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The politics of authoritarianism : the state and political soldiers in Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand Yawnghwe, Chao-Tzang 1997

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THE POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIANISM: THE STATE AND POLITICAL SOLDIERS IN BURMA, INDONESIA, AND THAILAND By Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe M. A., University of British Columbia, 1990 BA., University of Rangoon, 1961 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Political Science) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1997 ©Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe, 1997 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is. understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be ..allowed without my written permission. Department of Po l"t foM SCZ.O^CJL_ The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date 1A S ^ - p K DE-6 (2/88) A B S T R A C T This thesis investigates the impact of military rule on the state and society by looking at three cases from the same geographical region -- Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand — that have experienced military intervention and military rule. The thesis is framed by a number of questions: Why does the military sometimes decide to stay on to run the state after it intervenes? What happens to the military, its leaders, and most importantly, the state and society when the military reorganizes the state into a military-authoritarian order? What are the political outcomes of military rule in terms of state autonomy? How can the political variations ~ the extent of military penetration into the state order ~ between military regimes be explained? This thesis has found that there are three vital factors influencing the military's decision, having intervened, to stay on to rule the country. The most important factor is the emergence of an extraordinary military strongman-ruler. The second, and related, factor is military unity ~ forged and maintained by the strongman-ruler and bound by the myth that the soldiers are the guardians and saviors of the state. The military supports the ruler and is in turn rewarded by him, and becomes a privileged class. Together they dominate and control other state and societal forces. In fact, while military-authoritarian states are highly autonomous from society, it is clear that the state is not well insulated from abuse by its own elites. The third factor is the extent to which the strongman-ruler is constrained by having to share power with an unimpeachable force (a person, ideal, or myth). This thesis has found that military rulers in Thailand have been constrained because of the person and the role of the monarch. This thesis has also found significant variations in military-authoritarian ii states. They range from a nearly pure praetorian example to a tentative quasi-democratic set up ~ resulting from historical circumstances combined with the vision, political will and astuteness of the strongman-ruler, his concern with his legacy, and the presence or not of an important consfraining force. The military has played a dominant role in politics in Burma and Indonesia since the 1960s; in Thailand, it has been in and out of power since the 1930s. It has become apparent from this research that, although the global democratization trend is hopeful, it is not so easy to get a politicized military to go back to the barracks to stay. iii T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S Abstract ii Glossary v Acknowledgement x CHAPTER ONE: 1 INTRODUCTION: SOLDIERS OR POLITICIANS? CHAPTER TWO: 29 THE MILITARY AND THE STATE CHAPTER THREE: 66 BURMA: MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN DOMINATION CHAPTER FOUR: 141 INDONESIA: MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN DOMINATION CHAPTER FIVE: 210 THAILAND: MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN DOMINATION CHAPTER SIX: 276 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN DOMINATION BIBLOGRAPHY 306-332 iv G L O S S A R Y B U R M A : Abha ~ Revered Father (a term used by soldiers in reference to Ne Win) AFPFL ~ Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League Adipati — Supreme Leader (a title adopted by Dr.Ba Maw) Anya-Manva Th'bawtra ~ Burmese Socialist doctrine (See SCME) Bama Pri-Ma — Bama Mother-country Bama Tatmadaw ~ The Burma Army (or Tatmadaw) Baungbee-khvot ~ Ex-military officer (Burmese slang) BCP ~ Burma Communist Party (the White Flag Communist of Thakin Than Tun), BDA — Burma Defence Army, the forerunner of the current Burma Army BIA ~ Burma Independence Army, the forerunnerof the current Burma Army BNA — Burma National Army, the predecessor of the current Burma Army Bo — (Bama and Shan), A military leader Bogyoke ~ (Military rank) General Bogyoke-Wungvi — General-Minister BSPP — Burmese Socialist Program Party, or Lanzin Party Chaofa — (Shan) Ruling prince CPB -- Communist Party, Burma (Red Flag Communist of Thakin Soe). DAB — Democratic Alliance of Burma Dobama Asi-Ayone — We Bama Movement (Dobama) DSI - The Defence Service Institute DDSI - The Directorate of Defence Service Intelligence Duwa — (Kachin) ruling chief KIA — Kachin Independence Army KKY ~ (Ka-Kwe-Ye): Homeguard units KMT ~ (Kuomintang): Nationalist Chinese of Chiang Kai-shek KNU - Karen National Union LORC ~ Law and Order Restoration Committee Lu-Myo — Race, nation, humankind Luptha-Prithu — The working people MIS (Em-D ~ Military Intelligence Service Mranma Sosheilit Lanzin Party - The Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP) NCGUB - National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma NLD ~ National League for Democracy v NSA — National Solidarity Association NUF - National Unity Front NUP - National Unity Party The Panglong Agreement ~ An Agreement signed in 1947, forming the basis of the 947-48 Constitution of the Union of Burma PBF ~ Patriotic Burmese Force Pri — (or Pyi. Burmese) country Prithu Hluttaw — People's Parliament Prithu-Yebaw ~ People's Volunteer Organization (PVO) Pyinnya-tat — An educated person Rakhine People's Liberation Organization ~ A Rakhine rebel army RC - The Revolutionary Council (1962-1974) SAC ~ Security and Administrative Committee Saw-phaya — (Karenni) Ruling prince SCME — System of Correlation of Man and His Environment SLORC — State Law and Order Restoration Council SSA - Shan State Army SNLD ~ Shan National League for Democracy Thakin ~ (Burmese) Master, overlord Union Party - A political party led by UNu (1960-1962) USDA ~ Union Solidarity Development Association T H A I L A N D : BPP - Border Patrol Police The Chakri dynasty ~ The currently reigning royal house Chart — Nation Chart Thai Party -- The Thai Nation Party Class 5 -- Fifth graduating class of the Military Academy after the adoption of the West Point curriculum CPT - The Communist Party of Thailand FFT ~ Farmers Federation of Thailand Isan - The Northeastern region ISOC — Internal Security Operation Command Kharatchakarn — Officials, civil servants, bureaucrats Luang ~ A title bestowed on high official (no longer current) Muang Thai — Informal term for Thailand Nak-phendin ~ Those "uselessly weighing down the earth", a term applied to leftists and radicals in 1973-76 vi NAP ~ New Aspiration Party (of Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, the current Prime Minister) Nawapol — A rightwing organization of the urban middle and upper class NSCT ~ National Students Centre of Thailand Phu-noi ~ "Small" people; an "inferior", or subordinate person(s) Phu-yai -- "Big" man; a "superior" person(s) Prachachon ~ The People Prathet Thai - Formal term for Thailand Ramwong — A popular folk dance Rath Niyom — Cultural Edicts of Pibul Songkhram Red Gaur ~ A rightwing para-military body of vocational students Sangchat ~ Nation-building SAP -- Social Action Party Sawasdi — A term of greeting Seri Thai ~ The Anti-Japanese ("Free Thai") Movement Siam ~ The name of the country before "Thailand" was adopted in 1939. UTPP -- The United Thai People's Party Village Scouts — A royal-sponsored civil-action organization The Young Turks ~ A radical officers group I N D O N E S I A : Abangan — nominal Muslim ABRI ~ Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, the current Armed Forces Adat - Customary law Aksi Sepihak ~ Unilateral action BKR ~ Bandan Keamanan Rakyat, a forerunner of ABRI BAKIN ~ State Intelligence Coordinating Body BAKORSTANAS ~ National Stability Coordination Board Budi Utomo ~ An early nationalist organization or movement Bupati ~ Regent, administrator Dharma Wanita — The official Women's body DPA ~ Supreme Advisory Council DPR — Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Parliament Dwi Fungsi — Dual Function Dwi-Tunggal — Joint Leadership (of Sukarno and Hatta) The Fifth Force ~ A force of armed workers and peasants Gerwani - Women's Militia (of the PKI) Gestapu ~ The 30 September Movement vii Golkar ~ Golongan Karya, Functional Groups (the government's party) Gotong Rovong ~ Mutual assistance HANKAM - Department of Defence and Security Hizb'ulla — Army of Allah HMI ~ Islam University Students Association ICMI — Association of Muslim Intellectuals IGGI -- Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia Inkopad — The Army's trading firm IP-KI — The League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence KAMI ~ Indonesian Students Action Group Konfrontasi ~ Confrontation with Malaysia, "Crush Malaysia" campaign KOPKAMTIB — Operation Command for the Restoration of Security and Order KORPRT ~ Civil Servants Association KOTI ~ Supreme Operation Command ("Crush Malaysia" campaign) KNIL - The Royal Netherlands Indies Army KNIP ~ Central Indonesian National Committee KOSTAD -- Strategic Reserve Command Laskar Rakvat - People's Militia (of the PKI) LBH — Legal Aid Society LPSM — Institute for Promoting Self-Reliant Community Development LSM — Self-Reliant Community Development Institute MANIPOL - The Political Manifesto of 1959 Marhaenism ~ Sukarno's Creed of the "Little People" Masjumi — The Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations MKGR ~ Family Mutual Help Association MPR — Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly Mufakat ~ Consensus Murba ~ The Proletarian Party; a communist faction of Tan Malaka and Adam Malik Musyawara — Consultation NASAKOM — Nationalism, Religion, and Communism Nekolim ~ The forces of Neocolonialism, Colonialism, and Imperialism NU — Nahdlatul Ulama (Council of Muslim Scholars) P4 ~ Pancasila Indoctrination Pancasila ~ Five Ideological Principles Pemuda ~ Politicized youth, youth movement Perhimpunan Indonesia ~ The Indonesian Association Pertamina ~ National Oil and Gas Mining Agency PETA ~ Volunteer Force for the Defence of Java, a forerunner of ABRI viii Petisi 50 — Petition 50 group PDI ~ Indonesian Democratic Party (the non-Islamic party) PKI — Communist Party of Indonesia PNI ~ Partai Nasional Indonesia, or Indonesian National Party PPP — Development Unity Party (the Islamic Party) PPPKI — Permufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan (Committee for the Prep-aration of Indonesian Independence) PRRI — The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia Priyayi ~ The official class (roughly, an aristocracy) PSI — The Socialist Party of Indonesia Rakyat ~ The People, the common people, the masses Santri - Strict or devout Muslim Sarekat Islam — The Islamic Union Sekber Golkar ~ Joint-Secretariat of Functional groups SOB ~ State of Siege; Martial Law SOBSI ~ Central Organization of All Indonesian Workers SOKSI — Central Organization of Indonesian Socialist Workers Supersemar — Letter of March 11 (1966) TKR — Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, a forerunner of ABRI TKR — Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat, a forerunner ABRI TNI — Tentara Nasional Indonesia, a forerunner of ABRI TRI - Tentara Republik Indonesia, a forerunner of ABRI USDEK ~ The 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and Indonesian Ideology VOC ~ (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) The Netherlands East India Company ix ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The production of this dissertation, like all such labor, has been very rigorous and difficult, involving years of thoughts, occasional "road-blocks", and being "unlinked" from "real" life and "normal" people. It could not therefore have been completed without the kindness and support of many people, especially my family: Nu Nu, Sawan, and Onjana. First of all, I owe much to Professor Diane Mauzy who ~ despite the inconveniences I must have caused, academically or otherwise ~ has been long-suffering and kindly constructive, making my work much, much better. I also owe much to Professor R. Stephen Milne for his help and great wisdom. Much gratitude is owed to Professors John Wood, Phillip Resnick, Robert Jackson, and Terry McGee, members of my supervisory committee. I would also like to thank the "three pillars" of the department: Dory Urbano, Nancy Mina, and Petula Muller, who were always helpful and cheerful, and also the department's "higher-ups" for providing me from time to time with what is the life-blood of a graduate student, a Teaching Assistantship. I also owe much to fellow graduate students for their stimulating presence. Because they contributed enormously to my intellectual growth, I am much indebted to Professors Alexander Woodside (History), Terry McGee (Geography), Y.C. Chang (Sociology), and to Lonny Carlile, especially, and Diane Mauzy, Philip Resnick, and John Wood (Political Science). They have not only inspired but have taught me well the art of rigorous analysis and the meaning of scholarship. The works of scholars and analysts on the countries I have examined — Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia ~ have been invaluable. I am grateful to these scholars not only for the insights they provided and the challenge posed, but also for x the opportunity to communicate with them. Warm thanks therefore to Drs. Chai-anan Samudavanija (in more than one way), Kusuma Sanitwongse, Suchit Bunbongkarn, Sulak Sivaraksa, Ben Anderson, Mochtar Pabottingi, Harold Crouch, William Liddle, Nurcholish Madjid, John Girling, Chandran Jeshurun, Josef Silverstein, Mya Maung, Mya Than, KMn Maung Gyi, Tin Maung Maung Than, Michael Aung-Thwin and Robert Taylor. Deep thanks to Bertil Lintner, Martin Smith, Anussorn Thavisorn, and Generals Sudibyo, Dr.Ben M'boy, and Mahaeson Kasemsant for their helpful insights. My gratitude also to Khin Maung Nyunt (former Lieutenant, Burma Army), Dr.Myint Maung, Zarni, Zaw-Oo, Dr.Kyin Swee, and compatriots overseas who, sadly, cannot all be thanked openly. I am greatly indebted to the Department of History for the Frederic Soward Foundation Award in 1990, the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada for a doctoral Fellowship in 1991-1994, and the Canada-ASEAN Research Travel Grant, for a grant which allowed me to visit Southeast Asian again on a field research trip in 1993. In the above regard, my gratitude to the late Dr.Kernial Sandhu of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, and as well the Institute's helpful and cheerful staff, and Dr. Pat Lim, Mr. Tee Teo Lee, and a host of scholars and experts I have had the good fortune to interact with while at the Institute. My research trip to Southeast Asia was much facilitated by the kindness of fellow Canadians, Francis and Jackie Tjia, who offered me guidance and unstinting hospitality, and Eugene Galbraith (an American) in Jakarta. Unrepayable thanks is owed to Marcel and Elizabeth Tjia; U Kyaw Myint and Shirley Khun Kyi; and Sai Yee Leik and Angelina, Bertil and and Hsengnong Lintner for their unstinting hos-pitality in Singapore and Bangkok; and to Shan compatriots in Thailand. Much xi thanks to Mr. Pao Lo Lim and Jenny (Vancouver), and Mrs. Julie Forbush (Seattle), for their interest and friendship. My gratitude also to Khun Chamchit Laohavad and Khun Oun Chutima, who have always been gracious and helpful, no questions asked. Last, but not the least, I am grateful for having an understanding wife, Nu Nu Myint, who gave, without any reservation, more than moral support, and to my son and daughter, Sawan and Onjana, for their excellent and undemanding behavior despite being full-fledged Canadian teenagers. xii THE POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN DOMINATION: THE STATE AND POLITICAL SOLDIERS IN BURMA, INDONESIA, AND THAILAND [= = = = = = =====1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION: SOLDIERS OR POLITICIANS? Political Soldiers in Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia The purpose of this study which I have undertaken of the phenomenon of military intervention in three Southeast Asian countries ~ Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand ~ is to examine, one, what happens to the military, its leaders, and especial-ly to the state and society when the military intervenes and decides to stay and to re-organize the state? And two, how the political outcomes resulting from military intervention and its reorganization of politics in such states, which are not identical, can be explained? The phenomenon of soldiers' intervention in politics and the business of the state is not a very exceptional one in most of the Third World.1 This has prompted Charles Kennedy and David Louscher to note that over three-fourths of the states created since 1945 have experienced direct military rule.2 In many, the military's role in politics has been significant. It has become in many Third World countries as important, at least, as other state institutions, such as civil bureaucracies, legislatures, the courts, etc.3 However, as Kennedy and Louscher argue, theories bearing upon the issue of civilian-military interaction have "not kept pace with [the] welter of data", and none of the models proposed thus far can adequately explain the rich diversity of 1 forms and styles of civilian-military interaction in many "new" states.4 In Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand, the men on horseback —to borrow the title of Samuel Finer's classic study5 ~ have been active, even dominant, in politics and the state for decades: from 1932 in the case of Thailand, and from the late 1950s in Burma and Indonesia. In the last two, the armed forces were from the onset as much political as military forces. They had their roots in politics, coming into existence during World War II as nationalist "armies"; they were made up of politicized (and needless to say, ambitious) young men mobilized by Japan during World War II.6 The militaries subsequently mythologized their role in the "independence struggle" and now see themselves as creator-guardians of the state and "nation".7 After independence ~ Burma in 1948, Indonesia in 1949 ~ soldiers were closely involved in the respective struggles of the new rulers to maintain power and preserve the territorial integrity of the "new" states.8 By the mid-, to late-1950s, they had established themselves as relatively autonomous power centres to which governments were beholden. In Burma, the military exercised power for the first time as caretaker in 1958-1960, following a fatal split in the ruling AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League). In 1962, it again marched into the political fray when its chief, General Ne Win, staged a coup to set up a military-"socialist" state. Ever since, soldiers have run the affairs of state in Burma. In Indonesia, a struggle occurred in 1965 between one pillar of Sukarno's Guided Democracy state ~ the armed forces — and another pillar -- the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Following a countrywide slaughter of alleged communists, among others, the already dominant military formally "captured" the state. Ever since, as the power base of President Suharto, it has stood at the helm of the New Order Pancasila state. 2 In Thailand, soldiers could not claim "freedom fighter" status as in Burma and Indonesia. Nonetheless, they were prominent in the genesis of the modern Thai state. They played a pivotal role in the "people's revolution" of 1932, which forced King Prajadipok (Rama VII) to relinquish absolute power. In the immediate post-revolut-ionary years, soldiers like Field Marshal Pibul Songkhram, Phya Song Suradej, and Phya Bhahon Yothin figured prominently. From 1939-1944, the military was the main prop of the "modernizing" authoritarian regime led by Pibul Songkhram. In 1947, the military led by Phin Choonhaven, Phao Sriyanond, and Sarit Thanarat ousted Pridi Banomyong's post-war civilian government, and installed Pibul as head of a military regime. Again, in 1958, under Sarit's leadership, it intervened. Sarit set up a regime which resulted in military dominance under his co-successors, Thanom Kittikachorn and Praphart Charusathien, that lasted until 1973, when their regime was toppled by a mass uprising. There followed a period of unstable, sometimes violent politics, as the military attempted to reassert itself. The early 1980s saw the onset of a decade or so of "civilian" rule overseen by King Bumiphol Adulyadej and General Prem Tinsulanond. However, in 1990, the military, led by Suchinda Kraprayoon, struck again. It was not until two years later that the "Bloody May" incident forced the soldiers to withdraw, and to be content with behind-the-scenes influence. Clearly, soldiers in the three countries have not merely dabbled in politics. They have been highly visible, often dominant actors, frequently displaying a reluctance to leave the management of national affairs to civilians.9 There is a need to investigate the military in more depth in a way that acknowledges it as a prominent political force. This study, then, will examine the patterns of domination established by the military, its role in consolidating an authoritarian relationship between state 3 and society, and the problems that have confronted the military as rulers, politicians, and state managers. I hope to present a different perspective on soldiers' political involvement in Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand ~ not merely as actors "intervening" (or "meddling") in politics but, as Eric Nordlinger puts it, "soldiers in mufti"10 are involved in the creation of different kinds of military-backed authoritarian polities. As will be discussed below, these are generally defined as military-based polities where political power is concentrated in the hands of a few key leaders (operating within the state sphere) and where a large segment of the population within broader society is depoliticized and excluded from access to the political arena or from having a voice in the affairs of the nation and the state. My aim is to situate the phenomenon of military intervention within a wider theoretical context. There have been many studies of military intervention, focusing on the military's motivation, opportunity, and modus operandi at the time of the coup d'etat. More recently, the focus of research has shifted to investigating civil-military relations as the key variable. Likewise, a considerable amount has been written in recent years about the "back-to-the-barracks" phenomenon. My interest, however, and the focus of this enquiry, is the question of what happens to the military and the state when the military leaders decide to stay in power and re-shape the state. How do these regimes consolidate and retain power? What are their goals and methods? What are their advantages and disadvantages? Why do the soldiers stay on in polit-ics? What kind of "new" states are created? Do they — the military and the "new" states ~ change over time? If so, how do they evolve? I agree with the more perceptive analysts of the military intervention phenom-enon, such as Samuel Finer, Harold Crouch, and Christopher Clapham, who maintain that the political orders established by the military ~ that is, military-authoritarian 4 regimes and states ~ are not identical, although they are based primarily on, or are supported by, the armed forces, and are, in many aspects, fairly similar.11 This being the case, I believe that an examination of quite long-lived military-authoritarian regimes post-dating the military's capture of the state, can yield useful theoretical insights into variations in these regimes with respect to the strategies of rule, the nature of the state and its goals, the extent of military participation or domination, and the military's own degree of subordination to its chief and/or a military strongman-ruler. Since the study is oriented toward making theoretical sense of military-authoritarianism and its effects on politics and society, much of the research is based on the interpretation and analysis of the very substantial body of scholarship on soldiers and "military regimes" in Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand. These analyses and their underlying assumptions, interpretations, and explanatory devices form a crucial part of my attempt to make theoretical sense of the subject. They are supplemented, though, by interviews and correspondence with knowledgable individuals from the selected countries themselves. The Third World Military: A View of Soldiers in Mufti Through their close and protracted involvement in politics, soldiers in Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand - along with many other Third World countries - have brought about far-reaching changes. In the process, they themselves have also been changed. As armed politicians, state managers, and rulers, they are firmly ensconced in the structures of power; they have become prominent political actors. As rulers and politicians, I contend that they have shaped political and socio-economic land-scapes, often decisively. They have also been pivotal in determining the character of 5 state-society relations — more precisely, relations among state actors, and between rulers and ruled in the countries under study — in Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand where, as stated, they have established quite durable military-authoritarian regimes. It would be conceptually inaccurate in such cases to view soldiers simply as armed, professional state servants. Rather than military interventions into politics being limited forays, undertaken with specific aims, these interventions have in some cases, been quite open-ended in fact. Hence, the approach that views the military as intervening temporarily to "clean up the mess" made by civilian politicians does not always apply.12 The open-ended presence of soldiers in politics in some states cannot be reconciled with the implied assumption that these same soldiers will return to the barracks once specific objectives are attained. Despite this, largely as a result of Latin American experiences, a "return to the barracks" literature has developed, attempting to explain the "whens" and "hows" of military disengagement from politics.13 A few of the postulated preconditions include: the professionalization of "praetorian" armed forces; a higher degree of political institutionalization; the emergence of strong civilian alternatives (and the concomitant ability of civilian politicians to defuse the military's fear of popular vengeance); the lessening of the kind of threats that trigger coups; mounting or lessening economic problems; dissension within the military; an institutional disposition to withdraw; external pressures; and so on.14 Up to a point, these theories offer useful generalizations about political soldiers and politics. However, as Robin Luckham notes, military disengagement is often viewed as a kind of "intervention in reverse," assuming that the conditions favouring military disengagement are simply the reverse of those that triggered coups in the first place.15 In this sense, the literature tends to concentrate on pinpointing conditions for withdrawal and is 6 appropriate when the military either seeks to return power to civilian rule, or does not harbour any goals for re-fashioning the state. It is not so appropriate, however, for investigating cases where the military leadership retains power and seeks to change the way the state functions. Harold Crouch's observation on the long presence of the military in politics in Southeast Asia is instructive.16 He states that "military regimes" are military-dominated bureaucratic polities, where power rests in the hands of military and civil-ian government functionaries themselves, and not held in check by weak extra-bureaucratic interests, i.e., parliament, political parties, and interest groups.17 He also acknowledges the great variety of roles that the military has played in such bureau-cratic states. Crouch, like Juan Linz, points out that no existing general theory satisfactorily covers the great variety of both the roles performed by the military and the political and socio-economic circumstances in which the military finds itself in the new (or post-coup)18 configuration of state and society.19 In investigating military intervention, scholars have explained the phenomenon as stemming from a number of factors. As summed up by Crouch, they are, (a) the values and orientation of many Third World soldiers, which hold that participation in politics is not "abnormal", but is a "national" or "revolutionary" duty; (b) the military's corporate interests, which includes a sufficient budget allocation, appropriate housing, satisfactory pay, and so on; (c) the personal interests of senior officers in gaining the government's patronage network; (d) socio-economic conditions, especially in countries with a very low level of economic development; and (e) the failure of civilian governments to satisfy the expectations of the middle class and its demand for rapid economic growth, and their failure to govern effectively and preserve stability20 ~ which involve repressing communists or other 7 subversives. The widely argued view that blames the failures of civilian governments for military takeovers seems, to Crouch, "an excessively narrow view". He suggests that it is more useful to see military intervention as arising from a "total situation" rather than "the deficiencies of a particular group".21 In this respect, it might be useful to be mindful of the very different kind of politics that transpire in the Third World. As many perceptive scholars have noted, often Third World politics is primarily a struggle for domination among self-interested, state-linked elites ~ a struggle moreover that takes place within a complex, poorly institutionalized, unstable environment.22 From this vantage point, military interventions appear to stem from problems in civilian-military relations23 which, as Amos Perlmutter notes,24 is gravely exacerbated in many Third World areas by the absence of a consensus on what the proper civilian-military relationship is, unlike in the West, where a Sandhurst tradition of defending civilian authority prevails. Often in the Tliird World the military exercises independent political power, thus turning the "classical" civil-military arrangement "upside down."25 It is generally agreed among analysts that central to the phenomenon is a particular political condition which Samuel Huntington terms, "praetorianism" » a condition where social groups, including the military, take direct political action instead of through political institut-ions (especially political parties) to reconcile and implement demands.26 In such "free for all" political struggles involving all groups or leaders in society, and even, or especially, those within the state sphere or government, for advantage, or more importantly, for dominance and power, soldiers are likely to be the most successful because they largely control the instruments of force, as Clapham notes.27 The struggle for power will invariably involve, I believe (as does Clapham), a contest for control of the state, since in a praetorian context, the state is the pivotal 8 prize.28 In instances where the military is involved in political struggle, the prize ~ the state itself - will likely be won by the one who controls the armed forces of the state: the military strongman. Hence it is a mistake not to recognize the military as a potential political instrument of the military officer who commands the armed forces when it steps onto the political stage to take control of the state and impose its control and to re-fashion state-society relations. Guardians of the Nation: Masters and Servants of the State This study considers the military in politics from a somewhat different perspective. Central to it are three factors which, I argue, are crucial to the appreciation of the military as an interventionist political force. The first is the claim, commonly heard from soldiers in Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand, that the armed forces as an institution are the guardians of the state and the "national" interest. The notion of the military as "guardians," standing above politics and governments, is common among Third World soldiers. In Thailand and Indonesia, respectively, the claim is embodied in the Prime Ministerial Order 66/23 (which became official military doctrine in 1980), and Nasution's Doctrine of Territorial Warfare (officially adopted in 1962). Legislative acts were passed in Indonesia in the 1980s to legitim-ize the military's role in politics. Soldiers in Burma have never possessed such a doctrine, and are only now attempting to "legalize" a guardianship role at the ongoing "National Convention" (convened at gunpoint in 1993). Nonetheless, the lack of a formal doctrine has not prevented soldiers from claiming a guardianship role. The second factor is that, with rare exceptions like Costa Rica, the military plays a specific role in the organizational scheme of the state ~ as a body in which is vested the state's monopoly on coercion. In this respect, the military enjoys a unique 9 structural position and privileged access to state resources. Owing to this unique position, and considering its privileged access to the state's resource, it is not surprising that in some states, the military tends to be the best-endowed and most powerful actor within the state structure (and in society). In such states, it dominates other state elements, along with civilian politicians, who are unarmed and do not enjoy automatic access to state resources. The third factor is that the military is a force upon which the authority of new or weak governments may depend heavily. The very existence of the state, in its territorial-political aspect, is often dependent on the military's coercive function, on its role as a "protector" and in containing or repressing (often with external assist-ance) "communist" and "secessionist" rebels, or repelling or detering foreign aggress-ion. Taken together, these factors mean that Third World soldiers, as the state's high-ly privileged (but dependent) servants, have the potential simultaneously to be masters of the civilian government-of-the-day. The unique, structural position of the military as an armed body that is integral to the state and the nation, reinforced by its role as a "protector", and the military officers' self-image as the selfless, dedicated national guardians, has resulted in the defining, legitimizing, and rationalizing of the military's corporate interests in a way that makes it, Nordlinger argues, almost indistinguishable from that of the nation.29 The military's close self-identification with the nation, as J. Samuel Fitch points out, was further boosted when the cold war intensified. There occurred a redefinition of its role in Latin America30 ~ as also in many other Third World areas, including Thailand, Indonesia, and Burma. It was redefined to include "national security", rather than simply "national defence", since the enemy included subversive elements. The consequence was to erase "most of the boundary between civilian and military 10 spheres of competence".31 Thus, the military's role was expanded to include national security and development functions, and this, combined with external military assistance and training, increased its strength, size, and importance. The military's expanded role in turn not only validated its self-image as the most vital for both the historic continuity of the nation and the survival of the state, but also boosted its position relative to other state elements: in many countries, the military became so strong that it became, in effect, "a state-within-a-state". With the military in many Third World polities so closely linked with the state and its affairs, as noted, it is only one step further then for the military to step in and take over. This is all the more so if it dislikes the way the state is being run or, as pointed out by T.O.Odetola and Edward Feit, if it perceives that the state's very existence is threatened.32 Thus the "protector" of the state and "guardian" of the nation, becomes the "savior" of the nation. And, in cases where the military has spent decades encamped on the political stage, it would not be too far wrong to view the military as a special sub-stratum of armed politicians firmly lodged within the state — or even, as Robin Luckham suggests, an armed de facto ruling party, since it is, and also functions as, the political power base and instrument of the state and its chief-and-ruler.33 Military Intervention and the Re-Configuration of Politics and the State Military intervention is a multi-dimensional, complex, and heterogeneous phenomenon ~ made more so by differences in the underlying historical, geograph-ical, cultural, and socioeconomic settings. But there is a common feature. Political soldiers tend not to be predisposed to upholding a democratic order which allows for conflicts among groups, interests, and institutions.34 Democratic politics, which are 11 "open" to societal interest groups and forces, are viewed as disorderly and hannful to the nation and national unity by soldiers, as noted by Gerald Heeger.35 I argue that soldiers tend to prefer a political order that is congruent with their vision of how pol-itics and society (or the "nation") are to be managed: that is, an authoritarian one. Thus we often have, in cases where the military intrude into politics and decides to remain on the political stage, a reconfiguration of state-society relations by the milit-ary's chief-and-ruler. The vision of politics that informs the military's actions as builders and manag-ers of the state is embodied in what Manuel Garreton calls "national security" ideology.36 In this ideology, state and nation are seen as forming a single living organism; they are "larger" or higher entities that stand above individuals (who are viewed as "subordinate subjects").37 The concept of "national unity" plays a key role. It is conceived of by the military as the absence of conflict and dissent. Opposition to the state, the government (especially one backed or dominated by the military), and the armed forces ~ all of which from this perspective embody the nation's destiny and goals ~ is viewed as damaging to national unity and as something that must be prevented or punished.38 The ideal form of governance for soldiers is — as Garreton notes — an authoritarian state order managed, protected, and guaranteed by the military. The military deems itself the "bulwark of the nation" and the bastion that stands above social divisions, the group best qualified to define and defend the national interest, and guarantee the nation's unity, and more importantly, its historic continuity.39 After capturing the state, I argue that the military ~ more specifically, the military leader who becomes the ruler of the state ~ will either seek to return power to civilians quickly or, in line with the national security ideology and associated statist orientation, will stay to establish a non-democratic, authoritarian 12 type "military regime". At this juncture, it is important to, one, heed Finer's observation which in effect states that it is difficult to make a hard distinction between civilian and military regimes as the latter tend to shade off by degrees into civilian authoritarian regimes.40 And two, it is important to be aware of the heterogeneity and range of what have been labelled "authoritarian" regimes. As Linz indicates, they are found in a variety of forms, in a wide range of economic, social, and cultural environments — in Europe during the interwar years (1920s to the 1930s), in many post-independence "new" Third World states, and in the post-Stalin Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (until the late 1980s)41 Authoritarian regimes, which include military-authoritarian regimes, are to varying degrees non-democratic (or not very democratic). But, importantly, they are also different from, and at the same time share some elements and traits in common with, traditional absolute monarchical, or similar types, and to totalitarian regimes.42 Owing to a complex mix of elements, military-authoritarian regimes are not easily confined within neat categories: some may be very undemocratic, while a few may even be semi-democratic. In one dimension, military-authoritarian regimes can be characterized by features found in what Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski calls an "autocracy" 4 3 A cardinal characteristic is the concentration of decision-making at the apex of the official hierarchy possessing "the highest power over citizens."44 There is an absence of other authorities who have "have sufficient power to compel the law-breaking rulers to submit to the law."45 Needless to say, also absent is a genuine opposition, a free press (except in rare cases, as for example, in Thailand), and so on 4 6 There is a strong emphasis, as David Beetham notes, on discipline and order, 13 and an arbitrary and unaccountable style to the exercise of power.47 Importantly, military rulers will, through the employment of the military as a political instrument, reassert the authority of government (or the state) over society by removing the freedom of organized groups to pursue their interests independently of the state or its officials; impose "unity" by removing the political avenues for competition and conflict; and attempt to restore confidence in the ability and integrity of government by removing independent means for monitoring its actions.48 The military resolves the problems of democratic politics by abolishing politics altogether and immunizing "the state from the problems of society by elevating the state above society" 4 9 In this regard, the military ~ as the wielders of the legitimate means of coercion — constitut-es the most important building block of authoritarianism. Its importance lies in its usefulness to ruling strongmen as a political instrument in making the state more autonomous and cohesive by excluding and de-politicizing the ruled, and also in mtimidating the civilian bureaucracy and non-state elites, making them more easily co-opted, pliant, and loyal. On another dimension, however, authoritarian regimes are distinctively marked by what Linz terms a "pluralistic element" — a pluralism which, although varied, is limited. This limitation may be legal or de facto, implemented more or less effect-ively, and imposed on political and interest groups which have not been created or co-opted by the state, and are not dependent on the state. However, some regimes may even institutionalize the political participation of a limited number of independ-ent groups or institutions, and as well encourage their emergence, but "without leav-ing any doubt that the rulers ultimately define which group they will allow and under what conditions".50 Another feature is that although political power does not devolve to the citizens 14 and the rulers are not accountable to them, rulers might still be responsive to them.51 They will respond through sanctioned participating groups, such as the government's party, political parties that are not banned (but heavily restrained), state-sponsored associations (or corporatist-like, interest-representing bodies or ''functional'' groups), interest groups (cultural, economic, semi-political) tolerated by the state, and various "representative" and legislative assemblies (but controlled or manipulated by the executive). Further, in authoritarian regimes, there is usually found a constant proc-ess of co-optation of leaders which constitutes a mechanism by which different sect-ors or institutions become participants in the system. And there is in consequence a certain heterogeneity of elites, composed of some co-opted professional politicians, bureaucrats, technocrats, military men, religious leaders, and local notables, and even, in some cases, activists (such as former student leaders, trade unionists, peasant leaders, and so forth).52 It is also important to bear in mind that we are dealing with states and regimes situated in the Third World. As Guenther Roth, Crouch, and Clapham point out, it is an area where "personalized patrimonialism", inextricably linked to material incentives and rewards, is the dominant form of government (although patrimonial elements are also found, to varying degrees, in industrialized countries as well).53 In such states, state institutions and governmental organizations are, like in the precolonial days, patrimonialized since they are, as Crouch indicates, largely based on the distribution of "fiefs and benefices".54 Government and politics take place, as Linz and other scholars observe, in traditional or mixed institutions through traditional or informal, personal channels (that connect national and sub-national leaders or holders of power to their respective clients, patrons, kinfolks, friends).55 Hence there obtains in states which are, at one level of analysis, authoritarian and 15 highly autonomous from society, a situation where there is an informal, anti-institutional style of politics based on private, clientelistic access to the state and office holders.56 The overall effect of limited pluralism and patrimonialism on authoritarian regimes is that the state, significant power-holders, and key officials are, in one dimension, quite highly autonomous from society, but are, in another dimension ~ quite paradoxically ~ not autonomous. They respond in a paternalistic or patrimonial manner to particularistic, private, informal demands or preferences of some groups and segments in society. The Military, the Strongman, and the Consolidation of Authoritarianism The changing role of the military once an authoritarian order is established is of theoretical interest. I argue that for the military to intervene successfully in politics, and importantly, for it to remain and dominate and, furthermore, to re-fashion the state-society order according to its preferences, it must first achieve a considerable degree of cohesion. As Clapham maintains, when there is no dominant leader, it is all the more likely that the military will not be able to stay on for long ~ even if it intervenes ~ and will likely hand over power to a new civilian government (although it might intervene again later).57 Cohesion is achieved when there emerges a military leader who is able to unite all military factions, or alternatively, eliminate rivals or troublesome subordinates. Thus, after the military intervenes and captures the state, a person accepted by the important military factions as the leader, and who is primarily responsible for bringing the military onto the political center-stage, becomes the head of the military authoritarian state. However, all too often this person is given the standard label of 16 being the "military dictator" or head of a "military junta" or "personal ruler". Person-al rulers are given much prominence in accounts of military and other authoritarian regimes.58 However, the label conceals significant differences between military strongmen; and the characteristics, goals, ambitions, power, and force of will of individual military strongmen are often not clearly delineated. The relation between the military personal ruler and his military power base is not static nor uniform. I argue that it is a complex, dynamic, often shifting one. The relationships will vary among military-authoritarian regimes. To elaborate upon the general trend: as the military strongman proceeds to consolidate the authoritarian order and his dominance within it, he will tend to gain more personal power and authority. The military, which serves the successful strongman-ruler as a political instrument, will become subordinated to some extent to the man who is its chief and also the state ruler. In many cases, the more the military ruler wants to transform the state to obtain greater legitimacy, or to transform himself into a leader-ruler of the nation as a whole, and not just of a segment, the more likely it is that he will want to "resign" from the military and present a civilian face. Being a "civilian" will invariably change his relationship with the military over time, as he increasingly seems less a military man. And as a relatively simple military regime evolves, or is transformed by the ruler into a more complex, sophisticated authoritarian order, the military's position will also change in a number of ways. A new set of institutions and actors may emerge: the presidential or "palace" staff; a ruling or governmental party; a new hierarchy of representative-legislative bodies; a more professional (or professional-looking) bureaucracy, and so on. While still serving as the primary power base of the ruler, the military will, in such cases, be confronted with, and constrained by, other 17 powerful players emerging from the new institutions, as well as favoured ministers; useful and influential techno-bureaucrats and advisors; and money-making clients and cronies of the president, his family, and kin group. In other cases, however, the military's position may remain as dominant as it was in the early years of the regime. It will remain, next to the strongman-ruler, the most dominant force, and it will prevent non-military elites from gaining a hold over the levers of power. In still other cases, only the top brass will figure prominently in politics: soldiers, including most officers, will "return to the barracks" after their chiefs seizure of power. In polities where power is concentrated in the hands of one key leader, his ability to manipulate and control subordinate leaders and factions within the ruling circle is crucial. Such a ruler — the strongman-ruler in military regimes — will often work to maintain the balance of power via the politics of factionalism, especially within the armed forces - the essential pillar of his support, but also a potentially dangerous one. To this end, he may carry out frequent purges or transfers; restruct-ure the chain of command or operational procedures; promote hard-core loyalists into top positions; sow distrust and rivalry among top generals, among services, and even among loyal aides; or create special surveillance units to spy on the officer corps. He may reward military men with positions as governmental politicians and party bosses, representatives, legislators, "czars" of admmistrative and economic empires, ambass-adors, and so on. In all these ways, the strongman-ruler works to dilute the officer corps' cohesion and render it incapable of moving politically against him.59 At the same time, soldiers gain a vital stake in defending both the ruler and his authoritarian order. In long-lived, stabilized authoritarian states, soldiers are socializ-ed into their roles as defenders of the personal ruler and also come to appreciate that 18 it is in their own best interest to do so. The person and role of the ruler are "mystified" ~ identified with order, the state, nation, and the national interest. As the man at the centre of things, he becomes the only one capable of mamtaining overall cohesion and balance against the back-drop of opaque, convoluted "palace politics" that tend to characterize military-authoritarian governance. In "mature" military-authoritarian states, the successful strongman-ruler tends to gain greater power vis-a-vis the military but, as noted, politics in such states is by no means static. With the passage of time, as authoritarianism becomes routinized, interaction between the military as an institution, the ruler, and other powerful state factions grows more complex. Owing to the complexity of politics in military-authoritarian regimes, they will, as Finer indicates, exhibit as much diversity among themselves as civilian regimes.60 As Finer suggests, "military regimes" can be distinguished from one another through a classification system based on measurements along spectrums of different dimensions.61 There are three measurements relevant to this study. First is a spectrum based on the extent of military penetration of the civil bureaucracy and the military's role in policy-making.62 The extent of military penetration as located along a spectrum is an indicator of the degree of authoritarianism being exercised in a state. The greater the penetration, the more authoritarian the state is likely to be; likewise, the smaller the penetration, the less authoritarian the state is likely to be. Second is a spectrum based on the autonomy of the regime vis-a-vis political parties and legislatures. In this spectrum there are four broad focal points: (a) milit-ary regimes where legislatures and parties are suppressed; (b) regimes which hold elections but refuse to acknowledge negative results and prohibit the elected legislat-19 ure from convening; (c) legislatures and parties that exist as "simple ancillaries or appurtenances,"63 that are quite autonomous vis-a-vis society; and (d) regimes with legislatures and parties that function democratically following competitive elections and are relatively free of military or state control. Again, (a) and (b) can be seen on the spectrum as most authoritarian; (c) as less authoritarian; and (d) as least authorit-arian for this dimension. A third spectrum, related to (and inferred from) the second, is based on the autonomy and responsiveness of the state to society. There are three broad focal points here: (a) regimes with high autonomy that are not responsive to societal demands or aspirations; (b) regimes with relatively high autonomy, and yet are somewhat responsive; and (c) regimes that are relatively autonomous, and quite responsive to society. Likewise, (a) can be seen on the spectrum as most authorit-arian, (b) as less authoritarian, and (c) as least authoritarian in this dimension. The spectrums mentioned above are broad categorizations representing certain dimension of regimes which can be identified and placed along a spectrum according to the criteria mentioned. The measurements of these spectrums are not mathematic-ally quantifiable, but neither are they simply intuitive. There will be a body of empirical evidence presented in the case studies to justify the measurements. Spectrums allow for shades of difference to be noted. Many military regimes will fit in between the broad focal points described. For example, there may be military regimes that allow "limited autonomy" for parties and legislatures, and therefore would be placed somewhere between (c) and (d) on the spectrum, as depicted above. Also, spectrums allow changes — and directions ~ over time to be noted, by placements on the spectrum of regimes of the same country in different, important, years. This is useful for a country like Thailand, which has fluctuated 20 between different types of military rule and also intervening periods of civilian government. The importance of placing the regimes of Burma, Indonesia and Thailand along these three spectrums is that doing so helps to clarify not only variations among these regimes, but also important elements that contribute to the differences. In this chapter, I have examined the conceptual framework underlying the phenomenon of political soldiers and their relations with the state. I have looked at the relationship between the personal ruler and the military, the nature of military-authoritarian orders and the military's role within them, and the changes (notably in the military's role and relative influence or autonomy) that occur in "mature" military-authoritarian regimes. The intent of this thesis is to examine military-authoritarian regimes in a way that draws out the wide variations in the way these regimes are organized and how the military is situated within them. In the next chapter, I will consider the broader concepts and assumptions related to the military in power. In particular, I will focus on theories of the state, state autonomy, and state-society interaction. I will conclude by stating the main arguments of this dissertation. 21 E N D N O T E S CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION: SOLDIERS OR POLITICIANS? 1 It is with great reservations that I use the term "Third World". But it is less problematic than terms like the undeveloped or underdeveloped world, the developing or transitional world, the non-West, the peripheries, etc. Although "Third World" is often considered pejorative, and is anyway ambiguous with the collapse of the "Second World", it at least avoids the implication of a linear trajectory of development. It is also generally accepted in academic discourse. 2 Charles Kennedy and David Louscher, "Civil-Military Interaction: Data in Search of a Theory", in Charles Kennedy and David J. Louscher, eds., Civil-Military Interaction in Asia and Africa (Lieden: E.J. Brill, 1991), pp. 1-10. 3 Ibid,P- 1. 4 ItM 3 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. 2nd.edn. (London: Penguin, 1975). 6 It should be noted that in both Burma and Indonesia, professionally-trained soldiers and officers did exist. They served in British units during the fighting in Burma. In Indonesia, they existed as the col-onial army (the Royal Netherlands Indies Army). In both cases, these were units comprising mainly ethnic minorities. After independence, the more professional officers were pushed out by the "political soldiers." 7 Although the claim is partially valid in the Indonesian case, it should be stressed that the independ-ence "war" also involved political and diplomatic struggles. A similar claim by soldiers in Burma is more of a myth (and a persistent one at that), in the view of Dr. Ba Maw - the supreme leader (Adipati) of war-time Burma and a leading mentor of the Thakins. See Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma: Memories of a Revolutionary. 1939-1946 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). This will be discussed further in the relevant chapters. 8 Soldiers defended the new power-holders against challengers and those who rejected, or wished to change, the boundaries of the new states. Almost all "national" boundaries in the Third World were demarcated by colonial powers (as with the British-French demarcation of Siam). Hence, it is not surprising that the "modern" boundaries bequeathed to certain ethnic groups, demarcating certain countries as "belonging" to them, are disputed by others who find themselves arbitrarily incorporated as "minorities". For an iconoclastic, intriguing discussion of the making of "Siam" by Britain and France, see Thongchai Winnichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of a Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992). This source also addresses the claims made by Thai leader Pibul 22 Songkhram, the "modernizing" strongman-ruler - and by others - that Thailand (Siam) existed as a "nation-state" for centuries. 9 It would be rash to say that military intervention is a thing of the past in Thailand. In the 1980s, it was thought that soldiers had "permanently" vacated politics. However, in 1991, General Suchinda Kraprayoon overthrew the Chart Thai (Chatichai Choonhavan) government. After the 1992 "Bloody May" protest (when Suchinda was forced to step down), a coalition government led by the Democrat Party's Chuan Leekpai was installed by electoral means. Another election was held in 1995, and a coalition government headed by Banharn Silpa-archa (Chart Thai) ruled until it resigned in late 1996. Former General Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth now heads a coalition government, following a general elect-ions in early 1997. 10 This phrase is borrowed from Eric A.Nordlinger's influential article on military intervention, where he discusses and refutes the "military-as-modernizer" argument. See Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States", American Political Science Review 64 (December 1970), pp. 1131-1148. A few notable examples that view soldiers as "modernizers", are: Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Modernization", in John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 69-90; Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade", in World Politics (April 1959), pp. 339-340; John J. Johnson, The Military and Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Edwin Lieuwen, Generals vs Presidents (New York: Praeger, 1964); Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); and Martin C. Needier, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America", American Political Science Review 60 (September 1966), pp. 616-626; P.J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961). 1 1 See Samuel E.Finer, "The Morphology of Military Regimes", in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Karbonski, eds., Soldiers. Peasant and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Mod-ernizing Society (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 281-304 (281 and 301 esp.); Harold Crouch, "The Military and Politics in Southeast Asia", in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, eds., Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 287-317 (esp., p.287, 314-315); Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics: An Introduction (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), p. 149. 12 The "cleaning up the mess" explanation is the standard justification of coup-makers. It has been quite effective in legitimating coups externally, especially those which took place in the 1960s. Such a claim is today less effective, because more is now known about military rule. 13 Works on military withdrawals are numerous. They include: Samuel E. Finer, "The Retreat to the Barracks: Notes on the Practice and Theory of Military Withdrawal from the Seats of Power", Third World Quarterly. 7(1) January 1985, pp. 16-30; Claude E. Welch Jr., No Farewell To Arms (Boulder: Westview, 1989), esp., Ch.2, pp. 9-29; Edward Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats (Boston: Houghton 23 Mifflin, 1973); Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Random House, 1957); Talukder Maniruzzaman, Military Withdrawal From Politics (Mass: Ballinger, 1987), esp., pp. xii, 80-89, 91-95, 99-102,209, 212; Paul Cammack and Philip O'Brien, Generals in Retreat (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1985). 14 The similarity between the "back to the barracks" and "democratization" literature is interesting. The military figures prominently in both. For examples, see Constantine Danopoulos "Intervention and Withdrawal: Notes and Perspectives", in Constantine P. Danopoulos, ed., From Military to Civilian Rule (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 1-18; and D. Ethier, "Introduction: Processes of Transition and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical Indicators", in Diane Ethier, ed., Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe. Latin America and Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 3-21. 15 Robin Luckham, "Introduction: The Military, the Developmental State and Social Forces in Asia and the Pacific: Issues for Comparative Analysis", in Viberto Selochan, ed., The Military, the State, and Development in Asia and the Pacific (Boulder: Westview, 1991), pp. 1-49 (p. 16). A typically confusing analysis of military disengagement focused on Southeast Asia, is found in Ulf Sundhaus-sen, "The Durability of Military Regimes in Southeast Asia", in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, eds., Civilian-Military Relations, pp. 269-286. The above is an unfortunate example as Sund-haussen is usually a perceptive analyst of the military. He states that the military will disengage only if "civilian forces group together, demand power for themselves, and offer policies that are acceptable to a majority of the people without antagonizing the military." This "solution", although theoretically plausible, begs the question: how are civilians to band together when political activities are circum-scribed by the military? 1 6 Crouch, "The Military and Politics". 1 7 Ibid., p. 311. 18 The term "post-coup" is in parentheses because authoritarian states established by soldiers need not always result from coups. For example, in 1958, Ne Win took over as head of the caretaker government of Burma upon being "invited" to do so by Prime Minister U Nu. This was not a coup; there was even a provision for it in the Constitution. U Nu was "persuaded" by "Young Turk" Brigadiers — Aung Gyi, among others — to hand over power to Ne Win to help set up elections. Suharto attained power in Indonesia in 1965 as head of the counter-coup force. 19 Crouch, "The Military and Politics", p. 315. Also, Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science: Macro-political Theory. Vol.3 (London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 175-411 (esp., p. 284). 20 For example, see Finer, The Man on Horseback, pp. 66-71, and Eric A.Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1977), pp. 65-71. 24 2 1 Crouch, "The Military and Politics", p. 295. 2 2 For excellent works essential to the understanding of Third World politics, see Gerald A. Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974); Robert H. Jackson and C.G. Rosberg, Jr., Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince. Autocrat. Prophet. Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); W. Howard Wriggins, The Ruler's imperatives (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Clapham, Third World Politics. 2 ^ See Claude, E. Welch, Jr., and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civilian-Military Relations (Belmont, California: Duxbury Press, 1974), esp. pp. 34-80, 235-62. See also a special issue on civil-military relations in Pacific Focus. Vol. PV, No.2 (Fall 1982). Among the articles in the issue, see Chung-in Moon, "Democratization, National Security Politics and Civil-Military Relations: Some Theoretical Issues and the South Korean Case", (pp. 3-22), and J. Samuel Fitch, "Military Professionalism, National Security and Democracy: Lessons from the Latin American Experience" (pp. 99-147). 23 Amos Perlmutter, "Civil-Military Relations in Socialist Authoritarian and Praetorian States: Pros-pects and Retrospects", in Roman Kolkowicz & Andrzej Karbonski, eds., Soldiers. Peasants, and Bureaucrats, pp. 301-331. 25 Perlmutter, "Civil-Military Relations", p. 318. The difference between a professional military force and a politicized one is highlighted by the recent disbanding of a Canadian Airborne regiment by a civilian government over atrocities in Somalia. Several top brass, including General Jean Boyle, the armed forces chief, were grilled by a civilian commission. In some Third World countries, in particul-ar, in the countries examined — Burma, Indonesia, and even Thailand — there would, in the first place, not likely be voices raised about military atrocities especially those occurring far away. And also, had civilians shown this much assertiveness, a coup would have been staged, with "political interference" in military affairs likely cited as the reason. 26 Samuel P.Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 192-198. 2 7 Clapham, Third World Politics, p. 139. 2 8 Ibid., p. 140. 2 9 Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti", pp. 1136-1137. 30 Fitch, "Military Professionalism, National Security". 3 1 Ibid., p. 107. 3 2 See Odetola, T.O. Odetola, Military Regimes and Development. (London: George Allen and 25 Unwin, 1982), pp. 182-84., and Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats, p. 18. 33 Robin Luckham, "Introduction, etc.," in Viberto Selochan, ed., The Military, the State, pp. 30-31. 34 See Odetola, Military Regimes and Development, pp. 182-84., and Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats, p. 18. Except in rare cases such as Prem Tinsulanonda in Thailand in the 1980s (to be discussed later). 35 For a discussion of the military's strong distrust of politics, and its special dislike of the politics of diverse groups with conflicting interests, see also Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment, pp. 109-112. 36 Manuel Antonio Garreton, The Chilean Political Process (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 68-83. Although the definition of the ideology of "national security" is derived from a discussion of soldiers in Latin America (Chile, in particular), it represents the mind-set of military-authoritarian rulers, and is applicable to other Third World areas. 3 7 Ibid, P- 69. 3 8 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 39 Ibjg^  pp. 70-72, 75. 40 Finer, "The Morphology of Military Regimes", p. 281. 41 Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", p. 264. 42 Ibid, pp. 179,264-265. 43 Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Frederick A.Praeger, 1965), pp. 3-14. The authors' use of the term "autocracy" and objection to the term "authoritarian" seems problematic, however. They say that it "rather misleading to speak of autocratic regimes as 'authoritarian'" (pp. 9-10), because they define authority as residing in both power and legitimacy. They therefore assert that a constitutional democracy may be highly authorit-arian — even more than an autocracy. Nonetheless, I will employ the commonly-accepted term "authoritarian regime", to denote not very democratic or dictatorial regimes, rather than "autocracy" or "autocracies", the terms used by the authors. 44 Ibid, p . 8. 45 Ibid., pp. 4, 8-9. However, the term "law and order" is a favoured slogan of coup-makers and authoritarian regimes, and is often used to justify repression. It is also effective in placating external audiences, since the fear of anarchy is universal. However, the term "law and order" poses a grave problem when the judiciary is not autonomous, and law itself is subject to "the rule of men" as 26 opposed to it being impartially and equally applied. 46 Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, pp. 4-5, 9. 4 7 See David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London: Macmillian, 1991), p. 232. 4 8 Ibid, pp. 228-236. 4 9 Ibid., p. 232. 50 Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", pp. 265-266. 5 1 Ibid., p.266. 5 2 Ibid. 53 Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire Building in the New State", in World Politics. Vol. 20, No.2 (January 1968), pp. 94-206. Although written more than a decade ago, it is still pertinent today, validating the author's argument (pp. 205-206) that personal rule and patrim-onialism will not be easily swept away, as then expected (or assumed), by the advent of industrializ-ation in the Third World. Also, Clapham, Third World Politics, pp. 44-59 (Neo-Patrimonialism and its Consequences); and Harold Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia", in World Politics. Vol.31, No.4 (July 1979), pp. 571-587. His expectation (over a decade ago) that the patrimonial-style stability will not endure owing to the development of the economy and greater bureaucratization, rationality, and regularity associated with economic development (p. 587), has not, so far, been fulfilled. Parimonial-style stability is still very much in evidence. 54 Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule", pp. 575-579 (on patrimonialism in Suharto's New Order state). 55 Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", pp. 253-255, 263-264. Also see, Ann Ruth Win-ner, "The Neo-Traditional Accommodation to Political Independence: The Case of Indonesia", in John T. McAlister Jr., ed., Southeast Asia: The Politics of National Integration (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 517-541. 56 The phenomenon that O'Donnell points to in the Latin American context is applicable to most Third World societies as well. See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes", in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democratization in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 17-56 (esp., pp. 21, 26, 34, 36). As S.N. Eisenstadt notes, moreover, post-traditional ("modernizing") orders are characterized by political-aclministrative fram-ings that exploit both traditional and modern symbols. They are bureaucratic political orders whose modern, legal-rational facade cloaks a neotraditional core — social and political arrangements that are inegalitarian, particularistic, ascriptive, paternalistic, etc. By "inegalitarian" is meant not only 27 the unequal distribution of wealth, privileges, and power, but the whole complex of social ordering when the essential relationship is a hierarchical one, with superior or inferior status based on ascriptive criteria (age, possession of power and office, status, position in the kin group, etc.). See S.N. Eisenstadt, "The Influence of Traditional and Colonial Political Systems on the Development of Post-Traditional Social and Political Orders", in Hans-Dieter Evers, ed., Modernization in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 3-18 (esp., p. 13). For a short but insightful exposition of the Third World's patrimonial, anti-institutional style of politics, see Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics, pp. 44-60. 5 7 Clapham, Third World Politics, p. 153. On the subject of military re-intervention, which he dis-cusses pertaining to the "veto coup", see pp. 146-147. 58 The concept of personal rule is also well established in academia, especially in the context of Third World regimes and politics and studies of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. For example, see Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule.; Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy; Hugh M. Hamill, Jr., ed., Dictatorships in Spanish America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965); and Daniel Chirot, Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in our Age (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1994). 59 Heeger. The Politics of Underdevelopment, p. 117. 60 Finer, "The Morphology of Military Regimes", p. 281. 6 1 Ibid., pp. 301-302. 62 Ibid. For a discussion on the military, the bureaucracy, and supreme decision-making power, see pp. 297-301. 63 The phrase, "simple ancillaries and appurtenances" is Finer's. Ibid-, p. 301. For a brief discussion on military regimes and parties and legislatures, see , pp. 287-291. 28 CHAPTER TWO: THE MILITARY AND THE STATE a Introduction: The Military and the State In the preceding discussion, the phenomenon of military intervention was exam-ined, with particular emphasis on the military which does not disengage from politics, but rather, to varying degrees, maintains its political control of the state. The military's actions were examined in terms of the political reorganization of the state. These actions have a powerful influence on the nature of state-society interaction. Because the military is involved in the restracturing of politics, it also affects the ways societal groups articulate interests and/or relate to the state, and because power is concentrated at the top, it increases the autonomy of the state. Consequently, the military normally maintains a highly autonomous authoritarian state order. However, as I have stressed earlier, military authoritarian regimes are not identical. Their characteristics will vary from regime to regime, as will the degree of authoritarianism, and the extent to which the state structures are autonomous. To gain a better theoretical appreciation of the military's role in politics, it is necessary to examine concepts that assist in understanding the state — the ultimate structure of power and dominance in any state-society formation. Significant here are a number of key concepts relating to the state: the nature of state autonomy; the way power is organized or arranged; the particular forms of the state-society interrelation-ship; and, finally, changes in the patterns of domination or relative autonomy among elements within the state in military-authoritarian orders. 29 The State, Society, and the Autonomy of the State There is a general tendency, when discussing the state, to apply the term rather broadly. For example, it is often used interchangeably with a territorially-bounded entity (colloquially, a country, or "nation-state"); a set of powerholders (the ruling regime or government); the bureaucratic machinery, its personnel, and a set of national institutions (executive, legislative, judicial); the overarching structures of power and domination; and so on. The wide application of the term may be confusing, but all these definitions seem valid, depending on the context. For this purposes of this inquiry, "the state" is defined as an ensemble of power structures, manned and directed by power-holders and officials, situated within an internationally recognized legal-territorial space (sometimes known as the "nation-state"), and dominating another set of structures and relationships: the wider society. From this standpoint, the state is part of society, and society is part of the state. However, as Naomi Chazan notes, state and society can be analytically conceptualized as intersecting, interrelated, but potentially independent variables.1 The relationship between state and society is a complex, dynamic one. To better to understand how the state relates to society and vice-versa, it is important to study elements of the state in relation to forces within society, and also the reverse.2 In this thesis on military-authoritarian regimes, the military constitutes an important component of the state. At the heart of the politics of state-society interaction is the issue of state autonomy, which will be examined next. An especially well-known position on state autonomy is Karl Marx's view of the modern state as a committee for managing the common affairs of the capital-holding class, the bourgeoisie.3 The state is merely a "loyal agent" of capital. However, in a review of Marx's thoughts on the state, Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum assert that different historical circumstances can 30 produce different outcomes in the nature and development of states. Thus, although the Prusso-German empire, Switzerland, Britain, and the United States all had in common a capitalist system, the form of the state in each was different.4 Marx even argues that under particular circumstances, the state may stand above, and distinct from, society. In Prussia, residual feudalist influences enabled the landed classes to construct a state that was "oppressive, independent, a sacred force [in no way] degrad-ing itself by becoming a vulgar instrument of bourgeois society".5 The Bonapartist state, in Marx's view, was likewise one which reduced all classes ~ including the bourgeoisie ~ to a position of subservience, kneeling "before the rifle butt".6 The view of the state as autonomous from or independent of society is advanced by Eric Nordlinger in his analysis of state autonomy in democratic states, the United States particularly.7 Nordlinger argues that the convention holding that state elites and functionaries (or as he puts it, "state officials") in democracies are "consistently constrained by societal groups" is a distortion of reality. Even when the preferences of powerful societal actors diverge from those of officials, the latter not only possess, but are able to capitalize on, "autonomy-enhancing capacities and opportunities". They are able to translate their preferences into public policy. He maintains that officials do act in ways that assert the state's autonomy, in disregard of the preferences of society.8 Gianfranco Poggi shares Nordlinger's views.9 He notes that officials in democracies, having secured firm guarantees of tenure, pensions, and "the autonomy of their professional judgement", do assert their independence, and that the increased use of highly technical knowledge in administering a complex economy "leaves the mere citizen nowhere".10 Poggi sees public policy increasingly being replaced by bureaucratic interaction among self-regarding state interests and their allies in business (the "privileged parts of society").11 For her part, Theda Skocpol notes that all states 31 play a major role in forming and implementing policies, managing economic development, resolving extranational problems, and shaping class formations and social protests.12 It would seem, then, that the state everywhere has a high degree of autonomy, and society is somewhat powerless in its relations with the state. The question that arises at this point is: if the state is increasingly autonomous, even in a democracy, how does a democratic state differ from an authoritarian or even "totalitarian" one? Is there, at bottom, no difference at all in terms of the state's relative autonomy or independence from society? If there is, what is/are the differentiating feature(s)? To answer these questions, we must delve further into the various aspects of state autonomy. Extrapolating from Skocpol's discussion of state autonomy, the concept can be broken down in four ways.13 First, the state is autonomous relative to society because it responds to a dominant class, the bourgeoisie, more than to the "public". This is the conventional perspective of Marx and Marxian scholars in general. To a degree, it is also Poggi's. Second, it is autonomous from privileged segments (the bourgeoisie, traditional notables, landowners, etc.), and responds to the need to achieve higher nationalist or "communitarian" goals. This is the ideal claimed by nationalists, author-itarians, and recently some Asian/ASEAN leaders. Third, the state is relatively independent of all classes and segments, and responds mainly to the policy preferences of state officials. This, more or less, is Nordlinger's position (and that of Marx the sociologist).14 And four, it is relatively not autonomous, but responds to all, because the state is a site of contestation between groups that articulate different and conflicting interests. This is the view of the pluralist, liberal school. In the context of the autonomy-responsiveness axis, it is possible to consider the phenomenon from another perspective: to what or to whom is the state responsible or 32 responsive? A useful conceptualization in this regard is Nordlinger's treatment of the state's autonomy and responsiveness in terms of the autonomy relations of society and the state (and state officials).15 In Nordlinger's view, state autonomy rests on malleability, insulation, and resilience, among other factors.16 Less malleable or non-malleable states are those that are not susceptible or responsive to societal pressures. "Malleability", in turn, is determined by whether the state is separated by high (non-porous) or low (porous) "walls". In the former, officials will tend not to respond to, or will ignore, societal preferences.17 "Insulation" is an autonomy-maximizing feature. Nordlinger states that the most extreme type is represented by "sultanism," where the ruler is little concerned with responding to his subjects. Insulation is high in a state where officials do not depend on society for resources, but rely on coercive measures rather than upon support that is more or less freely given.18 "Resilience" is defined as the state's capacity to counteract potential and actual societal opposition. The state is resilient when officials possess policy instruments that enable them to use a "carrot-and-stick" strategy to assert autonomy. The instruments at hand include the granting or withhold-ing of contracts, licenses, and exemptions; other discretionary behaviour, such as the speed or tardiness with which laws are implemented or ignored, the strictness or laxness with which regulations are enforced, and the like.19 The state will have a high degree of autonomy from society if the state is low in malleability, and high in insulation and resilience. But the insulation, resilience, and malleability that account for the autonomy of the state are also determined, in Nordlinger's formulation, by the availability to society of access to the state, and by the depth of a society's intermediary institutions and associations20 ~ i.e., the way power and state-society relations are organized. An 33 inference can be drawn that the autonomy of the state and its officials rests, to a large degree, on the existence of these intermediary institutions and associations, their autonomy from the state and its officials, and their ease of access by society. Where they are nonexistent or not autonomous, and where accordingly their availability to societal forces is limited, the state will tend to be highly autonomous. Society, conversely, will be relatively non-autonomous vis-a-vis the state. Skocpol makes a similar point about state autonomy: namely, that it is not a simple phenomenon, nor does it stand alone. It is closely tied to two main factors. The first is the situation of state actors. Their organizational resources and policy instruments, their means of utilizing power, their ideology, and their cohesion will influence their propensity to assert state autonomy. These, in turn, determine the extent to which the state and its officials are autonomous from society. The second factor is the strength or weakness of non-dominant segments and/or powerful private interests (especially economic interests), together with their degree of access to the state, i.e., via autonomous and accessibile intermediary institutions and channels to the state. This will determine the degree to which the state responds to or ignores them, which is indicative of the extent to which the state preserves autonomy from society. As Skocpol puts it, state autonomy is not "a fixed structural feature", but varies with the dynamics of politics. Those dynamics centre on the question of who, or what, has privileged access to the state and is able to move it in the desired direction.21 In other words, state autonomy is largely the function of political interaction or, simply, politics. It is, fundamentally, the way power and politics are organized.22 The Democratic Institutionalization of Political Power Democratic systems occupy one end of the spectrum, representing in ideal-34 typical form, at the extreme end, a pluralistic system where the state is responsive to society and not very autonomous from it. As discussed, the autonomy of the state hinges on (1) factors internal to the state, such as organizational resources and policy instruments, ideology or mind-set, cohesion of state elites, and (2) the availability of access to the state by social forces, i.e., the depth and autonomy of Nordlinger's "inter-mediary institutions and associations" that mediate state-society relations and interact-ions. At this juncture, it will be useful to explore, briefly, some of the salient features of the state and how they relate to society. Skocpol, citing Max Weber, notes that states are compulsory associations claiming control over territories and people within them.23 A(miinistrative, legal, extractive, and coercive organizations are the core of any state. States matter because of the power that enamates from them. States may formulate and pursue goals that do not reflect the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society,24 i.e., they attempt to assert their autonomy from social groups. However, states are variably structured. The organizational configuration and structures of states, along with their overall patterns of activities, "affect political culture; encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions (but not others); and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not others)".25 Some may be "embedded"26 in some sort of constitutional-representative system of parliamentary decision-making or electoral contest for key executive and legislative posts, and some others, as implied, may take in various forms of non-parliamentary or authoritarian arrangements. States vary in their structures and the way they function for a number of histor-ical, economic, political and cultural reasons, including, as an important reason, the actions of key elites. Precisely because states do vary in their structures and in the 35 way which political power is organized, it is possible to place along a continuum states exhibiting varying degrees of state autonomy. Like democracy and authoritarianism, state autonomy is not an issue of "yes-and-no", but a matter of "more-or-less". In a state where political power is democratically organized and the state is compelled by its own legal requirements to provide social forces with relatively open access to politics and avenues of political influence, and more freedom of political action, the state will be (and is) relatively less autonomous from society, and more responsive to competing social forces. Poggi's thoughts on how political power is organized in a democratic polity27 help clarify the patterns of autonomy in different states and regime, which further our understanding of some of the key differences between democratic and authoritarian states. Poggi's inquiry into the nature of the democratic state begins with the notion that in any state-society order, political power is paramount with respect to other social power. Power — the capacity to mobilize the energies of others, even against their will ~ is grounded, in the political sphere, upon the possession of coercive capabilities. The state holds the legitimate monopoly over these.28 Since political power directly relates to the state, the way it is organized will define its nature, and thus the measure of its autonomy as well. What characterizes a democratic state is the fact that political power is organized and institutionalized in a particular way. Present first is what Poggi terms "democratic legitimation": the state's acknowledgement that it regards the citizens as the foundation of its rule and the "ultimate seat of all powers that it exercises."29 Second, he claims that a bond links the populace to the state via the notion of citizenship: a set of general and equal entitlements and obligations vested in individuals with respect to the state, as well as the content of society's activity and outputs.30 Third, "the rule of law" exists. 36 Law is brought into the "organization of political power [and] the modes of its exercise," establishing what Weber called "legal-rational domination."31 Fourth, opposition to the state, debates and contestation over policies, critical orientations, and expressions are legitimized and institutionalized ~ indeed, they are regarded as productive. This in turn is linked to the idea of the public sphere: recognition of the rights of assembly, association, and petition. Fifth, there is the established institution of representative government based on free and fair elections.32 An important point about the democratic institution of power is the situation of power-holders and officials. To coin a phrase, power-holders are "temporary tenants of power": they are required to seek popular mandates in competitive elections.33 Also, they are subject to removal by political-legal means if they abuse their power. Likewise, because officials exercise power on the public's behalf, they are public servants, not masters.34 The state is not the "creature" of rulers and officials: the state is "separated," conceptually and institutionally, from officials and holders of power — more accurately, from their personal preferences.35 In other words, the office is more important than the office-holder. To summarize, the principles and practices of states where political power is democratically institutionalized establish the people (as citizens and electors) as the basis of rule. Political power is "tamed" and depersonalized. Citizens are able to protect themselves from the arbitrary exercise of power through legal safeguards and their legitimate right to participate in politics more or less independently of state control. They are also able to make the state respond, in varying degrees, to their pref-erences. The state-society interrelationship is monitored and moderated by the legal sphere and legal-rational procedures, binding on both rulers and ruled. Power is institutionalized in such a way that state power ~ and state autonomy ~ is moderated 37 by countervailing forces in the public sphere. The above discussion of how power is organized illustrates that how the state is structured affects, among other tilings, the pattern of autonomy relations between the state and society. It is wise at this point, however, to be aware that this portrait of the democratic polity, synthesized from Poggi's work, is only a general conceptual one. Despite some fundamental similarities, democracies do differ. They range on the spectrum from the pure liberal democracy model to a more restrictive model of democracy that merges into the most mild form of authoritarianism on the spectrum. The Authoritarian Configuration of Political Power Historically, polities where political power is, in Poggi's definition, "democrat-ically institutionalized", are relatively new. By contrast, untamed political power —its arbitrary use and exercise, its manifestation in a mode of domination based on power held by officials or derived from heredity ~ has been with mankind since the dawn of recorded history.36 It is also more or less the norm in the Third World. As with democratic systems, and perhaps more so, authoritarian systems vary considerably, from mild near the center of the spectrum to harsh near the totalitarian end. The Third World authoritarian state, including the military-authoritarian state, is one where power is not democratically institutionalized. It will suffice to say, as dis-cussed in the previous chapter, with reference to Juan Linz, David Beetham, and Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski,37 that political power and state structures are arranged in such a way that key holders of power, and their power base in the military or the bureaucracy, or both, are largely unaccountable to (and more autonomous from) society, or what might be called the "public". They are also "insufficiently subject to antecedent and enforceable rules of law".38 As Fred Riggs notes, with reference to 38 Thailand,39 the only meaningful political actors are power-holders and top officials, military and civilians ~ an appraisal that could be applied to most Third World "milit-ary" regimes. The state is quite highly "insulated" from society by a body of officials and power-holders. Pressures that direct or influence the state come chiefly from within it, via "palace" politics, or by means of intra-military and intra-bureaucratic struggles, with the "public" (or the ruled), having very little say in "public affairs".40 Power, furthermore, is usually not de-personalized. It rests largely in the hands of personal rulers ~ to varying degrees, depending upon the ruler's ability to assert his dominance and/or autonomy from subordinate power-holders, the military, and cliques and factions within the ruling circle.41 Likewise, in the rest of the system, bureaucratic power is not institutionalized in a rational-legal mode. Rather, it tends to be characterized by particularistic, patrimonial relations that obscure the distinction between public and private domains, and between public and private goods.42 The state and its power structures are generally "semi-private" property, and are often used (or misused) by power- and office-holders for private gain.43 There is in such regimes, the removal ~ but more commonly, the control and manipulation ~ by bureaucratic elites of what Poggi calls the "public space" and inter-mediary institutions and associations: the means by which citizens participate in public affairs, and power-holders are pressured or made accountable.44 Subordinate segments ("the masses") are excluded, coercively depoliticized, and deprived of meaningful access to both the political arena and the state. Owing to such an organizational con-figuration and structures, the Third World military-authoritarian state is, as a rule, quite autonomous, relative to society, but highly responsive to the preferences of state elites - including their private and personal concerns. However, as Linz notes, although authoritarian orders are non-democratic, they 39 are not totalitarian, despite the many similar traits.45 As discussed, there is found in authoritarian regimes a certain measure of participatory pluralism. There often exist political parties ~ but usually a "mobilizing" single-party, and sometimes an official party. Also elections are held, legislatures are "elected" and sit in session, and "legis-lators" might even debate issues. But the political and participatory pluralism in such regimes, in contrast to that in democracies, is limited, controlled, co-opted, and manipulated, as Linz notes.46 In consequence, the relative autonomy of society ~ especially its non-dominant segments ~ is quite low, in contrast to the state and its managers. The above discussion on the way power is organized, and how this results in an authoritarian system, illustrates the importance of state structures — namely, their centrality in shaping state-society politics and the relative autonomy pattern in nation-states. At this point, it is important to note that authoritarian orders are not, as Friedrich and Brzezinski observe, based solely on coercion, repression, or violence.47 There also exists some version of consensus. It is only in the initial stage of their establish-ment, or re-establishment that such consensus tends to be lacking. Over time, they may develop some responsiveness and generate a viable consensus. (On the other hand, they may become more repressive). A broad consensus may emerge as the populace becomes accustomed to authoritarian rule, or as some segments are given, or discover, opportunities for personal advancement and gain 4 8 We might add to this list the idea of consensus based on an ideology,49 such as nationalism; on principles, such as constitutional monarchy; or on a founding constitution that is regarded as legitimate, and which the regime or the ruler might skilfully manipulate. Owing, therefore, to varying mixtures of coercion, repression, violence, rewards, and consensus, authoritarian orders may prove quite durable.50 40 The Military-Authoritarian Order and the State Stratum The shift from one order to another, especially from incipient democracies to an authoritarian one, particularly in the Third World, does not occur by accident. It involves human and political will. Clearly, the impetus for change tends to arise not among those below, in the mass of the population, but among those who already possess the means to affect change, and also dislike the participation of contending social forces in politics. In many, perhaps most, cases, it will be the military ~ ambitious officers, the top brass, or the military chief — who will most directly bring about the shift to authoritarianism. The relocation of political power to the top will involve not only the mobilization and use of coercive agencies, but also the "occupation" by officials (or bureaucrats, armed and unarmed) of institutions that mediate interactions between state and society: representative bodies, political parties, and so on. As Gerald Heeger notes, political roles and position are redefined as roles within the bureaucratic hierarchy.51 The net result is the insulation of the state from society by a special, hierarchically-organized collectivity of state officials - the "state stratum".52 In the Third World, the state stratum is in some respects a bureaucracy. It is also, as James Petras suggests, a distinct social entity: a class-conscious, vertically-and horizontally-linked stratum.53 In military-authoritarian states, the class comprises both military and civilian officials, as well as government politicians and legislators, and intellectuals in "think tanks" and state universities. Incidentally, members of the state stratum will comprise a large segment of the "middle class" of Third World societies. This is the "new class" that Milovan Djilas isolated in the communist and socialist context.54 The typical Third World state stratum, like this "new class", achieves greater dominance through its hold over the state, on which it depends for its 41 livelihood and accumulation of wealth.55 In this situation, as Clive Thomas notes, the "classic relation of economic power to political power" is reversed. Economic power is consolidated "after political power and the state is captured".56 Members of this stratum are differentiated from other strata by various privileges and entitlements. They are also imbued with a distinctive esprit de corps, often built around a strong "us-against-them" feeling towards the mass of the population.57 The existence of this stratum of state functionaries is crucial to the insulation and the non-malleability of the state, and enhances its independence (or autonomy) from society. The Personal Ruler in an Authoritarian Order In addition to the distinct stratum of officials referred to, the most prominent feature of Third World authoritarianism (including its military-authoritarian variant) is the phenomenon of personal rule.58 It is defined by Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg as a system of rule predominating in a poorly institutionalized political arena. The system is structured not by institutions but by the political players themselves. It is a system where the formal rules of the political game do not effectively govern the con-duct of rulers or other political actors most of the time. Rather, political actions result more from personal power and private whims than are derived from established proc-edures inside institutions.59 Personal rulers are not linked with the "public", but to patrons, associates, clients, supporters and rivals, who constitute the "system". As such, political power is not checked by institutions and formal rules. Personal rulers are restrained ~ if, and when, they are ~ by the limits of their personal authority and power, and that of their patrons, associates, clients, supporters, and rivals.60 The authors note, however, that although countries with a comparatively low level of social and economic modernization are especially susceptible to personal rule, 42 relatively "developed" states ~ even modern, developed states ~ are not immune to, as they put it, "personal authoritarianism".61 Personal rule is, according to the authors, inherently authoritarian. It has given rise to "the narrowing of the public sphere and its monopolization by a single ruling party or a military oligarchy", under the direct con-trol, typically, of a dominant personality.62 This has transformed the political process into a private struggle for power and place. It is politics marked by intra-regime fact-ionalism and personal rivalry ~ "palace" politics and "court" intrigues — that revolve around the ruler who exploits, encourages, and manipulates division within a quite narrow circle of key subordinate leaders, so as to maintain both his personal dominan-ce and system equilibrium (or power balance).63 In authoritarian orders established by military means, it is ordinarily the coup leader ~ the officer who has managed to unite the military factions under his leader-ship, often the chief of the armed forces ~ who emerges as the head of state. He is the pivotal player and, as the military regime is consolidated, his role evolves from that of a "military dictator" to the ruler of a more complex (and perhaps legitimate) authoritar-ian order. Further in this respect, it is worthwhile heeding Heeger's point that in a military regime, the armed forces as a whole seldom rule.64 More often than not, the state is "captured" by a military faction or a small group of plotters (in rare cases involving civilian colleagues)65 After the capture of the state, in cases where the military has not yet been unified by a strongman, there will tend to follow a period of often-opaque struggle between military factions and aspirants to personal power. Finally, a winner will tend to emerge; but it is also possible that intense military factionalism may never be effectively resolved, leading to a successor coup or coups, and sometimes to polit-ical disengagement ~ a temporary or more enduring return to civilian rule.66 43 The Strongman-Ruler and the Politics of Military Factions After the capture of the state by the military, as a personal ruler dominating an authoritarian order that is well on the way to consolidation, the strongman-ruler will have to "tame the tiger" on whose back he rode to power: the armed forces. He will need to make it a more pliant instrument, which may involve turning it into a more professional, less overtly politicized body. This he may accomplish by playing factions off against each other; by appointing loyalists to strategic positions; by restmcturing the chain of command; or by removing elite units from the operational control of the top brass. He will often resort to purges of actual or potential military rivals (usually senior officers, and those with an excess of ability or ambition). He will also keep top soldiers off balance, by transferring them or by compelling them to spy on each other. The military may also be tamed by the provision of rewards, as noted in the earl-ier chapter. Rewards for the military as a whole may include bigger military budgets, more modern military hardware, the funding of pet projects, the granting of commerc-ial monopolies and other opportunities to accumulate wealth through the selling or "renting" of influence, bribery, corruption, and extortion. Officers may be given positions as government politicians, legislators, bureaucratic "czars," and the like, both to keep them busy and divided amongst themselves. Rewards also tie them more closely to the "great benefactor": the strongman-ruler. The provision of rewards and opportunities will entrench soldiers more deeply in the structure of power, giving them a personal stake in upholding both the authoritarian system and the preeminence of the ruler-and-benefactor. The strongman-ruler may also attempt to keep the military in check by creating 44 new centres of power headed by civilians who are wholly dependent on his favours. He might even allow the civilian bureaucracy or the governing party a degree of auton-omy from the military, thereby offsetting the military's role and influence with a net-work of civilian ministers, bureaucratic czars, and governmental party bosses. Often the ruler will create special intelligence agencies which are given wide powers both to sow fear among the populace and to spy on members of the officer corps. This phenomenon of the smfting relationship between the strongman-ruler and the military is well-documented in the literature on military regimes. It has, however, been insufficiently theorized. The gap in the literature seems to derive from a failure to appreciate the changes that occur in the role and status of the strongman-ruler vis-a-vis the military, as he becomes more of a "national" leader and presides over a more complex and mature authoritarian order.67 Building Authoritarian Orders: Differing Strategies and Different Outcomes As the pivotal figure in a complex authoritarian order, the strongman-ruler is further prodded to extend and consolidate his personal control and to legitimize the fact of his dominance. The particular strategy employed will depend on the psycho-logical makeup, skill, and style of the strongman-ruler. He may choose to construct a new order that is based on soldiers alone. He will then insert soldiers into the power structure with little regard for the former occupants (that is, civilian officers, techno-crats and previous political appointees). In other cases, military dominance will be "diluted".68 For example, the ruler, while reliant on the military, will not only incorporate civilian officials into the new order, but also various technocrats, politicians, notables, and so on. A wider and more inclusive support base is the intended result. In the process, civilian bureaucrats may 45 be made into reliable ~ if at times coerced and mtimidated ~ supporters of the reorganized authoritarian order.69 In keeping with, as Linz notes, limited political pluralism that marks authoritarian regimes, as discussed, the ruler will build up a constitutional facade ~ consisting of political parties, electoral processes, legislative-representative assemblies, and corporatist-style bodies like official trade unions, business councils, trade associations, and a variety of government-sponsored bodies that "represent" peasants, women, and so on.70 As the regime "matures," the facade may gain legitimacy, and actually come to function as quite a stable institutional framework for the new order. The strategy selected by the strongman-ruler to consolidate his position and routinize authoritarian rule will, I maintain, shape the contours and trajectory of the authoritarian order. (It must be noted that a mixture of intervening variables ~ econ-omic, social, political, external ~ is also brought into play; the way the ruler reacts to them will play a large part in this regard.) Military-authoritarian regimes will therefore vary widely in their structures, patterns of state-society interaction, and relative auton-omy relations, and so on.71 In some cases, the outcome may be a state that is autocratic, exclusionary, "strong" (in its capacity to repress, at least), and highly autonomous ~ but weak in re-solving problems, and unable to win minimal acceptance from the wider society, owing either to poor economic performance, gross injustices, or increasing alienation. In others, the state may prove to be comparatively strong and stable politically and economically, enduring to, or beyond, the final years of the strongman-ruler. In the longer run, or with the passage of years, however, these states may be faced with potentially serious problems. In cases where states practice some degree of democracy or where constitutional documents enshrine democratic principles, or rulers 46 employ democratic rhetoric to legitimize their hold on power, the regime will be dependent on contmuing and uninterrupted "performance legitimacy" to contain pressures for political liberalization. In cases where the state is unable to win minimal acceptance, the cost to the regime of mamtaining power through coercion, in the absence of legitimacy, can be expected to keep rising. These potential problems will tend to be deepened by a range of new challenges. For example, there are those arising from regional or global power re-alignments, changes in society as a result of economic failure or success, growing tensions between rivals power factions in the ruling circle, and the physical or political weakening of the ruler himself. Also, the regime and the strongman-ruler may also be challenged by a popular, charismatic leader advocating a democratic alternative, or perhaps preaching a fundamentalist religious message that articulates growing popular resentment against (or alienation from) the regime. Faced with these challenges, the entire authoritarian edifice may unexpectedly collapse (as may democratic structures for a different set of reasons). Alternatively, the military may violently restore authoritarian rule under a new strongman-ruler. In the absence of a strongman-ruler, there may be a period of coups and counter-coups as factions and aspiring strongmen battle for dominance. Or political stalemate may result, with neither the military nor the opposition winning a decisive victory. This can result in protracted struggle until one side achieves victory, or until a compromise of sorts is reached.72 A crucial point is that since the whole military-authoritarian order is kept in balance by the skill of the strongman-ruler, it is highly vulnerable to a succession crisis. This could also lead to a crisis in the transition — a transition from one state order to another. Since most such orders are not firmly institutionalized and, more 47 importantly, lack established procedures for succession and/or transition, the decline or death of a strongman-ruler can constitute a dangerous political flashpoint. The crises derive in large part from the personalistic nature of rule: the close identification, over time, of the strongman-ruler with the government, the state, the nation, or because his personal preferences largely influence, or subvert, state policies. This illustrates the extent to which the state's high degree of autonomy relative to society, and its low autonomy vis-a-vis the strongman-ruler, can result in system instability, or at least considerable uncertainty. The Pattern of Autonomy Relations in Military Authoritarian Regimes The vulnerability of the regime to succession and transition crises suggests that the issue of the relative autonomy of the state is more complex than is sometimes acknowledged. The complexity suggests that a different category of autonomy relat-ions may obtain in authoritarian orders. In the literature on state autonomy, debates have mainly centred on the degree of autonomy of the state versus society. They address the relative degree of autonomy of the state, or independence from society granted to state decision-makers, including Wgh-ranking bureaucrats (including military officers where it applies), and technocrats (or techno-bureaucrats) working within the policy-making apparatus of the state (all of whom will, in the proceding passages, sometimes be referred to, for brevity, as "state officials"). It is however assumed that state officials are public servants and that their preferences are bound by the rational-legal, public-oriented norms.73 For example, the preferences of presidents, prime ministers, and cabinet ministers are assumed to be policy-related and in the public domain. Their private preferences and agendas are regarded as marginal to the policy preferences they champion and support. 48 It is, however, the view of this thesis that, just as state and society can be con-ceptualized as two intersecting, interrelated, but potentially independent variables,74 so can the state and its component officials be analyzed along similar lines. Although officials are of the state, if their private preferences largely determine the content of state outputs (i.e., corruption), then a situation arises where officials or key power-holders, and their preferences do not belong, conceptually, to the "public" state. In such instances, they can be conceived as being independent vis-a-vis the state. In Third World mihtary-authoritarian states in particular, along with other authoritarian orders, a situation often arises in which some segment of officials, espec-ially military, are not the servants of the state, but its masters. The state's institutions (the executive and legislative branches, the administrative bureaucracy, regulatory and law-enforcement agencies, the courts, and so on), being subordinated to key power-holders or to the top brass, will often reflect the latter's personal preferences. There-fore, I argue that the relatively autonomous state vis-a-vis society is relatively non-autonomous from the preferences of high officials or the military and its officer class. Military-authoritarian regimes and states are distinguished by three interrelated characteristics which illuminate autonomy relations between, on the one hand, the state (and its institutions), and on the other, state officials (who make decisions within the state's institutions). The first characteristic arises from the transformation of political actors into bureaucratic ones, as some politicians are replaced as representatives or legislators by soldiers (and bureaucrats), as others are excluded or co-opted, and as political parties are banned, manipulated, or neutralized.75 An almost completely "depoliticized hierarchy of governmental organizations" is created as a substitute for a more or less autonomous political arena.76 The explanation for this state of affairs lies in the distrust of politics that many military and authoritarian leaders exhibit, along 49 with their strong dislike of social conflicts to which politics is held to contribute.77 The distrust of political participation extends, as Heeger notes, to regime-sponsored or -sanctioned political parties, and even to its own party.78 The latter is usually insulated from decision-making and not permitted to develop as an autonomous institution. It is used mainly to win votes, manage political participation, and mobilize, theoretically, the "people," ~ in fact the regime's supporters.79 Its other function is to manage, manipulate, and control the representative-legislative sphere (which serves also to provide regime with a mantle of constitutional legitimacy). Because the political arena and the institutions that mediate state-society inter-action are neutralized or controlled, the means by which society can influence or press-ure the state are abolished or radically reduced. The first characteristic contributes to making the state highly autonomous, or less "malleable" - in Nordlinger's formulation - thereby increasing its "insulation" and "resilience."80 This malleability, though, is not as simple as Nordlinger presents it. In military-authoritarian states - in authoritarian orders more generally - the state is non-malleable only so far as the public is concern-ed. It may be exceedingly malleable if the private interests of key power-holders are considered: those of the strongman-ruler, the top brass, favored bureaucrats and their patron-cronies, clan members, and so on. Viewed from this angle, the authoritarian state does not seem to have much autonomy, which leads us to a second characteristic of this type of regime: the erosion of the bureaucracy's organizational integrity and autonomy. After the military's seiz-ure of power, as politicians are replaced by bureaucrats, the bureaucracy —military, administrative, and political — is increasingly brought under the personal control of the strongman-ruler, who holds all meaningful power. As a consequence, impersonal, rational-legal bureaucratic norms are displaced by operational modes and relationships 50 based on patrimonial reciprocity, patronage bonds, personal obligations, and loyalty to immediate superiors ~ above all, to the strongman-ruler. A third characteristic follows from the second. With the whole bureaucracy becoming less rational-legal oriented, more patrimonial, personalistic, and particular-istic,81 the state's policy outputs come increasingly to reflect the personal-patrimonial preferences (of state officials), rather than preferences bounded by rational-legal norms and a public-oriented agenda. The state then becomes the "creature" of the strongman-ruler and, to a varying extent, trusted subordinates (together with their respective personal networks and connections). The relative autonomy of the state is eroded to reflect the interests of those who exercise key power within it. Due to these three characteristics, then, there obtains a pattern of relative auton-omy in which the state is (a) autonomous from society, and (b) more or less "captured" by, and made more malleable to, or non-autonomous from those who hold power or high state and/or military positions. The pattern of state autonomy in military-authoritarian orders is therefore more complex than it seems. In military-authoritarian states, the pattern of relative autonomy relations are thus shaped by the shifting dynamics between three elements — the state, state officials (or key power-holders), and society. As a consequence, the pattern of autonomy relations will differ not only from those in democracies, but among, and also within, a particular military-authoritarian order over time. It will vary according to the ways in which the three elements — the state, officials or power-holders, and society — relate to one another within the system. Military Intervention: The Questions, Concepts, and the Arguments The inquiry into the military intervention phenomenon is chiefly prompted by 51 concern (echoed by scholars like Kennedy, Louscher, and Crouch82) about the unsatis-factory exploration and explanation of the great variety of roles the military may play, and the diverse political and socio-economic circumstances military actors find them-selves in after the state is captured. More plainly put, the study primarily examines what happens after the military seizes power. They are, first, why the military decides to stay on to rule and to reorganize political power; second, how (in what ways) the military decides to reorganize power; third, what kind of military authoritarian pattern emerges when the military chief becomes the state strongman-ruler; and fourth, how differences between, and within regimes, over time, are to be explained? To help in the search for answers to these questions, I have constructed a theoretical framework built around existing concepts on military intervention and the state, state autonomy and relative autonomy; the organization and reorganization of political power in democratic and non-democratic polities; authoritarianism and milit-ary regimes, and authoritarianism and personal rule. I have, on this basis, synthesized a conceptual framework that looks into three interrelated issues (and questions pertin-ent to them): (1) the military and the politics of military intervention as they relate to the reorganization of power in the state; (2) the pivotal role of, and strategies employ-ed by, the military strongman in the reorganization of political power (and long-term outcomes), the relationship between the ruler and his power base in the military; and (3) the nature of military authoritarian orders, their structures (or organizational con-figuration); autonomy relations; the degree of authoritarianism exercised, and the dom-inance (or otherwise) of the military, in the countries examined ~ Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand. Utilizing this framework, I will show that military intervention is a complex, often protracted phenomenon involving the engagement and the use of the armed 52 forces to change the way power is organized. The intention, as noted, is usually to render the state more authoritarian, reinforcing its autonomy vis-a-vis society. The result is what we ordinarily term "military regimes," and the implicit assumption we make is that military regimes are similar enough that they are hardly worthwhile o^ stmgmshing. I maintain, however, that despite the common features of military intervention and backing, these regimes do differ significantly. They vary in terms of the way the state is run, its nature and goals, the extent to which the military participates in governance and dominates the political sphere, and the pattern of relative autonomy relations. They also vary in the degree they are authoritarian: some may be highly authoritarian, some less so, and some may even be quasi-democratic (broadly defined). The exact form of the reorganization of state structures and institutions in a military-authoritarian order will vary widely. This is because much depends on the goals, political will, and astuteness of different strongman-rulers who oversee the process in their respective countries. The degree of autonomy exhibited by the state will also largely depend on the varied systems of governance and control put in place by the strongman-rulers. The strongman-ruler who assumes power with military backing indeed has a unique relationship with the military - he is, after all, its chief. But over time, he will tend to be transformed into a "state" ruler, and his bond with the military will almost invariably slacken. Accordingly, he will need to take action to maintain his dominan-ce over the rhilitary. At the same time, for the sake of legitimacy, it may be necessary or desirable for the ruler to "separate" himself from the military. It is not uncommon for a military-authoritarian regime to be converted into a "civilian"-led, military-backed regime, headed by the military ruler now clad in mufti. The significance of 53 this change varies according to the goals and capabilities of the strongman-ruler. It may be purely cosmetic, or it may lead to efforts to subordinate the military in its political role, while at the same time seeking to avoid incurring its wrath. If successful, the ruler's attempts to subordinate and personally dominate the military will result in the latter becoming a safely co-opted, quiescent elite body. The military and its personnel will often be rewarded with positions in the state or in representative-legislative bodies (including perhaps the government-sponsored political party). If they are abundantly rewarded with budgets, projects, economic opportunit-ies, and the like, the military will likely accept without demur some reduction in its political role and influence. This will obtain provided that the ruler retains his mani-pulative skills and political sawy, and the military does not perceive itself as being "pushed out" in ways that injure its corporate interests and self-image as protector of the nation. Further, in order to dilute the influence of the military, the strongman-ruler may attempt to co-opt other groups into the ruling circle, or recruit new supporters from among elite segments of society: technocrats, bankers, professionals, businessmen, local notables, and so on. Over time, as the state's structures changes shape, this may reduce the state's autonomy vis-a-vis societal and economic elite, though this conseq-uence is often unintended and unforeseen. And attempts may even be made by the strongman-ruler and his subordinates (including those in the military) to obstruct and restrict the "opening" of the state sphere to individuals, groups and sectors outside its parameters. It is possible that in the long run, the autonomy of the state may decline in military-authoritarian regimes and states. To test this and other arguments advanced in these preliminary chapters, I turn now to an examination of three Southeast Asian 54 countries where the military has been politically active and prominent: Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand. 55 E N D N O T E S C H A P T E R T W O : T H E M I L I T A R Y A N D T H E S T A T E 1 Naomi Chazan, "Patterns of State-Society Incorporation and Disengagement in Africa", in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, eds., The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 121-148. 2 Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 25-29. Shue speaks of looking at politics as a process, i.e., the "patterns of flux and flow" among elements that constitute and animate the polity itself, including interactions between elements of the state (bureaucracy, army, party, etc.) and elements of society (elites, village communities, families, and so on). 3 Cited in Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State (Chicago: Chicago Univ-ersity Press, 1983), p. 10. 4 Ibid., p. 4. A formulation more recent than Marx's in this vein is Moore's thesis, whereby the posit-ion of the feudal class (the landowning class) vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie is posited as deteniiining the two paths of capitalism: the parliamentary democratic path, or dictatorship. See Barrington Moore, Jr., The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lords and Peasants in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), esp. Ch. 7 (pp. 413-432). 5 Badie and Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, pp. 4-7. 6 Ibid., pp. 5, 7-8. The authors, however, note that in most of his writings on the state, Marx aband-oned "the subtlety of his earlier arguments" and reverted to a mechanistic, reductionist vision. 7 Eric A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981). 8 Ibid., p. 40. Officials achieve state autonomy by either transforming divergent societal preferences into non-divergent ones (what is termed Type II autonomy), or by ignoring, neutralizing or overcoming societal constraints (Type I autonomy). For Type II and Type I, see pp. 99-117, 118-143, 144-181. Type III autonomy occurs where there is no serious divergence between the preferences of the state (public officials) and society (see pp. 74-98). 9 Gianftanco Poggi, The State. Its Nature. Development and Prospects (Oxford: Polity Press, 1990), esp. Ch. 8, pp. 128-144. 1 0 Ibid, pp. 131-32. 56 1 1 Ibid., pp. 134-36, 142, also 173-196 (Ch.10). 12 Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Current Research", in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 3-37. 1 3 For a brief overview of the various positions on state autonomy, see Ibid., pp. 4-7. 14 At this point, a clarification is called for concerning the preferences of state officials, mentioned in (among other discussions) Nordlinger's and Poggi's presentation of the preferences and relative autonomy of state officials. Here, the underlying implication is that (a) state officials are public serv-ants as understood in the West and generally in academia; and (b) their preferences are related to policies in the public domain, not personal and private considerations. (Nor are they shaped by pat-rimonial relationships, structures, and modes of operation.) The authors are more or less silent about instances where state officials are only marginally "servants of the public" - as in the many Third World states - and where their preferences tend more towards the personal than the public. 15 Eric A. Nordlinger, "Taking the State Seriously", in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Understanding Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1987), pp. 353-390. 1 6 Ibid,, p. 372. 1 7 Ibid., pp. 373-376 (on malleability). 18 Ibid., pp. 376-78 (on insulation and cohesion). Officials in a cohesive state can ignore societal support if they control abundant military, paramilitary, and police forces. These enable them to dis-suade opponents from actively challenging them, or to repress opposition. The author concedes that a less cohesive or "divided" state may also opt for repressive rule. Because it is divided, it will choose repression as a means of self-preservation. 19 Ibid., pp. 379-82 (on resilience) 2 0 Ibid, P- 388. 21 Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In", pp. 14 and 16. In support of Skocpol's point about state autonomy, it should be noted that in the Third World, the state is "insulated" ("separated") from society by a state stratum, as discussed later in the chapter. However, it is not autonomous from (and is highly responsive to) the interests of those who control and manage the state or are linked to the state -powerholders, officials, and those linked in turn to them by patrimonial bonds. 2 2 Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In", p. 25. 2 3 Ibid., p. 7. 57 2 4 Ibid., p. 7, 9. 2 5 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 26 "Embedded" is the term used by Skocpol (Ibid., p. 7). 27 The conceptual and organizational framework presented here as underlying democratic states and polities (despite numerous variations) is based on Poggi, The State. Its Nature, op. cit. and Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978). 28 For a comprehensive discussion of social power (including political power), and an argument that political power is paramount in the state-society formation, see Poggi, The State. Its Nature, pp. 3-18 (Ch.l). 29 Ibid., p. 28. The notion that power legitimates itself, and can be used arbitrarily by those holding power, is anathema to notion of democratic governance and politics. As for legitimacy, a comment by Weber can be applied to most Third World states. According to Weber, a system of domination that is protected by the obvious community of interests among state elites — and where the populace has no say — is one where even the pretense of legitimacy is unnecessary. Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 214. 30 p0ggi? The State. Its Nature, p. 28. It must be noted, however, that the notions of democratic leg-itimation and citizenship are "universal" in the sense that they have, in one form or another, been adopted by all contemporary states, including authoritarian ones - at least formally, in that they are constitutionally enshrined in many authoritarian, even totalitarian, states. 31 Ibid., pp. 29-30. The state creates a separate, independent sphere of law and a legal process, to which all, including agents of the state, submit. 32 Ibid., pp. 55-6. Representation via free, fair, and competitive elections gives a concrete reality to the notion that power comes from the people as electors. It also gives meaning to the notion that the people somehow rule or govern themselves. The fact or perception that elected representatives are controlled by the party leadership, or are unduly influenced by monied or powerful interests, does not totally negate this notion: citizens are empowered periodically as voters to elect new representatives, or to put a new party in power. 33 Poggi's concern about the trend towards reduced citizens' participation in the public sphere, esp-ecially in elections, is quite valid. It stems, as Poggi also notes, from the emphasis of television and other media on "noise" rather than information; the reduction of issues to "sound bites"; "media circus-es" and sensationalized trivia; messages urging mindless consumption; and so on. In addition, job and family pressures, the complexity of policy decisions and problems (along with a lack of accurate infor-mation available to the public), and a variety of other factors have led to the increased "privatization of concerns" and decreased citizen participation in the public sphere. Poggi, The State. Its Nature, pp. 136-138. 58 34 Since they are not "masters," politicians and government functionaries in democracies are nowadays not accorded reverence as superiors; indeed, they are regularly subjected to satire, usually with impunity (consider television shows such as "Saturday Night Live" and "Yes, Prime Minister", as well as cari-catures in newspapers). The deference and reverence that not only national leaders but the lowest bur-eaucrat may expect in non-Western countries is perhaps the most crucial difference between these soc-ieties and their Western counterparts. This may reflect both culture and its offshoot, "political culture." One should not underestimate the success that Third World governments and elites have had in social-izing the ruled into a superior-inferior relationship, and the extent the political-socioeconomic elites have benefitted from neo-traditional values and structures. For an insightful portrayal of the successful "re-traditionalization" of society in Southeast Asia, see Niels Mulder, Inside Southeast Asia: Thai. Javanese and Filipino Interpretations of Everyday Life (Bangkok: Editions Duang Kamol, 1992). 35 To clarify: although state officials operate in the public domain, they also have private preferences. In many non-democratic states, or states that are pervaded by patrimonial norms and structures, there arises a situation where (a) officials' preferences are often more private than public; (b) the state's public offices and power structures are used by state officials (especially those at the apex of the hierarchy) to advance their private agenda. This leads to a situation where the private preferences of officials (especially the personal ruler or the military ruler) become policies of state - a situation that contradicts the "public" nature of the state, or the concept of the state as a public institution. In practice, there is no firm "boundary" (or strong institutionalized distinction), or at best a very fuzzy one, between state officials and the state in terms of the preferences they display. Private preferences effectively become state or public policies. 36 For a comprehensive account of ancient bureaucratic empires (Egyptian, Roman, Persian, Chinese, etc.), see S.N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (London: Macmillan, 1963). 37 Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W.Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science: Macropolitical Theory. Vol.3 (London: Addison-Wesley Publish-ing Company, 1975), pp. 175-411; David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London: Macmillan, 1991); and Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Frederick A.Praeger, 1965). Friedrich and Brzezinski dispute Lenin's claim to have created a "new type of state," and argue that although the Soviet state represents "a radical departure from the traditional and hereditary autocracy," it is only "a new species of autocracy" (p. 3).The authors use the term "autocratic" for non-democratic, authoritarian regimes. They include in this category, military dictatorships and related forms of emergency rule, and the modern personal regimes of Francisco Franco of Spain and Charles De Gaulle of France (op cit. p. 8). 38 Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, p. 4, 8-9. 39 Fred Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1966). 40 Ibid., pp. 197, 212, 326-361, 378-381. To better appreciate the relationships between (a) the state, 59 (b) state elites (or officials and functionaries), and (c) citizens (or society), it is instructive to examine Riggs' schema of the dynamics of four basic components of a polity - the people (society), state elites or officials (the state), political parties (power organizations), and assemblies (political institutions) - as they are configured in different polities. In a democracy, citizens (society) are the basis of rule, since they exert control over officials and policies (the state and its outputs) via parties (power organizations) and assemblies (political institutions). By contrast, in a party-tutelage system, essentially authoritarian in character, the single party (a specialized power organization) or its leaders, constitutes the basis of rule. The party controls assemblies, officials (the state), and society. In a bureaucratic tutelage system, which is also authoritarian, officials (the state) are the basis of rule; they control citizens/society via the manipulation or control of parties and assemblies (op_cit, esp., pp. 181-182). 41 Friedrich and Brzezinski note that an autocracy need not be ruled by a single person. The rule may also be collective, as with rule by bureaucrats - including "armed bureaucrats." See Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, p. 8. The term "armed bureaucrats," applied to soldiers, is found in Edward Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973). Feit argues that military takeovers are propelled by a perceived threat both to order and to the state, by political interference in military affairs, and by the military's principled interest or goal - to regenerate society and reconstruct the polity along "just" lines (p. 18). 42 Guillermo O'Donnell, "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes", in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, & J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democratization in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 17-56 (esp. p. 39). The author also discuss similarities, in some respects, between contemp-orary aumoritarian-patrimonial domination in Latin America and that in ancient patrimonial societies (pp. 36, 39, 50). See also Max Weber, Economy, pp. 774, 776, 784. On the patrirnonialization of Third World bureaucracies and states, see Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics: An Introduction (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), pp. 44-60. 43 in this sense, the state, its offices and agencies - for example, the military - are all transformed into semi-private (if not private) "property" of powerholders/officials, who "rent" it out. See Richard Tanter, "Oil, IGGI and US Hegemony: The Global Pre-Conditions for Indonesian Rentier-Militarization", in Arief Budiman, ed., State and Civil Society in Indonesia (Monash University: Monash Papers on South-east Asia, 1988), pp. 51-98. 44 See Poggi, The State. Its Nature, pp. 145-72. The above conceptual map of a state-society con-figuration where political power is not democratically institutionalized, is synthesized from Poggi's discussion of the contemporary democratic state, and of what he calls "a new type of state", i.e., authoritarian (communist) states. My framework here is also derived from a more specific study of Third World authoritarianism: Clive Y. Thomas, The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Soc-ieties (London: Monthly Review Press, 1984), esp. pp. 49-112. 45 Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", pp. 241-242. 4 6 Ibid., pp. 265-266, 269-274. 60 4 7 Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, pp. 10-12 (the authors discuss the use of violence and terror and interrelated "autocratic cycle" and "violence cycle"). 4 8 Ibii, pp. 12-13. 4 9 See Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats, p. 18-19. Feit argues that the military will be unable to achieve its goal of building "national unity". It can only build what he calls "cohesion without consensus," owing to its inability to formulate a unifying ideology, and because of its distrust of other groups in society, and hence unwillingness to work with them, except on its own terms. However, there are, it might be added, rare military leaders, like Thailand's General Prem — also perhaps, Chaovalit, a general-turned-politic-ian (and the current Thai Prime Minister) — who deeply appreciates the need to bargain with and accommodate politicians and other interest groups, and do not feel the urge to impose the military's version of "unity" over the whole society. All societies are generally pluralistic, if not ethnically, then at least in terms of interest and concerns. 50 Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, pp. 12-13. It might be added that the transition from a simple military regime to a more complex authoritarianism order is usually mark-ed by the "civilianization" of the military dictator and his close subordinates. This is often accompanied by the adoption of the military regime of a new constitution, and in some cases, the holding of "success-ful plebicites", (as in Burma in 1974) or a post-constitution "elections" (in Thailand in 1969 by the Thanom and Praphart military regime, Indonesia in 1971, after Golkar was formed). 51 Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment, pp. 117-118. 52 The term "state stratum" will be used interchangeably with "a stratum of state officials (or state managers)". Here, it describes a collectivity of officials and power-holders who are in more or less "permanent occupation" of the state's structures of power. "State stratum" avoids the problems inher-ent in the terminology common among Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars: "state petty bourgeoisie" (Clive Thomas), "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" (Issa Shivji), "state bourgeoisie" (Nicos Poulantzas), and so forth. The problem is that "bourgeoisie" is used to cover all those who are not peasants or the "proletar-iat". It is also an imprecise term that covers a range of population segment that own "property" (very widely defined). See Clive Thomas, The Rise, pp. 59-60; Issa Shivji, "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle", in L. Cliffe and J.S. Saul, eds., Socialism in Tanzania. Vol. 2 (Nairobi: East African Publish-ing House, 1973), pp. 304-330; and Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Class (London: New Left Books, 1973), p. 334. The problem of "who rules" in Third World states, in class terms, has been much debated. The most commonly-cited works in this regard are Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh", New Left Review. 71 (January-February, 1972), pp. 59-81; John Saul, "The State in Post Colonial Societies: Tanzania", The Socialist Register 1974, pp. 349-72; and Colin Leys, "The 'Overdeveloped' Post-Colonial State: A Re-evaluation", Review of African Political Economy (January-April 1976), pp. 39-48. 53 See James Petras, "State Capitalism and the Third World", Development and Change. 8 (1977), pp. 1-17. Concerning the distinctiveness of the state stratum, in the Third World context (notably in South-61 east Asia, except Singapore), even the lowest state employees are regarded by the lower strata and peasants as "superior" beings. State employees, in turn, tend to view non-officials as "inferior", and often, as unrefined, ignorant. It is not uncommon to see peasants humbling themselves before a lowly township clerk, even in an unofficial social context. Moreover, in recruitment processes, those connect-ed to state employees by kinship or other ties are likely to do better in entry exams than those lacking them. As such, the state stratum is not as open and meritocratic as it would seem. Nor does it owe its cohesion to official functions or roles. The social and cultural context, especially patrimonial-kinship factors, are factored in. 54 Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (New York: HJB Book, 1983), first published 1953. 55 The discussion of the state stratum in authoritarian Third World polities draws on Djilas's analysis (The New Class, pp.37-48). Clive Thomas's work on the "state petty bourgeoisie", is also referred to. See Thomas, The Rise. 56 Thomas, The Rise, pp. 61-2. As Djilas puts it, it is also a situation where necessary administrative functions may coexist with parasitic functions in the same person. See Djilas, The New Class, pp. 39-40. Tanter's discussion on the "renting" of state and public offices by their holders for private gain is a good example of the parasitic nature of the state stratum. See Tanter, "Oil, IGGI". 57 They are socialized into, or ascribe to, a statist ideology (so that their prime loyalty is to the gov-ernment); speak the same "language" (although they may actually speak a variety of tongues); live in special housing estates; and enjoy better amenities, facilities, and usually enjoy a higher standard of life. In many Southeast Asian countries, officials even dress differently - in Western or military-like garb with badges, insignias, etc., in contrast (sometimes sharply) to the peasants, comprising the population majority, who wear traditional garbs. This suggests the need, consciously or otherwise, of many author-itarian rulers to awe the ruled with pomp and splendour, and to mystify both power and their hold on power. Or alternatively, the drawing of a sharp line between officialdom and the populace may be the legacy of colonialism in part, and in part inherent in the hierarchical traditional culture and political culture. Owing to the quite obvious distinction drawn between those belonging to the "state stratum" and those outside, it is more or less appropriate to attribute to the state stratum the same "distinctiveness" accorded to socio-economic classes or communal groups. Often, the shared "affinities" and interests between officials of different ethnic groups may be stronger than those they have in common with the majority of members of their respective ethnic groups. In many respects, the identity-formation process of most Third World "state stratum" are quite similar to those of national-identity formation, as discuss-ed by Benedict Anderson: a common "language," a shared space (or "territory"), a shared "history" and "tradition," regular contacts, communication, and so on. For an excellent discussion on the construction and birth of national identity, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 58 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince. Autocrat. Prophet. Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), esp. pp. 5-8, 14-21, 22-31, 37-38, 64-65, 73-82. The authors' examination of personal rule in Africa is broadly applicable to polities dominated by a 62 paramount leader in other Third World areas. For analyses of personal rule in non-Third World polit-ies, focused mainly on "totalitarian dictators" like Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini, see Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship, esp., pp. 31-44. See also Daniel Chirot, Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1994). 59 Jackson and Rosberg. Personal Rule, pp. 11-12. 6 0 Ibid., p. 19. 61 Ibid., pp. 21.Examples the authors give of relatively "developed" Asian countries where "personal authoritarianism" is found, are Singapore, and Taiwan (in the 1970s). The modern, developed countries they cite are Italy, Germany, and Yugoslavia (before its partition in the early 1990s). However, as Linz points out and history shows, even regimes that might be regarded as firmly institutionalized such as Nazi Germany, experienced personal rule. In such instances, personal rule is, according to Linz, owed to a "committment to an indisputeable ideology that expresses inexorable laws of history". See, Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", p. 207. 6 2 Ibid., p.23-24. 6 3 Ibid., p. 24. 64 Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment, p. 108. 65 in this respect, it might be noted that Iraq's Saddam Hussein was a party-man (of the Ba'ath party), not a military officer. The military became his power base and instrument of rule only after he attained power. Such instances are rare in the Third World — though not so rare as in the Second or First World, where a party or a movement (rather than the armed forces) serves as a vehicle for the consolidation and maintenance of the dictator's personal dominance. 66 In earlier analyses, military cohesion - or the lack of it - after the seizure of power was seldom attributed to the presence or absence of a unifying military strongman. For example, Martin Needier discusses the breakdown of military cohesion in terms of disagreements between hardliners and soft-liners. See Martin C. Needier, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," in Henry Bienen, ed., The Military and Modernization (New York: Atherton, 1971), pp. 79-101 (esp. pp. 86-94). Claude E. Welch, Jr., and Arthur K. Smith also discuss military cohesion, and see low military cohesion as the cause of frequent counter-coup attempts, and unstable and ineffective military rule more generally, as in Thailand (1947) and Nigeria (1966). The authors view cohesion as a function of the social origins of the officer corps; the military socialization process; and the autonomy of the military, among other factors. See Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule: Persp-ectives on Civil-Military Relations (Belmont. California: Duxbury Press, 1974), pp. 14-15, 240-41. 67 The inadequacy of most theorizing about changes in the relationship between the strongman-ruler and the military is understandable, since "men in green" are conspicuous in military-authoritarian states. Further confusion is sown by what could be called the "civilianization" phenomenon, whereby the 63 strongman-ruler and governing or political generals take off their uniforms. As Heeger points out, at the other extreme this has given rise to contentions that the regime is no longer a military one [The Politics of Underdevelopment p. 129 (fh.24)]. Heeger is, however, one of the few who discusses the establish-ment of primacy over the mihtary junta by "a particular military leader". He appoints close aides, loyalists, friends to high military position, purges and transfers rivals, and occupy the position of president, defence minister, and armed forces chief fop cit. p. 117). He is a military leader who, in this thesis, is termed the "strongman-ruler". 68 in some cases, the military will be returned to the barracks after the strongman becomes the ruler of the state. This was the case in Thailand under Pibul, Sarit, and Thanom and Praphart. 69 It must be noted that it is relatively easy for authoritarian rulers to obtain the loyalty, or at least the compliance and deference, of state personnel - regardless of where their real loyalties or preferences lie. Civil servants are, so to speak, the "captive audience" of whoever controls the state. They are dependent on it for their livelihood, sense of self-worth, identity, and so on. In interviews with active and retired civil servants, as well as retired military officers, in Burma, Chiangmai, Bangkok, Singapore, and Jakarta, I found that although many state officials may harbor a deep dislike for authoritarianism in general and military rule in particular, they were fearful of losing the privileges they enjoy, no matter how meagre. Most felt that there was no alternative but to support the regime in power, however personally distasteful they found it. 70 The constitutional facade may be fashioned out of a constitution drawn up by the new regime or drafted by a "constitutional convention" created by the military. This has been the case in Thailand and Burma, as will be shown. Alternatively, the existing constitutional framework may be modified or man-ipulated by the military strongman-ruler and his close advisors and loyalists — as in Indonesia. The 1945 Constitution of Sukarno's "old" order has been manipulated both to stabilize and to legitimize Suharto's new order. 71 Needless to say, these strategies are not mutually exclusive. The more politically sophisticated and skilful rulers will employ a range of strategies, perhaps using one more than others, depending on the strength and weakness of the opposition, the complexity of the situation, or the dictates of expediency. 72 The possible outcomes and scenarios will be outlined and discussed in the country chapters. Here again, the probable scenarios and outcomes are not mutually exclusive. This is all the more so since the strategy selected and implemented depends on a set of complex motives and situations. 73 See Nordlinger, "Taking the State Seriously", pp. 353-390, for an insightful discussion of state autonomy in highly-institutionalized polities where the preferences of state officials are related to public policies - that is, institutional rather than private interests. 74 See Chazan, "Patterns of State-Society Incorporation and Disengagement in Africa", pp. 121-148, and the earlier discussion. 75 Heeger. The Politics of Underdevelopment, pp. 110, 112. 64 Ibid, pp. 109-112. As Heeger notes, the military's goal is to impose an "apolitical calm" and national unity, interpreted as a state of "one-ness" and the absence of social conflicts. For a similar view, see Manuel Antonio Garreton, The Chilean Political Process (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 68-72. For his part, Huntington sees political participation in rapidly-modernizing Third World societies in terms of societal groups that are mobilized into politics in the absence of firmly-established institut-ions that serve to lend order to political participation and politics more generally. Military interventions constitute both a form of direct military participation and a reaction to "praetorian politics" — politics where, in Huntington's words, "the wealthy bribe, students riot, workers strike, mobs demonstrate, and the military coup." Huntington, Political Order, pp. 79-92, 195-196. 78 Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment, pp. 121 -22 7 9 Ibid, pp. 117, 122. 8 0 Nordlinger, "Taking the State Seriously". 81 Heeger. The Politics of Underdevelopment pp. 116-118, 119, 122, 126-127. For observations of the "personalization of executive authority" and the spread of patrimonialism in West Africa - an analysis that can also be applied to other Third World states - see Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966), pp. 110-111, 136, 141-42, 143-44. For Zolberg, these phenomena attest to the growing salience of traditional or neo-traditional relationship structures and practices. See also Alain Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 29-35. Although Rouquie deals with patrimonial relationships and structures in the Latin American context, his analysis is likewise applicable to most Third World states, societies, and political cultures. 82 Charles Kennedy and David Louscher, "Civil-Military Interaction: Data in Search of a Theory," in Charles Kennedy and David J. Louscher, eds., Civil-Military Interaction in Asia and Africa (Lieden: E.J. Brill, 1991), pp. 1-10; and Harold Crouch, "The Military and Politics in Southeast Asia," in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, eds., Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 287-317. 65 \ = — — = — — = ^ = — = = = = = = = = — : ] CHAPTER THREE BURMA: MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN DOMINATION Introduction: The Politics of the State and the Military in Burma Military rule began in Burma in 1962, and was dominated by Ne Win (Thakin Shu Maung1) until the "people's power" uprising of 1988. This was bloodily supp-ressed by the military, which has remained in power to the present. In this chapter, because of the prolonged presence of the military in politics and the important role it has played in shaping the contours of state-society relations and the political land-scape, the examination of the phenomenon of military intervention will go beyond the conceptualization of it as a response to crises, implicitly connoting limitations to the intrusion of the military into politics. Military intervention will be analyzed as one intertwined with the reorganization of power, the reconfiguration of state structures, and the re-ordering of state-society relations. As mentioned in the preliminary chapters, military intervention occurs in complex, diverse historical, socio-economic, and political settings, and is triggered by diverse events and factors. Soldiers are motivated to intervene by a mix of factors — in addition to a situation of "praetorian" politics characterizing the politics of many Third World countries. This is a situation where groups, including the military, participate directly in politics. Although politics in Burma was (and is) praetorian, the military has not ~ unlike its Thai counterpart ~ intervened frequently. It has 66 intervened only three times ~ indirectly in 1958, then in 1962, and 1988. But, as will be discussed, it has dominated the political landscape and has been pivotal as the power base of its chief and ruler, Ne Win, in establishing and mamtaining a harsh military-authoritarian order for over two decades, and it still dominates politics and the state up to the present. The military in Burma has its roots in the politics of a global war. Its leaders, were politicians first and foremost. They were "Thakins" ~ members of a nationalist movement, the Dobama Asi-Avone (or Dobama, "We Bama"2 movement) — who became leaders and officers in a series of nationalist armies created by the Japanese during World War II. The world-view of these military leaders — the military Thakins ~ was shaped by their Dobama creed, with its highly statist and authoritarian ideals.3 The military Thakins have viewed themselves, for reasons which will be dis-cussed, as much more than armed servants of the state. In their view, they fought almost singlehanded against both the British colonizers and the Japanese invaders and they won independence. After independence, they did not intervene in politics until 1958, although they were extensively involved, as were their Indonesian counterparts, in non-military roles. The military Thakins, like their counterparts in Indonesia, were not happy with the post-independence state, the Union of Burma, dominated by the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League), a political front of the Thakins. The new state was more or less democratically organized and comparatively inclusive from a polit-ical and ethnic standpoint.4 It was not in keeping with the Dobama creed which they adhered to. Nonetheless, in the first decade of independence, the military Thakins, as officers of the armed forces, the Bama Tatmadaw.5 defended the AFPFL state and 67 civilian Thakin power-holders against challengers, also armed (a legacy of major World War II campaigns fought in Burma) ~ as will be discussed.6 In defending the state in a "internal war" situation, and undertaking "national security" tasks, the military in Burma, as in Indonesia, gained much political leverage and, in time, grew into a powerful, quite autonomous center within the state. In 1957, when the AFPFL, ruling party, split into two camps and many cliques, the door was opened for soldiers to enter politics. "Young Turk" Brigadiers in the military stepped in as "caretakers" in 1958, to "save" the country from splitting ~ as had the ruling party ~ into two, but returned to the barracks in 1960. As will be examined, the first military's foray into politics was not led by the military's chief, Ne Win, but by "Young Turk" Brigadiers who placed their chief, Ne Win, as head of a military caretaker government. Quite uncharacteristically — to judge from his later performance — Ne Win chose to rule as a constitutional military caretaker. Elections were promised for 1960. Even though the AFPFL (Stable) faction favored by the military was humiliated in these elections, the mihtary kept its pledge — given by its chief, Ne Win ~ to return to the barracks. In 1962, the military, unified by Ne Win ~ after the purge of most "Young Turks" Brigadiers prominent in the niilitary-caretaking government ~ stepped dramat-ically onto the political stage. This time, it was led personally by Ne Win, now the undisputed leader, and he meant business. As will be discussed, he proceded to re-organize political power in an authoritarian direction. Like Sarit in 1958 (in Thai-land), he abrogated the 1947-1948 Constitution; abolished parliament; banned political parties; detained the Prime Minister, U Nu, cabinet members, the Chief Justice, Members of Parliament, leaders of non-Bama ethnic segments (especially of 68 the Shan), politicians (both of the left and the right political spectrum), and so on; closed down papers and imposed censorship and, just three months after the coup, had a number of protesting Rangoon University students killed. In contrast to Sarit and Indonesia's Suharto, Ne Win decreed a "socialist" economy, and set up a "socialist," one-party, military-authoritarian order around the BSPP, with himself as supreme leader. Ne Win's military-run Lanzin.7 or BSPP (Burmese Socialist Program Party) state, was well in line with the authoritarian, nationalist-socialist Dobama creed. He reorganized political power and the order of state and society in ways that shut out not only the population at large, but also most non-military (or civilian) elites, both bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic, from the political arena and limited their access to the state. Laws instituted to promote and protect the "Burmese Way to Socialism" prohibited the masses from engaging in private economic activity, causing them enormous economic hardship ~ again markedly unlike the economic paths chosen by military-authoritarian regimes in Indonesia and Thailand. In 1988, owing in large part to the extreme hardships associated with "socialist" economic failures and the monopolization of political and economic resources by the military, Ne Win's state "of soldiers, for soldiers, by soldiers" was confronted and challenged by popular forces in a country-wide, urban "people's power" uprising. Seemingly invulnerable, the BSPP state nonetheless collapsed almost overnight. The power base of the "old" regime, the military, did not collapse, however. It was still held together by Ne Win's authority, or by fear of the leader. This, together with fear of popular retribution that might await them, spurred the military to carry out a bloody coup to re-establish military-authoritarian rule, and 69 restore the status-quo ante and with it, the military's dominant place. This time, the military ~ represented by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) — claimed it would hold onto power only to restore law and order and promote free-market economic development. Nearly a decade later, it still rules at gunpoint. State and Society in Burma: A Brief Overview I stated in the theoretical framework that the military intervention in politics and the reconfiguration of the state-society order are closely linked. As a point of departure in the examination of the military as an armed political actor involved in the politics of the state, a brief survey of the nature of state orders and state-society relations in Burma follows. Because this inquiry focuses on military intervention in "modern" states, the older Burmese "kingdoms," though interesting in themselves, will not be considered. Suffice it to say, with Renee Hagesteijn, that the "kingdoms" in what we now know as Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand — and in Southeast Asia generally ~ were non-territorial "states," where rule and dominance was articulated in a personalistic, non-institutionalized way. These were systems based on shifting, unstable relations between supra-regional lords ("kings") and regional lords (tributaries), and among the "kings" themselves.8 Strictly speaking, there was no "state" in the modern sense - only structures of domination based on, and moderated by, patrimonial bonds. The ruled — "society" ~ had no say in politics or the affairs of "state," nor much protection from the rulers and their officials and favourites.9 The genesis of the Burmese state in its modern form lies in the economic expansion of the West and its political by-product, colonialism. It is a classic case of the flag inevitably following trade, as John Furnivall notes.10 Over time, "planting 70 the flag" became a larger project involving the reorganization and restmcturing of pre-capitalist, agrarian societies, and the erosion of their political and socio-cultural "superstructures." This led to the "modernization" and "rationalization" of politics and governance to ensure a smooth ride for capitalism. Furnivall's comment that the tropics were "colonized with capital" might be reworded as " colonized With capital, for capital."11 The establishing of European colonies changed the colonized entities in two main ways. Old "kingdoms" were transformed into "modern" territorial, political-administrative units along Western lines. Also, colonial methods of man-agement founded on notions of market rationality, commercial efficiency, and so on, forcibly imposed on "native" societies a European-capitalist universalizing hegem-ony.12 Despite Robert Taylor's view ~ influenced by nationalist rhetoric, perhaps ~ that Burma could have modernized without colonialism, British colonial rule did bring about modernization.13 British rule in Burma was relatively short, lasting from 1885 to 1942.14 But with the annexation of 1885, change was rapid and irreversible. The British broke the cycle of "anarchy and conquest"15 and installed a more or less modern state and structures.16 In keeping with the "modernity" of this enterprise, there was a gradual shift in Burma's political status, until it became in the 1930s a distinct political entity ~ Ministerial Burma ~ albeit one still under the imperial flag.17 In the way the British reorganized political power in colonial Burma, we can discern some rather clear democratic features. From the 1920s onwards, there exist-ed intermediary institutions, associations, and procedures that allowed societal forces to participate in politics and even to set themselves up in opposition to the state. Those who participated in the open political arena in opposition to British colonial 71 rule from the 1930s onwards, were the young Thakins. Referring back to the discussion in the theoretical framework of the ways polit-ical power is organized to yield authoritarian or democratic outcomes, it can be said that the colonial state in Burma was authoritarian and quite autonomous from society, in that it was foreign-imposed and ultimately responsible to London. The Governor, for example, was "above politics" and could not be removed by the legislature, introduced in Burma from the 1920s onwards.18 State officials likewise stood apart from society politically and socially, further insulating the state from society. On the other hand, state officials were public servants in the real sense of the word. They were forbidden to be closely involved (or interfere) in politics or to use their office to advance their personal preferences. The state, in other words, was gen-erally non-malleable vis-a-vis officials' private agendas. In this sense, the autonomy of the official class, from the Governor downwards, vis-a-vis both society and the state was moderated by legal-rational bureaucratic norms and the rule of law. Also, the gradual introduction of a more or less open, somewhat democratic political arena and a representative-legislative sphere from the 1920s onward, as noted, meant that the autonomy of the colonial state ~ and its officials — was moderated by their malleability by societal forces. The British may have been laying the foundation for Burma to emerge event-ually as a liberal-democratic polity ~ a dominion of the empire over which the sun never sets. As Taylor notes, the British "for reasons associated with imperial policy in India, had begun to transfer power and authority to Burmese politicians in a rather major way under the last pre-war constitution", based on a system of parliamentary rule and politics.19 The sunset in fact came quite rapidly, however. The colonial 72 state disappeared at the point of Japanese bayonets in 1942. Nonetheless, when Burma gained its independence, the new rulers — the moderate Thakins, led by Thakin Aung San ~ chose to install a democratic state, based on the system of parl-iamentary politics and government. Democracy lasted for a decade, until the AFPFL state was displaced in 1962 by the authoritarian order dominated by the military and its chief, General Ne Win. A Decade of Democracy: The State of the Moderate Thakins, 1948-1958 Power in post-war Burma did not devolve into the hands of the "old time" pol-iticians ~ U Saw, Sir Paw Tun, U Ba Pe, U Pu, and so on ~ who had been "trained" and were experienced in the ways of parliamentary politics and governance.20 It fell into the hands of the Thakins. They were politicized young men who emerged in the 1930s as extreme and impatient nationalists. They were the product of a time when the world was gripped by a severe economic depression; when anti-capitalist sentiments were as strong as nationalist ones, not only in the world's peripheral regions but in Europe itself. In Burma, the global depression resulted in the only peasant rebellion of any note in colonial Burma ~ the rebellion of Saya San, now hailed as the foremost Bama national hero.21 The Thakins — from whose ranks sprang the military Thakins ~ were mostly from the "educated" (pvin-nva-taf) sub-stratum. They were inspired by Saya San, by "past glories" of the Bama lu-myo (race),22 and as well by Karl Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mussolini, Hitler, and other Western figures. They were politicized, too, by the dismal prospect of employment in the lower ranks of the colonial bureaucracy, serving the imperial power as school-teachers and clerks.23 It was these men who 73 shaped Burma's destiny. To name only the most prominent, they included Aung San (later, Bogyoke or General), Maung Nu, Than Tun, Soe, Ba Swe, Kyaw Nyein, Shu Maung (later General Ne Win), and Aung Gyi, Tin Pe, and Maung Maung (all top military brass in later years). They called themselves thakin ("lord" or "master," a form of address used towards Europeans). They belonged to the Dobama Asi-Ayone, the Dobama, "We Bama," movement.24 Their platform was independence, and their version of nation-alism rested on negative sentiments — anti-White, anti-foreign, anti-capitalist. They rejected liberal democracy, espoused a foggy notion of "national" socialism, and held to a vague vision of a "golden past" that depicted the Bama as a conquering master race (lu-mvo), which doniinated and ruled over other lesser lu-myo, until it was defeated by the British, and its kingdom disembered. As it was spelled out in 1941 by Aung San (then an obscure supplicant in Tokyo), the Dobama creed aspired to "a strong state ... [as] in Germany and Italy, [of] only one nation, one state, one party, one leader." It would be a state without parliamentary opposition or the "nonsense of individualism" 2 5 In Josef Silverstein's view, Aung San later repudiated the authoritarian statism attributed to him.26 None-theless, like their nationalists counterparts in Indonesia, most Thakins retained the authoritarian, or non-democratic, notion of state-society order. The Communist Thakins (Than Tun and Soe), for example, aspired to an authoritarian Leninist-Stalinist state. The AFPFL itself, consisting mostly of moderate Thakins, aspired to rule for forty years.27 The military Thakins under Ne Win established a military-"socialist" authoritarian state between 1962 and 1988. Ne Win's successors are now attempting to establish an authoritarian "capitalist" state. 74 Despite its authoritarian, unitary orientation, the Dobama was actually a loose-ly structured political front, composed of sWfting cliques and factions, headed by leaders with diverse and changing beliefs.28 Among its leaders, some in time became "moderate socialists," like Thakin, later General, Aung San, and Thakins Nu (later U Nu), Ba Swe, and Kyaw Nyein, to name a few. Then there were staunch Marxists like Thakins Soe, Than Tun, Ba Hein, and Thein Pe Myint, along with rightwing nationalists such as Thakins Ba Sein, Tun Ok, and Shu Maung (Ne Win). The result was much jockeying for dominance among Thakin groups and leaders. The fortunes of war and politics determined that some became ministers, "national" leaders, and high officials, first in the Japanese-sponsored "independent state" during the war years (1943-1945), and later in post-independence Burma. Leftist-communist Thakins, lost out in the power struggle on the eve of independen-ce. They ended up in the jungle, fighting as rebels and revolutionaries. The military Thakins commanded assorted "armies" during the war,29 and some of them later became senior officers in the Tatmadaw, and some of them and their "successors", have been in command also of the state since 1962. The AFPFL emerged after the war as a formidable force. It was another broad nationalist front organized by Aung San against the Japanese, which he dominated. Its members established themselves in the structures of power (left vacant after the British retreat from Burma). At the time, Aung San also commanded the loyalty of military Thakins, some of whom the British had incorporated into the reformed Burma Army. He also headed a militia grouping, the Pyithu-Yebaw (PVO: People's Volunteers Organization), which was in effect the AFPFL's private army.30 It was fortunate for the AFPFL that Japan delivered a death blow to British 75 power and prestige in Asia. When combined with the war's realignment of global power, Britain's parlous postwar condition, and the decision to quit India, there was virtually no possibility of the British reimposing their rule. The years 1945 to 1947, then, were a time to choose a successor to the colonial power.31 Thanks to Aung San's pragmatism and political acumen,32 the war-weakened condition of other elite segments,33 and the undesirability of the left-communist Thakin alternative, the transfer of power to Aung San and moderate Thakin forces was all but inevitable. The transfer of power was orderly and peaceful, in contrast to events in Indonesia which will be discussed in the next chapter. As "moderate socialists," AFPFL powerholders, like "socialists" counterparts in Indonesia, opted for democracy and parliamentary government, while retaining their socialist goals. Beset by erstwhile comrades — communist Thakins and their allies ~ contesting their rule, and not strong enough to stand alone, they had no choice but to take the accommodative ~ i.e., a more politically and ethnically inclus-ive ~ path chosen by Aung San (assassinated in July 1947). It was led this time by U Nu as Prime Minister.34 The AFPFL state was thus out of step with the more "revolutionary," ethnocentric, and authoritarian creed of the Dobama movement, to which the military Thakins (or Thakins in the armed forces) clung. The state's structure was decentralized to a degree in the wake of the 1947 Panglong Agreement signed by Aung San and the Yawnghwe chaofa (prince), Sao Shwe Thaike, and later the first Union President, along with other non-Bama leaders. In keeping with the 1948 Constitution, based in part on the Panglong Agreement, non-Bama states enjoyed some political-acUTiinistrative autonomy. Each non-Bama state had its own government, legislature, and its own administrative setup. In this 76 sense, the AFPFL state was ethnically inclusive in that the rights and autonomy of larger non-Bama ethnic segment were recognized and respected, in principle at least. The recognition of ethnic diversity, or ethnic inclusiveness, went against the military's notion of national unity which is one that is based on, as discussed in the theoretical chapters, the notion of "one-ness", or the absence of conflicts (and diss-ent, or even differences). Likewise, the military in Burma subscribed to the Dobama's version of national unity premised upon the claimed historical dominance or hegemony of the Bama race ("nation"), or the submission of all non-Bama segments to the notion of nationhood based almost exclusively on Bama ethnicity. However, although the non-Bama states were "autonomous", they were subordinated to the government of Bama Pri-Ma (the Bama mother-state), which was concurrently the government of the union: there did not exist what one might describe as a federal government. The quasi-federal/semi-unitary arrangement was a compromise that satisfied the moderate Thakins' need to claim they had "recovered" all territories which were "lost" when the British administered the non-Bama areas as separate entities.35 On the down side, however, it did not satisfy in particular the military Thakin, who viewed the quasi-federal arrangement as detrimental to unity. At the same time, many non-Bama saw the "union" as a Bama ploy to "Burmanize" them and destroy their "national" identity.36 On the whole, the AFPFL state was, in the way power was organized, democ-ratic in form and to a degree in content. It sought the institutional separation of the state, government, and powerholders, and kept open the political arena. There were many different and competing power centres, interest groups, and political parties, with one of the latter, the AFPFL, winning elections and exercising power. The 77 ability of AFPFL leaders, especially U Nu, to maintain this complex state-society configuration in a more or less democratic environment for about fourteen years, despite extreme praetorian conditions and regular rebellions, is impressive.37 To appreciate just how impressive, it should be noted that on assuming power, the AFPFL was everywhere challenged, and severely wounded by the loss of its most vital asset, Aung San. His death weakened the AFPFL's cohesion as his charisma had cemented it. With Aung San went the AFPFL's hold on the majority of the milit-ary Thakins, both in the armed forces and in the party's private "army," the Pyithu Yebaw (PVO). Thakin officers in three of the four Bama "class" battalions38 defected to the communist Thakins, as did the PVOs. An exception was Ne Win's Fourth Burma Rifles, which included Maung Maung, Aung Gyi, Tin Pe, Sein Lwin, "Em-I" Tin Oo, 3 9 and others. The AFPFL's weakness emboldened communist Thakins to rebel soon after independence; their revolt lasted until the collapse of communism in the late 1980s.40 In turn, the many tasks which confronted AFPFL power-holders as rulers ~ such as combating communism (or specifically, fending off communist Thakin rivals), keep-ing the country together, extending the reach of the state, repulsing foreign intruders, and so on ~ resulted not only in their growing dependence on the military, but also in the expansion of the military's role and, correspondingly, its importance and political leverage. It also reinforced the military's perception of itself as an indispensible guardian-protector and savior of the state. This suggests the strengthening of factors that encourage, as discussed in the preliminary chapters, the military's propensity not only to intervene in politics, but also to "stay on", as theoretically discussed, to re-fashion the state and take on the task of ruling. 78 Next to the communist Thakins, the most serious challenge to the AFPFL state and power-holders was posed by the Karen. In 1948, a year after independence, the fragile truce patched up with the Karen following the wartime BIA massacres of Karens dissolved into Karen-Bama clashes. The "loyal" Karen who fought against the Japanese had, in a sense, won the war. But in its aftermath, they were faced with the prospect of being ruled, from their standpoint, by "deceitful" Bama — by those who had betrayed not only the British, but their own Japanese mentors as well. Their position was desperate. U Nu and Saw Ba U-Gyi, the top Karen leader, tried to defuse the tension, but they could not prevent the Karen rebellion, which continues at a reduced level still today.41 The Karen were joined in revolt by the Mon, Pa-O, and Kachin mutineers. Compounding the AFPFL's problems with internal challenges, Chiang Kai-Shek's defeat in China brought KMT (Kuomintang) units flooding into Shan State. There they laid the foundations for a multi-billion-dollar, global opium-heroin business which still flourishes. Worse still, the military units dispatched into Shan State to counter the KMT ended up committing atrocities and sparking a Shan upris-ing in the late 1950s 4 2 Despite these many problems and internal wars, however, the AFPFL continued to respect the parameters of parliamentary politics. They held and won elections in 1952 and 1956. The 1956 vote was especially pivotal: the opposition, the National Unity Front (NUF, a moderate leftist front) won 45 percent of the popular vote and 47 seats.43 The NUF's electoral gains convinced significant "underground" elements that parliament was a viable venue of politics. In 1958, responding to U Nu's "Arms for Democracy" program, they abandoned the armed struggle.44 By 79 most indicators, it seemed democracy in Burma was well on the way to consolidation. On the other hand, although the AFPFL Thakin were more or less able to main-tain a parliamentary, quasi-federal order until 1962, the commitment to democratic process that they displayed was rather ambiguous. First, the AFPFL openly aspired to rule for forty years. They stacked the administrative apparatus, the military, state agencies, and even municipal bodies with their supporters and clients. This under-mined the state's autonomy from key power-holders, undercut the institutional integ-rity of the bureaucracy, and eroded democratic norms. Second, the AFPFL interfered in the politics of the non-Bama states. Opposit-ion leaders and groups received help from the AFPFL, the military, or its intelligence services (MIS, the Military Intelligence Service).45 The military was particularly active not only in "mopping up" rebels, but in imposing its presence, via "pacificat-ion" marches into the rural areas to intimidate the non-Bama populace ("showing the flag", so to speak). It also established garrisons, set up check-points, and in many areas took direct control of administrative functions. For example, in areas put under martial law, the military set up a hierarchy of Security and Administrative Committees (SACs), head-ed by the local military commander. The heads of the SACs, being military officers, held the balance of power vis-a-vis local civil officers, and reported to their superiors in the military chain of command. Thus, in the non-Bama states, the power exercised by military commanders over-shadowed those vested in local officers, and even the constitutionally vested powers of the non-Bama state governments.46 Moreover, MIS personnel busied themselves with "rooting" out "secessionists", and terrorized 80 the non-Bama populace, so as to dissuade them from even harboring the idea of secession. The policy of "Burmanization" ~ the central pillar of which was making Burmese (the Bama language) the official language ~ predictably caused non-Bama much distress. It gave rise to suspicions that the "Bama" government had a hidden agenda aimed at cultural genocide. The apparent unwillingness or inability of the AFPFL to put a stop to atrocities by the Bama military further fuelled these suspicions. Third, the AFPFL's professed adherence to democracy was undermined by its socialist statism, as this was proclaimed in the 1947 Sorrento Villa Conference, en-shrined in the 1948 Constitution, and reiterated in the 1952 Pyidawtha Plan.47 AFPFL socialism resulted in what one American analyst called a "socialist economy" based on grandiose, ideologically-driven planning 4 8 The implementation of some socialist policies, the rhetoric portraying capitalism and capitalists as evil, strength-ened the hegemony of this left-socialist world view. It kept alive the Dobama's creed of national-socialist authoritarianism, especially among military Thakins who, like soldiers in Indonesia and Thailand, were mistrustful of "disorderly" democratic polit-ics. The attitude of the military toward democratic politics in Burma reflects the observations made in the theoretical framework concerning the military's distrust of democratic politics, and its view of it as disruptive of national unity and encouraged social conflict. The First Military Foray Into Politics: The Military Caretakers, 1958-1960 Politics in any democratic polity are complex. In a multi-ethnic state like Burma, it was all the more so. Although the AFPFL Thakins were beset by armed 81 rebellions from the start, they managed more or less to cope within the framework of parliamentary politics. Democracy might have endured had they not split into the Stable (Swe-Nyein) and Clean (Nu-Tin) camps, with numerous additional cliques, in 1957-58. The split stemmed from the fact that the AFPFL was a coalition of rival fact-ions led by AFPFL "bosses" like U Ba Swe, Kyaw Nyein, Thakins Tin, and Kyaw Tun.4 9 The split stemmed basically from competition between AFPFL factions (or party "empires" and party "czars") over the spoils of office and power, and jockeying among top leaders to get their respective loyalists appointed to strategic party posts. Such intra-party conflicts are common to many political parties. What made them deadly was that U Nu, regarded as standing above the factions, ended up joining the Clean camp. The split paralyzed the government: all of the national and sub-national state machinery were filled by the AFPFL's allies, clients, and supporters. Anyone of importance was sucked into the fray: politicians, civil servants, mayors, editors, businessmen, even the third Union President - U Win Maung, a Karen. With the ruling party and its member organizations split, the bureaucracy paralyzed, and even society-based institutions divided into Stable and Clean camps, it seemed the govern-ment and the state itself were in danger of sphtting asunder. In 1958, as the theoretical discussion of the previous chapters would predict, the military, feeling its privileged place in the state hierarchy threatened along with the state itself, intervened in the political sphere. The military intrusion was led by "Young Turks" Brigadiers like Aung Gyi, Tin Pe, Maung Maung, Than Sein, Hla Myint, and others. Well-informed Burmese with good military connections insist that the young Brigadiers who "persuaded" U Nu to hand power over to Ne Win ~ 82 did so without Ne Win's order or direct involvement.50 As such, the intervention took on the complexion of an "aid to civil power" operation by the military at the request of the Prime Minister, to restore stability and prevent the break-up of the country. It did not lead to the reorganization of political power ~ which is in agreement with the theoretical discussion where I stressed the importance of a military strongman-unifier, who must transform the military into a cohesive political instrument. The official ~ and U Nu's and the military's ~ version is that U Nu, worried by the party split which affected the whole country, especially the elite segments in government, politics, even societal associations, made use of a clause in the const-itution allowing for the appointment of a non-MP to the government, to invite the armed forces chief, Ne Win, to assume temporary control.51 There was, officially, no "coup". However, there were troops and armoured cars posted at strategic points in Rangoon for several weeks, and there were as well checkpoints manned by soldiers in full battle gear on the outskirts of the capital, again, for several weeks.52 The fact of the matter may lie in-between those who believe that the Brigadiers staged a coup, though indirectly, and the official version. The situation was complicated by the struggle ~ at its height then — between two ruling factions, and Aung Gyi was close to U Ba Swe, the co-leader of the Stable faction that failed to oust U Nu from government. Moreover, U Nu's decision to "invite" Ne Win in as a caretaker was made soon after a visit by Maung Maung and Aung Gyi ~ but not much is known, up to now, about what was actually said and what transpired. The decision to hand over power to the military was U Nu's, and his alone. It came as a surprise to most cabinet members.53 According to Richard Butwell, U Nu had no choice but to agree to hand over power: the choice was 83 between inviting the military to power, or "inviting" a coup.54 It was, as Dr. Ba Maw, a very prominent Burmese former mentor of the Thakins, put it, a "coup by consent".55 Soldiers ruled as caretakers for two years. Compared with the second intervention in 1962, though, they performed well.56 Especially praised was the encouragement of capitalist development, as provided for in the 1959 Burma Investment Act. It offered domestic and foreign investors a 20-year guarantee against nationalization; looser restrictions on the importation and repatriation of capital and earnings; and exemptions for new investors from custom duties and taxes for three years. All of this was drastically reversed in 1962 ~ when Ne Win gained undisputed control of the military and was able to reorganize the state in accordance with his "Burmese socialist" agenda.57 The soldiers-caretakers launched "annihilation" operations against insurgents, and as in Thailand after Sarit's takeover, soldiers cracked down on "subversives" (ethnic activists and "communists"), black marketeers, price-gougers, street-hawkers, slum-dwellers, squatters, and stray dogs. They cleaned up the streets and gave build-ings a fresh coat of paint. They also waged a relentless psychological war against leftist and communist philosophies via the National Solidarity Association (NSA),58 a creation of the military's psychological-warfare department. The thrust of this initial military intrusion into politics was typical of the anti-communist, "can-do" mentality operative among Burmese soldiers, as in Thailand under Sarit, who seized power around the same time.59 The military appeared to be "getting the job done," building the state and the nation, and setting the stage for a free-market "take-off' by liberating the economy of the AFPFL's "socialist" shackles. 84 What is of particular theoretical relevance about this first military intervention is how different it was from the second. It came more in the form of an "aid to the civil power," rather than a seizure of power. Parliament was only suspended; political parties were not banned. In fact, Ne Win insisted on obtaining a parliamentary mandate to rule as head of the caretaker regime-60 The adnmiistrative machinery of the state was neither seized nor subordinated to the military. And, importantly, the military caretakers chose to recognise (in form at least) the autonomy of the non-Bama states, as constitutionally provided. In the appointment of new heads for these states, for examples, they accepted candidates chosen by the state legislature. Unlike in 1962, there was almost no change in mimsterial-adniimstrative personnel at the state level.61 Further, as promised, Ne Win held an election in 1960, and handed power over to U Nu and his Union Party (formerly the Clean AFPFL), which had won a landslide victory. Ne Win thus gained fame as a "no-nonsense" statesman-soldier. He so impressed the outside world with his competence and professionalism that he was nominated for the prestigious Magsaysay prize, which he declined.62 His image as a constitutional, professional soldier was further boosted when he dismissed the "Young Turks" who figured prominently as miUtary caretakers ~ Maung Maung, Kyi Win, Aung Shwe, Tun Sein, Chit Khaing, and others. This also restored U Nu's trust in Ne Win 6 3 Lulled by a sense that parliamentary democracy had been restored, legislators, politicians, and community-communal leaders went about their business as usual. No one then realized the magnitude of the change in the balance of power at the heart of the state that the AFPFL split had brought in its train. Surprise was thus the order of the day when, in the pre-dawn hours of March 2, 1962, the military seized power. Soldiers have remained as "permanent" actors in politics ever since. An explanation of the differences between the first and second military inter-vention may lie in the actions that Ne Win took following the announced handover of 85 power in 1958. He insisted on being "elected" by the parliament in October 1958, to effect a legal transfer of power for a year. Again in September 1959, parliament was convened to extend his tenure for a year further. His concern for constitutional legal-ity can be interpreted as actions of a politically unambitious professional soldier, or alternatively as those of a military chief unprepared to try to run the country — the former interpretation contradicts his later actions. Knowledgable Burmese maintain that the Tatmadaw was then dominated by "Young Turk" Brigadiers, who were ambitious, capable, and did not hold Ne Win in awe, as would those who followed them. They believe that had Ne Win been in undis-puted control in 1958, it is likely that military rule would have lasted much longer.64 That this is likely the case is reinforced by Ne Win's dismissal, before his 1962 coup, of the "Young Turks" who were prominent in the caretaker regime, and the dismissal soon after of Aung Gyi, one of the masterminds of the 1958 "handover", and leader of a strong Tatmadaw faction. The analysis indicates support for the theoretical observation advanced earlier that effective, prolonged military intervention that results in the reorganization of political power depends to a large extent on the military being unified by a strongman; and if an undisputed strongman is lacking, the military will most likely restore civilian rule — if only temporarily. As shown, military intervention in 1958 did not lead ~ as it would in 1962 ~ to the reorganization of political power and the state. Ne Win had not at the time become what he was to become two years later: the undisputed, military strongman-unifier. Therefore, upon being handed power in 1958 by the "Young Turks", Ne Win ~ most uncharacteristically ~ played the role of a professional, constitutional leader and reluctant military ruler. He saw to it that elections were held in 1960 as he promised, and led his soldiers back to the barracks. 86 Ne Win's Bama Tatmadaw: The Power Centre Within the State Although the military seized complete control of the state only in 1962, its history is inextricably linked to politics. In this context it is worth noting that the notion of the military as a specifically-organized coercive arm of the state, subordin-ated to the civil power and led by an apolitical officer corps, is quite novel in many Third World polities. As Dorothy Guyot notes, the Tatmadaw was at its inception a "political movement in military garb": its founders and leaders ~ the military Thakins -- were politicians first and foremost.65 The Tatmadaw's history is shaped primarily by politics. It originated in the plan of a Japanese intelligence officer, Colonel Keji Suzuki (Burma's "Lawrence of Arabia"), to raise a guerrilla force that would disrupt traffic on the Burma Road, an important logistic life-line of the Nationalist Chinese government in Chungking. It was with this in mind that his agents contacted Bama politicians such as Dr. Ba Maw, Thakins Tun Ok, Ba Sein, and even U Saw (Prime Minister of Ministerial Burma from 1940 to 1942)66 The irony is that Aung San, the "father of the Tatmadaw." was only vaguely aware of these links. He and a companion were in fact fugitives, stranded in Amoy, their plans to seek the help of the famed Eighth Route Army getting nowhere. When Suzuki learned of Aung San's whereabouts, the latter was picked up and taken to Tokyo. In 1941, he returned secretly to Burma, hastily recruiting some Thakins (now known in the nationalist myth as the "Thirty Comrades") for military training on Hainan island. Among these was Thakin Shu Maung (Ne Win).67 But the plan for a Burmese guerrilla force was shelved when Japan invaded Burma following its attack on Pearl Harbor. Still, Suzuki managed to raise a motley armed band for his Thakin "officers". Their first army, the Burma Independence Army (BIA), marched "victoriously" behind Japanese columns and "liberated" the country 6 8 In reality, though, the BIA fought only rarely; its chief Aung San admitted that he led 87 no units, into combat or otherwise, but rather tagged along as Suzuki's staff member 6 9 Some BIA units, however, did attack the Karen (loyal to the British), and committed various atrocities and massacres. After a few months, the Japanese disbanded the BIA, now filled mostly with new Thakin recruits, many of whom were little more than drifters. Thereafter, the Burma Defence Army (BDA) was formed from selected BIA members. In 1945, when Aung San and the Thakins turned on their Japanese sponsors shortly before the Allied victory (after Upper Burma was recaptured), the army was renamed the Burma Nation-al Army (BNA). The BNA was recognized by the British as an anti-Japanese guerrilla force, and again renamed as the Patriotic Burmese Force (PBF).70 This, too, was subsequently disbanded, with selected members and officers incorporated by the British into four Bama battalions of the re-formed Burma Army. The above account of the various "armies" shows that from 1942 to 1948, mil-itary Thakins commanded or served in four differently-composed and -organized forces. Only a handful served in all of them; of these, only a few served in the post-1948 armed forces. As such, the conventional view of the Tatmadaw as a direct descendant of the "armies that fought for independence" is inaccurate. The current Tatmadaw is essentially the child of Ne Win and the Fourth Burma Rifles who stood by the AFPFL in 1948. Nonetheless, the military has persisted with its claim that it expelled both the British and the Japanese, "winning" Burmese independence, and therefore it is the rightful guardian of the state and nation.71 But there is no questioning the debt AFPFL power-holders owed to the military Thakins in the first fragile years of independence. It was the Tatmadaw. its ranks reinforced by Chin, Kachin, and Shan recruits, that blunted the offensive capabilities of both the communist Thakins and the Karen. In this it was assisted by friendly governments, including the United Kingdom, India, and the British Commonwealth.72 88 Even though the military quickly became an autonomous centre of power, one crucial to the survival of AFPFL Thakins prior to the 1958 AFPFL split, its chief and future strongman-ruler was apparently not very engaged politically. Ne Win led the high life of wine, women, and pleasure. He attended the races regularly; travelled abroad for the nightlife and horses; was involved in scandals with European callgirls and local starlets; broke up the marriage of Daw Khin May Than, a prominent social-ite, and then married her, though he was already married 7 3 As such, he commanded little in the way of public esteem, and almost no Thakin superior - not U Nu, not Kyaw Nyein, not Ba Swe - thought of him as a threat or rival. On the other hand, top brass such as Aung Gyi, Maung Maung, and Tin Pe, those who believed in the Dobama creed and the founding myths of the military, resented the civilian Thakins. In their view, those who had not risked their necks in the independence struggle, civilian TJ^ akins and others now enjoying the "fruits of independence", were necessarily less capable, less patriotic, and "umevolutionary."74 As true believers, they were unhappy with two main features of the AFPFL state. One was its underpinnings of parliamentary democracy, which they saw, like their Thai and Indonesian counterparts, as a dangerously unstable system that would only hamper the state's ability to perform its tasks.75 Accordingly, the Burmese military hardly welcomed the outcome of the 1956 elections, which gave the moderate-left NUF a full 45 percent of the votes. The military was also deeply suspicious of U Nu's "Arms for Democracy" program, which included the 1958 surrender of a number of rebel armies and their embrace of parliamentary politics. Soldiers (and analysts like Frank Trager) viewed this as "crypto-communist" subversion, and saw the need for the military to step in and "save" democracy and the nation.76 For the military, the years of democracy under the AFPFL were years of incompetence, corruption, and weakness that demonstrated the inability of the state to counter the communist threat. 89 The other aspect of the AFPFL state that fuelled military disgruntlement was the semi-federal arrangement between the centre, the Bama mother-country, and the non-Bama states. This constitutional arrangement was seen as encouraging "narrow" non-Bama nationalism. In Taylor's view, reflecting the military's, it was of Western derivation, the creation of colonial pseudo-scholars.77 Likewise, the military did not view the 1961-1962 "Federal" movement to reform the constitution as a reflection of non-Bama confidence in the Union and democracy. The movement was initiated and led by the governments of non-Bama states. Its aim was to re-negotiate the terms of incorporation in the Union, and gain a more equitable share of power, particularly in terms of taxation and defence. Defence was a thorny issue since the military, under the central government, was not in the least accountable to state governments and regularly perpetrated grave atrocities. In essence, the non-Bama leaders wanted the union of co-equal states that Aung San and AFPFL leaders promised at the Panglong conference a year before independence.78 Instead the military saw the movement as a secessionist scheme of Shan princes led by Sao Shwe Thaike, the first Union Pres-ident and regarded as the co-creator (with Aung San) of the Union in 1947.79 The military's growing disenchantment with the AFPFL state, and its wider distaste for democratic politics, was matched by its growth as an autonomous centre of power, a "state within a state." First, military officers had usurped administrative-political power while conducting military operations in "insecure" areas of the non-Bama states and the Bama hinterland itself. They exercised wide administrative powers as heads of the SACs, and enjoyed authority over regular civilian administrat-ors. Second, the MIS, responsible for rooting out "enemies of the state," had grown very powerful thanks to its key