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Harbinger of a new world order?: humanitarian intervention in Somalia Fricska, Szilard Paul 1994

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HARBINGER OF A NEW WORLD ORDER?HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN SOMALIAbySZILARD PAUL FRICSKAB.A., The University of British Columbia, 1993A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES(Department of Political Science)We accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAOctober 1994© Szilard Paul Fricska, 1994In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature)________________________Department of Sc-’vcThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate Oc* 11z1DE-6 (2/88)11ABSTRACTThis paper examines the relationship between humanitarian intervention and theevolution of international society using as a principle case study, the 1992 intervention inSomalia. Martin Wight’ s three traditions of international relations—realist, rationalist andrevolutionist—are used to develop three models of international society reflecting differentdegrees of human solidarity. These three models are discussed, in Chapter One, in thehistorical context of the Cold War debate on the legality and practice of humanitarianintervention. The argument demonstrates that prior to Somalia there were few, if any,instances of what could properly be called humanitarian intervention. The study finds that inmost cases, various geo-strategic and economic motives undermine the purportedlyhumanitarian character of the intervention. Chapter One concludes by introducing the post-Cold War revival of the concept of humanitarian intervention, noting the heightened sense ofoptimism that prevailed.Chapter Two begins by reviewing the practical embodiment of the post-Cold Waractivism in three specific cases: Liberia, Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. These cases set thestage for a more detailed investigation of the collapse of the Somali state and thehumanitarian intervention that resulted. The final chapter returns to the subjects ofhumanitarian intervention and the evolution of international society, noting the followingobservations: the decreased importance of geo-strategic and economic interventions asmotivations for intervention; the increased importance of domestic and media factors in thedetermination of when and where interventions take place; the emergence of a new legal normthat permits United Nations-sanctioned intervention in situations where no governmentexists; and the emergence of two general criteria for humanitarian intervention: grossviolations of human rights and the prospect of only minimal resistance to outside intervention.The paper concludes that while significant evolution has occurred at the level of legalnorms, the inability of the international community to respond effectively to the break-down ofstates threatens to undermine international support for humanitarian intervention.111TABLE OF CONTENTS:Abstract iiTable of Contents iiillTRODUCflON 1Chapter One International Society and Humanitarian Intervention During the Cold War 7Martin Wight’s Three Traditions of International Theory 8The Revolutionist Argument: The Morality of Human Rights 10The Realist Critique: The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention 14The Rationalist Compromise: Pluralism and Solidarism 22Into the New World Order 25Conclusion 31Chapter Two Post-Cold War Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia 32Post-Cold War Humanitarianism 32Failure of the Somali State and Humanitarian Intervention 40Traditional Somalia: Pastoral Democracy 40Colonialism 42Siad Barre’s Legacy 43Somalia’s Civil War 51International and United Nations Response 54The United States’ Role 57From UNITAF to UNOSOM II 60Conclusion 63Chapter Three Somalia: Harbinger of a New World Order? 64Post-Cold War Humanitarian Intervention 64Absence of Cold War Rivalry 64Post-Cold War Motives 69Unusual Public Interest 75Minimal Prospects of Retaliation 76Implications for International Society 79Revolutionism: The New Interventionism 79The New Non-Interventionism 81The Realist Anarchy 81Rationalist Compromise 82Conclusion 85Bibliography 861IntroductionSomalia’s slow slide into anarchy began many years ago; the January 1991 ouster ofPresident Mohammed Siad Barre simply removed the fmal restraints. Prior to Barre’s flight, theopposition subsumed their separate interests to the task of ending the more than two decades ofauthoritarian rule. No sooner had Barre fled to Ethiopia than the opposition fragmented. AuMahdi Mohamed had himself unilaterally declared the next President, infuriating his United SomaliCongress ally, and also a Presidential-hopeful, General Mohammed Farah Aideed. At its roots acrude struggle for power between two equally dubious proponents of democracy, the ferocity ofthe ensuing battle led to the evacuation of most international aid agency personnel and diplomaticrepresentatives. Somalia then slowly faded from international attention.The crisis, however, continued. In his 5 February 1992 testimony, United States AssistantSecretary for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, estimated that as many as 6,000 people had died anda further 15,000 had been wounded in Mogadishu alone after two and a half months of renewedfighting between All Mahdi and Aideed.’ Moreover, Cohen reported that “some estimates are that90 percent of casualties are non-combatants and that, of these, 75 percent are children.” AndrewNatsios, Assistant Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development,described Somalia as “the most acute humanitarian tragedy in the world today.”2 Yet nothinghappened. As one United States government official put it, “Somalia has ceased to exist. Andright now, nobody cares.”3 The transformation of Somalia from Cold War detritus to post-ColdWar ‘nation-building’ paradigm is the central focus of this paper.Suddenly, in December, somebody seemed to care. Asserting the overriding need to “savethousands,” U.S. President George Bush went to great lengths to emphasize that “military supportis necessary to ensure the safe delivery of the food Somalis need to survive. “And let me be clear,”he said, pressing home his point, “Our mission is humanitarian.”4 In the same address, he also1 United States. Senate. Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. EmergencySituation in Zaire and Somalia. 102 Cong., 2nd Session. 5 February 1992. Washington: GPO, 1992, P. 22 Cited in, “Help Needed For Forsaken Somalia.” Editorial. New York Times 9 February 1992, Section IV, p. 16Cited in Keith Richburg, “Peace Effort in Somalia Meets Initial Failure,” Washington Post, 4 January 1992, p.A18‘“Transcript of President’s Address on Somalia,” New York Times: 5 December 19922sent a message of reassurance to the people of Somalia: “We do not plan to dictate politicaloutcomes.” Indeed, it soon became apparent that the United States could not leave Somalia fastenough. By early March, U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia, Robert Oakley, was declaring theUnited States-led mission a success, having accomplished three objectives: creating “a secureenvironment for the delivery of food and relief supplies; establishing “a level of disarmament tobring relative peace to the villages and cities of Somalia;” and, his greatest success, “reducing thepower of the warlords [sic] and bring[ing] into the peace negotiations everyone from elders tointellectuals to women.” He reasserted that “the U.S. mission was not to rebuild [the Somali]political system.”5The Clinton administration and United Nations Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali, however,seemed to have other, more ambitious plans. Boutros Ghali declared that the second UnitedNation’s Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) “would be an expression of the internationalcommunity’s determination not to remain a silent spectator to the sufferings of an entire people forno fault of their own.”6 Describing UNOSOM II as a “peace-enforcement mission with teeth,”Clinton’s Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Peter Tarnoff, declared “In a world rifewith humanitarian crises caused by armed conflict, the authorization of such a force is a landmarkaccomplishment which it is in our interest to cultivate. UNOSOM is a model worth promoting.”7Tarnoff went so far as to describe this model as “nation building.”8Just two months later, however, Sentator Jesse Helms bitterly stated:all of us should have heard the fwebell ringing when we convened this committee in July, but we did not.We were bound to be aware that the Security Council’s resolution authorizing UNOSOM II is impossiblybroad and dangerously vague... Its scope includes building a nation,’ whatever that means in practical terms.It envisions the reconciliation of people who have been engaged in furious wars against each other forcenturies. It specifies the disarming of a population that has been in chaos for at least 2 years, and itproposes to create a viable judicial and law enforcement system out of thin air. The problem with yourcolorful endorsement of UNOSOM II on July 29..., Mr. Tarnoff, is that UNOSOM II was already thenbeginning to unravel.95 Cited in Donatella Lorch, “U.S. Envoy to Somalia Says Mission is a Success,” New York Times, 3 March 1993,p.A46 United Nations Document St25354, “Report of the Secretary General,” (3 March 1993) P. 22.‘ Statement of Peter Tarnoff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, U.S. Policy in Somalia, 29 July1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1994) p. 4.8 Peter Tarnoff, U.S. Policy in Somalia, p. 4.9 Jesse Helms, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, U.S. Participation in Somalia Peacekeeping, 19 and20 October 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1994) p. 2.3Following the deaths of twenty-three Pakistani peace-keepers on 5 June 1993, the humanitarianoperation to “save thousands” had become a war between the United Nations and MohammedFarah Aideed. Branded a “criminal,” posters were circulated offering a twenty-five thousanddollar reward for Aideed’s capture. An elite unit of U.S. Rangers was brought in to expediteAideed’s arrest, but itself suffered 12 deaths and 78 wounded on October 3rd when twohelicopters were shot down. Quickly, images of starving, helpless Somalis were replaced bypictures of defiant Somalis dragging through the streets of Mogadishu the naked body of a slainU.S. Ranger. In the United States, Congressional and public opinion swung against continuedU.S. presence in Somalia. “The people who are dragging American bodies don’t look veryhungry to the people of Texas,” said Senator Phil Gramm of Texas.10 After narrowly defeating aCongressional motion to immediately withdraw U.S. troops, President Clinton managed to extendthe U.S. presence to 31 March 1994. Sixteen months after the initial humanitarian mission, theUnited States was trying to come to terms with what went wrong. The words of U.S. LieutenantColonel Raoul Archambault, just prior to his 31 March 1994 evacuation, speak volumes:I wish we could have accomplished more... We somehow managed to elevate Aidid, Morgan and Jess from thelevel of criminals to the level of statesmen. We’re dealing with a group of gangsters, if you want; the bottomline is that they’re thugs... It wouldn’t supise [sic] me if you had total anarchy here before Christmas.11Lieutenant Colonel Archambault articulated a question on the lips of many people: Whathappened?The answer to this question, as the title of this essay suggests, requires integrating three levelsof analysis. At one level, Somalia was an instance of humanitarian intervention, that is, anexample of a non-consensual use of force by an outside actor to remedy gross violations of humanrights—especially the right to life—within a sovereign state. But the international community’sactions in Somalia represented a new phase in the conceptual and practical evolution ofhumanitarian intervention. Somalia became the crucible in which the act of intervention becameonly one stage in a much more ambitious project of conflict resolution overseen by the UnitedNations. Initially outlined in Boutros Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for Peace, this mechanismconsisted of a continuum of options ranging from preventative diplomacy through peace-keeping10 Cited in Clifford Kraus, “White House Tries to Calm Congress,” New York Times, 6 October 1993, p. A1611 Cited in Donatella Lorch, “American Troops Count Hours to End of Mission in Somalia,” New York Times, 28February 1994, p. A3.4and into two new options: peace-enforcement, in which the United Nations would enforce cease-fire agreements; and post-conflict peace-building, involving steps aimed at assisting the rebuildingof a strife-tom nation. In this continuum, humanitarian intervention in Somalia was used as a toolto secure the delivery of humanitarian relief and facilitate political reconciliation. In order tounderstand the precedents and failures of the international community’s experience in Somalia, itmust be understood within the tradition of past ‘humanitarian’ interventions and within the contextof the expanded conflict resolution mechanism. The expanded objectives of humanitarianintervention themselves suggest a second level of analysis: the evolution of post-Cold Warinternational society to greater degrees of human solidarity. Speaking during the Persian Gulfcrisis, U.S. President George Bush evoked images of the optimism following the end of the twoWorld Wars: “We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the PersianGulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward a historic period ofcooperation. Out of these troubled times...a new world order can emerge; a new era — freer fmmthe threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace...”12The civil war in Somalia became the proving ground for the existence of a ‘new world order.’ Butthere is a third level of analysis, often forgotten amidst the hubris of U.N. humanitarianintervention and new world orders: the reality of Somalia’s civil war. Many of the reasons for the‘failure’ of the Somalia intervention can be traced back to a simple lack of understanding to thedynamics and the history underlying the Somali civil war. Accordingly, considerable attention willbe devoted to understanding Somalia as a case study of a “failed state.”Linking the three levels of analysis is this paper’s thesis: the degree of human solidarity ininternational society can be related to the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention, aneffectiveness which itself depends on how well the international community understands theconflict which it seeks to resolve. Two hypotheses are therefore proposed:(i) if the international community understands the reasons for the collapse of a state, and ifit intervenes in a timely and effective manner, then that is evidence of international society’sevolution towards greater solidarity; but12“Towards a New World Order,” address by President George Bush before a joint session of the Congress,Washington, D.C., September 11, 1990, Department of State Current Policy No. 12985(ii) if the reasons for the state’s collapse are misunderstood and if the intervention is neithertimely nor effective, then there is reason to be skeptical of the degree of solidarity ininternational society.This essay argues that while some significant legal and theoretical evidence indicates a greaterdegree of human solidarity, the majority of the practical lessons from Somalia support the secondconclusion.In an essay that seeks to integrate these three levels of analysis, the conceptual frameworkemployed requires careful elaboration. Accordingly, the first chapter will lay the conceptualgroundwork necessary for understanding the lessons learned from the Somalia intervention.Chapter One begins by outlining Martin Wight’s three models of international society, each ofwhich correspond to a different level of human solidarity: the realist, rationalist and revolutionistmodels. Derived from these models are three perspectives on the issue of humanitarianintervention: the revolutionists’ endorsement of humanitarian intervention as a demonstration of themoral solidarity of humanity; the skepticism of realists who regard such interventions as motivatedby selfish considerations; and finally, the rationalists, who endeavor to chart a middle coursebetween skepticism and altruism. Chapter One will then review the Cold War arguments and casestudies to provide a historical context for understanding the significance of the Somaliaintervention. Finally, this first chapter will examine the ambitious agenda for humanitarianintervention in the post-Cold War world.Chapter Two, while focusing on Somalia itself, will be divided into two sections. First, inorder to evaluate the precedential value of the intervention in Somalia, brief consideration will begiven to three post-Cold War interventions prior to Somalia. Accordingly, international action inLiberia in 1990, in northern Iraq in 1991, and in the former-Yugoslavia will be reviewed. Due tothe constraints of space, discussion of these cases will concentrate on U.N. Security Councilresolutions. As the discussion moves into the Somalia intervention, these resolutions willdemonstrate the evolution away from the requirement of consent prior to the deployment of outsideforces. The second part of Chapter Two will focus entirely on the collapse of the Somali state.Such a concentration is warranted for two reasons: first, the international community consciouslychose Somalia as a crisis in which to test its new theory’s of reconstructing failed states; andsecond, the complexities of the Somali civil war indicate very clearly the limits of outsiders to6resolve civil wars. Accordingly, the second part of Chapter Two will be comprised of sixhistorical sections: the nature of traditional Somali society; the impact of colonialism; the legacy ofPresident Siad Barre; the civil war; the initial international response; and finally, the period of theU.S.-led UNITAF intervention to the UNOSOM II mission.These two chapters set the stage for the third chapter which analyzes the normative andprecedential value of the Somalia intervention. While Chapter Three wifi concentrate on Somalia asin terms of its importance relative to prior interventions, the chapter will include references to morecurrent interventions such as occurring in Rwanda and Haiti. From these lessons, the discussionbroadens its focus to the theoretical level of the development of international society. Here thepaper returns to the Martin Wight’s three traditions to ascertain the extent of international society’sdevelopment since the end of the Cold War.7Chapter 1Martin Wight’s Visions of International SocietyFor Martin Wight, just as every political philosophy required a theory of human nature, sotoo did international theory require a theory of international society. Thus, to the question ‘what ishuman nature?’ Wight posed its international relations corollary: What is the nature of internationalsociety?”3 Based on historical answers to this question, Wight identified three traditions ofinternational theory: realism, rationalism and revolutionism. Each tradition can also be said toemphasize one of the three theoretical components of humanitarian intervention: morality, law andpolitics. Thus revolutionists emphasize morality; the rationalists, international law; and the realists,politics. From this emphasis it becomes clear that revolutionists are generally supportive of the useof force as a sanction against human rights violations, that rationalists advocate the principle ofnon-intervention, while sometimes making an exception to this rule and that realists are fairlyambivalent about the concept, supporting it if such interventions advance the ‘national interest’ ofthe intervening state, all the while clear that it is this element of self-interest and not altruism thatmotivates the intervention.Openly acknowledging the dangers of reification, Wight asserts that he is merely attempting“to pin down and define the central principles and characteristic doctrines of each of the threetraditions.”14 For Wight, “classification becomes valuable.., only at the point where it breaksdown.”5 After his initial exposition of the three traditions, Wight’s own system of classificationrapidly becomes more sophisticated. In fact, as this essay demonstrates, the three traditionsquickly result in five positions on the subject of humanitarian intervention. During the Cold War,however, the humanitarian intervention debate became as polarized as the relationship between thetwo superpowers. The danger of a general nuclear conflagration erupting out of a local conflictmade intervention, for any purpose, a perilous proposition. The effect of this era of fear was toimpose both intellectual and practical straightjackets on the humanitarian intervention debate: either13 Martin Wight, “Western Values in International Relations,” Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory ofInternational Relations, eds. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966) p. 92.14 Martin Wight, International Theory, p. 258 (emphasis in original).5 Martin Wight, International Theory, p. 259.8one advocated humanitarian intervention, like the revolutionists, or one stood fast on a noninterventionist position.In the interests of clarity, however, this chapter will begin by introducing the three traditionsas Martin Wight himself presented them. From there the nuances of the rationalist andrevolutionist perspectives will be developed, attempting to preserve Wight’s emphasis on the“central principles and characteristic doctrines” of even these refmements. Accordingly, the realistposition may seem to get short shrift in this chapter. While this may be true, it follows from thefact that in the humanitarian intervention debate, its central principle has been to maintainskepticism about the motives of the intervening state and, as such is the case, is more appropriatelydiscussed in the following chapter.Martin Wight and International SocietyRealists conclude that the nature of international society is characterized by anarchy. Theydescribe international relations as taking place between “a multiplicity of sovereign statesacknowledging no political superior, whose relations are ultimately regulated by warfare.”16Given this anarchy, realists create a sharp distinction between the role of morality in the domesticand international realms.’7 Because the fundamental objective of states in international relationsinvolves the pursuit of power that moral considerations cannot be included in foreign policy: inHans Morgenthau’s words, “universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions ofstates.”8 George Kennan explains Morgenthau’s premise:Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society itrepresents... [which] are basically those of its military security, the integrity of its political life and thewell-being of its people. These needs have no moral quality.19For Kennan, the pursuit of national interest by a government is a representative act and thusdistinguished from individual morality and individual action. Mother realist reason for skepticismof the role of morality in international relations can be found in the works of E.H. Carr. He statesthat, “supposedly absolute and universal principles... [are simply] the unconscious reflections of16 Martin Wight, International Theory, p. 7.7 Martin Wight, International Theory, p.17.18 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd. Ed. (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1954) p. 9.19 George F. Kennan, “Morality and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 64 (Winter 1985-86) p. 206.9national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time.”20 Anyattempt to propound a universally valid morality, according to Carr, will simply be a projection ofone’s own values. More cynically, Nicholas Spykman has written, “The search for power is notmade for the achievement of moral values; moral values are used to facilitate the attainment ofpower.”21 Yet, whether they view morality as inapplicable to international relations, as interests indisguise or as a tool to advance the national interest, realists are united in their suspicion of statesacting for altruistic purposes.At the opposite end of Wight’s spectrum of international theory lies the revolutionisttradition. Contrary to the realist emphasis on the sovereign state as the fundamental unit ofinternational relations, revolutionists argue that “the society of states is the unreal thing—a complexof legal fictions and obsolescent diplomatic forms which conceals, obstructs and oppresses the realsociety of individual women and men, the civitas maxima.”22 The primacy of the individualanimates revolutionists’ demands that international relations be “assimilated” to the condition ofdomestic society. Wight envisioned three paths for this assimilation could take: cosmopolitanism,in which the common bonds of humanity are gradually strengthened and the need for sovereignstates disappears; doctrinal uniformity, in which a single mode of domestic governance becomesaccepted by all states; and finally, doctrinal imperialism, in which a single mode of governance isimposed on all states. How one decided to achieve this assimilation created another distinctionamongst revolutionists, with ‘soft’ revolutionaries favouring “yearning and talk” whilst ‘hard’revolutionaries advocate “violence” to achieve their ends.24 From this catalogue of distinctions,proponents of humanitarian intervention can be said to share the ethos of cosmopolitanism, yetdraw different conclusions from it. Some, such as Fernando Tesón for example, seem to slide intodocthnal imperialism in their advocacy of intervention. ‘Softer’ cosmopolitans such as RichardFalk, however, seem to verge on quietism in their rejection of the use of force. In addition, interms of ends, some cosmopolitanists foresee the United Nations replacing a system of sovereign20 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan Co. Ltd., 1939), p. 87.21 Nicholas J. Spykman, America’c Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance ofPower (NewYoric Harcourt, Brace, 1942) p. 18.22 Martin Wight, “Western Values,” p. 93.Martin Wight, International Theory, pp. 41-48.24 Martin Wight, International Theory, p. 45.10states. Others, such as international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), emphasize humansolidarity at the individual level and reject the idea of a United Nations capable of taking on the roleof world government. While the Cold War debate on humanitarian intervention became onebetween realists and revolutionists of Tesón’s type, the post-Cold War era has seen the emergenceof these other types of cosmopolitanism.The Cold War also marginalized Martin Wight’s third tradition, rationalism.25 Rejectingboth the realist depiction of international relations as taking place in a state of anarchy and therevolutionist denial of the existence of a society of states, rationalism described internationalrelations as “habitual intercourse expressed in the institutions of diplomacy, international legalrules, commerce...”26 As Wight states, “[rationalism] does not see international society as readyto supersede domestic society; but it notes that international society actually exercises restraintsupon its members.”27 Thus, while acknowledging that states do not have a common superior,rationalists assert the existence of a society of states which limits, through international law,economics and, to varying degrees, morality, the actions of its member states. This tradition,Wight contends, while lacking “intellectual conciseness and emotional appeal,” nevertheless “mayclaim that it corresponds more accurately to the intractable anomalies and anfractuousities ofinternational experience.”28 In their accuracy, however, rationalists invite the charge that they aredefenders of the status quo. Indisputably valid as a criticism, such an observation also provides anopportunity to locate the compromise between realism and revolutionism during any era. Bylocating the ‘status quo’ on the subject of humanitarian intervention before and after the Cold War,one can better understand the nature of the evolution of international society. Following therevolutionist and realist Cold War debate, this compromise will be sought out in the writings ofHedley Bull and R.J. Vincent.The Revolutionist Argwnent: The Morality ofHuman RightsFor another account of the history of international theory, in terms of realists and utopians, see E.H. Carr, TheTwenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan Co. Ltd., 1939).26 Martin Wight, “An Anatomy of International Thought,” p. 22127 Martin Wight, “Western Values,” p. 9528 Martin Wight, “Western Values,” p. 95, 9611Revolutionist proponents of humanitarian intervention share a general antipathy for thesovereign state: in David Luban’s classic phrase, states are not to be loved and seldom to betrusted.29 Not only do states sometimes engage in gross violations of their citizens’ mostfundamental human rights, but outside states often refuse to act to end this barbarity. This twofold failure represents an egregious denial of our common humanity. It is this same commonhumanity that serves as the legitimizing basis for humanitarian intervention. As Michael ReismandeclaresThe validity of humanitarian intervention is not based upon the nation-state oriented theories of internationallaw; these theories are little more than two centuries old. It is based upon an antinomic but equally vigorousprinciple, deriving from a long tradition of natural law and secular values: kinship and minimum reciprocalresponsibilities of all humanity, the inability of geographical boundaries to stem categorical moralimperatives, and ultimately, the confirmation of the sanctity of human life, without reference to place ortransient circumstance.3°A single phrase from Reisman’s quote above reveals much about the revolutionists’ position: ‘theinability of geographical boundaries to stem categorical moral imperatives,’ reflects therevolutionists’ common reliance on Immanuel Kant’s ethical system. Yet it is in their interpretationof Kant’s ethics that the Wight’s distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ revolutionists emerges.Operating from the premise that “respect for states is merely derivative of respect forpersons,” ‘hard’ revolutionists such as Fernando Tesón argue for a redefinition of the concept ofstate sovereignty: “the sovereignty of the state is dependent upon the state’s domestic legitimacy;and therefore the principles of international justice must be congruent with the principles of internaljustice.”31 Tesón’s reading of Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace calls for a concurrent reading ofthe first two Definitive Articles: the First Article calls for all nations to be founded upon republicanconstitutions, while the Second Article declares the foundation of international law to be afederation of free states.32 Such a reading, for Tesón, links “arbitrary government at home withaggressive foreign policies.”33 Put simply, international peace depends on the domestic legitimacyof individual states which itself is derived from a form of government described by Tesón as a29 Luban, David, “Just War and Human Rights,” in Beitz et al. (eds), International Ethics, Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1985, p. 20830 Reisman, “Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos,”Appendix A in Lillich (ed), Humanitarian Interventionand the United Nations, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973, p. 16831 Tesón, “Kantian Theory,” p. 5432 Tesón, “Kantian Theory,” p. 60-61Tesón, “Kantian Theory,” p. 6112liberal democracy. Tesón argues that “government that engages in substantial violations of humanrights betrays the very purpose for which it exists and so forfeits not only its domestic legitimacy,but its international legitimacy as well.”34 Up to this point, TesOn’s argument reflects a cleararticulation of the revolutionist position: all revolutionist supporters of humanitarian interventioncan be said to formulate their arguments in a similar fashion.Tesón distinguishes himself as a ‘hard’ revolutionist, however, by his claim that“humanitarian intervention is justified not only to remedy egregious cases of human rightsviolations, such as genocide, enslavement or mass murder, but also to put an end to situations ofserious, disrespectful, yet not genocidal oppression.”35 So assured is Tesón’s belief in ‘liberaldemocracy’ as the universally accepted sine qua non of domestic governance and in theeffectiveness of force as a sanction, that he is willing to endorse humanitarian intervention in a verybroad range of scenarios. This is not to suggest that Tesón is a raving interventionist, but as onereviewer of Tesón’s Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law and Morality put it, “there issomething a little totalitarian in the author’s moral jurisprudence of international law.”36 Whilewilling to acknowledge the existence of an “exquisite tension” between human rights and statesovereignty, Tesón seems unwilling to concede any ground to utilitarian or prudentialconsiderations or place much value in the notion of cultural pluralism. As the title of HumanitarianIntervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality suggests, Tesón excludes political considerationsfrom his investigation, subordinating everything to the moral primacy of the individual. Thisexclusion does simplify his argumentation, but only by neglecting to demonstrate the validity of hisfirst premise: that human rights protection is the raison d’être of the international system. Thisfailure at the level of first principles haunts the revolutionist argument in all its subsequent stages.Revolutionists advance three major arguments in support of humanitarian intervention: theexistence of 19th century and Cold War precedents; a ‘major purposes’ interpretation of the UnitedNations Charter; and the failure of the United Nations Security Council to fulfill its role as34 TesOn, Fernando, Hwnanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality Dobbs Ferry: TransnationalPublishers, 1988, p. 15Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 1536 Bederman, David 3., Book Review. Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, in AmericanJournal ofInternational Law 83(1989), p. 40813guarantor of international peace. As both sets of precedents are central to the realist critique of therevolutionist position, they will be discussed later. Richard Lillich summarizes the major purposesargument thus: “examining the United Nations Charter ‘as a whole,’ it is apparent that its twomajor purposes are the maintenance of peace and the protection of human rights.”37 From thisinterpretation, the Charter’s Preamble and Article 1(3) represent, in Reisman’s terms, “the intimatenexus that the framers perceived to link international peace and security and the most fundamentalhuman rights of all individuals.”38 Examining the references, the Charter’s Preamble begins withthe now familiar “We the Peoples of the United Nations” and goes on to “reaffirm faith infundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights ofmen and women...” Article 1(3) calls on Members “To achieve international cooperation insolving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and inpromoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms...” To supporttheir assertion of the importance of human rights, interventionists also cite: Articles 55, whichessentially restates Article 1(3); Article 56, in which “All Members pledge to take joint and separateaction in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article55;” and the Genocide Convention (1948), which in Article VIII states “Any contracting party maycall upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of theUnited Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts ofGenocide.”39 Given this list of human rights instruments, the last clause of Charter Article 2(4)prohibiting the use of force — ‘...or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter’ —gains special significance. As Lillich states, “humanitarian interventions. ..actually may further oneof the world organization’s major objectives in many situations.”4°The last clause of Article 2(4)thus becomes an escape clause from the otherwise strict prohibition against the use of force. Asecond potential hurdle presented by Article 2(4), that the use of force is illegal if it affects the‘territorial integrity or political independence’ of the target state, is overcome by the assertion that aLillich, Richard, “Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Jan Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives,”in John Norton Moore (ed), Law and Civil War in the Modern World, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, p. 23638 Reisman, “Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos,” p. 1719 Reisman, “Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos,” p. 174-7540 Lillich, “A Reply to Ian Brownlie,” p. 23614truly ‘humanitarian’ intervention does not compromise either.41 Reisman’s conclusionsummarizes the major purposes approach:Since a humanitarian intervention seeks neither a territorial change nor a challenge to the politicalindependence of the State involved and is not only not inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nationsbut is rather in conformity with the most fundamental peremptory norms of the Charter, it is a distortion toargue that it is precluded by Article 2(4).42The second pillar of the revolutionist argument is based on the failure of the United Nationscollective security organs during the Cold War. As Lillich asserts, “to the extent that statesconsciously relinquished the right to use forcible self-help, they took such action under theassumption that the collective implementation measures envisaged under Chapter VII soon wouldbe available.”43 While the United Nations is unable to act, so their argument goes, the customaryright of unilateral self-help is revived and the “full thrust” of Article 2(4) should be “partiallysuspended.”” Thus they envision a gradual phasing out of the unilateral right to intervene tocoincide with a strengthened and presumably active United Nations.45 Until that time, however,the interventionists point to Cold War examples of humanitarian intervention as indicating therevival of the 19th century ‘self-help’ doctrine.The Realist Critique: The Politics ofHumanitarian InterventionIn contrast to the revolutionist emphasis on the morality of human rights, the realist positionis distinguished by two assumptions: its rejection of the applicability of morality to internationalrelations and an assertion that “individuals are not the stuff of international politics in the presentstate system—states are.”46 The first assumption leads them to be deeply skeptical of statesasserting humanitarian motives justifying their intervention, while the second leads to a positivisticview of international law. In Brierly’s classic phrase, “International law is simply the sum of therules by which states have consented to be bound, and nothing can be law to which they have not41 Lillich, “A Reply to Ian Brownlie,” p. 236; see also Fernando Tesdn (1988) p. 131, and Reisman (1973) p. 17742 Reisman, “Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos,” p. 177Lillich, “A Reply to Ian Brownlie,” p. 238Reisman, “Sanctions and Enforcement,” in Black and Falk eds., The Future of the International Legal Order(III), 1971, p. 273.Lillich, “A Reply to Ian Brownlie,” pp. 237-38.46 Caroline Thomas, “The Pragmatic Case Against Intervention,” in Political Theory, International Relations, andthe Ethics ofIntervention, p. 91.15consented.”47 Thus realists reject any form of natural law—be it based on secular or religiousfoundations—in favour of treaties signed between representatives of sovereign states. The legalpositivism of realist thought leads to an extremely restrictive interpretation of the United Nations’Charter and of the role of human rights in international relations.Realists place great stock in three Articles of the United Nations’ Charter:Article 2(4) which readsAll members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorialintegrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of theUnited Nations;Article 2(7), which statesNothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which areessentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such mattersto settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcementmeasures under Chapter VII;and finally, Article 51 which affirms thatNothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if ananned attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken themeasures necessary to maintain international peace and security...4The realist interpretation of these Articles can be summarized thus: first, Articles 2(4) and 51 areread together to indicate that the only lawful use of force by member states without prior U.N.authorization, is in self-defense in the face of immediate and overwhelming armed aggression;second, the United Nations is the only body permitted to use force for any purpose other than theself-defense provision outlined in Article 51; fmally, Article 2(7) is interpreted as applying not onlybetween the United Nations and Member States, but also between Member States themselves.49Any other interpretation, in the words of Tom Farer, amounts to “doctrinal manipulation.”5°In support of their interpretation, realists also refer to the travaux preparatoires of the UnitedNations Charter and to the various United Nations General Assembly declarations on the use offorce. As Ian Brownlie observes, the travaux preparatoires indicate that “the phrase ‘against theterritorial integrity’ was added at San Francisco at the behest of small states wanting a strongerJ.L. Brierly, The Law ofNations, 5th ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1955) p. 4248 Charter of the United Nations, Appendix II of mis Claude Jr., Swords into Ploughshares, p. 465.See Brownlie, Donnelly, Franck and Rodley, and Hassan.50 cited by Lihich in “Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply,” p. 24016guarantee against intervention.”51 Moreover, the final clause of Article 2(4), ‘or in any mannerinconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,’ was “intended to guarantee that there wouldbe no loopholes.”52 In the General Assembly, the “Declaration on the Inadmissibility ofIntervention in the Domestic Affairs of the States and the Protection of their Independence andSovereignty” and the 1970 “Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning theFriendly Relations Among States,” are cited by realists as further proof of a legal rule of nonintervention. The first operative article of the former, for example, states that “No state has theright to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairsof any other State.”53 For realists such as Jack Donnelly, the United Nations Charter, theGeneral Assembly’s Declarations and the weak language and absence of strong enforcementprovisions in the existing human rights instruments confirm the realist claim that human rights areessentially matters of domestic concern and that the U.N. Charter priorizes the maintenance ofinternational peace and security over the promotion and encouragement of human rights.54 Thus,realists entirely reject the ‘major purposes’ interpretation of the revolutionists.It is this same skepticism that defmes the realist position on the purported existence historicalcases of humanitarian intervention. They look askance at the revolutionists’ list of 19th and 20thcentury precedents. As Ian Brownlie has written of the 19th century cases, “An examination of thepractice provides one possibly genuine example of altruistic action, namely, the intervention of1860 in Syria to prevent the recurrence of massacres of Maronite Christians.”55 Revolutionists,however, cite four additional 19th century precedents: the Concert of Europe’s intervention in theGreek war of independence from Ottoman rule (1827 to 1830); the Concert’s ‘peremptorydemands’ against the Ottoman’s misrule of Crete; the Russian intervention in the Balkans (1877 to1878), again against the Ottoman Empire; and, finally, the Concert’s intervention against Ottoman51 Brownlie, “Humanitarian Intervention,” in Moore (ed), Law and Civil War, p. 22452 Wehberg in Fonteyne, J.P.L., “The Customary Internatioanl Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: ItsCurrent Validity under the U.N. Charter,” California Western International Law Journal 4(1974), p. 243.“Declaration on the Inadmissability of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of the States and the Protection oftheir Independence and Sovereignty,” U.N.G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), adopted 21 December 1965.Donnelly, “Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign Policy,” p. 317Ian Brownlie, “Humanitarian Intervention,” Law and Civil War in the Modern World ed. J.N. Moore (JohnsHopkins University Press, 1974) p. 22117misrule in Macedonia (1903 to 1908).56 The specific details of these interventions have beenthoroughly discussed elsewhere and need not preoccupy this study.57 Even a cursoryacquaintance of 19th century history is sufficient to cast significant doubt on the disinterestednature of these interventions.Two aspects of 19th century international society undemñne the revolutionists assertions: the‘balance of power’ operating between the great powers; and the existence of a double-hierarchy.In terms of the balance of power, one notices that all the interventions characterized ashumanitarian were carried out by, or under the legal sanction of, the Concert of Europe and tookplace on the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Regarded as the ‘sick old man of Europe,’ that is, adecaying empire, the Ottoman’s territory became the battleground for competing Europeanambitions in the area. As Woolsey writes of the Russian intervention in the Balkans: “It was basedin theory upon religious sympathy and upon humanity. It was a move, in fact, upon the Straitsand Constantinople, in pursuance of Russia’s century long program [of expansionism].”58 Whileall of the above interventions were not so naked a territorial grab, the temptation for selfaggrandisement sometimes proved irresistible, as the Crimean War of 1853-1856 attests. Moreoften, however, the Concert took pains to emphasize, as it did prior to the Syrian intervention, thatno member of the Concert would seek “any territorial advantage, any exclusive influence, or anycommercial concession for their subjects which might not be granted to the subjects of all the othernations.”59 Rather than consider such interventions to be humanitarianly inspired, it seems moreappropriate to interpret them in the political context in which they took place: five relatively equalEuropean powers with a common weak neighbour in a strategically and economically importantlocation. As Antoine Rougier concludes, the Turkish territory became the battleground on whichthe broader European balance of power was played out:Ds l’instant que les puissances intervenantes sont juges de I’opportunitd de leur action, elles estimerontcette intervention au point de vue subjectif de leurs intérets du moment... Si l’Europe a mis In Turquie en56 See Lillich, “A Reply to Ian Brownlie,” p. 232.See especially, Ellery Stowell, Intervention in International Law, (Washington, D.C.: John Byrne andCo.,1921); Manouchehr Ganji, International Protection ofHuman Rights, (Paris: Librairie Minard, 1962); and JohnPierre Fonteyne, “The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validityunder the U.N. Charter,” CalVornia Western International Law Journal 4(1974), pp. 203 -27058 Woolsey, America’s Foreign Policy, p. 74 as cited in Stowell, Intervention, p. 131, ff. 61.Stowell, Intervention, p. 64-6518tutelle, c’est moms dans l’intérêt des sujets ottomans que pour parer aux conflits d’int&êts de 1’Angleterre, de1’Autriche, de la France et de la Russie autour de la mer Noire.6°In addition to their skepticism of the intervenor’s motives, realist critics of 19th centuryinterventions also focus on the hierarchical nature of the international system at that time. JohnClaydon criticizes revolutionists such as Richard Lillich for ignoring the existence of a “doublehierarchy” in the 19th century system.61 At the intra-European level, there existed a hierarchy ofsmall states subsumed under the larger powers. This resulted in interventions aimed at maintainingthe balance of power either by propping up weak states, such as occurred in Belgium in 1830, or,more drastically, in the partition of Poland. At a second level of the hierarchy, there existed thepredominance of European states over non-European states. The effect of this double hierarchy,observes Claydon, was a somewhat flexible doctrine of sovereignty.62 While the sovereignty ofEuropean powers was considered absolute in their relations amongst themselves, “an absoluteprinciple of non-interference did not accord with their interests in all occasions.”63 Thus, while theOttoman Porte would protest, as he did on the occasion of the Concert’s intervention in the Greekcivil war, that “l’affaire grecque est une affaire inteme de la Sublime Porte, et que c’est a elle seulea s’en occuper,” his protestations invariably would be ignored.M This double hierarchy reflectswhat was considered a truism of the time: that there existed those states that were, in Rougier’sterms, the dirigeants and those who were the dirigés.65 Simply put, the 19th century internationalsystem was based on a hierarchical paternalism that was accepted almost without question by thegreat powers of Europe. As Antoine Rougier states: “Ceux qui peuvent mettre au service de lacommunauté une plus grande science, un plus grand développement juridique et social, une plusgrand puissance economique, financiére ou militaire, devront être investis d’une autorité légitimesur les Etats inférleures qui ne peuvent que suivre l’impulsion reçue.”66 Developed during a timewhen ‘the civilized world’ consisted of Europe, by states sharing many cultural and economic60 Antoine Rougier, “La Th&rie de L’Intervention D’Humanitd,” Revue Générale du Droit Internationale, 17(1910)p. 525.61 Claydon, John, “Humanitarian Intervention in International Law,” Queen’s Intramural Law Journal 1 (November1969) pp. 36-63.62 Claydon, “Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 4663 Claydon, “Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 46.64 cited in Ganji, International Protection ofHuman Rights, p. 23. In fact, the Porte, without exception, protestedevery instance of Concert intervention.65 Rougier, “Théorie,” p. 504.66 Rougier, “Thdorie,” p. 504.19interests, exercised by the strong against the weak (but only when action did not threaten to disturbthe balance of power), the 19th century doctrine does not seems to offer much support forrecognizing it as legally acceptable practice.The realist skepticism of 19th century interventions continues undiminished into the 20thcentury. Once again, the motives of the intervening state most often undermine the humanitarianaspect of the intervention. What one immediately notices about the Cold War era is the sheernumber of interventions characterized as humanitarianly inspired. Whereas most authors cite five19th century examples as case studies, the Cold War debate includes, in general, approximatelytwelve.67 Fortunately, many of these can readily be dismissed as the claim of humanitarianism ispatently false. Some, such as South Africa’s intervention into Angola, Indonesia’s interventioninto East Timor, or Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea are fairly straightforward cases ofaggression. While humanitarian motives were an absolutely preposterous claim in the first twocases, the depth of the tragedy in Kampuchea was horrific. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese, asBazyler has written, “harbored territorial ambitions over Kampuchea. Recognizing theunpopularity of the Khmer Rouge regime, the Vietnamese took advantage of the situation to invadeKampuchea and install a puppet regime.”68 Other cases, such as the 1960 Belgian intervention inthe Congo and the combined French, Belgian, Italian, British and Greek intervention in Zaire in1978 represent clear cases of economic interest-inspired intervention. In the Congo, the Belgianshoped “the Katangese rebels... would respect Belgian commercial interests in the mineral-richprovince of Katanga, in exchange for its armed support.”69 Meanwhile, in Zaire the collectiveEuropean intervention against the National Congolese Liberation Army’s seizure of Koiwesi, thecapital of the copper-rich Shaba province, was instrumental to the survival of the pro-FrenchMobutu regime.7° Still other interventions had more to do with the imperatives of Cold War“spheres of influence” than humanitarianism. The United States’ interventions into Central67 Among the best surveys of Cold War interventions are: Fonteyne, “Customary International Law Doctrine ofHumanitarian Intervention;” W.D. Verwey, “Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law,” NetherlandsInternational Law Review, 32(3) 1985, pp. 357-418; and, Anthony Clark Arend and Robert 3. Beck, InternationalLaw and The Use ofForce New York: Routledge, 1993.68 Michael J. Bazyler, “Reexamining the Doctine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of the Atrocities inKampuchea and Ethiopia,” Stanford Journal ofInternational Law 23 (1987) p. 608.69 W.D. Verwey, “Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 400.70 Verwey, “Humanitarian Intervention,” p.40320America stand out in this regard.71 In its 1965 foray into the Domincan Republic, for example, theU.S. Government initially justified its actions as necessary “to protect the lives of US nationals andthose of other countries.”72 The true motives of the operation were made clear by PresidentJohnson as the U.S. operation entered its second phase: “The American nation cannot, must not,and will not permit the establishment of another communist government in the Westernhemisphere.”73 Interventions during the Cold War, therefore, were more often motivated byopportunism, economic, or ideological motives—often in combination, such as in the multinationaloperation in the Congo in 1964—and involved the rescue of nationals of the intervening state.Two cases in particular reveal the weakness of the revolutionist argument: India’s 1971intervention into East Paldstan and Tanzania’s 1979 ouster of Ida Amin Dada of Uganda. In bothcases, revolutionists must engage in a significant amount of self-deception in order to considerthese to be humanitarianly inspired. Of the Indian intervention Fernando Tesón has written:The important point here is not so much whether the Indian leaders harbored selfish purposes along withhumanitarian ones, or in what proportion did those purposes blend as an efficient cause of theintervention.., but rather that the whole picture of the situation was one that warranted foreign interventionon grounds of humanity. Humanitarian intervention is the best interpretation we can provide for theBangladesh war. That reading puts the incident in the best light under both principles of international lawand elementary moral commitments to human dignity.74Because he has elevated human rights protection to the level of a categorical imperative, TesOn isforced to impose an interpretation of events that does not necessarily accord with reality. Theintervention must be understood in the context of the effect on India’s economy of the 10 millionrefugees,75 the Pakistani attack on India’s airport and, most importantly, in terms of regional geopolitics. Not only was India anxious to strike a blow at its bitter rival Pakistan and establish amore moderate state on its northern border, but India was also interested in creating a neutral bufferstate between itself, Pakistan and China. Given the alliance India had with the Soviet Union,Pakistan had allied itself with China. With the creation of Bangladesh, the common border71 The Indian intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 reflects the same type of hegemonial considerations. See For adifferent spin on these events, see Ninnala Chandrahasan, “The Use of Force to Ensure Humanitarian Relief: ASouth Asian Precedent Examined,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 42(July 1993) pp. 664-672.72 U.S. Dep’t of State, Legal Basis for U.S. Action in the Dominican Republic, 111 Cong. Rec. 11119 (1965),cited in Sohn, Louis B. and Burgenthal, Thomas, International Protection ofHuman Rights, eds. Louis B. Sohnand Thomas Burgenthal (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973) p. 206.‘ Johnson, cited in Arend and Beck, International Law and the Use ofForce, p. 116‘ Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 186-87cited in Verwey, “Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 40221between Pakistan and China was effectively severed. If we were to evaluate the Indian actionsolely in terms of the effect of Indian intervention on the plight of the Bengali population, thenundoubtedly it was overwhelmingly humanitarian. Once we examine India’s motives, however,all semblance of altruism vanishes. Perhaps India itself recognized this because while it initiallystated “we have on this particular occasion absolutely nothing but the purest of motives and thepurest of intentions: to rescue the people of East Bengal from what they are suffering,”76Indialater deleted all references to humanitarian intervention in the Official Records of the SecurityCouncil.77A similar misinterpretation occurs in Tesón’s discussion of Tanzania’s intervention intoUganda. Of this intervention, he writes:Admittedly, Nyerere most probably would have not invaded Uganda had not Amin engaged in his frivolousaggressive enterprise. It is also possible that Nyerere was upset over the overthrow of his friend MiltonObote and was committed to help reinstate him in power. Yet considerations of humanity are the onlyconceivable legal justification for the Tanzanian overthrow of Amin. Reasons of humanity lie at the rootof Tanzania’s disregard for sovereignty-related inhibitions.78Despite Tesón’s exhortations to the contrary, the facts of the intervention do not support hisassertion that Tanzania’s intervention was humanitarianly inspired. First, Tanzanian PresidentNyerere harboured a long-standing hatred of Idi Amin dating back to the January 1971 coup,which resulted in the ouster of Neyerere’s close personal friend Milton Obote. Neyerere grantedObote asylum in Tanzania and refused to recognize Amin’s government. Neyerere went so far asto support an attempt to reinstate Obote, by assisting a “small invading army” that was “driving tooverthrow President Amin.”79 Second, this political hatred also resulted in years of militaryskirmishes and even some invasions, most notably Amin’s 1978 invasion and occupation of theKageria Salient region of Tanzania.80 A third factor that must be considered is the blow toNyerere’s prestige occasioned by Amin’s invasion. As one observer writes, ‘[Amin’s] invasion76 Franck and Rodley, “After Bangladesh,” p. 276Akehurst, “Humanitarian Intervention,” in Bull (ed) 1984, p. 96.78 Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 164Hassan, Farooq, “Realpolitik in International Law: After Tanzanian-Ugandan Conflict ‘HumanitarianIntervention’ Reexamined,” Willamette Law Review 17(4) 1981, p. 86880 Hassan, “Realpolitik,” p. 868-922infuriated Nyerere and was indeed humiliating... [and] could alone explain [Tanzanian]invasion.”81Clearly the operation was not entirely without selfish motivations, yet, as Tanzania’sharshest critic acknowledges, “If humanitarian concerns ever may outweigh respect for territorialsovereignty, they did in this case.”82 Still, one should not confuse moral approbation with legalendorsement. Tanzania’s intervention was received with the least amount of international criticismof any 20th century cases. As Wani writes, “Though it was charged as a violation of certainpreemptory norms, it was never seriously censured.”83 Thus perhaps the most that may be saidabout this case may have already been said by Sir Vernon Harcourt: humanitarian intervention is“above and beyond the domain of law and when wisely and equitably handled by those who havethe power to give effect to it, may be the highest policy ofjustice and humanity.” While we mustbe wary of attempts to impose ex post facto arguments on past interventions, we must alsoacknowledge that the Tanzanian intervention represents the closest thing to a humanitarianintervention during the Cold War.Concluding the realist critique of the revolutionist position, it is possible to summarize theirarguments in an observation made by Jack Donnelly: “When will states act?” he asks:Necessary conditions seem to include very low prospects of successful retaliation or loss of benefits, theabsence of Cold War unusually high level of popular interest in the situation...Furthermore,unless there are also clear and considerable selfish national interests to be furthered, ‘humanitarian’intervention almost certainly will not take place...85Given the post-Cold War intervention in Somalia, these criteria, despite their cynicism, seem ratherprescient. In fact, these four criteria will form the basis of Chapter Three’s analysis of theevolution of humanitarian intervention.The Rationalist Compromise: Pluralism and Solidarism81 Ibrahim J. Wani, “Humanitarian Intervention and the Tanzania-Uganda War,” Horn ofAfrica 3 (No. 2, 1980), p.2582 Hassan, “Realpolitik,” p. 892.83 Wani, “The Tanzania-Uganda War,” p. 24.84 Harcourt, Sir Vernon, Letters by Historicus on Some Questions ofInternational Law (1863) New York: KrausReprint Co., 1971, p. 1485 Donnelly, “Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign Policy: Law, Morality andPolitics,” Journal ofInternational Affairs 37 (Winter 1984), p. 320.23While the polarized nature of the Cold War carried over into the academic debate onhumanitarian intervention, rationalists nevertheless attempted to “partak[e] of the realism of theMachiavellians, without their cynicism, and of the idealism of the Kantians, without theirfanaticism.”86 In seeking this via media, however, they often found themselves defending thestatus quo. Nevertheless, as Hedley Bull observed, the search for a compromise could befollowed from one of two paths, pluralism or solidarism, reflecting the authors predilection forrealism or revolutionism. The writings of both authors reflects a tension between pluralist andsolidarist inclinations: Bull’s Anarchcal Society: A Study of Order in World Politics can becontrasts with his later effort Justice in International Society; Vincent’s Nonintervention andInternational Order contrasts with Human Rights and International Relations. For Bull’s part,however, his defense of a pluralist position is flawed. R.J. Vincent, on the other hand, presentsnot only a more coherent defense of pluralism, but also offers a more solidarist vision ofinternational society.Bull’s defense of pluralism is a two stage process: first, understanding the relationshipbetween order and justice; and second, infusing order with moral value. While recognizing theinherent value of both order and justice, he noted that they were not always compatible:the institutions and mechanisms which sustain international order, even when they are working properly,indeed especially when they are working properly, or fulfilling their functions.., necessarily violate ordinarynotions of justice.87He pointed out that institutions such as the balance of power, war, international law and the systemof great powers were inherently conservative, often sacrificing the interests of small countries,minority groups and individuals to the imperatives of international order. While recognizing thisincompatibility, Bull also embraced it, noting that order and justice were only incompatible “inthose cases where there is no consensus as to what justice involves, and when to press the claimsof justice is to re-open questions which the compact of coexistence requires to be treated asclosed.”88 For Bull, humanitarian intervention during the Cold War was just such an issue. Hewrote:86 Hedley Bull, “Martin Wight,” p. 107.87 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 91.88 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 95.24The reluctance evident in the international community even to experiment with the conception of a right ofhumanitarian intervention reflects not only an unwillingness to jeaopardize the rules of sovereignty andnon-intervention by conceding such a right to individual states, but also the lack of any agreed doctrine as towhat human rights are.89Without a minimum consensus on the content of human rights, Bull fell back to a defense of order:‘justice... is only realizable in the context of order... It is true afortiori, that international society,by providing a context of order of some kind, however rudimentary, may be regarded as pavingthe way for the equal enjoyment of rights of various kinds.”90 Bull’s pluralism amounts to adefense of order based on the fact that it provides some kind of context in which justice canflourish. R.J. Vincent, however, was not satisfied with Bull’s argument. Linldng the moral valueof order to self-determination, he stated, can result in “rationalizing blindness to central moralissues concerned with the treatment of individuals...[and} a morality giving no sight of such centralissues would be a third-rate morality whatever the argument of prudence that supported it.”91While Vincent himself did not stray far from a non-interventionist stance during the Cold War, hewas deeply aware of the dangers of complacency involved in defending order.Vincent’s own defense of pluralism acknowledged the value of order in internationalrelations, yet also offered an additional moral argument in its defense, one which is truer to thepluralism of rationalist thought. Like Bull, his argument was advanced in two stages. First, heargued that there did in fact exist a body of human rights law that could be considered universal.Referring to them as ‘basic rights,’ he defined them as “what is essential or necessary for aproperly human life” and incorporating “a right to security against violence and a right tosubsistence.”92 These rights reflect what Vincent terms the “minimal modification of the moralityof states: it seeks to put a floor under the societies of the world and not a ceiling over them. Fromthe floor up is the business of several societies.”93 Yet it is in Vincent’s discussion of theimplications of the existence of ‘basic rights’ that the solidarist tradition distinguishes itself:The admission of basic rights is not only a modification of the morality of states, it is also a modificationof the argument that the domestic legitimacy of a state has nothing to do with its international legitimacy...89 Hedley Bull, “Conclusion,” Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) p. 193.90 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 87-88.91 RJ. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, p. 124.92 Ri. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, p. 14, 125.RJ. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, p. 126.25The failure of a government of a state to provide for its citizens’ basic rights might now be taken as areason for considering it illegitimate.94Unlike Bull, Vincent advocated a more critical evaluation of the domestic governments. At thesame time, however, he drew a distinction between criticism and action: “if we made [humanrights] the basis for international conduct, as distinct from international criticism, there would beno end to wars of intervention... In the society of states as it is, righteous intervention will bereceived as imperialism.”95 The distinction between criticism and action reflects not only thedegree of solidarity in Cold War international society, but also his own defense of pluralism: thenon-intervention principle “accepts variety within states, and seeks to prevent its forcefulreduction. It recognizes the foreignness of foreigners. It can concede that cultural differences arein some degrees morally relevant.”96 This is pluralism in the rationalist tradition: starting from thepremise that human rights are universal, but recognizing that cultural pluralism not only exists, butalso has value; recognizing that while we may be able to learn many things about a culture from abook, we are still outsiders. This is the lesson that Somalia would teach the world.Finally, it bears restating that during the Cold War the rationalist compromise betweenrevolutionism and realism ended up endorsing the non-intervention principle. As Franck andRodley observed, “Nothing would be a more foolish footnote to man’s demise than that his finaldestruction was occasioned by a war to ensure human rights.”97 After the Cold War, however,Vincent returned to the subject of humanitarian intervention and observed:[W]e have to engage with an emerging notion of international legitimacy: ‘emerging’ since it can now beargued that the international law of human rights is recognized as part of the ius gentium intra Se... Thisopens up the state to scrutiny from outsiders and propels us beyond non-intervention.98Into the ‘New World Order?’While unaccompanied by the typical post-war celebrations, the end of the Cold War hasnonetheless resulted in a surge of euphoric optimism. As in 1919 and 1945, the United States9 R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, p. 127.9 RJ. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, p. 123.96 RJ. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986) p.117.9” Franck, Thomas and Nigel Rodley, “After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by MilitaryForce,” American Journal ofInternational Law 67(1973), p. 30098 RJ. Vincent and Peter Wilson, “Beyond Non-Intervention,” Political Theory, International Relations, and theEthics ofIntervention ed. Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman, (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1993) p. 12826seems to be leading the rest of the world into a ‘new world order’ shaped by a political consensusthat Stephen John Stedman has described as a ‘new interventionism.’99 “The newinterventionists,” avers Stedman, “wed great emphasis on the moral obligations of the internationalcommunity to an eagerness for a newly available United Nations to intervene in domestic conflictsthroughout the world.”100 Four elements of this interventionist consensus are especially relevantto this paper’s purposes. First, the end of the superpower rivalry and with it the possibilities ofinter-state warfare, international attention could now be focused on the scourge of civil war.Typical of the ‘new interventionists,’ David 3. Scheffer sanguinely observes that “it just might bepossible that by the end of the 20th century the senseless abuse of people within borders will be astrictly historical phenomenon.”°’ A second aspect of the post-Cold War consensus is the revivalof the United Nations as the vehicle for effecting the end of domestic conflicts. Citing theorganization’s experiences in Namibia, El Salvador and Yugoslavia, Gerald Helman and StevenRatner observe that the lessons gained “bode well for its ability to adapt to the more complexdemands of conservatorship.”102 One of the most complex types of United Nations operation, asdescribed by Helman and Ratner, will be the task of saving “failed states,” that is, those states suchas Somalia where the “governmental structures have been overwhelmed by circumstances.”103 Insuch situations, unlike Cambodia, local authorities will simply “turn over power to the UnitedNations and follow its orders, rather than retaining a veto.”04 A third assumption of the ‘newinterventionists,’ therefore, is the increasing obsolescence of the principle of state sovereignty. Nolonger the cornerstone of international order, it is now regarded as a “political constraint” or as a“barrier” to effective humanitarian action.105 It is the fourth and final element of this ‘newinterventionism,’ however, that most clearly typifies the post-Cold War consensus in the UnitedStates: a certain element of naive idealism. Described by Stedman as one of the “long-standingStephen John Stedman, “The New Interventionists,” Foreign Affairs 72 (No. 1, America and the World 1992-93)pp. 1-16.100 Stedman, “The New Interventionists,” pp. 1-2.101 David 3. Scheffer, “Towards a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention,” University of Toledo LawReview 23 (Winter 1992) p. 293.102 Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. RaWer, “Saving Failed States,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-93) p. 17.103 Helman and Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” p. 5.104 Helman and Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” p. 16.105 See Frances M. Deng, Protecting the Dispossessed (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1992) p. 15 and Deng andLarry Minear, The Challenges ofFamine Relief (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1992) p. 119.27tendencies of American foreign policy,’ this idealism is comprised of three elements: “missionaryzeal, bewilderment when the world refuses to conform to American expectations and a belief thatfor every problem there is a quick and easy solution.”106 Nowhere was the ‘new interventionism’program more clearly at work than in the dispatch of United States troops to Somalia in Decemberof 1992. As one commentator remarked: “A visitor could walk the corridors of the United Nationsfairly swollen with the majesty of the United States that could at last glory in its conscience insteadof its might. We have assembled our battalions not to fight but to save a people we do not evenknow...”107Contrary to the picture just presented, the ‘new interventionism’ did not simply materializeovernight. In fact it evolved in three phases, beginning at the United Nations General Assembly,moving to the Security Council and Boutros Boutros Ghali and ratified in the U.S. Presidentialelections of 1992. Reflecting the emergence of what Martin Wight might call ‘grassrootscosmopolitanism,’ international NGOs began a process of asserting their role in the delivery ofhumanitarian relief. Emerging in the wake of the Armenian earthquake in 1988, the ongoingSudanese civil war and the creation of ‘safe havens’ for the Kurds in northern Iraq, threeresolutions were unanimously passed at the General Assembly. Resolution 43(13 1) of 8December 1988, for the first time in U.N. history, recognizes the important role of NGOs inproviding humanitarian assistance and invites states to make use of their skills.108 Second,resolution 45(100) of 29 January 1991, endorsed the concept of “relief corridors” described byU.N. officials as one of “history’s largest humanitarian interventions in an active civil war.”1°The culmination of the NGO effort would be realized in General Assembly resolution 46(182),passed by a unanimous vote on 17 December 1991. Entitled “Strengthening of the Coordination ofHumanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations,” the resolution had two chiefobjectives: first, to centralize coordination of the numerous United Nations and international NGOrelief organizations; and second, to enable the coordinator to put pressure on recalcitrant106 Stedman, “The New Interventionists,” p. 4.107 Murray Kempton cited in Alexander Cockburn, “Beat the Devil,” The Nation (21 December 1992) P. 762.108 U.N. Doc. G.A./Res./43/131, 8 December 1988.109 U.N. Doc. G.A./Res./45/100, 29 January 1991, p. 3.110 Deng and Minear, Challenges ofFamine Relief p. 84.28governments denying aid to their citizens. In addition, its key paragraph offers five hedges on theconcept of state sovereignty: humanitarian assistance should (but not must) to be delivered with theconsent (but not request) of the affected country (but not necessarily its formal government) basedin principle (though but not necessarily always) on an appeal (again, not a formal request).111While Paul Lewis of the New York Times has referred to this resolution as “a small but significantstep toward establishing a right of humanitarian intervention,”112 Larry Minear’s evaluation isprobably closer to the mark: “[t]he new language reflects growing global solidarity with peoplesuffering in intolerable conditions and a heightened support for more assertive internationalaction.”3 These resolutions were the beginning of a renewed international effort to alleviate theplight of those suffering in incidents of natural disasters and civil wars. As outgoing U.N.Secretary General Perez de Cuellar stated, “We are clearly witnessing what is probably anirresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the nameof morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents.”114 One of the humanitarian reliefcoordinator’s first challenges would come in Somalia.In the wake of the Gulf War and George Bush’s promulgation of a ‘new world order,’ theUnited Nations Security Council directed its new Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, toinvestigate the possibilities for strengthening “the capacity of the United Nations for preventativediplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping.”5Boutros Ghali’s response, An AgendaforPeace, outlines two new concepts central to this paper’s focus: peace-enforcement and post-conflictpeace-building.116 In his clearest statement of the purpose of peace-enforcement, Boutros Ghalistates that it will “enable the United Nations to deploy troops quickly to enforce a cease-fire bytaking coercive action against either party, or both, if they violate it.” Such an operation, Boutros“Strengthening of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations,” U.N. Doc.G.A./Res/46/182, 8 December 1991. For an overly sanguine appraisal, see Christine Ellerman, “Command ofSovereignty Gives Way to Humanity,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnaiional Law 26(2), May 1993, p. 368.112 Paul Lewis, “U.N. to Centralize Its Relief Efforts,” New York Times 18 December 1991, p. A.19.113 Larry Minear, Humanitarian Intervention in a New World Order, (Washington: Overseas Development Council,1992), p. 3.114 Javier Perez de Cuellar, cited in David 3. Scheffer, “Challenges Confronting Collective Security: HumanitarianIntervention,” in Scheffer, Gardner and Helman, Post-Gulf War Challenges to the U.N. Collective Security System:Three Views on the Issue ofHumanitarian Intervention, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1992)p.4.“Security Council Summit Declaration: New Risks for Stability and Security,” New York Times, 1 February1992, p. 4.116 Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda For Peace (United Nations: New York, 1992) p. 26, 32.29Ghali continues “goes beyond [traditional] peacekeeping to the extent that the operation would bedeployed without the express consent of the two parties (though its basis would be a cease-fireagreement previously reached between them).”117 In addition to enforcing cease-fires, the UnitedNations would now be called upon to engage in post-conflict peace-building, described by BoutrosGhali ascomprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance asense of confidence and well-being among peoples. Through agreements ending civil strife, these mayinclude disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possibledestruction of weapons... advisory and training support for security personnel... advancing efforts to protecthuman rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informalprocesses of political participation.8The first United Nations-sponsored mission to rescue a ‘failed state’ took place in Somalia andunderscored the possibilities and limits of both peace-enforcement and post-conflict peace-building. In fact, the international community’s experience in Somalia demonstrates, somewhatironically, the theoretical validity of the entire conflict resolution continuum, while illustrating itsshortcomings in practice.The new interventionist agenda and the United Nations expanded peacekeepingresponsibilities were both endorsed by incoming Clinton administration. The Democratic versionof the ‘new world order’ was described by Clinton’s U.N. representative Madaleine K. Albright asa “principled international community.” “It’s in our interest to shape a world that is more than anagglomeration of states,” she observed, stating that such a community was “forced” upon theUnited States by five imperatives: first, the strategic imperative of coping with diffuse geographicalthreats; second, the legitimacy gained by acting according to international law; third, the economicimperative of burden-sharing; the imperative of utilizing the collective moral authority andresources of the international community to offer principled change to the disaffected; and fmally,the equity imperative of addressing north-south disparities.’9While rejecting the responsibility to“right every wrong,” Albright did announce that “our goal is to foster the development of a117 Bouiros Boutros Ghali, “Empowering the United Nations,” Foreign Affairs 71(Winter 1992/1993) p. 96.118 Boutros Ghali, Agenda for Peace, p. 32, pam. 55.119 Madeleine K. Aibright, “A Strong United Nations Serves U.S. Security Interests,” Address before the Councilon Foreign Relations’ Conference on Cooperative Security and the United Nations, New York, 11 June 1993reprinted in US Department of State Dispatch 4 (No. 26, 28 June 1993) pp. 461-62.30community capable of easing, if not terminating, the abominable injustices and conditions that stillplague civilization...”120To address these five imperatives, the Clinton administration proposed to expand its supportfor the United Nations and its peacekeeping activities. During the election campaign, Clintonhimself advocated a the creation of a U.N. rapid reaction force to address regional conflicts.Clinton’s future Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, also asserted that “It will be thisadministrations policy to encourage other nations and the institutions of collective security,especially the United Nations, to do more of the world’s work to deter aggression, relievesuffering, and keep the peace.”121 To assist the United Nations, the new administration promisedto pay its outstanding debts, declared its intention to support the “rapid expansion’ of UnitedNations peace enforcement operations around the world” and even suggested that U.S. troopsmight serve under foreign commanders on a regular basis.122 Describing the U.S. approach to theUnited Nations as “assertive multilateralism,” Albright used the example of “state-buildingoperations” to extol its benefits:There is simply no way the United States or any other nation could unilaterally undertake the rescue offailed societies. But a viable collective security system can provide authority and, when necessary, militarymuscle to achieve democratic aims that are unquestionably in our best interests.123Thus the goal of state-building came to embody a new U.S. commitment to the United Nations, topeace-keeping operations and the spread of democracy. As his aids stressed, the aim of theDemocratic presidency would be to “establish democracy-building as a hallmark of Clinton’spresidency in the same way that... Jimmy Carter is remembered for his championing of humanrights.”124 To accompany the aids’ inauspicious choice of presidential analogies, Secretary ofState Warren Christopher would also remark, “Democracy cannot be imposed from above. By itsvery nature, it must be built, often slowly, at the grass-roots level.”125120 Madeleine K. Aibright, “A Strong United Nations Serves U.S.,” p. 462.121 Warren Christopher, “Statement at Senate Confirmation Hearing,” Washington, D.C., 13 January 1993reprinted in US Department of State Dispatch 4 (No. 4, 25 January 1993) p. 47.122 Barton Geilman, “Wider U.N. Police Role Supported,” The Washington Post, 5 August 1993, p. Al.123 Madeleine K. Aibright, “Building a Collective Security System,” Statement before the House Foreign AffairsCommitte, Washington D.C., 3 May 1993, reprinted in US Department of State Dispatch 4 (No. 19, 10 May 1993)p. 333.124 John M. Goshko and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Details of Clinton’s Democracy’ Program Slowly Begin to Emerge,”The Washington Post 5 May 1993, p. A28.125 Goshko and Smith, “Clinton’s Democracy Program,” p. A28.31ConclusionThe new interventionist agenda represents the sea-change that has taken places since the endof the Cold War. At the level of international society, the new interventionist ideas are clearly‘revolutionary,’ expressing an increased level of human solidarity. In terms of humanitarianintervention, the ambitious vision of a United Nations responsible for ensuring the protection ofminimum human values, by force if necessary, embodies the greater resolve of an internationalcommunity seeking to respond to the carnage of civil wars. Unfortunately, as the next chapterdemonstrates, the United Nations had suffered more than anyone knew during its 45 years ofcryogenic sleep; it proved unequal to the demands of the immediate post-Cold War world.32Chapter 2Post-Cold War Humanitarian Intervention in SomaliaIn order to properly evaluate the international intervention in Somalia, it is necessary tounderstand the historical, cultural, political and economic forces that precipitated the initial crisis.This chapter’s principle purpose is to analyze these factors and provide an historical overview ofthe international community’s involvement in Somalia. Accordingly, five historical periods arereviewed: traditional Somali society to Independence in 1960; the dictatorship of Siad Barre (1969-1991); the civil war (1990-92); international involvement in the civil war period; and from theUnited States-led intervention (IJNITAF) to the subsequent UNOSOM II operation. Beforeturning to this historical overview, however, three case studies will be reviewed to provide acontext within which to evaluate the international community’s intervention in Somalia: the 1990intervention in Liberia by the military arm of the Economic Community of West African States(ECOMOG); the creation of safe-havens in Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War; and fmally, theinternational response to the disintegration of the Yugoslav republic.Post-Cold War “Humanitarianism”Liberia 1990Founded in 1847 by freed slaves from the United States, Liberia soon became sharplydivided as the new arrivals seized political power, subjecting the indigenous populations to secondclass status. The 1980 coup that brought Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe to power was thereforewidely welcomed many Liberians who saw it as the long-awaited overthrown of the traditionalelite. Five years after his coup, his popularity waning, Doe fell back upon electoral fraud andviolence to restrain his opposition. An ethnic Krahn, Doe specifically targeted two other ethnicgroups, the Gios and Manos, and setting the stage for more violence and, eventually, civil war.On 24 December 1989, a rebel group led by Charles Taylor, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia(NPFL), invaded from neighbouring Ivory Coast. The government responded with violentrepression, eventually forcing the United Nations to withdraw in June 1990.33By August 1990, with atrocities mounting and no prospect for U.N. intervention, a threethousand-strong force assembled by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)and led by Nigeria, intervened in Liberia without the explicit consent of President Doe. ECOWASjustified its intervention on the grounds that the fighting was no longer a civil war, with thousandsof refugees crossing into neighbouring countries. In its post-intervention declaration, ECOWASidentified its mandate as “first and foremost to stop the senseless killing of innocent civiliannationals and foreigners, and to help the Liberian people to restore their democraticinstitutions...”126 While critics raised questions as to the relationship between Doe and NigerianPresident Babingida and Nigerian aspirations for the role of regional hegemon, even the harshestcritics acknowledge that in its initial stages, the ECOMOG force succeeded in establishing order inthe capital of Monrovia, obtaining a cease-fire that permitted the return of humanitarian relieforganizations, returning the government troops (the Armed Forces of Liberia - AFL) to theirbarracks and installing an interim government led by Amos Sawyer. Most Liberians in Monroviawelcomed the ECOMOG intervention. As Africa Watch observed, “A number of other Liberiansand expatriates pointed to the disaster in Somalia, noting that were it not for ECOMOG, Monroviawould have disintegrated into a situation like Mogadishu, with none of the factions able to win aclear victory and all of them preying upon the civilian population.”27For two years the fragile cease-fire held. During this time, ECOMOG sought to extend itsmandate over NPFL territory and reinvigorate civil society to replace the violence of the variousfactions. United Nations special representative Trevor Livingstone Gordon-Somers described theincorporation of elders, community leaders and women’s groups into the peace process as “anessential step to a major national reconciliation conference...”28 Unfortunately, in October of1992 Taylor unleashed “Operation Octopus” and the greatly outnumbered ECOMOG forces werecompelled to retreat to Monrovia. ECOWAS appealed for help to the United Nations and on 19November the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 788, formally determining that“the deterioration of the situation in Liberia constitutes a threat to international peace and126 Cited in Christopher Greenwood, “Is there a right of humanitarian intervention?” The World Today 49 (No.2February 1993), p. 37.127 Africa Watch, “Liberia: Waging War to Keep the Peace,” (New York: Human Rights Watch, June 1993) p. 8.128 Africa Watch, “Liberia: Waging War to Keep the Peace,” p. 28.34security.”29 Accordingly, the Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo underChapter VII of the Charter. Two aspects of this decision bear emphasis: first, there was anundoubted threat to international peace and security in the region as the fighting had spread intoneighbouring Sierra Leone; and second, the interim government of Amos Sawyer government hadapproved the arms embargo.Vastly oumumbered, the ECOMOG forces gradually formed an alliance with the rebelgroups opposing Taylor. From this point in the conifict, the ECOMOG force become focused onousting Taylor to the point that it itself became guilty of violating the humanitarian laws of war,bombing relief convoys destined for NPFL territory and several hospitals. On 26 March 1993, theUnited Nations passed resolution 813 condemning the attacks on the ECOMOG forces and calledon all parties to “respect strictly the provisions of international of humanitarian law.”130 Theresolution, however, did not criticize ECOMOG. Africa Watch posits two reasons for this: first,the desire to avoid the cost of another peace-keeping operation; and second, the goal ofstrengthening regional organizations to settle problems locally rather than involve the U.N.itself.131 Nevertheless in September of 1993, the United Nations sent 300 observers to monitor adisarmament agreement hammered out in July as ECOMOG forces closed in on Taylor. ByNovember, however, talks had again stalled. As Kenneth B. Noble observed, “the real issue ispower. none of the camps are certain that it can win outright if elections are held as planned earlynext year.”32Iraq 1991The passage of resolution 660 of 2 August 1990 is seen by many as the rebirth of an activistUnited Nations in the post-Cold War world.133 That resolution condemned Iraq for its invasionand occupation of Kuwait, calling for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal. In the face of129 see Christopher Greenwood, “Is there a right of humanitarian intervention?” p. 37.130 Africa Watch, “Liberia: Waging War to Keep the Peace,” p. 28-29.131 Africa Watch, “Liberia: Waging War to Keep the Peace,” p. 29.132 Kenneth B. Noble, “As Liberia’s Factions Talk, Strife and Fear Drag On,” New York Times 5 November 1993,p. A3.133 See, for example, Robert H. Jackson, “Armed Humanitarianism,” International Journal 48(Autumn 1993) p.591.35Iraqi intransigence, the Security Council acted with explicit reference to Chapter VII of the U.N.Charter to pass resolution 678, authorizing member states to use “all necessary means” to removeIraq from Kuwaiti soil. It should be noted that resolution 660 was a response to a clear threat to“international peace and security,” understood in the traditional sense of territorial aggression. Inaddition, once this resolution was approved, the United Nations effectively handed over theprosecution of the Persian Gulf War to the coalition forces and, more specifically, the UnitedStates. Following Iraq’s defeat, the Security Council approved resolution 687, the so-termed“cease-fire” resolution, which granted to the victorious coalition supervision authority on suchissues as the destruction of any nuclear, chemical and biological weapons found in Iraq. The sameresolution also placed further limits on Iraqi sovereignty, preventing the export of petroleum unlessIraq agreed to divert a substantial portion of such revenues into a war reparations fund.Interestingly, all the permanent members of the Security Council supported this resolution, whileCuba opposed it and Yemen and Ecuador abstained.As the Gulf War drew to a close, on 15 February 1991, George Bush announced:There’s another way for the blood.shed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to takematters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside, and then comply withthe United Nations resolutions and rejoin the family of peace-loving nations. We have no argument withthe people of Iraq. Our differences are with that brutal dictator in Baghdad.On 28 February the Persian Gulf War ended and Saddam Hussein turned his Republican Guardsonto the northern Kurds and the southern Shi’a populations. The Kurds retreated into themountains along the Turkish and Iranian borders where their miserable plight attracted enormousmedia attention. Unwilling to accept so many Kurds into its southeastern and predominantlyKurdish region, Turkey closed its borders and even made advances into Iraqi territory to deterfurther refugees.While the United States announced that it would not use military force to support theuprisings because such action would be a violation of the Charter’s non-intervention principle, theFrench government asserted its intention to change the law.’35 Action at the Security Council134 Cited in, Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, Sdf-Determinalion in the New World Order, (Washington,D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 1992) p. 40, ff. 24.135 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, “Continuing Limits on U.N. Intervention in Civil War,” Indiana Law Journal 67(1992), p. 905.36resulted in the approval of resolution 688 on 5 April 1991. Its first paragraph stated that theSecurity CouncilCondemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, includingmost recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten internationalpeace and security in the region...Having invoked the language of Chapter VII, the resolution added its “demands” that Iraq“immediately end this repression,” its insistence that “Iraq allow immediate access by internationalhumanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq,” appealed tomember states to provide assistance. The resolution received the least approval of any previousresolutions connected with the Gulf War, passing with one more vote than the required two-thirdsminimum: China and India abstained while Cuba, Yemen and Zimbabwe were opposed.The day after the resolution’s approval, Britain and the U.S. announced that their troops inthe region would begin the delivery of humanitarian relief. Only ten days later was the plan tocreate safe-havens announced: hereafter the Iraqi government would be excluded from venturingnorth of the 36th parallel. Coalition forces defended this action by reading together resolution 678(authorizing “all necessary means” to restore international peace and security to the region) andresolution 688 (which again made reference to the refugees creating conditions threateninginternational peace and security).136 Significantly, Iraq’s consent to the operation was not soughtin its initial phase, but when the coalition forces sought to hand-off the operation to the UnitedNations, an agreement with Saddam Hussein was secured, pennitting the deployment of 500 U.N.monitors.137 While the Secretary General had initially stated that a new resolution would berequired to authorize the creation of safe-havens, no new resolution was passed, most likelybecause of the subsequent Iraqi consent.While the safe-havens were an unprecedented resthction of Iraqi sovereignty, the coalitionforces, from the beginning, rejected the use of force to assists Kurdish secession and regarded thesafe-haven proposal as a short-term solution. As Bush himself declared, “I want to stress that thisnew effort, despite its scale and scope, is not intended as a permanent solution to the plight of the136 see O’Connell, “Continuing Limits on U.N. Intervention,” p. 907.137 see U.N. Doe. Sf22513, “Letter from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations,” 22 April1991.37Iraqi Kurds. To the contrary it is an interim solution designed to meet an immediate, penetratinghumanitarian need.”138 The United States, in fact, was reluctant to press the issue of creating ademocratic Kurdish state for fear that it might be “more destabilizing than stabilizing,” declaringinstead that democratization should proceed at its “own pace.”39 Having created the safe-havens,the coalition found no simple solution for the future. Eventually, “Operation Poised Hammer” wascreated to provide for the stationing of coalition fighters in Turkey which would fly sorties over thesafe-havens (both Iraqi and Shi’a) to protect against Iraqi incursions. The safe-havens are still inexistence today.The Former Yugoslavia 1991The break-up of the Yugoslav Republic occurred in two phases: first, a civil war period fromJune 1991 to mid-1992 and a second internationalized conflict following the internationalcommunity’s recognition of the fragmented remnants. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, thereexisted a great deal of tension between the nationalistic federalism of President Milosevic and thedesire of Slovenians, Croats and Bosnians for greater regional autonomy. Afready in 1990, theU.S. Central Intelligence Agency had predicted that a Yugoslav breakup, resulting in civil war,would occur “most probably within the next 18 months.”140 In September of 1989, Slovenia hadaltered its constitution to permit secession. Croatia made similar constitutional arrangements inDecember of 1990. Civil war broke out in June of 1991 following Slovenian and Croatiandeclarations of independence. A dispute arose between the United States and the EuropeanCommunity over whether or not to recognize the self-declared republics. Germany led the EC byrecognizing Croatia, believing that such an action would remove the rump Serbian state’s incentivefor hostilities. The United States, on the other hand, argued on 13 December 1991 that earlyrecognition would undermine attempts at achieving a negotiated settlement and invariably lead tomore, not less war.’41138 Cited in Lawrence Freedman and David Boren, “Safe-Havens’ for the Kurds in Post-War Iraq,” in To Loose theBands of Wickedness: International Intervention in Defense ofHwnan Rights, Nigel S. Rodley ed., (London:Brassey’s for the David Davies Memorial Institute, 1992) p. 63.139 see Freedman and Boren, “Safe-Havens’” in Rodley, Bands of Wickedness, p. 65.140 Halperin and Scheffer, Seif-Determination in the New World Order, p. 33.141 Halperin and Scheffer, S4f-Determination in the New World Order, p. 36.38During this initial civil war phase, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution713 in September of 1991. It declared that the continuation of the civil war constituted a threat tointernational peace and security and imposed an arms embargo under Chapter VII of the Charter.Crucial to some members of the Security Council was the fact that the arms embargo had beenimposed with the consent of the Yugoslav government and that the suspension of the sameembargo would occur in consultation with the Yugoslav government.142 Yugoslav consent wasalso obtained for the deployment of the peacekeeping force authorized in resolution 721. The latterresolution noted that the consent of the warring groups was crucial to the successful operation of apeace-keeping force.143 As the civil war deepened and the parties came to be recognized asindependent states, the consent of the former-Yugoslavian government was no longer sought.Resolution 743, for example, established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)solely on the basis of a Chapter VII determination of a threat to international peace and security.The prospects for humanitarian intervention came to be associated with Bosnia and theefforts of the newly elected Clinton administration. On 10 February 1993, Secretary of StateWarren Christopher announced that “The world’s response to the violence in the formerYugoslavia is an early and crucial test of how it will address the concerns of the ethnic andreligious minorities in the post-cold-war period.”44 In the same speech, Christopher outlined thesix-point Clinton approach: active engagement in the Vance-Owen negotiation process; pursuit of anegotiated settlement; tightening the economic sanctions against Serbia; calls for enforcement of theno-fly zone, increased delivery of humanitarian aid and a war crimes tribunal; promises of for the implementation and enforcement of an agreed upon settlement; and finally, wideconsultation with allies. This approach, while indicating U.S. involvement, represented a stepback from the level of commitment suggested by Clinton during his election campaign. He hadearlier advocated air-strikes and lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnians, declaring that “thelegitimacy of ethnic cleansing cannot stand.”145 The Clinton administration’s policy, however,came to involve symbolic gestures of its commitment, such as air-dropping relief to besieged142 Christopher Greenwood, “Is there a right of humanitarian intervention?” p. 38.43 Christopher Greenwood, “Is there a right of humanitarian intervention?” p. 38.144“Christopher’s Remarks on Balkans: ‘Crucial Test,” New York Times ii February 1993, p. A6.145 Michael R. Gordon, “Policy’s Limits on Bosnia,” New York Times 4 March 1993, p. Al, A6.39enclaves. The Bosnian Serbs, sensing the lack of real commitment, responded to the air-drops by:shelling the Muslims who came to collect the relief supplies; engaging in a major offensive againstthe Cerska enclave; and issuing a humiliating “Open Letter” citing the bombing of the World TradeCentre as evidence of the “dangers of direct foreign involvement” in the Bosnian conflict.146When the Security Council attempted to respond by authorizing a ban on military flights overBosnia, Russian objections twice forced postponement. Facing a serious domestic crisis, Yeltsinand his Western allies did not wish to offer Russian nationalists any further weapon against thebeleaguered President.147 Even more serious measures, such as the air-strikes—used only fourtimes to date since being proposed in June of 1993—were short-teim measures hoping to force therecalcitrant Bosnian Serbs back to the negotiating table.In April of 1993, the Clinton policy shifted. No longer casting the Bosnian crisis as a moralissue, the Administration began to describe it as “a tribal feud that no outsider could hope tosettle.”148 Five considerations can be said to have fueled the change in policy: Russian oppositionto more forceful action; lack of domestic public opinion support; Clinton’s desire to focus like a“laser” on the economy; opposition from the Pentagon which regarded Bosnia as a quagmire; andthe protests of U.S. allies who feared that more forceful action would endanger their peace-keeperson the ground.’49 A negotiated solution became the hope of all Western nations involved in theconflict. In early May, however, when the Bosnian Serbs rejected such a settlement, Clintonhimself tried to make the case that the Bosnian crisis was in the national interest of the UnitedStates. He stated: “We’ve seen too many things happen, and we do have fundamental intereststhere, not only the United States, but the United States as a member of the world community.”150Despite Clinton’s protestations to the contrary, the simple reality was that in Bosnia, there wassimply no vital national interest. As Warren Christopher would later state, Bosnia “involves our146 Anthony Lewis, “On Bended Knee?” New York Times 5 March 1993, p. A15.147 Paul Lewis, “U.N. Postpones Enforcing Ban on Serb Flights,” New York Times 25 March 1993, p. A3.148 Thomas L. Friedman, “Bosnia Reconsidered,” New York Times 8 April 1993, p. Al.149 Anthony Lewis, “The Limit of Shame,” New York Times 5 April 1993, p. All.150 Steven A. Holmes, “Backing Away Again, Christopher Says Bosnia Is Not a Vital Interest,” New York Times4 June 1993, p. A7.40humanitarian concerns, but it does not involve our vital interests in survival.”151 And so Bosniacontinues to haunt the international community even today.The Failure of the Somali State and Humanitarian InterventionThe brief survey of three international crises sets the stage for a more detailed examination ofthe origins, and the international response to, a single post-Cold War crisis: the collapse of theSomali state. In order to fully discuss the complexities of this case study, significant attention willbe devoted to the origins and underlying factors that precipitated this collapse.Traditional Somalia: Pastoral DemocracyThe key to understanding Somali politics lies in its evolution from a nomadic lifestyle. Asanthropologist Seifulaziz Milas observes, “The values of Somali society are those of survivors, ofsurvivors in a pastoral nomadic society struggling for life in a harsh desert setting where the cost ofa mistake, the price of weakness, was often death.”152 Responding to the severe challenges ofdesert life, Somali society developed two important characteristics: a reliance on kinship ties and acommunitarian brand of politics and economics.Somali society is organized into six clan-families derived from two eponymous ancestors.Thus, from the “Somalle” eponym are derived the Dir, Darod, Issaq and Hawiye clan-families,while the Rahanweyn and Digil clan-families trace their origins to the “Sab” eponym. Below thelevel of clan-family, Somali society is further divided into clans, primary lineage groups, diyapaying groups and elders. Such a structure makes for extremely fluid alliances, which, as SaidSamatar describes:at once draw the Somalis into a powerful social fabric of kinship affinity and cultural solidarity whilesetting them against one another in a complicated maze of antagonistic clan interests. A person, forexample, gives political allegiance first to his/her immediate family, then to his immediate lineage, then tothe clan of his lineage, then to a clan family that embraces several clans including his own, and ultimatelyto the nation that itself consists of a confederacy of clan-families. Each level of segmentation defines aperson’s rights and obligations as well as his/her standing in relation to others. The segmentary lawdictates, for example, that two lineages that are genealogically equidistant from a common ancestor shouldstand in an adversarial relationship to each other but should be drawn together as allies against the membersof a third lineage whose genealogical lines fall outside of the common ancestor. The result is a society so151 Steven A. Holmes, “Backing Away Again,” p. A7.152 Cited in Reid Miller, “Age-old Loyalties Feud for Thought,” Globe and Mail 11 December 1992, p. A9.41integrated that its members regard one another as siblings, cousins, and kin, but also so riven with clannishfission and factionalism that political instability is the society’s normative characteristic. 153As Samatar’s discussion suggests, kinship creates a strong sense of corporate identity. This canhave both positive and negative results. On the negative side, the corporate identity can reduce thesense of individual responsibility. As Maxamed D. Afrax describes: “if a man wants to commitmurder, he may be encouraged by the feeling that he will be protected by his kin; likewise, theaggrieved party may seek to take vengeance not just on the murderer but on his kin individuallyand collectively. As a result of this irrational outlook, innocent people may be harmed, and culpritsneed not held accountable for their deeds.”lM More positively, the corporate identity can be usedby the larger kin structure to coerce the individual into following the majority’s wishes.The exigencies of desert life also facilitated the development of a communitarian style ofpolitics characterized by a fundamentally decentralized structure. As I.M. Lewis observes:Few societies can so conspicuously lack those judicial, administrative, and political procedures which lie atthe heart of the western conception of government. The traditional northern Somali political system has nochiefs to run it and no formal judiciary to control it. Men are divided amongst political units without anyadministrative hierarchy of officials and with no instituted positions of leadership to direct their affairs. Yetalthough they thus lack to a remarkable degree all the machinery of centralized government, they are notwithout government or political institutions.155The most important of the political institutions referred to by Lewis is the contract, or Heer, appliedat the diya-paying group level of kinship segmentation. The contract “denotes a body of explicitlyformulated obligations, rights and duties. It binds people of the same treaty... together in relationto internal delicts and defines their collective responsibility in external relations with othergroups.”156 It is at the level of the dia-paying group, that the full force of the heer can be broughtto bear: “It is the enforcement of sanctions within the dia-paying group which marks it off as adistinct political and jural unit,” observes Lewis.157 Literally “bloodwealth,” the diya represents adeterrent to continued hostilities. As Lee Cassanelli remarks: “In the absence of any externalauthority, the alternative to bloodwealth payments was almost always retaliation in kind for insult,injury or homicide and, more often than not, the start of a prolonged feud between the two parties153 Said Samatar and David D. Laitin, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder: Westview Press: 1987) pp.30-31.154 Masamed D. Afrax, “The Mirror of Culture: Somali Dissolution Seen Through Oral Expression,” in TheSomali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal? ed. Abmed I. Samatar (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994) p. 236.155 I.M. Lewis, Pastoral Democracy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1961) p.1.156 I.M. Lewis, Pastoral Democracy, p. 162157 I.M. Lewis, Pastoral Democracy, p. 168.42that could eventually draw in other diya groups and sometimes the entire clan. The institution ofthe diya groups thus reduced the incidence of open conflict in Somali society.”158A further characteristic of the decentralized nature of communitarian politics is the fact thatSomali society has essentially no specific institutionalized positions of leadership. To be sure,there were leaders, both religious and secular, but the true test of one’s leadership was one’s ownpersonal qualities: age, political acumen, knowledge of religion and poetry, inherited prestige andwealth are the only means at the disposal of any mediator. Because the elders of a particular diyapaying group have coercive power—capable of even expelling a recalcitrant member and therebydepriving him or her of their identity—they are crucial to successful conflict resolution. Eldersfrom two feuding clans would meet, face-to-face, under the shade of a tree to resolve a conflict.Negotiation was an extremely long process, characterized by a great deal of ceremony, recitation ofpoetry, prayer and general discussion of the issue. In this way, everyone felt they had voiced theirconcerns and, consequently, slowly began to commit themselves to the slow process ofreconciliation.In sum, traditional Somali society was fundamentally decentralized, relatively egalitarian(only men could be “elders”), and organized on the communitarian values of a people trying tosurvive in an unforgiving climate.ColonialismColonialism can be said to have had two major impacts on traditional Somali society. First,the imposition of European borders simultaneously heightened the sense of Somali unity ornationalism, while also dividing the society into five different regions. The French, for example,created their colony in what would become modern-day Djibouti. The British established theSomaliland Protectorate in the northeastern in order to supply with fresh meat their coaling stationof Aden, located across the Red Sea. British control of Kenya would lead to a northern border thatdivided the Dared clan-family between Kenya and the future Somali state. The Italians, who hadthe greatest hopes for their own colony on the eastern coast, enforced their colonial rulership more158 Lee V. Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600-1900, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982) p. 20.43tightly than any other imperial power. Finally, the Ethiopians were given vast tracts of the centralplateau region, simultaneously dividing the Ogadeni clan and depriving future Somali pastoralistsfrom access to their traditional rangelands. The seeds of Somali irredentism—symbolized in thefive-pointed star that graces the Somali flag—were sown.The second and perhaps most damaging impact of colonialism was the effect of centralizedcolonial rule on traditional communitarian politics and economics. The policy of “indirect rule”through the akils or Local Authorities had two principle effects. On the economic front, the akilwas an artificial entity, basing its status not on successful pastoral practices, but on the prestige andwage earned from the colonial government. On the political front, the akils, as I.M. Lewisobserves, “threaten the stability of the dia-paying groups.”159 Lewis adds that, “elders naturallyview the system in terms of the advantages which may accrue to them personally and to theirkinsmen, rather than in terms of the distatsteful tasks which the Administration may require them toperform. Many indeed hope to enjoy the benefits while avoiding the disadvantages as skillfully aspossible.” As the colonial government became the centre of personal and clan gain, jealousies andrivalries were created, while the importance of kinship connections was heightened. In Somalia’sbrief experiment with democracy, kinship became the only means of distinguishing one candidatefrom another, while the concentration of power in a single President became an irresistable objectfor competition. In the 1964 elections, for example, twenty-one parties and 973 candidatescontested the elections, while in 1969, 62 parties and 1,002 candidates contested the same 123seats in the national legislature. Following the second election, what should have become theopposition, stood up and walked across the legislature floor to join the new government. Onehundred twenty-two of a possible 123 seats were now ‘officially’ in the hands of a single party.Disenchanted with their democratic experiment, Somalis were ready for change, even if changemeant coup d’etat.160SiadBarre’s Legacy159 LM. Lewis, Pastoral Democracy p. 203.160 see I.M. Lewis, “Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 10 (No. 3, 1972) p.399.44On 21 October 1969, General Mohammed Siad Barre seized power. His overarching goalwas to create a state out of the Somali nation. While he can take credit for some positiveaccomplishments such as the introduction of a Somali script, improving the literacy rate and, atleast initially, successfully mobilizing civil society behind public works projects, he will beremembered for further exacerbating the effects of colonialism and repressing civil society.16’Barre’s tenure is notable for four effects: increasingly centralizing political control into a repressivestate apparatus; manipulating kinship ties to maintain power; destroying the Somali economy; andusing Somali irredentism to build a huge military machine.Barre’s centralization program evolved in two phases: first, with the Somali RevolutionaryCouncil following his coup d’etat, followed by his attempts to institutionalize the the “SocialistRevolution” in the Somali Socialist Republican Party. Immediately after the coup, Barre outlawedpolitical parties, replacing them with the Somali Revolutionary Council. Comprised of 23 of hisloyal military officers, Barre made himself the Chairman and consolidated the office of President,the Council of Ministers, the National Assembly and the Supreme Court under his authority. Arepressive body of “National Security Laws” was promulgated by the new court.162 Law No. 54of 10 September 1970, for example, contained 26 articles detailing a wide range of politicalactivities which constitute “crimes” against the “freedom, unity and security” of the nation.”Twenty of these offenses carry a mandatory death sentence. In addition, Law No. 8 amends thepre-coup Code of Criminal Procedures to admit the use of confessions in cases concerningSomalia’s ‘national security.’ Barre also abolished the right of habeas corpus and passed lawspermitting, for example, house searches and the confiscation of property of those suspected of“anti-revolutionary activities.” To further extend his reach into society, Barre created the NationalSecurity Service (NSS) with the power to detain whomever it suspected of threatening ‘peace,order and good government’ or otherwise conspiring to undermine the revolution.163 In the rural161 For a positive evaluation of Barre’s early successes, see David Laitin, “The Political Economy of Military Rulein Somalia,” The Journal ofModern African Studies 14 (No.3,1976), pp. 449-68.162 Human Rights Watch, “Somalia: Evading Reality,” (New York: Africa Watch, 12 September 1992) p.7.163 Abdilsalam M. Issa-Saiwe, The Collapse of the Somali State, (London: Haan Associates, 1994) p. 58.45areas the civilian administrators were replaced with former military and police officers and givensimilar powers to the dreaded NSS.lMIn 1976 and at the request of his Soviet patrons, Barre attempted to institutionalize hisrevolution by creating the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party (SSRP). Barre, however, held theposts of Chairman of the Politburo, Party Secretary, President of Somalia and Commander inChief of the armed forces. Moreover, the five politburo posts under Barre’s chairmanship were allfilled by loyal army officers. As Abdi Samatar wryly observes, “the SRC was disbanded, only toappear in party attire.”165 Thus, while the SSRP had three stated purposes—to educate Somalis insocialist ideas, to spearhead the economic transformation, and the enhancement of Barre’ssecurity—in fact, it only proved successful in the last of its objectives.’66 In 1979, after his lossin the Ogaden War, Barre introduced a new constitution calling for the creation of a People’sAssembly, but when he insisted on retaining control over who was elligible to sit in the newAssembly, it became known as the “Assembly of Applause.” At the local level, Barre createdDistrict Pary Committees, Local People’s Assemblys and village councils in response to populardemands for decentralization. As Abdi Samatar concludes, these new structures were merelysymbolic: “In spite of this appearance of decentralized state structure and the potential for popularinput in determining development strategy.. .the new village councils have only two functions:collecting tribute from the villagers and notifying them of new government dictates.”167On the economic front, Barre employed two principle tactics to help maintain his rulership.First, he increased the export of Somali livestock through the use of state marketing boards. Whilepromising to reinvest a portion of the profits in improved veterinary and water services, Barrediverted the funds to his own coffers or used them to secure the support of allies.168 Thisdisproportionate “taxation” of the Somali economy most severely affected the northern Issaqs andsewed the seeds for their later disaffection with the entire idea of a Somali state. A second tacticaimed at enhancing Barre’s power was nepotism. Barre appointed allies to posts within164 Ahmed Samatar, Socialist Somalia, p. 86.165 Abdi I. Samatar, Samatar, Abdi I., The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia: 1884-1986,(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989) p. 119.166 Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peacefrom Chaos: Hwnanitarian Intervendon in Somalia, International PeaceAcademy Occasional Paper (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993) p. 23.167 Abdi I. Samatar, The State and Rural Reconstruction, p. 120.168 Ahme.d Samatar, “Socialist Somalia,” p.109.46departments dealing with finance and development, where, acting as brokers or middlemen, theywould “make a quick fortune” operating outside the State machinery and not paying into itsTreasury.169The effect of the state economy’s failure was to cause more and more Somali’s to ‘opt out’into the informal sector, essentially falling back on their kinship bonds. One method of survivalinvolved Somalis working abroad in the rich oil states of the Gulf and sending home a portion oftheir wages. More than US$ 330 million was being remitted, an astonishing 15 times the sum ofSomali yearly wages and nearly 40 percent of the nation’s total GNP. The official remittancefigure was US$ 30 million.170 Another strategy involved the interriverene agropasoralists sellingtheir grain to the northern nomads at prices substantially higher than dictated by the InternationalMonetary Fund.171 In the urban areas, David Laitin has documented how a civil service of 90,282actual wage earners can sustain 300,000 to 360,000 people:Many families had one member working for the government, not so much for the salary, but for the accessto other officials that enable the family to engage in quasi-legal trading activities. Remittances fromoverseas prevented starvation for some families. Many urban families had members who were livestocktraders and throughfranco valuta had access to foreign exchange. Many government workers prospered onbribery for the profiteers in the so-called gray economy. Other government workers could obtain “letters ofcredit” (the right to draw funds from the government-held foreign exchange accounts) allowing them toimport goods for sale and for family use. Still other civil servants moonlighted for international agencies,receiving valuable foreign currency for their efforts.172The failure of the government to achieve its economic goals resulted in a downward spiral ofdeclining production, withdrawal from the formal economy and the revitalization of blood-ties as anecessary response to government predation.As the initial glow of the revolution faded, Barre used the latent Somali irredentism todistract the population from its economic and political woes and build a formidable army. Barreincreased the army’s size from 16,000 strong in 1967 to 31,000 in 1976. Just prior to the OgadenWar of 1977-78, the Somali army peaked at 54,000 soldiers. Yet even after the loss of the Ogadencampaign, the Somali army held strong in the neighbourhood of 45,000 members.173 Given apopulation of approximately 5 million, Somalia’s army has been huge, even by Africa’s inflatedstandards. According to Jeffrey Lefebvre, Somali was able to sustain its military by employing169 Mohamed Osman Omar, The Road to Zero: Somalia SeDestruction, (London: Haan Associates, 1992) p.190.170 David Laitin, “The Economy,” in Somalia: A Courntry Study 4th edition, ed. Helen C. Metz, (Washington,D.C.: United States GPO, 1993) pp. 141-42.171 David Laitin, “The Economy,” p. 143.172 David Laitin, “The Economy,” p. 146.173 Data taken from Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Armsfor the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia 1953-1991 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992) p. 32.47three strategies.’74 First and not surprisingly, Barre diverted huge sums of revenue to itsmaintenance, between 13.3 and 27.5 percent of the national budget during most of his reign.Second, he imported arms to the tune of 25 to 47 percent of Somalia’s total imports. Third,superpower support in the neighbourhood of US$ 2 billion since independence was also animportant factor. In addition to internal security, Somalia’s claims on the Ogaden became the chiefreason for the military build-up.With Ethiopia’s ‘Emperor,’ Haille Selaissie, seemingly ready to fall in the early 1970s, Barrewas presented with an irresistible opportunity to divert attention from Somalia’s internal woes byrecapturing the traditional Somali pastureland in the Ogaden. Barre, however, made two fatalerrors: first, he did not calculate that the Soviet Union had also noticed that Sellassie was to bereplaced by a more ideologically pro-Soviet faction and was slowly abandoning its Somali client infavour of the strategically more important Ethiopia; and, second, when the Soviets actuallyabandoned Somalia during the Ogaden War, he assumed that the United States would rush to fillthe void. Thus, despite some initial successes, once the Soviet’s executed their volte face and theU.S. did not take up the slack, the Barre forces were routed in spectacular fashion. This was to bethe beginning of the end for Barre. The fact that he was able to remain in power for another 12years is a testament to his ability to manipulate kinship ties and to the inability of the opposition topresent a united front.While the manipulation of kinship ties would increasingly replace attempts to legitimize hisregime, Barre came to power promising to end ‘tribalism.’ During February and March of 1971,he promoted his ‘Campaign Against Tribalism’ by burning and burying effigies representingtraditional clan ties.175 He outlawed the use of the traditional Somali terms ma adeer (cousin) andadeer (uncle) used in addressing each other, replacing them with the word jaalle, or comrade.More significantly, however, Barre went to great lengths to undermine the traditional sources ofsocial control and replace them with his own. As Ahmed Samatar describes:the SRC abolished the traditional diya while assuming its social responsibility. Moreover, the ‘aaqils wererenamed nabaad-doons (peacemakers), and afminsharism (political propaganda and tribal gossip) wasoutlawed. Furthermore, weddings and burials which took place under clanist auspices were now given adifferent meaning: weddings were to be held in the newly created Orientation Centres, and burials becamethe responsibility of neighbourhoods. The logic behind these steps was to undercut lineage loyalties and togive the primordial heterogeneity of neighbourhoods a new and special function.176174 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Armsfor the Horn, pp. 32-33.175 Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of the Somali State, p. 56.176 Ahmed Samatar, Socialist Somalia, p. 10848Significantly, Barre continued the colonial practice of akils, albeit under a new name, as a means tocontrol the local populations. He lured pliant elders—most often from clans allied with him, butnot traditionally located in the farming areas—into these posts with promises of farmland, often atthe expense of the small minority groups that populated the fertile interriverene regions. Thus,Barre effectively created a new class of landowners who owed him their loyalty, whilesimultaneously politicizing kinship relations.’77Most importantly, however, as Barre consolidated his grip on power, he himself came torely on three clans to maintain himself in power: the Marehan of his own patrilineage, the Ogadeenof his mother, and the Dulbahante of his principal son-in-law whom he made head of the NationalSecurity Service. This triad earned the contemptuous moniker of MOD. The MOD element withinthe important positions of power increased dramatically. The Ministers of Information and ForeignAffairs as well as the chiefs of the para-military forces and social organizations were all chosenfrom the President’s own clan. In fact, Barre’s own son replaced Omer Arteh Ghalib in the post offoreign affairs minister.’78 Moreover, while in 1969 there were only four Marehan officers in theofficer corps, by 1981 60 percent of these officers were from Barre’s clan. Whereas recruitment inthe Somali army had been carried out initially without considerations of clan, Samuel Makindanotes that by the late 1980s, “there was no clear difference between regular army units and clanmilitias.”179 Ultimately, the meritocracy he had initially championed was abandoned even at thelevel of secondary leadership. These positions were now used to build tribal ties and alliances, buthad the additional effect of encouraging patron-client relationships and corruption. Former SomaliAmbassador to India, Mohamed Osman Omar, recalls how Barre appointed loyal members of theMOD triumvirate to watch over governmental ministries. “In due course of time,” he states, “thesePresidential appointees came to exercise more power and influence than the ministersthemselves.”180177 see African Riglgs, “Land Tenure, the Creation of Famine, and the Prospects for Peace in Somalia,” DiscussionPaper No. 1, (London: African Rights, October 1993).l7 Abdi Sheik-Abdi, “Ideology and Leadership in Somalia,” Journal ofModern African Studies, 19(1) 1981,p.163-72179 Samuel Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos, p. 24.180 Mohamed Osman Omar, The Road to Zero, p. 190.49As Barre’s legitimacy decreased, he increasingly turned his military on his own population,singling out different clans as they rebelled. After the debacle in the Ogaden, a 1978 Majerteen-ledcoup attempt was put down and, of the 17 executed afterwards, only one officer was not ofMajerteen lineage.18’ In response, some Majerteen, led by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, fled acrossthe Ethiopian border and established the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), staging raidsinto neighbouring areas in Somalia. In 1979, Barre sent crack troops of the Duub Cas (Red Hats)into the Majerteen area around the town of Galka’yo, killing upwards of 2,000 Majerteen, rapingwomen, destroying wells, and slaughtering livestock.’82 Next to rouse Barre’s ire would be thenorthern Issaq clan, who, unhappy with the limited economic benefits of ‘Scientific Socialism,’formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1981. After years of sporadic guerrilla activity,the SNM launched a general offensive against the Barre regime, albeit with a somewhat rag-tagforce. Barre’s response was swift and merciless, unleashing the full force of his military machineagainst the Issaq. According to Human Rights Watch, between 50 and 60 thousand Issaq lost theirlives.’83 When Barre was finally ousted in 1991, the north seized the opportunity to secede,declaring itself the independent Somaliland Republic.One particularly tragic legacy of Barre’s anti-Issaq campaign was his institutionalization ofwhat Africa Watch has termed “the strategy of banditry:”During this brutal campaign, Siad’s troops, many of whom later joined clan factions after the collapse ofthe contral government, were allowed openly to loot and sell the spoils of the war in the markets ofMogadishu, with no fear of punishment. This practice broke with traditional Somali customs governingcompetition between clans, and changed the character of the civil war. After Barre’s ouster, other clanfactions continued these tactics.184Traditionally, elders met after a conflict and sat down to long negotiations over who had stolenwhat from whom and how much restitution should be paid. By condoning looting, Barre usheredin the era of the mooryaan, that is, youths who would steal and rob in order to survive beyond thecontrol of traditional leaders or even the future ‘warlords.’ The faction leaders themselves reliedon the promise of looted bounty in order to attract not only the stray mooryaan, but also the armedmen of their own particular clan. Indeed, as Africa Watch notes, “many observers argue thatwithout the implied promise of fruitful looting, few factions would be able to summon any sizablemilitary support.”185181 Said Samatar, Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil, A Minority Rights Group Report, (London: The MinorityRights Group, August 1991) p. 11.18z Said Samatar, A Nation in Turmoil, p. 11.183 see Africa Watch, Somalia: A Government at War with its own People, January 1990.184 Human Rights Watch, “Somalia: Beyond the Warlords: The Need for Verdict on Human Rights Abuses,”News From Africa Watch (New York: Africa Watch, 7 March 1993) p.4.185 Human Rights Watch, “Beyond the Warlords,” p. 5.50Following the campaign against the SNM, Barre’s grip on power fast became tenuous:within his MOD triumvirate there was dissension and outside there was violent opposition. In1986, Barre suffered serious injuries in a car crash, raising questions and disagreements oversuccession within his own Marehan clan. In 1988, following the signing of a treaty with Ethiopiain which Barre gave up Somali claims to the Ogaden, the Ogaden component of his power basesplit, with several generals breaking away to form the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in 1989.Finally, during the violent campaign against the northern Issaq, two generals from the Dulbahanteclan refused Barre’s order to fight. With the MOD alliance weakened, opposition to Barreexploded, but, without a concentrated focus. Exiled members of the Hawiye clan formed theUnited Somali Congress (USC) in late 1988 after Barre launched attacks against their regionalstronghold north of Mogadishu. In addition, the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) was formed in1989 by members of the Gadabursi clan. Despite the fact that every militia contains the word‘Somali’ in some form or another, they could not mount a coordinated offensive until August 1990when the SNM, the SPM and the USC united in order to oust Barre from Mogadishu.One brief moment of unified action took place on 15 May 1990 with the publication of anopen letter to Siad Barre demanding change. Signed by 144 prominent Somali intellectuals, formergovernment officials, business leaders, professionals and trades persons who came to be known asthe Manifesto Group. Significantly, this group cut across clan lines to unify behind a three-stepprocess to end the civil war:.186 First, it recommended the establishment of a thirteen membercommittee to prepare the groundwork for a national reconciliation conference. Charged withdeveloping an agenda for the conference, selecting appropriate regional representatives and,significantly, religious and intellectual leaders, the proposal seemed to hold much promise. Thetwo other goals of the proposed conference consisted of finding common ground on basicprinciples for a new constitution to provide for greater regional autonomy and establishing adefinite timetable for elections. Barre’s response came on the night of 11 June 1990: he arrested45 of the 144 signatories. From this moment on, a military solution seemed to become the onlysolution. Nevertheless, on 9 January 1991, Italy stepped in and tried to broker a last-minuteagreement, but its stipulation that Barre retain the presidency, while relinquishing most of his186 Human Rights Watch, “Evading Reality,” p. 11.51powers to a committee of national reconciliation, was flatly rejected by the opposition. The civilwar was on.Somalia’s Civil WarFour factors of the Somali civil war have had a long-term impact on the Somali crisis andaffect the prospects and potential strategies for national reconciliation: the origins of the rivalrybetween General Mohamed Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, both members of the Hawiye clanfamily; Barre’s destruction of the fertile interriverene region; the post-Barre politics betweenAideed and All Mahdi; and the dubious legitimacy of both Presidential-hopefuls.While the largest clan-family in Somalia, the Hawiye were notably absent from the Somalimilitary scene during the 1980s, with the SNM and the SSDF suffering most at the hands of Barre.The Hawiye military and political arm, the United Somali Congress, was formed in Rome inJanuary of 1989. At its inception, the USC was lead by neither Aideed nor Ali Mahdi, but by AliMohamed Wardigly.’ At this time, Dr. Ismael Jumale Ossoble was quietly being groomed for thePresidency of Somalia.187 Jumale himself appointed Aideed to lead the army, recalling him fromIndia to train the USC forces in Ethiopia. For his part, Ali Mahdi resented the arrival of Aideedinto USC politics and refused to recognize Aideed’s election, in June of 1990, to the Chairmanshipof the USC. Aideed’s election came on the heels of the death of Wardigly in April of 1990, yet thepresence of Jumale in the background meant that intra-clan relations were still under control.Unexpectedly, Jumale died in August of 1990 and created a leadership vacuum within the USC.Aideed and Au Mahdi became the principle protagonists in the bid for control of the USC. Whileboth of the Hawiye clan-family, Aideed belonged to the Habr Gedir sub-clan, while Ali Mahdibelonged to the Abgal sub-clan. Because Jumale had also belonged to the Abgal sub-clan, AliMahdi felt he was the logical successor to the reigns of the USC and, most likely, to thePresidency. Immediately after Barre’s ouster, Au Mahdi had himself declared President by agroup of his USC supporters. Such a move not only angered the USC chairman, Aideed, but italso violated an August 1990 agreement between the USC, the SNM and the SPM. These threegroups had united to oust Barre and had agreed that noone would become President until all threeparties agreed. Upset by Ali Mahdi’s perfidity and infighting among the USC, the northern Issaqs(SNM) withdrew from the south and declared their independence on 18 May 1991.187 see John Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia? (London: Haan Associates, 1994) pp. 16-17.52The manner in which Barre was finally ousted also played a pivotal role in determining thenature of the post-Barre conflict. Before leaving Mogadisbu, Barre unleashed all his remainingmilitary might on the city and its environs. Somali journalist Mohamoud M. Afrah describes thisfinal act of violence and its effects: “Governmental rockets landed on crowded residential areas andmarketplaces, and an estimated 20,000 civilians lost their lives. In retaliation, the rebels havecarried out a slaughter against the President’s clansmen and top officials.188 Following thiscarnage, the rebels fell upon Barre’s ‘Villa Somalia’ to take possession of the vast quantities ofarms still stored there. Mohamoud Afrah describes what the rebels found:Guerrilla forces... captured over $45 million in US supplied military hardware, including 25,000 M-16rifles... 15,000 AK-47s, thousands of hand grenades and landmines, 20 Soviet-made T-55 tanks, 35 artillerypieces, 36 rocket launchers, 40 armored personnel carriers, six Chinese-made MiGs... and enough othermaterial to field the entire armies of two African countries.189These and other weapons procured during the civil war, despite the arms embargo declared inUnited Nations resolution 733 of January 1992, have created a climate of fear in which guns are anindispensable part of one’s security. The interriverene Rahanweyn (and the many minority clansof the area) learned this lesson the hard way as Barre’s retreating forces swept through their fertileagricultural belt, slaughtering civilians and livestock alike, destroying irrigation systems, smashingwater pumps, and stealing valuable grains and even the seeds necessary to grow crops. Aideed’sforces pursued Barre and the farming area became a battleground, with both armies being fed offlooted crops and animals. As Africa Watch concludes of this period, “these attacks on civilians sothoroughly disrupted production and distribution of food that, far more than the drought, they areresponsible for the famine in Somalia.”190 While a drought did exist in Somalia, it bearsrepeating, thefamine was man-made.With Aideed pursuing Barre into the Gedo region, Ali Mahdi declared himself interimPresident of Somalia, creating much of the animosity between the two seen today. A hotelier byoccupation, Mahdi’s contribution to the USC had been primarily financial. This explains hisdecision to claim the Presidency: with Aideed the clear military leader and no such credentialshimself, Ali Mahdi tried to seize the political leadership of the USC. When Aideed returned toMogadishu, protesting this unilateral action, Ali Mahdi (whose Abgal clan had claimed Mogadishuafter Aideed and Barre left) declared that Aideed had arrived “very late in the day” to claim the188 cited in Edward Sheehan, “In the Heart of Somalia,” New York Review ofBooks, 40 (Nos. l&2, 14 January1993)189 cited in Edward Sheehan, “In the Heart of Somalia.”190 see Africa Watch, “Beyond the Warlords,” p. 5.53fruits of victory.191 Au Mahdi sought to consolidate his position by organizing a nationalreconciliation conference, but Aideed refused to attend or to recognize the legitimacy of AuMahdi’s government. The labyrinthine world of Somali politics took another sharp turn when, atthe annual USC Congress held on 4 July 1991, Aideed was elected the Chairman of a reconstitutedUSC with the support of 70% of the USC delegates. This would become Aideed’s principle claimto leadership. Yet, at the second Djibouti conference (Aideed boycotted the first) held between 15and 21 July 1991, Ali Mahdi was elected interim President of Somali for a period of two years.Samuel Makinda describes the effects of this vote:Aideed had apparently wanted both jobs [Chairman of the USC and the Presidency]. Because of thelegitimacy conferred on Ali Mahdi by the Djibouti conference, his government was recognized by severalcountries, including Djibouti, Egypt, Italy, and Saudi Arabia. However, as other states appeared torecognize Mahdi, Aideed became increasingly intransigent about accepting the conditions of unity.192Thus, during 1991 the political situation in Somalia ground to a stalemate: Aideed, the clearmilitary leader, lacked political legitimacy; Au Mahdi Mohamed, recognized as President by somecountries, but without any military credibility and of dubious political legitimacy. Throughout1991, Aideed and Mahdi’s conflict alternated between civil war and an uneasy cease-fire while theyregrouped.Despite their claims to the presidency, both Ali Mahdi and Aideed are of dubious characterand this has become an important consideration in outside efforts to find a solution to the Somalicrisis. Both leaders command only small armies that are consistently loyal to them. To expandtheir power-base, they have taken up the ‘strategy of banditry’ initiated by Siad Barre, trading thepromise of retained booty for the loyalty of the innumerable small militias. Both havedistinguished themselves by bombing civilian targets and hospitals, using starvation as a weaponto defeat the other side, and antagonizing clan hatred by condoning vendettas. More recently, asthe world became aware of Somalia once again, food-aid became the most valuable commodity inSomalia: he who can provide food and income from re-sold humanitarian relief can command thegreatest allegiance. As Africa Watch concludes of the Aideed-Mahdi rivalry, “the final element inthe fighting is money:”191 Africa Watch, “A Fight to the Death?” p. 4.192 Samuel Makinda, Seeking Peace From Chaos, p. 31.54In a poor and aid-dependent country such as Somalia, controls over the symbols of “legitimate” or“sovereign” government are more than a matter of status, they are a licence to print money. Thegovernment not only literally manufactures banknotes, but controls the exchange rate, can run up debts onthe national account, and receive foreign aid--all of which are elements that can bring great personal fortunesto those in office. Mi Mahdi and his ministerial colleagues have mostly lost their businesses.., and dependupon anticipation of future office for future income. Similarly, General Aidid and his financial backers...anticipate sharing in the spoils of office should they win.193The stakes in this rivalry, therefore, are enormous and, if one recalls Somali history around thetime of 1960, very similar to the competition over the controls of government during the fIrst yearsof independence. The battle for political control in Somalia lasted almost two and a half years, butduring this time the international response to the humanitarian tragedy was less than exemplary.International and United Nations Response“Ill-equipped, ill-informed and un-coordinated,” is how the British director of Save theChildren Fund United Nations involvement in Somalia in 1992.194 In fact, for most of the civilwar’s first year one could add ‘non-existent’ to the above list. Osman Hashim, U.N.representative to Somalia had determined Mogadishu to be unsafe and had evacuated his staff toneighbouring Nairobi.195 After repeated requests for United Nations engagement were rejected,the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) took the unusual step of publicly criticizingthe U.N. Pierre Glassman asked “How come Unicef Somalia has 13 people in Nairobi and no oneinside [Somalia]?” Perhaps so stung by the criticism that he forgot about United Nationsoperations in the former-Yugoslavia, the deputy director of the United Nations DevelopmentProgram (UNDP), Mario Borsotti, replied, “In a situation of war, we don’t operate.”196 Otherequally dubious excuses included the difficulty of finding a company willing to insure U.N. reliefworkers’97 and, later in 1992, the difficulty of obtaining a Somali signature to permit thedistribution of US$68 million in unspent aid money budgeted for Somalia. Of the need for a hostsignature, Alex de Waal declared “there must be a hundred ways around the problem. But theyonly decided two weeks ago to get a waiver.”198 Even David Bassiouni, humanitarian affairscoordinator for Somalia, and one of the first such positions appointed under General Assembly193 Africa Watch, “A Fight to the Death?” p. 7.194 see David Watts, “Charity pins Somalia aid ‘shame’ on UN,” The Times ofLondon 31 August 1992, p. 5.195 see Human Rights Watch, The Lost Agenda: Human Rights and U.N. Field Operations, (New York: HumanRights Watch, 1993) p. 116.196 see Jane Perlez, “Somali Fighting Keeps Aid From a Suffering City,” The New York Times, 11 December1991, p. A7.197 U.N. Undersecretary for Africa, James Jonah, cited in Keith Richburg, “In Africa, Lost Lives, Lost Dollars,”The Washington Post 21 September 1992, p. Al.198 see Julie Flint, “UN’s $68 m Somali aid blunder,” The Observer 6 September 1992, p. 2.55resolution 46(182), proved unable to cut through the red-tape. Appointed in March of 1992, hehad no staff until August.’99Yet even when the United Nations took action on Somalia, such as after Pierre Glassman’scriticism, its actions reflected so rudimentary a knowledge of the conflict and Somali society thatthey often, albeit unintentionally, did more harm than good.2°° United Nations Special Envoy forSomalia, James Jonah, responded to mounting criticism by flying into Mogadishu with a two itemagenda: negotiate a cease-fire and uninhibited passage for relief supplies. Perhaps unaware that hisdestined airport was in the hands of two ‘neutral’ clans, the Hawadle and the Murasade, he madeno arrangements to meet them. Aideed fired artillery shells over the airport as Jonah arrived andsuccessfully diverted him to an airport under his control. Aideed then did his level best to impressupon Jonah the extent of his control of Mogadishu. During his time with Aideed, Jonah concludeda peculiar agreement with the faction-leader. A United Nations Press release dated 3 January 1992states: “The Jonah delegation and the Aidid faction of the USC also reached agreement that threehospitals in Mogadishu would be declared “areas of tranquillity” and would as such be protectedby troops of Aidid’s faction... “201 The Jonah agreement effectively made the three hospitalstargets for Au Mahdi’s artillery fire. Unable to cross the ‘Green Line’ dividing the city, Jonah thenreturned to Nairobi. The diplomatic and military coup belonged to Aideed. Jonah returned toMogadishu the next day in order to meet with Mahdi. Following these discussions, Jonah issued ahasty declaration in Nairobi that while Mahdi had agreed to international intervention, Aideedremained the obstacle to progress. Both sides having claimed their respective diplomatic victories,they became more intractable. In addition, while intending to open the Mogadishu airport for reliefflights, Jonah’s visit resulted in its closure for a period of 10 days. Most seriously, however,Jonah upset the balance of power in Mogadishu. While the Murasade had been instrumental innegotiating a cease-fire in September of 1991, after Jonah’s visit they began drifting closer to theMahdi group, a drift that would be irreversible after Aideed took advantage of his new confidenceto overrun their positions in Mogadishu. In addition to all the other ‘territorial claims’ that must besettled after the conflict, the Murasade are demanding Aideed return buildings and property wonduring Jonah’s brief, high profile, visit.202199 see Mort Rosenbium, “Somalia Famine Avoidable, Aid Workers Say,” Los Angeles Times 4 October 1992, p.A16.200 Detailed in Africa Watch, “Somalia: A Fight to the Death?” (New York: Human Rights Watch, 13 February1992) pp. 7-9.201 cited in Africa Watch, “A Fight to the Death?” p. 17.202 see Keith B. Richburg, “Somali Clan Fights Remain Intractable,” The Washington Post 22 January 1993, p.A26.56A second United Nations attempt at diplomacy is especially instructive when contrasted withthe negotiating style of a subsequent Eritrean delegation.203 In a highly publicized visit, UnitedNations Special Coordinator Brian Wannop flew into Mogadishu and invited Aideed and Mahdi toweekend talks in New York. He did not invite any clan leaders or neutrals. The day after theinvitations were distributed, Au Mahdi made an aggressive move on other’s areas in Mogadishu inan attempt to secure maximum territorial control prior to the talks. More than 80 civilians weretreated in Digfer hospital the first night of fighting. While Wannop was delivering his messages,the U.S. Senate Sub-Committee on Africa was hearing testimony from Professor Ali KhalifGalaydh to the effect that by only inviting Aideed and Mahdi, other groups would be morereluctant to join negotiations later. He also criticized the “weekend, or a few hours” diplomacy ofthe United Nations, advocating instead the appointment of a special envoy.204 In contrast toWannop’s approach, the Eritrean delegation stayed for more than two weeks, met with both sidesand numerous elders and neutrals, and did not make any public statements on positions orprogress. Without economic incentives or military disincentives, however, the Eritreans werehandicapped. Trying to find the right balance between ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ would prove to be thebiggest challenge faced by mediators.The second United Nations Special Envoy to Somalia, Mohamed Sahnoun, arrived on 24April 1992. Prior to his arrival, the Security Council had passed two resolutions: numbers 733 (23January 1992) and 746 (17 March 1992). The first, resolution 733, declared that “the continuationof this situation [in Somalia]... a threat to international peace and security...” and, under ChapterVII of the Charter, imposed an arms embargo.205 It also requested the Secretary-General to“undertake the necessary actions to increase humanitarian assistance of the United Nations and itsspecialized agencies to the affected populations in liaison with the other international humanitarianorganizations and, to this end, appoint a coordinator to oversee the effective delivery of thisassistance.” Resolution 746 reaffirmed the allusions to Chapter VII and dispatched a technicalteam to observe and report back on progress.206 This is how Sahnoun describes the situation inSomalia upon his arrival in Mogadishu on a fact-fmding mission:the city was almost deserted. Most people had fled to the surrounding areas, where they lived in the worstof conditions and many faced death by starvation. Despite the cease-fire, fighting still occurred periodicallyaround Mogadishu. These sldrmishes seemed grotesque in view of the tragedy and chaos in the country as a203 see,Africa Watch, “A Fight to the Death?” p. 10.204 United States. Senate. Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. EmergencySituation in Zoire and Somalia., pp. 19-21.205 U.N. Doc. S/Res/ 733 (23 January 1992) pp. 1-2.206 U.N. Doc. S/Res/ 746 (17 March 1992) pp. 1-2.57whole. At least 300,000 people had died of hunger and hunger-related disease, and thousands more werecasuakies of the repression and the civil war. Seventy percent of the country’s livestock had been lost, andthe farming areas had been devastated, compelling the farming population to seek refuge in remote areas oracross the border in refugee camps. Some 500,000 people were in camps in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti.More than 3,000—mostly women, children, and old men—were dying daily from starvation.207Into this tragic situation, with Security Council resolution 751 of 24 April 1992, MohamedSahnoun officially commenced what would become the first of two United Nations Operations inSomalia (UNOSOM). In addition, the resolution requested the Secretary-General “immediately todeploy a unit of 50 United Nations observers to Monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu...”208 AuMahdi welcomed the proposed deployment, convinced that his cooperation with the UnitedNations would result in his increased legitimacy and his recognition as President by othercountries. Aideed, on the other hand, for the same reason that Au Mahdi welcomed the peace-keepers, felt threatened by the deployment and initially refused to offer his consent. With onlyfour of the fifty peace-keepers deployed, Sahnoun went back to the negotiating table and afterarduous talks secured Aideed’s consent for the presence of the additional 46 peace-keepers on 19July 1992.209 On 10 August, again after protracted negotiations with Aideed, Sahnoun securedagreement for the deployment of 500 additional peacekeepers. He forwarded his recommendationsto the Secretary General and Security Council resolution 775 was unanimously passed 28 August1992.210 Due to bureaucratic delays, the first peacekeepers did not arrive until September 14, fartoo late.211 A frustrated Sahnoun made a series of public statements critical of U.N. inaction in1991 and of the efforts of his predecessor, James Jonah.212 He was rebuked by Boutros Ghaliand, on 26 October 1992, resigned.The United States’RoleFor most of 1991 and 1992, the United States adopted what Roland Marchal has termed a“politique proprement schizophrénique:” on the one hand, the United States Agency forInternational Development (US AID) provided the single largest amount of international relief toSomalia; on the other hand, it resisted taking more decisive action at the United Nations.213 In thewake of United Nations inaction during 1991, the United States almost doubled its emergency aid207 Mohamed Sabnoun, Somalia: The Missed Opportunities, (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1994)pp. 15-16.208 U.N. Doe. SfRes/ 751 (24 April 19921 p. 2.209 Jane Perlez, “U.N. Observer Unit To Go To Somalia,” New York Times 20 July 1992, p. A3.210 U.N. Doe. S/Res/ 775 (28 August 1992) p. 2.211 Jane Perlez, “Armed U.N. Troops Arrive in Somalia,” New York Times 15 September 1992, p. AlO.212 See for example, Mort Rosenblum, “Somalia Famine Avoidable;” and Jane Perlez, “U.N. Relief Official inSomalia Quits in Dispute with Headquarters,” 28 October 1992, p. A6.213 Roland Marchal, “Somalie: Autopsie d’une Intervention,” Politique Internationale (automne 1993) p. 194.58to Somalia, conthbuting an additional 19 million dollars on December 12th. Andrew Natsios,director of the U.S. Office for Foreign Disaster Relief Assistance, criticized the United Nations fortheir “failure to engage themselves.” He explained that a United Nations transport plane was beingheld in Nairobi due to the risks posed by the civil war in Somalia. By contrast, the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross was, at the same time, making daily Hercules flights into the capital.“The United Nations is involved in six other civil wars in Africa,” Natsios asked, “are they goingto pull out of thoseT’214 At the same time, however, senior Bush administration officials “rejectedthe suggestion, made by some at the State Department, of putting Somalia onto the SecurityCouncil agenda.”215The same pattern of U.S. action and inaction continued into 1992. On the relief front, theUnited States was again leading all other nations, supplying $85 million in aid in its first 14months of involvement in the civil war.216 With an average of one to two thousand deaths per dayin early 1992, it encouraged the ICRC, a medical organization, to undertake the coordination andoperation of a massive feeding operation. Funded by the United States, the ICRC established 195communal kitchens in Mogadishu alone, serving one meal a day for 230,000 people. Anadditional 176 kitchens were distributed outside Mogadishu providing food to 220,000 otherSomalis.217 The ICRC announced its 90-day emergency plan of action for Somalia on 9 July1992 with the ominous declaration: “It’s now or never.”218 The action plan stated that a staggering75% of Somalis faced “severe malnutrition,” while the overall “malnutrition” figure was 95%.Bush himself became involved in early July 1992 upon reading a dispatch from U.S. Ambassadorto Kenya, Smith Hempstone, entitled “Dispatch from a place near Hell,” describing the plight ofSomali refugees in northeastern Kenya.219 Finally, upon reading a front page article in the NewYork Times, Bush drew up plans for an emergency airlift to Somalia and northern Kenya.22°Announced on 14 August, by 9 September, according to U.N. figures, the high-profile airlift haddelivered only 300 tons to Somalia.221 Having repeatedly testified before various Congressionalcommittees, publicly rebuked the United Nations and organized the delivery of thousands of tonsof humanitarian relief, a weary Andrew Natsios declared: “It bothers me a lot that these things214 Jane Perlez, “U.S. Increases Aid to Somalia After U.N. Balks,” New York Times 15 December 1991, p. 6.215 Jane Perlez, “Somalia Self-Destructs, And the World Looks On,” New York Times 29 December 1991, p. 4.216 Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. Took Slow Approach to Somali Crisis,” Washington Post 24 August 1992, p. A13.217 Source: Kent Matheson, Canadian Red Cross, Vancouver, B.C.218 ICRC Geneva, Africa Zone, “Emergency Plan of Action: Somalia,” 9 July 1992.219 reprinted in Washington Post 23 August 1992, p. Cl.220 Jane Perlez, “Deaths in Somalia Outpace Delivery of Food,” New York Times 19 July 1992, p. Al.221 Mort Rosenblum, “Somalia Famine Avoidable, Aid Workers Say,” Los Angeles Times 4 October 1992, p.A16.59happen, and I am ultimately responsible for this and I sit a lot and say, ‘What could I have donedifferently over the last year,’ because it weighs on me a lot. I don’t know what else we couldhave tried.”As early as January of 1992, international NGOs were suggesting a different approach to theSomali crisis. Wilhelm Huber, regional director for the Austrian charity SOS Kinderhofen, metwith Western diplomats to propose an alternative way to provide relief.2 Having maintained theconfidence of Somalis for staying during the worst of the civil war in 1991, and a Somali speaker,Huber’s plan combined the use of humanitarian ‘relief corridors’—modelled on the Sudaneseexperience and endorsed in General Assembly Resolution 43(131)—and the idea of ‘safe havens’to transport food into the interior. Huber planned to avoid Mogadishu entirely and keep ruralfamilies at home to grow crops. “I told them exactly what they could do,” he explains, “They justsat there and said nothing. The British guy snickered, and he ridiculed the idea.” Huber adds thatno one in the international community was prepared to take the risk or pay the cost. Nevertheless,as word of a military intervention in Somalia was leaked to Leslie Geib of the New York Times,disaster relief expert Fred Cuny, proposed very much the same plan. He estimated that his planwould require 2,500 U.S. Marines with an additional multi-national force of 1,000 others and airand naval support. “We can’t impose a peace,” Cuny states, “but we can create a safe haven toallow the voluntary organizations to strike at the heart of the famine.”During most of 1992, however, the United States was not very interested in Somalia. At theSecurity Council, the United States blocked attempts by other members for more assertive action.In a draft version of resolution 733, Cape Verde called upon the Secretary General and regionalorganizations to contact all parties to the conflict “to ensure their commitment to the cessation ofhostilities and promote a cease fire and its compliance and assist in the process of politicalnormalization of Somalia. The U.S. representative downgraded the term ‘ensure’ to ‘seeks’ andurged ‘a political settlement of the conflict,’ rather than the ‘political normalization’ of Somalia.224While a subtle textual difference, the implication was clear: the United States was not prepared toengage itself at the level requested in the original draft. A second draft resolution, this timeproposed by Venezuelan Diego Arria, was also downgraded. Draft resolution 746 states that theSecurity Council “strongly supports the Secretary-General’s decision to urgently dispatch atechnical team to Somalia to prepare an operational plan for a monitoring mechanism to guarantee222 see Mort Rosenblum, “Somalia Famine Avoidable.”223 see Leslie Gelb, “Shoot to Feed Somalia,” New York Times 19 November 1992, p. A27; and Anthony Lewis,“Action or Death,” New York Times 20 November 1992, p. A31.224 see Human Rights Watch, “A Fight to the Death?” p. 25.60the stability of the cease-fire.” Under U.S. pressure, the fmal version omitted any references to theneed to monitor the cease-fire. Instead, the Security Council simply dispatches a technical team“accompanied by a [relief] coordinator.”2While the drafting history of resolution 733 did notbecome public, the Nigerian Foreign Minister told the Security Council “Africa must receive thesame qualitative and quantitative attention paid to other regions.”226 “Throwing a few crumbs ofbread won’t solve the problems of Somalia,” added Simbarashe Mumbenegegwi of Zimbabwe.U.S. reluctance to engage itself in Somalia again manifested itself in April of 1992 during thedebates that authorized the deployment of 50 observers under resolution 751. According to PaulLewis of the New York Times, “because of United States objections, the [Security] Councilbacked off a plan to sent [sic] a force of 500 armed troops to protect relief workers in the SomalicapitaL”227 A subsequent editorial explained that “State Department officials advised the U.N. thatCongress and voters were weary of paying for peacekeeping operations.”228 Compared to the costof the August airlift, however, the proposed $7.5 million plan for 500 peace-keepers seems abargain. Yet even when Bush proposed the airlift, the Pentagon’s representatives were “reluctant”even to consider it, considering Somalia a “bottomless pit.”229From UNITAF to UNOSOM HAs the situation in Somalia further deteriorated, the U.N. Secretariat seemed to growimpatient with the requirement of securing the consent of the faction leaders prior to deployingpeace-keepers. The first concrete indication of this frustration occurred in September of 1992. On10 August, after grueling negotiations, Mohamed Sahnoun had secured Aideed’s consent to thedeployment of 500 peace-keepers as specified in resolution 767 of 27 July. Before these peace-keepers had even arrived, the U.N. Secretariat announced that a further 3,000 “reinforcements”would also be deployed.230 The announcement caught everyone off-guard: Aideed was outragedand became more intransigent. Sahnoun himself was not consulted prior to the announcement andfelt his position as mediator had been compromised.23’Shortly thereafter, Sahnoun resigned andwas replaced by Ismat Kittani.225 see Africa Watch and Physicians For Human Rights, “Somalia: No Mercy in Mogadishu: The Human Cost ofthe Conflict and the Struggle for Relief,” (New York: Human Rights Watch, 26 March 1992), p. 25.226 cited in Paul Lewis, “U.N. Security Council Weighs a Role in the Somali Civil War,” 18 March 1992, p. A8.227 Paul Lewis, “Reined In by U.S., U.N. Limits Mission to Somalia,” New York Times 26 April 1992, p. 15.228 New York Times “Uncle Pygmy Pleads Poverty,” Editorial. 28 April 1992, p. A22.229 cited in Don Oberdorfer, “The Path to Intervention,” Washington Post 6 December 1992, p. Al, A35.230 Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Missed Opportunities,” p. 39, 53.231 Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Missed Opportunities,” p. 39.61Kittani’s report to Secretary-General Boutros Ghali formed the basis of a letter to theSecurity Council that set the stage for the Somalia intervention. In fact, some believe that it wasprecisely Sahnoun’s objection to the use of force without the prior consent of the various factionleaders that led to his dismissal.232 The letter, dated 24 November 1992, describes the increasingintransigence of Aideed prior to Kittani’s arrival: Aideed’s declaration that the Palcistani battalionalready deployed in Mogadishu was no longer welcome; his expulsion of the UNOSOMCoordintator of Humanitarian Assistance, Mr. Bassiouni, on the basis that the latter’s securitycould not be guaranteed; and, most significantly, his outright rejection of any non-consensualUNOSOM deployments.233 Even after Kittani’s arrival, the letter asserts that Aideed and Mahdicontinued to obstruct not only U.N. deployments, but also the delivery of humanitarian assistance.Boutros Ghali concludes his letter by declaring, “I am giving urgent consideration to this state ofaffairs and do not exclude the possibility that it may become necessary to review the basic premisesand principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia.”The basic principles of the UNOSOM operation were in fact reviewed and, finding thesituation in Somalia to be “intolerable,” Boutros Ghali was asked to propose new options. In aletter to the Security Council dated 29 November 1992, Boutros Ghali offered five suggestions.235The first option, consisting of renewed attempts to deploy the previously agreed to troops “guidedby the existing principles and practices of United Nations peace-keeping operation.” BoutrosGhali concluded, however, that the situation in Somalia had “deteriorated beyond the point atwhich it is susceptible to the peace-keeping treatment.” The second option, withdrawal of militaryforces leaving the humanitarian agencies to negotiate their own security, was also rejected byBoutros Ghali. He declared, “the Security Council has no alternative but to decide to adopt moreforceful measures to secure the humanitarian operations in Somalia.” The third option consisted ofa show of force in Mogadishu, but was deemed inadequate to affect the situation positively. As hisfourth option, Boutros Ghali proposed a “country-wide enforcement option undertaken by a groupof member States authorized to do so by the Security Council. In the end, this was the optionselected, with the United States leading a multi-national force to “Restore Hope” to Somalia.Boutros Ghali, however, clearly preferred the fifth option, which he regarded as “consistent with232 Personal Interview with Alex De Waal, Co-Director of African Rights, London: 29 June 1994.233 U.N. Doe. Sf24859, “Letter Dated 24 November 1992 From the Secretary-General to the President of theSecurity Council,” (27 November 1992) p. 1.234 U.N. Doe. Sf24859, p. 5.235 U.N. Doc. 5/24868, “Letter Dated 29 November 1992 From the Secretary-General to the President of theSecurity Council,” (30 November 1992).62the recent expansion of the Organization’s role in the maintenance of peace and security and whichwould strengthen its long-term evolution as an effective system of collective security.” Consistingof a “country-wide enforcement operation to be carried out under United Nations command andcontrol,” such an approach was regarded as too ambitious given the U.N.’s limited practicalexperience in military activities and the reluctance of government leaders to place their troops underU.N. command. In any even, on 3 December 1993, the Security Council passed resolution 794,authorizing the use of “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environmentfor humanitarian relief operations in Somalia,” and thus beginning the first ever Chapter VIIoperation in support of a humanitarian emergencyP6Even before the U.S. troops landed, however, a controversy was brewing over the precisemandate given the “UNITAF” forces. Resolution 794 outlined three basic goals for the operation:to open and secure the main ports of Mogadishu and Kismayu; to open supply routes into theinterior; and to prepare the way for, in Boutros Ghali’s terms, “a return to peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building.”237 What was unclear was whether any of those three tasks, or the moregeneral task of creating a “secure environment” meant disarming the Somali faction leaders. ForBoutros Ghali, the answer was clear: “Disarmament is very important to provide the security whichwill allow us to replace the unified command with a peace-keeping operation... The point of viewof the Security Council is that disarmament is a prerequisite.”238 For the U.S. military commanderin Somalia, General Johnson, the U.S. mandate was also clear: “Someone has to change mymission before we tackle that one.”239 In the end, the U.S. was forced into a quasi-disarmamentpolicy: confiscating heavy weapons, seizing weapons carried openly in the street and issuingpermits to those protecting relief agencies. The result of this policy was to create a situation ofrelative security in areas held by UNITAF forces, but to heighten the insecurity outside theseregions.The failure to begin a serious disarmament program meant that while UNITAF succeeded inalleviating the initial humanitarian problems, the long-term sources of instability remainedunaddressed. Contributing to the problem of arms was the U.N.’s inability to provide economicincentives that would have induced the feuding militias to pursue more peaceful employment.U.S. Special Representative, Robert Oakley, repeatedly criticized the U.N. for “dragging its feet”236 U.N. Doe. S/Res/ 794 (3 December 1992).237 U.N. Doe. Sf24868, p. 6.238 see Jane Perlez, “Must the U.S. Strip a Land of Guns?” New York Times 15 December 1992, p. Al.239 see Jane Perlez, “Must the U.S. Strip?” p. Al.63in the deployment of the follow-on peace-keeping mission.240 Yet, the simple fact was that theUnited Nations was nowhere near ready to undertake on its own the kind of operation it intendedfor Somalia. When it finally took over, in May of 1993, the “seamless transition” between theUNJTAF and UNOSOM II mission was not to be found.Nevertheless, the UNOSOM II operation became the first ever Chapter VII peace-enforcement operation conducted under the leadership of the Secretary-General. The resolutionstated that the Secretary-General’s special representative would “assume responsibility for theconsolidation, expansion, and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia” with theoverall goal of providing “humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia inrehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and nationalreconciliation.”24’When resolution 814 was passed, the U.S. representative to the UnitedNations, Madeleine Aibright, declared: “With this resolution, we will embark on an unprecedentedenterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioningand viable member of the community of nations.”242ConclusionAs the resolutions and activities of the United Nations in Somalia attest, there have beensignificant developments in international law and practice since even the early post-Cold War era.Unfortunately, some of the precedential value may have been forgotten in the wake of theUNOSOM II tragedy. The hasty decision to brand Aideed a criminal, tainted not only thepurported humanitarian nature of the UNOSOM U mission, but of the earlier UN[TAF operation.The purpose of the final chapter is to determine what kind of legal and practical precedents havebeen established by the intervention in Somalia.240 see John Lancaster, “U.S. Beginning Pullout From Somalia,” Washington Post 19 January 1993, p. Al.241 U.N. Doe. S/Res/ 814 (26 March 1993) p. 4.242 cited in John R. Bolton, “Wrong Turn in Somalia,” Foreign Affairs 73(No. 1, 1994), p. 62.64Chapter 3Somalia: Harbinger of a New World Order?The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: to examine the impact of the Somalia intervention onthe development of the concept of humanitarian intervention; and to assess its implications for theevolution of international society. Accordingly, it begins by examining the lessons learned fromthe international experience in Somalia according to the four criteria for post-Cold War interventionas outlined by Jack Donnelly in Chapter One. In order to fully discuss the post-Cold War world,the three case studies introduced at the beginning of Chapter Two will also be included. Inaddition, reference will be made to the more recent international response to Haiti and Rwanda.From this discussion of humanitarian intervention, the discussion will be broadened to examine theimplications of post-Cold War “humanitarianism” for the evolution of international society. Herethe essay will return to Martin Wight’s three traditions of inquiry into the nature of internationalrelations: revolutionary cosmopolitanism; realist anarchy; and the rationalist compromise.A. Post-Cold War Humanitarian InterventionIn Chapter 1, Jack Donnelly’s asserted that ‘states will act’ in the face of gross violations ofhuman rights when four criteria have been satisfied: (i) the absence of Cold War rivalry; (ii) whenconsiderable self-interested motives can also be advanced; (iii) an unusually high level of publicinterest; and (iv) the prospects of significant opposition to the intervention appear minimal.Examining these criteria in the context of the Somali intervention offers important insights into thefuture of humanitarian intervention.Absence of Cold War RivalryWith the passing of the bi-polar era, new possibilities for cooperation have presentedthemselves. Perhaps most revolutionary are the advances represented by Somalia in the legal andtheoretical realm after the Cold War. Resolution 794 reflects the evolution of the internationalcommunity to a greater degree of solidarity than evidenced during the Cold War or the 19thcentury. Recall that the key legal argument advanced by the Cold War revolutionists was the65existence of two ‘major purposes’ in the United Nations Charter: the maintenance of peace and theprotection of human rights. As Michael Reisman argued, there is an “intimate nexus” betweenviolations of human rights to threats to international peace and security.3 While during the ColdWar such a proposition may have seemed like ‘doctrinal manipulation,’ Resolution 794 endorsesthe ‘major purposes’ approach. It states: “the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by theconflict in Somalia... constitutes a threat to international peace and security.244 The fact thatresolution 794 was passed unanimously bears emphasis. China, who usually abstains fromresolutions authorizing the use of force against member states—as it did during the passage ofresolution 688 authorizing ‘Operation Provide Comfort’ for the Kurds in 1991—supported theresolution. India, who also abstained from resolution 688 and whose deletion of references tohumanitarian intervention after its actions in East Paldstan in 1971 distinguished it as an opponentof humanitarian intervention, supported the Somalia resolution. Zimbabwe, who voted againstresolution 688, supported resolution 794. For the first time in history, the ‘Western’ world,Russia, China, the Non-Aligned Movement and Africa all agreed on the need to use force touphold minimum standards of humanity.By deciding that the situation inside Somalia represented a threat to international peace andsecurity resolution 794 marks a significant development from earlier interventions in Liberia, Iraqand Yugoslavia. The latter three situations had clear potential for disrupting the regional peace and,if unchecked, leading to a wider conflict: Liberia’s neighbours Ghana, Gambia and Sierra Leone allhad dissidents who were known to be working with Charles Taylor’s NPFL;245 the threat of a“Balkan War” involving the Greeks was so palpable as to warrant “preventive deployments” ofWestern troops in Kosovo and Macedonia; and for Turkey and Iran, both of whom havesignificant Kurdish minorities, the refugees were clearly a potentially destabilizing factor. InSomalia, however, the presence of refugees did not pose as severe a threat to regional stability.True, there were significant numbers of refugees, but international humanitarian assistance alonecould have coped with the situation. From this evidence, one can conclude that the phrase243 See Reisman, “Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos,” p. 171.244 U.N. S/Res/794 (3 December 1992) p.1.245 See Africa Watch, “Liberia: Waging War to Keep the Peace,” p. 7.66“international peace and security” has become quite elastic since the Cold War, when it wasprimarily interpreted as triggered by actual cross-border aggression.Also in terms of the post-Cold War world, resolution 794 reflects the culmination of effortsat the General Assembly to (i) effect greater respect for humanitarian law and (ii) require theconsent of the “government.” While the right of non-combatants to neutral humanitarian relief haslong been enshrined on paper, the international community’s action in Somalia represents the firsttime that this right has been enforced. In addition, the resolution makes specific reference to“reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law,” indicating a subtletransformation of the concept of humanitarian intervention.2”Whereas international human rightshave served as the theoretical basis for intervention, the emphasis on humanitarian law mayindicate a more specific future direction for the concept’s evolution. Two implications arise from ashift to humanitarian law: first, the provision of humanitarian relief is a more limited goal than thedirect confrontation of a government engaging in deliberate violations of human rights; and second,the military requirements will be smaller. The French intervention in Rwanda represents, perhaps,a future model of such “humanitarian interventions:” only 2,500 troops were involved in theestablishment and protection of safe-havens. Similar operations might well be within the capabilityof a United Nations rapid reaction force. Resolution 794 also endorses the liberal interpretation ofGeneral Assembly resolution 46(182) which did not specify that the government was the solesource of a legitimate request for outside assistance. The Somalia resolution states that it is“Responding to the urgent calls from Somalia for the international community to take measures toensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance...”247 The ambiguity of the phrase “from Somalia”in the resolution is not dispelled by the presence of Ms. Hassan as the “representative of Somalia”in the final deliberations prior to resolution 794’s passage.248 As the earlier discussion hasshown, Somalia had no government since Barre’s ouster in January of 1991. And this fact bringsus to the heart of the matter: how important is the fact that Somalia had no government to consentto the intervention?246 S/Resf794 (1992) p. 2.247 SIRes/794(1992)p.2.248 U.N. S/PV. 3145 (3 December 1992) p. 2.67Prior to resolution 794, the Security Council had made a point of requesting the consent ofthe government of Yugoslavia and of the warring factions in Somalia prior to imposing an armsembargo and, more importantly, prior to deploying peace-keepers. From the security councildebates on resolution 794, two important conclusions may be drawn. First, the absence of arecognizable government in Somalia seems to have been a decisive element in the decisions ofChina, India and Zimbabwe to support the resolution.249 Chinese Ambassador Li, for example,stated that “the long-term chaotic situation result[ed] from the present lack of a Government inSomalia.” Indian Ambassador Gharekhan noted that resolution 794 “recognizes the uniqueness ofthe Somali crisis: [t]he rapidly deteriorating and extraordinary situation, with no Government incontrol, demands an immediate and exceptional response...” The emphasis of the uniqueness ofSomalia reached feverish proportions in the opinion of Mr. Mumbengegwi, Ambassador ofZimbabwe and spokesperson for the Non-Aligned Movement: “the question of Somalia is a uniquesituation that warrants a unique approach. However, any unique situation and the unique solutionadopted create of necessity a precedent against which future, similar situations will be measured.”In the wake of resolution 794, perhaps the most that can be said about its precedential value is thatin closely analogous situations, that is, where no recognizable government exists, the internationalcommunity may intervene to uphold minimum standards of human decency.Such a contention is supported by the international involvement in fraq. When the coalitionforces established safe-havens in northern Iraq, Saddam Hussein was very much in power. Yetthe safe-havens were announced 2 days prior to Iraqi consent in the 18 April 1991 Memorandumof Understanding. Does the intervention in Iraq, therefore, offer a legal precedent for a “classic”humanitarian intervention? Not exactly. Resolution 688 never explicitly authorized the creation ofsafe-havens, only insisting that Iraq “allow immediate access by international humanitarianorganizations to all those in need of assistance.” The decision to create the camps was takenunilaterally by the coalition forces, based on a somewhat suspect interpretation of resolutions 678and 688. The Security Council debates on resolution 688 suggest that the provision ofhumanitarian relief was the limit of acceptable action. China, for example, stated that Article 2(7)249 U.N. S/PV. 3145 (3 December 1992): p. 16 (China), p.49 (India), p. 7 (Zimbabwe).68of the Charter meant that “the Security Council should not consider or take actin on questionsconcerning the internal affairs of any State.”25° India, who also abstained, notedOur endeavor was to focus the attention of the Security Council on the aspect of the threat or likely threatto peace and stability in the region rather than on the factors that have created the present situation. Webelieve that the Council should have concentrated on the aspect of peace and security, which is its propermandate under the Charter, and left other aspects to other, more appropriate organs of the UnitedNations.25’In addition to these objections, one must also consider the actual application of the safe-havens onthe ground. The coalition did not target the repression itself, nor did they seek to change the Iraqigovernment and thereby eliminate the source of the repression. In fact, the coalition offeredrepeated statements that it had no desire to undermine Iraqi sovereignty by forcibly creating anindependent Kurdish state. What the safe-havens approach suggests, therefore, is an increasedrecognition of the right to receive humanitarian assistance, something confirmed by the interventionin Somalia.A second conclusion arising from the passage of resolution 794 concerns the manner bywhich such approval was secured. As Zimbabwean delegate Mumbengegwi stated, “An effort canbe construed as international only if the United Nations is at its centre. This draft resolution...places the Secretary-General at the controlling centre of the operation.” Mumbengegwi goes on tooutline the three essential criteria for an ‘international action:’Zimbabwe attaches a lot of importance to the idea that in any international enforcement action the UnitedNations must define the mandate; the United Nations must monitor and supervise its implementation; and theUnited Nations must determine when the mandate has been fulfilled. This [resolution] sets an importantprecedent for future operations under equally unique circumstances.2While the Zimbabwean Ambassador may have been overly optimistic regarding the extent of theSecretary General’s oversight powers, the three conditions he describes do seem to reflect therequirements necessary for endorsement by the entire international community. Moreover, theIndian delegation expressed its preference for the fifth and most ambitious option proposed by theSecretary General, that is, “an operation carried out under United Nations command andcontrol.”253 The Chinese delegation also expressed its “reservations” about “authorizing certain250 Cited in Nigel Rodley, “Collective intervention to pmtect human rights and civilian populations: the legalframework,” inTo Loose the Bands of Wickedness, Nigel S. Rodley ed., p. 29.251 Cited in Nigel Rodley, “Collective intervention to protect human rights,” p. 30.252 U.N. S/PV. 3145 (3 December 1992): pp. 7-8.U.N. S/PV. 3145 (3 December 1992): p. 50.69countries to take military actions, which may adversely affect the collective role of the UnitedNations.”254 Increasingly, this preference for United Nations command and control ofenforcement operations seems to be the ideal against which all enforcement operations will bejudged. After Somalia, and in light of Haiti and Rwanda, the ideal seems to be increasinglyidealistic: the norm seems to be the United Nations “authorizing certain countries to take militaryactions.” Such a trend, as the Chinese Ambassador noted, may prove detrimental to the legitimacyand effectiveness of the United Nations.Given this marked preference for U.N. endorsement of an intervention, can we conclude thatthe days of unilateral action are passed? Not exactly. The Nigerian-led intervention in Liberia, forexample, suggests that unilateral interventions may still occur. In addition, the French interventionin Rwanda was finally approved by the Secretary-General, at least in part, when it became clearthat the French were prepared to go with or without U.N. blessing. Evidently, the Secretary-General decided that the potential damage to the U.N.’s legitimacy posed by inaction was greaterthan that posed by authorizing the French mission. More importantly, however, the presentclimate of cooperation between the West, Russia and China is not guaranteed. Russia dusted-offits veto in 1993 when it rejected a proposal that the costs of the peace-keeping operation in Cyprusbe assessed according to standard practice, that is, no longer on a voluntary basis. While not a aninstance of Russian opposition to a crucial U.N. proposal, the Russian veto served notice that thehoneymoon between the West and Russia might some day be over. Moreover, Chinesecooperation at the Security Council is far from guaranteed. Increasingly, China seems to havebecome the bridge over the “North-South Divide,” that has replaced the U.S.-Soviet antagonism ofthe Cold War period. Increasingly, it will be this conflict between the developed and developingnations that defines the degree of solidarity in international society.Post-Cold War MotivesJack Donnelly’s second criteria for post-Cold War intervention, the presence of considerableself-interested motives, also contains some important lessons in light of the Somalia intervention.U.N. S/PV. 3145 (3 December 1992): p. 17.70As the first chapter noted, interventions characterized as “humanitarian” were often motivated bygeo-strategic, economic and ideological imperatives. In Somalia, however, none of these motiveswere present. On Somalia’s geo-strategic importance, Robert Weil writes, “Situated at the bottomof the Red Sea, on the Gulf of Aden, right across from Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the Horn ofAfrica remains critical to the stability of the oil-bearing region which the United States defines asmost vital to its interests, and over which it most recently fought the Gulf War.”255 Unwittingly,Weil’s argument contains the seeds of its own refutation. As Jeffrey Lefebvre declares, in a studywritten prior to the Somalia intervention:While the United States appreciated Somalia’s... political support at the Arab League and the UnitedNations during the Gulf crisis, the war highlighted the fact that, strategically, regional threats to U.S.interests could be handled without using the military facilities in the Horn.., in the event of a seriousmilitary threat in the Persian Gulf, everything was opened up to the United States, negating the importanceof Berbera.6The Somali port of Berbera was never used during the build-up or the actual conduct of waragainst fraq. In fact, the port was simply stripped of its useful resources. A more important ally,Turkey, granted the United States permission to fly sorties from bases on its territory and SaudiArabia, for its part, ‘invited’ the United States to deploy ground troops on its territory. Moreover,after the Gulf War it was with Oman that the U.S. signed a ten year base-access agreement, whilepast agreements with Somalia and Kenya were allowed to lapse.257 Turning to economic motives,skeptics have also highlighted the motivation of securing access to Somalia’s oil. The L.A. Timespublished an article by Mark Fineman reporting “the close relationship between Conoco and theU.S. intervention force” which used the oil company’s Mogadishu headquarters as a “de factoU.S. embassy.”258 Another report raised the concern that Robert Oakley’s move into the Conococompound “left everyone thinldng the big question here isn’t famine relief but oil—whether the oilconcessions granted under Siad Barre will be transferred if and when peace is restored.”259 OfSomalia’s oil reserves, Ossman Hassan Au, closely connected to Aideed, has stated “The chancesof finding oil are very high. There are encouraging signs. They have drilled several wells, and255 Robert Weil, “Somalia in Perspective: When the Saints Go Marching In,” Monthly Review 44 (No. 10 March1993) p. 3.256 Jeffery Lefebvre, Armsfor the Horn, p. 270.257 Jeffery Lefebvre, Armsfor the Horn, p. 270.258 Fineman, Mark, L.A. Times, 18 January 1993 cited in Extra! March 1993, p. 11259 Cohen, Mitchel, “Somalia: The Cynical Manipulation of Hunger,” Z Magazine, 6(11) November 1993, p. 3471some have shown oil, but the commercial value must be evaluated. There is no proof yet.”260While someday Somalia’s oil reserves may become valuable enough to be developed, the PersianGulf War has secured, for the foreseeable future, U.S. access to cheap oil from far more reliablesources. On the ideological front, the Cold War’s passage has meant the end of U.S.-Sovietrivafry, but has also resulted in wary, suspicious glances as Islamic fundamentalism. Someskeptics of the U.S. intervention in Somalia, see that nation as a useful breakwater against therising tide of fundamentalism in such places as the Sudan.261 On the Sudan a senior Clintonofficial recently stated, “There is no thought being given by the U.S. or anyone else in theinternational community to introducing troops... Instead our strategy is to increase internationalpressure on the Government of Sudan.”262 While Islam has been demonized in the West forcenturies, it does not seem ready to replace communism as the central focus of U.S. foreignpolicy, much less justify the Somalia intervention. In fact, in the broader context of U.S. post-Cold War Africa policy, the more common nature of U.S. involvement on the continent has beentermed ‘cynical disengagement’ by Michael Clough.263Is the absence of considerable geo-strategic motives in the Somalia interventionrepresentative of post-Cold War interventions in general? It does appear to be true in the cases ofHaiti and Yugoslavia. Even in the Liberian and Rwandan interventions, the motivations seem tohave been other than geo-strategic. While the relationship between Liberian President Doe andNigerian President Babingida has been stressed as an important factor in the ECOMOGintervention, Nigeria’s ability to rally other West African states does tend to militate against pureself-interest. The French intervention in Rwanda, however, is based on a more complicatedhistory. For three years, between 1990 and 1993, the French government had actively supportedthe Hutu regime. At the height of French support, 700 French paratroopers were working side-by-side with the Habyarimana regime.2M In addition, France equipped the Rawandan government’s260 see Geoffrey York, “Why the U.S. Really Cares About Saving Somalia,” Globe and Mail 27 January 1993.261 Robert Weil, “Somalia in Perspective,” p. 3.262 Steven Greenhouse, “U.S. Asks U.N. to Condemn Sudan on Bombings,” The New York Times, 26 February1994, p. 3.263 Michael Clough, “The United States and Africa: The Policy of Cynical Disengagement?” Current History91(No. 565, May 1992) P. 193.264 see Marie-Pierre Subiil, “French Blamed in Rwanda’s Nightmare,” Guardian Weekly 19 June 1994, p. 19.72military during this period, preventing the minority Tutsis from succeeding in their 1990 invasionfrom Uganda. And when Habyarimana suddenly died in a plane crash, France sent paratroopers torescue his family. Based on this past relationship, many have argued that the French were merelylooking after their Hutu allies when they intervened in 1994. Clearly, however, France waswilling to intervene much earlier and would have if not for international suspicion of its motives.The rapid withdrawal of the French, in spite of widespread urgings to the contrary, seems toindicate that the intervention was to a large degree motivated by humanitarian considerations.Comparatively, the creation of safe-havens in Iraq, coming as it did in the wake of the Persian GulfWar, has suffered as a potential precedent because of its association with the war. Many regard theimposition of safe-havens as “victor’s justice,” a temporary suspension of sovereignty to thedictates of the victorious coalition. In addition, George Bush’s 15 February 1991 speech in whichhe suggests that an overthrow of Saddarn Hussein would be regarded favourably, also underminesthe altruism of the creation of safe-havens.Having rejected the three ‘selfish’ motives for the U.S. intervention in Somalia, does thiscase qualify as the first instance of altruistic “humanitarian” intervention? Certainly it was far lessselfishly motivated than Cold War interventions, but the intervention itself demonstrates theinherent dangers of, as Jim Hoagland suggests, “doing the right thing for the wrong reasons.”265In this case, the wrong reasons have less to do with Somalia than what Somalia could do for theUnited States. In increasing importance, three motives for the intervention can be discerned: thepersonal motives of President Bush himself; the need to formulate new roles for the United Statesmilitary; and finally, the lingering guilt from inaction on Bosnia. While The Washington Postcorrectly asserts that “[ut trivializes what Mr. Bush is doing to suggest that he is reaching for thecommander in chiefs last tour at the helm,”266 Bush’s personal motives reflect the convictions ofsomeone determined to ensure that the United States remains internationally engaged. Amidstassertions that ‘We won the Cold War,’ Bush declared that the United States, as the lonesuperpower, bore certain responsibilities of leadership:265 Jim Hoagland, “On Somalia, A Mysterious Decision,” The Washington Post, 3 December 1992, p. A21.266“Operation Restore Hope,” Editorial. The Washington Post, 6 December 1992, p. C6.73A world once divided into two armed camps now recognizes one sole and pre-eminent power, the UnitedStates of America. And they regard this with no dread. For the world trusts us with power—and the worldis right. They trust us to be fair and restrained; they trust us to be on the side of decency. They trust us todo what’s right.267Based on this sense of responsibility, in the run up to the 1992 Presidential elections Bush declaredthat the primary foreign policy objective of the United States would be to “find a way to maintainpopular support for an active foreign policy and a strong defense in the absence of an overridingsingle external threat to our nation’s security and in the face of severe budgetary problems.”268 Itis crucial to understand Bush’s sense of moral responsibility and his desire that the United Statesremain engaged in order to understand why the United States first went to Somalia. As aides toPresident Bush told Michael Wines of The New York Times, Bush saw “a chance to exit with anexample of America’s global responsibility in a fragmented world.”269Bush’s desire to maintain a strong defense dove-tailed nicely with General Colin Powell’svision of the Pentagon’s future.270 Throughout 1992, though in the background of suchmomentous international events as Russia’s transition to democracy and the Bosnian crisis, thePentagon was busily preparing its triennial vision of the future of U.S. military. On 16 February1992, however, a disillusioned Pentagon staffer released to The New York Times a draft documentoutlining the Pentagon’s vision of future threats to U.S. security and the commensurate forcestrengths necessary to meet these challenges.271 Comprised of seven conflict scenarios describedas ‘illustrative, not predictive,’ critics were inclined to denounce them as “incredibly unlikely” andas evidence that the Pentagon was more concerned about sustaining “robust military spending.”272“[TIhe striking thing about the Pentagon list,” as Leslie Gelb remarks, “is how far its planners hadto stretch to come up with any plausible threats.”273 In the face of a Clinton presidency that had267 George Bush, “State of the Union Address,” Excerpts relating to foreign policy from the State of the Unionaddress to Congress, Washington, D.C., 28 January 1992 reprinted in U.S. Department ofState Dispatch 2(3February 1992) p. 73.268 George Bush, “The Need for an Active Foreign Policy,” Excerpts from remarks at the Nixon Library dinner,Washington, D.C., 11 March 1992, reprinted in U.S. Department ofState Dispatch 2(16 March 1992) p. 211.269 Michael Wines, “Aides Say U.S. Role in Somalia Gives Bush a Way to Exit in Glory,” The New York Times,6 December 1992, p. 12.270 Michael R. Gordon, “Report By Powell Challenges Calls to Revise Military,” The New York Times, 31December 1992, p. Al.271 Patrick E. Tyler, “Pentagon Imagines New Enemies to Fight in the Post-Cold-War Era,” The New York Times17 February 1992, p. Al.272 Erich Schmitt, “Some Senators Say Military Exaggerates Threats of War,” The New York Times 21 February1992, p. A7.273 Leslie Geib, “What Peace Dividend?” New York Times, Op-Ed, 21 February 1992.74made an election promise to cut the military by as many as 250,000 persons, Powell wasgalvanized into action. As Linda Hossie writes: “Facing a serious loss of turf, American militaryplanners took a sharp policy turn away from the old criteria for action—increasing U.S. security,for instance—and came up with a new willingness for humanitarian action and peacekeeping.”274More cynically, Eugene Carroll, deputy director of the Center of Defense Information inWashington, declared: “Its mission shopping. We don’t have any enemies and we have this ColdWar budget... It’s a place to go and be seen using these very expensive military resources.”275And seen they were. The arrival of the first U.S. soldiers in Somalia coincided with U.S.television news programs, prompting a French politician to declare “A military escort for aninternational humanitarian operation must not be made to look like a prime-time television seriessponsored by the Pentagon.”276 If the Pentagon’s reluctance in August of 1992 to intervene inSomalia is recalled, the reversal of its opinion in late November seems a testament to its recognitionthat the Clinton administration would soon be in power and, in order to maintain a robust military,a use had to be found that fit the new leadership.It is the third self-interested motive that is most important. In explaining the decision tointervene, Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger offered two reasons: “This is a tragedy of massiveproportions and, underline this, one that we could do something about. We had to act.”277 Theintervention in Somalia was, in effect, undertaken because unlike Bosnia, something could bedone. To summarize: facing charges of racism from African and Islamic groups abroad and frompowerful African-American lobbies at home, George Bush, a genuine moral internationalist, waspresented by a Pentagon, seeking new roles in the post-Cold War world a plan to intervene inSomalia. While on the surface, these three motives seem to reflect the impossibility of genuinelyaltruistic action, more than a damning indictment of the Somalia intervention as selfish act, it is theknee-jerk, ad hoc, nature of the intervention that is so dangerous. As Anna Simons, a U.C.L.A.anthropologist studying Somalia, wrote “As the troops and the network anchormen head for274 Linda Hossie, “A Place For U.S. Troops To Go And Be Seen,” The Globe and Mail 11 December 1992, p.A19.275 Cited in Linda Hossie, “A Place For U.S. Troops To Go And Be Seen,” p. A19.276 Jean-Michel Boucheron cited in Alan Riding, “French Fault ‘Circus’ Coverage of U.S. Arrival,” The New YorkTimes 10 December 1992, p. A8.277 Cited in Don Oberdorfer, “The Path to Intervention,” The Washington Post 6 December 1992, p. Al, A35.75Somalia, I have this feeling—one that has grown with every passing morning new show, talkshow and evening newscast—that we Americans literally don’t know what we’re getting into.”278She could not have been more correct.An Unusually High Level ofPublic InterestThis brings up Jack Donnelly’s third criteria for post-Cold War intervention: an unusuallyhigh level of public interest. What Donnelly could not have foreseen, however, is what has cometo be termed the ‘CNN effect,’ that is, “the ability of CNN to mobilize public support by virtue offootage of horrible events.”279 Paradoxically, the Somalia tragedy is the product of both too littleattention early on and too much attention too late. For images, especially television images, are adouble-edged sword. As Walter Goodman writes, “The television camera is as blunt as it ispowerful; it is a prisoner of its own immediacy.”280 In Somalia, television images of wide-spreadsuffering played an enormous role in rallying public opinion in favour of intervention yet, at thesame time, these same images could not explain the underlying causes of the famine. As CharlesPaul Freund argues, “In terms of cause and effect, the story’s narrative is backwards: this is, inother words, a story defined by its emotional impact:”But the actual factors shaping this tragedy become extremely fuzzy almost immediately. Few people areinterested in the internal politics of Somalia, and not one person in a thousand is likely to be able to tellyou, after a week of discussion about American intervention, who these warlords are, how many arecompeting for power, what if anything any of them stand for politically, how well armed they are...[or]what might make them stop fighting amongst themselves... It’s as if Somalia’s tragedy were a naturaldisaster without perpetrators.281While the generosity of the international community can be incredible, a phenomenal amount ofpublic education is required in order to maintain the initial support. In the post-Cold War world, asDavid S. Broder observed, “Clinton has the challenge of introducing Americans to a world ofethnic conflicts where most of us are utterly at sea.”282 Without sufficient public education of thepolitical realities and the potential risks involved, the awesome power of television images might278 Anna Simons, “Our Abysmal Ignorance About Somalia,” The Washington Post 6 December 1992, p. C7.279 Barry Posen in House Committee on Armed Services. “The Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era,” p. 31.280 Walter Goodman, “Re Somalia: How Much Did TV Shape Policy?” The New York Times, 8 December 1992,p. C20.281 Charles Paul Freund, “Images From Somalia: Reality, Rationalization and Politics,” The Washington Post, 6December 1992, p. C3.282 David S. Broder, “The Q-Word,” The Washington Post, 7 April 1993, p. A27.76turn on the intervening state. This is precisely the lesson of Somalia. When the U.S. Rangerssuffered huge casualties in the 3 October fire-fight, the television images again rallied publicopinion, but this time in favour of getting out of Somalia as soon as possible.The way out of the dilemma of having “Ted Turner as the new de-facto Secretary of State,”argues Thomas Friedman, is to engage in preventive diplomacy and develop criterion for action.283Because the crisis in Somalia was presented as ‘do-able,’ that is, simply getting food to thehungry, the United States public was never prepared to take casualties. As for preventivediplomacy, Edward Luck draws attention to “the difficulty of rallying international public andpolitical support for intervention before a crisis escalates and there is substantial loss of life...Preventive measures while less costly, also require a degree of vision and political leadership thatis exceedingly rare these days.”284 The evocation of sovereignty to ward-off outside pressure andthe inability to link the national interest to an ‘international interest’ suggest that the degree ofsolidarity extant in contemporary international community is less than might be hoped for. As theinternational community begins to contemplate humanitarian intervention on a more regular basis—pace Rwanda and Haiti—preventive diplomacy will become the test of the maximum humansolidarity in the international community, while humanitarian intervention might indicate theminimum amount that exists.Prospect ofMinimal RetaliationDonnelly’s final criterion—the prospect of minimal retaliation—as we have seen, played apivotal role in the Pentagon’s decision to support Operation Restore Hope. An importantcomponent of the Powell Doctrine of “overwhelming force,” the Somali intervention demonstratesthat it is wholly inappropriate for humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War world. Fromtheir experience in Lebanon, writes Diana Jean Schemo, the U.S. marines learned the danger ofhaving strict rules of engagement that essentially limited them to taking protective measures.285283 Thomas Friedman, “Clinton Inherits Conflicts That Don’t Follow Rules,” The New York Times, 13 December1992, p. E3.284 Edward Luck testifying before House Committee on Armed Services. “The Use of Force in the Post-Cold WarEra,” 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 4 March 1993 (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1993) p. 106.285 Diana Jean Schemo, “Boy’s Death in Somalia Tests Uneasy U.S. Role,” New York Times 20 February 1993,p. 1,2.77While the U.S. Marines generally carried out their duties in Somalia with restraint, the Marineswere involved in several incidents in which questions were raised about the extent of force usedand the absence of public inquiries.6 The most prominently discussed such incident involved theshooting death of 13 year old Omar Ahmed Mohammed. According to Somali witnesses, the boywas merely pointing at a Marine’s gun with an empty hand when he was shot and killed. Suchincidents engendered a great deal of resentment in Somali society. On 5 February 1993, forexample, 200 Somali protesters hurled stones at U.S. Marines and burnt tires in a demonstrationafter a rumour spread that U.S. troops had killed 6 Somalis.287 The important point is not simplythat some Marines may have acted without the requisite restraint, or that these incidents may havecontravened established humanitarian laws, but that these incidents created an atmosphere ofsuspicion that played into Aideed’s hands. With greater transparency regarding the rules ofengagement and the inquiries into the deaths of Somali civilians, a greater degree of trust couldhave been established.More importantly, however, the precipitate passage of U.N. resolution 837, without a publicinquiry, played straight into Aideed’s cards. Unlike Mohamed Sahnoun and Robert Oakley, BobGosende did not fully understand the relationship between the warlords and his supporters. AsRoland Marchal observes, there were two prominent theories about the legitimacy of the warlords:one argued that the warlords were in fact illegitimate, ruling only by the gun and suppressing civilsociety to their advantage. There is an element of truth to this theory. The second theory arguedthat these warlords were actually popularly chosen to represent their clans, there is some truth tothis as well. John Drysdale, however, effectively describes the symbiotic relationship between thetwo:Neither elders nor politicians will independently admit to their inseparability... But the day the politiciancan no longer deliver what is expected of him, his elders will abandon him. Once established the elder issecure, a constant factor whereas the individual politician can be ephemeral.288Sahnoun recognized this and sought to ensure civil society was strengthened as a restraint againstthe warlords. Oaldey recognized this and made sure to consult with Aideed and the other faction286 See, for example, Michael R. Gordon, “Pentagon Says Killing of 2 Somalis May Have Been Accidental,” NewYork Times 12 December 1992, P. 6.287 see New York Times (6 February 1993) p. AS.288 John Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia? p. 71.78leaders when carrying out his peace-enforcing operations. Admiral Howe and Robert Gosende,however, tried to isolate Aideed, but made him feel that his position, and that of his clan, werethreatened. In this situation, the clan will unify behind the most powerful leader. By demonizingAideed, UNOSOM U played to Aideeds strength, military might.In broader terms, the post-Cold War interventions suggest that the degree of resistanceexpected will be a crucial determinant for where and when humanitarian interventions will takeplace. Nowhere is this fact in greater evidence than in Bosnia. Fairly early in that conflict, thePentagon concluded that the only means of overturning Serbian gains was through the massive useof force. But because no “vital national interests” were at stake, the outside world adopted a policythat can only be described as “wishful thinking,” hoping to secure a Serbian commitment to peacewith minimal risk to their own troops. The interventions in Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti, on theother hand, were seen to involve minimal prospects of successful retaliation and were undertaken,at least in part, because of this perception. From these latter cases, one can propose what seem tobe the two criteria for post-Cold War humanitarian intervention: massive (almost genocidal)violence and the absence of significant opposition.These two criteria reflect a significant development in the evolution of humanitarianintervention. Donnelly’s four criteria are remarkable for their prescience and for their implicitskepticism of the possibilities for humanitarianly-inspired intervention. A mere six years afterDonnelly published these four criteria, the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia took place, the first ofa series of post-Cold War interventions. After the Somalia intervention, it can no longer be a statedas a categorical truth that a massive humanitarian tragedy will be permitted to runs its course.Furthermore, the critical outside observer cannot so easily turn to the geo-strategic motives of self-interest to explain away an intervention. At the same time, however, the two new criteria—massive (almost genocidal) violence and the absence of significant opposition)—suggest that thepost-Cold War international community has only taken its first, and sometimes, faltering stepstowards responding to the new potential for concerted action. Consequently, the international79community’s response to the collapse of the Somali state contains some valuable insights into thedevelopment of international society.289B. International SocietyRevolutionism: The New InterventionistsIn the wake of what has come to be known as the “debacle in Somalia,” the revolutionaryagenda of the new interventionists seemed to be in full retreat. Seemingly leading the charge wasone of the principle proponents of post-Cold War peacekeeping, U.S. President Clinton. While inApril of 1992, he had declared his support for a U.N. rapid-reaction force “standing guard at theborders of countries threatened by aggression, preventing mass violence against civilianpopulations, providing humanitarian relief and combating terrorism,” by 8 October, just after thedeaths of the U.S. Rangers in Somalia, he was announcing that U.S. armed forces personnelwould not serve under United Nations command.290 In fact, by May of 1994 when the Clintonadministration announced its “Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” the UnitedStates declared, “The U.S. does not support a standing UN army, nor will we earmark specificU.S. military units for participation in UN operations.”29’In a further retreat from peace-keeping,the Clinton administration developed a two-tier approach to the approval of new missions. First,in order for a specific operation to be approved by the U.S. at the Security Council, eight factorswould have to be in place. Atop the list was the requirement that UN involvement advance U.S.interests and that the threat to international peace and security be clearly evident. Additionally,clear objectives, solid financial support and that the duration be tied to realistic criteria for endingthe operation. The second tier, that is, the additional criteria required for actual U.S. participation,the U.S. announced six other factors, once again led by the need to advance U.S. interests. Twoother criteria stand-out: “acceptable” command and control arrangements and the perceivednecessity of U.S. involvement for the operations success. In addition, clear objectives, sufficientfinancial, Congressional and domestic support were also specified. Under these criteria it is289290 Elaine Sciolino, “The U.N.’s Glow is Gone,” New York Times 9 October 1993, p. Al.291 U.S. Government, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,”(Vancouver: U.S. Consulate, May 1994), p. 3.80dubious that any peace-keeping operation would qualify for U.S. participation. Conor CruiseO’Brian, writing in the summer of 1993, clearly captures the nature of the U.S.-U.N. relationship:“The US associates itself with the various UN operations but on its own terms, according to itsown agenda and conserving its autonomy.”292 In Martin Wight’s terms, U.S. peace-keepingpolicy is guided by realist self-interest.Yet while the alarm is being sounded in the revolutionist camp, one should be careful not tomake too much out of the U.S. position on peace-keeping. While the criteria may seem hopelesslyinflexible, in reality they are more pliant, more susceptible to Presidential discretion. A moreappropriate avenue of inquiry is to examine the practical underpinnings of the revolutionistargument. Have the domestic realities of the United States changed, making it freer to pursue apolicy of Par Americana? Will civil wars cease to erupt? Will people cease to care about the plightof innocent civilians? A more realistic appraisal of the revolutionist program is offered by BoutrosGhali. Following Clinton’s 27 September 1993 address to the U.N. General Assembly—in whichthe President admonished the U.N. for its inability to “say ‘no”—Boutros Ghali declared, “Itmust be understood that there will be failures as well as successes... The UN is not a magic wand.The problems before us cannot be solved quickly.”293The crucial aspect of the revolutionist vision is that, by and large, it recognizes the realities ofthe post-Cold War world. Even the now much maligned “Agenda for Peace” is remarkable for itsdiagnosis of these needs. Preventive diplomacy, for example, is of fundamental importance to theprevention of crises. In Somalia alone Mohamed Sahnoun cites three occasions when preventivediplomacy had a chance of averting the collapse of the Somali state: after Barre’s 1988 massacre ofthe northern Issaq’s, when the Manifesto Group presented its demands to Barre in 1990 andduring the 1991 Djibouti conference.294 Moreover, early intervention could have averted the crisisin Yugoslavia and would have resulted in less casualties in Rwanda. The UNITAF interventionalso demonstrates the need for post-conflict peace-building in order to secure the initial gains of ahumanitarian intervention. Unfortunately, the UNOSOM II experience in Somalia has292 Cited in, Mats R. Berdal, “Fateful Encounter: The United States and U.N. Peacekeeping,” Survival 36(Spring1994), p. 47.293 see “Action, Not Talk, Will Define U.S. Foreign Policy,” Africa Report (November/December 1993) P. 9.294 Sahnoun, The Missed Opportunities, pp. 5-11.81overshadowed the initial, even if limited, successes of humanitarian intervention, resulting in abacklash that could be called the “new non-interventionism.”The New Non-InterventionismAs indicated in the first chapter of this essay, Martin Wight noted the existence of a type ofrevolutionary that rejects entirely the use of force as a remedy for civil wars. Following the failureof UNOSOM II, this school has gained a new prominence as it has become allied with theresurgent isolationist tendencies in U.S. foreign policy. Richard Falk, whose revolutionismborders on pacifism, makes the argument shared by both kinds of non-interventionists:Intervention.., is never good foreign policy, no matter how appealing the overall humanitarian case seemsto be for changing political structure. Even if the intervening side has overwhelming military superiority,it rarely works, and its failure invariably leaves the target society worse off than if the internal play offorces had been allowed to run its course, however destructive and brutal.295For these non-interventionists, the lessons of Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia can be expressed in asimple formula: “nonintervention is intolerable, but intervention remains impossible.” There isboth truth and fallacy in this assertion. It is true that overwhelming force does not guaranteesuccess and can, as the UNOSOM II operation demonstrates, become an impediment to the initialhumanitarian objectives. Moreover, it is also true that a ‘knee-jerk’ intervention, without properunderstanding, diplomacy or an overall strategy can also easily lead to failure. What the noninterventionists ignore, however, is that a limited amount of force can be effective. The initialstages of the interventions in Somalia and Liberia did save lives. The belated French interventionin Rwanda offers another testament to this fact. As the New York Times observed, “Grant Francethis much credit for its risky armed intervention into the genocidal civil war in Rwanda. Some2,500 French troops moved into Rwanda, saved lives and created a safe area in the southwest, andare now poised to withdraw.”296The Realist AnarchyAs the preceding discussion suggests, the revolutionary age of global cosmopolitanism ishardly on the horizon. The realist postulate of international relations consisting of a “war of all295 Richard Falk, “Intervention Revisited,” The Nation 257 (No. 21, 20 December 1993) p. 757.296 Editorial. “France Helps in Rwanda — So Far,” New York Times 14 July 1994, p. A16.82against all” is still relevant, though the present “war” is not one of survival but of advancing ordefending one’s own interests. In terms of humanitarian intervention, the most profound impact ofrealist politics will be in the determination of where and when to intervene. While many call for thedevelopment of principled criteria for humanitarian intervention, the reality is that the process ofdeciding on intervention is a profoundly political one. Prior to the UNITAF intervention, forexample, African and “Southern” states had adamantly demanded more forceful action. Threeresolutions were passed, however, before the Security Council authorized a large deployment ofpeace-keepers. The same political considerations have also been played out in the recent attemptsto intervene in Rwanda. There, at U.S. insistance, the deployment of peace-keepers evolved in atwo-stage process. First, in late May, the Security Council “approved” a 5,500 peace-keepingforce. Almost an entire month passed, however, before the “deployment” of the same peace-keepers was approved.297 Still smarting from its recent experience in Somalia, the United Stateswas not prepared to engage in another peace-keeping operation. More characteristic ofWashington’s new approach was its attitude to the Yemeni civil war. Again, in the face ofpressure from Saudi Arabia for a peace-keeping force, the United States “persuaded the SecurityCouncil to authorize merely a regional monitoring force, which would be deployed only after alasting cease-fire takes hold.”298 In response to a Security Council reluctant to authorize newpeace-keeping operations, countries will either have to compete for attention with even more vigouror, as the Yemeni experience suggests, increase the effectiveness of regional organizations.The broader implications of renewed self-interest is that it illustrates a fundamentalshortcoming in the development of international society towards greater solidarity. The inability toidentify the national interest with the pursuit and defense of the international interest suggests thatinternational relations are still quite anarchical. As the Bosnian crisis indicates, the internationalinterest in defending such established norms such as the right to self-defense against armedaggression can be quite minimal.The Post-Cold War Rationalist Compromise297 Editorial. “Rwanda is Waiting,” Guardian Weeklyl9 June 1994, p. 13.298 Editorial. “Yemen: Risky War, Cautious Response,” New York Times 5 July 1994, p. A14.83While it may be too early to determine the locus of the compromise between realism’sanarchy and revolutionism’s solidarity, some indications may be discerned. As mentioned earlier,the development of international society in defense of human rights seems to be limited, at least forthe near future, to situations of near-genocidal violence which pose little threat to prospectiveintervenors. This is the post-Cold War compromise.Nevertheless, there are signs that R.J. Vincent was correct in his determination that thedomestic legitimacy of states will become an increasingly important criteria in internationalrelations. The United States action in Haiti demonstrates that when a democratically electedgovernment is overthrown in a military coup and refuses to yield (even after signing the GovernorIsland Accord), it risks the prospect of international intervention. Whether such an interventionwould occur in a hemisphere other than the American is, however, dubious. In addition, theexamples of Rwanda and Somalia indicate that where no legitimate government is deemed to exist,the Security Council may authorize an intervention to restore order without it impinging on thesovereign indepenence of the state in question. This last point is crucial. The internationalcommunity has yet to witness a post-Cold War intervention against a sovereign government that isfound guilty of gross human rights violations. In fact, in the debate prior to the authorization ofthe Rwanda peace-keeping force, China objected to the inclusion of any reference to the “genocide”in Rwanda.299Another conclusion reached by R.J. Vincent is born out by the present study. No matterhow strong the cosmopolitan feelings of loyalty seem on the surface, the simple fact is thatforeigners are still foreign. This determination has two implications. First, a state’s territorialboundaries are still very much the endpoint of political loyalty. In fact, in many states, subnational loyalties or micro-nationalism, is the defining feature of political life. Most minoritygroups still regard the sovereign state as their best protection against neighbouring ethnic groups.While these feelings persist, the non-intervention principle will remain a powerful rallying cry. Asecond implication, also born out by the Somalia experience, is that outsiders have little prospect ofrebuilding a modern state which has had almost no successful experience with the Western model.299 see Editorial. “Rwanda is Waiting.”84While it is too early to rule out democracy for Somalia, it may be time to ask whether a strongcentral government is the most appropriate model to build on. In addition, one might also askwhether the attempts to build a state out of a fundamentally clan-based society represents the bestprospects for peace in Somalia.85ConclusionWith the end of the Cold War, the international community was confronted with the need tocreate a new international order. Having undergone forty-five years of simmering superpowerconifict, there existed a tremendous sense of optimism that the next order would be more principledand more just. The concept of humanitarian intervention became one focal point of debate aboutthe shape of the “new world order.” The possibility of using force to redress grave violations ofhuman rights proved highly seductive. The international community became engaged in variouscivil wars, such as in Liberia, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia. Yet it was in Somalia that the firstattempt was made to translate the post-Cold War optimism into a practical demonstration of humansolidarity in action.Returning to this thesis’ original hypothesis—if the reasons for a state’s collapse areproperly understood and if the intervention is timely and effective, then that is evidence for theevolution of international society towards greater solidarity—an interesting relationship emergesbetween the degree of solidarity in international society and the ability to translate that solidarityinto effective action. The intervention in Somalia was not timely, occurring after almost two andone half years of civil war. As for its effectiveness, the short-term alleviation of suffering isundeniable, yet the inability to seize the opportunity provided by the UNITAF intervention hadserious long-term implications for the subsequent UNOSOM II operation. The intervention inSomalia, therefore, demonstrates two truths: first, that there exists a considerable degree ofsolidarity, in terms of genuine feelings of compassion and a desire to improve the lot of others;but, secondly, the actual ability of the international community to translate these sentiments of acommon humanity into practical, concrete improvements through the use of force is limited. Theintervention in Somalia clearly demonstrates the disjunction between the human solidarity asexpressed in legal norms, compared to the inability of national governments to effectively respondto civil crises. 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