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Negotiation in environmental policy-making: a case study of nitrate regulation in B.C.’s Code of agricultural.. 1996

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NEGOTIATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY-MAKING: A CASE STUDY OF NITRATE REGULATION IN B.C.'S CODE OF AGRICULTURAL PRACTICE FOR WASTE MANAGEMENT by KATHLEEN AGNES ZIMMERMAN B.Sc, The University of Guelph, 1986 M.Sc., The University of Guelph, 1988 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Resource Management and Environmental Studies Programme) We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA February 1996 ° Kathleen Agnes Zimmerman, 1996 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department-of 4JiJJi^LiJl/j P.A <^(3/^rH ff\^ The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date r DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT NEGOTIATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY-MAKING: A CASE STUDY OF NITRATE REGULATION IN B.C.'S CODE OF AGRICULTURAL PRACTICE FOR WASTE MANAGEMENT Kathleen A. Zimmerman, M.Sc, 1996 U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Non-point sources of water p o l l u t i o n from a g r i c u l t u r a l production are a growing problem i n B r i t i s h Columbia. In response, the government has adopted the Code of A g r i c u l t u r a l P r a c t i c e f o r Waste Management. This t h e s i s o u t l i n e s the environmental impacts of a g r i c u l t u r a l non-point source p o l l u t a n t s i n general, and the d i f f i c u l t i e s of r e g u l a t i n g manure n i t r a t e contamination i n p a r t i c u l a r . This i s followed by a b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n of the p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , and economic f a c t o r s that a f f e c t agro- environmental policy-making. These factors help to set the context f o r the Code's development. The Code was developed using an industry-government m u l t i - stakeholder n e g o t i a t i o n . The goal of the t h e s i s was to describe and evaluate the n e g o t i a t i o n process used i n the Code's c r e a t i o n , and to evaluate how the process a f f e c t e d the Code's implementation. Q u a l i t a t i v e data were gathered through tape-recorded personal i n t e r v i e w s with 12 s e l e c t i v e l y sampled respondents who were i n v o l v e d i n the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n , and ten s e l e c t i v e l y sampled respondents who were i n v o l v e d i n the Code's .implementation. In a d d i t i o n to the i n t e r v i e w t r a n s c r i p t s , other sources of data were documents produced during the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n , and the proceedings of a non-point source p o l l u t i o n workshop. i i The major f i n d i n g s were that the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n was a productive process ( i t met eleven of the s i x t e e n c r i t e r i a f o r negotiated rulemaking), and i t d i d increase farmers' awareness of environmental issues. However, i t was not s u f f i c i e n t - by i t s e l f - to motivate farmer compliance. I t was concluded that the Code was part of a l a r g e r "package" of programs (e.g. cost-sharing programs, Environmental Guidelines booklets, producer conservation groups), that i n t o t a l are h e l p i n g to motivate compliance. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT i i TABLE OF CONTENTS i v LIST OF TABLES v i i LIST OF FIGURES v i i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT i x CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1 1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 1 2. GOAL AND OBJECTIVES 2 3. OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 2 4. OVERALL RESEARCH DESIGN 4 4.1 The Researcher's Values 6 5. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 7 6. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 7 PART ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW 9 CHAPTER TWO: MANURE AS A NON-POINT SOURCE POLLUTANT . . . 10 1. INTRODUCTION 10 2. AGRICULTURAL NON-POINT SOURCE POLLUTANTS 10 2.1 Manure N i t r a t e : Information Gaps 11 2.1.1 The Nature of Non-Point Source P o l l u t i o n . 11 2.1.2 U n c e r t a i n t i e s of N i t r a t e Leaching . . . . 12 2.1.3 Health Risks 15 3. CONCLUSION 16 CHAPTER THREE: REGULATION OF AGRICULTURAL POLLUTION . . . 18 1. FACTORS THAT AFFECT AGRO-ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION . . . 18 1.1 The A g r a r i a n Myth 19 1.2 S p e c i a l Features of the A g r i c u l t u r a l Sector . . . . 20 1.3 A Powerful I n t e r e s t Group 21 2. CONCLUSION 23 CHAPTER FOUR: A REVIEW OF REGULATORY MEASURES 24 1. INTRODUCTION 24 2. POLICY OPTIONS 24 3. REVIEW OF REGULATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 29 3.1 The United Kingdom 30 3.1;1 B i o p h y s i c a l Factors 30 3.1.2 Chronology of Regulation 31 3.1.3 The Actors Involved 33 3.1.4 T a c t i c s Used to Deal With Information Gaps 34 3.1.5 D e s c r i p t i o n of the Process 35 i v 3.1.6 E f f e c t i v e n e s s of the Regulations 36 3.2 The Netherlands 37 3.2.1 B i o p h y s i c a l Factors 37 3.2.2 Chronology of Regulation 38 3.2.3 The Actors Involved 39 3.2.4 T a c t i c s Used to Deal With Information Gaps . 40 3.2.5 D e s c r i p t i o n of the Process 41 3.2.6 E f f e c t i v e n e s s of the Regulations 42 3.3. Lessons From the European Experience . . . . . . 44 CHAPTER FIVE: NEGOTIATION IN THE REGULATION OF POLLUTION . 47 1. INTRODUCTION 4 7 2. FACTORS THAT PROMOTE BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION . . . . 47 3. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF NEGOTIATION 51 4. EVALUATION OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS 53 5. NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 60 6. CONCLUSION 61 PART TWO: INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDY AND METHODS . . . 63 CHAPTER SIX: A CASE STUDY OF NITRATE REGULATION IN BC . . 64 1. INTRODUCTION 64 2. BACKGROUND 64 2.1 N u t r i e n t Impacts 64 2.2 The P o l i t i c a l Economy of A g r i c u l t u r e i n BC . . . 66 2.3 The BCFA As An I n t e r e s t Group 68 3. CHRONOLOGY OF THE CODE'S DEVELOPMENT 7 0 4. THE CODE'S FORMAT 74 5. THE CODE'S ENFORCEMENT 75 6. CONCLUSIONS 7 6 CHAPTER SEVEN: CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 77 1. INTRODUCTION 77 2. DATA COLLECTION METHODS 77 2.1 Document A n a l y s i s 77 2.2 Personal Interviews 78 2.3 Non-Point Source P o l l u t i o n Workshop . . . 80 2.4 Sampling 80 2.5 Data C o l l e c t i o n 82 2.6 Questionnaire Format 84 2.7 Data A n a l y s i s 84 PART THREE: FINDINGS 87 CHAPTER EIGHT: EVALUATION OF THE CODE'S NEGOTIATION . . . 88 1. INTRODUCTION 8 8 2. OBJECTIVE 2a: EVALUATION OF THE REGULATION MAKING PROCESS . . • 88 2.1 C r i t e r i o n One: C o u n t e r v a i l i n g Power 88 2.2 C r i t e r i o n Two: L i m i t e d Number of P a r t i e s 90 2.3 C r i t e r i o n Three: Mature/"Ripe" Issues .91 v 2.4 C r i t e r i o n Four: I n e v i t a b i l i t y of De c i s i o n . . . . 93 2.5 C r i t e r i o n F i v e : Opportunity f o r Gain 94 2.6 C r i t e r i o n S i x : Fundamental Values 98 2.7 C r i t e r i o n Seven: P e r m i t t i n g Tradeoffs 99 2.8 C r i t e r i o n E i g h t : Research Not Determinative of Outcome 101 2.9 C r i t e r i o n Nine: Agreement Implementation . . . . 102 2.10 C r i t e r i o n Ten: Agency r o l e 103 2.11 C r i t e r i o n Eleven: Role of a m e d i a t o r / f a c i l i t a t o r 104 2.12 C r i t e r i o n Twelve: D i s t r i b u t i o n of costs and b e n e f i t s 105 2.13 C r i t e r i o n Thirteen: BATNA (Best A l t e r n a t i v e to a Negotiated Agreement) 106 2.14 C r i t e r i o n Fourteen: S e t t i n g a deadline . . . . 108 2.15 C r i t e r i o n F i f t e e n : Who should p a r t i c i p a t e . . . I l l 2.16 C r i t e r i o n S ixteen: Financing the e n t e r p r i s e . . 115 3. CONCLUSIONS 116 CHAPTER NINE: NEGOTIATION'S EFFECT ON THE FORM OF REGULATION 118 1. INTRODUCTION 118 2. NEGOTIATION'S EFFECT ON THE FORM OF REGULATION . . . . 118 3. CONCLUSIONS 129 CHAPTER TEN: COMPLIANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION 130 1. INTRODUCTION 130 2. NEGOTIATION AND COMPLIANCE 130 3. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE CODE/ITS ENFORCEMENT 137 4. CONCLUSIONS . 145 CHAPTER ELEVEN: SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . 14 6 1. INTRODUCTION 146 2. GOAL AND OBJECTIVES 146 3. METHODOLOGY 147 4. MAJOR FINDINGS 148 4.1 L i t e r a t u r e Review . 148 4.2 The Effectiveness of the Code's N e g o t i a t i o n Process 149 4.3 Negotiation's E f f e c t on the Regulation 151 4.4 N e g o t i a t i o n and Compliance 152 4.5 Suggested Changes 152 5. DISCUSSION 154 6. RECOMMENDATIONS 158 BIBLIOGRAPHY .159 APPENDIX I: COVERING LETTER 167 APPENDIX I I : CONSENT FORM 169 APPENDIX I I I : QUESTIONNAIRE 171 APPENDIX IV: SAMPLE OF A SUMMARY TABLE 177 APPENDIX V: LIST OF ACRONYMS. . ' 178 v i LIST OF TABLES Table Page Table One: Environmental Impacts of A g r i c u l t u r a l Non-Point Source P o l l u t a n t s 11 Table Two: E v a l u a t i o n of Selected P o l i c y Instruments f o r A g r i c u l t u r a l Non-Point Source P o l l u t i o n . . . 27 Table Three: Data A n a l y s i s 86 Table Four: E v a l u a t i o n Summary of the Code's N e g o t i a t i o n . . .117 v i i LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page Figure One: The Fate of Manure Nitrogen i n the S o i l 14 Figure Two: ESP D i s t r i b u t i o n f o r the Sumas and Matsqui Watersheds 135 v i i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would l i k e to express my deep a p p r e c i a t i o n to my graduate committee - Tony Dorcey, Kathy Harrison, Maureen Garland, and Les L a v k u l i c h . They each o f f e r e d valuable a s s i s t a n c e and guidance. I would a l s o l i k e to thank my f e l l o w Resource Management and Environmental Studies graduate students f o r t h e i r camaraderie and moral•support. i x CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION I . STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM Non-point sources of water p o l l u t i o n from a g r i c u l t u r a l production are a growing problem across Canada. In B r i t i s h Columbia the problem has manifest i t s e l f i n the form of n i t r a t e and p e s t i c i d e contamination of groundwater (Liebscher e__ al.„ 1.992), and phosphorus lo a d i n g i n surface water (Nagpal, 1992) . In response, the government of B r i t i s h Columbia has adopted the Code of A g r i c u l t u r a l P r a c t i c e f o r Waste Management, a unique piece of l e g i s l a t i o n i n Canada (Science C o u n c i l of Canada, 1992), designed to reduce non-point source p o l l u t i o n . The r e g u l a t i o n w i l l h e r e a f t e r be r e f e r r e d to as the Code. H i s t o r i c a l l y , many environmental s t a t u t e s exempted farm operations, leaving the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r environmental p r o t e c t i o n to a g r i c u l t u r a l agencies. This t r a d i t i o n has been i n f l u e n c e d by the agrarian myth, special, features of the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector, the nature of a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n , and the f a c t that farmers are a powerful i n t e r e s t group.. Regulating a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n r e q u i r e s a r e c o g n i t i o n that the farm sec t o r i s d i f f e r e n t from the i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r . N e g o t i a t i o n i s one way of d e a l i n g w i t h these d i f f e r e n c e s , and the general purpose of t h i s t h e s i s i s to determine how w e l l n e g o t i a t i o n works i n r e g u l a t i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l non-point source p o l l u t i o n . 1 2. GOAL AND OBJECTIVES The goal of the thes is i s to describe and evaluate the negot ia t ion process used in. the Code's creat ion , and to evaluate how the process has af fected the Code's implementation. The descript ion and evaluation are based on the perspectives of various stakeholders. The research has the fol lowing f ive object ives : 1) To review the l i t e r a t u r e on negot iat ion and regulat ion of a g r i c u l t u r a l po l lu t ion to place the Code i n context, and to create a framework for the assessment. 2) To assess, from the stakeholders' viewpoints, a) the p r o d u c t i v i t y (e f f i c iency and effectiveness) of the Code's negot iat ion process; b) how the Code's negot iat ion process af fected the form of regulat ion se lected; c) how the Code's negotiation affected the farmers'incentive to comply. d) how wel l the Code's implementation i s working, why, and what changes they would suggest. 3. OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS The thes is consists of four p a r t s . Part One (Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five) places BC's Code into context, i n order to understand how and why i t was developed. The general context includes the b i o p h y s i c a l , socio-economic, and p o l i t i c a l factors that come into play when regulat ing a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n . H i s t o r i c a l l y , many environmental statutes excluded farm operations, 2 and the reasons f o r t h i s are examined i n Chapter Three. A more s p e c i f i c context i s provided by examining the e v o l u t i o n of governance of n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n i n Europe. Over time there, governance has evolved i n terms of the power of the stakeholders i n v o l v e d , the r e l i a n c e on v o l u n t a r y measures, and the degree to which economic or e c o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s are seen as being the most important in. r e g u l a t i n g the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector. The more s p e c i f i c context of the European experience helps to e x p l a i n the e v o l u t i o n of BC's n i t r a t e p o l i c y . I t a l s o a s s i s t s i n e x p l a i n i n g how the process a f f e c t e d the form of r e g u l a t i o n s e l e c t e d i n BC (Objective 2b), as one of the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the Code's ne g o t i a t i o n t r a v e l l e d to Europe on a f a c t - f i n d i n g mission. This p a r t i c i p a n t concluded that "we ignore the European experience at our p e r i l . " (BC M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e , F i s h e r i e s and Food (BCMAFF1) Report, J u l y 1988, 5). Part Two (Chapters Six and Seven) begins w i t h a case study of the factors that a f f e c t n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n i n BC, and a chronology of the key events that l e d up to the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n . This i s followed by an o u t l i n e of the methods used to c o l l e c t and analyze the data on the experience w i t h n e g o t i a t i o n . Part Three contains three chapters'. Chapter E i g h t evaluates the p r o d u c t i v i t y of the n e g o t i a t i o n process used to create the Code (Objective 2a), through the use of c r i t e r i a that improve the l i k e l i h o o d of s u c c e s s f u l negotiated rulemaking. The s i x t e e n c r i t e r i a , which r e l a t e to n e g o t i a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s and p a r t i c i p a n t s , l i s t of the acronyms used i n the t h e s i s i s l o c a t e d i n Appendix V. 3 are derived from the l i t e r a t u r e on experience with negotiated rulemaking i n the United States. Chapter Nine discusses the negotiation's effect on the form of regulation selected (Objective 2b). The p o l i c y options that the negotiating committee considered evolved over time, from more stringent approaches (e.g. livestock density l i m i t s ) , to the "softer" approach of a code of practice.. Chapter Ten contains a q u a l i t a t i v e assessment of the Code's implementation (Objectives 2c and 2d). The results of this chapter lead to recommendations on how the Code's negotiation process could have been improved, how the regulation i t s e l f could be changed, and how i t s enforcement could be enhanced. In the f i n a l chapter, (Chapter Eleven), the thesis addresses the question of whether t h i s type of negotiation process or the format, of a. "code of p r a c t i c e " could, be used for other types of non-point source pollutants. 4. OVERALL RESEARCH DESIGN The o v e r a l l research design was that of a qualitative.case study approach to policy analysis (Patton and Sawicki, 1993). This approach focuses on the way the p o l i c y operates, and how the participants view i t . The aim i s to understand what i s valued by the participants, and to present the diverse views of the involved p a r t i e s . This thesis describes the regulatory system before the Code, the exact nature of the new regulation, and the new regulatory system that resulted. The understandings of the Code's participants were determined through personal interviews, document 4 a n a l y s i s , and attendance at a BCMELP-sponsored (BC M i n i s t r y of Environment, Lands and Parks) workshop on non-point source p o l l u t i o n . According to Y i n (1994, 6), a case study i s the appropriate research method when the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s are met: 1) the research questions are "how" and/or "why" questions; 2) c o n t r o l over behavioural events i s not re q u i r e d ; and 3) the focus i s on contemporary events. A case study i s a r e l e v a n t method f o r t h i s research, as the three c o n d i t i o n s s t a t e d above match the s i t u a t i o n s l i s t e d below. 1) This t h e s i s has focused on addressing a) how and why the Code came to be negotiated, b)how w e l l the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n process worked, and c) how the Code's stakeholders view i t s implementation. 2) The study of the Code's development and implementation r e q u i r e s an examination of events that have already occurred or are p r e s e n t l y o c c u r r i n g . No c o n t r o l over behavioural events i s re q u i r e d . 3) The t h e s i s focuses on a n e g o t i a t i o n that occurred from 1987 to 1992, and an implementation process t h a t i s ongoing. Thus the emphasis of the research i s on contemporary events. A major strength of the case study approach i s the opportunity to use m u l t i p l e sources of evidence (Yin, 1994). This case study i n v o l v e d the f o l l o w i n g sources of information: l ) a l i t e r a t u r e review of documents r e l a t e d to the r e g u l a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n . , 5 2) a n a l y s i s of the documents r e l a t e d to the AWMC ( A g r i c u l t u r a l Waste Management Committee - the Code's n e g o t i a t i n g committee). 3) personal interviews of stakeholders who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the AWMC, and those i n v o l v e d i n the Code's implementation. 4) the r e s u l t s of a Non-Point Source (NPS) P o l l u t i o n Workshop, h e l d i n B.C. while: the research f o r t h i s t h e s i s was being conducted. The data c o l l e c t i o n methods are discussed i n more d e t a i l i n Chapter Seven. 4.1 The Researcher's Values Q u a l i t a t i v e research r e q u i r e s that researchers come to g r i p s w i t h the tremendous i n f l u e n c e they have on c o l l e c t i n g and i n t e r p r e t i n g the data. Researchers are not simply n e u t r a l and unbiased recording instruments. One way of d e a l i n g with t h i s i s to admit the s u b j e c t i v e experiences of researchers i n t o the research frame, by exposing t h e i r biases (Fontana and Frey, 1994). A c c o r d i n g l y , I acknowledge that I was r a i s e d on a farm, and have two u n i v e r s i t y degrees i n a g r i c u l t u r e . I have strong b e l i e f s about the importance of main t a i n i n g s u s t a i n a b l e , r e g i o n a l , a g r i c u l t u r a l economies as part of pr e s e r v i n g g l o b a l food s e c u r i t y . At the same time, I have l i v e d i n urban areas f o r most of my adult l i f e , and a l l of • my u n i v e r s i t y degrees have a l s o focused on environmental i s s u e s . I a l s o have strong personal b e l i e f s that businesses ( i n c l u d i n g farms) should ensure that they minimize the negative impacts on the environment from t h e i r p r a c t i c e s . The 6 values that I hold a l s o help to shape my research conclusions and recommendations. 5. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY The r e s u l t s of the study can be of b e n e f i t to p o l i c y makers and stakeholders by determining how productive the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n process was, and how t h i s process can be a p p l i e d to other s i t u a t i o n s . I f the Code's development succeeded because i t followed e s t a b l i s h e d n e g o t i a t i o n c r i t e r i a , then the secondary b e n e f i t of the study i s to determine whether the process helped to develop a sense of "ownership" and "buy-in" amongst farmers. "Ownership" would improve the l i k e l i h o o d that farmers would comply w i t h the Code. This f i n d i n g i s of i n t e r e s t because, as mentioned above, the Code regulates non-point source p o l l u t i o n which i s more d i f f i c u l t to c o n t r o l than p o i n t source p o l l u t i o n , because of i t s dependence on the v o l u n t a r y behaviour of the waste producer. I f p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a neg o t i a t i o n process helps to develop a sense of ownership, which i s an important step i n behaviour m o d i f i c a t i o n , then stakeholders i n other non-point source p o l l u t i o n problems might u s e f u l l y be i n v o l v e d i n s i m i l a r approaches. 6. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY The major l i m i t a t i o n s on t h i s research were the time c o n s t r a i n t s of both myself and the respondents. The in t e r v i e w s were conducted i n V i c t o r i a , the Lower Fraser V a l l e y , Kamioops, and the Okanagan over a p e r i o d of two months. I was the s o l e i n t e r v i e w e r , and many of the respondents had busy schedules. The farmer respondents were s e l e c t e d f o r t h e i r knowledge of (and 7 experience with) the Code, and. are not meant to be a random sample of farmers i n the province. I a l s o t r a n s c r i b e d most of the tape-recorded i n t e r v i e w s (see Chapter Seven). There i s a concern that " i n v e s t i g a t o r s who t r a n s c r i b e t h e i r own i n t e r v i e w s i n v i t e not only f r u s t r a t i o n but a l s o a f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the data that does not serve the l a t e r process of a n a l y s i s " (McCracken, 1988, 42). While I d e f i n i t e l y f e l t f r u s t r a t e d w i t h the tedium of the t r a n s c r i p t i o n process, I made a conscious e f f o r t to ensure that the t r a n s c r i p t s were verbatim records. The only p a r t s of the i n t e r v i e w that were not tra n s c r i b e d were when the respondents had d e f i n i t e l y gone o f f t o p i c (e.g. one respondent mentioned h i s work wi t h the a r t i f i c i a l insemination of c a t t l e ) , or when they discussed something " o f f the record." 8 PART ONE LITERATURE REVIEW 9 CHAPTER TWO MANURE AS A NON-POINT SOURCE POLLUTANT 1. INTRODUCTION This chapter begins w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n of a g r i c u l t u r a l non- p o i n t source p o l l u t a n t s , t h e i r sources and t h e i r impacts. From t h i s broad overview, the focus narrows to the impacts of n i t r a t e s from excessive manure use. This focus has been adopted because, w i t h respect to the a g r i c u l t u r a l i n d u s t r y , manure n i t r a t e i s the "...most s i g n i f i c a n t contaminant, and the one t h a t i s appearing on the widest s c a l e " i n BC (Freeze et a l . . 1993). The i n f o r m a t i o n gaps r e l a t e d to the nature of non-point source p o l l u t i o n , the h e a l t h r i s k s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h n i t r a t e s , and the u n c e r t a i n t i e s of n i t r a t e movement i n the s o i l are h i g h l i g h t e d . 2. AGRICULTURAL NON-POINT SOURCE POLLUTANTS There are a number of a g r i c u l t u r a l non-point source p o l l u t a n t s that are of concern (see Table One). The sources i n c l u d e manure, chemical f e r t i l i z e r , s o i l e r o s i o n , s i l a g e e f f l u e n t , m i l k p a r l o u r e f f l u e n t , wood waste leachate, and p e s t i c i d e s . The contaminants most often i d e n t i f i e d with these sources are n u t r i e n t s , sediments, organic m a t e r i a l s , p e s t i c i d e residues, and pathogens. Depressed oxygen l e v e l s i n surface water, t o x i c i t y to aquatic organisms, and human h e a l t h impacts are the main impacts of concern (Hagen, 1990) 1. 1 For readers wishing i n f o r m a t i o n on the other a g r i c u l t u r a l non- p o i n t source p o l l u t a n t s , please r e f e r to Hagen (1990), Government 10 T a b l e One E n v i r o n m e n t a l Impacts o f A g r i c u l t u r a l N o n - P o i n t Source P o l l u t a n t s SOURCE POTENTIAL POLLUTANT IMPACTS Manure Pathogens, Phosphorus, N i t r a t e , Ammonia, Organic Nitrogen, Organic Carbon Human Health, A l g a l Growth, Oxygen. Depletion, L e t h a l to Aquatic Organisms Chemical F e r t i l i z e r Phosphorus, Nitrate,- Ammonia Same as Manure S i l a g e E f f l u e n t Same as Manure Same as Manure M i l k P a r l o u r E f f l u e n t Same as Manure, plus A c i d i t y Same as Manure S o i l E r o s i o n Phosphorus, Nitrogen, P e s t i c i d e Residue, Sediment Same as Manure, plus Diminished A g r i c u l t u r a l P r o d u c t i v i t y Wood Waste Leachate Organic Nitrogen, Organic Carbon, A c i d i t y , Resin Acids Oxygen Depletion, L e t h a l to Aquatic Organisms P e s t i c i d e s A c t i v e Ingredients, I n e r t Ingredients Human Health, L e t h a l to Aquatic Organisms Source: Adapted from Hagen (1990). 2.1 Manure N i t r a t e : I n f o r m a t i o n Gaps There are informat i o n gaps that make n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n very d i f f i c u l t . These gaps are due to the nature of non-point source p o l l u t i o n , the u n c e r t a i n t i e s of n i t r a t e l e a c h i n g , and the h e a l t h r i s k s of n i t r a t e consumption. 2.1.1 The Nature of Non-Point Source P o l l u t i o n A major d i f f i c u l t y i n v o l v e d i n making p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s to of Canada (1991), Environment Canada and BCMELP (1992), and BCMELP and Environment Canada (1993). c o n t r o l a g r i c u l t u r a l non-point source p o l l u t i o n i s u n c e r t a i n t y . The causes of the contamination and t h e i r e f f e c t s are o f t e n separated, both temporally and s p a t i a l l y . Thus i t i s d i f f i c u l t to connect causes and e f f e c t s , and to a s s i g n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r environmental damages. Furthermore, should farmers be h e l d responsible f o r past p r a c t i c e s , undertaken i n good f a i t h , w i t h the advice of a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o f e s s i o n a l s , and o f t e n w i t h government support? The l a c k of i n f o r m a t i o n about the extent of water contamination, as w e l l as the costs of water q u a l i t y improvement, introduces tremendous u n c e r t a i n t y about the p o t e n t i a l gains from p o l i c y a c t i o n s (Baldock, 1992). A g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n i s not confined to a few, e a s i l y i d e n t i f i e d p o l l u t e r s . There are few p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l devices that can be i n s t a l l e d on farms. Abatement would r e q u i r e changes i n farming p r a c t i c e s and systems, i n c l u d i n g n i t r o g e n f e r t i l i z e r i n p u t s , manure storage and a p p l i c a t i o n p r a c t i c e s , and cropping systems (Braden and Lovejoy, 1990). 2.1.2 U n c e r t a i n t i e s of N i t r a t e Leaching In order to understand why n i t r a t e l e a c h i n g i s a problem, and the u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n v o l v e d w i t h i t s r e g u l a t i o n , one needs to understand what happens to nitrogen i n manure when i t i s a p p l i e d to s o i l . The problem i s complex, not only because of the various forms that n i t r o g e n assumes, but because of the d i f f i c u l t y i n p r e d i c t i n g what these forms w i l l be at any one time. Consequently i t i s d i f f i c u l t to p r e d i c t how much w i l l be taken up by the p l a n t s , and how much w i l l be l o s t to l e a c h i n g and other processes. 12 The nitrogen i n manure i s mainly i n the organic and ammonium form (Figure One) . S o i l organic matter i s transformed into plant available forms of nitrogen (ammonium and. nitrate) through the processes of mineralisation and n i t r i f i c a t i o n . Nitrates not taken up by the plant can be l o s t to the a i r i n gaseous forms (by the process of d e n i t r i f i c a t i o n ) , or l o s t by leaching. Leaching poses the greatest threat to groundwater supplies. Nitrates may also be immobilised i n s o i l organic matter, and may later be mineralised to continue the cycle. The factors that a f f e c t the process include the types of s o i l microorganisms present, the temperature, the carbon to nitrogen ratio of the organic matter, and the presence of oxygen i n the s o i l ( D ' l t r i and Wolfson, 1987). In addition to the uncertainties of n i t r a t e leaching from the nitrogen cycle, there are uncertainties as to how much of the leached nitrate on ag r i c u l t u r a l land comes from f e r t i l i z e r . . In the UK, s c i e n t i s t s at the Institute of Arable Crops Research at Rothamsted discovered that the majority of n i t r a t e leached from c u l t i v a t e d f i e l d s over the winter came from s o i l organic matter, not from excess nitrogen f e r t i l i z e r . They also discovered that n i t r a t e leaching from organic matter continued for a very long time. Plots of undisturbed s o i l , established i n 1877, had n i t r a t e leachate measured annually. It took 41 years for the n i t r a t e leachate to decline to half of i t s o r i g i n a l rate because of the "large pool of decomposable nitrogen i n the s o i l , which i s broken down very slowly" (Addiscott, 1988, 52) . Similar research results^ have been found i n the U.S. (Francis, 1992). 13 14 Another source of u n c e r t a i n t y i s the r a t e at which n i t r a t e moves through the s o i l and reaches groundwater. This i s h i g h l y s i t e dependent, and v a r i e s w i t h the amount of p r e c i p i t a t i o n , the depth of the water t a b l e , the type of s o i l , and the type of bedrock. Depending on a l l of these f a c t o r s , the n i t r a t e i n the water drawn from an a q u i f e r may r e f l e c t what was happening on the surface up to h a l f a century ago (Addiscott, 1988). The Rothamsted researchers f u r t h e r c a l c u l a t e d that i f UK farmers halved the amount of f e r t i l i z e r they applied over a decade, t h i s would only reduce the s o i l ' s organic n i t r o g e n content by four percent. Furthermore, y i e l d s would be reduced by about ten percent, ". . .but farmers make a l l t h e i r p r o f i t on that l a s t ten percent" (Addiscott, 1988, 54). 2.1.3 Health Risks The main h e a l t h r i s k a s s o c i a t e d w i t h n i t r a t e s i n d r i n k i n g water i s methaemoglobinaemia ("blue baby syndrome"). Methaemoglobinaemia i s a blood d i s o r d e r that occurs predominantly i n c h i l d r e n under one year of age who consume excess n i t r a t e . I t occurs only i n i n f a n t s whose d i e t i s d r i e d m i l k and water ( i . e . those who are not breastfed) (Addiscott e t . a l . , 1992). Babies have g a s t r i c j u i c e s with a r e l a t i v e l y high pH, which favour the presence of n i t r a t e - r e d u c i n g b a c t e r i a . The n i t r a t e ions consumed are reduced to n i t r i t e i ons, which pass i n t o the blood and a f f e c t the haemoglobin molecule. The oxygen c a r r y i n g capacity of the blood i s impaired, and the baby's s k i n turns a blue colour (Muia and Thomas, 1990). 15 Although the majori ty of cases have occurred when water contained more than 100 mg/1 of n i t r a t e / the maximum allowable l e v e l of n i t r a t e s i n drinking; water i n Canada has been set at 45 mg/1, g iv ing a safety factor of approximately two (Addiscott e__ a l . . 1992). 2 Although the research resu l t s have been inconclus ive , other health concerns have ar i sen regarding the consumption of n i t r a t e . These concerns include hypertension, increased infant mor ta l i t y , central nervous system b i r t h defects, and certa in cancers inc luding g a s t r i c cancer (Spalding and Exner, 1993). Drinking water contr ibutes only about 20 percent of the d ie tary intake of n i t r a t e s , with the remainder coming from various food products (Muia and Thomas, 1990, 93). Thus, i t i s unclear how much of the hea l th r i s k s associated with n i t r a t e consumption are re la ted to contaminated water. 3. CONCLUSION Any po l i c i e s to control a g r i c u l t u r a l n i t ra te po l lu t ion need to consider three points re la ted to information gaps. F i r s t , p o l i c y makers need to have a good understanding of the nitrogen c y c l e . This i s needed i n order to determine what can be achieved by r e s t r i c t i n g f e r t i l i z e r a p p l i c a t i o n , and to assess the 'costs and benef i ts of various p o l i c y opt ions . Second, each loca t ion i s unique i n terms of i t s p o t e n t i a l for n i t r a t e leaching . Thus, 2 N i t ra te l i m i t s are expressed i n two ways. The 45 mg/1 l i m i t i s the t o t a l amount of n i t r a t e . I f only the nitrogen i n the n i t r a t e i s measured, the equivalent l i m i t i s 10 mg/1. 16 r e g u l a t i o n s designed to address the problem on an area-wide b a s i s may not be e f f e c t i v e i n l o c a l s i t u a t i o n s . (However, t a i l o r e d standards are not n e c e s s a r i l y b e t t e r , unless policy-makers have the i n f o r m a t i o n needed on the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of s p e c i f i c s i t e s . ) F i n a l l y , the degree to which.the problem would be solved by banning n i t r o g e n f e r t i l i z e r s depends on the pool of s o i l organic n i t r o g e n that can be converted to n i t r a t e (Francis,. 1992). 17 CHAPTER THREE REGULATION OF AGRICULTURAL POLLUTION 1. FACTORS THAT AFFECT AGRO-ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION There are a number of h i s t o r i c a l , socio-economic, and p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s that come i n t o play when r e g u l a t i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n . These f a c t o r s are important because they tend to overshadow the b i o p h y s i c a l f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d (e.g. the source and q u a n t i t y of the p o l l u t a n t ) . These f a c t o r s have a l s o moulded farmers' values, a t t i t u d e s and behaviour w i t h regard to environmental i s s u e s . A g r i c u l t u r e i n North America has a p o l i c y t r a d i t i o n that emphasizes vo l u n t a r y compliance, and provides i n c e n t i v e s as added inducements. For example, i n the US, Environmental P r o t e c t i o n Agency r e g u l a t i o n s mandated adoption of a g r i c u l t u r a l Best Management P r a c t i c e s (BMPs). 1 The st a t e s sought v o l u n t a r y implementation of BMPs, by o f f e r i n g c o s t - s h a r i n g programs to pr o v i d e f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e (Kerns and Kramer, 1985). This t r a d i t i o n i s based'on the premise, that farmers are stewards of the land, and that i t i s i n a farmer's best i n t e r e s t to address any i d e n t i f i e d resource problems and that r e s o l v i n g those problems w i l l l e a d to b e t t e r crop production and ... b e t t e r farm f a m i l y h e a l t h and q u a l i t y of commodities (Zinn and Blodgett, 1989, 185). H i s t o r i c a l l y , many environmental s t a t u t e s excluded farm ^ P s are those, p r a c t i c e s considered to be the most e f f e c t i v e and p r a c t i c a b l e techniques f o r c o n t r o l l i n g NPS p o l l u t i o n . 18 operations, leaving the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r environmental p r o t e c t i o n to a g r i c u l t u r a l agencies. Where does t h i s h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n come from? 1.1 The A g r a r i a n Myth Browne et a l . (1992) tr a c e the t r a d i t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r e ' s s p e c i a l status back to the o r i g i n s of the a g r a r i a n myth. (Myth here i s not used i n a p e j o r a t i v e way, but ra t h e r i n the sense of a s t o r y or b e l i e f that attempts to e x p l a i n a b a s i c truth.) In the nineteenth century the myth professed that farmers embodied moral and p o l i t i c a l i d e a l s that should be adopted by a l l c i t i z e n s . Farmers were perceived to be at the economic mercy of those who bought t h e i r commodities. There was a b e l i e f that farmers as a group worked harder and invested more resources i n t h e i r e n t e r p r i s e f o r a smaller r e t u r n than d i d any other major sect o r of the economy. Consequently, farmers were "owed a s o c i a l debt because they s u f f e r e d so that a democratic s o c i e t y might prosper" (Bonnen and Browne, 1989, 11-12). The myth became supported by p u b l i c p o l i c y that t r i e d to preserve f a m i l y farms and farming as a way of l i f e . This l e d to in c r e a s e d support f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l p r i c e and commodity support programs. By the twentieth century, the myth had changed. Today, the myth has been i n t e r p r e t e d to mean that farmers should be exempted from c r i t e r i a r o u t i n e l y a p p l i e d to others because f a m i l y farms are " r e p o s i t o r i e s f o r family values and hence f o r t r a d i t i o n a l ways of d e f i n i n g personal l o y a l t i e s w i t h i n a framework of community" (Browne et a l . , 1992, 11). 19 1.2 Spec ia l Features of the A g r i c u l t u r a l Sector The a g r i c u l t u r a l sector i s made up of a l a r g e number of small u n i t s , many of them f a m i l y farms. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to t r e a t these u n i t s i n the same way as larg e commercial e n t e r p r i s e s . The costs of compliance w i l l vary across a g r i c u l t u r a l commodity groups. Commodity groups i n d i f f e r e n t p r o v i n c e s / c o u n t r i e s that are competing f o r the same markets w i l l be. put at a competitive disadvantage, as they face d i f f e r e n t environmental regulations.. For example, farmers cannot pass on the costs of compliance w i t h environmental r e g u l a t i o n s , since they are p r i c e takers ( i . e . they cannot c o n t r o l the p r i c e s they r e c e i v e ) 2 . This puts them at a disadvantage i n complying with environmental standards, compared to other i n d u s t r i e s such as manufacturing (Baldock, 1992). Land i s a g r i c u l t u r e ' s c e n t r a l resource, and i t may l i m i t p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l options or farmers' capacity to adjust production methods. Since land i s immobile, farmers cannot e a s i l y s h i f t to a l t e r n a t i v e l o c a t i o n s where p o l l u t i o n i s l e s s damaging (Baldock, 1992) . Farmers i n BC are even more constr a i n e d i n t h e i r land use. In 1973, land designated as a g r i c u l t u r a l land was placed i n the A g r i c u l t u r a l Land Reserve (ALR) , and can not be used f o r other purposes unless the owner i s given permission by the Land 2Some a g r i c u l t u r a l commodity groups w i t h marketing boards are able to set p r i c e s . In BC, t h i s i n cludes p o u l t r y , eggs, m i l k , mushrooms, and grapes. The Vegetable Marketing Commission attempts to set p r i c e s , but the imported p r i c e of vegetables u s u a l l y determines the market p r i c e . Commodities i n BC that are not able to set p r i c e s include c a t t l e , hogs, sheep, tree f r u i t s , and b e r r i e s (Bohman, 1995) . 20 Conimisslon (Wilson and. Pierce/ 1982) . Farmers produce f o r and compete w i t h i n markets f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l commodities. I t i s b e l i e v e d that the best prospect f o r s u r v i v a l i s to adopt new technologies that w i l l lower p e r - u n i t c o s t s and expand (short-term) production. In the long term, farmers must adopt ever-improving technologies simply to maintain t h e i r e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n . This t r e a d m i l l e f f e c t means that farmers are r e l u c t a n t to reduce t h e i r agro-chemical use, f e a r i n g t h a t i t would place them at a competitive disadvantage. Farmers have come to view agro-chemicals as a form of "insurance" that reduces the f i n a n c i a l r i s k s of unstable p r i c e s or crop f a i l u r e s (Roberts and L i g h t h a l l , 1991) Commodity p r i c e support and farm income programs tend to base be n e f i t s on yield/ha.. The increase i n farm incomes brought by farm programs i n the 1960's helped to finance the t r a n s i t i o n to c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e , high input farming. Consequently, chronic overproduction and a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n are two aspects of the same problem (Roberts and L i g h t h a l l , 1991). 1.3 A Powerful Interest Group .• Farmers are a powerful i n t e r e s t group i n Canadian p o l i t i c s . Although only 3.2 percent of Canadians l i v e on farms ( S t a t i s t i c s Canada, 1994, 455), the food i n d u s t r y - from farm to supermarket - i s one of Canada's l a r g e s t sectors, with annual sales exceeding $50 b i l l i o n i n 1986 (Wilson, 1990, 3). In terms of primary i n d u s t r i e s ' c o n t r i b u t i o n to Canadian GDP, a g r i c u l t u r e i s second, a f t e r mining and o i l w e l l i n d u s t r i e s , outpacing logging and f o r e s t r y , and 21 f i s h i n g and t r a p p i n g ( S t a t i s t i c s Canada, 1994, 452). There are a number of reasons why the farm sector has major p o l i t i c a l c l o u t . F i r s t , the way that e l e c t o r a l r i d i n g boundaries are drawn gives r u r a l votes more weight than urban votes. Second, the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the r u r a l way of l i f e i s very appealing to urban Canadians, even though most of them are at l e a s t one or two generations removed from the farm (Wilson, 1990). A t h i r d reason i s the m o n o p o l i s t i c farm o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t p l a y e d a key r o l e i n a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y . For example, the Canadian Federation of A g r i c u l t u r e (CFA) and t h e i r p r o v i n c i a l a f f i l i a t e s , are widely i n t e g r a t e d across both commodity groups and t e r r i t o r y . This' system of h i e r a r c h i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n has e x e r c i s e d maximum leverage on p o l i t i c i a n s . (They) can speak with leaders on very s p e c i a l i z e d issues one day and have thousands i n the s t r e e t s the next day focusing on general issues a f f e c t i n g . a l l farmers...... (T) h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n s are s u f f i c i e n t l y co- o r d i n a t e d one w i t h the other that a l l r e l e v a n t p o l i t i c i a n s w i l l r e a l i z e the e l e c t o r a l consequences of t h e i r actions e a r l y i n the decision-making process...Here i t i s not the i n d i v i d u a l farmer's group that i s important but the system of groups (Coleman, 1988, 121). I t i s not only the farm groups, but the type of r e l a t i o n s h i p they have wi t h the s t a t e . ' Cox et a l . (1985) c h a r a c t e r i z e the r e l a t i o n s h i p as a c o r p o r a t i s t s t y l e of i n t e r e s t representation.. In corporatism, " i n t e r e s t s are represented through a l i m i t e d number of h i e r a r c h i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n s , .expressly or t a c i t l y acknowledged by government as the p r i n c i p a l l e g i t i m a t e source of p o l i c y demand" (Roberts, and Edwards,. 1991, 32) . In the case of a g r i c u l t u r e , both the government and the farmers are committed to complementary 22 o b j e c t i v e s ( i . e . s t a b l e food production and s t a b l e farm incomes). Corporatist representation has a formal l i n k w i t h r e g u l a t i o n . The i n t e r e s t group members must i n v o l v e themselves i n the s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n and d i s c i p l i n e of t h e i r own constituency i n r e t u r n f o r the p r i v i l e g e of t h e i r favoured r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the government. 2. CONCLUSION There are s e v e r a l f a c t o r s that make i t d i f f i c u l t to regula t e a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n . . These f a c t o r s i n c l u d e the a g r a r i a n myth, s p e c i a l features of the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r , and the p o l i t i c a l power of farm i n t e r e s t groups. These f a c t o r s create s e v e r a l challenges f o r designing e f f e c t i v e p o l i c i e s f o r c o n t r o l l i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l NPS p o l l u t i o n , as i s evident from the consideration of experience with d i f f e r e n t types of p o l i c y options discussed i n the next chapter. 23 CHAPTER FOUR A REVIEW OF REGULATORY MEASURES AND EXPERIENCE 1. INTRODUCTION This chapter gives an overview of types of regulatory measures to c o n t r o l a g r i c u l t u r a l non-point source p o l l u t i o n , and then reviews n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n i n the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands. These two countries have been chosen because Europe, w i t h i t s smaller a g r i c u l t u r a l land base and i n t e n s i v e l i v e s t o c k production, has been at the fo r e f r o n t of agro-environmental p o l i c y - making. The chapter concludes w i t h a d e s c r i p t i o n of a three stage process that countries tend to move through when t r y i n g to regulate n i t r a t e p o l l u t i o n . These stages help to e x p l a i n the e v o l u t i o n of the r e g u l a t o r y process i n B.C., as discussed l a t e r i n the t h e s i s . 2. POLICY OPTIONS The n i t r a t e - r e l a t e d information problems discussed i n Chapter Two, and the h i s t o r i c a l , p o l i t i c a l , and economic f a c t o r s discussed i n Chapter Three suggest s e v e r a l challenges f o r the design of p o l i c i e s to c o n t r o l a g r i c u l t u r a l non-point, source p o l l u t i o n . . The challenges include designing p o l i c i e s that are p o l i t i c a l l y v i a b l e , not excessively d i f f i c u l t or expensive to enforce, yet at the same time s t i l l p r o t e c t the environment. Braden and Segerson (1993), F r a n c i s (1992), and S h o r t l e e_£ a l . (1989) o f f e r a number of c r i t e r i a f o r e v a l u a t i n g the e f f i c i e n c y of a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c i e s . These c r i t e r i a are important i n l i g h t of the informat i o n and p o l i t i c a l problems i n v o l v e d i n n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n , and incl u d e 24 a b i l i t y to enforce, a b i l i t y to t a r g e t s e n s i t i v e areas or times, c o r r e l a t i o n with water q u a l i t y , p o l i t i c a l v i a b i l i t y , and e f f e c t on producer income. Ease of enforcement i s r e l a t e d to a v a r i e t y of f a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p o l i c y o p t i o n , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the l e g a l and j u d i c i a l system, and the receptiveness of the target population. Since i t i s very d i f f i c u l t to monitor non-point source p o l l u t i o n emissions, enforcement w i l l be more c o s t l y and needs a t t e n t i o n at the outset. E f f e c t i v e enforcement requires an overseeing body to detect and sanction non- compliance. The costs of detection and sanctioning must not be too high, or e l s e government may monitor at a l e s s than optimal l e v e l and p o l l u t e r s may be able to escape compliance (Braden and Segerson, 1993). As described i n Chapter Two, the impacts of p o l l u t i o n r e l a t e d d e c i s i o n s vary over both time and space, due to n a t u r a l v a r i a b i l i t y . Thus, p o l i c i e s that can be targeted to s e n s i t i v e times or areas are p r e f e r a b l e to ones that ignore n a t u r a l v a r i a b i l i t y and induce uniform responses (Braden and Segerson, 1993) . P o l i c i e s must be p o l i t i c a l l y v i a b l e , both i n terms of support from the powerful a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r , and i n terms of acceptance by p o l i t i c i a n s , i n t e r e s t groups and the general p u b l i c . Changes i n manure management p r a c t i c e s to reduce n i t r a t e l e a c h i n g w i l l g e n e r a l l y increase production c o s t s , and reduce producer income. However, v a r i a t i o n i n the p h y s i c a l determinants 2 5 of the p o t e n t i a l f o r environmental contamination between farms, mean that some farmers may be able to take a c t i o n to p r o t e c t water q u a l i t y at a lower cost than others. Obviously, a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c i e s d i f f e r c o n s i d e r a b l y i n terms of these c r i t e r i a . Table Two summarizes how four s e l e c t e d a l t e r n a t i v e approaches 1 might be judged. The rankings are r e l a t i v e r a t h e r than absolute, and the column headings have been worded so that a l l the "High" rankings are the most d e s i r a b l e . Moral suasion and education are based on the premise that farmers w i l l v o l u n t a r i l y adopt p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l p r a c t i c e s i f they are informed of" t h e i r . own r i s k and s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Voluntary programs have short-run p o l i t i c a l appeal, as p o l i t i c i a n s can appeal to the v i r t u e s of a c l e a n environment without having to do anything. 2 They are a l s o very appealing to farmers. Education programs can be targeted to farmers who appear to be most at r i s k , but are non-enforceable because' they have no r e g u l a t o r y b a s i s . T h e i r c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h water q u a l i t y i s low because farmers w i l l a lso be subject to pressures from competitive a g r i c u l t u r a l markets, and i t i s u n r e a l i s t i c to b e l i e v e the average farmer w i l l v o l u n t a r i l y adopt c o s t l y p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l measures under these 1Although taxes are a commonly suggested p o l i c y o p t i o n f o r reducing the impacts of inorganic nitrogen f e r t i l i z e r , they are not a very v i a b l e o p t i o n f o r reducing manure n i t r a t e impacts. Taxes would have to be t i e d to the number of animals or the amount of purchased fodder. As described i n S e c t i o n 3.2, the Netherlands' attempt, to reduce the water q u a l i t y impact of manure by taxing, animal fodder was not very e f f e c t i v e . 2 T h i s p o l i t i c a l appeal w i l l only succeed i f the p u b l i c b e l i e v e s that p o l l u t e r s w i l l respond, or i f the p u b l i c doesn't care. 26 LZ oo o d i - i o o> co P- Co ri-fD H i H O ro H D_ fD DJ 3 a CO CD i Q fD H CO O 3 00 3 O H- 00 CD 3 CO H tr Co o H rt- H- j—i CD _! CO CD rt Co H Co ro I—1 r t fD i—» _> 3 CD o CO rt • I Q *d > tt £ O t ) 0 H- (D a 0 tJ 0 21 < 3 CQ •a d H rr v- SD CD SD rr H 0 SD rr ^ 3 •1 V - JD !-• 8 3 fl) 3 0 H- 0 rr * 3 H- 0 fD CA CO (D SD rr rr 0 d H H- H- 3 SD n rr 0 0 CO fD M 3 3 H- OJ CO 3 cn 0 3 CD (D 3 c e n  \ N 0 3 SD 3 a rr 3 3 rr H- H- H- a 3 < 3 iQ e s  iQ tt > 3 tr H) H -£ 0 1—1 ta O H H- H- H- 0 rr vQ fD CD K: tr tr r a t e  > to  H •-3 > fD SD 5 " Co l-< H - O cr H- K ta (Q M rt d _) H- P - P - CD H- H- rt tr rr rr < tr tr tr *: fD to  IO 3 O d H- 0 H £ £ SD rr n fD -—- o o M 3* H CO cr tn a a tr* H- (D n d H- fD fD o rr £ H rt r r _> H H s: •< SD SD H- tr Co Co rr rr < rt rt CD H-fD fD fD H 0 3 < < 13 < H - 0 Co Co SD 1—1 H tz i - i cr H- H- P - P - P - H- rr Co Co H H-U J_ tr V 1 tr H- 0 ft SD fD fD t < 1—1 i—t 1—1 O O H 3 £ 3 £ H i-i £ 3 ^ n n Co PJ a o H O H- H o P - P - to P - o a fD H 3 fD I-i 3 fD 3 fD 3 3 d Co r t Co r t a r t a rt (D 0 CO Co oo Co d Co d Co fD fD H- fD P - n P - o P - H 3 3 fD 3 fD 3 tt <; SD I—• d SD rr H- O M 3 rr O d d SD o H i fl) o CO CD z 0 3 1 rr SD •d CD CT o a t - ' H- CD 3 t) r t O H CO H- O 8 ^ n H CD 3 CO •d rr O 4 d CD rr 3 H- rr O 3 CO H i O H pressures (Shortle et a l . , 1989). Another p o l i c y option i s r e g u l a t i o n s that r e s t r i c t the t i m i n g or amount of manure a p p l i e d , or zoning of land according to allowable manure input r a t e s . These r e g u l a t i o n s may be a b e t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e i f l o c a l i z e d i n t e n s i t y of use - r a t h e r than t o t a l o v e r a l l use - i s the major cause of n i t r a t e l e a c h i n g . Per hectare r e s t r i c t i o n s on the amount of manure applied would e f f e c t i v e l y deal w i t h a l o c a l i n t e n s i t y of use problem. D i f f e r e n t regions could achieve a given water q u a l i t y o b j e c t i v e w i t h q u i t e d i f f e r e n t degrees of manure use r e s t r i c t i o n s . Therefore, uniform l i m i t a t i o n s would not have uniform impacts (Francis, 1992). I f the r e s t r i c t i o n s were only applied on a l o c a l b a s i s , and i f they l e d to decreased farm output, care would have to be taken to avoid economic harm to the area. Farm income i n the r e s t r i c t e d area might become depressed, while farm, income outside the area would inc r e a s e . P o l i t i c a l v i a b i l i t y would be higher i f farmers were accustomed to working w i t h r a t e r e s t r i c t i o n s on other farm inputs (e.g. f e r t i l i z e r , p e s t i c i d e s ) , and i f the r e s t r i c t i o n s were set at a r a t e r e q u i r e d f o r optimum economic r e t u r n (Francis, 1992). Land could be zoned according to allowable manure a p p l i c a t i o n r a t e s , or s e n s i t i v i t y of a q u i f e r recharge areas. The e f f e c t s of zoning would be s i m i l a r to those of a p p l i c a t i o n r e s t r i c t i o n s , except zoning would r e s u l t i n a higher degree of c o n t r o l of farming a c t i v i t i e s . I t would a l s o have a more negative e f f e c t on incomes of producers i n the zoned areas. F i n a n c i a l i n c e n t i v e s such as c o s t - s h a r i n g programs or 28 s u b s i d i e s may f a c i l i t a t e the adoption of p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l technologies (e.g. manure storage t a n k s ) . While f i n a n c i a l i n c e n t i v e s could be c o s t l y to the government, i t may be able to j u s t i f y t h i s o p t i o n by p o i n t i n g out that supporting p r o v i n c i a l farmers helps to maintain food s e c u r i t y and r e g i o n a l food s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . Government spending on water d e n i t r i f i c a t i o n i s another o p t i o n . While t h i s type of p o l i c y would not i n v o l v e enforcement, i t would be a r e a c t i v e r a t h e r than p r o a c t i v e way to deal w i t h t a r g e t i n g and water q u a l i t y . This could be very c o s t l y , as once an a q u i f e r i s contaminated i t i s o f t e n p r o h i b i t i v e l y expensive or t e c h n i c a l l y impossible to clean i t (Sharefkin e£ a l . , 1984) . P o l i t i c a l l y , i t would be d i f f i c u l t f o r the government to j u s t i f y why i t was r i s k i n g the health of i n f a n t s by a l l o w i n g the p o l l u t i o n to continue. The type of p o l i c y instrument chosen to deal w i t h n i t r a t e p o l l u t i o n i n v o l v e s p o l i t i c a l as w e l l as t e c h n i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , farmers p r e f e r a vo l u n t a r y approach supplemented by input or output support arrangements such as tax c r e d i t s , low- i n t e r e s t loans, and cost sharing (Kerns and Kramer, 1985). The next s e c t i o n o u t l i n e s how the twin c o n s t r a i n t s of information gaps and i n t e r e s t group p o l i t i c s have played themselves out i n the r e g u l a t i o n of n i t r a t e i n the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 3. REVIEW OF REGULATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS Europe appears to be at the f o r e f r o n t of r e g u l a t i n g p o l l u t i o n 29 from a g r i c u l t u r a l n i t r a t e s . I have s e l e c t e d two c o u n t r i e s , the Un i t e d Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands, and present short case studies of the factors that have shaped each of t h e i r r e g u l a t i o n s . Both c o u n t r i e s have a c o r p o r a t i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e i r dominant farm i n t e r e s t group and t h e i r a g r i c u l t u r a l m i n i s t r i e s (Watson, 1992)(Huppes and Kagan, 1989). The UK was s e l e c t e d because Canada has i n h e r i t e d i t s system of parliamentary government, and thus the two co u n t r i e s have some s i m i l a r i t i e s i n terms of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . BC's Code of A g r i c u l t u r a l P r a c t i c e f o r Waste Management appears to have been based on the UK's Code of Good A g r i c u l t u r a l P r a c t i c e s , and we can thus l e a r n from t h e i r experience. The Netherlands was s e l e c t e d because i t i s recognized as the most advanced country i n Europe i n terms of i t s agro-environmental r e g u l a t i o n s (Baldock, 1992). The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s o u t l i n e each country's experience, i n terms of the b i o p h y s i c a l problems, a chronology of r e g u l a t i o n , the actors involved, the t a c t i c s used to deal w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n gaps, a d e s c r i p t i o n of the p o l i c y process by which r e g u l a t i o n s were developed, and any i n d i c a t i o n s of effectiveness of the r e g u l a t i o n s . Unfortunately, there does not appear to be as much inf o r m a t i o n i n the l i t e r a t u r e surveyed on the p o l i c y development processes used, so i t i s d i f f i c u l t to determine to what degree n e g o t i a t i o n was employed. 3.1 The United Kingdom 3.1.1 B i o p h y s i c a l Factors The n i t r a t e problem i n the UK i s concentrated i n the southern 30 and eastern p a r t s of England, where i n t e n s i v e c u l t i v a t i o n , high r a t e s of i n o r g a n i c n i t r o g e n f e r t i l i z e r a p p l i c a t i o n , and permeable rock and s o i l are found. In t h i s area, a q u i f e r s supply up to 70 percent of the d r i n k i n g water (Conrad, 1991). 3.1.2 Chronology of Regulation The UK approach to d e a l i n g w i t h n i t r a t e ; contamination has evolved through three d i s t i n c t phases (Watson-, 1992) .. P r i o r to 1985, there was l i t t l e o f f i c i a l a c t i o n , although i t was known that n i t r a t e l e v e l s were i n c r e a s i n g i n a number of a q u i f e r s . In 1985 the M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e , F i s h e r i e s , and Food (MAFF) published the "Code of Good A g r i c u l t u r a l P r a c t i c e s , " to help farmers meet the requirements of the P o l l u t i o n - Control Act. The Code was voluntary, and contained general g u i d e l i n e s f o r i n o r g a n i c and organic f e r t i l i z e r a p p l i c a t i o n .and storage, but d i d not a c t u a l l y r e s t r i c t t h e i r use ( H i l l e_£ a l . , 1989). The Code was supplemented by advisory l e a f l e t s and booklets on a l l aspects of a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n control,- as w e l l as a telephone i n f o r m a t i o n s e r v i c e . Considerable resources were devoted to b u i l d i n g farmers' c a p a c i t y and enabling them to operate i n a r e s p o n s i b l e manner. The N a t i o n a l Farmers' Union (NFU), a powerful farmers' lobby group, put a good deal of e f f o r t i n t o promoting the Code with t h e i r members. They warned farmers that i f they d i d not comply that "...there can be no question that a future government of any p a r t y would consider more p u n i t i v e c o n t r o l s " (Cox et a l . , 1985, 145). The second phase began i n 1986, w i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a European Community (EC) 50 m g / l i t r e n i t r a t e standard i n d r i n k i n g 31 water (Watson, 1992), and the p r i v a t i s a t i o n of B r i t a i n ' s municipal water supply and sewage treatment system ( H i l l ej; a l . , 1989) . Prior to the EC standard, the UK had used the 100 mg/litre standard set by the World Health Organization. Suddenly, the p r i v a t i z e d water industry found i t s e l f with d r a s t i c a l l y increased costs for water treatment. It was estimated that the cumulative c a p i t a l expenditure to keep water supplies below the. 50 mg/litre l e v e l would cost the equivalent of $400 m i l l i o n (CDN) by 2006 (Watson, 1992, 11.8). A t h i r d development during t h i s time was the idea that nitrate contamination might be reduced as part of the move to reduce farm surpluses i n the EC, through a reduction i n the numbers of livestock raised ( H i l l et a l . , 1989). The t h i r d phase began i n 1989, with the introduction of the Water Act. The act revoked farmer's exemption from prosecution for water p o l l u t i o n offenses, and i t was admitted that the 1985 Code had f a i l e d to contain the growing volume of farm p o l l u t i o n . A new "Code of Good A g r i c u l t u r a l Practice for the Protection of Water" was issued (Seymour e_t. a l . , 1992) . The Act also contained provisions for designating Nitrate Sensitive Areas (NSAs), which are administered by the MAFF. The NSAs were introduced In 1990 for a f i v e year t r i a l period. They involve ten areas, and only, cover about 15,000 hectares. C r i t i c s are concerned since some high n i t r a t e aquifers have been l e f t out of the scheme.. Nine additional areas have been designated as Ni t r a t e Advisory Areas (NAAs). The NAAs cover another 23,000 hectares, and the farmers i n them were subject to a twelve month 32 intensive advisory campaign (Seymour e£. a l . , 1992). In 198 9, the National Rivers Authority (NRA) took over the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for p o l i c i n g water p o l l u t i o n . The NRA i s also responsible for administering new, l e g a l l y defined, mandatory standards for l i q u i d manure f a c i l i t i e s . The standards are complemented by a 50 percent grant for new farm waste f a c i l i t i e s offered by MAFF (Glasbergen, 1992). 3.1.3 The Actors Involved The key players i n n i t r a t e control p o l i c y have been MAFF and the NFU, which for decades after World War Two had a corporatlst r e l a t i o n s h i p . The NFU enjoyed considerable s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n and access to government decision-making, i n exchange for " s e l l i n g " the government's programs and p o l i c i e s to the farming community. Environmental regulations, which would have made farmers answerable to non-agricultural authorities, were "tenaciously r e s i s t e d " (Cox et aj^f 1985,. 141) . Environmental groups, led by Friends of the Earth (FOE) ,. have challenged, the formerly closed p o l i c y network.. In 1986,. FOE formally complained to the EC Commission that the UK was not meeting the water quality d i r e c t i v e ( H i l l e_£. a l . , 1989).. Their "ferocious lobbying," along with the p r i v a t i z a t i o n of the water supply "...transformed n i t r a t e s i n water into a public issue with a high p o l i t i c a l profile"' (Seymour e_t al... 1992, 87) . The water authorities (the p r i v a t i z e d water industry) and the Department of Environment have also been involved, but up to the late 1980s were l a r g e l y excluded from the key bargaining and decision-making 33 processes (Conrad, 1991). 3.1.4 Tactics Used to Deal With Information Gaps In the U.K., there were two debates related to n i t r a t e information gaps. The f i r s t dealt with the v a l i d i t y of the EC n i t r a t e standard, and the second revolved around contrasting explanations of n i t r a t e p o l l u t i o n . A powerful group of a l l i e s downplayed the EC d i r e c t i v e of 50 mg/litre nitrate i n drinking water. A pamphlet published by one of the major f e r t i l i z e r manufacturing firms i n 1986 stated, "No s c i e n t i f i c basis was given and no reference made to new medical evidence i n deciding these l e v e l s " ( H i l l e_£ a l . , 1989, 230) . In 1987, the House of Commons Select Committee on the Environment suggested that the EC be asked for a re-examination of the n i t r a t e p o l l u t i o n level.; The government's Chief Medical O f f i c e r and the NFU saw the d i r e c t i v e as an "arb i t r a r y " l e v e l , and perceived "no r i s k to the population. . .at levels of n i t r a t e up to 100 mg per l i t r e i n drinking water" (Seymour e_£ al.,. 1992, 87). The water authorities also saw no need to favour a " s c i e n t i f i c a l l y unsound" standard. These groups questioned the s c i e n t i f i c status of the arguments used to support the 50 mg/litre l i m i t , and characterized supporters of the l i m i t as " i r r a t i o n a l " (Seymour ejt. a l . , 1992) . Environmental groups were alone i n consistently supporting the 50 mg limit.. They stressed erring on the side of caution i n the li g h t of "inconclusive and scant evidence r e l a t i n g both to stomach cancer and. . .(the) 'blue-baby syndrome 1" (Seymour et a i . , 1992, 89). They also emphasized the detrimental ecological impact of 34 r i s i n g n i t r a t e le v e l s , . and were supported i n t h i s by the government's Nature Conservancy Council. The interested parties also demonstrated a s t r i k i n g lack of consensus i n Identifying the causes of n i t r a t e l e v e l s i n water. Environmental groups saw the r i s i n g use of inorganic nitrogen f e r t i l i z e r s as causally s i g n i f i c a n t , and as proof of r i s i n g concentrations of nitrate i n water sources. They often used terms such as ' a r t i f i c i a l nitrogenous f e r t i l i z e r s , ' "implying that inorganic nitrogen i s 'unnatural' and alien, with t h e i r arguments drawing credence from these pejorative associations" (Seymour et a l . . 1992, 90) . However, this explanation of nitrogen pollution was questioned by government s c i e n t i s t s , f e r t i l i z e r manufacturers, and the NFU. They asserted that inorganic nitrogen only made a n e g l i g i b l e contribution to leaching, and. stressed the "natural" properties: of n i t r a t e . This group claimed that most of the nitrate leaching came from manure and the ploughing of permanent pastures. However, there was a general consensus amongst a l l . the groups over the point that n i t r a t e leaching i s exacerbated by intensive a g r i c u l t u r a l practices. 3.1.5 Description of the Process The B r i t i s h p o l i c y s t y l e r e l i e s on voluntary agreements, i n combination with growing social pressure on farmers to enter these agreements, despite the not very a t t r a c t i v e compensation payments. This p o l i c y style i s based on the history of conservation and "country-side" (e.g. landscape and w i l d l i f e ) issues being the most 35 prominent environmental issues associated with agriculture. The conservation p o l i c y s t y l e has been to r e l y on the voluntary approach rather than on mandatory controls for farmers (Conrad, 1991) . The Codes of Practice were drawn up i n consultation with agricultural, groups. The central pri n c i p l e was that farmers should be persuaded or given incentives to adopt a p a r t i c u l a r kind of conduct, rather than coerced. However, since the National Rivers Authority took over r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for p o l i c i n g water p o l l u t i o n , prosecution i s no longer regarded as a method of l a s t resort. In 1990, 123 farmers were prosecuted i n England and Wales, and the maximum fine was raised from £2,000 to £20,000 (Glasbergen, 1992, 38). The B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l process surrounding n i t r a t e has functioned mainly as private i n t e r a c t i o n and bargaining between, administrative and associated actors. The p o l i c y s t y l e can be characterized as r e l a t i v e l y adversarial (in terms of c o n f l i c t s between environmental and farm interest groups), although there was also a corporatist relationship between government and the farmers. "The problem-solving approach has been slow, incremental, reactive and more short term than long term. P a r t i c i p a t i o n i s narrow, and the openness of the p o l i t i c a l process to the public i s low" (Conrad, 1991, 64). 3.1.6 Effectiveness of the Regulations T r a d i t i o n a l l y , UK agro-environmental p o l i c y has had a number, of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c features: i t has been reactive instead of 36 p r o a c t i v e ; i t h a s i n v o l v e d c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r f a r m e r s ; a n d t h e r e h a s b e e n a p r e f e r e n c e f o r v o l u n t a r y c o m p l i a n c e a n d s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n . I n g e n e r a l , t h e U K i s j u d g e d t o l a g b e h i n d t h e N e t h e r l a n d s a n d o t h e r E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s i n t e r m s o f c o n t r o l l i n g i t s a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n ( B a l d o c k , 1 9 9 2 ) . 3.2 The Netherlands 3 . 2 . 1 B i o p h y s i c a l F a c t o r s T h e N e t h e r l a n d s , o n e o f E u r o p e ' s s m a l l e s t c o u n t r i e s , h a s a b o u t 5 m i l l i o n c o w s , 1 3 m i l l i o n p i g s , a n d 8 5 m i l l i o n c h i c k e n s . T h e p i g s a n d c h i c k e n s a r e r a i s e d i n t e n s i v e l y , a n d f e d m a i n l y i m p o r t e d f o d d e r ( M o e n a n d C r a m e r , 1 9 8 7 ) . F r o m a n - e c o n o m i c p o i n t o f v i e w , t h e N e t h e r l a n d s ' a g r i c u l t u r e h a s b e e n v e r y s u c c e s s f u l . W i t h o n l y 2 . 3 p e r c e n t o f t h e t o t a l c u l t i v a t e d a r e a i n t h e E C , t h e c o u n t r y p r o d u c e s 1 2 . 1 p e r c e n t o f t h e E C ' s m i l k , a n d 1 5 . 1 p e r c e n t o f t h e E C ' s p o r k ( G l a s b e r g e n , 1 9 9 2 , 3 3 ) . H o w e v e r , f r o m a n e c o l o g i c a l p o i n t , o f v i e w , t h e r e , a r e m a j o r p r o b l e m s . O n a p e r h e c t a r e b a s i s , . D u t c h f a r m e r s u s e f a r m o r e f e r t i l i z e r ( i n o r g a n i c a n d o r g a n i c ) t h a t a n y o t h e r c o u n t r y . F o r e x a m p l e , i n t e r m s o f i n o r g a n i c n i t r o g e n f e r t i l i z e r , f a r m e r s i n t h e N e t h e r l a n d s a v e r a g e 2 5 0 k g p e r h e c t a r e . T h i s c o m p a r e s w i t h o n l y 2 4 k g p e r h e c t a r e i n t h e U S . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e N e t h e r l a n d s a d d s a n o t h e r 1 2 0 k g • o f n i t r o g e n p e r h e c t a r e i n t h e f o r m o f m a n u r e ( H u p p e s a n d K a g a n , 1 9 8 9 , 2 2 7 ) . T h e e x c e s s n u t r i e n t s , e s p e c i a l l y n i t r a t e a n d p h o s p h o r u s , h a v e c o n t a m i n a t e d g r o u n d w a t e r a n d c a u s e d s u r f a c e w a t e r e u t r o p h i c a t i o n . I n t h e n e a r f u t u r e , a n . e s t i m a t e d 2 5 p e r c e n t o f t h e g r o u n d w a t e r 3 7 sources i n the most intensively farmed areas (the northeastern and southern parts) w i l l exceed the 50 mg/litre n i t r a t e l i m i t (Glasbergen, 1992). In the areas with the most intensive animal husbandry, "trees have died, drinking water has been spoiled, and formerly abundant species i n nature preserves have become sparse" (Huppes and Kagan, 1989, 227) . In addition, the ammonia from manure, which often bonds with airborne sulphur, i s considered to contribute to about 30 percent of the country's acid rain, and the subsequent s o i l a c i d i f i c a t i o n problem (Moen and Cramer, 1989, 144). 3.2.2 Chronology of Regulation The Netherlands has responded to the problem by regulating manure, but not inorganic f e r t i l i z e r s . In 1985, the Ministry of Agriculture adopted the Interim Act on Intensive Animal Husbandry. The Act. prohibited the growth of e x i s t i n g farms and the introduction of new farms i n areas of intensive pig and. poultry production. Despite the regulation, pig and poultry farming continued to increase. This occurred because municipalities i n areas with intensive agriculture were strongly influenced by farmers' concerns, and "contrary to the rules, permits were allowed i n nearly a l l cases" (Huppes and Kagan, 1989, 238) . The Interim Act was replaced i n 198 6 by the Act on S o i l Conservation and the Act on N u t r i t i o n a l Substances. The Acts, which were developed j o i n t l y by the m i n i s t r i e s of agriculture and environment, l i m i t the amount of manure that can be applied, based on the phosphate content of the manure.. The allowable amount of 38 manure v a r i e s by the type of crop, and d e c l i n e s every f i v e years u n t i l the year 2000 (when the f i n a l standard w i l l be reached). The acts also p r o h i b i t spreading manure i n the winter (Moen and Cramer, 1987). In 1987, the Ground P r o t e c t i o n Act created s p e c i a l groundwater p r o t e c t i o n areas and farmers i n those areas had manure a p p l i c a t i o n l e v e l s that were s t r i c t e r than the n a t i o n a l standard (a form of zoning). Water a u t h o r i t i e s who e x t r a c t water i n these zones pay a fee to the p r o v i n c i a l government. The p r o v i n c i a l government then compensates the farmers f o r the a d d i t i o n a l r e s t r i c t i o n s (Glasbergen, 1992)(Conrad, 1991). Farmers are r e q u i r e d to Keep d e t a i l e d records concerning manure production, use, s a l e s , and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . To f a c i l i t a t e t r a n s p o r t i n g manure to other areas where a surplus does not e x i s t , p r o v i n c i a l "manure banks" have been e s t a b l i s h e d . The government also subsidizes farmers' investment i n manure storage tanks (Huppes and Kagan, 1989). In a d d i t i o n , two taxes have been l e v i e d on manure producers to help finance the manure banks and processing f a c i l i t i e s . The f i r s t i s a progressive tax that Is assessed on purchased fodder. The second tax i s based on the number of animals per hectare, over a c e r t a i n base number. The t a x - f r e e base number of animals roughly corresponds to the amount of manure the farmer i s permitted to spread (Huppes and Kagan, 1989). 3.2.3 The Actors Involved The main actors i n Dutch n i t r a t e p o l i c y were the 39 "Landbouwshap" (the Agriculture Board - a powerful organization of national farmers' unions and a g r i c u l t u r a l trade unions), the association of water company proprietors, environmental groups, and the ministries of agriculture and environment. Although they shared similar interests, there was l i t t l e j o i n t action and lobbying between the environmentalists and the water u t i l i t i e s (Conrad, 1991). In 1989, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries became the M i n i s t r y of Agriculture, Nature Management, and Fisheries. The change has gone beyond that of a mere name change. The ministry has gradually broadened i t s narrow production-oriented perspective. It has loosened i t s t i e s with the "Landbouwshap," and developed closer relations with the Ministry of Environment, and non- a g r i c u l t u r a l interest groups (Frouws and. Van Tatenhove, 1993). 3,2,4 Tactics Used to Deal With Information Gaps In the Netherlands, "information gap" t a c t i c s have focused on how best to deal with the problem of the environmental impacts of n i t r a t e . I n i t i a l warnings about the p o l l u t i n g e ffects of agriculture were sounded i n the late 1960s by a g r i c u l t u r a l researchers and environmental groups. These warnings were denied or minimized by both the farmers' organizations and the Ministry of Agriculture. A range of delaying t a c t i c s were employed by the agricultural policy community to escape environmental regulations. The tactics included "... contesting the Ministry of Environment's competency i n agro-environmental matters, endless demands for further research, and constant arguments against .. environmental 40 l e g i s l a t i o n affecting agriculture" (Frouws and Van Tatenhove, 1993, 224). This defensive strategy was gradually supplemented by an offensive one. "Sustainability" was introduced as an objective of a g r i c u l t u r a l policy, along with competitiveness., Thus, the offensive strategy focused on "... pursuing technical alternatives and solutions for environmental problems to safeguard the future of the a g r i c u l t u r a l industry" (Frouws and Van Tatenhove, 1993, 224) . It was argued that the technical solutions should be developed by the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector i t s e l f , i n consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture, and with governmental support. 3.2.5 Description of the Process T r a d i t i o n a l l y Dutch p o l i t i c s were characterized by consultation, negotiation, and the s t r i v i n g for consensus (Glasbergen, 1992). The search.for compromise that defines Dutch p o l i t i c s makes i t a lengthy process. For example, the Ground Protection Act of 1987 took 15 years to develop, between the f i r s t submission, of a draft version to parliament and the f i n a l introduction of the act (Conrad, 1991). The closed, corporatist a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y community I n i t i a l l y t r i e d to sidestep the n i t r a t e issues i n the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1980s, growing public concern about the environment and the growth of the environmental movement acted as a dr i v i n g force i n the opening up of the a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y community to environmental interests (Glasbergen, 1992.) . 41 3.2.6 Effectiveness of the Regulations Given that the Netherlands has the most elaborate system of regulations, how well are they working? Not surprisingly, Dutch farmers have been able to weaken the regulations' impact. The Department of Agriculture, which has t r a d i t i o n a l l y had a corporatist relationship with the Dutch farming community, enforces the. controls on manure use and sales. Farmers objected to the time-consuming bookkeeping requirements of the detailed manure records and "... engaged i n c o l l e c t i v e destruction of the prescribed forms and lobbied successfully for changes i n recording requirements" (Huppes and Kagan, 1989,, 229) . Consequently, i t i s estimated that the bookkeeping entries only cover about half of the actual manure produced. Dairy farmers are also suspected of using corn f i e l d s to dump excess amounts of manure, 'because unlike pasture, excessive amounts of manure are not as noticeable there (Huppes and Kagan, 1989). The taxes on farm animals and fodder place the largest financial burden on. the pork and poultry producers, even though the t o t a l amount of manure produced by Dutch cows i s a larger source of nitrogen compound emissions. The tax-free base number for the farm animal tax i s high enough to exempt most dairy farms, and dairy farms usually produce at least some of their own fodder (Huppes and Kagan,, 1989) . Huppes and Kagan (1989) trace this inequity to the corporatist structure, of the Dutch farming community. T r a d i t i o n a l l y , producer c o l l e c t i v e s , (e.g. dairy c o l l e c t i v e s ) , performed a variety of 42 functions, including representation i n the major p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . The intensive livestock producers are r e l a t i v e newcomers, and are regarded with suspicion by the rest of the a g r i c u l t u r a l community. Because of t h e i r farms' offensive odours and more v i s i b l e environmental impacts, they have received more public attention. Environmental groups have also c r i t i c i s e d them on e t h i c a l grounds, and lobbied for improved animal welfare 3. The Dutch Department of Agriculture has not rushed to the livestock producers' aid because i t i s concerned about the increasing levels of meat production i n a saturated European market. If environmental regulations lead to a reduction i n livestock, i t would help to deal with the e x i s t i n g meat surpluses. The Department of Agriculture helped to develop the manure regulations- Although this meant they had to p u b l i c l y acknowledge the problem and begin resolving i t (Huppes and Kagan, 1989), the manure surpluses are s t i l l mounting. In the future, the manure appl i c a t i o n standard w i l l probably have to be revised to include the nitrogen content, and not just phosphate lev e l s as at present. This w i l l i nevitably lead to reductions i n livestock numbers (Glasbergen, 1992). 3 Interestingly, environmental groups have chosen not to use l i t i g a t i o n , as. a. means of forcing farmers to comply with, the regulations.. The lack, of action was. not due to lack of funds, as these groups are subsidized by the Dutch government. Rather, they f e l t that " . . . l i t i g a t i o n would have impaired s o c i a l r e lations with the farmers for a long time, while producing only l i m i t e d environmental gains. In the long run (they) f e l t a cooperative attitude might be more constructive" (Huppes and Kagan, 1989, Fn. 13, 238). 43 The Dutch have chosen both proactive and r e a c t i v e p o l i c i e s , as w e l l as both comprehensive and piecemeal problem-solving approaches. The p o l i c y time-frame i s long-term, and the problem p e r c e p t i o n and p o l i c y response have been r a t h e r slow. Given the b a s i c antagonism between a g r i c u l t u r a l and environmental concerns, the degree of i n t e r a c t i o n and p a r t i a l cooperation on both sides i s notable (Conrad, 1991). 3.3 Lessons From the European Experience The European experience w i t h n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n provides a backdrop f o r the experiences i n BC. The information gaps i n the UK were more contentious than they were i n the Netherlands. Perhaps there was l e s s c o n f l i c t i n the Netherlands because the i n t e n s i t y of l i v e s t o c k production, and the l i m i t e d s i z e of the country meant that i t was more obvious where the n i t r a t e l e a c h i n g was coming from. In both countries, p o l i t i c a l pressure from farmer and other a g r i c u l t u r a l groups was a s i g n i f i c a n t force i n the forms of r e g u l a t i o n that were s e l e c t e d . Glasbergen (1992),' a Dutch w r i t e r , suggested there has been an e v o l u t i o n of governance i n n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n . Over time, t h i s e v o l u t i o n changes i n terms of the r e l a t i v e power of the actors i n v o l v e d , the r e l i a n c e on v o l u n t a r y measures, and the degree to which economic or e c o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s are seen as being the most important i n r e g u l a t i n g the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . His d e s c r i p t i v e model c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h i s e v o l u t i o n as having three phases. In the f i r s t phase, awareness develops about a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n , although the s e v e r i t y of the problem (or 44 the perception of i t ) i s usually l i m i t e d . The central feature i s a reliance on voluntary responses on the part of agriculture, and the perspective i s that of public health protection of drinking water. The measures employed "...are c h i e f l y aimed at reducing the harmful effects of farming practices, without questioning the practices themselves" (Glasbergen, 1992,, 41) . The second phase begins when i t becomes obvious that f i r s t - phase controls are not s u f f i c i e n t to contain the problem, es p e c i a l l y i n the face of a g r i c u l t u r a l i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n . This forces a reassessment of the voluntary measures, and new measures are geared to changing the methods of a g r i c u l t u r a l production. Farmers are offered financial compensation to cushion the re s u l t i n g costs. During t h i s phase ecological concepts become more prominent, but "...regulations remain s t r i c t l y within the context of. what i s considered t e c h n i c a l l y and f i n a n c i a l l y f e a s i b l e " (Glasbergen, 1992, 42). In the t h i r d phase farming practices are fundamentally reassessed regarding t h e i r ecological foundations. Instead of strengthening the competitive p o s i t i o n of domestic agriculture, forcing i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n and expansion, the objective i s now to get to the root of the problem. Regulations become s t r i c t e r , and i n some regions, r e s t r i c t i o n s are imposed on a g r i c u l t u r a l production. Glasbergen (1992) argued that the UK has reached the point of t r a n s i t i o n from phase one to phase two. The Netherlands, on the other hand, i s beginning a transition to phase three. Although the two countries are different with regard to the nature and scale of 45 a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n and the type o f government: regulations, t h e i r agro-environmental p o l i c i e s seem to proceed i n the same manner. A common theme i s opposition to far-reaching environmental measures by the Ministry of Agriculture and farmers'' organizations. At the same time, expanding a g r i c u l t u r a l production leads to even greater environmental pressures, which, i n turn overwhelms the modest remedial measures, and weak controls that had previously been conceded. In this way, agro-environmental policy i s making advances through a succession of c r i s e s . The pace of change continues to be dictated by the a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y community but a l l the time the counter-forces are strengthened. In the long run, the a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y community may come under so much external pressure as to run the r i s k of dis i n t e g r a t i o n (Glasbergen, 1992, 47). Understanding the policy development processes used i n the UK and the: Netherlands provides a valuable foundation for studying what i s happening in. BC. Unfortunately, there i s almost no information on the use of negotiation to design p o l i c i e s i n either the UK or the Netherlands. Thus the p o l i c y development process i n both of those countries cannot be rigorously compared with that of BC's. One noticeable difference i s that ENGOs (environmental non- governmental organizations) were not involved i n the development of BC's Code, whereas they did play a role i n both the UK and the Netherlands. Chapter Six begins the look at BC's n i t r a t e p o l i c y development process with a description of the events that lead to the Code's negotiation. 46 CHAPTER FIVE NEGOTIATION IN THE REGULATION OF POLLUTION 1. INTRODUCTION This- chapter discusses negotiation i n the regulation of agricultural pollution. Like other sectors i n Canada, i n s t i t u t i o n s and a g r i c u l t u r a l i n t e r e s t groups have promoted the negotiation of regulations.. This chapter examines the advantages and disadvantages of industry-government negotiation, and ends with some normative c r i t e r i a for evaluating negotiations. These c r i t e r i a are used, l a t e r i n the thesis to evaluate the negotiation of BC's regulation to control manure n i t r a t e s . 2. FACTORS THAT PROMOTE BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION Like other sectors i n Canada, a g r i c u l t u r a l regulation i s dominated by bargaining. In 1980, Andrew Thompson stated unequivocally that "bargaining 1 i s the essence of the environmental regulatory process as i t i s practised i n Canada" (emphasis i n original)(Thompson, 1980, 33). In other words, both the regulations and. the timetables for t h e i r implementation were negotiated with industry, at both the provincial and federal l e v e l s of government. In order to understand how t h i s dependence on bargaining and negotiation evolved, i t i s important to understand 1 The terms bargaining and negotiation are used interchangeably i n this thesis.. The d e f i n i t i o n of bargaining I am using i s "...a process whereby two or more parties attempt to se t t l e what each sh a l l give and take, or perform and receive, i n a transaction between them" (Dorcey, 1986, 68). 47 the s p e c i f i c interests, i n s t i t u t i o n s , and ideas behind t h i s p o l i c y s t y l e (Hoberg, 1993). In e a r l i e r years, the interests involved were industry and government.2 Environmental interests were assumed to be represented by the relevant government agency, rather than by private interest groups. Hoberg (1993, 314)- characterized the power relations within this p o l i c y s t y l e as "... a r e l a t i v e l y weak state, strong business interests, and weak environmental interests." The fear i s that the government becomes "captured" 3 by industry i n t e r e s t s . Industry has considerable influence. Government min i s t r i e s that have direct links to a sp e c i f i c industry are often designed to promote that industry's interests (e.g. BCMAFF and farmers). The industry i s constantly dealt with to ensure compliance, and over time the ministry and the industry develop a rela t i o n s h i p . The. industry has multiple points of access to the legi s l a t i v e - process, both through the d i f f e r e n t levels of government and d i f f e r e n t government departments, and through i t s various trade or commodity organizations. F i n a l l y , the industry's control over investment gives i t the power to threaten divestment i f regulation becomes too stringent. (In the case of agriculture, i t can threaten farm closures which a f f e c t the continuity of r u r a l communities and the 2Now the interests involved are usually multipartite,- and include environmental groups. 3 "Capture" occurs when the agency becomes increasingly influenced by i t s regulated c l i e n t e l e , and loses sight of the broader public i n t e r e s t (Bernstein, 1955). 48 s e c u r i t y o f t h e f o o d s u p p l y . ) A l l o f t h i s I n f l u e n c e l e a d s t o t o u g h , s y m b o l i c l e g i s l a t i o n a n d w e a k e n f o r c e m e n t ( S c h r e c k e r , 1 9 8 4 ) . S c h r e c k e r ( 1 9 8 4 ) o u t l i n e d a n u m b e r o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t o r s t h a t h e l p t o e x p l a i n C a n a d i a n g o v e r n m e n t s " r e l i a n c e o n n e g o t i a t i o n . T h e f i r s t i s C a n a d a ' s l e g i s l a t i v e f r a m e w o r k . C a n a d a ' s s y s t e m o f p a r l i a m e n t a r y g o v e r n m e n t m e a n s t h a t a u t h o r i t y i s c e n t r a l i z e d i n C a b i n e t , w h i c h r e p r e s e n t s a f u s i o n o f b o t h e x e c u t i v e a n d l e g i s l a t i v e f u n c t i o n s . T h u s C a b i n e t d o e s n o t n e e d t o d e v e l o p d e t a i l e d b i l l s , a n d c a n g i v e i t s e l f d i s c r e t i o n i n d e v e l o p i n g a n d i m p l e m e n t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n . D i s c r e t i o n a r y l e g i s l a t i o n ( i . e . l e g i s l a t i o n w r i t t e n i n f a i r l y b r o a d t e r m s ) g i v e s t h e a g e n c y t h e a u t h o r i t y t o I m p l e m e n t t h e r e g u l a t i o n , b u t i t r a r e l y s p e c i f i e s ' t h e c r i t e r i a f o r d e v e l o p i n g r e g u l a t i o n s o r t i m e t a b l e s f o r a c h i e v i n g c e r t a i n o b j e c t i v e s . S o m e t i m e s t h e g o v e r n m e n t c h o o s e s n o t t o u s e e x i s t i n g . p o w e r s , s o a s t o n o t i n c r e a s e f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l t e n s i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y w i t h r e g a r d s t o a r e a s o f o v e r l a p p i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n . M a n y e n v i r o n m e n t a l r e g u l a t i o n s i n v o l v e s e v e r a l d e p a r t m e n t s , a n d m a n y a r e m a d e i n c l o s e d C a b i n e t m e e t i n g s , b a s e d o n m i n i s t e r i a l d i s c r e t i o n ( i . e . t h e M i n i s t e r h a s t h e f i n a l d i s c r e t i o n w h e t h e r t o a p p r o v e t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n o r n o t ) . A n o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t o r i s t h e f r a g m e n t a r y n a t u r e o f C a n a d i a n f e d e r a l i s m . C a n a d i a n e n v i r o n m e n t a l r e g u l a t i o n r e m a i n s d e c e n t r a l i z e d a t t h e p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l , w i t h t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t d e f e r r i n g t o t h e p r o v i n c e s . E v e n w h e n f e d e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n i s c l e a r , b u r e a u c r a t i c f r a g m e n t a t i o n a f f e c t s s t a t e c a p a c i t y . A s a g e n e r a l p o l i c y p r i o r i t y , c o n t r o l l i n g e n v i r o n m e n t a l 4 9 hazards may be at a d i s t i n c t disadvantage i n in.tra- governmental c o n f l i c t s . . . . Departments with r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s for promoting industry . . . may f i n d concerns with (environmental) hazard reduction irrelevant, or even a n t i t h e t i c a l to t h e i r p r i n c i p a l objectives and those of t h e i r major c l i e n t groups (Schrecker, 1984, 14) . The second factor i s that agency resources are often limited. The agency does not have the funds or the s t a f f necessary to c o l l e c t comprehensive data on the environmental impacts of a l l i n d u s t r i e s . Consequently, they depend on industry for t h i s information. Third, i s "how the cards are stacked" i n terms of who i s regulated and who benefits. As Wilson (1992) pointed out, environmental regulation involves d i s t r i b u t e d benefits for society as a whole, and concentrated costs on a small segment of society (i.e. industry). Policy entrepreneurs, those who work on behalf of the unorganized or i n d i f f e r e n t majority, are a. key element i n the adoption of these regulations. Policy entrepreneurs are not as l i k e l y to emerge in Canada, due to p o l i t i c a l party s o l i d a r i t y , the closed decision-making process, and infrequent reliance on c o a l i t i o n b u i l d i n g at the l e g i s l a t i v e l e v e l (Schrecker, 1984). The ideas that supported t h i s type of bargaining and negotiation were, as mentioned above, that the state represents the public int e r e s t i n terms of environmental protection, and that cooperation. - rather than c o n f l i c t - with industry i s valued (Hoberg, 1993). Thompson (1980) and Dorcey (1986) emphasized the role of bargaining i n natural resource management because of increasing 50 c o n f l i c t s amongst stakeholders r e s u l t i n g from knowledge gaps. The government has to deal with three factors that lead to increasing c o n f l i c t : 1)increasing demands for both resource development and resource conservation; 2)increasing complexity i n biophysical, socio-economic and- i n s t i t u t i o n a l systems of natural resources (these systems are complex i n both t h e i r number of parts and t h e i r interrelationships) ;. .and 3) increasing uncertainty i n the knowledge of the systems involved, and how changing one part of a system affects the other parts. Bargaining occurs because of the knowledge gaps and uncertainties that pervade environmental issues, and allows the use of tradeoffs i n resolving those issues. These knowledge gaps "...preclude any process of a more certa i n and precise nature. In effect, bargaining ... i s a substitute for. knowing i n advance what the res u l t should be" (Thompson, 1980, 37) . As discussed i n Chapter Two, these knowledge gaps are exacerbated i n the case of a g r i c u l t u r a l non-point source p o l l u t i o n , and seem to indicate an even greater need for bargaining and negotiation i n n i t r a t e regulation. 3. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF NEGOTIATION There are a number of" advantages and disadvantages for government-industry negotiation. The advantages are mainly pragmatic. Since there i s a lim i t e d pool of resources available for regulatory a c t i v i t y i n Canada, industry can provide advice on technological and economic issues, and provide information on emissions (Nemetz, 1986) . If government bureaucrats have a wide 51 v a r i e t y of l e g a l responses (e.g. tax' subsidies as well as regulations and fines) negotiation provides them with "...the right combination of c a j o l i n g and threats" (Webb, 1990) . Perhaps somewhat o p t i m i s t i c a l l y , Thompson (1980) also argued that bargaining would promote the adoption of s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y within industry, reduce industry resistance to regulation, and ensure the f e a s i b i l i t y of implementation of the negotiated measures. This sense of "ownership" should make industry more l i k e l y to comply with the regulation. Nemetz (1986) and Thompson (1980) also l i s t e d a number of disadvantages. The government may simply be "outgunned" since industry holds most of the information and can hire experts to work f u l l time on presenting t h e i r issues and concerns. The government's c r e d i b i l i t y may be compromised i n the public eye. Environmental groups are concerned that the process has an. apparent bias toward industry input. The "cosy" relationship established between government and industry may hamper government's a b i l i t y to act decisively when faced with signif i c a n t hazards to public health and safety. And f i n a l l y , the option of negotiation may simply be temptation for p o l l u t e r s to delay complying with regulations. Harrison (1995) discovered that t h i s was the case for the Canadian pulp and paper industry. Sixteen years after "standards were developed i n closed negotiations between, federal and p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c i a l s and the industry" (page 226), only 69 percent of m i l l s complied with federal biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) standards on an annual basis, and only 59 percent of m i l l s complied with th e i r 52 t o t a l suspended s o l i d s (T'S'S) l i m i t s (page 238) . Given the disadvantages of negotiation, some f e e l i t i s b e t t e r to d i s c a r d government-industry n e g o t i a t i o n and pursue other p o l i c y s t y l e s (e.g m u l t i - s t a k e h o l d e r n e g o t i a t i o n , l i t i g a t i o n ) (Hbberg, 1993; Schrecker,- 1984) . Others f e e l that industry-government n e g o t i a t i o n i s i n e v i t a b l e , and should be improved (e.g. t r a i n i n g government s t a f f i n n e g o t i a t i o n techniques, developing e f f e c t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n systems, and having more p u b l i c involvement i n the process) (Dorcey, 1986; Thompson, 1980) . This t h e s i s supports the view that these two a l t e r n a t i v e s are not mutually e x c l u s i v e . B i p a r t i t e n e g otiation i s s t i l l a form of negotiation, a l b e i t a more p r a c t i c a l one that r e q u i r e s fewer resources. I t s t i l l i n v o l v e s i d e n t i f y i n g stakeholders and b r i n g i n g together extreme ranges of o p i n i o n . The next s e c t i o n o u t l i n e s an. a n a l y t i c a l framework f o r evaluating the negotiation process, i n c l u d i n g attempts to deal w i t h some of n e g o t i a t i o n ' s c r i t i c i s m s . 4. EVALUATION OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS Negotiated rulemaking i s defined as o c c u r r i n g when ...an agency and other p a r t i e s w i t h a. s i g n i f i c a n t stake i n a r u l e p a r t i c i p a t e i n f a c i l i t a t e d face-to-face i n t e r a c t i o n s designed to produce a consensus. Together the p a r t i e s explore t h e i r shared i n t e r e s t s as w e l l as d i f f e r e n c e s of opin i o n , c o l l a b o r a t e i n gathering and ana l y z i n g t e c h n i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n , generate options, and bargain and trade across these options according to t h e i r d i f f e r i n g p r i o r i t i e s (Susskind and McMahon, 1985, 136- 137) . Negotiated rulemaking began i n the US i n the e a r l y 1980s. The Environmental P r o t e c t i o n Agency (EPA) had a number of reasons f o r wanting to t r y an a l t e r n a t i v e to conventional rulemaking. About 80 53 percent of the rules i t promulgated were challenged i n court, and about 125 EPA staff-years of e f f o r t annually were devoted to managing these cases. The EPA also wanted to see i f they could shorten the time frame i t took to complete regulations (an average of three to f i v e years) (Thomas, 1987) ., The EPA conducted an assessment of i t s negotiated rulemaking a c t i v i t i e s up to the end of 1987 (Kelly, 1989). Their findings included the following p o s i t i v e points: -the rulemaking proposals were more pragmatic i n some respects, and produced better environmental results, than those the EPA would have developed through conventional rulemaking. -the negotiations f a c i l i t a t e d exchanges of information and understandings of the issues i n dispute. For example, i n the negotiation of farmworker health and safety protection standards, many of the participants provided information and insights about "real world" practices and conditions that were very useful i n developing the regulations.. -using negotiation has made the f i n a l rulemaking easier and less c o s t l y . For example, the wood stove performance standards regulation saved the agency about $150,000 i n data c o l l e c t i o n and analysis, and was completed on schedule "...which i s often not the case with EPA rulemakings" (Kelly, 1989, 164). -the negotiations fostered working relationships which have helped some of the participants to work together constructively i n other situations. However, the K e l l y report (1989) was unable to determine i f 54 n e g o t i a t e d r u l e m a k i n g d i d I n d e e d r e s u l t i n a n e t s a v i n g o f E P A r e s o u r c e s , a n d w h e t h e r t h e r i s k o f l i t i g a t i o n i s r e d u c e d . I n a d d i t i o n , s o m e n o n - E P A p a r t i c i p a n t s h a d s o m e r e s e r v a t i o n s a b o u t t h e p r o c e s s . O n e c o n c e r n w a s t h a t t h e p r e s s u r e t o r e a c h c o n s e n s u s m a k e s p e o p l e u n c o m f o r t a b l e , a n d c o u l d r e s u l t i n " w e a k e r " r e g u l a t i o n s . A n o t h e r o f t e n - v o i c e d c o n c e r n , : b y b o t h l a r g e a n d s m a l l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , w a s t h e a m o u n t o f t i m e r e q u i r e d f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n . O v e r a l l , t h e r e p o r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t n e g o t i a t e d r u l e m a k i n g w a s s u i t a b l e f o r t h e s e l e c t n u m b e r o f s i t u a t i o n s t h a t m e t t h e c r i t e r i a ( d i s c u s s e d i n t h e n e x t p a r a g r a p h ) . A l t h o u g h a b i p a r t i t e n e g o t i a t i o n b e t w e e n i n d u s t r y a n d g o v e r n m e n t i s n o t e x a c t l y t h e s a m e a s a m u l t i p a r t i t e n e g o t i a t e d r u l e m a k i n g , t h e n o r m a t i v e c r i t e r i a f o r a s u c c e s s f u l n e g o t i a t i o n a r e l a r g e l y t h e s ame , f o r b o t h . I n h i s s e m i n a l a r t i c l e , H a r t e r . ( 1 9 8 2 , 4 5 - 6 7 ) l i s t e d c r i t e r i a r e l a t e d t o c o n d i t i o n s a n d p a r t i c i p a n t s t h a t w o u l d i m p r o v e t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f s u c c e s s f u l r u l e m a k i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s . T h e c o n d i t i o n s i n c l u d e d t h e f o l l o w i n g n i n e c r i t e r i a : 1 . C o u n t e r v a i l i n g p o w e r . I f a n y p a r t y h a s t h e p o w e r t o a c t u n i l a t e r a l l y a n d c o n t r o l t h e o u t c o m e , t h e n n e g o t i a t i o n i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e . W h i l e g o v e r n m e n t h a s t h i s p o w e r i n t h e o r y , t h e f a c t o r s t h a t p r o m o t e b a r g a i n i n g a n d n e g o t i a t i o n m a k e i t d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t t o u n i l a t e r a l l y e x e r c i s e i t s p o w e r i n p r a c t i c e . 2 . L i m i t e d n u m b e r o f p a r t i e s . I n o r d e r t o h a v e t h e n e c e s s a r y g i v e a n d t a k e o n i s s u e s a n d p o s i t i o n s , H a r t e r f e l t t h a t t h e n u m b e r o f p a r t i c i p a n t s s h o u l d 5 5 be lim i t e d to fewer than f i f t e e n . After experience with a number of negotiated rulemaking e f f o r t s , i t was discovered that up to 25 participants was workable (Pritzker and Dalton, 1990) . 3. Mature/"ripe" issues. Mature issues are those i n which the parties should have stopped jockeying for po s i t i o n (e.g. l i n i n g up p o l i t i c a l support, building a media campaign), and the issues should have been c l a r i f i e d s u f f i c i e n t l y to permit resolution. In other words, the issues should be c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e d , and the parties should have s u f f i c i e n t Information on the issues. 4. I n e v i t a b i l i t y of decision. Negotiations are l i k e l y to work best i f a l l parties believe a decision i s inevitable, or better yet, imminent. "The most favorable climate for negotiation occurs when a l l p a r t i e s believe there i s some urgency for reaching a decision" (Harter, 1982, 47) . 5. Opportunity for gain. Negotiation i s not l i k e l y to be successful i n "zero sum game" situations, i n which one party wins only to the extent that another loses. The dispute must be transformable into a "win/win" s i t u a t i o n so that a l l parties are better o f f for having negotiated, or at least, the gainers must be able to compensate the losers. 6. Fundamental values. The dispute should not only concern or be dominated by 56 f u n d a m e n t a l v a l u e c h o i c e s ( e . g . i s s u e s t h a t i n v o l v e s t r o n g l y h e l d m o r a l o r e t h i c a l b e l i e f s ) . F o r e x a m p l e , a b o r t i o n r i g h t s o r c a p i t a l p u n i s h m e n t a r e n o t s u i t a b l e i s s u e s f o r n e g o t i a t i o n , a s t h e y a r e v a l u e l a d e n a n d t h e r e i s n o r o o m , f o r c o m p r o m i s e o r c o l l a b o r a t i v e p r o b l e m s o l v i n g . 7 . P e r m i t t i n g t r a d e o f f s - T h e r e m u s t b e m u l t i p l e i s s u e s " o n t h e t a b l e , " t o p e r m i t t r a d e o f f s s o t h a t t h e p a r t i e s c a n m a x i m i z e t h e i r o v e r a l l i n t e r e s t s . I s s u e s i n n e g o t i a t e d r u l e m a k i n g s i t u a t i o n s t h a t a l l o w t r a d e o f f s i n c l u d e " t h e e x t e n t o f t h e p r o b l e m , t h e s t r i n g e n c y o f t h e r e s p o n s e , t h e m a n n e r o f c o m p l i a n c e , t h e c o m p o n e n t s o f t h e r e g u l a t i o n , a n d t h e d a t e o f i m p l e m e n t a t i o n " ( H a r t e r , 1 9 8 2 ' , 5 0 ) . 8 . R e s e a r c h n o t d e t e r m i n a t i v e o f o u t c o m e . N e g o t i a t i o n m a y n o t b e a p p r o p r i a t e f o r r e g u l a t i o n s r e q u i r i n g b a s i c r e s e a r c h . T h i s i s b e c a u s e c e r t a i n r e s e a r c h r e s u l t s m a y d i c t a t e a p a r t i c u l a r r e g u l a t o r y r e s u l t , a n d p a r t i e s m a y n o t w i s h t o c o m m i t t h e m s e l v e s i n a d v a n c e t o a c c e p t i n g t h e r e s u l t s o f s u c h r e s e a r c h , t h u s , n e g o t i a t i o n m a y b e i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r r e g u l a t i o n s " . . . w h e n f u n d a m e n t a l r e s e a r c h i s n e c e s s a r y , t h e o u t c o m e i s i n s u b s t a n t i a l d o u b t , a n d t h e o u t c o m e w o u l d d i c t a t e t h e r e g u l a t o r y r e s u l t " ( H a r t e r , 1 9 8 2 , 5 1 ) . H o w e v e r , n e g o t i a t i o n s a r e a p p r o p r i a t e w h e n r e s e a r c h w o u l d o p e n u p a r a n g e o f r e g u l a t o r y a l t e r n a t i v e s , o r w h e r e p a r t i e s c a n a g r e e o n w h a t r e s e a r c h i s n e e d e d , a n d t h e p r o t o c o l f o r t h e r e s e a r c h , a s a f i r s t s t e p . 5 7 9 . A g r e e m e n t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . P a r t i e s m a y b e u n w i l l i n g t o I n v e s t t h e r e s o u r c e s n e e d e d t o r e a c h a n a g r e e m e n t i f I m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h a t a g r e e m e n t i s u n l i k e l y . P a r t i e s m u s t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e a g e n c y w i l l u s e t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e a g r e e m e n t a s t h e b a s i s o f p u b l i c p o l i c y . S i n c e H a r t e r w r o t e h i s p a p e r , , a n u m b e r o f n e g o t i a t e d r u l e m a k i n g e f f o r t s h a v e b e e n c o m p l e t e d . O n t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e s , a n u m b e r o f a u t h o r s h a v e a d d e d f u r t h e r c r i t e r i a f o r s u c c e s s : 1 0 . A g e n c y r o l e . T h e a g e n c y s p o n s o r i n g a n e g o t i a t e d r u l e m a k i n g s h o u l d t a k e p a r t i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s . T h i s r e d u c e s t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r p a r t i e s t o u n d e r m i n e t h e n e g o t i a t i n g p r o c e s s b y m a k i n g " e n d r u n s " t o t h e a g e n c y ( P e r r i t t , 1 9 8 6 ) , a n d p r o m o t e s r e a l i s t i c e x p e c t a t i o n s o f w h a t f i n a l r u l e w i l l b e a c c e p t a b l e ( P e r r i t t , 1 9 8 7 ) . 1 1 . R o l e o f a m e d i a t o r / f a c i l i t a t o r . T h e a g e n c y s h o u l d s e l e c t a s k i l l e d m e d i a t o r / f a c i l i t a t o r t o a s s i s t t h e n e g o t i a t i n g g r o u p i n r e a c h i n g a n a g r e e m e n t ( P e r r i t t , 1 9 8 6 ) . 1 2 . D i s t r i b u t i o n o f c o s t s ' a n d b e n e f i t s . T h e n a t u r e o f t h e r e g u l a t i o n i n f l u e n c e s t h e i n t e n s i t y o f s t a k e h o l d e r f e e l i n g . P r o g r a m s t h a t c o n c e n t r a t e b o t h b e n e f i t s a n d c o s t s a r e b e t t e r c a n d i d a t e s f o r n e g o t i a t i o n b e c a u s e i t i s e a s i e r t o m o b i l i z e s t a k e h o l d e r s f o r b a r g a i n i n g w h e n t h e i n t e r e s t g r o u p s a r e f e w i n n u m b e r a n d n a r r o w i n s c o p e 5 8 ( P e r r i t t , 1 9 8 6 ) . 1 3 . B A T N A ( B e s t A l t e r n a t i v e t o a N e g o t i a t e d A g r e e m e n t ) . S u s s k i n d a n d M c M a h o n ( 1 9 8 5 ) a d d e d t h e c r i t e r i o n o f a " B A T N A . " P a r t i e s w i l l o n l y c o m e t o t h e t a b l e i f t h e y b e l i e v e t h a t t h e n e g o t i a t i o n w i l l p r o d u c e a n o u t c o m e t h a t i s a s g o o d a s o r b e t t e r t h a n t h e o u t c o m e t h e y c o u l d a c h i e v e f r o m o t h e r a v a i l a b l e m e t h o d s , i n c l u d i n g t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e m a k i n g p r o c e s s e s . T h e B A T N A c o n c e p t w a s d e v e l o p e d b y F i s h e r a n d U r y ( 1 9 8 1 ) . Two e f f e c t i v e B A T N A s u s e d i n t h e U . S . h a v e b e e n t h a t i f t h e p a r t i e s d o n o t a g r e e t o n e g o t i a t e a r u l e e i t h e r t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t w i l l s e t a d e a d l i n e t o c o m e o u t w i t h a r u l e o f I t s o w n ( c r e a t i n g a C r i t e r i o n F o u r s i t u a t i o n ) ; o r , i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a f e d e r a l r u l e , t h e r e w i l l b e a p a t c h w o r k o f s t a t e r u l e s ( S t a n f i e l d , 1 9 8 6 ) . 1 4 . S e t t i n g a. d e a d l i n e . A d e a d l i n e f o r c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i l l h e l p t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s t o k e e p m o v i n g t o w a r d a r e s o l u t i o n a t a n e f f i c i e n t p a c e ( P r i t z k e r a n d D a l t o n , 1 9 9 0 ) . W i t h o u t d e a d l i n e s , t h e n e g o t i a t i o n c a n b e u s e d b y s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s a s p a r t o f a s t r a t e g y o f d e l a y ( D o n i g e r , 1 9 9 0 ) . H a r t e r ( 1 9 8 2 ) a l s o d e v e l o p e d t w o c r i t e r i a t o d e t e r m i n e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p a r t i c i p a n t s f o r n e g o t i a t e d r u l e m a k i n g : 1 5 . Who s h o u l d p a r t i c i p a t e . T h i s p o i n t r e l a t e s t o i d e n t i f y i n g t h e a p p r o p r i a t e I n t e r e s t s t o b e r e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e t a b l e , a n d i d e n t i f y i n g i n d i v i d u a l s w h o w i l l r e p r e s e n t t h o s e i n t e r e s t s . A p p r o p r i a t e p a r t i c i p a n t s r e p r e s e n t a l l t h e g r o u p s w h o h a v e a n i n t e r e s t i n , o r w i l l b e a f f e c t e d b y t h e o u t c o m e o f t h e d e c i s i o n ( P r i t z k e r a n d D a l t o n , 1 9 9 0 ) . T h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s m u s t h a v e e n o u g h d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g a u t h o r i t y i n t h e c o n s t i t u e n c y t h e y r e p r e s e n t t o m a k e d e c i s i o n s w i t h o u t c o n s t a n t l y h a v i n g t o c h e c k w i t h t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s f i r s t . F r e q u e n t l y , t h e m o s t d i f f i c u l t j o b i n v o l v e s a c h i e v i n g t h e a g r e e m e n t s b e t w e e n n e g o t i a t o r s a n d t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s , r a t h e r t h a n a g r e e m e n t s b e t w e e n n e g o t i a t o r s ( P e r r i t t , , 1 9 8 6 ) . 1 6 . F i n a n c i n g t h e e n t e r p r i s e . T h o s e i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s w h o m a y h a v e d i f f i c u l t y p a r t i c i p a t i n g d u e t o l a c k o f f u n d s s h o u l d h a v e t h e i r e x p e n s e s d e f r a y e d . T h i s i s b e c a u s e p a r t i c i p a t i o n b y a l l i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s i s e s s e n t i a l t o s u p p o r t t h e p o l i t i c a l l e g i t i m a c y o f a n e g o t i a t e d r u l e . T h e s e c r i t e r i a a r e u s e d t o e v a l u a t e t h e n e g o t i a t i o n o f B . C . ' s n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n . T h e r e s u l t s a r e p r e s e n t e d i n C h a p t e r E i g h t . 5 . NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION A s m e n t i o n e d i n S e c t i o n T h r e e , o n e o f t h e h y p o t h e s i z e d a d v a n t a g e s o f n e g o t i a t i o n i s h i g h e r c o m p l i a n c e r a t e s d u e t o f e e l i n g s o f " o w n e r s h i p " o f t h e n e g o t i a t e d a g r e e m e n t . • W h e n c o n s e n s u s i s a c h i e v e d , p a r t i c i p a n t s t e n d t o a c q u i r e a n i n t e r e s t i n s e e i n g t h e p r o c e s s s u c c e e d , s i n c e t h e y f e e l t h e y h a v e a s t a k e i n t h e r e s u l t i n g r e g u l a t i o n ( P r i t z k e r a n d D a l t o n , 1 9 9 0 ) . 4 A m i n o r e m p h a s i s o f t h i s t h e s i s w i l l b e t o e v a l u a t e , f r o m t h e s t a k e h o l d e r s ' 4 A s m e n t i o n e d p r e v i o u s l y , H a r r i s o n ( 1 9 9 5 ) a r g u e s t h a t t h i s w a s t t h e c a s e f o r t h e C a n a d i a n p u l p a n d p a p e r i n d u s t r y . 6 0 p e r s p e c t i v e s , w h e t h e r t h e n e g o t i a t i o n o f B . C . ' s n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n h a s a f f e c t e d t h e f a r m e r s ' i n c e n t i v e t o c o m p l y w i t h t h e r e g u l a t i o n . 6. C O N C L U S I O N P a r t One o f t h e t h e s i s h a s w o v e n t o g e t h e r t w o c o m p l e m e n t a r y f a c t o r s t h a t make n i t r a t e p o l l u t i o n f r o m m a n u r e d i f f i c u l t t o r e g u l a t e : n i t r a t e - r e l a t e d i n f o r m a t i o n g a p s a n d t h e p o l i t i c a l p o w e r o f t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y c o m m u n i t y . T h e s e t w o f a c t o r s w e r e d i s c u s s e d i n g e n e r a l t e r m s , a n d t h e n h i g h l i g h t e d i n a r e v i e w o f t h e n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n s d e v e l o p e d i n t h e UK a n d t h e N e t h e r l a n d s . The U K ' s r e g u l a t i o n s a r e n o t a s s o p h i s t i c a t e d a s t h o s e o f t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , a n d h a v e f o c u s e d more o n v o l u n t a r y c o m p l i a n c e . The UK h a s h a d m o r e d e b a t e o v e r n i t r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n g a p s , s p e c i f i c a l l y o v e r t h e EC n i t r a t e s t a n d a r d f o r d r i n k i n g w a t e r , a n d o v e r t h e c a u s e s o f r i s i n g n i t r a t e l e v e l s i n w a t e r . The p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s s u r r o u n d i n g n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n h a s f u n c t i o n e d m a i n l y a s p r i v a t e b a r g a i n i n g b e t w e e n , t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n d i n f l u e n t i a l a g r i c u l t u r a l i n t e r e s t g r o u p s . The N e t h e r l a n d s h a s m o r e i n t e n s i v e l i v e s t o c k p r o d u c t i o n , a n d m o r e s e v e r e e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s f r o m a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n . N o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e D u t c h h a d l e s s d e b a t e o v e r n i t r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n g a p s , a n d more s t r i n g e n t r e g u l a t i o n s . E v e n t h o u g h t h e D u t c h p o l i c y p r o c e s s f o c u s e s m o r e o n n e g o t i a t i o n a n d c o n s e n s u s b u i l d i n g t h a n t h e U K ' s p o l i c y p r o c e s s , t h e c o r p o r a t i s t a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y c o m m u n i t y was a b l e t o w e a k e n t h e r e g u l a t i o n s ' i m p a c t . E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s s eem t o move t h r o u g h a t h r e e p h a s e e v o l u t i o n o f g o v e r n a n c e i n n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n . G l a s b e r g e n (1992) 61 s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e U K h a s r e a c h e d t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m p h a s e o n e t o p h a s e t w o . T h e B r i t i s h h a v e r e a l i z e d t h a t v o l u n t a r y m e a s u r e s a r e riot s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n t a i n t h e p r o b l e m , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e f a c e o f a g r i c u l t u r a l i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n . G l a s b e r g e n a l s o p r o p o s e d t h a t t h e N e t h e r l a n d s i s b e g i n n i n g a t r a n s i t i o n t o p h a s e t h r e e . F a r m i n g p r a c t i c e s a r e b e i n g r e a s s e s s e d i n t e r m s o f t h e i r e c o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s , a n d r e g u l a t i o n s a r e b e c o m i n g m u c h s t r i c t e r . I n d u s t r y - g o v e r n m e n t n e g o t i a t i o n o f r e g u l a t i o n i s w i d e s p r e a d a c r o s s C a n a d a . I h a v e a r g u e d t h a t , g i v e n t h e n i t r a t e - r e l a t e d i n f o r m a t i o n g a p s a n d t h e p o l i t i c a l p o w e r o f t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y c o m m u n i t y , i n d u s t r y - g o v e r n m e n t n e g o t i a t i o n o f n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n i n B . C . w a s p r a c t i c a l l y i n e v i t a b l e . G i v e n t h a t s o m e f o r m o f n e g o t i a t i o n i s I n e v i t a b l e , g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d e n s u r e i t s p r o d u c t i v i t y . O n e w a y t o e v a l u a t e i t s p r o d u c t i v i t y i s b y c o m p a r i n g t h e . p r o c e s s t o c r i t e r i a r e l a t e d t o i t s c o n d i t i o n s a n d p a r t i c i p a n t s . T h i s p a r t o f t h e t h e s i s h a s c r e a t e d a c o n t e x t f o r t h e r e s e a r c h r e s u l t s t o b e d i s c u s s e d i n P a r t T h r e e ( C h a p t e r s E i g h t a n d N i n e ) . T h e r e s e a r c h r e s u l t s w i l l s h o w w h e r e B C i s i n t h e t h r e e p h a s e e v o l u t i o n o f n i t r a t e g o v e r n a n c e . T h e r e s u l t s w i l l a l s o d e t e r m i n e t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h n i t r a t e - r e l a t e d i n f o r m a t i o n g a p s a n d t h e p o l i t i c a l p o w e r o f t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y c o m m u n i t y p l a y e d a r o l e i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n o f n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n . F i n a l l y , t h e r e s u l t s w i l l e v a l u a t e t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f B C ' s n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n n e g o t i a t i o n ; a n d s e c o n d a r i l y , t h e i n f l u e n c e t h e n e g o t i a t i o n h a s h a d o n i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . 62 PART TWO INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDY AND METHODS 63 CHAPTER SIX A CASE STUDY OF NITRATE REGULATION IN BC 1. INTRODUCTION T h e s e c o n d p a r t o f t h i s t h e s i s i n t r o d u c e s t h e c a s e s t u d y o f n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n i n B C ( C h a p t e r S i x ) , - . a n d t h e n l i n k s t h e r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n s t o t h e r e s e a r c h m e t h o d s s e l e c t e d ( C h a p t e r S e v e n ) . 2. BACKGROUND A n u m b e r o f f a c t o r s l e d u p t o t h e C o d e ' s d e v e l o p m e n t i n B C . T h e s e f a c t o r s i n c l u d e d a g r o w i n g a w a r e n e s s o f t h e i m p a c t s o f e x c e s s i v e m a n u r e u s e , a n d t h e p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m y o f . a g r i c u l t u r e i n t h e p r o v i n c e . T h e n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s t h a t w a s u s e d t o d e v e l o p t h e C o d e w a s i n f l u e n c e d b y t h e p o l i t i c a l p o w e r o f t h e m a i n f a r m l o b b y g r o u p i n t h e p r o v i n c e . T h i s g r o u p w a s a l s o a b l e t o i n f l u e n c e h o w t h e C o d e i s e n f o r c e d . 2 . 1 Nutrient Impacts M o d e r n a g r i c u l t u r e , w i t h i t s i n t e n s i v e p r o d u c t i o n p r a c t i c e s , h a s b e e n i m p l i c a t e d i n m a n y e n v i r o n m e n t a l i m p a c t s , a s d i s c u s s e d g e n e r a l l y i n C h a p t e r Two a n d v a r i o u s l y e v i d e n t i n . B C . F o r e x a m p l e , o n e o f t h e m a j o r i m p a c t s h a s b e e n e x c e s s n u t r i e n t s i n g r o u n d w a t e r a n d s u r f a c e w a t e r . N i t r o g e n a n d p h o s p h o r u s l o a d i n g s f r o m a g r i c u l t u r e c a n r e d u c e a v a i l a b l e o x y g e n i n w a t e r , a n d t h i s h a s r e s u l t e d i n . f i s h k i l l s i n t h e S e r p e n t i n e , N i c o m e k l a n d S u m a s R i v e r s ( E n v i r o n m e n t C a n a d a a n d B C M E L P , 1 9 9 2 ) . N i t r a t e c o n t a m i n a t i o n h a s a l s o b e e n d e t e c t e d i n w e l l w a t e r i n t h e L o w e r F r a s e r V a l l e y , t h e O k a n a g a n a n d t h e K o o t e n a y s ( B C M E L P a n d E n v i r o n m e n t C a n a d a , 1 9 9 3 ) . 64 Contamination of the Abbotsford A q u i f e r i n . t h e Lower Fraser V a l l e y i l l u s t r a t e s the p o t e n t i a l seriousness of emerging problems. The a q u i f e r i s an important source of. d r i n k i n g water, and Is probably the most p u b l i c i z e d case of n i t r a t e contamination. There are i n excess of 500 water w e l l s i n the re g i o n , and the a q u i f e r also supplies the m u n i c i p a l i t i e s of Abbotsford and Matsqui, and the Fraser V a l l e y Trout Hatchery. Water usage can be broken down i n t o i n d u s t r i a l ( i n c l u d i n g the Hatchery) (41 percent), municipal (34 p e r c e n t ) , i r r i g a t i o n (21 percent),, and domestic (4 percent) (Liebscher e_£ a l . . 1992) . I t i s important to note that p a r t s of the Abbotsford A q u i f e r already have concentrations of n i t r a t e - n i t r o g e n that exceed the 45 mg/1 maximum allowable c o n c e n t r a t i o n l i m i t . However, i n the l a s t 10 years, there has only been one reported case of methaemoglobinaemia. The case occurred i n Langley. The fami l y ' s w e l l water contained 65 mg/1 n i t r a t e , and was located downhill from a manure p i l e . Undoubtedly other cases have been prevented by the a c t i o n s of l o c a l Health U n i t s and p h y s i c i a n s . They r o u t i n e l y advise pregnant women and new mothers to have t h e i r w e l l water t e s t e d , and to use b o t t l e d water f o r mixing i n f a n t formula i f the family's d r i n k i n g water i s at r i s k ( M i n i s t r y of Health respondent) . P r e c i p i t a t i o n i s the p r i n c i p a l source of recharge f o r the aquifer, and much of t h i s water passes through a g r i c u l t u r a l s o i l s . Consequently, the nature and amount of agrochemicals present i n the s o i l w i l l a f f e c t the q u a l i t y of the groundwater below. In south coas t a l BC, the greatest r i s k of n i t r a t e leaching occurs during the 65 f a l l and winter with the heavy r a i n s . This i s because any r e s i d u a l i n o r g a n i c n i t r o g e n i n the s o i l a f t e r the growing season can be n i t r i f i e d and leached over the winter (Kowalenko, 1987b). Exposed manure s t o c k p i l e s , manure s o i l enhancement ( i . e . to i n c r e a s e s o i l organic matter), s e p t i c tank e f f l u e n t , a i r p o r t de- i c i n g urea formaldehyde, s o i l n i t r a t e m i n e r a l i z a t i o n , and manure and chemical f e r t i l i z e r s are a l l sources, of contamination to the 7Abbotsford a q u i f e r . While the sources of contamination of the a q u i f e r are reasonably w e l l understood, the mechanisms and degree of contamination from each of these sources remains unknown (Liebscher eJt a l . , 1992). Thus the information, gaps on the e f f e c t s of manure n i t r a t e s , and the u n c e r t a i n t i e s of n i t r a t e l e a c h i n g i n t h i s area t y p i f y the u n c e r t a i n t i e s mentioned i n Chapter Two. The n i t r a t e contamination of the a q u i f e r has i n t e r n a t i o n a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , i n terms of the Boundary Waters Treaty (1909). The Abbotsford A q u i f e r extends across the Canada-U.S. border, and the p o l l u t i o n from the Canadian h a l f i s flowing south i n t o the American h a l f . This v i o l a t e s the Treaty, which s t a t e s that "water f l o w i n g across the boundary s h a l l not be p o l l u t e d on e i t h e r s ide to the i n j u r y of health and property on the other si d e " (Munro, 1992, Bl) . 2.2 The P o l i t i c a l Economy of Agriculture i n BC The p o l i t i c a l economy of a g r i c u l t u r e i n BC also influenced the Code's development. Since 1941, farm numbers have decreased i n B r i t i s h Columbia (except f o r the decade 1971-1981) . At the same time, there has been a steady increase i n the average s i z e of farm u n i t s (except again f o r 1971-1981). These changes are g e n e r a l l y 66 attributed to increased mechanization of agriculture, and the substitution of c a p i t a l for labour. Farm incomes have been very unstable as a res u l t of uncertain and often declining prices received for farm products, and the increasing costs of farm inputs. In the 1986 census, 51.1 percent of BC farmers reported off-farm work (Hay and Basran, 1988, 15). Along with farm expansion came the trend towards greater s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . These changes, coupled with new crop v a r i e t i e s and management practices, have resulted i n increased productivity. However, these developments have also been accompanied by increased environmental impacts, such as contaminated bodies of water (as described i n the previous section). Because of BC's rugged topography, li m i t e d a g r i c u l t u r a l land base, and the agriculture Industry's v u l n e r a b i l i t y to developments outside i t s borders, BC farmers face some unique problems. One problem i s higher-than-average production costs due to transportation costs. These costs are incurred i n moving c a t t l e from the i n t e r i o r to other provinces to be finished, and transporting f r u i t from the Okanagan to out-of-province markets. Another problem facing BC farmers i s high land values (as a.result of a limited agricultural land base and speculation on a g r i c u l t u r a l land for developmental purposes) . This not only drives up production costs, but also makes i t d i f f i c u l t for young farmers to enter farming (Skogstad, 1987). In addition, the expanding suburbs have meant that farmers and municipalities have had to deal with increasing complaints of odours and noise emanating from nearby 67 farms (Wood, 1987). The t h i r d problem i s the competition from lower-priced American f r u i t and vegetables which reach the market e a r l i e r than BC produce (Skogstad, 1987). American farmers a l s o have the advantage of a wider v a r i e t y of p e s t i c i d e s to choose from. BC farmers f e e l that the more r e s t r i c t e d number of p e s t i c i d e s r e g i s t e r e d f o r use i n Canada l i m i t s t h e i r options i n disease and pest c o n t r o l , and puts them at a competitive disadvantage ( E g r i , 1993) .. However, BC farmers also have a p o l i t i c a l advantage. Skogstad (1987) notes that the intense competition between the two h i s t o r i c a l l y dominant p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s (the New Democratic Party and the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party) has meant that the p a r t i e s cannot a f f o r d to a l i e n a t e any i n t e r e s t groups. She speculates that t h i s competition "...has probably given BC producers a c l o u t beyond what t h e i r meagre 1.9 percent of the p o p u l a t i o n would warrant" (34). 2.3 The BCFA As An Interest Group As discussed i n Chapters Three and Four, farm lobby groups tend to c a r r y considerable p o l i t i c a l c l o u t . The BC Federation of A g r i c u l t u r e (BCFA) i s no exception. The BCFA was founded i n 1935. The BCFA's mission " i s to ensure that farmers can earn a l i v i n g from farming and that BC's a g r i c u l t u r e i n d u s t r y remains economically v i a b l e over the long term" (BCFA, 1991, 6). They lobby p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c y makers d i r e c t l y , and f e d e r a l p o l i c y makers through t h e i r membership i n the Canadian Federation of A g r i c u l t u r e . 68 The BGFA i s the largest, and most important umbrella farm organization i n the province, with 58 commodity association members and seven regional farmers' i n s t i t u t e s . 1 In 1992 i t was estimated that the BCFA represented 8,000 of the province's 8,500 farmers (Egri, 1993, 401). However, i n 1993, the BC Cattlemen's Ass o c i a t i o n (BCCA) voted to leave the BCFA. The BCCA f e l t t h e i r membership fees could be better spent, and that they were powerful enough to lobby the government on t h e i r own. The withdrawal of t h i s large and powerful commodity association meant the loss of about 25 percent of the BCFA's membership, as well as a s i g n i f i c a n t part of t h e i r finances and lobbying power (Egri, 1993) . Traditionally, the BCFA has had strong ties- with BCMAFF. This was displayed after the creation of the ALR i n 1972. Many farmers feared an immediate decrease i n t h e i r land values, and f e l t deprived of the major source of their, retirement income. The BCFA lobbied for, and obtained, a farm income s t a b i l i z a t i o n program (The Farm Income Assurance Act), "the most generous of i t s kind i n North America i n terms of raising and s t a b i l i z i n g farm prices" (Skogstad, 1987, 62). The BCFA was further entrusted with a large degree of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for administering the program. Skogstad (1987) attributes the BCFA's influence to the "open c l i e n t e l e " r elationship between BCMAFF and the farmers. This xAt the time of the Code's negotiation, the BCFA included 55 member commodity associations. These commodity groups encompassed the diverse range of crops and livestock grown i n the province. Examples of the commodities included berries, eggs, c a t t l e , poultry, vegetables, tree f r u i t s , sheep, grain, dairy, and h o r t i c u l t u r a l crops (BCFA, 1991). 69 r e l a t i o n s h i p i s based on the t r a d i t i o n a l concept that the m i n i s t r y i s there to serve and help farmers. Thus the BCFA enjoys " r e g u l a r c o n s u l t a t i o n and close contact i n the f o r m u l a t i o n of p o l i c y " (64). Although t h i s arrangement provides the farming community wi t h s e v e r a l advantages, i t can a l s o be a double-edged sword. In the past, i n d i v i d u a l farmers have come to the BCFA f o r support concerning a s p e c i f i c problem w i t h BCMAFF. The BCFA was r e l u c t a n t to become i n v o l v e d f o r "fear that i t s involvement might harm i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p with the m i n i s t r y i n a general sense, or jeopardize a s p e c i f i c attempt to execute a p l a n which would b e n e f i t the t o t a l i n d u s t r y " (Shoop, 1979, 88). 3. CHRONOLOGY OF THE CODE'S DEVELOPMENT In the e a r l y to mid-1980's, the BC M i n i s t r y of Environment, Lands and Parks (BCMELP) became concerned about the vagueness of the wording of Section 11 of the Waste Management Act. In Section 11, farmers were exempted from having to get permits f o r waste d i s p o s a l f o r " a l l discharges of p l a n t and animal waste emanating from t r a d i t i o n a l farming operations which are managed and a p p l i e d i n a reasonable manner" (BCMAFF Memo, September 28, 1989). At that time, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l waste management was given to l o c a l a g r i c u l t u r a l a ssociations with the assistance of BCMAFF personnel. This program was known as the A g r i c u l t u r a l Environmental Service (AES). BCMELP personnel only got involved i f the combination of peer pressure and BCMAFF a c t i o n could not achieve p o l l u t i o n abatement. "A s i g n i f i c a n t degree of success (was) achieved by t h i s method" (BCMELP Memo, December 21, 1987, 2) . 70 However a large number of problems occurred because the process d i d not have s u f f i c i e n t power to deal with p o l l u t e r s . These polluters were agricultural operations that overloaded t h e i r land base with wastes or nutrients, and should not have been exempted as " t r a d i t i o n a l " practices. The operations included concentrated livestock operations that produced large volumes of animal waste but d i d not have s u f f i c i e n t land available for adequate disposal by land application; large beef cattle operations with an i n s u f f i c i e n t waste/land r a t i o i n t h e i r over-wintering operations, and that allowed free ranging of c a t t l e into streams; and o v e r - f e r t i l i z a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r a l land (BCMELP Memo, December 21, 1987). Pollution from a Cargill-owned hog farm, located i n Matsqui i n the early 1980s, i l l u s t r a t e d the weakness of the Waste Management Act. At this time the farm was the largest brood sow operation i n the Commonwealth. The farm, which had 1,000 sows on 65 acres of land on the south bank of the Fraser River, had a major problem with manure disposal. C a r g i l l b u i l t two large lagoons to handle the 60,000 gallons of l i q u i d manure produced da i l y , i n an attempt to treat the manure before discharging i t into the r i v e r (Regina vs. C a r g i l l Limited, 1984). In 1982 BCMELP decided that C a r g i l l could not dispose of i t s wastes by applying them on the land, and that the lagoons would have to be upgraded at an estimated cost of one m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . C a r g i l l refused and the next time they discharged manure into the Fraser River, BCMELP took them to court- The p r o v i n c i a l court 71 f o u n d C a r g i l l n o t g u i l t y . T h e j u d g e ' s d e c i s i o n n o t e d b o t h B C M E L P ' s l a c k o f a g r i c u l t u r a l e x p e r t i s e , a n d t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y d i d n o t s e e k t h e a d v i c e o f a g r i c u l t u r a l e x p e r t s ( R e g i n a v s . C a r g i l l L i m i t e d , 1 9 8 4 ) . B C M E L P a l s o f e l t t h a t t h e v a g u e n e s s o f t h e W a s t e M a n a g e m e n t A c t c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e i r n o t w i n n i n g t h e c a s e ( B C M E L P r e s p o n d e n t ) . W h i l e t h e C a r g i l l i n c i d e n t m a d e i t c l e a r t h a t t h e W a s t e M a n a g e m e n t A c t n e e d e d " t i g h t e n i n g , " t h e p o l i c y c h a n g e w a s p a r t o f t h e g e n e r a l g r o w i n g a w a r e n e s s o f e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s s u e s , a n d t h e i n c r e a s i n g e m p h a s i s p l a c e d o n e n v i r o n m e n t a l s u s t a i n a b i l i t y i n t h e l a t e 1 9 8 0 s ( H o b e r g , 1 9 9 3 ) . I n O c t o b e r o f 1 9 8 6 , a t a m e e t i n g o f B C M E L P ' s r e g i o n a l m a n a g e r s , a d e c i s i o n w a s m a d e t o e s t a b l i s h t h e A g r i c u l t u r a l W a s t e M a n a g e m e n t C o m m i t t e e (AWMC) t o r e v i e w a g r i c u l t u r a l w a s t e m a n a g e m e n t p r o b l e m s i n B C . I n i t i a l l y t h r e e B C M E L P s t a f f w e r e a p p o i n t e d . t o t h e AWMC ( B C M E L P M e m o , O c t o b e r , 1 9 8 7 ) . A f t e r t w o m e e t i n g s t h e y r e a l i z e d t h e y n e e d e d t h e i n p u t o f a g r o l o g i s t s o n t h e c o m m i t t e e , s o i n S e p t e m b e r o f 1 9 8 7 , a t t h e r e q u e s t o f B C M E L P ' s A s s i s t a n t D e p u t y M i n i s t e r , t w o B C M A F F s t a f f w e r e a p p o i n t e d t o s i t o n t h e AWMC ( B C M E L P L e t t e r , , A p r i l 2 1 , 1 9 8 7 , a n d B C M A F F L e t t e r , S e p t e m b e r 1 , 1 9 8 7 ) . T h e G r e a t e r V a n c o u v e r R e g i o n a l D i s t r i c t (GVRD) w a s i n c l u d e d i n t h e C o m m i t t e e , a t t h e i r o w n r e q u e s t ( B C M E L P M e m o , D e c e m b e r 1 8 , 1 9 8 7 ) , a n d t h e n t h e B C F A i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e y t o o w o u l d l i k e t o a t t e n d AWMC M e e t i n g s (AWMC M i n u t e s , F e b r u a r y 4 , 1 9 8 8 ) . B y 1 9 8 9 , t h e C o m m i t t e e i n c l u d e d E n v i r o n m e n t C a n a d a (AWMC M i n u t e s , A p r i l 1 0 , 1 9 8 9 ) a n d b y 1 9 9 0 i t g r e w f u r t h e r t o i n c l u d e t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f F i s h e r i e s a n d O c e a n s ( D F O ) a n d t h e B C I n s t i t u t e o f A g r o l o g i s t s 7 2 ( B C I A ) (AWMC M i n u t e s , A p r i l 2 3 , 1 9 9 0 ) . T h e B C F A ' s i n c e n t i v e t o p a r t i c i p a t e w a s t h a t t h e y k n e w B C M E L P w a s " t i g h t e n i n g u p " t h e W a s t e M a n a g e m e n t A c t . R a t h e r t h a n j u s t b e h a n d e d t h e f i n a l l e g i s l a t i o n , t h e B C F A w a n t e d t o b e i n v o l v e d s o t h a t t h e y w o u l d h a v e s o m e s a y i n w h a t w a s d o n e ( B C F A r e s p o n d e n t ) . B C M E L P w a n t e d B C M A F F ' s a g r i c u l t u r a l e x p e r t i s e f o r d e s i g n i n g t h e C o d e . T h e D e p u t y M i n i s t e r o f B C M E L P s p e c i f i c a l l y a s k e d t h a t t h e t w o m i n i s t r i e s w o r k t o g e t h e r . B C M E L P h a d n o p r o b l e m s w i t h t h e B C F A ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n . T h e f a r m e r s h a d a r e p u t a t i o n f o r b e i n g e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y c o n s c i o u s a n d c o o p e r a t i v e ( i . e . r e l a t i v e l y p r o a c t i v e w i t h r e g a r d t o e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s s u e s a s o p p o s e d t o I n d u s t r y i n g e n e r a l ) ( B C M E L P r e s p o n d e n t ) . T h e AWMC u s e d a m u l t i - s t a k e h o l d e r n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s t o d e v e l o p a r e g u l a t i o n t o r e p l a c e t h e p r e v i o u s l o o p h o l e ( S e c t i o n 1 1 ) . T h e y d i d n ' t c o n s c i o u s l y c h o o s e a m u l t i - s t a k e h o l d e r n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s , b u t t h a t i s w h a t i t e n d e d u p b e i n g . A s d e s c r i b e d a b o v e , t h e c o m m i t t e e o n l y s t a r t e d o u t w i t h t w o p a r t i e s ( B C M A F F a n d B C M E L P ) . B y t h e e n d o f t h e . f i r s t y e a r i t e x p a n d e d t o i n c l u d e t h r e e p a r t i e s , a n d b y t h e e n d o f t h e t h i r d y e a r i t i n c l u d e d s e v e n p a r t i e s . A s d e s c r i b e d i n C h a p t e r E i g h t , t h e r e w a s a l o t o f g i v e a n d t a k e d u r i n g t h e C o d e ' s d e v e l o p m e n t , w i t h a l l p a r t i e s w o r k i n g t o w a r d s a n a g r e e m e n t t h a t t h e y a l l c o u l d a g r e e t o . D u r i n g t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s , a B C M A F F r e p r e s e n t a t i v e m e t w i t h t h e c o m m o d i t y g r o u p s ' ' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , a n d t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t h e n m e t w i t h t h e i r g r o u p s ' m e m b e r s . T h u s t h e r e w a s a c o n t i n u o u s f e e d b a c k l o o p f r o m t h e f a r m e r s b a c k t o t h e AWMC ( B C M A F F r e s p o n d e n t ) .. 7 3 4 . THE CODE'S FORMAT In 1992 the AWMC produced the "Code of A g r i c u l t u r a l P r a c t i c e f o r Waste Management" which became p a r t of the p r o v i n c i a l Waste Management Act. They chose a vol u n t a r y compliance system, because i t was f e l t that a more s t r i n g e n t permit system would not be acceptable to farmers (BCMELP respondent). I t was f e l t that the p o l i c y could be amended i n the future i f i t became evident there i s a- need to i n s t i t u t e permits, or set q u a n t i t a t i v e l i m i t s on the amounts of manure that can be spread on f i e l d s . The Code addresses the use and storage of a g r i c u l t u r a l products and waste m a t e r i a l s , using a combination of q u a n t i t a t i v e and q u a l i t a t i v e r e s t r i c t i o n s . Part of the Code focuses on preventing the- a p p l i c a t i o n of excessive amounts of manure, and ensuring proper manure storage to reduce non-point p o l l u t i o n from a g r i c u l t u r a l sources. The Code i s very general, and does not include inorganic f e r t i l i z e r . For example, the Code s t i p u l a t e s at what times of the year or under what weather c o n d i t i o n s manure may not be ap p l i e d , but does not s p e c i f y the q u a n t i t i e s that can be ap p l i e d . Farmers may estimate q u a n t i t i e s from "Environmental Guidelines" booklets that are published f o r a l l the major commodity groups. The Guidel i n e s are d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the Code, and are intended to support i t . They complement the Code by o f f e r i n g d e t a i l e d advice on r e l a t e d t o p i c s , i n c l u d i n g manure storage tank design and. barn design. The Guidelines are part of a l a r g e r "package" of programs and s e r v i c e s aimed at he l p i n g farmers to comply w i t h the Code. This 74 "package" includes a cost-sharing program (e.g. to help farmers buy manure storage tanks), farmer conservation groups (who do research and extension education on manure management), and Best A g r i c u l t u r a l Waste Management Plans (BAWMPs) (plans designed by q u a l i f i e d p r o f e s s i o n a l s ) . When the concerns i n the plan are addressed, the farm operation should be i n compliance w i t h the Code. 5. THE CODE'S ENFORCEMENT The Code i s enforced by a peer i n s p e c t i o n system, administered by the A g r i c u l t u r a l Environmental P r o t e c t i o n C o u n c i l (AEPC). Although the AEPC i s not recognized i n the l e g i s l a t i o n , i t was part of the AWMC's negotiated agreement. The AEPC c o n s i s t s of members from BCMELP, BCMAFF, and BCFA. The AEPC's o b j e c t i v e i s "to ensure that environmental p r a c t i c e s used on BC's farms and ranches are maintained at the standard set by the Code" (BCFA, 1992). The AEPC responds to complaints about environmental concerns on farms and ranches using the f o l l o w i n g process: 1) Within 24 hours of r e c e i v i n g a complaint, the AEPC contacts the l o c a l peer i n s p e c t o r and has the complaint i n v e s t i g a t e d . 2) The l o c a l peer i n s p e c t o r w r i t e s a report e x p l a i n i n g : -what the environmental concern i s ; -whether i t i s j u s t i f i e d ; -recommendations made and what c o r r e c t i v e measures are req u i r e d ; and -a date by which the c o r r e c t i v e measures should be i n s t a l l e d . 75 3) The report i s sent w i t h i n two weeks of the i n s p e c t i o n t o : -the farm or ranch complained a g a i n s t ; -the person or agency who made the complaint; and -the AEPC. 4) The AEPC contacts the l o c a l peer i n s p e c t o r to conduct a follow-up v i s i t to the farm around the date that c o r r e c t i v e measures should have been i n s t a l l e d . Normally, t h i s i s no more than s i x months a f t e r r e c e i v i n g the complaint. 5) Farmers who are s t i l l not a b i d i n g by the Code a f t e r going through steps 1 to 4 are turned over to BCMELP f o r prosecution under the Waste Management Act (BCFA, 1992). The AEPC conducts t r a i n i n g sessions f o r peer inspectors across the province. They eventually hope to have 150 t r a i n e d Inspectors (Schmidt, 1992). 6 . CONCLUSIONS This chapter has o u t l i n e d the b i o p h y s i c a l and p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s that l e d up to the- Code's n e g o t i a t i o n , and b r i e f l y described the Code's format and enforcement. The Code's chronology helps to e x p l a i n how the respondents who were interviewed were selected (Chapter Seven). This chronology l a y s the foundation f o r the f i n d i n g s of the e m p i r i c a l study on the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n (Chapter E i g h t ) , the negotiation's e f f e c t on the form of r e g u l a t i o n selected (Chapter Nine), and the negotiation's e f f e c t on compliance (Chapter Ten) . 76 CHAPTER SEVEN CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 1. INTRODUCTION T h i s c h a p t e r b e g i n s w i t h t h e r e s e a r c h d e s i g n f o r e v a l u a t i n g t h e c a s e s t u d y o f t h e . C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n . T h e m e t h o d s u s e d t o c o l l e c t a n d a n a l y z e t h e d a t a a r e t h e n e a c h e x p l a i n e d i n d e t a i l . 2. DATA COLLECTION METHODS 2.1 Document Analysis I n N o v e m b e r a n d D e c e m b e r , 1 9 9 4 , I v i s i t e d t h e o f f i c e s o f t h e B C M E L P r e s p o n d e n t w h o c h a i r e d t h e A W M C , a n d t h e t w o B C M A F F r e s p o n d e n t s . T h e s e t h r e e p e o p l e w e r e t h e k e y p l a y e r s , i n t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n . I w a s a l l o w e d f r e e a c c e s s t o c o p y a n y d o c u m e n t s i n t h e s e t h r e e r e s p o n d e n t s ' f i l e s t h a t r e l a t e d t o . t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n . I o b t a i n e d m i n u t e s f r o m m e e t i n g s , m e m o s , l e t t e r s , d r a f t s o f t h e C o d e , a n d a r t i c l e s f r o m t h e f a r m p r e s s . T h e s e w e r e a r r a n g e d i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l o r d e r , a n d t h e n c o l o u r c o d e d t o c r e a t e t h e f o l l o w i n g d o c u m e n t s : - a l i s t o f t h e n a m e s o f t h o s e w h o a t t e n d e d AWMC m e e t i n g s , t h e g r o u p s t h e y r e p r e s e n t e d , w h e n e a c h g r o u p f i r s t b e g a n t o a t t e n d m e e t i n g s , a n d h o w t h e y c a m e t o p a r t i c i p a t e ( e . g . w h e t h e r t h e y w e r e i n v i t e d t o j o i n t h e AWMC, o r w h e t h e r t h e y a s k e d t o j o i n ) . T h i s l i s t o f n a m e s w a s u s e d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e p o t e n t i a l r e s p o n d e n t s f o r p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w s . - a t i m e l i n e o f t h e m e e t i n g s h e l d , a n d d e c i s i o n s m a d e , f r o m 1 9 8 6 t o 1 9 9 2 . 77 -a summary of each group's concerns or i n t e r e s t s i n p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the AWMC. -a l i s t of the regulatory options that were considered i n the d r a f t i n g of the Codes. -a d e s c r i p t i o n of how the d r a f t s of the Codes evolved, -and a summary of the r o l e that i n f o r m a t i o n gaps played i n n e g o t i a t i n g the Code. 2.2 Personal Interviews Based on the document a n a l y s i s , a personal i n t e r v i e w questionnaire was developed to meet the study's o b j e c t i v e s . A semi-structured "focused i n t e r v i e w " format was chosen/ i n which a set of predetermined questions was asked, but sometimes the order of questions was v a r i e d to accommodate a respondent's wish to speak about a c e r t a i n subject f i r s t , or at length. This type of i n t e r v i e w i s commonly used f o r a more i n t e n s i v e study of perceptions, a t t i t u d e s , and motivation than a s t r u c t u r e d i n t e r v i e w permits. The focused i n t e r v i e w ' s f u n c t i o n i s "to focus a t t e n t i o n upon a given experience and i t s e f f e c t s " (Kidder,- 1981, 188) . The interviewer's l i s t of questions are derived from an a n a l y s i s of the experience i n which the respondent has p a r t i c i p a t e d , and from hypotheses based on n e g o t i a t i o n theory. The l i s t e s t a b l i s h e s the topi c s to be covered, but the interviewer can d i r e c t the inte r v i e w , by e x p l o r i n g reasons and motives, and probing f u r t h e r i n u n a n t i c i p a t e d d i r e c t i o n s . The questions were open-ended, which allowed the respondents to give reasons or explanations, and to t a l k about those things. 78 that mattered most to them. For example, some t a l k e d about other aspects of a g r i c u l t u r e , e.g. the urban-rural c o n f l i c t s i n the Lower Fraser V a l l e y . I t r i e d to ensure the respondents' ease of answering questions by p r e - t e s t i n g the questionnaire to check c l a r i t y of the wording, and by beginning each i n t e r v i e w w i t h an "ice-breaker" question about the respondent's background. Any p o t e n t i a l l y s e n s i t i v e questions were put towards the middle or end of the questionnaire, so they would be reached when rapport was w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d . I t r i e d to e s t a b l i s h rapport by mentioning I had a farm background, t h a t my parents had grown up on farms i n Switzerland, and that I had two degrees i n a g r i c u l t u r e from the U n i v e r s i t y of Guelph, a respected a g r i c u l t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n . The importance of having a farm background was demonstrated when, by coincidence,- one respondent a l s o had Swiss-German parents who had emigrated to Canada to farm. His i n t e r v i e w was very long (almost two hours), and he spoke very f r a n k l y . He a l s o introduced me to h i s f a m i l y , and showed me part of h i s farm. Each Interview s t a r t e d w i t h an inf o r m a l i n t r o d u c t i o n to the study, and a sharing of my and the respondent's backgrounds. I e x p l a i n e d the purpose of the study, and assured respondents that t h e i r responses would be anonymous. The respondents f i l l e d out a consent form, i n d i c a t i n g whether they agreed to be tape recorded ( a l l respondents agreed) . They al s o i n d i c a t e d on the consent form whether they wished to see a copy of any m a t e r i a l i n which they were quoted i n a d r a f t form of the t h e s i s , so that they could 79 v e r i f y the quote was accurate and was not taken out of context. An example of the consent form Is located i n Appendix II. If the response to a question was incomplete, I used probing to ensure that each question was adequately answered (Gorden, 1992). At the close of each interview, I included a thumbnail sketch of impressions and observational notes to help f l e s h out the interview for f i n a l analysis. This included the respondent's non- verbal behaviour, i n i t i a l thoughts regarding the data, and any other relevant thoughts or insights. These were recorded at the end of the handwritten notes taken during the interview, and were added to the typed notes at the end of each Interview t r a n s c r i p t . 2.3 Non-Point Source P o l l u t i o n Workshop In March 1995 a workshop on NPS Po l l u t i o n Management was held i n Richmond, B.C. This event was sponsored by BCMELP, Environment Canada, and DFO. The. workshop included a focus on agri c u l t u r a l NPS pollution, and I was invited to attend. Other participants i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l working group included representatives from DFO, Environment Canada, BCMAFF, BCMELP and an ENGO. I used the re s u l t s of the workshop to f a m i l i a r i z e myself with each of these group's perceptions of the issues, to add recommendations for changes to the Code (Chapter Ten), and to help develop the recommendations In Chapter Eleven. 2.4 Sampling A selective sample of the main participants i n the Code's negotiation was employed, to assess differences i n pa r t i c i p a n t s ' viewpoints, on the Code's negotiation process.. The names of 80 p o t e n t i a l r e s p o n d e n t s w h o h a d p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n w e r e d e v e l o p e d f r o m a l i s t o f p a r t i c i p a n t s o b t a i n e d d u r i n g t h e d o c u m e n t a n a l y s i s . T h o s e p a r t i c i p a n t s w h o w e r e n o t i n t e r v i e w e d h a d o n l y a t t e n d e d o n e o r t w o m e e t i n g s , a n d I i n t e r v i e w e d o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s f r o m t h e g r o u p s t h e y r e p r e s e n t e d . T h o s e n o t i n t e r v i e w e d i n c l u d e d f o u r B C M E L P s t a f f , a n d o n e t e c h n i c i a n f r o m B C M A F F . A b r o a d c r o s s - s e c t i o n o f v i e w p o i n t s f r o m t h e p a r t i c i p a n t g r o u p s w a s s t i l l p r e s e r v e d . I n N o v e m b e r a n d D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 4 , I v i s i t e d t h e o f f i c e s o f t h e t w o B C M A F F r e s p o n d e n t s a n d t h e B C M E L P r e s p o n d e n t w h o h a d c h a i r e d t h e AWMC a n d p h o t o c o p i e d d o c u m e n t s r e l e v a n t t o t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n . T h e t y p e o f d o c u m e n t s a r e d e s c r i b e d i n s e c t i o n 2 . 1 , a b o v e . F r o m t h e s e d o c u m e n t s I f i n a l i z e d a l i s t o f a l l t h e m a i n p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n . O f t h e 1 3 p a r t i c i p a n t s o n t h e l i s t , o n l y o n e c o u l d n o t b e i n t e r v i e w e d a s s h e d i d n o t r e t u r n m y p h o n e c a l l s . T h i s p e r s o n r e p r e s e n t e d t h e B C I n s t i t u t e o f A g r o l o g i s t s , - a n o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t o n l y b e c a m e i n v o l v e d l a t e i n t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n ( s e e C h a p t e r S i x ) , a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y p l a y e d a l e s s e r r o l e . T h e r e m a i n i n g 12 p a r t i c i p a n t s w e r e i n t e r v i e w e d b e t w e e n M a r c h a n d M a y , 1 9 9 5 . T h e r e w e r e a l s o t w o " i n d i r e c t " p a r t i c i p a n t s . O n e w a s a l e g a l c o u n s e l f o r B C M E L P w h o h a d w o r k e d o n t h e w o r d i n g o f t h e C o d e , a n d t h e o t h e r w o r k e d f o r t h e M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h . T h e M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h h a d o n l y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e C o d e ' s d e v e l o p m e n t b y t h e r e f e r r a l p r o c e s s , i . e . o f f e r i n g c o m m e n t s o n t h e d r a f t s o f t h e C o d e s , a n d d i d n o t a t t e n d a n y AWMC m e e t i n g s . I n a d d i t i o n , a s e l e c t i v e s a m p l e o f f a r m e r s a n d f a r m g r o u p 8 1 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from d i f f e r e n t commodity groups, and government s t a f f i n v o l v e d i n implementing the Code was employed to assess d i f f e r e n c e s i n viewpoints about the Code's implementation. The implementers interviewed were a l s o chosen to represent as many d i f f e r e n t commodities/sectors as p o s s i b l e , so that there would be a broad c r o s s - s e c t i o n of viewpoints portrayed. The names of suggested farm commodity group respondents who were knowledgable about the Code's implementation were obtained from a senior BCMAFF employee who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n . For example, he suggested I contact the BCMAFF berry s p e c i a l i s t to o b t a i n the name of a berry farmer. The s p e c i a l i s t i n i t i a l l y gave me the name of a cranberry farmer, who didn't use manure i n h i s operation. The cranberry farmer then gave me the name of the strawberry and raspberry farmer who was interviewed. The implementers interviewed i n c l u d e d two farm conservation group leaders, a peer i n s p e c t o r , a member of the AEPC, two farmers who had had complaints lodged a g a i n s t them wi t h the AEPC, and a farmer considered to be an innovator i n the f i e l d of manure management.. They represented, the d a i r y , p o u l t r y , pork, vegetable, and berry commodity groups. In a d d i t i o n , I interviewed three government s t a f f and one BCFA s t a f f person i n v o l v e d w i t h the Code's implementation. The government implementers represented BCMELP, DFO, and Environment Canada. Of the ten implementation respondents, a l l agreed to p a r t i c i p a t e i n i n t e r v i e w s . 2.5 Data C o l l e c t i o n Each selected respondent was sent a covering l e t t e r about two 82 t o t h r e e w e e k s i n a d v a n c e o f t h e i r i n t e r v i e w . A n e x a m p l e o f t h e c o v e r i n g l e t t e r c a n b e f o u n d i n A p p e n d i x I . E a c h r e s p o n d e n t w a s t h e n t e l e p h o n e d o n e t o t w o d a y s i n a d v a n c e t o s o l i c i t t h e i r c o o p e r a t i o n a n d t o s e t u p a c o n v e n i e n t i n t e r v i e w i n g t i m e . A l l o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e i n t e r v i e w e d a t t h e i r o f f i c e s , e x c e p t f o r o n e w h o w a s i n t e r v i e w e d a t a r e s t a u r a n t ( o n h i s w a y t o a m e e t i n g ) a n d o n e w h o w a s i n t e r v i e w e d i n h i s h o m e . T h e y w e r e a l l i n t e r v i e w e d a l o n e . T h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e e i t h e r i n t e r v i e w e d a t t h e i r o f f i c e s o r a t t h e i r f a r m s . T w o w e r e i n t e r v i e w e d w i t h t h e i r w i v e s a n d s o m e f a m i l y m e m b e r s o c c a s i o n a l l y p r e s e n t , b u t I d i d n o t f e e l t h a t t h a t i n f l u e n c e d t h e i r r e s p o n s e s . T h e i n t e r v i e w s o c c u r r e d i n V i c t o r i a , V a n c o u v e r , N o r t h V a n c o u v e r , B u r n a b y , D e l t a , L a n g - l e y , S u r r e y , A b b o t s f o r d , C h i l l i w a c k , K a m l o o p s , - K e l o w n a , a n d P e n t i c t o n . O n a v e r a g e , t h e i n t e r v i e w s l a s t e d 3 0 t o 4 5 m i n u t e s . T h e l o n g e s t o n e t o o k t w o h o u r s , a n d t h e s h o r t e s t t o o k 1 5 m i n u t e s . G e n e r a l l y I f e l t t h a t t h e r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e o p e n i n t h e i r r e s p o n s e s , a n d f e l t . c o m f o r t a b l e a n s w e r i n g t h e q u e s t i o n s . T w o s a i d t h a t t h e y h a d e n j o y e d t h e i n t e r v i e w , a n d a l l w e r e i n t e r e s t e d i n r e c e i v i n g a s u m m a r y o f t h e r e s e a r c h r e s u l t s . T h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w a s p r e t e s t e d w i t h t h e f i r s t t w o r e s p o n d e n t s , a B C M E L P r e s p o n d e n t a n d a B C F A r e s p o n d e n t . I h a d m e t e a c h o f t h e m b e f o r e , a n d a s k e d t h e m f o r f e e d b a c k o n t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e . S u b s e q u e n t l y , a f e w q u e s t i o n s w e r e d r o p p e d , a n d t h e q u e s t i o n o r d e r w a s s l i g h t l y c h a n g e d . A c o p y o f t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e i s l o c a t e d i n A p p e n d i x I I I . 8 3 2.6 Questionnaire Format The questions i n the questionnaire were designed to e l i c i t each respondent's view of the Code's development, and/or i t s implementation. The questions that evaluated the Code's negotiation process were based on the c r i t e r i a l i s t e d i n Chapter Five. After the introduction to the study, the questionnaire was divided into seven categories: the respondent's background, the h i s t o r y of the Code's development, the groups involved, each group's concerns and preferred regulatory options, the negotiation process, and the Code's implementation. 2.7 Data Analysis The audio-taped interviews were transcribed from March to May 1995. As each tape was transcribed, I made notes i n a separate f i l e on any themes I saw emerging, where responses had been s i m i l a r to other respondents', and any other notes I f e l t would be help f u l l a t e r i n the. data analysis. After each t r a n s c r i p t was completed, I played the tape again with a printed t r a n s c r i p t i n front of me, to check for accuracy of the tr a n s c r i p t i o n . The tapes were transcribed as soon as possible after the interviews, to aid my r e c a l l of the tone of the interview. Quotes from the tra n s c r i p t that are separated by four periods were made at separate times i n the interview. The interviews and documents were analyzed by using the objectlve/criterion/question/key word correspondence, shown i n Table Three. The key words were derived from the l i t e r a t u r e on negotiation. Each o b j e c t i v e / c r i t e r i o n was assigned a colour, and 84 the margin of the relevant part of the each t r a n s c r i p t was marked i n that colour. For example, the answers to Question 13 (which corresponded to C r i t e r i o n Nine — Agreement Implementation) were marked with a yellow s t r i p e i n the margin. At an intermediate stage of the analysis, a l l the s i m i l a r l y colour coded parts of the transcripts were examined together, and a table created with a summary of each respondent's answer, as well as any sentences I f e l t might be useful as direct quotes. An example of the table can be found i n Appendix IV. When a l l the relevant questions were colour coded, the. parts of the t r a n s c r i p t that were not yet assigned a colour were examined, to ensure that a l l relevant parts of the t r a n s c r i p t were included i n the analysis. 85 Table Three Data A n a l y s i s Research Method of Analysis Objective Number 1 - Chapter Two L i t e r a t u r e Review 2a - ; C r i t e r i o n 1: Questions 6 and 12 E f f e c t i v e - C r i t e r i o n 2: Document A n a l y s i s ness of C r i t e r i o n 3: Questions 2 and 11 the Code's C r i t e r i o n 4: Document A n a l y s i s Negotia- C r i t e r i o n 5: Key words: win, b e n e f i t , gain, b e t t e r t i o n o f f Process C r i t e r i o n 6: Question 9 and key word: common ground C r i t e r i o n 7: Question 14 and key words: t r a d e o f f , .give and take C r i t e r i o n 8: Question 15h and key word: research C r i t e r i o n 9.: Question 13 C r i t e r i o n 10 : Document A n a l y s i s C r i t e r i o n 11 : Question 15a C r i t e r i o n 12 : L i t e r a t u r e review C r i t e r i o n 13 : Questions 15c and 15g C r i t e r i o n 14 : Questions 15b, 15d and 15e; Document A n a l y s i s C r i t e r i o n 15 : Questions 5, 7 and 16 C r i t e r i o n 16 : Questions 8 and.l'5f 2b - Question 14 and Document A n a l y s i s Negotia- ti o n ' s E f f e c t on the Regulation 2c - Question 17 Negotia- ti o n and Compliance 2d - Questions 18 and 19, NPS P o l l u t a n t s Workshop Suggested Results Changes 86 PART THREE FINDINGS 87 CHAPTER EIGHT EVALUATION OF THE CODE'S NEGOTIATION One t h i n g that one person s a i d to me once, 'There's two things that you should never know how they're made. One i s sausages and the other i s law.' (Laughs) . . . I'm beginning to thi n k that's r i g h t (BCMAFF respondent). 1. INTRODUCTION Part Three o u t l i n e s the findi n g s of my research on the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n process. The s e c t i o n headings are arranged i n the order of the research o b j e c t i v e s (see Chapter One). This chapter begins w i t h o b j e c t i v e 2a) : an e v a l u a t i o n of the n e g o t i a t i o n process. The evaluation c r i t e r i a , explained i n Chapter Five, form the sub-headings. Each c r i t e r i o n i s analyzed using r e s u l t s from e i t h e r or both of the i n t e r v i e w t r a n s c r i p t s and the document a n a l y s i s . 2. OBJECTIVE 2a: EVALUATION OF THE REGULATION MAKING PROCESS 2.1 C r i t e r i o n One: Countervailing Power This c r i t e r i o n addressed whether any of the p a r t i e s had the power to act u n i l a t e r a l l y and c o n t r o l the outcome. Respondents were asked whether any group was able to dominate the n e g o t i a t i o n (Question 6), and what they thought would have happened i f BCMELP had t r i e d to develop a r e g u l a t i o n on t h e i r own ( i . e . acted u n i l a t e r a l l y ) (Question 12). Generally, a l l the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t e r v i e w e d f e l t that the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n was e q u i t a b l e , and that no one group was able to dominate the process. As one BCMAFF 88 ..respondent said, " I t ' s the model of cooperation, I t h i n k . " A BCFA respondent added that " i t was an e x c e l l e n t model of a c o n s u l t a t i o n process at work." I n t e r e s t i n g l y , one federa l government respondent f e l t that the a g r i c u l t u r a l industry d i d have "a r e a l l y strong voice" (emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) , while another f e d e r a l government respondent f e l t that the f e d e r a l government probably dominated by v i r t u e of having the a u t h o r i t y of the F i s h e r i e s Act behind them. Both the BCFA p a r t i c i p a n t s mentioned that they sometimes f e l t outnumbered by the p l e t h o r a of government agencies that sat at the t a b l e , but they a l s o knew that they had the weight of the commodity a s s o c i a t i o n s behind them. However, everyone agreed that i t would have been a " d i s a s t e r " and unworkable i f BCMELP had t r i e d to develop the Code on i t s own. There would have been "a l o t of vociferous backlash" on the p a r t of the farmers, and " i t would have been blocked (by farmer lobbying and p r o t e s t s ) , " according to a BCMAFF respondent. Both of the BCMAFF p a r t i c i p a n t s noted that a f t e r the Code was enacted, BCMELP worked on two other pieces of l e g i s l a t i o n that a f f e c t e d farmers - the Open Burning Smoke Con t r o l Code of P r a c t i c e and the B r i t i s h Columbia Environmental P r o t e c t i o n Act (BCEPA). Both of the other pieces of l e g i s l a t i o n were developed by committees that had no farmer or BCMAFF representatives on them, and were simply presented to the farming community as f i n a l d r a f t s , f o r comments. The farmers had major concerns about both pieces of l e g i s l a t i o n , and made t h e i r concerns known. The Open Burning Code was subsequently 89 r e w r i t t e n with farmer input. The BCCA j o i n e d the BCEPA committee, and the l e g i s l a t i o n was r e v i s e d . One BCMAFF respondent concluded that, (BCMELP) should never have been allowed to do tha t , because they probably a l i e n a t e d a l o t of people out there over that Burning- Code. Sure they changed i t , but why would you drag people out of t h e i r homes to have to go to p u b l i c meetings because somebody has a piece of l e g i s l a t i o n that's not acceptable? And i t wasn't. . . . We've got to do a b e t t e r job i n communicating between other m i n i s t r i e s when i t comes down to d e a l i n g w i t h a g r i c u l t u r e . We j u s t want to make sure that we're at the t a b l e here. The Code's neg o t i a t i o n met the f i r s t c r i t e r i o n , as no one f e l t that any one group was able to dominate. BCMELP would not have been able to act u n i l a t e r a l l y and develop an a g r i c u l t u r a l l y - r e l a t e d r e g u l a t i o n on i t s own, as recent experience w i t h other r e g u l a t i o n s has proven (even though they have the l e g a l a u t h o r i t y to do so). 2 . 2 C r i t e r i o n Two: Limited Number of Parties This c r i t e r i o n s t a t e d that there should be a maximum of 25 pa r t i e s at the tab l e , i f the process i s to be productive. The main p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d i n the AWMC were the BCMELP, the BCMAFF, and the BCFA. Other groups who attended some of the AWMC meetings were the GVRD, Environment Canada, DFO, and the BCIA. (The l a t t e r group appears to have attended only one meeting.) The M i n i s t r y of Health was in v o l v e d through the r e f e r r a l process ( i . e . they commented on d r a f t s of the Code), but d i d not a c t u a l l y attend meetings. The BCCA attended one meeting i n 1991, and appears to be the on l y farm group to have p a r t i c i p a t e d d i r e c t l y i n the process. O v e r a l l , more than 17 farm groups were consulted (BCFA and BCMAFF, 90 1992), and they made t h e i r views known outside of AWMC meetings through meetings or correspondence w i t h BCFA or BCMAFF s t a f f . Therefore, the AWMC negotiation process met the c r i t e r i o n of having l e s s than 25 p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d . 2.3 C r i t e r i o n Three: Mature/"Ripe" Issues In order to be s u c c e s s f u l l y negotiated, the issue at hand should have c l a r i f i e d s u f f i c i e n t l y to permit r e s o l u t i o n . For example, the p a r t i e s should have stopped l i n i n g up p o l i t i c a l , , , . , , • ,. campaigns. xne respondents support and b u i l d i n g media _ . _ „, _ demonstrated, by recounting the h i s t o r y of concerns about farm waste management i n BC, that i t was a mature i s s u e . They were asked how w e l l they f e l t the previous exemption clause i n the p r o v i n c i a l Waste Management Act had worked (Question 2), and what t h e i r concerns were r e l a t e d to the r e g u l a t i o n of manure management ( i . e . how they saw the i s s u e s ) ( Q u e s t i o n 11). As one BCMELP respondent s a i d , the Code r e s u l t e d from "a combination of a l o t of events that occurred over a number of years." P r i o r to concern about contamination i n the Abbotsford A q u i f e r (discussed i n Chapter S i x ) , BCMELP s t a r t e d studying a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n i n surface water i n the Williams Lake area i n the l a t e 1970s. In the 1980s an inventory of farm waste management p r a c t i c e s i n the Okanagan i d e n t i f i e d some serious shortcomings. At the same time, BCMELP knew that i n -the Lower Fraser V a l l e y "the density of animals was exceeding the capacity of the land to support those animals" (BCMELP respondent), and that there was excess manure a p p l i c a t i o n to the f i e l d s . DFO was 91 becoming concerned about f i s h k i l l s i n r i v e r s , low d i s s o l v e d oxygen l e v e l s , and b a c t e r i a l contamination of s h e l l f i s h (DFO respondent). As mentioned i n Chapter S i x , there were a few court cases, where BCMELP t r i e d to prosecute farms under the previous exemption, however they l o s t these cases. There were al s o problems w i t h the AES system of peer i n s p e c t o r s keeping up w i t h the volume of complaints. And a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n "didn't gain the a t t e n t i o n i t deserved i n V i c t o r i a " (BCMELP respondent) u n t i l a f t e r municipal discharges were d e a l t w i t h . This combination of events culminated i n a d e c i s i o n to form the AWMC. According to a BCFA respondent, "Everybody recognized the current status quo wasn't working, wasn't sustainable, and that we had to have a b e t t e r system. So I t h i n k that was probably the key i n making the whole t h i n g work." I n t e r e s t i n g l y , there was no media campaign to make the p u b l i c aware of the farm waste management i s s u e . In f a c t , most of the p u b l i c i t y about a g r i c u l t u r a l contamination of groundwater came out i n 1992, a f t e r the Code was enacted (see Munro, 1992, and Liebscher et a l . , 1992) . One BCMELP respondent complained about the l a c k of media coverage. I guess i t ' s up to the t e c h n i c a l people ourselves to heighten the concern about a g r i c u l t u r a l impacts, because they are s i g n i f i c a n t . . . .1 t h i n k one problem i s that i t ' s not an i n t e r e s t i n g or unique t o p i c l i k e d i o x i n s i s , or something new. Manure p i l e s have been around since we were a l l k i d s , and the press j u s t doesn't.. Who cares? But i f i t ' s dioxins or something that can cause cancer i n one of a m i l l i o n people, l e t ' s w r i t e up that, rather than t a l k about the dozens or hundreds of w e l l s that are contaminated from a g r i c u l t u r a l waste, e i t h e r b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l l y or from a n i t r a t e p e r s p e c t i v e or a 92 p e s t i c i d e p e r s p e c t i v e i n the V a l l e y . I t ' s j u s t not i n t e r e s t i n g to people to read about t h a t . I t ' s unfortunate (emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . Thus, the issu e s that the AWMC worked on had c l a r i f i e d s u f f i c i e n t l y to permit r e s o l u t i o n . 2.4 C r i t e r i o n Four: I n e v i t a b i l i t y of Decision Negotiations are l i k e l y to work best i f a l l p a r t i e s b e l i e v e a d e c i s i o n i s i n e v i t a b l e . The documents r e l a t e d to the AWMC's n e g o t i a t i o n process were used to determine whether or not the d e c i s i o n to regulate manure management was i n e v i t a b l e . S h o r t l y a f t e r the BCMELP Regional Managers met i n October of 1986, one of the a s s i s t a n t deputy m i n i s t e r s f o r BCMAFF wrote the S o i l s and Engineering Branch suggesting that BCMAFF s t a f f needed to s t a r t " d i s c u s s i o n s d e a l i n g w i t h a g r i c u l t u r a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s to aq u i f e r contamination" (BCMAFF L e t t e r , February 16, 1987) . BCMAFF's r a t i o n a l e was to act p r o a c t i v e l y to reduce the impact on farmers. "We should be co n s i d e r i n g what e f f o r t s need to be considered now i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of r e s t r i c t i o n s that may be imposed to p r o t e c t the groundwater resource i n the Fraser and Okanagan V a l l e y s " (BCMAFF L e t t e r , February 16, 1987). In A p r i l of 1987, BCMELP i n v i t e d BCMAFF to appoint s t a f f to s i t on the AWMC. I t became obvious that BCMELP intended to re w r i t e the exemption f o r a g r i c u l t u r e i n the Waste Management Act because of the s e v e r i t y of the documented a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n problems. BCMAFF saw t h i s , and was happy to be in v o l v e d i n the AWMC's nego t i a t i o n process. I n i t i a l l y , BCMAFF sought to reduce the Code's impact on the farming community by 93 producing guidelines f o r proper farm management p r a c t i c e s that are environmentally s e n s i t i v e . ... F a i l u r e f o r our M i n i s t r y to provide guidelines w i l l i n e v i t a b l y r e s u l t i n other M i n i s t r i e s developing farming g u i d e l i n e s , that can be o v e r l y r e s t r i c t i v e to the farming community. For example, M i n i s t r y of Environment and Parks are p r e s e n t l y reviewing the Waste Management Act i n response to known ground and surface water contamination. ... (BCMAFF should) inform other M i n i s t r i e s i n v o l v e d i n p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l of a g r i c u l t u r e ' s new proposed standards that w i l l address prevention of a g r i c u l t u r e ' s p o l l u t i o n of the environment (BCMAFF Fax, October 9, 1987). When the BCFA asked whether they could attend AWMC meetings i n February of 1988, i t was obvious to them the BCMELP was t i g h t e n i n g up the Waste Management Act. Rather than be handed the new r u l e s , the BCFA preferred to have some say i n what was done i f they became involved (BCFA respondent). Another f a c t o r was "farmers' d e s i r e to demonstrate t h e i r commitment to p r o t e c t i n g the environment by launching a program to deal with p o l l u t e r s s w i f t l y and d e c i s i v e l y " (Walters, 1991, 32). O v e r a l l , the d e c i s i o n to develop the Code was seen as i n e v i t a b l e , because BCMELP, BCMAFF, and the a g r i c u l t u r a l community were aware that the previous exemption was not working. Everyone recognized the Waste Management Act needed to be changed, because the o l d wording j u s t simply was not working. And there was the a u t h o r i t y f o r the M i n i s t e r of Environment, or government at l e a s t , to pass a r e g u l a t i o n , aimed at c o n t r o l l i n g farm discharges. And there c e r t a i n l y was the knowledge that something had to be done, and the M i n i s t r y was prepared to do something i f we couldn't work something out. And I t h i n k that d i d kind of help b r i n g things together as w e l l . There was that (imminence) of something about to happen because the present system wasn't working (GVRD respondent). 2.5 C r i t e r i o n Five: Opportunity f o r Gain Harter (1982) suggested that the negotiated dispute must be 94 transformed i n t o a "win/win" s i t u a t i o n so that a l l p a r t i e s are b e t t e r o f f f o r having negotiated, or the winners can compensate the l o s e r s . The t r a n s c r i p t s and documents were searched f o r the key words of win, b e n e f i t , gain, and b e t t e r o f f to o b t a i n evidence to support t h i s contention. There were three aspects of the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n that r e f l e c t "win-win" outcomes, and helped to add up to a "win-win" package o v e r a l l . One was that while the Code req u i r e s farmers to p r o t e c t the environment (BCMELP's concern), i t a l s o p r o t e c t s farmers. Section 19 of the Code s t a t e s that nothing i n the Code p r o h i b i t s odours from a g r i c u l t u r a l operations, p r o v i d i n g the operations are c a r r i e d out i n accordance with the Code. An a r t i c l e i n a B.C. farm magazine described how the Code was valuable to the a g r i c u l t u r e i n d u s t r y i n terms of d e a l i n g w i t h nuisance complaints from non-farming neighbours. ' I t protects, farmers' r i g h t to farm. E s t a b l i s h i n g a set of c o n s i s t e n t farming standards should allow farmers u s i n g normal p r a c t i c e s to farm free of harassment from the non-farming p u b l i c ' ... 'We now have an a i r t i g h t system, one that's good fo r industry. We've s p e l l e d out what good farming p r a c t i c e s are,' says (a BCMAFF employee). ... The r u l e s are p u b l i c and o f f i c i a l . That means everybody w i l l have the same length y a r d s t i c k . I t ' l l be d i f f i c u l t f o r cranky neighbours, over-zealous env i r o n m e n t a l i s t s or e c o - t e r r o r i s t s to c r i t i c i z e c o n scientious farmers (Walters, 1991, 32). Two farm respondents remarked on t h i s p r o t e c t i v e aspect of the Code. And the Guidelines' a c t u a l l y can work i n our favour. We're i n an urban area. As I joke sometimes, most farm boys leave the country and go to the c i t y . Well, w i t h me, the c i t y came to me. L i t e r a l l y . Surrey's a c i t y , I'm now i n a c i t y . And i t ' s a major problem i n my 95 o p i n i o n . Urban problems are a nightmare. I t ' s to the point that I'd l i k e to get out, i f I could. I don't l i k e a l l these people around here. They cause me nothing but problems. And at l e a s t i f I have a Code of P r a c t i c e s , and I'm fo l l o w i n g i t , I've got p r o t e c t i o n . I f there's no Code of P r a c t i c e , then who says, "This i s standard farming p r a c t i c e s ? " (Vegetable farmer, emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . What i t does i s i t gives us a t h i n g when there's environmental issues. . . .When we begin to get heat from the general populace, w e l l we say, 'We have a Code of P r a c t i c e . We are doing what we're supposed t o . . . .In the meantime, what are you doing to keep up with the re s t of us?' (BCCA respondent). Another perceived advantage f o r farmers was that the Code could be used as a marketing t o o l to address cross-border shopping and f o s t e r consumer l o y a l t y . The Code was seen as an e x c e l l e n t opportunity to promote a g r i c u l t u r e , to show that industry i s taking the i n i t i a t i v e , that farmers aire taking r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r themselves and t h e i r neighbours and that farmers are committed to farming s u s t a i n a b l y . Bragging about the Code could give B.C.'s farmers a r e a l competitive edge, p r e d i c t s (a BCMAFF employee). Farmers south of the border cannot l a y c l a i m to the kind of stewardship B.C. farmers can (Walters, 1991, 33). The second win-win s i t u a t i o n was the way the Code was w r i t t e n , as a r e g u l a t i o n by reference. Regulation by reference means that the actual A g r i c u l t u r a l Waste Con t r o l Regulation, which i s p a r t of the Waste Management Act and i s only two sec t i o n s long, r e f e r s - t o the Code. Section two of the A g r i c u l t u r a l Waste Control Regulation s t a t e s that anyone who c a r r i e s out an a g r i c u l t u r a l operation i n accordance w i t h the Code i s exempt from having to o b t a i n a permit under the Waste Management Act. I t gave BCMELP, DFO, Environment Canada, and the GVRD the r e g u l a t i o n that they wanted, but i t sounded " s o f t e r " to the farmers (BCMELP Respondent). As a BCMAFF 96 employee wrote, This approach [the Code] i s much " s o f t e r " than the "hard" l e g a l c o n t r o l s adopted by many European c o u n t r i e s . In t h i s way i t i s our expectation that the l e g i t i m a t e environment p r o t e c t i o n mandate of the M i n i s t r y of Environment can be s a t i s f i e d without undue f i n a n c i a l impact on the industry (BCMAFF L e t t e r , October 13, 1988). T h i r d l y , i n retrospect, both BCMELP and the farmers f e e l they proved the usefulness of i n v o l v i n g producer groups i n the development of r e g u l a t i o n s that a f f e c t them. As mentioned i n Section 4.2.1, other branches of BCMELP subsequently t r i e d to develop some other r e g u l a t i o n s without farmer input, w i t h d i s a s t r o u s r e s u l t s . A BCFA respondent f e l t that government has recognized that they can b r i n g producers i n t o the process, and . . . gain from i t . Because they've been burned a few times with t r y i n g to come out and do things where they've developed them i n t e r n a l l y , and then j u s t come out and t r y to impose them on the i n d u s t r y . Another mutually b e n e f i c i a l s i t u a t i o n arose w i t h the involvement of farmers as the f r o n t l i n e of the AEPC's enforcement approach. This saved BCMELP money and s t a f f resources, and gave farmers more confidence i n the v a l i d i t y of farm i n s p e c t i o n s . I know everybody's budgets are l i m i t e d and so on. . . . More and more we're t a l k i n g about new ways of doing business, that t r a n s f e r s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the owner of the waste, and to the lower l e v e l s of government. And that r e a l l y i n v o l v e s a great deal of t r u s t . And that means what we have to do, i n senior governments, i s to do spot checks and p e r i o d i c audits, so that we're s t i l l out there buzzing around, you never know where we are. And that's about the only way we can cover the p l a y i n g f i e l d (DFO respondent). Thus, the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n provided o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r gain f o r a number of the p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d . 97 2.6 C r i t e r i o n Six: Fundamental Values This c r i t e r i o n s t a t e s that the dispute negotiated should not onl y concern or be dominated by fundamental value choices (e.g. strongly held moral or e t h i c a l b e l i e f s ) . The evidence was obtained i n d i r e c t l y , by asking the respondents whether the groups who were involved i n the Code's negotiation shared common ground on at l e a s t some of the issues (Question 9) . While the groups i n v o l v e d i n the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n a l l had f a i r l y s t r o n g l y h e l d views, these d i d not i n v o l v e overwhelming moral or e t h i c a l b e l i e f s . In f a c t , the groups shared some common ground, which helped to make the n e g o t i a t i o n process e a s i e r . There were some areas where we s t a r t e d out a f a i r ways apart, but . . . i t was never the r e a l l y p o l a r opposites so f a r apart that there wasn't even any room to s t a r t . . . . There was a common goal, which was to come out wit h something that everybody could l i v e with. . . . There was r e a l l y a common o b j e c t i v e from the beginning. We might have had a l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t view of what that common o b j e c t i v e was, but we ( a l l ) knew that we had to get a b e t t e r system (BCFA respondent). A DFO respondent described a s i t u a t i o n during the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n where t h i s common ground was expressed. Often we t a l k e d about t h i s other piece of l e g i s l a t i o n , the A g r i c u l t u r a l P r o t e c t i o n Act, . . . that s a i d that i f a farm moved i n t o an area and made a bad smel l , too bad f o r the s u b d i v i s i o n that came i n l a t e r . And a l l of us sort of cheered and went, 'Hear, hear.' When i t comes to that kind of thing, i t ' s not hard f o r F i s h e r i e s to agree wit h i t because we don't have anything at r i s k . And as long as you keep that s t u f f out of the streams, then you do have the r i g h t to be prot e c t e d to c a r r y on your business. . . . And as w e l l , a l o t of the a g r i c u l t u r e (representatives) would say, 'We're i n t e r e s t e d i n p r o t e c t i n g the environment. We have to l i v e i n the community too. And we happen to be r e c r e a t i o n a l fishermen. We l i k e to know that the streams are a l i v e too.' So we had those common grounds to work from 98 (emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . Thus the issues negotiated during the Code's development d i d not involve compromising any of the groups' fundamental values, and there was room f o r c o l l a b o r a t i v e problem-solving. 2.7 C r i t e r i o n Seven: Permitting Tradeoffs This c r i t e r i o n s t a t e s that there must be m u l t i p l e issues "on the t a b l e , " to permit t r a d e o f f s so that the p a r t i e s can maximize t h e i r o v e r a l l i n t e r e s t s . The respondents were asked what t h e i r i n i t i a l p r e f erred regulatory options were, and whether the options that they were w i l l i n g to support changed over time, as the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n progressed (Question 14). During the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n , there were m u l t i p l e issues on the t a b l e that permitted t r a d e o f f s . For example, the issues included rates and times of manure spreading, maintaining farmers' exemption from mandatory p e r m i t t i n g , r e v i s i n g the peer i n s p e c t i o n system, and determining setback l i m i t s f o r feeding l i v e s t o c k near water bodies. A BCMELP respondent discussed how the AWMC had negotiated the times of the year f o r manure spreading, f o r d i f f e r e n t s o i l and weather c o n d i t i o n s throughout the province. And t h a t ' s where you've got to go through t h i s give and take, and say, 'Well okay, t h i s would make l i f e easy f o r me, but that doesn't work f o r you. So how can we do something here that w i l l achieve what I want, and s t i l l give you the o p e r a t i o n a l freedom that you need?' BCMAFF's main concern was to maintain the farmers' exemption from permitting. They wanted to ensure that the Code was f l e x i b l e enough "to recognize that there was a great range of ways that • 99 people can farm i n an environmentally sound manner" (BCMAFF respondent). The BCFA wanted to maintain t h e i r peer i n s p e c t o r system of enforcement, but had to concede that i n case of serious environmental impacts, BCMELP would send t h e i r s t a f f i n f i r s t to deal w i t h i t . When we f i r s t s t a r t e d out, government would have l i k e d to have a stronger r e g u l a t o r y r o l e . . . . They probably d i d n ' t r e a l l y want the a g r i c u l t u r e i n d u s t r y to be the f i r s t l i n e of defense. . . . And one of the things that . . . we had to accept, i s the f a c t that i f there i s o u t r i g h t p o l l u t i o n . . . the M i n i s t r y of Environment s t i l l has the a u t h o r i t y to go i n d i r e c t l y . They don't have to come back through the producer process. . . . And we had to accept that. . . . There was a compromise (BCFA respondent, emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . The n e g o t i a t i o n of setback l i m i t s f o r seasonal feeding s i t e s for l i v e s t o c k were a very contentious issue towards the end of the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n . I n i t i a l l y BCMELP and BCMAFF j u s t a r b i t r a r i l y chose a distance of 200 metres as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r one of the d r a f t s of the Code. And people s a i d , 'Well, geez, t h i s i s r i d i c u l o u s . You're wiping out a l l t h i s land base a l l over the p l a c e . ' And i t wasn't u n t i l we looked at a few ( s i t e s ) that we r e a l i z e d that ( i t didn't) make sense. And one of the issues (the ranchers) were worried about was c a t t l e having access to water. . . . Once we s a i d , 'Okay, we won't go 200 metres, w e ' l l go 30 metres, but i f we're going' to go that way, then these are the other r e g u l a t i o n s . You must feed throughout the f i e l d so the manure i s spread, and there's no b u i l d up anywhere f o r r u n o f f . . . . I f you want permanent feeders you go to (BCMELP fo r approval) . . . Those two s e c t i o n s were added because we dropped the 200 metres and went to 30 metres. And we a l l discussed i t , and everybody s a i d , 'Yes, that would be f a i r ' (BCMAFF respondent). Thus the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n d i d permit t r a d e o f f s . 100 2.8 C r i t e r i o n Eight: Research Not Determinative of Outcome N e g o t i a t i o n may not an appropriate method f o r designing regulations when fundamental research i s necessary, and the outcome Would d i c t a t e the r e g u l a t o r y r e s u l t . The respondents were asked whether the necessary data to make a d e c i s i o n was r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e (Question 15h). While there were some data f o r c e r t a i n p a r t s of the province (e.g. the Okanagan, Williams Lake, the Lower Mainland) that i n d i c a t e d there were d e f i n i t e l y a g r i c u l t u r a l non-point source p o l l u t i o n problems, there was very- l i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n to help -determine p o s s i b l e r e g u l a t o r y s o l u t i o n s . (The l a c k of data) was the key issue fbr-srae. Having to agree to a c e r t a i n number, not knowings whether I was s t r i n g e n t enough or o v e r l y s t r i n g e n t . And I don't t h i n k the engineering e x p e r t i s e e x i s t s . I don't t h i n k the studies are done. And i t may be so s i t e s p e c i f i c that i t would be f o o l i s h to t r y and do them (DFO respondent). The biggest t e c h n i c a l issue around manure management was - what i s the d i f f e r e n c e between using i t as a resource, and j u s t disposing of i t ? . . . When are you overloading i t , and when does i t become more than a f e r t i l i z e r ? . . . That took a f a i r amount of research. There's not a l o t of work done i n that area. And i t ' s not an exact science e i t h e r . I t a l l depends on your crop cover, and. your type of s o i l , . . . and the type of manure (BCFA respondent) . The AWMC used a few c r e a t i v e ways to work, around the data l i m i t a t i o n s . Some examples were the use of photos from h e l i c o p t e r f l y o v e r s , w i t h accompanying water q u a l i t y data ( i f a v a i l a b l e ) to document the environmental impacts of farms and f e e d l o t s ; l o o k i n g at other regulations f o r guidance; i n v i t i n g s p e c i a l i s t s to speak to the Committee on s p e c i f i c t o p i c s ; and u t i l i s i n g the e x p e r t i s e of those at the negotiating table to come up with ideas that were both p r a c t i c a l and e f f e c t i v e . For example, DFO r e l i e d on Environment 101 C a n a d a ' s e x p e r i e n c e w i t h e n f o r c i n g p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l u n d e r t h e F i s h e r i e s A c t , t o a d v i s e t h e C o m m i t t e e " a s t o w h a t w o u l d b e g o o d e n o u g h t o p r o t e c t t h e r e s o u r c e , o r g i v e u s t h e w a t e r q u a l i t y we e x p e c t i n t h e s t r e a m f o r t h e f i s h " ( D F O r e s p o n d e n t ) . C o n s e q u e n t l y t h e r e w a s n o r e s e a r c h o n m a n u r e m a n a g e m e n t t h a t d i c t a t e d t h e r e g u l a t o r y r e s u l t f o r t h e C o d e . T h e AWMC d i d n o t u n d e r t a k e a n y r e s e a r c h , a n d n o n e o f t h e d a t a t h e y h a d a v a i l a b l e i m p o s e d a p a r t i c u l a r r e g u l a t o r y r e s u l t . 2.9 C r i t e r i o n Nine: Agreement Implementation T h i s c r i t e r i o n s t a t e s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n m u s t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e g u l a t i n g a g e n c y w i l l u s e t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e a g r e e m e n t a s t h e b a s i s o f p u b l i c p o l i c y . T h e r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e a s k e d w h e t h e r t h e y w e r e c o n f i d e n t t h a t B C M E L P w o u l d u s e t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n a s t h e b a s i s f o r a n e w r e g u l a t i o n ( Q u e s t i o n 1 3 ) . T h e r e s p o n d e n t s h a d a d i v e r s e r a n g e o f o p i n i o n s , a s t o w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y i n i t i a l l y f e l t t h a t B C M E L P w o u l d i m p l e m e n t t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e a g r e e d u p o n C o d e . B o t h t h e G V R D a n d t h e B C C A r e s p o n d e n t s f e l t t h a t i t w a s c l e a r f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g t h a t t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n w o u l d b e i m p l e m e n t e d . T h e D F O r e s p o n d e n t w a s s o m e w h a t c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n w o u l d b e i m p l e m e n t e d , b u t w a s " s c e p t i c a l i n a r e a s o f r e a l c o n t r o v e r s y . " H e s a w B C M E L P a s b e i n g i n t h e m i d d l e , t r y i n g t o b e e v e n h a n d e d a n d c o m p r o m i s e b e t w e e n t h e i n d u s t r y ' s . d e s i r e f o r m o r e l a x r e g u l a t i o n s a n d D F O ' s d e s i r e f o r m o r e e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o t e c t i o n . T h e B C M A F F r e s p o n d e n t s a n d o n e o f t h e B C F A r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e 1 0 2 not sure that BCMELP would use the r e s u l t s of the n e g o t i a t i o n as a r e g u l a t i o n . One BCMAFF respondent f e l t that i t was j u s t p a r t of the u n c e r t a i n t i e s of working i n government. You're always doing things that may never happen. That's the state of doing work around here. . . You never know, the government could have an e l e c t i o n , the government could change, and that's j u s t the way i t i s . The other BCMAFF respondent expressed concern that s e n i o r BCMELP bureaucrats (who were not AWMC members) had t r i e d to change the Code's wording a f t e r i t had been agreed to by the Committee. (This problem i s f u r t h e r discussed i n Sec t i o n 2.15). A BCFA respondent was worried that BCMELP "would have d i f f i c u l t y s e l l i n g the f i n a l package to the senior l e v e l s i n government. . . (because i t wasn't) as t i g h t and as tough as some people would r e a l l y l i k e . " O v e r a l l , t h i s c r i t e r i o n was only p a r t l y met. Some of the respondents b e l i e v e d that the negotiated agreement would be implemented, while others had t h e i r doubts. However, a l l the p a r t i e s stayed i n v o l v e d because they saw the p o s s i b l e l a c k of implementation as part of the inescapable u n c e r t a i n t y of p o l i c y making, not because of any s p e c i f i c m i s t r u s t of BCMELP. 2.10 C r i t e r i o n Ten: Agency r o l e C r i t e r i o n Ten sta t e s that the agency sponsoring a negotiated rulemaking should take part i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s . This c r i t e r i o n was e a s i l y met, as BCMELP played an a c t i v e r o l e i n the negotiations. One BCMELP employee was the chairperson of the AWMC, and there were two other BCMELP re p r e s e n t a t i v e s on the Committee. 103 2.11 C r i t e r i o n Eleven: Role of a m e d i a t o r / f a c i l i t a t o r The r e g u l a t i n g agency should s e l e c t a s k i l l e d mediator/ f a c i l i t a t o r to a s s i s t the n e g o t i a t i n g group i n reaching an agreement. The respondents were asked whether a t r a i n e d f a c i l i t a t o r was used during the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n (Question 15a). Most respondents i d e n t i f i e d e i t h e r one, or both, of a BCMAFF p a r t i c i p a n t and the BCMELP chairperson as having acted as a f a c i l i t a t o r ( s ) . These two people were c r e d i t e d with doing an e x c e l l e n t job. I would say i t was one of the best committees I've probably ever worked on. So, and i f I can say, I give that to (the BCMELP chai r p e r s o n ) . (He) chai r e d i t i n a very amicable way, not dominating. And I've worked i n other l e g i s l a t i o n i n (the M i n i s t r y of) Environment afterward, and I've not found that same type of r e l a x a t i o n d e a l i n g with a committee at a l l . And what I l i k e d about i t was the way i t was handled by (a BCMAFF p a r t i c i p a n t ) . I seem to r e c a l l him being the lead - whether he was formally the lead or what - but he was kind of the f o c a l p o i n t of the group. And he was c o n t i n u a l l y showing evenhandedness, even though the BCMAFF i s - I guess you could say - i s an advocacy agency f o r the a g r i c u l t u r e i n d u s t r y . They didn't run i t w i t h any undue bias, and they always l i s t e n e d to our F i s h e r i e s Act requirements. But at the same time had to l i s t e n to also i n d u s t r y ' s requirements, and they t r i e d to balance those. So I think they d i d a good job (DFO respondent) . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , respondents from BCMELP, BCFA, GVRD, DFO, and Environment Canada a l l reacted negatively to the idea of a n e u t r a l , t h i r d p a r t y " f a c i l i t a t o r " . 1 They f e l t that such a person would •••The respondents ob v i o u s l y had a c e r t a i n idea of what a " f a c i l i t a t o r " was, probably from labour-management n e g o t i a t i o n s . The n e g o t i a t i o n l i t e r a t u r e d i f f e r e n t i a t e s between the r o l e of a f a c i l i t a t o r (who i s i n charge of arranging the l o g i s t i c s f o r the negotiation) and the r o l e of a mediator (who i s involved i n he l p i n g the p a r t i e s reach consensus during the negotiation) . The 104 have made the process too formal, and was simply not needed because the Committee was small, and the Committee members shared a l o t of common ground. As a BCMELP respondent s a i d , a f a c i l i t a t o r wasn't necessary i n t h i s case, "because a l l the r i g h t people were on t h i s Committee." C r i t e r i o n Eleven was p a r t l y met, as the AWMC d i d not use a n e u t r a l f a c i l i t a t o r . However, the BCMAFF and BCMELP p a r t i c i p a n t s who were i d e n t i f i e d as a c t i n g as f a c i l i t a t o r s were c r e d i t e d w i t h doing a good job. 2 . 1 2 C r i t e r i o n Twelve: D i s t r i b u t i o n of costs and benefits Issues that i n v o l v e concentrated b e n e f i t s and concentrated costs are bet t e r candidates f o r negotiation because i t i s easier to m o b i l i z e stakeholders when the i n t e r e s t groups are few i n number and narrow i n scope. The r e g u l a t i o n of farm waste i s a case of concentrated costs (for the farmers) and d i s t r i b u t e d b e n e f i t s (for soc i e t y at l a r g e ) . Thus t h i s c r i t e r i o n was only p a r t l y met, as the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n didn't i n v o l v e both concentrated costs and concentrated b e n e f i t s . However, the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n s t i l l worked because those who bear the concentrated costs (the farmers) were present, and the federal and p r o v i n c i a l environmental agencies spoke on behalf of the general p u b l i c (those who bear the d i s t r i b u t e d b e n e f i t s ) . The cost sharing programs that were a v a i l a b l e to farmers a f t e r the Code was enacted have been f a i r l y l i m i t e d , so the programs have respondents were using the l i t e r a t u r e d e f i n i t i o n of a mediator when they r e f e r r e d to a f a c i l i t a t o r . 105 not d i f f u s e d the costs f o r farmers as a whole. 2 Farmers are a l s o concerned that consumers w i l l be u n w i l l i n g to pay more f o r food i f farmers attempt to pass on the costs of compliance (and make the b e n e f i t s more concentrated). The farmer has always sa i d , " I ' l l do whatever you want me to do, but then pay me for i t . " And the person who goes to the Safeway, or Save-On store, he's not i n t e r e s t e d i n paying any more f o r h i s food. He doesn't want to pay more. H e ' l l say, "Well, l e t ' s buy i t from C a l i f o r n i a then." There's a cost i n v o l v e d when you make changes. And those costs have to be borne by someone, and i f they're borne by an i n d u s t r y t h a t ' s already s t r u g g l i n g , t h a t makes i t very d i f f i c u l t to maintain that i n d u s t r y (BCFA respondent). 2.13 C r i t e r i o n Thirteen: BATNA (Best A l t e r n a t i v e to a Negotiated Agreement) P a r t i e s w i l l o n l y come to the t a b l e i f they b e l i e v e that n e g o t i a t i o n w i l l produce an outcome that i s as good as or b e t t e r than the outcome they could achieve from other a v a i l a b l e methods. Respondents were asked what was t h e i r i n c e n t i v e to negotiate (as opposed to using other methods) (Question 15c), and whether they f e l t a l l the p a r t i e s negotiated i n good f a i t h (Question 15g). A l l the respondents agreed that a l l the groups who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the Code's development had an i n t e r e s t i n being t h e r e , and i n using n e g o t i a t i o n as t h e i r p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n to develop the Code. The best way to resolve the problems i s to work them out with those people who are concerned about the problems, 2For example, the A g r i c u l t u r a l Land Development A s s i s t a n c e Program (which was disbanded i n 1995) funded 25 waste management p r o j e c t s i n 1991/92. These p r o j e c t s r e c eived $1,616,000, or j u s t under 30 percent of ALDA's funds (BCMAFF, 1993). 106 by f a r . As you say, there are these other routes. Legal routes can be quite resource i n t e n s i v e , and i n many cases then not a l l factors are considered and c e r t a i n l y not a l l people who want to comment have an opportunity to comment. So i n many cases the wrong d e c i s i o n can be made. So t h i s i s by f a r the best route to go. You can always res o r t to those other areas i f t h i s kind of route i s not s u c c e s s f u l (GVRD respondent). BCMELP wanted a r e g u l a t i o n that was e a s i e r to enforce. The a g r i c u l t u r a l i n d u s t r y wanted what they considered to be f a i r and r e a l i s t i c standards, and the BCMAFF was i n the middle " i n being able to influence both sides, and helping (them) to reach something tha t would be workable f o r both of (them)" (BCMELP respondent). Even though DFO was regarded w i t h some s u s p i c i o n i n i t i a l l y , they too were perceived as wanting the n e g o t i a t i o n approach as t h e i r p r e ferred option. Going to the courts would have been DFO's BATNA, and p o l i t i c a l lobbying (see Section 3) would have been BCFA's BATNA. I t h i n k everybody f e l t that way (that n e g o t i a t i o n wa~ t h e i r best o p t i o n ) . I c e r t a i n l y got that message from the a g r i c u l t u r a l community, from the M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e , and our M i n i s t r y . . . . DFO made i t c l e a r that i f p o l l u t i o n was being caused or there was a problem to the f i s h e r i e s resource, whether (farmers) were f o l l o w i n g the Code or not, they'd be charged. And they s a i d that i n the meetings. I th i n k i t was s t i l l to the point where the commodity representatives were s a t i s f i e d t h a t DFO was on board, and al s o f e l t that t h i s was the best way to go (BCMELP respondent). A l l the respondents agreed that no one was there j u s t to s t a l l f o r time, and that everyone negotiated i n good f a i t h . I didn't see that ( s t a l l i n g f o r time). And I t h i n k that's because the ac t o r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y from i n d u s t r y , were there i n good f a i t h , and went away, and when they s a i d , "I'm going to take t h i s back to my people and get ' you t h e i r views on whether they could comply," they d i d so. And that was u s e f u l (DFO respondent). 107 2.14 C r i t e r i o n Fourteen: Setting a deadline S e t t i n g a deadline f o r completion of the n e g o t i a t i o n helps to keep the p a r t i c i p a n t s moving toward a r e s o l u t i o n at an e f f i c i e n t pace. The respondents were asked whether the AWMC had a deadline (Question 15b), whether they decided i n advance where to meet, how often and at convenient l o c a t i o n s (Question 15d), and whether they defined consensus i n advance (Question 15e). The AWMC d i d set a number of deadlines, although none of them were s t r i c t l y adhered t o . I n i t i a l l y , each member was assigned s p e c i f i c tasks, and the Code was to have been f i n i s h e d by May of 1988 (BCMELP Memo, October, 1987). By the spring of 1988 i t became obvious that the a c t i v i t i e s chart was not r e a l i s t i c and would have to be extended (AWMC Agenda, March 14, 1988) . In the s p r i n g of 1989, they hoped to f i n a l i z e the Code by that September (BCMAFF Memo, March 30, 1989) . Two years passed, and the (presumed to be) f i n a l d r a f t of the Code was being reviewed by l e g i s l a t i v e counsel. The target date to enact the Code was August of 1991 (BCFA L e t t e r , June 29, 1991). However the AWMC then r e c e i v e d comments from the M i n i s t r y of Health, which n e c e s s i t a t e d some f u r t h e r r e v i s i o n s ( M i n i s t r y of Health Memo, August 7, 1991). By November 1991 the Code had been sent to Cabinet (Walters, 1991), and i t was f i n a l l y enacted i n A p r i l , 1992 (BCMELP and BCMAFF News Release, A p r i l 29, 1992) . Although the Code's development took a long time (almost f i v e years) , most of the p a r t i c i p a n t s thought that i t needed to take years, as opposed to months. The length of time ensured that 108 everyone had input, the stakeholder support increased, and farmers had time to sta r t thinking of how to incorporate the costs of new waste management practices or f a c i l i t i e s - into t h e i r budgets. It would have been d i f f i c u l t to do It any faster, and have the support of a l l the stakeholders. We could have rushed i t out. We could even have done i t by ourselves and come up with something very close to what resulted, but i n terms of effectiveness i t would have been worse without everybody signing on (BCMELP respondent). Another positive i n taking so long . . . i s that i t gave the farmers more warning that things were changing. . . . The thing I've found about farmers i s that they're always spending money on t h e i r farms. . . . So you have to get the work that•you want done incorporated into that ongoing work cycle (BCMELP respondent) . However, a BCMELP respondent, a BCMAFF respondent, a BCFA respondent and the GVRD respondent f e l t a s t r i c t e r deadline would have helped to make the process more e f f i c i e n t . As one BCMELP respondent said, I think my biggest frustration was that there'd be times where . . . I would think we'd agreed to something and then we would come back - i t would take a couple of months ' t i l we had the next meeting - and i t would seem l i k e we had to recover the same ground again. I think had we been on a tig h t e r schedule, we might have been able to get through things. It just seems l i k e there was so much repetition. But at the same time, perhaps that's a l l part of the give and take. That people r e a l l y weren't ready to make that compromise yet. And you have to recover the same issue three times before everybody reaches consensus on how you want It to end up. As mentioned i n Chapter Six, the d i f f e r e n t groups became members of the AWMC at different times. This too may have added to the length of time the negotiation took, because the new members had to be brought up to speed. 'Cause every time you (brought) somebody new into the process, you'd have to go back and explain a l o t of 109 things. . . . And i t ' s not always bad, because sometimes new insights result i n useful things, but, . . .1 think . . .my biggest f r u s t r a t i o n was the number of times we covered the same ground (BCMELP respondent). Two other factors that can help to make negotiations run more e f f i c i e n t l y are to regularly schedule meetings at convenient locations, and to define consensus i n advance (Dorcey, 1992) . Almost a l l the respondents f e l t that the practice of s e t t i n g the next meeting's date at the end of each meeting worked well. "Sometimes I think you can burn people out by having a 'meeting anyways' sort of thing. I think that was a c t u a l l y one of the good things. We never had a meeting that was wasted" (BCMAFF respondent) . Only one respondent f e l t that i t would have been better to have a regular meeting schedule, because "we could have a l l b u i l t that into our schedules. We could have . . . achieved the same number of meetings i n a shorter time frame" (BCMELP respondent). Most of the meetings were held i n Abbotsford, which was considered to be a convenient location. A l l the respondents agreed that consensus had not been defined ahead of time. The AWMC was fortunate to have reached a long term agreement, as the negotiation l i t e r a t u r e suggests that defining consensus i n advance i s essential to ensuring a successful negotiation (National Round Table, 1993). Only one BCMELP respondent f e l t that i t would have been beneficial to do t h i s . The other respondents f e l t that consensus was reached anyway. We didn't, no. . . . And I think i t was deliberate from the beginning, not to do that. We didn't have votes, and we always said that this was just a process to come to a mutually agreeable system. And that we would continue to 110 work at i t ' t i l we had i t . And I think they knew there' were b a s i c a l l y three major players that had to be s a t i s f i e d - Agriculture, Environment, and the producers. And when you have those three s a t i s f i e d , we knew we had something that was going to work. . . . We didn't.do i t formally, but we knew at the end that the consensus had to be there, that everybody agreed. We didn't know exactly how we were going to get to i t when we started out. (Laughs) . . . We had to have everybody on side to make i t work. Because everybody had a role i n the thing i n the end (BCFA respondent, emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . Well, consensus was defined i n terms of the goal. And the goal was to develop a Code of Practice that could be embodied i n a regulation. That was a very clear goal, right from the beginning. And everyone was working towards that goal (GVRD respondent). We didn't do that. And I'm not sure how you would do i t . Because what's consensus? I guess consensus i s when people stop objecting strongly to something. Everybody says "Okay, we'll go along with i t the way i t ' s written." That's sort of the default that we arrived at as well. So I don't know that defining consensus ahead of time would have resulted i n us working any d i f f e r e n t l y than we did (BCMELP respondent)). The AWMC did not use firm deadlines, so this c r i t e r i o n was not met. When the participants encountered d i f f i c u l t i e s , they just kept t a l k i n g about the issues u n t i l they were able to f i n d a resolution. 2.15 C r i t e r i o n F i f t e e n : Who should p a r t i c i p a t e This c r i t e r i o n i s divided into two parts: f i r s t , were a l l the groups who had an interest in, or would be affected by the outcome of the decision, represented (Question 7 ) ? Second, did the representatives at the table have enough authority to make decisions without constantly having to check with t h e i r constituents f i r s t (Question 5 ) ? The answer to the f i r s t question i s that a broad cross-section 1 1 1 of government agencies concerned with environmental protection were present, along with BCMAFF and the farmers' interest group, the BCFA. There were no environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) present, nor were there any representatives from the general public. The reasons given for not having an ENGO representative included the h i s t o r i c a l fact that involving ENGOs i n p o l i c y development was not as much of an issue i n the mid-1980s; that they didn't know of any ENGOs with agricultural expertise; and that the environmental agencies present did a good job of representing the public interest with respect to environmental issues. With one exception, most of the participants did not feel that ENGOs would have been a benefit to the AWMC. I personally f e e l that at that p a r t i c u l a r point i n time there was a different kind of an environmentalist. They were a l i t t l e more ra d i c a l . . . . I think that there was a general consensus around that table that we would probably never have got thi s regulation through had we, at that time, too many environmentalist people at the table (BCMELP respondent)). I may be wrong and my perception may be t o t a l l y warped, but I believe (ENGOs) have a cause and the cause comes f i r s t , and l o g i c and rationale have nothing to do with i t . And so to include . . . the r a d i c a l wings that we have seen - no, I don't think they would have benefitted the process at a l l . They would have hampered i t (BCFA respondent). The idea of consensus with environmental groups i s almost a dichotomy. . . And I mean, as a government regulatory person, I would also sometimes take the hard l i n e and say, 'Absolutely none whatsoever, no. toxic discharge, that's i t . ' And that would shut down major sections of our i n d u s t r i e s . And you can't. You have to stage i t . Hopefully not to the detriment of the environment, longlasting. You may have to accept zones of influence, where you know there's going to be degradation and water 112 quality problems, and there's going to be conditions that you don't l i k e . But over a period of time i t ' s going to improve. . . . But that's not the case with some environmental groups. The consensus doesn't exist (Environment Canada respondent, emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . . . . In small meetings l i k e t h i s , with agriculture, I don't think environmental groups would've been a great deal of help to us. They probably would've gotten stuck on odour and noise, and land use decision making, and subdivisions, and planning st u f f . . .They haven't r e a l l y caught on to (a g r i c u l t u r a l pollution) i n a big way, and I don't think i t would have been very useful (DFO respondent). One respondent mentioned a negative experience with an ENGO on the committee that developed BCEPA. They had some people on there that said they didn't want any pes t i c i d e s . Now to me, somebody has to make the decision before they come in the room, that why would you i n v i t e somebody that says that? That's extreme. It's l i k e somebody saying - who uses pesticides, "I want absolutely no regulation of pe s t i c i d e s . " You wouldn't bring that person i n , because they're i l l o g i c a l (BCMAFF respondent, emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . With the benefit of hindsight, and i f the Code were to be negotiated today, the respondents suggested they would add representatives from the following groups: the Ministry of Health (to be involved d i r e c t l y , not just through the r e f e r r a l process), F i r s t Nations groups 3, an economist (to generate data on the state of the farming industry to gauge the impacts of d i f f e r e n t types of regulations), the BCCA, the horse industry, ENGOs, and the public. The answer to the second question i s that a l l of the respondents f e l t that they had enough authority to make decisions. 3As the Code i s a p r o v i n c i a l regulation, i t does not apply to F i r s t Nation's Band land, which i s federal land.. There are quite a few Band operated ranches on the Nicola River (DFO respondent). 113 I was never challenged on any d e c i s i o n s that we made (BCMELP respondent). I found complete support from my peers and superiors and subordinates i n terms of what we were doing and the way we were doing i t . Once they s t a r t e d to get i n t o the meat of what we were doing, they r e a l l y were e n t h u s i a s t i c . And I used to have to update them at every meeting, e x t e n s i v e l y , with what stage we were a t . They were r e a l l y anxious to get t h i s r e g u l a t i o n i n place (BCMELP respondent)). The one exception, was some senior BCMELP employees i n V i c t o r i a , who "would change the d i r e c t i o n a b i t " on the d r a f t s , from what had been agreed to at the meetings. The Code's development was intended to be an i t e r a t i v e process, and a l l the p a r t i c i p a n t s were expected to b r i n g back comments from t h e i r groups on d r a f t s of the Code. However, these people acted i n an a r b i t r a r y f a s h i o n . There was quite a b i t of work - I was going to say behind the scenes - but i n a way to make sure i t wasn't changed, r i g h t up u n t i l the day i t passed. And that was working w i t h other people - and no names - but other people i n the M i n i s t r y of Environment that were above (the chairperson), that would look at Nsome of t h i s and f i g u r e that maybe i t should be worded d i f f e r e n t l y . And we had to s o r t of scurry q u i t e a b i t there to say to them, ' L i s t e n . We have negotiated t h i s , we've worked years, months, on t h i s to get an agreement to the wording. And changing the wording could have a t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t meaning.'. . And so some of them would say, 'I t h i n k i t would be be t t e r t h i s way, ' and i t was kind of scary. We had to keep on top of them (BCMAFF respondent). Thus c r i t e r i o n f i f t e e n was only p a r t l y , met. The AWMC d i d not in v o l v e ENGOs or members of the p u b l i c , and there was some interference by some BCMELP s t a f f who were not p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the n e g o t i a t i n g process. 114 2.16 C r i t e r i o n Sixteen: Financing the enterprise This c r i t e r i o n states that any p a r t i e s who may have d i f f i c u l t y p a r t i c i p a t i n g due to lack of funds should have t h e i r expenses defrayed. Respondents were asked whether they had enough resources to p a r t i c i p a t e f u l l y (Question 8), and whether there was funding a v a i l a b l e to help groups w i t h fewer resources (Question 1 5 f ) . Lack of funding d i d not prevent any of the groups from p a r t i c i p a t i n g at the time of the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n . However, a number of respondents noted that i f the Code was negotiated now, the farmers'-representatives would need to be funded. I t should be required more now than i t was then, because farmers are g e t t i n g poorer, and there's j u s t so many (p u b l i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n processes) i t ' s unbelievable (BCMAFF respondent). (Intervenor funding) wasn't an issue i n t h i s process. I t c e r t a i n l y would be now, and probably would be u s e f u l on an ongoing b a s i s . I t puts a l o t of s t r e s s and a l o t of onus on the producers who are there v o l u n t e e r i n g t h e i r time (BCFA respondent). The BCFA depended on the resources of BCMAFF, i n terms of funds f o r o b t a i n i n g background in f o r m a t i o n . From the Federation p o i n t of view, we counted very h e a v i l y on the resources of the M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e . But i n terms of doing research, or g e t t i n g background information, or some a n a l y s i s , or anything l i k e t h a t, a l o t of that was done by the M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e s t a f f (BCFA respondent). I n t e r e s t i n g l y , one BCFA respondent saw i n t e r v e n o r funding as a., way for the government to p o t e n t i a l l y co-opt the smaller groups. I f we have someone paying us to do t h i s , and p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l resources, then they a l s o have some c o n t r o l over the outcome. And there's an o l d saying that goes "He who pays, says." (Laughs) So I think that's an area that would have concerned us. I f government was going to 115 give us money to s i t there and t a l k to them, then we would a l s o be more s u s c e p t i b l e to t h e i r ideas, and the outcome might have been d i f f e r e n t . This c r i t e r i o n was f u l l y met as everyone had enough f i n a n c i a l resources to p a r t i c i p a t e (at that time). 3 . CONCLUSIONS The research r e s u l t s show that the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n was c a r r i e d out i n a productive way. The negotiation met eleven of the sixteen c r i t e r i a set for negotiated rulemaking, o u t l i n e d i n Chapter Five (see Table Four). Four a d d i t i o n a l c r i t e r i a were p a r t l y met, and one was not met. The one c r i t e r i o n that was not met was that of s e t t i n g a deadline. Had the AWMC adhered to a deadline, t h i s would probably have shortened the almost f i v e years i t took f o r the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n . 116 Table Four Evaluation Summary of the Code's Negotiation C r i t e r i a Number: Whether the C r i t e r i a Was Met 1 Yes - the negotiation was equitable. No one group dominated. 2 Yes - there were less than 25 groups who participated. 3 Yes - the negotiation dealt with mature/"ripe" issues. 4 Yes - the decision was inev i t a b l e . 5 Yes - there was opportunity for gain. 6 Yes - the issue did not involve fundamental values.. 7 Yes - the negotiation permitted tradeoffs. 8 Yes - research was not determinative of outcome. 9 Partly - most participants believed the agreement would be implemented. 10 Yes - the implementing agency played a role i n the negotiation. 11 Partly - the AWMC did not use a neutral f a c i l i t a t o r . 12 Partly - the issue involved concentrated costs, but dis t r i b u t e d (not concentrated) benefits. 13 Yes - no group had a better alternative than negotiation. 14 No - there were no s t r i c t deadlines. 15 Partly - the AWMC did not involve ENGOs, or members of the public. There was some interference by non- part i c i p a n t s . 16 Yes - everyone had enough f i n a n c i a l resources to par t i c i p a t e . 117 CHAPTER NINE NEGOTIATION'S EFFECT ON THE FORM OF REGULATION 1. INTRODUCTION O b j e c t i v e 2 b ) i s t o a s s e s s h o w t h e n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s a f f e c t e d t h e f o r m o f r e g u l a t i o n s e l e c t e d . T h i s i s d o n e b y l i s t i n g t h e r e g u l a t o r y o p t i o n s c o n s i d e r e d , a n d d e s c r i b i n g h o w t h e r e g u l a t o r y o p t i o n s c h a n g e d o v e r t i m e , a n d w h i c h g r o u p s p l a y e d a r o l e i n s u p p o r t i n g t h e v a r i o u s o p t i o n s . 2. NEGOTIATION'S EFFECT ON THE FORM OF REGULATION T h e A W M C ' s p r e f e r r e d r e g u l a t o r y o p t i o n s e v o l v e d o v e r t i m e . T h e C o m m i t t e e s t a r t e d o f f b y l o o k i n g a t s o m e k i n d o f a p e r m i t t i n g s y s t e m , t o p l u g t h e " l o o p h o l e " f o r f a r m w a s t e i n t h e W a s t e M a n a g e m e n t A c t . I n t h e s p r i n g o f 1 9 8 7 , B C M E L P ' s s u g g e s t e d s t r a t e g y w a s t o d e v e l o p m o r e s p e c i f i c r e g u l a t i o n s t o e x e m p t s m a l l , n o n - t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l o p e r a t i o n s f r o m h a v i n g t o o b t a i n w a s t e m a n a g e m e n t p e r m i t s , a n d r e q u i r i n g p e r m i t s f o r l a r g e r , n o n - t r a d i t i o n a l o p e r a t i o n s ( B C M E L P I s s u e S t a t e m e n t , M a r c h 4 , 1 9 8 7 ) . I t i s c o n s i d e r e d b y m o s t c o n t r o l p e r s o n n e l t h a t a b e t t e r d e s c r i p t i o n o f t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r e i s r e q u i r e d s o t h a t p i g g e r i e s , d a i r i e s , f e e d l o t s a n d c o n c e n t r a t e d p o u l t r y r a i s i n g o p e r a t i o n s r e q u i r e p e r m i t s . O n e w a y o f a c h i e v i n g t h i s w o u l d b e t o e x e m p t o n l y t h o s e o p e r a t i o n s f o r w h i c h t h e r e i s a d e q u a t e l a n d b a s e o n t h a t o p e r a t i o n t o a c h i e v e s a t i s f a c t o r y l a n d a p p l i c a t i o n o f a n i m a l w a s t e s a n d s i l a g e e f f l u e n t . T h e r e f o r e , c r i t e r i a ( a r e ) r e q u i r e d f o r e x e m p t i o n - a n i m a l s / a c r e w i t h a m a t r i x o f c r i t e r i a b a s e d o n a n i m a l t y p e , s o i l t y p e , p h y s i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , s u c h a s : s l o p e , d e p t h t o g r o u n d w a t e r , d i s t a n c e t o w a t e r c o u r s e , e t c . ( B C M E L P M e m o , O c t o b e r , 1 9 8 7 ) . T h e B C M A F F r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s c o n c u r r e d " w i t h t h e c o n s e n s u s t h a t 1 1 8 . . . t h e r e a r e m a n y e x a m p l e s o f b a d o p e r a t o r s - p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e c o n c e n t r a t e d l i v e s t o c k o p e r a t i o n a r e a - t h a t a r e h i d i n g b e h i n d t h e ( l o o p h o l e i n t h e ) r e g u l a t i o n a n d a r e c a u s i n g p r o b l e m s " ( B C M E L P M e m o , D e c e m b e r 1 8 , 1 9 8 7 ) . O n e o f t h e B C M A F F p a r t i c i p a n t s d i s t r i b u t e d c o p i e s o f r e g u l a t i o n s f r o m T e x a s t h a t r e q u i r e d i n t e n s i v e l i v e s t o c k o p e r a t i o n s t o h a v e p e r m i t s f o r d i s c h a r g i n g w a s t e s . " T h e c o m m i t t e e g e n e r a l l y f e l t r e g u l a t i o n s o f t h i s t y p e a r e r e q u i r e d t o c l a r i f y t h e p r e s e n t e x e m p t i o n " ( B C M E L P M e m o , D e c e m b e r 1 8 , 1 9 8 7 ) . E n g l a n d ' s C o d e o f A g r i c u l t u r a l P r a c t i c e w a s f i r s t m e n t i o n e d a t a n AWMC m e e t i n g i n F e b r u a r y , 1 9 8 8 , i n a d i s c u s s i o n o f r e g u l a t i o n s i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s . A t t h a t p o i n t t h e c o m m i t t e e s t i l l f e l t " t h a t w h e r e a g r i c u l t u r a l , o p e r a t i o n s c a n ' c l e a r l y ' b e i d e n t i f i e d a s ' h i g h r i s k ' w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e m e t h o d o f s t o r a g e , l a n d b a s e a n d i n a p p r o p r i a t e a p p l i c a t i o n o f w a s t e , a p e r m i t s h o u l d b e r e q u i r e d " (AWMC M i n u t e s , F e b r u a r y 4 , 1 9 8 8 ) . A t t h e n e x t m e e t i n g i n M a r c h , 1 9 8 8 i t w a s b e c o m i n g o b v i o u s t h a t i t w o u l d b e d i f f i c u l t t o e s t a b l i s h w h e t h e r o r n o t a f a r m h a d a n a d e q u a t e l a n d b a s e f o r w a s t e d i s p o s a l (AWMC M i n u t e s , M a r c h 1 4 , 1 9 9 4 ) . A t t h e M a y , 1 9 8 8 m e e t i n g , t h e t w o B C M A F F r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s u b m i t t e d a p a p e r o n s u g g e s t i o n s f o r t h e " n e w p e r m i t " s y s t e m f o r t h e W a s t e M a n a g e m e n t A c t . T h e y b a s e d t h e i r s u g g e s t i o n s o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t W a s t e M a n a g e m e n t s t a f f d o n o t w a n t t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f i n s p e c t i n g e v e r y f a r m t o a p p l y s p e c i f i c c r i t e r i a f o r a l l o w i n g e x e m p t i o n o f a p e r m i t . T h e r e f o r e , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o s u p p l y d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n t o t h e f a r m i n g i n d u s t r y . . . e x p l a i n i n g h o w t h e f a r m e r r e t a i n s t h e 1 1 9 e x e m p t i o n p r i v i l e g e " (AWMC M i n u t e s , M a y 5 , 1 9 8 8 , e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) . A t t h e s a m e m e e t i n g , t h e y p r o p o s e d t o u p d a t e t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a l g u i d e l i n e s b o o k l e t s t h a t t h e y h a d f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1 9 7 9 , t o p r o v i d e e x p l i c i t i n s t r u c t i o n s o n h o w t o b e s t d i s p o s e o f a n i m a l w a s t e s . F r o m J u n e t o J u l y , 1 9 8 8 o n e o f t h e B C M A F F p a r t i c i p a n t s w e n t t o E u r o p e o n a f a c t - f i n d i n g t r i p . H e s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e E u r o p e a n e x p e r i e n c e w i t h r e g u l a t i n g f a r m w a s t e " s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t s " t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f c r i t e r i a b a s e d o n a m i n i m u m m a n u r e s t o r a g e p e r i o d , a n d a m a x i m u m n u m b e r o f a n i m a l s p e r h e c t a r e . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , h e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t f a r m e r s p e r c e i v e l e g i s l a t i o n " a s e i t h e r n o t n e c e s s a r y o r m u c h t o o s e v e r e . " H e c o n c l u d e d t h a t " o n t h e s u r f a c e , e s t a b l i s h i n g c r i t e r i a f o r m a n u r e s t o r a g e a n d a n i m a l n u m b e r s a p p e a r s t o b e a s o l u t i o n . . . t h a t w i l l s a t i s f y b o t h t h e r e g u l a t o r y a g e n c i e s a n d f a r m e r s . " H o w e v e r , h e c a u t i o n e d t h a t m o r e b i o p h y s i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n w a s n e e d e d o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n S o u t h C o a s t a l B . C . , t o m a k e a n a s s e s s m e n t o f h o w c h a n g e s t o t h e W a s t e M a n a g e m e n t A c t w o u l d I m p a c t f a r m e r s . H e s u g g e s t e d t h a t " e x t e n s i o n a n d e d u c a t i o n w i l l r e m a i n t h e p r e f e r r e d m e t h o d t o c h a n g e p r a c t i c e s t h a t a r e c a u s i n g p o l l u t i o n . " H e p r o p o s e d d e v e l o p i n g a C o d e o f A g r i c u l t u r a l P r a c t i c e t o " d e s c r i b e h o w c e r t a i n p r a c t i c e s c a u s e p o l l u t i o n a n d t h e n g u i d e p r o d u c e r s t o w a r d s e c o n o m i c s o l u t i o n s " ( B C M A F F R e p o r t , J u l y 1 1 , 1 9 8 8 ) . B y t h e f a l l o f 1 9 8 8 , t h e C o d e ' s f o c u s h a d b r o a d e n e d t o i n c l u d e f e r t i l i z e r s , s i l a g e e f f l u e n t , a n d w o o d w a s t e . B C M A F F ' s 120 p r e f e r r e d a p p r o a c h w a s t o f o l l o w t h e B r i t i s h m o d e l o f d e v e l o p i n g C o d e s o f G o o d A g r i c u l t u r a l P r a c t i c e . . . . T h i s a p p r o a c h i s m u c h ' s o f t e r ' t h a n t h e ' h a r d ' l e g a l c o n t r o l s a d o p t e d b y m a n y E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s . I n t h i s w a y i t i s o u r e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e l e g i t i m a t e e n v i r o n m e n t p r o t e c t i o n m a n d a t e o f t h e M i n i s t r y o f E n v i r o n m e n t c a n b e s a t i s f i e d w i t h o u t u n d u e f i n a n c i a l i m p a c t o n t h e i n d u s t r y ( B C M A F F L e t t e r , O c t o b e r 1 3 , 1 9 8 8 ) . T h e f o l l o w i n g s p r i n g , a f t e r m e e t i n g s w i t h t h e B C M A F F r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o n t h e A W M C , t h e B C F A a n n o u n c e d t h a t i t p r e f e r r e d " d e v e l o p m e n t o f a c o d e o f g o o d a g r i c u l t u r e p r a c t i c e a s o p p o s e d t o s p e c i f i c r e g u l a t i o n s e m b o d i e d d i r e c t l y i n l e g i s l a t i o n " (AWMC B r i e f i n g , M a r c h 2 1 , 1 9 8 9 ) . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t w o AWMC m e m b e r s m e t w i t h a l e g a l c o u n s e l f r o m B C M E L P t o s t a r t d e v e l o p i n g t h e C o d e . T h e B C F A w a s a s s u r e d t h a t t h e r e w a s n o i n t e n t t o h a v e a p e r m i t s y s t e m , a n d t h a t t h e AWMC w a n t e d t o m a i n t a i n a n d s t r e n g t h e n t h e A E S s y s t e m . I n i t i a l l y t h e p l a n w a s t o h a v e c o m m o d i t y s p e c i f i c c o d e s , a n d t h e i n d u s t r y w a s p r o m i s e d t h a t t h e y w o u l d b e d e v e l o p e d w i t h f u l l c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h c o m m o d i t y g r o u p s ( B C F A M i n u t e s , A p r i l 1 3 , 1 9 8 9 ) . I n M a y o f 1 9 8 9 , B C M E L P ' s l e g a l c o u n s e l h a d a c h a n g e o f h e a r t a n d d e c i d e d t h a t " t h e r e a p p e a r t o b e n o u n u s u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t w o u l d j u s t i f y a n a d o p t i o n ( o f r e g u l a t i o n ) b y r e f e r e n c e " ( B C M E L P L e t t e r , M a y 1 8 , 1 9 8 9 ) . B C M E L P , B C M A F F , a n d t h e B C F A i m m e d i a t e l y s t a r t e d a l e t t e r w r i t i n g c a m p a i g n t o l o b b y t o r e - i n s t a t e t h e r e g u l a t i o n b y r e f e r e n c e a p p r o a c h . T h i s ' a d o p t b y r e f e r e n c e ' p r o c e d u r e i s t h e t y p e o f l e g i s l a t i o n u s e d i n E n g l a n d a n d i s , i n f a c t , t h e r e a s o n w h y i t w a s p r o p o s e d f o r B . C . . . . W e h a v e g o o d a n d a c t i v e s u p p o r t , f o r t h e r e g u l a t i o n / c o d e s a p p r o a c h f r o m t h e ( M i n i s t r y o f ) E n v i r o n m e n t s t a f f , B C F A a n d t h e i r c o m m o d i t y g r o u p s , a n d o t h e r m e m b e r s o n t h e A g r i c u l t u r e W a s t e C o m m i t t e e . W i t h t h i s p o s i t i v e s u p p o r t f r o m a l l t h e s e a g e n c i e s , i t i s e x p e c t e d t h a t s o m e v e r y e f f e c t i v e c o d e s 1 2 1 c a n b e d e v e l o p e d w i t h s t r o n g s u p p o r t f o r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n b y t h e f a r m e r s . A n y s u g g e s t i o n t o f a r m e r g r o u p s t h a t a g r i c u l t u r a l p r a c t i c e s b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o a r e g u l a t i o n w i l l n o t b e w e l c o m e d a n d , i f t h r u s t u p o n t h e m , w i l l n o d o u b t b e a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e n i g h t m a r e ( B C M A F F M e m o , J u n e 8 , 1 9 8 9 ) . ( A r e g u l a t i o n ) w i l l l i k e l y n o t b e a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e B C F A o r t h e c o m m o d i t y g r o u p s t h e y r e p r e s e n t . F a r m e r s a r e k n o w n f o r t h e i r i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d i m p a t i e n c e w h e n i t c o m e s t o t h e l e n g t h y b u r e a u c r a t i c p r o c e s s . T h e r e g u l a t i o n w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e C o d e w a s i n t e n d e d a s a w i n / w i n s i t u a t i o n ( B C M E L P M e m o , J u n e 2 1 , 1 9 8 9 ) . T h e s u c c e s s o f t h e p r o g r a m a n d d e v e l o p m e n t o f a c c e p t a b l e w a s t e m a n a g e m e n t p r a c t i c e s w i l l l a r g e l y r e l y o n t h e s u p p o r t a n d g o o d w i l l o f t h e a g r i c u l t u r e c o m m u n i t y . T h e c o n c e r n i s t h a t B C F A s u p p o r t m a y n o t b e f o r t h c o m i n g i f t h e f a r m i n g c o m m u n i t y d o e s n o t d e v e l o p a f e e l i n g o f o w n e r s h i p f o r t h e p r o g r a m , a n d t h e r e g u l a t i o n s ( B C M E L P L e t t e r , J u l y 1 2 , 1 9 8 9 ) . T h e a p p r o a c h t a k e n h a s r u n i n t o a s e t - b a c k b e c a u s e o f a M i n i s t r y o f A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e C o d e s o f P r a c t i c e m u s t b e i n c o r p o r a t e d a s r e g u l a t i o n s . T h i s p o s i t i o n i s n o t s u p p o r t e d b y t h e i n d u s t r y o r b y e i t h e r M i n i s t r y . A c t i o n i s c u r r e n t l y u n d e r w a y a t t h e p o l i t i c a l a n d s e n i o r l e v e l s i n t h e M i n i s t r i e s t o t r y t o r e s o l v e t h i s i s s u e s o e f f o r t s c a n c o n t i n u e t o d e v e l o p t h e r e g u l a t i o n a n d C o d e s i n a m a n n e r s u p p o r t e d b y i n d u s t r y ( B C F A M e m o , J u l y 1 9 , 1 9 8 9 ) . I n J u l y , 1 9 8 9 , t h e l e g a l c o u n s e l s a t t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ' s o f f i c e c h a n g e d t h e i r m i n d , a n d a g r e e d t o t h e r e g u l a t i o n b y r e f e r e n c e f o r m a t a g a i n ( M i n i s t r y o f A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l L e t t e r , J u l y 1 9 , 1 9 8 9 ) . O v e r t i m e , t h e r e w a s a n o b v i o u s e v o l u t i o n i n t h e p r e f e r r e d f o r m o f r e g u l a t i o n . T h e i n i t i a l e m p h a s i s o n p e r m i t s a n d l i v e s t o c k d e n s i t i e s w a s d r o p p e d i n f a v o u r o f a C o d e o f P r a c t i c e . T h e r e w a s a l s o a n e v o l u t i o n i n t h e C o m m i t t e e , w h i c h w e n t f r o m n o t e v e n h a v i n g t h e B C F A a s a m e m b e r t o d e p e n d i n g o n t h e B C F A ' s s u p p o r t a n d a p p r o v a l . T h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n C h a p t e r T h r e e o n f a r m i n t e r e s t g r o u p p o l i t i c a l p o w e r , a n d t h e t h r e e p h a s e e v o l u t i o n o f n i t r a t e 1 2 2 regulation i n Europe helps to explain how B.C. ended up with a Code of Practice. B.C. obviously started i n a phase one approach of hoping that extension education would solve the problem. The Code was intended to be an educational document, as well as a regulatory one. The intention of the Code was e s s e n t i a l l y to create a model for educative and other purposes, i n creating a cer t a i n goal that farmers would aspire to balance the interests of continued farming i n a modernized t r a d i t i o n a l manner with a need not to pollute the environment (BCMELP legal adviser). One could argue that a phase one approach offers a low standard of environmental protection, and that the AWMC should have been able to "leapfrog" to phase three by learning from the European experience. There are a number of possible reasons why this did not occur. The f i r s t reason i s that i t did not appear to be clear to the AWMC that the more stringent regulations i n the Netherlands were the result of an evolution to a phase two or three approach. I believe the AWMC saw the d i f f e r e n t regulations i n the Netherlands and the UK as simply d i f f e r e n t options that they could select from. Second, the selection of a phase one educational approach was the appropriate outcome at the time, i f i t r e f l e c t e d what the groups at the negotiating, table could agree to. Obviously, tradeoffs were made between environmental and economic goals, and the perceived e n f o r c e a b i l i t y of d i f f e r e n t p o l i c y options. If more stringent regulations were selected, the AWMC was concerned that there would have been a backlash, and BCMELP would have needed more enforcement s t a f f to deal with the increased 123 r e s i s t a n c e . However, the Code i s not viewed as a s t a t i c document. With the new informati o n a v a i l a b l e on the seriousness of the manure problem i n the Lower Fraser V a l l e y (that was not a v a i l a b l e at the time of the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n ) , the AWMC p a r t i c i p a n t s are aware that the Code w i l l probably be made more s t r i n g e n t . I think (animal density l i m i t s are) i n e v i t a b l e . . . .We have b a s i c a l l y n e a r l y passed our c a p a c i t y of the Fraser V a l l e y to absorb manures on land. . . . I know (the AWMC) di d n ' t r e a l i z e how serious t h i s was. And (the BCMAFF representative) came back from h i s European t r i p , and he tal k e d about . . .where they were r e s t r i c t i n g the number of animals per hectare, . . and he r e a l i z e d that t h i s was i n e v i t a b l e , and t h a t would have to come here. Now what form i t would take, we don't know yet. We're j u s t c o l l e c t i n g Information and d e f i n i n g the problem, and then we have to f i n d s o l u t i o n s (BCMELP respondent). I think we do know that the problem i s bigger than t h a t . That what they're faced w i t h i s handling more animals than the land, can handle j u s t to compete i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y now. And so i t ' s a d i f f i c u l t i s s u e , i t ' s not one that the producers can address without having an economic Impact on them. And i t may even go beyond the p o i n t where they're economically v i a b l e . So we recognize that i t ' s l i k e that i n some cases. But we also recognize that the impacts i n c e r t a i n p a r t s of, say, the Lower Fraser V a l l e y , are at a poi n t where we can no longer condone those types of p r a c t i c e s . Where they're handling more animals than the immediate environment can handle (BCMELP respondent). The i n f o r m a t i o n gaps made i t d i f f i c u l t to make the Code more s t r i n g e n t , or to set l i v e s t o c k d e n s i t y l i m i t s . We probably discussed that approach (of d e n s i t y l i m i t s ) . But you f i n d some problems w i t h that approach. For example, the grazing c a t t l e on rangeland. We thought i t would be very appropriate i f they brought the water to the c a t t l e . And then we r e a l i z e d that there are many areas where they didn't have power. How were they going to pump the water to the c a t t l e ? . . . There are p o s s i b l y areas t h a t maybe should be fenced o f f , . . but then you have to think about what you do with the w i l d l i f e (BCMELP 124 respondent). The Code was used as the f i r s t approach, because of the need for f l e x i b i l i t y to deal with varying conditions around the province. I think we decided that we should minimize the amount of numbers i n the Code. If we say, 'You can't have more than so many animals,, or you have to have a. certain, months (worth) of storage', . . then anyone who didn't meet that was i n v i o l a t i o n of. the Act. And i n fact, they may well be doing things i n a very reasonable way. It's ju s t they've found a d i f f e r e n t way of doing i t . So we needed to have the f l e x i b i l i t y to recognize that there was a great range of ways that people can farm i n an environmentally sound manner, and that we shouldn't have any numbers i n the Code (BCMAFF respondent). We started o f f with try i n g to put black and. white standards in, and to some degree we kept that, but we had to put a l o t of q u a l i t a t i v e things i n too. There's situations where the farmer can spread on snow-covered, frozen f i e l d s because he's so far away from the nearest watercourse that i t ' s not going to get there. So i f he wants to do that, why should i t matter to us? So we ended up with things l i k e , instead of saying you need this much storage, we ended up saying, 'You can't spread on frozen f i e l d s i f there's going to be runoff that gets to a creek' (BCMELP respondent). Part of the f l e x i b i l i t y also included the economic impacts on the industry. Numerical standards were perceived as desirable, but ultimately unreasonable i n terms of t h e i r f i n a n c i a l consequences. We were looking at i t on a per unit basis, so many animal units per acre, this sort of thing. And we just found It wasn't feasible In today's marketing conditions and . . . the way they do business. Because the hog farmers and poultry producers, to meet the requirements of society, that would have been unreasonable.. It would have been desirable. The farmer would have been out of business. . . . So I think we. had to be pragmatic. . . We're i n the business of cleaning up the p o l l u t i o n problem, we're not i n the business of putting people, out of business (BCMELP respondent). I think there was an. issue of cost. When you change a 125 p r o c e d u r e , t h e r e ' s u s u a l l y a c o s t i n v o l v e d . I n s o m e c o m m o d i t i e s , t h o s e c o s t s w i l l b e c o m e v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t , a n d t o a s k s o m e o n e w h o i s s t r u g g l i n g t o m a k e a n a d j u s t m e n t t h a t ' s c o s t l y , a n d n o t g i v e t h e m a n y g u a r a n t e e t h a t y o u ' r e g o i n g t o h e l p t h e m w i t h t h a t c o s t , t h a t ' s d i f f i c u l t . I t w a s d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e i n d u s t r y t o a c c e p t t h a t . We d i d n ' t w a n t t o r e b u i l d b e e f . f e e d l o t s . We d i d n ' t w a n t t o s e l l , o r t r y t o s e l l , a l l t h e w a s t e d i s p o s a l e q u i p m e n t w e h a d a n d c h a n g e t o n e w t h i n g s . We h a d t r i e d s o m e d i f f e r e n t f o r m s o f w a s t e d i s t r i b u t i o n , b a s e d o n s u g g e s t i o n s f r o m t h e M i n i s t r y o f A g r i c u l t u r e , a n d s o m e o f t h e m w o r k e d a n d s o m e o f t h e m d i d n ' t . A n d s o m e o f t h e m c r e a t e d w o r s e p r o b l e m s . A n d s o t h e i n d u s t r y s a i d , ' W e ' r e b e i n g a s k e d t o c h a n g e w i t h n o g u a r a n t e e s t h a t i t ' l l w o r k . W e ' r e b e i n g a s k e d t o i n v e s t s u m s o f m o n e y a n d t h e n f i n d o u t t h a t i t d o e s n ' t w o r k . ' A n d t h e i n d u s t r y s a i d , ' M a y b e we s h o u l d g o a w h o l e l o t s l o w e r w i t h t h e s e c h a n g e s . ' A n d t h e y h a d a g o o d p o i n t ( B C F A r e s p o n d e n t ) . O n e B C M E L P r e s p o n d e n t d i d n o t f e e l t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f e c o n o m i c i m p a c t s w a s t h e f a c t o r t h a t t i p p e d t h e d e c i s i o n t o w a r d s a c o d e . R a t h e r i t w a s t h e a b i l i t y t o t a k e a s t a g e d a p p r o a c h , a n d t o m a k e t h e C o d e m o r e , s t r i n g e n t a t a . l a t e r d a t e i f i t w a s n ' t e f f e c t i v e . I d o n ' t r e c a l l ( l i v e s t o c k d e n s i t y l i m i t s ) b e i n g d i s c o u n t e d f o r a s p e c i f i c r e a s o n l i k e ( e c o n o m i c c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s ) . I k n o w i t w a s o n e i s s u e t h a t w a s b r o u g h t u p , b u t I i m a g i n e i t w a s m o r e t h a t we f e l t i t m i g h t b e b e s t t o g o i n a s t a g e d p r o c e s s , w h e r e we p u t o u t t h e C o d e f i r s t a n d s e e h o w w o r k i n g w i t h t h e C o d e w i l l a d d r e s s p r o b l e m s . A n d i f t h e r e a r e s t i l l s i g n i f i c a n t e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s e v e n w i t h c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e C o d e , t h e n we k n e w we w o u l d h a v e t o t a k e a c l o s e r l o o k a t d e n s i t y i s s u e s ( B C M E L P r e s p o n d e n t ) . A n o t h e r f a c t o r w a s t h a t , i n B . C . , f a r m e r s a r e l i m i t e d i n t h e a m o u n t o f l a n d t h e y c a n u s e f o r m a n u r e s p r e a d i n g b e c a u s e o f t h e l i m i t e d a m o u n t o f l a n d i n t h e A L R . D e n s i t y i s v e r y d i f f i c u l t . . . . . I s t i l l t h i n k t h e r e ' s p r o b a b l y a l e v e l we c a n a l l a g r e e t o . I f y o u ' v e g o t t e n a c r e s a n d y o u g r o w 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 c h i c k e n s o n i t , a n d y o u c a n . g e t t h a t w a s t e . . . a n d g o a n d s p r e a d i t d o w n i n D e l t a o n v e g e t a b l e s o i l , w h a t ' s w r o n g w i t h t h a t ? W h e r e a s s o m e b o d y w i t h 1 0 , 0 0 0 b i r d s c o u l d h a v e m a n u r e r u n n i n g i n t o 1 2 6 a d i t c h a n d r u n n i n g i n t o a c r e e k , a n d h a v e m a j o r p r o b l e m s . S o d e n s i t y d i d n ' t r e a l l y m e a n a n y t h i n g . I t d i d n ' t m e a n p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a t a l l . . . . . A n d y o u c a n d o t h a t , m a y b e , i n s o m e p l a c e l i k e t h e P r a i r i e s o r s o m e t h i n g , w h e r e y o u ' v e g o t l a r g e l a n d b a s e s , w h e r e y o u c a n s a y t h e , a m o u n t o f m a n u r e y o u p r o d u c e , y o u n e e d t h a t s a m e a m o u n t o f l a n d t o d i s t r i b u t e i t o n . I m e a n , y o u c o u l d n ' t d o t h a t h e r e , b e c a u s e y o u ' d e l i m i n a t e a h e c k o f a l o t o f t h e . A L R ( B C M A F F r e s p o n d e n t ) ) . A l s o i n B C we h a v e t h e l a n d r e s e r v e f o r a g r i c u l t u r e . A n d t h a t ' s a n u n d e r l y i n g f a c t o r ' i n h o w p r o d u c e r s c a n d o t h e i r j o b . A n d t h a t ' s a c t u a l l y a d e t r i m e n t r i g h t n o w , t o a l o t o f p r o d u c e r s b e c a u s e o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i r l a n d i s h e l d i n t h i s r e s e r v e , a n d y o u c a n ' t d o a n y t h i n g o n i t b u t f a r m o r a g r i c u l t u r e , b u t . n o w y o u ' r e n o t e v e n a l l o w i n g t h e m t o f a r m . S o a n y b o d y e l s e w h o b u y s a h o u s e , a n d s o m e l a n d , t h e y c a n d o w h a t t h e y w a n t t o d o w i t h i t . T h e y c a n s e l l i t , a n d t h e y c a n g o s o m e w h e r e e l s e . W e l l , t h e s e g u y s c a n ' t d o t h a t . N o b o d y ' s g o i n g t o b u y t h e f a r m i f t h e y c a n ' t f a r m I t . A n d y o u c a n ' t d o a n y t h i n g b u t f a r m i t . S o i t ' s t h i s c a t c h - 2 2 ( B C F A r e s p o n d e n t , e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) . A l t h o u g h n o n e o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t s m e n t i o n e d i t , t h e r e w a s a n o t h e r p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r - r e l a t e d t o t h e A L R - t h a t m a y h a v e p l a y e d a r o l e i n t h e C o d e ' s d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . . W h e n t h e A L R w a s f i r s t i n t r o d u c e d , t h e g o v e r n m e n t o f t h e d a y a l s o a n n o u n c e d a F a r m I n c o m e I n s u r a n c e ( F I I ) p r o g r a m t o p r o v i d e a s s i s t a n c e t o p r o d u c e r s w h e n r e t u r n s f r o m t h e m a r k e t p l a c e f e l l b e l o w t h e c o s t o f . p r o d u c t i o n . " T h i s w a s w i d e l y r e g a r d e d b y f a r m e r s a s a m e a s u r e t o s e c u r e t h e i r s u p p o r t f o r t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e ( A L R ) " ( A n o n y m o u s , 1 9 9 3 ) . T h e F I I p r o g r a m w a s c a n c e l l e d i n 1 9 9 3 , o n e y e a r a f t e r t h e C o d e w a s e n a c t e d . T h e F I I ' s d e m i s e m a y h a v e b e e n a n t i c i p a t e d b y B C M A F F , a n d t h u s a l e s s s t r i n g e n t c o d e m a y h a v e b e e n t h e i r p r e f e r r e d r e g u l a t o r y o p t i o n . B C M A F F w o u l d h a v e k n o w n t h a t i f f a r m e r s w e r e f a c e d w i t h h a v i n g t h e i r l a n d t i e d u p i n t h e A L R , w i t h n o i n c o m e I n s u r a n c e p r o g r a m a n d v e r y s t r i n g e n t w a s t e m a n a g e m e n t r e g u l a t i o n s , t h e e n t i r e 1 2 7 a g r i c u l t u r a l community would have been very upset. Over time, the drafts softened i n t h e i r approach, but the bottom lin e i s that the Code s t i l l charges farmers not to p o l l u t e . Well, i t seems to me from when the f i r s t time that I came in ' t i l the f i n a l documentation, that, the words i n terms of what s h a l l constitute a p o l l u t i o n , or what sort of practices can be done, i t softened quite, a b i t . When I. f i r s t came i n there was a l i t t l e b i t more teeth i n the draft, i n terms of what an operation s h a l l and s h a l l not do. . . I guess I f e l t that we could agree to the f i n a l wording because . . . the bottom l i n e was, 'Thou s h a l l not p o l l u t e . ' And so that my f e e l i n g was well we (laughs) have a l i t t l e ground here, we have some s t u f f that's l a i d out i n the regulation. I mean, there's some good stuff i n there. I would l i k e to have seen stronger wording, but we s t i l l have, 'Thou s h a l l not p o l l u t e ' (Environment Canada respondent). Ultimately, BCMELP f e l t that they would have come up with something similar had they developed the Code on their own, perhaps because of the. uncertainties of n i t r a t e p o l l u t i o n , and t h e i r lack of in-house agricultural expertise. But, as mentioned previously, they were afraid that producers wouldn't have bought into i t . Thus there was a tradeoff between choosing a regulation that would be more responsive to environmental problems or one that would be more p o l i t i c a l l y viable, i n terms of producer acceptance. I think there would have been some changes i n the wording of the Code, but I think the main difference would have been i n perception i n the industry. That they were having something rammed down their throat, more than i t ' s something that was negotiated and r e a l l y i s the proper approach that they should be taking. And I think that i s a big advantage to having them at the table, that they recognize that they were represented there. So I don't think a major difference would be i n the Code i t s e l f . I think the major difference would be in. the perception of the Code, and how i t was received (BCMELP respondent). 128 3. CONCLUSIONS The AWMC looked at a v a r i e t y of r e g u l a t o r y options, but ended up with a " s o f t e r " r e g u l a t o r y approach - a code of p r a c t i c e . Information gaps and the p o l i t i c a l power of the a g r i c u l t u r a l community both played a r o l e i n the choice of a code of p r a c t i c e rather than a permit system or l i v e s t o c k density l i m i t s . There was' no d e f i n i t i v e research that could answer the s i t e s p e c i f i c c o n s t r a i n t s of s e t t i n g numerical standards f o r d i f f e r e n t regions of. the province, and d i f f e r e n t types of commodity groups. The p o l i t i c a l power of the BCFA became apparent when they s u c c e s s f u l l y l o b b i e d f o r the r e g u l a t i o n by reference format used f o r the Code, and were able to i n f l u e n c e the s e t t i n g of setback l i m i t s f o r seasonal feeding areas. The research r e s u l t s show that B.C. c l e a r l y f a l l s w i t h i n phase- one of Glasbergen's (1992) three phase process of the c o n t r o l of a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n ( f i r s t mentioned i n Chapter Four). At the time the Code was negotiated, there was an awareness of the p o l l u t i o n , but the p e r c e p t i o n of the s e v e r i t y of the problem was l i m i t e d . Producers were encouraged to take environmental aspects of t h e i r operations i n t o account, but the AEPC r e l i e d on producers to v o l u n t a r i l y change t h e i r p r a c t i c e s . With the s t r i c t e r enforcement of manure management p r a c t i c e s that began i n the f a l l of 1995, i t appears that B.C. may be beginning the t r a n s i t i o n i n t o phase two. 129 CHAPTER TEN COMPLIANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION 1. INTRODUCTION This chapter begins with the research findings as to whether the Code's negotiation affected farmers' incentive to comply - objective 2c). The findings come from the interview t r a n s c r i p t s , as well as recent surveys conducted for the federal and p r o v i n c i a l governments. The chapter ends with the findings related to objective 2d), i . e . suggested changes to the Code and i t s enforcement. The suggestions are a summary of the recommendations from the respondents, as well as recommendations from the NPS Po l l u t i o n Workshop. 2 . NEGOTIATION AND COMPLIANCE Objective 2c) was to determine how the Code's negotiation affected farmers' Incentive to comply with the Code. As there was no baseline data c o l l e c t e d as to farmers' waste management practices p r i o r to the Code, th i s question can only be answered, i n d i r e c t l y from the viewpoints of the respondents. The answer to t h i s question i s divided into two parts. F i r s t , did the Code's negotiation lead to increased awareness (on the part of farmers) about the Code (Question 17a)? This f i r s t question i s important because knowledge i s the f i r s t step i n the innovation-decision process of changing one's practices (Rogers, 1983). The majority of the respondents f e l t that the Code's negotiation did increase farmers' awareness of the Code. 130 An example i s the beef producers reprinted the Code i n one of t h e i r publications, with l i t t l e pictures of examples for some of the points. And I don't think that would have happened i f they hadn't been involved i n the (negotiation) process (BCMELP respondent). I think there has been an e f f e c t . . . . You go to . . . a commodity group's meeting . . . and they can quote sections of the Code. It's become well known (BCMELP respondent, emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . I think i t ' s r e a l l y gone up. I think they're very much aware of the environmental concerns out there. When I was going out to investigate complaints when the Code f i r s t came in, a l l the producers knew about the Code. In fact some of them knew the Code quite well, even the ones in noncompliance (BCMELP respondent). It's helped tremendously. There's a lot more farmers out there who look at things from an environmental point of view now (BCFA respondent, emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . Well, i t ' s gone a long way to get the message out to them. And I think i t was absolutely essential (DFO respondent). A smaller number f e l t that the Code's negotiation alone was not enough to generate awareness. They pointed out that the farmer conservation groups ( f i r s t mentioned i n Chapter Six), which began just before the Code came into effect, have been more important i n that respect. You see, helping to develop the Code was only a small group, a few people. >They are not representative (of) the pork industry, I think. . . . What the (conservation group) did to generate awareness, that was b a s i c a l l y , I think, the main thing. And that was one of the major mandates under (the funding program's mandate) generating awareness. . . . So a l o t of time and money was spent i n that d i r e c t i o n (Hog producer, emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . I don't know i f the actual development of the Code would have increased the farmers' knowledge so much, (as) what was done . . . at the same time . . . as (the Code) was nearing completion. . . . Because of the follow-up (conservation group) programs afterwards, I think there 131 h a s b e e n a f a i r l y s u b s t a n t i a l i n c r e a s e i n k n o w l e d g e ( C o n s e r v a t i o n g r o u p c o - o r d i n a t o r , e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) . Y o u h a d t o h a v e t h e C o d e , t h e r e ' s n o d o u b t a b o u t t h a t . B u t t h e C o d e i n i t s e l f , i s n ' t t h e e n d a n d i t ' s o n l y a p a r t o f i t . A n d w h e t h e r i t ' s t h e m a j o r p a r t , o r n o t , I ' m n o t s u r e . B u t c e r t a i n l y i t i s s o m e t h i n g t h a t y o u h a v e t o h a v e . T h e r e ' s n o d o u b t a b o u t t h a t . I n m y m i n d , t h e r e ' s t h e t h r e e t h i n g s y o u h a v e t o h a v e . Y o u n e e d t h e C o d e , y o u n e e d t h e r e g u l a t o r s , a n d y o u n e e d t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n g r o u p s t o b r i n g a b o u t c h a n g e . T o l e a d t h e m i n t h e w a y y o u w a n t t o s e e t h e i n d u s t r y g o i n g ( C o n s e r v a t i o n g r o u p c o - o r d i n a t o r , e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) . O n l y o n e r e s p o n d e n t f e l t t h a t t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n h a d n o t m a d e a d i f f e r e n c e . N o . N o t t h e a v e r a g e ( f a r m e r ) . . . . A n d t h e p e o p l e t h a t a r e c a u s i n g t h e w o r s t p r o b l e m s a r e t h e o n e s t h a t d o n ' t d o a n y t h i n g . . . T h e y w o u l d n ' t g o t o t h e m e e t i n g s . T h e y ' r e t h e o n e s l e a s t i n t o u c h ( V e g e t a b l e p r o d u c e r , e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) . T h e p e r c e p t i o n t h a t f a r m e r s ' a w a r e n e s s o f t h e C o d e h a s i n c r e a s e d i s s u p p o r t e d b y t h e c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e o f t w o . s t u d i e s . A 1 9 9 3 s t u d y o f f a r m e r s i n t h e " A b b o t s f o r d A q u i f e r a r e a f o u n d t h a t 8 1 p e r c e n t o f B C F A m e m b e r s w e r e v e r y a w a r e o f t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n c e r n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h m a n u r e a n d / o r t h e C o d e . T h i s c o m p a r e d t o o n l y 3 9 p e r c e n t o f n o n - m e m b e r s w i t h t h e s a m e l e v e l o f a w a r e n e s s ( M e i e r , 1 9 9 3 , 1 7 - 1 8 ) . A 1 9 9 4 s u r v e y o f d a i r y a n d p o u l t r y p r o d u c e r s i n t h e L o w e r F r a s e r V a l l e y f o u n d t h a t 61 p e r c e n t a n d 34 p e r c e n t , r e s p e c t i v e l y , h a d c h a n g e d t h e i r a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d s m a n u r e m a n a g e m e n t i n t h e p r e v i o u s t h r e e y e a r s . O f t h o s e w h o h a d c h a n g e d t h e i r a t t i t u d e s , 92 p e r c e n t o f t h e p o u l t r y p r o d u c e r s a n d 4 7 p e r c e n t o f t h e d a i r y p r o d u c e r s a t t r i b u t e d t h e c h a n g e t o t h e i r p r o d u c e r c o n s e r v a t i o n g r o u p ( F e r e n c e W e i c k e r a n d C o m p a n y , 1 9 9 4 , 2 0 ) . 1 3 2 S e c o n d l y , d i d t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n l e a d t o i n c r e a s e d c o m p l i a n c e b e c a u s e t h e f a r m e r s d e v e l o p e d a s e n s e o f " o w n e r s h i p " a b o u t i t ( Q u e s t i o n 1 7 b ) ? T h e m a j o r i t y o f r e s p o n d e n t s f e l t t h a t f a r m e r s ' c o m p l i a n c e w a s m o t i v a t e d b y t h e " p a c k a g e " o f p r o g r a m s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e C o d e , r a t h e r t h a n j u s t b y t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n a l o n e . A s m e n t i o n e d i n C h a p t e r S i x , t h i s " p a c k a g e " i n c l u d e s c o s t - s h a r i n g p r o g r a m s , c o m m o d i t y - s p e c i f i c E n v i r o n m e n t a l G u i d e l i n e s b o o k l e t s , t h e p r o d u c e r c o n s e r v a t i o n g r o u p s , B A W M P s , a n d t h e A E P C p e e r i n s p e c t o r s a s t h e f r o n t l i n e i n t h e e n f o r c e m e n t p r o c e s s . I t h i n k a l o t h a v e ( c h a n g e d t h e i r p r a c t i c e s ) . I d o n ' t t h i n k i t ' s j u s t t h e C o d e . ( M e n t i o n e d A L D A l o a n s , G u i d e l i n e s , A E P C ) . . . . S o t h e C o d e d o e s n ' t s t a n d i n i s o l a t i o n . I t ' s p a r t o f a n e n t i r e p r o g r a m ( B C M E L P r e s p o n d e n t ) . I t i n c r e a s e d t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o c o m p l y . A n d t h a t w a s f o r t w o r e a s o n s . O n e i s t h a t t h e r e w a s j u s t h e i g h t e n e d a w a r e n e s s , t h e o t h e r w a s t h e r e w a s a s t r o n g e r c o m p l i a n c e m e c h a n i s m t h a n t h e r e w a s i n p l a c e p r e v i o u s l y . A n d w h e n p u s h c o m e s t o s h o v e , s o m e t i m e s t h a t i s u s e f u l ( B C F A r e s p o n d e n t ) ! I t h i n k t h e y d o ( h a v e a s e n s e o f o w n e r s h i p ) , b u t m o s t l y b e c a u s e t h e y u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e a s o n , a n d i t ' s a v a l i d r e a s o n . L i k e , y o u c a n ' t d u m p y o u r m a n u r e i n a c r e e k b e c a u s e i t k i l l s t h e f i s h . . . . S o , b e c a u s e i t ' s r e a s o n a b l e , a n d t h e r e ' s a v a l i d r e a s o n f o r t h e r e g u l a t i o n a s . i t s t a n d s . T h a t ' s w h e r e t h e b u y - i n i s . A n d t h a t ' s b e c a u s e t h e y h e l p e d i n d e v e l o p i n g i t . T h a t ' s t h e o w n e r s h i p . . . . T h e y d o h a v e a s e n s e o f o w n e r s h i p b e c a u s e t h e y w e r e i n v o l v e d . B e c a u s e s o m e o n e c a m e a n d a s k e d t h e m t h e i r o p i n i o n , a n d t h e n t h e i r o p i n i o n w a s a c t u a l l y u s e d . . . . I t h i n k i t a l s o h e l p s h a v i n g t h i s p e e r a d v i s o r p r o c e s s b e c a u s e i t ' s t h e p e e r r e v i e w e r w h o k n o w s a g r i c u l t u r e , . . . a n d w h o ( i s ) s o r t o f t h e r e t o h e l p y o u , n o t t o h i n d e r y o u . W h i c h i s s t i l l s o m e w h a t o f a n a t t i t u d e w i t h r e s p e c t t o a n y g o v e r n m e n t p e r s o n s h o w i n g u p o n t h e i r f a r m . ' O h g r e a t , n o w w h a t ' s h e g o i n g t o m a k e me s t o p d o i n g ? ' ( B C F A r e s p o n d e n t , e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) . 1 3 3 W e l l i t ' s m e a n t t h a t t h e y h a d t o b u y - i n . A n d t h e y t h e r e f o r e w e r e p a r t o f t h e t e a m . T h e y h a d o w n e r s h i p o f t h e p r o d u c t a t t h e e n d . A n d e v e n i f t h e y w e r e r e c a l c i t r a n t m e m b e r s o f t h e i n d u s t r y s e c t o r , t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , b r o u g h t t h e m i n . A n d i f t h e y d i d n ' t c o m p l y t h e p e e r p r e s s u r e i s s u p p o s e d t o b r i n g t h o s e p e o p l e i n l i n e . A n d s o t h e y d o h a v e t h a t h a n g i n g o v e r t h e m ( D F O r e s p o n d e n t , e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) . A s m a l l n u m b e r o f r e s p o n d e n t s f e l t t h a t t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n m o t i v a t e d f a r m e r s ' t o c o m p l y b e c a u s e t h e i r a d v i c e h a d b e e n i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o d r a f t s o f t h e C o d e . ( T h e f a r m e r s b o u g h t i n t o t h e C o d e b e c a u s e o f ) t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y s a w ( d r a f t s ) i n f r o n t o f t h e m a n d s a i d , ' T h i s i s o u r s . D o n ' t d o t h a t , d o t h i s . ' A n d n e x t t i m e t h e y s a w t h e C o d e c o m e b a c k a n d t h e y s a w w e ' d l i s t e n e d t o t h e m ( B C M A F F r e s p o n d e n t ) . We d o f e e l we h a v e o w n e r s h i p o n t h i s . I t i s n ' t s o m e t h i n g t h a t w a s b r o u g h t d o w n f r o m u p a b o v e o n t o u s . We h a d a h a n d i n d e v e l o p i n g i t - a t l e a s t t h a t ' s h o w we f e l t ( D a i r y p r o d u c e r ) . A s o n e E n v i r o n m e n t C a n a d a r e s p o n d e n t p o i n t e d o u t , c o m p l y i n g w i t h t h e C o d e i n v o l v e s a l e a r n i n g c u r v e t h a t h a s i n c r e a s e d o v e r t i m e . T h i s l e a r n i n g c u r v e h a s b e e n q u a n t i f i e d b y a 1 9 9 4 s t u d y o f f a r m s i n t h e L o w e r F r a s e r V a l l e y ( F i g u r e T w o ) . T h e s t u d y c r e a t e d a n E n v i r o n m e n t a l S u s t a i n a b i l i t y P a r a m e t e r ( E S P ) b a s e d o n f a r m w a s t e m a n a g e m e n t . A n e v a l u a t i o n o f m a n u r e m a n a g e m e n t m e t h o d s i s t h e l a r g e s t c o m p o n e n t i n t h e E S P v a l u e . T h e s t u d y s u r v e y e d 64 p r o d u c e r s i n t h e M a t s q u i S l o u g h w a t e r s h e d , a n d 1 2 2 p r o d u c e r s i n t h e S u m a s R i v e r w a t e r s h e d . W e l l , o u r m o n i t o r i n g s h o w s t h a t i t ' s b a s i c a l l y a n o r m a l d i s t r i b u t i o n i n t e r m s o f m e e t i n g t h e C o d e . T h e r e a r e s o m e e x t r e m e s o n e i t h e r e n d o f t h e s c a l e . S o m e f a r m e r s a r e r e a l l y t a k i n g a p r o a c t i v e a p p r o a c h a n d p u t t i n g i n m a n u r e s t o r a g e f o r s i x m o n t h s , a n d t h i s k i n d o f t h i n g , a n d a t t h e o t h e r e n d o f t h e s c a l e l i t t l e i s b e i n g d o n e . ( A n d e v e r y b o d y e l s e i s i n ) d i f f e r e n t d e g r e e s o f 1 3 4 F i g u r e T w o : E n v i r o n m e n t a l S u s t a i n a b i l i t y P a r a m e t e r 1 D i s t r i b u t i o n f o r t h e S u m a s a n d M a t s q u i W a t e r s h e d s S o u r c e : . E n v i r o n m e n t C a n a d a a n d B C M E L P , 1 9 9 4 . 1 A n E S P o f 8 0 t o 1 0 0 p e r c e n t i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e f a r m i s l i k e l y e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y s u s t a i n a b l e . 1 3 5 c o m p l i a n c e ( E n v i r o n m e n t C a n a d a r e s p o n d e n t ) . O v e r a l l , t h e g e n e r a l i m p r e s s i o n i s t h a t t h e C o d e w a s t h e c a t a l y s t t o m o t i v a t i n g f a r m e r c o m p l i a n c e , b u t i n a n d o f i t s e l f w a s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o m o t i v a t e c o m p l i a n c e . M o t i v a t i o n o f c o m p l i a n c e n e e d e d t h e o n g o i n g e f f o r t s o f t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n g r o u p s , t h e E n v i r o n m e n t a l G u i d e l i n e b o o k l e t s , t h e c o s t - s h a r i n g p r o g r a m s , t h e B A W M P s , a n d t h e p e e r i n s p e c t o r s . A n i n t e r e s t i n g p o i n t w a s b r o u g h t u p d u r i n g t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e C o d e ' s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . A B C F A r e s p o n d e n t m e n t i o n e d t h a t f a r m e r s f e a r t h a t t h e C o d e i s a " s l i p p e r y s l o p e " t o a m o r e s t r i n g e n t r e g u l a t i o n . T h e y a r e w o r r i e d t h a t a s m o r e u r b a n s p r a w l e n c r o a c h e s o n r u r a l a r e a s , t h e r e ' s g o i n g t o b e m o r e a n d m o r e p r e s s u r e o n f a r m e r s i n t e r m s o f w h a t a r e a l l o w a b l e w a s t e m a n a g e m e n t p r a c t i c e s . T h a t ' s t h e r e a l i t y o f i t , i t w i l l b e ( m o r e s t r i n g e n t ) . T h e r e ' l l b e m o r e a n d m o r e c o n d i t i o n s a s t i m e g o e s o n . A n d t h e m o r e u r b a n s p r a w l t h a t e n c r o a c h e s o n r u r a l a r e a s , y o u ' r e g o i n g t o h a v e m o r e a n d m o r e p r e s s u r e . S o i n t h e e n d , we a l l r e a l i z e t h e v o t e r i s i n u r b a n a r e a s , ( h e ' s ) n o t i n t h e r u r a l a r e a s . S o h e ' s g o i n g t o g e t l i s t e n e d t o ( B C F A r e s p o n d e n t ) . A n o t h e r f a r m e r r e s p o n d e n t m e n t i o n e d t h a t t h e p o r k p r o d u c e r s a r e n o t w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t t h e G u i d e l i n e b o o k l e t t h a t h a s b e e n w r i t t e n f o r t h e m b e c a u s e t h e y f e e l t h a t a s s o o n a s t h e y ' r e a c c e p t e d a s G u i d e l i n e s , t h e y v e r y q u i c k l y b e c o m e l a w . T h e t w o f e l l o w s t h a t a r e q u i t e l e a d e r s h i p i n v o l v e d i n t h e p o r k p r o d u c e r s a r e f r o m E n g l a n d , a n d t h e y b o t h , s a i d t h a t t h e y s a w t h i s h a p p e n i n E n g l a n d b e f o r e t h e y l e f t 2 . 2 I n t e r e s t i n g l y , o n e o f t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n g r o u p l e a d e r s t o l d me t h a t a n u m b e r o f f a r m e r s i n h i s c o m m o d i t y g r o u p w e r e o r i g i n a l l y 136 3. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE CODE/ITS ENFORCEMENT Only f i v e of the respondents (a berry farmer, and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from GVRD, BCMELP, BCCA and BCMAFF) thought that the Code d i d not need to be changed. The changes that were suggested i n c l u d e d d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g the Code by region of the province, reducing the need to prove p o l l u t i o n , and adding fencing requirements to protect r i p a r i a n zones. The NPS P o l l u t i o n Workshop p a r t i c i p a n t s added the suggestions of mandatory BAWMPs f o r i n t e n s i v e l i v e s t o c k producers, and changing the G u i d e l i n e s to enforceable r e g u l a t i o n s (as required) (BCMELP and Government of Canada, 1995). The d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of the Code by region has j u s t begun. BCMELP r e c e n t l y released a p u b l i c advisory, reminding farmers i n the Fraser V a l l e y area that from October 1st to A p r i l 1st i n c l u s i v e , a l l manure p i l e s must be s e c u r e l y covered, and s t a t i n g that there i s to be no a p p l i c a t i o n of manure to bare land (BCMELP, 1995). Farmers r e l u c t a n t l y admit that t h i s type of a r e s t r i c t i o n i s necessary. And I think also you've got to be aware that i n d i f f e r e n t climates you're going to have d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s . I'm sure that probably down i n t h i s area and the Fraser V a l l e y , I hate to say t h i s , i s we're going to have to have the s t r i c t e s t . Not because of the people, but because of the r a i n f a l l (Vegetable farmer). There's been some d i s c u s s i o n about p u t t i n g some date r e s t r i c t i o n s as f a r as spreading times. . . . I'm sort of wishy-washy on that one. . . . I guess my personal preference would be not to a c c e l e r a t e that process too from the Netherlands. Some of them emigrated to get away from the s t r i c t e r r e g u l a t i o n s there. 1 3 7 m u c h , b u t I c a n s e e i t c o m i n g i n a p e r i o d o f m a y b e a f e w y e a r s o r s o m e t h i n g ( C o n s e r v a t i o n g r o u p l e a d e r ) . A m a j o r f r u s t r a t i o n f o r B C M E L P s t a f f w h o h a v e t r i e d t o e n f o r c e t h e C o d e i s a n u m b e r o f s e c t i o n s t h a t s t a t e t h a t p r a c t i c e s a r e a c c e p t a b l e a s l o n g a s t h e y d o n o t c a u s e p o l l u t i o n . I n l e g a l t e r m s , t h i s p h r a s e g i v e s p r o t e c t i o n t o t h e e n v i r o n m e n t , b u t i n t e r m s o f p r a c t i c a l i t y , t h e r e a r e d i f f i c u l t i e s . T h i s p h r a s e s e e m s t o i m p l y t h a t B C M E L P h a d t o p r o v e p o l l u t i o n w a s o c c u r r i n g b e f o r e t h e y c o u l d c h a r g e s o m e o n e w i t h n o n - c o m p l i a n c e o f t h e C o d e . I w a s n e v e r h a p p y w i t h t h e a s p e c t w h e r e t h e r e w e r e s o m a n y p o i n t s t h a t w e r e q u a l i f i e d w i t h , " T h i s i s o k a y a s l o n g a s i t d o e s n ' t c a u s e p o l l u t i o n . " B e c a u s e t h a t ' s a b i g v a l u e j u d g e m e n t ( B C M E L P r e s p o n d e n t ) . . . . I n t e r m s o f o n e p h r a s e t h a t t h e y a d d e d i n t o a l o t o f t h e s e c t i o n s w a s " t h a t c a u s e s p o l l u t i o n . " I c e r t a i n l y u n d e r s t a n d t h e p r o d u c e r s ' s i d e o f t h a t , b u t I d o n ' t k n o w i f o u r c o n c e r n w a s v o i c e d t o t h e m s t r o n g l y e n o u g h i n h o w d i f f i c u l t i t i s f o r u s t o , a n d c o s t l y i t i s f o r u s t o g o a f t e r t h e o b v i o u s n o n - c o m p l i a n t p r o d u c e r s ( B C M E L P r e s p o n d e n t ) . I t h i n k t h a t t h e w a y t h e C o d e i s w r i t t e n , w e ' r e r u n n i n g i n t o a f e w p r o b l e m s h e r e . . . . H e r e ' s a n e x a m p l e , ' A s t o r a g e f a c i l i t y m u s t b e o f s u f f i c i e n t c a p a c i t y , e t c . t o p r e v e n t t h e e s c a p e o f a n y a g r i c u l t u r a l w a s t e t h a t c a u s e s p o l l u t i o n , o r i n a m a n n e r t o p r e v e n t p o l l u t i o n . ' A n d i t r e a l l y p u t s t h e o n u s o n u s , t h a t we h a v e t o p r o v e p o l l u t i o n . A n d l i k e I s a i d , a l o t o f a g r i c u l t u r e i s n o n - p o i n t , s o i t r e a l l y m a k e s i t d i f f i c u l t i n s o m e s i t u a t i o n s t o e n f o r c e t h i s ( B C M E L P r e s p o n d e n t ) . T r a d i t i o n a l l y , B C M E L P w o u l d d e a l w i t h c l a u s e s l i k e t h i s b y i s s u i n g a p o l l u t i o n a b a t e m e n t o r d e r . A t t h e t i m e o f t h e i n t e r v i e w s , B C M E L P w a s o b t a i n i n g l e g a l a d v i c e a s t o w h e t h e r t h e y c o u l d i s s u e p o l l u t i o n p r e v e n t i o n o r d e r s i n s t e a d . T h e p r e v e n t i o n o r d e r s w o u l d b e e a s i e r t o a d m i n i s t e r a s t h e y d i d n o t r e q u i r e t h a t p o l l u t i o n b e p r o v e d , o n l y s u s p e c t e d . P r e s u m a b l y B C M E L P ' s l e g a l 138 c o u n s e l h a s a g r e e d t o t h e u s e o f t h e p o l l u t i o n p r e v e n t i o n o r d e r s , a s t h e r e c e n t p u b l i c a d v i s o r y s t a t e s t h a t , " P r o d u c e r s w h o h a v e n o t c o v e r e d t h e i r m a n u r e p i l e s w i t h i n t h e g i v e n t i m e f r a m e w i l l b e s e r v e d w i t h a P o l l u t i o n P r e v e n t i o n O r d e r " ( B C M E L P , 1 9 9 5 ) . H o w e v e r , o n e r e s p o n d e n t c a u t i o n e d t h a t i f t h e C o d e i s c h a n g e d , i t s h o u l d b e d o n e t h r o u g h t h e s a m e s t a k e h o l d e r n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s . . . . N o w i t ' s o u t t h e r e , s o m e b o d y w a n t s t o s a y , ' O h we s h o u l d t i g h t e n t h i s , we s h o u l d d o m o r e o f t h a t . ' A n d I s a i d , ' T h e r e ' s a p r o c e s s f o r d o i n g t h a t . Y o u ' v e g o t t o g o b a c k t o t h e i n d u s t r y . Y o u ' v e g o t t o d o i t t h e s a m e w a y . ' A n d t h a t ' s t h e o n l y p r o b l e m . I t h i n k t h a t p e o p l e h a v e s e e n t h e C o d e a s a s u c c e s s . T h e s u c c e s s i s n o t r e a l l y i n t h e w a y i t ' s w r i t t e n , . . . ( i t ) w a s j u s t c o m m u n i c a t i o n , d i r e c t c o m m u n i c a t i o n . S u r e i t ' s w r i t t e n d o w n , b u t u n l e s s s o m e b o d y u n d e r s t o o d w h a t t h e l o g i c o f i t w a s . . A n d t h a t w a s o n e o f t h e s u c c e s s e s . Y o u h a v e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e l o g i c o f t h e C o d e ( B C M A F F r e s p o n d e n t ) . A l l o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t s s a i d t h a t t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n h a d h e l p e d t h e m t o e s t a b l i s h b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h t h e o t h e r p a r t i e s a t t h e t a b l e . I f a n o t h e r m u l t i - s t a k e h o l d e r n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s i s h e l d , t h e g o o d r e l a t i o n s h i p s a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d w i l l n o d o u b t h e l p t o e x p e d i t e t h e p r o c e s s . T h e r e s p o n d e n t s h a d m a n y s u g g e s t e d c h a n g e s f o r t h e C o d e ' s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . T h e s e i n c l u d e d i n c r e a s i n g e d u c a t i o n ( f o r f a r m e r s , B C M E L P s t a f f , a n d t h e p u b l i c ) , i n c r e a s e d e n f o r c e m e n t ( e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e L o w e r F r a s e r V a l l e y ) , i m p r o v i n g t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e A E P C , a n d s e t t i n g u p a s e p a r a t e b o a r d t o d e a l w i t h " n u i s a n c e " c o m p l a i n t s ( e . g . f l i e s , o d o u r , n o i s e ) . I t h i n k a l o t m o r e h a s t o b e d o n e a s f a r a s e d u c a t i o n o f t h e p u b l i c a n d t h e M i n i s t r y o f E n v i r o n m e n t a s t o w h e n i s a g o o d t i m e t o a p p l y m a n u r e , a n d i t ' s s o m e t h i n g t h a t t h e f a r m e r h a s t o b e e d u c a t e d o n , t o o ( B C M E L P r e s p o n d e n t ) . 1 3 9 I w o u l d p r o b a b l y d o m o r e o f w h a t w e ' r e d o i n g , w h i c h i s t r y i n g t o g e t o u t , i n f o r m , a n d e d u c a t e t h e p r o d u c e r s , t r a i n p e e r a d v i s o r s , r e a l l y e n c o u r a g e t h e m t o h a v e m o r e t h a n o n e p e e r a d v i s o r . . . . I w o u l d d o t h e s a m e t h i n g w i t h E n v i r o n m e n t R e g i o n a l B r a n c h p e o p l e . . . . T h e y k n o w e n v i r o n m e n t a l c a r e , o r t h e y k n o w t h e i r b i o l o g y , b u t t h e y ' v e n o u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a g r i c u l t u r e ( B C F A r e s p o n d e n t ) . A n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l t r a i n i n g i s a n o t h e r t h i n g t h a t ( t h e p e e r i n s p e c t o r s ) c o u l d p r o b a b l y d o . W e ' v e o f f e r e d t o d o a s e m i n a r o r w o r k s h o p o r s o m e t h i n g , j u s t t o s h o w t h e m w h a t t o l o o k f o r a n d w h a t we w o u l d b e s a t i s f i e d w i t h ( B C M E L P r e s p o n d e n t ) . A n d m y s u g g e s t i o n i s t h a t we h a v e t o p e r s e v e r e o n t h i s c o u r s e o f e d u c a t i n g o u r f a r m e r s . . . . We j u s t h a v e t o b e p r e p a r e d t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t i t ' s g o i n g t o t a k e a l i t t l e t i m e , a n d t h a t i t h a s g o t t o b e s o m e t h i n g t h a t f a r m e r s d o w i l l i n g l y , n o t o u t o f f o r c e . I f w e ' r e f o r c e d t o d o s o m e t h i n g b e c a u s e o f a c o u r t a c t i o n o r c o u r t o r d e r a g a i n s t u s , t h e n we r e a l l y h a v e n o c o n t r o l i n t h a t a g a i n . A n d I w o u l d v i e w t h a t , a n d I t h i n k a l o t o f f a r m e r s w o u l d v i e w t h a t , a s we a r e b e i n g f o r c e d t o f a r m b y s o m e b o d y o r b y s o m e g r o u p w h o r e a l l y d o n ' t k n o w a n y t h i n g a b o u t w h a t w e ' r e d o i n g ( D a i r y f a r m e r ) . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e B C M E L P r e s p o n d e n t s , t h e C o d e ' s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n s e e m s t o b e h a v i n g v a r y i n g s u c c e s s i n d i f f e r e n t r e g i o n s o f t h e p r o v i n c e . T h e O k a n a g a n a n d W i l l i a m s L a k e a r e a s s e e m t o b e d o i n a v e r y w e l l , w h i l e t h e K a m l o o p s a r e a h a s d i s c o v e r e d m o r e p r o b l e m s t h a n w e r e i n i t i a l l y p e r c e i v e d ( s i n c e t h e y w e r e a b l e t o h i r e a n a u x i l i a r y s t a f f p e r s o n t o w o r k f u l l - t i m e o n d e a l i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h f a r m w a s t e ) . T h e a r e a t h a t i s h a v i n g t h e m o s t p r o b l e m s i s t h e L o w e r F r a s e r V a l l e y . A s t o u n d i n g l y , f o r a n a r e a t h a t p r o d u c e s 5 0 p e r c e n t o f t h e p r o v i n c i a l f a r m g a t e r e c e i p t s , a n d h a s s o m e o f t h e m o s t i n t e n s i v e l i v e s t o c k o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e p r o v i n c e , t h e L o w e r F r a s e r V a l l e y h a s o n l y o n e B C M E L P e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r f o r t h e C o d e . S h e i s a n a u x i l i a r y ( i . e . h e r c o n t r a c t i s r e n e w e d a n n u a l l y ) , a n d 1 4 0 she u s u a l l y has a co-op student. To do an e f f i c i e n t job, we probably need three people. Two f u l l - t i m e would do, but three people would be great and then we could do p r o a c t i v e work. Right now we're s t r i c t l y r e a c t i v e (BCMELP respondent). In my view, the province has to support the Code wi t h enough person-year resources to implement i t . . . . I n f a c t we're supporting some s t a f f i n g through FRAP (the Fraser River A c t i o n Plan) to deal w i t h a g r i c u l t u r e . In my view you need at l e a s t three years of presence to show that t h i s i s a serious concern, and changes are expected, and you j u s t can't do i t on a h i t and miss type of b a s i s (Environment Canada respondent). The lack of adequate numbers of enforcement s t a f f seems to be r e l a t e d to low l e v e l s of awareness w i t h i n BCMELP regarding the seriousness of a g r i c u l t u r a l waste problems. As noted below, t h i s c o n c l u s i o n was a l s o reached by the NPS P o l l u t i o n Workshop. I don't t h i n k our M i n i s t r y , r i g h t now, understands the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the environmental impacts from a g r i c u l t u r a l waste management. I think that's one of the reasons why i t ' s not adequately s t a f f e d (BCMELP respondent). Another suggestion was to improve the AEPC, e s p e c i a l l y i n the Lower Fraser V a l l e y . In t h i s area there are not enough peer i n s p e c t o r s , not a l l of the farm groups have peer i n s p e c t o r s , and there does not seem to be s u f f i c i e n t follow-up. But I guess i t would a l s o help, i f the AEPC had more i n s p e c t o r s . . . . And there's no i n s p e c t o r s f o r hobby farms, and a l o t of our farms are hobby. . . . I f (the peer inspectors) f i n d a r e a l problem, they should send i t back to us - i f i t ' s something that they can't handle - (but) i t r a r e l y happens. And another problem that we f i n d with the AEPC, too, i s that they don't do follow-up i n s p e c t i o n s . T h e y ' l l go on the farm, and t h e y ' l l make recommendations, but t h e y ' l l never go back f o r .another v i s i t . So they don't know whether the recommendations were followed up on, or c a r r i e d out. And o f t e n , they haven't been, so the p o l l u t i o n c a r r i e s on, o f t e n g e t t i n g worse. . . . The AEPC r i g h t now i s n ' t r e a l l y e f f e c t i v e . 141 A n d f o r a n y t h i n g t h a t we t h i n k i s s e r i o u s we w i l l h a n d l e i t o u r s e l v e s , a n d n o t i f y t h e m t h a t w e ' v e d o n e i t . B u t we c a n ' t a f f o r d t h e t i m e f r a m e . I f we t h i n k s o m e t h i n g i s s e r i o u s , w e ' r e u s u a l l y o u t t h e r e i n a c o u p l e d a y s , o r r i g h t a w a y i f we t h i n k i t ' s s e r i o u s . A n d we c a n ' t a f f o r d t h e c o m p l a i n t g o i n g o f f , a n d m a y b e t h e y d o n ' t g e t o u t t h e r e f o r t w o o r t h r e e w e e k s . T h e r e w a s t h i s o n e , i t w a s s e v e n m o n t h s i t t o o k t h i s o n e , s o m e t i m e s t h r e e m o n t h s . O f t e n t i m e s we d o n ' t g e t t h e i n s p e c t i o n r e p o r t b a c k s o i t ' s k i n d o f l o s t . T h e r e h a v e b e e n c o m p l a i n t s t h a t we h a v e n e v e r h e a r d b a c k o n ( B C M E L P r e s p o n d e n t , e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) . A s o n e E n v i r o n m e n t C a n a d a r e s p o n d e n t p o i n t e d o u t , t h i s i s a m a t t e r o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . T h e r e a r e m a n y a d v a n t a g e s t o a s e l f - r e g u l a t i n g p o l i c y , b u t b o t h B C M E L ' P a n d t h e A E P C n e e d t o e n s u r e t h a t e n o u g h f u n d s a n d h u m a n r e s o u r c e s a r e c o m m i t t e d t o t h e p e e r i n s p e c t i o n p r o c e s s t o e n s u r e t h a t i t i s w o r k i n g . A n d o n e t h i n g w e ' v e d o n e f o r a g r i c u l t u r e i s t o p r o v i d e f u n d s t o ( t h e ) B . C . F e d e r a t i o n t o s e t u p a t r a c k i n g s y s t e m f o r c o m p l a i n t s , t o s e e h o w m a n y c o m p l a i n t s t h e y ' r e g e t t i n g , w h a t t h e f o l l o w - u p i s a n d w h a t t h e s t a t u s i s . We h a v e n ' t h a d a n y r e p o r t y e t , a s a p r o d u c t o f t h a t i n i t i a t i v e . . . . I t ' s n o t a f u l l y p u b l i c p r o c e s s , a n d I d o n ' t t h i n k t h e p u b l i c t r u s t t h a t p r o c e s s . T h e y d o n ' t h a v e a l o t o f f a i t h i n t h a t p r o c e s s , s o t h a t ' s w h y I t h i n k y o u h a v e t o d e m o n s t r a t e o r s h o w w h e t h e r t h e p r o c e s s i s w o r k i n g o r n o t . T h e f i n a l p r o b l e m t h a t w a s i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e C o d e ' s e n f o r c e m e n t i s t h a t t h e c u r r e n t c o m p l a i n t s y s t e m t e n d s t o h a v e a l a r g e n u m b e r o f " n u i s a n c e " c o m p l a i n t s , i . e . c o m p l a i n t s a b o u t f l i e s , o d o u r , a n d n o i s e . T h e s e c o m p l a i n t s d o n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e l a t e t o t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a l i m p a c t s o f f a r m w a s t e m a n a g e m e n t p r a c t i c e s , a n d t e n d t o b e l o d g e d b y n o n - f a r m i n g n e i g h b o u r s o f f a r m e r s . I r o n i c a l l y t h e f a r m e r s , w h o w o u l d h a v e a g o o d s e n s e o f w h e t h e r a f e l l o w f a r m e r i s p o l l u t i n g , t e n d n o t t o l o d g e c o m p l a i n t s a g a i n s t t h e i r n e i g h b o u r s . T h i s i s b e c a u s e r u r a l n e i g h b o u r s d e p e n d o n e a c h o t h e r 142 i n t i m e s o f n e e d , a n d d o n ' t w a n t t o d e s t r o y t h e c l o s e - k n i t r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f t h e i r c o m m u n i t i e s . T h i s c a t c h - 2 2 s i t u a t i o n i s c a u s i n g s o m e r e s e n t m e n t a m o n g s t t h e i n n o v a t i v e f a r m e r s w h o i m m e d i a t e l y c o m p l i e d w i t h t h e C o d e , a n d s p e n t s u b s t a n t i a l s u m s o f m o n e y t o i n s t a l l w a s t e m a n a g e m e n t f a c i l i t i e s 3 . I k n o w a f e w e x a m p l e s o f t h e s e p r o d u c e r s t h a t h a v e d o n e t h a t , w h e r e n o w t h e y l o o k a t t h e s y s t e m a n d g o , ' W h y h a v e I s p e n t 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 b u c k s o n i m p r o v i n g m y f a r m w h e n t h e n e i g h b o u r d o w n t h e r o a d h a s m a n u r e r u n n i n g o f f i n t h e c r e e k , w h a t e v e r , a n d t h e y h a v e n ' t d o n e a n y t h i n g y e t , a n d t h e r e ' s n o r e a l h e a v y e n f o r c e m e n t f o r c i n g t h a t g u y t o d o a n y t h i n g ? ' ( C o n s e r v a t i o n g r o u p c o - o r d i n a t o r ) . B C M A F F i s a d d r e s s i n g t h i s p r o b l e m w i t h a n e w p i e c e o f l e g i s l a t i o n , t h e F a r m P r a c t i c e s P r o t e c t i o n ( R i g h t t o F a r m ) A c t . T h i s A c t , w h i c h i s e x p e c t e d t o c o m e i n t o e f f e c t i n t h e s p r i n g o f 1 9 9 6 , w i l l e x p a n d o n t h e " E n v i r o n m e n t a l G u i d e l i n e s " t o e s t a b l i s h " n o r m a l f a r m p r a c t i c e " s t a n d a r d s . T h e A c t w i l l a l s o s e t u p a b o a r d t o r e s o l v e n u i s a n c e c o m p l a i n t s , a n d r e m o v e t h e m f r o m t h e A E P C ' s w o r k l o a d ( B C M A F F , 1 9 9 6 ) . A n o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t y i s f o r t h e A E P C t o a l l o w a n o n y m o u s c o m p l a i n t s , s o m e t h i n g t h e y ' r e n o t c u r r e n t l y d o i n g . T h e N P S P o l l u t i o n W o r k s h o p p a r t i c i p a n t s o f f e r e d t h e a d d i t i o n a l s u g g e s t i o n s o f i n c r e a s i n g t h e p r o f i l e o f a g r i c u l t u r a l N P S p o l l u t i o n i n B C M E L P , t r y i n g t o a d d r e s s t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n w i t h i n a w a t e r s h e d 3 H o w e v e r , t h e r e i s a l s o s u b t l e p e e r p r e s s u r e t h a t h e l p s t o c o u n t e r f a r m e r s ' u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o l o d g e c o m p l a i n t s a g a i n s t t h e i r n e i g h b o u r s . O n e c o n s e r v a t i o n g r o u p c o - o r d i n a t o r d e s c r i b e d h o w f i r s t o n e f a r m e r , l o c a t e d a t o n e e n d o f a r o a d , h a d a BAWMP d o n e a n d m a d e c h a n g e s t o h i s / h e r f a r m . T h e f o l l o w i n g y e a r , a n o t h e r f a r m e r , a t t h e o t h e r e n d o f t h e r o a d f o l l o w e d s u i t . T h e t h i r d y e a r , a f a r m e r l o c a t e d i n b e t w e e n t h e f i r s t t w o f a r m s , w i t h o u t a n y p r o m p t i n g f r o m t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n g r o u p c o - o r d i n a t o r , r e q u e s t e d a B A W M P . 1 4 3 p l a n n i n g f r a m e w o r k , s e t t i n g c l e a r t i m e l i n e s f o r c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e C o d e , a n d c r e a t i n g a n " u m b r e l l a " p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c y f o r a l l t y p e s o f N P S p o l l u t a n t s , t o e n s u r e e q u i t y a m o n g t h e t y p e s i n t e r m s o f m a n a g e m e n t a n d r e g u l a t o r y e f f o r t ( B C M E L P a n d G o v e r n m e n t o f C a n a d a , 1 9 9 5 ) . T h e i s s u e o f e q u i t y a m o n g s t a l l t y p e s o f n o n - p o i n t s o u r c e p o l l u t a n t s s t r u c k a c h o r d w i t h a n u m b e r o f r e s p o n d e n t s . F a r m e r s f e e l t h a t a g r i c u l t u r e i s b e i n g s i n g l e d o u t o r " p i c k e d o n " i n t e r m s o f h a v i n g t o c o m p l y w i t h s t a n d a r d s t h a t n o o n e e l s e i s y e t b e i n g h e l d t o . T h e B C C A r e s p o n d e n t s p e c i f i c a l l y m e n t i o n e d t h e c a s e o f s e w a g e t r e a t m e n t w h i c h h a d b e e n v o t e d d o w n i n V i c t o r i a , a n d t h e f a c t t h a t a l o t o f n e w s u b d i v i s i o n s i n K e l o w n a a r e o n s e p t i c s y s t e m s , n o t s e w a g e t r e a t m e n t s y s t e m s , a n d t h a t t h e r e i s n o i m p a c t m o n i t o r i n g . B e c a u s e a s y o u ' r e t e l l i n g f a r m e r s y o u w a n t a l i t t l e b i t m o r e h e r e , y o u p i c k u p t h e p a p e r a n d G V R D i s p u m p i n g s e w a g e i n t o t h e F r a s e r R i v e r , t h a t t h e y f i g u r e i s k i l l i n g t h e f i s h . A n d V i c t o r i a v o t e s n o t t o h a v e a s e w a g e t r e a t m e n t p l a n t . T h e y g e t t h e r i g h t t o v o t e , n o t t o h a v e a s e w a g e t r e a t m e n t p l a n t s o t h e y c a n p u m p m o r e s e w a g e i n t o t h e o c e a n . P e o p l e w o n ' t e v e n l e t a f a r m e r d o t h a t . . . . . A n d y o u h a v e t o p u t t h i n g s i n p e r s p e c t i v e . O n e p e r s o n g o i n g , o v e r t h e b r i d g e d o e s n ' t l i k e t h e s m e l l o f m a n u r e a n d y e t t h e y ' r e p o l l u t i n g o u r v a l l e y . . . . I t ' s e a s y . . . f o r u s t o l o o k u p a n d s a y , ' Y e s we t h i n k f a r m e r s s h o u l d d o t h i s a n d t h a t . ' A n d p i l e t h e w a s t e u p , a n d d r i v e o u r c a r s . I g u e s s I ' m a l w a y s f i g h t i n g f o r , b e f o r e w e g e t i n t o ( r e v i s i n g t h e ) C o d e , l e t ' s m a k e s u r e t h a t e v e r y t h i n g ' s g o i n g d o w n t h e r o a d t o g e t h e r . T h a t e v e r y b o d y e l s e i s u p t o t h e f a r m e r s a n d t h e i r C o d e s y s t e m ( B C M A F F r e s p o n d e n t ) . A t t h e N P S W o r k s h o p , t h e o t h e r N P S p o l l u t a n t s d i s c u s s e d w e r e a l l u r b a n - r e l a t e d . ( F o r e s t r y w a s n o t i n c l u d e d b e c a u s e f o r e s t r y N P S i m p a c t s a r e c o v e r e d u n d e r t h e n e w F o r e s t P r a c t i c e s C o d e . ) A t t h e 1 4 4 end of the day, a g r i c u l t u r e was recognized as being at the f o r e f r o n t of d e a l i n g w i t h i t s NPS p o l l u t i o n problems. 4. C O N C L U S I O N S The t h e o r i z e d b e n e f i t that having the farmers p a r t i c i p a t e i n the n e g o t i a t i o n would lead to increased compliance w i t h the Code d i d not unambiguously m a t e r i a l i z e . Rather, the Code was seen as part of a "package" of programs t h a t , i n t o t a l , are mo t i v a t i n g farmers to comply. Chapter Eleven discusses the conclusions i n more d e t a i l , and o f f e r s some recommendations f o r the Code and i t s implementation. 1 4 5 CHAPTER ELEVEN SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS This i s a unique type of i n d u s t r y . I t ' s not l i k e the petro-chemical industry or the wood industry where you're d e a l i n g w i t h a small number of l a r g e companies. Here you're d e a l i n g w i t h hundreds of s m a l l , medium and l a r g e operations. So there's a l o t of t r a d i t i o n that you're working again s t . And one t h i n g we've had to accept i s that there's a time frame to change things, to get things i n t o compliance. And r e a l l y the only way you can do that i s to work together (BCMELP respondent). The process that they went through, and what was developed s i n c e then, I s t i l l f e e l i s r e a l l y good. And i t ' s working w e l l . Whatever you do, you're always going to come up against problems you have to s o l v e . So I don't suggest that because we come up w i t h a problem, that i t ' s not working. What's working i s the f a c t that we can solve the problem (BCFA respondent). 1. INTRODUCTION This chapter provides a summary of the t h e s i s . I t i n c l u d e s the research o b j e c t i v e s , methodology, major f i n d i n g s , d i s c u s s i o n , and recommendations. The reader should remember that t h i s research was conducted i n the s p r i n g of 1995, and i s j u s t a "snapshot" of what i s a dynamic r e g u l a t o r y scenario. 2. GOAL AND OBJECTIVES The goal of the research was to describe and evaluate the n e g o t i a t i o n process used i n the Code's c r e a t i o n , and to evaluate how the process has a f f e c t e d the Code's implementation. The d e s c r i p t i o n and evaluation was based on the p e r s p e c t i v e of various stakeholders, as w e l l as from document a n a l y s i s . These stakeholders i n c l u d e d BCMAFF, BCMELP, BCFA, Environment Canada, 146 D F O , G V R D , a n d f a r m e r s . T h e r e s e a r c h h a d f i v e o b j e c t i v e s : 1) T o r e v i e w t h e l i t e r a t u r e o n n e g o t i a t i o n , a n d r e g u l a t i o n o f a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n t o p l a c e t h e C o d e i n c o n t e x t . 2 ) T o a s s e s s , f r o m t h e s t a k e h o l d e r s ' v i e w p o i n t s , a ) t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y ( e f f i c i e n c y a n d e f f e c t i v e n e s s ) o f t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s ; b ) h o w t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s a f f e c t e d t h e f o r m o f r e g u l a t i o n s e l e c t e d ; c ) h o w t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n a f f e c t e d t h e f a r m e r s ' i n c e n t i v e t o c o m p l y . d ) h o w w e l l t h e C o d e ' s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n i s w o r k i n g , w h y , a n d w h a t c h a n g e s t h e y w o u l d s u g g e s t . 3 . METHODOLOGY Q u a l i t a t i v e d a t a f o r t h e r e s e a r c h w e r e o b t a i n e d f r o m d o c u m e n t a n a l y s i s , t r a n s c r i p t s o f t a p e d p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w s , a n d a t t e n d a n c e a t a N P S p o l l u t i o n w o r k s h o p . F o u r t e e n p e o p l e w h o h a d p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n , a n d t e n p e o p l e i n v o l v e d i n t h e C o d e ' s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n w e r e i n t e r v i e w e d . T h e i n t e r v i e w s i n c l u d e d q u e s t i o n s o n t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e C o d e ' s d e v e l o p m e n t , t h e g r o u p s i n v o l v e d , e a c h g r o u p ' s c o n c e r n s a n d p r e f e r r e d r e g u l a t o r y o p t i o n s , t h e n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s , a n d t h e C o d e ' s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . T h e d a t a w a s a n a l y z e d u s i n g t h e o b j e c t i v e / c r i t e r i o n / q u e s t i o n / k e y w o r d c o r r e s p o n d e n c e s h o w n i n T a b l e T h r e e , C h a p t e r S e v e n . 1 4 7 4. MAJOR FINDINGS 4.1 Literature Review T h e l i t e r a t u r e r e v i e w b e g a n w i t h a n o v e r v i e w o f m a n u r e n i t r a t e a s a n o n - p o i n t s o u r c e p o l l u t a n t , a n d t h e i n f o r m a t i o n g a p s w h i c h m a k e i t s o d i f f i c u l t t o r e g u l a t e . T h e s e g a p s a r e d u e t o t h e n a t u r e o f n o n - p o i n t s o u r c e p o l l u t i o n , t h e u n c e r t a i n t i e s o f n i t r a t e l e a c h i n g , a n d t h e h e a l t h r i s k s o f n i t r a t e c o n s u m p t i o n . T h e n e x t s e c t i o n o f t h e l i t e r a t u r e r e v i e w o u t l i n e d h i s t o r i c a l , s o c i o - e c o n o m i c , a n d p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s t h a t a f f e c t a g r o - e n v i r o n m e n t a l r e g u l a t i o n . T h e s e f a c t o r s i n c l u d e t h e a g r a r i a n m y t h , s p e c i a l f e a t u r e s o f t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r ( e . g . l a n d i s a g r i c u l t u r e ' s c e n t r a l r e s o u r c e a n d i t m a y l i m i t p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l o p t i o n s ) , a n d t h e p o l i t i c a l p o w e r o f f a r m i n t e r e s t g r o u p s . T h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n g a p s a n d f a c t o r s t h a t a f f e c t a g r o - e n v i r o n m e n t a l r e g u l a t i o n i n f l u e n c e t h e t y p e o f p o l i c y o p t i o n s s e l e c t e d t o d e a l w i t h m a n u r e n i t r a t e p o l l u t i o n . A c h r o n o l o g y o f n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n i n t h e U K a n d t h e N e t h e r l a n d s i l l u s t r a t e d t h e e f f e c t o f t h e a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d t w o f a c t o r s . W h i l e t h e N e t h e r l a n d s c u r r e n t l y h a s t h e m o s t s t r i n g e n t r e g u l a t i o n s i n E u r o p e , b o t h i t a n d t h e U K a r e m o v i n g t h r o u g h a t h r e e s t a g e e v o l u t i o n o f g o v e r n a n c e ( G l a s b e r g e n , 1 9 9 2 ) . O v e r t i m e , t h i s e v o l u t i o n c h a n g e s i n t e r m s o f t h e r e l a t i v e p o w e r o f t h e a c t o r s i n v o l v e d ( t h e f a r m g r o u p s b e c o m e l e s s i n f l u e n t i a l ) , t h e r e l i a n c e o n v o l u n t a r y m e a s u r e s ( w h i c h d e c r e a s e s ) , a n d t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h e c o n o m i c o r e c o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s a r e s e e n a s b e i n g t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t ( w i t h e c o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s g a i n i n g p r o m i n e n c e ) . 1 4 8 F i n a l l y , t h e l i t e r a t u r e r e v i e w e n d e d w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e f a c t o r s t h a t p r o m o t e i n d u s t r y - g o v e r n m e n t n e g o t i a t i o n i n C a n a d a . I a r g u e d t h a t i n d u s t r y - g o v e r n m e n t n e g o t i a t i o n w a s p r a c t i c a l l y i n e v i t a b l e i n t h e c a s e o f n i t r a t e r e g u l a t i o n , a n d t h a t t h e p r o c e s s s h o u l d b e i m p r o v e d . U s i n g c r i t e r i a f o r n e g o t i a t e d r u l e m a k i n g , t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s w a s e v a l u a t e d . 4 . 2 The Effectiveness of the Code's Negotiation Process T h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s w a s e v a l u a t e d a g a i n s t s u g g e s t e d c r i t e r i a f o r n e g o t i a t e d r u l e m a k i n g . T a b l e F o u r ( i n C h a p t e r E i g h t ) o u t l i n e d h o w w e l l t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n m e t t h e c r i t e r i a . E l e v e n o f t h e s i x t e e n c r i t e r i a w e r e e a s i l y m e t , f o u r w e r e o n l y p a r t l y m e t , a n d o n e w a s n o t m e t . T h o s e t h a t w e r e p a r t l y m e t i n c l u d e d t h e f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s : - o n l y s o m e o f t h e g r o u p s b e l i e v e d t h a t B C M E L P w o u l d u s e t h e n e g o t i a t e d o u t c o m e f o r a r e g u l a t i o n . H o w e v e r , t h e i r s c e p t i c i s m o r i g i n a t e d f r o m t h e v a g a r i e s o f t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , r a t h e r t h a n f r o m a n y s p e c i f i c m i s t r u s t o f B C M E L P . - t h e AWMC d i d n o t u s e a n e u t r a l f a c i l i t a t o r . N o n e o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t s i d e n t i f i e d t h i s a s a p r o b l e m , b e c a u s e o n e o r t w o o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s t o o k o n t h a t r o l e , a n d d i d i t v e r y e f f e c t i v e l y . - I n t e r e s t i n g l y , s e v e r a l r e s p o n d e n t s r e a c t e d n e g a t i v e l y t o t h e i d e a o f a f a c i l i t a t o r , p e r c e i v i n g t h a t s u c h a p e r s o n w o u l d h a v e m a d e t h e p r o c e s s t o o f o r m a l a n d t o o a d v e r s a r i a l . - t h e i d e a l c a n d i d a t e i s s u e f o r n e g o t i a t i o n i s o n e w h e r e t h e r e a r e b o t h c o n c e n t r a t e d c o s t s a n d c o n c e n t r a t e d b e n e f i t s . T h e C o d e i n v o l v e d a s i t u a t i o n o f c o n c e n t r a t e d c o s t s ( f o r f a r m e r s ) a n d d i s t r i b u t e d b e n e f i t s ( f o r s o c i e t y ) . H o w e v e r , i t i s m y i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e f e d e r a l a n d p r o v i n c i a l e n v i r o n m e n t a l a g e n c i e s r e p r e s e n t e d t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n t e r m s o f e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o t e c t i o n . A n u m b e r o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t s m e n t i o n e d t h a t D F O , i n p a r t i c u l a r , w a s m o r e " h a r d l i n e " i n t e r m s o f r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t p o i n t o f v i e w . T h e c o s t - s h a r i n g p r o g r a m s a v a i l a b l e a f t e r t h e C o d e w a s e n a c t e d h a v e b e e n l i m i t e d , a n d t h u s f a r m e r s s t i l l b e a r m o s t o f t h e c o n c e n t r a t e d c o s t s . - t h e r e w e r e n o E N G O s o r p u b l i c g r o u p s r e p r e s e n t e d o n t h e A W M C . T h e AWMC p a r t i c i p a n t s s a i d t h a t t h e y w e r e n o t a w a r e o f a n y E N G O s w i t h a n i n t e r e s t i n a g r i c u l t u r e , a n d t h a t i t w o u l d h a v e b e e n d i f f i c u l t t o r e a c h c o n s e n s u s w i t h ( p e r c e i v e d t o b e ) r a d i c a l g r o u p s . A l s o , b r o a d l y b a s e d s t a k e h o l d e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n p r o c e s s e s w e r e n o t a s p r e v a l e n t w h e n t h e AWMC b e g a n a s t h e y a r e t o d a y . T h e o n e c r i t e r i o n t h a t w a s n o t m e t w a s t h e s e t t i n g o f a d e a d l i n e . T h e AWMC h a d s e v e r a l d e a d l i n e s , b u t n o n e w e r e s t r i c t l y a d h e r e d t o . W h i l e m o s t o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s t h o u g h t i t w a s a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n t o o k y e a r s ( a s o p p o s e d t o m o n t h s ) , t h e a l m o s t f i v e y e a r s t h a t t h e C o d e t o o k t o d e v e l o p c o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d t o b e e x c e s s i v e . T h e l e n g t h o f t i m e i t t o o k t o d e v e l o p t h e C o d e c o u l d h a v e b e e n s h o r t e n e d t o p o s s i b l y t w o o r t h r e e y e a r s b y i d e n t i f y i n g a l l o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s a t t h e b e g i n n i n g ( a s o p p o s e d t o h a v i n g d i f f e r e n t g r o u p s j o i n a t d i f f e r e n t t i m e s 1 5 0 t h r o u g h o u t t h e p r o c e s s ) , a n d b y s e t t i n g f i r m - b u t r e a l i s t i c - d e a d l i n e s . T h e s u c c e s s o f t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e s a m e t y p e o f p r o c e s s b e u s e d i n e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e r e g u l a t i o n s f o r t h e n e w F a r m P r a c t i c e s P r o t e c t i o n A c t . 4.3 Negotiation's E f f e c t on the Regulation T h e A W M C ' s p r e f e r r e d r e g u l a t o r y o p t i o n s e v o l v e d o v e r t i m e . T h e c o m m i t t e e s t a r t e d o u t b y l o o k i n g a t a p e r m i t t i n g s y s t e m a n d s e t t i n g l i v e s t o c k d e n s i t y l i m i t s . I n 1 9 8 8 o n e o f t h e c o m m i t t e e m e m b e r s w e n t t o E u r o p e o n a f a c t - f i n d i n g t r i p . H e p r o p o s e d d e v e l o p i n g a c o d e o f p r a c t i c e , a s h e f e l t e x t e n s i o n a n d e d u c a t i o n s h o u l d r e m a i n t h e p r e f e r r e d a p p r o a c h t o c h a n g e f a r m e r s ' p r a c t i c e s . T h e B C F A p r e f e r r e d a " r e g u l a t i o n b y r e f e r e n c e " f o r m a t . T h i s m e a n t t h a t t h e C o d e w a s r e f e r r e d t o b y a t w o p a r a g r a p h r e g u l a t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g e m b o d i e d d i r e c t l y i n t h e l e g i s l a t i o n . W h e n B C M E L P ' s l e g a l c o u n s e l d e c i d e d t h a t t h e " r e g u l a t i o n b y r e f e r e n c e " f o r m a t w o u l d n o t b e u s e d , t h e y w e r e s u b j e c t t o p r o t e s t s f r o m B C M E L P , B C M A F F , a n d t h e B C F A . T h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ' s o f f i c e r e l e n t e d , a n d t h e r e g u l a t i o n b y r e f e r e n c e w a s r e i n s t a t e d . T h i s w a s o n e o f t h e " w i n / w i n " o p t i o n s m e n t i o n e d i n C h a p t e r E i g h t . T h i s " s o f t e r " r e g u l a t o r y a p p r o a c h w a s c h o s e n b e c a u s e i t w a s m o r e a p p e a l i n g t o f a r m e r s , a n d b e c a u s e i t a l l o w e d a " s t a g e d a p p r o a c h " w h e r e b y t h e r e g u l a t i o n s c o u l d b e m a d e s t r i c t e r i n t h e f u t u r e i f t h e C o d e w a s n o t e f f e c t i v e . A c o d e o f p r a c t i c e w a s a l s o s e l e c t e d b e c a u s e o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n g a p s i n t e r m s o f t h e e x t e n t o f t h e n i t r a t e p r o b l e m , a n d t h e f i n a n c i a l i m p a c t s o f t h e o t h e r • 1 5 1 r e g u l a t o r y o p t i o n s o n t h e f a r m i n g c o m m u n i t y . T h e C o d e w a s i n t e n d e d t o b e a n e d u c a t i o n a l d o c u m e n t , a s w e l l a s a r e g u l a t o r y o n e . H o w e v e r , t h e C o d e i s n o t v i e w e d a s a s t a t i c d o c u m e n t . N o w t h a t n e w i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e o n t h e i m p a c t s o f t h e m a n u r e p r o b l e m i n t h e L o w e r F r a s e r V a l l e y , t h e C o d e w i l l b e m a d e m o r e s t r i n g e n t . 4 . 4 Negotiation and Compliance T h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n l e d t o i n c r e a s e d a w a r e n e s s , o n t h e p a r t o f f a r m e r s , a b o u t t h e C o d e a n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s s u e s r e l a t e d t o f a r m i n g . H o w e v e r , i t w a s n o t s u f f i c i e n t - b y i t s e l f - t o m o t i v a t e f a r m e r c o m p l i a n c e . R a t h e r t h e C o d e i s p a r t o f a " p a c k a g e " o f p r o g r a m s a n d s e r v i c e s t h a t i n t o t a l a r e h e l p i n g t o m o t i v a t e c o m p l i a n c e . T h i s p a c k a g e i n c l u d e s c o s t - s h a r i n g p r o g r a m s , c o m m o d i t y - s p e c i f i c E n v i r o n m e n t a l G u i d e l i n e s b o o k l e t s , t h e p r o d u c e r c o n s e r v a t i o n g r o u p s , B A W M P s , a n d t h e A E P C p e e r i n s p e c t o r s a s t h e f r o n t l i n e i n t h e e n f o r c e m e n t p r o c e s s . 4 . 5 Suggested Changes T h e C o d e i s n o t v i e w e d a s a s t a t i c d o c u m e n t , a n d t h e r e s p o n d e n t s i n t e r v i e w e d s u g g e s t e d a n u m b e r o f c h a n g e s t o t h e C o d e i t s e l f , a s w e l l a s f o r t h e C o d e ' s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . T h e c h a n g e s s u g g e s t e d i n c l u d e d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g t h e C o d e b y r e g i o n o f t h e p r o v i n c e , r e d u c i n g t h e n e e d t o p r o v e p o l l u t i o n b e f o r e n o n - c o m p l i a n c e w a s e s t a b l i s h e d , a d d i n g f e n c i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s t o p r o t e c t r i p a r i a n z o n e s , a n d i n c r e a s i n g t h e n u m b e r o f e n f o r c e m e n t s t a f f ( e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e L o w e r F r a s e r V a l l e y ) . T h e N P S P o l l u t i o n W o r k s h o p p a r t i c i p a n t s a d d e d t h e s u g g e s t i o n s o f m a n d a t o r y B A W M P s f o r 152 i n t e n s i v e l i v e s t o c k p r o d u c e r s , a n d c h a n g i n g t h e G u i d e l i n e s t o e n f o r c e a b l e r e g u l a t i o n s ( a s r e q u i r e d ) . H o w e v e r , i t s e e m s p r u d e n t t o u s e a s t a k e h o l d e r n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s t o m a k e a n y c h a n g e s t o t h e C o d e , t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f t h e g o o d r e l a t i o n s h i p s d e v e l o p e d d u r i n g t h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n . A t t h e n e x t n e g o t i a t i o n , t h e c o m m i t t e e s h o u l d b e a m u l t i p a r t i t e o n e , a n d i n c l u d e e n v i r o n m e n t a l g r o u p s . T h e r e s p o n d e n t s a l s o s u g g e s t e d c h a n g e s f o r t h e C o d e ' s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . T h e A E P C c o n t i n u e s t o m e e t r e g u l a r l y , a n d m i g h t b e t h e v e h i c l e f o r i m p l e m e n t i n g s o m e o f t h e s e c h a n g e s . T h e s u g g e s t e d c h a n g e s i n c l u d e d i n c r e a s i n g e d u c a t i o n ( f o r f a r m e r s , B C M E L P s t a f f , a n d t h e p u b l i c ) , i n c r e a s e d e n f o r c e m e n t ( e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e L o w e r F r a s e r V a l l e y ) , i m p r o v i n g t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e A E P C , a n d s e t t i n g u p a s e p a r a t e b o a r d t o d e a l w i t h " n u i s a n c e " c o m p l a i n t s ( e . g . f l i e s , o d o u r , n o i s e ) . T h e N P S P o l l u t i o n W o r k s h o p p a r t i c i p a n t s o f f e r e d t h e a d d i t i o n a l s u g g e s t i o n s o f i n c r e a s i n g t h e p r o f i l e o f a g r i c u l t u r a l N P S p o l l u t i o n w i t h i n B C M E L P , t r y i n g t o a d d r e s s t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n w i t h i n a w a t e r s h e d p l a n n i n g f r a m e w o r k , a n d s e t t i n g c l e a r t i m e l i n e s f o r c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e C o d e , a n d c r e a t i n g a n " u m b r e l l a " p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c y f o r a l l t y p e s o f N P S p o l l u t a n t s ( t o e n s u r e e q u i t y a m o n g t h e t y p e s o f p o l l u t i o n i n t e r m s o f m a n a g e m e n t a n d r e g u l a t o r y e f f o r t ) . T h e l a s t p o i n t w a s e m p h a s i z e d b y m a n y r e s p o n d e n t s w h o p o i n t e d o u t t h a t m a n y u r b a n N P S p o l l u t a n t s a r e n o t y e t r e g u l a t e d , a n d t h a t i t i s u n f a i r t o i n c r e a s e t h e s t r i n g e n c y o f t h e C o d e b e f o r e t h e s e o t h e r p o l l u t i o n p r o b l e m s a r e d e a l t w i t h . 1 5 3 5. DISCUSSION B . C . c l e a r l y f a l l s i n t o p h a s e o n e o f G l a s b e r g e n ' s ( 1 9 9 2 ) t h r e e p h a s e p r o c e s s o f a g r o - e n v i r o n m e n t a l r e g u l a t i o n . T h e AWMC w a s a w a r e o f a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l l u t i o n p r o b l e m s , b u t t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e p r o b l e m s ' s e v e r i t y w a s l i m i t e d b y i n f o r m a t i o n g a p s . T h e y c h o s e t o r e l y o n v o l u n t a r y c o m p l i a n c e ( a s o p p o s e d t o a l l f a r m s b e i n g i n s p e c t e d ) a n d e d u c a t i o n . A f t e r t h r e e y e a r s o f t h e C o d e ' s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , f u r t h e r w a s t e m a n a g e m e n t p r o b l e m s a r e c o m i n g t o l i g h t , a n d B . C . a p p e a r s t o b e m o v i n g i n t o p h a s e t w o . N e w m e a s u r e s a r e b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d , e c o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t s a r e b e c o m i n g m o r e p r o m i n e n t , a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l p r a c t i c e s a r e b e i n g q u e s t i o n e d . B C h a s n o t y e t d e a l t w i t h t h e c o r e o f t h e m a n u r e n i t r a t e p r o b l e m , a n d s t i l l h a s m o r e w o r k t o d o . A l t h o u g h t h e AWMC c l e a r l y k n e w a b o u t t h e d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f r e g u l a t i o n s i n u s e i n E u r o p e , t h e y o p t e d t o f o l l o w t h e U . K . ' s c o d e o f p r a c t i c e m o d e l , a s o p p o s e d t o H o l l a n d ' s m o r e s t r i n g e n t r e g u l a t i o n s . H o w e v e r , t h e y s a w t h e C o d e a s p a r t o f a s t a g e d a p p r o a c h , w h i c h c o u l d b e m o d i f i e d t o b e m a d e m o r e s e v e r e i n t h e f u t u r e . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , f a r m e r s p e r c e i v e t h i s a s a " s l i p p e r y s l o p e . " S o m e o f t h e f a r m e r s w h o h a v e e m i g r a t e d f r o m E u r o p e s p e c i f i c a l l y c h o s e B . C . b e c a u s e i t h a d f e w e r e n v i r o n m e n t a l r e g u l a t i o n s f o r a g r i c u l t u r e , a n d h a v e w a r n e d t h e i r c o m m o d i t y g r o u p s t h a t t h e C o d e w i l l p r o b a b l y b e t h e f i r s t s t e p i n a s e r i e s o f s t r i c t e r r e g u l a t i o n s . T h e s e t w o d i f f e r e n t p e r c e p t i o n s w i l l l e a d t o m i s t r u s t o n b o t h s i d e s i f t h e y a r e n o t c l a r i f i e d . F a r m e r s n e e d t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t a l l i n d u s t r i e s h a v e b e e n s u b j e c t t o a s t a g e d 1 5 4 a p p r o a c h , a n d t h a t i t i s n o t m e a n t t o s i n g l e o u t o r " p i c k o n " t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l i n d u s t r y . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e u r b a n - r u r a l p r e s s u r e s t h a t i m p a c t o n f a r m e r s ( e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e i n t h e L o w e r F r a s e r V a l l e y ) , a n d t h e e c o n o m i c p r e s s u r e s c r e a t e d b y t h e A L R n e e d t o b e k e p t i n m i n d b e f o r e m a k i n g t h e C o d e m o r e s t r i n g e n t . A l a r g e n u m b e r o f n u i s a n c e c o m p l a i n t s h a v e b e e n l o d g e d w i t h t h e A E P C , a n d t h e c o u n c i l w a s n o t s e t u p t o d e a l w i t h t h i s t y p e o f c o m p l a i n t . T h e n e w F a r m P r a c t i c e s P r o t e c t i o n A c t s h o u l d t a k e c a r e o f m o s t o f t h e s e c o m p l a i n t s . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , f a r m e r s n e e d t o s e e t h a t u r b a n N P S p o l l u t i o n i s a l s o b e i n g d e a l t w i t h , s o t h a t t h e y d o n o t f e e l t h a t t h e y a r e b e i n g a s k e d t o d o m o r e t h a n u r b a n i t e s i n t e r m s o f a d d r e s s i n g t h e i r w a s t e p r o b l e m s . T h i s w i l l h e l p t o e n h a n c e t h e " w i n - w i n " a s p e c t o f t h e C o d e , m e n t i o n e d i n S e c t i o n 2 . 5 o f C h a p t e r E i g h t . T h e C o d e ' s n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s m e t m o s t o f t h e c r i t e r i a f o r n e g o t i a t e d r u l e m a k i n g a n d w a s p e r c e i v e d f a v o u r a b l y b y a l l o f i t s p a r t i c i p a n t s . B u t h o w d i d t h e C o d e s t a c k u p a g a i n s t t h e t h e o r e t i c a l a d v a n t a g e s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s o f i n d u s t r y - g o v e r n m e n t n e g o t i a t i o n ( C h a p t e r F i v e ) ? I n t e r m s o f t h e a d v a n t a g e s , t h e f a r m g r o u p s w e r e a b l e t o s u p p l y a d v i c e o n t e c h n o l o g i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c i s s u e s . T h e n e g o t i a t i o n d i d p r o m o t e t h e a d o p t i o n o f s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a n d r e d u c e d f a r m e r s ' r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e r e g u l a t i o n . H o w e v e r , a s m e n t i o n e d b e f o r e , t h e C o d e ' n e g o t i a t i o n a l o n e w a s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o d e v e l o p t h e s e n s e o f " o w n e r s h i p " t h a t w o u l d m a k e t h e i n d u s t r y m o r e l i k e l y t o c o m p l y w i t h t h e r e g u l a t i o n . M o s t o f t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e s d i d n o t m a t e r i a l i z e . T h e g o v e r n m e n t 1 5 5 was not "outgunned" - (nor was anyone e l s e ) , as the i n d u s t r y d i d not hold most of the information, and d i d not have the funds to h i r e f u l l - t i m e experts to present t h e i r i ssues and concerns. The government's c r e d i b i l i t y was not compromised i n the p u b l i c eye. In f a c t , the p u b l i c seems b a s i c a l l y unaware of the environmental impacts of farm waste, and seems only to have focused on the "nuisance" f a c t o r of normal farm operations. Although BCMAFF and the a g r i c u l t u r a l industry do have a w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p does not prevent BCMELP or any of the f e d e r a l environmental agencies from a c t i n g d e c i s i v e l y to p r o t e c t p u b l i c h e a l t h and s a f e t y . The i n d u s t r y d i d not use the o p t i o n of n e g o t i a t i o n as a means of simply d e l a y i n g compliance w i t h r e g u l a t i o n s . Admittedly the Code's development d i d take a long time, but there was no evidence that anyone on the AWMC was there j u s t to s t a l l for time. However, the Code's negotiation d i d r e s u l t i n a " s o f t e r " r e g u l a t o r y approach. As discussed i n Chapter Three, the a g r i c u l t u r a l i n d u s t r y has some unique features. I t i s important to keep i n mind that manure, to a c e r t a i n degree, i s d i f f e r e n t from other types of i n d u s t r i a l wastes. In the r i g h t amounts i t can o f f e r the b e n e f i t s of being used as f e r t i l i z e r and a s o i l c o n d i t i o n e r , and thus i s d i f f e r e n t from some of the other wastes that the Waste Management Act covers. The Code was w r i t t e n to cover the f l e x i b i l i t y of manure's use, as w e l l as the v a r y i n g farming c o n d i t i o n s around the province. The "Thou s h a l l not cause p o l l u t i o n " clauses were meant to give that f l e x i b i l i t y , but have u n f o r t u n a t e l y caused d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h the 156 Code's enforcement. 6 .' RE COMMENDATI ONS Industry-government n e g o t i a t i o n works w e l l i n the r e g u l a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r a l NPS p o l l u t i o n . In order to b r i n g the farming i n d u s t r y on s i d e , and minimize the enforcement agency's co s t s , I would argue that n e g o t i a t i o n i s even e s s e n t i a l . I f the Code i s r e v i s e d , a m u l t i - s t a k e h o l d e r n e g o t i a t i o n process should be used again, w i t h the a d d i t i o n of environmental groups. As BC moves i n t o stage two of the three stage process of agro- environmental r e g u l a t i o n , experience i n the UK and the Netherlands may suggest that there i s a need f o r increased f i n a n c i a l support. C o s t - s h a r i n g programs may need to be increased, or something s i m i l a r to the Farm Income Insurance program r e i n s t a t e d . The government could j u s t i f y these costs by p o i n t i n g out that the land i n the ALR, e s p e c i a l l y the best land, i s as unique an ecosystem as old-growth f o r e s t and should be preserved. The costs could a l s o be j u s t i f i e d by p o i n t i n g out that farmers are bearing the costs of p r e s e r v i n g a common good ( a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d ) , and should be compensated. A negotiated approach i s most e a s i l y t r a n s f e r a b l e to other NPS p o l l u t a n t s where there i s a c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e d i n t e r e s t group that bears the concentrated costs of new r e g u l a t i o n s . An example of an issue where t h i s approach might work i s NPS p o l l u t i o n from urban development. There are r e l a t i v e l y e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e groups (e.g. construction companies) , and they bear the costs of any changes to standards of urban development. 157 A n e g o t i a t e d rulemaking approach would be more d i f f i c u l t i n terms of dealing with s e p t i c systems and stormwater r u n o f f . These types of NPS p o l l u t a n t s have two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that make i t d i f f i c u l t to organize groups. A l a r g e number of people share the same i n t e r e s t , but the i n t e r e s t a f f e c t s each person i n only a small way. There are no organized groups of s e p t i c tank owners (although there are homeowners' and ratepayers' a s s o c i a t i o n s ) , and everyone who l i v e s i n an urban area c o n t r i b u t e s to stormwater ru n o f f . S e p t i c tank owners have no i n c e n t i v e to form such groups because they then could be made to bear concentrated c o s t s , as opposed to the d i s t r i b u t e d costs they now bear. However there are ways to work around t h i s problem. I f the companies that make or i n s t a l l s e p t i c tanks are subject to some form of r e g u l a t i o n or increased c o s t s , they w i l l attempt to f i n d ways to pass on the r e g u l a t o r y requirements or the c o s t s . 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The A g r i c u l t u r a l Land Commission of B r i t i s h Columbia. Environments 1 4 ( 3 ) : l l - 2 0 . Wood, C o l i n . 1987. A g r i c u l t u r e . In B r i t i s h Columbia: I t s Resources and People. Charles N. Forward (ed.), Western Geographical S e r i e s , Volume 22, Department of Geography, U n i v e r s i t y of V i c t o r i a : 139-161. Y i n , Robert K. 1994. Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Second E d i t i o n ) . A p p l i e d S o c i a l Research Method S e r i e s , Volume 5. London: Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s . Zinn, J.A. and Blodgett, J.E., 1989. A g r i c u l t u r e Versus the Environment: Communicating Pe r s p e c t i v e s . Journal of S o i l and Water Conservation, 44 (3): 184-187. 166 APPENDIX I COVERING LETTER 167 February 22, 1995 (Respondent's Address) Dear (Respondent): I am a graduate student i n the Resource Management and Environmental Studies Program at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia. The t i t l e of my t h e s i s i s "Negotiation i n Environmental Policy-Making: A Case Study of N i t r a t e Regulation i n B.C.'s Code of A g r i c u l t u r a l P r a c t i c e f o r Waste Management." The purpose of my t h e s i s i s to describe and evaluate the n e g o t i a t i o n process used to develop the Code, and to evaluate how the process has a f f e c t e d the Code's implementation. I am working under the supervision of Professor Tony Dorcey, School of Community and Regional Planning, at UBC. My research i s independently funded, and w i l l increase understanding of the effectiveness of r e g u l a t i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l non-point source p o l l u t i o n using a n e g o t i a t i o n process. As a stakeholder i n the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n and/or implementation, I am i n t e r e s t e d i n your opinions, and the opinions of the group you represent. The i n t e r v i e w w i l l c o n s i s t of about 20 questions, and should take about 1 hour. Your p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s e n t i r e l y v o l u n t a r y . You may refuse to p a r t i c i p a t e or withdraw your p a r t i c i p a t i o n at any time. W i t h i n a few weeks I w i l l be c a l l i n g you to arrange a mutually convenient time f o r an interview. A l l of the information c o l l e c t e d w i l l be treated as s t r i c t l y c o n f i d e n t i a l , and your name w i l l not be i d e n t i f i e d i n the t h e s i s or r e l a t e d p u b l i c a t i o n s . I would appreciate your a s s i s t a n c e i n t h i s study, as a v a r i e t y of stakeholders i s needed to o b t a i n v a l i d r e s u l t s . I thank you i n advance f o r c o n s i d e r i n g my request, and look forward to your response when I speak with you by telephone. Yours s i n c e r e l y , Kathleen Zimmerman M.Sc. Candidate 168 APPENDIX I I CONSENT FORM APPENDIX I I I QUESTIONNAIRE 171 Preamble: To begin with, l e t me t e l l you a l i t t l e b i t about my background and how I became i n t e r e s t e d i n researching the Code of A g r i c u l t u r a l P r a c t i c e f o r Waste Management. I grew up on a small farm i n the I n t e r i o r , and both my parents grew up on d a i r y farms i n Switzerland. I have a B.Sc. i n A g r i c u l t u r e from the U n i v e r s i t y of Guelph, and an M.Sc. i n Extension Education, also from Guelph. I then worked i n Indonesia f o r two years, as the f i e l d manager of a Canadian development p r o j e c t . I'm c u r r e n t l y i n the Resource Management and Environmental Studies program at UBC. My main i n t e r e s t i s the r e g u l a t i o n of the environmental impacts of a g r i c u l t u r e , and how government can develop such r e g u l a t i o n s by responding to both the general p u b l i c ' s i n t e r e s t i n p r o t e c t i n g a i r and water resources, and the farming community's i n t e r e s t i n maintaining the v i a b i l i t y of t h e i r sector of the economy. Increasingly i t has been recognised that a l l those with an i n t e r e s t should be involved i n discussing these issues. How best to do t h i s i s not c l e a r , because of l i m i t s on time and resources. One way t h a t has been proposed i s to b r i n g a l l those with an i n t e r e s t i n the i s s u e ( i . e . the stakeholders) to s i t down at a t a b l e and discuss or negotiate how to resolve the problems. N e g o t i a t i o n and stakeholder involvement are some r e l a t i v e l y new techniques that the B.C. government i s using to develop r e g u l a t i o n s , and I am i n t e r e s t e d i n seeing how w e l l they work i n the case of r e g u l a t i n g a g r i c u l t u r e . That's why I am i n t e r e s t e d i n t a l k i n g to people who were i n v o l v e d i n the n e g o t i a t i o n process that developed the Code, and also i n people who are involved i n implementing the Code. I am p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d i n the p a r t s of the Code that r e l a t e to manure use and storage. I want to take a constructive look at what worked i n the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n , and what, i n r e t r o s p e c t , people f e e l could have been improved. Over the next hour, I'd l i k e to t a l k about a number of areas I am p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d i n : why the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n occurred i n the f i r s t place, the types of i s s u e s "on the t a b l e , " the p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d , how the n e g o t i a t i o n meetings were arranged/organized, and the Code's implementation. There are no r i g h t or wrong answers to these questions. I am simply i n t e r e s t e d i n your p o i n t of view. I f you f e e l you don't know the answer to a question, w e ' l l j u s t move on to the next one. Before we begin the actual i n t e r v i e w , I would l i k e to request your permission to tape record what you t e l l me. A f t e r years of experience, UBC has determined that the best way to p r o t e c t the i n t e r e s t s of people who are interviewed, and to make sure that there are no misunderstandings about what might be quoted, i s to ask them to s i g n a consent form. I f you don't mind, w e ' l l j u s t take a minute to go over the consent form, and i f you're agreeable I ' l l ask you to s i g n i t . 172 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS I. Respondent's Background 1) To s t a r t o f f with, can you t e l l me something about your involvement i n a g r i c u l t u r e and environmental r e g u l a t i o n , before you became in v o l v e d with the Code? I I . Origins/History of the Code's Development Now I'd l i k e to ask you some questions about why the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n occurred i n the f i r s t p l ace. 2) P r i o r to the Code's development, there was an clause i n the Waste Management Act that exempted farmers from having to o b t a i n permits f o r wastes i f they were farming " t r a d i t i o n a l farming op e r a t i o n s " , and managed and a p p l i e d the waste i n a "reasonable manner." How d i d you see the o l d system working/not working? Probe: Can you give me some s p e c i f i c examples that showed that the exemption wasn't working? I I I . The Groups Involved Next, I'd l i k e to ask you some general questions about the groups who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n . 3) How d i d your group f i r s t come to j o i n the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n ? (I.e. I n v i t e d by BCMELP, asked i f they could j o i n , etc.) 4) How were you chosen to represent your group at the Code's ne g o t i a t i o n ? 5) Did you ever have problems w i t h the people you represented, i . e . you had d i f f e r e n t views on the issues and how they should be resolved? 6) Was any group able to dominate the ne g o t i a t i o n ? 7) Were there any groups missing from the ne g o t i a t i o n ? I f yes, why weren't they i n v i t e d to j o i n ? Probe: -Were they not r e a d i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e ? 8) Did you f e e l that your group had enough funds/resources to p a r t i c i p a t e f u l l y ? 9) Did the groups who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the Code's negotiation share common ground on at l e a s t some of the issues? 10) Did p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the Code's neg o t i a t i o n help to develop an ongoing r e l a t i o n s h i p between your group and the p a r t i e s , or wit h your group and BCMELP?- 173 IV. Concerns Next, I'd l i k e to t a l k about your group's concerns, w i t h regard to the r e g u l a t i o n of manure management. 11) From your perspective, what were the main concerns r e l a t e d to the r e g u l a t i o n of manure management? 12) What do you t h i n k would have happened i f BCMELP had t r i e d to develop a r e g u l a t i o n on t h e i r own? (I.e. Could they have done i t u n i l a t e r a l l y ? ) 13) Were you confident that BCMELP would use the r e s u l t s of the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n as the b a s i s f o r a new r e g u l a t i o n ? Not for BCMELP respondents. V. Options A f t e r a l l the groups involved became aware of the issues r e l a t e d to manure management, they probably had a number of d i f f e r e n t options that they p r e f e r r e d to deal w i t h the i s s u e s . 14) What were your o r i g i n a l ideas on how to deal w i t h the manure management issues? Probes: How d i d your options compare wi t h the options that other groups i n the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n were i n favour of? Did the options that you were w i l l i n g to support change over time, as the n e g o t i a t i o n progressed? VI. The Negotiation Process Now I'd l i k e to move to some general questions the Code's n e g o t i a t i o n process. 15) What factors do your think helped or hindered the d i s c u s s i o n s while the Code was developed? Probes: a) - a (trained) f a c i l i t a t o r ? (E.g. Took care of l o g i s t i c s of meetings, pointed out areas of agreement, kept the p a r t i e s communicating, and created confidence i n reaching a r e s o l u t i o n ) ? b) - a deadline (to keep p a r t i c i p a n t s moving toward a r e s o l u t i o n at an e f f i c i e n t pace)? Was the time a v a i l a b l e adequate? c) - an i n c e n t i v e to negotiate? (What was your group's i n c e n t i v e to negotiate, as opposed to other methods of i n f l u e n c i n g the Code's decision-making process?) 174 d) - decide i n advance on where to meet, how o f t e n , and at convenient l o c a t i o n s ? e) - define consensus, or how you would know when you had reached an agreement that everyone could l i v e w i t h , i n advance? f) - funding to help the groups wi t h fewer resources to p a r t i c i p a t e as f u l l y as p o s s i b l e ? g) - a l l the p a r t i e s negotiated i n good f a i t h ? (E.g. no one had a hidden agenda, no one merely t r i e d to s t a l l f o r time?) h) - the necessary data was r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e ? The reason I'm b r i n g i n g t h i s point up i s that Code mainly regulates non-point source p o l l u t i o n , which means i t i s much harder to measure amounts of p o l l u t a n t s released, and where they're coming from. Was a lack of information, or u n c e r t a i n t y about the i n f o r m a t i o n , a problem when you were t r y i n g to design r e g u l a t i o n s f o r manure use and storage? I f yes, how d i d you deal w i t h these inform a t i o n gaps and u n c e r t a i n t i e s ? 16) With the b e n e f i t of h i n d s i g h t , i f you had to negotiate the Code's development over again, i s there anything you would change i n terms of the procedure used or the groups who p a r t i c i p a t e d ? Possible probes: - a d d i t i o n a l funds - a d d i t i o n a l p a r t i c i p a n t s -increased p a r t i c i p a n t t r a i n i n g i n n e g o t i a t i o n methods -wider c i r c u l a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n -increased amounts of info r m a t i o n -improved u n d e r s t a n d a b i l i t y of i n f o r m a t i o n -more b a s i c data about current c o n d i t i o n s , and future i m p l i c a t i o n s of the options considered - p r e s e n t a t i o n of opposing viewpoints - s e t t i n g deadlines -more frequent meetings -other (please explain) -no changes needed 175 VII. Implementation F i n a l l y , I'd l i k e your o p i n i o n on how w e l l the Code's implementation i s working, and how farmers f e e l about complying with the Code. 17) In your opinion, how has the BCFA's and other farm groups' p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Code's development a f f e c t e d : a. The knowledge of farmers with respect to manure management and the environment? Please e x p l a i n . b. The farmers' i n c e n t i v e to comply w i t h the Code? 18) In your opinion, how w e l l i s the Code's implementation working? Why i s i t working/not working? 19) What changes would you suggest to make the Code a more e f f e c t i v e r e g u l a t i o n ? 20) Thank you very much fo r p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h i s i n t e r v i e w . Are there any other comments you would l i k e to add, or questions you would l i k e to ask me? 176 APPENDIX IV SAMPLE OF A SUMMARY TABLE C r i t e r i a #6 - Fundamental Values While the groups a l l had f a i r l y s t r o n g l y h e l d views, they weren't moral or e t h i c a l b e l i e f s . In f a c t , the groups shared some common ground which helped to make the n e g o t i a t i o n process e a s i e r . Key word search: common ground Name*/Org'n. Response Summary XX, BCMELP 9)"We were a l l t r y i n g to do our best f o r the environment, without bankrupting the farmers. . . . Yes, I'd say we had a f a i r amount of common ground." 20) BCMAFF was "the common ground between us. . . . They were t r y i n g to bridge the gap between us and the farmers." XX, BCMAFF 10)" I t ' s c e r t a i n l y helped to b r i n g people together, to t r y to f i n d where t h e i r common i n t e r e s t s l a y , r a t h e r than c o n t i n u i n g to be some s o r t of a d v e r s a r i a l s i t u a t i o n . " XX, BCFA 9)"There were some areas where we s t a r t e d out a f a i r ways apart, but. . . i t was never the r e a l l y p o l a r opposites so f a r apart that there wasn't even any room to s t a r t . . . . There was a common goal, which was to come out wit h something that everybody could l i v e w i t h . " 16) "There was r e a l l y a common o b j e c t i v e from the beginning. We might have had a l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t view of what that common o b j e c t i v e was, but we both knew that we had to get a b e t t e r system." XX, Environment Canada 9)"I do b e l i e v e that a l l the i n t e r e s t groups f e l t they were at the t a b l e because they a l l b e l i e v e d that there was a need f o r some Code of P r a c t i c e . . . . So that would be the common ground." *Names have been suppressed to preserve anonymity. 177 APPENDIX V LIST OF ACRONYMS AEPC - A g r i c u l t u r a l Environmental P r o t e c t i o n Council (the c o u n c i l that oversees the peer i n s p e c t o r system) AES - A g r i c u l t u r e Environmental Service (precursor to the AEPC) ALDA - A g r i c u l t u r a l Land Development A s s i s t a n c e Program ALR - A g r i c u l t u r a l Land Reserve AWMC - A g r i c u l t u r a l Waste Management Committee (the group that negotiated the Code) BATNA - Best A l t e r n a t i v e to a Negotiated Agreement BAWMP - Best A g r i c u l t u r a l Waste Management Plan BCCA - B r i t i s h .Columbia Cattlemens' A s s o c i a t i o n BCEPA - B r i t i s h Columbia Environmental P r o t e c t i o n Act BCFA - B r i t i s h Columbia Federation of A g r i c u l t u r e (farm lobby group) BCIA - B r i t i s h Columbia I n s t i t u t e of A g r o l o g i s t s BCMAFF - B r i t i s h Columbia M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e , F i s h e r i e s and Food BCMELP - B r i t i s h Columbia M i n i s t r y of Environment, Lands and Parks BMP - Best Management Plan CFA - Canadian Federation of A g r i c u l t u r e DFO - Department of F i s h e r i e s and Oceans EC - European Community ENGO - Environmental Non-Governmental Organization EPA - Environmental P r o t e c t i o n Agency ESP - Environmental S u s t a i n a b i l i t y Parameter FII - Farm Income Insurance (Act) FOE - Friends of the Earth GVRD - Greater Vancouver Regional D i s t r i c t MAFF - M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e , F i s h e r i e s and Food ( i n the United Kingdom) NFU - N a t i o n a l Farmers' Union (farm group i n the United Kingdom) NPS - non-point source NAAs - N i t r a t e Advisory Areas NRA - Na t i o n a l Rivers A u t h o r i t y NSAs - N i t r a t e S e n s i t i v e Areas UK - United Kingdom 178

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