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Rural out-migration and rural development in Iran : implications for the roles of infrastructure in case… Sarrafi, Mozaffar 1995

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RURAL OUT-MIGRATION AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN:IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROLES OF INFRASTRUCTUREIN CASE OF HAMADAN PROVINCEBy:MOZAFFAR SARRAFIMArch. Tehran University, 1978M.Arch. University of California, Los Angeles, 1982A THESIS SUBMITTED N PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHYinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES(School of Community and Regional Planning)We accept this thesis as conformingto the required s ndardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAFebruary 1995© Mozaffar Sarrafi, 1995In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature)______________________Deptrñt of * e6v4( ‘iøijThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate MI1VtL1 (5, IDE-6 (2/88)In the Name of the CreatorABSTRACTLarge scale rural out-migration has gained momentum over the past four decades in Iran,contributing to urbanization at unprecedented rates. In the wake of the IslamicRevolution, it was recognized that in order to reduce reliance on oil revenues and fosterself-sufficiency and social equity, it was essential to ensure the viability of agriculture andrural settlements. As a part of this new strategy, a rural infrastructure provision policy(RIPP) was undertaken in order to bring about rural prosperity and to curb out-migration.Yet, the plight of villagers and out-migration persist.This dissertation focuses on the village end of the problem, and on permanent out-migration in post-revolutionary Iran. It investigates the causes of rural out-migration andtheir impacts on the remaining rural households. Further, it examines the potential ofRJPP to reduce out-migration and enhance village viability.In terms of methodology, a cross-analysis was conducted at the levels of individual,household, and community. Both qualitative and quantitative research methods wereemployed. Data were collected from primary and secondary sources. While the latterserved analysis needs at the macro-level, the former, which included case studies in fivevillages in Hamadan Province, served those at the micro- and meso-levels.The macro-level analysis reveals population pressure on agricultural resources and rural-urban disparities as the overriding causes of rural out-migration in Iran. Correspondingly,the micro- and meso-level analyses: (a) highlight the critical importance of the middlestrata (MS) for the fhture viability of rural Iran; (b) identify household insecurity, resultingfrom precarious and uncertain rural livelihoods as the root cause of out-migration for MS;and (c) suggest that the ongoing migration of youth from MS must be contained to ensurethe next generation of farmers. Finally, five roles are identified for RIPP to target theoverriding causes as well as those pertaining specifically to MS.While there is need for policy changes in the macro-economic sphere in Iran, RIPP has thepotential to reduce rural out-migration. More fundamentally, it suggests that it is notmerely the presence of physical infrastructure and its direct role, but rather an effectivelyfunctioning social infrastructure and its intermediary roles that are vital to curbingexcessive out-migration and ensuring village viability.IITABLE OF CONTENTSABSTRACT iiTABLE OF CONTENTS iiiLIST OF TABLES viiiLIST OF FIGURES xiNOTE ON THE IRANIAN CALENDAR YEAR xiGLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS xiiACKNOWLEDGMENTS xvDEDICATION xviCHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION1.1 THE QUANDARY IN THE FIELD OF iNQUIRY 21.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM IN IRAN 41.3 A PRINCIPLE, A PREMISE AND AN ETHICAL ISSUE 71.4 RESEARCH RATIONALE 81.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 91.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 101.7 RESEARCH SCOPE 111.8 RESEARCH STRATEGY 121.9 ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 15CHAPTER II: DEVELOPM]NT AND RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION2.0 INTRODUCTION 172.1 RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT THEORIES . . ..172.1.1 Modernization Theory 182.1.2 Dependency Theory 202.1.3 Sustainable Development 22Social Equity 22o Ecological Balance 23o Implications for Migration in the South 252.2 ASSESSMENT OF RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION 272.2.1 Trends of Population Distribution in the South 282.2.2 A Conceptual Framework for the Assessment 302.2.3 Rural-Urban Migration in the South: A PreliminaryAssessment 32inCHAPTER ifi: RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION AND NATIONAL POLICIES INIRAN3.0 INTRODUCTION 373.1 RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION TN IRAN 373.1.1 Rural and Urban Distribution ofPopulation 393.1.2 Rural-Urban Migration 403.1.3 Settlement Pattern 433.2 STATE INTERVENTION TN POPULATION DIST1UBUTION 453.2.1 The Need ofPolicy Intervention 473.2.2 Policy Classification 483.2.3 Significance of the Government’s Role in Iran 523.3 A BRiEF HISTORY OF RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION TN IRAN 523.3.1 Stage One: Modernization Approach 523.3.2 Stage Two: Oil-Driven Urbanization 543.3.3 Stage Three: Inconsistency and Turbulent Movement 573.4 POST-REVOLUTIONARY MIGRATION POLICIES 613.4.1 Restrictive Policies in Urban Centers 623.4.2 Retentive Policies in Rural Areas 643.5 AS SES SMENT OF RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION TN IRAN 67CHAPTER IV: MIGRATION THEORIES AND THE ROLES OFINFRASTRUCTURE4.0 INTRODUCTION 724.1 THE MACRO-LEVEL MIGRATION THEORIES 744.1.1 The First Branch 754.1.2 The SecondBranch 784.1.3 The Third Branch 794.1.4 Summary 814.2 THE MICRO-LEVEL MIGRATION THEORIES 824.2.1 The First Branch 824.2.2 The Second Branch 874.2.3 Summary 894.3 THE MESO-LEVEL MIGRATION THEORIES 904.3.1 The First Branch 914.3.2 The Second Branch 944.3.3 Summary 974.4 THE IRANIAN LITERATURE IMPLICATIONS 994.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROLES OF 11’IFRASTRUCTURE INRURAL OUT-MIGRATION 1014.5.1 A Conceptual Framework for the Roles of Infrastructure 103ivCHAPTER V: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY5.0 INTRODUCTION 1085.1 APPROACHTOMIGRATION STUDY 1085.1.1 On Searching for Cause of Migration 1095.1.2 On Searching for the Infrastructural Cause 1125.2 LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 1135.3 RESEAR.CH DESIGN 1135.3.1 Units of Analysis 1145.3.2 Variables and Measurement 1145.3.3 Data Collection 1155.3.4 Research Strategy 1195.3.5 Cases Selection and Sampling Method 1195.4 CONCLUSION 127CHAPTER VI: SURVEY FINDINGS6.0 INTRODUCTION 1296.1 THE CHARACTERISTICS AJ’1]) BEHAVIOR OF RURAL OUT-MIGRANTS 1296.1.1 Sex, Age, and Marital Status 1306.1.2 Education 1316.1.3 Destination and Presence of Relatives 1336.1.4 Occupational Change 1366.1.5 Collaboration and Contacts with the Original Household 1396.1.6 Summary 1406.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RURAL MIGRANTS’HOUSEHOLDS 1416.2.1 Size and Composition 1416.2.2 Literacy 1436.2.3 Occupation ofHead ofHouseholds 1446.2.4 Land and Livestock Ownership 1456.2.5 Sources of Income 1466.2.6 Remittances and Spending Patterns 1466.2.7 Migration Intention 1476.2.8 Housing and Economic Status 1486.2.9 Summary 1506.3 STATED CAUSES OF MIGRATION 1536.3.1 Stated/Perceived Causes for Out-Migrants 1536.3.2 Stated Causes for Would-be Individual and HouseholdMigrants 1566.4 CONCLUSION 158VCHAPTER VIE: GROUP INTERVIEWS’ FINDINGS7.0 INTRODUCTION 1627.1 ON THE VILLAGE OUT-MIGRANTS 1637.2 ON THE CAUSES OF OUT-MIGRATION 1667.3 ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF OUT-MIGRATION 1717.4 THE KEY iNFORMANTS’ APPROACH TO THE FUTURE OUT-MIGRATION 1737.5 ON THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT AN]) INFRASTRUCTURALSERVICES 1757.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE’S ROLES 1797.7 CONCLUSION 181CHAPTER Vifi: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS8.0 INTRODUCTION 1858.1 A SUSTAINED MOVEMENT TOWARD UNSUSTAiNABLEDEVELOPMENT 1868.2 THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF RURAL OUT-MIGRATION 1908.2.1 MACRO-LEVEL 1908.2.2 MICRO- AND MESO-LEVEL 1938.2.3 THE MIGRATION INTENTION OF RURALDWELLERS 1968.2.4 SYNTHESIS 1998.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROLES OF INFRASTRUCTURESIN THE RURAL AREAS 2018.3.1 SERVICE DELWERY FACILITATION 2028.3.2 EMPLOYMENT GENERATION 2048.3.3 INCOME UPGRADING 2058.3.4 RURAL-URBAN INTEGRATION 2078.3.5 RURAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION 2108.3.6 SYNTHESIS 2138.4 EPILOGUE: RURAL DEVELOPMENT, OUT-MIGRATION,AND INFRASTRUCTURE 215BIBLIOGRAPHY 219viAPPENDICESAPPENDIX (A): Household Questionnaire .257APPENDIX (B): Group Interview Questions and List ofParticipants 260APPENDIX (C): Additional Survey Tables 264APPENDIX (D): Summary ofLivestock Ownership for the Sample Migrants’Households 277APPENDIX (E): Abridged Record of Group Interviews 279APPENDIX (F): Data on the Five Sample Villages 302APPENDIX (G): Out-Migration & Infrastructure Availability in theDehestans of Hamadan Province 305APPENDIX (H): Labour Force and Employment in the Urban and RuralAreas of Iran in the Census Years 312APPENDIX (I): Population Pressure on Rural Resources and Rural-UrbanDisparities in Iran 317POSTSCRIPT 321viiLIST OF TABLESTable 3.1: Distribution of Iranian Residing in Places Other Than Their Birthplace inUrban and Rural Areas 38Iran’s Urban & Rural Population Changes during 1956-199 1 39Estimation of Iran’s Rural-Urban Migration during 1956-199 1 41Changes in the Size Distribution ofUrban Centers in Iran: 1956-1986 44Changes in the Size Distribution ofRural Settlements in Iran: 1956-198.6 44Classification ofMigration Policies & Their Emphases 50Implications for the Roles of Infrastructure in Rural Out-Migrationaccording to the Macro-Level Theories 105Implications for the Roles of Infrastructure in Rural Out-Migrationaccording to the Micro-Level Theories 105Implications for the Roles of Infrastructure in Rural Out-Migrationaccording to the Meso-Level Theories 105The Sample Villages (Population, Location and No. of Questionnaires).. 123Relationship ofMigrants to Household Heads 129Distribution ofRural Out-Migrants by Sex 130Distribution ofRural Out-Migrants by Age Groups 131Marital Status of Out-Migrants at Present and at Departure Time 131Distribution of Out-Migrants by No. of School Years Attained 132Distribution of Out-Migrants Sex by Literacy Status 133Distribution ofMigrants Education by Age Groups and Sex 133Distribution of Out-Migrants’ First and Final Destinations 135Distribution ofMigrants Who Have Had Relatives at Destination by Sex 136Distribution ofMigrants’ Occupations Prior to and After Migration 137Distribution ofMigrants’ Sex by Their Assistance in Agricultural Work .139Distribution ofMigrants’ Visits to Their Origin by Marital Status 140Distribution ofRural Households by the No. of Out-Migrant Members .142Distribution ofRural Migrants Households by Size 142Literacy among Members ofRural Migrants’ Households 143Distribution ofRural Migrants’ Household Heads by Education 143Distribution ofRural Migrants’ Household Heads by Occupation 144Average Land Ownership among the Sample Households by AgriculturalType 146Table 6.19: Distribution of Sample Households by Recipient/Non-Recipient ofRemittance 147Table 6.20: Rural Migrants’ Household and Respondents’ Migration Intention 148Table 6.21: Distribution ofRural Out-Migrants’ Causes ofMigration 154Table 6.22: Distribution of Rural Respondents’ Causes ofMigration Intention 156Table 6.23: Distribution of Sample Households’ Causes ofMigration Intention 157Table 8.1: Typical Social Strata and Out-Migration Status in Rural Hamadan 198Table 8.2: The effectiveness of Infrastructure’s Roles on Out-Migration Causes 214Table C. I: Distribution of Sample Households by the Number ofMale ChildMigrants 265Table 3.2:Table 3.3Table 3.4:Table 3.5Table 3.6:Table 4.1Table 4.2:Table 4.3Table 5.1Table 6.1Table 6.2:Table 6.3Table 6.4:Table 6.5Table 6.6:Table 6.7:Table 6.8:Table 6.9:Table 6.10:Table 6.11:Table 6.12:Table 6.13:Table 6.14:Table 6.15:Table 6.16:Table 6.17:Table 6.18:viiiTable C.2: Distribution of Sample Households by the Number ofFemale ChildMigrants 265Table C.3: Distribution of Sample Households by the Number ofFemale Members .. .266Table C.4: Distribution of Sample Households by the Number ofMale Members 266Table C.5: Distribution of Sample Households by the Number of Aged 6 Years andOver Members 267Table C.6: Distribution of Sample Households by the Number ofLiterate(Aged 6 Years and Over) Members 267Table C.7: Distribution ofHousehold Heads’ Occupations by Education 268Table C.8: Distribution of Sample Households by Their Amount ofRain-FedFarmland Ownership 268Table C.9: Distribution of Sample Households by Their Amount of IrrigatedFarmland Ownership 269Table C. 10: Distribution of Sample Households by Their Amount of OrchardOwnership 269Table C. 11: Distribution of Sample Respondents’ Migration Intention by TheirRelationship to Household Heads 270Table C. 12: Distribution of Sample Households’ Migration Intention by theOccupation of Household Heads 270Table C. 13: Distribution of Sample Households by Their Available Rooms 270Table C. 14: Ownership of Certain House-Ware/Transportation Items by SampleHouseholds 271Table C. 15: Distribution of Sample Households’ by Their Main Sources of Income ....271Table C. 16: Distribution of Sample Households by Remittances’ SpendingCategories 272Table C. 17: Distribution ofMale Rural Out-Migrants’ Causes ofMigration byTheir Previous Occupation 272Table C. 18: Distribution ofFemale Rural Out-Migrants’ Causes ofMigration byTheir Previous Occupation 272Table C. 19: Distribution ofRural Out-Migrants’ First Causes ofMigration byTheir Education at the Time ofDeparture 273Table C.20: Distribution ofRural Out-Migrants’ Second and Third Causes ofMigration by Their Education at the Time ofDeparture 273Table C.21: Distribution ofRural Out-Migrants’ First Causes ofMigration byTheir Relationship to Household Heads 274Table C.22: Distribution ofRural Out-Migrants’ Second and Third Causes ofMigration by Their Relationship to Household Heads 274Table C.23: Distribution ofRural Respondents’ First and Second Causes ofMigration Intention by Their Relationship to Household Heads 274Table C.24: Distribution ofRural Respondents’ First and Second Causes ofMigration Intention by Their Household Heads’ Occupation 275Table C.25: Distribution of Sample Households’ First and Second Causes ofMigration Intention by Their Household Heads’ Occupation 275Table C.26: Distribution ofRural Respondents’ First and Second Causes ofMigration Intention by Their Household Heads’ Education 276ixTable C.27: Distribution of Sample Households’ First and Second Causes ofMigration Intention by Their Household Heads’ Education 276Table F. 1: General Data on the Five Sample Villages 303Table F.2: Availability/Non-Availability of Services and Institutions in theSample Villages 1992 304Table G. 1: Correlation Coefficients Among Dehestan-Level Variables 311Table H. 1: Distribution ofEmployed Population of 10 Years of Age and Over inthe Urban and Rural Areas of Iran by Economic Sectors, 1966 & 1976 ..3 15Table H.2: Distribution ofEmployed Population of 10 Years of Age and Over inthe Urban and Rural Areas of Iran by Economic Sectors, 1976 & 1986 ..3 15Table H. 3: Urban and Rural Labour Supply and Employment in Iran, 1966 & 1976 316Table H.4: Urban and Rural Labour Supply and Employment in Iran, 1976 & 1986 316xLIST OF FIGURESFigure 1.1: The Location of Hamadan Province in Iran 14Figure 2.1: Rural-Urban Migration Assessment Model 31Figure 3.1: Internal Forces ofUneven Development and Resultant PopulationMobility 46Figure 4.1: Multi-Level Contextual Factors in Migration Decision-Making 103Figure 5.1: Diagram of the Research Major Variables 115Figure 5.2: Hamadan Province: Distribution ofHuman Settlements, Major Roads,and Highlands 122Figure 5.3: The Locations of Sample Villages in Hamadan Province 124Figure 8.1: Mechanism ofRural Labour Migration in Iran (Macro-Level) 192NOTE ON TIlE IRAKEAN CALENDAR YEAR:The Iranian solar year (Sal-e-Shamsi), which starts on March 21 (the Spring equinox), hasbeen converted to the Christian year by adding 621 years to the solar year. For example,the census years of 1355 and 1365 are converted to 1976 and 1986, ignoring the January1 to March 20 difference. In other words, the precise conversion would be March 21,1986 to March 20, 1987.xiGLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONSBeh Sazi-ye Roosta A national program for rural renovation with special emphasison infrastructure provision, embarked on circa 1985 in Iran.Boneh-kan Refers to the wholly out-migrated rural householdDehestan The next highest level administrative/jurisdictional boundaryafter the rural settlement itse1f comprised of farms, hamlets,and villages, but not towns.Household “A group of persons who wish to live together and thereforeshare living quarters and their principal meals.” (Goodall1987, 215) Some of the members may be temporarily away.It is not necessarily equal to family and can be a singleperson or multi-family.Homemaker A person whose principal occupation is managing ahousehold and taking care of domestic affairs. The same ashousekeeper, but is not a hired person.Infrastructure Installation and facilities that provide a fundamentalframework for a community and which, therefore, facilitateall forms of development such as: agricultural, industrial, andeducational. It includes the provision of transport,telecommunications, power supplies, water and sanitation,waste disposal, educational and health care facilities, andother public utilities. These are considered as social overhead capital , belonging to the community as a whole(Bannock et al. 1987, 206; World Bank 1994, 2).Institutionalization “A process, as well as the outcome of the process, in whichsocial activities become regularized and routinized as stable,social-structural features” (Jary & Jary 1991, 239).Key Informant A community person who is most likely to be well-informedabout the topic of interest, e.g., village councilor, elderlyperson, local teacher (Bilsborrow 1984, 428).Khaneh Behdasht The lowest order of health care centers in the health carenetwork for the Iranian rural areas, which has at least onehealth care worker/nurse, being visited once a week or moreby a medical doctor.xiiKhod-Yari Voluntary contribution of community residents,often exclusively for funding and physical labour, for theconstruction of public facilities (e.g., public bath, school,telecommunication center) by the government sector.Khosh-neshin Same as Aftab-neshi, a landless villager “without rights tocultivation or permanent employment on the land”(McLachlan 1988, xx).Markaz-e-Shahrestan An urban center which is the administrative center of thetownship jurisdiction (i.e., Shahrestan).Markaz Khaclamate-Roosta’ei Rural service center which offers agriculturalextension services and some subsidized inputs (e.g., seed,fertilizer, pesticide, tractor tires) by the Ministry ofAgriculture. A nation-wide network has been establishedsince the Islamic Revolution in Iran.Migration A permanent population displacement or change of residenceto a new population center (Lee 1966, 49). Thus, otherkinds of population mobility such as: circulation,commuting, and seasonal movements, are not addressed inthis dissertation.RCC The Rural Construction Crusade, Jihad-e-Sazandegi,established after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.Rial The Iranian currency. The official exchange rate is1750 rials to $1 U.S. (as of July 1994).RIPP Rural infrastructure provision policy.Remaining Household Always refers to the migrant’s household of origin(i.e., village) and excludes the migrant. Same as ruralmigrant household or originating household.Rural Area Area classified in each country as rural according to its ownjurisdictional definitions. In Iran, any human settlementwhich is not classified as an urban area, is considered to be arural area.Rural Development Rural development is defined as a sustainable process whichleads to a continuous rise in the capacity of rural communityto attaine its own values, to control reaources, and toxliiconserve environment, accompanied by a wider distributionof benefits resulting from such a process. (Weber &Abeyramal984, 70; Misra 1981, 116)Rural Migrant Household Always refers to the migrant’s household (prior to leavingthe village) which has at least one member still living in thevillage. Also, the terms remaining and originatinghousehold may be used interchangably.Rural Out-Migrant A villager who had out-migrated at the time ofinterview with the intention to stay elsewhere permanently.Tantamount to rural emigrant.Rural Out-Migration Permanent movement of individuals or households from arural area to another rural or to urban areas in the country.Equal to emigration. Also, see the definition ofmigration.SCI Statistical Center of Iran, affiliated with Plan and BudgetOrganization.Sevener Conmiission Refers to seven-member committees of land devolution,established after the Islamic Revolution of Iran to carry outa limited land reform, mostly for confiscated lands ofescaped big landlords (Schirazi 1993, 161; Lahsaeizadeh1993, 257)Stayer A rural person or household member who has remained atthe village.Sustainable Development “Improving the quality of human life while living within thecarrying capacity of supporting ecosystems.” (IIJCN/UNEPI WVTF 1991, 211) A development process whichcould be sustained through the promotion of social equity,economic viability, ecological balance, and all together,their integration in the ecosphere.The North Same as: developed countries or industrialized countries.The South Same as: Third World or developing countries.Urban Area Area classified in each country as urban according to itsown jurisdictional definitions. In Iran, any populationcenter with a municipality approved by the Government isconsidered to be an rural area. (SCI 1991, 32)xivAcknowledgmentsIn writing this dissertation, numerous individuals and organizations have assisted me. To begin with, Iwish to express my deepest gratitude to my research supervisor, professor Setty Pendakur for hisunderstanding character, compliant support, and the intellectual guidance he constantly provided me inthe course of my research. I am also much indebted to the other members of my research committee,professor Peter Boothroyd and professor Terry McGee for their invaluable advice, comments, andencouragement during three years of study. In general, I certainly benefited from the educationalenvironment and facilities available in UBC; especially, my thanks are due to the faculty and the staff ofthe School of Community and Regional Planning, Center for Human Settlements, and the UBC libraries,who responsibly responded to my research needs.My research could not have been completed without generous scholarship provided by the IranianMinistry of Culture and Higher Education, during the four years, residence in Vancouver. In addition, Iowe much to Canadian Universities Consortium for the grant which partially allowed me to undertake thefield work in Hamadan Province.The arduous task of carrying out the field survey in the remote rural areas was eased by the kind supportof many persons. The hospitality of five sample village households during the field work, their time,devotion, and enthusiasm, was a great moral energy, without it this research would never have beenfinished. I humbly feel they are the only authority to appraise my research in the future. I am particularlygrateful to Mr. Majidi, director of Plan and Budget Organization of Hamadan Province for his good-hearted and full support. My special thanks are due to: Mr. Shobeiri, Mr. Farsh-chian, Mr. Farzanehkari, Mr. Shokouh-e-Zanganeh and Mr. Firoozfar and his family who sincerely facilitated my researchneeds in the Province. The diligent assistance of Mr. Alishahi, Mr. Salehian, Mr. Mohebi, and Mr. Sayyadpoor, was a decisive help during the administration of my survey in the villages.Warm appreciation is expressed for the support of all my colleagues in the Regional Planning Bureau ofPlan and Budget Organization at Tehran, especially Mr. Karimi, Mr. Haghighi, Mr. Baroumand, and Mr.Kabiri. A special word of appreciation should go to Mr. Sabetghadam for his whole-hearted andinvaluable consultation on the SPSS program and to Ms. Nazari and Ms. Alaindari for their kindassistance.Furthermore, thanks are due to many colleagues in IJBC, including: Priscilla Boucher, John Curry,Sudharto Hadi, linn Teetzel, and Mathis Wackernagel (with whom I started the curriculum), and SamAfrane, Khalid Alskait, Madhav Badami, Michael Carr, Stan DeMello, Yoshihiko Wads, PongsakVadhanasindhu whom I enjoyed for their encouragement and insights. I extend my heartfelt gratitude tothem for their goodwill, companionship, and collegiate support during my stay in Vancouver. Also, Iwould like to remember my late friend, Joseph Otto, a Ph.D. fellow from Ghana who willingly helped meduring the first month of my arrival. I am also indebted to some Iranian families in UBC housing,particularly to the Ghofraniha family, whose compassionate friendship was a great help for me and myfamily. Special thanks go to Heather Ross whose editing assistance helped me to clarify my arguments.And last, but certainly not the least, my greatest debt in writing this dissertation goes to my family. Mywife, Soheila, her insights, encouragement, and support, allowed me to realize this work. I cannot thankher adequately who suffered being away from her professional work and being engaged in homemakingall these years. Also, I would like to remember my late aunt, from whose compassionate support Ibenefited and who passed away while I was studying. My deepest gratitude goes to my children andespecially my family in Iran: my mother, my sister and my niece, who painstakingly tolerated mynegligence and absence. To all my family, I am forever indebted and grateful.I have dedicated this dissertation to the memory of my father and to my mother who raised me with greatsacrifice and wisdom and taught me the best lessons of altruism, though I might not be a good disciple.There are no words that I can find to express my respect, love and indebtedness toward them.xvThis dissertation is dedicatedto the memory of my father: Mahmood Sarrafi,to my mother: Fatemeh Zand,and through them, to all the altruistic people of Iran.CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION11.1 The Quandary in the Field of InquiryThere is general agreement among researchers that the population distribution trends inthe South’ are not desirable. Urban population in general, and the population of primatecities in particular, is increasing at a very high rate.2 Acute urban problems such asunemployment, overloaded infrastructure, environmental pollution, squatter settlements,social alienation, etc., have spread in most metropolitan areas (Qadeer 1983, Ch. 1).Ninety-four South countries have made “reversing or at least slowing the tide of rural-urban migration one of the top priorities of their population policies” (ICSC 1994, 5).While rural-urban migration is not typically the most important component of urbanpopulation growth,3 its secondary effect becomes more significant should we take intoaccount that a substantial proportion of natural increase is made up of migrants’ offspring.However, there is little prospect that the rural areas of the South will retain their high ratesof natural population increase in years to come. Environmental degradation, widespreadpoverty and rapid population growth (as three intersected global threats) are rampant inmost rural areas (Sadik 1991, 16). Parallel to these, in wake of the growing prevalence ofmarket-friendly policies (World Bank 1991, 1), the so-called structural adjustments (ADP1992, 274) and market globalization in the South, it seems less attention will be paid tojob creation and social welfare in rural areas (IFAD 1992, 270-271; Afshar 1994, 271).1 Throughout this study, the tenn the South or South Countries will be used interchangeably with: ThirdWorld, less developed or developing countries. Also, the tenn North has been used interchangeably with:developed countries or industrialized countries.2 The average annual growth rate of the urban population in 1985-1990 was 5.5 times the rural one inthe South (refer to: UN 1991, 154 & 160). Population growth rate for most mega-cities (with apopulation 8 million or more according to the UN defmition) in the South was more than 3 percent duringthe period 1980-1990 while the corresponding figure in the North was less than 1 percent (UN 1991, 30).The causes of urban population growth are, in typical order of importance: natural growth, rural-urbanmigration, and reclassification of rural centers or their assimilation to adjacent urban centers. The rural-urban migration component usually constitutes over one third of the increase.2Thus, rural-urban migration will persist, at least until the promise of trickle down, ifpossible at all, comes true.At the same time, skepticism regarding the ongoing development at the world scale isgrowing (MacNeil 1991; Brown et al. 1992). More than at any time in recent decades, thequest for another concept of development [under the rubric of sustainable development](WCED 1987) has occupied intellectuals and, by and large, the grass roots.4 Sustainabledevelopment, though, is not a new concept and a large spectrum of previous conceptscountervailing to the mainstream development, such as equity, self-reliance, andecological balance, are gathered under its umbrella, gaining momentum and internationalattention. In general, urban growth in the South is currently unsustainable; the solution tothis problem calling for, among other things, the conservation of rural areas andagricultural production without degrading the natural base. As such, the populationdistribution trend in the South is unfavorable.5Many scholars attribute the rural-urban migration6 in the South to the interaction betweenthe “pull” forces of cities and the “push” forces of villages conditioned by the context. Formany years, the governments of the South have attempted to change this trend, withinsignificant success. Despite governments’ rhetoric, in practice, most of the remedieshave focused on the urban side of the problem, neglecting the rural side (UNCHS 1987,17). Ironically, alleviating the negative effects on the urban side often intensifies rural out-‘ As an indication, the social malaise in many South countries since 1992, from Mexico and Brazil, toAlgeria and Rwanda, and to South Korea and Thailand portend the popular aspiration for an alternativedevelopment paradigm.In many cases where migrant labour in rural areas is substituted with energy-intensive technology orthere is an abandonment of land, the negative results in rural areas are as important as in urban areas (seesection 2.2.3).6 Migration is defined as a pennanent population displacement or change of residence to a newpopulation center (Lee 1966, 49). Thus, Other kinds of population movements such as: circulation,commuting, and seasonal movements are not addressed in this dissertation.3migration (Savasdisara 1983; Danisword 1984). And the city has continued to beperceived by the majority as being a better living place than is the village (e.g., in terms ofquality of life, income, social mobility, and job opportunities), a notion nurtured byobjective reality in conjunction with subjective presumptions. Thereby, if governmentshave been successful in tackling emergent urban predicaments, the glaring rural-urban gaphas also widened, drawing more migrants to cities.All together, the quandary about the growing urban problems and the continuity of rural-urban migration in the future on one hand, and the necessity of rural revitalization andenvironmental conservation on the other hand, rationalize the inquiry into how to affectpopulation distribution trends, specifically rural out-migration, towards a sustainabledevelopment in the South.1.2 Statement of The Problem in IranIn a short period of time, during almost three decades, Iran has undergone a drasticchange from being an agricultural and rural-dominated society to being a non-agriculturaland urban society. While in 1956, 56.7 percent of the employed labour force was in theagricultural sector, and 68.6 percent of Iran’s population was living in rural areas, in 1986these ratios were 29.1 percent and 45.7 percent respectively.7 Considering thequantitative aspect of this transition, it can be said that an urban explosion has taken placein the last three decades. For the next three decades, the projection of Iran’s urbanpopulation indicates prolonged immense growth. It is projected that with a moderatepopulation control policy, the urban population will triple from approximately 32 millionin 1991 to 99 million in 2021 (Zandjani 1991, 39).To illustrate the previous situation, a scholar estimates that in 1900 and also in 1926 fran’s populationwas 79 percent rural and the labour force was 90 percent and 85 percent in agriculture, respectively(Bharier 1971, 26).4A substantial part of the urban population growth in Iran is derived from rural migrants(around one third; see section 3.1). While the limitation of agricultural resources(specifically water) and the high natural population growth have a major push impact, thelarge rural labour out-migration implies that there are exogenous forces at work as well(see section 3.3). These forces are mainly due to the infusion of oil revenues into theurban economy of Iran, which has created higher economic opportunities, better social andphysical infrastructures, and a higher standard of living in urban areas (Goldscheider 1983,186-187). In essence, cities in Iran attract rural inhabitants with the hope of gainingaccess to the oil revenue-created opportunities, a fluctuating and unsustainable resource.8As a result, agricultural activities in the rural areas of Iran are under strain of labourshortage, abandoned fields, and under-utilization of resources and establishments.Moreover, other long-run problems can be foreseen, namely: loss of local experiencedknowledge and skills, lack of the next generation of farmers, greater dependency on foodstuff imports, and ecological imbalance.9 As such, the historical rural settlement patternin Iran has been gradually disintegrating and the viability of a majority of 65,000 Iranianvillages is threatened.’° It appears, therefore, that the population distribution trend isdetrimental to rural viability and sustainable development of the country.8 Analogically, the “pseudo-urbanization’ in the South-East Asia (McGee 1967) with some reservationsis attributable to urbanization in Iran (see section 3.3). For realizing the impact of exogenous factors inurbanization in the Middle East, including the case of Iran, refer to Costello (1977). In essence, theinsightful inference of M.H. Pesaran about the pre-Revolution hasty industrialization, can be generalizedto rapid urbanization of Iran which was “sustained exclusively by means of excessive exploitation of thecountry’s exhaustive oil reserves” (Pesaran 1985, 26).Iran depends heavily on food stuff imports. The surge in imports started before the Revolution. In1974 and 1978, the imports were 1.27 and 2.01 billion dollars respectively (Beaumount & McLachlan1985, 41). The peak was in the year 1990, with 6.25 million tons of cereal alone. Iran is one of the topimporters in the world (IFAD 1992, 27) A major share of oil revenues is spent on this kind of consumergoods. The combination of squeezing oil income, rapid population growth, adverse effects on domesticfood production and natural constraints, warn of the unsustainability of this trend.10 The historical pattern of rural settlements in Iran can be summed up as numerous scattered smallsettlements in accordance with the natural resource base, often subterranean water capacities (EnglishSince the 1979 Revolution, great controversy has raged over the striking disparitybetween Iran’s rural and urban areas and over rural-urban migration.” The avowedpolicies of the post-revolutionary State have been to stem the influx of rural emigrants, asit was believed to be deleterious to development (see section 3.3.3). Because of thisconviction, from the outset of the establishment of the Islamic Republic, we havewitnessed an enormous effort to make villagers satisfied with their way and place of living.To a large extent, a pivotal effort in this struggle has been the provision of physical andsocial infrastructures in the rural areas. 12 While there are some merits to these efforts, therural out-migration has continued, and in some time periods, intensified in absolute terms.In a nutshell, the problem is village viability and a problematic population distributiontrend in Iran, associating with agricultural disruption and retardation in originating ruralareas, dysfunctioning of receiving cities, and environmental degradation in both areas.The controversy about excessive rural out-migration while provision of publicinfrastructure as a method by which to remedy the plight of remaining villagers in Irancalls for investigation.1966, Ch.3; Aresvilc 1976, 13; Misra 1978, 156; Ehiers 1985). However, in this century, non-naturalfactors (e.g., state policies and market factors) become more significant in the changing pattern of ruralsettlements (Sharbatoghlie 1991, 34 & 44).In fact, many scholars have argued that rural migrants, especially in squatter settlements aroundcities, have played a significant role in urban m.rnrest, leading to the 1979 revolution (Kazemni 1980;Ahmad 1981; Hooglund 1982; Kielstra 1987, 218; Kamrava 1990, 109; Lahsaeizadeh 1993, 245; Schirazi1993, 25). They somehow consider the bulk of migrants as “classless” idlers living in shanty towns withrevolutionary potential as the African thinker, Fanon has purported (Fanon 1966). However, somedisagree as to this models applicability to Iran (Denoeux 1993, 223). Paradoxically, another school ofthoughts refutes the revolutionary potential of the first generation migrants as a whole (Safa 1975, 8).12 In this study infrastructure is defined as: installation and facilities that provide a fundamentalframework for a community and which, therefore, facilitate all forms of development, such as:agricultural, industrial, and educational. (Bannock et a!. 1987, 235). It includes the provision oftransport, telecommunications, power supplies, water and sanitation, educational and health care facilitiesand other public utilities. These are considered as social over-head capital, belonging to the communityas a whole (Bannock et a!. 1987, 206; World Bank 1994, 2).61.3 A Principle, a Premise, and an Ethical IssueThe issue of migration in this research is not pursued for understanding of its mechanismand effects alone. Rather, the purpose is to probe into the causes of migration in light ofrural and national development (Stark 1991, 19).This thesis is based on the premise that the village will be an indispensable type of humansettlement for years to come in the South. The underlying reasons for this premise are:1- The considerable number of people who will continue to live in the South rural areas(Afshar 1994, 272).2- The crucial need for village-based agricultural production. (Korten 1992b, 72)3- The important nexus of rural community and natural milieu for ecologicalsustainability. (Lele 1991, 617)However, by this premise I do not mean to pursue ways of ceasing rural out-migration.Freedom of movement and residence within the boundaries of each country, free choice ofemployment, and equal access to public service in each country, are all recognized ashuman rights by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 13 & 23). Thismeans migration must be open to and optional for all national citizens. Nevertheless,prevailing poor conditions in the rural areas of the South impel many villagers not to stay.Thus, the research is not intended to provide answers of how to move or how to stopvillagers, but What is the reason behind dissatisfaction and how to create a choice ofstayingfor villagers. Enlarging the choices of people has been stipulated as necessary forhuman development (UNDP 1990, 10).71.4 Research RationaleResearch on issues of migration has been neglected in Iran when compared to thatconducted in the other countries of the South. With existing knowledge, it is difficult tocomment on the general causes and consequences of internal migration in Iran, let aloneon assessment of state policies. However, recurring debates on the success or failure ofrural development policies after the Revolution in Iran resort to the simplistic criteria ofintensification or reduction of rural out-migration.’3 Despite insufficient data and a lackof studies, the widely-held belief in Iranian politics is that rural out-migration ought to bereduced, if not stopped. Therefore, the primary rationale of this research stems from thediscrepancy between the lack of studies on the issue of rural out-migration in Iran and themajor efforts by the Iranian government to reduce it (see section 3.4).As will be discussed later, it appears that the present population distribution trend in Iranis unsustainable and detrimental to rural development (see section 3.5). This may requireus to change our development paradigm first, and consequently, to change our policiestowards enhancement of balanced rural-urban development. Meanwhile, we should notdownplay many urgent and immediate solutions that can be undertaken within theexercised policies (e.g., rural infrastructure provision policy). These solutions may sustainrural settlements in order to provide conditions favorable to long-term transformation.Hence, the other rationale of this research is related to a prevailing rural developmentpolicy, i.e., infrastructure provision, which is intended to retain the rural population ofIran. Again, the potential of rural infrastructure for playing such a role is not known andneeds investigation. Indeed, there are scant empirical studies about the relation of ruralout-migration to infrastructure, even in the other South countries.13 That is, any policy which results in rural out-migration is wrong and vice versa is right (see section3.3.3).8Moreover, this research is a response to some researchers’ call for research on the rural-side of migration: on the intention of potential rural migrants (Hugo 1981a, 222; Chang1981, 324; Goldstein 1981, 339; Lee 1985, xviii; Permi 1990, 203; Boyer & Ahn1991,56)14 and the developmental impacts of out-migration (Balan 1981, 13; Lipton1982, 25; Stark 1991, 19).’51.5 Research ObjectivesInfrastructure is conceived to be a major component of rural development in the South,and to be provided mainly by states (World Bank 1988, 149; Asian Development Bank1992, 265; Singer 1992, 116). It is supposed to support rural production and to facilitatesocial services. In so doing, it is presumed the infrastructure will satisfy the need of ruralproducers (mainly farmers) for village viability and thus bring about satisfaction andincentives to stay in rural areas (at least for rural producers, if not for surplus labour).This presumption, which was relied upon by Iranian State policy-makers, needs to beinvestigated.Across a wide spectrum of theories, there is agreement that voluntary human migration isa purposive move in response to perceived spatial differences in opportunities forbetterment in one or more aspects of life. Hitherto, mainstream theories of migration havesought to explain migration in economic terms (see Ch.IV). Also, the most consistent and14 For instance, Goldstein maintains that: “We also need to know much more about those who stay andwho constitute a massive potential, especially in rural areas, for future migration.” (Goldstein 1981, 339)Also, Lee insists on the importance of data on migration intention. (Lee 1985, xviii)15 In this regard Lipton says: “We need not worry much, or mainly, about the rural-urban migrantsthemselves... We need not worry that rural-urban migration is massive or swamping... We must worryabout the damage that even quite low emigration rates can do; to those who stay in the country-side...(Lipton 1982, 25)9recurrent finding of empirical studies is that migration occurs for economic reasons (e.g.,Simmons et al. 1977, 12). While accepting that causes of migration are manifold andcomplex, non-economic reasons are subordinated to, even submerged in, the major trendof economic reasoning.However, there has been strong evidence supporting the significant influence of noneconomic migration reasons in the rural South (e.g., Connell et al. 1976, 50; Hugo 1981a,188; Mitchell quoted in: Oberai et al. 1989, 37). This is not to deny economic reasons,but to stress that it is simplistic to reduce the causes of rural migration to economic onesalone. Migration causes must be thoroughly and deeply understood.This research attempts to explore non-economic reasons in conjunction with economicreasons. The role of infrastructure in rural out-migration is investigated for the interplayof non-economic and economic reasons. The objective is to contribute to a humaneparadigm of development, not merely a physical one, and to shift from reductionism to anholistic approach to rural development: a development of people with the help ofinfrastructure, not vise versa (Chambers 1991, 532; Korten 1984).The major objective here is to complement the common policies in practice in Iran with amultifaceted approach, integrating non-economical and economical roles of infrastructurein relation to village viability.1.6 Research QuestionsThe following principal questions will be answered by this study in the selected context:• Why do people migrate from rural areas?10• To what extent do infrastructure availability/non-availability play a part in the decisionto migrate from rural areas?In conclusion, the determinants of a successful policy for rural infrastructure provision toenhance village viability are logically discussed.The subsidiary research questions are:1. What are the characteristics of rural out-migrants and of those who intend to leave thevillage?2. What are the causes of out-migration for different individuals and rural households?3. What kind of rural households have the highest potential to migrate from the village?4. What is the dominant reason for rural out-migration in Iran, rural push or urban pull?5. What is the relative importance of various infrastructures in relation to the migrationcauses of rural households?6. What is the impact of out-migration on the migrants’ remaining members of thehousehold in the village? and on the agricultural activities?7. Which rural groups are more crucial to village viability?8. What are the policy implications of the migration causes of varied rural households forinfrastructure provision?1.7 Research ScopeThe scope of this study is limited as follows:1. Iran as a medium income, oil-exporting mixed economy and Islamic country, has beenselected for sampling rural out-migration in the South context.2. While the interaction between rural and urban forces in the occurrence of migration isundeniable, this study undertakes only a one-ended view of the process of rural outmigration by concentrating on the forces operating within rural areas.113. Again, recognizing complex and interactive causes of rural out-migration, the studyfocuses on infrastructural causes.4. Out-migration in the period of 1979 to 1992 is investigated.5. Only permanent and intentional migration is considered; On the basis of my four yearsexperience in the Province before starting this research, other kinds of migrations (e.g.compulsory, circular, seasonal or temporary) are considered not important for thisregion and/or for this research topic.6. While it is not intended to be male-oriented research, in practice, due to culturalbarriers and a higher rate of participation by males, most of the addressees are male-headed households and the female concerns may be underrepresented.’61.8 Research StrategyTo investigate the relationship of infrastructural provision and the causes of rural out-migration, and also, to probe the non-economic as well as the economic aspects together,the research uses a relational and explanatory approach via an empirical study (Northey& Tepperman 1986,10-17). A case study is employed using the conceptual framework ofthe roles of infrastructure, grounded in the South development and rural-urban migrationtheories.The case study in rural Iran provides a basis for interweaving the complex andmultifaceted causes of migration in relation to the availability or non-availability of theinfrastructure. Multi-causality and interaction at different levels set forth the necessity ofmulti-level research. Therefore, a macro-level outlook with a structural approach(including: the country’s development history and state policies) is combined with both the16 Notwithstanding, over 20 percent of respondents in our household survey were women.12meso-level and the micro-level research (including: village, household, and migrant unitsof analysis), using a cognitive-behavioral approach (Chant & Radcliffel992, 20-23;Uphoff 1992, 331). These are discussed at length in Chapter V.The research has been conducted in a rural-based and chronically out-migrating region inthe western part of Iran, called Hamadan Province (Figure 1.1). This province, with anarea of about 20,000 sq. km, is located to the west of Tehran, the Capital. Roughly, twothirds of its 1.5 million people are rural (1986 census), and the rest live in 12 small-to-medium-sized cities.’7 The rural population is scattered among more than 1200 villages.However, in terms of the average population size of villages, those of the Province rankfirst in the country.’8 The capital of the Province is the city of Hamadan (population272.5 thousand in 1986), a historic place on the Silk Road, on the foot of Alvand (analmost 4000m. altitude mountain), and about 300km away from Tehran.’9 The overallclimate is cold and semi-arid with a lack of water being the main natural limitation of theProvince. As will be described in chapter five, five depopulating villages in HamadanProvince were selected for the case study.17 The urban center definition, since the 1986 Iranian census, has been: a population center with townhail or municipality. Other population centers are considered as rural centers.18 In 1986, the arithmetic average of villages’ inhabitants in Hamadan Province was 782 as compared to341 inhabitants for the same figure at the national level (Sarrafi et al. 1991, 94).19 Harnadan encompasses the ancient site of Ecbatana, the second-largest city of Persia and ninth in theworld around 650 to 430 B.C. (Chadler 1987, 460-461) It is estimated that the Ecbatana populationreached 150,000 around 100 A.D. (Ibid. 570)13Figure 1.1: The Location of Hamadan Province in IranS—iSOVIETEUNIONA.1\Ill’AY Au•,JIAVAI1Ihy,Tabiiz Ardebil‘U, a) 1r” •—.A7Z’( nlarI!iI •..r—. -5,—?Karkük Sananda\ I hard. CIf Bdkhtarin j, I (>• ‘ r’ f’ I Kashàn•‘rhorramaba •. .. -(aghd.d hi4:‘• FAHAN(AM •i’ (f bànI I” lAPIL4Al ‘I‘I.) II•Shiraz•iEI-l1\ FARS________________1AUDI ARABIA.SOVIETUNION-.KizylAivat.Asbkhabad N Mary/Gorgárr•• Mashhad-I-.-- ).5..-. •.ahi — -—KHORASANHeui(’i/ Kavi,-e/ NarnakAFGHANISTh,Farilit..r-Kermàa- f —•‘-c.:. ihedáà’\—‘Nobusdic B LUHES TANVA SISi ANSChardzhoj.,lb....1..arl‘MAZANOARANSEMNA,JàyDasMt Kay,,9W’•5,’ ••%•-•YAZD•ZarandIraninternational boundaryProvince boundaryNational capitalProvince capitalRailroadRoad050 Kitomelerso io Miles --—--——-—--—-—-Bartda-e‘a-. I4, 5-’141.9 Organization of the DissertationThe stream of discussions to be pursued in the following chapters, is as follows:The next chapter begins with an overview of development theories from a migrationperspective. It concludes by considering the way in which we should look at the spatialmobility of a population and what developmental viewpoint should be used for assessingrural-urban migration in the South.Following the description of rural-urban migration as a problem, in chapter three, statemigration policies in Iran are explained in order to illuminate macro driving forces. Thechapter provides the sets of policies contrived by the revolutionary government whichaffected rural out-migration. At the end of the chapter, an attempt is made to assess themigration pattern in Iran according to the previously mentioned developmental criteria.Chapter four extensively reviews the migration theories and their explanation of rural-urban migration in the South. Then, a summary of Iranian migration literature is presented.At the end of this chapter the implications of migration theories for the role of theinfrastructure are drawn and a conceptual framework is proposed. The appropriateresearch methods necessary to fulfill the research objectives and to find the answer ofresearch questions are presented in chapter five. The research design and its componentsare discussed afterward.The findings of the case studies of rural migrants, remaining members of households, andvillage key-informants are described in chapter six and chapter seven. The last chaptersummarizes the findings in relation to the causes and consequences of rural out-migrationin Hamadan Province and to the potential roles of infrastructure in affecting them. Finally,the end of the chapter concludes with the general implications for rural development andout-migration studies in Iran and similar South countries.15ChAPTER II:DEVELOPMENT AND RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION162.0 IntroductionThis chapter explores ways to assess rural-urban migration from a broad view. Sincedevelopment achievement is the mega-framework for assessing societal phenomena in theSouth, I will focus on the main theories of development and their relation to rural-urbanmigration. Modernization theory, dependency theory, and an evolving paradigm, calledsustainable development, will be reviewed, and finally, a conceptual framework for theassessment are drawn.2.1 Rural-Urban Migration and Development TheoriesDevelopment is probably the predominant term used to describe the goals of the Southcountries. There is a lack of consensus about its meaning. “Development”, a normativeterm (Seers 1969, 2), can be viewed differently from various socio-economic and culturalviewpoints (Sachs 1992). However, it is generally accepted that “the ultimate purpose ofdevelopment is to improve human well-being” in all aspects (UNCHS 1991, 1)20Human migration, as change of migrant’s residence, is generally believed to mean a moveto improve the migrant’s well-being (Adepojo 1992, 36). Thus, one may postulate thatmigration is consistent with the goal of development, i.e., that of achieving human wellbeing. Although this view can be true in certain cases, it equates individual developmentof migrants with the development of society as a whole which is contentious (Oberai1987, 51; Abu-Lughod & Hay 1977, 195). This contention, Development theories and20 J found the following definitions to be appropriate in the South context:“Development is an increasing attainment of one’s own cultural values” (H. M. Jackson quoted in: Misra& Honjo 1981, 9). “Development is a process by which the members of a society increase their personaland institutional capacities to mobilize and manage resources to produce sustainable and justlydistributed improvements in their quality of life consistent with their own aspirations” (Korten 1990, 67).17their interpretations of migration, will be discussed from a theoretical perspective inensuing sections.While migration is a divergent phenomenon, I will focus only on rural-urban migration.Using Western yardsticks of development, we see that for decades development has beenassociated with the reduction of the agricultural share of the overall economy and theincrease in the urban population (Oberai 1987, 10; U.N. 1982, 10). As a matter of fact,this association has been seen in the industrialized countries, and to a lesser extent in theSouth as well (see Renaud 1979, 18). However, as of two decades ago, numerousscholars have characterized rural-urban migration as an obstacle to development in theSouth context (Mortuza 1992, 126; Hauser et al. 1985, 10; Bhaskara Rao 1980,1; Todaro1976, 2). I will attempt to establish which theoretical framework best serves to conductresearch on the South rural-urban migration. To that end, an overview of the maindevelopment theories will be provided.2.1.1 Modernization TheoryModernization theory (i.e., the theories of neo-classical economics) has been the mostpervasive theory of development in practice. In retrospect, this theory began tooverwhelm the South starting in the 1950’s. Economic growth was seen as the only forcecapable of overcoming underdevelopment. To this end, modernization via the Westerntechnological and economic path was to be applied (Hume & Turner 1990, 24). Thus,saving money, investing, earning foreign currency (with which to import the moderntechnology) and replacing the traditional socio-economic organizations with modernorganizations were of paramount importance. (Friedmann & Weaver 1980, 111)Modernization theory postulates that “investment in industrial enterprise will stimulategrowth in the modern sector, draw surplus labour out of subsistence agriculture into the18modern sector, and result in a significant increase in levels of living” (Midgley 1992, 23).The pivotal strategy was that of raising productivity through industrialization and it wasbelieved that a “big push” could make the economy “take off’ into the developed stage(Rosenstein-Rodan 1961; Rostow 1960). Economist-theorists, such as Nurkse in his bookon Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries (1953), prescribed ruralout-migration as a means by which to achieve economic development (Bhaskara Rao et al.1980, 7) In a nutshell: industrialization, urbanization and migration, were all seen to beconcomitant to the modernization process.2’Having regard for scarcity of resources and prevention of dispersed inefficiencies, theprocess of modernization was to evolve gradually around a leading sector.22 Hence, adualistic co-existence of modern and traditional sectors was accepted, with the hope ofgradual dissolution of the latter (Lewis 1955; Higgings 1956).The modern sector had its spatial preference and as mentioned, was conducive to urbangrowth (Mabogunje 1989, Ch.7). The process, in turn, has created intra- and inter-regional disparities23 (Stohr & Taylor 1981). However, the idea of “polarization and21 As an example of this belief, a classic work on modernizing the Middle East prescribes that massesshould move “from farms to flats and from fields to factories” and seek what the West is (Lemer 1966,48). Also, the following conclusion about migration policies in Asia by a U.N. research center is self-evident: “Urbanization is the direct consequences of economic development and industrialization.Urbanization and migration are also positively associated” (Bhaskara Rao et al. 1980, 14). In hindsight,the relationship of industrial development and urbanization in the South cannot be explained as a priori.22 These description could be oversimplifications due to the differences existing among the pioneers ofeconomic development theory. For example, the notion of the leading sector by Rostow were weakenedby the balanced growth of Nurkse proposal (ESCAP 1979, 24). Yet, for our general purpose, thedescription of the core attitude seems adequate.23 Emphasizing industrial sector and related services, the principles of economies ofscale tend to placethe modern sector in the major urban centers of dual economies(Johnson 1970, Ch.5). In the samecourse, the strategy of growth poles was proposed for induced modernization in regional planningHaiiseii 1972). Combining with the high degree of political centralization in most South countries,primate cities have emerged as a spatial manifestation of these discriminatory policies. (McGee 1971; ElShakhs 1972)19trickle-down’ was formulated (Hirschman 1958) to suggest that the centripetal stage wastransient and later a centrifugal stage would occur (Pryor 1975, 24). As Walter Stohrsays:A basic assumption of neoclassical economics is that regional imbalances betweensupply and demand of production factors or commodities will even out automaticallyonce the accessibility between regions and the mobility of production factors andcommodities increased sufficiently. (Stohr 198 ib, 218)Two conclusions are asserted by modernization theory: 1) Labour migration fromrural/traditional sector to urban/modern sector is imperative for development; 2) Suchmigration is a transitory phenomenon which will cease in higher stages of development,when spatial equilibrium is supposedly attained. Generally, modernization theory holds apositive view of rural-urban migration, as fostering modern development and “transfer ofprosperity” (Osterfeild 1992, 194).2.1.2 Dependency TheoryIn the early 1970’s, because of the persistence and even aggravation of poverty andinequalities on one hand, and the sluggish attainment of national development goals on theother, some of the South leaders who had been disenchanted with the modernizationapproach, appealed for another development (Dag Hammarskjold Foundation 1975). Thisappeal was answered by a countervailing theory named dependency theory which to someextent influenced the mainstream practices of development.Theoretical dissent about modernization outcome may be traced back to Gunnar Myrdal(1957). He argued that dual economies would be perpetuated in a developing situation20through backwash effects.24 This set the stage for positing that the backward sector is recreated by the modern sector. Building on this idea at an international level, as elaboratedby Frank (1967) and the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America,underdevelopment was explained by its linkage to developed regions (Armstrong &McGee 1985, 21).Put another way, this theory is concerned with the structural relationships between thecore [developed country] and the periphery [undeveloped country] (Friedmann 1966).From this perspective, it is external impediments which are the decisive factors, asopposed to internal ones in modernization theory (Agazzi 1988, 45; ESCAP 1979, 26).Moreover, dependency theory refutes the necessity for South countries to follow the sameeconomic path as Western countries, and advocates the need to delink from the worldmarket system(Seers 1981). Overall, the emphasis was placed on self-reliance, equitabledistribution, inward-looking growth, and the reduction of regional and sectoral imbalancesin the country. 25According to dependency theory: 1) Population mobility in the peripheral countries ismotivated by dependent development and it increases existing inequalities; 2)The trendwill not cease, and it will debilitate indigenous development. Dependency theory holds a24 It is unfair not to acknowledge that Mahatma Gandhi was the first political leader who rejected theimitation of the Western model of development in a coherent manner and elaborated on the cultural-specific and self-sufficient path of development during his compaign for India’s independence in the1940’s (For a brief summary of Gandhi’s developmental vision refer to Misra & Natraj 1981, 275-8).Unfortunately, this has not been sufficiently recognized in development theories. (Agazzi 1988, 18).25 Some writers enumerate another point of view called structuralist or world system (Hajnal & Kiss1988, 19; Welsh & Butorin 1990, 322) which I consider as a mixture of the preceding views in terms ofdiscerning both internal and external impediments, though in an interwoven structure. Thereby itacknowledges: the truth lies somewhere between the two! This view has not been spelled out and itseems that the implied strategy resembles more the dependency one (Packenham 1992, 111). Theprominent writers in this regard are Galtung (1980) and Wallerstein (1979).21negative view of migration, referring to the result as overurbanization26 and treating it asa symptom of economic underdevelopment (Shrestha 1990, 60).2.1.3 Sustainable DevelopmentIn addition to the aforementioned well-known classification of general developmenttheories, it seems a third distinctive theory is emerging. Unlike the preceding theories,which in general were both based on classical economics and its ramifications in othersocial sciences, the new paradigm questions the bases as well as the results. Some almostconcomitant tenets have been incorporated into this alternative paradigm under the bannerof sustainable development.27• Social Equity:A certain tenet contributing to this alternative, the social equity concern emphasizes noneconomic values. The archetypal idea could be found in Schumacher’s Small is Beautful(originally published in 1973):26 Here the evaluation of migration is closely related to its consequences in the urban areas. The termoverurbanization is used to show that urban growth has greatly outstripped industrial growth (Rogers1977, 68) and the productive absorptive capacity of the South cities. With a slightly different meaning,Gugler argues that overurbanization should be viewed as the misallocation of labour between rural andurban areas in the South economy (Gugler 1986b). Correspondingly, the term hyperurbanization is foundin John Friedmann’s book with the same comiotations (1973, Ch.5). In the same stream, considering thevariance of Western course of urbanization with the South, T. G. McGee coined the term pseudo-urbanization (1967, p1 9). Later, he revised it concerning the urbanization process in a few Southcountries -viz. Newly Industrialized Countries, e.g., South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil (Armstrong & McGee1985, 2-5). Yet, the trust of cities’ roles in strengthening dependency and in siphoning-out theaccumulated capital is strong in this stream of idea (Ibid. 213-219; Amin, 1976).27 The well-quoted definition by the Brundtland Commission defines sustainable development as“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generationsto meet their own needs.” (WCED 1987, 43) Bearing in mind a wide variety of interpretations from theconcept of sustainable development, I use the term in its radical meaning (cf. Daly & Cobb 1989;Bookchin 1989; Rees 1990; Boothroyd 1991; lIED 1991; Brown 1993) which will be summarizedhereinafter. The mainstream approach to sustainable development by international agencies maintainseconomic growth while it renders some conciliatory adjustments in the present economic system (cf.WCED 1987; IIJCN/UNEP/WWF 1991; World Bank 1992; UNCED 1992).22There is the immediate question of whether “modernization”, as currently practicedwithout regard to religious and spiritual values is actually producing agreeable results.As far as the masses are concerned, the results appear to be disastrous- a collapse of therural economy, a rising tide of unemployment in town and country, and the growth of acity proletariat without nourishment for either body or soul. (Schumacher 1989, 65)if we could return to a generous recognition of meta-economic values, our landscapeswould become healthy and beautiful again and our people would regain the dignity ofman... (ibid. 124)Negating the overemphasis being placed on economic growth, Schumacher admonishes:The starting point of all our considerations is poverty... The primary causes of extremepoverty are immaterial, they lie in certain deficiencies in education, organization, anddiscipline. Development does not starts with goods, it starts with people. (Schumacher1989, 178-179)On their part, these concerns are incorporated into the emerging paradigm of sustainabledevelopment, emphasizing: spiritual values, human scale, appropriate technology,agricultural and rural sectors in achieving social inclusion and equity (see: Friedmann1 988b).• Ecological Balance:The other tenet which has been constructing the core of this alternative paradigm isecological concerns.28 According to Goodland and Daly, it started with the source limit -28 The climax of global concerns for the environment can be best seen in the Earth Summit at Rio, anunprecedented participation of 178 governments -including 106 heads of state- in June 1992 (Brown1993, 3). Apparently, there is a growing consensus that the exercised course of development is leading toan ecological collapse and must be altered. Nonetheless, convictions about the degree of necessarychanges drastically diverge. The following excerpts from Agenda 21 should be viewed as the bottom lineof general agreement: “Underlying the Earth Summit agreement is the idea that humanity has reached aturning point. We can continue with present policies which are deepening economic division within and23i.e. depletion of natural resources like fossil fuels- and later the sink constraints -i.e. theovershooting of the absorptive carrying capacity- have been added (Goodland & Daly1992a, 37). Accompanying these, a trust to conserve the natural capital and to cease thethroughput growth is the cornerstone of ecological views (Ibid.). Consequently, thismeans a shift to environmentally friendly technologies, and as a whole, it denotes anecessity to change the consumption and production pattern. Moreover, a far-reachingequitable redistribution is intended to break the vicious cycle of poverty and environmentaldamage. 29Overall, the third theory relies on a different paradigm with the all-encompassing conceptof sustainable development. In the wake of challenging the embedded values and outlooksof conventional development, the new paradigm rejects the economic model of unlimitedgrowth, consumerism and production-centered attitudes (Korten 1990; Ekins 1992).Instead it builds upon a steady-state economics (Daly 1991), on conservation, and on abiophysical approach (Wackernagel 1992), on eco-community (Bookchin 1977), and onpeople-centered development (Korten 1990).In summary a comparison of development approaches show that if the emphasis of themodernization was on growth and efficiency, and of dependency was on independence andnational equity, the third approach places its priorities on ecological balance and socialbetween countries -which increase poverty, hunger, sickness and illiteracy and cause the continuingdeterioration of the ecosystem on which life on Earth depends. Or we can change course. We can act toimprove the living standards of those who are in need. We can better manage and protect the ecosystemand bring about a more prosperous future for all. No nation can achieve this on its own. Together wecan -in a global partnership for sustainable development” (UNCED 1992, 3).29 This is a well-documented fact and widely accepted (for a recent reference see Jazairy et al. 1992). Acardinal policy in this regard is population control, which is being accepted overwhelmingly by the states.It should be noted that overconsumption by the rich -mostly in the West- is also considered as a majorsource of ecological threat, if not a greater one (refer to: Ekins 1991; Daly 1989). In fact, despite the needfor ceasing growth economics in the North, growth is imperative in the South for sometime (Daly 1992,12; SID 1992, 4). “It is ironic that significant environmental degradation is usually caused by poverty inthe South - and by affluence in the North” (UNDP 1991, 28).24equity at a global scale. Here, the hallmark of development is the preservation of the life-support system for all at present and in the future.Implications for Migration in the South:Bearing in mind the variety of migration patterns in the South (Nam et al. 1990, 8; Gugler1986, 2 12-217), there is a pitfall of over-generalization in interpreting the pattern and itseffects. However, since the purpose of this section is to give a schematic view ofsustainable development implications for migration, some interpretation for a stereotypedpattern can be made.From the viewpoint of sustainable development -particularly from its biophysicalapproach, the prevailing rural-urban migration in the South unquestionably hampers thedevelopment of the South by intensif,’ing the present form of urbanization and itsimplications (Rees & Wackernagel 1994; Wackernagel et al. 1993). In fact, fromSchumacher’s view, the major problem arises from the economics principles which makepeople footloose (Schumacher 1989, 72). He contends that prior to the advent of masstransport, because of the community structure, “there were communications, there wasmobility, but not footlooseness” (Ibid. 73). Schumacher states that destructuring of thepoor countries, “produces mass migration into cities, mass unemployment, and as vitalityis drained out of rural areas, the threat of famine” (Ibid. 75). He sums up by claiming thatrural migration resulting from the dual economy is poisonous to both the rural and urbansectors. 3030 The following excerpt from Schumacher is self-evident: Until recently, the development expertsrarely referred to the dual economy and its twin evils of mass unemployment and mass migration intocities. When they did so, they merely deplored them and treated them as transitional. Meanwhile, it hasbecome widely recognized that time alone will not be the healer. On the contrary, the dual economy,unless consciously counteracted, produces what I have called a ‘process of mutual poisoning’, wherebysuccessful industrial development in the cities destroys the economic structure of the hinterland, and thehinterland takes its revenge by mass migration into the cities, poisoning them and making them utterlyunmanageable” (1989, 177).25It may be stated that if the source limit and the sink constraints are both performing as azero-sum game at the planetary level, then the place of people, on the macro scale, is notconducive to sustainable development. However, the rural life style is virtually moresustainable, considering its reliance on agricultural activities and its low level ofconsumption and waste. This sustainability is endangered by ongoing trends,overpopulation in general, and a growing number of impoverished rural people inparticular (UNCED 1992, 31; Jazairy et al. 1992; World Bank 1990), application ofinappropriate technologies in general, and expansion of fossil fuels-dependent agriculturalmethods in particular (Daly & Cobb 1989, 272).In terms of urban areas, their concentrated growth often supersedes the absorptivecapacity of the environment (Rees 1992). In addition, it causes inefficient use of resourcesdue to automobile dependence (Roseland 1992, 26), urban squalor, conspicuousconsumption and specious investment (lIED 1991, 31; IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1991, Ch.12;Gugler 1988, 86). Therefore, in the status-quo the rural-urban migration in a typicalSouth country is detrimental to sustainable development.31In sum, the present rural-urban migration in the South, has been seen at the foremost as aresult of wrong socio-economic policies, which intensify a non-viable pattern of settlementand environmental degradation.31 There are optimistic views of the ongoing pattern which suggest the problem can be solved by thepatterns themselves: “Human settlements, and particularly large urban agglomerations, are majorcontributors to environmental degradation and resource depletion. At the same time, human settlements,large and small, are also areas of unused opportunities: creativity, economic growth, communication;accessibility for transfer of knowledge; and an efficient and effective attack on waste and pollution.” (M.van der Stoel, ‘Statement of the chairman’ to the Intergovernmental Meeting on Human Settlements andSustainable Development, The Hague, Nov. 1990; cited in: UNCHS 1991, 0). Another view holds thatsalvation from the negative aspects of urbanization lies in tackling fmancial shortcomings (World Bank1992). And since, supposedly, there is a positive relationship between economic development andurbanization (Henderson 1987), ultimately, rural-urban migration is not a negative phenomenon.262.2 Assessment of Rural-Urban MigrationThe preceding section sought to highlight the relationship of development theories andtheir presumptions to rural-urban migration. While the interdependent nature of resourceallocation and population distribution is obvious, in reality, priority is given toeconomically and politically-driven decisions for resource allocation, thereby, causingpopulation displacement.All development theories accept that South rural-urban migration is engendered by rural-urban inequalities, but the solution proposed within each theory varies. Accepting thereality of urbanization, modernization theory calls for continuing the current path,promising future equilibrium in a developed economy.32 However, according to severalresearchers “in reality, this equilibrium mechanism does not materialize in mostcountries.”33 (Stohr 1981a, 45; also: Abu-Loghod & Hay1977, 105; Rodinelli 1984, 222)For dependency theorists the solution lies in cutting international ties and adjustment ofnational policies toward even development. Looking back, no country has experiencedsuch a development strategy thoroughly. Anyhow, the viability of this strategy in faceof economic hardships, and presumably, trade embargo is questionable. The ecologicalblind-point in this theory (i.e., not reckoning with the environmental impact of socioeconomic processes), as in the modernization theory, eventually makes it unsustainable.32 A recent time-series study on Israel verifies the U-shaped curve in relation to the decrease ofpopulation concentration after progressing toward ‘the second phase of development” (Alperovich 1992,63). However, the author concedes that international cross-sectional data fail to confirm this relationship(ibid. 72).Preswnably, Taiwan, South Korea, and Israel are among the exceptional cases. The ensuing sectiondescribes the continuation of unbalanced trends in the South.In my opinion, policies of some socialist countries, like: Albania, Cuba and China - before 1978 -may be partly interpreted as the practice of this theory.27Sustainable development theory evokes a paradigm different from that of neo-classicaleconomics in practice. Consequently, the generative forces of rural-urban migration willoccur on the basis of ecological constraints not economical exigencies and consistent witha healthy community-planet relationship. Rural-urban migration may thereby take place tobalance the carrying capacity of bio-regions at a macro scale and/or to respond to micro-ecological imperatives (Andruss et al. 1990; Sale 1985). Ultimately, in the next centurythe world population should be stabilized and thus, the footlooseness of people will bedrastically reduced.This overview of development theories does not provide sufficient data with which todraw up a list of advantageous and disadvantageous effects of migration. However, itacknowledges that assessing migration is embedded in underlying development theory andthat “the overall implications of migration for national development . . . cannot be stated apriori” (Oberai 1987, 70). Moreover, it poses the need for a conceptual framework andboth global and local criteria to assess developmental impacts of rural-urban migration in aSouth country.To find out the guidelines for assessing rural-urban migration, first, the trends ofpopulation distribution in the South are described. Next, a general framework formigration assessment is elaborated. Finally, the assessment’s developmental tenet isproposed.2.2.1 Trends of Population Distribution in the SouthHaving summarized the theoretical spectrum of migration interpretation, I now turn to theconsideration of the factual population distribution in the South. I intend to give a senseof the dimension of trends before posing a conceptual framework for the assessment.28First of all, it should be noted that the quantity and pace of population growth in the Southare two of the driving forces of distributional changes. In 1990, over 77 percent of theworld’s population was in the South and 93 percent of world population growth occurredtherein (U.N. 1991a, 10&100).Secondly, the mega-trend is undoubtedly one of rapid urbanization. The urban populationof the South has risen from 17 percent in 1950 to 37.1 percent in 1990, and is expected topass 62 percent in 2025 (U.N. 1991b, 106-107). This means, that since 1950 the volumeof urban population has multiplied 5.3 times, until 1990, when it amounted to 1.5 billion.It is projected to multiply 15.3 times by 2025 (Ibid. 118-119).Thirdly, urban agglomerations containing 5 million or more inhabitants, have beengrowing rapidly in the South. While 11 of the 20 world agglomerations in 1970 had beenlocated in the South, the figure was 23 of 34 such agglomerations in 1990 (U.N. 1991b,22). It is expected that 34 (more than three forth of the projected 45) agglomerations inthe year 2000 will be in the South (Ibid.).Finally, another trend in South urbanization is the emergence and proliferation of megacities, defined by the U.N. as those with 8 million or more residents. In 1970, there were10 world mega-cities; 5 belonged to the South (U.N. 1991b, 24). This figure changed to14 mega-cities in the South, out of 20 in the world, and it is projected that by the year2000, 8 more cities will have gained mega-city status, all located in the South (Ibid.). Thisurban tendency of over-concentration is materialized “at the expense of towns withpopulations below half a million” (U.N. 1982, 9).29The general perspective shown above, hints at the contribution of rural-urban migration toSouth urbanization, or as the IJNDP calls it, to the urban explosion (UNDP 1990, 85).As a matter of fact, the average annual rates of change of urban population between 1980-85 and 1985-90 have been 4.62 and 4.53 respectively as compared with 0.97 and 0.81 forrural population (U.N. 1991b, 154&160). Bearing in mind that the change in distributionof population has taken place through differential natural population growth, andinternational and internal net migrations. A crucial component of South urbanization isinternal migration, particularly rural-urban one (Parnwell 1993, 18; Nam et al. 1990, 9;Bhaskara Rao et al. 1980, 4). It is estimated to account for an average of 40 percent ofurban population growth (White & Whitney 1992, 18; Gugler 1988, 74; Hauser et al.1985, 8; Todaro 1976, 10; also, for seeing the wide variety of contributing rates amongcountries, refer to: UN 1980, 24 and Renaud 1979, Annex Tables 2.3).All the above trends herald aggravation of population distribution imbalances in most ofthe South countries, with the momentous share of rural-urban migration in thepredicament.2.2.2 A Conceptual Framework for the AssessmentTaking into consideration the difference in theoretical approaches, assessment of rural-urban migration requires a multifaceted approach, distinguishing between different causesof out-migration at the place of origin and between different consequences at the place ofdestination. The following diagram (Figure 2.1) depicts the hypothetical assessment ofrural-urban migration (with positive and negative symbols as appropriate andinappropriate streams, respectively) relating “push” forces in the village to “pull” forces inthe city. The diagram shows two overall contexts for the propensity to leave the village:30• When there is excessive labour force, as the outcome of mechanization diffusion,saturation of the agriculture-sustaining natural resources, and overload of the nonagricultural sector, (etc.); showing as a thriving state and positive [+] repulsion.• When there is an out-flow of people, due to the deterioration of the socio-economicsystem, perception of rural-urban disparities, degradation of life-supporting naturalresources, occurrence of natural disasters, (etc.); showing as a declining state andnegative {—j repulsion.35In the city, the rural in-flows can be categorized into two extreme situations:• When the in-migrants are absorbed by the productive urban sectors which indicates apositive [+j attraction because ofgenuine demand in the urban labour-market.• When the supply of in-migrants are more than the city’s absorptive capacity and theunproductive urban sectors are inflamed by emigrants which imply a negative [—jattraction because offalse expectation on behalf of the migrants.Figure 2.1: Rural-Urban Migration Assessment ModelGenuine / + Thriving/ Demand Situation—I...Pull\___________V’N +\ False / DecliningExpectation \ — SituationSource: AuthorIt is also possible that due to overpopulation and the resultant pressure on natural resources, the outflow of population can be viewed positively in terms of its environmental impact in the village. Though,in retrospect, rarely has the out-flow acheived a level which has removed population pressure.31These categories identify four variants for rural-urban migration, only one of which maybe assessed as merely negative [—j at both ends from a societal perspective (i.e., leavingthe declining state of the village with false expectations or a lack of socio-economicopportunities in the cities). This conceptual framework gives the possibility of applying avariety of development theories. In other words, the normative evaluation for ascribingthe declining state, genuine demand and so on, is changeable according to differenttheoretical explanations.Generally speaking, there is a combination of all these variants in rural-urban migration inthe South. Hence, policy-making should be differential and in accordance with concreteregional development cases and visions. In the absence of such visions, making decisionson migration is a political action, and is vague in developmental terms.2.2.3 Rural-Urban Migration in the South: A Preliminary AssessmentDespite conceptualizing the above model, rural-urban migration cannot be assessed unlessa specific development paradigm be employed for distinguishing the four situations in themodel (i.e., declining situation, thriving situation, genuine demand, and false expectation).On the basis of our development theory overview, it has been argued that one of theapproaches, that is sustainable development, has a promising and indispensable tenet. Inthis view, normative evaluation of rural-urban migration in the South ought to take intoaccount the sustainability of the receiving and the originating communities as well as theglobal community.Accordingly, when there is environmental degradation in the rural areas, whether becauseof source depletion (e.g., fall of water table, soil erosion, deforestation) or sink overflow(e.g., water pollution, soil poisoning, acid rain), the declining situation label is applicable.32However, from the mere economic point of view, it could coincide with thriving or slackperiods.The thriving situation is when the environment is saturated without human-madedegradation, and thus, if the excessive population (i.e., more than the natural carryingcapacity) stays, then there will be degrading pressure and/or loss of livelihood. Again,this could be simultaneous with thriving or recession economic periods.Sustainable development requires social equity, economic viability, and ecologicalbalance (BCRT 1992). These encompass a broad range of values. The following aresuggestions from some of the scholars:• Meeting the basic needs of all people36• Broadening individual and community participation, and control over resources(Korten 1992b, 71)• Enhancing the social capacities to deal with scarcity and limitations37• Protecting life support systems (Robinson et al. 1990; Korten 1992a, 97)The declining situation or environmental degradation occurs when the above criteria havenot been met in the originating village. Conversely, if these are met, a thriving or healthyenvironment could be declared to exist.36 David Korten defines these needs as: “a humanly adequate standard of food, clothing, shelter,education, basic medical care, and decently remunerated employment.’ (Korten 1 992b, 71) I would adda psychological dimension, say self-esteem, and a social one, say belonging together andfreedom, aswell. (Goulet 1971)Specifically, regarding the economy the criteria are: a) Reduction of throughput of energy and othernatural materials. b) Waste emissions within the assimilative capacity of the local environment. c)Harvest of renewable resources within their regenerative capacity. (Goodland & Daly 1992a, 37 &1992b, 66)33For example, in a given agricultural economy, if fossil fuel throughputs are increasing (as adirect result of, say, mechanization, or as an indirect result of application of fertilizers,pesticides, and herbicides) even though the production grows, this is an unsustainable wayof development, and of environmental degradation.38 However, in such a situation therecould be no out-migration if the new employment opportunities absorbed the unemployedlabour force.Clearly, these criteria are too complex and too general to be precisely applied to rural-urban migration in the South. But my intention is to scan the major considerations inassessing the overall pattern of migration. In other words, I want to sketch criteria on thebasis of holistic developmental effects, and to conclude whether there is a need for changein the prevalent migration patterns. Like those regarding other social phenomena, thisconclusion will be conditional upon temporal and spatial conditions and may be variedgreatly.Drawing on my understanding of sustainable development criteria, it can easily be elicitedthat most of the rural-urban migrations in the South are not compatible with thesustainable development paradigm which is outlined above.39 Unquestioningly, those whoare leaving the rural areas at present are entering an unsustainable urban development,considering their ecological impact (White & Whitney 1992). The question remains openif this modern way of urban development can be transformed into a sustainable lifestyleand also, if the traditional way of rural development may be viable in face of global marketforces.38 This is due to inconsistency with the principle of “reduction of throughputs”, and it results in thedebilitating of the social capacities to deal with scarcity and limitations.Undoubtedly out-migration has helped to ease pressure on the rural job market (Dasgupta 1981, 53),and in turn, has put a strain on urban labour markets in the South (Gugler 1986, 195). However, theunsustainablity implications in temis of production and consumption patterns are more vivid in the cities.34In fact, it is not certain whether the modern way of rural development is less harmful thanthe urban one. The effect of migration on the community depends on the resourcesavailable, the number of people living off of these resources, the rate ofexploitation/consumption, and the type of technology which they are using (Ehrlich &Ehrlich 1990, 58). Therefore, the diagnosis of unsustainability cannot be reduced to arural/urban or agriculture/non-agriculture differentiation. However, viewing rural outmigration as an index of dissatisfaction, invites us to investigate the viability of ruralsettlements as a whole. Here, my concern is about the majority of the South population,i.e., the rural people, and their livelihood, which is mostly based on agriculture. As such,the assessment of rural-urban migration is looked at from the village standpoint and fromits effect on the sustainability of the community. This will be discussed concretely in termsof the Iranian case at the end of next chapter (section 3.5).35CHAPTER ifi:RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION AND NATIONAL POLICIES IN IRAN363.0 IntroductionThis chapter outlines the Iranian context and discusses the problems of rural-urbanmigration. It begins with presenting the statistical dimension of the problem, covering theavailable data of four recent decades. It shows the significance of rural-urban migration aspart of unprecedented urban growth.The next section introduces the necessity of policy intervention by the South states in thepopulation distribution. It goes on to classifS’ varied policy approaches. Lastly, thedecisive role of the Iranian state is demonstrated.A brief history of migration in Iran continues the contextualization of the problem of rural-urban migration and its relationship to sustainable development. It is demonstrated howthe internal and external intervening factors create migration streams, regardless of theequilibrium process. Subsequently, the policies of post-revolutionary Iran are reviewed.It is stated that infrastructure provision at the rural-end has become an important policytool, though without proving to have successful results. Finally, a general appraisal ofrural-urban migration in Iran is presented.3.1 Rural-Urban Migration in IranA staggering trend in the last four decades in Iran has been rapid urbanization and itsconcomitant influx of rural out-migrants to the large cities. To convey the quantitativemeaning of this abrupt shift, the Iranian population components are illustrated here instatistical data. Whereas national and provincial data are only available for the censusyears, the data are presented in ten-year intervals from the first national census in 1956 upto 1986, augmented in some cases by a recent broad national survey in 1991.37Generally speaking, since 1956, the Iranian population mobility both in relative andabsolute terms, has continued to increase. In particular, life-time migration (as the onlytype of internal migration that has been the subject of a question in all the four decennialcensuses) has almost doubled within thirty years, from 1956 to 1986 (see Table 3.1). Thehigh proportion of migrants in cities compared to villages is notable. It implies that thereis more attraction to the cities. The Table also shows an accelerating rate of life timemigration in the last 35 years, in which the recent jump in rural areas from 5.3 percentbefore the Revolution to 15.3 percent after the Revolution is remarkable.4°Table 3.1: Distribution of Iranians Residing in Places OtherThan Their Birthplace in Urban and Rural Areas*(percentage)Census Year** Country Urban Areas Rural Areas1956 11.01966 13.1 26.4 4.61976 15.5 27.2 5.31986 21.6 29.7 11.91991 25.3 32.2 15.3* Rural population, hereafter, includes unsettled population, e.g., nomads andgypsies, accounted for 0.5 percent of total population of Iran in 1986.** Except 1991 which is the year for a national survey and the figures must be treated discreetly.Source: Calculated based on SCI 1992a, 48-2; SCI 1990a, 3.The following sections will explain the changes in: the national distribution of the rural andurban population, the rate of rural-urban migration, and the settlement pattern ofpopulation in Iran.40 The life-time migration to rural areas, according tomy observation and inference, has been mostlymigration to: 1- Frontier agricultural areas (e.g., Moghan, Jiroft, Gonbad and part of Khuzestan), 2-Marginal settlements in the vicinities of major cities (e.g., new squatter settlements or commuter settlersin nearby villages around Tebran and Isfahan) and, 3- Frontier mineral lands (e.g., Bafgh in Yazd,Pabedana and Sarchesh-meh in Kennan). The sudden growth of migration to rural areas during 1976-86,in addition to what was pointed out, is due to the destruction of some 4000 rural settlements by Iraq’sinvasion (Arnirahmadi 1990, 64) and the consecutive inhabiting of other villages. In addition, theAfghani’s settlement in rural areas is another contributing factor to the rise of non-indigenous villagers.383.1.1 Rural and Urban Distribution of PopulationThe unceasing exodus from rural society to urban society can best be seen in Table 3.2.Over a period of 35 years, the urban population of Iran grew more than 5.5 times whilethe rural population grew less than 2 times. Correspondingly, the urban share of thepopulation raised quickly from 31.4 percent to 57 percent. Overall, it is estimated thatnear 33 percent of the total urban population growth in the period between 1956 and 1991consisted of net rural-urban migration. 41Table 3.2: Iran’s Urban & Rural Population Changes during 19561991*Census Country Urban Rural Average Annual Growth Rate (%)Year** (in 1000’s) (in 1000’s) (in 1000’s) Total Urban Rural1956 18,955 5,954 13,001(100%) (3 1.4%) (68.6%)1966 25,788 9,794 15,994 3.13 5.10 2.09(100%) (38.0%) (62.0%)1976 33,709 15,855 17,854 2.71 4.93 1.11(100%) (47.0%) (53.0%)1986 49,445 26,845 22,600 3.91 5.41 2.27(100%) (54.3%) (45.7%)1991 55,837 31,837 24,000 2.46 3.47 1.21(100%) (57.0%) (43.0%)*The figures are rounded in thousands.** Except 1991 which is the year for atreated discreetly.Source: Computed from: SCI 1982; SCI 1985; SCI 1991; SCI 1992a.national population survey, and its figures should be41 The average annual growth rate of the urban population has been 4.91 percent, comparing to 3.13percent for the whole country. Given the lower fertility rate of the urban population, it is estimated that10.9 million is made up of the natural increase. Thus, the reminders of the increase in urban populationduring the last 35 years, i.e., 15 million, has originated from outside the cities of 1956. A roughcalculation shows that around 6.5 million accounted for the reclassification of rural centers as new towns,and for their natural increase within this time period. Consequently, the remaining 8.5 million of theincrease was caused by net rural-urban migration. In other words, the components of urban populationincrease since 1956 are: 32.8 percent net rural-urban migration, 42.1 percent natural increase of theoriginal urban areas, 25.1 percent reclassification and pertinent natural increase. However, a majordeficiency in this calculation is the unknown number of international migrants. The international out-migration from the large cities could be quite effective in changing our calculation of rural in-migrants toa higher number.393.1.2 Rural-Urban MigrationAs far as rural-urban migration is concerned, comparable census data is only for life-timemigrants (i.e., residing in places other than their birthplace) as shown in Table 3.1. Only inthe latest Iranian national census, has the duration of stay for life-time migrants and somecharacteristics and origins for the in-migrants within the census interval (i.e., since tenyears before 1986) been augmented. Therefore, the calculation of flow of migrationbetween rural and urban areas is an estimation by using the indirect method of naturalgrowth assumption (Oberai 1987, 31). The method assumes a slightly lower naturalincrease in the urban areas, than in the rural areas. Wherever it was possible, acomparative study of other researchers’ estimation with this or other methods has beenemployed.The net in-migration to the urban areas from 1956 to 1966 is calculated to beapproximately 1.5 million, an average of 150 thousand a year, and 39.1 percent of urbanpopulation increase.42 Because of the oil boom, the climax of city-ward migrationoccurred in the next decade. The volume of net rural-urban migration sprang to 2.4million between 1966-1976, equal to 39.6 percent of urban growth.43 The same migrationfigures for 1976 to 1986 are calculated at about 3.2 million, or a surge to an average of320 thousand net urban in-migration and a relative decline to 29.1 percent of urban42 For comparison’s sake, the following has been calculated independently by others for the 1956-1966period: 1.33 million and 1.68 million Bharier 1972, 58 from two different methods), 1.2 million (ZahediMazandarani eta!. 1985, 83), 1.52 million (Karshenas 1990a, 283).The independent calculations of net rural-urban migration between 1966-1976 are: 2.2 million (Majd1992, 453); 2.337 million (Karshenas 1990a, 283), 2.578 million (Hakimian 1990, 136), 3.5 millionMohtadi 1990), 2.3 million Zahedi Mazandarani et al. 1985, 83), 2.363 million (Alizadeh & Kazerooni1984, 71), 2.111 million (Kazemi 1980, 28). Danesh estimates the volume of rural-urban migration at6.2 14 million during 1966-1982, on the basis of a lower natural growth rate and a higher population forthe urban component (Danesh 1987, 48). Another researcher has claimed that more than a million ruralmigrants entered the Iranian cities every year between 1973-78 (Farazmand 1989, 155), a certainlyincorrect figure.40population increase.44 A milestone in this decade was the Islamic Revolution and itsdramatic socio-economic upheavals. As will be described later, two major groups of war-stricken people and Afghani refugees intensified urban growth in this time period, as well.From the recent national survey, it is estimated that roughly 1.4 million rural people havemigrated to urban areas in the 1986-1991 period, yielding only a 28 percent urbanpopulation increase. Table 3.3 shows the aforementioned migration volumes.Table 3.3: Estimation of Iran’s Rural-Urban Migration during 1956-1991Time Period Total No. of Rural- Annual Average of R-U Migration as %Urban Migrants* R-U IVligration of Urban Growth1900-1956 700,000 12,500 16.51956-1966 1,500,000 150,000 39.11966-1976 2,400,000 240,000 39.61976-1986 3,200,000 320,000 29.11986-1991 ** 1,400,000 280,000 28.0* See footnotes 42 to 44 for alternative estimations.** See the text for dubious estimation on the basis of the 1991 figure.Source: Calculated based on: Bharier 1972, 55; Karshenas 1990a, 283; SCI 1982; SCI 1985; SCI 1992a.While there are serious doubts about the 1991 figure45, if correct, the trend shows that forthe first time in Iranian history, there has been both a relative and an absolute decrease inrural-urban migration. However, it should be noted that because of the migration surge inthe 1976-86 period, a subsequent drop in the number of rural-urban migrants is‘ Other researcherstcalculations for 1976-1986 are: 3 million (Lahsaeizadeh 1993, 288), 3.2 million(Schirazi 1993, 313). One researcher has stated the doubtful figure of 2.2 million for the 1979-1983period (Haghayeghi 1990, 45). Some analysts have estimated that 2.93 million has been the netmigration to the urban areas of Iran between 1976 and 1982, an average of 488 thousand a year whichwas sharply reduced after this period (Alizadeh & Kazeroom 1984, 72).One reason for this doubt is the result of preliminary extraction which shows about 1.3 million moreurban population than the fmal results (see the preliminary results in: Shafigh 1992, 8). On that basis, therural-urban migration would be more than 340 thousand a year. Another reason is the sharp drop ofnatural population growth of Iran from 3.92 percent a year to 2.46 percent (see Table 3.2). Finally, thisfigure is the result of a broad sample survey, not census, and consequently, susceptible to more errors.41expected.46 Indeed, the annual average for the fifteen years is more than 306 thousandmigrants a year, unprecedentedly high. The other point to be noted is that the decrease ofthe rural migrants’ component in the urban population growth is partly due to the suddenjump in natural population growth (from 2.71 percent to 3.91 percent a year) after theRevolution. Moreover, the ever-increasing base figure, i.e., urban population, which from1981 surpassed 50 percent of the country’s population, relatively, tends to reduce the in-migration portion.Bearing in mind the predominance of the rural-urban type of migration in Iran,47 the dataon inter-provincial migration also assists us to comprehend region-specific movements.Briefly, over 50 percent of the inter-provincial migrations were destined for the CentralProvince, including the Capital, during 1956-1976 (Tale’ et al. 1978, 36). In thefollowing decade, the same figure dropped to 42 percent (SCI 1990a, 7).48 According tothe official statistics, Tehran’s share of the urban population and logically its share of urbanimmigration has been decreasing in the last decade. Generally, the dominant trend can bedistinguished as one of rural emigration from the western provinces to the thriving centraland coastal provinces49, because of the administrative centralization, investment46 Regarding the fall in rural out-migrants’ number, the prolonged economic crisis of urban centers(during and after the Revolution and in the War period) should be considered as a cardinal deterrent ofrural-urban migration. Similarly, a study in Peru indicated that the slow-down of rural out-migration wasdue to the urban economic crisis and the importance of extended family in the absence of social securityfor the villagers (Osterling 1988, 173).There is no national census or other reliable source of data on the share of rural-urban migration inthe total internal migration in Iran. A well-red study suggests a 90 percent share in the 1956-66 period(Bharier 1972, 58). Probably the most accurate data belongs to a national survey conducted by theStatistical Center of Iran in 1972 which shows 53.5 percent of all internal migrations have been of therural-urban type. Another pilot study by the Center in 1974 found 66 percent for the same figure (quotedinDanesh 1987, 47).48 On the contrary, some earlier studies indicated that the share of the Central Province & Tebran raisedto an unprecedented two thirds of the country’s internal migration in the first four years after theRevolution (Alizadeh & Kazerooni 1984, 38). However, this trend assuredly subsided in the followingyears to the benefit of other regional cities.Aside from the impact of the war-damaged zones, the principal provincial out-migration occurred in:East-Azarbaijan, Hamadan, Kurdestan, Zanjan and Lorestan in the western part of Iran. The main42concentration, and foreign trade ports in their major cities. In addition, the higher densityof western provinces and their higher ratio of rural population as compared to the rest ofthe country, denote their potential for out-migration.Although the share of natural increase in the urban population growth of Iran has beengrowing faster than the share of net rural in-migrants, one cannot deny the decisive effectof such a migration in the last decades. Even the present secondary effect of in-migrationis more evident should we take into account that a substantial proportion of naturalincrease is made up of migrant’s reproduction.3.1.3 Settlement PatternHaving described the flow of migration, its effect on the settlement pattern will now beexplained. Although the changing pattern of settlement may be partly attributed to othertypes of migration and to differential natural population growth, hitherto, it has beenstrongly shaped by the decisive share of rural-urban migration.Changes in the urban component of the settlement pattern are illustrated in Table 3.4. Theevident variance in the average annual growth rate of the four population categories in theTable indicates a higher growth rate for the large cities. This is reflected in the perpetualfall of the small cities’ share of the urban population, as opposed to the ever-increasingshare of large cities. Nevertheless, the primacy index (i.e., the percentage of the primatecity’s population to the total urban population) of Tehran has decreased from 30.5 percentin 1966 to 28.6 percent and 22.5 percent in 1976 and 1986 respectively (Amirahmadi &Kiafar 1987, 171; SCI 1991, 43). In other words, the polarization process, especially afterprovinces for receiving migrants in the last decade were: Tehran,Isfahan, Hormozgan, Bushebr andSemnan in the central and southern part of Iran (SCI 1991,48; Zanjani 1991, 210).43the Revolution, has not been confined to the Capital, but has spread to other large citiesas well.Table 3.4: Changes in the Size Distribution of Urban Centers in Iran: 1956-1986(percent) *Share of Urban Population Average Annual Growth RatePopulation Ranges in the Census Years______ of Populationof Urban Centers 1956 1966 1976 1986 1956-66 1966-76 1976-86Lessthan25,000 25.8 20.2 17.8 12.7 2.48 3.64 1.8325,000 to 99,999 23.3 21.9 19.4 20.3 4.39 3.64 5.95100,000to499,999 25.7 30.1 22.1 22.3 6.71 1.72 5.51500,000 & more 25.2 27.8 40.7 44.7 6.04 9.03 6.39* The definition of a city in 1956 to 1976 censuses was: a population center with 5 thousand or morepopulation and all “Markaz-e-Shahrestan” (i.e., township center) jurisdictional centers, regardlessof their population size. The city definition for the 1986 census was changed to: a populationcenter with town hail or municipality, regardless of its population size. (SCI 1991, 32)Source: Compiled and modified from: SCI 1991, 42; Alizadeh & Kazerooni 1984, 69; Madjd-abadi1991, 169-202; Sharbatoghlie 1991, 70.Table 3.5: Changes in the Size Distribution of Rural Settlements in Iran: 1956-1986(percent)Share of Rural Population Average Annual GrowthPopulation Ranges in the Census Years______ Rate of Populationof Rural Centers 1956 1966 1976 1986 1956-66 1966-76 1976-861 to 99 06.8 07.9 06.4 04.7 +3.35 -0.76 -0.69100 to 499 44.5 42.1 36.8 27.6 +1.28 -0.02 -0.41500to999 23.0 23.7 24.7 22.2 +2.16 +1.71 +1.441000to2499 18.9 19.7 22.9 26.3 +2.23 +2.86 +3.96Over 2500 06.8 06.7 09.2 19.2 +1.68 +4.63 10.29Note: Up to the 1976 census, the over 2500’ population range of villages did not include villages withover 5000 inhabitants. In the 1986 national census, however, 194 villages with more than 5000inhabitants were included. See the footnote of Table 3 for the definition of city in each census.Source: Compiled and modified from: SCI 1985, 58: SCI 1991, 42; Vadi’ei 1974, 134; Sharbatoghlie1991, 69.Table 3.5 illustrates the changes in the rural component of the settlement pattern. Here, itcan be elicited that villages with a population of under five hundred have been facing44severe out-migration.5°In contrast, villages with over one thousand inhabitants have beenreceiving migrants. The abrupt increase in the growth of villages with a population ofover 2500 during the last decade (i.e., from 4.63 percent to 10.29 percent) is quitestriking.5’ A ftirther fact that should be taken into consideration is the acceleratingnumber of depopulated villages, from 15,925 to 38,571 during 19661986.52 In short,these changes in the settlement pattern manifest the recurring trend of rural out-migrationfrom smaller to larger centers, leading to polarization.3.2 State Intervention in Population DistributionBefore discussing the case of Iran, it is worth paying attention to how developmenttheories affect South migration in general.During the recent century, the process of so-called modern development has accrued in anuneven fashion (Cook 1983, 20), manifested predominantly in a spatial concentration ofpeople and activities in the South countries (Kuklinsky 1972; Frank 1967; Friedmann1966). The unequal distribution of people and activities is partly explained by the variedendowment of natural resources in the South and by the occurrence of natural phenomenaaffecting their availability -e.g., drought, earthquake, flood (Barke & O’Hare 1984).Partly the unequal distribution sterns from historical and contemporary human-madeevents, whether spontaneous or induced -e.g., demographic changes, the state’s policies50 The small rural centers have significant contribution to the country’s agricultural production. As theminister of RCC has acknowledged more than one third of arable lands of Iran are located close tovillages with less than 250 inhabitants that are threatened by rural depopulation (cited in: Schirazi 1993,314). The number and the population of these villages are roughly 62 percent and 20 percent of all therural settlements, respectively (SCI 1990C).51 To my knowledge, the majority of the growing villages are on the outskirts of cities in a transitionalphase.52 These depopulated settlements may have formerly contained one or more persons or may have beenestablished as non-resident farms. Thereby, it cannot necessarily be elicited as abandonment of villagesor agricultural lands. This point will be elaborated in the last chapter.45(Mabogunje 1989; Morrill & Dormitzer 1979). Reciprocally, the population distributionaffects the spatial variation of previously causal factors: resources and humaninterventions (see Figure 3.1).Figure 3.1: Internal Forces of Uneven Development & ResultantPopulation MobilitySource: AuthorIncreasingly the impact of the state’s intervention policies, specifically by scarce resourceallocations, permissions and land use control, determine the trend of distribution of peopleand activities in the South (Stohr 1981a, 42; Singh 1991, 42). As a matter of fact,numerous decolonized states after the second World War, in addition to other preindustrial countries aspired to catch up with the modern industrialized countries by stateintervention (Friedmann & Weaver 1980, 108-110). National development planning werein vogue and considered to be the imperative method of conscious intervention toovercome backwardness (Hulme & Turner 1990, 100). In so doing, the influentialtheories of development have played a decisive role as a mindset for the state’s policyDevelopment_____TheoryStateIntervention>SectoralPrioritiesSpatialDisparitiesI —Differences in_ __Natural ResourcesNaturalCalamities ii [46planning. Consequently, it is inferred that the political priorities manifested in througheconomic strategies are the root cause; rural-urban migration is the observed malady”(Stark 1991, 16).3.2.1 The Need of Policy InterventionWhichever development is perceived, it appears the ongoing rural-urban migration in mostof the South countries and especially in Iran is detrimental in terms of socio-economic andenvironmental sustainability (Roseland 1992, 22-6; White & Whitney 1992; WCED 1987,Ch.9). In this sense, migration is the reflection of premature urbanization and maldevelopment (Amin 1990) and exacerbates the already acute problems, such as:environmental degradation, hornelessness, overloaded infrastructure, unemployment andunproductive employment, cultural alienation and social disintegration, particularly inlarge cities (Qadeer 1983; Drakakis-Smith 1987).In fact, despite broad criticism, modernization theory has been widely practiced in theSouth. It has, though, been subjected to repetitive revisions. As already explained, thisapproach has brought about huge rural-urban migration streams. The resultant populationdistribution is highly unsatisfactory as expressed overwhelmingly by South governments in1978 and 1983 United Nations’ surveys Seemingly, the governments consider theirpopulation distribution patterns as a deterrent to offsetting present disparities. Thus, theytend to intervene in the trend of population distribution for facilitating the process ofbalanced development.In a 1978 survey, 121 South Countries out of 136 respondents perceived the spatial distribution oftheir population as being unacceptable (U.N. 1982, 19). Specifically, 116 out of 122 had devised policiesto reduce the rural-urban migration (Parnwell 1993, 130). And in 1983, “the governments of 123developing nations out of 126 respondents indicated that they considered their population distribution tobe partly or wholly inappropriate; the remaining three were relatively small island states” (Oberai 1987,13).47A further point worthy to be mentioned is that while the development theories summarizedabove present contrasting views about the future of ongoing migration, almost all agree onthe predicament of South urbanization, and by and large, on the failure of laissez-fairepolicies at the present time (Wood 1982, 304). Hence, all-in-all, the theoreticalinterpretations, governments’ perceptions and factual evidence, uphold the necessity ofgovernment intervention in the status quo.3.2.2 Policy ClassificationIn order to investigate policy interventions by the state, it is important to understand itsvariety of approaches. A wide spectrum of socio-economic policies directly and/orindirectly influence the population distribution between rural and urban areas (Todaro1976, 3). However, for the scope of this study, those policies which are designedexplicitly to alter rural-urban migration behavior are discussed.Whereas most of the rural-urban migration streams in the South are toward metropolitancities, the definite objective of policies may be traced in one or more of the followingcategories:1- Restrain the migration stream at the rural source or at the cities’ gates.2- Divert the stream to other destinations, such as rural frontier areas, small orintermediate cities.3- Return the migrants from cities to their rural homes.4- Accommodate the migrants at their destination. (Simmons et al. 1977, 103; Skeldon1990, 193; Oberai 1983, 11)Needless to say, any of the above categories may be carried out through direct or indirectand voluntary or compulsory leverages.48The underlying policy approach to select each of the above objectives is varied. A usefulclassification of policy approaches, as Stohr put it, is to distinguish between adaptive andnormative interventions. The two approaches may be seen as reactive and proactiveresponses, respectively. The objective of adaptive intervention is “to adapt populationdistribution to the consequences of functional societal change, e.g., of industrialization,modernization, [and] spontaneous growth centers” (Stohr 198 la, 42). The objective ofnormative intervention is “to use government intervention as an instrument to influencethe rate and direction of functional societal change” (Ibid.).The adaptive policies are mostly implemented in cities and in their fringes, and are aimedat responding to the resultant needs of in-migrants -i.e., the accommodating objective.This kind of policy is more ‘curative’ than ‘preventive’. The normative policies are carriedout in both urban and rural areas, often relying on negative leverages in cities, e.g., banson in-migration, and on positive ones in villages, e.g., rural development programs.To put it more precisely, in terms of policy leverage, normative policy can be divided intotwo groups: negative and positive. Negative policies are mainly discouraging and/orrestrictive (Skeldon 1990, 193). Conversely, positive policies place the emphasis onencouragement and/or facilitation.Probably, the most exercised positive-normative policies to control South rural-urbanmigration are rural development programs. A substantial component of these programs issocial and physical infrastructure provision (e.g., the case of Pakistan in: Aziz 1988, 113).From the aspect of geographical points of stress, the rural-urban migration policies may beclassified into three groups. The first group underlines the push forces in the rural origin,49consequently devising rural development. The second group accentuates the pull forces inthe urban destination, mostly using disincentives such as high taxation.The third group highlights the origin-destination relationship and attempts to find solutionsfor a structural balance between rural and urban areas. These policies are often of aneconomic nature, in Todaro’s words, and aim at dismantling urban-biased policies (Todaro1981, xiii), such as changing the terms of trade or wage regulations to the benefit of therural sectors.In the first policy group, as already mentioned, infrastructure provision in rural areas iscrucial to enhance socio-economic performance. Similarly, for the third group, theexistence of infrastructure in rural areas is an integral part of attempts to mitigatedisparities. Considering the arduous and long-term task of rural-urban balanceddevelopment, and despite its questionable outcomes, the practicality and visibility of ruralinfrastructure-building by governments make it virtually common.Table 3.6 demonstrates the geographical points of stress for adaptive/normative policyclassification. It is needless to say that the above policy groups are not mutually exclusiveand could be combined as well.Table 3.6: Classification of Migration Policies & Their EmphasesPolicy Emphasis on: Adaptive Normative/ Normative!Policies Positive Policies Negative PoliciesOrigin PushDestination Pull 0 0Structural Relations 0 0Source: Author503.2.3 Significance of the Government’s Role in IranThe need for state intervention in prevalent trends of population redistribution anddifferent policy approaches were discussed above. Now the authority of the Iranian stateis underscored. The significance of the State role emanates from two specific bases. First,since the movement of nationalization of the oil industry in 1953 and the clear recognitionin the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, the State has enjoyed exclusiverights over oil revenues, among other things. In an oil-dependent country with a weakprivate sector [at least in terms of willingness for productive investments] the momentousinvestment and expenditure of the oil-rich State is clearly decisive54 (Karshenas 1990a,239).Second, taking into consideration the historic tradition of centralization in the MiddleEast, the State of Iran has the constitutional right to intervene in the market, and itauthoritatively exercises its power, consistent with Islamic jurisprudence.55 The politicalsystem of Iran is highly centralized and there is no local government whatsoever. On thisground, the importance of investigating the State’s policies as a determinant of migrationin Iran becomes more evident.56The State’s share of investment in Iran during 1973-78 was 66.1 percent of the total as compared to32.4 percent in 1963 (Ehteshami 1993, p.21 5). The following figures of the peak years, before and afterthe Islamic Revolution, depict the importance of government income from oil exports:- In 1975, oil revenues were 20.9 billion dollars, accounted for 96.9 percent of fran’s exports income and50.6 percent of GDP (SCI 1981, 798 & 1001; CBI 1975, 22)- In 1983, oil revenues amounted to 20.2 billion dollars, about 98 percent of the exports’ income. Thegovernment share of gross domestic capital fonnation was more than 46 percent (SCI 1985, 515 & 699 &785).- It is worth mentioning that due to the sharp fall of oil prices in the international market, in 1986, han’srevenues dropped to 5.9 billion dollars (SCI 1991,410).In part of article 44 of the Constitution it has been stated: “... The state sector is to include all large-scale industries, foreign trade, major minerals, banking, insurance, power generation, dams and large-scale irrigation networks, radio and television, post, telegraph and telephone services, aviation, shipping,roads, railroads and the like; all these will be publicly owned and administered by the State.”(Constitution of the Islamic... 1990, 44)56 In terms of employment, the state sector comprises roughly one third of all the jobs (SCI I 992a, 74).513.3 A Brief History of Rural-Urban Migration in IranMigration cannot be isolated from its socio-economic context. In this section, I do notintend to provide a historical account, but rather to delineate those factors that determinedrural-urban migration flows. These determinants in the last three decades or so arereviewed to portray migration patterns, by and large as inevitable spatial manifestation ofadopted policies by the government. Nonetheless, migration streams, in return, have beenaffecting policy making through their pressing needs and backlashes.In terms of driving forces, three distinct stages can be distinguished in the era of migrationintensification in Iran, as follows:3.3.1 Stage One: Modernization ApproachRural-urban migration is not a recent phenomenon in Iran (Khosravi 1978, 99). Albeit, itgained momentum in the mid 1950’s during the reign of the Shah,57 when the prevailingstrategy for development, like that of many other Third World states, was themodernization approach (Bharier 1971, 27).58 Consecutive National Development Plansplaced enormous emphasis on urban-based infrastructure and industrialization.59 The5 Interesting to know, between 1900 and 1956, according to Bharier’s calculations, city-ward migrationwas between 685 and 728 thousands, or an average of 13 thousand annually (Bharier 1972, 57).58 The inception of modernization can be traced back to the establishment of the first modem school(i.e., Dar-ol-Fonoon school) in 1851 (Menasliri 1992, 5) or the Reza Khan’s coup d’etat in 1921(Karshenas 1990a, Ch.3). The era and its pervasive influence on the country is still seen in the statedperiod.For example, during the years of the Second Development Plan (1955-1962), 49 percent of the wholebudget was allocated to industrial development and to major physical infrastructures, such as airports,seaports, railroads and highways. Also, in 1965, government investment in the secondary sector (i.e.,industry, mining and construction) and tertiary sector (i.e., all services and infrastructures) were 8.4 and5.2 times that in the primary sector. The same figures changed to 11,8 and 5.7 respectively, in 1976,during the second stage of rural-urban migration (calculated on the basis of data in: MEB 1990). Analternative study during 1962-77 by Karshenas (1990b) argues for the inefficiency of resources allocatedto the agriculture sector, rather than inadequacy.52national economy conspicuously disintegrated into dualistic sectors, namely the modernsector with its spatial preference for principal cities, versus the traditional sector in therest of the country, basically in rural areas.In the early 60’s, the government embarked on an extensive land tenure reform whichdeveloped capitalist relationships in rural areas and thus dissipated the traditional ties oflandlords and peasants (Lahsaeizadeh 1993, 305; Hakimian 1990, 79). But the quasi-feudal institution and the subsistence economy in rural areas were not substituted by anorganized market economy.60 New landowners, on average, did not receive enough landand lacked supportive services. Disenchanted by this land reform, many farmers joined thealready-on-the-move landless villagers toward large cities, where unskilled labour washailed for construction work.6’In light of the prioritized industrialization and incomplete land reform on one hand, andgradual increase of oil revenues and related urban-biased policies on the other;62 a largeportion of the agricultural sector, and consequently of rural areas, was marginalized, if not60 This analysis about the consequences of Land Reform in Iran has been docwnented in many studies(Cf. Misra 1978, 153; Hooglund 1982; Afshar 1985; Danesh 1987; McLachlan 1988; Amid 1990; also inPersian: Ra’is-dana 1979).61 It must be mentioned that while there is a vast literature on Iranian land reform, two contrastinganalyses of its consequences are observed. Mainstream criticism emphasizes the overwhelming negativeimpacts on separating peasants from the land, intensification of rural out-migration and total failure tobenefit the peasants (for example see: Adibi 1977, 176; Katouzian 1981, 308; Hooglund 1982, Ch.6;Azkia 1986, 124; Danesh 1987, 81; Lahsaeizadeh 1987; Farazmand 1989, 108; Araghi 1989, 1049;Vosoughi 1990, 193). The alternative analysis poses that the land reform has been “highly advantageous”to the majority of peasants and has not driven major migration streams (Majd 1987, 847; Majd 1989,1053; Majd 1991, 76; Majd 1992, 455). Some scholars held a centrist view like Ashraf (1991).62 Iran oil income rose from 11 percent of the GNP in 1959, to 18 percent in 1969, while its value infixed price became almost 3.5 times greater. In the second stage of migration, described in the followingsection, oil revenues jwnped to 50.6 percent of the GNP in 1973 and dropped to 34.7 percent in 1978(Katouzian 1981, 257; MEB 1990, 1-2).53isolated.63 At the same time, large cities, which were deemed to perform as growth poles,became the focus of government infusion of modernization.643.3.2 Stage Two: Oil-Driven UrbanizationThe second stage in the accelerated pace of rural-urban migration started in the early1970’s, and can primarily be related to the oil boom. In fact, Iran’s per barrel oil revenueskyrocketed from $0.98 to $9.49 between January 1971 and January 1974.65 As a result,the petroleum revenues of the government in 1974 were about 18 times that of 1970 whilethe GNP increased at the rate of 33.3 percent per annum in the 1970 -1977 period (Ghods1989, 202).66 This boost in revenue provided the government with a capital surplus withwhich to hasten and expand the aforementioned modernization approach, using morecapital-intensive technologies which had smaller labour needs (Katouzian 1978, 367). Aconsiderable leap in the amount of investments in construction and an enormous growth ofurban services took place in these years,67 both offering a great number of jobs tounskilled migrants68 (Kamrava 1990, 107; Hakimian 1990, 124; Kielstra 1987, 218).63 On the narrow-minded policies in this period, refer to Jacobs’ sociological research, which shows thatthe Shah had substituted linear economic growth for a genuine development (Jacobs 1966, Cli. 12).64 M. Vosoughi suggests two different sub-stages within the first stage, that is prior to the Land Reformand after it. He characterizes the first sub-stage with dominance of rural-rural and seasonal migration ofthe landless individuals as opposed to the expansion of rural-urban and permanent migration of ruralfamilies (Vosoughi 1990, 46-49). For a rare study, briefly mentioning rural-rural migration in 1960’srefer to Safi-nejad (1976, 96)65 Interesting to know that the price rise in “per barrel” oil of Iran during 1960-70 was only $0.06(Pesaran 1985, 24 & 31), compared to more than $36 during 1970-1980 (Amirahmadi 1990, 71).66 The national income - at the 1974 fixed price - grew astonishingly on average by 21 percent perannum over the period 1970-1977 (calculated on the basis of: MEB 1990, 4).67 From 1970 to 76, the investment in the construction sector and the service sector (excludingtransportation and communication) increased 3.2 and 5.5 times respectively (calculated on the basis ofdata in: MEB 1990, 10). In the same years, the share of domestic fixed capital fonnation, in constructionat the 1973 fixed price, grew from 13.3 percent to 31.2 percent, while its volume became 4.2 times larger(SCI 1982, 1093). The construction sector’s share in the total employment of the country almost doubled:from 7.2 percent in 1966 to 13.5 percent in 1976 (Hakimnian 1988, 223).68 To underscore the importance of the booming construction sector, a glance at “prestigious” urbanprojects in the Capital is convincing: Shahestan-e-Pahlavi (a huge new city center), Shahrak-e-Gharb (anew city adjacent to Teliran), many satellite “bedroom” towns, high-rise complexes and freeway54At the same time, urban demands for consumer goods rose sharply by virtue of the higherpurchasing power of the urban population. In 1974, the government started to subsidizestaple goods for the first time (Afshar 1985, 70). Really, the extravagant imports boughtwith petro-dollars benefited the urban dwellers most.69 For instance, food stuff importedwith an open-door agricultural policy (Farazamand 1989, 155), inhibited the price rise ofdomestic food production70. Otherwise, the high demand could have stimulated balancedgrowth in the agricultural sector (Katouzian 1978, 350). Thereby, the urban-drivensectors and rural-based ones did not accrete simultaneously, embodied as they were inuneven spatial development of urban and rural areas.Another government policy which adversely affected rural emigration was the expansionof agro-businesses, farm corporations, and in essence, spatially concentrated investmentsin pursuit of “efficiency and productivity” 71 Agricultural poles received easy credits forlabour-saving technologies and cash-crop cultivation72 (Aresvik 1976, 124; Atash 1988,construction, an underground mass-transit system, an Olympic sport complex, etc. The construction andservice activities account for over 70 percent of the employment increase in urban areas between 1973and 1978 (Nattagh 1986, 63).69 In this respect, the open-door policy and lavish imports brought about a modern consumption patternfar ahead of the capabilities of the country’s economic sectors to meet. The economy, in terms ofproduction (e.g., because of needed intermediate goods for the performance of assembling /processedmanufacturing) and consumption (e.g., the consistently increasing imports of food stuff and other staplegoods) was addicted to petro-dollars and became quasi-mono-base (Jazayeri 1988, 186).70 Some noteworthy figures are: during 1970-78, the demand for food grew 10 percent yearly comparingto 4.6 percent growth in domestic production, and per capita yearly meat consumption rose from 10.5 Kg.to 24.3 Kg. (Majd 1991a, 74),71 Government policy was shifted in favor of large-scale production after the failure of the co-operativeprogram in the wake of the 1962 land reform (Najafi 1991, 327; Najmabadi 1987). In spite of heavysupports, the contribution of the modem sector to agricultural output accounted for only 4.1 percent in1975 (McLachlan 1988, 136), while the modem sector gained many times of this share from state-runagricultural banlcs (Amid 1990, 113-119; Ghahreman 1982, 135-154).72 As a matter of fact, the application of machinery in agriculture ever since modernization’s approach,has been widely diffused throughout the entire country. The number of tractors in 1977 had increasednearly nine times since 1962 (Amid 1990, 122). For a complete analysis see: Okazaki (1985).55103; Salehi-Isfahani 1989, 374). Overall, however, the state was reluctant to investproportionately in the agricultural sector (Aresvik 1976, 239). Again, these changesfostered new push factors for agricultural workers73 as well as peasant land-owners whohad been assimilated into these large-scale, bureaucratic establishments.74Overall, the oil-induced “boom” was channeled mainly to major urban centers and to alesser extent to a few agricultural poles.75 The inequalities between rural and urban areas,as well as within the rural areas deteriorated (Amid 1990, 139; Kamiar 1988, 333; Nattagh1986, 61; Amirahmadi 1986, 501). However, a tendency toward conspicuousconsumption and the new urban life-style was ubiquitous.76 Accordingly, the bright lightof metropolitan areas, as well as cash and higher wages for unskilled workers,77 attractedan unprecedented flow of rural migrants to urban areas.78 At the same time, continuingrapid population growth was the decisive force for all these displacements of the villagersMany studies relevant to the cause of rural-urban migration in this stage clearly conclude that therural push factors make for a better explanation than do urban pull factors for the pattern of migration inIran (Mohtadi 1990, 842; Rarnin 1988, 33; Danesh 1987, 49; Kazemi 1980) However, some held to thedominance ofpull factors (Hakamian 1988, 218) As it is discussed in footnote 122, push and pullsegregation is not clear-cut reasoning.Regarding the negative impact of rural bureaucratization in the Shah’s regime, especially after the oilboom, refer to Farazmand (1991, 551-565).On the neglect of the rural areas at large and the damaging effect of the oil boom on Iranianagriculture, most scholars agree (for example: Katouzian 1978; Hooglund 1982; McLachlan 1988).However, some scholars recently have challenged the view and asserted that the faster growth of urbansectors, not the neglect of agriculture, has been the cause (Majd 1987 & 1988 &1991b; Hakimian 1988;Karshenas 1990b).76 A cardinal catalyst of this tendency, undoubtedly, was the Westernization campaign of the massmedia before the 1979 revolution. (Kamrava 1990, 127)For the necessity to gain cash as a supplementary means of support even for peasant land-owners see:Hooglund (1982, 93-94), Azkia (1986, 124),. Also, for the high involvement of peasants in urbanconstructions which were calculated at 15 percent of the urban labour force and more than 1 million from1975 to 1977, see: Hoogland (1982, 116).78 This wave of migration is seen in the latest national census data which shows a sudden increase inlife-time migrants to urban areas who had been migrated nineteen years prior to the census (i.e., 1967-SCI l993a, 6). The surge of city-ward migration is also obvious in Hamadan Province. Here the numberof life-time migrants to urban areas who arrived between 1967 and 1976 is 3.2 times the same number for1957 to 1966 (SCI 1992b, 6)56(Ashraf 1991, 289). The general perception of migrants was simple: to partake of the oilwealth, one must go to the core cities.3.3.3 Stage Three: Inconsistency and Turbulent MovementsThe modernization approach was disrupted by the Islamic Revolution in February of1979. Suffice it to say that animosity towards urbanization as a phenomenon which wasdeemed to create dependency, to usurp oil windfalls to the benefit of urban elites, and toruin cultural values, prevailed among the leading politicians (Etemad 1984). In this view,even industrialization, due to its structural dependence on oil revenues, was rejected andrural emigration was condemned and seen as the cause leading to agricultural decline andurban predicaments. The opposition to the Shah’s plans and the “back to the roots” spiritleft virtually no room for a modernization approach. Policy-making attitudes werefundamentally changed at this time.79Two of the most emphatic slogans of the Revolution were independence and socialjustice. To realize these, the new regime vowed to achieve self-sufficiency in food stuffsand also to eradicate deprivation.80 Contrary to the toppled regime, the agriculturalsector was proclaimed to be the pivot of national development. The new governmentcalled for small-scale projects and increased loans for small farmers (Weinbaum 1982, 44).‘ In recent years, many of these views, e.g., the anti-urbanization attitudes or underrating ofindustrialization, have been fading away among the politicians. During the years of the First Five YearPlan (1989-1993) mainstream economic policy has been in the direction of so-called restructuring,adjustment and privatization policies (see Askari 1994). Due to these shifts, I tend to assert that a fourthstage of population movements has been going on since 1989, the beginning year of the First Plan;though, it is too soon to analyze this.80 In retrospect, increasing dependency on the imports of agricultural goods followed the 1973 oil boom.The revolutionary leadership stressed self-sufficiency as a requisite for national sovereignty and asbargaining power in selling oil at a fair price. Iranian agricultural imports, however, did not cease afterthe Revolution and reached more than 8 million tons of grain and an estimated $3.8 billion in agriculturalimports in 1989. These figures in 1976 were 2.7 and 1.3 respectively (SCI 1990a, 392-393; SCI 1981,.997; McLachlan 1988, 232). To convert Rial figures into U.S. Dollars, the somewhat official exchangerate of $1 = 70 Ris. has been used.57In the same course, the Rural Construction Crusade was hailed as a revolutionaryinstitution (it later became a ministry) all over the country. Effusive youths volunteered towork in rural areas to build basic services and to help agricultural production in a non-bureaucratic form (Sharbatoghlie 1991, 75).Furthermore, a new land reform program was launched, mainly aimed at barren lands leftby owner absentees or fugitive landlords, but was not continued in order to include abroader range of lands (Ashraf 1991, 306; Farazmand 1991, 560).81 The agriculturalpolicies of the State lacked consistency, particularly in regard to ownership, andconsequently, negatively affected the incentives for new investments on farmlands(McLachlan 1988, 221; Schirazi 1993). Besides, for those agricultural outputs which usedto be purchased exclusively by the government, the prices increased well but the marketdetermined prices of inputs, and thwarted their positive effects on agricultural households’incomes (Alizadeh & Kazerooni 1984, 24). Many inputs for the farmers were subsidizedby the government, but only for a part of their needs, and also the amount of subsidy hasbeen dependent upon oil revenues -as the cardinal determinant of the State income- withimmoderate fluctuations (Mojtahed & Esfahani 1989; Najafi 1991).In this stage, from 1979 on, some momentous events seem to have had more impact onpopulation movements than have policy-related issues, including:The drastic decline of oil income since the Revolution (except in 1982 and 1983):Owing to this, the dependent structure of manufacturing (e.g., dependence onimporting intermediate products) was paralyzed, which caused a prolonged recession81 Taking into account that only 1.7 million hectares of agricultural lands of the total 18 millions weresubject to the reform up to 1987 (PBO 1 990a, 4/1 & 4/2), it means only about 3 percent of the total(Ashraf 1991, 306).58for the already contracting economy. Correspondingly, cities could not be asattractive as before with respect to economic opportunities.82• The imposed war by Iraq: It is estimated that about 1.5 million war-inflicted peopletook refuge in urban areas, most of whom are still living there (Alizadeh & Kazerooni1984, 35).• Domestic um-est and strife in the western region: In a short period of time (from 1979to 1982) many villagers (estimated at as many as 200 thousand), fled from the insecurerural areas to the provincial cities in three western provinces.83• The Afghanistan Civil war and Iraqi Refi.igees: More than 2 million refugees haveentered Iran, approximately 50 percent of whom have resided in city centers.84• International Emigration: As of 1978, it is estimated that at least 2 million Iranians,mostly residents of large urban centers, have emigrated abroad (Danesh 1987, 30).Another crucial factor, contributing to the migration in this stage, was the lack of birthcontrol policy or, as some may interpret it, an implicit encouragement of larger family sizeand young marriage.85 In effect, the average annual growth rate of the population,dissimilarly to the two previous decades, well exceeded 3 percent.86 More than 22 million82 Oilrevenues from export dropped from $20.5 million in 1977 to $11.6 million in 1980 and then wentup to $20.5 in 1983 and fell again to $5.8 million in 1986 (Arnirahmarh 1990, 225; SCI 1991, 410).83 The 200 thousand figure was roughly calculated as the difference between the 1986 urban populationand the expected rural population in 1986 (i.e., the extrapolation 1966-76 trend) of the pertinentprovinces, subtracting the war refugees.84 The 1986 census shows that almost 840 thousand Afghanis and Iraqis are residing in Iran, which iscertainly a miscount (see: Zanjani 1991, 179). Regarding this, many official speakers haveacknowledged that more than three million were living in the country (Kayhan-e-Havai 1992, 4). Orrecently, only for Afghams, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees announced that: “Bymid-1993, the number of Afghans in Iran stood at 2.4 million.” UNHCR 1993, 31) The estimation ofrefugees in Iran for 1992 was 4.2 million (by Population Action) which distinctly ranked first in the world(Vancouver Sun 1994, A14).85 At least in the first five years of the Revolution, the principle of the priority of most populatedfamilies governed the State laws and by-laws for subsidized and short-of-demand allocations (e.g., Low-cost housing and urban land cession).86 The 1986 census showed the average annual growth rate of population during 1976-86 as 3.9 percent.Bearing in mind that a huge number of international emigrants entered the country, population studies59were added to the 1976 population, an average increase of 1.47 million a year till 1991.On the assumption of a natural increase at 3.2 percent per annum, in 1991, 11.5 millionshould have been added to the 17.8 million rural population of 1976 (the last census yearunder the previous regime), a significant 64.6 percent growth. Essentially, the majordriving force of rural population for decades. i.e., rapid population growth, has remainedintact. Yet, in the last five years, the govermnent has launched a broad campaign onfamily planning programs. It seems that these efforts effectively reduced the populationgrowth rate to well below 3 percent.87Despite salient changes in rural and agricultural policies, ironically, the practice of rural-urban migration persisted (Schirazi 1993, 312). Part of this has been rooted incontradictory policies on the urban side88 which still provide better economicopportunities in the cities and eventually, perpetuate urban-rural disparities (Sharbatoghlie1991, 104). For this, the unhealthy growth of employment in unproductive urban servicesis mostly responsible. Indeed, the highest value added per capita and the greatest growthin job numbers, have been in the urban service sector, evidently booming the urban pull.89The accelerated trend of rural out-migration, in spite of policy shifts, has continued (Adibi1989, 279). The rural-urban gulf in employment and income which was slightly narrowedsuggested 3.23 percent as the right figure for the natural increase (Zandjani 1991, 36 & 156;Sharbatoghlie 1991, 204).87 The latest national population survey in 1991 shows the average annual growth rate of the populationas2.46 percent for the 1986-9 1 period which seems under-counted. Some Iranian population expertsestimate the natural growth rate of that period to be around 2.9 percent per annum which was the target ofthe First Five Year Plan for the year 1993 as well (Assadpour 1992).88 An example is a top official declaration of the urban land grants for the deprived migrants at thebeginning of the Revolution (Adibi 1989, 270). No need to say that it was not put into effect.89 Another widespread urban policy has been that of the projects similar to site-service schemes(Arnadeh Sazi-e-Zamin) for low and middle income housing in majority of cities and towns. So far, itseems that the effect on the increase of urban land ownership and to some extent decentralization ofurban population has been positive. However, one more time it sends the message of hope andfulfillment in the cities to the blighted villagers.60(Atash 1988, 99; Behdad 1989, 351; Sharbatoghlie 1991, 209; Schirazi 1993, 309), is stillquite wide (Amirahmadi & Atash 1987, 155; Shafigh et al. 1992). However, themigration pattern has been changed to the benefit of better distribution of migrants incities (as opposed to heavy concentration in the Capital). But once again the incentive forvillagers to emigrate is strong. The perception could be simplified as this: Prosperity inthe city is plausible but not likely in the village. Even to gain the promised fruits of theRevolution, wisdom calls for being close to the center of power: the city!3.4 Post-Revolutionary Migration PoliciesAs briefly mentioned in the preceding section, post-revolutionary governments in Iran,have used numerous policies in order to reduce the outflow of migrants from rural areas.90In retrospect, the policy instruments prescribed in Iran have been more normative, thoughencouraging and directive, rather than being coercive and indicative. They mostly rest onthe normative and restrain category of the previously mentioned classification, with verylittle attention to the other categories (i.e., divert, return, accommodate). However,especially at the outset of the Revolution, some adaptive policies (e.g., land cession to thecity squatters, providing infrastructure for shanty towns) were made.9’An overview of the policies carried out after the 1979 Revolution is presented in thefollowing categories:a- The restrictive policies in urban centers, which attempted to discourage migrantsfrom staying at the destination (i.e., preventing in-migration and returning them to90 To realize the priority which was given to solving migration by the government, it suffices to quotethe then-successor of the spiritual leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran who said: “After the War [withIraq] our most important problem is migration” (Kayhan 1985, 15).91 See section 3.2.2 for clarification of policies.61their rural homes). These policies are negative-normative, such as: banning peddlersor not entitling the in-migrants to rationed foods.b- The retentive policies in rural areas, which aimed at holding back migrants at theirplace of origin (i.e., restraining rural out-migration). These policies are positive-normative, such as: providing more services or higher agricultural pricing to ruralareas.3.4.1 Restrictive Policies in Urban CentersWithout spelling out the policies or making a chronological summary (which is notintended for this study), the principal government policies are explained here. First, and ofthe paramount importance, is the rationing system for both urban and rural areas whichbegan after the Iraqi invasion in September 1980. The system introduced a registeredcertification-- a passbook, on the basis of the birth place/residence of each individual. Thispassbook became essential for obtaining many rights and privileges. Receiving rationedstaple goods (which these days have gradually disappeared), obtaining work and businesslicenses (for the formal sector, excluding most of construction and other blue collarworkers), registering children at school, applying for some home appliances and carsprovided by the state or the cooperatives (at subsidized prices and by lottery-- a processwhich have been almost stopped since 1988), receiving bank loans, obtaining urbanproperty and even renting a house legally,92 all required the submission of the localpassbook by the residents of large cities. Thus, in deciding weather or not to move tolarge cities, would-be migrants had to take into account the difficulties of obtaining theforegoing goods and services without a passbook for that particular city.92 The requirement of local passbook for purchasing a house or an urban land was removed in 1985.62While rationing-local passbooks were an obstacle to easy population movement, in realityrural migrants were not halted from entering the cities for a number of reasons. First, interms of schooling, many migrants were alone or had no children of school age. Also,sharing residence with a previously villager and now city resident, or renting a roomwithout the notarized lease contract were among their options to cope with the constraintsimposed by the local passbook. Second, the availability of all rationed items in the blackmarket at exorbitant prices (Amirahmadi 1990, 185), attracted many rural migrants topresent their saved rationed rural goods in this market and/or to engage in middlemanactivities in large cities. Third, many migrants could join the informal sector and byprofiteering could offset the legal restrictions of the cities.Another cardinal policy that indirectly influenced the rate of migration to cities was themajor cutbacks in the state subsidies for large cities.93 In effect, the city taxes increasedrapidly, affecting day to day expenses, especially in recent years. Coinciding with theprolonged economic recession of the war time and the consequent post-war years, thecontracting urban economy, did not at least magnetize those would be migrants who couldmake a living in their villages.In addition, some pre-Revolutionary policies for curbing city expansion were adopted andmodified, namely: placement of restrictions on new industrial establishments within a 120Km. radius of Tehran, enactment of city master plans to control physical development,conditioning of the transfer of government employees to large cities, and requirement ofcertain professionals to work outside large cities for a number of years (Hemmasi 1980,224; Amirahmadi 1990, 216). Resuming the harassment of large city peddlers and otherTo give an idea of this trend, in 1977, the ratio of urban to rural households expenditures was 2.1 andthe ratio for their incomes was 2.7. In 1987, these ratios changed to 1.64 and 1.59 respectively whichimplies that income disparities had lessened (Amirabmadi 1990, 200). It also indicates that the growth ofurban households, expenditures was faster than their income growth, in comparison to rural areas.63unlicensed shopkeepers were among the other perpetual restrictive policies against ruralemigrants.3.4.2 Retentive Policies in Rural AreasWhile lacking clear-cut policies from the inception of the Islamic Republic, offsetting therural-urban disparities and meeting the particular needs of rural people (which couldsuitably influence villager& out-migration) were on the states agenda. To begin with, therevolutionary institutions, particularly the Rural Construction Crusade (RCC) and theHousing Foundation, made the effort to develop physical and social infrastructures in therural areas. Despite war time shortcomings, these institutions and conventional relevantministries, immensely expanded the following rural services: electrification, potable waterpipework, road, school and public bath building, networks of health care and agriculturalservice centers (Sharbatoghlie 1991, 75-78). The state dominantly invested in all theseprojects with a less than one third contribution of local people in most cases. Overall, thephysical constructions proceeded well, while the functional operation (especially in theabsence of adequate skilled and higher-educated manpower and in face of theshortcomings in the government current expenditures) was questionable in many areas.94For example, lack of qualified health practitioners or agricultural experts with respect tothe rural health care network or the agricultural service centers network were a majordeficiency (Vosoughi 1990, 252) which in some extreme cases led to abandonedstructures that were newly built.95To give an idea of the enormous efforts by the RCC for physical projects in rural areas, the followingdata are self-evident: In 1989, 56.6 percent of rural households had piped water, 70.8 percent hadelectricity, compared to oniy 14 percent and 22 percent for the same figures in 1978, the last year beforethe Revolution (Shafigh et al. 1992, 31-2). “Only 8,000km of village roads were built before therevolution, according to the minister, but Jahad had constructed 43,000km of village roads by the summerof 1988.” (Schirazi 1993, 307)Najafi’s observation about rural agricultural service centers is to some degree different. He maintains,at least in the Fars province, that the centers “have been successful because the farmers are not obligedany more to travel to nearby towns for required services.” Based on my own four years of research inHamadan and north Khorasan province, this was not the case. Usually, to obtain the allocated quota of64In the same course of infrastructure provision, since 1985, the ambitious national programof rural renovation (called: Beh Sazi-ye Roosta) was embarked upon. The program mainlyconsisted of physical master plans for large villages and resultant projects like: wideningand paving village roads, allocating land for mosques and other public needs, buildingdrainage and sewage systems. The selection of villages and the programming devolved toprovincial authorities. A 50 percent local contribution was a prerequisite for financing therest of the budget for the proposed program by the government in each selected village.The compensation for damaged buildings in the village (as a result of renovationprograms) has been negotiated and mediated by the revolutionary institutions and thevillage Islamic Councils, successfully in many reported cases.96The above-mentioned efforts can be labeled as physical remedies to rural backwardness,the objectives of which were to diminish the attractiveness of infrastructure availability incities for potential rural emigrants and to a lesser extent, to provide supportive services foragricultural activities. As the years are passing, there is a tendency to pay more attentionto the production supporting role of infrastructure as opposed to the overemphasizedsocial service delivery role. This is probably due to the low return of the latter and to therecent budget cutbacks.fertilizers, tractor spare parts, etc. by the service centers and also, to purchase their remaining needs[often more than half of their needs] the farmers had to go to cities. Regarding the shortage of healthpersonnel, refer to Malek (1991).96 As an attempt at encouragement, the provincial authorities have given a quota of subsidizedconstruction materials (e.g., cement and iron beam at formal prices) to those who have incurred a loss. Ina few cases, I observed that the damaged property has been given the commercial land use designation(i.e., shop) and business permission for the owner.65The other lines of efforts in rural areas were numerous economic policies, of which thenew land reform and subsidization of agricultural inputs are already mentioned. Thegeneral impacts of these economic policies may cautiously be drawn as follows:• Despite a better access to credits and loans (Amirahmadi 1990, Ch.3) and a betterprovision of supportive services, the small holdings of most peasant farmers are stillunder economic strain and far behind their needs.• Subsidized agricultural inputs and government pricing of some agricultural outputswere inadequate to economize staple cropping (i.e., particularly wheat and barely).Besides, free market pricing made cash cropping and livestock breeding more lucrative(Mojtahed & Esfahani 1989). Thus, where it was feasible, the commercializationprocess was spread out.• The supply of rationed goods through rural cooperatives (although lesser than whatwas supplied for the cities) was beneficial in helping to keep the level of rural absolutepoverty down (Shafigh et al. 1992, 28-31).• Income distribution in the rural areas of Iran, compared to 1977 (before theRevolution) is less unequal.97 However, the new land reform did not radicallymitigate the land distribution inequalities (McLachlan: 1987, Ch.8).• The service sector in general and the public employment sector in particular, expandedrapidly in the rural areas, fostering a limited diversification in the employmentstructure.98 Nevertheless, the shortcomings of supportive services for agriculturalproduction were more remarkable than those of social services.On the whole, the Gim Coefficient has followed a decreasing trend in rural areas after the Revolution.It was 0.448 in 1977, 0.416 in 1982 and 0.408 in 1987 (Shafigh eta!. 1992, 34-37).98 Census statistics show an average annual growth rate of 9.2 percent for service sector jobs in ruralareas and 5.3 percent in urban areas during 1976-1986. The share of public employees in total rural jobsrose from 5.7 percent in 1976 to 17 percent in 1986 (SCI 1981, 83; SCI 1990a, 65).66Equally important were the social impacts of some other types of policies (e.g., social,cultural, administrative, etc.) such as:• The establishment of the rural Islamic council.• The implementation of new rural jurisdictions (i.e., regrouping villages into a newdistrict with a central village, called dehestan).• Welfare payments/pensions for elderly villagers (albeit quite short of their needs, andhitherto non-existent).• The broad cultural campaign for the value of a rural life-style and of agriculturalworks.All the selected policies pointed out here, in essence, have influenced rural out-migrationwith varying degrees of effect. Yet, they were not sufficiently effective to alter, as theState intended, the predominant pattern of urban-bound migration. Aside from this, nowlet us briefly assess rural-urban migration in Iran, to see if there is such a need ofintervention.3.5 Assessment of Rural-Urban Migration in IranSo far, the context and dimension of rural-urban migration in Iran and the post-revolutionary policies to cope with it have been delineated. Subsequently, it can bededuced that the occurrence of Iranian rural-urban migration has been inevitable due to anumber of determinants created by the foregoing policies. Recapitulating thedeterminants, I highlighted the driving forces of rural-urban migration in three stages asbeing:1- The breakdown of the village-city relationship and the traditional organization ofagriculture (without sufficient substitution) in the name of modernization672- Oil-driven urbanization and the Westernization of consumption in the name ofindustrialization.3- The revolution of rising expectations among the rural masses after the Revolutionand consecutive waves of refugees.Notwithstanding, other non-policy factors which contributed involuntarily and historicallyto the rural out-migration trend in Iran should not be underrated. The most significant ofthese are the demographic traits (e.g., very high natural growth rate) and the naturalresource constraints (e.g., severe water shortage).99The widespread common view about rural-urban migration in Iran is negative and isderived from two misconceptions about the consequences of rural-urban migration. It isassumed that this kind of migration has: 1) devitalized the agricultural sector, and 2)created urban predicaments. While there are some truths in these assumptions, their flawsare not taken into consideration.In fact, much evidence inversely suggests that certain portion of rural out-migration makesagriculture viable in most parts of Iran. The statistics demonstrate that the increase inarable lands has not kept up with the natural population growth in Iranian rural areasduring the last three decades.’°° Considering the low productivity per capita of theThese factors are pointed out in section 4.4, but not discussed in detail due to the scope of thisresearch. For the combined effect of demographic pressure on the resources in Iranian mountains andhighlands refer to the study by Xavier de Planhol (1970) and notes of Bowen-Jones in Costello (1977,47). The general description of land and water constraints in Iran are found in: Mclachlan (1988, Ch.2)and Nattagh (1986, Ch.3)100 Between 1971 and 1978 there was 1.4 percent growth of arable lands; then a sluggish growth of 0.4percent on average annually uiitil 1987 (PBO 1990b, 2-4). During this period, the actual populationliving in rural areas increased at an average rate of 1.8 per annum whereas their natural growth rate isestimated to be at least one percent above that.68agricultural sector in comparison with other sectors,101 and also the higher household sizein rural areas,102 it is virtually unlikely to have considerable and commensurable growth inagricultural employment opportunities. Even though the non-agricultural jobs rose sharplyin the years after the Revolution, they could not hinder the increase in population/job ratioin the rural areas. 103 As a result of the growing pressure of population on land and theinadequate growth of non-agricultural sectors in the rural areas of Iran, probably we canconclude that emigration to a large extent was helpful from the point of view of economicviability at its origin: the village.Nonetheless, from the broader point of view of sustainable development, rural out-migration in Iran probably debilitates the rural community because of its selectivity(Hakimian 1990, 137). The most possible negative impacts are: skill drain, exodus ofeducated and entrepreneurial persons, demoralization of staying villagers, and capital flight(Hooglund 1982, 119). In many environmentally sensitive areas, it has led toabandonment of land and the aggravation of soil erosion and desertification. It is notcertain if correlation of the growing migration with the increasing imports of agriculturalgoods in Iran is causally linked (Nattagh 1986, 63). However, the out-migration certainlyhas caused the shortage of household labour which adversely affected agriculturalproduction (Hakimian 1990, 146; Amid 1990, 140). In addition, it is strongly believedthat environmental degradation, particularly soil erosion, overgrazing, desertification and101 In 1960, the share of the agricultural sector in the GDP (excluding oil) was 37 percent with 52percent of the country’s employed workforce. In 1976, the same figures were 14 and 36 percent ascompared to the service sector having 63 percent of the GDP and 31 percent of employed workforce. in19 87, while about 28 percent of the employed people were in the agricultural sector, they produced 19.5percent of the country’s surplus value (SCI 1991, 537; National Accounts, Central Bank ofIran. cited in:ZahediMazandaranietal 1985, 135-137).102 The average rural household size was almost 0.7 persons more than in the cities in 1986 -- i.e., 5.45vs. 4.77 (SCI: 1990, P.33).103 The ratio of populationljob in the rural areas grew from 3.55 in 1966 to 3.81 and 4.46 in 1976 and1986 respectively (refer to Appendix H.).69aquifer decline, is proceeding hastily in Iranian rural areas. In essence, there is a decliningsituation at the rural end.On the other side, the migrants’ drift aggravated urban problems in Iran, because oftransferring unemployment, underemployment and the need for infrastructure to the cities.The unemployment rate and the unproductive service sector are rampant in metropolitanareas (Danesh 1985). Holding back the emigrants from the cities could mitigate the urbancrisis but would hide the acute rural problems as well. Therefore, at the national level,intensification of cities’ shortcomings is due to a spatial transformation of problems whichmust be confronted anyhow.’°4 This evidences suggests false expectations for in-migrants of cities.So, referring to the proposed conceptual framework for assessing migration in section2.2.2, the migration from a declining situation in the village to the city with falseexpectations, is a negative movement all together (see Figure 2.1). Undoubtedly, a shiftfrom a weak agricultural base to a specious urban economy on the basis of oil revenuescan neither be assessed as positive nor as sustainable. In lieu of extensive studies on theimpact of rural out-migration in Iran, this rough generalization brings us to the crucialneed of intervention in the general trend, which must yet be investigated case by case.104 As a matter of fact, the influx of migrants to the cities (particularly to the Capital) forced thegoverifinent to pay more attention to the needs of this potentially disturbing group, reciprocallyencouraging more rural-urban migration. Hence, the cycle will continue. So, the question remains forthe national strategy to delineate in which places, rural or urban, and at what level should the needs ofpotential migrants be met.70CHAPTER W:MIGRATION ThEORIES AND THE ROLES OF INFRASTRUCTURE714.0 IntroductionDespite considerable theoretical work on migration, the focus area of this research,namely, the role of infrastructure in rural out-migration, cannot be drawn explicitly fromthese theories. By reviewing major migration theories in this section, the causes anddeterminants of rural out-migration will accordingly be summarized to be related to thepotential roles of infrastructure. This is how the conceptional framework for the fieldresearch will be outlined.At the beginning, two caveats are necessary. First, the focus of this research is onvoluntary migrations, excluding compulsory migrations whether driven by natural [e.g.,drought] or artificial forces, [e.g., war]. Second, while migration theories have beentreated universally, the presupposition is that they are applied to the South context inrelation to rural-urban movement.There exists a huge migration literature which emphasizes the descriptive aspects ofmigration with who and how questions on an empirical level, rather than with whyquestions on a theoretical level (cf Skeldon 1990, 126). And as many authors havediscussed, it seems that, if possible at all, the field lacks a general theory’°5 (Shrestha1990, 59; Selier 1988, 20; Oberai & Bilsborrow 1984, 21; Ogden 1984, 5; Wood 1982,298; Peek 1981, 59; Portes 1978, 5; Simmons et al. 1977, 9; Goldstein 1976, 427). Theoverriding reason for this lack could be the interwoven multi-disciplinary (economic,demographic, ecological, cultural, etc.) and multi-level (individual, household, community,regional, etc.) nature of migration study. Bearing in mind that there is a dire need forpolicy guidelines in relation to inappropriate migration trends, it is logical to put research105 As has been pointed out comprehensively by some scholars, “a general theory of miation must beable to answer: Who are the migrants? Why do they move, stay, or return? How and where do they move?When do they move? What are the effects of such actions on the migrants and on others?” (Chang 1981,305-6).72efforts towards grounded theory and praxis, contrary to trying to construct a generaltheory. Therefore, the aim of this overview is to compile the implications of existingtheories for the roles of infrastructure in the South.For the purpose of this overview, it is convenient to summarize the migration theories inthree categories, namely: macro, micro and meso-levels. Macro-level of theories positsmigration as a structurally determined social process at the aggregate level, usually interms of nations or regions. At the other end, micro-level theories of migration treatmigration on personal level, seeking to explain the migrant’s decision to move. And at themeso level, there is a growing interest to concentrate on the household/community level asthe interface of both micro and macro migration theories. These are discussed in thefollowing sections.Prior to proceeding with the review of migration theories, it should be mentioned thatsome classic and general theories of migration, namely, Ravenstein’s laws of migration’°6(1885 & 1889), Lee’s theory of migration’°7 (1966), Gravity and Spatial Models’°8 (refer106 On the bases of Britain’s data between 1871 and 1881, Ravenstein suggests the laws ofmigration.As Ogden has summarized these are: “1) The majority of migrants go oniy a short distance. 2) Migrationproceeds step by step. 3) Migrants going long distances generally go by preference to one of the greatcenters of commerce or industry. 4) Each current of migration produces a compensation counter-current.5) The natives of towns are less migratory than those of rural areas. 6) Females are more migratory thanmales within the kingdom of their birth, but males more frequently venture beyond. 7) Most migrants areadults; families rarely migrate out of their country of birth. 8) Large towns grow more by migration thanby natural increase. 9) Migration increases in volume as industries and commerce develop and transportimproves. 10) The major direction of migration is from the agricultural areas to the centers of industryand commerce. 11) The major causes of migration are economic” (Ogden 1984, 17). Admittedly, manyof the stated laws are subject to enormous modification, if not abolition, in terms of population mobility,e.g., female predominance, short-distance migrations, and step-by-step procedure.107 Lee’s formulation is further development of Ravenstein’s work. In a nutshell, he proposes a push-pull model (Lee 1966) comprised of negative, positive, and indifferent factors associated with the area oforigin and the area of destination, all are governed by personal factors and intervening obstacles. Theapplication of this conceptual framework is useful for analysis but not suggestive of causation.108 The gravity model postulates that migration is directly related to the population size and inverselyrelated to the distance between origin and destination. Stouffer (1940 & 1960), by proposing the idea ofintervening opportunities, incorporates some other spatial factors into the model. As stated by HuwJones, Stouffer argues that linear distance is a less important a determinant of migration patterns than is73to: Zipf 1946, Stouffer 1940 & 1960, Hagerstrand 1962, Morrill 1963), have beenexcluded because of their descriptive approach. Put another way, these theoriesessentially address how, not why, migration occurs. They tend to treat migration as ablack box at the aggregate level. Let us briefly states that: distance , momentum ofpopulation movement, gravity of population size and mental-maps, among others,considered as deterrent or motive, are all of more of an intervening nature, than rootcauses of rural out-migration in the South countries. Consequently, the interpretation ofcausal relation is faulty when determining the role of infrastructure. Thus, these theorieshave not been reviewed in this chapter.4.1 The Macro-Level Migration TheoriesThe theories in this category hold migration to be a causal outcome of socio-economicdevelopment and ultimately, seek migration determinants at a superior level. The keyquestion at this level of theory is: why does migration occur rather than the movement ofindividual migrants? (Shrestha 1990, 63). Although the developmental paradigm of thesetheories has been discussed earlier in relation to the migration assessment in the secondchapter, here their concrete migration theories are reviewed. Three contrasting branchesof theories can be classified within this level. First, those which have been drawn fromneo-classical dual economy and modernization theory and secondly, those derived fromMarx’s views and dependency theory. A third branch may also be recognized on the basisof an ecological approach and Maithusian theory.the nature of space; that distance should be regarded in socio-economic rather than geometric terms; andthat because migration is costly (socially as well as frnancially), a mobile person will cease to move whenhe encounters an appropriate opportunity (in Ogden 1984, 21-2).744.1.1 The First BranchThe basic tenet of the first branch is migration as an equilibrium mechanism, which shiftsunutilised and unlimited surplus labour of the subsistence/agricultural sector to the labour-deficit modern/industrial sector (Dasgupta 1981, 52-53; Bhatia 1992, 15-16). This wasthe conventional economic approach to migration, known as the Lewis-Fei-Ranis model(Lewis 1954; Fei & Ranis 1961) and a cornerstone for then mainstream micro-leveltheories of migration. It was believed that the process of labour transfer and the growthof employment in the modern sector were concomitant and were brought about by highindustrial capital accumulation and its reinvestment in the modern sector (Todaro 1976,21). Therefore, migration was conceived to be a necessary component of structuraltransformation to a modern state, mutually beneficial to urban and rural areas, andeventually bringing about an equalization of income and productivity in two sectors109(Oberai 1987; 38)In spite of its appeal, the model has been found unsatisfactory. There are major inherentsuppositions in the model which much empirical evidence does not confirm. First, itimplies that lost agricultural production (as a result of rural migration) is none and thus,attributes zero or even negative marginal productivity to the migrants. Second, the modelpostulates that full employment in cities prevails and that continuous investment is enoughto absorb the increasing labour supply. Third, the supposition is of the continuedexistence of constant real urban wages until the supply of rural surplus labour is exhausted(Todaro 1976, 23-25; Dasgupta 1981, 52; Cherunilam 1984, 41-42). None of these in the109 To elaborate on this, it is supposed that the migrants will be absorbed with a constant wage premiumup to the point where there is excess labour in cities and a shortage of that in the countryside. Corollaryto this, since it is thought that there is a cumulative reinvestment in the city-based modem sector, thedemand for agricultural production will increase. Thus, there will be a higher agricultural wage andbetter tenns of trade for rural-based sectors. (see Bilsborrow et al. 1984, 16)75South countries have been realized, and with other theoretical developments are no longer10A good reflection of this branch of theory is found in the work of Zelinsky who introducedthe mobility transition theory. He has hypothesized that patterns of movements changeaccording to stages of development. In his words,“there are definite, patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility throughspace-time during recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential componentof the modernization process.” (Zelinsky 1971, 221-222)Zelinsky delineates five evolutionary phases from traditional to super advanced society.Rural-urban migration, in this model, will increase during transition and finally will declinewith improvements in transport and communications and diffusion of developmentalspace” (Pryor 1975, 24;Guest 1989, 7).110 Due to the importance of this theory, it is noteworthy to mention the serious shortcomings accordingto different scholars: Todaro enumerates the conspicuous consumption and the transfer of capital tooverseas as the outlet for profits (inhibiting reinvestment in the South cities) and also argues that mostmodern technologies are labour-saving and do not create jobs proportionate to the rate ofinvestment(1976, 24-5). Peek adds that a positive rural-urban wage difference is not enough to attractsubsistance farmers and that there is a need for preferntial government policies to pave the way( 1981, 61-2). Similarly, Bhatia argues that migration from rural areas is not solely induced by underemployment.He points to the adverse effects of labour/skill drain on rural areas of the South which lead to a fall inproduction (1992, 16-7). McGee shows the dynamic interaction of dual sectors and the existence of bothpeasant and capitalist workforces in both rural and urban areas of the South. Thus, he draws the attentionto the different implications for inter-sectoral mobility (1977, 207-11). Grindle emphasizes the inabilityof the model to explain temporary migration, a growing pattern in the South (1988, 26). And as a whole,Lipton swnmarized the equilibrating failure because of the migrants’ characteristics, migration process,the impact of absence on the village, remittances, and the effect of return migrants (1982, 202-15).11 Zelinsky deals with mobility in a broad sense including migration and various forms of circulation.Mobility transition in his view parallel vital transitions, specifically fertility and mortality(Kosinski &Prothero 1975, 10). He suggests an evolutionary model of spatial behavior with the ensuing traits: Stageone: low residential mobility and natural increase. Stage two: a sudden increase in fertility, accompaniedby large scale rural-urban migrations. Stage three: a decline in the rate of natural increase, rural-urbanand rural-rural migrations, but inter- and intra-urban mobility increases. Stage Four: leveling off rates ofnatural increase and further decline in rural-urban and rural-rural migration. Stage Five: a substantialdecline in residential mobility because of communication developments allowing closer place of work toplace of residence and their integration (McGee 1977, 200).76The mobility transition theory hypothesizes a unilinear process of modernization occurseverywhere (McGee 1977, 201) and the underlying premise is the similar accessibility ofeach settlement to major urban centers and its resource endowment for all social groups(Brown 1991, 52). Furthermore, it treats migrations as a homogenous phenomenon(Standing 1984a, 53). The empirical evidence is mixed and generally, does not supportthe patterned regularities consistent with the development process in the South(Colferl985, 248; Lait 1985, 117; Brown 1991, 52). The theory gravely underestimatesthe volume of circulatory migration, and overall, poorly articulates the cause of migrationvariation from region to region ( Woods 1985, 2;Guest 1989, 8). Reliance onmodernization theory, undermines the ability of the mobility transition theory toacknowledge the coexistence of rural/urban, modern/traditional, and formal/informaleconomic sectors in a dualistic society with irregular mobility implications.”2In general, this branch fails to explain the increasing flows of migration in the face ofincreasing urban unemployment and does not recognize migration as a result ofcontinuous disequilibrium”3 (Paul 1989, 24). As such, it is concluded that rural-urbanmigration in the South can no longer be seen as transfer of surplus labour to moreproductive urban employment, rather it is a shift of under- and unemployment from ruralto urban areas (Oberai 1987, 39; Dasgupta 1981, 53).112 It is stated that “the transfer of population alone, without economic development is not a solution...[it adds] to population-resource problems... in developing countries the majority of migration is not theresult of sustained socio-economic growth, but of pressure associated with population increase, limitedeconomic development, and rising expectations...” (Kosinski & Prothero 1970, 255-6).The critiques say this requires recognition of the national process of capitalism penetration (McGee1977, 202) and the dependence on the external market as well (Peek 1981, 62).774.1.2 The Second BranchIn the second branch, the theories utilize historical-structural factors to explain migration,specifically the changes in the organization of production (Wood 1981, 339; Shrestha1990, 55; Chant & Radcliffe 1992, 18). Wood describes their difference as being that:“migration is conceptualized as a class phenomenon, where the unit of analysis is thestream, as opposed to the atomistic approach that treats migration as the sum ofindividual choices.” (Wood 1982, 302)It is stated that “proletarianization” and penetration of capitalist relationships in rural areasof the South generate streams of rural-urban migration (McGee 1977, 205; Roberts 1978,Ch.4; Peek 1981, 62; Standing 1981, 201; Friedmann 1992, 14-18).Consequently, a spatially uneven structure has been brought about “by geographicallyseparating capital (the employer) from capital-dependent labour” (Shrestha 1990, 54).Given structural imbalances, many scholars pose that there is a necessity of labourdisplacement from backward rural areas to thriving urban areas (Shrestha 1990, 42-44).As such, people vote with theirfeet to gain access to the opportunities114 (Parnwell 1993,74; Lipton 1976, 217). Nevertheless, the notion of proceeding toward equilibrium isnegated by deducing the recurring mechanism of uneven population distribution in theSouth (Lipton 1976, Ch.9 Amin 1974).To exemplify these views, Amin, a prominent researcher in this category, has studied themigratory phenomena in West Africa “which accompanied the consolidation of colonial114 On this theory, Portes explains: “In general, the structure of economic forces in core and peripherytends to be arranged so as to condition migrants to sell their labour in places where needed and at thecheapest possible price... The phenomenon of migration thus stands at the crossroads between nationaland regional inequalities and class exploitation” (Portes 1978, 47-8). Other authors in the same veinsuggest: “Migration to cities reflects merely a demographic adjustment to change in the spatial structureof economic and social opportunities... in a developing economy where foreign capital investments areimportant” (Friedmann & Wulff 1976, 26-7).78presence”(Amin 1974, 69). He maintains the determinant role of external forces andemphasizes unequal spatial development as being the root cause of migration (Ibid. 120).Amin points out that this migration reciprocally perpetuates the inequalities. Anotherresearcher studying the same region notes the trivial effect of population pressure inpushing the villagers to migrate, and underscores the state-driven unequal concentration ofopportunities in the cities (Hart 1986, 72-76).The major critiques of the second branch of macro-level theories are: they tend to bedeterministic (Skeldon 1990, 33), to lead to generalities over time without directlyaddressing acute migration problems (Oberai & Bilsborrow 1984, 20) and ‘pay littleattention to the factors that motivate individual actors” (Selier & Karim 1986, 13).Particularly, this branch fails to address the variation of migrations which occur under thesame structural conditions.4.1.3 The Third BranchMigration is believed here to be a symptom of the growing population pressure onresources, often arable lands (Grigg 1980, 63). Therefore, it is perceived that migrationequilibrates the regional distribution of population or at least lessens the pressure in theoriginating region. Equilibrium is thence considered from the ecological point of view, notfrom the economic standpoint echoed in the first branch theories. The fundamental tenetarises from the Malthusian theory of population, stipulating that population growthoutstrips the means of feeding it, i.e., there is a geometric/multiplicative progression ofpopulation vs. an arithmetic/additive progression of food supply (Goodall 1987, 282).In the same vein, some geographers and ecologists use carrying capacity concepts toshow from a broader perspective, that a specific area can support a certain number ofpeople without deterioration of its eco-systems (Hagget 1979; Catton 1980). Rationally,79the capacity is affected from the following patterns: population growth, distribution ofresources, consumption, production, and technology (Hynes 1993). By virtue of thisconviction, with respect to rural-urban migration it is elicited that“...with given technology there is a certain proportion of the labour force which can beabsorbed by agriculture. As population grows, unless the rural non-crop husbandrysectors [dairing, poultry, forestry and fisheries] or cottage and small-scale industriesexpand so as to absorb the surplus, increasing number of people must move to the urbancentres to find employment.” (Oberai & Bilsborrow 1984, 18)Hence, while the cause of rural out-migration can be justified, the urban consequences inall probability create more pressure on the eco-systems. As such, migration is not a trueequilibratory mechanism from the ecological point of view.”5The stumbling block in this branch is preoccupation with natural forces and naturalimpacts. Bearing in mind the importance of unemployment and poverty for rural out-migration in the South, studies have demonstrated that “population pressure is not theonly or even the principal cause of increasing unemployment and poverty of the ruralpopulation” (Ibid). It has been evident that there have been varied responses to increasesin rural population in the South, “categorized as: a) economic, e.g., increase in arable landor land intensification, b) demographic: fertility decline, c) economic-demographic: ruralout-migration” (Bilsborrow 1987, 198). Forces like individual motives, types oftechnology, socio-economic structures, and economic policies that affect the carrying115 An interesting study by Boserup indicates that an increase in population density through populationgrowth will hasten the adoption of more intensive methods of farming. She concludes: “According tothe explanation offered here, population increase leads to the adoption of a more intensive system ofagriculture in primitive communities and an increase of total agricultural output” (Boserup 1965, 118).She goes on to say that migration because of population pressure is not inevitable and “...the choice [is]between harder work in more intensive food production, or migration to urban areas” (Ibid. 120). Also,in studying migration in the Philippines, Simkins argues that “migration is not an automatic response toincreasing population pressure- there are a number of other alternatives open that may be moreacceptable to the persons invoved” (Simkins 1970, 266).80capacity have been downplayed (De Jong & Fawcett 1981, 19; Meyer 1993, 1516).h16Of particular weight is the system of resource distribution, which exerts heterogeneouspopulation pressure due to social classification.4.1.4 SummaryIn short, all the branches of macro-level theories view migration as a dependent variableand are concerned with the macro contextual constraints. The first and the secondbranches share the focus on economic factors that are virtually determined within urbanareas (Guest 1989, 7). Both rely on the conditioned behavior of individual migrant due todevelopment structure”7 (Selier 1988, 23-24). In modernization-led theories, rural-urbanmigration is caused principally by the incapability of rural sectors to absorb moreproductive labour. Dependency-led theories in essence attribute rural out-migration to the“skewed distribution of capital resources” (to the benefit of cities) and to structuralconstraints for resource accessibility(Shrestha 1990, 60; also see Lipton 1976). Generally,as Pryor has mentioned, “assuming that migration is always economically purposivebehavior” and related to macro-level variables, overlooks “the significant proportion ofmigrants who move for social, idiosyncratic and particularly multiple reasons” (Pryor1975, 30).The third branch of macro-level theories attributes the cause of rural out-migration chieflyto deterioration of the environment and/or to shortage of the natural resource capacity.Anyhow, it should be taken into consideration that despite the suggestive rationality at the116 Analogy with international migration may be helpful. It has been noted that: “Enviromentaldegradation is but one element in the interconnected web of forces rending to generate new patterns ofSouth-to-North movement” (Simmons 1992, 32). Simmons indicates that the globlaization of economiesis the chief cause of increased differentiation and uneven development, generating increased humanmigration (Ibid.).117 In other words, it is asserted even in the free-market situation “the way individuals respond to marketconditions is itself an artifact of development” (Brown 1991, p.44).81macro-level, the majority of rural people in the South decide not to migrate (Parnwell1993, 91). Hence, the micro- and meso-level theories complement macro-level theories intheir application towards an holistic understanding of migration cause.4.2 The Micro-Level Migration TheoriesIn contrast to macro-level migration theories, “the micro-level approach looks at the issuefrom the perspective of the individual unit, which could be the separate individual or thefamily” (Chang 1981, 309). The migration theories in this category pursue the question ofwhy individual migrants move instead of why migration occurs. And they deal with theperception and the behavior of migrants (called cognitive-behavioral approach) as opposedto the historical-structural approach at the macro-level (Chant 1992; Boyer & Ahn 1991).Two branches in the micro-level can be discerned as follows: the first branch, in general,emphasizes the individual migrant-decision making in the framework of neoclassicaleconomics and virtually, probes the economic determinants of migration. The secondbranch, which by no means is mainstream, underpins the non-economic cause ofmigration, still on the basis of individual decision-making.4.2.1 The First BranchAs pointed out, the focus here is on economic reasons for migration, and overall it rests on“the premise that the direction of the progression or path of development is towardsequilibrium in the price of factors of production and in living standards” (Therom & Graaff1987, 2). Similarly to the first branch of the macro-level, labour mobility is the core ofreasoning. The labour mobility studies of economists postulate that “as labour demandand supply are always in equilibrium in a classic competitive framework, differences in neteconomic advantages, chiefly differences in wages,” are the main cause of migration.(DeJong & Fawcett 1981, 22) However, the criticism that the macro-level theories consider82the mobility as a passive response to a variety of stimuli and do not differentiate the ruralsource areas, cannot be repeated at the micro-level (Parnwell 1993, 94).The main contention in the first branch is based on human-capital migration theory,formulated by Sjaastad (1962). The theory treats migration as an investment decision inlight of cost-benefit calculation by a potential migrant. In effect, if returns of migrationover time (i.e., both monetary and non-monetary) outweigh the related costs, then thetheory assumes that the individual will rationally 18 (De Jong & Fawcett 1981,23-24; Oberai 1987, 39). It is taken for granted that the “people desire to maximize theirnet real incomes over their productive life and can at least roughly compute their lifetimeincome streams in the present place of residence as well as in all possible destinations”9(Oberai & Bilsborrow 1984, 16).In the same strand of theory, the most prominent migration model is known as Todarosmodel (Todaro 1969; Harris & Todaro 1970). He copes with the seemingly contradictoryphenomenon of continued in-migration while unemployment is being increased in theSouth cities. Todaro writes:18 As Lee describes: “The costs of migration are the costs of moving -often represented by distance as aproxy- earnings lost while moving and fmding a new job, and the psychic costs associated with thedisruption of leaving familiar surroundings. The returns of migration are better employmentopportunities, increased job earnings in the new location and the value of amenities or public servicesthat might be superior to those in the location of origin’ (Lee 1985, 15-6). From this viewpoint, thecritical amount to justify or reject the migration decision is “the difference between the expected utilityof the present discounted value of the lifetime real-income stream the migrant expects to receive if he orshe moves to that destination and the expected utility of the present value of the lifetime real-incomestream the migrant expects to receive if lie or she does not move, less the costs of moving” (Da Vanzo1981, 93).119 Sjaastads contribution is more successful in rationalizing the characteristics of migrants.Accordingly, it can be justified that most of the migrants must be: youth [thus having a longer period ofharvesting the returns], single [thus having lower moving costs], educated [thus having a better chance ofobtaining a high wage job] and following the known path [thus reducing the cost of residence at thedestination] 1Paul, 1989,25-6). The operational problem for testing this theory is in respect togeneralization from aggregate data analyses to the individual level (De Jong & Fawcett 1981, 23-4).Also, it is noted that because of less stability and more uncertainty in the South countries, probablypotential migrant attach less value to future gains than immediate ones (Da Vanzo 1981, 94).83“migration proceeds in response to urban- rural differences in expected rather thanactual earnings.. Expected income gains are measured by [a] the dfference in realincomes between rural and urban job opportunities and [b] the probability of a newmigrant obtaining an urban job.” (Todaro 1976, 28-29)Actually, Todaro considers migration as a direct response to real-wage and opportunitydifferentials. In other words, migrants participate in a lottery of relatively high-paid jobsin towns (Gillis et al. 1987, 187). This formulation of the role of economic incentives hasbeen quite influential in migration policy-making -e.g., drawing attention to themigrational implication of urban wage determination and agricultural pricing.The findings of empirical studies in the rural South are not supportive of this theory at best(Parnwell 1993, 87; Bhatia 1992, 20-21; Simmons et al. 1977). Though the income gapbetween rural and urban areas has been widely inferred as the overriding cause ofmigration, there are numerous criticisms in relation to the undervalued role of noneconomic factors on one hand and the neglected characteristics of economies andcommunities of the South on the other.Specifically, the criticism about the theories in this branch are:’20• Family ties and commitments, and the migrant’s stage in the life cycle are crucial inmigration decision-making in the South, but have not been accounted for (Gillis et al.1987, 190; Grindle 1988, 27).• While the cost-benefit theory of migration “is developed in terms of the individualdecision-maker, most tests are conducted with aggregate level data” (Speare et al.1988, 108) which suggests “misleading aggregation and artificial separation ofvariables” (Chang 1981, 320).120 Because of the prevalence of this branch in migration studies, a more detailed criticism of thisbranch is discussed here.84• lVligrants tend to optimize, not necessarily maximize utility as assumed -e.g., the casefor circulation between rural and urban areas12’ (Chang 1981, 314; Grindle 1988, 26).• The implicit assumption of complete information and rational evaluation of alternativesis not valid and the antecedence of migration streams and establishment of networkswith urban areas over time chanalized the information -e.g., the case for chainmigration (Cherunilam 1984, 44; Oberai & Bilsborrow 1984, 17; Paul 1989, 31-32;Singh 1991, 37; Parnwell 1993, 93).• The models assume homogenous migrants’ labour while in reality it has been observeduniversally that migration is a highly selective process in respect of skills and attitudes(Oberai 1987, 40; Paul 1989, 31 cited Sabot).• The access to the urban labour market is not equal and friends and relatives play animportant role in who, where, whatjob (Speare et al. 1988, 309; Singh 1991, 35).• A large informal sector, in addition to dual economic sectors, exists in the South, isbeing ignored (Paul 1989, 31).• The explicit assumption that migration is the only way in which to compensate forgeographical wage differences is invalid. (Bhatia 1992, 20-21) In-situ strategies, e.g.,diversification, specialization and circulation, are possible in most cases as well (Guest1989).• The theories in this branch are not helpful in explaining particular choices ofdestination (Grindle 1988, 27).• The aspiration to a higher quality of life and social mobility via migration to cities hasbeen overlooked (Lee 1985, 16-7; Parnwell 1993, 87).121 The premise of utility maximization and income as its proxy has been strongly questioned in theliterature. For instance, Chang states: “Use of the income maximization principle could producemisleading conclusions if the migrant does not maximize all the components of this aggregative variable.The demand for urban income by in-migrants could mean a demand for the options conferred bypurchasing power. These other demands may include economic and noneconomic goods. But they havenow all become disguised economic aggregative variables.” (Chang 1981, 322)85• In the South, with the importance of push factors in rural out-migration’22(Sovani1984; Gillis et at. 1987, 189; Oberai 1987, 12; Ghose 1990, 48; Brown 1991, 49;Singh 1991, 226), many villagers migrate “not because of expected income differencesbut because they are unable to earn a subsistence” (Dasgupta 1981, 64) and there is noreal alternative (Wood 1982, 305). Put another way, weighing the decent lfe chancein two environments is more relevant to the majority of migration decisions than acost-benefit analysis.From a different perspective, proponents of macro-level theories raise a meta questionabout the cause of differentiation of wages: “Capital is much more mobile than labour”, sowhy does capital not move for equilibrium? (Amin 1974, 85) Indeed, in this branch theunequal geographical distribution of the factors of production except for labour (i.e.,capital, land, and natural resources) have taken for granted that which, among others,determines the unequal remuneration of all the factors’23 (McGee 1977, 197).In addition, advocates of meso-level theories pose the problem of overemphasis on theindividual at the micro-level and ascribe it to “the consequence of influence from Westernscholarship, which stress the Benthamite atornistic individual economic man.” (Chang1981, 317).122 It should be noted that the distinction between push and pull factors, as elaborated by Lee (1966), isnot a convincible polarity. To illustrate this, while urban employment opportunities are necessary as thepull factors, they do not suffice to cause rural out-migration unless the push factors [e.g., dwindlingincomes, unemployment and landlessness] are present (ILO 1960). Thus, researchers argue for a quasi-push and quasi-pull distinction (Connell et al. 1976, 198; Pryor 1979, 326). A further point worthy to bementioned is that for better-off rural migrants it has been elicited that pull factors are the main cause ofmigration (Lipton 1980, 15), the assertion ofpush prevalence must be regarded relatively and discretely.For instance, in some part of the South, e.g., West Africa and probably in oil-rich states of Middle East,seemingly, the urban pull is more explanatory of rural out-migration than the rural push (Hart 1986, 75).123 fact, remuneration varies mainly becouse of productivity. And the detenninants of productivityare the level of technology, the workforce skills and the reproduction /enhancement of its quality. Thus,migration due to unequal remuneration is a superstructural explanation.864.2.2 The Second BranchThe thrust of this branch of theory is on the preponderance of non-economic factors inmigration behavior. Ever since the economic discipline prevailed the migration studies inthe 1960’s, this branch has been on the wane and not an articulated theory can be found.While most studies of migration acknowledge the presence of a wide variety of noneconomic factors in any decision to move, they often ascribe to them a peripheral role andsubmerge them in the economic factors’ supremacy. Dissimilarly, some studies in thisbranch negate any explicit economic calculations for migration (e.g., Speare 1971) andinstead search for non-economic motivations.Regarding non-economic factors in the migration literature, there are studies which focuson the individual perception of the utility of the environment, mostly studying intra-urbanmobility and residential location preference in the North countries (Shaw 1975, Ch.5). Asan example, on the basis of the subjective evaluation of place utility by a potential migrant,the stress-threshold model views migration as “a form of individual or group adaptation toperceived changes in environment” (Wolpert 1965, 161). It conceptualizes a stressthreshold for the potential migrant to bear or modify the environment of origin, andbeyond the threshold, to seek a new place of residence (Shaw 1975, 110, Wolpert 1966).Considering another example, the residential satisfaction model postulates thatsatisfaction with one’s home area is inversely related to the migration intention and thissatisfaction is proposed to be in the bonds to other people in the community (Lee 1985,15; Spear 1974). To operationalize the level of place satisfaction, amenities of the originhave been used (Lee 1985, 15) which have implications for the role of infrastmcture.’24124 It is noteworthy that there are studies which incorporate the role of location-fixed amenities inhuman migration from the point of view of neoclassical economics (see Knapp & Graves 1989). Theyargue that “in an equilibrium setting, rising per capita income levels lead to changing demands forlocation-specific amenities. These changing demands lead to migration flows to more desirable locationsover time... amenity values are capitalized into wages, rents, or other local prices” (Ibid. 71).87Parallel to these studies, the most famous formulation with some proof in the South rural-urban migration, is the so-called bright lights of the city (Gulliver 1955). It has beenhypothesized that the rural youths, being aware chiefly through mass media and formermigrants’ stories, were attracted to the urban entertainment and life-style.’25 A scholarindicates:‘The city is thus portrayed and seen as the place to find fun and excitement, and in themind’s eye of young impressionable villagers contrasts sharply with the generally slowand unexciting pace of life in the countryside.” (Parnwell 1993, 89)In general, however, few empirical studies in the South have supported the theory(reviewed in: Findley 1977).The fact of the matter is that many people do migrate for a wide variety of non-economicreason, as well.’26 It has been observed that education, health and housing facilities, theabandonment of traditional norms of rural life, aspiring social mobility, and escape fromvillage disputes cause many migrations (Bilsborrow et al. 1984, 19; De Jong & Gardner1981, 50; Shaw 1975, 110-115). It has been argued that non-economic factors aredifficult to truly investigate and that in any case they follow primary economic cause or atbest “become more important relative to economic factors at higher levels ofdevelopment” (Bilsborrow et al. 1984, 19). So, Parnwell in relation to the bright lightstheory, suggests that these factors influence the direction, rather than the incidence, ofmigration (Parnwell 1993, 91).125 In the rural North, it is worth mentioning that an extensive survey titled: The Cause of Rural-UrbanMigration among the Poor in the USA, has summed up its findings: “The urban amenity variable whichwe have interpreted as a measure of the bright lights attraction of cities is the chief predictor ofmigration for all groups, not just for the young” (Abt Associates 1970, 73).126 The importance of some non-economic causes, such as family and community ties, and detenninantssuch as community context and cultural system, will be discussed with the meso-level theories, later.88All in all, it is believed in this branch that migration is more than a direct response to theobjective economic factors (Wolpert 1965, 161). The subjective accounts of migrationmotives are pursued with a view to determining difficulties in operationalization. Evenwith the acceptance of the primacy of economic objectives, the individual subjectiveperception is indispensable (Shaw 1975, 107).4.2.3 SummaryThe theories at micro-level maintain that migration can be understood by investigatingindividual decision-making, in terms of both the perception and the behavior. Differentfrom the macro-level theories with an historical-structural approach, they apply acognitive-behavioral approach. For the first branch which stresses the economic reasonof labour mobility, a rational decision to move is taken when the stream of life-timeincome in another place exceeds that available in the place of residence (Sjaastad 1962).Further theoretical work suggests that the migrant’s calculation is discounted at presentrates and in addition, modified by the probability of getting a job in the new place (Todaro1969).In the second branch, the non-economic reasons of migration are underscored. A groupof them reckons the perceived place utility as the motive to consider moving (Wolpert1965; Spear 1974). And another theory in the same branch, puts forward the perceivedattractiveness of urban social facilities, especially its entertainment, for the villagers(Connell et al. 1976, 51).The empirical findings for both branches are non-conclusive and in many cases,contradictory. Nonetheless, the mainstream migration policy-making, by and large, relieson the first branch theories of this level of analysis, to the extent that some scholarsconclude:89An unchallenged assumption in all literature is that differences in the price of labouramong regions and sectors provide the principal incentives for mobility of economicallyactive members of the household. (Sabot 19, 232)Both branches assume freedom of movement in response to individual aspirations orsocio-economic forces. And both abstract from the socio-economic structural context(Oberai & Bilsborrow 1984, 17; Standing 1981, 173)1274.3 Meso-Level Migration TheoriesHaving criticized the neglect of concrete contextual factors in foregoing migrationtheories, now we turn to consideration of meso-level migration theories. This level oftheories is characterized by recognition of household as the unit of analysis and payingmore attention to the community context.’28 It is claimed by the proponents of this levelthat relying on household gives the potential of linking micro- and macro-level analysis(Wood 1981, 339; Bilsborrow et al. 1984, 20; Goldscheider 1984, 294; Selier 1988, 27).Both questions of why individual migrants move and why migration takes place, areaddressed in this approach.Since in almost all South countries the prevalent unit of production and control ofproperty in rural areas is household -i.e., usually extended families with three generations(Gugler 1988, 57)- it is believed that “migration is rarely a solitary affair” (Gugler 1 986a,204). By virtue of this, rural-urban migration is viewed as a household decision,127 It is safe to reiterate the claim that: “atomistic, ahistorical free social agents do not accurately reflectthe realities involved in the process of migration” (Sherestha 1990, 48).128 Household is defined as a group of persons who wish to live together and therefore share livingquarters and their principal meals” (Goodall 1987, 215). In other words, household consists of a group ofpeople who “ensures its maintenance and reproduction by generating and disposing of a collectiveincome fund.”(Wood 1981, 339) The key difference withfamily is the kinship which is not necessary inthe case of household. As we will see in case of the first branch at this level, there is an ambivalentemphasis on both family and household.90responding to changes in its conditions (Goldstein 981, 337; Harbison 1981, 228).Understanding these changes in the context of local community is called for when seekingthe motives of migration129 (Hugo 1981a, 222).In a sense, no articulated theory which explains the cause and pattern of migration can befound at this level. The novelty of this kind of study and its recognition of contextual andsituational factors, make the formulation of theories at this level methodologicallycomplex. Nonetheless, two branches of theoretical works may be discerned. One branchis more concerned with the economic rationale of migration, mainly through labourmigration, though in a limited way looks at some contextual causes as well. The secondbranch utilizes an inter-disciplinary approach (psychology, sociology, and to a lesserextent economics) and interprets migration as one of the household sustenance strategies.4.3.1 The First BranchHere the diversion from conventional economic approaches, reviewed as the first branchat the micro-level, started with consideration of family/household as the basic unit ofmigration decisions. To differentiate this from human capital and Todaro’s models, it hasbeen stated that:decisions to migrate are generally made on the basis of a calculus of householdincome streams from a variety of sources [agriculture, wage labour, petty commerce,artisan manufacturing, and remittances from labour migration] and so levels of wagesmay not be as important as the extent to which employment opportunities combineefficiently or effectively with other income-generating pursuits ... Households attempt to129 To illustrate this, Saint & Goldsmith (1980) in their study in Brazil, have shown that as familylabour supply increases, more labour intensive crops predominate, which emphasize total rather than percapita output. When demographic pressure on the farm exceeds the capacity of the most labour intensivesystem, then out-migration of family members occurs. The study hereupon suggests that individualrational-decision explanations of migration are inseparable from structural social explanations. It shouldbe added that this inseparability is manifested in household decision-making, i.e., the meso-level study.91maximize total family income at the same time that they attempt to minimize the risk tooverall income level through diversification.” (Grindle 1988, 26-27)Thus, the family investment, particularly in the agricultural context, instead of individualgain, is considered to motivate migration of persons or households (Mincer 1978, 750;Da Vanzo 1976, 7; Stark 1980, 367). Subsequently, there is a possibility of incurring loss(in income or utility) for one migrant while the migrants family is gaining in total (Clark1986, 69).A useful theoretical formulation in this branch is the theory of relative deprivation,elaborated by Odek Stark (1984). Substituting an interpersonal and concrete incomedifferential in place of general and abstract comparisons, he writes:“The relative deprivation approach analyzes rural-to- urban migration as a response tomeasurable dissatisfaction within an origin reference group and as a means of reducingor eliminating such dissatisfaction.” (Stark 1984, 481-482)The emphasis again is on labour migration as the chief reason, though not from anindividualistic optimizing perspective (Stark 1991, 3). Recently, revisiting hiscontribution, he has mentioned:“Placing the family, rather than the individual, at the center of the migration decision[this need not result in migration by the family] was a relatively new direction. Thismust not be interpreted to suggest that the behavior of individuals should be ignored, butrather that it should be analyzed in the context of a decision-making unit operating as agroup. (Stark 1991, 5)92Stark explicitly set forth that rural-urban migration is more than a labour migration inresponse to wage differential and indicates that “the ill-functioning capital market” is themajor cause of”a great many of migratory phenomenon”3°(Stark 1991, 4 & 18).In sharp contrast to a widely held view, he postulates that migration is a risk-aversion, notrisk-seeking, behavior by the household who spread the risk through diversifying sourcesof income (Stark 1978 & 1991, Ch.4). While there is no direct empirical test, manydispersed findings in the rural South support the argument. However, the major criticismis that it does not pay enough attention to contextual determinants at the community level.Another theoretical formulation which may be considered in this branch is named thevalue-expectancy model (DeJong & Fawcett 1981). Respectively, migration is assumedas a purposive and instrumental behavior, emanating from a “cognitive calculus” of familycosts and benefits to improve or enhance the quality of life (DeJong & Fawcett 1981, 47-57). The intention for migration is the sum of “the value-expectancy products” (Ibid.). Inthis model, values are associated with objective goals and expectancies with subjectiveprobabilities.Attempting to link different levels of migration determinants, this model proposes that:“Migration behavior is hypothesized to be the result of [1] the strength of the value-expectancy-derived intentions to move, [2] the indirect influences of backgroundindividual and area factors, and [3] the modifying effects of constraints and facilitators130 The relative deprivation theory has built on three premises: I. There is more to labour migrationthan an individualistic optimizing behavior 2. There is more to labour migration than a response to wagedifferential 3. A great many migratory phenomena would not have occurred if the set of markets andfinancial institutions were perfect and complete (Stark 1991, 3-4). However, the third premise overlooksthe poor agricultural resource base in many South countries (as shown in Mexico by Grindle 1988),which cannot be helped by technical and capital infusion alone.93that become salient during the process of migration decision-making.” (DeJong &Fawcett 1981, 56)Criticizing the narrow assumption of economic rationality and self-interests maximization,it is correctly postulated that maximization of values need not to be economic and from anindividual perspective (Chan 1981, 313).The value-expectancy model is more useful as a research tool and still has difficulties foroperationalization. Particularly, its cognitive approach makes it vulnerable to theinaccurate expression of goals and expectations by the respondents. Also, in spite ofincorporating contextual factors, the weight assigned to them, especially for macro-setting, is not as important as we observe it to be in the South countries. The structuraland cultural attributes of society may primarily predispose the individual to move or not tomove (Brake & O’Hare 1984, 196).4.3.2 The Second BranchThe salient feature of this branch is its clear stress on the household as the unit ofmigration decision-making and on trying to connect it with contextual constraints andpossibilities. To offset the major critiques of micro-level theories, i.e., overlookingunderlying structural factors, and of macro-level ones, i.e., ignoring individual choices andbehavioral differences, it is claimed here that:“Migration is conceptualized as an integral part of the sustenance strategies thehousehold adopts in response to the opportunities and limitations imposed by conditionsthat lie beyond the household unit... In the context of rural areas, where the unit ofproduction and consumption is the household, an integration of individual and structuralapproaches can be accomplished through the analysis of household behavior as the unitinteracts with its environment.” (Wood 1981, 338-339)94This branch of theory thereby, providing a more holistic approach than other levels ofmigration theories, it is believed that migration is only one, though important, aspect ofthe adaptive strategy of the household and is conditioned on the effectiveness of otherstrategies for maintaining or increasing the household quality of life’3’ (Wood 1982, 314).Scholars in this branch have shown that in many of the South communities, a differentkind of family/household is emerging as a result of rural-urban migration. For instance, inWest Africa, migrants maintain strong ties with their homes (Gugler & Flanagan 1978).Or in the Philippines, Trager argues, the ties between the migrant member and the originalfamily/household, regardless of where the families live, endure and this kind of functionallyrelated but locally dispersed household does not meet the definition of co-residence andsharing a common pot (Trager 1988, 182-184). Consequently, the terms like expandedfamily (Selier 1988, 31) or shadow household (Caces et al. 1985) have been coined. Thisphenomenon implies that comprehending the decision of household in the areas of origin iscrucial to the understanding of individual or family migrations.In this respect, household decision-making to maximize its welfare is embedded in familyvalues and community norms and carries moral commitments for its members. So, thehousehold life-cycle stage plays an important role in determining which member, forexample, should migrate. These kinds of decisions include reciprocal obligations underwhich members contribute their share of responsibilities at another stage (Trager 1988,188). Therefore, considering migration as a survival strategy of households and havingmentioned the contextual impact on choosing this strategy, the strand of studies in thisAs Selier mentions: “Rural-urban migration is not the only option when the source is no longersufficient to reproduce the household.” There are many other alternatives, such as: altering consumerneeds, reinterpretation of the sexual division of labour to market production, seeking new local non-farmopportunities, commuting to nearby towns, etc. (Selier 1988, 29).95branch may be characterized by relying on household labour allocation and interactivecontextual decision-making (Goldscheider 1984).To mention a few theoretical and empirical studies in this branch, three studies publishedby the Brown University Studies in Population and Development are good examples. Thestudy undertaken by Lee (1985), associates community-level factors of rural out-migrationin the Philippines with individual ones and shows contextual influence on explanation ofmigration behavior (Lee 1985, Ch.2&6).132 He postulates that the competition for land inthe study area is “the most decisive factor determining the probability to move’ (Lee 1985,122).The other study by Findley (1987) stresses interactive contextual decisions made byfamilies in the Philippines. She argues that migration for gaining a certain amount of cashis the family strategy when the local community cannot provide such a complementaryincome to the insufficient farm income (Findley 1987, 6). She then concludes: “From thefarmers perspective, farming and migration are an integrated system, not discrete,exclusive choices” (Ibid.). Findley hypothesizes that:“Families of the same socio-economic status are more likely to migrate if they live incommunities with a lower level of socio-economic development.” (Findley 1987, xxii)The third study, conducted by Guest (1989) in Javanese villages, investigates the linkagebetween household labour allocation and rural out-migration. He contends that there aretwo strategies for household responses to dwindling income: production [viaspecialization or diversification] and demographic [via labour mobility, whether132 The study shows that both the commitment to family, job, and place, and community resources oforigin, as well as resources for moving, are the major determinants of migration intention (Lee 1985,117-122).96commuting, migration, or fertility reduction] (Guest 1989, 32-33). Guest found that asubstantial proportion of the differences among villages in the amount of labour allocatedthrough migration could be explained through the patterns of land ownership and access.He writes about the findings in the cases:“...variation among villages in the amount of labour allocated through migration are notexplainable by processes operating within households. Instead I have argued that theeconomic and social institutions within villages play independent roles in affectingpatterns of labour allocation. (Guest 1989, 183)Guest construes that rural non-agricultural income is the key to curtailing labour out-migration (Ibid. Ch.7).Since this branch is rather new, not much criticism can be found. A point of strength maybe enumerated in its elaboration through empirical works and developing groundedtheory. The weak point of this branch lies in its vagueness in pinpointing what constitutesthe cause of migration in general, and in discovering what the weight is of each level offorces in different contexts? After all, this branch has more capability than other branchesin all levels to synthesize the broad reasons of migration, working at different levels.4.3.3 SummaryMigration theories at the meso-level view migration as a household decision for itsmaintenance or well-being. In pursuit of conceiving the mechanism and dynamism of thisdecision-making, the macro social forces and micro individual forces are contextualized atthe household level. The macro forces can be pursued on general societal and culturalterrain and/or on the local community terrain. The micro forces entail a wide range ofindividual motives acting on the basis of migrants’ characteristics.97I have categorized two branches of theories at this level. The first branch concentrates onthe economic behavior of the household and, using a labour migration framework, stressescollective rationality instead of individual rationality. One theory in this branch explainsmigration in relation to the family perception of relative deprivation (Stark 1984, 1991).A perception which is emanated from the comparison with a reference group, and not allgroups. The major cause of rural migration is attributed to relative low-income,precarious agricultural income, capital-market deficiency, and supremacy of urban values.The second branch places more emphasis on community contextual forces and associatethem with household labour allocation (Goldscheider 1984). Migration is interpreted ashousehold sustenance strategy and as one option in combination with or in lieu of otheroptions (Wood 1981). From this point of view, the major cause of rural migration may becited as: the lack of local employment opportunity (especially in non-farm sector),population pressure, poor agricultural resources, limited access to land, and socialinequality in general.In sum, much controversy exists over the excellence of micro- or macro-levels ofmigration theories. As a matter of fact, by evidence of the preceding literature review,none of them could theoretically or empirically assert to be exhaustive and exclusive. Todate, the most appropriate conceptual framework toward interrelating and probablysynthesizing the causes of rural out-migration in the South, has been approached by what Icalled as meso-level theories of migration. Despite the lack of enough elaborated theory,the promising feature of the meso-level is its capability to interrelate different levels and toconnect insights of all levels in a holistic approach. However, the presumption thatmigration is merely a household affair, should also give space to the individual andunlinked migrations (Connell et al. 1976, 90) which occur in some cases as well.984.4 The Iranian Literature ImplicationsBack to the policy explanation in sections 3.3 and 3.4 and having reviewed the migrationstudies on Iran (almost exclusively studying the last pre-Revolution decade), the followingcauses for rural out-migration have been specifically accentuated among others:133• Population pressure: population growth has outpaced the growth of agriculturalresources and have been exacerbated by heritage traditions and land fragmentation(Ashraf 1977; Mahdavi 1982; Hamidi et al. 1983; Alizadeh & Kazerooni 1984;Zahedi et al. 1985; ILO in: Nattagh 1986; Karshenas 1990a; Majd 1992).• Employment opportunities: new employment opportunities in the cities have beengreater than the rural ones and the very low rate of investment in rural areas has beenobserved (Adibi 1977; Ashraf 1977; Nik-Kholgh 1979; Kazemi 1980; Zahedi et al.1985; Ramin 1988; Vosoughi 1990; Mohtadi 1990; Lahsaeizadeh 1993; Schirazi1993).• Rural-Urban income gap: average household income, wages and agriculturalprofitability in the rural areas have been less than those in the urban ones (Keshavarzet al. 1976; Khosravi 1978; Kazemi 1980; Alizadeh & Kazerooni 1984; Azkia 1986;Hakimian 1988; Kamiar 1988; Shafigh et al. 1992; Schirazi 1993).• Unequal land distribution: mostly attributed to the incomplete and adverse effects ofthe Shah’s land reform, landlessness and insufficient land-holdings have beenunderstood as the determinants of out-migration (Paymaan et al. 1976; Nik-Kholgh1979; Alizadeh & Kazerooni 1984; Azkia 1986; Vosoughi 1990; Lahsaeizadeh1993). Land fragmentation, mostly due to the inheritance tradition and populationpressure, is also part of the inefficient land distribution causing diseconomy of scale(Papoli Yazdi & Hossein Poor 1992, 176).133 In Iran, because of the huge varieties among the rural areas across the country, it is virtuallyimpossible to ascribe general common causes for out-migration. The following causes should thereforebe treated as the most recurrent ones.99• Mechanization: as a result of inequalities in land distribution and governmentfacilitation, inappropriate technological change in rural areas is biased against labour(Paymaan et al. 1976; Adibi 1977; Ashraf 1977; Harnidi et al. 1983; Zahedi et al.1985; Danesh 1987; Lahsaeizadeh 1993).• Institutional and price mechanism: not only the terms of trade between urban andrural areas, but also, provision of credits and other services favored cities andreinforced the inequalities (Alizadeh & Kazerooni 1984; Rafi’e-Pour 1985; Danesh1987; Karshenas 1990a; Schirazi 1993).• Awareness of urban opportunities: precedence of migration patterns, expansion oftransportation, communications and literacy, have increased contacts and awarenessand reduced the deterring effect of distance (Adibi 1977; Nik-Kholgh 1979; Kazemi1980; Hemmasi 1980; Ramin 1988; Vosoughi 1990).• Cash Needs: the somewhat self-reliant and closed economy of villages was changedand the cottage industries and rural crafts production decreased due to newconsumption patterns and rural female migration/education. Wage-labouring in citiesbecame a device to earn cash income for new needs (Khosravi 1978; Mahdavi 1982;Rafite-Pour 1985).• Cultural Discrimination: the urban-biased policies of governments and its culturalcomponents, such as conspicuous consumption pattern, inculcated the supremacy ofcity life-style before the Revolution and nurtured the aspiration of breaking awayfrom the village norms (Paydarfar 1974; Keshavarz 1976; Mahdavi 1982; Rafi’e-Pour1985; Vosoughi 1990).• Natural calamities: drought, flood, earthquake and agricultural pests are among thenatural calamities causing mass migrations in some cases (Nik-Kholgh 1979).Other activities such as: accompanying the head of the family, pursuing an education,escaping from village disputes, breaking away from rural norms, intermittent nature ofagriculture, etc. have been considered as subordinate causes.100Given this interconnected causality, the array of foregoing causes of migration may bereduced to two root-motivations as following:1. Subsistence motivation: encountering pauperization and degrading factors in the ruralarea, many villagers are pushed to leaving the natal community for another place.2. Enhancement motivation: in response to inequalities in opportunities among humansettlements, some villagers are pulled to the conceivably better places, which are oftenurban centers.Subsistence motivation is more objective and related to absolute poverty, being often anact of desperation for the poorest villagers. On the contrary, the enhancement motivationis more subjective and associated with relative deprivation, being often an act ofpreference by wealthier villagers (Lipton 1980). A combination of both motivations arefound in most migration streams in the South.As to the cause of rural out-migration studied in this dissertation, the stated two root-causes are probed in the Iranian case after the 1979 Revolution. This might be achievedthrough investigating prerequisite questions about characteristics of migrants and theirhouseholds and logically locating their cause of migration in one or both of the categories.4.5 Implications for the Role of Infrastructure in Rural Out-migrationIn reviewing the migration theories at different levels, we observed a wide range of causesfor migration. It was demonstrated that all the theories have something to contribute,while none might claim exclusive competency. With reference to the new emergingparadigm in social science, it seems a pluralistic approach can be more safe in face of the101accepted uncertainties and lack of a received theory in the field.’34 Indeed, thecontinuums such as: micro- to macro-level theories, economic to non-economic reasons ofmigration, and freewill to deterministic views, all call for an integrated and inclusiveapproach. Several scholars have reached the same conclusion from different aspects (forexample: Singh 1991, 11; Findley 1987, 16; Gardner 1981, 88; Hugo 1981a, 222; Wood1981, 338; Todaro 1976, 51).In fact, it is self-evident that while migration streams are basically a response to change,whether spontaneous or induced changes, and either for worse or for better, it will notoccur unless certain conditions facilitate the actualization process. These conditions aredistinguished at different contexts: an individual within the household context, and thehousehold within the community context, and the community within the regional-nationalor even global context. That is to say, there is an embedded or nested set of contextswhich influences the potential migrant decision. (Figure 4.1)For instance, in the South the overall motivation for rural out-migration can be attributedto the macro-level factors (e.g., inequitable resource distribution). Still this needs to beconceived by the potential migrant (e.g., information flow by previous migrants) andfacilitated by community factors (e.g., norms and structures) as well as by household (e.g.,division of labour and family ties) and individual factors (e.g., personal characteristics andmoral obligations). Considering this interrelated contextual nexus, the complementary134 Concerning the new paradigm in social science, refer to Uphoff s book which contends themechaiistic and reductionist way of thinking should give way to a probabilistic one, avoiding polarity ofconcepts and using chaos theory (Uphoff 1992, Ch.14), Also, some alternative paradigms positepistemological problems in knowing things as they “really are” and “really work” and refute simplecausation because: “Any observed action is the instantaneous resolution of a large number of mutual,simultaneous shapers, each of which is constantly shaping, and being shaped by, all other shapers.”(Guba & Lincoln 1989, 106). Regarding the cause of migration, this implies a holistic/inclusive view.102nature of different levels of theories of migration is indispensable and should beincorporated into our research.Figure 4.1: Multi-Level Contextual Factors in Migration Decision-Making4.5.1 A Conceptual Framework for the Roles of InfrastructureThe following comparative tables (4.1,4.2, and 4.3) present a concise translation of allmigration causes, suggested by different theoretical branches, into the potential roles forinfrastructure in the South rural areas at each level. In the first place, a taxonomy of thecauses of rural migration according to varied theories is listed and then their implicationsfor rural policies, in terms of coping with deficiencies, are inferred. Subsequently, therelevant roles of infrastructure in carrying out policies are drawn.’35 The interpreted roles135 It should be noted that these roles are not necessarily intended to stein the migration, but to enhancethe rural development. Indeed, the provision of some infrastructures may play a contradictory role byeasing rural out-migration or as some argues reducing the deterrent effect of intervening obstacles (Lee1966). For instance, in the absence of balanced sectoral and spatial policies, building a road or a schoolall alone in a deprived village is more probable to encourage city-ward migration than retarding it (cf.Rhoda 1983; Findley 1981; Connell et al. 1976, 15-6). These discourse will be elaborated in thefollowing chapters.fSource: Author103of infrastructure are by no means a comprehensive list; however, an attempt has beenmade to cover all the potential areas. As suggested at the beginning of this section, aninclusive and multi-level approach has been employed here.In keeping with the major concern of this dissertation, the stated potential roles ofinfrastructures in the preceding comparative tables are categorized into the five ensuingcategories. The parentheses at the end of each category show the merged roles:1. Service Delivery Facilitation: Expanding of service accessibility, whether in cities orin rural areas, and enhancement of the service quality are offered by infrastructures.(Including: providing financial services, delivering family planning services, and healthand literacy improvement roles)2. Employment Generation: This is achieved through direct employment generation, asduring construction or operation and maintenance of infrastructures, and indirectly byfacilitating investment in rural sectors. (Including: economic diversification role)3. income Upgrading: Infrastructures increase outputs, and decrease inputs, marketing,and transportation expenses. Also, they provide technical skills for better resourcemobilization. (Including: facilitation of better resource mobilization role)4. Rural-Urban integration: A viable rural settlement pattern is brought about byexpansion of infrastructures and articulation with the city centers. Here the dichotomyof rural vs. urban and the isolation of rural activities are blurred. (Including:improvement of service accessibility role)5. Rural Institutionalization: Infrastructures play an important role forinstitutionalization of rural capacities, creating self-reliance, and more bargaining powerwith cities through providing better communication and organizational arrangements.(Including: cultural/community programs enhancement role)104Table 4.1: Implications for the Roles of Infrastructure in Rural Out-Migrationaccording to the Macro-Level TheoriesTheoretical Branch Cause of Rural Rural Policy Inference Potential Role ofOut-Migration InfrastructureDual Economy and Low Productivity of Rural Equilibrating Agriculture Employment Generation,Modernization Sectors and High with other Economic Rural-Urban Integration,Theory Productivity of Urban Sectors and Diversifying Income/Efficiency(Modern) Sectors Rural Economy Upgrading.Marx’s Views and Unfavorable Resource Balancing Rural/Urban Improvement of ServiceDependency Theory Allocation and Structural Development and Accessibility, Socio-PoliticalConstraints to Empowering Rural Institutionalization.Accessibility PeopleEcological approach Limited Agricultural Upgrading Resource Facilitation of Betterand Malthusian Lands relating to High Mobilization and Resource Mobilization,Theory Fertility & Environmental Promoting Family Health and LiteracyDegradation Planning Improvement.Source: AuthorTable 4.2: Implications for the Roles of Infrastructure in Rural Out-Migrationaccording to the Micro-Level TheoriesTheoretical Branch Cause of Rural Rural Policy Inference Potential Role ofOut-Migration InfrastructureHuman-Capital and Income differences Improving Rural People’s Employment Generation,Wage-differential! during lifetime, Wage- Income vs. Urban Economic Diversification,Job-Probability differences & People’s, Investing in Income/EfficiencyTheories Employment Probability more Rural Jobs Upgrading.Stress-Threshold! Dissatisfaction with Upgrading Rural Quality Amenities/Service Delivery,Place Utility and Place Utility & Rural of Life, Valuing Rural Cultural/CommunityBright Lights Community, Urban Life- Culture, Enriching programs Enhancement.Theories Style Attraction Community BuildingSource: AuthorTable 4.3: Implications for the Roles of Infrastructure in Rural Out-Migrationaccording to the Meso-Leve! TheoriesTheoretical Branch Cause of Rural Rural Policy Inference Potential Role ofOut-Migration InfrastructureRelative Deprivation Low Income, Unstable Upgrading Rural Income, Income/EfficiencyTheory and Value- Agri. Earnings, Capital- Improving Upgrading, ProvidingExpectancy Models Market Deficiency, Banking/insurance, Financial Services, CulturalUrban Values Resuscitating Rural Values Programs Enhancement.Household Labour- Insufficient Expanding Non-Farm Employment Generation,Allocation and Employment, Poor Jobs, Undertaking Land Socio-PoliticalContextual Factors Agri. Resources, Social Reforms, Promoting Institutionalization,Models Inequality, Population Family Planning Delivering Family PlanPressure Services.Source: Author105All these potential roles are supposed to fulfill the underlying goal for the infrastructure,that is equal accessibility to opportunities, and thereby provide a choice for villagers: thatof not being compelled to leave their home.’36 This accessibility can be prepared in twophases. First, the physical requirements (e.g., establishments and equipment) must beprovided and secondly, the service must be functioned and maintained (e.g., supplyinghuman resources and efficient management). These two phases are inseparable for theproper fulfillment of infrastructures’ roles. It is inferred that the process of infrastructureconstruction, in addition to the process of its operation, are important to its function in theaforementioned roles.The case study of this research is basically intended to investigate the capabilities of theabove-mentioned five categories in affecting rural out-migration. However, this might beachieved through investigating prerequisite questions, as is discussed in the next chapter.136 Let us elaborate on a broader meaning of equal accessibility, or as some call it, spatial equity (Stohr& Todtlmg 1979). Often, the spatial outcome of conventional resource allocation in national planning isnot reckoned and is left to spontaneous forces. In retrospect, such a spatial development tends toconcentrate in few centers and the resultant concentration causes a better opportunity for those who havethe advantage of spatial access. Hence, development space with regard to the general shortage ofresources in the South should be considered as another scarce resource. This space must be allocated asequitably as any other resource to avoid regional disparities. However, even with equitable nationalallocations, many areas will still not receive many of the fruits of development. To increase the numberof beneficiaries, the created opportunities ought to be accessible to more than the geographicallyimmediate people. Expanding this accessibility (e.g., by reducing friction of space) is a major goal ofinfrastructures.106CHAPTER V:RESEARCH METHODOLOGY1075.0 IntroductionReviewing a wide variety of migration theories in the previous chapter, it was clarified thata combination of the theories were needed for a holistic approach to the complex andmulti-faceted issue of rural out-migration. What this implies for methodology is thenecessity of a pluralistic approach to accommodate a variety of theories’ needs.Accordingly, a combination of research methods were adopted with respect to multi-levelneeds which supplement each other.As noted in Chapter I, the principal purpose of this research is to explain the causalrelationship of rural out-migration and infrastructure availability/non-availability from arural development standpoint. The purpose is not categorized as exploratory, descriptiveor predictive research, but rather relational and explanatory research (Northey &Tepperman 1986, 21; Marshall & Rossman 1989, 78; Babbie 1991, 90-92). Keeping thisin mind, this chapter presents the appropriate approach to the research method and theselection of the levels of analysis. Then, the research design is discussed and the researchcomponents including: units of analysis, variables, measurement, data collection, researchstrategy, cases selection and sampling are explained.5.1 Approach to Migration StudyWithin the three levels described for migration theories, I identified the meso-level as themost appropriate theoretical level (see section 4.3.3). This has certain implications for theresearch design in terms of units of analysis which will be discussed later. But beforeelaborating on this, the general approach to migration study needs to be selected.Two distinctive approaches in studying causes of migration are distinguished. First, astructural approach, as was noticed in macro-level theories (section 4.1), seeks to108understand the reason of movement beyond individual will and from contextual andhistorical perspectives which are embedded therein. It stresses the effect of context onbehavior (Uphoff 1992, 330). The structural approach is appropriate for examining therationality and selectivity of broad movements of population (Sylvia 1992, 19).Second, a cognitive approach, as was mentioned in micro-level theories (section 4.2), isconcerned mostly with the cause of migration from individuals’ point of view includingtheir ideas, values, and ideals (Uphoff 1992, 331). The migrants’ perception plays animportant role (Boyer & Ahn 1991, 56). This approach provides better insights intosituational and cultural specifics in the migration process (Sylvia 1992, 21).In the theoretical review it was elucidated that the migration process took place as theinterface of different level factors. Ostensibly, an individual makes a decision. Uponfurther investigation, the influences of household and community become evident.Continuing in more profound study, the regional and national level factors are linked andset the ground for population movements. So, while migration intention can bediscovered with a cognitive approach, “the actual migration takes place only when thepolitical, legal, and economic constraints have been examined” (Boyer & Ahn 1991, 56).Consequently, cognitive and structural approaches are complementary, and theconcomitant use of them is conducive to a thorough understanding of migration cause.’37This research relies on both approaches.5.1.1 On Searching for the Cause of MigrationTo understand the cause of migration, as a scholar states,137 Empirical studies have well shown that individual characteristics are a very important factor in theexplanation of migration behavior. However, the same literature also shows, after controlling forindividual characteristics, that migration behavior differs widely due to social setting (Findley 1987,Guest 1989).109either we accept the migrant’s own statement of motive, or we infer motives from a studyof objective structural determinants and then impute these motives to the migrants. Thethird possibility is that we combine the migrant’s subjective account of motives with ourown account based on objective inference. (Taylor 1969, 99)The present study has selected the third possibility. Indeed, as will be explained later,three different ways to find the cause of migration have been examined:1. Surveying Individuals’ Perception2. Investigating Key-Informants’ Perception3. Making Objective and Statistical InferencesFinally, all these have been synthesized, and with a logical argument the overriding causesof rural out-migration have been postulated. Both quantitative and qualitative data areincluded.’38The traditional way of approaching the cause of migration by asking the individual hasbeen widely criticized (see De Jong & Gardner [eds.] 1981). The main flaws are:• The respondent tends to state the last straw or triggering reason which may concealthe root causes.• The respondent is required to recall the cause(s) of migration about their priorbehavior which may be forgotten or not correctly accentuated.• The respondent may state rationalized excuses to the decision to migrate according tohis/her latest understanding, social values, etc., which may not be the actual cause atthe time of migration (De Jong & Fawcett 1981, 34).• Categorization of the respondents’ terms is not accurate; this involves semantics.138 Since there is a tendency to rely more on quantitative data, Patton’s critique of this method isnoteworthy. He asserts that it: “1) oversimplifies the complexities of real-world experience, 2) missesmajor factors of importance that are not easily quantified, and 3) fails to portray a sense of the programand its impact as a whole.” (Patton 1990, 49-50)110And in general, it requires an articulated response, which is difficult for many people in therural South.’39The next flaw in the above individual questioning is that it overlooks other causes whichmay be found if the household are interviewed. Collective rationality could be quitedifferent from individual rationality (Goldscheider 1984, 302; Grindle 1988, 27). Seekingthe household’s cause of migration, still does not necessarily include other factorscontributing to the decision to migrate by the individual. Household functions instructural and community setting and is affected by related objective factors(e.g., existenceof migration patterns, resource accessibility and local labour market opportunities) andsubjective factors (e.g., community values, family ties and social bonds).’4°It bears repeating that migration is enmeshed within a very broad range of issues. And acomplex interplay of a great variety of factors at different levels is involved (Hugo 1981b,179; Wood 1982, 314). Hence, a cross-level analysis of responses and inferences ispreferred for understanding the cause of out-migration. In spite of all rigor, realizing thecause of migration is problematic. Lee correctly has warned:‘Since we can never specify the exact set of factors which impels or prohibits migrationfor a given person, we can in general, oniy set forth a few which seem of specialimportance and note the general or average reaction of a considerable group.” (Lee1966, 49)Some scholars talk about tacit knowledge “as the inner essence of human understanding, what weknow, but can’t articulate” (Patton 1990, 72). This should be more of a problem for the illiteratevillagers. For example, I could not use a semantic differential scale [choosing between two oppositionpositions] or a Likert-type scale [standardized responses] (Babbie 1992,180-181) for gauging the weightof each contributing factor in migration decision making.140 With the same view, Grindle observes: “Households and the decisions they make are constrained bythe development potential of their community, the policies historically adopted by governments thataffect them, and the characteristics of both national and international political economies.” (Grindle1988, 28)liiAll in all, probably the most safe way to approach the cause of migration is to use cross-validation to corroborate the finding at each level. That is why a holistic and multi-levelapproach has been adopted in this research.5.1.2 On Searching for the Infrastructural CauseHaving discussed the complicacy of searching for causes of migration, now I focus on themain purpose of this research, i.e., searching for the importance of infrastructure motive inthe decision to migrate from rural areas. Here, in addition to the aforementioneddifficulties, we deal with the problem of weighing and priorizing the causes. Needless tosay, this cannot be accomplished by questioning the individual alone and requiresadditional information gleaned with other levels of analysis. Finally, the integration of allthis information and the building of a logical argument, will shed light on the inquiry.A particular problem, probably not exclusive to Iran, is that if interviewer is seen as anoutsider, either the villagers censure their ideas and resort to rhetoric when answeringsensitive questions, or try to portray a bleak picture of the situation in the hope of gettingmore of the state allocations for infrastructural projects. In fact, numerous previousattempts (e.g., for income data) have shown the inaccuracy of this kind of direct soliciting.Instead, lateral questions which are the building blocks of decisions to migrate are moreeffective in obtaining the right motives. The approach for the survey, in sum, should beto acquire knowledge of the ingredient of migrant’s decision for our final inference, ratherthan simply the accumulation of direct responses.In the case of community-level interviews, there are fewer constraints than in theindividual interviews since quite often, the people expressing more precise data for covillagers and for the village in aggregate. The elders and community leaders especially feela strong moral obligation to present the situation as truly and as fairly as possible. The112presence of other respected villagers fortifies this conscientious feeling. Thus, theapproach for the group interviews, in contrast to the individual survey, could be throughdirect questioning, though associating the ingredients of typical decision-making regardingmoves, as well.5.2 Level of AnalysisIn a seminal work, Germani (1965) distinguished three levels of analysis in the study ofcauses of migration, as follows:1. Objective level, comprising of the so-called push and pull factors, and also the natureand conditions of communications, accessibility, and contact between origin anddestination.2. Normative level, which contextualizes the objective influences according to the normsof the particular society of origin.3. Psycho-social level, entailing the attitudes and expectations of individuals, differentfrom the normative pattern (Hugo 1981a, 189190)141This conceptualization highlights the necessity of investigating migration cause in differentand interdependent levels. Once again, the multifold and multi-level causes of migrationare stressed. This, in return, calls for employing an inclusive research method at differentlevels.5.3 Research DesignThe main research questions involve the cause of rural out-migration and the significanceof infrastructure motives therein. Until now, the theoretical framework of meso-level141 In this regard, Taylor (1969) developed the above discussion and argued that each level conditionsthe others, the objective level having priority While it apprears that priority of the objective level isvalid, the interplay of other levels should not be undeffated.113theories has been adopted and also an inclusive research method in terms of generalapproach and level of analysis has been stressed. Now, the research components aredelineated.5.3.1 Units of AnalysisDue to the explained inter-connection of causes of migration at different levels, there arefour units of analysis in the present research, as follows:1. Dehestan (a rural jurisdictional unit in Iran), for aggregate analysis of the relationshipof independent and dependent variables at the macro-level, from its structural andobjective aspects.2. Community or village, as the unit for investigating the migration causes from itsstructural, objective and normative aspects.3. Household, as the key unit at the meso-level which links the community and theindividual units, particularly covering its cognitive and normative aspects.4. Individual, as the base unit of migration at the micro-level for scrutinizing its cognitiveand psycho-social aspects.5.3.2 Variables and MeasurementAs mentioned before, this study in its basic type is a relational study Northey &Tepperman 1986, 10) between one independent variable [i.e. infrastructure availability]and one dependent variable [i.e. rural out-migration] (Figure 5.1). The importance,however, of conditioning and intervening variables [e.g. the migrants personalcharacteristics, household status, kinship ties, village economic condition, accessibility andperformance of infrastructures] that effectively mediate between the former variables,incorporate explanatory traits as well (ibid. 17).114Figure 5.1: Diagram of the Research Major VariablesSource: AuthorThere are several more variables regarding the subsequent questions (stated in section 1.6)which have been reflected in questionnaire design and will be described later in the nextsection.The study relies mainly on quantitative methods for measurement at the household and theindividual levels, while for the village level qualitative methods are utilized for a holisticconclusion (Marshall & Rossman 1989, 49). All the levels of measurement, i.e., nominal,ordinal, and ratio, are employed with respect to different variables.5.3.3 Data CollectionThe methods of data collection for social scientists are identified in four categories,namely: experimental research, survey research, field research, and unobtrusive research(Babbie 1992, 234; Singletone et al. 1993, 179).142 The relevance and application of eachto the present research are discussed in the following.142 Babbie also talks about a fifth kind which he calls evaluation research (Babbie 1992, Ch. 13). Headmits, however, that this “refers to a research purpose rather than to a specific research method” (Ibid.346). This kind of research, according to Babbie, is most pertinent to evaluating a social intervention in(Independent Variable) (Intervening Variables)((Dependent Variable))Motivation/Perception/Determinantsant&Household Characteristics,Community Norms, Societal Structures, etc.Behavior/Intention115Experimental research, usually associated with physical sciences, requires manipulationand control over the research environment to test the causal processes (Singletone et al.1993, 181). It usually tests “the effect of an experimental stimulus on some dependentvariables through the pre-testing and post-testing of experimental and control groups”(Babbie 1992, 258). This method is not relevant to the present research, whereas thereexists no control over the research environment (i.e., rural communities, households, andindividual migrants). Besides, no control group can be used to make sense of comparingthe effect of infrastructure availability/non-availability on rural out-migration, for everyvillage has its unique complex of socio-economic, historical and geographical factorswhich contribute with different weights at different times.Survey research is useful when there is a population too large to observe directly (Ibid.262). A representative sample is selected for data collection through questionnaires,interviews, etc. (Jackson 1988, 32). Typically, an individual should be asked to respondto the questions, even if the unit of analysis is other than individual. This method isappropriate for part of this research, because of lack of existing data for each village, andin general for rural households and individuals. For the household and the individual units,a questionnaire was developed to be filled by face-to-face questioning and with emphasison quantitative data.143 A semi-structured interview also was designed for the village unitlight of the intended results. This dissertation uses this kind of research as the outcome of answering thequestions of the causes of migration and the significance of infrastructure. In other words, afterconcluding the relationship of infrastructure and rural out-migration, the policy implications are logicallydrawn.143 The other ways of administrating the survey are categorically negated. Because of high illiteracy,self-administered questionnaires exclude a large portion of the rural population (over 50 percent in 1986).Considering the lack of availability of telephones in the rural area of Hamadan, obviously, telephoneinterviews are irrelevant. Both types are outlandish for authentic communication in Iranian rural culture.116with much more emphasis on qualitative data (Fontana & Frey 1994). 144 In terms of thetime dimension, both designs are cross-sectional with some questions included toapproximate longitudinal aspects for certain variables.Field research refers to the probing of social phenomenon in its natural setting (Singletoneet al. 1993, 349). Using direct observation by the researcher, whether in a “participant” or“non-participant” manner, this method more typically yields qualitative data, and deeperand fuller understanding (Patton 1990, 10; Babbie 1992, 285). Field research isappropriate for studying a comprehensible-size community such as a village and forfocusing on human behavior and groups’ attitudes (Ibid. 286). Thereby, it is useful in thepresent dissertation for researching migration behavior on village context. My activeinvolvement for more than four years in a comprehensive development plan for the ruralareas of Hamadan Province,’45 prior to starting this research, enabled me to observe themigration phenomenon, its causes and consequences in a longer period of time and in abroader geographical sphere. In addition, this helped me gain access to sampled settingswithout appearing to be such as an outsider.Unobtrusive research or non-reactive research implies the study of social behaviorwithout affecting it (Babbie 1992, 342). As opposed to the foregoing research methods,this method relies on the available data (Singletone et a!. 1993, 387)146 This dissertationutilizes the unobtrusive research method as a complementary method at the macro-level144 To make a valid case and adding to the rigor, breadth, and depth of analysis, use of multiplemethods, or triangulation is suggested by many researchers (Denzin & Lincoln 1994, 2). In this sense,the supplementary data collection methods have been considered in this research.145 From 1987 to 1991, as the head of The Plan coordination committee, and also in charge of spatialdevelopment synthesis, the author and his collaborators prepared the first volume of The ComprehensiveRural Development Study of Hamadan Province.146 The analysis of these available data could be of three types: analysis of secondary information,content analysis, and historical/comparative analysis (see Babbie 1992, 312; Singletone et al. 1993,Ch.12).117for laying the background of government policies and for studying cardinal historicalevents which affect population movements in Iran (see Chill). The existing data for arural administrative unit called Dehestan, are useful for aggregate analysis of the effect ofinfrastructure availability/non-availability on rural out-migration trends from a quantitativepoint of view. Moreover, the content analysis is appropriate regarding the analysis ofvillage-level interviews and their qualitative data (Marshal & Rossman 1989, 98).Bearing in mind that these methods are not mutually exclusive, in sum, an integratedapproach is taken to complement the data collection at various levels (Harrison 1987, 21).The levels and the data collection methods in this research are listed below:• Macro-level with the whole country as the overall context: using national existing dataand reviewing government policies and major events as were seen in Chapter III[unobtrusive research].’47• Macro-level with Dehestan as the unit of analysis: relying on existing provincial dataas are displayed in Appendix G.• Meso-level with village as the unit of analysis: doing group interviews and fieldobservation for contextual factors as are shown in Chapter VII [survey and fieldresearch].• Meso-level with household as the unit of analysis: conducting questionnaire surveysfor the remaining migrants’ household at the village as is presented in Chapter VI[survey research].• Micro-level with Individual as the unit of analysis: as part of the householdquestionnaire survey for obtaining individual data and it is described in Chapter VI[survey research].The integrity of these data is discussed in the research strategy.147 Using a limited macro-level rural migration analysis with the help of national census in differentyears, adds a longitudinal dimension to the so-far cross-sectional approach of this study.1185.3.4 Research StrategyThe principal research questions of this research may be reduced to: Why do peoplemigrate from village? and How important is infrastructural cause in their decision? Toinvestigate these, the case study strategy has been undertaken which requires no controlover behavioral events and is appropriate for why and how questions (Yin 1989, 17).Also, case study research has the ability to include a variety of research methods (e.g.,qualitative and quantitative, survey, field, and unobtrusive research) in order to deal withthe contemporary phenomenon in its context.’48 As mentioned above, questionnairesurvey, community key-informants’ interview, and field observations have been conductedin each selected case. The integrity of the case study is suitable for synthesizing thequalitative and quantitative findings for a holistic approach to the cause of migration(Stake 1994, 245).It should be stated that the research strategy consists actually of embedded case studies(Yin, l989:p.46). To put it another way, the case of rural households is embedded in thecase of sample villages which are embedded in the case of Hamadan Province of Iran.5.3.5 The Cases Selection and Sampling DesignTo investigate the research questions, a rural-based province named Hamadan, which hasa recorded history of three decades of high rural out-migration, was selected.’49 Since the148 In this regard, the Yin definition is elucidating: “A case study is an empirical inquiry that:investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries betweenphenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.”(Yin 1989, 23) All these fit precisely the objectives of this research. Interesting to know, Yin holds that“case study research is among the hardest types of research to do.” (Ibid. 61)‘ The 1986 census showed that 62.6 percent of the Province’s population resided in rural areas, ascompared with 45.2 percent for the whole country. Since the first national census in 1956, HamadanProvince has had a constantly lower rate of population growth than the national rate and, consequently,119Islamic Revolution, Hamadan Province has benefited from a higher resource allocation forrural development compared to other provinces, and the rural coverage of social andphysical infrastructures is significantly better than the country’s average.’50 Moreover, animportant rural development program (i.e., Beh Sazi-ye Roosta or rural renovation) wasfirst initiated and implemented in this province, and later expanded to be country-wide. Itshould be added that the researcher had worked for more than four years (1986-1990) asone of the principal planners in charge of Comprehensive Rural Development Plan forHamadan Province. Thus, the ample background information and access to the wholestudy area was a privilege for me.In the case of Dehestan, the existing data were extracted from the latest two nationalpopulation censuses in 1976 and 1986, and from the agricultural census of 1988. Thevillage-level data was gathered through field observation and a semi-structured interviewwith open-ended questions from village key-informants in a panel-discussion setting (Yin1989, 89). For primary data collection, a stratified and multi-stage random sampling forvillages (Jackson 1988, 162), and a survey comprising of simple random sampling forindividuals and households were employed (Babbie 1992, 211).To find the stereotypes of out-migrating villages with implications for the infrastructureprovision, the following steps were taken:its population share has dropped from 3.8 percent of Iraii’s population to 3.2 percent between 1956 and1986, respectively.150 For instance, in the First Five Year Development Plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hainadan’srural areas, with 4.21 percent and 1.84 percent of Iran’s rural population and rural centers respectively,had been earmarked with 5.16 percent of public investments (computed on the basis of detailedallocations in the Plan by the author). As an example regarding infrastructures, 69.3 percent ofHa.rnadan’s rural population was covered by primary health care network as compare to the average of53.5 percent for Iran’s rural population in 199 1(World Bank 1993b, 53).120a- In the Province, all the villages which had lost part of their population during 1976-86 were marked on a map, also showing different population ranges (e.g., 1-99, 100-249, 250-499,...).b- Due to easy access to urban infrastructure and the blurred boundary of urban andrural areas, those of the marked villages which were located within the 30-minuteisochronal zones of cities, were eliminated.c- Using the findings of an analysis extensively undertaken for the Province (Sarrafi etal. 1991, 441-450), all the villages with over 19 kinds of public services (as thesuperior threshold to be surpassed) were identified. Among five identifieddepopulating villages in this service category, two sample villages were randomlyselected from each of the two main geographical areas (i.e., the Northern and theSouthern halves of the Province, separated by a high mountain range. (see Figure5.2).d- Because of the economy of scale in general, and resource constraints in particular, itis impractical to provide basic public services, substantively, for each rural centerwith a population of less than 250 people.’5’ Thus, for the remaining sample villageselections, those with populations of under 250 people were eliminated.e- Overall, five peripheral sample clusters as the typical manifestation of rural out-migration were distinguished in the Province. Among them were the two previouslyselected sample villages. Three other sample villages were selected randomly fromthe remaining sample clusters.151 Given a 50 percent-and-over occunence of each service (in any population range of rural centers) tobe considered as a viable andfeasible service in that range, there found only 3 public services (i.e.,primary school, public bath and mosque) among the 25 needed ones in the 100-249 population range(Sarrafi et al. 1991, Ch.4).121Figure 5.2: Hamadan Province: Distribution of Human Settlements, Major Roads,and HighlandsMajor RoadAbove 2000 m. ElevationHamedan Province122After selecting the five sample villages, 10 percent of their number of households weredetermined as the sample size to which to administer the household questionnaires.’52The sample villages are shown on the map (Figure 5.3) and the number of samplehouseholds are given in Table 5.1 (for detailed community-level data refer to Appendix F).Table 5.1: The Sample Villages (Population, Location and No. of Questionnaires)Name of Number of Nearest Population HouseholdSample Questionnaires City (1986) NumbersVillage (Access Time)Maanizan 32 Malciyer 1469 328(35 minutes)Jorban-lou 18 Ghorveh 1 190 177(55 minutes)Se-miran 6 Asad-abad 340 59(45 minutes)Hassan-taimur 6 Kaboudar- 322 59ahang (75 mm.)Mian-roudan 6 Nahavand 304 56(35 minutes)Source: Author & SCI 1990c.In each village, due to the lack of the list of households and the research constraints, withthe help of a table of random sampling, the residential units were chosen by starting fromtwo vertical directions on the village roads.’53 In each direction, first it was asked if thehousehold has had an out-migrant member after the Islamic Revolution. In most cases theresponses were positive. Where the household did not have any out-migrant member, or152 It is said that reduction in sampling error is possible by increasing the sample size and increasinghomogeneity of the elements being sampled (Babbie 1991, 219). According to the aforementioned studyof rural development planning in the Province, inter-village homogeneity is higher than intra-village one.Thus, the number of villages is reduced to the minimum number which could represent all five subregions. The number of households in each case assigned: 10 percent; respecting the elimination ofhouseholds without migrant members, it amounts to more than that.153 All the five sample villages have a compact and nucleated settlement pattern. Using an elevatedstandpoint or a walking reconnaissance, the principal researcher made effort to include the typicalsections of the pattern in each direction of random sample surveys. Always one of the direction werestarted from the village center and the other from the fringe inward.123ÑC 0 C Cl)could not be contacted for any reason, it was excluded and replaced by the next countedhouse, according to random numbers and along the same road.The household questionnaires were orally administered. For this purpose, twoexperienced interviewers were recruited from the staff of Hamadan Plan and BudgetOrganization, rural data collection division. They were instructed carefully in advance andwere accompanied during the fieldwork in July of 1992. The respondent was chosen fromamongst the adult members of the household, foremost the head of the household and thenhis spouse or in rare instances, her/his children.The questionnaire contained questions on the rural households and their emigrants whohad left the village after 1979, the year of Islamic Revolution (see “Appendix A” for thequestionnaire format). Therefore, it should be noted that the method employed here waspartially that of pursuing the respondent’s perceived reason(s) of migration for his/herhousehold member(s). This was deliberately chosen, whereas the study scope wasconfined to the place of origin. Moreover, it had been designed to investigate the stayer’sview as an implicit proxy for his/her satisfaction with the village and to probe the attitudetowards migration. The other option, which is to interview emigrants in the city, could becomplementary, but not possible because of the research constraints. Such a study,however, requires more data than what is available for the identification of emigrants of aspecific village, in order to have the same probability of inclusion in different destinationsfor all of them.While the interviewers were filling out the questionnaires, in addition to supervision, Ipursued my “participant observation” and personal interaction with the village leaders. Atthis time, the purpose and the content of research were fully described. These contactslaid the ground for my next year visits to the field and for conducting the in-depth125interviews with the community key-informants.’54 Indeed, without such a precedent oftrust-building, it was hard to communicate authentically and sincerely during interviews.The village interviews were carried-out in field, over a period of one week by the author inSeptember 1993. All interviews were taped and conducted in one of the villagers’ houses.For each interview, key community informants (mostly being male, elderly, andcouncilors) had been identified during my field observation in the previous year. Inaddition, at least one male youth who has been working in the village and has been vocal,was invited too. As opposed to the collection of household and individual data (whichshould be asked usually without the presence of others for personal information) thevillage interviews were designed to benefit from the dialogue, varied information, cross-checking and sometimes, conflicting interpretation among a group of villagers (Bilsborrow1984, 427).A set of questions to probe the causes, consequences, and patterns of out-migration ineach village and the relevant RIPP impacts, as well as the socio-economic characteristicsof community was raised (see “Appendix B” for interview questions). Nevertheless, dueto the interactive dialogue among the participants and the open-ended nature of questions,circumstantial issues also have been addressed in each interview (Fontana & Frey1994). ‘55154 Ever since I designed the research, I had thought about the use of community-level data tosupplement and cross-check/complement the household survey. However, during conducting the survey Igradually arrived at the necessity of interviews with key informants as the best source of primary data forthe villages. Other researchers on migration in the South, after extensive work, have stressed the sameconclusion (Bilsborrow 1984, 426)155 For quantitative data analysis, frequency tables, cross-tabulation, and correlation analysis, and forqualitative data analysis, analytic description and content analysis have been employed.1265.4 ConclusionIn this chapter, it was shown that in response to the selected theoretical framework (inCh.IV), there is a need for a variety of research methods to be employed at different levelsof research, which finally, should be integrated. Generally, this research was categorizedas explanatory and relational and was used to investigate the infrastructural causes of ruralout-migration in light of rural sustainable development.It was contended that both structural and cognitive approaches for seeking the cause ofmigration were essential and should be used for validation. Regarding the infrastructuralcauses, indirect inference for the individual and household survey, and both direct andindirect inquiry for the village interviews were discerned as being appropriate.It was argued besides that multiple units of analysis were needed in the wake of multi-levelresearch, including: individual, household, community, and dehestan. Correspondingly, aset of data collection techniques: survey, interview, field observation, and the use ofexisting data were found relevant. These different modes of inquiry provide a betterunderstanding and increase the precision of research (Huberman & Miles 1994, 431).The case study research strategy was employed to interconnect all these variousapproaches, units, techniques and methods. Also, the selection of embedded cases (i.e.,case within case), community informants and random sampling of households in fivedepopulating villages in the Hamadan Province were described.127CHAPTER VI:SURVEY FINDINGS1286.0 IntroductionIn this chapter, the survey findings from five sample villages will be discussed. Thechapter begins with the characteristics and behavior of rural life-time out-migrantsaccording to the description of the respondents (85 percent of whom being the heads ofremaining households), and some of the characteristics of the originating rural households(with at least one life-time out-migrant) are summarized. Then, the stated reasons forrural out-migration are discussed. The survey findings and their analysis are discussedtogether. However, conclusions will be elaborated upon after the discussion of interviews,in the next chapter.6.1 The Characteristics and Behavior of Rural Out-MigrantsIn total, from 68 sample households selected from five sample villages of HamadanProvince, 238 migrants who had migrated after the 1979 Revolution were identified. Theaverage number of emigrants was found to be 3.5 per household, of whom 3.1 persons(89.1 percent- see Table 6.1) were children of the heads of the remaining household(including 1.8 sons and 1.3 daughters- see Appendix C, Tables C. 1 & C.2).Table 6.1: Relationships of Migrants to Household-HeadsRelationship Frequency PercentSpouse 1 0.4Child 212 89.1Parent 2 0.8Grandchild 10 4.2Son- or Daughter-in-law 8 3.4Neice or Nephew 2 0.8Sister or Brother 2 0.8Sister- or Brother-in-law 1 0.4Total: 238 100.0Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural Areas1296.1.1 Sex, Age, Marital Status57.6 percent of rural out-migrants were male; 42.4 percent were female (see Table 6.2).The provincial sex ratio156 for the rural population in 1986 was 108.1 (HPPBO 1992, 29)as compared to 135.6 for the sample migrants. Given the dominance of the head ofhousehold’s decision in initiating migration, and the overwhelming majority of male-headed households, male selectivity in migration is magnified.Table 6.2: Distribution of Rural Out-Migrants by SexSex Frequency PercentageMale 137 57.6Female 101 42.4Total 238 100.0Source: Author’s Survey in Hamacian’s Rural AreasThe urban migrants were mostly young, 54.2 percent were in the age group of 16-30, 33.2percent were between 31 and 45 years, 7.6 percent were under 16 years of age and 10.5percent were over 45 years of age (see Table 6.3). Considering that half of the Hamadanrural population is under 15.5 years age, and having reviewed the detailed age distributionof migrants, the dominant ages for city-ward migration is 16 to 32 years. Indeed, themean, median, and mode are 28.5, 28, and 25 years respectively.64.7 percent of migrants were single at the time of out-migration. However, 76.1 percentof them are married at the present time’57 (see Table 6.4). This indicates that while thefirst move is easier for singles, after establishment migrants tend to marry. The common156 Sex ratio is calculated as number of men is divided by number of women, multiplied by one hundred.157 Eliminating the not-responded category, the married cases are increased to 80.1 percent of total.130pattern is an arranged marriage with a villager from the originating place, which results ina higher proportion of married females among the out-migrants than single females.Table 6.3: Distribution of Rural Out-Migrants by Age GroupsAge Group 1-15 Years 16-30 Years 3 1-45 Years 46 & OverFrequency 18 129 79 12Percentage 7.6 54.2 33.2 5Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural AreasTable 6.4: Marital Status of Out-Migrants at Present and at Departure TimeMarital Status Frequency at Percentage at Frequency at Percentage atof Out-Migrants Present Time Present Time Departure Time Departure TimeSingle 44 18.5 154 64.7Married 181 76.1 71 29.8Divorced 1 0.4 1 0.4NotResponded 12 5.0 12 5.0Total 238 100.0 238 100.0Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural Areas6.1.2 Education78.6 percent of migrants are literate (see Table 6.5). The literacy rate is increased to 79.2percent among persons of 6 years of age and more. Comparing to 49.6 percent as theliteracy rate for the rural population of Hamadan Province in 1986 (SCI 1990a, 115), outmigrants are considerably better-educated (prior to migrating) than the remainingpopulation of the sample villages.The frequency column of Table 6.5 reveals that there is an upsurge in the number ofmigrants in certain groups. This is due to the end of a stage in the Iranian educationalsystem. The five and six years groups come at the end of the new and old primaryeducation curriculum and the eight years group is for those who have reached the end of131junior high school (namely guidance school). The results in the column reveal that hightendencies of out-migration among rural youth are created after finishing primary schooland to a lesser extent after the end ofjunior high school.Table 6.5: Distribution of Out-Migrants by No. of School Years AttainedCum.School Years Frequency Percent PercentOne Year 3 1.3 1.3Two Years 8 3.4 4.6Three Years 5 2.1 6.7Four Years 7 2.9 9.7Five Years 61 25.6 35.3Six Years 44 18.5 53.8Seven Years 5 2.1 55.9Eight Years 46 19.3 75.2Ten Years 1 0.4 75.6Eleven Years 3 1.3 76.9One Year ofAdult School 2 0.8 77.7Two Years ofAdult School 2 0 .8 78.6None Formal Education 49 20.6 99.2Under Six Years ofAge 2 0.8 100.0Total: 238 100.0Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural AreasThe cross-tabulation of literacy and sex variables of sample out-migrants indicates thatwomen were over-represented in the illiterate category. Women compose 81.6 percent ofilliterate migrants although they constitute only 42.2 percent of migrants (compare Table6.6 and Table 6.2). It is true that the literacy rate of rural women in Hamadan Province(being 23.4 percent in 1986) dramatically lagged behind the corresponding figure for ruralmen (63.3 percent).’58 The same unsuitable situation is observed in the sample out-158 The 1991 national survey shows a sharp increase for the female literacy rate in rural Harnadan, up to58.8 percent (Hosn Bakhshan in: Sarrafi et al. 1991, 274), which cannot be confirmed in our out-migrantsand households survey.132migrants. However, the illiteracy rate are quite higher than the aforementioned rates at theprovincial level (60.3 and 93.3 percent for male and female migrants respectively).Table 6.6: Distribution of Out-Migrants’ Sex by Literacy StatusSex of Literate Illiterate Under 6 YrsMigrant (Frequency) (Percentage) (Frequency) (Percentage) (Frequency)Male 126 67.4 9 18.4 2Female 61 32.6 40 81.6 0Total 187 100.0 49 100.0 2Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural AreasControlling sex variables in the cross-tabulation of age groups and school years of out-migrants shows that while the same age groups of men and women are likely to migrate(i.e., 16 to 45), the female migrants are less literate than the male (see Table 6.7).Table 6.7: Distribution of Migrants’ Education by Age Groups and SexAge Groups: 1-15 Years 16-30 Years 31-45 Years 46 & + YearsSchool Years Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Total]to4Years 4 2 3 6 6 2 0 0 23Sto6Years 7 1 37 17 27 12 3 1 1057 to 8 Years 1 0 25 15 9 1 0 0 519to12 Years 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 4Adult School 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 4None 1 0 2 20 3 15 3 5 49Under6Yrs. 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2Total 15 3 70 59 46 33 6 6 238Note: Shaded cells indicate notable over-representation.Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural Areas6.1.3 Destination and Presence of RelativesTo find out the pattern of migration stages, the first and final destination of rural migrantshave been questioned (Table 6.8). The responses suggest a trivial change of the first133destination and thus, a step-wise migration pattern is not observed. Greater Tehran(about 300km away from the province capital) magnetizes the largest portion (47.5percent of migrants), followed by the relevant township center (31.5 percent).Accordingly, the predominant type of permanent migration is the rural-urban type, with95.8 percent of the movements belonging to this category. Rural-rural migration consistsof only 4.2 percent of the out-migration moves.Interestingly, the capital of Hamadan Province, i.e., the city of Hamadan, has not attracteda good deal of rural out-migrants. In the last thirty years, the city’s economic activities(especially industry and construction) have not boomed.’59 This, as well as its limitedpopulation scale, hindered competition with not only the unchallenged Tehran magnet atthe national level, but also with the other regional centers; the Township Center orNeighbouring Province Cities categories in Table 6.8.These observations lead us to conclude that the regulation of destination choice bymigrants for distance and the negative influence ofdistance (a cornerstone of Ravenstein’sLaws of migration- 1885 & 1890) is not of importance in the sample villages. In otherwords, the proportion of out-migrants moving to a farther destination is quite greater thanthose moving to nearby cities; providing that there are abundant means of access, bettereconomic opportunities, and also, that necessary information is disseminated by covillagers in the far destinations (e.g., in Tehran).’6°159 Despite the salient role of Hamadan City as the regional center up to the 1960’s, it lost its supremacyhenceforth. Hamadan was bypassed by the important national highway which links the Persian Gulf portsto the Capital, and was not designated as the site of a few industrial centers in the region. The boomingcrescent of industrial centers around Hamadan City, including: Zanjan, Ghazvin, Saveh, and Arak,drained many of the required resources (see: Sarrafi et al. 1991, 31).160 The same conclusion was found in Uttar Pradesh of India, studied by Najma Khan (1986, 117).134In the same vein, crossing these with the data of migrants’ visit of originating village(Table 6.12) shows that while 43.6 percent of migrants has gone to destinations closeenough for regular visits (including the central village, township center, other villages andother cities in the Province, and Haniadan City categories), 58.8 percent of migrants doregularly visit their original homes. This is due to the extension of transportation systembetween major cities in Iran and the low marginal cost for the distance increase.Table 6.8: Distribution of Out-Migrants’ First and Final DestinationsMigrants Destination Final Destination First Destination(Geographical Categories) Frequency Percentage Frequency PercentageClose Central Village 3 1.3 6 2.5Township Center * 75 31.5 80 33.6HamadanCity** 17 7.1 18 7.6Neighbouring Province Cities 10 4.2 6 2.5The Greater Tehran 113 47.5 110 46.2Other Villages in the Province 7 2.9 9 3.8Other Cities in the Province 2 0.8 1 0.4Other Cities in Iran 1 1 4.6 8 3.4Total 238 100.0 238 100.0* Markaz-e-Shahrestan, including migrations to the city of Hamadan, if originating in the rural areasof the same township.** Those intra-Provincial migrations which has occurred beyond the townships’ boundaries, excludingHamadan township. Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural AreasMany migration studies have suggested that existence of prior migration patterns intensifythe stream of migration and generate chain-like movements. In a limited way, the datapresented in Table 6.9, shows that more than half of the migrants (55.9 percent) have hadrelatives in their first place of residence after migration to rely on.’61 For the rest,161 This is accentuated for those who have migrated because of arranged marriages, continuingeducation, and jobs in the urban formal sector. The precedence of migration to certain places with readilyaccessible jobs plays a significant role in decision-making about prospective destinations (i.e., chainnigration).135however, the source of information may still come from the previous co-villagers whohave migrated, as will be discussed in the next chapter.Another unexpected observation in Table 6.9 is that, in relative terms, male migrants haverelied on relatives more than the female migrants. In fact, this can be misinterpreted if it isnot taken into account that those females who have married a relative and have hadrelatives at destination, would not be considered as they have had relatives at destination.The relatives have been stated for the husbands only by the respondents.Table 6.9: Distribution of Migrants Who Have Had Relatives at Destination By SexRelative at Destination Male Migrants Female Migrants Total MigrantsFrequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency PercentNo 51 37.2 51 50.5 102 42.9Yes 84 61.3 49 48.5 133 55.9MissingData 2 1.5 1 1.0 3 1.3Total 137 100.0 101 100.0 238 100.0Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural Areas6.1.4 Occupational ChangeThe change in the occupational pattern of sample out-migrants, before and aftermigration, as shown in Table 6.10, indicates the following points:• The loss of family agricultural workers (from 17.3 percent to zero) is very high andcould be detrimental to the household agricultural income; however, the probability ofdisguised unemployment of the family workers should be probed to determine if theshift is truly detrimental.• In the after migration occupations, the substantial growth of governmental jobs isindicated (from 2 to 18.4 percent). It demonstrates the key role of government in the136creation of employment opportunities in certain places and the consequent labourforce movements.• In addition, the share of daily wage earners and venders/brokers (including hawkersand sales persons) has considerably increased in the after migration composition (from2 to 15.6 percent and from 1.3 to 8 percent respectively). These are low-skilled jobswhich are subject to great fluctuation in demand and income.Table 6.10: Distribution of Migrants’ Occupations Prior to and After MigrationOccupational Category Before Migration After Migration ChangeFrequency Percent Frequency Percent PercentFarmer/Herder/Agricultural 3 1.3 0 0.0 — 1.3WorkerFamily Agricultural Worker 41 17.3 0 0.0Public/Army Employee 5 2.0 44 18.4Private Sector Employee* 0 0.0 2 0.8 + 0.8Driver (Self-Employed) 2 0.8 8 3.4 + 2.6Shopkeeper/Vender/Broker 3 1 3 19 8 0 + 67Constructional/Daily Wage Eai ner 5 2 0 42 17 6 + 15 6Artisan (Self-Employed) 0 0.0 3 1.3 + 1.3Soldier (lvlilitary Service) 0 0.0 3 1.3 + 1.3Carpet Weaver 16 6.7 12 5.1 — 1.6Homemaker (Home Economics) 63 26.5 74 31.1 + 4.6Student 97 40 8 29 12 2 — 28 6None (Six Years ofAge & Under) 3 1.3 2 0.8 — 0.5Total 238 100.0 238 100.0* Including clerical, technical, and blue collar jobs.Note: Shaded cells indicate dramatic change.Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural Areas• The sharp drop in students’ share of the after migration composition (from 40.8 to12.2 percent) denotes two possibilities: first, the supremacy of a higher quality of lifeand better job expectations for the educated villagers over the desire to continue theireducation, and second, the poverty of rural students which deprive them fromcontinuing their education. The second was not seen as predominant pattern.137• The change in occupational status suggests that a small portion of migrants have beenable to acquire new semi-skilled jobs and a relatively larger portion have acquired jobsin the public/formal sector of cities (usually life-time jobs).• The out-migrants have become more economically active mostly due to leaving thestudent category. Looking at the jump in the homemaker category (from 26.5 to 31.1percent) and the fall in the carpet weaver category (from 6.7 to 5.1 percent), we maypostulate that, in conventional economic terms, women have become less active aftermigration than they were in original situation. It should be recalled that femalemigrants have had less education than male migrants, and that this hinders theirparticipation in the urban job market.162Cross-checking the present occupations of the rural migrants with their final destinationswe arrive at the following conclusions:1- Most students (68.0 percent) go to their township center (Markaz-e-Shahrestan) orthe city of Hamadan for a continuation of their studies (mostly secondary school).2- The majority of low-skilled migrants (69 percent of construction/daily wage earners)work in Greater Tehran.3- The proportion of government employees for occupational composition of themigrants who have resided in their township center or Hamadan City is more than thecorresponding figure of those who have resided in the Greater Tehran or other cities.4- Most of the migrants who are self-employed drivers or venders/brokers (75 and 77.8percent respectively) live in the Greater Tehran.162 Another aspect worthy of mention is socio-cultural barriers. In rural areas, young women can easilylearn the agricultural and carpet weaving skills and work in their family unit of production in a congenialmilieu. This is not easily possible in the urban areas, except in informal home-based employment.According to some rural people’s mentality, the idea of women working outside the home and havingremunerated jobs is considered degrading in male-headed households (Moghadam 1993, Ch.6).1385- While all of the above observations are chiefly for men, female migrants’ occupationsbecome more diverse for those who live in Greater Tehran and then, for those who live intheir township center (still overwhelmed by housekeeping).6.1.5 Collaboration and Contacts with the Originating HouseholdOn the participation of out-migrants in agricultural work, the responses were that only21.8 percent (or 21 percent of total in Table 6.11) , basically at the times of sowing andharvesting, have assisted their remaining households at the original villages. Granting thatthe migrant females hardly participate in this kind of work (2 percent), the share ofparticipating males rises to 37.2 percent (omitting those in the not able category).Considering that most of sample households live on agriculture, as will be discussed in thenext chapter, their assistance is still crucial to the remaining household.Crossing these data with the number of migrants’ visits to the originating householdsreveals that nearly one third of those who regularly (from over two times a year to once aweek) visit the home village assist the household in agriculture. The proportion sharplydrops when the visit numbers are reduced.’63Table 6.11: Distribution of Migrants’ Sex by Their Assistance in Agricultural WorkAssisting the Originating Household’s Agricultural WorksJVligrant Sex No Yes Not Able* TotalFrequency Row Percent Frequency Row Percent Frequency FrequencyMale 81 59.1 48 35.0 8 137Female 98 97.0 2 2.0 1 101Total 179 75.2 50 21.0 9 238* Including disablec, and aged persons, and those who were considered by respondents too young to work.Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural Areas163 Precisely, 34 percent of those migrants who visit once a week, 30 percent of those visiting over twotimes a year, and 6.1 percent of those visiting two times and less, collaborate in the agricultural works oftheir previous household at the home village.139Asking about the frequency of migrants’ home visits as shown in Table 6.12, it was foundthat one fifth of them do not visit their originating village yearly, whereas approximatelythree fifths have a sound contact with their previous households (three visits or moreduring a year). The out-migrants’ marital status slightly affects their frequency of visits.The single migrants are more prone to regular visits than are the married ones (5.4 percentdifference for over twice a year categories).Table 6.12: Distribution of Migrants’ Visits to Their Origin by Marital StatusMigrants’ Single Migrants MarriedMigrants Divorc’d Unkno’n Row TotalVisits Order Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Frequency Frequency PercentOnce a Week 10 22.7 34 18.8 0 3 47 19.7Over Twice aYear 19 43.2 70 38.7 1 3 93 39.1Once/Twice aYear 8 18.2 42 23.2 0 0 50 21.0Less thanOnceaYear 7 15.9 35 19.3 0 6 48 20.2Col. Total 44 18.5 181 76.1 1 12 238 100.0Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural Areas6.1.6 SummaryIn summary, the migration selectivity ofyoung, single, educated male children, and to alesser extent young, married, educatedfemale children, of rural migrant households hasbeen recorded for the sample villages. The most important type of rural out-migration istoward the cities. Their first and final destination is almost the same, beingoverwhelmingly the Greater Tehran and their pertinent township center (Markaz-eShahrestan). And more than half of migrants go to a place where they have a relative torely on.140Prior to the migration, most of the would-be migrants were: student, family agriculturalworker, and housekeeper. After migration, the dominant occupation among the out-migrants was: government/army employee, constructional/daily wage earner, and againhomemaker (solely for female migrants). The occupations of those who have resided inthe Greater Tehran, proportionally, required less skills-training than migrants to cities atshorter distance. Approximately one fifth of the out-migrants still assist their originatinghouseholds with agricultural work at peak times. The drop in the level of assistance inhousehold works for the female migrants is higher. About three fifths of the out-migrantsregularly visits their home village, with the higher share being single migrants. It shouldbe emphasized that the major structural shift in the migrants’ occupations are from theagricultural sector in rural areas to the construction and service sectors in urban areas.6.2 Characteristics of the Rural Migrants’ HouseholdsThe majority of the sample rural migrants’ households (61.8 percent) have two to fourout-migrants and more than one fourth (26.5 percent) have five to seven out-migrants (seeTable 6.13). The average is 3.5 migrants per remaining household at the sample villages.A noteworthy point is the existence of at least one son remaining at the rural migranthousehold(i.e., the traditional caretaker of the household) for 66.2 percent of the samplehouseholds (see Appendix C, table C.4).6.2.1 Size and CompositionIn the five sample villages, the average size of the 68 sample remaining households of ruralout-migrants were 4.69 (see Table 6.14), composed of 2.32 male and 2.37 femalemembers (see Appendix C, Tables C.3 & C.4). The Provincial average for the ruralhouseholds in 1986 was 5.55 persons, including 2.88 men and 2.67 women (HPPBO1992, 29). As a result, the sex ratio in the rural migrants’ households was 97.9 compared141to 108 in the Province. This indicates a smaller size and fewer male members in the ruralmigrants’ households than the average provincial statistics for rural households. This isconsistent with our findings about out-migrants’ characteristics (i.e., male selectivity) inthe preceding section.Table 6.13: Distribution of Rural Households by the No. of Out-Migrant MembersValid Cum.No. of Migrants in Household Frequency Percent PercentOne Migrant 7 10.3 10.3Two Migrants 15 22.1 32.4Three Migrants 13 19.1 51.5Four Migrants 14 20.6 72.1Five Migrants 10 14.7 86.8Six Migrants 5 7.4 94.1Seven Migrants 3 4.4 98.5Nine Migrants 1 1.5 100.0Total 68 100.0Mean: 3.559 Median: 3.0 Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural AreasTable 6.14: Distribution of Rural Migrants Households by SizeNo. of Rural Household Members Frequency Percent Cum. PercentOne Person 6 8.8 8.8Two Persons 10 14.7 23.5Three Persons 11 16.2 39.7Four Persons 9 13.2 52.9Five Persons 8 11.8 64.7Six Persons 7 10.3 75.0Seven Persons 3 4.4 79.4Eight Persons 10 14.7 94.1Nine Persons 1 1.5 95.6Ten Persons 1 1.5 97.1Eleven Persons 2 2.9 100.0Total 68 100.0Mean: 4.69 Median: 4.00 Source: Author’s Survey in Harnadan’s Rural Areas1426.2.2 LiteracyIt was found that out of 289 household members of 6 years of age and over, 179 wereliterate or were going to formal schools (Table 6.15 and see Appendix C, Tables C.5 &C.6 for details). The rate of literacy was 61.94 percent among the rural migrants’households, Compared to the 49.6 percent literacy rate of the rural population ofHamadan Province in 1986 (SCI 1990a, 115), the rural migrants’ households were moreliterate than the average rural households. However, they were less literate than themigrants’ households itself (79.2 percent literate as described in section 6.1.2). Theremaining households lose better educated members while on the whole they are still moreliterate than other households.Table 6. 15: Literacy among Members of Rural Migrants’ HouseholdsDescription Frequency Mean ModeLiterate Members of 6 Yrs. ofAge & More 179 2.63 3Total Members of 6 Yrs. ofAge & More 289 4.25 4Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural AreasTable 6. 16: Distribution of Rural Migrants’ Household-Heads by EducationEducation Frequency Percent Cum. PercentNo Education (Illiterate) 40 58.8 58.8Grade Twoto Grade Five 8 11.8 70.6Grade Six (End ofPrimaiy School) 3 4.4 75.0Grade Eight to Grade Nine* 2 2.9 77.9Grade Twelve (End qfHigh School) 1 1.5 79.4First/Second Year ofAdult School 3 4.4 83.8Old Traditional School Education 11 16.2 100.0Total 68 100.0* No cases were observed for Grade Seven, Grade Ten, and Grade Eleven Categories.Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural AreasWith respect to the head of rural migrants’ households, 58.8 percent of them were illiterateand only 4.5 percent had attended high school (Table 6.16). The small portion of those143who have attended adult schools, as in the case of out-migrants, indicates that post-revolutionary efforts for literacy have failed to broadly address rural illiterates.6.2.3 Occupation of Head of HouseholdsThe occupation of head of households is overwhelmingly that of farmer (Table 6.17).Adding half of the number of shop owner/farmer and housekeeper/farmer categories, theshare of farmers rises to 70 percent. The same Provincial figure stood at 57.7 percent in1986 (Sarrafi et al. 1991, 70). Thus, rural migrants households rely more than theaverage rural households do on the agricultural jobs.Table 6. 17: Distribution of Rural Migrants’ Household-Heads by OccupationOccupational/Ability Category Frequency PercentageFarmer/Land Owner 43 63.2Housekeeper/Land Owner 4 5.9carpet Weaver/Land Owner 1 1.5Driver/Self-Employed 3 4.4Disabled/Land Owner 2 2.9Aged/Land Owner 2 2.9Shop Owner/Farmer 5 7.4Shop Owner/Vendor 6 8.8Artisan (Self-Employed) 1 1.5Public Employee 1 1.5Total 68 100.0Source: Authors Survey in Hamadan’s Rural AreasOf special importance from the social welfare viewpoint is the existence of 5.8 percentaged or disabled heads of household. Obviously, the number of aged or disabled personsis quite higher among the other members of households which has not been recorded. Theextended family is the common shelter for these persons in rural areas. However, when144the head of household rests in this category, it implies a desperate situation for the wholehousehold who mainly rely on the head.’64The distribution of the occupational categories of the household-heads by theireducational achievements shows that, both in absolute and relative terms, there are moreilliterate among the farmer-headed households than among the others (27 persons or 62.8percent of the farmer/land owner category in Table C.7 of Appendix C).6.2.4 Land and Livestock OwnershipOn average, the sample rural migrants’ households, excluding those who have no landownership in each category, have 2.2 and 20.2 hectares irrigated and rain-fed arable landrespectively, and 0.44 hectare of Orchard (Table 6.18 and see Appendix C, Tables C.8,C.9 & C. 10 for details). In the rural areas of the Hamadan Province, the averages forproducers of each category are 2.9, 7.9, and 0.19 hectares, respectively (Ebn-e-Ali 1992,207). Thus, our sample farmers own some less irrigated land and more of otheragricultural lands.’65 This indicates that the majority of the migrants’ households fall intothe middle and the upper-middle stratum of land owners.166In terms of livestock ownership, it was found that near two third of the sample householdshad on average 2.1 heads of cow and less than half had an average of 23 heads of sheepand goats (see Appendix D). The rest of the households in each category had no livestockat all. The inclusion of livestock breeding with cultivation was an important source of164 The almost non-existence of social supports (e.g., welfare/retirement payments) in the rural areas ofHamadan Province, creates a stark disparity with the urban areas where some kind of social supports maybe reached. As will be pointed out in the next chapters, this disparity is a major cause of out-migration.165 On the basis of my knowledge of the Province’s rural areas, I believe that the sum of the samplevillages’ irrigated lands are Less than the commensurate provincial average. Therefore, theaforementioned lesser possession of irrigated lands may be ignored.166 This seems to be true, especially considering the predominance of small holdings and a fairly nonpolarized land distribution in the Province.145income for the pertinent rural owners. In general, these units of production were small,using traditional methods for a semi-subsistence/semi-commercial production. There is noaccurate provincial statistics to compare the livestock ownership of the sample householdswith the rest of the province.Table 6.18: Average Land Ownership among the Sample Households byAgricultural TypeType of Agriculture No. of Owners Total Area (Hec.) Average OwnershipRain-FedLand 28 567 20.25 Hec.Irrigated Land 50 111.2 2.22 Hec.Orchard 62 27.3 0.44 Hec.Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural Areas6.2.5 Sources of Income95.6 percent of respondents have stated selling surplus agricultural products as the mostimportant source of household income.’67 Selling surplus husbandry products (e.g.,dairy, sheep) is the first source for 2.9 percent and the second most important source ofincome for 48.5 percent of households. The next important sources of income, andusually supplementary ones, are wage labour activities, shopkeeping/vending, andmigrants remittances (Appendix C, Table C. 15). In general, the heavy reliance of ruralmigrants’ households on the sale of agricultural and husbandry products is observed.6.2.6 Remittances and Spending PatternsAccording to the interviewees, 60.3 percent of the rural out-migrants of the five samplevillages do not send money home (Table 6.19). For the remaining 39.7 percent, however,the remittances were spoken of as being crucial. As various studies in the South countries167 The staple food products in Iran are wheat and then rice. The predominant production pattern inHamadan Province is one of wheat and barley. The common exercise of rural households is to set asidetheir yearly consumption at first and then to sell the rest mainly to the governmental organization which isthe only formal buyer (i.e., monopsony).146suggest, there is an obvious need to take into account the out-flow of capital (e.g., forstudents) to ascertain the net income transfer (Standing I 984b). This was not available forthe sample villages.Table 6.19: Distribution of Sample Households by Recipient/Non-Recipientof RemittanceReceiving Remittance Frequency PercentageNo 41 60.3Yes 27 39.7Total : 68 100.0Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural AreasDespite the complexity of household budgets for ascertaining the allocations, theresponses to the remittance spending prove that the major part has been spent onpurchasing everyday household needs, and only next, for agricultural production(Appendix C, Table C.16). It may be postulated that ‘the spending of remittances reflectsthe poverty and lack of investment opportunities from which the migrant came” (Connel etal. 1976). In the field, not much evidence of spending for conspicuous consumption wasobserved.6.2.7 Migration IntentionAs part of probing the would-be migrants’ characteristics, the intention to migrate in thenear future was probed both for the respondent and the whole household. Table 6.20shows that the majority have no short-term plan for migration. The number of thoseindividuals who want to migrate is greater than that for whole households, which isconsistent with our previous observation about the pattern of rural out-migrants (section6. 1. 6). 168168 As mentioned before, part of the did not express categoiy can be considered as intends to migrate forrespondents. This is so because of the unwillingness of individuals to directly express their risky and notappreciated decisions (in the eyes of co-villagers).147Table 6.20: Rural Migrants’ Household and Respondents’ Migration IntentionMigration Intention Respondent (Individually) Household (Collectively)Frequency Percentage Frequency PercentageNo intention 42 61.8 49 72.1Intends to migrate 20 29.4 17 25.0Did not express/Missing 6 8.8 2 2.9Total 68 100.0 68 100.0Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural AreasCross-tabulation of respondents’ relationship to the household-heads with their migrationintention reveals that 75 percent of the heads of remaining households do not want tomigrate. Inversely, almost the same ratio among his/her children want to migrate from thevillage (see Appendix C, Table C. 11).Moreover, crossing the occupation of heads of households with whole households’intentions indicate that 81.4 percent of farmers (i.e., 35 out of 43 persons) do not want tomigrate while the majority of self-employed people in the service sector want to migrate(Appendix C, Table C.12). This leads us to tentatively conclude that the place-relatedcapital (e.g., land) are a hindrance to movement of owners, whereas better opportunitiesfor businesspersons in the urban areas and the higher degree of capital mobility in theservice sector make the private service prone to migration.6.2.8 Housing and Economic StatusTo peruse the original socio-economic status of rural out-migrants, the housing qualityand the income level of remaining households at the villages were investigated. The qualityof households’ houses were observed and classified loosely into three general classes (i.e.,148poor, average, and good) by the interviewers themselves.’69 The housing quality of ruralmigrants’ households is reported as follows:- Poor quality: 10.3 percent (7 cases)- Average quality: 51.5 percent (35 cases)- Good quality: 38.2 percent (26 cases)In addition, the number of rooms utilized by the household, were asked about and it wasfound that on average 3.1 rooms are available (see Appendix C, Table C. 13 for details).Owing to the average size of the sample households (i.e., 4.69), this means that there are1.5 persons per room, which is less than the provincial average of 2.2 (Arjomandnia1991). This fortifies the above findings that generally the remaining households’ housesare located in the upper half of rural standards.Because of the confidentiality of household income in a somewhat close rural community(the so-called threatening question), respondents were reluctant to provide income-relatedinformation. As acknowledged in other Iranian studies, it is not reliable to obtainresponses as regard to amount of income, though it could be inferred from the amount ofland ownership and other sources of income, as well as from the quantity and the qualityof the household labour force. This was the case for assessing the approximate incomelevel of the sample households. Therefore, the interviewers themselves chose one of thethree broad categories (i.e., low-, middle-, and upper- income level) and it was checkedwith other data by the principal researcher. The ensuing results were found:- Lower-income: 25.0 percent (17 cases)- Middle-income: 39.7 percent (27 cases)- High-Income: 35.3 percent (24 cases)169 Ahead of fieldwork in each sample village, the interviewers were instructed by the author on how toselect the class of each house. The rule of thumb was to typify the house appearance (constructionalmaterials, design and size) in each class according to common sense and the local standards.149Again, like the housing situation, it implies that generally the remaining households’income levels are slightly above the village average. This was implied also by thehouseholds’ ownership of certain house-wares (see Appendix C, Table C. 14 for details).6.2.9 SummaryOn the basis of the foregoing analysis, the characteristics of typical rural migrants’households in the sample villages are summarized as follows:• The majority of households have two to four out-migrants.• Average size of households are 4.7 persons with slightly more female members,contrary to the general rural situation in the Province with more male members.• One third of the remaining households has two male members, another third has morethan two male members, and the remaining third has one or none (Appendix C, TableC.4).• The remaining households are better-educated than the rest of rural households inHarnadan Province, even though they have lost their own better-educated members.• The sample household-heads were mostly illiterate and farmers.• On average, the farmer-headed sample households own slightly less irrigated land andquite more rain-fed land and orchards than do corresponding households in theProvince.• The main source of sample households’ income was the sale of surplus agriculturalproducts. Other important ones were migrants’ remittances, shopkeeping, and wagedlabouring.• Only two fifths of out-migrants remit; nonetheless, remittance is crucial for receivinghouseholds. A major part of these remittances is spent on purchasing everyday needsand some on agricultural production by the households.• The majority of respondents in the sample villages, being household-heads andfarmers, do not want to migrate in the near future, neither individually and nor with the150household. However, adult children of these households and non-farmer headedhouseholds are more prone to migration.• Considering the socio-economic status of rural migrants’ households, It appears thatthe upper half of the spectrum (according to their pertinent village standards) are morepresent than the lower half.6.3 Stated Causes of MigrationAs discussed in Chapter V, investigating the cause of migration is more complex thansimply asking migrants for the cause. Owing the research objective, the perceptions ofrespondents from remaining households were used as proxy for the statement of migrationcause by migrated members. During the survey, interviewers strove to make respondentsunderstand that they should convey the causes according to the out-migrant’s perception.Nevertheless, unavoidably, these responses should be considered as mixed with therespondents’ own perceptions as well.In addition, two more questioned were pursued. Those respondents who intended toleave the village were questioned as to their reasons. Those rural households who alsointended to migrate, were also asked to state their reasons. After listing the causes, for allthree questions, the respondents were asked once more to prioritize their reasons.Therefore, sets of first, second, third, and all of the causes were generated.Being asked “why did your household member(s) migrate?”, rural respondents have statedan array of causes. The interviewers were instructed to ask this simple and open question.There were a detailed list of probable causes to be marked, as well as enough space towrite the non-fitted answers in the questionnaire. The latter were categorized by theprincipal researcher later.151However, for an effective analysis of varied causes, it is found that the followingcategorization is comprehensive for comprehending the driving causes of out-migration:Type 1- Survival: This includes stated causes such as unemployment, underemploymentand insufficient income, which indicate a desperate decision to leave the village foradequate income and job.Type 2- Promotion: Seeking a higher-paying job, expanding a business and employmenttransfer are motivations for migrants in this category. This shows an act ofpreference on the basis of perceived better opportunities somewhere else (i.e., inurban areas).Type 3- Education: Continuing education for oneself or one’s children which shows theabsence of higher levels of educational institutions in the village and/or aspiring abetter quality of such services.Type 4- Enhancement: Pursuing better quality of services, social welfare arrangementsand an urban life-style which implies the desire for life enhancement and securelivelihood. This cause is beyond a simple economic cause as in Type 1.Type 5- Resentment: Inter-/intra village skirmishes or household disputes which show aresentment toward the village milieu or household authority as the motive tomigration.Type 6- Subordination: Marriage and joining/accompanying the family which indicate asubordinate decision-making and in most cases a compelling one to move. Thiscause should not be considered as the primary motivation for migration, and isstimulated by the head of household’s decision.The foregoing categorization was based on identifying the root causes as to:• whether the migrant had a job or not in the originating community (promotion &enhancement vs. survival). This differentiation is important to substantiate if outmigration was excessive and detrimental to the village viability or not.152• whether migration was motivated by mostly personal economic reasons vs. noneconomic ones (survival & promotion vs. enhancement & resentment). Here thepotential of infrastructure roles is examined as was mentioned in section 4.5.1.• whether migration was initiated by the migrant or not (all types vs. subordination).This distinction demonstrates the weight of dependent migrants for householdmigrations.Besides, essentially the first, third and fifth types (i.e., survival, education, and resentment)reveal the dominance ofpush factors in the village (equal to subsistence motivation posedin section 4.4), while the second and fourth (i.e., promotion and enhancement) can berelated to pull factors of the cities (similar to enhancement motivation mentioned insection 4.4). The sixth type cannot be interpreted in such distinction as push or pull and itdepends on the principal migrants’ causes.’7°6.3.1 Stated,Perceived Causes for Out-MigrantsTable 6.21 provides the results of the above-mentioned questions. The significance ofmarriage and accompanying the household (i.e., type six: subordination) are evident inmigration decisions. However, setting aside both the under six years of age and the femalemigrants (for whom type six has often been stated as the predominant cause of migration)the predominant cause remains only an economic one (i.e., type one and type two) with42.1 percent of all the paramount causes and 41.9 percent of all the three main causes.’71Nonetheless, educational cause (14 percent) comprises a notable force, particularly in170 It bears repeating that the push and pull distinction is not a clear cut distinction and not mutuallyexclusive. However, it is useful for identii’ing the chief cause of rural migration as being internal orexternal (also see footnote 122).171 As will be discussed later, it should be mentioned that ascribing the causes to economic motivation isnot mutually exclusive. There is no doubt that the expectations of migration are higher than those of mereeconomic gains. They have to do with security, hope, preference, and human dignity. Economicmotivation is undeniably a major cause of migration but not the exclusive or necessarily the decisive one.153driving out the rural youths. The family disputes or village skirmishes were notunderscored as an important cause, barring two cases.’72Table 6.21: Distribution of Rural Out-Migrants’ Causes of MigrationTypical Cause of Migration Paramount Cause Three Main CausesFrequency Valid Percent Frequency Valid PercentType One: Survival 66 29.9 87 26.6Type Two: Promotion 27 12.2 50 15.3Type Three: Education 31 14.0 46 14.1Type Four: Enhancement 3 1.4 48 14.7Type Five: Resentment 2 0.9 2 0.6Type Six: Subordination 92 41.6 94 28.7Missing 17 --- 387*Total: 238 100.0 714 100.0* The majority of respondents did not state the second and third overriding causes of out-migration.Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural AreasAs expected, the frequency of stated causes of migration in relation to the quality of life(type four and to some extent type two), dramatically increases in the “three main causes”category as compared to their weight in the “paramount cause” category. In theaggregate, as shown in Table 6.21, the push related causes (sum of type one, three, andfive) with 44.8 percent and 41.3 percent, are greater than the pull related causes (sum oftype two and four) with 26.2 percent and 30.0 percent. This summation should be cross-checked with the key-informants’ data in Ch.VII.Cross-tabulating the typical causes of migration by occupation of the male out-migrants(see Appendix C, Table C. 17) shows that 70.7 percent of previously family workers haveleft the village for type one cause (i.e., survival), and the rest for type two cause (i.e.,promotion). Moreover, of those male out-migrants who used to be students at the village,172 This might be understated because of reluctance on the rural household side to admit the domesticproblem for an out-sider (i.e., interviewer). However, on the basis of our field observation and the keyinformants’ interviews, type five cause of migration is not rampant in the sample villages.15443.9 percent have left for survival, 36.4 percent for education, and 18.2 percent forpromotion and enhancement. Thus, unemployment and meager income (the overridingforce for survival cause) are the main repulsive forces for male family workers.This is also true for the male students, and is augmented by the lack of higher-ordereducational facilities at home, for those who would like to continue their education. Theeducational migration mostly takes place after finishing primary school or, to a lesserextent, after the end of junior high-school for both males and females (see Appendix C,Tables C. 19 & C.20). It is seen that the survival cause is relatively higher for those maleout-migrants with less education than others. 173Cross-tabulation for female out-migrants reinforces the preponderance of the type sixcause (i.e., subordination). This includes 98.4 percent of previous homemakers, 93.3percent of previous carpet weavers, 73.7 percent of previous students and all the previouspublic employees (see Appendix C, Table C.18). Subordination remains the chief cause ofout-migration for rural females irrespective of their level of education (see Appendix C,Tables C.19 & C.20).Once more, it was found that for the male rural out-migrants of sample households, beingoverwhelmingly the sons of the remaining household heads174 (see Appendix C, TableC.21), the typical first causes were: survival (52.5 percent), promotion (22.5 percent), andcontinuing education (20.8 percent). The same first cause for females, beingoverwhelmingly the daughters of the remaining household heads were again subordination173 Not that a causal relation can necessarily be elicited from this, as the higher the education, the higherthe aspirations. There could be a root-cause of the previous socio-economic status of the household in therural community. In other words, it may be said that higher status leads to higher education which in turnleads to higher aspirations. Therefore, the education factor may be an intervening variable.174 Interesting to know that no son-in-low has been stated as a member of an extended family (see TablesC. 19 & C.20). Actually, it is not common for sons-in-law to live with the wife’s family in rural Iran.155and to a lesser extent continuing education. Considering the second and third causes ofout-migration (see Appendix C, Table C.22), enhancement comes up as a major cause forboth sons and daughters of the remaining household heads.6.3.2 Stated Causes for Would-be Individual and Household MigrantsThe rural respondents were asked if they individually intend to migrate in the near future,and also, they were questioned about the migration intention of their entire household.The stated paramount and second causes of migration intention have been presented inTable 6.22 (for the rural respondents) and Table 6.23 (for the sample households).Whether those who intend to migrate will in fact do it or not, “the expression of intentionsreveals the normative acceptance of migration as a reasonable option” (Lee 1985, xviii).This provides insights into the potential roles of infrastructure in our later discussion.Table 6.22: Distribution of Rural Respondents’ Causes of Migration IntentionTypical Cause of Migration* Paramount Cause Second CauseFrequency Valid Percent Frequency Valid PercentType One: Survival 4 6.5 2 3.2Type Two: Promotion 9 14.5 3 4.8Type Three: Education 0 0.0 1 1.6Type Four: Enhancement 7 11.3 8 12.9Type Five: Resentment 0 0.0 3 4.8Type Six: Subordination 0 0.0 3 4.8No Migration Intention 42 67.7 42 67.7Missing/Not Stated 6 --- 6Total: 68 100.0 68 100.0* For description of each type see section 6.3 of text.Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural AreasAccording to the rural respondents, the paramount cause of their tendency to migrate istype two (promotion), type four (enhancement), and then type one (survival). As thesecond cause, type four (enhancement) comes first. In the aggregate, enhancement and156promotion (with 27 out of 40 or 67.5 percent of the stated causes of those individuals whointend to migrate) cause the most incentive to leave the village.From the household point of view, the paramount cause of migration is foremost type six(subordination) and then equally type one (survival), two (promotion), three (education),and four (enhancement). Like the respondents’ case, as the second causes of migrationintention, type four (enhancement) and type two (promotion) have been stated mostfrequently. In the aggregate, enhancement and promotion, similar to the respondents’case, cause the most incentive to leave the village (with 20 out of 34 or 59 percent of thestated causes of those households who intend to migrate). The following scrutiny of thesurvey data with the help of cross-tabulation provides more details on the stated causes.Table 6.23: Distribution of Sample Households Causes of Migration IntentionTypical Cause of Migration* Paramount Cause Second CauseFrequency Valid Percent Frequency Valid PercentType One: Survival 3 4.6 1 1.5Type Two: Promotion 3 4.6 4 6.2Type Three: Education 3 4.6 1 1.5Type Four: Enhancement 3 4.6 10 15.4Type Five: Resentment 0 0.0 0 0.0Type Six: Subordination 5 7.7 1 1.5No Migration Intention 48 73.8 48 73.8Missing/Not Stated 3 --- 3Total: 68 100.0 68 100.0* For description of each type see section 6.3 of text.Source: Author’s Survey in Hamadan’s Rural AreasThe migration intention of most household heads and their children is caused by types twoand four (promotion and enhancement appeals- see Appendix C, Table C.23). The samechief causes are observed for the sample agricultural households’75,though education‘ Those households whose heads work in the agricultural sector.157(type three) is also added (see Appendix C, Tables C.24 & C.25). Regarding thehouseholds whose heads are engaged in self-employed service occupations (e.g., artisan,shop-owner, driver), again, promotion and enhancement causes are primary.’76In conjunction with literacy, the survey data reinforce enhancement and promotion causesfor the greatest number of literate respondents (see Appendix C, Tables C.26 & C.27).While the corresponding data for sample households who intend to migrate reveal that inaddition to enhancement cause, education and promotion causes are significant, forilliterate sample respondents who intend to migrate, survival and enhancement are maj orcauses.The preceding cross-tabulation of stated causes of migration intention and householdcharacteristics further supports the importance of the aforementioned enhancement andpromotion causes in general. This in turn, contrary to the out-migrants’ causes ofmigration (refer to section 6.3), implies the dominance of pull factors for the migration-prone households of the sample villages.6.4 ConclusionThe data presented in this chapter have shown that better-educated children of agriculturalhouseholds (mostly sons) have left the village mainly for survival and promotion types ofcauses toward the urban areas. The dominant cause for female migrants (mostlydaughters) is subordination type. The continuation of education, particularly, is animportant cause for youths after finishing primary school. The out-migrants usually176 Type six cause of migration intention (subordination) is often a significant cause when the householdmigration cause is asked. However, it is not a generic cause of migration and should be regarded as aconsequence of other causes (which usually are found in household heads’ responses). Thus, I do notemphasize type six cause in this summary.158maintain their contact with home, while a minority assist their original rural households interms of financial aid and physical labour.The survey reveals that the sample households with migrant members are of a smaller sizethan the other rural households, and also have more educated members. The majority ofthese rural migrants’ households own proportionally more agricultural lands and are oftenconsidered to be among the upper half, in terms of socio-economic status. 177 In general,it seems the principal farmers (often the head of household) have not abandoned their land,according to these findings.’78 In approximately two thirds of rural households, therehave remained one or more sons. Logically, in wake of youth flight, village viabilitylargely depends on the rural ability to retain the last remaining sons.On probing the migration intention of the rural migrants’ households, it was found that themajority of them do not want to migrate. However, the young adult educated children arequite prone to leave the village. The tendency to out-migration is higher among nonagricultural sample households. Generally, the so-called pull factors seem to be moreeffective on the would-be out-migrants than the push ones. Inversely, the push factorswere reported greater for most of the already rural out-migrants.In view of the foregoing observations, the major conclusion of this chapter with respect topotential rural migrants is as follows:17 It bears recalling that uprooted migrant households (wholly absent in the village) were not covered inthis survey. It can be postulated that the poor and landless households mainly left the villages after theShah’s land reform, when there were lots of menial work opportunities in the large cities (refer to section3.3).178 Once again, the result could have been different if the uprooted migrant households had been takeninto account. Albeit, one study of the impact of migration on cultivated land use has suggested that thefarmlands of migrant households are cultivated either by their rural relatives (share-cropping) or byinformal purchasers (Farrokhian et al. 1977, 88).159• the typical illiterate would-be rural migrant is seeking a job and trying to make lifesecure (tantamount to survival and enhancement causes) by moving to the city.• the typical literate would-be rural migrant is pursuing a better job and a higher qualityof life (tantamount to promotion and enhancement causes) by going to the city.All-in-all, they come to cities to secure life, though with different aspirations.160CHAPTER VII:GROUP INTERVIEWStFINDINGS1617.0 IntroductionThis chapter, unlike the preceding one, relies on qualitative data and employs groupinterviews with key-informants in the rural communities to cross-check the foregoingconclusions and to gain further insights into the out-migration mechanism and context, andinto its impact on the originating villages. Following this, in order to find remedies to theincessant migration of rural youths, the participants’ views as to rural development and theinfrastructural services are sought.Starting with field observation and a survey in the five sample villages of HamadanProvince, I identified some key questions at the community level. Indeed, survey methodhas weaknesses in examining intricate patterns of social interaction (Marshal & Rossman1989, 85). As discussed earlier, in-depth interviewing as a qualitative data collectiontechnique was selected in order to acquire the answers to context-related questions.However, due to interviewing scope and pitfalls (e.g., data distortion and personal biasesof interviewees or interviewers- Yin 1989, 89), the supplemental data collection by surveyand existing data at the other levels was still found to be essential.’79 In short, the use ofthe group interview is not meant to replace individual interviewing, but to provide anotherlevel of data gathering and a perspective not available through individual interviews(Fontana & Frey 1994, 364).In order to respect how the participants (i.e., interviewees) frame and structure theresponses, and at the same time not losing sight of the research focus, a semi-structured179 Interviewing is based on: “...an assumption fundamental to qualitative research - the participant’sperspective on the social phenomenon of interest should unfold as the participant views it, not as theresearcher views it”(Marshal & Rossman 1989, 82). According to Fontana and Frey, “recently,postmodernist etknographers have concerned themselves with some of the assumptions and moralproblems present in interviewing and with the controlling role of the interviewer. These concerns haveled to new directions in qualitative interviewing, focusing on increased attention to the voices and feelingsof the respondents and the interviewer-respondent relation.” (Fontana & Frey 1994, 363)162format was used. Semi-structured group interviewing refers to a situation in which aninterviewer asks the respondents a series of open-ended questions and participates infollow-up questions and clarification discussions. The interviewer somewhat directs andmoderates the discussion among the participants, trying to create an authenticcommunication environment and minimizing the misinterpretation due to culturaldifferences, observers’ effects, etc. (Marshal & Rossman 1989, 104).The following text summarizes the responses to a list of questions at five full-sessiongroup interviews in the sample villages (see: Appendix B, for the list of questions andparticipants, and Appendix E, for an abridged record of interviews).7.1 On the Village Out-Migrants:’8°Two categories of out-migrants were discussed with the key-informants from the samplevillages: first, those households who have wholly migrated from the village and second,those villagers who individually have migrated and left their households behind.Regarding the wholly migrated families, it was said that the majority of them (except inSe-miran where it was the minority) had transferred their lands to other villagers.’8’Some of them (majority in Se-miran) have kept their land and are supervising thelabourers’ works by periodic visits in the work season (particularly in the case ofvineyards/orchards) or taking advantage of share-cropping with some rural peasants. It israre for the wholly migrated families to abandon their lands, except those of very poorquality (e.g., in terms of available water, soil, steepness).The inquiry about the characteristics of rural out-migrants at this level was quite general and couldnot be as precise as our survey results. However, the general pattern, perceived by the respondents, assistsin our generalization of the survey data. Some new data about wholly migrated households are alsocomplementary.181 The buying and selling of agricultural lands in Iran is prohibited by law. However, quite often thelands are informally transferred [bought and sold] with mutual agreements. A unique survey of theconsequences of landholders’ migration in the Hainadan rural areas before the Revolution demonstratedcases of this kind of transfer with almost no cases of abandonment of lands (Farrokhian et al. 1977, 59).163The economic status of wholly migrated households (Boneh-kan) were perceived by themajority of interviews’ participants as being mainly among the two tails of the wealthdistribution spectrum (i.e., poor/landless and richllandlord strata).’82 However, thepoor/landless households outnumbers the others in migration streams. Also, it wasmentioned that there were instances in which only the head of household had migrated.The economic status of this group was described as being that of landless or very smalllandholders. The remaining members are usually living in their extended families and arevisited frequently by the out-migrant head. The ultimate objective of this group isoverwhelmingly to permanently settle the whole household in the city.For individual out-migrants, the situation is different. Many of them, as described by theinterviews’ participants, are offspring of small- or medium-size landowner families.Unanimously, it was accepted that single young, educated male children are mostsusceptible to city-ward migration.’83 Traditionally, they will inherit part of their familylands. The divided land, though, is often inadequate for survival of remaining children(i.e., multiplication of users due to formation of new families vs. fractionated land). Thisgroup of migrants, which consists in bulk of decisive out-migrants in our survey (ChapterIV.), may not be considered as poor/landless. In certain times, they benefit from theiroriginal household resources (e.g., during studying, wedding, and unemployment) andhave the prospect of cashing their share of land in the village. Hence, their originaleconomic status is often middle-class in the rural scale.’84182 This finding is consistent with the extensive studies on the South Asia (Connell et al 1976; Oberai &Singh 1980).In fact, the prevailing pattern is that an unmarried male Leaves the village (in many cases afterfinishing the compulsory military service) and comes back to the community later to marry a village girl(i.e., arranged marriage) and eventually, when getting established, takes his wife to the city. In theprevalent Islamic tradition, single females rarely may migrate by themselves.184 This finding is at odds with Connell et al.s generalization about migrant backgrounds in the Southrural areas (Connell et al. 1976).164Gradual out-migration streams have been going on for decades in all the sample villages.The key-informants of four villages (excluding Jarban-lou) indicated that there was asudden out-migration intensity during the first or the second year after the establishmentof the Islamic Republic (due to rising expectation), but that it was reduced to the samechronic occurrence as before.’85The common description by interviewees about other aspects of out-migration patternswere as follows:• Rural-to-rural migration is very small (even the exchange of brides is notcommon).’86• Destination of out-migrants is mostly Tehran and then, the township center (Markaze-Shahrestan).• A few villagers (from remaining Khosh-neshins and/or very small landholders)seasonally out-migrate (increased in high-yielding and well-accessed villages, i.e.,Mian-roudan and Maanizan in our samples).• Seasonal migrants go to national poles of constructional works (e.g., Tehran,Isfehan, Arak) and to the warm climate ports (i.e., Bandar Abbas, Boushehr,Abadan).• Return migration is non-existent.185 The national census data of 1986 indicate the climax of in-migration to the urban areas circa 1980for the whole country (SCI 1993a, 11) and Hamadan Province as well (SCI 1992b, 11). The contractingurban economy in the following year reduced the influx.186 However, following the discussions I found out that there were some temporary rural in-migrants forcontractual labour during the harvest season.165As might be already noted, that information which has been pursued for out-migrantscharacteristics and out-migration patterns in our survey (Section 6.1.6) is notcontradictory to the pertinent information in this section.7.2 On the Causes of Out-Migration:The overwhelming first response to the question of the cause of out-migration in all thegroup interviews was lack of job and/or insufficient income for the out-migrants (i.e., thesurvival type of causes in section 6.3) who were largely rural youths (refer to Appendix E,for summary of views). The general logic implied the population pressure on agriculturalresources (water and land) and dwindling share of the next generation of farmers as themost effective cause for the young generation of small and medium land-holdinghouseholds.Upon scrutinizing the responses, it is evident that the disguised unemployment is also quiteimportant. This is so because of two issues: first, the intermittent and precarious nature ofagriculture, being mostly a seasonal activity and depending on appropriate weather (somevillagers spoke of the long winters, or slack season, of agriculture, and of the frustrationof being idle at home for up to eight months-a-year in some areas); second, the reductionof the per-capita work load of the labour force. In other words, since the prevalent unit ofrural production in Hamadan Province is the household (like family-run farm), there isalways the possibility of a new division of labour among the members. A new workingmember of the household can be added, while the marginal productivity may be quitesmaller than the additional needs and the result is impoverishment (i.e., smaller piece of piefor the members) and underemployment (i.e., more free-time for the working force).Thus, many villagers tend to complain about insufficient income rather than a lack ofjobs.In their view, they can share one of the household responsibilities which is somehow a166part-time job but without enough reward (insufficient income). Here we note that thespreading mechanization also reduces the work load of the household labour force.Those rural out-migrants who come from a non-agricultural or landless households, inaddition to those who are from land-owner households (whether with sufficient land ornot) but are not willing to continue at an agricultural job, all out-migrate for other causes,as was explained by the participants regarding various issues.One of the issues cutting across the interviews was schooling and the educational systemfor encouragement of out-migration. As a good example of causal sequence in ourdialogue with the participants, and the inter-connectivity of causes, I summarize the viewsbelow.According to a Se-miran councilor, even the aspiration of junior high school students inhis village cannot be fulfilled by present agricultural work, which is perceived as menialwork. At the same time, the prospects for getting non-agricultural jobs in rural areas arequite limited. Thus, the majority of students flock to the cities. Despite the fact that theschool textbooks were wholly revised after the Revolution to remove “Westernlurbanvalues”, two rural teachers in our interviews in Hassan-taimur and Jarban-lou attributedthe above mentality to the content of textbooks (i.e., biased in favor of urbanization).However, most of the other village key-informants agreed that children’s schooling is adistraction from agricultural work. Rural children as early as seven years old are involvedin domestic and agricultural family work in these villages (Aghajanian 1988, 95). Amongthis work, sheep-herding for boys (Mir-Hosseini 1987, 460), carpet weaving for girls, andbringing fresh water for both, were observed as being most helpful to household work.Gradually, as the children grow up (especially in the case of boys) they get involved in167cultivation hardship. The skills of traditional agriculture in Hamadan Province, as in otherparts of Iran are learned through supervised and continuous practice, a kind of master-apprenticeship relationship within the household unit of production. Attending the formaleducation detracts from the learning process of the young villager by interrupting regularwork along with the household long-time farmer(s) and by not offering alternativeagricultural knowledge and experience. Consequently, according to the old farmer inMaanizan, the rural children are raised ‘without callous hands” (i.e., unable to toleratebackbreaking work) and “without loving soil” (i.e., with no sense of affinity to the farm -see: Appendix E).From a different angle, another participant from Se-miran, a community activist,suggested that the logic is vise-versa. He elaborated: “Education is instrumental foryouths to get rid of village. It is a bridge to promotion in cities.” Indeed, he connotedthat the blame should not be placed on the education, but on the village stagnation. Hewent on to warn that the village cannot compromise on education if it has to bedeveloped.’87 The challenge, as the Jarban-lou teacher put it, is to expand the educationwhile being able to attract the necessary educated labour force in rural areas: “Why notbeing able to have educated and prosperous farmers?”When I raised a question about the future of village agriculture in the wake of youthexodus, the rural teacher in Jarban-lou sarcastically answered: “Don’t worry, there arealways many lazy pupils who fail to continue their education even at the primary level.Given the increasing unemployment in the cities, most of them are doomed to work on theland for their daily bread.” In Hassan-taimur, somewhat the same response wasencountered. A young villager stated that he and some of his friends have no option other187 Interestingly, these farmers are often illiterate but they do recognize the value of education; eventhough, the life becomes harder for them, when sending their children to school.168than that of staying in the village. Educational failure (in some cases by voluntary dropout due to poverty), the harsh, discriminating and dwindling urban jobs for unskilledworkers, as well as family obligations and social bonds were given as the reasons for theirstaying in the village. The idea that “stupid people remain in the village” was repeatedmany times in different discussions.188Another issue that was brought out at a different stage of interviews was uncertainty aboutagricultural works and about farmers’ futures. Farmers underscored the calamities theywere facing in their work (particularly: draught, flood, crop infestation, and reduction incrops prices) and the uncertainty associated with these for one’s whole life. As an oldfarmer in Jarban-lou complained: “You never know if you can survive another year ornot. Looking back, if everything goes fine, one can only survive. Otherwise, like many,have to leave the village after one or two years of crop failure.” Living with such anxietyprompts the successful farmer to leave the village as soon as accumulating enough moneyfor a new start in the city and as long as having the ability to do so.Regarding the farmer’s future, strong concerns were raised about the lack of old-agepensions and social welfare in the villages. The disabled villagers (i.e., too old to work,disabled, or retarded) have almost no support, unless their children provide support forthem. Access to social welfare in the cities is remarkably better than in the rural areas. Afar-sighted villager takes this into account when considering migration and even considerssome present losses in return for future gains (i.e., the enhancement type of causes).In Maanizan a middle-aged councilor described another limitation of rural life causing theout-migration of well-to-do villagers. He elucidated that the rural economy has a limited188 One of the most famous poets in Persian literature, Mo’iavi, has a well-known poem exhorting: “Donot go to the village. Village makes the man idiot.” (verbatim translation)169capacity of growth for each business. Having a contracting economy on the basis of semi-subsistence and semi-commercial cropping, the non-farm business of the village cannotexpand itself. Augmenting other cultural barriers, like narrow-minded and parochial viewswith respect to successful business, the local investors (entrepreneurs) prefer to go tocities, if possible. Another councilor in Jarban-lou revealed that it was not sociallyacceptable to be rich while most of the community was striving to meet ends. Thus, thebig capitals and the entrepreneurial individuals tend to leave the almost closed circle of thevillage to the urban anonymity (i.e., the promotion type of cause).In general, there was unspoken agreement regarding the domination of subordinationcause for rural female out-migrants.’89 Also, in all the sample villages, the precedence ofout-migration streams underscored as a facilitating factor, not a generating one. It wasmentioned that exaggerated or exceptionally successful ex-villagers motivated the alreadymigration-prone villagers.’90I asked the village key-informants about their ideas as to how significant are the cities’amenities and urban excitements in the youths’ cause of out-migration (i.e., the brightlights hypothesis). Except for one participant, others strongly rejected the cause.191 Theunanimous approach was that a trade-off was seen between the friendly and congenialmilieu of the home village on one hand, and the better income and job opportunities in thetarget city on the other hand. In their view, the cities’ amenities are not considered in a189 However, in Maanizan (with a higher level of school-girl enrollment comparing to the others) it wassaid that some brides set the condition of migration to the city before getting married.190 The same observation has been made in the south of India (refer to; Singh 1989, 153).191 A rare empirical study on rural out-migration in Garm-sar (a township 120 kilometers to the west ofTehran) indicated the insignificance of bright lights in villagers decisions to migrate (Hamidi et al. 1983,193). Nevertheless, it signifies the presence of basic services (e.g., electricity, potable water, road, publicbath, school) in the villages with less out-migration. The cardinal cause of out-migration was seen to be ashortage of agricultural water (Ibid. 191) which implies that there is population pressure on resources.170mostly survival type of decision-making. For instance, a father of three out-migrants inSe-miran objected to my suggestion by saying: ‘No, it is not the bright lights of city;rather it is the dimness of village which drives the youth.” He later complained of themass media propaganda about “the lure of cities for youths” and pathetically said that ruralplight pushed the youth, not the lure of cities.’92 By the same logic, rural participantstrivialized higher income aspiration and highlighted the search for minimum income andjob (i.e., the survivaltype of cause).’937.3 On the Consequences of Out-Migration:Upon probing the participants’ views regarding the consequences of past out-migration onthe sample villages, the most common response was found the loss of family workers andthe deteriorating home-economy. They explained in detail how agriculture is noteconomical due to its increasing costs and that thus, the farmer cannot substitute a familyworker with the hired one. Given the readiness to hire, the shortage of labour forceduring harvest time was evident for the small villages (i.e., Se-miran, Hassan-taimur,Mian-roudan) where recruitment should have been done from the large villages in theregion. Nevertheless, the villagers accepted that this kind of shortage is seasonal, and isnot a full-time job with which to sustain their out-migrant children. Therefore, it may beconcluded that the farmers are complaining from loosing a source of cheap labour ratherthan from a shortage of labour.192 It is worth noting another related hypothesis on youth migration. During four years of field work inrural areas of the Province and also, while doing this research, I questioned a variety of out-migrants andremnant villagers about different aspects of out-migration. I did not gather that migration as rite depassage was an attitude of rural youth. Probably curious youth experience the city on a short-term staywith an ex-fellow-villager, without needing to migrate.193 Often, in my opinion, it seems the interviewees could not go beyond their concern for their childrenand they overlooked the somewhat varied caused for Boneh-kan and non-agricultural families. That iswhy the promotion type of cause (refer to section 6.3) was not pronounced.171As another adverse impact, the interviewees mentioned the lack of support for the aginghouseholds whose sons have migrated. The loss of daughters was expressed to beimportant due to the income lost from carpet weaving.’94 It was also stated that somewholly migrated families kept their land as a saving for emergency needs and thereforecultivated it without enough interest as collateral income while working in earnest in thecity. This absentee land ownership results in the low-productivity of some valuable lands.The other negative consequence of out-migration, which is vivid in the case of smallvillages, was revealed as the reduction or obstruction of some essential services for thecommunity. The depopulated village looses its scale of economy for some services, andalso its contracting economy hinders its chances of attracting provincial funds for newservices. The concomitant aspect is the demoralization of stayers.In terms of positive consequences, the most important was that population pressure onhousehold lands was reduced and some opportunities were even created for smalllandholders to buy the land of wholly migrated households. The participants did not findrelevant my question about the impact on agricultural technology of rural migranthouseholds and said that there was no difference.’95194 In terms of providing cash, this home-based efficient activity (which especially makes use of thewinter idle time of female farmers), has been a crucial supplementary income to Iranian rural families forcenturies (Keshavarz et al. 1976). Nevertheless, it is not only out-migration, but schooling as well, whichdeprives households of this kind of home craft. It should be mentioned that the exploitation of femalechild labour by carpet weaving factories and sometimes by the families themselves (having the girls workin damp and dim basements all day long and preventing them from going to school) has been one of themost inhumane ways of earning cash by the indigent parents. Ironically, in many cases the justificationused is that this practice is necessary to save money for the daughter’s dowry (Rafi’e-Pour 1985, 227-230).195 This is inconsistent with some findings on the positive impact of out-migration on householdagricultural technology and on innovation diffusion (refer to: Oberai 1987, 60; Barke & O’Hare 1984,201).172Regarding the out-migrants’ remittances, it seemed that there was a social reluctance todiscuss it. When hinted at, the interviewees treated it as a small amount from few senders,nevertheless, considerable for the small number of recipient households.Another positive impact of out-migration in the case of the larger sample villages (i.e.,Maanizan and Jarban-lou) which the villagers take pride in it, is the generous contributionof successful out-migrants for community buildings (e.g., junior high school, mosque,bridge and road).7.4 The Key-Informants’ Approach to the Future Out-Migration:The foremost concern of the majority of key-informants in the case of the continuation ofrural out-migration was the villages’ viability in the future. It was widely believed that thevillages will be stripped of able forces if the present trend endures and rural elders will beleft out without support. Notwithstanding, the old farmers did not hesitate to approve oftheir chidren’s out-migration under the status quo, as the ensuing report explains.The elder villagers in the five interviewing sessions, upon being asked if they want to seetheir children become farmers, all said: “No!” They often insisted on the necessity ofleaving the village in general, and agricultural jobs in particular, to improve life standards.Only two participants of the all interviewees lamented for their family land to be cultivatedin fhture. One of them, a middle-aged councilor in Hassan-taimur, complained about hissons who did not appreciate farming and of whom only one was living with him, due to hisyouth.’96 He regretted that nobody would carry on his forefathers’ job and that his farmwould be dried-up after his death. Immediately, a feeble old man in the meeting196 Almost all the respondents in my interviews, when talking about the out-migration impact and thecontinuation of their job and so on, have their son in mind. Daughters, while inheriting one third of thefamily wealth according to Islamic law, are usually not taken into account for decisive socio-economicroles in the Iranian rural society (refer to: Nik-kholgh 1991; Shashahani 1986).173responded passionately; showing his worn-out clothes, he asked why his sons should stayin their village. “After fifty years of plowing now I have nothing to ensure my old-age.Isn’t it enough to take their fathers’ example? Why should they care for the job when it didnot provide them with a secure livelihood? By farming we sow seeds for one year, godwilling. Yet, by going to the cities they sow seeds for seventy years.” Other participantsbitterly shook heads in agreement.Following the above expressed frustration, I witnessed a conviction among the addresseesthat those who have out-migrated, were better-off than those who have not. Thisrecurrent answer, regardless of the accuracy in generalization, suggests that the remainingvillagers are disenchanted with the official campaign which portrays a healthy picture ofgod-loving and self-contained tillers versus a bleak picture of uprooted migrants in the cityslums.’97 A Mian-roudan elder, in the same vein said: “I am aged and debilitated. If Icould leave, I would not hesitate a minute. I am too old to start a new way of life. But, Iam not so selfish to hold back my children from searching for their fortune in the city.” Inanother meeting, an old-man from Maanizan asserted: “I will sell even my last carpet’98for my children’s education to become a [medical] doctor.”Considering the importance of family obligation in the migration decision, if the elderswillingly approve the move, as I recorded, a major hurdle is certainly removed from themigration path of youth.197 As an example, a wishy-washy poem in the second-grade coursebook for primary students praisesthe rural life and envies the villagers for their clean air and beautiful sceneries compared to the urbanpolluted air and noisy environment. Singling out the environment, the poem ignores the wide gaps in allthe other vital aspects (e.g., life expectancy, educational achievement, income per capita, incidence ofdisease, social welfare coverage).198 A Persian saying means being ready to sell everything one owns for achieving his/her goals.1747.5 On Rural Development and Infrastructural ServicesIn discussing the needs of the villages and the potential solutions for rural development,’99the interviewees’ suggestions essentially revolved around two axes:1. Boosting agricultural activities.2. Expanding non-agricultural activities.Regarding the first axis, the solutions were often for increasing income and to a lesserextent for generating more jobs and upgrading the living standard of farmers. The overallconsensus about the key to coping with the rural predicaments in this regard was, first,provision of agricultural water200 (by simply proposing digging deep wells and/or buildingdams201) and next, supplying inexpensive agricultural inputs (e.g., seed, fertilizer,pesticide, fodder, fuel, credit).202 These were followed by demanding the full involvementof the government for their realization.The second axis of suggestions was concerned with non-farm employment generation.Almost all the rural key-informants expected the government to establish ‘factory” as thethriving element for their respective rural economy. The examples were limited to theirRural development is an all-embracing term. It has been very difficult -if not impossible- toinvestigate its meaning and its implications through our survey and interviews analysis, but this attemptis nevertheless important for contextualiztion and for putting the infrastructure analysis in a properperspective.200 Excluding Mian-roudan where arable lands are the major limiting factor, not the shortage of water.201 The extensive study of water resources in the Hamadan Province revealed that there was notconsiderable new resources to be used as opposed to improving the efficiency of irrigation. It wasestimated that on average the efficiency of irrigation from surface and ground water were 24 percent and32 percent respectively in the whole Province (quoted from water resources study group in: Sarrali et a!.1991, 236). As was expected, the villagers were unaware of these and thus, suggested new resourcesinstead of efficiency. In the same vein, they did not consider the rapid population growth as an importantfactor contributing to the resource scarcity. Their approach was to catch up with the increasing demandas much as possible by exploring new resources not by limiting the demand.202 The dual pricing system (i.e., official prices and black market prices) has crippled agriculturalactivities. When farmers say that there are no spare parts, it usually means that they cannot purchasesomething at official prices through their cooperative stores. Almost every kind of need can be satisfied,but through the exorbitant prices of the black market. The government as the sole purchaser of thesurplus grain of farmers, buys at a price which makes it uneconomical for the farmers to use the blackmarket in-puts.175observation in the other villages. In fact, the rural residents’ solutions were constrained bytheir personal and community experiences and by the disseminated information about theexperiences of other comparable/counter-rural areas.203 I did not witnessed anyentrepreneurial suggestions; there were many ideas about what the government should dofor the rural residents.204In addressing infrastructure issues, the key-informants of four villages (excludingMaanizan which was privileged from the past) acknowledged that compared to the past,more resources have been allocated to their villages and many basic facilities have beenbuilt since the Revolution (see Appendix F, for the villages’ facilities). Notwithstanding, asin Jarban-lou, a young man said: “Nobody will stay for the new facilities (infrastructure)that they have provided us, unless he has adequate income.”When I hinted at the controversy about the road effect on encouraging out-migration (asin the case of school), the participants reciprocally raised counter-examples; for instance acouncilor in Se-miran contended: “Improving the road conditions for the village waspeace of mind for the stayers. In general, it might have increased the out-migration. But,can we survive without it? Before the improvement, there were pregnant women whocould not be taken to the city because of the closed road in winter and many died.”203 For instance, in many villages one hears request for certain kinds of factories (e.g., for production oftomato paste, pasta, dried fruits, canned compote) aithoug it is not known whether or not it is feasible andwhether or not the market has enough capacity. Certainly, the manufacturing sector in the Province, letalone in its rural areas, has not been able to catch up with rapid labour force growth in the last decades(referto: Sarrafietal. 1991, 16&70).204 Some other reiterated needs included: agricultural credits for peasants without ownership documents,crops insurance, social welfare, land consolidation, stabilization of the ownership system, frequentelections for councils, direct marketing of crops by cooperatives, higher quota of rationed goods for therural cooperative stores.176Similarly, another councilor in Hassan-tairnur further offered: “Before road buildingsometimes for twenty days in winter we were besieged by snow. Just imagine if you had asick child, what would you do? Once I took my child nightly in snow by a fellow’s tractorto the city. I was praying all the way and was not sure if my child could resist the freezingcold. God blessed us. He survived. So, do not ask me if a road encourage the migrationor not I know that we cannot live without it.” The point was clear that it was not thefault of having roads (as in the case of schools; they are an indispensable rudiment ofdevelopment) but there were fundamental reasons for out-migration (especially: saturationof agricultural resources and disparities between urban and rural opportunities205)whichprompted the mainly youth rural out-migrants.An important theme regarding the existing infrastructure was that of quality of service.Particularly, in the case of the agriculture extension centers (Markaz Khadamat-eRoosta’ei) and the health care centers (Khaneh Behdasht), despite their growing coverageof the Province’s rural areas, it was asserted that they did not carry adequate agriculturalinputs and medicines, respectively, and they lacked both skillful personnel and necessaryequipment. Hence, the rural residents are compelled to defer to cities for much of theirneeds and quality services.There were also a few complaints about the quality of teaching in the rural schools and aserious demand for junior high-schools (an important cause of youngsters’ out-migrations). It should be noted that all these infrastructures are run centrally from outsidethe rural areas and the local people have little, if any, control of them. Consequently, the205 When the urban and rural disparity is high, the population-drain by a new road between the two isplausible. As a metaphor, the road siphons off the rural population to the urban areas (like the law ofcommunicating vessels).177people passively and increasingly demand from the operators that their needs be satisfied,and they in turn transmit the demands to a higher level of government.Indeed, the recurrent terms of “government should ...“ (see the interviews’ reports inAppendix E) reveals a serious shortcoming in the communities’ approach to thedevelopmental problems. I labeled this as government should syndrome and it denotes theaspiration for an external mighty hand to overcome the development obstacles. It isrooted in the historical central policies of the Iranian government (which is out of thescope of this research). The result is dependency on central power ability and highexpectation from central resource allocations (mostly oil windfalls). The debilitating effectof paternalistic intervention is lucid in these times of oil glut and decreasing centralrevenues which induce the rural people to stand on their own feet.206 Taking the vision ofsustainable development into account (refer to section 2.1.3), the source of this kind ofgrowth will be negated as well.Having analyzed this aspect of infrastructure provision, the description of a communityactivist in Se-iniran is understandable: “When the power pole fell down, nobody felt thatwe should erect it on our own. So, we waited for Jihad-e-Sazandegi (RCC) to take careof the problem!” Probably the villagers were intimidated, as well as alienated by the top-down delivery of infrastructural services and lack of active participation in the projectphases. The same person implied that “public participation” was a buzzword, often206 On the issue of ex’ternal aid, Uphoff notices the following effects on the communities: “Too oftenwhen outside resources are provided, there is a zero-sum effect --outside resources simply substitute for thecontributions which local people would have made-- or worse, negative-sum --where the total amount ofresources available is decreased. This can happen, for example in communities where there is a traditionof self-help labour mobilization for road repair or irrigation maintenance work, and where the governmentor a donor agency comes in to provide food-for-work to compensate people for their effort. It can happenthat the people henceforth refuse to provide any more unpaid labour. If the outside aid disappears, so toodoes the work previously accompanied.” (Uphoff 1985, xviii)178substituted by collection of local donations (Khod-Yari) and by provision of manual labourfor the pre-determined projects.7.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE’S ROLESBy evidence of the survey in the previous chapter and the key-informant& ideas in thischapter, survival and promotion were the two major types of migration causes among theprincipal out-migrants. Therefore, it is inferred that infrastructure has not been a crucialconcern for the majority of out-migrants, unless it directly creates economic opportunitiesfor them. This means that the employment generation and income upgrading roles (referto section 4.5.1 for description of the roles) are most important for their migrationmotivations. Also, the rural-urban integration role is important due to its potential tomake urban employment and service opportunities accessible to villagers residing in ruralareas.The major types of migration intention for the remaining principal members of thehouseholds were found to be promotion and enhancement. Here a combination ofeconomic and non-economic motivations are observed. It was argued that ensuringsecure livelihood is the quintessential reason. Thus, all the conceptualized roles ofinfrastructure are effective on their intentions. However, these roles should be facilitatedconcurrently in an integrated approach. As was mentioned several times by theinterviewees, nobody will stay for infrastructure alone (i.e., without job and income) andalso, nobody will remain in the village for money alone (i.e., without having neededservices and hope for future). By this reasoning, the well-understood economic objectivesfor RTPP (Rural Infrastructure Provision Policy) should be associated by the social andecological ones.179Therefore, service delivery facilitation and rural institutionalization has to be augmentedto the above mentioned roles. These are critical to village viability, consideringcommunity disintegration and demoralizing process which I witnessed in the field. It isworth noting that for the rural stayers the trade-off is community spirit and congenialmilieu of the home village versus better income and opportunities in cities. Thereby, theroles of infrastructure should aim at both:• offsetting what is lacking toward rural-urban balance• strengthening or revitalizing what is rural advantageBy such concerted actions, RIPP has the potential to mitigate the excessive out-migrationin the sample villages and to nurture rural sustainable development.In addition to the above general implications, some specific policy actions for RIPP seemquite effective with regard to the stated causes of out-migration. Foremost, provision ofnew sources of agricultural water and irrigation networks should be prioritized as the lifeline of villages. This will positively affect the out-migration of all social strata andenhance village viability. It is essential to employ labour intensive technologies and tochoose projects with higher number of local beneficiaries (in terms of both construction ofproject and its spin-off) in rural areas of high employment and low incomes.Owing to the pattern of out-migration for the rural youth (specifically sons of thehouseholds), establishing junior secondary school within villages’ reach becomes anotherpriority. Yet it should be noted that the quality of educational services (like the case ofhealth care centers) is critical to the success of all educational facilities in rural areas.Therefore, schools depending on their affordability/accessibility, quality of service (relativeto urban ones) and type, may increase or decrease out-migration for different rural socialstrata.180In this respect, our statistical analysis at the Dehestan level along with the aggregate datademonstrated the flaws of attributing a non-differentiated relationship betweenavailability/non-availability of infrastructure and out-migration rate (refer to Appendix G).In fact, there is no certain relationship in the aggregate. The key to understanding ruralout-migration through RIPP is to analyze specific migrant groups and their particularcontexts.7.7 ConclusionIn accordance with the survey findings in the previous chapter, the key-informants of thesample villages conceded the greater tendency of single educated male youths to out-migration. This group, which accordingly consists of the bulk of the on-going out-migrations, are mainly coming from the rural households with small holdings. Theirmigration has two important adverse effects on the remaining household. First, thehousehold, as the dominant unit of production in the region, looses a potent and cheapsource of labour in their struggle to earn a livelihood. Second, due to the almost nonexistence of social welfare in the rural areas, the household is deprived from an importantsupport when the head is no longer able to work (e.g., because of old age, accidents, orsickness). The other possible effect for some households is that there will not be a nextgeneration farmer to preserve the local knowledge of predecessors. It was stated that thefamily ties, community bonds, and congenial environment of the village were still majorattractions for the rural youth.The causes of migration for the above group stem mainly from the survival type of causes(categorized in section 6.3). They are often underemployed in their own household, (i.e.,having seasonal agricultural work without sufficient income). The interviewees admitted181that job/income was the root-cause for them which could not be tackled in the presentcircumstance.The participants in the interviews also talked about the wholly migrated households(Boneh-kan) who mostly have sold their lands to the villagers or have been landless(Khosh-neshin). Their out-migration was welcome by some who viewed it as a reductionof the population pressure on resources. However, for landless and non-agriculturalhouseholds in the villages, the reduction of the village population has caused theabatement of their work and business opportunities. Moreover, these depopulatingvillages are loosing their economy of scale for having certain services that they could havehad before. An agreed inefficient aspect of this group of out-migrants, according to thekey-informants, is those few who keep their land as an extra reserve for their future (e.g.,to be sold in case of emergency or after having settled down for purchasing a house).They lackadaisical cultivate their lands to maintain their property rights.The cause of migration for landless boneh-kan households, as explained by theinterviewees, is of the survival type, whereas for the landholder and well-to-do boneh-kanhouseholds, the enhancement and promotion types of causes are implicated.The common belief of the villages stayers, as represented by the key-informants in ourinterviews, was that there was a bleak future for them there and that definitely the outmigrants had a better future. Accordingly, the remaining households are chieflyapprehensive about the uncertainty of their income and their old age maintenance, and to alesser extent they aspire to a better quality of life. When considering their dilemma, thecardinal incentive in regard to considering out-migration for these villagers is theenhancement type of cause.182Overall, it was affirmed that in the sample villages, a gradual out-migration has been goingon for decades. An aggravating population pressure on the agricultural resources(principally on water), is evident in the villages. Unlike in many South countries (Stark1980; Findley 1987; Yadava 1989, 246; Oberai et al. 1989, 149; Bhatia 1992, 181),remittances and technological changes as the out-migrants contribution to the originalvillages in the region is not significant.207 However, the out-migrants’ contributions inbuilding physical and social infrastructures, in the case of large villages, are considerable.The outstanding efforts after the Revolution for infrastructure provision in most of thesample villages have not notably reduced, if not encouraged, out-migration streams. Thetop-down delivery and the centralized operation of these services have raised the ruralresidents’ passive expectations of government (i.e., government should syndrome), whilethey have criticisms about the quality of the provided services.207 Generally, two contrasting views on the impact of remittances are found in the literature. Griffin(1976) and Oberai and Singh (1983) are advocates of a positive impact, and Connell et al (1976) andLipton (1980) are scholars who argue for a negative impact (in terms of net flow of capital from thevillage and the overall distribution of income among rural residents). A recent survey on the rural areasof Sudan, also confirms the second view (see; Abdelgadir 1989, 142).183CHAPTER Vifi:CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS1848.0 IntroductionThis thesis is concerned with the cause of rural out-migration and village viability in Iran.It was intended to focus on the remnant rural households, in order to gain knowledgeabout their discontent with the village and to indicate remedies through the widelyexercised infrastructure provision policy.208 In essence, it addresses rural developmentfrom the angle of population movement issues. To begin, chapter two of the presentthesis outlines development theories and proposes general criteria for assessing rural out-migration in accordance with sound development practices. In addition to description ofpopulation and migration data in Iran, chapter three discusses the historical-structuralcontext of macro-population movement vis-a-vis the government policies. Here, ongoingrural out-migration is assessed as a problematic. An overview of migration theories andthe relevant Iranian literature is presented in chapter four which concludes with aconceptual framework of the potential roles of infrastructure.Chapter five argues for the necessity of an inclusive and holistic approach to probing thecause of migration and its implications for the roles of infrastructure. Subsequently, a casestudy strategy with multi units of analysis is adopted. Chapter six utilizes a quantitativesurvey of migrant individuals and rural migrants’ households to reveal their characteristicsand behavior. A cognitive study of causes of migration is pursued in the final section ofthe chapter. Chapter seven relies on qualitative data gathered from group interviews withkey-informants in the villages. It provides a cross-analysis of the causes and consequencesof rural out-migration and the stayers’ view on out-migration and rural development.Finally, this chapter synthesizes the findings of the research to conclude what the rootcauses of out-migration are from a developmental view, what are the potential roles of208 Linking knowledge to actions in the public domain has been asserted as the hallmark of planning(Friedmann 1987. 48), the discipline of this research.185infrastructure in coping with them, and what are the implications for the ongoing policiesin Iran.8.1 A Sustained Movement Toward Unsustainable DevelopmentHaving examined the major theories of development, it was concluded that the rural-urbanmigration in the South is not the same as that experienced