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Squaring the circle : West European terrorism, EC/EU counter-terrorism and liberal democratic acceptability Chalk, Peter 1995

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SQUARING THE CIRCLE: WEST EUROPEAN TERRORISM, EC/EU COUNTER-TERRORISM AND LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC ACCEPTABILITY by PETER CHALK M.A. Hons., The University of Aberdeen, Scotland, 1990. A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Political Science) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA December 1994 ©Peter Chalk, 1994 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. (Signature) Department of Political Science The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date Adufa DE-6 (2/88) Abstract - Page ii ABSTRACT This dissertation is concerned with an analysis of the dynamic of West European terrorism and European Community/Union (EC/EU) counter-terrorism as it has evolved since the late 1960s. The first half of the study is devoted to an investigation of the nature of the terror is t phenomenon itself; the factors that were primarily responsible for its escalation from the late 1960s onwards; the new and continuing t rends that are likely to affect the future course of terrorism within Western Europe into the 1990s. The main focus of the second half of the project centers on an examination of the effectiveness and appropriateness of the latest EU provision to counter terrorism (and other major threats to internal security) - the Maastricht third "pillar." This assessment is made from a perspective that takes into account questions of both operational ant i- terroris t proficiency and liberal democratic acceptability. Police and security forces throughout the EU have strongly endorsed the third pillar as providing an efficient response to serious criminality. However, from a liberal democratic point of view, the Maastricht provisions raise critical questions concerning the underlying ideological rationale that appears to be guiding the Twelve's evolving internal security cooperation, the lack of public debate surrounding this coordination and the absence of any effective means to control closer EU judicial and law enforcement action. Abstract - Page iii All this poses a serious problem for the future of EU counter-terrorism cooperation. Close coordination between the EU member states is absolutely necessary if the continuing threat of terrorism in Western Europe is to be effectively quashed in the 1990s. However, one cannot realistically expect this to happen if fundamental fears exist over the desirability and legitimacy of establishing ever closer internal security cooperation. It is therefore vital that in the headlong rush to provide for an enhanced international operational capacity to deal with terrorism critical considerations of democratic control and acceptability (both of which the EU as well as individual member states are sworn to uphold by vir tue of their "status" as a liberal democratic entities) are not lost by the Union Twelve. Table of Contents - Page iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Abs t r ac t ii Table of Contents iv List of Tables viii Glossary xi Preface xvi INTRODUCTION The L i t e r a t u r e on Terror ism 12 Some General Remarks 12 The Major Works on Terror ism 14 The Place of t h e Disser ta t ion in t h e L i t e r a t u r e on Terror ism 19 CHAPTER ONE: THE NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM Problems of Definition 32 Towards a Definition of Terror ism 37 Terror ism Defined 56 Types of Te r ro r i s t S u b - S t a t e Actor 57 CHAPTER TWO: THE GENERAL RISE IN WORLD WIDE TERRORIST ACTIVITY FROM THE LATE 1960s In t roduc t ion 68 The Shift in Latin American Revolut ionary S t r a t e g y 69 The Rise of Palest inian Extremism Abroad 73 The Rise of t h e New Left 80 The Development of Modern Mass Media Networks 87 The Inc reas ing Use of War By Proxy 92 CHAPTER THREE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERRORIST THREAT IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1968-1989 In t roduc t ion 114 West European Terror ism in Historical Perspec t ive 116 Table of Contents - Page v The Concentra t ion of Terror ism Within Western Europe 126 Political Rationales 126 Ecological Determinants 136 In te rna t iona l Linkages 144 CHAPTER FOUR: WEST EUROPEAN TERRORISM IN THE 1990s In t roduc t ion 157 Nor thern I re land 165 Militant Islamic Fundamental ism 176 Xenophobic Right Wing Extremism 187 Potential Th rea t s : New Separa t i s t Groups 192 Ins t rumenta l Developments 201 The Proliferat ion of Arms Throughou t Europe 201 The Creation of a Single European Market 206 CHAPTER FIVE: THE LIBERAL RESPONSE TO TERRORISM In t roduc t ion 235 Indiv idual Freedom, S ta te Author i ty and t h e Rule of Law Within t h e Liberal S ta te 237 The Liberal S ta te and t h e Criminality of Terror ism 242 Counte r -Ter ro r i sm and Liberal Democracy: In Search of a Solution 246 The Specific S ta te Context 251 An t i -Te r ro r i s t Legislation 251 The Use of Special An t i -Ter ro r i s t Assaul t Teams 258 Covert In te l l igence Gather ing 264 Control Over t h e Media 272 The Liberal Democratic Response to Terror i sm 278 Looking Ahead Towards t h e European Union 281 CHAPTER SIX: THE DEVELOPMENT OF EC/EU ANTI-TERRORIST COOPERATION, 1970-1994 In t roduc t ion 297 The European Response to Terror ism: Obstacles and Facil i tat ing Factors 298 Table of Contents - Page vi Informal and Formal Networks and Associations for EC/EU Ant i -Te r ro r i s t Cooperation 306 Bilateral Cooperation 306 The Terror ism, Radicalism, Extremism and In te rna t iona l Violence (TREVI) System of Consultat ion 307 The Dublin Agreement 309 The Police Working Group on Terror ism (PWGOT) 311 In te rpo l 312 The Schengen Agreement 315 Shor tcomings of t h e Above In i t ia t ives 319 Bilateral Cooperation 319 TREVI and PWGOT 320 The Dublin Agreement/ECST 322 In te rpo l 323 Schengen 326 Lack of In t eg ra t ion and Coordination 329 The Maast r icht Third Pillar of Judicial and Home Affairs Cooperation 331 The Maast r icht Third Pillar and Counte r -Ter ro r i sm 337 CHAPTER SEVEN: THE MAASTRICHT THIRD PILLAR AND LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC ACCEPTABILITY In t roduc t ion 361 The Maast r icht Third Pillar and Liberal Democratic Acceptabil i ty 362 Limitation 362 Credibi l i ty 372 Accountabi l i ty 382 The Philosophical and S t r a t eg ic Consequences of Failing to Adhere to a Limited, Credible and Accountable Ant i -Ter ro r i s t Policy 391 CONCLUSION 400 The F u t u r e of EU Ant i -Te r ro r i s t Cooperation 406 BIBLIOGRAPHY 411 Table of Contents - vii APPENDIX: STATISTICAL TABLES 441 Note Concerning Data Used in Stat is t ical Tables 467 Data Sources 467 List of Tables - Page viii LIST OF TABLES Table One: International Terrorist Incidents By Region, 1968-1989 441 Table Two: Casualties Caused By International Terrorism, 1968-1989 442 Table Three: International and Domestic Worldwide Terrorist Incidents, 1968-1988 443 Table Four: Relative Frequency Distribution of Worldwide Terrorist Incidents in Percentages, 1968-1987 444 Table Five: International and Domestic Terrorist Incidents in Europe, 1970-1978 445 Table Six: Domestic Terrorist Incidents in EU NATO Countries, 1980-1986 446 Table Seven: International and Domestic Terrorist Incidents in Western Europe, 1968-1988 447 Table Eight: Terrorism in the EU By Countries and Incident Type 448 Table Nine: Killing in Northern Ireland, 1969-1989 449 Table Ten: Deaths Attributable to Republican and Loyalist Paramilitaries, 1969-1989 451 Table Eleven: Deaths Attributable to ETA Terrorism, 1968-1989 452 List of Tables - ix Table Twelve: Fatal i t ies From Terror i sm in Spain, 1968-1983 452 Table Thi r teen : Political Ter ror i sm in I ta ly, 1968-1987 453 Table Four teen : Middle Eas t e rn Terror ism in Europe , 1980-1989 455 Table Fi f teen: In ternat ional T e r r o r i s t Inc iden t s By Region, 1990-1993 456 Table Sixteen: Worldwide In te rna t iona l and Domestic Te r ro r i s t Inc iden t s By Geographic Region, 1989-1993 457 Table Seventeen: Casualt ies Caused By In te rna t iona l and Domestic Worldwide Terror ism, 1990-1993 458 Table Eighteen: Comparative F r e q u e n c y of In te rna t iona land Domestic Worldwide Te r ro r i s t Inc iden t s in Totals and Annual Averages 459 Table Nineteen: Pe rcen tage Sha re of In te rna t iona l and Domestic Te r ro r i s t Inc iden t s By Geographic Region, 1989-1993 460 Table Twenty: In te rna t iona l and Domestic Terror ism in EU Member Countr ies , 1990-1993 461 Table Twenty One: Comparative F r e q u e n c y of In te rna t iona l and Domestic Te r ro r i s t Inc iden t s in EU Sta tes in Totals and Annual Averages 462 Table Twenty Two: In te rna t iona l and Domestic Terror ism in Italy, 1990-1993 463 List of Tables - x Table Twenty Three: International and Domestic Terrorism in Spain, 1990-1993 464 Table Twenty Four: Terrorism in Northern Ireland, 1990-1993 465 Table Twenty Five: Terrorism in Germany, 1990-1993 466 Glossary - Page xi GLOSSARY. List of Abbrevia t ions Used in Disser ta t ion. AGPO AD AIS ANO ANS APLA ARM ASALA ASF BfV BKA BLA BR BSB BVD C18 CCC GELAD CHM CIREA CIREFI CIS CIS CRI CRW DA Dev Sol DFLP DIA DST DVU EC Association of Chief Police Officers Action Direct (Action Directe) Islamic Salvation Army Abu Nidal Organization Actiefront Nationaal Socialisten Azanian People 's Liberat ion Army Animal Rights Militia Armenian Secre t Army for t h e Liberat ion of Armenia Automatic Search Facility Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutzamt Bun deskrimin alama t Black Liberat ion Army Red Br igades (Brigate Rosse) Brigade Speciale Beveilingsopdrachten Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdient Combat 18 Communist Combatant Cells Comite Europeen de la Lutte Anti-Drouge Commando Holger Mains Cent re for Information, Discussion and Exchange on Asylum Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on t h e Cross ing of Borders and Immigration Commonwealth of I n d e p e n d e n t S ta tes Customs Information Serv ice Centrale Recherche Informatiediense Counter Revolut ionary Wing German Al te rna t ive Devrimci Sol Democratic F ron t for t h e Liberat ion of Pales t ine Labour Relations Inspect ion Serv ice Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire German People 's Union European Community Glossary - Page xii ECPHRFF ECST EIS ELA EOKA EPC ERCA ETA ETA-M ETA-PM EU Europol FANE FAP FBI FCO FIS FLN FLNG FLQ FNE FP-25 GAFI GCHQ GDR GEO GIA GIA GIGN European Convention for t h e Protect ion of Human Rights and Fundamenta l Freedoms European Convention for t h e Supp re s s ion of Ter ror i sm European Information Serv ice Revolut ionary People 's S t r u g g l e National Organizat ion of Cypriot Combatants European Political Cooperation Red Army for t h e Liberat ion of Catalonia Basque Fa the r land , Land and Liberty (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) Basque Fatherland, Land and Liberty-Military Basque Fatherland, Land and Liberty-Political/Military European Union European Police Office Federation d'Action Rationale Europeene Free German Worker's Party Federal Bureau of Investigation Fighting Communist Organization Islamic Salvation Front National Liberation Front (Front de Liberation Nationale) Corsican National Liberation Front (Front du Liberation National Corse) Front for the Liberation of Quebec {Front de Liberation de Quebec) Faisceaux Nationahstes Europeenees Popular Forces of 15 April Groupe d'Action Financiere In ternationale Government Communications Head Quarters German Democratic Republic Grupo Especial de Operaciones Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Arme) Groupe Interforce Antiterroriste Group d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Glossary - Page xiii GIS GRAPO GSG-9 HEU IGPG INLA IRA JRA KGB LARF LTTE MAD MAG MGO MNR/RENAMO MPSB NAR NATO NCB NCIS NF NIEPA NO NOGS OIRA PAF PFLP PFLP-GC PFN PIJ PIOS PIRA PKK Groupe Interventionale Speciale October 1st Ant i -Fasc is t Group Grenzschutzgruppe 9 Highly Enr iched Uranium In te rna t iona l Criminal Police Commission I r i sh National Liberat ion Army I r i sh Republican Army J a p a n e s e Red Army (aka. United Red Army of Japan/URA) Committee for S ta te Secu r i t y (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnostl) Lebanese Armed Revolut ionary Faction Liberat ion Tigers of Tamil Eelam Mutually Assured Dest ruct ion Mutual Ass is tance Group May 19th Communist Organizat ion National Resis tance Movement Metropolitan Police Special Branch Italian Armed Revolut ionary Nuclei North Atlantic Trea ty Organization National Central Bureau National Criminal In te l l igence Serv ice Nationalist Front Nor thern I re land (Emergency Provis ions) Act National Offensive Nucleo Operativo Centrale di Sicurezza Official I r i sh Republican Army P r o t e s t a n t Action Force Popular F ron t for t h e Liberat ion of Pales t ine Popular F ron t for the Liberat ion of Pales t ine-General Command Parti des Forces Nouvelles Palest inian Islamic Jihad Persone, Institutionen, Objekte, Sachen Provisional I r i sh Republican Army Kurdish Worker 's Pa r ty (Pesh Merga) Glossary - Page xiv PLF PLO PLOTE PNV PPSF PTA PWGOT QMV RAF RAID RARA RO-17 November RPG RUC RZ SAM SAS SCENT SDECE SDS SEKs SID SIFAR SIReNE SIS SIS SISDE SLA SSU STAR Group TEU TL TREVI TSFN UCLAF Palest ine Liberat ion Front Palest ine Liberat ion Organization People 's Liberat ion Organization of Tamil Eelam Partido de Avana Palest ine Popular S t r u g g l e Front Prevent ion of Terror ism Act Police Working Group on Terror ism Qualified Majority Vote Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion) Reserche, Assistance, Intervention, Dissuasion Revolut ionary Anti-Racist Action Revolut ionary Organizat ion of 17 November Rocket Propelled Grenade Royal Uls ter Cons tabula ry Revolut ionary Cells (Revolutionarer Zellen) Surface to Air Missile Special Air Serv ice Systems Customs Enforcement Network Direction de Documentation Exterieur et de Contre-Espionage S t u d e n t s for a Democratic Society Spezialeinsatzkommandos Servizio Informazioni Democraticia Servizio Informazioni della Forze Armata Supp lemen ta ry Information Request at t h e National En t r i e s Secre t In te l l igence Serv ice Schengen Information System Servizio Informazioni Sicurezza Democratica Symbionese Liberat ion Army Special Suppor t Unit Stan digearbeidsgruppe Ra uschgift Trea ty on European Union Free Land Terror ism, Radicalism, Extremism, In te rna t iona l Violence TREVI Secure Fax Network Unite de la Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Fraude Glossary - Page xv UDA UDR UFF UN UNITA UNSO US USSR UVF VAPO VMO WP WUO Ulster Defence Association Ulster Defence Regiment Ulster Freedom Fighters United Nations National Union for the Total Independence of Angola Ukranian People's Self-Defence Association United States Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Ulster Volunteer Force People's Extra Parliamentary Opposition Vlaamse Militante Or den Warsaw Pact Weather Underground Organization Preface - Page xvi PREFACE This thesis represents the culmination of three years research in the field of West European terrorism and EC/EU counter-terrorism. The dissertation is predicated on the belief that terrorism in its various manifestations poses a fundamental threat to the freedoms and principles enshrined in the liberal democratic political systems of Western Europe. However, it is equally stressed that some of the potential responses to terrorism could pose an equal, if not greater, threat to democratic norms than does terrorism itself. It is hoped that the words which follow will provide a sense of perspective and understanding that both contributes to a more sophisticated understanding of the nature of the terrorist phenomenon itself as well as stimulates informed debate with respect to the need for appropriate and balanced responses. There are many people to thank. In particular, I would like to extend my gratitude to the following for their input and help in the writing of the text: Martin Baldwin-Edwards of the Queen's University of Belfast, Northern Ireland; Dr Monica den Boer, formerly of the University of Edinburgh and now at the Nederlands Studiecentrum Criminaliteit en Rechtshandhaving, the Netherlands; James Gooney of the Department of International and Public Affairs, Placer Dome Inc., Vancouver; Christopher Groves of Control Risks Ltd., London; Dr James Dingley of the University of Ulster, Northern Ireland; Superintendent Bill Emerton of the Metropolitan Police (UK) Special Branch, New Scotland Yard, London; Detective Superintendent Ken Grange of the Metropolitan Police's Directorate of Performance Review, New Scotland Yard, London; Donald Kerr of the International Insti tute of Strategic Studies, London; Dr Mike King of the Centre for the Study of Public Order, the University of Leicester; Dr Alasdair Stewart of the University of Aberdeen, Scotland; Professor Paul Wilkinson of the University of St Andrews, Scotland; and Dr Rachael Woodward of the Centre for the Study of Public Order, the University of Leicester. A special debt of thanks is owed to my dissertation supervisor, Professor Brian Job, for his tireless efforts in guiding me through the often harrowing experience of writing a thesis. His many insights and comments on the various drafts of the manuscript are much appreciated and greatly contributed to the final product that is contained in the pages that follow. Needless to say, however, the thoughts contained herein are those of my own and I consequently take full responsibility for any errors or faults that might occur in the text. Finally, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my wife, Tasha, for the patience, support and encouragement that she has given me since I first undertook to write this academic study. It has been said that the only thing worse than writing a thesis is living with someone writing a thesis. I can only hope that the experiences of the past three years have not done too much to confirm this in her mind! Introduction - Page 1 INTRODUCTION "- that all power is a t rus t - that we are accountable for its exercise -that, from the people, and for the people, all springs, and all must exist." [Benjamin Disraeli, Vivian Grey, book vi, chapter 7]. "- so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which nobody can have a right to. And this is making use of the power any one has in his hands; not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private separate advantage." [John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, Chapter XVIII]. We are living in an age where organized violence has become a tool that is increasingly available to sub-s ta te actors and groups. The basic division between the government, army and people - the bedrock of the trinitarian concept of conventional warfare - has collapsed as a result of the production and diffusion of armament technology. This de-structur ing, rooted in the mass production and proliferation of basic combat weapons, has made it increasingly difficult for the state to monopolize violence in its own hands and has given a variety of organizations options that were formerly reserved only to the government and its armed forces. Moreover, in an age where large scale inter-s tate conventional war is constrained both by the costs of modern armaments (one fighter aircraft today costs what an entire squadron did in World War Two)2 and the awesomely destructive nature of nuclear weapons (which makes the Clausewitzian concept of total war non-sensical), "war by proxy" - the use of military capabilities up to, but not including, sustained combat between regular forces^ has become the preferred means of conflict for the vast majority of states in the Introduction - Page 2 contemporary international system. This has led to what the former US Secretary of the Army, John Marsh, once described as the "twilight battlefield."^ Indeed, any current issue of the New York Times will provide ample evidence of the death and destruction that has resulted from conflict which falls short of the conventional level. One aspect of "modern warfare" that has become progressively more prevalent at the lower end of the conflict spectrum is terrorism. This is due not only to the fragility and vulnerability of modern civilization to disruption but also to the success that this mode of violence has had in generating publicity for a cause. As Connor Gearty notes: "We follow with horrified interest the fate of the hostages in each new hijack or kidnap drama. We wonder not only at the terribleness of the deeds but also about the personalities and the causes that underpin them."5 Although terrorism is a phenomenon that exists throughout the international system, its development has been especially marked in the West European context. Indeed, between 1969 and 1988, the number of international terrorist acts in the region totalled 3,629 - 33.2% of the worldwide share (see tables one and four in appendix). Terrorism is certainly not something that is new to Europe. As far back as the Middle Ages, European maritime states were known to have employed pirates and to have officially sanctioned the practise of privateering against their enemies and those engaged in trading with them.0 During the French Revolution, the term "terror" was used to describe the "regime de la terreur" of the Jacobins between 1792 and 1794.7 And throughout the latter par t of the nineteenth century, a Introduction - Page 3 variety of indigenous nationalist and anarchic European groups, resorted to violent terroris t type tactics to attain some higher goal. The most well known example was the Narodnaya Volya, an anarchist movement which operated in Russia between 1878 and 1881 and which was responsible for carrying out a systematic terror is t campaign against the Tsarist authorities that included the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. Other terroristic groups that were active in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries included the Russian Boevaya Organisatsia, the Irish Invincibles, the French Illegalistes and the Spanish Pistoleros. Despite these early instances, it was not until the late 1960s that terrorism became more or less a permanent feature of political life in Europe, especially in the West. In part , this can be explained by the general rise in world-wide terrorist activity that took place at this time as a result of the increasingly urbanized nature of guerrilla warfare as well as the broad historical, political, ideological and technological changes that were occurring. These developments coincided with a number of crucial regional-specific developments that combined to produce a rapid intensification of terroristic violence in the West European area. The most important included the emergence of indigenous radical separatist movements in Northern Ireland and Spain which were reacting to a heritage of past violence and the excesses and provocations committed by their respective governments and police forces; the rise of persistent extreme left-wing organizations which claimed allegiance to revolutionary brotherhoods dedicated, for the most part , to Third World national liberation, the overthrow of the "imperialist Introduction - Page 4 bourgeoisie", or both; and the rapid developments in West European technology, communications and t ransport facilities which considerably enhanced the region's value, to both indigenous and foreign-based terroris t organizations, as a favorable tactical environment in which to carry out their operations. Unfortunately, the positive military and political developments that have swept across the globe since 1989 in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Eastern b l o c ^ are not likely to reduce the threat of terrorism in Western Europe for three reasons. First, sectarian violence and militant Islamic fundamentalism, two major sources of West European terrorism in the 1970s/80s that remain independent of East-West considerations look set to continue as a major source of instability during the 1990s. Second, the collapse of the bi-polar superpower s t ruc ture that has dominated global politics for the past five decades carries with it a number of profound consequences that are likely to exacerbate considerably both the motivation for, and potential destructiveness of, terrorism in the region. These include the collapse of authoritarian rule in Eastern Europe, the disengagement of the superpowers from many areas of unresolved ethnic and territorial tension and increased population movements. Third, the commitment by the member states of the European Community (EC), renamed the European Union (EU) after the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU), to create a unified internal market will result in the loss of border controls that were formerly designed to combat a wide range of offences, including terrorism. This will dramatically increase the freedom Introduction - Page 5 of movement opportunities available to indigenous and foreign-based terror is ts , opening up a "target of opportunity" that constitutes one of the most densely populated and industrialized areas in the Western world. The reality of the continued existence and potential escalation of terrorism in Western Europe has not been lost on the states of the region. Particularly in the context of the EU, policy efforts have been increasingly directed at the implementation of measures that are designed to combat this threat in a more effective and meaningful manner. Indeed, a fundamental feature of the (TEU), signed in the Netherlands on February 7 1992, was the provision by the Twelve for extensive cooperation on matters of justice and home affairs - the so-called Maastricht third "pillar." Its purpose is to provide the liberal democratic states of the newly formed Union with the means necessary to initiate a more s t ructured, coherent and rationalized response to such destabilizing threats as terrorism, drug trafficking and serious organized crime. The recent initiatives taken by the EU member states at Maastricht represent the beginnings of what den Boer refers to as a "European security network."1 1 Though still in its infancy stages, it has now become apparent that, henceforth, the EU will aim to combat major threats to its internal security with the same means and instruments on a single, Union-wide basis . 1 2 Whilst this represents an important step forward in European anti- terrorist cooperation by providing an administrative framework for internal security and formalizing much of Introduction - Page 6 the work presently undertaken by non treaty-based forums such as TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and International Violence), it also raises extremely serious questions concerning civil r ights , legitimacy and accountability. In essence, the Maastricht provisions represent a form of transitory cooperation that is neither nationally nor supranationally based. On the one hand, EU member states have, for the first time, made interior policy a matter for intergovernmental cooperation - creating a formalized, t reaty based executive body, the "K4 Committee", in which to coordinate their efforts. On the other hand, because such collaboration is lodged in an Intergovernmental framework of cooperation, it both reduces the jurisdictional effectiveness of national courts and parliaments and remains beyond the purview of official EU institutions of oversight such as the European Court of Justice and European Parliament. As a result a "democratic deficit" has grown up whereby decisions that have the potential to affect a great number of people can now effectively be taken without reference to either national parliaments or elected EU institutions. This is a serious problem. As John Benyon points out: Police cooperation in Europe is developing at various levels...Whether the initiatives are inspired by ministers or generated by police officers, there appears to be a widespread neglect of mechanisms to ensure political and social accountability. Politicians, officials and police officers seem to have seriously underestimated the importance of workable and visible structures of accountability. These are necessary to secure legitimacy and public consent, both of which are vital for effective policing in open, democratic societies. Introduction - Page 7 If domestic remedies for accountability are rendered ineffective without providing for alternatives at the European level, there is a very real danger that liberal democratic norms of legitimacy will be violated in the process of internationalization. This runs directly counter to the underlying rationale that guides EU integration, namely that it should respect and build upon the constitutional customs and traditions which are common to all member states, philosophically defined as liberal democratic polities - which is, itself, a fundamental requirement of Union membership. There can be little doubt that the potential threat of terrorism within the EU in the coming years demands a joint response that is s t ructured, efficient and coordinated. The internal security provisions of the Maastricht Treaty at least begin to provide the Twelve with the means by which such a strategy could emerge. However, if the EU is to build on this progress , it is vital that such operational development be accompanied by adequate mechanisms to ensure democratic accountability and political responsibility. In other words, cooperative arrangements have to be regarded as socially legitimate. If they are not, fears will inevitably arise that closer law enforcement and judicial collaboration, far from serving to protect the democratic process, actually serves to damage it and is, thus, not warranted. With these points in mind, the conceptual parameters of the thesis can now be set. Its aim is to address the issue of EU anti- terroris t collaboration in the post-Cold War era from a perspective that takes into account questions of both operational efficiency and democratic Introduction - Page 8 acceptability. It argues that while the internal security provisions of the Maastricht TEU have the potential to enhance considerably the Union's operational capacity to deal with terrorism, they could, in the final analysis, be self-defeating in that they fail to secure the public support and consent that is so vital to any democratic response to this mode of violence. Chapter one seeks to ascribe a coherent meaning to "terrorism" -defining the concept by reference to the nature of the act ra ther than the identity of the perpetrators . Such an approach proceeds from the belief that terrorism is a particular type of subversion which can be differentiated from other modes of organized violence. Accordingly, ra ther than abandoning the attempt to conceptualize terrorism as a hopeless semantic exercise, the practise will be classified into a unique analytical category by reference to the essential at tr ibutes that are seen to constitute the practise. Chapter two analyzes the underlying political and strategic reasons that account for the upsurge in worldwide terroristic activity from the late 1960s onwards. Five factors in particular appear to have played a critical role: The shift in Latin American revolutionary strategy away from conventional guerrilla tactics; the rise of Palestinian extremism abroad as a result of the defeat of the Arabs at the hands of the Israelis in the 1967 Six Day War; the emergence of the New Left; the development of modern mass media networks; and the increasing use of war by proxy as a result of the strategic constraints placed on conventional conflict in the nuclear age. Introduction - Page 9 Chapter three traces the development of the terroris t phenomenon within Western Europe up to and including 1989, the year many consider to mark the beginning of the end of the Cold War. The region is unique in that it is an area of the world which has experienced terrorism that has originated from both nationalist and ideologically inspired organizations, as well as from indigenous and international groups. The answer as to why this development occurred lies in a combination of underlying historical, political and socio-economic considerations which, given certain environmental characteristics of the region, caused a whole variety of "home grown" and extra regional groups to seek their objectives through terrorist ic means. Chapter four examines how terrorism within Western Europe is likely to develop in the post-Cold War era. If anything, the incidence and lethality of this form of organized violence are expected to rise. Not only does the res t ructur ing of East-West international relations not affect the major underlying political causes for indigenous and extra regional terrorism within Western Europe, new threats are also being created by the forces of nationalism and the breakdown of central order in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the commitment by the Twelve to eliminate their internal borders as part of the program to create a unified internal market will likely heighten the "value" of the region as a favorable tactical environment in which to carry out terroris t operations. Chapter five develops a model of counter-terrorism that is consistent with liberal democratic norms and principles of legitimacy. Political, social and ethical values that are common to all liberal Introduction - Page 10 democratic polities require that terrorism be classified as an illegitimate mode of non-state sanctioned violence. However, in countering this normatively defined problem it is essential that liberal polities do not sacrifice the very principles that make a democratic way of life possible in the first place. In other words, remedies have to be both effective and acceptable. Any coercive response that is initiated must be congruent with such democratic maxims as the rule of law and political accountability. It is precisely this which gives liberal counter- terrorist policies their acceptable quality, as distinguished from the more hardline solutions that are characteristically favored by totalitarian regimes -which clearly fall into an unacceptable category (from a liberal democratic standpoint). The following general requirements will be highlighted as crucial to any liberal democratic response to terrorism: limitation, credibility and accountability. Chapter six traces the development of EC/EU anti- terroris t cooperation as it has evolved since 1970. It will analyze the measures that were adopted prior to the incorporation of a separate "pillar" of judicial and home affairs cooperation in the TEU in 1992. The 1992 initiative will be assessed, in purely practical terms, in relation to the measures that were adopted prior to its inception. In very general terms, the major importance of the Maastricht third pillar lies in its horizontal coordination of the Twelve's customs, policing, judicial and immigration services. Hitherto, these arrangements had been dealt with in a largely ad-hoc, un-integrated and disparate manner. This represents an extremely important development in EU anti- terroris t Introduction - Page 11 cooperation. By bringing these separate areas together under one over-arching forum, it will now be far easier to achieve the level of international inter-service coordination that is so necessary for any effective joint action in this area. Moreover, the provisions provide an administrative framework for the future development of EU anti- terrorist collaboration, establishing in the process a "solid legal basis for future European police [and judicial] cooperation". Chapter seven evaluates the Maastricht provisions from the perspective of the liberal democratic model developed in chapter five. Police and security forces throughout the EU have strongly endorsed the Maastricht provisions as providing "an efficient European response to criminality."17 One aspect that they especially seem to favor is the fact that decisions and the collection/dissemination of information will, henceforth, be taken "without bureaucracy, immediately and complete."1" However, from a civil libertarian perspective, the Maastricht provisions raise extremely serious questions concerning human r ights , critical public debate, data protection and systems of accountability in the EU. These concerns pose a serious problem as one cannot expect to gain the type of public consent that is crucial for democratic acceptability if fundamental fears exist over the legitimacy and desirability of ever closer law enforcement and judicial cooperation. Introduction - Page 12 THE LITERATURE ON TERRORISM Some General Remarks. The li terature on terrorism is comparatively young, with the vast majority of books (85%) being written in the years since 1968. It is not the product of a single discipline. Scholars from fields as diverse as political science, history, military studies, psychology, philosophy, sociology, religious studies, criminology, law and communications sciences have all, in one way or another, contributed to it. A fully integrated and comprehensive multi-disciplinary approach to the study of terrorism is extremely important. The subject is not merely complicated; it is complex. It represents a nexus of issues, a methodological whole that cannot be treated by separation into its various component elements. Leaving aside any single factor, let alone a whole dimension of the problem amounts to, at best, a partial or, at worst, an irrelevant analysis that could have possibly catastrophic results on policy formulation. Nearly all who write on terrorism are neither advocates of the practise nor have they been directly involved in or affected by its application. This has lead to a somewhat lopsided academic discourse which lacks a degree of intellectual balance and "hands on" experience. Exceptions are rare . Robert Kupperman, David Long, Dennis Pluchinsky and G. Davidson Smith are examples of four authors who have been associated with both the academic and government operational sectors in North America. Richard Clutterbuck and Benjamin Netanyahu are both Introduction - Page 13 practitioners turned intellectuals with considerable para-military counter-insurgency experience. J. Bowyer Bell and Eugene Walter are two of the few scholars who have taken the trouble to go to places such as Northern Ireland, the Middle East and Latin America to talk to terror is ts and revolutionaries. This gives their work a rare authenticity, the value of which should not be underestimated. Despite the growing interest shown by governments and the media with terrorism, such attention has not, by and large, been reflected in academia. In most universities and research institutes terrorism studies are reduced to a small scale/peripheral concern and in some instances are excluded altogether. Few of the authors to have written on terrorism have gone beyond publishing one or two articles on the subject. Even fewer have dedicated a significant part of their research time to this field of study. According to Schmid, as much as 80% of the entire l i terature on terrorism is not research-based in any real sense, being, instead, narrative, impressionistic, superficial and pretentious. Real specialists in academia are still f ew .^ Scholars working extensively in this area tend, therefore, to find themselves on their own, relying on, if anything at all, "shoestring" research grants . One major consequence of this is that the type of team-based high cost research projects normally found in other areas of the social sciences (such as the Correlates of War (COW) project) has not been present in the study of terrorism. As Wilkinson observes, this in part helps to explain the lag in developing high quality data banks, statistical analysis and operational research applications. Mickolus, Introduction - Page 14 Schmid, Jongman and Jenkins (in his capacity as a research analyst at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica) are perhaps the only scholars no who have managed to make any real effective headway in these areas. £-Finally, as with all aspects of the social sciences, research on terrorism should, ideally, be based on an objective and balanced analysis. Even if one intends to approach the subject from a particular viewpoint (which, if so, should be made explicit from the outset), it is nevertheless vital that any ensuing study proceed in a consistent and even handed manner. However, the emotive nature of the subject matter does not readily lend itself to such analysis. Often moral outrage and the eagerness to condemn thwart attempts to arrive at more sophisticated and indepth understandings of the phenomenon at hand, especially in the context of definition and response. Coherence and consistency is as necessary to the study of terrorism as it is to any aspect of politics and/or international relations in general. It is, however, the lack of such congruity which serves as the major characteristic of a significant portion of the current l i terature on terrorism. The Major Works on Terrorism. It is possible to categorize the essential l i terature on terrorism into the following main categories: conceptual works; definitional works; the strategy of terrorism; case studies; state sponsored terrorism; international terrorism; international responses; and dilemmas of response in a liberal democracy. Introduction - Page 15 The conceptual works on terrorism concentrate on the development of various theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of terrorism. The aim is to produce an adequate research framework that allows for a comparative analysis of the socio-political context of individual incidents and events. This "scientific" l i terature aims to be both apolitical and amoral, adopting an objective neutral posture which avoids any skewed focus or research bias. It sees its role not in fighting terrorism per se but in explaining the underlying root causes of the phenomenon in all its various forms and contexts. Definitional works on terrorism set out with the more modest aim of trying to identify, ra ther than explain, the phenomenon at hand. These works define/conceptualize terrorism by reference to the essential characteristics that are seen to constitute the practise. In many instances, typologies are developed, providing for more precise definitions of subgroups of terrorism. As with the scientific l i terature on terrorism, these authors seek to minimize the subjective content of their analysis (with certain exceptions such as Wilkinson) in an attempt to maximize the possibility of achieving consensual agreement. There are a number of researchers who deny that it is possible to arrive at a widely accepted generic definition/conception of terrorism. Some authors s t ress the careless and indiscriminate way in which the term is used, maintaining that this not only artificially inflates statistics but also makes identification of the specific character of terrorism very Or difficult. •J Others reject the possibility of arriving at a definition in principle, arguing that the very process of denotation is, itself, par t of Introduction - Page 16 the wider conflict between political objectives, ideologies and social real i ty.2 6 The li terature that deals with the strategy of terrorism essentially concerns itself with terrorism as a mode of revolutionary warfare. Analysis generally centers around the historical development of terrorism as a strategy; the assumptions on which the terror weapon is based (such as the psychology of fear and publicity/political communication); terrorism's relation to and difference from other forms of political violence (such as guerrilla warfare); t rends in terrorism; the effect of technological advances in terms of both means (weapons) and ends (targets); and the short and long term (dis)advantages of this mode of violence.27 A rapidly growing sub-set of this l i terature is devoted to the specter of nuclear terrorism. These works look at the opportunities and constraints that are serving to increase/decrease the probability of terroris ts exploiting nuclear weapons of mass destruction as par t of their wider repertoire of violence. Case studies are an extremely important component of the terrorist l i terature. As Wilkinson observes, "context is all in the study of political on vio lence ."" Rather than concentrating on the development of general theoretical models to explain terrorism, these studies aim to discern the underlying root causes, determinants and development of particular campaigns and organizations. This is done through analysis of the specific social political, economic and cultural backgrounds of terrorist conflicts as well as the personalities and ideas of relevant leading figures. These studies have yielded some interesting results in areas Introduction - Page 17 such as the motivations/self-perception of terror is ts , the organization and strategy of particular groups and the crucial determinants of the on success or failure of certain campaigns. u A considerable sub-l i terature has grown up around state support/sponsorship of terrorism. These works aim to provide definitive evidence of direct or indirect involvement by state actors in acts of terrorism. Most works have attributed sponsorship activities either to particular countries in the third world and/or to the states of the former Soviet bloc. A number of these have developed elaborate "conspiracy theories" maintaining that a master cell exists allegedly controlling the activities of terrorist groups around the world. On the other side of the coin there are also a number of scholars who maintain that there has been extensive Western complicity in terrorism, particularly from the US in Central America.-*2 Finally there are those who look, not at state sponsorship of surrogate actors, but at the direct use of terror as an official means of repressive state enforcement.33 A huge l i terature now exists on the phenomenon of international terrorism. These analyses approach the subject from a global perspective, looking at terrorism as a problem of international relations. Most works concentrate on identifying the primary geo-political, strategic, economic and technological causes for the spread of terrorism throughout the international system; elucidating the linkages that are alleged to exist between terrorist groups and/or state actors; and forecasting future t rends with respect to targets and levels of incidence/destructiveness. Given the prominence of Middle Eastern Introduction - Page 18 terrorism in Western Europe, certain researchers have also devoted considerable attention to this particular area. Equally as prominent in the field is the l i terature that deals with responses to terrorism. These works concentrate on a number of approaches for the management and control of terrorism. Those that deal with international initiatives generally emphasize the need for effective international legal s t ructures to facilitate the arrest , trial and extradition of terror is ts ; comprehensive sharing of terroris t intelligence information to help prevent terror is t attacks before they occur; and a commitment to uphold and enforce joint economic and diplomatic sanctions against states that sponsor terrorism. An extremely influential offshoot of this sub-set of l i terature are works that concentrate on the development of legal and police cooperation in Western Europe to counter terrorism. The importance of, and interest in this particular body of research has been significantly heightened by both the prospect of increasing instability in the post-Cold War era and the judicial and law enforcement aspects of closer EC/EU political and economic integration. ° ' The most important works that deal with national responses to terrorism are essentially studies devoted to the dilemma of the liberal state in countering terrorism. These analyses concern themselves with questions of the democratic society and the balance between security and freedom. For these authors the real issue is not control of terrorism per se. Rather it is how to contain terrorism without paying the unacceptable price of sacrificing the open society which one seeks to Introduction - Page 19 protect. The aim of this body of research is to relate and reconcile practical considerations of anti-terrorism with the moral, theoretical and philosophical imperatives of liberal democratic acceptability. The Place of the Dissertation in the Literature on Terrorism. This dissertation seeks to complement two of the above bodies of research: studies which deal with the developing West European cooperative response to terrorism; and works which analyze counter-terrorism from a liberal democratic philosophical perspective. Drawing on and incorporating sociological, international relations, comparative legal, historical and philosophical approaches, the thesis aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the dynamic of West European terrorism and EC/EU counter-terrorism, analyzing the recent developments made in EU judicial and law enforcement cooperation from both a practical and philosophical perspective. Since the collapse of the Soviet Eastern bloc and with the prospect of a borderless Europe fast becoming a reality, terrorism's status as an important topic of research in Western Europe has been considerably heightened. Academic and policy makers alike have expended a great deal of time and effort in trying to ascertain how the end of the Cold War is likely to affect the development of this mode of violence and what steps can and should be taken to counter it. However, much of this l i terature is incomplete in that it deals with the problem of joint counter- terrorist measures in essentially a technical manner - favoring a standard setting, atheoretical pragmatism. Indeed, Introduction - Page 20 with the exceptions of the comprehensive study made by Benyon et al. in 1994 and the edited volume put out by Anderson and den Boer, again in 1994, almost no systematic attempt has been made to extend philosophical questions of democratic acceptability to the wider perspective of integrated EU law enforcement and internal security cooperation. This is an important shortcoming. It is jus t as vital for a community/union of liberal states to ensure that democratic values and safeguards are not damaged in their response to terrorism as it is for the single liberal state. This is especially so when, as is now happening with the EU member states, certain aspects of interior/ internal security policy are to be taken out of a purely national context and, hence, out of its accompanying system of checks and balances. Introduction - Page 21 ENDNOTES See Martin van Crevald, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 192-193. James Adams, Secret Armies (New York: Bantam Books, 1989), 5. TRADOC pamphlet, US Army Operational Concept for Low Intensity Conflict (Department of the Army, Ft. Monroe, Virginia, No. 524-44): 2. Keynote address by John Marsh, in Frank R. Barnett, ed., Special Operations in US Strategy (Washington, D.C: National Defense University Press, 1984), 24. Connor Gearty, Terror (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), 1. Ethan Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society," International Organization 44(4) (Autumn 1990): 487. The practise of privateering originated in the thirteenth century when Henry III of England sanctioned privately owned English vessels to attack and loot French ships so long as half the captured bounty was turned over to him. Gearty, Terror, 20. Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism. Theory, Tactics and Counter-Measures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 19. Ibid., 22. For a good account of the activities of the Irish Invincibles see C. Townshend, "Terror in Ireland: Observations on Tynan's The Irish Invincibles and Their Times," in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1989), 179-186; and C. Townshend, "The Process of Terror in Irish Politics," in N. 0'Sullivan, ed., Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 88-111. An interesting account of the activities of early terroris ts can also be found in Gearty, Terror, 17-26. These include the termination of US/USSR ideological rivalry, nuclear disarmament, the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the democratization of East European countries. Monica den Boer, Immigration, Internal Security and Policing in Europe, Working Paper VIII in Series "A System of European Police Cooperation in 1992," (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, February 1993), 3. In t roduc t ion - Page 22 12 13 20 21 22 Ibid. John Benyon, I s s u e s in European Police Cooperation (Leicester Unive r s i ty Discussion Pape r s in Politics, August 1992), 34. •^ Certain commentators deny tha t it is poss ib le to a r r i v e at a gener ic definition of t e r ro r i sm tha t is capable of solicit ing more t h a n a superf ic ia l cong ruence of opinion g iven t h e fact t ha t t h e label itself is a h igh ly va lue laden term t h a t has come to mean many different t h i n g s to d i f ferent people . Definitions, it is a r g u e d , if t h e y a r e to be genera l ly acceptable , have to be b roadened to such an extent t ha t t h e y become essent ia l ly use les s for r e s e a r c h p u r p o s e s . See no tes 25 and 26 below. 1 5 The 1990 Par i s CSCE Summit, a s cene of East-West reconci l ia t ion, is seen by many as t h e rat i f icat ion of t h e geo-poli t ical and ideological v ic to ry of t h e West. *6 Rachel Woodward, The Establ ishment of Europol: A Cri t ique (Paper p r e s e n t e d to t h e C y p r u s Police Academy In te rna t iona l Seminar, "Cooperation with t h e Police Forces of t h e Community and with Europol ," Nicosia, Cyprus , 20-23 April 1993), 15. 1 7 This comment made by a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the French Ministry of t h e In t e r i o r is typical of t h e favorable a t t i t udes towards Maastr icht t h a t a r e p r e v a l e n t among EC police forces . Quoted in P. Le Jeune , Europol (Paper p r e s e n t e d to t h e Joint Sess ions of Workshops, European Consortium for Political Research , Limerick, 30 March - 4 April 1992). 1 8 E. Grootaar ts , The Harmonization of Immigration; The Implications for t h e Police (Paper p r e s e n t e d at t h e In te rna t iona l Police Conference, London, 15 October 1992), 10. 1 9 Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, Political Terror ism: A New Research Guide to Concepts , Theor ies , Data Bases and L i t e r a t u r e (Amsterdam: North Holland Publ i sh ing Co., 1988), 177-182. Ibid. , 177-180. Paul Wilkinson, "Terror ism: An In te rna t iona l Research Agenda?" in Wilkinson and Stewar t , eds . , Contemporary Research on Terror ism, xvii. See especial ly Edward Mickolus, ITERATE (Ann Arbor , MI: ICPSR, 1976); Edward Mickolus, Transna t iona l Terror ism: A Chronology of Even t s 1968-1979 (Westport, CT: Greenwood P r e s s , 1980); Edward Mickolus, Todd Sandler and Jean Murdock, In te rna t iona l Terror ism in t h e 1980s: A Chronology of E v e n t s , Volume I, 1980-1983 (Ames: Iowa S ta te Univers i ty P r e s s , 1989); Edward Mickolus, Todd Sandler Introduction - Page 23 and Jean Murdock, International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events, Volume II, 1984-1987 (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1989); Edward Mickolus, Terrorism 1988-1991. A Chronology of Events and a Selectively Annotated Bibliography (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993); Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Actors, Conflicts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1983); Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Research Guide to Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature; Albert Jongman, "Trends in International and Domestic Terrorism in Western Europe, 1968-1988," Terrorism and Political Violence 4(4) (Winter 1992): 27-53; Brian Jenkins, Terrorism in the 1980s (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation Monograph P-6564, December 1980); Brian Jenkins, Testimony Before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, January 27 1978 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation Monograph P-6586, February 1981); Brian Jenkins, A Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation Monograph P-6624, May 1981); Brian Jenkins, Combating Terrorism: Some Policy Implications (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation Monograph, P-6666, August 1981); and Brian Jenkins, Terrorism and Beyond (RAND Corporation Report, R-2714, December 1982). See for instance Yonah Alexander, David Carlton and Paul Wilkinson, eds., Terrorism: Theory and Practise (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979); Yonah Alexander and John Gleason, eds., Behavioral and Quantative Perspectives on Terrorism (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, 1981); Ronald Crelinsten, "Terrorism as Political Communication: The Relationship between the Controller and the Controlled," in Wilkinson and Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 3-23; Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative Politics (July 1981): 379-399; F. Ferraroti, "Theories of Terrorism," in International Terrorism and the Drug Connection (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1984), 225-239; P. Grabosky, "The Urban Context of Political Terrorism," in Michael Stohl, ed., The Politics of Terrorism (New York: Dekker, 1983), 51-76; Ted Gurr, "Some Characteristics of Terrorism in the 1960s," in Stohl, ed., The Politics of Terrorism, 23-50; Peter Knauss and D.A. Strickland, "Political Disintegration and Latent Terror," in Stohl, ed., The Politics of Terrorism, 77-118; Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature; Harry Targ, "Societal Structure and Revolutionary Terrorism: A Preliminary Investigation," in Stohl, ed., The Politics of Terrorism, 119-146; and Eugene Walter, Terror and Resistance: A Study of Political Violence (London: Oxford University Press, 1969). There are also several general theories on violence which have yielded a number of interesting hypotheses on terrorism. Some of the more influential works include: Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1969); James Davies, "The Circumstances and Causes of Revolution: A Review," Journal of Conflict Resolution (June 1967): 11; James Davies, "Towards a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review 27 (February Introduction - Page 24 1962): 5-14; I. Feierabend, R. Feierabend and T. Gurr, Anger, Violence and Politics: Theories and Research (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 19072); Erich Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (London: Cape, 1974); and T. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971). Good representatives of this body of l i terature include S. Andreski, "Terror," in J. Gould and W. Kolb, eds., A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 179; Martha Crenshaw, "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism," Journal of Conflict Resolution 16(3) (1978): 383-396; Brain Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1980); David Long, The Anatomy of Terrorism (New York: The Free Press, 1990); Ali Merari, "A Classification of Terrorist Groups," Terrorism: An International Journal 1 (1978): 167-175; Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Research Guide to Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature; Thomas Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," in Harry Eckstein, ed., Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 71-99; Wardlaw, Political Terrorism; and Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: MacMillan, 1986). See for instance, Malcolm Anderson, Policing the World: Interpol and the Politics of International Police Cooperation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1987); Walter Laqueur, The Terrorism Reader (New York: The New American Library Inc., 1978); Geoffrey Levitt, "Is Terrorism Worth Defining," Ohio Northern Law Review 97 (1986): 97-116; and R. Thackrah, "Terrorism: A Definitional Problem," in Wilkinson and Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 24-44. Five good examples include Didier Bigo, "Terrorisme, drouge, immigration: la construction de la menace," RIAC (forthcoming in 1994); Didier Bigo, Terrorisme, drouge, immigration: les nouvelles figures de l 'insecurite en Europe, (mimeo, 1994); H. Cooper, "Terrorism: The Problem of the Problem of Definition," Chitty's Law Journal 26(3) (1978): 105-108; H. Griesman, "Social Meanings of Terrorism: Reification, Violence and Social Control," Contemporary Crisis 1(3) (1977): 303-18; and Christopher Hitchens, "Terrorism: A Cliche in Search of a Meaning," ETC: Review of General Semantics (Spring 1989): 147-152. See Alexander, Carlton and Wilkinson, eds., Terrorism: Theory and Practise; Edward Badolato, "Terrorism and the US Energy Infrastructure," Terrorism: An International Journal 13(2) (1990): 159-163; Ronald Crelinsten, "Power and Meaning: Terrorism as a Struggle Over Access to the Communication Structure," in Wilkinson and Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 3-23; Crenshaw, "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism"; Ralph Dowling, "Terrorism and the Media: A Rhetorical Genre," Journal of Introduction - Page 25 Communication 36(1) (Winter 1986): 12-24; John Dziak, "Military Doctrine and Structure," in Uri Ra'anan, Robert Pfaltzgraff, Richard Shultz et al., eds., Hydra of Carnage. The International Linkages of Terrorism and Other Low-Intensity Operations (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1986), 77-92; William Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1975); Gearty, Terror; Herb Greer, "Terrorism and the Media: Myths, Illusions, Abstraction," Encounter LIX(2) (August 1986): 56-62; Frederick Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in Our Time (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976); Brian Jenkins, Terrorism Works - Sometimes (Santa Monica: RAND, 1974); Brian Jenkins, "The Future Course of International Terrorism," in Wilkinson and Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 581-589; Robert Kupperman and Darrell Trent, Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response (Stanford: Hoover International Press, 1979); Robert Kupperman, "Vulnerable America," in Wilkinson and Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 570-579; Laqueur, The Terrorism Reader; Neil Livingstone, "The Impact of Technological Innovation," in Ra'anan, Pfaltzgraff, Shultz et al., eds., Hydra of Carnage, 137-154; Carlos Marighela, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1978); John Martin, "The Media's Role in International Terrorism," Terrorism: An International Journal 8(2) (1985): 127-146; R. Moss, Urban Guerrilla War (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1973); Edward Price, "The Strategy and Tactics of Revolutionary Terrorism," Comparative Studies in Society and History 19(1) (January 1977): 52-66; S. Rada, "Transnational Terrorism as Public Relations?" Public Relations Review 11 (Fall, 1985): 26-33; Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature; Alex Schmid and D. Paletz, Perspectives on Terrorism and the Media (The Netherlands: University of Leiden Press, 1990); Alex Schmid and J. de Graff, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media (London/Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982); Alessandro Silj, Never Again Without a Rifle: The Origins of Italian Terrorism (New York: Karz Publishers, 1979); Claire Sterling, "The State of the Art," in Ra'anan, Pfaltzgraff, Shultz et al., eds., Hydra of Carnage, 49-56; R. Thompson, Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-1969 (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1970); Harold Vetter and Gary Perlstein, Perspectives on Terrorism (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1992); Wardlaw, Political Terrorism; Gabriel Weimann, "Media Events: The Case of International Terrorism," Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 31 (Winter 1987): 21-39; Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State; Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism (London: MacMillan, 1974); and Paul Wilkinson, Conflict Studies 236: Terrorist Targets and Tactics: New Risks to World Order (London: RISCT, 1990). Good representatives of this body of research include: F. Barnaby, Conflict Studies 235: Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Growing Threat in the 1990s? (London: RISCT, 1990); Robert Beckman, "Conference Report: International Terrorism: The Nuclear Dimension," Terrorism: Introduction - Page 26 An International Journal 8 (1986): 351-377; L, Beres, "Responding to the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism," in Charles Kegley, ed., International Terrorism: Causes, Characteristics, Controls (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 228-240; J. Denton, "International Terrorism: The Nuclear Dimension," Terrorism: An International Journal 9 (1987): 113-123; Louis Giuffrida, "Dealing with the Consequences of Terrorism: We Are Not Yet Where We Must Be," Terrorism: An International Journal 10 (1987): 231-232; Sven Hellman, "The Swedish Initiative on Accidental Nuclear War," Disarmament XIV(3) (1991): 61-73; Seymour Hersh, "The Wild East," Atlantic Monthly (June 1994): 61-86; P. Hoodbhoy, "Myth Building: The "Islamic" Bomb," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (June 1993): 42-49; David Hughes, "Arms Experts Fear Nuclear Blackmail," Aviation Space and Technology (January 4 1993): 61-62; Michael Intriligator, "Defining Global Security," Disarmament XIV(4) (1991): 59-70; Robert Kupperman, "Emerging Techno-Terrorism," in Igor Beliaev and John Marks, eds., Common Ground on Terrorism: Soviet-American Cooperation Against the Politics of Terror (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 88-103; Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, eds., Preventing Nuclear Terrorism (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1987); Paul Leventhal and Brian Chellaney, "Nuclear Terrorism: Threat, Perception and Response in South Asia," Terrorism: An International Journal 11 (1988): 447-469; Paul Leventhal and M. Hoenig, "The Hidden Danger: Risks of Nuclear Terrorism," Terrorism: An International Journal 10 (1987): 1-19; S. Menaul, Conflict Studies 125: Changing Concepts of Nuclear War (London: RISCT, 1983); Steven Miller, "Western Diplomacy and the Soviet Nuclear Legacy," Survival 34(3) (Autumn 1992): 3-27; Jerrold Post, "Superterrorism: Biological, Chemical and Nuclear," Terrorism: An International Journal 13(2) (1990): 165-176; and M. Wilrich and T. Taylor, Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger, 1974). Wilkinson, "Terrorism: An International Research Agenda?" xviii. Some good examples include, Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky, Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations (London: Frank Cass, 1992); J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: A History of the IRA, 1916-1979 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980); Robert Clark, The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984); Robert Clark, "Negotiating with Insurgents: Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country," Terrorism and Political Violence 2(4) (Winter 1990): 489-507; B. Cordes, "Euroterrorists Talk About Themselves: A Look at the Literature," in Wilkinson and Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 318-336; Ronald Crelinsten and Alex Schmid, eds., Special Edition, Western Responses to Terrorism (Terrorism and Political Violence 4(4), Winter 1992); Martha Crenshaw, Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978); Richard Drake, Revolutionary Mystique and Terrorism in Contemporary Italy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989); Richard Drake, "Contemporary Terrorism Introduction - Page 27 and the Intellectuals: Italy," in Wilkinson and Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 130-139; Hans Horchem, "Terrorism in Germany: 1985," in Wilkinson and Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 141-163; Alison Jamieson, "Entry, Discipline and Exit in the Italian Red Brigades," Terrorism and Political Violence 2(1) (Spring 1990): 1-20; Alison Jamieson, "Identity and Morality in the Italian Red Brigades," Terrorism and Political Violence 4 (Winter 1990): 508-519; Leslie MacFarlane, "The Right to Self-Determination in Ireland and the Justification of IRA Violence," Terrorism and Political Violence 2(1) (Spring 1990): 35-53; Edward Moxon-Browne, "Terrorism and the Spanish State: The Violent Bid for Basque Autonomy," in H. Tucker, ed., Combatting the Terrorists. Democratic Responses to Political Violence (New York: Center for Security Studies, 1988), 155-172; Dennis Pluchinsky, "Germany's Red Army Faction: An Obituary," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 16(2) (April-June 1993): 135-157; Bruce Scharlau and Donald Philips, "Not the End of German Left-Wing Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 4(3) (Autumn 1992): 107-116; Charles Townshend, Political Violence in Ireland: Government and Resistance Since 1848 (London: Oxford University Press, 1984). Joseph Bermudez, Terrorism: The North Korean Connection (New York: Crane Russak, 1990); Alvin Berstein, "Iran's Low Intensity War Against the United States," Orbis 30 (Spring 1986): 149-167; Roger Fontaine, Terrorism: The Cuban Connection (New York: Crane and Russack, 1988); Roberta Goren, The Soviet Union and Terrorism (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984); Edward Herman and Frank Brodhead, The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection (New York: Sheridan Square Publications, 1986); Ernst Halperin, "Central America: The Role of Cuba and of the Soviet Union," in Ra'anan, Pfaltzgraff, Shultz et al., eds., Hydra of Carnage, 125-134; Brian Jenkins, "Libya's Continuing Role in International Terrorism," TVI Report 7(2) (1987): 1-6; Michael Ledeen, "Soviet Sponsorship: The Will to Disbelieve," in Benjamin Netanyahu, ed., Terrorism. How the West Can Win (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1988), 87-92; Moshe Ma'oz, "State Run Terrorism in the Middle East: The Case of Syria," Middle East Review 19(3) (Spring 1987): 11-15; Richard Schultz, "Recent Regional Patterns," in Ra'anan, Pfaltzgraff, Shultz et al., eds., Hydra of Carnage, 95-124; and Claire Sterling, The Terror Network (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980). Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston: South End Press, 1979); Roger Clark, "State Terrorism: Some Lessons from the Sinking of the Rainbow Warrior," Rutgers Law Journal 20(2) (Winter 1989): 393-413; I. Gidley, The Rainbow Warrior Affair (London, 1986); Alexander George, ed., Western State Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Edward Herman, The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda (Boston: South End Press, 1982); Michael McClintock, The American Connection. Volume 1, State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador. Volume 2, State Terror and Introduction - Page 28 Popular Resistance in Guatemala (London: Zed Press, 1982); and H. Vanden, "State Policy and the Cult of Terror in Central America," in Wilkinson and Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 256-269. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973); A. Dallin and G. Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970); I. Horowitz, Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980); Michael Stohl and George Lopez, The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984); and Michael Stohl and George Lopez, "State Terrorism: From the Reign of Terror to Nineteen Eighty Four," Chitty's Law Journal 32(1) (1984): 14-33. Some of the major works include: Adams, Secret Armies; Yonah Alexander, International Terrorism: National, Regional and Global Perspectives (New York: Praeger, 1976); Cherif Bassiouni, International Terrorism and Political Crimes (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1975); Jillian Becker, "The Centrality of the PLO," in Netanayahu, ed., Terrorism: How the West Can Win, 98-102; L. Bloomfield and G. Fitzgerald, Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975); J. Boywer Bell, Transnational Terror (Washington D.C: American Insti tute for Public Policy Research, 1975); David Carlton and C. Schaerf, eds., International Terrorism and World Security (New York: Wiley, 1975); Martha Crenshaw, "Transnational Terrorism and World Politics," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1 (1975): 109-129; Gearty, Terror; H. Han, ed., Terrorism, Political Violence and World Order (London: University Press of America, 1984); Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1983); Anthony Kellett, International Terrorism: A Prospective and Retrospective Examination (Ottawa: ORAE, Department of National Defence, 1981); Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism; M. Livingstone, ed., International Terrorism in the Contemporary World (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978); Hugh Percell, Revolutionary War, Guerrilla Warfare and Terrorism in Our Time (Melbourne: Nelson, 1981); Ra'anan, Pfaltzgraff, Shultz et al., eds., Hydra of Carnage; Sterling, The Terror Network; and Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State. See, for instance, Yonah Alexander, "The European: Middle Eastern Terrorist Connection," International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 13(2) (1988/89): 1-6; Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism, Drugs and Crime in Europe After 1992 (London: Routledge, 1990); Dennis Pluchinsky "Middle Eastern Terrorism Activity in Western Europe," in Wilkinson and Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 164-178; Dennis Pluchinsky, "Middle Eastern Terrorism in Europe: Trends and Prospects," Terrorism: An International Journal 14(2) (1991): 65-75; Dennis Pluchinsky, "Middle Eastern Terrorist Activity in Western Europe in Introduction - Page 29 the 1980s: A Decade of Violence," in Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky, eds., European Terrorism Today and Tomorrow (New York: Brassey's 1992), 1-41. See Cherif Bassiouni, "Effective National and International Action Against Organized Crime and Terrorist Criminal Activities," Emory International Law Review 4(9) (1990): 9-42; Beliaev and Marks, eds., Common Ground on Terrorism: Soviet-American Cooperation Against the Politics of Terror; Davis Bobrow, "Preparing for Unwanted Events: Instances of International Political Terrorism," in R. Crelinsten, ed., Research Strategies for the Study of Terrorism (Montreal: International Centre for Comparative Criminology, 1977), 35-60; Paul Bremer, "Combatting International Terrorism," TVI Report 7(3) (1987): 1-3; Paul Bremer, "Countering Terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s," Current Policy 1135 (November 1988): 1-4; Peter Burleigh, Terrorism: Efforts Towards International Solutions, (Paper presented to the 1992 World-Wide Anti-Terrorism Conference, Kansas, June 23 1992); Simon Crawshaw "Anti-Terrorism Networks: Information and Intelligence for Fighting International Terrorism," The Futurist 23 (March-April 1989): 12-13; Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983); Martha Crenshaw, Occasional Paper Series 11: Terrorism and International Cooperation (New York: Insti tute for East-West Studies, 1988); Robert Friedlander, Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1979); Naomi Gal-Or, International Cooperation to Suppress Terrorism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985); Kevin Greene, "Terrorism as Impermissible Political Violence: An International Law Framework," Vermont Law Review 16 (1992): 461-498; William Gutteridge, "Countering Terrorism: Evaluating the Options," in Kegley, ed., International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, 245-252; Phillip Heyman, "International Cooperation in Dealing with Terrorism," American Journal of International Law and Policy 6(1) (1990/91): 1-34; Kupperman and Trent, Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response; Walter Laqueur, "Reflections on the Eradication of Terrorism," in Kegley, ed., International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, 207-212; Neil Livingstone and T. Arnold, eds., Fighting Back: Winning the War Against Terrorism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985); John Murphy, "The Need for International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism," Terrorism: An International Journal 13 (1990): 381-396; Ethan Nadelmann, "The Role of the US in International Enforcement of Criminal Law," Harvard International Law Journal 1 (1990): 37-76; Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Impediments and Prerequisites to Counter Terrorism," in Kegley, ed., International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, 201-206; Paul Wilkinson, "Trends in International Terrorism and the American Response," in Lawrence Freedman et al., eds., Terrorism and International Order (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), 37-55; and Paul Wilkinson, Conflict Studies 226: Lessons of Lockerbie (December 1989). Introduction - Page 30 The best studies include Philip Butt, European Border Controls: Who Needs Them? (London: RIIA, 1989); Clutterbuck, Terrorism, Drugs and Crime in Europe After 1992; Richard Clutterbuck, Alison Jamieson and Juliet Lodge, Conflict Studies 238: Counter-Terrorism in Europe: Implications of 1992 (London: RISCT, February 1991); Philippe de Cock, "The Operational Problems of Police Cooperation and Communications Between the European Police Forces," in Malcolm Anderson and Monica den Boer, eds., European Police Cooperation: Proceedings of a Seminar (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 41-61; David Freestone, "Legal Responses to Terrorism: Towards European Cooperation," in Juliet Lodge, ed., Terrorism: A Challenge to the State (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), 195-223; Bruce George and Timothy Watson, "Combating International Terrorism After 1992," in Alexander and Pluchinsky, eds., European Terrorism Today and Tomorrow, 181-193; Frank Gregory, "Police Cooperation and Integration in the European Community: Proposals, Problems and Prospects," Terrorism: An International Journal 14 (1991): 145-155; House of Commons (UK) Home Affairs Committee, Session 1989-90, Practical Police Cooperation in the European Community (London: HMSO, 1990); Alison Jamieson, "1993 - L'Europe Sans Frontieres," Conflict Bulletin (January 1993); Juliet Lodge, "Internal Security and Judicial Cooperation Beyond Maastricht," Terrorism and Political Violence 4(3) (Autumn, 1992): 1-29; Juliet Lodge, "The EC and Terrorism," in Tucker, ed., Combating the Terrorists, 45-74; Juliet Lodge, "The European Community and Terrorism: From Principles to Concerted Action," in Juliet Lodge, ed., The Threat of Terrorism (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988), 229-264; Juliet Lodge, "The European Community and Terrorism: Establishing the Principle of Extradite or Try," in Lodge, ed., Terrorism: A Challenge to the State, 164-193; Juliet Lodge, "Terrorism and the European Community: Towards 1992," Terrorism and Political Violence 1 (1989): 28-45; Juliet Lodge and David Freestone, "The European Community and Terrorism: Political and Legal Aspects," in Yonah Alexander and Kenneth Myles, eds., Terrorism in Europe (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 79-101; Piet van Reenen, "Policing Europe After 1992: Cooperation and Competition," European Affairs 2 (1989): 45-53; David Schiller, "From a National to an International Response," in Tucker, ed., Combating the Terrorists, 185-201; and Paul Wilkinson, "Can the European Community Develop a Concerted Policy on Terrorism?" in Lawrence Howard, ed., Terrorism: Roots, Impacts, Responses (New York: Praeger, 1992), 167-171. See J. Bowyer Bell, A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence (New York: Basic Books, 1978); J. Bowyer Bell, "Terrorist Scripts and Live Action Spectaculars," Columbia Journalism Review 17(1) (1978): 47-50; James Burchael, "Framing a Moral Response to Terrorism," in Kegley, ed., International Terrorism. Characteristics, Causes, Controls, 213-218; D. Carmichael, "Of Beasts, Gods and Civilized Men: The Justification of Terrorism and of Counter-Terrorist Measures," Terrorism: An Introduction - Page 31 International Journal 6(1) (1982): 1-26; Crelinsten and Schmid, eds., Special Edition, Western Responses to Terrorism; D. Das, "Impact of Anti-Terrorist Measures on Democratic Law Enforcement: The Italian Experience," Terrorism: An International Journal 13(2) (1990): 89-98; G. Davidson Smith, Combating Terrorism (London: Routledge, 1990); Robin Evelegh, Peace-Keeping in a Democratic Society (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1978); Frank Gregory, Conflict Studies 194: Policing the Democratic State: How Much Force? (London: RISCT, December 1986); W. Jaehnig, "Journalists and Terrorism: Captives of the Libertarian Tradition," Indiana Law Journal 53(4) (1987): 727-744; Alison Jamieson, "The Italian Experience," in Tucker, ed., Combating the Terrorists, 113-54; Alison Jamieson, "The Italian Experience," in Lodge, Jamieson and Clutterbuck, Conflict Studies 238: Counter-Terrorism in Europe: The Implications of 1992, 13-20; Peter Janke, Terrorism and Democracy (London: MacMillan, 1992); Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism; Lodge, ed., Terrorism: A Threat to the State; Leslie MacFarlane, "Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism in Northern Ireland," Terrorism and Political Violence 4(1) (Spring 1992): 89-99; W. Nelson, "Terrorist Challenge to the Rule of Law: The British Experience," Terrorism: An International Journal 13(3) (1990): 227-236; Edgar O'Ballance, Terror in Ireland (Novato: Presidio Press, 1981); Jean Pelletier, "When to Speak Out When to Keep Silent," Peace and Security (Winter 1991/92): 6-7; Ken Robertson, "Intelligence, Terrorism and Civil Liberties," in Wilkinson and Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 549-569; Barry Rubin, ed., The Politics of Counter-Terrorism: The Ordeal of Democratic States (Washington, D.C: University of America, 1991); P. Sederberg, Terrorism and Democracy (New York: Prentice Hall Inc., 1989); Judith Shklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," in Nancy Rosenblum, ed., Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989), 21-38; John Stalker, Stalker: Ireland, "Shoot to Kill" and the "Affair" (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988); Wardlaw, Political Terrorism; Paul Wilkinson, "Pathways Out of Terrorism for Democratic Societies," in Wilkinson and Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 453-465; and Paul Wilkinson, Conflict Studies 67: Terrorism versus Liberal Democracy: The Problems of Response (London: ISC, 1976). Malcolm Anderson and Monica den Boer, eds., Policing Across National Boundaries (forthcoming in 1994); John Benyon, Liz Turnbull, Andrew Willis, and Rachael Woodward, Police Cooperation in Europe: A Preliminary Investigation (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Public Order, 1994). Chapter One - Page 32 CHAPTER ONE: THE NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION "One man's terroris t is another man's freedom fighter." Although this is a much over-used and, to many, t r i te cliche, it does, nevertheless, capture a central problem in the s tudy of terrorism: the failure to establish a universally accepted definition of the concept under study. Indeed, certain commentators believe there to be no definition of terrorism at all - merely a Babylonic confusion of meanings. However, if we are to frame effective counter-measures against the threat of terrorism, one requires, at the very least, an identification of the problem at hand in a form which allows it to be addressed in an acceptable fashion. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a satisfactory definition of international terrorism, conceptualizing the concept in a manner that will yield more than a superficial congruence of opinion. The greatest obstacle hindering the development of a generally accepted definition of terrorism is the fact that the term is associated with thoroughly negative connotations. It is not that terrorism is intrinsically more difficult to define than any other political concept, merely that it has escaped definition due to the tendency to embellish its meaning with value laden statements. As Cooper maintains, the concept of terrorism "becomes invested with meaning as a result of the process of human reasoning. Reality, as it were, is filtered through the human mind and is inevitably changed in the process. "^ In essence, terrorism has become a pejorative concept: analysts not only seek to Chapter One - Page 33 classify the act in purely objective terms but also to evaluate it by such designations as "extranormal", "immoral" and "extreme." The problem with this approach is that it is a simple fact of human life that different individuals will interpret the same reality differently. As a result, subjective evaluations of objective phenomenon can hardly be expected to yield any form of general acceptance. Indeed, whilst most people would no doubt agree that terrorism essentially falls into the "wicked" category of human behavior there are also many who interpret it as a justified (and, in some cases, heroic) form of violence -an act of self defence, ethnic expression or self-determination. Terrorism, it would thus seem, becomes dependent on one's point of view. Whilst this problem can be significantly reduced by minimizing the subjective content of the analysis, it is impossible to exclude totally a normative dimension from the discussion. At the very least, in order to be able to establish the basic criminality of terrorism, it is necessary to refer to those values and principles which have shaped the ethical and legal systems that stand opposed to the practise. For this reason, the following analysis of terrorism proceeds from a liberal democratic context and the consequential s tandards of behavior that are inherent in this philosophical political outlook. A further problem is that terrorism has become a "fad" word that has been attributed to all types of violence. The range of behavior that has been categorized under the term is so diverse as to make the concept virtually useless for research purposes. A good example of this Chapter One - Page 34 was the definition once proffered by a former National Security Adviser to Ronald Reagan, Robert McFarlane: "terroristic acts can be defined as calculated political crimes against people." So loose and vague a definition is this that it is possible to include anything from the genocide of the Third Reich to the illegal activities of the Nixon administration during the Watergate scandal under its ambit. Most definitions of terrorism tend to be variants of a basic formula stressing political acts of violence carried out by non-state actors. However, such delineations fail adequately to differentiate terrorism from other activities such as assassination, sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, they fail to capture certain elements that are fundamental to the practise of terrorism including its use as a symbolic and invariably indiscriminate form of psychological political communication. A contradictory but equally debilitating problem is that sovereign states have also been reluctant to identify certain behavior as terroristic largely as a result of national self-interest. States are unwilling to base their response to terrorism on definitional criteria alone for the simple reason that foreign or domestic political considerations invariably take precedence over legal interpretations. Afro-Asian states at the UN continually s t ress the need to "reaffirm the inalienable right to self determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination and foreign occupation" and the importance of "upholding the legitimacy of [such] struggles, in particular the struggle of National Liberation Movements."6 As such, any formula defining terrorism as politically Chapter One - Page 35 motivated violence aiming to influence the policy of a government by intimidation and/or coercion has no chance of success. Geoffrey Levitt has accurately captured this primary difficulty in reaching a generic definition of terrorism at the UN: Put simply governments that have a strong stake in the promotion of "national liberation movements" are loathe to subscribe to a definition of terrorism that would criminalize broad areas of conduct habitually resorted to by such groups; and on the other end of the spectrum, governments against which these groups' violent activities are directed are obviously reluctant to subscribe to a definition that would criminalize their own use of force in response to such activities or otherwise. Even those states that are adamant about the need for effective international cooperation against terrorism, and, hence, the necessity to define the concept, are prone to undermine their own efforts by adopting double standards and "turning a blind eye" to certain acts of terroristic violence if it suits the national interest . Examples have included a deal struck by the Italians with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) promising Italian non-interference and moderate political support in exchange for a guarantee exempting Italian citizens and terr i tory from PLO operations;9 British collusion with loyalist assassination squads such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), all of whom are opposed to the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) fighting to terminate British rule in Northern Ireland;1^ repeated reluctance on the part of the French to condemn outright either hijackings by Arab terroris ts or sabotage within Israel as well as Chapter One - Page 36 numerous instances of appeasement of Iran - a state known to sponsor terrorism. United States (US) support of counter-revolutionaries -"contras" (such as the Nicaraguan Democratic Force - FDN) resisting the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua;-1-2 South African support of the National Resistance Movement (MNR/RENAMO) in Mozambique as well as alleged sponsorship of a secret "third force" - a hit squad that was alleged to be engaged in a campaign to deliberately stir up African rivalry to enable the government to rule through a policy of divide and rule, and most recently, a Belgian decision in 1993 to refuse extradition and grant political asylum to two Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) separatists charged with terroristic offences by the Spanish government. Finally, one must not forget that those states which have recognized in terrorism a useful means for furthering their own foreign policy objectives will obviously not support efforts that aim to outlaw its use on the basis of a generic legal definition of the term. Given factors such as these, it is hardly surpris ing that no acceptable definition of terrorism has yet materialized. But it is certainly not the answer to adopt the attitude of the United Nations (UN) which attempts to deal with the problem largely by ignoring it. If effective measures are going to be brought to bear against this problem, it is essential that one move away from the position of one man's terrorist being another man's freedom fighter. What is thus needed is a conceptualization of terrorism that prevents the concept from being used without qualification to mean whatever one wants it to mean. Chapter One - Page 37 TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF TERRORISM As Wardlaw maintains, any serious student of terrorism must make a decision about how to treat the term. Should it be banished all together since it may degenerate into little more than moralized "name calling", or should it be retained whilst acknowledging that some useful distinctions can be made between different types of violence so long as one approaches the subject in an even handed manner?1 5 The latter approach will be adopted here. A definition will be formulated from the salient characteristics that differentiate terrorism as a unique manifestation of organized violence. As such, terrorism will be defined by the nature of the act, ra ther than the identity of the perpetrators . What then are the essential features of terrorism? 1) From the outset, it must be s tressed that terrorism, as dealt with in this study, is a political activity. " Whatever group we are talking about, the presence of underlying political objectives is a common characteristic. Terrorism aims at more than mere criminality: its ultimate objective is not to achieve material gain but to influence political behavior. In so doing, it is differentiated from other forms of organized criminal violence such as that undertaken by the Mafia or Hong Kong Triads. Invariably politically motivated terrorism involves a deeply held grievance over some form of perceived injustice. This may be economic or social in nature, but it is, nevertheless, always blamed on the prevailing political s t ruc ture and/or authority. Chapter One - Page 38 i s foi? PL' Almost without exception, ] higher moral imperatives which are taken in their name. Moderr appealing not simply to the sta1 they belong but also to some h For the Hizbollah hijacker, it ii crusade that is waged against Faction (RAF) kidnapper it cataclysmic revolution that class system. And for the national self-determination, a Catholics finally to free them 2) Although terrorism i manifests itself as a criminal activity, such as bombing, k are illegal under the penal < murder is punishable, witho polities. The basic criminals Nations in 1989, when the C acts of terrorism, wherevei been set aside as the UN's states have pledged to un terrorism and its underlyi A major confusion i failure to distinguish bet' rist Chapter One - Page 39 groups may well be pursuing objectives that could be regarded as legitimate, it does not necessarily follow that any means, however unjust, are thereby exonerated. Terrorists reject current norms of behavior as being manipulated in the interests of the strong against the weak and a device used by the established social order to prevent change and maintain the present s tatus quo. In this light, law is regarded as both the symbol and embodiment of the injustice and oppression that has to be removed and violence is justified as a corrective mechanism for certain types of political systems that are identified in of themselves as the equivalent of brutality. However, the basis of modern Western jur isprudence and its Judaeo-Christian values (which also form the foundation of international law) res ts on the idea that change must occur peacefully and within the context of an established legal framework. To reject this standard is, in effect, to reject the right of the established community to determine the standards of civilized behavior and to advocate an extreme form of pluralism whereby all acts are legitimatized on an individualist basis. This would necessarily entail a re turn to the Hobbesian state of nature that is characterized by nihilism and a war of all against all where life is, at best, "brutish nasty and short." 3) Terrorism should be seen as a form of psychological warfare. The immediate objective is not to destroy but, through the use or threat of violence, to create an atmosphere of fear, anxiety and collapse, exploiting this emotional reaction to influence political behavior. Viewed in this context, terrorism is, first and foremost, a psychological tactic. Chapter One - Page 40 Thornton refers to this process as disorientation - the removal of the underpinnings of order in which the targets live out their daily lives. The ultimate purpose of this tactic is to destroy the s tructural supports that give society its s t rength. Terrorists aim to both show that the government is unable to fulfill its primary security function and to destroy the solidarity, cooperation and interdependence upon which social cohesion and functioning depend. Eventually the community is reduced to pockets of frightened individuals concerned only with their personal safety and, thus , isolated from their wider social context. The most psychologically damaging factor is the unpredictability of danger whereby no one any longer knows what to expect from anybody else . 2 1 4) In order to generate the desired psychological state, terrorism has to involve an inherently indiscriminate element. Indiscrimination plays an important role in the generation of anxiety responses: the more unpredictable terrorism becomes, the more disorientating its effects tend to be. This point is emphasized in one of Raymond Aron's most perceptive observations on terrorism: "An action of violence is labelled "terrorist" when its psychological effects are out of all proportion to its purely physical result...The lack of discrimination helps to spread fear, for if no one in particular is a target, no one can be safe."2 2 When terrorism becomes predictable it loses its broader character and its effectiveness as a psychologically damaging instrument vis-a-vis a "larger" audience. The utility of the terror weapon is rooted in a feeling of helplessness, that is based on actual impotence: as the attacks appear Chapter One - Page 41 completely irrational it precludes the possibility of responding in any rational manner. However, when one knows against whom and from where the terroris t is likely to strike, one can take the appropriate counter-measures. The indiscriminate element of terrorism does not deny the fact that terroris t groups have a primary target audience whom they are trying to influence and against whom they will concentrate their acts of violence. However, it does affirm the assertion that they will not necessarily limit their activities to this group alone and are prepared to engage in indiscriminate violence in pursui t of their overall objectives. Indeed, by their very nature, it is impossible to ensure that bomb attacks, one of the most characteristic forms of terrorism, will only result in the deaths of selected victims, especially when they occur on board aircraft en route to international destinations. The destruction of an Air India Boeing 747 from Canada to London in June 1985 by the Dashmesh Regiment - killing all 329 aboard - is a case in point. Equally illustrative was the death of 16 Puerto Rican pilgrims who happened to be in the departure lounge of Lod Airport in Israel in 1972 when the Japanese Red Army (JRA) decided to launch their attack against "Zionist Imperialism." Furthermore, the reluctance of tourists to travel to areas of high terrorist activity, such as the UK, Middle East and Latin America, underscores the basic proposition that terrorism is a peculiarly arbi trary type of violence that ensures no one can be absolutely certain of their basic safety. Chapter One - Page 42 Many commentators have argued that terrorism should not be seen as an indiscriminate tactic, maintaining that to designate it as such, necessarily means excluding the activities of those that selectively target victims such as the German RAF and Commando Holger Mains (CHM). ^ However, as long as these activities precipitate a widespread fear that others might be harmed in the future, they are terroristic. It should be remembered that it is the terrorist , operating according to h is /her own specific and peculiar code of conduct, that decides who is and who is not a legitimate target . As a result, it is impossible to know who will be considered "legitimate" victims in the next attack. Given this situation, all must assume themselves to be potential future targets . As Wilkinson observes: ...even when terrorists claim to select individual targets they do so, of necessity, clandestinely and according to their own idiosyncratic codes. No one can be certain that they will not be the next victim. It is of the very nature of this kind of violence that terrorists, in order to terrorize their audience, strike like lightening in the dark. The indiscriminate nature of terrorism, by creating fear in a larger group than the immediate victims, necessarily gives the practise a perceived threat out of all proportion to its actual effect. This, consequently, makes it a relatively efficient weapon. It only requires a few well placed bombs to explode successfully to induce a general state of panic and fear. The actions of the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA - the armed wing of the Pan African Congress) in South Africa in December 1992 vividly demonstrate this point. Although the attacks on a golf club and restaurant only resulted in the deaths of five whites, at Chapter One - Page A3 the time they precipitated a general and widespread fear of an escalating and increasingly threatening tide of black against white violence. 6) Terrorism is essentially a form of violence that involves non-combatant civilian and military victims. The attacks perpetrated by the terrorist are nearly always carried out against the civilian population. No attempt is made to minimize such casualties. Indeed, civilians are deliberately targeted as a way of delivering a message that is designed to shock. This systematic murder of civilians completely violates the political and ethical codes of all states that uphold the sanctity of human life.27 The three most "spectacular" acts of international terrorism have all involved the mass murder of non-combatants: the explosions aboard the Air India Boeing 747 in June 1985, a Pan Am Boeing 747 in December 1988 and a UTA DC-10 in September 1989, resulting in the respective deaths of 329, 279 and 171 civilians.2° Especially in India, the civilian targeted nature of terrorism seems to have reached chronic proportions. In terms of total casualties, it ranks as one of the most terrorism-battered countries in the world, consistently being placed in the "top ten" list of nations for the last six 29 years. * Acts that are carried out against the military can also be said to be terroristic in nature when they are directed against troops not deployed in an active combat role. When terror is ts do target the military it is almost always done for the psychological ra ther than material effect with attacks typically occurring in a non-combatant context. Soldiers are Chapter One - Page 44 killed, for example, while on leave, eating out in res taurants or sleeping in their barracks. These actions violate the non-combatant immunity principle that is an inherent aspect of those articulated norms, customs, professional codes, legal precepts, religious/philosophical principles and reciprocal arrangements which shape our judgements of military conduct in the western world. The purpose of this "war convention" is to set certain classes of people outside the permissible range of warfare whereby the killing of any one of their numbers is to be regarded not as a legitimate act of war but as a crime. Although military terminology is often used by terroris ts to describe their activities against soldiers, it should be remembered that terroris ts are unable to engage combat troops in a sustained counter-force strategy. As such, they follow an alternative counter-value strategy - utilizing the "politics of atrocity"^2 similar to that characteristically adopted in "civilian" operations. The killing of non-combatant soldiers is, thus, analogous to brutal and wanton murder in the sense that it involves the targeting of individuals who, like innocent civilians, are not currently engaged in, or prepared for, the business of fighting war. The non-combatant nature of terrorism sets it apart from other forms of low intensity conflict such as guerrilla war and wars of national liberation. Guerrilla war is a type of unconventional para-military operation in which hit and run tactics are employed against a far stronger active military opponent with the purpose of wearing down the enemy to the point where it is possible to engage it in conventional Chapter One - Page 45 warfare. Terrorism, on the other hand, is a form of psychological warfare that is used to create extreme fear through the use or threat of force against non-combatant civilian/military targets . The important point to note is that guerrillas are primarily concerned with active military enemy targets , whereas terror is ts are primarily concerned with non-combatant targets. The distinction between the two has been undermined because guerrilla forces have, on occasions, attacked civilian populations-" while terror is ts , when they do engage military personnel, tend to characterize their activity as a form of "urban guerrilla warfare." However, all that this should alert the analyst to is that terrorism, as a mode of conduct, is open to any who choose to use it. There is, thus, no need to accept the cliche stated at the beginning of this chapter that "one man's terroris t is another "man's freedom fighter." This is merely a reflection that some groups have adopted terrorism in pursui t of goals that are perceived as internationally legitimate, such as wars of national liberation. It is very important to be able to distinguish between terrorism and other forms of low intensity conflict if one is ever to have a chance of formulating an internationally acceptable generic definition of terrorism. To this extent, there seems to be an increasing awareness at the UN, that even favored national liberation movements should not be allowed to engage in particular acts of violence against certain targets and acceptance of the norm that the deliberate targeting of civilians and non-combatant military personnel should be treated as an international crime. Chapter One - Page 46 7) Terrorism is systematic. It is an organized policy that aims to achieve certain political objectives through a sustained campaign of terror . This distinguishes its use from isolated acts of te r ror which merely aim at the calculated production of an immediate state of extreme fear. Terrorism goes beyond this. It seeks to generate a prolonged condition of anxiety with the objective of exploiting this emotional reaction to manipulate later political conduct. To realize this end, acts of violence necessarily have to be repeated. One single incident will not suffice, as, once it is over, there will be no further inducement to alter future behavior. Wardlaw argues that it is not particularly useful to distinguish between isolated and systematic acts of terror in practise. This is because it is not possible to know how to classify a particular act until it is seen, or not seen, as par t of a wider pat tern. For instance, a killing that occurs today may be initially classified as a "simple" case of murder yet reclassified some months later as a more complex case of terrorism if further killings establish a pat tern. Given that isolated acts of violence can come to be so easily reclassified as a systematic policy of terrorism, it is rather frivolous and pointless, argues Wardlaw, to attempt to make any such distinction. " However, it is important to remember that if one were to exclude the systematic element from a definition of terrorism, one would also lose the essential quality of the practise as a deliberate type of psychological warfare that is designed to sap the community of the will to resist through a sustained policy of terror . In this context, the Chapter One - Page 47 extent of the threat posed by a particular act should not be assessed until it is seen, or not seen, as par t of a wider policy: if one has to reclassify an act at a later stage, so be it. Initially to label an isolated incident as terrorist ic would be to imply that it has the same coercive potential as a sustained policy of terrorism. This is a serious mistake. An isolated incident poses no further risk to society beyond its immediate danger and, hence, has no additional power to influence political behavior. A sustained policy of terrorism, however, carries with it the threat of continued aggression if certain demands are not met and, thus , has a prolonged ability to further manipulate conduct. It is jus t as essential to distinguish between the threat posed by isolated acts of te r ror and a sustained policy of terrorism as it is to differentiate between the danger posed by a single outbreak of small pox and a general epidemic. 8) Terrorism must be seen as a means of political communication in which violent acts are committed to gain attention and/or a hearing. It is the very essence of terrorism that it be noticed. Advertising not only demonstrates the existence of a group but also serves as a reminder of its political agenda. By staging dramatic acts, terroris ts are able to project themselves as a group that must be listened to and taken account of. In so doing, terroris ts are able to exploit Bakunin's theory of the propaganda of the deed which conveys the following message: "We are here. Look what we can do. Heed us or worse will follow."^° Used in this fashion, terrorism can be employed as a means to demonstrate the inability of a ruling government to protect its subjects; to confirm the Chapter One - Page 48 invulnerability of the perpetrators ; to justify actions; to spread terror; or to transfer guilt by blaming the consequences of all violence on the opposing government authorities. By their very nature, terroris t groups are too small and ineffectual to achieve their results through a direct confrontation with the state. In this context, the importance of the modern processes of mass communications acting as a vehicle for the transmission of their messages cannot be overlooked. Margaret Thatcher once referred to the media as providing the terror is t with the "oxygen of publicity." Whilst this may be an exaggeration, there is an element of t ruth in the statement. As Ted Koppel, ABC's nightline host, once put it: "Without [the media] terrorism becomes rather like the philosopher's tree falling in the forest: no one hears it fall and therefore it has no reason for being."^1 Maximum exposure via television, radio, satellite and newspaper ensures that the terrorist is able to carry his /her conflict r ight to the very heart of the audience that he /she is trying to influence. Without this publicity the terrorist could not hope to achieve the necessary emotional reaction that is requi