Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Fishery planning in Barbados: the implications of social strategies for coping with uncertainty McConney, Patrick A. 1995

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata


831-ubc_1995-060195.pdf [ 6.38MB ]
JSON: 831-1.0088377.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0088377-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0088377-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0088377-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0088377-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0088377-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0088377-source.json
Full Text

Full Text

FISHERY PLANNING IN BARBADOS:THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL STRATEGIESFOR COPING WITH UNCERTAINTYbyPATRICK ADRIAN McCONNEYB.Sc., The University of Wales, 1981M.E. S., Daihousie University, 1987A THESIS SUBMITTED TN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHYinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESInterdisciplinary Studies(Resource Management Science)We accept this thesis as conforming?e required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAJune 1995© Patrick Adrian McConney, 1995In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of therequirements for an advanced degree at the University of BritishColumbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely availablefor reference and study. I further agree that permission forextensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may begranted by the head of my department or by his or herrepresentatives. It is understood that copying or publication ofthis thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without mywritten permission.(Signature)Department of MCQH “LThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate 2(, Lqq11ABSTRACTThis thesis provides information relevant to fisheries in which there is a desire to establishfisherfolk organizations, but where individualistic social networks rather than social cohesionand community prevail. Such situations in small-scale fisheries are poorly documented, but maydefine limits to the feasibility of co-management. In the case researched, the government ofBarbados is designing a fisheries management planning process, but there is insufficientinformation on the social and economic characteristics of the unmanaged, small-scale,commercial fishery for migratory pelagics to determine whether either a state-structured(bioeconomic) or a cooperative (co-management) approach is appropriate.As a contribution to solving this practical, interdisciplinary problem, this study examined:the fishery-related uncertainties perceived by fisherfolk and government officials in Barbados;the social strategies of atomism, personal networks and formal organizations that fisherfolk mayuse to cope with uncertainty; and, whether the most appropriate initial management planningapproach is bioeconomic or co-management. Research was conducted in Barbados betweenNovember 1993 and September 1994 involving surveys, social network analysis, participantobservation and the study of official documents.Uncertainties related to fish catch and price were perceived by the majority of fisherfolk tobe the most problematic, and the analysis focused on the means of coping with these. Evidenceof social atomism was weak. Social networks, which tended to be individualistically-orientedamong fishers, boat owners and processors, but more cooperative among vendors, wereprevalent. Attempts by the harvest sector to formally organize to obtain market power hadfailed, but efforts to use this strategy persist. The state was found deficient in fishery planningand management capability. Barriers to communication within the state, and between it and theindustry were apparent.Due mainly to the prevalence of networks and the state’s deficiencies, the bioeconomicapproach is judged to be inappropriate in this setting. Due mainly to the high level ofindividualistic competition, the repeated failure of harvest sector organizations, and barriers tocommunication, co-management is problematic but more likely to be successffil. An incremental,institution-building approach to co-management is proposed due both to the flexibility of thisapproach and to the current political and planning environment that favours participativeinitiatives.111TABLE OF CONTENTSABSTRACT iiTABLE OF CONTENTS iiiLIST OF TABLES viiLIST OFFIGURES ixACKNOWLEDGMENT x1. OVERVIEW 11.1 BACKGROUND 11.2 RESEARCH CASE 31.3 ARRANGEMENT OF CHAPTERS 42. RESEARCH PROBLEM, QUESTIONS AND CONCEPTS 62.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND QUESTIONS 62.1.1 General problem 62.1.2 Research problem 72.1.3 Research questions 82.1.4 Key concepts 92.1.5 Relationships between concepts 113. LII’.KS TO THE LITERATURE 163.1 BIOECONOMICS VERSUS CO-MANAGEMENT 163.1.1 Bioeconomic model 163.1.2 Co-management 183.2 FISHERIES-RELATED UNCERTAINTY 203.2.1 Perceptions and planning 203.2.2 Uncertainty is ubiquitous 223.2.3 Uncertainty in the Caribbean context 243.3 SOCIAL STRATEGIES FOR COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY 293.3.1 Social atomism versus embeddedness 293.3.2 Social networks and organizations 303.3.3 Sampling Caribbean sociology 333.3.4 Social strategies in the fisheries literature 373.4 PERSPECTIVES ON PLANNING 403.4.1 Information as a social power resource 403.4.2 General considerations 413.4.3 Integrating social science into fishery planning 433.4.4 Co-management and participatory planning 453.4.5 Planning development in the Caribbean 503.4.6 Progress in fishery planning 543.4.7 Using this study as a planning resource 564. THE BARBADOS SITUATION 63iv4.1 COUNTRY PROFILE.634.1.1 Physical conditions 634.1.2 People and economy 634.2 THE FISHING INDUSTRY 654.2.1 Pelagic resources 654.2.2 Harvest sector 694.2.3 Postharvest and supporting activities 744.2.4 Administration and organizations 785. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 835.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 835. 1. 1 General considerations 835.1.2 Perceptions of uncertainty 845.1.3 Social strategies for coping 855.1.4 Implications for planning 855.2 RESEARCH METHODS 865.2.1 Survey of fishing industry 865.2.2 Social network measurement 945.2.3 Survey of government officers 985.2.4 Other interviews 1005.2.5 Participant observation 1025.2.6 Document study 1035.2.7 Discussion 1046. FISHERFOLK AND UNCERTAINTY IN THE PELAGIC FISHERY 1066.1 SURVEY RESPONDENTS 1066.1. 1 Occupational categories 1066.1.2 Respondent profile 1086.2 PERCEPTIONS OF UNCERTAINTY 1126.2.1 General uncertainty 1136.2,2 Specific uncertainties 1136.2.3 Major uncertainties 1216.3 OFFICIAL AND SCIENTIFIC MEASUREMENTS OF UNCERTAINTY 1226.3.1 Fish catches 1226.3.2 Fish prices 1306.3.3 Other uncertainties 1346.3.4 A note on uncertainty reduction through information exchange 1366.4 CONcLuDII’JG DISCUSSION 1376.4.1 Summary 1397. SOCIAL STRATEGIES FOR COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY: ATOMISM ANDNETWORKS 1417.1 SURVEY RESULTS 1417.1.1 Income from the fishing industry 1417. 1.2 Occupational alternatives and credit 1437.1.3 Kinship 1457.1.4 Degree of fisherfolk interaction 1467.1.5 Social network ties and contents 1467.1.6Power 1507.1.7 Desired industry improvements 151V7.2 SoCIAL NETWORK GENERAL FEATURES .1537.2.1 Aid utilized 1557.3 FISHING INDUSTRY NETWORK DETAILS 1607.3.1 Fishers as focal individuals 1617.3.2 Owners as focal individuals 1757.3.3 Vendors as focal individuals 1847.3.4 Processors as focal individuals 1917.4 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 1957.4.1 Summary 2028. SOCIAL STRATEGIES FOR COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY: ORGANIZATIONS . .2048.1 ATTITUDES TOWARDS ORGANIZATION 2048.1.1 Fishers 2048.1.2 Owners 2058.1.3 Vendors 2058.1.4 Processors 2068.1.5 Summary 2068.2 ORGANIZATIONAL ALTERNATIVES 2078.2.1 Cooperatives 2088.2.2 Union 2188.2.3 Associations 2228.2.4 Company 2238.3 BUFFA: A MICRO-STUDY OF ORGANIZATION FORMATION 2258.3.1 Origins and background 2268.3.2 Membership 2298.3.3 Management 2328.3.4 Relationship with government 2348.3.5 Current status 2368.4 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 2378.4.1 Summary 2449. IMPLICATONS FOR FISHERY PLANNING 2469.1 SURVEY RESULTS 2469.1.1 Barriers to joint efforts 2479.1.2 Fisheries management planning 2509.1.3 Fisherfolk involvement in management planning 2529.1.4 Information for planning: usefulness and availability 2579.1.5 Information on uncertainties and strategies 2599.2 ILLUSTRATIVE EXPERIENCES 2609.2.1 Tent Bay infrastructure project 2619.2.2 Fisheries legislation public consultation 2629.2.3 Reads Bay Coastal Zone Management Project 2649.2.4 Early Fisheries Advisory Committees 2669.2.5 Bridgetown Fisheries Complex Advisory Committee 2679.2.6 Fish Importation and Marketing Committee 2699.2.7 Oistins boat trailer cooperation 2709.2.8 National Development Plan 2729.3 PRESENT PLANNING ENVIRONMENT 2759.3.1 Legal framework 275vi9.3.2 Political aspects .2779.3.3 Status of the Fisheries Division 2809.4 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 2839.4.1 Summary 29410. CONCLUSION 29611. BIBLIOGRAPHY 30712. APPENDIX A: QFISH SURVEY 32213. APPENDIX B: QGOVT SURVEY 32714. APPENDIX C: SOCNET STUDY 33215. APPENDIXD: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA 338viiLIST OF TABLESTable 4. iGross domestic product and employment in Barbados, 1992 64Table 4.2 The recent history of the fishing industry in Barbados 66Table 4.3 Contribution of major pelagic species to estimated total landings 67Table 4.4 Boat ownership by gender, concentration and type 71Table 4.5 Estimated fishing income and expenses 72Table 4.6 Estimated total fish landings, contribution to GDP and trade 78Table 5.1 Harvest sector populations 88Table 5.2 Quota allocations and actual interviews executed 90Table 6.1 Distribution of fishers by boat type 107Table 6.2 Boat ownership among respondents 108Table 6.5 Government officers’ perceptions of contributors to uncertainty 120Table 6.7 Seasonality in the pelagic fishery at Oistins 126Table 7.1 Proportion of income from fishing industry 142Table 7.2 Fisherfolks alternative work in and out of the fishing season 144Table 7.3 Involvement of fisherfolk kin in the industry 145Table 7.4 Means of coping with fishing industry uncertainty 146Table 7.5 Catch information networks 148Table 7.6 Price information networks 148Table 7.7 Marketing networks 148Table 7.8 Small loan networks 149Table 7.9 Large loan networks 149Table 7.10 Most useful types of aid received 149Table 7.11 Sources of most useful types of aid received 150Table 7.12 Who has the most influence on how the fishing industry operates 150Table 7.13 Most important desired improvements to the fishing industry 152Table 7.14 Who should improve the fishing industry 153Table 7.15 Perception of difficulty in state/industry cooperation 153Table 7.16 Reasons for difficulty in state/industry cooperation 153Table 7.17 Respondents’ strategy for coping with uncertainty 155Table 7.18 Perceptions of others’ strategies for coping with uncertainty 155Table 7.19 Fisherfolk’s average network strands of aid 156Table 7.20 Fisherfolk’s average network composition by member category 156Table 7.21 Fisherfolk’s average network composition by ties, gender and affiliation 158Table 7.22 Multistranded ties (number of strands per tie) 158Table 7.23 Proportion of friends in the fishing industry 158Table 7.24 Linkage of network members 159Table 7.25 Fisherfolk’s average network by extent of reciprocal and conflictual ties 160Table 7.26 Aid received from the network of a fisher 161Table 7.27 Aid received from members in the network of an owner 175Table 7.28 Aid received from members in the network of a vendor 184Table 7.29 Aid received from members in the network of a processor 191Table 9.1 Reasons for difficulty in state/industry cooperation (copy of Table 7.16) 247Table 9.2 Acquaintance with the term “fisheries management plan” 250Table 9.3 Meaning of “fisheries management plan” 250Table 9.4 Preferred fisherfolk involvement in management planning 252Table 9.5 Usefulness of information for planning 257viiiTable 9.6 Availability of information for planning 258Table 9.7 Fisheries Division’s budget within the Ministry of Agriculture 282Table 9.8 Applicability of factors that favour comanagement 289ixLIST OF FIGURESFigure 3.1 Social research framework 21Figure 3.2 Ocean environment around Barbados 25Figure 3.3 Social atomism, networks and formal organization 31Figure 3.4 Fishery planning approaches 58Figure 4.1 Fishing boats and methods 70Figure 4.2 Fish landing sites 75Figure 4.3 Simplified fish marketing and distribution channels 76Figure 6.1 Uncertainties perceived by all fisherfolk 114Figure 6.2 Uncertainties perceived by fishers 115Figure 6.3 Uncertainties perceived by fishing and non-fishing owners 118Figure 6.4 Uncertainties perceived by vendors and processors 119Figure 6.5 Oistin’s total pelagic fish catches, 1981 to 1984 124Figure 6.6(a) to (e) Seasonality of major pelagic species at Oistins, 1981 to 1994 124Figure 6.7(a) to (e) Variation in fish prices for the major pelagic species at Oistins 131Figure 9.1 Fisherfolks’ political opinion 279xACKNOWLEDGEMENTI would like to thank the Government of Barbados for granting me the leave to conduct thisresearch funded under the CARICOM Fisheries Resource Assessment and ManagementProgram (CFRAMP). I am grateful for the invaluable guidance of my research SupervisoryCommittee: Professors L. Lavkulich, J.D. McPhail, B. Elliott, P. Boothroyd and N. Guppy(Research Supervisor). I particularly appreciate my Research Supervisor taking the time andinterest to visit me in the field and experience the fishery firsthand.My greatest debt of gratitude, however, is owed to the very many people in the Barbadosfishing industry who shared their thoughts and experiences with me, and without whose interestand cooperation this study would not have been possible. Among these, special thanks are dueto the founders of the Barbados United Fisherfolk Association who allowed me the privilege ofparticipating in the formation of the organization. The assistance of my colleagues in theFisheries Division and the Ministry of Agriculture is also deeply appreciated.Last, but not least, I am very grateful to Pamela and Jamila, my wife and daughter, for theirmotivation and support throughout this project.11. OVERViEWThe purpose of this thesis is to examine the possible implications of social relations andsocial organization in a fishing industry for planning the introduction of a state-structured(bioeconomic) or cooperative (co-management) approach to fishery management. The purposeis met through a case study of Barbados’ unmanaged tropical small-scale commercial fishery formigratory pelagics. Special attention is paid to the use of information on perceptions ofuncertainty as a planning resource. This chapter provides an overview of the thesis.1.1 BACKGROUNDIn recent times, neoclassical economics has been combined with fisheries biology to becomethe dominant theoretical influence on fisheries management and planning (Wilson et a!. 1994). Inthe conventional model used for planning it is assumed that individuals in the fishing industry aresocially atomistic and that the state should be responsible for over-seeing fishery managementdecision-making (Jentoft 1989). This bioeconomic model, based on the open access commonproperty resource theme, ignores the empirical evidence from sociology and anthropology of thesocial embeddedness of economic action. Embeddedness is demonstrated, for example, in thestrategies involving the social networks and organizations that some people use to managefisheries and cope with the uncertainties of the fishing industry (Acheson 1981).Although the bioeconomic perspective continues to predominate, its preeminence isdeclining because of its inability to encourage sustainable fishing practices in real situations(Ludwig et a!. 1993; Wilson et al. 1994). Support is growing for co-operative management (comanagement) as an alternative (Pinkerton 1989; McGoodwin 1990; Dyer and McGoodwin1994). Co-management is “power-sharing in the exercise of resource management between agovernment and a community or organization of stakeholders” (Pinkerton 1992:33 1). This2alternative approach rejects social atomism and accepts the social embeddedness of fishing as aneconomic activity. How universally co-management might be applied has recently beenquestioned. Kuperan and Abdullah (1994) suggest that there are limits to co-management whereresource, political and socioeconomic factors hinder social cohesion or organization formationamong fisherfolk.Associated with the bioeconomic and cooperative management models are characteristicapproaches to the planning that precedes and accompanies fishery management. Planningassociated with the bioeconomic model tends to be structured by the state, and dominated bybiological and economic concerns, ignoring social factors due to the atomism assumption(Jentoft 1989). In contrast, co-management typically involves cooperative planning as anexpression of power-sharing. It can potentially, but not necessarily, include a wide range ofsocial issues in addition to biological and economic concerns (Pinkerton 1989).Cycon (1986) criticizes the unquestioning use of the neoclassical bioeconomic fishery modelby international development agencies and beneficiary governments, claiming it unrealisticallyassumes social atomism, and is problematic on this account. Furthermore, he claims thatinternational aid agencies and fisheries planning agencies in developing nations are not gearedtoward consideration of social issues, regardless of the approach attempted. This implies that,whether planning agencies seek to introduce either bioeconomic or cooperative managementapproaches, without applied socioeconomic research on social relations and organization theyrun the risk of using an unsuitable approach. Social scientists have long argued for the inclusionof situation-specific socioeconomic data in fishery planning (Cycon 1986; Orbach 1986; Wilsonetal. 1994).In summary, there is no universally accepted approach to fishery planning or management.Depending on the situation, either the bioeconomic or co-management approach or perhaps a3new formulation, may be most suitable. Fisheries plans may fail due to the use of inappropriatesocioeconomic conceptions of society and insufficient use of socioeconomic information (Poggie1992). Integrating applied social science into fisheries planning processes could make them moreproactive and better able to direct the collection and evaluation of socioeconomic data (Dyer1994). Such data could provide information useful for designing the process for managementplanning and for subsequently executing the process and managing the fishery.1.2 RESEARCH CASEIn the case that I have chosen to research, the government of Barbados is at the criticalpoint of designing its fisheries management planning process with international assistance. Thethesis research problem is that it is not clear, in terms of the social relations and organization inthe pelagic fishery, whether it is most feasible to introduce a bioeconomic approach, a comanagement approach or neither. Without social information the appropriate approach tofisheries planning and the consequences of its use will be difficult to determine.The applied interdisciplinary research undertaken in Barbados from November 1993 toSeptember 1994 involved the collection of pertinent socioeconomic data on the small-scale,commercial, open access fishery for migratory pelagics. The choice of an appliedinterdisciplinary approach with a social focus reflects, first, an enduring perspective in theCaribbean that, given the limited human and other resources of small island developing states,social research should be applied to real problems (Lindsay 1978). And second, that althoughthe path towards sustainable development in the Caribbean is thought to be throughinterdisciplinary approaches, social issues have previously been neglected in planning (Cox andEmbree 1990).Specifically, the study first examines the fishery-related uncertainties that people in thefishing industry and relevant state agencies perceive. Then it examines the social strategies that4people in the Barbados pelagic fishing industry use to cope with their perceived uncertainties. Itevaluates whether their strategies are socially atomistic or embedded in personal networks or informal organizations. It explores the implications of this information on perceived uncertaintiesand strategies for fisheries planning in Barbados, with emphasis on evaluating the most suitableplanning approach. Finally, it indicates the significance of the Barbados case for the generalliterature on fisheries management planning.1.3 ARRANGEMENT OF CHAPTERSThe next chapter reviews the research problem, questions, and concepts. Chapter Threedescribes the linkages between this research and existing literature, and Chapter Four providesdetails on the historical and contemporary situation in Barbados.Interviews were used to gather data on perceptions, social strategies and planning from thepeople involved in the fishing industry and from government officials. These data weresupplemented by evidence from documents along with observation of, and participation in, theactivities of the fishing industry. Chapter Five describes research design and methods.Chapter Six, the first results and discussion chapter, addresses the first research question.This is done by examining the perceptions people have of uncertainty, and how these relate toscientific and statistical data on the fishery.Chapters Seven and Eight address the second research question dealing with socialstrategies for coping with uncertainty. The focus is on the relative importance of, and problemswith, social atomism, social networks and formal organizations as coping strategies based on thedata from all sources.Chapter Nine deals with the last question: the implications of the research results forapproaches to fisheries planning. It examines the relationship between fisheries management anddevelopment planning in Barbados and whether the co-management or the bioeconomic5approach is likely to be better suited to the Barbados situation.Chapter Ten reiterates the study’s major findings and contribution to knowledge. Followingthis chapter is the Bibliography and Appendices.62. RESEARCH PROBLEM, QUESTIONS AND CONCEPTS2.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND QUESTIONS2.1.1 General problemWe all face uncertainty in almost every endeavour, and we generally try to devise strategiesfor coping with uncertainty based on our measurement or perception of it (Lorenzi 1980). In thefisheries context it is generally accepted that uncertainty permeates our attempts to understandecological systems (Ludwig et a!. 1993). These systems include marine pelagic fisheries in whichuncertainty affects fisherfolk (fishers, boat owners, fish vendors and processors) and stateofficials (fishery scientists, managers and planners). Yet the fisheries management and planningliterature focuses mainly on how officials measure and perceive ecological and economicuncertainty, and how the scientific and legal-institutional strategies they devise ultimately affectfisherfolk. For example, state fishery planners often set plan objectives, strategies and tacticstaking measurements and their perceptions of uncertainty into account (MacKenzie 1974).But understanding what uncertainties fisherfolk perceive, and why they chose particularstrategies to cope with them, may also be important for planning. I do not mean cognitivestrategies such as ignoring uncertainty, but social strategies ranging from individual to collectiveand from informal to formal. For example, some uncertainties may be perceived to be of suchmagnitude that fisherfolk devise social coping strategies ranging from social atomism orindividualism, through loose or closely knit personal networks, to formal organizations such ascooperatives (Polinac 1988a). These social aspects of the fishery have received less attention inthe fisheries management and planning literature.Information on the uncertainties that people in the fishing industry perceive, and the socialstrategies they use for coping, can be a potentially powerful resource for fishery planning by7contributing a realistic social foundation to the planning model. However, as mentioned in theoverview, the currently predominant bioeconomic approach to fishery planning typically assumessocial atomism in the fishing industry and largely ignores social information (Poggie 1992). Theincreasingly favoured co-management approach typically requires, among other things, thatsocial cohesion and the capability to form organizations exists in the fishing industry or can beinduced, most commonly at the community level (Pinkerton 1989). Social networks are eitheromitted, or are seen as the causes of model imperfections from the bioeconomist’s perspective(Terkla et al. 1988). Networks are typically seen as possible precursors to greater organizationalformality from the co-management perspective (Acheson 1989).Using the three categories of strategy—social atomism, social networks and formalorganizations—several scenarios are conceivable, and a few are summarized here. It is possible,for example, that the fishing industry may exhibit more than one social strategy simultaneously,there being differences by occupation, gender, age or other variables. The mix of strategies or asingle strategy may be dynamic, changing over time perhaps in response to uncertainty.Strategies may be conflicting—tendencies towards atomism and network obligations workingagainst effective organization, for example. Since one requires an absence of social ties and theother strong social ties, neither the bioeconomic nor co-management models may be satisfied bythe social situation in the fishery if it is intermediate or mixed. This can only be discoveredthrough empirical investigation.2.1.2 Research problemIn the case that I have chosen to research, the government of Barbados has stated, and putinto law, its intention to plan the management and development of its fishing industry. The majorfishery is a seasonal, small-scale, commercial, open access fishery for shared stocks of migratorypelagics. My observations as a fishery officer in Barbados suggest that, while this fishery seems8individualistic, it is not atomistic. Social relations both enable and constrain fishery activities, butbroad social cohesion and industry-wide formal organizations are weak.The research problem is that it is not clear, in terms of the social relations and organizationin the pelagic fishery, whether it is most feasible to introduce a bioeconomic approach, a comanagement approach or neither. There is no documented information on perceptions ofuncertainty or social organizational strategies for coping with such uncertainty. Caribbeanregional organizations and states have expressed “critical concern” about “the capability toprepare fishery management and development plans” and think that “special consideration”should be given to “involving resource users in fishery management systems” (Chakalall1992:12). This may imply that fishery planning for co-management is favoured, but it has onlybeen assumed that the necessary social foundation among the fisherfolk exists to be built uponor can easily be induced.2.1.3 Research questionsUsing the case of the Barbados pelagic fishery, I pose the following general researchquestion: what potential implications do the uncertainties that fisherfolk perceive, and theparticular social strategies they adopt to cope with these uncertainties, have for fishery planning?I propose to answer this general question by addressing the three components:What uncertainties are perceived to characterize the Barbados pelagic fishery?Why are particular social strategies used to cope with these uncertainties?What potential implications do these perceived uncertainties and coping strategies have forfishery planning?This applied research cannot provide all the socioeconomic information required for fisheryplanning in Barbados, but it will contribute a useful, and presently absent, perspective that couldbe described as bio-socio-economic. In a broader context, since the type of fishery found in9Barbados is not often reported on, this research contributes an important additional case to theinternational fishery planning and management literature. Also, more information is needed onthe vulnerabilities of co-management, and the conditions under which it can arise, in order tobuild a theory of co-management (Pinkerton 1989, 1994). This research contributes to thatimportant effort.2.1.4 Key conceptsThis research is interdisciplinary and based on a conceptual framework, rather than a singlebody of theory. The concepts already introduced but not explained, which form the basis of theresearch questions, are explained below. Those less frequently found in the fisheries literaturereceive most attention, and the explanations include references to literature in which theconcepts are discussed in some detail. The relationships between the concepts are addressed inthe next section.Perception is the process of selecting, organizing and interpreting data to create anunderstanding of the environment that is meaningful to the perceiver. The process may beaffected by cultural, social, educational, experiential and other variables (Downey and Slocum1975).Uncertainty is an actor’s lack of information about, or inability to predict, a particular stateor event (Cashdan 1990). This is broader than the sense used in decision theory (Connolly1980). It accommodates the reality of the research situation.Coping is the ability to identify and pursue goals under conditions of uncertainty (Lerner1980).Strategy is the conscious decision, involving long term perspective, to take action (Crow1989). Social strategies include the decisions of individuals to form, or not to form, socialrelations with other individuals.10Social atomism is the assumption that society comprises independent individuals, each ofwhom carries out economic action to achieve goals independently arrived at, and whoseaggregated actions comprise the functioning of the social system (Coleman 1990).Social embeddedness means that economic action, outcomes and institutions are affected byindividuals’ relations, and by the structure of the overall interactive network of relations thatintegrate the individual into society (Granovetter 1985).A social network is a conception of social structure as patterns of relations (ties), withvarious contents, joining defined social actors (nodes) which can be individuals or collectivessuch as organizations (Berkowitz 1982; Marsden 1990).Individualistic social strategies emphasize the precedence of benefits to the individual overthose to any collective, but may be based on either social atomism or networks (Hinde andGroebel 1991; Jentoft and Davis 1993).Organizations are social collectives predominantly oriented to the attainment of specificgoals (Haralambos 1985).Social capital is a resource embodied in a network relation that facilitates an actor’s actions(e.g., obligations and expectations, aid, information) (Coleman 1990).Social power is the capability of actors, singly or collectively, to mobilize resources andcarry out particular control activities in relation to other actors (e.g., orienting, sanctioning,constraining) (Burns 1985).A power resource is anything an actor may use to influence or regulate the decision-makingand action of other social agents. For example, information is a potential source of power forinfluencing perceptions, preferences, evaluations and actions (Burns 1985).Socioeconomic indicates that social factors influence, and are an integral part of, economicobjectives and activity (Charles 1988).11Fisheries planning is the process of making proactive decisions about alternative ways ofusing available resources to manage or develop a fishery with the aim of achieving goals specificto the situation. The resources are commonly human, financial, informational and physical. Thegoals may be biological, social, economic or political (MacKenzie 1974; Panayotou 1982).Management is the mechanism for optimally utilizing resources (Johnston 1992).Development generally implies induced positive social change, although formal definitionsdiffer greatly (Orbach 1986).Bioeconomic means an approach to fishery planning and management structured by thestate, and dominated by biological and economic theory. The state avoids power-sharing withthe fishing industry which it assumes to be socially atomistic (Jentoft 1989; McGoodwin 1990).Co-management means an approach to fishery planning and management jointly structuredby the state and fishing industry, and not dominated by biological and economic theory. Thestate engages in power-sharing with a community or organization(s) of stakeholderscharacterized to some degree by social networks (Pinkerton 1989, 1992).2.1.5 Relationships between conceptsSince the essence of an interdisciplinary thesis is to integrate disciplines, concepts are drawnfrom several bodies of theory. This section shows how the interdisciplinary approach selectedfor this study is particularly well suited to the research problem. It is, in a sense, a thematicoutline of the literature review in the next chapter. Since the operational use of the concepts isdealt with in detail there, below I focus on their integration into a coherent conceptualframework.The major debate in this thesis involves the applicability of bioeconomic versus comanagement perspectives on fishery management planning. I hesitate to label the debate“theoretical” since, as Brox (1990) argues, the bioeconomic perspective is more akin to12analytical modeling than to empirical explanation, whereas co-management has not yet beensufficiently researched to achieve the status of accepted theory (Pinkerton 1994). Nevertheless,these represent fundamentally important and different ways of conceptualizing relationships inthe fishery as outlined earlier and, because of their differences, a first step is to identifj commonground from which the analysis can proceed.This common ground is the problem of the fisheries-related uncertainties faced byfisherfolk, fishery planners and managers (Wilson et al. 1994). These uncertainties originatefrom the bio-physical environment (e.g., fish biology and behaviour, climate, oceanography), thesocioeconomic environment (e.g., competition, pricing, politics) and their interaction. I begin bydocumenting how fisherfolk perceive uncertainty, and move from there to examine their socialstrategies for coping with uncertainty. A person can either face uncertainty independently, or heor she can make socioeconomic connections with others who can assist. Such assistance can beused for individualistic or collective purposes, and may be formally or informally organized.Which strategy dominates at any particular historical juncture is an empirical question. A host offactors (e.g., personal income, socio-cultural history, political ideology, world events) promoteor inhibit one strategy over another depending on the relative strengths of their influence. Thesefactors independently, and in association with the choice of social strategies, affect fisheryplanning in terms of determining what approach is most feasible at any given time.More specifically, because state planners face a situation of natural and social scientificinformation deficiency, but need information on the fishery sufficient to provide initial guidancefor planning, a start can be made by investigating what measurable fishery phenomena areperceived by fisherfolk to be most uncertain. This can highlight aspects of the fishery thatfisherfolk and planners may find most troublesome, and to which most attention should be paidin management planning (Ruddle and Chesterfield 1976). But whether planners generally13perceive uncertainty as a phenomenon to be controlled or adapted to could also partly determinethe management planning approach they adopt irrespective of the specific findings onuncertainty. Holling (1978) and Lamson (1984) note that fisherfolk, when allowed to devisetheir own methods, typically develop flexible strategies for coping with uncertainty. Hence theyargue, on the basis of ecological theory, that state fishery planning and management should alsobe geared towards flexibility of response rather than stability through control.Wilson et a!. (1994) also use ecological theory to address this point directly. They showthat experience with the often rigid, state-structured bioeconomic approach has not beenencouraging, and argue that decentralized, community-based approaches to fishery managementcould be more flexible, and hence successful. To support their claim they draw upon evidencefrom maritime anthropology and sociology where the social aspects of fisheries receiveattention. In this literature, however, the “co” in co-management has tended to be more aboutcoping strategies within the resource-using mmunity rather than about cQoperativemanagement with the state (e.g., Dyer and McGoodwin 1994). But Pinkerton (1989) points outthat for co-management of highly migratory pelagics to be successful, both cooperation amongresource users and cooperation between the resource users and state(s) are essential under thenew legal-institutional ocean regime of the Law of the Sea.Yet, situations in which there is little cooperation among users or between them and thestate, and in which state authority and management capability are also weak, have not receivedtheoretical attention. It is possible in these cases that neither the bioeconomic nor comanagement approaches are immediately applicable. One needs to assess critically, on the basisof empirical data, which approach is most feasible given the social structure of the fishery, andthe capability of the state.To progress, one needs to examine the actual and potential strategies of fisherfolk and the14state for coping with uncertainty, either separately or interactively. This requires a perspectivethat can address a wide range of relationships at various scales. The chosen perspective ofnetwork analysis arose in social anthropology, but its current application is multidisciplinary. Ithas been described as “a comprehensive paradigmatic way of ... studying directly how patternsof ties allocate resources in a social system” (Weliman 1988:20). Wellman goes on to say that“its strength lies in its integrated application of theoretical concepts, ways of collecting andanalyzing data” (p. 20), and consideration of social action and power (Burns 1985). Becausenetwork actors can range from individuals to states, the frill scope of fishery-related relationshipscan be explored. Attention can be paid to both the absence, presence and nature of relationshipson the empirical basis crucial to applied research. The findings should show whether conditionsfavour the bioeconomic, co-management or some other approach.Since the network perspective facilitates examination of both horizontal and hierarchicalrelationships, attention also needs to be paid to integrating what happens at sea and ashore. Theabsence of adequate bio-socio-economic theory is conspicuous. Davis (1984) points out theprevalence of socioeconomic relationships within and between the harvest and postharvestsectors which influence the interaction between the harvest sector and fishery resource. Thebioeconomic perspective tends to ignore such relationships, and Matthews (1993) has shownhow the adoption of this narrow perspective by the state conflicts with the more holistic view ofthe fishery generally employed by fisherfolk. However, the co-management approach is onlylikely to be superior if it is specifically designed to include a broad range of issues beyond thebiological and economic.This concerns theories of planning in the context of the relationship between fisherymanagement and development planning. It includes determining which elements andstakeholders are necessary for incorporation into the fishery system for planning purposes,15without contributing unnecessarily to complexity and uncertainty in the planning process(Johnston 1992; Nielsen 1994). There is no universal formula that can be easily applied sinceresponsive planning arrangements will be determined by the requirements of the specificsituation and the host of factors that constitute the planning environment. My research effortaims to provide sufficient research data on uncertainty and social coping strategies to generateinformation that could be applied to solve the problem of determining the most feasibleintroductory planning approach and process in the case of Barbados, with application to otherfisheries.My argument for integrating these diverse concepts from ecology, sociology, anthropologyand planning is similar to that of Davis (1984) and Matthews (1993) among others. It is thattheoretical concepts should be used as necessary to help us understand and solve real, complexproblems. Theory should not be allowed to constrain applied research by demanding anunrealistically abstract perspective.The review of the literature in the next chapter is organized to provide additional details onthe relationships between the above concepts. It will be shown how pervasive uncertaintynecessitates various social strategies for coping, and how social relations and organization canbe consequential for fishery planning.163. LINKS TO THE LITERATUREBy reviewing general literature, and work specifically on the Caribbean, this chapterexamines the linkages between the concepts and arguments used in this study. I review first theliterature underpinning the purpose of the study, then subsequent sections deal with topicsarranged in the order of the research questions.3.1 BloEcoNoMics VERSUS CO-MANAGEMENT3.1.1 Bioeconomic modelwith the fish resources being common property, fishers individually are rationaland try to maximize their catches, but collectively are irrational, take the [development]incentives, and deplete the stocks through overfishing” (CFRAMP 1992:10)Taken from the report of a workshop on fisheries management planning in Caribbeancountries, this extract reflects a bioeconomic perspective on the fishery. No empirical evidencefrom the Caribbean is given as the basis for the choice of this perspective. It is presented as aself-evident, universal truth.The fishery as an open access common property resource was first addressed by economists(Gordon 1954; Scott 1955) in combination with a simple biological model (Schaefer 1954).Later, Hardin (1968) brought the common property model to the fore with his essay on the“tragedy of the commons”. Hardin misused the term ‘common property’ by referring toexamples of communal ownership (res communes) instead of non-ownership or open access (resnullius). The debate over what constitutes common property (e.g., McCay and Acheson 1987;Berkes 1989) will not be reviewed here. Scott (1979) provides a useful review of the earlydevelopment and use of the bioeconomic common property model in fisheries science. It is thebasis of conventional wisdom in fisheries planning today.In essence, people in the harvest sector are cast as socially atomistic, self-interested, profit17maximizers, driven solely by economic goals to overexploit open access resources to the long-term detriment of everyone. The roles that social institutions and norms may play in moderatingresource exploitation to levels that are sustainable are ignored (Berkes 1989). The model doesnot provide a clear link to the market for fish, but this is covered by the assumption ofmicroeconomic theory that social atomism is an ideal for perfect competition.Hardin’s solution to the open access common property problem for any fishery resource isauthoritative state control, while economists favour the creation of market-based, state-enforcedproperty rights in the resource (Anderson 1986). Bioeconomic prescriptions administered inreality often include combinations of the two (Marchak et at. 1987). Considerable conflictbetween industry and government, the loss of community spirit, and plan failure have resultedfrom the imposition of fisheries plans based on the socially atomistic, state-structuredbioeconomic approach. This has happened particularly where social ties have been known to bestrong, and resource management socially based (Davis and Kashdan 1984; House 1988;Thiessen and Davis 1988).Yet management measures such as access limitation, fishing restrictions and creation ofproperty rights are used both in bioeconomic prescriptions that are problematic and in sociallybased mechanisms that succeed (Ruddle 1988). This suggests that the principles of bioeconomicmanagement are perhaps less at fault than the approach used to devise and implement them. Thecritical point is that social relations, whether they hinder or facilitate resource management, tendto be ignored in the socially atomistic model. Hence the problems or failures of state-structuredprescriptions are due mostly to inattention to social realities. Others have also criticized (Ludwiget at. 1993, Wilson et at. 1994) and defended (Rosenberg et at. 1993) the non-social aspects ofthe bioeconomic approach, but I confine my concerns to social features.Bioeconomic modeling does not prescribe the planning process necessary to formulate and18execute management measures. However, from a social perspective, if the model assumesinevitable social atomism in its conception of society, then in its application it is less likely toconsider the implications of either the social relations found in reality or the implications ofexcluding stakeholders from management decision-making. The latter creates serious problemsdue to the resultant lack of legitimacy of management measures in the eyes of the resource users(Jentoft 1989; Dyer and McGoodwin 1994).However, if the bioeconomic approach is inappropriate, what are the alternatives? Thefisheries literature provides no simple answer. There is no bio-socio-economic fishery model,and no theoretically based maximum social yield to parallel the maximum economic yield (IVIEY)and maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of the bioeconomic model (Poggie 1992). The conceptof optimal yield (OY) used in the United States to include social issues has not been particularlysuccessthl (Dyer 1994).3.1.2 Co-managementMoving away from the socially atomistic and authoritarian, state-structured constraints ofthe bioeconomic approach requires a conceptual shift towards co-management, a participativeplanning and managing process that is not by itself a model of the social, biological andeconomic aspects of the fishery. Co-management is “power-sharing in the exercise of resourcemanagement between a government and a community or organization of stakeholders”(Pinkerton 1992:331). Since it incorporates, but is not exclusively concerned with, biologicaland economic factors, it allows the implications of personal networks and formal organizationsto be considered. According to its proponents, co-management theoretically offers benefits of“more appropriate, more efficient, and more equitable management” than the conventionalbioeconomic approach (Pinkerton 1989:5). It can also be argued that successful co-managementcomes closer to Hardin’ s recommendation of “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the19majority of the people affected” (1968:1247) than either unilateral, state-structured regulatoryregimes or quasi-property rights (Jentoft 1989).Co-management is seen as a possible route towards community-based development, statedecentralization and participatory democracy especially where, among other things, resource andresource user boundaries can be easily defined (Pinkerton 1989; Dyer and McGoodwin 1994).But the conditions under which co-management is feasible have not been exhaustivelyresearched (Pinkerton 1989, 1994), and tests across a range of social conditions are essential.One critical test is to determine if and how co-management may be achieved in a highlycompetitive fishery. To conduct such a test one needs to find a case or cases in which comanagement is being considered, but where community or collective action is not accentuated.In developing countries the state often encourages the formation of community or broader-based fishing industry organizations through which it can channel economic development efforts,and for this narrow purpose it has sometimes been successful (Bay of Bengal Programme 1990).When such a state initially subscribes to co-management it may assume without justification thatsocial relations in the fishery meet, or have the potential to meet, the requirements for fullerparticipation. Yet actual social networks and organizations, perhaps because of prior historicalor development experience, may not fit this requirement (Polinac 1988b; Jentoft 1989). Thisunderscores the need for socioeconomic information to evaluate the actual social organizationand appropriate planning approach (Cycon 1986; Orbach 1986; Dyer 1994). One of thechallenges of this study is to determine whether the social scenario in Barbados, whichsuperficially seems hostile to co-management, is actually so.Figure 3.1 provides a schematic overview of my overall research framework from a socialaction perspective. What it shows sequentially is that the social actors in the fishing industryperceive and then try to cope with uncertainty through social strategies that have various20outcomes. These outcomes provide feedback, sometimes by altering the source of uncertaintyitself, or the perceptions of uncertainty. Fishery planners, within the parameters of the politicaland bureaucratic framework, have the potential to influence all stages of this process byinformation or action. Conversely, what is perceived or is happening may influence planners ifthey have information on it. All of this must operate within the broader contexts of theBarbadian culture and society, and the international environment.3.2 FISHERIES-RELATED UNCERTAINTY3.2.1 Perceptions and planningPlanning involves proactive decision-making based on forecasts of events or actions. Sinceperceptions influence people not to act, or to act in various ways, knowing what people perceiveassists in reducing the uncertainty of planning, assuming perceptions remain stable. Such anassumption is unrealistic, however, since perception is more than a deterministic stimulusresponse function (Downey and Slocum 1975), and change in perception also needs carefulconsideration.21Figure 3.1 Social research frameworkINTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTResearch on perception shows how people interpret uncertainty in various ways, and howthese interpretations may vary according to such attributes as age, gender, education oroccupation (Institute for Social and Economic Research 1982). Perceptions that departconsiderably from some accepted standard or that are lacking may indicate the need forproviding education and information. If fisherfolk make frequent observations of measurablephenomena in the environment, knowing their perceptions can also assist planners in developing22useful estimates of changes in natural resources (Ruddle and Chesterfield 1976). Howperceptions of uncertainty can be used to supplement scientific measurement is a concern of thisstudy. Knowing the ways in which perceptions arise, are maintained and change is particularlyimportant if perceptions are used to supplement environmental data collection. But suchresearch would involve investigation of both cognitive and social processes (Downey andSlocum 1975), and is well beyond the scope of my research.While my focus is on fisherfolk’ s perceptions of potentially measurable uncertainty, Iacknowledge that every part of this study concerns perceptions in some way. For example, howplanners perceive fisherfolk influences whether they adopt top-down or people-centred planning.How clients perceive planners and their plans influences the effectiveness of planning andmanagement. And how both planners and their clients perceive social science influences whetherit becomes integrated into the planning process. Moreover, the absence among stakeholders ofshared perceptions of the environment, of problems and solutions, and of each other poses aserious obstacle to participatory planning (Ruddle and Rondinelli 1983). Some of these factorsare dealt with in this thesis, but less explicitly than perceptions of uncertainty.3.2.2 Uncertainty is ubiquitousUncertainty permeates the fishing industry, but understanding how people respond to it isstill in its infancy (Cashdan 1990). The fisheries literature is mostly concerned about uncertaintyfrom the viewpoint of the fishery scientist or manager, and the way in which the uncertainty ofthe ecological and economic environment complicates management, especially in multispecies,multifleet situations (Hilborn and Walters 1992). My interest differs. It is primarily in howuncertainty affects fishers, boat owners, fish vendors and fish processors in their everydayactivities.Uncertainty has three main interrelated sources: the natural resource environment, human23activity and its influence on this environment, and the limitations to human understanding of thetotal environment. This last point implies that in many situations we cannot distinguish betweenstochastic systems and complex deterministic systems that produce chaos. Chaos is uncertaintybetween reasonably stable bounds, but often we cannot discover these bounds (Wilson et al.1994). Temporal and spatial scales are also relevant to the measurement and perception ofuncertainty, but uncertainty may either increase or decrease with time or space depending on thephenomenon and how it is measured or perceived (May 1983). One strategy to cope withuncertainty, typical of scientists and managers, is to try to control the decision setting so as tominimize surprises (May 1983). Another strategy, typical of most resource users, is to focus onbeing sufficiently flexible to adapt to whatever surprises arise (Ruddle and Rondinelli 1983). Thelatter is of greater concern in this study as regards strategies for coping with uncertainty.Sources of uncertainty in the harvest sector, many of which are shared by both fishers andboat owners, include environment (sea conditions, oceanographic features), catch rates (per trip,per season), equipment performance (mechanical failure, gear loss), human factors (experienceand skills of captain and crew, competition and conflict between fisherfolk), price (sensitivity tovolumes landed, demand, exchange rates) and institutions (government regulations, labourrelations) (Gates 1984). Boat owners face the additional uncertainties surrounding their financialdecisions such as the borrowing of investment funds and determining the appropriate level ofinvestment (Bort 1987).The major uncertainties in marketing seafood are associated with price and quantity of fish,periods of delay between first-hand and final sales, product image and demand changes, productquality, and interference of market signals particularly by government intervention (Prochaska1984). Of the above, supply and price uncertainties are shared by fishers and boat owners.Through increased regulation, fishery management itself may become a principal source of24uncertainty. Decision-making uncertainty in the management or planning apparatus is added tothe uncertainty of nature—the rules governing the fishery keep changing (Hannesson 1984;Anderson 1984). Some argue that, because of uncertainty, fisheries science cannot providesolutions to resource sustainability problems without integrating social and political aspects(Ludwig et at. 1993). Others state that while fisheries science has provided solutions underconditions of uncertainty, it has been the inability of managers to implement scientific advice thathas lead to the failure of bioeconomic plans (Rosenberg et at. 1993).3.2.3 Uncertainty in the Caribbean contextIn the eastern Caribbean, since the pelagic fisheries are open access and unmanaged, fisherymanagement plans are not sources of uncertainty for resource users. However, scientists,planners and managers (often all the same person), plus resource users, face significantchallenges from the marine environment and limitations to comprehension. Perceptions of thesame phenomenon may differ—fishers for example seeing seasonality in terms other thancompeting scientific hypotheses about stock structure and migration, but since planning involvescommunication, it is useful to look at the information which fisherfolk and the state may have toexchange. The value of this information as perceived by the other may determine the nature ofstate/industry interaction. Only a few illustrations are sketched below from the perspective of theplanner/manager/scientist. Figure 3.2 shows a few of the features to be discussed.25Figure 3.2 Ocean environment around BarbadosAngudla- -- .---. Antgua/Barbudavi:SabaSt.-Kit:ts/\ CV S/ GoadCIoupQC /)omiriIca1artlniqUSt. Luc i..;GC__________---NEC North Equatorial CurrentGC Guiana Current—* Current direction27°C Mean annual sea surfacc temperatureHypothetical equidistant EEZs263.2.3.1 Marine environmentBoth fishers and planners typically need to reduce their uncertainty about the relationshipsbetween oceanographic and ecological processes, but scientists know little about the inter-annual variability of climate and oceanography in the eastern Caribbean. For example, althoughthe mean monthly patterns of circulation suggest smooth current flows, recent research showsthat there are complex systems of gyres and eddies both east and west of the Lesser Antilles, anduncharted upwelling may occur near the islands (FAO 1993; Bowman et at. 1993). The spatialvariability of currents, eddies and water types is so great in the region that coarse sampling fromships, or short time series of observations, could lead to misconceptions about oceanographicprocesses (Muller-Karger 1990).There is also uncertainty about processes at all trophic levels. For example, there areconflicting reports on the causes of seasonality in zooplankton abundance (Muller-Karger 1990).While there is debate about which, if any, approaches to modeling multispecies fisheries areappropriate, understanding the dynamics of primary and secondary production is basic to most(Hilborn and Walters 1992). Such understanding is crucial to the ecosystem modeling whichWilson et at. (1994) propose as a way of reducing uncertainty, and distinguishing betweencomplexity and chaos, by using the ecosystem knowledge of fishers to make scientific dataanalysis more robust. Reducing the oceanographic uncertainty described above may be possibleby involving the harvest sector in sampling the marine environment at finer spatial and temporalscales than presently feasible through conventional research (May 1983). Harvest and post-harvestRegarding commercial fishing, the information base for the assessment and management ofpelagic fisheries in the eastern Caribbean is patchy and scant. For example, migratory pelagics(flyingfish, dolphin, wahoo, kingfish, tuna, billfish, swordfish and shark) show marked seasonal27availability but it is currently impossible to distinguish between large scale directional migrationand smaller-scale onshore-offshore movements (FAO 1993). Stock definition and the status ofthe stocks are also poorly known, with few scientifically rigorous conclusions (ICCAT 1992).Regarding stock assessment, the practice of different boat types targeting several species onthe same trip by using a mix of gear confounds the fine tuning of effort indices (Mahon et at.1990). Recording species in groups, gaps in the data, and unquantifiable errors confound thecommercial catch time series presently available (Mahon and Rosenberg 1988). Without betterinformation on stock structure and catches only crude estimates of potential yield have beenpossible using data from other, roughly comparable, tropical regions (Marcille and Caddy 1987;Singh-Renton and Nielsen 1994). Much uncertainty surrounds these estimates due to differencesin the productivity and fishing effort in these surrogate areas.Uncertainty about the marine environment highlights the need for studies on how muchfishers know about where and when various species are available, whether there are indicatorswhich fishers use to determine availability, and what changes in fishing strategy are employed inresponse to perceived or anticipated changes in availability (Mahon et at. 1990). The sharing ofperceptions and measurements of harvest sector uncertainty seems to be a necessity rather than aluxury in this predicament of information paucity.Although uncertainty affects not only the harvest sector, very little has been written onseafood marketing and distribution in the eastern Caribbean except for acknowledging that it ispoorly developed and a major constraint to continued economic growth and fish consumption(Systems 1984). The uncertainties that affect the fisherfolk (all participants in the fishery) areunknown, and as with other small firms, lack of information on the productivity and profitabilityof fishery operations has made it difficult for state planners to evaluate and address the perceivedproblems (Howard 1989). Geo-politicsWhile the eastern Caribbean states have not yet engaged in management planning for theirpelagic fisheries, they face several geopolitical uncertainties which in turn affect their fishingindustries. First, the pelagics are shared within the region and with high seas internationalfisheries. Evidence for the assumption that stocks of some species probably migrate only withinthe Lesser Antilles sub-region, is largely circumstantial (FAO 1993). Furthermore, there are fewnegotiated marine boundaries delimiting exclusive economic zones (EEZs). If EEZs were to beestablished, the region would be carved into a complex patchwork with none of the nationalextended jurisdictions matching appropriate management units (Mahon 1 990a). This causesuncertainty about where boats may legally fish, and how regional and foreign fishing will bemanaged, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).With some of these issues being addressed mainly by state and research agencies, thefisherfolk may be unaware of the political and scientific complexity. Yet, as stated at the outset,their perceptions of the situation are important especially if fisherfolk wish to adapt to or controlaspects of uncertainty by playing an active role in planning. Uncertainty generated by man-madecomplexity may not be tolerated in the same way as that from the natural environment which,according to Aronoff (1970), Caribbean fishers enjoy as a valued feature of their work. SummaryIn summary, uncertainty is as pervasive in the pelagic fisheries of the eastern Caribbean aselsewhere, and the uncertainty is mainly in the form of widespread absence of information. Thetask is first to identify which uncertainties are perceived in Barbados to be of sufficientimportance that strategic social responses for coping are warranted. It is also necessary todetermine how perceptions of uncertainty differ among people in different positions in thefishing industry, and differ from measurements of the phenomena perceived to be uncertain.29How fisherfolk cope with uncertainty through social mechanisms is examined next.3.3 SOCIAL STRATEGIES FOR COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY3.3.1 Social atomism versus embeddednessBioeconomic models assume, among other things, that economic behaviour is sociallyatomistic such that social relations are either irrelevant or non-existent (Figure 3.3a). Thisundersocialized conception of economic behaviour is crucial to the paradigm since, according toAdam Smith, social atomism is a prerequisite for perfect competition. To conceive of economicaction as social action (i.e., as relational) weakens certain rational choice assumptions such asself-interest, individual utility maximization, and the rationality of organizations. Particularlybecause of deficiencies in explaining empirical evidence, rational choice models have beencriticized, and alternatives have been presented (Zey 1992).The theme of social embeddedness is an alternative to the atomism assumption forexplaining economic behaviour. According to the embeddedness argument, economic“behaviour and institutions are so constrained by ongoing social relations that to construe themas independent is a grievous misunderstanding” (Granovetter 1985:482). However,embeddedness is not equivalent to the functionalist over-socialized concept of human action,where individuals are assumed to be governed or pre-programmed entirely by norms or customsalone. By removing any active role for social relations this over-socialized conception reverts, ineffect, to atomism (Granovetter 1985).Compared to atomism, many argue that embeddedness appears to better explain empiricalevidence from sociology, anthropology and economics (Wellman and Berkowitz 1988; Plattner1989; Zukin and DiMaggio 1990). This is my rationale for using social embeddedness as a keyconcept in this research. In turn I use the term “socioeconomic” to emphasize my perspective ofeconomic activity being inextricably embedded in its social context. Discovering whether,.,.3working from the perspective of embeddedness is consequential and useful for planning andmanaging a fishery, or whether, in contrast, social atomism assumptions would suffice and bemore useful, is at the heart of this applied research.As discussed above, atomism corresponds closely to the western concepts of individualismor autonomy involving the shedding of social attachments. In contrast, the Afro-Caribbeanconcept of autonomy is of an individual realizing independence through strong interpersonalsupport (Sutton and Makiesky-Barrow 1981). Thus individualism or autonomy conveys animpression of networks rather than atomism in the Caribbean. However, since individualismoften implies that each person tends to act in their own interest, it may be functionally similar toatomism for the purpose of planning and management.3.3.2 Social networks and organizationsThe social network concept operationalizes embeddedness and is the foundation of networkand structural analysis (Berkowitz 1982). My interest is in the personal or egocentric networksof people in the pelagic fishing industry where the fishery actor, as the focal individual (centre,ego) of his or her personal network, uses the social capital embodied in ties to other actors(alters) in strategies for coping with uncertainty or is constrained by ties to other actors (Figure3.3 b).3(a) Social atomism(b) Social networkFigure 3.3 Social atomism, networks and formal organization(c) Formal organizationNot all ties are beneficial to the focal individual, and both constraining and enabling ties areof interest in this study. I am also interested in the shared attributes of individuals associatedwith characteristic patterns of relations, and in how social relations differ. My approach isrelated to research on the use and exchange of material aid, advice, financial assistance and theBO= boat ownerCA= fisher captain KEYCR= fisher crewFV= fish vendorFP fish processor= ties between alters andegos; and= links between altersprovide social capital= extent of formalorganization within whichmembers are engaged in collectiveaction, enabled and constrained bytheir ties and links to others withinand outside of the oranization32like in personal networks for social support (Weilman et at. 1988; Weilman and Wortley 1990),but I employ network analysis in a limited way. I look only at specific enacted informational andinstrumental ties, and I also use attribute, not relational, categories to classify people (surveyrespondents) in the industry.Network analysts criticize the methodological individualism typical of social surveys whererespondents’ categories, and their expected roles in social organization, are determined solely onthe basis of their attributes, not their relations with others (Weilman 1988). However, inpractice, fishery planners depend heavily on knowing the categorical memberships of people inthe fishing industry — in distinguishing fishers from non-fishing boat owners, for example. Yet,while it is necessary to categorize the industry by such occupational labels, it is also useful toacknowledge the network argument that persons with different categorical memberships mayperform the same functions in a network. For example, both fishers and non-fishing boat ownersmay supply the same information on fish catches to a focal individual, making their categoricalmemberships immaterial for this purpose. This suggests that planners could benefit from havinginformation on both categorical and network memberships, and that the similarities anddifferences between the two would be of practical interest.Social networks are said to be universal (Bott 1971). But Wilson (1973), in doing researchin the Caribbean, warns that when the network is used as an analytical research construct itshould not also be assumed to constitute social reality for the people studied. That is, they maynot consciously perceive networks (at least not in the manner of the researcher) or operatepurposefully on a network basis. For them society may be organized in a different manner,causing them to pursue a different strategy for coping.The formal organization is a social unit that, from the embeddedness perspective, issuperimposed upon the personal networks of the individuals that are its members (Granovetter331985) as shown by the shaded area in Figure 3.3c. I use ‘formal’ to imply an organization with aname, elected officers and perhaps legal identity such as a union or co-operative, therebydistinguishing it from a network. An organization can also be a node in a network with othercollectives, and in which social relations and power constrain and enable the activities oforganizations just as they do individuals. Similar to the refutation of social atomism, this viewcontradicts the rational choice perspective that organizations function rationally, but at the sametime it appears to more consistently explain empirical findings (Zey 1992).3.3.3 Sampling Caribbean sociologyMuch of Caribbean sociology focuses on social stratification, with M.G. Smith’s image of aplural society currently being most influential (Craig 1982). It is not my intent to provide anexhaustive accounting of how culture, race, colour and class may have shaped Caribbeansocieties (Smith 1984), but I necessarily rely on some historical detail to set in context certainexplanatory accounts of the current situation. In this section I draw selectively upon the smallbody of literature dealing with social networks in the Caribbean.Most of this literature is from writers concerned with female centered kin and non-kinsupportive networks in the lower or working class. Powell (1982), in reviewing the use of thenetwork concept, notes that much of the work showing West Indian women in social networksdoes not use the network approach and terminology. None of this literature is specific to thefishing industry, and male networks are mentioned only occasionally. Kinship, individualism andgender are variables commonly discussed. KinshipRodman (1971), researching the black lower class in Trinidad, found the concept of kinshipto be open with indistinct breaks and exceptional fluidity between nuclear family, household,extended kinship and community relationships. The kinship group did not engage in corporateactivity, and kinship ties were used primarily for security and survival. The use of fictive kinlabels for non-kin often signifies the strength of a relation (Powell 1982).More recently, Le Franc (1989) examining higglering (small-scale trading) in Jamaica, alsofound that the family enterprise, family based economic networks and family labour dependencewere generally absent. Recruitment to the enterprise had little to do with family ties andtraditions, and family or household members competed in the same economic activity. Onecannot readily use the family or household as an analytical unit due to frequent changes inhousehold composition and individualistic relations among household members (Rodman 1971).That is, in general, the personal aspect of relations is more important than kinship. A finding ofweak kinship ties among Caribbean fisherfolk would be contrary to most social science accountsof small-scale fishing industries (Acheson 1981). The favoured hypothesis is that the weaknessof formal kinship ties and importance of the personal element give the individual greaterflexibility in adapting behaviour to circumstance (Rodman 1971; Barrow 1986). In thefluctuating economies of the Caribbean the most successful strategies are said to be the mostflexible ones. So a flexible network of kin and friends is an adaptive social feature (Gussler1980). By selectively opening, reinforcing and terminating dyadic ties with kin and non-kin, anindividual can maximize opportunities to conserve or increase scarce resources, and minimizesocial obligations or expectations that deplete resources (Gussler 1980). Individualism hasconsequences for the form of the network and how individuals manage their networks. IndividualismMintz (1971) observed that the main features of social interaction among rural lower classpeople are dyadic ties formed along lines of common interest to satisfy particular individualneeds. This implies either a predominance of dyadic ties, not true networks, or networks withfew or weak links between members. Consequently, individuated social structure may require a3person to have a large number of dyadic ties in order to receive adequate information andsupport. A relationship with one person will not naturally lead to ties with their circle of friendsand relatives as is probable with well developed personal networks (Gussler 1980). Gusslerfound in St. Kitts that if you supplied a person with a valued resource, in order to monopolize itthe person would discourage you from having additional relations with friends and foes alike.However there is insufficient evidence to say whether this non-sharing behaviour and thepredominance of dyadic rather than network ties can be generalized to all countries and sectionsof society in the Caribbean.Other authors have sought to explain Caribbean individualism not only by presentcircumstance, but also by historical political economy. Mintz (1971) argues that the plantationserved as a societal model which individualized Caribbean peoples, having greater effect inplaces such as Barbados where peasants competed for scarce non-plantation land after slavery.According to Makiesky-Barrow (1976), plantation organization constrained collective actionand encouraged individual efforts at improving life chances, but individual advancement on theplantation implied accommodation to planter interests in opposition to slave interests. Unity orsolidarity was experienced mainly in collective, egalitarian resistance to subordination and wasviewed as a strategy for change. She argues that this provides the historical basis for distrust ofhigher status groups and the perception that status differences threaten group interests. Itimplies that individualism is more than a response to current circumstance, but is culturallyrooted in history and hence enduring.However, several authors have noted in Caribbean societies a dynamic duality or tensionbetween a western liberal type of ideology, espousing individual achievement to seek higherstatus, and a more socialist ideology stressing unity and equality (Rodman 1971; Wilson 1973;Makiesky-Barrow 1976). This duality affects individuals, networks and organizations. Amongislanders whose networks were based on egalitarianism, Wilson (1973) describes how a localhigher-status change agent was ineffective at organizing and effecting change because he did notsubscribe to their system of values, and hence lacked social acceptance and authority. Thisseems relevant to fishery planners’ interactions with fisherfolk since the two are likely to be ofdifferent social status. More important, if fisherfolk are extremely individualistic, then socialatomism may come closest to modeling frmnctional social reality, and collective cooperation maybe unrealistic. GenderFinally, networks seem to differ by gender. While lower class women in the Caribbeanperceive themselves as having a hard life, they also live in societies where their self-reliance andcompetence go relatively unchallenged, and there is less gender inequality than in westernindustrialized countries (Bourguignon 1980; Sutton and Makiesky-Barrow 1981). This too is aproduct of the plantation past where there was little sexual division of labour and the adoptionof colonial gender differentiated culture was discouraged (Hart 1989). If there is generally lessinequality, gender differences are of particular interest.A high percentage of West Indian households are female-headed, and women are moreactive in maintaining extended kinship and non-kinship networks. These they use as sources ofassistance and support for activities such as child-rearing (Powell 1982). Rotating creditassociations (vestiges of West African society) common in the lower class throughout theCaribbean as informal network-based mechanisms for saving usually have a higher participationrate among women than men (Barrow 1976). Also, women’s networks are said to be moredispersed geographically and less homogenous (in terms of members’ social status) than men’snetworks (Sutton and Makiesky-Barrow 1981), and while reciprocity is strong in both, it ismore balanced for males than females (Powell 1982). Small all-male groups are common in37Barbados (Stoffle 1969) and elsewhere in the Caribbean (Wilson 1973). They tend to beegalitarian, more social than instrumental, and have boundaries that are fluid, with membershipchanging frequently (Makiesky-Barrow 1976). SummaryIn summary, the use of social networks is a survival strategy of the Caribbean black lowerclass, but such networks exhibit gender differences and are based more on individualisticpersonal relations than kinship. So although the network concept has not been applied to easternCaribbean fishing industries, with most fisherfolk being from the black lower class, the abovefindings should be relevant for comparison. While, as in the research reviewed above, thenetwork concept tends to be used more as a metaphor than as an analytical approach, the non-Caribbean fisheries literature provides useful examples of the ways in which networks function inthe fishery. Some of these are reviewed below.3.3.4 Social strategies in the fisheries literatureEvidence from reviews of the anthropology and sociology of fishing shows that social tiesare used to cope with uncertainty in the fishing industry (Acheson 1981; Pollnac 1988a; Baileyet at. 1986). The literature on the eastern Caribbean does not deal with perceptions ofuncertainty or social strategies for coping, yet the ubiquity of these phenomena leads me tosuspect that they may be found there. Given the thorough reviews mentioned above, only a briefsynopsis is provided here referring to Figure 3. 3b as a generalized example. NetworksIn this example, with the boat owner as the focal individual, recruiting fishers on the basis ofkinship obligations secures a core supply of available and hopefully trustworthy labour (Thiessenand Davis 1988). If additional fishers are contracted, their labour may be tied as expectedrepayment of credit advanced by the boat owner during periods of low catches (Platteau 1984)..3The fishers, in turn, form networks to reduce the uncertainty at sea by exchanging informationon sea state, fishing success, etc. between members and concealing it from outsiders (Palmer1990). Information is more likely to be shared in a fishery for migratory species (Stuster 1978).In my illustration the boat owner provides the fish vendor and processor with supplies offish on a regular basis in preference to other buyers. In return she receives fishing inputs fromthe processor (Barrett and Apostle 1989). Both she and her fishermen receive small loans fromthe fish vendor which may be especially valuable when maintaining or modernizing the vessel(Bort 1987).However, credit ties can be exploitative, conflictual and perpetuated by buyers (Bailey1983). Yet fishermen and fish buyers who do not form ties are at a competitive disadvantage(Wilson 1980). Not shown here are the collusive ties for price-fixing and non-market tradebetween buyers which reduce their uncertainties about market fluctuations (Peterson andGeorgianna 1988). Hierarchical ties such as those found between the layers of the harvest andmarketing sectors have received special attention since their prevalence is not explained well byneoclassical economic theory (e.g., Williamson 1975), but become clearer under the socialembeddedness theme (Granovetter 1985).Of particular interest to this study is the relationship between social ties and fisheriesmanagement planning. No generalization is possible. Although social ties, often on a communitybasis, have served fisheries management functions either intentionally or as byproducts oftraditional custom, they also have been used exclusively for increasing the efficiency ofexploitation (McCay and Acheson 1987). In some cases socially based resource management onits own has been very successful (Johannes 1978). In others it has co-existed peacefully withofficial regulations (Berkes 1985). In an instance where social ties were used to facilitate illegalexploitation, self-regulation was rejected in favour of imposed external policing (Taylor 1987).-3Most often, however, where social ties have been evident, management failure, conflict betweenindustry and government, and the loss of community spirit has resulted from the state’simposition of fisheries management plans based on the socially atomistic model (Davis andKashdan 1984; House 1988; Thiessen and Davis 1988). According to Jentoft and Davis(1993 :3 60), modernization and use of this model in eastern Canada has generated among small-scale fishers an ethic of “utilitarian individualism” typified by “profoundly self-interested” goalsand strategies, “primarily economic in character”. OrganizationsIn developing countries, cooperatives are the most common form of fisher organization(Pollnac 1988b; BOBP 1990). Much less has been written about formal collectives in the post-harvest sector, presumably because these are less common for two main reasons. First, since fishbuyers are, or are assumed to be, better off than fishers, they seldom receive the same level ofstate attention in terms of organizational promotion as an aid channel. Also, as described byEmerson (1980) and illustrated in Figure 3.3c, vendors and processors may be able individuallyto gain sufficient control over the harvest sector, even those members in organizations, throughnetwork ties that penetrate formal bodies, that their own collective is unnecessary (Meynell1984).The greatest barriers to fisher cooperative formation and successful operation are often saidto be such penetrating ties especially where the state introduces the cooperative idea as analternative to dealing with exploitative middlemen. In this situation the fisher who joins the coop is branded, not as an individual exercising alternatives in an open market, but as a traitor tocustomary relations and community structure (Emerson 1980). Another barrier is individualism,with utilitarian individualists who evaluate fisherfolk organizations mainly in instrumental, profitoriented terms being unlikely to exhibit a durable cooperative ethic (Jentoft and Davis 1993).40Jentoft (1985) sees the fisherfolk co-ops as underutilized tools in fisheries managementplanning. Yet, fisherfolk organizations in developed countries are also prone to conflicts andconspiracies, especially where the body is put in a position of power by the state as in comanagement (Jentoft and Mikalsen 1987). The strong ties formed between the elite in theorganization and state officials, compared to the weak ties between the same elite and lowerranking members are of particular concern in a case such as the above due to the enhancedpossibility of subtle or overt state manipulation. This scenario is raised again when reviewingsome of the planning literature.3.4 PERSPECTIVES ON PLANNINGIn this section I take a comprehensive look at planning in general, and in the Caribbeancontext, in order to situate this study within the theoretical literature and practical application onthe basis of experience.3,4.1 Information as a social power resourceThe social power of organizations and persons occupying positions within them can bederived from individual action through the network concept. This is essentially the case whencitizens elect a government which then delegates some aspects of the exercise of power to itsagencies and officials. In this manner persons in the fishery planning apparatus acquire powerover aspects of the fishing industry. They may use information about the fishing industry on itsown to change perceptions, and with other resources as power for sanctioning or constrainingactors (Burns 1985). Yet conventional biological and economic fisheries studies ignore thepotential use of their information output as a power resource since the concept of power, in thepolitical context, is not considered in either discipline. But applied scientific information isneither neutral nor value free.For example, while major reductions in fishers’ perceptions of uncertainty usually originate41from the experience of fishing itself, fishery planners and managers can assist this reductionthrough the provision of information (e.g., biological surveys, correlation between fishabundance and oceanographic features, sea state forecasting) if they are aware of perceiveduncertainties (Mangel and Plant 1984). Conversely, withholding information or allowing falseinformation to persist can exacerbate uncertainty and consequently perhaps slow fleetcapitalization or other activities. Differential access to information can result in powerdifferences within the industry, and fisherfolk may use their information to bargain with the state(Ruddle 1994). Whatever is the case, the socioeconomic implications of disclosing or revealinginformation should be known to planners in order to inform decision-making (Peterson andSmith 1982). Action arising from such decision-making involves the exercise of power by thestate in the context of the overall social setting depicted in Figure 3.1.My concern is with the potential exercise of power since the actual extent of power is onlyrevealed upon application. That is, the activities in which actors participate contribute tomaintenance or change in the institutional framework and relative powers among actors (Burns1985). An investigation of revealed power dynamics is beyond the scope of this study since thestate did not undertake fishery planning during the period of fieldwork.3.4.2 General considerationsThe finding that failure in fishery planning has not been in all cases a fishery problem, butsometimes a reflection of problems with planning in general, has been reviewed by Rothschild(1973) and MacKenzie (1974). While not suggesting that interdisciplinary research and problemsolving is the only answer to these problems, they suggest that a narrow perspective constrainsappropriate decision-making. Their other comments will not be repeated except to note thatfailure to understand the linkages in the total planning environment, failure to involve clients in acontinuous iterative process of plan review and refinement, and failure to take into account42complexity and uncertainty figure high on their list of identified problems.A substantial part of planning involves decision-making under uncertainty and devisingstrategies for responding to uncertainty by adaptation or control (Conyers and Hills 1984).Decision-making under the uncertainties facing scientists, managers and planners has figuredprominently in fisheries literature and in the recent debate on the role of scientists and scientificadvice in planning for fishery resource sustainability (Ludwig et a!. 1993; Rosenberg et a!.1993). However, although uncertainty as a statistical problem for planners and managers mustbe appreciated, this aspect is not as important in this study as its social consequences forfisherfolk and state officials.While I have usually referred to fishery planning as if it were a single topic, it comprisesboth management and development planning, and the relationship between the two componentsneeds to be examined. According to Chakalall (1992:56): “a fishery development plan shouldnot be confused with a fisheries management plan, which focuses mainly on resourceconservation and forms part of the development plan.” Johnston (1992) locates fisherymanagement as a development strategy and proposes that in unmanaged, open access fisheries,fishery development should take the form of fishery management. This is to allow decision-makers to acquire a “thorough knowledge of the resource, economic conditions in the fisheryand elsewhere, and the legal/institutional environment” prior to embarking on developmentplanning (Johnston 1992:11). However, the political reality is that fishery management usuallyfollows development, and is supported mainly in order to improve the lot of stakeholders alreadyengaged in development who are experiencing problems (Caddy 1984). Thus the relationbetween management and development planning may be more complex in practice than in theoryand must be taken into account in applied research.Although the same planning process can be applied to both fishery development and43management planning, I focus more on the latter. This is for two reasons. First, the priority inthe eastern Caribbean and elsewhere is for examining the options for managing fisheries (Mahon1990a). Second, this focus is consistent with the notion that Caribbean planners, and publicservants in general, should cultivate a sense of managing rather than administering aspects ofdevelopment (Demas 1992).3.4.3 Integrating social science into fishery planningThe argument for integrating social science, specifically sociology and anthropology, intofishery management planning rests on the fact that, whether or not they affect fish, theimplementation of fishery plans inevitably involves social change. Orbach (1986:105) uses thecliché that “one does not manage fish, one manages people” to point out that social informationmay be useffil at all stages in the planning process. This argument is strengthened by whatauthors have been calling a “crisis” in world fisheries management (McGoodwin 1990: Nielsen1994). The situation is that resource overexploitation has not been halted by bioeconomicrestrictive control or market-based measures partly because in the eyes of resource users theseregimes lack legitimacy. The solution tendered is that legitimacy and overall effectiveness can beimproved by greater involvement of resource users in management, transferring somemanagement responsibility to them if possible. This is the growing argument for comanagement.If disenchantment with bioeconomics promotes social considerations and co-management,then it is pertinent to ask first if social science can be successfully integrated into fisheriesmanagement planning and then what useful perspective can it provide. I attempt to answer thesequeries by examining some of the literature written from a social perspective on participatoryplanning in developing countries and on co-management. Throughout I try to show therelevance of the concepts introduced earlier, especially the network concept.4434.3.1 General problems and politicsProblems encountered with the integration of social science often relate to the history offishery management planning. First, since sociology did not accompany biology and economicsin the evolution of fishery science, social accounts of fisheries are seldom in the form of appliedresearch immediately usable by planners, even though the number of such accounts has beenincreasing (Dyer and McGoodwin 1994). Second, with few persons inside fishery planningagencies having a background in sociology or anthropology, it is difficult for such agencies tocollect social data and convert it into useful information (Ward and Weeks 1994). Third, beingaccustomed to quantitative bioeconomic methodologies and prescriptions, fishery planners findit difficult to accept and integrate the more qualitative aspects of social science (Orbach 1986).Especially in multispecies fisheries, experience has shown that social issues fail to be includeddue to the existence of already complex biological and economic interactions (Dyer 1994). Suchcomplex fishery interactions are prevalent in the Caribbean.In terms of the mandatory incorporation of social issues into fishery planning, the UnitedStates’ Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (IVIFCMA) of 1976, with itsconcept of optimum yield mentioned earlier, is a frequently examined model. However, althoughprovision is made for social impact assessments, appointing social scientists to advisory panels,and using a system of public hearings to broaden participation, social and cultural factors are stillnot being integrated into management decision-making (Smith 1982; Paredes 1985). Dyer(1994) elaborates on the barriers to achieving effective fisheries management planning under theU.S. system and suggests some strategies for overcoming these. A few of the strategies mostrelevant to this study include more balanced representation from user groups, bettercommunication between stakeholders, the co-management of resources, and more proactiveplanning involving social scientists. At present fishery planing is reactive, “the need for45regulation is generated by perceptions of users and policy makers ... instigated by declining catchlevels, economic factors, politics or other considerations” (Dyer 1994:84). He admits thatpolitics often overrides science in the final stages of planning.The inclusion of politics should not be surprising since planning is fundamentally a politicalprocess. Plans are political statements, and technically superior plans that are politicallyunacceptable usually gather dust. Political theory provides a basis for the legitimacy and form ofplanning (Low 1991), and is relevant to this study since social embeddedness also implies thatrelations are influenced by politics (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990). Western liberal-democraticpolitics, and atomistic, market oriented economic ideology are often associated. Yet liberalpolitics and market-based economics may not necessarily rule out alternatives to thebioeconomic approach, the most obvious being co-management. Where the maxim “lessgovernment is good government” is put into practice, it is conceivable that the state may wish todelegate responsibility and encourage co-management of the fishery (Jentoft 1989). SummaryIn summary, before one can examine the implications of social information for fisheryplanning, one must consider how that information is going to enter the planning process. Itappears that there have been difficulties with the integration of social science information evenwhen institutionalized through legislation. However, liberal-democracy as an ideology does notappear to be a factor inherently in opposition to social science integration or co-management.Pinkerton (1989, 1994) and others discuss several additional factors that influence theestablishment of co-management regimes.3.4.4 Co-management and participatory planningIn this research I focus on the influential factors most relevant to the perspective that formalorganizations comprise social networks which link members to each other and to the outside.46Most significantly, the institution of co-management typically requires that fisherfolkorganizations participate with the state in the management process. This necessitates consideringthe concept of participation in the context of citizen/state interaction. There is a large body ofliterature on participation, and the concept has been reviewed generally (Oakley and Marsden1984) and in the context of fisherfolk (BOBP 1990) especially in relation to cooperatives(Meynell 1984, 1990; Pollnac 1988b). Participation is a complex concept for which there is nouniversally applicable definition, partly because it can be interpreted as a graduated scale ofinvolvement (Arnstein 1969). A crucial issue is whether participation is conceived as a means toan end, or an end in itself. Participatory democracyAlthough co-management can be a mechanism to manage consent and reduce conflictthrough participatory democracy (Pinkerton 1989), democratic co-management organizationscan become the victims of power struggles and the general political environment (Jentoft 1989).The perspective on participation within an organization or country cannot be divorced from itspolitics. In the experience of non-industrialized countries, participation has generally been aproject input of top-down development planning. It has been a short-term means to achievingproject goals usually not formulated by the intended beneficiaries (Oakley and Marsden 1984).This token, manipulative or co-optational participation is incorporated for reasons of sharingproject costs, increasing the efficiency of capital inputs and increasing the effectiveness ofproject outputs (Garcia-Zamor 1985). Since the failure of development projects is oftenattributed to sub-optimal participation, there has been a move in general development planning,parallel to the one in fishery management planning, to make planning more grassroots, bottomup or people-centred (Pollnac 1988b; BOBP 1990; Cernea 1991). In a country accustomed todevelopment projects, but unused to fishery co-management, a pertinent conditioning factor may47be the extent to which the former was truly people-centred. EmpowermentPeople-centred planning is an exercise in empowerment, and begs the related query aboutwho are the ‘people’ involved. Here the co-management literature focuses on communitydevelopment or participation in a ‘natural resource community’. This notion links the peoplewho reside within some geographic area, determined to be relevant on various socio-spatialcriteria, with their utilization of and cultural dependence on a particular renewable naturalresource (Dyer and McGoodwin 1994). However this is only one interpretation of‘community’, a term with numerous definitions. Social network research has shown that widelydispersed individuals can and do form communities because of their ties based on sharedinterests, values, norms or other commonalities (Wellman 1988). But if there are few tiesbetween fisherfolk, if they are very individualistic, one cannot properly use the label‘community’, a term typically invoking some sense of solidarity and mutual orientation (Scherer1972). Since, in the literature, examples of the potential benefit of co-management to communitydevelopment typically refer to a natural resource community (Berkes 1989; Pinkerton 1989;Dyer and McGoodwin 1994), broader application to other concepts of community withindefinition bounds is worth exploring.Social research also frequently elucidates a hierarchical power structure within communitiesand organizations, those who command the most social capital being the most powerfhl. Insocial network terms, the influence of powerful clients on the state, those who determine what isan ‘issue’ that gets dealt with, depends on the structure of the policy domain (Knoke andLaumann 1982). Since participation is about empowerment, particularly if it is an end in itself,there is the question of whether under co-management an existing elite within a community ororganization will restructure the policy domain to become even more powerful or the mass of48people become newly empowered (Jentoft 1989). The latter is the intention of grassrootsplanning, but one that may be subverted by persons or organizations already in powerfulpositions who wish to defend their special status. Delineating, through social research, thenetworks connecting beneficiaries and the state may help to explain if and how social powercould be redistributed and employed under a co-management scenario. State and bureaucracyHowever it should not be assumed that the state, specifically the government andbureaucracy, will want to relinquish and redistribute power for the common good. With the comanagement approach, adoption of participation as an end or means may require politicalchange and the political will to institute bureaucratic reorientation (Montgomery 1986). Liberal-democracy is not inherently antagonistic to participation, and may encourage it through interestgroups where pluralist political beliefs are also prominent (Midgley 1986). What preventspoliticians from adopting, and bureaucracy from reorienting towards, participative approachesmay be more in the nature of particularistic barriers to change. Two major barriers, in terms ofstructurally altering networks of social capital, may be having to break both the patron-clientrelationships with fisherfolk beneficiaries, and the class association relationships with economicelites, from which power may be derived (Montgomery 1986; Pinkerton 1994).Socio-cultural and operational constraints to co-management may also exist for both thebureaucracy and the potential participants. These constraints may be most relevant to thedecentralization objective of co-management (Pinkerton 1989). In situations wheresubordination to authority, such as the state, is culturally embedded, it may be a pre-requisite tofirst raise the consciousness of the fisherfolk to a level where they have the desire and will to beinvolved in participatory processes (BOBP 1990). A fundamental requirement is that thefisherfolk voluntarily subordinate their private and short-term interests to the collective long-49term interests of a fishery organization (Jentoft 1989; Kuperan and Abdullah 1994). Inindividualistic societies such as described above for the Caribbean this may be difficult, butadded to this are the typical operational difficulties associated with establishing effectiveorganizations and mechanisms for interaction with the state. These include questions of technicaland managerial skills, conflict resolution, communication and financial resources often related tothe number and scale of organizations and the homogeneity of their membership (Jentoft 1989).This leads to the question of what, if any, role the state should play in institutionalizingparticipation. It has been argued that genuine participation can arise spontaneously only from thepeople themselves and that anything else is unsatisfactory and manipulative (Oakley andMarsden 1984; Midgley 1986). This view has been criticized as idealistically naive since theconstraints described above are real and only through state assistance, sometimes termedbureaucratic populism, may participation be initiated successfully, eventually graduating to amore self-reliant arrangement (Montgomery 1986; Pomeroy 1994). In studying the role offishermen’s organizations in fishery management around the world, Hannesson (1988) andKurien (1988) generally conclude that, to be effective, these bodies need more recognition andsupport than they have been receiving. Whether such intervention is co-optation or manipulativeis situation-specific, often determined by the degree to which the political and bureaucraticdirectorate are intent on neutralizing opposition and retaining or establishing control over thepopulace (Midgley 1986; Pinkerton 1994). The history of interaction between state and industryrelevant to previous fisherfolk organizations can determine the response to state-aided initiationof co-management (Jentofi 1989). SummaryIn summary, the impetus to integrate social science into fishery planning and move towardsco-management comes from the failure of the bioeconomic approach that ignores social factors50and the potential additional benefits of co-management. However problems exist both for theintegration process and the institution of participatory planning. These problems have highpolitical and social content and many are situation specific rather than generic. Thus theintegration of social science may provide planners with the perspectives, concepts and methodsnecessary to collect and evaluate appropriate socioeconomic data useful for understanding theimplications of social organization in the fishery.The case in the eastern Caribbean is that although there is uncertainty about the island statesever gaining a thorough knowledge of the pelagic resource, fishery development has beenunderway for some time. Since management planning is not yet practiced, but management anddevelopment planning are closely related, a review of the Caribbean development planningexperience and environment may serve as a guide for what to expect in fisheries managementplanning. These factors are likely to be of relevance to co-management. The next sectionprovides a general overview of development planning and administration in the easternCaribbean before turning to the small body of literature on fishery planning.3.4.5 Planning development in the Caribbean3.4.5.1 Main featuresPlanning was introduced to the English-speaking eastern Caribbean in 1945 as a means ofallocating Colonial Development and Welfare funds. From colonial to recent times, developmentplanning has consisted mainly of thinly disguised listings of ongoing and desired high visibility,foreign-funded, capital projects in the public sector investment programme (Khan 1987). As aresult of aggressive foreign borrowing, some countries have had to seek assistance from theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF), and planning is now done within the framework of liberalstructural adjustment packages with less emphasis on capital projects.This situation has had several implications. Being small open economies, these states are51exceptionally dependent on the world economic environment, especially international financeand trade. It has been argued that true economic planning has never been done, nor is it possible,under conditions where there is no certainty of controlling the key variables to any appreciabledegree (Barsotti 1992). With plans being primarily a collection of projects funded from differentexternal sources, sectoral linkages have been poorly articulated and national sectoral inputminimal (ISER 1982). Therefore, development planning, although supposed to achieve socialends through political and economic means, has been a mechanistic, technical process decoupledfrom the political process (Brown 1992). And although planning in the Caribbean is supposed tobe indicative, neither plans, nor the political manifestos on which they are usually based, seem tobe assimilated by either their authors or the electorate (Cox and Embree 1990). Humanresources, in terms of adding the creativity of the citizens to the planning process, have beenneglected (Khan 1987; Howard 1989). Politics of planningIt is argued that the political education required for informed citizen participation has beenlacking. “There is no serious attempt to bring the issues to the people, to give us a proper graspof these issues and allow us to apply our wisdom to the process of problem-solving at thenational level” (Hodge 1986:96). It is thought that political education should lay the basis for thegreatest possible participation in planning to create a common understanding of what planningentails, and for policy to evolve from the people (Manley 1986). However, no political party inthe Caribbean has shown enthusiasm for the political education essential for any major change inpolitical consciousness since this would end the practice of personalized patronage politics(Wedderburn 1986; Khan 1987).The consequence of this political style is that small sections of the electorate seek directaccess to politicians, bypassing the bureaucracy and supporting the tradition of political52patronage (Manley 1986). Large sections who are alienated from the political process expresscynicism about the ability of governments to solve problems and work out their own strategiesfor survival (Hodge 1986). Plans are shelved if they constrain the freedom of action of thepolitical directorate, and long term interests of a more general nature are subordinated to theshort term interests of influential elite minorities adept at manipulating political structures andresources (Khan 1987). This means that long term plans and policy decisions are ignored andsituation-specific decisions are taken for political expediency, an approach to planning describedas reactionary (Cox and Embree 1990).Since the majority of people place little faith in democracy in the Caribbean, some writerssee community councils and co-operatives to be essential if Caribbean states are to break out ofnon-democratic and non-participatory traditions (Thomas 1986). One purpose of suchorganizations would be to create, without political interference, greater commonality of variousperceptions through information exchange and therefore greater capacity for common action invarious situations (Manley 1986). The latter, which includes allowing more people to makeinputs into planning, seems to share similarities with co-management.The above prescriptions, even though tendered from a socialist perspective, may perhapsstill be viable in a true liberal-democracy. However, the states of the eastern Caribbean are saidto be only nominally liberal-democratic. This ideology is allegedly threatened by the practice ofgoverning which, to the present, is trapped within the colonial plantation value system ofpaternalism, authoritarianism and elitism (Stone 1985). These values, and the personalizedpolitical leadership style which causes the civil service to serve as a patronage vehicle rather thana change agent, places a limit on the degree of openness of government institutions (Khan1987). Thus, popular participation is impeded by restricting the flow of and public access toinformation. Also, government agencies seem more concerned with control than client53satisfaction. When dealing with lower class clients who cannot fully articulate their needs, civilservants decide what is best for them using a top-down approach (Jones 1974). The tendency ofcivil servants to act on organizational premises and perceptions rather than those of the client isallegedly entrenched (Khan 1987). SummaryTo sum up, even today “one of the most significant characteristics of CommonwealthCaribbean systems of government and public administration is the non-participative nature ofdecision-making processes”(Jones and Mills 1976:333). These authors also say that when forcedto facilitate participation these governments and bureaucracies engage in “symbolic institution-building” (Jones and Mills 1976:341) so as to devise participative structures with no power. OnArnstein’s ladder (1969) participation in the eastern Caribbean is said to equate to tokenism, andit is therefore not surprising that citizen response to participative opportunities is often less thanvigorous when the issues are not of direct interest (Khan 1987).However, at least one prominent regional public administration agency has recognized thatthe “broader dimension of public management is connected with empowerment of peoplesthrough increased participation in the overall development process” and that there is a need for“bureaucratic reorientation” since the “participatory approach has acquired urgency asgovernments and the governed become more estranged” (CARICAD 1992:348). It isacknowledged that the popular image of the public service as self-serving, not nation-serving,noted by Khan (1987) needs to be improved. Yet formidable barriers to change may be set up bythe political directorate rather than bureaucracy. As Hodge (1986:95) states somewhat cynically,political parties are usually intent on “keeping the people from making too many inroads on theresources which they control and intend to control forever.” This is not an encouragingenvironment for fishery planning based on co-management.543.4.6 Progress in fishery planningIn the Lesser Antilles fishery planning has taken place within the environment describedabove from the inception of planning, but its part has been minor within the scheme of nationaldevelopment. Only since the mid-1980’s has fishery planning in the region been examinedcritically by national, regional and international agencies. By this time, academic researchers hadalready commented on deficiencies in the conceptualization and implementation of fisheriesdevelopment plans (Kirton 1977; Berleant-Schiller 1981) but these comments either did notreach or receive the attention of those involved in planning.Gumy (1985), in reviewing the situation, observed that planning, although practiced widely,was not utilized in the fisheries sector as intensively as in the agricultural and industrial sectors.That is, fisheries development had either not been planned at all, or had not been properlyplanned. To make improvements, he and others (e.g., Cox and Embree 1990) haverecommended interdisciplinarity, participation of the fishery sector, and greater harmonizationbetween the actual decision-making power of state agencies and what is required according tothe contents of plans (i.e., the reduction of political interference). However, all acknowledgethat the technical, human and financial resources of state fishery agencies are inadequate in mostcountries.Under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nationsthere have been follow-up activities. The first session of the Working Party on FisheriesEconomics and Planning of the Western Central Atlantic Fishery Commission (WECAFC) heldin 1989 again reviewed the situation and came up with general guidelines based primarily onconventional development economics with few social considerations (FAO 1991). Next, andmore relevant, were the 1990 Workshops on the Economic and Social Aspects of Small-scaleFisheries in the Caribbean and on the Socio-economic Implications of Fisheries Management in55the WECAFC Region. The common conclusion from the workshops was that the typicalbioeconomic approach could not deal with the “complexity of issues presently affecting themanagement of fishery resources [so] social and economic studies were considered as animportant tool in the formulation and assessment of fishery management plans” (FAO 1991:3).The workshop also noted as a constraint the “lack of effective mechanisms enabling the activeparticipation of fishermen in the formulation of management measures and often their reluctanceto cooperate in the implementation and the accomplishment of management measures” (FAO199 1:3).These statements were made at about the same time as an FAO Technical CooperationProgramme to devise fishery management options for the Lesser Antilles had concluded.Ironically, although the study noted the deficiencies in national and regional fisheries planning,and the need to get resource users involved in planning and management, the discussion ofmanagement options was almost exclusively biological (Mahon 1990a). However, in anotherregional meeting it was stated that “governments should establish mechanisms which will ensureregular and effective representation of all components of the fishery sector in the fisherydecision-making process, for example Fishery Advisory Committees” (Chakalall 1992:13).The most recent follow-up is the CARICOM Fisheries Resource Assessment andManagement Program (CFRAI\4P). This is a joint project between the Canadian InternationalDevelopment Agency (CIBA) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a treaty-basedpolitical grouping of English-speaking Caribbean territories. The 1991 Memorandum ofAgreement states that the goal of CFRAIVIP is “to promote the management of fisheriesresources of CARICOM countries and to permit the exploitation of these on the basis ofsustainable yield” (p.12). Therefore, included in CFRAMP is a sub-project on fisheriesmanagement planning.56The 1992 sub-project specification workshop (at which no fisherfolk were present) includeddiscussion in favour of co-management and its associated features such as consideration ofsocioeconomic and political factors, fisher participation, more information exchange andevaluating fisher organizations’ potential role in management (Espeut 1992). But thebioeconomic fishery model appeared to dominate the technical sessions on managementmeasures, with mention that ‘community involvement’ was useful in facilitating compliance(CFRA1VIP 1992). Community involvement was not a major and integral part of the discussions,and it does not appear that the issues involved in the bioeconomic versus co-management debatehave been frilly articulated and evaluated. The fisheries management planning sub-project has notbegun, and the latest strategic review of CFRAIVIP (1994) identifies the same issues as before.This is the point of departure for my research. SummaryIn summary, Caribbean fisheries planning has been subordinated to agriculture and locatedwithin a non-participatory development planning environment. However, within the last tenyears this situation has changed to one in which fisherfoik participation is favourably discussed.Yet it is not clear which factors may determine whether the extent of this intended participationwill be minimal as in the bioeconomic approach, or significant as in co-management. It is hopedthat this study can make a practical contribution to the articulation and resolution of some of theissues in the case of the Barbados pelagic fishery and may also have broader application. A briefreview of the analytical framework through which this may be accomplished based on theliterature previously discussed is presented below in the final section.3.4.7 Using this study as a planning resourceThe socioeconomic information gained from this study can be used by a fishery planner toprovide orientation for the interaction between the state and fishing industry. First, the57information could be used to evaluate the social organization of the fishery and select or modifythe bioeconomic or co-management approach. Second, it could be used to plan the planningprocess — that is, the operational details of state/fishing industry interaction. Third, it could beused in the execution of the planning process that is, formulating, implementing, monitoringand evaluating plan components. I illustrate some planning process options through diagramsshowing the proportion of government versus fishing industry (a) participation and (b) decision-making in planning (Figure 3.4). The second chart illustrates that within co-managementsignificantly different power arrangements are possible, and these need to be critically analyzed(Jentoft 1989; Pinkerton 1994).In the diagram, open access means that there is no management planning being undertakenby either party. This is the current state in the Caribbean to be addressed, so its continuation isnot an option unless the situation proves to be unmanageable or management costs exceedbenefits. Exclusive community management, in effect self-governance over a location orresource, implies that state intervention is and will be absent. Successful cases of community-based management have been much documented, especially in reaction to the proposition bybioeconomists that some resources such as fish are by nature open access common property(McCay and Acheson 1987; Berkes 1989; Dyer and McGoodwin 1994), but examples fromoffshore fisheries are scarce (Jentoft 1989). Community management of migratory pelagics isnot known to occur in the eastern Caribbean and so is unlikely to arise in the near future.Because of the nature of the fishery, a private property rather than communal solution to thecommons dilemma has been proposed to be more suitable for Barbados (Berkes 1987).58Figure 3.4 Fishery p1aniing approaches(a) Degree of state and fishing industryparticipation in the planning processmax.______________Stateparticipationxmmwi propey managementmm.Fishing industry max.participation(b) Degree of state and fishing industrydecision-making in the planning processmax.Statedecision—malcingcommon propertymm.Fishing industry max.decision-making59Co-optation means that the fishing industry takes no active part in decision-making, but isinstead persuaded to implement state plans based on the belief that they are generally beneficialor inevitable (Kearney 1989). Two levels can be readily distinguished. However, in the mostauthoritarian or undemocratic situation the industry may not be consulted at all on the measuresplanned. In most countries where the bioeconomic approach is used the industry may beinvolved in the planning process to the point of being consulted for information or opinion, butno further (Jentoft 1989). I label these levels respectively co-optation (non-consultative) andconsultation (consultative co-optation), and it is likely that consultation will be more feasiblewhere there is some formal organization.Co-management was discussed previously and will not be reviewed again here. However,one of the anticipated benefits of co-management is reduced transaction costs because peoplebuy into the plan (Pinkerton 1989; Berkes 1989). Yet, when successful, co-optation in eitherform assists in reducing the transaction costs of management even more than co-management bysecuring compliance without the price of fuller participation. But, as noted earlier, both levels ofco-optation tend to fail for several reasons including lack of legitimacy, and hence compliance,among fisherfolk.Consider the first use of this study and recall previous discussion. If, for example, socialstrategies are found to be highly individualistic, the people used to authoritarianism, the potentialto form effective fisherfolk organizations low, and the political and bureaucratic barriersformidable, then the bioeconomic assumptions and approach may be a feasible way forward, atleast in the short term. In contrast, should the data indicate a high level of embeddedness withwell developed social networks, effective fisherfolk organizations, and a desire for democraticparticipation by all, then conditions seem favourable to co-management. If the data present some60intermediate image then, depending on the degree of digression from the purest form of eitherapproach, acceptance or modification of the closer one is an option. With the bioecononiicapproach this may mean paying more attention to ‘imperfections’ due, for example, to kinship orunionization (Terkia et a!. 1988). With co-management, digression may mean careful nurturingand support of the elements that are favourable pre-conditions. The use of criteria such asdiscussed immediately above, and earlier in the literature review, facilitates an applicabilityanalysis of alternative approaches.The second and third tasks of using the findings to plan the details of the planning processand execute it are closely related. Selecting the bioeconomic approach would suggest cooptation or consultation, whereas co-management suggests participative planning. But in thelatter, deciding which stakeholders participate, and how to share decision-making andresponsibility between them, would still be at issue. If an intermediary situation exists, then theprocess chosen and the method of executing it would depend on the specifics of the socialrelations and organizations discovered.One method of assessing a suitable planning process and its execution is by examiningwhich functions such as data collection and analysis, plan implementation, monitoring andevaluation, and enforcement are potentially sharable given the socioeconomic and politicalsituation (Jentoft 1989; Pinkerton 1989; 1994). Comparing perceptions of uncertainty is relevanthere since, as stated much earlier, shared perceptions form the basis of common action andproblem-solving, while significant differences may form the basis for dialogue and informationexchange, but also can be barriers to communication (Ruddle and Rondinelli 1983). Commoninterests, if not perceptions, could be expected to facilitate power and responsibility sharing inthese functions.Perceptions of uncertainty also have practical implications for plan strategies, and examples61were given in the discussion of the use of information as a social power resource. However, thequestion of whether planners can actually influence perceptions of uncertainty among fisherfolkdepends, among other things, on the networks that connect fisherfolk to different sources ofinformation, and which of these sources they act upon. It may also depend on the quality andquantity of information available to planners. It is conceivable that, for example, fishers mayhave superior information usable by them as a power resource to gain leverage in orienting theplanning process to their own needs (Ruddle 1994). Due to the paucity of data on the resourcesand fishing practices in the Caribbean, the functional expertise and perceptions of fisherfolk maybe very valuable to planners (Berkes and Shaw 1986; Mahon 1 990b). Situations in which thestate needs fishers’ experience and observations, and the fishers in exchange want more controlover management, are not uncommon in co-management cases (Pinkerton 1989). Such a caseallows relatively easy non-political entry into sharing power through data collection and analysis.Perceptions of uncertainty can also play an important part in determining the fundamentalrole and direction of fisheries management planning. On the subject of environmentalmanagement, Holling complains of the “fundamental myth” that “the central goal for design is toproduce policies and developments which result in stable social, economic and environmentalbehaviour” (1978:2). Lamson (1984) observes that fisheries management planning has generallysubscribed to this myth, and that it will be continually prone to failure unless reoriented forcoping with variability and uncertainty rather than aimed at stability and prediction. She suggeststhat “a more appropriate set of goals would include: 1) learning how variability and fluctuationcan be incorporated into resource policy design, and 2) seeking specific mechanisms that arecapable of assisting individual fishermen and resource-dependent communities to surviveunpredictable and sudden shocks” (1984:124). If one finds that uncertainty is perceived to be apervasive and serious problem in the Barbados pelagic fishery, and accepts that the key method62for coping with uncertainty is flexible and adaptive fisheries management planning, then it mayalso be possible to choose whether bioeconomic or cooperative management planning is moreappropriate based on socioeconomic information on the fishery.34.7.1 SummaryIn summary, use of this study’s information involves evaluating: (1) whether the mostfeasible planning approach is bioeconomic, co-management or some intermediate; (2) the mostfeasible arrangements for participation and decision-making in the planning process; and (3)which, if any, planning functions are compatible with the anticipated level of state/industryinteraction. These evaluations can be performed through the analysis of socioeconomic data onthe social strategies that people in the industry use to cope with a pervasive feature such asuncertainty. These analyses involve comparing factors mentioned in the literature as positively ornegatively affecting the above options with the actual situation based on interpreting thecollected socioeconomic data. Before looking at the data collection methods used in myresearch, the situation in Barbados is briefly described.634. THE BARBADOS SITUATIONThe purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with an image of the study site througha brief historical and contemporary description. Many features of the fishing industry analysed insubsequent chapters are introduced here, but not elaborated upon.4.1 COUNTRY PROFILE4.1.1 Physical conditionsBarbados is the most eastern of the Caribbean islands, being entirely surrounded by theAtlantic Ocean and located at latitude 13° 10’ N and longitude 59° 35’ W. The mainly low reliefand coraline island has a total land area of about 432 square kilometres encompassed by acoastline 95 kilometres long. The island shelf is small, only 320 square kilometres, and deepwater is found close to shore. Since no marine boundaries have been negotiated, the potentialextended marine jurisdiction has been estimated to cover around 48,800 square kilometres ofocean (Singh-Renton and Neilsen 1994).The surrounding oceanic surface waters are relatively low in nutrients, thermally stable andof low productivity. Surface currents off Barbados are complex but generally directed towardsthe northwest, sometimes bringing lenses of lower salinity water containing debris from theAmazon and Orinoco Rivers of South America (FAO 1993).4.1.2 People and economyFirst settled by the British in 1625 and remaining under British rule throughout the colonialperiod, Barbados became independent in 966. The Constitution of Barbados enshrinesparliamentary democracy based on the Westminster Model. In recent history the electoralcontest has been between two major political parties with little difference in political ideology.Both describe themselves as social-democratic, but are typically described by others asessentially liberal-democratic (Stone 1985).64With an economy based for much of the past on sugar plantation capitalism and later agrocommercial mercantilism, the growth of industrial capitalism has been slow. Post-independenceeconomic development was based on Arthur Lewis’ Puerto Rico model of industrializationthrough attraction of substantial foreign capital investment (Howard 1989). The major focus isnow on service industries such as tourism, data processing and offshore financial services.However, external and domestic factors caused negative growth in GDP during 1990, increasingdeficits and rapidly depleting foreign reserves. This situation prompted the government in 1991to enter into a stabilization programme with the International Monetary Fund (IlviF) aimed atreducing government intervention and strengthening the market economy, including free trade(Government of Barbados 1993).Table 4.1 shows the contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) at 1992 current prices inBarbados dollars for various industries. The same table shows the deployment of the labourforce in 1992 when the official unemployment rate was reported at 23% of the labour force,mainly as a result of the stabilization programme, in an estimated national population of 262,600persons. Overall female participation was 60.1% of the 1992 labour force.Table 4. iGross domestic product and employment in Barbados, 1992Economic sector Contribution to GDP at current Employment ofprices labour force($ Bds rnillions*) (%) (No.x 1000) (%)Trade and restaurants 498.9 18.6 14.2 14.7Government services 480.4 17.8 20.9 21.7Finance and business services 453.1 16.8 4.1 4.3Tourism 317.3 11.8 9.6 10.0Transport and communication 248.6 9.2 4.2 4.4Manufacturing 203.2 7.6 10.0 10.4Agriculture and fishing 163.8 6.1 6.0 6.2Construction-related 118.4 4.4 7.4 7.7Otherservices 107.7 4.0 18.1 18.8Electricity, gas, water 100.6 3.7 1.7 1.8TOTAL 2692.0 100.0 96.2 100.0*Exchange rate is 1 Barbados dollar 0.5 U.S. dollar Source: Barbados Statistical serviceEarly elections were called in 1994, with the state of the economy and the relationship with65the I1VIF being central issues. The government changed hands, but one of the primary objectivestypical of mainstream development economics, and stated in both the latest development plan ofthe former government and the political manifesto of the present government, is to restore theeconomy onto a path of “sustainable growth” (Government of Barbados 1993:42; BarbadosLabour Party 1994:4).4.2 THE FISifiNG INDUSTRYBoth administratively and statistically, fishing is included under the umbrella of agriculture.As shown in Table 4.1, and elaborated upon below, fishing is not a major contributor to theeconomy based on the official statistics. But, as FAO (1993) points out for the easternCaribbean in general, the true value of the fishing industry is seldom accurately estimated due todeficiencies in available information. Some of the circumstances surrounding these uncertaintiesare introduced in this section.Table 4.2 chronicles some of the major events in the recent history of the fishing industry,not all of which will be discussed in the text.4.2.1 Pelagic resourcesSince the small island shelf cannot support a large demersal fishery, the multifleet,multispecies fishery for oceanic pelagics is predominant (Table 4.3). All of these species appearto be seasonal, some more than others, but in most cases the main season runs from Novemberto July when over 90% of the annual catch is landed. Within the season there are usually peaksof abundance which shift from year to year and which are difficult to explain since so little isknown about the fish, and all indices of abundance come from commercial catch and effort data(Mahon 1987, 1990b). Abundance indices based on such data can be exceptionally misleadingeven when the data are properly recorded using statistical design (Hilborn and Walters 1992),which is not the case in Barbados (McConney 1983; Willoughby et at. 1988).66Table 4.2 The recent history of the fishing industry in BarbadosYear Comment or event1940 . Fishing fleet consists of 371 sailboats and 165 rowboats employing 1200 fishers1942 . Report by H.H. Brown, the first comprehensive description of the industry, envisages aFishery Department1943 . Fishing Boat Loan Scheme established and administered by the first Fisheries AdvisoryCommittee1944 . Fishery Division established with grant funds under Colonial Development and Welfareprovisions• First Fishery Officer and one Clerk appointed• A new Fisheries Advisory Committee chaired by the Director of Agriculture1945 • Fishing included in the first development plan1947 • Fishing Industry Act (FIA) passed which requires all boats to be inspected and registeredwith the Fisheries Division1949 • Colonial government begins to finance Fisheries Division after CD&W grant expires• Tractor with winch installed at Tent Bay to replace manual labour for hauling up boats• Fishery experimental boat “Investigator” launched• Amendment to FIA requires fishers to be registered annually with Fisheries Division1952 • Gill net for flyingfish capture is introduced to fishers after 2 years of trials• Boatyard set up at Fishery Experimental Station and “Calvert” design introduced• Fisheries Division has a staff of 17 people• Boat motorization started1955 • Hurricane Janet destroys many boats and ready supply of wood from felled trees facilitatesboat rebuilding and motorization1961 • Fishing cooperatives introduced as savings societies• Formation of the Barbados Marketing Corporation (BMC)1962 • The Barbados Fishing Vessels Co-operative Insurance Society formed but never active1963 • Workmen’s Compensation Act amended to include fishers as employees1964 • Most fishing savings societies converted into full cooperatives1967 • UNDP/FAO Fishery Project starts and introduces chilled fish to consumers through theBMC before its termination in 1972• Most fishing cooperatives have disbanded or become inactive1971 • Barbados Development Bank makes its first loan to the fisheries sector1974 • First small iceboat operated briefly1976 • First large iceboat is commercially operational1980 • Sand Pit fishers form informal group to counter relocation plans by the Barbados PortAuthority1981 • First locally built fibreglass iceboat is commercially operational1982 • Some iceboat owners form a processing company, Barbados Fish Processing Ltd., to buy andmarket their catches1983 • Fish gluts caused by iceboats overwhelm the market1985 • Short-lived attempt to form a Fisherman’s Association1986 • The Barbados Fishing Cooperative Fishing Society Ltd. (BARFISHCOS), comprisingmainly iceboat owners, is registered1991 • Barbados Union of Fishery Workers (BUFW) registered as a trade union1993 • A Fisheries Act, drafted to facilitate fisheries management planning, is passed1994 • Barbados United Fisherfolk Association (BUFFA) fonned67Table 4.3 Contribution of major pelagic species to estimated total landingsAll other EstimatedYear Major pelagic species landed species totallandelandingsFlyingfish Dolphin Kingfish Tuna Bilifish (metric(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) tons)1986 62.9 21.6 3.3 1.7 3.3 7.2 42281987 36.4 55.3 2.4 1.2 1.7 3.0 66961988 65.3 22.1 3.6 2.6 3.7 2.7 90971989 54.4 29.6 2.9 3.2 3.2 6.7 27541990 58.4 30.8 1.9 2.4 2.8 3.7 25351991 52.7 34.5 2.2 2.6 2.1 5.9 20741992 44.0 43.7 1.5 3.3 2.5 4.8 33621993 69.7 18.0 1.9 3.5 2.1 4.9 2852AVERAGE 55.5 32.0 2.5 2.6 2.7 4.9 4200Source: Agricultural Planning Unit and Fisheries DivisionCommercially, the most important of these is the small pelagic fourwing flyingfish(Hirundichthys affinis) which usually comprises about 55% of total annual landings. The firsthistory of Barbados, written in 1657, marvels at their ‘flying’ (actually gliding) habit andmentions human consumption, suggesting that exploitation commenced shortly after settlement(Bair 1962). Flyingfish is of less, but growing, importance in the neighbouring islands and H.affinis appears to be the major species in all cases (Mahon et a!. 1986).The increasing regional capital investment in flyingfish capture, proceeding withoutknowledge of the potential yield, structure, or stability of flyingfish stocks, prompted theexecution of a regional five year biological research project which started in 1987. The EasternCaribbean Flyingfish Project had objectives of assessing the scope for developing the flyingfishfishery, investigating stock structure to determine the appropriate spatial boundaries forassessment and management, and developing feasible and appropriate management strategies(Oxenford ci’ a!. 1993). In addition to research dating back to the 1960’s, the project madeflyingfish the most intensively studied of the pelagic species in the region. Many of the biologicalcharacteristics of H. affinis relevant to assessment and management have been described, but a68long list of required research still exists.Dolphin (Coryphaena hippurus, the fish, not the mammal) is the second most commerciallyimportant pelagic species in Barbados, usually comprising about 30% of the total annuallandings. The biology of this large pelagic and its implications for the Barbados fishery havebeen studied, and hypotheses on stock structure and migration in the region have been putforward (Oxenford and Hunte 1984, 1985; Oxenford 1985). Both dolphin and flyingfish areschooling, short-lived (perhaps annual) species, and such stocks are notorious for providing littleindication of overfishing before sudden and precipitous collapse (Hunte 1986).Besides sharks, which are usually not primary targets, the remaining pelagics of commercialimportance are kingfish — chiefly wahoo (Acanthocybium solanderi), tunas — chiefly yellowfin(Thunnus aibacares), bilifish — chiefly blue marlin (Makira nigricans) and Atlantic sailfish(Istiophorus albicans), and swordfish (Xiphias gladius). Hunte (1987) in reviewing theavailable database on oceanic pelagics in the Lesser Antilles concludes that we are ignorant ofthe stock structures of most of the above and, except for the obvious overfishing of swordfish(Berkeley and Waugh 1986), the database is inadequate to conclude that these stocks are notbeing depleted. Little research has been done, or can comprehensively be done, on these fish inthe eastern Caribbean since they are highly migratory and fall under the auspices of theInternational Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).Through CFRAMP, fishery scientists and managers are gaining access to ICCAT data andattempting to encourage more research in this region where international fleets are known tofish, often illegally. These efforts have produced preliminary estimates of potential yields of largetunas and bilifish (Singh-Renton and Neilson 1994). This work is important to Barbados since itis thought that large pelagics, for which well-developed export markets already exist, hold thekey to the future of fishery development in the region (FAO 1993). Although its 1990 landings69were only 0.3 9% of the total for the western central Atlantic (Stamatopoulos 1993), Barbadoshas already begun to invest in this direction.4.2.2 Harvest sectorThe Barbadian fishing fleet of over 500 boats is usually divided into four, not clearlydefinable, design categories. The smallest are open, oar or outboard powered dinghies (locallyknown as ‘moses’), less than 7 metres in length overall (LOA) used mainly for inshore captureof reef and slope demersals. These are not relevant to this study. The remaining categories(dayboats, iceboats and longliners) and their fishing methods are described below and in Figure4.1.There is relatively little corporate or concentrated ownership, most owners being maleindividuals with a single boat (Table 4.4), and there are only about 3 female commercial fishers,one of whom is also the captain and owner. But it is commonly reported that only about 30% ofthe boats are owned by people who fish regularly (Berkes and Shaw 1986). While it is not clearhow the composition of ownership has changed over time, it is generally felt that the proportionof fisher-owners has declined since motorization of the dayboat fleet in the 1950’s due to theincreasing capital requirements of initial investment and operation (Table 4.5). Certainly fewerfishers than non-fishers own iceboats or longliners.Dayboats are typically decked wooden launches 7 to 11 metres LOA, propelled by inboarddiesel engines, which carry two fishers and land their catch daily since they carry no ice for thepreservation of the catch at sea. On the same trip a dayboat may attempt to catch flyingflsh bygillnet with screeler (a tethered fish aggregating device) and handline, and any or all of the largepelagics by trolling or drifting (lurk) handlines. They normally range up to 20 miles from shoreand there were about 370 dayboats in 1993. A typical dayboat lands 6.5 metric tons of flyingfishand 3.5 metric tons of large pelagics per year (Hunte and Oxenford 1986).70Figure 4.1 Fishing boats and methodsa) Dayboat using screeler to drift giinet for flyingfishwhile also handlining (lurklining) for large pelagicsb) Iceboat trolling for large pelagicsc) Longliner setting for tuna and bilifishIceboats can be very similar to dayboats except for size (10 to 15 metres LOA and 3fishers). They carry ice to sea in insulated fish holds, facilitating trips of several days duration,and usually harvest the same species as dayboats using the same gear, but sometimes more of it.The important difference is that they range further in search of fish, often up to 200 miles ormore. In 1993 there were about 76 iceboats. A typical iceboat lands 17 metric tons of flyingfishand 9.2 metric tons of large pelagics per year (Hunte and Oxenford 1986).71Table 4.4 Boat ownership by gender, concentration and typeOwnership criterion Dayboats Iceboats and longliners (%)(%)A. Gender (N340) (N82)male 92.4 91.5female 7.6 8.5B. Concentration (N=340) (N82)ownslboat 91.8 85.4owns 2 boats 7.9 11.0owns 3 boats 0.0 2.4owns 4 boats 0.3 1.2C. Type (N=370) (N=87)sole owner 90.5 87.4partnership 9.5 12.6Source: Fisheries Division Nov. 1993 boat registry databaseThe 1993 longliner fleet consisted of about 11 boats varying in length from 12 to 30 metresLOA. They stay at sea for 2 to 3 weeks and range sometimes more than 400 miles. With 4 or 5fishers on board they use the gear and methods of Florida-style vessels. Their target species aretuna and swordfish for export, with bycatches of shark and billfish sold locally. Due to thegreater size and fishing method variations among longliners it is difficult to assign a typicalyear’s catch, but over 50 metric tons of total pelagics is not unreasonable (Bellairs ResearchInstitute 1994).In the early 1980’s considerable conflict between the dayboat and iceboat fleets was causedby frequent localized fish gluts. These gluts, characterized by record low prices for both fleetsand dumping at sea of excess iceboat fish, resulted from the rapid state-financed expansion ofthe iceboat fleet in conjunction with an inadequate fish marketing and distribution system. It wassaid then that iceboats had the potential to drive both themselves and dayboats out of businessunless fleet growth slowed or the postharvest situation improved (Lavine 1984). Due to input72and infrastructure constraints on iceboat operations and fleet expansion, this competition andconflict with dayboats is not now as apparent although it still exists. Since most of the longlinelandings do not compete on the local market they seem not to have been drawn into the fray.However, no statistics show the contributions of the three boat types to total landings orearnings, and the direction of future fleet development is not clear since recent tough economicconditions in the country have prompted a renewed interest in smaller, more versatile, boats.The numbers in Table 4.5 should only be taken as a very rough guide to vessel economics.No financial data from complete, detailed actual expense and revenue records are available forany of the boat types since few owners keep or divulge such records. From the 1940’s to thepresent, reports that have claimed to show the profitability of “typical” boats have varied somuch in their conclusions as to whether boats are making profits or losses, and the amountsinvolved, that the true situation is still a matter of speculation (McConney 1987). The tabledepicts only one of several scenarios, and it is relative rather than absolute values that deservemost attention.Added to the uncertainty of the financial data are the several different ways thataccountants, economists and others have of calculating profitability. For example, while theincrease in overall enterprise profitability and fuel efficiency with scale is generally agreed upon,profit per ton of fish is lower for an iceboat than dayboat, while investment per fishing jobcreated is much higher (Berkes and Shaw 1986). Whether increasing scale is good or baddepends on one’s perspective. The situation with personal cash income to owners and fishers issimilarly subject to interpretation.73Table 4.5 Estimated fishing income and expensesItem Dayboat a Iceboat a Longliner b($) ($) ($)Capital cost 45.000 200,000 375,000Annual enterprise profitabilityTotal revenue 34.540 90,640 1,003,226Total costs ° 23.702 65,726 948,704Net revenue 10,838 24,914 54,522Personal annual net cash incomeOwner/captain d 7,076 11,640 24,522Crewman 1 6,764 10,638 10,000Crewman 2 — 10,638 10,000Crewman 3 — — 10,000Derived from: (a) Hunte and Oxenford (1986); (b) Bellairs Research Institute (1994)(c) includes loan, insurance, maintenance, operational and depreciation expenses(d) net of loan, insurance and maintenance expensesIf the dayboat owner is the captain, he or she gets 75% (i.e., fisher plus boat share) of thegross revenue minus operational expenses, and the single crew gets 25% (Hunte and Oxenford1986). They report an iceboat owner/captain getting 70%, with 15% to each of the two crew,and say that these share systems are fairly typical. For both boat types, when you subtract theowner’s cash expenses (i.e., excluding depreciation) there is little income difference between anowner and fisher in the short-term. In the long-term for an owner/captain, and in both the shortand long-term for non-fishing owners, income tends to erode to a level below that of fishers. Asdiscussed in Chapter Seven, fishers seem not to realize that an owner’s returns to equity can benegative (Burtonboy and Horemans 1988), and the only financial incentive for owning a fishingboat appears to be short-term cash flow when fishing is good.A typical picture for longliners is even more difficult to present due to the vessel variabilitymentioned above, and the personal incomes represent only base estimates. Several differentshare and other payment systems are in use as owners experiment with incentives to retainskilled fishers and increase their productivity.74Due to the increasing capitalization of the fleet and the competition for fish at increasingfishing ranges, it has been reported that Barbados is experiencing a tragedy of the commonssituation (Berkes 1987). It is likely, however, that deficiencies in the postharvest sector havebeen important in inhibiting the hunt for that last fish.4.2.3 Postharvest and supporting activitiesPelagic catches are landed mainly at the sites shown in Figure 4.2 and sold there by one ofthe fishers, the boat owner or an agent. Ex-vessel sales approximate to brief informal auctionsdepending on the species of fish, the amount offered for sale and the relationship between sellersand buyers. The buyers are usually vendors (hawkers) in the case of dayboats and some iceboats,or small processing companies in the case of many iceboats and longliners, particularly whenlandings are large. At present there are 5 fish processing plants, varying greatly in scale, but eacheasily identifiable with a particular individual rather than being anonymously corporate. Theremay be about 200 regular fish vendors, but the actual number operating varies with the volumeof landings since the occupation is opportunistic and many more people sell fish when it isplentiful. During the season some vendors buy for processors in addition to their own trade, andin the offseason buy imported or local stockpiled frozen fish from them for resale to consumers.Overall, most of the vendors are women, but this varies with location. Most vendors andprocessors handle all species of pelagic fish except for swordfish which is the preserve ofprocessors. Fish is sold directly to consumers at the landing site by vendors, and tosupermarkets, restaurants and hotels by both vendors and processors. At all sites some fish issold by the fisher or owner to buyers other than vendors or processors, but this varies bylocation and volume of landings. Figure 4.3 shows some typical distribution channels.7559°40’ WFigure 4.2 Fish landing sites‘s BayTent Bay°“nes Bay Conset BaBayPit13°OO’ NA number of other occupations, not directly part of this study also play supporting roles.For example, many vendors make use of ‘boners’ and ‘scalers’ to assist them in processingwhole flyingfish into the boneless butterfly fillets increasingly demanded by consumers forconvenience. The relationship to vendors varies from being virtual employees, workingexclusively with one person and sometimes assisting in sales, to being for general hire by anyoneMoon FcflSi) I’Ien’shtsfnxvnLANDING SITES• Primary• Secondary! TertiarATLANTICOCEANApprox. 8 km76including consumers. At a time of high unemployment, this form of self-employment with itsminimal capital outlay has attracted both young men and women, thereby increasingspecialization and the gender neutral division of labour in the industry. These jobs have thedrawback of being lucrative only when landings of flyingfish are large. Similar observationsapply to ‘dolphin skinners’, another specialty task, but these are almost exclusively male andconcentrated at Oistins where dolphin landings are greatest.Figure 4.3 Simplified fish marketing and distribution channelsBoat agents or fish sellers (not vendors) are typically older men operating at Bridgetown.On behalf of dayboat owners, once the fish is landed they sell to vendors or the general public atthe best price in order to receive a commission. Many pay the fishers their share and hold theprofit for the owner to collect later. Some agents are also vendors. Another category of fish77seller is the man who trucks fish from smaller landing sites to Bridgetown, sometimes selling fishalong the way. This added expense to boat owners is necessary since market demand isinsufficient at these sites. Some fish transporters are essentially ‘speculators’, buying fish cheapanywhere and selling where prices are higher.Boatbuilding is another major supporting activity not included in this study. The woodenboats in all categories are locally constructed from imported materials mainly by a handful ofindividual artisanal shipwrights using (without blueprints) a traditional design that has changedlittle over the past 40 years. Fibreglass boats are fewer and are imported or built locally by twocommercial firms. Very recently a new boatbuilding division of labour, the fibreglassing ofwooden boats, has arisen.Finally, there is a general category of person, usually male, who performs almost any task,but typically assists in unloading and washing down the larger boats, runs various errands forpayment in kind or cash, and sometimes becomes a crewman if the opportunity arises. Thesepeople are found mainly at Bridgetown and Oistins.Most of the fish landed are consumed locally by Barbadians and visitors. Besides thedemand from tourism for types of seafood that the local fleet does not supply, Barbados alsoimports quantities of fish mostly in the offseason to top up supplies for general consumption.The expected inverse relationship between local production and imports is obscured by a numberof factors including doubt about the statistics on the amount of fish landed. The most commonlyreported total annual landings for the past 30 years have been between 3,000 to 5,000 metrictons with lows and highs to nearly 2,000 and 10,000 metric tons respectively, depending on thesource consulted. For the same period, annual fish consumption has been estimated at 25-30kilogrammes per person or 20 % of animal protein supply (Laureti 1992). Local fish is seldomprocessed beyond being frozen and filleted or steaked, and must compete with both imported78value-added convenience seafood and lower-priced basic items. Bearing in mind the warningabout official estimations of GDP given earlier, the low contribution of fishing in Barbados isapparent from Table 4.6 which sets out landings, trade and economic statistics.Table 4.6 Estimated total fish landings, contribution to GDP and tradeYear Estimated total Contribution to GDP at Fish imports Fish exportsfish landings a current prices b live weight equivalent live weight equivalent(let C tons) (mçtric1980 3735 (or 3672) 0.7 3044 401981 3411(or3963) 0.6 4943 361982 3480(or 3435) 0.6 4164 141983 6522(or 5904) 1.0 3010 351984 5787 0.9 3527 261985 3915 0.9 3993 221986 4227(or2956or9200) 0.9 3744 311987 3702(or9800or6696) 1.0 3765 281988 9097(or5300or7800) 0.8 3461 1821989 2547(orS000or2O5l) 0.6 4646 691990 2967(or2535) 0.9 4747 611991 2698 0.6 na na1992 3283(or3341) 0.8 na na1993 2852 0.8 na naa = FAO FISHSTAT (or Economic Report or Agricultural Planning Unit)b = Barbados Statistical Servicec = Laureti (1992)4.2.4 Administration and organizationsAs stated earlier, the pelagic fishery is not managed in the sense of being regulated forconservation or utilization. It has, however, been developed largely through state intervention inthe form of physical infrastructure at landing sites, and provision of credit for boat construction.Fishing as a subsector of agriculture has been mentioned in all development plans since the firstin 1945. It had received attention before that through the appointment of a Fishery AdvisoryCommittee (FAC) and Fishery Officer (see Table 4.2). However, in comparing the contents ofdevelopment plans to what actually took place, one can conclude that fishery development hasessentially been ad hoc (McConney 1987).79Except for brief periods, responsibility for the fishing industry, and most of the governmentagencies directly concerned with it, has been with the colonial or government body responsiblefor agriculture. The more indirect services of credit and insurance have been provided, post-independence, by statutory corporations under the finance ministry. The only agency whosejurisdiction is exclusively the fishing industry is the Fisheries Division.The Fisheries Division, which originated with one Fishery Officer in 1944, now employsabout 25 persons (including one Fisheries Biologist) most of whom are engaged in providingservices mainly to the harvest sector. Some of these services such as free engine maintenance, avariety of subsidies and boat haul-out by tractor are diminishing through attrition orgovernment’s recent structural reform policy. Other functions such as boat registration, boatinspection for safety, training and research of all sorts, statistical record-keeping and fisheriesmanagement planning are being implemented within severe operational constraints including asmall operating budget. These functions are linked in part to a new Fisheries Act (1993) whichgives the Fisheries Division responsibility for fishery management and planning. The latterincludes formal consultative mechanisms through which persons in the fishing industry canadvise the minister on a wide variety of fishery-related topics. The operational constraints areargued to reflect the low status of the fishing industry and Division among government’spriorities, except for capital works (Research and Productivity Council 1980; FAO/IC 1982).The Fisheries Division’s status in the parent ministry, especially in relation to planning, isdiscussed in the penultimate chapter.The Markets Division is responsible for operating the state-owned premises whereagricultural produce is sold to the public. These include the three fish markets at Speightstown,Oistins and Bridgetown. The latter, costing twenty million dollars in 1989, consists of fishingharbour, boat repair yard, ice production, chill and cold storage, blast freezing, processing hail80and retail areas. It is the major fish landing site, serving up to 150 boats. Oistins, costing fivemillion dollars in 1983 and serving about 80 boats, is the second largest site consisting ofajettyand scaled-down versions of most of Bridgetown’ s facilities, except blast freezing. The MarketsDivision, unlike the Fisheries Division, has no development mandate and is more concerned withpost-harvest services. It is also responsible for recording daily fish landings and prices at the fishmarkets.The Agricultural Planning Unit is also concerned with fisheries statistics, but in collating notcollecting them, except for the occasional survey. Its relevance to this study is its primary role inwriting the fisheries section of the agricultural sector development plan which subsequentlybecomes incorporated into the national development plan. Since fishery planning is locatedentirely within the agriculture ministry, the national planning process is pertinent only in terms ofsetting guidelines for the sectoral exercise and editing the output. Such guidelines set up aconsultation system to facilitate input, by the private sector and ‘technical’ departments such asthe Fisheries Division, into the latest development plan.Other former arms of the agriculture ministry were important in shaping the fishing industryin its early stages. The Cooperatives Division, which introduced co-ops to the fishing industry inthe early 1960’s, some would argue was also partly responsible for their sharp decline within thedecade (Wedderburn 1981). This negative experience with producer co-ops in general, andfishing co-ops in particular, apparently shapes fishers’ current attitudes towards grassrootscollective action despite the considerable success of credit unions. Pre-independence politicalideology played a critical role in the promotion of cooperatives, and the intention of promotingfishing co-ops still appears in every plan. This is despite lack of action, and in the face ofevidence that this may be a lost cause (Burtonboy 1988). Collective action is considered in detaillater.81The Barbados Marketing Corporation (BMC), a statutory body formed in the early 1960’s,was also part of the political philosophy of the day. It offered development support by workingwith fishing co-ops and offering a guaranteed market and prices for fish. Subsequently, forpolitical, economic and technical reasons, the BMC’s fisheries operations were terminated, butnot before it had shaped expectations of how the government should intervene to make lifeeasier for the harvest sector. Some of these expectations, which remain alive today in aninhospitable political and economic environment, are discussed later.Credit for fishing fleet modernization and expansion originally came from the colonialFisheries Division whose revolving loan fund ground to a halt decades later due to lowrepayment. Now credit is provided mainly by the Barbados Development Bank (BDB).Apparently without the benefit of detailed technical or socioeconomic evaluation, the Bank wasinstrumental in facilitating the iceboat fleet expansion that changed the face of the industry in the1980’s (McConney 1987). Under pressure from international donors to reduce its non-performing loan portfolio, the BDB is in the process of restructuring, and its future relationshipwith the fishing industry is uncertain (W. Lavine pers. comm.). The BDB is relevant to thisstudy due to its lack of formal connection to the other agencies, and the fact that its credit policyis a major factor in shaping investment in the harvest sector. This is of concern in fisheriesmanagement planning. The Insurance Corporation of Barbados (ICB) is the main insurer for thefishing fleet, especially boats financed by the BDB. It is relevant only in that objection to itsallegedly high premiums may be one common basis for collective action.Regarding collective action, there are currently no fully functional organizations in thefishing industry. As shown in Table 4.2, after the failure of the early cooperatives there wereshort-lived attempts at collective action. These included a purchasing and processing companyoperated by iceboat owners, a fisherman’s association, a cooperative of mainly iceboat owners, a82general fishery worker trade union, and an embryonic association of mainly boat owners andfishers. All of these are reviewed later, but especially the latter which was formed as a responseto uncertainty and provided an opportunity for participant observation. This and the otherresearch methods used are discussed in the next chapter.835. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODSIn this chapter, I begin with the research design, describing why various methods werechosen and how they were combined to answer the research questions. The methods used tocollect and analyse the data are then each explained in detail. This detail is useffil from an appliedperspective since research on the Barbados fishing industry by state agencies and the localuniversity is becoming more common, but information on methods is seldom exchanged tofacilitate learning from experiences. A brief discussion of the methods used concludes thechapter.5.1 RESEARCH DESIGN5.1.1 General considerationsResearch, from formulation to conclusion, implicitly involves making choices aboutalternative designs at each stage. The benefit from making design choices explicit is that you canbetter determine the appropriateness of design at each stage and the applicability of the finalresults. General considerations like the nature of the study, the population of interest, andmethods are the pre-sampling choices of research design (Henry 1990).To reiterate, the choice of research problem was based on the desire to applyinterdisciplinary social science to a real situation. As a consequence of the lack of information onthe specific circumstances in Barbados, the study is largely exploratory and data-driven. But it isalso analytical in terms of investigating relationships, and prescriptive in terms of recommendingalternative courses of action based on the findings.It would be ideal for the purpose of theory-building to generalize the research results atleast to the entire small-scale pelagic fishery in Barbados and preferably to the wider Caribbeanor elsewhere. But it was known from the outset that the statistical requirements for external84validity could not be fulfilled. Yet it was intended that the methods chosen should provideresults that were indicative, if not representative, of features within the pelagic fishery, Thereforesome thought went into selecting combinations of methods that, if used together, would justifythe claim that results were more than particularistic. Considerations such as limited time andfinancial resources, the physical and socioeconomic aspects of the location, the lack of earlierresearch on which to build, and the anticipated application of the findings also shaped thechoices of research methods. In all cases complementary methods were brought to bear on eachquestion as shown below.5.1.2 Perceptions of uncertaintyThe first research question asks: “What uncertainties are perceived to characterize theBarbados pelagic fishery?” It is not the intent to investigate the causes of perceptions, but onlyto describe the perceptions themselves, and this was most feasible through self-report by meansof structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews. Since, similarities and differences inperceptions have consequences for common action and dialogue, respondents both in the fishingindustry and in government were interviewed using some common questions.The uncertainties investigated were those most frequently reported in the general literature,but especially those which the documentation available on Barbados also addressed. This wasdone in order to compare perceptions and measurement of uncertain phenomena, and to identifyareas of possible collaboration or conflict between fishery officials and industry participants. Theuncertainties associated with some of the government records, and the extent of availableplanning information, were also identified through document study and interview.Also, by listening to, and participating in, conversations and activities at fish landing sites itwas possible to get indications about what aspects of their work experience people in the fishingindustry felt were most uncertain, and what could be done about them.855.1.3 Social strategies for copingThe second research question asks: “Why are particular social strategies used to cope withthese uncertainties?” As noted above, some of this information came from participantobservation at fish landing sites. People said whether they dealt with things by themselves,through relations with others or if they thought formal organization would be the solution. Itwas possible to directly observe interactions that could be interpreted as examples of networkrelations, particularly with assistance from key informants. The opportunity also arose to applyparticipant observation to the initial stages of the formation of a fisherfolk organization inresponse to a perceived uncertainty. This was almost akin to ethnographic research.The detailed investigation of social strategies for coping was carried out later in theresearch. Notes from the participant observation and unstructured interviews at fish landingsites, and the analysis of the data from the preceding fishing industry questionnaire survey,allowed design to be both theory- and data-driven, that is, partially based on prior results. Thusthe social network research related to coping with the uncertainties perceived by fisherfolk to bemost important, and the research on formal organizations by semi-structured interviews relatedto those organizations most discussed, and the persons most involved.The state intervention aspect of fisherfolk organization was also studied by examination ofofficial documents and files in order to fill in the historical gaps for periods outside the accuraterecall of respondents, and for which no other records exist. This overlapped with considerationof planning.5.1.4 Implications for planningThe third research question asks: “What potential implications do these perceiveduncertainties and coping strategies have for fishery planning?” Questions in structured and semistructured interviews soliciting opinions on various aspects of planning were posed to both86fishing industry and government respondents, but mainly the latter since they are the onesexpected to apply the research recommendations. Since there was little evidence ofstate/industry planning interaction available for direct observation, self-report was the majortool. Comparison of the opinions of officials, industry participants and the policy statements indocuments highlight areas of potential conflict and cooperation within the bureaucracy, andbetween the bureaucracy and industryHowever, much was also made of documentation describing both the historical andcontemporary planning and political environment. The timing of national elections during theresearch period facilitated the latter investigation. The legislative basis and administrativepreparedness for fisheries management planning was also included in the document study.5.2 RESEARCH METHODS5.2.1 Survey of fishing industryThis survey, code-named QFISH, was primarily exploratory, the main purpose being toprovide data useful for compiling a general picture of the pelagic fishing industry in terms ofperceptions of uncertainty, social coping strategies and opinions on planning. The data waspartially analysed in the field to inform the design of the subsequent research methods. Therequirement was to rapidly survey a large number of people in the fishing industry on several ofthe areas described in the literature review.Although the cost per respondent is usually lower for phone or mail surveys, these optionsare not feasible in Barbados, especially for the fishing industry, since adequate sampling framesdo not exist. These methods would also have been inappropriate since the benefits of personalinterview such as higher response rate, greater spontaneity and flexibility, and the ability toobserve non-verbal behaviour outweighed the disadvantages of the method (Bailey 1982).Guidelines for social survey design, administration and data processing (e.g., Converse and87Presser 1986; Rea and Parker 1992) were consulted. Also reviewed were special considerationsfor developing countries (Bulmer and Warwick 1983) and the Caribbean (Barrow 1983). RespondentsIn QFISH the study population comprised the principal players in Barbados’ and mostsmall-scale fishing industries: fishers, boat owners, fish vendors and fish processors. However, itwas not possible to rely on random techniques to select interview respondents. The practicalproblems of random sampling in small-scale fisheries surveys are well documented and have led to theuse of non-probability samples in Barbados and elsewhere in the Caribbean (Poggie 1979; McConney1987). The fundamental problem is that adequate sampling frames are not available. However, evenif they were available, fishers and fish vendors (to lesser extent) are difficult to physically contacton the basis of publicly available records. Many will not have telephones or current addresseslisted, they are usually known by nicknames rather than the names on official records, and theywork long and irregular hours often at several sites. Therefore to identify and locate randomlyselected respondents is prohibitively time-consuming, if not impossible.Although inadequate for random sampling, registration and licensing lists of boat ownersand fish vendors are available from the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF).There are no lists available for fishers, but the few processing plants are in the telephonedirectory. Using these lists, minimum populations of the respondent categories were estimated inorder to draw quota samples reasonably representative of their numerical proportions in theindustry. Fish processors were the exception since, with only 5 operating, a census was feasible.The means of calculating quotas are described below. Errors and omissions in the officialrecords are highlighted since these are some of the uncertainties which I do not describe againin detail, but are the realities fishery planners now face.Since persons who sell fish to the public are required by law to be licensed, the best88available list of fish vendors is the Register of Fish Seller’s Licences maintained by the MarketsDivision. However, some sellers within, and most sellers outside, the environs of the publicmarkets may not be licensed, and the number of unlicensed vendors varies during the season.Many people, including specially recruited relatives and friends of vendors, sell fishopportunistically during periods of heavy landings and when alternative opportunities foremployment are few. Rough estimates of the numbers of licensed and unlicensed regular fishvendors were obtained from observation and inquiry and, it is reasonable to conservativelyestimate the minimum population of fish vendors at 200 people.For the harvest sector, a computerized database of owners and registered fishing boats,expected to have been relatively accurate for the 1992-93 fishing season, was obtained from theFisheries Division. The numbers of commercial fishing boats and their owners in mid-1993 wereas in Table 5.1. However, one must take into account possible errors of both over and underestimation. Overestimation occurs since not all boats listed may be actively fishing due torepairs, dereliction or wreckage. Underestimation, probably the greater error (E. Holder pers.comm.), occurs due to an unknown number of boats that are unregistered, but believed to stillbe fishing, and boats recently registered which are not yet on the database.Table 5.1 Harvest sector populationsBoat type Owners Boats Fishers per boat Total fishersdayboat 340 370 2 740iceboat 74 76 3 228longliner 8 11 4 44TOTAL 422 457 1012Source: Fisheries Division recordsSince the database does not contain information on the occupations of boat owners, it is notpossible to determine how many are also fishers, vendors or processors (i.e., occupy dualrespondent categories). Yet it is believed in the fishing industry and the Fisheries Division that89the majority of boat owners (70-80%) do not regularly fish on their boats, and the frequency ofownership combined with other fishery occupations is low. Assuming that the registerunderestimated the active fleet at the time of the survey by about 20%, then it is reasonable toestimate the population of non-fishing boat owners at 422. Boat owners who fish are includedamong the fishers for the purpose of sampling.The Fisheries Division estimated that 1,875 fishers were active in 1993 in all of thefisheries, but since there is no sampling frame for pelagic fishers, an estimate of their minimumnumber was obtained by multiplying the numbers of dayboats, iceboats and longliners by theofficial records of the typical complement of fishers onboard. The calculations are shown inTable 5.1. The grand total represents the estimated minimum number of fishers that would be onall the boats fishing at the same time. Errors are carried over from the estimation of the numberof boats in the fleet, and are introduced by the actual crew complement being different from theofficial records in some cases, and the fact that since all boats do not fish simultaneously, fishersfrequently shift between boats. However, it is not unreasonable to expect that the number ofpelagic fishers will be close to 1,012. It is also logical to assume that the number of captainsequals the number of boats, but this neglects the practice of captaincy rotating fairly freely,especially in the dayboat fleet, between the regular captain and the ‘second man’ when theformer is unavailable. As a consequence, no distinction was made between captain and crew inassigning quotas of fishers.Based on available time and financial resources, the researcher being the soleinterviewer, and the exploratory nature of the survey, it was expected that about 200 interviewscomprising samples of fishers, boat owners and vendors and a census of the processors would befeasible and adequate. The populations of respondents used for this study as estimated above,and the interview quotas assigned proportionately to respondent category are in Table 5.290Table 5.2 Quota allocations and actual interviews executedCategory Population Population Respondent Respondentsos) intrv (nos.)vendor 200 12 23 32owner 422 26 51 40fisher 1012 62 121 126SUB-TOTAL 1634 195 198processor 5 census 5 5TOTAL 1639 200 203Given the very crude nature of estimating populations, the quotas were intended to beguides only, to be modified in the field according to the numbers of persons in the variouscategories actually observed. Quotas could most easily be filled by approaching potentialrespondents at fish landing sites where they were working or relaxing. Sampling sitesThe Fisheries Division recognizes about 30 fish landing sites. Pelagic fish are landed atapproximately 15 of these during the fishing season. For logistical (time and travel) reasonssampling was done only at the 9 most active sites. Based on the number of boats listing them astheir normal operating bases, their recorded fish landings for the 1992/93 fishing season, thenumbers of fish vendors and fishers estimated to operate at them, and observations onpreparedness for the current fishing season, each of the sites was subjectively weighted. Theweights were Bridgetown (xl 5), Oistins (x8), Sixmens (x2), and Speightstown, Pile Bay, ReadsBay, Skeete’s Bay, Conset Bay and Half Moon Fort each (xl).This exercise was done to allowquota sampling to proceed on the basis of landing sites being visited on randomly selected days,with the probability of site selection weighted by the anticipated relative importance of the site.The purpose was to reduce potential bias from selecting visits purely on the basis ofconvenience. Except for Bridgetown and Oistins which are active all day, the sample sites wereusually visited in the afternoon between 14:00 and 18:00 when fish landing and marketing is atits daily peak. To further reduce bias, transects were walked in random directions across the site,91and anyone not obviously engaged in an activity which could hinder the interview wasapproached, the study explained and consent to interview sought. The questionnaire was readaloud to the respondent and filled in by the researcher. This was the most feasible arrangementwhich also avoided complications due to the possibility of respondent illiteracy. InstrumentMy requirement was for an interview schedule that could be administered in about 20 minutesgiven the number that had to be completed by the researcher and the need to minimize the impositionon respondents. The questionnaire needed to cover the following areas:• Respondent attributes such as work category, gender, age, education;• Perceptions of uncertainties in the environment, resource, operations, economics;• Social relations involved in coping strategies such as information exchange, marketingarrangements and credit provision; and• Opinions on fishery planning such as what objectives are important, who should worktowards them and the nature of government/industry interaction.The QFISH questionnaire in Appendix A is a result of modifications made followingpretests. The pretests were mainly to assess the interpretation of the concepts, clarity ofresponses, task difficulty and level of interest among respondent with various attributes. Theneed for a second pretest was based on the results of the first which showed ftirther refinementwas necessary.To start the study, and test the phrasing of questions in the everyday language of fisherfolk,I first had informal interviews with people at fish landing sites who were not aware of theimpending survey. The instrument was then tested on 3 people in the fishing industry (fishercaptain, fisher crewman, female fish vendor) conveniently selected from among persons whoappeared to be typical of their occupations at the main fish landing site. They answered the92questions on the interview schedule under typical field conditions, and then were asked to givetheir views on the interview experience. I noted separately any difficulty in responding toquestions and found that respondents did not seek clarification or explanation, but wereproviding minimal and irrelevant answers, where they were confused. In another Caribbeansurvey Barrow (1983) warns about over-estimating respondent comprehension.Revisions were made and the second draft schedule was tested at fish landing sites on 20respondents purposely selected to include a range of persons in each respondent category. Themain selection criteria were various lengths of experience in the industry, and variations inanticipated ability to comprehend the questions (based on previous casual conversations). Again,at the end of the interview, additional questions were asked in order to obtain feedback on theexperience, and separate observations were made by the researcher. These results were morepositive.I found that, for example, the background variables were not problematic except thataccurate and reliable responses to queries on absolute income were not forthcoming, so aquestion soliciting relative income was substituted. This pretest also showed that the notion ofthings in the industry being uncertain (unknown or unpredictable) was a familiar one. This wasimportant in order to validate one of the main concepts. But people could not easily scale theirperceptions of uncertainty. With few exceptions they thought that things either were, or werenot, usually predictable. Hence most uncertainty questions were assigned dichotomous closedresponses. Similar response options had to be assigned to most of the questions due to the fieldconstraints of requiring brevity and simplicity. More than for the planning questions, the tradeoff between receiving a superficial broad image and seeking a richer understanding was apparentin the questions on social networks. However it was expected that this would have to beaddressed through other means since previous researchers had also found typical questionnaire93methods to be inadequate in the Caribbean (Barrow 1983). Execution and analysisThe numbers of persons in the various positions who were actually interviewed differedfrom those in the quotas shown in Table 5.2 due to the levels of activity observed. First, a largernumber of boats than usual did not fish in the early part of the season, mainly due to ongoingrepairs. Therefore, the actively fishing fleet was smaller than expected, and consequently thenumbers of non-fishing boat owners sought was reduced. Second, large flyingflsh catches earlyin the season coupled with high unemployment in alternative sectors brought out a largernumber of fish vendors than expected, so a number larger than the original quota wasinterviewed. Third, the latter reason affected the numbers of fishers, and competition to go tosea was fierce, so the numbers of fishers interviewed was more than in the quota.The interviews were conducted between 3 January and 30 March 1994. Each lasted onaverage about 14 minutes, but ranged between 7 and 64 minutes. Of the 203 respondents, 180were male and 23 female. The refusal rate was low and mainly due to busy fishers who said thatthey did not have the time, and older female vendors who were reluctant to talk under anycircumstances. Younger females and all male vendors were more cooperative than the latter, butless so than fishers, owners or processors. Some initial hesitancy was encountered when peoplethought that this was yet another local university or government survey in which they hadalready participated, but had heard nothing of afterwards. However there was little non-responseonce the interview commenced, and only twice did an interview have to be completed at anothertime. Interference or distraction from bystanders was negligible.Throughout the research, despite explaining my student status, people in the fishing industryidentified me primarily as a fishery officer (my previous post). Key informants in the industrythought that my association with the Fisheries Division prompted fisherfolk to cooperate and be94honest with me more than they would with someone not so affiliated. I have no evidence of this,and cannot say what other biases were introduced because of my perceived position.Post-survey data processing followed standard procedures (Borque and Clarke 1992). Thecompleted questionnaires were checked and edited daily as a quality control measure. Data entryand coding of open-ended responses commenced mid-way through the survey fieldwork, andpreliminary data analysis took place at the end of QFISH in order to use the results to design thesubsequent research methods. The microcomputer version of the Statistical Package for theSocial Sciences (SPSSIPC+) was used.Although some elements of randomization were used so as to improve the applicability ofthe study results, the fact that respondents were not selected entirely on a probability basismeans that the results will be particular to the samples, not necessarily representative of theindustry. For this reason the data were subjected only to simple descriptive statistical analysis.Since the results provide information where none existed, and may reveal avenues for furtherdetailed investigation by indicating features useful for to fishery planners to consider, advisingthe consumer to beware of assuming representativeness is preferable to not collecting oranalyzing the data.5.2.2 Social network measurementThe main purpose of this small survey, code-named SOCNET, was to obtain detailedinformation on social networks and relations in the fishing industry not attainable throughQFISH. The issues on which SOCNET focused were determined from the partial analysis ofQFISH data. In addition to the previously cited guidelines on social surveys, literature specific tosocial network analysis (e.g., Marsden 1990; Scott 1991; Wellman and Baker 1985) wasconsulted.955.2.2.1 RespondentsA subsample was drawn from among the QFISH respondents on the basis of theirwillingness to participate in a longer interview. This was assessed in the last question of thesurvey. The subsample was representative insofar as it was chosen to include a diversity ofQFISH responses and all respondent categories. But, since this exercise required much moreexplanation and effort on the part of respondents, selection favoured respondents that theresearcher found to be most articulate and interested in the previous survey. Sampling sitesFor several reasons only fisherfolk Bridgetown and Oistins were sampled. First, focus ononly two sites relatively close to each other reduced operational constraints. Second, thesepublic markets, because of the number and diversity of users and administration by the state,offer the best opportunity for investigating a rich array of interactions, many of whichsuperficially seemed to be conflictual. Third, since the proportions of male to female vendorswere dissimilar at these sites, there was potential for studying gender issues. Fourth, it was atthese two major landing sites that both users and the state seemed to be putting most of theirefforts into planning improvement. It was here, therefore, that priority appeared greatest forpossible application of the research results by planners. InstrumentMy requirement was for an instrument that could be administered in about 40 minutes underconditions similar to the previous survey. The instrument needed to cover the following areas:• Composition of informational and instrumental networks by gender, kinship, friendship,linkages and categories of alters;• Information on ties offering assistance through information exchange, marketingarrangements and credit provision;96• Indicators of conflict in relations and the types of reciprocity; and• Impressions of what people thought were the important features of social relations in theindustry that were necessary to know in order to understand its dynamics.Although network analysis was only used in a limited manner, several methodological issuesnot encountered in typical surveys had to be addressed. These are reviewed by Marsden (1990),and some of the issues most pertinent to this study are discussed below. The SOCNETinstrument, finalized after pretest on three fisherfolk, is in Appendix B.Even though a questionnaire soliciting self-report on social ties through unaided recall is thepredominant personal network research method, there are important differences in detailbetween studies (Marsden 1990). The name generator is of particular conceptual significance.This is a statement used to prompt the respondent into listing the names of their networkmembers according to specific research criteria. My name generator was designed to solicitnames of alters involved in routinized ties of an instrumental or informational nature actuallyused for coping with uncertainty. Actual specific exchanges and routinized ties were chosen toyield improved respondent recall and accuracy. The problem of static bias was addressed laterthrough unstructured interviews which sought to ascertain network dynamics.Name interpreter items addressed both the attributes of the alters and the properties of theties. However, because of priority and time constraints these excluded common networkmeasurements like frequency of contact, duration of acquaintance and strength of ties. Includeddue to significance in the fisheries literature review, although known to be methodologicallyproblematic, were measures of conflict and reciprocation. With conflict the problem is one ofgetting accurate responses to sensitive issues, and with reciprocation there is usually biastowards claims of giving more than is received (Marsden 1990).No boundary was set on networks in terms of the numbers of alters that could be named,97network size was allowed to vary across respondents. A list to accommodate twenty entries waschosen on the basis of common research practice, data handling capacity and the pretests. Givenresearch resource constraints it was not feasible to interview named alters although this wouldhave helped considerably to validate ego self-reports, especially about reciprocation. However aquestion on the perceived amount of interaction between alters was used to obtain an index oflinkage in networks.The entire interview was tape recorded in order to capture the vocalized train of thought ofthe respondent throughout. It was especially useful for capturing the response to the final open-ended question which in the pretests produced considerable useful information as respondentsslipped into a more natural conversational mode. Execution and analysisThe 37 respondents interviewed between 18 June and 15 August 1994, included 26 fromthe original fishing industry survey. The remaining 11 were fisherfolk not previously surveyed,but required due to the high refusal rate of QFISH respondents in this second round ofquestioning. However, since care was taken to select additional respondents similar inoccupation, age and gender to the original subsample, the final sample appears to be no lessrepresentative than the original.Because of their length these interviews were not opportunistic like the first round, butwere arranged by appointment. No one openly refused to be interviewed, but three failedattempts to secure an appointment were taken to constitute refusal and that person was removedfrom the list. The reasons for refusal can only be speculated upon. Secured interviews generallyproceeded as intended. In the final sample there were 18 fishers, 10 owners, 7 vendors and 2processors. Among these 37 were 34 male respondents.It was expected that respondents may have been concerned about the confidentiality of the98tape recording, and that reaction to the recorder may have caused bias. However, norespondents objected, some said that confidentiality did not matter, and all appeared to ignorethe unobtrusively placed machine once the interview started.The completed instruments were checked and edited daily, and the tapes tested foraudibility. The conventional questionnaire data were treated as for QFISH. For the socialnetworks, guidelines for handling tie and net relational data were followed (Scott 1991;Weliman and Baker 1985). It was neither feasible nor necessary to transcribe tapes in theirentirety. Only key statements, illustrations and quotations were later indexed and documented.Although the real names of alters were not requested, the consistent use of nicknames thathad become familiar to the researcher proved to be an asset in being able to identif,r memberscommon to several networks who appeared to be key people in the fishing industry. Some ofthese later participated in unstructured interviews. This consistency also allowed cleareridentification of the 307 alters to whom the 37 egos were linked by 557 ties composed of 792strands. Only 3 people exceeded 20 entries on the name generator list and the smallest networkcomprised 6 alters.5.2.3 Survey of government officersThe main purpose of this survey, code-named QGOVT, was partly to solicit opinions onseveral of the areas investigated by QFISH, but mainly to investigate attitudes towards planningand the involvement of the fishing industry. The usual literature on social surveys was againconsulted (see above). RespondentsAll government officers likely to have any influence on, or to participate in, fishery planningwere selected for QGOVT. This amounted to a census of 13 people in the Fisheries Division andthe administrative section of the IVlinistry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries.995.2.3.2 InstrumentMy requirement was for an instrument that could be administered in about 40 minutes tocover the following areas:• Respondent categorization such as position, gender, age, and education;• Uncertainty and social strategies for coping;• The relationship between fishery management and development planning;• The role of the fishing industry in fisheries planning; and• The availability and potential uses of biological, social, and economic information on thepelagic fishery for planning.The QGOVT interview guide provided at Appendix C was designed without the benefit of apretest due to the small number of potential respondents, but it was partially based on the resultsof QFISH. The time limit reflected the longest anticipated period without interruption to beexpected in the government offices where the interviews were to be conducted. Officeinterviews were selected to facilitate sequential batch interviews where possible in order toreduce the possibility of discussion of the interview by prior respondents influencing potentialrespondents.Based on the experience of Khan (1987) in interviewing Caribbean public servants, a semi-structured interview format was followed to allow latitude in responses. The interviews weredesigned to be tape recorded in order to capture this latitude in response. A few questions wereidentical to those in the fishing industry survey in order to facilitate direct comparison. Sinceseveral of the questions addressed complex topics, closed responses were provided on theinterview guide to provide prompts for the common ground that had to be covered. Execution and analysisPermission from the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry was sought for the interviews in100order to assure officers that the time spent with the researcher was approved. Access to theofficers was not problematic, and although it was not possible to arrange the interviews in batchsequence at the two offices there was no detectable contamination from previous interviewees.Seven of the 13 interviews were with Fisheries Division staff, and there were four females in thecensus. The interviews lasted between 31 and 111 minutes, averaging 65 minutes. As found byprevious researchers (Lindsay 1978; Khan 1987), the civil servants spoke very freely and severalseemed to appreciate the opportunity to discuss their work in detail. Special attention was paid todetecting respondent bias from being previously acquainted with the researcher, but none wasobviously discernible.Analysis of QGOVT was similar to that for QFISH in terms of the questionnaire, and toSOCNET in terms of the tape recordings.5.2.4 Other interviewsThe instruments described above were essentially structured questionnaires even thoughflexible use as interview guides was incorporated in the latter two. Less structured wereinterviews conducted by appointment with persons involved in fishing industry organizations,and the ad hoc unstructured and informal interviews held with key informants and otherfisherfolk at fish landing sites. Semi-structuredDuring the earlier research several sources pointed to formal organization as the route manypeople in the fishing industry favoured to address their perceived uncertainties and problems.Previous experience with fonnal organizations also seemed to have shaped their attitudestowards working with each other and government. Based on these findings, interview guideswere the main tools chosen to investigate the formation and operation of early fisherfolk andgovernment organizations through questioning the key people involved. Since some of these101events occurred up to 30 years ago, making the accuracy of respondent recall an issue, theywere each important for validating the other and the scant documentary evidence available. Thekey informants were identified through a reputational or snowball sampling process (Bailey1982), and all 10 persons selected consented to be interviewed. The focus was on fishingcooperatives, a trade union, the Cooperatives Division and the Barbados MarketingCorporation.The interview guides used varied with respondents (all male), but covered topics such ashow and why the organization was formed, who were its members, what were its objectives,what did it achieve and how, what were the interactions with sections of the industry andgovernment, and what problems were experienced and why. The interviews, conducted near theconclusion of the fieldwork, were all tape recorded and lasted between 30 and 200 minutes. Theaudio tapes were analysed as previously described. Special care was taken to detect sources oferror such as impression management, topic avoidance, deliberate distortions andmisunderstanding (McCracken 1988). While some impression management was noticed in theform of self-aggrandizement there were few apparent serious sources of error. Unstructured and informalEarly in the research a few fisherfolk were selected as key informants, or consultants, on thebasis of their long experience in the fishing industry, their ability to analyse and articulateconcerns, and their interest in keeping track of the research. In order to minimize potential bias,these people were not explicitly informed of their special status, but were frequently consulted inthe form of unstructured interviews to assist in the interpretation of observations and results.Throughout the fieldwork informal interviews were held with a wide variety of fisherfolk oftenduring periods of participant observation as described below.Both types of interview lasted from minutes to hours, but none was tape recorded. The102main points were entered into field notes as soon after the interviews as practicable. Due to thenatural atmosphere and unlimited flexibility, compared to the previously described morestructured and quantitative ones, these interviews provided a far richer source of qualitativematerial essential for understanding the meanings of communication, actions and events from theperspective of fisherfolk.5.2.5 Participant observationAlthough participant observation was not intended to be a primary research method, like theunstructured and informal interviews it turned out to be important. In order to capitalize on thevalidity potential of this method, relevant guidelines (Jorgensen 1989) were followed, and thecaution that the researcher be aware of his social location was kept in mind. Fish landing sitesMy perceived social location as a fishery officer precluded completely blending in, butaccording to key informants, participating in the normal activities and conversations at the twomain fish landing sites facilitated my acceptance and elicited greater cooperation than wouldotherwise have been received. My focus on Bridgetown and Oistins was for the reasons listedpreviously (see SOCNET sampling sites) plus the fact that it was only here that there wassufficient activity in the form of people of all types just hanging around, observing and talking toeach other for the researcher to not be overly conspicuous.Between interviews and at other times I closely observed interactions and transactionsbetween fisherfolk, but particularly among fishers and between fishers and vendors.Observational evidence of the types of relations described in the QFISH and SOCNET surveyswere sought and recorded. I also took note of fish landings and prices in the field notes compiledafterwards.1 -•1lv., Organization formationA fortuitous unforeseen event, described in detail in Chapter Eight, was the emergence of afisherfolk organization formed initially as a response to a specific perception of uncertainty, andlater conceived generally as a response to several perceived existing and potential sources ofuncertainty. Due to prior acceptance by most fisherfolk I was able to observe and participate inthe formation process at a time when government officials and some fisherfolk (specificallyprocessors) were excluded. This research was conducted between 12 April and 27 August 1994.It facilitated the collection of additional firsthand data on perceptions of uncertainty, the notionsbehind the use of the formal organization as a coping strategy, the effect and dynamics of socialnetworks within and outside the organization, and the problems and potential of interaction withthe state. For the study, this event was an opportunistic natural experiment during whichmeeting minutes and supplementary field notes were recorded.5.2.6 Document studyDocument sources included academic and government institutions, CFRAIVIP and thepopular press. The acquisition of natural and social scientific literature on phenomena perceivedto be uncertain, and pertinent Caribbean sociology, was straightforward from all sources, but notabundant. The paucity of relevant documentation was encountered repeatedly.The difficulty, mentioned by other Caribbean researchers (Lindsay 1978; Khan 1987), withaccess to government documents such as files, statistics, development plans, political manifestos,annual reports and the like was not encountered. Possible reasons include my status as agovernment official, my knowledge of what material did or was likely to exist, and theremoteness of any of the information requested being considered sensitive. In subjecting theofficial documents to content analysis, the possibilities of errors, omissions and bias were noted(Bailey 1982).1045.2.7 DiscussionThe research design incorporated several methods to attempt to answer the questions.Multimethod research or triangulation tries to compensate for the weaknesses of one methodwith the strengths of another (Brewer and Hunter 1989). An example was the use ofunstructured interviews and participant observation to provide the qualitative depth missing inthe rapid questionnaire survey. Since theory-construction or hypothesis-testing are not the primeobjectives of this study, and the situation in Barbados is expected to be dynamic, less emphasiswas placed on reliability and external validity than accuracy and internal validity. Qualitativemethods were used to try to ensure that issues were understood and the research concepts valid.But without the data from the more quantitative methods it would have been difficult todetermine which issues were the most important on an industry-wide basis. Such reinforcementof methods by sequence and type may be particularly useful in conditions similar to those inBarbados about which little is known and data are scattered or scarce.Lessons were also learnt from the execution of the methods. For example, fisherfolk arewilling to participate in social surveys partly because they feel that the results may be used toimprove their circumstances. However, the patience of some appears to be wearing thin due tothe increased frequency of questionnaire surveys coupled with the lack of feedback from them(perhaps symptomatic of a deeper communications problem). The academic and governmentinstitutions particularly guilty of this are likely to soon create an environment hostile tointegrating social science data into fishery planning through the survey method.Yet, so far this reaction is entirely against questionnaires which, in any case, may not be themost appropriate way to collect social science information or identify problems or solutions.This is especially so in the complex and unfamiliar territory of fisheries management planning.When confronted with a questionnaire, fisherfolk are adept at supplying the minimum105information required, and typically do not seek clarification or explanation when confusing orunfamiliar terms arise. Because of this, and since pockets of illiteracy eliminate other thanpersonal interviewing anyway, it could be feasible to use unstructured approaches (perhaps witha tape recorder) in order to cover similar ground more effectively, and with more meaningfulresults.1066. FISHERFOLK AND UNCERTAINTY IN THE PELAGIC FISHERYIn this chapter I address the first research question mentioned in Chapter 2, that is: whatuncertainties are perceived to characterize the Barbados pelagic fishery. I begin by describing thesalient characteristics of people involved in the fishing industry. Next, I turn to perceptions ofuncertainty reported by fisherfolk and state officials in the QFISH, QGOVT and otherinterviews. Then, scientific data and official records related to the factors perceived to be mostuncertain are considered. This is done in order to compare these technical measurements withthe perceptions reported by fisherfolk. Before concluding, I describe a simple exercise thatexamined the potential for reducing uncertainty through information exchange between the stateand fishers.Tables of the results discussed are provided in Appendix D if not in the chapter.6.1 SIJRVEY RESPONDENTSI begin with a profile of the fisherfolk and state officials who were respondents in theQFISH and QGOVT surveys respectively. The QFISH survey was conducted primarily toquickly provide some basic background data on the industry. The QGOVT survey was moredetailed and focused mainly on fishery planning.6.1.1 Occupational categoriesThe assignment of fisherfolk to the occupational categories of fishers, owners, vendors andprocessors was a critical first step in the analysis of the QFISH survey data since the manner inwhich respondents are categorized has implications for interpretation. In all of the abovecategories some respondents fill more than one occupational niche in the industry. In addition totheoretical considerations, the finding from pretest questions that people invariably identifiedmore with one aspect of their work if they occupied multiple niches guided selection of107occupational categories as explained below.The category ‘fishers’ for example, comprises captains and crew who fish on differenttypes of boats (Table 6.1). Occupational categorization by position and boat type was not usedin analyses since fishers are quite mobile within the fleet. Crew readily move between boat types,and dayboat captains may serve on iceboats as crewmen for the anticipated higher income. In theoffseason mobility is even higher as fishing becomes more of an opportunistic activity andswitching between fisheries is frequent. For these reasons, and the prevalence of good relationswith low conflict among boat types (examined later), a single category was used for fishers.Table 6.1 Distribution of fishers by boat typeBoat type Captain Crew’fished on (%) (%)Davboat 66 69Iceboat 30 23Iceboat/Longliner 1 4Longliner 3 4Sampie (NNote: Unless otherwise indicated, in all tables the column percentages sum in eachcolumn to 100% which represents the sample size for the column category.Boat ownership sub-divided all occupational categories (Table 6.2). Although this researchwas not undertaken from a political economy perspective, evidence that ownership of capitalinfluences socioeconomic relations has been well established in the literature (e.g., Barrett andApostle 1989). In the pretest it was found that fishers who owned any type of boat perceivedthemselves primarily as fishers, not boat owners. Most of the dayboats owned by the fisherswere older or smaller vessels with low capital value, The self-perception of fishers who ownediceboats, egalitarian relationships between fishing owners and crew, and the fact that boatownership did not necessarily imply high net income (also examined later) argued against puttingiceboat fisher-owners into a separate category.108Table 6.2 Boat ownership among respondentsTypes of boat owned Captain Crew Owner only Vendor Processor(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)None 52 90 97 40Moses 1 4Dayboat 36 2 65Iceboat 9 2 20Iceboat/Longliner 1 2 3Longliner 5 60Dayboat & Iceboat 1 3 3Dayboat, Iceboat & Longliner 2Dayboat & Longliner 248 32Vendors predominantly had one occupation and none of the processors were the soleowners of the few longliners in which they had invested. Given the small number of processorsin their census, further sub-division of this category was not undertaken. The term ‘owner’ washence reserved to mean boat owners who were not otherwise involved in the fishery, that is,who were not also fishers, vendors or processors. Breakdown of owners by boat type was notnecessary since their experiences and outlooks were relatively similar despite the differences intheir levels of estimated capital investment. The latter were too inexact to serve as a useful basisfor categorization.In this manner the four main occupational categories used in this study were selected.Preliminary analyses also revealed that little additional information from the QFISH survey datawould be gained by disaggregation of occupational categories. Throughout this study, sincerespondent selection was not random, the survey results are not necessarily representative offisherfolk in general. However, in reporting and interpreting results, attention is paid mainly tothe major trends and features of findings that may have the widest relevance.6.1.2 Respondent profileThe QFISH sample reflects the preponderance of males in the pelagic fishing industry.109Nationally, across all industries, women comprise 60% of the labour force (Government ofBarbados 1993). Compared to the national statistic, males dominate all fishing industryoccupations except for fish vending where the female participation rate is 62% (Table 6.3 a). Butthe latter differs by site, female vendors being more in evidence, for example, at Oistins (8 5%)than at Bridgetown (5 0%). The marked sexual division of labour reported here is common tofisheries around the world (Acheson 1981), and differs little from earlier accounts of theBarbados fishery (e.g., Stoffle 1969). The female government officers were in relatively seniorpositions. Those in the Fisheries Division had begun to study fishing industry gender issues suchas the savings practices reported on later.There is little difference across industry occupations in the mean age of fisherfolk, althoughboat owners tend to be older (Table 6.3b). This probably occurs because young people have lessopportunity to acquire the capital necessary to buy a boat. Also, as mentioned in Chapter 4 anddiscussed later, owning a boat may not always be as profitable an undertaking as implied by theestimates in Table 4.5. Hence young people, especially those familiar with the industry, may seeboat ownership as a burden to be avoided. The relative scarcity of young boat owners may haveimplications for innovation and related factors that are not prime considerations in this study.The mean period of involvement in the industry was also similar among fisherfolk sampled,except for the more recent development of fish processing which commenced in the 1970’s(Table 6.3c). Before then one mainly had different scales of fish vending. Many of the ownerswho have less than average experience in the industry own iceboats, a section of the fleet whichexpanded rapidly in the 1980’s.Within government, the staff of the Fisheries Division are on average younger and havebeen slightly longer in their present jobs than those in the Ministry, but there are few officialswith long fisheries service. This latter finding may be important in terms of institutional memory110and attitudes towards the industry. Officials’ perceptions of state intervention and theindustry may lack the historical perspective of experience. Although Ministry staff do not dealfrequently with fisherfolk in their normal line of duty, they all said that they were regular buyersof fish at markets. Since vendors handle most fish sales, the Ministry officials’ impressions of theother fisherfolk, especially fishers, may not be based on direct interaction, but on socialstereotyping. Although experiences and impressions may either be positive or negative, thesocial image of fisherfolk held by the public (discussed in Chapter Seven) is predominantlynegative. Hence this may be the one more likely to be received by Ministry staff Conversely,fisherfolk may hold stereotypical images of government officials as self-serving and oppressiveof the lower classes (Khan 1987), and unable, due to lack of experience, to communicate onfishery matters.In the industry, owners and processors tend to have more formal education than fishers andvendors, but fisherfolk typically have less formal education than government officers (Table6.3d). While the }Vlinistry has proportionally more officers with tertiary education, none have thetechnical fisheries training received by over half of the Fisheries Division staff In randomsamples of the general population taken in 1978 and 1984, the proportion of people withprimary education decreased from 58 to 50%, while secondary increased from 40 to 44% andtertiary from 3 to 4% (Dann 1984). If my sampling was random by design, and the trendtowards more formal education continued since 1984, one could conclude that fishers andvendors have on average less formal education than the typical population, and that all otherrespondent categories in Table 6.3d have more. The distribution of education amongst ownersreflects recent entrants with higher education mixed with older, less educated owners.Education is an important background variable for several reasons. Most obviously, personswith less formal education have a limited range of economic opportunities since jobs requiring111paper qualifications are not available employment options. However, Dann (1984) found thatalthough education was popularly perceived as being important to Barbadians, people randomlysurveyed ranked it low in their hierarchy of “important things in life” (p. 100). Education wasperceived to have little impact on their daily lives, but was highly correlated with social class andseen as an avenue to individual social mobility. If these attitudes and perceptions hold truetoday, it is possible that fisherfolk could perceive the higher formal education of the stateofficials, not as an index of competence and expertise, but mainly as a social barrier.Some fishers, vendors and older owners were sensitive to queries about their level ofeducation. There was a strong impression that authority was not accepted automatically byfisherfolk on the basis of title or education alone. Informants said that only if highly educatedindividuals were perceived as practical and “down to earth” were they likely to be takenseriously by fisherfolk. Wilson (1973) reached similar conclusions for other Caribbean coastalcommunities. He found that competent persons who were not socially accepted into thenetworks of lower class clients were ineffective as change agents. While being “down to earth”is a primarily a matter of social and communication skills, what is perceived to be practicaldepends on education and experience. These findings could be especially pertinent tointeractions between state officials and fisherfolk given their different backgrounds.Tables 6.3(a) to (d) Profiles of QFISH and QGOVT respondents(a) GenderGender Fisher Owner Vendor Processor Fish. Div. Mm. Agric.() °4) ().............Male 99 95 38 100 57 83Female 1 5 62 43 17Sample (N) 126 40 32 5 7 6112(b)AgeAge Fisher Owner Vendor Processor Fish. Div. Mi Agric.(years) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)under 24 725to34 18 3 10 20 5735to44 28 18 39 60 29 5045to54 27 34 29 3355to64 12 24 16 20 14 1765to74 8 16 7over 75 5Mean 44 54 46 42 36 46Sample (N) 126 38 32 5 7 6(c) Period of involvementPeriod of involvement in Fisher Owner Vendor Processor Fish. Div. Mm. industry (years) (%)(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)under 10 25 37 26 40 100 100llto2O 27 17 22 4021to30 25 15 26 2031to40 14 15 1341to50 6 8 13over 50 2 8Mean 21 22 23 14 4 2Sample(N) 12640.1(d) Formal educationEducation Fisher Owner Vendor Processor Fish. Div. Mi Agric.(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%Primary 61 50 66Some secondary 18 10 22 20 14Full secondary 20 28 12 60 43 17Tertiary 1 12 20 43 83Sample (N) 126 40 32 5 7 66.2 PERCEPTIONS OF UNCERTAINTYI focus mainly on the uncertainties that people perceive and can express in some quantifiableform. These perceptions are compared with reported measurements. Often, for example in the1I of environmental and ecological variables, this is a comparison of ordinary and scientificknowledge. The variables of prime interest here are perceptions of uncertainty across theoccupational categories discussed in the previous section.6.2.1 General uncertaintyOne of the QFISH questions asked respondents to rank the extent to which they agreed ordisagreed that the fishery was generally unpredictable. The modal response among governmentofficers and processors was “agree” (57% to 67%), and among owners, fishers and vendors itwas “agree very much” (41% to 70%) (Table 6.4). This suggests that uncertainty is generallyperceived to characterize the Barbados pelagic fishery.Table 6.4 General perception of uncertainty by occupationThe pelagic fishery is Fisher Owner Vendor Processor Fish. Div. Mi Agric.geral1y unpredictable () .°<) (%) ( ()Agree very much 62 70 41 14 33Agree 24 18 34 60 57 67Not sure 2 3 40 14Disagree 12 12 22 14Sample (N) 126 40 32 5 7 6Disagreement was highest (22%) among the vendors. Some people, mainly fishers andvendors, laid off from other industries disagreed since they found self-employment in the fishingindustry to be more reliable for providing income. These were invariably recent entrants. In theFisheries Division two respondents argued that the pelagic fishery was not unpredictable, butseemed complex, and chaotic.6.2.2 Specific uncertaintiesThe uncertainties perceived by all categories of fisherfolk are examined first, followed bymore detailed analysis of the harvest and post harvest sectors. Finally, the views of state officialsare noted.1146.2.2.1 AlifisherfolkOver 95% of fishing industry respondents perceived total catch, proportions of species incatches and their earnings (daily and seasonal) to be unpredictable (Figure 6.1). About 90%found the kinds of fish expected in the catch and fish prices unpredictable, but around 75%thought that season duration and periods of peak abundance for particular species werepredictable. The pelagic fishing season was perceived to run from November to July, althoughlongliners attempted to fish year round. Periods of peak abundance were identified as May forflyingfish, and February to March for dolphin and kingfish, but tuna and billfish could beabundant in any month. Agreement on these periods among respondents was high.Figure 6. 1 Uncertainties perceived by all fisherfolka_________aj=’?‘t. IIe2IIIIIIIl2.%.p.II ‘. ‘22222.22 2’222%1t2.?.c.% 12.222:62 ‘c22€€62 221222 P222622 62P2t?t2 ‘t22 a ==;;;=----•2 $During informal and unstructured interviews it appeared that the relatively new practice oflonglining was redefining the fishing season and perceptions of fisheries ecology. Iceboats hadDyes Qno N=203Are you usually able to predict:season earnings_______thy or trip earnings____fish prices__ __season endsesason startpeak abunthncespecies proportions_species in catch_total catch per trip0% 10% 20% 30°/d 40% 50% 60% 70% 30%Percentage response90% I00°’s115done this a few years earlier by increasing access to new fishing areas. The impression wasthat pelagics could be available for more of the year, but further afield, than previously thought.Just as iceboats had extended the fishing season, so too were longliners, and more iceboats werebeing outfitted to switch to longlining in the offseason. Harvest sectorFishers, when asked about uncertainty in their routine operations, reported equipmentfailure such as gear loss and mechanical breakdown to be unpredictable (Figure 6.2). Somefishers said that environmental factors such as rough seas and current direction were predictable(5 and 13% respectively). Slightly more fishers said they could predict seasonal fish migrationand good fishing locations (17 and 22% respectively). Fishers’ observations on search methodsand currents were more detailed than those on fish migration, but most were either unwilling orunable to systematically organize and link their observations (in a way that I could understand).Figure 6.2 Uncertainties perceived b fishersAre you usually able to predict: ayes no N=126rough seas____gear loss_breakdown_fish migrationcurrent directionfishing location •:__ __0% 10% 20% 3000 40% 50°o 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%Percentage respoisseThe search methods included paying attention to moon phase, water colour, drifting objects116and seabirds since fish catches were thought to vary with these, often inter-related, factors.They did not explain their observations in terms of the major currents and oceanographicprocesses in the region. Many fishers added, however, that their perceptions of uncertaintydepended not only on their skills and knowledge (human capital). They also depended on theirability to be in touch with others who could supply reliable information on recent catches (socialcapital) as described in the next chapter.The hunt for fish by North American fishing boats is heavily dependent on sophisticatedtechnology. Cost, size and boat design limit dayboats to being equipped usually only with radios,but most iceboats carry more wheelhouse electronics. Yet the potential of available onboardinstrumentation such as fish finders, water temperature gauges and global positioning systems(GPS) to reduce uncertainty is not fully exploited. This appears to be due to lack of education,training, capital, and a preference to rely on intuition and observation. In many cases electronicinstrumentation is not installed by owners since it will not be used by fishers. Some fishersdescribed the admiration for their ability to successfully “fish blind” which they received fromAmerican longline skippers who set gear only when their instrumentation reduced uncertaintyconsiderably. Comparison of the results of blind and instrument-guided fishing effort was notpossible.The complex topics of fisheries conservation, ordinary knowledge, and attitudes towardsscientific knowledge relating to uncertainty were tackled mainly through unstructured andinformal interviews. Of all the pelagics, only flyingfish elicited concerns about conservation, andthis was only from a minority of fishers and boat owners. They were aware that the fisherytargeted spawning aggregations and were concerned about this. They wondered if retrievinginstead of releasing the “screelers” (tethered fish aggregating devices), when they were ladenwith recently spawned eggs, could reduce future abundance. Given that the use of new screelers117on each trip would impose an additional input cost with unknown returns to the fishingenterprise, they were uncertain about its feasibility as a conservation measure.Fishers revealed a wide range of knowledge on all the pelagics based on frequentobservations at sea and examination of the fish ashore. Observations included fish abundanceand distribution, behaviour, stomach contents, external features such as body shape andmarkings, and relationships between catch and oceanographic features. They had fewexplanations for their observations and said that scientific knowledge could be useful to them.But they also doubted that Caribbean marine scientists knew as much about “out there” as didfishers, since they were seldom seen at sea. No fishers interviewed were aware of regional orlocal research findings such from the Eastern Caribbean Flyingfish Project, although most wereaware of its tagging program and had some idea of its purpose. Since academic and governmentresearchers have used local fishers and fishing boats in studies, some had participated in fisheriesresearch. But the interest to be told about the findings was not great among any of therespondents.Few fishing and non-fishing boat owners (only 11%), reported uncertainty about where thecatch would be landed at the end of a trip (Figure 6.3). Yet, the landing site often changedduring the season, especially for the east coast boats, when seas became rough at their homeports. Owners who were uncertain about their landing site explained that sometimes their boatseither went to wherever the price was best, or were not sufficiently powerful to travel againstthe current at times so landed at the closest port. Most owners were certain (67%) about findingregular crew, although uncertainty about crewing was highest among dayboat owners. The latterexperience a high rate of crew turnover due to the relatively unskilled nature of the work. Only38% of owners reported being certain about their ex-vessel fish buyers, and more were uncertainabout short term (trip) profits than longer term (season) profits (83% versus 68%).vv— —aE——:— za3.— a,.aMost owners were also fairly certain (73%) about fishing supply availability, but iceboatowners reported relatively high levels of uncertainty about getting sufficient ice promptly. Thisproblem pertained to those who relied mainly on the government’s cheaper supply atBridgetown. What boat owners and fishers argued was that, unless fish abundance and locationwere fairly certain, it made more sense to wait for the cheap ice (lower operating cost) than torisk a poor trip with expensive ice. The larger the boat, the greater was the incentive to reduceuncertainty by acquiring information before going fishing. It appeared that sets of iceboats wentto sea and returned at the same time which increased their ice, price and hence incomeuncertainty. Postharvest sectorIn the postharvest sector, when asked about operational uncertainties, vendors andprocessors were less certain about making a seasonal profit than boat owners (43% of vendorscompared to 68% of owners) (Figure 6.4). Less than half of the vendors and processors saidFigure 6.3 Uncertainties perceived by fishing and non-fishing owners118Are yon usually able to predict: Dyes D N=82landing siteregular crew EE’regular buyer cc . re a t-supplies availability______trip profitseason profitF F F F0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80°/d 90% 100%Percentage response119they could predict good sales days, fish prices to customers and the amount of fish spoilage(42%, 28% and 31% respectively). However, 80% were certain about which boats would expectthem to buy their fish, and 54% knew which boats would not sell their catches to them. Vendorswere often heard to refer to boats as “theirs” or someone else’s. This referred not to ownership,but the shared knowledge of who would be offered the catch first because of several types ofinformal ties with the fisher or owner.Figure 6.4 Uncertainties perceived by vendors and processorsAre you usually able to predict: LI yes LIno N37season profit =t f .1 t tamoun 0 spoi age_____goodsales day r z: i . = =resale prices .._,::..e,l..,:c.r;.rf,; Z = = = =,= =boats expect to sell =boats will not sell 9:0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%Percentage responseSince the QFISH pretest showed that state intervention was a complex and provocativeissue, this was explored through less structured interviews. Many fisherfolk were unaware of thefrmnctions and actions of the state agencies responsible for the fishing industry and the recent,comprehensive Fisheries Act (1993) which governed the fishery. Since the state was mainlyperceived to neglect rather than actively intervene into the fishing industry, there was theperception among fishers, vendors and some owners that it did not generate much uncertainty.However, what uncertainty it did generate was commonly perceived to be in the form ofconstantly changing policies and procedures. Processors had to deal more with the state becauseof the nature of their business. They all felt that a high level of government intervention and120uncertainty affected them. State officialsDetailed perceptions of uncertainty in the fishing industry were not solicited fromgovernment officials, but they were asked for general impressions. Most in the Ministry thoughtthat ecological factors and marketing practices contributed very much to uncertainty (both 66%)(Table 6.5). Most Fisheries Division respondents thought these contributed relatively less (57%and 43% respectively). In the Ministry, fluctuation in catch was seen “as just luck from year toyear” (QGOVT Interview No. 11). Conversely, officials in the Fisheries Division thought thatfishing methods and state intervention contributed more to uncertainty (43% “very much” and“much” respectively) than did people in the Ministry (33% “much” and 66% “fair bit”respectively).Table 6.5 Government officers’ perceptions of contributors to uncertaintyFisheries ecology Fishing methodsExtent of Fish. Div. Mm. Agric. Fish. Div. Mi Agric.contribution (%) (%) (%) (%)Little 17 29 17Fair bit 29 33Much 57 17 29 33Very much 14 66 43Don’t know 17Sample (N) 7 6 7 6Table 6.5 continuedFish marketing State interventionExtent of Fish. Div. Mm. Agric. Fish. Div. Mm. Agric.contribution (%) (%) (%) (%)Nothing 29 17Little 14 14 17Fair bit 14 17 43 66Much 43 66 43Very much 17Sample (N) 7 6 7 6Regarding state intervention, the lack of clear and consistent policy, and the gap between121plans and practice, were cited as sources of uncertainty. Referring to the development plan,one official said that “in writing there is a policy, but I’m not too sure this policy is beingimplemented” (QGOVT 10). For example, the harvest sector relies heavily on subsidy throughconcessions to import goods free of duty (e.g., boat equipment and fishing gear). But anotherofficial remarked that the concessions “become available and then they disappear, and then youare not sure whether they are available or they aren’t” (QGOVT 11).6.2.3 Major uncertaintiesThe aspects of the fishing industry perceived by fisherfolk and state officials to be mostuncertain are shown in Table 6.6. Fish prices and catches were reported most frequently as themost uncertain aspects of the industry. The majority of fishers and vendors thought prices weremost uncertain, but owners, processors and the Fisheries Division put catches first. Ministryofficials were split between the two. Boat owners, vendors and processors were the only oneswho found customer demand to be a significant uncertainty. Many reported that this was arecent, and presumably temporary, uncertainty caused only by the general economic conditionsin the country. Demand uncertainty, rather than supply, they said had more influence over exvessel prices, causing them to lower the prices offered even when fish was scarce.Table 6. 6 Aspects of the fishing industry perceived to be most uncertainMost unpredictable Fisher Owner Vendor Processor Fish. Div. Mm. Agric.1industry (%) ( (/)Fish prices 35 30 28 43 33Fish catches 26 35 13 60 57 33Customer demand 10 19 20Ice availability 8 5 6Weather/sea state 8Everything 6 5 9 17Safety at sea 4 2 17State intervention 1 3 20Other 2 3Don’t know 10 10 22Sample (N) 125 40 32 5 7 6122The prominence of ice availability as an uncertainty was reported mainly by iceboat ownersand fishers. Its absence from the concerns of the government respondents is notable sincegovernment is the main source of ice. Weather, sea state and ocean currents were primeconcerns only to fishers, but they were joined by owners and a Ministry official in concern oversafety at sea. State intervention ranked low as a maj or uncertainty and did not figure at all in theresponses from vendors and government. Several people said that “everything” about the fishingindustry was uncertain, and an unexpectedly high proportion did not know what aspect to saywas most uncertain. In a sense these two responses were similar since people frequently said thatso many things about the industry were highly variable that they did not know which amongthem was the most unpredictable.6.3 OFFICIAL AND SCIENTIFIC MEASUREMENTS OF UNCERTAINTYThe data in this section are derived mainly from official and scientific statistics anddocuments available to fishery planners. The resulting information is compared to the resultsfrom the interviews, with emphasis on the major uncertainties, to determine where they aresimilar and where they diverge.6.3.1 Fish catchesAt the primary landing sites Markets Division staff compile daily records of fish prices andlandings (synonymous with catch since discards are negligible). The comments in Chapter Fiveabout the errors and omissions in official statistics should be borne in mind. Observation anddocument study suggested that only Oistins fish market provided reasonably accurate andcomplete time series useful for examining variability in fish catches and prices. Although theOistins data are not necessarily representative, they serve to illustrate features believed not to beunique to that site.123Uncertainty about fish catch is multidimensional. Measurements of several of the factorsthat contribute to fish catch uncertainty, which were identified in the interviews, are describedhere. SeasonalityAlthough the landings time series goes back 30 years or more, the years 1981 to the presentwere chosen for analysis. They encompass the recent modernization period of iceboat andlongliner fleet expansion easily recalled by respondents, and so provide the best comparisonbetween the perceptions of fishery workers and official records. Figure 6.5 illustrates interannualvariability in the Oistins landings of the major pelagic species during this period. Seasonality isobvious even when all species are combined. Since the fishery is multispecies, it is this imagethat determines the perception of overall season duration and interannual variability. Althoughthere is variation within seasons, from year to year the November start and July end is quiteconsistent. Over the 14 year period there is no clear trend that total pelagic landings are eitherincreasing or decreasing. Examination of the individual species components (provided inAppendix D) leads to the same conclusions.Figure 6.5 Oistin’s total pelagic fish catches, 1981 to 1984124The within-season monthly variation in landings of each species is seen in Figure 6.6(a) to(e). Landings for each month in the time series are plotted with the means of these values inorder to illustrate details of the seasonal variation that respondents may recall over a period ofseveral years. Within the season, and particularly around the seasonal peak(s) of abundance, themonthly landings vary substantially from year to year. This is especially so for the two majorspecies, flyingfish and dolphin.Figure 6.6(a) to (e) Seasonality of major pelagic species at Oistins, 1981 to 1994Catch Multispecies pelagic fishery(metric tons)16014012010080604020081 81 82 82 83 83 84 85 85 86 86 87 88 88 89 89 90 90 99 92 92 93 93 94Year+ ++—•—-- MeanCatch (a) Flyingfish(metric tons)120100806040200++*+Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec14onth125Catch(metric tons)(b) Dolphin9080706050403020100—•— Mean+ +IIIoJan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov DecMonth+Catch(metric tons) (c) Kingfish—4——Mean25201510)0+MonthJan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov DecCatch (il) Tuna________(metric tons)—•—— Mean7÷654; +3. + + +2 +zE HitJan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov DecMonth126Using a longer time series from Oistins and more sophisticated analysis, Mahon et al.(1990) reported the seasonality described in Table 6.7 which agrees fairly closely with the dataplotted above and the reports of the fisherfolk. The agreement between perceptions andmeasurement of seasonality is not surprising since they are based on the same data set—thecommercial landings. A more informative picture of seasonality could be based on test fishingindependent of the commercial fleet.Table 6.7 Seasonality in the pelagic fishery at OistinsCatch Seasonality based on average pattern Seasonality based on individual yearsFlyingfish Unimodal May Frequently bimodalDolphin Unimodal Feb-Apr Usually unimodalKingfish Slightly bimodal Jan-Jun Frequently bi- or trimodalTuna Bimodal Dec and Jun Usually bi- occasionally trimodalBilifish Slightly bimodal Dec and Apr SpikySource: Mahon et al. 1990Independent of commercial catches, Khokiattiwong (1988) verified flyingfish seasonalitynear Barbados, finding few or no fish of catchable size between August and November. He alsoconfirmed the unpredictably patchy distribution of flyingfish schools reported by fishers. For thelarge pelagics, the assumption common in the literature is that availability to the commercialfleet is a reasonable index of abundance, and hence seasonality, within the areas fished (MahonCatchOnetric tons)4(e) Bilifish+3.532.521.5+Mean+ +++0.50++++Jan Feb Mar Apr May JunJul Aug Sep Oct Nov DecMonth1271987). Independent research on these species is limited by the costs involved. Search parametersIn terms of what fishers search for to find fish, during the early summer months of fieldworkfishers reported high catches of dolphin in green water passing southeast of the island. Severalboats were tracking this patch since it increased the certainty of good catches. Reports fromfishers and others of higher catch rates associated with green water lenses from the distantAmazon and Orinoco rivers are common (Brown 1942; Muller-Karger 1990; Gomes et at.1994). Khokiattiwong (1988), however, found no catchlcolour correlation in his research onflyingfish. The occurrence and trajectory of these river water lenses seem to be unpredictable.This is because of the complicated relationships between the volume and timing of the Amazonand Orinoco river discharges which produce them, and the poorly understood ocean circulationpatterns which transport them. Thus, finding a rich patch is likely to be unpredictable, butkeeping track of it once found is not a difficult proposition if observations on position are madefrequently and shared among fishers between trips.Gomes et at. (1994) report that the occurrence of drifting objects, and perhaps the tendencyof fish to associate with them, is greatest in water which is green or brown in colour. Theyconfirm that drifting natural or anthropogenic objects, which occur singly or along fronts called“riffles”, are sought by fishers because they have been proven to attract pelagics and increasetheir catchability. Flocks of feeding seabirds often provide visual clues about the location ofthese objects from a distance. These authors find that the formation of riffles is most frequentduring the January to March period of higher current speeds. But no clear pattern to the spatialand temporal occurrence of drifting objects has been described.Early in the flyingfish study an increase in flyingfish catch per unit effort (CPUE) around thefrill moon and a decrease around the new moon was found. This is consistent with the128observations of fishers, but was later reported to be a weak correlation (Oxenford et al.1993). So in this case, as with the other search parameters, it appears that the uncertainty offishers is reasonable to expect given the large gaps in scientific knowledge. As with seasonality,there is, reasonable agreement between what is perceived by fishers and what has beenmeasured. CurrentsCurrents can be expected to play a major role in determining fish behaviour, but this role isdifficult to map out in the eastern Caribbean. Currents in the area have flow rates that varyconsiderably over space and time, with convoluted meanders and eddy formation being typical(Mahon 1987). Cyclonic and anticyclonic eddies in the island wake may be stationary, oralternately form and shed downstream with a periodicity that depends in part on flow directionand speed. The eddies affect plankton abundance and patchiness through entrapment, andconsequently influence fish abundance and distribution. This partial understanding ofrelationships has not, however, made the spatial or temporal prediction of good catch locationson the basis of currents possible yet. Although flyingfish and other species appear to follow themain circulation patterns at times (perhaps associated with floating debris or river water lenses),counter-current movements have also been reported (FAO 1993).The available scientific data tend to support the high level of uncertainty about currentsreported by fishers. But contrary to fishers, marine scientists seem to be more deficient ondetailed current observations (particularly about which features are transient and which are morepermanent) than on information about the large scale current regime. The scientists arereasonably confident in supplying explanations for much of what is observed, and this may serveto facilitate information exchange between scientists or officials and fishers.1296.3.1.4 MigrationUnderstanding fish migration is important to fishers since the small boats have access to thefish only when they move close to the island. This is one of the reasons their fishing season isshorter than that of larger boats. For the larger boats and fishery planners another key issue isthe sharing of resources between different national marine jurisdictions. Scientists, however,seem no more informed than fishers since migration has not been mapped out and explained withcertainty for any of the pelagic species (Mahon 1987; FAO 1993). Slightly more is known aboutthe fourwing flyingfish (Oxenford et al. 1993) and dolphin (Oxenford and Hunte 1986) than theother pelagics in the region. These two species appear to have stocks that migrate within thesoutheastern Caribbean although their distribution beyond the commercially fished areas isunknown. Again perceptions and measurement of uncertainty appear to be similar, especially interms of appreciation for the deficiencies in basic information. Conservation and managementThe evidence immediately above suggests that only management on a regional or largerscale is likely to be effective. International management, under ICCAT for example, is acceptedas inevitable for the very highly migratory pelagics. However local fishers may also providevaluable input. For example, on the matter of releasing screelers as a conservation measure, theflyingfish scientists agree that this could be advantageous and perhaps the only feasible form ofgear regulation. Part of their concern stems from research cruises revealing an apparent scarcityof spawning substrate, leading to new questions about where and on what flyingfish spawn(Oxenford et al. 1993).Although no documentation was found specifically on the integration of ordinary andscientific knowledge as a means of reducing uncertainty, fishery managers and scientistsadmitted their reliance on the fishing industry for information and supply of affordable research1,,1Lplatforms. Collaborative work with fishers on various inshore fisheries demonstrated thatscientists were willing to take into account ordinary knowledge, and that fishers were willing toplay an active part in scientific research and management (e.g., Mahon and Drayton 1992).There is no evidence, however, that this type of collaboration has been utilized in the Barbadospelagic fishery, or that scientific information is being disseminated to resource users bygovernment or academic agencies to educate them about management issues.6.3.2 Fish pricesThe interannual and monthly variation in ex-vessel and retail prices from 1981 to 1994 atOistins fish market is illustrated for the major species in Figure 6.7. A shorter period wasavailable for bilifish. Years cannot be compared directly without adjustment since the time seriesdo not take inflation into account. However, constant dollar comparison is pertinent mainly tolong-term perceptions and planning, not routine operations. Some boat owners, for example,have observed that the prices of fishing inputs, particularly gear and equipment, are increasing ata much faster rate than fish prices, thus putting them at a net disadvantage in real terms. Overthe 1981 to 1994 period fish prices would have had to rise by around 75% to keep pace withinflation. Clearly this has not happened. Yet, from informal interviews, boat owners’ greatestconcerns, and those of the other fisherfolk less concerned with investment, are with the shortterm, current price, uncertainties over which they hope to have more control. It is on these that Iconcentrate.Figure 6.7(a) to (e) Variation in fish prices for the major pelagic species at Oistins131(a) Flyingfishex-vessel-----• retailPrice (S/kg) 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94YearDolphinPrice (S/kg) ex-vessel retail14.0012.0010. 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94YearPrice (s/kg)14.00(c) Kingfishex-vessel .-----. retail12.0010. 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94Year1’.,IiFlyingfish is the most variable of the species, and in recent years current prices for thisspecies in particular have been lower than in the past due to low demand rather than highsupply. The prices of other pelagic species are more stable, and (on a current price basis) appearto be increasing slightly on average. The most available evidence of lower consumer buyingpower was found in news media reports. They said that the average Barbadian had lessdisposable income due either to unemployment in the household or a decision to save more toinsure against risks such as future unemployment or currency devaluation.My observation was that consumers were indeed scarce at fish markets compared to(d) Tunaex-vessel retailPrice (S/kg)12.0010. 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94Year(e) BilifishPrice (S/kg) ex-vessel retail14.0012.0010. I I90 91 92 93 94Year-‘,,IN fl’1 ‘•‘13.)previous fishing seasons, and purchased fish in smaller quantities. Being traditionally theleast expensive fish, whole flyingfish is the choice purchase of lower income consumers inparticular. Examination of price records shows, however, that despite lower demand, thedifferences between ex-vessel and retail prices (the mark-ups) remained similar to those in moreprosperous years. I observed vendors unwilling to lower their mark-up in order to sell fish andrecoup revenue from increased volume. Instead, unsold fish was stored for redisplay and thevolume of ex-vessel purchases was reduced to compensate for inventory, which further reducedex-vessel prices. Without information on the economics of fish vending it was not possible toadequately explain this behaviour or determine the extent to which it exacerbated the demandand price uncertainty.By comparing the price figures to the landings figures, the expected inverse relationshipbetween price and catch is also apparent. However, since government records do not recordcatch and price over time during the day, they obscure one of the most critical and dynamicrelationships in the fishery. This is the short-term fluctuation of ex-vessel prices in response toanticipated landings during the day, a feature which is especially important in determining thefortunes and behaviour of dayboats. This important contribution to uncertainty has been notedby early and recent authors (Brown 1942; Berkes and Shaw 1986).Daily price variation is most pertinent to flyingfish, the price of which was often observeddockside to fluctuate within a range of $107100 fish during the typical 5 hour window oflandings. Most often a decrease over time (not always smooth) was observed, but if the actuallandings proved to be less than speculated upon earlier, the ex-vessel price increased for latearrivals. At the minor landing sites the daily fluctuations were smaller and the prices wereusually, but not always, on average higher than at the major sites. However it sometimes tooklonger to dispose of the catch at the smaller sites if few buyers were around. Flyingfish comprise1—,IL,about 65% of dayboat and iceboat landings (Hunte and Oxenford 1986). This observed dailyvariability due mainly to supply, and the variable overall trend in prices due to consumerdemand, create the uncertainty reported by fishers and vendors especially, and recognized bygovernment.The only detailed investigation of the relationships between the landings of pelagics, pricesand revenue found evidence of market saturation in which increased landings resulted in reducedtotal revenue at Oistins (Mahon and Willoughby 1990). Their analyses were largely exploratoryand further attention at the level of the individual or enterprise is necessary. They did, however,illustrate that market dynamics are quite complex and poorly understood. This suggests that thefisherfolk engaged in market transactions have reason to be extremely uncertain about price.6.3.3 Other uncertaintiesFrom the planners’ perspective, ice unavailability has a well documented history mainly inMinistry files and the print media. The key points are that the Ministry elected to engage in theprovision of ice at its Oistins and Bridgetown markets. But neither has it been able to providethe full quantity demanded (mainly due to fleet expansion), nor has it actively encouragedprivate investors to supply the ice shortfall. Although constant unsatisfied demand has recentlyattracted private ice companies, because government ice has a lower (some argue subsidized)price, the harvest sector behaves as reported earlier. A Barbados Development Bankspokesperson surmises that, facing increasing capital costs and fluctuating fish prices, “fishermenhave therefore elected to minimize spending and ... preferring to buy cheaper ice fromGovernment [have] created what could be termed a false shortage of ice” since demand exceedsgovernment’s supply (Barbados Advocate 26 Sept. 1994). From interviews, governmentofficials, unlike boat owners, appeared to perceive harvest uncertainty to be uniform becausethey do not take information sharing into account. Therefore they consider the harvest sector1,,‘3irrational to accumulate fixed costs and forego income opportunities solely to reduceoperating costs.Regarding weather and sea state, examination of daily records revealed that theMeteorological Service in Barbados usually forecasts swells of 1-2 metres which are eithermoderately increased or decreased by the winds which typically blow from the east.Khokiattiwong (1988), in contrast, found high daily variability and no clear seasonal pattern inwind speed and direction or in swell height. This uncertainty is less important than thatsurrounding the features of greatest concern to fishers which were the intermittent episodes ofnortherly swells generated by north Atlantic storms.These high swells affect the Caribbean some time between January to March in most yearsbut are unpredictable in timing and intensity within this window (P. Drakes pers. comm.). Thesewere the months that many east coast boats relocated to fish from Bridgetown. There wereseveral days in the first quarter of 1994 when the dayboats especially were observed to stay inport due to high winds and rough seas. Also, reporting on an extreme episode, a newspaperarticle stated in January 1990 that fishers had not ventured to sea for two weeks because of highwinds. It quotes them as saying such weather is expected due to experience, but if and when itcomes is unpredictable (Daily Nation 30 Jan. 1990). But even if the wind does not entirelyprevent fishing, by influencing surface currents it can affect catch through decreasing gearefficiency or affecting the formation of the island wake eddies described earlier (Khokiattiwong1988).Concerning safety at sea, due to increasing mutual assistance rather than reliance on theCoast Guard, recent official statistics no longer reflect the true incidence of fishing boatsbreaking down. However the mid-1980’s records of the Fisheries Division revealed that boatsfrequently became disabled at sea due to mechanical or electrical problems so frequently that136safety was a constant concern of many fishers and government officials at the time. Forexample, in 1985 and 1986 about 16% of the fishing fleet required the assistance of CoastGuard, and an unknown additional number of vessels that experienced problems would havebeen helped by colleagues. While the sea around Barbados is not particularly dangerous on aglobal basis, and loss of life or limb is rare, the boats are small and ill-equipped. Should fishersdrift through the island arc, they are likely to suffer the hardship of not making landfall forseveral weeks. Apart from the human element, there is also the financial risk to owners. Only asmall proportion of the fleet is insured, and recovery of a boat from a distant salvage can beprohibitively expensive if the boat is offered for return at all. Legislation on fishing vessel safetywas being finalized during my fieldwork, suggesting that it is still an issue.State intervention is addressed in detail in following chapters.6.3.4 A note on uncertainty reduction through information exchangeAs stated earlier about perceptions of uncertainty about currents, fishers provided detailedobservations but seldom seemed to organize or explain them systematically. More information isavailable on currents than most other oceanographic features of mutual interest to fisherymanagers and fishers. So a supplementary investigation of fishers’ knowledge was undertakento assess the potential of information exchange as a means of reducing the uncertainty of bothparties. Among the recent literature was a paper, Bowman et al. (1993), that describedmesoscale ocean circulation around Barbados in detail. Both the article’s authors and localscientists found the variability and complexity of the current patterns unusual since the findingswere not expected on the basis of previous research or prevailing theory.In the first part of the exercise, a group of three experienced fishers was asked, collectivelyand without prior notice, to describe their observations about the currents around Barbados.There was more agreement than disagreement among them on what they observed. This137information, entered onto a rough sketch of the area, was found to conform closely to thefindings in the scientific paper in terms of current directions, speeds and seasonal variability. Thefishers seemed interested to hear of the scientific findings and to compare them with their ownobservations.In the second part of the exercise the same fishers were asked to describe observationsinvolving currents which they could not explain. Their observations were entered onto anothersketch. One conformed closely to the formation and shedding of eddies in the island wake.When this phenomenon was explained to them they seemed willing to accept the scientificexplanation. Afterwards, they expressed interest in gathering other experienced captains andexploring other areas in which fisheries-related scientific information useful to them could beexchanged.This did not occur, but I provided the most enthusiastic fisher with extracts from scientificarticles on topics of interest to him and we later discussed the contents. This proved informativeto both of us, but communication was difficult due to unfamiliarity with each other’sterminology (a problem also encountered by the Coast Guard during search and rescue). Also,despite limited formal education, this fisher was able to quickly grasp the significance of newinformation (e.g., types and causes of ocean fronts) fitted to familiar experiences (e.g.,conditions favouring successful tuna sets).The experience described above is not necessarily representative of what may occur withmost fishers. It implies, however, that limited formal education is not inevitably a barrier toinvolving the fishing industry in scientific research and management of the pelagic fishery.6.4 CONCLUDING DISCUSSIONFollowing a brief profile of the respondents, this chapter reported information pertinent tothe first research question: what uncertainties are perceived to characterize the Barbados pelagic1’)1.,fishery. Although gender may be an issue in the interface between harvest and postharvestsectors, the most consequential background variables for fishery planning appear to beexperience and education. The lack of experience and high levels of formal education of stateofficials compared to fisherfolk, fishers and vendors in particular, may influence planningperspectives and interaction.Regarding the research question, it is generally perceived by fishery participants and stateofficials that uncertainty characterizes the fishery. The uncertainties perceived by the fisherfolkin Barbados are similar to the types reported in the general literature (e.g., Gates 1984). Theirhigh levels of perceived uncertainty are in line with the quality and quantity of scientificinformation available on Barbados and the Caribbean. Fisherfolk, scientists and officials are allconstrained by large gaps in basic fishery knowledge.In specific terms, there are features and relationships particular to Barbados and thesurrounding marine region. For example, there is a complicated set of relationships betweendistant freshwater sources, currents, floating debris, fish behaviour and catch. Within the fishingindustry there are some, but not many, differences in perceptions of uncertainty according tooccupation or technology. The difference between harvest and postharvest sectors on seasonalprofitability, and that between dayboat and iceboat owners on input availability and crewturnover are examples.We also see evidence of the three root sources of uncertainty, that is, the marineenvironment, human activity, and our limits to comprehension. The example above of the seriesof links between distant rivers and catch illustrates the first, and uncertainty about prices due tothe behaviour of fishers and vendors relates to the second. Limits to our comprehension andability to predict are evident in the lack of a clearly understood relationship between landingsand price beyond its obvious inverse nature.1,,1.,Indeed, to answer the first research question directly, catch and price are the maj oruncertainties that characterize the pelagic fishery. Others have been identified, and some, like iceavailability and customer demand, may only be transient features, whereas concern about theweather and safety are likely to always be present. Despite the absence of fishery management,state intervention is already a cause of uncertainty.Investigation of the measurements of phenomena perceived to be uncertain showed thecauses of uncertainty often to be large gaps in knowledge rather than small doubts about existingknowledge. This was most apparent with almost every aspect of marine scientific information asevident in the multidimensional examination of what factors fishers and scientists hadrespectively perceived and measured relevant to catch. Here, differences exist in the spatial andtemporal scales of observations to which the two have access although the conclusions reachedby both parties on some factors, for example, seasonality of species availability, are similar.These differences and similarities have the potential for encouraging dialogue on commonground where information exchange could be beneficial for reducing the uncertainty of bothparties. The potential for collaboration in fitting scientific explanations to fishers’ detailedecological and oceanographic observations holds particular promise. But there are also potentialbenefits for exchanging information on non-scientific subjects such between the state and iceboatowners on ice supply decision-making. The role of information exchange in planning is a part ofa later discussion, and will not be dealt with here further. But a final point of significance is thatthe uncertainties examined appear to be of such magnitude and prevalence that it would not beunreasonable to expect that social strategies could be employed for coping with them.6.4.1 Summary• The Barbados pelagic fishery is generally perceived to be characterized by uncertainty.• The most unpredictable aspects of the industry are fish catches, fish prices, customer140demand, ice availability, weather and sea state, safety at sea, and state intervention.• Both perceived and measured uncertainties are mainly as large scale gaps in informationwhich may be reduced through information exchange.• Given the magnitude and prevalence of the uncertainties examined, it would not beunreasonable for social strategies to be employed for coping with them.1417. SOCIAL STRATEGIES FOR COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY:ATOMISM AND NETWORKSThis chapter starts the investigation of the second research question. It addresses whyparticular social strategies are used to cope with uncertainties in the pelagic fishery. Evidencerelating to the strategies of social atomism and networks is presented here before examiningformal organizations in the next chapter. I first look at results from the QFISH and QGOVTsurveys which were used, in the context of social network methodology, to design the moredetailed SOCNET study reported on next. The primary source of information for this chapter isderived from structured interviews. Additional information from semi-structured, unstructuredand informal interviews, as well as from observation and documentary analysis assists in myinterpretation of the links between uncertainty and coping.Tables of the results discussed in detail appear in the chapter, with supplementary tabularmaterial provided in Appendix D.7.1 SURVEY RESULTSI began the fieldwork by using two short surveys, QFISH and QGOVT. These surveysprovided basic background data which helped me to focus further research, especially theSOCNET study on social networks in the industry. This first section reports briefly on thesurvey results.7.1.1 Income from the fishing industryNearly all fisherfolk interviewed (88% to 100%) reported that over 75% of their annualincome was from the fishing industry (Table 7.1). In Barbados the fishing industry is the soleeconomic pursuit of most fisherfolk. The exception to this pattern was owners. Only 35% ofowners report deriving a substantial portion of their income solely or largely from the fishery. In142fact, 38% of owners report receiving less than 25% of their annual income from the industry.Table 7.1 Proportion of income from fishing industryProportion of income Fisher Owner Vendor Processor.fr9m fishing industry (°) (°) () ().....Otol/4 2 38>1/4 to 1/2 3 17 3>1/2to314 3 7 6>3/4 to all 90 35 88 100Don’t know 2 3 3Some owners who reported a small proportion of income from the industry said that theywere involved in the industry only as a “hobby”, or that they let the boat’s commercial fishingsupport their recreational fishing, or that they no longer paid much attention to the boat since ithad failed to yield much income. The cases in which the owner described the boat as a profitableinvestment were not common, but this finding seemed to be contradicted by continued fleetexpansion. The financial analyses of Burtonboy and Horemans (1988) may provide anexplantation for this contradiction and preference for investing in iceboats.Using estimated cost and revenue figures they calculated the return on equity capital (REC)for a typical dayboat owner-fisher or non-fishing owner to be -13% if the boat was financedthrough a loan, and -6% if the owner supplied all capital. For iceboats the returns were -8.5%and 0% respectively. Although not positive, they showed iceboats to be more profitable thandayboats (recall profits and shares in section 4.2.2). They speculated that positive short-termcash flows could be realized if obligations like loan repayment and insurance were avoided, anddepreciation was not taken into account. In the long-term, however, the bank, a disaster ornormal wear and tear would erode the unsustainable profit. The above responses of ownerssuggested that many were facing the long-term reality. These findings also implied that if profitwas the aim of boat ownership, then rational means could include highly competitive strategies1in order to make money and get out quicidy. Hence the nature of owner involvement in theindustry was one of the areas identified for further study.7.1.2 Occupational alternatives and creditExamination of occupational alternatives, both in and out of season, and informal creditsources completed the brief economic profile of fisherfolk. Espeut (1992) notes the prevalenceof occupational multiplicity among people in the Caribbean with low incomes, including fishers,as a response to uncertainty. He distinguishes between cyclic and concurrent alternativeoccupations (outside of and within the fishing season respectively).As the income data suggest, 90% of fishers and vendors worked only in the fishing industryduring the season (Table 7.2). All fish processors and non-fishing owners had the same jobs inand out of season. In and out of season, only 20% of the non-fishing boat owners dependedentirely on their boats for income. The greatest proportion of the remainder were involved inskilled technical and managerial/professional occupations ranging from medical and mechanicalservices to tourism and engineering. During the off-season 73% of fishers and 91% of vendorsstill worked in the fishing industry. Fishers mainly switched to other, minor fisheries. Vendorssold demersal, longline or imported fish. Selling fish at Bridgetown tended to be more seasonalthan at Oistins since large demersal catches were not usually landed at the former site. As anoffseason alternative, 13% of the fishers did skilled manual work such as masonry, carpentry,house painting and automotive mechanics.144Table 7.2 Fisherfolk’s alternative work in and out of the fishing seasonAlternative work Fisher (%) Owner (%) Vendor (%) Processor (%)in and out of the season in / out in and out in / out in and outNo alternative work 88 70 20 91 81 100Fisheries-related 3 3 10 3 10Managerial/professional 1 1 23Technician/artisan 3 13 20Commerce/transport 2 3 7Agriculture-related 1 4 7 3 3General labour 1 5 3 3Preacher 1 1 3Administrative 3 3 3Housewife 2Recreation 2Sampie(N) L... -The state usually puts fishery work and agricultural labour in the same occupationalcategory (Government of Barbados 1993) and, like agricultural labour, fishing was viewed as anoccupation of last resort (Berkes and Shaw 1986). The latter authors say that fishers do notperceive themselves as traditional since recruitment to fishing is primarily due to lack ofalternative employment opportunities. There is, however, a strong impression that both harvestand postharvest fishery work is gaining status as a viable alternative to a wider range ofoccupations for reasons that are not clear, but appear to be both social and economic.Earning supplementary income from small-farming, a commonly cited alternative forfisherfolk around the world (McGoodwin 1990), was not prominent among the respondents.People reported having kitchen gardens mainly for household consumption and limiteddistribution within a small social circle. Resorting to alternative occupations outside the fishingindustry was not a common practice of the fisherfolk sampled, and since the offseason fisheriesare minor, reliance on the pelagic fishery is substantial.Credit was a potential economic link between the main and offseason that required145investigation. A direct question about fishers credit ties with vendors, suspected to be mostcommon and sensitive, was avoided in the early section of the questionnaire. However, whenfishers were asked if they had experienced credit ties to owners just over 10% replied positively.About the same proportion of owners reported credit ties to vendors or processors in exchangefor catch. However, nearly 20 % of vendors and processors said they had instituted credit tieswith owners or fishers for fish. Being a feature of some importance in the fisheries literature,credit ties were returned to in more detail at several subsequent points in the research.7.1.3 KinshipThe roles played in the fishery by the kin of fisherfolk are known to vary widely among andwithin fisheries (Acheson 1981). In British Columbia, for example, around 90% of Indian fishersreported having parents in the industry compared to around 50% among non-Indians (Guppy1987). In Barbados, while 63% of owners had no kin presently in the fishery, more than 50% ofthe other fisherfolk did (Table 7.3). Most of these relations were close kin (defined as spouse,father, mother, sister, brother, son or daughter). While the mere existence of kinship ties in thefishery says nothing about the role of kin, there may exist family traditions of occupationalinheritance. Other researchers have reported that most Barbadian fishers do not come fromfamilies in which fishing is a tradition and they seldom fish with relatives (Berkes and Shaw1986). The role of kinship in networks was also investigated later.Table 7.3 Involvement of fisherfolk kin in the industryKin involved Fisher Owner Vendor Processor• .n• çlust’ (%) () (%) ()Close kin 47 35 59 60Distant kin 9 2 3No kin 43 63 38 40Sample (N)•.•J .•1467.1,4 Degree of fisherfolk interactionFisherfolk around the world, especially fishers, have a reputation for uncompromisingindividualism coupled with the necessity to cooperate in their work (Pollnac 1988a). Because ofthe conceptual complexity involved, this quick survey was not designed to distinguish betweensocial atomism and individualistic or cooperative networks. It focused just on asking whetherfisherfolk coped with uncertainty interactively or non-interactively.The majority of fisherfolk (between 57% and 80%), with vendors the exception (44%), saidthey coped with uncertainty by interacting with others in the industry rather than by dependingsolely on themselves (Table 7.4). State officials were asked a similar question in QGOVT ontheir observations of how fisherfolk coped with uncertainty. All the Fisheries Division and 67%of the Ministry staff thought that it was through interaction with other fisherfolk.The reported lack of instrumentally oriented interaction among vendors may be explainedby heightened competition for customers in the fish markets due to the low customer demandnoted previously.Table 7.4 Means of coping with fishing industry uncertaintyStrategy for coping Fisher Owner Vendor Processor Fish. Div. Mm. Agric.(0%) (/) (%) (/‘Interactive 72 57 44 80 100 67Non-interactive 28 43 56 20 33Sample (N) 126 40 32 5 7 47.1.5 Social network ties and contentsA ftiller impression of the social relations in the fishery, comes from examining some of thetypes of instrumental aid most commonly reported in the literature were investigated. Thesewere information on fish catches and fish prices (Tables 7.5 and 7.6), fish marketing (Table 7.7),and cash loans (Tables 7.8 and 7.9). Respondents were asked whether they provided or receivedthe type of aid, and to identify the occupations of their most important network members and147their relationship to them. Also, to make sure other support important to the fisherfolk was notmissed, they were asked, open-ended, to name the type and sources of aid most important tothem (Table 7.10 and 7.11).Network relations are discussed in detail in the following section (SOCNET study), so onlya few points which guided the subsequent study, are highlighted here. First, in all questions,over 90% of the respondents reported that the most important people usually involved in eitherthe giving or receiving of aid were not related to them. This suggested, subject to furtherinvestigation, that kinship did not play a very important role in exchange of instrumental aid.This is an important finding, one that is contrary to the situation in many other small-scalefisheries although not completely unheard of (Acheson 1981). Second, the importance ofnetwork member occupations differed with the type of aid received or provided (e.g., ownersasked more fishers about catch than price), and exchanges were often asymmetric. That is, moreand/or different aid was received than provided (e.g., all processors received price information,but not all provided it). Other impressions were that fishers tended to interact more amongstthemselves than did other fisherfolk, and that while credit ties were important, they were likelyto be underreported.The results of the open ended question suggested that the four main aid types beinginvestigated, and particularly information on catches, were utilized. However, the low ranking ofmarketing arrangements and information on prices, and the higher ranking of financial assistanceamong vendors compared to other occupations, required particular attention. Other useful typesof aid were search and rescue, and fishing or seamanship advice. From comments made duringinterviews, however, the impression was given that the latter was limited to dyadic ties betweenfishers only. Hence this was less relevant to the type of network and organizational study beingconducted here. The importance of boat maintenance and repair to owners, and general148information on activity in the fishery to processors, were also noted. The large proportion ofvendors who claimed not to know the type of aid most useful to them was taken as a hint that,having apparently not given it much prior thought, they perhaps had less need of assistance.Table 7.5 Catch information networksCatch info. Fisher Owner Vendor Processornetwork Rec. Prov. Rec. Prov. Rec. Prov. Rec. Prov.members (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)Fishers 100 100 97 81 76 61 75 67Owners 3 16Vendors 3 19 33 33ProcessorsOthers 5 6 25Sample (N) 122 121 32 32 21 18 4 3Table 7.6 Price information networksPrice info. Fisher Owner Vendor Processornetwork Rec. Prov. Rec. Prov. Rec. Prov. Rec. Prov.members (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)Fishers 80 96 56 74 31 28Owners 2 2 9 17 8 4Vendors 8 1 29 9 61 68 40 67Processors 2 1 40 33Others 8 6 20Sample (N) 96 95 34 35 26 25 5 3Table 7.7 Marketing networksMarket prop. Fisher Owner Vendor Processornetwork Rec. Prov. Rec. Prov. Rec. Prov. Rec. Prov.members (%) (%) (%) (%) (% (%) (%) (%)Fishers 36 56Owners 64 44 60 75Vendors 47 61 40 62Processors 53 39 60 38 20Others 20 25Sample (N) 19 26 10 8 11 9 5 4149Table 7.8 Small loan networksSmall Joan Fisher Owner Vendor Processornetwork Rec. Prov. Rec. Proy. Rec. Prov. Rec. Prov.members (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)Fishers 25 75 94 25 22 50Owners 63 7 50 6 75 45 50Vendors 4 14 50 33Processors 4 4Others 4Sample (N) 24 28 2 18 4 9 0 4Table 7.9 Large loan networksLarge loan Fisher Owner Vendor Processornetwork Rec. Prov. Rec. Prov. Rec. Prov. Rec. Prov.members (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)Fishers 30 65 71 25 14 50Owners 40 17 100 29 75 57 50Vendors 18 29Processors 10Others 20Sample (N) 10 17 1 7 4 7 0 4Table 7.10 Most useful types of aid receivedMost useful type of aid Fisher Owner Vendor Processor(%) (%) (%)Fishing, seamanship advice 18 25Search and rescue 17 17Information on fish catches 15 19 5Bait and input supply 7General fishery infonnation 7 11 9 50Boat maintenance, repair 7 30Boat launch, haul-up 5 6Financial assistance 1 27Fish handling advice 1 9Fish marketing proposals 5Information on fish prices 25Other types of aid 10 3 9Don’t know 12 14 36Sample(N) 113 36 22 4150Table 7.11 Sources of most useful types of aid receivedNetwork Fisher Owner Vendor Processor•. membe (°4)..(°) (Fishers 81 80 33 50Owners 1 3 33 25Vendors 1Processors 10 10 27 25Others 7 7 7Sample7.1.6 PowerTo measure perceptions of power, respondents, including state officials, were asked toname who had the most influence on how the fishing industry operates (Table 7.12). Theprocessors were seen as the most influential by all categories except the fishers who identifiedthe vendors. Presumably this was partly because fishers deal more with vendors than processors.Processors also ranked themselves as having the most influence. This strongly suggests that thepostharvest sector wields the most power in the industry. Boat owners were clearly perceived tohave the least influence. Government was most often ranked third or a tied second.These results were important for guiding further investigation given the centrality of powerin social relations and organizations. It appears that there is a perceived hierarchy in the industrywith the state subordinate to the elite in the postharvest sector. For almost everyone thepostharvest sector wields the most power in the industry. Evidence of power dynamics andpotential power in networks were key issues for further study.Table 7.12 Who has the most iiffluence on how the fishing industry operatesCategory with Fisher Owner Vendor Processor Fish. Div. Mm. Agric.• en (%) (%)Fishers 8 8 26 25 17Owners 5 3 17Vendors 46 28 10 14 17Processors 26 45 39 50 71 33Government 10 13 10 25 14 17Don’t know 6 5 16Sample (N) 125 40 31 4 7 61517.1.7 Desired industry improvementsWith no goals or choices of direction, there is little point in devising strategies to cope withuncertainty. However, if there are goals, such as improvements people would like to see in theindustry, then one could expect them to be related to major uncertainties. And, one could alsoexpect people to seek improvements either through their own efforts or those of others,depending upon who they thought was capable and should be responsible for making suchimprovements. Pertinent to this and subsequent chapters, respondents were asked what was themost important thing they would like to see done to improve the fishing industry for themselves(Table 7.13), and who should be responsible for making the improvements (Table 7.14).The results reveal a reasonable fit between what people found to be most uncertain andwhat they wanted done to improve things. We see that fish price stability and related stateinterventions into the market (e.g., state marketing and processing, and protection from imports)are more prominent in the harvest than postharvest sectors. Credit is mentioned, but the onlyreference to catch is a desired increase in amount, not stability, from a processor. Theconspicuous absence of catch stability or predictability suggests that these improvements areperhaps inconceivable or not feasible to respondents. The relatively high ranking, by allrespondents except processors, of the need for cooperation among fisherfolk signals the need fora very close look at conflict and organizational factors.In the majority of cases (65% to 100%) respondents said that both the fisherfolk and thegovernment should be responsible for improvements. If fisherfolk want both themselves andgovernment to assist in improving the industry, then we should see evidence of strategiesemployed to do this both by self-help and by persuading government to take favourable action.Yet not all the government officers’ desired objectives coincide with the fishing industry.Conspicuously absent are price and marketing.152Furthermore, 50% to 100% of respondents in all categories perceived difficulty in the stateand fishing industry working together to achieve objectives. Processors and the state wereunanimous on this point (Table 7.15). If fishers and vendors had not perceived the researcher asbeing connected to the state, perhaps the “yes” response from them would have been higher.The reasons suggested for the perceived difficulty (Table 7.16) also assisted in informing theexamination of social networks and organizations, and are returned to in the later chapters.Perceptions of industry conflict, state indifference and poor communication are widely shared,but lack of education among fisherfolk and state bureaucracy are also perceived to be barriers bythe Ministry and processors respectively. These differences and similarities further emphasize theneed to examine relations within the fishing industry, and the relationship between the fishingindustry and state to comprehend events and behaviour in the fishery. The social relations andorganizational aspects are discussed below and in the next chapter.Table 7.13 Most important desired improvements to the fishing industryMost important fishing Fisher Owner Vendor Processor Fish. Div. Mi Agric.industry improvement (.°‘)Fish price stability 30 13 3 20Physical infrastructure 19 15 35 14 50Increased ice supply 11 20 13 20 14Fisherfolk cooperation 10 10 19 14 33Cheaper fishery inputs 8 13 3 20State marketing, processing 7 15 3Easier access to state credit 5 5Stop fish importation 2 6Safety services, training 2 3Bigger fish catches 1 20Reduce bureaucracy 1Regional fishing access 1Reduce foreign fishing 20Better fish quality 14 17Better state/industry dialog 14Better scientific data 14Proactive fish management 14Donotknow 3 6 18) .5* This column totals 98% due to rounding.1 rI .)LTable 7.14 Who should improve the fishing industryWho should improve Fisher Owner Vendor Processor Fish. Div. Mi Agric.thefishingindustry (%) (%) (%) (%) (°4)Government alone 26 33 19Industry alone 7 3 6Both 65 65 72 100 100 100Don’t know 1 3...................Table 7.15 Perception of difficulty in state/industry cooperationIs there difficulty in Fisher Owner Vendor Processor Fish. Div. Mi Agric.state/industry cooperation (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)Yes 51 73 50 100 100 100No 41 27 44Don’t know 8 6Table 7.16 Reasons for difficulty in state/industry cooperationReasons for difficulty in Fisher Owner Vendor Processor Fish. Div. Mi Agric.ii4qslry ptic1 (°4) (°4) ...... (.°4’) (2)Fisherfolk conflict 28 32 13 20 17State indifference 27 11 7 58 17Poor conmunication 20 25 40 20 14State corrupt, unreliable 15 11 13State lacks finances 6 4 13Fisherfollc not educated 2 66State bureaucracy 7 60 14Fisherfolk unreliable 4State lacks fishery data 7Inadequate infrastructure 14Don’t know 2 6 7,7.2 SOCIAL NETWORK GENERAL FEATURESThe results in this and the following sections derive from the SOCNET study of 37respondents, supplemented by unstructured and informal interviews, documents andobservation. The overview of general features provides a brief look at network structures beforeexamining relations in detail from the perspectives of people in each respondent category. Thenetwork terms introduced in the literature review are used to describe ties between the focal154individual (ego) and network members (alters). To reiterate, in this study, the theoreticallyrelevant content of a tie is usually some sort of instrumental aid (e.g., information). But a tie cancontain more than one type of aid (e.g., credit and price information) in which case the tie is‘multistranded’, each type of aid comprising a single ‘strand’. The other terms used havecommon usage, except ‘links’ which refer to relations between alters rather than between theego and alters (see Figure 3.3b).In this study, at least half of the respondents in all categories (50% to 77%) said that boththey and others coped with the “ups and downs” of the industry by interaction rather than ontheir own (Tables 7.17 and 7.18). Allowing for limitations in the survey method, these resultsagree reasonably well with the QFISH self-reports (Table 7.4). Fishers saw themselves asemploying interaction more than other people in the industry, whereas owners and especiallyvendors placed others as being more interactive than themselves. Processors’ responses weresplit between doing things mostly on their own and interactively in both self-report and reportingon others.Most respondents said that, from an economic standpoint, interactive strategies were anecessity since, without “connections”, you “couldn’t last long” in the industry. Some added thatsharing information was useful to know how “to work to suit”. The reasons for non-interactionwere vague, most respondents just citing avoidance of conflict in the industry. Probing revealedthat non-interaction was not synonymous with social atomism since respondents reported thatties existed but were used only sparingly, not routinely, so as not to accumulate obligations.Credit ties were especially perceived as almost inevitably conflictual obligations. The perceptionof fishers that they are highly interactive is consistent with data on their behaviour at sea.155Table 7.17 Respondents’ strategy for coping with uncertaintyRespondents’ own Fisher Owner Vendor Processorstrategy for copin (0/) ()Interactive 77 50 57 50Non-interactive 23 50 43 50SampleTable 7.18 Perceptions of others’ strategies for coping with uncertaintyRespondents perceptions of Fisher Owner Vendor Processorothers’ strategies for coping (%) (%) (.°<) (°).Interactive 50 60 71 50Non-interactive 44 30 29 50Do not know 6 10Sample (N) 18 10 7 27.2.1 Aid utilizedIn terms of how the strands in respondents’ networks contributed to aid, the largestcontribution in all cases was the diverse “other aid”. This consisted of aid in addition to the 5types specifically identified (Table 7.19). This is discussed later, but in few instances did anysingle component exceed any of the specific aid types. Regarding the aid types of primaryinterest, fishers and owners followed the same pattern with most strands providing informationon catch, then prices, then marketing proposals. The strands of vendors and processors mainlyconcerned information on prices, but vendors listed marketing proposals next, whereasprocessors followed first with information on catch. Catch information was little used byvendors, but presumably concerned processors more because of the greater volumes of fish dealtwith. Strands supplying credit were reportedly few in all cases. More strands were reported forthe short term or chronic concerns of each occupation than longer term or occasionalrequirements.156Table 7.19 Fisherfolk’s average network strands of aidStrands containing types of aid as Fisher Owner Vendor Processor% of total network aid content (%) (%) (%) (%)Information on catch 23 19 7 18Information on price 16 15 20 20Marketing arrangements 13 11 19 17Loanof$10-$500 11 11 8 11Loanof $500-$5000 7 4 6 5Otheraid 30 40 40 29Sample (N) Average network compositionIn terms of who were the most common network members for supplying aid in general,fishers and vendors in the sample each have members of their occupation comprising the greatestpercentage of their networks (Table 7.20). Boat owners list fishers as their main component, andprocessors list vendors as theirs. The other fishery occupations in owners’ networks are mostlyboat agents listed by Bridgetown respondents. Processors appear not to supply each other withany type of aid, but of the fisherfolk they have the highest proportion of contacts withgovernment and non-fishery occupations. The limited representation of government employeesin the networks of the other fisherfolk, especially fishers, supported the earlier findings thatperceptions of bureaucracy are related to levels of interaction with the state.Table 7. 20 Fisherfolk’s average network composition by member categoryMember category as Fisher Owner Vendor Processor% of total network (%) (%) (%) (%)Fishers 40 35 25 15Boat owners 18 13 17 18Fish vendors 21 21 38 29Fish processors 6 7 1Government employees 2 3 6 12Other fishery occupations 6 11 8 6Non-fishery occupations 7 10 5 20Sample (N) 18 10 7 2A high degree of interaction within an occupational category may be symptomatic of closeknit networks based on survival-oriented ties (Rodman 1971), and access to a wider range of157resources from more distant ties may be constrained (Granovetter 1973). Ties, strands, gender and relationshipsLooking at Tables 7.21 and 7.22, it appears that the processors have more ties and morecomplex relationships with their network members than the other fisherfolk. Multistranded tiesare reported to be more durable and constraining in the sense of shaping action and limiting theformation of new ties (Granovetter 1973). Presumably, whether multistranded ties have moreeffect on the ego or alters may be determined by relative power in their relations. This is pursuedin the detailed study of processors.Gender composition of networks is fairly closely linked to that of the industry in general.This is shown by women being in greatest proportion amongst the vendors especially since, asshown above, they tend to deal the most amongst themselves. Kinship in networks is low, buthighest amongst vendors, and only fishers and owners have appreciably more friends thanassociates in their networks.The higher proportion of kin in vendors’ networks may reflect the finding by Sutton andMakiesky-Barrow (1981) that women are more active than men in maintaining kinship networksfor support. Given that this support is often for child-rearing (Powell 1982), it may be betterdeveloped among the vendors at Oistins where kin tend to live in close proximity. It would beuseful in future gender studies to determine if such domestic networks are translated intocommercial ties between vendors since this may assist in explaining the dominance of females atOistins especially.158Table 7.21 Fisherfolk’s average network composition by ties, gender and affiliationMember ties, strands, gender and Fisher Owner Vendor Processorrelationship with focal individualNumber of ties or members (n) 15 15 15 17Number of strands (n) 21 22 20 29Numberofstrandspertie(nln) 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.7Male members (%) 81 89 65 82Female members (%) 19 11 35 18Members who are kin (%) 6 6 10Members who are friends (%) 61 59 44 50Members who are neither friends nor kin (%) 33 35 46 50..? 18 7Table 7.22 Multistranded ties (number of strands per tie)Network members Fishers Owners Vendors ProcessorsFishers 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.6Owners 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.7Vendors 1.3 1.7 1.8 2.3Processors 1.3 2.2 1.0 —Other fishery 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.5Government 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.02.0.:?Table 7.23 Proportion of friends in the fishing industryProportion of friends Fisher Owner Vendor Processoriithe 4ustiy (°) .(°‘‘) () (°4)From0to25% 11 60 29 50Over 25 to 50% 39 30 14 50Over 50 to 75% 28 43Over 75 to 100% 22 10 14m..10 7 ..Given the previously mentioned theoretical significance of network composition in terms ofaccess to distant sources, respondents were also asked the broader question of what proportionof their friends worked in the industry (recognizing the limitation of “friend” being interpreteddifferently). At the 75-100% level, fishers have the greatest proportion of friends in the159industry, but their modal response was at a lower proportion than vendors (Table 7.23). It wasfrequently reported by fisherfolk that “the majority [of fishers and vendorsj still hang outamongst themselves” and they “still cut away from the general public” (SOCNET Interview No.11). Processors and owners reported the lowest proportion of friends in the industry. LinkageAlso related to the previous questions, respondents were asked to estimate what proportionof their network members interacted amongst themselves (Table 7.24). This was so as toroughly determine whether their network could be considered closely knit or if there was truly anetwork structure rather than disconnected dyadic ties. Only in the case of processors waslinkage among members particularly low due to the high proportion of non-fishing alters.Vendors reported the highest linkage. A high degree of linkage does not necessarily mean thatinstrumental aid is being exchanged, but it implies that network members potentially have accessto more social capital than if the ties were purely dyadic (unless the number of dyadic ties wasvery large). Persistent, strong links can give rise to cliques, highly socially cohesive groups,which may form the basis of collective action (Wellman 1988).Table 7.24 Linkage of network membersProportion of linked Fisher Owner Vendor Processornetwork members (%) (%) (%) (%)Few 11 14 50About half 11 30 50Most 78 70 86There was also a high degree of overlap between the networks of Oistins and Bridgetownfisherfolk although respondents were selected individually, not by snowball sampling. Althoughflows of resources along links were not measured, these findings suggest that the predominantlydyadic ties found in previous periods and other Caribbean societies by Mintz (1971) and Gussler160(1980) may not be typical of the Barbados fishery. Specific investigation of linkages, notincluded in this study, would be required to properly address this point. Reciprocity and conflictPerhaps from being towards the end of the interview, or because of sensitivity, theresponses to questions on reciprocity and conflict were vague and of fairly poor quality.However, the predominance of general over specific reciprocity is clear in all cases (Table 7.25).Taking into account all other evidence, particularly on credit, the reported incidence ofconflictual ties from this data source is unrealistically low. Besides fatigue and sensitivity,another possible reason for few reports of conflict is that aggressive business practices may notbe interpreted as conflictual in a competitive market economy. The processors most readilyadmitted that competition could often be “rough”.Table 7.25 Fisherfolk’s average network by extent of reciprocal and conflictual tiesReciprocal and conflictual ties Fisher Owner Vendor Processoras % of total network (%) (%) (%) (%)Specific reciprocity 24 17 21 18General reciprocity 72 73 66 82Absence of reciprocity 4 10 13Conflictual 5 4 3Non-coifflictual 95 96 97 100Other studies (e.g., Wellman et al. 1988) have also found that general reciprocity tends topredominate in personal networks, and that network exchanges tend to be asymmetric. Whilethe latter point is not presented numerically, several respondents identified ties in which theyeither provided or received a disproportionate amount of assistance. The few cases of conflictrepresent those in which the respondents found the imbalance too much to their disadvantage.7.3 FIsHING INDUSTRY NETWORK DETAILSDiscussion in this section continues within the context of the general conceptual model161(Figure 3.1) from the perspective, in turn, of each of the fishing industry respondent categoriesas focal individuals. Besides reporting on specific network relations, additional general factorsthat shape the perceptions and relations of fisherfolk, and assist in explaining why particularstrategies are chosen, are examined. Only points upon which there was substantial agreement orsupport from other evidence are discussed, but important points upon which there wasdisagreement or insufficient evidence are also mentioned. There is unavoidable overlap amongsub-sections, but this facilitates comparison and contrast. Individualistic and cooperativenetwork strategies are also differentiated. Comparison and contrast between Oistins andBridgetown is made where the data permit.The tables are based on the means of values for the respondents in each of the fouroccupational categories in the SOCNET study.7.3.1 Fishers as focal individualsTable 7.26 Aid received from the network of a fisherFishers’ Information Information Marketing Loan of Loan of Other typesnetwork members on fish catch on fish price proposal $10 - $500 $500 - $5000 of fishery aid(%) () (.°<) ()Fishers 87 44 16 17 39Owners 10 12 2 18 28 19Vendors 1 35 75 22 10 6Processors 2 19 6 6Other fishery 2 8 4 2 3 8Government 7.‘ Fish catchesThe most common strategy of fishers for coping with catch uncertainty was to obtaininformation about factors related to the location of good catches. There were several ways forfishers to do this, and the anticipated outcomes were to reduce search times, and increase catchor catch rate with consequent increased earnings.Not unexpectedly, the average fisher in the sample received most (87%) of the catch162information from peers, followed by the boat owner (10%) (Table 7.26). Regarding the natureof the relationships with network members who provided this type of aid, fishers were aboutevenly divided between long-term friendships that extended beyond providing this type ofinformation, and non-friendship ties on the basis of good access to information and with ahistory of truthfulness.At the landing site, some fishers obtained information from the owner of the boat on theidentities of successful fishers who had landed earlier and could be asked to “give the course”.Since the owner was invariably at the site to oversee fish sale or check on the boat, functions notalways well tolerated by fishers, this type of aid was volunteered or solicited only in cases ofgood relations between the fishers and owners (mainly of dayboats). Iceboat fishers sometimesreceived information at sea from boat owners who operated base stations and had access toradio communications or other information not received by the boat.Among fishers ashore, more information was reportedly exchanged around the immediatelanding site than elsewhere due to the absence, at most places, of the fishing villages typical inaccounts of small-scale or artisanal fisheries. Discussion groups typically comprised 3 to 7persons who fished from the same site, but not necessarily as a group. Unlike the case ofowners, the information exchanged here usually concerned most of the factors involved in thesearch for fish, either observed directly or obtained from the radio at sea. In the latter instances,debates about the reliability of information occurred depending on personal acquaintance withthe source and corroborating evidence. Also ashore, at night fishers telephoned friends whofished from other bays in order to compare information. For example, there were phone callsbetween Oistins and Conset Bay fishers since the fleets often fished different areas, but withsome overlap. This level of communication appeared to be mostly, but not exclusively, betweenowner fishers.1103At sea, communication was more complex. Among dayboats radio communication wasvirtually continuous and seldom limited to others from the fisher’s home port. Some fishers usedsimple radio code, for example, “I going up home”, to unobtrusively signal a fishing partner toswitch to a pre-arranged higher frequency for a brief secret exchange. No evidence of theelaborate codes and code groups reported in other fisheries were found (e.g. Stuster 1978).Since few frequencies were used and the codes were well known, this ruse offered only limitedor temporary secrecy. Codes were said by some to be shared more among fishers from a landingsite than between landing sites, but there was insufficient evidence to confirm this.More often there was deception, not so much about location and whether fish were beingcaught, but about the catch and catch rate which were usually reduced rather than exaggerated.Some fishers said that they never asked for information, but just listened to others on the radioand made their own judgments, an individualistic strategy, free-riding on the networks of others.Palmer (1990) describes similar behaviour off Maine as a common short-term economicstrategy. Barbados fishers explained that the resulting “problem” of owing someone a favour,and the likelihood of deception, often outweighed the benefits if you called someone other thana close friend. Some fishers were said to brag about successful deception, but these were in theminority. Fishers explained the non-malicious reasons for deception as just part of thecompetition to show who was best without assistance, the protection of expected income if youthought you were doing well on a generally poor day, and the related need to prevent accuratecatch information from reaching the networks of vendors.Respondents agreed that iceboats, more often than dayboats, called their colleagues “for thedrift” (typically floating tree branches or debris with associated schools of fish). They did thiswhen they were ready to head home, and it virtually guaranteed the other iceboat(s) a high catchrate. Iceboat fishers explained this information sharing in terms of being less congested and164competitive than dayboats because of their wider search areas. But they also said that mosticeboats keep in touch regularly anyway by radio for safety purposes due to the distance of theirfishing grounds from home. This set up a norm of cooperation. Although not stated explicitly, itwas implied that supplying rather than withholding fish catch information was insurance for abetter search and rescue (SAR) response from colleagues if ever required.An unintended outcome of the efficiency of iceboat cooperation was found in thecomplaints of dayboat fishers that iceboats, particularly when several fished close to the island,“cut off the fish” and “fished out the wood” up-current, increasing dayboat uncertainty offinding fish around the floating objects. Indirect conflict due to interception fishing has beennoted for Barbados previously (Berkes and Shaw 1986), and is common in other placesincluding the east and west coasts of Canada (Pearse 1982). The latter, however, tend to beconflicts between gear types. In Barbados, since the boats use the same gear, it is more a matterof scale and efficiency. Similar problems exist in southeast Asian fisheries undergoingmodernization (Thomson 1980), but the Barbados situation is mild in comparison. Among otherthings, the difference in vessel scale is relatively small and not all species are affected to the sameextent.When fish, particularly dolphin, was found, the dayboats tended to be secretive ordeceptive, pointedly ignoring their normal network obligations by not cooperating to reduce theuncertainty of their colleagues. Some allegedly removed objects or tried to sink them afterfishing so that their competitors in the fiercer “fresh fish” market could not lower prices withsubsequent large catches. This individualistic strategy was used since the next day often startedat the previous day’s prices. Another individualistic strategy with the same goal was totemporarily move away from an object to mislead other boats who were searching and could betempted to investigate a boat that had stopped to fish. At Oistins, one dayboat fisher, who for a165few days was consistently catching more dolphin than others, was said to be “tricking thefellows” by putting to sea much earlier and secretly so that no one could follow him to hisunknown fishing area. He also kept off the radio for these days in order to have no obligation toshare information. The other fishers who considered him to be in their network apparently didnot object to this breaking of ties for individual achievement since they said that they would dothe same in that situation.Because the boats had different ranges, and were thought to sequentially fish in the samebodies of water brought closer to the island by the currents, some fishers said that theyespecially sought information from network members in the larger boat types so as to getadvanced knowledge of what to expect in their area in the next few days. This informationtransfer was least conflictual from longliners to iceboats since they targeted different species, butwas also common from iceboats to dayboats since if the former followed fish into “dayboatterritory”, and fished among dayboats, they stood the chance of ridicule. There appeared to be anorm of spatial fleet separation which reduced the potential for direct physical and economicconflict due to congestion. On the fishing grounds you were obliged to “give the other fellow achance.” This is conceptually similar to the more formal rights to access and territorialitycommon to inshore demersal fisheries worldwide (Acheson 1981). But since both the pelagicfleets and resources are highly mobile, it is much more informal and flexible.Uncertainty was also reduced by egalitarian relations between captain and crew. While thecaptain was expected to suggest the fishing location, the final decision was often by consensusexcept on longliners where the fishing was more specialized and dependent on instrumentation.On dayboats and iceboats, the one or two other fishers onboard usually supplied their owninformation and suggestions for decision-making to an extent that seemed to vary markedlybetween boats. Since it was the captain, not the owner, that chose the crew in almost all cases,166he set the criteria for their selection. It was said that that iceboat crew were chosen more on thebasis of seamanship or fishing skills (that presumably could reduce uncertainty), and thatdayboat crew were chosen more on the basis of casual friendship with the captain (with lessobvious contribution to uncertainty reduction). Fish prices, marketing and creditThe social relations involving fishers in pricing, marketing and credit are especially complexsince, as one fisher put it, “everything is connected” (SOCNET 14). Obtaining information onfish prices is a strategy used to choose between ex-vessel sales options in both the open marketand in marketing arrangements, since the latter do not include contractual prices and are flexible.However, a fisher’s credit and other ties to those in the postharvest sector influence both priceand marketing arrangements, which affect access to further credit. The fishers’ preferredoutcome is apparently continuity of income rather than either the short or long termmaximization of earnings. It is in this intricate web of relations that individualistic strategies andconflicts of interest are most evident.Although other fishers mainly supplied information on prices (44%), vendors were alsoimportant (3 5%), and in marketing arrangements they occupied primacy of place (75%) ahead ofprocessors (19%). Sources outside the fishing industry were the main providers of both smalland large loans (35% and 41% respectively). A fair amount of credit was also obtained withinthe industry except from the processors with whom fishers seldom interacted directly. There wasa tendency to borrow larger lump sum amounts from owners (28%) than vendors (10%).In selecting network members for fish price information, fishers focused more on reliability(60%) than friendship (20%). The modal reason for choosing a particular person for a marketingarrangement was split between the person being able to buy large quantities of fish, and theirability to agree on a fair price (around 40% each). About 15% of fishers had their marketing167person referred to them, often by the owner. Significantly, no fishers said that their marketingalters were chosen due to credit ties, although this seems frequently to be the case. Fishers chosemainly friends and kin as the sources of small and large loans (about 65%), followed by peoplewho were neither of the above, but with whom they frequently did business, such as owners andvendors.Once ashore, one overhears the prevailing prices within a few minutes of being at a landingsite, so there is seldom the necessity to ask. If they do ask the going price, fishers said theypreferred to rely on their peers since they cannot trust vendors to always tell them the truth. Yeta dayboat fisher will often come ashore and immediately ask of no one in particular, or thevendor with whom he has a marketing arrangement, “How the fish selling?”, and acceptwhatever response is heard unless others immediately say otherwise. If the prices have beenvolatile (only with flyingfish) another fisher may occasionally offer advice on the current trend.In contrast, iceboat fishers only proceeded with fuller information, usually waiting until theowner arrived or until the next day before selling. When several iceboats were selling, theyconsulted amongst themselves before and during sale.At sea, dayboat fishers, generally being price-takers, did not exchange price informationmuch. Exchange by radio was more common between iceboats in port and those at sea, since thelatter have some scope to schedule their return for favourable prices. Many said, however, thatoften by the time they landed the price had changed to the extent that the information was notmuch help. This was usually because several boats had received the same price information andchose, individualistically, to land at the same time. Cooperation on information did not extend tothe more critically strategic cooperation on scheduling landings.Except to some longliners, prices were always uncertain since, marketing arrangements areinformally flexible and usually only address the identity of preferential buyers and the quantities168they are likely to take. No prices are pre-arranged with dayboats or iceboats. Preferential buyersmay offer, or are offered, preferential prices depending on whether the market is in glut orscarcity respectively. Except in cases of scarcity, the unanimous perception of fishers is that thepostharvest sector sets prices by collusion, and that there is no room for the harvest sector tonegotiate if they wish to dispose of their perishable product quickly to obtain reasonablepayment within a reasonable time. Fishers claimed never to be certain (within boundaries) whatprice would face them since it depended on retail demand, the catches of other boats, buyers’projections of the above and the behaviour of other fishers and boat owners. As notedpreviously, the price range is widest for flyingfish, and it is on the uncertainty of marketing thisfish that I focus.Fishers in all boat types said that they usually sought to maximize their catches, returninghome only when prompted by declining catch rates or market information. However, because ofthe marketing uncertainty of flyingfish, the Oistins dayboats have a tradition of targeting dolphin(as confirmed by their catch records), and many iceboats adopt the strategy of targeting thelarger pelagics and “topping up” with flyingfish at the end of the trip if possible. The success ofthese market-driven harvest strategies depend in part on networks for sharing information oncatch as described previously. Dayboat fishers are especially constrained by market uncertainty,and their marketing strategy is to leave the grounds early, and often secretly (avoiding networkobligations to communicate), with reasonable (in their opinion) catches in the hope of getting ahigh price. They have each day to “catch the market” (usually before 7p.m.) since they do notstore their catch ashore for later sale. This is a typical ffinction for a fishing cooperative.Rivalry is especially fierce if more boats are due to arrive, particularly at Bridgetown wherenetworks among fishers appear to be weaker than at Oistins, and the fear of having your priceundercut by another fisher is greater. As one fisher explained, “We selling at one price, then he169would drop his oniy to get off the fish because he see more coming” (SOCNET 24). Fishersfrom rural landing sites that had their fish transported to Bridgetown were reportedly at anadditional disadvantage. A Conset Bay fisher is quoted as saying that “sometimes vendors intown don’t want to buy fish from us unless we sell it for less than the fishermen from aroundtown” (Daily Nation 5 Oct. 1993:19).In order to get quick sales, especially for large catches, I observed Bridgetown fishersindividualistically lowering the price themselves to entice buyers, or for a preferred vendor, evenwhen the prevailing price accepted by other vendors was higher. Although this strategy wasdetrimental to the earnings of other fishers, some of whom could be network members, I wastold and observed that no social sanctions were applied beyond relatively mild complaints sincemost fishers engaged in this behaviour when they thought necessary. Price undercuttingoccurred with both dayboats and iceboats even after the latter had previously agreed to “holdout” for a particular price. Individualism, sometimes through ties credit and gender-based withbuyers, seemed to predominate over cooperative pricing strategies amongst fishers.When some fishers, but more often fisher-owners or owners, could not get the price thatthey desired from vendors they sold at retail, or lower, prices to the public in competition withthe vendors. This was most common at Oistins, and network relations among this smaller groupof fishers who often sold together were sufficiently cooperative to prevent price undercutting toconsumers. Younger fishers and owners also demonstrated non-price marketing power, evenwithin marketing arrangements, by only selling dolphin if flyingfish was also bought, or bydistributing fish only to certain, frequent buyers. This market power was mainly effective againstthe smaller vendors since the larger ones typically had sufficient suppliers or fish in short-termstorage not to be placed in a subordinate position.Regarding credit, fishers, particularly of dayboats, were said to be notorious for170“borrowing” without repayment in cash. They acknowledged that their debt ties to vendorscaused fish sale preferences both in terms of to whom the fish was sold, and the price offered oraccepted. They also confirmed that ties to non-fishery creditors caused fish to be given away.What gets them into conflict with boat owners is that this fish is the property of the collectivefishing enterprise before sharing, so the owners suffer income loss at the expense of the fishers’private gains.Fishers tended to seek credit from vendors in frequent small amounts in and out of seasonas a strategy to supplement fluctuating income in the absence of personal savings. They avoidedasking vendors for large loans so as to prevent gossip from being used as a means ofexploitation. One fisher explained that “they talk about it although you repay them. ... They feelthat when the fish is scarce that they should have priority over you and your fish, that youshould sell them what they want, and they want to control you. Or when fish is scarce they feelsomebody else shouldn’t have any, and then the talk starts up from there. Then they tell youwhen you ain’t have this, they lend you this and they lend you that” (SOCNET 10). Youngerfishers were generally said to be borrowing less and saving more, but there were opposing viewson this from older respondents. It is possible, therefore, that ffiture fishers will be tied less tovendors for credit, especially on iceboats where the younger fishers are mostly found and wherethey earn more. It was also widely reported that younger vendors were less likely to extendcredit, preferring to use ties based on gender.Noting that ties amongst themselves, and with owners, ashore are generally weaker thanwith vendors, some fishers argue that there will never be effective collective bargaining by theharvest sector once their peers are involved in firsthand sales. There can be no pricemaximization because, as long as fishers make reasonable earnings in the short term, their longterm credit relations with vendors and non-fishery alters are more important for guaranteeing171income. Since a large proportion of vendors (hawkers) are female, gender relations are alsointroduced because according to a fisher, “if you don’t borrow nothing, or have no socialgathering with that hawker, you going to be strongly against her [but] if I have a lady friend andshe is a hawker, my feelings might get in the way of common sense” (SOCNET 14). Yet the tiesthat favour vendors (male or female) may also be due to intervening gender relations. The samefisher explains that “very few fellows in the fishing industry got girlfriends outside the fishingindustry or, even if he got a girlfriend outside the industry, he has a side woman in the industry. Isell [the vendor] my fish because my woman does work for [the vendor]. I know when I give hefish, she is gainfhlly employed. I might not directly deal with he if my woman wasn’t working forhe” (SOCNET 14). This is further evidence that networks, rather than dyads, describe the socialstructure of the fishery.Fishers are aware of their general reputation for reducing owners’ income in several ways.They are also aware that other fishers, especially at Bridgetown, will carry true or false tales toowners to get a berth aboard an iceboat. So a common strategy to cultivate trust, and ensurethat they keep the boat and good relations with the owner, is to have boat owners around duringsales, or for owners to conduct the sales themselves, especially with the larger sums of cashdealt with on iceboats. Other aidFishers get most of their other aid from their network peers (3 9%) and from boat owners(19%). Indirectly, being able to get bait from other fishers either ashore or at sea is a strategyagainst the uncertainty of catches, the outcome of which is to increase catch and earnings. Thistype of network cooperation occurs among all boat types. Since you are most likely to requestbait when you have located fish, and getting bait from another boat frequently means that it mayjoin you, both boats may enjoy higher catch rates than they previously were. Because of the172patchy occurrence of the pelagics, boats in the same area can have very different catch rates.With dayboats especially, it is higher catch rate rather than more catch that is important so as toreturn for early higher market prices.More important than bait was safety at sea. Fishers said that even where there wasanimosity and lack of cooperation on land, there was always good will and cooperationregarding safety at sea. This occurred whether or not you were a member of a rescuer’snetwork. Cooperation among all boat types has increased in recent years since fishers found thatthey could and would often respond faster to each other’s calls for assistance (seldom life-threatening) than the Barbados Coast Guard. Networks were important even during CoastGuard rescue operations since other boats assisted in pinpointing and translating the position ofthe distressed boat. With dayboats especially it often took an owner with a home base totranslate the fishers’ language for describing position and current direction into nautical termsthat the Coast Guard could understand. Fishers often cite this persistent communications barrieras evidence of state indifference towards them.But cooperation among the boats themselves was not always free or freely volunteeredunless there were close ties between members of the fishing enterprises. For safety far fromhome, iceboats fish in groups that maintain radio contact. Yet because they frequently did notwant to stop fishing to assist even a friend, fishers commonly employed the individualisticstrategy of radio silence when they heard a distress call. They hoped that another would respondwith assistance before they felt obliged. This was typically only a brief lapse in the norm ofcooperation, since within a short period of communication it was usually determined who wouldassist, typically on the basis of least fishing time lost or a prior network obligation.Given the attention that they paid to safety at sea, and their well developed networks,iceboat fishers especially objected to boat owners charging exorbitantly for towing the disabled1 7’I I.)boats of owners not in their networks. Due to one exceptionally high salvage claim whichoccurred during the fieldwork, fishers were concerned that in the ftiture, owners’ expectations ofreceiving or paying salvage (based in part on their networks) could affect fishers’ safety andlives. This was seen as a source of potential conflict. Fishers preferred salvage reciprocityamongst themselves over the tendency of owners to individualistically charge income-earningsalvage fees which subsequently increased the insurance rates for all boats. A return tocooperation was facilitated when a processor caused that particularly high salvage charge to becanceled in return for assisting the claimant. In this case the processor’s network and powerextended beyond the market for fish.The general impression often conveyed was that relations between owners and fisherstended to be strained, if not conflictual. This was due in part to fishers’ perceptions of owners’credit obligations and income earning in relation to theirs. Fishers identified boat owners whothey alleged did not repay bank loans and ftiel credit, even though they could afford to. Fishersmade the latter evaluation on the basis of the gross revenue about which they knew. Theseowners were said to be investing earnings from their boats in property, businesses, statussymbols and other items of personal benefit while paying little or moderate attention toimproving the working conditions of their fishers, (e.g., by providing safety equipment).Ignoring the fact that few fishers could satisfy banks’ requirement for collateral, this rift waswidened by corroborating statements from some owners who said that “the bulk of the loanswere going to the ‘big fellows’ who were not even fishermen [and] these are the people whodefault on their loans and the small fishermen are punished for this” (Barbados Advocate 26Sep. 1994).Fishers often expressed the view that, unlike other occupations in the industry, theirearnings were based directly on their labour productivity and that without them there would be174no fishing industry to employ others. Fishing was unique to them as being “the onliest industrywuh part the employee does tell the employer wuh to do” (SOCNET 14). In this context theyappeared to particularly resent non-fishing boat owners both for receiving high gross earningswithout “doing any work”, and for not living up to network obligations despite their highersocial and economic status. Fishers were very conscious of the general perception, which theyshared, that their status in society was low. Fishers were reported to have commented to thepress that “the profile of the profession has taken a turn for the better .... there was a socialstigma attached to their vocation and those of higher stratum ridiculed fisherfolk for their smell,language and social pastime. Fishermen and women are now painting a more acceptable socialpicture” (Daily Nation 13 July 1993).Given this sensitivity, the general tension was exacerbated during fieldwork by a reportedincreasing tendency among owners not to pay captains an end of season bonus (often the onlything that set him apart from the crew) due to the general economic climate, and to include moreoperational expenses (such as repairs owners claimed were caused by fishers’ negligence) in thedeductions from gross revenue rather than from the boat’s share. To the fishers interviewed,these steps were both socially and economically backward. As one fisher put it, “boat ownersdoes thief from fishermen, and fishermen does thief from boat owners. All of them trying tooutsmart one another. If it was harmonious relations, everybody would see eye to eye andrealize it was in their interests to get together” (SOCNET 14). Interaction with the stateThe ties between fishers and government workers are few and weak. The ties reported byrespondents dealt mainly with general information on what government was or was not planningto do, and the frequency of information supply was low. Thus although there were routinetransactions with officials (e.g., from the Fisheries and Markets Divisions), these seldom resulted175in ties supplying instrumental aid. More specifically, several fishers said that the FisheriesDivision had “good intentions”, but was ineffectual at getting things done because officersneeded to “get out among the people” more. They explained that unless fisherfolk, andparticularly fishers, knew and trusted an official personally they would be unlikely to cooperateor follow instructions even for their own benefit. That is, the messenger was perceived to be asimportant as the message. The need for fishery officers in developing countries to be personallyidentified by fisherfolk is stressed by Abdullah and Kuperan (1994) as a key ingredient tosuccess in co-management.Despite frequent transactions with officials, fishers were found to know little about thestate. One fisher said that they needed “a whole ongoing program that would help them tounderstand how government functions” to make better use of its services and be able to bargainfor improvements (SOCNET 14). Contrary to official statistics, the view was often expressed byfishers that the fishing industry contributed substantially to the economy, second only to tourism,and that fish markets operated at a profit due to the landings tax, when in fact they were heavilysubsidized. Among fishers it appeared to be this gap between the perceived economiccontributions of the fishery and the assistance provided by the state that generated the strongestimpressions of state indifference.7.3.2 Owners as focal individualsTable 7.27 Aid received from members in the network of an ownerOwners’ Information Information Marketing Loan of Loan of Other typesnetwork members on fish catch on fish price proposal $10 - $500 $500 - $5000 of fishery aid() %)Fishers 59 13 14 40Owners 18 14 21Vendors 8 60 48 41 22 11Processors 8 10 36 9 22 8Other fishery 3 13 12 9Government 3 4Non-fishery 3 3 4 23 56 81767.3.2.1 Fish catchesObtaining information on harvest was part of the strategy boat owners used to cope withcatch uncertainty, but the information often pertained more to the activities of the fishers and theboats as to the fishery resource. A common desired outcome was to ensure catch maximizationwith minimum expenditure on the boat. Fishers (59%) and owners (18%) were the main sourcesof information on harvest activities (Table 7.27). Choice of network member was evenly splitbetween long-standing friendships and persons with reliable knowledge who were notnecessarily friends.Except for those who operated base stations, owners typically got their information at thelanding site from observing and asking their alters questions about what the boat had caught.Sometimes the information was unsolicited, particularly at Bridgetown. Underemployed fishers,covetous of captaincy on an owner’s boat, would inform them of low catches to discredit theskills of the current fisher. This test of the tie between owner and fisher was reportedly morefrequent and more successful where it was perceived that the owner was in the industry to getrich quickly, and had a history of replacing captains who, for whatever reason, did not performup to expectation. Experienced owners said that new entrants with no fishing background(estimated to be the majority among iceboats and longliners) frequently had unreasonable catchexpectations based on inadequate investment research, and their high turnover of captainscreated conflict between fishers and owners in general.To be more certain about continued fish supply, owners also sought information from theirfishers as to whether the boat was mechanically capable of the next trip. Fishers are reputed toignore early warning signs and fish a boat until it breaks down, “as long as fish are catching”.They then fish on other boats until the first one is fixed entirely at the owner’s expense andincome loss. This individualistic strategy of fishers, and the attendant unnecessary costs, was177reported by dayboat owners especially to be a major source of irritation in their relations withfishers. Owners claimed that fishers “never seem to understand that everything costs money”(SOCNET 34). Several fishers stated that, being the owners’ problem, they were not interestedin hearing about repairs once they had caught fish for the owner. Boat owners and fishers rarelydiscussed the vessel as a complete fishing enterprise. Strained employer-employee relationshipswere more common at Bridgetown than Oistins.Owners also attempted to reduce catch uncertainty by installing electronic equipment toimprove search efficiency or by persuading fishers to obtain training. However, several ownersclaimed to feel that they could not discuss fishing methods with fishers due both to theseparation of interests (fishing process and product), and to the difficulty with interactionbetween people of different socioeconomic strata. Social barriers to exchanging informationabout matters that could reduce catch uncertainty reportedly frustrated owners. Several saidthey found that fishers were reluctant to expose themselves to situations in