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Navigating from harbored to heavy seas : a history of Japan’s international fisheries in the North Pacific,… Smith, Roger Dale 1999

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Navigating from Harbored to Heavy Seas: A History of Japan's International Fisheries in the North Pacific, 1900-1976 By Roger Dale Smith B.A, University of British Columbia, 1995 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of History) We accept this thesis as conforming to the reauired standard THE UNIVERSITY O F I & R I T I ^ C O L U M B I A April 1999 © Roger Dale Smith, 1999 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. 1 further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada D A T E M I L 3 0 / 1 1 DE-6 (2788) i i Abstract This paper examines the development of Japanese high-seas fishing with a focus on the North Pacific region. As Japanese fishers expanded activities outside of coastal waters and into international oceans, fisheries became an important issue of foreign policy. Japan had to manage its fisheries activities within a changing international legal framework, analyzed in this paper through regime theory. High-seas fishing in the North Pacific passed through three resource-regime phases, each consecutively more restrictive in correlation with increasing concern over resource depletion. The paper also examines the roles played by American cold war security concerns, changing technology, and environmental concerns to explain how and why fisheries regimes transformed. i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i i List of Figures i v Introduction 1 Chapter 1 The Development of Japan's High-Seas Fisheries 8 1.1 Japanese Fisheries 8 1.2 The Early Oceans Regime 12 Chapter 2 The North Pacific Fisheries Convention 14 2.1 The Impact of World War Two and Post-War Rehabilitation 14 2.2 Tripartite Negotiations 18 2.3 Changes in the North Pacific Fisheries Regime 23 2.4 Course of the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention, 1953-1975 24 Chapter 3 The Extension of National Fisheries Jurisdictions 32 3.1 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Enclosure Movement 33 3.2 Unilateral Enclosure in the North Pacific 37 3.3 The Enclosure Regime in the North Pacific 39 Bibliography 45 List of Figures Figure 1. Fisheries Production, Japan Proper, 1908-50 10 Figure 2. Japanese Pre-War Fishing Areas 16 Figure 3. Trends in Various Sectors of Japan's Fishing Industry, 1958-69...27 Figure 4. EEZ's in the North Pacific 39 Figure 5. Distribution of Primary Production of the World Ocean 42 Introduction Fish play an integral role in the economy, diet, culture, and history of Japan. For the past century, the development of Japan's fishing industry provided not only an important source of protein for an expanding population in a resource-poor country, but also an impetus for coastal community growth and national economic development. As demand for greater volumes and variety of fish products increased, Japanese enterprises established operations in international oceans around the world. This expanded quest for fish was seen in Japan as less a matter of the maintenance of livelihoods and jobs than an issue of survival. This study is concerned with the environment that customary international rights and practices created to facilitate the development and later the abatement of the international fishing industry in Japan. An examination of twentieth-century domestic changes in fishing-industry policy, American Cold-War security concerns, priorities concerning resource-use, and technology will also illustrate the impact that local conditions may have upon the international system. The development of the high-seas fishing industry can be seen as a significant step in Japan's pursuit of secure access to an essential food source for domestic consumption. While Japan is normally regarded as a resource-poor country with little arable land in proportion to the nutritional needs of its population, the coastal waters have traditionally provided a rich source of protein. As demand increased with population growth and expanded consumer desires, however, even Japan's abundant coastal stocks proved to be insufficient to provide the quantity and diversity of marine resources required. Consequently, the high-seas fisheries grew in importance as they augmented and later superseded domestic sources of fish. Japan's international fisheries 1 2 policy in the post-war era may be seen as an attempt to guarantee access to what was becoming a vital resource. The activities of high seas fishing industries in the high seas and near the coasts of other nations tended to raise international concerns, particularly coastal state apprehension, over conservation and ownership of ocean resources. As Japan expanded fishing operations into international oceans they came into conflict with other nations over control of various fish stocks. Japan consequently had to negotiate international arrangements with regard to rights of access and management of fisheries resources. Fisheries thus became not only an issue of domestic importance but also a matter of foreign policy as well. This paper analyzes the evolution of Japan's overseas fisheries in terms of changing international resource regimes. Regimes exist when states become parties to international arrangements or assume patterns of behavior whereby internationally recognized norms, expressed in rights and rules, influence calculations of national interest and state actions.1 As defined by international relations scholar Oran Young, regimes consist of institutions and, at times, organizations. Institutions are customary social practices which shape and are shaped by explicit rights and rules that govern the relations among the regime's constituents. Organizations, on the other hand, are material entities that possess locations, offices, budgets, and personnel to administer social institutions.2 1 Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization, vol. 41, no. 3, Summer 1987, p. 492. Other notable scholars concerned with regime studies include Oran Young, Stephen Krasner Ernst B. Haas, and Mark Zacher. 2 Oran Young, Resource Regimes: Natural Resources and Social Institutions, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p. 18-19. 3 The central components of resource regimes are rights and rules. These arise as arrangements to lend order to human activities and, typically, to regulate conflicts of interest.3 Rights are frequently expressed as either property or entitlement rights while rules usually govern use, liability, or procedural issues. The restrictive or open nature of regime rights and rules can either significantly constrain or augment certain aspects of individual actors' behavior. This is especially true for resource management. For example, a regime granting common property to all participants, as in the case of high-seas fishing, can produce economic incentives which lead to socially undesirable outcomes such as the 'tragedy of the commons'.4 For the purpose of this paper, such rights and rules are examined through codified or de facto laws of the sea and multilateral treaties. The focus here is placed upon the North Pacific since this region has long been an important source of resources for Japan's international fisheries. In the past there have been numerous agreements governing various resources in the North Pacific, but this study will start with an examination of the role of the North Pacific Fisheries Convention (FNPFC) in consideration of the fact that it was the first multilateral treaty concerning fisheries in the North Pacific as well as the most geographically and biologically extensive in scope. Moreover, the INPFC is illustrative of a post-war trend in global politics to establish multilateral arrangements to govern the allocation and protection of international resources. Japan's role in the North Pacific 3 Oran Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for National Resources and the Environment. (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 55. 4 Garret Hardin, "Tragedy of the Commons," Science. 162 (1968), p. 1243-8. The 'tragedy of the commons' refers to the tendency of common property systems to create incentives for individuals to exploit a resource before a competitor can. This behavior will eventually lead to the depletion of the communal goods. 4 fisheries system may serve as an interesting example to assess the utility of resource regimes and interstate cooperation to effectively solve problems associated with sharing global resources. This study will explore several themes that have emerged over the course of the development and expansion of Japan's international fishing industry with a particular focus on the post-war era. The first concerns the tension between Japan's quest to guarantee access to high-seas fisheries resources in the North Pacific and the United States' attempts to protect valued fish stocks. Developed within a global custom of free access to international oceans, the Japanese high-seas fisheries depended upon the North Pacific for many resources vital to Japan's economic and social security. Japan viewed these resources as the common heritage of humankind and maintained that such abundance should not be appropriable by any single nation, coastal or otherwise. Japanese foreign policy was largely predicated upon the advancement and defence of the principle of freedom of the high seas. The United States, on the other hand, shifted its position from a relatively generous to a restrictive policy with respect to Japanese fisheries in the post-war period. Initially, the United States concluded a relatively open and free-to-entry fisheries treaty with Japan in order to permit Japan access to an essential natural resource in the well-stocked Bering Seas and North Pacific for domestic consumption and dollar-procurement exports. In return, the United States was able to prop up two cornerstones of its Cold-War security policy in Asia: to revitalize Japan's economy and to ensure Japan's commitment as a reliable ally. Vocal fishing communities, labour organizations, and coastal fishery associations in the United States, however, opposed Japan's claims of freedom of the 5 seas and advocated that valued fish species such as salmon should be entitled to protection even outside of national jurisdiction. Domestic fishing industries, especially in Alaska, sought to exclude foreign enterprises from fisheries such as the Bristol Bay salmon runs in the name of conservation. This alternative gained considerable political support as resource protection superceded Cold War security interests as a new policy priority in the 1970s. Such protection, however, was less a policy of conservation than an attempt to prevent foreign competition in order to defend local fishing industries. In one sense, North Pacific fisheries politics in the latter quarter of this century were a product of Japan's attempt to secure access to fish and the United States' determination to protect employment and livelihoods. The international community's changing priorities with respect to resource use is another important subject under consideration. Early philosophies concerning living resources were predicated upon the assumption that nature was boundless and the oceans were inexhaustible. Fish supply was deemed to be virtually limitless. Technological progress, however, boosted the catch-capacity of an expanding worldwide industry to the point where it placed considerable and, in some cases, excessive pressures on fish populations. As evidence emerged in the post-war era that certain stocks were in decline or even approaching extinction, ecologically sustainable management arose as a new concern among national governments, especially coastal states. Moreover, the unlimited common-property nature of the international regime of 'freedom of the high seas' was considered by many states as unsuitable to manage these new environmental problems. Consequently, the international community undertook efforts to harmonize property and entitlement rights concerning living resources with 6 the conservation concerns of coastal states through multilateral and unilateral arrangements, most significantly through a national enclosure movement. Another theme under consideration is the role that technological advances played in developing the high-seas fishery. The most significant of these was the introduction of the internal-combustion engine to the domestic fishing fleet in the 1920s. Steam- and, later, diesel-powered engines increased the navigable range of ships and the efficiency of transportation so that Japanese fishers could reach resources as far away as the Antarctic and Atlantic Oceans. Moreover, progress in shipbuilding enabled the production of large trawlers and transport ships to increase the catch- and carrying-capacity of such vessels. Concurrent enhancement of refrigeration and ice-making technologies also facilitated the ease of transport of fish-products over long distances. Finally, the introduction of drift-net equipment and sonar in the post-war period led to a significantly higher catch-capacity on the high seas. Such technological change not only provided Japanese fishers with the capacity and incentive to fish in the broader oceans outside of coastal waters, but also undoubtedly contributed to the substantial ecological impact upon fish stocks in the North Pacific. This study considers the course of Japan's international fisheries practice in the North Pacific as a function of three resource-regime phases. The first stage was characterized by a common principle of 'freedom of the seas' which established an open-to-entry common property system in international waters. This regime facilitated the growth of Japan's international fisheries operations in the pre-1945 era through open access to ocean resources and the absence of significant property constraints on the high seas. 7 A second phase was introduced through concerted US efforts to reconstruct Japan's economy and fishing industry after the Pacific War. Japan, Canada, and the United States arranged a new multilateral agreement governing resource allocation and the promotion of conservation principles — the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention (INPFC). This regime modified the early concept of mare liberum with the Abstention Principle and established a limited-entry common property system. Japan successfully staved off an increasingly influential movement in the United States aimed at preventing foreign fishing in the Northeast Pacific and managed to maintain secure access to most fisheries with the one notable exception of salmon. As coastal states became increasingly alarmed at the rate and extent of living-resource depletion, however, an enclosure movement was initiated to extend national jurisdictions with two-hundred mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ's). It was hoped that EEZ's would transfer resource management from international to coastal state control in order more effectively to protect and promote the sustainability of fish stocks with a restricted-entry common property regime. Japan made an unsuccessful attempt to defend the principle of freedom of the high seas and had to devise a new foreign policy to accommodate this shift in international values. The unilateral adoption of the two-hundred mile zones by the United States, Canada, and Japan eclipsed the earlier multilateral INPFC regime and effectively deprived Japan's high-seas fisheries of guaranteed access to an important source of fish supply. 8 1. The Development of Japan's High-Seas Fisheries Japanese Fisheries Japan has a long tradition of coastal, beach, and inland-water fishing that stretches back to well before 1900. It would be difficult to overstate the importance of fish in the diet of most Japanese and their consequently large role in the domestic economy. Fish products constituted more than half of the animal protein consumed in Japan as opposed to about five percent in the United States and Canada.5 The natural productivity of the waters surrounding Japan, the lack of alternative food sources, and the concentration of population along the island's extensive coastlines led to the early intensive development of the local fishing industry.6 Three distinct types of fisheries emerged in the early twentieth century distinguished both by their areas of operation and by their techniques: coastal, offshore, and overseas. Coastal fisheries were the oldest form of fishing in Japan. Such fisheries were largely conducted by village associations or diverse small-scale individual enterprises characterized by techniques requiring low-capitalization such as non-motorized boats, simple equipment, and small-scale production. Their methods of operation included beach seines, lift nets, set nets or traps, gill nets, and hook-and-line fishing within the customary three-mile zone as well as shellfish and seaweed collection, and inland fresh-water catches. The principal species landed were herring, 5 Food and Agricultural Organization, Relative Importance of Trade in Fishery Products, 1973. 6 The warm Kuroshio current is largely responsible for providing the greatest source of diverse and plentiful fish species despite the relatively short fishing banks surrounding Japan. 9 salmon, trout, yellowtail, tuna, horse mackerel, bream, sharks, cuttlefish, octopus, crab, shrimp, clams, and oysters.7 Offshore fishing, on the other hand, ranged from just outside the territorial sea to hundreds of miles from the coast. Due to the higher costs for the equipment and mechanized boats capable of operating at such ranges, offshore fishing was largely conducted by companies and special associations utilizing large-scale purse seine fishing, two-boat power trawling, and line-and-pole tuna fishing techniques. The de-centralized coastal fisheries with their low levels of capitalization were joined by a new enterprise fisheries with much higher-levels of capitalization as fleets extended into offshore areas. Such fisheries were largely based on tuna, skipjack, sardines, mackerel, cod, bream, sharks, flatfish, skipper, and mullet.8 As a result of the high cost and technical sophistication of refrigeration, diesel engines, and larger ships, Overseas fisheries did not develop extensively prior to the mid-1920's. Even after the technology became available, only large companies such as Taiyo Gyogyo and Nippon Suisan (Nissui) were able to provide the capital investment and organizational expertise necessary to turn international expeditions into profitable ventures. Such fisheries primarily operated motorized factory ships and trawlers off the coasts of Russia, the Kwantung Peninsula, Korea, Formosa, and the Japanese mandated islands in the mid-South Pacific, and mother-ship operations in the 7 Edward Ackerman, Japan's Natural Resources and Their Relation to Japan's Economic Future. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1953), p. 114. This book is mostly a compilation of SCAP studies and documents. 8 Ibid., p. 114. 10 Sea of Okhotsk, the Bering Sea, and the North Pacific high seas.9 The main species exploited were sardines, tuna, skipjack, salmon, shrimp, crab, and whales. In terms of the relative importance of each fishery to the domestic Japanese economy in the pre-war period, coastal fisheries remained the largest supplier of fish. While offshore and overseas sources of supply continued to amount to only a fraction of the coastal catch in absolute terms according to Figure 1, their production increased 7.5 times from the mid-1920's to 1940 and continued to provide commercially valued species such as whales, crab, and salmon to the domestic market. Moreover, Figure 1 does not consider colonial fisheries which supplied a yearly average Katurui xttfftnrcajt A W f f n H C*iJQ, SCAf*, 'J't?iye> Figure 1. Natural Resources Section GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo. Found in Edward Ackerman, Japan's Natural Resources and Their Relation to Japan's Economic Future,, p. 130. of nearly 2.3 million tons of fish and whales — close to one-third of Japan's total production from 1935-40.10 Since Korean coastal waters provided most of this total, one 9 Ibid., p. 115. 1 0 Ada Espenshade, Japanese Fisheries Production. 1908-46, ( SCAP Natural Resources Section Report 95). Found in Ackerman, op cit. 7, p. 132. 11 must not underestimate the importance to the domestic market of fishing products supplied from outside of Japanese coastal waters. The increase in fisheries productivity was an important factor in the Meiji government's campaign offukoku kyoheiu and in later governments' developmental strategies. Political leaders hoped that expanded fisheries would meet the dual functions of providing for the nutritional requirements of a rapidly growing population while simultaneously promoting enhanced economic activity in targeted industrial sectors. In 1905, the government enacted the Pelagic Fisheries Encouragement Act to assist the construction of large, motorized fishing vessels. Subsidies were also provided from 1918 onward to help the construction and repair of mechanized ships. Moreover, the government offered subsidies in 1923 and again in 12 1932 to promote refrigeration technology and ice-making facilities respectively. Such promotional policies greatly benefited those companies engaged in or expanding into overseas fisheries. Japan's expanded fisheries productivity also had important environmental repercussions. Although general fishing effort in coastal and offshore trawling grounds substantially increased after 1933, catch-rates actually levelled off.1 3 This was an indication that the full-utilization of marine resources was achieved by the early 1930's and that further effort merely resulted in overfishing. Moreover, Japanese fishers earned a poor international reputation for their over-exploitation of ocean resources. Japan's position as one of the world's major exploiters meant that its refusal 1 ' Wealthy country, strong military. 1 2 A . Niwa, et al., Japanese Fisheries: Their Development and Present Status, (Tokyo: Asia Kyokai, 1957), p. 2. 1 3 Ackerman, op cit. 7, p. 444. 12 to join the International Whaling Convention (IWC) in 1936 doomed any global whale-conservation efforts to only partial success at best.14 The pre-war failure of the iWC's protective measures was largely attributed to Japan's absence from and non-compliance with the agreement. In addition, several exploratory salmon expeditions to Bristol Bay in 1936 also prompted the Pacific Fisherman, an influential North American industrial fisheries magazine, to warn of an impending 'alien invasion.' 1 5 Canadian and U.S. fishers feared that intensive Japanese fishing would produce unsustainable yields and possibly deplete this valuable North American stock. Thus, the expansion of Japan's fishing activity led in some cases to excessive exploitation of fisheries resources, and engendered international resentment against its fishing practices. The Early Oceans Regime By the time Japan's fisheries extended operations into the high seas, a long-standing global oceans tradition was already firmly established. International maritime and fisheries law was predicated upon the principle of the 'Freedom of the Seas' as originally outlined in Hugo Grotius' 1609 publication, Mare Liberum. This principle maintained that no state or navy could own unenclosed seas or oceans. Unlike land, the seas were considered to be inexhaustible and inappropriable, and, consequently, did not share the qualities of property. Therefore, the high seas were open to everyone's use.16 Over the years, the mare liberum concept was modified with the widespread acceptance of 'territorial seas'. As a form of mare clausiem, the territorial 1 4 Douglas Johnson, The International Law of Fisheries, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 396-411. 1 5 Pacific Fisherman, Late 1936 throughout 1937. 16Johnson, op cit. 14, p. 165. 13 sea allowed littoral states a three-mile zone of coastal water ownership — roughly the distance of a cannon-shot.17 Outside this zone, however, freedom of the seas prevailed. While neither principle was codified in international law, they were nonetheless regularly used in practice. As Thomas Baty, an international jurist, once observed with regard to the three-mile limit: "...the rule, while not infrequently attacked in theory, is supreme in practice. Diplomatists seldom or never question it; professors occasionally do. In the actual conduct of affairs, it is seldom challenged, and never successfully so." 1 8 No international organization, however, governed the.application of these institutions. Consequently, no state or other actor could claim exclusive rights to any fish stocks in their natural habitat. Any actor was entitled to harvest fish anytime and anyplace, except within the narrow confines of territorial seas. In economic terms, fisheries resources were allocated upon the basis of an open-to-entry common property system.19 This was coupled with a procedural device known as the Law of Capture which provided that the capture of any fish from the ocean automatically transformed the common resource into the private property of the fisherman.20 The prevailing regime of 'Freedom of the Seas' in international waters was favourable to the expansion of Japan's fishing activities. As steam- and then diesel-engine technology in conjunction with refrigeration facilities extended the range, catch capacity, and transportation ability of Japan's fishing fleets, no legal framework or 1 7 Larry Leonard, International Regulation of Fisheries, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), p. 7. 1 8 Thomas Baty, "The Three-Mile Limit", American Journal of International Law, vol. 22, (1928), p. 503. 1 9 Richard James Sweeney, Robert Tollison, and Thomas Willet, "Market Failure, the Common-Pool Problem, and Ocean Resource Exploitation", Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 17 (1974), p. 179-192. 2 0Young, op cit. 2, p. 138. 14 property rights existed to restrict such development. The unlimited-entry nature of the common resource regime enabled any actors, including growing Japanese fishing companies, to limitlessly expand their activities into the international waters of the North Pacific and elsewhere to meet domestic consumption demands and export opportunities. 2. The North Pacific Fisheries Convention The Impact of World War Two and Post-War Rehabilitation The course of the Pacific war had a devastating impact upon Japan's domestic and international fisheries. By 1945, the tonnage of powered fishing-boats declined to forty percent of 1940's total while ice-making capacity fell to below half the pre-war average.21 Many port facilities were rendered inoperable and required extensive repairs due to bombing damage. Moreover, the new occupation authorities in the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers' (SCAP) headquarters declared Japan's traditional offshore and high-seas fisheries areas off-limits. As a consequence, fish-catch dropped by half while fish consumption, a staple of the Japanese diet, fell by one-third from 1937 levels (the pre-war peak).22 In the Occupation's early stage (1945-47) two alternatives were considered with respect to Japan's economic recovery: restriction and revival. Several Allied powers, including Australia, the USSR, and Great Britain, favoured a policy of restriction whereby SCAP would allow the Japanese economy to rebuild to a level of self-sufficiency but not to the point where renewed prosperity might once again 2 1 Japanese Fisheries, op cit. 12, p. 2. 15 compromise regional security. As the United States grew increasingly wary of communist encroachment in East Asia after 1947, however, Washington pushed for the revival of an economically strong Japan to serve as a bulwark in Asia. The United States used its pre-eminent position in SCAP, the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), and the Allied Council on Japan (ACJ) to promote the renewal of Japan's economic 23 power. SCAP authorities soon identified the fishing industry as an area critical to economic revitalization. It was hoped that a strong fishery would both allow the Japanese to provide for their own food requirements while relieving the United States of burdensome aid expenses, and create the necessary impetus to rebuild essential economic sectors such as ironworks and shipbuilding.24 Furthermore, exports of surplus fish products could provide much needed hard currency and help build foreign exchange reserves. Thus, fisheries were promoted to alleviate the nation's post-war economic crisis, including serious food shortages, and to foster economic recovery. Although SCAP initially suspended the movements of all vessels weighing over one-hundred tons in the interest of security following Japan's surrender, by September 27, 1945, restrictions were relaxed to enable fishing within an authorized zone known as the MacArthur Line (see Figure 2). 2 5 At the same time, the domestic government provided funds to reconstruct fishing boats, ice-making facilities, and l L Ibid., p. 2-3. 2 3 See Henry Esterly's masterly study of the political dimensions of Occupation policy in "Overseas Fisheries and International Politics in the Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952" in The Occupation of Japan: Economic Policy and Reform, Lawrence Redford, ed. (Norfolk: MacArthur Memorial, 1980), pp. 91-123. 2 4 In 1949, SCAP spent 45 percent of its $515 million relief funds on food. Ibid., p. 94. 2 5 General Headquaters of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP Records R G 331, National Archives and Records Service): Description of Contents, compiled by National Archives and Records Service, (Tokyo : Nipponmaikuro, 1990). 16 coastal ports. By 1946, Antarctic whaling was permitted to increase the nation's food supply. Since traditional fishing areas near Korea, China, and the Soviet Union remained closed due to considerable wartime resentment, security considerations, and the fears of fish-stock over-exploitation, SCAP authorities recognized that they would eventually be required to allow Japanese fishers to expand their activities eastward into the North Pacific and the Antarctic to meet domestic needs. -so*-. - 12a* • i«<3* t=s** -XJ* m* 30* , ,„— T_ „„ , . ^„,T^ . JAPANESE PREWAR . FISHING AREAS n& I M ' . - tis&' so* *c* so* Figure 2. Natural Resource Section GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo. Found in Edward Ackerman, Japan's Natural Resources and Their Relation to Japan's Economic Future, p. 112. These promotional policies were successful to the extent that by 1947 the restored fishing-fleet tonnage exceeded pre-war levels. In spite of considerable population growth, indigenous production of agricultural and fisheries food was Japanese Fisheries, op cit. 1 2 , p. 3. 17 sufficient to provide 66 percent of Japan's caloric requirements — close to prewar levels.2 7 Yet, Japan still suffered from a food deficit of 11 percent even as late as 1950 according to SCAP studies.28 Moreover, too many vessels contributed to additional problems of overfishing as catch intensity increased within the narrow confines of the MacArthur Line. In order to allow Japan to continue on its development path and to avoid ecological catastrophe, SCAP needed to extend or find new fishing areas for Japanese fishers. As a provisional measure to relieve some pressure from Japan's coastal fisheries, the MacArthur line was extended in 1949. To demonstrate its assumption of a new role as an internationally responsible nation in the global resource-management framework, moreover, the Japanese government sent SCAP and various government missions a declaration announcing its willingness to abide by worldwide conservation 29 standards and agreements regarding ocean resources. This also served to alleviate fears of a revival of Japan's pre-war neglect with respect to resource depletion. Accordingly, Japan joined the International Convention on Whaling in April 1951. Furthermore, the threat of overfishing in the authorized area also prompted Tokyo to make better use of available resources through more rigorous conservation measures beginning in 1950.30 Thus, Japan sought to preserve a position based on unrestricted freedom of the high seas with voluntary constraints in the interest of conservation. Ackerman, op cit. 7, p. 153. 2 8 This figure is based upon an approximate 1900 calories/day consumption for an adult requirement of 2250 calories/day. Ibid., p. 160. 2 9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Microfilm Series IT0039 (kitatalheiyo no kokaigyogyo ni kansuru kokusai-joyaku kankei ikken). 3 0 Japan's first fisheries conservation law, the Law for the Prevention of the Exhaustion of Marine Resources, was enacted on May 1, 1950 to restrict catch-rates within the MacArthur Line. This is not to say, however, that the Japanese hereafter adopted the 'maximum sustainable yield' concept as a new 18 The promotion of sound resource-management principles also had important political implications for Japan as well. Most of the worldwide opposition to Japanese high-seas fisheries — including American, Canadian, and Australian fishing industries — stemmed from Japan's previous lack of proper conservation practices. Tokyo's voluntary compliance to international standards, however, provided a reasonable justification for SCAP to permit an extended fisheries area for Japan. As stated in a letter from Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida to American Ambassador John Foster Dulles in February 1951, Japan's voluntary adoption of restrictions in certain eastern Pacific and Bering Sea fisheries would "constitute convincing evidence of the desire of the Japanese Government to deal with this whole problem [the management of international fisheries] in an equitable manner, designed to promote good will and the mutual interest of all who.... depend for their livelihood upon fishing in the high seas."31 Hereafter, both Washington and Tokyo felt that an extension of Japan's fishing areas could best be accomplished with a multilateral agreement that set out rights and rules governing access and conservation in the North Pacific. Tripartite Negotiations American fishing interests as well as Korean, Indonesian, Chinese, and Australian representatives pressured SCAP and the State Department to enshrine restrictions on Japanese fishing in the Peace Treaty. Somewhat alarmed by the extent of these requests, Ambassador Dulles even commented that the treaty was becoming an 'international operative management principle for all fisheries. The law was primarily designed as an ad hoc arrangement to mitigate an impending ecological crisis in the authorized zone. 3 1 Department of State, Bulletin, vol. 24, no. 608, Feb. 26, 1951, "Letter from Prime Minister Yoshida to Ambassador Dulles", p. 351. 19 fisheries convention.' He opposed such attempts largely to sidestep any singular opposition this might bring to the treaty as a whole and to avoid a punitive settlement with respect to Japan's international fisheries. In order to conclude the treaty as soon as possible "this pressure had been resisted in every instance." Instead, a separate agreement was negotiated in 1952 as a first step in Japan's general effort to conclude fisheries-treaties governing contiguous fishing areas. In accordance with Article 9 of the forthcoming Peace Treaty, Japan was required to negotiate fishing treaties with signatory states before Japanese fleets would be allowed near their coastal waters. Japan and the United States decided to negotiate the first fisheries treaty in an effort to establish a favourable precedent for ensuing negotiations as well as quickly to open up an abundant fishing area for Japanese fishers. Washington also elected to negotiate a treaty for the Northeast Pacific with the inclusion of Canada since an agreement for the Northwest Pacific and the Japan and China Seas was virtually impossible due to subsequent wartime bitterness and Cold War maneuvering of littoral states, namely China, Korea, and the Soviet Union. Tripartite negotiations were held in Tokyo in November and December, 1952. SCAP conveyed temporary sovereignty to Japanese authorities for the duration of the negotiations since the Peace Treaty had not yet been completed and full sovereignty had yet to be restored.33 The negotiation policy of the Japanese Foreign Ministry was to defend the principle of freedom of the high seas by avoiding any restrictions on fishing Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol . VI , 1951, pg. 1184. 3 3 Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Microfilm Series BTJ039 {kitataiheiyo no kokaigyogyo ni kansuru kokusai-joyaku kankei ikken) 20 activities. Moreover, they wished to secure American and Canadian support of this principle through a mutual declaration that defended the freedom as a universal right. In the Japanese draft of the convention, Article 2 stated that "no country concerned under this convention is to be subject to discriminatory exclusion from the exploitation of any high seas fishing resource..."35 In other words, the Japanese argued that no restrictions should be applied to any single country in compliance with the standards of the earlier oceans regime, while conservation measures should be applied equally to all signatories. The Japanese negotiators hoped to avoid the adoption of any exclusionary principles for fear they might serve as adverse precedents in later negotiations with the USSR, China, and Korea. The Ministry also emphasized the particular importance of fisheries to the economic revitalization of the post-war economy.36 This tactic was persuasive since Washington had already committed itself to the reconstruction of Japan through SCAP while the State Department wished to divest itself from financially burdensome aid expenses through the promotion of a self-supporting domestic economy. Moreover, Japan and the United States were concurrently negotiating arrangements for a mutual security treaty whereby the "economic stability and development of Japan shall be its prerequisite."37 Such a strategy reasoned that fisheries were an important component of the Japan's economic development and, consequently, to American security interests. Canadian and U.S. fishing industries, on the other hand, sought to exclude Japan from any fishing in the Northeast Pacific. As resolved in the November 34 Ibid., pgs. 0084-0094 (kitataiheiyo no kokaigyogyo ni kansuru kokusai-joyaku kankei ikkeri). 3 5 Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tripartite Fisheries Conference, Tokyo, Japan, 1951, (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1951), p. 176. 3 6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Microfilm Series, op cit. 34. 21 1950 meeting of the Pacific Fisheries Conference, a meeting held among United States and Canadian industrial fishing companies, West Coast fishers encouraged their respective governments to negotiate with the objective of ensuring that "Japanese fishermen will stay out of the fisheries of the Northeast Pacific Ocean which have been developed and husbanded by the United States and other countries of North America." 3 8 Fishing industry advocates cited Japan's earlier 'invasion' of the Bristol Bay salmon fishery in 1936-7 as well as potential threats to peaceful relations with Japan as substantial reasons to impose an eastern limit on Japanese high-seas fishing. The United States government, however, concurred with the Japanese Foreign Ministry's position with respect to the defence of freedom of the seas and the need for economic revival through fisheries expansion. Much more concerned with Communist victory in China, Soviet expansionary policy in East Asia, and the Korean War than fisheries in the Bering Sea, the State Department was mostly attentive to security needs in Asia. As stated in a CIA special estimate conducted for the State Department in 1951, Japan would play a critical role in establishing an "East-West balance of power in the Far-East" and it would be important to secure markets and natural resources, such as fish, in non-communist areas.39 The fall of Nationalist China raised urgent problems regarding the replacement of the very important and proximate mainland economy with one large enough to support the Japanese market while friendly to American interests. Part of the answer to this dilemma was to open American markets to Japanese exports to provide a source of dollars for the capital-poor Japanese economy, 3 7 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol . X I V , 1952-54, pg. 1446-7. 3 8 Pacific Fisherman, January 1951, p. 15. 22 as in the case of tuna fisheries.40 This policy was adopted in part to prevent Japan from turning to the market of Communist China in search of export earnings. Another partial solution was to allow the Japanese into the North Pacific to secure access to another source of natural resources. The Tripartite negotiations were conducted under the understanding that the United States and Canada would allow Japan to fish in waters proximate to American coastal waters while making efforts to prevent Japan from entering selected, valuable North American fisheries, namely salmon, halibut, and herring. Thus Japan would be able to develop an export market and provide for domestic consumption needs without having a directly adverse affect on valuable North American fisheries. While the contemporary oceans regime did not allow the exclusion of Japan from such fisheries, the North American delegations pressured the Japanese to adopt some voluntary measures to reserve these stocks for Canadian and American exploitation. Perhaps owing to Japan's role as a vanquished nation in the negotiations, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Agriculture/Forestry agreed to a compromise whereby an abstention principle would be applied to Japanese fishers alone. Although the adoption of such a restriction may have seemed severe in terms of Japan's pre-war experience, the agreement nonetheless opened up a vast fishing area beyond the diminutive authorized zone for future use. 3 9 Pacific Fisherman, 1951, p. 204-5. 4 0 The State Department resisted attempts to levy tariffs on Japanese tuna imports in the 1951-2 even when American tuna boats were dry-docked due to poor market conditions. Their reasoning, as outlined in a report submitted to a Ways and Means Committee of the Senate in 1952, highlighted two urgent matters: 1. Japanese exports were an important source of dollars for post-war reconstruction and 2. Further trade restrictions may have pressured Japan to trade heavily with Communist China and driven the Japanese to pursue unfair trade practices in other products in an effort to earn the dollars they needed. Testimony of Harold Cinder, Secretary of State for Economic Affairs before the Senate Finance 23 The resulting agreement, known as the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention (INPFC), was finally signed on May 9, 1952 and came into effect on June 12, 1953. The INPFC contained three important provisions. First of all, support for freedom of the high seas was included in the preamble in accordance with Japan's wishes.41 Secondly, the abstention principle was adopted in full, but included in the appendix of the treaty. While not readily apparent, this section served as the operating basis for the new treaty. The Japanese in effect agreed not to fish herring, salmon, and halibut east of an Abstention Line demarcated at 175 degrees West Longitude. Finally, the agreement established a supervisory organization, the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC), to provide an annual trilateral forum to coordinate dialogue and to supervise biological studies on designated stocks. Changes in the North Pacific Fisheries Regime The new treaty modified the pre-existing resource regime in the North Pacific. While freedom of the seas prevailed for most fisheries, the Japanese voluntarily restricted their activities with respect to specified species of fish. This represented one of the first cases in the North Pacific fisheries where, in economic terms, resources continued to be considered common property, but allocation changed from the basis of unrestricted entry to limited entry.42 Hereafter, the new international governing principle was limited common property. Committee, February 6, 1952. Found in Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Microfilm Series ET0039 {kitataiheiyo no kokaigyogyo ni kansuru kokusai-joyaku kankei ikken). 4 1 International North Pacific Fisheries Commission. International North Pacific Fisheries Commission Handbook. Vancouver: INPFC, 1990. 4 2 Three other fisheries arrangements preceded the INPFC in the North Pacific: the Pacific Halibut Commission (Canada/U.S., 1923); the International Whaling Convention (1936); and the Fraser River Salmon Convention (Canada/U.S., 1937). Another significant alteration of previous high-seas practice was the introduction of a supervisory organization. As mentioned before, no multilateral body governed fishery-resource allocation in the North Pacific prior to 1952. The International North Pacific Fisheries Commission established its headquarters in Vancouver, Canada and provided for regular scientific and political consultations among the three signatories. Unlike several other extant fisheries organizations, such as the International Whaling Commission, the INPFC was relatively decentralized. It did not formulate quotas, could not enforce decisions upon its members, and did not have a formal dispute-resolution process. While the INPFC supervised scientific studies offish stocks and regularly employed 'conservationist' language at annual meetings, it was not a resource conservation regime. Allocation of salmon, herring, and halibut was its effective function, not the management of environmental sustainability. Conservation considerations were the voluntary responsibility of each national government. The most important role of the INPFC was to re-open the North Pacific to Japanese fishing in the post-war era. Course of the North Pacific Fisheries Convention, 1953-1975 Although the Japanese fishers were prevented from the exploitation of salmon, herring, and halibut in the Northeast Pacific, all other fisheries remained open. The promulgation of the INPFC ended the system of restrictions on Japanese fisheries including the MacArthur Line and entitled Japanese fishers to operate in both the eastern and western portions of the North Pacific high seas. Japan vigorously expanded their fish catch after 1952 and soon re-attained its former status as the foremost fishing nation in the world. Their total fish catch increased from 4.8 million metric tons in 1952 25 to 6.9 million metric tons in 1962 — nearly 15 percent of the world's total. In the North Pacific, crab, herring, sardines, whale, pollack, and salmon fisheries among others became important food sources for the Japanese market.44 The adoption of new technologies and techniques, moreover, enhanced the productivity of Japan's high-seas fishing fleets. The introduction of sonar devices increased the efficiency with which fishing fleets could locate and track schools of fish. While mothership operations continued to be the dominant form of high-seas fisheries until the 1960s, the new fishing technique of driftnetting was also increasingly adopted after 1952 and proved to be highly cost-effective. As a form of gillnet that was allowed to drift in ocean tideways, drift nets became especially popular due to the fact that they did not require fuel to function and their vast size, at times as much as sixty kilometers in length and fifteen meters in depth, permitted a sizable catch with little effort.45 While drift nets were a particularly destructive and indiscriminate form of capture - frequently referred to as a 'curtain of death' - they also enabled the Japanese high-seas fisheries to rapidly expand their overall fish catch. Despite the adherence to abstention in the Northeast Pacific, Japanese fishing activities in the Northwest, particularly of salmon, continued to expand. After a period of contentious fisheries relations, the Japanese managed to conclude bilateral fisheries agreements with both the USSR in 1956 and South Korea in 1965. While neither convention applied the Abstention principle so feared by Japanese negotiators, Japanese fishing fleets were in no way guaranteed access to fisheries near either the 4 3 Food and Agricultural Organization, Yearbook of Fishery Statistics, 1965, vol. 20, 1966, p. a-30, a-31. 4 4 Both the Northeast and Northwest Pacific. 4 5 Douglas M . Johnston, "The Driftnetting Problem in the Pacific Ocean: Legal Considerations and Diplomatic Options," Ocean Development and International Law, Vol . 21, p. 6. 26 Soviet or Korean coastlines. The two agreements provided an annual bilateral determination of quotas whereby the Soviet Union and South Korea sold access permits to Japanese fishers, and vice versa, but yet reserved the right unilaterally to exclude foreign fishing from protected areas as witnessed in Peter the Great Bay in 1957 and the entire Sea of Okhotsk.46 Nonetheless, the Japanese high-seas fisheries were entitled to catch a vast amount of salmon and other species that were previously the exclusive reserve of coastal states. In fact, despite various restrictions and limitations placed upon the high-seas fleets in the Northeast and Northwest Pacific, Japan's total salmon catches between 1955-1961 were larger than those of the United States, and in some years, larger than the combined catches of Canada and the United States.47 A 1973 study conducted by Hiroshi Kasahara and William Burke concluded that in spite of the numerous international agreements governing the North Pacific Fisheries, including the INPFC, more than 90 percent of fish stocks remained unregulated.48 Consequently, freedom of the high seas still prevailed in both principle and practice throughout most of the North Pacific. The high-seas fisheries, in particular those operating in the North Pacific, grew in importance relative to domestic fisheries as well as in terms of overall fish harvests. As indicated in Figure 3, distant-water fisheries surpassed inshore production in 1966 and, finally, offshore production in 1968. By 1975 Japan's North Pacific fisheries harvested 8,729,626 metric tons of fish which amounted to 83 percent of overall Edward Miles, Stephen Gibbs, David Fluharty, et al., The Management of Marine Regions: The North Pacific, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p. 95. 4 7 The International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, Historical Catch Statistics for Salmon of the North Pacific Ocean, Bulletin 39, 1979, p. 20. 4 8 Hiroshi Kasahara and William Burke, North Pacific Fisheries Management, (Washington: Resources for the Future, 1973), p. 43. 27 production.49 Of this amount, 88 percent was harvested west of the Abstention Line in the Western Bering Sea, and near the Sea of Okhotsk and Kamchatka. Thus, the North Pacific provided a very important source of fish supply for domestic Japanese consumption. Moreover, while the INPFC may have protected valuable North American fisheries from Japanese competition in the Northeastern Pacific, it did not restrict catch levels and failed to regulate other commercial species within the rest of its North Pacific jurisdiction. Production of four sectors of the Japanese fishing industry, 1959-69. 4 -1 * 3H | 2 H Gopslol (or o f f s h o r e ) •rf*..#iv fisheries'- — I n s h o r e f i sher ies D i s t on i - wo te r f i she ri es T ) ™~t— 1958 60 '62 "64 Y e a r 1 6 6 1 - T ^ -6 8 Figure 3. Trends in Various Sectors of Japan's Fishing Industry, 1958-69. Found in Hiroshi Kasahara and William Burke, North Pacific Fisheries Management, p. 16. Concurrent with the rise in high-seas fisheries, Japan's two largest international fishing companies, Taiyo Gyogyo and Nippon Suisan, began to exercise considerable influence in Japanese fisheries and within the INPFC itself. By the mid-1960's, it was estimated that these two enterprises in conjunction with the smaller Nichiro and Kyokuyo Hogei companies accounted for 63 percent of Japanese distant-' Food And Agricultural Organization, Yearbook of Fisheries Statistics, 1977, vol. 44, pgs. 4, 220, 222. 28 water catches.50 As Tsuneo Akaha argued in Japan in Global Ocean Politics, the relative importance of these large-scale fishing companies enabled them to exert significant influence on Japan's foreign and fisheries policy through both the powerful Japan Fisheries Association lobby, and direct links to the bureaucracy and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.51 Finally, the service of Taiyo's President, Kenkichi Nakabe, and Nissui's President, Kyuhei Suzuki, for a total of six terms as INPFC Commissioners ensured the continued direction and impact of Japan's distant-water industries upon the management of the Trilateral Commission. The INPFC provided a forum within which North American and Japanese fishing industries could express their interests and concerns. Shortly after the conclusion of the Tripartite agreement, Alaskan fishers were becoming increasingly alarmed at the impact Japanese high-seas fishing may have had on North American salmon, particularly as scientific evidence emerged showing that such stocks were regularly migrating west of the Abstention Line, thus putting themselves within reach of the Japanese. Such American industry fears were first expressed at the 1957 Annual meeting of the INPFC and by 1958 the American delegation even warned of the "hazard to preservation of some sockeye salmon runs of North American origin," in particular the Bristol Bay salmon runs.52 In spite of the fact that scientific study was unable to provide conclusive evidence of this, Alaskan industrial fishers implicated the Japanese in the decline of the Bristol Bay salmon runs. While little could be achieved within the INPFC framework since the Japanese were entitled to fish west of the Abstention Line, the Americans were able to 5 0 Fishing News International, March 1968, pp. 44-46. Cited in Roy Jackson and William Royce, Ocean Forum: An Interpretive History of the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, (Farnham, England: Fishing News Books, 1986), p. 131. 5 1 Tsuneo Akaha, Japan in Global Ocean Politics, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), p. 21-23. 29 utilize informal networks including a meeting between operators within both US and Japanese industries to request the Japanese to reduce operations close to the Abstention Line. 5 3 One explanation for the more assertive articulation of Alaskan fisheries interests was that jurisdiction over fisheries switched from federal to state control when Alaska became a full-fledged state in 1959. The salmon fisheries were seen to provide not only an important resource to the Alaskan economy but also a source of considerable domestic political support. Consequently, various fisheries such as the Bristol Bay salmon fishery acquired a new political significance which was not sympathetic to the open-seas rights of foreign fishing fleets, especially Japan. Federal officials were thus tasked to meet the demands of a politically empowered Alaskan fishery while fulfilling American obligations to Japanese high-seas industries under the INPFC. The INPFC encountered a considerable challenge during renegotiations of the original agreement when it was up for renewal in 1963. Despite the relatively loose fishing limitations applied to Japan in the North Pacific, Japanese domestic public opinion and the fishing industry increasingly resented the abstention principle. As revealed in a 1964 editorial for the prominent Keidanren industrial organization, Kenkichi Nakabe argued that restrictions imposed on Japan by the INPFC and other agreements were unfair and ultimately detrimental to world fisheries supply.54 At Commission meetings throughout the 1950's, moreover, Japanese delegates repeatedly condemned the abstention obligation as unduly severe. As the end of the ten-year term of 5 2 International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, Annual Report, 1958, p. 2. 5 3 Pacific Fisherman, July 1958, p. 9-10. 5 4 Kenkichi Nakabe, "Kokusai Gyogyo Seigen ni Taisuru: Wareware no Shucho", Keidanren Geppo, vol. 12, no. 7,(1964) pp. 7-9. 30 the fisheries commission approached, significant public pressure favoured termination instead of renewal of the agreement.55 Buoyed by this growing resentment over the original terms, the Japanese government elected to request renegotiation in 1963. Meanwhile, many US fishers and some politicians sought to exclude Japan from fishing any salmon of North American origin in the Northwest or Northeast Pacific. Poor Bristol Bay salmon runs from 1962-4 led many to blame the Japanese high-seas fishery and request domestic action in addition to abrogation of the INPFC. In 1965, the Congress of American Fishermen even sponsored a national boycott of Japanese goods although with little effect.56 Senators Magnuson (Washington) and Bartlett (Alaska) demanded that the Japanese abstain from fishing North American salmon anywhere in the North Pacific. In a move clearly aimed at Japan, they helped sponsor a bill in 1965 to authorize the increase of import duties for those countries whose fishing industries were 'injurious' to American fish conservation programs.57 While the bill failed to pass the House of Representatives, it was indicative of the protectionist political climate within the US and was timed so as to add pressure to the Japanese delegation during renegotiation talks for the INPFC. At each of the three meetings held in 1963-6 with regard to renegotiation of the 1953 INPFC, Japanese negotiators sought to remove the Abstention line entirely while the Canadian and American delegations preferred to retain the status quo. The Japanese even proposed a strengthening of the convention to permit trilateral regulation and conservation of all fisheries in the North Pacific if the North Americans would drop 5 5 Jackson and Royce, op cit. 50, p. 213. 5 6 Ralph W. Johnson, "The Japan - United States Salmon Conflict", Washington Law Review, vol. 43, no. l , p . 11. 57 Ibid., p. 11. 31 the Abstention principle. Canadian and American delegates rejected this proposal since it would have deprived both countries of national control over valuable salmon stocks while presumably allowing Japanese industry competition in the Northeast Pacific. After considerable debate both in the meetings and in the public arena, all three countries decided that continuation of the existing agreement was preferable to the political hazards of renegotiation. Japan agreed to the continuation of the abstention provisions while Canada and the United States removed Bering Sea halibut from the protected species list found in the appendix of the agreement.58 Thus, the durability of the North Pacific fisheries regime was tested within a decade of its enactment. It survived, at least in part, since Tokyo feared that it had more to lose with a newly negotiated treaty in the event the INPFC dissolved. The North Pacific Fisheries Convention established a regime that served to allow the expansion of Japanese high-seas fisheries activities in the North Pacific while protecting North American industry interests with respect to salmon, halibut, and herring. As consumer demand increased in Japan's revitalized post-war economy, high-seas fishing companies such as Taiyo Gyogyo and Nissui secured internationally recognized rights of access to numerous profitable and productive fishing grounds throughout the North Pacific. Japan was therefore quite successful in its search to secure guaranteed access to a crucial source of protein even if somewhat constrained by the Abstention principle governing a few select species of fish. The United States succeeded in its attempt to foster Japanese economic revitalization with fisheries playing an important part in that growth. The American-backed Mutual Security arrangement also achieved its goals insofar as the maintenance of an economically sound Japan was a key component 58 Ibid., p. 127. 32 of US Cold War policy in East Asia. Yet the INPFC regime had a fundamental weakness since it was allocative and not conservationist in function. As coastal states became increasingly alarmed at the declining state of fish populations in the two decades after the inception of the INPFC, the regime was unable to adapt to meet conservationist concerns or provide the regulations and quotas necessary for the protection of fish stocks. The United States and Canada were unwilling to vest additional regulatory power to the INPFC due to their reluctance to surrender aspects of national sovereignty to international institutions. Instead, they both pursued a growing global trend to expand national jurisdiction at the expense of international authority. 3. The Extension of National Fisheries Jurisdictions Japan's high-seas fisheries prospered under the INPFC regime in the North Pacific. Drift-net fishing helped substantially to increase, albeit indiscriminately, the catch of fish such as squid, salmon, and herring in the mid-ocean. As indicated earlier, the high-seas fishing industry surpassed both coastal and offshore fisheries production by the end of the 1960's. The total production figure for Japan in 1975, 10.5 million tons of fish, represented a 150 percent increase from 1962 records, and of that total 83 percent was caught in the North Pacific including oceans surrounding Japan.59 Consequently, Japan favoured the continuance of the freedom of the seas status quo as it entered into its third decade of the ESTPFC regime. Food and Agricultural Organization, Yearbook of Fisheries Statistics, 1977, p. c-61, c-67. 33 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Enclosure Movement Concurrent developments concerning a new approach to oceans law, however, threatened to undermine Japan's increased access to living ocean resources. After years of academic debate, the United Nations General Assembly finally sought to codify the law of the seas in light of changing practices and policies. The establishment of two-hundred mile 'conservation zones' off the west coast of South America in a multilateral arrangement by Chile, Ecuador, and Peru in 1952 and the unilateral extension of the territorial sea for nine states by 1944 are simply a couple of examples of the challenges posed to the old regime in the early post-war period.6 0 The United Nations finally elected to host a worldwide multilateral conference to negotiate a new law of the sea to reconcile the conservation concerns of coastal states with the rights and obligations of the world community with respect to open access to ocean resources. The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) convened in Geneva in 1958. The conference adopted four separate conventions concerning the high seas, continental shelf, fishing, and continental-shelf resource use. Although the Continental Shelf Convention granted coastal states "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources," the wording of the articles was otherwise ambiguous and did not adequately define what constituted a continental shelf nor provide an agreed-upon breadth.61 Moreover, fishing was expressly identified as a protected 'freedom of the sea', and no agreement was achieved with respect to coastal fishing rights for international fishers. Thus, while the 1959 negotiations may 6 0See Johnston, op cit. 14, pp. 333-41 and Barry Buzan, Seabed Politics, (New York: Praeger, 1976), p. 2. 6 1Convention on the Continental Shelf in the United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 499, no. 7302, p. 312. 34 have indicated a gradual shift in values with respect to coastal state claims on ocean resources, the conventions were not yet codified as international law due to lack of consensus on crucial issues. A second conference (UNCLOS II) was held a year later in 1960 to resolve these jurisdictional conflicts. A North American proposal for a six-mile territorial sea and fishing zone attracted a great deal of support, but was finally defeated by a single vote.62 The Conference adjourned without the resolution of any of the significant issues. Again, no limits for the zones of coastal-state jurisdiction were agreed upon or included in the conventions. Consequently, the old three-mile territorial sea and the principle of mare liberum continued as de facto international custom. These two UNCLOS sessions reflected a movement to protect coastal fisheries that was gaining momentum around the world. Increased technological capacity and demand intensified the pressures on living resources worldwide. Within the North Pacific, as in other oceans worldwide, coastal states were becoming increasingly alarmed at the mounting evidence of overfishing and other forms of resource depletion which brought to an end any belief in the age-old Grotian premise of the inexhaustibility of the oceans. Correspondingly, coastal states united in an enclosure movement to bring contiguous fishing areas under national sovereign control in the interest of more effective management and conservation practice. Chile, Ecuador, and Peru created an impetus for enclosure with their 1952 declaration of a two-hundred mile fishery zone. By 1974, 33 nations declared extended fisheries jurisdiction beyond twelve miles. 6 3 62James Morell, The Law of the Sea: An Historical Analysis of the 1982 Treaty and Its Rejection by the United States. (Jefferson: McFarland and Co., 1992), p. 8. 6 3Ross Eckert, The Enclosure of Ocean Resources: Economics and the Law of the Sea. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 129. 35 As UNCLOS launched into its third round of talks in 1973, the Japanese government recognized that it needed to address the increasingly influential enclosure movement. The simple advocacy of general freedom of the high seas would no longer suffice to counter coastal state claims of extended jurisdiction. It became apparent at the first procedural session held in New York in 1973 that special exclusive economic zones (EEZ's) concerning coastal control of fisheries and other natural resources would dominate the forthcoming debate. In a talk to the Japan Press Club in May, 1974, Director-General Shinichi Sugihara of the Foreign Ministry's Office for the Law of the Sea Conference declared that the government should abandon opposition to the 200-mile zones and, instead, discuss the options for Japan to adopt its own economic zone.6 4 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was particularly concerned that the adoption of EEZ's by such states as China, Korea, or the Soviet Union might impinge upon Japan's control of its own coastal resources. The high-seas fishing industry, however, firmly opposed such an idea and pressured the Fishery Agency of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) to resist the M F A proposal. As a result of pressure from such groups as the Japan Fisheries Association — for which the president of Taiyo fisheries was a vice-director — the M A F F Minister recommended with the Cabinet's formal support to oppose the concept of the 200-mile economic zone at the second UNCLOS III session in Caracas.65 The M A F F and large fishing companies did not wish to support a concept that might exclude Japan's international fishing fleets from productive overseas fishing areas. Consequently, the Japanese delegation to UNCLOS III which was composed of both 'Nihon Keizai Shinbun. May 29, 1974. 'Nihon Keizai Shinbun, June 19, 1974. 36 MFA and M A F F officials among others remained split with regard to exclusive economic zones as it entered the Caracas negotiations in 1974. The division within the Japanese group became increasingly apparent as the Caracas meeting progressed. One study of Japan's diplomatic style at the UNCLOS sessions suggested that the Japanese were in disarray and largely ineffectual at Caracas.66 Much of the confusion stemmed from the inability of the delegates to establish a clear position before the negotiations. The Foreign Ministry was shocked when it found out that it was the only nation at UNCLOS actively to oppose the two-hundred mile proposition, largely due to the delegation's incapacity to forge successful coalitions and formulate effective alternatives. Japan's performance at the conference, according to one observer, was characterized by "silence, smiling, and sleeping".67 Although no convention text was entirely agreed upon at Caracas, the 200-mile E E Z concept was widely supported — most notably by the United States. Hereafter, the Japanese Fisheries Association and the M A F F elected to reassess their policy in light of Japan's isolation regarding the fishery zone issue. The fishing industry abandoned its opposition to coastal states' extended jurisdiction in favour of the advocacy of Japan's traditional fishing rights.68 In subsequent UNCLOS III negotiations, the M A F F and M F A argued that living resources were the common heritage of mankind, even if found within the 200-mile EEZ's. Therefore, long-standing fishing countries such as Japan should enjoy access privileges based on traditional rights 6 6Michael Blaker, "Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic Performance" in Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change. Gerald Curtis, ed. (New York: M.E . Sharpe, 1993), p. 13. 6 1 Ibid., p. 16. 6 8 "Choki Shokuryo Seisaku no Ikkan de Kakuritsu o: Kaiyoho e Gyokai Hoshin, Jisseki Kakuro no Sessho nado Sanken," Suisankai, no. 1084 (April 1975), pp. 52-4. Cited in Akaha, op cit. 51, p. 93-4. 37 notwithstanding the new sovereign rights of coastal states.69 Moreover, the Japanese delegates argued that coastal states were no more capable of conservation or management of living resources than fishing states. Consequently, international organizations, such as the INPFC, should be strengthened and entrusted with such responsibilities.70 Unilateral Enclosure in the North Pacific Meanwhile, another significant development prompted the Japanese government to reconsider its ocean-policy alternatives. As a result of the widespread acceptance of EEZ's at the UNCLOS meetings, the United States passed the Fishery Conservation and Management Act in 1976 to establish its own 200-mile fishery conservation zone. This represented a reversal of United States policy regarding freedom of the seas. Previously, Washington adhered to the principle of mare liberum to enable the free navigation of its vessels, largely for security concerns. This policy was finally relinquished in favour of the protection of the 62 percent of the fish species that were 'fully utilized' or 'overfished' within 200 miles of the American coastline — mostly in the Atlantic Ocean.7 1 Washington was no longer willing to compromise domestic fishing interests in favour of Cold War policy, which included the bolstering of its Asian ally, Japan. The Soviet Union soon followed suit with the declaration of its own 200-mile fishing zone in December of the same year.72 Finally, Canada announced its intention to establish a fishing conservation area of the same proportions effective Kazuomi Ouchi, "A Perspective on Japan's Struggle for its Traditional Rights of the Ocean", Ocean Development and International Law, vol. 5, no. 1, 1978, p. 121. 10Ibid.,p. 118. 7 1Eckert, op cit. 63, p. 134. 7 2Jackson and Royce, op cit. 50, p. 149. 38 January 1, 1977.73 Consequently, many of Japan's most valuable fishing areas in the North Pacific were unilaterally appropriated under national control by the beginning of 1977. Japan was reluctant to declare its own fisheries zone for fear of. implicitly sanctioning the unilateral declarations of EEZ's that deprived Japan of many of its international fishing areas. The threat of an extended Soviet fishing area, however, prompted domestic fishing interests, particularly in Northern Japan, to defend their own coastal fisheries from the encroachment of Soviet fishers with the establishment of a counter fisheries jurisdiction.7 4 The Japanese Diet passed two laws, the Law of the Territorial Sea and the Law on Provisional Measures Relating to the Fishing Zone, that established a twelve-mile territorial sea and two-hundred mile fishing area on Japan's eastern and northern coasts, effective July 1, 1977. It is worth noting that the fishing zone did not extend into waters contiguous to Korea or China since neither country claimed such zones at this time and the Japanese government wished to maintain the status quo in their fishery relations.76 Barbara Johnson, "Canadian Foreign Policy and Fisheries," Canadian Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, Barbara Johnson and Mark Zacher, ed. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977), p. 88. 7 4 Shunji Yanai and Kuniaki Asomura, "Japan and the Emerging Order of the Seas: Two Maritime Laws of Japan," Japanese Annual of International Law, 1977, p. 72-3. 15Ibid., p. 48. 16Ibid., p 74. 39 The Enclosure Regime in the North Pacific As a result of this enclosure movement, Japan's high-seas fisheries were deprived of a significant share of their traditional source of fish. According to catch statistics for 1975, close to 2.8 million tons of production fell within the United States' and USSR's Exclusive Economic Zones — 27 percent of Japan's total catch.77 Moreover, almost half of Japan's total catch came from fisheries which fell within the 200-mile zones of other Figure 4. EEZ's in the North Pacific. Found in Barbara Johnson and Frank Langdon, "Two Hundred Mile Zones: The Politics of North Pacific Fisheries. states and ninety percent of this amount originated in the North Pacific. Thus, Japan lost much of the free access to living resources it was once guaranteed under the old Fishery Agency of Japan, 1977. Table found in Yanai and Asomura, op cit. 1A, p. 73. 7 8Delegation of Japan to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, "Statement by H.E. Ambassador M . Ogiso, Head of the Japanese Delegation before the Plenary of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea", Caracas, July 15, 1974. Cited in Barbara Johnson and Frank Langdon, 40 regime of mare liberum and narrow territorial seas. Domestic fisheries, on the other hand, gained substantially with the new exclusive economic zone. Japan's fisheries jurisdiction expanded to nearly 376 square kilometers of ocean space, or fifty times as large an area as it controlled under the 3-mile territorial sea rule. It is difficult to determine the net effect upon Japan's overall fisheries production since there appeared to be no substantial decrease or increase in catch totals even a decade after the implementation of national enclosure.79 One important transformation worth noting, however, is the shift within the fishing industry from high-seas to coastal and offshore production. The United States enclosure movement successfully achieved one of its main purposes. As expressed in the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, one of the intentions of enclosure was "to encourage the development of fisheries which are currently underutilized or not utilized by the United States fishermen."80 Between 1978 and 1987, U.S. West Coast fishers expanded their total catch in the Northeast Pacific from 5.1 to 25.7 million tons whereas total Japanese catches dramatically dropped by one-quarter to 2.1 million tons of fish. 8 1 It appears that the expansion of United States fisheries displaced their Japanese counterparts in the Northeast Pacific Ocean. Dispossessed of their profitable fishing grounds, Japan's two largest high-seas fishing companies, Taiyo Gyogyo and Nippon Suisan, adopted new corporate strategies to cope with the changed regime. Taiyo continued to diversify its operations "Two Hundred Mile Zones: The Politics of North Pacific Fisheries", Pacific Affairs, vol. 49, no. 1 (Spring 1976), p. 15. 7 9 F A O Yearbook of Fisheries Statistics, 1987, vol. 64, p. 102. 8 0 Jackson and Royce, op cit. 50, p. 148. 8 1 F A O Yearbook of Fisheries Statistics, 1987, vol. 64, p. 366. 41 82 into other agricultural-food sectors, real estate, and even a baseball team. The company has also sustained its fishing interests through the establishment of an extensive international import operation and more intensive fish farming. By 1985, Taiyo was among the foremost harvesters of cultivated fish in the world, producing ten percent of 83 the company's annual catch through fish farms in various locations in Japanese waters. Nippon Suisan, however, continued to focus on fish products. It maintained its supply through more concentrated fishing on the open sea, purchase of products from foreign fisheries, and the establishment of new joint ventures in key countries such as the United States, Canada, and Russia. The new regime guaranteed freedom of the high seas outside of territorial waters and coastal-state EEZ's. However, since most of the world's productive fisheries are located on the coastal margins within two-hundred miles of the coastline (see Figure 5), the new regime placed sovereign control of most fisheries under coastal state authority. According to Article 56 of the Law of the Sea Convention (1982), coastal states are granted exclusive "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources..."85 While the regime maintained its common property nature, allocation changed from limited to restricted-entry. Only coastal state fishers or those fishers granted rights by the governing national authority were entitled to access the common resources. Moreover, the organizational structure governing EEZ's changed from multilateral commissions to those national organizations entrusted with fisheries 8 2"Taiyo Fishery Co., Ltd.", International Directory of Company Histories, Vol.2 (New York: St. James Press, 1997) p. 579. S3Ibid., p. 579. 8 4"Nippon Suisan Kaisha Limited", Ibid., Vol . 2, p. 552. 8 5United Nations, The Law of the Sea: Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index, (New York: United Nations, 1983), p. 18. Similar wording was employed in the Caracas (1974) and Geneva (1975) sessions. 42 management. Figure 5. Distribution of primary production of the world ocean. Found in Hiroshi Kasahara and William Burke, North Pacific Fisheries Management, p. 3. Note: Darker areas indicate higher productivity The new regime displaced the earlier INPFC multilateral arrangement in the North Pacific. The two-hundred mile extensions deprived the INPFC of regulatory control over the most important fisheries, including halibut and herring, since they now fell under national jurisdictions. Only the highly-migratory salmon which ventured into the mid-Pacific remained under the INPFC mandate. Under the renegotiated 1977 INPFC Protocol, a new Abstention line was demarcated at 175 degrees East Longitude and applied only to salmon.86 With regard to access to other species, Japan was required to engage in bilateral negotiations which it concluded with Canada, the Soviet Union, and the United States in 1977. Although Japan was entitled to stocks deemed surplus from 'INPFC, Handbook, op cit. 41, pp. 8-11. 43 87 coastal state catch quotas, its allocation diminished considerably over the next decade. While the INPFC continued to conduct scientific surveys and monitor the abstention line until 1993, it was never vested with the powers necessary to enforce regional conservation measures. The decisions by Washington, Tokyo, and Ottawa to forgo FNPFC multilateralism in favour of national appropriation of resources may indicate a reluctance of nations to surrender aspects of sovereignty to international institutions, even in the case of international resource management. Over the course of the postwar era, Japan continuously fought for the preservation of the principle of freedom of the high seas in resistance to littoral state appropriation of coastal fishery resources. For over two decades, the Foreign Ministry and the M A F F successfully managed to secure rights of access to important fisheries in the Pacific high seas through the INPFC and the voluntary adoption of the abstention principle relating to a few species of fish. This was a remarkable achievement for Japan given that it was able to do so in a generally subordinate role in its political relationship with the United States. Washington too played a substantial role in the development of Japan's high-seas fisheries by fostering their growth in the service of economic renewal and the maintenance of the mutual security arrangement in Asia. The United States also honored its international obligations in spite of substantial domestic pressure to the contrary. In this role, the United States assisted the food security needs of this important Pacific ally. As the 1970's neared, however, coastal states recognized the failure of the FNPFC and other multilateral institutions to mitigate fish-stock depletion. Japan could no 8 7 Hisano Aoki, "200 kairi to Nihon no Gyogyo: Beikoku Oyobi Soren no Tainichi Gyotaku Wariate o Chushin ni Shite," Kokusai Kankei Kenkyu, no. 7, 1984, pgs. 31-56. 44 longer rely upon American Cold War imperatives to support the increasingly untenable principle of freedom of the seas. The original mare liberum regime was significantly challenged by a 'tragedy of the commons' dilemma. As the number of fishers and efficiency of fishing technology increased, the ecological pressures on stocks of living resources magnified and sustainable management of common resources became a widespread priority. Consequently, a movement to introduce a national collective-choice system through expanded state jurisdictions established the current regime of Exclusive Economic Zones. Enclosure served to appropriate international resources for domestic exploitation and benefit. The enclosure movement was predicated upon the belief that national control of common resources could be managed to more effectively apply disincentives to overfishing and incentives for conservation. It was hoped that national property rights and rules could circumvent the commons tragedy through the creation of domestic vested interests and licensing systems. In consideration of the mounting difficulties encountered by contemporary national fishery departments around the world, however, the feasibility of the national-control alternative to solve the commons-resource problem remains in doubt. 45 Bibliography Ackerman, Edward. Japan's Natural Resources and Their Relation to Japan's Economic Future. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1953. Akaha, Tsuneo. Japan in Global Ocean Politics. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985. Akaha, Tsuneo. "Muddling through successfully: Japan's post-war ocean policy and future prospects". Marine Policy. Vol. 19, No. 3. 1995. pp. 171-183. 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