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The gender gap toward foreign policy : a cross-national study Warner, Dorothy Alison 1999

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THE GENDER GAP TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY by DOROTHY ALISON WARNER A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL F U L F I L L M E N T OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF M A S T E R OF ARTS in THE F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES (Department of Political Science) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH C O L U M B I A April 1999 © Alison Warner, 1999 I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a n a d v a n c e d d e g r e e at t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y sha l l m a k e it f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e a n d s t u d y . I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s m a y b e g r a n t e d b y t h e h e a d o f m y d e p a r t m e n t o r b y h i s o r h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It is u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t b e a l l o w e d w i t h o u t m y w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . D e p a r t m e n t o f Po (- I T t £ fu S<21^KJCQ T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a V a n c o u v e r , C a n a d a D E - 6 ( 2 / 8 8 ) II A B S T R A C T For several decades public opinion researchers have identified differences in women's and men's attitudes toward specific policy issues One of the most controversial gender gaps is toward foreign policy and defence issues. This investigation has two objectives. First, to examine and compare gender difference in attitudes toward foreign policy in Canada, the United States and Britain over four decades to determine if a gap actually exists and whether or not it has changed over time. Second, to examine competing explanations for the gender gap discussed by feminist International Relations scholars. These include: women's role as care giver; structural constraints such as women's traditionally lower socio-economic status; and gender consciousness expressed mainly through the impact of the feminist movement. The findings of this investigation suggest that a gender gap exists between women and men in attitudes toward force and violence, not foreign policy in general. This gap remains stable over time in both the U.S. and Canada. In Britain the gender gap increases from the 1980s to the 1990s, but this is because men's attitudes have changed. The gap is not easily explained. The presence of children in the home partially accounts for the gap in the U.S. and Britain, and gender consciousness partially accounts for the gap in Canada. I l l T A B L E OF C O N T E N T S Abstract ii Table of Contents iii List of Figures iv List of Tables v Acknowledgements vi Chapter One Introduction 1 Chapter Two Theoretical Context 21 Chapter Three Data and Methods 38 Chapter Four Conclusion and discussion 66 Bibliography 75 Appendix One 85 Appendix Two 87 Appendix Three 89 rv LIST OF FIGURES Figure 3.1 Stage-Wise Regression 41 Figure 3.2 Graph: Mean Scores for U.S. Defence Spending 51 Figure 3.3 Graph: Mean Scores for U.S. Militarism 52 Figure 3.4 Graph: Mean Scores for U.S. Isolationism 53 Figure 3.5 Graph: Mean Scores for Nuclear Weapons in Britain 54 Figure 3.6 Graph: Mean Scores for Defence Spending in Britain 55 V LIST OF TABLES Table 3.1 Gender Gap toward General Military Issues 45 Table 3.2 Gender Gap toward Isolationism 46 Table 3.3 Gender Gap toward Conflict 47 Table 3.4 Summary of U.S. Gender Gap 59 Table 3.5 Summary of Gender Gap in Canada 61 Table 3.6 Summary of Gender Gap in Britain 64 VI ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to acknowledge the following people for all their help and support during the writing of this thesis. Professor Richard Johnston for all his help, encouragement and patience. Professor Barbara Arneil for assisting with the gender component. Andrew Steele for sharing ideas and references. Karen Guttieri for her many helpful suggestions. The women in the M A program—Su Myong, Jen Delaney, Lise Bendikse, Emily Nakai, Erica Mills , Adrienne Nash—for their support and our weekly meetings. My cousin Sue for providing so many meals and support. Jonathan Oppenheim for being a good firend the past few years. And finally, my family and friends for having patience while I finished writing. The work in this thesis is the responsibility of the author. 1 Chapter One: Introduction For several decades public opinion researchers have identified differences in women and men's attitudes toward specific policy issues (Smith 1984; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Conover 1988; Conover and Shapiro 1996; Everitt, 1998; O'Neill , 1996). One of the most controversial gender gaps is toward foreign policy and defence issues. Although researchers often cite foreign policy as an issue area producing the largest and most consistent gender difference, studies have been inconclusive and the findings contradictory. One reason is the broad range of issues considered to be foreign policy. Decisions to go to war or make peace, spending on defence and membership in international defence organizations all constitute a country's foreign policy. This leaves several unanswered questions. What foreign policy issues actually produce a gap? What is the size and extent of this gap? How has this gap changed over time? Is it a universal phenomenon, or specific to the foreign policy in one country? This study attempts to answer these questions. This investigation has two objectives.1 First, to examine and compare gender difference in attitudes toward foreign policy in Canada, the United States and Britain over four decades to determine if a gap actually exists and whether or not it has changed over time. These three countries share similar political, social and cultural institutions which allows for a comparison of the gender gap without accounting for a wide range of 1 This investigation considers women only. The purpose is to investigate the connection between women and peace. 2 differences that may affect political attitudes.2 The foreign policy issues used in this study are related to the military and defence and include both direct violence in the form of actual conflicts, and indirect violence, in the form of militarism (defence spending, nuclear weapons) and the country's position in world politics. This will provide insight into what issues actually produce gender gaps. The second objective is to examine competing explanations for the gender gap discussed by feminist International Relations scholars.3 These include: women's role as care giver; structural constraints such as women's traditionally lower socio-economic status; and gender consciousness expressed mainly through the impact of the feminist movement.4 Many feminist IR scholars argue that these factors have socialized women to be more peaceful than men, favouring compromise and peaceful reconciliation of disputes over the aggressive or violent behaviour associated with "male" approaches to international politics (See Sylvester, 1994; Tickner, 1992; Enloe, 1990 and 1993; Peterson and Runyan, 1993; Grant and Newland, 1991; Keohane, 1991). The intent of ' This is not to deny that differences exist among the three countries which may affect patterns of public opinion. Both Canada and Britain have a multi-party system. The American system consists of only two major parties. In the American case the gender gap may be closely associated with the policies of particular parties. In the 1980s and 1990s feminist groups and women in general were closely associated with the Democratic Party. In Canada's and Britain's multi-party system it is more difficult to link gender gaps to specific parties. In Canada, for example, the gender gap has varied (See Everitt, 1996 for a discussion of the difference between Canadian and American gender gaps). However, all three are classified as advanced industrial societies and most cross-national gender gap research suggests patterns exist in gender difference (See Inglehart and Norris, 1998; Studlaret al., 1998). 3 Feminist International relations scholars are referred to as feminist IR scholars for the rest of the document. 4 The explanations tested in this study are "socialization" arguments. Biological explanations of difference cannot adequately be tested with public opinion data (See O'Neill, 1996). 3 this investigation is to comment on the salience of the association between women and peace, so common in feminist IR literature. Why study the gender gap over time and in three societies? Foreign policy may differ in meaning across the three geopolitical areas. Although the three countries are militarised, both the U.S. and Britain have been considered great powers, whereas Canada has only ever been considered a small to medium power. This may affect how the citizens of a country perceive foreign policy issues. For example, in the U.S. the isolationism variable is generally interpreted on a continuum of peace-conflict which reflects the predilection for the American military to become involved in conflict (Nincic, 1997). In Canada, with its tradition of peace keeping, involvement in world problems may not be interpreted as a hostile action. This may affect how the gender gap is interpreted in different societies. Why include several decades? Most longitudinal research into the gender gap suggests that women's attitudes have changed in the past few decades (See Baxter and Lansing, 1983; Klein, 1984; Norris, 1985; Inglehart and Norris, 1998). In the 1950s and 1960s women were thought to hold more conservative values than men. Recent evidence suggests that women may be shifting from right to left in response to changing cultural and structural constraints (Baxter and Lansing, 1983; Inglehart and Norris, 1998; Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler, 1998). Ronald Inglehart observed in 1977: We might conclude that sex differences in politics tend to diminish as a society reaches an advanced industrial stage. Or, going beyond our data, one could interpret the cross-national pattern as reflecting a continuous shift to the Left on 4 the part of women: in the past they were more conservative than men: in Post-Industrial society, they may be more likely to vote for the Left. The relative conservatism of women is probably disappearing (in Inglehart and Norris, 1998: 5). Cross-time studies also allow researchers to examine changes in attitudes toward issues. Longitudinal analysis can help identify why change occurs and provide some indication of future trends. For example, one of the explanations for the gender gap tested in this study is gender consciousness. Part of the development of gender consciousness is attributed to the growth of the feminist movement in the past few decades. If attitudes toward issues such as peace and war change over the three decades studied, part of this change may be explained by the growth of this movement. The changing nature of gender is also a reason to include several decades. Sandra Harding identifies three processes of gendered social life: j,;:ider identity, which is a form of socially constructed individual identity that includes, but is not dependent upon, sex; gender symbolism, the perceived dichotomies based on sexual difference; and gender structure which is the organisation of social activity around these dichotomies (Harding, 1983). In this sense gender is a social construction that is vulnerable to change over time and across cultures. For example, women's role in the private sphere as homemaker has changed drastically over the past few decades. Women in all three of these societies have been integrated into the workforce at an increasing rate (Walby, 1997; Klein, 1984). This affects how we think about gender and gender relations within society. By incorporating 5 several societies over a period of time, the changing nature of the concept of gender can be taken into account. Gender may also vary across the three countries. The concept of gender is influenced by changing social roles and social movements. Although the three countries share many similarities in both role change and the women's movement, there are differences that may affect public opinion. For example, the U.S. has been highly influenced by liberal feminism, which assumes there is no difference between women and men. The long yet unsuccessful fight for the Equal Rights Amendment reflects the position of many women's organizations, if not women in general. In Canada and Britain the women's movement has been far more influenced by social feminism (Bashevkin, 1984). Women's organizations in Canada and Britain have focused more on policies to improve women's lives, rather than individual c^aal rights. Defining the Gender Gap Conover (1988) suggests there is not one single gender gap, but many distinct ones. According to early studies women voted less often than men, resulting in a participation gap, and when they did vote, tended to favour conservative parties (See early works such as The American Voter (1960) by Campbell et al. and The Civic Culture (1963) by Almond and Verba for early mentions of gender difference).5 The dominant view at this time was that women and men existed in distinct political cultures resulting in different 6 political attitudes. Women were less involved in conventional political activity such as campaigns, political discussion, and voting. Women also tended to be conservative and apolitical. This attitude was summarised in the The Civic Culture: Wherever the consequences of women's suffrage have been studied, it would appear that women differ from men in their political behaviour only in being somewhat more frequently apathetic, parochial, conservative...Our data on the whole, confirm the findings reported in the literature. (Almond and Verba, 1963: 325) By the 1980s the traditional gender gap disappeared and the "modern" gap emerged. Women voted at the same rate as men (and sometimes in greater numbers) in most industrial societies (See Baxter and Lansing, 1983; Welch and Thomas, 1988) and increasingly took part in political discussions and campaign activity (Baxter and Lansing, !983).6 Women in North America and several European countries began to form distinct voting blocs favouring "liberal" and "left" parties, although in many other countries, differences in vote choice disappeared (Inglehart and Norris, 1998). Most interesting is the gender difference that began to appear in attitudes toward specific issues. Many studies showed that difference between women and men occurred on some issues, but not others (See Conover and Sapiro, 1988; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Norris, 1985 and 1988; Everitt, 1996; O'Neill, 1996). Everitt's study of the Canadian gender gap revealed 5 Many feminists (See Carroll and Zerilli, 1995; Chapman, 1995) have challenged these studies, claiming researchers often used poor methods to arrive at their results or they "fudged" the numbers. 6 Other evidence to support this view is the increase in government funded women's organizations (NOW in the U.S. and NAC in Canada, for example) and the growth of women's studies programs in many industrialized societies. 7 that women and men differed in attitudes toward some social policy issues and force and violence, but displayed similar attitudes toward issues of equality and feminism. This investigation addresses the modern gender gap. The gender gap toward one issue, foreign policy, is examined over several decades to determine if the gap has increased as suggested by other research. The findings suggest the gap is more complex. The results reveal that a gap does not exist toward foreign policy, but toward specific foreign policy issues. Defence spending and militarism do not yield a significant gap, but direct conflict produces, in some cases, quite a large gap. Existing Evidence The Gender Gap in Attitudes toward Foreign Policy The gender gap in attitudes towardToreign policy was first noticed in the U.S. in the early 1980s. In both the 1980 and 1984 U.S. presidential election, women were far more likely to vote for Carter and Mondale over Reagan. According to the New York Times Poll Reagan received 47% of women's vote compared with 57% of men's vote in 1980 (Burris, 1984: 335). One of the contributing factors to women's vote preference was Reagan's foreign policy, which was considered "hawkish" in comparison to the Democrats (Lake 1982; Baxter and Lansing, 1984). For example, Reagan favoured increases in military expenditures such as the elaborate "star wars" defence system. According to Lake women see a trade off between defence spending and social welfare programs (See also Baxter and Lansing, 1983; and Deitch, 1988) as opposed to men who were more likely to see a trade off between economic and the social welfare system. 8 The importance of the gender gap toward military issues surfaced again in 1992 during the Gulf War. In an attempt to "sell" the war to the public, the government attempted to make the war more appealing to women. The usual rhetoric that focused on the "just war" was replaced by personal stories of babies being torn from incubators. This was a direct attempt to gain the support of women and shift public opinion toward support for the war. A number of studies in the past two decades have examined gender difference in attitudes toward foreign policy with differing and often inconclusive results. Some studies find a gender gap toward specific issues, such as actual conflict and nuclear weapons. Women in the U.S. were far less supportive of American intervention in both the Korean and Vietnam wars than men (Conover and Sapiro, 1988; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Baxter and Lansing, 1983) and women in Britain were less likely to support the presence of troops in Northern Ireland (Norris, 1988; Welch and Thomas, 1988). Women in Canada were less in favour of cruise missile testing (Everitt, 1996 and 1998) and women from several European countries were less likely to support nuclear weapons, nuclear power and defence spending (Norris, 1988). Not all studies reveal that women are less supportive of the use of military force. Wilcox (1996), in a close examination of women's and men's attitudes in several American cities toward the Gulf War, found little evidence that women were less supportive of the war than men. In a more recent article, Tessler and Warriner (1997) came to similar conclusions in their study of four Middle East countries—Israel, Egypt, Palestine and Kuwait. They were specifically interested in examining the hypothesis put 9 forth by feminist scholars that women are more pacific than men. They found no significant difference in female and male response to survey questions about the Arab-Israeli conflict and no evidence that "women are less militaristic than men or more oriented toward diplomacy and compromise in their judgements about the most important international conflict in the region in which they reside." Men were as likely as women to support a non-violent end to the conflict. Issues that deal with violence indirectly such as militarism defence spending, and nuclear weapons also produce differing results. Conover and Sapiro (1988) found little evidence that a gender gap exists on any of these issues in the U.S. Women were just as likely to support militarism, for example, as were men. Similar results were found in Britain in attitudes toward defence spending (Welch and Thomas, 1988; Norris, 1988). Cross-Time Trends in die Gender Gap Most gender gap research suggests women's attitudes have been changing. Women's status in society has changed dramatically in the past few decades and this is assumed to effect political behaviour and attitudes. Many scholars suggest that women have become more "liberal" and less "conservative" as originally suggested by researchers (See previous discussion on women's apathetic and apolitical nature). Evidence suggests that women in Britain and several European countries have moved from the right to the left in party identification and voting patterns (Norris, 1985 and 1988), a pattern replicated in several advanced industrial societies, including Canada and the U.S. (Inglehart and Norris, 1998). 10 \ Studies that examine changing attitudes toward specific policy issues tell a different story. Women's attitudes have remained stable throughout the past few decades. In the U.S. women's attitudes toward foreign policy issues remained reasonably stable until the early 1980s, when some changes began to occur in women's attitudes toward general military issues (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986). And in Canada, women's attitudes toward force and violence and a variety of policy issues remained unchanged between the 1960s and 1980s (Everitt, 1996 and 1998). In the 1980s attitudes of Canadian women began to change toward social policy issues, but women remained strongly opposed to force and violence, both domestically and internationally. Some evidence suggests that it is not women who have changed, but men. This is an area that has not yet received much attention (See Steele, 1998; Wirls, 1984). Changing socio-demographics of women, thought to account for women moving from th° right to the left, may also have an impact on men. Wirls (1984) specifically studies women's and men's changing attitudes. The evidence in his study suggests that in the U.S. men have become more conservative in the past few decades, possibly in response to the changing role of women in society. Explanations for the Gender Gap toward Foreign Policy Attempts to explain gender gaps toward foreign policy have produced conflicting results. One reason for this may be the difficulty in obtaining consistent and reliable measures. How do you measure motherhood? Or gender consciousness? Do income and education levels really reflect structural constraints faced by women? Another problem is 11 determining what variables can reasonably account for gender difference. The explanations tested in this study have been the focus of other studies with mixed results. The caregiver hypothesis is generally measured by examining attitudes of women with children. This is not the best measure (as discussed in greater detail in chapter three), but it does provide some indication of the attitudes and opinions of women with children. The caregiver explanation is also limited to studies of foreign policy issues since the strongest theoretical evidence specifically addresses mothers and peace. In the U.S. motherhood does not adequately account for the gender gap toward foreign policy issues (Conover and Sapiro, 1988) or for gender differences toward the Gulf War (Wilcox, 1993). Structural differences have been examined far more broadly by researchers. Women's access to society's resources through increased education, entrance into the work force and professional work status have made obvious Ganges to women's lives. It is assumed that this has had an impact on women's attitudes. Structural differences account for part of the gender gap toward a variety of social and economic issues in the U.S., Britain and Australia (Studlar et al., 1998). But evidence from other studies suggests that structural factors do not account for gender difference. In several advanced industrial societies in both Europe and North America, structural factors did little to explain women's left vote choice (Inglehart and Norris, 1998), in Canada structural factors did not explain gender gaps toward issues of force and violence (Everitt, 1996) and in the U.S. it did not explain gaps in attitudes toward conflict (Conover and Sapiro, 1988). 12 Much of the recent gender gap research in the past few years has focused on the impact of the feminist movement. Women's organizations have grown in both number and strength in the past few decades. They regularly disseminate information and education concerning women's status in society. Many researchers argue this is influencing women's political attitudes. Feminism offers some explanation for the gender gap in several countries. In the U.S. feminist identity was able to account for the gender gap toward a variety of issues including foreign policy (Conover, 1993), and in Canada gender gaps have at least partially been explained by association with feminism (Everitt, 1996). Other theories suggest that feminism cannot adequately explain a gender gap because both women and men are influenced by feminism (Jelen, Thomas and Wilcox, 1994). In several western European countries, women and men were equally influenced by feminism, which affected attitudes toward a variety of issues (Jelen, Thomas and Wilcox, 1994) and in Canada feminist women and men share many political attitudes and opinions toward a variety of issues. Contributions of this Study Existing studies that examine gender difference toward foreign policy are often inconclusive, testing only a few foreign policy questions, or limiting the study to one year or one country. This study corrects for this omission by testing a wide range of foreign policy issues and explanations for gender difference in three countries over four decades. This provides more conclusive evidence of the size and extent of the gender gap and how 13 it has changed over time. Testing in only one year may mean a gender gap that appears or does not appear, is an anomaly or a response to specific political events of that year. Examining explanations provides insight into why gender gaps occur. This contributes to our knowledge and understanding of gender difference. Finally, this study expands on many of the studies by commenting on feminist theoretical literature that suggests women are more peaceful then men. Explanations for Gender Difference toward Foreign Policy The association between women and peace has been around for centuries. Euripides wrote Lysistrata, a play in which the women withhold sex to stop a war, in the fourth century, BC. Feminist IR scholars in the past two decades have kept this idea alive. Many of these scholars argue that war is a "male" activity based on male norms and values (See Tickner, 1992; Sylvester, 1994; Elshtain, 1987; Vickers, 1993). Why the association between women and peace? Three explanations for gender difference dominate the current literature: caregiver; structural factors; and gender consciousness.7 These explanations all suggest that women, because of various processes of socialization, are more peaceful then men.8 7 These explanations are treated as distinct, but it is important to note that they are not mutually exclusive. The feminist movement and the development of gender consciousness has been influenced by changing societal conditions for women, in particular, increased access to education and the workforce. And Ruddick, one of the most well known proponents of the motherhood-peace connection, argues that the mothers influenced by feminism produces a peaceful nature. 8 A nature versus nurture debate exists among many theorists who advocate the caregiver approach. Motherhood is strongly associated with biological arguments for gender difference. Because biological arguments cannot adequately be tested, the discussion in this paper focuses mainly on socialization arguments. 14 Caregiver explanations are early childhood socialization arguments that suggest that because women are socialized to be caretakers and mothers, they have less tolerance for violence.9 This explanation for women's association with peace is not new; it was used by First Wave feminists (turn-of-the-century feminists and suffragettes) to argue for suffrage. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom promoted itself as "a continuing force for mother values in international relations" (Rowbotham, 1997: 97). 1 0 Many of these feminists argued that mothers developed a distinct set of values that was incompatible with war and violence. Drawing mainly from the work of psychoanalytic feminists, many feminist IR scholars argue that women's role as mother socializes them to be "peaceful." From an early age young girls are socialized differently from boys, being taught to take care of the home, think of others before themselves, and value relationships. As adults, the care-taking and nurturance skills women learned as children influence political attitudes and opinions. Women continue to value relationships, the family and care taking, and this is reflected in the values and beliefs they adopt. Structural factors that account for gender difference are societal constraints that have limited women's integration into the conventional public sphere. Traditionally women 9 The care-giver or "motherhood" argument is sometimes interpreted as a biological explanation for gender difference. Ruddick, for example, argues that the fact that women can have children, whether they choose to or not, also makes them more peaceful (she also does not exclude men from being mothers). However, this study focuses on socialization explanations, mainly because biological explanations cannot adequately be tested with survey data. 15 have had less access to resources such as education and employment, have been responsible for the majority of childcare and care for the elderly, and when women have worked, it has often been as nurses, clerical workers, and grade school teachers. Women's position in society has changed dramatically in the past few decades. Women enter universities in numbers equal to men, have increasingly entered the workforce, and the number of women in traditionally male-dominated professions has also increased. Women also marry later, have fewer children, and spend less time as care takers. Many feminists argue that the change in women's position in society has resulted in changes in political attitudes and behaviour. Structural explanations are economic and socialization arguments. As women's socio-economic status changes, there is an expected change in attitudes. Many feminist authors argue that resources invested in defence and the military mean fewer resources are spent on daycare, healthcare, education and other policy areas that concern women (See Deitch, 1988; Everitt, 1996; Sylvester, 1994). As women's economic position improves, women's attitudes toward foreign policy may change. Two theories exist to explain how women's changing status in society accounts for gender difference. The first suggests that gender difference will disappear as women's access to societal resources increases. Researchers who support this view believe women and men are inherently the same, they have just been socialized differently. As women WILPF began as part of the suffrage movement at the turn of the century. Some suffrage movements supported the war effort (World War One), causing many feminists to leave these organizations and begin 16 become "equal" to men in education and employment status, women's and men's political attitudes and behaviour will become similar. The second theory suggests that as women's access to societal resources increases, they will be made aware of gender hierarchy within society. Women who enter colleges and universities and the workforce often face discrimination. Women in the workplace are often not promoted at the same rate as men, experience sexual harassment, and are often paid less than men. Women at universities often experience similar types of discrimination. They often report feeling ignored in classrooms, subjected to inappropriate comments, and learn subject matter that ignores women's contribution to society. The growth in women's studies courses and the inclusion of gender as a component in course material, has also helped make women aware of gender hierarchy. Many feminists argue that women's increased awareness of gender discrimination will influence political attitudes and behaviour. Women will be more aware of issues that disproportionately affect women and will begin to favour policy and legislation that promotes "women's issues." Women's increased education and income also means women experience greater autonomy. The emancipation from the home and economic dependence on husbands and Fathers, encourages political independence. Women may begin to express opinions and behaviour that reflects women's interests. This may result in an increase in difference between women's and men's attitudes. peace movements (Banks, 1993). 17 Feminism and gendef consciousness is an adult socialization argument for women's and men's difference. Many feminist scholars argue that the growth in the feminist movement in the past few decades has influenced women's political attitudes and behaviour by disseminating information and fighting for policy changes that benefit women." Issues that deal with force and violence and aggressive foreign policy are often on the agenda of women's organizations. Many feminist organizations argue that militarism is a form of violence and oppression (See Sylvester, 1994; Tickner, 1992; Enloe, 1993; Sowerby, 1997). The connection between feminist organizations and peace is not as simple as it may seem. Disputes about war divided many early feminist organizations fighting to gain the vote. Many feminists left Britain's best-organized suffrage organization, Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU), because the organization supported Br i an ' s involvement in the First World War (Banks, 1993).12 Canadian feminist leaders, such as Nellie McClung, also supported the war effort. She and many other feminists felt that Canada's involvement in the war would allow Canadian society to shed its colonial and parochial roots, and in the process, improve the status of women (Allen, 1971).13 Some scholars " Women's organizations have been influential in making sexual harassment in the workplace illegal, repealing outdated sexual assault laws, and fighting for a variety of women's benefits such as maternity leave. 121 have limited this discussion to women's attitudes toward peace and war. It is interesting to note, however, that some of Britain's women's organizations were often violent, in one case burning a train station. This also caused divisions within the movement. 1 3 American women's organizations were more united around the peace issue. The war was unpopular with the American public, so American's women's organizations had no incentive to support the war (Banks, 1993). 18 have argued that war has often raised women's position in society. Women entered both the workforce and universities in the absence of young men. Despite this diverse history, the link between feminism and peace is still strong. The majority of women's organizations that emerged after the First World War were committed to peace (Banks, 1993). Women were becoming increasingly aware of the gendered nature of warfare.14 Issues that involve violence were increasingly being included on the agenda of women's organizations. Association with feminist organizations generally means an exposure to the oppression and violence that result from war and militarism. Feminism "Second Wave" beginning in the early 1960s was a diverse movement, but shared rallied behind the issue of violence against women. Militarism has increasingly become part of this violence.15 Outline This study is divided into four sections. The introduction has presented the intent of the investigation, the contributing theoretical literature, and has briefly outlined some of the existing evidence. An assumption exists in much of the feminist TR literature that women are more peaceful. However, empirical evidence has been inconclusive. This investigation expands on this evidence and tests thoroughly the theories presented by feminist scholars. 14For example, Mary Sargent Florence, a turn of the century feminist, wroie Feminism and Militarism in 1918 which challenged policies such as conscription that targeted young men and the hardship suffered by women during war, both in battle and on the homefront. 19 Chapter two sets out the theoretical framework used in the investigation drawn from prior research by feminist theorists. The three explanations most prominent in accounting for gender difference toward foreign policy—caregiver, structural factors, and gender consciousness—are discussed at length. These explanations provide the -logic and theory behind the empirical investigation. Chapter three provides the empirical evidence. The Findings suggest that contrary to much of the theory discussed in chapter two, little difference occurs toward most foreign policy issues. The most substantial and consistent gap appears toward issues that involve conflict and direct violence. In Britain and the U.S., this gap is partially explained by the presence of children in the home. In Canada, however, gender consciousness explains part of the gap in the 1990s. Another finding contrary to much feminist theory, is the stability of women's attitudes across the four decades. Gaps that appeared in the 1960s were likely to be the same in the 1990s. When the gap did fluctuate, it is more likely that men's attitudes changed. Chapter four comments on the results of the study. The largest gap does not appear toward foreign policy, but force and violence. The findings also challenge some of the basic assumptions made by feminists scholars. Women do not necessarily make a strong connection between defence spending, weapons, and general militarism and violence. In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that women are less in favour of general military 1 5 Some feminist IR scholars (Petersen, 1992; Tickner, 1992) have argued that entering the military is a means for women to gain equality. However, many of these feminists (Petersen, 1994 and Tickner, 1997) 20 issues than men. Finally, many feminist scholars have rejected "motherhood" as a viable argument for difference, yet it is the presence of children that actually does provide some explanation for gender difference. 21 Chapter Two: Theoretical Context: Gendered Perspectives of International Relations Three explanations that account for difference in women's and men's attitudes toward foreign policy can be identified in feminist IR literature. The first suggests that women are more peaceful than men because of their role as "care giver" and nurturer. Early childhood socialization based on sex difference teaches girls to value qualities that enhance social and communal relations. As women, this caring nature translates into political expression influencing attitudes toward policy. The second explanation suggests that structural constraints account for the difference in women's and men's attitudes. Traditionally women have had less access to resources such as education, job training, and occupational status. Women's lower socio-economic status influences attitudes toward particular policy issues. It is assumed that women are more supportive of the welfare state and less supportive of the military and defense spending (Deitch, 1988; Everitt, 1995). As women's access to education and integration into the workplace increases, differences between women and men are expected to diminish (for further discussion of socialization and structural constraints see Togeby, 1994; Studlar, 1998). Finally, the politicization of women expressed mainly through "gender consciousness" and identification with feminism is a social constructivist hypothesis that accounts for difference in attitudes toward foreign policy and in particular, attitudes toward war and conflict. Social identity based on the awareness of and identification with gender is constructed through the growth of the feminist movement in the past few decades. Most feminism(s), particularly those associated with Second Wave Feminism (liberal, social, cultural feminism, for example) share a commitment to end oppression and violence. Many feminist scholars argue that the feminist commitment to end oppression translates into a commitment to end violence and militarism. 22 The Care Giver Approach to International Relations Feminist IR scholars who subscribe to the "care giver" approach to international relations emphasize compromise, empathy, value for human life and the importance of social relations that are associated with the experience of being a woman in most societies (Many feminist IR theorists have discussed the care giver approach; see Sylvester, 1994; Tickner, 1997; Sowerby, 1997). Women are primarily responsible for raising children, and taking care of the home, and dominate care-taking professions such as nursing and teaching. In the international arena it is argued these qualities predispose women to value peace over conflict. Women are more inclined to negotiate, to compromise and to avoid aggressive and competitive behaviour. Feminists rely on findings from several related fields to support the "care giver" position. One hypothesis is that women's unique experience of motherhood is related to a feminist-pacifist commitment. The link between motherhood and peace was popular with first wave feminists who suggested that mothers could not support a war that would leave their husbands and sons dead. Olive Schreiner, an early century feminist expressed this view succinctly when she wrote "there is, perhaps, no woman, whether she have borne children, or be merely potentially a child bearer, who could look down upon a battlefield covered with slain, but the thought would rise in her, 'So many mothers' sons! So many bodies brought into the world to lie there'" (Schreiner, 1992: 18). Suffragettes in both Britain and North America used a "moral motherhood" argument to obtain the vote. It was thought that once women began to vote an end to war and conflict would soon follow. This did not come to fruition.16 1 6 As discussed in the introduction, feminist were divided on the war issue. Many feminist organizations argued that the war would benefit women's position in society and women would be awarded the vote for their support of the war effort (Banks, 1993; Allen, 1971). 23 Cultural feminists who celebrate female values and identity have revived this link between motherhood and peace (See Ruddick, 1989; Chodorow, 1978). Sara Ruddick argues that the potential for motherhood promotes "maternal thinking" characterized by empathy, respect for human life, skills for reconciliation and "preservative love." These characteristics of motherhood lead to a pacifist commitment, an alternative to male aggression and violence. Motherhood, in conjunction with feminism provides the characteristic necessary to transform human life leading to a more peaceful world. Although she does not limit motherhood to just women, allowing for the possibility that men may be mothers, she does argue that maternal thinking is a form of cognition that in the present is more commonly associated with women. Three concepts of motherhood are examined by Ruddick (See also Sowerby for a discussion of Ruddick's work on motherhood): the mater delorosa; the mater pieta; and terra mater. The mater delorosa represents the wartime mother; a woman scrounging for food to ensure the survival of her family. She represents the suffering during war while at the same time she supports the war effort by maintaining the family on the homefront. The mater pieta is a peace time version of the mater delorosa. She embodies the feminine, the virtuous mother who cares for her home^and family with patience and a sense of duty during times of peace. She acts as a counter to the image of the masculine warrior that dominates western society. The terra mater represents the image of "mother earth". Women have often been associated with nature as opposed to culture. Women are responsible for giving life, maintaining the family, and providing nurturance, all in the private sphere. Men, on the other hand, are associated with the public sphere, rational thought, and politics. 24 Eileen Sowerby relies on Ruddick's idea of maternal thinking to support her argument that motherhood is not consistent with warfare. She also believes that both women and men can learn the skills necessary to "mother". Contrary to popular opinion that motherhood is natural, she argues that it is a socially learned behaviour. Women develop peaceful attributes such as compassion, empathy and unconditional love because they are called upon to act as mothers. She cites conflict resolution as an example of a skill learned by mothers that would benefit international negotiations: Conflict resolution is reputedly a new discipline using many techniques that are not new—mothers have used some conflict resolution strategies for generations. (For example, to resolve conflict over how two children share a cake—one child cuts and the other chooses) Its advantage is that it tries to turn a win/lose, or even a lose/lose confrontational situation into a win/win amicable situation (Sowerby: 63). Not all feminists are comfortable with Ruddick's assertion that the potential for motherhood results in a more peaceful nature. One criticism \„ that Ruddick claims to s P e a k f o r a | j m o m e r S 5 universalizing the concept of motherhood. Although she acknowledges that r a c e ' C ' a s s a n c * s e x u a n t y a f f e c t maternal practice there is an underlying set of maternal activities common to all mothers. These are the preservation of life, nurturance and social training. The transition from motherhood to peace politics is perhaps far more complicated than Ruddick suggests (Bailey, 1998). The maternal practice that, she argues, all mothers share does not necessarily manifest itself in a way that promotes peace and non-violent behaviour. Militarism and war are socially constructed activities that rely on socialization practices and an ideology that society must 25 be preserved. Maternal thinking and practices can just as easily translate into a means to support war and conflict. In Canada, for example, women were used to recruit soldiers in World War Two by pinning white flowers on young men who were not fighting in the war. Ruddick's idea of motherhood has two elements. First there is the potential to bear children, linking motherhood with biology. And, second, there is the concept of motherhood defined by a particular set of beliefs and values (See also Klein, 1984 for a discussion of motherhood). Many feminists, in contrast to Ruddick's claims of maternal thinking, argue that motherhood is not a stable category (See Klein, 1984). In the past few decades motherhood as the defining feature of female identity has begun to change. Men have begun to assume more child rearing responsibilities. In industrial nations the birth rate has declined (See Klein 1984; Walby, 1987). Smaller families with fewer children mean that women spend less time rising children than in the past. A l l these factors have increased the amount of time available to women for other activities. Carol Gilligan's hugely influential but controversial work on difference is often cited to support the "care giver" approach to international relations. In several studies of difference she reports that girls and women tend to value social relations, caring and demonstrate a concern for others. In contrast men and boys are more inclined to exhibit competitive behaviour and value individual achievement (See In a Different Voice and Between Voice and Silence: Women and Girls, Race and Relationship co-authored with Jill McLean Taylor and Amy Sullivan). Some feminist IR scholars use Gilligan's theory of difference to support the claim of a unique women's perspective on issues that concern peace and conflict. Women's caring nature and concern for social relations affects how 26 women think about foreign policy. It is suggested that women are less likely to support militarism and conflict. Women also learn to negotiate and compromise, which are skills required to promote peace. When one begins with the study of women and derives developmental constructs from their lives, the outline of a moral conception different from that described by Freud, Piaget, and Kohlberg begins to emerge and informs a different description of development. In this conception, the moral conflict arises from conflicting responsibilities rather than from competing rights and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than formal and abstract. This conception of morality as concerned with the activity of care centers moral development around the understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as fairness ties moral development to the understanding of rights and rules (Gilligan, 1982: 19). Many feminists are uncomfortable with Gilligan's assertion of difference between women and men. She is accused of "gender stereotyping" and "universalizing" the experience of women. Her conclusions suggest not just a difference between females and males in moral development, but also a superior feminine epistemology and ontology (See Heyes, 1997) Gilligan's work maintains "harmful, oppositional dichotomies between people t ^ a t contribute to the hierarchical thinking that is part of the practice of war" (Kaplan, 1998). This denies the complex relationship not just between the genders but also among different groups of women and men. Race, class, sexuality also influence behavior and attitudes. On some issues, including foreign policy, it is conceivable that women and men of similar race and class may have more in common than all women (See Fine, 1998). Structural Explanations 27 The second explanation of women's and men's difference is structural. Structural differences refer to societal constraints including occupation, income and education that limit political resources. Women's traditional lack of access to higher education and professional work have long been thought to affect women's involvement in and opinions about, politics. In the past few decades the number of women enrolled in higher education has increased dramatically. In Canada, for example, 54% of enrollment in universities and community colleges in 1996/97 were women. This is an increase from 40% in 1972. Although they are still outnumbered by men, women have also enrolled in graduate programs at an increasing rate. Work status has changed dramatically as well. More women than ever have entered the work force. Prior to the Second World War, few women were employed outside the home. During the war years, women occupied many jobs traditionally held by men. Women also enrolled in universities in far greater numbers at this time because so many young men were fighting in the war, enrollment at universities declined. After the war many women returned to the home (Friedan, 1963), but others kept their paid work. Over the past few decades women have also entered traditionally male dominated fields of employment such as engineering, medicine, academics and agriculture at an increasing rate. There are several reasons why women have entered the work force in greater numbers. Economic conditions in the 1970s forced many families to rely on two incomes. Women spend more of their lives single and have fewer children and are therefore accustomed to paid employment. Increased education has also increased women's awareness that paid employment is not only an option, but may add fulfillment to women's lives. And Walby points out that the work place has also changed in ways that benefit women. There is 28 more part-time work which is convenient for women with children. Women are also more willing to accept part-time over full-time employment. Increased technology has also made it possible for many employees to work at home. Again, this is a favourable situation for women with children. Structural differences affect women's political attitudes in three ways. First, the feminization of poverty has long been observed in western societies, as women continue to rely on the welfare state in far greater numbers than men (Klein, 1984; Walby, 1997; Deitch, 1988; Everitt, 1995). This situation has been exacerbated by increasing numbers of women who are the sole care takers of children, continue to work in low paid jobs or have to rely on the state for aid. It is assumed that women are more supportive of government legislation that maintains social assistance programs. It is also assumed that women will be less supportive of government spending on defence and the decision of governments to go to war (Deitch, 1988). The economic and social cost of spending money on weapons and war instead of childcare and education is considerably higher for women than it is for men (Lake, 1982). Second, women's traditional lack of access to societal resources affects women's integration into the political sphere (Togeby, 1994; Sylvester, 1994; Klein, 1984). Women's association with the family and with domestic responsibilities has lead many researchers to assume that women are apathetic and apolitical (The Civic Culture. 1963 by Almond and Verba and The American Voter, 1960 by Campbell et al.). Nowhere has this been truer than in the field of international relations. Many feminist scholars have denounced IR as "one of the most gender blind, indeed crudely patriarchal, of all institutionalized forms of contemporary social and political analysis" (Walker, 1992). Some feminist scholars (See Sylvester, 1994; Enloe, 1992) argue that the position outside 29 the dominant sphere gives women a unique perspective on the international system and issues that relate to foreign policy. In a measurement of attitudes women can be expected to favour domestic issues such as education and welfare programs over defence issues (Deitch, 1988; Lake, 1981; Everitt, 1996; Vickers, 1993). Third, women have not been socialized to enter the military in most western industrialized nations.17 Some feminists argue this begins in childhood with the designation of games and toys as "masculine" and "feminine" (Vickers, 1990; Elshtain, 1987). Boys are encouraged to play with guns, G.I. Joes and army paraphernalia, while girls play with dolls and dishes. Boys grow up pretending they are engaged in military combat, while girls decorate Barbie's dream house. As adults, the military is an acceptable career option for men, but not for most women. In the past, women have served mainly as clerical staff and nurses. Specific policies also target young men for military service. In times of crisis the U.S., Canada and Britain have all conscripted young men to fight in the war. In the U.S. men still register with the military when they turn eighteen (Vickers, 1993). The lack of women's socialization toward the military may explain why women would have different attitudes toward foreign policy issues.18 First, women just do not have the same experience as men when it comes to both direct and indirect contact with the military. This lack of "real" experience has lead many scholars and politicians to assume This is changing. Women are entering the military in greater numbers. Women in other countries at different times in history have been active in the military. Currently women in Israel are required to enter the military (if they are single and they are usually not in combat roles) and in the 19th century women in Austria fought alongside men and were entitled to military awards (Vickers, 1993) Men, however, still make up the majority of recruits, and it has only been recently that women in industrialized nations have taken part in combat. 1 8 Gingras (1995) examined the gender gap in attitudes toward peace in the military and found little difference between women and men. 30 women are more peaceful because they do not understand, nor are they interested in, international politics. Second, lack of military service places a barrier for women interested in taking part in the institutions that make and implement foreign policy (Grant, 1991). An example of how military service can affect a woman's entry into politics was apparent in the George Bush and Geraldine Ferarro debate. Bush made constant reference to his role as a fighter pilot in the Korean War. The implication was obvious: How could a woman with no military service be in charge of the world's most powerful military (Vickers, 1993)?19 Structural differences between women and men do not fully capture the impact of gender on women's attitudes. The argument that women are rational actors whose attitudes are contingent on social and economic circumstance relies on an individualistic analysis of human behaviour (Everitt, 1996; Steele, 1998). It is assumed that women and men share similar motivations and ignores the possibility that gender, regardless of economic status, plays an important role in determining women's attitudes. For example, it is often assumed that once women's and men's socio-economic status is equal, the gender gap will disappear. Many studies, however, show that the largest gender gap appears among women and men who are educated and in a higher income bracket (See Everitt, 1998). It is possible that women's experience in academia and as professionals raises a gender consciousness (discussed more fully in the next section). Women may be more aware of the difficulties women face in a society dominated by men. According to Lise Togeby: 1 9 Women's lack of socialization in the military is probably a contributing factor to women's and men's differences in attitudes toward defence and military issues. However, this explanation is not tested in the empirical model because the data does not provide adequate measures. 31 The full integration of women in the labor force has admittedly resulted in growing equality between men and women, but it has not resulted in anything like full equality in the labor market, in political life, or in the family...It is therefore to be expected that women will pay more attention to unacceptable conditions and to unequal treatment than before, and they will make political demands for changes. In general, we will expect women to become more leftist and especially more feminist (Togeby, 1994: 217). In other words, education and involvement in the labour force may actually increase difference between women and men. The argument that women are not apolitical, but have a unique perspective that can be attributed to their socio-economic position, does not fully consider the changing nature of gender and gender relations in society. There is an assumption that gender is a stable category influenced by women's position outside the traditional economic and social sphere. This does not take into account women's changing role and status in society. Women's participation in the workforce and level of education has increased in the past few decades (Klein, 1984; Walby, 1997). It was once thought that women comprised mainly a reserve labour force, but with the increased importance and availability of part time work and the number of people who work from home, women have become more integrated into the public sphere (Walby, 1997; Togeby, 1994). Women's lack of military service is also limited in explaining gender difference. Women and men may not be socialized to participate in the military equally, but women have certainly been socialized to support the military through war work, providing sons to enter the military, and rallying behind soldiers going to battle. Women are also "nationalistic" and are concerned about protection from outside threats. This can translate into support for military activity. Militarism may be "gendered" but it does follow that women will be less supportive of the military as a result. 32 Feminism and Gender Consciousness Finally, many feminists argue that feminism and "gender consciousness" are responsible for difference in women's and men's attitudes toward peace and conflict. Feminism and gender consciousness are concepts that are related, but are not necessarily the same thing. Elizabeth Adell Cook (1989) points out that it is not necessary to identify as a feminist to have gender consciousness. The growth of the women's movement has made women aware of issues that affect mainly women, such as childcare, violence against women, abortion and sexual harassment. Increases in women's education and work experience have also made women more aware of gender inequality within society. Gender consciousness has been defined in many ways. Virginia Sapiro defines gender consciousness as "identifying with women as a social group, having an awareness of gender inequality and believing this inequality to be illegitimate, locating the reasons for inequality in social causes and assuming a need for collective as opposed to individual solutions" (Sapiro, 1992: 232). Klein (1984) describes gender consciousness ab a type of group consciousness with three components: identification with the group and the recognition of common interests; reject the rationale of the situation of the group; and recognize the need for group solutions. These definitions suggest there is a close relationship between gender consciousness and feminism. The awareness of the influence of gender in society and the hierarchical relationship between the genders, influences political attitudes. Bashevkin argues that the history of women's involvement in socialism, and in particular the impact of feminism, explains women's attitudes. Early studies that produce gender difference in attitudes toward particular issues often referred to women's "moralism"as an explanation. She maintains that "the anti-war and pro-social spending attitudes are liberal, not 33 conservative, in orientation (Bashevkin, 1984: 51). Women's organizations in the first few decades of this century were closely related to social movements. Feminism as a political activity has long been associated with peace and peace movements. Organizations such as Women's League for Peace and Freedom and the Cooperative Guild have existed since the early 1900s and more recently the Greenham Common's women's peace camp has received international attention. Feminism and peace share an important commitment: "both are critical of, and committed to the elimination of, coercive power over privilege systems of domination as a basis of interaction between individuals and groups" (Warren and Duane, 1998: 3). The feminist critique of international relations is that it is based on a hierarchy that values male-identified over female-identified attributes. Many feminist IR scholars argue that this male-identification supports war and conflict as a social activity. The feminist movement and women's organizations have also been concerned with the issue of violence. For many Second Wave feminists, the fight against violence against women has been a common theme uniting the movement. Enloe writes: Feminist thinking about peace is not necessarily locked in this war/peace dichotomy. Perhaps because feminists start from the conditions of women's lives, and because they see how many forms violence and oppression can take, they are more likely to define peace as women's achievement of control over their lives (Enloe, 1993: 65). The military and war create the potential for violence. Feminist IR scholars have begun to focus, and educate the public about, the gendered nature of warfare (See Enloe, 1993; Sylvester, 1994; Vickers, 1993). Women (and children) in Rwanda and the former 34 Yugoslavia have been discriminated against, targeted for acts of violence (such as rape often resulting in pregnancy, damage to the body and death), marginalized and tortured because of their gender. Women, children and the elderly have also outnumbered other groups in refugee camps. The military also creates forms of indirect violence which have received more attention in the past decade.20 Prostitution rings have materialized around military bases in the Philippines, Indonesia and Japan to "service" soldiers (Sterdevant and Stoltzfus, 1992). Women have been removed from their villages in the country and taken to urban centres for this purpose. After a few years of making money for their families, women are often unable to return to their homes because they will not be accepted by their families and friends because of their profession. In the past, women have been used as "comfort" women during war and forced into prostitution. Dutch and Chinese women have recently asked for, and received, an apology from the Japanese government for the abuse they suffered during the Second World War (Vickers, 1993). This abuse has been acceptable to, even supported by, military institutions. Feminist and women's organizations around the world have rallied together to make citizens around the world aware of the plight of women as a result of the military and war. Most women learn from an early age that they are vulnerable in society and are at risk for violence and can relate to the sufferings of other women. Increasingly women, (and men) are becoming aware of the gendered nature of warfare and how it affects women. Feminism is able to influence attitudes by raising gender consciousness in women and men and promoting policy and legislation that addresses women's issues. Social welfare 2 0 Many of these women also experience direct violence. 35 policies, equality, and issues of force and violence are frequently on the agenda of feminist and women's organizations (Everitt, 1995). As the issues that concern women, including issues of international violence, are conveyed to the public through the media, the education system and legislation, women's and men's attitudes toward certain policy issues should begin to change. For example, sexual harassment in the workplace has received public attention in the past few years, mainly because women's organizations have made it a public issue. As a result, both Canada and the U.S. have passed legislation making sexual harassment in the workplace illegal. Employers have also changed work environments in response, banning sexual material, educating employees and putting in place specific policies. This may eventually have long term effects on attitudes of both women and men in the work place. Many feminists argue these issues are more salient to women who identify with feminism from the personal experience of being a woman (Sapiro, 1990). This implies a difference between women and men in attitudes toward these issues. It is women who are more likely to suffer from poverty, rely on social assistance, have the majority of childcare and domestic responsibilities and fear violence, even in their own home. It is argues that these personal experiences have a greater impact on women. Men may be able to sympathize, but they cannot fully understand the experience of being a woman in society. The size of the feminist movement has increased steadily in the past few decades in both North America and Britain. Much of the literature about the feminist movement describes feminist activists as young, educated and employed (See Klein, 1984; Addell Cook, 1989; Everitt, 1998; Norris and Inglehart, 1998; Fine, 1998). Klein (1984) suggests that these young feminists also lack strong religious affiliations and attachment to 36 traditional values. She also found an increase in the number of women who identify as o feminist. This suggests that as women come of age, they are increasingly identifying with feminism. Feminism as an agent of social change is far more complex than this simple analysis suggests. Within the feminist movement there is an abundance of political thought that reflects a variety of perspectives. It cannot be assumed that all women or all feminists subscribe to so-called "women's issues" that deal with social welfare, violence, abortion and childcare. The influence of the feminist movement and the development of gender consciousness may manifest in many ways and affect attitudes not just toward "women's issues" but toward a variety of issues that include both social and economic concerns. For example, age may influence how receptive a woman or man is to feminist issues. Women and men who come of age during the feminist movement are more likely to identify with feminism as a social movement (Klein, 1984; See also Everitt, 1995 and Deitch, 1988). Difference in attitudes may be more affected by age. A second consideration is the social and economic position of women. It is suggested that young, unmarried women are more receptive to feminism and more likely to acquire gender consciousness than women who live with men (Klein, 1984; Sapiro, 1990).21 Young, unmarried women also have a variety of political interests that are not entirely focused on policy that deals with childcare, education, abortion and welfare policy. Testing the Explanations 2 1 Young, unmarried women are not specifically tested in the model. The explanations have been drawn mainly from feminist IR literature. Feminism as an explanation dates back to the turn of the century and women's association with peace movements. Therefore, women's identification with feminism and equality issues is the measure used. 37 In the following chapter the explanations for gender difference are operationalized through survey data collected in Canada, the U.S., and Britain. The theory as to why gaps may appear toward foreign policy issues provides critical information about how to proceed in setting up the empirical model. As discussed in the introduction, the caregiver approach is difficult to test. How do we determine who is a caregiver? Theoretical research connects the caregiver approach to motherhood. This measure is weak, but provides a starting point for testing the hypothesis. Structural constraints are generally discussed by feminist scholars in terms of women's traditional lower socio-economic status. Education and income levels are available in each country and reflect, to some degree, women's position outside the conventional political sphere. And finally, theories that address the influence of feminism and the development of gender consciousness provide insight into how to measure the explanation. Identity merely as "feminist" does not fully encompass gender consciousness. More than one measure is needed to identify not just feminists, but women who are aware of gender inequalities within society. 38 Chapter Three: Data and Methods The analysis in this study relies on data collected from the American National Election Study (NES) for the United States, the Gallup Poll and the Canadian Election Study (CES) for Canada, and the British Election Study (BES) for Britain. The NES is a cumulative file based on pre election interviews and post election re-interviews between 1960-1992. The 1996 data set is a similar format but is not yet included in the cumulative file. The average number of cases for each study is approximately 3,500. In Canada the Gallup Poll is used between 1965 and 1984 and relies on both telephone interviews and mail out surveys. The average number of cases for Gallup and CES ranges between 1,000 to 1.200. BES conducts personal interviews based on a sample of parliamentary constituencies. The average number of cases over the four decades is 3,500. The dependent variables are foreign policy questions, set up as dichotomous variables (0.1), with "peaceful" responses assigned the value 1." Women are expected to choose the more "peaceful" response. Questions are organized into three categories to allow for easy comparison across the countries: actual conflict and use of military force; isolationism (this refers to attitudes toward a country's involvement in world problems); and general military issues (defence spending and nuclear weapons, for example). The independent variables are demographic variables to test the three explanations discussed in the previous chapter—motherhood, socio-economic status and gender consciousness—re-scaled to fall between the values 0 and l . 2 3 Reducing the variables to the same scale allows for a comparison of the coefficients. 2 2 One NES question—militarism is a scale from 0-97. The scale is reduced to fall between 0-1, the mean score calculated, and then the variable is set up as dichotomous, with scores below the mean assigned the value, 1. 2 3 Feminist identity in the U.S. is a seven point scale. The same method used in the scale toward militarism is used for this scale (See footnote 11). More detail as to the method is given in the analysis of each country. 39 Finding a measure for the caregiver hypothesis is difficult. The best measure available is women with children, a poor measure. The question for each country asks the respondent to list the number of children under eighteen years of age living at home. This means that older women who have already raised children are excluded, along with men. However, this is the best measure available and does provide some indication of the effects of the caregiver hypothesis. A l l women who indicate they have a child at home, are assigned the value, 1, without children assigned the value, 0. Next, women's socio-economic status is examined, depending on the availability of measures in each country. A l l three countries provide some measure of income, education and professional work status (details about the actual questions used are given in the analysis of each country). Two theories exist to explain the impact of women's improved socio-economic status on the gender gap. First, the gap will diminish as women's education and income increase and they become "equal" to men. Second, as women face more obstacles in the workplace and education institutions, they becouie more aware of gender relations and their political attitudes will diverge from men. Women with higher education and work status are assigned the value, 1. If the gap decreases, women's socio-economic explains at least part of the gap. If the gap increases, professional, educated women show a greater difference in attitudes with men than women with less education. Finally, the impact of the feminist movement and gender consciousness is examined. The measurement of this variable differs in each country. Feminism and gender consciousness is another difficult measure. As already discussed, women may recognize gender hierarchy within society, but not necessarily identify as feminist. Some feminist scholars (Cook, 1988; Fine, 1998; Sapiro, 1990) argue that better measures would ask women if they identify with other women. However, this type of question was not 40 included in the survey data used in this study. When available I have tried to use more than one question (feminism and equality issues) to measure gender consciousness. Women who respond that they are in favour of equality or believe that women should be able to work outside the home, are demonstrating that they recognize that in the past women's choices about work and family have been limited. Women who identify as feminist or indicate they are in favour of women's equality, are assigned the value, 1. The method I use is a "stage-wise" regression. In the first stage the difference between women's and men's responses without controls are recorded. The next three stages include gender and each of the three explanations (motherhood, socio-economic status and gender consciousness). Each stage is run independently producing four separate regression equations. For example, attitudes toward militarism are examined first with only the gender variable included. The next stage includes gender and motherhood; the third stage gender and socio-economic status; and finally gender and gender consciousness. The more an explanation accounts for difference in women's and men's response, the greater the decrease in the gender gap. Figure 3.1 is a diagram of the stage-wise regression, showing the independent variables. Stages 2-4 include gender plus an explanation. 41 Figure 3.1-Stage-Wise Regression Stage One Stage Two Stage Three Stage Four Gender Only Gender + Gender + Gender + Caregiver Structural Constraints Gender Consciousness The data sets have several limitations. The British and Canadian data do not include as many foreign policy issues as the U.S. This may reflect a difference in importance of foreign policy issues among the three countries. And questions are not consistent. This makes it difficult to assess trends that may appear over time in each country. In Canada, for example, questions that deal with conflict occur only in 1966 and 1993. Specific questions cannot consistently be compared across the three countries. There are enough similarities, however, to detect certain trends. Each country asks questions that pertain to military spending and specific conflict so it is possible to examine the data and determine if particular trends exist. Cross-Time Trends Tables 1 to 3 provide information about the size, stability and growth of the gender gap over the four decades, for gender and foreign policy (Stage 1, Figure 3.1). The largest and most consistent gap in all three countries appears in attitudes toward conflict. The gender gap remains fairly stable in all three countries until the early 1980s. Growth in the 42 gap seems to depend on the country and specific issue. In Britain and the U.S., for example, the gap grew for some issues, but not all. The information in these tables does not indicate whether it is women's or men's attitudes that have changed. The comparison of means in the following section is a better indication of changing attitudes. Military Issues In the United States (See Table-1) general military issues do not produce a significant gap and this is fairly stable in all the years examined. Two years, however, do produce a significant difference between female and male response, with women more in favour of militarism in 1974 and defence spending in 1990 (by 7% and 8% respectively). In all other years the gap is not significant. It is possible that these years are a response to specific foreign policy issues. Contrary to the U.S.. the gap toward general military issues in Britain does change over the decades examined. By 1992 the gap toward nuclear weapons increases to 9% from 4% in 1983, with women less in favour of nuclear weapons. A similar pattern is found in attitudes toward defence spending. In 1974, a significant gap exists (7%) with women actually less in favour of cutting defence spending. By 1983 this gap disappears entirely and by 1992 the gap increases to 15% with women now less in favour of defence spending. There are few issues available to really measure cross-time trends in Canada. From the data available it appears that there is little difference in female-male response toward general military issues. Until 1983 no significant gap appears. In 1988, there is a slight 43 increase in the gender gap toward the testing of cruise missiles (from 3% in 1983 to 5% in 1988). This may indicate a trend toward an increasing gap, but it is difficult to determine with the data available. Isolationism Until the early 1980s, the gap in the U.S. remains fairly stable, at 4%-5% for America's involvement in world problems, which is not that significant (See Table 2). In the 1980s, the gap increases to a more significant level of 7%-8%. A significant gap also appears in Britain in the early 1970s. Women are less in favour (by 7% in 1974) of ties with America. Canada, however does not follow this trend. In the years examined, no significant gap occurs. Contrary to original expectations, questions about communism produce large gaps in both Britain and the U.S., with women less in favour of good relations with Russia in the U.S. and more in favour of curbing Communism in Britain (from 16% in 1976 to 9% in 1988 in the U.S. and a 9% difference in Britain in 1974). It is difficult to determine why women would be less in favour of communism and good relations with Russia, given the evidence that woman are increasingly supporting parties on the left (Inglehart and Norris, 1998). Some evidence suggest that women are often more nationalistic than men so it is possible that anti-Communism is an expression of nationalism. During the Cold War Russia was the "enemy," the opposition for Western Democratic nations. Opposition to Russia may be a way of expressing nationalism and support for one's own country. Another plausible explanation is that women differ ideologically from men on a left-right 44 spectrum. Some evidence suggests that although women are supporting leftist parties, their ideological position is more conservative (Wilcox et al., 1996). Women's lack of support for Communism may be a reflection of ideological beliefs. Involvement in Conflict Attitudes toward actual conflict produce the most significant gender gap, with women less supportive of the conflict in all three countries. The only exception is the Falklands War in Britain which did not produce a gap (1 %) (discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). In the U.S. and Canada, the gap shows little change from the 1960s to the 1990s. In the U.S. the difference between women and men ranges from 5% in 1964 to 13% in 1968 toward the Vietnam War and 9% in 1992 toward the Gulf War. In Canada, women are less supportive of U.S. involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s and peace keeping at the risk of death in the 1990s. In Britain, however, the gender gap increases from the early 1980s when conflict questions were first asked, to the 1990s. In 1983 women were 13% less likely to support the presence of British troops in Northern Ireland, but this increases to 30% in 1992. A 30% difference in female and male response is quite large. British women and men differ quite dramatically in attitudes toward conflict. 45 TABLE 3.1—GENDER GAP TOWARD MILITARY ISSUES General Military Issues 1964 1968 1974 1980 1982 1984 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 United States Mil i tar ism -2 -1 -7 0 — -1 -1 — 1 2 . . . . Defense Spend ing — — — 1 — 0 . . . . -8 -3 . . . . 1 Britain 1963 1970 1974 1983 1992 Nuc lear W e a p o n s 3 -4 — — . 4 — — . . . . 9 — — Unsa fe wi th nuc lear miss i les . . . . . . . . — — 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — Mili tary C u t s — . . . . -7 . . . . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . — — Defense spend ing . . . . — — — 0 . . . . . . . . 15 — — Canada 1966 1975 1983 1988 Admi t C h i n a to the U N 3 C h a n c e s of nuc lear war -2 U.S. test c ru ise miss i les 3 5 Noic: All numbers are percentages. The number indicates the difference between women's and men's response. Positive numbers indicate women chose the more peace response. Statistically significant gaps in bold. 46 TABLE 3.2—GENDER GAP TOWARD ISOLATIONISM Isolationism 1964 1968 1 9 7 4 1976 1980 1982 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 2 1996 U n i t e d S t a t e s Invo lvement : wor ld p r o b l e m s . . . . 5 . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 4 7 8 8 Relat ions wi th Russ ia . . . . — . . . . — -16 . . . . - 1 1 -9 — B r i t a i n 1963 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 4 1983 1 9 9 2 T ies wi th A m e r i c a 3 7 — . . . . Increase Fore ign A id — 2 — Curb C o m m u n i s m . . . . - 9 — C a n a d a 1983 1988 Increase N A T O cont r ibu t ion 3 5 Stay in N A T O Note: All numbers are percentages. The number indicates the difference between women's and men's response. Positive numbers indicate women chose the more peace response. Statistically significant gaps are in bold. 47 T A B L E 3.3—GENDER G A P T O W A R D A C T U A L C O N F L I C T Involvement in conflict 1964 1966 1968 1974 1980 1982 1 9 9 2 1994 U n i t e d S t a t e s Peacefu l se t t lement 5 8 13 9 . . . . . . . . — 12 Enter conf l ic t 5 9 13 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 B r i t a i n 1 9 6 3 1970 1974 1983 1 9 9 2 Falk lands — . . . . — 1 N. Ireland — — — 13 3 0 C a n a d a 1966 1 9 9 3 US invo lvement in V i e t n a m 8 Part ic ipate in p e a c e keep ing if sold iers at risk 8 Note: All numbers arc percentages. The number indicates the difference between women's and men's response. Positive numbers indicate women chose the more peace response. Statistically significant gaps are in bold. 48 Changing Attitudes Figures 3.2 to 3.6 are graphs of the mean scores for women and men toward issues that show changes in the gender gap.24 The mean score is the average response to the survey questions. Examining whether mean scores are increasing or decreasing is a good way to determine if attitudes are changing. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 are the mean scores for defence spending and militarism in the U.S. As discussed, a gap appears toward militarism in 1974 and defence spending in 1990 (7% and 8% respectively), with women more in favour of both. The graphs indicate that both women's and men's attitudes have remained reasonable stable. Not much difference appears between women's and men's mean scores toward defence spending. Figure 3.3 indicates that men's attitudes have changed toward militarism, becoming slightly less militaristic in 1974. Women's mean scores indicate that their attitudes toward general military issues shifted in the same direction, but this shift was not as great. Figure 3.4 is a graph of the mean scores of U.S. involvement in world problems. It is different from the first two graphs because there is a general trend for the gap to increase by the late 1980s and 1990s (Refer to Table 3.2). An examination of the mean scores shows that both women's and men's attitudes toward this issue have varied from year to year. Again, it is men's attitudes that have changed. Men have become more in favour of U.S. involvement in world problems, which explains the increase in the gap. Can any conclusions be drawn from this information to explain the increase in the gender gap? Although an examination of mean scores offer no conclusive explanation as to why the gap expanded in these years, more information is now available to construct a 2 4 Graphs of Canadian data are not used. The gap remained fairly stable in Canada over the four decades. 49 reasonable hypothesis. A change in men's attitudes explains changes in the gender gap toward militarism and isolationism. In 1974 the U.S. had recently pulled out of the war in Vietnam. By this time, this was an unpopular war entered into by an unpopular government. It is reasonable to assume that the American population would respond with less support for the military, men perhaps more vehemently since so many young men were drafted for this war. Men's attitudes toward isolationism in the 1980s may be changing in response to the greater role the U.S. has played in international politics. The gender gap in Britain increases in the 1980s and 1990s toward all three issues. Figures 3.5-3.6 show the mean scores for defence spending and nuclear weapons. " Men's mean scores change the most dramatically for both issues, indicating that changes in men's attitudes explain the increased gender gap. Between 1983 and 1992 men's support for nuclear weapons increases. It is difficult to determine whether this is a general trend or a response to foreign policy in that year. In 1992, Britain was involved in the Gulf War. The international environment seemed less stable then it had a few years earlier. Men may have been responding to this. A similar argument can be made to explain why men's support for defence spending also increased. 2 5 An increase in the gender gap toward actual conflict also occurred. However, there are only two points in the graph, so it has been excluded. 3HCOS NV3W Iff! LU I I -z S cn < t-Q rr < o 00 LU £E o O C/3 < LU Z LU CC < UJ >-Q Z < 00 z LU LL O X < o co p j LU IT D O LL S3UOOS NV3W ^ d ' n . d ^ d T d ° o o o o o S 3 U 0 0 S NV3W < OC DO CO o Q. < HI DC < 111 _ l O 3 Z Q GC < O I -to LU r r O o co z < LU LL O X CL < GC O to CO LU QC (3 LL CM CD CT) CO co rr < UJ o cn co co cn S3HCOS NV3IAI 56 Explanations for the Gender Gap Tables 4 to 6 show the impact of the three explanations on the gender gap. The first column shows only the gender coefficient with no controls. This is the first stage of the regression (see Figure 3.1) and the gaps that occur in this column have already been discussed in detail in the previous two sections (Cross-Time trends^and Changing Attitudes). The next three columns represent the three stages of the stage-wise regression. Each of the three explanations is included in the regression equation with gender, and the gender coefficients recorded. If the coefficient for gender decreases once the variables for ah explanation have been added, the explanation accounts for at least part of the gender gap. The coefficients in columns 2 to 4 should be compared to the gender coefficient in column 1 to determine if the gap is reduced. Bold numbers in the tables indicate that the gender coefficient has decreased more than 3%, which means the explanation at least partially accounts for the gap. The United States U.S. foreign policy questions are listed in Appendix 1. Most the foreign policy questions from NES contain three to five responses ranging from peaceful to non-peaceful. Feelings toward the military are presented in a scale between 0 and 97. This is re-scaled to fall between 0 and 1. This allows for an easy comparison of coefficients. An average is then taken (in this case the mean is .56). Responses above the average are considered militaristic, while responses below the average are considered less favourable toward the military. The motherhood variable is straightforward: women with children are assigned the value one. In 1974 and 1988, this question is not asked. To test the 57 structural (or socio-economic) explanation, family income and education are used. NES provides five percentiles for income, adjusted each year to reflect current salary ranges. Women who indicate they have higher levels of education are also given the value one. Six options are provided ranging from grade eight or less to BAs and advanced degrees. Two measures are used to examine gender consciousness. The first question asks about feelings toward the "women's liberation movement" and provides three responses: anti, neutral and pro. The other feminist scale asks about equal rights and provides a seven point scale, ranging from one, women and men should have an equal role to seven, women's place is in the home. This is re-scaled to fall between 0 and 1, and the mean is calculated. The numbers below the mean are assigned the value 1, and above the mean, the value 0. Before 1970, however, neither of these questions were used. Motherhood is the only explanation that accounts for the U.S. gender gap. In 1964 the gap toward actual conflict decreases from .05 to .01 and in 1966 from .08 to .05, once the motherhood variable is included in the equation. By the 1990s, however, this explanation fails to account for the gap toward the Gulf War. This is a surprising result. Motherhood is one of the weakest measures in the model. Only women with children eighteen and younger in the home are included, excluding older women who may have already raised their children. Yet it still accounts for part of the gap. It is also interesting that only the gap toward conflict is explained. Mothers share similar attitudes to non-mothers on other issues. Structural constraints are the weakest of the three explanations. These variables fail to account for the gap toward conflict, relations with Russia or the two gaps that appear toward defence spending and militarism. The weakness of this variable suggests that as 58 women increase their education, income and professional work status, attitudes toward foreign policy remain similar to other women. Feminism and gender consciousness have a small effect on the gap in 1970 and 1994, decreasing the coefficient for actual conflict from .10 and .09 to .08 and .07, respectively. A decrease in the coefficient by .02 is not very significant. This is surprising, considering the association between women's organizations and peace. Women who identify as feminist are no less likely to support U.S. involvement in conflict. It is also interesting that gender consciousness did nothing to explain women's lack of support for good relations with Russia. Feminist organizations, even in the U.S., have often been associated with "socialist" movements (Bashevkin, 1984). It is reasonable to expect that feminists may have a greater tolerance for communism than non-feminists. 59 Table 3.4 Summary of the Gender Gap in the U.S. No controls Care Giver Structural Gender consciousness Militarism 1968 -.01 .01 0 . . . . 1974 -.07* — -.06 -.11' 1980 0* -.01* 0* -.02* 1984 -.01* 0* 0* -.02 1992 .01 .02 .01 0 1996 .02* .02* .01* 0 isolationism 1960 .04 .05 .04 . . . . 1968 .05* .08* .04* — 1976 .04 — .04 .04 1984 .04* .04* .04* .02 1988 .07* .09* .07* — 1992 .08* .08* .08* .10* 1996 .08* .08* .07* .05 U.S. get along with Russia 1980 -.16* -.11* -.11* -.17* 1984 -.11* -.10* -.10' -.08* 1988 -.09* -.09* -.09* -.09* Increase defence spending? 1980 .or 0* .01* .01* 1984 0* -.01* 0* -.05' 1986 .03* .02* .03* .CK 1990 -.08* -.06* -.08* -.08' 1992 -.03* -.03* -.03* -.03* 1996 .02* .02* .02* .01* Peaceful settlement in Korea/Vietnam/Gulf War? 1964 .05* .01 .05 . . . . 1966 .08" .05* .08* — 1968 .13* .10* .12* — 1970 .09* — .09* .08* 1994 .12* .12* .11* .09 Should the U.S. have stayed out of Korea/Vietnam/Gulf War? 1964 .05* .01 .05 — 1966 .09* .05* .08* — 1968 .12* .12* .12* — 1970 .10* — .09* .08* 1994 .09* .09* .09* .07* *p<.05 — data not available for that year "Bo ld numbers indicate the gender coefficient decreased 60 Canada Canada's foreign policy questions from CES and Gallup are listed in Appendix 2. To measure the care-giver hypothesis, women with children under the age eighteen are assigned the value, 1. Two measures for socio-economic status are available in both surveys, women's education and income.26 Women with higher levels of education and income are assigned the value, 1. Three measures for gender consciousness are available. Both surveys include questions that about the feminist movement. Other gender consciousness questions include an "equal break" question and whether or not women with children should work outside the home. Women who are in favour of women's equality are assigned the value, 1. Unlike the U S . , the motherhood explanation does not decrease the gender gap in attitudes toward conflict in either 1966 or 1993 (this is the only gap to appear in the Canadian data). Neither do structural explanations. In 1993 feminism does provide some explanation (the gap decreases from .07 to .04), indicating that women who identify as feminist or with the feminist movement are less likely to support Canada's involvement in conflict. This indicates that the feminist movement in Canada may be having more of an impact on women's attitudes toward foreign policy than in the other countries examined. Income levels are adjusted each year to reflect current wages. 61 Table 3,5 Summary of the Gender Gap in Canada No controls Care Giver Structural Gender consciousness 1966 U.S. involvement in Vietnam 0.08 0.08 0.07- 0.08 Should China be admitted to the UN 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 1975 Chances of nuclear war -0.02 -0.01 0* 0* 1983-1984 Should the U.S. test the cruise missile 0.03 .02* .02* .or Increase contribution to NATO -0.05* -0.04* -0.05* -0.04 Aim for nuclear superiority 0.03 0.02 .02* .or 1988 Should the U.S. test the cruise missile 0.01' 0" 0* 0 Increase contribution to NATO 0.02* .02' 0.02* o.or Stay in NATO or get out -0.01 -0.01 0 0 Should Canada have nuclear submarines -0.02 -.02" -.02* -.or 1993 Should Canadian participate in peace 0.07* .08' .07* .04* Keeping even if soldiers are at risk •p<.05 62 Britain Britain's foreign policy questions are listed in Appendix 3. Three to five responses ranging from "agree strongly" to "disagree strongly" are provided with each question. The relationship between the U.S. and Britain is most often characterized as a military relationship. Responses that are less in favour of strong "ties to America" are considered the more "peaceful" response (Curtis, 1995). Every year the survey included a question pertaining to the n u m b e r 0 f children with the exception of 1974. However, in this year a question was included in the survey that asked if there was a child either in school or going to school in the next few years. This question was used to identify women with children. Women with children are assigned the value, 1. Two questions were used to measure structural constraints: women's professional work status and women's education. Women who are educated and professional are assigned the value, 1. Gender consciousness is not consistent throughout the years. It is not until 1974 that questions about women's equality were asked. Two measures are available: feelings toward equal rights for women and should women stay at home. Women who are in favour of equality are assigned the value, 1. Similar to the U.S., motherhood partially accounts for the gender gap toward conflict in Northern Ireland in 1983 and 1992 (the gap decreased from .13 to .09 and from .30 to .20, respectively). In 1992 the decrease in the coefficients is quite substantial. Again, this 63 is surprising for similar reasons discussed in the U.S. analysis. This is a poor measure; excluding women who have already raised their children. Structural explanations account for a small part of the gap toward defence spending in 1992 (.15 to .13). This is the only country in which structural factors have any impact on gender. However, it is not that significant and does not explain gaps toward other issues. The small decrease indicates that educated, professional women partially account for the gap in attitudes toward defence spending. This gap does not seem significant enough to provide support for the structural hypotheses discussed in chapter two. Gender consciousness partially explains the gap in attitudes toward defence spending in 1992. The feminist movement in Britain is fairly active and it is surprising that gender consciousness did not provide a stronger explanation for gender difference. The British women's movement has also been associated with socialist movements (even more than in the U.S.), yet women's anti-Communist stance remained even when gender consciousness was included in the equation. 64 Table 3.6 Summary of the Gender Gap in Britain No controls Care Giver Structural Gender consciousness 1963 Nuclear weapon policy 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 Ties with America 0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.02 1970 Nuclear weapon policy -0.04 -.09* -0.06 -0.04 Ties with America .07* 0.09' 0.11* .09* 1974 Military cuts -.07* -0.03 -.09* -0.07 Increase foreign aid -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 Curb communism -.09* -0.05 -.07* -.13* 1983 Negotiate in the Falklands 0.01 0 -0.02 0* Defence spending 0* -.02* -.02* -.01* Withdraw troops from Northern Ireland .13* .09* .16* .12* Get rid of nuclear weapons 0.04 0.03 0.04 .03 Britain unsafe with nuclear missiles .03* 0 .02 .02 Military cuts 0* -.02* -.02* -.05* 1992 Withdraw troops from North Ireland .30* .20' 0.30* 0.27" Get rid of nuclear weapons 0.09* .13* .09' 0.07 Defence spending .15* .20' .12* .07* "p<.05 66 Conclusions A comparison of the three countries reveals some interesting trends. First, foreign policy issues in general do not produce significant gender gaps. In fact, it is fair to say that women and men have similar attitudes toward most foreign policy issues. The most significant gaps in all three countries occur toward issues that involve actual conflict. Second, contrary to the belief that women's attitudes have been changing, women's attitudes toward most of the foreign policy issues tested in this investigation have remained stable. Gaps that have increased are explained by changes in men's behaviour (with the exception of attitudes toward world problems in the U.S.). And third, the explanations for gender difference tested in this study are weak, with the exception of motherhood, the poorest measure. Chapter four provides a more in-depth analysis of these findings and the implications for feminist IR theory. Much of the feminist IR literature draws a connection between women and peace. Peace is often defined not just in terms of anti-violence and anti-war, but anti-militarism. The empirical evidence in this study suggests that women are not always more peaceful. Women are less in favour of conflict, but at times have been more supportive of the military. This poses a direct challenge to feminist theorists who associate women with peace. 66 Chapter Four: Conclusion and Discussion This investigation began with a question: Are women more peaceful than men? This question was inspired by the growth in feminist IR literature that suggests that women are less enthusiastic about war and militarism and more concerned with providing food, clothing, shelter, education and care for their children and families (Boulding, 1984). Many feminist scholars have pointed to the absence of women in the political institutions that make decisions to go to war and the troops sent to war. They have focused on women's role in peace organizations and the violence suffered by women during conflict. They have argued that both the practice and theory of international relations is gendered, creating a hierarchical relationship between female and male. The association between women and peace is not as straightforward as many feminists would suggest. Throughout history '"omen have supported war, both directly as participants and indirectly through support roles. Women in many countries have fought in battles; Indira Ghandi and Margaret Thatcher have lead their countries into war; and women guerilla groups are being organized and trained to fight in countries such as Turkey and India. Women have also worked in factories to support the war effort and have participated in campaigns to recruit young men for the military. To investigate the link between women and peace, this study uses a variety of questions from public opinion survey data that concern the military, defence, and the country's international position. The first task was to determine the size, direction, and any changes to the gender gap toward foreign policy over four decades. The second task 67 was to examine competing explanations for the gender gap discussed by feminist IR theorists. The results of this investigation are contrary to original expectations. I began this study with the belief that women would differ from men toward a variety of foreign policy issues. I also expected to see an increase in the gender gap over the four decades, which would support the hypothesis that women are influenced by a changing social structure. The empirical evidence, however, suggests that this is not the case. Women in all three countries are more opposed to the use of force and violence, but not toward policies that make this violence possible. The gender gap is also stable over time. The results of the investigation are summarized as follows: 1) A gender gap exists between women and men in attitudes toward force and violence, not foreign policy in general. 2) This gap remains stable over time in both the U.S. and Canada. In Britain the gender gap increases from the 1980s to the 1990s, but this is because men's attitudes have changed. 3) The gap is not easily explained. The presence of children in the home partially accounts for the gap in the U.S. and Britain, and gender consciousness partially accounts for the gap in Canada. The findings suggest that the connection between women and peace is not as straightforward as many feminist theorists suggest. Women are not opposed to many of the policies that support the ability of a country to engage in conflict. This chapter provides an in-depth examination of these findings and what they mean for feminist IR 68 theory that promotes the connection between women and peace. Finally, this chapter concludes with suggestions for further research into gender difference and foreign policy. The Gender Gap Contrary to original expectations, most defence and military issues did not produce a significant gap. The results indicate the women are not less supportive of the military and defence than men, and at times have even been more in favour of the military and defence spending. Issues involving force and violence produced the most significant gap in all three countries. American women were less supportive of the Vietnam and Gulf Wars, British women were less supportive of British troops in Northern Ireland, and Canadian women were less supportive of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and peace keeping if soldiers may be injured or killed. The only exception is the Falklands War, which did not "77 produce a significant gap between British women and men." The fact that the gap toward issues of force and violence appeared in all three countries indicates there is strong connection between gender and issues of violence. The gap toward force and violence is not surprising. Women's organizations and feminist theorists have promoted the idea that women are less violent than men for some time (See Vickers, 1993; Sylvester, 1994). What is surprising is the lack of gender difference toward other foreign policy issues. A strong argument has been made as to why women would differ toward issues such as defence spending, nuclear weapons and 2 7 T h e Fa lk lands W a r was b l o o d y (255 B r i t i s h so ld iers were k i l l e d and m a n y m o r e i n j u r e d ) , but the m e d i a d o w n - p l a y e d the v io lence , re leas ing ve ry f e w negat ive images. T h e w a r was ha i led as B r i t a i n ' s last s tand as 69 militarism. Feminist IR theorists argue that militarism in general is a form of violence against women (See Sylvester, 1994; Vickers, 1990; Sowerby 1997; Enloe, 1993). The presence of military bases in developing nations has increased prostitution and violence against women. Spending on defence and nuclear weapons often means that less money is allocated to issues that overwhelmingly affect women. Some feminist theorists argue that the military incorporates negative images of women into the training of soldiers (Tickner, 1992; Elshtain, 1989, Sylvester, 1994), and violence against enlisted women and partners of enlisted men is higher than national averages (Vickers, 1993; Sylvester, 1994; Sowerby, 1997). Why would women not differ from men toward militarism? This is difficult to determine. Feminist IR theorists draw a connection between militarism and violence. Vickers writes: The extent of damage to human beings caused by militaristic policies is inestimable. Armed conflicts, investment in arms at the expense of health education and social programs and environmental damage have had lethal effects upon children and adults throughout the world (Vickers, 1993: 40-41). Women in general, however, seem to distinguish between the two. Women are less likely to support conflict or war but are willing to spend money on defence, the military and weapons. Women may see this as a way of preventing conflict and war, not promoting it. In their personal lives women often report feeling less safe and secure than men. Women may view the military as a means to ensure their homes are safe from invasion. -a great military power (Childs, 1992). This may have had an impact on British women's attitudes toward the 70 Changing Attitudes The majority of research into women and politics suggests that women's attitudes have changed in the past few decades in response to a changing social structure. As a result, the gender gap is expected to increase. This investigation reveals that the gap toward force and violence has remained fairly stable in the U.S. and Canada, but has increased in Britain. 2 8 This suggests that in Canada and the U.S., at least, women's attitudes toward force and violence have not been influenced by changes in social structure that are supposedly causing women's and men's attitudes to diverge. The increase in the gap toward force and violence in Britain is explained by a change in men's attitudes. British women have not become less tolerant of troops in Northern Ireland. The gap has increased because British men have increased their support of the presence of troops. It is unclear why men's attitudes have changed, but it reasonable to assume that men are responding to societal changes. Explanations for the Gender Gap toward Conflict The presence of children in the home is the strongest explanation for the gap toward conflict in both the U.S. and Britain. Even though the measure was poor, women with children are less supportive of force and violence. This supports the caregiver hypothesis for women's and men's difference. Gilligan and Ruddick both argue that women are more nurturing and caring than men and this is reflected in women's political attitudes. 71 Women learn these skills from their role as mother and caretaker in society. Motherhood as an explanation for gender difference is not strongly supported by many feminists. Arguments made by Gilligan and Ruddick are criticized for being ^ essentialist'and suggesting there is a woman's nature bound by her ability to have children. These feminists often prefer to explain gender difference by adult socialization arguments and structural constraints. In Canada, the results were less surprising. In the 1960s the gender gap persisted despite controls, but in the 1990s gender consciousness at least partially explained the gap. This suggests Canadian women have become more responsive to the feminist movement and as a result are less likely to support violence. Force and violence issues have definitely been on the agenda of Canadian women's organizations.29 This is probably having an effect on how women respond to international violence. Future Research This investigation is by no means conclusive. It has provided insight into the connection between women and peace and has challenged some of the basic assumptions made by many feminist IR scholars. To fully understand how women and men differ in attitudes toward force and violence, further research is required. The following outlines a few suggestions. 2 8 Force and violence produced the largest and most consistent gender gap in all three countries so this is the oply^ gap discussed in this section. 2^AClfior example, provides financial support for centres that deal with violence against women. The organisation also disseminates information about acts of violence against women around the world. 72 The most significant gender gap occurs in attitudes toward issues that involve force and violence, not foreign policy in general. Further investigating the link between gender and violence may provide further insight into the gender gap. Public opinion surveys include questions that concern domestic violence, such as capital punishment, violence on television and opinions about violence within society. Everitt (1996 and 1998) included several issues that concern violence in her study of the Canadian gender gap. Her findings indicate a significant gender gap occurs toward all these issues. Men are conspicuously absent from this study. The objective of the investigation was to study the link between women and peace and empirically test some of the theories of difference discussed by feminist IR scholars. However, men, not women, have been the dynamic element that has caused changes in the gender gap. This leaves several questions unanswered. Why are men more supportive of the use of f~"ce and violence? Why has this support increased, in Britain, at least? Why have men's attitudes changed? Studies have only begun to examine men's attitudes and behaviour (Steele, 1998; Wirls, 1984; other studies that examine the structure of both women's and men's attitudes include Gidengil, 1995; Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler, 1998). These finding suggest that men may be a key element in understandingJrfe gender difference. The link between motherhood and peace also needs further investigation. The findings here indicate only that women with children under eighteen in their home are less likely to support conflict. A better measure of the caregiver hypothesis would allow for a better investigation of this link. Public opinion surveys are beginning to include questions that 7? ask respondents to indicate their care-taking responsibilities, both active and potential. This would expand the measure of the care-taking variable. This investigation also raises several questions about the link between motherhood and peace. Is it actually motherhood, or is it parenting? Would men with children share similar attitudes about force and violence as women with children? Ruddick argues that men can be mothers. Understanding how men who are caretakers respond to issues of force and violence would add strength to the caregiver hypothesis. This investigation has examined each explanation separately. However, there is the potential for interaction among the variables. Both education and motherhood may interact with feminism and gender consciousness. Several studies indicate that women with higher levels of education and income are more likely to develop a gender consciousness. Ruddick (198s' argues that feminist mothers are the most likely to develop a "peaceful" nature. This investigation is limited to three western industrialized countries. It would be interesting to compare women's and men's attitudes across time in other nations to determine if similar trends exist. There seems to be a strong link between women and non-violence and findings from other countries may indicate whether this is a universal phenomenon or limited to industrial nations. Investigations that focus on countries with different cultural, social and economic institutions would add strength to the findings in this investigation. 74 Finally, continuing to study the gender gap toward foreign policy in the three countries examined in this investigation is important. Although overall, the gap remained stable, there is some evidence to suggest a shift is taking place. Issues that did not produce any gap in the 1960s and 1970s began to show some signs of change in the 1980s. 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New York: HarperCollins. 85 APPENDIX ONE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS General Military Issues Some people believe we should spend less money for defense. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this? (Scale from 1 to 7 provided) Military - Feeling Thermometer. (Scale between 0 and 96 provided). Isolationism This country would just be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with the problems in other parts of the world. (Agree or disagree). Some people think it is important for us to try very hard to get along with Russia. Others feel it is a big mistake to try too hard to get along with Russia. (Seven point scale provided—1 is cooperate more, 7 is get much tougher) Conflict Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Vietnam/Gulf War or should we have stayed out? (no, yes) Which of the following do you think we should do in Vietnam/Gulf War? (Pull out entirely, try for peaceful settlement, take a stronger stand) U.S. CARE-GIVER QUESTION Number of children under 18 years old in household unit/family. (Categories 0 to 8 provided, with 0, none, 8, 8 or more children) U.S. S T R U C T U R A L QUESTIONS R's education, (grade 8 or less; 9-12 grades; 12 grades, diploma or equivalency; 12 grades, diploma or equivalency plus non-academic training; some college, no degree, or community college diploma; B A level degrees or advanced degrees) 86 About what do you think your total income will be this year for yourself and your immediate family? (5 percentiles provided, with the lowest) U.S. GENDER CONSCIOUSNESS QUESTIONS Women's liberation - feeling thermometer (Wording changed to feminism in the 1980s). (Anti rating, neutral, pro) Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's right. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government. Others feel that women's place is in the home. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about it? (Scale from 1, women and men should have an equal role, to 7, women's place is in the home) 87 APPENDIX TWO FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS FOR C A N A D A 1966 Should China be admitted to the United Nations? (yes, no) 1975 In your opinion, are the chances of nuclear war breaking out greater or less than they were ten years ago? (greater, less great, the same) 1983-1984 The U.S. wants to use northern Canada area because the guidance system must be tested in the arctic-like climate. In the proposed test the cruise missiles would not have either conventional or nuclear warheads. How do you feel about this testing—do you think Canada should or should not permit the U.S. to test these missiles in its territories, (yes, should or no, should not) Should Canada increase its contribution to NATO? (should, should not) Should Canada aim for nuclear superiority? (yes, no) 1988 The U.S. wants to use northern Canada area because the guidance system must be tested in the arctic-like climate. In the proposed test the cruise missiles would not have either conventional or nuclear warheads. How do you feel about this testing—do you think Canada should or should not permit the U.S. to test these missiles in its territories, (yes, should or no, should not) Should Canada increase its contribution to NATO? (should, should not) Should Canada increase its contribution to NATO? (yes, no) Should Canada have nuclear submarines? (yes, no) 88 1993 Should Canada continue to participate in peace-keeping operations even if soldiers at risk? (yes, no) C A R E GIVER QUESTIONS FOR C A N A D A How many people including yourself are there in this household? How many under the age of ten? How many between ten and seventeen? (1,1 child to 6, 6 or more children) (this question used between 1965 to 1985). S T R U C T U R A L QUESTIONS FOR C A N A D A What was the name of the last institution you attended? How far did you go? (grades 1 to 8, some; grades 1 to 8, graduated; grades 9 to 13, some; grades 9 to 13, graduated; technical school, some; technical school, graduated; university, some; university graduated) Which letter on this card correspond to you total family income from all sources, before tax deductions? (1 to 8 categories from lowest to highest provided) GENDER CONSCIOUSNESS QUESTIONS FOR C A N A D A In you opinion do women in Canada get as good a break as men? (yes, no) Do you think that married women should take a job outside the home if they have children? (yes, no) Do you think married women should take a job outside the home if they have no young children? 89 APPENDIX 3 FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS IN BRITAIN 1963 Should Britain keep nuclear weapons on its soil? (Agree strongly, agree, neutral, disagree, disagree strongly) Should Britain maintain strong ties with America? (Agree strongly, agree, neutral, disagree, disagree strongly) 1970 Should Britain keep nuclear weapons on its soil? (Agree strongly, agree, neutral, disagree, disagree strongly) Should Britain maintain strong ties with America? (Agree strongly, agree, neutral, disagree, disagree strongly) 1974 Should the government cut military spending? (Agree strongly, agree, neutral, disagree, disagree strongly) Should the government increase foreign aid? (Agree, neutral, disagree) 1983 Should the government cut military spending? (Agree strongly, agree, neutral, disagree, disagree strongly) 


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