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Getting to the table: making the decision to negotiate comprehensive land claims in British Columbia Thomas, Patty 1994

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GETTING TO THE TABLE:MAKING THE DECISION TO NEGOTIATE COMPREHENSIVE LAND CLAIMS IN BRITISHCOLUMBIAbyPatty ThomasBSN, University of British Columbia, 1987A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESSchool of Community and Regional PlanningWe accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAApril 1994©Patricia A. J. M. Thomas, 1994In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature)___________________________epartmentofThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate 1’l99DE-6 (2/88)ABSTRACTAlthough the rest of Canada has a long history of treaty making,British Columbia has refused to negotiate treaties with Natives since1854. In 1991, B.C. reversed this position. Events across Canada inthe years 1990 and 1991 provide a case study to explain why thisdecision was made.Quebec’s Oka crisis catalyzed the decision making process underwayin B.C. First, during the Oka crisis, B.C. agreed to cooperate with thefederal government on a strategy to settle Indian land claims. Second,following the Oka crisis, the First Nations and the federal andprovincial governments set up the B.C. Claims Task Force to recommendhow these negotiations should proceed. Third, the Task Force maderecommendations to address numerous Native grievances and to prevent“another Oka.” Fourth, because of the changed political environment inB.C., both governments accepted all the Task Force’s recommendations byDecember 10, 1991. It can be argued that B.C. took a rational approachin making this decision to negotiate.The B.C. comprehensive claims conflict can be viewed as part ofthe evolution of the Native/non—Native relationship in Canada. In earlyCanada, the two parties initially cooperated through trading andmilitary alliances. Next, in the coercive phase of their relationship,the parties interacted through treaty making and assimilation attempts.Starting in 1969, Natives used protests, lobbying, and legal cases toiiconfront non—Natives. Although B.C. followed a similar pattern, thisprovince’s most notable difference is that no major treaties were signedhere. Now, by agreeing to negotiate comprehensive land claims, B.C. isstarting to re—establish the cooperative relationship that Natives andnon—Natives initially had.iiiTABLE OF CONTENTSABSTRACT iiTABLE OF CONTENTS ivLIST OF FIGURES vLIST OF TABLES viGLOSSARY viiACKNOWLEDGMENTS viiiCHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 11.1 Introduction and Context 11.2 Purpose and Objectives 21.3 Significance of the Research 21.4 Methodology 31.5 Thesis Organization 4CHAPTER TWO: CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 52.1 Introduction 52.2 Ury, Brett, and Goldberg’s Model 62.3 Fisher’s “Eclectic” Model 132.4 Comparing and Contrasting the Two Models 162.5 Power Processes in Conflict Resolution 182.6 Summary and Conclusions 24CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND 283.1 Introduction 283.2 Overview of Canada’s History 293.2.1 Cooperation 293.2.2 Coercion 313.2.3 Confrontation 363.2.4 Summary 383.3 British Columbia’s History 383.3.1 Cooperation 383.3.2 Coercion 403.3.3 Confrontation 423.3.4 Summary 50CHAPTER FOUR: GETTING TO THE TABLE 514.1 Introduction 514.2 Why Did the Province Agree to Cooperate on a Strategy toSettle Indian Land Claims? 544.2.1 Background to the Oka Crisis 554.2.2 The Outcome 574.3 Why Was the Task Force Set Up? 644.4 Why Did the Task Force Come Up With Their Recommendations? 684.5 Why Did The Governments Unanimously Accept All theRecommendations of the Task Force? 724.6 Summary 75CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS 775.1 Getting to the Table 775.2 Now that We Are at the Table . . . 805.3 The Larger Relationship 83BIBLIOGRAPHY 85ivLIST OF FIGURFSFIGURE 1: Interrelationships Among Interests, Rights, and Power 7FIGURE 2: Model of a Dispute Resolution System 10FIGURE 3: The Eclectic Model 14FIGURE 4: Modelling the Native/non—Native Conflict 26FIGURE 5: Historic Treaties 33FIGURE 6: Northern Comprehensive Claims 44FIGURE 7: Indian Roadblocks in B.C. on August 1, 1990 61FIGURE 8: Comprehensive Claims Submissions in B.C. 66VLIST OF TABLESTABLE 1: 1990—1991 Time Line 52TABLE 2: Different Views of Indians 74TABLE 3: Summary of the Provinc&s BATNAs 77viGLOSSARYThe following terms and terminology are those found in theCoolican Report (1985) and the Report of the B.C. Claims Task Force(1991) and are used in this thesis.The terms First Nations, aboriginal, and Native, are usedinterchangeably to refer to the descendants of the aboriginalinhabitants of this land. The terms Indians, Inuit, and Metis areConstitutional terms used to describe specific aboriginal groups.Similarly, the terms Europeans, whites, and non—Native refer to the non—aboriginal population.The term land includes waters; resources refer to the products ofboth land and water.The terms Indian title, aboriginal title, and rights are usedinterchangeably to refer to the rights of aboriginal peoples.viiACKNOWLEDGMENTSWriting this thesis has been both difficult and interesting. Whenthe going got tough, I thought of the task in a humorous wayIt has occurred to me that thesis writing and indeed negotiations,are like episodes from Star Trek. Successful missions depend on havingthe right crew and support staff. Many people assisted me on thisparticular voyage.Thanks to Tony Dorcey for being in the Captain’s chair. Manythanks to my second—in—command, Paul Tennant, for sharing his Spock—likeknowledge of the B.C. Land Claims question and his human kindness withme. Thanks to Peter Boothroyd, the McCoy, for providing a third pointof view.The support staff aboard the Enterprise do the often unnoticed,but equally important background work. On this particular voyage Iwould like to thank my thesis support group (Signe Bagh, LenoreMitchell, Sophie Megalos, and Sinclair Tedder) and especially commendDeanna Thomas. Many thanks go to all the wonderful nursing staff (theNurse Chapels> at Banfield 4th floor for their support, interest, and“little, nameless, unremembered acts of kindness . . .“ they gave meduring my extended period of education. Additional support servicesprovided by Jerri Pladsen (the Communications Officer) of Westwater. Toher goes my appreciation for listening to my most frequently issuedcommuniques of: “This takes longer than I thought” and “I wish I wasfinished.” Thanks to my friends Pauline Lee and Ingrid See, forfrequently refueling and always encouraging me——more of that much neededScotty/Nurse Chapel type of behavior. I also appreciate the comments ofmany family members (especially my brothers) and other friends who areinterested or involved in Native issues. Your different perspectivesand honest comments were appreciated. We all have so much in common.viiiCHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION1.1 INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXTNatives and non—Natives have a long history of resolving theirdisputes through treaty making. Initially, European nations madetreaties with Aboriginals to establish trading relationships and forgemilitary alliances. Following confederation, Canada made treaties withNatives to acquire land for settlement and development. These “numberedtreaties” cover most of western Canada. “Modern day” treaties arecomplex legal documents that cover most of the North. For varioushistorical, political, economic, and legal reasons, British Columbiarefused to make treaties with Natives from 1854 onwards. In 1991, B.C.finally agreed to negotiate Natives’ outstanding claims. The thesisexplains why this decision was made.All British Columbians now face the challenges and opportunitiespresented by negotiating these “modern day” treaties. To resolve ourdifferences, we must share the use and benefits of the land and theresponsibilities to make decisions regarding it. Negotiators face thedifficult task of deciding how to fairly distribute the costs andbenefits of settlements amongst existing users. Some users may incurlosses (e.g., a decrease in fish allocations) as a result of claimssettlements, thus paving the way for further resource conflicts.Balancing these challenges are opportunities. In my opinion, we willall benefit if agreements reached include more sustainable resource1management regimes. Most importantly, these negotiations provide FirstNations with opportunities to address the numerous social and economicproblems they face. Together we face a difficult, yet promising task.1.2 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVESThe specific purpose of this thesis is to explain why B.C. madethe decision to negotiate comprehensive land claims.The general objectives of this thesis are:• To describe conflicts and conflict resolution processes.• To explain when negotiation is an appropriate way to resolveconflicts.• To outline the historical background of this conflict.• To discuss the alternatives to negotiation pursued by First Nationsand the province.• To suggest areas for further research regarding this conflict and itsresolution.1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCHThis research is significant to planning for two main reasons.First, by summarizing the background behind comprehensive claims, thisthesis helps planners understand many of the current conflicts andchanges occurring in the area of natural resource planning. Forexample, questions related to aboriginal title underlie many ongoing2fisheries’ and forestry disputes. In Clayoquot Sound, the recentinterim agreement reached between Natives and non—Natives affectsforestry practices.2 Throughout the province, final agreements willcreate changes in natural resource management regimes (see Cassidy andDale 1988). Since comprehensive claims affect these many areas,planners should understand the issue.Second, this research is important because it examines conflictsand conflict resolution——two topics familiar to planners. Althoughnumerous methods of conflict resolution exist, negotiating is anincreasingly common and expected way for planners to resolve disputes(see Forester 1989). To be effective practitioners, planners shouldknow when and how to negotiate. By studying the province’s decision asa case study, this thesis helps planners understand why partiesnegotiate.1.4 METHODOLOGYThe thesis uses the years 1990 to 1991 as a case study. Therationale for this approach is as follows. Tennant’s (1990) detailedstudy of the B.C. land question ends at 1989. At this time, theprovincial government still refused to negotiate. However, by July 31,1990, the province agreed to “cooperate” with the federal government ona strategy to settle land claims. By December 10, 1991, B.C. accepted‘See Vancouver Sun, 29 June 1993. “Court rulings ‘hammer’ natives.”2See Vancouver Sun, 11 December 1993. “Logging deal upsets green strategy.”3all the Task Force recommendations for a new land claims policy.Clearly, the years 1990 to 1991 mark the turning point in this conflict.The events that happened during this time deserve a close analysis andtherefore form the subject matter for the case study.The case study uses secondary sources of information. Thesesources include Native and non—Native newspapers, newsmagazines,journals, books, and government publications.1.5 ThESIS ORGMUZATIONThe thesis unfolds as follows. Chapter One provides an overviewof the thesis. Chapter Two discusses conflict resolution models. Intwo sections, Chapter Three traces the evolution of this particularconflict. The first section provides a survey of Canada’s history,focussing on how the relationship between Natives and non—Nativesevolved and changed over time. The second section looks more closely atB.C.’s history, highlighting how this province acted differently thanthe rest of Canada and how these historical behaviors led to the presentday conflict. Chapter Four analyzes the events that occurred between1990 to 1991 that caused the provincial government to change itsposition. Chapter Five draws conclusions about this conflict andidentifies areas for further research.4CHAPTER 2: CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESSES2.1 INTRODUCTIONConflicts are a common, unavoidable and important aspect of life.Conflictprevents stagnation, it stimulates interest andcuriosity, it is the medium through which problems can beaired and solutions arrived at, it is the root of personaland social change (Deutsch 1973, 9).Along with creative aspects, conflict also has destructive properties.Wars can be an outcome of poorly managed conflict. Since conflict hasthese “Jekyll and Hyde” aspects, the challenge is not to eliminateconflict, but handle it better.Since conflicts are so common, they have been studied extensivelywithin various disciplines (e.g., sociology and political science) andfrom multidisciplinary approaches. Although various authors usedifferent terminology, (e.g., Mack and Snyder 1957, Deutsch 1973, Rex1981, Fisher 1990), all seem to agree that the social conflictphenomenon consists of (1) parties in conflict, (2) over substantiveissues, for example land, ideology, and jobs (3) applying behaviors orprocesses meant to influence each other’s positions. Examining point(1) answers “who” questions about a conflict whereas point (2) answersthe “what” questions, and point (3) looks at the “how” and “why” aspectsof a conflict. Since the specific purpose of this thesis is to explainwhy British Columbia agreed to negotiate land claims with the FirstNations, this chapter focusses more on point (3). At the same time, itis recognized that all three parts of a conflict are inter—related.5In order to understand the conflict resolution process, twodifferent models are examined. The first model, an inductive one, isbased on Ury, Brett, and Goldberg’s (1988) experiences in resolvingconflict in the coal industry. The second model, a deductive one, comesfrom Fisher’s (1990) multidisciplinary, multilevel analysis of conflictresearch. The features of these two models will be first describedseparately and then compared and contrasted with each other.2.2 URY, BRETT, AND GOLDBERG’S MODELAccording to the Ury, Brett, and Goldberg (1988) model, conflictconsists of disputes over interests, rights, and power. Interests are“needs, desires, concerns, fears—the things one cares about or wants.They underlie people’s positions—the tangible items they say they want”(p. 5). Rights disputes involve disagreements over the application ofagreed upon standards, for example rules, contracts, or law, to specificinterest situations. The authors define power as “the ability to coercesomeone to do something he would not otherwise do” (p. 7). Powerincludes objective sources such as financial resources and subjectivesources such as the other side’s perception of one’s power. In theirview, “The reconciliation of interests takes place within the context ofthe parties’ rights and power” (Ury, Brett, and Goldberg 1988, 9). Forexample, satisfying First Nations’ interest in accessing timberresources, depends on having recognized rights (e.g., obtained throughthe courts or in the form of a “modern day” treaty), and access to power6to enforce these rights, if necessary (e.g., police force). The diagrambelow illustrates this relationship (Ury, Brett, and Goldberg 1988, 9):FIGURE 1: Interrelationships Among Interests, Rights, and PowerThe authors then divide conflict resolution processes into threetypes based on the above diagram. The first process, reconcilinginterests, involves “interestbased” or “problem—solving” negotiationswith or without a neutral mediator. The authors differentiate interest—based negotiations from those based on rights or “power—based”7negotiations that involve verbal insults and threats. The secondprocess focusses on the formal use of a legitimate third party todetermine who is right. Examples of this include use of the courts oradjudication. In the third process, parties use various types ofcoercive power to determine who appears stronger. The authors alsorecognize that not all disputes get resolved in these three ways; somedisputes end up with parties “lumping it” or avoiding contact with eachother.The authors believe that, in general, an interest—basednegotiation process is “best” and that a “rights” based approach isbetter than a power struggle. They base their conclusions on thefollowing criteria or “costs and benefits”:1. Transaction costs in terms of time, money, and emotional energy.2. Parties’ mutual satisfaction with the fairness of the results andthe dispute resolution system.3. Effect on the relationship between the disputing parties.4. Recurrence or whether a particular approach produces a lastingagreement.According to them, interests based negotiations may involve lowertransaction costs, better resolve the problems underlying a grievance,lead to a higher level of mutual satisfaction, produce better workingrelationships, and prevent disputes from reoccurring. Since the authorsadvocate an interests—based approach, they do not discuss rights orpower processes in any detail.8The remainder of their book focusses on setting up an interest—based dispute system. The diagram below shows their model of a disputeresolution system (Ury, Brett, and Goldberg 1988, 22):9To create a “better” system, the authors recommend that you firstdiagnose the existing system, then design a more effective one, andfinally, implement your new system. These three steps are discussedbelow.The first step towards creating a better dispute resolutionprocess involves collecting information that answers “what, how, andwhy” questions about the existing system. Finding out about the currentand recent issues in a dispute answers the “what” questions. Learningabout the existing conflict resolution processes answers the “how”questions. Since “why” questions are important to understanding thenature of the B.C. Comprehensive claims dispute, some of the authors’questions are outlined below (adapted from Ury, Brett, and Goldberg1988, 33—39):• How satisfied are disputants with the outcomesof the procedures?• Does the procedure provide an opportunity for“voice”? Can disputants air their grievancesfully in their own terms? Do disputants havecontrol over the procedure—are they in charge,or does someone take it out of their hands? Dodisputants participate in shaping the outcome?Do they think the procedure is fair?• Does the procedure allow for the venting ofemotions such as anger and frustration?• How costly do disputants perceive the procedureto be in terms of time and money?• Does the procedure serve the interests ofparties other than the disputants? [e.g., Does aprotest serve to unify a group internally andconsolidate leadership?]• Does the procedure serve purposes for thedisputants other than resolving the particular11dispute at hand? [e.g., Is it a public relationsexercise?]• Is negotiation hampered by a lack of norms,precedents, laws, and other standards that couldbe used to settle disputes or by a lack oftechnical information about the problem?• Do the procedures need to be activelyadministered by a person or an institution?• In what ways are procedures in use affected byorganizational decision—making procedures?• How does the surrounding culture affect theprocedures used?These questions give insights into the motivations, skills, andresources that influence the use of either an interests, rights, orpower approach to dispute resolution.Once these diagnostic questions are answered, the next step is todesign a new conflict resolution system that addresses the above issues.The six principles of designing a new dispute system are:• . . put the focus on interests; build in“loopbacks” to negotiation; provide low—costrights and power backup; build in consultationbefore, feedback after; arrange procedures in alow—to—high cost sequence; and provide thenecessary motivation, skills, and resources(Ury, Brett, and Goldberg 1988, 42)In order to implement a new conflict resolution system, theauthors recognize that you need the right opportunity and the support ofthe disputing parties. The right opportunity can arise through acrisis, an insider’s idea, or when a new relationship or organization isbeing established (Ury, Brett, and Goldberg 1988). The authors notethat12• . it is exceedingly difficult to change adispute resolution system without workingclosely with the disputing parties. . . Theprocess of design is as much of a political taskof garnering support and overcoming resistanceas it is a technical task (Ury, Brett, andGoldberg 1988, 65).To summarize, the Ury, Brett, and Goldberg (1988) model dividesconflict resolution processes into interest, rights, and power basedapproaches. Because they believe that an interest—based approach isbest, the authors outline how to diagnose the existing system, design abetter approach, and then implement the new interests—based approach toconflict resolution.2.3 FISHER’S “ECLECTIC” MODELIn building his “eclectic,” deductive model, Fisher (1990)reviewed individual, group, and intergroup conflict literature. Theresult was (Fisher 1990, 93):13FIGURE 3: The eclectic modelT low Intensity Conflict ]Sources IndMdual Grouo ProcessInterests flmdble st,le moderate cohesionvalues limited perceptual! moderate constituentcognitive biases pressureIntensity Indicators adequate problemmoderate threat Interaroug Relationship soMngmoderate ethnocentrism competitive/cooperative orientationlow mistrust adequate cothmunication/interactionsmal number issues adequate dispute resdutionSettlementaccommodation/withdrawalnegotiation/mediationResdution / History of AntagonismEffects Cultural DifferencesDe-Escalation EscalationThird Party J Malignant SocialConsultation ProcessSuperordinate / Structural ChangesGoals 0Settlementstalemate/capitulationarbitrationIntergroup Relationship Intensity Indicatorscompetitive orientation high threatinadequate communIcation/interaction high ethnocentrismcounterproductive dispute resolution high mistrustlarge number IssuesGroup Processhigh cohesionIndividual Sourceshigh constituent pressurerigid steinadequate problem solvingpeivasive perceptual/ powerpolarization, entrapmentcognitive biasesHigh Intensity ConflictBoundaries14Fisher’s (1990) model separates conflict into high and lowintensity states. System states are “conditions of the system in whichall units take on distinctive values or ranges of values that persistover some period of time” (Fisher 1990, 108). Ury, Brett, and Goldberg(1988) would call this the “diagnosist’of the dispute resolution system.The boundaries or limitations of Fisher’s (1990) model are that itapplies to two group conflicts, in which both groups are relativelyequal in power, live in close proximity to one another, and interactfrequently. The time frame for the conflict may be short or long. Hismodel is restricted to conflicts that evidence minimal regulation or arenot highly institutionalized.In a low intensity conflict, interests and values are the sourcesof disagreements. Interests are conflicts over resources or positions(e.g., jobs) that can be resolved through negotiation or mediation.Value conflicts, involving incompatible preferences, principles, orpractices (e.g., culture, religion, politics, or ideology), requireaccommodation or withdrawal from each other. Accommodation requiresadhering to some super ordinate values that allow for differences amongsubordinate values. In low intensity conflict, the group is moderatelycohesive, communicates well with the other party, and has a mixedcompetitive and cooperative orientation.In a high—intensity state, needs and power are the sources ofconflict. A power conflict is the attempt of one group to have control15over non—negotiable needs such as identity, recognition, security, andself—determination. Within the group, individuals are ethnocentric,that is, they show a high—level of in—group cohesion and negative out—group attitudes or prejudices and they communicate poorly. Theircompetitive behaviors involve various forms of coercion or powerstruggles.Fisher’s (1990) diagramming of escalative and de—escalativeprocesses are helpful in understanding how system—states change. Aconflict will escalate if the parties have a history of antagonism andexperience cultural differences, malignant social process (i.e., poorconflict resolution systems), and structural changes (e.g., decline ordisappearance of resources). Fisher (1990) outlines three processes tode—escalate a conflict. The first, “resolution effects,” involves astrategy of safe “conciliatory gestures” (i.e., a cooperative, but“firm” approach). The second approach relies on a mediator to judgeboth parties and intervene accordingly. The third approach is the samestrategy that a low—intensity system applies to resolve value conflicts,that is, the finding of mutual goals.2.4 COMPARING AND CONTRASTING THE TWO MODELSAlthough arrived at in different ways, the Ury, Brett, andGoldberg (1988) model and the Fisher (1990) model are essentially alike.Their terminologies differ; for example Fisher’s (1990) low—intensityconflict is the same as Ury, Brett, and Goldberg’s (1988) interest—based16dispute resolution system. There is some confusion over the differentdefinitions of the substance of a conflict, for example Ury, Brett, andGoldberg (1988) include “needs” as interests, whereas Fisher (1990)separates the two. Both models outline a similar process, that is themovement from a power based dispute resolution system or high intensityconflict to an interest—based or low intensity one. The questions Ury,Brett, and Goldberg (1988) suggest asking to diagnose a system aresimilar to the individual, group, and intergroup variables Fisher (1990)identified in his “system—states.” Although Fisher’s (1990) modelclearly shows how conflicts evolve and escalate (e.g., history ofantagonism), Ury, Brett, and Goldberg (1988) discuss this processthrough numerous examples. Thus, both the inductive and deductiveapproaches yield similar models of conflict resolution.Ury, Brett, and Goldberg’s (1988) model has some advantages overFisher’s (1990). First, Ury, Brett, and Goldberg’s (1988) modelincorporates the institutional or relationship aspects of a conflict,whereas the Fisher (1990) model lacks this. Institutions andrelationships shared between parties are important in the conflictresolution process. Formal institutions (e.g., the legal system) definethe boundaries for an interest—based process. Informal institutions orrelationships such as Natives marrying non—Natives, attending schooltogether, and speaking the same language, create numerous “cooperativebonds” that keep the conflict at a low to moderate intensity (Mack andSnyder 1957, Deutsch 1973). Second, Ury, Brett, and Goldberg’s (1988)17diagrams are simpler and easier to follow; their approach is more “userfriendly.” Third, Ury, Brett, and Goldberg (1988) recognize thatdisputants negotiate when it is in their best interest to do so (interms of costs and benefits), a point not well discussed by Fisher(1990). Thus the Ury, Brett, and Goldberg (1988) model is moreapplicable to the problem addressed in this thesis. Since both modelsdo not address the role of power adequately, this topic is discussedseparately below.2.5 POWER PROCESSES IN CONFLICT RESOLUTIONPower is a nebulous, but important part of conflicts and conflictresolution processes. Ury, Brett and Goldberg (1988) note, “In someinstances, interests—based negotiations cannot occur unless rights orpower procedures are first employed to bring a recalcitrant party to thenegotiating table” (p. 16). Since this statement applies to the B.C.Comprehensive claims conflict, no discussion of conflict resolutionprocesses would be complete without explaining some aspects of power.Power can be defined in many ways. Authors who take a narrow viewsee power only as a coercive force (e.g., Mack and Snyder 1957, Ury,Brett, and Goldberg 1988). Deutsch (1973) gives a broader view ofpower:An actor (a term used here to refer to either agroup or an individual) has power in a givensituation (situational power) to the degree thathe can satisfy the purposes (goals, desires, or18wants) that he is attempting to fulfill in thatsituation. Power is a relational concept; itdoes not reside in the individual but rather inthe relationship of the person to hisenvironment [environmental power]. Thus thepower of an actor in a given situation isdetermined by the characteristics of thesituation as well as by his own characteristics[personal power](pp. 84—85) . . . [P]ower can befacilitative as well as coercive, that it canliberate as well as restrain, that is, it can be“for” as well as “against”(pp. 86—87).This broader definition of power is used in this thesis when referringto power processes. Deutsch (1973, 87) then identifies some of thedifferent types of power:• Coercive power, which uses negative incentives,such as threats to physical well—being, wealth,reputation, or social status, to influence theother;• Reward or exchange power, which employs positiveincentives, such as promises of gain in wellbeing, wealth, and the like, in exchange of whatis desired from the other [e.g., “In the long—run, settling land claims will cost thetaxpayers less money”];• Ecological power, which entails sufficientcontrol over the other’s social or physicalenvironment to permit one to modify it so thatthe modified environment induces the desiredbehavior or prevents the undesired behavior[e.g., “Self—government strategies will reducethe incidence of family violence on thereserves”];• Normative power, which is based on theobligations arising from social norms governingthe relationship [e.g., “Indians should betreated fairly by the government”];• Referent power, which uses the other’s desire toidentify with or be similar to some person orgroup in order to alter his attitudes and values[e.g., “All Canadians, including Indians, wantthe best for their children”];19• Expert power, which is grounded in the other’sacceptance of onets superior knowledge or skill[e.g., “Indians have managed natural resourcesin an ecological manner long before the whiteman ever came”].Coercive power can be further classified on a continuum from nonviolent (e.g., peaceful roadblocks) to violent processes (e.g.,organized use of armed forces). Violence refers to “. * , physicalinjury to persons or destruction of their property’t (Schellenberg 1982,226). The use of violent coercive power often is a crisis or turningpoint in a conflict; after its occurrence, conflict becomes moredifficult to resolve (Miall 1992). However, violence is not necessaryto make coercive processes effective; threats or implied threats offorce also influence a party’s behavior.Various types of coercive processes are acceptable in differentsocieties. A party using a coercive process must be capable of carryingout the threat, be credible to the target party (e.g., the police areallowed to enforce the law on citizens), the act must target the rightparty, and be legitimate (Schellenberg 1982). Legitimacy depends on theparty establishing a good reason for carrying out its actions andestablishing credibility in the eyes of “disinterested” or neutralparties (Schellenberg 1982). Thus social norms and values dictate theuse of coercive types of power. For example, it is acceptable for aparent to discipline a child and it was historically acceptable for thefederal government to enforce the “paternalistic” Indian Act onto itsIndian “wards.”20The description of non—coercive types of power gives insight intocultural aspects of the Native/non—Native conflict. At the time ofcontact, both parties had very different cultural norms, differentreligious beliefs, and different sets of laws. In power language, eachparty possessed different normative, expert, ecological, and referencepowers—they were distinct nations. Because of their greater coercivepower, non—Natives tried to make Natives abide by their cultural norms(e.g., assimilation policy). As Deutsch (1973) notes, the use of anytype of power entails “costs.” He believes thatthe costs of maintaining effectivecoercive and ecological power far outweigh thecosts of maintaining the noncoercive forms[e.g., normative power], it is generally ashort—lived economy to employ coercion as asubstitute for the effort involved in developinga trusting relationship with the other (p. 88).In simpler language, non—Natives’ use of coercive power greatly damagedtheir relationship with the Natives. This is why both the B.C. ClaimsTask Force (1992) and the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1992)focus on the need to build “new relationships” between Natives and non—Natives.This discussion of power also lends insight on the recent changesthat have occurred in the Native/non—Native relationship. In 1969,Indians were referred to as “powerless’t people by the federal government(see White Paper 1969). Now both the federal and provincial governmentsrefer to them as “equal partners” at the negotiating table (see Reportof the British Columbia Claims Task Force 1991). Clearly, using thislanguage, Natives have become empowered. Their power—building21strategies include increasing the resources that underlie power (e.g.,land claims); increasing the effectiveness of existing resources (e.g.,becoming better educated); by finding allies (e.g., environmentalgroups); and/or by decreasing the resources or increasing the costs ofthe more powerful group (e.g., court injunctions affecting forestcompanies). In addition, Natives have used other strategies recommendedby Deutsch (1973) such as inducing the high—power group to use its powerbenevolently, through such techniques as ingratiation (reference power)and the arousal of guilt or the appeal to general norms of equity orjustice (aspects of normative power). In making these suggestions to alow—power group, Deutsch (1973) notesIt is difficult to assume that such a group isunlikely to change the power relations unless itis an effectively organized, cohesive group witha high level of frustrated aspiration, asignificant degree of optimism about thepossibilities of change, and considerablefreedom of fear of the high—power group (p. 91).Thus to gain some power, a group has to be organized, motivated, andhave freedom to criticize the high power group. Power—buildingstrategies also have to happen in the right “environment” or point intime to be effective.From the non—Natives’ perspective, in this discussion, they werethe “high—power” group, lacking incentives to change the existing powerrelationships (Deutsch 1973). Over the history of the Native/non—Nativeconflict, non—Natives have used the following types of power to defendand promote the status quo. They22• Attributed greater competence (expert power) and/or superior moralvalue (normative power) to themselves;• Employed defense mechanisms such as avoiding contact with the low—power group (e.g., B.C. government not wanting to negotiate with theFirst Nations);• Denied the existence of any problems (e.g., Joseph Trutch, agovernment “expert” denying that B.C.’s Indians were unhappy).An understanding of the different types of power lends insightinto many aspects of the complex Native/non—Native relationship. At thesame time, power remains a confusing concept yielding almosttautological definitions. Viewing power only in a coercive waysimplifies things, but this approach ignores the “persuasive war ofwords” that accompanies most non—violent forms of coercion. Forexample, the “power” of an Indian roadblock forces logging companies toget court injunctions, but at the same time, appeals for justiceinfluence public opinion. To this end, it seems that power is alwayspart of a conflict, but it cannot be measured directly. Public opinionpolls and behaviors of third parties are indirect ways to assess therelative strength of each party without naming and evaluating thedifferent types of power used.232.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONSSo far, this chapter has described and discussed two models ofdispute resolution. Although both models were alike, Ury, Brett, andGoldberg’s (1988) model was simpler to understand and more complete. Becauseneither model discussed the role of power thoroughly, this topic wasdiscussed under a separate heading. This final section discusses theconflict resolution process from the point of view of the participants andthen diagrams how the Ury, Brett, and Goldberg’s (1988) model applies to theNative/non—Native conflict.Fisher and Ury (1981), with their “Best Alternative to NegotiatedAgreement” (BATNAs), simplify the above theoretical explanation ofmodels and power processes. At the same time, they take the view ofparties contemplating negotiations, rather than those designing thedispute resolution system, and give them the following advice.According to Fisher and Ury (1981), you should first list yourBATNAs and then compare each one to what you would get throughnegotiating. This step coincides with the “diagnosis” stage of theBrett, Ury, and Goldberg (1988) model. The BATNAs for the FirstNations’ are (1) civil, non—violent forms of protest such as roadblocks, marches, rallies (power processes); (2) use of court system(rights process) and (3) policy changes (rights process). The provincealso tried (2) and (3) in addition to avoiding the issue.24Next, Fisher and Ury (1981) prescribe selecting the “bestalternative to negotiating” from your list and developing it fully.Since this particular conflict involves numerous First Nations memberswith differing opinions, Natives undertook a multi—faceted BATNAinvolving all three processes. For similar reasons, the province alsopursued all their BATNAs.Finally, Fisher and Ury (1981) believe, “The reason you negotiateis to produce something better than the results you can obtain withoutnegotiating” (p. 104). Others support this point of view (e.g., Deutsch1973, Schellenberg 1982) and it also parallels the Brett, Ury, andGoldberg’s (1988) rationale for building “interest—based” conflictresolution systems. This thesis supports this rational view that theprovince agreed to negotiate when it was in their best interest to doso.Applying the Brett, Ury, and Goldberg’s (1988) model and Fisherand Ury’s (1981) “BATNA” terminology to the Native/non—Native conflictyields the following diagrams:25FIGURE 4: Modelling the Native/non—Native ConflictBackground to ConflictNonNativest Interests, Rightsand Powers (as in Fig. 1)/—Cooperation—interests_based dispute resolution system—— — - — ———power—based dispute resolution system1J,\CoercionDirm ANatives’ Interests, Rights,and Powers (as in Fig. 1)TIMEIIConfrontati?flf’:r,ct: tiidv/EnvjronThird Parties’ BehaviorsBlocl<ades (First Nations BATNA)+.1,.,Public OpinionLegal Redress (Both parties’‘PINTEREST—BASED PROCESSES_____I ProceduzesPolicy Changes (Both partiest BATNA)HTS—BAED PR“Do Nothing” (Province’s BATNA) / Motivations llsro,esOCESSES0 OKA CRISISPOWER-BASED PROCES—26These diagrams show the following. Diagram A relates to thehistorical background of the Native/non—Native conflict covered inChapter Three. It shows that Natives and non—Natives initiallycooperated (Miller 1991) or used an interests—based dispute resolutionmodel (Brett, Ury, and Goldberg 1988) when their power was relativelyequal and their interests coincided. In the coercion phase, non—Nativesand Natives interests did not coincide; non—Natives used their greaterpower to coerce Natives to assimilate. In the confrontation phase,Natives are attempting to re—establish a relative balance of power withnon—Natives based on common interests. Diagram B refers to the years1990 to 1991 in British Columbia. It shows the variables that wereimportant in making the decision to negotiate land claims in B.C. Thesevariables relate together as a system, rather than in a linear fashion.The province’s rational decision to negotiate arises from this model ofa dispute resolution system,27CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND3.1 INTRODUCTIONWriting this section presented a challenge: Whose view of historyis “right”? As a high school student, I recall learning how savageIndians scalped pious missionaries. Some historians (and Nativepoliticians) now portray the White man as the villain. Neither approachtells both sides of the story; no one race of people can be entirelysavage or conversely, completely benevolent. This chapter is an attemptto provide a balanced view of the background issues,- events, andpolicies important to the case study. Section I briefly highlights howthe conflict evolved in Eastern and Central Canada, while section IIfocusses on B.C.’s history.Of all the books reviewed for this section (e.g., Berger 1991,Frideres 1988, Ponting and Gibbons 1980), Miller’s (1991) SkyscrapersHide the Heavens, proves the most useful. Miller (1991) classifies theNative/non—Native relationship into three phases of cooperation,coercion, and confrontation. In his eyes, Natives are neither ignorantsavages nor passive victims, but active participants in all phases ofthe relationship. Since his approach is both fair and comprehensive,this thesis uses it as an outline for this chapter and as the mainsource for section I.28Since Section II focusses on B.C.’s history, it uses other sourcesto supplement Miller (1991). Fisher (1977) best covers B.C.’s historyfrom 1774—1890. Since Tennant (1990) provides the most detailedtreatment of the B.C. Indian land question, Section II frequently citeshim.3.2 OVERVIEW OF CANADA’S HISTORY3.2.1 CooperationEarly explorers thought they found an “empty” land that they couldclaim for their respective countries. This terra nullius was populatedwith numerous and different groups of Natives, living in recognizedterritories and practicing their own form of self—government. Nativestraded and carried out small scale warfare with each other. Despitevery different cultural values, non—Natives and Natives initially gotalong.Natives and non—Natives initially cooperated through trading.Aboriginal peoples and the newcomers established trading relationshipsduring the 1500—1700s in Eastern Canada and on the Prairies. Theycooperated because their interests coincided; Europeans desired furs andNatives wanted products such as guns and iron utensils. Initially,Natives had the upper hand in these early “business negotiations”; theyhad better wilderness skills and greater numbers than their non—Native29trading partners (Miller 1991). As a sign of their cooperation, theseparties signed “Peace and friendship” treaties during this time.The next phase of this cooperative relationship involved militaryalliances. As Europeans struggled for control over North America,Native tribes sided with the warring factions. When the English andtheir Indian allies finally defeated the French at Montreal in 1760, thevictors wished to maintain the loyalty of their allies. Through itslanguage, The Royal Proclamation of 1763 recognized this important“connection” between sovereign “Nations or Tribes” and the British:And whereas, it is just and reasonable, andessential to our Interest, and the Security ofour colonies, that the several Nations or Tribesof Indians with whom We are connected, and wholive under Protection, should not be molested ordisturbed in the Possession of such parts of ourDoininions and Territories as, not having beenceded to or purchased by us, are reserved tothem or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds.Wanting to stay on good terms with Indians, The Royal Proclamationprotected Aboriginal land rights from being abused by increasing numbersof new settlers. The Royal Proclamation stated that land was to beceded only to the Crown (which excluded colonists) and if not ceded orpurchased remained reserved to Indians. In addition, this proclamationstipulated the process for land transfers: No longer could individualsfreely trade land, now transfers could occur only at a public meetingattended by authorized representatives of the aboriginal group. This“Magna Carta of Indian Rights” became the policy for subsequent30treaties and remains an important part of comprehensive claims argumentstoday.3.2.2 CoercionThe relationship between the Natives and non—Natives changedduring the 18th century with cooperation becoming less important as thefur trade declined, warfare decreased, and white settlement increased.Now, rather than valuable war arid business partners, whites saw Indiansas impediments to getting land they wanted for farming. In this changedrelationship, treaty making and assimilation attempts were the white’ssolutions to the Indian “problem.”Initially, both sides saw treaty making as their best alternative.By making treaties, the federal government could meet its goals of:avoiding a costly Indian war; obtaining cheap access to land foragricultural settlement, railway building, and resource exploitation;and following the guidelines stipulated under The Royal Proclamation.For the Indians, treaties also met their goals of: ensuring theircultural survival against encroaching white settlement; avoiding furtherpopulation losses in a war; and obtaining education and tools necessaryfor a new lifestyle.The two groups negotiated treaties throughout Canada starting withthe “Robinson” treaties in Upper Canada. Following confederation, theymade seven “numbered” treaties in the southern parts of the prairie31provinces and Ontario. Next, during 1899 to 1921, Natives and thefederal government negotiated treaties 8—11 in the northern parts of thecountry. In northern B.C., they negotiated treaty 8 without anyprovincial involvement. The map below shows the location of thesehistorical treaties.32ci0 CD CD CEPacificCoastPlateauMackenzieRiverDPlainsAlgonkianc::IroquoisC)ciI-I.0 0 I-a.CD C,,A-RobinsonSuperior.1850B-RobinsonHuron.1850C-WilliamsTreaties,1923D-Treatiesof1781-1857E-DouglasTreaties,1850-540Indians believe they were treated poorly during these historicalnegotiations (Barber 1977, Berger 1977, Fisher 1977). Because thegovernment entered into the process only when it was most convenient forthem, some Indian groups were starving when they signed treaties. Sincemany Indians could neither read nor write and depended on others totranslate for them, the government sometimes used missionaries topersuade them to sign treaties (Daniel 1980). Due to their differinglanguages and views of land ownership, some Natives maintain they didnot understand the meaning of “extinguishment” (Price 1991). Theseexperiences taint the present day relationship between Natives and thefederal government.The second goal of the white society was to “assimilate” theIndian population, meaning they wanted to make “inferior” Indians“civilized” like themselves. The rationale for this process came frommisinterpretations of Darwin’s evolution theories, religious zeal, and alack of understanding of and interest in Indian ways. Since thegovernment thought their assimilation policy would be a success, theygave less attention to fulfilling promises made in treaties.Europeans used religion, education, and legislation in theirassimilation attempts. In an effort to convert “heathen” Indians toChristianity, missionaries initially lived with the tribes and later setup special schools for Indian children. At one time, the federalgovernment labelled Indian doctors or lawyers “fully assimilated” and34forced them to give up their special status. Under the treaty system,the federal goverrnnents established reserves to “protectt’ Indians whilethey were taught white farming ways. Through the Constitution, thenewly established Dominion of Canada had jurisdiction over “Indians andlands reserved for Indians.” Since it now had a formal “guardian” roleover its Indian “wards,” the federal government proceeded to develop thepaternalistic Indian Act to fulfill its mandate. This legislationclassified Indians into categories (e.g., status and non—status),created new methods of land ownership, displaced traditional governancesystems, and banned potlatching and sundancing (till 1951).Although this assimilation policy failed to achieve its ultimategoal, it had good, bad, and indeterminate effects on Indians. Forexample, while some Indians welcomed Christianity, others rejected it,and still others practiced a hybrid of the two religions (Miller 1991).Indians wanted education; it was the way they were “taught” and abusedin residential schools that was wrong. Although the government tried toban potlatching, its legislation was unenforceable and the traditioncarried on under a Protestant disguise (Tennant 1990). Although mostIndians now want to get rid of the Indian Act, they also want to keepthe benefits it provides. As Indians learned about the bad effects ofthis policy, for example, their marginalized position in society, theygrew increasingly angry at any further government “assimilationattempts.”353.2.3 ConfrontationIndians’ rejection of the 1969 Statement of the Government ofCanada on Indian Policy (known as the White Paper) marked a turningpoint in the Native/non—Native relationship in Canada (Pouting andGibbons 1980). Although the White Paper was the federal government’sattempt to better the Indians’ economic and social conditions, Indiansthoroughly rejected its proposed “equitable ending” of treaties and oftheir special status. They also disagreed with its view thatcomprehensive claims were “too general.” While some politicians laudedits “liberal individualism” focus, Indians viewed the White Paper as anexplicit assimilation policy. By forcing the withdrawal of thedocument, Indians served notice that the federal government could nolonger dictate solutions to them.Further confrontations helped strengthen the Indian position.With federal government funding, the Native Indian Brotherhood (nowAssembly of First Nations) lobbied for control over Indian socialprograms, self—government and education. Their extensive politicallobbying put Native rights into the 1982 Constitution:Section 35(1) The existing aboriginal and treatyrights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada arehereby recognized and affirmed. . .(3) For greater certainty, in Subsection (1)“treaty rights” includes rights that now existby way of land claims agreements or may be soacquired.36This amendment was significant for several reasons. First, itgave constitutional protection to any new land claims agreementsreached. Second, it led to numerous attempts to define what theseaboriginal rights were and thus kept the topic on the public agenda.Third. by arguing that land claims agreements generated rights requiringconstitutional changes, the federal government could pressure B.C. toget involved in negotiations (Morse 1989). Fourth, despitedisagreements within the Aboriginal community, this amendment was amajor symbolic victory for them. While the White Paper had arguedagainst rights based on racial criteria, now Aboriginal rights were“recognized and affirmed” in the most important document in Canada.During these confrontations, public opinion supported the Indians’aspirations (Weaver 1981, Dyck 1988). When comparing results of his1976 and 1986 study, Ponting (1988) found:Canadians generally hold supportive attitudestoward Natives, although that support variesconsiderably from region to region and haseroded slightly since the mid—1970s. .Canadians seem to recognize Natives’ specialrelationship with the land and up to a point,are willing to make accommodation for that.• While there is widespread support for thegeneral notion of increased self—determinationfor Natives, levels of knowledge and awarenessof aboriginal issues were found to be generallylow (p. 9)During the 1970’s, public opinion was influenced by the black civilrights movement in the United States, the Hawthorn Report (1966—67) thatdocumented Indians miserable socio—economic conditions, and theincreased media attention (e.g., the 1977 Berger Inquiry). Protests and37lobbying are the main influences on present day public opinion (Jhappan1990a, 199Gb).3.2.4 SummaryIn the East and Central Canada, the Native/non—Native relationshipevolved as follows. Although Natives and non—Natives initiallycooperated in trading and military relationships, when warfare decreasedand European settlement increased, whites viewed Indians as a “problem’that required a solution. During the period of coercion, whites sawtreaty making and assimilation as the appropriate solutions to theIndian problem. These solutions failed and left Indians angry; theirrejection of the White Paper marked the start of confrontations with thenon—Natives. The Indians’ confrontational behavior captured thepoliticians’ attention and the public’s support.3.3 BRITISH COLUMBIA’S HISTORY3.3.1 CooperationAs in other parts of Canada, fur trading flourished between B.C.Indians and the Europeans between the 1770s and the 1820s. They tradedsimilar items; Indian pelts for European cooking and carving tools.However, B.C.’s history differs from other provinces in that Native/non—Native military alliances were not part of this cooperativerelationship. Also, because of the more recent and briefer period of38contact, many Native groups in BC. maintained their strong culturalidentities (Tennant 1990).In the transitional period from fur trade to colonialization,James Douglas had the pivotal role in determining the direction of theB.C. land question. His fur trading background gave him knowledge andrespect for Indian culture; he often used traditional Indian ways tomete out justice. Because he was an agent of the British government, heapplied British laws to land deals. As governor, he wanted to maintainpeace in the colonies and thus tried to treat both groups fairly.Therefore, he first made treaties with Indians to appease whites andthen later refused to when he realized their limited benefits toIndians.As governor of the colony of Vancouver Island from 1851 to 1864,Douglas negotiated fourteen small treaties with the Indians to make wayfor white settlement. In these treaties, Indians were reserved landthat they had village sites and enclosed fields on in exchange forblankets and gifts. Since the initial treaties were blank pieces ofpaper that Douglas filled in after the signing occurred, both partieslater questioned the validity of these agreements (Tennant 1990).However, in the cases Regina v. White and Bob (1965) and SaanichtonMarina Ltd. v. Tsouat Indian Band (1989), the court ruled that thesedocuments were treaties.39Despite ongoing pressure from settlers and authorities, Douglasmade no more treaties with Natives. Most scholars believe treaty makingstopped due to a lack of funds (Duff 1964, Fisher 1977, Miller 1991).However, Tennant (1990) argues that Douglas did have funds to arrangetreaties on the mainland colony, but instead chose to spend the money onroads to take gold miners into the interior of the province. BecauseDouglas believed that Indians would soon be assimilated as equals intothe white society, he viewed treaty making as unnecessary. He alsonoticed that Indians with treaties were worse of f then their cohorts.Unlike his contemporaries, Douglas believed ‘the solutiont’was to giveIndians the right to pre—einpt land like the settlers. Althoughinitially well meaning, his land policies ignored cultural differencesand pre—existing aboriginal title. Thus by not making treaties, Douglassowed the seeds for the “Indian land question” protests to follow.3.3.2 CoercionWhile Douglas attempted to treat Indians as equals, Joseph Trutchtook the opposite approach. His correspondence and speeches containnumerous derogatory references to Indians (Fisher 1977). In hisposition as Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works from 1864 to 1871, hereclaimed Indian reserve lands that Douglas allocated and gave it tosettlers. In 1866, with Trutch’s support, legislation was passed toprohibit Indians from pre—empting land. Despite undoing Douglas’ work,Trutch refused to make treaties.40Trutch maintained his position against pressure from the federalgovernment, advising Prime Minister John A. Macdonald that Canada’streaty making policy was inappropriate for B.C. He claimed that B.C.had never recognized aboriginal title and that Douglas’ treaties wereonly “friendship” ones (Tennant 1990). Furthermore, Trutch impliedtreaty making was unnecessary since Indians were content with thetreatment they were receiving here (Fisher 1977).Contrary to what Trutch said, B.C. Indians were dissatisfied withtheir situation. First, they asserted their unextinguished aboriginaltitle and demanded the government negotiate treaties. Second, theydesired parity with other provinces regarding reserve land allocations.They complained that they received only 10 acres per family of five,whereas Indians under the numbered treaties received 160 to 640 acres.Both governments took steps to resolve Indian grievances; however theprovince’s participation came only when the federal government promisedthat aboriginal title was not on the agenda.By addressing other grievances, politicians hoped the questionsabout Indian title would disappear. Thus, officials of the JointCommission (1877—1910) ignored questions about Indian title as theyallocated reserve land in B.C. Aboriginal title was not on the McKenna—McBride Commission’s agenda as it undertook “a final adjustment of allmatters relating to Indian Affairs in the Province of British Columbia.”By giving B.C. Indians $100,000 a year instead of treaty benefits in1927, politicians hoped to satisfy any outstanding grievances. At the41same time, the federal government amended the Indian Act to make landclaims activity illegal throughout Canada (in place till 1951). Daniel(1980) refers to these numerous political activities as “bureaucraticdevices for settling inter—governmental disputes, rather than a means toachieve comprehensive agreements between native people and governments(p. 205—6). Thus, none of these efforts satisfied B.C. Indians, nor didthey make the question of aboriginal title disappear.Indians pursued numerous alternatives in an attempt to gettreaties. They sent protest delegations and petitions to Victoria,Ottawa, and London. The Nisga’a formed a land committee in 1907 topursue the question of aboriginal title. Although Indians establishedvarious political organizations, these parties lacked the unity andclout to change the province’s position (see Tennant 1990). During thistime, Indians were of little concern to the public, making it easier forthe government to ignore their concerns (Tennant 1990). It was the 1973Calder case that provided Indians with their first breakthrough in theirlong struggle to get treaties.3.3.3 ConfrontationThrough the Calder case, the Nishga’a attempted to get legalanswers to questions about aboriginal title in B.C. In the SupremeCourt of Canada judgment, six judges agreed that the British recognizedIndian title to land at the time of B.C.’s colonialization. (One judge42dismissed the case on a technicality.) According to three of thejudges, this recognition derived from the Royal Proclamation. Theremaining three believed title existed because of Indians’ longàccupation of the land. However, the Court split 3—3 on the issue ofwhether this title had been lawfully extinguished in B.C.Although it was an inconclusive legal judgment, this case was animportant political victory for Indians. After this judgment came out,the federal government announced a new comprehensive claims policy andbegan negotiating with the Nishga’a. Now that they had a comprehensiveclaims policy, other Indian groups began to prepare their claimssubmissions. Following this case, the federal government reached thefollowing ttmodern day” treaties with Aboriginals: James Bay (1975) andNorthern Quebec Agreement (1978); Inuvialuit Agreement (1984) YukonAgreement (1988); and Nunuvut Agreement (1992). The map belowillustrates the location of these “modern day” treaties.43FIGURE 6: Northern Comprehensive Claims(Source: Price 1991, 94)44Legend to ‘Northern Comprehensive Claims”1. Council for Yukon Indians2. Inuvialuit Settlement Region3. Dene Nation4. Metis Association of the Northwest Territories5. Tungavik Federation on Nunavut6. James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement45Although effective at the federal level, the Calder case left theprovince’s position on aboriginal title unchanged. They argued thatsince the Calder case was a split decision, the lower court decision (infavor of the province) held. B.C. also argued that Indians and theirclaims were federal responsibilities and thus took only took a“bystander” role in the Nishga’a’s negotiations. Their entrenchedposition hindered progress and frustrated other claimant groups who werenow waiting their turn to negotiate.By the 1980s, Natives and environmentalists shared a commoninterest in protecting the forests of B.C. Angry with the province’sposition on land claims, Natives took direct action to protect theircultural heritage from being harvested away (see Pinkerton 1983).Concerned with the province’s forestry practices, environmentalistsjoined the Natives on blockades. Although the state of B.C.’s forestsconcerned both groups, only the Natives’ land claim issue got legalrecognition.Through various processes, Native groups put pressure on theprovince. In Macmillan Bloedel Limited v. Mullin et al., the Nuu—Chah—Nuith won an injunction to prevent the logging of Meares Island pendingthe resolution of land claims. In the B.C. Court of Appeal on March1985, Justice McFarlane seemed to speak directly to the province when hesaid:46[Tin the end, the public anticipates that theclaims will be resolved by negotiation and bysettlement. This judicial proceeding is but asmall part of the whole of a process which willultimately find its solution in a reasonableexchange between governments and the Indiannations (p. 607).Public support for the Nuu—Chah—Nulth’s strengthened their case againstthe government: A suppressed poll showed that 78% of the B.C. residentssurveyed believed that land claims settlements should precede logging onMeares Island.3The South Moresby conflict was similar to the Meares Island case.In court, the Haida argued their religious obligation to protect theircultural heritage. Nhile dressed in traditional costume, theydeliberately got arrested in the media’s presence (Jhappan 1990a).Again, a public opinion poll done by the Vancouver Sun on November 30,1985, found that 63% of the people believed that Premier Bennett shouldnegotiate land claims. Additionally, on average 50% of the respondentsfelt that the Haida were justified in their actions.4 This time theprovince diverted the pressure by transferring the disputed land intothe federal government’s hands. In the end, the federal governmentreserved the land for park purposes and left the land claim issueunresolved.Because of the successes obtained by the Nuu—Chah—Nulth and theHaida, other Native groups used the same combination of roadblocks,3vancouver Sun, 31 January 1985. “MB sits on poll results.”4”Talk land issue, poll tells Bennett.”47media attention, and court injunctions to get their concerns addressed.Notable victories included: the Kwakiutl obtaining an injunction againstlogging in their territory; Indian bands along the Thompson Riverstopping railway expansion; the Gitskan—Wet’suwet’en halting loggingpreparation in their claimed area; and the McLeod Lake band stoppingresource development in the Treaty 8 area (Tennant 1990). With theseinjunctions, the courts were clearly telling the province that questionsabout aboriginal title could no longer be ignored.In addition to the above strategies, the First Nations werelobbying third parties. When the Lytton and Mount Currie bands launcheda campaign to protect the Stein Valley in 1988, their story gained mediaattention through David Suzuki’s television show, The Nature of Things(Jhappan 1990a). Indian organizations met with the British ColumbiaFederation of Labor, the British Columbia Council of Forest Industries,and the Fisheries Council of British Columbia (Tennant 1990). Thesemeetings helped educate and address concerns of these third parties, whothen lobbied the government to change their position.The provincial government did respond to the Indians activities.Initially, prominent Social Credit politicians attempted to discredittheir arguments about title (Tennarit 1990). Since this failed to swaythe public, the province began to address Indian concerns. While stillpublicly refusing to talk about title they:• Established a Ministry of Native Affairs;48• Became an active party in both the tripartite negotiation processesto resolve the “cut—off” reserve land issue (e.g., Chemainus Band.1984; Penticton Band, 1985) and in setting up the Sechelt self—government model in 1988;• Created a Premier’s Council on Native Affairs in July 1989 to reviewprovincial policies affecting aboriginal people and hear tribalcouncils’ concerns.Behind the scenes, the province’s Attorney General, Brian Smith andfederal Indian Affairs Minister, David Crombie were communicating on howBC. might resolve the issue of comprehensive claims.5The activities undertaken by both the First Nations and theprovincial government between 1985—1989 set the stage for a “yes”decision on the land question. By pursuing their alternatives in thecourts, through protests, and with third party lobbying, B.C.’s FirstNations obtained support for their cause. During this time, theprovince recognized the importance of the issue and stopped “doingnothing.” By establishing the Ministry of Native Affairs (now theMinistry of Aboriginal Affairs) and participating in other tri—partitenegotiations, the province began to address the institutional andrelationship aspects of the Native/non—Native conflict. However, at theend of 1989, B.C. still refused to negotiate land claims and continuedto defer the issue to the federal government.5Written correspondence between British Columbia Attorney General BrianSmith and Indian Affairs Minister David Crombie. December 19 1985—April 111986. Available from the UBC Law Library.493.3.4 SummaryWhile the pattern is similar to that in the rest of Canada,B.C.’s Native/non—Native relationship has several important differences.First, B.C.’s briefer and more recent period of cooperation left Indianculture more intact and in a stronger position to pursue the landquestion. Second, James Douglas envisioned a society in which Indiansand whites would be equals and to this end, he believed that Indiansshould pre—einpt land rather than sign treaties. Third, despitedisagreeing with Douglas’ views, his successors did not sign treaties.Fourth, although governments made numerous attempts to address Indiangrievances over the years, none of their interventions addressed theissue of aboriginal title. Fifth, the Indians’ confrontational activityduring the 1980s gained the support of an environmentally consciouspublic. Together, all these differences created the setting, need, andsupport for an affirmative decision regarding land claims. The nextchapter outlines how the province finally reached a tyest decision.50CHAPTER FOUR: GETTING TO THE TABLE4.1 INTRODUCTIONB.C. would have continued its small incremental steps towardsmaking a “yes” decision into the 1990s had it not been for the catalystprovided by the Oka crisis. During the Oka crisis, B.C. took the firstmajor step towards conflict resolution by agreeing to cooperate with thefederal government on a strategy to settle Indian land claims. Second,following the Oka crisis, the parties set up the B.C. Claims Task Forceto recommend how these negotiations should proceed. Third, the TaskForce made recommendations aimed at preventing “another Oka.” Fourth,because of the changed political environment, the governments acceptedall nineteen recommendations made by the Task Force. The signingceremony on September 2]., 1992, on Squamish Indian land symbolized thestart of this new cooperative relationship. This chapter explains eachof these four steps separately. The time line below summarizes theevents and steps that occurred during this time.51TABLE 1: 1990—1991 Time LineFirst Nations’ activities GoverniRents’ activitiesMarch 1990 Release of The New DemocraticLand Claims Policy stating thata NDP government will negotiatethe Land Claim Question.Elijah Harper used June 1990the peaceful symbolof an eagle featherto reject the MeechLake agreement.Start of the Oka July 11, 1990Crisis in QuebecJuly 25, 1990 Premier Bill Vander Zaim. receives the Progress Report andInterim Recommendations of thePremier’s Council on NativeAffairs.52blockadePremier meets with IndianAffairs Minister Tom Siddon andthey announce that the federaland provincial governments wouldcooperate on a strategy tosettle Indian land claims.6Vancouver Sun, 20 October 1990. “Land claims imperil jobs, study finds.”During the first three months of 1990, Price—Waterhouse surveyed manymining and forestry firms in B.C. The study found that fears about B.C.native land claims were putting $1 billion in capital investment and 1500jobs at risk.July 31, 1990 Premier visits a KitwancoolRelease of theUnion of B.C.Indian Chiefs’draft treaty forsettling Indianland claimsOka crisis ends Sept. 26, 1990Oct. 20, 1990 A Price Waterhouse study findsthat fears about B.C. nativeland claims are putting $1billion in capital investmentand 1500 jobs at risk6Dec. 3, 1990 British Columbia Claims TaskForce created.March 8, 1991 Chief Justice Allan McEacherndelivers his judgment on theDelgamuukw caseJuly 3, 1991 Release of B.C. Claims TaskForce Report.53First Nations July 10, 1991accept therecommendations ofthe Task ForceOct. 17, 1991 Provincial election won by theNew Democrat PartyNov. 13, 1991 Federal government accepts allrecommendations of the TaskForceDec. 10, 1991 The B.C. government accepts allthe recommendations of the TaskForce4.2. WHY DID THE PROVINCE AGREE TO CO—OPERATE ON A STRATEGY TO SETTLEINDIAN LAND CLAIMS?The tensions created by the Oka crisis gave the province theneeded incentive to change its position and agree to cooperate with theNatives. During this crisis, the world watched confusing and upsettingevents happen at Oka, Quebec: Masked and armed Mohawk warriorsmaintained a blockade; Corporal Lemay was shot; and Mohawk women,children, and elders were stoned by whites at nearby Kahnawake while theQuebec police stood by. Premier Bill Vander Zaim also watched theevents at Oka unfold and did not want this tworst case scenario’t54happening in B.C. He decided it was in B.C.ts best interest to‘cooperatet and settle land claims here.4.2.1 Background to the Oka crisisThe Oka crisis brought together all the elements of the largerNative/non—Native conflict. First, there was the sovereignty issue withthe residents of Kanesatake and Kahnawake believing they are neitherCanadians nor Americans because the 1794 Jay Treaty exempted them fromallegiance to either country. Unlike the majority of First Nations,they consider themselves a sovereign nation outside Canada and some usethis argument to justify the gambling and smuggling activities thatoccur on the reserves.Next, the Indian Act created internal power struggles betweentraditional ‘People of the Longhouse” (Haudenosaunee) and the federallyacceptable Hereditary chiefs. Because the Haudenosaunees do notrecognize the Hereditary chiefs and regard any initiative related to theIndian Act as contrary to Mohawk law, they refuse to participate infederally sponsored referenda or elections meant to resolve theseinternal disputes (Hughes 1991). The militant Mohawk Warriors alsosupport these People of the Longhouse. As a result of these internalconflicts, two Mohawks were killed on the Akwesasne reserve before thecrisis.55Third, the Oka crisis involved a long—standing land conflict.Although this land dispute went to the highest law court in the land,the Mohawks were unsatisfied with the 1912 Judicial Committee of thePrivy Council’s findings that title to the land belonged to theSulpicans (a Roman Catholic religious order). In 1945, the federalgovernment took over the land left by the Sulpicans and began to buyland to assemble an Indian reserve. As a result, blocks of reserve landwere interspersed with privately owned land. Although the Mohawks filedboth comprehensive and specific land claims to the area, theirsubmissions failed to meet the federal government’s criteria. Thus,despite numerous attempts over the years, the land conflict remainedunresolved.In the summer of 1990, all these outstanding grievances came to atragic boiling point. Before the crisis, the Municipality of Oka heldan option to buy these privately held lands. The Mohawks also valuedthis land as it provided access to their cemetery. Against the protestsof the Mohawks, the municipality planned to exercise their option andthen lease “the Pines” to the Oka Golf Club. Although the partiesattempted a negotiated solution, neither the federal government nor theMohawks would compromise their position on sovereignty (Hughes 1991).Since initial negotiations failed, some Mohawks erected blockades toprotect what they believed was rightfully their land. Armed MohawkWarriors resisted the Quebec police’s and army’s attempts to removethese blockades. During this resistance, Corporal Lemay was shot andkilled. When the House of Commons called on Senator Ken Hughes to56investigate and report on the Oka crisis, Hughes (1991) concluded, “Thetragedy was avoidable” (p. 30).4.2.2 The outcomeBecause of the attention the Oka crisis received, other Indianleaders used the threat of violence to get their grievances addressed:This is not going to be the last battle. Thisis not the last stand, this could be the firststand.[lit the army shot Indians, then you’re going tosee a long, protracted fighting condition by teIndian people, and it’ll be guerrilla warfare.Yes, more battles lay ahead. And I am afraidthat some of them will be bloody, as we haverecently seen with the Mohawks at Oka, Quebec.It need not be that way. It should nRt be thatway. I hope to God it’s not that way.[Confrontations might increase] in number andintensity as a direct result of the govçp-nnent’slack of political will and imagination.”-’Although Native leaders made these “political” threats, I believe thatthey preferred to negotiate, not repeat the Oka crisis.George Erasmus, national chief of the 593,000 member Assembly of FirstNations cited in Maclean’s, 10 September 1990 “The Fury of Oka.”8Don Ryan, Gitksan—Wet’suwet’en Chief, cited in Macleants, 10 September1990 “The Fury of Oka.”9Wendy Grant, Musqueam band chief, vice—chief of the Assembly of FirstNations, cited in Kahtou. 2 August 1990. “B.C. land claims heat up.”10Saul Terry, Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs, cited in the Vancouver Sun, 1August 1990. “Land claims plan reached.”57Because Natives depend on public support to attain “relativepower” with the government, they must use “power processes” that do noterode this support. As Jhappan (1990a) notes,Indians must be sparing in their use of acts ofprotest which are high on the militancy scale,since public tolerance is likely to diminish themore frequently such tactics are used (p. 300)Ken Hughes (1991) made similar comments when he said:There is a deep well of public support for FirstNations people on the issues of land rights andself—government. There is an equally deepcommitment to the principle of non—violentsocial and political change. The armed standoffat Kanesatake and Kahnawake triggeredconflicting emotions as Canadians tried toreconcile their support in these two areas. Inthe end, it seems clear that support across thecountry for peaceful conflict resolution remainsdeeply entrenched in the public mind. Canadianswant justice achieved for aboriginal peoples inCanada but will not accept any side of thenegotiating table resorting to the use of armsas a negotiating technique or as a fail—safe fora lack of creativity, goodwill or negotiatingskill. In a world of competing interests andoften conflicting perspectives and values,peaceful conflict resolution is the only realguarantee of human rights and good government(p. 29).Both Jhappan’s (1990a) and Hughes’ (1991) comments are emphasizing theappropriate boundaries in the Native/non—Native conflict. However,because the public continued to support the Indians over the government,the Indian leaders’ “political threats’ were acceptable. For example, apublic opinion poll done between September 19—27, 1990, by Angus Reid,found:58• 67% believed that the government broke its obligations to aboriginalpeoples• 70% believed that the government failed to honor its treatyobligations• 62% supported land claims settlements (cited in Fleras & Elliot 1992)Thus, the onus was on the government, rather than the Indians, to changetheir behaviors to de—escalate the Native/non—Native conflict. The Okacrisis created both a need and an opportunity to try new conflictresolution processes.The international community also noticed the events at Oka.Archbishop Desmond Tutu and American black activist Jesse Jackson spokeout publicly against the handling of Oka. Even the Pope questionedPrime Minister Mulroney about human rights violations at Oka (Fleras &Elliot 1992).With all this attention on Oka, Canadians called their politiciansto task. On September 25, 1990, Prime Minister Brian Muironey denouncedthe Quebec police behavior as “absolutely disgraceful.” He promised toaccelerate both specific and comprehensive land claims settlements andappoint a land claims commissioner (cited in Fleras & Elliot 1992). Inhis report to The House of Commons, Hughes (1991) concluded that, “Somesubstantive policy change is required immediately” (p. 29). Regardingland claims policies, he believed the federal government should:(i) Establish a body independent of governmentto conduct an independent review of the validity59of claims and to make recommendations to theGovernment on acceptance of claims fornegotiation;(ii) Establish a judicial tribunal independentof government to deal with the validity ofspecific claims and to recommend compensationrequired to meet valid claims;(iii) Establish an independent body to monitorand review the implementation of claims policyand of claims agreements to ensure fairness;(iv) Establish a National Mediation Service,independent of the Department of Indian Affairsand Northern Development and of the Departmentof Justice, composed of expert mediators in eachregion of the country acceptable to the partiesinvolved. These people would be made availableto apply their mediation skills to prevent localland use conflicts from expanding into largerdisputes (p. 32).He believed the same institution could perform these four functions. Aswith Muironey’s announcements, Hughes’ recommendations influenced theoutcomes of the B.C. Task Force.The Oka crisis had its most significant effect on the B.C.situation. Although Indian blockades were a common occurrence in B.C.before Oka, violence was riot yet a part of these protests. During theOka crisis, more blockades went up to support the Mohawks. The mapbelow illustrates the location of some of these roadblocks.60FIGURE 7: Indian Roadblocks in B.C on August 1 1990INDIAN ROADBLOCKS: 1. Duff ey Lake Road: Closed2. Penticton and3. Vernon: Information blockades4. Moricetown: Information picket.5. Kitwancool: Taken downTuesday6. Agassiz: Information picketremoved7. Alert Bay: BlockadeS•a• Kwancoo -).:4 Lako4, /.- KAOOP5I..•.Cum.,•84y 1_@0’-(Source: Vancouver Sun. 1 August 1990)61As the diagram shows, most of the roadblocks are in the interiorof the province, and by bands who support the Union of British ColumbiaIndian Chiefs (UBCIC).11 At the time of the Oka crisis, the oncepowerful UBCIC played a minor role in B.C. Indian politics. Bands ortribal groups supporting the First Nations Congress, the other majorB.C. Indian political party, did not erect roadblocks. They knew that adecision to negotiate land claims was imminent, thus they were moreconcerned with designing a framework for these negotiations, rather thanundertaking roadblocks. Ironically, as events unfolded, the FirstNations Congress benefitted the most from the roadblocks put up by theUBCIC’s supporters. Most British Columbians are not aware of thesepolitical divisions between these two Indian organizations; what theysaw was another potential “Oka.” Thus, Premier Bill Vander Zaim tooksteps to diffuse the situation here in B.C.Two key events happened on July 31, 1990. For the first time,Vander Zalin, Forests Minister Dave Parker, and the B.C. Indian AffairsMinister Jack Weisberger personally visited a Kitwancool blockade tohear the Natives’ concerns.’2 On the same day, Vander Zalin met with thefederal Indian Affairs Minister Tom Siddon in an airport hangar inSydney. Together, they announced that the federal and provincialgovernments would cooperate on a strategy to settle Indian land claims.In making this important decision, Vander Zaim acknowledged that Ottawawas “primarily” responsible for the costs of settling claims, but agreed“Personal communication. Paul Tennant, Feb. 16, 1994).‘2Vancouver Sun, 1 August 1990. “Land claims plan reached.”62that his government would be “flexible.”3 Thus, to de—escalate theNative/non—Native conflict, Vander Zaim made what could be called a“cooperative, but firm” statement (Fisher 1990).Since the Premier’s Council on Native Affairs had released theirProgress Report and InterIm Recommendations on July 25, 1990, one couldargue that the Premier based his decision on its findings rather than onthe Oka crisis. This report found that, “The outstanding issue ofaboriginal land claims was the over—riding concern of the tribalcouncils.” It also concluded that the current federal land claimspolicies were totally impractical for the B.C. situation and that B.C.must do its part to address this complex issue.This argument is less than plausible for several reasons. First,from the Indians’ perspectives, the report contained nothing “new”——allprevious governments had ignored these same concerns. Second, thisreport left the Premier’s position unchanged: When he met with theKitwancool early on July 31, 1990, Vander Zalm declined to comment ontheir requests for “comprehensive agreements,” telling the Natives that“. . . things can’t remain the way they were in years gone by and ahealthy provincial economy is necessary to maintain the standard ofliving that British Columbians have come to respect.”14 Because ofthese comments, the Kitwancool expressed regret for taking down theirroad block. Third, his later meeting with Tom Siddon seemed hastily13op. cit. at 12.14op. cit. at 12.63arranged and his statements differed to those that he had justcommunicated to the Kitwancool. Perhaps Tom Siddon emphasized theseriousness of the Oka situation to the premier. It does seem thatduring this meeting Vander Zalm changed his position and not after therelease of the above report. Thus, although the Premier’s reportprovided him with politically defensible reasons for making hisdecision, it was the events at Oka that forced him into action.4.3 WHY WAS THE TASK FORCE SET UP?The second step in this decision making process occurred onDecember 3, 1990, when representatives of the First Nations, thegovernment of B.C. and the government of Canada created the BritishColumbia Claims Task Force. The Task Force’s role was to recommend howthe three parties could begin negotiations and what these negotiationsshould include. Seven members were to sit on the Task Force; two eachfrom the federal and provincial governments and First Nations Congressmembers, with a seventh seat reserved for the Union of B.C. IndianChiefs. This section explains why a Task Force was needed.From the Indians’ perspective, a Task Force provided opportunitiesfor them to resolve their long—standing political differences over theland claims issue. On one side was the minority viewpoint of the Unionof British Columbia Indian Chiefs (UBCIC). They wanted the federalgovernment to persuade the province to accept their organization’s termsfor negotiating. If British Columbia refused to accept the URCIC’s64terms, the province was to be barred from any negotiations.’5 Knowingthat the federal government was unable to persuade the province tonegotiate in the past and recognizing that the province needed to be atthe negotiating table, other First Nations questioned whether UBCIC’srequests were realistic. The majority supported the First NationsSummit (formerly the First Nations Congress), and their plans for a TaskForce that involved the province. Since the majority of Indiansrejected the UBCIC’s framework treaty, the UBCIC did not accept the seatoffered to them on the Task Force committee. Thus, before the December3, 1990, announcement, the First Nations Summit had clearly identifiedthemselves as the main political organization for B.C.’s Indians and hadmet with the Premier in August 1990.16 Although the Task Force didprovide an opportunity to unify B.C.’s Indians, success was elusive.From the federal and provincial governments’ perspective, thesituation in B.C. was critical and thus required the special attentionof a Task Force. No other territory or province in Canada faced thenumber and extent of comprehensive claims illustrated in the map below:15op. cit. at 12.16Kahtou. September 1990.”Province Agrees to Negotiate Land Claims.”65FIGURE 8: Comprehensive Claims Submissions in B.CL(Source: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1991)66Legend to “Comprehensive Claims Submissions in B.C.”1. Nisga’a Tribal Council2. Kitwancool Band3. Gitksan—Wet’suwet’en Tribal Council4. Haisla Nation5. Association of United Tahltans6. Nuu—Chah-Nulth Tribal Council7. Council of Haida Nation8. Heiltsuk Nation9. Nuxalk Nation10. Nazko—Kluskus Bands11. Kaska—Dena Council12. Carrier—Sekarui Tribal Council13. Alkali Lake Band14. Taku Tlingit (Atlin)15. Kootenay Indian Area Council16. Allied Tshinshian Tribes17. Council of Tsinishian Nation18. Nlaka’pamux Nation19. Kwakiutl Nation20. Sechelt Band21. Musqueam Band22. Horn alco BandAdditional Submissions may be received.67Since both governments believed the Gitskan—Wet’suwet’en would win theirland claims case,’7 politicians wanted to present an attractivealternative to more litigation. Muironey’s comments post—Oka, thePremier’s Report, and the Hughes report all “diagnosed” the need for anew way to settle comprehensive claims. By setting up a Task Force, thegovernments could develop this new “made in B.C.” approach.In summary, setting up a Task Force was an attempt to get allparties to design the new process of negotiating land claims in B.C.With all parties participating in the design, the implementation stagehad a better chance of succeeding (Ury, Brett, and Goldberg 1988).Although a seat was reserved for the UBCIC, the organization chose notto participate. Thus, the “negotiations about negotiations” weresupported by a majority, but not all, First Nations, as well as theprovincial and federal governments.4.4 WHY DID THE TASK FORCE COME UP WITH THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS?To complete the third step “in getting to the table,” all partieshad to agree on the Task Force’s recommendations. This was difficult;despite having twice revised its initial 1973 comprehensive claimsguidelines in 1981 (In All Fairness) and in 1987 (Comprehensive LandClaims Policy), the federal government resisted any real changes to its17When the Delgamuukw decision came out in favor of the province, FederalIndian affairs minister Tom Siddon said, “Everybody was so suprised at theresult, they are trying to figure out what to do.” Vancouver Sun, 12 March1991 “Parties agree on Indian policy.”68policy. Now after much Indian criticism, supporting governmentdocumentation (e.g., The Penner Report 1983, The Coolican Report 1985),the recent Oka crisis, and an expected loss in Delgamuukw, the federalgovernment recognized the need for meaningful change. This sectionhighlights these past criticisms about the policy and then discusses howthe Task Force proposed to address them.First, claimant groups complained that the existing policy wasinefficient and ineffective in addressing the number of outstandingclaims, especially in B.C. In response to this criticism, thegovernment argued that owing to the complex nature of the negotiations,they could only handle six claims at one time. In addition, they arguedthat the groups themselves slowed down the process due to conflictswithin and amongst claimant groups (Office of Native Claims [ONC] 1983).Thus, rather than making the process more efficient, the federalgovernment blamed Aboriginal groups for any delays.Second, Aboriginal peoples disliked the conflicting roles held bythe Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND).Because DIAND judged the validity of the claims and then subsequentlynegotiated with claimant groups, critics argued that DIAND acted both asthe judge and then as an adversary (Barber 1977, Leghorn 1985). Criticsalso argued that because the government could both allocate and withdrawfunding, it unfairly controlled the process (AFN 1990). Instead ofDIAND, Indian groups favored an independent, impartial advisory body(Barber 1977, AFN 1990). Instead of this neutral third party, the69federal governnient had set up a Comprehensive Land Claims SteeringCommittee under the 1987 policy. Since its members were AssistantDeputy Ministers from government agencies, this Committee failed toaddress the criticisms regarding DIAND’s conflicting roles.Third, Aboriginal peoples abhorred the federal government’s“extinguishment agenda.” (AFN 1990, Barber 1977, Penner 1983).Extinguishment is a powerful, emotional word when taken out of its legalcontext: It conjures up images of putting out a fire or blowing out acandle. Thus, no group of people would want their rights extinguished.According to the federal government, extinguishment provides “certainty”of title (Comprehensive Claims Policy 1987), but because of all thecriticism their extinguishment agenda received, they proposed thefollowing “acceptable options”:(1) The cession and surrender of aboriginaltitle throughout the settlement area in returnfor the grant to the beneficiaries of definedrights in specified or reserved areas and otherdefined rights applicable to the entiresettlement area; or(2) The cession and surrender of aboriginaltitle in non—reserved areas, while allowing anyaboriginal title that exists to continue inspecified or reserved areas; granting tobeneficiaries defined rights applicable to theentire settlement area (Comprehensive LandsClaims Policy 1987, 12).These extinguishment alternatives received mixed reactions fromAboriginal groups. The Dene/Metis rejected their final settlement in1990 despite these “options,” whereas in 1992 the Inuit accepted theirs.70From a negotiation perspective, there is an obvious need •to generateacceptable alternatives to “extinguishment.”Since the previous comprehensive claims policy had failed toprevent the Oka crisis or address the above criticisms, the Task Forcerecommended major changes. Believing the cap on six claims wasinappropriate, the Task Force recommended that up to thirty separatenegotiations be undertaken simultaneously. Although it recognized theneed for “certainty” by all parties, the Task Force rejected the“blanket extinguishment” approach of previous treaties.The Task Force’s most important recommendation was:A British Columbia Treaty Commission beestablished by agreement among the FirstNations, Canada, and British Columbia tofacilitate the process of negotiations (p. 82).This Commission was to be responsible for some of the roles previouslyhandled by DIAND. The five member Commission would help startnegotiations, distribute funding to First Nations, assess readiness tonegotiate, monitor progress, provide dispute resolution services asrequested, submit progress reports to the governments, and inform thepublic.Thus, the Task Force’s role was to diagnose the existing disputeresolution system and then design a new one. In the diagnosis stage,the Task Force recognized the claimants believed the existing processwas inefficient and unfair. The members wanted to design a process that71would prevent “another Oka” and to this end, drew on recommendationsmade previously by other groups. Most importantly, the Task Forceaddressed the criticisms regarding the fairness of the process byestablishing an institution or neutral third party, the TreatyCommission, to oversee the negotiating process.4.5 WHY DID THE GOVERNMENTS UNAIIMOUSLY ACCEPT ALL RECOMMENDATIONS OFTHE TASK FORCE?On July 3, 1991, the B.C.. Claims Task Force released their report.On July 10, 1991, First Nations approved the recommendations. Owing toa federal—provincial conflict over cost—sharing, the federalgovernment’s approval was delayed till November 13, 1991.18 Theprovincial election further delayed the province’s response untilDecember 10, 1991. This section argues that the changed politicalenvironment in B.C. made the politicians realize that negotiating was“their best alternative.”The Gitskan—Wet’suwet’en led the way in creating this “politicalenvironment” in B.C. Not only did they launch the most important landclaims trial in Canada’s history, Delgamuukw, but they also maintainedblockades, published books, and sold T—shirts and buttons to supporttheir bid to get land claims settled. As Don Ryan, speaker for theGitskan—Wet ‘suwet ‘en noted:You’re seeing a move made by the province now totry to deal with this whole question and that we18Kahtou, December 1991, “Extinguishment Agenda Exposed.”72were trying to create a political environmentfor a proper decision in our case.’9First Nations succeeded in creating this “political erivironnient”—--it wasChief Justice Alan McEachern’s Delgamuukw judgment that did not fit thenew views of most British Columbians.Politicians’ responses to the Delgamuukw judgment exemplified thischanged political environment in B.C. In this new politicalenvironment, the province set aside old stereotypes or traditionalbeliefs and adopted a “new” view of Indians when it agreed to settleland claims. In conflict resolution terms, the parties accommodatedeach other’s different values. When Justice Alan McEachern commentedthat the plaintiffs’ ancestors had “no written language, no horses orwheeled vehicles” arid that “slavery and starvation were not uncommon .• that aboriginal life in the territory was, at best, ‘nasty, brutishand short,” his comments did not fit into this “new” way of thinking(Tennant 1991). The table below contrasts these two opposing views(from Tennant 1991):‘9Kaiitou, August 1991. “Biggest B.C. Land Claims Case Wraps Up.”73TABLE 2: Different Views of IndiansSince the Gitskan—Wet’suwet’en lost their case on these “traditionalviews,” government officials attempted to distance themselves fromMcEacherntsjudgment. Provincial Native Affairs Minister JackWeisberger said, “The vast majority of British Columbians believe thatjustice has not been done in a moral, political or economic sense.” 20Both the Social Credit and NDP supported “political,” instead of legalsolutions to the land claims question, agreeing that B.C.’s outstandingTraditional views• Aboriginal people were primitive.• Aboriginal people had no groupidentities.• Indians made little use of theland and its resources.• Politicians blamed Indianassertions of title on “whiteagitators.”• Indians need officials andinstitutions to identify and solvethe “Indian problem.”New views• Aboriginal groups have same moralworth as other groups of peoplesand deserve equal respect.• Aboriginal groups have acontinuing cultural identity.• Indians used the land in similarways as other groups of peoples.• Aboriginal communities possessinherent rights.• A sharing, cooperative relationshipmust be established between Nativesand non—Natives.cit. at 17.74land question was too important to become a partisan issue.21 Thus,the land claims question did not become a major election issue.The final step in “getting to the table” happened after the NDPdefeated the Socreds in the October 17, 1991, election. Since the NDP,third parties, and public opinion all wanted land claims settled throughnegotiations, and since the NDP were now facing an appeal of theDelgamuukw case, there really was only one choice for the government tomake. Upon accepting the recommendations of the Task Force on December10, 1991, Premier Mike Harcourt stated:Resolution of land claims is a criticalpolitical, economic and moral issue that can nolonger be ignored. The settlement of claimswill not only bring justice for aboriginalpeoples, it will bring economic certainty,increased investment and jobs for B.C.communities. . . . Negotiation, not litigationor confrontation, is in 3he best interests ofall British Coluinbians.2’4.6 SUMMARYTo review, the decision to negotiate comprehensive land claims inB.C. occurred in four steps. First, during the Oka crisis, Bill VanderZalin agreed to cooperate with the federal government on a solution tothe issue. Next, First Nations and the federal and provincialgovernments agreed to set up a Task Force to design the negotiationprocess. The third step involved the Task Force making its nineteen21op cit. at 17.22Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, December 10, 1991, News Release.75recommendation. Finally by December 10, 1991, all parties had acceptedthe Task Force’s recommendations.76CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONSThis section first draws conclusions about the explanationproposed. Second, it examines areas of concerns regarding comprehensiveclaims and suggests areas for further research. Third, it drawsconclusions about the larger Native/non—Native conflict.5.1 GETTING TO THE TABLEThis thesis proposed that the province of British Columbia chose tonegotiate with the First Nations when it was in their best interest to doso (Fisher and Ury 1981). The case study of the province’s decision makingbehavior during the years 1990 to 1991 supports this view. The provincepursued its other alternatives or BATNAs until 1991 when Premier MikeHarcourt concluded that negotiation was in the province’s best interest.The province’s other BATNAs are summarized below:TABLE 3: Summary of the Province’s BATNAsAlternative Provincial government’s views1. Do nothing • Risk of “another Oka.”• Does not address economic and legaluncertainties created by land claimsactivities• Not supported by public opinion or thirdparties.772. Policy and • Initiatives undertaken did not satisfy Firstlegislative changes Nations (e.g., Self—government)3. Legal Redress • Risky, costly, and time consuming23• Focusses on compensating for past wrongdoings• Creates adversarial relationships• May cause further public embarrassment• Court decisions generally favorable toNatives since mid 1980s (e.g., Sparrow,Guerin).By choosing to negotiate, the province acted in its best interest.By negotiating, the province could avoid a “winner takes all” outcome.Through negotiating, all parties could come up with creative solutionsthat would address different First Nations needs. Potentially, reachingnegotiated agreements could be more expedient and economical than acourt based decision. In addition, because all parties create thesolutions, they are more committed to making them work. Most of all,negotiations can build the needed “new relationship” between Natives andnon—Natives.Fisher and Ury’s (1981) rather simplistic explanation for whyparties negotiate belies the complex nature of this conflict. In B.C.,First Nations have always wanted to negotiate treaties; their “bestinterests” arise out of a desire for recognition and respect by non—23The Delgamuukw trial lasted 374 days and cost all parties a total of $25million.78Natives (Tennant 1990). The province’s recognition of its “bestinterest” is the result of First Nations’ intense lobbying efforts.From the perspective of conflict resolution theory, the 1980s featured a“power struggle’ between First Nations’ and the provincial government.The First Nations’ strategy of blockading logging roads gained thempublic support and produced court injunctions in their favor during thistime. With these efforts, the First Nations re—established “relativepower” with the province.Next, once “relative power” was established between the twoparties, the province began to take steps to de—escalate the conflict.The Oka crisis highlighted the need for peaceful conflict resolution inB.C. and catalyzed the decision making process already underway. First,the province agreed to “cooperate” with the federal government on astrategy to settle land claims. Second, the formation of a Task Forcewas a way to get all parties cooperating in the preliminary“negotiations about negotiating” process. Third, all parties wereinvolved in the diagnosis of the existing dispute resolution system.Since all parties designed the Task Force’s recommendations, it set thestage for unanimous acceptance. Fourth, all three parties accepted theTask Force’s recommendations by December 10, 1991. Although theDelgamuukw judgment seemed to indicate that the province could rejectthe Task Force’s recommendations, a newly elected NDP government chosenot to. Over the years, the First Nations’ strategies had produced a“new view” or changed political climate in B.C., whereby Natives were“equals” to the non—Natives. Instead of backtracking to the “power” or79“rights” approach that characterized the 1980s, the province recognizedthat it was in its best interest to negotiate under the guidelines ithelped create.Thus, the province’s decision to negotiate when it was in their“best interest” is the end result of a complex process of conflictresolution. Although Fisher and Ury’s (1981) approach is commendablefor its simplicity, understanding why parties negotiate requires theauthors’ approach be supplemented by a discussion of power processes,models of conflict resolution systems, and de—escalatory behavior. Tothis end, the Fisher and Ury (1981) approach to negotiating can beconsidered only as a primer on the larger topic of conflict resolution.5.2 NOW THAT WE ARE AT THE TABLE .Getting to the table is only one part of a long process inachieving satisfactory agreements. Now the parties face the equallydifficult task of translating the words of the Task Force intomeaningful actions. The following questions require further research.1. Do comprehensive claims settlements achieve any lasting benefits?Although all parties spend much money and time on reachingcomprehensive claims settlements, they put little effort into evaluatingtheir results. So far, only the James Bay Agreement (1975) has beenevaluated to any extent and most of the results are disappointing (e.g.,80Peters 1990). From B.C.’s perspective, knowing the strengths andweaknesses of past agreements would contribute to reaching lastingsolutions here.2. What are the appropriate “substance” models for B.C.?Now that the Task Force has created a “made in B.C. process,” thenext step is to now work out what the final settlements might contain.Despite much rhetoric on the topic, Sanders (1991) notes, “To date theFirst Nations, the province, and the federal government have all failedto suggest factors that would work in settlements in this province” (p.284). In addition, both Sanders (1991) and Thompson (1992) believe thatthe contents of the “Northern” agreements are not appropriate for B.C.Although Cassidy and Dale’s (1988) predictions of “after native claims”provide some answers about what settlements might look like, we needmore research on these possible models.3. What are acceptable alternatives to “extinguishment”?Since “extinguishment” is unacceptable to First Nations, thenegotiators need alternatives to it. Land trusts may be one reasonablealternative because neither side would “own” the land. Instead, allparties would manage it according to agreed upon standards, thusfocussing on their interests rather than their positions. In the stateof New York, this solution resolved a land claims dispute between the81Ganienkeb Mohawks and the government.24 We need further research toknow if this or other alternatives could apply to the B.C. situation.4. How will comprehensive claims settlements meet the needs of urbannatives?According to the Aboriginal Peoples Survey (Statistics Canada1991). over two—thirds of B.C.’s North American Indians adults andchildren live off reserve and almost 45% of adults living off reserveare in Vancouver or Victoria. Since comprehensive claims settlementsfocus on traditional territories, it is unclear whether this populationwill benefit under these agreements. If these urban Natives wish toreturn to reserves and share the settlement benefits, there is noguarantee that others would welcome them. Both the governments’ fiscalrestraint program and Indians’ urban migration are a reality;settlements must address these issues.5. What factors affect the public’s support of settling land claims?Comprehensive claims settlements are expensive and change thestatus quo. Although past public opinion shows British Columbianssupport the settlement of land claims, this support cpuld change asawareness of settlements increases (e.g., fisheries disputes arisingfrom the Sparrow decision). As Jhappan (1990b) notes, publicity is a24Vancouver Courier. 3 March 1991. “Conservationist says land trusts way offuture.”82“double—edged” sword that could easily turn into a public backlashagainst Indians. Although First Nations have learned how to effectivelyuse the media, they should continue to research and track public opinionto maintain this support.5.3 THE LARGER RELATIONSHIPThe Native/non—Native relationship has historically evolved fromcooperation to coercion to confrontation and is now slowly returning tocooperation. Weaver (1990) calls this evolution “a paradigm shift”(also see Tennant 1991). According to Weaver (1990), this new paradigmfeatures:• The re—establishment of “a permanent organic relationship” betweenthe First Nations and Canada• Recognition of First Nations’ evolving sanctioned rights• Recognition that aboriginal cultures change and evolve• Development of political ethics to control the state’s relations withFirst Nations• Jointly formulated policies• Empowerment of aboriginal peoples through the development of FirstNations self—government• Development of joint resource management systems• Recognition of the importance of aboriginal knowledge (e.g., in self—government models, wildlife management boards)• DIAND taking on a development—oriented administrative role instead ofits traditional custodial one83Weaver (1990) believes the Penner Report (1983) arid the Coolican Report(1985) broke the ground for this new paradigm. I believe that the B.C.Comprehensive Claims Task Force’s work builds on this “new paradigm”fouriclat ion.We face a difficult task in achieving this paradigm shift. Attimes, the process seems more regressive than progressive. This newrelationship is difficult to nurture due to the legacy of mistrust andmisunderstanding born out of the old one. In addition, both sides oftenhave different and well—entrenched positions to defend. Despite allthis, Canadians see negotiation as the best way to both establish theprocess and substance for this “new relationship” or “new paradigm”between Natives and non—Native people (Barber 1977, Frideres 1988,Penner 1988, Fleras & Elliot 1992).The Two—Row Wampum Belt symbolized the early treaties negotiatedbetween the Iroquois and the Dutch in Canada. In this Belt, two rows ofcolored beads signified the differences between the two Nations, whilethe white beads represented their common interests of peace, respect,and friendship. Behind the rhetoric on aboriginal title lies similarhuman needs; First Nations want their cultural similarities anddifferences acknowledged and respected. In B.C., comprehensive claimsnegotiations provide hope that Natives and non—Natives can re—establishthis “Two—Row” cooperative relationship. We have not yet come fullcircle.84BIBLIOGRAPHYCOURT CASESCalder v. Attorney—General of B.C. 1973. 34 D.L.R. 145. (S.C.C.).Delgamuukw v. the Queen. 1991. B.C.S.C. No. 0843, Smithers Registry,March 8.Guerin v. Regina. 1984. 2 S.C.R. 335.Macmillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Mullin et al., 1985. 61 S.C.L.R. 145.Regina v. Sparrow. 1990. 4 W.W.R. 410 (S.C.C.)Regina v. White and Bob 1965. 52 D.L.R. 481. (S.C.C).Saanichton Marina Ltd. v. Tsawout Indian Band. 1989. 57. D.L.R. (4th)161 (B.C.C.A.).GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONSBarber, L. 1977. Commissioner on Indian Claims. Minister of Supply andServices Canada.Berger, T. R. 1977. Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland: The report ofthe Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry to the Minister of IndianAffairs and Northern Development, Ottawa, Ont. 2 vols.British Columbia Claims Task Force. 1991. The Report of the BritishColumbia Claims Task Force. June 28, 1991Coolican, M. 1985. Living Treaties: Lasting Agreements: Report of theTask Force to Review Comprehensive Claims Policy. Ottawa:Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.Department of Indian and Northern Affairs. 1969. Statement of theGovernment of Canada on Indian Policy. (White Paper).Daniel, R. C. 1980. A History of Native Claims Processes in Canada 1867—1979. Research Branch, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs.Hughes, Ken. 1991. The Summer of 1990. Report to the Standing Committeeon Aboriginal Affairs.Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. 1981. In AllFairness. Ministry of Supply and Services Canada.Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. 1986. ComprehensiveLand Claims Policy. Minister of Supply and Services Canada.Office of Native Claims. 1983. Perspectives in Native Land ClaimsPolicy. A Background Paper For the Canadian Arctic Resources85Committee’s (CARC) Third National Workshop on “People, Resourcesand the Environment North of 60,” Yellowknife June 1—3, 1983Permer. K. 1983. Indian Self—government in Canada: Report of theSpecial Committee. House of Commons (The Penner Report).Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. 1992. Framing the Issues.Statistics Canada. 1991. Aboriginal Peoples Survey: Language,Tradition, Health, Lifestyle, and Social Issues.NATIVE NEWSPAPERKab touGENERAL NEWSPAPERS AND NEWSMAGAZINESBritish Columbia ReportsMaclean ‘sGlobe and MailVancouver CourierVancouver SunUNPUBLISHED MATERIALSAssembly of First Nations. 21 August 1990. AFN’s Critique of FederalGovernment Land Claims Policies. (Available from organization.)Bush, P. 1987. See You in Court: Native Indians and the Law in BritishColumbia, 1969—1985. MA Thesis. The University of BritishColumbia.Jhappan, C. R. 1990a. The Language of Empowerment: Symbolic Politicsand Indian Political Discourse in Canada. Phd Thesis. TheUniversity of British Columbia.ARTICLES AND BOOKSBerger, T. R. 1985. Village Journey: The Report of the Alaska NativeReview Commission. New York: Hill and WangBerger, T. R. 1991. A Long and Terrible Shadow. Vancouver: Douglas &McIntyre.Cassidy, F. and Dale, N. 1988. After Native Claims? The Implications ofComprehensive Claims Settlements for Natural Resources in BritishColumbia. Lantzville, B.C.: Oolichan Books.86Cassidy, F. (Ed.) 1990. Reaching Just Settlements: Land Claims inBritish Columbia. Proceedings of a Conference held February 21—22,1990. Lantzville, B.C.: Oolichan Books.Deutsch, M. 1973. The Resolution of Social Conflict. London: YaleUniversity PressDuff, W. 1964. The Indian History of British Columbia. Vol. 1.Victoria: Provincial Museum of Natural History and Anthropology.Dyck, N. 1988. “Negotiating the Indian ‘Problem.” In Out of theBackground, edited by R. Fisher and K. Coates, 267-284. Toronto:Copp Clark Pitnian Ltd.Fisher, R. 1977. Contact and Conflict. Vancouver: University of B.C.PressFisher, R. J. 1990. The Social Psychology of Intergroup andInternational Conflict Resolution. New York: Springer—Verlag Inc.Fisher, R. and Ury, W. 1981. Getting to Yes: Negotiating AgreementWithout Giving In. Penguin Books.Fleras, A. and Elliot, J. L. 1992. The Nations Within. Toronto: OxfordUniversity Press.Forester, J. 1989. Planning in the Face of Power. Los Angeles:University of California Press.Frideres, J. S. 1988. Native Peoples in Canada. Scarborough, Ontario:Prentice—Hall Canada Inc.Jhappari, C. R. 1990b. Indian Symbolic Politics: The Double—Edged Swordof Publicity. Canadian Ethnic Studies. xxii(3), 19—39.Leghorn, K. 1985. Planning for Fairness: An Evaluation of the CanadianNative Claims Settlement Process. UBC Planning Papers. School ofCommunity and Regional Planning.Mack, R. W. and Snyder, R. C. 1957. The analysis of social conflict—toward an overview and synthesis. The Journal of ConflictResolution. 1(2), 212—248.Miall, H. 1992. The Peacemakers. London: Macmillan Academic andProfessional Ltd.Miller, J. R. 1991. Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of IndianWhite Relations in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Morse, B. W. 1989. “Government Obligations, Aboriginal Peoples andSection 91(24).” In Aboriginal Peoples and GovernmentResponsibility, edited by D. C. Hawkes, 59—92. Ottawa: CarletonUniversity Press.Pinkerton, E. 1983. Taking the Minister to Court: Changes in PublicOpinion About Forest Management and Their Expression in Haida LandClaims. B.C. Studies. 57, (Spring), 68—85.87Penner, K. 1988. “Their Own Place: The Case for a Distinct Order ofIndian First Nation Government in Canada.” In Governments inConflict?, edited by J. A. Long and M. Boldt, 31—37. Toronto:University of Toronto Press.Peters, E. 1990. “Federal and Provincial Responsibilities for the Cree,Naskapi and Inuit Under the James Bay and Northern Quebec andNortheastern Quebec Agreements.” In Aboriginal Peoples andGovernment Responsibility, edited by D.C. Hawkes, 173—242.Ottawa: Carleton University Press.Ponting, J. R. and Gibbons, R. 1980. Out of Irrelevance: A Sociopolitical Introduction to Indian Affairs in Canada. Scarborough,Ont.: Butterworth.Ponting, 3. R. 1988. Public Opinion on Aboriginal Peoples’ Issues inCanada. Canadian Social Trends. Winter, 9—17.Price, R. T. 1991. Legacy Indian Treaty Relationships. Edmonton,Alberta: Plains Publishing Inc.Rex, J. 1981. Social Conflict: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis.Longmann Inc. New York.Sanders, D. 1991. “Getting Back to Rights.” In Aboriginal Title inBritish Columbia: Delgamuukw v. The Queen. Edited by FrankCassidy, 261—287. Lantzville, B.C.: Oolichan Books Ltd.Schellenberg, J. A. 1982. The Science of Conflict. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.Tennant, P. 1990. Aboriginal Peoples and Politics. Vancouver: Universityof British Columbia Press.Tennant, P. 1991. “The Place of Delgamuukw in British Columbia Historyand Politics—and Vice Versa.” In Aboriginal Title in BritishColumbia: Delgamuukw v. The Queen, edited by Frank Cassidy, 73—91. Lantzville, B.C.: Oolichan Books Ltd.Thompson, A. 1992. Aboriginal Land Claims: Lessons from the North.Native Voice, 20(4).Ury. W. L., Brett, J. M. and Goldberg, S. B. 1988. Getting DisputesResolved. San Francisco: Jossey—Bass Publishers.Weaver, S. H. 1981. Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda1968—1970. Toronto: University of Toronto Press_________1990. A New Paradigm in Canadian Indian Policy for the1990s. Canadian Ethnic Studies. 22(3), 8—18.88


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