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Europe’s mirror: civil society and the Other Fieldhouse, Julie 1997

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EUROPE'S MIRROR: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE OTHER by J U L I E FIELDHOUSE LL.B.(Hons.), Victoria University of Wellington, 1981 B.A., Victoria University of Wellington, 1985 M.A. (With Distinction), Victoria University of Wellington, 1989 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Political Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A September 1997 ® Julie Fieldhouse, 1997 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of f o M T l C P t L , S c t g N C £ . The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date H i C C J ^ W , DE-6 (2/88) 11 A B S T R A C T While much has been written in recent times on the concept of civil society, the idea that it is part of an Orientalist construct of West and non-West has not been explored. This dissertation addresses this lacuna in the literature by examining Western concepts of civil society and establishing the ways in which these concepts are constructed through the deployment of a mirroring construction of non-Western Others. I examine the work of three theorists (Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel) who wrote on civil society during the Enlightenment or in its aftermath. These theorists are emblematic of a discursive formation which differed from prior discursive formations in two related respects: their concept of civil society and their construction of non-Western Others. During the eighteenth century both constructions of the concept of civil society and of non-Western Others were undergoing significant changes leading eventually to a concept of civil society as distinct from the state and to what might be termed a "post-Enlightenment geographical imagination". To demonstrate the disjuncture between discursive formations, the work of two seventeenth-century theorists (Hobbes and Locke) is compared and contrasted with that of these writers. The work of three late twentieth-century social scientists (Shils, Gellner and Fukuyama) is examined and their concept of civil society and use of non-Western Others is contrasted with those of the prior discursive formation. I show how their concept of civil society is informed both by the concept of civil society developed in the Enlightenment and its aftermath and by the mirroring constructions of non-Western Others of the post-Enlightenment geographical imagination. Underscoring the work of all these theorists are methods of comparison and the I l l representational practices they authorize. These are explored through two conceptions of alterity which have operated in Western thought and their connections to questions of comparison. An analysis is made of the relationship of the ideas of comparison and comparative method to questions of translation in Western philosophy and social science. The implications of this discussion of comparison and representation for theories of civil society and their constructions of non-Western Others is analyzed. iv T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S Abstract ' i i Acknowledgement v i I N T R O D U C T I O N 1 P A R T I : E U R O P E ' S M I R R O R : N A T I V E S I N T H E L O O K I N G G L A S S 18 C H A P T E R O N E : H I S T O R Y O F C O N C E P T S 19 Introduction 19 Beginnings 20 The History of Concepts and the Archaeological Method 28 Polyvalence, the Enlightenment, and C i v i l Society 34 Colonial ism, 'Civi l izat ion ' and Europe's Others 45 C H A P T E R T W O : H O B B E S A N D L O C K E : S E V E N T E E N T H C E N T U R Y C O N C E P T S O F C I V I L S O C I E T Y 55 Introduction 55 The Hobbesian State of Nature 57 Hobbes' C i v i l Society and the Non-European Other 63 The Lockean State of Nature 67 Lockean C i v i l Society 70 C i v i l Society and the Other in the Seventeenth-Century 72 C H A P T E R T H R E E : M O N T E S Q U I E U A N D F E R G U S O N 78 Introduction 78 Montesquieu 79 The State of Nature and the Nature of Government 81 The Empire of Climate 84 C i v i l Society and the Corps Interm&liaires 90 Points of Disjuncture Wi th Seventeenth-Century Concepts 93 Ferguson 97 The State of Nature and the Origins of Society 100 C i v i l Society 102 Non-European Others 108 Points o f Disjuncture With Seventeenth-Century Concepts 111 C H A P T E R F O U R : H E G E L 115 Introduction 115 Hegel and Modernity 115 Critique of Natural Law Tradition 123 C i v i l Society 130 Wor ld History and the Non-European Other 144 V Relationship to Montesquieu and Ferguson 156 Conclusion to Part I 160 P A R T II : H E G E L ' S S H A D O W 164 C H A P T E R F I V E : T R A V E L L I N G T H E O R Y 165 Introduction 165 Said's Travelling Theory 167 Hegel's Legacy 173 Derrida's Critique of Western Metaphysics 179 Hegel and History 184 Spectres of Hegel 187 C H A P T E R S I X : S H I L S , G E L L N E R A N D F U K U Y A M A 193 Introduction 193 Sh i l s 194 Virtue and Civi l i ty 196 C i v i l Society 207 Universal Historical Narrative 209 Non-Western Others 215 Ge lh ie r 218 C i v i l Society 219 Non-Western Others 228 Fukuyama 237 The End of History 238 C i v i l Society 248 Non-Western Others 254 Conclusion to Part II 261 P A R T III: O U T O F T H E P A S T 265 C H A P T E R S E V E N : C O M P A R I S O N A N D R E P R E S E N T A T I O N 266 Introduction 266 Questions of Comparison 267 Two Conceptions of Alterity 268 Operation of Conceptions of Alterity 273 Derrida's Critique of Hegelian Metaphysics 280 M i l l ' s Strategies of Exclusion 284 Comparison and Translation 294 Comparative Method 301 Conclusion to Part III 314 C O N C L U S I O N 318 B I B L I O G R A P H Y 327 v i A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T I would like to thank the following people who have assisted me in various ways in the production of this dissertation. I am grateful for the assistance provided by my thesis committee (Derek Gregory, Robert Jackson and Philip Resnick) who read and commented on the drafts. M y thanks go to my family and friends for providing support in a number of ways throughout the dissertation process. Final ly , I am indebted to D r Raj K . Vas i l o f the Department of Political Science, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand for encouraging me to undertake graduate study at the doctoral level. 1 I N T R O D U C T I O N A s in a mirror the semblance is in one place, the substance in another, so matter seems to be full when it is empty, and contains nothing while seeming to contain all things. The copies and shadows of real things which pass in and out of it, come into it as into a formless shadow. They are seen in it because it has no form of its own. Plotinus, Enneads. The breakthrough toward radical otherness (with respect to the philosophical concept - of the concept) always takes place within philosophy, the form o f an aposteriority or an empiricism. But this is an effect of the specular nature of philosophical reflection, philosophy being incapable of inscribing (comprehending) what is outside it otherwise than through me appropriating assimilation of a negative image of it, and dissemination is written on the back - the tain - o f that mirror. Jacques Derrida, Dissemination. I begin this introduction with an epigram from the Greek philosopher Plotinus because it illustrates an important and frequently forgotten point about mirrors and their literal and figurative uses as representational devices. Plotinus draws our attention to the way in which mirrors may be used to create illusions or how they may deceive those who unwittingly employ them. This illusory capacity of mirrors bears directly on my choice o f a tide for this thesis and upon the argument I intend to present herein concerning "c iv i l society" and mirroring constructions of non-Western Others. A s Richard Rorty has shown in Philosophy and the Mir ror of Nature.' the mirror has been a ubiquitous metaphor in Western philosophy from the Greeks to the early twentieth century. The predominant construction of the mirror metaphor in this tradition has been the idea 1 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mi r ro r of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). 2 of the "mind as the Mir ror of Nature", a mirror that accurately reflects the 'reality' outside the mind. Accordingly, the premiere task of Western philosophy (what Rorty calls "Philosophy with a capital P") has been to find ways to achieve more accurate representations ". . .by inspecting, repairing, and polishing the mirror". 2 In so doing, however, philosophers often ignored the mirror's other properties: the ability to create illusions, either consciously or unconsciously. The idea of the mind as the "mirror of nature" facilitated the establishment of philosophy as a "foundational" discipline; the Kantian ideal of " . . . philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims o f the rest of culture . . . " 3 and providing " . . . a general theory of representation . . . " 4 Mainstream Western philosophy (which Rorty calls "systematic philosophy") from Descartes onward sought to establish a " . . . permanent, neutral framework for inquiry . . . " which is ahistorical, "rational", and "objective". 3 Again , this enterprise is centred around a Conception of accurate representation as knowledge. 6 Such ah ahistorical epistemology attempts to construct all knowledge claims as commensurable. 7 Rorty questions Western philosophy's epistemological concern with accuracy of representation and argues for a rejection of this epistemology and of the goal of universal 2 Ibid. , 12. 3 ib id . , 4. 4 Ibid. , 3. 5 Ibid. , 8, 12. 6 See ib id . , 12. 7 See ib id . , 357. 3 commensurability. 8 He demonstrates that "systematic philosophy's" fixation with ocular metaphors (especially mirrors) continues into contemporary ways of thinking: There was, we moderns may say with the ingratitude of hindsight, no particular reason why this ocular metaphor seized the imagination of the founders of Western thought. But it did, and contemporary philosophers are still working out its consequences, analyzing the problems it created, and asking whether there may not be something to it after a l l . 9 Mainstream Western philosophy has not attempted to problematize its central mirror metaphor. Rather, in its attempt to perfect this metaphor, "systematic philosophy" has aspired to transcend it: The notion of the unclouded Mir ro r of Nature is the notion of a mirror which would be indistinguishable from what was mirrored, and thus would not be a mirror at a l l . The notion of a human being whose mind is such an unclouded mirror, and Who knows this, is the image . . . o f G o d . 1 0 While Rorty's work deals primarily with "systematic philosophy" and with its early twentieth century critics (the "pragmatic" philosophers, Dewey, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein), I assert that his argument about the dangers of an uncritical use of the mirror metaphor and its associated epistemology can also be applied to much of contemporary social and political theory. Indeed, many of the writers in Western philosophy and social theory who employ the term "c iv i l society" have used a mirroring construction as a representational and theoretical device. Before discussing the transfer to and use of the mirror metaphor in contemporary political and social theory two caveats must be added. First, in my discussion of these matters I do not mean to (re)privilege Philosophy as the tribunal before which al l claims in social and political theory are to finally be 8 See ib id . , 368. 9 Ibid. , 38 1 0 Ibid. , 376. 4 adjudicated. Second, it should be noted that the boundaries between philosophy, social and political theory and, indeed, "literature", have been productively blurred in the second half of the twentieth century. The utilization of mirroring constructions in contemporary social and political theory, I suggest, has two underlying bases; one involving the act of "comparison", and the other inherent in Western philosophy itself. Plotinus refers to "the copies and shadows of real things which pass in and out..." of the mirror. A mirror has no form of its own but reflects content from somewhere outside it. This reflection may be " true" or it may be distorted. I argue that "c iv i l society" is used as a mirroring device to reflect content from somewhere outside itself. Discussions of "c iv i l society" have an inherent comparative dimension where Western ideas and values are compared (usually unconsciously) with those of the non-West. " C i v i l society" acts as a mirror which reflects content about the non-West (the Other) to the West for inspection and comparison. Derrida suggests how this is often "negative" content since, in Western philosophy, the Other is appropriated though the assimilation of its negative image. Comparison is, then, inherently in the West's favour. A s the epigram quoted from Derrida at the beginning of this introduction suggests Western philosophy, when confronted by the "Other", deploys a mirroring device in the form of the appropriation of a negative image of the "Other". Derrida echoes the assertion of Levinas that "from its infancy philosophy has been struck with a horror of the other that remains other..." 1 1 and that its response to the Other is to appropriate it into the Same. Levinas calls 1 1 Emmanuel Levinas, "The Trace of the Other", in Deconstruction in Context, ed. Mark C . Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 346. 5 this the "imperialism of the same". 1 2 Hence, as Robert Young argues: In al l cases the other is neutralized as a means of encompassing it: ontology amounts to a philosophy of power, an egotism in which the relation with the other is accomplished through its assimilation into the self. 1 3 This "philosophical allergy" to the Other, 1 4 endemic in Western philosophy, is expressed in its derivative social science disciplines through the use of mirroring devices which appropriate and negate the Other. The use of such devices is facilitated by the very nature of the comparative enterprise, in that, historically the idea of comparison has frequently involved the construction of holding up a figurative mirror to Others in order to better understand and/or establish an identity for the Self. 1 5 This has been particularly true of social science disciplines which rely to a large extent on primary field research. Marcus and Fischer have analyzed the use of this technique in relation to anthropology in general and, ethnography, in particular. A s they note, those working in this genre often have " . . . a marginal or hidden agenda of Critique of their own culture . . . " 1 6 This process has been well illustrated by analyses of the colonial encounter in the Americas and Af r i ca . 1 7 Patrick Brantlinger argues that: 1 2 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity. A n Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 87. 1 3 Robert Young, White Mythologies (London: Routledge, 1990), 13, 1 4 Ibid. , 12. 1 3 Note Lacan's "mirror stage" in the construction of identity. 1 6 George E . Marcus and Michael M . J . Fischer, Anthropology A s Cultural Critique (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 111. 1 7 On the Americas, see for example, Stuart H a l l , "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power," in Formations of Modernity, ed. Stuart H a l l and Bram Gieben (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 275-320; Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (New York : Harper and Row, 1984). On Afr ica , see for example, Patrick Brantlinger, 6 Nothing points more uncannily to the processes of projection and displacement of . . . guilt for one's own savage and shadowy impulses than those moments when white man confronts white man in the depths of the jungle . . . the famous scene of "Dr Livingstone I presume?" suggests a narcissistic doubling, a repetition or mirroring. The solipsistic repression of whatever is nonself or alien characterizes al l forms of cultural and political domination. 1 8 In this manner, Brantlinger continues, " . . . the Dark Continent turned into a mirror, on one level reflecting what the Victorians wanted to see - heroic and saintly self-images - but on another, casting the ghostly shadows of guilt and regression." 1 9 The analysis of the way in which the mirror has been used figuratively as a representational and analytical device to facilitate comparison of Same and Other can be applied to the way in which the term "c iv i l society" has been deployed in Western thought. " C i v i l society", from its earliest employment by philosophers through to its contemporary usage by social scientists has been used as a comparative mirror. " C i v i l society" is a mirror that appropriatingly assimilates the Other (in the form of a negative image) in the manner discussed by Derrida and Levinas - the "imperialism of the Same". This mirror both casts light into the so-called "murky depths" of Other societies and illuminates and enhances the understanding of the identity of the society of the Same and consolidates that identity. In analyses which employ the comparative mirror, the "Other" is separated from the Same "Victorians and Africans: The Genealogy of M y t h of the Dark Continent", in "Race", Writ ing and Difference, ed. Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1986), 185-222; Jean Comarbff and John Comaroff, O f Revelation and Revolution: Christianity. Colonialism and Consciousness in South Afr ica , vo l . 1, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991) 170-197. 1 8 Brantlinger, ib id . , 215. 1 9 Ibid. , 217. 7 (Europe or the West) either temporally or spatially. 2 0 Temporal separation was employed in the analysis of ancient civilizations (e.g., Greece, Rome, Egypt) which were considered to have fallen into decline by their sixteenth - eighteenth century investigators. Spatially distinct, though temporally equivalent, societies became the frequent objects of analysis and comparison for Western philosophers and social scientists with the "Age of Exploration" (e.g., the Americas, Afr ica , Asia) . A s Fabian argues, separation and distancing through time and space are fundamental to the comparative method: There would be no raison d'etre for the comparative method i f it was not the classification of entities or traits which first have to be separate and distinct before their similarities can be used to establish taxonomies and developmental sequences.21 These practices of separation and distancing derived their ideological underpinnings and support from Enlightenment philosophy and from evolutionary theory. 2 2 A s Fabian concludes, "neither political Space nor political Time are natural resources. They are ideologically constructed instruments of power . H 2 3 Here Fabian's analysis strongly echoes that of Foucault, of whom I w i l l have a lot more to say in Part I of this thesis. While it is true that until the latter part of the nineteenth century a "comparative method" did not exist per se, historians and philosophers from the classical civilizations onward utilized comparison as an analytical tool to examine Other societies as well as to describe and critique 2 0 See Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other. H o w Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York : Columbia University Press, 1983) 27ff. 2 1 Ibid. , 26-27. 2 2 See ib id . , 27. 2 3 Ibid. , 144. 8 their own societies. Herodotus' The Histories. Montesquieu's Persian Letters and de Tocqueville's Democracy in America provide examples of three different genres (employed in three separate centuries) in which comparison as critique was employed. 2 4 Wi th the development of "social science" in the nineteenth century, social theorists also sought to establish a scientifically based "comparative method". In political science, for example, the first attempts to establish such a method were pioneered by philosophers and academics situated in nineteenth century Bri ta in . 2 5 However, it was not until the early twentieth century and the transplantation of these ideas across the Atlantic to the United States, that a "comparative method" in political science became fully fledged. Marcus and Fischer analyze how the device of cultural critique developed as an integral part of the comparative method. While cultural critique has been an element of many different genres (from literature to ethnography) and appeared in many epochs, they argue that in certain eras, cultural critique is adopted more often by social scientists. The nineteenth century, the 1920s to 1930s, and the period from the late 1960s to the present are examples of this phenomenon. Marcus and Fischer identify two general forms of cultural critique: epistemological critique of analytical reason and empirical critique of institutions, etc. 2 6 2 4 For example, in The Mir ror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writ ing of History, trans. Janet L l o y d (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), x x i i i , Francois Hartog argues that " . . . Herodotus's mirror is also held up to the Greeks themselves." Thus Herodotus provided a mirror which reflected representations about an Other (the Scythians) and at the same time reflected images about the Greeks.(See ib id . , 10-11). 2 5 For a history of the development of a comparative method in political science in nineteenth century Britain, see Stefan C o l l i n i , Donald Winch and John Burrow, That Noble Science of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 207-246. 2 6 See Marcus and Fischer, op. cit . , 114. 9 In the twentieth century, social scientists have amalgamated these two types of critique into one. In anthropology, at least, such critique has often taken the form of problematizing Western society by juxtaposing it against a non-Western Other. Sometimes the critique takes the form of "romanticizing" the Other, sometimes it works from a negative standpoint. Either way, Marcus and Fischer argue, these critiques do not take into account the problems of appropriating Otherness to a quite different location. In the nineteenth century, cultural critique was an important element in the attempts to constitute the comparative method (and social science generally) as "scientific" and secular approaches. While some aspects of nineteenth century comparative method may have been an advance on the more glaringly racist approaches of earlier research methodologies, it still relied on evolutionary premises and ideas of a "civil izing process". Many of the twentieth century attempts to employ cultural critique as part of the comparative method still retain this evolutionary character despite the inherent problem of critiquing an "advanced" society by comparison with a "less advanced" one. 2 7 A s Marcus and Fischer contend: Despite the examples drawn from other societies to critique aspects of these most modern societies, such critique remains ad hoc, fragmentary, and nostalgic; the subliminal message tends to be affirming of the basic superiority of modern European or American society. 2 8 The evolutionist approach remains an inherent aspect of much contemporary comparative research and can be seen in the use of such terms as "progress", "modern", "tradition", e t c . 2 9 In contemporary comparative analysis, one can see the way in which "c iv i l society" is 2 7 See ib id . , 128-129. 2 8 Ibid. , 129. 2 9 See ibid. 10 deployed as a figurative mirror in the study of contemporary "Other" societies, in order to not only examine a variety of changes which are perceived to be taking place in those societies, but also to throw some light on the condition of Western society itself. This illumination of the state of the West is not necessarily a conscious part o f a comparativist's research agenda but it is often a significant by-product of the comparative enterprise and provides a confirmation, at the very least, of the researcher's assumptions about the process of comparison, the canons of Western knowledge on which these are based, and the nature of "c iv i l society" i n the West. 3 0 This brief discussion of the mirror metaphor in Western philosophy, its reinscription in contemporary Western social and political theory, and o f the way in which "c iv i l society" is deployed as a mirroring construction in the study of "Other" societies, establishes the horizons within which the issues I deal with in this study emerge. Before turning to those questions, however, I need to problematize the notions of "West" and "Western" which I used in that discussion. Stuart H a l l claims that the question "where and what is 'the West '?" has been problematic at least since the fifteenth century when Columbus sailed "west" and insisted the New Wor ld he "discovered" was the mythical "East" he had been looking for. This problem of the identity o f the West, he continues, still exists today. Further, "our ideas of 'East' and 'West' have never been free of myth and fantasy, and even to this day they are not primarily ideas about place and geography." 3 1 The terms "West" and "western" are used today in a variety of senses. Although they 3 0 See ib id . , 111. Marcus and Fischer suggest that cultural critique is often a hidden or marginal agenda of ethnographers. 3 1 Stuart H a l l , "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power," in Formations of Modernity, ed. Stuart H a l l and Bram Gieben (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 276. 11 appear to refer to locations or geographies, they are also used to describe kinds of society and levels o f socio-economic development. Whi le the notion of the "West" seems to have arisen initially in relation to western Europe, its contemporary meaning is no longer restricted to Europe and today parts of Europe are not included in the "West". Hence, since the Wor ld War II era, America has been included in the "West" and Eastern Europe has been left out. In more recent times, the "West" has taken on new meanings which equate it with a type of economy (capitalist) and level of development, enabling the inclusion of countries outside Europe or North America in the "West" (such as Japan). A s Ha l l concludes, "Clearly, 'the West' is as much an idea as a fact o f geography". 3 2 Rather, " . . . 'the West' is a historical, not a geographical construct.. . 'the West' is . . . also an idea, a concept. " 3 3 H a l l contends that as a concept or idea, 'the West' has four principal functions: First, it allows us to characterize and classify societies into different categories -i.e. 'western' and 'non-western' . . . Secondly, it is an image or set of images. It condenses a number of different characteristics into one picture . . . it functions as a 'system of representation' . . . Thirdly, it provides a standard or model of comparison. It allows us to compare to what extent different societies resemble, or differ from, one another . . . It helps to explain difference . . . Fourthly, it provides criteria of evaluation against which other societies are ranked . . . it produces a certain kind of knowledge about a subject and certain attitudes towards i t . 3 4 Hal l goes on to argue that it was this comparative function of the concept of the West that lead to the evolution of ideas of Western superiority and uniqueness. Thus, he claims mat during the 3 2 Ibid. See also Raymond Wil l iams, Keywords. 2d ed. (London: Fontana, 1976), 333-334. A s Hay points out, "Europe" was also more an idea than a geographical construct, see Denys Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968). 3 3 H a l l , ib id . , 277. 3 4 Ibid. 12 Enlightenment these notions were "produced by Europe's contact and self-comparison with other, non-western, societies." Hence, "the difference of these other societies and cultures from the West was the standard against which the West's achievement was measured. It is within the context of these relationships that the idea of 'the West' took on shape and meaning". 3 3 Consequently, the concept of the West was developed as part of a process of identity formation for those in "the West"; "the West's sense of itself - its identity was formed, not only by the internal processes that gradually moulded Western European countries into a distinct type of society, but also through Europe's sense of difference from other worlds - how it came to represent itself in relation to its 'others'. 3 6 In using terms like "West" and "Western", processes of homogenization, simplification and essentialization are involved. This "makes the West appear unified and homogenous -essentially one place, with one view of other cultures , . . " 3 7 'The West' encompasses many variations over space and time both within and outside Europe, and within colonialism and imperialism beyond Europe. However, as H a l l remarks, "simplification is precisely what this discourse itself does. It represents what are in fact very differentiated (the different European cultures) as homogeneous (the West). A n d it asserts that these different cultures are united by one thing: the fact that they are al l different from .. [the non-West] . . . n 3 * Why then use terms like 'West' and 'Western'? I suggest there are two reasons for doing 3 5 Ibid. , 278. 3 6 Ibid. , 279. 3 7 Ibid. 3 8 Ibid. , 280. 13 so. First, the four functions outlined by H a l l that 'the West' as a concept performs, describe the processes involved in the constructions of difference used to present non-Western Others as mirror-images of Westerners in Western concepts of c iv i l society. However, in the first part of this study I w i l l use the terms "Europe" and "European" since, although the writers I discuss there use the "West" at times, it is clear that by this they mean (Western) Europe alone. In Part II, I use the terms "West" and "Western" to acknowledge the shift in spatial and temporal location of the authors discussed there and to recognize the broader sense in which they think of "the West". A second reason for using terms like "the West" is that, i f these terms are not used, there are problems in finding better alternatives. A s Robert Young observes, "how do you posit an alternative without simply repeating the category in question or asserting a transhitorical essence that the representation travesties?"3 9 This points to a wider problem identified by Partha Chatterjee in relation to Western social science in general. A s he puts it, it is in fact the very condition of Our intellectual discourse - in the ways it is framed through disciplinary practices in the universities and in the international academic community - that forces us to speak in the language of European philosophy . . . If we wish to do academic social philosophy, we cannot pretend to occupy an alternative subject-position merely by privileging the concepts of . . . [non-Western] philosophy. Alternative subject-positions, i f they are to emerge, must be fought for through contestations within the site of European philosophy by pushing its terms of debate beyond its own discursive boundaries. 4 0 Chatterjee uses this strategy to contest the assumption that "only by extending and enriching . . . [concepts of European social philosophy, like c iv i l society] can one encapsulate non-European 3 9 Young, op. cit . , 128. 4 0 Partha Chatterjee, " A Response to Taylor's 'Modes of C i v i l Society'", Public Culture 3, n o . l (Fall 1990), 120. 14 processes as the particulars of a universal history whose theoretical subject is, and w i l l always remain j Europe". 4 1 In this study, I also want to raise and problematize the use of concepts of c iv i l society in this manner by Western writers. There are many definitions of c iv i l society which vary over both time and space. Since there is no single accepted definition for this term and, since its meaning has changed significantly over time, I w i l l not offer a single, definitive definition here. Rather, I w i l l elucidate the different meanings o f this term within the text itself and w i l l examine the different definitions and meanings of "c iv i l society" used by each of the writers I discuss. However, on a general level, there appear to be two broad strands of meaning discernible in discussions of c iv i l society: c iv i l society defined in relation to the state and comprising forms of association distinct from the state, and c iv i l society defined in relation to notions of "civi l i ty" or "civilization". While both of these strands may be present in discussions of c iv i l society, most work tends to focus on the first strand, namely, c iv i l society as a realm of non-state associations. Although I w i l l be concerned with both strands in this study, the second strand o f meaning relating to notions of "civi l i ty" , "civilization", etc. w i l l be of particular importance. Hence, as Bryan Turner has noted, while there is a large amount of literature on the concept of c iv i l society, "the fact that it has been part of the Orientalist construct of East and West has been seriously neglected". 4 2 In this study, I intend to address this lacuna in the literature by examining Western concepts of c iv i l society and establishing the ways in which 4 1 Ibid. 4 2 Bryan S. Turner, "Orientalism and the Problem of C i v i l Society in Islam," in Orientalism, Islam and Islamists, ed. Asaf Hussain, Robert Olson, Jamil Qureshi (Battleboro: Amana Books, 1984), 39. 15 these concepts are constructed through the deployment of a mirroring construction of non-Western Others. In so doing, I w i l l not be following what Said calls an "encyclopedic narrative" approach. 4 3 The literature on Western concepts of c iv i l society is vast and it would be impossible within this project to consider al l of it. Nor , would this be a productive approach since most works in the "encyclopedic narrative" genre tend toward descriptive narrative rather than analysis. Instead, I w i l l try to make a more selective and strategic contribution. In so doing, however, I am aware that I am writing from within the Western political imaginary, that my own view is highly partial, and that my view is neither the only view nor a privileged one. Before describing the structure of the thesis, I w i l l outline one additional caveat. I do not deal with "theory" in a separate (initial) chapter as most studies of this kind would do, since I do not see theory as separate from, or as something that stands over (or looms over) the text. Instead, theory is woven into the text throughout this study and put to work there. Structurally, the thesis is divided into three parts. In Part I, I examine the work of three authors (Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel) who wrote during the Enlightenment or in its aftermath on c iv i l society. I begin my analysis here because I suggest that both constructions of the concept o f c iv i l society and of non-Western Others were undergoing significant changes in this period leading eventually to a concept of c iv i l society which took account of modern life and of what might be termed a "post-Enlightenment geographical imagination". I move on in Part II to examine the work of three late twentieth-century social scientists (Shils, Gellner and Fukuyama), how they conceptualize c iv i l society, and how they deploy mirroring constructions of non-Western Others. Further, I discuss continuities and disjunctures 4 3 See Edward Said, Orientalism (New York : Vintage Books, 1979). 16 between these two groups of theorists to elucidate how twentieth-century work on c iv i l society has been informed by the concept of c iv i l society developed in the Enlightenment and its aftermath and how it has been informed by the post-Enlightenment geographical imagination in its construction of non-Western Others. In Part III, I discuss broad issues of comparison and representation in order to illuminate, the works examined in Parts I and II. Each Part is further subdivided into chapters. Part I consists of four chapters. In Chapter One, I establish a theoretical framework for the first Part of the thesis and provide a sketch of the eighteenth-century context in which the concept of c iv i l society began to be constructed as distinct from the state. I canvass methodological questions concerning how to establish a starting point or point of departure for a study of this kind and theoretical approaches within which to enframe my project. Discussion of the eighteenth-century context focuses upon changes occurring in the social> economic and political spheres and on changes in European views of, and relationships to, non-European peoples. In Chapter Two, I outline the concept of c iv i l society, the construction of alterity and the mirroring construction of non-European Others, in the seventeenth-century as a point of contrast with the way in which these matters are constructed by the theorists discussed in Chapters Three and Four. In Chapters Three and Four, I examine the work of Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel, their concepts of c iv i l society and mirroring constructions of non-European Others, how they each contributed to the eventual conceptual separation of c iv i l society from die state, and their contributions to the post-Enlightenment geographical imagination. Part II is divided into two chapters. In Chapter Five , I continue to use the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter One and add a further theoretical dimension in order to examine 17 the continuities and points of disjuncture in ideas brought about by temporal and spatial displacements such as those between the theorists examined in Parts I and II of this study. This is provided through a critical interrogation o f Edward Said's notion of "travelling theory". This enables analysis of how, and with what effects, ideas or theories move across time and space. To this end, I provide a critical exegesis of Hegel's legacy for Western social and political theory which then is examined in relation to the work of three twentieth-century theorists in the next chapter. In Chapter Six, I outline the theories of c iv i l society and constructions of non-Western Others of Shils, Gellner and Fukuyama and discuss how their work is informed by the post-Enlightenment geographical imagination and concept of c iv i l society. Points of continuity and disjuncture between the writers in Parts I and II are considered under two broad headings - the use of a universal historical narrative and the construction of a complementary opposite or Other. Part III consists of one chapter. In chapter Seven, I examine the wider context within which discussion in Parts I and II occurs and consider notions of Comparison and the representational practices they authorize. In addition, I analyze how conceptions of alterity in Western philosophy are connected to ideas of comparison and how the concept of translation is imbricated in questions of comparison and comparative method. In the Conclusion, I draw together the strands of analysis running through the thesis, outline the findings of the study, and identify further matters for future investigation. P A R T I E U R O P E ' S O T H E R S : N A T I V E S I N T H E L O O K I N G G L A S S 19 C H A P T E R O N E T H E H I S T O R Y O F C O N C E P T S The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe's greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience. Yet none of this Orient is merely imaginative. The Orient is an integral part o f European material civilization. Edward W . Said, Orientalism. They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented. K a r l Marx , The Eighteenth Brumajre of Louis Bonaparte. Introduction In this chapter my task is to establish a theoretical framework for Part I of the thesis and to provide a broad account of the eighteenth-century context in which the concept of c iv i l society began to be constructed as separate from the state. The chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section I review Edward Said's discussion of the methodological question of "beginnings" and the issues that arise regarding how to establish a starting point or point of departure in a project such as mine. In the second section I examine Georges Canguilhem's history of concepts approach and Miche l Foucault's archaeological method and adopt them as a theoretical framework for this study. In the third section I outline briefly the eighteenth-century context in which a new concept of c iv i l society was beginning to be constructed and highlight the significant changes that were taking place in the economic, social and political spheres. In the fourth and final section of the chapter, I continue my examination of the eighteenth-century context through a brief discussion of the changes in European views of, and relationships to, 20 non-European peoples. In particular, I spotlight the impact of the Pacific voyages on those attitudes and relationships along with changes taking place in representational practices and theories of knowledge. Wi th a theoretical framework and a backdrop o f the eighteenth-century context in place, I then move in Chapter Two to outline the concept of c iv i l society, the figuring of difference and the mirroring construction of the non-European Other in the seventeenth century. In Chapters Three and Four I show how these differ from, and form a point of disjuncture with, the concept of c iv i l society and the figuration of difference developing from the eighteenth century as evidenced in the work o f Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel. Beginnings In the introduction to Orientalism, Edward Said discusses the significance of establishing a starting point for projects in the human sciences. He suggests that "...there is no such thing as a merely given, or simply available, starting point: beginnings have to be made for each project in such a way as to enable what follows from them." 1 Establishing a beginning involves carving out from the full volume of available material something that can be " . . .separated from the mass, and made to stand for, as well as be, a starting point, a oeginning..." 2 In a project such as the study of Orientalism, Said continues, one is faced with the additional problem of deciding which "texts, authors, and periods" are appropriate for the work at hand. 3 I should make it clear that my citation of Said here is not intended to privilege him or to 1 Edward Said, Orientalism (New Y o r k : Vintage Books, 1979), 16. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 21 ignore critical approaches to the question of "origins". Nor , do I intend to conflate critiques of "origins" with the discussion o f "beginnings" which Said puts forward, since they deal with somewhat different concerns. For example, both Foucault and Derrida have problematized the notion of an "Origin". Foucault examines "the retreat and return o f the origin" as an element of the analytic of finitude (man's finite limitations). He states that "it is always against a background of the already begun that man is able to reflect on what may serve for him as or igin ." 4 M a n is " . . . 'always already' in die world, in language, in society, and in nature." 5 But this retreat from the origin is not insurmountable. The origin is recuperated through the notion t h a t m a n always already has a history precisely insofar as his social practices enable him to organize al l events, including events in his own culture, historically." 6 However, although the origin is recuperated in this manner, it retreats again as man is unable to "reflect on what these practices are precisely because they are too near to h im and thus too encompassing." 7 Hence, "the origin or basis o f man's history cannot be some empirical event in the past which is its beginning, nor an empty temporal field, nor an 'original ' event . . . " 8 Derrida is also suspicious o f the search for an origin and presents a "critique of the classical concept of origin as a point of presence and simplicity to which reflection tries to return 4 Miche l Foucault, The Order of Things (New York : Vintage Books, 1973), 330. 3 Hubert L . Dreyfus and Paul RabinOw, Miche l Foupault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermenentics. 2d ed., (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1983), 38. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. , 39. • I b i d . , 40. 22 as to an ultimate ground from which eveiything else can be deduced . Ins tead , Derrida seeks to pluralize the origin by showing that "the origin is characterized by a certain heterogeneity. " 1 0 Hence, both Foucault's and Derrida's critiques of origins are somewhat different projects from Said's. They are concerned with theoretical, epistemological questions while Said's discussion of beginnings deals instead with methodological questions and "the methodological importance for work i n the human sciences o f finding and formulating a first step, a point of departure, a beginning principle. ' ' 1 1 So^ rather than searching for the origin of the concept o f c iv i l society or the origin of the use o f mirroring constructions o f non-Western Others, my intent here is merely to raise the methodological question of where to begin my project. Fo r me, Said provides a useful discussion of the issues which arise in relation to establishing a beginning and selecting texts for scrutiny. So, where to begin? For this first part of the thesis, I have selected for analysis three authors (Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel) who wrote about c iv i l society during the Enlightenment or its immediate aftermath. These choices may appear to be somewhat arbitrary. However they are intended to enable die analysis that follows, in mat, when examined more closely within the same frame, they illuminate the way in which the Other was constructed during the Enlightenment and its aftermath (a mirrored construction) and the relationship of this figuring of difference to the way i n which c i v i l society was being reconstructed in this period. The Enlightenment was also the time when the features of the comparative method (and social 9 Rodolphe Gaschd, The Tain o f the Mi r ro r : Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1986), 180. 1 0 Ibid. I discuss Derrida's critique o f origins in relation to Hegel in Chapter Seven, infra. 1 1 Said, op. cit . , 15. 23 science generally) were being significantly developed. Consequently, the texts I have selected are meant to be exemplary, i .e. , "made to stand for" what was happening generally in relation to my objects of examination in this period. However, the arguments for adopting such an approach need some elaboration both in respect o f the method adopted and as to why I begin my analysis with the Enlightenment. Said suggests some initial guidelines as to method in relation to his own work which I think are helpful to raise and follow here. In establishing the parameters o f his study of Orientalism, Said rejects what he calls the "encyclopedic narrative" approach to the topic since material for such an approach would be unlimited and because others have already created encyclopedic works on the topic. This then, as Said points out, provides the would be critic with a different task. 1 2 That said, however, one is still confronted with the daunting task o f delimiting the copious body of potential material to a practical and workable size. Then comes the task of "...outiining something in the nature of an intellectual order within that group of texts without at the same time following a mindlessly chronological order." 1 3 M u c h of the contemporary work oh c iv i l society adopts, at least in part, the "encyclopedic narrative" approach and attempts to give the reader an account o f the uses of the term "c iv i l society" from the Greek polis to contemporary Eastern Europe. Whi le this approach seeks to outiine the broad changes in meaning of the term throughout its history and illustrates these by reference to exemplary texts, it often does not lend itself to much specific critical reflection on the concept itself. Rather, it tends to a descriptive narrative. The critical reflection 1 2 See ibid . 1 3 Ibid. 24 that does occur tends to be pitched at a high level of generality, attributing the same rationale for the concept o f c i v i l society in each historical period, e.g., opposition to the state.14 This is, for example, why Charles Taylor is critical o f any work on c iv i l society "which identifies it simply with the existence of autonomous associations free from state tutelage" since "it fails to do justice to the historical concept" which has many more varied and complex dimensions than mere opposition to the state.15 Similarly, this type o f analysis usually does not address fully the question of whether the concept is identical in each epoch and whether one is analyzing the same thing merely because it is called "c iv i l society". For example, on the one hand, the term c iv i l society has been used both in the sense of being coterminous with political society (i .e. , the state) and with being separate from it. On the other hand, several authors have constructed concepts o f c iv i l society in the same way but have used different names for it. For these reasons, then, and since there are already more than enough encyclopedic works available, writing another would contribute little, i f anything, to academic discourse. I, therefore, intend to adopt a different approach to the analysis of c iv i l society as a mirroring device and hence a different critical task. Once the encyclopedic narrative approach is rejected the assignment, as Said counsels, is to delimit an ensemble of texts for examination and to establish an intellectual order among them which is not unreflexively chronological. In his study of Orientalism, Said emphasizes the importance of analyzing the "authority" of Orientalism, in particular, what he calls a "strategic 1 4 For example, see John Keane, "Despotism and Democracy: The Origins and Development o f the Distinction Between C i v i l Society and the State 1750-1850," in C i v i l Society and the State, ed. John Keane (London: Verso, 1988), 35-71. 1 5 See Charles Taylor, "Modes of C i v i l Society," Public Culture 3, n o . l (Fall 1990), 111. 25 formation"; which is " . . . the relationship between texts and the way in which groups o f texts, even textual genres, acquire mass, density, and referential power among themselves and thereafter in the [Western] culture at large." 1 6 The analysis of such formations is not undertaken to find deep meanings in the texts themselves but is, rather, premised on the idea of the exteriority of the text to what it narrates. In this manner, the Oriental is t" . . . makes the Orient speak, describes the Orient, renders its mysteries plain for and to the West." 1 7 The exteriority of texts creates "representation"; the text does not render a "true" portrait o f its object but rather a re-presentation o f it. In so doing, " . . . these representations rely upon institutions, traditions, conventions, agreed-upon codes of understanding for their effects . . . n 1 8 This, and other notions of "representation" are critical to an understanding of how the concept of c iv i l society is deployed as a mirroring device (which is why I devote a whole chapter to "representation" and "comparison" later in the present work). The idea of a strategic formation, as outlined by Said, appears to bear some resemblance to Foucault's concept of a discursive formation and his approach to analysis might appear somewhat similar to Foucault's archaeological method. The relationship between Said and Foucault is both complex and contentious. Although Said, at the outset of Orientalism, notes his intellectual debt to Foucault for the notion of discourse (part of the archaeological method), he does not make uncritical use of it. Said is eager to distinguish himself from Foucault because he considers that Foucault disregards the influence o f particular writers or texts in favour of "the 1 6 Said, op. cit . , 20. 1 7 Ibid. , 20-21. 1 8 Ibid. , 22. 26 otherwise anonymous collective body of texts constituting a discursive formation like Orientalism". 1 9 Instead, Said advocates a careful analysis of writers and texts to establish the relationship between them and the overall formation. 2 0 Or , as Gary Gutting puts it, "Archaeology is an important alternative to standard history of ideas, with its emphasis on the theorizing of individual thinkers and concern with their influence on one another."2 1 However, Said's distinction is somewhat overstated as Foucault does examine specific texts when employing the archaeological method and relates them to the relevant episteme. For example, in The Order of Things, he discusses Descartes' Rules For the Direction o f the M i n d which he considers first expresses the new way of thinking of the Classical Age. In addition, Said's critics also find it difficult to reconcile his recuperation o f liberal humanist values with his invocation of Foucault's antihumanism. 2 2 Said is also uncomfortable with other aspects of Foucault's work. In later works, he is more critical of Foucault's analysis of power, especially its use outside the French context in which it was developed, which Said claims leads Foucault to draw universal conclusions on the basis of only French examples, and its conceptual expansion, which sees 'power '" . . . swallowing up every obstacle in its path (resistance to it, the class and economic bases that refresh and fuel it, the reserves it builds up)." Said views these both as instances of theory that " . . . travels too 1 9 Ibid., 23. 2 0 See ib id . , 23-24. 2 1 Gary Gutting, "Introduction. Miche l Foucault: A User's Manual" in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 9. 2 2 See Derek Gregory, Geographical Imaginations (Oxford, Blackwell , 1994), 177. 27 far." 2 3 In another register, however, Said criticises Foucault for being too limited in his work. He argues that FoucauJt's "Eurocentrism was almost total, as i f history itself took place only among a group of French and German thinkers." 2 4 In addition, Said contends, Foucault did not take account of the imperial project: "He seems unaware o f the extent to which the ideas of discourse and discipline are assertively European and how . . . discipline was used also to administer, study, and reconstruct - then subsequently to occupy, rule, and exploit - almost die whole o f the non-European wor ld . " 2 5 However, Said has also been critiqued for his use of Foucault's notion of discourse. To this end, L isa Lowe has criticized Said for " . . . totalizing orientalism as a monolithic, developmental discourse that uniformly constructs the Orient as the Other of the Occident." 2 6 In contrast, she claims, "Foucault emphasizes that neither the conditions of discursive formation nor tiie objects of knowledge are identical, static, or continuous through time. In this way he seeks to avoid some of the overdetermining idealities of traditional historical study, with its desire for origins, unified developments, and causes and effects. n 2 7 Consequently, while Said employs some of Foucault's concepts (like discourse) in his 2 3 Edward W . Said, "Traveling Theory, m> chap, in The Wor ld , the Text, and the Critic (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1983), 245. 2 4 Edward W . Said, "Miche l Foucault, 1926-1984," in After Foucault. ed. Jonathan Arac (New Brunswick, U S A : Rutgers University Press, 1988), 9-10. 2 5 Edward W . Said, "Criticism Between Culture and System," chap, in The Wor ld . The Text, and the Cri t ic , op. cit . , 222. 2 6 L isa Lowe, Crit ical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 4. 2 7 Ibid., 6. 28 work, this is done neither uncritically nor unprobiematically. Foucault's archaeological method is, I think, different in emphasis from Said's analysis of strategic formations and requires some further explanation since it is to Foucault's archaeological method and to its antecedent, Canguilhem's "history of concepts", that I look for an alternative approach to an analysis o f the concept of c iv i l society in the Enlightenment and its aftermath. The History of Concepts and the Archaeological Method A large proportion of Foucault's work may be classified under the rubric of the "history of concepts", an approach to the history of science developed by Georges Canguilhem. Indeed, Gary Gutting argues that Foucault's archaeological method may be understood as an expansion and reworking of Canguilhem's approach. 2 8 The archaeological method is one of the tools Foucault developed to enable him to undertake what he came to call "histories of the present", which involve his attempt "to use an understanding of the past to understand something that is intolerable in the present. n 2 9 Archaeological analysis also plays a role in the genealogical method Foucault subsequently developed as another means to tackle histories of the present. Foucault's two principal works concerning the archaeological method are The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Order of Things: A n Archaeology of the Human Sciences. It is to these two works that Gutting primarily refers in constructing his account of Foucault's 2 8 See Gary Gutting, Miche l Foucault's Archaeology o f Scientific Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 54. Canguilhem taught Foucault at the Ecole Normale Superieure and supervised his doctoral thesis: see ib id . , 53-54- M y discussion of Foucault's archaeology and its relationship to Canguilhem's history of concepts follows Gutting's account in the above work and in the "Introduction" to The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. op. cit. ^ G u t t i n g , "Introduction . . . " , op. cit . , 10. 29 method. While Foucault's archaeological method may appear to be confined to these works and his later work to signal a departure therefrom, Gutting contends that his archaeology underwrites a much more extensive and comprehensive project; genealogy. The genealogical method continues to use archaeology since "archaeology remains needed to describe the fields of practice (both discursive and nondiscursive) in which genealogical causes operate . . . [they] . . . are complementary instruments towards Foucault's goal of uncovering the controlling structures that operate below the level of human subjectivity." 3 0 To begin to understand what Canguilhem meant by a history o f concepts it is useful to contrast his approach with those of the history of terms, o f phenomena and o f theories. The history of terms focuses on correspondence in the terms utilized by scientists i n different epochs and bypasses the need for the critical interrogation of whether they actually perceived the subject matter in the same way. The history of phenomena seeks to uncover who first discovered a particular phenomenon but ignores the more important question of how mat discovery was interpreted.3 1 However, it is in contrast to the history o f theories that the history of concepts becomes most clearly delineated. To grasp the essence of Canguilhem's approach, Gutting proposes that, in contradistinction to Anglo-American approaches to the history of science, it is necessary to draw a contrast between theory and interpretation. The Anglo-American approach " . . . assumes that the interpretation o f data is a matter of reading them in terms of a theory; that is, in terms of a 3 0 Gary Gutting, "Foucault's Genealogical Method," Midwest Studies in Philosophy X V (1990), 342-343. 3 1 See Gutting, Miche l Foucault's Archaeology, op. cit . , 32-33. 30 set of scientific generalizations put forward to explain the phenomena under investigation. Interpretation is held to derive from theoretical commitments. " n Canguilhem, on the other hand, sees it as crucial to detach " . . . the concepts that interpret data from the theories that explain them. " 3 3 Once this is done, then: A concept provides us with the initial understanding of a phenomenon that allows us to formulate in a scientifically useful way the question o f how to explain it. Theories provide a variety o f (often competing) ways of answering the explanatory question. 3 4 The same concept may be explained by several different theories; this is what Canguilhem describes as concepts being "theoretically polyvalent". Canguilhem can, therefore, compose histories which trace the generation and metamorphosis o f concepts which work on a separate and more basic plane than histories of the evolution o f theories. 3 5 One major advantage o f this approach is that it removes the need to discover the "precursors" of important scientific advances. Canguilhem contends that the identification of a precursor is often rooted in the inability to appreciate basic conceptual distinctions which subtend explanations which cosmetically appear to be al ike. 3 6 A s Canguilhem observes, except where it has been: . . . explicitly established that two researchers are asking the same question and have the same research goal, that their guiding concepts have the same signification and draw their meaning from the same system of concepts it is 3 2 Ibid. , 33. 3 3 Ibid. , 34. 3 4 Ibid. , 34. 3 5 See ibid. 3 6 See ib id . , 39. 31 artificial, arbitrary, and inadequate . . . to say that two scientific authors stand in a logical relation o f beginning to completion or of anticipation to realization. 3 7 However, Canguilhem does not discount the effect prior works may have on their successors. His approach stresses the importance of acknowledging the existence of continuities as wel l as points of disjuncture when writing histories of science. 3 8 A s Gutting argues, Foucault's archaeological method draws upon Canguilhem's history of concepts and Foucault follows his accentuation of concepts rather than theories and stresses the futility of the search for "precursors". However, he did not simply mechanically copy Canguilhem's approach but, instead, reworked and expanded it to suit his own purposes. 3 9 While Canguilhem's analysis is concerned for the most part with medicine and biology, Foucault applies the history of concepts to the social sciences. Further, Canguilhem sees concepts as coinciding with disciplines and therefore their history is inscribed within the pertinent discipline. However, in The Order of Things. Foucault expands the use of the history of concepts from disciplines to an interdisciplinary focus. This enables him to show conceptual similarities across different disciplines in the same historical era. 4 0 In addition, he argues that underlying concepts such as representation, resemblance and man, which are the "conditions o f possibility" for conceiving first-order concepts, infuse every discipline in a particular epoch. First-order concepts are the concepts employed by those working in specific disciplines, e.g., the reflex was a first-order concept used by biologists. Hence, Foucault shows how first-order concepts are rooted in 3 7 Quoted ibid . 3 8 See ib id . , 40. 3 9 See ib id . , 54. 4 0 See Gutting, "Introduction . . . " , op. cit . , 9. 32 more universal formulations of representation.4 1 This, in turn, directs him to the idea of "an episteme as the system of concepts that defines knowledge for a given intellectual era." 4 2 A n episteme may be defined as "a conceptual grid that provides conceptions of order, sign and language that allow a series of discursive practices to qualify as 'knowledge'". 4 3 Each episteme is characterized by a particular manner of thinking which differs from both prior and future systems of thought and, thus, signifies a decisive point of rupture. Whi le other approaches to the history of ideas attempt to find precursors, the notion of epistemes opposes this. 4 4 Many of Foucault's critics find the idea of epistemes to be totalizing and to imply a trans-discursive coherence. While it is true that Foucault tends to overstate the scope and coherence of epistemes (e.g., "in any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge . . . M 4 5 ) , this does not mean that his work can simply be dismissed or rejected. Rather, as Gutting observes, "the value of sweeping historical constructions such as Foucault's is precisely as sources of fruitful suggestions rather than as ultimately accurate generalizations.M 4 6 Like Gutting, I find Foucault's archaeological work helpful for "its ability to stimulate a fruitful 4 1 See Gutting, Miche l Foucault's Archaeology, op. cit . , 219. 4 2 Gutting, "Introduction . . . " , 9 . 4 3 Gregory, op. cit . , 21. 4 4 See Gutting, Miche l Foucault's Archaeology, op. cit . , 176-179. 4 5 Foucault, The Order of Things, op. cit . , 168. 4 6 Gutting, Miche l Foucault's Archaeology, op. cit . , 179. 33 process of criticism and reconstruction," 4 7 rather than for its overstated universal claims concerning epistemes. Foucault's expansion of the history of concepts shifts it to a new plane which does not compel the definition of a discipline on its own level. His archaeological approach enables the analysis of the "intellectual subconscious" of disciplines. Rather than focusing on the ideas of particular authors and their interrelationship, archaeology emphasizes that particular works evolve in a universe organized and regulated by rules. Cognitively mapping the dimensions of this universe is the task of archaeology. 4 8 Hence, archaeology is " . . . concerned only with the conceptual structures subtending rea l i ty" 4 9 Gutting, following Foucault, suggests that "the history of concepts is most appropriate for disciplines well past the 'threshold of scientificity' and so is particularly prominent in . . . [Foucault's] . . . treatment of the social sciences and their predecessors."5 0 Nevertheless, archaeology should not be seen as a total replacement for other historical methods. Rather, Gutting advises that it should be viewed as a "corrective" to the more common approaches to historiography: its strength is " . . . what it finds in the conceptual structures that lie beneath and outside the consciousness of individual subjects. " 5 1 When talking about the purpose of his work, in a 1976 interview, Foucault stated that his 4 7 Ibid. 4 8 See Gutting, "Introduction . . . " , 9-10. 4 9 Ibid., 12. 5 0 Ibid. , 13. The quotation is from Miche l Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A . M . Sheridan Smith (New York : Pantheon Books, 1972), 187. 5 1 Ibid. , 14. 34 books " . . . function as invitations, as public gestures, for those who may want eventually to do the same thing, or something like it, or, in any case, who intend to slip into this kind of experience. " 5 2 In the spirit o f this invitation, I want to try to write a history of the concept of c iv i l society in the Enlightenment and its aftermath and provide an archaeological analysis of the "conditions of possibility" for conceiving the concept in this period. Polyvalence , the Enlightenment, and C i v i l Society C i v i l society is "theoretically polyvalent" in the sense that Canguilhem uses this phrase: writers may produce different theories to account for the same concept. A history of concepts avoids the need to search for "precursors" for the way in which the concept was constructed in this period. Hence, it avoids the danger of comparing concepts which appear to be cosmetically similar but which are, in fact, conceptually distinct. In other words, it is important to be clear that one is dealing with the same concept and only different explanatory theories for it. This approach also avoids the problem of mistaking the disagreements between theorists, who propose different theories to explain the same concept, for fundamental conceptual shifts. 5 3 Foucault cautions against these dangers when he questions the contemporary adoption of the term "c iv i l society" to explain events in the late twentieth century: Although this opposition between c iv i l society and the state may quite righdy have 5 2 Miche l Foucault, Remarks on Marx (New York : Semiotext(e), 1991) 40. 3 3 For example, in The Order of Things. Foucault considers the disputes between the Physiocrats and the Ulitilitarians about the nature of wealth occurred within a common framework of thinking about wealth rather than being the sharp disjuncture in thought that traditional historical works would suggest: see Gutting, Miche l Foucault's Archaeology, op. cit. , 170-172. 35 been greatly used in the late eighteenth and in the nineteenth century, I 'm not at al l sure that it is still operational. . . In fact, the notion of an opposition between c iv i l society and state was formulated in a given context and with a particular intention: liberal economists proposed it in the late eighteenth century with a view to limiting the state's sphere of action, c iv i l society being conceived as the locus of an autonomous economic process. It was a quasi-polemical concept, opposed to the administrative power o f the states at the time, in order to bring victory to a certain liberalism. 5 4 A s Foucault points out, the development of the concept of c iv i l society as separate from the state arose in a specific context; eighteenth-century Europe. In order to argue this new concept of c iv i l society (expressed from anticipation to realization in the work of Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel) began to develop in the eighteenth century and that this represented a significant break or rupture with earlier formulations it is helpful to briefly consider the broader context in which this conceptual shift was taking place. There has been much debate from the eighteenth century onward about how best to define the Enlightenment. Dorinda Outram notes that until recentiy, historians tended to speak of the Enlightenment, seeing it as single entity expressed in the alleged homogeneity of ideas of selected canonical authors (i.e., white, European males). Historians such as Ernst Cassirer and Peter Gay followed this approach in their works on the Enlightenment. However, in the last twenty years or so, a new approach to the question of defining the Enlightenment has emerged. This involves 5 4 Miche l Foucault, "Social Security," interview by Robert Bono, Miche l Foucault. Politics Philosophy Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984. ed. Lawrence D . Kritzman (New York : Routledge, 1990), 167 ; K a r l Marx makes a similar point about the eighteenth century economic context of c iv i l society in The German Ideology where he states that "The term ' c i v i l society'[burgerliche Gesellschaft] emerged in the eighteenth century, when property relations had extricated themselves from the ancient and medieval communal society. C i v i l society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie . . . " (Karl Marx , The German Ideology, in The Marx-Engels Reader. 2d ed., ed. Robert C . Tucker (New York : W . W . Norton and C o . , 1978), 163). The importance of political economy and the bourgeoisie to Hegel's concept of c iv i l society is discussed in Chapter Four, infra. 36 seeing " . . . the Enlightenment as a series of debates, which necessarily took different shapes and forms in particular national and cultural contexts . . . " 5 5 Porter and Teich's edited volume, The Enlightenment in National Context, for example, follows this approach. 5 6 Outram considers viewing the Enlightenment as a series of debates to be a better approach than seeing it as a homogeneous, monolithic entity. This is because it enables a more nuanced discussion of the Enlightenment which takes into consideration differences between national contexts. She approaches " . . . the Enlightenment as a series of problems and debates, of 'flash-points', characteristic of the eighteenth century, or of 'pockets' where projects of intellectual expansion impacted upon and changed the nature of developments in society and government on a world-wide basis. 1 , 5 7 Thus the Enlightenment is seen as a succession of discussions which varied in content and casting in different geographic and cultural locations. 5 8 In this manner, the Enlightenment may be surveyed most usefully as: . . . a capsule containing sets of debates, stresses and concerns, which however differendy formulated or responded to, do appear to be characteristic of the way in which ideas, opinions and social and political stractures interacted and changed in the eighteenth century. 5 9 This approach w i l l be followed here so as to highlight some of the issues and concerns raised in this period which are relevant to the way in which the concept of c iv i l society was constructed 5 5 Dorinda Outram, The Enlightenment (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3. 5 6 See Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich, The Enlightenment in National Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 5 7 Outram, op. cit, 3. 5 8 See ibid. 5 9 Ibid. , 12. 37 and in which alterity was cast by Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel. In the eighteenth century Europe underwent profound political and social change. 6 0 The population increased markedly, urbanization escalated and communications networks expanded. It was also a period of significant economic change both in terms of the size, nature and complexity of the economy. Europe experienced the onset of large-scale industrialization with mechanized production in factories instead Of small-scale production by craftsmen. The establishment of a division of labour in factory production facilitated increased production of cheaper consumer goods which in turn led to increased profits. Such fundamental economic change was concomitant with a recasting o f social and political relationships " . . . between social classes . . . between states and societies, monarchies and social classes". 6 1 Indeed, the whole concept of "society" was undergoing a profound shift in meaning in the eighteenth century because of the type of social transformation outlined above. This can be seen clearly i f one looks at the etymology of the term "society". In Keywords, Raymond Wil l iams outlines the history of the concept of "society" in European thought.6 2 He argues that "society" today has two principal meanings: "as our most general term for the body of instittitions and relationships within which a relatively large group 6 0 The examination of these changes which follows is based on Outram's account, ib id . , 15-17. 6 1 Ibid. , 30. 6 2 Raymond Wil l iams, Keywords. A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (Glasgow: Fontana, 1976), 243-247. For a discussion of the German distinction between "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesellschaft" (or "community" and "society" or "contractual association") advanced by German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies in 1887, see Christopher Lasch, The True and Only Heaven: Progress and its Critics (New Y o r k : W . W . Norton and Company, 1991), 139-143. On "society" and "community," see also R . G . Coll ingwood, The New Leviathan: Or M a n . Society, Civi l izat ion and Barbarism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942). 38 of people l ive; and as our most abstract term for the condition in which such institutions and relationships are formed." 6 3 "Society" is derived from the Latin root, socius (companion). Its initial meanings were confined to ideas of companionship, fellowship, and association. The general sense of "society" developed from the mid-sixteenth century. Wil l iams asserts that the passage to the modern idea of "abstract and more impersonal laws which determine social institutions" may be illustrated best by juxtaposing "society" to the "state".64 He contends that until the eighteenth century, "state" and "society" were not always clearly, separately, well-defined, but that what developed: . . . was eventually a distinction between society and state: the former an association of free men ( s i c ) , drawing on the early active senses; the latter an organization of power drawing on the senses of hierarchy and majesty. The crucial notion of c iv i l society . . . was an alternative definition of social order, and it was in thinking through the general questions of this new order that society was confirmed in its most general and eventually abstract senses.65 The definitive shift in meaning thus occurred in the eighteenth century. Will iams illustrates this by examining Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) where "society" is used to mean "system of common life" more than four times as often than as to mean "company of his fellows". 6 6 The profound alterations that were occurring in the nature of society, and in particular the uneasiness with which changes in class relations were greeted, can be seen clearly i n Montesquieu's works, Persian Letters and The Spirit of the Laws, where he is especially 6 5 Wil l iams, ib id . , 243. 6 4 Ibid., 244-245. 6 5 Ibid. , 245. 6 6 See ib id . , 245. 39 concerned with the role o f the nobility in the face of the rise of a bourgeois class. The bourgeois or burgher was also of particular interest to Hegel in the construction of his theory of c iv i l society. These economic and social transformations also were concomitant with changes occurring in political arrangements in the eighteenth century. Foucault traced the effects on the century's political arrangements in his lectures on "governmentality". 6 7 Col in Gordon asserts that while classical philosophy focuses on questions of obedience and sovereignty in trying to establish the theoretical underpinnings of the 'best' government, "governmentality" is concerned with questions of how to govern which are conditioned by "immanent conditions and constraints of practices." 6 8 Foucault does not think these classical political questions are unimportant but, rather, that they do not help to establish how power is really deployed in a system of government. 6 9 He centres his analysis on 'modern governmental rationalities' and commences his investigation in the sixteenth century with the evolution of ideas of raison d'etat which signify the beginning of 'modern governmentality' " . . . as an autonomous rationality." 7 0 A s Gordon contends, reason of state means that "tp know how to govern, one 6 7 The account that follows is drawn primarily from Col in Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: A n Introduction" and Graham Burchell , "Peculiar Interests: C i v i l Society and Governing 'the System of Natural Liberty '" in The Foucault Effect, ed. Graham Burchell, Co l in Gordon and Peter M i l l e r (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 1-51 and 119-150.1 have relied on these works rather than on Foucault directly since most of Foucault's work on 'govemmentality' is in the form of untranslated or unpublished lectures. Although, some of his lectures have recently been published in French, they are still unavailable in English: see Miche l Foucault, Pi ts et Ecrits: 1954-1988. 4 vols. (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1994). 6 8 Gordon, ib id . , 7. 6 9 See ibid. Ibid. , 9. 40 must know the state and the secret springs of its interests ... " 7 1 For Foucault, the object o f reason of state is the state (not a ruler) and "government in accordance with the state's strength". 7 2 This is opposed to the Machiavellian approach which focused on the more limited task of perpetuating a ruler's sovereignty. The Machiavellian approach was transcended by the development in Germany of Cameralism or the 'science of police' (which today would probably be called "public administration") with its aim of increasing 'the state's strength'. Police science endeavoured to collect as much knowledge as possible concerning the government of the state. This hinged on the study of the 'population' which was considered the basis of the state's strength.7 3 Cameralism involved incessant and minutely figured control of the population and meant that it was difficult to distinguish between the state and the 'whole body of society'. This was the case in particular in respect of the economy since police science was: . . . in conjunction with the allied knowledge of mercantilism and political arithmetic, the first modern system of economic sovereignty, of government understood as an economy. The economy emerges here . . . as a specific, but not yet (as for liberalism) an autonomous form of rationality. The economy of a functioning whole is a machine which has to be continuously made, and not merely operated, by government. This governmental theme of economy retains here from the ancient context of the oikos al l its implications of possession, domestication and controlling action. 7 4 In police science, government not only regulated the economy but produced the space in which economic relations took place. A s Foucault argues, Cameralism was a government ' o f al l and 7 1 Ibid. 7 2 Foucault, quoted ibid. 7 3 See ib id . , 10. 7 4 Ibid. , 11. 41 of each'; the state was concerned with individuals and their welfare as productive units which contribute to the state's strength.7 5 To effect this type of government the state regulated, ordered, and controlled most aspects of life. This kind of governmental rationality was expressed in Hobbes' dictum that "Man is not fitted for society by nature, but by discipline." 7 6 The level of state intervention was reflected in the lack of a clear distinction between c iv i l society and the state. Foucault identifies a major shift in governmentality during the eighteenth century with the advent of liberalism. A pivotal work in this process is Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations. 7 7 Foucault discusses Smith's contribution to this shift in The Order of Things. He contends that: In relation to that of his predecessors, Adam Smith's analysis represents an essential hiatus: it distinguishes between the reason for exchange and the measurement of that which is exchangeable . . . he formulates a principle of order that is irreducible to the analysis of representation: he unearths labour . . . A s for the fecundity of labour, it is not so much due to personal ability or to calculations of self-interest; it is based upon conditions that are also exterior to its representation: industrial progress, growing division of tasks, accumulation of capital, division of productive labour and non-productive labour . . . 7 8 7 5 See Miche l Foucault, "Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Crit icism of 'Polit ical Reason'," in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol.11, ed. Sterling M . M c M u r r i n (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1981), 245. 7 6 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive . 1.1., quoted in Gordon, op. cit . , 14. 7 7 Susan Buck-Morss asserts that Hegel's concept of c iv i l society "is precisely the society created by what Smith called political economy," see her "Envisioning Capital: Political Economy on Display," Crit ical Inquiry 21, no.2 (Winter, 1995), 475. I discuss Buck-Morss ' article and Hegel's relationship to political economy, especially the political economists and moral philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment like Adam Ferguson, in more detail in Chapter Four, infra. Foucault, The Order of Things, op. cit . , 224-225. 42 Thus Foucault sees The Wealth of Nations " . . . as effecting not only a transformation in political and economic thinking but also a transformation in the relationship between knowledge and government. n 7 9 Smith's idea of the ' invisible ' hand is critical here. Since economic mechanisms work invisibly the government is unable to observe and regulate them and is, therefore, limited in its ability to act. This is opposed to the preceding formulation o f the Physiocrats who argued that a ruler might" . . . permit economic subjects freedom of action just because . . . the sovereign can still know what is happening in the economy, and how." 8 0 Liberalism breaks with Cameralist notions of order as visible and representable. Rather, the workings of mechanisms of population are considered to be impenetrable and autonomous. In "Envisioning Capital: Polit ical Economy on Display", Susan Buck-Morss disagrees with this analysis, claiming that "Smith's economic theory would have had no conviction i f one could not see the effects of the processes it described", hence, the notion of envisioning capital. She argues that changes in the methods of visual representation, which occurred at the same time that Smith wrote, "made it possible to chart the effects of the invisible hand". 8 1 Buck-Morss claims that "Foucault praises the invisibility of Smith's hand because it does not allow the sovereign sufficient knowledge to control the social field of individual desire . . . " and criticises "Foucault's affirmation of the incapacity to envision the economy . . . " . n However, 7 9 Gordon, ib id . , 14, 8 0 Ibid. , 15. 8 1 Buck-Morss, "Envisioning Capital," op. cit. , 454. 8 2 Ibid. , 466. 43 this seems to me to attribute judgements and motivations to Foucault which he may not have had. In Gordon's account of Foucault's lectures on governmentality, Foucault appears to me to be attempting to describe liberal notions of economics and the relationship between knowledge and government they authorize, rather than passing judgement on whether these were positive or negative. 8 3 To continue with Foucault's account, despite the (alleged) invisibility of economic processes and the mechanisms of population, liberals are still concerned with the necessity of controlling, of governing, the population, and this is expressed in the idea of 'security' as the principal element in liberal governmental rationality. Gordon contends that: Foucault locates a major source o f what is specific and original in the liberal treatment of population - and hence security - in a discovery of British empirical philosophy, that of economic man as a subject of interest, a subject o f individual preferences and choices which are both irreducible . . . and non-transferable... Political economy and Smith's conception of an 'invisible hand' characterize the private determination of individual interests and their effective harmonization within society . . . [which are] incapable in principle of becoming accessible to the totalizing scrutiny of subject or sovereign. 8 4 Liberalism is therefore, faced with a new assignment; the reformulation of the parameters of the realm of government. What liberalism attempts, then, is: . . . the construction of a complex domain of governmentality, within which economic and juridical subjectivity can alike be situated as relative moments, 8 3 Buck-Morss, at times, attributes Gordon's words to Foucault, for example, when she states that "Foucault, in his late lectures, addressed The Wealth of Nations directly, speaking positively of the 'benign opacity' of the economic system . . . " (see ib id . , 450) In fact, the term 'benign opacity,' which appears in Buck-Morss ' account to be a quotation from Foucault, is Gordon's phrase ("Foucault notes that this thesis of the benign opacity of economic processes see Gordon, op. cit . , 15). This 'thesis' is not Foucault's but Adam Smith's idea of the invisible hand; it was Smith who thought it was benign, not Foucault. 8 4 Gordon, op.cit . , 21. 44 partial aspects of a more englobing element. The key role which it comes to play in this effort of construction and invention is, for Foucault, the characteristic trait of the liberal theory of civil society.85 A s Gordon contends, prior to the eighteenth century, c iv i l society was used to describe juridical or political society. However, during the Enlightenment the meaning of c iv i l society changed. Foucault considers that this change can best be observed in Ferguson's Essay on the History of C i v i l Society. He considers that Ferguson broadens Smith's idea of individual 'economic interest' as the driving force of economic growth to encompass the establishment o f society in general. 8 6 Society is constituted and reconstituted through the free-play of economic against non-economic interests, and "the activity of government, as an organic component of the evolving social bond, participates in this historic passage through a range of distinct, consecutive social forms." 8 7 Hence, c iv i l society is seen as part of (or a tool of) a 'technology of government'. Foucault perceives c iv i l society to be inhabited by homo economicus (the 'man of interest') and, therefore, " . . . c iv i l society is the concrete ensemble within which these abstract points, economic men, need to be positioned in order to be made adequately manageable." 8 8 In Gordon's summation: "Adam Ferguson's notion of c iv i l society can be read . . . as being concerned with the task of inventing a wider political framework than that of the juridical society of contract, capable of encompassing individual economic agency within a governable order . n 8 9 Hence, the far reaching 8 5 Ibid., 22. 8 6 See ib id . , 22. 8 7 Ibid. 8 8 Foucault, quoted ib id . , 23. 8 9 Ibid., 37. 45 socio-economic changes of the eighteenth century were accompanied by alterations in the 'technology of government' and changes in the concept of civil society and its role as part of the emerging liberal method of'governmentality'. C o l o n i a l i s m , ' C i v i l i z a t i o n ' and Europe ' s Others The conceptual shift in the meaning of civil society that began to take place in the eighteenth century occurred at a time when European relationships to and, views of, non-European peoples and areas of the globe also changed. These shifting relationships were manifested in the way both Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment authors (like Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel) figured difference and in the mirrored constructions of non-European Others in their theories of civil society. The expansion of colonial empires and the debates over the meaning of "civilization" and "civility" which occurred during the Enlightenment were of particular importance. During the eighteenth century, colonies were extended (e.g., America and India) and areas of the globe that were hitherto unexplored by Europeans were mapped and claimed by Europe. As Outram explains, colonialism, the exploitation of nature and the exotic were bound together in the Enlightenment and "by confronting non-European lands and societies, Europeans ... also found themselves confronting the whole question of difference. "M This in turn raised the question of European identity. The way "Europe" was defined was changing markedly as it was no longer feasible to define "Europe" as opposed to its traditional "other" ("Islam") with the waning of Turkey and the rise of Russia as a European power. Self-definition in relation to the Outram, op. cit., 63. :•/: 46 'exotic' natives of the South Pacific thus seemed a more fruitful avenue of inquiry. 9 1 While religion had provided an important driving force conditioning encounters with Others since the "discovery" of America, in the eighteenth century this was not an incentive for interaction. Outram argues that this caused a significant transformation in the questions raised in European minds by encounters with Others. Hence, prior to the eighteenth century, Europeans (especially the Catholics who 'discovered' the New World) were concerned with issues surrounding the human status of natives and whether they possessed souls. In contrast, "Eighteenth-century concerns focused on three major areas: the debate generated by the idea of a 'universal' human nature; the associated debate on the meaning of human history; and the debate generated over the worth and nature of 'c ivi l isa t ion '" . 9 2 L i k e the term "society", "civilization" was also undergoing significant alterations in meaning in the eighteenth century. Today, as Raymond Wil l iams suggests, "civilization" is used to characterize " . . . an achieved state or condition of organized social l ife", however, " . . . it referred initially to a process . . . " 9 3 The prior term "civi l ize", is derived from the Latin root, cvdtts (of or belonging to citizens) and from the sixteenth century also denoted "orderly and educated". 9 4 The term "c iv i l society" was used by Richard Hooker (1594) i n conjunction with this sense of citizens l iving together in an orderly fashion: " C i v i l society doth more content the See ib id . , 64. Ibid. Wil lams, op. cit. , 48. Ibid. 47 nature of man than any private kind of solitary l iv ing" . ' 5 However, it was the related term of "civi l i ty", derived from civilitas (community), which in the eighteenth century led to progress in the creation of a term for "an ordered society". Will iams shows that the term "civil i ty" was frequently employed where now "civilization" would be used. A t this point, the principal meaning of "civi l i ty" " . . . emphasized not so much a process as a state of social order and refinement, especially in conscious historical or cultural contrast with barbarism."96 In the early eighteenth century, "civilization" was connected with the "refinement of manners" and during the Enlightenment, "civilization expressed this sense of historical process, but also celebrated the associated sense of modernity: an achieved condition of refinement and order." 9 7 The term "polishing" is used at this time in relation to "manners" (for example, Ferguson uses it prominently in his Essay). Will iams notes that in eighteenth-century French and English, the terms "polished" and "polite" are imbricated and share the same root. The association of "civilization" with "manners" continued into the nineteenth century but it was during this period that it fully developed its modern meaning. 9 8 9 5 Richard Hooker, Laws of Ecclesiastical Poli ty. 1594, vo l .1 , para. 10, quoted in the Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 446. 9 6 Wil l iams, op. cit . , 48. For another discussion of "civil i ty" from the ancient world to the eighteenth century, see Ernest Barker, Traditions of Civ i l i ty : Eight Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948). On "civilization" and "barbarism", see also Collingwood, op. cit. 9 7 Wil l iams, ib id . , 49. 9 8 See ib id . , 49-50. Wil l iams notes that "manners" had a much broader meaning in the eighteenth century than it does today. For a detailed discussion of "civilization" in the history of ideas in France, see Lucien Febvre, "Civilization: Evolution of a Word and a Group of Ideas," in A New K i n d of History, ed. Peter Burke, trans. K . Folca (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), 219-257. 48 "Civil ization" was an important concept in the shifting constructions of European identity in the Enlightenment. Hence, rather than seeing their identity as opposed to Muslims and other non-Christians as in the Renaissance, eighteenth-century Europeans constructed their identity in counterpoint to uncivilized peoples. McGrane contends that "it was in the Enlightenment, at this epistemological moment, that the European became civilized (and since then, on the most primitive level, the West's self-understanding has been absolutely interwoven around its conception of itself as "civi l ized") ." 9 9 However, "civilization" was not without its European (and non-European) critics. Debate concerning the merits of 'Western civilization' evolved primarily from the mid-eighteenth century onwards. O f particular importance were Rousseau's works which questioned the benefits of Western civilization. He contrasted what he saw as the corrupted and alienated life of Europeans with the more natural, genuine lifestyle of 'primitive societies'. 1 0 0 'Noble savages,' because they existed in a more immediate relationship to nature, were figured as the antithesis of 'c ivi l ized ' Europeans. This was because "peoples outside Europe, apart from the Chinese, were usually seen as not having 'civilisations' o f their own, but as being to greater or lesser degree in contact with 'nature'". 1 0 1 However, while Rousseau criticized Western civilization, he did not advocate a return to the lifestyle of primitive societies as a remedy for civilization's 9 9 Bernard McGrane, Beyond Anthropology: Society and the Other (New York : Columbia University Press, 1989), 56. 1 0 0 See Outram, op. cit. , 66-67. 1 0 1 Ibid., 67. 49 discontents. 1 0 2 These issues were accented by the voyages of Bougainville and Cook to the South Pacific. This switched the spotlight from Native Americans to Pacific islanders (particularly Tahitians) as exotic referents. The Pacific peoples were viewed by most eighteenth century authors in the way that Native Americans had been viewed, namely, as " . . . spy-glasses into the heroic phases of European culture, their simple, natural cultures replicating those of Greece and Rome in their earliest phases." 1 0 3 In this manner, they were seen by Europeans " . . . as both the ultimate 'opposite' or 'other' to themselves and yet also as a replication of Europe's own origins." 1 0 4 Outram contends that the parallels between natives and the ancient world occurred because o f the conceptualization of history and society as morality. The ancient world was seen as epitomizing virtues like "civic spirit, self-control, self-sacrifice and stoicism". ' 0 5 Consequently, "Once even some o f these characteristics could be identified by Europeans in the exotic peoples they encountered, it was very easy to conflate their distance in space from Europe with their distance in time from the classical world. B y the end of the century, die exotic was both profoundly 1 0 2 See Tzvetan Todorov, On Human Diversity. Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1993), 277-282. 1 0 3 Ibid. , 67. However, Bernard Smith suggests that the exposure of artists on the Pacific voyages to "the influence o f scientists and naval officers trained in empirical habits of observation" resulted in "their mode of perception bec[oming] increasingly less dominated by neo-classical theories o f art and increasingly more influenced by empirical habits of vision", see Bernard Smith, European Vis ion and the South Pacific 1768-1850: A Study i n the History pf Ar t and Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 3-4. 1 0 4 Outram, op. c i t , 67. 1 0 5 See i b i d . , 68. 50 other, and yet intimately linked to European origins". 1 0 6 Discourses o f "civilization" produced contradictory images of others that were deployed concurrently. A s Stuart H a l l puts it, the uncivilized, non-European " . . . becomes defined as everything the West is not - its mirror image. It is represented as absolutely, essentially, different, other, the Other."107 Europeans then further divided the category of the "Other" into two: the noble and the ignoble. 1 0 8 O n the one hand, European civil i ty was juxtaposed to the barbarity o f non-European peoples. On the other, non-Europeans were represented as lacking European civil i ty but as l iving innocent, peaceful lives in accordance with nature. In the eighteenth century, natives were represented frequently as 'noble savages', depicted in the manner of Romans and Greeks, and imagined as l iving an idyll ic life in Utopian societies situated in harmony with nature. 1 0 9 A t the same time, however, they were also constructed as 'ignoble savages' - primitive, barbarous, rude, uncivilized. H a l l contends that during the eighteenth this latter construction " . . . was becoming the vehicle for profound reflection in European intellectual circles on the nature o f social development." 1 1 0 This kind of reflection revolved around the following type o f questions: "What had led the West to it is high point of refinement and civilization? D i d the West evolve from the same simple beginnings as 'savage Ibid. Stuart H a l l , op. cit . , 308. See ib id . See ib id . , 310-311. Ibid. , 311. 51 society' or were there different paths to ' r iv i l izat ion '?" 1 1 1 Underlying these kind of questions and many o f the innovations in Enlightenment constructions o f alterity, were shifts in the way knowledge and systems of representation were constructed. This was the case, in particular, with respect to 'science', which was called 'natural philosophy' at this time. Foucault considers that changes i n this field were exemplary of what was happening to knowledge in general. "According to Foucault", Outram remarks, "taxonomy served during this period not only as the dominant impulse for the pursuit of natural history, but as the organising principle for all intellectual activity." 1 1 2 This involved a transformation of representational practices in "natural historical discourse from static tabulation of the external similarities and differences of plants and animals to dynamic narration of the inner developmental and historical process of l iving beings." 1 1 3 During the Enlightenment natural history was trying to break free of theology especially in relation to establishing causal relations in the natural order (i.e., instead of attributing everything to divine plan). The introduction of history into natural philosophy constituted a breakthrough in this regard. 1 1 4 Dorinda Outram provides a more nuanced account of these claims. A s she observes: Between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries natural history underwent profound transformations. A n overwhelming interest in evolving classification systems for specimens of plants and animals was slowly edged out, though never completely replaced, by investigation into aspects of the inward functioning of 1 1 1 Ibid. 1 1 2 Outram, op. cit . , 48. 1 1 3 Nicholas Jardine and Emma Spary, "The Natures of Cultural History," in Cultures of Natural History, ed. Nicholas Jardine, James A . Secord and Emma C . Spary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19%), 7. 1 1 4 See Outram, op. cit. , 59. 52 their physiological systems. 'Natural history' itself slowly separated into separate subdisciplines such as physiology and palaeontology, each with their own methods, agendas, and subject-matter. A t the same time, natural history began to separate from theology, especially in continental Europe, though at a slower pace than in Britain. By the early nineteenth century active men of science began to see natural history as distinct from attempts to argue from the nature of the created world to belief in and knowledge o f a benevolent deity. 1 1 5 However, Foucault's claims regarding natural history are somewhat contentious and far from universally accepted. Thus, as Nicholas Jardine and Emma Spary observe: Where Foucault emphasized the temporal discontinuities of disciplines, others have attended rather to their spatial and social discontinuities, arguing for the importance of national styles, and of divergences between the metropolis and the provinces, between the elites and artisans, between authors and their publics, between men and women. 1 1 6 However, while there is disagreement about what to emphasize regarding the changes taking place i n the study o f natural history i n the eighteenth century, it seems clear that important transformations i n representational practices occurred during that century. These innovations in the study of natural history also helped to facilitate the development of social science and comparative method. Methods developed in the natural sciences (observation, description, classification, comparison) were applied to other peoples and cultures. 1" The eighteenth century voyages to the South Pacific provided ample opportunities to put these methods into practice in relation to Pacific peoples. Bernard Smith notes through the 1 , 5 Dorinda Outram, "New Spaces in Natural History," in Cultures of Natural History, ed. Nicholas Jardine, James A . Secord and Emma C . Spary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 249. 1 1 6 Jardine and Spary, op. cit . , 7. 1 1 7 However, it is also the case that methods moved i n the opposite direction: see David Phil ip Mi l l e r , "Introduction," in Visions of Empire: Voyages. Botany, and Representations of Nature, ed. David Philip M i l l e r and Peter Hanns Re i l l (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3. 53 Pacific voyages "the sciences o f visible nature, geology, botany, zoology . . . imposed their interests . . . " upon other fields such as the visual arts and thus "in the end scientific method triumphed in the description both of nature and man." 1 1 8 However, scientific explanation of human phenomena " . . . continued to be mediated by European conceptual categories and European ways o f seeing." 1 1 9 For example, Enlightenment ideas of "civi l i ty" and "civilization" informed comparative analysis of others and established a frame in which stadial theories of social development evolved. A s Stuart H a l l states, " in Enlightenment discourse, the West was the model, the prototype and the measure o f social progress. It was Western progress, civilization, rationality and development that were celebrated. A n d yet, al l this depended on the discursive figures of the 'noble and ignoble savage', and of 'rude and refined nations' . . ." 1 2 0 These then were the type o f important social, economic and political changes which took place during the Enlightenment and underscored the alterations in modes of representation and die production of knowledge during this period. They provide keys to understanding the "intellectual subconscious" of disciplines and the "conditions of possibility" o f first-order concepts (such as c iv i l society) during the eighteenth century. Wi th this backdrop i n place, I now torn in Chapters Two , Three and Four to an examination o f how during the Enlightenment a rupture developed with previous conceptualizations of c iv i l society. B y way o f illustration, in Chapter T w o the work o f Hobbes and Locke w i l l be traced. In Chapters Three and Four, I w i l l show how Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel construct their theories of c iv i l society on a 1 1 8 Smith, op. cit . , 254, 7. 1 1 9 Gregory, op. cit . , 23. 1 2 0 Stuart H a l l , "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power" in Formations o f Modernity, ed. Stuart Ha l l and Bram Gieben (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 313. 54 different conceptual basis from seventeenth century theorists l ike Locke and Hobbes. 55 C H A P T E R TWO H O B B E S A N D L O C K E : S E V E N T E E N T H - C E N T U R Y C O N C E P T S O F C I V I L S O C I E T Y It may preadventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America . . . live at this day in that brutish manner . . . Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651). Thus, in the beginning, al l the world was America. John Locke, Two Treatises on Government (1690). Introduction In this chapter I examine the concept of c iv i l society and the mirroring construction of non-European Others in the work of two seventeenth-century theorists: Hobbes and Locke. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first two sections deal with Hobbes' theory of c iv i l society and his use of non-European Others in its construction. The next two sections of the chapter are devoted to Locke 's work on these topics. In the final section of the chapter, I compare and contrast Hobbes' and Locke 's work and juxtapose their concept of c iv i l society to the one arising in the eighteenth century. This chapter, therefore, is meant to be read in conjunction with Chapters Three and Four which examine the work of Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel. By comparing the work of the seventeenth-century writers with these theorists, I want to show how a point of discontinuity or rupture regarding the concept of c iv i l society began in the eighteenth century. The opening of this rupture is evidenced in Montesquieu's work, continues in Ferguson's and is most fully 56 realized in Hegel's concept of c iv i l society. This disjuncture wi l l be examined on three levels. First, Hobbes' and Locke 's conceptions of c iv i l society are constructed in contrast to the state of nature and constructions of alterity are used to illustrate conditions in the state of nature. However, eighteenth-century theorists reject the state of nature as a philosophical starting point for their conceptualizations of c iv i l society. Instead, they make use of a stadial theory of history to ground their concept of c iv i l society. Alterity is figured as part of this stadial approach to the history of human development.1 Second, both Hobbes and Locke see c iv i l society as coterminous with the state. Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel a l l break with this approach (to different degrees) by positing c iv i l society as distinct from the state. This represents a major conceptual shift and a point of rupture with their predecessors' conceptualization of c iv i l society. In short, they are not dealing with the same concept. Third, Hobbes and Locke make only brief (but effective) use o f Others to ground their analysis. The range of examples chosen to illustrate their arguments is limited: their primary focus is on American Indians with only brief (almost throw-away references) to Other peoples or cultures. More constant referents are the civilizations of antiquity (predominately Greece and Rome). In contrast, Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel make use o f a much wider range of comparative material in which to ground their concept of c iv i l society. This, in turn, is ushered in by new systems of observation, classification, and ordering of material developed in the eighteenth century. Hence, a much more complex and comprehensive form of comparative 1 For a related argument about the contrast between the state o f nature debate and stadial theories of history as contexts for discussing "savagery", see the "Editors' Introduction" to Peter Hulme, "The Spontaneous Hand o f Nature: Savagery, Colonialism, and The Enlightenment" in The Enlightenment and its Shadows, ed. Peter Hulme and Ludmil la Jordanova (London: Routledge, 1990), 16-17. 57 method can be discerned at work here. However, while greater and more sophisticated use is made of comparative material, it is still structured by Western techniques of seeing and methods of representation. The Hobbesian State of Nature In formulating his theory of c iv i l society Hobbes broke with prior conceptualizations of the concept and with the canonical views on cosmology and on the correct methods for building political theories. Instead, he applied the principles of geometry and mechanical philosophy to political theory. In the 1630s, he set out to construct a comprehensive philosophical system based on these principles. This was to have three parts: "the first would deal with Body, or matter in motion, the second would deal with Man as a specific kind of body in motion [and] the third would deal with The Citizen, and how knowledge of human nature could be used to create a stable state."2 Hobbes developed a mechanistic ontology based on the idea that l iving things differ from non-living substances in that they have interior "vital motion" (i.e., blood circulation in humans). Whi le al l l iving beings have the same imperative, maintenance of this vital motion or self-preservation, humans differ from animals since their superior mental faculties give them an advantage in self-preservation.3 In addition to vital motion, humans also experience motion through the functioning of their sensory organs. Hobbes argued that "whenever such motions augment the vital motions they 2 Richard Olson, The Emergence of the Social Sciences 1642-1792 (New York : Twayne Publishers, 1993), 39. 3 See ib id . , 40. 58 produce . . . pleasure and when they decrease the vital motions they produce ...pain. Since all humans are motivated principally to maintain their vital motions, humans inevitably act to increase their pleasures and decrease their pains." 4 It is this instinct for self-preservation which causes humans to leave the state of nature and form c iv i l or political society. 5 Hobbes' mechanistic ontology also lead h im to different ideas of liberty and freedom than those of classical political theory. For h im, liberty meant "the absence of external impediments to motions" (negative freedom) rather than the classical notion of liberty as the right to engage in certain conduct (positive freedom). 6 Hobbes also applied the principles of geometry to questions of political theory. In this he was strongly opposed to experimental methods which lead him into a long conflictual relationship with Boyle and the Royal Society. 7 He favoured geometry over experiment since he believed it provided precision and certainty. His concept o f reason was constructed according to geometric principles, so that the mental processes which define reasoning " . . . are just those kinds of activities, and those kinds of activities alone, which are allowed in mathematics . . . I f we reason correctiy in this way our conclusions must be true. " 8 Hobbes' attempts to ground political theory in principles of natural science can be seen in his concepts of the state of nature and c iv i l or 4 Ibid., 41. 5 See ib id . , 42. 6 Ibid., 43. 7 See Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the A i r Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Li fe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). This work provides an excellent and comprehensive discussion of Hobbes' use of geometry and mechanical philosophy, the scientific basis of his work, and of the conflicts with other theorists it engendered. 8 Olson, op. cit. , 46. 59 political society. 9 Hobbes departed from the Aristotelian model of c iv i l society which counter-posed it to the family and instead viewed it as in contradistinction to the state of nature. In Leviathan and De Cive . Hobbes begins his analysis of the state of nature by establishing his disagreement with the Aristotelian model. Thus in Chapter 1 of De Cive . "Of the State of M a n Without C i v i l Society", Hobbes states that most authors who have written on Commonwealths assert that "Man is a creature born fit for society" (Aristotle describes man as a political or social animal) and "on this foundation they so build up the Doctrine of C i v i l l Society". 1 0 Hobbes says that these authors behave "as i f for the preservation of Peace, and the Government of Man-kind there were nothing else necessary, then that M e n should agree to make certaine Covenants and Conditions together, which themselves should then call Lawes." 1 1 However, these writers are in error since they have not made a thorough study of human nature. For Hobbes, a proper study of humans shows that they do not naturally come together into society but, rather, people form society for personal benefit: " A l l society therefore is either for Gain , or for Glory; (i.e.) not so much for love of our 9 Foucault argues that the "new technical and political rationality" associated with the study of population "branched off from . . . the Hobbesian line [of political theory] which sought a general theory of society imitative of the physical sciences": Hubert L . Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Miche l Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2d ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), 134. For a somewhat inaccessible interpretation of Foucault's views on Hobbes' theory of sovereignty, see Pasquale Pasquino, "Political Theory of War and Peace: Foucault and the History of Modern Political Theory," Economy and Society 22, n o . l (February 1993): 77-88. 1 0 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive . ed. Howard Warrender (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 42. Capitalization and spelling are as they appear in the original. 1 1 Ibid. 60 Fellowes, as for love of our Selves . . . " 1 2 However, no society can endure or be illustrious i f founded for gain or glory. Above a l l , it cannot be a c iv i l society. This is because " . . . c iv i l l Societies are not meer Meetings, but Bonds, to the making whereof, Faith and Compacts are necessary . . . " 1 3 While humans might naturally desire c iv i l society, they are not naturally suitable for it. Hobbes asserts that "Man is made fit for Society not by Nature, but by Education . . . " 1 4 A s Hobbes rejects gain, glory or mutual goodwill as bases for founding enduring (civil) societies he must establish another motive. He contends that c iv i l society is established through the "mutual fear" that humans have for each other. He defines "fear" as not just being frightened but as having " . . . a foresight of future evil l . . . " and a highly developed sense of mistrust, suspicion and a heightened awareness of and sense of preparedness against the potential harmful acts of others. 1 5 Mutual fear is generated by the condition of man in the state of nature. The natural equality of humans in the state of nature precipitates conflict and violence. A l l have an equal right to everything in the state of nature and, combined with man's egotistical nature, this leads inevitably to jealousy, suspicion, conflict and violence. Since every man has die right to protect himself by whatever means necessary, he may do what he likes " . . . against whom he thought fit, and to possesse, use, and enjoy al l what he would, or could get." 1 6 Hobbes argues that because o f " . . . how easie a matter it is, even for the weakest man to k i l l the strongest...", 1 2 Ibid., 43. 1 3 Ibid., 44. 1 4 Ibid. 1 5 Ibid. , 45. 1 6 Ibid. , 47-48 61 no one can claim that he is naturally superior or safe from the threat of others.1 7 This leads Hobbes to his quintessential statement in Leviathan about the state of nature: During the time men live without a common Power to keep them al l in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre as is o f every man, against every man . . . In such a condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea: no commodious Building; no instruments of moving; . . . no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no letters; no Society; and which is worst of a l l , continuall feare, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. 1 8 After describing the state of nature in this manner, Hobbes turns to the question o f whether the state of nature every existed. He contends that "It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over al l the world: but there are many places, where they live so now." 1 9 He then cites the case of American Indians as exemplary of this: "For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no government at a l l ; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. " 2 0 In De Cive , Hobbes again uses the American Indians as his example of people in the state of nature: They of America are Examples hereof, even in this present Age : Other Nations have been i n former Ages, which now indeed are become c i v i l l , and Flourishing* but were then few, fierce, short-lived, poor, nasty, and destroy'd of a l l that Pleasure, and Beauty of life, which Peace and Society are wont to bring with 1 7 Ibid. , 45. 1 8 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C B . MacPherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), Part 1, ch. 13, 185-186. 1 9 ib id . , 187. 2 0 Ibid. Italics in the original. 62 them. 2 1 In his formulation of the state of nature and his use of American Indians as examples, Hobbes broke with Aristotelian cosmology and with the canons of natural history. 2 2 In Aristotelianism, humans ranked above animals and, in Christian cosmology, Christians were above heathens and devil-worshippers. Americans Indians were not easily placed in this taxonomy because, although their humanity was acknowledged, they were thought to live like animals and to venerate devils. Seventeenth-century Europeans were eager to distinguish themselves from the "savage beasts" of America both on developmental and religious grounds. So while it was widely accepted that animals l iving in an ungoverned natural condition were constantly at war, it was difficult to accept Hobbes' argument that this was the "natural condition o f mankind". 2 3 Hobbes' contention that the progenitors of contemporary Englishmen were once like the "savages" of America was difficult for his contemporaries to accept. Similarly, Hobbes suggestion that even those currently l iving in c iv i l society might slip back into a savage state i f c iv i l government were removed was equally disturbing to his contemporaries. 2 4 A s Ashcraft contends, "the savages of the New Wor ld were important to Hobbes' argument precisely because he did not view them as exceptions, outside the framework of history 2 1 Hobbes, De Cive , op. cit. , 49. Italics in the original. 2 2 See Richard Ashcraft, "Leviathan Triumphant: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of W i l d M e n " in The W i l d M a n Within: A n Image in Western Thought F rom the Renaissance to Romanticism, ed. Edward Dudley and Maximil l ian E . Novak (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972), 154. 2 3 See ib id . , 149-151. 2 4 See ib id . , 162. 63 or political theory." 2 5 However, in so doing, Hobbes transgressed the conventional rules for the production of political theory. Political theory then was generally based on the common features of "civilized" people l iving under the rule of law and not on the extraordinary lifestyle of savages l iving without legal restrictions. 2 6 While Hobbes' contemporaries saw Christianity as the hallmark of "civilization", he considered civilization to follow from the establishment of c iv i l society and not to precede it. Hence, he asserted that "Whatsoever distinguishes the civility of Europe, from the barbarity of the American savages, is the workmanship of fancy, but guided by the precepts of true philosophy. " 2 7 Hoboes ' C i v i l Society and the Non-European Other After outlining the condition of humans in the state of nature, Hobbes turns to the formation of political or c iv i l society. A s already noted, c iv i l societies require bonds or covenants between men before they are established. These bonds are created when everybody subjects their w i l l to one man or a council. Each person contracts with the others " . . . not to resist the will of that one man, or counsell, to which he hath submitted himselfe . . . and this is called U N I O N . " 2 8 Hobbes continues: "Now union thus made is called a Gty, or civill society, and also a civill Person . . . A C I T Y therefore (that we may define it) is one Person, whose will, by the compact 2 5 Ibid., 154. 2 6 See ib id . , 163. 2 7 Hobbes, quoted ib id . , 163. 2 8 Hobbes, De C i v e : op.cit., 88-89. 64 of many men, is to be received for the will of them all . . . " 2 9 It is clear from these statements that Hobbes sees political and c iv i l society as coterminous. In this he is in accord with preceding formulations of c iv i l society (such as Aristotie's) which do not distinguish between c iv i l society and political society or the state. However, he is not in accord with eighteenth-century constructions of c iv i l society which try to establish distinctions between c iv i l society and the state or political society. Further, Hobbes deviates from prior (Aristotelian) conceptualizations of c iv i l society which counterpose c iv i l society to the family. Instead, Hobbes posits c iv i l society in contradistinction to the state Of nature. Hobbes use of the state of nature as a linchpin for his concept of c iv i l society also places him at odds with his eighteenth century successors. Eighteenth-century philosophers dispensed with the state of nature as a basis for building a concept of c iv i l society and, instead, tended to employ stadial theories of human development on which to construct their arguments.3 0 Hobbes' use of the American Indians as l iving examples of people in the state of nature is also noteworthy. A s the passages quoted above from Leviathan and De Cive demonstrate, Hobbes considers Indians l iving in the state of nature to be the Other; the antithesis of Europeans l iving in c iv i l society. A s Ashcraft notes, these references to American Indians are not atypical allusions but appear in other places in Hobbes' work. For example. Hobbes employs this mirrored construction of difference in De Corpore Politico where he speaks of the condition of man in the state of nature as one of hostility and war and states that this "known" by " . . . the Ibid., 89. See Ashcraft, op. cit. , 166. 65 experience of savage nations that live at this day . . . " 3 I Similarly, in subsequent discussions of the state of nature in both Leviathan and De Cive . Hobbes uses the lifestyle of the Amazons to illustrate his argument. 3 2 Thus Ashcraft concludes that "Clearly, Hobbes' definition of the state of nature was explicitiy intended by him to be associated with the 'brutish' and 'savage' life of the Indians." 3 3 For Hobbes, then, the Indians represent the Other counterposed to 'civilized* man in c iv i l society. In this, his construction of difference as mirror image prefigures his eighteenth-century successors except for one crucial point of disjuncture; he finds the origins of c iv i l society in the state of nature (as represented contemporaneously by the Indians) whereas eighteenth-century philosophers rejected the state of nature as a starting point for their discussion o f c iv i l society. Similarly, Hobbes assertions regarding the conditions pertaining in the state of nature bear similarities to discussions by Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel of communities lacking a c iv i l society. For example, in the passage quoted from Leviathan, he speaks of the absence of industry and agriculture, transportation and trade in commodities, spacious architecture, knowledge of geography, systems of time keeping, arts and literature, and society. These perceived deficiencies of the state of nature are referred to by the eighteenth and nineteenth century theorists but, again, not in the context of people in the state of nature. Rather, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century writers tend to pose difference i n terms of stadial theories of development which w i l l be discussed more fully below. 3 1 HObbes quoted in Ashcraft, ib id . 3 2 See Hobbes, Leviathan, op. cit. , 254 and De Cive . op. cit. , 124. 3 3 Ashcraft, op. cit . , 154. 66 When looking at the American Indians, Hobbes was clearly impressed by what he perceived as the lack of c iv i l or political society and, therefore, of 'c ivi l izat ion ' . A s Stuart H a l l argues in respect of the inhabitants of America, "In fact, these peoples did have several, very different, highly elaborated social structures . . . These were functioning societies.What they were not was 'European' ." 3 4 Hence, since the political and social organization of the Indians was not recognizable to Hobbes, he assumed they had no organization at a l l . 3 3 Ha l l contends that those who employed the Indians in their literary works (such as Hobbes) believed that "l iving close to Nature meant that they had no developed culture - and were therefore 'unciv i l ized ' . " 5 6 Indeed, Hobbes' views on 'c iv i l i ty ' were similar to those of eighteenth-century authors as well as to those of the contemporary explorers and travel writers for whom his description of the state of nature had so much affinity. 3 7 In Chapter 10 of De Cive , Hobbes compares the state of nature with that of c iv i l society and argues that, in the state of nature, man is subject to " . . . a Dominion o f Passions, war, fear, poverty, slovinliness, solitude, barbarisme, ignorance, cruelty." However, c iv i l society is " . . . the Dominion of reason, peace, security, riches, decency, society, elegancy, sciences, and benevolence." 3 8 But, again, Hobbes constructs his mirror images of ' c iv i l i ty ' and 'barbarism' around the state of nature. The centrality of the state of nature to the Conceptualization o f c iv i l society can also be discerned in the writings of Hobbes' seventeenth-3 4 Stuart H a l l , op. cit . , 303-304. 3 5 See ib id . , 305. 3 6 Ibid. , 306. 3 7 For Hobbes' affinity with contemporary views expressed in travel writing and other fields, see Ashcraft, op. cit. , 147. 3 8 Hobbes, De Cive . op. cit . , 130. 67 century successor, John Locke. The Lockean State o f Nature Hayden White argues that by the seventeenth century there were two general perspectives regarding nature and society, and therefrom, towards so-called "primitive" peoples. One perspective, exemplified by Hobbes, saw nature as bestial and as a sphere of conflict and strife. Society was^ therefore, an improvement on the state o f nature. Natural man was the antithesis of worthwhile human beings and an example of the fate of "civil ized" man i f he abandoned c iv i l society. The other perspective took a benign view of nature and perceived society as an unfortunate (but necessary) departure from the ideal natural world. Natural man was perceived as the antithesis of man in the social state. This second perspective is exemplified by Locke . 3 9 Hence, while Locke uses die state of nature as the basis for his theory of the origins of government and c iv i l society, his view of it is somewhat different from Hobbes. In his Second Treatise on Government, entitled " A n Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End o f C i v i l Government", Locke outlines the condition o f humans in the state of nature. He describes this as " . . . a state o f perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending on the w i l l o f any other man. "*° I f the law of nature is broken then 3 9 See Hayden White, "The Forms o f Wildness: Archaeology o f an Idea", in The W i l d M a n Within: A n Image in Western Thought From the Renaissance to Romanticism, ed. Edward Dudley and Maximil l ian E . Novak (Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1972), 28. 4 0 John Locke, " A n Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of C i v i l Government," Two Treatises on Government, in The Social Contract, ed. Ernest Barker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), para. 4, 4. 68 anyone has the right to judge the offender and execute a punishment. Locke argues that the absence of a universal and impartial judicial authority leads to disorder and disarray. The treatment for this state of affairs is c iv i l government, " . . . to restrain the partiality and violence of men." 4 1 Hence, " . . . c iv i l government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature . . . " 4 2 The most fundamental "inconvenience" of the state of nature is the failure to provide security of property. Locke devotes a whole chapter of the Second Treatise to the subject of "property" which forms a linchpin for his whole argument about the state of nature and the origins of c iv i l society and government. In the prior chapter on the state of nature, Locke uses "an Indian, in the woods of America" as an example o f man in the state of nature.4 3 He develops this example at greater length in the chapter on property. He sets up his analysis on property with the following assertion: The earth and al l that is therein is given to men for the support and comfort of their being. A n d though all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature, and no body has originally a private dominion exclusive of the rest of mankind in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state, yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial, to any particular man. 4 4 Locke's example of man exercising these common property rights is the American Indian. Thus 4 1 Ibid., para. 13, 9. 4 2 Ibid. , para. 13, 9-10. 4 3 See ib id . , para. 14, 10. Locke also refers in this paragraph to Garcilasso de la Vega's history of Peru. 4 4 Ibid., para. 26, 17. 69 " . . . the fruit or venision which nourishes the wi ld Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be his . . . " 4 5 While God has bestowed the earth on all mankind equally, he has also endowed humanity with reason so that they may best exploit it. Locke argues that man also has a property in his own body and, therefore, his labour and work belong to him. Consequently, "Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left in it, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined it to something that is his own, and therefore makes it his property." 4 6 For example, Locke says that a deer in the wi ld belongs to everyone until an Indian kil ls it, whereupon it becomes the hunter's property. 4 7 However, Locke distinguishes this application o f labour from that of reason. The "spontaneous hand of nature" provides food and it does not require the exercise o f reason to merely collect it. The application o f reason is evinced by the development of land.4* Proprietorship in land also involves the application of labour to it. Cultivation or enclosure of land confers rights to its products since " . . . 'tis labour indeed that puts the difference o f value on every thing . . . " 4 9 Again , Locke illustrates this point with the American example: There cannot be a clearer demonstration of anything than several nations of the Americans are o f this, who are rich in land and poor in all the comforts of life; 4 5 Ibid. 4 6 Ibid., para. 27, 17. 4 7 See ib id . , para. 30, 19. 4 8 See Peter Hulme, "The Spontaneous Hand of Nature: Savagery, Colonialism, and the Enlightenment", in The Enlightenment and its Shadows, ed. Peter Hulme and Ludmil la Jordanova (New Y o r k : Routledge, 1990), 30. 4 9 Locke, op cit . , para. 40, 25. 70 whom nature, having furnished as liberally as any other people with the materials of plenty, i .e. , a fruitful soil , apt to produce in abundance what might serve for food, raiment, and delight; yet, for want of improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of the conveniences we enjoy. A n d a king of a large and fruitful territory there feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day labourer in England. 5 0 Locke seeks to strengthen his argument for private control of land by asserting that it benefits all in the long run. He contends that cultivation of land (by Europeans) increases its product one hundred fold, thus benefitting the poor and impoverished masses. He illuminates this by a comparison of America and England: For I aske whether i n the wi ld woods and uncultivated wast of America left to Nature, without any improvement, tillage, or husbandry, a thousand acres w i l l yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniences o f life as ten acres of equally fertile land doe in Devonshire where they are well cultivated. 5 1 Locke closes his chapter on property with the bold statement "Thus, in the beginning, all the world was America", indicating that the present condition o f the Indians in the state of nature was once the condition of Europeans (and others) who applied reason to life in the natural condition and, thereafter, advanced. 5 2 Similarly, when speaking o f the origins of political societies, Locke suggests that the Indians of America are " . . . a pattern of the first ages in As ia and Europe." 5 3 Lockean C i v i l Society Fol lowing his discussions of the state of nature and property, Locke turns in Chapter 7 5 0 Ibid. , para. 41, 25. 5 1 Ibid., para. 37, 23. 5 2 Ibid., para. 49, 29. 5 3 Ibid. , para. 108, 63. 71 to the origins of political or c iv i l society. While the state o f nature is one of absolute equality and freedom governed by natural law, it may degenerate into a condition of war since some individuals w i l l inevitably disobey the laws of nature and cause conflict. Without an impartial judicial system or a means to enforce judgements, an individual's property rights (i.e., to life, liberty and estate) are not secure. This insecurity leads humans to make a contract with one another to give up their powers to punish wrongdoers to a common authority, and in so doing, form a political society. Locke continues, "Those who are united into one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies between them and punish offenders, are in c iv i l society one with another..." 5 4 He asserts that " . . . a l l this is for the preservation o f property of al l the members o f that society . . . " , indicating again the fundamental importance of property (life, liberty and estate) to his argument. 5 5 Once humans leave the state of nature in this manner they become a commonwealth. 5 6 The form of government is also a defming feature o f c iv i l society. Locke advises that absolute monarchy is "inconsistent" with c iv i l society and is, therefore, not a type of c iv i l government. A n absolute monarch is not established by the people as a governmental authority which means that such communities are still in the state o f nature. To illustrate the importance of consent to the establishment of the social contract and its absence i n absolutist government, Locke uses the example of the Indians, "He that would have been insolent and injurious in the 5 4 Ibid., para. 87, 50. 5 5 Ibid. , para. 88, 51. 5 6 See ib id . , para. 89, 52. 72 woods of America would probably not be much better in a throne". 5 7 Locke suggests that c iv i l society or political society may take several forms (democracy, oligarchy, monarchy) but to be a true commonwealth it must be consented to and established by the parties to the contract. The term commonwealth is not used by Locke to designate a particular form of government, but rather, refers to " . . . any independent community which the Latins signified by the word civitas, to which the word which best answers in our language is Commonwealth, and most properly expresses such a society o f men which community does not . . . and city much less." 5 8 C i v i l Society and the Other i n the Seventeeth Century Locke 's discussion o f the state of nature and the origins o f c iv i l society differs from Hobbes' in some important respects but, at the same time, maintains some significant continuity of ideas. The most obvious point of difference is that the state of nature for Locke is not the anarchic battleground that Hobbes portrays but a realm of perfect equality and freedom which does not fully protect property. However, neither Hobbes nor Locke see c iv i l society as natural but as artifice; something created or made by the people who contract with one another to leave the state o f nature. Both Locke and Hobbes use the American Indians as examples of people in the state of nature. While both theorists have an underlying conception of human development at play in their work, neither advances a fully fledged stadial theory to account for man's social evolution or for the origins of c iv i l society. Ronald L . Meek argues that Locke gives some inklings of the germs of a stadial theory through his discussion of the origins of property. 5 7 Ibid., para. 92, 53. Locke continues by adding the example of Ceylon. 5 8 Ibid. , para. 133, 77. 73 However, while Locke makes some reference to modes of subsistence he does not discuss all o f the four stages associated with stadial theories of socioeconomic development - hunting, pasturage, agriculture and commerce. Further, he does not give the clear enunciation of a progression from stage to stage that eighteenth-century theorists do. 5 ' However, both Locke and Hobbes remark on the lack of agriculture and commerce in the state of nature. These factors were later developed by eighteenth-century theorists as indicators of the presence or lack of c iv i l society. This is particularly evident in Ferguson's work. Rather than setting out a fully developed stadial theory, Locke seems to have been arguing only that Indians in the state of nature were what Europeans were once like. In The Great Map o f Mankind , Marshall and Will iams suggest that Locke 's portrayal of the Indians in this manner may have been a response to large amounts of conflicting information regarding the Indians which was bombarding late seventeenth century England. Unable to establish a universal image of the Indians, a popular resolution was to portray them as like Europeans in an initial phase of development. 6 0 However, l ike Hobbes, Locke differs from eighteenth-century theorists in that he grounds his discussion of the origins of c iv i l society in the state of nature whereas his successors reject the state of nature as a starting point. Locke conceives of c iv i l society as coterminous with political society or the state. In this 5 9 See Ronald Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 20-23. 6 0 See P . J . Marshall and Glyndwr Wil l iams, The Great Map of Mankind: British Perceptions in the Age of Enlightenment (London: J .M.Dent & Sons, 1982), 191. See also Stuart B . Schwartz, ed., Implicit Understandings. Observing. Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters Between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 74 he is in accord with Hobbes and at odds with the eighteenth-century theorists. However, Charles Taylor contends that although for Locke c iv i l society is coterminous with the state, there is a "pre-political" society in existence in the state of nature. A community is formed in the state of nature through the exercise of natural rights. Taylor asserts that Locke is here " . . . preparing the ground for the emergence of the new, contrastive sense [of c iv i l as opposed to political society] a century later". 6 1 L i k e Hobbes, Locke uses the American Indians as an example of people in the state of nature. Given his more benign view of the state of nature he does not depict the Indians with quite the degree of barbarity or savagery apparent in Hobbes' work, Nevertheless, he deploys the Indians as the mirror images of civil ized man in c iv i l society as evinced in his statement that " . . . in the beginning all the world was America ." Again , like Hobbes, he prefigures his eighteenth-century successors in the use of a mirroring construction but he uses the state of nature to form one side o f the mirror relation, something the eighteenth-century writers do not do. Locke's discussion of the lack of cultivation by the Indians is also notable. A s Arnei l points out, Locke emphasizes cultivation (especially crop-growing) over other kinds of labour and lauds the English farmer as the preeminent exponent of this type of work. 6 2 In his emphasis on the superiority of the English farmer, Locke conveniently overlooks the fact that crops like maize and tobacco had been cultivated for hundreds of years by the Indians of the Americas. 6 1 Charles Taylor, "Modes of C i v i l Society", Public Culture 3, n o . l (Fall 1990): 105. 6 2 See Barbara Arne i l , "Trade, Plantations, and Property: John Locke and the Economic Defence of Colonial ism", Journal of the History of Ideas 55, no. 4 (October 1994): 603. 75 Hulme argues that this omission coincides with Locke 's use of the concept of "the spontaneous hand of nature" in order to establish a distinction between Europeans who improve the land and Indians who merely gather what nature offers. A s Hulme demonstrates, Locke 's Second Treatise was used by bis contemporaries as a philosophical basis on which to rationalize the alienation of Indian land by the Bri t ish . 6 3 Thus "from its inception the natural right to property is defined in such a way as to exclude non-Europeans from being able to exercise i t . n 6 4 By asserting that the Indians only gather what nature provides, Locke makes it difficult to distinguish between them and animals, since animals collect food from nature without the application of reason. In this he seems to echo Hobbes' arguments about the similarity of man and animals in the state of nature.6 5 Locke's argument that die Indians have not applied their reason, as demonstrated by the improvement of land, is echoed in his comments in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding where he places Indians with illiterates, idiots and children because they cannot apply reason in comparative, speculative or abstract ways. 6 6 However, Locke does not consider the Indians to be irredeemable primitives. I f they were raised and educated as Englishmen he considered they had the potential to be as well educated, but their natural condition was dismal and unconducive to development. Locke states, "Their notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from those objects they have most to do with, and which have made upon their senses the frequentest and 6 3 See Hulme, op. cit. , 30. 6 4 Arne i l , op. cit . , 609. 6 5 See Hulme, op. cit. , 33. 6 6 See Marshall and Wil l iams, op. cit . , 192. 76 strongest impressions. Such kind of general propositions are seldom mentioned in the huts o f Indians . . . ° 6 7 In his Secon4 Treatise. Locke makes primary reference to American Indians to illustrate his arguments. In a similar manner to Hobbes, he does refer to Classical Antiquity and the Bible as sources of comparative material but these references are not fundamental to his thesis in the way that the Indians are. Similarly, Locke makes the odd allusion to other peoples (e.g., Ceylonese, Turks), usually in respect of absolute government, but these are merely brief illurninations and are not essential to his argument. In this regard, Locke is in distinct contrast to his eighteenth century colleagues such as Montesquieu. Through the examination of the theories of c iv i l society of Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel in the next two chapters, I w i l l argue that the Enlightenment signifies a point of rupture with the preceding seventeenth-century formulations of c iv i l society and w i l l illustrate this by contrasting the work of Hobbes and Locke with that of these three theorists. This break with previous works revolved around the conceptual shift in the construction o f c iv i l society from seeing it as coterminous with the state, to viewing it as a separate entity. In other words, Locke and Hobbes were not dealing with the same concept as Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel. However, the rupture between seventeenth- and eighteenth-century concepts of c iv i l society did not occur in one fell swoop. Rather, it was anticipated in Montesquieu's work, extended in Ferguson's, and fully realized in Hegel's Philosophy of Right. In addition, the way that Otherness is figured and used to ground the concept also changes. While some similarity remains between Hobbes and Locke on the one hand, and 6 7 John Locke, A n Essay Concerning Human Understanding, quoted ib id . , 192. 77 Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel on the other, in that both draw on the ancient world and America for constructions of difference, from the eighteenth century onwards writers tend to look to a much broader range of examples to ground their analyses (e.g., the Middle East, the South Pacific, and Asia) . This expansion of the use of comparative material can readily be seen in Montesquieu's Spirit o f the Laws and culminates in Hegel's theory of world history which divides up the whole globe (except Africa) into representations of his conception o f the historical phases of human development. In this instance, there is a "logical relation o f . . . anticipation to realization" from Montesquieu to Hegel. Further, in the work of Hobbes and Locke, the alterity of Native Americans is put to a specific purpose, namely, to describe the original condition of humanity in the state o f nature. None of the three theorists under discussion in the next two chapters use the state of nature to ground their philosophy. In Chapters Three and Four, the way that Otherness is figured in the Enlightenment, as opposed to that in earlier periods, raises questions of how underlying concepts (such as representation) structured the way in which first order concepts such as c iv i l society were conceived. Foucault's archaeological analysis comes into play and facilitates the identification and analysis of the "conditions o f possibility" which underscore thought across disciplinary boundaries in this period. 6 8 In this manner, the similarities between the three theorists in modes of representation through the figuration o f difference and alterity, which were characteristic of this period, w i l l be identified. A H three writers make use of a comparative representational strategy but it is much broader and more complexly figured than their predecessors'. 6 8 It should be noted that modern disciplines as we understand them did not exist in this period. 78 C H A P T E R T H R E E M O N T E S Q U I E U A N D F E R G U S O N Everywhere I see people who talk continually about themselves. Their conversation is a mirror which always shows their own conceited faces.They w i l l talk to you about the tiniest events in their lives, which they expect to be magnified in your eyes by the interest that they themselves take in them. They have done eveiything, seen everything, said everything, thought of everything. They are a universal pattern, the subject of unending comparisons, an inexhaustible fount of examples. O h , how empty is praise when it reflects back to its origin! Montesquieu, Persian Letters. It is in their [Arabs, Native Americans] present condition, that we are to behold, as in a mhrour ( s i c ) , the features of our own progenitors; and from thence we are to draw our conclusions with respect to the influence o f situations, i n which, we have reason to believe, our fathers were placed. Adam Ferguson, A n Essay on the History o f C i v i l Society. Introduction This chapter is divided into two main sections. These sections deal i n turn with the writers under discussion in this chapter - Montesquieu and Ferguson. The discussion o f each theorist w i l l be broken down further into subsections dealing with topics such as the state of nature, c iv i l society and attitudes towards and uses o f non-Western Others in their work. Here I w i l l compare and contrast the two authors with their seventeenth century predecessors - Hobbes and Locke -with respect to these matters. In addition, each of the writers w i l l be compared and contrasted with the other, and, with Hegel. The task of this chapter is to demonstrate how Montesquieu and Ferguson each 79 contributed to the eventual conceptual separation o f c iv i l society from the state and how each contributed to what might (eventually) be called the post-Enlightenment geographical imagination. 1 The modes of representation that were figured i n this imaginary were principally those of a mirroring construction of non-European (and in the twentieth century, non-Western) Others. In these two spheres, I suggest that each theorist may be viewed as forming a relation o f "anticipation to realization" (as Canguilhem puts it), with Montesquieu marking the beginnings of a conceptual shift which is fully realized in Hegel's work which is discussed i n the next chapter. In Part II, I go on to show how these modes Of representation and constructions of knowledge (most fully realized in Hegel) have been influential in stnicturing the work o f twentieth-century authors working on the concept of c i v i l society, on their figuration of alterity and on their use of mirroring constructions o f the non-Western Others. M O N T E S Q U I E U Co l l i n i , Winch and Burrow remark that eighteenth century Europe was characterized by variety in many respects - there was diversity in the constitutional, social, cultural, religious, and economic spheres. In addition, the expansion o f the Ottoman Empire into Europe, the voyages to the Pacific, and the enlargement and acquisition of colonial territories, confronted Europeans with even greater diversity. This variety, then, "constituted a pressing intellectual challenge" to eighteenth-century theorists and "the first and most influential author to respond to die challenge of the new opportunities for the comparison of law and government across space as well as time 1 1 am indebted to Derek Gregory for this insight and for this term. 80 was Montesquieu". 2 Montesquieu's writings differed from his predecessors in political theory in that he employed a much more comprehensive comparative approach and spotlighted the influence of morals and manners on laws and government. 3 This approach may be discerned in his two principal works, The Spirit o f the Laws and the Persian Letters (1721). These works also reflect his "major intellectual interests" which were "natural history, especially geography and meteorology." 4 A s part o f his interest in geography, Montesquieu read many o f the vast number o f volumes of travel writing, traders' and missionaries' accounts produced about non-European peoples in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A s Olson observes, "several of these, especially Lahontan's [Supplement to the Voyages of Baron Lahontan in which One Finds Curious Conversations Between the Author and a Wise Savage (1703)], had used dialogues with non-Europeans as vehicles for criticizing current European society," and this may have inspired Montesquieu, in the Persian Letters, to adopt the device of a "fictional set of letters, ostensibly sent home by two Persian ambassadors in Paris during the final years o f Louis X I V ' s reign, in order to criticize French society and the French monarchy." 5 In the Great M a p of Mankind. Marshall and Wil l iams remark that English works on Indians in the seventeenth century were distinguished by " . . . their brevity, their thinness, their 2 Stefan Co l l i n i , Donald Winch and John Burrow, That Noble Science of Politics. A Study in Nmeteenm-Century Intellectual History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 17. 3 See ibid . 4 Richard Olson, The Emergence o f the Social Sciences 1642-1792 (New York : Twayne Publishers, 1993), 146. 5 Ibid. , 147. 81 reliance very often on hearsay information." 6 In contrast, one could rarely accuse their Enlightenment successors of brevity or thinness in their descriptions of non-Western Others. However, the eighteenm-century writers still relied on hearsay accounts; for the most part they had no personal experience of the lands or peoples they were so keen to write about i n their voluminous accounts. Such was the case with Montesquieu, whose work did not lack for myriad illustrations from a wide variety of peoples but tended to be based on his perceptions and imagination about Others, rather than on any first-hand knowledge or experience. Despite Montesquieu's disclaimer that "I do hot draw my principles from my prejudices but from the nature of dungs," 7 these observations become clear from an examination o f his two principal works. The State of Nature and the Nature of Government Montesquieu begins The Spirit o f die Laws with a discussion o f natural law and the state of nature. He asserts that prior to c iv i l and political laws are the laws o f nature. H e writes that "TO know them wel l , one must consider a man before the establishment o f societies." 8 Humans in the state of nature " . . . have the faculty of knowing rather than knowledge" and cannot think i n a conjectural, abstract fashion; their instinct would be to self-preservation rather than an inquiry into their origins. A s an example of this, he cites "savages" in forests who are timid and 6 P . J . Marshall and Glyndwr Wil l iams, The Great M a p o f Mankind: British Perceptions i n the Age of Enlightenment (London: J . M . Dent and Sons, 1982), 192. 7 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f the Laws, trans, and ed. Anne M . Cohler, Basia Carolyn M i l l e r and Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), x l i i i . 8 Ibid. , Book 1, ch.2, 6. 82 afraid o f everything. People in these conditions do hot perceive themselves as equal but have a profound sense of inferiority. He continues, "Such men would not seek to attack one another, and peace would be the first natural law." Montesquieu then claims that Hobbes has got it wrong when he argues that men in the state o f nature want to fight and conquer each other. In answer to Hobbes' question as to why do people arm themselves and lock their houses i f there is no condition of war in the natural state, Montesquieu contends that this " . . . can happen to men only after the establishment of societies, which induced them to find motives for attacking others and for defending themselves Mutual fear, biological attraction, and the acquisition of knowledge al l lead man to "the desire to live i n society". 9 Society is not established by a social contract to get out of the state of nature. Montesquieu makes it clear that "society" precedes both c iv i l and political laws or government and c iv i l society. In Chapter 3 of Book 1 he explains that " A s soon as men are i n society, they lose their feeling of weakness; the equality that was among them ceases, and the state of war begins." This leads to the establishment o f positive law. Positive law is comprised of political law which defines relations between the governors and the governed and c iv i l law which deals with relations between citizens. H e continues by claiming that " A society could not continue to exist without a government." Governments may take different forms. However, the best government is one which most closely conforms to the nature o f the polity and the people 9 Ibid., 6-7. In bis "Defence o f the Spirit o f the Laws", Montesquieu says o f the beginning of that work that "The Author was attempting to overthrow Hobbes' system; a system the most terrible, it making al l the virtues and vices depend on human establishments: and by endeavouring to prove, that all mankind are born in a state of war, and that the first natural L a w , is that al l should make war against a l l , he, l ike Spinoza, overthrows al l religion, and al l morality": quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, O n Human Diversity. Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1993), 369. 83 thereof. Montesquieu explains his argument thus: Laws should be so appropriate to die people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the laws o f one nation can suit another . . . t hey should be related to die physical aspect o f the country; to the climate, be it freezing, torrid, or temperate; to the properties of the terrain, its location and extent; to die way of life of the peoples, be they plowmen, hunters, or herdsmen; they should relate to the degree o f liberty that die constitution can sustain, to the religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, their wealth, their number, their commerce^ their mores and manners . . . They must be considered from al l these points of v iew. 1 0 Montesquieu states that this is exactiy what he intends to examine in the rest o f the book. He says that he is only interested in this "spirit" o f laws and not in distinctions between c iv i l and political laws. He begins his analysis by delimiting three types of government and then investigates the relationship of each sort o f government to the factors outlined above." Montesquieu posits that there are three types of government: monarchies, republics, and despotisms. He defines each as follows: "republican government is that in which the people as a body, or only part of the people, have sovereign power; monarchical government is mat i n which one alone governs, but by fixed and established laws; whereas, in despotic government, one alone, without law and without rule, draws everything along by his w i l l and his caprices. " 1 2 Montesquieu argues that each form of government is based on a "principle" ("the human passions that set it in motion"): honour in monarchies, virtue i n republics, and fear in despotisms. 1 3 In addition, each type of government is associated by Montesquieu with a particular spatial and temporal location: monarchy with contemporary Europe, republic with the Ancient Wor ld , and 1 0 Montesquieu, ib id . , Book 1, ch.3, 8-9. 1 1 See ib id . , 9. 1 2 Ibid. , Book 2, c h . l , 10. 1 3 See ib id . , Book 3, chs.1-9. 84 despotism with "oriental" peoples. 1 4 Montesquieu's examination o f monarchies and despotisms is o f particular relevance to the development of a concept o f c i v i l society separate from the state and to his discussion of non-European Others. Therefore, from here on, I w i l l bracket his work on republics. 1 5 Montesquieu devotes a considerable amount o f space i n The Spirit o f the Laws to an exegesis of the moral and physical causes of different types of government; Parts 3-5 (Books 14-24) deal with these matters. It is clearly impossible to re-present a l l his arguments or the profuse empirical examples made by way o f illustration. Hence a "broad brush" approach w i l l be used to indicate the general thrust of Montesquieu's argument and to demonstrate his deployment of non-Western Others as mirror-images o f Europeans. The Empire of Climate Montesquieu's principal interest i n this part of his work is with the effects o f climate on people and, ultimately, on the type of government and the laws. H e devotes Books 14 T 17 to this topic. Clarence Glacken argues that there was nothing original in Montesquieu's discussion of climate since he simply restated ideas that had been held for a long time. Rather, Montesquieu's original contribution was to refocus attention on the association of physical and moral causes and away from an exclusive consideration o f social causes. B y the end of the 1 4 See ibid , Books 2 and 3, passim. See also Norherto Bohhio T Democracy and Dictatorship, trans. Peter Kennealy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), ,147-148. 1 3 1 discuss Montesquieu's work on republics i n Chapter Six, infra., in relation to Edward Shils ' invocation of his notion of virtue. 85 eighteenth century, Montesquieu was regarded as the authority on this topic. 1* Montesquieu establishes the primacy of climate for his analysis when he writes that "The empire o f climate is die first of al l empires." 1 7 He makes the same suppositions about climate as his predecessors: climate (i.e., temperature) affects human physiology, human mental states are affected by climatic effects on die body, and die mental states of individuals are aggregateable to that of a whole group.1* , He establishes a binary Opposition between those who live in cold (Northern) climates and those who live i n hot (Southern) climates. The peoples o f England, Germany and Scandinavia are Northern peoples while those l iv ing in Southern Europe, the Middle East and As i a are the Southern peoples. When discussing the South, however, his main focus is on As ia and the Middle East. He argues for the superiority of peoples in cold climates based on beliefs about the effects o f temperature on the body. O n this basis he claims that". . . men are more vigorous in cold climates" and that "the peoples in hot countries are timid like old men; those in cold countries are courageous tike young men." He argues further that people in cold climates are insensitive to pleasures while those in hot countries are extremely sensitive and that libido is weak in cold climates and strong in hot climates. 1 9 Montesquieu expands these kind of comments to establish a comprehensive explanation 1 6 Clarence J . Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought From Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 565-566. 1 7 Montesquieu, op. cit . , Book 19, ch. 14, 316. 1 8 See Glacken, op. cit . , 568. 1 9 Montesquieu, op. cit. , Book 14, ch.2, 231 -234. 86 for differences between cultures. He describes the people of hot climates at various points as cowardly, lazy, slothful, barbaric, weak, delicate, lascivious, prone to excess, voluptuous, t imid and effeminate. In contrast, Northern peoples are courageous, vigorous, calm of passions, etc. He devotes substantially more space to the description and critique of the 'exotic' and 'gruesome' lifestyles and practices of non-Europeans, than to descriptions of virtuous Europeans. 2 0 Montesquieu's use of the term "effeminate" to describe non-Europeans may seem odd in that he also uses terms like "savage" and "barbarian" to describe these peoples. However, the sense in which effeminate is used by Montesquieu is part of a "long-standing tradition of discourse" s t i t ch ing back to the ancient wor ld . 2 1 This involved the juxtaposition of the term "fortune" to "virtue". The relationship was gendered: virtue was masculine and fortune was feminine. Fortune often was represented visually as a woman (hence, "Dame Fortune") or by a wheel and was ruled by imagined feminine traits such as capriciousness or unpredictability, denoting a condition of uncertainty. Virtue, on the other hand, was endowed with allegedly masculine qualities such as "heroic fortitude" and it was this quality which enabled men to deal "effectively and nobly with whatever fortune might send". Hence, virtue was masculine and active, while fortune was feminine and passive, and, therefore, virtue "could carry many of the connotations o f vir i l i ty , with which it is etymologically linked; v i r means man". 2 2 When Montesquieu describes non-Europeans as "effeminate" he is invoking this meaning of passive femininity (linked with unpredictability and caprice) and opposing it to the manly virtue of 2 0 See ib id . , Books 14 -17, passim. 2 1 See J . G . A . Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 36-38. 2 2 Ibid. , 37. 87 Europeans which is active and noble, and expressed i n the notion of civic virtue. 2 3 Hence, he describes Europeans as vigorous, courageous and calm of passions. This trope of "effeminacy'' is also used by Ferguson and Hegel in relation to non-Europeans. 2 4 Montesquieu also considers religious affiliation to be determined by climate. For example, he argues that Buddhism is an outgrowth of the climate in India and that Islam is more popular in As ia than Europe because of climatic factors (especially as the climate in As ia favours polygamy while in Europe it favours monogamy). 2 5 However, he exempts Christianity from environmental deternuuiism by claiming that it is a revealed religion and, therefore, does not originate in physical causes as other religions do. Eastern religions are " . . . purely human inventions that grew out of earthly conditions and the circumstances o f life . . . False religions could be explained by physical causes; Christianity, a revealed religion, could not. " 2 6 Whi le , Montesquieu may have engaged in this kind o f academic sleight-of-hand to avoid trouble with the Vatican (this did not prevent both his major works being placed on the Vatican's Index of Prohibited Books), he convenientiy ignores the fact that Eastern religions such as Islam are also revealed religions. Montesquieu discusses the effects of climate on a myriad of other matters, from public health issues to suicide, from the imagination to sexual desire, in the remainder of 2 3 In Persian Letters. Montesquieu claims that "...idleness and effeminacy are incompatible with the arts of civil ization," Montesquieu, Persian Letters, trans. C . J . Betts (London: Penguin, 1973), Letter 106, 195. 2 4 1 discuss the opposition between fortune and virtue i n Chapter S ix , infra., with respect to Edward Shils ' invocation of Montesquieu's notion o f virtue. 2 5 See Montesquieu, The Spirit o f the Laws, op. ci t . , Book 14, ch.5, 236; Book 16, ch.2, 264-265. 2 6 Glacken, op. cit . , 572. 88 Books 14-17. Whi le climate defines divergences i n culture, for Montesquieu, i t also accounts for cultural endurance. Whi le European culture changed over time, Eastern cultures have remained static. Montesquieu claims that " . . . laws, mores, and manners, even those that seem not to matter, like the fashion in clothing, remain i n the East today as they were a thousand years ago. n 2 7 He rounds off" Book 17 with a further assertion about the unchanging nature of the East by asserting that".. . liberty never increases in As ia , whereas in Europe it increases or decreases according to circumstances." 2 8 This is consistent with Montesquieu's statement in the Persian Letters that "it would seem that freedom suits the character of the European peoples and servitude those o f A s i a " . 2 9 A s Said remarks, "the theme of Europe teaching the orient the meaning of liberty" was to "acquire an almost unbearable, next to mindless authority in European wri t ing". 3 0 Book 18 deals with the effect of material factors other than climate. It is concerned with the effects of soil fertility, typography, water, etc. O f principal significance here is the chapter on savages and barbarians. Montesquieu draws the following distinctions between them: "One difference between savage peoples and barbarian peoples is that the former are small scattered nations which, for certain particular reasons, cannot unite, whereas barbarians are ordinarily small nations that can unite together. The former are usually hunting peoples; the latter, pastoral 2 7 Montesquieu, op. cit . , Book 14, ch.4, 235. 2 8 Ibid. , Book 17, ch.3, 280. 2 9 Montesquieu, Persian Letters, op. cit . , Letter 131, 331. 3 0 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York : Vintage Books, 1979), 172. 89 peoples." 3 1 In Persian Letters he speaks of savages' "universal opposition to agriculture and work" and describes barbarism as an absence of "knowledge and culture". 3 2 These definitions of barbarians and savages, together with the discussions of modes of subsistence and land cultivation, were of particular interests to the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment, especially Adam Ferguson, 3 3 Also of interest in relation to Ferguson's work are Montesquieu's comments about the effects of commerce. It was Montesquieu's identification o f the ambiguous effects of commerce (especially the political effects) which was recognized, praised and adopted by writers of the Scottish Enlightenment (especially Ferguson) and later by Hegel. In The Spirit o f the Laws. Montesquieu expresses the eighteenth-century theorists' ambivalence toward commerce. While in Books 20 and 21 he acknowledges some of what he considers to be the positive and progressive effects on society o f increased commercial activity, he also expresses serious doubts that greater commercial interaction is an unqualified good. In particular, Montesquieu is concerned with the effects o f luxury and concomitant inequalities of wealth on the polity. If one reads on beyond the initial definitions of virtue i n Books 3, 4 and 5 o f The Spirit o f the Laws one finds sustained discussions o f the effects of commerce on civic virtue and the corrosion of the warrior ethos by the corrupting effects of luxury. A l so expressed is an unease with the effects o f the division o f labour being ushered in by the expanding economy. In particular, Montesquieu is concerned about the division of a citizen's civic and military duties. For example, he discusses 3 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f the Laws, op. cit . , Book 18, c h . l l , 290. 3 2 Montesquieu, Persian Letters, op. cit . , Letter 120, 215; letter 106, 193. 3 3 See Glacken, op cit. , 605. 90 the effect on civic involvement when citizens no longer take up arms to protect the republic and, instead, establish a professional army to do the job for them. 3 4 Similarly, when Montesquieu speaks of the need for equality in a republic he means not only the equal subjection of citizens to the laws but also the desirability of the equal division o f land between citizens in order to curb the creation of wealth. Wealth leads to inequality among citizens, to the excitation of the passions, and to corruption. Hence Montesquieu states that the "love o f democracy is also love o f frugality." 3 5 However, in contrast to these negative consequences of commerce, Montesquieu also notes that it may have civi l iz ing effects. He claims that: Commerce cures destructive prejudices and it is an almost general rule that everywhere there are gentle mores, there is commerce and that everywhere there is commerce there are gentle mores . . . it polishes and softens barbarous mores, as we see every day. 3 6 The effects of commerce on the development of c iv i l society was of major interest to the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment who explored the nature and effects o f the economic expansion taking place in the eighteenth century. Ferguson's work w i l l be exarnined in the next section of the chapter. C i v i l Society and the Corps IntermeoHaires Montesquieu associates despotism with hot climates, especially those in the Middle East 3 4 See for example, Montesquieu, The Spirit o f the Laws, op. cit . , Book 5, chapter 19, 69. 3 5 Ibid. , Book 5, chapter 3, 43. 3 6 Ibid. , Book 20, c h . l , 338. ' 91 and A s i a . 3 7 In contrast, he associates cold climates like Northern Europe with moderate governments such as monarchies. He distinguishes moderate and despotic governments in the following manner: In order to form a moderate government, one must combine powers, regulate them, temper them, make them act; one must give one power a ballast, so to speak, to put it in a position to resist another; this is a masterpiece of legislation that chance rarely produces and prudence is rarely allowed to produce. B y contrast, a despotic government leaps to view, so to speak; it is uniform throughout; as only passions are needed to establish it, everyone is good enough format.38 Here he outiines one of the defining distinctions between monarchies and despotisms - the constraint of a ruler by law and by the existence of countervailing powers. It is i n his elaboration of this thesis that Montesquieu begins to construct a theory of c iv i l society distinct from the state. In Book 2, Chapter 4 of The Spirit o f the Laws. Montesquieu states mat "intermediate" powers are a defining feature of monarchy and distinguish it from despotism. H e argues that the "most natural" intermediate power is the nobility. He cites lords, clergy, and towns as other examples of intermediate powers which (with the nobility) correspond to the three Estates. The function o f these intermediate bodies is to provide a check on the monarch: Just as the sea, which seems to want to cover the whole earth, is checked by the grasses and the smallest bits of gravel on the shore, so monarchs, whose power seems boundless, are checked by the slightest obstacles . . . 3 ' 3 7 In Persian Letters he also associates As ia and the Orient (especially Persia) with despotism: see Letters 131, 102, 8,19, 33, 121, op. cit. However, in this work, he also makes a veiled critique of what he saw as the despotic tendencies of the French monarchy and in particular of Louis X I V (who Betts describes as "one o f the magnificent despots of modern times"): see Letter 37, ib id . , 91 and ib id . , 17. 3 8 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, op. cit . , Book 5, ch.14, 63. Ibid. , Book 2, ch.4, 18. 92 However, the presence of intermediate bodies alone is insufficient to check the power o f the monarch. In addition, a "depository" o f law is required. This depository exists i n the political/judicial bodies - the Parlements. "Under the French ancien rigime," C . J . Betts remarks, the Parlement "was an institution which administered the law as its main function, but also retained vestiges of a political power which in the past was considerable (and was to be revived during the eighteenth century)". 4 0 In the Persian Letters. Montesquieu laments the enervated state o f the Parlements: "The Parlements are like a ruin which can be trodden underfoot, but can still summon up the idea of a temple famous in some former religion. Almost the only function they still have is to dispense justice, and their authority always remains precarious unless some unexpected combination o f events occurs to revive their life and strength" .*) Montesquieu argues that in despotic states there are no intermediary bodies and no depositories o f law. To Montesquieu this explains why religion holds so much sway in despotic states; its customs provide the content for a type of alternative depository. 4 3 Marshall and Wil l iams argue that in the eighteenth century i t was a commonly held belief that". . . despotism also stifled progress by destroying al l those groups between the ruler and the mass of the people from whom exertion could be expected . . . " ; a belief they consider Montesquieu also held. 4 3 Norberto Bobbio suggests that for Montesquieu, " . . . the power o f the monarch must be limited not only by the existence o f indisputable superior laws but also by the existence of 4 0 C . J . Betts, "Introduction," in Persian Letters, op. cit . , 18. 4 1 Montesquieu. Persian Letters. Letter 92. op. cit . . 173-174. 4 1 See Montesquieu. The Spirit o f the Laws, op. cit . . 19. 4 3 Marshall and Williams* op cit. , 142. 93 legitimate power-centres - the clergy, the nobility and the cities with their collegial organs. . , . " . 4 4 From this, Charles Taylor contends, one can argue that Montesquieu "laid the ground for the c iv i l society/state distinction" with his discussion of intermediate powers. Taylor asserts that in Montesquieu's view " . . . limitation by law is ineffective unless there exist independent bodies which have a standing in this law, and are there to defend it. The rule of law and the 'corps mterniediaires' stand and fall together."4 5 Thus, for Taylor, "Montesquieu's 'corps interme'diaires' are in fact 'amphibious' bodies. They have a life outside the political structure, and this is indeed their primary purpose, and the basts o f their strength. But it is crucial to the health of the polity that they also play a role within i t . " 4 6 Taylor suggests that the influence o f Montesquieu's notion of intermediate bodies may be discerned in Hegel's 'corporations' and later in Tocqueville's 'associations'. 4 7 Points of Disjuncture with Seventeenth-Century Concepts Montesquieu differs from earlier writers like Locke and Hobbes in that he does not make the state of nature the starting point to ground his work. Although he does discuss the state of nature briefly, he does so mainly to disagree with Hobbes about the status of natural law. He does not consider that society was established by a social contract to get out of the state of nature. Instead, Montesquieu begins his analysis with the assumption that man is a social being 4 4 Bobbio, op. c i t , 94. 4 5 Charles Taylor, "Modes of C i v i l Society," Public Culture 3, n o . l (Fall 1990), 105. 4 6 Ibid., 114. 4 7 See ib id . , 116-117. 94 whose normal condition is in a social milieu. In Persian Letters he contends that "Man is born in society and there he remains''. 4 8 Montesquieu's move away from the state of nature as a foundation for his thesis lead him towards the exposition of an early formulation of what would later, in the bands of the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment, become a fully fledged stadial theory. Meek suggests that Book 18's discussion of the relationship between laws and the mode o f subsistence was o f particular importance in this regard. Here Montesquieu draws distinctions between 'savages', 'barbarians', and those who cultivate land and use money. Meek posits that "Montesquieu's sustained use . . . of the notion that differences in manners and social institutions are related to differences in the mode o f subsistence has no parallel in any o f the earlier literature . . . and there would seem to be little doubt that this . . . was of considerable importance in the subsequent development of the four stages theory." 4 9 However, Montesquieu does hot clearly enunciate that the modes of subsistence he refers to are stages through which human societies sequentially progress. This was to be expressed more clearly by writers o f the Scottish Enlightenment who were greatly influenced by Montesquieu's work in this area. 5 0 In discarding the state o f nature as an original point on which to found philosophy Montesquieu contributes to the eventual separation of c iv i l and political society. H e does this by theorizing that society exists as man's natural state and that it exists prior to the formation o f political society or government. It is die conflict that develops between humans in society that 4 8 Montesquieu, Persian Letters, op. c i t . . Letter 94, 175. 4 9 Ronald L . Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 34. 5 0 See ib id . , 31-35. 95 leads to the creation of law and government Montesquieu does more to further the distinction between c iv i l society and the state through his discussions of the differences between monarchies and despotisms. Here he evinces the role of intermediate bodies (the three Estates)5 1 in limiting the power o f the monarch i n conjunction with the rule of law. Whi le , admittedly, Montesquieu does not use the term c i v i l society or make a decisive distinction between it and the state, his work paved the way for others such as Hegel to make the distinction clear. In this sense, one can discern a relation of "anticipation to realization", as Canguilhem puts it, between the work of Montesquieu and that of Hegel, Montesquieu provides some similarities with, but also differs from, the seventeenth-century writers i n the way in which he makes use of comparative material. L i k e Hobbes and Locke he deploys a mirroring construction o f non-Western Others to illustrate his argument. Again , like them, this use o f a mirroring construction is of fundamental importance to his argument and to his assertions regarding the significance o f intermediate bodies (and hence regarding c iv i l society). It is this construction which provides the basis for his comparison of despotism to monarchy and, thus, of Europeans to non-Europeans. However, Montesquieu differs substantially from Hobbes or Locke i n die range of material he employs in his comparisons. Whi le the seventeenm-century writers essentially confine themselves to the examples of the American Indians (with additional references to Antiquity and the Bible), Montesquieu expands Iris gaze to encompass almost the whole known world. He does 5 1 In Persian f i t ters Montesquieu states that "there are three estates in France: the Church, the nobles of the sword and the nobles o f the robe" (Letter 44, op. c i t , 98). 96 not pay much attention to the American Indians except for one or two brief citations to indicate their despotic tendencies. The sources he employs are similar to those of the seventeenth century, namely, accounts of voyages and travel wri t ing. 5 2 However, he does make use of Jesuit missionaries' accounts which were not a resource used by Locke or Hobbes. A s with earlier writers, Montesquieu's work suffers from the same problems as his sources i n terms o f reliability and point of view. He regards his material through a European lens and, hence, reproduces the familiar type of account where non-European Others are counterposed to 'c iv i l ized ' Europeans. In his expansion of the scope of his comparative material, Montesquieu again provides an anticipation of Hegel's work. Hegel classified and organized the world into developmental stages which corresponded with spatial and temporal regions. This he derived from Montesquieu's division in this manner of types o f government into monarchies (contemporary Europe), republics (Antiquity) and despotisms (Oriental). Montesquieu considered that these forms of government were progressively substituted for one another. This was also true for Hegel although his taxonomy includes four phases as opposed to Montesquieu's three. 5 3 While Montesquieu did not present a comprehensive account of c iv i l society as a discrete entity from the state or a fully developed stadial theory, his work may be seen as an anticipation of both o f these notions which were more fully realized in the works of Hegel and Ferguson respectively. Similarly, his categorization of the world into spatial and temporal periods 5 2 Readers interested in Montesquieu's use of travel literature may wish to consult Appendix II to Montesquieu, The Spirit o f Laws ( s i c ) , ed. David Wallace Carrithers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 469-471, which lists 26 items of travel literature which Montesquieu cited in footnotes to his works. 5 3 See Bobbio, op. cit . , 102. 97 corresponding to phases in human history anticipates Hegel's philosophy of history and anticipates the post-Enlightenment geographical imagination. Montesquieu's influence on the Scottish Enlightenment and the evolution of the concept o f c iv i l society can be clearly discerned in the work of A d a m Ferguson, to which I now turn. FERGUSON J . G . A . Pocock has identified two main "approaches to the study of early modern political and social thought, and of Scottish historical and economic theory in particular;" the civic humanist and c i v i l jurisprudential paradigms. 5 4 The c iv i l jurisprudential approach views Scottish social thought " i n the context o f a generalized history of western political theory, which everything encourages and even enjoins us to organize, and to see as having been organized, along jurisprudential and philosophical l ines. 1 , 5 5 The civic humanist paradigm, which Pocock used in The Machiavellian Moment, begins with "a certain early modern articulation of the idea of virtue," drawing on the classical idea of the "practice o f citizenship," which . . . entailed the maintenance of a civic equality among those who passed the often severe tests prerequisite to equality, and the moral disposition of the self towards the maintenance of a public (a better adjective than common) good, identifiable with the political association, poUs or respubttca, itself. It affirmed that the human personality was that of a zoon politikon and was fully expressed only in the practice of citizenship as an active virtue; man (the male bias of this ideal 5 4 J . G . A . Pocock, "Cambridge Paradigms and Scottish Philosophers: A Study of the Relations Between the C i v i c Humanist and the C i v i l Jurisprudential Interpretation o f Eighteenth-Century Social Thought," in Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping o f Political Economy in The Scottish Enlightenment, ed. istvan Hont and Michael IgnatiefT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 235. He refers to these as "Cambridge paradigms" since many o f the exponents o f each approach are located there. 5 5 Ibid., 247. 98 bordered on the absolute) was by nature a public being, and his public action was less that of a magistrate exercising authority than of a citizen exercising equality . . . A n d as the result of historical processes . . . virtue in this sense had acquired material as well as moral preconditions. To qualify for equality and citizenship, the individual must be master of his own household, proprietor along with his equals of the only arms permitted to be borne in wars which must be publicly undertaken, and possessor of property whose function was to bring h im not profit and luxury, but independence and leisure. Without property he must be a servant; without a public and civic monopoly o f arms, his citizenship must be corrupted.5* In The Machiavellian Moment, Pocock argues that these classical republican ideas were developed by the Florentines and reinscribed by English and American theorists. This was then responded to by the writers of the Scottish Enughtenment, " . . . a reply which helped constitute the new science of political economy". 5 7 ; Pocock suggests that these paradigms are neither mutually exclusive nor necessarily oppositional and that they have coexisted since at least the thirteenth century. He argues that both are useful for analyzing Scottish social thought in the eighteenth century, so that "some aspects . . . w i l l continue to answer to the civic humanist paradigm, while others yield better results when treated by the jurisprudential". 5 8 Pocock favours "approaching the birth of political economy" through die civic republican paradigm and, hence, viewing "Scottish thought as responding to the civic humanist challenge".5* Ferguson's Essay on the History of C i v i l Society may be seen as part of this genre of nascent political economy and, therefore, may be best approached in this manner. 5 6 Ibid, , 235-236. 5 7 Ibid. , 246. 5 8 Ibid. , 249-250. 5 9 Ibid. , 251, 240. 99 Nicholas Phillipson follows this approach in his work on the Scottish Enlightenment. He suggests that the Scots " . . . modified the traditional language of civic morality which political moralists were accustomed to employ in discussing the affairs of c iv i l society," and attempted to redefine the concept of civic virtue for their own time. 6 0 In the republican tradition, men valued "above eveiything else the sense o f moral autonomy that could be won by learning how to live virtuously in c iv i l society" (i.e., political society) and virtue was actualized through political participation. However, Phillipson continues, The Scots took it for granted that a sense of moral autonomy - or, as they sometimes put it, 'independence' - represented the supreme source o f gratification to which men could aspire, and that this sentiment could only be found by participating in the public affairs o f society. But they did not believe that political participation was die only means of releasing it. It was clear to them that savages, l iving in pre-political, tribal societies were capable of experiencing a sense of moral autonomy. More important, it was equally clear that in modem societies there were many men and women, often l iving far from the seat o f government, who devoted themselves to local affairs and knew something of these feelings o f moral autonomy even though the classic means of participating in the political process were effectively closed to them. 6 1 The awareness of the social and economic differences between the classical and other forms of society, lead the Scots to reevaluate the received civic republican paradigm: Perhaps classic ideas of civic morality attached too much importance to the role o f politics in shaping the moral personality of a citizen class and die constitution of a c iv i l society or even a tribe. Perhaps not enough attention had been paid to the civic importance of economic, social and intellectual activity. Perhaps it was time to reconsider traditional ideas o f civic virtue i n light of the experience of men l iving in primitive and civi l ized societies and from what could be discovered 6 0 Nicholas Phillipson, "The Scottish Enlightenment," in The Enlightenment in National Context, ed. Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 21. 6 1 Ibid. , 21-22. 100 about the principles of human nature.*2 This reevaluation was accomplished by the latter part of the eighteenth century and "provided the Scots with a new understanding of civic virtue and that 'sociological ' understanding of the Science of M a n which is the unique contribution of the Scots to the philosophy of the Enlightenment". 6 3 Adam Ferguson's work may be examined in this context. The reevaluation of civic virtue by the Scottish writers may be seen as part of the process under way in the eighteenth century of separating c iv i l society from its conflation with political society in the republican and other traditions. Similarly, the historical "sociological" approach to the study of man may be viewed as an eighteenth-century contribution towards the post-Enlightenment geographical imagination. These two themes w i l l now be explored in Ferguson's work on c iv i l society. The State of Nature and the Origins of Society Ferguson begins bis Essay on the History of C i v i l Society (1767) with a discussion of the general traits of human nature. Wood contends that "Ferguson's whole approach to the study of man and society was grounded in the methods of the natural historians" and that "Ferguson invoked the methodological practices of natural history". 6 4 Accordingly, Ferguson found fault with both Hobbes' and Rousseau's ideas of a state of nature since he saw them as hypothetical 6 2 Ibid. , 22. 6 3 Ibid. 6 4 Paul B. Wood , "The Sciences o f M a n , " in Cultures of Natural History, ed. Nicholas Jardine, James A , Secord and Emma C . Spary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 205. 101 constructs which were not based on historical fact. Instead, he argued that ideas about human nature should be grounded in "the historical record which, he claimed, demonstrated that man is naturally a sociable animal." 6 3 Ferguson posits that society is mankind's natural condition and that it has existed for as long as there have been individuals. Humans l ive in collectivities in several different circumstances. Ferguson thinks that these are al l 'natural' and, consequently, he rejects the idea of a state of nature or an 'original ' condition. 6 6 Therefore, in the first section of the Essay, Ferguson asserts that it is fallacious to begin analysis o f the evolution of human history with the idea of escaping from the state of nature. In answer to the question 'where is the state of nature located?', Ferguson states that "it is here; and it matters not whether we are understood to speak in the island of Great Britain, at the Cape o f Good Hope, or the Straits of Magellan". 6 7 Here he argues against the hypothetical quality o f the state of nature (the "imaginary state o f nature"). Further, he contends that: ! If we admit that man is susceptible o f improvement, and has in himself a principle o f progression, and a desire of perfection, it appears improper to say, that he has quitted the state o f his nature, when he has begun to proceed; . . . he only follows the disposition, and employs the powers that nature has given. 6 8 ' Ferguson suggests that it is this ability to improve which accounts for the diversity of 6 5 Ibid. 6 6 See Duncan Forbes, "Introduction" in Adam Ferguson, A n Essay on the History of C i v i l Society, ed. Duncan Forbes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), xv -xv i . 6 7 Adam Ferguson, A n Essay on the History of C i v i l Society, with an Introduction by Louis Schneider (New Brunswick ( U . S . A . ) : Transaction Publishers, 1980), 8. A l l citations o f Ferguson are from this edition. 6 8 Ibid. 102 circumstances in which one finds humans. Man ' s desire for perfection and to better his lot leads him to cultivate his faculties and skills. It is on the capacity of human beings to ' improve' that Ferguson places his primary focus. He seeks to analyze the development o f mankind from primitive ("rude") to civil ized ("polished") types o f society. This process o f societal evolution, he considers, proceeds in a series of increments. Ferguson, like Montesquieu before him, rejects the idea o f the state o f nature as the origin of society and also the notion o f a social contract which establishes society. Society is not established according to rational planning or contract. In Principles of Mora l and Political Science, Ferguson makes a point of attacking Hobbes' assertion of a contractual basis of social relations. 6 9 Instead of a social contract, Ferguson sees society as arising and progressing i n a spontaneous manner. He did not believe men were naturally pacific but, rather, that conflict is inherent to human nature. Further, he considered that conflict is an important factor i n an individual's advancement and also in the creation of social institutions. 7 0 The variation in human abilities leads to the creation of social structures and forms o f government through a system of "subordination". The form of government is determined by the type of subordination. Civil Society After discussing the issues surrounding the origins of society, the social contract and the state of nature, Ferguson spends the remainder of the Essay examining the historical transition 6 9 See Louis Schneider, "Introduction" in Ferguson, ib id . , x . 7 0 See Forbes, op. cit . , xv i -xv i i i . 103 of societal forms from 'rude' to refined or ' c iv i l ized , ' i .e . , "the natural history of society"." A s Forbes observes, while Ferguson tides his book as an essay on "c iv i l society", it is not particularly clear what he means by this. Forbes suggests that: ' C i v i l society' could mean civilization in the broadest sense, a state o f society 'polished' and 'refined' as contrasted with rude or savage society; more technically, it could mean the state . . . or a state of society with regular government and political subordination as opposed, in the fashionable political philosophy, to the 'state o f nature'. One has only to glance at the table o f contents to see that the scope of Ferguson's Essay is much wider than this latter meaning of ' c i v i l society'; it is a history of civi l izat ion. 7 2 However, Ferguson depicts civilization as defined in political terms. H e states that "Civil ization . . . belongs rather to the effects o f law and political establishment, on the form o f society, than to any state merely of lucrative possession of wealth." 7 3 By way of illustration he uses the Roman republic and Sparta as examples of societies that were backward in technological innovation and commerce but were ' c iv i l ized ' (due to their political institutions and laws). In contrast, he cites China and India as examples of societies which have advanced commercially and administratively but which are not ' c iv i l ized ' (or part of the history o f c iv i l society) because their governments are despotic. 7 4 Forbes concludes that Ferguson uses the term ' c i v i l society' rather than 'civil ization' because he wants to encompass a wide variety o f matters within the 7 1 Ibid. , x ix . 7 2 Ibid. , x ix . 7 3 Adam Ferguson, Principles of Mora l and Political Science, ed. Rene" Wellek (New Y o r k : Garland Publishing, 1978), vo l .1 , 252. 7 4 O n Rome and Sparta, see ibid . On China and India, see Ferguson, Essay, op. cit . , Part 3, s ec . l . 104 'poli t ical ' , such as the 'advancement of the commercial arts'. 7 5 Ferguson frames his discussion of social progress in a tripartite distinction between savages, barbarians, and 'polished' societies. He classifies savages and barbarians as 'rude' societies while 'polished' societies are considered ' c iv i l ized ' . Ferguson differentiates between savages and barbarians on the following grounds. Savage societies " . . . have little attention to property, and scarcely any beginnings of subordination or government" while barbarous societies " . . . having possessed themselves of herds . . . know what it is to be poor and rich. They know the relations of patron and client, of servant and master, and suffer themselves to be classed according to their measures o f wealth". 7 6 The key to progress here is 'property' and the effects it has on human behaviour. The effort required to obtain property conquers the inclination towards "sloth" or "enjoyment" which afflicts those in the savage state. The " . . . habit of acting with a view to distant objects is slowly acquired, and is in reality a principal distinction of nations in the advanced state of mechanic and commercial arts". 7 7 The development o f private property leads to disparities of wealth and the ensuing rivalries lead people to band behind leaders " . . . distinguished by their fortunes, and by the lustre of their birth". 7 8 This establishes forms of what Ferguson calls "casual subordination". There are three sources of subordination: differences in natural abilities and temperament, disparities in property holding, and differences in " . . . the habits which are 7 5 See Forbes, op. cit . , xx. 7 6 Ferguson, op. cit . , 81. 7 7 i b id . , 82. 7 8 Ibid. , 98. 105 acquired by the practice o f different arts [liberal or mechanical]". 7 9 Ferguson argues that: In every society there is a casual subordination, independent o f its formal establishment, and frequently adverse to its constitution . . . this casual subordination, possibly arising from the distribution of property, or some other circumstance that bestows unequal degrees of influence* gives the state its tone, and fixes its character. 8 0 The intrinsic distinctions and inequalities between human beings form the basis from which formal political arrangements are derived. The source o f government is not a contract but the natural relations o f subordination within society and governmental arrangements change as society changes or, as Ferguson expresses it: N o constitution is formed by concert, no government is copied from a plan . . . [Humans] . . . proceed from one form o f government to another, by easy transitions . . . the seeds o f every form are lodged in human nature; they spring up and ripen with the season. 8 1 While the establishment o f private property and the pursuit o f wealth which ensues are seen as civi l iz ing forces by Ferguson, an additional factor is required to make the transition to a "polished" society. This factor is the division o f labour. Savages and barbarians must be self-sufficient and as a result choose to spend their spare time in "the enjoyments o f sloth" rather than i n the pursuit o f wealth. The lack of a division o f labour also inhibits the development o f ski l l in any one area o f endeavour, so that a man becomes a 'jack o f a l l trades' and a master o f none. This leads Ferguson to conclude that". . . a people can make no great progress in cultivating the arts o f life, until they have separated, and committed to different persons, the several tasks, 7 9 Ibid. , 184. 8 0 Ibid. , 133. 8 1 Ibid. , 123. 106 which require a peculiar ski l l and attention". 8 2 The division o f labour leads to prosperity and the perfection of production techniques. A similar process takes place in the realms of the military and of government. 8 3 A n efficient government allows for the development of the economy and further "improvements". However, the improvement o f society is not without its costs. The struggle to accumulate wealth is the result o f "virtue", but the attainment o f wealth may lead to corruption and decline. A s Ferguson states, "the virtues o f men have shone most during their struggles, not after the attainment o f their ends. Those ends themselves, though attained by virtue, are frequently the causes o f corruption and v ice" . 8 4 Corruption manifests itself in several different forms. For example, a focus on money-making to the exclusion o f other things makes humans self-interested and corresponds to a loss in public spirit. In addition, die division o f labour leads to a weakening o f public spirit. This occurs because the division of labour tends " . . . to break the bands of society . . . and society is made to consist o f parts, o f which none is animated with the spirit o f society i tself 1 . 8 5 The quest for economic advancement following on from the division o f labour promotes disparities o f wealth which corrupt both the lower and upper classes. This leads to " . . . considering public life as a scene for the gratification of mere vanity, avarice, and ambition . . . n 8 6 A dialectical relation 8 2 Ibid. , 180. 8 3 See ib id . , 181. 8 4 Ibid. , 206. " I b i d . , 218. 8 6 Ibid. , 258. 107 exists between "egoistic economic interest" and the "disinterested passions" in Ferguson's argument. 8 7 The loss o f public spirit is further compounded by two factors - die administration o f government by public servants and the abdication o f responsibility for defence to a professional military. Ferguson considers that " . . . to separate the arts which form the citizen and the statesman, the arts of policy and war, is an attempt to dismember the human character, and to destroy the very arts we mean to improve." 8 8 Ferguson's study of the Roman Empire lead him to fear that a people's lack o f military training might leave them unable to resist the violation of their freedom by the professional armies they had established: The Romans only meant by their armies to ihcroach on the freedom o f other nations, while they preserved their own. They forgot that, i n assembling soldiers of-fortune, and in suffering any leader to be master of a disciplined army, they actually resigned political rights, and suffered a master to arise for the state. This people, in short, whose ruling passion was depredation and conquest* perished by the recoil o f an engine which they themselves had erected against mankind. 8 9 This points to Ferguson's primary fear concerning the loss o f public spirit - the lull ing of the people's distrust o f those who hold power which facilitates the downhill slide to despotism. Ironically, c iv i l society may degenerate into despotism since c iv i l society has enlarged the state's sphere o f administration, created a professional military and, thereby, may have benumbed its subjects' vigilance with the veneer o f peaceful, orderly government. C i v i l society may lead to 8 7 See Graham Burchell , "Peculiar Interests: C i v i l Society and Governing 'the System o f Natural Liber ty ' , in The Foucault Effect, ed. Graham Burchell , C o l i n Gordon and Peter M i l l e r (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 135. 8 8 Ferguson, op. cit . , 230. 8 9 Ibid. , 231. See also Ferguson's Hfonry p f the Progress and Termination o f thft Rpmf# Bspybiic (1783). 108 the loss of public spirit and, hence, "die rules of despotism are made for the government of corrupted men". 9 0 However, Ferguson does not consider despotism to be the inevitable result o f modern c iv i l society. Despotism can be avoided i f attempts are made to increase public spirit, the level o f civic interactitm, and the leadership role of the upper stratum o f c iv i l society, within a constitutional monarchy. Consequentiy, he advocates "a more c i v i l society" to overcome the deleterious effects of the inadequate level o f ' c iv i l i ty ' in modern c iv i l societies." Non-European Others Ferguson's examination of human nature and die evolution of human history involved the study of non-European as well as European societies. L i k e Montesquieu, he divides the world into zones according to climate. Civi l izat ion and c iv i l society are found in temperate zones (i.e., Europe) where man "has always attained to the principal honours o f his species" while "the torrid zone, everywhere round the globe . . . has furnished few materials for history . . . has no where matured the more important projects of political wisdom, nor inspired the virtues which are connected with freedom, and required in the conduct of c iv i l affairs."*2 Extremes o f climate account for the static, unchanging nature o f societies and peoples in those areas. Temperate climates enable people to progress. Climate also affects the qualities o f humans and "under extremes of heat or of cold, the active range o f the human soul appears to be limited; and men 9 0 Ibid, 240. See also John Keane, "Despotism and Democracy: The Origins and Development of the Distinction Between C i v i l Society and the State 1750 1850", in C i v i l Society and the State, ed. John Keane (London: Verso, 1988), 42. 9 1 Keane, ibid . 9 2 Ferguson, Essay, op. cit . , 110. 109 are of inferior importance . . . " In cold climates, men are "dull and slow, moderate in their desires, regular and pacific in their manner o f l i fe", while in hot climates "they are feverish in their passions, weak in their judgements, and addicted by temperament to animal pleasure. "*J Throughout the Essay. Ferguson describes humans l iv ing outside the temperate zones o f Europe in the hot climates of A s i a , Afr ica , and the "East" as sensuous, passionate, cruel, absurd, wi ld , debauched, violent, superstitious, groveling, mean, impetuous, servile, corrupt and effeminate. A s they are "addicted to pleasure" and "sunk in effeminacy" they w i l l always be subject to "a permanent fabric of despotical government". 9 4 L i k e Montesquieu, Ferguson thought that different kinds of government were the product of environmental conditions and represented different stages o f development and that "forms o f government must be varied, in order to suit die extent, the way o f subsistence, the character, and the manners o f different nations". 9 5 He also cites with approval Montesquieu's tripartite division of types o f government. L i k e Montesquieu, he attributes these to spatial and temporal locations: democracy to the ancient world, monarchy to contemporary Europe and despotism to As ia , Afr ica and the East. 9 6 In particular he remarks on "the very important distinction, which M r Montesquieu has made, between despotism and monarchy" and adopts the idea that despotism is a corrupt form o f monarchy based on fear rather than honour. 9 7 9 3 Ibid. , 112. 9 4 Ibid. , 116. 9 5 Ibid. , 62. 9 6 See ib id . , 65-73. 9 7 Ibid. , 65. 110 Fergsuon considers man to be capable of progress. In the history o f c i v i l society man has progressed form the savage state through barbarism to a "polished," "refined'' or "civil ized" condition as represented by the nations o f contemporary Europe. In Part II o f the Essay. " O f the History o f Rude Nations," Ferguson argues that die rude ancestors of contemporary Europeans "resembled, in many things, the present natives of North America: they were ignorant of agriculture; they painted their bodies; and used for clothing, the skins o f beasts."9 1 This condition, he claims, was the starting point o f a l l societies and " in such circumstances are we to look for the original character o f mankind." He continues that it is in the contemporary condition of the Indians, as in a mirror, that European man should look for an account o f die life of his rude ancestors.9 9 Ferguson devotes considerably more time to discussion o f the North American Indians than to any other non-Europeans and bases his account o f their lifestyles on the works o f travel writers (principally Charlevoix and Lafitau). Ferguson visited America 1778 with die Carlisle Commission whose task was to negotiate with the American government. 1 0 0 However, this trip was seventeen years after the Essay was published. In his discussion of rude nations, Ferguson claims that everywhere in America, As ia , and Afr ica one finds savage and barbarous nations. Thus the inhabitants of these areas have little interest in property and survive primarily through hunting and fishing. Since "property is a matter of progress" these nations have not progressed from the rude to a refined state as witnessed by the European nations. They also have not developed a division o f labour which is 9 8 Ibid. , 75. 9 9 Ibid. , 75, 80. 1 0 0 See Fania Oz-Salzberger, Translating the Enlightenment; Scottish Djscouqe H Etghteeflth-Century Germany (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 101. I l l another factor required for man to progress to a condition o f refinement and civil ization. Since they lack the advances characteristic o f refined nations (modern c iv i l societies) rude nations w i l l "always yield to the superior arts, and the discipline of more civi l ized nations . . . and hence the Europeans have a growing ascendency over the nations of Afr ica and America. " t 0 1 Points of Disjuncture with Seventeenth-Century Concepts L i k e Montesquieu, Ferguson departs from the work o f Hobbes and Locke by not grounding his theories in a state o f nature and disagrees h i particular with Hobbes' analysis. Similarly, he rejects the idea o f a social contract and instead cites Montesquieu's claim i n the Persian Letters that man is born in society and stays there. 1 0 3 In departing from the state o f nature and the social contract as the foundations for his study o f the history o f mankind, Ferguson developed his own "highly idiosyncratic" version o f what Ronald Meek calls me "four stages" theory. This theory is based on the idea that: . . . society 'naturally' or 'normally' progressed over time through four more or less distinct and consecutive stages, each corresponding to a different mode of subsistence, these stages being defined as hunting, pasturage, agriculture, and commerce. To each o f these modes o f subsistence... correspond different sets of ideas and institutions relating to law, property and government, and also different sets o f customs, manners and morals. 1 0 3 Meek argues that the four stages theory became the dominant paradigm for the study o f the history o f mankind and of political economy in the second half o f the eighteenth century and was important in the development o f disciplines l ike sociology, anthropology, economics and 1 0 1 Ferguson, op. cit . , 95. m See ib id . , 16. m Meek, op. cit. 2 . 112 historiography in the next century. 1 0 4 In Ferguson's discussion o f rude nations he follows Montesquieu's attribution of savages to the hunting stage and barbarians (herdsmen) to the pasturage stage. Progress to the agricultural staged is premised on the establishment of property which leads to industry and the accumulation o f wealth. The commercial phase is represented by the "polished" and "refined" commercial states o f modern Europe. 1 0 ' The notion of the sequential progression of human development is also the basis o f Hegel's philosophy of history although he sees human development in terms o f the evolution o f self-consciousness and the unfolding o f reason. L i k e the seventeenth-century writers, Ferguson places most emphasis on the American Indians in his use of comparative material. Unl ike mem, however, he does not confine his analysis o f non-Europeans to the study o f the Americas. Rather, Ferguson makes use o f material on the peoples of As ia , Afr ica , and the Middle East to illustrate his argument. He employs a mirroring construction between Europeans and non-European Others. H i s discussion o f refined, modern (European) c iv i l society is juxtaposed to the rude (savage and barbaric) societies outside Europe. Ferguson's sources are similar to those o f Montesquieu, consisting primarily of travel writing and missionaries'accounts. Ferguson associates different types o f government with different modes o f subsistence, customs, manners and morals. He also associates them with different spatial and temporal locations. He adopts Montesquieu's tripartite typology o f governments and attributes them to the same locations. Ferguson particularly emphasized Montesquieu's distinction between monarchies 1 0 4 See ibid . m See ib id . , 153-154. 113 and despotisms, and like h im, identified non-European forms of government as despotic. This categorization of the world into spatial and temporal regions anticipates Hegel's philosophy of history and the post-Enlightenment geographical imagination. Ferguson's discussion of c i v i l society shows some evidence of breaking with the classical and natural law traditions' conception of c iv i l society as political society. Whi le Ferguson does not present c iv i l society as separate from political society he does include many matters within the 'polit ical ' which were absent i n earlier accounts. This is especially the case in relation to economic matters and his discussion of the commercial arts. Foucault's analysis o f governmentality also suggests how Ferguson's discussion of die market economy contributed to the eventual separation of c iv i l society and the state. In prior formulations, c iv i l society was juridical or political society. Foucault sees Ferguson's Essay as signalling a change in the meaning of c iv i l society. Thus for Foucault, Smith's idea of individual 'economic interest' as the driving force of economic growth, was extended by Ferguson to encompass the establishment of society i n general. Foucault sees Ferguson's conception of c i v i l society "as being concerned with the task of inventing a wider political framework than that of the juridical society of contract, capable of encompassing individual economic agency within a governable order."' 0 6 Hence, Foucault considers c iv i l society to be "the correlate of a political technology of government." 1 0 7 In his account of the history of c i v i l society, Ferguson was confronted with the problem 1 0 6 C o l i n Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: A n Introduction," in The Foucault Effect, op. ci t . , 37. 1 0 7 Burchell, op. cit . , 141. 114 of how the civic republican paradigm's notion o f virtue could be revised to take account of modern life. "Ferguson", as Forbes remarks, "following Montesquieu, did not expect to find the wholly selfless public spirit or 'virtue' o f the simple and economically primitive republics o f antiquity in the large, complex and commercial monarchies of modern Europe." 1 0 8 Consequendy, he modified the classical emphasis on die political and the practice of citizenship in determining virtue by including discussion o f economic and social considerations and of the principles o f human nature. 'Mora l autonomy' was realized through involvement in the public affairs of society but this was not limited to the practice of citizenship as in the classical wor ld . 1 0 9 ,. Ferguson and Montesquieu both wrote large historical analyses of the Roman republic and, l ike other eighteenth-century writers, looked to the classical models of Greece and Rome in constructing their works. However, this did not involve a merely uncritical appropriation o f the ancient models. Rather, each tried to reevaluate the classical models in the light o f the changes wrought by a market economy and by the other changes that occurred in the eighteenth century. Hegel, in the nineteenth century, was confronted by a similar prOblemmatic. H i s work may be viewed as an attempt to understand and theorize modernity and to reevaluate the classical models of ethical life in light o f modern conditions. Forbes, op. ci t . , x x x i i . See Phillipson, op. cit . , 21-22. 115 C H A P T E R F O U R H E G E L ... the creation of civil society is the achievement of the modern world. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of Right. Introduction In this chapter I trace Hegel's contribution to the conceptual separation of civil society from the state and his contribution to the post-Enlightenment geographical imagination. In both these respects Hegel's work may be viewed as farming a relation of anticipation to realization with the works of Montesquieu and Ferguson discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter is divided into six sections. In the first section I address Hegel's relation to modernity and its impact on his philosophy. The next four sections deal with Hegel's rejection of the concepts of the natural law tradition, his concept of civil society, his theory of world history and his construction of non-European others, and his relationship to Montesquieu and Ferguson. In the final section, I elucidate the principal common themes which may be drawn from these authors regarding civil society, the figuration of difference, and the use of non-European Others as mirror-images of Europeans. Hege l and Modern i ty Hegel's attempts to understand and theorize the notion of "modernity" are central to his concept of civil society and, indeed, to his philosophy in general. In The Philosophical Discourse 116 of Modernity, Jurgen Habermas claims that "Hegel was the first philosopher to develop a clear concept of modernity." 1 He shows how Hegel deployed the concept of modernity in historical contexts so that "within the horizon of the modern age, . . . [i.e., from c.1500 onward] . . . the present enjoys a prominent position as contemporary history." 2 For Hegel, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution mark a point of rupture which ushers in the history of the present. Hegel describes this as "a glorious sunrise" which signifies "the last stage in History, our world, our own time." 3 Along with this understanding of the present, Habermas contends, a problem arose for "the modern historical consciousness of Western culture," namely, "modernity can and w i l l no longer borrow the criteria by which it takes its orientation from the models supplied by another epoch; it has to create its normativity out of itself. " 4 In this " . . . problem of grounding modernity out of itself Habermas declares, "modernity sees itself cast back upon itself without any possibility of escape. This explains the sensitiveness of its self-understanding, the dynamism o f the attempt, carried forward incessantiy down to our own time to 'pin itself down' . " 5 1 Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass. : The M I T Press, 1987), 4. 2 Ibid. , 6. 3 Georg Wilhe lm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J . Sibree (New York : Dover, 1956), 442. 4 Ibid. Habermas' ethnocentric focus on Western history and culture is well established and is comprehensively canvassed and critiqued in Victor L i , "Habermas and the Ethnocentric Discourse of Modernity," in Constructive Crit icism: The Human Sciences in the Age of Theory, ed. Mart in Kreiswirth and Thomas Carmichael (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 44-58. I discuss L i ' s critique of Habermas' ethnocentrism in Chapter Five , infra. 5 Habermas, ib id . , 7-8. 117 For Habermas, Hegel's achievement was to take the process of grounding of modernity in its own norms (rather than the external norms of past epochs) and elevate it to the plane of philosophy; Hegel was the first to conceive this as a philosophical problem. Indeed, Habermas considers this to be "the fundamental problem" o f Hegel's philosophy. 6 Hence, "the anxiety caused by the fact that a modernity without models had to stabilize itself on the basis of the very diremption [or divisions ...] it had wrought is seen by Hegel as 'the source of the need for philosophy'." 7 The self-consciousness of modernity brings with it a need for "self-reassurance," which manifests itself as "the task of grasping its own t ime." 8 Hegel perceives modernity as characterized by 'subjectivity' (self-relation) which he explains through the concepts of 'reflection' and 'freedom'. 9 A s subjectivity is historically produced, Hegel considers the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution to be milestones in the evolution to full subjectivity. 1 0 Since modernity and its guiding principle of subjectivity are historically produced as the present, i . e . , contemporary Europe, the milestones that represent the break with past epochs are all European. Subjectivity conditions a l l aspects of modern life so that " . . . religious life, state, and society as well as science, morality, and art are transformed into just so many embodiments of the principle of subjectivity." 1 1 6 Ibid. , 16. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 See ibid. 1 0 See ib id . , 17. 1 1 Ibid., 18. 118 In philosophy, subjectivity has been analyzed in the philosophy o f reflection from Descartes to Kant and expressed as " . . . die structure of a self-relating, knowing subject, which bends back upon itself as object, in order to grasp itself as in a mirror image - literally in a 'speculative' way." 1 2 This formulation of the philosophy of reflection (which appears in Kant's three Critiques) did not satisfy Hegel because: Kant does not perceive as diremptions the differentiations within reason, the formal divisions within culture, and in general the fissures among a l l those spheres. Hence he ignores the need for unification that emerges with the separations evoked by the principle of subjectivity. 1 3 For Hegel, Kant's formulation o f the philosophy of reflection (and of the "self-interpretation of modernity") fails to account for the divisions within the society and culture of (European) modernity. His task, therefore, was to remedy this omission by finding a way to "grasp his own time" and account for these divisions in his concept of modernity and for what he perceived as the consequent need for unification. John E . Grumley has analyzed this aspect of Hegel's philosophy through the concept of totality. He argues that by the end of the eighteenth century, Europe had undergone a period of rapid socio-economic transformation as evidenced in the growing complexity o f contemporary society, increasing disparities in wealth and a rapidly advancing division of labour.1* However, although the mood of the time was generally optimistic and the new science of political economy 1 2 Ibid. 1 3 Ibid. , 19. Here I w i l l only consider the philosophy of reflection in broad outline as I discuss more fully the philosophy of reflection, Hegel's problems with prior formulations and his proposed resolution of those problems in Chapter Seven, infra. 1 4 See John E . Grumley, History and Totality. Radical Historicism F r o m Hegel to Foucault (London: Routledge, 1989), 12. 119 mainly argued that these changes heralded growing national wealth, some eighteenth-century social critics (e.g., Ferguson and Montesquieu) worried about the negative aspects of modernity. 1 5 Grumley identifies three principal areas of concern: "the loss of community and the resulting social and individual fragmentation." 1 6 Thus there was a concern for the 'totality' o f individuals who were affected by increasing social complexity and the specialization concomitant on an expanding division of labour and a concern for the 'totality' o f society which was becoming more divided socially through inequalities i n economic status culminating in a loss of community. For Hegel, the diremption of individuals in modern life was connected to the divisions in contemporary culture. Lack of cultural union or community was diagnosed by Hegel as the source of the alienated state of the modern individual. 1 7 These problems appeared al l the more acute because many eighteenth-century theorists looked to the "idealised homogeneity attributed to the classical Greek polis" as a comparative model. 1 8 L i k e his eighteenth-century predecessors, Hegel was concerned with these issues and, l ike them, idealized the polis as a model of homogeneity, community and social concord. In his early work, he would " . . . often compare the deplorable privatisation o f modern individual existence to this ancient communality that integrated the individual into a higher social unity affirmed in a common religion and morality. This vital unity was polis l i fe . " 1 9 However, unlike many of 1 5 See ibid. 1 6 Ibid. 1 7 See ib id . , 14. 1 8 Ibid. , 12. 1 9 Ibid. , 13. 120 the eighteenth-century social critics, Hegel realized that the polis could not serve ultimately as a model for modem society. This realization emerged from his analysis of modernity in historical terms (as suggested by Habermas above) and through his study of the burgeoning field of political economy. 2 0 Hegel came to see that the changes taking place in the economy, which had intrigued the eighteenth-century Scottish political economists, were accompanied by changes in the nature of society and its relation to the political sphere. The questions that troubled writers like Montesquieu and Ferguson regarding the relations between the nascent commercial society of modernity and the political stracture of modem society also formed the central problematic of much of Hegel's work, especially his later work. His analysis of these issues was expressed most fully in his discussion of c iv i l society (and the state) in the Philosophy o f Right. Ferguson and Montesquieu, in their attempts to answer these questions, still tended to glance backwards to the polis and the Roman republic (and the idealized notions of civic virtue and citizen participation) as potential models for trying to understand the evolving relations between an increasingly economically based, depoliticized notion of society and an increasingly discrete political sphere. While they made important steps towards separating c iv i l society and the state and in rejecting the ancient models, they were never able to analyze modernity without some recourse to these models. Hegel, however, with the benefit o f hindsight was able to step back and analyze die changes that occurred in the eighteenth century from some temporal distance. From this vantage point, he was able to present a new concept of c iv i l society which differed substantially from the classical models and was thus able to ground modernity out of See ib id . , 17. 121 itself. From his study of political economy, particularly the works of writers of the Scottish Enlightenment, Hegel derived a new view of the changes occurring in modernity and began to put a positive spin on processes he previously had conceived negatively as instances of decline. From political economy, "he gained a new perspective on the apparent fragmentation and disunity of the emergent bourgeois order. There he found an evolutionist understanding of historical development based on the idea of the progressive unfolding o f society's economic structure."2 1 Hegel thus saw "an underlying progress of reason in history" and began to see the history of human life as a totality in which diremption was "a moment or a phase in a totalising process which overcame and encompassed it. " 2 2 Hence, social disunity and division were a part of a dialectical process which enabled history to progress and the "fixed oppositions and polarities were relativised and subsumed as moments in greater unities of organic wholeness and living totalisation. Diremption and opposition are . . . necessary moments of a l iving process it 23 Hegel conceived this historical process as one of spiritual development, as the progress of reason and the unfolding of human freedom. In this manner, he ontologized and historicized the concept of totality. 2 4 Therefore, "his mature idea of totality involved the processual self-actualization of an infinite, rational subject in the natural and historical worlds thereby realising 2 1 Ibid. , 17. 2 2 Ibid. 2 3 Ibid. , 19. 2 4 See ib id . , 20. 122 its own adequate self-knowledge. 1 , 2 5 This is why Habermas suggests that for Hegel the goal of philosophy was of demonstrating reason as "the power of unificat ion. n 2 6 Reason is able to conquer the condition of diremption into which the (Kantian) notion of subjectivity had hurtled contemporary social conditions and also reason itself. 2 7 Hegel takes issue with the philosophical oppositions which characterize the Kantian self-knowledge of modernity and thus with Kant 's philosophy of reflection, so that "the critique of subjective idealism is at the same time a critique of modernity; only in this way can the latter secure its concept and thereby assure its own stability." 2 8 Nevertheless, Habermas maintains that Hegel's attempts to overcome the problems he perceives in the philosophy of reflection and to critique modernity are ultimately unsuccessful because "he conceives the overcoming of subjectivity within the boundaries of a philosophy of the subject. "2* This means, Habermas explains, that: . . . the negative aspect of a self-sufficient subjectivity that is posited absolutely is also disclosed to the faculty of reflection applied to itself. Hence, the rationality of the understanding, which modernity knows as its possession and recognizes as its only source of obligation, has to be expanded into reason, following in the tracks of the dialectic of enlightenment. But as absolute knowledge, reason assumes a form so overwhelming that it not only solves the initial problem of a self-reassurance o f modernity, but solves it too well. The question about the genuine self-understanding of modernity gets lost in reason's ironic laughter. For reason has now taken the place o f fate and knows that every event of essential 2 5 Ibid., 21. 2 6 Habermas, op. cit . , 21. 2 7 See ibid. 2 8 Ibid. 2 9 Ibid. , 22. I discuss Derrida's critique of Hegel's resolution of the problems of the philosophy of reflection in Chapter Seven, infra. 123 significance has already been decided. Thus, Hegel's philosophy satisfies the need of modernity for self-grounding only at the cost of devaluing present-day reality and blunting critique. 3 0 Habermas contends that the "blunting o f critique" that occurs once the dialectic o f enlightenment has been played out, is also present in what he calls Hegel's "construction of the 'sublation' of c iv i l society in the state."31 In order to understand what Habermas means by this statement, I now w i l l examine Hegel's theory of c iv i l society against the backdrop of bis attempts to understand and theorize modernity. A s a way into Hegel's concept o f c iv i l society, however, I w i l l oudine first his reasons for rejecting the basic tenets o f natural law theory and its classically based conception of c iv i l society. B y contrasting Hegel's theory of c iv i l society with these earlier formulations, I intend to show how he presents c iv i l society as distinct from the state and how this places his concept in , as Canguilhem puts it, a relation o f "anticipation to realization" with those of Montesquieu and Ferguson. C r i t i que o f Natura l L a w Trad i t ion L ike Montesquieu and Ferguson before him, Hegel was critical of the natural law tradition of political theory and o f its ideas of a state o f nature and a social contract. Hegel's critique of the natural law tradition is particularly important because it is part of the rupture with classical and natural law theories of c iv i l society (such as those propounded by Locke and Hobbes) which his theory of c iv i l society establishes. In both his Philosophy of History and Philosophy of Right, Hegel rejects the notion of a state of nature as the original condition of 3 0 Ibid. , 41-42. 3 1 Ibid. , 37. 124 mankind. He attacks what he calls the "errors" of current "fashionable" theories "which pass for established truths, and have become fixed prejudices. 1 , 3 2 He dismisses both theories of the state of nature as a hypothetical philosophical construct and as a condition which existed historically. Regarding the hypothetical construct he argues that "the idea of a state of nature was merely an assumption as far as historical existence is concerned, an assumption made in die twilit regions of hypothetical reflection. " 3 3 While here he is critical of natural law theories generally, his primary target is Rousseau and his idea of the "primitive paradisiac condition of man". 3 4 This is the notion "that man is free by nature, but that in society, in the State - to which nevertheless he is irresistibly impelled - he must l imit his natural freedom." 3 5 While Hegel rejects this formulation because it conflates (civil) society with the state, he also objects 3 2 Georg Wilhe lm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy o f History, trans. J . Sibree (New York : Dover, 1956), 40. The Philosophy of History is based on Hegel's lectures over several years on this topic and is comprised o f Hegel's manuscript drafts and published versions of the lectures, supplemented by passages from the notes of several students who attended the lectures. Sibree's translation does not distinguish between these sources in the text and he has edited the text with respect to content in a different manner from other translations. A more recent translation of the introduction to The Philosophy o f History by H . B . Nisbet is now available: Georg Wilhe lm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy o f Wor ld History. Introduction: Reason in History, trans. H . B Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). Nisbet's translation distinguishes between passages derived from Hegel's own drafts o f his lectures and those derived from students notes. He also presents much more historical material on non-Western peoples (e.g., Hegel's discussion of Africa) which is omitted from Sibree's translation. Unfortunately, Nisbet's translation is only of die introduction and not the whole work. Consequentiy, I w i l l use primarily the Nisbet translation but I w i l l make use of the Sibree translation for the sections other than the introduction or where it provides material not covered or explored in as much depth by Nisbet. 3 3 Georg Wilhe lm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of W o r l d History, trans. H . B . Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 131. F rom Hegel's text. 3 4 Ibid. 3 5 Hegel, Philosophy of History, op. cit . , 40. Capitalization and italics as in the original. 125 to it because "when man is spoken of as 'free by Nature,' the mode o f his existence as well as his destiny is implied. His merely natural and primary condition is intended. 1 , 3 6 He argues that this conception is wrong since man is not 'free' (in Hegel's sense of the word) in his natural condition. Thus he contends that: What we find such a state o f Nature to be in actual experience, answers exacdy to the Idea of a merely natural condition. Freedom as the ideal o f that which is original and natural, does not exist as original and natural. Rather must it be first sought out and won; and that by an incalculable medial discipline of the intellectual and moral powers. The state of Nature is , therefore, predominandy that of injustice and violence, of untamed natural impulses, of inhuman deeds and feelings. 3 7 However, even though this so-called 'state of nature' is wi ld and violent, man in this condition is a member of society and constrained by "social arrangements". Hegel asserts, therefore, that the state of nature as conceived by natural law theorists never existed. The state o f nature, . . . is not indeed raised to the dignity o f the historical fact; it would indeed be difficult, were the attempt seriously made, to point out any such condition as actually existing, or as having ever occurred. Examples of a savage stage of life can be pointed out, but they are marked by brutal passions and deeds of violence: while however rude and simple their conditions, they involve social arrangements which (to use the common phrase) restrain freedom.38 Consequendy, Hegel argues for the rejection of the idea of a state of nature and of the Rousseauian notion o f a "primitive paradisiac condition of man," since even savages (humans in the so-called natural condition) have social arrangements and, therefore, are neither in the state of nature nor 'free' in the sense that natural law theorists use either of these terms. In addition, Hegel contends that we should not regard the existence of social arrangements in the natural 3 6 Ibid. 3 7 Ibid., 41. 3 8 Ibid. , 40. 126 condition as a restriction of freedom. Rather, "we should on the contrary look upon such limitation as the indispensable proviso of emancipation. Society and the State are the very conditions in which Freedom is realized. 1 , 3 9 Hegel makes similar arguments for the rejection of the state of nature and of the tenets of natural law theory in the Philosophy of Right . 4 0 In this work he also rejects the natural law theorists' idea of a social contract (to get out of the state of nature). Hegel dismisses the idea of contract as the basis of marriage and the family as "shameful," since these involve "ethical" relationships and spiritual bonds which transcend mere contractual relations which treat the parties as separate individuals. 4 1 Nor can the state be founded on mere contract. Hegel argues that the notion of contractual relations ". . . is not the guiding principle o f the family, still less of the state" and that such a notion " . . . stands opposed to the Idea of ethical l i fe . " 4 2 He maintains that the state cannot be founded on contract on two grounds. 4 3 First, since a contract may be dissolved by the parties, the state must be based on other ties which are indelible and irreversible. To found the state on contract would place political rights and duties in the private realm and would move "the characteristics of private property into a sphere of a quite different 3 9 Ibid., 41. 4 0 Georg Wilhe lm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T . M . Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), paras. 168, 187, 194, pages 116, 125, 128. 4 1 See ib id . , paras. 75, 163, pages 58, 112. 4 2 Ibid. , para. 281, page 186. 4 3 See Norberto Bobbio, Democracy and Dictatorship. The Nature and Limits of State Power, trans. Peter Kennealy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 7. 127 and higher nature." 4 4 It would also mix up or conflate the state with c iv i l society and appear to make membership of the state optional: If the state is confused with c iv i l society, and i f its specific end is laid down as the security of and protection of property and personal freedom, then the interest of the individuals as such becomes the ultimate end of their association, and it follows that membership of the state is something optional. But the state's relation to the individual is quite different from this. Since the state is mind objectified, it is only as one of its members that the individual himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical l i fe . 4 5 Hegel is critical of natural law theorists for their conflation of c iv i l society and the state through the notion of a social contract and singles out Rousseau for particular criticism in this regard. 4 6 Hegel's second ground for rejecting a social contract as the basis of the state is that die state can require its citizens to pay taxes and to make the ultimate sacrifice, i .e. , to give up their lives for it, but these sacrifices cannot be required on-the basis of contract. Hegel states that".. . the state is not a contract at a l l . . . no r is its fundamental essence the unconditional protection and guarantee of the life and property of members o f the public as individuals. On the contrary, it is that higher entity which even lays claim to this very life and property and demands its sacrifice. " 4 7 Thus Hegel concludes for these reasons that the state cannot be based on contract and, instead, contends that".. . we are already citizens of the state by birth. The rational end o f man is life in the state, and i f there is no state there, reason at once demands that one be 4 4 Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, op. cit. , para. 75, page 59. 4 5 Ibid. , para. 258, page 156. 4 6 See ib id . , 157. 4 7 Ibid. , para. 100, page 71. 128 founded."48 Susan Buck-Morss argues that Hegel's rejection of the concepts of natural law theory such as the state of nature and the social contract is bound up with his departure from the classically based natural law theory of c iv i l society. 4 9 Fol lowing Riedel, she suggests that i n natural law theories, societies are established by humans endowed with natural rights contracting to form society, that is, a political association. However, for Hegel, society is part of the private sphere and " . . . consists by definition i n private persons bound together by need and labour. Labour is a specific mode of action, need is the natural basis of man as a 'private person'." 5 0 Hence, Buck-Morss contends, "for Hegel, it is the (depoliticized) system of the economy that produces the social form . . . and in modernity that form is the division of labor. Society is not a political creation, but an economic one." 5 1 While natural law theories conceive c iv i l society as a political association and, therefore, as the state, Hegel separates c iv i l society from the state by shifting it "topologically" from the political to the economic plane as an historically produced aspect of modernity. 5 2 A s Riedel notes, the concepts of natural law theory were still stamped by the influence of classical political theory. This is apparent in their conflation of the state with c iv i l society 4 8 Ibid. , para. 75A, page 242. 4 9 See Susan Buck-Morss, "Envisioning Capital: Polit ical Economy on Display," Critical Inquiry 21 (Winter 1995), 457. 5 0 Manfred Riedel, Between Tradition and Revolution. The Hegelian Transformation of Political Philosophy, trans. Walter Wright (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 44. 5 1 Buck-Morss, op. cit. , 457. 5 2 See ibid . 129 which follows the classical notion of 'society' as political or c iv i l society or the state.53 In the classical world, c iv i l society had a political, public character, expressed in the polis. This was juxtaposed to the economic, private character of the oikos or domestic society. Riedel argues that in the ancient world, c iv i l society was "distinguished by the specific civic quality of civility ... the citizens take part in public life, legislation, and administration. 1 , 5 4 Accordingly, c iv i l society was the domain of politics. Counterposed to the political domain of c iv i l society was the economic domain of the oikos: For in this classical tradition of politics, not al l inhabitants of the community distinguish themselves by ' c iv i l i ty ' . Neither the unfree of every kind, who must carry out the necessary elementary nurturing labours underlying the public -political c iv i l sphere in the private circle of the home, nor the artisan, equally active 'economically' but bound to the domestic workshop, nor women, belong to societas civilis sive res pubhca; since they are part of the oikos, 'domestic society', they lack the political standing which confers c iv i l i ty . 5 5 This exclusionary model o f c iv i l society is the basis of the natural law conception of c iv i l society which appears in the work of Hobbes and Locke. Hence, in the classical world there was no place in c iv i l society for slaves, servants, or women and, to this list was added day-labourers and artisans by the eighteenth century. A s Riedel observes, "their life runs its course outside the literally c iv i l society which as such defines and contrasts itself by reference to them. " w To this list of 'internal' Others who define and contrast with c iv i l society must be added the non-Western Other. 5 3 Riedel, op. c i t , 134. 5 4 Ibid. , 136. 5 5 Ibid. , 137. 5 6 Ibid. 130 In the ancient world, "barbarians" were excluded from the polis. The term "barbarian" originally denoted anyone who was not a Greek, i .e . , it was the term for "foreigner," and was not originally or necessarily a pejorative term. 5 7 Barbarians lacked the quality of civility necessary for life in the polis, they were not classical citizens, as witnessed by Herodutus' comments about the Scythians in his Histories. Herodutus constructed a mirror which reflected representations of an Other (the Scythians) as wel l as representations of the Greeks themselves. 5 8 The use of a mirroring construction of non-Western Others in the construction o f natural law concepts of c iv i l society in the work of Hobbes and Locke was identified and analyzed in Chapter Two of this thesis. The location of non-Western Others outside the concept of c iv i l society through the use of a mirroring construction by Montesquieu and Ferguson has been noted already in this chapter. Hegel also sets the non-Western Other outside c iv i l society by locating c iv i l society exclusively in the "modern world" (i .e., in contemporary Western Europe). I w i l l discuss this more fully once I have outlined Hegel's concept of c iv i l society and his philosophy of history on which this mirroring construction is based. Civil Society Hegel breaks with the classically based model o f civil/polit ical society and economic/domestic society. He divides: 5 7 See Nicholas Thomas, Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 72. 5 8 See Francois Hartog, The Mir ror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other In the Writ ing of History, trans. Janet L l o y d (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), x x i i i , 10-11. 131 . . . the political sphere of the state from the realm of 'society' which has become ' c i v i l ' . In this way the expression ' c i v i l ' gains a primarily 'social ' content as opposed to its original meaning and is no longer taken to be synonymous with 'polit ical ' . . . It now names only the 'social ' position of the self-supporting citizen within the state which has become absolute politically, and which from its side grants society its own source of gravity and sets it free as ' c i v i l ' . 5 9 Riedel posits that this separation of c iv i l society and state was concomitant with a new meaning of citizenship which arose in the eighteenth century. This was the notion of the citizen as bourgeois in contrast to the citizen of the polis or republic. In the natural law tradition, man as a human being is "a member of the societas generis humani, species-being and individuality at the same time . . . n 6 ° , while man as a citizen is a member of c iv i l society or the political sphere. However, for Hegel, man in c iv i l society is a "burgher as bourgeois", he is subject to material needs. Hence, "as a mere (i.e., natural) man, the human being is a being with needs, and as a being with needs he is a private person, i .e. , citizen as bourgeois. Human being and citizen are no longer opposed as they were in the . . . [natural law tradition} . . . but rather in modern c iv i l society the bourgeois contains the human being." 6 1 Riedel suggests that this indicates a rejection by Hegel of the recourse to the civic republican notions of citizenship and the classical models that were still popular with eighteenth-century theorists. He argues that it is only after Hegel that "citoyen and bourgeois stand side by side, the citizen of the state (a status extended to all subjects) next to the private cit izen." 6 2 In the Philosophy of Right. Riedel continues, H e g e l " . . . divides the study of c iv i l society 5 9 Ibid. , 139. 6 0 Ibid., 141. 6 1 Ibid. 6 2 Ibid., 142. 132 (human being as bourgeois) from that of the state (human being as citizen)."61 In so doing, he explores this relationship between the universal and the particular or individual which was so important to the theorists of the ancient world. However, while reflecting on these enduring concerns of political theory, Hegel is ever aware that one cannot merely apply the ancient models or principles to modernity; Ancient principles and models must be reworked to take account of the condition of diremption which characterizes modernity. Thus, Hegel's conception of the modern state is able "to sustain the contradiction between bourgeois and citoyen precisely because it produces the contradiction and pushes it to the limit in thought and reality." 6 4 The question of the relation between the universal and the individual is, therefore, critical to his analysis of modernity. Accordingly, Hegel's resolution o f this matter is expressed within the overarching concept o f Sittlichkeit (ethical life) which provides the framework for his separation of c iv i l society from the state. In The Philosophy of Right, Hegel distinguishes morality (Moralitat) from ethical life (Sittlichkeit) on the basis that morality is individual and subjective while Sittlichkeit deals with the ethical life of society as a whole. Thus Moralitat governs relationships between individuals as individuals while Sittlichkeit governs relations among individuals interacting as part of a community. 6 5 Charles Taylor explains Hegel's notion of Sittlichkeit thus: 'Sittlichkeit' refers to the moral obligations I have to an ongoing community o f which I am a part. These obligations are based on established norms and uses . . . 6 3 Ibid. , 127. 6 4 Ibid., 127-128. 6 5 See Shlomo Aviner i , Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (CambridgeCambridge University Press, 1972), 137. 133 The doctrine o f Sittlichkeit is that morality reaches its completion i n a community . . . Because the realization o f the Idea requires that man be part of a larger life in a society, moral life reaches its highest realization in Sittlichkeit. This highest realization is an achievement, of course, it is not present throughout history . . . 6 6 For Hegel, then, Sittlichkeit is historically produced, the most recent incarnation being the Greek polis. Here, "men had seen the collective life of their city as the essence and meaning o f their own lives, had sought their glory in its public life, their rewards in power and reputation within it, and immortality in its memory." 6 7 A s Taylor notes, Sittlichkeit also "was his [Hegel's] expression for that vertu which Montesquieu had seen as the mainspring o f republics." 6 8 However, Hegel realized that the Sittlichkeit of the Greek polis was no longer an apposite model for ethical life in modernity. It is through man's relation to the contemporary community that Hegel reworks the notion of ethical life for the modern age. In his discussion o f Sittlichkeit, Hegel deals with types or "moments" of communal association: the family, c iv i l society and the state.69 In modern society, these moments form an ascending hierarchy. The family is Sittlichkeit " in its natural or immediate phase" but it "loses its unity, [and] passes over into divis ion." 7 0 It passes into c iv i l society which is comprised of self-subsistent, interdependent individuals. Their association is a means to fulfil their egoistic needs and represents only "abstract" universality. Unity is only achieved in the "Constitution of the State which is the end and actuality of bom the substantial universal order and the public life 6 6 Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 376-377. 6 7 Ibid., 378. 6 8 Ibid. 6 9 See Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, op. cit. , para. 157, page 110. 7 0 Ibid. 134 devoted thereto. " 7 1 Hegel examines each of these moments in turn. The family, as already noted, is not based on contract but on love. 7 2 It also differs from the classical domestic sphere, the oikos, since it is no longer conceptualized as an economic entity but, rather, as a 'private' domain structured by emotional bonds. The economic functions of the oikos are now part of c iv i l society. 7 3 The family manifests a form of unity based on these emotional bonds which allows its members to view themselves as elements of a community. However, the unity of the family does not allow for individuality and this unity i s based on emotion rather than reason. Hence, the family by itself is insufficient to realize ethical l i fe . 7 4 Hegel argues that the family "disintegrates" once its children become adult individuals, can hold property and begin families of their own. Its unity also disintegrates through man's realization o f individuality (subjective freedom) in the modern age. 7 5 The disintegration of the family marks the point of transition to c iv i l society. In c iv i l society, man behaves as an individual and interacts economically with other individuals. Accordingly, Hegel defines c iv i l society as: an association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality which, because of their self-subsistence, is only abstract. Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal system - the means to security o f person and property - and by an external organization for attaining their particular and 7 1 Ibid. 7 2 See ibid, para., 158, page 110. 7 3 See Riedel, op. cit. , 47. 7 4 See Taylor, op. cit. , 432. 7 5 See Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, op. cit . , paras. 177-181, pages 118-122. 135 common interests.7 6 He then proceeds to analyze each of these aspects of c iv i l society in turn. This analysis begins with Hegel's notion of man. A s Taylor observes, "c iv i l society is the level of relations into which men enter . . . just as men. It is a sphere in which men are related to each other as person's in Hegel's sense, i .e. , as bearers of rights." 7 7 For Hegel, such a man is a "concrete person," a "totality of wants and a mixture of caprice and physical necessity." 7 8 However, each person is related to others since in modern society he cannot alone satisfy his needs or aims. Consequentiy, he states that "individuals in their capacity as burghers in this state are private persons whose end is their own interest. This end is mediated through the universal which thus appears as a means to its realization." 7 9 This creates a "system of complete interdependence," a form of universality which "constitutes" c iv i l society as "the world of ethical appearance". Hence, while the economic interdependence of c iv i l society may look like ethical life, this is really an illusion; this universality is only abstract. Instead, it is a realm o f egoistic self-interest which is only restrained by some elements of universality. 8 0 Hegel summarizes these contentions in the idea that c iv i l society has three "moments": the system o f needs ("the mediation of need and one man's satisfaction through his work and the 7 6 Ibid. , para. 157, page 110. 7 7 Taylor, op. cit. , 432. 7 8 Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, op. cit. , para. 182, page 122. 7 9 Ibid. , para., 187, page 124. 8 0 See ib id . , para. 185, page 123. 136 satisfaction of the needs of a l l others"), the administration of justice which protects property ("the actuality of the universal principle of freedom"), and the Police and the Corporation which deal with "contingencies still lurking i n . . . . [the first two moments] . . . and care for particular interests as a common interest. " 8 1 Hegel begins his discussion of the system of needs by distinguishing between animal and human needs. M a n satisfies bis needs through labour which mediates his relationship to nature. The conquest of nature through labour is a liberating experience which allows man to transcend the restrictions that animals are still subjected to by nature. In addition, while animal needs are material and corporeal only, humans require consciousness to express their needs. Consciousness is also developed through labouring to satisfy needs. 8 2 Since man's needs are not restricted by nature they can become infinite. This creates two opposing conditions - luxury or dependence and want: When social conditions tend to multiply and subdivide needs, means, and enjoyments ^definitely - a process which, like the distinction between natural and refined needs, has no qualitative limits - this is luxury. In this same process, however, dependence and want increase ad infinitum, and the material to meet these is permanently barred to the needy man because it consists of external objects with the special character of being property, the embodiment of the free w i l l of others . . . 8 3 Hence, the market economy operating in c iv i l society produces economic benefits and advancement for some (to the point of luxury) while for others it produces poverty and dependence. This is the result of the multiplication and subdivision of needs which in turn 8 1 Ibid. , para. 188, page 126. 8 2 See ibid, paras. 190-195. See also Aviner i , op. cit . , 143-144. 8 3 Ibid., para. 195, page 128. 137 encourages the expansion o f the division of labour. The multiplication of needs and the division of labour become interdependent, creating "an endless spiral" which drives the system of needs. 8 4 Norbert Waszek, in his study of the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on Hegel's concept of c iv i l society, argues that "the framework of Hegel's discussion of the division of labour, i.e. his conception of contemporary industrial and trading conditions, is essentially the framework of the Scottish Enlightenment authors . . . , , 8 S He further suggests that Hegel was indebted particularly to Adam Ferguson's analysis of the division of labour. 8 6 L ike the Scots, Hegel perceived both positive and negative consequences arising from the division of labour produced by the modern market economy. However, while he evinces some concern about the negative effects and considers they justify interference with the mechanisms of the free market economy, he does hot query the institution of the free market per se. Rather, he takes as a given the market economy, and examines the conditions under which intervention in the market is justifiable. 8 7 One condition requiring ameliorative intervention is the poverty caused by the division of labour. Participation in world markets and the international division of labour causes unemployment (and thus poverty) for those employed by domestic industries due to the vagaries of the world market or the loss of competitive advantage. Greater mechanization of production 8 4 Norbert Waszek, The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel's Account of ' C i v i l Society' (Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishers, 1988), 214. 8 5 Ibid. , 219. 8 6 See ib id . , 230. 8 7 See ib id . , 1%. 138 processes also produces more unemployed workers. Unemployment and poverty exacerbate social inequality. The division of labour produces great profits for the owners of capital but for workers it leads to dependence. Specialization of work means that workers are limited in the type or range of work they can do, so that, i f there is no work which requires their particular skills they cannot do other work. 8 8 However, while Hegel saw poverty as a problem, it was not the mere existence of disparities of wealth that bothered h im. On the contrary, he saw these as an inevitable and necessary, albeit undesirable, part of a free market system. This can be seen in bis distinction between the poor and "the rabble" who are affected psychologically by the division of labour. Thus, what did concern him were these negative psychological effects of the division of labour which enervate the human spirit and destroy communal association. Hence, "on the level of communal life, too, the division of labour necessarily has unintended and indeed unwanted outcomes: i t corrupts the 'sense of community' which is so essential for the virtues of the citizen and the soldier. In this respect, Hegel is very close to Ferguson. n 8 9 The system of needs and the relations of production, distribution and exchange which it creates, produce three economic class divisions: the agricultural, business and c iv i l servant classes. These classes are placed in an apparently hierarchical relation. The agricultural class is closest to nature and "owes comparatively little to reflection and independence of w i l l " . 9 0 Here Hegel suggests that "the real beginning and original foundation of states has been rightly ascribed 8 8 See ib id . , 221-224. 8 9 Ibid., 226-227. 9 0 Ibid. , para. 203, page 131. 139 to the introduction of agriculture" since this establishes the idea of private property and contrasts this with the "nomadic life of savages".'1 The business class is more advanced in that it must adapt raw materials through labour to meet man's needs. This work has three forms: craftsmanship, manufacture and trade, which require "reflection and intelligence".' 2 The third class, the c iv i l servants, deals with "the universal interests of the community". To fulfil this function, the c iv i l servants do not perform "direct labour" and instead are paid by the state or have independent means. 9 3 Hegel argues that class membership is ultimately determined by "subjective opinion and the individual's arbitrary w i l l " rather than by "accident of birth". Here he distinguishes between "the political life of the east and the west", arguing that social structures like the Indian caste system.do not take account of or reconcile subjective particularity within society and, therefore, fall prey to inner corruption and degeneration. In contrast, the West is able to incorporate and reconcile subjective particularity and thus "when subjective particularity is upheld by the objective order in conformity with it and is at the same time allowed its rights, then it becomes the animating principle of the entire c iv i l society . . . " ' 4 With respect to the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment study o f political economy on Hegel's work, Waszek contends that: "Hegel's 'philosophy o f right' assimilates and reproduces the views of a variety of Scottish Enlightenment authors with respect to the following subject matters: 9 1 Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, op. cit . , para. 203, page 131. 9 2 Ibid. , para. 204, page 132. 9 3 Ibid. , para. 205., page 132. 9 4 Ibid. , para. 206, page 133. 140 needs, labour, exchange, classes; the mterventionist quahfications to the idea of the free market economy; and the division of labour . . . [and]. . . through his study and assimilation o f the advanced economic theories of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, was able to raise their understanding of the modern market economy to a comprehensive political philosophy. 9 5 In this manner, Hegel was able to 'grasp his own time' and ground modernity out o f itself. This is what Habermas maintains makes Hegel the first philosopher to conceptualize modernity. Indeed, it is in relation to understanding the characteristics and processes of the system of needs in modern c iv i l society that Hegel perceives the role o f political economy. He declares that: Political economy is the science which starts from this view of needs and labour but then has the task of explaining mass-relationships and mass-movements in their complexity and their qualitative and quantitative character. This is one of the sciences which have arisen out of the conditions of the modern world. Its development affords the interesting spectacle (as in Smith, Say, and Ricardo) of thought working upon the endless mass of details which confront it at the outset and extracting therefrom the simple principles of the thing, the Understanding effective in the thing and directing it. It is to find reconciliation here to discover in the sphere o f needs this show of rationality lying in the thing and effective there . . . 9 6 Here Hegel expresses the way in which the analyses of political economy enable him to perceive the rationality underlying modern economic processes which initially appear only to manifest themselves as instances of division and diremption in modern society. This allows him to see reason working within c i v i l society through the universal authority (in the form of police/public authority and the corporation) which ameliorates and contains the extremes of the systems of needs. While the system of needs is the realm of the particular, it also contains an element of Waszek, op. cit . , 230. Ibid. , para. 189, page 126-127. 141 universality, "the universality o f freedom", but this is only abstract (as true freedom is only present in the state) and is expressed as the right to private property. This right is recognized and actualized in c iv i l society by the protection o f property through the administration of justice. 9 7 This moment of c iv i l society is concerned with the promulgation of laws and with the adjudication of alleged mfringements especially in relation to property and contract. Public authorities - courts of justice - perform this adjudication function. Through the administration of justice, then, me particularity of c iv i l society is mediated by universality but only as abstract right. Rather, Hegel contends, "the actualization of this unity through its extension to the whole ambit of particularity is (i) the specific function of the Police, though the unification i t effects is only relative; (ii) it is die Corporation which actualizes the unity completely, though only in a whole which, while concrete, is restricted; " 9 8 The Police and the Corporation are the third moment of c iv i l society. Hegel posits that "the right actually present in the particular requires, f irst that accidental hindrances to one aim or another be removed, and undisturbed safety of person and property be attained; and secondly, that the securing of every single person's livelihood and welfare be treated and actualized as a right The need for the Police or public authority arises from this injunction to ensure public welfare because of the operation of the free market economy in c iv i l society. The Police are required to ensure security in two areas - the sphere of contingencies and external organization. See ib id . , para. 208, page 134. Ibid. , para. 229, page 145. Ibid. , para. 230, page 146. 142 With respect to contingencies, the Police have both ongoing and emergency jurisdictions. Their ongoing functions are dealing with crime, "control of victuals" (weights and measures, meat inspection, pharmaceuticals), control of the education system (administration, enforcement of attendance, curriculum), public health (vaccinations) and public works (road and harbour building and maintenance). 1 0 0 Emergency powers are given to the Police where conflict and immediate problems pose a danger to the public and the situation cannot be.left to the market to resolve. Problems concerning "daily necessities" (e.g., basic foodstuffs) such as supply and pricing issues entitle the Police to regulate the market through price controls or setting shop trading hours. 1 0 1 Problems caused by "external organization" are also within the Police's purview. This refers to difficulties generated by international markets and divisions of labour. Where these forces threaten local industries the police may impose measures such as tariffs, customs duties, taxes, etc. The.public authority is also charged with trying to find new markets for goods. 1 0 2 This search for new markets is also part of the government's function of trying to alleviate the negative effects of the market economy produced by the division of labour. These are unemployment, social inequality, poverty and human degradation.' 0 3 One of the remedies Hegel puts forward for some of these problems is colonization which ameliorates the problems by creating new markets and removing surplus population. However, this can only provide a See ib id . , paras. 232-240, page 146-148. See also Waszek, op. cit. , 198-200. See ib id . , paras. 235-236, page 147; see Waszek, ib id . , 201-202. See ibid, para. 236, page 147; Waszek, ib id . , 203. See ib id . , paras. 236-244, pages 147-150; see Waszek, ib id . , 222-227. 143 temporary solution to these difficulties, and the public authority must f ind other ways to mitigate these problems at home. 1 0 4 Hegel's concern with the diremption modernity causes in the individual through the loss of community is sought to be remedied by the Corporations. Corporations are "not the traditional, restrictive old guilds, but voluntary organizations into which persons organize themselves according to their professions, trades and interests." 1 0 5 They form intermediate bodies which exist between the state and the individual. Hegel considers it important to provide individuals with ways to act in the public domain as part of ethical life: Under modern political conditions, the citizens have only a restricted share in the public business of the state, yet i t is essential to provide men - ethical entities -with work of a public character, over and above their private business. This work of a public character, which the modern state does not always provide, is found in the corporation. 1 0 6 The corporations provide a forum for the egoistic individuals of c iv i l society (especially the business class) to interact with others in a communal setting. A s Aviner i notes, "because o f the strength o f the disruptive forces of c iv i l society, Hegel realized that the kind of solidarity he envisaged in the state cannot be created in an uhmediated way; antagonistic bourgeois cannot become co-operative citoyens without a lengthy process of mediation and Bildung, and the corporation is one of .the .prime vehicles for .this education of modern man." 1 0 7 Corporations act as a "second family" to their members, providing them with education, ameliorating the negative See ib id . , paras. 246-249, page 151-152. Aviner i , op. cit. , 164. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, op. cit . , addition to para. 255, page 278. Aviner i , op. cit. , 165. 144 effects o f the market economy, and aggregating and representing their interests. Through the institutionalization of interests, corporations provide an "institutionalized guarantee against state encroachment upon economic a c t i v i t y . " m Corporations are intermediate bodies between the individual and the state. Charles Taylor has noted the connection between Montesquieu's 'corps intermeoiaires'..and Hegel's corporations. L i k e Montesquieu's intermediate bodies, the corporations are "amphibious bodies," which function outside me political sphere i n c iv i l society but they also have a function to perform with respect to it. Hence, the corporations are "engaged in conscious self-management" and "are also integrated i n their own way into the state."1 0 9 The corporations, then, provide a setting for mediation and for the education of the bourgeois in a communal association in c iv i l society which prepares them for the fulfilment of ethical life in the modern state. In the "higher community" of the state, individual subjectivity and the universal are harmonized. Hegel calls this "concrete freedom." 1 1 0 W o r l d His to ry and the Non-European Other A s part of his attempt to theorize ethical life in modernity, Hegel locates c iv i l society spatially and temporally in contemporary Western Europe. Hence, he temporalizes c iv i l society by his claims that "the creation o f c iv i l society is the achievement of the modern world . . . " and 1 0 8 Ibid. , 166. See Hegel, op. cit . , para. 288, page 189. 1 0 9 Charles Taylor, "Modes of C i v i l Society," Public Culture 3, n o . l (Fal l , 1990), 108. 1 1 0 See Hegel, The Mosophy of Right, op. cit. , para. 260, page 160; See Taylor, Hegel, op. cit . , 438. 145 with the description of c iv i l society as "the child of modernity". 1 1 1 In the Philosophy of History, he locates c iv i l society spatially i n the modernity of Western Europe by contrasting it with contemporary America. America, he claims, does not have a c iv i l society or an organized state. These w i l l only arise "after the immeasurable space which that country presents to its inhabitants shall have been occupied, and the members of the political body shall have begun to be pressed back on each other." Hence, "only when, as in Europe, the direct increase of agriculturists is checked, w i l l the inhabitants, instead of pressing outwards to occupy the fields, press inwards upon each other - pursuing town occupations, and trading with their fellow citizens; and so form a compact system of c iv i l society, and an organized state."1 1 2 Hegel also grounds his discussion of ethical life culminating in the modern state in an historical framework in the Philosophy pf Right. In the section entitled "World History," he refers to "c iv i l society" as the "particular," i n contrast to the universality of world history. 1 1 3 Hegel's phdosophy of history is the underpinning to his location o f c iv i l society in modernity and the construction o f non-European Others as outside modernity and c i v i l society. Once again, these Others are used as a mirror in which Hegel is able to construct modern European c iv i l society. The section on "World History" ht The Philosophy of Right is a condensed version of 1 1 1 Hegel, ib id . , addition to para. 182, page 266, translator's note to para. 202, page 356. 1 1 2 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, op. cit. , 86. Nisbet translates the term "organized state" as "organic state" which makes more sense in this context (see Nisbet, op. cit. , 170). The state to which Hegel refers is the modern state which is the actualization of reason and freedom and the apex of ethical life. This form of state only occurs i n the modern world, i . e . , contemporary Western Europe. 1 1 3 Hegel, The Philosophy o f Right, op. cit . , para. 341, page 216. 146 Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history.' 1 4 A t the outset of Lectures on the Philosophy of Wor ld History. Hegel tells his audience that "I have no text book on which to base my lectures; but in my 'Elements of the Philosophy of Right , ' . . . I have already defined the concept of world history proper, as well as the principal periods into which its study can be divided. " U 5 The progressive development of spirit is the basis of Wor ld History through "freedom's progress towards self-realization in human consciousness, and the unfolding of reason ...... " 1 U S Hegel divides world history into four phases which are associated with specific spatial and temporal locations: the Oriental, Greek, Roman and German worlds. Each of these phases embodies a stage in human consciousness which culminates in the self-consciousness or self-awareness of man in the modern state. Each phase of history is represented by one national culture which expresses the spirit of the age in its culture. Hegel encapsulates this in his claim that "the east knew and to the present day knows that only that Owe i s Free; the Greek and Roman world, that some are free; the German Wor ld knows that All are free. " I l 7 Each of these historical epochs is expressed in a particular type of government: "the first political form therefore which we observe in History, is Despotism, the second Democracy and Aristocracy, the third Monarchy."11" History is a dialectical process in which man develops in stages to self-consciousness. 1 1 4 These Lectures present a constructed and composite Hegel, reconstructed from his own (fragmentary) lecture notes and those of several students, see footnote 32 supra. 1 1 3 Nisbet, op. cit . , 11. 1 1 6 Aviner i , op cit . , 221. 1 1 7 Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, op. cit . , 104. 1 1 8 Ibid. 147 While individuals have a role to play in creating history ("world historical individuals") then-agency is limited as they are vehicles for the expression of the spirit of the age. Thus, reason unfolds i n the progress of history through these agents although they may not be conscious of the role of reason or of their own role in history. Hegel calls this the "cunning of reason". However, while world historical individuals are unconscious of reason working in history, philosophers are able to see this and perceive the relationship between history and the development of consciousness. 1 1 9 Philosophers have the benefit of hindsight but as philosophy "comes on the scene too late" it is not the task of philosophers to give "instruction as to what the world ought to be." This is expressed in Hegel's well-known statement that "When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old. B y philosophy's grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl o f Minerva spreads its y/ings only with the falling of dusk." 1 2 0 This is also why Hegel does not consider it to be the role of philosophers to predict the future. 1 2 1 Hegel considers history to be geographically based and, like Montesquieu, he believed that national spirit or character were determined to a large extent by geographic.factors such as climate. He spends a substantial amount of the introduction to The Philosophy of History discussing the effects of typography and climate on the peoples of various geographic regions. He divides the world into old and new worlds: the new world is America and Australia while the old world is comprised of the continents of A s i a , Afr ica and Europe. See Aviner i , op. cit, 230-234. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right. "Preface," 12-13. See Aviner i , op. cit. , 236. 148 Hegel's discussion of the new world is confined to the Americas. Here he distinguishes between the white settlers and the native inhabitants whom he likens to "unenlightened children, l iving from one day to the next, and untouched by higher thoughts or aspirations." 1 2 2 The natives are inferior "in all respects" both physically and mentally. He considers the Africans in the Americas to be superior to the native Americans since " the negroes are far more susceptible to European culture than the Indians." 1 2 3 Accordingly, he concludes that in the Americas "die effective population comes for the most part from Europe, and everything that happens in America has its origin there." 1 2 4 Turning to the old world, Hegel declares that this is "the setting of world history". He divides it into three continents which differ not only according to geographical considerations but also according to "spiritual character". Hegel claims that his principal source for this typology is K a r l Ritter (1779-1859), a professor of geography at Ber l in and the principal architect of a comparative 'scientific geography'. He says "it was Ritter who formulated these distinctions between the continents and expressed them in a direct and tangible form. " 1 2 s Hegel begins his discussion of the old world with the African continent. He subdivides Afr ica into three regions: Afr ica proper (south of the Sahara), European Afr ica (north of the Sahara), and the Ni le (linked to Asia) . European Afr ica and As ia do not figure in his account since they are not world-historical settings and their characters are conditioned by their 1 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Wor ld History, op. cit . , 165. 1 Ibid. 1 Ibid. ' .Ibid., 173. 149 relationship with Europe and As i a respectively. 1 2 6 Thus his analysis of Afr ica centres around "Africa proper". He begins with Afr ica since " . . . it can wel l be taken as antecedent to our main enquiry. It has no historical interest of its own, for we find its inhabitants l iving in barbarism and savagery i n a land which has not furnished them with any integral ingredient of culture." He describes Afr ica as "the land of childhood, removed from the light o f self-conscious history and wrapped in.the dark mantie of night." This he attributes not just to its tropical climate but to its "geographical character," i .e. , "it is still unexplored, and has no connections whatsoever with Europe." This is in contrast to the European part of Afr ica (the north) which has a "new character through contact with Europeans." 1 2 7 Consequentiy, "in this main portion of Afr ica , history is in fact out of the question. Li fe there consists of a succession of contingent happenings and surprises. N o aim or state exists whose development could be followed; and there is no subjectivity, but merely a series of subjects who destroy one another." 1 2 8 Hegel notes that not much study has been done o f the "peculiar mode of self-consciousness" apparent in Afr ica . Indeed, most of the firsthand accounts of Afr ica are considered by Europeans to be "incredible" (i .e., so strange that they are not credible, they are unbelievable) and furnish merely "a collection of fearful details" instead of an historical analysis. Here he imposes two caveats, one concerning source materials and, the other, concerning the content of those materials. Wi th regard to.source materials he warns.that "the literature on a subject of this kind is somewhat indefinite in scope, and anyone who wishes to go into it in detail 1 2 6 See ib id . , 173-174. 1 2 7 Ibid. , 174. 1 2 8 Ibid. , 176. 150 must avail himself of such material as is available i n the useful works of reference. The best general account of Africa is provided in Ritter's geography". Next he warns that the "African character" discerned from these accounts ".... is difficult to comprehend, because it is so totally different from our own culture, and so remote and alien in relation to our own mode of consciousness." He continues that because of this quality o f absolute otherness, "we must forget al l die categories which are fundamental to our own spiritual life, i .e. the forms under which we normally subsume the data which confront us . . . " l 2 9 Therefore, Afr ica is so profoundly different from Europe that it requires a completely different framework and categories of analysis. Here hexonstructs Af r i ca as contradiction, as the denial and negation of Europe. 1 3 0 Hegel devotes several pages of the introduction to describing the character and conditions of Afr ica . It seems odd to devote so much space to a region which is not, by bis own definition, part of history and of which he repeatedly states that "the consciousness of the inhabitants has not yet reached an awareness o f any substantial and objective existence." 1 3 1 Rather, he seems to be fascinated by the "fearful details" originating from the accounts of missionaries and gets caught up in recounting these at every opportunity. A s h i s discussion of Afr ica is derived from his lectures on world history this recital of the "fearful details" may have served to enliven his lectures with sensational and gruesome content apart from any prurient interest he may have 1 2 9 Ibid. 1 3 0 1 owe this insight to Derek Gregory who has analyzed Hegel's geographical imaginary in terms of the principle Hegel uses to characterize the relation of Europe to other non-European geographic areas: contradiction for Afr ica , and opposition for As ia . « 1 3 1 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy Of Wor ld History, op. cit . , 176-177. Sibree's translation omits al l the detail o f Hegel's discussion o f Afr ica . 151 harboured. Africa is mired in subjectivity with no concept of the universal or knowledge of the absolute. M a n i n Afr ica has "not progressed beyond immediate existence" and "is nothing more than a savage". Hegel describes Africans as savages, barbarians, lawless, cannibals, idolaters, fetishists, sensuous, effeminate, arbitrary, fanatics, and frenzied. H e claims that "the negro is an example of animal man in all his savagery and lawlessness, and i f we wish to understand him at a l l , we must put aside al l our European attitudes." He continues that "for this reason, we cannot properly feel ourselves into his nature, no more than into that of a dog . . . " 1 3 2 Once again, Hegel constructs Africans as absolutely Other and as incomprehensible to Europeans. So much so, that they do not even appear to h im to be part of the same species. A long this line, he also rejects the Rousseauesque idea of Africans as in a paradisiacal "state o f innocence." On the contrary, he declares, "this primitive state of nature is m fact a state o f animakty. Paradise was that zoological garden in which man lived in an animal condition of innocence - but this is not his true destiny." 1 3 3 Indeed, the slaves taken to the new world are better off than those who were left behind in Afr ica . This is because slavery is "a moment of transition towards a higher stage of development" in which man moves from his "purely fragmented sensuous existence" and is educated to "a higher ethical existence and a corresponding degree of culture." 1 3 4 While Africans have government, they are not ruled by "rational laws". Rather their government is patriarchal and despotic since " . . . sensuous barbarism can only be restrained by Ibid. Ibid. , 178. Ibid. , 184. 152 despotic power." 1 3 5 L ike Montesquieu, Hegel constructs a tripartite model of types of government: democracy, aristocracy, monarchy. He further subdivides monarchy into despotism and "monarchy proper," as Montesquieu does. 1 3 6 Hegel ascribes these types of government to spatial and temporal locations and to phases in the development of Spirit. Hence, the oriental world is characterized by despotic government, the Greek world by democracy, the Roman world by aristocracy, and the European world by monarchy. The African form of government is also despotic even though Afr ica is not part of the development of Spirit. Taking al l these "traits" into account, Hegel concludes that " . . . intractability is the distinguishing feature of the negro character" and that "the condition in which they live is incapable of any development or culture, and their present existence is the same as it has always been." 1 3 7 Hence, Africa is stationary and static, enduring and unchanging. A t this juncture, he concludes, "we shall leave Afr ica at this point, and it need not be mentioned again. For it is an unhistorical continent, with no movement or development of its own." 1 3 8 After dismissing Afr ica as unhistorical, Hegel turns his attention to the "real theatre of world history". In As ia or die Oriental world, "consciousness in and for itself" begins to emerge. He describes As ia as the "continent of sunrise and of origins in general . . . it is there that the light of the spirit, the consciousness o f a universal, first emerged, and with it the process of world history". He continues that "while every country is both east and west in relation to others, Ibid., 186. See Hegel, The Philosophy of History, op. cit . , 44. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Wor ld History, op. cit. , 190. Ibid. , 190. 153 so that As ia is the western continent from the point of view of America; but just as Europe is the centre, and end of the O ld Wor ld - i .e. absolutely the west - so also is As ia absolutely the east." Here, Hegel establishes from the outset the oppositional relation between east and west, between As i a and Europe. They are opposites - mirror-images. Hegel employs a heliographic trope repeatedly when describing the progress of world history: The sun rises in the Orient. The sun is light, and light is universal and simple self-relatedness, i.e. universality in itself. This light, though universal in itself, exists in the sun as an individual or subject. We often imagine someone watching the moment of daybreak, the spreading of me light, and the rise of the sun i n al l its majesty . . . A n d by evening, man has constructed a building, an inner sun, the sun of his own consciousness, which he has produced by bis own efforts . . . 1 3 9 Like the progress of the sun, "world history travels from east to west; for Europe is the absolute end of history, just as As i a is the beginning." 1 4 0 Hegel invokes other luminary metaphors to describe me birth and maturation of history: tight, radiance, dawn, etc. He contrasts these with terms like dark, night, evening, etc., evoking again the trope of the dark continent for Africa which he describes as "removed from the light of self-conscious history and wrapped i n the dark mantie of night." 1 4 1 In the Oriental world, the universal and the individual are not distinct in consciousness. Hence, "the substantial world is distinct from the individual, but the object has not yet been located in the spirit itself." 1 4 2 This phase of spirit is manifested in the form of government, 1 3 9 Ibid. , 196-197. 1 4 0 Ibid. , 197. 1 4 1 Ibid., 174. 1 4 2 Ibid. , 198. 154 which is despotic, since the type of government (the despot) embodies the level of consciousness and freedom. Hence, only the despot is free. This kind of state is static; it is "an enduring state, for it cannot change itself by its own efforts." 1 4 3 A s Aviner i notes, "Hegel is extremely critical of the various romantic idealizations of Oriental society, so fashionable in the early nineteenth century . . . [e.g., his] . . . devastating critique of Wilhe lm von Humboldt's and Johann Josef von Gorres' views, especially on India..... " 1 4 4 He further separates the Oriental world into three forms: China, India and Persia. China is a "theocratic despotism" since subjective consciousness and objective existence are still combined. It is static, stagnant, stationary and has no history. 1 4 5 Hegel describes the Chinese as unchanging, fixed, superstitious, imitative, proud, servile, 'clever' , and their language, mathematics, science, philosophy, historiography, religion, and art as inferior i n various respects. Hegel considers India to be "more advanced" than China since the Chinese state is patriarchal and despotic and the individual has no sense of self. However, Indians are, according to Hegel, governed by a caste system whose divisions do not express spirit but do allow for differentiation on some level . 1 4 6 Thus India is a "theocratic aristocracy" since "independent members ramify from the unity of despotic power." 1 4 7 He describes India as "in the ecstatic state o f a dreaming condition," and as sensuous, bizarre, confused, ridiculous, dumb, disgusting, Ibid., 198. See Aviner i , op. cit . , 224. See ibid. See Aviner i , op. cit. , 225. Hegel, The Philosophy of History. Op. cit . , 144. 155 wicked, degraded, voluptuous, vulgar, monstrous, irrational and effeminate. L i k e China, India is "stationary andf ixed" . 1 4 8 Persia, Hegel contends, forms the "true transition from the Orient to the west," since here "the.substantial unity has attained a purer form" which is "theocratic monarchy". Unl ike China and India which have remained fixed and stationary, Persia "has been subject to those developments and revolutions, which alone manifest a historical condition." 1 4 9 The Persians, are, therefore, the first historical people since they "discovered reason as wel l as its opposite, but never were able to go beyond this opposition...... [and] freedom is still embedded in the abstract.action of the monarch, not in any consciousness acting in the populace. " 1 S 0 World history now moves to the second phase in the development of Spirit - the Greek world. Individuality arises here but is still grounded in substantial unity. However, since these two elements are combined, freedom is still unrealized and Spirit moves to the third phase o f history "when inner reflection liberates itself and presses forward, so preparing the way for a new universal end." 1 5 1 This next phase is the Roman Empire which is characterized by universality, but only abstract universality. This "subjugates" individuality and leads .to the transition to the next phase of history; the tiansition is "a struggle between abstract individuality and individuality." 1 5 2 The principle of subjective consciousness arises with Christianity during Ibid., 139. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, op. cit . , 173. Aviner i , op. cit . , 225. Hegel, Lectures, op cit. , 203. Ibid., 204. 156 the era of the Roman Empire. Hence, as A v i n e r i notes, for Hegel "the role of the Germanic peoples in history is due solely to the fact that they received Christianity from the Romans, and though they destroyed the Roman empire, they.absorbed its culture which included at that time the Christian re l ig ion . H 1 5 3 The fourth stage of history is represented by the "Germanic Wor ld" which would be better translated as Western Europe or Western Christendom since it comprises France, England, Scandinavia, Italy, and Spain as well as Germany. 1 5 4 The subjective freedom expressed in Christianity is further advanced by the Reformation and the French Revolution. These events signal the beginning of modernity, of the present, within this world. Self-consciousness and freedom are concretized in this world. Relat ionship to Montesquieu and Ferguson In his philosophy of history, Hegel figures alterity through a mirroring construction of non-European Others. In this he is similar to Montesquieu and Ferguson. However, his construction is more complex than those of the eighteenth-century writers. One possible reading of Hegel's geographical imagination is through a semiotic square. In this manner, Hegel produces a tripartite model of the Other with Europe as the reference point. Afr ica and As ia are characterized by a principle of relation with Europe: As ia by opposition and Africa by Aviner i , op. cit. , 229. See Hegel, Lectures, op. cit. , 195; see also Aviner i , ib id . , 228. 157 contradiction. 1 5 5 Both of these Others, in different ways, act as mirrors in which European identities and notions of c iv i l society are constructed. Africans are so different from Europeans that they scarcely belong to the same species and live a savage and barbarious existence so alien to European experience that there is no possibility of civi l i ty or c iv i l society. Africans are the absolute Other, they are the negation and contradiction of European life; they are "blank darkness". , S 6 Asians, on the other hand, have civilizations but these are opposite to European civilizations. While European civilizations have progressed and evolved, Asian civilizations have remained static and unchanged from their inception. Their form of government (despotism) is the negative mirror-image of the European form of government (monarchy). Hegel's more sophisticated and differentiated mirroring construction of non-European Others reflects his overall relationship with his tighteenth-century predecessors. Waszek expresses this succinctly when he states that while "Hegel himself cannot be considered an Enlightenment figure Hegel's indebtedness to the Enlightenment is of a ' l iv ing mirror, ' which does not directly reflect the Enlightenment, but assimilates i t . " 1 5 7 This claim is echoed by Cohen and Arato who contend that Hegel "synthesized much of late eighteenth-century thought" on c iv i l society. In particular, they assert, Hegel synthesized the eighteenth-century idea of 'society' as expressed, for example, by Montesquieu, the notion of a 'civi l ized society' 1 5 5 America/Australia cannot be described as relational in this manner as they are neither oppositional nor contradictory to Europe and hence form the "impossible relation" or "impossible square". On the semiotic square, see Donna Haraway, "The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others," in Cultural Studies, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler (New York : Routiedge, 1992), 295-337. 1 5 6 See Christopher L . Mi l l e r , Blank Darkness. Africanist Discourse in French (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985). 1 5 7 Waszek, op. cit. , 18. 158 defined in economic terms by Scottish Enlightenment writers l ike Ferguson, and the notion of intermediate bodies suggested by Montesquieu. 1 5 8 With respect to Montesquieu's influence on Hegel, he cites Montesquieu with approval both in The Philosophy of History and The Philosophy of Right. Montesquieu's principal influence appears to have been in relation to the tripartite model of government (monarchy, democracy/aristocracy, despotism), the doctrine of the separation of powers, the geographical basis of history and the effects of geography and climate on national character, and the role of intermediate bodies as part of c iv i l society. 1 5 9 In The Philosophy o f Right Hegel claims that "Montesquieu proclaimed the true historical v iew", referring to The Spirit o f the Laws (Book 1, chapter 3), and in The Philosophy of History he also praises this work, calling it "both thorough and profound." 1 6 0 Ferguson's influence on Hegel is less overt, though no less important. Waszek, in his study of the Scottish Enlightenment's influence on Hegel's concept of c iv i l society, argues that Ferguson and the other Scottish writers worked at a time when the social sciences were beginning to evolve from moral philosophy but they still considered their economic and sociological writings to be part of moral philosophy. However, much of Hegel's work was produced in the nineteenth century at a time when the social sciences were established. He viewed political economy as a resource for philosophical work but did not see it as part of philosophy. He 1 3 8 Jean L . Cohen and Andrew Arato, C i v i l Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, Mass. : The M I T Press, 1994, 89-90. 1 3 9 See Hegel, The Philosophy of History, op. cit . , 44, 79, 104, 251; The Philosophy of Rjght, op. cit . , 16 ,20 , 161, 175, 177. 1 6 0 Ibid, 16; Hegel, Lectures, op. cit . , 22. 159 therefore viewed the works of me Scottish philosophers as " . . . 'external' or 'extra-mural' influences which he felt less obliged to acknowledge, especially in purely philosophical contexts." 1 6 1 For example, Waszek demonstrates that in his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel examines Hume's philosophical works but " . . . Ferguson, who no doubt exerted a far greater influence on h im, he only mentions i n passing." 1 6 2 Waszek sets out to demonstrate the influence of the Scottish enlightenment authors despite this lack of direct citation in his work. Through a meticulous analysis and comparison of the works of the Scots with Hegel's writings (which are far too detailed to repeat here), Waszek presents a convincing case for Scottish influence on Hegel. Wi th regards to Ferguson, his Essay on the History o f C i v i l Society was translated into German and was available within a year of its first publication. 1 6 3 Waszek demonstrates that Ferguson's work, "which Hegel knew for certain", especially his discussion o f the division o f labour, was influential in the construction of Hegel 'snot ion of c iv i l society. 1 6 4 However, some writers seem to argue against Ferguson's influence on Hegel. They claim that Ferguson's notion of c iv i l society is still the same as the natural law conception of civil/polit ical society. 1 6 5 However, this is not really the case. Ferguson includes a wide variety of matters within the 'poli t ical , ' including economic matters such.as the 'advancement o f the 1 6 1 Waszek, op. cit . , 21. 1 6 2 Ibid. 1 6 3 See ib id . , 59. 1 6 4 I b i d , 153, 230. 1 6 5 For example, see Fania Oz-Salzberger, Translating the Enlightenment. Scottish C i v i c Discourse in Eighteenth-Century Germany (Oxford• Clarendon Press 1995), 113. 160 commercial arts' and, consequently, his concept of c iv i l society is not simply that of the natural law tradition. This seems to be a situation where Canguilhem's caveat about the difference between concepts and theories applies. There is no great conceptual shift between Ferguson and Hegel. Both have the same concept of c iv i l society but, rather, have different theories about it. Hence, it is better to see their work on c iv i l society (along with Montesquieu's) as forming a "relation of beginning to completion or of anticipation to realization." 1 6 6 Conclusion to Part I The task of Part I of this study was to demonstrate that a discontinuity or rupture with respect to the concept o f c iv i l society began to occur during the eighteenth century. The beginning of this rupture is evidenced in Montesquieu's work, continues in Ferguson's and is most fully realized in Hegel's concept of c iv i l society. Hence, the eighteenth century marks the commencement o f a discursive break or conceptual shift in the concept of c iv i l society expressed in the conceptual separation of c iv i l society and the state. To establish this break or conceptual shift the work of Hobbes and Locke on Civil society was contrasted with that of Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel. F rom this discussion, conclusions may be drawn regarding two major themes: one relating to the concept of c iv i l society, and the other to what I have called the post-Enlightenment geographical imagination. In both cases, the work of Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel forms a relation of "anticipation to realization". The disjunture with prior concepts of c iv i l society that began in the eighteenth century 1 6 6 Georges Canguilhem, quoted in Gary Gutting, Miche l Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 39. 161 is evident in several points of contrast with the theories of seventeenth-century authors. Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel all reject the state of nature and the social contract as starting points for political theory. Instead, they consider man to be born in society and to remain there. In rejecting these concepts they begin to also reject the identification of civil society with political society evident in Hobbes' and Locke's work. Through their discussion of the modern market economy and its relation to ancient models of civic virtue and ethical life, they also begin to diverge from the classical notion of civil society as political society This represents a break with the classical dyadic model of polis (civil/political society) and oikos (domestic/economic society). The disjuncture is most fully realized in Hegel's notion of civil society as a realm of (individual, self-interested) economic activity tempered by public intervention. Hence, each writer attempted to reevaluate the received classical models of civic virtue and revise them to take account of the modern European economy. However, each writer expressed some ambivalence towards modern commerce and its effects on (civil) society. While commerce was perceived in general to be a civilizing and progressive force, its potential for social diremption and the weakening of communal association were of concern to each author. In rejecting the ideas of a state of nature and a social contract, Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel each adopted instead their own versions of a stadial theory of human development. They all perceived man to be progressive. Montesquieu and Ferguson presented versions of the "four stages" theory of human development which saw mankind moving in increments from a primitive, rude state (represented by contemporary non-Europeans, especially the American Indians) to a refined, civilized state (represented by contemporary Europeans). Hegel also viewed man as progressing in stages but each stage was linked to the development of self-consciousness 162 and reason rather than to the mode of subsistence. However, all three writers associate forms of government with spatial and temporal locations that also correspond to stages of human development. Montesquieu's typology of democracy, monarchy and despotism is adopted and the forms of government are associated respectively with the ancient world, contemporary Europe, and the contemporary non-European world. Similarly, Montesquieu's distinction between monarchies and despotisms (with its notion of corps intermeVIiaires which are important for the development of a concept of civil society separate from the state) is adopted by Ferguson and his idea of intermediate bodies is echoed in Hegel's notion of the corporations. In the development of a concept of civil society as separate from political society or the state, each writer deploys a mirroring construction of non-Europeans. Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel all make use of non-Europeans as points of contrast with Europeans with respect to civil society, suggesting that non-Europeans are uncivilized and therefore do not have civil societies. Their conception of civil society is confined to Europe. This is epitomized in Hegel's statement that "the creation pf civil society is the achievement of the modern world". These mirroring constructions of non-European Others also played an important role in the development of the post^ Enlightenment geographical imagination. While seventeenth-century writers like Hobbes and Locke largely confined their use of non-Western comparative material to illustrations drawn from works on the American Indians, eighteenth-century writers like Montesquieu and Ferguson drew on a much wider range of comparative material. This was due in part to the exploration of different geographic areas in the eighteenth century (e.g., the Pacific voyages) and to changes in the practice of natural history 163 with the introduction of new scientific techniques and epistemologies. The use of comparative material by Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel was also much more sophisticated and complexly figured than that presented by prior authors. They al l were concerned with the effects of geography on human development. Geographic variables such as typography and climate were examined to ascertain their effects on the mode of subsistence, character, and differences in cultures. The effects of climate were of particular importance to each author and climatic variables were used to explain differences between cultures and to ground typologies o f static (non-European) peoples and progressive (European) peoples. The characteristics of different societies derived from geographical analysis were used in turn to divide the world into spatial and temporal locations which corresponded with different societies and stages in human history. Each location was part of a stadial theory of human development and was associated with a particular form of government. These developmental sequences culminated in contemporary Europe and the (modern) idea of c iv i l society. Again , a relation of anticipation to realization can be discerned in the work of Montesquieu, Ferguson and Hegel. Montesquieu's discussions o f geographic factors such as climate and his spatially and temporally located typology of types of government, were followed by Ferguson, and were refined and developed by Hegel as part of his quadratic typology of world history. In Part II of this thesis, I w i l l examine how this post-Enlightenment geographical imagination and the concept of c i v i l society which were realized in Hegel's work have informed twentieth-century writing on c iv i l society and the use of non-European Others in the construction of that concept. 164 PART II HEGEL'S SHADOW 165 C H A P T E R F I V E T R A V E L L I N G T H E O R Y The Philosophical traveller, sailing to the ends of the earth, is in fact travelling in time; he is exploring the past; every step he makes is the passage of an age. Joseph-Marie Degerando, The Observation of Savage Peoples (1800). A place on the map is also a place i n history. Adrienne Rich , "Notes Toward a Politics o f Location (1984)". Introduction In Part I o f this study, the relationship between the post-Enlightenment geographical imagination and the concept o f c iv i l society was encapsulated in Hegel's claims that "the creation of c iv i l society is the achievement of the modern world" and that c iv i l society is "die child of modernity". B y the modern world, of course, Hegel meant contemporary Europe. America was not yet part of this modern world, in Hegel's eyes, because c iv i l society and a modern state had not yet been established. However, Hegel believed that America was "the land of the future, where in the ages that lie before us, the burden of the World ' s History shall reveal itself . . . M 1 In the twentieth century, America's prominent role on the world stage, in particular since Wor ld War II, encouraged the shift from the use of the terms "Europe" or "European" to "West" or "Western". While originally the "West" seems to have been defined geographically in relation to the "East", the inclusion of the United States in the Western alliance in Wor ld War II altered 1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J . Sibree (New York : Dover, 1956), 86. 166 the notion of the West/East divide. Post-World War II, in die C o l d War era, the world was divided into East (the U S S R and its allies) and the West (the U S A and its allies). This notion of the West eventually evolved into the idea of the West as capitalist or free-enterprise systems in contrast to (Eastern) socialist systems. Thus (non-European or American) capitalist states like Japan are now included under the term "western". 2 Today, therefore, "West" and "Western" are not geographically defined (if they ever really were) but, instead, are historically constructed and express an idea or concept, an imagined geography. 3 This refocusing of attention from the idea of Europe to that of the West may be discerned in the work of twentieth-century theorists of c iv i l society. In Part II of this study, I examine the work of three writers (Shils, Gellner and Fukuyama), their theories of c iv i l society and their use of non-Western Others in the construction of those theories. In so doing, I w i l l analyze how their work is informed by the post-Enlightenment geographical imagination and concept of c iv i l society in light of this shift from the notion of Europe to the West. Each of these writers is influenced by either Montesquieu, Ferguson, or Hegel in their work on c iv i l society. However, as the most fully realized theories of the post-Enlightenment geographical imagination and c iv i l society, Hegel's work w i l l be used as emblematic of these constructions in this chapter. Here, the influence of his work i n general, and his philosophy o f history i n particular, upon contemporary Western thought w i l l be discussed. In the following chapter, I w i l l examine the effect of this 2 This discussion is based on Raymond Wil l iams, Keywords. 2d ed. (London: Fontana, 1988), 333-334. 3 See Stuart H a l l , "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power," in Formations of Modernity, ed. Stuart H a l l and Bram Gieben (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 276-277. For a more detailed discussion of the terms "West" and "Western", see the introduction to this thesis, supra. 167 legacy on Shils, Gellner and Fukuyama and their constructions of c iv i l society and non-Western Others. This chapter is divided into five sections. In the first section I outiine Said's notion of travelling theory and its utility for understanding how and with what effects ideas or theories (such as Hegel's) move across time and space. In the next four sections, I provide a critical exegesis of Hegel's legacy for contemporary Western social science. The theoretical framework established in this chapter w i l l then be applied to an analysis of the work of Shils, Gellner and Fukuyama in Chapter Six . Said 's T r a v e l l i n g Theory While I w i l l continue tp use Foucault's archaeological method and Canguilhem's history of concepts (outiined in Chapter One of this thesis) as analytical tools for examining contemporary works on c iv i l society in Chapter Six , a further theoretical dimension must first be added in order to examine the continuities and points of disjuncture in ideas brought about by temporal and spatial displacements such as those between the theorists discussed in Parts I and II of this study. This is provided through a critical interrogation of what Edward Said has called "travelling theory". In his essay, "Traveling Theory", Said observes that "ideas and theories travel - from person to person, from situation to situation, from one period to another. " 4 While the transfer of ideas (whether it be through "creative borrowing or wholesale appropriation") is in general 4 Edward W . Said, "Traveling Theory," chap, in The Wor ld , the Text, and the Cri t ic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 226. The spelling of "travelling" or "traveling" varies and follows that in the original texts. 168 a boon for academic work, it should not be considered to involve a simple, direct transfer or to be an innocent or value-neutral activity. Consequentiy, Said continues: . . . one should go on to specify the kinds of movement that are possible, in order to ask whether by virtue of having moved from one place and time to another an idea or theory gains or loses in strength, and whether a theory in one historical period and national culture becomes altogether different for another period or situation . . . Such movement to a new environment is never unimpeded. It necessarily involves processes of representation and institutionalization different from those at the point of origin. 5 Taking an historical approach, Said goes on to track the travels of one particular theory. He demonstrates how Lukacs' theory of sociohistorical change set out in History and Class Consciousness (1923) is subsequentiy taken up by Lucien Goldmann in 1955 and is "transformed and localized" by this appropriation. F r o m Goldmann the theory is picked up by Raymond Will iams who further modifies and localizes Lukacs ' ideas. Said is eager to highlight two points of displacement which occur in each act of travel. The first concerns the question of praxis and the location of the individuals making use of the theory. Hence, Lukacs was "a directiy involved militant" and "committed revolutionary" while Goldmann was a "politically committed scholar" and Wil l iams a "reflective cr i t ic" . 6 The other displacement concerns the spatial and temporal location of the writers in question. Lukacs ' theory moved from its original location in "revolutionary Budapest" to post- Wor ld War II Paris and then to 1970s' Cambridge. 7 For Said, these two kinds of displacement have important effects on what happens to theory when it travels. Hence, "Lukacs wrote for as well as in a situation that produced ideas about 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid., 234, 238. 7 Ibid., 238. 169 consciousness and theory that are very different from the ideas produced by Goldmann in his situation. " 8 History and situation, therefore, must be taken into account. However, this is not to say that theory is determined by spatial location. Rather, one must recognize " . . . the extent to which theory is a response to a specific social and historical situation . . . " ' F rom this Said concludes that: N o reading is neutral or innocent, and by that same token every text and every reader is to some extent the product of a theoretical standpoint, however, implicit or unconscious such a standpoint may be . . . we distinguish theory from critical consciousness by saying that the latter is a sort o f spatial sense, a sort of measuring faculty for locating or situating theory, and this means that theory has to be grasped in the place and the time out of which it emerges as a part of that time, working in and for it, responding to it; then, consequentiy, that first place can be measured against subsequent places where the theory turns up for use. The critical consciousness is awareness of the differences between situations, awareness too of the fact that no system or theory exhausts the situation out of which it emerges or to which it is transported.1 0 He notes further that when theories travel they may be in danger of undergoing two kinds of revision. Travelling theory either may be "reduced, codified, and institutionalized" or may become "a theoretical overstatement, a theoretical parody of the situation it was formulated originally to remedy or overcome." 1 1 Said sees this "theoretical overtotalization" at work in Foucault's ideas on power when they travel from specific institutional sites to society in general and from France to other geographic locations. 1 2 8 Ibid. , 236. 9 Ibid. , 237. 1 0 Ibid. , 242. 1 1 Ibid. , 239. 1 2 See ib id . , 242-247. 170 Oddly enough, as Janet W o l f f points out, Said's idea of "travelling theory" (in the sense of the effects on theory when it changes location) has not been used in much subsequent writing on theory and travel. Instead most writing on this topic has been concerned with travel writing or with the idea that "there is something mobile in the nature o f theory" or with metaphors of travel which are intended to call into question the actual travel of researchers to research sites and the "fixed and ethnocentric, categories of traditional anthropology". 1 3 Whi le it is curious that Said's focus on travelling theory has not been more widely employed, since it seems to offer an extremely useful and necessary framework for charting the movement and modifications of theory, it has not completely been ignored. 1 4 For Derek Gregory, Said's discussion o f "travelling theory" raises the "situatedness" of 1 3 Janet Wolff , "On the Road Again : Metaphors of Travel in Cultural Cr i t ic ism," Cultural Studies 7, no. 1 (May 1993): 225-226. One o f the most comprehensive works i n this travel genre is James Clifford's "Traveling Cultures" in Cultural Studies, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson and Paula A . Treichler (New Y o r k : Routledge, 1992), 96-112. Clifford discusses the implications of travel for twentieth century ethnography, especially travel by ethnographers to research sites. However, as bell hooks has noted in relation to Clifford's other essay on travel ("Notes on Travel and Theory," Inscriptions 5 (1989): 177-188) his "playful" invocation o f travel does not take account of the possibility that " . . . travel as a starting point for discourse is associated with different headings - rites of passage, immigration, enforced migration, relocation, enslavement, homelessness." Clifford's textual situation o f writing from the rather Eurocentric viewpoint o f the Western ethnographer avoids recognizing the wholly different experiences of travel o f people of colour and those outside the privileges of the academy. A s hooks points out, "theorizing diverse journeyings is crucial to our understanding of any politics of location" (bell hooks, "Representing Whiteness in the Black Imagination," in Cultural Studies, op. cit. , 343). 1 4 On the need for this type o f framework Said claims that". . . it is ridiculously foolish to argue that 'the facts' or 'the great texts' do not require any theoretical framework or methodology to be appreciated or read properly" ("Traveling Theory", op. cit . , 241). Caren Kaplan in Questions of Travel: Postmodern Discourses o f Displacement (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996) makes use of Said's analysis to discuss "terms, tropes, and subjects of criticism" rather than theories (see ib id . , 5). 171 theory which may be considered in two imbricated respects.1 5 The first sense of "travelling" involves Culler 's idea of "theory" as a genre and its ability to create "redescriptions that challenge disciplinary boundaries." 1 6 This travel across disciplinary boundaries becomes more apparent if, as G