahmed believes that Pakistani rulers will have no choice but to succumb to the international (read American) pressure on the NPT if the country wants to become economically self-reliant. Once the connection between the economic self-reliance and the nuclear policy is established, it becomes a matter of choice to give up one for the other. Ahmed unambiguously favours signing of the NPT as xa way out of economic collapse' .88 Since the dominant view in Pakistan makes any move in the direction of nonproliferation conditional upon similar initiatives by India, Ahmed implicity advises the Americans to offer positive incentives to persuade Pakistan to 'sign on the dotted line(of nonproliferation) while India keeps its nuclear arsenal'.89 The economic determinism of Khaled Ahmed is in total contrast with the strategic determinism of the dominant discourse. For Ahmed 87 Ibid., p. 127. 88 Khaled Ahmed, "The NPT and Pakistan," in, Mian,ed., Pakistan's Atomic Bomb, p. 115. 89 Khaled Ahmed, "NPT: More Troubles Ahead for Pakistan," The Friday Times, 1-7 December 1994. 183 xeconomic reality is the only reality on the basis of which to calculate one's chances of survival'.90 That is why he does not see any 'American conspiracy' in financing informal dialogue between opinion-makers of India and Pakistan to further the cause of economic liberalization as the most viable form of ensuring security in both countries. Conclusion By way of concluding the discussion of nukespeak in Pakistan I will try to recap the main tenets of the contemporary dominant security discourse in the country and the salience of the nuclear option in them. A functional model to summarize the discussion looks at the dominant discourse's notions of threats and the threatened, reasons behind that situation, security objectives in such context, means to attain those objectives, and finally costs involved in pursuing the suggested means. This is followed by summarizing the counter-narrative's vision of Pakistan's security needs. The reading offered in these chapters will highlight the relevance of the theoretical value of the discourse analysis if offering a better understanding of the dynamics of the nukespeak •in Pakistan. In the dominant security discourse, the primary threat to Pakistan emanates from external sources. India, which is portrayed as a Hindu entity, is the nearest and the most potent of them, followed by Israel and the West. The threatened 90 Khaled Ahmed, "Is "Neemrana Dialogue" a Conspiracy?," Ibid., December 29-January 4, 1995. 184 community is that of a Muslim Pakistan whose Islamic identity is endangered by external enemies and their local collaborators. The image of the threatened community is a monolith and any evidence to suggest otherwise is seen as a manifestation of the foreign hand. Explanations of threats are located in so-called objective incompatibility of Islam against the Hindu psyche and other forms of expansionism, i.e, Zionism and Western civilization. This objective conflict facilitates a tripartite alliance of Western-Jewish-Hindu forces against the Muslim world (of which Pakistan is a fortress). Faced with this situation, the key objectives of Pakistan's security policy are strengthening of an independent Islamic identity, bringing Kashmir in the fold of Pakistan to complete the unfinished agenda of the 1947 partition, and finally building the solid foundations of an Islamic Ummah{community) in world politics. Thus, the nuclear option is firmly fixed in the larger context of security discourse and any suggestion to renounce the nuclear programme is portrayed as a compromise of national interests. Nukespeakers also emphasize that since the nuclear programme is a symbol of national sovereignty only enemies of Pakistan can recommend or put pressure on the government to abandon this option. Fully aware of these pressures, the dominant discourse expects international pressure on Pakistan to give up the nuclear option. Therefore, they warn the nation that the resistance to such pressures may cause economic hardship. The counter-narratives in the security discourse locate threats at the internal level which exist in the shape of economic disparities, social problems, and bad governance. Among 185 the threatened are the masses of Pakistan and the liberal intelligentsia. Reasons behind this situation are traced to the rule by a military clique in conjunction with a feudal, comprador bourgeoisie and clergy. They argue that the dominant notions of national security are created by the ruling classes to sustain higher military spending. The objective of the dissident voices is to make Pakistan a liberal state with either a semi-socialist economy or a market economy based on good governance. Such a Pakistan will have friendly relations with India and close ties with international markets. The best way to achieve these objectives is through drastic cuts in defence spending, including renouncement of the nuclear programme, and moderation in Islam-based rhetoric. The costs of creating Pakistan on the above lines would possibly include close ties with international capital and a drastic reduction in Pakistan's military might. This in turn would tamper the militaristic rhetoric and possible deals with India on issues like Kashmir. In sum, both narratives have limits set by the respective imagination of national identities they espouse for Pakistan. Both are foundationalist and based upon a distinct power-knowledge frameworks as the bases of their existence. Through the methodology of discourse analysis, I have tried to locate the nukespeak as it permeates the dominant security discourse. This reading is an improvement on the available accounts of nuclear issue in Pakistan as it makes us aware of the underlying reasons behind the power as well as limits of the respective positions. The dominant discourse derives its power in the regime of truth by referring to Islam and the Two Nation theory as the key 186 foundations of Pakistan's existence as an independent state. Consequently, Islamic nationalism becomes the ultimate arbiter of differentiation between foes and friends in the security discourse conducted in the name of Pakistani national interests. The counter-narrative's ultimate reference is the Renaissance model of rationality with the individual's material progress as the ultimate criterion to distinguish good from bad. Pakistan, as the dominant discourse imagines, is a country created in the name of Islam because the Muslims of the subcontinent constitute a separate nation with predominantly Hindu India. Since post-1947 India is viewed as a Hindu state, it is considered a permanent enemy of Muslim Pakistan. Visualizing limits as well as ultimate justification of the dominant discourse are set by the imagination of Pakistan based upon the Two Nation theory. What the dissenting narratives are suggesting would fundamentally alter the basis of Pakistan as we know it today. Expecting or demanding to change the fundamentals of that discourse in the name of 'reason' comes, across as an unreasonable petition. The territorial security-centric and Islamist view of Pakistan does not reject the socio-economic costs caused by high military spending or costs accrued due to aid cut-off because of the nuclear policy. But yielding to those pressures or temptations of material well-being alone is a betrayal of the very ideals Pakistan was created to serve. Invariably, transgression of limits imposed by this identity version of Pakistan risk the transgressor being put in any other category but a true Pakistani. Since the dominant security discourse is 187 couched in either the modern dictum of nationalism or wrapped in religion, transgressors are either 'traitors' 'external agents' or 'heretics'. Conversely, someone who is a 'traitor' for Zia-ul-Haq may be a good example of enlightened reason for his/her liberal cohorts. The individual being the focal point of the imagination in the alternative discourse sees nothing but bigotry in the dominant discourse. His efforts to fundamentally change the parameters of truth in the existing discourse are met with resistance at different levels. A process which is seen by adherents of 'reason' as repression by those who dominate the levers of power, •rather than realizing the limits of his imagination of another Pakistan: a Pakistan in which power to set the criteria of truth will be invested in the reasoning liberal social democrat. This is a different regime of truth in which today's custodians of the national security risk are termed lunatics. As this study shows, nukespeak in the present form in Pakistan is made possible by a regime of truth that derives sustenance from a particular imagery about the country: a Pakistan which is only conceivable in terms of its incompatibility with India. This scheme is based on binary dichotomies in which Pakistan is a good, superior, and peace-loving country, whereas India is embodiment of an evil and expansionist power. In the preceding pages I have attempted to explain nukespeak by demystifying the arbitrary bases of knowledge that govern the politics of nuclear weapons in Pakistan. The methodology of discourse analysis enables us to better understand the dynamics and the elements that turn the 188 nuclear issue into an all powerful matter capable of assuming a political life of its own in the security discourse. The discourse analysis not only helps in demystifying the myths that make the nuclear issue powerful, but this methodology also makes us aware of the limits of the perspectives that seek to alter the nature and direction of Pakistan's nuclear programme by pointing out the strategic undesirability and economic unviability of the nuclear option. 189 Chapter Five NUKESPEAK IN INDIA i: From Celibacy to Explosion Indian identity is a work in progress. 'Midnight's children' started their 'tryst with destiny' in the name of democracy, secularism, and non-alignment.1 Although officially still wedded to those ideas, the present day reality of India leaves much to be desired on the above fronts. Distrusted by neighbours as a regional hegemon, plagued by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism, feared by various identity-based movements as an oppressive centre; contemporary India is more guided by assumptions of political realism than the visionary dreams of Gandhi or Nehru. Nuclear weapons once dubbed as 'evil' by the political leadership of independent India have become a viable strategic option in the eyes of the present-day Indian leadership and strategic experts. The proponents of nukespeak in India portray the abdication of the nuclear option as an act of compromising the national sovereignty. If the nuclear discourse in Pakistan is almost exclusively centred around the Indian threat, the same cannot be said of India. The discourse in India is guided by a mix of factors ranging from an aspiration to great power status to allocating blame to the adversaries (Pakistan being the major 1 The phrase 'a tryst with destiny' comes from Jawaharlal Nehru's speech delivered on the eve of India's independence on August 14, 1947. See, Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946- April 1961 (Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India,) p. 13. 'Midnight's Children' comes from the title of Salman Rushdie's novel which deals with the contemporary India. 'Midnight's children' has now become the by-word for the generation of Indians born in the 1940s. See, Salman Rushdie, Midnight's Children (London: J.Cape, 1981). 190 one) for the nuclear imbroglio in South Asia. The Indian nukespeak also exhibits traits of dichtomizing the world, both external and internal, in binary opposites to privilege the dominant discourse of the security of the country. The arbitrariness of the assertions made in the name of India's national interests can be best analyzed with the help of the methodology of discourse previously employed to explain the Pakistani nukespeak. Chapters Five and Six on India will be looking critically at the regime of truth regarding India's security with special reference to the nuclear issue. This chapter examines the background of Indian nukespeak starting with a brief account of the period marked by, what G.G. Mirchandani aptly terms, 'nuclear celibacy', i.e, from independence in 1947 until Nehru's death in 1964.2 Coincidently, the Chinese joined the nuclear club later in the same year. Nehru's death and the Chinese explosion resulted in a shift in Indian official policy with the introduction of an element of nuclear ambiguity and emergence of some, hitherto peripheral, voices in favour of exercising a nuclear option in the wake of the Chinese threat. Thus, the second part of this chapter discusses elements of nukespeak leading to the so-called peaceful nuclear explosion by India in May 1974. It was during this period that the nuclear programme increasingly became enmeshed in the jargon of national security against enemies. 2 G. G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi, Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 49. This is one of the earlier and indepth surveys of Indian opinion-makers on the nuclear issue. Mirchandani's book is an essential primer available to students of the nuclear debate in India. 191 We will start our story of Indian nukespeak with the views of independent India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, regarding India's two important neighbours, i.e, Pakistan and China, and his hopes for post-1947 India's international status. This is followed by an account of marginal voices in the Indian security discourse in favour of the nuclear option specially in the wake of defeat at the hand of China in a brief border war in 1962. By the late 1960s a perceptable shift was obvious in the official Indian stand on the nuclear issue: from unequivocal nuclear abstinence to guarded ambiguity. This ultimately led to the Pokhran nuclear explosion in 1974. This chapter ends with a discussion of the explosion and its immediate effects on the nuclear discourse in India. India and Its Neighbours Nehru can be credited with personifying the dominant discourse that shaped the post-1947 Indian identity, both in terms of its internal as well as external parameters. Two aspects of his thoughts merit a close look. First, how did he define the international status of independent India and what practical means did he rely on to ensure that status? Where did nuclear weapons fit into this equation? Second, how did he portray Pakistan and China? Regarding India's position in the world hierarchy, it was considered a great power in Nehru's episteme. Such a status was portrayed as a manifest destiny which the country could not escape even if it wanted to. However, nuclear weapons were not in 192 the panoply of this great power. Nehru portrayed Pakistan as an intimate yet puzzling Other, whereas China was depicted as a friendly country up until the 1950s. This characterization had a lasting impact on India's strategic discourse in which Pakistan continues to be the ideal candidate to identify as an enemy in the Indian nukespeak. Let us look it some detail at these two interrelated themes of the dominant security discourse of India as expounded by Nehru. Before India became formally independent in August 1947, Nehru in January 1947 declared it a 'great country, great in her resources, great in manpower, great in her potential, in every way' .3 He envisioned the key conflict in the world to be between two things, i.e, the atomic bomb and the spirit of humanity, and he foresaw an independent India representing the spiritual rather than the atomic side of humanity. Two years later, India's emergence in world affairs was construed to be of 'major consequence in world history'.4 Nehru is almost apologetic for being at the helm of affairs of the country when it was 'growing into a great giant'. Considering himself and his team as men of small stature, he pledged that 'in spite of our own smallness, we have to work for great causes and perhaps elevate ourselves in the process'.s It is evident that the Indian role was perceived in no other terms but as an influential global actor. But Nehru personally 3 Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 13. 4 Ibid., p. 23. 5 Ibid. 193 did not like calling India the leader of Asia. Despite his dislike, he acknowledged that xa certain special responsibility is cast on India. India realizes it, and other countries realize it also. The responsibility is not necessarily for leadership, but for taking initiative sometimes and helping others to co-operate' .6 Below the surface of Nehru's modesty, one can easily see the message to others which is premised upon justifying India's external policy as a moral mission and infusing the sense of special responsibility among Indians. In the polarized world of the cold war, the Indian policy of special responsibility became popularly known as non-alignment. Assuming this major power role without resorting to a traditional military build-up was not exclusively guided by a belief in the cherished ideal of non-violence. Shyam Bhatia, a security analyst and journalist, argues that it was more a result of India's military weakness.7 India's global role was based upon the twin strategies of becoming a mediator between the two hostile superpowers and assuming the role of being one of the leaders of the post-colonial world. India's history as a mosaic of different cultures was seen as an advantage which could enable her 'to be a bridge to join warring factions and to help in maintaining the most urgent thing of today and the future-- the peace of the world'.8 Gradually the hope for a mediator's role would fade in the background with more emphasis on being a Third 6 Ibid., p. 44. 7 Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), p. 11. 8 Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 134. 194 World leader. One sympathetic reading of the Indian foreign policy during the Nehru period describes it as a 'search for equitable global system, populated by nonaligned states and genuine disarmament'.9 The internal and external realms were intertwined in this explanation and India's defence policy was 'geared to the threat from Pakistan and the danger of communist subversion within India'.10 The language of dangers and threats came as a convenient link to tie the external with the internal affairs. Sometimes even Nehru castigated internal opponents of his foreign policy as lesser Indians. Acknowledging differences in the area of foreign affairs as natural, Nehru still had a criterion by which to judge a person's patriotism in India. That person must believe in 'India's progress, economically and otherwise, and India playing a part in the freedom of the world and the preservation of peace in the world'." Keeping these objectives in mind, whose parameters were certainly going to be defined by him, he saw no scope of difference on foreign policy issues, and those who differed with these ideas were 'individuals or groups who think in terms of other countries and not primarily of India at all'.12 Since such people did not qualify as Indian patriots, any possibility of interaction with them was deemed very difficult. 9 Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New York and London: Praeger, 1976), p. 6. 10 Ibid., p. 8. 11 Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 152. 12 Ibid. 195 Although Nehru was regarded as a leader who went beyond traditional means of conducting foreign policy, one could still sense the use of the theme of internal and external dangers in his words to define India's position in the world. While internal detractors on foreign policy issues were portrayed as the custodians of foreign interests (alluding to the communists in India as followers of the Soviet and Chinese instructions); external adversaries, especially Pakistan, were depicted as the unpredictable other. Echoing the dominant views in India on the formation of Pakistan as an historical abberation, Nehru in June 1948 saw Pakistan as a 'breakaway part of India'.13 This background put Pakistan in a special category because 'all the people of India' were completely shocked and emotionally upset over 'the way Pakistan was formed and India was divided'.14 Such characterisations suggest at least two things. First, claiming that all people of India were upset over the creation of Pakistan effectively marginalized the huge number of Indian Muslims who wanted an independent country. Second, the creation of Pakistan is always projected as the division of an Indian whole. This binary opposition between the whole and the part always sees Pakistan as a part of what ideally should have been Akhand Bharat (whole India). Since Pakistan's existence boiled down to that of a wayward child in the greater Indian family, it was only natural for New Delhi to be keenly interested in the affairs of Pakistan despite 13 Ibid., p. 259. 14 Ibid. , p. 42. 196 a proclamation that 'it is not our policy to criticize the internal affairs of Pakistan',15 Referring to the political difficulties faced in the newly formed state by the Pashtun nationalist leader Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who was a Congress ally in pre-partition days, Nehru saw it fit to express an interest in the Khan's cause because he was one of "colleagues and friends' and it would be xinhuman of us to forget these friends'.16 Such statements laid the foundations of a persistent use of the Pakistan factor in India's dominant security discourse. Furthermore, Nehru's characterization of Pakistan on the above lines belied the Indian claims that New Delhi did not believe in interfering in other countries' internal affairs. As compared with Pakistan, Nehru viewed the People's Republic of China in markedly different terms. It was considered a friendly country with a different political system but with problems similar to India's. In fact, in Nehru's notion of international hierarchy, China preceded India. China was considered by Nehru as a great power. He said it was 'a major fact of the middle of the 20th century, that China has become a great power-- united and strong'.17 The position of India vis-a-vis China in the international arena was seen by Nehru in the following terms: Leaving these three big countries, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and China, aside for the moment, look at the world. There are many advanced, highly cultured countries. But if you peep into the future and if nothing goes wrong--wars and the like-- the obvious fourth country 15 I b id . , p . 289. 16 Ibid . 17 Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p . 305. 197 in the world is India.18 Praising the Chinese revolution as a harbinger of stability for the country, Nehru suggested that India could learn a great deal from China because they both faced similar problems like huge peasant populations, technological backwardness, and an urge to attain higher standards of living.19 These views were best echoed in the slogan of Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai (Indian and Chinese are Brothers) coined during Chou En-Lai's trip to New Delhi in 1954. Nehru claimed that during two thousand years of mutual relations between China and India 'there is no record of war between us'-- an assertion that would be contradicted in 1962.20 The zeal of Sino-Indian brotherhood was dampened in the late 1950s by a growing divergence of views between the two countries on the issue of international boundaries.21 Occasional skirmishes in the mountains between the Chinese and Indian forces became routine from 1959 onward. In spite of these tensions, Nehru trod on a delicate diplomatic path when commenting on the 18 Ibid. 19 Nehru at a press conference in November 1954. In, A. Appadorai, ed., Selected Documents on India's Foreign Policy and Relations: 1947-1972, Vol.1 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 472. 20 Nehru's speech at a banquet held in honour of Chou en-Lai in New Delhi on 26 June 1954. Ibid., p. 468. 21 For various aspects of the Sindo-Indian dispute see, Neville Maxwell, India's China War (London: Penguin, 1972); Alastair Lamb, The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries (London: Oxford University Press, 1964) ; Ramakrishna Rao and R. C. Sharma,eds., India's Borders: Ecology and Security Perspectives (New Delhi: Scholars Publishing Forum, 1991). 198 issue. Rather than criticizing China he told his countrymen in 1959 that 'I do not think war will come'. Although he used nationalist rhetoric in somewhat abstract terms, Nehru emphasized that if war is thrust upon us, we shall fight, and fight with all our strength. But I shall avoid war, try to prevent it with every means in my power. There are, however, some things which no nation can tolerate. Any attack on its honour or the integrity of its territory, no nation tolerates, and it takes risks, even grave risks, to protect them.22 Yet China was not rapped in the manner used to condemn Pakistan. Even when the war broke out in 1962, Nehru's words were more that of an individual in a pensive rather than a combative mood. Expressing shock over what he called the Chinese invasion of India, he said: Nothing in my long political career has hurt and grieved me more than the fact that the hopes and aspirations for peaceful and friendly neighbourly relations which we entertained and to promote which my colleagues in the Government of India and myself worked so hard ever since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, should have been shattered by the hostile and infriendly twist given in India-China relations during the past few years.23 Comparison of Nehru's thoughts on Pakistan and China make it 'clear that the former has always been easier to identify as an enemy. China appears more like a distant giant, disagreements with whom are mainly due to misunderstanding. Even the brief border war with China was viewed as a departure from the norm of peaceful relations that lasted over two thousand years. The same, 22 Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 363. 23 Nehru's letter to Chou En-Lai dated October 27, 1962. In, A. Appadorai, India's Foreign Policy, p. 656. 199 however, cannot be said in Pakistan's case. This brief account will serve as a useful background to understand the dynamics of nukespeak in India. xNuclear Celibacy': 1947-1964 In terms of India's role in the global context and with a special reference to nuclear and atomic weapons, Nehru viewed atomic energy as a harbinger of progress for India while expressing contempt for its military uses on moral grounds. That remained the extent of nuclear weapons in Indian politics, both at home and abroad.24 Nehru and Homi Bhabha's views on the merits and demerits of nuclear energy for India constitute the core of early nuclear discourse in the country.25 Exhaustive details about 24 Indian authors tend to offer an over-estimated account of India's role in international atomic diplomacy to achieve genuine disarmament. J.P. Jain's Nuclear India (1974) in two volumes is an excellent source about India's nuclear politics. The volume II is a collection of documents ranging from the details of discussions in Lok Sabha on the nuclear issue to submissions of Homi Bhabha in the international forums. Ashok Kapur's India's Nuclear Option (1976) is a good overall history of India's nuclear diplomacy and the history of development of nuclear technology in India. For a highly one-sided account which portrays India as the undisputed leader of the Third World interests on the nuclear issue see, K. K. Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India: A Third World Perspective (New Delhi: Gitanjali Prakashan, 1980). 25 (Dr.) Homi J. Bhabha (1909-1966) is rightly viewed as the architect of India's atomic energy programme. The Cambridge trained pysicist as early as in 1945 persuaded India's industrial giant, the House of Tatas, to establish the Tata Institute for Fundamental Research (TIFR), and in 1948 played a key role in setting up the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1948. With his efforts the AEC decided to set up Atomic Energy Establishment (AEE) at Trombay in 1954. The AEE was renamed Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in 1972. Bhabha, a close confidant of Nehru, was at the helm of nuclear affairs of India until his death in an air crash in January 1966. 200 India's technical achievements and international cooperation in the atomic and nuclear fields have been documented in the sources mentioned in the previous footnote. The Nehruvian model of development was based upon heavy industrialization for India. Nuclear energy entered in this equation as a panacea to meet India's power requirements to embark on the path of industrialization. Vijay Laxmi Pandit26 aired these aspirations in the UN General Assembly as early as in 1948. She argued that India was an *under-developed and under-powered country in whose economy, it is our belief, atomic energy will play an important role'.27 The need to explore atomic energy possibilities became even more pressing because India lacked resources like oil. India's ruling elite stuck to this position, thereby eschewing the military use of atomic energy as an evil which India would not obtain. However, an immense potential was seen in its peaceful uses, especially to meet energy needs of countries like India. The choice was between developing India (read industrialization) and using the atomic energy as a means to achieve that or remain *under-developed and under-powered'. Nehru saw more use of this energy for a 'power-starved and power-hungry country like India' than industrially 26 Vijay Laxmi Pandit, who happened to be Nehru's sister, was India's leading diplomatic figure. She served as India's representative at the UN and ambassador to the United States. Because of her close ties with Nehru, who took a keen interest in India's external relations, she exercised considerable influence in India's early foreign policy making. 27 Statement by Vijay Laxmi Pandit in the UN General Assembly, 4 November 1948, in, J. P. Jain, Nuclear India, Vol. II (New Delhi, Radiant Publishers, 1974), p. 3. 201 advanced countries like France or the United State.28 If Nehru made the political case for India's atomic needs, the mantle of making the scientific sense of such endeavors fell on the shoulders of India's foremost atomic scientist and Nehru's close associate, Dr. Homi Bhabha. Echoing the above views, Bhabha expressed concern over the disproportionately higher amounts of energy used by the West to sustain its existing living standards. He argued that to make such living standards possible for the rest of humanity, countries like India should 'turn to atomic energy for a solution'. He was convinced that atomic energy would be a cheaper and more efficient means with which to meet power needs.29 Bhabha saw immense potential for India in the atomic field especially because of its well-developed pool of scientists and large deposits of atomic raw materials, especially thorium. Convinced of the peaceful nature of the Indian programme, Bhabha appreciated Canadian help in the field and claimed that India 'unhesitantly' accepted the Canadian condition of peaceful uses.30 The Nehru-Bhabha belief in the potential uses of atomic energy for India's economic development was the main reason behind the fact that by 1959 Atomic Energy Establishment in Trombay staffed over one thousand scientists. Bhabha was sure that given India's huge population nuclear power was the only 28 While speaking in Lok Sabha in 1954. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, pp. 191-92. 29 Homi Bhabha's presidential address at the First International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, August 1955. See, Jain, Nuclear India,Vol.II, p. 14. 30 Bhabha speaking in 1957 at the IAEA conference. Ibid., p. 47. 202 viable energy option. He suggested that vby the end of the century atomic energy will be supplying a major part of the total power production, and practically all the increase from this period will be covered by nuclear power'.31 In sum, Nehru held sway over the nature and direction of the Indian nuclear programme with Bhabha serving as his loyal lieutnant. The energy efficiency of atomic power became an article of faith for Indian planners. Military uses of such a technology were seen with contempt by Nehru. The dominant security discourse in India during the Nehru years primarily echoed what he postulated as the country's national interests. India's answer to end the arms race during the 1950s was advocacy of suspension and eventually banning of nuclear tests, followed by a dismantling of weapons systems, and finally a declaration by the nuclear powers not to manufacture atomic weapons in the future. But Nehru was not sure what role India could play in this regard except for putting forward such proposals.32 Echoing Nehru's disdain for atomic weapons, Bhabha categorically stated in 1963 that India had consistently opposed any utilization of atomic energy for military purposes.33 Voices in favour of India making nuclear weapons were conspicuous by their absence. The nuclear issue was primarily the concern of a few diplomats assigned duties to represent India in the 31 Statement by Bhabha before the Atomic Industrial Forum Annual Conference, Washington, D.C, November 1959. Ibid., p. 97. 32 Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 200. 33 Bhabha at the Administrative and Legal Committee of the IAEA in September 1963. See, Jain, Nuclear India, Vol.11, p. 128. 203 Conference on Disarmament or a very select group of scientists at India's Atomic Energy Commission headed by Dr. Homi Bhabha. However, India's image as spokesperson of the Third World came under strain when its relations with China soured during the late 1950s. The Indian dream for Third World leadership came to a violent end when the People's Republic of China and India fought a brief but decisive war in 1962 over the disputed borders. China scored a decisive victory and forced hitherto anti-Western India to seek military assistance from the West and embark upon the road of beefing up its defence expenditures. Nehru's deteriorating health after the defeat symbolized a nation in pain. Two years after defeating India in the war, China acquired nuclear weapons in October 1964. The Nehru era ended in May 1964 with his death after leading India for seventeen years. Under the changed circumstances the xnuclear celibacy' gave way to xnuclear ambiguity' at the government level, whereas more radical voices arguing in favour of nuclear weapons started to appear on India's political horizon. The following section discusses early nukespeak in India. The taboo surrounding the military aspects of nuclear technology in India's political discourse slowly gave way to discussions about the potential deterrence value of nuclear weapons. Nukespeak on the Political Margins Defeat at the hands of the Chinese was a severe blow to the dominant security discourse of India in which New Delhi was viewed as a self-proclaimed leader of the Third World. Two years 204 after the Sino-India war, China joined the nuclear club in October 1964. The public reaction to the detonation in India is described by Shyam Bhatia as 'surprisingly inchoate and scattered'.34 The reason why this reaction was inchoate and scattered has to do with the lack of political importance hitherto attached to the nuclear issue in the Indian security discourse. At that time, the mainstream political leadership had not used the nuclear issue as an instrument of domestic politics for consolidating their patriotic credentials or condemning their opponents. Moreover, there was no epistemic community which made its living by writing as experts and true patriots on the importance of the nuclear option as a means to enhance India's image and decry nuclear threats posed by China or Pakistan. However, there were some voices arguing in favour of India overtly going nuclear for strategic reasons. This section briefly situates those voices in the framework of the Indian security discourse. The official Indian position on the Chinese detonation of the atomic device reflected the lack of political value of the nuclear issue in the dominant security discourse of India. Less than a month before the Chinese explosion, a debate on external affairs in the Indian parliament had no reference to any aspect of nuclear politics. Swaran Singh, the then External Affairs minister, spoke 15,000 words on foreign policy but did not o comment on news reports of a possible Chinese explosion and its 34 Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb, p. 109. 205 repercussions for India.35 When the Chinese detonated their atomic device in October 1964, defence minister Y.B. Chavan maintained that the Chinese threat to India emanated from conventional weapons; the introduction of the nuclear factor would not make a big difference.36 Mirchandani, documenting the reaction in the leading Indian dailies, did not find the situation much different from what Chavan had described. Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri condemned the Chinese test as a disservice to the cause of international peace, but vowed that India would not emulate China.37 This synopsis of the opinions of people holding important official posts amply represents the dormant nature of the politics of the nuclear issue. Although India's political leadership ruled out any immediate strategic use of the nuclear option in the country's defence planning, Bhabha, shortly before Nehru's death, had started to speak publicly about the value of nuclear weapons as a possible effective deterrent. In a paper presented at the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs in February 1964, Bhabha argued that nuclear weapons with an adequate delivery system would enable a state to acquire 'absolute deterrence even against another having a many times greater destructive power under its control'.38 Acknowledging nuclear weapons as great equalizers, he viewed the conventional superiority of a big 35 Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, p. 24. 36 Ibid. , p. 25. 37 Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb, p. 109. 38 See, J. P. Jain, Nuclear India, Vol.11, p. 13 9. 206 country like China as va danger to its smaller neighbours'. He said such a danger could be averted either by establishing an effective collective security arrangement or by resorting to nuclear deterrence. Bhabha hinted at the possible value of such weapons for India by arguing that collective security arrangements have usually failed to prevent wars. He also maintained that dual uses are inherent in atomic knowledge. It appears that the deteriorating health of Nehru had resulted in the loosening of his grip over India's atomic establishment. After Nehru's death in May 1964, the theme of dual uses of atomic knowledge and the possible deterrence value of nuclear weapons became quite recurrent in Bhabha's writings until his tragic death in an air crash in January 1966.39 Although he did not advocate a fundamental shift in the existing policy of nuclear celibacy, Bhabha's later views did pave the way for India's dominant security discourse to adopt official ambiguity on nuclear matters. Amid the morally high-sounding policy of abstinence there were some voices on the Indian political scene which did propose the nuclear course for India. One leading exponent of the nuclear option was the Jana Singh, the Hindu fundamentalist political party and precursor of the present day Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The party demanded an indigenous nuclear weapons programme in the wake of the Indian defeat in 1962. The Jana Sangh's ideas revealed ingredients of nukespeak based upon a Hindu ideal of the 39 Also see the draft of a talk by Homi Bhabha on All India Radio in August 1964 titled "Overview of Atomic Development in India," in, Jain, Nuclear India, pp. 145-50. 207 Indian identity. Ramachandra Bade, one of the fourteen Jana Sangh MPs in the 489 member Lok Sabha, proposed Indian development of nuclear weapons in 1963 saying that xonly those who wish to see Russians or Chinese ruling India will oppose the development of nuclear weapons'.40 It is obvious that the external and internal realms were intimately linked in the Jan Sangh's view. The suggestion that opposing the nuclear option amounted to inviting Russian or Chinese rule was targeted at two sections within India. First, various communist factions formed the second largest bloc of MPs at that time in the Indian parliament and they all opposed the nuclear weapons option. The Jana Sangh portrayed them as no more than Indian stooges of the two major communist powers. Second, the party was also taking a shot at Nehru who was firmly against nuclear weapons and was seen by many as a politician with socialist orientations. It is obvious that for the Jana Sangh, the opponents of the nuclear weapons option could be either Russian or Chinese agents, leaving out any possibility of them being American spies or Western agents. Such a selective demonization was quite intentional because anti-American rhetoric was used by Nehru to enhance India's international stature as an independent centre of decision-making . The Jana Sangh had to offer some positive rationale for putting India on the nuclear course beyond dubbing opponents as external agents. The urgent reason cited was to equip the Indian army with nuclear weapons because they reprsented most modern 40 Ibid. , p. 109. 208 arms available to any state. Such weapons would, according to the Jana Sangh, enable India to conduct international affairs from a position of strength.41 The theme of a strong Indian voice in global affairs was a common goal that the Jana Sangh shared with Nehru, the arch figure of India's dominant security discourse. However, the Jana Sangh's means to achieve that also included nuclearizing India. Analyzing the contents of the leading English language dailies of India during that period, both Bhatia and Mirchandani agree that there was little space allocated to the discussion of the Chinese test and its repercussions for India. Similarly, the so-called experts on security issues had not made the nuclear issue their main concern as yet. The absence of the Jana Sangh's .concern among the scholarly community is attributed by Bhatia to xa lack of interest and inadequate discussion of the nuclear issue'.42 The situation was compounded by a lack of technical information on the matter. International Studies, the leading Indian journal of foreign affairs at that time, did not publish a single article on the nuclear issue between 1959 and 1964, and there were hardly any books published on the subject. As stated earlier, this situation was indicative of the apolitical nature of the nuclear issue rather than a lack of technical information available to scholars. As we shall see later, the select group of people who became experts on the nuclear issue did not attain that status by virtue of having access to the select circle of 41 Ibid. , p. 111. 42 Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb, p. 117. 209 individuals which made technical and political decisions regarding the nature and direction of India's nuclear programme or because they had any accurate technical knowledge of the matter. Their claim to expertise rested rather on the political use they made of the nuclear issue in India's political discourse. Explaining Indian masses' lack of interest in the nuclear issue at that time, Ashok Kapur argues that 'the low level of literacy' made it difficult for the 'lay public in India to take an interest in foreign defence issues' .43 Officially, India still strove to obtain "positive security assurances" to meet possible nuclear threats. Positive security assurances mean formal 'declarations that nuclear-weapon States will come to the assistance of any non-nuclear-weapon State threatened with nuclear weapons'.44 This policy of acquiring positive security guarantees would eventually amount to informal treason in the eyes of experts who would insist on having indigenous means to ensure national security. However, by the end of 1964, Shastri did slightly alter India's earlier position of absolute 'nuclear abstinence' by suggesting that if the need arose, India might favour a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). This change was apparently in response to Dr. Homi Bhabha's claim that India could be ready for a PNE by 1967 and the demand of a 43 Kapur, India's Nuclear Option, p. 178. Ashok Kapur's observation is more reflective of the author's own biases of trusting literates over illiterates in the matters of politics; but it is belied by the Indian, or for that matter Pakistani, illiterates' enthusiastic participation in the political process. 44 The United Nations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, The United Nations Blue Book Series, Vol.Ill (New York, 1995), pp. 18-19. 210 number of MPs within the Congress party to seriously consider the nuclear option.45 India entered 1965 with an embryonic nuclear debate and the legacy of defeat by China. The tension between India and Pakistan steeply rose in this year ultimately culminating in the second full-fledged, although indecisive, conventional war between the two in September 1965. For the pro-nuclear voices in India, war with Pakistan came as a boost because Pakistan had always been easier to identify as an enemy than China. Furthermore, friendly relations between China and Pakistan were seen as a grand conspiracy to harm India. During the same period, international efforts to institute a non-proliferation regime intensified. The Indian opposition to this regime, based upon the supposedly moral high ground, crystallized in this era and remains at the heart of the Indian security discourse to day. Immediately after the war with Pakistan, nearly 86 MPs urged Shastri to opt for nuclear weapons on grounds that the security of this country (India) can no longer be left to the mercy or whims of so-called friendly countries. India's survival, both as a country and democracy, casts a duty on the Government to make an immediate decision to develop our own nuclear weapons.46 Ambiguity replaced celibacy as a policy in Indian diplomats' presentations on the international stage. Badr-ud-din Tayabji, Indian Representative at the IAEA General Conference, in September 1965 hinted at the policy shift in New Delhi. Tyabji 45 Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb, pp. 121-26. 46 Sampooran Singh, India and the Nuclear Bomb (New Delhi: C. Chand, 1971), p. iii. 211 argued that if China proceeded to stockpile atomic weapons it might not be possible for a number of countries, including India, which were capable of producing such weapons but which so far had refrained from doing so, to continue their present policy.47 More or less similar views were expressed by Vishnu C. Tridevi, Indian representative at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, a month later when he said that technologically India was undoubtedly xa very advanced nuclear capable country'.48 And the Indian stance to refrain from manfacturing nuclear weapons was a political decision. The discourse which demanded that India should opt for nuclear weapons was premised upon two inter-connected themes. First, the argument that genuine Indian national security could only be achieved through indigenous nuclear weapons and anything less would be mortgaging that security to external powers. That was the crux of the Jana Sangh position discussed earlier. Secondly, this time India's national security was seen in wider terms that went beyond ensuring territorial integrity and also included safeguarding the Indian political system based on constitutional democracy. According to this logic the acquisition of nuclear weapons was to serve multiple functions. Along with strategic purposes, such weapons, this argument suggested, would ensure the smooth functioning of the Indian democratic system. The issue of nuclear weapons was gradually becoming infused with nationalist pride. However, the government of India officially 47 See, Jain, Nuclear India, Vol.11, p. 169. 48 Ibid. p. 173 212 did not subscribe to this point of view and opposed an overt nuclear weapons programme. India refused to become a party to the NPT in 1967, and made its support for the treaty conditional upon a time-bound programme for global disarmament. Officially, India considered the NPT as a discriminatory treaty against the developing countries on two grounds. First, the NPT institutionalized nuclear apartheid by dividing the world into Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). Second, the treaty did not spell out clearly mechanisms for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This line of argument has become the hallmark of Indian nukespeak. One invariably finds a substantial part in most books dealing with the nuclear issue written by Indian writers allocated to the analysis of the * discriminatory' nature of the NPT and India's ^principled' opposition to it. The Indian experts' views on the NPT will be discussed in detail later. Suffice it to say that the opposition to the NPT would constitute a patriotic duty and support of the treaty could be construed as an act of possible national betrayal. Such voices had found their way into India's emerging community of nuclear experts. Sampooran Singh's India and the Nuclear Bomb published in 1971 is a good example of incipient Indian nukespeak. In the following section I looks closely at Singh's nukespeak to show the reader how the nuclear issue is used to perpetuate a particular security discourse in India. 213 Nukespeak in Academia The methodology of discourse analysis makes us aware of the fact that vilifying the 'enemies' by creating binary oppositions is the most convenient tool utilized by nukespeakers. Concern with the alleged Sino-Pakistan collusion against India becomes the launching point to build the case for a nuclear capable India. Here is a brief sample how China and Pakistan are portrayed in Sampooran Singh's work. The Chinese government is considered 'intensely ethnocentric and expansionist with a dogmatic ideology'. It is a totalitarian and 'hegemonic' power which launched 'a massive attack in 1962 and occupied our territory'.49 The condemnation of China is not restricted to attacks on its regime. It is also accused of training 'hostile Nagas and Naxalites'.so Demonizing the adversary in the above fashion implies that the enemy is not only dangerous by virtue of its characteristics per se and harbouring intentions to cause military damage through territorial aggression, but it is also intricately involved in fomenting internal divisions within India. Denying any role played by the Indian authorities in failing to address the socio-political demands of either the Naga tribes or Naxalite guerillas, the onus of unrest is squarely placed on China. This not only absolves New Delhi of any wrong-doing but also endorses violent suppression of internal dissent (in this case the Naga and Naxalite 49 Sampooran Singh, India and the Nuclear Bomb (New Delhi: C. Chand, 1971), pp. 75-76. 50 Ibid. , p. 77. 214 insurgencies) in the name of rooting out external conspiracy. Nuclear weapons are seen as cards that China can use 'to win the psycho-political game' and also 'an option to precipate a crisis in which India could be blackmailed into paralysis'.51 While the Chinese threat is explained through the Communist regime's attributes, Pakistan becomes a threat by virtue of its very existence. Its creation in 1947 is seen as the emergence of a theocratic state pitted against secular India. Pakistan is held responsible for 'invading the state of Jammu and Kashmir' in 1947 and launching 'an offensive in April and September 1965'." Such accounts are guided by a logocentric logic where binary opposites operate in such a manner that the opponent is always the embodiment of lesser and evil forces. Pakistani leadership is considered 'unscrupulous' because it might try to 'pressurize India to part ways with Jammu and Kashmir' and 'may pose a nuclear threat to India'." This historical representation of Pakistan as the guilty party in the nuclear stalemate in the subcontinent would become a staple theme of Indian nukespeak. It should be borne in mind that Singh was allocating responsibility to Pakistan well before Islamabad had embarked on its controversial nuclear path. Given the friendship between 'expansionist' China and 'aggressive' Pakistan, Singh's suggestions for India are unequivocal. The case for nuclear weapons' acquisition proceeds with an 51 Ibid. , p. 80. 52 Ibid., p. 80. 53 Ibid., p. 111. 215 appeal to what are considered obvious 'truths'. Paramount among them is the fact that 'nuclear weapons are the supreme symbol of national self-reliance' and 'the states without them tend to be ignored by those who have them'.54 Since China has them, the small Asian states 'have no alternative to accepting China's supremacy and domination'. The Indian role is seen in terms of a country which ought to 'break the myth of China's supremacy and will act as a deterrent to its expansionist policy'.5S Opting for nuclear weapons would not only serve as an effective deterrent against China but also enhance India's credibility vis-a-vis 'small countries like Nepal and Bhutan' who 'have begun to doubt the ability of India to protect and defend them'.56 It is obvious that India's interest in countering China's position is guided by the equally expansionist desire to hold sway over smaller neighbours. Hence, while accusing China of expansionism and hegemonism, the course charted for India entails the same objectives. The by-word for hegemony here is India's ability to 'defend' its smaller neighbours. The twin strategies of nukespeak, i.e, holding external adversaries responsible for internal chaos and conducting an ideological witch-hunt against domestic anti-nukespeakers, could be seen, as evidenced in Singh's work, at play in India by 1971. Anti-nuclearist elements were being portrayed as a group lacking 'strategic understanding'. Therefore, a deviation from the 54 Ibid. , p. 97. 55 Ibid. , p. 99. 56 Ibid. , p. 102. 216 dominant path of thinking is relegated to naivete rather than an alternative mode of thinking. In summarizing the benefits of nuclear weapons, Singh argues that they would 'help to foster national pride and help to further internal unity'.57 This summary assumes that opponents of the nuclear option wanted to undermine the unity of the country and lessen its international status. As far as the costs of not developing nuclear weapons go, they are outlined as universal truths which India simply can not ignore or escape. Any nation state that does not develop national power commensurate with its size and population is not likely to be permitted to continue that way for long. It will be reduced in size and population to commensurate with its power.58 In the foregoing account, the symbol of national power commensurate with India's position was nuclear weapons. However, much to the dismay of the doomsday predictions of Singh, India has not been reduced in size or population in spite of not being a formal member of the nuclear club. Yet the use of the scare tactic that India's integrity can only be guaranteed by acquiring nuclear weapons intensifies with the passage of time in Indian nukespeak. India entered the 1970s on an upbeat note. A decisive victory against Pakistan in 1971 compensated a great deal for the stigma of defeat in 1962 and the indecisive war of 1965. Explosion, of what it termed as a peaceful nuclear device in 1974, made the politics of the nuclear issue a lasting feature of 57 Ibid., p. 131. 58 Ibid., p. 132. 217 the dominant security discourse in India. Krishnaswami Subrahmanyam epitomizes this dominant discourse on nuclear issue in India.59 His writings have left an indelible mark on Indian nukespeak in the last two decades, and thus Subrahmanyam's prominence in this study is understandable. The Road to Pokhran India's role is not that of a middle power. Her area and population rule that out. India will, in the next two or three decades, become a major power, and if she fails to do that, external pressures will break her up.60 The manifest destiny of India as a major power and images of its demise in case it does not become one remain at the heart of the security discourse propounded by India's strategic epistemic community. Such a discourse of national security is invariably and typically tied to privileging the self, condemning the other and a constant reminding of external and internal threats. Writing just before Pakistan's humiliating defeat by India in December 1971, Subrahmanyam was still unsure of India's military might against Pakistan. However, he had no doubts about Pakistan and China's assistance to vthe Naga and Mizo hostiles'.61 The 59 Krishnaswami Subrahmanyam is considered the flag-bearer of India's nuclear hawks. He has served as Secretary of Defence Production, and Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee for the government of India. He was head of the Institute for Defence and Strategic Analyses, New Delhi. In the latter capacity this prolific writer became a key exponent of India retaining the nuclear option. At present he works with a Calcutta based NGO. 60 K. Subrahmanyam, Our National Security (New Delhi: Economic and Research Foundation, 1972), p. ix. 61 Ibid. , p. 15. 218 solution to warding off such threats was simple: 'it (India) must have adequate military power'. However, the champion of the nuclear option in present-day India was aware of the value of nuclear weapons as a source of national power but was less emphatic in his demand that India should acquire them to become a great power. Outlining the external enemies' collusion with internal 'hostiles' to harm India, Subrahmanyam in a somewhat philosophical manner describes what is being threatened. India as a national idea is thousands of years old. Indianness which distinguishes the people of the subcontinent from the rest of the world exists. The crisis of Pakistan has been its inability to free itself from the Indianness and establish for itself a separate identity. At the same time, the nation state idea is comparatively new to India. The binding force for a composite nation like this (India) will be common historical memories, commonly shared goals and values, and above all, a sense of pride in belonging to a community. The last one does call for a development of national power. A nation without an image of power is not likely to induce such a pride.62 Serving as the bedrock of India's dominant security discourse, the above characterization has eerie similarities with Pakistani nukespeak which is also enmeshed in a particular version of national identity. The assertion that contemporary India may be a new entity as a national state but it is based upon thousands of years old idea of Indianness is axiomatic in this scheme rather than subject to scrutiny. It is conveniently forgotten in such analyses that the very idea of nation in its modern sense is a recent invention. Stretching it over 'thousands of years' sanctifies the present arrangement as the recent stage of an 62 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 219 eternal situation and any deviation from it as a sign of momentary aberration. This brings us to the over-riding concern in India's security discourse in which Pakistan is portrayed as an aberration from the Indian norm. That deviation becomes a danger to the fragile Indian identity that continues to grapple with strains emanating from contending claims by various identities within the spatial boundaries of postcolonial India. Emergence of Pakistan as a separate state is viewed as a ploy to weaken India. Pakistan and India are usually cast in diametrically opposite terms in which the latter always represents the forces of good. The dark shadow of Pakistan always helps to illuminate the achievements of India. Even when the discussion is about democracy in India, Pakistan serves as an example which tried to do without it and xcame to grief." Similarly, India is portrayed as a resounding success as a federal polity by initiating the reorganization of states and Pakistan as a dismal failure. To assert such claims, the notion of instilling a sense of national pride through enhancing the image of national power comes in handy for strategic analysts. In a security discourse conducted on these lines, the nuclear programme of India ultimately becomes a symbol of national power. Although India is juxtaposed as a secular and democratic unified whole pitted against an undemocratic and theocratic Pakistan, Subrahmanyam is aware of identity-based movements within India which assert contending identities. The case of the 63 K. Subrahmanyam, Defence and Development (Calcutta: The Minerva Associates, 1973), p. 35. 220 Indian Muslim community's reluctance to accept the secular claims of the Indian state is one of the constant reminders of New Delhi's failure to sell the secular dream to the Indian population. Subrahmanyam largely blamed Muslims for this situation. In 1973 he argued that 'over the past 26 years of our secular life this largest minority has not moved closer to integration with the national polity, but has remained alienated'.64 Integration here implies assimilation and it is obvious that for Subrahmanyam secular is a synonym of Hindu. Alienation of Muslims is quickly dubbed as their emotional attachment to Pakistan, which makes them dubious Indians. It is claimed that the Indian army's triumph against Pakistan in 1971 'produced a traumatic effect on sections of the Muslim community in India' .65 The insistence by Muslims to use the Urdu language is considered a key evidence of this community's lack of allegiance to India and attachment to Pakistan. Contrary to claims of India being a composite multi-lingual and multi-ethnic state where various languages may flourish, the Indian Muslims' affiliation with Urdu is seen by Subrahmanyam as something that hurts the Muslim community and perpetuates communalism among them. As a result, they (Muslims) are held responsible for the rise of Hindu communalism in India.66 His recipe to resolve the problem is as simplistic as his analysis. Muslims should 'see how the Indian 64 I b i d . , p . 77 . 65 I b i d . 66 I b i d . , p . 78". 221 Christians have adjusted and integrated themselves with the mainstream of Indian life'.67 Once again, the term vIndian life' implies xHindu life'. Although it would be erroneous to assume that there is something undifferentiated called Hindu life, let alone Indian life; the talk of the new Indian identity at the expense of other contending identities in the mainstream discourse is a by-word for upper caste Hindu ethos. The reason behind outlining K. Subrahmanyam's views on issues like Indian Muslims, Pakistan and Indian nationalism is to inform the reader of the broader context in which Indian nukespeak operates. The talk of security is meaningless without threats, and the above-mentioned are some of the threats invoked by the Indian analysts. Technological developments in the nuclear field and the emerging epistemic community of strategic analysts existed in somewhat mutually exclusive compartments in India. No event better illustrates that than India's first and only nuclear explosion in May of 1974 in the desert of the state of Rajasthan. The Pokhran test, as it is popularly referred to due to the name of the village at the site, was euphemistically termed by the Indian government as a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). The test was a total surprise for the world as well as for the Indian security analysts. Retroactively the Indian strategic community has regarded the explosion as a defining moment but at the time of its occurrence, none of the analysts had a clue to the impending development. Therefore, all publically available 67 Ibid. 222 accounts of the Pokhran explosion are post facto. What this signifies is that the politics of nuclear weapons is not dependent upon the actual technological developments or lack of them. Nukespeak operates in a broader context and the technological hallmarks are used as symbols and signs for political purposes. It is not imperative for strategic analysts to be aware of technological developments or be well-versed in nuclear science in order to champion the nuclear cause. The technical information does come in handy but the stamp of expertise is bestowed or denied on the basis of which side is chosen in the regime of truth. That is solely a political issue and our concern here will be to analyze the political uses of the Pokhran test by the Indian security analysts. Only a select group of people, who did not even include the minister of defence, knew in advance about the Pokhran test. According to Raja Ramanna68, then director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), only six people were present at the crucial meetings in which the decision about the explosion was made.69 However, the international reaction to the test and the subsequent response of the Indian authors has become an integral 68 (Dr.) Raja Ramanna (1925- ) studied at the King's college, London, for his doctorate. Became director of the BARC in 1972 and also served as Minister of State for Defence in 1990. Later became Director of the National Institute of Advanced Studies in Bangalore, India. 69 According to Ramanna following people participated in those meetings: Mrs. Indira Gandhi; P.N. Haskar, the former Principal Secretary to the PM; P.N. Dhar, the incumbent Principal secretary; Dr. Nag Chaudhary, Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister; H.N. Sethna, the then Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Ramanna himself. See, Raja Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage: An Autobiography (New Delhi: Viking, Penguin, 1991), p. 89. 223 part of the nuclear discourse. Our focus will be on the Indian security analysts' perception of the international reaction, especially that of Pakistan, and some important elements of their response. Reaction to Pokharan Regarding the West's condemnation of the Indian test, the standard Indian response was to castigate it as the advanced nations' determination to 'crush India for its temerity'.70 The Western criticism is portrayed as an example of the hypocrisy of the developed world in the wake of a scientific stride by a Third World country. The Western suspicion of a likely military aspect of the Indian explosion is dismissed by citing the official Indian position that the Pokhran test was a peaceful nuclear explosion and nothing more than that. In spite of heavy security, reaching the level of paranoia, surrounding the test and the intricate link between the civilian and military uses of nuclear technology, Indian authors and decision-makers insisted-- and still insist-- upon accepting the official stance of New Delhi at its face value. Anything else was either an hypocrisy or an attempt to crush India. International criticism of the Indian explosion was not confined to the West alone. Some developing countries expressed their concern over the Indian test in terms of it being a blow to international non-proliferation efforts and harmful for the South 70 Ibid., p. 92. 224 Asian security environment. Pakistan, understandably, reacted sharply to the Indian test and its reaction continues to evoke response from Indian analysts. Before discussing the Indo-Pakistan exchange on the issue in detail I would document the Indian reaction to other critical voices on its test that emanated from other Third World countries. When the Philippines questioned India's motives behind the test, Raja Ramanna was surprised by the reaction and saw it as a vpart of the larger conspiracy to develop a rift in the cordial relations between India and the Philippines'.71 A senior Philippines' official was blamed by Ramanna for orchestrating the plot to sour good relations between the two countries. Casting another country's reaction in such terms is representative of the Indian nukespeak. First, the very concern of a Third World country other than Pakistan about the Indian test becomes an anomaly in light of the Indian claim that its test symbolized the Third World's resolve against the nuclear odds. To resolve that anomaly without undermining the validity of the Indian claim, the next best option is to allege that the other Third World country was naive enough to become a tool in the West's conspiracy against India. The Philippines here is not the perpetrator of a plot against India but a mere passive actor deployed by the West. Furthermore, the country's position (in this case Philippines) should not be taken seriously because the stance in question is that of a single official who was apparently working under the instructions of the West. In that whole scenario, the act, 71 Ibid. , p. 72. 225 namely, the Indian nuclear explosion, which prompted the Philippines' reaction is eclipsed by the talk of international conspiracy and a critical assessment of the Indian step is deemed unnecessary. The Pakistani reaction to the Pokhran blast has been discussed and analyzed in the chapter on Pakistani nukespeak. Here, the focus will be on the Indian responses to the Pakistani reaction. Firstly, Pakistani concern that the Indian test aggravated the regional security and posed a threat to its national security was dismissed as a figment of Islamabad's imagination. Secondly, some Indian authors would eventually claim that Pakistan's nuclear ambitions predated the Indian explosion, therefore, the responsibility for introducing the nuclear element into South Asian security rests with Pakistan and the Indian explosion had nothing to do with it. A detailed examination of these claims will shed light on the contents of Indian nukespeak. The next chapter is devoted to this analysis, because such claims are at the heart of the latest phase of the Indian nukespeak which started in the late 1970s with a renewed interest in the so-called Islamic bomb of Pakistan. The awkward position of India in international atomic diplomacy is seen as the price it has to pay for adhering to a principled nuclear stand based upon equal right of all nations to exploit nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The most common way to explain it is by creating a dichotomy of the West versus the non-West, where India symbolizes the true interests of the non-West. We have already seen a castigation of the Philippines for expressing doubts about Indian nuclear ambitions. The Pakistani 226 reaction usually attracts more attention in Indian writings on the issue. Pakistan was portrayed as an unruly child whose objective in international forums dealing with atomic issues is to embarrass India. Such Pakistani tactics make things difficult for India, which has to cope with the West's 'pressure to sign an unequal treaty (the NPT)'.72 Pakistan is used by the West in this process to 'intimidate' India. In Ramanna's opinion, Pakistan 'was instigated by the others to make mischief .73 K. K. Pathak is quite clear about powers that use Pakistan to blackmail India in the nuclear field. He argues that Pakistan's 'hue and cry' that the Indian test caused proliferation 'is part of the game her military allies may be playing' .74 In the final analysis, Pakistan's concern over the Indian nuclear explosion is no more than a 'ruse to follow her foreign policy goals'.7S This careful construction of the Other relegates it to an entity incapable of independent decision-making. Consequently, if Pakistan is assumed to be acting on the West's instructions then its protestations regarding India's actions become crocodile tears. In the end, the sum total of Pakistan's international diplomacy is negatively dubbed as 'mischief to convey that any criticism of India by its next door neighbour merits no serious consideration. 72 Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage, p. 83. 73 Ibid. 74 K. K. Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India: A Third World Perspective (New Delhi: Gitanjali Prakashan, 1980), p. 178. 75 Ibid. , p. 180. Conclusion 227 This chapter started with documenting the post-1947 Indian leadership's opposition to nuclear weapons, and ends with a shift in that policy which culminated in the Pokhran explosion in 1974. I have tried to situate the nuclear issue within the framework of the dominant security discourse in India. This discourse operates in the name of national interests, which in turn, rely on constant reference to enemies. Neither these interests nor threats to them is objective, or hanging out there, only to be recognized by patriots. In the real world, both the interest and enemies are created, and re-created, through conscious efforts. The nuclear weapons option is one of the modern innovations used in security discourses to ward off threats. Political dynamics determine the value assigned to nuclear weapons or to the option of having them. In this chapter, I have shown how the nuclear weapons option gradually entered the dominant security discourse in India. This background sets the stage for the next chapter in which the present-day facets of both the dominant narratives and counter-narratives regarding the nuclear weapons option are explored. Chapter Six 228 INDIAN NUKESPEAK TODAY One expression of the kind of contempt that familiarity has bred between Pakistan and India is found in the latter's dominant security discourse. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the discussion of the Chinese threat to India could never achieve the intensity that the Pakistan factor could bring to the strategic discourse in India. Two inter-related factors appear to have prevented China from becoming the ultimate enemy in the Indian dominant discourse. First, the Himalayan divide made China a more distant country with less interaction between the two Asian giants. Second, the near absence of the Indian factor in the Chinese strategic discourse made it quite difficult for the Indian strategic elite to endlessly talk about the Chinese threat. Conversely, Pakistan permeates the security discourse of India as an all encompassing 'clear and present danger'. Words of Uma Bharti, an MP belonging to Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the largest party in the Indian parliament in 1997, capture that sentiment eloquently. Who is in occupation of our territory in Kashmir? Who is fuelling terrorism in the Valley? Who has forced lakhs of Kashmiris to flee their homes? Who engineered the Bombay blasts? Who is responsible for communal violence in different parts of India? Pakistan.1 How and why Pakistan continue to assumes such characteristics in 1 Uma Bharti, "Should we help Pakistan swim- or sink?," The Sunday Times of India (Mumbai), 29 September 1996. 229 contemporary Indian nukespeak is the primary focus of this chapter with special emphasis on the nuclear discourse since the 1980s when Pakistan's alleged Islamic nuclear bomb became a security concern of 'secular and democratic' India. This is followed by a look at Indian nukespeak in the 1990s. The final section discusses the counter-narratives in the nuclear discourse. Along with outlining the salient themes of contemporary Indian nukespeak the reader will also find analytical comments in the text on the specific points under discussion. The nuclear hawks in India dominate the discourse on the issue and they define the rules of the game for participation in the debate. According to David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, xthe discourse has been almost totally appropriated by a handful of scholars and former military officials and government officials who usually present no more than justification of official policy'.2 The following pages provide an attempt to expand on the above authors' apt observation. That is why there is a conspicious presence of views of Krishnaswami Subrahmanyam, the undisputed nuclear leader of India's strategic epistemic community, in this chapter. It is an acknowledgement of the fact that he is a credible representative of the dominant discourse as well as a sign of how a select number of strategic luminaries almost single-handedly dominate the nuclear discourse in India. 2 David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, eds., India and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, A Publication of Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 1996), p. 6. This volume is an excellent guide to different aspects of the elite opinion on the nuclear politics in India. 230 Exploring possibilities of denuclearization in the region, Zafar Iqbal Cheema, a leading Pakistani defence expert, suggests that 'the chances of denuclearization of South Asia are slim because of the level of nuclear weapons capabilities both countries have acquired'.3 Cheema's view regarding the slim chances of denuclearization are accurate but due to different reasons than those suggested by him. It is the political investment of the voices of the dominant security discourses in both Pakistan and India in the nuclear issue which makes it immensely difficult for either government to abandon the nuclear option. This chapter expands this theme by highlighting factors which make the retaining of the nuclear option as symbol of India's independent and major power identity. In the nukespeak of the 1990s, the China factor usually became an issue in the context of an alleged Sino-Pakistani cooperation in nuclear and missiles field. This was mainly due to the pace at which Sino-Indian relations have improved in the post-Cold War period. For most Indian nukespeakers the threat to the national security now primarily emanated from Pakistan, whereby China's strategic collaboration with Islamabad made the situation even more difficult for New Delhi. This line of argument, as we shall see, became the mainstay of the Indian nukespeak when the NPT came up for indefinite renewal in 1995 and the signing of the CTBT in 1996. India continued to decline to be 3 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policies: Attitudes and Postures," in, P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Iftekharuzzaman, eds., Nuclear Non-Proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives (New Delhi: Manohar, A Publication of Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, 1996), p. 103. a part of either agreement. 231 Islam, the Bomb, and Pakistan The military coup in Pakistan in 1977 and the subsequent Islamization programme put in place by General Zia-ul-Haq gave a new angle to the nuclear discourse in India. The Islamic bomb, a term coined by Z. A. Bhutto, became the new catch-phrase of the Indian strategic community to highlight the dangerousness of Pakistan. The nukespeak in the 1980s continued the textual strategy of privileging Us versus Them with the alleged Pakistani danger as a propelling force for such a discourse. The new phase of the nukespeak followed two textual strategies. It either started with a general characterization of Islam and then viewed Pakistan as a part of that larger problem, or it discussed the dangerous aspects of Pakistan and then magnified them as an omen of a wider threat posed by resurgent Islam to India in particular and the world in general. In most Indian accounts, India would usually emerge as an innocent victim at the hands of global powers or Pakistani propaganda. That continues to be the main characteristic of the Indian nukespeak even today. The Indian role in the South Asian security environment is generally seen by the other countries of the region as an example of a hegemonic design. The strategic community in India is often puzzled by such concerns and quickly dubs them, as K. Subrahmanyam does, as ill-founded propaganda because 'India does 232 not have an imperial or expansionist history'.4 But such claims regarding Indian innocence are contradicted subsequently by him through assertions like the subcontinent is a strategic unity and India as the biggest nation has a special responsibility in ensuring the integrity of all states within the subcontinent especially against the inroads of extra-subcontinental powers.5 Pakistan is always seen as a power that inhibits India from exercising its rightful responsibility in the region. It is identified as an instrument of external intervention in the subcontinent to countervail India. Such aspirations are considered a hangover of the past and part of a scheme 'to lean on the U.S. or China to claim parity with India'.6 But Subrahmanyam has no doubts that such efforts are bound to fail because they contradict the laws of nature. India's dominance is "natural" because of its sheer size which is ten times that of Pakistan. Pakistan, however, is not the only South Asian country to express qualms about Indian dominance, but other countries' concerns receive similar dismissive views from Subrahmanyam. Size is not the only factor invoked to justify what are considered by smaller neighbours as India's hegemonic aspirations. Issues of civilization and culture are brought in to demonstrate that South Asia is a single entity and the voices of separate national identities are a mere chimera. Since that singleness is seen as how India describes it, the others' efforts 4 K. Subrahmanyam, Indian Security Perspectives (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1982), p. v. 5 Ibid., p. 68. 6 Ibid., p. 158. 233 to evolve separate identities are characterised in the following way. Pakistani and Bangladeshis resent references to common cultural heritage, shared languages and ethnicity. Pakistan wants to identify itself with West Asia and Bangladeshis with Southeast Asia. The same is true of Sri Lanka. Nepalis want neutrality between India and China.7 Practically all South Asian neighbours of India barring Bhutan are condemned for harbouring ill-will against New Delhi because of their own complexes. India is portrayed as a victim of smaller neighbours' unrealistic policies and priorities. If these neighbours think that India should not act like a big brother in South Asia then they are living in a Utopia because 'it does not occur to those who advocate that India should not behave as a great power that any other role for this country will not be credible'.8 In light of these arguments, Subrahmanyam's assertion that India is not vying for supremacy in South Asia sounds paradoxical. What is interesting is that no role except that of a regional hegemon is considered acceptable or credible by these analysts. Such notions of great power identity are based upon the geographical size and mammoth population of India. Since those two factors are a given, R. R. Subramanian, another leading security analyst associated with Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), suggests that India 'must project power equal to that of China' .9 Despite such claims, adherents of the 7 Ibid., p. 211. 8 Ibid., p. 230. 9 R. R. Subramanian, India Pakistan China: Defence and Nuclear Tangle in South Asia (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1989), p. 41. 234 dominant security discourse demand that India's neighbours ought not attribute any hegemonic aspirations to India, but at the same .time should complacently abide by the dictates of New Delhi. Nevertheless, India's neighbours are unlikely to comply with New Delhi's wishes and may try to look elsewhere for balancing against India. In order to deal with that situation, the only course suggested for India is to keep 'defence equipment up-dated at the level of the rest of the world'.10 Even the remedy to counter smaller neighbours' concerns is militaristic. When Pakistan or any other neighbouring country quotes instances like the Indian armed intervention in Sri Lanka or Maldives as examples of regional muscle-flexing, Indian authors argue that Indian forces went to Sri Lanka and Maldives at the request of their respective governments, and also came back as and when the situation demanded. It spent huge resources in Sri Lanka, and faced heavy casualties too, in order to ensure the island nation's integrity, and still got the blame for hegemonistic designs.11 Rather than critically examining the historical context and New Delhi's pressures to get 'invited' into tiny countries, D. D. Khanna and Kishore Kumar assume smaller neighbours' willingness to have Indian forces on their territory. Secondly, these authors see no hegemonic designs even when they are asserting that India took upon itself to ensure other sovereign countries' integrity. The double-speak of portraying India as a genuine great 10 K. Subrahmanyam, "Problems of Indian Security in the Next Decade and Beyond," in, K. Subrahmanyam, M. Zuberi, and R. Ramanna, Problems of Living in Nuclear Age (Chandigarh: Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, 1985), p. 10. 11 D. D. Khanna and Kishore Kumar, Dialogue of the Deaf: The India-Pakistan Divide (Delhi: Konark Publisher, 1992), p. 18. 235 power that has a 'natural' right to correct wrongs in neighbouring countries to ensure its legitimate interests is in marked contrast with claims that India does not harbour any expansionist or hegemonistic desires in the region. One way, although never fully successful, to resolve this contradiction has been through holding smaller countries responsible for leaving no room for India but to intervene in their internal affairs in a variety of ways. This unresolved contradiction is at the heart of the Indian nukespeak. In the following section, I will concentrate on the manner in which Pakistan-- and others neighbours to a lesser degree-- emerges as the main villain in writings of the Indian strategic community. Some aspects of this issue, like views on partition, have already been discussed in the previous chapter; here, the focus will be on the literature of the 1980s-onward when the Indian strategic analysts' concern with the Pakistani nuclear bomb became paramount. Grand Conspiracy Versus National Autonomy Almost any discussion of Pakistan by the Indian strategic epistemic community addresses the issue of Islam and its role in shaping the Pakistani domestic and foreign policies. In spite of the complexities and heterogeneous nature of Islam in India, let alone Islam in general, Indian security analysts are usually content with stereotypes prevalent in the West about Islam. Foremost among them is the myth of the separation between the Church and state in Christianity and Hinduism and the fusion of the two in Islam. This fusion allegedly exacerbates conflict 236 between secularism and traditional values in Muslim countries. Because of a blurred line between the state and the mosque 'in Islamic countries, the men from puplit claim jurisdiction to determine the nature of the state and polity and not merely social and religious behaviour'.12 Starting with this premise Subrahmanyam explains the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in terms of 'the enormous wealth in the hands of the ruling elites of the Islamic countries as a result of oil price hike'.13 This explanation of a complex phenomenon like the rise of Islamist movemements in different countries is a gross over-simplification at the best.14 Despite the glaring differences that divide the so-called Islamic world, some Indian authors promote the idea of a Muslim 'sense of fellowship in the concept of Millat'(community) which is said to work against non-Muslims.15 12 K. Subrahmanyam, Indian Security Perspectives, p. 63. 13 Ibid. 14 Subrahmanyam wrongly correlates Muslim countries with oil. Countries where Islam is the dominant religion of a majority of the people are not necessarily oil rich. The three most populous Muslim countries, i.e, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, can not boast such a claim. Secondly, the most populist Islamic movements are not found in the oil rich Muslim countries. For example, the movements in Afghanistan, Algeria or Lebanon have little or nothing to do with oil price hikes. As for the fusion between the mosque and the state argument, it will be futile to make any sweeping generalizations because of the varied forms of governance throughout the so-called Islamic world. Generalizations regarding Islam are a common problem in the West as well. For a good view of how Islam is (mis)represented see, Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine how We see the Rest of the World (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981). 15 Maj. Gen. D. K. Palit and P. K. S. Namboodri, Pakistan's Islamic Bomb (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), pp. 21-26. 237 The combination of the two factors-- the uniqueness of Islam as a religion in which the temporal and spiritual realms are undifferentiated and the alleged sense of community among Muslims around the world-- work as grounds to castigate contemporary Pakistan and the scope of its nuclear programme on the pan-Islamic level. In this regard, the event of partition still casts a long shadow on the Indian strategic community. The creation of Pakistan usually signifies a paradoxical situation for Indian analysts. It is still seen by many as an 'artificial' creation by a British-backed political party, i.e, the All India Muslim League (AIML); and also a theocratic state bent upon creating troubles for India. The accounts concerning Pakistan sometimes have a surreal air about them mainly due to the above problem. By the 1980s, Pakistan emerges in Indian security discourse as an unstable, unpredictable and irrational danger which •intervenes in India's internal affairs and poses a nuclear challenge. Discussions about the two recent challenges to the dominant Indian identity by Sikhs in the Punjab and Muslims in Kashmir are seen as ploys of Pakistan to weaken India. For instance, General Krishnaswami Sundarji, former chief of staff of the Indian Army and now a regular commentator on strategic issues, has no doubt that the upheaval in Kashmir was created by the infiltration of regular Pakistani soldiers as volunteers in the valley. Not content with the performance of its soldiers, Pakistan also sends Afghan Mujahideen to Kashmir to 238 fight a proxy war against India.16 By establishing a link between the Pakistani army and the Afghan Mujahideen, the idea is to show that the domestic troubles of India are perpetrated by a grand coalition of different sources. In the post-Cold War .period, the linking of the former Afghan Mujahideen and the Pakistani government in instigating troubles in Kashmir serves the purpose of portraying a grand alliance of Islamic fundamentalist forces. It is implied that such an alliance is certainly against the interests of a secular India in particular and the West in general. Pakistan is portrayed as a danger with a long history of intervention in Indian internal affairs of which the current uprising in Kashmir is the most recent example. Some Indian experts argue that Pakistan has always 'tried to capture Kashmir but the people of Kashmir and the Indian armed forces defeated such plans'.17 Therefore, an explanation of any upheaval in Kashmir is reduced to the evil desires of Pakistan; and by doing that, an imaginary alliance is created between the Indian armed forces and the Kashmiri people. Those Kashmiris who resist the Indian armed forces, and the number would be certainly quite high, by the above definition cease being Kashmiris. Jasjit Singh, a retired Air Commodore who later became director of the IDSA, unequivocally holds Pakistan responsible 16 General K. Sundarji, Blind Men of Hindoostan: Indo-Pak Nuclear War (New Delhi: UBS Publishers, 1993), pp. 3 and 9. 17 Maj. Gen. D.K. Palit and P.K.S. Namboodri, Pakistan's Islamic Bomb, p. 115. 239 for imposing three wars and two major skirmishes on India.18 The reasons behind this situation range from Pakistan's supposed efforts to Balkanize Indian and the vested interests in Pakistan which project India's military build-up as a threat without recognizing India's needs.19 Subrahmanyam also echoes the same views and laments the fact that Pakistan has committed aggressions against India because it does not have 'adequate respect for India's power'.20 This discourse on bilateral relations invests all responsibility for tension-ridden relations with Pakistan. Any movement within India to assert identities not .endorsed by Delhi becomes the handiwork of Pakistan to Balkanize India. The military build-up of India is justified under all circumstances as a legitimate way to address its needs and no matter how genuine the Pakistani concerns, they are nothing but a lack of realization in Islamabad of India's needs. Any discussion of the Pakistani nuclear programme is preceded by such characterizations in the Indian strategic epistemic community where logocentric logic invokes the dangers of an artificial, theocratic, unstable Pakistan against a more natural, secular, and democratic India. The manner in which the nuclear issue is framed is an extension of the above parameters 18 Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, "Politics of Mistrust and Confidence Building,", in, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, ed., India and Pakistan: Crisis of Relationship (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers in association with Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1990), p.104. 19 Ibid. , p. 105. 20 K. Subrahmanyam, "Role of National Power," in, India and the Nuclear Challenge (New Delhi: Lancer International in association with Institute for Defence studies and Analyses, 1986), p. 257. 240 of security discourse where for some 'the Pakistan bomb signifies many more things than the possession of a new weapon by a hostile nation, a nation which has not yet reconciled itself to its defeats and disintegration'.21 Indian alarmists have no doubt that the alleged Pakistani bomb 'is meant for use' against India in a not-so-distant future in a conventional war'.22 According to this logic, the Pakistanis are being backed by the U.S. and China to mount such an attack on India as a result of which the efforts of the anti-India coalition will culminate in installing a puppet government in Delhi.23 Documenting these statements is not aimed at showing what would appear to an outsider as the incredibility of assumptions prevalent among India's security analysts. The objective is to demonstrate that these statements have the power to ring true if repeated constantly in a regime of truth established in the name of national security. And there is no dearth of evidence regarding their repetition. If for some Indian analysts there is a grand coalition between a theocratic Pakistan, communist China, and the capitalist U.S. to harm India; others would like the whole developing world to take serious note of Pakistan which is 'about to explode a nuclear device'.24 Pakistan 'has been a partner in the neo-colonial design to keep the third world under-21 J. A. Naik, The Pak Bomb and Rajiv's India (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1986), p. v. 22 Ibid. , p. 23. 23 Ibid. 24 K. K. Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India-, a Third World Perspective (New Delhi: Gitajali Prakashan, 1980), p. 200. 241 developed through her alliances with the West'.25 In this scheme, Pakistan's nuclear programme apparently is a vital component of a greater Western conspiracy to weaken the whole Third World. No need is felt to back these assertions by unveiling the mechanisms of the conspiracy, which definitely would be an interesting read, having such large-scale implications. While K. Subrahmanyam does not credit the Pakistani nuclear programme with the scale of undermining the whole Third World, he 'still views the nuclear ambitions of the Zia regime in terms of Pakistan becoming xthe defender of the Gulf area'.26 It is assumed that 'money will pour in from Muslim countries' to fund Pakistan's nuclear programme.27 In all above instances, the Pakistani nuclear programme is depicted as something more sinister than just a response to the Indian nuclear programme. Whereas the Indian nuclear programme is conceived in terms of a nationalist project representing the political will and scientific zeal of the Indian establishment, the Pakistani programme has more to do with the conspiracy of India's adversaries, an undermining of the so-called Third World interests, and the ganging up of the Muslim world to acquire nuclear capability. Evil Designs Versus Noble Intentions 25 Ibid., p. 201. 26 K. Subrahmanyam, Indian Security Perspectives, pp. 182-3. 27 Ibid. 242 The Pakistani nuclear programme is deemed not only as a danger to India in terms of its wider scope but also because of Islamabad's malicious intentions. Pakistan's intent is considered militaristic as against India's peaceful nuclear programme. The broader scope and ill intentions coupled together, according to Indian nukespeak, make the Pakistani nuclear programme a real concern for India. A common method to ascribe ill-intentions to the Pakistani nuclear establishment has been a spy-thriller mode of representing the career of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the controversial metallurgist who heads a nuclear research facility in Pakistan.28 One Indian study argues that Dr. Khan acquired Dutch citizenship to gain access to secret information about nuclear installation designs while working as a researcher in the Netherlands which was further made easier by 'his command of German language'.29 What better proof can one look for of Dr. Khan's evil designs than his presence at the IAEA meeting in 1979 held in Salzburg as a member of the Pakistani delegation where he did not present any paper and asked just one question.30 By this account, a good number of conference participants around the world would qualify as spies with 28 This author does not contend or imply that Pakistan's nuclear programme has no clandestine aspect. However, Pakistan is not the only such country. Most Third World nations, including India, aspiring to achieve nuclear technology for strategic purposes have resorted to questionable methods. 29 P.B. Sinha and R.R. Subramanian, Nuclear Pakistan: Atomic Threat to South Asia (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1980), p. 115. 30 Ibid., pp. 115-6. 243 ulterior motives. Reports about Dr. Khan's expeditions have no difficulty in finding front page splashes across the Indian newspapers. One headline in Times of India in 1996 read: 'U.S. spies found bomb document in Pakistani scientist's luggage'.31 The story was not only an unconfirmed news item lifted from Washington Post, but it referred to an alleged incident that took place in the early 1980s. The report said that 'during an overseas trip in the early 1980s, Pakistan's foremost scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan's luggage was secretly rifled by U.S. intelligence operatives who found a drawing of a Hiroshima-sized bomb that U.S. officials insist must have been supplied by Beijing'. P. L. Bhola, an Indian strategic analyst, states with authority that Dr. Khan made secret notes of the complete design plans of the uranium enrichment process at Almelo plant during his visit to the site.32 However, his thriller account reports a wider network of Pakistani nuclear thieves across Europe and is not confined to the suspicious activities of an individual scientist. That network operated something like this: A secret buying network was established in 1975 in Europe to acquire nuclear technology, equipment, components of equipment and materials for reprocessing and for uranium enrichment. S. A. Butt was appointed In charge of Science and Technology at the Pakistani embassy in Brussels in July 1975. In February 1977, he was shifted to the Pakistani Embassy in Paris in the same position. He developed contacts with Belgo Nuclearie and SGN. Most of the purchases made by Butt in France related to reprocessing and only few were to the enrichment project. Ahmad Kamal, the Pakistani Charge Affaires in Paris was involved in such deals. In January 1977 Ikram-ul-Haque of the Pakistani Ordinance Services was sent to Bonn, where he set up office at Watchberg Pech, 20 31 Times of India (Mumbai) , 2 April 1996. 32 P.L. Bhola, Pakistan's Nuclear Policy (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, South Asia Studies Series, 1993), p. 64. 244 miles from the Pakistani Embassy. From there Ikram-ul-Haque placed orders for the enrichment project throughout Europe. The network was known as the Special Works Organisation (SWO) .33 Although some of the instances in the above account may have been just regular bureaucratic appointments or transfers, the author sees a grand scheme to acquire nuclear capability in every move without substantiating such assertions. Yet the levelling of such allegations is, as usual, not backed by any concrete or conclusive evidence to prove the point. Still the Indian nukespeak blatantly brands the Other as a spy, thief and cunning adversary. The ill intentions of Pakistan are not only manifest in the clandestine operations of its foreign missions and questionable ways of Pakistani scientists but also in what is portrayed as the greed-stricken mentality of its political leadership as against the moral superiority and the far-sight of the Indian leadership. The basic premise is to classify the Indian programme as civilian in nature guided by the vision of Nehru-Bhabha team, and categorize the Pakistani programme as militaristic from day one.34 This assumption is validated in two interestingly interrelated ways. First, discounting the Pakistani claim that their programme is a response to the security threats posed by Indian activities in the nuclear and conventional spheres, the Indian scholarship suggests that the Pakistani nuclear programme 33 Ibid. , p. 65. 34 P.K.S. Namboodiri, "Perceptions and Policies in India and Pakistan", in K. Subrahmanyam, ed., India and the Nuclear Challenge, p. 198. 245 predates the Indian nuclear programme. Secondly, the above point is stressed by attributing peculiar personality characteristics to the Pakistani leadership and their domestic needs. In Pakistan, the Indian nuclear explosion of 1974 is cited as the watershed event which qualitatively changed the security environment of the subcontinent by introducing the nuclear factor. This left no choice for the Pakistani decision-makers but to keep the nuclear option. This is not what prompted Pakistan to pursue nuclear ambiguity, according to the Indian authors. Interestingly, they argue that the nuclear factor was introduced by Pakistan in the region and Islamabad's nuclear ambitions pre-date the Pokhran test. K. Subrahmanyam uses deductive logic to prove that Pakistan's nuclear programme was not sparked-off by the Indian moves. He argues that it was Pakistan which introduced F-104 aircrafts, sophisticated tanks, and staged aggressions in 1947 and 1965. Since all such security-aggravating moves were initiated by Pakistan, it is considered perfectly reasonable by Subrahmanyam to assert that Pakistan introduced the nuclear factor in the Indo-Pakistan relations.35 This oft-repeated tactic of blaming Pakistan, not India, for introducing the nuclear factor proceeds with branding the Pakistan leadership for harbouring such desires. Special reference is made to Z. A. Bhutto's contribution in this regard. Rikhi Jaipal, a leading strategic expert, argues that 'it would be a mistake to imagine that Pakistan developed nuclear 35 K. Subrahmanyam, Indian Security Perspectives, p. 201. 246 ambitions only after the Indian test explosion'.36 This assertion is made on the basis that since Z. A. Bhutto exercised considerable influence in the foreign and defence policy-making in Pakistan during the 1960s, his penchant for nuclear means to meet the energy as well as security needs must have sown the seeds of Pakistan's nuclear programme. In the Indian accounts written on the above lines, it is conveniently forgotten that despite Bhutto's insistence on seriously exploring the costs and benefits of a nuclear programme, Gen. Ayub Khan, then president of Pakistan, never looked sympathetically into the matter and even naively maintained that Pakistan would buy nuclear weapons off the shelf if such a need arose.37 For some Indian authors, Bhutto appears as a man obsessed with acquiring nuclear weapons well before India exploded its nuclear device.38 For others, it was his personal greed which led to the nuclear stalemate in the subcontinent.39 Those who are more generous say that Bhutto introduced the nuclear factor because of domestic compulsions.40 In sum it was one or the other aspect of Bhutto's personality or political expediency which introduced the nuclear factor into 36 Rikhi Jaipal, "The Indo-Pakistan Nuclear Options," in, K. Subrahmanyam, ed., India and the Nuclear Challenge, p. 184. 37 This is how Z. A. Bhutto described Ayub's lack of understanding of the nuclear issue as early as 1963. Bhutto attributed these comments to Ayub while reacting to the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974. For a detailed discussion of this see the chapter Nukespeak in Pakistan I. 38 P.B. Sinha and R.R. Subramanian, Nuclear Pakistan, p. 68. 39 P.L. Bhola, Pakistan's Nuclear Policy, p. 68. 40 K. K. Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India, p. 183. 247 Indo-Pakistan interaction. In these accounts, India emerges as a helpless bystander which was dragged into the nuclear mire by Pakistan. Indian innocence is maintained even in accounts which hypothetically deal with situations of open nuclear confrontation with Pakistan. General K. Sundarji's fictional depiction of such a situation is pertinent in this connection.41 He imagines two scenarios involving the use of nuclear weapons in an Indo-Pakistan conflict and its subsequent results. First, the Pakistani decision-makers, unsure about the Indian nuclear capabilities, launch a successful nuclear attack resulting in an unfair cease-fire imposed on India. The second scenario envisages India responding in kind and emerging victorious. In both situations, it is Pakistan who initiates the nuclear war. In both cases, the war is a result of Pakistan's unabated support for secessionists in Kashmir and its ignoring of Indian ultimatums to desist from anti-India activities-- the cause of the conflict in each case is Pakistan's bid to balkanize India. In the first case scenario of imaginary warfare in which Indian nuclear capability is not taken seriously, Pakistan uses its 'consummate skills in propaganda' to try to portray the insurgency in Kashmir as a popular uprising and then threatens to use all means to combat an Indian attack.42 This is read as a 41 This discussion is based upon General K. Sundarji's Blind Men of Hindoostan in which he outlines different situations in which a nuclear war between Pakistan and India can break-out. Gen. Sundarji is a former chief of staff of the Indian Army. After retirement has has become an important and articulate voice of the dominant security discourse of India. Ibid., p. 50. 248 threat of the use of nuclear weapons against India which creates panic in the Indian public. Cities come to a grinding halt, economic activities are badly disrupted etc. A conventional war starts in the plains and Pakistan immediately resorts to using nuclear weapons and targets defence establishments, initially killing ten thousand people. Pakistan claims that they had definite information about an impending Indian nuclear attack, which Sundarji considers x a masterpiece in disinformation'.43 Pakistan manages to win the international community's support and agrees to a cease-fire, provided Indian forces surrender in Kashmir, withdraw from the plains, and promise to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. Or else it (Pakistan) will continue with the nuclear onslaught against India. Under such circumstances, India is left with no option but to agree with the cease-fire offer. The Indian prime minister resigns in disgarce. However, in the end, the whole situation turns out to be an imaginary Indian prime minister's nightmare. Since Sundarji is convinced of plausibility of such situation, he calls for a fundamental reassessment of the Indian defence strategy against Pakistan. Before moving to the next scenario depicted by General Sundarji, it is worth pausing for a moment to highlight some elements of nukespeak in the above portrayal. It is Pakistan which instigates violence and has the audacity to ignore the Indian ultimatum. It is presumed that the trigger-happy Pakistani decision-makers would use nuclear weapons at the first available opportunity. And not only will they be Ibid., p. 55. 249 successful in crippling the Indian defence establishment, but will be able to convince the world of the necessity of using their nuclear weapons through their 'disinformation'. Such accounts become possibilities only with the suspension of minimal logic while reading them. But we are told it was just an Indian prime minister's nightmare. A more realistic scenario, according to General Sundarji, proceeds on the following lines. The Indian leadership is convinced of the minimum deterrence value of nuclear weapons and appropriate delivery systems. This is conveyed to Pakistan in clear terms along with a declared 'no first use' policy which puts Pakistan in a difficult strategic situation. Once again the starting point of the conflict is Pakistan's intervention in the Indian part of Kashmir; India issues an ultimatum to Pakistan to refrain from such activities or be ready for a full-scale war. Pakistan, as usual, does not heed the Indian voice and a conventional war in the plains starts. Pakistani forces prove no match for the Indian army in the conventional realm. In desperation, Pakistan unleashes a nuclear attack hitting cities like Mumbai and Delhi. The Indian response is based upon the following dictum: 'Our anger should be directed at those crazy decision-makers in Islamabad-Rawalpindi rather than at the people of Pakistan'.44 Instead of a massive response, India opts for a quid pro quo, and even there it decides to 'spare Karachi because Indian Muslims' relatives live in the city' .45 44 Ibid. , p. 137. 45 Ibid., p. 138. 250 Here again India emerges as the considerate and saner power which keeps its cool even in the wake of a nuclear attack by the 'crazy decision-makers' of Pakistan. Although Pakistan does not take into account the relatives of Pakistani Muslims who could have been killed in their nuclear attacks of Delhi and Mumbai, the Indians desist from attacking