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The nature of social cognition in high performance adolescent team athletes Tench, Elizabeth 1999

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THE NATURE OF SOCIAL COGNITION IN HIGH PERFORMANCE ADOLESCENT TEAM ATHLETES by ELIZABETH TENCH B.Educ, The University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1977 M.A., The University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1991 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Educational and Counseling Psychology and Special Education, University of B r i t i s h Columbia) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA May 1999 ©Elizabeth Tench, 1999 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of 1^0(0^01 QfA CjQjC&J jJVQ ^ f ^ 0 ^ ^ T h . , , • u, f R r h r , w ^ o u x V ^docattA^ The University of British Columbia p-v^ Vancouver, Canada Date ApriL £-1 JQ9 DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT F i f t y adolescent ice-hockey players, ranging from 13 to 15 years of age, were studied i n order to determine whether high performance players d i f f e r e d from non-high performance players on measures of soc i a l cognition i n the sport context. Two Divisions of Bantam hockey players were studied: (1) Div i s i o n A or high performance players, and (2) Division B or non-high performance players. Participants were examined for differences on a measure which assessed l e v e l of Case's neo-Piagetian Central Social Conceptual Structure (CCS; Case, 1992) and for differences on three measures of elaborations on the basic structure. No differences were found between groups i n a Multivariate Analysis of Variance, with participant's weight and Division of play as independent variables, on the four dependent variables. A Hotellings T 2 analysis revealed no differences between high and non-high performance players of the same chronological age on Case's CCS. Univariate ANOVAs following the main analysis revealed no differences between the two groups of players i n Concentration which i s the a b i l i t y to detect advance cues which would predict opponent's actions. High performance players demonstrated higher levels than non-high performance players i n F l e x i b i l i t y , which i s the a b i l i t y to provide adequate solutions to so c i a l game problems. High performance players also demonstrated a greater orientation toward Intensity which i s an orientation toward achieving Mastery goals (Dweck, 1992) than non-high performance players. Seven factors were obtained i n an oblique Prin c i p a l Components analysis of the Concentration scale. An ANOVA of Division of play on the f i r s t p r i n c i p a l component revealed no s i g n i f i c a n t differences between high and non-high performers. Number of words used i n responding to the problem set assessing CCS were correlated with Structural Level (.56, p_ <.01) and F l e x i b i l i t y (.47, p_ <.01). The findings have the following implications f o r theory and practice i n the area of high performance: (1) structural l e v e l , which i s largely maturational, does not account for differences between high and non-high performers, (2) encapsulated a b i l i t i e s , which appear to have a high learning component, explain differences between high and non-high performers, (3) s i g n i f i c a n t increases i n performance w i l l most l i k e l y occur as a result of e f f o r t s to develop the encapsulated component of development rather than the structural component. i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i i Table of Contents i v L i s t of Tables v i L i s t of Figures v i i Acknowledgements v i i i CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1 Roots of Case's Theory 3 CCS and Encapsulated A b i l i t i e s . . 5 Importance of the Study 10 De f i n i t i o n of Terms 11 CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW 15 Studying Social Cognition 15 Application of Case's Theory to Social Cognition 17 Encapsulated A b i l i t i e s i n High Performance 27 Encapsulated A b i l i t i e s i n the At h l e t i c Domain • • • • 33 Concentration 34 F l e x i b i l i t y 39 Intensity 44 Summary 47 Hypotheses 48 CHAPTER III METHODOLOGY 51 Participants 51 Procedure 52 Instruments 53 Assessment of the CCSS 54 Description of Coding System 56 Assessment of Encapsulated A b i l i t i e s 63 CHAPTER IV RESULTS 69 CHAPTER V DISCUSSION 76 Limitations of the Study 76 i v Discussion of the Research Questions 79 Hypothesis 1 80 Hypothesis 2 81 Hypothesis 3 83 Hypothesis 4 89 Summary 90 Summary of Implications of the Findings f o r Theory and Practice.. 93 Directions f o r Future Research.... 94 REFERENCES 96 APPENDIX A Case's Staircase Model 102 APPENDIX B Tables of Results 103 APPENDIX C Boxplots of Dependent Variables 113 APPENDIX D Glossary of Terms used i n Coding 117 APPENDIX E Factor Analysis Results 118 APPENDIX F Questionnaire 120 v LIST OF TABLES Table 1 Means and Standard Deviations f o r Bantam Players For Entire Sample and by Division 103 2 Percentages of Structural Level Scores by Division... 104 3 Correlations Among Variables used i n Main Analyses... 105 4 Means and SD for Dependent Variables f o r Entire Sample 106 5 Means and SD fo r Dependent Variables for Division B.. 107 6 Means and SD f o r Dependent Variables f o r Division A.. 108 7 Means and SD fo r Dependent Variables by Weight and Division 109 8 Pooled within c e l l s variance-covariance matrix for Weight by Division 110 9 Pooled with-in c e l l s variance-covariance matrix for Divi s i o n A and B I l l 10 Means and Standard Deviations f o r Dependent Variables by Division 112 11 Factor S t a t i s t i c s for PCA on Concentration Scale Items 118 12 Factor Correlation Matrix f o r PCA on Concentration Scale Items 119 v i LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 Case's Staircase Model 102 Figure 2 Boxplot for Structural Level f o r Division A and B 113 Figure 3 Boxplot f o r F l e x i b i l i t y f o r Division A and B 114 Figure 4 Boxplot f o r Concentration f o r D i v i s i o n A and B 115 Figure 5 Boxplot for Intensity for Division A and B 116 v i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation i s dedicated to my loving mother, Doreen Tench, who started me on this path and whose fondest wish was that the journey be completed. Without her love, patience and enthusiasm, this achievement would not have been possible. I t i s also dedicated to my dear father, George Tench, who loved, supported and guided me along the way and encouraged me through the d i f f i c u l t times, even when the road seemed very long. I would also l i k e to thank my family who gave a l l of the i r love and support, r a l l i e d around me, offered opinions, consulted on e d i t o r i a l matters, and list e n e d to my ideas. My greatest af f e c t i o n and appreciation go especially to my brother Anthony Tench, for his concern, patience and unflagging e f f o r t s i n a s s i s t i n g with f i n i s h i n g this work, to Elaine Markin, my confidante and cheering section, to Anthea Stammers, for being the voice of reason and for loving support, to Alexandra Markin, Amy Markin, Liana Stammers, and Mark Stammers, for unqualified love and good cheer along the way, and to Ron Patch, for his love and considerable contribution to helping me complete t h i s work. I would l i k e to express my gratitude to the youngest family members who took a very sincere interest i n becoming a part of the great adventure by asking a l o t of questions and by s i t t i n g on my knee and helping me draw tables and graphs on the computer. I would l i k e to take this opportunity to acknowledge my committee who supported, advised and encouraged me along the way. I would l i k e to thank Dr. Marion Porath f o r her unending patience, enthusiasm, humour, genuine kindness, and concern. I could not have asked fo r a better advisor, and I am hopeful that her enjoyment of this collaboration was equal to my own. I would also l i k e to thank Dr. William Borgen for his patience, and for his wisdom i n the guidance he provided i n this work. I would l i k e to express my appreciation to Dr. Nand Kishor f o r his knowledge and input, and for making sure my s t a t i s t i c s were i n order. F i n a l l y , I would l i k e to thank the Bantam hockey players, and the i r coaches, who took the time to f i l l out questionnaires and t e l l me thei r thoughts on things s o c i a l and otherwise. Without them, this study would not have been possible. v i i i CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Social cognition has been found to be c r i t i c a l to the attainment of high l e v e l performance i n sport through the interpretation and prediction of other's behaviour (Smith & Christensen, 1985). For the purposes of the present study, the term 'sport' refers i n p a r t i c u l a r to group or team sports, i n which interaction between individuals i s the focus and, therefore, s o c i a l cognition plays a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e . The benefit i n being able to understand and predict the behaviour of both opponents and teammates during competition l i e s i n planning strategies to sidestep problems that arise during s o c i a l interactions that are incompatible with sport goals. Social cognition i s defined i n the current work as an awareness on the part of the observer of aspects of another's internal states, such as t r a i t s or mood states. This knowledge permits the observer to make predictions of the other's behaviour by coordinating various b i t s of this type of information. High performance on a s o c i a l cognition task e n t a i l s the development of the a b i l i t y to coordinate successively greater numbers of these pieces or units of information about the other's internal state and to then make more accurate predictions about how that state w i l l motivate their actions (Abroms & G o l l i n , 1980; Case, 1993; Gardner & Hatch, 1989) . In the current study, s o c i a l cognition was studied i n the sport or a t h l e t i c context as research has revealed the importance of this 1 a b i l i t y to high performance i n sport (Smith & Christensen, 1995). At top levels of competition, athletes d i f f e r so l i t t l e i n terms of physical attributes af f e c t i n g performance that psychological factors become c r i t i c a l i n determining success or f a i l u r e (Onestak, 1996). Anshel and Porter (1996) have indicated that the s o c i a l environment can d e b i l i t a t e or f a c i l i t a t e athletes' attempts to achieve sport goals. Variations i n the psychosocial climate require the athlete to u t i l i s e adaptive strategies to deal with such performance influencing events. Examples of such events are things such as emotional i r r i t a t i o n from teammates or competitors, and demands placed on the athlete by coaches, parents, or others. I t i s apparent that s o c i a l interaction plays a c r i t i c a l role i n performance outcomes, and that the a b i l i t y to understand and predict the behaviour of others w i l l enhance performance. I t i s the primary goal of the current study to determine the nature of s o c i a l cognition i n high performance athletes. The achievement of this objective i s sought through an examination of the mental structures and a b i l i t i e s that contribute to s o c i a l cognition i n the sport domain. One construct proposed by Case and Marini (1984) to contribute to how such understanding increases over the course of development i s that of a Central Conceptual Structure (CCS). This construct i s part of a stage theory of i n t e l l e c t u a l development i n which CCSs, s p e c i f i c to a number of domains, form the basis f o r how the individual understands the world (see Figure A l ) . The term CCS has been defined by Case (Case, 1987; Case et a l . , 1996) i n the 2 following way. A structure i s a mental en t i t y consisting of a set of nodes and th e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s . The conceptual part of the d e f i n i t i o n i s derived from the notion that the inte r r e l a t i o n s between the nodes are semantic, i n that they consist of conceptualizations that the individual attributes to external events i n the environment. The structure i s central because i t i s the core of a wide range of s p e c i f i c concepts within a domain and also i s essential i n enabling the individual to progress to increasingly more complex stages of thought. This progression i s characterized by sequences of hier a r c h i c a l integrations of lower order structures into increasingly more complex structures. The result i s that the individual i s able to gradually operate at more abstract epistemic l e v e l s . The notion of a CCS arose from an attempt to coordinate several viewpoints that addressed the issue of whether an individual's cognition i s subject to a common set of constraints across d i f f e r e n t domains of knowledge (Marini & Case, 1994). Roots of Case's Theory Case has referred to his conception of CCSs as a modified version of neo-Piagetian theory (Case, Okamoto, Henderson, & McKeough, 1993). I t has also been described as f a l l i n g under the category of Information-processing theory (Siegler, 1998) because of the emphasis on automization, working memory capacity, and the acquisition of strategies f o r dealing with problem situations. In fact , Case's theory has roots i n several traditions. The notion of a CCS was developed out of an attempt to integrate apparent inconsistencies 3 between Piagetian theory, neo-innatist theory, neo-Piagetian theory, and Learning Theory. Piagetian theory proposed monolithic structural changes across domains (Piaget & Inhelder, 1974). Investigations s p e c i f i c a l l y within the s o c i a l domain included such topics as the individual's understanding of society, interpersonal understanding, and the way i n which s o c i a l concepts develop (Damon, 1977; Purth, 1980; Selman, 1980; T u r i e l , 1978). Neo-Piagetians researched s o c i a l cognition i n such areas as narrative, role conception, intentions, empathy, and intrapersonal i n t e l l i g e n c e (Astington, 1975; Bruchowsky, 1992; Goldberg-Reitman, 1992; G r i f f i n , 1992; McKeough, 1992; Porath, 1996) . This l i n e of inquiry d i f f e r e d from Piagetian research i n that neo-Piagetians, while adhering to the concept that there were universal structural sequences which were constrained by neurological development, maintained that the nature of i n t e l l e c t u a l progress was far more modular than Piagetian theory proposed. Neo-innatists proposed that development consisted of a series of 'theory changes' related to b i o l o g i c a l mental modules (Keil, 1986) which resulted i n q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t ways of viewing the world. Learning theorists also saw development as being modular but did not stress the ro l e of innate predispositions and modularity as much as they focussed on the role of learning and task domains (Chi & Rees, 1983). Case's theory of CCSs i s an attempt to bridge the notions of b i o l o g i c a l constraints, modularity, and learning. The consideration of both structural development and learning factors may be useful i n accounting f o r performance that exceeds that which i s expected given age-related 4 b i o l o g i c a l constraints. CCS and Encapsulated A b i l i t i e s The CCS i s a conceptually loaded en t i t y that develops i n a recursive fashion and i s t i e d quite closely to chronological age due to b i o l o g i c a l developmental constraints (Case, 1985, 1993; Porath, 1992). These structures are conceptually loaded i n that they have a very broad domain of application, although not system-wide, and t h i s wide range of a p p l i c a b i l i t y demonstrates understanding of an underlying concept of how problems i n that domain might be understood and solved. The comprehension of such a concept allows understanding and application i n many situations within a given domain (Case et a l . , 1996). The notion of c e n t r a l i t y i s important as i t allows the individual to deal with a variety of problem situations i n a given domain. Case's theory of a CCS was not developed s p e c i f i c a l l y to address s o c i a l cognition, although he and his colleagues have completed some research i n the s o c i a l domain (Case et a l . , 1993; Case et a l . , 1996; Marini & Case, 1994). I t appears that Case's research has, at the least, established that s o c i a l cognition i s domain s p e c i f i c (Case & Okamoto, 1996, chap. I l l ) . Further evidence f o r the existence of a separate conceptual structure f o r the s o c i a l domain i s apparent from the work of several researchers (Abroms & G o l l i n , 1980; Barnes & Sternberg, 1989; Case, 1992; Gardner, 1983). Under the rubric of Case's work, i t has been possible to begin to study how individuals who demonstrate high performance on tasks that tap s o c i a l cognition d i f f e r from non-high performance 5 individuals with respect to s o c i a l cognition. Case's work has added a possible dimension of understanding of high performance within a domain that was not accounted f o r by Piaget's theory of development (Piaget 6 Inhelder, 1984). Piaget proposed cross-domain, monolithic age-constrained changes i n structural development. Neo-Piagetian researchers, while concurring that there was evidence of age-constrained advances i n development, attempted to account for d i f f e r e n t i a l rates of development i n various domains between individuals (Case, 1992; Case et a l . , 1996). Much of the research to date has concentrated on determining that there i s indeed domain s p e c i f i c development and e f f o r t s have also been made to describe development within p a r t i c u l a r domains. Case has found that, although r e l a t i v e l y small differences occur within chronological age cohorts i n the development of the CCSs within and across domains, there i s evidence of domain s p e c i f i c structures. The main emphasis of the CCS theory i s to describe development i n terms of the growth of the conceptual structures and to emphasize that there are d i f f e r e n t CCSs for each domain. I t i s , therefore, a model of how conceptual development takes place across domains i n which age-constraints have been proposed as the rationale f o r the small differences between individuals i n general development across structures. In this way, Case has opened the door for elaborations on the nature of development within a p a r t i c u l a r domain. I t may be suggested that structure i s maintained through s p e c i f i c stages of development but that the content of this structure changes i n some way. The manner i n which such 6 content changes may account f o r development which appears to exceed that of structures that i s age-bound. What has not yet been widely investigated u t i l i s i n g the tenets of Case's work i s rapid age-inconsonant development r e s u l t i n g i n high performance within a single domain. The a b i l i t y of high performance individuals to progress rapidly well beyond age cohorts i n a given domain emphasizes the need f o r other considerations apart from conceptual development. Given that there are maturational constraints upon conceptual development, i t seems l i k e l y that factors other than conceptual ones need to be accounted f o r i n development of high performance individuals. The lack of findings of q u a l i t a t i v e or quantitative structural differences between high performance and non-high performance individuals indicates that non-conceptual factors may be i n f l u e n t i a l i n promoting the rapid development of some individuals within p a r t i c u l a r domains. A modelling of the developmental process must then account not only f o r changes i n structural development, as outlined by Case, but include also such non-conceptual factors. The study of high performance individuals i n a s p e c i f i c domain i s most l i k e l y to illuminate such factors. Preliminary research i n the area of high performance i n the s o c i a l domain has already commenced and suggestions have been made as to the nature of high performance using Case's work as a theoretical basis (Porath, 1996). Porath has studied 'gifted' children who, f o r the purposes of the current study, may be considered high performers on the tasks she set f o r them. There appears to exist, i n addition to the age-constrained CCSs proposed by Case, a set of non-conceptually loaded s k i l l s that can develop quickly to adu l t l i k e l e v e l s . Porath (1992, 1997) describes these a b i l i t i e s as being "encapsulated" and has found that such s k i l l s allow f o r more elaborate representations of problem situations than those of chronological-age peers and may i n fact contribute to the elaboration of mental structures. Encapsulated a b i l i t i e s may be defined as a b i l i t i e s that distinguish 'giftedness' and are more to do with b i o l o g i c a l l y determined points of focus regarding the internal and external world of the individual (Bekoff, 1988). In other words, encapsulated a b i l i t i e s may be b i o l o g i c a l l y predetermined tendencies to focus on and learn s p e c i f i c content areas that w i l l enhance performance i n that context. The l i n k between the CCS and encapsulated a b i l i t i e s i n so c i a l cognition as i t pertains to high performance i n a t h l e t i c s i s therefore proposed to be the following. High performance i n a t h l e t i c s o c i a l cognition may permit more elaboration i n the representations of so c i a l problems and the i r solutions due to the predisposition to focus on certain aspects of the internal and external environment that, when coupled with extensive experience, can re s u l t i n very high levels of performance i n that environment. While structure i s defined by and constrained i n l e v e l by maturational factors, encapsulated a b i l i t i e s seem to be open to learning e f f e c t s . Case (1992) has indicated that there i s a c e i l i n g on structural development that i s encountered at every stage. High performers may i n fa c t traverse each stage and reach this c e i l i n g more quickly than non-high performers. While high performers may not greatly exceed the c e i l i n g of the structural l e v e l appropriate f o r the i r age, they may be able to either: (1) u t i l i s e 8 working memory resources freed from structural development processes i n the development of s k i l l s s p e c i f i c to a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l context, or (2) combine information contained i n the structure i n creative ways (Porath, 1992). In this way, encapsulated a b i l i t i e s can r e s u l t i n performance that appears to be well beyond that expected for the individual's chronological age. I t seems, therefore, necessary to consider both the constraints of the Central Conceptual Social Structure (CCSS) and the unconstrained nature of encapsulated a b i l i t i e s as being important to s o c i a l cognition as i t i s pertains to exceptional performance i n the a t h l e t i c context. Three variables have emerged from the sport l i t e r a t u r e as being a b i l i t i e s that are important to s o c i a l cognition i n this domain and serve to distinguish high performance from non-high performance i n a t h l e t i c s . They may be considered the encapsulated component of a t h l e t i c s o c i a l cognition and consist of the following: (1) focus, (2) f l e x i b i l i t y , and (3) in t e n s i t y (Kirschenbaum, 1987; Mahoney & Gabriel, 1987; Whelan & Epkins, 1990). These a b i l i t i e s are encapsulated i n that they appear to develop rapidly, at d i f f e r e n t rates, with d i f f e r e n t endpoints i n various individuals, and coupled with experience, permit development f a r beyond that expected for chronological age. The conception of encapsulated a b i l i t i e s i s consonant with that of s k i l l a cquisition through 'proceduralisation' which was proposed by Anderson (1983, 1993). Proceduralisation refers to the construction of a large set of 'if-then' action plans gained through extensive experience i n a domain. High l e v e l performers are characterised as being able to extract task-relevant advance cues to 9 maximum benefit from the problem situation at hand, engaging i n longterm deliberate practice i n t h e i r domain, and being able to u t i l i s e short and longterm memory more e f f i c i e n t l y than non-high performers. In summary, the intent of th i s investigation to unite Case's theory of CCSS with the information-processing conception of s k i l l or encapsulated a b i l i t y development i n order to describe the nature of s o c i a l cognition i n the a t h l e t i c domain. Importance of the Study There are several ways i n which th i s study makes important contributions to the understanding of conceptual development i n the area of high performance, the understanding of domain s p e c i f i c development, and i n p r a c t i c a l terms, to the understanding of the elements that comprise outstanding a t h l e t i c performance. These possible contributions are outlined i n the following section. Perhaps the most important contribution i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of adding support to Case's theory that gathers the primary tenets of several major developmental theories under i t s rubric. Learning theorists interested i n modular development have expressed an interest i n examining both knowledge that i s s p e c i f i c to p a r t i c u l a r content domains and also i n defining ways i n which knowledge of the domain d i f f e r s between experts and novices. There i s also a growing interest which i s t y p i f i e d by the neo-Piagetian viewpoint i n determining whether development i s at once both constrained and also open to rapid a d u l t l i k e development (Case et a l . , 1993; Marini & Case, 1994). This proposition requires studies i n varied domains to determine i f i n fa c t 10 there are both central structures and encapsulated a b i l i t i e s s p e c i f i c to those p a r t i c u l a r domains. The a t h l e t i c domain has encapsulated a b i l i t i e s that are unlike those previously studied under the auspices of Neo-Piagetian theory. The study of this domain w i l l add to the existing l i t e r a t u r e on s o c i a l cognition which has largely been examined i n terms of narrative (Case et a l . , 1993; McKeough, 1992; Porath, 1996), role-playing studies (Fischer & Pipp, 1984), empathy (Bruchowsky, 1992), intentional understanding (Eikelhof, 1992, Goldberg-Reitman, 1992), and interpersonal understanding ( G r i f f i n , 1992). The need fo r further studies that focus on e c o l o g i c a l l y v a l i d contexts has been emphasized by several researchers (see Porath, i n press). F i n a l l y , this study i s important to the education of coaches, parents of athletes, and athletes themselves. The understanding of the det a i l s of conceptual development as well as the status of encapsulated a b i l i t i e s i n each individual would be of great benefit i n t a i l o r i n g instruction to the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the athlete. D e f i n i t i o n of Terms 1) Central Conceptual Social Structure: CCSS refers to the mental structure which develops over time and aids the individual i n understanding and solving problems i n the s o c i a l domain. The CCSS i s proposed by Case to develop at a r e l a t i v e l y age-related pace and i s closely t i e d to chronological age. The CCSS develops i n four q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t stages each of which contain three substages. Each stage i s dependent upon structures b u i l t i n the preceding stages. Developmental differences between chronological-age cohorts have not been found to exceed one substage (Case & Marini, 1984). 11 2) Encapsulated A b i l i t i e s : Encapsulated a b i l i t i e s are unconstrained individual tendencies to focus on cues that a s s i s t i n s o c i a l cognition. They develop at a rapid pace r e l a t i v e to experience i n very s p e c i f i c task domains. These a b i l i t i e s serve to elaborate the so c i a l conceptual structure by widening the breadth of meaningful experiences that speed i t s development within but not beyond a par t i c u l a r stage. 3) High Performance or Giftedness: The terms 'gifted', 'high performance', ' e l i t e ' and 'expert' are used interchangeably i n th i s study as the sport l i t e r a t u r e usually refers to top athletes using a l l these terms. Giftedness, the term usually used to refer to high performance on tasks tapping such a b i l i t i e s as i n t e l l e c t u a l and a r t i s t i c , has been defined by Case (1992) as an a b i l i t y to learn at an accelerated rate within a developmental stage. High performance individuals are better able to exhibit increased understandings and therefore perform at higher levels than chronological-age peers on given tasks. 4) Concentration: Concentration i s the a b i l i t y to break down into very small segments, ranging between .25 and .50 seconds, (LeMire, 1997) important information being transmitted to the indivi d u a l . The basic concept i s that many s o c i a l cues as to what another individual i s going to do next are being transmitted to the individual but that (1) many are irreleva n t i n predicting the intentions of another person, and (2) segments must be broken down quickly enough to c l e a r l y see that p a r t i c u l a r cues i n a myriad of environmental indicators are more relevant to the solution of the problem situation at hand than other 12 non-relevant cues. Concentration i s used interchangeably with the terms 'focus' and 'attention' i n th i s study as the sport l i t e r a t u r e usually u t i l i s e s one of these two terms synonymously with 'concentration'. 5) F l e x i b i l i t y : F l e x i b i l i t y i s the a b i l i t y of a individual to adapt quickly to novel situations. I t may be considered a response to the information gathered through intensive concentration. The concept of novelty i s important to this construct as environmental v a r i a b i l i t y and changes over time make reliance on standard responses inadequate when a novel problem i s encountered. Several authors have noted that extensive mental preparation enhances the a b i l i t y of the athlete to exhibit high performance i n s o c i a l a t h l e t i c situations (Rushall, 1989; Whelan & Epkins, 1990). Mental practice i s considered a means of developing solutions to di f f e r e n t problems that arise i n the a t h l e t i c context. 6) Intensity: Intensity i s defined as a desire to perform at maximal levels i n situations that require problem solving. There i s a notable intensity i n pr a c t i s i n g and performing and considerable displeasure i n making mistakes. Kirschenbaum (1987) refers to this factor as an a b i l i t y that i s under control of the athlete. Whelan and Epkins (1990) refer to self-generated arousal strategies that enhance performance. The importance of self-regulation i n this d e f i n i t i o n i s that i n t e n s i t y i s not considered a personality t r a i t but an a b i l i t y that i s open to development. In summary, this study has several goals. The f i r s t i s to describe the s o c i a l conceptual structure and encapsulated a b i l i t i e s 13 i n high performers. A second goal i s to inform Case's theory of CCSSs by studying how encapsulated a b i l i t i e s may be an important adjunct to f u l l y understanding i n t e l l e c t u a l development. Another goal i s to contribute to the l i t e r a t u r e on high performance by doing research i n a s p e c i f i c domain, that of sport, which has not been studied under the rubric of a theory of s o c i a l cognition. A f i n a l goal i s to provide an understanding of the role of s o c i a l cognition i n a t h l e t i c high performance i n order to a s s i s t the individual and those involved i n sport i n helping each participant excel to the best of t h e i r a b i l i t i e s . In the following chapter, a detailed description of l i t e r a t u r e relevant to the stated goals w i l l be reviewed. 14 CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW Chapter Two i s concerned with the task of reviewing and integrating the l i t e r a t u r e on s o c i a l cognition with respect to Case's theory of CCSS and encapsulated a b i l i t i e s as i t applies to the a t h l e t i c domain. The l i t e r a t u r e review has four main parts. The f i r s t part describes i n d e t a i l the roots of Case's theory and evidence that supports the theory. This discussion i s followed by a description of the emerging f i e l d of study of s o c i a l high performance, and i n p a r t i c u l a r one conception that expands upon Case's theory. This conception, termed 'encapsulated a b i l i t i e s ' , has been proposed to account for what appears to be accelerated development i n s p e c i f i c domains of endeavour including s o c i a l cognition. The t h i r d part of Chapter Two consists of a review of the sport l i t e r a t u r e i n which three encapsulated a b i l i t i e s are i d e n t i f i e d that serve to distinguish high performance from non-high performance athletes i n the domain of a t h l e t i c s o c i a l cognition. The conclusion of Chapter Two outlines the hypotheses that the present study w i l l investigate. Studying Social Cognition i n the A t h l e t i c Domain Ways i n which the understanding and prediction of others' behaviour develops over time has been a theme i n both psychological and educational l i t e r a t u r e (Astington, Olson, & Harris, 1979; Case et a l . , 1986; Case et a l . , 1993). The need for studies i n various contexts where s o c i a l cognition contributes to the successful prediction of, and appropriate response to, the actions of others has 15 been brought forward (Porath, i n press). I t has been proposed that the difference between novices and experts, or high performers and non-high performers i s a useful way i n which to study most forms of i n t e l l e c t u a l change (Chi, 1988; Chi & Reeves, 1983). One of the main problems that plague the study of expert-novice performance i s i n the d e f i n i t i o n of what constitutes an expert, what kinds of knowledge constitute expertise, and what duration of experience i s required to acquire expert status. The a t h l e t i c domain i s one i n which interactions between team members and opponents denote the need for understanding the intentions or anticipating the actions of others. This domain provides a useful context i n which to examine the nature of expertise i n the s o c i a l domain due to the fact that athletes are c l a s s i f i e d i n a b i l i t y by a number of objective competition indices. In the majority of sports, s t a t i s t i c s such as rankings i n a group of participants are available and are an indication of high performance. This investigation i s confined to young athletes who demonstrate superior performance that i s not necessarily based so l e l y on high levels of experience, but on other additional factors that may allow them to exceed the performance l e v e l of chronological age peers. In the following sections, two l i n e s of inquiry that may be applied i n the study of development i n general and high performance i n p a r t i c u l a r are examined. The f i r s t theory described i s that of CCSSs (Case & Okamoto, 1996) which addresses structural, conceptual, age-related domain-specific changes i n i n t e l l e c t u a l functioning. The 16 second theory described concerns the development of context-specific, unconstrained s k i l l s (Anderson, 1983, 1993) or encapsulated a b i l i t i e s . Application of Case's Theory to Social Cognition Case's notion of CCSSs has been applied i n the study of so c i a l cognition. The development of s o c i a l cognition i s an area that has been extensively studied with emphasis being placed on such concepts as s o c i a l conventions (Turiel, 1978), friendships, (Damon, 1977; Selman, 1980), emotional states (Borke, 1971), narrative (Case et a l . , 1996; McKeough, 1991; Porath, 1996), and empathy (Bruchkowsky, 1991). Although the relationship between general i n t e l l i g e n c e and so c i a l cognition has been an area of s i g n i f i c a n t interest (eg., Mayer & Geher, 1996), there has developed a greater interest i n examining the personal (Luthar & Ripple, 1994), interpersonal, and c u l t u r a l (Robitaille & Robeck, 1995) contexts i n which such cognition takes place. Case's theory has aroused considerable interest i n that i t places cognitive functioning i n s p e c i f i c domains while addressing more general issues such as working memory capacity, learning, and the development of strategies f o r dealing with s p e c i f i c types of problems. Case's (1991; Case et a l . , 1996) conception of Central Conceptual Structures (CCSS) has emerged from the coalescing of several predominant theoretical viewpoints and has been supported empirically i n several contexts. The theories from which the notion of CCSSs arose were: (1) the neo-innatist view, (2) the learning theory view, (3) the soc i o h i s t o r i c t r a d i t i o n , and (4) the neo-Piagetian view, the l a t t e r of which Case's theory might be considered 17 a special case. The i n t e g r i t y of the theories of o r i g i n has largely been maintained, which points to a communality of understanding and indicates that Case's theory i s fundamentally sound. This plus the empirical support to date, from several s p e c i f i c contexts, makes Case 1s theory a t t r a c t i v e as a way i n which to approach the description of s o c i a l cognition i n the a t h l e t i c domain. The neo-innatist view was based on Chomsky's (1957) proposition that the individual acquired language through an innate neurological module that functioned i n an autonomous way. This viewpoint was expanded to include the idea that there were several modules with s p e c i f i c functions, and that f o r each module there was a preset disposition to pay attention to p a r t i c u l a r features of the environment (Fodor, 1982; Gardner, 1983). Although i t was not discounted that there might be a set of universal structures underlying development, these structures were thought to be module s p e c i f i c . I t was primarily experience which contributed to the increasing a b i l i t y for the individual to develop more elaborate 'theories', which upon s u f f i c i e n t elaboration, could be considered to have made a stagelike change (Carey, 1985). This change was not considered to occur i n a system-wide fashion as each module had i t s own s p e c i f i c developmental course (Spelke, 1988). The Learning Theorists shared some similar propositions to the neo-innatist group but placed much more emphasis on the influences of experience. There was less importance placed on the contributions of biology or modules than on s p e c i f i c domains of 18 expertise, such as physics or chemistry. The concept of studying the progress from novice to expert status seemed to be an ideal way i n which to understand i n t e l l e c t u a l development and was developed largely from this paradigm (Simon & Simon, 1978). While adhering to the notion that modularity i s important, this group was i n agreement with the concept that conceptual structural change was important to development, and that these changes were domain s p e c i f i c rather than system-wide. Vygotsky's (1962) work formed the basis f o r the soc i o h i s t o r i c viewpoint. Vygotsky asserted that s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l factors influenced development i n d i f f e r e n t domains. Development was seen as being dependent on the l i n g u i s t i c and conceptual frameworks to which the individual was exposed i n a s p e c i f i c culture, with p a r t i c u l a r technologies, both physical and s o c i a l . The neo-Piagetian stance on development incorporated some of the tenets of Piagetian theory. Piaget postulated that development was based on the acquisition of a single underlying structure, was invariant, and was r e l a t i v e l y unaffected by outside influences. One of the central tenets of Piaget's theory was that expertise was achieved across a wide number of domains as the underlying structure became increasingly more sophisticated. Neo-Piagetian studies produced evidence to support the contention that, although there were constraints on development resu l t i n g from age-linked c e i l i n g s i n information-processing capacity and working memory, development was much more modular than that which had been proposed by Piaget 19 (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). This evidence appeared i n the form of studies i n which i t was determined that (1) the expected correlations between tests supposedly tapping the same underlying structure were not found, (2) s i g n i f i c a n t t r a i n i n g effects could be found f o r logico-mathematical tasks f o r which problem-solving a b i l i t y was proposed by Piaget to depend on the emergence of an underlying construct which was not trainable, (3) training effects occurred within a content domain but not across content domains (Case, 1985; Case et a l . , 1996; Marini & Case, 1994; Rich, 1982). I t i s apparent from the above discussion that there has been emerging f o r some time a movement away from the Piagetian notion of monolithic, invariant structural changes toward a stance where domain s p e c i f i c development i s more descriptive of the way i n which development occurs. Case's theory i s an attempt to integrate these perspectives without abandoning Piagets' concepts e n t i r e l y . Case's solution was to develop the notion of CCSSs where structural change, constrained by neurological development, occurred within task groups or domains. Primary li n e s of investigation have been i n the quantitative and s o c i a l domains (Case, 1992, 1993; Case & G r i f f i n , 1990; Case & McKeough, 1990; Case et a l . , 1996; Porath, 1996) although such domains as emotional ( G r i f f i n , 1992), and a r t i s t i c / s p a t i a l development (Dennis, 1992; Porath, 1997) have been researched by others (Case, 1992; Case et a l . , 1996). The wide range of quite d i f f e r e n t domains to which Case's conception has been applied has ramifications f o r i t s u t i l i t y i n sport 20 research. The a t h l e t i c arena provides a source of several domains of study, including s o c i a l problem solving. Social cognition, which i s brought about i n part by solving the problem of understanding the intentions of others, i s a s i g n i f i c a n t component of success i n the a t h l e t i c context. Sport i s a domain which i s largely concerned with learning and the acquisition of strategies to solve complex s o c i a l problems. The very basis of sport, competition, implies that a s i g n i f i c a n t component of s o c i a l cognition i s involved. Indeed, i t has been noted that athletes at the very top levels of performance are separated i n achievement primarily by psychological s k i l l s (Iso-Ahola & Hatfield, 1986). Case's theory i s primarily concerned with learning and the ways i n which strategies are constructed; therefore these features make the conception p a r t i c u l a r l y a t t r a c t i v e as a basis f o r beginning to describe high performance i n a t h l e t i c s . As Case's theory has been developed, i n part, through research i n the s o c i a l domain, and has contributed to findings on the nature of s o c i a l cognition, i t seems appropriate to apply this theory i n order to describe i n part the nature of high performance s o c i a l cognition i n sport. The notion of a CCSS can be broken down into a d e f i n i t i o n of the terms that describe the construct: (1) central, (2) conceptual, and (3) structure. Case and his colleagues (Case et a l . , 1996) specify that the structures are central i n several d i f f e r e n t senses. Within a p a r t i c u l a r domain, the structures permit understanding of a wide variety of situations. The structures are central i n that they form the core from which more elaborate structures w i l l be b u i l t 21 throughout development. Each successive structure i s dependent upon the preceding one and this notion forms the basis of what Case terms 'recursive cycling'. In order to develop more sophisticated structures, the individual builds upon previously existing elements by combining them i n d i f f e r e n t ways. Elaboration of preceding structures requires an expansion i n working memory capacity by which the individual can hold i n memory an increasing number of goals, and therefore address problems requiring greater numbers of operational steps i n order to achieve a solution. F i n a l l y , structures are central i n that a l l structures are subject to system-wide maturational constraints (Case, 1992; Case et a l . , 1996). These constraints are proposed to be b i o l o g i c a l l imitations on working memory a r i s i n g from the degree to which neural connections have formed between various parts of the brain involved i n problem solving (Case, 1992). Structures are conceptual i n that they form the basis for the manner i n which the individual i n t e r n a l l y represents problem situations i n the external world. F i n a l l y , the term structure i s meant to denote the individual's internal blueprint of the network between several concepts. Case contends that CCSs advance through four developmental stages: (1) the sensorimotor stage, (2) the i n t e r r a t i o n a l stage, (3) the dimensional stage, and (4) the v e c t o r i a l stage (see Figure 1). Within each of these stages a recursive progression takes place. At the f i r s t substage children are able to coordinate two executive structures that e x i s t separately i n their repertoire. At the second 22 substage, the two structures are able to be executed i n a s e r i a l manner. At the t h i r d substage, the two structures are executed simultaneously. Progression i s related to the amount of working memory available and each f i n a l structure forms the basis f o r the next stage of development. Each stage has cha r a c t e r i s t i c developmental advances. At the sensorimotor stage, the f i n a l outcome of the substage development i s the acquisition of operational r e v e r s i b i l i t y . This refers to the development of the concept that there are reversible relationships between objects. At the i n t e r r e l a t i o n a l stage, children are able to comprehend the notions of enabling or preventing relations between objects. The dimensional stage i s characterised by the solving of problems requiring estimates of differences i n magnitude between objects. The f i n a l stage, which Case terms the v e c t o r i a l stage, i s t y p i f i e d by the a b i l i t y to understand the relations between objects i n systems that have no concrete referents. The v e c t o r i a l stage i s the f i n a l q u a l i t a t i v e change i n cognitive development before adulthood. Evidence to support the propositions put forward by Case have been gathered i n various domains by Case and others. Case and Marini (1994) conducted an experiment to determine whether adolescents progressed through developmental stages i n physical (non-social) and s o c i a l reasoning at approximately the same rate. Prior studies had demonstrated that younger individuals developed i n d i f f e r e n t domains at similar rates (Case, Marini, McKeough, Dennis, & Goldberg, 1986; Marini, 1992; Marini & Case, 1989). In this study the balance beam 23 task was used to assess physical reasoning. Social reasoning was assessed with three d i f f e r e n t tasks. The f i r s t task required that the individual be able to describe t r a i t s from a description of a protagonist's behaviour. The second measure consisted of the presentation of a problem i n which prediction of a character's behaviour, where there might be a problem produced by that character's response, was required; In the t h i r d task the individual was required to integrate both t r a i t and problem information i n predicting a character's intentions i n a story. The tasks were devised to incorporate the proposition that thinking becomes increasingly abstract as the individual develops. Case and Marini (1994) found that the developmental sequence proposed i n Case's model was substantiated i n the levels of complexity of the tasks completed successfully by the adolescents. The second finding was that although development i n both domains was quite similar, a substantial minority showed differences of one substage i n development between the domains. The conclusions drawn from this study were that development progresses i n a monolithic way i n that between-domain advances are similar, but that development i s also modular i n that there was some decalage between the two domain s p e c i f i c tasks. In another study, Case et a l . (1993) attempted to demonstrate that numerical and s o c i a l domains are underpinned by two d i f f e r e n t CCSs. Two sets of tasks, one numerical and the other s o c i a l , were administered to a group of individuals. I t was found 24 that intra-task correlations of moderate but s i g n i f i c a n t magnitude indicated that there was domain s p e c i f i c i t y . Although there were some si g n i f i c a n t correlations found between the domains on some tasks, the majority of tasks were not s i g n i f i c a n t l y correlated between domains. Both orthogonal and oblique factor analyses were conducted on the tasks and re f l e c t e d the results found i n the simple corr e l a t i o n a l analyses. Case et a l . (1993) also successfully attempted to demonstrate that some moderate progress within but not across domains could be achieved by training. This study demonstrated two important themes of Case's model: (1) that understanding i n the two domains was indeed based on di f f e r e n t CCSs, and (2) that structural development was not greatly affected by training or learning. Case et a l . (1996) conducted a similar study i n which numerical and s o c i a l tasks were administered to another group of individuals. This study d i f f e r e d from the f i r s t i n that, i n order to control f o r method and content variance, a methodological problem that has plagued the study of this area i n forming a coherent picture, numerical content was injected into the s o c i a l tasks and so c i a l content was contained i n the numerical tasks. I t was expected that the factors would be correlated due to this procedure but that, s t i l l , two d i s t i n c t factors would emerge. Correlations within the tasks were of intermediate magnitude, while inter-task correlations were less strong with a less d i s t i n c t i v e pattern, the majority being s t a t i s t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t . Two clear and strong factors emerged. 25 The f i r s t factor was described by loadings from the numerical tasks, while the second factor was comprised of the narrative or s o c i a l tasks. To summarize, the work to date on Case's theory of CCSs indicates the following: (1) there appears to be domain s p e c i f i c development of structures that regulate internal representations of the environment, (2) these structures are conceptual i n nature, (3) the CCSs develop at an age-constrained rate which i s most l i k e l y due to maturational factors, and (4) advances over chronological age peers i n CCSs are confined to one substage or approximately two years. These findings have implications for the study of high performance i n the a t h l e t i c domain. Fischer and Canfield (1986) noted that high performance may be accounted for by the elaboration of structures within a stage. High performance may be p a r t i a l l y explained by a v e r t i c a l acceleration i n development i n that high performers are more adept at acquiring concepts within t h e i r stage. However, this notion i n i t s e l f does not f u l l y account f o r high performance, although i t provides a basis f o r understanding of the phenomenon, as progression within the stage may be accelerated only to one substage beyond age-predicted norms. I t i s plausible to suggest that rapid v e r t i c a l progression within a stage allows the high performer more resources to allocate to learning non-conceptual s k i l l s , while chronological age cohorts are s t i l l engaged i n building conceptual s k i l l s . Learning then becomes a factor i n development whereas i n terms of conceptual development, maturation i s a more s i g n i f i c a n t 26 factor. These non-conceptual, learning-based s k i l l s have been termed 'encapsulated a b i l i t i e s ' (Porath, 1996) and may be factors that distinguish between high and non-high performance. This aspect of development i s discussed here as i t provides a rationale f o r including encapsulated a b i l i t i e s i n the study of high performance. I t i s , however, not the intent of the current study to assess this proposition that indicates a need to introduce elements of learning theory to the study of high performance. The main objective i s , rather, to describe the structure and a b i l i t i e s of which s o c i a l cognition i n the a t h l e t i c domain are comprised. The nature of the CCSS has been outlined i n previous sections. In the following sections, Case's structural theory i s united with the tenets of Learning Theory i n an attempt to describe the encapsulated a b i l i t i e s that characterise high performance i n s o c i a l cognition i n the a t h l e t i c domain. Encapsulated A b i l i t i e s i n High Performance As noted above, and i n other studies, i t has been found that chronological age peers do not d i f f e r by more than one substage on tasks measuring the l e v e l of development of the CCSS (Case, 1992; Porath, 1992, 1996, 1997). Porath conducted two studies of what she termed 'gifted performers' who for the purposes of the current study are considered to be the equivalent of high performers. To account for g i f t e d performance, Porath (1996, 1997) described an additional set of a b i l i t i e s that were non-conceptual, encapsulated, or c r y s t a l l i z e d . These a b i l i t i e s are termed 'encapsulated' i n that they 27 are proposed to be independent of the development of conceptual understanding. In a study of g i f t e d young a r t i s t s , Porath (1997) found that g i f t e d children performed i n a similar manner to non-gifted children on a picture structure task that was designed to assess the l e v e l of the CCS f o r s p a t i a l representation. The greatest degree of advancement within the g i f t e d group was one substage beyond the age predicted norm. However, there were s i g n i f i c a n t differences found between g i f t e d and non-gifted children on tasks assessing encapsulated a b i l i t i e s , including graphic competence and creative use of space. These differences were found to be related to age i n that there were periods of rapid development seen i n g i f t e d children at p a r t i c u l a r ages on some of the encapsulated a b i l i t i e s . In a study of narrative, Porath tentatively concluded that g i f t e d children d i f f e r e d from non-g i f t e d children i n narrative structure by only one substage. The hypothesis that g i f t e d children would d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y from non-g i f t e d children on non-conceptual variables was more strongly supported. In this study, encapsulated a b i l i t i e s such as grammar and vocabulary, distinguished g i f t e d from non-gifted children. Porath (1992) also conducted a study i n which individuals who were either verbally g i f t e d , s p a t i a l l y g i f t e d , generally g i f t e d , or of average a b i l i t y were compared. The intention of this study was to attempt to f i n d children who exhibited asymmetrical developmental p r o f i l e s . Such a finding would challenge the notion of generality of developmental patterns. The groups were tested on e x i s t i n g conceptual structures and the a b i l i t y to create new knowledge structures within 28 existing working memory u t i l i s i n g experimenter feedback. With the exception of the two tests where feedback was available and could be u t i l i s e d to improve performance, generally g i f t e d individuals did not d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y from chronological age peers. I t was determined, however, that asymmetrically g i f t e d individuals outperformed a l l other groups on the tasks s p e c i f i c to the i r p a r t i c u l a r asymmetry. Porath concluded that there were several possible explanations f o r this finding including special achievement motivation, talent, and most relevant to the current study, an experiential advantage over the other groups. Porath proposed that g i f t e d individuals would i d e n t i f y t h e i r areas of expertise early on and devote more time and energy to developing those areas. Therefore, they would bring to the task a greater amount of experience with which to address the problem. A f i n a l analysis revealed that more s p e c i f i c attributes of language and narrative, such as vocabulary, syntax and thematic maturity, distinguished g i f t e d from non-gifted controls. A r t i s t i c a l l y g i f t e d children were found to d i f f e r from the other groups on a drawing task that involved s p e c i f i c s p a t i a l - a r t i s t i c a b i l i t i e s such as elaboration of figures. In this study i t was apparent that high performance individuals were not markedly d i f f e r e n t from non-high performance individuals on conceptual measures but d i f f e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y on s p e c i f i c a b i l i t i e s associated with a domain of expertise. The distinguishing factor appeared to be what was described above as encapsulated a b i l i t i e s . The encapsulated a b i l i t i e s examined i n the current study are 29 posited to be predispositions to pay attention to certain cues i n the environment that are relevant to solving problems i n the s o c i a l domain. This predisposition of attention i s probably not a conceptual component but rather a propensity to notice and u t i l i s e cues i n the environment. The conceptual development may not yet be i n place but the predisposition to acquire experience i n recognizing cues that permit some l e v e l of s o c i a l prediction may catapult high performance individuals beyond non-high performance individuals. These a b i l i t i e s would permit the individual to focus on pertinent environmental cues that takes performance beyond the r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed on conceptual l e v e l by working memory. Case et a l . (1996) have demonstrated c u l t u r a l and socioeconomical differences i n the l e v e l of CCSs, which points to experiential differences a f f e c t i n g understanding i n di f f e r e n t domains. Both Siegler (1996) and Keating (1996) have discussed research that indicates advanced performance i n areas that are cult u r e - s p e c i f i c . These findings would seem to indicate that while CCSs progress at a r e l a t i v e l y uniform rate with respect to chronological age, there i s a component of experience and learning involved i n the d i f f e r e n t i a l way i n which individuals develop. What has not been c l a r i f i e d i s the rationale f o r how individuals exposed to similar experiences i n a given domain can demonstrate markedly d i f f e r e n t progress i n solving problems i n that domain. An examination of this phenomenon may provide the means for distinguishing between high performance and non-high performance individuals and may indicate the need f o r some 30 elaboration on Case's theory to account f o r high performance. Case primarily addresses the development of CCSs i n s p e c i f i c domains, but does not focus on exceptional development within a domain. The increments i n performance noted i n training studies (Capodilupo, i n Case et a l . , 1996) are s i g n i f i c a n t but do not appear to be major quali t a t i v e changes i n individual functioning. I t appears that some learning i s possible within the structure but does not e f f e c t a substantial advance between stages of structural development. From the findings reported so f a r , i t i s reasonable to suggest that there might be processes other than CCSS developing i n the individual to account f o r the difference between high performance and non-high performance individuals i n s p e c i f i c domains. These encapsulated a b i l i t i e s would develop at a rapid rate i n high performance individuals, be non-conceptual, and most l i k e l y be related to experience. In the domain of a t h l e t i c s o c i a l cognition, di s t i n c t i o n s between high performance and non-high performance appear to depend upon the following encapsulated a b i l i t i e s : (1) focus, (2) f l e x i b i l i t y , and (3) drive to be the best (Kirschenbaum, 1987; Mahoney & Gabriel, 1987; Whelan & Epkins, 1990). Encapsulated a b i l i t i e s appear to be similar to the s k i l l s that Anderson (1983, 1993) proposed under his theory of learning and 'proceduralisation'. A l l a r d and Starkes (1991) developed a concept i n the t r a d i t i o n of learning theory that refers to 'production systems' (Anderson, 1983) i n describing the execution of a t h l e t i c s k i l l s . Production systems are a form of procedural knowledge i n which 31 condition-action rules are stored i n long-term memory. These abstract units or rules are proposed to be triggered by cues absorbed by the individual depending upon the current attentional focus. I t i s an automatic system i n that when an ' i f i s recognized a 'then' response i s generated. The acquisition of procedural rules has been referred to by Anderson (1995) as 'proceduralisation'. An example of this i n the a t h l e t i c domain would be a breakaway i n i c e hockey. In a breakaway situation, a player skates i n on the goaltender alone with the puck and by attending to the cues of body positioning, small movements, and gaze direction of the opponent, the goaltender can determine the intentions of the player before they are executed. A fa m i l i a r t a c t i c u t i l i s e d by goaltenders i s not to 'make the f i r s t move' which, i n ef f e c t , decreases the number of cues available to the shooter i n anticipating the goaltender's actions (Beliefleur, 1983). In Anderson's model, procedures change over time and become composed into higher order productions. S k i l l s are developed through the compilation of several productions. Anderson indicated that thousands of productions underlie a p a r t i c u l a r s k i l l and develop with experience. The question then arises as to how i t i s possible that similar degrees of experience, along with s i m i l a r i t i e s i n physical factors (Ericsson & Chamess, 1994) , can lead some individuals and not others to the l e v e l of high performance. The answer to this question appears to l i e i n the manner i n which the knowledge gained from experience i s sought and stored. Chi (1988) refers to this as a 'knowledge strategy' i n that the individual learns how to better 32 recognize, store, and retrieve information relevant to various problem situations i n a s p e c i f i c domain. This i s i n contrast to the 'power strategy' i n which i t i s proposed that high performance i s somehow based on greater processing capacity of the indivi d u a l . A review of the l i t e r a t u r e on the three a b i l i t i e s i s now appropriate to demonstrate that these a b i l i t i e s are linked with high performance. I t may be suggested that these three a b i l i t i e s a s s i s t the individual i n the gathering, processing, storage, and r e t r i e v a l of information i n the a t h l e t i c context. These a b i l i t i e s may resemble c r y s t a l l i z e d a b i l i t i e s , i n that they develop at a very f a s t rate, are not d i r e c t l y related to the stagelike development of CCSs and may p a r t i a l l y account for high performance i n individuals who are moving through, but not s i g n i f i c a n t l y advancing beyond one substage of, Case's stages of conceptual development. Encapsulated A b i l i t i e s i n the A t h l e t i c Domain A review of the sport l i t e r a t u r e revealed many constructs that are proposed to play a part i n distinguishing high performance from non-high performance a t h l e t i c performance. I t has been noted that at the very uppermost levels of competition, differences i n physical s k i l l are minimal, and that given a good preparation i n physical conditioning, i t i s psychological s k i l l s that distinguish high performance from non-high performance athletes (Iso-Ahol & Hatfield, 1986). Psychological s k i l l s are of interest i n that they are believed to be amenable to improvement (Boutcher & Rotella, 1987), less permanent than personality characteristics, and less 33 transitory than mood states (Spielberger,1971). I t i s the intent of the current study to determine whether such cognitive s k i l l s , i n conjunction with CCSS development, are cha r a c t e r i s t i c of high performance i n s o c i a l cognition i n the a t h l e t i c domain. Following an extensive reading of" the l i t e r a t u r e , and when non-cognitive constructs such as emotion are f i l t e r e d out of the picture, the following factors appear to contribute to high performance: (1) concentration, (2) f l e x i b i l i t y , and (3) intensity. Concentration Concentration, or the systematic a l l o c a t i o n of attention to a p a r t i c u l a r set of environmental cues, has been found to distinguish e l i t e from non-elite athletes (Mahoney, Gabriel, & Perkins, 1987). In most sport psychology studies the terms 'attention' and 'concentration' are used interchangeably (Bond & Sargent, 1995). There are two main dimensions emphasized i n the d e f i n i t i o n of concentration: 1) the a b i l i t y to sustain attention upon a p a r t i c u l a r cue or set of cues (also known as 'mental e f f o r t ' , and 2) the a b i l i t y to distinguish cues that are appropriate targets of attention (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996), which i s known as ' s e l e c t i v i t y of attention' (Orlick & Partington, 1988; Summers & Ford, 1995). 'Mental e f f o r t ' consists of the controlled processing of cues relevant to the task at hand. 'Selectivity' refers to the a b i l i t y to s h i f t focus from internal to external cues, and to control the bandwidth of the focus. An athlete may "be able to sustain attention on a p a r t i c u l a r cue, f o r example the responses of spectators to the performance, but this i s 34 not useful i n allowing the individual to focus on cues from opponents which w i l l permit successful solution of problem situations. In the same way, an athlete i n a team sport may be able to focus attention on one player when i t would be more b e n e f i c i a l to be able to divide attention between two or more opposing players. The conclusions reached i n most studies of attention indicate that successful athletes can be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from less successful athletes i n being more focussed on the task at hand than on worrying about the outcome of the competition. At the point of peak performance, the athlete's mind i s focussed completely on the task-relevant cues of the situation. Examples of sports i n which s o c i a l cues would provide important clues as to strategies l i k e l y to be employed by opponents can be found i n the sport l i t e r a t u r e . Gould, Eklund, and Jackson (1992) found that best performances by wrestlers i n the 1988 Olympics were related to the a b i l i t y to keep from engaging i n task-irrelevant thoughts and to concentrate on opponents' moves. Kerr and Cox (1991) were able to distinguish s k i l l e d from l e s s - s k i l l e d squash players based on t h e i r a b i l i t y to narrow attention to cues relevant to the task such as opponent actions. Research on attention i n sport has been divided into f i v e general categories: (1) the s k i l l of detecting advance cues and screening out irrelevant cues, (2) the a b i l i t y to divide attention which consists of performing more than one action simultaneously, (3) the effects of arousal on narrowing the span of attentional c a p a b i l i t i e s , (4) individual differences i n attentional strategies 35 between athletes, and, (5) research on the psychophysiological aspects of attention (Abernethy, 1987). In the current study, the detection of advance cues and the d i v i s i o n of attention are of interest i n distinguishing high performance from non-high performance athletes. Rather than investigating physiological aspects of attention, or patterning a multitude of individual p r o f i l e s i n attentional strategies, the intent i s to investigate the cognitive and strategic aspects of attention that characterize high performance. I t i s apparent from various studies that expert athletes appear to attend to and extract cues that indicate the intentions of others more quickly and completely than non-expert athletes (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996). One interesting method of determining how expert performers extract such information has been u t i l i s e d by Abernethy (1993) i n what are termed clue-occlusion paradigms. In these experiments, experts were presented with a set of cues i n a performance situation and asked to predict such events as where a b a l l would land a f t e r being shot. Following t h i s , some of the cues were excluded from presentation and decrements i n prediction were observed. Early and more complete cue detection was also noted i n studies involving tennis (Issacs & Finch, 1983), soccer (Morris & Burwitz, 1989), and squash players (Abernethy, 1990). I t appears that early detection f a c i l i t a t e s accuracy of prediction and faster reaction times, and allows more working memory to be available to implement strategies or make changes to decision plans (Summers & Ford, 1995). These studies share the same methodological problems as many sport 36 studies i n that the athletes do not have to make a physical response to the stimulus nor do they have the added dimension of crowd and competitor effects which can produce anxiety which has been demonstrated to be linked to narrowing of attention (Summers & Ford, 1995). They do, however, demonstrate that there i s a u t i l i t y i n early and f u l l cue detection regardless of removal from the ecology of the performance situation. Division of attention has been studied i n sport psychology u t i l i s i n g the dual-task paradigm. Athletes are given a primary and secondary task to complete simultaneously and then compared i n terms of task completion with respect to l e v e l of proficiency i n a given sport. Parker (1981) conducted a study i n which b a l l players of diff e r e n t s k i l l levels were given an i n i t i a l single task of passing the baseball between two players as many times as possible within a 30 second time period. This was the primary task and did not serve to distinguish high performance from non-high performance players. The next phase of the study included a secondary simultaneous task that consisted of executing the primary task while monitoring the position of other players on the f i e l d . When the secondary task was introduced there was a s i g n i f i c a n t difference i n the performance on each task and p a r t i c u l a r l y so on the performance of the secondary task between highly s k i l l e d and less s k i l l e d players. Abemethy (1983) noted that this methodology was useful i n that simple observations of primary tasks alone do not necessarily distinguish high performance performers. This was a secondary benefit derived from applying this 37 methodology, the f i r s t benefit being that the results were interpreted as revealing that high performance players had more attentional capacity available to allocate to the secondary task than the less s k i l l e d players. Rose and Christina (1990) found similar results i n a di f f e r e n t form of the dual-paradigm task involving p i s t o l shooting i n which the secondary task consisted of a non-task relevant di s t r a c t e r . Expert shooters were able to screen out the d i s t r a c t e r much more e f f i c i e n t l y than the novice shooters indicating that attention was being directed toward the primary task. The dual task paradigm suffers from certain methodological flaws, the most notable being that practice enhances performance on secondary tasks. Another d i f f i c u l t y i s that, because performance on the primary task may vary across experimental conditions, a sensitive measure of the primary task that includes a baseline must be i n place i n order to gather meaningful results. Attentional processes have been regarded i n several ways, one of which i s as a cognitive s k i l l (Cox, 1994). I f this i s the case, then i t i s possible to theorize that extensive practice i n detecting cues that provide the greatest amount of task-relevant advance information might allow an athlete to display a b i l i t y beyond those of chronological age cohorts. There seems to be scant evidence that expert performers d i f f e r from novices on such physical factors as visual acuity, depth perception, range of peripheral f i e l d , or reaction time (Regnier, Salmela, & Russell, 1993). However, there appears to be a wealth of evidence that the a b i l i t y to detect advance 38 cues and to divide attention are s k i l l s that separate high performance from non-high performance performers (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996). This d i s t i n c t i o n between experts and novices i s carri e d over into other cognitive domains such as chess (Allard & Starkes, 1991) i n which i t was found that expert players appear able to 'chunk' larger amounts of meaningful information, thereby allowing them to take i n more information i n a single glance than less expert performers. The next step i n the process of i d e n t i f y i n g encapsulated a b i l i t i e s important to s o c i a l cognition i s to determine what high performance performers do with this richer knowledge base that results i n expert performance. F l e x i b i l i t y The term ' F l e x i b i l i t y ' , as used i n the current study, i s derived from Webb (1974) who found that i n t e l l e c t u a l l y g i f t e d children share mental structures i n common with chronological age cohorts but use these structures i n creative ways. Porath (1996) ci t e s work on g i f t e d children that gives evidence of t h e i r a b i l i t y to use e x i s t i n g conceptual structures i n f l e x i b l e and elaborate ways. F l e x i b i l i t y i n the sport context consists of the a b i l i t y of a individual to adapt quickly to various combinations of cues that a s s i s t i n determining the intentions of others; a s k i l l which i s essential i n competitive group sports. Through experience, many athletes can become adept at anticipating actions i f f a m i l i a r behaviours are displayed. The question arises as to which factors contribute to the difference between e l i t e and non-elite athletes i n solving problems when unfamiliar combinations of cues are presented. E l i t e athletes have 39 demonstrated superior a b i l i t y i n developing subjective event p r o b a b i l i t i e s compared to non-elite athletes (Whiting, 1979). In a given sport, this finding appears to indicate that the e l i t e athlete possesses a richer procedural knowledge base i n comparison to a non-e l i t e performer. What has not been widely examined are the processes which underlie 'knowing' and 'doing'. I t appears that there i s a minimum amount of time i n the acquisition of sport expertise of about ten years duration (Hayes, 1985). This proposition i s substantiated by Bloom's (1985) work i n which the role of deliberate practice i n gaining expertise i s emphasized. This period has been described as one consisting of ongoing selection and rejection of information during which the individual may gradually acquire the a b i l i t y to exhibit expert performance (Whiting, 1978). Whiting states that the individual must learn to b u i l d the information from various sources into an internal model during the progression from novice to expert. The problem solving a b i l i t y of athletes i s presumed to be based upon three types of knowledge: 1) declarative knowledge which can be divided into episodic and semantic components, (2) procedural knowledge which i s non-verbal, and (3) strategic knowledge which consists of h e u r i s t i c techniques. Episodic knowledge would be exemplified by knowing the general rules of a p a r t i c u l a r sport while semantic knowledge would consist of such things as knowing the score at any p a r t i c u l a r time of a game. Procedural knowledge would consist of such a b i l i t i e s as how to shoot a puck i n hockey. Strategic knowledge would include knowing 40 when to approach the net to take a shot. Expert performance i s t y p i f i e d by the a b i l i t y to u t i l i s e a l l three kinds of knowledge i n the solution of problems. F l e x i b i l i t y i s a s k i l l which en t a i l s i n p a r t i c u l a r the use of declarative and procedural knowledge i n developing strategic knowledge. The a b i l i t y to combine units of declarative and procedural knowledge i n d i f f e r e n t ways to solve problems may be one key to expert a t h l e t i c performance. Domain s p e c i f i c i t y of expert performance has been noted i n many areas (Hayes, 1985; Vincente & Wang, 1998). The l e v e l of s p e c i f i c i t y within the sport environment goes from the sport domain i n general, to between sports, to within sport position (Cox & Yoo, 1996), and even to the l e v e l of p a r t i c u l a r problem situations within a given event. I t has been suggested that the a b i l i t y to respond to very s p e c i f i c situations and, i n fact, combinations of cues not previously experienced by the individual may separate high performance and non-high performance a t h l e t i c performance (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996). Extensive experience would allow an athlete to draw upon existing declarative and procedural knowledge and to respond to situations presenting sets of fa m i l i a r cues. However, novel situations would present s p e c i f i c cues within an array that were not present i n any meaningful pattern existing i n memory. A l l a r d and Starkes (1991) have developed a model that might serve to explain the importance of si t u a t i o n a l s p e c i f i c i t y i n developing solutions to problems i n the a t h l e t i c context. These authors suggest that there are s i t u a t i o n - s p e c i f i c q u a l i t i e s of motor 41 s k i l l s that are cognitive and d i f f e r e n t from all-purpose general motor s k i l l s . The cognitive component permits the motor s k i l l s to be e f f e c t i v e i n performing actions consistently. This dichotomy i n s k i l l performance i n a t h l e t i c s exists i n the difference between the a b i l i t y to understand which action should be performed and i n the actual performance of the a c t i v i t y . This view of problem solving l i e s i n the realm of information processing theory rather than that of h i e r a r c h i c a l executive processes, or schemata theory, and may serve to explain highly s k i l l e d problem solving i n a t h l e t i c s . The theory of schemas or h i e r a r c h i c a l processes i s probably one of the major contending viewpoints with respect to the Learning Theory approach and merits a b r i e f discussion. Schema theory i s based on the notion that c e n t r a l l y stored schemas dictate responses to problem solving situations. B a r t l e t t (1932) defined a schema as 'an active organization of past reactions or past experiences, which must be operating i n any well-adapted organic response'. He believed that schemas were executive strategies that governed procedural and declarative knowledge. A hockey player, for example, would require a few basic schemata for shooting the puck that could be adapted to the current circumstance. The most important features of schemata with respect to novel situations i s that they are pre-packaged action plans that are h o l i s t i c i n nature. Due to the h o l i s t i c nature of a schema, most of the adjustment to the schematic action plan appears to take place only once an outcome has been experienced (Schmidt, 1988). This implies that the schemas available to the athlete would be l i m i t e d by 42 both the structure already i n place and the requirement fo r seeing outcomes i n order to modify the i n i t i a l schema i n a s i g n i f i c a n t way. Senemas might be p r a c t i c a l action plans i n situations f i t t i n g those already constructed i n longterm memory. It would seem, however, that a more f i n e l y tuned, immediate, and s i t u a t i o n - s p e c i f i c form of processing would be required to solve novel problems. The Learning Theory model described by Anderson (1983, 1993) has provided a view of cognition that seems to better address the manner i n which experts deal with the problem of novel situations. This difference i s proposed to l i e i n the way i n which information i s stored and retrieved which allows f o r more e f f i c i e n t cognitive functioning i n finding problem solutions. Chase and Simon (1973) determined that, i n the f i e l d of chess, experts d i f f e r e d from novices i n the a b i l i t y to f i n d meaningful patterns i n the information stored i n long-term memory. Novices did not d i f f e r i n the absolute number of production units available, usually between 5 and 9 units, but the units r e c a l l e d were not constructed i n patterns that were as useful as those r e c a l l e d by experts. Kahney (1993) compared this to word recognition a b i l i t i e s i n that novices r e c a l l l e t t e r s while experts r e c a l l words. The difference between expert and novice performance on patterning a b i l i t i e s may be explained by findings i n the study of contextual interference (Shea & Morgan, 1979). In this l i n e of research i t has been found that the order of presentation of practice t r i a l s i n learning a s k i l l affects performance and retention of the s k i l l 43 d i f f e r e n t i a l l y . I t was determined that when practice t r i a l s were presented i n a consecutive or blocked order, performance was enhanced. When practice t r i a l s were presented i n a random order performance was not as readily enhanced; however, retention of the s k i l l was greatly increased. One explanation of t h i s phenomenon was that much more intentional and elaborate processing strategies are required to r e t a i n several tasks i n learning memory simultaneously (Gabrielle, H a l l , & Lee, 1989). Another proposition entailed the notion that randomized presentation of practice t r i a l s forced the individual to produce more solutions to the problem due to the lack of an action plan. I t might be suggested that expert performers learn to combine production units i n a way that i s more char a c t e r i s t i c of the randomized practice t r i a l s method as they gain experience. In this manner, many more possible meaningful solutions are available to the expert and are more closely matched to the cues of the problem situation. I t appears that both concentration and f l e x i b i l i t y are s k i l l s that allow the individual to gather and e f f i c i e n t l y store information i n the acquisition of expertise. ' One further construct i s required to describe the a b i l i t y to focus on improving these s k i l l s , that being the motivation to learn i n a s p e c i f i c domain. Intensity I t has been noted that extensive experience i s a necessary but not s u f f i c i e n t prerequisite to develop expertise (Anderson, 1995). I t i s evident from the preceding sections that concentration and f l e x i b i l i t y both contribute to expert performance. Another cognitive 44 a b i l i t y that appears to contribute to high performance athletes i s intensity. Intensity may be defined as an intentional e f f o r t to improve one's own performance through practice, and an extreme displeasure i n not performing to top ca p a b i l i t y (Kirschenbaum, 1987; Whelan & Epkins, 1990). Dweck and Leggett (1988) speak of an individual valuing challenge and seeking goals i n a highly persistent manner. These authors indicate that this l e v e l of int e n s i t y i n pursuit of learning new s k i l l s contributes to enhanced problem-solving a b i l i t i e s . Intentional e f f o r t to develop individual expertise has been observed to be one of the factors that distinguishes high performance from non-high performance i n athletes (Ericsson 6 Chamess, 1994; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996) . The development of individual expertise may be considered as a form of goal-setting. Dweck (1992) defined goals as mental representations of outcomes which individuals s t r i v e to attain. In the case of a t h l e t i c s , i n t e n s i t y would consist of setting a goal to achieve the best personal r e s u l t i n terms of performance. Studies i n goal setting i n the a t h l e t i c domain have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been based on the theory of Locke and Latham (1985). A review of several studies (Kyllo & Landers, 1995) found that having no goal, or vague goals to do one's best, would not be as e f f e c t i v e i n enhancing performance as concrete, short-term, and r e a l i s t i c goals. Weinberg and Gould (1995) indicated that there are two general types of goals i n a t h l e t i c s : (1) performance goals, and (2) re s u l t goals. Result goals are those i n which the outcome of a competition 45 i s the focus. An example of this would be winning a marathon or a hockey game. Performance goals emphasize personal achievement and are measured by self-referenced standards. Performance goals are thought to enhance achievement by reducing focus away from future outcomes and onto present cues, and also by s h i f t i n g concentration away from uncontrollable factors such as opponents' s k i l l . Locke and Latham (1985) maintain that performance goals are linked to concentration i n that they focus the individual's attention on factors that are c l e a r l y defined and controllable. In Kyllo and Landers' (1995) review of the a t h l e t i c l i t e r a t u r e on goal-setting, i t was concluded that performance was improved by over one t h i r d of a standard deviation r e l a t i v e to baseline conditions. Winter and Martin (1991) found that e l i t e athletes tended to use breaks i n the play to review goal achievement strategies. Jackson and Roberts (1992) and Duda (1997) noted that performance and concentration were both enhanced i f performance goals were maintained. Onestak (1991) concluded that mental practice involving perceptions of a po s i t i v e performance appeared to a f f e c t s k i l l s having a s i g n i f i c a n t cognitive component and was better used by e l i t e than non-elite athletes. Kirschenbaum (1987) refers to this drive to r e a l i s e personal potential as an a b i l i t y that i s under control of the athlete, while Whelan and Epkins (1990) refer to s e l f -generated arousal strategies that enhance performance. I t appears from the research described that intensity i s an a b i l i t y that i s both under the control of the athlete and also characterises high performance. 46 Summary In summary, a review of work on Case's theory of CCSSs and on encapsulated a b i l i t i e s i n sport has lead to the following conclusions: (1) there appears to be domain s p e c i f i c development of structures that regulate internal representations of the environment; (2) these structures are conceptual i n nature; (3) CCSSs develop at an age-constrained rate; (4) Case's theory of CCSSs may better account for high performance with the addition of the notion of encapsulated a b i l i t i e s ; (5) encapsulated a b i l i t i e s which develop at a rapid, unconstrained rate may be considered as accounting f o r high performance, (6) the domain of s o c i a l cognition i s c r i t i c a l to high performance i n a t h l e t i c s , (7) s o c i a l cognition i n the a t h l e t i c domain i s characterised by the development of a CCSS, (8) high performance i n so c i a l cognition i n the a t h l e t i c domain i s characterised by three encapsulated a b i l i t i e s that include concentration, f l e x i b i l i t y , and intensity. The a t h l e t i c context i s one i n which much research has been conducted into the factors that contribute to high performance. This context i s p a r t i c u l a r l y conducive to studying novice versus expert performance as there are a wealth of v i s i b l e and objective performance indices by which this d i s t i n c t i o n i s c l e a r l y made. I t has been demonstrated that the understanding and prediction of the intentions and behaviour of others i s an essential factor that distinguishes high performance from non-high performance athletes (Mahoney & Gabriel, 1987; Smith & Christensen, 1995; Whelan & Epkins, 1990). Many sport 47 studies, however, have examined individual psychological factors (Pickens & Rotella, 1996; Rushall, 1989) without a strong theoretical rationale. There i s , then, both a need to expand upon the knowledge of how s o c i a l cognition develops by examining quite d i f f e r e n t s p e c i f i c contexts, a contribution to be made to the sport l i t e r a t u r e by the l i n k i n g of pertinent psychological factors to a theory of s o c i a l cognition that has been substantiated i n other contexts, and a contribution to be made to the understanding of high performance i n any domain by the study of encapsulated a b i l i t i e s . I t seems that factors other than those which are both conceptually and b i o l o g i c a l l y constrained must be brought forward to account f o r such discrepancies i n individual development. These are the main goals that are pursued i n the current study. Hypotheses Hypothesis 1: Developmental Stage of the CCSS i n high performance hockey players w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater than non-high performance hockey players of the same chronological age by one substage. This hypothesis i s related to the notion that high and non-high performers w i l l function at the same structural l e v e l i n solving s o c i a l problems. As i n p r i o r research on Case's model (case, 1992; Porath, 1996), a certain percentage of the high performers may d i f f e r from non-high performers by more than one substage. Overall, however, there w i l l not be a s i g n i f i c a n t majority of high performers performing at one substage beyond that expected for their chronological age. 48 Hypothesis 2: High performance hockey players w i l l demonstrate s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher levels than non-high performance hockey players of the same chronological age i n the a b i l i t y to detect advance cues predicting opponent's actions. This hypothesis i s related to the proposition that Concentration, or the a b i l i t y to focus attention on cues relevant to predicting the behaviour of others, w i l l be higher i n high performers than i n non-high performers. High performance i s proposed to predict the a b i l i t y to perceive clues as to another's behaviour. Hypothesis 3: High performance hockey players w i l l demonstrate s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher levels than non-high performance hockey players of the same chronological age i n the a b i l i t y to provide adequate solutions to s o c i a l game problems. This hypothesis i s related to the proposition that F l e x i b i l i t y , or the a b i l i t y to generate adequate solutions to s o c i a l problems i n the hockey context, w i l l be higher i n high performers than i n non-high performers. High performance i s proposed to predict the a b i l i t y to generate a greater quantity of highly strategic solutions to game problems. Hypothesis 4: High performance hockey players demonstrate s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher levels of Mastery goal orientation than non-high performance hockey players of the same chronological age. This hypothesis i s related to the proposition that Intensity, or the a b i l i t y to di r e c t one's attention toward improving s k i l l s rather than exhibiting acquired s k i l l s , w i l l be higher i n high performers 49 than i n non-high performers. High performance i s proposed to predict the a b i l i t y to d i r e c t attention towards the mastery of s k i l l s . In the chapter that follows, a description of the methodology used i n the study i s presented. 50 CHAPTER III METHODOLOGY In the current study a combination of quantitative and qualit a t i v e methodologies was used to assess basic structural l e v e l as predicted by Case's theory, as well as the more exploratory encapsulated a b i l i t y factors proposed to characterise high performance athletes. Participants The sample consisted of 50 14-15 year old male Bantam ice-hockey players (mean age was 14.22 years old). In the BC Minor Hockey League, participants who are i n the 14-15 year old age range are termed 'Bantam' players. Within the Bantam age range, teams are divided into Divisions i n the following calibres: (a) House, (b) C Division, (c) B d i v i s i o n , (d) A d i v i s i o n , (e) AA d i v i s i o n , and (f) AAA di v i s i o n . The divisions range i n a b i l i t y from House d i v i s i o n to AAA div i s i o n , with AAA calibre being the highest l e v e l of play. In the current study, 23 individuals were drawn from House and C d i v i s i o n teams, and 26 from AAA teams. For the purposes of this study, the House and C d i v i s i o n players were grouped together and termed 'Division B', while the AAA players were referred to as 'Division A'. The Division A players were considered to be the high performance players playing the top Bantam ca l i b r e hockey f o r t h e i r age group. Demographics f o r the entire sample and for each Division separately are presented i n Table B l . 51 The age-group selected was intended to allow f o r assessment of individuals at the v e c t o r i a l stage of Case's model. I t was thought that players of this age could p o t e n t i a l l y demonstrate the most advanced structural development possible within the age l i m i t s of Case's model. The selection of the 14-15 year o l d group, which i s an approximate midpoint of Case's v e c t o r i a l stage, also permitted the p o s s i b i l i t y of i d e n t i f y i n g individuals who may be advanced one substage beyond the norm fo r the group on Case's staircase model (see Figure 1). The v e c t o r i a l stage i s so termed because i t i s a phase of development at which the individual i s able to understand that the opposition between two variables may be considered as a second order variable. This second order variable has a magnitude and dir e c t i o n i n the same sense mathematical vectors have. For example, an individual may have two opposing t r a i t s such as being aggressive and cooperative. An individual reasoning at the v e c t o r i a l stage w i l l be able to consider the dir e c t i o n (type of t r a i t ) and magnitude (degree possesses t r a i t ) of the f i r s t t r a i t i n conjunction with the direction and magnitude of the second t r a i t i n predicting what the person might do i n a given situation. Procedure Participation i n the study was e l i c i t e d by approaching the coaches of six teams who provided access to the participants and assisted with questionnaire d i s t r i b u t i o n . Participants were informed of the nature of the study, that p a r t i c i p a t i o n was voluntary, and would require approximately an hour of th e i r time (see Appendix F) and that signed 52 parental consent was required before f i l l i n g out questionnaires. This set of instructions required approximately h a l f an hour of the participant's and investigator's time. A questionnaire was sent home with each participant with a request to complete the form without assistance from anyone and to return the f i l l e d out form by the following practice or game session. A small p i l o t study, consisting of 12 participants randomly selected from the sample of 50, was conducted. Th purpose of the p i l o t was to: (1) ascertain i f there was a difference between participants who were administered an oral form of the questionnaire and those who answered i n written form, (2) develop a coding system for structural l e v e l and F l e x i b i l i t y . No difference was found i n the d e t a i l of responses provided i n either or a l or written format, therefore, the more e f f i c i e n t l y administered written format was used for the study. Instruments The questionnaire administered to the participants consisted of f i v e problem scenarios and two Likert-type scales. The problem scenarios were based on work by Marini and Case (1994) and were adapted to the ice-hockey context. These f i v e problems were presented for two purposes: (a) to assess the l e v e l of the Central Conceptual Social Structure (CCSS), and, (b) to assess the degree of F l e x i b i l i t y or di v e r s i t y and quality of solutions to a single problem. The two Likert-type scales were intended to assess the p a r t i c i p a n t s attitudes toward Intensity, or commitment to Mastery goals that involved improving hockey s k i l l s , and Concentration, or the a b i l i t y to detect 53 cues relevant to predicting other players' behaviour during a game. Two expert raters, who had coached upper l e v e l minor hockey, were involved i n coding the f i v e problems fo r structure and F l e x i b i l i t y i n this analysis. Assessment of the Central Conceptual Social Structure. The f i v e problems assessing development of CCSS (see Appendix F) were derived from those used by Marini and Case (1994). Marini and Case speci f i e d f i v e levels of analysis f o r responses to problems with increasingly complex elements: (1) Level OA, abstraction of a single character t r a i t , (2) Level OB, abstracting c r i t i c a l dimensions of a story problem, (3) Level 1, making a prediction of behaviour from one character t r a i t , (4) Level 2, making a prediction of behaviour based on two character t r a i t s , and (5) Level 3, making a prediction of behaviour based on two character t r a i t s and a mood-altering event. Since the more advanced levels are b u i l t upon preceding l e v e l s , participants were expected to pass a l l problems below the highest l e v e l at which they passed. For example, i f a participant passed at Level 2, they would be expected to pass at less advanced levels OA, OB and 1 as well. In Marini and Case's study, 95% of the 13-15.5 year old sample passed up to Level 1, 75% of participants passed at Level 2 while 25% passed at Level 3. The participants i n this study were a l l between the ages of 14 and 15, therefore they were expected to pass a l l items up to and including the Level 1 problem. The o r i g i n a l scoring plan was intended to follow that of Marini and Case's which was as follows: (a) '0' indicated a pass at both Level OA and Level 54 OB, (b) '1' ref l e c t e d a pass at Level 1, (c) '2' r e f l e c t e d a pass at Level 2, (d) '3' ref l e c t e d a pass at Level 3. This system i s referred to -in the current study as 'between-problem scoring'. Within each of the f i v e l e v e l s , a 'within-problem scoring' system was devised. For each of the f i v e problems, the following system was used: (a) '0' was given i f the problem was not passed, (b) '1' was given i f the problem was p a r t i a l l y passed, and (c) '2' was assigned i f the problem was passed. The s p e c i f i c content f o r determining pass or f a i l at each l e v e l was established by a collaboration between the researcher and an expert Level 3 coach with 12 years coaching experience who had worked with upper l e v e l players of various ages. Coaches i n Canadian Minor Hockey are c e r t i f i e d from Level 1 to Level 5. The Levels r e f l e c t expertise i n the following way: (1) Level 1 and 2 coaches are c e r t i f i e d to coach House players, (2) Level 3 coaches are q u a l i f i e d to coach Rep hockey, including AAA players, (3) Level 4 coaches are q u a l i f i e d to coach Junior players, and (4) Level 5 coaches are c e r t i f i e d to coach beyond Junior. Responses of six Division B and six Division A players, randomly chosen from the sample of 50, were examined fo r content i n a small p i l o t study. A coding system was developed f o r the purposes of the current study which was based on Marini and Case's levels but was referenced to hockey-specific statements made i n the assessment of the 12 participants' responses to the f i v e problems. This coding format, presented below i n d e t a i l with examples, was then given to two other expert coach raters who had not 55 been involved i n developing the coding system and who then coded the second set of problems independently of each other. These two coaches were Level 3 and Level 5 i n c e r t i f i c a t i o n and had both had approximately 10 years of coaching experience. The two raters were given the 50 questionnaires and asked to assign a code value f o r each of the f i v e problems using the coding system devised from the responses of the 12 randomly chosen participants. Description of Coding System a) Problems Assessing Bidimensional Capabilities i) Level OA: Abstraction of a General T r a i t (nine to ten year olds) This task was intended to assess the a b i l i t y of the adolescent to abstract a single general dispo s i t i o n a l quality or t r a i t from a description of the protagonist's behaviour. Case (Marini & Case, 1994) noted that understanding of t r a i t labels emerges i n children's speech at approximately the age of nine or ten years. Level OA Problem: During a regular season ice-hockey game, Jason was heading for the bench on a l i n e change. An opposing team player got i n his way as he was trying to get o f f the ice. Jason t o l d the other team's player to get out of his way. What type of person i s Jason? What makes you think he i s this kind of person? A score of 2 was given i f the participant mentioned a t r a i t and the behaviour that l e d to that t r a i t extraction. A score of 1 was given i f a t r a i t was mentioned. A score of 0 was assigned i f neither a t r a i t 56 or an explanation was given. Responses were not graded on a presumed correct t r a i t extraction but rather oh a t r a i t extraction that was accompanied by a reasonable explanation. An example of a response to Problem 1 was as follows: "Jason i s a nice person (trait) because he did not punch or get rea l mad at the guy (explanation)". For a glossary of terms used by the participants and equivalent t r a i t descriptions assigned by raters(see Appendix D). i i ) Level OB: Abstracting the C r i t i c a l Dimensions of a Story Problem (nine to ten year olds) This task was designed to assess the individual's a b i l i t y to predict a protagonist's behaviour i n a situa t i o n where a simple response would be problematic, either through the fa c t that t h e i r rights were being challenged or some assistance was required. Participants were required to coordinate d i f f e r e n t dimensions of information from the problem i n order to make a prediction about the protagonist's behaviour. Level OB Problem: Tyler was dressing before a game. He was almost out of tape to put on his new st i c k . One of his teammates used up Tyler's tape without permission while Tyler was talking to the coach. What do you think Tyler d i d and why? A score of 2 was given i f the participant recognized that the tape had been taken without permission (dimension 1), that this problem needed to be solved (dimension 2), and a prediction of action on the protagonist's part was made. A score of 1 was given i f either one of 57 the problem dimensions were i d e n t i f i e d , along with a behaviour prediction. A score of 0 was given i f neither facet of the problem was mentioned. An example of a response which was assigned a "2" value i s as follows: "I think Tyler borrowed tape from someone else (dimension 2) and t o l d Jay not to use his tape with out permission (dimension 1)". b) Tasks assessing Vectorial Stage Three problem situations with increasing levels of complexity were presented to assess the individual's l e v e l of development within the Vectorial stage. In this set of tasks, the individual was f i r s t presented with some information about t r a i t s of the character. In the second part of the problem, increasing levels of complication were introduced that affected decisions about the outcome of the protagoni s t's behaviour. 1) Level 1 At Level 1, one personality t r a i t was relevant and could be inferred by the protagonist's behaviour i n part one of the story. A prediction was then required about the character's behaviour i n the problem episode that made sense i n l i g h t of the t r a i t i d e n t i f i e d . Level 1 Problem: Jonathan's team was having a practice session. They were pra c t i s i n g breakaway d r i l l s i n small groups. In Jonathan's group, one of the centres took several more shots at the goalie than Jonathan did. Jonathan t o l d the center that next practice they would share the shooting more equally. At the next practice the center again took 58 more shots than Jonathan. What do you think Jonathan did? Why? A score of 2 was given i f the participant i d e n t i f i e d Jonathan as having a t r a i t , such as assertiveness, that seemed plausible given his actions i n the f i r s t part of the story, as well as making a behavioural prediction which ref l e c t e d knowledge of the t r a i t described i n the f i r s t part of the story. A score of 1 was assigned i f either a t r a i t was i d e n t i f i e d or a prediction was made. A score of 0 was given i f neither was stated. An example of a response which was assigned a "2" value i s as follows: "Jonathan wanted to be f a i r (trait) so next practice he again t o l d the centre that they would share the shots more equally "prediction of behaviour from actions of protagonist i n f i r s t part of story). 2) Level 2 At Level 2, two personality t r a i t s were relevant and could be inferred by the protagonist's behaviour. As i n the Level 1 problem, a prediction was required about the character's behaviour which took into account both t r a i t s which made sense with reference to the t r a i t s i d e n t i f i e d . Level 2 Problem: Robert was standing i n the s l o t i n front of the opposing net waiting f o r a quick pass from his winger, Cody. Instead of passing, Cody t r i e d to score himself from a bad angle. On the bench, Robert t o l d Cody that the team might have scored i f the pass had been made. In the next play, Robert was close to the opposing net 59 but was being blocked by a defenseman. He passed the puck o f f to Cody and they scored. Toward the end of the game, when Robert's team was down by a goal, Cody t r i e d to carry the puck a l l the way down the ic e and score himself. Robert's team ended up losing the game. What do you think Robert did? Why? A score of 2 was given i f the participant i d e n t i f i e d two of the protagonist's t r a i t s from the f i r s t part of the story and coordinated these two pieces of information i n making a prediction as to how the protagonist would behave i n another part of the story A score of 1 was assigned i f only one t r a i t was i d e n t i f i e d and used i n predicting the protagonist's behaviour. A score of 0 was given i f neither was stated. An example of a response which was assigned a "2" value i s as follows: "Rob probably took Cody aside a f t e r the game ( t r a i t i d e n t i f i e d of Rob being assertive) and explained ( t r a i t i d e n t i f i e d of Rob being rat i o n a l or diplomatic) that i f he didn't pass the puck l i k e a team player, then the team would lose a l l season". 3) Level 3 At Level 3, an additional item of information had to be taken into account i n making a decision as to how po t e n t i a l l y c o n f l i c t i n g t r a i t s might be taken into account i n solving a problem situation. The additional information consisted of a mood-altering event that occurred during the course of a series of events. Level 3 Problem: Ryan was waiting i n l i n e to get his skates sharpened 60 and just as his turn came up they announced the shop was closing. Ryan t o l d the people at the shop that he had been waiting a long time and that he wanted his skates sharpened before they closed. After skating he went over to see his friends. Late i n the afternoon while they were playing road hockey, Ryan remembered that he had to be home because re l a t i v e s were coming, so he excused himself and started to leave when his f r i e n d asked him for help i n how to execute a wrist shot. Ryan helped his fri e n d with the wrist shot and then l e f t f o r home. On his way home he f e l l o f f his bicycle. While he was pushing his b i c y c l e home a person approached him asking f o r directions. What do you think Ryan did and why? A score of 2 was given i f the participant i d e n t i f i e d two of the protagonist's (Ryan) t r a i t s such as assertiveness and helpfulness, and an observation that he had experienced an event that could a l t e r the expression of these t r a i t s ( f a l l i n g o f f b i c y c l e ) , as well as a solution to the problem. A score of 1 was assigned i f two t r a i t s or the mood-altering event were mentioned, as well as a solution to the problem. A score of 0 was given i f neither of the t r a i t s or mood-al t e r i n g event were mentioned. An example of a response which was assigned a score of "2" i s as follows: "Ryan probably stopped and helped the people with directions because he was a good enough person (trait) to help with his friend's shots. He did this even though he was upset at a l l the bad things that had happened to him (recognise mood-altering events). He didn't say anything else to them because he 61 knew he was already la t e to see his rela t i v e s ( t r a i t ) " . Alterations to Coding of the CCSS D i f f i c u l t y i n using the data as planned from the f i v e structural problems arose during the coding process. I t was found that 22% of the participants who passed the age-appropriate Level 2 problem f a i l e d to pass the Level OA, Level OB and Level 1 problems which preceded Level 2. The fact that levels are recursive and sequential, and that the 5 problems re f l e c t e d this gradual increase i n complex thinking, indicated the proba b i l i t y that a factor other than i n a b i l i t y to pass each preceding l e v e l was operating. An inspection of the data revealed two p o s s i b i l i t i e s : (a) Level OA, OB, and 1 problems were not worded i n such a way as to e l i c i t s u f f i c i e n t responses to code adequately, or (2) participants were often i n s u f f i c i e n t l y challenged by the lower l e v e l questions to provide the necessary d e t a i l . I t was decided that since the majority of participants (68%) had passed the age-appropriate Level 2 problem and a l l had attempted the Level 3 problem that these problems would become the focus of analysis of structural development while the three lower l e v e l problems would be omitted from analyses. A 'Structural Level' score was calculated f o r each participant over the Level 2 and Level 3 problems as follows: (1) '0' was assigned i f the response r e f l e c t e d a Level OA or Level OB response, (2) '1' was given i f the response ref l e c t e d Level 1 structure, (3) '2' was given i f a Level 2 response was given, (4) '3' was assigned i f the response ref l e c t e d Level 3 structure. Once scores were obtained for 62 Problems 4 and 5, a 'structural score' was calculated by summing the two scores and dividing by 2. This score was thought to approximate the individual's actual structure. An individual could then receive a structural score of 0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, or 2.5. For the purposes of comparison with Marini and Case's (1994) work on the s o c i a l structure of this age group, averaged scores over Problems 4 and 5 that f e l l between structural levels were rounded up. Scores that were between Levels, such as 1.5 and 2.5, were rounded up to the next l e v e l . An in t e r r a t e r r e l i a b i l i t y of .96 (Cohen's Kappa) was calculated for the two sets of ratings on the CCSS or Level variable. Assessment of Encapsulated A b i l i t i e s Evaluating elaborations upon the CCSS included assessments of Concentration, F l e x i b i l i t y and Intensity. The Level 2 problem was selected as the l e v e l at which elaborations would be coded. This problem assesses the achievement of Level 2 structure which i s expected of the majority of the 14-15 year old sample, therefore elaborations on this l e v e l of structure would be of the greatest theoretical interest. The following assessments were used to evaluate the degree of elaboration within structural stage. 1) Concentration Concentration was assessed using an adaptation of Nideffer's (1976) Testing Attention i n Sport (TAIS) Scale developed s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r the purposes of this study (see Appendix F). The TAIS has been widely used i n a t h l e t i c assessment and has been found to be a predictor of sport excellence (Zaichkowsky, Jackson, & Aronson, 1982). This 63 adaptation of the TAIS was intended to measure the degree to which an individual was able to focus attention on relevant environmental cues that would a i d i n predicting the behaviour of other players. The Concentration Scale was comprised of 20 L i k e r t - s t y l e items on which the participants rated themselves from a low score of 1, or "Almost Never", to 5, or "Almost Always", as to how well they could maintain t h e i r on-ice concentration. A low score on the scale r e f l e c t e d low a b i l i t y to maintain e f f e c t i v e concentration while a high score indicated high a b i l i t y i n concentrating on relevant cues to a i d anticipation and performance. An alpha r e l i a b i l i t y of .69 was obtained f o r the Concentration scale which ref l e c t e d a reasonably good tendency for self- r a t i n g s on one item to correlate with self-ratings on other items which comprised this scale. 2) F l e x i b i l i t y The responses to the Level 2 problem were quantitatively and q u a l i t a t i v e l y analysed post-hoc as i t was expected that s p e c i f i c aspects which characterise F l e x i b i l i t y would emerge i n this process. Establishing guidelines f o r and carrying out of coding for F l e x i b i l i t y was similar to that of coding developmental l e v e l i n Problem 4. Responses from the 12 randomly chosen participants, s i x from each of Divisions B and A, were examined and rated on a continuum thought to r e f l e c t increasing levels of f l e x i b i l i t y , as described below. This i n i t i a l coding step was carried out by the researcher and the same league coach who participated i n the Developmental l e v e l coding to r e f l e c t increasing levels of f l e x i b i l i t y . The two expert raters who 64 had coached upper Division minor hockey and who had coded f o r Developmental l e v e l i n Problem 4 were then involved i n coding responses independently of each other. These two raters were given the 50 questionnaires and asked to assign a code value f o r each of the f i v e problems using the coding system devised from the responses of the 12 randomly chosen participants. F l e x i b i l i t y was assessed with consideration both f o r (a) the number of solutions provided f o r the Level 2 problem and also f o r (b) the content of these solutions. A coding system for F l e x i b i l i t y was devised from a review of the responses of 12 randomly chosen participants from the sample of 50. This system was based on the progression of responses from non-strategic, emotional reactions to highly strategic, r a t i o n a l solutions. The continuum represented responses that ranged from physical and poorly thought-out reactions to those which implied more re s p o n s i b i l i t y taken by the protagonist for solving the problem calmly and adequately. These responses were considered by the expert raters to r e f l e c t a high degree of leadership. Responses were coded on a scale of '0' to '4', with 4 representing the most strategic, r a t i o n a l and responsible solutions. A zero was assigned i f the solution to the problem consisted of a simple emotional reaction such as "get mad", "get even" or (non-strategic) "do nothing". A value of one was assigned i f the response involved a simple restatement of the solution presented i n i t i a l l y i n the problem i t s e l f ("just t e l l him again"). A response earned a value of two i f authority was the only method used to mediate the dispute ( " t e l l the coach") or i f the participant 65 referred to an attempt to mediate i n a d i r e c t way through anger with an attached explanation ("yell at him and t e l l him he l e t the team down"). A three was assigned i f an e f f o r t was made to demonstrate mediation through rational explanation ("take him aside, t e l l him they might have won i f he'd passed") or investigation ("ask him why he didn't pass on the second play"). A value of four was given i f there was evidence of sequencing or multiple solutions i n the response. For example, i f the respondent anticipated that d i r e c t mediation ("try talking to him one on one f i r s t " ) might not work and then suggested another step ("if that didn't work") such as "bringing the coach i n to help explain" might be necessary, the response was considered to show "if-then* anticipatory thought and was assigned a value of four. The f i n a l category of coding r e f l e c t e d the importance of the a b i l i t y to generate a number of solutions as well as q u a l i t a t i v e l y stronger solutions. 3) Intensity Intensity, or the willingness to devote extensive e f f o r t to improving one's s k i l l s i n a sport, was assessed using a protocol based on Leggett and Dweck's (1986) work on goal orientation which was developed s p e c i f i c a l l y for use i n the current study. The participants were administered a sport s p e c i f i c version of Leggett and Dweck's (1986) assessment of an individual's orientation toward Mastery or Performance goals. Individuals with mastery goals are oriented toward learning a new s k i l l and perceive e f f o r t as a strategy f o r achieving s k i l l i n an a c t i v i t y . Performance-oriented individuals are oriented 66 toward demonstrating existing a b i l i t y and view e f f o r t as r e f l e c t i n g a lack of a b i l i t y i n demonstrating or pra c t i s i n g a s k i l l . Leggett and Dweck contended that a Mastery orientation i s manifested by the endorsement of items such as "Even when you are very good at something, working hard allows you to r e a l l y understand i t " . Performance-oriented individuals endorse items such as "If you have to work hard at some problems, you probably aren't very good at them'. A 16-item Likert-type scale was included i n the assessment to determine goal orientation (see Appendix F). Participants rated themselves from 1 ('Not Very Successful') to 5 ('Very Successful') as to how they f e l t the 16 statements described them as hockey players. Eight items reflected Mastery goals such as fe e l i n g the most successful 'When I started to learn a new s k i l l ' . The remaining 8 items r e f l e c t e d Performance goals including such items as 'When others t o l d me I had a good game'. Dweck and Bempechat (1983) referred to Mastery and Performance goals as being 'essentially opposite conditions' as i f they were two ends of the same dimension and have treated them as diff e r e n t ends of one dimension. Accordingly, i n the current study scores on the 8 Performance items were coded so that a high score on a Performance Item contributed to a low overall Mastery score when a l l the items were summed. A high score on the Intensity Scale ref l e c t e d an orientation toward Mastery Goals i n the sport. An alpha r e l i a b i l i t y of .75 was obtained f o r the Intensity scale which refl e c t e d a reasonably good tendency f o r self- r a t i n g s on one item to correlate with self-ratings on other items which comprised this scale. 67 Alpha r e l i a b i l i t i e s were calculated also f o r the Mastery subscale (.61) and the Performance subscale (.66). Number of Words Used i n Responses The number of words used to respond to Problem 4 were counted. Porath (1996) refers to these indicators of a b i l i t y as 'tokens'. Tokens are variables that do not have a strong conceptual loading and are indicators of expertise which are less bound to age expectations. Number of words were counted i n the present study to provide a reasonably objective indicator of the complexity of the response. I t was proposed that the number of words used to respond to a problem would be a r e f l e c t i o n of the amount of information a participant was considering i n providing a response. In the next chapter, results of the analyses of the data are described. Results are related to each research hypothesis. 68 CHAPTER IV RESULTS In the following sections, the results of investigation of assumptions underlying analyses and the main analyses are described. Percentage of Participants Passing at Structural Levels An analysis of the percentage of participants passing problems assessing various levels of structure was conducted. Structural Level scores were obtained by averaging scores on Problems 4 and 5. Table B2 shows percentages of participants i n each Division who passed at each of the possible scores f o r Structural Level which included 1.0, 1.5, 2.0 or 2.5 once the two problems were averaged. Once Structural scores were computed, i t was found that 100% of the sample passed at Level 1 (obtained a Structural score of 1.0), 72% of the sample passed at Level 2 (obtained a Structural score of 1.5 or 2.0) and 16% of the sample passed at Level 3 (obtained a score of 2.5) . Correlations among the variables used i n the analyses are presented i n Table B3. Investigation of Assumptions underlying Analyses Prior to the main analyses, a l l variables were examined to determine i f t h e i r univariate and multivariate distributions were appropriate for inclusion i n the planned multivariate analyses. Data were examined for v i o l a t i o n of univariate assumptions for the entire sample as well as by Division. Means, standard deviations, 69 range values, and measures of skewness and kurtosis for the entire sample are presented for Level, Concentration, F l e x i b i l i t y and Intensity i n Table B4. Descriptive s t a t i s t i c s on these variables f o r Division B are presented i n Table B5 and f o r Division A i n Table B6. Normality of the dependent variables was confirmed by examination of data i n the form of: (1) frequency histograms, (2) normal probab i l i t y plots, and (3) detrended probability plots. Linearity and homoscedascity were confirmed through investigation of b i v a r i a t e scatterplots of the dependent variables. No univariate o u t l i e r s were detected fo r any of these variables using the following: (1) presence of standardised scores i n excess of -3.00 or +3.00, (2) boxplots, (3) histograms,(4) normal prob a b i l i t y plots, and (5) detrended p r o b a b i l i t y plots (see Appendix C for boxplots). Multivariate assumptions were examined through a variety of methods. The assumption of multivariate normality was met due to having greater than the suggested 20 df for error suggested by Tabachnick and F i d e l l (1989). Scatterplots between a l l pairs of dependent variables established that l i n e a r i t y was not a concern. The search for multivariate o u t l i e r s was conducted using regression analysis of the four variables on the dependent variable of Division. This analysis revealed no s i g n i f i c a n t values of Mahalanobis distance at p<.001. Box's M test resulted i n an F=1.67, p_>.05, thereby confirming homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices. The determinant of the pooled within-cells correlation matrix was 70 119.17. This r e s u l t was judged to be s u f f i c i e n t l y d i f f e r e n t from zero that neither m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y nor si n g u l a r i t y would present a problem. From the preceding analyses, i t was concluded that the data were suitable f o r entry into the planned multivariate analyses. Preliminary Analysis of Effects of Weight and Division on Dependent Variables The planned main analysis of the study consisted of a comparison of Division B and A players on the dependent variables of Structural Level, Concentration, F l e x i b i l i t y and Intensity. Since an inspection of the sample demographics revealed apparent differences i n physical size with respect to d i v i s i o n of hockey, i t was considered necessary to conduct a preliminary investigation as to whether this factor interacted with Division with respect to the dependent variables. A two-way MANOVA with Division and Weight as the independent variables and Structure, Concentration, F l e x i b i l i t y and Intensity as the dependent variables revealed no s i g n i f i c a n t main ef f e c t for Weight, F(4,43)=.49, p >.05, and no s i g n i f i c a n t interaction between Weight and Division, F(4,43)=.79, p>.05 using Wilk's c r i t e r i o n . There was a s i g n i f i c a n t difference between Divisions on the dependent variables, F(4,43)=8.34, p<.001. C e l l s t a t i s t i c s are presented f o r categories of Weight and Division i n Table B7. Box's M s t a t i s t i c f o r this analysis was F(30, 2264)=1.27, p>.05, confirming homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices. The B a r t l e t t test of sphericity yielded a value of .921 (p_>.05) which indicates that correlations among the dependent variables d i f f e r from zero. The 71 pooled within-cells correlation matrix used i n this analysis i s provided i n Table B8. A post-hoc analysis of power was conducted. Power values of the overall tests f o r determining differences between groups on the dependent variables were as follows: (1) Weight by Division (.23), (2) Weight (.15), (3) Division (1.0). I t was determined from these results that the intended analysis of D i v i s i o n without regard fo r weight would be appropriate as planned. Analysis of Effects of Division on Dependent Variables The main analysis consisted of a Hotelling's T 2 analysis with Division as the independent variable and Structure, Concentration, F l e x i b i l i t y and Intensity as the dependent variables. Twenty-four Division B players and 26 Division A players were compared on the four dependent variables f o r a t o t a l N of 50 participants. Using Wilk's c r i t e r i o n , the l i n e a r combination of dependent variables was s i g n i f i c a n t l y affected by Division, F (4,45)=10.54, p<.001. In univariate ANOVAs following the main test, differences between Division B and A players were found for F l e x i b i l i t y , F(1,48)=42.57, p<.001, and Intensity, F(1,48)=8.35, p<.01 (see Tables B5 and B6 for means and standard deviations of dependent variables f o r Divisions A and B). No s i g n i f i c a n t differences were found between the two Divisions f o r Structural Level or Concentration at p_>.05. Box's M s t a t i s t i c f o r this analysis was F(10, 10844) =1.67, p>.05, confirming homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices. The B a r t l e t t test of sphericity yielded a value of 11.52 (p>.05) which indicates that correlations among the dependent variables d i f f e r from 72 zero. The pooled within-cells correlation matrix used i n this analysis i s provided i n Table B9. A post-hoc analysis of power was conducted. The power value for the over a l l test of Division was 1.00. Power values f o r each dependent variable test were as follows: (1) Structural Level (.22), (2) Concentration (.05), (3) F l e x i b i l i t y (.99), (4) Intensity (.81). Means and standard deviations for Structural Level, Concentration, F l e x i b i l i t y , and Intensity appear i n Table BIO. Analysis of Factor Structure of Concentration Scale A Princ i p a l Components analysis was conducted on the 20 Concentration items to determine whether there was any meaningful structure underlying these items, as the Concentration Scale f a i l e d to reveal differences between Divisions (see Table E l ) . Seven oblique factors emerged from this analysis (see Table E2 for correlations between factors). Alpha r e l i a b i l i t i e s f o r the 7 factors were as follows: (1) .86, (2) .57, (3) .30, (4) .24, (5) .02, (6) .53, (7) .06. Factor 1 was judged to be the only factor with s u f f i c i e n t r e l i a b i l i t y to proceed with further analysis. Factor One had an eigenvalue of 4.30 and accounted fo r 21.5% of the variance. Concentration items 3, 11, 12, 15 and 16 were correlated greater than .50 with Factor One. These variables tapped into Nideffer's 'external wide focus' construct which r e f l e c t s the a b i l i t y to d i r e c t attention to many relevant action-predicting de t a i l s of the ongoing game action as possible. Factor One was subjected to an ANOVA with Division as an independent variable. A Bartlett-Box F(l,6880)=.31, p>.58 confirmed 73 homogeneity of variances. No s i g n i f i c a n t differences between Division were found on Factor One, F (1,48) = .04, p>.05. The remaining six factors had eigenvalues which ranged from 2.58 to 1.07 None of the s ix ANOVAs on each of the factors with Division as an independent variable were s i g n i f i c a n t . Analysis of Number of Words used i n responses to Problems The number of words used to answer the Level 2 problem were calculated. Number of words used correlated p o s i t i v e l y with F l e x i b i l i t y (.47, p<.01) and Structural Level (.56, p<.01). Summary In summary, an i n i t i a l analysis of the effects of weight and Divi s i o n on the dependent variables yielded no s i g n i f i c a n t findings. The main analysis revealed a s i g n i f i c a n t difference between Division B and A players on F l e x i b i l i t y and Intensity. Division A players showed greater F l e x i b i l i t y i n th e i r solutions to the Level 2 problem and a Mastery rather than Performance orientation toward t h e i r sport. Structural l e v e l d i d not d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y between Divisions. Concentration was also not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t between Divisions. A Princ i p a l Components Analysis on the Concentration Scale resulted i n seven components. An ANOVA with Division as the independent variables and the f i r s t p r i n c i p a l component as the dependent variable was not s i g n i f i c a n t . The number of words used to respond to Problem 4 correlated s i g n i f i c a n t l y with Structural l e v e l 74 and F l e x i b i l i t y . Implications of these findings are discussed i n Chapter V. 75 CHAPTER V DISCUSSION The primary purpose of the present study was to investigate whether Bantam Division B hockey players were distinguished from Bantam Division A players i n levels of s o c i a l cognition. Before a discussion of the results i s undertaken, limitations of the study are described which might a f f e c t interpretation of the results. Limitations of the Study There were some aspects of t h i s study which l i m i t the generalization of results to the target population of Bantam hockey players. These limitations are related to the development of methodology special to this investigation, constraints of sampling and methodology procedures. There are also some suggestions fo r future research guidelines which emerge from knowledge of these constraints. The measures developed for use i n this study were adapted for the most part from instruments used i n previous studies i n other contexts. The Concentration scale was developed i n the sport context and required l i t t l e adaptation for application to Bantam hockey players. The Intensity scale was adapted from work with children i n classroom settings which may have had an impact on the way i t was interpreted for use i n the sport context. The f i v e problems derived from Marini and Case's (1994) work were refined s p e c i f i c a l l y to t e s t the CCSS i n the s o c i a l domain on similar age groups and were changed very l i t t l e 76 f o r use i n the current study. These aspects of the origins of the scales, even though the format and content was very similar, may have had some e f f e c t on the v a l i d i t y of the measures. The sample of 50 Bantam hockey players was a volunteer group and therefore subject to the biases inherent i n volunteer samples. Coach cooperation and parental consent were also required for the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h i s sample, which further narrowed the g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y of the sample. There were l i m i t s on the number of teams which could be approached and sampled i n a reasonable time as the contact and instruction process was time-consuming. Ideally, a larger sample of players and a greater number of teams would have been advisable which would have increased power of the analyses which was lower than desirable i n some of the analyses. A further l i m i t a t i o n i n this study was probably due to the nature of the sample i t s e l f . In a small p i l o t study with an N of 12, ha l f the participants were given the questions o r a l l y and prompts provided by the interviewer. The other h a l f of the sample received the problems i n written form and responded without the e f f e c t of having an interviewer present. There was no s i g n i f i c a n t difference between the results of the two groups so the questionnaire methodology was adopted. In a future study, i t would be advisable to pre-test and u t i l i s e more e f f e c t i v e prompts i n order to get detailed replies as this target population does not appear to provide a great deal of d e t a i l from the prompts used, regardless of whether they are provided 77 o r a l l y or i n written form. This was most l i k e l y the reason f o r the f a i l u r e of many participants who passed Level 2 to pass the preceding level s . In terms of the order of presentation of problems, i t would be advisable to reverse the order or to f i n d some other way to subsume the simple problems within more complex ones. I t appeared that, f o r at l e a s t some of the sample, the lower l e v e l problems might have been so simple that the participant did not take them seriously. This i s a threat to face v a l i d i t y which could be addressed i n a future study. With regard to the content of the questions, the Level 3 responses were somewhat contaminated by the f a c t that several of the respondents focussed on the 'stranger danger' content of the question rather than on the problem of i d e n t i f y i n g characteristics of the protagonist and the situation. These participants provided a reasonable response, i f the focus of the question had been 'appropriate behaviour given approach by a stranger asking f o r help'. They did, i n a way, indicate high performance i n s o c i a l cognition but not related to hockey and also these responses were uncodeable i n terms of Marini and Case's coding h e u r i s t i c . In summary, there were several sampling and methodological problems with the study that could be r e c t i f i e d i n future work. Although the sample size was adequate given the small number of variables under consideration, i t may not have been adequately representative of the Bantam population due to a l l the levels of 78 consent required f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n as well as the methodological problems. Discussion of the Research Questions The main goal of the present study was to investigate whether Bantam Division B hockey players were distinguished from Bantam Division A players i n levels of s o c i a l cognition. Social cognition was defined as the a b i l i t y to successfully predict the behaviour of other players. Social cognition was proposed to be related to elaborations on basic cognitive structural development as defined by Case (1987). I t appears from the findings of the current study that the l e v e l of CCSS was consistent with what Marini and Case (1994) predicted f o r the age-group being studied but that the content of this structure changes at d i f f e r e n t rates between high and non-high performers. The e x p l i c i t content which changed was to be found i n the elaborations on the CCSS. The elaborations which were considered as important to s o c i a l cognition i n the sport context were as follows: (1) F l e x i b i l i t y or the a b i l i t y to generate adequate and diverse solutions to a given problem, (2) Concentration or the a b i l i t y to maintain attention i n an appropriate way i n order to pick up cues that would a s s i s t i n making predictions, and (3) Intensity or the commitment to Mastery goals such as improving s k i l l s , rather than Performance goals which are t y p i f i e d by an orientation toward demonstrating a b i l i t y . Several hypotheses were generated to examine aspects of t h i s main goal and are dealt with i n d i v i d u a l l y i n the following sections. I t i s important to emphasise that power values 79 for the individual tests of Structure and Concentration were low, and that conclusions regarding these variables are therefore tentative. The post hoc finding of low power i s important i n that i t may be suggested that the lack of differences between groups may have been due to: (1) actual lack of differences, (2) i n s u f f i c i e n t power i n the •analysis to f i n d differences when actual differences e x i s t , or (3) other factors.associated with n u l l findings (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1997). Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 1 stated that developmental stage of the CCSS would d i f f e r between high performance and non-high performance players of the same chronological age by one substage. As noted i n the Results section, i t was determined that problems which assessed structural levels preceding that of the age-appropriate Level 2 problem had not been responded to i n a manner to allow adequate coding. Since the majority of the participants passed at Level 2, which i s developmentally dependent on the preceding Levels OA, AB and 1, i t was considered appropriate to address the responses to the Level 2 and Level 3 problems i n determining Structural Level. This was based on the assumption that i f participants passed at Level 2, then i t was probable that their f a i l u r e to pass Level OA, OB and 1 was not due to i n a b i l i t y . In Marini and Case's (1994) work, from which the f i v e problems used i n the present study were developed, 75% of the sample i n the 13-15.5 year old age range passed at Level 2 on the personality 80 task. In the current study, Structural Level scores were obtained by averaging scores on Problems 4 and 5. I t was found that 100% of the sample passed at Level 1 (obtained a Structural score of 1.0), 72% of the sample passed at Level 2 (obtained a Structural score of 1.5 or 2.0) and 16% of the sample passed at Level 3 (obtained a score of 2.5). Within the Divisions, 63% of Division B players passed at the age-appropriate Level 2, while 81% of Division A players passed at thi s l e v e l . The figures f o r the over a l l sample rates of passing were comparable to Marini and Case's work and support Case's theory of the nature of Structure from 13-15.5 years of age. The univariate ANOVA on CCSS following the omnibus analysis between the two Divisions was not s i g n i f i c a n t . This was interpreted as rejecting the hypothesis that there was a difference between the Division B and A players on basic structure. I t appears that high performance emerges from a source other than advances on basic structural l e v e l within chronological cohorts. Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 2 stated that high performance hockey players would demonstrate higher levels than non-high performance hockey players of Concentration or the a b i l i t y to detect advance cues predicting opponent's actions. The Univariate ANOVA following the main analysis was not s i g n i f i c a n t f o r the Concentration variable. This variable d i d not relate to most other variables i n the analysis. There was a positive but i n s i g n i f i c a n t correlation between Concentration and the number of words used to respond to the Level 2 problem (.20, p_>.05) 81 and a stronger, s i g n i f i c a n t correlation between Concentration and attainment of Level 2 structure (.31, p_<.01) . Although these correlations might be interpreted as an indication of concentration i n terms of the process of responding to the problem on paper, there was no evidence that Concentration was related to on-ice performance. A Prin c i p l e Components Analysis of the 20 items comprising the Concentration scale yielded several factors indicating that the scale had more than one conceptual underpinning. The f i r s t factor obtained, which accounted f o r 21% of variance explained, was selected f o r interpretation and further analysis. The intention was to examine whether there was some construct underlying the set of Concentration items which might d i f f e r e n t i a t e players by Division. The items which correlated with the f i r s t factor were related to the participants' a b i l i t y to focus attention i n a wide, external bandwidth i n order to pick up important cues to predict action i n a game situation. When the f i r s t factor was used as a dependent variable i n an ANOVA, with Division as the independent variable, there was no s i g n i f i c a n t difference between high performance and non-high performance players. I t may be of note that the self-ra t i n g s on the Concentration scale were uniformly high regardless of Division, ranging around 3.5-4 out of 5 on a b i l i t y to maintain concentration e f f e c t i v e l y . Although the scale was balanced with regard to positive and negative statements, i t appeared that, regardless of Division, the 14-15 year olds rated themselves i n a highly positive manner on this scale. I t might be suggested that the emotional content of several of the items 82 interfered with the accuracy of self-report. The Concentration scale requires participants to endorse items such as "I worry about what might happen i n games" and "I tend to dwell on my feelings and miss game action". The findings may also have been related to the rather low r e l i a b i l i t y of the Concentration scale (.69). Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 3 stated that high performance players would demonstrate more F l e x i b i l i t y , or a greater number of more adequate solutions, to a s o c i a l problem than non-high performance players. This finding was supported by a univariate ANOVA following the main analysis. The Level 2 problem i s presented here f o r discussion purposes: Level 2 Problem: Robert (protagonist) was standing i n the s l o t i n front of the opposing net waiting f o r a quick pass from h i s winger, Cody (antagonist). Instead of passing, Cody t r i e d to score himself from a bad angle. On the bench, Robert t o l d Cody that the team might have scored i f the pass had been made. In the next play, Robert was close to the opposing net but was being blocked by a defenseman. He passed the puck o f f to Cody and they scored. Toward the end of the game, when Robert's team was down by a goal, Cody t r i e d to carry the puck a l l the way down the ice and score himself. Robert's team ended up losing the game. What do you think Robert did? Why? The responses to the Level 2 problem, which presented a c o n f l i c t 83 between team members, were coded on a continuum from non-strategic, emotional solutions to highly strategic, rational solutions f o r resolving the c o n f l i c t . The Division B players demonstrated attempts at rational problem solving, such as bringing the coach i n as an authority figure, but more frequently referred to emotional reactions centered around the protagonist's rights being infringed upon. Typical responses included reactions such as y e l l i n g , physical responses, getting even by doing the same thing back to the antagonist, or simply doing nothing. The most important aspect of the responses of the Division B players was that a single solution was usually provided and, i n many cases, that solution was not mediated by complex strategy. The Division A players' responses were, for the most part, more ra t i o n a l , anticipatory, d i v e r s i f i e d and implied more re s p o n s i b i l i t y on the part of the main character f o r solving the problem i n a d i r e c t and e f f i c i e n t manner. These responses were considered by the expert raters to r e f l e c t , o v e r a l l , a high degree of leadership. Division A players demonstrated, more than any other feature of t h e i r responses, a concern for the welfare of the team above any individual player. These players occasionally provided a response that was i n i t i a l l y emotional but that was then followed by a rational strategy. These responses were t y p i f i e d by such statements as "Robert got mad and then he asked Cody to pass more next time so that they might win." This strategy was coded under the category of mediating through emotion followed by r a t i o n a l explanation. 84 Several of the participants indicated that the team well-being ("they could maybe have won i f Cody had passed") was the f i r s t and most essential consideration, rather than any emotional reaction. They then went on to explicate a ratio n a l strategy to solve the problem so that i t would not happen again. This kind of response was coded as mediating primarily through rational explanation. In almost every case, the Division A players took r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r solving the problem without deferring to another authority such as the coach. Statements such as "Robert didn't want Cody to l e t the team down next time so he t o l d him that i f he thought about playing as a team the next time they might score" or "He should t e l l Cody there i s no 'I' i n team and that they could win i f he uses his linemates" were t y p i c a l of this category of response. In these explanations there was no mention of an i n i t i a l emotional response. The highest l e v e l of response involved an i n i t i a l concern for team well-being, an attempt to negotiate with the antagonist through rati o n a l explanation ("we could have scored i f you had passed") or discussion with information-seeking ("get Cody to explain why he didn't pass"), followed by evidence of sequencing i n the answer ("if that didn't work.."). This was coded under the category of sequencing and was based on the respondent anticipating that either a single or an i n i t i a l solution might be in e f f e c t i v e . I t involved either provision of a number of unrelated solutions or a sequence of attempts on the part of the protagonist to bring various factors into play which would probably solve the problem. An example of this was 85 "take him aside and ask why he didn't pass, then i f that didn't work then bring the coach i n and discuss i t between the three of them." An interesting feature of this l e v e l of response was a t a c i t recognition of an emotional reaction on the protagonist's part as being "what anybody would f e e l i f his winger did that" but a statement that this reaction was muted i n favour of r a t i o n a l strategy when i t came to the interaction between the characters. These responses indicated that Robert might have f e l t j u s t i f i a b l y angry but he suppressed i t i n order to solve the problem. Perspective of antagonist. Another aspect of the Division A solutions i n general was that many responses indicated a concern for the welfare of the antagonist. These solutions addressed the notion that Cody might have his own reasons for what he was doing that could be e l i c i t e d by private discussion. The s p e c i f i c a t i o n of privacy served two purposes, i n the opinion of the expert raters: (1) allowing Cody to explain what might be personal reasons (upsets and other factors influencing e f f e c t i v e performance) for disrupting team cohesion without embarrassment, and (2) maintaining team cohesion by avoiding open c o n f l i c t between members. Role of the coach. The role of the coach was considerably d i f f e r e n t between Division A and Division B responses. The Division A players depicted the coach more as an a l l y , or potential additional mediator, than an authority figure. Rather than seeing the coach as someone to step i n and take over, the coach's role was more of a coordinator and mediator. The f i r s t reaction of most of the Division 86 A players was to indicate that the protagonist would take d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n mediating with the antagonist. In fact, the term 'antagonist' seems inappropriate to describe the conception of Cody presented by some participants. He was just another team member, who had made a mistake, and the objective was to i d e n t i f y the reasons for the mistake, restore team goals and unity and then proceed on to the next game. Team unity. Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t difference between Division B and Division A players was the degree of e f f o r t expended i n preserving team unity. In both levels of play i t was apparent that unity was an important consideration i n any team c o n f l i c t . Statements such as "the team i s l i k e your family" and "the team comes before any one player" were made by both Division A and Division B players. The difference between the two Divisions was i n the complexity of solutions, evidence of foresight, and intention to solve the problem and reestablish unity that was more evident i n the Division A player solutions. I t appeared that some of the Division B players did not perceive the actions of the antagonist as even being a problem. Responses such as "forget i t and move on" indicated that a threat to team unity had not been recognised. The Division B player's strategy i n this case was not aimed at solving the problem but simply to ignore i t as being inconsequential. In none of the Division A responses was such an apparent breach i n team unity inconsequential. I t was suggested by the expert raters that the concept of team unity can be i n s t i l l e d i n most teams with competent coaching. 87 What appears to be the province primarily of high performance players i s a more complex conception of what team unity means and production of appropriate strategies to solve cohesion problems. In this group there was greater recognition that the team must function as a whole i n order to achieve i t s goals i n that personal goals might need to be subjugated i n order to reach team goals. Team welfare across both groups was a p r i o r i t y but there was evidence among the Division A players that the concept of team was not so much that of a si n g u l a r i t y but rather a group of individuals with t h e i r own requirements and aptitudes who shared a common goal. Rather than seeing the team simply as a unit, the Division A players were able to see i t as a complex combination of individual elements. This thinking i s highlighted by comparing two statements about the antagonist Cody: (1) "Cody i s a puckhog, there's no room f o r those types on a team" (Division B response), and (2) "Rob took Cody aside a f t e r the game and asked him why he didn't pass...maybe Cody had his reasons for not passing" (Division A response). In the f i r s t response Cody i s assigned a 'type' (a 'puckhog' i s a player who won't share possession of the puck). In the second response, Cody i s considered as an individual with possibly complex motivations. Complexity and length of responses. A more objective analysis of the F l e x i b i l i t y responses was conducted through counting the number of words contained i n each response. A s i g n i f i c a n t correlation between F l e x i b i l i t y and number of words used to describe the problem solution was found (.47, p<.01). This finding objectively 88 substantiates the notion of complexity of responses being associated with F l e x i b i l i t y i n that i t r e f l e c t s the provision of more d e t a i l , the d i v e r s i t y of problem parameters considered, and a greater number of solutions provided by the Division A players. I t may be noted, however, that i n several cases, a lengthy response di d not necessarily r e f l e c t attainment of the l e v e l to which the problem was linked. There were also many examples of b r i e f responses which captured a l l of the elements required to pass basic structure, as well as providing several elaborations. In some cases, the challenge of coding responses came from s i f t i n g meaningful content from a long response while, i n other instances, the d i f f i c u l t y was i n ensuring that meaningful content was not missed i n a b r i e f response. As a group, the responses of the Bantam sample were described by one rater as 'succinct', although several players provided an enormous amount of d e t a i l and c l a r i f i c a t i o n i n t h e i r responses. Hypothesis 4 Hypothesis 4 stated that high performance players would be more Mastery goal-oriented than non-high performance players. Higher levels of Mastery goal orientation were proposed to r e f l e c t Intensity or the e f f o r t and determination to improve one's own s k i l l l e v e l . A univariate ANOVA following the main analysis revealed that Division A players had a Mastery goal orientation when reporting what sorts of a c t i v i t i e s and outcomes make them f e e l the most successful at hockey. Division B players were more oriented, toward Performance goals. This i s an interesting finding as i t might be assumed that winning 89 (Performance goal) i s the most important goal f o r any player, p a r t i c u l a r l y D ivision A players where performance i s the c r i t i c a l determinant i n maintaining position on the team. The results of the Intensity scale demonstrated that competence and learning new s k i l l s were more t y p i c a l of Division A players than a c t i v i t i e s such as outperforming other players or winning without much e f f o r t . A single question was also posed i n which players were forced to choose between which was more important to them: (1) "winning the game", or (2) "playing my best." The majority of Division A players (76%) endorsed the second choice. Several of the Division A players q u a l i f i e d the choice by adding an explanation "when I play well we often win", but s t i l l indicated that the Mastery goal was the higher p r i o r i t y . Summary This study had several important goals related to e x i s t i n g research on high performance i n s o c i a l cognition: (a) to examine whether s o c i a l conceptual structure and encapsulated a b i l i t i e s contribute to high performance i n s o c i a l cognition i n the a t h l e t i c domain, (b) to inform Case's theory of CCSS by studying how encapsulated a b i l i t i e s may be an important adjunct to f u l l y understanding i n t e l l e c t u a l development, (c) to contribute to the l i t e r a t u r e on giftedness and high performance by doing research i n a s p e c i f i c domain, that of sport, which had not been studied under the rubric of a theory of s o c i a l cognition. The findings of the current study both confirmed and expanded on findings from much of the research on Case's theory of 90 structural development. Smith and Christensen (1995) determined that s o c i a l cognition i s c r i t i c a l to excellence i n sport. This study confirmed that the a b i l i t y to participate i n high performance play i n hockey was related to an enhanced a b i l i t y to ascertain the intentions of others and to plan strategy f o r coping with s o c i a l problems accordingly. I t was evident from the findings of the current study that performance l e v e l d i d not predict differences i n the l e v e l of Central Conceptual Structure (CCSS) as described i n Case's theory (Case, 1987, Case & Okamoto, 1996). The age-related structural levels assessed with personality tasks were found to be highly comparable to Marini and Case's (1994) work, upon which the methodology used i n the present study was i n part developed. This r e s u l t was important as i t both added confirmation to existing studies that Case's chronology of structure i s appropriate and also added support to findings that his theory of CCSS i s v a l i d i n quite d i f f e r e n t contexts (Bruchowsky, 1992, G r i f f i n 1992, Mckeough, 1992, Porath, 1992, 1996). This tenet of Case's theory implies some underlying factor that contributes to uni v e r s a l i t y i n structural development. The notion that there may be b i o l o g i c a l constraints on structural development appear to be supported with continued findings that there are l i m i t s on the l e v e l that any individual can reach within a given age range. Probably one of the single most important findings was that basic structure appears to be age-related and that there was no s i g n i f i c a n t difference between the Division A and Division B players 91 on this construct. I t seems that, as predicted i n the set of hypotheses that guided this study which are consistent with p r i o r research findings on high performers (Porath, 1996, 1997), high performance emerges from a source other than advances on basic structural l e v e l within chronological cohorts. The notion of encapsulated a b i l i t i e s (Porath, 1992, 1996) which account for advances i n development over basic structure was supported i n the current work. Porath's research indicated that i t was possible f o r an individual to demonstrate rapid, non-conceptual development f a r i n advance of chronological-age cohorts. Although the p a r t i c u l a r s k i l l s involved d i f f e r e d between domains, as Porath had studied narrative and a r t i s t i c development, there were p a r a l l e l s between narrative, a r t i s t i c and a t h l e t i c domains i n the finding that a set of such s k i l l s were i n place i n high performers i n a l l these contexts. Porath's work was based on a younger age cohort than the 13.5 to 15 year o l d age-group Bantam hockey players studied, but i n a l l three studies there was found both an age-consonant basic structure and a set of encapsulated s k i l l s , or elaborations on that structure, which distinguished outstanding performance. In summary, this study revealed that high performance i s t y p i f i e d not by advances upon age-appropriate structural l e v e l but instead by elaborations on basic structure. The nature of the elaborations that distinguished high performance players were as follows: (1) F l e x i b i l i t y consisting of the a b i l i t y to a) see the importance of team unity i n achieving the ov e r a l l objective of doing 92 well, b) to see that the whole i s comprised of individual parts, c) to defer emotional reaction i n an attempt to solve a problem, d) to take the perspective of another individual, e) to take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r solving problems i n a di r e c t manner on one's own authority, f) to develop sequences of solutions to a problem, and, g) to u t i l i s e other sources of information and influence i n the mediation of c o n f l i c t , and (2) Intensity which was characterised by the ascendance of Mastery goals over Performance goals i n the individual's orientation to ascertaining degree of success i n the sport. Summary of Implications of the Findings f o r Theory and Practice The findings of this study have implications f o r theories of so c i a l cognition and f o r application i n the sport context. Case and his colleagues (Case, 1992; Case et a l . , 1996) determined that there i s a c e i l i n g on structural development that i s encountered at every stage. He has suggested that high performers may i n fact traverse each stage and reach this c e i l i n g more quickly than non-high performers. I t seems reasonable to tentatively conclude, from the work of Case and others (Case, 1992; Porath, 1992, 1996, 1997), and the from the findings of the current study, that high performers do not greatly exceed the c e i l i n g of the structural l e v e l appropriate f o r thei r age, although they may reach i t more quickly than non-high performers. The significance of this proposition that high performers may progress through a stage more quickly than non-high performers i s as follows: (1) high performers may be u t i l i s i n g working memory resources freed from structural development processes i n the 93 development of s k i l l s s p e c i f i c to a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l context, and (2) high performers may use freed working memory to combine information contained i n the structure i n creative ways (Porath, 1992). In this way, encapsulated a b i l i t i e s can r e s u l t i n performance that appears to be well beyond that expected for the individual's chronological age. As a r e s u l t of this study, and from information derived from similar work (Porath, 1996, 1997), i t i s reasonable to suggest that there might be room i n current theories of s o c i a l cognition f o r a conception which takes into account both the maturational constraints of structure and also factors such as encapsulated a b i l i t i e s which may be open to learning e f f e c t s . This way of describing the development of s o c i a l cognition also has d i r e c t implications f o r practice. Educators and participants i n the sport context may gain much by having an awareness of which aspects of performance are maturationally constrained, or r e l a t i v e l y impervious to instruction, and which other s k i l l s may benefit from learning and rehearsal. Directions for Future Research One of the most important findings of this study was that Division does not predict structural l e v e l . This finding highlights one of the most fundamental contributions which this study makes to the understanding of s o c i a l cognition. The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a set of encapsulated a b i l i t i e s related to high performance i n the sport context adds support to Porath's (1996) finding that i t i s encapsulated a b i l i t i e s and not structure which distinguish g i f t e d performance i n narrative. Porath's work was 94 conducted i n a substantially d i f f e r e n t context than the current study. An interesting question a r i s i n g from these two studies i s whether the encapsulated a b i l i t i e s that appear to be associated with high performance i n these two contexts requiring s o c i a l cognition share any common features. In other words, are encapsulated a b i l i t i e s context-s p e c i f i c or i s there an underlying set of a b i l i t i e s common to performance i n so c i a l cognition i n a variety of contexts. 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Champaign, 111: Human Kinetics. 101 APPENDIX A CASE'S STAIRCASE MODEL VECTORIAL INTER-RELATIONAL Level 3 3.5-5 yrs Level 2 2-3.5 yrs Level 1 1.5-2 yrs Level 3 Al — X Bl 15.5-19 yrs A2 — B2 Levei 2 A l — B l 13-15.5 yrs A2 — B2 DIMENSIONAL Level 1 11-13 yrs A — B Level 3 9-11 yrs Level 2 7-9 yrs Level 1 5-7 yrs Al — Bl X A2 — B2 A l — B l A2 — B2 A — B Al — Bl X A2 — B2 A l — B l A2 — B2 B TJ F T Figure 1. Case's Staircase Model Note. Sensorimotor Stage precedes I n t e r r e l a t i o n a l and i s not shown 102 APPENDIX B TABLES OF RESULTS Table 1 Sample Demographics Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum Age in Years Division of Division B 14.48 .53 14.00 15.50 Hockey Division A 14.98 .54 14.00 15.50 Group Total 14.74 .59 14.00 15.50 Height in Inches Division of Division B 66 3 60 74 Hockey Division A 69 2 65 75 Group Total 68 3 60 75 Weight in Pounds Division of Division B 131 24 95 195 Hockey Division A 155 24 120 240 Group Total 144 27 95 240 Years of Playing Division of Division B 8.27 .57 7.00 9.50 Hockey Hockey Division A 8.90 .57 8.00 9.50 Group Total 8.60 .65 7.00 9.50 Note. N=24 for Division B. n=26 for Division A. 103 Table 2 Percentages for Structural Level Scores by Division Structural Level 0 1 2 3 Total Division of Division B Row% .0% 20.8% 62.5% 16.7% 100.0% Hockey Count 0 5 15 4 24 Division A Row% .0% 3.8% 80.7% 15.4% 100.0% Count 0 1 21 4 26 Note. N=24 for Division B. n=26 for Division A. 104 Table 3 Correlations Among Variables Used in the Main Analysis Variables Number of Words Structural Variables In Solution Concentration Level Flexibility Intensity Number of Words 1.00 Concentration 0.21 1.00 Structural Level 0.56* 0.19 1.00 Flexibility 0.47* 0.03 0.33* 1.00 Intensity 0.10 0.14 0.29* 0.45* 1.00 Note. N=50 for all correlations *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 105 Table 4 Means. Standard Deviations. Skewness and Kurtosis for Dependent Variables for the Entire Sample M SD Skewness Kurtosis Minium Maximum Concentration 74.86 6.79 -0.10 -0.23 61.00 89.00 Structural Level 1.83 0.45 -0.33 -0.52 1.00 2.50 Flexibility 2.24 1.52 -0.46 -1.25 0.00 4.00 Intensity 51.50 3.89 0.27 -0.67 45.00 59.00 Note. N=50 106 Table 5 Means. Standard Deviations. Skewness and Kurtosis of Dependent Variables for Division B M SD Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Concentration 74.91 6.83 -0.11 -0.31 61.00 88.00 Structural Level 1.75 0.51 -0.13 -1.02 1.00 2.50 Flexibility 1.17 1.40 0.60 -1.30 0.00 4.00 Intensity 49.96 3.77 1.02 0.98 45.00 59.00 Note. N=50 107 Table 6 Means. Standard Deviations. Skewness and Kurtosis of Dependent Variables for Division A M SD Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Concentration 74.81 6.89 -0.09 -0.49 62.00 89.00 Structural Level 1.90 0.37 -0.28 0.11 1.00 2.50 Flexibility 3.23 0.76 -0.43 -1.11 2.00 4.00 Intensity 52.92 3.49 -0.18 -0.40 46.00 59.00 Note. N=50 108 Table 7 Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by Weight and Division Weight in Pounds 140 lbs or less Over 140 lbs Group Total Variable Group M SD M SD M SD Structural Level Division B 1.68 .58 1.93 .19 1.75 .51 Division A 1.95 .44 1.88 .34 1.90 .37 Group Total 1.78 .54 1.89 .30 1.83 .45 Flexibility Concentration Division B 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Division A 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 Group Total 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 Division B 73.41 6.56 78.56 6.51 74.91 6.83 Division A 75.00 3.83 74.69 8.39 74.81 6.89 Group Total 74.00 5.67 75.87 7.93 74.86 6.79 Intensity Division B 49.35 3.76 51.43 3.64 49.96 3.77 Division A 53.10 4.53 52.81 2.81 52.92 3.49 Group Total 50.74 4.38 52.39 3.07 51.50 3.89 Note. n=27 for weight of 140 lbs or less; n=23 for weight of 140 lbs or more. 109 Table 8 Pooled Within-Cells Variance Covariance Matrix for Weight by Division Variables Structural Level Flexibility Concentration Intensity Structural Level .20 Flexibility .14 1.29 Concentration .47 .22 46.30 Intensity .34 1.09 2.77 13.24 Note. N=50. 110 Table 9 Pooled Withiri-Cells Variance Covariance Matrix for Division A and B Variables Structural Level Flexibility Concentration Intensity Structural Level .20 Flexibility .15 1.25 Concentration .58 .41 47.12 Intensity .39 1.12 3.77 13.14 Note. N=50. I l l Table 10 Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by Division Variable Group M SD Structural Level Flexibility Concentration Intensity Division B Division A Group Total Division B Division A Group Total Division B Division A Group Total Division B Division A Group Total 1.75 1.90 1.83 1.00 3.00 2.00 74.91 74.81 74.86 49.96 52.92 51.50 .51 .37 .45 1.00 1.00 2.00 6.83 6.89 6.79 3.77 3.49 3.89 Note. n=24 for Division B; n=26 for Division A. 112 APPENDIX C BOXPLOTS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES 3 Figure 2. Boxplot of Structural Level for Divisions A and B 113 5 = 0 x Q) iZ -1 24 Division B 26 Division A Division of Hockey Figure 3. Boxplot of Flexibility for Divisions A and B. 114 100 90 i Division B Division A Division of Hockey Figure 4. Boxplot of Concentration for Divisions A and B. 115 60 58 -56' 54-52 • 50 ' 48 • >> "55 46 1 c s S 44 • ' • • N = 24 26 Division B Division A Division of Hockey Figure 5. Boxplot of Intensity for Divisions A and B. 116 APPENDIX D GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN CODING Trait equivalents of Terms Used by Subjects in Problems 4 and 5 Subject's Term Trait identified bv Coders • nice Responsible, Conscientious, mean Antisocial, Nasty normal Reasonable, Rational aggressive Competitive, Direct, Confident impatient Impatient fair Sportsmanlike average Reasonable stupid Lacking Judgement competitive Ambitious frustrated Unhappy, Frustrated puckhog Selfish team player Cooperative reasonable Reasonable helpful Helpful sellout Sneaky, Underhanded baby Immature outgoing Friendly can handle himself Mature, Competent not a bad person Reasonable tough guy Aggressive hard working Ambitious, Conscientious serious Conscientious bossy Domineering coolheaded Calm calm Calm jerk Fool short-tempered Volatile troubled Short-tempered determined Ambitious intense Serious sticks up for self Confident idiot Fool tough Aggressive 117 APPENDIX E FACTOR ANALYSIS RESULTS Table 11 Factor Statistics for Principal Components Analysis on Concentration Scale Items Item Fl F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 h2 concl .00 .35 -.14 .30 -.57 .25 .70 .72 conclO .15 .00 .00 .81 .00 .00 .00 .76 concl1 .85 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 -.24 .82 concl2 .66 -.10 .28 .00 -.13 -.20 .00 .69 concl3 .15 -.10 .00 -.33 .00 .71 .23 .68 concl4 .00 .00 .30 .29 .68 .00 -.33 .84 concl5 .75 .11 .00 .19 .00 .10 -.20 .75 concl6 .77 .00 .00 .17 .26 .15 .00 .72 concl7 .14 .16 .80 .00 .00 .14 .00 .76 concl8 .00 .00 .75 .00 .00 .00 .00 .59 concl9 .00 .65 -.43 .00 -.18 .17 -.36 .78 conc2 -.26 .00 .31 .00 -.75 .14 -.13 .72 conc20 .16 .70 .26 .13 .00 -.23 .12 .64 conc3 .82 .00 .00 -.13 .00 .00 .00 .65 conc4 .00 .74 .00 .00 .00 .00 .40 .75 conc5 .00 .00 .12 .21 .71 .00 -.75 .73 conc6 -.25 .00 -.22 .44 .00 .43 .56 .84 conc7 .00 .12 .00 .00 .00 .00 .64 .45 conc8 .00 .00 .18 .17 .00 .81 .00 .73 cone 9 -.16 .45 .10 -.36 .37 .39 -.11 .68 % Var Expl. 21.50 12.92 9.73 8.47 7.32 6.16 5.33 Eigen. 4.23 2.58 1.95 1.70 1.46 1.23 1.07 Note. N=50, numbers < .005 reported as zero. 118 Table 12 Factor Correlation Matrix for Principal Components Analysis on Concentration Scale Items Item F l F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 1 1.00 2 -.01 1.00 3 ;21 -.01 1.00 4 .13 .11 .02 1.00 5 .03 -.06 .05 -.01 1.00 6 -.11 .17 .04 .00 -.02 7 -.11 .06 -.15 .11 -.08 Note. N=50, numbers < .005 reported as zero. 119 APPENDIX F In this appendix are contained the recruitment presentation and the questionnaire that the subjects were given to complete at home and return by the next practise. Recruitment Presentation The following presentation was given to Bantam hockey players at the practise sessions for each team. "I am a doctoral candidate in Educational Psychology and Special Education at the University of British Colombia. I am doing a study on the psychological skills that allow hockey players to anticipate what other players will do on the ice. This kind of anticipation is expected to improve on ice performance. During the course of this study you will be invited to respond to a questionnaire concerning psychological skills that you use on and off the ice to improve your performance. In this questionnaire you will be asked to respond to five hypothetical problems concerning situations that arise on and off the ice specific to ice hockey. You will also be asked to fill out a series of questions about times you feel successful in hockey and how well you are able to concentrate during games. Your responses to the questionnaire will be coded and analyzed. The information you provide is expected to yield valuable information as to the psychological skills that assist in anticipating the actions of others. You will be asked to devote one hour total of time for the questionnaire and return it at the next practise session . If at any time during the assessment you wish to withdraw from the study you are free to do so with no effect on your participation and standing in the team. Any information resulting from this research study will be kept strictly confidential, all documents will be identified only by code number and kept in a locked filing cabinet. You will not be identified by name in any reports of the completed study. Data records contained on a computer hard disk will be identified only by coded numbers. Your participation in this study would be much appreciated and I hope you will be interested in taking part." 120 Dear Hockey Player, I am a doctoral candidate in Educational Psychology and Special Education at the University of British Columbia. I am doing a study on the psychological skills that allow hockey players to anticipate what other players will do on the ice as part of a PhD dissertation. Anticipation is an important aspect of hockey that contributes to on-ice performance. I would like to ask you to fill out the attached questionnaire in order to study how this skill is developed. Your answers to the questions, and personal input at the end of the questionnaire, will provide valuable information. Feedback following the study is expected to benefit you by providing information on improving anticipation skills. A take-home questionnaire is attached to this consent form. You will be asked to devote from a half-hour to an hour total of time at home or between on-ice sessions at the school/camp (as time permits) filling out the questionnaire. Please complete the questions carefully and return this form to either Elizabeth Tench or the hockey school directors at the next possible session in order to ensure participation in the study. Participation in this study is voluntary and if at any time during the assessment you wish to withdraw from the study you are free to do so. Any information resulting from this research study will be kept strictly confidential, You will not be identified in any reports of the completed study. I, (please print) _do do not (please circle one) consent to participate in the study described above. Signature Date Thankyou for your participation, Sincerely, Elizabeth Tench (B.ED, M.A., PhD Candidate) Section One: Please fill out the following before starting the questionnaire. Name Address (include postal code) Telephone Number (include area code) ( ) Hockey School or Other Session you are completing this form in 1) Position Mostly played Last Year (goal, defence, winger, centre) 2) Level of Hockey Played Last Year (Bantam, Midget; House, AAA) 3) Age 4) Birthdate 5) Height 6) Weight 7) How many games did you play in last season H 8) How many years have you played hockey 9) List any camps/tryouts/special competitions you participated in the past two years: 10) Have you ever been a Team Captain or Assistant Captain? yes no 11) List any awards received in the past two years 12) (Forwards) Number of Goals Scored Last Season 13) (Forwards) Number of Assists Last Season 14) (Forwards) What is your plus/minus rating for Last Season 15) (Goalies) What is your Goals Against Average for Last Season 16) (Goalies) What is your personal win/loss record 123 Section Two In the following section, you are asked to read a description of a problem situation that a character finds themselves in. After reading the description you will be asked one or two questions about the outcome of the problem. These questions are intended to find out about how you make decisions about what other people will do in problem situations. Please read each problem carefully before answering. There is no right or wrong answer. Please keep in mind that the explanation you give for your answer is important. Think over your answers and explanations before writing and try to provide as much detail as you feel necessary to explain why you gave the answer that you did. If you need more space please use the back of each page. 1) Problem 1 During a regular season ice-hockey game, Jason was heading for the bench on a line change. An opposing team player got in his way as he was trying to get off the ice. Jason told the other team's player to get out of his way. What type of person is Jason? What makes you think he is this kind of person? 124 2) Problem 2 Tyler was dressing before a game. He was almost out of tape to put on his new stick. One of his teammates, Jay, used up Tyler's tape without permission while Tyler was talking to the coach. What do you think Tyler did and why? 125 3) Problem 3 Jonathan's team was having a practice session. They were practising breakaway drills in small groups. In Jonathan's group, one of the centres, Kyle, took several more shots at the goalie than Jonathan did. Jonathan told Kyle that next practice they would share the shooting more equally. At the next practice Kyle again took more shots than Jonathan. What do you think Jonathan did? Why? 126 4) Problem 4 Rob was standing in the slot in front of the opposing net waiting for a quick pass from his winger Cody. Instead of passing, the Cody tried to score himself from a bad angle. On the bench, Rob told Cody that the team might have scored if the pass had been made. In the next play, Rob was close to the opposing net but was being blocked by their defence. He passed the puck off to Cody and they scored. In the final play of the game, when Robert's team was down by a goal, Cody tried to carry the puck all the way down the ice and score himself without using his Iinemates. He failed to score on the play. Rob's team ended up losing the game. What do you think Rob did? Why? 127 5) Problem 5 Ryan was waiting in line to get his skates sharpened and just as his turn came up they announced the shop was closing. Ryan told the people at the shop that he had been waiting a long time and that he wanted his skates sharpened before they closed. The people at the skate shop said they didn't have time to sharpen his skates. Ryan went skating anyway and then left the rink to go see his friends. Late in the afternoon while they were playing road hockey, Ryan remembered that he had to be home because relatives were coming, so he excused himself and was starting to leave when his friend asked him for help in how to execute a wrist shot. Ryan helped his friend with the wrist shot and then left for home. On his way home he fell off his bicycle and bent the wheel rim. While he was pushing his bicycle home a person approached him asking for directions. What do you think Ryan did and why? 128 Section Three In this section, please fill in the line provided at the end of each question with a number from '1' to '5' that indicates how much each statement generally describes you as a hockey player. Consider each statement and use the rating scale to describe in general when you feel the most successful as a player. For example if you feel very successful when you are learning a new skill then you would write '5' on the line after Question 1. Not at AH Not Very Somewhat Quite Very Successful Successful Successful Successful Successful 1 2 3 4 5 In general, when did you feel the most successful: 1. When I started to learn a new skill. 2. When a game made me think about how to improve. 3. When I understood a complex play for the first time. 4. When I was able to practice and execute a new skill. 5. When I was working on a challenging skating drill. ._ 6. When I learned a skill I'd had a hard time with before. 7. When I got to use a new skill during a game. 8. When I played well even though we lost the game. 9. When others told me I had a good game. 10. When I didn't have to try hard but we won the game. 11. When I scored a goal unassisted or made a big save. 12. When I was one of the best players in a game or drill. 13. When I beat teammates in a speed drill. 14. When I accomplished a skill that most others could not. 15. When I thought my teammates played better than I did. 16. When we lost a game. Which of the following is more important to you? Please check only one of the choices. 1) Winning the game 2) Playing my best in a game 129 Section Four In this section, please fill in the line provided at the end of each question with a number from '1' to '5' that indicates how much each statement generally describes you during a game. Consider each statement and decide whether it is true of you 'Almost Never', 'Not Often', 'Sometimes', 'Often' or'Almost all of the Time'. For example, if you almost always miss what is going on around you during a game you would write '5' on the line after Question 1. In general, during a game: Almost Not Often Sometimes Often Almost all Never Of The Time 1 2 3 4 5 1. I miss what is going on around me. 2. I react blindly in one-on-one plays. 3. I am able to pick up details of game situations. 4. I find it difficult to forget mistakes and go on. 5. I am not easily distracted while following a play. 6. I find myself thinking about good plays I just made. 7. I tend to commit early during plays. 8. I daydream on the ice. 9. I worry about what's going to happen. 10.1 am not distracted by spectators. 11.1 know where most of the players on the ice are. 12.1 notice when an opposition penalty is almost over. 13.1 have to consult others about plays I didn't see. 14. Player's comments don't distract me from the action. 15.1 am good at picking up on all the play action. 16. Most of my attention is on the present situation. 17. It is easy for me to stay mentally into the game. 18.1 can keep track of action behind the play. 19.1 tend to dwell on my feelings and miss game action. 20.1 can't keep my thoughts focussed. 130 Section Five In this section you are asked to provide your own input into the understanding of what helps a hockey player 'anticipate' plays or, in other words, predict what other players will do on the ice. First, please write your own short definition of what you think 'anticipation' means. Then take a few moments and consider how hockey players are able anticipate plays. Please write this information in the space provided below. This information will be very valuable to the study so as much detail as you can provide from your knowledge and experience will be of assistance. 1) Your Definition of Anticipation 2) How do hockey players anticipate plays? Feel free to provide examples of plays to assist your explanation. 131 

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