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Transformative or abortive? : a "de-voluntaristic" analysis of the Nationalist Revolution in modern Chinese… Lanyan, Chen 1994

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TRANSFORI4RTIVE OR ABORTIVE? A “DE-VOLUNTARISTIC” ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONALIST REVOLUTION IN MODERN CHINESE HISTORY by  CHEN LANYAN B.A., The University of Inner Mongolia, 1982 M.A. (Communication), Simon Fraser University, 1986 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  in  THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  Department of Anthropology and Sociology  We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1994  ©  Chen Lanyan,  1994  In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  (Signature)  Department of Anthropology & Sociology The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date  -1cr  7  100L  ABSTRACT Interpretations of the Nationalist Revolution in modern Chinese history, especially the so-called “Nanjing decade” (1927-1937) are dominated by theoretical notions which see the state as autonomous in its relationship to society. This autonomous state model, the dissertation argues, finds its roots in the voluntaristic ideas of Talcott Parsons. Arguments based on Parsons’s ideas view the Nationalist Revolution as abortive. The dissertation rejects these views and develops an alternative perspective based on the construction of a quasi—market model of social relations.  The theoretical  underpinnings, in contrast to Parsons’s ideas, are termed “de—voluntaristic.”  These arguments suggest that  individuals participate in, and have influence on, the operation of the state. The application of a quasi-market model suggests that there was a major transformation in Chinese society during the Nationalist period.  The dissertation argues that the  Nationalist Government after 1927 did not continue to achieve the initial objectives of the Nationalist Revolution which, it is suggested, aimed to build a quasi-market society.  The revolution, however, was not abortive.  It  transformed the political system. In the Imperial tradition of government, local elites protected local communities against state encroachment 11  through their involvement in property management.  After  1927, the Naning Government adopted a “free market” approach to political affairs, and centralized the use of military and legal power to protect property against labour and the peasants. Peasant demands for rights to the land they tilled, a key element in Sun Yat—sen’s programme for the revolution, questioned the brokerage market economy, in which local elites acted as the intermediaries of contractual partners. Workers, in the context of industrialization, and with support from Communist organizers, attempted to improve working conditions.  Peasants and workers contested the  power of active elites that grew in the new political order established by. the Nationalist Government.  The Nationalist  State abandoned the traditional role of the Chinese state to protect the well-being of society.  Deeply influenced by new  elites, it protected capital accumulation and safeguarded the sanctity of contracts. The Nationalist Revolution ultimately failed as it was unable to resist the invasions of the Japanese, or the alternative social formulations of the Communist movement.  111  TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract  ii  Table of Contents  iv  Acknowledgement  vi  INTRODUCTION Chapter One  Chapter Two  1 THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Problems in the Existing Western Interpretations Parsons’ Voluntaristic Model of Social Relations The Quasi-Market Model and Scope of the Work MANDATE OF HEAVEN AND TRANSFORMATION OF PROPERTY RELATIONS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY IMPERIAL CHINA Tian Ming and Imperial Elite Rule Systems of Justice and Propriety Chinese Family and Elite Rule Local Autonomy and Self—Government Growth of Property Relations and Rise of the “Free” Labour Force Property Relations to Land Early Industrialism and the Industrial Labour Force  Chapter Three  CONTRADICTIONS IN THE THEORY OF NATIONALIST REVOLUTION Sun Yat—sen and His Three People’s Principles Chiang Kai-Shek’s Conception of China’s Destiny  Chapter Four  BUILDING NATIONALIST ELITE RULE Historical Conditions of Centralization Initial Reform Efforts in the late Qing Reforms in the Last Decade of the Qing The 1911 Revolution and Power iv  9 9 25 35  60 65 69 74 80 87 88 103  126  131 147 158  160 161 165  Struggles Thereafter The United Front and the Division Centralization of Control over the Army Unification of the Party and Government Chapter Five  FORMING THE SOCIAL RELATIONS OF A “FREE—MARKET” SOCIETY Foreign Influence and Rising Modern Economic Relations The Growth of a “Free-Market” Society Policies Affecting External Relations In the Rural Lower Yangzi Valley In the Urban Lower Yangzi Valley  Chapter Six  Appendix  186 196  218  222 243 249 251 257  FROM ELITE ACTIVISM TO INDIVIDUAL ACTIVISM: TRANSFORMATION OF PUBLIC INFLUENCES ON GOVERNMENT 273 Intellectual Pursuit of Freedom and Democracy The Struggles of Labour and the Peasants  Chapter Seven  171 177  277 286  TRANSFORMATIVE OR ABORTIVE? CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE “DE-VOLUNTARISTIC” PERSPECTIVE  300  THE “DE-VOLUNTARISTIC” PERSPECTIVE  309  The Legacy of Voluntarism Smith and Marx: Political Economy of Capitalism  311 318  Case for a “De—Voluntaristic Approach” 346 Bibliography Figure 1  Figure 2  Figure 3  Figure 4  374 THE QUASI-MARKET MODEL OF SOCIAL RELATIONS  396  THE “FREE MARKET” MODEL OF SOCIAL RELATIONS  397  THE MODEL OF (LOCAL) LATE IMPERIAL CHINA  398  SOCIAL RELATIONS IN  THE “DE-VOLUNTARISTIC” PERSPECTIVE v  399  ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would like to express my deep gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Graham Johnson, who spent numerous hours reading and commenting on the drafts.  Without his painstaking  efforts, I would not have had the opportunity to pursue the study, and to have carried it through.  William Leiss,  Patricia Marchak, and Alexander Woodside attended the project with care and provided guidance. I have benefitted from the discussions and debates with teachers and fellow graduate students in and outside the Department of Anthropology and Sociology at the University of British Columbia.  Neil Guppy, Martin Silverman, Yunshik  Chang, Diana Lary and Pitman Porter offered critical comments.  I give my thanks to the Department of Sociology  and Anthropology at the Simon Fraser University for the chance to improve many ideas of the thesis during my teaching appointment there in the Fall of 1992.  Jan Walls,  Ian Angus, and Bob Anderson encouraged me and extended helpful advice.  I also acknowledge my appreciation of the  teaching opportunity offered by the Department of Pacific and Asian Studies at the University of Victoria in the Fall of 1993 and the Spring of 1994.  Michael Bodden, Helen  Chancey, Harry Hsiao, Joe Moore, Peter Vandergeest and Yuen— fong Woon offered friendship and made the year of rewriting fruitful.  Those who also helped me realize a year of  fruitful thinking were my students, who had no idea of how vi  much they have taught me. A special thank goes to Bob Cosbey, Andrew Klobucar, and Laurie Ricou, who carefully editted the manuscript at different stages and corrected my faulty gralnmer. I am grateful to many friends who have encouraged me and helped me keep a proper perspective of the challenges in life, work and personal growth.  I thank Pat and Roger  Howards, Bonnie Eaton, Yukiko Jo, Helen MacDonald, Sharon Fuller, Bill and Marianne Livants, Tan Xiao-bing, Carole Christopher, Rick Pollay, and Joe Roberts for their helpful discussions and heart—warming concerns.  -  I was able to concentrate on my research and writing in the past years due largely to the support of my family. am indebted to my parents, Chen Yuhai and Guo Fengzhen, and my brother, Chen Zhao, in China.  Their understanding and  faith comforted me and urged me to move on despite difficulties.  It is to them that I dedicated the work.  vii  1 INTRODUCTION The objective of this dissertation is to develop a sociologically—informed explanation of the causes and consequences of the transformation of China during the Nationalist Revolution and especially during the so-called “Nanjing Decade”  (1927-1937).  It is based on arguments that  stem from a contrast between two theoretical model s. One model portrays the state as autonomous in its relationship to society.  It is a view that is dominant in  the literature on the Nationalist period in modern Chines e history and is especially reflected in the studies of the late Lloyd Eastman, Theda Skocpol, and John A. Hall.  It is  my view that the theoretical foundation of these perspectives is the voluntarism of Talcott Parsons, arguab ly the most compelling theorist in American sociology in the immediate post-Second World War period. A second formulation is elaborated in this study, which I term a quasi-market model of social relations.  It forms  the basis for an alternative explanation of the nature of the Nationalist period in modern Chinese history.  It draws  ideas from Adam Smith, Karl Marx, C. B. Macpherson and William Leiss. The assumption that the state represents the ‘general interest’ of individuals in the protection of property is central to Parsons’s voluntarism.  The legitimacy of  representation by the state derives from the argument that  2 rights are voluntarily surrendered by individ uals.  The  state intervenes only on behalf of indiv 1 iduals.  This  assumption underlies the idea of state autono my.  In my  view, it inevitably gives rise to a “free market ” approach to rule by the state in which individual rights are subsumed under the protection of property by the state. The alternative quasi—market model of social relat ions takes a critical view of the perspective of the autono mous state.  Its theoretical underpinning is one that, in  contrast to the voluntaristic ideas that stem from Parson s’s formulations, I term “de—voluntaristic.”  This view focuses  on the relationship between the operation of political and social institutions and the independent pursuit of justi ce by individuals.  To understand such a relationship is to  connect the private and public spheres as individuals participate in, and have influence on, the operation of government and the state.  It is my argument that  individuals have certain inalienable rights to exercise sentiments of justice, in order to attain a full and free life.  Such sentiments are exercised through the process of  political participation.  Recognition by a society of these  inalienable rights of individuals is a precondition for the establishment of a moden political economy that is just, fair, and acceptable, in which the state protects the public interest as a whole and not merely group interests, such as those who hold prop 2 erty.  3 The autonomous state model sees the Nation alist Revolution as essentially abortive.  An application of the  quasi—market model argues against this view and suggests that there was a major transformation in Chinese society during the Nationalist period.  My argument is that there  were two major groups during the period that opted for a version of political development to attain an accept able form of political economy that was derived from a quasi— market model.  One group was an intellectual elite which,  deeply influenced by non-Chinese ideas, worked to build a constitutional government and institutionalize the participation of the citizenry in national affairs.  A  second group of peasants and workers sought independence from the Imperial tradition of elite rule, which it saw as obstructing the exercise of their sentiments of justice through paternalism.  They objected to the position that  only a moral elite could appropriately represent the interests of society as a whole.  A representation would  deny the inalienable rights of individuals.  The Nationalist  Government in Nanjing adopted a “free market” approach to political affairs and consistently supported the interests of property against those of workers and peasants and the ideas of intellectuals towards constitutionally determined rights of political participation.  The adoption of this  approach by the Nationalist State was a response to the changes in public influences on government.  4 My arguments suggest that during the Nationalist Revolution, public influence on governme nt underwent a change from what I term elite activism to individual activism.  Social influence on government by activ e elites  stemmed from their efforts to preserve their dominance over society through the management of property relations. In contrast, social influence on government, arising from the struggles of labour and the peasants for citiz enship rights, was characterized by their efforts to attain justice for all.  These latter efforts represented the growth of  individual activism as they involved individua ls making choices between approval and disapproval of the influence of active elites on Nationalist rule. The “free market” approach adopted by the Nati onalist Government in its efforts to continue China’s trans formation in the period between 1927 and 1937 was a result of its expansionary use of military and legal force to protect the growth of property in cooperation with establishe d elites. This approach ignored social welfare, suppressed the exercise of sentiments of justice by labour and the peasants, and resulted in a political defeat of the Nationalists by the Communists.  It also failed to achieve  the initial objectives of the revolution which, I would argue, attempted to build a quasi-market society.  An  analysis of the discrepancy between the theory of the revolution, entailed in Sun Yat—sen’s Three People’s  5 Principles of Nationalism, People’s Rights and People’s Livelihood, and the Nationalist prac tice after 1927 argues for a substantial failure of the 3 revolution. The revolution failed, but it was not abortive, as Eastman strongly argued. The revolution, even in failure, contributed to the transformation of Chinese society. The version of Chinese society which emerged during Nationalist rule was a transformation of the Imperial tradition of elite rule and a brokerage market system. A cont rast between two types of Chinese society Imperial China and Nationalist -  Republican China  -  indicates that the revolution was a  conduit for China’s transformation from the Impe rial tradition of elite rule over a brokerage mark et economy to the Nationalist establishment of centralized elite rule over a “free market” economy. In developing these arguments, I am informed by recent studies by scholars in China who recognize the growth of the Chinese economy amidst the efforts of the Nati onalist Government to regulate and control economic relat ions and the penetration of foreign influ 4 ences.  These studies  challenge the dominant view in China that in the hundred years before 1949, the country did not develop, as “the imperialists used its feudal ruling class and bure aucratic capitalists to suppress and exploit its peop 5 le.” I am further informed by studies by western scholars who have provided insights into the Nationalist orde r of  6 social relations from varying persp ectives.  The two recent  studies by Thomas Rawski (1989) and Prasenjit Duara (1988) discuss the transformative process of the early decades of the twentieth century. Duara examines the relationship between the building of a modern state in Republican China and what he terms the “cultural nexus” of local power 6 struc tures.  He argues that the imposition of tankua n (new  taxes increasingly levied by the National ist State on the village as a whole) helped create a stratum of local brokers, known as “local bullies,” whose inter est was to pursue entrepreneurial gains at the expense of the community.  The emergence of these local “political  entrepreneurs” transformed the old power struc ture at the local rural level.  Rawski investigates the relationship of  the modern with the inherited economic sectors,  (both of  which grew while competing broadly in the market place,) and the extent and the limits of growth and structural change in the Chinese economy.  He argues that the Republican State in  the 1930s played an increasingly important role in economic growth by regulating market relations and controlli ng the modern sector, represented by such operations as cotton textile factories, rail or steamship transport, and western— style commercial banking, which were adopted from foreign models.  The political system, the military and monetary  instability, however, failed to provide an adequate framework of stable property rights and social  7 infrastructure necessary to secure furth er economic growth.  In what follows, Chapter One is devo ted to the construction of the theoretical argumen ts for the quasi— market model of social relations as the case for a “de— voluntaristic” perspective and its histo rical implications in the evaluation of China’s transformation during the Nationalist Revolution. Chapter Two discusses the notions of government and law and the changes in property relations in nineteent h century Imperial China.  It focuses on the Confucian conception of  the Mandate of Heaven and its incorporation into the social structure.  It further suggests that the struggles of  peasants for rights to the topsoil of land they tilled challenged that structure.  A discussion of these issues  provides the backdrop against which the theory and practice of the Nationalist Revolution are analyzed and becom e distinctively transformative. Chapter Three examines the Nationalist theoretical program, entailed in Sun Yat—sen’s Three People’s Principles and Chiang Kai-shek’s China’s Destiny.  The three subsequent  chapters consider the practice of Nationalist Revolutio n in three aspects, all of which substantiate the argument that the revolution resulted in a “free market” society based on the transformation of the Imperial tradition of elite rule and brokerage market system.  Chapter Four describes the  8 process of military and administrativ e centralization after the founding of the Nationalist Govern ment in Nanjing. Chapter Five discusses the advent of a “free market” economy and its role in the increasing disintegra tion of the brokerage market system. From my perspective the development of the “free market” econom y indicates the failure of the revolution to achieve its initial objectives of building a quasi-market society. Chapter Six, in addressing the relationship between the state and society in Nationalist Republican China, which is a pivotal concern of the quasi—market model of social relations, examines the development of Nationalist elite rule over individual citizens, including labour and the peasants, who then struggled to gain independence from elite dom inance. Chapter Seven, the concluding chapter, summari zes the arguments that are put forward.  NOTES 1.  See the collection on Bringing the State Back In (1985).  2. I thank William Leiss and Graham Johnson for their suggestions on this point. 3. I thank Patricia Marchak and suggestions about this analysis.  Alexander  Woodside  for  their  4. See most importantly, Dong Changzhi and Li Fan (1988), Wang Fangzhong (1992), Chen Ruiyun (1988), Cheng Daode (1992), Sun Jian (1989) and Huang Daoyao (1992). In the past decades since 1949 independent scholarsh ip in Taiwan on the same subject has been very limited as infor mation is highly  9 controlled by the government, the Nationalist failure. For Muchen (1956), a study by Nationalist Central Committee  which would not like to make note of an official view in Taiwan, see Hu the Cultural Work Meeting of the (1984) and Zhang Jingyu (1977) .  5. Zhang Xianwen writes in his Pre face to Dong and Li (1988). 6. Duara sees that both the Imperial state and local power structures had relied upon the “cu ltural nexus” to establish their authority, the “cultural nexus” whic h was composed of hierarchical institutions, such as those of the market, kinship, religion, and water control, and networks of info rmal relations, “such as those between patrons and clients or amo ng affines” (1988:5). I thank Alexander Woodside and Diana Lary for drawing my attention to many sources, Chinese and western, listed above.  9p’ CHAPTER ONE Theoretical and Historical Perspectives  This chapter constructs the theoretical arguments for the quasi—market model of social relations.  This model  forms the basis of an alternative .perspevtive to the existing literature that is influenced by the ideas of state autonomy and Talcott Parsons’s voluntarism.  It plans to  examine the views of Skocpol, Hall and Eastman in order to overcome the problem of neglecting the significance of social influences on government.’  It then investigates  Parsons and his idea of the state protecting rights based on proprietorship.  The alternative perspective rejects  Parsons’s idea and suggests that rights are recognized based on the exercise of sentiments of justice by individuals. These rights are inalienable because they are necessary for individuals to attain a full and free life and to prepare for the establishment of an acceptable form of modern political economy. Problems in the Existing Western Interpretations In the two sociologically-informed historical studies of China’s transformation of which the Nationalist Revolution formed part, Skocpol (1979) and Hall (1985) develop methods to explain transformation through comparison.  Skocpol compares the growth of modern states as  they emerged in revolutionary transformations in France,  10 Russia, and China.  Hall compares the moment of unity in the  growth of western politics, economics and ideology with that in the other three great civilizations in the world Imperial China, Hindu India and Pastoral Islam explain the rise of capitalism.  -  -  in order to  Both Skocpol and Hall,  although they have separate objectives in their studies of China’s transformation, emphasize the role of the state as a centripetal force in social transformation.  This emphasis  fails to recognize that the state protected property in reaction to a social influence on government originating in the struggles of labour and the peasants.  This problem is  especially reflected in Eastman’s analysis of the Nationalist Revolution based on the autonomous model of the state.  In this section, I examine the views of Skocpol,  Hall and Eastman in order to find the roots of the problem which have not been dealt with by their critics. Skocpol bases her study of French, Russian and Chinese transformations on a critical evaluation of the existing sociological theories of revolu 2 tion.  She adopts a  structural perspective in order to understand the causes of the revolutions and their accomplishments. two broad issues.  She addresses  She examines, first, the historical  context of the system of international relations and how it causes and shapes revolutionary transformations (Skocpol 1979:19-24).  Secondly, she analyzes the structure of the  state within which social and economic ‘struggles occur.  She  11 argues that a set of administrative and coercive organizations are created to pursue two major tasks  —  to  maintain internal order and to meet external threats (Ibid:29—31). In her analysis of the Chinese revolution, Skocpol applies her analytical scheme to a study of the modern state as an autonomous force and examines the internal preconditions of revolution and international pressures. She argues that in the face of the incapacity of the Manchu government to maintain internal order and to defend itself against external forces, the dominant class became organized and was strong enough to overthrow the Imperial government and to establish a more autonomous modern state. Paralleling Eastman’s (1984:85-88) view that Chinese peasants made only indirect contributions to the revolution, Skocpol (1979:148-54) argues that the Chinese peasantry, because of its lack of local, community—based collective autonomy, was not able to mobilize a widespread strike against landlords in the face of the domination of the Chinese elites over local rural communities.  Not until the  Chinese Communist Party fused its leadership efforts with the forces of peasant-based social banditry did the Chinese peasants acquire the collective leverage against landlords that they had historically lacked.  The failure of the  Nationalist Revolution lies, therefore, in its urban—based background and in its incapacity to mobilize peasants.  The  12 eventual success of the Communist Party was in part a result of its efforts to build a state with the support of peasants. Skocpol’s view that Chinese peasants lacked “solidarity and autonomy” in their communal institutions and collective action, however, as both Perry and Kiernan point out (see note 1), neglects the fact that there were more frequent and organized peasant revolts in China than anywhere else in world history.  Notions of kinship and community solidarity,  as well as the secret societies, all could draw peasants together to pursue collective action.  The socio—economic  order in the countryside changed when property relations to land had begun to take new forms favoured by peasants. After 1927, the Chinese Communist Party was forced to shift its focus from organizing urban workers which, following Bolshevik strategies as it understood them, had been at the heart of its revolutionary policies since the founding of the party in 1921.  It was obliged to abandon the cities and  the urban proletariat to the Nationalists, and sought to realize the revolutionary potential of the peasants as its only political alternative.  It also saw the need to  establish its own military force and formed the Red Army. 3 Perry suggests that Skocpol “offers little help in establishing the relationship between the international system and agrarian change”  (note 1).  Skocpol argues that  imperialism helped dismantle the Imperial state but “did not  13 fundamentally alter the economic and political situation of the vast majority of peasants”  (Skocpol 1979:153).  The  foreign impact appears to be limited to its effects on the Chinese state.  The relationship between the state and  China’s peasant is not, however, specified.  Skocpol also  minimizes the impact of changes in local power structures during the Chinese revolution for rural social structure, which further obscure the link between the international system and agrarian change. Hall adopts Adam Smith’s analysis of the rule of law as a political constraint over market relations, Marx’s examination of economic operation, and Weber’s work on ideology to explain the growth of western capital 4 ism.  He  suggests that social energy is created when such enabling powers as the rule of law, market and ideology agree with one another.  He argues that the West developed because of  the operation of an accord between politics, economics and ideology of capitalism.  China did not “rise,” he proposes,  because of the absence of such an accord.  He reckons that,  first, the Imperial state was not as strong and autonomous as it needed to be In order to generate public energy.  Such  autonomy was minimized by local elites who dominated society and resisted government tax policies.  Secondly, elite  domination and government regulation of economic relations prevented the market from gaining autonomy and from generating economic advancement.  Thirdly, Hall holds,  14 similar to Weber, that Confucianism was created by the state. Confucianism was thus passive and reflective in character rather than truly creative, although Confucianism supported the state but did so only as long as it was successful: the withdrawal of the mandate of heaven could be proclaimed, as most empero rs realized. (1985:40) Although Hall grants Confucianism a certain autonomous power, capable of generating social energy, he sees an obstacle undermining such power.  This obstacle is the  Imperial government controlled by the elite who sat atop a series of separate ‘societies’, penetrate or mobilise”  “which it did not wish to  (Ibid:52).  The government’s  inability, therefore, to penetrate local society, over which local elites held sway, and to establish decent currency and credit arrangements, prevented the peasants from growing strong as it left them to be exploited by moneylenders and landlords.  All the factors, in Hall’s view, had worked  against China’s transformation from an agrarian society to an industrial society.  Only after the arrival of the  influence of western industrial powers in the- nineteenth century did China begin to see progress.  -  Skocpol and Hall have both made efforts to open windows into social transformation in modern world history by resorting to Weber, a predecessor of Parsons, whether it be to his notion of the state, in the case of Skocpol, or to his account of religion, in the case of Hall.  They regard  the state as autonomous and thus emphasize the presence of  15 state power over individuals.  In the process, Hall  addresses Skocpol’s unestablished relationship between the state and society by adopting Smith’s view of the rule of law. Hall’s interpretation of Smith is, nevertheless, one— sided.  His neglect of the civic humanist reading of Smith  prevents him from recognizing a quintessential aspect of Smith’s contribution to understanding the capitalist West. In other words, Smith sees the rise of the West as being accompanied by the rise of the labouring poor seeking independence from the tradition of elite activism.  This  development incites changes in the relationship between state power and the property-owning society, a focal point in the present analysis. An older, more prevalent treatment of the relationship of the state to society among most Marxists and many non— Marxists holds that the Nationalist regime was the natural ally,  “and even the mere ‘hireling’ of the urban bourgeoisie  and the rural landlord class”  (Geisert 1982:2).  Eastman  rejects this older view because it fails to account for significant signs of tension between the regime and local elites (Ibid.).  He adopts an autonomous model of the state  and develops an opposite view. In The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule,  1927-1937  (1974), Eastman raised an argument which has  become influential, namely that the Nationalist Revolution  16 was abortive because it did not create a new and effective political system 5.  The failure to establish this political  system resulted from the fact that “neither revolutions nor the exposure to the West had infused the bureaucratic administrators with a new spirit or purpose”  (Ibid:11).  These administrators, instead, followed the “authority— dependency pattern” of social relations, a pattern which was rooted in Chinese political culture (Ibid:287-9), and ruled autonomously. In describing the characteristics of a Chinese political culture, Eastman argues that “China was a status— oriented society in which social relationships tended to be structured vertically; all social relationships, that is, tended to be between individuals who acted as either a superior or a subordinate in the relationship”  (Ibid:288).  The persistence of this pattern of social relationships, Eastman reasons, impelled the Nationalist officials to engage in certain modes of political behaviour, such as corruption,  factionalism, ineffectual administration and  political repression, which directly contributed to the building of the Nationalist dictatorship (Ibid:287) and determined the abortion of the revolution. Tracing the development of the Nationalist dictatorship, he examines the evidence of a group of young Nationalist activists close to Chiang Kai-shek, known as “the Blue Shirts.”  He suggests that this group of youths  17 were influenced by the German Nazi movement and pursued fascist ideas of erecting a superior leader and establi shing direct control over individuals in order to supersede the family which used to dominate the life of individuals 6 (Ibid:3 1-84).  He also points out that the Nationalist  Party purge in the late 1920s was not simply used as a weapon against the Communists but against all real, suspected, or potential opponents of the Nationalist regime and thus destroyed democratic tendencies within the party (1974:5—6).  The concession, moreover, Eastman correctly  observes, of the Nationalists to former warlords and old bureaucrats, although it was perhaps justified by the Nationalist objective to achieve national unity and by the desperate need for expertise and experience in administration, contributed in part to the failure of the Nationalists to build an effective government.  The  incorporation of former warlords and bureaucrats not only significantly handcuffed the new Republican state with the values, attitudes and methods of the warlord regimes but also prevented the Nationalists from pursuing their revolutionary objectives.  Patronage and factionalism,  furthermore, dominated government decisions.  Unrealistic  policies alienated the Nationalists from the peasantry. To characterize the alienation of the Nationalists from the peasantry, Eastman points to the fact that attacked by the agrarian depression in the early 1930s, Chinese peasants  18 were also striken by taxes and tankuan, a tax levy on each household including tenants in the village.  Tax collection  fees charged by tax collectors, the unsalaried quasi— official keepers of the tax rolls, who served to bridge the gap between the governmental structure and the landowners added additional pains to the life of peasants, who were already in great distress (1990:202).  Although, beginning  in 1934, Eastman reckons, the Nationalist Government actively promoted co—operative associations as a solution to the agrarian depression, these co—operatives tended to be controlled by members of the rural elite, such as landlords, rich peasants, and merchants (Ibid:213).  These co  operatives adopted a policy to lend loans which discriminated against ordinary peasants who were regarded as security risks.  This practice was defended by government  bureaucrats (Ibid:213-4).  Without land redistribution,  therefore, rural communities continued to be dominated by rural elites. In all, Eastman considers that the Nationalist Government made efforts to build a national economy by abolishing the him, an internal tariff on goods moving from one region to another, and by unifying the currency and standardizing weights and measures throughout the nation (Ibid:227).  During the Nanjing era (1927-1937), modern  industrial production, moreover, grew annually despite monetary deflation, collapse of the domestic market due to  19 rural decline and warfare.  Eastman argues that the  Nationalist Government succeeded in establishing control over major banks and the urban business community (Ibid:233). But it had not succeeded in creating an integrated political system: the administration continued to be ineffective and corrupt; the regime had not begun to cope with the problems of the rural masses; the process of cultural disintegration was not arrested, and the leadership’s reliance on the New Life Movement gave little promise of promoting a sense of moral community; and the government never adequately resolved the problem of how to deal with the growing pressure for political participation. (Ibid:xiii) The Nationalist Revolution, therefore, for Eastman, failed because “[t]he government did not in the main comprise officials who were highly dedicated to the welfare of society”  (Ibid.).  It also did not “assume a more dynamic  role in society” and “devise ways of dealing with the newly mobilized social and economic groups”  (Eastman 1974:310-1).  In his debate with Bradley Geisert over a model for analyzing the Nationalist order of social relations, Eastman defended his view that the Nationalists ruled autonomously because the regime did not provide institutionalized avenues for the representation of citizens’ concerns (1984a:12). Geisert (1982) argues, based on his study of the relationship between the state and rural elites (1979) and Richard Bush’s study of the relationship between the Nanjing regime and the textile mill owners in the lower Yangzi valley (1978), that local elites and industrialists, by using personal ties and opportunities for factional conflict  20 within the political establishment, exercised influence on government.  He suggests that a pluralistic, not an  autonomous model of analysis is more appropriate to examining the order of social relations under the Nationalist rule.  This pluralistic model provides a more  balanced view of regime—elite relations and is however less sufficient in explaining the Nationalist suppression of the demands of labour and the peasants. Another important participant in the debate with Eastman is Joseph Fewsmith (1985), who suggests that the Nationalist regime adopted a corporatist strategy to reorganize chambers of commerce and to resolve conflicts of interest in the business community.  This strategy allowed  capitalists a representational access to decision—making. In “Response to Eastman”(1984:22), Fewsmith maintains that the Nationalists did visit ideas in much resemblance to corporatist thinking.  He notes that  The Kuomintang did call for class conciliation, “harmonization” of public and private, and for functional representation both through hierarchical, non—competitive interest associations and through party—run mass associations. (Ibid.) -  Rejecting Fewsmith’s view of the Nationalist establishment as an “authoritarian—corporatist regime,” Eastman (1984a:14) argues that Nationalist China did not have the corp.oratist structures associated with such regimes as Franco’s Spain or Mussolini’s Italy. corporatist practices at the time.)  (He ignores other  In those regimes, he  21 reasons,  “there were corporatist structures in society  —  such as the church, monarchists, industrialists, and laborers  —  to which the authoritarian regime granted  monopoly representation of its members’ political interes ts” (Ibid.).  It was however not evident  “...  that corporatism  was a meaningful part of the Nationalist polity.” Considering the Nationalist polity, Eastman suggests that it was characterized by such aspects of deficient bureaucratic functioning as factionalism, ineffectual administration, corruption and political repression.  These  characteristics of the Nationalist bureaucracy implied the failure of the revolution.  This failure was caused by  nothing less than the influence of Chinese political culture because  “...  the political behaviour of Chinese bureaucrats  working within weak institutions was determined in large degree by the social traits that they acquired before they became members of the bureaucracy” emphasis added).  (Eastman 1990:287;  The superior—subordinate pattern of social  relations in Chinese political culture,  (Eastman is clearly  influenced by Parsons’s notion of value—orientation of action,) would certainly determine the traits of the political behaviour of its bureaucrats (Ibid:288). It is acceptable that Eastman views the Nationalist Revolution as a failure because it resulted in a dictatorship.  It is probably true that the Nationalist  bureaucracy shared certain characteristics with the Imperial  22 bureaucracy (or with any bureaucracies), such as factionalism, corruption, ineffectual administration and even political repression.  It is nonetheless questionable  for Eastman to conclude that these characteristics allowe d the Nationalist Government to establish an autonomous rule over society beyond the reach of the diverse interests of the population.  This conclusion fails to account for some  of the most salient features of the Nationalist government protecting property in suppressing the demands of labour and the peasants.  This failure arises from his adoption of  Parsons’s version of liberal democracy. In the latest edition of The Abortive Revolution (1990), Eastman maintains his original argument with essentially little revision.  When he declares in the  preface to the new edition, nevertheless, the book  -  “that the theme of  which is that the Kuomintang, after seizing power  in 1927-1928, quickly lost revolutionary momentum and became a military dictatorship primarily concerned with maintaining itself in power  -  remains valid”  (1990:xviii), he is  actually being more ambiguous about his argument than he was earlier.  He seems to admit that the Nationalists did  establish a military dictatorship, a political system which was new, compared to the Imperial system.  This political  system was also effective in the sense that it used coercive means to extend control over individuals, and to extract the best resources it could under the circumstances.  However,  23 the revolution was still abortive because Chinese political culture caused it to create a military dictatorship imbued with corruption, ineffectual administration, factionalism and political repression, rather than a “moral comm unity” envisioned by Parsons. According to Eastman, the Nationalist Revolution should be considered abortive, because, as “Talcott Parsons has remarked, a ‘politically organized society’ is clearly a ‘moral community’ to some degree”  (Eastman 1990:x), and the  Nationalist Republic failed to create political institutio ns which could provide a social base upon which a Parsonian version of  ‘moral community’ could be established.  This  version of moral community, in Eastman’s view, is based on the principles of “[ijiberal democracy in the West,” a democracy which is predicated on the belief that the force of public opinion, transformed into political power by means of representative parliaments, organized interest groups, and a powerful free press, will suffice to control and give direction to the executive and administrative branches of government. (Ibid:285) The Nationalist bureaucracy, however, with its questionable characteristics prohibited the spread of western liberal democracy.  The revolution was abortive because a free press  was suppressed, interest groups were not strongly organized, and the force of public opinion was not transformed into political power to be used to control and to direct government administration. Eastman’s view of democracy based on Parsons’s version  24 of moral community has inherent contradictions and is inadequate in evaluating the Nationalist Revolution.  It is  inadequate because Parsons’s model of a “politically organized society” based on the institution of property lends little support to Eastman’s argument that the revolution was aborted by the Nationalist centralized rule with the use of military and legal force. Parsons’s model of social relations treats the state as the “honest broker” representing authority to protect property, resolving conflicts between interest groups and exercising power to define and to facilitate the attainment of goals, to which individuals are required to voluntarily comply.  Such a treatment of the relationship of the state  to society reflects a Parsonian version of voluntarism because it simply assumes that “the force of public opinion” is “transformed into political power by means of representative parliaments, organized interest groups, and a powerful free press,” without providing empirical evidence to answer the question of whose interests parliaments represent, by whom interest groups are organized, to what extent a press is free and powerful, and lastly, whether it is the “force of public opinion” that is transformed into political power.  It also assumes that the transformed  political power would work for the public without questioning who actually controls that power, opinion” or the state?  “public  Its unclear treatment of the  25 relationship between the public and the state, hence, leaves unresolved such fundamental questions as: who represents public opinion, and what is the role of the state. This inherent theoretical contradiction, thus, constitutes a fundamental problem in the autonomous model of the state.  Would the Nationalist Revolution be viewed  differently if this model is refuted?  I regard that an  alternative arises after the nature of voluntarism is revealed.  The quasi—market model, which is developed here,  provides an alternative.  It argues that the state plays a  role to uphold public interest only when it pertains to the independent exercise of sentiments of justice by individuals.  It is therefore the individual exercise of  sentiments of justice that brings to the fore public concerns.  It is upon expressions of such concerns that the  rules of justice are established and amended.  It is  moreover in accord with the rules of justice that the state operates to protect the individual rights to a full and free life more than to transform “public opinion” into political power, which is then used by the state to control the rights of individuals.  This quasi—market model can nonetheless be  established only upon the rejection of Parsons’s model of social relations, which protects rights based on proprietorship. Parsons’s Voluntaristic Model of Social Relations The ‘problem of meaning’ and the ‘problem of order’ are  26 central to the sociological thinking of Talcott Parsons. The former boils down to a question of how to influence individual motivations for action (Parsons 1968:330), and the latter how to integrate them into normative standards (Ibid:36).  Parsons attempts to resolve the latter, known as  the “Hobbesian” problem of order, in the context of modern capitalism, in resorting to a resolution of the former. him, the  For  ‘problem of meaning’ is resolved when individuals  are socialized to internalize shared values as motives for action.  The ‘problem of order’  is resolved when the shared  values are institutionalized to enforce social cohesion based on the internalization of them by individuals. Parsons’s voluntarism aims to persuade the individual to conform to a moral order by internalizing its institutionalized values, a process achieved through the state protecting rights based on private proprietorship.  In  this section, I shall examine his resolution of the ‘problem of order’ in order to establish the alternative perspective to his voluntarism: the quasi—market model of social relations. Parsons created a general ‘theory of the capitalist system by synthesizing Weber’s view of the social importance of ideas and Durkheim’s notion of an interdependent “moral order.”  In his formulation of the capitalist system, Alvin  Gouldner (1970:143) notes, Parsons went from the first stage of his intellectual development in the prewar period to the  27 second stage in the postwar period.  In the prewar period,  he was interested in the question of how to save the system after it had been seriously mutilated by the Great Depression.  In resolving this question, Parsons came to  German Romanticism largely through Weber, stressing the role of ideas as inward stimulants to outward or public action. He regarded the inward moral convictions of individuals to social values as the key to securing the system and to resolving the ‘problem of order’.  It was also in this  period, Gouldner (Ibid:138) explains, that he characterized his synthesis as “voluntarist.” In the postwar period, Parsons became more concerned with the question of how to maintain the integration of the system in order to sustain the postwar economic growth. continued to stress moral values,  He  “although moving from a  more Weberian view that emphasizes their role as energizers of action to a more Durkheimian view that emphasizes their role as sources of social order”  (Ibid:140).  It was thus in  the postwar period, when Parsons caine closer to French functionalism, that he began to focus more on how the social system maintains its own coherence, “fits individuals into its mechanisms and institutions, arranges and socializes them to provide what the system requires”  (Ibid:143).  Similarly, in his later interest in confoimity as a key to the resolution of the ‘problem of order’,  “[a]n emphasis on  voluntaristic individual commitment is supplanted by a  28 reliance on the ‘socialization’ of individuals to produce the choices the system requires”  (Ibid.).  Consequently,  although Parsons’s earlier theory of social action emphasizing individual volition was not congenial and perhaps hostile to the emerging Welfare State, his later theory of system—equilibrium based on conformity, Gouldner suggests, certainly suited it because This was a vision of societal solidarity that fit in with the Welfare State’s practical interest in finding ways to produce loyalty and conformity and with its operating assumptions that the stability of society is strengthened by conforming with the “legitimate” expectations of deprived social strata which, in turn, are then expected to have a willing conformity with conventional morality. The operating assumption is that deprived strata will be “grateful” for the aid they are given ... and that they will therefore conform willingly to the expectations of the giver. (Ibid:1434) The question of Parsons’s emphasis on conformity agreeing with the Welfare State is admittedly not addressed within the present focus.  The ‘problem of order’, the  resolution of which remains the objective of Parsons’s inquiry, however, is; and it will delineate his view of the state protecting rights based on private proprietorship. In The Social System (1968), Parsons sees the “Hobbesian” problem of order as having two significant aspects.  One aspect of the problem “is that of the  regulation of the settlement of the terms of exchange” (Ibid:71).  It can be resolved, Parsons envisages, by the  institution of mechanisms, such as norms and values, through which the conflict between the short-term self-interest of  29 the individual (or in his term the “ego”), and the long-term self—interest of the collective (or the “alter”) is settled in such a way that the stability of the system is kept.  The  system is maintained because institutionalized norms and values provide normative orientation to action.  The  internalization of institutionalized norms and values by individuals not only shapes the meaning of action but also orients them to act in conformity with it (Ibid:37). The other aspect of the problem of order arises from a conception that one exchanges something as “rights” with others for their contributions to his goals of selfpreservation.  These rights define the conditions under  which possessions are “held” and may be disposed of. exchange of “rights,” Parsons conceives,  “...  The  cannot in a  complex social system be settled ad hoc as part of each exchange transaction”  (Ibid.).  He argues that  A stable system of exchange presupposes a priori settlement among possible alternative ways of defining such rights, that is, an institutionalization of them. The institutionalization of rights in such possessions is, in one major aspect, what we mean by the institution of property. (Ibid.) The institution of property, according to Parsons, is established upon the differentiation of roles in a hierarchical order.  This order is bound together by moral  rules because the roles to which individuals are assigned are differentiated by rights regulated by the institutionalized norms and values 7.  It is hierarchical  because the institution of property defines rights by  30 possessions and their limits and differentiates them according to classes thereof (Ibid:71-3).  Rights are thus  not only based upon private proprietorship, but also exercised, in Hobbes’s terms, as power over the actions of others, or in Parsons’s terms, at least as an ability to count on the non-interference of others (Ibid:121). exercise of power is the protection of property.  The  “The  greater power is power over the lesser, not merely more power than the lesser”  (Ibid:126).  Parsons views the  ability to control the use of force in relation to territoriality as the crucial focus of power.  It is this  focus of power that gives the state the central position In the power system of a complex society. The institution of differential power and hierarchical authority is, consequently, for Parsons, a matter of establishing a leadership role, one which would represent the collectivity (1) to regulate rights particularly to such “possessions” as materials, equipment, premises and the like that are devoted to the “production” of further “utilities” (Ibid:72), and (2) to coordinate a variety of factors and contingencies in the interest of the collective goals (Ibid:100).  It is therefore a matter of achieving goals  upon preserving the integrity or solidarity of a system, a process which requires not only the protection of property but also institution of obligation.  Parsons writes,  It will be noted that solidarity in this sense involves going a step beyond “loyalty” as that concept  31 was defined above. Loyalty is, as it were, the uninstitutionalized precursor of solidarity, it is the “spilling over” of motivation to conform with the interests or expectations of alter beyond the boundaries of any institutionalized or agreed obligation. Collectivity-orientation on the other hand converts this “propensity” into an institutionalized obligation of the role-expectation. Then whether the actor “feels like it” or not, he is obligated to act in certain ways and risks the application of negative sanctions if he does not. (Ibid:97-8) Henceforth, Parsons’s resolution of the ‘problem of order’ is the building of a moral order dominated by the state which protects property as its goal to which individuals are required to conform “voluntarily.”  Parsons’s model of  social relations failed to perceive conflict as the source of systemic change (Hamilton 1983).  Its emphasis on  individual conformism, thus, potentially justifies a rule by the state with the use of military and legal force to protect property and suppress labour and the peasants. Parsons’s model of social relations as his resolution to the ‘problem of order’, a problem which harnesses social systems including the Welfare State, is voluntaristic since voluntarism, as Richard Flathman (1992:9) defines it, aims to persuade individuals to conform to a moral order. Flathman indicates that liberalism itself is committed to a form of voluntarism as liberalism presupposes individuals whose conduct is for the most part voluntary. “Voluntary” in this regard means both that the actions taken are not coerced or compelled by other agents or agencies and that they occur because of the choices and decisions of the individuals whose conduct it is, because of desires and interests, beliefs, values and reasons that are in some sense the individual’s own. (Ibid.)  32 In these ways, Parsons’s view of the internalization of values as the basis for individual conformism to a moral order develops from what Flathman classifies as a strong to a weak form of voluntarism.  While the weak voluntarism  stresses group and associational life and regards individuals and individuality as a manifestation of the breakdown of social life (Ibid:7-8), the strong emphasizes that any transformations of individual acceptance of group values and ideals are to be sought, the work of individuals”  (Ibid:12).  “but this is and must be (Flathman’s adoption of  the strong form of voluntarism as opposed to the weak is based on the idea of acceptance of group values, an emphasis which stretches away from the current focus on the exercise of sentiments of justice by individuals to attain equality.) Parsons’s resolution of the ‘problem of order’ is a weak form of voluntarism because his emphasis on conformism subordinates individuals to the state which protects property.  His basic commitment to the collectivist  tradition, Jeffrey Alexander (1978:192)  suggests, not only  supports the Welfare State but also underplays “the social costs of economic systems that institutionalize private 8 proper ty.”  It is, thus, this conception of the role of  the state to protect private property that provides the basis for shared values in Parsons’s terms.  It is upon the  assumed individual voluntaristic acceptance of the above role of the state that Parsonian arguments were established  33 to justify the existence of state power over society. Parsons’s voluntarism,  therefore, as Anthony Giddens  identifies, lies not only in the above understanding of the shared values, but also in its promotion of the institution of differential power and hierarchical authority.  This  institution is dominated by the elite and operates to repress the will of the unpropertied. In rejecting Parsons’s voluntaristic model of social relations and tracing what he terms a “return of the repressed will,” Giddens searches for ideas of emancipation. He argues that emancipation constitutes: “the effort to shed shackles of the past, thereby permitting a transformative attitude towards the future; and the aim of overcoming the illegitimate domination of some individuals or groups by others”  (1991:211).  To pursue emancipation, he points out  the importance of the individual preserving a coherent narrative of self—identity, and resolving tensions and difficulties on the level of the self while living in a world where institutionalized systems sequester experience and repress the will (Ibid:188).  He argues that the project  of preserving the self against overwhelming institutions is not only possible but also necessary.  It is possible  because most aspects of social activities and material relations with nature are subject “to chronic revision in the light of new information and knowledge”  (Ibid:20).  revision occurs because such information or knowledge  This  34 develops from reflexive relationships in modern social life (Ibid:21).  Thus, contrary to Parsons, who insists that  institutionalized values provide normative orientations to action, Giddens argues that, Even the most reliable authorities can be trusted only ‘until further notice’; and the abstract systems that penetrate so much of day—to—day life normally offer multiple possibilities rather than fixed guidelines or recipes for action. (Ibid:84) He therefore suggests that there is room for the individ ual to influence institutions while acquiring mechanisms of self-identity that are shaped by institutions (Ibid:85).  He  believes that this process of tracing a “return of the repressed will” is a way to overcome differential “power as the capacity of an individual or group to exert its will over others”  (Ibid:211-2).  It also helps to attain the  imperatives of justice, equality, and participation. Consequently, Giddens adopts the liberal principle of emancipation to project the political engagement of the self in social movements while seeking self—actualization collectively.  It is a central focus of his effort to  repudiate the voluntarism of Parsons’s model of internalized moral order.  A question, yet unresolved, reveals the  tension between the “return of the repressed will,” and obstacles to emancipation.  Such obstacles are a consequence  of differential power and hierarchical authority, and various moral dilenimas that the individual faces when adopting freely chosen lifes 9 tyles.  35 To address this question, this dissertation now donsiders the recognition of  ‘inalienable rights’ of  individuals to exercise sentiments of justice as a key to superseding the influence of Parsons’s voluntarism. The Quasi-Market Model and Scope of the Work The quasi—market model of social relations promotes individual independence, not conformity.  It further  suggests that power should be generative rather than repressive.  The model combines the concept of sentiments of  justice with Leiss’s elaboration of Macpherson’s view of a quasi—market society.  The concept of sentiments of justice  derives from Adam Smith’s ideas of the independently-minded individual, who has a natural endowment to perceive the essential justness in social relationships.  It also  incorporates Marx’s ideas of individual emancipation and freedom from subordination, which forms a central idea that shapes the arguments for the quasi—market model.  This model  embraces a “transformative” attitude towards the future as it considers the legal recognition of  ‘inalienable rights’  of individuals to exercise sentiments of justice, not proprietorship, as the precondition for movement toward an acceptable form of modern political economy, in which the state protects the public interest and not simply property rights.  It explains why the “free market” approach  developed by the Nationalists led them to fail to achieve their objectives of building a quasi-market society.  In the  36 following pages, I shall focus on the advantages and applicability of this model in an analysis of China’s transformation during the Nationalist Revolution.  For the  detail of the model, I refer the reader to the Appendix. The quasi—market model of social relations is based on the understanding of an historical, intellectual effort made by Adam Smith and Marx to reject social contract theory.  It  began with the recognition by Smith of the value of labour in the process of production and the implication that workers had the right to bargain with their employers, the owners of capital, for a reasonable price for their labour (wages) in the market place.  This, in its turn inspired  Marx, who revived interest in the idea of human equality in emancipation and freedom. In the search for individual emancipation, Marx argued that workers produced surplus value, which was expropriated by the owners of capital, a process of exploitation.  He was  critical of Smith’s analysis of an equal exchange in the market place and favoured the conception of rights to equality guaranteed by a system of redistribution.  He  argued that labour had to overthrow the capitalist state in a revolution in order to achieve more equitable social relations. Macpherson and Leiss endeavour to update the analyses of capitalism by both Smith and Marx and elaborate the concept of a quasi—market society.  A quasi—market society,  37 Leiss explains, began to appear in the western world of “free market” capitalism during World War I. continued to grow since.’ 0  It has  This form of society has a  ‘mixed economy’, in which fully-developed market relations exist sideby—side with a state apparatus that oversees the national economy and takes responsibility for major social programs through transfer payments. (Leiss 1988: 119) It is neither capitalist nor socialist, that has some of the features of both”  “but a hybrid form (Ibid.).  Within  quasi—market society, Leiss suggests, there is a thoroughgoing politicization of property.  Wealth remains  largely in private hands and its distribution is unequal. Its possession and enjoyment are controlled by democratically elected governments (Ibid:135).  The  politicizatiàn of property implies a change in the meaning of property and it is viewed as “‘the means to a full and free life of action and enjoyment’”  (Ibid:106).  It has  consequences for social welfare, especially the claim to a right of access for everyone to a minimum share of resources. This share is in effect an entitlement to a stream of revenue that is sufficient to sustain every person at a decent level of existence, whether this stream of revenue be generated by earning an income at paid employment or receiving various kinds of welfare benefits from the state. (Ibid: 104—5) Macpherson saw a contradiction between private property and democracy and saw the abolition of private property as a solution to the resolution of the issue.  Leiss rejected  such a radical idea and argues that the liberal—democratic  38 tradition can lead to the “fullest possible realization of every individual’s capacities”  (Ibid:107)  so as to preserve  the growth of quasi—market social relations. Leiss attributes at least six characteristics to a quasi—market society: market relations, income distribution, capital concentration, regulation, government spending and welfare floor 11 .  He places market relations at the centre  of the society (Ibid:116).  He considers that social action  revolves around market relations (Ibid:134).  The problem is  that by focusing on the market, individual action may be overlooked and the problem of injustice in economic relationships may not be fully addressed.  As Leiss  indicates: Every kind of economic order may be pervaded with injustice, and in every known society individuals and groups have prevented themselves, at least in part, from realizing their own objectives by constructing behavioral patterns and pictures of the world that contain inconsistencies and regressive features. The quasi—market society is not immune from contamination by this longstanding practice. (1988:140) To explore further the mechanism whereby the individual can address injustice and inequality, I introduce the concept of sentiments of justice.  This concept follows  Smith’s theory of moral sentiments and Marx’s search for the independence of the labouring poor from the tradition of elite activism.  It recognizes that individuals have a  natural endowment to participate in social relat 12 ions. They exercise a naturally—endowed will to make choices and to attain justice while pursuing their needs in relationship  39 to others.  They develop sentiments about the essential  justness of the set of social relationships in which they 1 parti cipat 3 e.  They exercise sentiments of justice to  maintain a reasonable level of social well—being.  The  exercise of sentiments of justice to evaluate participation in social relations indicates the growth of individual activism.  This activism brings together private individuals  to form a ‘public’ and to express a ‘public interest’ which calls for 1 protect 4 ion.  The expression of public interest  provides the basis upon which rules of justice or public policies are established and improved.  Such rules provide  the rational ground upon which political and economic institutions are operated to protect the public 15 inter est.  These rules also stipulate the rights of  individuals.  These rights are not based on proprietorship  but on the articulation and recognition of individual needs. 16 The understanding of individuals who exercise sentiments of justice to influence the operation of institutions indicates that individuals are at the centre of social action.  Individuals exercise sentiments of justice  to influence the government and its decisions to allocate resources according to claims of need, or merit.  They also  exercise sentiments of justice to build more equitable relationships in the market place through the distribution of wealth and redress of injuries.  The development of these  40 relationships depends upon the exercise of sentiments of justice by individuals to articulate their needs and to bring forth their concern for a public interest which calls for protection. The pursuit of justice by individuals underlies the formation and transformation of social relations of production.  It gives rise to organized movements to gain  legal recognition of citizenship rights and to counter undue state author 17 ity.  A necessary outcome of this process is  the recognition of “inalienable rights” of individuals to exercise sentiments of justice to attain a full and free life equally for all under conditions of representative government.  This government looks after the public interest  through a viable social welfare system. To. formulate the necessary precondition for movement toward an acceptable form of modern political economy, I apply the concept of sentiments of justice to the idea of a quasi-market society.  I add individual activism to Leiss’s  list of six characteristics.  By adding this one, I hope to  meet the challenge posed by voluntarism and to keep Leiss’s commitment to the realization of the capacities of individuals, especially in the participation in political and economic processes.  With the seven characteristics, I  construct a quasi-market model of social relations (Figure 1). This model indicates that individuals have the ability  41 to make moral judgments and the right to express their views and protest against injustice, including government exceeding its authority.  The model allows individuals to  initiate direct influences on government policies, to articulate concerns for the protection of the public interest, and to elect a government which fosters societal well-being. The state manages social resources to protect the public interest in accord with rules of justice.  In Leiss’s  view, the state oversees, at the societal level, action which includes public sector economic activity, regulation of and subsidies to business, and capital concentration (1988:124—5).  It also undertakes action such as income  distribution, and transfer payments and the welfare floor that are relevant on the individual level (Ibid.).  The  strength of the state in its fiscal and administrative capabilities is measured by how well the government protects the public interest within the limit of social resources. The state upholds justice equally for all in distribution and the redress of injuries in response to the exercise of sentiments of justice by individuals.  The model, thus,  relates the operation of political and economic institutions directly to the political and economic participation of citizens.  The central mechanism is the recognition of  ‘inalienable rights’ of individuals to exercise sentiments of justice and to attain a full and free life through their  42 influence on government. The building of this relationship provides a key to the resolution of the tension between the “return of the repressed will” and the institution of differential power and hierarchical authority, a point raised by Giddens.  When  modern political and economic institutions operate in accord with the exercise of sentiments of justice by individuals, the tension is resolved because, as Giddens suggests, power is generative, rather than repressive.  This resolution  overcomes the difficulty of the poor being excluded from the political and economic processes in which individuals become defined in terms of the property transactions in which they are involved. This model argues against the voluntaristic notion of the “internalized moral order” in Parsons’s thought.  It is  centred on the independent exercise of sentiments of justice as  ‘inalienable rights’ of individuals to influence  government and attain equality.  It does not accept the view  of the state protecting ‘transferable rights’ based on proprietorship.  The model also indicates that the exercise  of sentiments of justice by the individual is an example of autonomous political power, one which is not transformed by institutions such as parliaments, organized interest groups and a free press.  The power is exercised upon individually—  based moral grounds.  The institutions do not operate to  translate public opinion into political power which is then  43 used to regulate the rights of individuals.  They operate,  instead, in accord with rules of justice which are established and modified on the basis of the independent exercise of moral sentiments by individuals. The model argues that rights are recognized and exercised not by law or law—makers, but by individuals who express sentiments and indicate approval or disapproval of their participation in relationships of exchange and distribution.  Laws are established and amended based on the  mechanisms of the exercise of sentiments of justice.  These  mechanisms can take the form of procedural rules of justice, as John Rawis (1971) and Roberto Unger (1976) have suggested, to ensure fair and equal opportunities for citizens to attain justice in their participation in social 1nships relatio 8. (Ibid:52-3)  These rules are not autonomous as Unger  suggests, but subject to historical changes.  They function in response to the exercise of sentiments of justice by individuals.  In contrast to the argument of  state autonomy shared by Eastman, Skocpol, and Hall, the view of the political and economic institutions operating upon the exercise of sentiments of justice by individuals leads to the recognition by society of their ‘inalienable rights’ to pursue justice in the attainment of equality, not to the recognition of the state autonomously conditioning their political behaviour. The model insists that the scope in which the  44 ‘inalienable rights’ of individuals are recognized differentiates two types of society: a “free market” type and a quasi—market type.  A “free market” society is  different from the latter.  In a “free market” society, the  state expands its power through its involvement in the accumulation of capital, and through the use of force to control productive relations between capital and labour.  As  Leiss points out, Public sector expenditures and employment are kept to an absolute minimum (except for military and police functions), as is government regulation of the economy: the role of the state is to guarantee the sanctity of contracts and to provide internal and external security, that is, to protect property. Furthermore, there is no welfare floor, the poor being rescued from misery or extinction only by private charity. (1988:119) Not only is government involvement in income redistribution absent as a matter of principle, but the exercise of sentiments of justice is also repressed as the government increases taxes to strengthen the military and augment police power to protect the growth of property, thereby ignoring social welfare.  These ideas are illustrated in  Figure 2. A distinct characteristic of a “free market” society is that the role of the state is to protect property.  A quasi  market society guarantees everyone, through redistribution, a right “to the means of a fully human life”  (Ibid:105),  that is, a right to influence not only redistribution itself but also a movement toward an acceptable form of modern  45 political economy in which justice for all prevails.  The  central mechanism whereby the former role of the state is historically superseded is the recognition by society of ‘inalienable rights’ of individuals to exercise sentiments of justice to attain a full, free life upon transcending the recognition of rights based on proprietorship. The quasi—market model observes that when sentiments of justice are in accord, society is just and fair, in which the state protects the public interest.  When the pursuit of  justice by individuals is obstructed, conflicted sentiments presupposes the transformation of social relations.  When a  system of socially organized production emerges in the process of transformation, the state, as Weber suggests, enhances its administrative and legal control of society in alliance with capitalist interests in order to destroy local structures ruled by old elite 19 s.  This changing role of  the state may become a process recently characterized by scholars of modern China as one in which a ‘strong society’ dominated by local elites embraces and foils a ‘weak state’ when an expansionary state power seeks legitimacy from society, while protecting capital accumulation through forming a constitutional government in allies with some local interests of the propertied elite against those of 2 labour ° ers.  The exercise of sentiments of justice by  workers and peasants soon challenges this role of the state protecting property and ultimately brings forth the  46 recognition of their participation in political and economic processes.  The recognition of the changing relationship  between the effort by elites to build state power by forming constitutional government, and the pursuit of justice by labour and the peasants to build more equitable social relations, provides theoretical directions for an analysis of the social transformation in modern China, of which the Nationalist Revolution formed a part.  These directions help  generate an historical perspective on the process of social transformation and its consequences. My argument is that Imperial China grew for more than a thousand years because of the acceptance of the exercise of sentiments of justice included in the Confucian notion of the Mandate of Heaven.  The Imperial tradition of  “government by virtue” was characterized by local elites distinguishing themselves by their pursuit of selfcultivation in providing guardianship over local communities, and managment and protection of local property relations against outside forces, including those of the Imperial state.  This society was established upon  paternalistic relationships which molded the local economy. Revolt against rulers who neglected the well-being of the people was justified by invoking the Mandate of Heaven (Figure 3). In the Imperial system, the goal of government was to establish social harmony.  State rule was maintained at the  47 local level by the xian (county) magistrate, who relied upon local elites to carry out tasks fundamental to the governance of the local area, including facilitating the collection of tax revenue.  Some of this revenue was  retained by local levels of government, although the bulk of it was destined for transmission to the metropolitan centre and to other needy areas.  Some of the funds were used for  the costs and the tasks of local governance.  Part was  certainly put aside for disaster relief and as welfare payments for those in distress. Individual members of the elite involved in the management of family property and household production, two main sources of income from which funds were derived not only for schools but also for welfare relief in a local area.  They were expected to make contributions for  charitable relief to the needy.  They established and  supported schools as a major underpinning of training in state ideology.  They controlled market operations and  dominated local economies as both informal extensions of Imperial power and by virtue of the fact that they were the major holders of land in their native localities.  They were  also managers of local infrastructural projects, especially for irrigation and water control, which protected and augmented the value of local property, of which they were major owners.  They maintained systems of conflict  resolution through mediation, as a form of social control,  48 so as to ensure a stable growth of local property relations. They resisted outside forces, including those of the state, which encroached upon the management of local property rights 21 My analysis of Imperial China suggests that Imperial China was reasonably just because of some degree of recognition of the exercise of sentiments of justice by individuals.  It also argues that the obstruction of the  exercise of sentiments of justice on the part of peasants to attain Heaven—given prosperity was a catalyst for social change.  This obstruction occurred especially in the  nineteenth century when, in the wake of economic growth and commercialism, peasant demands for rights to the topsoil of the land they tilled questioned customary practices.  These  demands challenged the brokerage market system in which local elites acted as the intermediaries (or brokers) of contractual partners.  This challenge prompted the late Qing  government to establish administrative and legal means to reinstall the function that was served previously by the broker.  The state attempted to promulgate the terms of  exchange of rights so as to stabilize property relations and to break down geographical barriers.  State involvement in  market operations assisted the growth of commercialism.  The  state also abandoned its role to uphold the general ‘well being’ of society mandated by Heaven.  It adopted a role to  protect the growth of property in response to the influence  49 of the new commercial elite on government. A result of this change in the role of the state was that more peasants were driven off the land and joined the “free” labour force ready to be mobilized by capital in large—scale industrial operations.  The intrusion of foreign  forces, which accelerated, at times, and obstructed, at others, the process of social change that had already been underway, profited from the use of this labour force.  The  efforts led by the Chinese revolutionaries to resist foreign penetration and the suppression of the Qing government finally brought to an end the Imperial system in a revolution in 1911.  The revolutionary impulse, which was  checked by warlordism, was kept alive by the Nationalists, who developed a radical alternative approach to continuing China’s transformation to the warlord rule by the 1920s. The idea of transformation was embedded in the Nationalist theory of revolution.  In the western world  after World War I, there was a movement towards the establishment of quasi—market societies.  This movement was  reflected in the developments of the recognition of labour unions, government regulation and involvement in income redistribution.  These developments were a source of  reference for Sun Yat—sen’s formulation of revolutionary objectives.  Features of quasi-market social relations in  his Principles encouraged the Nationalists in the Guangzhou era (1924-1926) to expand state institutions to accommodate  50 a wider participation in legislation, to address concerns of labour and the peasants, and to reshape economic relations with the help of Comintern advisors.  The development of the  worker and peasant movements in the late 1920s, stimulated by Sun’s revolutionary strategies of “Uniting the Soviet and Communists and supporting the peasants and workers,” posed a threat to the Nationalist elite which, pressed by the imperialists, Chinese bankers and mill—owners, took measures to bring society under centralized state control.  The  building of Nationalist state power with the use of military and legal force contributed to a disjunction between the theory and practice of the revolution. In an examination of reasons for, and the consequences of, the disjunction between the theory and practice of the revolution, I argue that the theory of the revolution itself, included in Sun’s Three People’s Principles and Chiang Kai—shek’s China’s Destiny, places an emphasis on individual sacrifice for “national liberty,” represented by the state controlled by experts.  This emphasis is in part a  consequence of the influence of western voluntaristic thinking.  It forms the basis upon which Chiang justifies  his demands for individual loyalty to the state.  It gives  rise to essential contradictions in the theory, which become a vital source of discrepancy between the theory and practice, and ultimately contribute to the development of a Nationalist “free market” approach and divert the efforts  51 from building quasi—market social relations. The “free market” approach of the Nationalist Government was reflected in its intervention in economic relations in order to enhance fiscal power, to establish control over society and to maintain the growth of property through safeguarding the sanctity of contracts.  It was also  rooted in the alienation of the Nationalist pursuit of a constitutional government from the demands of the labouring poor for citizenship rights.  The exercise of these rights,  which is the basis of civil liberty and freedom, and the necessary precondition for the establishment of political and economic institutions of a quasi—market society, was denied by the “free market” approach of the Nationalist Government in the period between 1927 and 1937. My analysis of this “free market” approach suggests that after the founding of the Nanjing Government in 1927, the assumption that the state represented the “general interest” of society became central to Nationalist rule. The Nanjing Government under Chiang Kai-shek applied force, legislation, compromise, and an understanding of Confucian virtues to establish law and order.  Warlords and  established elites, who had influence over regional armies and police, were accepted into the KMT and the government in order to achieve national unity.  The Nanjing Government  suppressed the worker and peasant movements, waged extermination campaigns against the Communists, and coerced  52 capitalists into paying higher taxes through increasingly centralized economic institutions.  It continued efforts to  pursue a constitutional government in emulation of the West. Law and order was established only to protect and sustain the enjoyment of property.  It was used not to reduce  inequality and injustice for labour and the peasants but to maintain domination. participation.  Citizens’ rights limited political  The virtue of obedience was promoted.  By a  combination of compromise, force, legislation and the appropriation of Confucian virtues, the Nationalist Government developed a greater degree of control over individuals.  It compromised the protection of communities  by local elites at least in the areas where the Nationalists had influence. At the end of these developments, there was a shift in the relationship between the state and society.  In the  Imperial tradition, local elites protected the general well being of local society against the encroachment of the state.  In the Nationalist establishment, the state  protected property in co-operation with established political and economic elites against the demands of labour and the peasants.  This shift occurred at a time when the  social influence on government originating in the struggles of labour and the peasants increased.  Labour and the  peasants were able to increasingly contest the power of active elites.  This contest influenced government.  53 In the establishment of Nationalist elite rule, the labouring poor, particularly the peasantry, becam e a more autonomous, organized social force which determined the fate of political revolution in modern Chinese history.  The  strength of this force was increased by its struggles for citizenship rights, independent of the proclaimed tutelag e of the Nationalist State over society.  Such independence  indicated the growth of individual activism, involving members of this force to exercise sentiments of justice to evaluate their participation in the transformation of social relations.  The Nationalists, associated with the  established elite, were estranged from this force and ultimately lost to a Communist—led social movement. It becomes clear that the Nationalist Revolution failed because it did not achieve its initial objectives of building a quasi-market society, in which the state would protect public interest.  The Nationalists diverted their  efforts from supporting the peasants and workers in the mid 1920s to establishing control over society with military and legal force.  They protected property and suppressed the  demands of labour and the peasants.  An analysis of this  failure suggests that although Nationalist theory and practice were radically deficient in preparing for a quasi market society, the revolution itself was not abortive.  It  was a conduit for the transformation of the political system.  The Imperial tradition of local elites protecting  54 the local community against state encroachment was replaced by Nationalist elite rule.  The revolution was  transformative also because it resulted in a “free market ” society, which formed a contrast with the Imperial tradition of elite rule and brokerage market system. To represent the historical context in which the process of change occurred, it is necessary to contrast the two types of Chinese society: late Imperial China and Republican China in the Nationalist period.  This contrast  entails an analysis of three intertwined developments: social and economic crisis;  (1)  (2) external pressures on  internal political and economic crisis; and (3) the Nationalist political programs included in Sun’s Three People’s Principles and Chiang’s China’s Destin 22 y.  The  contrast provides the background setting against which the present historical perspective is prominently figured.  This  historical perspective offers an alternative explanation of the causes -and consequences of the transformation of China during the Nationalist Revolution to that in the existing literature.  55  NOTES 1. These views call for attention more than those which dominate the on—going debates, such as the question of whether the ‘impact’ of foreign influence or internal factors of cultural practice and social structure promoted or retarded “revolution” and “development” in China. It is fundamental because it directly affects not only the present construction of an acceptable form of modern political economy but also a method to determine the causes and consequences of transformation, a point which divides and confuses the approaches to the question in debate. There are four different approaches to the question; one incurs counterpoised arguments. Based on the focus of their analyses, these approaches are generally known as cultural, historical and technological/demographic explanations, adding onto them the two opposing views of a debate: modernization versus dependency theory. While different views of the cultural explanation examine the adequacy and inadequacy of Chinese culture and social structure in improvising modern economic development (Eastman 1988; Balazs 1972; Gray 1990), Lippit (1978) adopts an historical analysis of the subordination of the merchant class to the gentry and argues that Chinese merchants were concerned more with purchasing a degree to become members of the gentry than with investing in technological advancement. Only did the coming of western influences help Chinese merchants turn attention to technology. Similar to Lippit, Elvin (1973) considers that western influences helped China get out of what he calls “high equilibrium trap,” in which high population growth exhausted land resources and pressed the traditional methods of production to their limits. Riskin (1975) rejects Elvin’s theory based on his analysis of the economic growth of 1933 when population growth was substantially accommodated by traditional methods of production. For a study of the debade between modernization and dependency theory, see Cohen (1984). A treatment of the debate is found in Chapter Three. 2. Skocpol groups currently important social—scientific theories of revolution in four families: the Marxist which is represented by Marx himself and his ideas, and other three families which are more contemporary, drawing particular themes from classical sociologists such as Tocqueville, Durkheim, Weber, and Marx. According to Skocpol, these three more recent groupings are: aggregate— psychological theories focussing on people’s psychological motivations for participating in revolution, represented by Ted Gurr’s work, Why Men Rebel; system/value conscience theories, viewing revolutions as purposive attempts to change disfunctional social systems, represented by Chalmers Johnson’s Revolutionary Change; and political-conflict theories, seeing revolution as collective violence and conflict over power among governments and organized groups, represented by Charles Tilly’s From Mobilization  56 to Revolution. See Skocpol (1979:6-9) Skocpol rejects the above theoretical approaches on the following three grounds: one, these theories, tend to take a voluntaristic perspective on the causes and processes of social revolutions, a perspective which comes from Parsonian structural— functionalism. Secondly, they tend to focus on intra—national conflicts. Finally, they tend not to differentiate state and society, “or they reduce political and state actions to representations of socioeconomic forces and interests” (Ibid:14). Her unestablished relationship between the state and property owning society, however, as soon pointed out, leads her to fail to overcome Parsons’s voluntarism. Her search for state autonomy exposes her to the influence of voluntarism. For book reviews, see C. W. Cassinelli, American Political Science Review, v.74, 1980, pp.571-2; V. G. Kiernan, English Historical Review, v.95, 1980, pp.638-41; Sidney Monas, Journal of Modern History, v.52, 1980, pp.299-300; Elizabeth J. Perry, Journal of Asian Studies, v.39, 1980, pp.533-5; and Keith Tribe, Sociological Review, v.28, 1980, pp.471-5. Skocpol’s analytical scheme of revolutions is discussed by Jack Goldstone (1980:441). 3. Apparently, as Perry points out, the solidarity of peasants that the Communist Party had supplied was based on dismantling and quickly reconstituting local community organizations. 4. For reviews of Hall’s work, see Thomas D. Hall, American Journal of Sociology, v.93, 1987, pp.732-3; Justin Wintle, New Statesman, 17 January 1986, p.33; and W. G. Runciman, London Review of Books, v.7, n.18, 17 October 1985, pp. . 9 — 18 5. Eastman regards nationalism, not class or ideological struggle, as the strongest impetus to the Nationalist Revolution, “whose destructive thrust was directed against warlordism and imperialism, and whose constructive thrust was directed toward the creation of a new and effective political system” (1990:xii). For comments on Eastman’s study, see Ranbir Vohra, Library Journal, v.100, April 1975, p.662; Michael Gasster, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, v.421, September 1975, pp.163-4; Choice, v.12, June 197, p. . 585 6. See especially Eastman’s article on “Fascism in Kuolnintang China: the Blue Shirts,” in which he claims that “the ‘fascistization’ of the Blue Shirts was an accomplished fact” (1972:16). Chang (1985) rejects Eastman’s use of the term ‘fascism’ and challenges his analysis of the Blue Shirts. The recent study by Huang Daoxuan, moreover, notes that “Under the pressure of public opinion [against Nazism], Chiang Kai-shek had to draw a line between him and [the discussions of] fascist distatorship in November, 1934” (1992:168) and publicly questioned its applicability in China.  57 7. In fact, Giddens points out, in his Social Theory and Modern Sociology, that the above notion of roles is voluntaristic, “as where roles are ‘made’ rather than just ‘taken’, but for most part the idea of role was understood in a deterministic way. Roles are pre—constitu ted modes of behaviour that shape individuals’ actions far more than the reverse” (1987:189). In the light of this point, Eastman (1974) may err in his conception of China as a status-oriented society, in which individuals act according to the roles assigned to them. 8. I thank Yunshik Chang for drawing my atten tion to this study. 9. The question itself is raised by Giddens (1991: 210-31). For an informative study of power and authority, see Steven Lukes (1978). 10. Leiss clearly states that this transition is by no means complete because the ideal capitalist society still appear s in the fervent rhetoric of “free market” ideologies (1988: 119). 11. According to Leiss, the six characteristics are as follows: (1) The public or government sector accounts for about one—half of a nation’s annual Gross National Product and about one—quarter of its direct employment. (2) There are fully-developed market relations: labor is a commodity, satisfaction of most needs is accomplished through market purchases, and almost all individuals are engaged in numerous market transactions every day. (3) Notwithstanding (2), the state undertakes indirect regulation of the entire economic and direct regulatio n of a substantial portion of the national economy. (4) The economy comprises a relatively small number of large enterprises, privately or publicly controlled (or a mixture of both), which dominate the national economy. (5) Income and wealth distributions show large and persistent inequalities across sectors of the populatio n. (6) A “welfare floor” protects the least-well-off from being deprived of the basic necessities of life, and in some cases assures a “decent” standard of living. (1988:115) 12. I thank William Leiss for suggesting this expression. 13. I thank Graham Johnson for suggesting this expressio n. 14. Jurgen Habermas (1989) developed the idea of public sphere. Recently, some western scholars of China discuss the idea. According to Philip Huang (1993:225), public as a third realm bridging between the state and society, has always been  58 part of Chinese socio-political life. The study of Imperial China in Chapter Two demonstrates that the (‘inalienable’) right given by Heaven to the subjects of the Emperor to revolt against corrupt government was the central source of search for a just society in which public was formed to protect the well-being of people. 15. Recognizing the role of the state in the creation of public interest, Patricia Marchak notes, The expanding institution of the state reflected both its basis in private property and its role as a custod ian of something more than property, something that, in many ways, it created: the public interest. Legislation, the justification for legislation, the creation of public schools and public transportation these nurtured the public interest, and with that, a dimension of being “above particularistic interests” that was no longer (if it ever had been) just a masking of the instrumental interests of a dominating class. (1991:40) —  16. For an expression of genuine needs, see Leiss (1988:140). While rejecting the ideas of false needs and false consciousness in the discussions of reification and commodity fetishism, Leiss recognizes “... the genuine gratification of quite genuine and deeply—felt needs.” Viewed, therefore, from neither a structural nor a cultural point of view, the endowment in individuals to articulate their needs is put to use more importantly upon individually based moral ground. For a discussion of structuralist and (neo)culturalist approaches to political culture in China, see Perry (1992:110). 17. In recent debates over the issue of what characterizes social transformation or continuity in China, opinions are divided between those who stress China’s transformation in the rise of “autonomous civil society” and those who concentrate on the persistent influence of confucian tradition of political culture. See, for instance, the articles in Modern China, April, 1993, Rosenbaum (1992) and Wasserstroni and Perry (1992). The present quasi-market model adopts its view, similar to that of Chen Ruiyun (1988), an historian of Republican China in China, and some of participants in recent discussions on contemporary economic and political liberalization in the non-Western world (see World Development, September, 1993), that the quality of the government is indicated by its accountability to the people. This view allows society to change shape upon changing relationships of the government and people. Considering the changes taking place in the very relationships in modern Chinese history, the quasi-market model holds that the late Qing saw the anticipation of civil society as there were signs of the emergence of socially—organized production and social  59 efforts to build a representative government. The configuration of civil society, however , shifted, in the course of Nationalist Revolution, as the Nationalist State changed its role from supporting labour and the peasants in the mid of 1920s to protecting property in the 1930s. 18. I thank Pitman Potter for drawing my attention to the studies by Rawis and Unger, and the Law of Civil Procedure of the People’s Republic of China adopted by the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People’s Con gress at its 22nd Session on March 8, 1982. 19. For the expression from Weber, see Vivienne Shue (1988:73). I thank Graham Johnson for drawing my attention to Shue’s work. 20. See especially David Strand (1990). I thank Graham Johnson for raising the question of ‘strong’ society and ‘weak’ state. 21. Chang Chung-li, earlier studies of Rankin, Philip Huang Chapter Two. I thank  Hsiao Kung-ch’uan and Philip Kuhn led Imperial China. Joseph Esherick, Mary and others are among recent ones. More in Graham Johnson for his suggestions.  22. I thank Patricia Marchak and Alexander Woodside for their advice on this analysis.  60 CHAPTER TWO Mandate of Heaven and Transformation of Property Relations in Nineteenth Century Imperial China  The Mandate of Heaven (Tian Ming) was a widely held Confucian conception of the natural order  (  or Way).  It  was understood to have bestowed upon the Emperor the right to rule for the betterment of his subjects, and gave his subjects the right to revolt when the Emperor failed to bring prosperity and justice.’  The understanding of the  mandate as the basis from which both the right to rule and to revolt derived indicates that it was the grounds upon which developed both the justifications for Imperial government and peasant rebellions.  The former affected  official perceptions of justice and prosperity.  These  perceptions were often used to justify Imperial state power, but they were not always endorsed by peasants.  The  recurrence of peasant rebellions suggested that peasants not only held the perception of justice and prosperity independent of Imperial state power but also exercised their sentiments of justice against corrupt government.  Some,  perhaps most powerful peasant rebellions in Chinese history rallied support by the claim “to make the Way prevail for Heaven”  (titian xingdao)  (Shih 1967:293-4).  This claim  signalled the withdrawal of the mandate. The different use of the mandate suggests that there were both elements of oppression and resistance in the  61 ielationship between the Imperial state and property-owning society.  The contest between oppressive state power and  peasant resistance historically offered peasants and their allies an opportunity to build a just society, one which was prescribed by the mandate.  This  ‘just’ society would  operate based on a harmony between the perceptions of justice held by the rulers and the ruled. The complex of property relations in Imperial China was established upon the recognition of peasants’ demand for land and prosperity through measures of justice, such as low taxation and land redistribution via tuntian (land colonization).  These measures were dictated by Confucian  principles of benevolent rule adopted by the government. They were used to reduce the level of concentration in landholding and to maintain the growth of prosperity. Together with the practice of self—government and an important degree of social mobility, they tended to prolong a tie between the Emperor and the peasantry which kept Chinese dynastic rule intact and stabilized society. Efforts on the part of peasants and their allies to build the ‘just’  society enabled China to grow and prosper for  more than a millennium without fundamental changes. 2 The Confucian conception of the Mandate of Heaven, although it gave the peasants the right to pursue the ‘just’ society, was, however, never promulgated in a written constitution and fully implemented in the Imperial system.  62 Subsequently, in the adoption of the Confucian conception of a moral order mandated by Heaven in the Imperial establishment, the society was turned into something considerably different from what the Tian Ming purported to bestow.  To maintain a society ruled by the Emperor, a  sociology of learning was established among the Emperor’s subjects.  Those who had more time and resources could  devote themselves to higher learning.  Those who were  learned claimed to be more virtuous and acquired rights and property in order to control those who were less learned. Imperial China, therefore, saw the rise of elites, who served in the government and controlled localities through their hold on family and community organizations, and their dominance of local property rights.  The Emperor’s subjects  were divided into a group of ruling elites and a group of those who were ruled.  The elites ruled over the structure  of social relationships through systems of government and law, norms and values of learning and the operation of a brokerage market economy.  This market economy grew upon the  order of local property relations in which the local elite acted as the intermediaries of contractual partners and exercised domination over the local community in resistance to state encroachment. In late Imperial China, elite rule combined with state power in the face of peasant struggles for rights to land they tilled and the right to organize themselves.  These  63 struggles incited changes in property relations to land, challenged old customary practices, and brought China to a different trajectory of economic development.  As Mi Chu  Wien notes, in the late Qing, agricultural labourers were largely free peasants related to their landlords in a contractually—based tenancy system, with legally or customarily protected rights and the capability of forming strong peasant alliances in the village communities. This picture is different from the Sung [or Song) situation ... in which a substantial and probably preponderant number of agricultural labourers were bound to the soil, prohibited from leaving their masters, treated unequally under the law and subjected to personal control and numerous restrictions by their lords. (Hamilton 1990:89) An examination of the transformation of property relations in nineteenth century China demonstrates that the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), in attempting to attain equal distribution of land, expressed peasants’ demand for rights to land against heavy rent and taxes (Shih 1967:230-4). When the Confucian scholar elite sided with the government to maintain Imperial rule, its efforts undermined the revolutionary character of the Tian Ming.  The right given  by the mandate to the peasants to act against injustice was rejected by the Confucian school that dominated nineteenth century statecraft.  This school, as Mary Wright (1967:59)  notes, emphasized the idea that the objective “principle” on which the state and society were organized was entailed in the Confucian concept of j.  This concept encouraged a  pyramidal order “with clearly defined rights and obligations for every individual and every group.  A general harmony  64 resulted when these rights were recognized and the corollary duties performed with the state as arbiter”  (Ibid:61).  The idea of the state as arbiter justified the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion led by the Qing official, Zeng Guof an, who saw that when people ceased to perform their duty to submit to the ‘harmony’,  “it became  not only necessary but right that they be punished” (Ibid:63).  The ‘punishment’, that Zeng inflicted upon the  Taipings, was, for him, not only necessary but right to protect the Imperial rule and to defend the ‘mandate’ given by Heaven (Shih 1967:399—400). The recognition of the difference in the use of the mandate, that is, the exercise of the right by the state to rule for the ‘well-being’ of the people and the right exercised by the people to revolt against corrupt government, suggests that the allocation of power in China was determined neither by personality, nor solely by political machinery or laws, but by the nature of the relationships between the state and society.  An analysis of  the transformation of property relations in nineteenth century Chinese economic history indicates that the power of Imperial property rights was limited.  It was contested by  the efforts of local elites to safeguard their control over local property relations and by the efforts of peasants to exercise the right given by Heaven against corrupt government.  This analysis leads to a conclusion about the  65 peasants fighting for their rights to the topsoil of land they tilled against elite domination over the local community.  The peasant struggles were the seed—bed of  China’s transformation on the eve of the intrusion of the West.  This transformation was inspired by the widely-held  notion of the Mandate of Heaven, which recognized an ‘inalienable right’ of the people to revolt in search for a protection of their welfare. In what follows, the transformation of property relations in nineteenth century China is examined, first, by a study of Tian Ming in the Imperial tradition of elite rule.  This study provides a context in which the  transformation of property relations occurred.  I, then,  analyze the growing changes in property relations of the brokerage market economy.  This economy was increasingly  challenged as peasants gained rights to the topsoil of land they tilled and as the rise of “free labour” threatened the existence of the household economy. Tian Ming and Imperial Elite Rule  Many Chinese philosophers believed in a universal natural order existing in the minds of people as well as in the physical universe.  For them, the Mandate of Heaven  ruled the universal natural order to which every natural object belonged, and humanity, as a part of that order, conformed and showed respect (Escarra 1937:250).  Some early  Chinese thinkers argued that to conform to the mandate was  66 to follow the Way learning.  ()  and to be kept in the Way by  They believed that in conformity with the Way, a  social order was to be controlled from above and government was a search for harmony between the rulers and the ruled. The ruler, who held a sacred trust from Heaven (Tian), relied on his ability to learn by heart the mandate (Ming). The ruled learned it by their observation of the ruler’s example.  Thus, following the mandate became a central  concern in operating state affairs, and learning was its quintessensial principle particularly strongly held by Confucianism (Hsu 1975:30—3). Although the Tian Ming entrusted the emperor to rule in the spirit of benefitting his subjects so as to create harmony, the emperor needed money to fund his government and army.  He then taxed his subjects to obtain revenue, and  solicited corvee labour to serve in his army and government. In maintaining his rule, he also adopted policies to affect the formation of social relations based on the exercise of rights and obligations, property ownership and transferral, and sentiments of approval and disapproval.  In the  establishment of the Imperial rule, the Mandate of Heaven was adapted as the ideology of the state, and a tradition of elite rule was established to sustain the stable growth of society. Historically, views were united on the legitimacy of a direct descent of Tian (i.e., the Tian Zi or the Son of  67 Heaven) who held the sacred trust of Heaven to be the ruler. Opinions were however divided over how to implement his rule over people in the name of the Ming.  Early Chinese  statecraft developed in the midst of debates about how to bridge the gap between the mandate and reality.  Two  different views were developed over the central issue of how to build and to control society for the welfare of the 3 people.  The Confucianists were devoted to learning about  the natural order and to cultivating whatever concerns the public, particularly composed of the wise and the capable, had for the good of society.  They argued that much less  control was necessary if morality prevailed.  They stressed  moral education through a system of rites, hoping that virtue would lead people to follow their consciences.  They  especially adhered to their teacher’s understanding of the purpose of government, against which they critically measured government’s policies and conduct.  As their  debates with the Legalists who served in the court unfolded, they eventually found themselves the leading subjects of the Emperor, speaking for both Heaven and the public with a 4 sense of moral conscience. The Legalists, who advocated state control over social activities in the spirit of law, stressed punishment, hoping that force would make people adhere to righteous conduct. The rise of the two views occurred in the period when the social activism of Confucian scholars had greatly  68 enhanced the influence of Confucianism.  This was the  beginning stage of the so—called confucianization of Chinese society, as well as of Chinese thinking in the Han (206 B.C.-220 A.D.)  (Twitchett and Loewe 1986:752-7).  Confucianism prevailed as more Confucian scholars served in the court through the established civil service examination 5 system.  Legalist ideas were incorporated into penal law  to complement the rule of rites to punish those who did wrong.  The culture that was developed between scholarly  officials and learned members of the public (the gentry) then dominated state politics for a millennium to come. The application of propriety and institution of rites helped adapt Confucian views of a moral order to the ideology of the state.  In the process, the Mandate of  Heaven was interpreted to justify a rule by a “learned and virtuous” elite.  The emergence of this elite rule occurred  when Confucian scholars speaking as public voices switched their role from critics of the government to the emperor’s moral subjects working to stabilize society and improve the relation of the state and society within the existing structure (Gernet 1985:xxviii).  This change indicated that  the mandate had become more ambiguous amidst the institutionalization of rites in the family and state.  The  ambiguity arose partly because the indoctrination of Confucianism encouraged a more diversified society built upon the intricate networks of social relations dominated by  69 elites and affected by both Imperial and lineage rules of justice and propriety. To understand the complex of property relations dominated by elites, and the rules of justice and propriety which regulated these relations in the nineteenth century Chinese society, the following three aspects are examined: Imperial systems of justice and propriety; the family system and elite rule; and local autonomy and self—government. This examination suggests that the Imperial tradition of elite rule was founded on a symbiotic relationship between Imperial state power and the exercise of dominance over the local community on the part of local elites in charge of family relations.  This relationship included both elements  of oppression and of self—government. 6  It is thus not a  surprise that late Qing reformers, such as Liang Qichao and Tan Sitong, rejected the rigid Confucian doctrine in the form of rites, and promoted self—government as a product of the practice of a Confucian moral order. Systems of Justice and Propriety The Imperial systems of justice and morality were developed in an exploitative and patriarchal agrarian society in accordance with Confucian ideas of a moral order. Rights and property relations grew in peace and sometimes in war in correspondence with individual sentiments of approval and disapproval of dynastic rules.  When injustice causing  injuries aggravated contention among the emperor and the  70 wealthy and powerful individuals (including high officials and relatives of the Imperial family), local elites, and the peasantry, the result might be a change of mandate.  To  establish a stable growth of rights and property relations, nevertheless, the Imperial state managed to apply  (law)  and jj (rites) to maintain harmony through the institutions of moral rules and punishment. Li (rites) largely operated in a social hierarchy centering around ancestor—worship.  Its purpose was to  promote proper moral sentiments of justice and propriety in maintaining social harmony between the family and state. For the Emperor to enforce his rule over the family which was independently controlled by the father, he had to transcend the autonomy of the family. done by the acquisition of a title  -  It was ideologically the Ancestor of All.  In the Qing bureaucracy, the Board of Rites was in charge of ceremonies and ritual observances, stipulated in the Book of Rites, a canonical book of Confucianism. 7  The Board of  Rites was an important branch of the Imperial administration.  It served the purpose of government by  cultivating moral sentiments of its officials in harmony with patriarchal rules of propriety revolving around the Son of Heaven.  These rules were strict not only about the  attitudes and behaviour of all involved in the Imperial court and offices, but also about their types of dress, houses and number of servants owned, that were in  71 correspondence with their official posts.  Any breach of  rules was subject to punishment (Jernigan 1905:44-5). Another key which enabled the Emperor to legitimate his rule over all was the institution of justice to regulate social relationships, especially those in the family. 8 This institution was a product of the historical transition of the state from one dominated by the Legalists, who promoted  (law) as the key to an orderly society to the  dominance of the Confucianists, who adhered to rites system of moral rules.  —  the  was used based on the sanction of  force to complement the rule of rites. 9  The Board of  Punishment in the Qing bureaucracy adjudicated law, and reviewed punishments given by lower courts.0  In  association with the Board of Punishment, the censorate, a distinctively Chinese political institution, was set up. According to Kracke (1971:319), the Censorate was destined to maintain proper functioning and health of the 11 government.  The institution of disciplinary measures  against the misconduct of bureaucrats represented an effort to establish a reasonably honest and fair system of justice. This effort formed a distinct aspect of Chinese political culture entailed in the relationship between the state and society. In the Qing dynasty, the law which gave broad moral guidelines in both lower court judgment and upper court review was the Penal Code (Da Qing Luli) published in 1647.  72 In the Code, kinship relations were observed and family rites reinforced through the regulation of individual behaviour.  As there was no concept of individual,  (no word  for “individual” in Chinese at the time,) a person was conceived as an element discernable in relationships with other persons. 12  Rights of a person could be understood  only in the context of his or her involvement in property relations with others.  The Code saw individuals either as a  person or group of persons who shared common characteristics through family ties and business association and who had rights to life, property and justice.  It insisted on proper  behaviour by laying out clear punishment to those who verbally abused, hurt and damaged, or killed his or her relatives, or comnutitted adultery.  The punishment increased  if litigants were closer relatives and if the injured party was a senior male.  Homicide, infanticide, neglecting the  uncared—for, and taking “stray” children into slavery were subject to criminal punishments. Rights of a person to property such as marriage presents (dowry in particular) and inheritance were especially protected by the Code in cases where family unity and rights of legal heirs were in dispute.  With dowry, it  is a daughter’s right to share her family property at the time of her marriage.  Marriages of people who were in  mourning were not lawful and were given severe punishment. That especially included widows.  With succession, the law  73 recognized every heir (including adopted heirs) the right to a share of family property and every family head the right to resist family division. 13 An important right that individuals had in the Imperial society calls for special attention.  That is the right to  bring their complaints of injuries to the magistrate. 14 The magistrate as the emperor’s representative to the local people and appointed caretaker of the lives of a local community, was particularly responsible for the Imperial rule in accord with the mandate.  His conduct was subject  not only to the scrutiny of local society but also to administrative surveillance.  Any abuse of office faced  criminal charges stipulated by the Code.  It is thus not a  surprise that some view the Code as an administrative law. The characteristic of justice making in Imperial China is that the magistrate sought a right judgment guided by the statutary law based upon a semi-institutionalized dialogue with kin/community groups which mediated the situation with their well-established customary practices for dispute resolution.  As Philip Huang further notes,  The filing of a plaint generally galvanized further efforts at community/kin mediation. At the same time, magistrates routinely commented on each plaint, counterplaint, and petition submitted by the litigants. Those comments were posted, read, or otherwise made known to the litigants. They therefore figured prominently in the ongoing negotiations towards a settlement. Such settlements, in turn, were generally accepted by the magistrate in preference to formal court adjudication. (1993:226) Justice was therefore provisioned by the order of  74 rights and property relations and individual sentiments of approval and disapproval of his or her existence in relation to that of others.  The pursuit of right to justice was  preconditioned by the interplay between state power and social control that gave emphasis to the role of the family in cultivating public spirit and sentiments of propriety. Chinese Family and Elite Rule As it was understood that the Mandate of Heaven devised a person to preserve his or her existence in harmony with the preservation of others, it became important to cultivate individual sentiments of justice and propriety.  This task  was naturally taken by families through the exercise of social control, since they played a vital role in arranging social relations into an orderly and stable structure, establishing and sustaining rules of justice and propriety, and cultivating sentiments of approval and disapproval in everyday conduct. The Chinese family system is characterized by 5 lineages.’  A lineage  ()  was an extended kinship group  tied together by patrilineal relations which were generally distinquished in five degrees especially manifested in the mourning system essential in lineage rites.’ 6  The  stability of the kin group was based on family rites upheld by the dominating values, such as family pride, the ancestral cult, and common ownership of family property.’ 7 These values were upheld by the family head who managed  75 family property and made efforts to carry on family virtue 18 and rules of propriety. The Chinese family system, consequently, was patriarchal and dominated by its heads who were themselves large landholders, and its subordinate members were either tenants, or worked as servants and slaves.  These heads  endeavoured to secure the growth of the lineage based on the support and the contributions of its member families, to whom it provided certain common activities and benefits, and moral well-being.  To be able to maintain its growth, each  lineage ideally financed its own education and welfare.  It  funded its own private schools and tutors for its juniors, and offered relief to its poor members within the limit of its resources.  It often set aside land (yitian)  for  collective purposes, such as ancestral worship, lineage temple maintenance, education and relief ef forts. 19  It  was thus understood that the lineage prosperity was maintained by the growth of its property and relatively harmonious kinship relations, which could then in turn help build family pride and public spirit by offering more to ancestral worship attended by all kin and to the community welfare. The pursuit of lineage prosperity led family heads to draw an interest in the growth of property rights.  Their  interest in property growth encouraged a concern over the direction of local decision-making, and the implications of  76 state policies in the local socio—econoiuic development.  To  act on their concerns, these family heads turned themselves into a group of individuals known recently among students of China as the local elite. 20 The local elite had power to swing the direction of local decisions and were qualified to be the voices of the local public.  Having served as the examples of justice and  propriety, they bore the responsibility of protecting the growth of local society from outside pressure, be it the Emperor, a wealthy and powerful individual (such as a high official or a relative of the Imperial lineage), or a neighbouring community.  Occupying a position between the  Imperial state and local society, local elites could thus mitigate antagonism between the Emperor and his subjects, although they could also forment it. The role of làcal elites as mitigators or instigators was fulfilled largely by the establishment of a rule by elite who differentiated themselves from people by their hold over local property and learning, the last of which prepared them to serve in the government. ’ 2  While serving  in the government, official elites were able to bring prestige, honour and benefit to their home locality.  They  thus protected home communities through their ties with the Emperor who used them to rule in order to maintain harmony. They, in turn, used the Imperial ties to protect their domination over local property rights.  77 While acting as a dominating force in local society, on the other hand, local elites enjoyed the allegiance of such commoners as artisans, merchants and peasants, who sought occasionally either to merge with them, as the merchants did, or ally with them for protection, as did the farmers and the artisans, in the face of pressure from outside.  In  this event, local elites mobilized local people to defend the community against state encroachment.  This common  interest in defending the local community against state power formed the basis upon which elites and peasants politically concurred.  Since the peasants formed the  overwhelming majority of the emperor’s subjects, the well being of this population became a crucial test of how well Imperial rule served the Mandate of Heaven and how well family growth was maintained.  This social group gave rise  to social mobility either up into the elites or down to the farm labourers and even servants and slaves.  Any rapid  social mobility occurring in this population would cause social unrest resulting in reform efforts or peasant rebellions.  In case of the elites embracing new—comers from  artisans, merchants, and peasants, however, the growth of their power was felt in their increasing influence in political affairs. The elite class grew as some members may have had the benefit of backing from powerful individuals in the Imperial family or certain court officials and made bigger and faster  78 fortunes than others, who had climbed up the ladder of public services through examinations, a promising avenue to success, and joined proteges of the emperor.  At the same  time, those who lost, moved downward, joining the ever growing peasantry and the “little and mean,” (xiaoren, comprising corvee labourers, servants, family slaves and convicts who had little or no standing in rights and property relations,) as fast as those who went upward through civil service examinations or patronage.  It was  only when social mobility went downward faster than upward that the Mandate of Heaven would then be invoked to rescue as well as to consolidate the status of the elite against the domination of the nobles and the discontent of the “little and mean” through reforms or even revolt. Given the interest in securing their control over the local community while defending local property rights against state power, on the one hand, and containing popular discontent, on the other, local elites developed networks of social control, extending their influence either through personal influence or through organizational channels like the family, and community organizations such as the baolia. As it was long believed that families operate on their own terms so as to maintain the stability of local communities, the state had always accommodated the lineages alongside other organizations, such as the village (xiang) and later baolia, which facilitated ties to the government.  79 The institution of baojia in local communities under the 22 jurisdiction of the magistrate began in the Song.  It  was installed in local communities by using single households as its basic unit. Tanigawa Michio comments that in China, Local society and state power formed a kind of support— In this sense, it is not necessarily protection bond. unreasonable to understand the rationale for the state to lie in its functions of preserving and sustaining local society. (1985:84) The baolia system was an example of the support—protection bond between state power and local communities.  It emulated  the organization of the xianq (village) paralleling the kinship organization inside each walled city in the time of Zhou.  The cooperative spirit and collective responsibility  in each xiang run by a group of lineage elders served as principles on which the baolia was elaborated (Wen 1939:30). The baolia system helped transmit public concern to the magistrate and at the same time assisted him in fulfilling his duties (Liu 1959:85-6; Qi 1959:103—7).  Through the  baolia, government intensified its application of law in running public affairs.  While pressing for the collective  responsibility, it could also ease its effort to collect taxes and corvee services, and to obtain runners to public service and the army.  Since the baolia helped maintain  peace and order in local communities without the establishment of government—supported police forces (Hucker 1961:27), Zeng Guofan, a powerful Qing official during and  80 after the Taiping Rebellion,  “praised it as a gradual  remedy, one that would calm the people as order and firm guidance soothed a child recovering from a long illness” (wright 1967:137). The baolia, however, had also facilitated local initiatives since it cultivated public spirit through providing community-funded welfare and education.  It helped  draft labour “for work on large—scale, construction projects on roads and water—ways, irrigation systems, public buildings, and the like”  (Hucker 1961:26).  It, in many  ways, extended services of kinship organizations to an 23 enlarged public.  These extended services were always  controlled by local elites who dominated village administration (Jamieson 1970:72) and initiated efforts with their influence on governments, and people under their control (Duara 1988).24  A revival of local elite  V  activities occurred in the late Qing after the Manchu ruling class failed to consolidate its hold over society following the Taiping Rebellion.  Social control was strengthened by  the increasing local participation in management.  As Rankin  (1986) notes, local public activities grew, and so did oppositional opinions.  Elite activism in the late Qing  advanced the tradition of local self—government. Local Autonomy and Self—Government In an environment where baolia matched family organizations, the relation between social control and local  81 self—government was developed between those who controlled the lineage and community and those who delegated state power to local people.  The strength of social control can  be measured by the influence of local elites on the magistrate.  After all, it is in the interaction between the  local community and the magistrate that social control and state power met and contested. The realm in which social control and state power met encompassed the spheres of management of public welfare. The Chinese concept of state responsibility for public education and welfare is as old as the state itself (Lum 1985:iii).  But, government efforts for public welfare,  though generally initiated by an Imperial injunction, largely depended upon each local government’s grain reserves and policies to manage famine relief through tax exemption, price control, and subsidies (Huang 1984:557-66).  These  state relief efforts depended heavily on the proper administration of the local government and its co—operation with local elites who participated in funding and management of public service and welfare. As the lowest level of the Imperial bureaucracy, directly in contact with the lives of ordinary people, magistrates played a undeniably important role in keeping an equilibrium between state control and local autonomy and the support—protection bond between the Imperial state and local 25 society.  To meet this end, the magistrate was  82 historically given substantial autonomy in running local affairs.  This autonomy was granted in the spirit of the  Confucian principle of benevolent rule (Zelin 1984:100). The ties of the magistrate with the central government evolved from noble kinship relations in the zonqfa system to reliance on administrative mechanisms such as courts, fiscal systems and agricultural management. 26 Xian magistrates were initially given the responsibility to try criminal cases personally and lay charges against offenders.  This was in addition to their  regular duties to survey xian prisons and listen to complaints.  No official was separately assigned to do any  of the above (Liao 1969:115).  Being at the lowest of the  four levels below the Imperial court in the judicial system, xian magistrates operated local courts and prisons, settled minor disputes and sentenced offenders to no more than 27 bambooing.  To respect local elites, as well as the  family system, the magistrate refused to listen to cases that had not been judged according to lineage rules or bylaws of the  ..  Being the bureaucrat closest to local  people, in any case, he had judicial power to bring immediate impact on local society. The magistrate was also required to strengthen public grain storage houses in order to control grain market prices and restrain high rent and interests set by wealthy families  (Qi 1959:114-21), and to conduct a land survey on which tax  83  -  quotas were calculated, and to re—register the area of land that each local household owned.  The magistrate also used  locally reserved tax revenue to handle welfare relief in time of famine and to fund local public education and The magistrate controlled the local economy and  welfare.  hence, at least in theory, the well-being of the local people. A vital duty of magistrates on behalf of the central government was tax collection.  The Imperial central  government decided a tax quota, primarily on land and corvee.  Magistrates assumed direct control over its  collection.  They could be ordered either to deliver taxes,  after collected, to the capital, or to put them in a fund for future local use, or to send them to needy provinces as subsidies.  The magistrate, as the local financial  administrator, could raise the tax rate while in collection. Different kinds of tax surcharges were also at his disposal. He could additionally determine the manner in which taxes were collected.  Taxes could be directly collected but  indirectly delivered by setting up a chest or vice versa. With indirect collection, local government runners and clerks could contract the collection of taxes (baozheng) with the magistrate.  Or the magistrate saw through a  contract for tax payment (baolan) under certain arrangements between a well-off local elite and the tax-payer (Wang 1973).  84 The right for the magistrate to control the collection of taxes was not absolute, theoretically, since higher level officials came frequently to check on his conduct based on the rules stipulated in the law.  There was also the  tradition for the magistrate to hold offices in places distant from his home locality, to free him from local pressures for favoritism.  While in office, he was not  allowed any economic opportunities to purchase land or businesses. His right was not absolute, moreover, because his behaviour was also closely observed by the local elite who dominated baojia in the xian where he served in office.  As  he came from outside, he required the assistance from the local elite, who possessed knowledge about local customs and current social problems.  Given that any delay of tax  collection and other official duties would bring severe punishment to him from his superior, he needed their co operation in fixing the tax rate and smoothing the tax collection.  He, therefore, formed a symbiotic relationship  with the local elite (Watt 1972:14).  This symbiotic  relationship was built on the ground that he relied on the elite for exercising the rights authorized by the Emperor; whereas the elite depended upon him for maintaining the growth of local property rights. The consolidation of this relationship could mean a self—governed community in which property relations were  85 safely maintained so as to instigate economic prosperity. However, when the magistrate and local elite failed to look after the issues concerning peasants and the “little and mean,” comiuunication between the peasants and the government through the magistrate and local elite was short-circuited. The peasants would then revolt.  The peasants would also  revolt when the magistrate, conspiring with local elite, abused his right to tax collection by adding surcharges.  In  the Qing, they formed secret societies, and fought against the government. The right for the magistrate to control the collection and use of -tax was apparently a constant source of corruption.  “Inasmuch as neither the official’s personal  expenses, nor most administrative and service costs were provided for through legitimate government channels, no distinction was made between public and private means or ends in the operation of the official yamen” 1984:118).  (Zelin  It is inevitable for embezzlement and corruption  to find inroads on government when public and private gains on the part of magistrate were unseparated, and when the local elite connived with government runners and even with the magistrate to evade taxes by concealing real local landholding. Corruption became so rampant in the Qing that the Imperial court renewed efforts to reform the fiscal system. The fiscal reforms in the 1730s, focussing on “huohao  86 quigong”  (the “return of the meltage fee to the public  coffers”) through legalizing the tax rate and dividing the tax revenue into designated uses, were carried out under the emperor, Yong Zheng.  They were aimed to curb the  magistrate’s power over the use and collection of tax with returning the huohao (meltage fee) to the public coffers, and to eliminate corruption by limiting his access to funds while increasing his subsidy, so that he had no reason to levy additional surcharges or to extort additional customary fees and gifts from his subordinates (Ibid:117-8). Although the emperor used a secret palace memorial system to guide as well as to check on the implementation of the reforms, the decision to place tax remittances in the care of provincial revenue in effect enhanced the fiscal power of the province (Ibid:168).  These reforms,  strengthening central state power, had significant implications for the potential development of a strong, modern state.  The reforms, however, ultimately failed not  least because they met with severe resistance from local government officials and the elite class.  They failed also  because they were not intended to meet the needs stemming from population growth, commercialization and most importantly the changes in the complex of rights and property relations, but to increase government revenue and renew Imperial rule through reducing corrupt conduct of local governments.  It is thus not difficult to agree with  87 Perdue (1987:4-5) when he claims that China had never had a strong central government until today.  In fact, in the late  Qing, not only regional concentration of power was on its way to a climax, corrupt government coupled by its high taxation created obstacles to economic advance energized by the growth of property relations. Growth of Property Relations and Rise of the “Free” Labour Force Elite rule was sustained by the growth of rights and property relations of a market economy under the regulation of such institutions as rents and taxes which gave recognition not only to peasants’ rights to Heaven—given prosperity but also to Imperial obligations to the mandate of maintaining harmony.  The establishment of this rule was  however contested when the rise of commercialism and early industrialism in the late Ming and the Qing fomented changes in property relations against which the old rules in rents and taxes proved cumbersome. This section is devoted to understanding the growth of property relations in a brokerage market economy.  This  economy grew upon the early political and economic development of land use.  Property relations formed around  land use were largely developed among the landholders, the tenants, and the state, and were substantially characterized by an intricate set of claims and obligations, that is, rents and taxes, two institutions that affected the  88 establishment of the mandate of maintaining harmony.  Just  settlement of rents and taxes meant less controversial property relations and thus social stability.  Problems with  rents and taxes could mean social unrest and destruction of the economy.  An examination of the historical growth of  property relations must therefore be chronological, from the changing property relations to land to early industrialism, in order to delineate the development of the peasants struggling for rights to land against elite domination and the rise of “free” labour in the transformation of brokerage market economy. Property relations to land The right of the government to tax was rooted in the theory that the title to all land was vested in the Son of Heaven, who saw to the welfare of the society.  He could  impose taxes, and appropriate land for public use without compensation whenever he chose to do so (Jernigan 1904:28). However, under the dictate of the Mandate of Heaven, taxes ought always to be moderate so as not to compromise the well-being of the people.  In the thousand years of  practice, however, taxes had evolved from acknowledging the right of the landless poor to a living to aiding the landlords.  This shift was initially reflected in the Single  Whip tax reforms in the Ming, and it was reinforced later, as Duara (1988) argues, by modernization policies of the late Qing.  89 In the Ming under Shen Zong’s reign in 1581, tax reforms, known as the “single whip system,” were implemented to merge land and corvee taxes on a fixed amount payable only in silver.  This tax system was designed to stabilize  government income when the landholding was concentrated in the hands of a few nobles who benefitted greatly from the commercial boom.  It devastated tenants since they had to  first sell crops for silver in the market which was often controlled by big landholders.  The reforms incurred  widespread bondservant and tenant riots. 28  This shift of  orientation in taxation largely resulted from the changes in the relationships between the elite and state, and between landlords and peasants.  To understand this shift of  emphasis in government taxation, it is necessary to examine these relationships first. The relationships between landlords and peasants emerged by the last centuries of Zhou when buying and selling land became widespread, and when land was concentrated in the hands of the wealthy while peasants were reduced into tenancy and farm labourers (Twitchett and Loewe 1986:28; Wu 1987, vol. 1:49—50).  Private ownership of land  was then not only officially recognized but 29 accommodated.  From the beginning, private land use and  exchange involved not only landlords and peasants but also the Emperor, aristocrats, officials, and merchants.  Apart  from the private lands of the Emperor such as the palaces,  90 the Imperial parks and pleasure grounds that were exclusive, and exempted from taxes and all other government dues (Jamieson 1970:90-1), wasteland belonged to the Imperial state and could be brought into use only with Imperial sanctions and registration with the government for levies. Land so entered could be sold or mortgaged afterwards without government interference, like other land in common tenure (Jernigan 1905:135). Based on his study of the late Qing, Jamieson (1970:914) classifies two kinds of land tenure: common, and colony or military tuntian. ° 3  The lands under the latter tenure  were generally granted to certain lineages, and to demobilized soldiers, in consideration of certain specific duties they performed, such as guarding the frontier or furnishing boats and men for the grain transport service between the provinces of the lower Yangzi and the capital. In return for their services they were given certain areas to cultivate, not free of land taxes but charged at a lower rate.  The land was not allowed to be transferred outside  the lineages.  However, as the above kinds of services  became abandoned over time, the distinction between colonized lands and lands of common tenure also disappeared. Tuntian, nevertheless, was used and enforced from time to time for reallocation of land throughout history (Twitchett 1962:23; Jamieson 1970:91—4; Wu 1987, vol. II).  Especially,  when land concentration into the hands of a few wealthy and  91 powerful individuals, such as relatives of the Imperial lineage and high officials, who enjoyed favourable tax exemption, aggravated towards the end of the Han dynasty, tuntian became a strategy to cope with social discontent and dwindling government revenue.  It was repeated by the  governments of the subsequent dynasties of Wei, Jin, the South and North dynasties, Sui, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing. Normally land was owned on a tenure conditioned by payment of land tax and corvee, and by official payment and registration on alienation.  Traditionally, as Schurinann  (1956:509) indicates, property was expressed in land deeds, statutes, and other mechanisms explicating property relations in terms of tian (cultivated fields), chan (productive medium) and y (a term denoting cultivation in the abstract sense).  These terms, he continues, were  usually used in the transaction of landed property or inheritance not to establish ownership but to describe the productiveness of property.  For possession and ownership,  there were terms of zhan and y.  Both of them, however,  were not equivalent to ownership of property in European sense, since zhan and Y2 in China were not as alienable and transferable as western ownership of property. In the Han dynasty, property relations to land had gone to a stage where a system of customs had developed to regulate land use and exchange.  These customs, as Zhang  92 (1985:35) implies, were kept basically intact in the following two thousand years.  According to the customs,  land transactions stipulated in the form of contracts (giyue) would prove ownership of land.  In the formation of  a contract, a third party (the intermediate, be it a relative, friend, or community leader), whom both contracting partners trusted, should be present and sign as a witness.  The copies of the signed contract kept by both  sides would then be recognized by the public.  The contract,  though it was authorized by customary law, was just as viable as if it was authorized by Imperial law, but was required to be registered with the government in order to transfer land tax obligations from the seller to the ’ 3 buyer. Inasmuch as the Chinese believed that land was part of the provision of Heaven to family ancestors, they would not want to relinquish ownership of land.  Hence, the  alienability and transferability of land was hardly 32 absolute.  Traditionally, there were such practices as  dian (mortgage—sales) and  (sale) in property transfer.  Mai was a “dead” and irrevocable sale, under which the seller could not redeem the property upon repayment of the money (Kroker 1959:129), a custom known since at least the Tang.  As g meant an absolute transfer of property from  the old to the new owner, dian was much preferred. Dian was used to execute a property transfer in which  93 the buyer received full use of the property, but ownership was limited to a given time period.  After that period of  time, the original owner had the right to repurchase at the original price. No interest is payable on the one hand and no account of rents and profits is required on the other. The use of the land is simply exchanged for the use of the money, ... Unless the old owner comes forward to redeem, the new occupant becomes absolute owner without further process. (Jernigan 1905:142) The practice of dian was advantageous to peasants who were short of money in between harvests.  Wealthy landholders,  however, could also take advantage of dian to accumulate landed property when sellers could not repurchase in time of poor harvest and famine.  That forced many peasants into  tenancy. Historically, there were three categories of tenancy: private, monastic, and official.  Most Imperial land and  land of Imperial lineages were rented out to tenants who paid produce rents, usually a share of their grain crop. Monastic land was rented out under similar provisions. tenancy of private land was most complex.  The  Across the  country there were probably three kinds of rent systems that co—existed:  “money rents; rent in kind as a fixed amount of  the harvest; and rent in kind as a share of the harvest” (Myers 1970:227).  Chen Han-seng categorizes five ways of  leasing out the lineage land on which rents were collected: (1) by apportioning it among all the applicants; (2) by leasing it to these in turn; (3) by leasing it out in one contract to some one person; (4) by using separate  94 written contracts with a number of people; and (5) by making separate oral agreements with more than one tenants. (1936:42—3) From this single account one recognizes the looseness of tenant arrangements and perhaps predicts the intricacy of tenancy.  Over time, all the above arrangements deteriorated  when such developments as government manoeuvres of redistribution of land through tuntian and land transfers through dian or j jeopardized the status of tenants (Twitchett 1962:24).  Such deterioration took place  particularly in the commercial boom in the late Qing.  The  tenants had no other choice but to fight to protect themselves.  Given that rents were often fixed in face—to—  face relationships and that tenants, as Emperor’s subjects, were entitled to Heaven-given prosperity, they therefore deemed it right to acquire rights to land they tilled. Their struggles brought forth the recognition of their “permanent tenant right to land”  (yongdian guan).  In the case of dian—mai, for instance, as land prices increased, the seller (now the tenant) demanded a share in the increased land value and thus legal disputes multiplied. To solve the problem, a distinction was made in local areas between subsoil and surface rights, all of which could be transferred through  or dian. 33  This could further  complicate the situation of private tenancy but tenants were recognized to have certain rights to land they tilled. Perdue (1987:151-7) observes, in Hunan, the fee fixed as  As  95 rent deposit gave tenants the permanent right to the (“skin” of) land.  When land prices went up, disputes also broke out  over the increase of rents.  In order to motivate tenants to  keep investing in land and to avoid tenants’ rent resistance, local officials were forced to limit interest rates to three percent per month of the debt to landlord. Inasmuch as they knew rent resistance impaired the ability of landlords to pay taxes, they still had to pardon those who could not pay rents in bad years in order to avoid tenants riots (Wu, 1987, vol. 11:335-52). acknowledged by (adjusted)  Tenants were also  local customary law to have the  right not only to pay a reasonable rent but also to keep the surplus. Perdue (1987:137-43)  finds, apparently, that as local  customary law became less adequate in judging property rights disputes in the face of increased land value, government stepped in to regulate land markets by replacing white contracts with red contracts, prohibiting redemption rights by officially limiting them in a fixed time period, 34 and adjusting local customary law.  Meanwhile,  provincial codes were developed in response to the diversity of local economic conditions and rules of customary practices.  Government intervention, Perdue (Ibid:148-56)  notes, assisted the growth of land market and commercialization.  By imposing restrictions on redemption  rights and thus limiting the rights of the tenant to reclaim  96 land ownership, however, this assistance, as Yang Guozhen (1988:115) argues, helped stabilize property relations to land.  Government intervention, after all, could not  effectively deal with the increasing detachment of the peasants from the landlords and mounting legal disputes over land ownership rights unless the government made decisions, as it had done, to expand its legal and administrative means of regulation. The development of the government to work with local customary laws formed a sharp contrast with the reforms in the late Qing during which foreign models were studied and copied without an effective consideration of the changes taking place in property relations in the countryside.  The  reform efforts in the late Qing and the Nationalist Revolution thereafter created a process of social transformation under foreign influences, intercepting the transformation of property relations to land which had already been underway.  What could become modern China if  she were left to take her own course of developing law and order that were in close interaction with the changes in the land property relations?  One can only ponder over this  question and make speculations based on what historical evidence reveals.  Perdue (1987:151-7)  suggests,  “The best  that local officials could do was to treat tenants as commoners with equal rights before the law.”  Henceforth,  many tenants who held the “skin” right of land in effect  97 became well—to—do peasants. The group of well-to-do peasants made its first appearance in the Ming and matured in the early Qing.  They  were seen more in southern provinces along the lower Yangzi and the coast than in the North.  Some could be small  landholders committed to land and farming.  They either  cultivated land themselves with or without hired hands, or rented some of their land out to get an income with which to operate a family business in cash crop production (such as growing silkworms, cotton, tea and other commodities), in commerce and handicraft manufacturing.  Others could be  tenants, tilling the land over which they owned the right.  “skin”  They could prosper only on the surplus they made  with the help of hired labourers after they paid rents and taxes (Fu 1982:132—44, Myers 1980:90—102). Accompanying the rise of well—to—do peasants was the expansion of cities when more and more landlords left land for hired superintendents to look after.  The former direct  contact between the landlord and his tenants over rent issues were intercepted by the superintendent. was  The landlord  now busy with his commercial and manufacturing  eng4gement  in  the city.  He became less concerned about  farming but more interested in economic return of the land (Myers 1970:229-34).  His imposition of high rents and  interests on his tenants forced them into becoming hired farm labourers.  This was the beginning alteration of the  98 relationship between the landlord and the peasant  -  from  tenancy of the latter to the former, to hired labour of the latter by the former (Wu 1987, vol. 11:329—35). Alongside the growth of well-to-do peasants, therefore, there were three classes of people: absent landlords, farm labourers and wholesalers.  Intricate relationships were  developed among the above classes.  The well—to—do peasant  was in a tenant relationship with the landlord to whom he paid rents often high enough to make him bankrupt.  Part of  the rent came from the exploitation of farm labourers who had little resources besides their own labour power.  With  the wholesaler who served as a broker between the peasant and the market, the peasant sought to bargain a good price but not at the cost of losing good relations (Myers ibid.). Since the contract between the landlord and the tenant was long enough to enable a surplus production, the well—to— do peasant was motivated to invest in land and became prosperous.  However, because the well—to—do peasant was  tied to the landlord, the broker and the farm labourer, his status could be as insecure as his business.  If the  government raised levies, as the late Imperial governments did, the landlord increased the rent, and the well-to-do peasant would go bankrupt.  He could also be destroyed by  the broker who forced lower prices on him through monopolization.  Tensions between him and the hired farm  labourer could also cost him dearly, especially when the  99 latter organized together to take revenge on him. In the meantime, however, the well—to—do peasant might have found ways to cope with the situation and even managed, to expand production through the establishment of a new market for his products, and new business associateships. Soon he became an influential person to be consulted with local affairs in the vicinity.  Some members of the family  might have obtained a degree after passing civil service examinations, or had purchased one.  His chance of  maintaining the growth of his wealth was nevertheless slim, given that he had all the above obstacles to overcome: the rack—renting landlord, suppressive broker and landless poor resorting to arms to make a living. 35  On top of all  these, the government which imposed on him increased taxes, such as the “single whip” taxation. When the “single whip” taxation came along, tenants bore its brunt, particularly those tenants who had acquired permanent rights to the “skin” of land and had in many cases to pay both silver and labour for the land they tilled, while the landlords who owned the “bone” of the land, especially those who had moved into cities and engaged in commerce and manufacturing, were favourably exempted. Increased government intervention in the growing detachment of peasants from landlords, reflected in its efforts to control rents and land markets.  In any event, it met with  resistance from landlords who had grown in number and  100 resources and had dominating influence in money and land markets.  Since the elite landlords were now funding and  managing the growing process of industrialization in urban areas, which could provide further sources of government income, the choice that the government had between protecting the poor while curbing the power of landlords and favouring landlords while suppressing the poor was clearly made, especially under the pressure of foreign forces in the late Qing.  The government’s effort to enhance economic  development in the Self-Strengthening programs reflected its decision in the nineteenth century to adopt western model of industrialism in co-operation with the merchant elite. To understand this co—operation, it is important to recognize that the conflicts between peasants, landlords and the goverrunent challenged the Imperial tradition of brokerage market economy.  This challenge was accompanied by  the fact that property relations became depersonalized and more commercialized as a growing distance (both geographical and social, cultural, economic as well as political) between landlords and peasants was created by the former moving into towns and the latter going bankrupt and becoming farm labourers.  It was also accompanied by the fact that the  influence of elites on government was increasingly contested by a social influence arising from the struggles of the peasants for rights against elite domination. This challenge was magnified, on the one hand, by the  101 development of farm labourers who became more numerous in the late Qing and were ready to be mobilized in large-scale industrial operations.  They had no way of protecting their  interests in the face of degeneration of social relationships in the local community and the suppression of the late Imperial government on rebels, and were thus left. with no choice but to organize themselves into secret societies to defend their right to life.  Secret societies,  as Chesneaux (1972:5-8) indicates, first appeared in the Yuan when the Chinese were ruled by the Mongolians. 36  In  the late Qing, they revived and organized frequent revolts against the Manchu empire with the aim of restoring Chinese rule. As the Taiping Rebellion exemplifies, peasant revolt as a right undeniably given by Heaven occurred in history in times of economic chaos and as a result of corruption in government and heavy taxation (Shih 1967:354).  The  Rebellion pursued an ideal order promised by the mandate in which peace and harmony prevailed (Ibid:237-8).  ()  as well as equality (ping)  Although in history, after each  rebellion, the newly established ruler began his dynasty with such measures of justice as land redistribution through equalizing land ownership and tax reduction, his efforts were directed, as a matter of fact, to strengthening the relationship between him and his subjects through diminishing the power of big landholders and mitigating the  102 burden on peasants (Wright 1967:44-5).  The result of these  efforts in effect was a renewal of Imperial elite rule.  The  Taipings, however, strived for equal distribution of land by turning wealth “to be shared and enjoyed by all”  (Shih  1967:231—2). This idea has made at least two significant contributions to Chinese thinking: one is that in distributing land according to the number of persons in a household, the Taipings treated male and female members of the family as equals.  Secondly, by turning the cultivation  of all lands into a collective concern of the people, the Taipings pursued not the traditional pattern of Imperial state ownership, as Shih (Ibid:233)  suggests, but perhaps an  order based on a more centralized control over more equalitarian social relations.  The Taiping economic thought  certainly influenced Sun Yat-sen, the leader of Nationalist Revolution, who compared Taiping practice with that of Soviet socialism and identified his Principle of People’s Livelihood (minsheng zhuyi) with the Taiping theory of equalization of wealth (Ibid:493-4).  The Taiping Rebellion,  although it was put down by the government with the help of foreign forces and local militia led by local elites, shook the Manchu empire and planted the early seed of the dissolution of Imperial rule. 37 The challenge to the Imperial tradition of brokerage market economy was also magnified, on the other hand, by the  103 growth of “free labour” who moved into towns and enabled the expansion of urbanization and industrialization.  This  growing force of “free labour” defied the Imperial tradition of elite rule and ultimately contributed to its demise. Early Industrialism and the Industrial Labour Force For the sake of revenue, the state generally tried to keep industry and commerce regulated, and thus collusion between officials and the wholesalers and large dealers became a recurrent social and political characteristic of China’s early economic history (Kirby 1954:144).38  A  turning—point was however made in the Song dynasty when the government turned to work with merchants instead of executing direct control over them. In the Song dynasty industries such as mining and manufacturing were either managed by the state or contracted out to merchants and iron masters who owned ore deposits or smelting plants.  There emerged probably a substantial  number of privately owned large—scale enterprises operating under the supervision of the government.  The state assigned  smelting tax officials, industrial prefects and so on to 39 secure the state’s share in production.  A brokerage  market system, which allowed government to regulate the market through the licensed brokers who were obliged to pay and to collect taxes, was established and inherited by the Ming and the Qing (Mann 1987:30-5). As a result, at the beginning of the eleventh century  104 in the Northern Song, a commercial economy was taking shape while the wide use of money pushed mining and other industries forward to an extent that both output and scale of production exceeded those later achieved during the eighteenth century’s industrial revolution in Western Europe.  The industries of alum making, shipbuilding, quick  silver, cinnabar production, papermaking and printing in addition to textile industries were greater in scale than in any societies before the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century.  Many of the achievements were greater  than those in Republican China during the first decades of 40 the twentieth century. During the growth of commercial economy in the Song, wage labour was widely used in both state and privately operated enterprises.  What is known is that government set  out general procedures for employers to follow in terms of conditions under which workmen were hired in order to maintain a reasonable level of their well-being (Hartwell 1963: 150-4).  What is not known, however, is whether workmen  were organized into unions to look after their interests. The kind of organizations from the Song that were recorded were the guilds (hang or hui). In order to bring markets under their control and defend their socio-economic position, Song producers and merchants organized themselves into guilds, which grew especially rapidly in the Qing (Mann 1987:22-5).  There were  105 guilds of producers and merchants.  These guilds were  organized sometimes by the people in the same trade in a locality to eliminate competition from outside and to defend themselves against government control.  They were also  pulled together by merchants from the same province but stationing in another province to promote trade in order to 41 provide information and protection to each other. The guild often offered protection and welfare relief to its members. contract.  It collected taxes for the government under  Within a guild everyone except the apprentices  had rights to elect and be elected into the board which managed the guild’s affairs.  Every member contributed to  the collective funds which were used for the guild’s temple maintenance, festive celebrations and subsidies to needy members. Apprentices were generally not full members. attached to their masters. and board.  They were  They received no wages but room  They were locked into a kind of. familial  servitude which perhaps institutionally confined them to be loyal to their masters and hence the guild.  As the  household economy became threatened by a large influx of mobile labourers, however, and as the scale of business undertakings in the early industrialization of the late Ming and the Qing grew, their confined servitude was challenged. Some of them were pulled into the growing wage labour force. They then felt it necessary to find their own identity once  106 freed from servitude.  Their collective struggle against  maltreatment by their employers in the late Ming and the early Qing demonstrates the growth of their strength (Fu 1982:158—70,327—37). At the same time, the group of artisans who worked side by side with hired labourers and apprentices in family shops, and merchants who ran a family business with hired hands and apprentices, contracting to sell products either made by artisans and handicraft workers or imported by big (Chinese or foreign) wholesalers, grew upon their own hard work and the exploitation of labourers.  However, in  comparison with the well-to—do peasant in the countryside, the merchant or the artisan faced sometimes tougher barriers.  Among them, governments kept a closer scrutiny  over the urban merchants and artisans.  In Hankow, for  instance, family shops were required to post a placard on their doors to give detailed information about the business operation.  For the sake of government inspection, the  placard had the names of business partners, shop assistants and apprentices (Rowe 1989:39-40).  In addition to  government control, the merchant or the artisan was also subject to suppression from foreign businesses backed by large capital, which could ultimately drive him out of the market through dumping. Another threat to the growth of the urban household economy was the huge influx of mobile labourers who were  107 essentially the rural landless poor coming to cities to make living.  This mobile labour force first appeared as a  consequence of the coimuercial revolution of the late Ming. Rowe (1989:43) suggests that the group kept growing in the early Qing  “...  as a result of further commercialization,  coupled with imperial policies favoring freely contracted labor and geographic mobility.”  They were either brought to  cities by labour contractors or came individually, but soon fell into the hands of labour gangs controlled by labour contractors who acted as brokers in the labour markets. This type of organization of labour force made possible production on a larger scale than the family economy, as “these gangs increasingly found work in a wide variety of jobs in the transport, construction, and industrial sectors, at times displacing artisan households”  (Ibid.).  Accompanying the development of bankrupt household economy, however, Rowe finds at the same time that some family firms expanded far beyond the household scale.  lIe  writes, It is not easy to determine where these overgrown family businesses leave off and more distinctly “modern” enterprise begin; by the last quarter of the nineteenth century, for instance, we hear of wholesale warehouses with 150 stockboys, banks with 36 clerks, and retail stores employing up to 100 to 200 workers many of whom still lodged on the businesses premises and were subject to (obviously much attenuated) household-style paternalistic controls. (Ibid.) -  These overgrown “family firms” that had survived the destruction of household economy found themselves a growing  108 political force in organizing efforts to recover the ravaged economy and to reconstruct the social lives of towns and villages after the Taiping Rebellion when the government was incapable of providing a leadership. 42  The established  merchants and industrialists who headed these firms became a growing elite whose power was reflected not only in their leadership in economic construction but in their resistance to the government’s new tax of him. Lilin was a one—percent tax on the value of commercial goods sold in the market and an internal tariff on goods transported from a region to another, collected either by local officials, or merchants, or through contracted tax— f arming (Mann 1987:3,95-104).  It was brought in by the late  Qing government to cope with dwindling revenue which had been depleted by wars against foreign invasions.  It was a  burden on direct producers such as peasants and handicraft workers.  It, therefore, met with resistance from guilds  until an acceptable level of taxation was agreed on the basis of self-assessment of business (Ibid:130—2).  These  guilds were also put in charge of collecting the him  tax  themselves. The introduction of him  represented a corner—stone in  the development of property relations between the merchant elites and the government, and the artisans. institution of him  The  brought local merchants closer together  with local government officials, and at the same time  109 alienated them further from the “commoners” such as the artisans and the peasants (Fu 1982:278-9), who were increasingly forced into bankruptcy and became wage labourers.  Their collaboration with local governments  reinforced the development of provincial governments growing stronger at the expense of the weakness of the central government.  The problem of regionalism finally reached its  peak in the early decades of the twentieth century when the Nationalist Revolution of 1911 failed to overcome it.  These  merchants, through the experience of Self-Strengthening reforms, found that the Imperial rule was unable not only to protect their interest against foreign domination and discontent among the poor but also to accommodate an economic expansion with a central leadership to coordinate regional efforts initiated by provincial governments. As the dissatisfaction of the merchant elite with the government mounted, the late Qing government could not be maintained without reforming itself to meet the pressure of the elite class.  The efforts to change the system, initiated by the  elite, were welcomed by foreign powers whose influence found •  inroads on the thinking of reformers and subsequently affected the course of reforms in the late Qing and the Nationalist Revolution thereafter. The above analysis of the transformation of property relations in nineteenth century China suggests that the Imperial system renewed itself upon the peasants’ efforts to  110 attain a ‘just’  society in application of confucian  conception of the Mandate of Heaven.  These efforts ensured  the establishment of a reasonably fair system which could operate in accordance with the demands of peasants for prosperity mandated by Heaven. In the two millennia of application of Confucian ideas, however, the recognition of the right to revolt and question a ‘lost’ mandate on the part of the peasants was juxtaposted by the establishment of elite rule over the property relations of a brokerage market economy.  The elite, which  controlled local communities, monopolized the political stage.  It occupied a strategic position between the Emperor  and wealthy and powerful individuals including high officials and relatives of the Imperial lineage, and the rest of the Emperor’s subjects.  It strived to establish a  rule buttressed by the practice of rites (j) and kinship ties.  Its domination over local communities was maintained  on the basis of its representation of popular sentiments of approval and disapproval of dynastic rule and the protection of local communities against the encroachment of Imperial power.  It was also maintained by the fact that the Emperor  stabilized his rule with the help of local elites who claimed to have the right to interpret the Mandate of Heaven and to speak for the public. Rapid commercialization in the Ming and Qing provided opportunities to realize individual potential and encouraged  111• social mobility.  Many new-corners joined the elite through  gains in commercial and other undertakings.  Their political  activism for recognition of their rights posed a threat to the old members of the elite, including wealthy and powerful individuals having closer ties with the Emperor.  The  struggle between them and the old members perpetuated social changes in the late Qing. Bankrupt members of local elites and the commoners, including small landholders and peasants, fell under the tenant category.  To defend their livelihood, tenants  struggled to secure their holding of the ‘surface’ of land so as to win rights to till and to dispose of surplus produce outside of rent and interest dues.  High rents and  interest, however, continued to endanger their livelihood and forced many to become landless labourers.  These  labourers, who, together with servants and bond slaves, had been at the rim of property relations between the Emperor and his subjects, looked for protection from each other through secret societies.  To express their moral sentiments  of justice and search for a protection of their welfare, they found themselves struggling for recognition in the unfolding of rights and property relations of wage labour in the early twentieth century.  This transcendence ultimately  led to the disintegration of the Imperial tradition of brokerage market economy. Towards the end of the nineteenth century,  112 consequently, the Imperial tradition of elite rule could no longer maintain the patriarchal order.  A variety of social  groups sought to change the complex of property relations. This development resulted from aggravated conflict between the labouring poor seeking independence from the elite and the latter attempting to secure its rule over society.  It  set in motion the social transformation of modern China, a process in which the state expanded its legal and administrative control over society, and a process upon which foreign powers exerted influences.  It is to  understand this process that we turn to examine, next, the Nationalist theory and practice of revolution, which continued China.’ s transformation.  NOTES 1. See William Alford (1986:936).. Alford recognizes the idea of the Mandate of Heaven as the Chinese tradition of Natural Law and suggests, in his debate with Roberto Unger (1976), that the failure of the latter to acknowledge this idea is akin to writing about the modern liberal state without mentioning the notion of the social contract (Ibid:937). 2. I thank David D. Buck for his suggestions on these ideas. 3. During the period of the “hundred schools” in the Eastern Zhou (551-233 B.C.), numerous political thinkers travelled from state to state trying to convince each duke to adopt their opinions. It was a period in which small feudal states constantly bickering or making war upon each other. Renowned scholars, who wanted to restore the harmony and prosperity of the Western Zhou (1122-771  113 B.C.), initiated the tradition of Chinese political ideas. 2\mong them were Shang Yang and Han Fei Zi, representing the Legalists, and Confucius and his followers, Mencius and Xun Zi. For the present purpose of simple clarification, the history of Chinese political thought is only vindicated by a focus on the two schools: the Legalists and the Confucianists. Even within the camp of the Confucianists who were influenced by other schools of thinking, such as Legalism, Taoism and Buddhism, there are many different voices, each with a specific accent, that cannot be presented here. 4. According to Confucian thought, public (gong) concern was a general good defined by a community, usually with the consent of the state, as opposed to the private, selfish () interests of one or a few. The public sphere in Chinese society captured areas of social control exercised by family, community organizations, urban guilds, and associations of individuals. The purpose of social control was to increase the welfare of the community, and obtain social recognition of and respect for the community. It was also to protect local property rights from outside menaces of state power, big landholders and neighbouring competitors for resources. Rankin suggests that “[i]n any locality there was a generally recognized area of community interest in which consensual decisions were articulated by community leaders and services were managed by local men” (1986:15). These leaders, who expressed public concerns and exercised social control, were the ones who were literate and had stakes in local property rights (Skinner 1971:273). They were interested in serving as community leaders so as to protect their property holding and dominance. They utilized both formal and informal contacts through business and ex—official connections to sway the direction of social control at the local level as well as the levels of the capital of a province or the Imperial court. For more, see Rankin (1993) and Esherick and Rankin (1990). 5. Historically, the opportunity for the Confucian scholars to gain higher status was furthered by the institution of civil service. examinations in the Han Dynasty around 165 B.C. “These examinations brought into the government many men of quite humble origin. An increasing proportion of officeholders were educated in an Imperial university (Hanlin Academy) that was expressly founded in 124 B.C.,” in a time when Confucianism was gaining official recognition (Creel 1964:156). By the Tang dynasty, civil service examinations had become quite elaborate institutions which impressed European scholars such as Max Weber (1962), whose well—known studies of are considered bureaucracy classics. still Educational institutions, paralleling civil service examinations, were first established in Imperial palaces. They were then increasingly spread. out in provincial capitals and county towns after the Song (Huang 1984:536-41). These examinations not only brought people with merit into public service, but also provided a hope to move upward that was open to all (Ho 1962).  114 6. In fact, Confucian principle of benevolent rule harboured the idea of local government officials exercising autonomy in their pursuit of virtuous conduct. Ku Yen—wu, a leading spokesman of the seventeenth century statecraft, propagated ideas in favour of decentralization, given that the power then was held in the hands of Manchu conquerors, and argued for a strong local government with active participation of the local elites (Ku 1985). 7. In the Qing bureaucracy, the Grand Secretariat (Imperial Cabinet) was of great antiquity and can be distinquished as early as the Zhou (Jernigan 1905:44-5). (Later on in the Qing, the Grand Council was provided in 1730 and gradually superseded the Grand Secretariat, becoming the Imperial chancery or court of appeals.) Under the Grand Secretariat, which had daily audiences with the Emperor, there were six administrative boards: the Civil Board (j Bu), the Board of Revenue (Hu Bu), the Board of Rites (Li Bu), the Board of War (Bing Bu), the Board of Punishment (Xing Bu), and the Board of Works (Gong Bu). Below the central government, there were either three or four strata in the bureaucratic hierarchy operating in different dynasties. In the Qing it went from provincial governor, through prefect to district and county (xian) magistrates. 1\mong the above boards in the central government, the Board of Revenue controlled payment contributed to and from provinces. The Board of War and the Board of Works, as their names implied, were in charge of Imperial armies and public works. Both of them could initiate large—scale operations only with the assistance of local governments. The Civil Board controlled the entire inandarinate, regulating its duties, pay, and promotion, the assignment of work and distributing the Emperor’s and the granting of leave, posthumous honours or rewards. In association with the Civil Board, a distinctively Chinese political institution grew more important in the Imperial government, namely, the civil service examination system. This system served to bring untapped talent into public service. The examination ranking also then determined subsequent promotions. The civil service examination system and the censorate discussed later, were two aspects of the Imperial heritage that were maintained even after the downfall of the empire in the building of Nationalist Republic. For more, see Twitchett and Loewe (1986:28—9), Jernigan (1905:44—5), Kracke (1971:324—7), Chen (1988) and Hsu (1975). 8. 1\mong most noted studies of Chinese law, Jean Escarra pointed out different meanings of ““ from western meanings of law. He. even argued that there would not be “law” in China if one analyses Chinese “f” by using western meanings of law. A popular view considers that Chinese law, since it left out property and contractual relationships for customary law, was penal in nature (Bodde 1963:379-98). In any event, state law in Imperial China could only come from one source, i.e., the will of the emperor. There were different terms of law stemming from the throne, each serving specific purposes. In the Qing, there were four classes of  115 edicts: mandate (iii) ordinances (zhao), patents (&) and decrees (chi). They served, in one way or another, to regulate and to harmonize rights and property relations and to achieve harmony between the state and family. For an understanding of the Chinese conception of law on the, part of the Imperial government, see Vandermeersch (1985:3-25), Needham, II, 1969, the last chapter; Bodde and Morris (1967:3—39); and Schwartz (1957:25—39). 9. The stringent and punitive f, which was promoted by the with Legalists causes some scholars of today compare Legalist Western positive law the same way as Confucianist li with the Western concept of natural law. See particularly Needham, II, 1969, the last Chapter; Bodde and Morris (1967:3-43) and Schwartz (1957:25-39). For a comprehensive understanding of a history of Chinese law, see Dai (1960). 10. Jernigan (1905:18) helps explain the system: With this Board are associated, at certain, periods of’ the year, the censors and Court of Revision, and when the three are combined they form a Supreme Court for the trial of capital offenses; at other periods of the year there are six minor courts associated, forming the complete judicial bench of Peking, and for the purpose of revising the punishments ordered throughout all the provinces before placing them before the Emperor for his approval. The magistrate who resided over the lowest court gave first level trial. His judgments were then reviewed by upper courts according to the severity of the case. roots trace the system of of the one can Although 11. administrative discipline in the Zhou (Metzger 1973:268), it was really Tai Zu, the founder of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), who elaborated the system upon an administrative restructuring of the centralized Yuan dynasty government (Hucker 1978:34-43). During the 1380’s reform, Tai Zu built the censorate into a hierarchy and replaced ad hoc bureaus with surveillance offices at local levels. Nevertheless, as Metzger (1973:269-70) points out, historically, outside the capital, the censorate had no major effect on the centralization of the disciplinary system in any period... At least by early Han times, a tendency had naturally begun to develop for officials holding regular administrative posts to carry out surveillance over their subordinates. Hence, the censorate was simply reduced to capital offices in representing that institution. 12. I thank Jan Walls for suggesting this idea. 13. For above discussion, see the Penal Code of Qing (Staunton 1966:112-3), and also Book I, II, III of the Third Division, Book II, III, IV, and VIII of the Sixth Division. In retrospect, property relations regulated by the Code were all limited to those  116 who had access to individually or communally owned properties. Since labour was not recognized as property, family servants and slaves were excluded from its protection. 14. See the Code, Book II of the Second Division, and also for discussion of Chinese magistrates, see Watt (1972:11-22). 15. A lineage (zu), as defined by Liu (1959:1), was the consolidating group organized by the numerous component families which traced their patrilineal descent from a common ancestor who had first settled in a given locality. These families either lived in the same community or among several nearby communities in the same geographic region. Families in a lineage belonged to one of the three types: the small-sized conjugal family with husband, wife and their unmarried children (and perhaps unmarried brothers and sisters); the large— sized joint family with three and four generations living together including married brothers and sons and grandsons; and the medium— sized stem family with two conjugal families, the family of the head and that of one of his sons who served as the stem in the line of the family lineage. Historically, the Chinese lineage system evolved from the ancient zongfa system in the Zhou. When lesser noble kingsmen had the title to build walled cities to establish their own lineages, inside cities of the Zhou, households (of about one hundred) common descendants were organized into a xiang (village) run by a group of elders who educated villagers in a moral order whereby villagers were mutually responsible for one another’s conduct and well—being (Tanigawa Michio 1985:83). In the village, kinship relations overlapped social relations. Only the noble class had lineage organizations. Since the Zhou, as Liu (1959:4) explains, primogeniture was no longer the practice, the sons had equal inheritance rights, and the family system became quite varied. Yet, the clan organization evolved into another form. People of remote or alleged aristocratic origin found the clan institution gave them more prestige; and the pooling of their individual properties gave them more self-protection and power. Powerful clans not only dominated the local region but won from the centralized state the legal status of “esteemed clans” (wang tsu []) with special privileges in tax matters and civil service appointments. After a period of decline in the Tang dynasty, the Chinese lineage system gained attention from the Song scholar—officials as the Neo-Confucianist revival stressed the family and its moral “They believed the lineage which upheld ethical education. teachings to be as necessary as the state which upheld the law” (Ibid:5). They favoured the expansion of lineages beyond the limit of the privileged and propertied class. They encouraged small landholders and poor tenants to join a lineage under a wealthy family or together by themselves for reasons of receiving family moral education. Many small families thus joined large lineages for  117 economic and political protection. 16. As Ch’u (1961:16-7) explains, “A mourning unit includes only descendants from a coimnon great—great grandfather down to his great-great grandchildren. This group constitutes the nine tsu [.JaJ, the unit within which kinship is recognized.” This group was the one in which five degrees (wufu) of mourning were defined among kinsfolk. First degree mourning was given to the closest relatives such as father and mother, for the longest period: three years. The higher the degree of mourning, the more remote the relative, and the shorter the period of time in mourning. The least length of time in mourning, for marginal relatives, was three months. One’s standing in the mourning system and his or her attitude and behaviour towards a deceased relative before and after the mourning, was shown not only by the length of time one spent in mourning but also by the costume and the material of which it was made. Thus, Dai (1960:24) suggests, a kin member was always able to find his or her five-degree kinship relations in a pictograph. One’s pictograph position would also affect his or her status, attitude and behaviour towards others, and power and influence in this social network. The government’s assent to the sovereignty of family relations could in effect collaboratively generate values that were morally coercive and socially oppressive. None could be more oppressive than the values dictating women’s attitude and behaviour in their relationships to (in-law) parents, their husbands, their children and others in the family system as well as their relationship to the world outside the family. For more on the life of women in traditional China, see M. Wolf’s studies. 17. Family size, usually in correspondence to family economic situation, was accepted as another dominating values (Liu 1959:2— 3). This dominating value was sustained by the growth of family property. Henry McAleavy (1955:546) explicates this property. The general rule was that the fruit of the labour of all family members, whether they worked at home on the family land, or earned money from jobs outside the home, had to be put into the common fund from which the family supported itself and which, on partition was divided among those entitled. To this rule there were certain exceptions. A statute of the T’ang dynasty provided by necessary implication that land granted by the state to junior members of a family as a reward for distinquished government service should not become family property for the purposes of partition,... But more important still was the treatment of property brought by a son’s bride on her marriage. ...[T]he objects of her trousseau were her personal property,... those that were 18. As Ho Ping-ti (1962) notes, Chinese families could be kept together for three and four prosperous and large generations by diligent family heads. Once they died, families could split among male descendants. More on the Chinese family, -  —  118 also see H. Baker and M. Freedman. 19. It is thus not a surprise that Duara (1988:86-92) regards. Chinese family as both of a corporate group of the common descent line, and an unit of political economy. 20. In the work compiled by Esherick and Rankin (1990), a comprehensive definition of local elites is given, intending to capture both a wide range of individuals and a wide scope of their social characteristics including culture, life—styles, networks, and degree—holding as well as their exercise of dominance with various means over a local arena. local elites were not all necessarily big local landlords or degree—holders themselves, as the term “the gentry” suggested, but included, as well, public servants, powerful family heads and elders, merchants and important individuals in local society. Esherick and Rankin suggest that in Imperial China, a clear consciousness of class and status existed both among elites and between elites and masses. This situation appears similar to E.P. Thompson’s description of eighteenth century England. (Ibid:308) I sympathize with their view and find Thompson’s definition of class prudent and acceptable. Hill cites the following from him: If we stop history at a given point, then there are no classes but simply a multitude of individuals with a multitude of experiences. But if we watch these men over an adequate period of social change, we observe patterns in their relationships, their ideas and their institutions. Class is defined by men as they live their own history, and in the end, this is its only definition. (1974:247) 21. Schwartz (1966:52). suggests that this rule was based on the polarization between elites who created moral rules and people who learned to accepted them, one which coincided with the polarity between the attainment of virtues to rule and to obey the rule through the observance of rites. Some Confucian scholars wished to see the political relationship between the governor and the governed as the paramount characteristic of all social relations, and the system of rites as a differentiation of those gentlemen (lunzi) who were virtuous and worked with their minds from those “little and mean” (xiaoren) who were unlearned and worked with their ‘hands’. Kuo Yu, a Confucian scholar, said, “The great men devote themselves to governing, and the small men devote themselves to labor” (Ch’u 1961:227). An ideal social order was believed viable only when the superior and the inferior all attended their business diligently and conscientiously. That the latter should be governed by the former was the order of nature, in which peace and prosperity would prevail. In this order of nature, Confucianists believed that property rights, honor and class distinction were necessary incentives for the cultivation of virtue (Hsu 1975:11).  119 In 1070, during the early Northern Song, an edict on bao and was issued with a primary aim to reconstruct the armed forces of the Song. The edict stipulated that every neighbourhood of ten (xiaobao). Every ten small households was to form a small formed a ten large again and (dabao), formed a large to devotion intelligence and of person A (dubao). capital bao bao head the the of elected as should be well-being collective (baozhang) at each level (Qi 1959:102—5). In most cases village elders (also elders of kin groups) were elected to head bao. Each bao functioned according to a village agreement (xiangyue) prepared by the members collectively. The village—agreement was used to manage all community affairs and particularly for the settling of disputes by the head (baozhang). Every able bodied male above fifteen years of age was required to join a j to engage in a neighbourhood watch. The difference between bao and j•. largely varied from area to area on the basis of different local customs. As well, different emphasis that each level of state government pursued in different times served to differentiate bao and j. was a unit of organization of households which Basically, a a unit of organization of male labourers served as a base for j.j who could be drafted in time of military undertakings (Wen 1939:245). 22.  —  23. Community granaries run by community organizations for charity and famine relief grew since the Song (Hymes 1986:152-60). When initial made (voluntary associations) societies benevolent revival the in late Ming, appearance as part of the Confucian public welfare building further flourished (Lum 1985:118-9). In promoting Mencius’ doctrine of “Benevolence common to all men,” members of benevolent societies saw their contributions to public welfare and education through public lectures and readings and philanthropy as their constitutional duties. 24. The baolia system evolved as each dynasty had a particular emphasis in local government from local security in the Song, through local xianq education in the Yuan, to more centralized control in the Ming and more systematized and legalized control in the Qing (Wen 1939). There was a growing tendency for the state to enhance its control of local society through the baolia in order to collect tax and to maintain order. 25. Xian magistrates had conventionally been selected by the central government from the scholars who passed the examinations. In the Song dynasty, however, Wang Anshi determined to reform what had become a corrupt bureaucracy and strengthen xian governments by promoting officials on the basis not only of their performance in the examinations but also of their political views on rebuilding the state (see Qi 1959:86). He started a tradition by writing the names of magistrates into the government archives (Liao 1969:83) and increasing magistrates subsidies (Qi 1959:85). He enlarged the state pay—roll for lower levels of government employees, in order to eliminate unlawful surcharges on ordinary people by government  120 runners (Ibid.). The result was that the central government tied xian magistrates and employees of the xian government closer to itself. However, at the same time, the magistrate was given greater Thus, one has to look at the authority and responsibilities. before held official posts in which magistrates situation determining the nature of the relationship between state power and local autonomy since the Song. 26. In the. area of agricultural management, besides cadastral survey of land and land registration, the magistrate had a duty to urge people to take up agriculture (guannong sang) (Zhou 1959:3658). In each of his tours of the land and villages, the magistrate encouraged agricultural pursuits and helped peasants with their problems in production (Huang 1984:542-3). The Imperial government paid great attention to agriculture. The art of farming was also particularly valued by the elite—scholars whose interest was primarily in land. The magistrate bore the brunt of the task of seeing that land was managed well and made good use of. This was regarded as an essential objective of the Imperial rule under the Mandate of Heaven. 27. Appeals and severe cases were handled at upper level courts at the district, the prefecture, the province and the capital. Magistrates’ judgments were reported at fixed intervals to the immediate upper administration. These reports then served as or promotion in considering performance of their records administrative disciplining. For a detail account of the judiciary in Imperial China, see Bodde and Morris (1967:113-22); and van der Sprenkel (1962). For Chinese magistrates, see Wen (1939) and Watt (1972). 28. For more on Chinese taxation, see Liu (1935:1-46), Chen (1966), Wu (1987), Perdue (1987), Mann (1987) and Zelin (1984). 29. Alford notes that the Zhou developed rules to regulate family relations, “contractual obligations, military conduct, monetary affairs, tax administration, and other matters.” He continues that “individuals who believed that persons with whom they had contracted had not lived up to their end of the bargain could seek recourse through the government” (1986:929). 30. Tuntian (land colonization) was a practice originating perhaps in the opening of “aitian” (land.colonization for the common good) in the state of Jin during the last centuries of the Zhou. It was used to guard transportation such as canals, and other Imperial against attacks by the frontiers and to defend property, Civilian northwestern nomadic Mongolian ancestors (Xiongnu). settlers came to the frontiers historically along with military settlement (Wu 1987, vol. 1:95—103).  121 31. Duara (1988:181-3) argues that the presence of the third party served not only to personalize impersonal market relations but also guarantee rights of the contractual partners without the state. intervening in the process of exchange. Yang Guozheng, nonetheless, sees in his study of contracts in the Ming and Qing that any transfers of land ownership, although they took place between individual persons, were conducted under two influences: the state and lineage community (1988:73-4). He points out that since land taxes were a major source of state revenue, the state sought to regulate the transaction by placing a red seal on the contract. In fact, since the Yuan, the government prepared standard documents (guanwen shu) to indicate government recognition added to the contract together with the red seal. In time of litigation, this contract was recognized. Contracts without government recognition in the form of a red seal and the standard document, the so—called “white contracts,” were often denied by the court. Perdue (1987:137) explains the appearance of “white contracts” and writes that “In Sung [or Song], red seals were applied and contract tax rose to twenty percent. Thus, ‘white contracts’ started to appear.” Kroker (1959:127) also makes a note of red field and white field. “Red fields can be sold irrevocably, but white fields may not.” He moreover finds that “owners of white fields are entitled to cultivate them,..., they are owners of the ‘skin of the field’ but not of its ‘bone’ or its ‘skeleton’,” upon which tax was collected. The question of the “bone” vs. “skin” of the land will be discussed in due course. Jernigan (1905:133), nevertheless, observes in the late Qing that the Code of Qing ordered all lands which were acquired without registration with the public records of the government illegal and to be forfeited. For more, also see Zhang (1985:35—7). In terms of the influence of lineage community on transferrals of land ownership, one sees the influence of local elites. The third party signing the contract as witnesses was likely to be some members of the local elite who were rich, and had influences and an interest in keeping the growth of local property rights. 32. Kroker notes (1959:140-1), first of all, religious attributions of land ownership to divinity the god of the earth or other folk figures in sale deeds of grave land, for example, acted against the alienability and transferability of land. Secondly, joint ownership of family property placing emphasis on ancestral unity prohibited the absolute alienation of land, even though family collectivity seemed to have been more a characteristic of elite families than that of the commoners’. Finally, in relation to the above, property sales in accordance with customary law should be offered first to relatives and neighbours with the intention of keeping property within the “family” or the community (Schurmann 1956:509-14). Custom was therefore against the probability of disposing land by will (Jernigan 1905:133). Kroker (1959:133) even argues that “The land is not deemed strictly to be personal property of the owner or of his family but rather the heritage of -  —  122 the village community, of which the occupant is a member.” However, Duara’s (1988) study of rural north China in the first decades of the twentieth century seems to suggest that based on the owner’s deliberations, land was sold to outsiders through the mediation of a third party. 33. Perdue (1987:138-40) cites Fujian as an example. Wickberg (1981:212-6) talks about an “one-field three-owner” system in his study of high tenancy rate in leasing lineage land in Taiwan. Wu Tingyu points out, apparently, that the “permenant tenant right to land” (yongdian guan) appeared in the practice of dividing the “skin” from the “bone” of land in the late Song and developed ever since in many parts of the country (1987, vol. 11:224-7). He argues that the recognition of tenants’ permenant right to land they tilled had different effects on tenants. For those who were rich peasants purchasing this right to expand production and sometimes to rent out the land to earn profit. For ordinary peasants, however, the purchase of this right would not improve their living since they had to pay rents after paying for the right which was usually costly. Yang Guozheng (1988:98-9) argues that the “permenant tenant right to land” improved the tenant relationship in three aspects: one, the rent was relatively fixed and hence stabilized. The second is that the tenant became more autonomous in managing the land he tilled. The third is that the tenant was less dependent and his relationship with the landlord was based more on a contract which stipulated rights and obligations on both sides (Ibid: 119). 34. The deeds of dian, ever since widely accepted in the Song, had caused disputes from time to time over ownership rights and brought increasing number of cases in front of magistrates. “There was once great confusion with reference to the right of redemption.” Jernigan (1905:142) documented in the late Qing, “The time within which the right could be exercised was very indefinite, and in order that there should be more certainty a law was passed in the seventeenth year of Kien-lung which enacted that the right of redemption must be exercised within thirty years, unless the time was specially mentioned in the mortgage.” 35. Myers in fact points out three new obstacles to the growing prosperity of the well—to—do peasant. He writes, By the end of the nineteenth century three new developments began to take place and slowly impinged on the rural economy. First, the import of manufactured goods ruined many handicraft producers and forced peasants to sell their land. Second, the export of agricultural staples came under the control of powerful native and foreign traders, who through credit and price control were able to exploit smaller traders and peasant producers. Third, the establishment of Western enterprise in the treaty ports through special exemptions made it impossible for Chinese entrepreneurs to compete on an equal footing.  123 These obstacles not only made the well—to—do peasant concerned for his security but also affected the growth of merchants and artisans in cities. 36. Secret societies were usually known as hui, bang or dang. Bankrupt peasants and rural outcasts formed the majority membership of secret societies over which literati, merchants and workers ejected from the conventional order often exercised leadership. Secret societies rejected social conventions since they were pulled together by people who were hostile to the normative order under the Imperial rule. They were strongly committed to a Taoist sense of individual salvation and united, as Wakeman (1972:31) remarks, “by common ritual and a vague sense of brotherhood.” “They were ineffect surrogated kinship groups,” in the wake of dissipated kinship ties, “offering their outcast and rebellious members the services conunonly furnished to the orthodox by their kinsmen,” such as those in the family, the lineage, the village, and the guild (Chesneaux 1972:6). Hence, voluntary initiative and individual choice were their founding principles. They therefore became a potential force in revolution. For more on secret societies, see Perry (1980). 37. Chesneaux (1973:25) informs us that Hong Xiuquan, the leader of the Taiping Rebellion, broke with the secret societies largely in Guangxi and Guangdong for ideological reasons: “they refused to follow his attempted Christian syncretism. For his part, he disapproved of their dream of restoring the Ming dynasty, and in 1851 founded his own dynasty ‘The Celestial Kingdom of Great Peace’ (T’ai-’-ping T’ien-kuo).” In addition to the introduction of the divinity of God and spiritual salvation in protestant belief system, the Taipings adopted the western calendar and western public service systems such as a network of railways, postal service, hospitals and banks. The practice of primitive collectivism, in the name of “land under Heaven farmed by all,” attracted peasants. However, after the formation of the Kingdom, peasants were distressed by heavy taxes and corvee imposed by the Taiping bureaucratic administration. Internal division within the Taiping Movement greatly weakened it even before its suppression by the Qing government assisted by western forces (Ibid:27-31). The Taiping Rebellion, which engaged the Qing government in battles for a decade, stretching across central China and many parts in the south and north, irreversibly encumbered the empire. -  38. Having owned the subsoil of all land and hence all underground minerals, the Son of Heaven ultimately controlled the early industries such as mining and mint manufacturing. By the Han dynasty, a state economy based on salt and iron industries had already been in operation with the forced labour supplied by corvee labourers, soldiers and convicts. The salt and iron industries were brought into the control of the state from being contracted out to merchants, the industries boomed but the management then became bureaucratized. As a result, the industries soon declined (Zhang  124 1985:233-41). Hartwell (1963:3) describes the development after the Han. He notes that, after a period of disunion from 220 to 589 A.D., The unification of the country under the Sui (A.D. 590-618) and T’ang (A.D. 618-906) in the seventh century resulted in reviving the prosperity of the Han, and at the beginning of the eighth century the pattern of commercial and industrial activity was not much different from what it had been in the first century of B.C. During the next three hundred years the economic landscape of China was to be completely transformed. By the beginning of the eleventh century, the essentially self—sufficient, natural economy of the early T’ang had changed to one in which money formed the most important medium of exchange; the patterns of population distribution had radically altered and movements of people to different regions was accompanied by a phenomenal growth of new urban centres; and novel methods of fiscal administration combined with the localized conunerce predominant in pre—eighth—century China. 39. It is originally from Eberhard informed by Harwell (1963:73).  (1957:248-52).  Here  I  am  40. See Hartwell (1963:4-8, 31, 50). There are many theories in the sociology of development. Those noted, such as Wallerstein’s (1976) theory of international trade and Wittfogel’s (1959) theory of irrigation control, have been applied to explain why China did not continue to pursue its track in industrialization. What Hartwell (1963:107) has expounded may worth considering. After the Mongolians caine and established the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368), officials (mostly Mongolians) replaced the appanage holders. The tighter state control was in place of relatively independent industrial management and brokerage market regulation with which the Song government approached industries and merchants. Policies of the Yuan had a marked influence on the Ming and the early Qing. 41. For a detailed study of guilds in China, see Liu Chongri and Zuo Yunpeng (1981:187—204), Morse (1967), Burgess (1970), and Fewsmith (1985). 42. Rankin (1986) studies the growth of merchants of Zhejiang in the late nineteenth century. She finds that many of the merchants stepped out of local financial and mercantile market and into the market of Shanghai a central financial and mercantile market of late Imperial China. Similar with earlier elite who held offices in areas distance from their home localities, Zhejiang merchants in Shanghai and other urban centres maintained business links with home merchant organizations. In comparison with earlier of ficial— elites who brought home benefits of contacts and channels of influence through office connections, these Zhejiang merchants in Shanghai brought home areas the same advantages but with additional financial and philanthropic contributions. “They invested money at home, provided leadership in initiating projects, and dispensed —  125 their own kind of patronage by providing jobs for men from their lineage or locality” (Ibid:88).  126 CHAPTER THREE Contradictions in the Theory of Nationalist Revolution It is argued that the Nationalist Revolution was a conduit for China’s transformation from the Imperial tradition to the Nationalist establishment of a “freemarket” society.  In the process, a new style of elite rule  was developed on the basis of the centralized use of military and legal force.  The labouring poor were deprived  of key rights, despite the fact that the theoretical objectives of the revolution included building a quasimarket society in which people’s rights and livelihood would be honoured equally.  The apparent discrepancy between the  theory and practice of the revolution raises the question of why egalitarian sentiments resulted in a “free market” society under the rule of the Nationalist elite in solidarity with the propertied class and not a “quasimarket” society, as had been proposed in theory. Searching for answers to this question, this chapter examines the theory entailed in Sun Yat—sen’s Three People’s Principles of Nationalism, People’s Rights and People’s Livelihood, and Chiang Kai-shek’s conception of China’s Destiny.  The later chapters  -  Chapters Four, Five and Six  will address the Nationalist practice of social transformation. Sun’s Three People’s Principles, as the following  -  127 examination illuminates, advocates a social order based on a quasi—market society.  At the same time, it emphasizes  individual sacrifice for “national liberty” represented by a state controlled by experts.  This emphasis is in part a  consequence of the influence of western thinking, in conformity with the impact of imperialism on Chinese social transformation.  This influence on the theory of the  Nationalist Revolution came primarily from ideas popular in the West in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, such as social contract theory, the theory of the sovereign state, social evolutionism, scientific positivism, and Soviet socialism (Bao 1992).  Imong these ideas, there was  an ethical conviction that technological progress in the pursuit of wealth and power was irrefutably desirable.  This  conviction encouraged the elite to dominate this pursuit. This domination gave rise to a voluntaristic strategy of modern state-building, focusing on the role of the state to represent the “general interest” of the populace in peace and security, to set social goals, and to maintain order over the society of (disassociated) individuals whose moral duty was to be trained as citizens. This chapter indicates that Sun’s Principles reflect the influence of the voluntaristic strategy of modern state— building.  They emphasize the power of the state to exercise  its right to define which goals best realize the “general interest” of society in “national liberty,” the goals to  128 which individuals are required to conform voluntarily. 1 This voluntaristic influence gives rise to essential contradictions in the theory which become a vital source of discrepancy between it and practice of the revolution. The examination of Chiang’s conception of China’s Destiny involves the recognition of the doctrine of “political tutelage” as its focus.  The argument is that,  for a limited, but unspecified, period, that state would prevail over the people.  This doctrine is different from  the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, the centre piece in the Imperial tradition of elite rule, as discussed in the previous chapter.  The doctrine of “political tutelage” is a  product of the voluntaristic influence.  It advocates the  development of the state not only to define goals for the transformation of the order of social relations but also in assuming power over individuals whose moral duty is to conform with that order.  It is a product of the  voluntaristic influence also because it allows the government to protect the interests of property against the labouring poor.  It, thus, deviates from Sun’s wishes to  honour equally people’s rights and livelihood. In light of the quasi—market model of social relations which is the case for a “de—voluntaristic” perspective, the inherent contradictions in Sun’s Principles and Chiang’s conception stem from their neglect of the exercise of sentiments of justice by individuals.  This neglect leads  129 not only to the excessive use of state power but also to the repression of the individual will.  The result of the  Nationalist Revolution in establishing centralized elite rule over a “free—market” society indicates that the theory of revolution was deficient in preparing for a quasi—market society based on more equitable social relations. The recognition of the influence of voluntarism on the theory of the Nationalist Revolution will shed light on the role of imperialism in China’s transformation before and during the Nationalist Revolution.  It raises questions  about the two opposing views of Andrew Nathan (1972) and Joseph Esherick (1972).  These views consider the  contributions of western imperialism to the failure of the Nationalist Revolution and the difficulties in the socio economic development of modern China in the early twentieth. century. Esherick argues that western imperialism not only prevented the growth of modern Chinese socio—economic development but also decisively intervened in the revolutionary movement.  He indicates that foreign powers  compelled the leaders of the 1911 Revolution to make their revolution acceptable to foreign interests.  He also argues  that foreign intervention contributed to the partition of China and allowed reactionary forces, such as Yuan Shikai, and subsequent warlord governments, to prevail against the Nationalists and progressive reformers.  He concludes that  130 the imperialist impact was an integral part of the struggle for power which led to China’s political disintegration in the early twentieth century (1972:14). Nathan, on the other hand, suggests that internal factors, such as culture and social structure, carried more weight in causing modern China’s difficulties than external forces did climax.  -  a point of view which Eastman brings to its  He insists that the imperialist economic and  political effects on modern Chinese socio—economic development, brought about by the treaties, extraterritoriality, foreign loans, and trade, were unclear in their impact and not all were harmful.  By way of an  “apologetic,” he argues that the “foreign role was essentially peripheral,” in the partition of China among warlords and that the Nationalist Government of 1927-1937 was not established entirely on the support of a compradore class created by imperialism (1972:6). The views of Nathan and Esherick, representing two sides of the on-going debate in the China field on economic and political change after 1911, are presently contrasted to a view to be established upon an examination of, first, western voluntaristic influence on the way in which the leading Nationalists envisioned the future of China’s transformation.  The following analysis of Sun’s Principles  and Chiang’s conception assesses this influence on the Nationalist conceptual preparation for the establishment of  131  centralized elite rule over a “free market” economy.  This  alternative view of the impact of imperialism on the Nationalist Revolution recognizes Sun’s vision of a quasi— market society for China’s future, a vision which is influenced by the West.  At the same time, it points out the  deficiency of this influence. Sun Yat-sen and His Three People’s Principles  Sun Yat—sen’s Three People’s Principles of Nationalism, People’s Rights and People’s Livelihood were all a product of Chinese society of the early twentieth century.  They  responded to a China which was controlled and pulled apart by alien governments, oppressed by warlords, and overwhelmed by poverty and death in unending internal conflict.  Sun  Yat—sen wanted China to regain sovereignty, to change from rule by a few to one by all people, and to achieve equal opportunities for all.  The Three People’s Principles  defined these goals. Sun Yat—sen’s vision of a future China was a product of his intellectual development and his active pursuit of social change.  Sun began to learn about the existence of  anti-Manchu secret societies during his studies at Po-chi Medical Institute in Hong Kong. 2  In 1894 he secretly  founded the Restore China Society (Xingzhong Hui) with like minded intellectuals.  The official oath of membership, and  the nature of its organization suggested resemblances as well as ties to secret societies. 3  The Guangzhou uprising  132 in 1895 organized by the Xingzhong,Hui invoked the participation of secret societies. Sun discovered  “...  It was also then that  the widespread system of secret  societies and their mass character, and sketched the areas in which they were active”  (Borokh 1972:135).  After the failures of the Guangzhou uprising in 1895 and the second attempt at rebellion in Guangdong province in 1900, Sun and his Xingzhong Hui realized that they had different goals from the secret societies.  They were not  committed to abolishing the Qing dynasty and replacing it with another one dominated by Chinese.  They aimed, instead,  at a constitutional government, which represented greater changes in the socio—political structure and the complex of rights and property relations. After the Guangdong rebellion, Sun caine to Japan to seek asylum and to contact other revolutionari 4 es. his exile in Japan Sun developed his ideas.  During  He travelled  extensively to learn about the West and to raise funds.  In  1905 he initiated the formation of the Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmeng Hui, reorganized into the Nationalist Party in 1912), the first political party in Chinese history, to unite all revolutionary forces.  His clear  objective to build a republic after the expulsion of the Manchus separated Sun from reformers under Kang Youwei. 5 The goals of expulsion of the Manchus and restoration of Chinese rule, nevertheless, were in broad harmony with the  133 goals of secret societies, even though differences existed in the understanding of the nature of “Chinese rule.”  Sun’s  followers continued to infiltrate secret societies and enroll their leaders into the Alliance (Borokh 1972:138-9). Sun envisaged a republic founded upon the equalization of land rights (pingiun diguan), a view which was influenced by Taiping economic thought (Shih 1967:493-5) and the ideas of John Stuart Mill (Franke 1970:63-5).  He designed the  Five Powers Constitution (Wuguan xianf a) in an attempt to combine the positive aspects of both western and Chinese state organizations.  This Constitution incorporated the  three political notions developed in the West  -  the  legislative, executive and judiciary powers, and the two institutions which played a special role in China  -  the  civil service examination system and the censorial system for supervising the conduct of bureaucrats (Tsao 1947:8-9). Following the idea of a republic constructed upon the Five Powers Constitution, Sun envisioned three consecutive periods in which the establishment of the republic was to be completed in a span of six years.  Franke describes the  three periods: The first was the period of military rule lasting until the monarchy or its representatives had been overthrown and the enemies of Revolution destroyed. This period was to last three years. Every district (hsien [or xian]) should constitute a unit in itself. If in any district the necessary preconditions were fulfilled within three years, the second period would begin: ‘the. rule of the provisional constitution’ (Yue-f a chih chih), during which the elected representatives of the people and elected officials in a particular district  134 were responsible for administering local affairs on the basis of a provisional constitution agreed upon with the military government. The third period (constitutional government) was to begin after six years. At that stage the whole power of government was to be transferred from the military into the hands of Parliament, which was also to be elected by the people, and of the executive bodies appointed by them. (1970:67) In 1907, the Revolutionary Alliance adopted a moderate policy towards foreign powers.  Having concluded that the  revolution could not succeed unless foreign powers stood neutral, Sun and his followers promised to keep all treaties signed prior to 1907 in force and all obligations that the Qing government was forced to fulfil.  These included  indemnities to be paid partially from maritime custom duties, foreign concessions and settlements to be respected, and those foreigners and their property in areas controlled by the future revolutionary military government to be 6 protected. After the formation of Revolutionary Alliance, activities were geared to secretly expanding revolutionary organizations into every province and large town.  To avoid  further damage to revolutionary organizations after individual arrests by the Qing government, grass—root organizations were forced to operate underground and in linear connections.  Only at higher level headquarters were  all linear connections brought together under conditions of utmost secrecy. 7  Between 1906 and 1908 the Revolutionary  Alliance either organized or was involved in a number of  135 attempted rebellions. the Dowager Ci Xi died.  In 1908 both the Emperor Guang Xu and The new Emperor Xuan Tong was only  a minor who was guided by the regent  -  his father.  development favoured the revolutionary movement.  This In the  next two years, the revolutionary party intensified the effort to expand its organization and to prepare for uprisings, one of which eventually toppled the Qing. 8 Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles originated in the political slogan of “Chu dalu, huifu zhonghua, chuangli hezhong zhengfu”  (overthrowing the Manchu Government,  restoring Chinese nation, and building a republican government) upheld by the Xingzhong Hui.  It represented a  turning point in Sun’s life from a reformer to a revolutionary, committed to the philosophy of social transformation from a Manchu—dominated monarchy to a republic.  The principles were raised as the revolutionary  objectives of the Alliance.  During the high tide of  Nationalist Revolution in 1924 when the Nationalists underwent reorganization with the Comintern advice and in the united front with the Chinese Communists (their party was founded in 1921), Sun spent time exploring his views on the Principles. than before.  He then took a more anti—imperialist stance  His public lectures at the time became primary  sources for later students of his Principles. Nationalism (minzu zhuyi), People’s Rights (minguan zhuyi), and People’s Livelihood (minsheng zhuyi), as the  136 Three People’s Principles (sanmin zhuyi), bear a Nationalist vision of a sovereign China with economic prosperity and political democracy.  Having recognized that China had just  entered the period of developing democracy after overthrowing the autocracy the Qing dynasty, Sun recommends the “Three People’s Principles” as the watchword for China’s revolution, as opposed to that of the French Revolution “Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.”  —  In Sun’s view, the  difference between the two resulted from the different experiences that China and the West had had with autocratic rulers.  According to Sun, western tyranny was a more severe  type of despotism than that of Imperial China.  People in  the West fought for liberty for years in order to do away with autocratic suppression whereas Chinese Imperial power was more liberal in its approach to government.  Apart from  paying the regular grain taxes, the Chinese people had almost no business with the Emperor in their everyday lives. Autocratic pressure was felt only when China was subject to political and economic domination by foreign powers.  Hence,  China’s cry for liberty, he concludes, is foremost for the people’s sovereignty, that is, the liberty of the nation and freedom from foreign suppression (Sun 1960:76,84). Echoing J. S. Mill, Sun states that only individual liberty which did not interfere with the liberty of others can be considered true liberty. If one’s liberty is incompatible with another’s sphere of liberty, it is no longer liberty. 9 (Ibid:73)  137 He indicates that:  “Liberty, to put it simply, means the  freedom to move about as one wishes within an organized group”  (Ibid:68).  He argues that,  The individual should not have too much liberty, but the nation should have complete liberty ... To make the nation free, we must each sacrifice his personal liberty. (Ibid:76) There are however questions regarding who will define and represent “national liberty” for which individuals are required to sacrifice.  If the state or the Nationalist  Party is to define and represent “national liberty,” as the case viewed by Sun, there is then the question of whether the sacrifice of individual liberty for “national liberty” is a mere justification for the superiority of state power. This justification is an imported expression from the West. The notion of “Obeying the government, because it works for the betterment of the people,” justifies the state’s guardianship over the cultivation of public virtue congenial with the tradition of voluntarism. On the basis of the above understanding of liberty and the objectives of Chinese revolution, Sun claims that the Principle of Nationalism is the “doctrine of state” which mandates the way the Nationalist political economy is built. He argues that if we do not earnestly promote nationalism and weld together our four hundred millions into a strong nation, we face a tragedy the loss of our country and the destruction of our race. (Ibid:5) —  The Principle of Nationalism, according to Sun, connotes  138 both a united nation with a common national identity, and a harmonious family of all nations. Nationalism, for Sun, also reflects Chinese tradition, even though it is considered imported. ancient Chinese virtue  —  It cultivates an  love of harmony. ° 1  Sun reasons  that since love of harmony, as China’s national spirit, had supported the growth of China for thousands of years, it would also save China from disunity and foreign domination. Nationalism, he argues, can mobilize the natural forces in China, such as blood kinship, common language, common livelihood, common religion, and common customs; the operation of these forces would elevate China to an equal position among the nations, in international affairs, in government and in economic development (Ibid:1).  As the  “doctrine of state,” nationalism upholds “national liberty” which provides the focus in the conception of the Principles of People’s Rights and Livelihood.  The former prescribes  the polity and the latter the economics of the Nationalist establishment. The Principle of People’s Sovereign Rights, Sun maintains, extends people’s power and authority in government.  He explains that “[t]he power to execute orders  and to regulate public conduct is called ‘sovereignty’, and when ‘people’ and ‘sovereignty’ are linked together, we have the political power of the people.”  Defining the “political  power of the people,” Sun enunciates that  139 government is a thing of the people and by the people; it is control of the affairs of all the people. The power of control is political sovereignty, and where the people control the government we speak of the “people’s sovereignty.” (Ibid:51) “People’s sovereignty,” foremost, has two basic functions: protection and sustenance.  The former means  self—defense, and the latter seeking food.  They are “the  two chief means by which mankind maintains its existence” (Ibid:52).  The utilization of these two means by citizens  is, for Sun, the realization of democracy, a process in which citizens claim their sovereign rights to political and economic participation against the subjugation to monarchical rules.  Sun thus conceives that “‘Equality’ is  similar to our ‘Principle of the People’s Sovereignty’ which aims to destroy autocracy and make all men equal”  (Ibid:77).  Recognizing, however, that human beings are naturally born unequal in intelligence and ability, Sun made a distinction between “sovereignty” and “ability,” arguing that “[t]he people of a republic are shareholders, the president is general manager, and the people should look upon the government as an expert”  (Ibid:124).  Therefore, it  is to men of ability and skill that “we should be willing to give the sovereignty of the state  ...“  It is also based  upon the conception of unity of the “sovereignty” of the state and the “ability” of experts that Sun chooses to invest the exercise of the rights to “self—defense” and to “seeking food” in the hands of literate elites.  140 Sun, subsequently, develops the idea of balancing the political power of the people and the administrative power of the government by giving each side separate and distinct rights.  Examining popular western political practices at  the time, Sun introduces four rights on the side of the people: suffrage, recall, initiative and referendum. Combining Chinese and western traditions, Sun grants the government five rights stipulated in the Five Powers Constitution discussed earlier, that is, legislative, judiciary and executive from the West, and civil service examinations and censorial system from the Chinese tradition.  Sun is satisfied with the balance between the  people and government because the government has the power to work and to acquire authority, while the people have the power to control and to check the government (Ibid:145-8). Restrained by his earlier idea of the people to voluntarily conform with “national liberty” defined by the government, however, his version of the “balanced” relationship between the people and government would ultimately be thrown off balance.  An examination of the  establishment of Nationalist political economy indicates that the government did assume the five rights which Sun had endorsed, but the people had none of the rights which were due to them. The third principle, the Principle of People’s Livelihood, Sun claims, parallels the idea of “Fraternity”  141 during the French Revolution (Ibid:77).  “It denotes the  livelihood of the people,” reflected in “the existence of society, the welfare of the nation, the life of the masses” (Ibid:151).  The reason why People’s Livelihood is raised to  a principle, Sun argues, is two—fold.  On the one hand, it  refers to the growing western social problem of unemployed people losing their livelihood as a result of technological change.  On the other hand, it is the Marxist principle of  material force as the centre of gravity in history that Sun is inclined to refute.  The Principle of People’s  Livelihood, Sun states, is his understanding of history: livelihood is the central force in social progress, and ... social progress is the central force in history; hence the struggle for a living and not material forces determines history. (Ibid:155-6) Sun’s disagreement with Marx actually originates in his rejection of Marx’s characterization of material production in industrialized societies.  Marx considers the capitalist  production to be based on a struggle between the capitalists —  the oppressors, and the workers  —  the oppressed.  Sun  argues that Marx’s conceptions of class struggle and social progress are not a cause—effect relationship because class struggle is a disease developed in the course of social progress.  He says that “[t]he cause of the disease is the  inability to subsist, and the result of the disease is war.” He rejects “the disease of class struggle” because it disturbs the harmony of the economic interests of the society, a harmony which is a necessary precept of social  142 progress (1960:161).  Based on his understanding of movement  towards a quasi—market society in the industrialized world at the time, Sun envisions social progress as being made possible by the harmony of economic interests, harmony which is maintained by the state under the control of capable experts. Like Marx, Sun is fascinated by technological innovations occurring in all fields of industrial production.  Unlike Marx, however, he argues that surplus  value is not generated by labour alone.  Technological  wonders, he holds, such as electric engines, steamships, railways, manufactures, machinery, fertilizer, scientific agriculture, and a wide market, are all powerful factors in the creation of surplus value (Ibid:162).  He suggests that  social progress is made because human beings behind these factors want to find a living and to eliminate economic strife that they are introducing public distribution of goods, heavy taxes upon capitalist incomes and inheritances for the development of national transportation and communication, reform of living conditions among workers and of working conditions in the factories, and all sorts of practices which will help to harmonize the larger number of economic interests within the nation. (Ibid:163) Sun, therefore, finds comfort in the argument that when the capitalists improve the living conditions of the workers, the latter can increase their productivity and produce more for the former.  It is from the capitalists  that the government collects taxes.  A reconciliation and  143 not a clash of interests between capitalists and workers thus enables society to progress.  The harmony of economic  interests would also help enhance the class harmony that Sun wants to see and not class struggle. He, consequently, perceives four social practices in the movement toward a quasi—market society at the time that bring forward progress.  These four social practices  —  social and economic reform, public ownership of transportation and communications, direct taxation and socialized distribution are overthrowing old systems and giving rise to new systems. It is the constant emergence of new systems that makes constant progress possible. (Ibid:160) —  “Social and economic reform,” first of all, Sun continues,  “means the use of government power to better the  workingman’s education and to protect his health, to improve factories and machinery so that working conditions may be perfectly safe and comfortable”  (Ibid:157-8).  Using Germany  in the 1920’s under the influence of social progress policies as an example, he argues that “[s]uch reforms give the worker more strength for his work and make him quite willing to work; they also greatly increase the rate of production”  (Ibid.).  On the growth of public ownership, Sun remarks that smooth and rapid transportation and convenient communication can be assured by the financial resources that the government is able to conjure up, rather than by private institutions.  Also, public ownership under government  direction prevents the development of individual monopoly  144 which is regarded by Sun as an obstruction to social progress.  He regards direct taxation as serving justice  when the government imposes income and inheritance taxes upon capitalists.  “Because of the large income of  capitalists, direct taxation by the state ‘gets much without seeming oppressive’”  (Ibid:159).  For Sun, finally,  “socialized distribution” is defined  primarily by the goods that are distributed not by merchants but through social organizations or by the government.  In  Sun’s understanding, this government involvement in distribution eliminates heavy losses that the consumer suffers from paying a large commission for merchants under the trade system of merchant distribution. view, a form of socialized distribution, applied to distribution”  It is, in Sun’s  “or socialism  (Ibid.).  Clearly, Sun’s understanding of the movement toward a quasi—market society reflects the recognition of the increasing state involvement in the economy in the western industrialized societies since the First World War.  It also  mirrors the influence of the socialist tradition emphasizing state regulation of the economy, as represented by the Soviet regime.  Sun’s incorporation of socialism into his  vision of a future China can be seen as the result of his co-operation with the Comintern and the fledgling Chinese Communist Party in his last years. In his program of economic reconstruction, Sun singled  145 out two methods: equalization of land ownership and regulation of capital (Ibid:170-1).  Both methods were  policies of radical social engineering which could not be achieved peacefully.  The reason for this is that Sun  proposed the equalization of land ownership through nationalization and the regulation of capital through government taxation, both of which challenged the tradition of a brokerage market economy in which local elites maintained domination over local communities against state encroachment.  Sun, however,  saw these methods as feasible  not only because the Nationalist Republican State would act justifiably for the betterment of all people, but also because it would be strengthened by the profit of her own capital (Ibid:177-84).  The methods were feasible, moreover,  because the Nationalist State could serve to build a quasimarket society so long as it acted, as Sun hoped, to protect the betterment of all people, not the interests of property. In the Three People’s Principles, Sun developed his theory of revolution on the basis of an understanding of the ideas and practices of the movement toward a quasi—market society of his day and their applicability to China.  The  standpoint from which Sun spoke for social progress is clearly closer to that of a social democrat.  He was  concerned with national wealth, the growth of which would sustain an increase in the general well—being of the people. His concern, however, reflected an ambiguity, not only in  146 the conception of class conflict, but also in the recognition of an individual’s citizenship rights.  This  ambiguity arose from the fact that Sun’s Principles, while granting individuals the right to supervise government operations, required them at the same time to make sacrifices for what the state dominated by the expert elite defined as “national liberty.”  This, in turn, provided an  excuse for the conservative right—wing Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek to argue that Sun had an idea of “the revolution of all the people,” and to suppress workers’ and peasants’ movements in the late 1920s in the name of upholding “national liberty.” With the application of these principles, social inequality would grow as the individual rights of selfdefense and seeking food were transfered to the elite who controlled the state and managed and distributed resources, all once in accord with its definition of “national liberty.”  The rise of elite rule would lead to the  repression of the independent pursuit of justice by individuals.  It would also coincide with the building of a  “free-market” society in which the Nationalist State exercised power to protect the sanctity of contracts, not the betterment of all people as Sun had hoped.  Chiang Kai  shek’s conception of China’s Destiny suggested the development of this “free market” society.  147 Chiang Kai-shek’s Conception of China’s Destiny  Writing in 1943, at the time when China was occupied and ravaged by the Japanese, Chiang Kai-shek followed his predecessor, Sun Yat—sen, in considering nationalism as the ideology of the state and aiming to achieve “national liberty” with the elimination of warlordism and the abolition of unequal treaties with foreign powers.  He  viewed imperialist intervention as both a causal element in the wars between warlords (1947a:111) and a destructive factor in the debasement of China’s political, economic, and social fabric (Ibid:76-100).  He regarded nationalism as the  most important force not only in the eventual abolition of the unequal treaties with Great Britain and the United States in 1942  (Ibid:149-51) but also in the future  realization of China’s independence and freedom from the Japanese occupation. Deviating from Sun, however, Chiang envisioned the Nationalist Revolution in accord with his argument that “[t]he Three People’s Principles are unchangeable, but the method for putting these principles into effect is not unalterable”  (Ibid:11O).  He chose to abandon Sun’s methods  of “Uniting the Soviet and the Communists and supporting the workers and peasants.”  Fearful of threats to his  acquisition of power left by Sun, he crushed the workers’ and peasants’ movements in the late 1920s, waged military campaigns against the Communists and suppressed leftist and  148 oppositional opinions in the early 1930s. Explaining his methods in theory, Chiang criticized the Communists and leftist intellectuals for adopting foreign ideas without understanding Chinese conditions.  He turned  to Chinese history and purposefully selected Confucian virtues and historical events as supporting evidence.  The  evidence selected represented a simplification and sometimes a distortion of history.  As a result, Chiang dressed up his  methods with certain “Chinese historical evidence” even though such methods were developed through expanding Sun’s voluntaristic argument, which was fundamentally rooted in the West.  This argument emphasized the sacrifice of  individual liberty for “national liberty” represented by the state.  Chiang’s stipulation of individual conformity with  the Nationalist State drives home the indoctrination of that argument. In what follows, I shall not reiterate mounting criticisms of Chiang’s instrumental use and unjust treatment of history (Jaffe 1947:298-306), but concentrate, instead, on an examination of his explanation of the methods with which the Principles of the Nationalist Revolution were realized. Restoring the Confucian virtue of filial piety, Chiang first combines nationalism with his principle of individual loyalty, a loyalty which would not only subject the individual to the domination of the Nationalist State but  149 also reduce the role of the family.  As he states,  To fulfil the principle of complete loyalty to the state and of filial piety toward the nation; to be altruistic and not seek personal advantage; to place the interests of the state ahead of those of the family; such is the highest standard of loyalty and filial piety. (1947a:165) The principle of loyalty is significant, according to Chiang, because, bringing individual interests in line with the “interests” of the state, it would help to establish government authority based on the free and voluntary will of the individual (Ibid:165-6).  This principle is significant  also because it could prepare for “the united will of all,” one which would make possible not only China’s independence and freedom from foreign domination but also the realization of the other principles of the Nationalist Revolution (Ibid:112). Building upon the principle of loyalty, Chiang contemplates the methods with which the two objectives of the Nationalist Revolution were achieved after the realization of the Principle of Nationalism: the realization of the principles of democracy and of people’s livelihood (Ibid:156). Discussing the principle of democracy, he writes, we must establish China as a strong, closely knit state in its foreign relations, so that it will not slip back into a status of pseudo—freedom and so—called liberalism in which the. state and the nation would resemble a pan of loose sand. We must train all our citizens to exercise their governing power, without favoring any particular class; making Chinese politics the politics of all the people, and not class politics. (Ibid:156)  150 Supplanting Sun’s Principle of People’s Rights with his principle of democracy, however, Chiang undermined Sun’s advice to balance power between the people and the government and emphasized, instead, the role of the government to train citizens.  In the course of training,  People’s Rights were withheld since citizens were educated by the government, particularly with regard to the issues of what their rights are and how to exercise them. This suspension of People’s Rights in the course of training constitutes the basis upon which Chiang understands democracy, a view which has two interrelated aspects.  On  the one hand, Chiang declares that “[t]he purpose of our Nationalist Revolution is to build China into a state ruled by law”  (Ibid:207) because democracy is based on law  (Ibid:208).  To achieve democracy requires the  centralization of state power to enforce the law and to designate the duties and privileges of each individual (Ibid:217).  It also requires citizens to  “...  accept the  laws, decrees, and orders with a consecrated mind and solemn purpose, and carry them out in a voluntary and active spirit”  (Ibid:212).  Not until they had acquired this spirit  of voluntary conformity, and not until their duties and privileges had been designated, would citizens have to make do without rights. As Chiang states,  “Only when a man does not neglect his  own duty will he be protected by the state, and only when he  151 exerts himself fully can he urge his countrymen to common endeavor”  (Ibid:181).  Does this mean that the workers’ and  peasants’ movements were not protected and in fact crushed for not fulfilling their duties to the state?  Moreover, is  it class politics that the Nationalist Government deprived the workers and peasants of their rights to justice in the pursuit of equality?  Is it for the purpose of securing the  increase of its own income and the growth of property that the Nationalist Government protected the sanctity of contracts between capital and labour in the name of “national liberty?”  Chiang certainly contradicted himself.  Democracy is, in his view, necessarily entailed in a division of labour.  As he proclaims,  According to scientific methods, each man’s work must follow the principles of division of labor and specialization of duty. Though those that know and those that act should co-operate there would still be a division of labor. Therefore only Sun Yat—sen’s theory that “to know is difficult but to act is easy” constitutes a true guiding principle for man’s life. (Ibid: 188) This guiding principle, for Chiang, is the division of labour placing thàse who know and are learned to give orders and make laws.  Those who know less, however, follow orders  and obey laws so that they are molded by state ideology and learn to accept the demands of the state as free and voluntary demands (Ibid:164-7).  Linking the two  requirements of democracy (that is, the building of a centralized state and voluntary conformity of the individual with that state), for Chiang, is this division of labour,  152 insuring that not only those who are learned will control the centralized state but also those who are less learned will conform with it. Finally, explicating the methods by which the Principle of People’s Livelihood is realized, Chiang states that we must continue the productive reconstruction begun during the War of Resistance, and prepare to carry out Production must the Industrial Plan [of Sun Yat-sen]. that it will not so the entire nation, be the work of in an warfare, or result class into degenerate in to survive would’ be unable that economy unplanned capitalism. state and of trusts the present world (Ibid: 156—7) In his view, the building of a planned economy is most crucial because On the one hand, national industries must be developed, and on the other hand, private capital must be brought Thus there will be no real motive for under control. class struggle, since the workers will only enjoy increasing opportunities for employment and the improvement of their livelihood, and will not suffer from capitalist oppression. (1947b:282—3) This planned economy, according to Chiang, could be built by carrying out the industrial policy, which aimed to “abandon hand labor for machinery, and to unify industry under Government ownership”  (Ibid:285).  This industrial  policy could, for Chiang, create employment because the government directed private capital to its desired projects. He suggested that abandoning hand labour for machinery was inevitable because each man’s activities were only a part of the activities of all members of society, and that surplus value was produced not only by labour but by all participants in production, including management and the  153 capitalists who invested (Ibid:280).  It was inevitable also  because industrialization, which involved machinery displacing hand labour, was the objective of all the members of society, an objective to which individuals were required to conform. The increase of government regulation, Chiang further argues, could resolve the land problem because land values are stabilized when the government prohibits private investment in land, as Chiang writes that The inability of rich men to invest their money in land will automatically equalize land ownership and will prevent these equalized land rights from becoming unequal. (Ibid:284-5) After they had lost to the Communists and retreated to the island of Taiwan, the Nationalists, applying Chiang’s ideas, created a system of individual peasant owners and a class of vigorous capitalists through planning and the use of economic incentives.  They distributed income relatively  equitably by the systematic allocation of industry throughout the rural areas.  They, by adopting what is  recently known as the neo—authoritarian approach to government, managed to take Taiwan to the top of the leading economies in the developing world (Gray 1990:406; Baum: 1991). During the Nanjing era, however, the method of using government regulation to create employment had been applied only in the sense that the accumulation of capital (especially state capital), not labour, was at the centre of  154 attention.  Capital was protected when labour was  suppressed.  The suppression of labour occurred when the  real value of labour was not duely recognized and the rights of labourers were denied.  As well, as later chapters  discuss, land reform was not carried out to resolve the land problem.  Rural communities remained to be controlled by  landlords who continued to be protected by local governments, while more bankrupt peasants were forced to join industrial labour force or to take up arms to fight for a living. In sum, Chiang had a voluntaristic vision of the Nationalist establishment, one which was contrasted to the autonomous model of the state in its relationship to society.  The Nationalist State was not autonomous because  it formed an alliance with the owners of private capital to control the demands of labour. Chiang’s vision of a social order was different from Chinese traditional political culture, in which state power had been contested by local elites’ efforts to control the local community and peasants’ efforts to exercise the right given by Heaven to revolt against corrupt government.  The most obvious disparity  existed between the practice of local elites representing the public against Imperial state encroachment and the notion of “general interest” represented by the state centrally controlled by the Nationalist expert elite. Chiang’s vision also diverted from what the Nationalists  155 following Sun in the Guangzhou period (1924-1926)  had  attempted to achieve, namely, the building of a quasi-market society.  In that period, the Nationalists had adopted  policies to meet the demands of the workers and peasants and supported their struggles for rights to justice in the pursuit of equality. Chiang’s theory is voluntaristic also because it advocated the political tutelage of a centralized state over society based on the institution of rights and obligation. This centralized state protected property against the demands of the labouring poor.  Chiang’s theory, therefore,  contributed to the establishment of a “free—market” society in contrast to the objectives of the revolution to build a quasi-market society.  It is to the question of how the  Nationalist Revolution resulted in the establishment of a “free-market” society dominated by the Nationalist elite that the study, now, turns.  156 NOTES  1. For a study of the influence of western statism, advocated by J. K. Bluntshli and others, on Sun, see Xia Liangcai (1992). 2. Sun Yat—sen was a son of a peasant family in a Pearl River Delta village near Guangzhou. He went to Hawaii with an elder brother at the age of twelve and received his Christian education in Honolulu. From 1887 to 1892 he studied medicine in Hong Kong and subsequently settled down as a doctor in Macao (Franke 1970:52). 3. As the Xingzhong Hui founded by Sun Yat-sen grew in southern China and abroad, other independent societies of a similar nature sprang, such as the Liberation Society (Guangfu Hui) in Zhejiang and the Society for China’s Prosperity (Huaxing Hui) in Hunan. Huang Xing, for instance, a member of a well—known elite family, after taking part in the attempted coup of 1899 in his home province of Hunan, founded the Huaxing Hui in 1903 in close association with a secret society called the Xiongdi Hui (Society of the Elders and Brothers). Like Huang Xing, members of the Huaxing Hui and the Guangfu Hui tended to appeal to young progressive intellectuals from well—to—do elite families, who had perhaps studied in Japan (Franke 1970:60). 4. According to Franke (1970:60-2), Japan at the time was the haven of Chinese progressive intellectuals whether in their acquisition of knowledge or revolutionary alliance. In 1905, 8,000 Chinese students of science and technology were studying in Japan and more than 13,000 in the following year. This group of people soon became a sympathetic audience to revolutionary ideas. The Japanese government at the time adopted a policy of welcoming all types of political refugees from China, whether reformers to change the government or revolutionaries to overthrow the dynasty. Franke (Ibid.) remarks that “The best way of serving Japanese interests, it was thought, was by helping to power those who were well disposed towards Japan and who needed Japanese support in order to maintain their position.” Therefore, “Soon after the end of the Japanese-Chinese war of 1895, the Japanese, by means of clever propaganda emphasizing their common Asian race and culture, had succeeded in diverting the hatred and hostility of China from themselves and directing it against the real common enemy, the West.” 5. See Franke (1970:58). Over the nature of a constitutional government, Sun was separated from reformers under the influence of Kang Youwei in the late Qing. Their views were divided precisely over the question of whether a constitutional government was meant to curtail the power of the Emperor, as Sun would like to see, or to facilitate the traditional rule of the emperor, as Kang and his followers promoted.  157 6. To discourage foreign powers from supporting the Imperial government, the revolutionaries also declared that foreigners on the side of the Qing were regarded as enemies of the revolution and goods provided to the Qing would be confiscated. See Franke (1970:68). 7. Franke As (1970:71) reveals, the headquarters of the Revolutionary Alliance were originally in Japan. Later on, the Japanese government did not want to bear unnecessary complications with the Qing government. Sun Yat—sen and other leaders were expelled from Japan. They moved to the French Indo—China, where the French authorities granted them protection. 8. After many attempted rebellions in southern provinves of Guangdong and Guangxi failed due to the government’s enhanced vigilance, revolutionary activities advanced into central and northern China in 1910 (Franke 1970:72). In October 1911 Wuchang Uprising signalled the downfall of the Qing. 9. Sun Yat—sen, in fact, considered western individualism as an evil consequence of the excesses of liberty (Ibid.). 10. The essense of China’s ancient virtue to adhere to harmony, Sun explicates, born in The Great Learning (Da Xue, a Confucian canonical text), lies in the teaching to “Search into the nature of things, extend the boundaries of knowledge, make •the purpose sincere, regulate the mind, cultivate personal virtue, rule the family, govern the state, pacify the world.” Notedly, this virtue is to be acquired by anyone, not just the one who governs the state. Sun’s view reflected a dominating intellectual sentiment at the time, see Chen Gaoyuan (1992) and Zheng Yunshan (1992).  158 CRAPPER FOUR Building Nationalist Elite Rule Towards the end of 1927, Chiang Kai-shek began to gain dominance over the Nationalist Party by establishing state power centrally controlled by the Government in Nanjing. His power was, however, fragile in the face of challenges from both within and without the KMT.  Externally, Chiang  was pressured by foreign powers, particularly Japan, which had great interests in China, and by the Chinese Communists. Internally, he had to overcome many obstacles in his aim to build a strong central government.  He sought to subdue  regional militarists with a “Program of Military Reorganization and Disbandment.”  After the purge of the  Communists in 1927, he organized a “Party Rectification” campaign to wipe out Communist influences on leftist elements within the party.  He centralized control over  local affairs by helping local governments and police against those local Nationalist Party organizers who had been influenced by leftist ideas.  He engaged in Nationalist  state building by utilizing the most effective means of the military force at the disposal of the government in Nanjin g. The use of force to control the party, the army and citizens, which characterized Chiang’s “free market” approach to government, significantly impeded the development of democratic processes required for achie ving the objectives of building a quasi-market society.  159 In explaining the failure to build a quasi-m arket society, the following three chapters examin e the process in which the Nationalists continued China’s transformation from the Imperial tradition of elite rule over a brokerage market economy to their establishment of centralized elite dominance over a “free market” economy in the era between 1927 and 1937. This chapter concentrates on the establishment of Nationalist elite rule through an analysis of the relationship between the adaptation of foreign influence and militarization of state power.  To understand this  relationship, it is necessary to examine the process in which the Nationalists contended regional militarism, which grew alongside foreign forces exerting influences on the struggles for power between old and new elites since the late Qing.  This forms a central aspect of the Nationalist  effort to continue China’s transformation from the Imperial system to a constitutional government.  It is a process  which is examined in two ways: first, the centralization of control over regional military forces in order to remove their threat to the Nanjing Government and impose on them a centralized budget; second, the unification of the party and state to counter the independent growth of local governments. One ironic result of this centralized control is, as Bedeski (1981:viii) suggests,  “that a unified State exists  160 in China today due in large part to the State-building efforts and successes of the Kuomintang (KMT) during the Nanking [or Nanjing] period (1928-1937).” These efforts of containing regional military forces and indepe ndent development of local governments affected the way in which the Nationalists expanded administrative and legal means to secure the growth of property. Historical Conditions of Centralization Western powers with a military force unimaginabl e to the Qing government arrived at the southern coast in the middle of the nineteenth century and demanded spec ial rights.  Beginning in 1842, when the Treaty of Nanjing was  signed between the Manchu and British governments, China was compelled to open treaty ports along the coast where foreign powers mapped out each of their territories of influen ce governed under the laws of their own countries.  The so-  called concession governments were set up to cont rol every aspect of life in these territories.  Crimes involving  foreigners had to be brought to their own territories and tried by their own courts.  A Mixed Court consisting of a  Chinese magistrate and foreign consular—officers was used to judge cases involving Chinese in the “International Settlements”  (Jernigan 1904:222-9).  The imposition of these arrangements was advantageous to foreign trade and expansion in China but weakened the Qing government.  In the period after the 1840s, foreign  161 penetration accelerated the disintegra tion of the Imperial order which was built on an intricate network of social relations dominated by local elites, which represented local society against state encroachment. This order of rights and property relations underwent transform ation in the formation of Nationalist elite rule.  This transformation is  reflected predominantly in the changing style of elite activism.  The Nationalist elite, which was oriented to  change, sought to establish a constitutional government to ensure its participation in national affairs. were deeply influenced by foreign practices.  Such norms The  Nationalist elite vied with other elites who were keen to maintain the status quo with arms.  Labour and the peasants  struggling for citizenship rights saw the conflict among elites as not meeting their interests.  This section will  discuss this process of change from the reform effor ts in the late Qing to the founding of the Nationalist Govern ment in Nanjing. Initial Reform Efforts in the Late Qing The process of transformation in the late Qing began, as nationalist sentiment developed among the Chinese and questioned the ethnicity of the Manchu ruling class.  The  Taiping Rebellion, which waged battles against Manchu domination for nearly a decade and a half in the 1850s and 1860s, had great consequences for the Qing government.  In  assisting the suppression of the rebellion, foreign powers  162 demonstrated a superiority of arms.  They impressed leading  Qing provincial officials, Zeng Guof an, Li Hongzhang, and Zuo Zongtang, who felt a need to build China militarily. After the Taiping Rebellion, these provin cial officials suggested the self-strengthening program. They initiated an effort to embark on the building of arsenals and dockyards, under state supervision, with the employment of western expertise and the exploitation of government corvee labourers (Zhang 1979:21-68).  A railway was constructed  from Tangshan to Tianjin to transport materials under Li Hongzhang’s governorship, and Hankou—Beijing and Hanko u— Guangzhou railway lines were built under Zhang Zhidon g, the governor—general in Nanjing. At the time when provincial officials considered that advanced military machinery gave the West superior power over China, Wang Dao argued that western superiority actually lay in its scientific learning (Cohen 1987:176-9). Gao Fengqian, however, conceived that western superiority lay in government.  He saw the western science of government  as constituting not only the rule of norms and standards but also western politics.  Neither of them, he reasoned, was  dispensable to the government of an orderly society (Wang 1987:102).  These latter perceptions became more influential  after the Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. This defeat further depleted China’s sovereign rights and its protection of the domestic economy.  It also signaled  163 the failure of the effort to strengthen the Qing militarily. This failure stemmed from the fact that the effort, itself, lacked coordination from the centre as political and military state power became increasingly concentrated in the hands of provincial officials. In the face of the disintegration of the Imperial system, the intellectual elite began to push for reforms in the late 1890s and the first decade of the twentieth century.  The influence of  foreign ideas encouraged the changing style of elite activism: that is, having performed their tradi tional role in public welfare and education, elites now acquired resources, such as modern education and news media, which could broaden their influence in national affairs and the processes of govern 2 ment. The first wave of reform began when the Qing government was forced to sign the treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan after China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Prominent nation—wide scholars were in Beijing to take the metropolitan examination.  Reform-minded persons like Kang  Youwei were greatly disturbed by the humiliation of China’ s partition by foreign powers.  Kang recognized that lack of  modern weaponry and technology was not the entire answer to China’s obvious weaknesses.  He argued that a great number  of fundamental changes were necessary in the organization of state and society. memorials.  The Emperor Guang Xu read Kang’s  Severe resistance, however, from the anti—reform  164 party headed by conservative nobles, including the Empress Dowager, prevented Kang’s ideas from circula tion in the capital.  It was not until 1898 when foreign affairs became  critical, that popular support for reform finally moved the Emperor Guang Xu. Kang was called upon to supervise the Wuxu Reform program, which lasted for One Hundr ed Days. During the reform, Imperial decisions were primar ily made to encourage such developments as the introduction of scientific, especially technical, studies and courses of instruction on the Western model, the improvement of agricultural methods of production, the introduction of military training on the Western pattern, the establishment of a university at Peking, the modernization of the school system, the abolition of the traditional civil service examination system, the drawing up and publication of an annual budget for government expenditure, the abolition of sinecures, the dismissal of officials who opposed reform, etc. (Franke 1970:48) These decisions greatly upset conservative elements in the government which aborted the reform. persecuted and the Emperor impeached.  Reformers were  The reform, though  short—lived, reinforced efforts to set up modern educational institutions modelled after Western practices.  It also  gathered together a group of reformers, besides Kang Youwei, such as Liang Qichao and Tan Sitong, who questioned the foundation of Chinese society and Confucianism (Kwong 1984:125-6). ef forts.  Their ideas encouraged the 1900’s reform  These efforts reinforced the growth of regional  political and military power in two aspects: one was the institution of self—government, and the other was the  165 institution of a constitutional government.  The former  served to bring local elites closely workin g with the government rather than local people.  The latter offered  elites an avenue to influence national affai rs. Reform in the Last Decade of the Qing After the failure of the 1898 reform, social discontent agonized local of 3 ficials.  Measures that they took to  maintain social security prompted further reform effor ts. As early as 2 October 1901, an edict was issued to approv e the proposal for reforms from Zhang Zhidong in Hubei and Liu Kunyi in Jiangsu with an intent to attain more effective government by adopting foreign methods.  The edict gave  local of ficals the authority to define their efforts in light of their local cond 4 itions. In Shanxi, reform efforts led by Governor Zhao Erxun in 1902 and 1903 were largely focussed on the community (xiangshe) level below the county (xian).  The so-called  xiangshe reform was seen by Governor Zhao as the first necessary step of changing the system.  With the increasing  number and magnitude of market towns, the lower level administration was required to be strengthened (Ibid:30). The reform efforts were primarily targeted at curbing corrupt local leadership through the public nomination (gonglu) of a leader (shezhang) by the conunu 5 nity. According to the Shanxi provincial regulations on xiangshe reform, the shezhang was to be elected only by  166 members of the community who possessed ten mu or more of. land with valid 6 documents. The electorate were to meet and recommend a list of nominees. The magist rate then was to select one from the list. With this provis ion, impediments were expected to be reduced in selecti ng persons who would uphold public good.  As a result, well-to-do  peasants, besides village elders, could be elected to the post of shezhanq (Ibid:52-3), or to a post among sub district leaders in a xiang, a town, or a village that had a title like gongzheng, gongzhi, or gongre 7 n.  The  composition of local elites, therefore, began to exhibit a shift in leadership style from traditional community leaders representing the interest of the community against state encroachment to the newly—elected shezhang who was specifically charged with the responsibility of overseeing the actions of the people, and of reporting those who did not yield to his authority or follow the directives sent down from the district yamen. (Ibid:53) The establishment of local police (tuanhian) at the disposal of shezhanq would reinforce his power over people. The shezhanq was given a salary to make him feel more obligated to his job and thus tie himself closer to the government.  Ultimately, the goal of the “people to  administer the people, the power (guan) still residing in the ranks of officialdom” (Ibid:41), was achieved.  The  result was however the alienation of local elites from local people.  The moral and cultural dominance of local elites  over society, although endorsed by local people, was now  167 supplanted by a new political and milit ary power authorized by the government. In contrast to the Shanxi xiangshe reform , another model, developed in Zhili province, was based more on foreign ideas.  In August 1905, Yuan Shikai, governor-  general of Zhili, obtained Imperial consent to conduct reforms following the Japanese exam 8 ple.  He employed vocal  young scholars who had studied Japanese govern ment in Japan after the Meiji reforms.  He emphasized the Japanese model  of self—government as a way to constitutionalize the Chinese monarchy.  His efforts served to incorporate local elites in  local public administration and to institutionaliz e their participation in central government affairs. In Tianjin, the capital city of Zhili, a SelfGovernment Bureau (Zizhi Ju) was established on 29 Augus t 1906 to experiment with Japanese representative 9 assem blies.  Specialists were encouraged to formulate a  prototype model for other provinces to follow.  Yuan Shikai  proposed a formal administrative structure based on the hierarchy of subordination of villages and towns to cities, cities to districts, and districts to prefectures (Ibid:101— 2).  In accordance with this scheme, self-government  organizations were to be established at each level.  The  fact that the first experiment with local self-governme nt was located in Tiánjin suggested a concentration of reform efforts in cities rather than in villages, and encouraged  168 the direction of reforms to be from the top downwards. In contrast to the xiangshe reforms in Shanxi, the self—government council in Zhili invested local power not in one person, the shezhang, but in the council which was expected to participate in the management of local affairs as a legislative body overseeing the conduct of an executive board.  Delegates elected by the local council would then in  turn be elected to the provincial and national assemb lies. According to the Tianjin self-government regulations, the members of the local council were elected by people of the community who could meet the electoral requirements.  Apart  from property ownership rights, education was a central requirement of the electorate.  In part it was because the  regulations of “self—government” had to be studied and appropriately applied in local af 10 fairs. Between the two models of reforms, Tianjin’s example was favoured by the Qing court.  The Tianjin model  allowed the government not only to regulate the procedure of reform but also to train local leaders in the management of local affairs.  Soon after the Self—Government Bureau was  established in Tianjin, an order was thus issued by the Imperial court to call on all provinces to set up self— government bureaus. The impact of the local self—government reform in Tianjin was profound.  The application and popular education  of self—government potentially favoured those members of  169 society who were young, literate, and eager to receive recognition of their rights, an otherwise impossible goal in the traditional system of domination. The idea of local self—government appealed to these people becaus e it offered an opportunity for them to participate in government processes even if they were neither traditional elites nor local elder 12 s.  These people included merchants who were  in one way or another associated with foreign agents and would have liked to see China adopt a life-style similar to that of the countries of their foreign patrons.  They also  embraced those who had a stake or saw potential succes s in the growing industrial and commercial businesses. Cities were filled with such people who came to seek opportunities or to acquire resources (such as education and business skills), and therefore imbued with enthusiasm for self—government reforms.  This enthusiasm particularly  displayed itself in the appearance of increasing numbers of newspapers and civic associations and societies.  In the  countryside, on the other hand, local self-government reform institutionalized the participation of local elites in government affairs and, thus, reassured local elite domination by striking an alliance between local elites and government military and police force 13 s. When local self—government institutions were being set up in the country, the Imperial government in Beijing gathered all prominent scholars knowledgeable in  170 international political affairs to work towards the establishment of a constitutional govern ment.  Shortly after  the Imperial court announced its inten tion on 1 September, 1906, ad hoc commissions were organized to investigate foreign governments and to prepare legislatio n for the organization of a representative assembly.  The Compilation  Commission proposed a consultative assembly (zizheng yuan) at the national level to facilitate public discu ssions (gonglun) and to prepare for the representative assembly. Three methods were recommended to be used in the selection of the consultative assembly.  These were the  nominations by the emperor, by the metropolitan bureaucracy, and by provincial officials based on recommendations from educational societies, chambers of commerce, and vario us bureaus and offices associated with local self—government under the jurisdiction of magistrates.  In the end, the body  was largely made up of government officials and representatives selected by provincial leade 14 rs. At the same time, the Qing court attempted to apply the western type of cabinet administration.  Eleven ministries  were rearranged in 1908: respectively, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Measurements, Rites, Military Defense, Justice, Communication, Interior, and Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Trade, and Academics, and the Censorate.  In March 1911, the Qing court issued regulations  on the administration of the cabinet and its subordinate  171 offices.  The noble kinsman Yi Kuang was appointed Prime  Minister (Yang 1958:2-4).  This government reshuffle did  little to change the nature of the governme nt, given that the Prime Minister was appointed by the Emper or from among his close kin.  This màve provoked the revolutionary actio n  by radical reformers following Sun Yat—sen, who had already been thwarted by the government draft of the 1 con stitu 5 tion. The 1911 Revolution and Power Struggles Ther eafter An opportunity favourable to revolution presented itself in the event following the Qing governme nt’s decision in the Spring of 1911 to nationalize all the railw ay systems, including the parts still under construct ion.  This  nationalization effort was attempted with a loan from the foreign powers (England, France, Germany and the United State) to cover the costs.  The move toward centralization  roused opposition in provinces, particularly, in Hunan, Hubei and Sichuan.  It outraged the interested parties in  the provinces, chiefly local governments. An armed insurrection supported by secret societies and local elites quickly spread out under the “movement for the protection of the railway” initiated in Sichuan.  Before the  rebellion in Sichuan was put down by government troop s, a revolt broke out in the garrison of Wuchang, Hubei, on the Yangzi River on 10 October 1911.  The rebellion successfully  took control of the whole city and the first Repu blican  172 Military Government was founded. spread throughout China.  Soon revolutionary fervor  Provinces of Hunan, Jiangxi,  Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangsu, Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangdong, Guangxi, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichua n and Shandong declared independence from the Qing government.  In a few  months, Gansu and the provinces in the northe astern China followed suit.  In many of these provinces revolution  occurred without bloodshed, when provincial govern ments joined the revolution and revolted against the Qing court. Former Qing provincial governors in command of the army became governors of revolutionary military governments (Zhang 1986:54-61). In November 1911 representatives from the independent provinces assembled to decide on a central government.  On  29 December, Sun Yat—sen, upon returning from the United States, was elected as the acting President of the Provisional Government in Nanjing.  Quickly, however, Sun  realized that real power lay in the hands of the army under former Qing provincial officials and not his government. found it impossible to exercise authority without the support of the regional forces. In the meantime, Yuan Shikai in Beijing, having just been brought back by the Qing court from his retirement to save the dynasty, was given the authority by an Imperial edict on 12 February 1912 to organize a provisional republican government after the emperor relinquished his  He  173 power.  The next day Sun stepped down from the Presidency in favour of Yuan Shikai chosen by the Qing court, hoping Yuan could be the person powerful enough to unite different forces in the country. On 10 March, Yuan, with the support of military forces, took over the Pres idency in Beijing, as the seat of the Republic, in the face of opposition from revolutionaries in southern and central China. Newly invented state institutions were moved north where Yuan’s military and political power lay. The significance of the Uprising lay obviousl y in its termination of the Imperial system and the comme ncement of a new order.  In the first meeting of the representatives of  independent provinces in November 1911, the United States’ presidential administration was chosen as the model of government as opposed to the French cabinet system .  V  According to the “Organizational Principles of the Provisional Government” passed at the time, the acting President was elected by provincial representatives who together formed the provisional legislative assemb ly which declared its formation on 28 January 1912.  The Provisional  Government had the departments of foreign affairs, interior, finance, military, communication, and busi 1ness 6.  The  provisional central court acted as the supreme legal institution whose judges were appointed by the Pres ident. In later revisions of the Organizational Principles by the legislative assembly between 7 February and 8 March ,  1912, a  174 Provisional Constitution took shap 17 e.  One significant  change in the Constitution was to repla ce the presidential administration with a French-type cabinet system.  This was  an attempt to curb the power of the presi dency taken over by Yuan Shikai. After Yuan assumed the acting Presidency of the Republic, the Provisional Assembly (Canyi Yuan) reconvened in Beijing on 29 April 1912.  There were about 120  attendents representing three major parties: the Republican Party (Gonghe Dang), the Revolutionary Alliance (Tonqmenq Hui), and the United Republican Party (Tongyi Gonghe Dang). The Republican Party, formed by the moderate Repub licans and the Lixian Pai (constitutionalists) of the late Qing, advocated centralism and a strong state power under Yuan. The Revolutionary Alliance promoted local self—governm ent and hence acted against Yuan’s centralized state build ing. The third party, the United Republican, offered a compromise between the first two.  A fourth party, the Democrat Party  led by Liang Qichao, was made up of reformers and some retired members of the Revolutionary Alliance at the time of its reorganization.  As Yuan’s regime was established, unity  was achieved at least temporarily. Provisional Assembly was closed.  In less than a year, the The parliament was to be  established as the provisional constitution stipulated. After vigorous campaigns among all parties, the Nationalist Party held forty-five percent of the seats while  175 the Republicans, the Democrats, and the United together held about twenty—five percent, when the parli ament comprising the senate and the house of representatives first convened on 8 April 1913 (Chen 1988:11—5). draft constitution was pass 18 ed.  On 31 October,  1913, the  During the months of its  compilation, debates broke out about Confu cianism, local self—government, and style of administrative institution. Despite opposition from Nationalists and radic al reformers, Confucianism was recognized as the state relig ion, local self—government postponed, and the style of cabin et administration adopted to restrict Yuan’s power. Witnessing the success of the Nationalists, Yuan Shik ai hastened to control the parliament by force.  He ordered the  murder of the Nationalist parliament leader, Song Jiaor en, split the Nationalist group in the parliament through bribes, and persecuted other Nationalist representatives (Chen 1988:11-13).  As the Nationalists were greatly  weakened, Yuan ordered the parliament to meet to nomin ate himself as the President on 6 October 1913.  He initiated  the revision of the Draft Constitution, accusing it of a Nationalist conspiracy.  Immediately on 4 November, he  banned the Nationalist Party and, later, on 10 January 1914, dissolved the parliament (Zhang 1986:116). Yuan organized an administrative conference on March 18,  1914 to draft his Constitutional Compact, which was  passed on May 1.  The President was given overwhelming  176 authority, including the recognition of his office as a life-long position. To follow his idea of a constitutional monarchy, Yuan restored the Consultative Assembly on 20 June 1914, appointing himself as its leader (Zhang 1986:109). He persuaded the assembly to agree that China was ready for a constitutional monarchy.  He assembled provincial  militarists in Beijing to force a consensus. December,  1915 Yuan became the emperor.  Finally, on 12  Japan recognized  Yuan as emperor as a gesture to acknowledge his conces sion to its “Twenty—One Demands,” a concession which provok ed strong opposi 19 tion. At the same time, Sun Yat—sen called on people to impeach Yuan Shikai.  Soon sentiments against Yuan’s regime  spread across the country.  On 22 March 1916, Yuan was  compelled to withdraw his claim to the monarchy.  He died on  June 6. At this time China was divided politically.  In the  North, regional militarists fought one another in order to take control over Beijing.  After Yuan’s death, different  warlords tried either to continue the practice of republican government in Beijing or to restore the monarchical system. The constitution and the parliament were used or ignored for the convenience of building warlord rule. ° 2 In southern China, especially in Guangdong, the Nationalists had a stronger influence.  To stop Yuan Shikai  from becoming an emperor, Sun Yat—sen started a Second  177 Revolution against Yuan for “protecting the cause of constitution”  (hufa yundong).  In September,  1917, the  Protecting-Constitution Military Government (Huf a Jun Zhengfu) was formed with Sun the Chief-Marshal.  While the  southern Parliament under Sun’s leadership contemplated the problems of what form of government was more appropriate for China and how to achieve a national unity bound by constitution, opinions concurred on the view that the only potential unity could arise from a federation of self— governed prov 2inces 1.  This view seemed not only  impossible to be realized at the time, it was also abando ned when in 1923, Sun Yat—sen prepared to reorganize the Nationalist Party upon the advice of Comintern and with the co—operation of the Chinese Communists.  V  The United Front and the Division The reorganization of the Nationalist Party was inspired in part by the Soviet Revolution which impressed many Chinese intellectuals.  During the May 4th Movement,  the first Comintern agent, Gregor Voitinsky, arrived in Shanghai.  He served to draw together intellectuals into the  Comintern.  Among them were anarchists, Marxists, various  Socialists, Republicans and anti-Confucianists, including Chen Duxiu  —  a founder of the Chinese Communist Party  —  and  his followers, and Sun Yat—sen’s close associates, Hu Hanmin and Dai Jitao.  They came to meet him with heterogeneous  senses of what they were looking for.  Hu and Dai were not  178 as enticed by the Marxist theory of class struggle as they were by Lenin’s theory of struggles of oppres sed colonial and semi-colonial peoples against imperialists. that reason,  Perhaps for  “The intervention of a foreign power in the  form of the Comintern in internal Chinese party politics,” turned Hu and Dai away as determined opponents of the Communists (Franke 1970:116). Before Voitinsky operated in Shanghai, the Soviet government announced its intention to renounce all concessions and rights, including the right of extraterritorial jurisdiction, that the Czarist government had acquired in China.  This gesture in recognizing China as  a sovereign country touched many Chinese, including Sun Yat— sen who continuously,  (though vainly,)  sought out foreign  powers to support his cause. Like other Chinese intellectuals, Sun was impressed by the Russian Revolution.  When the Comintern proposed to form  a link with Chinese revolutionaries, Sun accepted its help to reorganize the Nationalist Party and to rebuild the republic.  While the diplomatic exchange went on between Sun  and the Comintern, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), born in 1921 with a commitment to Marxist ideals and a united front of the working class and petti—bourgeoisie, sought an alliance with Sun for the cause of national 2ndence indepe 2.  The co—operation between Sun and the  Communists took place alongside the political and military  179. restructuring of the Nationalist Party follow ing the Soviet model (Wilbur 1983:5—8). In early 1923, Sun Yat-sen and the Russian delegate Joffe issued a joint statement of co-o 2 pera 3 tion.  In the  autumn, a group of Comintern advisers led by Michael Borodin came to Guangzhou to assist Sun, while he sent Chiang Kai— shek as his representative to Moscow to study the formation of the Soviet party and the red army (Chen 1988:121-45) . At the First Nationalist Party Congress in Januar y 1924, Sun’s Three People’s Principles were reinterpreted.  A  stance against imperialism but in favour of the workin g people characterized the new interpretation:  “Uniting the  Soviet and the Communists, and supporting the workers and peasants.”  Two important documents were passed; the  Constitution of the Nationalist Party, and the Essential Decisions on the Republican Government Organization, which outlined Nationalist restructuring (Ibid:124-27). Congress was the legislative body.  The Party  The Central Executive  Committee (CEC), the highest party apparatus, administered standing military and civil affairs between biennial sessions of the Party Con 24 gress.  Sun died on his way to  Beijing to negotiate with the warlord government for unification in early 1925. peaceful unification.  With his death went the idea o.f  The Nationalist Republican Government  was founded, according to his will, in Guangzhou on 1 July 1925.  Wang Jingwei was the President.  A year later the  180 government initiated the Northern Expe dition against warlords (Zhang 1986:192—5). In retrospect, when Sun Yat—sen and his fellow Nationalists began to develop opposition to the northern warlords after the revolution was usurped by Yuan Shikai, they based themselves in Guangdong because they were all Cantonese and had support from Cantonese and overseas Chinese.  They were also in alliance with local militarist s,  such as Chen Jiongming, who were interested in their cause of overthrowing powerful warlords in the north.  Since  inilitarists were not fully committed to the Prin ciples of Nationalism, People’s Rights, and People’s Livelihoo d, the alliance of Sun with Chen was tenuous.  When Chen organized  a coup against Sun, incited by foreign powers and north ern warlords, Sun’s “Military Government for the Protectio n of the Constitution”  (Huf a Jun Zhenqfu) was greatly damaged and  Sun himself had a narrow escape (Zhang 1986:183-5).  Sun  learned from this incident that his cause of building a republic required a revolutionary army loyal to the revolutionary goals.  Therefore, during his Nationalist  reorganization, the Whampao Military Academy was created to initiate a military force under the Nationalist Party leadership. The Whanipoa Military Academy (Huangpu Lulun Xuexiao) outside Guangzhou was formed to train a reliable officer corps,  following the Soviet model.  Training at the academy  181 went beyond military education.  Students were given party,  political, revolutionary training in the Three People’s Principles, propaganda, and the tactics of revolutionary warfare.  1mong the staff members as well as students of the  academy, Communists and Nationalists formed a mixed 2 com posi 5 tion.  They later formed the backbone of both  parties in their political and military careers. When the Nationalist Northern Expedition, of which Chiang Kai—shek was in command, started from Guang dong on 1 July, 1926, the country was divided among the warlor d Sun Chuanfang in the southeast, his nominal superior Wu Peifu in Central China, and Chang Zuolin’s Fengtian forces in the north.  The Kuomintang army, due largely to its solid  military training and effective political education, demonstrated its superiority over those under the warlor ds. The central areas south of the Yangzi River in Hunan and Jiangxi were quickly captured by it.  In August, the Yangzi  metropolis of Wuhan, Hubei, fell in its hands.  By the end  of the year, part of the political leadership of the united front moved from Guangzhou to Wuhan. The Nationalist Party, at this time, was far from united.  Contention for Sun’s mantle divided it into  factions headed by Wang Jingwei, Liao Zhongkai, Chiang Kai shek, and Hu Hanmin.  Sun Fu (Sun Yat—sen’s son)  led the  young Nationalist group known as the “Western Hills” faction (after the meeting that was held in the Western Hills as  182 part of a right-wing conspiracy against the united front in late 1925).26 The most divisive issue was the united front of the Nationalists and the Communists.  This united  front supported the workers’ and peasants’ movements against “local bullies and evil gentry.”  The labouring people’s  movements organized by the Communists and the left—wing Nationalists, such as Liao Zhongkai whose popula rity ascended during the Hong Kong seamen strike, posed a threat to the right-wing Nationalists who would not see “local bullies and evil gentry” as their enemies.  The right-wing,  led by Hu Hanmin, staged the murder of Liao. The person who contributed most to the upsurge of right—wing movement was Dai Jitao, a renowned party theoretician who had served as Sun’s secretary and person al assistant after 1911.  Three days after Sun’s death, Dai  published an article demanding that party members observe the traditional practice of “filial piety” to the late founder.  Having been troubled by the thought that many  revolutionary youths began to listen to the Communists, whom he saw as taking advantage of the united front and the inaction of the Nationalist leaders, Dai wrote the follow ing in his article “The National Revolution and the Kuomintang.” In order to secure the survival of the Chinese Republic, we have first to secure the survival of the KMT; in order to secure the survival of the KMT; we have to give free rein to the (development of the) monopolistic, exclusive, unitary and dominative nature which is absolutely necessary for the survival of the Three People’s Principles’ KMT. (Wang 1985:55)  183 With this ideological assurance, the right-w ing members staged the “Zhongshan Gunboat Incident” of 20 March 1926 directed by Chiang Kai-shek, accusing Comm unists of conspiring to overthrow the government.  The incident,  though it was meant to be a signal to and not the final showdown against the Communists, was enough to impel them to act against Chiang 27. The success of the Northern Expedition boosted Chiang ’s popularity.  His open dispute with Wang Jingwei occurred  when Chi