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The implementation of European Community environmental directives in the United Kingdom Gupta, Indrani Debbie 1994

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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITYENVIRONMENTAL DIRECTIVES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM:ANALYSIS OF THE MAZMANIAN AND SABATIER FRAMEWORKBYINDRANI DEBBIE GUPTAB.Sc., The University of Calgary, 1987B.Sc., London School of Economics and Political Science, 1992A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESDepartment of Political ScienceWe accept this thesis as conformingto the re uired standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIASeptember 1994©Indrani Debbie Gupta, 1994In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives, it is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature)Department of 1CQ SC)’€J/1C Q.The University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate t4DE-6 (2188)ABSTRACTThis study applies the Mazmanian and Sabatier model for successful policyimplementation to the application of EC environmental Directives in the United Kingdom. Usingtwo areas of air pollution— vehicle emissions and large combustion plant emissions— theapplicability of the Mazmanian and Sabatier framework is assessed with regard to (a) theenvironmental policy arena and (b) the British policy style.The Mazmanian and Sabatier model suggests that six conditions must bemet for successful policy implementation to occur. These conditions incorporate five variables:legislation, science and technology, state institutions, target groups and external factors. Theimplementation of EC Directives 91/441 and 92/55, regulating automobile exhaust emissions,met all six conditions suggested by the model and was successful in achieving the stipulatedpolicy goals. The implementation of EC Directive 88/609, controlling SO2 and NO emissionsfrom large combustion plants, failed to meet any of the conditions. Nonetheless, the UK wassuccessful in attaining the Directive’s targets.It is suggested that the Mazmanian and Sabatier model for successful policyimplementation is not useful, as a predictive tool, to the cases studied here. The framework,derived from American practice and experience, does not appear to fit with the British policystyle and the implementation of EC environmental Directives in the UK.11TABLE OF CONTENTSAbstract iiTable of Contents iiiList of Tables vList of Figures viAcknowledgement viiINTRODUCTION 1CHAPTER ONE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 41.1 Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973 61.2 ‘Top—Down’ and ‘Bottom—Up’ Models of Policy Implementation 91.3 Berman’s Model of Policy Implementation 101.4 The Mazmanian and Sabatier Model 121.5 Framework of Analysis 17CHAPTER TWO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 212.1 The European Union and Environmental Protection 212.2 The European Union and the Debate over Jurisdiction 222.3 European Union Policy—Making: Institutions and Practice 242.4 Macro—Implementation: European Union and Policy Implementation 282.5 Meta—Implementation: The Member States and Policy Implementation 302.6 The United Kingdom, Policy—Making and Environmental Protection 352.7 Implementation in the United Kingdom 38CHAPTER THREE THE PROBLEM AN]) ITS SOLUTIONS 423.1 Vehicle Emissions 42The Directives 44Implementation in the United Kingdom 45Legislation 45Jurisdiction 46Enforcement 47The Effect on UK Practice 471113.2 Large Combustion Plant Emissions 49The Directive 52Implementation in the United Kingdom 56Legislation 56Jurisdiction 56Enforcement 57The Effect on UK Practice 57CHAPTER FOUR APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK 624.1 Legislation 624.2 Science and Technology 654.3 State Institutions 694.4 Target Groups 764.5 External Factors 80Economic Policy 81Transport Policy 82Privatisation 82The Role of Sovereigns 84CHAPTER FIVE ASSESSING THE SUCCESS 89CONCLUSION 98Bibliography 102Appendix I Emissions from Stationary Sources of SO2 for Member States,1990—1991 114Appendix II Emissions from Stationary Sources of NO for Member States,1990—1991 115Appendix III SO2 Emission Quota/Limits from LCP, 199 1—1993 116Appendix IV NO Emission Quota/Limits from LCP, 199 1—1993 117ivLIST OF TABLESTable 1 Infringement Procedures Relating to EnvironmentalDirectives Under Article 169, 1985—l989 30Table 2 Directive 91/441 (All Passenger Cars) 44Table 3 Emission Standards Failure Rates, 1991—1994 48Table 4 Pollutant Emissions for the Member States, 1980 50Table 5 Emission Limits for°2, Directive 8 8/609 53Table 6 Emission Limits for NOR, Directive 8 8/609 55Table 7 NO Emission Limits for New Plants, Directive 88/609 55Table 8 Estimated Emissions of SO2, 1990—1992 60Table 9 Estimated Emissions of NO, 1990—1992 60Table 10 UK Pollution Control Arrangements Prior to the Formation of HMIP 71vLIST OF FIGURESFigure 1 Variables Involved in the Implementation Process 14Figure 2 Incorporation Measures taken by Member States 32Figure 3 Emission Limit Values for SO2 for New Plants 54viACKNOWLEDGEMENTSI gratefully acknowledge the generous funding provided by Dr. Brian Job at the Institute ofInternational Relations, University of British Columbia, without which the research and writingof this thesis would not have been possible.I am grateful to Dr. George Hoberg and Dr. Alan Siaroff for their academic guidance andeditorial advice. I also wish to express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Don Munton, ProfessorIvan Head and Dr. Kathryn Harrison for their encouragement and support over the past year.For assistance with printing, layout and graphics — and for moral support — I am indebted toAva.DEDICATIONFor my parents,without whom...viiIntroductionThe implementation of European Community Directives within its Member Statesis unique in its structure and implications. The European Community is the only internationalorganisation that is able to legislate policy objectives that are binding on its Members, withoutnecessarily receiving assent from them. Through its terms of membership and new votingprocedures adopted under the 1987 Single European Act, the Community as a whole is able toenforce standards of performance in Member States that may oppose those standards.Community environmental regulations are no exception in this regard. This paperseeks to compare the implementation of two EC Directives relating to the control of air pollutionin the United Kingdom: EC Directive 91/441 regulating vehicle exhaust emissions and ECDirective 8 8/609 controlling emissions from large combustion plants (LCP). The UnitedKingdom is an appropriate focus for this study since, in both cases, it was long opposed to thestandards proposed in the Directives and resisted their adoption for a considerable length of time.Although eventual UK support was secured, the history of the UK’s policy position during thelengthy negotiations at the EC would appear to suggest that the UK would have more problemsimplementing the Directives than other, more enthusiastic Member States such as Germany andDenmark. However, the UK has been successful at meeting the standards stipulated in theDirectives.The Directives themselves provide interesting material for a comparative studyof implementation since they differ in two important attributes. The Directive relating to exhaustemissions incorporates uniform standards applicable to new vehicles, while the LCP Directivesets differential standards of emissions for each Member State, and applies to both new andexisting facilities. These differences between the Directives have required the UK to use varied1techniques for the effective implementation of the European standards.This paper seeks to apply the theoretical framework of implementation analysissuggested by Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) to assess the relevance of their model to (a) theenvironmental policy arena and (b) the British public policy style. Mazmanian and Sabatier, intheir model for successful policy implementation, describe six conditions that should be met.Utilising the cases of vehicle emissions and large combustion plant emissions, this paper willdetermine to what extent each of these six conditions have been met. Evidence suggests that bothDirectives have been successfully implemented in the UK, and thus one would expect thatMazmanian and Sabatier’ s six conditions were met.In assessing the applicability of the Mazmanian and Sabatier model, this studyexplores the relationship between the EC and its Member States in terms of its authority to‘dictate’ uniform standards. It also examines the problems the UK has had in adopting standardsto which it was, for a long time, opposed. In assessing the implementation process, five variableswill be examined according to the six conditions suggested for successful implementation:legislation, science and technology, state institutions, target groups and external factors (such asconflicting public policies and socioeconomic conditions).Examination of these variables will serve to elucidate the particular attributes ofimplementation within the United Kingdom in terms of EC environmental Directives. I argue thatthe Mazmanian and Sabatier model for successful implementation cannot be easily transposedto other national contexts, nor to all policy arenas. While the vehicle emission Directives appearto have enjoyed smooth implementation according to the conditions set forth by Mazmaman andSabatier, the implementation of the LCP Directive has been no less successful despite notmeeting a substantial number of the framework’s conditions.2It is hoped that this study will contribute to a fuller understanding of therelationship between the European Conimunity and its Member States with reference to publicpolicy, as well as highlight the weaknesses within the Mazmanian and Sabatier framework forsuccessful policy implementation.3Chanter OneTheoretical PerspectivesThe study of implementation in public policy analysis is a relatively recentphenomenon. Emerging in the 1970s, with the publication of Pressman and Wildavsky’sseminal study of the Economic Development Administration, theories of classic publicadministration were challenged. Classic public administration held that the politics of publicpolicy occurred at the decision—making or formulation stage. Once an authoritative statementof policy had been issued by policy—makers, implementation was both assumed andautomatic.Studies on implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Bardach, 1977;Berman, 1978) focused on the area of public policy that stands between policy formulationand actual impacts. These studies found that implementation was often assumed, but by nomeans automatic. Indeed, the politics of implementation played a considerable role in creatinga divergence between policy intent and policy impact.Since the 1 970s, scholars have attempted to give form to the theoreticalinsights and inferences suggested by these case studies (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975;Rein and Rabinovitz, 1978; Lipsky, 1978; Berman, 1978; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979).This section aims to provide a brief overview of the major components of implementationtheory, and to then detail the Mazmanian and Sabatier framework applied to the cases studiedhere.‘Implementation’ is used freely in public policy literature, though its precisemeaning is often confusing. The word has been used to describe the process ofoperationalising a policy through the creation of a program, the administering of such a4program and the local—level impacts (that may or may not be the intended outcomes of theprogram). In this sense, an excellent program may be poorly executed or a poor programmay be efficiently applied. In the context of this study, Mazmanian and Sabatier’s definitionof implementation will be used. Mazmanian and Sabatier make a distinction between policyformulation, where the program is designed, and policy implementation, where the programis applied. Thus, the authors are not concerned with the merits of the program itself in termsof ‘poor’ or ‘excellent’. Instead they focus on implementation as “the carrying out of a basicpolicy decision, usually incorporated in a statute...” (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983:20). Assuch, through implementation analysis, they seek to identify the crucial variables that affectthe achievement of policy objectives throughout the process of policy application (Mazmanianand Sabatier, 1983:21).Theoretical frameworks of implementation analysis seem to place varyingemphasis on different variables throughout the implementation process. It is useful toorganise the various theoretical frameworks of policy implementation according tocontrasting perspectives of ‘top—down’ and ‘bottom—up’. I begin by discussing theseperspectives, after looking in greater depth at the findings of Pressman and Wildavsky’s 1973study. Berman’s theory of implementation proposes a framework according to levels ofanalysis, and this is particularly useful in the context of the implementation of EuropeanCommunity legislation within the Member States. Accordingly, a full discussion of Berman’stheory precedes the presentation of the Mazmanian and Sabatier framework. The Mazmanianand Sabatier framework represents, I believe, the most versatile and illuminating approachto the study of implementation. Incorporating both ‘top—down’ and ‘bottom—up’ factors, theauthors suggest six conditions that must be met if implementation is to be successful. Theseare examined in terms of the European context.51.1 Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973The study of policy implementation by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) wasground—breaking in raising issues that had, hitherto, been largely ignored by both policy—makers and academics. Implementation represents one of the most important contributionsto the field of implementation analysis. Pressman and Wildavsky focused their study on theEconomic Development Agency’s (EDA) attempts to create employment for the hard—coreunemployed of Oakland in the late 1 960s. In 1966, the EDA agreed to offer public worksgrants and loans amounting to over $23 million to alleviate severe unemployment in the city.At that time, Oakland’s unemployment rate stood at 8.4 per cent, almost double the nationalaverage. The problem was even more pronounced amongst the black and Hispaniccommunities, where rates ran as high as 12 per cent, and these communities became aparticular target of the EDA program. Although the program promised to create over 3,000new jobs, by 1969 only 20 jobs had been created for minorities. The program was describedas one of ‘big promises and little action’ by the Los Angeles Times (Pressman andWildavsky, 1978:4). The high hopes with which the project had begun were, three yearslater, destroyed by the difficulties faced in its application. The failure of the EDA toimplement a job—creation program is the focus of Pressman and Wildavsky’s study. As theauthors statePromises can create hope, but unfulfilled promises can lead to disillusionmentand frustration. By concentrating on the implementation of programs, as wellas their initiation, we should be able to increase the probability that policypromises will be realized. Fewer promises may be made in view of aheightened awareness of the obstacles to their fulfilment, but more of themshould be kept. (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1978:6)6Pressman and Wildavsky’ s study closes with a series of prescriptive warningsabout the pitfalls of implementation. Three conclusions are drawn from their study. The firstis that policy implementation should not be divorced from the formulation, evaluation andreformulation processes. Instead policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation shouldbe considered simultaneously by decision—makers. In later editions of their study, theysuggest policy formulation and implementation have a mutually adaptive effect. Each, inessence, shapes the other. Policies are continuously transformed by implementing actions,while the policy itself makes assumptions about the problem that inevitably affect both theimplementation and the outcome (Majone and Wildavsky, 1984:170—174). Thus, policyimplementation is a learning process. Implementation should not be seen, they assert, as theculmination or end—point of policy but as an integral part of an ongoing, evolutionaryprocess of policy—making.Secondly, Pressman and Wildavsky assert that successful policyimplementation should take due account of the “complexity of joint action”. Few policyprograms are simple and straightforward. Most involve a myriad of different perspectives,participants and decision—points..we do not begin to appreciate the number of steps involved, the number ofparticipants whose preferences have to be taken into account, the number ofseparate decisions that are part of what we think of as a single one. Least ofall do we appreciate the geometric growth of interdependencies over timewhere each negotiation involves a number of participants with decisions tomake, whose implications ramify over time (Pressman and Wildavsky,1978:93).Each decision made during the implementation process has often unpredictable consequenceson numerous other participants. Decision—making also involves delay, and as time progresses,participants’ perspectives and positions change. Thus, the assumptions upon which successwas predicated at the outset of the implementation process may no longer be applicable to7participants and target groups by the time they become involved. The ‘complexity of jointaction’ will inevitably affect successful implementation.Finally, Pressman and Wildavksy point to the necessity for a careful analysisof the causal assumptions behind an original policy decision. Without sound causal theory,it is unlikely that policy goals will be met. Identifying relevant causal factors is importantto the formulation of appropriate policy as well as successful implementation. For instance,if the policy objective of reducing nitrogen oxide (NO) emissions is implemented throughthe application of pollution abatement technology to power plants, success is likely to belimited. Although power plants contribute to NO levels in the atmosphere, they account foronly a small percentage of emission sources. The majority of NO emissions are attributedto vehicle exhaust gases. The causal theory in the implementation process is flawed such that,even if successfully implemented, the policy is unlikely to meet the policy objective ofreducing overall NO levels.The significant contribution of the Pressman and Wildavsky study is that itviews the implementation as a process of evolution and learning. The application of a policyprogram is as much the product of the policy itself, as it is of the institutions and personnelthat have jurisdictional responsibility over its implementation, and the behaviour of theparticipants and target groups at whom the policy is directed. Effective policy implementationcan only occur when the program, the institutional environment in which it is implemented,and the affected individuals are taken into account. Thus, due attention must be paid to boththe intent of the decision—makers as well as the actions of the local implementers andreactions of target groups. In other words, Pressman and Wildavsky suggest thatimplementation analysis should incorporate both top—down (the intent of decision—makers)and bottom—up (the behaviour of local actors) approaches.81.2 ‘Top-Down’ and ‘Bottom-Up’ Models of Policy ImplementationThe top—down and bottom—up implementation analysis approaches rely on adifference of perspective (top or bottom), but assume that the implementation process is anessentially hierarchical, structured and vertical one. The leading proponents of the top—downframeworks (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979) argue thatimplementation analysis must begin with the statute or policy statement of the authoritativedecision—maker, usually central government. The outcomes of implementation can then bemeasured against the policy objectives of those decision—makers. Important to thisperspective is (a) the articulation of clear objectives in the statute and (b) the reliance on asound causal theory, with reference to scientific evidence and technological capability.The top—down theorists explore the behaviour of implementing institutions,organisations and relevant interest groups in relation to stated policy objectives. By contrast,proponents of the bottom—up approach (Elmore, 1978; Lipsky, 1978) assert that decision—makers “are forced largely to acquiesce to the preferences of street—level bureaucrats andtarget groups” (Sabatier, 1986:25).Lipsky admits that the bottom—up framework is particularly suited to policyareas where (i) the jobs of policy implementers are defined in terms of wide discretion, (ii)policy implementers are faced with a multiplicity of goals and work tasks and (iii) policyimplementers are engaged in implementing policy shifts in the context of their ongoingpractices (Lipsky, 1978:399—400). Despite its limited applicability, Lipsky’s frameworkprovides “an alternative approach to the study of policy implementation” by focusing on“those who are charged with carrying out policy rather than those who formulate and conveyit” (Lipsky, 1978:397).9Parallels exist between top—down/bottom—up approaches and what Sharp terms‘programmed’ and ‘adaptive’ frameworks of implementation analysis (Sharp, 1981). Thepremises are essentially the same insofar as Sharp asserts that the scholars employing theprogrammed implementation framework are concerned with the clarity of policy goals, thedegree of compliance from target groups and the ability to structure and control the policyenvironment (Sharp, 1981:103), echoing the top—down approach. The programmedimplementation framework views the implementation process as a “centralised, directivemodel of organizational change” (Sharp, 1981 :10 1). By contrast, the ‘adaptiveimplementation’ theorists (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Lipsky, 1978; Berman, 1980)emphasise a model based on a “process that allows policy to be modified, specified andrevised.. .according to the unfolding interaction of the policy and its institutional setting”(Berman, 1980:211). The adaptive implementation process describes “a disorderly learningprocess” rather than “predictable procedure” (Sharp, 1981:104), echoing the assumptionsof the bottom—up approach.1.3 Berman’s Model of Policy Implementation: Macro- and Micro-LevelsBerman (1978) distinguishes clearly between ‘levels of implementation’ byusing the concepts of macro— and micro—implementation. In his study of the implementationof federal social programs in the United States, Berman describes macro—implementationproblems in terms of the execution of policy at the federal level “so as to influence localdelivery organisations to behave in desired ways” (Berman 1978:164), or the ability to createan ‘implementation machine’ (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980:16). Micro—implementation,on the other hand, describes how local organisations “devise and carry out their own internalpolicies” in response to federal actions (Berman, 1978:64). As such, this level of10implementation refers to the standard operating procedures of the implementing agencies andmethods of enforcing statutory objectives.Berman suggests four clusters of variables that influence the implementationof policy at the macro—level (Berman, 1978:166). The first concerns the degree to whichgoals can be agreed upon amongst the various organisations and agencies involved in thepolicy execution process. The second involves differentials of authority and influenceamongst the relevant agencies, and the third relates to resource deficiencies amongst them.Finally, communication difficulties between agencies and organisations can have aconsiderable impact on implementation at the macro—level.At the micro—level, Berman classifies implementation according to fourpotential outcomes (Berman, 1978:178). These relate to the extent to which firstly, the localimplementing agency changes in response to implementation, and secondly the amount ofchange the project undergoes in order to accommodate the standard operating procedures ofthe local agency (Berman, 1978:172). Thus micro—implementation is “ function of theadopted project and the characteristics of the implementing organisation” (Berman,1978:173). Micro—implementation depends not only on project and organisationalcharacteristics, but also on what happens to the organisation because of the project and themanner in which it is implemented. Unfortunately, Berman does not elaborate on thevariables which affect organisational or project characteristics to elicit the outcomesdescribed. The discussion does not address the relationship of the outcome to adaptations inthe project and/or the organisation. By focusing on outcomes alone, at the micro—level,Berman describes general patterns in project or organisation change without addressing thecausal factors related to such changes.11Although Berman’s study focuses on the United States with its federal systemof governance, the macro— and micro— distinctions are useful in the European context insofaras the Community can be seen as emulating a federal system. I would suggest, however, thecreation of a middle category— that of meta—implementation— to analyze the cases presentedhere. Macro—implementation problems refer to policy execution within the Europeaninstitutions, while micro—implementation problems occur at the local delivery level. Meta—implementation accounts for the level at which the national governments of Member Statesoperate, forming a distinct and important part of the overall policy implementation processwithin the European Community.Analysing implementation in terms of macro—, meta— and micro—levels is auseful method of organising the framework for this study. The actors involved in theimplementation process are examined in relation to the variables and options identified ateach level. Berman’s framework suggests both a lateral and vertical analysis ofimplementation, exploring the lateral relationships between the relevant actors at eachsuccessive stage of the implementation process. In this sense, Berman’s framework buildsupon, and extends, the top—down and bottom—up approaches to implementation analysis.1.4 The Mazmanian and Sabatier ModelMazmaman and Sabatier (1983) base their framework (Figure 1) around threefactors: the tractability of the problems being addressed by the statute, the ability of thestatute to structure the implementation process and a variety of non—statutory variables. Theauthors assume that (a) policy implementation analysis must adopt a top—down approachinsofar as the starting point is the authoritative statement of policy objectives, and (b) thepolicy objectives are framed within the context of a statute or similar document.12The tractability of problems being addressed by the statute is based on theavailability of valid technical theory and technology. Sound causal theories provide both ajustification of the policy objectives and a valuable resource for implementing officials inpursuing those objectives. The diversity of target group behaviour is another important factorin the consideration of tractability. The more diverse the range of behaviour being regulatedby the statute, the more difficult it will be to ameliorate the problem(s).13Tractability of the Problem1. Technical difficulties2. Diversity of target group behaviour3. Target group as a percentage of the population4. Extent of behavioural change requiredAbility of the Statute To Structure Non-Statutory Variables AffectingImplementation Implementation1. Clear and consistent objectives 1. Socioeconomic conditions and2. Incorporation of adequate causal theory technology3. Initial allocation of financial resources 2. Public support4. Hierarchical integration within and 3. Attitudes and resources ofamong implementing institutions constituency groups5. Decision rules of implementing agencies 4. Support from sovereigns6. Recruitment of implementing officials 5. Commitment and leadership7. Formal access by outsiders skills of implementing officialsStages (Dependent Variables) in the Implementation ProcessPolicy outputs of Compliance with policy Actual impacts ofimplementing agencies outputs by target groups policy outputsPerceived impacts of Major revision inpolicy outputs statuteFigure 1 Variables Involved in the Implementation ProcessSource: Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983:2214The size of the target group is another significant factor. If the target groupis small, and isolatable, then statutory objectives are more likely to be met. However, if thebehaviour being modified involves a large percentage of the population, then success willtend to be elusive. The final consideration in determining the tractability of the problem isthe extent of behavioural change required for success. If the statute requires limited changesin target group behaviour, objectives are more likely to be met. I would further suggest thatthe nature of behavioural change is also a factor. Negative behavioural change, for examplebanning the use of the private automobile in areas where there are high levels of airpollution, is less likely to meet with success than positive behavioural changes such asencouraging consumers to purchase lead—free petrol by subsidising its retail value.The ability of a statute to structure the implementation process is Mazmanianand Sabatier’ s second broad determinant of success. The statute should consist of clear andconsistent objectives. These provide valuable resources to the implementing officials andsupporters of the policy. Incorporation of sound and adequate causal theory within the statutecan also be an important consideration, as is the provision of adequate financial resources.Hierarchical integration with and among implementing institutions preventscompetition over jurisdiction and resources, and is thus crucial to successful implementation.In a similar vein, the decision—rules, or routinised administrative behaviour, of implementingagencies must be consistent with the policy program. The implementation process will befurther facilitated by the presence of a committed leadership, and to this end, the recruitmentof implementing officials is a consideration. Finally, the framework suggests that formalaccess to groups outside the policy implementation process is necessary. By this, Mazmanianand Sabatier refer predominantly to the provision of ‘citizen suits’.15Thus statutes that provide liberal rules of standing for citizen participation asformal interveners in agency proceedings and as petitioners of judicial review(in the form of mandamus actions requiring agency officials to comply withstatutory provisions) are more likely to have their objectives attained(Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981:14)The third broad category of determinants for success accounts for factorsexternal to the policy implementation process. Such variables as media coverage, publicopinion, general socioeconomic conditions and technological developments will play a rolein the attaimnent of policy objectives. Mazmanian and Sabatier also include in this category,the commitment of implementing officials and their leadership skills, as well as the level ofsupport from the governing executive (sovereigns).Based on this framework, Mazmanian and Sabatier set out six conditions thatmust be met, if successful policy implementation is to occur (Sabatier and Mazmanian,1983:7).1. The enabling legislation or other legal directive mandates policy objectivesthat are clear and consistent or at least provides substantive criteria forresolving goal conflicts.2. The enabling legislation incorporates a sound theory identifying theprincipal factors and causal linkages affecting policy objectives, and givesimplementing officials sufficient jurisdiction over target groups and otherpoints of leverage to attain, at least potentially, the desired goals.3. The enabling legislation structures the implementation process so as tomaximise the probability that implementing officials and target groups willperform as desired. This involves assignment to sympathetic agencies withadequate hierarchical integration, supportive decision rules, sufficient financialresources, and adequate access to supporters.4. The leaders of the implementing agency possess substantial managerial andpolitical skill and are committed to the statutory goals.5. The program is actively supported by organized constituency groups andby a few key legislators (or a chief executive) throughout the implementationprocess, with the courts being neutral or supportive.166. The relative priority of statutory objectives is not undermined over time bythe emergence of conflicting public policies or by changes in relevantsocioeconomic conditions that undermine the statute’s causal theory orpolitical support.1.5 Framework of AnalysisThe six conditions suggested by Mazmanian and Sabatier represents, I believe,the most comprehensive tool for implementation analysis. It takes into account both the top—down and bottom—up perspectives of the theoretical literature and provides a useful checklistfor determining successful implementation. Furthermore, it is a predictive tool insofar as itimplies that the degree to which these conditions are met, the greater the probability ofachieving the policy objectives. This paper will draw on the work of Berman (1978) instructuring the levels of analysis, but will focus on the extent to which the Mazmanian andSabatier framework holds true for the implementation of two EC Directives in the UK.Mazmanian and Sabatier, in outlining the six conditions for successfulimplementation, start with the attributes of the statute articulating the policy objectives, movethrough the characteristics of the implementing agencies, constituency groups, target groupsand state institutions, and end with the impact of external variables. For the sake of clarityand comparison however, I have chosen to analyze policy implementation in these casesaccording to the attributes of legislation, science and technology, state institutions, targetgroups and external factors.In terms of legislation, the degree to which the statute structures theimplementation process will be examined at both the European and national levels in the firstsection of Chapter Four. Evidence of clear and precise policy objectives will be sought at allthree levels, and the extent to which the legislation provides substantive criteria for theresolution of goal conflicts will be determined. The section on science and technology will17examine the existence of sound causal theory. The theory should identify the principal causalfactors, and the linkages between them and the target group behaviour. Both factors andlinkages should, at least implicitly, be AFAPO the provisions of the statute. From acomparative perspective, the degree of consensus on scientific theory within the scientificcommunity and amongst policy—makers, and the technological capabilities was an importantconsideration in the process of negotiations on the Directives within the EC. Furthermore,the causal theory will identify the extent of behavioural change required for the problem tobe ameliorated.The third section will address the role of state institutions in theimplementation process. Questions such as whether implementing officials and agencies havesufficient jurisdiction over target groups; whether officials and agencies have sufficientsources of leverage and recourse to sanction; whether or not officials and agencies possessadequate managerial, political and leadership skills to guide the implementation process; andwhether the courts play a significant role in adjudicating and enforcing implementation mustbe addressed.The disposition of target groups will be analyzed in terms of their support forpolicy objectives. The level of opposition and support from these constituencies may havevaried over time and these variations will have a significant impact on the degree to whichsuccessful implementation can be achieved, and sustained. Finally, external variables will beexamined in an effort to determine their impacts on the success of policy implementation.I will explore the existence of conflicting policies, the prevailing socioeconomic conditionsand the level of support for the policy demonstrated by the governing executive (sovereigns).In terms of environmental policy in Europe, and the EC Directives underconsideration, both the top—down and bottom—up approaches are relevant to the study. The18top—down approach allows the success of implementation to be judged, according to thespecific standards provided for in the Community’s legislation. However, particularly in thecontext of the UK, the bottom—up approach is important. Wide administrative discretion andstreet—level decisions have traditionally guided the implementation of environmentalprotection regulations in Britain (Richardson, 1982; Vogel, 1986). Although not identifiedby Lipsky as a policy area where such a framework would prove useful, environmentalpolicy is very much a product of discretionary implementation in the UK.• . .one of the principles followed by successive Governments has been that theprimary responsibility for dealing with pollution problems should rest as faras is practicable with authorities operating at a local or regionallevel... .implementation is delegated to.. .local level. Authorities may exercisea considerable degree of discretion as to the limit they impose on the releaseof local pollutants, so that account may be taken of local resources and socialpriorities, the uses to which the surrounding areas are put and the capacity ofthe environment to absorb pollutants. (DoE, 1978:2)By all accounts, the problems of implementing EC Directives will likelyincrease as the realisation of a continental internal market draws closer. EC environmentalDirectives only complicate the process further. Environmental protection problems transcendtraditional policy sectors, incorporating such diverse issues as trade, economy, individualrights, agriculture, transport and energy. Thus environmental protection Directives issued bythe EC must be applied to a vast array of economies, cultures and political systemssimultaneously. It is unlikely that such a process will be easy, nor that such problems willdiminish in time.Nonetheless, if we are to assume that implementation is judged to besuccessful when the standards articulated through legislation are met, then both Directivesunder study here have been successfully implemented in the UK. However, the degree to19which the conditions, suggested by Mazmanian and Sabatier, have been met varyconsiderably. It is hoped that this study will serve to clarify the framework suggested byMazmanian and Sabatier, and illustrate its weaknesses in terms of judging the implementationof EC environmental Directives in the UK.20Chapter TwoThe European Union and The United Kin2dom2.1. The European Union and Environmental ProtectionEnvironmental policy was not acknowledged as a European Communityconcern until 1972, fifteen years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome.’ At a meeting ofthe Heads of State and Government held in Paris, it was felt that “economic expansion shouldequally result in an improvement in the quality of life, and that to this end particular attentionshould be given to environmental protection’T (Johnson and Corcelle, 1989:2). Theestablishment of the first Community Environmental Action Programme was realised in1973.From its belated acknowledgement in 1973, environmental policy has becomeone of the most important areas of EC activity in recent years. In recognition of thisexpanding area, the 1987 Single European Act (SEA) included an important new chaptergiving environmental protection constitutional status. The activism of the EuropeanCommission and the ‘greening’ of the European Parliament have been instrumental inmaintaining the steady flow of legislative documents on environmental protection emanatingfrom the European Council of Ministers (Johnson and Corcelle 1989:2—3).Through recent developments in environmental policy—making at theCommunity level, Member States have found their own autonomy in policy—makingThe European political, monetary and economic entity is now officially termed theEuropean Union (EU) after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union)on 7 February 1992 and coming into force following German ratification on 1 November 1993(the last Community Member to do so). Prior to this time, the organisation was known as theEuropean Community (EC). Throughout this paper, EU and EC will be used interchangeably.21gradually recede in the face of collective decision—making. Some Members are now subjectto regulations and bound to implement legislative measures that they do not necessarilysupport. This then, is the unique character of the EC as a supranational institution— itsability to force Member States to conform to standards and patterns of behaviour that maybe antithetical to national policies, traditions and culture.2.2. The European Union and The Debate Over JurisdictionThe European Union is a unique phenomenon. It has, since its creation in1957, engendered considerable political rhetoric and scholarly inquiry into the limits of itsjurisdiction vis-a-vis the national sovereignties of its Member States. The dynamics of thisjurisdictional debate are no more clearly illustrated than in the arena of European policymaking and implementation. Indeed, as one scholar notes “case studies in individual policyareas are the necessary basis for a better understanding of the European Community as awhole” (Arp 1993:150).The environmental policy arena has provided fascinating and clear examplesof this struggle between supranational jurisdiction and national sovereignty. This battlebetween authority and autonomy arises from four related factors. Firstly, the politicalconstitution of the European Union and the relationship between the EU and its MemberStates is by its very nature a source of conflict over jurisdiction. Secondly, the foundingprinciple of the establishment of a Common Market and (thirdly) the related rules ofsubsidiarity place severe constraints on national legislative functions. Finally, new votingprocedures adopted under the 1987 SEA have exacerbated tensions that further impinge onMember States’ national autonomy.22The political origins of the struggle between autonomy and authority lie in theconditions of membership. Members of the European Union have all transferred some degreeof legislative and executive authority to the supranational institution. Member Stateconstitutions permit such a transfer and this is, indeed, a condition of membership.[S]pecific responsibilities and the authority to discharge them have beentransferred from the Member State to the Community, whose competence nowextends among other things to commercial and trade policy, agriculture,transport and the protection of the environment (EC Commission 1992:23).Unlike other international institutions, the EC is more than the sum of its parts. Regulationsare generally the result of intergovernmental negotiations and agreements, but are by nomeans reliant on them.The ability of the EC, as a supranational institution, to legislate measures thatare binding on its Member States is thus one source of tension between the need for ECauthority and the protection of national autonomy. The second, and related, source ofcontention is the founding principle of the establishment of a Common Market. The purposeof EC regulations is to harmonize standards and thus “ensure that different national standardsand regulatory procedures do not interfere with free trade and business competition”(McCormick, 1991:129).The first EC regulations addressing environmental protection were notinstituted through concern about environmental degradation but through a desire to setuniform standards for internal trade. The vehicle emission regulations, for example, werenegotiated under Article 100 of the Treaty relating to the attainment of a common market(Arp, 1993:152). It was not until the 1987 SEA that environmental protection was accordedconstitutional recognition under Article 130 of the new Treaty.23Subsidiarity is the third complicating factor in the relationship between the EUand its constituent Member States and represents one of the general principles of Communityaction. In effect, subsidiarity allows the EU to take direct action at the national level, whennational authorities’ action has been “less efficient”. Specific reference to this principle ismade in the Treaty provisions relating to environment (EC Commission 1992:23). Indeed,as the Commission notes, “no national authority can declare a provision of Community lawnull and void” (EC Commission 1992:25). Thus, in all cases, EC legislation takes precedenceover national legal provisions.The erosion of national sovereignty, as perceived by some Member States, isfurthered by the fourth factor of voting procedures. The 1987 SEA saw the introduction ofQualified Majority Voting into some aspects of EU decision—making, including those arisingunder Article 100 involving the realisation of a common market. Previous voting procedureswere based on unanimity, effectively imbuing all Member States with the right to veto anylegislation. Since 1987 however, voting rights have been weighted amongst Member Statesand a qualified majority is sufficient to ensure the passage of legislation. This aspect of theEU, more than any other, represents the most overt subjugation of national sovereignty sinceit can potentially lead to circumstances where a Member State is forced to enact legislationto which it is vehemently opposed.2.3. European Union Policy-Making: Institutions and PracticeThe net result of the struggle between EU jurisdiction and Member States’national sovereignties is that policy—making has become a prolonged, arduous andcomplicated process. It is at this policy formulation stage alone, that Member States are ableto protect their own interests and ensure that legislative proposals are acceptable to their24respective domestic constituencies. It is at this stage that Member States are forced to ‘showtheir hand’ and declare their national positions on policy proposals. Policy—making for boththe Vehicle Emissions Directive and the Large Combustion Plant Directive were clearexamples of this struggle. The UK, in both cases, strongly resisted the measures beingproposed, and succeeded in winning important concessions against Danish, German andDutch pressure to adopt more stringent standards.The legislative institutions of the EC are comprised of four constituent parts:the European Commission which acts as the bureaucracy, the European Council of Ministerswhich represents the executive, the directly elected European Parliament as the legislatureand the European Court of Justice as the judiciary (EC Commission, 1992:24). However, thebalance of power amongst these constituent elements is considerably different to that foundin most national jurisdictions.2The Commission bureaucracy is, for all intents and purposes, the driving forcebehind the EC as a whole (Peters, 1992:76). It has a monopoly on initiating legislation anda responsibility for ensuring that adopted legislation is properly applied (EC Commission,1992:24). Composed of 23 Directorates—General governing each policy area, the Commissioncan be called upon to submit proposals at the request of the Council. However, as is moreoften the case, the Commission initiates proposals that are put forward to Council forconsideration. It is worth noting that the Council, although the ‘political’ centre of the EU,cannot act without policy initiation from the Commission bureaucracy (Peters, 1992:89).2 For a more substantial discussion on the workings of the Community’s institutions see S.S.Andersen and K.A. Eliassen (eds) [1993j Making Policy in Europe, p. 19—3 3 and W. Nicoll andT.C. Salmon [1994] Understanding the New European Community, p.61—99.25Decision—making and final policy formulation occur at the Council ofMinisters, which is composed of representatives from the Member States, varying accordingto the policy area. Thus, the Council is usually the site of protracted wrangling, negotiatingand articulation of national policy positions. The difficulties of negotiation have beenexacerbated by changes in the voting rules brought in with the 1987 SEA. The 1987 Actintroduced Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) on issues pertaining to the completion of theinternal market and this is increasingly used in Council decision—making (Peters, 1992:83).The QMV procedure effectively eliminates the right of veto for Member States, and rendersEC policy—making dependent on coalition formation amongst national delegations.3The 1987 SEA also served to enhance the participation of the EuropeanParliament in the EU policy—making process. Prior to 1987, the Parliament’s role waspredominantly consultative. Parliament would render an opinion on Commission proposalsbefore the Council took action, “but this opinion had little influence” (Peters, 1992:92). Anew ‘cooperation procedure’ introduced under the terms of the 1987 Act enables Parliamentto essentially override Council decisions in concertation with the Commission.4QMV rules allocate 10 votes each to France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom and8 votes to Spain. Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal each have 5 votes, whileDenmark and Ireland have 3. The smallest Member State, Luxembourg, has 2 votes. The totalvoting complement is 76. 54 votes constitute a qualified majority, and 23 a blocking coalition(Peters, 1992:83).‘ Parliament is now obliged to review Council decisions. If it is not satisfied with theCouncil’s position, Parliament can suggest amendments to the proposal. If these amendmentsare supported by the Commission, Council can only overturn them with a unanimous vote. QMVrenders the amendments to the proposal accepted. The ‘cooperation’ procedure, together withQMV, were instrumental in the process of adopting the EC Directives regulating vehicle exhaustemissions (Peters, 1992:92).26EC legislation must be approved by the Council before the Commission canbe called upon to ensure its proper application. EC legislation is binding on Member Statesand the persons or institutions to which it is addressed. There are three legislative toolsavailable to the Council: Regulations, Directives and Decisions. Regulations address preciseobligations to specific organs, institutions or persons within the Member States leaving littlescope for the exercise of national legislative competence (Siedentopf and Hauschild,1988:10). Decisions confer rights and or obligations only on those to whom they areaddressed (EC Commission, 1992:24).The Directive, which constitutes the most favoured option for institutingenvironmental protection measures, has created problems for Member States in terms ofimplementation. The Directives on environmental protection are no exception. Environmentalpolicy in the EU relies mainly on Directives since they are used in cases where a substantialchange in Member State national legislation is envisaged, in order to put the policy intoeffect (EC Commission, 1992:25).Three levels of governance are typically involved in the implementation of ECDirectives, in marked contrast to the usual policy formulation and policy implementationprocedures within national jurisdictions. The institutions of the EC form the macro—level, thenational authorities of the Member States represent the meta—level and the application ofpolicy in local contexts is performed by local agencies at the micro—level. The introductionof an ‘extra’ level in the implementation of Community legislation, together with the uniquerelationship between the EC and its Member States, has generated issues that have beenreceiving considerable academic and scholarly attention in recent years.272.4. Macro-Implementation: The EU and Policy linpiementationHaigh asserts that the implementation of Community legislation is inevitablymore complex than the implementation of purely national legislation.not only is the chain between Community legislation and action on theground one link longer, but the mechanics of enforcement is a matter for theMember states themselves and competent authorities within them who will nothave had much say in the drafting of the Community legislation. (Haigh1986:91)There is no doubt that the greater political distance between implementers and decision—makers generates problems. However, the Directive as a legislative tool was designed toaccommodate such problems. Since Directives are the most common form of ECenvironmental policy, this discussion will focus on the particular issues associated with them,to the exclusion of Regulations and Decisions.The Directive is a unique kind of legislative tool, having “no clear precedentsin the legal systems of Member States” (Siedentopf and Hauschild, 1988:8). It is only the‘ends’ specified in the Directive, and not the ‘means’, that Member States are obliged tomeet. The statutory definition of the EC Directive is provided in Article 189 (3) of the EECTreatyA directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon eachMember State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the nationalauthorities the choice of form and methods.Furthermore, Article 5 of the Treaty obliges Member States to incorporate Directives intobinding national law (Siedentopf and Hauschild, 1988:8—9).In terms of macro—level implementation then, the Commission is responsiblefor formulating legislation in accordance with the Council’s decisions, and directing MemberStates to incorporate these legislative decisions into their own national legal code. Withregard to Directives, the Commission has the duty to ensure that the provisions are28transposed into national law (formal compliance), and that the national law is implementedin such as way as to achieve all the objectives of the Directive (practical compliance) (ECCommission, 1992:25). To enforce this process, the Commission can call upon the EuropeanCourt of Justice through the initiation of infringement procedures provided for under Article169 of the EEC Treaty.When Directives have not been implemented according to the terms laid outby the EC, the Commission can serve formal notice of infringement to Member States underthe terms of Article 169. If the Member State challenges the Commission, either throughdenial of an infringement or through a failure to correct the problem, the Commission is thenauthorised to take the matter to the European Court of Justice. The Court may conclude thata Member State is in breach of Community law, and may request that country to takemeasures to rectify the breach. However, and importantly, there are no further sanctionsavailable to the EC (although a second infringement procedure may be initiated).In the absence of sanction, the EC relies on political pressure to ensurecompliance. The Commission claims that such political pressure is considerable and “noncompliance is very much the exception” (EC Commission, 1992:25—26). This assertion bythe Commission is certainly debatable. In its 1990 annual report on the implementation ofEC legislation in its Member States, the Commission noted that the situation was “far fromsatisfactory” (cited in ENDS Report 205 February 1992, p.32).Many of the Commission’s problems in ensuring practical compliance with theterms of its Directives is its lack of resources. It has neither the personnel nor the financialresources to ensure that Community standards, including environmental ones, are being metwithin the EU’s Member States. Instead, it is dependent on individual and interest groupactivism to bring implementation failures to its attention. In a study done by Kramer, it was29found that the citizens of Europe were making increasing use of the Commission in its roleof European environment watchdog. While the number of Article 169 proceedings haveshown a decline in recent years, the number of complaints has more than tripled (Table 1).UK citizens are the Community’s most numerous complainants, accounting for over 25 percent of the complaints against breaches of environmental law lodged with the EC in 1990(ENDS Report 205 February 1992, p.32).Table 1 Infringement Procedures Relating to Environmental Directives UnderArticle 169, 1985-1989YEAR 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989# complaints 11 36 150 138 465# proceedings 100 118 155 186 147Source: Kramer, 1991:39—562.5 Meta-Implementation: The Member States and Policy ImplementationImplementation of EC Directives is, by statutory definition, determined by thelegislative and administrative procedures that the Member State establishes for the realisationof the objectives set out in the Directive. This poses a problem for the uniform applicationof a Directive, given that there is a vast range of institutional resources, political systems ofgovernance and policy styles across Member States.5 This divergence inevitably influencesthe manner in which the objectives of the Directive are realised.Richardson et. al. (1982) describe a ‘policy style’ as a system of societal decision—making.Policy style, in this sense, refers to both policy—making and policy implementation (p.2). Vogel(1986) prefers the term ‘regulatory style’ to describe patterns of regulation between governmentand business.30A fundamental, and initial, problem in the implementation of EC Directivesat the meta—level is the widely divergent legislative systems that exist across EU Members.Countries such as Italy and the Netherlands face a lengthier legislative process for theadoption of statutes than does, for example, the United Kingdom. Thus, some Members findthemselves unable to implement Directives by the formal compliance date by virtue of themanner in which their legislative processes operate.Much of this delay is attributed to the type of legal instrument used withineach national jurisdiction to give effect to the objectives of the Directive. Where suchobjectives can be met through administrative regulations (secondary legislation), formalcompliance is relatively quick and problem—free. However, where primary legislation suchas Acts of Parliament are used, formal compliance can be a lengthy and arduous process. Insome national jurisdictions, no new legislative measures will be needed in cases where suchpolicy objectives are already being met by existing domestic law. Siedentopf and Hauschild’ sstudy of the implementation of seventeen Directives within Member States illustrates thepreferred legislative mechanisms employed across the EU (Figure 2). Germany shows amarked preference for primary legislation to enact the Directives, while the Netherlands,Luxembourg and Ireland favour secondary legislation procedures. Belgium, Germany,Luxembourg and the Netherlands employed no administrative acts to enact the Directives,whereas these were readily established in Denmark, the United Kingdom, Italy and Ireland.Other processes may also hinder the implementation of Directives at the meta—level. Implementing officials may be ignorant of the terms of the Directives. This is aconsequence of the political distance between local environmental control officers anddecision—makers in Brussels. Local officials are not necessarily concerned with the broadobjectives of the EC in the “carrying out of their day to day duties” (Haigh, 1986:92—94).31131211 -109.8-a)a) 7>6-LE04-La).0E 30z2— A - 0 OK — F GA GR - I IRL L NLMember StatesPrimary legislation Secondary legisi n Administrative actsExisting legisi n NoneFigure 2Incorporation Measures taken by Member StatesSource: Siedentopf and Hauschild, 1988:5432Furthermore, imprecise legislation, or Directives that provide for discretionaryobligations, are unlikely to be applied uniformly throughout the EU. Such legislation allowsfor a degree of interpretation on the part of the Member State, which will in turn bedetermined by national priorities, administrative arrangements and legal and political cultures.Such was the case with the EC Directive concerning water standards for freshwater fish,where Member States were responsible for designating waters and then maintaining theenvironmental quality standards contained in the Directive. Germany failed to designate anyfreshwater areas, and thus did not need to meet any of the statutory provisions of theDirective (Haigh, 1986:28).While imprecision, discretionary administration and delays in theimplementation procedure at the meta—level have accounted for problems and failures informal compliance, other factors have contributed to a weakening of practical compliance.In their survey of comparative air pollution control measures, Knoepfel and Weidneridentified several factors that contributed to differential policy outputs in various countries.The first relates to the ability for monitoring systems to be manipulated. Countries mayemploy different measuring equipment, variations in the size of the area being monitored andwidely divergent evaluative methods to skew the results that are reported to the Commission.Although countries may seemingly meet the objectives of a Directive according to their ownmonitoring data, the actual impacts of the application of the Directive may be negligible(Knoepfel and Weidner, 1988:200).The second factor relates to what the authors called ‘percentile reduction’.Ambient air quality standards can be made less stringent by establishing a low percentile forwhich the average measured air quality value for a given time period is to be calculated. Byincreasing the number of peak values that do not have to be included in calculating the mean33average value, the frequency with which the statutory standard is met (or surpassed) iseffectively raised (Knoepfel and Weidner, 1988:200). Other problems identified by theauthors include a reliance on estimated emissions, rather than actual emissions; sitingmonitoring stations away from areas of high air pollutant concentrations; and attributingexceedences of statutory standards to exceptional ‘externalities’ such as prevailing winds,harsh climatic conditions and a high incidence of imported air pollutants (Knoepfel andWeidner, 1988:203—204).The flexibility of application inherent in the Directive has also been the sourceof considerable problems in its implementation. As Arp has argued, the purpose of ECregulation has been to create uniform conditions for economic activity. Thus,.clear standards have to be set out against which implementation of the rulescan be judged. Loopholes must be avoided which might allow member statesto apply the law inadequately, be it in response to political or economicpressures or due to differing national regulatory systems. The detailed natureof Community law is thus necessary to ensure the intended uniformity ofeffect, often under very different national conditions. (Arp 1993:161)Because of these reasons, Directives have become increasingly precise in their language andstipulations, and specific in their means. Indeed, EC legislation “often consists ofexhaustively detailed stipulations which blur the overall objective” (Arp, 1993:161).Discretionary powers over Directives that were supposedly left to the Member States, asoriginally envisaged in the EEC Treaty, have been eroded (Siedentopf and Hauschild,1988:10). In some respects, Directives are so precise that they leave Member States littlelatitude (Haigh, 1986:81).The legalistic precision with which Directives are imbued has made it difficultfor states where national policy styles rely on vague articulations of objectives and a highdegree of administrative discretion. As Arp notes, “the institutional mechanics of the EC34are.. .conducive to a regulatory style which emphasises legalistic precision” (Arp, 1993:161).The United Kingdom, with a policy style that is antithetical to the EC ‘ s preference forlegalistic precision, is one such Member, and the conflict between British policy style andthe precise nature of EC Directives is examined in the following section.2.6 The United Kingdom, Policy-Making and Environmental ProtectionThe United Kingdom has the world’s oldest system of pollution control. It wasthe first country to introduce regulations for the protection of the environment in 1273, andthe first to establish a pollution—control agency in 1863. The British conservation movementdates back to the late nineteenth century and the establishment of statutory conservationagencies in the early 1900s (Vogel, 1986:3 1). In recent years, and particularly during the1 980s, Britain’s reputation in terms of environmental protection has been described as “thedirty man of Europe” (Rose, 1990). The British government has been reluctant to adoptstringent environmental standards, has indulged in protracted political wrangling with itsEuropean partners over the need for environmental protection and demonstrated lethargy inacknowledging environmental pollution as an important domestic concern. As McCormicknotes, “by almost every measure, the environment is a relatively minor issue on the Britishpolitical agenda” (McCormick, 1991:7).The perception of the UK as a laggard in environmental protection is due, forthe most part, to the regulatory style that characterises British policy—making and policyimplementation. The British policy style demonstrates a preference for consensualagreements, secret negotiations and gentle persuasion rather than aggressive coercion forcompliance. As Ward and Samways describe, “the British style of regulation involvesimplementation by consent” (Ward and Samways, 1992:119).35Environmental policy—making in the UK shows no significant departure fromthe British policy style. Environmental regulations are generally flexible and informal andthere is an extensive reliance on industrial self—regulation. Prosecutions are rare and thereis a heavy reliance on a cooperative and close relationship between industry and government.The British regulatory style, in the arena of environmental protection, shows a markedreluctance to employ uniform standards for emissions or environmental quality and is,instead, heavily dependent on administrative discretion (Vogel, 1986:21).British pollution control policy has traditionally been based on three principles:best practicable means, voluntary compliance and secrecy (McCormick, 1991:92). Bestpractical means (BPM) is a unique concept insofar as standards are calculated with referenceto local conditions, the state of technological knowledge and the costs of pollution abatement.BPM is fundamentally “based on the idea that government should interfere as little aspossible with industry” (McCormick, 199 1:92). Voluntary compliance is also an importantprinciple of environmental regulation. Pollution control agencies have, for the most part,worked in partnership with industry, seeing their role as to educate and persuade rather thanto coerce through threat of prosecution. Finally, in order to foster this close cooperativerelationship with industry, both regulator and regulated are protected by an implicit code ofconfidentiality and secrecy (McCormick, 1991:93).In general, British governments have resisted EC—inspired environmentalinitiatives. This reluctance stems from four factors. The first relates to the UK’s geography.British territory is surrounded by “large turbulent gales and gusty Atlantic gales” such that,it is believed, the natural environment is able to absorb (through dilution or dispersion) morepollutants than its continental neighbours. Secondly, the British style of regulation isantithetical to the legally—binding standards preferred by the EC. Thirdly, the British have36always been cautious of the costs of pollution abatement. The economics of pollution controlhas been an important factor in the government’s reluctance to accept uniform standards.Traditionally, Britain has argued for pollution abatement regulations that are economicallysustainable given the current state of technological knowledge within the UK, rather than thetechnology—forcing standards often favoured by more ‘green’ EC Members such as Germanyand Denmark. Finally, the British have been sceptical about adopting regulations based onscientific speculation, preferring instead to wait for concrete evidence before regulatingbehaviour (0 ‘Riordan, 1988:40—41).I would suggest that the British policy style does not facilitate the smoothapplication of EC Directives. EC Directives, as has been noted, involve precise legalisticlanguage and an ‘open’ and ‘accountable’ administrative system. EC legislation typicallyinvolves the establishment of provisions for performance review, public access to informationand judicial enforcement of statutory standards. Britain’s reliance on notions of ‘bestpracticable means’ and ‘best available technology not entailing excessive cost’ conferdiscretionary powers on administrators and inspectors, and thus run against the grain of ECenvironmental legislation with its statutory environmental standards. Similarly, the close andcooperative relationship between government and business leaves little distance between thetwo for open and accountable administration, judicial review or public involvement.Nonetheless, the EC is now arguably the single most important and effectiveinfluence on British environmental policy (McCormick, 1991:273). All EC Directives, in theprocess of negotiation, go to the European Secretariat to the Cabinet Office. The Secretariat,staffed by personnel from the Foreign Office, serve to coordinate consultations with therelevant government departments potentially affected or interested in the terms of theDirective. Typically, interdepartmental communication is characterised by informal contact37rather than institutionalised consultation. Because of the unitary and centralised system ofgovernance, there is virtually no consultation with local authorities or regional implementingagencies (Siedentopf and Hauschild, 1988:33—36).2.7 Implementation in the United KingdomEC Directives are usually implemented under existing British statutes. TheEuropean Communities Act 1972 provides general powers for the British government toimplement Community obligations. Practice has shown that there is a preference for usingadministrative regulations under existing Acts of Parliament to implement the objectives ofEC Directives, when such primary legislation already exists (Figure 2). The majority ofDirectives are implemented through the issuance of government circulars addressed to therelevant authorities. These circulars indicate how existing national legislation is to beinterpreted according to the terms of the Directive, but do not have the force of law (Haigh,1986:85).In recent years, the EC has taken a dim view of the use of administrativecirculars in the implementation of Community Directives. In infringement procedures broughtbefore the European Court of Justice, the Court“has repeatedly emphasised the importance of correct incorporation ofdirectives into national law by requiring binding rules and ruling out theapplication of a directive by administrative practice alone...” (Siedentopf andHauschild, 1988:10)Consequently, there has been an increasing number of statutory instruments (secondarylegislation) which activate existing statutes to put into effect the terms of EC Directives.Statutory instruments (SI) must be laid before the Houses of Parliament, but typically are notdebated (Boehmer—Cbristiansen and Skea, 1991:267). Less than 25 per cent of the 2,50038statutory instruments made each year are referred to a Parliamentary Select Committee forscrutiny (Grant, 1989:63).In recognition of the increased importance accorded to environmentalprotection by the EC, the British government passed the Environmental Protection Act in1990. This constitutes an ‘enabling’ legislative framework, under which the terms of mostenvironmental Directives can be implemented. The 1990 Act introduced a new, holisticapproach to environmental protection through the use of Integrated Pollution Control (IPC).Under the terms of IPC, two approaches are mandated in industrial processes causingpollution to the environment. The first involves the use of the ‘best practicable environmentaloption (BPEO)’. BPEO required industries to take into account pollutant emissions to air,water and land, and then employ the option that causes the least overall damage.The second approach, to be used in conjunction with BPEO, is the ‘bestavailable technique not entailing excessive cost (BATNEEC)’. As mentioned previously, theincorporation of BATNEEC was an important concession won by the UK during ECnegotiations on pollutant emissions to the air. It is worth noting the subtle change of text thatoccurred in the process of formal implementation. The EC text refers to ‘technology’ whileBritish legislation has preferred the term ‘technique’. This would appear to reflect the UK’sconcern with the expense that pollution abatement incurs implying that ‘best availabletechnology’ would necessarily be more expensive than ‘best available technique’, which doesnot carry with it the implicit utilisation of existing technology. Such technology may beavailable on the European market but expensive for the UK to employ. This subtle changein text is interpreted as a “deliberate weakening” of the intent and spirit of EC Directives onenvironmental protection (Boehmer—Christiansen and Skea, 1991:267).39In general, however, the UK has an exemplary record on the formalimplementation of EC legislation. Mazey and Richardson find the British demonstrate a highdegree of compliance, in stark contrast to the “tradition of non—compliance” in other ECstates such as Italy (Mazey and Richardson, 1993:19). However, attention must be drawn tothe gulf that separates formal compliance and practical compliance. There is little debate overthe UK’s claim to one of the best records in the EC for formal implementation (Mazey andRichardson, 1993:19; Siedentopf and Hauschild, 1988:69). Ironically, criticism of the ECCommission was raised by British civil servants who were concerned that the Commissionseemed solely concerned with formal compliance, and had little regard “to how exactlyCommunity directives were being applied and to what effect” (Siedentopf and Hauschild,1988:70). It can be seen that successful implementation at the macro— and meta— levels doesnot necessarily translate to effective implementation at the micro—level. The Commission mayensure formal compliance and national authorities will undertake the necessary legislativemeasures to make the objectives of a Directive binding within their national jurisdictions. Itis at the micro—level of local application that one finds the discrepancies of policy impact,should they exist.The inherent problems between the arenas of policy formulation and policyimplementation are exacerbated by the terms of membership within the EC. This is clearlyillustrated in the environmental policy arena. Using the examples of vehicle emissions andemissions from large combustion plants, I will examine the role played by the EC vis—a—visits relationship to the UK. In both cases, the jurisdictional debate featured highly in thenegotiations leading up to the agreement on the relevant Directives. While vehicle emission40negotiations were motivated by concerns about the Common Market, large combustion plantemissions began from a concern to protect the environment and international concern overthe impacts of acid rain. Chapter Four looks at the implementation of these directives in theUK in terms of the factors that played a role in meeting the objectives laid down by the EC.However, it would seem prudent to precede such a discussion with an overview of theproblems that gave rise to the Directives, and the manner in which the UK sought to addressthe application of the Directives themselves.41Chapter ThreeThe Problem and Its Solutions3.1 Vehicle EmissionsThe debate in the EC over vehicle emission standards has been predominantlyinformed by the desire to promote free and equal trading opportunities for the Community’sautomobile manufacturers (Haigh, 1992:6.8—2). Vehicle emissions controls were raised inthe Community as a free trade issue because ? [bjefore the 1 980s, environmental concernswere insufficiently articulated to challenge seriously the priority given to free trade” withinthe EC (Arp, 1993:153). This is not to suggest, however, that environmental concerns wereabsent from the debate. It was simply the case that “economic and environmental concerns[were] valued differently by different actors” and that, for the most part, environmentalissues were generally overshadowed by economic ones (Arp, 1993:153). Indeed, “[had] itnot been for the interest shared by industry and governments to keep a common market forautomobiles, Community regulation on exhaust emissions might not have survived” (Arp,1993:153). As a result of the economic concerns over free trade, most EC Directives entailed‘optional’ standards. Member States were not obliged to meet the emission limits, but couldnot set more stringent limits than those specified by the Directive. To do so would lead tothe effective erection of a trade barrier against imported vehicles which did not comply withthe higher domestic standards (Haigh, 1992:6.8—5).Negotiations on the Directives relating to emission limits were fraught withtension and conflict. Germany and Denmark pushed for more stringent standards in the faceof resistance from the UK, France and Italy. Much of the protracted wrangling reflected thedomestic car industries’ interests. German manufacturers such as Mercedes and BMW42produced large and relatively expensive cars that could easily absorb the technological costsof meeting higher emission standards.6 Indeed, many of their models designated for exportto the United States were already built to comply with the higher US exhaust emissionstandards. The British, French and Italian manufacturers, on the other hand, were primarilyconcerned with their small and medium—sized vehicles, which made up the bulk of theirtrade.7 The technological adaptation required for these cars would result in a considerableincrease in the price of their exports and thus have a greater adverse effect on trade.In an attempt to forestall German moves to unilaterally set higher emissionlimits than those provided by existing Directives, the Commission proposed tighter standardsfor the Community as a whole in June 1984. A year later agreement was finally reached withthe ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ which set varying standards according to differential enginecapacities. However, formal agreement was made contingent on Greece receiving financialsupport form the EC for environmental protection, and eventually blocked by Denmarkwhich wanted standards of comparable stringency to those in the United States.The passage of the 1987 Single European Act served to break the deadlockover negotiations with the introduction of new voting procedures, and a ‘cooperationprocedure’ that enabled the Commission and the Parliament to work together in placingpressure on the Council (Haigh, 1992:6.8—6). By 1989, utilising these new procedures, theCouncil was able to agree to uniform emission standards that were obligatory rather thanoptional, and by 1991 these became applicable to all passenger vehicles regardless of engine6 Arp suggests that the introduction of three—way catalytic converters to large cars (1 .8L—2.OL) would increase costs by 5 percent, while similar technological application to smaller cars(O.75L—1.OL) would lead to a 17 percent increase in cost (Arp, 1993:158).The market share of cars under 1 .4L is 84 per cent in Italy, compared with 37 per cent inGermany (Arp, 1993:158).43capacity through the adoption of Directive 91/441.Directive 92/5 5 relates to the inspection and maintenance of vehicles, in orderthat exhaust emission standards are monitored and regulated beyond manufacturingspecifications. Once manufacturing specifications had been agreed to at the EC however, littleresistance was offered to the passage of this follow—up Directive.The DirectivesThe EC Consolidated Directive (9 1/441) concerning pollution from vehicleemissions stipulate emission limit values for carbon monoxide (CO), hydrocarbons (HC),nitrogen oxides (NOt), volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and particulates. The Directive,the last in a long line of regulations relating to passenger cars, served to consolidate existingregulations that set limits according to vehicle engine capacities by setting standards to beapplied to all passenger cars (Table 2). The Directive stipulates that emission limits must beimplemented by 1 July 1992 for all new models, and by 1 December 1992 for all new cars.Table 2 Directive 91/441 (All Passenger Cars)CO HC/NO VOCs particulatesa CO(g/km) (g/test) idling speed(%_by_volume)2.72 0.97 <2 0.14 3.5—4.5Source: Haigh, 1992:6.8—3a For compression ignition engined vehicles only44A further provision, in the preamble to the Consolidated Directive, was theencouragement of the use of tax incentives to accelerate the introduction of ‘clean’ cars tothe European market.• .the environmental impact of the more stringent standards would be greatlyincreased and speeded up if the Member States were to grant.. .tax incentives...This practice had been instituted in Germany and the Netherlands in the mid—i 980s and drewconsiderable criticism from Britain and France. Tax incentive schemes were seen by theircritics as providing an unfair market advantage to car manufacturers already employingcatalytic converter technology, to the detriment of those (mainly British and French) that didnot (Arp, 1993:156).The consolidated Directive 91/441 applies to the manufacturing specificationsof vehicles by requiring them all to be fitted with three—way catalytic converters. Directive92/5 5 requires Member States to measure tailpipe emissions through the administration ofperiodic roadworthiness tests on all vehicles covered by the terms of the Directive.Implementation in the United KingdomLegislationPrior to 1993, the Consolidated Directive 91/441 was implemented in theUnited Kingdom by the Motor Vehicles (EC Type Aptroval) Regulations 1992 (SI No.3107).For new models, The Motor Vehicles (Type Approvafl (Great Britain (Amendment)Regulations 1992 (SI No.1341) makes EC emission limits mandatory within the jurisdictionof England and Wales. The Road Vehicles (Construction and Use (Amendment (No.5)Regulations 1992 (SI No.2137) makes similar stipulations for new cars first used on, or after,4531 December 1992 within England and Wales.8 Since 1993, Directive 91/441 and all otherrelevant Directives were consolidated in the United Kingdom Statutory Instruments onVehicle Emissions 1993 (SI No.2199) . All Regulations (secondary legislation) relating toexhaust emission limits are enacted under the Road Traffic Act 1972.JurisdictionResponsibility for the implementation of national legislation relating to theDirective lies with the Department of Transport (DTp). Automobile manufacturers arerequired to receive type—approval from the DTp before full—scale production can beundertaken. The implementation of Directive 92/55 occurs at the local level where registeredvehicle inspectors are empowered by DTp to carry out annual roadworthiness testing on carsover three years old. Vehicle inspectors are provided with guidance notes on the standardsto be attained in such tests, through the circulation of Tester’s Manuals circulated by theDTp.’° These tests now incorporate EC emission standards. Vehicles are issued with aMinistry of Transport Certificate of Roadworthiness which is required to insure vehicles.These Certificates are also necessary to purchase Road Tax badges, which must be displayedby all vehicles that are in roadworthy condition and operational.8 Jill Speed, HMSO. Personal communication, 5 July 1994.Stephen Hall, Environmental Protection Statistics Division, Department of the Environment.Personal communication, 7 July 1994.10 David Briggs, Head of Roadworthiness Testing and Enforcement, Department ofTransport. Personal communication, 5 September 1994.46EnforcementVehicle examiners are empowered to prohibit the further use of any vehicleconsidered to be in an unsatisfactory condition, by the failure to issue such a Certificate.Enforcement of Road Tax payment is undertaken by the police authorities and acts as anindirect enforcement of EC emission standards. Police authorities are also empowered toundertake spot checks on exhaust emissions at the roadside (DoE, 1978:11).The Effect on UK PracticeThe implementation of Directives 91/441 and 92/55 in the UK has beenrelatively smooth. Although the negotiations over standards, at the EC, were fraught withdispute and conflict, the adoption of the 91/441 standards came at a stage when thetechnological capabilities of domestic car manufacturers had progressed to the extent that theincorporation of catalytic converters would not create unbearable economic costs. Some UKmanufacturers such as Vauxhall and Ford announced, in March 1989, that they would bemarketing catalyst—equipped cars. It was only then, in May 1989, that the governmentannounced its agreement to back catalytic converter technology, thus enabling the UK tomeet stricter Community emission standards (Rose, 1990:173).The implementation of inspection and maintenance programs has also beenrelatively smooth in the UK, in stark contrast to similar programs in the US.” The DTpundertook consultations with various interest groups in November 1991, and the responsewas “generally supportive” of the incorporation of EC emission standards into the annual‘ For discussions on the implementation of inspection and maintenance programs in the US,see Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983, Chapter 4 and Mills and White, 1978.47roadworthiness testing program. 12 Indeed, emission testing in the UK predated theincorporation of Directive 92/55. The Directive served to tighten the standards to whichvehicles were forced to comply rather than create a new system of testing.’3 Roadworthinesstest failures of the EC emission standards are set out in Table 3.The low failure rates for heavy goods vehicles and public service vehiclesreflect the special preparation that such vehicles are subject to, prior to their annualroadworthiness testing. Private vehicles, accounting for the largest proportion of vehicleemissions within the UK show an improvement in failure rates since the implementation ofthe EC Directive 92/55.Table 3 Emission Standards Failure Rates As A Percentage of Total VehiclesTested, for Different Classes of Vehicles, 1991-1994.Class of Vehicle 1991/92 1992/93 l993/94Heavy Goods Vehicles n/a 1.9Public Service Vehicles n/a 2.4 2.7’Private Vehicles 13 10.9 77dSource: David Briggs, Head of Roadworthiness Testing, Department of Transport. Personalcommunication, 5 September 1994.a 22 million vehicles were tested in 1993/94.b 1.25% of total vehicles were HGVs0.39% of total vehicles were PSVsd 98.36% of total vehicles were private vehicles12 David Briggs, Head of Roadworthiness Testing and Enforcement, Department ofTransport. Consultations were undertaken with the Automobile Association, the RoyalAutomobile Club and the Consumers’ Association. There is no public record of the results ofthese consultations, though DTp describes the response as “generally supportive”. Personalcommunication, 5 September 1994.13 David Briggs, Head of Roadworthiness Testing and Enforcement, Department ofTransport. Personal communication, 5 September 1994.483.2 Large Combustion Plant Emissions14Negotiations over sulphur dioxide (SO2)emissions were instigated by concernsover acid rain deposition in Scandinavia and Germany. In 1982, Germany brought the issueto the attention of the Connnission, and the Framework Directive relating to the regulationof air pollutants was agreed to in April 1984 (EC Directive 84/340). Like the negotiationsover vehicle emission regulations, Germany was once again the principle instigator and themost enthusiastic proponent of strict emission controls for large combustion plants, thelargest emitters of SO2. Once again, Britain proved to be the most consistently reluctant partyto the negotiations.Britain’s acceptance of the agreement was of great importance since it was thelargest emitter of SO2 in the Community (Table 4). UK Government estimates have shownthat 71 per cent of British SO2 emissions are from power stations. 32 per cent of NOemissions originate from power stations while 45 per cent are from vehicle emissions(Friends of the Earth, 1990:3). These figures point to an obvious need to address emissionreductions within the UK. However, the UK government has been guided by a concern toprotect the coal industry and, during the Directive negotiations, preparing for the privatisationof the electricity industry.Like the vehicle emissions proposals, uniform reductions of SO2 emissionswere proposed by the Commission in November 1983. Under the terms of the originalproposal, all Member States would have to undertake 60 per cent reduction in SO2 emissions14 The protracted debate over acid rain, sulphur dioxide emissions and negotiations on theLarge Combustion Plant Directive within the European Community is well documented. For afull discussion of the issues see S. Boebmer—Christiansen and J. Skea Acid Politics, 1991; N.Haigh Manual of Environmental Policy: the EC and Britain, 1992; M.E. Wilcher The Politicsof Acid Rain, 1989.49and cut NO emissions by 40 per cent. These reductions, based on 1980 emission levels,would have to be completed by 1995. Due to its reliance on coal—fired electricity generationand the high sulphur content of its indigenous coal, Britain vehemently opposed the proposedreduction targets, arguing that such a programme would place disproportional costs on theUnited Kingdom (Weale, 1992:70).Table 4 Pollutant Emissions for the Member States, 1980Member State NQ SO2Belgium 110 530Denmark 124 323Germany 870 2225Greece 36 303Spain 366 2290France 400 1910Ireland 28 99Italy 580 2450Luxembourg 3 3Netherlands 122 299Portugal 23 115United Kingdom 1016 3883Manual of Environmental Policy Release 4, p.6.10—2; Boehmer—Source: Haigh, N.,Christiansen and Skea, 1991:238.50Lengthy negotiations ensued, and it was not until five years later thatconsensus was finally reached among Council members. The compromise proposal involved,for the first time, a system of differential reductions for each Member State (Johnson andCorcelle, 1989:139). 15 The United Kingdom was able to secure lower reductions on thebasis of the high—sulphur indigenous coal used in its power plants. Most Member States,including France, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium, agreed to a threephase target that would require SO2 reductions of 40, 60 and 70 per cent (based on 1980emissions) in 1993, 1998 and 2003 respectively. The EC Directive however, allows lessstringent reduction targets for the UK at 20, 40 and 60 percent for each of the three targetyears. Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain were also able to secure considerablederogations from the 40—60—70 reduction programs by virtue of their weaker economies andneed to pursue industrial growth (Table 5). Similar derogations were allowed for NOemissions (Table 6).The Large Combustion Plant (LCP) Directive was finally agreed to inNovember 1988. Separate provisions were made for new and existing plants. Existing plantSO2 emission reductions were based on national emission totals, which were to be reducedin three stages and varied according to differing domestic circumstances in the MemberStates. Phase I targets were to be met by 1993, while Phases II and III were to be attainedby 1998 and 2003 respectively. NO emissions reductions were to be phased in two stages.Phase I targets were to be met by 1998, and Phase II by 1998. New plants were subject tospecific emission limits, although Britain was once again able to secure a derogation for newplants burning indigenous high sulphur coal.15 OECD data on SO2 emissions, together with Phase I EC reduction targets, is given foreach of the Member States in Appendix I. Data for NO emissions is provided in Appendix IL51For new plants burning indigenous solid fuel, specific emission limits for SO2have been set by the DoE that are higher than those set out in the Directive. For plants witha rated thermal input of between 50 and 100 MW, the emission limits are set at 2250 mg/rn3,rather than the EC standard of 2000 mg/rn3.For plants of 100 MW or greater, the limits arebased on the amount of sulphur removed as a percentage of that contained in the fuel. Plantsbetween 100 and 166 MW must remove more than 40 per cent of the sulphur contained inthe fuel, and plants greater than 500 MW must remove over 90 per cent. Plants between 166and 500 must remove sulphur on a sliding scale between 40 and 90 percent, determined bynumerical formulae provided by the DoE (DoE, 1991:7).The DirectiveThe Large Combustion Plant Directive (8 8/609) was proposed by theCommission on 15 December 1983. Final agreement was not reached until 24 November1988. The Directive sets different requirements for new and existing plants. Emission limitswere applied to SO2 and NO emissions from plants with a thermal input of 50 MW or more.Existing plants are regulated by total national emission limits through phasedreductions and with different limits for different Member States (Table 5; Table 6). Existingplants are defined as those for which the original construction licence, or operating licence,was granted before 1 July 1987. Formal compliance was to be achieved by 30 June 1990,and by 31 December 1990 all Member States were to submit to the Commission a nationalprogramme, including timetables for the implementation of the phased reductions set out inthe Directive (Haigh, 1992:6.10—1).For new plants, i.e. those licensed after 1 July 1987, specific emission limitswere set according to the rated thermal output of the plant (Figure 3; Table 7). These limits52were based on the ‘best available technology not entailing excessive cost (BATNEEC)’.Derogations from the limits were allowed in certain cases, such as Spain’s larger plants andBritish plants burning indigenous high sulphur fuel.Table 5 Emission Limits for SO2, Directive 88/609Emission ceilings % Reductions[KTonnes/yr] (1980 base yr)_________________ 1993 1998 2003 1 1993 1998 [ 20031Belgium 318 212 159 —40 —60 —70Denmark 213 141 106 —34 —56 —67Germany 1335 890 668 —40 —60 —70Greece 320 320 320 +6 +6 +6Spain 2290 1730 1440 0 —24 —37France 1146 764 573 —40 —60 —70Ireland 124 124 124 +25 +25 +25Italy 1800 1500 900 —27 —39 —63Luxembourg 8 1.5 1.5 —40 —50 —60Netherlands 180 120 90 —40 —60 —70Portugal 232 270 206 +102 +135 +79United Kingdom 3106 2330 1553 -20 -40 -60Source: Annex I, Council Directive 88/609/EEC53SoHd Fues21.91.81.71.61.51.41.31.21.1c’JI0 0.9080.70.60.50.40.30.20.10500MWFigure 3Emission Limit Values for SO2 for New PlantsSource: Annex III, Council Directive 88/609/EEC100 70054Table 6 Emission Limits for NO, Directive 88/609Source: Annex II, Council Directive 88/609/EEC% Reductions(1980 base year)Table 7 NO Emission Limits for New Plants, Directive 88/609Type of fuel Limit values(mg/Nm3)Solid in general 650Solid with less than 10% volatile 1300compoundsLiquid 450Gaseous 350Source: Annex VI, Council Directive 88/609/EECEmission ceilings[KTonnes/yr]1993 1998 j 1993 1998Belgium 88 66 —20 —40Denmark 121 81 —3 —35Germany 696 522 —20 —40Greece 70 70 +94 +94Spain 368 277 +1 —24France 320 240 —20 —40Ireland 50 50 +79 +79Italy 570 428 —2 —26Luxembourg 2.4 1.8 —20 —40Netherlands 98 73 —20 —40Portugal 59 64 +157 +178United Kingdom 864 713 -15 -3055Implementation in the United KingdomLegislationFormal compliance with the Directive is met through the provisions of theEnvironmental Protection Act 1990 and the use of Integrated Pollution Control (Part I of theAct). Environmental Protection (Prescribed Processes and Substances Regulations 1990 (SI199 No.472) requires all combustion plants to possess authorizations for pollutant emissions.The Large Combustion Plant (New Plant Directions 1991 issued by the Secretary of Statefor the Environment requires plants to accommodate the provisions of the EC Directive. TheDirections have taken advantage of the derogation allowed for the burning of high—sulphurindigenous coal (Haigh, 1992:6.10—5).In order to meet national emission limits by controlling the emissions fromexisting plants, the UK has drawn up a programme of implementation which was submittedto the Commission by the compliance date. Apparently, the United Kingdom was the onlyMember State to comply with the implementation date (Haigh, 1992:6.10—5).JurisdictionAt the meta—level, the Department of the Environment is responsible for theimplementation of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate ofPollution (HMIP), under the Department of the Environment, is responsible for implementingthe terms of the Directive at the local level, through its powers to issue authorizations tolarge combustion plants within its jurisdiction. Regional offices of HMIP have beenestablished in Leeds, Bristol and Bedford to facilitate this process. The Secretary of Statefor the Environment can direct HMIP about conditions which are to be included in theauthorizations, and in this maimer EC emission limits can be complied with.56EnforcementA breach of the authorization conditions renders the operator of the plant liableto prosecution. A person found guilty of such an offence would be liable to a fine notexceeding £20,000 on summary conviction, or an unlimited fine and up to two yearsimprisonment on conviction on indictment. Failure to comply with the court order wouldrender the operator in contempt of court and liable to sequestration of assets and an unlimitedterm of imprisonment. The legislative provisions also enforce corporate liability (DoE,1990:5).The Effect on UK PracticeLarge combustion plants fall under the scheduled processes listed in Part I ofthe 1990 Environmental Protection Act. Such processes will have to comply with theprovisions for integrated pollution control (IPC) according to the ‘best practicableenvironmental options (BPEO)’ (Carden, 1991:151). Integrated pollution control (IPC) is aradical new approach to environmental regulation in the UK and warrants closer attention.Sections 7(2)(a) and 7(7) of the 1990 Environmental Protection Act state thatpollution abatement technology shouldinclude the objective of ensuring that the best available techniques notentailing excessive cost will be used for minimising pollution which may becaused to the environment taken as a whole by the releases having regard tothe best practicable environmental option available as respects the substanceswhich may be released.Two issues are of particular interest in the use of best practicable environmental option(BPEO) and best available technique not entailing excessive cost (BATNEEC) as policyobjectives. The use of “best” as a standard is highly subjective, dependent upon individualInspectors’ interpretation of local circumstances and the characteristics of each plant.57Furthermore, the best techniques must also take into consideration cost (DoE, 1991:3).Utilising BPEO and BATNEEC, no one technique for pollution abatement is specified andno uniform standard applied. Instead, standards are set for each plant through the issuanceof operating authorizations from HMIP (Appendix III; Appendix IV).The onus is on the operator to determine, according to BPEO and BATNEEC,the most appropriate means for reducing emissions. The operator must “take into account thelatest techniques for pollution prevention”, must be “encouraged to develop improvedtechniques” and “will need to demonstrate compliance with BPEO criterion” (DoE, 1991:3).Furthermore, considerable costs are incurred by the operator during the process ofapplication through the levying of fees by HMIP for the granting of authorizations (seebelow). These requirements on the part of the operator have involved a considerable changein behaviour from the manner in which such processes were regulated prior to theintroduction of the 1990 Act.Applications for authorizations were to be made to HMIP between 1 April1991 and 30 April 1991. HMIP is authorised to levy a fee for the process of application andthis charge is related to components of the process rather than the application as a whole.The initial application fee is £1,200 per component, with an annual fee of £500 percomponent (Carden, 1991:155).The 1990 Environmental Protection Act also provides for judicial review ofHMIP decisions relating to the granting of operating authorizations. Plant operators canappeal to the Secretary of State for the Environment for a review of the conditions stipulatedin the operating licences granted by HMIP. Reacting to the new practices required underIPC, most operators have utilised these provisions both as a means of delaying theimplementation of the Directive, and as a tool for the clarification from HMIP. Appeals by58operators must be lodged within six months of the granting of HMIP authorizations, and alarge number of operators have taken advantage of this provision. ICI, for example, hasappealed the emission limits set for one of its chemical plants, arguing that the standards aretoo stringent “to be justified on the grounds of the requirement to use BATNEEC” (ENDSReport 213, p.19).The terms of the Directive do not specify the means by which emissionreductions should be achieved. Plants may be retrofitted with flue gas desuiphurisationequipment (FGD), switch to low sulphur coal, or focus on emission reductions from specifichigh emitters only (Johnson and Corcelle, 1989:141). The costs of retrofitting are estimatedto raise the production cost of energy by 10 per cent (Johnson and Corcelle, 1989:140).The UK, despite having secured lower national emission reduction targets andderogations from the limits imposed for new plants, on the basis of the use of high—sulphurindigenous coal, has opted to meet its target through the utilisation of imported low sulphurcoal. Original plans to retrofit power stations with FGD have been shelved (Haigh,1992:6.10—6).In terms of enforcement, HMIP seems to be demonstrating greater willingnessto prosecute persistent offenders, though these have “generally been either smaller companiesor simple processes” (ENDS Report 213, p.4.1). It remains to be seen whether or not HMIPis able to achieve similar results with larger operators should the situation arise. Preliminaryindications are that HMIP will, from the recent record of five successful prosecutions againstBritish Steel for exceeding permitted emission levels in 1991/92 (ENDS Report 213, p.41).The success with which the UK has met the terms of the Directive, in termsof existing plants and national emission targets, are set out in Tables 8 and 9. With regardto SO2 emissions, DoE estimates for 1991 and 1992 were 2747 and 2674 KTonnes59respectively. This is well below the 1993 target of 3106 KTonnes stipulated in the Directive(DoE, 1994a: 13). Although NO emissions have not met with quite the same degree ofsuccess, they are still estimated at 742 KTonnes (1992) and thus meet the 1993 Directivetarget of 864 KTonnes (DoE, 1994a:22).Table 8Table 9Estimated Emissions of so2, 1990-1992 and EC Emission Targets(KTonnes/year)steelEstimated Emissions of NON, 1990-1992 and EC Emission Targets(KTonnes/Year)Source: Department of the Environment, 1 994a:22a Large combustion plants include power stations, refineries and proportion of iron and steeland other industrial combustion processes.In accordance with the terms of the Directive, these statistics are collected byan extensive regional monitoring network and reported annually to the EC. Compliance withstandards for new plants is harder to ascertain because the implementation process involvesthe granting of operating licences by HMIP Inspectors. Since many of these licences areTarget 1990 1991 1992Large combustion plantsa 3106 3175 2747 2674Source: Department of the Environment, 1 994a: 13a Large combustion plants include power stations, refineries and proportion of iron andand other industrial combustion processes.60currently under judicial appeal (ENDS Report 213, October 1992, p.18), it may be too earlyto determine the degree of compliance with these standards. The EC is expected to publisha report on the implementation of this Directive later this year.The preceding chapter has served to establish the provisions of the ECDirectives and the extent to which the UK has been successful in meeting them. The processof implementation has been described, including the problems encountered at both theformulation and implementation stages. It is clear that although each Directive has beenimplemented through very different methods, the UK has been successful in meeting thestandards established at the macro— Community level.The following chapter seeks to explain the implementation of each Directiveaccording to the attributes of the Mazmanian and Sabatier framework. It is hoped thatthrough such an analysis, the roles played by legislation, science and technology, stateinstitutions, target groups and external factors will be determined to the extent with whichthey comply with the six conditions laid down in the Mazmanian and Sabatier framework.61Chapter FourApplying the FrameworkAs noted in Chapter One, Mazmanian and Sabatier outline six conditions thatshould be met if implementation is to be successful. While the authors look at theimplementation process as a series of related conditions, I prefer to examine implementationfrom the five variables included in their framework: legislation, science and technology, stateinstitutions, interest groups and external factors. By examining the implementation processin this manner, I believe that comparative patterns are more clearly elucidated. Through theuse of these variables, it is hoped that a clearer understanding will be reached as to the extentto which each of the Directives was able to meet the Mazmanian and Sabatier conditions ofsuccessful implementation.4.1 LegislationThe Directive, as a legislative tool, specifies standards that must be attained.It is left to the national authorities to determine the means by which these standards are metwithin their respective domestic jurisdictions. As such, the Directives lay down clear goalsbut do not structure the implementation process at meta—level. In the case of the vehicleemissions Directive (91/441), specific emission limits are set for carbon monoxide,hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides and particulates, and a time limit imposed for the attainmentof these limits. These are to be met by the manufacturer of the vehicle and can only be donein a consistent manner through the application of a three—way catalytic converter to thevehicle engine (see Section 4.2). While the application of such technology is not mandatedby the Directive, current technological knowledge leaves manufacturers with few alternative62options. At the macro—level then, policy objectives are clearly defined. These same goals areincorporated into UK practice at the meta—level, through the United Kingdom StatutoryInstruments on Vehicle Emissions 1993 (SI No.2199), enacted under the Road Traffic Act1972. The practice of licensing pre—production vehicles prior to manufacture is a longstanding one (DoE, 1978:11).Directive 92/5 5 relates to the inspection and maintenance of vehicles in aneffort to regulate tail—pipe emissions beyond manufacturing specifications. This Directive hasbeen implemented, at the meta—level, under the terms of The Road Traffic Act 1988. ThisAct requires annual roadworthiness testing of all vehicles by necessitating a Ministry ofTransport Certificate for the purposes of insurance and road tax. EC emission standards areincorporated into the testing standards. These standards are circulated, through theDepartment of Transport’s Tester’s Manual, to all licensed inspectors. Vehicles failing tomeet emission standards are not issued with a certificate, and operation of vehicles withouttest certificates is an offence under the 1988 Act.The Directive concerning emissions from large combustion plants (8 8/609)also sets statutory limits for SO2 and NO pollutants. National emission targets are set forexisting plants, while new plants are subject to specific limits according to their thermal inputand type of fuel employed. However, the Directive includes provisions for derogations fromthese statutory limits in cases where there is “a substantial and unexpected change in energydemand” [Article 3(5)], or where new plants are using indigenous high—sulphur solid fuel[Article 5(2)]. Furthermore, Article 8 makes specific reference to exemptions for theelectricity supply industry in cases where compliance with the terms of the Directive willjeopardise the nation’s electricity supply.63The stringency of emission limits are contingent on the derogations permittedin the Directive. The UK, in publishing its program of implementation, has taken fulladvantage of these clerogations with regard to the use of indigenous high—sulphur coal in itspower plants. To this end, the Directive has been implemented under the terms of integratedpollution control in the Environmental Protection Act 1990, The United Kingdom’sProgramme and National Plan, and Inspectors’ Guidance Notes circulated by the Departmentof the Environment.The National Plan sets emission quotas for SO2 and NO according toindustrial sectors, with the electricity supply industry being permitted more lenient reductionsthan other industrial sectors (Appendix III; Appendix IV). Unlike the provisions for newplants, no limits have been set for existing plants according to their rated thermal input.Rather, industrial sector—specific quotas have been established in order to meet the nationalemissions reductions articulated in the Directive. Specific limits are set for new plants in theGuidance Notes to Inspectors, according to their rated thermal input. Here too, the UK hastaken advantage of derogations permitted for plants using high—sulphur coal.The 1990 Environmental Protection Act empowers HMIP Inspectors toregulate SO2 and NO emissions for existing plants through the provisions of integratedpollution control (IPC). IPC relies on the concepts of ‘best practicable environmental option(BPEO)’ and ‘best available technique not entailing excessive cost (BATNEEC)’. BPEO andBATNEEC are not clearly defined as uniform standards and appear to allow considerableadministrative discretion in the establishment of emission limits for the granting of licencesfor new and existing plants. It would seem that the goals specified for existing plants in theDirective are vague insofar as they suggest reduction targets on a national basis, rather thanfor individual plants. For new plants, specific limits according to plant capacity have been64specified by the Directive, but have been circumvented by the UK through derogationsallowed for cases where there is an indigenous source of high—sulphur fuel. These factorshave allowed individual inspectors, through the application of integrated pollution control,considerable discretion in regulating individual large combustion plants.4.2 Science and TechnologyMazmanian and Sabatier argue that legislative measures taken to enact policyobjectives must incorporate sound causal theory, and the statutory mandate should identifythe causal linkages of the problem being addressed. In other words, legislation should bebased on scientific evidence and incorporate available technology in prescribing behaviouralchange. Both issues of vehicle emissions abatement and LCP emissions control have beenfraught with disputes over scientific evidence and technological knowledge played out, forthe most part, in the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the Directives.In terms of vehicle exhaust emissions, there is little dispute as to the publichealth risks associated with continued high levels of exhaust pollutants in the atmosphere(Rose, 1990:179—180). However, the technology required to abate such emissions wasstrongly disputed amongst Member States. The German delegation in particular, proposedstatutory emission levels that would require the fitting of three—way catalytic convertertechnology to vehicle engines. German manufacturers had already been applying suchtechnology to vehicles marked for export to the United States, where stringent emissionlimits were in force, and thus would benefit from the adoption of such standards within theEU (Arp, 1993: 154). The UK on the other hand, had invested considerable efforts in thedevelopment of the lean—bum engine. This technology would enable emission limits and fuel65efficiency to be addressed simultaneously.’6The negotiating position of the UK was heavily influenced by the Britishautomobile industry’s desire to develop lean—burn technology and thus, at Councildiscussions, the UK delegation pushed for lower emission limits (Boehmer—Christiansen andSkea, 1991:206). The Luxembourg Compromise of 1985 was a concession to Britishdemands. In time however, lean—burn engine technology proved difficult to developsuccessfully, and British manufacturers resigned themselves to accepting three—way catalyticconverter technology. Hence, agreement was finally reached for uniform standards to beapplicable to all passenger vehicles, giving rise to Directive 91/441. The acquiescence ofBritish industry to three—way catalytic converter technology has meant that the Directive hasfaced little problem— in terms of science and technology— in being implemented at themeta—level.Negotiations over acid rain damage, and the need for SO2 emission abatementfrom industrial plants, was similarly disputed at the EC. Swedish studies, during the 1 960s,on the deleterious effects of acid rain attributed much of the cause to imported SO2 emissionsfrom the UK (Waterton, 1993:3). British scientists pointed out that there was no directevidence to prove the Scandinavians’ claim. There were disputes over the proportion ofemitted SO2 that returned to the earth’s surface as acid rain, with UK researchers assertingthat limiting emissions would not necessarily lead to diminished acid rain. Furthermore, theBritish suggested that sulphur deposits locked up in various chemical forms in the soil could16 Dunne tested different cars, over varying road conditions, for tailpipe emissions and fuelefficiency. The results showed that fuel efficiency declined with the application of three—waycatalytic converters, but dramatic reductions in HC, NOx and CO were achieved relative to non—catalytic converter vehicles. The lean—bum engine prototype vehicle was the most fuel efficient,but attained lower emission reductions than the three—way catalytic converters (Dunne,1990:209).66be more liable for the ‘acid rain’ damage being observed (Boehmer—Christiansen and Skea,1991:42).In addition to the controversy surrounding the scientific evidence of theharmful effects of SO2 and NO emissions, there were difficulties in determining theappropriate technology for emission abatement. Fuel scrubbing physically separates thesulphur from fuel sources with high sulphur content. This technology can only be applied tosolid fuels and is relatively expensive (Cooke and Pragnell, 1990:227). Alternatively, sulphurcan be removed during the combustion process, but requires specific combustion processesand operating conditions to work effectively (Cooke and Pragnell, 1990:228). By far themost common method for removing sulphur dioxide from industrial emissions is through fluegas desuiphurisation (FGD). This technology is applicable to a wide variety of processes andcan achieve up to 90 per cent removal rates (Cooke and Pragnell, 1990:231). Removal ofnitrogen oxides is an equally complex process (Cooke and Pragnell, 1990:234—36).Unlike the vehicle emissions regulations, there is no general consensus on thebest way to attain the Directive’s standards. Thus meta—level implementation is made morecomplex. The application of BPEO and BATNEEC to SO2 and NO emission abatementvaries widely in technology and cost since much depends on the size of the plant and theparticular dynamics of the industrial process itself. The UK government’s original 502emission reduction plans, published in September 1989, were to retrofit the largest plants,used for national electricity generation, with FGD equipment. An estimated 12 000 megawatts of generating capacity was to be targeted, at a cost of £2 billion, in order to meet theterms of the Directive. However, in April 1990 and with the impending privatisation of theelectricity supply industry, the government announced drastic reductions in thedesuiphurisation program, with only 8 000 watts targeted at a cost of £1.2 billion (Friends67of the Earth, 1990:5). National SO2 reduction targets were to be met, instead, byredistributing abatement to other industrial sectors. Thus, the electricity generators were onlyrequired to achieve 9 per cent reductions in SO2 by 1993, while refineries were subject toreductions of 63 per cent and other industries to 56 per cent (Appendix III). Similar leniencyis demonstrated in specified reductions for NO emissions (Appendix IV).Both National Power and PowerGen have found it more profitable to importlow sulphur coal than to undertake the costly process of retrofitting FGD (Haigh, Manual ofEnvironmental Policy Release 4, p.6.10—6; Weale, 1992:70). The electricity generatorsargued that retrofitting 8 MW of generating capacity with FGD would only be commerciallyviable if the price of indigenous coal was low enough (Waterton, 1993:31). Greenpeace’ sanalysis of the situation concluded that retrofitting only 8 MW would render the UK unableto comply with EC targets (cited in Waterton, 1993:32). The importation of low sulphur coal,on the other hand, regardless of expanded retrofitting programs, would ensure that targetswere met.It is worth noting that Directive 8 8/609, insofar as it applies to existingindustrial processes, is inherently more difficult to implement than the standards for newplants or for new cars (Directive 91/441). Technological applications to new plants areabsorbed into start—up costs that will determine the feasibility of a new operator entering themarket. Plants that do not meet new environmental standards will be unable to enter themarket. Similarly, uniform standards applied to new cars will see the costs of technologicalapplication passed on in the retail price of the vehicle. In cases where technologicalapplications are applied to existing processes or products, the costs incurred can jeopardisethe economic viability of the operator or producer. In such cases, resistance is likely to bemore pronounced and implementation more difficult. Nonetheless, the UK has successfully68met the terms of the Directive as it applies to existing plants, through the establishment ofnational emission limits.4.3 State InstitutionsThis section limits itself to an examination of those institutions having directjurisdiction over the implementation of the Directives. In particular, the discussion will focuson the Ministry or Department with overall jurisdiction at the meta—level, the localimplementing agency at the micro—level, and the particular characteristics of micro—levelinstitutions, such as personnel and standard operating procedures, that influence thesuccessful application of the EC Directive.The Vehicle Emissions Directive, enacted in the UK under the Road TrafficAct 1972, falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Transport (DTp). The DTp wasbriefly incorporated under the Department of the Environment in 1970, but was returned tofull autonomy in 1974. The DTp has traditionally had regulatory powers over the automobileindustry and monitoring exhaust emissions, through a close cooperative relationship with theautomobile manufacturing industry.Until 1988, much of the British automobile manufacturing industry wasgovernment—owned. Indeed, until 1988, the DTp had strongly opposed EC proposals onvehicle emission standards since these would have threatened the industry’s attempts todevelop lean—burn engine technology (Boehmer—Christiansen and Skea, 1991:110). DTp’ sposition was also influenced by its desire to protect the government—owned, and alreadytroubled, British Leyland from having to absorb the increased costs of utilising catalyticconverter technology and thereby diminish its international competitiveness (Boehmer—Christiansen and Skea, 1991:126).69Annual roadworthiness tests are an established practice in British life andconformity to EC standards is implemented through these tests, carried out by accredited andauthorised vehicle examiners. The Directives involve only a small change in the nature ofthe annual tests, and the application of new, stricter standards. Implementation of theDirective standards in the UK does not require the establishment of new standard operatingprocedures, but rather a minor adjustment to existing ones. As such, the Directive has beenrelatively smoothly implemented at the meta— and micro—levels.The implementation of the LCP Directive, on the other hand, illustrates a verydifferent story. Responsibility for the implementation of the Directive fell to the Departmentof the Environment (DoE), established in 1970 and a relative newcomer to Britishadministration. The DoE’s responsibilities are varied and diverse, including such areas ofpublic policy such as “planning, local government, housing, inner—city issues, sports andrecreation, royal parks and ancient monuments” (McCormick, 199 1:13). Much of the DoE’sactivities in recent years have been concerned with the contentious issue of local governmentfinance reforms through the implementation of the Poll Tax (Weale, 1992:15). Environmentalprotection thus, does not rank high in the list of Department priorities, taking up only 10 percent of the Department’s staffing allocation (McCormick, 1993:270).Prior to 1987, environmental protection functions were scattered through avariety of government departments and inspectorates (Table 10). Jurisdictionalresponsibilities were unclear, and often overlapping, between these disparate organisations.The integration of these pollution control agencies had first been suggested by the RoyalCommission on Environmental Protection in its 1976 Report. The Report noted that theplethora of agencies with control over some aspect of environmental protection had led to,in Lindblom’s words, a “muddling through” approach to domestic regulations. The70Table 10 UK Pollution Control Arrangements Prior to the Formation of HMIPType of pollution Legislation Level of primary Enforcement& mode of responsibility for agencyregulation pollution controlAir pollution Alkali Act, Health Central government Industrial air(registered works) & Safety at Work pollution controlledmust use Best etc. Act byPracticable Means DoE(BPM)Air and noise Control of Pollution District authorities Environmentalpollution Act Part III, Clean health departments(unscheduled Air Acts, Nuisance of local authoritiesworks) Provisions of Publicdiscretionary Health Actjudgement backedby BPM guidelines,and response to ECDirect’sWater Pollution Control of Pollution Regional authorities Regional watersome use of BPM, Act Part II authoritybut much discretionMarine Pollution Food and Central government Ministry ofinformal Environment Agriculture,arrangements, Protection Act Fisheries and Foodspecific ECDirectivesWaste Disposal to Control of Pollution County authorities Waste disposalLand Act Part I authoritiesinformalarrangementssubject to generalguidelinesLand Use Planning Town and Country District authorities Local authorityDoE circulars, Planning Acts etc. (County authorities planningcodes of practice for waste and departmentsand court rulings minerals)Source: O’Riordan and Weale, 1989:28271jurisdictional fragmentation had resulted in a situation where “no one authority hadresponsibility for looking at pollution in the round” (O’Riordan and Weale, 1989:283).HMIP was assigned the task of implementing the terms of the 8 8/609Directive through the provisions of integrated pollution control, under the 1990Environmental Protection Act. HMIP ‘ s relative youth is an important factor in the difficultiesit has experienced in implementing the LCP. Before the establishment of HMIP in April1987, air pollution was for the most part, controlled by the Industrial Air PollutionInspectorate under the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). The HSE had considerablepowers in the area of workplace safety, and “was of central concern to the trade unionswhose political support was essential to the maintenance of Labour in power” (0 ‘Riordanand Weale, 1989:279). IAPI’ s practices, following on from those of its predecessor the AlkaliInspectorate, involved discretionary approaches to environmental protection through theprinciple of ‘best practicable means”. This approach.depended much upon confidentiality, professional expertise and the cajolingnegotiative powers of officials for its success. The essence of the principle ofbest practicable means is that inspectors should seek to achieve a reasonablecompromise between the demands of environmental protection on the onehand and economic cost on the other, taking into account the technical meansto achieve control and the character of the surrounding environment(O’Riordan and Weale, 1989:281)Thus, in implementing environmental standards, British inspectorates had traditionally reliedon negotiation around achievable and flexible limits, rather than the implementation ofuniform, and inherently more rigid, ones. Consequently, inspectors avoided recourse toformal litigation and judicial enforcement of environmental standards. Between 1920 and1967, the Alkali Inspectorate brought only three cases before the courts, for violations of airpollution regulations (McCormick, 1991:12). HMIP, in implementing the statutory standardsof EC Directives, faces a far more difficult task and72has adopted a more aggressive arms—length approach in an effort to enforce them. It has alsodemonstrated a greater willingness to prosecute persistent offenders, albeit small operatorsand simple processes.The reasons behind the delay in establishing HMIP are various. Some scholarssuggest that the formation of a centralised inspectorate agency was antithetical to theThatcher administration’s desire to pursue deregulation and decentralisation of government(McCormick, 1991:19). However, it has also been suggested that it was indeed within theConservative Party’s interests to establish a stream—lined agency in place of a range ofagencies with often overlapping jurisdictions, so that public spending could be kept to aminimum and managerial efficiency increased (O’Riordan and Weale, 1989:289). Othersclaim that environmental protection was never high on the agenda of the British government,and that HMIP could not have come about without the surge of public interest inenvironmental protection in the mid—i 980s, and the need to coordinate the increasing numberof regulations issued by the EC (Jordan, 1993:410). Weale suggests that resistance toinstitutional integration reflected vested interests.partly from industry, which had a good working relationship with the Healthand Safety Executive, partly from local authorities who were also anxious notto have good working relationships disrupted, and partly from within the civilservice itself, where awkward questions of pay scales would be raised by thecreation of a new inspectorate (Weale, 1992:104—105).Whatever the exact reasons behind the fifteen year gap in integratingregulatory agencies, the HMIP was created in 1987 from four existing inspectorates: theAlkali Inspectorate, later renamed Her Majesty’s Industrial Air Pollution Inspectorate; theRadiochemical Inspectorate; the Hazardous Waste Inspectorate and the relatively recentlyformed Water Quality Inspectorate (Speakman, 1990:254—255). Water pollution control,73however, was given over to the National River Authority in 1989 in response to EClegislation (see below). From the beginning, HMIP was plagued with limited resources andinadequate staff. When the agency was first established, 66 of the 214 posts were vacant. Ayear later, 32 posts still remained unfilled. In May 1990, Chris Patten, Secretary of State forthe Environment admitted that 44 positions were unfilled at HMIP (Friends of the Earth,1990:136). In its first three years, four leading officials in the department resigned. Suchstaffing problems have been attributed to the low financial resources available to HMIP. Thesalaries offered by the agency are insufficient to attract high calibre personnel, and fall wellbelow those offered in industry, other EC countries and European and internationalinstitutions (Friends of the Earth, 1990: 136; Siedentopf and Hauschild, 1988:62).In addition to the problem of staffmg, was the problem of statutory standing.It was not until the passage of the 1990 Environmental Protection Act, which came into forcein April 1991, that the agency was imbued with any statutory powers to enforce ECenvironmental standards, three years after its birth. Finally, HMIP has had continuingdifficulties with the larger and more powerful National Rivers Authority (NRA), whosejurisdiction covers pollutant emission to water bodies (Weale, 1992:105). The NRA wascreated in 1989 from existing regional water authorities, in response to the EC’s demand foran independent water pollution control agency. A sense of competitiveness exists betweenthe two agencies over jurisdictional issues (Weale, 1992:107). In 1992 the governmentannounced plans to streamline pollution control functions further with the establishment ofan Environment Agency. This agency seeks to amalgamate the functions of HMIP, NRA andlocal government waste regulation departments, but has yet to be set in place (McCormick,1993:273).74The relative youth of HMIP, and the process of its formation, has meant thatthe agency has yet to ‘find its feet’ within the Whitehall machinery. Although HMIP wasenvisaged as a holistic approach to environmental regulation, through the use of integratedpollution control, its organisational arrangement remains “essentially medium—specific”(Weale, 1992:105). As such, many of the standard operating procedures within the respectiveagencies that amalgamated to form HMIP persist. Based on the traditional British style ofregulation, these procedures involve close cooperation with industry, negotiated consent andmutually agreed standards of operation. It has been suggested that some branches of theInspectorate are likely to maintain their ‘cosy’ relationship with regulated industries (Wardand Samways, 1990:227).The difference between the implementing agencies involved in the twoDirectives is enormous. The vehicle emissions regulations involved a simple adjustment tostandard operating procedures. Jurisdictional delineations are clear and adequate powers ofsanction are available for non—compliance through the failure to pass the annualroadworthiness tests. LCP emissions on the other hand, have involved a new agency in theHMIP, and new (some say revolutionary) operating procedures under the terms of integratedpollution control. The process of institutional integration has disturbed well—establishedrelationships between the regulator and the regulated. The implementation of the LCPDirective has, unlike the vehicle emissions directive, involved new personnel with newresponsibilities seeking to attain new standards under radically different legislation, in theabsence of standard operating procedures.754.4 Target GroupsMazmanian and Sabatier, in the discussion of their framework, are ultimatelyconcerned with the willingness and ability of the target group to alter its behaviour, and thedegree to which the policy goals are supported by organised constituency groups. Therelationship between the British government and target groups of environmental regulationhas had an important impact on the direction and character of the environmental policy arenain the UK.Close relations between government departments and industry are an importantelement of the British policy—making process. Regulations will be enacted only when theregulated industry is able to undertake the changes necessary, and more usually, willing todo so. A high degree of compliance is, according to Mazey and Richardson, a characteristicof the British policy style.British groups are by tradition used to a high degree of compliance with lawsin the context of a highly centralised state and will therefore go to greatlengths to ensure that the original decision is acceptable to them... (Mazey andRichardson, 1993:19—20).In terms of target groups, the vehicle emissions Directive sought, principally,to change the output of automobile manufacturers. Associated Directives sought to changethe behaviour of motorists insofar as to make them unable to operate vehicles with highlevels of pollutant emissions. As noted, the major automobile manufacturers were opposedto stringent emission standards and this was reflected in the Department of Transport’s (andindeed the government’s) resistance to such measures in the EC. Even as late as 1989Austin Rover, the only remaining large—scale British car maker, had nointerest in the equipment necessary to redesign its engines for unleaded petroland to fit catalytic converters. Ford UK also opposed the introduction ofcatalytic converter technology and looked instead to the prospect of a new76plant to build lean burn engines in an attempt to revive its flagging fortunes.Both companies had an incentive in avoiding strict standards which couldeasily be met by Japanese companies already pressing for greater importquotas to Europe’s protected car market. (Rose, 1990:173)Britain’s eventual agreement to stringent standards for all passenger cars, in1991, was a result of two factors: the changing relationship between industry andgovernment; and the failure to realise lean—bum engine technology. The automobilemanufacturing industry in Britain is made up of a handful of large companies which, untilthe late 1 980s, were government—owned. As such, they were an important source of jobs,foreign exchange and public revenue. As part of Thatcher’s privatisation policies, theseindustries were denationalized in the late 198 Os. The greater political distance betweenindustry and government, created by privatisation, allowed the government room tomanoeuvre in its position at the EC, and forced industry to comply with new EC—derivedregulations.The change in ownership proceeded hand—in—hand with the acknowledgementon the part of industry, that lean—bum technology was proving more difficult to realise thanhad at first been hoped. However, the ‘time bought’ by prolonging British resistance tostringent standards at the EC had allowed the industry to ‘catch—up’ with technologicaldevelopments on the continent and abroad, making the application of catalytic convertertechnology more feasible. This then, paved the way for the UK’s acceptance of EC standardsand the smooth implementation of the Directive at the meta— and micro—levels. With theindustry conceding to EC standards of manufacture, vehicle owners were able to purchase‘clean’ cars at competitive prices in the domestic market. Since vehicle owners were alreadysubject to annual roadworthiness testing, the new limits on exhaust emissions required little77change in consumer behaviour.The automobile manufacturing industry was by far, the most important targetgroup in the implementation of Directive 91/441. In this respect, it is worth noting thatindustry seeking to benefit from stricter emission standards were not taken into account.Johnson—Matthey, a manufacturer of catalytic converters based in Britain, was forced torelocate and build a new factory in Belgium as a result of the UK’s initial resistance to ECstandards (Rose, 1990:171).The LCP Directive, by contrast, was aimed at a large array of industries usinglarge combustion plants, estimated to be about 2,500 processes in all. The most importantof these was the electricity supply industry which remained largely nationalised until 1991,under the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB). Much like the nationalised carmanufacturers, CEGB was instrumental in delaying agreement on the LCP. CEGB wasBritain’s largest electricity producer, responsible for the production of 80 to 90 per cent ofBritain’s electricity. As a result, it was also the largest emitter of SO2, at 60 per cent of totalBritish emissions. CEGB argued that cutting sulphur emissions would be of no proven benefitto the environment, would cost £2 billion and raise electricity costs by 10 per cent(McCormick, 1991:141). It was only after CEGB agreed, with government financialassistance, to retrofit some of its largest generators with FGD equipment in 1988, that theUK was able to agree to the LCP Directive.Despite the industry’s privatisation in 1991, the two new electricity supplycompanies— National Power and PowerGen — continue to receive preferential treatment interms of the implementation of the LCP Directive (Appendix ifi; Appendix IV). As a resultof HMIP authorizations to these companies in 1993, no power station will be required toinstall emission abatement equipment beyond that which is already planned.78Authorizations issued by HMIP in April 1993 to individual National Powerand PowerGen power stations...set limits for 1993 SO2 and NO emissionswhich were more relaxed than their actual emissions for 1992, and theirallocated reduction targets under the UK national plan. HMIP ‘ s justificationfor this is that generators may wish to operate a particular station sointensively that its specific emission allocation under the national plan isexceeded, while being offset by greater reductions at other of its installations(Haigh, N. Manual of Environmental Policy Release 4, p.6.10—6/7)Smaller industries, operating large combustion plants and represented by theConfederation of British Industry (CB1), have expressed dismay at the implementation of theLCP Directive through integrated pollution control. Although many express enthusiasm foruniform standards of operation, CBI argues that too many elements remain vaguely defined.Complaints have been made about the unevenness of application, with some HMIP inspectorskeeping close to the guidance notes while others apply them more liberally, according to theconstraints of the particular circumstances. The CBI continues to complain about the costsof pollution abatement and the limited capital available to make such investments in thecurrent economic climate (Cridland, 1992:6).The relatively small number of companies affected by the vehicle emissionsdirective has certainly facilitated the successful implementation of EC Directive 91/441. Thecreation of political distance between government and industry through privatisation, and theacceptance by industry of catalytic converter technology, were important in easing theprocess of meta— and micro—level implementation. The total amount of change required ofthe target group, in terms of their limited numbers and actual behaviour (production) is muchlower and more feasible than that required by the implementation of the LCP Directive. Inthe latter case, a large number of processes are subject to procedures that they have neverbefore had to undertake. The 1990 Environmental Protection Act obliges them to apply for79authorizations from HMIP, and to apply the best available techniques of which many areignorant. The application of BATNEEC and BPEO to the industry as a whole, rather thanto individual processes, has further complicated implementation. Furthermore, given thediversity of processes subject to regulation, and the relative novelty of the standards to beused, the uniformity of application is also being called into question.4.5 External FactorsIn discussing external factors, Sabatier and Mazmanian make reference tovariables that, although outside the policy implementation process, impinge on the program’sability to be implemented successfully. To this end, they explore the impact of factors suchas the emergence of conflicting public policies and changes in socioeconomic conditions.Both play a considerable role in the implementation of the two Directives in this study.Competing public policies have had a considerable impact on the progress ofenvironmental protection within the British polity. Consider O’Riordan’s damning indictmentof the Thatcher eraIn general.. .environmental matters have taken a low priority against the greatTory political engines of economy, privatisation, tax cutting, defence spendingand reform of local government and the health and education services. Thisis largely because environmental issues demand investment of public money,a dollop of supervisory bureaucracy, and a scale of accountability andopenness that did not suit Thatcherite political priorities. Only Britain’scommitment to European Community directives and the growing toughnessof the European Commission, backed by the European Court of Justice, forcedthe government to obey the law on air and water pollution... (O’Riordan,1991:180—181)Many of the government’s priorities in other sectors of the economy have served toundermine not only the application of the Directives, but also their actual impacts.80Economic PolicyIn their study, Knoepfel and Weidner showed that SO2 emission reductionswere as much a function of economic and other public policy variables, as it was ofenvironmental policy itself. Citing Knoepfel and Weidner’s study, Weale suggestsBy engineering the economic depression of the early 1 980s, Mrs. Thatcher’sgovernment inadvertently secured an improvement in atmospheric qualitysince there were fewer factory chimneys emitting to the atmosphere and lowerelectricity generation. The flip—side of this interrelationship is thatenvironmental commitments can be undermined by an unregulated upswingin economic activity (Weale 1992:21).The economic boom of the late 1980s had caused an increase in SO2 emissions, underminingthe official projections used during the negotiations over national emission limits at the EC(Weale, 1992:21). Thus, the UK risked a failure to meet national emission targets, notthrough any conscious efforts to neglect the terms of the Directive, but through the indirectimpacts of economic activity.Economic activity also influences the actual impacts of regulating vehicleexhaust emissions. Manufacturing specifications in accordance with Directive 91/441,together with inspection and maintenance programs implemented under Directive 92/55, doesnot take into account increases of pollutant emissions through the absolute increase in thenumber of vehicles on UK roads. In periods of economic prosperity car ownership is greateras the population’s disposable income increases. Since 1987, car sales have grown. In 1988—1989 alone, domestic car sales increased by 15 per cent (Ward et.al., 1990:233). Actualreductions in vehicle exhaust emissions is thus undermined by the absolute increase in roadtraffic.81Transport PolicyThe increase in road traffic is addressed through government road policy,which has addressed projected increases in the number of vehicles on Britain’s roads throughproposals for road building programs. Road traffic is forecast to increase by up to 140 percent by the year 2025 (Hillman, 1992:227). In May 1989, in response to these projectionsand under pressure from the CBI, the Automobile Association, the Royal Automobile Cluband the Road Haulage Association, the government announced an increase in publicexpenditure on road building from £5 billion to £12 billion over the ensuing decade (Wardet. al., 1990:233). Faced with increased overcrowding of roads, particularly in the South East,government transport policy has been aimed at lowering transport costs, enhancing roadsafety, reducing congestion and avoiding wasteful delays and fuel consumption (Hillman,1992:227). Policy objectives do not seem to be motivated by concern for environmental airquality through the expansion of public transit services and the encouragement of cycling andcar—pooling as transport alternatives. Instead, current transport policy objectives serve tocancel out any beneficial effect on the application of catalytic converter technology toautomobile manufacturing (Friends of the Earth, 1990:6).PrivatisationThe privatisation of nationalised industries has been a central feature of theConservative Party’s administration over the last decade and a half. The government claimedthat privatisation would bring with it improvements in environmental quality.• . it suggested that privatisation of the electricity industry would improveenvironmental quality by allowing an increased investment in small—scale, lesspolluting, electricity plants by new entrants to the industry. This claim nowlooks unlikely to be born out, since there have been few entrants... (Ward andSamways, 1992:120)82Indeed, the electricity supply industry continues to be monopolistic insofar as there are onlytwo national power generating companies in England and Wales.The privatisation of the electricity industry drew much criticism from theenergy conservation industry (represented by the Association for the Conservation ofEnergy), environmental pressure groups and the opposition parties. The governmentcontended that privatisation would enable market forces to promote conservation. As realenergy costs rise, conservation becomes economically rational. Furthermore, despite callsfrom its critics, the government refused to write in specific targets on energy conservationand emission control into the Electricity Bill that heralded the privatisation program. Insteada weak clause was incorporated, asserting that environmental questions should be consideredwhen planning new generating capacity (Ward eta!., 1990:230—231).The cost of pollution abatement technology was an important consideration inthe run—up to the privatisation of the electricity supply industry. Strict financial controls wereplaced on the then nationalised industry (CEGB) in order to make the industry moreprofitable prior to flotation. Considerations of the industry’s profitability “became animportant factor in determining the degree of acceptability of major environmental protectionexpenditure” (Boehmer—Christiansen and Skea, 1991:123).This is not to suggest, however, that privatisation has spelled doom for theprogress of environmental protection. Indeed, privatisation has succeeded in placing politicaldistance between the regulator and the regulated. Previously, government was responsible forregulating its own industries, and this ‘cosy’ relationship was not conducive to strictlyenforced environmental quality standards. The private industries of PowerGen and NationalPower are now at arms—length to the government pollution control agencies and thus, it ishoped, more vulnerable to strict regulation. However, as noted previously, both power83companies appear to be receiving preferential treatment at the hands of HMIP.The privatisation of the automobile manufacturing industry has been moresuccessful, in this regard. The political distance between the now private companies and theDepartment of Transport has allowed the government to be more flexible in its negotiatingposition at the EC, and made the industry increasingly subject to the pressures of theinternational market. Both of these factors were important in facilitating the UK’ s acceptanceof the Directives’ standards for vehicle exhaust emissions, and the smooth implementationof the Directive in the domestic sphere.The Role of SovereignsMazmanian and Sabatier identify the role of sovereigns as one of thedeterminants of successful policy implementation. By this, they refer to the degree of supportprovided by key legislators or chief executive members throughout the policy implementationprocess, as well as the strength and political commitment of implementing officials inattaining policy objectives. Within the context of the United Kingdom, the DoE played a keyrole in the implementation of the LCP Directive, while implementation of the vehicleemissions Directive fell within the jurisdiction of the Department of Transport (DTp).The DTp, a long—standing government department, had sole jurisdiction overthe implementation of Directives 91/441 and 92/55. Representing the interests of Britishautomobile manufacturers, the Department prolonged the UK’s opposition to EC vehicleemissions standards until domestic industry had agreed to market catalyst—equipped vehicles.Having secured agreement from industry, the implementation of 91/441, together withDirective 92/55 relating to roadworthiness testing, was relatively smooth. The essential pointhere, is that DTp was permitted autonomy over this aspect of public policy decision making84because (a) the debate was framed as a Community trade issue and (b) implementation of theDirective was not likely to have an impact on other sectors of British public policy.This situation was in stark contrast to the departments involved in theimplementation of the LCP Directive. The DoE has jurisdiction over protection of theenvironment as one of its statutory functions. The Secretary of State for the Environment canpotentially have considerable influence over government policy, insofar as it represents aCabinet position. As such, the Secretary of State is involved in virtually all aspects ofgovernmental decision—making. The Secretary of State plays an important role in thenegotiations and implementation of environmental Directives, in conjunction with theEuropean Secretariat to the Cabinet which is responsible for coordinating EC policy in theUK.While the DoE retained overall jurisdiction over the implementation of theDirective, considerable impacts were likely to be felt within the powerful Department ofEnergy (DEn) which had jurisdiction over the energy industries (oil, natural gas and coal)in Britain. In addition, concerns over the profitability of the soon—to—be privatised electricitygenerator, the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB), made the LCP Directive aconcern of both the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Prime Minister herself(Waterton, 1993:3—4). The Treasury was also likely to be opposed to the Directive since thecost of retrofitting CEGB generators with FGD would have, at that time, been borne by thegovernment and increased the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement. As such, compliancewith the LCP Directive would have gone against the Conservative government’s commitmentto reducing national debt (Waterton, 1993:22). Given the overriding concerns of industryprofitability, government spending, national energy policy and the commitment of the PrimeMinister to utility privatisation, the DoE had little influence at the Cabinet level. Chris85Patten, Secretary of State for the Environment during the introduction of the Directive was,for example, described as lackingthe forcefulness to make anything other than a superficial impression upon hisCabinet colleagues. His crusading efforts were unable to overcome theempires of an inherently competitive departmental system of government, northe ideological dragons in the Cabinet (Robinson, 1992:229).Some scholars have suggested that far from promoting stricter environmentalregulation, the DoE has served to reflect government disinterest since “few Secretaries ofState for the Environment have shown any particular interest in the environment”(McCormick, 1993:270). Past Secretaries, including Nicholas Ridley, Michael Heseltine,Patrick Jenkin and Kenneth Baker, possessed political strengths not founded in theenvironmental sphere and “became preoccupied with other aspects of DoE’s work (Robinson,1992:137). Michael Heseltine, for example, devoted most of his energies, as Secretary ofState for the Environment, to the cleaning up of Britain’s inner—cities.Outside the realm of government departments, further conflict over the LCPDirective was experienced in the Select Committee procedures. After the introduction of thedraft proposal at the EC in 1983, two inquiries were held on the subject in each of theHouses of Parliament. The House of Lords Committee on the European Communitiescriticised the EC for failing to provide concrete scientific evidence for its proposed controls,arguing that implementation of the Directive would result in distortions of competitivetrading between Member States.17 The House of Commons Environment Committee metwith a variety of groups and interests over the issue of acid rain, including Greenpeace,17 It is worth noting that this Committee also suggested that the government’s commitmentto lean—burn energy technology, in relation to EC legislation on regulating vehicle exhaustemissions, would be untenable in the long—run (Waterton, 1993:2 1).86Friends of the Earth, the World Wildlife Fund, the National Society for Clean Air, BritishCoal and CEGB. Their conclusions, in contrast to those of the House of Lords Committee,suggested that the government’s stance on the acid rain debate was deeply flawed andrecommended that current government policy position be reversed (Waterton, 1993:22).Despite these conclusions, made by the House of Commons Environment Committee in its1984 Report on Acid Rain, governmental agreement to the LCP Directive was not secureduntil 1988.The role of sovereigns, in supporting the policy objectives of the Directiveshas been limited. Nonetheless, Directive 91/441 relating to vehicle exhaust emissions appearsto have enjoyed more support than the LCP Directive. In part, this can be attributed to themanner in which the exhaust emissions issue was framed. The Directive was the last in along line of EC measures to curb vehicle exhaust emissions and establish uniformCommunity standards, and was thus neither radical nor unexpected. In addition, once theautomobile manufacturers agreed to market catalyst—equipped vehicles, the way was clearedfor government acceptance of the more stringent and uniform standards proposed by the EC.Finally, support was forthcoming from the DTp because the implementation of the Directivedid not impinge on other departmental jurisdictions.The LCP Directive experienced greater difficulty in garnering support fromsovereigns. The implementation of the Directive was, from the beginning, likely to imposegreater costs on more operators than the vehicle exhaust emissions Directive. It was thuslikely to cause greater political concern for elected representatives. The implementation ofthe Directive was also likely to have a greater impact on several powerful governmentdepartments, including the Department of Energy and the Treasury. These departments, inparticular, were pursuing their own political agendas and the implementation of the Directive87was in direct conflict with the direction of policy they pursued. Add to this the weakness ofthe DoE and the Ministers who headed that Department, and it is not difficult to see why theLCP Directive suffered considerable problems in gaining support from key members ofgovernment.88Chapter FiveAssessing the SuccessIn their framework, Mazmanian and Sabatier proposed six conditions for thesuccessful implementation of public policy. These conditions incorporate elements of the‘top—down’ approach in their concern for a structured process, with clear delineations ofjurisdiction; and considerations of the ‘bottom—up’ approach in addressing issues such as theability and willingness of target groups to alter behaviour, and the commitment ofimplementing officials to the policy objectives. This study is concerned with exploring thepredictive ability of the Mazmanian and Sabatier framework in a variety of national contextsand policy arenas. In assessing the applicability of the framework to the implementation ofEC environmental Directives, and to the British context, it would seem prudent to addresseach of the six conditions in turn.1. The enabling legislation or other legal directive mandates policy objectives that are clearand consistent, or at least provide substantive criteria for resolving goal conflicts.Directive 91/441 relating to the regulation of vehicle exhaust emissions cancertainly be characterised as incorporating clear and consistent policy objectives, through thearticulation of specific and uniform emission limits for passenger vehicles. Building onprevious Directives, and in conjunction with other Directives on the monitoring andenforcement of exhaust emission regulations, the Directive represents the culmination of along process of incrementally tighter controls. As such, the implementation of the Directivein the United Kingdom was consistent with previous policy practice in this area. Goalconflicts were not a feature of this Directive although the goals of the Directive, in terms of89environmental air quality standards, appear to be in conflict with the aspirations ofgovernment transport policy objectives. The environmental benefits of limiting emissionsfrom individual vehicles seem to be undermined by the government’s desire to expand roadbuilding programs and increase the use of private vehicles as a mode of transport.Directive 8 8/609 relating to emissions from large combustion plants did notenjoy the same degree of clarity or consistency. Differential limits were set for each MemberState, though this would not appear to contravene the first Mazmanian and Sabatier conditioninsofar as these limits were clear. Furthermore, while specific national emission limits wereset for existing plants, and strict standards articulated for new plants, derogations from thesestandards were permitted for a variety of reasons. The Directive was unable to set clear,consistent and uniform standards for the Community as a whole because of the difficultiesinherent in their application to a wide range of economic capacities and levels of industrialgrowth. In addition, the utilisation of high—sulphur solid fuel in Member States such as theUK further hindered the ability to establish uniform limits.The implementation of the LCP Directive under the terms of BPEO andBATNEEC in the 1990 Environmental Protection Act does not establish criteria fordetermining standards. Conforming to “best”, whether that be an environmental option,available technology or economic viability, is at least, a subjective criterion. Standards aredetermined as much by concerns about limiting pollutant emissions, as they are aboutensuring the economic capacity of the industrial plant. Thus, for example, requiring a plantto fit pollution abatement technology to ensure emission reductions, is not considered the‘best available technique not entailing excessive cost” if such action were to jeopardise theeconomic viability of the plant. The standard of “best” must be taken into equal considerationwith the standard of “practicable”, where practicable is interpreted as economic viability.90The net result of BPEO and BATNEEC is that standards continue to be determined byindividual HMIP inspectors, for individual cases, and are far from clear or consistent.Furthermore, legislation in the United Kingdom does not establish substantivecriteria for resolving goal conflicts, even though these are implicitly acknowledged in thebody of the legislation. BPEO and BATNEEC both imply that consideration should be paidto costs of pollution abatement, the overall environmental impact on all media and thetechniques available. Whether this suggests techniques available to the individual plant or theindustry as a whole remains unclear.2. The enabling legislation incorporates a sound theory identifying the principal factors andcausal linkages affecting policy objectives, and gives implementing officials sufficientjurisdiction over target groups and other points of leverage to attain, at least potentially, thedesired goals.Directive 91/441 identifies the principal pollutants in vehicle exhaust emissions(HCs, NON, VOCs and particulates) and sets specific limits for each of them. Provisions aremade in other associated Directives on the methods that should be employed in measuringand monitoring such emissions. The motivation for the setting of uniform limits came,primarily, from the need to establish equal trading opportunities amongst Member States.Thus, the environmental benefits of limiting automobile emissions did not enter the debateuntil the process of regulating vehicle exhausts had become an established Communitypractice. In contrast to the LCP Directive, then, the link between regulating vehicle exhaustand protecting the environment was not a feature of the debate.It is generally accepted, within the automobile manufacturing industry, that themost effective technology available to meet these objectives is the three—way catalyticconverter. Although other technologies have been researched and suggested, the catalytic91..converter is by far the most practical and readily available option. On this, there is nowconsensus throughout the industry. The Department of Transport has had jurisdiction overcar—makers for many years, and relationships between government and industry are well—established through standard operating procedures. These have served to facilitate thesuccessful implementation of the Directive.The same cannot be said of Directive 8 8/609. It was not until the late 1 980sthat the UK finally accepted the scientific link between SO2 emissions and acid raindepositions, acknowledging the need for incremental reductions. For a long period of timethe degree to which LCP emissions affected environmental air quality characterised thedebate within the scientific community, and prolonged the negotiations over the terms of theDirective. While specific pollutants have been ear—marked for regulation (SO2 and NOX) thetechnology available for the abatement of such pollutants is varied. Although FGD equipmentis by far the most common technology employed to limit SO2 emissions from largecombustion plants, other technologies may prove more cost—effective or appropriate fordifferent combustion processes and fuel inputs.Implementing officials within HMIP are faced with applying newadministrative procedures than those to which industry has been traditionally accustomed,through the granting of operating licences. As such, relationships between regulator andregulated have become strained. Nonetheless, HMIP inspectors do, at least potentially, haveconsiderable power of sanction over industries that fail to meet emission limits. However,given the entrenchment of the electricity supply industry in the domestic polity, and itscolossal political power and strength as the primary source of national electricity supplyindicated by data provided in Appendices III and IV, sanctioning powers of HIV11P do notappear to seriously deter industry from its desired course of action.923. The enabling legislation structures the implementation process so as to maximise theprobability that implementing officials and target groups will perform as desired. Thisinvolves assignment to sympathetic agencies with adequate hierarchical integration,supportive decision rules, sufficient financial resources and adequate access to supporters.The relatively few car manufacturers in Britain facilitated the implementationof regulations relating to their behaviour. Monitoring of the correct application of Directive91/441 is made easier when there are a small number of target groups to oversee.Furthermore, relations between government, under the Department of Transport, and industryhave historically been close. Thus, the probability that desired performance will be realisedis high. Directive 92/55, relating to the inspection and maintenance of vehicles throughroadworthiness testing, applies to a wider target group. According to Mazmanian andSabatier, this Directive would therefore be more difficult to implement. However, the amountof behavioural change required of vehicle users was minimal, since the administration ofroadworthiness testing had long been a feature of British motoring. The implementationprocess, insofar as it remained consistent with existing practices, thus maximised theprobability that officials and target groups would perform as desired.Directive 8 8/609, as applied through the 1990 Environmental Protection Act,incorporates a well—structured implementation process. Individual plants must apply forauthorizations from HMIP, and HMIP makes these authorization conditional on the utilisationof pollution abatement equipment, provisions for monitoring emissions and a commitmentto emission limits. However the process has, in practice, not operated smoothly. The agencylacks fmancial resources, hierarchical integration and qualified personnel to ensure that policyobjectives are met consistently. The onus has been on industry to apply for authorizations,and many have failed to meet the application deadline.934. The leaders of the implementing agency possess substantial managerial and political skilland are committed to statutory goals.There is little information on the particular characteristics of the Departmentof Transport, or the vehicle examiners empowered to carry out vehicle emission testing.However, few problems have been documented in the application of the Directive in the UK,in terms of the managerial and political skill of the Department. Their commitment tostatutory goals was contingent on the enthusiasm exhibited by industry for stringent exhaustemission standards. Once this was achieved, the commitment of implementing officials wassecured.The problems of HMIP as an implementing agency have been welldocumented. From the beginning, the agency has had problems in retaining committedpersonnel with sufficient political and managerial skill, to ensure that the terms of theDirective under the 1990 Environmental Protection Act are met.5. The program is actively supported by organised constituency groups and by a few keylegislators (or a chief executive) throughout the implementation process, with the courtsbeing neutral or supportive.Although it is difficult to ascertain whether enthusiastic supporters of theseDirectives exist within the parliamentary system, some general comments can be made aboutthe fifth condition suggested by Mazmanian and Sabatier. The position of Secretary of Statefor the Environment carries with it considerable potential influence and power. However,since 1979, only one of the six Secretaries has demonstrated any genuine interest inenvironmental protection. Chris Patten, considered sympathetic to the environmental causewas, however, unable to use his position as Secretary of State for the Environment to fulleffect. Some influential political personalities have had influence on the environmental debatein parliament and the political parties, but this has been the exception rather than the rule.94MPs consistently rated issues such as defence, foreign affairs and trade and industry aboveconcerns for the environment (Robinson, 1992:127).The absence of enthusiastic environmentalists within the ranks at the DoE isnot surprising. The British political system traditionally prefers to assign political pragmatistsrather than technical experts or specialists to government posts. Furthermore, theinterdepartmental competitiveness of the British Cabinet system and the weak standing of theDoE, has hindered the ability of both the Department and the Secretary of State to achieveenvironmental goals that conflict with other government policy objectives. Given thistradition, and the marked absence of ‘green’ Secretaries of State, it is fair to assume that noconsistent support has been provided for the goals of the LCP Directive, by the DoE.Parliamentary Select Committees have played an important role in terms ofsupport for policy objectives. The House of Lords Committee, during the early stages of thedebate, was sceptical of the need to reduce LCP emissions and supported the government’sposition to protect the electricity supply industry prior to flotation. In stark contrast, theHouse of Commons Committee was severely critical of the government’s policy position.Hearing evidence from a variety of interest groups on both sides of the debate, their 1984report concluded that the government should reverse its position and act to reduce LCPemissions of SO2 and NO.At the Department of Transport, a different tale is told. The emission limitsset by the EC were derived from a concern about the European car market as a whole ratherthan about the environmental impact of automobiles. The Directive was based on assumptionsabout trade and the economy, and was thus relatively well received within the Departmentand leaders in industry. Informal consultations with motoring and consumer organisationsconducted by the Department of Transport, on the implementation of roadworthiness testing,95indicated widespread support for the policy objectives articulated in Directive 92/55.The English courts have not featured highly in the implementation of theseDirectives, with respect to individual claims. Indeed, the courts in the UK rarely play a rolein the enforcement of environmental legislation. Nonetheless, this trend would appear to bechanging, at least in relation to the LCP Directive. I{MIP appears to be demonstrating morewillingness to involve the judiciary in the enforcement of environmental standards. However,the provisions for judicial review in the 1990 Environmental Protection Act seem to haveworked to the benefit of industry, and against the interests of environmentalists. Industry hasexercised its right to judicial reviews of HMIP decisions in the granting of operatinglicences, as much to delay the implementation of the LCP Directive as to seek clarificationof environmental standards.6. The relative priority of statutory objectives is not undermined over time by the emergenceof conflicting public policies or by changes in relevant socioeconomic conditions thatundermine the statute’s causal theory or political support.Both Directives in this study have suffered from the government’s pursuit ofother policy objectives. In terms of the vehicle emissions Directive, the actual impact ofcatalytic converter technology on the abatement of exhaust emissions is undermined by theprojected traffic increases and government proposals to expand Britain’s road network toaccommodate more vehicles. An economic upswing will also serve to increase car sales, aswas the case in the late 1 980s. Privatisation, however, appears to have had a positive impacton the implementation of Directive 91/441.Economic policy also has an important influence on emissions from industrialprocesses. In periods of economic recession, energy consumption is lower, and pollutantemissions from power generating plants are diminished. During times of rapid economic96growth however, the reverse will be true. While economic policy has an indirect effect onthe abatement of SO2 and NO emission from large combustion plants, privatisation has hada more substantial impact on the implementation of Directive 88/609.In an effort to maintain a profitable nationalised industry prior to flotation, thegovernment was unwilling to undertake steps to abate pollutant emissions since they wouldinvolve considerable capital investment. The strategic importance of the electricity supplyindustry has also enabled it to receive favoured treatment by HMIP, undermining theobjectives of the Directive and calling into question the uniformity of implementation.97ConclusionThis study has explored the implementation of two EC Directives relating tothe regulation of air pollution within the United Kingdom. Berman’s discussion of levels ofimplementation has provided a useful tool in the analysis of the application of EC Directivesto its Member States. Incorporating a third, meta—level, of analysis has enabled theimplementation process to be structured in accordance with the stages of implementation thatEuropean legislation entails.Both vehicle emission regulations and LCP emissions reductions weresuccessfully implemented by the UK in terms of the policy objectives laid down in therespective Directives. This would appear to suggest that, according to the Mazmanian andSabatier framework, all six conditions were met by the UK. This has clearly not been thecase. Such findings call into question the applicability of the framework to different nationalcontexts and a variety of policy arenas, and also highlight some of the weaknesses of theframework as a predictive tool.Certainly, with reference to the Directives on vehicle exhaust emissions, manyof the conditions were amply met during the implementation of its provisions within the UK.The enabling legislation mandated policy objectives that were clear and consistent with pastpolicy objectives regulating automobile exhaust. Although debate continued on theappropriate technology required to achieve such policy objectives for some time, it wouldbe fair to say that there is now unanimity on the use of three—way catalytic convertertechnology as the most reliable and appropriate method of meeting emission standards. TheDepartment of Transport has long—established and cooperative relations with the relativelyfew British automobile manufacturers, ensuring sufficient jurisdiction over target groups.This relationship has maximised the probability that the target groups will perform as98desired. Relevant interest groups were generally supportive of the policy objectives. Althoughtransport policy appears to undermine the enviromnental benefits of the Directives goals, ifone is to assume that trade concerns were more important than those of environmentalprotection, then few other public policies conflicted with the aims of the Directive.The LCP Directive, on the other hand, meets few of the conditions forsuccessful implementation as suggested by Mazmanian and Sabatier. The enabling legislation,the 1990 Environmental Protection Act, incorporated standards that were far from clear andconsistent. Relying on an interpretation of ‘best’, through the use of BPEO and BATNEEC,these standards leave individual inspectors with considerable discretion in the setting ofemission limits for individual plants. Although inspectors are issued with guidelines from theDepartment of the Environment, these are far from binding in their application. The leveragethat HMIP inspectors have over target groups, which are numerous and varied in size, isdebatable. Certainly the strategic importance of the two largest electricity generators appearsto dwarf the sanctioning powers of HMIP. HMIP, and indeed the Department ofEnvironment, have been plagued with institutional reorganisation, limited financial resourcesand inadequately trained or committed staff. To exacerbate the implementation of the LCPDirective further, HMIP inspectors have been subject to new decision rules andadministrative procedures through the application of integrated pollution control. Support forthe Directive’s goals from industry or political sovereigns is limited. Finally, theimplementation of the Directive has been considerably undermined by the government’s otherpublic policy commitments — energy policy, economic policy and privatisation in particular.Applying the Mazmanian and Sabatier model to the implementation of the LCPDirective in the UK would have led to predictions that the policy goals would not meet withsuccess. However, reality has proved different to theoretical prediction. I would suggest,99therefore, that there are weaknesses within the framework itself. First, the frameworkattempts to account for many variables but does not indicate the weighting of importancebetween them. By saying that ‘everything matters’, Mazmanian and Sabatier’ s frameworkproves to be of limited use when some conditions are met, and not others. Theimplementation of the vehicle emissions Directive in the UK met most of the conditions laiddown in the framework, but the LCP Directive met very few. Yet both were successfullyimplemented.The success of the LCP Directive can be attributed, in part, to the Britishpolicy style. Systems of environmental regulation have traditionally been built on negotiationsbetween regulator and regulated and considerable administrative discretion. These attributesof the British style have played an important role in the implementation of the LCP Directiveby involving individual HMIP inspectors, individual operators and standards of ‘best’ in thegranting of operating licences. The Mazmanian and Sabatier framework appears to indicatethat such a style of policy implementation would not lead to the achievement of policy goals.They suggest, instead, that statutory standards which are legally enforceable and activelysupported by implementing officials, target groups and relevant constituency groups willalone result in successful implementation. I argue that such a framework is well suited to theAmerican system of governance, upon which the model is based. However, it is ill—matchedto the British style of policy implementation and thus is not a useful or reliable predictivetool.The implementation of European Community Environmental Directives in theUnited Kingdom has provided an interesting case to which the Mazmanian and Sabatierframework has been applied. The unprecedented role of the EC, with reference to publicpolicy within its Member States, provides a unique scenario for implementation analysis. This100study has focused on the implementation of two EC Directives— the first regulating vehicleexhaust emissions and the second controlling LCP emissions — in the United Kingdom. Thefirst required Community standards to be applied uniformly to all new vehicles, while thesecond employed differential standards for each Member State and applied to both new andexisting facilities. Implementation analysis for each Directive has shown that the vehicleemissions regulations conform to the framework insofar as the six conditions proposed byMazmanian and Sabatier were met. The second, however, fails on almost all six. It is thusfair to conclude that the framework is not applicable to all policy arenas, nor to all nationalcontexts.101BIBLIOGRAPHYAdler, J.H. “Clean Fuels, Dirty Air” in M.S. Greve and F.L. Smith Jr. (eds) [1992]Environmental Politics. New York: Praeger Publishers Inc.Andersen, S.S. and K.A. 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Younis (ed) [1990]Implementation in Public Policy.113APPENDIX IEmissions from Stationary Sources of SO2 for Member States, 1990-1991 and EC Phase I(1993) Targets.Member Target j 1990 1991Belgium 318 n/a n/aDenmark 213 170 n/aGermany 1335 861 n/aGreece 320 n/a n/aSpain 2290 n/a n/aFrance 1146 1055 1161Ireland 124 181 n/aItaly 1800 n/a n/aLuxembourg 1.8 n/a n/aNetherlands 180 175 171Portugal 232 201 n/aUK 3106 3651 3442Source: OECD, 1993:17n/a indicates statistics not reported114APPENDIX IIEmissions from Stationary Sources of NO for Member States, 1990-1991 and EC Phase I(1993) Targets.Member Target 1990 1991Belgium 88 n/a n/aDenmark 121 143 n/aGermany 696 697 ri/aGreece 70 n/a n/aSpain 368 n/a n/aFrance 320 427 419Ireland 50 68 n/aItaly 570 n/a n/aLuxembourg 2.4 n/a n/aNetherlands 98 216 222Portugal 59 52 n/aUK 864 1220 1169Source: OECD, 1993:17n/a indicates statistics not reported115APPENDIX IIISO2 Emission Quota/Limits For Large Combustion Plants (LCP) From 1991-1993 InAccordance With The LCP Directive [KTonnesjPOWER STATIONSREFINERIESEngland & Wales = quota 218 86 86 86Scotland = quota 50 14 14 14United Kingdom = sub-total 268 100 100 100% Reduction from 1980 63OTHER INDUSTRYEngland & Wales = quota 543 273 257 241Scotland = quota 78 39 37 35United Kingdom sub-total 621 312 294 276% Reduction from 1980 56Source: DoE, 1991:Annex ALCP-5O2Emissions 1980 1991__[_1992 1993National Power = quota 1595 1583 1497PowerGen = quota 1085 1077 1019England & Wales = sub—total 2776 2680 2660 2516% Reduction from 1980 9Power Stations in Scotland = quota 142 109 106 104% Reduction from 1980 27Power Stations in N. Ireland = quota 88 92 86 80% Reduction from 1980 9United Kingdom = sub-total 3006 2881 2852 2700% Reduction from 1980 10116APPENDIX IVNO Emission Quota/Limits For Large Combustion Plants (LCP) From 1991-1993 InAccordance With The LCP Directive [KTonnes]POWER STATIONSLCP-NO Emissions 1980 1991 1992 1993__1National Power = quota 430 424 418PowerGen = quota 264 260 256England & Wales = sub—total 783 694 684 674% Reduction from 1980 14Power Stations in Scotland = quota 76 67 66 63% Reduction from 1980 17Power Stations in N. Ireland = quota 38 20 20 20% Reduction from 1980 47United Kingdom = sub-total 897 781 770 757% Reduction from 1980 16REFINERIESEngland & Wales = quota 34 27 26 25Scotland = quota 9 7 7 7United Kingdom = sub-total 43 34 33 32% Reduction from 1980 26OTHER INDUSTRYEngland & Wales = quota 164 110 106 103Scotland = quota 23 16 16 15United Kingdom sub-total 187 126 127 118% Reduction from 1980 37Source: DoE, 1991:Aimex A117

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