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Post-Dayton: prospects for peace in Bosnia-Hercegovina Tudakovic, Emina Marija 1998

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POST-DAYTON: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA by EMLNA MARIJA T U D A K O V I C B.A. , The University of British Columbia, 1995 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL F U L F I L L M E N T OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF M A S T E R OF ARTS in THE F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES Department of Political Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH C O L U M B I A October 1998 © Emina Marija Tudakovic, 1998 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, 1 agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of fehltccx\ S c i g h C P The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date October W , DE-6 (2/88) 1 1 Abstract In 1995, after a brutal four-year war in Bosnia and Hercegovina, the initialing of the Dayton Accords brought an end to the violence. By accepting the Accord, the former warring parties agreed on both a cessation of hostilities and a framework for a Bosnian and Hercegovian state. This state has legal existence in international law and consists of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina and the Republika Srpska. The success of the peace agreement in putting an end to the violence has been witnessed in the past two and a half years. However, the question remains, and this is the principal focus of the thesis, what are the long-term prospects for peace in Bosnia? The analysis focuses on the long-term aspects of ethnic conflict regulation: peace-making and peace-building. The approach used in this analysis is two-fold. First, we rely heavily on Fen Osier Hampson's framework for evaluating the Accords as they fit into the wider body of literature on peace settlements. Second, we employ the assumption that the best way to prevent a recurrence of ethnic conflict is to reverse the processes that led to it in the first place. To that end, we identify some of the processes that led to the war and analyse the present situation in Bosnia as to whether or not these processes are being reversed. The author concludes that although the range of issues covered by Dayton can be generally evaluated as well-written and comprehensive, serious problems remain. Most importantly, the structures put into place do little to reduce the saliency of ethnic ties. Further, although there has been progress, many of the issues which fuelled the conflict remain a problem. i i i Table of Contents Page Introduction 1 Theory 5 How it all began 11 Reversing the Causes 22 The media and propaganda 22 War Criminals and the International Court in Hague 29 The Economy 36 So Now We've Got Bosnia, Where Are the Bosnians? 46 This Isn't Going to Work Without Trust 53 Inter-Entity Links and Co-operation 53 Refugee Repatriation 59 Muslim-Croat Federation (Or lack thereof) 69 Pasos, Molim! (Passport, Please!) 75 Elections 82 We Can't Do This Alone 93 Analysis and Conclusion - Hope Must be Maintained 100 Bibliography 109 List of Tables Page Table 1 - Peace in Bosnia 10 Table 2 - Voter Turnout in the 1996 Municipal Elections in Bosnia 88 V Lis t o f Figures Page Figure 1 The Olympic Stadium, converted into a graveyard during the 4 siege of Sarajevo. Figure 2 The hotel Saraj where the first steps towards the Dayton 4 Agreement were taken in secret meetings. Figure 3 Sarajevo daycare destroyed during the siege. 21 Figure 4 Rasim Ceramagic, political editor of Oslobojne. 22 Figure 5 The destroyed head office of Energoinvest, formerly one of the 37 largest companies. Figure 6 Dzevahira Kameric, Sarajevo pensioner. 39 Figure 7 A destroyed apartment in Sarajevo. 42 Figure 8 Dildar Gartenberg, OSCE election observer. 65 1 One could never have supposed that, after passing through so many trials, after being schooled by the scepticism of our times, we had so much left in our souls to be destroyed. 1 At one extreme is the obvious position that there must be a solution for the simple reason that no crisis, however deep and intricate, has been left without some kind of solution. Given sufficient time, a solution eventually emerges. That, of course, does not say much except that hope must be maintained.^ Introduction Just outside Sarajevo airport lies the suburb of Dobrinja, and it is here, at just past six o'clock in the morning where I get my first look at the capital of Bosnia and Hercegovina.3 Nearly two years to the day when, in 1995, the Dayton Accords put an end to the four-year war that had raged in Bosnia, Dobrinja is still a horrifying site. Charred and crumpled buildings serve as poignant reminders of life that is now gone. Eerily empty buildings stand as relics to times past and in a playground the frame of a swingset hangs as an effigy to the past over crowded tombstones which now indicate what it is. With the initialling of the Dayton Accords the violence in Bosnia ended and the former warring parties agreed on both a cessation of hostilities and a framework for a Bosnian and Hercegovian state. The first part of the Accord deals with the military aspects of the peace agreement. It focuses on the cessation of military hostilities between the warring parties, the establishment of demilitarised zones and the implementation of United Nations peacekeeping forces. 1 Alexander Herzen (1848) as quoted in "Afterword.," in The Black Book of Bosnia: the Consequences of Appeasement, ed. Nader Mousaizdeh (New York: BasicBooks, 1996), 191. 2 Mihailo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama. 2d ed., (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), 250. 2 The secondary aspects of the Accord are principally held in Annex Four, the Constitution of Bosnia. The Constitution holds that there is a Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina which has a legal existence in international law as a state. This state consists of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina and the Republika Srpska. The Federation is made up of a tenacious alliance between the Muslims and Croatians and responsibilities of governance are divided up between the Federal Government and the entities. The past two and a half years bear witness to the success of the Accords in bringing an end to the violence in Bosnia. But the question remains, what are the long-term prospects for peace in Bosnia? Bosnia is a country whose tripartite presidency is so incapable of co-operation that United Nations officials had to organise the presidential inauguration after discussions broke down over the choice of music to be played. It is a country made up of two distinct entities squarely at odds with one another where de facto power in one resides with war criminals. It is also a place where day-to-day governmental decisions are decided principally by a representative from the United Nations. It is a state where pensioners receive their money sporadically i f at all, where in the capital water is available for only four hours a day and where the streets are eerily empty of young people and where playgrounds and Olympic Stadiums serve as overcrowded graveyards. However, even a fragile peace is better than war, and signs of hope are emerging. The Croatian-Muslim alliance is still holding and there was cross over voting in the multi-ethnic city of Tuzla. Phone and bus lines in the country have been re-established and trains are expected to run by fall. Some multi-ethnic radio and television stations are available and there are several 3 Hereafter referred to as Bosnia or B i H . 3 newspapers committed to the Bosnian ideal. Although still a contentious and incomplete issue, some war criminals are being persecuted by the tribunal in Hague and, perhaps the most encouraging sign yet, people are voting in the elections signalling a commitment to the Accords. The approach used in this analysis will be two-fold. A portion of this paper will evaluate the Dayton Accords as they fit into the wider body of literature on peace settlements. The second portion will identify some of the processes that led to the war and analyse the present situation in Bosnia as to whether or not these processes are being reversed. To that end we will look at recent literature on peace accords and the causes of the Yugoslav conflicts. The rest of the paper is divided into five sections. The first section is in keeping with the theme of reversing the causes of the conflict. It includes discussions on the media and propaganda, war criminals and the economy. The second section focuses on the important question of Bosnian national identity. Third, we look at trust building and co-operative measures. These include inter-Entity links, refugee repatriation and the Muslim-Croat Federation. Fourth, we discuss the results and problems associated with post-Dayton elections. Finally, we will discuss the international community's involvement and regional actors. 4 5 Theory The question of how to sustain peace in a country which bears the scars of conflict is as fascinating as it is complex. The Dayton Accords are certainly not unique in that they are an agreement on a cessation of hostilities and a framework for ongoing negotiation and co-operation between warring parties. Therefore, the Accords, although retaining unique elements to themselves, can be placed in a wider theoretical body of literature. Stephen Ryan, in Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, provides us with a three-step model for conflict resolution. He divides his study into three sections: peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building. Peace-keeping is a military activity which deals with the problem of violence and aims to stop it. Peace-making is a political activity which deals with the target group of decision-makers and is a "political and diplomatic activity directed at reconciling political and strategical attitudes through mediation, negotiation, arbitration or conciliation."4 Peace-building deals with long-term strategies which deal with negative attitudes and socio-economic structures. As the violence ended more than two years ago, this analysis will focus on the long term aspects of ethnic conflict regulation: the functions of peace-making and peace-building. The theoretical approach used in this analysis will be two-fold. The first section will evaluate the Dayton Accords as they fit into the wider body of literature on peace settlements. The second approach will utilise the assumption that the best antidote for ethnic conflict is to reverse or eliminate the processes that led to it in the first place. This assumes that we can identify some of the processes that led to the war and find solutions to them. 4 Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations (Vermont: Darmouth Publishing Company, 1990), 6 Peace accords, as often as not, are greeted with scepticism by all parties, even those who have a sincere hope that the accord will prevail and peace will persist. On the most basic level, scepticism is warranted because a peace accord is not a guarantee of peace. It is simply a piece of paper that has been signed by parties involved in the conflict who, because their interests require it, have seen fit to be party to it. In Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail, Fen Osier Hampson places an emphasis on how the implementation process affects the possibilities of achieving a durable peace settlement. Quoting Kal Holsti, he notes that peace agreements sometimes contain the seeds of their own destruction and that the success or failure of a settlement depends largely on the ability of it to "anticipate and devise means to cope with the issues of the future" where a failure to do so may "set the stage for future areas of conflict and war."5 Hampson has four major points for evaluating accords. On a general level they are: third party involvement, characteristics of conflict processes, dynamics of regional/systemic power relationships and the range of issues covered by the settlement in question. We will examine each of these in more detail. One of the central arguments of Hampson's book, an issue also touched upon by Ryan, is that third party involvement is necessary for the success of a peace settlement. As was witnessed in the ex-Yugoslav case, third party peace-keepers while, on their "own cannot reverse destructive processes ... [they] can, by reducing violence, hold them in check and so provide a breathing space or cooling off period which may be used for constructive ends".6 103. 5 Fen Osier Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 1. 6 Ryan, 106. 7 These constructive ends can include the assistance of third parties during the mediation, negotiation and implementation phases of settlements. Further, by providing mediation assistance and by exerting pressures and influences on the combatants, third parties can influence provisions of the settlements. This brings us to the second of Hampson's four points, the characteristics of conflict processes. This hinges on his idea that there is a point of ripeness in a conflict where the conditions are most amenable to a solution and that, regardless of external factors, much of the success or failure of a peace settlement will hinge on these internal components of the conflict. Extrapolating from Hampson, although they may not all need to be present, there appear to be four key requirements for ripeness. The first deals with the fact that the interests of combatants may have changed to a point where they are no longer content with conflict. This may occur with a change of leadership, pressures from the constituency or, I would add, when conflict is no longer a means to the goals of the group. Second, all parties share the same perceptions about the desirability of the accords and, third, they have agreed on a process to settle their disagreements. Finally, ripeness may occur when there is a formula or a solution available to end the conflict.7 Of interest here is William Zartman's notion of a mutually hurting stalemate, "where the countervailing power of each side, though insufficient to make the other side lose, prevents it from winning".8 Hampson's third notion considers regional and systemic power structures. Systemic power structures, be they the bi-polar rivalry that marked the Cold War or, conversely, the 7 Hampson, 14. 8 William I. Zartman, "The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts," in Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 24. 8 changes in the system of states with the collapse of the Soviet Union are, according to Hampson, relevant when analysing peace settlements. Also of interest is his notion that most civil conflicts "are usually embedded in the politics of a "regional security complex' ... [which] suggests that the success of a peace settlement is inextricably tied to the interests of neighbouring regional powers and their overall commitment to the peace process".9 In a case such as Bosnia, where the actions and influences of neighbouring states such as Croatia and Yugoslavia directly affect the internal politics of the state, the idea of these regional security complexes is relevant. The final issue that Hampson raises, the range of issues covered by the settlement in question, has a great deal of relevance when we look at the Dayton Accords and evaluate them by judging the points that they cover. Hampson uses Holsti's eight prerequisites for peace to evaluate peace accords and extrapolates Holsti's interstate ideas to the intrastate scenario. The first area calls for a "system of government that embodies certain norms of what constitutes acceptable behaviour".10 The next two, legitimacy and assimilation, relate to socio-political conditions in the country. According to Holsti, legitimacy can refer to both horizontal and vertical dimensions. The first deals with "authority, consent, and loyalty to the idea(s) of the state and its institutions; the second deals with the definition and political role of the community."11 For the purposes of our case study, horizontal legitimacy, in particular as it refers to "the attitudes and practices of individuals and groups within the state toward each other and ultimately to the state that encompasses them"12 is of greater importance. The next four all 9 Hampson, 19. 1 0 Hampson, 20. 1 1 Ka l Holsti, The State. War, and the State of War. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 84. 1 2 Holsti, 87. 9 relate to mechanisms for preventing conflict. These include a powerful deterrent system, conflict-resolving procedures and institutions, procedures for peaceful change and an agreement that war is not an acceptable solution. The final point, perhaps the most crucial one, is that there must be "a system for anticipating issues that are potential sources of new conflict and for monitoring and handling them before they erupt into violence."13 There are other factors to be considered in peace accord evaluation. A crucially important adage to remember is that it is not possible to resolve conflict "if you leave out some of the protagonists and/or fundamental points of difference remain unresolved."14 Therefore, as alluded to above, the peace process must include co-opting all combatants and issues of contention and, if this is impossible, to ensure that mechanisms will be put in place by the peace accord to deal with these issues when they reappear later. The Dayton Accords may be placed in this wider theoretical body of literature. In evaluating the Accords and the peace in Bosnia we will primarily utilise three out of the four points Hampson employs for evaluating accords (Table 1 - Peace in Bosnia). These will include third party involvement and dynamics of regional/systemic power relationships but will mostly focus on the range of issues covered by the Accords. In the next chapter we will look at some of the events that led to the Yugoslav crisis in the first place. The focus will be on more recent events but we will include some historical background. This will provide the background for our second approach in assessing the prospects for peace in Bosnia. This 1 3 Hampson, 20. 1 4 John M Richardson and Jianxin Wang, "Peace Accords: Seeking Conflict Resolution in Deeply Divided Societies," in Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict, ed. K . M . de Silva and S.W.R. de A Samarasinghe (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993) 185. 10 approach will assume that the best antidote for ethnic conflict is to reverse the processes that lead to it in the first place. Table 1 PEACE IN BOSNIA (A) (B) (C) Third Party Regional/Systemic Range of Issues Covered by Peace Involvement Power Systems Agreement (a) Peacekeeping (a) Neighbouring States (a) Conflict Prevention (b) Mediation/Arbitration (b) System of Government (c) Legitimacy (d) Assimilation (e) Ability to Cope with New Issues 11 How it all began At a time which now seems an eternity ago but was, in reality, less then a decade ago, Yugoslavia was described as a country with "seven neighbours, six republics, five nations, four languages, three religions, two scripts, and one goal: to live in brotherhood and unity."15 A country born out of conflict with a foundation built on diversity, The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Yugoslavia's predecessor, officially came into existence on December 1, 1918. With the exception of Slovenia, all six of the Yugoslav republics had been medieval states. Bosnia was an independent state through some of the medieval period but was also under Croat and Hungarian rule. Under Tvrtko I, who was crowned King of both Bosnia and Serbia, Bosnia reached its territorial and political maximum in 1377. At the Battle of Kosovo, Tvrtko I's armies took part on the Serbian side. A l l these episodes are worth noting because they later formed the basis for some Serb and Croat territorial claims. By the end of the fifteenth century, Bosnia had been conquered by Turks and was a pasaluk (region) of the Ottoman Empire. During Ottoman rule, large numbers of the Slavic peoples in Bosnia converted to Islam. After four centuries of Ottoman rule, the Turks ceded autonomy to Bosnia in the San Stefano Agreement. Six months later, in August 1878, the Berlin Congress revised the agreement and Bosnia became a protectorate of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.16 Croatia's history is long and varied. The independent Croat medieval state reached its peak under King Tomislav in the late tenth century. Tomislav conquered a fairly substantial state which included roughly Croatia today and parts of Bosnia and Montenegro. In 1102, with the signing of the Pacta Conventa between Croatia and Hungary, Croatia lost much of its 1 5 Cmobrnja, 15. 12 independence. From then, into the First World War, Croatia's ruling nobility were subjects of either Hungary or the Austro-Hungarian Empire.17 Of interest, as noted by Mihailo Crnobrnja, the former Yugoslav ambassador to the European Community, was "the constant and persistent attempt by the Croatian nobility, and later the Croatian intelligentsia, to attain and maintain as high a degree of autonomy as possible."18 The Serbian medieval state, centred in and around what is now the Yugoslav province of Kosovo, was founded by King Nemanja in the 1100's. In 1389, defeat at the hands of Turks at the Battle of Kosovo ended the independence of the Serbian state. However, unlike many of the peoples in Bosnia, most Serbs did not convert to Islam but retained their Christian Orthodox religion. Serbia received autonomy in 1830, independence from 1845-78 and was received, at the Congress of Berlin, as a sovereign state. This led to a Serb movement to strengthen its ties with Serbs living in Bosnia. This triggered the annexation of Bosnia by Austria in 1909. Tensions culminated in the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, which sparked the First World War.1 9 The idea of a Yugoslav (South Slav) State was first introduced in the 1860's by the Croatian Bishop Josip Stossmajer and the Serbian foreign minister, Ilija Garasanin. According to Lenard J. Cohen, "for most Serbs the idea of South Slav unity before World War I was a useful concept only to the extent that it might facilitate and hasten the achievement of Serbia's distinct national and territorial goals."20 The Croats, on the other hand, envisioned unity either 1 6 Crnobrnja, 23. 1 7 Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged In War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 9-107. 1 8 Crnobrnja, 25. 1 9 Crnobrnja, 31-32. 2 0 Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition. 2d ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 6-7. 13 under the auspices of the Hapsburg Empire or in a country constructed along federal lines. Moreover, the idea of a trans-Slavic state was met in many circles with suspicion and never received widespread support. However, in the decade preceding the First World War, the spread of education and intellectual discourse promoted youth movements towards a unified Slav state. Enthusiasm for the idea was further bolstered, in 1905, by the formation of a Serb-Croat coalition. The First World War changed the political situation in the region dramatically. The Croatians and Slovenians, as members of the Monarchy, fought against the Serbs. According to Cohen, this intensified "the extent of interethnic distance and territorial fragmentation that already existed among the major South Slav peoples."21 However, throughout the war, the so-called Yugoslav Committee, composed primarily of Croatians, continued to espouse the idea of a South Slav state. Their vision was for a state based along federal lines and opposed to any idea of a Greater Serb state. In the Corfu Declaration, the Serbian leader, Nikola Pasic, agreed with the Committee, to the creation of a parliamentary and democratic state. The issues of federalism were left undecided, but, nonetheless, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was declared in 1918. However, the undecided issues of federalism soon became a problem. The Serbs, used to their unitary Serb state, were unwilling to give up a politically dominant role. They were also unwilling to have the country divided into federal units which would leave some pockets of Serbs on the units of other ethnic groups. The Croats and Slovenes continued to stress federalist principles. The reality of power in this new State was that it was highly centralised in 2 1 Cohen, 10-11. 14 Belgrade. This caused constant bickering between the country's leaders which, along with the rampant financial corruption, served to weaken any linkages between ethnic groups. Urifortunately, the situation was such that "the general atmosphere of interregional and internationality distrust and recrimination tended to strengthen the respective ethnic loyalties."22 In 1939, a new agreement between Serb and Croat leaders led to the recognition of a Croatian nation. It gave the Croatian government control over all administrative aspects of governance save for military, trade and foreign policy. Unfortunately, according to Crnobrnja, this agreement came too late. The Croatian far right disliked the agreement because they felt that it gave up too many powers. Conversely, the Serbs felt that the agreement signalled an end to Serbian domination. The worst problems came when the agreement was followed by calls for autonomous Slovenian, Bosnian and Serb units. Within ten days of the beginning of the Second World War the German army had occupied the country. Parts of Slovenia and Serbia were annexed to Germany, while the bulk of Slovenia and Dalmatia went to Italy. A puppet regime was installed in Serbia and a puppet independent Croatia had militant right-wing Ustashi, who had been training in Italy, for a government. Bosnia was put under the control of the Croatian State. During the war, Ante Pavelic and his Croatian government conducted a campaign of terror and genocide against minorities in Croatia and Bosnia. A guerrilla Serb movement, the Chetniks, soon emerged in opposition and became well known for their brutality. However, the fate of Yugoslavia was to be decided by a rag tag band known as Partisani. Led by Josip Broz Tito, who had been the 2 2 Cohen, 16. 15 head of the small Communist party prior to the war, they fought not only against the German occupiers but against both Ustashi and Chetniks. When the Second World War ended, Tito and his Partisani overwhelmingly won the first post-war elections.23 Tito's Yugoslavia was formulated on principles very different from the 1918 version. First, the bloody events of the war and the interethnic discord prompted an emphasis on brotherhood and unity, that is, mutual respect and equality for all the ethnic groups. However, unlike Germans, who for years after the war engaged in discussions about "collective guilt," Tito closed this chapter and "thought that by encouraging the population to look to national reconciliation, wounds would be healed."24 Second, Yugoslavia was anti-centralist and formulated along federal principles. Unfortunately, boundaries were never officially determined nor fixed in law. Tito's third principle dealt with the position of Serbs in Yugoslavia. Tito wished to ensure that they would be unable to dominant this Yugoslavia. To that end, autonomous provinces for Hungarian (Vojvodina) and Albanian (Kosovo) minorities were created out of portions of Serbia. This was not done to areas of Croatia populated by minorities so as to not diminish the power of the only ethnic group which could act as a balance to the Serbs.25 However, it should not be forgotten that power in Yugoslavia rested with Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY). They "had no interest in permitting the country's traditional cultural and territorial divisions to become the basis for political pluralism or 2 3 The elections were most likely rigged in some way. However, it is contented that they would have still won the elections just not by such a huge majority. 2 4 Crnobrnja, 69. 2 5 Crnobrnja, 69-70. 16 genuine decentralisation."26 The regime hoped that its centralised, planned economic program would lead to prosperity which would reduce the saliency of ethnic ties. The Tito years, although hardly Utopian, were marked as a period of relative prosperity in the region. However, by the last years of his reign, the economy was showing signs of faltering. After his death in 1980, a power vacuum emerged. This lack of a strong central leadership, coupled with a faltering economy, began the unravelling of Yugoslavia. By the late 1980's, citizens of Yugoslavia, in particular Slovenes and Croatians, found themselves moving from the federal government and towards their republics as their source of political and economic life. As Susan Woodward notes, "since the mid-1970s, extensive economic decentralisation had narrowed Yugoslav political life, much of communication, and the perspectives of the younger generation to the republic rather than the country as a whole."27 By the mid-1980s, as the country's economy faltered, the federal government's inability to initiate and cause change had become evident. In 1984, official unemployment stood at close to fourteen percent, with poorer republics, such as Bosnia, suffering from as much as twenty-three percent unemployment. Facing a growing debt crisis, the federal government was forced by the international community to institute drastic economic reforms, including the re-centralisation of some industries. However, politicians of the wealthiest two regions, Croatia and Slovenia, resisted reforms because they had benefited most from the earlier economic decentralisation. By 1987, these disagreements had risen to constitutional issues centred around who had the authority to decide on economic issues and on proposals for changes in the political structure. 2 6 Cohen, 26. 2 7 Susan L . Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 71. 17 The inability of the federal government to enact reform and the resistance of the republics led to progressive victories of the republics on issues of interest to them and to the radically delegitimization of the federal government's powers. The Yugoslav government's attempts to increase its power to strengthen the economy only weakened the state itself. Further, growing uncertainties caused by large-scale unemployment fostered greater cultural nationalism and religious solidarity.28 At the same time, with the rise of such charismatic leaders as Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, the political arenas, in particular in the republics, became increasingly a matter of personal power and skill. By 1992, some stores were replacing pictures of Tito with Tudjman or Milosevic. Both leaders, but particularly Milosevic, gathered support for their policies through a language of national victimisation for their respective ethnic group. For Milosevic, the legendary Battle of Kosovo again became the main myth and rallying point for the Serb people.29 It must also be stressed that the control of media in both Republics by these leaders served to reinforce and spread racist ethnic myths. The answer to the question of why ethnic nationalism arose in Yugoslavia has been alluded to above. Economic and political decentralisation led to a situation where individuals found their fortunes tied to those of their republics. This ties in with Russell Hardin's political issues of group co-ordination, in particular the ones relating to the allocation of positional and distributional goods.30 In times of economic austerity, the question of who has access to what has ever greater relevance. The rise of the republics in the political scene and the manipulation 2 8 Woodward, 86. 2 9 Crnobrnja, 31. 3 0 Russell Hardin. One for A l l : The Logic of Group Conflict (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 56. 18 of ethnic sentiments by elites attempting to consolidate and increase their power also contributed to the rise of ethnic nationalism. As Woodward notes, This language of national exploitation, national integrity, and moral right portrayed these issues in ethical terms, replacing economic ideology and legalistic disquisitions on governments' economic property rights brought on by the severe restrictions of the stabilisation program. This shift only escalated conflict further because it transformed conflict within elite circles over economic choices, which could temporarily be evaded with inflation, into non-negotiable questions of identity.31 Further, the uncertainty brought about by changes in the late 1980s led people to cling to what Michael Ignatieff notes is their "primary form of belonging": ethnicity. Also of interest is whether or not there was a history of subordination and domination between ethnic communities in Yugoslavia. Nationalist leaders used a perceived history of inequality between the ethnic groups as a crutch to prop up nationalist propaganda. This practice was aided by statistical evidence which noted that, for example, the 1972-73 "purge of Croatian nationalists from government posts and the subsequent political alienation of many Croatian citizens had had the effect of increasing substantially the proportion of Serbs in local government jobs in many communities".32 This was countered by Serbs who could easily be convinced that they had lost the most during Yugoslavia as, under Tito, they were no longer allowed to dominate the political scene. 3'Woodward, 99. 3 2 Woodward, 109. 19 By the late 1980's, the disintegration of legitimate authority in Yugoslavia was blatantly evident. The Federal government had lost the ability to enact even basic economic or social reforms. Power was devolving increasingly to the republics and by the time elections were held in 1990, "all the less visible bonds that hold any society together were collapsing — the rules of mutual obligation, the checks and balances, the equilibrating mechanisms, the assumption of minimal security of one's person and status."33 Political elites, striving to maintain and increase their personal power, grabbed at the appealing ties of ethnic nationalism as a means to finding voting blocs and establishing a support base. Further, as already noted, the disintegration of authority led to a need for individuals to turn towards their ethnic group for stability and security. Negative stereotypes fuelled fear and hostility. The question of how true these ethnic myths were is irrelevant. The fact that the perceptions existed was enough. As Ignatieff notes, "a nationalist minority on both sides went to work on their deeply intertwined common past, persuading all and sundry, including outsiders, that Serbs and Croats have been massacring each other since time immemorial. History has no such lesson to teach."34 It should also be noted that the myth of centuries of fighting between Croats and Serbs, that Western media were so quick to point out, was simply untrue. As Crnobrnja notes, "most of the fighting has occurred in the twentieth century, which fact provides for the vividness of memories."35 By the time mass violence broke out in 1991, Yugoslavia was effectively a failed state. The republics were resisting the authority of both the federal government and the Yugoslav National Army. Ethnic groups were fighting amongst each other and the federal government 3 3 Woodward, 116. 3 4 Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism. (Toronto: Penguin Books Canada Ltd., 1993) 15. 3 5 Crnobrnja, 9. 20 was powerless to stop them. The state was failing to provide basic security to its inhabitants. The classic neo-realist system of anarchy was in place in the country of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia would prove to be the scene of the most violent conflicts. External factors also contributed to the conflict. The international community's recognition of internal republican borders as sovereign fuelled the arguments of those camps, particularly in Serbia and Croatia, which had come to recognise the borders as written in stone. Further, international recognition of existing borders and legitimisation of the right to self-determination for some groups fuelled the sovereignist claims of other minorities. In Bosnia, Serbs, backed by the Yugoslav national army, carried on policies of ethnic cleansing and a territorial grab aimed, first, at a Muslim and Croat alliance. In one of the saddest episodes of the war, for a period, the Muslims and Croats began warring with each other, most visibly in the city of Mostar. They eventually made their peace, but not until a high level of mistrust had developed between the two groups. By the time final negotiations to end the war began in the summer of 1995, the Croatian army, still giddy from its victories in Croatian Slavonia, had managed to recapture some of the Serb territorial gains. Finally, the time appeared ripe for peace and with the aid of American power, an agreement was reached in Dayton. No single cause for the Yugoslav crisis can be identified. By the 1980's the Yugoslav economy was faltering. Tito had left no credible successor and a dangerous power vacuum had emerged. The re-emergence of ethnic politics and the election of racist, power hungry leaders in the Republics weakened the bonds that held Yugoslavia together. These leaders, who tightly controlled media, were the spark which ignited the wars. The Federal government's powers 21 were weakened by their need to introduce harsh economic austerity measures and by Yugoslavia's decreased relevance internationally. As the power of the Federal government declined, the power of the republic government's rose. An inability to agree on a loose consociational agreement soon led to secessionism. In the ethnically mixed country of Yugoslavia this proved disastrous. If the Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia is to create a lasting peace it must work to reverse some of these sources of conflict. First, the peoples of Bosnia must learn new national myths, that life together is possible and that ethnic groups other than their own are not necessarily evil. Second, the leaders, suspected war criminals in the Serbian case, must be removed from the political scene. Third, long term peace will not be sustained without economic stability. High unemployment and poverty will only continue to fuel bitter discontent. Discontent which could again lead to conflict. 1 JWHY*.. "jnf) ;^"f ••••1 Figure 3 - Sarajevo daycare destroyed during the siege. 22 Reversing The Causes The media and propaganda Bearded, handsome in a rugged way, Rasim Ceramagic leans back in his chair. The political affairs editor of Oslobojne shares this small room with the other three top editors at the paper and the only decoration is a picture of Mostar's famous bridge. Speaking with conviction he tells me that in five months if the media change to project more positive energy and less propaganda, that the situation in Bosnia would be very, very different. Monika Studel, from the public affairs department at the Office of the High Representative, agrees. Figure 4 - Rasim Ceramagic, political editor of Oslobojne. Many observers of the Yugoslav wars agree with Ceramagic and Studel, that, in short, cunning political leaders have used media outlets as propaganda machines to convince their respective peoples that they are in danger from other ethnic groups. As Michael Ignatieff states, 23 "a nationalist minority on both sides went to work on their deeply intertwined common past, persuading all and sundry, including outsiders, that Serbs and Croats have been massacring each other since time immemorial."36 In fact, stories of Muslim villages massacred by Serb soldiers being passed off on Serb television as Muslim atrocities have become something of a new national myth. The powerful images that the West saw on C N N were used by all three sides in the war but each side used separate tag lines and angles. Not surprisingly, it is widely contended by both the international community and observers that the Serbs were the worst propagators of misinformation. It appears that media manipulation, in particular via television, was particularly effective in rural areas of Bosnia where clustering of ethnic groups in villages and low educational levels contributed to ignorance and suspicion. This is not to say that all facts presented in the media prior to the wars were false. However, exaggeration and embellishment of "facts" was notorious. This was acknowledged under the Dayton Accords and steps have been taken, in particular of late, to eliminate the widespread use of media outlets to broadcast misinformation about the Dayton Accords and, to a lesser extent, about ethnic groups. It is perhaps best said by Anthony Lewis who holds that it was propaganda which led Serbs to take part in the extermination of a people and a culture. In Serbia itself, Belgrade television and radio broadcast unending invented horror stores about the massacres of Serbs. Bosnian Serb broadcasts told viewers and listeners that Serbian fighters were being roasted alive on spits. For many, this was the only source of news, and they believed. Serb minds as well as Muslim bodies have been cleansed in Bosnia. 3 7 3 6 Ignatieff, 15. 3 7 Anthony Lewis, "War Crimes," in The Black Book of Bosnia: the Consequences of Appeasement, ed. Nader Mousaizdeh (New York: BasicBooks, 1996), 57. 24 As per the Bonn Statement38 in December of 1997, the international community has a "firm commitment to establish free and pluralistic media throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina." 3 9 With a goal of eventually implementing and adopting full media and telecommunication laws and legislation to enforce international journalistic standards, the Office of the High Representative has implemented several programmes which will be discussed in further detail below. In addition, an important step was taken in the fall of 1997 with the seizure of television and radio broadcasting equipment from the control of Karadzic's supporters. On October 1, 1997, NATO-led troops finally acted upon the permission they had received in May to take action against any media accused of undermining the peace accords by seizing transmitters and cutting Bosnian Serb television off the air. This decisive action was prompted by the previous day's broadcast on Pale TV of a news conference by the chief prosecutor of the United Nations war-crimes tribunal in The Hague, Madam Justice Louise Arbour. The broadcast had been edited to exclude calls for Karadzic to be arrested to face war crimes charges and instead to accuse, according to U N spokesman Alexander Ivanko, the tribunal of "shifting down from being a legal institution to a political instrument aimed at putting pressure on the Serbs."40 The day after the seizure, Bosnian Serb radio television (RTV BiH) began to resume broadcasting from Banja Luka, the base of Bosnian Serb President Biljana Plavsic who is locked in a power struggle with Karadzic and has not attacked the peace 3 8 The Bonn Declaration refers to the statement produced by the Bonn Peace Implementation Conference held in December of 1997. It was attended by most of the major powers and all countries involved in the peace keeping operation in Bosnia. 3 9 "Bonn Peace Implementation Conference 1997: Conclusions," (Office of the High Representative, December 10, 1997), 14. 4 0 "NATO Pulls Plug on Serb Television," Globe & Mail . October 2,1997, A l . 25 accords. Previously, programming had alternated between Pale TV, under the thumb of Karadzic and his supporters, and Banja Luka TV. Aside from fulfilling the prescribed United Nations mandate of ensuring fair and impartial media representation, taking television control away from the Karadzic camp had several effects. First, it took away from Pale the ability to disseminate propaganda to a mass audience. Second, control over the medium gave Plavsic an additional advantage in the power struggle. As noted in The Economist, "with television under her thumb, she [Plavsic] now controls the republic's most potent political weapon. Instead of spewing out virulently anti-western propaganda, television now pelts Mr. Karadzic and his cronies with allegations of corruption."41 Third, as stated by the British Secretary of Defence, George Robertson, the action showed that the implementors of the Dayton Accords are "willing to take tough, hard measures to make sure there is no mucking around with the Dayton peace process."42 Further, N A T O indicated its commitment to take any necessary measures, including the use of force, against anyone inciting attacks or hatred. In February of 1998, the Republika Srpska government and the Office of the High Representative agreed on an assistance package for Srpska Radio-Television. The aim is to reconstruct "the network in accordance with western democratic standards of public service broadcasting"43 In addition, the former board of directors of Srpska Radio-Television was replaced and a new director, a former reporter for a Belgrade daily, Andejelko Kozomara, was appointed. 4 1 No Author. "Bosnia in the Balance." The Economist (on-line). October 11, 1997. 4 2 "NATO Pulls Plug on Serb Television," Globe & Mail . October 2,1997, A l . 4 3 "OHR Bulletin, February 23, 1998", 5. 26 Under the Geneva Agreed Statement (June 2, 1996), and due to the need for equitable access to the media for all political parties and candidates, one of the principal media goals of the civilian implementors of the Dayton Accords has been the Open Broadcast Network (OBN). Its mission, and many of its accomplishments, are worthy enough but problems remain. Set up in the summer of 1996, the network's central studio and control rests in Sarajevo but it broadcasts through local television stations in Zenica, Tuzla, Mostar, Banja Luka, Brcko and Pale. Support for the project has come from various international sources, with initial funding coming from foreign governments and the International Federation of Journalists, which is also the implementing agency of the project. The flagship central news programme, with its goal of political impartiality, is coupled with a "cross-entity sports programme" Olymp and a political talk-show, Telering. A US AID survey completed in March 1998, found that the "OBN holds a sound position in the Bosnian media scene and it competes strongly with the other TV channels in the country. The Bosnia-wide survey found that over 76% of the audience watches OBN regularly and that OBN is seen as independent, objective, professional and impartial."44 However, certain concerns can be noted. First, even though the eventual goal of the O B N is self-sufficiency, it appears that most of the impetus behind the project is still from the international community. Even though the cross-entity character of the O B N is to be praised, it is unclear how much of this is merely an artificial creation. Further, since the broadcasting is centred in Sarajevo ~ traditionally the city which is most pro-Dayton ~ what is being portrayed may not be a realistic reflection of the situation countrywide. In addition, the statistic of 76% 4 4 "OHR Bulletin, March 12, 1998", 7 27 watching O B N regularly may be misleading. If we take into account that only 50% of the population receives the program45 and, since B i H does not exist in the 59 channel universe of Rogers cable, people may view the programming due to a lack of other choices. A broader, comparative survey is needed. The Intermediate Media Licensing and Standards Commission (IMSLC) was established in May 1998. The Commission will provide a legal framework for media, license broadcasters and establish a code of journalistic practice. However, even though the head of the team establishing the council, John Watkinson, noted that "censorship is not the aim and purpose of the commission" and that "it will establish a legal framework within which different opinions can be expressed"46 there are concerns. Viewpoints which are not in keeping with those prescribed by the Dayton Accords will not be allowed or permitted and the commission will be used to censor viewpoints that it does not necessarily share. Many of the new standards will apply also to print media. Throughout the war only one newspaper, the now famous Oslobojne, managed to continue publication. At present, there are many newspapers espousing different viewpoints available, ranging from the sceptical, sarcastic weekly newsmagazine Danas to the impoverished, but still independent Oslobojne. It is safe to say, in the words of Professor Caratan, that in Bosnia, as in Croatia, "you can read everything but you need to read lots of newspapers."47 One much needed component of international activity in Bosnia is the Public Service Information Campaign (PSIC). Launched in May 1998 by the Office of the High 4 5 "OHR and the Open Broadcast Network (OBN) Project," (Office of the High Representative, May 20, 1998) 2. 4 6 "OHR Bulletin, May 16, 1998", 6. 4 7 Dr. Ismet Grbo, Interview November 24, 1997. 28 Representative, the goal of the campaign is positive public relations in regards to the peace process. A May 18, 1998 news release notes that due to the misrepresentation or lack of clarity on key issues the "Public Service Information Campaign (PSIC) is intended to redress this imbalance, by providing clear, transparent information on the Peace Process to the whole population of B i H . " 4 8 The theme, Razmislitel (Think about it!) will be disseminated in two ways: public service advertising slots and TV programming. The advertising slots will focus on the idea of thinking about the future and leaving a positive future for one's children. The information programs will aim to release hard information on vital issues, such as the new license plates which were the topic of the first programme. The importance of free and impartial media in Bosnia cannot be stressed enough. Although shining examples like the independent daily, Oslobojne, exist there is still much work to be done. The process whereby, "an entire generation of Serbs, Croats and Muslims were aroused by television images to hate their neighbours" must be reversed.49 4 8 "OHR Bulletin, June 1, 1998", 7. 4 9 Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers — America's last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why. (New York: Random House Inc., 1996), 121-122. 29 War Criminals and the International Court in Hague Due to the particular brutality of the Bosnian war, a War Crimes Tribunal was established in the Hague to try indicted war criminals from the war. Of the 78 accused, 57 are Serbs, 18 are Croats and 3 are Muslims. Included in the 57 Serbs are the two men most responsible for genocide and ethnic cleansing, Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic. It is no surprise that the Bonn Declaration was stated "that until all persons indicted for war crimes are brought before the ICTY, there will be no normalisation, no reconciliation, and the rule of law in Bosnia and Hercegovina will remain seriously impaired."50 This idea is shared by most citizens of Bosnia, with the noted exception of Karadzic supporters. The rationale behind removing war criminals is simple. First, there is the basic idea of punishment and revenge. A n example must be made that such crimes cannot be committed and go unpunished. This can also act to soothe the hearts of those left behind by letting them know that some justice is done. Second, as Ismet Grbo notes, "there is a need to capture war criminals, to get ride of the ideology which brought aggressiveness."51 It is not possible that peace can be implemented if the men in power are those that started the violence in the first place. This is recognised in Article 8 of the Rules and Regulations of the Provisional Election Commission which states that no person who is serving a sentence imposed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and no person who is under indictment by the Tribunal and who has failed to comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal, may stand as 5 0 "Bonn Peace Implementation Conference 1997: Conclusions," 4. 5 1 "Interview with Ismet Grbo," November 24, 1997. 30 a candidate or hold any appointive, elective, or other public office in the territory of Bosnia and Hercegovina . . . . 5 2 Further, any party which has such a person in it or uses their image or likeness is disqualified from running. However, it is recognised that in the Karadzic case, although he no longer has de jure power, he still wields much power and enjoys support throughout the Republika Srpska from his stronghold of Pale. The significance of Karadzic and his cronies remaining free will be more then a lack of justice for their victims or the symbolism of their ideology remaining. The fact that de facto power in parts of the Republika Srpska still rests with those that forced people out of their homes means that refugees, in particular those of Muslim and Croat origin, do not feel secure enough to return to their homes. Although refugee repatriation is an issue to which we will return later, we should note that this means that ethnic cleansing which was accomplished earlier will remain a reality on the ground and that strong opposition to the Dayton Accords and the idea of a unified Bosnia will remain. As Ceramagic notes, "while war criminals walk the streets of the same cities where they killed and cast out Bosnians and Croatians there will not be a mass and secure return of refugees."53 However, although the importance of trying those indicted for war crimes is well understood, the Dayton Accords leave the onus for turning in suspects to the regimes themselves. Therefore, it is not a surprise that The Economist notes that "fourteen of the 18 Croats who have been charged are in custody. A l l three indicted Muslims are on trial. Only the 5 2 "Press Guide to the 1997 Republika Srpska National Assembly Elections," (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe: Mission to Bosnia and Hercegovina, November 22-23,1997), 7. 5 3 "Rasim Ceramagic speech text, December 1997." 31 Serbs have failed to co-operate; of the 78 accused, 57 are Serb. One, Dusko Tadic, has been tried and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Two more await trail, three are thought dead, leaving 51 at large."54 The question of why so many of the worst war criminals remain at large is a complex one and points out one of the single largest problems with the Dayton Accords. With the signing of the Dayton Accords, the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was established. However, as noted by Richard Holbrooke, one of the chief architects of the Accords, pressure from NATO and the international community led to a limitation of its mission. As we are aware, IFOR, and its successor, the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) have successfully managed to keep peace. However, no Bosnian-led police force with enforcement capability was established and the NATO forces have refused a police force task even when it would seem prudent that they act in that capacity. For example, when Serb arsonists were forcing Serbs to leave Sarajevo immediately after peace was signed, IFOR leader, Admiral Smith, "refused to act, repeating his mantra that IFOR was not a police force, that putting out the fires or arresting the arsonists would be mission creep. That IFOR's passivity was endangering fundamental policy goals of the United States and N A T O seems unimportant to him." 5 5 The case of Miroslav Bralo is a telling indictment of further problems in capturing war criminals. Bralo is an indicted war criminal, a Croat who was second in command of the now notorious Jokers who slaughtered Muslims. According to the Washington Post, on July 14, 1997, "Bralo walked to a checkpoint manned by NATO peacekeeping troops and tried to surrender. He told Dutch troops at the checkpoint [that] he was ready to hand himself over to 5 4 No Author. "Bosnia in the Balance." The Economist (on-line). October 11, 1997. 32 the war crimes tribunal in The Hague and that he would testify against a Croatian army general who is currently on trial on war crimes charges.56 Unfortunately, due to a communications bungle, Dutch forces had not been informed that Bralo was wanted, so they refused to arrest him and instead took his address. Once it was established that he was wanted by the tribunal, US Army generals refused to pick him up because it would again involve "mission creep." This was the "clearest indication to date of the gap between NATO's stated policy ~ that its soldiers will arrest suspected war criminals if they run across them ~ and the reality in which 31,000 N A T O troops, armed with tanks, helicopter gunships and other heavy weaponry, take pains to avoid men sought by The Hague."57 As an aside, the tribunal earlier decided to have secret indictments of some war crimes suspects to avoid warning them of arrest. Unfortunately, according to John Pomfret and Lee Hockstader, "the tribunal has neglected to inform N A T O about some of its secret indictments, leaving the military operations in the dark."58 The incident involving Bralo is unfortunate but may be partially explained by an incident that happened only a few weeks earlier. In that first N A T O operation against suspected war criminals, British special forces killed a senior Bosnian Serb police officer and arrested another Serb, both of whom were wanted by the Tribunal. Later that same day, a vehicle was blown up outside of United Nations police headquarters in Zvornik. This was followed by a wave of threats and incidents directed at NATO troops and Western organisations in Bosnia. Further, the slain Serbian police officer was given a full state funeral, hailed as a 5 5 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 337. 5 6 Lee Hockstader and John Pomfret, "In Bosnia, A War Crimes Impasse," Washington Post. December 9, 1997), A01. 5 7 Ibid. 5 8 Pomfret and Hockstader, AO 1. 33 martyr who had died at the hands of international occupying forces and used to rally support for Karadzic's regime. A fear of further reprisals against Western officials and troops ensured that it was not until January 1998 that United States troops were to act to capture an alleged war criminal. For their first target they choose the innocuous Jelsic, who is considered neither close to Serb leadership nor popular, making him a "safe" target. Nevertheless, a warning was issued to Americans to be on the lookout for reprisals. This action helped to silence criticisms from civilian officials that the "US failure to act had provoked contempt for the Dayton Accord and impeded the creation of a new Bosnian nation."59 However, Serbs such as Jelsic are relatively small fish in comparison to Karadzic and Mladic. It is difficult to believe that the United States does not have the military power to capture Karadzic and Mladic and it is strange that political will appears to be lacking. Granted, capturing them would not be easy. Karadzic is in his stronghold of Pale, a former ski resort surrounded by hilly, heavily forested, intimidating terrain and a population loyal to Karadzic which promises to shoot down any NATO helicopters which come into the area. Mladic's whereabouts are less certain and rumours abound that he is presently writing his memoirs in Belgrade. However, the day after the Dayton Accords were signed, United States President Bi l l Clinton and French President Jacques Chirac, agreed on a joint commando raid to capture the two suspects. This led to the creation of a secret Franco-American military committee which was responsible for tracking the men. The committee eventually lost track of Mladic and the plan began to focus on Karadzic. According to a recent Time magazine article, by April 1997, 5 9 Richard Goldstone as quoted in Jeffrey R. Smith, "US Troops Capture "Serb Adolf," Washington Post. 34 the committee had formulated a 1.5 cm-thick booklet outlining a detailed kidnapping plan. In May 1997, at the signing of the NATO-Russian treaty, Chirac, Clinton, German President, Helmut Kohl, and British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, met to discuss the raid. No one was willing to commit to heading the raid for fear of reprisals. Further, it was agreed that, for diplomatic reasons, both the Russians and Italians would have to be informed. As Chirac, noted, "we might as well hold a press conference!"60 Due to these constraints, and the possibility that a French officer may have compromised the secrecy of the operation, the plan was put on hold until the summer of 1998. In early August 1998, the New York Times reported that the plan had been completely discarded "because of US military fears of a bloodbath, repeated French hesitations and the risk of Serb aggression."61 This has been countered by United States officials, who state that the improving situation on the ground is limiting the movement and authority of the two men, making it prudent to wait until it is easier to capture them. Other factors in the postponement lie in the difficulty of the operation and the necessity for success. A failed capture attempt would only bolster Serb support for Pale. Further, i f N A T O troops cannot defeat a few armed Serbs in Pale then how can Croat and Muslim refugees possibly return to their homes in that area? In addition, before a capture attempt is made, the action must be viewed as positive by the majority of the Republika Srpska population. This is why support for the more moderate Serb president, Plavsic and the widespread dissemination of her allegations of corruption for the Pale regime are important. If the capture of "small fish" promotes violence against NATO forces and civilians, the capture of January 23, 1998, A29. 35 the two most important men in the Republika Srpska would surely cause more retaliation unless support for the two diminishes greatly. The power struggle between Plavsic and Karadzic is of great importance to the situation in Bosnia. Plavsic, while still a hard-line Serb, has managed to win the support of the international community by her tacit support for the Dayton Accords. In fact, with the aid of SFOR she has managed to hold on to power and N A T O support for her has averted a near civil war situation in the Republika Srpska. This international support for Plavsic is part of a plan to destabilise Karadzic politically. The importance of capturing war criminals, who, if left free, are halting the return of refugees and slowing the peace process, cannot be stressed enough. In the words of the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, "we firmly believe that as long as criminals against humanity ... are at large, there is not going to be a normal life in [Bosnia], not only for rule of law reasons but also because of their influence in politics and economy in the country. They are contaminating the atmosphere of the country. They have to go to The Hague."62 Holbrooke agrees, "the reluctance of NATO to go beyond a relatively narrow interpretation of its mission has left a gaping hole in the Bosnia food chain. Recognising this, the Bosnian Serbs have increasingly defied the Dayton powers." Further, "the success of IFOR so far is now threatened by Karadzic's success in defying the political portions of Dayton. If he continues to thwart the Dayton powers, the peace process will fail." 6 3 Thomas Sancton and Gilles Delafon, "The Hunt for Karadzic," Time Magazine. August 10, 1998, 36. Ibid. Pomfret and Hockstader, AO 1. Holbrooke, 339-340. 36 The Economy Probably the toughest issue facing Bosnia, and the one which most affects the daily lives of its citizens, is the issue of economic reconstruction. An investigation into this question will first involve looking back into the economic situation of the region before the war started. This will be followed by a look into the present situation in Bosnia and an investigation into the economic reconstruction program. Finally, we will discuss some of the obstacles to economic reconstruction. Susan Woodward contends that "the real origin of the Yugoslav conflict is the disintegration of governmental authority and the breakdown of a political and civil order ... the result of the politics of transforming a socialist society to a market economy and democracy. A critical element of this failure was economic decline."64 The Western recession of the early 1980s led to a severe debt crisis which prompted government austerity measures intended to decrease imports and increase exports. For Yugoslav citizens this meant a severe tightening of belts and financial hardship that was more keenly felt, due to earlier decentralisation, dependent on where citizens lived. By 1984, official unemployment stood at 14 percent, with nearly full employment in Slovenia and Croatia, 50 percent unemployment in Kosovo and 23 percent in Bosnia. High unemployment, which mostly affected unskilled workers and youth, was coupled with high inflation which increased the economic burden. Not surprisingly, amongst the educated youth, "alienation and resentment that education did not bring its promised rewards translated into generational conflict with those who had secure jobs and increasing criticisms of 6 4 Woodward, 2. 37 Figure 5 - The destroyed head office of Energoinvest, formerly one of the largest companies. the system itself."65 By the mid-1980s, in areas such as the Croatian Krajina, Bosnia and Kosovo, de-industrialisation and new economic policies made unemployment rise and income fall fastest. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that, according to Woodward, those who fought in the Yugoslav wars tended to be unskilled workers, young people, the uneducated, high school or university graduates and those who had the most to lose, such as members of the Yugoslav National Army, by changes in the system. During the Yugoslav wars, much of the economic infrastructure that existed was destroyed. Also of interest is that economic sanctions which targeted Serbs and what remained of Yugoslavia further increased the economic austerity that had first created the sense of hardship. Therefore, "the sanctions, instead of undermining the sitting regime, increased the power of the government and of Milosevic personally, because the resulting supply shortages 38 and inflation ... required the state to act.66 Therefore, upon the signing of the Dayton Accords in late 1995, Bosnia had virtually no economic structure left, while of its two major neighbours, Yugoslavia and Croatia, only Croatia had a semblance of an economy. At present, life is difficult in Bosnia. According to Rasim Ceramagic, "simply said, every second Bosnian is more hungry then not."67 As an example, he notes that of the United Nations 53 items minimum for living food package, which is used for survey basis world-wide, most people in Sarajevo haven't seen half of these items since the war started.68 Further, the cost of the monthly package is 458 D M . He notes that "today in Bosnia only one in ten families can afford this, because from the 2,345,000 people living in the Federation only 338,000 work. And the average employed person has 300 D M monthly."69 As for the state of the 200,000 pensioners, his mother-in-law, Dzevahira Kameric, is an example. On paper her monthly pension is 102 D M a month and this makes it one of the better ones, as many pensioners receive only about 50 D M . To make matters worse, at present, pensions are 26 months behind and every month they arrive later and later. "So that they can eventually skip another month," she tells me with a dry laugh. Even if one takes into account that most food prices in Sarajevo are about 30% less expensive than in Vancouver and that rents are quite low, the rough equivalent of $100 a month does not take one very far. She makes do by taking in sporadic houseguests and by help from her daughter and son-in-law. However, both her daughter and son-in-law work for the newspaper Oslobojne which only manages to pay its staff 6 5 Woodward, 57. 6 6 Woodward, 293. 6 7 "Rasim Ceramagic speech text." 6 8 Of interest is the fact that living and economic conditions in the Federation are much, much better then in the Republika Srpska. 6 9 Ibid. 39 a monthly salary every two months or so. Most people I spoke to make do by taking separate jobs or, in Rasim Ceramagic's case, freelancing for international news wires. Other families survive on assistance from relatives and friends who are refugees in wealthier countries. One copy editor from Oslobojne tells me what she does on pay-day, "first, there is always something to buy for the little ones, shoes or something, then a few kilos of meat, some dry goods, cigarettes and then because you don't feel like cooking, four cevapi to bring home. And there it goes." Figure 6 - Dzevahira Kameric, Sarajevo pensioner. 40 However, an interesting and heartening phenomenon is that even i f people have no money, the cafes are always full and hospitality is high. A famous Balkan saying is that when times are good the cafes are full because we are all celebrating, when times are bad the cafe's are still full because we are all drowning our sorrows. One woman I spoke to, about 27 years old, whose medical training was interrupted by the war, now works for an international agency. She tells me that they have a different mentality here regarding money that outsiders don't understand. "If we have money we spend it. What's the point of saving it when you never know what's going to happen. First, it was inflation, then there was the war. You might as well live life to the fullest when you can." She cites as an example a holiday she and her fiance took on the Croatian coast last summer. Staying at their pension was a Czech family. They had brought from the Czech Republic their own food supplies, even bottled water! They didn't patronise any of the pubs or cafe's on the Rivera, "not even the ice cream shops!" she adds incredulously. "But, we Bosnians, we didn't know when we'd next be able to come here so we lived it up. We always do. If five friends go for coffee, the bill will come and someone will always offer to pay for the whole table. That's how we are." Foolish perhaps for western eyes, but in my short stay in Bosnia I found it very heartening. On my very first morning there, my taxi driver bought me a coffee and this generosity carried throughout the trip. The mentality in Bosnia, as in much of Eastern Europe, is very, very different from the west. Under socialism what could one save for? University education was free, buying your own property was very difficult and with rampant inflation you might as well keep your money in a sock. There is a joke which illustrates the mentality well. Ivo goes to buy a Yugo. He pays for the automobile and asks when it will be delivered. 41 "In ten years," says the clerk. "Ten years?, well, what month?" asked Ivo. "January." "Well, what week?" "The second week." "What day that week?" "Tuesday." "Is that in the morning or the afternoon?" "Why are you asking, it's in ten years, who cares!" "Well, because they're coming to put in the telephone that morning, so it will have to be in the afternoon." What must be remembered in a discussion of the Bosnian economy is that not only are we dealing with a country which has been ravaged by war but a country undergoing a transition from a socialist to a market economy. As noted by Samuel Berger, "while the rest of the former communist world in Central Europe was getting a crash course in the subject in the early '90s, Bosnia was simply crashing. Many of the habits of a command economy persist and with a corruption that too often has undermined the reconstruction effort."70 The same day that the Dayton Accords were signed, December 20, 1995, the international community made financial commitments to Bosnia totalling $500 million for the first few months of 1996. That same day, Bosnia was admitted to the International Monetary Fund. In March 1996 Bosnia was admitted to the World Bank. Up to the end of 1996, a total of $1.13 billion had been earmarked for emergency projects. These projects include farm reconstruction, transportation reconstruction, education reconstruction, electric power reconstruction, landmines clearing and housing repair. Projects in 1997 and 1998 have focused on institution building and policy reform with a particular emphasis on enterprise and banking 7 0 Samuel Berger, "Dayton Accords Must Succeed to Prevent Wider War." Defense Issues, volume 12, number 48, September 23, 1997, 6. 42 sectors. In total, a $5.1 billion Priority Reconstruction Programme for 1996-1999 was drafted by the World Bank in partnership with the United Nations and the Monetary Fund. Figure 7 - A destroyed apartment in Sarajevo. At present, even though donor funding has been below target levels, projects have focused on five key sectors. The first area, infrastructure, has focused on rebuilding transportation routes, telecommunications and power supplies. The second area deals with refugee return and community support programs. There is a recognised need for greater community development, including housing improvement, heat and gas power rebuilding, 43 water and sewage system rebuilding (even the capital, Sarajevo, only has water for about four hours a day) and reduction of landmine hazards. Other projects in this area include public works, retraining and micro-credit. The third area deals with social sectors and with funds needed to repair schools, hospitals and to supply medicines and other equipment. The fourth area deals with employment creation and calls for insurance and investor guarantees with an aim to rebuild investor confidence and normalise business relations. The final area deals directly with support for the building of Bosnian institutions which deal with fiscal reform.71 There has been some success in economic reconstruction. As reported by the World Bank, "the IMF reports a current growth rate in the Federation of at least 35 percent per year; wages are up about threefold, and unemployment has declined from its post-war high of 90 percent to between 50-60 percent. Sound monetary management by the authorities has led to stable prices. In contrast, however, the situation in Republika Srpska is not yet as promising. Growth there has been close to zero, wage levels are just one-third of those in the Federation, and inflation is high."7 2 For the reasons for this economic disparity we can turn to problems with Serb leadership. According to the United States' National Security advisor, Samuel Berger, "most of the economic growth in Bosnia has occurred in the Federation portion, the portion that has been forged together between the Muslims and Croats. By contrast, the recalcitrance of many Serb leaders has caused Srpska to languish. ... Srpska's persistent poverty will end only when its leaders fulfil their obligations and reconstruction can begin to flow."7 3 In short, the lack of co-operation by Serb leaders and the persistence of war criminals 7 1 The World Bank Group. "Bosnia and Hercegovina and the World Bank." November 7, 1997. 7 2 Ibid. 7 3 Berger, 5. 44 in key positions has effectively stopped the flow of aid into Serbia. However, positive results have been seen since Ms. Plavsic has assumed the Presidency. Her co-operation with the Dayton Accords has led to a trickle of reconstruction monies into the Republika and hopes that with continued co-operation greater rewards will follow. A major problem facing the reconstruction efforts is the lack of co-operation and effort on the part of Muslim, Croat and Serb officials. Again, as noted by the Bonn Implementation Council, there is "concern that the authorities in Bosnia and Hercegovina are placing reconstruction and sustained economic growth at risk by: the common institutions' shortcomings in addressing economic management; allowing political differences to slow down the pace of economic transition; taking insufficient action against fraud; the lack of transparency in the use of public funds; and the failure to establish Public Corporations."74 Unfortunately, the Bosnian Muslim leader, Alija Izetbegovic, "has little understanding of, or interest in, economic development or modernisation."75 However, his prime minister, Haris Siljadzic, has a greater focus on such matters and has aided the implementation process. It must also be noted that the economy cannot be rebuilt without inter-entity co-operation. Thus far, there appears to have been little. In fact, in early 1998, the Office of the High Representative had to disallow trade agreements between the Federation and Croatia and between the Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia. Such agreements are contrary to the Dayton Accords which are founded on the premise that "nothing was more important to peace in the former Yugoslavia then rebuilding economic ties that transcended ethnic divisions."76 7 4 "Bonn Peace Implementation Conference 1997: Conclusions," 16. 7 5 Holbrooke, 285. 7 6 Holbrooke, 258. 45 The slow road to economic recovery has been started on, but the journey is made difficult by the lack of co-operation from leadership, persistent corruption, and the difficulties of a transition from a socialist to a market economy. However, as Holbrooke notes, "a huge economic reconstruction program was [is] essential to any Bosnia settlement. Some people treated this as little more than rhetoric, but lasting peace in the region required rebuilding the interdependent economy, that until four years earlier, had existed in a single Yugoslavia."77 7 7 Holbrooke, 86. 46 So Now We've Got Bosnia, Where Are The Bosnians? The question of whether there is a Bosnian national identity is complex. Several issues arise: is there a sense of Bosnian national identity that is multi-ethnic? Are the Muslim and Bosnian identity one and the same? Finally, is it possible for a Serb or Croat to be a Bosnian? There does appear to be some historical evidence of a Bosnian national consciousness. However, it is more difficult to find that this national sentiment was equally shared by all three peoples. An investigation into this question is made even more difficult by the ease with which a glorious past, for any of the ethnic groups, could be invented. It is clear that there are three ethnic groups in Bosnia: Serbs, Croats and Muslims. What is less clear is whether there exists a Bosnian national identity distinct from a Muslim national identity. Bosnia was an independent state through some of the medieval period but was also under Croat and Hungarian rule. Under Tvrtko I, who was crowned King of both Bosnia and Serbia, Bosnia reached its territorial and political maximum in 1377. According to Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, it was at this time that Bosnian regional consciousness received an incalculable surge ... but in addition to these remarkable successes there was another reason for the growing affirmation of a Bosnian regional feeling ... Bosnia had become fertile ground for the growth of a new dualist sect, ... [the] Bogumils ... [who] represented a religious assertion of Bosnian individuality.78 By the end of the fifteenth century, Bosnia had been conquered by Turks and was a pasaluk (region) of the Ottoman Empire. During Ottoman rule, large numbers of the Slavic peoples, Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins. History, Politics, (London: Cornwall University 47 including many of the Bogumils, converted to Islam. Like most Ottoman subjects, the various religious communities were each allowed to govern themselves and, thus, maintain ties with their communities. The Catholics continued links with Croatia, the Serbs continued links with Serbia and the Bosnian Muslims found themselves distinct from the Turks as they continued to speak the Slavic language they had in common with Croats and Serbs. In particular for Bosnian Muslims, this continued the sense of a distinct Bosnian regional affiliation. This idea is also emphasised by Andras Riedlmayer, who firmly states that "until the late nineteenth century, people of all three faiths identified themselves simply as Bosnians."79 Francine Friedman also notes that the term Bosanski Narod (Bosnian Nation) appeared in a letter from a Muslim bureaucrat to the Turkish Knez. She does temper this by noting that it may have simply been the easiest way of referring to the population as a whole and not an unequivocal statement of identity.80 Moreover, Henrik Birnbaum, argues that "the awareness of being Slavs never ceased also among the Muslims [of Bosnia] right up to the decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire. Presumably, then, Islamisation did not significantly separate the Bosnian Muslim community from its Christian inhabitants communally (that is, as Bosnians) or, in certain ways, even socially."81 Robert J. Donia and John V . A . Fine also contend that in "the Middle ages the Bosnians called themselves 'Bosnians.' It most probably reflected either a shared geographical identity or participation in a state or regional enterprise ... in medieval Bosnia these identifying names, whether 'Bosnian' or more narrowly regional like 'Hum-ite,' cut across religious communities: a Press, 1984), 40. 7 9 Andras Riedlmayer, "A Brief History of Bosnia-Hercegovina," (The Bosnian Manuscript Ingathering Project, August 20, 1998), 1. 8 0 Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 41-42. 48 local Catholic was as much a Bosnian as a member of the Bosnian Church was."82 Donia and Fine present a convincing well-written case contending that there is indeed not only a historical background which constitutes a Bosnian national identity but that the Muslims are really only one component of a combined nationality. After four centuries of Ottoman rule, the Turks ceded autonomy to Bosnia in the San Stefano Agreement. Six months later, in August 1878, the Berlin Congress revised the agreement and Bosnia became a protectorate of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.83 In an attempt to combat Serb and Croat nationalism in Bosnia, which was considered dangerous and destabilising, the Monarchy sought to "promote a global Bosnian identity, taking control of the religious structures of Bosnia", by nominating religious leaders, and "forbidding the use of the terms 'Serb' and "Croat' in the titles of cultural organisations."84 However, this idea of a Bosnian nationhood or bosnjastvo, really caught on only with the Muslims and less so with Croats and Serbs who had been vying for Muslims to identify with their respective nations. Banac also contends that by the mid-nineteenth century, the Croats had been more effective in bringing the Muslims over to the Croatian side so that "the overwhelming majority of the first generation of university educated Muslims considered themselves Croats."85 However, it is of interest that a third of Muslim intellectuals and the vast majority of ordinary Muslims shunned any process of Serb or Croat nationalisation. 8 1 Henrik Brinbaum as quoted in Friedman, 43. 8 2 Robert J. Donia and John V . A . Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 72. 8 3 Crnobrnja, 23. 8 4 Xavier Bougarel, "Bosnia and Hercegovina ~ State and Communitarianism," In Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation. Despair and Rebirth, ed. D.A. Dyker and I. Vejvoda (Harlow, Essex: Addison, Wesley, Longman L td , 1996), 89. 8 5 Banac, 365. 49 Under the control of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Muslims were administrated by non-Muslims. "The Bosnian Muslims were faced with the challenge of political rather than religious self-identification as forces on all sides attempted to forestall their development of a narrower communal loyalty in favour of a larger, politically motivated fealty."86 She contends that it was at this point there was a political awakening of Bosnia's Muslims as a distinct group. Also of interest, as outlined in a reference book, Narodi Europe, is the contention that the national consciousness of Bosnian Muslims was from an even later date, in 1918 when the first Yugoslav State was created. During the two Yugoslavia's, and most particularly after the Second World War, there is ample evidence that the Bosnian Muslims considered themselves a distinct group. Unfortunately, there is less evidence of any multi-ethnic Bosnian identity. Immediately after the Second World War, at the first Yugoslav Communist Party Congress, the Yugoslav government decided that Bosnia could not "be divided between Serbia and Croatia, not only because Serbs and Croats live together on the whole territory, but also because the territory is inhabited by Muslims who have not yet decided on their national identity."87 The 1948 census allowed for three options for Muslims ~ they could identify as Serbs, Croats or undetermined. Eight-nine percent choose to register their nationality as undetermined. By the 1953 census, in the wake of Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform and a perceived need to begin slowly the creation of a Yugoslav national identity, Muslims were asked to declare themselves as Serbs, Croats, Yugoslavs or undetermined. Again, an overwhelming majority choose the undetermined option. 8 6 Friedman, 57. 50 By the 1961 census, people were allowed to identify as "Muslims in the ethnic sense" ~ a category chosen by an overwhelming majority. By 1963, the Bosnian constitution referred to Serbs, Croats and Muslims in an equal sense and by 1971 Muslims were allowed to self-identify as "Muslim, in the sense of a nation." In the 1981 and 1991 censuses the options of Muslims, Serbs or Croats were offered.88 In census figures from 1981, 39.52% of Bosnia's inhabitants identified themselves as Muslims.8 9 Thus, there appears a basis to conclude that there is a separate Muslim national identity. In regards to the Muslims, and borrowing from Benedict Anderson's definition of a nation, we can find evidence that they do, indeed, self-identify as a distinct group. Moreover, members share a common language ~ albeit one they share with Serbs and Croats ~ religion and, it follows, culture. Furthermore, Muslims in Bosnia share a common identity which has given them a basis for a feeling of affinity to a Muslim motherland located in Bosnia. At present, the notion of a Bosnian identity appears to be most strongly identified with the Muslim ethnic group's national expression. However, the twentieth century notion of a Bosnian identity which is identified with the Muslim identity is a recent phenomenon, one that only begins to appear in literature since the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Not all Muslims look at this positively. Halid Causevic, a liberal Bosnia intellectual, vehemently notes, Here it hasn't yet emerged what kind of Muslim association are we: are we a people (ethnic group?) a nation, or a religious group? What is a nation? A nation is a belief of one's historic 8 7 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (London: Macmillan London Limited, 1994), 197. 8 8 Malcolm, 197-199, 177-179. 8 9 Dragomar Vonic, "Disparity and Disintegration: The Economic Dimension of Yugoslavia's Demise," in Yugoslavia the Former and Future: Reflections by Scholars from the Region., ed. Payam Akhavan (USA: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 90. 51 existence on a given place. We don't have that. We haven't yet evolved from a people to a nation. Therefore, if amongst Muslims there isn't a sense of nationhood, we cannot be a nation. On the first hand, the SDS hasn't solved the problem of what the Muslims are. It has turned them into Bosnians which is another cardinal mistake. ... What are Bosnians? Bosnian is a regional identification.90 At present, there is a Bosnian state. It includes two parts, a Federation of Croatians and Muslims on one hand and a separate Serb territory on the other. Even i f they do not share a common script, all three groups speak the same language. However, there is a lack of statistical data to indicate which members of the territory of Bosnia self-identify as Bosnians. In fact, at present, Croats and Serbs who are inhabitants of Bosnia seem to be more inclined to join their respective motherlands than to live in a united Bosnia and Hercegovina. This is echoed by a Croatian political science professor with the University of Zagreb who believes that a multi-ethnic Bosnian identity is becoming less and less salient. "Bosniak's don't have a reserve homeland like Croats and Serbs, they must return or stay with Bosnia and Hercegovina." However, it appears that irredentist movements of the two groups have been silenced, at least for the time being, by the need for their leaders to co-operate with Dayton. During the Bosnian conflict in Sarajevo, Muslims, Serbs and Croats, jointly defended the city against Serbs. A partial explanation for this is the 30-40 % 9 1 of urban dwellers who intermarried in the fifty years since the Second World War. Intermarriage, and the secular nature of Yugoslav society, tended to reduce ethnic ties amongst some individuals. It is these people who appear to be the main proponents of a multi-ethnic Bosnian nationalism. It should "Interview with Halid Causevic," Dan. November 24, 1997. 52 also be noted that during the conflict and immediately after the signing of Dayton, the Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic, paid some lip service to representing "all Bosnians." This has subsided somewhat. However, electoral parties which strive for multi-ethnic nationalism do exist, although, as we will investigate below in our electoral section, they have not been doing very well at the polls. The idea of a multi-ethnic Bosnian national identity remains problematic. It is safe to state that a multi-ethnic Bosnian identity does not exist at present, nor has it existed since the Middle Ages. However, in order to reduce the possibility of ethnic conflict and to ensure peace, a multi-ethnic Bosnian identity must be created. It would be a vital component of keeping together and establishing a Bosnian state. However, at present, aside from an elite, urban minority, Muslims are the only group which considered themselves Bosnian. The creation of a Bosnian identity may be possible but will be an arduous task. Donia and Fine, 9. 53 This Isn't Going to Work Without Trust After the horrors of the Bosnian conflict, it is difficult to imagine how the citizens of Bosnia can now live in peace. But the fundamental fact remains that the Dayton Accords are based on the principle that members of all three ethnic parties must not only tolerate the presence of other ethnic groups but learn to work together. In this section we shall explore whether or not the ethnic groups are learning to work together. We will first look at inter-entity co-operation, that is, the day-to-day relations between the Republika Srpska and the Federation. Second, we will look at the vital issue of refugee repatriation. Are refugees returning to their homes, even if those homes are now on territory that belongs to an enemy? Do refugees trust in the Dayton Accords and the peace they have brought enough to do this? Finally, we will evaluate how the Muslim-Croat Federation is working. Inter-Entity Links and Co-operation The Dayton Accords provide for a state consisting of two halves. The two halves, the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska, each have a great deal of autonomy but are required, both under the auspices of the Dayton Accords and sheer logic, to co-operate with each other. Urifortunately, linkages between the two halves have been sporadic. As Lee Hockstader notes, Across the Interethnic Boundary Line, which divides the two halves of Bosnia, no sports are played and no professional organisations for teachers, doctors or engineers convene. Even the Red Cross Chapters barely speak to each other. The Serb member of the collective presidency, Momcilo Krajisnik, agrees 54 to attend occasional meetings with his Muslim and Croat counterparts only under intense Western coercion.92 However, as with everything in Bosnia, although progress was slow to start, there has been some progress in inter-entity co-operation in recent months. One of the important first steps in increasing inter-entity co-operation is to remove physical barriers for communication and transportation. When the Dayton Accords were first implemented each car in Bosnia had a license plate which identified to which Entity the driver belonged to and their home town. Naturally, this was an obstacle to free movement not only across Entity boundaries in Bosnia, but for movement into neighbouring states. In January 1998, hastened by the results of a telephone survey conducted by the Open Broadcast Network which found that the majority of people in both Entities favoured a non-ethnic license plate, an agreement was reached between representatives of both Entities on a new license plate policy. The plates are now ethnically neutral in design and consist only of number and letter combinations, with the 6 letters to appear on the plates, A,E,K,M,T,J, identical in both Latin and Cyrillic. In order to aid in the return of refugees to Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Bijelina and the Central Bosnia Canton, 3,000 plates were issued free of charge in February 1998. On April 27, 1998, a new Bosnian Vehicle Registration Document began to be issued in both Entities to all vehicles, including those that belong to the police and army. Effective June 1, 1998 only vehicles with the new license plates will be able to leave Bosnia and by August 30 vehicles not carrying the new ethnically neutral plates will be prohibited from travel. The price of plates was fixed at 15 D M until June 1, 1998. 9 2 Lee Hockstader. "Bosnia Not Sold on Multiethnic State," Washington Post. December 7, 1997, A01. 55 "If you stay another week or so," you can take a train from Sarajevo to Zagreb, the bus ticket vendor tells me. I raise my eyebrows, and look over my shoulder at the burned out remnants of what used to be one of the most beautiful train stations in Europe, "Really?" He starts to laugh, a loud resounding laugh, edged with not a little touch of bitterness, "No, but every few months they tell us that within the next few months basic rail travel will be available, but it just keeps on getting pushed forward." I've decided to travel by bus to Croatia because I want to see more of Bosnia than one is afforded when they simply fly into Sarajevo Airport (which itself only receives about 3 flights a day). My initial plan was to take the fastest route to Zagreb, the route that travels Sarajevo-Banja Luka-Zagreb. Of course, there was that little problem of elections being held in the Republika Srpska at the same time as I would be travelling through the capital. The friendly Canadian, Major John Blakeley, the SFOR spokesperson in Sarajevo, didn't have to tell me twice that it would be better to take a different route. So, instead I travelled through the Federation, Sarajevo-Mostar-Split, with a plan to spend the scheduled half hour to one hour stop in Mostar with a dash to see what remains of that famous bridge. Of course, things are tense in Mostar that day and SFOR troops occupy each street corner, "we're not stopping, i f you're getting off, get off, i f you're coming with us hurry up, " the bus driver yells as the bus pulls into the station. In his haste to leave, the bus driver nearly closes the door on one of those movie ending goodbyes between a young couple. As we drive past burned out buildings, streets eerily empty of people and tanks with grim looking foreign soldiers at the ready, I figure that maybe a nice plane ride out of Sarajevo would have been a good idea. 56 Travel and communication in Bosnia is still not easy, even though the new inter-Entity license plates will make movement easier. In December 1997, nearly one million pieces of mail that had been kept in the Republika Srpska areas, some since 1992, were brought to Sarajevo to be distributed. On April 22, 1997 "Ministers of the Republika Srpska and the Federation signed a Memorandum of Understanding on mail exchange."93 The general agreement is for a twice weekly exchange of mail between the two Entities, in the hopes that this will eventually lead to a reorganisation of the postal system in Bosnia. Until then, it was not possible to send a piece of mail directly, for example, from Tuzla to Banja Luka. Another huge obstacle to communication between the two entities is the refusal of Serbs to allow the reconnection of telecommunications systems linking the Republika Srpska to the Federation. However, in March 1998, three new telephone links with 30 channels each were established between Bijelina-Tuzla, Sarajevo-Republika Srpska and Trebinje-Mostar. Nevertheless, telephone service in Bosnia is still unreliable and it is easier to call outside of Bosnia then within it. Train travel in Bosnia is not yet functioning. A largely symbolic goods train travelled from Tuzla, through Sarajevo and into Ploce harbour on February 26, 1998. However, this was more a symbolic gesture of support for a Memorandum of Understanding signed 19 days earlier on the proposed resumption of Inter-Entity train travel than actual progress. The Memorandum allows for the creation of a public railway corporation which will be linked with railway companies of both Entities. The corporation was expected to become operational sometime in April, but that deadline was not met and the corporation is still not functioning. Of interest is 9 3 "OHR Bulletin, April 24, 1998," 17. 57 that "railway experts of the two Entities confirmed that there are no further political difficulties in resuming traffic."94 Instead, difficulties have been largely technical. Even though most of the repair work on railway lines has been completed by SFOR troops and funded by international donors in the past two years, much work still remains to be done to reconstruct bridges and communication systems. No traffic is possible on both the Samac Connection and the Slavonski Brod bridges which were both completely destroyed. Further, signal and communication levels are still woefully inadequate. In fact, that first train in February relied on a temporary mobile communications system borrowed from SFOR. However, bus travel, in particular between main cities, is readily available and inexpensive. Flights have been regularly scheduled into Sarajevo virtually ever since the Dayton Accords were signed. However, air travel into other areas has been sporadic and only a recent development. Although the airport in Banja Luka, the capital of the Republika Srpska, has had flights for the past year, it received its first flight from Yugoslavia via the Yugoslav Airline (JAT) on March 2, 1998. This signalled the start of air transport between Bosnia and Yugoslavia, with flights to and from Belgrade, Banja Luka, Sarajevo and Pristina. When an agreement was not reached on the opening of Mostar's airport by members of the Federation, the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, intervened in March 1998 and created a Mostar Airport Authority to be governed by seven people, three to be nominated by the Mayor of Mostar, three by the deputy mayor, and the last, the chairman, to be nominated by the Office of the High Representative. The airport was finally opened to civilian air traffic on July 7, 1998. 9 4 "OHR Bulletin, March 29, 1998," 12. 58 The opening was marked by the arrival of a Croatia Airlines plane from Zagreb and an Air Bosna plane from Sarajevo. One of the major issues which will test any level of co-operation between the three ethnic groups is the fate of the city of Brcko. Brcko is a small town lying on a disputed portion of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line in north-eastern Bosnia. Its status could not be agreed on when the Accords were signed. As a result, governance of Brcko was to be decided by three arbitrators, one from each Entity and one appointed mutually or, failing that, by the international community. Failure to resolve the problems surrounding this town, with its population of 45,000, could unravel the entire Dayton Peace Agreement. The Serbs hold that retention of Brcko is vital to them because it sits astride the narrow corridor which connects the eastern and western halves of the Republika Srpska. The Muslims insist "that they should govern the area because Muslims were the largest single ethnic group there before the war and that they need untrammelled access to the Sava River for foreign trade. They also insist that the manner of the city's conquest alone ought to negate Serb claims to continued jurisdiction."95 In many ways Brcko is a microscopic Bosnia. At present, Brcko remains in the hands of the government of the Republika Srpska but a final decision has been delayed, for about the fifth time, until March 15,1999. Until that decision, in March of 1998, the lack of co-operation Serb officials were displaying in the creation of a multi-ethnic government and administration had made it appear necessary to give control of Brcko to the Federation. Announcing the decision to postpone arbitration the international community cited three points. First, uncooperative Serb leaders had been replaced. Second, the international community wished to 9 5 Bradley Graham, "Ruling Again Delayed on Control of Brcko," Washington Post. March 13, 1998, A17. 59 give the new Republika Srpska leadership time to implement announced changes and plans to restore Brcko as a multi-ethnic community. Finally, the one year time period given may allow for further reforms to be undertaken, albeit under significant international supervision. The international community is using the leverage it has in Brcko to enforce compliance with other Bosnia-wide issues. The Republika Srpska, was "warned that unless the RS has, by the end of 1998, demonstrated clearly [that] it is committed to full Dayton implementation, the RS's position vis-a-vis the Tribunal's decision will be clearly diminished."96 The Federation has been warned that its position will be weakened if former residents are not allowed to their homes in the Federation, in particular in Sarajevo. Bradley Graham notes that "Western officials are reluctant to take jurisdiction over Brcko away from the Bosnian Serbs because such a move might undermine a newly elected moderate government in Serb territory."97 However, since the optimism that received the March decision and the commitments received by the new Republika Srpska leadership, progress in Brcko has been slow but steady. A multi-ethnic administration was expected, again after many delays, by late July 1998. In addition, a multi-ethnic police force has recently been receiving praise for its handling of criminal issues. The multi-ethnic judiciary now has a full staff but, unfortunately, as of April 1998, it still had no funds for heating, no legal library and no office or court space. Refugee Repatriation Our conversation was light and effortless until I brought up the subject of refugees. I found that this was not a good subject to bring up with Rasim Ceramagic, political editor of 9 6 "OHR Bulletin, March 28, 98," 2. 60 Oslobojne. His parents were forced away from their home in western Bosnia at the beginning of the war and remain as refugees in Copenhagen. Their property falls under the jurisdiction of the Republika Srpska and Serb displaced persons now live there. Their property is a large vineyard with an estimated value of over $1.0 million. It was everything they had. I said to him, "but perhaps they should just move on, consider the property a loss and consider themselves lucky to be alive." He folded his arms against his chest, leaned back in his chair, looked me straight in the eyes and said, "it is theirs, not anyone else's and it would be wrong." So it would. However, in Bosnia, the dichotomy between what is sanest, safest and easiest constantly finds itself facing the dilemma of what is the right thing to do. Ethnic cleansing was the most chilling thing to occur during the Bosnian conflict. Ethnic cleansing refers to forced mass population transfers of a particular ethnic group in order to remove that ethnic group from a prescribed territory. In Bosnia, ethnic cleansing was part of a horrifying menage-a-trois of genocide, "the systematic mass-killing of an ethnic collectivity or the indirect destruction of such a community through the deliberate termination of the conditions which permit its biological and social reproduction,"98 and a massive rape campaign. The goal of ethnic cleansing is not only the physical removal of a particular ethnic group from a prescribed territory but to ensure that they will not want to return. Therefore, while genocide was a factor in Bosnia, at times, it was enough to kill only a handful of villagers in a particularly gruesome way to ensure that other villagers of that same ethnic group would not only leave but would "Bradley, A17. 9 8 McGarry, John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, "Introduction - the Macro-political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict," in The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation, ed. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (London: Routledge, 1993), 6-7. 61 never wish to return. The mass rapes, of which it is reported 20,000" women were victims, deliberately targeted the reproductive aspects of an ethnic group and generated such fear and terror that many of these victims never want to return to their previous homes. However, the Dayton Accords are built on the principle of inter-ethnic harmony and rest on a belief that people must be able to return to their original homes and reclaim their original property. It is the only peace that would have been accepted in Bosnia and the only fair solution. However, it might be the most unworkable portion of the Dayton Accords. It is difficult to ascertain how many former citizens of Bosnia are displaced persons. Numbers of displaced persons range between 1.8 to 2.3 million, with the UNHCR estimate at 1.8 million. To put the number in context we can note that the pre-war population of Bosnia was 4,377,033, with an ethnic composition in 1991 of 31.4% Serbs, 43.7% Muslims, 17.3% Croatians, 5.5% Yugoslavs and 2.1% Other. The post-war ethnic composition of Bosnia is unavailable and no censuses have been conducted for fears of upsetting the already fragile peace. The UNHCR has estimated that in 1996, the first year of the Dayton Accord, roughly 200,000 - 250,000 people returned to Bosnia. The peace implementation council claims that 110,000 refugees returned from abroad in 1997. Elsewhere, figures as low as 35,000100 are noted. A l l the figures remain problematic as they cannot be verified and differ from source to source. For example, the Globe & Mail reports that by May 1996 only 50,000 refugees had returned to Bosnia, which means that 150,000 - 200,000 would have to return by the end of that year - an unlikely number - to correspond to the UNHCR figure. The peace implementation 9 9 Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War. 2ded. (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 208. 1 0 0 Misha Glenny, "Europe's Restless Region," Time. January 19, 1998, vol. 151, no. 3, 2. 62 council records 400,000 refugees returning by December 1997, another figure which simply doesn't add up. Another factor which makes these figures misleading is that it is very possible that many refugees returning from other countries are remaining internally displaced within Bosnia proper. This could mean that high figures, such as 400,000 returned, a return rate of 22%, could be misleading. Further, i f refugees from abroad are not returning to their pre-war homes but, instead, to cities which belong largely to their ethnic group then return rates are not as high as they may appear to be at first glance. A l l that can be said with certainty is that progress has been modest. Reasons for refugees not returning to pre-war homes can be divided into two categories. The first category is the one that deals with psychological and political elements. People are naturally hesitant to return to live in villages or towns from which they were forcibly and brutally evicted. It is not surprising that the sole survivor of a family would not want to return to the same farm where tragic memories remain. Further, there is fear that the peace of Dayton is still fragile and that the unthinkable could happen again. This question leads us to the notion of whether or not people trust in the peace of Dayton and the prescribed ideals of it enough to return home. For example, if a Muslim believes that Bosnia will split up into its two Entity halves, it would be foolish for her to move to the Republika Srpska. This makes refugee repatriation one of the true tests of Dayton. As Ceramagic notes, "without the return of everyone to their homes none of the problems of Bosnia and Hercegovina will be solved."101 Refugee repatriation is not just about justice or fairness but about whether or not the ideal of a multi-ethnic Bosnia, the underlying principle of Dayton, is possible. 1 0 1 "Interview with Rasim Ceramagic," November 23, 1997. 63 The second category deals with physical and economic conditions which make it difficult for refugees to return home. Areas of Bosnia were completely destroyed, with many dwellings razed to the ground and many land mines strewn. This makes some of Bosnia unliveable. There are also economic reasons for not returning. People will not return to someplace that gives them little or no possibility of making a viable living. Ceramagic also notes that many refugees don't want to return to Bosnia because they live better in other countries than they ever did there.102 In the first category, psychological and political elements for refugees not returning, we will focus on problems of continued violence and a lack of co-operation from officials in allowing the return of refugees. We will also include in this category a closer look into the refugee situation in Sarajevo. Fitting into this psychological and political category are also the rifts between urban and country dwellers and those persons returning from abroad. The second category will focus on economic and physical problems with refugees returning. As with so many things in Bosnia, the international community has many programs underway to encourage people to return to their pre-war homes and to facilitate a return to multi-ethnic society. One of the most practical was a publication, Going Home - A Guidebook for Refugees, which was produced in February 1997. The booklet deals with "practical advice on how to return, what to expect on arrival, human rights, regaining lost property, the danger of landmines and many other issues."103 Housing Committees in many of the major cities assist Canton authorities in resolving housing problems, which include multiple occupancy and legal repossession of dwellings by pre-war occupants. The most important and visible international 1 0 2 "Rasim Ceramagic speech text." 64 committee is the Return and Reconstruction Task Force which is in charge of all reintegration and return activities. This organisation has members from various world bodies, including the World Bank. The Task Force has a diverse focus, from broad resource allocation guidelines to more specific regional return structures. Two of the problems most difficult to surmount are continued violence and a lack of co-operation from Entity officials in allowing the return of refugees. There have been too many post-Dayton incidents of ethnic violence to list here, but we shall provide a representative sample. In March 1997, in Gajevi, a village in the north-east of the Republika Srpska, a group of 150 Serb civilians set fire to houses earmarked for the return of Bosnian Muslim refugees. Although it was a civilian group that started the blaze, Republika Srpska police forces were chided for neither attempting to stop or stopping the blaze. In Dizdarusa, also in the Republika Srpska, workmen work daily on destroyed houses intended for their former occupants, Muslim refugees, and every morning the workers return to find the houses trashed. The fact that they keep on rebuilding the houses, despite threats to their personal safety, does bode well. In Brcko, the only Muslim refugees that have returned have done so under heavy American troop protection. Elsewhere in Bosnia, in particular in 1996 and early 1997, some refugees who returned to their homes were beaten up although most of the damage has been to their homes. Although progress has been slow there has been progress. By July 1998, the Return and Reconstruction Task Force opened the bulk of their regional and local offices and is presently stepping up both reintegration programs and incident reporting mechanisms. On July 18, 1998, 135 Muslim Bosnians visited their former home town, Trebinje, now in the Republika Srpska. "OHR Bulletin, February 6, 97," 11. 65 The displaced persons met with officials and expressed interest in returning even though the meetings were interrupted frequently by loud remarks from those who did not want them to return. Dildar Gartenberg, an OSCE elections observer, who had been observing at an electoral office in southern Republika Srpska in November 1998, recounted another positive story. Quite a few Muslims had come to vote in their former home town, now in the Republika Srpska. In one incident, a group of Muslims met their Serb neighbours at the electoral office. She says that at first their remarks were guarded and simply cordial, and then they went with the Serbs, their former friends, to their homes for refreshments. This was a very positive, although small step, towards those refugees returning home. Figure 8 - Dildar Gartenberg, OSCE election observer. 66 Cross border returns, in particular between Croatia and Bosnia have progressed slowly with the only real progress occurring in recent months when international pressures on Croatia led to a Croatian about face on the issue of Serb return. In 1998, some progress has been seen as Serb houses in Croatia are being rebuilt to encourage resettlement and steps have been taken to guarantee minority rights. Returns in Croatia and Bosnia are interdependent with each other, as displaced persons living in Bosnia who are occupying homes of other displaced persons, often have nowhere to go if they do not return to their original homes in Croatia. This brings us to a notion that has not received much discussion — swaps. One of the obstacles to refugee repatriation, in particular within Bosnia, is that refugees cannot return to their homes because they are already occupied by other displaced persons. In turn, these people cannot return to their homes because they are occupied by other displaced persons. The international community and Entity officials do not want to evict people who have no place else to go. However, it may be possible to swap people. For example, 100 Serbs living in the Republika Srpska and occupying homes formerly owned by Muslims might actually want to return to their pre-war homes in what is now the Federation, now occupied by Muslim displaced persons. They could be swapped with each other, not necessarily returning people to their exact pre-war homes, but at least returning them to their pre-war regions and rebuilding a foundation for multi-ethnic co-existence. Another obstacle to the creation of a multi-ethnic Bosnia and to the return of refugees is the situation in Sarajevo. Pre-war Sarajevo was 49% Muslim, 28% Serb, 7% Croatian and 16% Yugoslav and other (who included mixed marriage products).104 At present it is almost 90% 1 0 4 Woodward, 226. 67 Muslim, with only about 26,000 citizens who were original inhabitants. The balance of the population is made-up of refugees. In February 1998, participants at the Sarajevo Conference, which included senior representatives of the Office of the High Representative, the United States, the European Union, Bosnian presidency and Entity officials, issued the Sarajevo Declaration, agreeing "that Sarajevo's status as the capital and its history of multi-ethnic co-existence necessitated [sic] that this city should take the lead. Sarajevo should serve as an example for reconciliation and the unconditional right of every citizen of B i H to return home."105 In the months since the conference, Sarajevo authorities have identified numerous cases of multiple occupancy, where one family occupies more than one dwelling, usually illegally. However, of the 794 such cases identified, only 26 were close to being resolved by July 15, 1998. Further, in the five months following the Declaration, only 1,202 individuals have returned to Sarajevo. As a result, and due to the abysmal performance by Sarajevo authorities, some donor aid has been suspended to Sarajevo. In recent weeks, this approach has yielded some positive results but more time is needed to determine i f substantive changes are taking place. The majority of Sarajevo's inhabitants are now displaced persons. This brings to mind two other problems with refuge repatriation and peaceful living in Bosnia, in particular in Sarajevo. One of the first things I heard in Sarajevo, from my taxi driver Germovic Bakir, was that Sarajevo is no longer Sarajevo because it is full of country dwellers. "I'd rather have a Serb from Sarajevo next door to me, then one of those peasants," he gruffly notes. Although his view is snobbish and condescending, he explains that before the war Sarajevo was full of 1 0 5 "OHR Bulletin, August 1, 98," 12. 68 secular people who looked towards Western Europe, "now we have people who had never even seen an indoor toilet!" He was particularly appalled by a sight he had witnessed the other day, "a woman, head to toe veiled! what is that? I'm Muslim, but not that Muslim!." This rift between country and city is a factor not really discussed in any literature in regards to Bosnia but in the minds and hearts of many I spoke to in Sarajevo it was fast becoming a problem. The second rift is between those who left Sarajevo and Bosnia to other countries and those who stayed and "fought for their country." In Sarajevo, which experienced one of the most brutal sieges in recent memory, this rift is particularly evident. Rasim Ceramagic notes that "the ones who stayed say that they should never permit the return of those who betrayed the homeland when she was in the most need. But those who left never stopped thinking that Bosnia was their home and that they still have rights on everything there. ...[but] those who escaped the war and now return have a better start than those who stayed."106 He goes on to note that refugees "don't want to return until there are ideal living conditions ... [but] they don't understand that they themselves are going to have to sacrifice i f they want to rebuild their country."107 The northern Federation city of Tuzla is one of the only areas to hold firmly to multi-ethnic ideals. The town's major, Selim Beslagic, strives to include all three ethnic groups into political life. In Tuzla, the majority of Croats, Serbs and Muslims voted for the List ~ one of Bosnia's only examples of cross-over voting. As noted in The Economist, "Tuzla's Serbs can pray in their own Orthodox churches. Most Muslim women in Tuzla wear western dress. Some "citizen's groups' have sprung up, promoting co-operation between Muslims, Serbs and 1 0 6 "Rasim Ceramagic speech text." 69 Croats, and preaching religious tolerance."108 Unfortunately, the biggest threat to Tuzla's multi-ethnic harmony comes from 35,000 Muslim refugees from Srebrenica who are not eager to live amongst Serbs. Muslim-Croat Federation (Or Lack Thereof) I grew up believing that Croats and Muslims not only get along but that Muslims were Croats who just had a different religious background. This had less to do with any propaganda I was fed by my parents than with my own ethnic heritage. My parents were both Croatians, born in Zagreb but with different backgrounds. My mother's family is Croatian and were regular churchgoers even during the height of communism. They paid dearly for being non-communist, losing their apartment after the Second World War. My grandfather was held back from promotions and my mother lost her job as a journalist with Radio Zagreb in the spring of 1971. On my father's side there was a mixed marriage. My grandmother's family was Catholic, but not strictly practising, and Croatian from Croatia proper. My grandfather had a Turkish mother, my namesake, and was born in Tuzla and raised Muslim. However, his family had always considered themselves Croatian. For reasons lengthy, my grandfather was an atheist, a Yugoslav and a Partisan who had fought as a colonel in the Second World War. He believed in a pure form of communism and paid for it by publicly disagreeing with Tito's split with the Soviet Union in 1948. He spent three years in prison, but left prison still firmly believing in the Yugoslav ideal. He was one of the minority in Yugoslavia who declared themselves Yugoslav. My grandparents ended up with a granddaughter who, growing up, firmly believed that she 1 0 7 Ibid. 70 was a Croatian Yugoslav, one born in the country of Yugoslavia but Croatian by ethnicity. As for religion, one of the main determinants of ethnicity? In a compromise worthy of Tito, my father agreed to my mother's desire to send me to Catholic private school and my mother agreed that aside from religious instruction and attendance through school that would be it for religion. The Bosnian heritage of my family was best expressed in my dad's explanations for his temper as the Bosnian side of him and the certain affinity he always feels with fellow Yugoslavs who came from Bosnia. If the destruction and death of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia were not enough, for myself, the biggest blow came when Muslims and Croatians began to massacre each other in Mostar. It shattered my self-righteous indignation about the Serbs and sorrowed me more then anything previous. But the Dayton Accords have made this wrong somewhat right by solidifying the alliance the Muslims and Croats had earlier forged. It is not a solid alliance, as in many ways the Dayton Accords agreed to an accord that wasn't even there, but it is one of the cornerstones upon which the fragile peace is made. Bosnia now consists of two Entities and one of these Entities is a Federation between the Croats and the Muslims. It is difficult to know where to begin when exploring the Croat-Muslim Federation which makes up one half of Bosnia. As background, the Constitution of Bosnia finds that the governance of both Entities rests with the Parliamentary Assembly which consists of two parts, a House of Peoples and a House of Representatives. The "House of Peoples shall comprise 15 Delegates, two-thirds from the Federation (including five Croats and five Bosniacs)."109 This is of interest because although it necessitates some degree of co-operation between the two ethnic No Author, "A last Redoubt of Balkan Tolerance," The Economist (on-line), April 26, 1997, 1. 71 groups. It does not really allow for the creation of non-ethnic based campaigns or parties. Instead of reducing the saliency of ethnicity this provision appears to make it more salient. On the other hand, the House of Representatives is comprised of 42 members, with two-thirds elected from the territory of the Federation. This is more positive in that this could mean that individuals of mixed ethnic heritage or of undeclared heritage could be delegates in this Assembly. We will explore parliamentary and election structures further in the section on elections. However, it should be noted that this is a curious set-up. As noted in the Economist in March 1996, "the constitution specified Muslim and Croat representation in federal institutions, thus reducing the potential influence by both the Serb minority and the non-nationalist parties."110 With the notable exception of Mostar, Muslims and Croats are managing to live together in a semblance of accord, which in some ways is not a true reflection of feelings on the ground. In fact, even though the Muslim-Croat Entity existed before Dayton was even signed, Richard Holbrooke noted that in January 1995, when he visited Zagreb and Sarajevo, that "the Federation — the Croat-Muslim entity that had been negotiated in Washington the previous March — existed only on paper, and frictions between the Croats and the Muslims were enormous."111 Parts of the Federation controlled by Croats, in particular Hercegovina, make no secret of wanting to join Croatia and it has even been reported that they are electing representatives to the Croatian parliament in Zagreb! Within the last 30 kilometres in Bosnia heading towards a Croatian-Bosnian border crossing in Hercegovina, newly rebuilt houses proudly boast Croatian flags. Constitution of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Article IV, 1. 72 Power in the Federation is monopolised by two parties, the Croatia HDZ (Hrvatska Democratska Zadenica, Croatian Democratic Party), a kissing cousin of the Croatian ruling HDZ, and the Muslim SDA (Stranka Democratske Akcije - Democratic Action Slate). Even Bosnian intellectuals, such as Halid Causevic, find that "we are still very divided. Look, in the Bosnian Federation there are two countries. A Croatian and a Muslim country."112 Even more troubling signs are that even though the Federation army is linked on paper, segregated barracks are maintained and linkages exist only at the very top of the chain of command. Most troubling is that "the federation's two top education officials, one of each ethnicity, agreed on a plan to segregate Muslim and Croat children in the federation's schools. Faced with international pressure," and, pressure from parents, "the plan is being re-examined for next year's academic calendar."113 If instead of teaching children multi-ethnic ideals they are segregated into ethnically based schools a united Bosnia will never be maintained. If the hate and prejudice of adults becomes passed on to the children there will really be no hope. Although the state of the Federation is shaky, some signs of progress are evident. Unlike the Federal bodies, Federation bodies meet regularly and, on occasion, even manage to agree on things. Laws that have been passed or are being considered, include Rules of Procedure for the House of Representatives and Legislation on Forestry, Agriculture, Veterinary Services and Water Resources. The Assemblies in the Federation have met regularly and have engaged in regular discussions on issues such as returns, human rights, media, new municipalities, pensioners insurance and disbandment of parallel government 1 1 0 No Author, "Bosnia: Carving Smoothly," The Economist (on-line). March 2, 1996. ' " Holbrooke, 61. 1 , 2 Causevic, 10. 1 1 3 Hockstader, 4. 73 structures. Further, when agreements have not been reached and members, of whichever party, have walked out in protest, they have generally returned to continue dialogue. Also of interest is that the Federation Assemblies have referred laws to the National Assembly for decisions. So even i f modest, there has been progress and, most importantly, a dialogue has been established. In particular, Federation officials have presented a unified front on issues such as condemning the murder of an elderly couple who had returned to Drvar, welcoming the re-opening of Mostar airport and jointly pledging "themselves to ensure freedom of speech and open access to media space in the run-up to the September elections ... [they] stressed determination to quell statements and approaches perpetuating intolerance and ethnic hatred."114 The true litmus test of the relationship between Croats and Muslims will be Mostar. The destruction of the famed bridge was, for many, more than just a brutal act of war, it signalled the burning of bridges, so to speak, in the relationship between Croats and Muslims. Since Mostar is the most ungovernable city in the Federation it stands as an example of problems elsewhere in the Federation. A German European Union administrator, Hans Koschnick, was appointed to Mostar on September 12, 1993. In March 1994, when the Muslims and Croats first entered into the Federation deal, part of the arrangement was that the European Union take over administration of the city. At that time, the goal was to restore the city by repairing infrastructure, organising a multi-ethnic police force and creating a city administration.115 However, progress was difficult as promised international funds and troops were slow to arrive. The biggest obstacle, however, 1 1 4 "OHR Bulletin, April 24 1998," 7. 1 , 5 Reinhardt Rummel, "The European Union's Politico-Diplomatic Contribution to the Prevention of Ethno-National Conflict," in Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilising International and Regional Organisations, ed. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 74 was the lack of co-operation amongst city officials, in particular Croatian ones. In fact, the Croatian mayor of the western half of Mostar, Ivan Prskalo, still refuses even to consider plans for Muslims to return to their former homes in his side of the city. He claims that he will not do so until there is a nation-wide plan for resettlement but many believe, with just cause, that he is simply stalling. Tensions in Mostar culminated in February 1997. At that time, the worst post-Dayton violence occurred when 500 Bosnians who were heading for the Liska cemetery, in Croatian controlled Mostar, to mourn their dead on the second day of Bairam were blocked by 700 Croats. At least one person died and 21 were wounded. In that same month, 28 Bosnians were evicted from their homes on the west side of the city. To the embarrassment of Croat officials, it was later discovered that Croatian policemen had participated in the attacks. Twenty-three Bosnians returned to their homes at a later date, but five refused, citing fear for their safety. In March of that same year, E U Administrator Koschnick was attacked by a mob and escaped uninjured. Complaining of a lack of co-operation from Croat and Muslim leaders, he resigned after twenty arduous months at his post. 1996), 221-222. 75 Pasos, Molim! (Passport, Please!) Bosnia cannot function as a single country without federal institutions and national symbols such as a flag. Article III, Section I of the Bosnian constitution outlines ten areas which are the responsibility of Bosnian institutions. These are foreign policy, foreign trade policy, customs policy, monetary policy, finance of institutions and international obligations, immigration and refugee policy and regulation, international and inter-Entity criminal law, establishment and operations of common and international communications facilities, inter-Entity transportation and air traffic control. There are two key governmental Bosnian institutions. Article V of the Constitution outlines the triumvirate presidency which is supported by a Council of Ministers. Article IV provides for the Parliamentary Assembly which consists of a House of Peoples and a House of Representatives. This section will investigate the Bosnian government's progress in two areas. The first area will evaluate national governmental institutions including the presidency and the houses. Unfortunately, due to the lack of co-operation in these institutions this section will be brief. The second area will deal with Bosnian national symbols. These will include the progress towards a common currency, flag and citizenship/passport issues. These two areas are closely related as the majority of progress by national governmental institutions has been in these areas. Article V of the Bosnian Constitution holds that the "Presidency of Bosnia and Hercegovina shall consist of three members: one Bosniac and one Croat,... and one Serb."116 In order for the Bosnian state to function it is imperative that these three individuals co-operate. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Within days of the Presidential election the Serb 76 member, Momcilo Krajisnik, got angry at something that either the Croat, Kresimir Zubak, or the Muslim, Alija Izetbgovic, had said. He walked out and has hardly spoken to the other two representatives since. The situation would almost be comical if their co-operation was not so integral to keeping Bosnian together. Thus far, most of the blame for the lack of co-operation has been cast on Krajisnik. Ceramagic notes that "the presidency of Bosnian doesn't meet because Krajisnik refuses to, and if they do meet, he blocks consensuses because all things must be agreed on by all three.""7 It is reported that he is strictly under Karadzic's thumb and is following his instructions by blocking any progress, because any progress in Bosnian institutions works against the goals of an independent Serbian Republic. It appears that the other two members have also blocked co-operation in the Presidency, but to a lesser extent. As a result, a stern reprimand was issued at the Bonn Implementation Conference in December 1997 that "the Council recalls that repeated, intentional absences constitute lasting incapacity to perform the duties of the Presidency. Wilful absences reflect an intention to avoid the obligations of office and violate the duty to attend all meetings of the Presidency."118 After the reprimand from the Peace Implementation Council in December there has been some progress, and agreement has been reached in several areas. They have agreed on some less contentious issues such as the opening of diplomatic offices and the appointment of ambassadors. The also agreed, in April 1998, to liquidate the National Bank and to adopt a temporary budget proposal. They have also ratified some minor international agreements, such as road traffic agreements. Progress within the Council of Ministers has been even slower. After nearly two years 1 1 6 Bosnian Constitution. 77 of stalling, the problems of organisation and co-operation within the Council of Ministers were referred to the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The recommendations of the OHR were adopted in late March 1998 by the Council of Ministers. These included proposals on permanent locations, staffing and internal structures of the ministries. The OHR found this "decision by the Council of Ministers represents a significant step forward towards the creation of a State District, which will include a special administrative and legal regime to apply to all of the common institutions of Bosnia."1 1 9 In regards to the Bosnian parliament, Ceramagic notes that, by late November 1997, it "has met only three times and made some formal laws, principally those regarding credit."120 As Holbrooke noted "the good news in Sarajevo is that joint institutions actually existed, the bad news was that they barely functioned."121 The parliament's first laws were passed on June 20, 1997. These laws were a quick start package intended to create a central bank, common currency, customs union and common external tariffs. However, the progress of the parliament is best measured if we look more closely into the second area we proposed to investigate, national symbols. Federal symbols and regulations must exist in order for Bosnia to exist. The peace is Bosnia is so fragile that without even the most minor details a united state of Bosnia is not possible. As Holbrooke noted, "a single country needed a single currency and a central bank ~ otherwise it would be a fraud from the outset."122 He also points out that he has been criticised "Rasim Ceramagic speech text." "Bonn Peace Implementation Conference 1997: Conclusions," 6. "OHR Bulletin, March 28,1998," 6. "Rasim Ceramagic speech text." Holbrooke, 352. Holbrooke, 256. 78 for spending 'the bulk of [my] time haggling over telephone area codes and designs for a currency and the appointment of Bosnian ambassadors [instead] of dealing with the principal threats to a unified Bosnia.' ... one of the main points of our trip, and indeed of the entire implementation process: to create a unified Bosnia, these seemingly small issues had to be solved, one by one i f necessary.123 It is also in the handling of these small issues that we can note the greatest failure of Bosnian institutions: the failure to reach consensus on these minimal issues and the need for intervention by the Office of the High Representative. The institutions must provide for "a single Bosnia with some central political and economic institutions [to] ... provide at least the framework for Muslims, Serbs and Croats to deal with their differences by negotiation rather than war. Without such regular contacts the inevitable disputes between them could soon spin out of control."124 "Don't forget to bring marks," I was warned by virtually everyone I spoke to in Sarajevo from Zagreb. Deutsche marks? Wasn't there supposed to be some sort of Bosnian currency by November, 1997? I soon realised the confusing conundrum that currency in Sarajevo posed. Deutsche marks were most frequently in use, with American currency, and some others, accepted "on the side." However, there was also the Bosnian dinar, with 100 dinars equivalent to one Deutsche mark. The Bosnian dinar had both Cyrillic and Latin writing and pictures of multi-ethnic symbols such as Mostar's famous bridge. Most people hesitated to use the Bosnian dinar, mainly because of a belief in the greater stability and dependability of German currency. Holbrooke, 353. 79 However, some shops did accept the dinar but banks converted Canadian dollars into Deutsche marks not dinars. The most unique difficulties were posed by shopkeepers who told Americans the price in United States dollars but would readily accept payment in Marks, Dollars, Dinars or any combination thereof. Smaller stores, were virtually the only ones that would accept only dinars.. Due to a lack of co-operation and decision making by the Bosnian parliament and an inability of Presidential committees to reach agreement, the currency issue was forwarded to the OHR for arbitration. The design eventually chosen for the currency, the Convertible Mark (KM) was the same for both Entities and featured poets and novelists from all three different nationalities. Mesa Selimovic, author of Death and the Dervish, is on currency from both Entities. Both alphabets are used. There are seven denominations (0.5, 1, 5, 10, 20, 50 and 100) for fourteen different bank notes which can be used in both Entities. The differences between Entity designs consist of the differential pictures and the order of the alphabets. The K M "will be fully backed by reserves of convertible currencies, primarily Deutschemarks, that are held at the Central Bank of B i H . . . The exchange rate will be fixed and stable at 1:1 D M . " 1 2 5 The new currency was brought into circulation on June 19, 1998. High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, speaking at the currency launch, noted that "the K M is now the legal tender currency of B i H and people will be obliged to accept it as a form of payment. A l l local public authorities will have to use the K M . ... The K M is, for the whole country, an important symbol of statehood ... It will facilitate trade and the capital flow between BiH's two Entities, and, we 1 2 4 No Author, "After Bosnia Votes," The Economist (on-line), September 14, 1996. 1 2 5 "OHR Bulletin, April 24,1998," 5. 80 hope, will bring the people closer together."126 The issues surrounding passports and citizenship were also referred to the OHR after they encountered obstructionists in the Bosnian Parliament. As a result, the High Representative decreed into law a new citizenship statute with similar provisions as European laws. However, it defines Bosnian citizenship "as applicable to all those who were residing in either Entity until 6 April 1992, and established a commission to resolve cases of persons who became resident between 1992 and 1995."127 The debate surrounding passports would, again, be almost amusing i f it were not such a serious issue. Monika Studel told me that heated and lengthy arguments were conducted about the size of lettering and the colour of passports. The biggest obstacles to the passport issue were that the Entities, most vehemently the Republika Srpska, wished to be able to issue their own passports. As with many other issues, the OHR had to step in and decide on the passport designs. In a ceremony on May 28, 1998 two citizens were the first to receive new passports. There will be three passport designs, one for each Entity and a diplomatic one. The High Representative decided on the Bosnian flag design using recommendations from local cultural associations. The flag design, adopted on January 26, 1998, called for a blue flag with a gold triangle and a row of stars. The flag is designed to be ethnically neutral with the "triangle represent[ing] the three constituent peoples of Bosnia and Hercegovina; the gold colour represent[ing] the sun, as a symbol of hope; the blue and the stars stand for Europe."128 The unfortunate political reality in Bosnia is that there has been little co-operation or 1 2 6 "OHR bulletin, July 5, 1998," 2. 1 2 7 "OHR Bulletin, February 6, 1998," 7. 1 2 8 "OHR Bulletin, February 6, 1998," 9. 81 national decision making in federal institutions. For the first two years after the signing of Dayton, the Croat and Serb representatives appeared to be continuing to try and further their earlier goals of independent, or joined with the motherland, Croat and Serb states. The only progress has been after stern reprimands and pressure from the international community. However, over the past nine months, there has been some decision making on issues that are vital for the functioning of the Bosnian state. Unfortunately, this decision making has been by Carlos Westendorp, not by Bosnian elected officials. The one positive thing here is that at least once the OHR has arbitrated the outcome of contentious issues they have been accepted. Perhaps, there will be more progress now that some issues of statehood, such as citizenship and passports, have been decided. 82 Elections Many theorists hold that the blame for the carnage in Bosnia should lie chiefly with the leaders of the three ethnic groups. In 1990, in the first democratic election in Bosnia the peoples of Bosnia tended to vote for leaders and parties of their own ethnic groups.129 This further exacerbated and accentuated ethnic cleavages. Unfortunately, the single largest flaw in the Dayton Accords and the Bosnian Constitution is that the electoral system is designed so that candidates need to seek votes from only one ethnic group in order to win office. However, it should be noted that the parties to Dayton would never have agreed to the agreement i f there were not provisions so that all three ethnic groups were equally represented in government. As investigated below, the post-Dayton elections, instead of promoting co-operation and democracy, have served merely to further exacerbate ethnic divisions and communalism. Before we begin our discussion it is worth taking note of what the Constitution states. Article IV deals with the Federal Parliamentary Assembly which holds that the House of Peoples "shall comprise 15 Delegates, two-thirds from the Federation (including five Croats and five Bosniacs) and one-third from the Republika Srpska (five Serbs). The House of Representatives is to consist of 42 members, with two-thirds from the Federation and one-third from the Republika Srpska. The Presidency of Bosnia is to consist of three members, one from each respective ethnic group. Dispite the objections of the International Crisis Group, the first Bosnia-wide elections were held on September 14, 1996. As expected, and in every single election since, "the three main nationalist political parties ~ the very ones that led their people into war ~ have each held 1 2 9 75 per cent opted for nationalist parties, Bosniac Party of Democratic Action, SDA won 86 seats, the SDS (Serb 83 onto power at the ballot box by promising to protect their corresponding ethnic supporters from the other two groups."130 The Bosnian, Alija Izetbegovic, Stranka za Demokratsku Akciju (Party for Democratic Action or SDA) and the Croat, Kresimir Zubak, Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, (Croatian Democratic Party or HDZ), both received more than 80% of the votes in their respective slots. The Serb, Momcilo Krajisnik, Serbska Demokratska Zajednica (Serbian Democratic Party or SDS), received 67% of the votes in his category. In the vote for the House of Representatives of Bosnia the SDA captured the largest amount of seats, 19, the SDS 8 and the HDZ, 7. Non-nationalist parties garnered 7 seats, with two Federation parties, the Zdruzena Lista (Combined List) with 3 and the Stranka za BiH (Party for Bosnia and Hercegovina) 2, the Savez za mir iprogres (The Party for Peace and Progress) from the Republika Srpska won 2. In the Federation itself, the House of Representatives vote was decidedly won by the SDA with an absolute majority of 78 seats out of the 140 available. The Croatian HDZ received 23 percent of the vote and 33 seats. Non-nationalist parties polled about 15 per cent. The Stranka za BiH won 7.5 percent, or 11 seats and the Zdruzena Lista, which has favour in Tuzla, won 10 seats with 7 per cent of the vote. In the Republika Srpska, Biljana Plavsic (SDS) received 65 percent of the vote, while her two nearest rivals a non-ethnic candidate, Zivko Radisic {Savez za mir iprogress) who received 16.5 percent and a Bosnian Muslim, Adib Dozic (SDA) who came third with over 10 percent. The SDS received 59 percent of the vote in the Republika Srpska National Assembly. The Savez za mir iprogres was second with 12 per cent and the Srpska patriotska stranka (Serb Patriotic Alliance) and the SDS both received 7 per cent. Democratic Party) 72 seats and the HDZ 22,202 out of 240 seats for the Bosnian parliament. 84 The International Crisis Group, and many other foreign observers, expressed concerns over elections taking place so early "on the grounds that the minimum conditions for a free and fair poll did not exist."131 There were numerous reasons for this. There had been no progress towards the repatriation and reintegration of refugees. Indicted war criminals were still heavily influential in politics, and basic civic rights, such as freedom of movement and an unbiased media, were severely curtailed. As a result of the Crisis Group's concerns, municipal elections were postponed, but federal elections were still conducted. The decision to proceed with the elections was not an easy one and has been heavily criticised. One of the reasons for the elections was pressure from foreign governments. They wished to witness events in Bosnia that would signal a democratic and unified state. This would represent a tangible achievement of their respective countries foreign policies. Further rationale for the decision to proceed with elections has been put forward by the OSCE. To this, the Crisis Group has responded critically. The OSCE's position was that elections were merely a single step in the long process of democratisation and that they would reaffirm the position of Bosnia as a multi-ethnic state. Further, they held that elections were desired by the parties involved and that elections would possibly allow the emergence of non-ethnically aligned opposition parties. The Crisis Group countered these arguments by noting that elections would likely merely reaffirm the saliency of ethnic group-based politics and that, instead of strengthening the process of democratisation, elections would only further destabilise the region. The Crisis Group's analysis of the situation proved the more accurate one. The September 1996 elections were filled with difficulties. During the election Hockstader, 3. 85 campaign, Dr. Haris Silajdzic, leader of the Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu (Party for Bosnia and Hercegovina) was struck on the head with a metal bar when supporters from the SDS interrupted his election rally. Other opposition parties and leaders experienced similar harassment and violence. Further, the appeal to ethnicity was not only utilised during campaigns but became the main voter calling card. The Crisis Group's publication, Elections in Bosnia and Hercegovina, notes that "advertisements of the Croat Democratic Party (HDZ) informed Croat voters that the "survival of their nation' was at stake on 14 September. Republika Srpska television, for its part, announced that a vote against the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) would constitute a vote 'against the Republika Srpska and the Serb people.'"132 Further, in the Republika Srpska, the elections were often presented as a referendum on independent statehood. Most troubling during the elections were the limitations on the freedom of movement of voters and the difficulties experienced by those who wished to vote in areas not controlled by their ethnic group or who wished to support candidates not affiliated with the ruling parties. Individuals who came to vote in areas not controlled by their ethnic groups were frequently harassed and detained. The UNHCR reported that buses they hired to transport people within the Republika Srpska were detained and even stoned. In the Republika Srpska, indicted war crimes suspect Karadzic, was frequently referred to and, in contravention of election policy, was even displayed in election supervisor's offices.133 The three ruling parties focused their efforts on intimidating opposition parties and their supporters by staging mass turnout to their rallies and evicting opposition party members from any official positions they held prior to the 1 3 1 "Elections in Bosnia and Hercegovina," International Crisis Group, Section One, 1. 86 elections. Difficulties with the actually enumeration of voters and voting were pervasive. Refugees from Bosnia are spread out amongst 63 countries and are subject to a complex voter registration process. However, due to organisational problems within the OSCE, voter registration for the September 14, 1996 election only began on June 10, 1996. Further, according to Dayton, refugees were expected to vote, either in person or by absentee ballot in the same municipality where they resided in 1991. However, the refugee is permitted to apply to vote elsewhere. The assumption in the international community at the time of the signing of Dayton was that by the time elections were held, refugee repatriation would be well on its way. Unfortunately, as we have earlier discussed, that was not the case. According to the Crisis Group report, the majority of displaced Bosnian Muslims and Croats presently living in the Federation registered to vote in their former municipalities either by absentee ballot or in person (187,414). Only 59,473 wished to vote in their current Federation homes. This was positive and signalled a desire on the part of these refugees to return to their original homes and to reintegrate with members of other ethnic groups. Unfortunately, the situation in the Republika Srpska was reversed. Two-hundred forty-one thousand, seven hundred forty-one Serbs choose to vote in their current place of residence, only 78,196 wished to vote by absentee ballot, and an even lesser number of these voting in their former Federation residences. Most troubling is the accusation of the international community that many Serbs did not have free choice of where to cast their ballot but were coerced by Bosnian Serb authorities. UNHCR special envoy for the former Yugoslavia, Soren Jessen-1 3 2 "Elections in Bosnia and Hercegovina," International Crisis Group, Section Two, 10. 87 Petersen, noted that "in some cases, the authorities threatened to withhold humanitarian aid to coerce voters to opt for Registration Form [P-2]. Many received registration forms which already indicated the location at which they were to vote."134 Voter registration of refugees in Yugoslavia was just as troubling, with Serb refugees being registered en masse to vote in municipalities which were formerly Bosnian Muslim majority, thus stacking the number of Serb voters in certain municipalities. In regards to the voting itself, accusations of election misconduct were widespread. Witnesses reported ballot box stuffing, persons voting on behalf of others and campaigning at electoral sites. Even more disturbing was the choice of polling stations in some areas. These included a notorious execution site for Muslims in Foca and in Lazete, near Zvornik, the exact site where Muslims were massacred in 1992. In the Republika Srpska, voters were often segregated into Bosnian Muslims and Serb stations, with Bosnian Muslim stations only processing a fraction of the people that the Serb stations did. Some Bosnian Muslim voters refused to vote when they found that their polling stations were far away from their former homes and, not as they had believed, in their former municipalities. If the above problems were not enough to make the election results seriously suspect it appears that the number of ballots cast was a mathematical impossibility. For the presidency election, 2,431,554 voters must have cast ballots. The maximum theoretical electorate, as estimated by the United Nations, OSCE, IFOR and OHR was 2,920,000. Table 2 looks at this voter turnout. 1 3 3 Conversation with Dildar Gartenberg OSCE election observer, November 28, 1998. 1 3 4 "Elections in Bosnia and Hercegovina," International Crisis Group, Section Two, 22. 88 TABLE 2135 Voter Turnout in the 1996 Municipal Elections in Bosnia Maximum theoretical electorate 2,920,000 Voters who did not cast ballots Refugees who failed to register 259,000 IDP voters who failed to cross IEBL 135,300 Serb refugees in F R Y who failed to return on the day 24,600 Maximum theoretical voter turn-out 2,341,100 Numbers of voters who cast ballots 2,431,554 Turn-out as proportion of maximum electorate 103.9% If we also take into consideration that an estimated 120,000 persons could not cast their votes as a result of registration errors and the high probability that 80,000 Serb voters from Yugoslavia were double counted, there were certainly serious problems with the elections. Municipal elections were held on 13-14 September, 1997. Voter turnout was approximately 87 % with 4,789 municipal council members elected. Again, as in the federal elections, the three ruling, ethnic parties dominated. They won 87 % of the vote in the Federation and 57 % of the vote in the Republika Srpska. Non-nationalist parties won 6 % of the seats in the entire country, 12% in the Federation and only 2% in the Republika Srpska. The only municipality where non-nationalist parties won a majority was Tuzla with 63% of council seats won by non-nationalists. In Mostar, the SDA coalition and the HDZ each retained control of their respective ethnic group's side of the city. The SDS lost some ground in the 1 3 5 "Elections in Bosnia and Hercegovina," International Crisis Group, Section Three, 11. ' 89 Republika Srpska, polling only 37% but other extreme nationalist parties provided the only viable opposition.136 As in the earlier election, there were difficulties. In the contentious city of Brcko, 15 percent of Serb registrations were proved fraudulent and, elsewhere in the Republika Srpska, Karadzic's image was again used. Allegations of other ethnic groups making voting more time consuming and difficult for refugees were again prevalent. However, these elections took place with less violence and harassment then the earlier ones. Municipal elections were again held in the Republika Srpska in December 1997 after a political crisis erupted there. The ruling SDS, whose de facto head is Karadzic, won 24 out of the 83 parliamentary seats. The Serbian President's, Biljana Plavsic, Serbian National Alliance took 17 seats. A hard-line nationalistic Serbian party, the Radical Party, took 13 seats. The Bosnian Serb Socialist Party garnered nine seats and a Muslim coalition, led by the SDA, won 16 seats. The elections thus far in Bosnia have been just shy of a complete disaster. They have done little to promote democracy or inter-ethnic living but have merely exacerbated ethnic tensions and further divided ethnic groups. The biggest difficulties have been in the Republika Srpska where election manipulation by leaders has blatantly violated Dayton provisions. The nearsighted decision by the international community to conduct the elections was a result of a need for these countries to reaffirm their own foreign policy goals and not a result of a clear understanding of the situation on the ground in Bosnia. Finally, since candidates were elected on their promises to protect their own ethnic groups, there is little need or desire for politicians to represent any interests or concerns other than those of their ethnic group. 1 3 6 "Press Release: ICG Analysis of 1997 Municipal Election Results." International Crisis Group. 90 Few positive things can be said about the elections but some things do stand out as significant. Even though voting conditions were difficult, people did vote. One can hope that this signals a belief by regular citizens of Bosnia that they believe in at least some tenets of the Dayton Accords and the peace process. This is evidenced particularly by Bosnian Muslim and Croatian refugees, the majority of whom wished to vote in their former homes now in Serb majority areas. Another positive aspect, one that has unfortunately garnered little comment in media, is that not all receptions of refugee voters were negative. Dildar Gartenberg, an American who was an OSCE observer for the September 1997 elections, noted that in her municipality in the Republika Srpska there were quite a few Bosnian Muslim voters who came there from the Federation in order to vote in their former municipality. Several of these Bosnian Muslims encountered their former neighbours, Serbs, at the polling station. Their conversation was cordial and then they went together to the home of one of the Serbs for drinks. A small step, but perhaps a crucial step in these refugees returning back to their homes. However, the electoral system in Bosnia must be changed in order to reduce the saliency of the ethnic card. The International Crisis Group has produced a paper, Changing the Logic of Bosnian Politic", with its suggestions for improving the process. It holds that the prospects for democracy in Bosnia would be greatly enhanced "if the electoral system provides incentives for parties to be broad based."137 The Crisis Group noted that in order for a multi-ethnic Bosnia to be reconstructed the electoral system must: build in ethnic security; prevent the domination of the majority; 1 3 7 "Changing the Logic of Bosnian Politics: ICG Discussion Paper on Electoral Reform," CITY: International Crisis Group, March 10,1998, 2. 91 provide incentives for conciliation by obliging political actors to seek support from peoples other than their own; ensure political representation of displaced persons returning to their homes; give Bosnians a chance to vote on issues, not simply according to their ethnic identity; facilitate stable and efficient government, build in a mechanism for future reform; build a pluralistic party structure; provide co-operative partners for the international community's reconstruction effort; ensure maximum voter participation; and minimise fraud.'38 Earlier we noted that seats are reserved for members of all three majority ethnic groups. However, there is no seat reservation for those who do not belong to either of the three ethnic groups or who are of mixed ethnic heritage. Seats should likely be allocated to these individuals as well, perhaps by utilising the 1991 census. The method of electing office-holders should be changed. The Crisis Group suggests multiple-voting. Through a complex process, ethnic results would be set in advance, to ensure that no ethic group has an absolute majority, and votes would be weighted, with each elector voting once for each Serb, Croat and Bosniac community. This would allow each ethnic group to have influence on who is elected in other communities, encouraging moderates and reducing the influence of ethnically fanatic leaders. Ballots would be considered spoiled i f not completely filled out and candidates would have to have a set minimum of votes from their own community to discourage bogus candidates. The idea of setting ethnic results in advance and having separate ethnic roles would be a difficult sell in the international community. However, the realities in Bosnia are not that of the United States melting pot model. The Crisis Group maintains that "while Westerners may find institutionalising divisions uncomfortable, the aim "Changing the Logic of Bosnian Politics: ICG Discussion Paper on Electoral Reform," 2. 92 of this proposal is to acknowledge differences and to build them into the system in such a way that elected officials are answerable to, and dependent on, all voters and not exclusively their own ethnic group."139 1 3 9 "Changing the Logic of Bosnian Politics: ICG Discussion Paper on Electoral Reform," 22. 93 We Can't Do This Alone Real authority in Bosnia today exists not with its elected officials but with the international community. Peace is maintained by the United Nations Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and when Bosnian politicians cannot agree on governmental policy they let the final authority rest with the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The future of Bosnia as an independent state rests largely on the continued involvement of the international community. This chapter will briefly explore the future and nature of this involvement. We will also take a closer look at Bosnia's two closest neighbours, Croatia and Yugoslavia. To bring this section back into our wider theoretical context we may note that this corresponds with Hampson's first and second points, third party involvement and regional/systemic power systems. Yugoslavia dissolved amidst the changing international climate of the end of the Cold War. New geopolitical and economic realities fertilised the seeds of national discontent. From the very beginning of the Yugoslav crisis international actors have played a role. Whether it was the ill-fated decision to recognise Bosnian sovereignty or numerous attempts to broker peace plans, the world indicated that the events in Bosnia were of interest. It is a near certainty that the Dayton Accords would not exist in the form they are today without the involvement of the United States. The war itself would have ended but without American intervention there would not be a Bosnian state. It is in the international community's best interests for Bosnia to remain a unitary state. Partition would be violent and would send the message to other irredentists that gains brokered by violence are acceptable. This view is succinctly put by United States national security advisor, Samuel Berger, "partition also would be wrong because it would send the message to 94 ethnic fanatics everywhere that the international community will allow the redrawing of borders by force ... to advocate partition is to accept defeat."140 The international prestige and foreign policy of many countries, in particular the United States, rests on the success of Dayton. Further, the abysmal failure of the international community to solve the conflict has been redeemed by its present success in stopping the conflict with Dayton. This is Holbrooke's belief that "while our national interests are not directly affected by whether Bosnia is one country or two or even three, the outcome in Bosnia will profoundly affect our overall role in the emerging post-post-Cold War world ..."' 4 1 There is also the moral argument that partition would likely mean that those who lost most in the war, the Bosnian Muslims, would likely be left without a state. Another argument is nicely put by Hockstader, that"... the West's real goal in Bosnia is stability, not reintegration of a society traumatised by bloodshed and hatred. Few diplomats, and almost no Bosnians, say it is possible to resurrect anything resembling Bosnia's pre-war multiethnic society."142 Further, there is a fear that further violence in Bosnia would trigger even more violence and instability in Europe. However, although the international community does not want to see the dissolution of Bosnia, there is concern about massive long-term foreign involvement. In fact, when the Dayton Accords were signed, military involvement by the international community was scheduled to end in December 1997. Although troop numbers have been reduced, this mandate has now been extended indefinitely. The reality is that European involvement will stop the minute that American involvement does. However, it is difficult to believe that the Americans 1 4 0 Samuel Berger, "Dayton Accords Must Succeed to Prevent Wider War." Defense Issues, volume 12, number 48, September 23, 1997. 1 4 1 Holbrooke, 339. 1 4 2 Holbrooke, 339. 95 will pull out of Bosnia if they believe that the situation will again become violent. The foreign military presence in Bosnia will likely be there at least until there is a neutral Bosnian police force and that could take years. United States foreign policy will not allow American withdrawal from Bosnia. Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright, has frequently stated that American involvement in Bosnia will continue and in a speech to Congress in March 1998 she firmly stated that "giving up now would be misguided -- and harmful to American interests."143 To the arguments of those who had feared the American involvement she has responded that "far from becoming entrapped in an endless quagmire in Bosnia, we have been able to reduce our troop presence; far from finding ourselves Bosnia's permanent administrators, we are handing more and more responsibility back to multi-ethnic institutions."144 However, a change in government in the United States could change American foreign policy imperatives. Foreign involvement is vital for not only keeping the peace but also for ensuring the implementation of the civilian areas of Dayton. The OSCE has been responsible for conducting and implementing the elections. International monetary organisations have been organising aid and attempting to revitalise the Bosnian economy. Further, the Office of the High Representative has often stepped in to arbitrate on matters where agreement could not be reached by elected Bosnian officials. However, there is the danger that the will and patience of the international community in dealing with Bosnian officials who, in many cases, refuse to co-operate is not infinite. 1 4 3 " Madeleine K. Albright Statement on Bosnia before the House National Security Committee", March 18, 1998, 2. 1 4 4 Ibid. 96 Addressing the Security Council of the United Nations on July 27, 1998, Westendorp cautioned that "the present degree of international support will not last for ever, and is now at its peak." Further, he expressed his belief that "Bosnia's leaders should exploit the window provided by aid, and by the recently extended international military presence, to build their country based on effective political institutions and a free market economy."145 The United Nations Secretary General speaking at the Bonn Peace Implementation Council also warned Bosnian officials that "allow me to remind you that neither our patience nor our resources are infinite. We are providing you and your people a chance to rebuild your country and economy. I urge you to seize this opportunity before it is too late."146 The easiest way to describe the foreign policies of Croatia and Yugoslavia toward Bosnia is to simply say that the Serbs would very much like to have that part of Bosnia that is populated by Serbs and that the Croats would very much like to have that part of Bosnia which is populated by Croats. If any leader of either country says something to the contrary they are lying. The same two leaders, Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic that share some of the burden for Bosnia's war, still hold tightly to the reigns of power and although they were both signatories to Dayton, there is little evidence that they signed on to Dayton for any reason other then they were coerced by the United States. The Economist has noted that Tudjman's "departure would be an unqualified boon for Bosnia. He often says that Bosnia has no future as an independent state, and his actions do much to undermine it." 1 4 7 Tudjman has made no secret of his dislike for both Serbs and 1 4 5 "OHR Bulletin, August 1, 1998", 4 U 6 n y ^ j Secretary General speech to a meeting of the Peace Implementation Council", December 9, 1997. 1 4 7 No Author, "Europe's Last Strongmen," The Economist (on-line). December 7, 1996. 97 Muslims, but has, in the past twelve months, made some gestures towards increased co-operation with the Muslim leader, Izetbegovic. On July 18, 1997, Richard Holbrooke witnessed a heartening sight. The two men, instead of repeating their usual behaviour of yelling at each other, were seated next to each other, shoulders almost touching. Their press officer explained to Holbrooke that they wanted to show that they could co-operate without American interference. They then made an announcement of an agreement to strengthen the Federation.148 The relationship with Bosnia is a cornerstone of Croatian foreign policy. Croatian political scientist Radovan Vukadinovic holds that there is a geostrategic connection with Bosnia and that "there is a wish of Croatian people living in Bosnia and Hercegovina to have the equal rights as the other two nations, and not to be treated as a minority there; there was a high level of engagement of Bosnian Croats in defence of Bosnia and Hercegovina and they had a leading role in its preservation."149 He holds that "without the process of de-ethnification and elimination of dominant nationalistic strategies there will be nor stable and democratic [sic], nor unique country in this territory."150 However, he notes, and this is essential to understanding Croatian foreign policy, that Croatian foreign policy is still searching for the fastest way to link itself to Europe. The carrot of being recognised as a European state coupled with a hope of joining the European Union and a generous dose of aid money is why Croatia signed onto Dayton. This Croatian desire to be recognised as part of Europe is the key leverage the international community has to hold over Croatia. If used effectively to force Croatia to enact reforms, such as freeing its media and welcoming back refugees, Croatia could suppress 1 4 8 Holbrooke, 350. 1 4 9 Radovan Vukadinovic, "Croatian Foreign Policy: From State Building to the Regional Power," Politicka Misao. Vol . XXXIII , No. 5 (1996), 154. 98 its desires for the Croatian inhabited parts of Bosnia. However, there is still a strong move for Croatians in Hercegovina to join Croatia proper. Until June, 1998 they had even declared their own independent province of Herceg-Bosnia. This pseudo-government was disbanded by the United Nations. It was also at one point electing representatives to the Croatian parliament. On the other hand, Croatia is enjoying relative economic prosperity, has received ample amounts of foreign aid in order to rebuild what was destroyed in war, and could easily enjoy a prosperous future. Tudjman is old and has had health problems, and dissatisfaction with the government's high taxes and spending could bring in a changing of the guard, one with hopefully a more moderate foreign policy. However, there is still no strong, viable opposition in Croatia. What's left of Yugoslavia is not doing well. The man who deserves most of the blame for starting the chaos in Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, is still in power. Further, as put by Misha Glenny, "not satisfied with having ripped Croatia and Bosnia apart, [he] has now ripped his own country to shreds. What little remains of the economy is run by gangsters, while political disputes are either settled by ballot rigging or guns to the head."151 Yugoslavia's economy is not doing well. As noted in the Economist, "industrial output in July [1996] though 15% higher than in July 1995 was still 41% below that of July 1991. Average salaries stand at D M 185 ($125) a month and living standards are lower than a year ago. Serbia will pay the price of war for fully a decade to come."152 Serbia has been refused admittance to both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Sanctions are again in place over the chaos in Kosovo. However, Milosevic, like Tudjman, still exerts a great deal of influence over Serb Vukadinovic, 156. 99 politicians in Bosnia. However, it would appear that the international community also has carrots and sticks to wield against Serbia. Serbia is in such need of economic aid that this can be effectively used by the international community to coerce Milosevic. However, it should be noted that the international community has not yet really used its clout in the situation in Kosovo. International pressure has already led to his removing himself somewhat from the Bosnian political scene. Further, according to Holbrooke, with economics the key to long-term peace, "Izetbegovic and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic may hate each other, but they have a mutual interest in making the central institutions work. The Croatians can put together half an economy because they have a long seacoast, a tourist industry and proximity to Western Europe. But the Bosnians and Serbs need each other economically. Milosevic knows this."153 However, the view of both Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was best put by the High Representative, they "are not demonstrating a stronger commitment to the peace process. They must also make significantly greater progress to meet international standards of human rights, democratic processes, media freedom and treatment of minorities and refugees."154 1 5 1 Glenny, 2. 1 5 2 Ibid. 1 5 3 Richard Holbrooke, "How Peace is Doing," Time International Magazine. September 16, 1996, Volume 148, no. 13. 1 5 4 "Statement on B i H , " Denver Summit of the Eight, June 22, 1997, 2. 100 Analysis And Conclusion - Hope Must Be Maintained I spent an evening in Sarajevo looking at pictures with a woman. Most of the people in them are dead and you can see the pain in her eyes. Worst almost then the dead are pictures before the war compared with during and after ~ in particular of her daughter. A strikingly beautiful woman before the war, the siege aged her. Her eyes are now haunting and drawn out. During the war they were all frightfully thin. Sitting in a building in Sarajevo looking at pictures of happier times. A before, a during, what will the after be like? If we look back at Fen Osier Hampson's four points for evaluating peace accords, we can identify three ideas of particular relevance to this paper: third party involvement, regional/systemic power structures and the range of issues covered by the accords.155 For the purposes of the Bosnian case study we can identify two aspects which are of primary importance for peace-building. The first issue deals with the prevention of violence and hostilities between the ethnic groups. Third Party Involvement is crucial here both in a peacekeeping capacity and in a role as mediator/arbitratrator. At present, the international community is playing the key role in ensuring that there is no war. They have established a deterrent system and act to resolve conflicts. Perhaps of even greater importance is that all three parties seem to be generally agreed that war, at least at present, is not a means to furthering their goals. The second issue, the most important, is legitimacy. How do we ensure that the newly created Bosnian state is legitimate, especially in light of the fact that a lack of legitimacy is one of the triggers of ethnic conflict. If our first issue, a lack of violence, is maintained then it will 1 5 5 Please refer to Table 1, page 10. 101 be possible to work on this second issue. This is where Hampson's theory and the idea of reversing the causes of the conflict meet. By removing the ideologies, the leaders and the media which disseminated their propaganda we can work towards creating legitimacy. Further, we must ensure that leaders co-operate and work towards building a multi-ethnic community. The democratic system of government will aid in this process, as will a move to create a multi-ethnic Bosnia identity. Frankly put, without the involvement of the international community there would more than likely not be any Bosnian state. The international community, and primarily the United States, was instrumental in the negotiation of the settlement. While it is true that the changing military situation on the ground and a declining public support for war meant that the conflict was ripe for settlement, the United States provided the necessary impetus. Further, international peacekeeping forces have played a vital role in ensuring that violence remains at a minimum. These same forces have ensured that some refugees have been able to return to their homes and have worked to restore irifrastructure vital to everyday life in Bosnia. Most importantly, when the disparate ethnic groups have been unable to enact even the most basic legislation or agree on issues of national importance, the Office of the High Representative has stepped in and arbitrated decisions. It appears that Bosnia is essentially a protectorate of the international community. Hampson's second point, regional power structures, is vitally important in the Bosnian case. Bosnia's former fellow Yugoslav Republics, Croatia and Serbia, have played and continue to play a decisive role in the future of Bosnia. In fact, much of the violence in Bosnia was a result of the grandiose schemes of Croat and Serb leaders. It is no secret that both countries are 102 still eyeing the parts of Bosnia that are occupied by their ethnic kin. However, as we witnessed of late, the co-operation of the Croat leader, Franjo Tudjman and the Serb leader, Slobodan Milosevic, in respect to Dayton has greatly improved. Further, both leaders may be instrumental in keeping down any irrendentist Croat or Serb movements. However, it may be more palatable i f they were removed from the political scene. However, since no viable moderate oppositions have gained credibility in their respective countries this may be a distant goal. In reference to Hampson's third and most important point, the range of issues covered by the settlement, we can note that the Dayton Accords can be generally evaluated as well-written and comprehensive. Hampson uses Holsti's eight prerequisites for peace to evaluate peace accords. The first three areas relate to socio-political conditions in the country and whether or not the Accords provide for the creation of a system of government that embodies norms of acceptable behaviour, legitimacy and whether the accords provide for the assimilation of disparate ideas. The next four deal with mechanisms for preventing conflict. These include a powerful deterrent system, conflict-resolving procedures and institutions, procedures for peaceful change and an agreement that war is not an acceptable solution. The final point, perhaps the most crucial one, is that a system for anticipating and dealing with problems must be put into place. In these respects the Dayton Accords do quite well. The democratic system of government put into place has built into it conflict-resolving procedures and institutions, as well as procedures for non-violent change. The international community provides help in these areas and also provides guidance and expertise in evaluating potential conflict sources and aids 103 in the resolution of difficulties. Essentially, the structures created by Dayton are not badly made. Unfortunately, the Dayton Accords, although excellent theoretically, are less successful in practice. Several fundamental flaws exist which may undermine the peace in Bosnia. The first major problem is that the structures put in place do nothing to reduce the saliency of ethnic ties. This again relates to the idea of legitimacy. The assumption upon the signing of Dayton was that by the time elections were held, refugee repatriation would be well on its way and that the first steps would already be taken towards the rebuilding of a multi-ethnic society. The architects of Dayton misjudged the sentiments of the people and the insolence of the ethnic leaders in this respect. As a result, the electoral process espoused by Dayton only reinforces ethnic cleavages as it is possible to win an election by only catering to your respective ethnic group. This means that, for example, Croatian leaders in Croat majority areas do not have to take into account the needs and interests of ethnic minorities on their territory. Unless the electoral system is changed, it is not likely that we will see the emergence of multi-ethnic parties or political leadership which are fully supportive of a Bosnian state. A further problem has been the reluctance of the international community to move beyond its often narrowly prescribed mandate. It took more then two years for the Office of the High Representative to act decisively on matters of importance for Bosnia. While it is unfortunate that the Bosnian institutions themselves could not agree on some issues, decisions had to be made and the lengthy delay only increased ties to ethnic groups. The notion of whether or not people believe in Bosnia as a unified state and, by extension, whether or not there is a Bosnian identity is of interest to this question of legtimacy. Thus far, there has been little concrete evidence that a multi-ethnic Bosnian national identity 104 exists. A l though such a national identity may have existed in the M i d d l e Ages , at present it is espoused only by a Bosnian intellectual elite and those urban dwellers who are o f mixed ethnic heritage. A Bosnian identity is being co-opted by the Mus l ims , and while it is not excluding other ethnic groups and, in some cases, is encouraging them to affiliate themselves with this identity, Croats and Serbs still seem to tie their nationhood to their mother lands. However , the fact that there are Croats and Serbs still wi l l ing and trying to rebuild their lives in Bosn ia indicates that perhaps there is a bit o f hope that members o f all three groups wi l l someday identify as Bosnians. The second argument o f this paper is that the easiest solution to ethnic discord is to reverse the processes that led to it in the first place. If the Dayton peace agreement in Bosn ia is to create a lasting peace it must work to reverse some o f the causes o f the conflict. First, the peoples o f Bosn ia must learn new national myths that life together is possible and that ethnic groups other than their own are not necessarily evil. Second, the leaders, suspected war criminals in the Serbian case, must be removed from the political scene. T h e ideology and bigotry that led to the war must be removed before peace can prevail. T h i r d , long term peace wi l l not be sustained without economic stability. H i g h unemployment and poverty wi l l only fuel bitter discontent which could again lead to conflict. In order for new national myths to be created, the media must stop spreading and inciting racial hatred and violence. Steps towards this have been taken by the international community with the creation o f the Open Broadcast Network and the removal o f radio and television transmitters from hard-line Serbs in Pale. Televis ion broadcasting informing citizens o f the tenets o f the peace accord and the peace implementation process help dispel negative 105 myths. In addition, television and radio access for all electoral parties will go a long way towards ensuring free and fair elections. There is already a healthy print media which are non-prejudiced and have integrity. Another failure of the Dayton peace is that those same leaders who bear much of the responsibility for the conflict still remain in de facto power in the Republika Srpska. This failure was what every single person I spoke to in Bosnia held up as the single biggest issue holding up the peace implementation process. The notion that indicted war criminals, suspected in genocide and mass terror, remain pulling the strings in the Republika Srpska is appalling. It is holding up the peace process and it is preventing refugees from returning to their homes there. Further, it is crippling Bosnia institutions, as Serb representatives, many still firmly under Karadzic's power, work to further the same nationalist goals they held during the war. Economic stability is still a distant goal. However, economic and banking legislation that has been enacted in the last twelve months will go a long way towards facilitating trade and business. The long awaited country-wide currency is also finally in place. Further, improved infrastructure and greater freedom of movement have created some foundations for economic rebuilding. Huge unemployment still exists and much of the primary Bosnian industry prior to the war, agriculture, is still not operational. However, there has been much aid money and infrastructural support either already invested or promised to Bosnia, so progress could be seen within a few years. Another factor to be noted here is that not only is Bosnia trying to repair an economy shattered by war, but it is trying to create a free-market economy from a centralist one. 106 Again, relating to the notion of legitimacy, it should be noted that there will never be long-term peace in Bosnia without the co-operation of members from all three ethnic groups. Thus far, the record has been abysmal. The three presidents, with the greatest problems caused by the Serb member, have been so unable to co-operate that only three solutions remain. The first is the easiest one and entails that all three leaders strive to co-operate. This, of course, depends greatly on the political climate in the Entities. The second solution is to replace either all of them or the one that is causing the most difficulties. The third solution, one unfortunately likely to never be utilised, is to give them a list of issues that they must agree on and lock them in a room until they emerge with a written document clarifying all these issues. This process would then be repeated until all three members were eager and willing to compromise and co-operate towards creating a Bosnian state. The same three methods might be employed for parliamentary and municipal bodies. For a more palatable, and realistic solution, we can again turn towards the need for the electoral system to be redesigned so that no party or representative can win office without catering somewhat to the interests of all the ethnic groups. Even if the electoral system is not changed, it is necessary that leaders who refuse to co-operate with Dayton be removed from the political scene. A big step in improved co-operation was the emergence of Biljana Plavsic, a former hard-line Serb nationalist, on the Serb political scene. Her willingness to co-operate with Dayton, regardless of how insincere it may be, has facilitated some positive changes in the Republika Srpska. Unfortunately, results of the recent municipal elections seem to entrench the ruling position of hard-line nationalists. However, the basic fact is that Bosnia would not function i f the international 107 community was not in charge. International representatives and bodies decide on virtually everything in Bosnia. Some of the implementation might be in Bosnian hands, but the impetus for action comes from outside. Some Bosnians see that the only way for sustained peace in Bosnia is an international or American protectorate. In fact, it is already de facto there. Further difficulties can be found when we look at inter-Entity co-operation. Again, bluntly put, there really isn't any. Aside from the slow processes of federal institutions, there is little tying the Entities together. They finally share a common currency and custom laws but it is unusual, to say the least, that each Entity has its own pictures on the common currency. We may see an improvement in inter-Entity co-operation when we see increased refugee repatriation and trade. The catch twenty-two is that we would witness greater progress in these areas if there was greater inter-Entity co-operation. However, although progress was abysmally slow for the first two years after Dayton, the last ten months have seen great improvement. Much of this has been due to the willingness of the international community and its representatives to arbitrate on issues. There has also been a start towards co-operation between ethnic leaders. I also like to think that some of this has to do with the fact that ordinary citizens are willing to start putting aside ethnic differences and working towards rebuilding their lives. When you enter Sarajevo you get an ache in your chest and it doesn't go away, it only grows stronger ~ mitigated only sometimes by occasional momentary happinesses. The dead are everywhere here. Not just in those who are long gone and buried on a hill slope which once overlooked the bountiful beauties of an Olympic Stadium. It is the living who find themselves surrounded by the dead, who find that life is little worth living because each day, each picture 108 brings to mind a loved one who is gone. Of those cruelly gone too soon from a sniper's bullet, a grenade, a missile shot into a crowded school-yard of fresh faced graduates. It is in the red paint filled "roses" of grenade holes which mark the streets of Sarajevo like the military decorations of a soldier's uniform. 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