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Transnational regional society Kossuth, Donald 1996

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TRANSNATIONAL REGIONAL SOCIETY by DONALD KOSSUTH B.A. (Hons.), Queen's University, 1991 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL F U L F I L M E N T OF T H E REQUIREMENTS FOR T H E D E G R E E OF MASTER OF ARTS in T H E F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES Department of Political Science We accept this thesis as conforming _ to the required standard T H E UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA November 1996 ® Donald Kossuth, 1996 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head! of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of ^ L f f f O f L - ? C ] B y J ^ £ T The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada "Date J - ? 1 P&utM%&^ . DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT This thesis explores the phenomena of transnational regional society and its effect on international relations. It attempts to answer two main questions: What are transnational regional societies, and what can they tell us about the condition of the society of states? In chapter one, 'international society' arguments are reviewed to illustrate how transnational regional society has been ignored by that literature and to develop a normative theoretic approach to understanding cross-border, non-statist forms of human society. In chapter two, the transnational and regional aspects of these human societies are explored more fully, and as any wholly 'positivist' delineation of a 'region' is difficult, examples of transnational regional societies are identified not only by their congruence with economically- and ecologically-localized territory, but by the entrenchment of their primary norm: the pursuit of the 'better' life, understood as the human desire for heightened socioeconomic well-being beyond the basic safety, order and social welfare the state can provide. So defined, transnational regional societies help advance three important debates in international relations theory. First, they offer a novel approach to the 'nature of security' debate, for they necessitate a focus on socioeconomic as well as physical or Hobbesian security. Second, transnational regional societies shed new light on the 'democracies do not go to war' argument. Third, they help assess the relative strength of communitarian and cosmopolitan impulses in world politics. Chapter three explores these debates, arguing that transnational regional societies help confirm a healthy prognosis for the 'state' and 'society of states,' for as transnational regional societies require international peace and order to thrive, they do not undermine the norms of state sovereignty and nonintervention. In short, the notable degree of cosmopolitanism in transnational regional society will not fuel the decline of the society of states into one global society of humankind. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ii T A B L E OF CONTENTS iii A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T iv INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1 - SOCIETY & NORMATIVE THEORY 15 International Systems and Societies: The Hegemony to Independence Spectrum . . . . 16 Normative Theory and Transnational Regional Society 26 CHAPTER 2 - TRANSNATIONAL REGIONAL SOCIETY 36 Transnational ism 36 Regions and International Relations Theory 43 A Normative Approach to a Regional Typology 53 Transnational Regional Societies: Some Empirical Examples 58 CHAPTER 3 - TRANSNATIONAL REGIONAL SOCIETIES & T H E SOCIETY OF STATES 66 The 'Condition' of the Society of States 67 The 'Nature of Security' Debate 71 The 'Democracies No Longer Fight Other Democracies' Argument 78 The 'Pluralist versus Solidarist' Debate 83 CONCLUSION 93 BIBLIOGRAPHY 99 iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This thesis is dedicated to Dr. Robert Jackson, without whose help and guidance it would never have been written. I would like express my most sincere thanks to Dr. Jackson, whose kindness, humility and wisdom has restored my faith in the academic enterprise. I am also most grateful for the support and friendship of Will Bain, who strengthened my arguments and challenged me to articulate my ideas more clearly. Many thanks also to my family and other friends whose encouragement kept me focused on the task at hand despite many distractions. Finally, a word of gratitude to my employers who both enabled and allowed me to pursue my master's degree while working full-time. iv INTRODUCTION 'There is no region or aggregate of national units that can in the very strict sense of boundary congruence be identified as a subsystem of the international system.' Bruce M . Russett, 1967' 'Regionalization can also involve increasing flows of people, the development of multiple channels and complex social networks by which ideas, political attitudes, and ways of tJiinking spread from one area to another, and the creation of a transnational regional civil society.' Andrew Hurrell, 19952 Over the last thirty years, many international relations scholars have either chosen or been obliged to grapple with the enigmatic concept of 'region' while trying to understand the workings of world politics. Even though Bruce Russett's now classic positivist analysis of international regions concluded that no grouping of states could constitute a 'subsystem' of the international system, theorists still continue to try and identify forms of human society that somehow transcend state boundaries while falling short of a Utopian, all inclusive global society of humankind. The challenge to understanding human communities that disregard borders in a pluralist world of states has greatly enriched the study of world politics; arguably, this curiosity led Karl Deutsch to develop the idea of security communities, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane to explore the concept of transnational ism, and Hedley Bull to differentiate between systems and societies of states, to cite but a few examples. In short, the historiography of regional theorizing by international relations scholars can be firmly situated in the discipline's larger quest to understand the nature of human social relations. 1 Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967, p. 168. 2 Andrew Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective." Fawcett, Louise, & Andrew Hurrell, eds. Regionalism in World Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 40. 1 Thus, when Andrew Hurrell discerns a relationship between 'regionalization' and the emergence of what he terms 'transnational regional civil societies,' he too engages the discipline's quest to understand cosmopolitan human impulses in a communitarian world of states. By studying 'regional civil societies,' he introduces yet another set of intriguing questions for international relations theorists, especially its 'international society' scholars. If, for example, the post-Cold War era is marked, among its many other attributes, by a renewed focus on 'regions' and 'regionalism' by both statespeople and theorists,3 is it still possible to debate the relative vitality of 'international' versus 'global' civil society without acknowledging the real possibility of 'regional' civil society as well? By extension, is the discipline any clearer on what is meant by 'region' and 'regionalization' in the discourse of international relations, let alone international society? And if empirical case studies do indeed reveal the existence of transnational regions with high degrees of 'civil society,' meaning regions with a significant level of social relations occurring between humans with a degree of 'indifference' to the states involved, which 'tradition' of international theory best accounts for their existence? In other words, where does the distinctive band of 'transnational regional society' appear on the spectrum ranging from pluralist to solidarist conceptions of world politics? In an attempt to begin answering some of these questions, this thesis explores the phenomenon of transnational regional society and tries to understand its place within the society of states. In doing so, it is unabashedly conceptual: this thesis endeavours to think 3 For a brief account of this renewed emphasis, see W. W. Rostow, "The Coming Age of Regionalism." Encounter 74.5 (June 1990): 3-7. 2 the subject of transnational regional society through to some meaningful conclusions. As such, empirical examples of the phenomenon are only highlighted herein as necessary; an exhaustive comparative analysis of empirical cases would require a book-length manuscript, which suggests a detailed research project should follow this conceptual introduction. This thesis is therefore framed by two main goals. First, it aims to create a degree of definitional or terminological familiarity with the no doubt enigmatic concept of 'transnational regional society.' Second, it tries to use the concept to assess the general 'condition' of international society as the twentieth-century comes to a close. Thus, while this thesis is rooted in our own particular historical epoch, it will hopefully encourage further study of transnational regional society and its effects on the society of states during other historical periods of its evolution; the extent and impact of transnational regional societies on states during the Westphalian era, the period of the Concert of Europe, and the various stages of international society's 'globalization' would all seem to be prime cases for further research and analysis. International Society and Normative Theory Before trying to understand what 'transnational regional society' can tell us about the current condition of the society of states, a fuller comprehension of this multifarious concept must first be developed through a closer look at each of its primary components. To begin establishing this definitional familiarity, chapter one explores the concept of human 'society' in world political theory, doing so in two main ways. First, the literature shaping the key 'international society' debates is reviewed to reveal the almost complete lack of attention that has been paid to the concept of transnational regional society by international society scholars. This critique helps to delineate one key component of transnational regional 3 society: primarily, it helps clarify what is meant by 'society' in its cross-border community sense. That this concept has been ignored is by no means indicative of its insignificance. On the contrary, it reveals a degree of poverty in the evolution of international society dialogue, and in its consideration of non-statist cross-border communities, including the notion of neo-medievalism. Second, the international society dialogue provides a very useful framework from which to develop a 'normative' theoretical approach to understanding transnational regional society. Chapter one thus attempts to show how this form of human society is identifiable by the extent to which its fundamental norm has become entrenched in a localized cross-border region. This norm, the human pursuit of the 'better' life, is herein defined as the efforts of individuals to secure a 'condition' of socioeconomic well-being that goes beyond the more basic level of physical security and social welfare provided for by the state. As the norms of sovereignty and nonintervention shape international society, so too do the norms that encourage the pursuit of 'well-being' by a distinct community of individuals occupying a localized cross-border tract of territory mould transnational regional societies. The concept of striving for 'well-being' within a specific tract of cross-border territory is thus crucial to distinguishing transnational regional society from other kinds of 'transnationalism' such as international commerce or trade within and between states that lacks a regional focus. 'Well-being' is thus herein conceived of as a 'condition' that entails more than the cross-border pursuit of material goods. While material gain is no doubt vital to achieving a heightened degree of 'well-being,' the pursuit of the 'better' life also entails striving for a heightened sense of 'belonging' to a physical place by a group of individuals and their efforts to enhance 4 social interaction with each other across borders. The sense of 'comfort' that an individual derives from identifying with a specific community that is cross-border yet sub-national, in addition to the material pursuits he or she can make within its localized market, is key to distinguishing transnational regional societies. This concept of the localized pursuit of the 'better' life helps distinguish transnational regional societies from the larger quest for material goods and well-being that transpires at the domestic, state or global levels not only because it is specific to distinct territorial areas marked in part by cross-border yet-sub-national economic markets, but because the concept also encompasses the group's pursuit of a sense of 'community,' their desire for a feeling of 'place' and 'belonging' to a geographic or physical space, and the quest for social interaction by people sharing a common language, culture, and history (among other 'empirical' traits) that so happen to live in neighbouring parts of separate states. Thus, while transnational regional societies are all identifiable as a unique form of cross-border human society due to their well-entrenched pursuit of 'well-being' and the 'better' life, the specifics of this pursuit vary quite widely, thereby rendering each transnational regional society to a degree 'distinct.' Different notions of wealth, differing tastes, and of course different resource bases and economies all have an impact on the particular form these localized pursuits of the 'better life' can take. As such, it is recognized that the examples of transnational regional society identified herein have very different identities; what is important, however, is to remember that their inhabitants all share a common desire to improve their lives by interacting as a localized community across the international borders that so happen to divide them into different nation states. 5 Transnational Regional Society Once our understanding of 'society' has been refined by reviewing its use and non-use in the international society literature and by establishing a theoretic focus on a society's constitutive norms, the concepts of 'transnationalism' and 'regionalism,' and their importance to a more complete understanding of cross-border human societies can then be considered. In chapter two, definitional familiarity with transnational regional society is further enhanced by first reviewing the traditional connotation of 'transnational' in the jargon of world politics. This usual meaning of the term, largely developed in Nye and Keohane's pioneering work, is of the sum of trans-border flows and transactions, primarily of an economic nature, between two or more (usually contiguous) states, including the activities of nongovernmental actors and sub-state intergovernmental agents. Thus, while this connotation of 'transnational' advocates for the inclusion of actors other than statespeople in the study of international relations, it remains firmly focussed on inter-state transactions. It was the transactions between nation-states, albeit those conducted by a wider range of actors, that were of empirical concern to the transnational relations scholars of the 1970s. However, this thesis contributes to a different and perhaps less well understood connotation of transnational ism. Building in part on the impact that geographers have had on the study of world politics, and on the work of international relations theorists who place the notion of 'territory' at the forefront of their analyses (especially with regards to secession and the environment), 'transnational' is used herein to refer to those transactions that occur between actors in specific parts of congruent states, as opposed to the entire nation-states themselves. While the intent still remains the inclusion of actors other than statespeople in 6 the study of international relations, the cross-border territorial 'area' within which they interact is no longer solely delineated by the state boundaries involved. Human transactions between parts of states, whether they be politically demarcated sub-units like provinces, or other ecologically and geographically distinct tracts of territory that cross state borders, are the primary focus of transnational ism in this sense. Realizing that transnational activity often takes place within a territorial area, or 'region,' that is not only demarcated by the states involved is crucial to a more complete understanding of transnational regional society. For when defined as human social interaction occurring within territorially-localized cross-border geographic areas not solely delineated by state borders, transnationalism necessitates a more rigorous analysis of the concept of 'region' in world political theory. Arguably, 'region' has most often referred to two or more states that are, usually with some basis in geographic contiguity, 'grouped' together by practitioners and theorists alike: the E U , A S E A N and even the N A F T A are considered 'regions' in this sense. In a similar vein, large continental or sub-continental geographic references to a 'region' of states, like North America, western Europe, south east Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, are often made for analytical convenience by international relations scholars. What is key to this conceptions of 'region' is that entire states comprise the most basic regional 'unit;' they can thus be called inter-state or international regions. Especially with regard to self-determination and secession, wholly contained parts of states or other units in political federations are also frequently referred to as regions by those international relations scholars studying issues like imperialism, decolonization and state formation. Thus in exploring how, for example, a domestic region striving for recognition 7 as an independent state becomes an issue of concern for the international community, international relations scholars have developed a second, fairly common, usage for the term: that of the domestic or intrastate region potentially becoming the world's next sovereign state. Quebec is a leading contemporary example. It is, however, with a third type of region, the transnational region, that this thesis is primarily concerned. Perhaps the most interesting and poorly understood region-type, transnational regions are in essence comprised of contiguous parts of two or more neighbouring states. They are thus the least 'political' of the three 'region types,' for they lack sharp borders and distinct political infrastructures. But by encompassing neighbouring tracts of physical territory in which much transnational activity takes place, activity that affects not only the particular states involved but also the larger society of states, transnational regions are in fact of great importance to a deeper understanding of world politics. As earlier empirical studies have illustrated, much transnational activity is 'economic' in nature, and transnational ism is often equated with 'economic interdependence.' It should not be surprising, then, that transnational regions are, at their core, economically- and ecologically-localized tracts of cross-border territory upon which distinctive human societies arise. For in addition to being delineated by their geo-physical endowments, and by the economies to which these endowments give rise, transnational regions are identifiable by the distinct human societies who occupy this territory, and who by-in-large produce and consume in its localized market. In short, the study of transnational regional society continues to focus on individuals as economic actors; however, it is their pursuit of the 'better' life within a transnational region that demands a new normative approach be applied to their analysis. 8 Clearly then, the study of transnational regional society has a strong affinity with both 'economic interdependence' and 'normative' approaches to world politics; the pursuit of the 'better' life, after all, has much to do with the socioeconomic well-being that wealth can provide. Ultimately, each individual's quest is only made possible by, and in doing so helps to constitute, the larger human societies in which they live. While the pursuit of the 'better' life within a transnational regional society is justified by norms that encourage the individual's quest for a heightened condition of socioeconomic well-being beyond that provided for by the welfare state and the society of states, just what constitutes the 'better' life for humans in different transnational regional societies varies quite widely. Partly to recognize this variance, and in order to encourage further familiarity with the concept of transnational regional society, chapter two concludes by raising a few empirical examples. To illustrate that what constitutes the requisite level or form of the 'better' life does indeed differ between transnational regional societies, examples are drawn from both North America and western Europe. It is in the 'first world' where the most advanced examples of transnational regional society can be found; the pacific northwest of North America, sometimes referred to as Cascadia, and 'transfrontier' regions in western Europe like Alsace and the Basque area, illustrate how the pursuit of the 'better' life is most advanced in those parts of the world where physical security and order is largely guaranteed and where strong regional economies can provide for enhanced material well-being. Undoubtedly, the entities being referred to as 'Cascadia,' 'Alsace' and 'Basque' differ from each other in many significant ways. To name but a few, Cascadia (which derives its name from the Cascade mountain range) usually describes an economic territory and the 9 distinct 'northwest coast' lifestyle of its immigrant-based inhabitants. The Alsace region can be delineated more precisely geographically, and is by-in-large an historical product of the many border disputes between France and Germany and their effects on its largely Germanic people. At this time, neither Cascadia or Alsace are marked by the extreme separatist sentiments of those Basques whose terrorist activities are aimed at achieving independent statehood. However, while these entities obviously have different 'identities,' they all possess the key characteristics of any transnational regional society. First and foremost, they are identifiable as a tract of physical territory that is cross-border yet sub-national and therefore non-sovereign. This territory is marked by its unique natural endowments and physical geography. Second, a distinctive if 'non-political' human society occupies this territory. The society is rendered distinct by its shared language or languages, by its common customs and practices, and by the desire of its members to foster a 'community' with a strong sense of belonging to the physical place it occupies. Third, these entities are marked by their localized economic market which arise from its natural endowments and to meet its consumer demands and tastes; they are therefore identifiable by the cross-border yet sub-national activity of its inhabitants in their socioeconomic pursuit of heightened well-being and the 'better' life. Transnational Regional Society and the Condition of the Society of States Having hopefully established an adequate degree of theoretic and empirical familiarity with the idea of 'transnational regional society,' this thesis attempts to draw some meaningful conclusions about the current and future condition of the society of states. It short, it tries to assess whether transnational regional society ultimately strengthens or weakens the 'state' as 10 the primary form of political organization, and challenges the notion that the globalization of international society must necessarily lead to more 'solidarist' forms of human political organization. To do so, chapter three applies the normative and economic approach to transnational regional society developed herein to three broad and somewhat interrelated debates in international relations theory. For when engaged from a transnational regional society perspective, it is argued that the 'nature of security' debate, the 'democracies no longer fight one another' argument, and the 'communitarian versus cosmopolitan' nature of human society debate can help make a more accurate prognosis for the condition of the 'state' and 'society of states' as they continue to evolve in the decades to come. First, the debate as to whether 'security' should, in its traditional Hobbesian sense, refer only to the 'physical' or military conditions of 'safety' and 'order,' and not to some 'material' condition of human socioeconomic well-being that is threatened, can be advanced by a more explicit consideration of transnational regional society. Doing so, it is argued, illustrates that along with base physical threats to the national interest, security theorists should consider threats to the individual's socioeconomic well-being and comfort when assessing the degree of 'security' being guaranteed by their state and the society of states in different regions of the world. For it appears that transnational regional societies, constituted by the important if 'soft' norm that encourages the human pursuit of the 'better' life, can only arise and thrive if the 'hard' norms of state sovereignty and nonintervention (which in constituting international society) have already created a requisite level of physical or military security and therefore safety and order. As such, the material security component to the individual's 'better' life is understood to be contingent on their ability to pursue the 11 conditions of socioeconomic well-being in life and not merely the basic survival of life, in its physical safety and social welfare sense. An important contribution to the 'democracies no longer fight one another' argument can thus be made by distinguishing between the state as the provider of physical safety and transnational regional society as the provider of an enhanced condition of 'well-being' made possible by the cross-border pursuit of material 'comfort,' of a heightened sense of belonging to a 'community' and its physical 'place,' and of social interaction among like people that so happen to live in neighbouring parts of separate states. Should empirical studies confirm that transnational regional societies arise primarily between parts of democratic states, and are most advanced in the world's 'zones of peace' where military and physical security concerns, especially the absence of war, have historically been or are being satisfied, then transnational regional society may help explain how the human pursuit of socioeconomic well-being helps mitigate against inter-democratic state warfare. Another important element of the 'nature of security' debate can also be addresses by an explicit consideration of transnational regional society; such a focus can help sharpen the discipline's understanding of 'environmental' security. For if threats, whether perceived or real, to the environments that help sustain a transnational regional society and its economy continue to intensify, will the environment rise in importance on state security agendas? Or given the perceived inability of international society to deal with environmental security concerns, will these threats come to be addressed primarily at the transnational regional society level? Chapter three then argues that a more explicit consideration of transnational regional society can advance considerably the debate as to whether a communitarian or cosmopolitan 12 paradigm will come to dominate world politics, and thus the basic form that human political organization could take in the future. That the debate between theorists who believe the state will continue to be the dominant form of human political association and those who argue states must inevitably give way to a larger global community has failed to consider transnational regional society as another viable form of human association is, of course, a key shortcoming this thesis attempts to address. This effort, however, should not be viewed as supporting the movement to 'de-centre' the state as the primary referent for international relations theory. For it is herein argued that transnational regional society, while indicative of cosmopolitan human impulses, and at times a threat to specific states, is not a threat to the pluralist society of states as a whole. In fact, transnational regional societies reinforce the fundamental norms of international society, for the human pursuit of the 'better' life, important a norm as it is, can only take place once a requisite level of safety, order and physical security, made possible by state sovereignty and nonintervention, already exists. Thus, as transnational regional societies do not threaten the 'state' as the primary political unit of human society, they should not be interpreted as proof of an intermediary stage in some larger teleological movement towards a global civil society. Neither should they be perceived as "states in waiting." For while some transnational regional societies contain strong secessionist elements who believe independent statehood would be the best guarantor of the 'better' life, they are manifestations of the localized norms, ethics, identities and loyalties of a group of individuals pursuing heightened well-being within the existing pattern of state borders. Thus, while secession theory is herein employed to emphasize the 'territorial' element behind transnational regional society, these cross-border yet sub-national 13 'communities' encompass parts of the states that ultimately enable its inhabitants to pursue socioeconomic well-being by providing for a requisite level of peace, security and order. Transnational regional societies therefore exist in tandem with the society of states, and to argue their rise represents a step towards one global civil society is problematic. While highly unlikely, should the secessionist element of a transnational regional society come to undermine the specific states within which they exist to the point these states fall apart, a new state would be created, with the 'remainder' states probably surviving as well, albeit with curtailed territory. At no point, however, is the concept of the 'state' as the dominant form of human political organization threatened. In conclusion, it is argued that the study of transnational regional society could ultimately help to answer other 'big questions' in the field of international relations theory. By illustrating that a more solidarist form of human society, one that differs from yet still co-exists with the pluralist society of states, can indeed be constituted by the individual pursuit of the 'better' life suggests a possible reconciliation between the polarizing 'realist' versus 'liberal' discord in world political theory. For the important but until now neglected study of transnational regional society suggests that communitarian and cosmopolitan impulses do indeed co-exist in world politics. Once understood as a distinctive form of human society arising from both the pluralist and solidarist impulses in world politics, transnational regional society can help explain a number of key patterns in international relations, including the rise of regional interstate political union and 'zones of peace and conflict;' the importance of transnational regional economic and environmental actors and activities; and the place of intrastate regional secession movements and state creation in a post-imperialist world. 14 CHAPTER 1 - SOCIETY & NORMATIVE THEORY What is transnational regional society, and can 'international society' and 'normative' theories help us better understand these multifarious entities? To begin answering these questions, this chapter undertakes an all too brief review of some key international society arguments, doing so with three main ends in mind. First, this critique helps clarify what is meant by a society of states and, as international relations are ultimately human relations, by 'society' in its non-statist, cross-border 'community' sense as well. For even if transnational regional societies do not directly embody specific political communities, all human societies are somewhat political and affect the state as humankind's main unit of political organization. Second, this review highlights a lack of any sustained transnational regional theorizing by international society scholars, especially in their 'evolution of international society' dialogue, and their consideration of non-statist forms of society, including neo-medievalism. Only once the use and non-use of 'society' in world political theory has been reviewed can its transnational and regional components be explored more fully. Third, by considering what norms and values 'constitute' a society, it is possible to model a normative theoretic approach to understanding its transnational regional form. If international society is constituted by a set of 'hard' norms (namely state sovereignty and non-intervention) that guide the state's pursuit of national security and order, then transnational regional society is also identifiable via its fundamental if 'soft' constitutive norm: the human pursuit of the 'better' life, understood as the condition of socioeconomic well-being and the acquisition of material goods, beyond those supplied by the welfare state, that are only attainable when physical security and order are well entrenched. 15 International Systems and Societies: The Hegemony to Independence Spectrum The international society school is perhaps most readily associated with the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics and Martin Wight who, with Herbert Butterfield, Adam Watson and Hedley Bull, spent about twenty-five years discussing the nature of systems and societies of states. Arguably the most important of Wight's papers on the subject is his De systematibus civitatum which, taking its cue from Pufendorf, aims to "offer some notes towards clarifying the idea of a states-system, and to formulate some of the questions or propositions which a comparative study of states-systems would examine."1 The essay is significant not only because it first described a 'state system' as a group of states who recognize no political superior and have more or less permanent relations with one other via messengers and a diplomatic language (i.e., ongoing communication), conferences and congresses (i.e., 'moments of maximum communication'), and trade. As importantly, De systematibus civitatum also prompted much subsequent debate over systems versus societies of states, introduced the need to consider norms, values and cultural unity in their analysis and, important to this thesis, launched the school's preferred 'comparative' approach to studying international systems and societies: Wight's comparison of suzerain to sovereign state systems launched the international society school's 'hegemony' to 'independence' spectrum for analyzing relations between political communities, an approach that has unfortunately marginalized the study of other potential forms of cross-border society, especially those that operate with some degree of indifference to state sovereignty. The international society literature has thus remained oddly silent regarding the 1 Martin Wight, Systems of States. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977, p. 22. 16 possibility of transnational or other forms of human community that impact upon both states and any system or society thereof. While the school's comparative and historical approach should be lauded for providing the context necessary for a fuller understanding our present international society, the 'independent' to 'empire' state system spectrum along which the comparisons have been made, as taken by Adam Watson in The Evolution of International Society, has overlooked non-statist cross-border communities, even though this spectrum strongly suggests they be considered. For according to Watson, "To understand even societies of more or less independent states requires a wider purview, which sees independence as only one end of the whole range of human experience in managing the coexistence of large and diverse communities of men."2 Surely this 'wider purview' should consider geographically localized trans-border communities, identifiable by a significant degree of social interaction occurring with some indifference to the main political 'units' involved, whether they be independent states or other parts of a suzerain state system; even Watson notes that "In practice all known ways of organizing diverse but interconnected communities have operated somewhere between these two extremes."3 Watson thus subdivides the spectrum of international systems stretching between the extremes of absolute independence and absolute empire into four basic categories: independence, hegemony (including suzerainty), dominion and empire. He does so to show that all state systems contain an intrinsic tension between the desire for order and the desire for independence: "Order promotes peace and prosperity, which are great boons. But there 2 Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society. London: Routledge, 1992, p. 4. 3 Ibid., p. 4. 17 is a price. All order constrains the freedom of action of communities...."4 Watson's point is significant because it suggests that another approach to studying cross-border communities, one more conducive to the study of transnational regional societies, is indeed possible. For if there is an inherent tension between the desire for order and prosperity, and the desire for independence and freedom, could not this tension give rise to multiple or different forms of human community that operate simultaneously instead of their being only one form of society somewhere along a spectrum? If order results from the independent political units of a 'system' surrendering some of their freedom in return for the benefits of 'society,' could not the human desire for freedom simultaneously find expression via some different constitution of society altogether? While Watson recognizes this possibility by asserting the provision of the good life "can be assigned to various confederal or society-wide bodies without destroying the identity and ultimate sovereignty of the state,"5 he does not dwell on what these confederal associations could be, except to assert, as did Wight, that they only arise within historical and cultural regions or periods as diverse as Macedonia, Islam and medieval Europe.6 Watson's not directly addressing the theoretic possibility of transnational regional society is especially curious given his agreement with Wight that a state system will only evolve when a degree of cultural unity exists among its members. In his essay "Systems of 4 Ibid., p. 14. 5 Ibid., p. 307. 6 Each chapter of Watson's book is devoted to a different cultural region or 'period' of societal confederation from ancient states systems (like the Macedonian and Islamic), through the expansion of European international society (from medieval Europe), to today's global international society. 18 States," Watson claims to "know of no international society that did not originate inside a single dominant culture,"7 a statement that prompts two important considerations. First, just what is meant by 'culture,' and second, what is the relationship between a 'culture' and a 'system' versus a 'society?' For if culture is regionally delineated, should not all systems and societies by extension have a definite regional basis, and is culture not nebulous enough to find expression in communities other nation states, humankind's primary political units? These questions are far from semantic, and considering them would help determine whether international and transnational societies only arise between contiguous states or communities, whether the norms, formal rules and institutions that transform an international system into a society can be cross-cultural, and whether a society, once it has evolved within a distinct culture, can indeed spread beyond its contiguous units to become, in a sense, more 'global.' Of course, this evolution of international systems into societies, and the future of international society itself, are of considerable concern to scholars like Watson and Hedley Bull. In their introductory chapter to The Expansion of International Society, they explore the relationship between regions, societies and culture. Bull and Watson assert that before today's "single international system or society," the world was "comprised [of] several regional international systems (or what we choose to call international systems, with some danger of anachronism), each with its own distinctive rules and institutions, reflecting a dominant regional culture."8 This claim is important for several reasons. First, it suggests 7 Adam Watson, "Systems of States." Review of International Studies 16 (April 1990), p. 101. 8 Hedley Bull & Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 1. 19 that independent political communities, and not just states, are able to form cross-border societies; international does not necessarily mean inter-state. Second, it confirms that human societies in the past had strong regional foundations arising from distinct cultures. Before the global expansion of the dominant European system, the most important regional international systems, according to Bull and Watson, were the Arab-Islamic, the Indian subcontinent, the Eurasian steppes, and the Chinese, all of which "were built on elaborate civilizations, including complex religions, governments, law, commerce, written records, and financial accounts." Beyond these regions lay 'areas' such as sub-Saharan Africa, the Americas and Australasia, where "political communities were often stateless."9 This focus on regional international systems suggests Bull and Watson are poised to explore in greater detail the dynamics of not necessarily statist yet geographically localized patterns of human society. However, they choose instead to study regional systems via the 'hegemony' versus 'independence' spectrum, and not by considering those factors which made or make each one unique. Accordingly, Bull and Watson claim "regional international systems were, of course, very different from one another.... But they had one feature in common: they were all, at least in the theory that underlay them, hegemonial or imperial."10 Thus, for Bull and Watson, regional international systems are ultimately suzerain-state systems; states remain the basic political communities for analysis, and regional systems are considered to be primarily inter-state by nature. As such, before the global expansion of the European system, no "relations between states or rulers that were members of different 9 Ibid., p. 3. 10 Ibid., p. 3. 20 regional international systems could be conducted on the same moral and legal basis as relations within the same system, for this basis was provided in part by principles that were culturally particular and exclusive."11 There could thus be no international society between regional international systems until Europe itself came to repudiate any hegemonial principle, become a society itself, and simultaneously spread its rules and principles to the far corners of the globe. The two key principles the Europeans spread were, of course, that all member states should be regarded as juridically equal, and that their sovereignty was absolute. Perceiving these principles to be the basis of international society is perhaps the school's most important contribution to world political theory. Bull is usually credited with developing a more exacting delineation between international 'systems' and 'societies,' and his essay in The Expansion of International Society is no exception. In it, Bull asserts that the "expansion of Europe from the fifteenth century to the nineteenth . . . gradually brought into being an international system linking the various regional systems together, which by the middle of the nineteenth century was nearly universal. This did not mean, however, that there existed a universal international society."12 For Bull, "An actual international society worldwide in its dimensions . . . emerged only as European states and the various independent political communities with which they were involved in a common international system came to perceive common interests in a structure of coexistence and co-operation and tacitly or 11 Ibid., p. 5. 1 2 Hedley Bull, "The Emergence of a Universal International Society" in Bull & Watson, Op. Cit., p. 117. 21 explicitly to consent to common rules and institutions."13 Again, this important insight reveals two reasons for the lack of transnational regional theorizing by international society scholars. First, any 'regional' basis to international society is effectively marginalized by Bull's focus on a worldwide or universal society, and to make his argument, Bull must claim that "Developments such as these could not have taken place except as the consequence of processes of cultural change within the countries concerned in which attitudes hostile to international norms based on equality and reciprocity were replaced by attitudes more favourable to them."14 Second, in Bull's conception of a universal society, states are the only form of human community worth considering. He says that by the First World War, "the coming together of numerous and extremely diverse political entities to form a single international society presupposed that these entities had come to resemble one another at least to the extent that they were all, in some comparable sense, states."15 This state-centric focus is similarly evident in Bull's The Anarchical Society, arguably the seminal work of the international society school. In his now classic comparison between a 'system' and a 'society' of states, Bull says that a "system of states (or international system) is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, to cause them to behave-at least in some measure-as parts of a whole."1 6 He chooses not to 13 Ibid., p. 120. 14 Ibid., p. 121. 15 Ibid., p. 121. 1 6 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, p. 10. 22 focus on the different forms this 'whole' could take, a focus that would arguably lead to some consideration of transnational regional society. Instead, Bull chooses to focus on the international society of states and the role it plays in maintaining international order. "A society of states (or international society)," according to Bull, "exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, forms a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations to one another, and share in the workings of common institutions."17 It is, in essence, this 'binding' that enables a modicum of peace and order to be established. Bull does assert that in a world of 'states but not a system,' "States might be linked with each other so as to form systems of states in particular regions," and that it "is of course possible to see a trend in contemporary world politics towards greater regionalism," but he does not really consider this option to be a viable path to world order.18 Bull gives some plausibility to the emergence of a 'new mediaevalism' whereby the states-system could become undermined by regional integration, state disintegration, the restoration of private international violence, and transnational organizations. For Bull, "it is not fanciful to imagine . . . a modern and secular . . . system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty,"19 and this concept of neo-medievalism has indeed been incorporated into subsequent theories.20 17 Ibid., p. 13. 18 Ibid., pp. 250, 260-61. 19 Ibid., p. 254. 2 0 Robert Jackson and Mark Zacher have, for example, challenged the recent theoretic perspective that "political authority is migrating away from states towards a condition that is perhaps reminiscent of the medieval era: up to international institutions and down to local organizations and nongovernmental networks." See Robert H. Jackson & Mark W. Zacher, "Westphalian Liberalism 23 However, Bull views neo-medievalism in universalist and not regionalist terms, and suggests that order could only be maintained through "a structure of overlapping authorities and criss-crossing loyalties that hold all peoples together in a universal society, while at the same time avoiding the concentration of power inherent in a world government. " 2 1 Bull also recognizes the challenges that ecological degradation and, building on the work of Rajni Kothari, third world regional federations could have on the international society of states. Yet ultimately, Bull remains a staunch advocate of the state, and remains optimistic for international society; as such, he too chooses not to consider the possibility of transnational regional society as an important theoretic unit of analysis in world politics. In his recent book The Structure of International Society, Geoffrey Stern comes closest to a direct consideration of the nature of transnational society. His analysis of (neo)medievalism suggests an important distinction must be made between the feudal forms of decentralized authority and multiple identity of the past, and the world of multiple, overlapping identities and unbundled territory that is arguably emerging today. For Stern reminds us that in the medieval world, the protection of and 'good' life for the individual was made possible in return for their service and deference; in other words, one medieval 'system' was responsible for both order and welfare. But Stern then suggests that, in the modern world, the society of states is ultimately responsible for order and an individual's protection, while another form of society, perhaps transnational or regional, could be and the International Territorial Order." Unpublished manuscript, 1996, p. 1. 2 1 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 255. 24 emerging as the primarily provider of welfare and the 'good' life. 2 2 Stern thus dedicates a full chapter to transnational movements and organizations in international society. He notes that "Before the age of the sovereign state, when the frontiers of existing political units were often both impermanent and porous, much political, social and economic activity was transnational . . . in the sense that it took and needed to take no account of existing frontiers."23 Stern reminds us that prior to the treaty of Westphalia, a person's ideas, inventions and loyalties tended to be largely transnational or subnational, or perhaps even regional, provincial or attached to their own town. Stern then argues that, with the rise international society, transnationalism is still evident in cross-border class and cultural affiliations, ideological ties and movements, and in the activities of economic non-state actors. For Stern however, the question remains whether this transnationalism is challenging the state's primacy, and he pursues his answer on moral, legal and political grounds. In short, he concludes that "while non-state actors may have significantly increased their claim to attention, the role of the state in world politics may also be said to have been growing dramatically."24 Stern makes the crucial realization that "there is no zero-sum relationship between state and non-state actors, and the expansion of the one does not necessarily mean a contraction of the other." In other words, transnationalism is "not in practice incompatible with nationalism and the notion of national interest."25 Thus, as 2 2 Geoffrey Stern, The Structure of International Society. London: Pinter Publishers, 1995, p. 60. 23 Ibid., p. 212. 24 Ibid., p. 220. 25 Ibid., p. 221. 25 with his discussion of neo-medievalism, Stern seems to suggest that human societies can take multiple forms. Unfortunately, he does not explicitly discuss transnational regional society, even though his line of argument is obviously conducive to doing so; for Stern, the study of international society remains predicated on comparing the pluralism of states to the solidarism of a transnational world society, even if the comparison is not a zero-sum game. It would therefore appear from this all too brief review of the international society literature that, from the earlier writings of Wight through to the recent work of Stern, the school continues to ignore the possibility of transnational regional society as a viable and important form of cross-border human community. International society scholars, by maintaining a focus on the state as the basic unit of cross-border communities, tend to analyze societies of states via the degree of hegemony or independence that exists between its separate units. In doing so, they unfortunately neglect to consider that multiple forms of trans-border society could simultaneously exist. Any such theorizing has usually been done under the rubric of neo-medievalism but, because any form of society with multiple identities, decentralized authorities and unbundled territory has usually been seen as a harbinger of a universal society of humankind, the possibility of there being transnational regional societies has been ignored. The impact of this neglect on theorizing about the current and future condition of the society of states, especially the 'international' versus 'global' society debate, will be addressed further in chapter three. Normative Theory and Transnational Regional Society The international society literature has, nevertheless, been crucial to establishing a normative theoretical approach to better understanding international society, an approach that 26 is also applicable to transnational regional society. In addition to Wight, Watson and Bull, other scholars associated to varying degrees with the international society school like Chris Brown, Terry Nardin, Mervyn Frost and Robert Jackson have focused on the norms and values that in essence 'constitute' a society of states. It is herein argued this 'constitutive' focus provides a sophisticated normative approach to better understanding transnational regional society. For as the global expansion of the main constitutive norms of international society are cited as the key reason why international 'systems' evolved into a global 'society' of states, so too can the basic constitutive norm of transnational regional society be seen as the most promising way to understanding this non-statist, cross-border, geographically-localized form of human community. In short, it will be argued that transnational regional society is constituted by the 'soft' but important norms that justify, or legitimate, and thus encourage, the human pursuit of the 'better' life via the acquisition of socioeconomic comfort well beyond the 'good' life as provided for by the welfare state. For many international relations theorists who take a positivist social science approach to the subject, any theory that is in some way 'prescriptive' is often deemed 'normative.' In other words, theory that advocates a better way of organizing the world's political affairs, that 'prescribes' a solution that is 'natural' or 'good' via its analysis, is labelled 'normative.' Unfortunately, this positivist viewpoint tends to over-simplify the normative approach, one that in essence attempts to understand the norms and values, the legal practices, the morals and rules, and the ethics and standards of practice that constitute a 'society,' most often the society of states. According to Chris Brown, normative international relations theory is "that body of work which addresses the moral dimensions of international relations and the wider 27 questions of meaning and interpretation generated by the discipline." It is basically concerned with "the ethical nature of the relations between communities/states, whether in the context of the old agenda, which focussed on violence and war, or the new(er) agenda, which mixes these traditional concerns with the modern demand for international distributive justice."26 In considering such 'ethical inquiry,' Terry Nardin argues theorists "should be particularly careful to avoid defining ethics as moral philosophy" because "moral philosophy is systematic;" it is a mistake, he says, to think of an ethical tradition as "a theoretical system of general principles" because ethics also involves the interpretation and application of these precepts.27 Yet the positivist social science view of normative theory 'prescribing' a system of 'better' principles still persists; it is, ironically, even evident in Mervyn Frost's attempt to show how the positivist bias accounts for the 'dearth of normative theory in the discipline of international relations.' In his introduction to Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations, Frost laments the fact that scholars of world politics "have for the most part avoided theorizing about how the world ought to be arranged," and have neglected to ask whether "the system of sovereign states [is] morally preferable to some sort of world state. " 2 Nevertheless, Frost is generally correct to realize that the 'positivist bias' in international 2 6 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory - New Normative Approaches. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, p. 3. 2 7 Terry Nardin, "Ethical Traditions in International Affairs." Terry Nardin & David R. Mapel, eds. Traditions of International Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 2. 2 8 Mervyn Frost, Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 1. 28 relations theory, or the tendency to favour factual knowledge and statements, to follow the 'scientific method,' and to dismiss as "emotivist, expressivist, [or] prescriptivist" statements based on values or norms, is "the most basic reason for the persistent neglect of normative questions" in the field. 2 9 Robert Jackson has also noted "several common misconceptions about the character of normative inquiry in political science," especially that it is exclusively prescriptive, "a recommendatory rather than interrogatory analysis which aims at giving advice or recommending a course of action to be followed," and "the equation of normative inquiry with moralizing."30 Jackson's normative theoretic approach to understanding international society goes well beyond debunking the 'prescriptive' myth, however, and is helpful to developing a more complete theoretic understanding of transnational regional society. For in addition to maintaining a primary focus on the 'social' character of international relations, Jackson reminds us that "Normative theories are distilled from evidence: they are derived and abstracted from normative practices which they are attempting to render intelligible in general terms."31 This focus on the normative practices of peoples, especially their attempts to justify their actions, provides a novel point of departure for analyzing transnational regional society. For it suggests that, as human societies, transnational regional societies are not only identifiable by empirical studies of the values, norms, senses of identity, and lifestyles that loosely demarcate a territorially-localized group of individuals. While such 29 Ibid., pp. 15-17. 3 0 Robert H. Jackson, "The Global Covenant." Chapter One in The Global Covenant: International Ethics After the Cold War. Unpublished manuscript, 1996, p. 6. 31 Ibid., p. 6. 29 empirical studies, with their phenomenological methodology, cannot be taken to ridiculous minutia, it is impossible to argue against the fact that 'societies,' in the middle-east, for example, form a distinctive grouping, as do, and in doing so differ from, 'societies' in east-Asia. Transnational regional societies which do not adhere to state borders can indeed be identified by the 'interrogation' of "the roles and situations of the people under study."32 The all too common references in world political theory to western Europe, south east Asia, the asia pacific, etc. attest to the general conviction that regional societies do exist; what is up for debate and analysis, of course, is their size, attributes, and exact locales. Jackson's approach thus suggests transnational regional society can be understood more fully from a normative perspective, one that focuses on what normative conduct 'constitutes' transnational regions as distinct human societies. This approach looks for the identifiable norms and values, and in some advanced cases of transnational regional society, the legal principals that guide cross-border 'interaction,' an activity occurring in tandem with, but remaining distinctively detached from, the activity of the society of states. Throughout this normative analysis, it is important to recognize, as does Jackson, that historical roots are important to explore; transnational regions and their societies have unique histories whose 'facts' can be 'interrogated' to help identify the sources of localized social norms. Normative theory is also cumulative, both in the sense of a 'building up of facts,' and in the sense of complementing other theoretical approaches; Jackson reminds us that "Old theorists still manage to communicate from across the centuries. " 3 3 Once evidence Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 6. 30 of localized 'activity' in the pursuit of the 'better' life, and the justifications made by the people doing so can be identified, it is possible to 'diagnose' the extent to which this activity affects or shapes or constitutes the community in question. Thus for Jackson, normative analysis involves 'thinking empirical pointers' through to some conclusions. One key approach for the normative craftsperson, Jackson suggests, is to look for the justifications employed by international actors and to interrogate them "in the context of the situation in which they are made. " 3 4 Thus we can investigate how transnational regional actors, whether they be the small business entrepreneur or the regional multinational director, the individual tourist or the long-established family, the educational institution, the environmental or cultural or sports organization, the lobby group representing the local industry or mode of production, the regional union, the 'provincial' (as in sub-'federaP) politician, the localized political party, etc. 'justify' their transnational activity that, to varying degrees, would occur irrespective of the states involved. We can, of course, also investigate the manifestations of these activities, which could range widely from, say, a 'reputation' as the source of a musical taste, to being known for a long-standing social 'tradition.' The combined impact of these transnational actors and their activities, it is argued here, is twofold: first, localized regional 'principles' have been and continue to be constructed by the people who live in that specific transnational region; and second, the basic 'norm,' common to all transnational regional societies, emerges. For as state sovereignty and nonintervention are the key norms shaping the society of states, so is the pursuit of the 'better' life via the acquisition of heightened socioeconomic well-being, beyond the security Ibid., p. 7. 31 provided for by the state, the key norm constituting transnational regional society. It would appear that for most people the pursuit of the 'better' life takes place in localized economies. Save the likes of global traders in equity and debt or the senior executives in multinational corporations, most people, whether they be the teller at the regional bank or the rice farmer in the Pearl River delta, primarily derive their income from the local market in which they live, a market that both shapes and is shaped by transnational regional society. There is a significant pull in the social activity of a great number of individuals towards the regional market in which they live. Localized economies, of course, also affect and are affected by how people earn and spend, and thus the pursuit of consumer culture, while somewhat regional in taste, is an emerging norm for all transnational societies. Different transnational regions in the world all display their own taste convergence around professional sports, leisure activities as shaped by geography and climate, perhaps around music, visual arts, or food and beer and coffee, to cite but a few examples. What is key is that the pursuit of the 'better' life is coming to be seen as 'inherent' by regionally identifiable segments of humanity. But it is also key to remember that these transnational groupings, for better or worse, also derive their physical security, and the condition of order which makes the pursuit of the 'better' life possible, from the society of states into which they are also organized. One would therefore expect to find empirical examples of overlap between both national and transnational markets that reveal transnational social activity in its ebb and flow with international society; China's special economic zones could be explored as prime examples. In essence, the primary norm of transnational regional society is a regional manifestation of what Jackson calls the 'natural law deep within humankind.' 32 Beyond this primary norm, each transnational regional society is also shaped by loose sets of localized 'principles' constituted by the social activity of the people who live in that region. Principles of marriage and family, of religion and caste, of leisure and comfort, and of political participation and protest, to name but a few, enable transnational human societies to coordinate their interactions in the pursuit of the 'better' life. One important associated principal is that of democracy, which of course usually requires a state apparatus through which to operate, but may spread transnationally; the Hong Kong and China case merits prompt study from this perspective. In essence, a number of transnational regional customs and practices undertaken by human beings can be discerned that help render localized transnational societies visible. In advanced cases, transnational regional society is constituted by the formal agreements made by the political leaders of 'provincial' or 'sub-state' units (or other political factions with a degree of control over territory), who are drawn together by transnational forces. To these agreements, federal officials sometimes add their support. At other times, they choose to turn a blind eye; and sometimes, they choose to confront the transnational social and market forces from which they arise. Of course, the many international treaties, protocols, declarations and resolutions made by interstate regional organizations like the E U , the OAS, APEC, etc. represent the most advanced examples of this basic 'regional impetus.' Yet transnational regional society is definitely detached in some way from the prudential burdens that go hand-in-hand with exercising the norms of state sovereignty and nonintervention. In fact, by leaving the hard responsibilities of world politics to states and their statespeople, transnational regional societies facilitate their inhabitants' pursuit of the 33 'better' life by constituting a 'level' of interaction that is markedly indifferent to international borders. The transnational and international 'planes' of human society operate in tandem so that a degree of specialization in human social activity can occur, thereby making possible relative gains in both the socioeconomic sphere via transnational regional society, as well as in the security and order sphere via international society. That human beings 'belong' to both transnational regional societies and, through their political elites, international society, should not come as a surprise. In addition to having multiple identities (for example, as a citizen, as being from a particular region, as a member of a profession, or religion, or fan club), human beings, as Jackson reminds us, "are varied and variable.... On almost any empirical view, human nature usually turns out to be human natures."35 What is up for debate, of course, is the relative strength of each of these 'natures' within a given group of territorially-localized human beings. It is important to keep in mind, however, that any hierarchy of human 'natures' is bound to change over time. In conclusion, it would appear that by applying a 'constitutive' or normative approach to cross-border human societies, it is possible to understand transnational regional society in much the same way that the international society school has approached the society of states. All societies, whether they be a community of states or a community of individuals, are after all human creations, and as such are best understood by looking at the norms and values, the rules and laws, and the identities that give shape to the society and render it intelligible. For societies, it would seem, arise because they ultimately provide the individuals on which they are founded with a better alternative to a life that is, in Hobbes's conception, nasty, brutish Ibid., p. 12. 34 and short. There is, however, more than one 'better alternative' and as such we should not be surprised to find more than one form of cross-border society operating in the world today This realization is, unfortunately, largely absent in the existing body of international society literature. 35 CHAPTER 2 - TRANSNATIONAL REGIONAL SOCIETY To begin addressing the lack of transnational regional theorizing by the international society school, and to further advance our familiarity with this distinct form of cross-border 'society,' this chapter examines in greater detail its 'transnational' and 'regional' attributes, and identifies a few empirical examples which merit more attention than can be given in the limited space herein. In the first section, two connotations of 'transnational' in the jargon of international relations theory are reviewed: the classic inter-state definition, developed by Keohane and Nye, is contrasted with the different notion of cross-border activities and relations transpiring between communities in neighbouring parts of states. This latter, more 'territorial' conception of 'transnational' has been developed, sometimes inadvertently, by theorists who have in their own way studied cross-border interrelations occurring with some disregard of the states involved. It is this connotation of transnational which makes a more complete understanding of its regionally-localized geographic, economic and ecological elements possible. In the second section of this chapter, the state-centric and positivist approach taken by the main schools of international relations theory to delineating regions is reviewed. By doing so, a more exacting, normative-based regional typology can then be developed in section three. It is hoped this typology will ultimately make the delineation of transnational regional societies possible; as such, the empirical examples identified are then briefly discussed in section four. Transnationalism In both their introduction to Transnational Relations and World Politics (1972) and in Power and Interdependence (1977), Keohane and Nye develop what has arguably become the 36 standard conception of 'transnationalism' in international relations theory. Both works begin by noting some dissatisfaction with the 'realist' approach to world politics, especially its 'inadequate analysis of economic integration' and overt focus on 'state power dynamics.' Claiming that a "good deal of mtex societal intercourse, with significant political importance, takes place without governmental control,"1 Keohane and Nye develop a more encompassing approach to cross-border interaction under the rubric of 'transnationalism.' Transnational interaction, they say, "may involve governments, but it may not involve only governments: Nongovernmental actors must also play a significant role. " 2 In essence, Keohane and Nye advocate for more serious theoretic attention being paid by international relations scholars to trade flows, personal contacts, and communications; to multinational corporations, unions, revolutionary movements, educational networks and transportation cartels; and to other institutions, including intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. Even if most of these actors remain based in one or more states, what matters are the 'contacts, coalitions and interactions' they create across borders which are largely beyond the control of the state governments involved. This focus on interactions, of course, anticipates Keohane and Nye's subsequent work on complex interdependence, or that situation of 'mutual dependence' "characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries" resulting from the transaction flows of money, goods, people and messages across 1 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, eds. Transnational Relations and World Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972, p. x. Italics added for emphasis. 2 Ibid., p. xii. 37 international boundaries.3 That Keohane and Nye's conception of 'transnational' remains firmly focused on inter-state transactions is important to note. While their intent is undoubtedly to include actors other than statespeople in the study of international relations, the 'activity' generated by these actors, and the resulting condition of 'interdependence' they help create, is still measured at the 'between-states' level. Even though Keohane and Nye do claim in Power and Interdependence that the term "Transnational applies when we relax the assumption that states are the only units,"4 their arguably best known study of transnational interdependence is conducted at a 'statist' level of analysis: chapter seven of Power and Interdependence compares the relationships between the United States and Canada, and the United States and Australia, and does so by identifying issues of importance to each state as a whole. It would appear that this inter-state connotation of transnational ism has dominated the international relations discipline ever since; that almost every essay in Canada and the United States: Transnational and Trans governmental Relations takes this 'statist' perspective is but one example of its theoretic primacy.5 However, some international relations scholars have advanced a second, distinctly 'territorial' notion of transnational ism by studying, in their own ways, the cross-border actions of humans that transpire with disregard or opposition to the whole states involved. 3 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. 1st edition. Boston: Little Brown, 1977. 4 Ibid., p. 25. 5 See Annette Baker Fox, Alfred O. Hero, Jr., & Joseph S. Nye, eds. Canada and the United States: Transnational and Trans governmental Relations. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. 38 Some theorists do so by highlighting the significant effects that physical geography, localized economies, and natural ecosystems can have on regional delineation. Other scholars such as secession theorists argue that the strength of a society's claim to territory is more important than their 'distinctiveness' as a people in establishing their right to secede. Lea Brilmayer has advanced a more territorial interpretation of cross-border interaction by arguing that "every separatist movement is built upon a claim to territory, usually based on an historical grievance, and that without a normatively sound claim to territory, self-determination arguments do not form a plausible basis for secession. " 6 As some transnational regional societies have secessionist elements (like Basque separatists or some Kurdish factions in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran) whose efforts involve 'first and foremost' a claim to disputed territory, when the territory and the people claiming it traverse existing state borders, the resulting secession movement can disrupt the specific transnational regional society, its 'host' states, and the larger society of states. Likewise, Buchanan develops a more 'territorial' view of transnational ism in his detailed study of secession. He recognizes that "secession necessarily involves a claim to territory,"7 and argues the act's legitimacy can be assessed in part by studying 'distributive justice' or the lack thereof within a state or federation. Regionally-based groups who feel alienated or subject to state injustices, says Buchanan, most commonly attempt what he terms "peripheral secession, [meaning] the territory to which the secessionists lay claim is part of 6 Lea Brilmayer, "Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation." Yale Journal of International Law 16.1 (1991), p. 192. 7 Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumpter to Lithuania and Quebec. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, p. 11. 39 but not wholly embedded within the territory of the remainder state," or what is left of the original state after secession.8 Because secessionists may seek a closer union with, or even to join outright, like communities occupying contiguous parts of one or more neighbouring states, a non-statist conception of transnationalism must be considered. Even Buchheit, who (as opposed to Brilmayer) believes the principle 'self-determination' is a crucial international norm for establishing a right to secede, claims that the only minimum obligation or criteria for being a separate international entity "is that the entity exercise effective jurisdiction and control over its own territory." He thus argues that in today's world of 'quasi-states,' "we are not wholly unprepared for the transition to an international structure accommodating territorial units that are not sovereign States in the classic sense. " 9 In short, it would seem that secession theory, with its strong territorial imperative, supports the development of a connotation of transnationalism not based on the state as the smallest interdependent unit in the region, even though sub-national or 'provincial' units of course play an important role. When this territorial and not statist imperative behind transnationalism is considered further, it becomes possible to identify transnationalism's foundations in physical geography, localized economic markets and their resources, and distinct ecological systems. For in this sense, transnationalism can be understood as the intersocietal activity transpiring within an economically and ecologically territorially-localized area that happens to transcend state borders. David Elkins has also recently contributed to this connotation of transnationalism; he envisions some breakdown of the 'territorial imperative' behind sovereignty, and argues 8 Ibid., p. 14. 9 Lee Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1978, p. 234. 40 that "a large portion of our current political problems stems from utilizing governments organized simply around a national territory." Elkins thus suggests that human society will need to "find more differentiated political forms which suit or adapt to ecological niches."10 John Ruggie, in a similarly postmodern vein, claims the current international relations vocabulary is "not very good . . . at addressing the question of whether the modern system of states may be yielding in some instances to postmodern forms of configuring political space."11 Ruggie claims these new territorial forms are important to understanding contemporary international transformation. The "decentred yet integrated space-of-flows, operating in real time, which exists alongside the spaces-of-places that we call national economies"12 he identifies help capture the localized economic market element of territorial transnationalism. Etel Solingen has also recognized the role that localized economic markets can play in the rise of non-statist transnationalism. Solingen argues that the liberalization of regional economic markets helps transcend the domestic-international divide by creating 'coalitions' that may or may not cooperate with the national units involved and which transcend "the idea of a unified state with monolithic interests."13 That many economic markets are 'localized' or regional because they arise around core cities and the land surrounding and connecting 1 0 David J. Elkins, Beyond Sovereignty: Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty-First Century. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995, pp. 20, 21. 1 1 John Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations." International Organization 47.1 (Winter 1993), p. 144. 12 Ibid., p. 172. 1 3 Etel Solingen, "Economic Liberalization, Political Coalitions, and Emerging Regional Orders." Unpublished manuscript, 1994, p. 29. 41 them, and because they arise in response to the activities of the population living in this territory, cross-border yet sub-national economic markets can be understood more fully by considering the ecological systems and geographic or physical environment that supplies many of their inputs, whether of the natural or human resource type. Understanding the connection between market economies and territory marked by distinct ecosystems and not political borders is important to advancing the non-statist connotation of transnationalism. This connection is explored, for example, by Thomas Homer-Dixon who in researching the correlations between environmental scarcity and conflict concludes that "There is substantial evidence to support the hypothesis that environmental scarcity causes large population movement, which in turn causes group-identity conflicts"14 within states and transnationally between parts of states, primarily due to migration and refugee flows. Simon Dalby, focusing on the 'geopolitics' of international relations, likewise recognizes the 'transboundary effects' that ecosystem degradation can have on states, and emphasizes "the need to develop new forms of political community and transnational institutional organizations to deal with global environmental problems."15 In sum, when this broader 'territorial' as opposed to 'statist' approach is taken to the study of transnationalism, it arguably becomes possible to understand more deeply the cross-border interactions of human societies that so often seem to transpire within a localized geographic locale, and which are shaped by the territory's economic market and geo-physical 1 4 Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases." International Security 19.1 (Fall 1994), p. 20. 1 5 Simon Dalby, "Ecopolitical Discourse: 'Environmental Security'and Political Geography." Progress in Human Geography 16.4 (1992), p. 506. 42 endowment. Of course, this 'territorial' connotation of transnationalism begs some important questions: in what sense, for example, can a distinct, localized cross-border tract of land, or a trans-border yet sub-state expanse of territory, be called a 'region,' especially when a 'region' is usually conceived of as some collection of states as the only 'units' of regions in the world? In other words, if a 'region' can be a sub-global territorial 'unit' that may or may not encompass entire states, is it even possible for the term to have a consistent meaning in world political theory? Or are there indeed various types of regions, each of which is comprised of a different set of 'territorial units,' whether they be states, economies or ecosystems? It is to the issue of regional delineation that this thesis now turns, and by doing so, it becomes possible to explore in greater detail the 'regional' element of transnational regional society. Regions and International Relations Theory If one were to ask a group of international relations scholars to define just what, in their opinion, comprises a 'region' in the discourse of world politics, one would arguably get as many different definitions as there are respondents.16 For the challenge of describing or delineating a 'region' in world political theory is fraught with obstacles, and it would seem that most scholars who do so define a region in whatever manner best suits their analytical purposes. For many, a region is nothing more than a collection of states; others believe that regions can only be rendered visible by the set of activities they encompass; and for others 1 6 That each international relations scholar could well have his or her own definition of a 'region' may be indicative of a larger problem of positivism: attempts to 'objectify' or render visible an ambiguous concept like 'region' via 'scientific measurement' are open to misrepresentation with the intent to advance a specific agenda. Terry Kersch identifies a similar problem with the concept of 'the national interest' in The Idea of the National Interest: A Conceptual Analysis in the Context of the Gulf War. PhD. Thesis: University of British Columbia, 1995. 43 still, a region is any distinctive tract of territory. What is common, however, to most approaches is that the 'region' is delineated largely by empirical analysis; in other words, the shared attributes of the region's 'sub-units' are identified, 'measured,' and grouped together if a strong correlation between these attributes and the region can be shown. Unfortunately, this positivist approach to defining regions is highly problematic; often, too many variables come into play, standards of measurement are difficult to establish, and the theoretic bias behind the delineation is hard to control. In short, it is not surprising that Russett could not, 'in the strict sense of boundary congruence,' identify even a region of nation states. A brief review of the approach to regional delineation taken by the main schools of international relations theory illustrates the 'poverty' of this positivist method. Ever since Russett's pioneering work in the 1960s, the 'state-centred' foundation of traditional positivist international relations theory has encouraged many scholars to conceive of the nation state as the only regional 'unit' in world politics. By according such theoretic primacy to the state, most theorists conveniently excuse themselves from having to consider the real possibility that significant regional cross-border activity occurs irrespective of the state boundaries involved. Such 'transnational interaction' is often 'localized' by the effects of geography, distance, language, and culture, to name but a few delineating factors. The enduring legacy of the realist school and its state-centrism both illustrates and helps explain why the concept of 'region' remains poorly understood or is often avoided in world political theory. There is, of course, little doubt that states remain the primary actors on the world stage; to use this dominance, however, to overlook the impact of transnationalism, or to define a region simply as a grouping of states, is to avoid challenging the enigmatic and 44 complex, but ultimately powerful, theoretic concept of 'regionalism.' Taking Hans Morgenthau to exemplify realism has become somewhat axiomatic in the international relations dialogue; in keeping with this conversation, no more than a brief recall of Morgenthau's approach is required to illustrate that realism remains antithetical to non-statist regional analysis, primarily because it enshrines "the nation state as the ultimate point of reference."17 Yet any nation state cannot exist as an island unto itself; it has historically been shaped by other states, and by the dynamics of the regions in which it so happens to be located. Morgenthau is correct to realize that "the contemporary connection between interest and the nation state is a product of history, and is therefore bound to disappear in the course of history," a claim which allows him to assert that realism does not say states cannot be replaced by "larger units of a quite different character." In doing so, Morgenthau alludes to the possibility of considering regions as units of analysis unto themselves, but unfortunately does not pursue this line of reasoning. Subsequent realist theorists have usually failed to do so as well; realism continues to focus on the state as the only true actor in world politics. Likewise, neo-realism, bolstered by the popularity of the 'scientific method' in the 1960s and '70s, remains wedded to the primacy of the state, even though its systems-centred focus suggests regions deserve a fuller consideration in world political theory. For Kenneth Waltz, the godfather of neo-realism, states are the functionally undifferentiated units in the states-system. He claims that "So long as the major states are the major actors, the structure of international politics is defined in terms of them."18 Yet his argument, with its emphasis 1 7 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. 5th edition. New York: Knopf, 1978, p. 10. 1 8 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House, 1979, p. 94. 45 on the different capabilities of states, seems to demand a closer examination of regions as well; because the capabilities of major actors are relative to the regions in which they are acting, the effect of regions on the structure of international politics cannot be dismissed. The capabilities of the Cold War superpowers, for example, clearly differed with respect to the 'sphere of influence,' or 'subsystem,' within which they were operating. The United States certainly had a greater impact in the western European 'theatre' than it did on the Soviet 'bloc' Thus Waltz's claim that there is only one system, the states-system, can be challenged by the bias in capabilities that make for distinct subsystems, in the plural. Still, neo-realism seems better equipped than realism for dealing with regions as subsystem-level units of analysis. With reference to the 'boundaries of the system,' Gilpin, without ever mentioning regions, says that "the topography of the land, the existence of water communications, and the climate obviously greatly facilitate or inhibit interactions among states. It is no accident, for example, that international systems tend to form around water communications."19 What is key to Gilpin's assertion is his recognition of multiple systems, thereby implying the existence of units larger than states but smaller than Waltz's global states-system. Moreover, it is interesting to note that in War and Change in World Politics, Gilpin concludes a shift away from the nation state to "a larger regional or even global" economic and political system may be "called for," even inevitable, but that such systemic change would be very costly. Such a fundamental conclusion seems to demand a more serious consideration of regions, which Gilpin unfortunately does not provide. 1 9 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 38-9. 46 Given their general aversion to the 'statism' of realism and neo-realism, one could expect (still positivist) 'liberal' international relations theories to be more conducive to considering regions and regionalism in world politics. Liberal theories traditionally tackle 'state-as-key-actor' approaches by expanding the list of actors and scientifically measuring their activity. In doing so, it was noticed this activity tended to 'cluster' between contiguous states,20 and thus a regionalist focus seems more intrinsic to the liberal perspective. As such, the concept of regionalism has been considered more fully by liberal theorists. Yet even liberal approaches to regionalism remain state-centric as is evidenced by, and surely due in part to, Karl Deutsch et al's 1957 Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, the pioneering work of regional integration theory. In their attempt to explain why there is "peace within the North Atlantic area," Deutsch and his colleagues focus on 'political communities' that have become 'integrated' into 'security communities.' By 'integration' they mean "the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population."21 Deutsch's group must therefore consider what delineates this 'territory' and creates its sense of 'community.' In doing so, Deutsch essentially defines an international 'region.' He claims "the North Atlantic area contains subareas of integration," and argues it should "include all countries geographically situated on the North Atlantic Ocean or the North Sea or in the 2 0 Again, chapter seven, "US Relations with Canada and Australia" in Keohane & Nye's Power & Interdependence is perhaps the definitive example of this 'contiguity' approach. 2 1 Karl Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 5. 47 immediate hinterland of that area," an approach that for Deutsch is "best because it is both simple and familiar. Geography is the positive test of inclusion."22 Thus the regional integration project reinforces two key delineating attributes of inter-state regions: the geographic territory and contiguity of states. There is no question that for Deutsch, states remain the 'building-blocks' of regions, an approach that should not be surprising given the project's somewhat 'militaristic' focus on the essential requirements for the establishment of pluralistic and amalgamated security communities. These conditions for integration also anticipate many of the attributes subsequently used to delineate regions. Deutsch's group concludes that most important to regional integration is the 'compatibility of major values' between the states within the geographic area, and for Deutsch they are state-centric values in the sense they "seem to be of major importance to the domestic politics of the units concerned."23 Other conditions include 'mutual responsiveness,' a 'distinctive way of life,' sub-regional core areas, economic growth and expectations of joint economic reward, a 'wide range of mutual transactions,' a 'broadening of elites,' 'links of social communication,' and the 'mobility of individuals.' Interestingly, for Deutsch, ethnic and linguistic assimilation are not essential to regional amalgamation. This liberal regional integration approach to world politics, with its security focus, remain inherently state-centric. This is clearly evident in Ernst Haas' statement that the "study of regional integration is concerned with explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbors Ibid., pp. 9-10. Ibid., p. 124. 48 so as to lose factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves."24 Haas' definition of 'regional subsystems' as "devices for explaining the interdependence between local ties and concerns and the larger world which constrain them" illustrates the lack of attention given to non-statist regions by liberal regional integrationists due to their overt focus on 'security' interactions. Donald Puchala's assertion that the process of integration, defined as political unification, will produce an "end-product [that] looks like a nation state" reinforces this statist approach. Puchala does recognize some of integration theory's shortcomings, like its "assumed relationship between communication and integration,"25 but he still focuses on the pluralistic security community of states, and unfortunately ignores the non-statist attributes that make transnational regions important theoretic units for world political analysis. Some of these non-statist attributes are more apparent in regional organization and regime theory, which encourages a shift away from the 'security' problematic in liberal regional theorizing. A focus on regional organizations and institutions, and the regimes which influence behaviour at the regional level, confirms that actors other than states can have an effect on world politics. These approaches, however, still tend to remain largely statist. Paul Taylor, for example, argues that the appearance of regional international 2 4 Ernst B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing." International Organization 24 A (Autumn 1970): 607-46. 2 5 Donald J. Puchala, "Integration Theory and the Study of International Relations." Merritt, R., & B. Russett, eds. From National Development to Global Community. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1981, pp. 156, 158. 49 organizations has not fundamentally challenged the sovereignty of states.26 As regimes and organizations tend to coalesce around issue-areas and not territorial areas, they have usually been analyzed from an intrastate perspective. But some organizations and regimes concern themselves with issues specific to a region; APEC, the EU and N A F T A are prime examples. As such, Stephen Krasner's now classic definition of international regimes as the "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area"27 seems equally applicable to regions as it is to states. Regions are thus also delineated in part by the empirical proof of their localized organizations and regimes. Nye argues that both macro-regional political organizations, and micro-regional economic organizations "restrict their membership, in principle and practice, on the basis of geographic contiguity. " 2 8 Regional organization and regime theory thus add another layer of complexity to the liberal positivist delineation of regions. The introduction to Nye's International Regionalism again reflects the state-level focus of liberal regional theories. He claims that "an international region can be defined broadly as a limited number of states linked by geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence, " 2 9 and this focus on interdependence has significantly enhanced the 2 6 Paul Taylor, International Organization in the Modern World: The Regional and the Global Process. London: Pinter, 1993, p. 1. 2 7 Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables." Krasner, Stephen D., ed., International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 1. 2 8 Joseph Nye, Peace in Parts - Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, p. 8. 2 9 Joseph S. Nye, ed., International Regionalism - Readings. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968, p. vii. 50 delineation of regions by advocating for closer analysis of their economic characteristics. Economic interdependence has since been taken as a key defining attribute of a region; dense transnational regional interactions, including those of non-state actors, create geographically-localized areas of interdependence, sometimes referred to as transaction networks. Nye also claims that regions "can be determined and various boundaries delineated by analysis of mutual transactions, effective organization and interdependence of political decision-making,"30 and although Nye and Keohane do not conclude that interdependence has a regional imperative, they do recognize the importance of "analyzing problems of economic or ecological interdependence. " 3 1 Other liberal theorists have subsequently taken evidence of dense 'webs' of economic transactions to be the primary determinants of international regions. Solingen, for example, argues that domestic ruling coalitions with a strong commitment to economic liberalization are more likely to create the cooperative postures required for distinct regions to emerge.32 In a similar vein, Kenichi Ohmae claims that on "the global economic map the lines that now matter are those defining what may be called 'region states'" whose boundaries "are drawn by the deft but invisible hand of the global market for goods and services." For Ohmae, "Region states are natural economic zones."33 Unfortunately, Ohmae's concept of a 'region state' is highly enigmatic, for it intertwines the concepts of regionalism and sovereignty. Ibid., p. vii: Keohane & Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. 8. Solingen, Op. Cit., p. 3. Kenichi Ohmae, "The Rise of the Region State." Foreign Affairs 70 (Spring 1991), p. 78. 51 Robert Scalapino's concept of 'natural economic territories' is therefore a more sophisticated approach to transnational regions than is Ohmae's. Scalapino believes the natural economic territories, or NETs, being formed in Asia, like the Singapore- Johore-Batam Island growth triangle, "are evolving apart from existing political jurisdictions" and present a serious challenge to sovereignty.34 He also claims that regional NETs will "permit much more meaningful dialogue across ideological-political boundaries and, together with evermore complex economic networks connecting societies, reduce the risks of military conflict."35 In sum, while the main schools of international relations theory all at times seem to demand a deeper consideration of regions, attempts to do so have been overtly 'statist' and 'positivist.' Even scholars who make regions and regionalism their primary focus use the 'scientific method' to delineating regions and explaining their dynamics. For example, in their comparative analysis of regional units, Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel "consider regions to be areas of the world which contain geographically proximate states forming, in foreign affairs, mutually interrelated units,"36 and attempt to assess the degree of interrelation by measuring the 'shared features' of all regions, an approach that even the authors must ultimately admit is fraught with difficulties. Richard Falk and Saul Mendlovitz face similar problems; they use "'region' as a comprehensive term covering any unit in international society that is comprised of two or more sovereign states and is not a global political 3 4 Robert Scalapino, "Northeast Asia - Prospects for Cooperation." Pacific Review 5.2 (1992), p. 102. 3 5 Robert Scalapino, "The United States & Asia: Future Prospects." Foreign Affairs 70.5 (Winter 1991/92), p. 25. 3 6 Louis J. Cantori & Steven L. Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970, p. 1. 52 international institution," and because "blocs, limited international institutions, subsystems, and alliances all qualify as 'regions,'"37 the term loses much of its analytic precision. Even Hurrell concedes that earlier "attempts to define and delineate regions 'scientifically' produced little clear result," that "contemporary debates remind us that there are no 'natural' regions, and that definitions of 'regions' and indicators of 'regionness' vary according to the particular problem or question under investigation."38 It would seem, therefore, that a different approach to delineating regions may be necessary, especially when trying to define regional transnational societies. A Normative Approach to a Regional Typology With an approach to delineating regions that includes a strong normative theoretic focus, meaning an explicit consideration of the norms that constitute the human societies occupying a distinct tract of localized cross-border territory, we can develop a more succinct yet encompassing typology of regions. By adding a normative analysis to positivism's basic list of empirical regional attributes, we can create a set of theoretic regions through which to understand more fully a number of key patterns in world affairs. This typology identifies three varieties of regions: the first type fits best with the interstate perspective on world politics; the second with the intrastate or 'domestic' factor in international relations; and the third with the transnational economic and ecological dynamics in world politics. The first type of regions are those interstate entities of which the nation state is the basic unit, are thus 3 7 Richard A. Falk & Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., Regional Politics and World Order. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1973, p. 179. 3 8 Andrew Hurrell, "Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics." Review of International Studies 21 (1995), pp. 333-34. 53 supranational in size, and are delineated by state boundaries and state-level intergovernmental relations. For interstate regions, state border congruity is very high. The more contiguous and proximate the states involved, the greater their sense of forming, for better or worse, a 'region.' This type of region is best applied to analyses of geo-political groupings like the E U and A S E A N , and to state-engineered economic 'free-trade' zones like the N A F T A and APEC. This is, of course, how traditional positivist international relations theory has usually envisioned regions, and we should not be surprised that most of the empirical attributes identified with interstate regions are measured at the nation state level. That the state dominates this first type of region is clearly evident in Jackson and James who refer to it as the "regionalism of the States system"39 and true to convention break the world down into very large 'continental' or 'sub-continental' groupings of states. The preferred method for analyzing the effects of interstate regions on world politics has been to measure the extent and impact of each state's power on security 'balancing' in the region, and to study the region's intergovernmental institutions, organizations, and regimes. There is, however, also a strong normative approach to understanding this interstate type of region, one that interrogates the constitutive norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, and the value that states place on both 'interstate regional' and 'international' society. Not merely limited to international law, such normative factors fuel the immersed communities' sense of identity with the state. It would appear that this loyalty, usually called nationalism, can co-exist with a more 'continental' (for lack of a better term) sense of regional fidelity. Results from Maastricht treaty referenda would suggest that at least half of Europe's population in Scalapino, "The United States & Asia: Future Prospects," p. 13. 54 the mid 1990s identified with the society of Europe as represented by the E U , while at the same time presumably identifying with their own nation state. Likewise, south east Asians may feel some suprastate affinity for their dynamic region of 'economic tigers.' In their second sense (one perhaps less often recognized by international relations scholars) regions are intrastate or wholly 'domestic' entities that can challenge a state's authority over territory and become a concern for that state and international society at large, especially those states in geographic proximity to the state 'under siege.' This definition of regions as sub-units within states identifies an important link between domestic issues and international relations; sub-state regional demands for self-determination or greater autonomy can escalate into secessionist challenges to the sovereignty of both specific states and to the fundamental norms of international society. Of course, intrastate regions have empirical attributes: they can be quite easily delineated by substate or 'provincial borders' and by assessing the degree of subnational integration within a state or federation; Quebec is no doubt a prime example of this type of region in the world today. However, intrastate regions are perhaps best understood by reference to their normative attributes. Groups with sub-state territorial identity are usually comprised of a community who have political aspirations for their distinct history, culture, language, or ethnicity, and when this community (or 'people' or 'nation') escalate their demands for 'self-determination,' the territorial imperative to regionalism becomes explicit. While there may be a strong legal norm for a right to self-determination, most groups trying to secede realize that endorsement by the society of states of their claim to territory is crucial to their success. Likewise, their people's loyalty to the group must supersede any 55 loyalty to the state. If both these conditions are met, their 'right' and ability to secede can be greatly enhanced. It is in this act of secession that intrastate regions become a key unit of analysis for better understanding international relations. If Jackson and James are correct to note that, with the late twentieth century collapse of the last European empires, the dramatic post-World War Two rate of state-proliferation is bound to slow, then state-creation in the future will likely be due primarily to the secession of regional groups from existing states. Thus the dynamics of intrastate regions merit serious consideration, for secession movements represent a rising source of intrastate as compared to interstate war. Incidentally, it is also arguable that interstate war will become more 'regional' in scope if the size and number of 'zones of peace' continue to rise. Should the post-Cold War era indeed turn out to be marked by multipolarity, there will likely be a consolidation of regional security theatres around the regional powers of China, India, Russia, perhaps Egypt or Saudi Arabia, western Europe, South Africa, perhaps Nigeria and Brazil, and certainly the United States. As Richard Rosecrance has argued, with the end of superpower intervention, "one would find several large regional powers dominating their geographic areas."40 Finally, regions in their third (and poorly understood) sense are transnational entities that often disregard state borders. Perhaps it is this type that fits best with Ohmae's concept of 'region states,' those entities that "may lie entirely within or across the borders of a nation state," but whose borders ultimately do not matter because they are defined by "the right size 4 0 Richard Rosecrance, "Regionalism and the post-Cold War E r a . " International Journal 46 (Summer 1991), p. 374. 56 and scale to be the true, natural business units in today's global economy."41 While he recognizes that transnational regions are primarily economic in nature, Ohmae is wrong to insinuate they are somehow 'sovereign.' For this type of region, state (or substate) border congruence is low, and hence they usually lack definite political referents. As they are transnational, these regions have both substate (encompassing only a part of a state) and suprastate (linking a part of one state with a part of another) characteristics, but cannot be purely intrastate or interstate. These regions are transnational because they are 'overlaid' onto the world's political map and, instead of 'fitting' with state borders, they have high congruity with localized economies, markets, patterns of population settlement and migration, and the natural landscape. They are often dominated by, or encompass the space between, one or more major urban centres. Key attributes of any transnational region is its ecosystem and physical endowments which often place parameters on the region by delineating the nature of its economy, tastes of its markets, and patterns of human settlement and movement. It is thus argued that an explicit focus on the norms and values that shape and guide the pursuit of the 'better' life by those individuals who comprise a 'community' occupying a cross-border yet sub-national tract of territory can help scholars achieve a more complete understanding of world politics. In essence, if there exist well-entrenched norms justifying the individual pursuit of socioeconomic well-being in excess of the 'good' life as provided for by the modern welfare state, and as this pursuit often takes place within a localized economy supporting a distinctive transnational regional society, then studying the norms that 4 1 Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State - The Rise of Regional Economies. New York: Free Press, 1995, p. 5. 57 sanction the individual's pursuit of the 'better' life via participation in localized but cross-border trade, investment, consumerism, tourism, inter-migration, unionization, professional association, educational exchange, resource usage and even land ownership, to name but a few, will be crucial to understanding the normative as well as empirical basis of regions. Regions so understood would therefore be delineated not only by the empirical measurement of such types of activity, and not only by assessments of the degree of human interconnectivity these activities create, but also by interrogating the extent to which the norms and values that justify such activity have taken hold within a localized as opposed to national or international society. For these norms and values could become so entrenched that the nation states across parts of which transnational regions arise, and the society of states itself, are either unwilling or unable to control the human societies who occupy them. Transnational Regional Societies: Some Empirical Examples While transnational regional society is to a significant degree constituted by norms justifying the individual's pursuit of the 'better' life beyond that provided for by the state and international society, what constitutes the 'better' life for individuals in different transnational regional societies varies widely. Partly to recognize this variance, and to further encourage familiarity with the concept of transnational regional society, some empirical examples are now briefly identified; unfortunately, a detailed case study of each lies beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, to illustrate that transnational regional societies can develop different 'identities' while their main attributes remain constant, some examples are now drawn from North America and western Europe. Arguably the most advanced examples of transnational regional society, the pacific northwest of North America, often referred to as Cascadia, and 58 'transfrontier regios' in western Europe like the Basque region, the Alsace and larger Rhine Valley region, and the territory represented by A R G E A L P 4 2 all share common elements. They are all distinctive cross-border yet sub-national tracts of territory in which members of an identifiable society with a strong sense of belonging to their physical space interact transnationally with one another via a localized economic market and social activities in their pursuit of heightened well-being and the 'better' life. Moreover, each example is entrenched in zones of the world where the individual's basic physical security is by in large being provided for by the state and international society, and where domestic, regional and global economies can help provide for the 'best' in material goods and comfort. Clear cut boundaries of transnational regional societies are impossible to delineate, but as Hurrell is correct to note, "patterns of regionalization do not necessarily coincide with the borders of states. Migration, markets and social networks may lead to increased interaction and interconnectedness tying together parts of existing states and creating new cross border-regions."43 Thus a transnational regional society like Cascadia, increasingly bestowed with a 'sense of identity' by both academics and the press,44 encompasses a set of transnational economic, social, and infrastructural activities and other human interactions between British Columbia, Washington, and Oregon (and for some commentators, Alaska, 4 2 The ARGEALP, or Arbeitsgemeinschaft Alpenldnder, association of elected heads of the regional governments of Bavaria, the Austrian provinces of Salzburg, Tyrol and Vorarlberg, the Swiss canton of Grischun and the Italian regions of Alto Adige, Trentino and Lombardy. See Malcolm Anderson, "The Political Problems of Frontier Regions." Malcolm Anderson, ed., Frontier Regions in Western Europe. London: Frank Cass, 1983, p. 3. 4 3 Hurrell, Op. Cit., p. 335. 4 4 As indicated by, for example, The New Pacific's 'design a flag for Cascadia' competition (Issue 9, Winter 1994), and many Vancouver Sun articles over the past three years. 59 Alberta, Idaho, and northern California as well), into an identifiable cross-border society. The empirical attributes of a transnational region like Cascadia can be studied, for example, by measuring the extent of localized trade, the levels of interregional investment, the scale of shared transportation infrastructures, and the patterns of population settlement and flows resulting from migration and tourism. Michael Goldberg and Maurice Levi have done this, claiming that "The national and state borders that cross the land between the Arctic Ocean and Oregon's southern border are simply political artifacts, hiding a harmony of interests and opportunities that makes Cascadia as meaningful an economic entity as California."4 5 By discussing the distinct economic characteristics of Cascadia, Goldberg and Levi render it 'identifiable' by illustrating the degree of cross-border activity conducted by its inhabitants in their (primarily economic) pursuit of the 'better' life, a pursuit ultimately made possible by the pacific northwest's distinctive geo-physical endowment and the resources its ecosystems can provide to its own local market, and to national and global markets as well. Thus Cascadia is unique because of its physical geography, its resources, and the economy this geo-endowment helps sustain. It is also distinct from all other transnational regional societies because of the combination of identities possessed by its inhabitants as a community, and due to their shared history, both of First Nations people and of settlers from the time of the Oregon Territory. History plays a large role in shaping a territory's 'sense of place,' and from this identity, which includes a shared language lifestyle, distinct consumer tastes have emerged. Cascadians by in large speak english and/or another asian language, 4 5 Michael A. Goldberg and Maurice D. Levi, "The Evolving Experience along the Pacific Northwest Corridor Called Cascadia." Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, 1993, p. 99. 60 share a cultural mosaic shaped by settlement patterns, and have formed a 'west coast' identity and 'lifestyle.' While in Cascadia we should expect to find a strong identification with its unique physical terrain, including its coastline, mountains and river valleys, we will also find a degree of inter-societal divergence based on ethnic, 'provincial' and nationalist sentiment. Hence, a transnational regional society like Cascadia is also rendered unique by the multiple loyalties its inhabitants hold to their ethnicity, to the local area in which they occupy private property, to the Canadian provinces and American states involved, and to Canada and the United States as well. However, Cascadia is ultimately constituted by the entrenchment in the pacific northwest of the norms, common to all transnational regional societies, that justify the pursuit of the 'better' life. For while Cascadia may lack a shared 'political' identity,46 it is nevertheless largely shaped by norms and values relating to its inhabitants' perception of 'their' identification with the physical place, and that justifies their pursuit of the 'better' life by earning, trading, travelling, consuming and even studying, for example, with very little concern for or hinderance from the territory's well-entrenched international and subnational borders. Douglas Brown and Earl Fry have studied some of these trends in their "States and Provinces in the International Economy Project" which concludes that "interdependence is accelerating the role of [American] states and [Canadian] provinces in the international 4 6 For a more detailed consideration of American state-Canadian province political relations, see David Cameron, ed., Regionalism & Supranationalism - Challenges and Alternatives to the Nation-State in Canada and Europe. Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1981. For an analysis specific to Cascadia, see Gerard F. Rutan, "British Columbia-Washington State Governmental Interrelations: Some Findings upon the Failure of Structure." American Review of Canadian Studies 15.1 (1985): 97-110. 61 economy."47 When compared to other communities, 'Cascadians' may, for example, identify more strongly with, or place a higher value on, their territory's 'wilderness' and the natural and recreational resources it provides. Thus in Cascadia, one can identify the norms and values that justify the individual pursuit of the 'better' life via participating in, and perhaps strengthening, the localized cross border economy; in the personal value placed on their relationship to the region's physical geography; and in the region's fit with their personal tastes, lifestyles, activities, work styles, and professional associations, to name but a few. In short, Cascadians pursue their own conception of the 'better' life; what is key is that this pursuit is both justified and well-entrenched within their transnational regional society. Norms that justify the pursuit of the 'better' life are, of course, also evident in, and help to constitute, a number of western European transnational regional societies. Also known as 'transfrontier' regions or Euroregions in the slim literature that discusses them, they are cross-frontier yet sub-national geographic territories that contain a high degree of interaction and cooperation between peoples who share a common history, culture, ethnicity, and language or languages. Again, this primarily economic and social interaction, it is argued, results from the sum of the area's individuals pursuing the 'better' life with little hinderance from the states involved. So entrenched are these norms in some parts of western Europe that intergovernmental bodies have had no choice but to confer a degree of legal sanction on them. The Council of Europe, for example, has endorsed the growth of transnational regional societies by specifically promoting the interaction and cooperation that 4 7 Douglas M . Brown & Earl H. Fry, eds., States and Provinces in the International Economy. Berkeley: University of California Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 1993, p. 16. 62 enables the localized pursuit of the 'better' life to transpire across international borders. For over 30 years, the Council has convened a Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe; in the early 1990s, the Conference drafted a convention on interterritorial co-operation, which "aimed at recognizing the right of local and regional authorities to co-operate with territorial communities or authorities in other states, and the legal validity in national law of instruments drawn up in the context of such co-operation. " 4 8 Thus, while western European transnational regional societies are all to a significant degree constituted by their networks of individuals pursuing the 'better' life, they of course also differ from one another, or are unique in many ways, because of the physical geography of the territory involved, and due to the type of economy and forms of production the land supports. They are also differentiated to a great degree by the multiple identities each society holds, identities with strong foundations in each area's long history of human settlement. In a study of western European frontier regions edited by Malcolm Anderson, Sven Tagil looks at the historical background of various border areas including the Basque transfrontier region, in which he identifies a distinct society living in the western Pyrenees between Spain and France. Even though some factions of the Basque society in Spain are terrorists for secession, others advocate for the status quo, and a Basque transnational regional society is flourishing in an industrially and economically well-developed region with strong ethnic and cultural ties.49 4 8 1992 Report on the Activities of the Council of Europe. Council of Europe Press, 1993, p. 97. 4 9 Sven Tagil, "The Question of Border Regions in Western Europe: An Historical Background." Anderson, Op. Cit., p. 31. 63 In a similar vein, Xavier Boos has looked at the economic aspects of Alsace, arguing that the pursuit of economic gain is a powerful factor constituting Alsatian society. Alsace's historically 'Germanic' cultural ties also play a large role, especially around Strasbourg which is home to the Council of Europe, and within the larger upper Rhine area. Based on the territory's most abundant resource, its gravel beds, Boos studies the high levels of transfrontier migration and cross-border investment between Alsace and neighbouring parts of Germany and Switzerland.50 Similar norms justifying the cross-border pursuit of the 'better' life are well-entrenched in the A R G E A L P region mentioned above. Rudolf Lill cites interdependence between the historically binational French and Italian 'kingdoms' of Piedmont and Savoy, the German, Slovene and Rhaeto-Romance populations along Italy's northern and north eastern borders, and the Italian-speaking provinces of Trentino, Friuli and Trieste which formerly belonged to the Austrian empire as the basis of this transnational regional society.51 Thus, while it appears there are significant differences between various western European transnational regional societies, the entrenchment of norms justifying the pursuit of the 'better' live through economic, social and lifestyle interdependence is a key constitutive factor common to all of them. In conclusion, it could be argued that transnational regional societies thus reveal a significant degree of cosmopolitanism within human society. That the cross-border yet sub-national pursuit of the 'better' life takes place in many parts of the first world would suggest 5 0 See Xavier Boos, "Economic Aspects of a Frontier Situation: The Case of Alsace." Anderson, Op. Cit., pp. 81-97. 5 1 See Rudolf Lill, "The Historical Evolution of the Italian Frontier Regions." Anderson, Op. Cit., pp. 109-122. 64 a strong solidarist impulse can arise within some segments of humanity. Moreover, that this pursuit seems to have acquired 'western' notions of consumerism and materialism suggests that a cosmopolitanism based on western values may indeed be spreading. However, because transnational regional societies are most developed in the first world's 'zones of peace,' the communitarian society of states must still be playing a key role; nation states are undoubtedly providing a requisite degree of order and security. In other words, states are still responsible for establishing the 'good' life from which the 'better' life can be pursued in transnational regional societies. This thesis now turns to a detailed consideration of these communitarian and cosmopolitan impulses by asking 'what can transnational regional societies tell us about the current condition of society of states?' It will be argued these distinct transfrontier regions can shed some new light on the 'nature of security' debate, the 'democracies no longer fight one another' argument, and the 'communitarian society of states versus the cosmopolitan global society' debate; in doing so, their consideration can advance the study of international relations. 65 CHAPTER 3 - TRANSNATIONAL REGIONAL SOCIETIES & THE SOCIETY OF STATES Now that a degree of theoretic and empirical familiarity with transnational regional society has hopefully been established, it is important to ask just what this distinct form of human society can tell us about the current 'condition' of the society of states. In short, do transnational regional societies strengthen or weaken both the 'state' and 'international society' as the primary 'communities' into which human affairs are organized? Or are transnational regional societies indicative of a trend towards the 'globalization' of, or an increasing 'solidarism' in, the structure of human government? To begin answering such questions, this chapter applies the concept of transnational regional society to three current debates in international relations theory from the normative and economic focus developed herein. After discussing what is meant by the 'condition' of the society of states, chapter three briefly considers the 'nature of security' debate between those who argue the term 'security' should only refer to the Hobbesian, physical or military condition of safety and order, and those who believe that socioeconomic conditions of well-being, including the state of the environment, are also valid security concerns. In doing so it is argued that, far from threatening international society, transnational regional society can only really flourish when both the specific states involved and the larger society of states are already providing for a requisite level of international peace, safety and order. The importance of international peace, safety and order (as supplied by international society and its fundamental norms) to the successful operation of transnational regional societies must be emphasized: localized cross-border human interactions marked by a degree 6 6 of indifference to the states involved can only occur when those states are at peace with one another and are expected to remain so in the foreseeable future. When this main proposition of this thesis is recognized, it becomes possible to shed some new light on the 'democratic states no longer fight one another' argument via a consideration of the geographic locales of transnational regional societies. To do so, the second section of this chapter asks, 'if transnational regional societies primarily arise between neighbouring parts of western democracies, do they perhaps augment or solidify the interstate interdependence and cooperation required for a so-called "zone of peace" to emerge?' For if this is indeed true, further empirical support can be added to the case of those who believe the 'long peace' in western Europe and North America is here to stay. In the final section of this chapter, it is argued that a degree of reconciliation is possible in the debate between those who argue that a pluralist world of states constituted into a society is the preferred way of organizing human affairs (a communitarian and rationalist position), and between those who foresee the rise of a solidarist or global society of humankind, ultimately leading to world government (the cosmopolitan or revolutionary position). That the debate has ignored transnational regional society is again indicative of an unfortunate void in the international society school literature; for ultimately, transnational regional society reveals that both the Grotian and Kantian impulses must indeed co-exist so that humans can pursue their idea of the 'better' life. The 'Condition' of the Society of States In order to consider whether transnational regional society strengthens or weakens the society of states, what is meant by the current 'condition' of international society must first be established before any 'prognosis' for the state and their society in the twenty-first century 67 can be attempted. For it would seem that any assessment of the condition of the society of states must consider whether state sovereignty and the state monopoly on the use of armed force, and whether the constraints placed on that authority and monopoly by the norms of international society, are somehow in decline, remain unchallenged, or are growing in strength. Relative to some prior bench mark, such an assessment should examine the current ability of states to provide an adequate level of peace, security and order, or that condition where a human population or community is not primarily concerned with their physical survival in a state of war, insecurity or disorder. It seems reasonable that if states are by-in-large fulfilling the primary 'goal' of human society, that of order,1 they can be seen as serving a vital purpose and therefore in little risk of decline as the primary form of human community. Moreover, states and the society they constitute by upholding international norms, especially the paramount norms of sovereignty and nonintervention, ultimately make the attainment of additional 'goods' by human society possible; by providing for a stable foundation on which humans can build their conception of the 'better' life, states seem to be anything but superfluous. As the main argument of this thesis, therefore, it is crucial to realize that transnational regional societies help confirm the stability of the current condition of peace, safety and order that is being provided for by the hard norms of international society in distinctive tracts of territory or 'zones' of the world. The existence of transnational regional societies also 1 This concept of order in social life is derived from Bull. Order is a primary 'need' in the sense of being a condition resulting from the three primary goals of society being met: that life is secure against violence, that promises are kept and arrangement carried out, and that there is stability in material possession. Says Bull, "By order in social life I mean a pattern of human activity that sustains elementary, primary or universal goals of social life such as these." See Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 4-5. 68 suggests a 'healthy' prognosis for the state, the dominant unit into which the affairs, political and otherwise, of humans are organized as it continues to evolve during the twenty-first century. This 'stability,' it is argued, derives in part from the high degree of interconnectedness created by the economic, social and cultural similarities linking individual members of a society that so happens to be cross-border yet sub-national. These links can only arise and thrive, to the point where their disruption would be very costly to the nation states involved, when the society of states is already providing for the long-term peace and order that enables stable patterns of interaction to develop. In essence, the society of states ultimately supports transnational regional societies who in turn reinforce certain states because they help make the 'better' life attainable for some of their citizens. To use a biological metaphor, a 'symbiotic' relationship of sorts develops between 'international' and 'transnational regional' society. Even a brief examination of the current patterns of warfare and interstate military relations would confirm there are large zones of the world's territory, or regions of states, that are both democratic and prosperous, across parts of which distinct transnational regional societies are now well-entrenched. There are, of course, international zones or regions of the world where states do not provide for even the rudiments of the 'good' life, where the level of society between states is largely undeveloped, where in absence of natural resources and infrastructures localized economies are largely subsistence-driven, and where humans, primarily concerned with their basic physical survival, are unable to pursue the 'better' life. Such 'zones of conflict' encompass, for example, large tracts of western, eastern and sub-Saharan Africa (although some evidence of transnational regional society could be found in southern Africa.) The 69 absence of transnational regional society in large parts of the world can therefore be seen as further evidence of regional instability and the failure of states to provide for both domestic and interstate order. That transnational regional societies rarely seem to arise between neighbouring parts of 'quasi-states,' to borrow Jackson's term, would suggest a more tenuous prognosis for their long term viability. Evidence of nascent transnational regional societies in the developing world, and the degree to which they are entrenched, can also help scholars assess the stability of specific (usually non-democratic) states that are perhaps directly threatened by cross-border yet sub-national societies arising in parts of their territory. The impact on China of the Pearl River Delta area, taken to include Hong Kong, Macau and especially the Shenzen Special Economic Zone during the 1980s and '90s, would be a fascinating case study of the tension between the economic benefits transnational regional societies provide for individuals and the resultant loss of control experienced by a non-democratic state regime. The Pearl River Delta example could also help illustrate how transnational regional societies should not be taken as proof of some larger movement towards the 'globalization' of, or an increasing 'solidarism' in, the structure of human government. As Leslie Sklair notes, Shenzen is an exercise in 'selective decentralization' that remains highly controlled by the Chinese state in preparation for Hong Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997.2 While a developing state like China may have little choice but to accept their existence, or may even encourage them for the economic benefits they can provide, transnational regional 2 Leslie Sklair, "Shenzen: A Chinese 'Development Zone' in Global Perspective." Development & Change 16 (1985): 571-602. 70 societies ultimately arise on the order and stability provided by international society, and thus help support the pluralist status quo of the society of states. Moreover, as transnational regional societies are not first and foremost politically constituted, it does not follow that their growth in size or numbers would lead to suprastate forms of political organization. World government cannot be the end result of amalgamated transnational regional societies, for they are another example of the pluralist impulse in world affairs; there are potentially many transnational regional societies. Instead, these unique constitutions of transfrontier human society should be understood as localized, sub-global manifestation of cross-border solidarism that can only arise in the condition of stability and order created by the primarily pluralist world of states. Transnational regional societies are constituted by the norms that justify the human pursuit of the 'better' life as made possible by localized markets and lifestyles, and it is this normative and economic approach to transnational regional society that makes it possible to now engage, and hopefully shed some new light on, some important debates in international relations theory. The 'Nature of Security' Debate International relations theorists who bring a 'security studies' focus to the discipline have debated whether 'security' as a term and concept should refer only to physical or military or national survival in the Hobbesian (and perhaps 'realist') sense, or to a wider condition of well-being that also includes, for example, economic interdependence, the state of the environment, and the rights of certain segments of humanity (a more 'liberal' or 'idealist' connotation.) Barry Buzan, in People, States and Fear, has perhaps given this debate more attention than have other scholars. He attempts "to show how a more fully 71 developed and broadly based concept [of security] can lead to constructive redefinitions of the national security problem." By concentrating on national security, Buzan argues the 'realist' focus on power and the 'idealist' focus on peace have created an underdeveloped concept of security in general, and "that the concept of security is, in itself, a more versatile, penetrating and useful way to approach the study of international relations than either power or peace."3 He thus develops a concept of 'security' based on the pursuit of 'freedom from threat' for both states and societies, but not necessarily individuals, and perhaps for the whole collectivity of humankind as well; security for Buzan is ultimately based on survival. He is correct to recognize that "The security of human collectivities is affected by factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental,"4 thereby suggesting that the term 'security' can refer to a wider condition of human well-being. Because Buzan takes a 'neorealist' approach to the concept, he claims that states remain the principal referent objects of security in the durable condition of international anarchy, and that the interdependence of their national interests is relative and shifting. Buzan thus focuses primarily on the state, and only secondarily on the individual and the international system, into which he subsumes international society; in sum, he claims "The state system itself is undoubtedly the most universal and important of the shared values of international society."5 Consequently, 'society' for Buzan is limited to a 'between states' condition, and he thus fails to consider the impact of transnational regional society on the 3 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear. 2nd edition. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, pp. 2, 3. 4 Ibid., pp. 18-20. 5 Ibid., p. 171. 72 nature of security. His more recent work on 'regional security' and on security complexes advances Deutsch's theory of pluralistic and amalgamated security communities but remains wholly state-centric. Buzan claims that in "security terms, 'region' means that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other. " 6 He thus defines a security complex as "a group of states whose primary security concerns are sufficiently closely linked that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another," and notes that the principal element in regional security complexes is "the pattern of amity and enmity among states."7 In doing so Buzan recognizes that regionalism does not necessarily lead to peaceful integration and political unification, but he does not discern that transnational regional society often creates an advanced type of interdependence (based on the condition of 'order' being supplied by interstate regional society) that reinforces the stability created by the fundamental norms of state sovereignty and nonintervention. In short, by applying the concept of transnational regional society to the 'nature of security' debate, it becomes evident that security theorists need to consider both the physical or military or Hobbesian threats to the national interest as well as threats to an individual's socioeconomic well-being and ability to pursue the 'better' life through the acquisition of goods beyond those provided for by the welfare state. For the ability to pursue the 'better' life is only possible when the basic security conditions of physical safety and order are being 6 Barry Buzan, "Third World Regional Security in Structural and Historical Perspective." Job, Brian L., ed. The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security in the Third World. Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1992, p. 69. 7 Ibid., pp. 169, 168. 73 supplied by the norms of state sovereignty and nonintervention. The mutually supportive relationship between transnational regional society and international society is thus once again revealed by the 'nature of security' debate; so long as the society of states can by-in-large guarantee human safety and order (i.e., the 'good' life) in certain tracts of territory, those occupying that territory can pursue the 'better' life as attainable within localized cross-border economies and society. The resulting condition of interdependence they create in turn supports both the growth of transnational regional society and the international status quo as dictated by the western 'centre' of global security patterns. For according to Buzan, military and political threats are now minimal between states in the 'core' of capitalist economies, and so the pursuit of freedom from economic, societal and environmental threats is on the rise.8 In 'periphery' regions, however, more basic security threats, both military and political, to an individual's survival still loom large, and it is therefore necessary to focus primarily on such threats when examining third world regional security patterns. In studying this widening gap between first and third world security patterns Brian Job develops the concept of the 'insecurity dilemma.' According to Job, the 'weak state' is often unable to control domestic threats, and can become the primary security concern for large segments of its populace. Third world states are also subject to internal fragmentation due to 'the paradox of static territorial borders' and, with the post-Cold War "diminution of superpower influence and interest in the Third World," are now faced with an insecurity 8 Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century." International Affairs 67.3 (1992), p. 433. 74 dilemma: their populations are increasingly vulnerable to both internal and external threats.9 Considering transnational regional society can shed some new light on this dilemma. If transnational regional societies do not arise between neighbouring parts of weak or failed states, the need to secure physical safety before being able to pursue material security or socioeconomic well-being would be confirmed. Examining the presence or absence of transnational regional society in parts of the 'core' versus the 'periphery' would also help scholars assess the prevalence of security or insecurity in large tracts of the world. Regional security studies like that of Neil MacFarlane and Thomas Weiss could also benefit from a more explicit consideration of transnational regional society. From their case studies of regional organizations managing localized conflicts, they conclude that the U N should not be neglected because organizations like the O A U , A S E A N , and E U fail to enhance regional security; their military, diplomatic, and financial capacities are just too weak.10 However, the ability of such regional organizations to reduce threats, even if indirectly, via their support or promotion of transnational regional society is not considered. Similarly, Patrick Morgan's study of regional conflicts, in which he recognizes that "state security is not equivalent to security for the society and may be contrary to it," 1 1 also begs a fuller consideration of transnational regional society's effects on the security management options 9 Brian Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World." Job, Brian, ed. The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States. Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1992, pp. 13, 18. 1 0 S. Neil MacFarlane & Thomas Weiss, "Regional Organizations and Regional Security." Security Studies 2.1 (Autumn 1992): 6-37. 1 1 Patrick Morgan, "The Study of Regional Conflicts: Preliminary Considerations and a Starting Point." Unpublished manuscript, 1994, p. 16. 75 open to distinct interstate regions. For ultimately, any study of the nature of regional security and the set of issues that comprise localized threats must consider those factors that make each region distinct. As transnational regional societies arise around localized markets and the physical geographic endowments that support them, and are constituted by the entrenchment of norms justifying the economic and social pursuit of the 'better' life within these markets, their impact on the nature of regional security patterns can be significant. Christopher Twomey and Susan Shirk realize that economic growth and interdependence, both hallmarks of transnational regional society, can "have important implications for regional security patterns."12 By studying the economic-security linkage, they illustrate how economic issues can become the primary security concern in some regions of the world. Intraregional trade and investment, and the linkages and stability they help foster, are key attributes of transnational regional societies, and thus an explicit consideration of these cross-border yet sub-national human communities cannot but help mould a notion of security that is more inclusive of threats to socioeconomic well-being and the individual's ability to pursue the 'better' life. This is, of course, an ardently 'liberal' approach to international order and security, like that taken by Mark Zacher in his assessment of regime governance in the international system. Zacher details the erosion of some 'pillars' of the Westphalian system due to rising economic, social and environmental interdependencies, but recognizes this transformation is not "undermining the centrality of states; rather, it involves the enmeshment of states in a network of explicit and 1 2 Christopher Twomey & Susan Shirk, "Exploiting the Economic-Security Linkage: Recognition and Balance." Unpublished manuscript, 1994, p. 3. 76 implicit international regimes and interdependencies that are increasingly constraining their autonomy."13 It is herein argued that by studying the impact of transnational regional society on these regimes and interdependencies, it would be possible to develop more comprehensive and inclusive conception of security, order and governance via a more detailed focus on just how states become enmeshed due to cross-border yet sub-national interdependency. In closing, it should be reiterated that, with its focus on territorially-localized environmental threats that pay no heed to international borders, a more explicit consideration of transnational regional society could further advance a fuller conception of the 'nature of security.' While Dalby notes a geopolitical approach to environmental security would "tackle the concepts of sovereignty and security and .. . expand its analysis beyond an explicitly spatial focus to examine questions of environmental politics in the context of the emergence of a global civil society,"14 he does not consider the possibility that transnational regional societies could well be most threatened by, and thus most likely to take action against, localized cross-border environmental degradation. This focus would again advocate for a broader conception of security that has populations, and not just states, as its referents. In a similar vein, Homer-Dixon's study of the links between environmental scarcities and conflict finds empirical support for the "hypothesis that environmental scarcity simultaneously increases economic deprivation and disrupts key social institutions, which in turn causes 1 3 Mark W. Zacher, "The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance." Rosenau, James, & Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds. Governance Without Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 62-4. 1 4 Dalby, Op. Cit., p. 504. 77 'deprivation' conflicts such as civil strife and insurgency."15 Studying the effects of environmentally-induced economic deprivation on transnational regional societies could, for example, shed some new light on the likelihood they pursue secession. In sum, the study of transnational regional societies introduces novel aspects the 'nature of security' debate, for they confirm the need to focus on both socioeconomic well-being, or comfort-related security, as well as basic human survival in the face of military and political threats. The 'Democracies No Longer Fight Other Democracies' Argument Given that the 'nature of security' varies widely between different parts of the world, it appears the phenomenon of transnational regional society can shed some new light on the related argument that democratic states no longer wage war with one another. It is thus very briefly asserted that an examination of the geographic locales of transnational regional societies would confirm they arise primarily between neighbouring parts of western democracies in the world's long-standing 'zones of peace.' As such, the high levels of interdependence combined with the notable absence of military conflict in the relations between democratic states in western Europe and North America can be interpreted as both supporting, and being supported by, transnational regional societies and the pursuit of the 'better' life they help make possible. Because disrupting the links, both economic and social, that facilitate this pursuit of the 'better' life would be very costly in terms of the public support democratic regimes require, and because promoting the cross-border, sub-national interaction of citizens can bolster their belief the legitimacy of the state, the high degree of correlation between democracy, peace, stability, order and transnational regional society Homer-Dixon, Op. Cit., pp. 23-4. 78 should come as no surprise. The argument that democracies no longer fight one another has received a fair degree of theoretic attention of late, with two key questions recurring in most analyses. First, for just how long must the condition of peace and order mark the relations between democratic states in order to assert they will not wage war in the future? And second, what are the factors that account for this stability in the world's 'zones of peace?' Unfortunately, the question as to whether and to what degree the 'long peace' in western Europe and North America is bolstered by transnational regional society has not been asked. In The Long Peace, John Gaddis explores why there was no world war during the Cold War and why, in the mid-1980s, this 'peace' "showed no signs of coming apart anytime soon." 1 6 He concludes that the structure of the postwar American-Soviet bipolar system provided for remarkable stability through a variety of self-regulating mechanisms of which nuclear deterrence was very important while economic interdependence was definitely not. In a similar vein, Waltz argues that "nuclear weapons are in fact a tremendous force for peace and afford nations that possess them the possibility of security at a reasonable cost,"17 and goes as far as proposing that the "slow spread of nuclear weapons will promote peace and reinforce international stability."18 That nuclear weapons have played a significant role in 1 6 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 216. 1 7 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities." American Political Science Review 84.3 (September 1990), p. 731. 1 8 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better." Adelphi Paper 171 (1981), p. 28. 79 creating the 'long peace' is a strong argument,19 one that reaffirms democratic nuclear states can form a society that provides for the high degree of military security and order required for transnational regional societies to flourish. In essence, under the nuclear shield, cross-border yet sub-national interdependence and socioeconomic well-being can take root and flourish. There are also theorists who attribute the striking absence of war between democratic states in recent decades to the high degree of economic interdependence that has arisen between them. Perhaps David Lake's overtly positivist microeconomic theory of state rent seeking is the best example of this line of argument. In comparison to autocratic states, Lake argues that "democratic states tend to be more constrained by their societies from earning rents" via imperialist expansion, and will thus "tend to create fewer economic distortions, possess greater national wealth, and devote greater absolute resources to national security." Moreover, "democracies will also tend to form overwhelming countercoalitions against expansionist autocracies," and are thus more likely to win wars with autocratic states.20 Key to Lake's argument is his realization that societies clearly seek to constrain their states at the lowest possible cost to their own economic security and well-being, and that these costs are lowest for the citizens of democratic states. As such, citizens pursuing the 'better' life in transnational regional societies act to constrain their democratic states from pursuing warfare that would adversely affect their comfort and heightened level of 1 9 A strong argument, of course, can also be made that in addition to nuclear deterrence, the growing acceptance and entrenchment of international norms and law, like article 2(4) of the UN Charter, plays a significant role in perpetuating the 'long peace.' 2 0 David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War." American Political Science Review 86.1 (March 1992), p. 24. 80 socioeconomic well-being. Interestingly, Jackson also notes that citizens of democracies are also indirect members of international society via the national governments they form, and he thus maintains that "There clearly is, then, also a communitarian aspect to international society which is probably most evident in democratic states where citizenship is highly developed. " 2 1 In short, there appear to be a number of factors, ranging from nuclear deterrence to international norms of nonintervention to conditions of high economic interdependence that have created 'zones' of peaceful democracies in the world today. Whether this condition of stability and order will continue to mark the relations between democratic states in the future seems more difficult to assess. Applying the study of transnational regional society to any prognosis for the 'long peace' in western Europe and North America could be helpful in this regard, for it is argued that as transnational regional societies ultimately support the society of states, their growth and solidification could help theorists identify and assess the relative longevity of the world's 'zones of peace.' The extent and permanence of these democratic 'zones of peace' are, of course, relative to the ongoing condition of conflict and anarchy that marks much of the autocratic or non-democratic world in which the absence of transnational regional society can again help explain the world's 'zones' of failing or failed states. For as Keohane has recently remarked about 'zones of peace and conflict,' Although constitutional democracy was remarkably successful in Western Europe and North America, [enduring peace] requires demanding conditions to be realized. These conditions are not met in much of the world and are unlikely to be met during the next several 2 1 Jackson, "International Society" in The Global Covenant: International Ethics After the Cold War, p. 7. 81 decades. Many countries of the former Soviet Union, much of the Middle East and Asia, and almost all of Africa do not have good prospects of becoming constitutional democracies in this generation.22 The prospects, therefore, for states in these regions to form 'zones of peace' replete with transnational regional societies that help make possible the pursuit of the 'better' life remain slim for the foreseeable future. It is therefore argued that by studying the geographic locations of transnational regional societies, their prevalence in the world's long-standing 'zones of peace' and their notable absence in the world's peripheral 'zones of conflict' would be confirmed. As such, they seem to both support and be supported by the conditions of peace, stability and order as provided for and realized through the state and international society in North America and Western Europe, and by socioeconomic interdependence. Transnational regional societies advance the 'democracies no longer fight other democracies' argument by illustrating how security as provided for by the democratic state can be, counter to Gaddis' argument, both a factor of state-level nuclear deterrence and the conditions of societal and economic interdependence that are especially evident localized cross-border communities. Moreover, transnational regional societies becoming even more entrenched in the world's 'zones of peace' should be taken as further evidence that the current peace between democracies will continue to endure; because of the potential loss of socioeconomic well-being as secured by individuals within transnational regional societies, they can be expected to exercise their political influence, through their elected officials, to preserve the peaceful status quo. 2 2 Robert O. Keohane, "Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society." Holm, H. H. , & George Sorenson, eds. Whose World Order? Boulder: Westview, 1995, p. 178. 82 The 'Pluralist versus Solidarist' Debate Finally, it argued that transnational regional society can help international relations scholars assess the relative strength of communitarian and cosmopolitan impulses in world politics. Scholars who view the world as a pluralist collection of states and who find merit in the 'order' the society of states is able to provide are often at odds with theorists who foresee the rise of a global society of humankind in a world where states no longer meet the disparate needs of their populations. The debate between these schools of thought is by-in-large over which human impetus, to either one or many human communities, will come to dominate the organization of human affairs in the years to come. However, the phenomenon of transnational regional society has once again been all but ignored in the 'society of states' versus 'global society' debate. This is especially unfortunate given that a consideration of transnational regional society, which is neither comprised entirely through the society of states, those privileged right and duty bearing units in world politics, nor via a Utopian global collectivity of individuals with shared rights and duties, confirms that elements of both impulses are necessary for groups of humans to pursue their conception of the 'better' life. Of those scholars who have to varying degrees and in their own ways engaged the debate as to whether a communitarian society of states is somehow giving way to a global or cosmopolitan society of humankind, few have considered that a transnational regional form of human society could already be bridging between, and thereby revealing the relative vitality of, both the pluralist and solidarist impulses in world politics. Save a recent essay by M.J. Peterson, the relationship between transnationalism and international society remains largely unexplored. Peterson is correct to discern that "Any discussion of 'international 83 society' that goes beyond the conception of a society of states must take into account the transnational activities of individuals, firms, interest associations and social groups."23 He notes the argument that 'civil society creates domestic order and thus international society must create world order' would encourage us to posit a global civil society ready to share a common global public space and to interact with some central world political structure, whether it be a world government or a concert of like-minded great powers. Yet this is misleading. Civil society within a country operates not only in a centralized political system but also in a context where the country enjoys a significant amount of loyalty and the state is perceived as a legitimate embodiment of authority.24 By doing so, Peterson makes the key point that human societies are not evolving into one global society, and to those who predict the state is disappearing he suggests that "the notion of an 'international' rather than a 'global' civil society reminds us that countries and national borders remain real. National loyalties are not being superseded by global or regional loyalty, nor are they being replaced by more localized ones."25 This realization enables him to conclude that "states and societal actors share a transnational public space. Both . . . have their reasons for existing;" states "need the dynamism created by an active and participatory civil society," while civil societies need states "to provide minimal security, guarantee property rights and help enforce contracts."26 What Peterson unfortunately does not consider is that society and loyalty can take a cross-border yet sub-national form. His 2 3 M.J. Peterson, "Transnational Activity, International Society and World Politics." Millennium 21.3 (Winter 1992), p. 371. 24 Ibid., p. 377. 25 Ibid., p. 379. 26 Ibid., p: 386. 84 study of civil society is based upon Nye and Keohane's 'interstate' notion of transnationalism and regionalism, which makes his claim that 'society' across borders is in essence "a set of variously interconnected national civil societies" ultimately suspect; transnational regional society and human loyalty can indeed be sub-national and cross-border. Peterson is, of course, considering the nature of 'civil' and 'international' society, the central questions of political and international theory as Wight had noted years earlier.27 Wight's discussion of the realist, rationalist and revolutionist approaches to the theory of international society reveals the debate between communitarians (whether of a realist or rationalist bent), and those who foresee one cosmopolitan society of humankind (to be achieved through revolutionism), has always posited the state as the primary societal unit. As such, that international theory has ignored other cross-border but non-statist forms of human society exhibiting both pluralist and solidarist impulses should come as no surprise. Bull, for example, notes the central assumption of the 'Grotian conception' "is that of the solidarity, or potential solidarity, of the states comprising international society, with respect to the enforcement of the law." 2 8 While he chooses to focus largely on the issue of 'just war' in the debate between the 'solidarist' conception of state society as presented by Grotius in De Jure Belli ac Pads and Vattel's 'pluralist' view of states not exhibiting such solidarism, and while he shows that both schools dismiss the doctrine of a universal or cosmopolitan society, Bull does not consider the possibility that transnational or regional 2 7 Martin Wight, International Theory - The Three Traditions. Wight, Gabrielle, & Brian Porter, eds. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991, p. 30. 2 8 Hedley Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Society." Butterfield, Herbert, & Martin Wight, eds. Diplomatic Investigations - Essays in the Theory of International Politics. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966, p. 52. 85 forms of human society can contain both solidarist and pluralist elements. This is especially unfortunate given his claim that for Grotians, "the members of international society are ultimately not states but individuals," and that the legitimacy of the sovereign state system is secondary to and essentially derived from the universal community of humankind based on natural law.2 9 That transnational regional society can help international relations scholars assess the relative strength of communitarian and cosmopolitan impulses in world politics has been ignored by scholars other than Bull. Keohane, for example, has claimed that "any coherent attempt to understand contemporary international relations must include an analysis of the impact of . . . long-term tendencies toward globalization" defined as "the intensification of transnational as well as interstate relations."30 He focuses on the institution of state sovereignty and how it is able to modify the 'Hobbesian dilemma' (the paradox that there is no security in anarchy because people are self-interested and power-loving, and precisely because they are so, unlimited power for rulers can create predatory states) by promoting complex interdependence and therefore 'zones of peace' in parts of the world. But Keohane neglects to consider the impact that transnational regional society can have on promoting this interdependence and peace, and instead implies that transnationalism is, in some parts of the world, supporting the 'globalization' phenomenon. Other theorists have, of course, also engaged this pluralist-solidarist debate by arguing that a global society is emerging which will ultimately displace the society of states. 29 Ibid., p. 68. 3 0 Keohane, "Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society," p. 165. 86 Martin Shaw, for example, claims that international society can be understood "as a central ideology of the international system in the Cold War period" whose state-centric insights "have reached the moment of their maximum validity."31 He believes this to be true because "In the weaker sense of a global system of social relations, in which all human beings are, to some extent, connected, and which covers the entire globe, we do indeed have such a world society;" this society exists through global commodity production and exchange, culture and mass media, and "the increasing development of world politics."32 Shaw's choice to ignore transnational regional society is especially problematic given his claim that within this global society "there are also very many segmentations corresponding to state, national, ethnic, religious, political, class, cultural and lifestyle divisions,"33 for surely these segmentations and divisions have regional, sub-national and cross-border characteristics. Similarly, Nick Wheeler's comparison of Bull's and R.J. Vincent's approaches to humanitarian intervention also engages the pluralist-solidarist debate by considering international versus global society but not transnational regional society. Unlike Shaw, Wheeler concludes that international society is here to stay even if "there is clearly a growing sense among liberal opinion that the international community should intervene despite the non-intervention principle, in exceptional cases of human suffering. " 3 4 However, he neglects to consider whether 3 1 Martin Shaw, "Global Society and Global Responsibility: The Theoretical, Historical and Political Limits of 'International Society.'" Millennium 21.3 (Winter 1992), p. 422. 32 Ibid., p. 429. 33 Ibid., p. 431. 3 4 Nicholas Wheeler, "Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention." Millennium 21.3 (Winter 1992), p. 487. 87 humanitarian intervention has greater legitimacy when the rights of individuals living in a cross-border yet sub-national society are being violated. It is perhaps Ronnie Lipschutz who, in arguing that a global civil society is indeed emerging, most clearly fails to discuss transnational regional society even though his analysis demands its consideration as a form of human society that displays both communitarian and cosmopolitan elements. Critical of the state-centrism in international relations theory, Lipschutz claims "the growing 'density' and visibility of global civil society and its impact on the socially constructed realms of international politics" is evident in the fact that "there is not one, but many heteronomous transnational political networks . . . challenging . . . the nation-state system."35 However, he then proceeds to argue that a single world society is arising due to a "norm-governed global system rooted in the global capitalist consumer culture," from the inability of states to deal with social welfare problems, and due to the decline of state-centred political identity and the rise of new forms of political and social identity.36 While Lipschutz is correct to recognize there are indeed many heteronomous transnational networks exhibiting these conditions which are in fact integral to the rise of transnational regional societies, he again chooses to focus on the prospects of a global society supplanting the society of states. In doing so, he fails to recognize that these networks, or transnational regional societies, can only really flourish because states and the society they constitute by upholding the norms of sovereignty and nonintervention are already providing for a degree of order and the 'good' life for their citizens; because states and international 3 5 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society." Millennium 21.3 (Winter 1992), pp. 390, 391. 36 Ibid., p. 392. 88 society are doing, they are, in reality, in little risk of decline. In a similar vein, Gene Lyons and Michael Mastanduno have attempted to assess the rise of a world 'beyond sovereignty' and international society due to, as James Rosenau claims, individuals "demanding democratic accountability and national self-determination, even at the expense of weakening the capacity of states to function" and "the transnational engines of finance and production . . . extending] their impact to areas from which they had been temporarily barred."37 In contrast to Lipschutz, however, Lyons and Mastanduno realize that "States remain necessary in that they link people to territory" even if "they can no longer monopolize sovereignty because they no longer can meet, fully and consistently, all the responsibilities that sovereignty requires of them."38 Unfortunately, they do not proceed to then consider that transnational regional society in fact arises as another form of society linking people to territory in a manner that does enable them to pursue the 'better' life which states may increasingly be unable to provide. The probability of humans forming more than one community or society, instead of either a society of states or a global society, is not considered. It is Jackson who, in his contribution to Lyons' and Mastanduno's collection, recognizes there are multiple forms of human community; he identifies two constitutions of international society: the community of states, and a community of humankind which also involves individuals as right and duty bearing units.39 Unfortunately, 3 7 Gene Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, eds., Beyond Westphalia? Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, p. 16. 38 Ibid., p. 9. 3 9 Robert Jackson, "International Community beyond the Cold War." Gene Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, eds., Beyond Westphalia? Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 89 Jackson does not discuss whether this community of humankind can assume a sub-national yet cross-border form. Jackson does, however, state elsewhere that "International society could consist solely of associated sovereign states and that has very nearly been the case at times in the past. But states and their relations do not exhaust the concept of international society: other social echelons are also involved." Thus for Jackson, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and individuals can also constitute a 'secondary' embodiment of international society. He argues that "International society also embodies what might be referred to as a 'transnational society' which consists of [nongovernmental organizations] that operate around the world," 4 0 utilizing Nye and Keohane's standard definition of inter-state interdependence. But by focusing only on the limited role that NGOs play in shaping the inter-state agenda, Jackson takes a rather narrow view of the arguably much wider range of not necessarily statist human activity that constitutes transnational regional society. In doing so he chooses, as did the other theorists mentioned above, to engage the international versus global society debate without really considering transnational regional society. While Jackson claims "There clearly is a cosmopolitan or solidarist aspect to international society," he does not view transnational regional society as the important manifestation of both communitarian and cosmopolitan impulses that it is. He is, however, correct to conclude that the "solidarist conception of world society presents theoretical difficulties: in what meaningful sense," he asks, "can all the people on earth actually form a 'society'?"41 For Jackson and most other 4 0 Jackson, "International Society" in The Global Covenant: International Ethics After the Cold War, pp. 5-6. 41 Ibid., p. 7. 90 international society scholars, the answer is much like Bull's; all the individuals on earth cannot in any useful sense be seen as constituting a global society. It is herein argued that transnational regional societies represent another manifestation of the human quest to create a degree of unity within diversity, in this case a unity that is not coterminous with the state in the diversity of international society. These societies represent a different solidarist manifestation of sub-global pluralism; they are the social constructs of human beings participating in the cross-border, sub-national pursuit of the 'better' life. Thus when Jackson asks whether "the pluralist world of the global covenant is giving way to a different normative world, perhaps a cosmopolitan world of human rights or a transnational world of socioeconomic interdependence or an environmentalist world in which the well-being of the earth itself becomes the basic normative consideration?,"42 he engages the international versus global society debate more fully than the other international society scholars mentioned above. Jackson recognizes the potential for different forms of human society, as an intermediary plane between the pluralist world of state sovereignty and a globalist or solidarist one, or perhaps representing a totally different form of human society all together. For transnational regional society strikes a 'balance' of sorts between the communitarian and cosmopolitan impulses in world politics, weaving a 'middle path' between the pluralist and solidarist conceptions of human society. The extent to which transnational regional societies are emerging vis-d-vis other societies, especially the society of states, seems to be the normative debate worth pursuing. 4 2 Jackson, "The Global Covenant" in The Global Covenant: International Ethics After the Cold War, p. 15. 91 In closing, it is argued that transnational regional society reveals humankind is not in some intermediary stage of a larger teleological movement towards global society. Instead of confirming the 'liberal' notion of progress towards a better world of global humanity, transnational regional society instead illustrates that different constitutions of human society do indeed co-exist in the world today. That human beings have multiple forms of association and are members of different communities and societies should not come as a surprise; humans have multiple goals, identities and loyalties which include, but are not limited to, 'order' as supplied by the society of states, to the 'good' life as provided for by the welfare state, to the 'better' life as made available by transnational regional societies, and to geographic territory and locale, province, city, neighbourhood, family, profession, club, team and many, many other social groupings. Once it is recognized that humans consider themselves to be members of many societies, transnational regional society can help international relations scholars assess the relative strength of both communitarian and cosmopolitan impulses in world politics. Transnational regional societies in essence reveal that while a notable degree of cosmopolitanism exists in human society, it is localized and manifests itself in the pursuit of the 'better' life, and will not 'fuel' the decline of the society of states and the rise of one global society of humankind. Instead, transnational regional societies help explain how the cosmopolitan impulse within human societies can co-exist with, and indeed grows from, its communitarian foundations. 92 CONCLUSION While international relations theorists are currently unfamiliar with the enigmatic phenomenon of transnational regional society, as more scholarly attention is directed towards these territorially localized, cross-border and sub-national manifestations of human society, the discipline's understanding of world politics will be greatly enriched. The phenomenon helps advance our understanding of what states can and cannot provide for their populations in an increasingly complex world. Nation states, the most important and formidable actors on the international stage, have been remarkably successful at supplying the 'good' life to large segments of humanity; and because they do so, they remain the ultimate arbitrators of physical security and welfare, and will not be exiting from the world stage in the foreseeable future. But individuals, as highly social actors, are rarely satisfied with 'rudimentary' levels of well-being, and have thus 'fuelled' the rise of supplementary communities and societies in their pursuit of the 'better' life that states are unable to provide. Given that their pursuit of material goods, heightened levels of comfort, and more fulfilling social lifestyles takes place within localized economies which to a degree disregard international borders, an indifference arising from the physical geography and natural endowments marking a tract of territory, the resulting society often crosses international borders by incorporating neighbouring parts of states. These societies are primarily constituted by the degree to which the norms that justify the pursuit of the 'better' life have become entrenched, a condition that is greatly augmented by democratic states who have, for a 'long' time, been supplying ample security and order. If transnational regional societies illustrate that human beings can create a degree of social unity while still maintaining political diversity, and can construct communities which 93 empower them to pursue the 'better' life via trans-boundary solidarism without undermining the security and order provided for by the pluralist society of states, do they not suggest that a degree of reconciliation is possible in the divisive 'realist' versus 'liberal' debate in world political theory? And if transnational regional societies prove that more cosmopolitan forms of human community can exist within a communitarian world of states, do they not enable scholars to understand more fully other key patterns in international relations? The answer to both questions, it is argued, is a resounding yes. For the phenomenon of transnational regional society helps prove that realism's pessimism regarding human nature, and its focus on the competition between states (with relative capabilities for relative gains) through the rational acquisition of power in an unrelenting condition of anarchy, has some foundation. This is illustrated by the fact that transnational regional society can only arise when states, with their monopoly on real power, are able to create a requisite degree of order and security, however tentative, by forming a 'society' through their support of the norms of state sovereignty and nonintervention, even if for self-interested reasons. At the same time, however, and as a direct result of the order and security created by states, transnational regional society illustrates that cooperation, interdependence and progress can be achieved by individuals pursuing material goods and societal well-being via the mutual absolute gains that a localized 'community,' arising around a transborder economy, can provide. Given their propensity to arise between neighbouring parts of peaceful first world democracies, transnational regional societies also reveal that liberal theories and terminology may well be better suited to describing relations between states in the world's 'core,' while their absence in the third world suggests that realism is more conducive to understanding 94 / relations in the conflict-ridden third world 'periphery.' As James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul have claimed, "while the increasing homogeneity of norms within the core will lessen the ability of realism to explain the behavior of the great powers, realism will still be helpful in explaining the behavior of states within regional systems outside of the economic and political core."1 Moreover, because transnational regional society maintains a theoretic focus on state relations and the society of states, it can also help us better understand the rise of regional interstate political unions like the EU as well as the 'zones of peace and conflict' discussed above. They do so by illustrating that cross-border interdependence can arise without undermining the norms of sovereignty and nonintervention or the states and international society which uphold them. Transnational regional society can enable cross-border community to flourish without unduly straining the fixed borders of states. As many theorists have pointed out, any regional transcendence of political sovereignty would merely result in the formation of a larger state, something the E U does not seem destined to become. Yet transnational regional society illustrates that a theoretic focus on cross-border economic interdependence is also necessary, and helps explain the growing importance of transnational regional economic and environmental actors and their activities. Should the norms of international society and the condition of nuclear deterrence continue to mitigate against war in western Europe and North America, and if 'zones of peace' develop in other parts of the world, cross-border activity will increasingly be focused on the economic and environmental spheres. As key locales for such activity, transnational regional societies 1 James Goldgeier & Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era." International Organization 46.2 (Spring 1992), p. 469. 95 could well become increasingly important to studying how threats to economic growth and the ecosystems that ultimately sustain human life will be addressed by humanity. For should the members of a transnational regional society prove to be both more threatened by, and more able to act to overcome economic and environmental obstacles to their pursuit of the 'better' life, would not their importance continue to rise on the world stage? Of course, economic interdependence and a shared environment can become sources of tension and conflict between states, and the ability of transnational regional societies to overcome such conflict at the local as opposed to state level, especially given that a recourse to war now seems very unlikely between democracies, should become of great interest to theorists. Transnational regional society reminds us that domestic issues can have a significant impact on international relations and vice versa. The correlation between transnational regional society and the rise of intra-state regional secession movements could prove very important to a fuller understanding of new state creation in a post-imperialist world. Should cross-border yet sub-national communities eventually become so entrenched and developed that the states across parts of which they spread are of little or no significance to their inhabitants, could they become catalysts for secession? The answer, as it has been argued herein, is most likely no; transnational regional societies are reliant on the security and order as provided for by both their 'host' states and international society, and the 'better' life they make possible would be threatened by such turmoil. However, should the current society of states itself undergo massive upheaval at some time in the future, a possibility that while slim cannot be entirely dismissed, .today's transnational regional societies could emerge as tomorrow's politically-demarcated units of human association. More likely, however, is the 96 individuals who inhabit a transnational regional society will continue to utilize their multiple identities and localized loyalties to improve their bargaining position within their respective states in order to ensure they can pursue the 'better' life to the fullest. Transnational regional societies are perhaps best understood as localized manifestations of the cosmopolitan impulse in a fundamentally pluralist and communitarian world of states. For when conceived of as distinct human communities arising from the cross-border interactions of its inhabitants in their pursuit of a territorially localized notion of the 'better' life, these societies indicate a gap in world political theory's understanding of cosmopolitanism. As these cross-border yet sub-state communities are ultimately the product of the human desire to form or join and uphold a collectivity or community or society so that life is more enjoyable, comfortable and secure, it would appear the cosmopolitan impulse does exist and need not be universal or 'global' in extent. Instead, as localized examples of solidarism, transnational regional societies enable individuals who occupy distinctive territory that so happens to cross international borders to identify with the other humans living in that territory; ultimately, they help to create a cross-border sense of 'belonging' or 'place' in a world that is divided into states. Cosmopolitanism should therefore not only be used to refer to universal solidarism or to describe a global society of humankind or to predict the rise of a Utopian world government; the notion of cosmopolitanism can also be used to, understand the localized solidarism behind non-statist regional cross-border societies. In closing, this thesis has attempted to create some familiarity with the complex phenomenon of transnational regional society, and has explored what these cross-border yet sub-national forms of human community can tell us about the current condition of the society 97 of states. While the international society school has suggested a normative approach to understanding the constitutive norms of transnational regional society, the literature has largely ignored their study. The transnational aspect of these societies reminds us that transfrontier interdependence is by no means limited to state level interaction; parts of states often mingle with one another with a notable degree of indifference to the larger 'federal' units. The localized nature of transnational societies reminds us how difficult the delineation of regions can be, especially if such attempts are wholly positivist. Understood as regional manifestations of cosmopolitanism in a communitarian world of states, transnational regional societies can shed some new light on the 'nature of security' debate, the 'democracies no longer fight one another' argument, and the 'society of states versus global society' debate. 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