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European integration and the member states : The national case, public opinion, party systems, and the… Brown IV, George Garvin 1995

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E U R O P E A N INTEGRATION A N D T H E M E M B E R STATES: T H E N A T I O N A L C A S E , PUBLIC OPINION, P A R T Y S Y S T E M S , AND T H E R O L E O F E L E C T O R A L SYSTEMS by G E O R G E GARVIN B R O W N IV B.A., McGill University, 1991 THESIS S U B M I T T E D IN PARTIAL F U L F I L L M E N T O F T H E REQUIREMENTS FOR T H E D E G R E E O F M A S T E R O F ARTS in THE  F A C U L T Y O F G R A D U A T E STUDIES (Department of Political Science)  We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  T H E UNIVERSITY O F BRITISH C O L U M B I A December 1995 © George Garvin Brown IV, 1995  In  presenting this  degree at the  thesis  in  partial  fulfilment  of  the  requirements  University  of  British  Columbia, I agree that the  freely available for reference and study. I further agree that copying  of this thesis for scholarly  department  or  by  his  or  her  It  is  an  Library shall make it by the  understood  that  publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without permission.  Department The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  ii W W  DE-6 (2/88)  ws~  advanced  permission for extensive  purposes may be granted  representatives.  for  head of my copying  or  my written  ABSTRACT Each of the member states of the European Union has had internal debates over the nature of European integration. The terms of the debate in each of the states have been framed by the visions of Jean Monnet and Charles de Gaulle.  Monnet's vision of  Europe was that of a federal and politically united continent, de Gaulle's vision of Europe was that of a loosely grouped and non-political Union. The goal of this thesis is to understand why the states have had different degrees of debate over European integration. Chapter I explains how the geographical, historical, economic, and political dimensions of a state can affect public opinion on European integration. A 'Combined Pro and Anti-integrationist Ranking of Member States' is made at the end of the chapter by giving each state one point for each pro-integrationist dimension that applies to it, and by subtracting one point for each anti-integrationist dimension that applies to it. Chapter II tests the ranking made in Chapter I by examining public opinion polls and European Parliament election results. A state that ranks as anti-integrationist in Chapter I is expected to have more anti-integrationist public opinion than the other states, and greater electoral results for its anti-integrationist political parties. It is expected that any exception to this pattern will be explained as the effect of a state's electoral system. Chapter III will complete our study by examining which states seem most likely to develop anti-integrationist political parties in the near future. By comparing the percentage of the public that poll as anti-integrationist to the percentage of the public that votes anti-integrationist, we will be able to make a rough estimate of which state has the capacity to develop anti-integrationist  ii  parties. We expect tofindthat our preliminary ranking of the member states in Chapter I will be corroborated by the evidence found in the subsequent chapters. Thesefindingswill allow us to better understand the current debates in the member states over European integration, and will allow us to suggest possibilities about where the new members of the EU will eventually stand on the integration debate  iii  TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract  •  "  Table of Contents  iv  List of Tables  •  vi  List of Figures  vii  List of Acronyms  viii  Acknowledgements  ix  INTRODUCTION  1  Chapter I  7  Hypotheses A. B. C. D. E. F. G.  Chapter II  Chapter III  Chapter IV  The Mediterranean Ireland The Benelux Countries Germany . . . . France Denmark and the United Kingdom Ranking the Member States  . .  19 24 . 25 27 29 31 38  Public Opinion and Elections A. France B. The United Kingdom (i) Electoral Systems (ii) Electoral Systems: The United Kingdom Compared to Denmark and France  39 47 52 56  Capacity for Anti-integrationist Political Parties A. Potential Opportunities and Limits for Anti-integrationists: The United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Spain, Denmark B. Potential Threats for Anti-integrationists: Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal, France C . The General Variation of Mobilisation Capacity of Anti-integrationist Vote Share  63  Concluding Remarks  59  67 70 72 73  iv  Selected Bibliography Appendix A  Appendix B  79  Table 1. National Attitudes Towards the Unification of Western Europe Table 2. National Attitudes Towards "Going further than the Single Market" B.1 Anti-integrationist Parties: The Mediterranean and Ireland B.2 Anti-integrationist Parties: Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg B.3 Anti-integrationist Parties: Germany  v  84 91  92 94 96  LIST O F T A B L E S Introduction 1. The Member States of the European Union - 1995  1 3  Chapter I 2.  Hypotheses Combined Pro and Anti-integration Ranking of Member States  7 38  Chapter II 3. 4.  Public Opinion and Elections Anti-integrationism in E P elections Effective Threshold (ET) of Electoral Systems  39 45 59  Chapter III 5.  Capacity for Anti-integrationist Political Parties Variation Mobilisation Capacity of Anti-integrationist Vote Share in the Member States  63 66  National Attitudes Towards the Unification of Western Europe National Attitudes Towards "Going further than the Single Market" . . .  84 84 91  Appendix A 1. 2.  vi  LIST O F FIGURES Introduction 1. Research Model  1 4  Chapter I 2. 3.  Hypotheses Pro-Integration Anti-Integration  7 8 9  Chapter II 1.  Public Opinion and Elections Chart 1: Combined Anti-integrationist Sentiment (1978-1993) Chart 2: Combined Anti-integrationist Sentiment (1992 & 1993)  2.  vii  39 40 41  LIST O F A C R O N Y M S  CAP EC ECSC EEC EP ET EU FPTP M SEA SMP PR WEU  Common Agricultural Policy European Community European Coal and Steel Community European Economic Community European Parliament Effective Threshold European Union First Past the Post Magnitude Single European Act Single Member Plurality Proportional Representation Western European Union  viii  Acknowledgements This thesis was written between May 1994 and October 1995 in Vancouver, Toronto, and New York. I would like to offer my grateful thanks to my thesis supervisor, Professor Alan Siaroff, for his much needed constructive criticism, guidance and patience throughout this period. I would also like to thank Professor Ken Carty for his valuable criticism and insight. Furthermore, I would like to thank Bregham Dagliesh for his German translation work, and Giddeon Rahat for alerting me to the role that electoral systems can play in silencing minorities. I would like to thank Messrs. Denys Heward and Victor Badian of Lower Canada College, and Messrs. Alan Weiner, Peter Evans and Seth Mendell of Avon Old Farms School for their respective insights on history and politics. I am grateful for the countless hours of support and understanding that my parents, Garvin Brown and Susan Casey Brown, my brother, Campbell, and my grandmother, Mrs. Yvonne Holland Casey, have given me throughout this project over the past year and a half. Finally, I would like to thank Steffanie Diamond for taking the time to read, edit and critique this thesis. I offer my humble thanks to Steffanie for her tireless help, support, and encouragement, and without whom there would have been neither thesis nor M.A.  ix  Introduction There has been debate over European integration within each of the member states of the European Union (EU) since the inception of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. The various national debates over integration have hinged on whether or not Europe is to be a confederal, or a federal Union. In the terms of 1  Jean Monnet and Charles de Gaulle, the debate has been between the competing visions of a 'United States of Europe' and a 'Europe des Patries' ('Europe of nation-states').  2  Monnet's vision of a 'United States of Europe' was that of a continent formed into a supranational and comprehensive federal super state - an anti-nationalist Europe.  3  Monnet's vision embraced both the domestic and foreign policy of Europe. Domestically, a 'United States of Europe' was meant to be founded on firm political institutions, and it was meant to be anti-nationalist, with the members subservient to the Community. On foreign policy, Europe was to be strongly linked to the United States. In the context of the 4  Cold War, Monnet felt that Europe could only overcome both a divided Germany and the stand off with the Soviet Union through strong ties with the U.S.. de Gaulle's vision of a 'Europe des Patries', on the other hand, saw the institutions of an integrated Europe as limited, technical, and politically modest. The unity of a  Svante O. Ersson and J a n - E r i k Lane, P o l i t i c s and S o c i e t y i n Western Europe (London: Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1994), 359. 1  R i c h a r d Mayne, The Community of Europe (London: V i c t o r G a l l a n c z L t d . , 1962), 13. 2  J.B. D u r o s e l l e , "General de G a u l l e ' s Europe and Jean Monnet's Europe," World Today (January 1966), 8. 3  4  I b i d , 8, 11. 1  TEurope des Patries' was to be effected by the voluntary consent of the member-states,  5  rather than by encroaching supranational laws and institutions. Domestically, therefore, de 6  Gaulle's Europe was to be a continent without a supranational political structure. On foreign policy Europe was meant to be led by France, independent of the United States, and open to the East. While not completely relevant in today's post-Cold War world, much of 7  the debate between Monnet and de Gaulle is alive today in the present disputes over European integration. There is debate in all of the member states over the extent to which integration should progress. The debate is more pitched, however, in some states than in others. The object of this thesis is to understand why there have been varying degrees of enthusiasm and scepticism • for European integration between the EU member states. In order to accomplish this, we will make use of both public opinion polls and the results from elections to the European Parliament. As such, we will have to limit our examination to the 'established twelve members' of the Union. The definition, here, of an 'established member' is a member state that has had at least three elections to the EP. As such, the new members of the Union - Austria, Finland, and Sweden - will not be examined in any great detail.  5  Ibid.,36.  With t h i s m i n i m a l i s t v i s i o n of European i n t e g r a t i o n , i t i s no s u r p r i s e t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y of G a u l l i s t MP's voted a g a i n s t t h e r a t i f i c a t i o n of. t h e European Coal and S t e e l Community T r e a t y (ECSC) i n December 1951. ( I b i d . , 13). 6  7  D u r o s e l l e , 4. 2  Table 1. The Member States of the European Union - 1995 Member State  Year Joined  # of Elections to the EP  Austria  1995  0  Belgium  1958  4  Denmark  1973  4  Finland  1995  0  France  1958  4  Germany  1958  4  Greece  1981  4  Ireland  1973  4  Italy  1958  4  Luxembourg  1958  4  Netherlands  1958  4  Portugal  1986  3  Spain  1986  3  Sweden  1995  1  United Kingdom  1973  4  The research model that will be used to examine the 'established twelve members' will be made up of four parts: an independent variable, a dependent variable, an intervening variable, and a consequent variable. The independent variable is the combination of geography, history, economics, and politics in each member state. As illustrated in Figure 1 below, the model suggests that the independent variable affects public opinion (the dependent variable), causing it to be either enthusiastic or sceptical about European integration.  The dependent variable, in turn, is reflected in the party system (the  3  consequent variable) of each member state, affecting the the electoral success of antiintegrationist parties. The intervening variable in this model is the electoral system. Depending on its character, an electoral system can prevent public opinion from being reflected in a state's party system. As such, the model relies on electoral systems to explain any exceptions that may be found in our study.  Figure 1. Research Model  Geography, History, Economics, Politics —> (Electoral System) —>  [Independent  Variable  --> Dependent  Variable  Public Opinion — >  Party System  —> (Intervening  Variable)  — > Consequent  Variable]  The goal of this model is to illustrate a general relationship between the geographic, historical, economic, and political cross section of each member state and its EP party system. If, for instance, we hypothesise that a state's political and geographic profile lend it to more anti-integrationism than the other states, we will then expect to find that its antiintegrationist parties have had greater electoral success than like minded parties in the other states. If this is not the case, we will look at the character of the state's electoral system in order to ascertain if it has intervened and had an impact on the state's party system. The structure of this model relies implicitly on the premise that there is only one intervening variable between public opinion and party systems. Because the model's  4  intervening variable is institutional, rather than 'political', the model assumes that European integration is the main 'political' issue in an EP election around which the electorate will vote. In doing this, the model ignores a range of other points that may affect voter behaviour. Despite its feeling on integration, for instance, the electorate may vote according to the personal appeal of a party leader, and/or the stance of a party on a variety of other political questions. While public opinion may be against European integration, the public might in fact vote for a party that is pro-integration as a result of these other factors. The model does not control for these other possible intervening variables; nor is it proven with a strict statistical correlation between the variables under examination. The model does, however, suggest a general theory that should help to explain why there are varying degrees of pro and anti-integrationism in the member states of the European Union. After examining the evidence for each of the member states, a "variation of mobilisation capacity" for anti-integrationist vote share will be calculated. This figure will compare the percentage of the public that polled anti-integrationist to the percentage of the public that actually voted anti-integrationist. The difference between the two figures will be calculated into a "percentage of mobilisation capacity" figure. A high "percentage of mobilisation capacity" will represent the portion of the public that polled anti-integrationist, but did not vote anti-integrationist. In other words, the "percentage of capacity" figure will represent the portion of the public that has yet to be mobilised into anti-integrationist voters. A high mobilisation figure will suggest that there is room for a political party to capture a hitherto unrepresented vote share. As with the above research model, calculating "mobilisation capacities" relies on a general premiss. The formula assumes that, given the  opportunity, the anti-integrationist public will vote anti-integrationist. The formula ignores the fact there may be other more important factors that influence voter behaviour. Like the research model, however, the formula will suggest a general pattern in the Union that will help contribute to our understanding of why the member states vary from each other over the question of European integration.  6  I. HYPOTHESES  As detailed in the above research model, pro-integrationist and anti-integrationist sentiments in the member states can be explained by the geographic, historical, economic, and political cross section of each member state. More specifically, pro and anti-integrationism can each be explained by three dimensions. As illustrated by Figure 2, the three dimensions that help explain why a member state'has pro-integrationist sentiment are: 'economic', 'political', and whether or not a country is at the 'centre' of Europe. The three dimensions that help explain the degree of anti-integrationism in a state are: whether or not a country belongs to an 'institutional-cultural extra-European' region, whether or not a country is a 'great power', and whether or not a country is at the 'periphery' of Europe, as illustrated by Figure 3. The centre-periphery factor is the only dimension that helps to explain both pro and anti-integrationism. The other four dimensions explain only side of the integrationist debate. The economic factor, for instance, explains only degrees of pro-integration, and not degrees of anti-integration. A country will favour integration if it receives transfer payments through membership in the Union. It may be argued that paying for transfer payments, the other side of the 'economic' dimension, as it is being defined here, should be included as an anti-integrationist factor. 'Paying' for integration, however, does not tax an economy to the same degree as 'being paid' for integration benefits an economy. German living standards, for instance, will not necessarily rise if payments to the EU stop. Irish living standards, however, might very well decline if transfer payments were to come to and end. The same logic informs the other three dimensions - 'political', 'great power', and belonging  7  PRO-INTEGRATION (Figure 2)  8  ANTI-INTEGRATION (Figure 3)  9  to an 'institutional-cultural extra-European' region. Each of these dimensions explains either pro or anti-integrationism, but their respective opposites do not necessarily have the substantive impact necessary to explain the other side of the integrationist debate. A crude ranking of how the member states stand on integration will be made by assigning +1 to each of the pro-integration circles, and -1 to each of the anti-integration circles. The tabulation of these points will appear in Table 2. It is expected that opinion polls and party results will roughly corroborate this ranking.  Economic A state may be pro-integrationist for a number of economic reasons. One of the most important economic reasons for a state to be pro-integrationist is held by all of the member states; that is, each state benefits from the free trade that comes with integration. Because, however, this benefit is universally enjoyed by all of the member states, it is not very helpful in the attempt to explain why there are differences of 'integration enthusiasm' between the members. A more fruitful way to measure which states stand to gain the most economically from integration is to isolate those economic reasons that are not universal; namely, those economic reasons that are above and 1  beyond the 'free market' benefits enjoyed by all members. The most striking economic benefit fitting this description is the transfer of money from the richer to the poorer states in the Union. Such transfers take place in accordance with the EU's regional integration programmes.  8  Our definition of the  Brigid Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in Europe (London: Routledge, 1992), 179, 180. And The Economist (10-16 8  10  economic dimension will be based on this financial transfer. Transfer payments give the 9  poorer states of the Union an economic reason for favouring integration that reaches beyond the benefits of free trade. The EU's Cohesion Fund and the Structural Funds are the main source of these transfers. The stated aim of the Cohesion Fund is to reduce 10  economic disparities between the member states, while the aim of the Structural Funds is 11  to reduce regional disparities.  12  The poorer states of the Union will be defined as those that receive transfers under the Cohesion Fund, and/or that receive at least 10% of the Structural Funds'  September, 1994), 22. The common a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y (CAP)is a l s o a source o f economic b e n e f i t t o some o f the member s t a t e s . The CAP was e s t a b l i s h e d under t h e Treaty, of Rome w i t h t h e aim o f i n c r e a s i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i v i t y , s t a b i l i s i n g t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l market, and g u a r a n t e e i n g a f a i r standard o f l i v i n g t o t h e farming p o p u l a t i o n (Leonard, 120). The poorer member s t a t e s w i t h l a r g e r a g r a r i a n s e c t o r s have b e n e f i t e d g r e a t l y from t h e CAP. CAP i s implemented through p r i c e f i x i n g and t h e use o f t a r i f f s a g a i n s t non-EU goods. Compared t o t h e d i r e c t f i n a n c i a l i n j e c t i o n s o f t h e r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n programmes, the CAP b e n e f i t s a r e i n d i r e c t . While t h e CAP i s , t h e r e f o r e , an economic inducement t o j o i n t h e EU f o r some c o u n t r i e s , i t i s not a d i r e c t " t r a n s f e r o f money" from t h e r i c h e r t o t h e poorer s t a t e s , and w i l l not t h e r e f o r e be i n c l u d e d i n our 'economic' d e f i n i t i o n . 9  "...Cohesion and S t r u c t u r a l Funds r e p r e s e n t t h e m a j o r i t y of t h e t r a n s f e r s t o t h e poorer s t a t e s . . . t h e y a r e t h e 'meat and p o t a t o e s ' o f t h e t r a n s f e r s . . . . " ( N i c h o l a s Colannino, d o c u m e n t a l i s t , t h e D e l e g a t i o n o f the Commission o f t h e European Communities t o t h e U n i t e d Nations, i n t e r v i e w by author, 2 3 August ,1995, New York, t e l e p h o n e ) . 10  European Commission, The European Union's (1994), 4. 11  Cohesion  Ibid. The Regional Fund, t h e S o c i a l Fund and t h e European A g r i c u l t u r a l Fund are c o l l e c t i v e l y known as t h e S t r u c t u r a l Funds. (Leonard, 140). 1 2  11  Fund  disbursements.  13  In order to receive transfers under the Cohesion Fund a state must,  "...have a per capita gross national product (GNP) of less than 90% of the Community average...." The states that benefit from the Cohesion Fund are Ireland, Spain, Portugal, 14  and Greece. Structural Funds, meanwhile, are directed towards predominantly agricultural 15  regions, with low income levels, high unemployment and sub-standard infrastructures. Four states have each received at least 10% of all of the Structural Funds. In 1991, a typical year, Spain received 25%; Italy received 21%; Portugal received 14%; and Greece received 13%.  16  The poorer states of the Union, thus can be identified as Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy. Portugal, Spain and Greece fit both criteria. Ireland is singled out for having a per capita GNP of less than 90%; though its economy is too small to make a large dent in the Structural Fund disbursements. Italy, meanwhile, is singled out, despite its higher GNP, because of the disparity that exists within its regions and the heavy demand that that puts on the Structural Funds.  Political  There are three elements that fall under the rubric of the political dimension, and that explain how a member state can benefit politically from the EU. Former war time 1 3  1991 i s used as t h e sample year.  " C o u n c i l R e g u l a t i o n (EC) No 1164/94 o f 16 May 1994 e s t a b l i s h i n g a Cohesion Fund" O f f i c i a l J o u r n a l o f t h e European Communities (15 May 1994), No L 130/1. 1 4  15  I b i d . , No L 130/8.  1 6  Leonard, 140. 12  aggressors, smaller states that have historical justification to regard their neighbours with caution, and newly established democracies all stand to benefit politically from integration. A state can fall into more than one of these political categories. In total, however, a member state will receive only one point in Table 2 for the political dimension, regardless of whether it falls into more than one political category. The supranational character of the EU can be of great political benefit to states that are struggling to rebuild a war time legacy. For former aggressors, integration sends a new 17  message to democratic sceptics abroad and at home. Union membership is taken to be a commitment to eschew from nationalist aggression, and as a pledge to pursue foreign relations in consultation with one's neighbours. As former members of the Axis Alliance, Germany and Italy both fall within this category. For the smaller states of Europe, integration offers a supranational guarantee against future hostile transgressions, and gives the states an avenue through which to pursue foreign policy goals without direct interference from larger neighbours. Smaller, states take the only foreign policy option that is left to them after decades of failing to protect their national interest in the arena of nation states; and, to the degree that they are able, they directly contribute to making a safer regional climate. Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg fall into this category. Finally, membership in a supranational democratic club like the EU can be of great benefit for those countries attempting to stabilise newly founded democratic political institutions. The EU 18  acts not only as an anchor against instability, but also as an incentive to make democracy  17  Laffan,  183, 191.  Samuel Huntington, The T h i r d Wave (Norman & London: U n i v e r s i t y o f Oklahoma Press, 1991), 87. 18  13  work. Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal fall into this category.  Centre - Periphery Whether a state lies at the centre or periphery of Europe will impact how it views integration. If a nation lies at the centre of Europe, it will be more inclined towards integration. Sitting on the periphery, meanwhile, will help explain why anti-integrationist sentiment may exist. In general, whether a state lies at the centre or periphery of Europe indicates whether a state has been a member of the Union from its inception as the ECSC. A state is likely to be more inclined towards integration if it has been able to shape the institutions of the EU through all of the steps of integration. Having the chance to influence the growth of the Union's institutions, therein 'climatising' itself to the gradual loss of sovereignty, will make a state more amenable towards integration.  19  Joining late, as states on the periphery invariably have, may lead to the opinion that national sovereignty has been resigned on another state's terms, therein contributing to anti-integrationist sentiment.  Less quantifiable is the fact that a state's position on this  dimension is also a general indicator of its experience with European politics. Being at the centre of Europe allows states to have developed political cultures that are more amenable to a European political perspective than to one of a strictly nationalist nature. Lying on the periphery, meanwhile, engenders an historical parochialism about, and distrust of, Europe, adding to the general feeling of not being in control of the EU's  Ronald I n g e l h a r t & K a r l h e i n z R e i f , " A n a l y z i n g Trends i n West European O p i n i o n : t h e Role of t h e Eurobarometer Surveys," i n I n g e l h a r t and R e i f , eds., Eurobarometer: t h e Dynamics o f European P u b l i c O p i n i o n (London: Macmillan, 1991), 4, 5. 1 9  14  development. The centre and periphery of Europe will defined by four criteria: geography, history, trade, and by the date that a state joined the Union. A state must satisfy three out of four of the criteria in order for it to be defined as sitting in either the centre or the periphery of Europe. The geographic centre of western Europe is all but self evident. It is the area formed by France and Germany, and their immediate neighbours: the Benelux countries, Switzerland, Austria, and northern Italy. Excluded are the islands (Ireland, the United Kingdom), southern Italy (including Sicily), the Iberian and Hellenic peninsulas (Portugal, Spain, and Greece), and the Scandinavian north (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland). Historically, the centre of Europe can be defined roughly as those countries that shared in the birth of Europe's medieval patterns of government, legal institutions and social patterns. These are the countries encompassed by what was the Carolingian Empire under 20  Charlemagne (768 - 814 AD). The borders of that empire stretched from the Ebro river in the West, just west of the Pyrenees; to the Elbe River in the East, part of which marked the border between West and East Germany; and from the English Channel in the North to the outskirts of Rome in the South.  France, Germany, the Benelux countries, Switzerland,  Austria, the northern half of Italy, and a narrow portion of northern Spain were all part of this area. An economic centre and periphery of Europe can be discerned by the post-war trade  John G a r r a t y and Peter Gay, eds., The Columbia H i s t o r y of t h e World (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 3 69. 15  relationships between the countries.  21  Interdependent trade relationships encourage  countries to reduce their barriers towards each other, since doing so benefits them both reciprocally. As such, the pattern of trade relationships in Europe can offer an insight as 22  to whether or not a country is inclined towards integration, those with more reciprocal relationships being more inclined towards integration. Likewise, those countries with dependent trade relationships, rather than reciprocal relationships, may be less inclined to integrate. The region with the greatest degree of reciprocal trade will be defined as the centre; and the region with the least will be defined as the periphery. In order to measure this, each country's 1987 export profile will be examined for country clusters, or regional concentrations. If, for instance, countries A, B, and C all have their greatest amount of trade with each other, then the cluster will be denned as a region. If exports in countries X, Y, and Z are all directed towards countries A, B, and C, then X, Y, and Z will also be considered a region. The dependence of the latter countries on the former, moreover, will qualify X, Y, and Z as the periphery, and the interdependence of A, B, and C will qualify that region as the centre. By these economic criteria, Germany, the Benelux countries, France, Italy, Switzerland, and Austria all qualify as the centre of Europe. Each of these countries has at least 47% of its trade with the other seven countries. There is comparatively very little 23  Per Magnus Wijkman, "Patterns of P r o d u c t i o n and Trade," i n W i l l i a m Wallace, ed., The Dynamics of European I n t e g r a t i o n (London and New York: P i n t e r P u b l i s h e r s , 1989), 89. d ]  2 2  I b i d . , 92  2 3  I b i d . , 92. 16  reciprocal trade between Portugal, Spain, Greece, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland. The southern countries send anywhere from 48% to 58% of their exports to the centre, with little reciprocity. Meanwhile, Finland and Sweden send 24  anywhere from 35% to 45% of their exports to the U.K., with little reciprocity; and finally, Denmark and the U.K. send most of their exports to the centre with comparatively little reciprocity.  25  The pattern of these relationships is evidence of a clear pattern in the  economies of Europe. At the centre of the continent are countries that have reciprocal trade relationships with each other, that in turn encourages the negotiation of economic integration. While at the periphery of Europe are countries that depend on the core as export markets, with little reciprocal consumer demand to bolster their bargaining position on trade issues. Finally, a state's place on the centre-periphery dimension will be measured by when it joined the EU. Whether a state began the process of European integration as a founding member of the ECSC, or later in the 1970's, '80's, or '90's, will indicate whether it sits at the centre, or periphery, for this criteria. By this criteria, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland, the U.K., Portugal, Spain, and Greece all sit on the periphery of Europe, all having been late EU joiners (or not all as in the case of Switzerland). Thus, there are four criteria used to measure the centre-periphery dimension: geography, the place in Europe's historical development, the economic place in the continent's trade patterns, and a state's joining date in the EU.  24  Ibid.  25  Ibid. 17  By all of these criteria,  Germany, France, the Benelux states, and Italy are at the centre. Switzerland and Austria, meanwhile, sit on the centre side of the dimension in three out of four of the criteria, qualifying them to be at the centre. Ireland, the U.K., Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal sit on the periphery in all of the criteria, putting them clearly on the periphery of the EU.  Institutional-Cultural Extra-European Region  Membership in an 'institutional-cultural extra-European region' serves to explain another source of anti-integrationist opinion. An extra-European region is a region whose roots are in Europe, but whose boundaries are not necessarily limited to.Europe. Culturally speaking, a region qualifies as belonging in this category if it possesses a sense of selfidentification stemming from the existence of a distinct and transnational cultural heritage. The Nordic region, the former Dominions of the British Commonwealth, and the bonds between Iberia and Latin America all qualify, culturally, as extra-European. From an institutional perspective, a region qualifies as extra-European if there exists an institutional structure that binds the region together, separate from the structures of Europe. The Nordic Council, the structures of the Francophonie, and the constitutional ties of the former Dominions of the British Commonwealth all qualify 'institutionally' as extra-European regions. Having defined the cultural and institutional criteria, it stands that the only extraEuropean regions on both counts are the Nordic region and the former Dominions. The link between Iberia and Latin America is strong culturally, but there is no institutional  18  affiliation comparable to the Nordic Council, the Francophonie, or the former Dominions. The Francophonie meanwhile may have an institutionalised structure, but the cultural binds between France and the other members stop after language and do not continue onto religion, or ethnicity, as do the cultural ties within the Nordic region, within the former Dominions, and between Iberia and Latin America. Scandinavia and the former Dominions, thus, are the only two extra-European regions that will be cited as encouraging antiintegrationist opinions in their respective 'home countries': Denmark and the United Kingdom. Great Power  The final dimension that serves to explain anti-integrationist sentiment is rooted in a state's role in international affairs.  A state will harbour greater anti-integrationist  sentiment if it can be characterized as being a 'great power'. In this case, a great power is defined as a state that possesses nuclear weapons and has a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations. While it may be fair to say that all states are reluctant to surrender their national sovereignty to an international organisation, this factor is especially true of great powers. Membership in the EU and the international obligations that this brings, erodes and threatens a part of the national self-image that is unique to great powers. Only France and the United Kingdom qualify for this category.  A. The Mediterranean  The Mediterranean member states share many of the same reasons for being prointegrationist. Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece all have both economic and political  19  reasons to be pro-integration. Italy, furthermore, sits at the centre of the Union on the centre-periphery dimension, a further reason for it to be pro-integrationist. As stated above, Greece, Portugal and Spain qualify for the Cohesion Fund. Furthermore, the Mediterranean states, including Italy, are great benefactors of the Structural Funds. In addition to the Cohesion Fund and the Structural Funds, the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, as agreed upon by the Council of Ministers in 1985, committed the Community to spend 4.1 billion ecus in grants and 2.5 billion ecus in loans on programmes designed to improve the material conditions of the southern regions of the EU.  26  Finally, the amount that the Single European Act committed to social and economic  cohesion was subsequently doubled by Jacques Delors for the peripheral regions by 1992.  27  It is no surprise, therefore, that economic benefits have been vital to the popularity of European integration in the Mediterranean states. In Greece, for instance, acceptance of greater integration has been attributed in large part to the economic gains it stands to make under the Treaty.  28  Portugal, meanwhile, is  set to receive 20% of the 15.5 billion ecu cohesion fund that has been set up under Maastricht. While the economies of both Italy and Spain are more industrialized than the 29  other states, they have likewise benefited from regional development aid and investment,  The e n t i r e programme came i n t o being i n l a r g e p a r t as a c o n d i t i o n i n order f o r Greece t o accept Spain and P o r t u g a l as members (Dick Leonard, Guide t o the European Community (London: the Economist books L t d . , 1992), 141). 2 6  2 7  L a f f a n , 199.  2 8  The Economist (6 June 1992), 51.  2 9  The Economist (30 October 1993). 20  both topping out the Structural Funds recipient list.  30  There have also been considerable political motivations for the Mediterranean region to be in favour of integration. Politically, EU membership and integration have played an important role in the consolidation of the newly (re-)established Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese democracies, "reinforc(ing) the commitment to democracy and provid(ing) an external actor against retrogression to authoritarianism." An example of the political 31  importance of membership can be seen by the manner in which Greece applied to join the Union. When called upon by the military to restore democracy in Greece, Constantine Karamanlis submitted an application for Greece's membership to the Community within eleven months of assuming power. In doing so, Karamanlis was asserting that the new Greece would develop in the liberal democratic model of Western Europe. The ensuing 32  debate over EC membership was thus also viewed as a debate over the future development of Greece itself. The final outcome, therefore, played a considerable role in resolving the 33  question over the nature of the political realm in post-war Greece.  i U  L a f f a n , 201. And The Economist (10-16 September  1994),  22. 31  Huntington, 87.  Susannah Verney, "To be or not t o be w i t h i n t h e European Community: t h e p a r t y debate and democratic c o n s o l i d a t i o n i n Greece," i n G e o f f r e y Pridham, ed., Securing Democracy (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 204. 3 2  That i s not t o say, however, t h a t a l l of t h e EU's (or modern Greece's opponents have been s i l e n c e d . As r e c e n t l y , as March 1991, f o r i n s t a n c e , two bomb a t t a c k s were made on t h e p r i v a t e c a r s o f EU employees. The a t t a c k s were p e r p e t r a t e d by the "November 17" t e r r o r i s t group i n response t o c o n s e r v a t i v e f i s c a l recommendations t h a t were made by t h e EU Commission ( S t a f f of t h e F r a n k f u r t e r Allegemeine Zeitung. 77). 3 3  21  Union membership played a similar function in the case of Spain. The role of the EU in consolidating democracy in post-Franco Spain has been so pivotal that commentators have precluded the Spanish democratic transition from serving as a model for Latin America as it goes through its own democratic transition. As there is no EU equivalent in the 34  Americas, commentators argue that Latin America should not assume that it can follow the easy transition of Spain. Finally, it is generally posited that the continued maturation of Portuguese political institutions is inextricably linked to the development of European integration. The first 35  decade of Portuguese democracy (from 1976 to 1986) saw no legislature complete its term, and no government last more than two years.  36  Since joining the EC in 1986, however,  Portugal has enjoyed a degree of relative political stability, including two majority governments. The political benefits that Italy has enjoyed from EU membership have also been attributed to the Union's stabilizing effects, though not in the same manner as may be seen in the other Mediterranean states. Italy's democracy is not as 'new' as that of the other states, nor as stable as that of non-Mediterranean states. Domestic political instability and bureaucratic inertia, together with a sometimes burdensome North-South rift , have all been 37  G i l l e s p i e , "The C o n t i n u i n g Debate on D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n i n Spain," P a r l i a m e n t a r y A f f a i r s . 46:4 (October 1993), 535. 3 5  I b i d . , 533.  David C o r k i l l , "The P o l i t i c a l System and t h e C o n s o l i d a t i o n o f Democracy i n P o r t u g a l , " P a r l i a m e n t a r y 46:4 (October 1993), 517. 3 6  3 7  Financial  Times (11 J u l y 1995), 12. 22  Affairs  trademarks of Italian government since its inception in the Post-War era.  Such  precariousness is clearly demonstrated in the fact that Italy has had over 40 governments since the war. A more recent illustration of such instability may be seen in the 1992 and May 1994 elections. Here, the traditional parties were eventually replaced by an entirely new set of political parties in what has been called an "earthquake" by Italian observers.  38  Thus, owing to this context, the Union has been viewed in Italian politics as a "critical counterweight" of stability in the domestic political realm. 39  The final pro-integration dimension into which Italy falls is that of the 'centreperiphery'. By virtue of its location, history, economy, and being one of the six original members of the EU, Italy is at the centre of the Union. The country has developed a greater trust of the EU's institutions, a form of national institutional memory. Together, these 40  factors have solidified an otherwise already strong case for integration in Italy. Sitting on the periphery of Europe, meanwhile, is the only reason that might generate some anti-integrationism in Portugal, Spain and Greece. The three countries stand on the outside of Europe geographically, and in terms of trade relations; have comparatively little historical commonality with the rest of Europe; and they were late joiners to the EU. This peripheral location, however, should be outweighed by the above reasons for which Portugal, Spain and Greece are pro-integrationist. M a r t i n J . B u l l and James L. Newell, " I t a l i a n P o l i t i c s and the 1992 E l e c t i o n s : From S t a b l e I n s t a b i l i t y ' t o I n s t a b i l i t y and Change," P a r l i a m e n t a r y A f f a i r s 46:2 ( A p r i l 1993), 203. 3 8  x  3 9  L a f f a n , 189.  M a r t i n H o l l a n d , European Community I n t e g r a t i o n (New York: St. M a r t i n ' s Press, 1992), 153. And L a f f a n , 204. And I n g e l h a r t and R e i f , 4,5. 4 0  23  B. Ireland Ireland's integration ranking is similar to that of Portugal, Greece, and Spain, with two reasons to be pro-integrationist and one reason to be anti-integrationist.  Ireland's  reasons to be pro-integrationist are 'economic' and 'political'. The one reason that might encourage anti-integrationist sentiment is the fact that Ireland sits on the 'periphery' of Europe. The case for the economic benefits of European integration in Ireland is strong. In 1989, the Irish GNP per capita was 66% of the Union average, the poorest in the 41  otherwise wealthy North, and the third poorest in the Union after Portugal and Greece. As a result of its relative poverty, Ireland receives a greater proportion of the Cohesion fund than the other poorer states. Ireland's portion of the Cohesion fund is one half the size of that of Greece's or Portugal's portions, despite the fact that its population of 3.5 million is one third the size of either of those country's.  42  With the ratification of Maastricht,  furthermore, Ireland received $12 billion in aid, as well as agricultural protection.  43  Politically, Ireland's reason to be pro-integration is similar to that of the Benelux states. Membership in the Union offers a means of tempering the influence of a large and historically intrusive neighbour: the United Kingdom. Ireland only gained political independence from the U.K. following the First World War. The EU has offered Ireland  41  Leonard, 238.  I r e l a n d r e c e i v e d 9.1% of t h e Fund i n 1993. Greece and P o r t u g a l r e c e i v e d approximately 18% of t h e fund each. (European Commission, 8) 4 2  4 3  A l e x Greer, 207 24  a multilateral means of lessening the continued influence of the U.K. in its affairs. The political benefits of membership in relation to the U.K. have been noted in Ireland since the eginning of its application procedure to the Union. Whereas the British, for instance, may  v  have had misgivings about the political impact of Union membership on their relations with the Commonwealth, the Irish were optimistic about the political impact of membership on their relations with other states. Therefore, rather than being perceived as an intrusion 44  on Irish political sovereignty, the Union has been viewed as a means of enhancing Ireland's political independence.  C. The Benelux Countries Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg each fall within the 'political' and the 'centre' pro-integrationist dimensions. Due to the fact that the Benelux states form a close subgroup within the EU, they will be discussed collectively. The political reasons that lead the region to favour integration are in good part born out of their experience with the neighbouring countries. German occupation in two world wars and French occupation under Napoleon have more than confirmed the fact that neither total independence nor annexation are feasible for the region. The Benelux nations came to the conclusion that their political future lay in their own common union, and that their national interests ultimately lay in a supranational Europe as early as 1944. A Europe with diminished 45  46  Denis Maher, The Tortuous Path: t h e Course o f I r e l a n d ' s E n t r y i n t o t h e EEC, 1948-73. (Dublin: I n s t i t u t e o f P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 1986), 132. 4 4  4 5  L a f f a n , 190, 191. And The Economist 25  (6 June 1992), 51.  national rivalries and constrained national sovereignty was seen as the only solution to recurring invasions from the French and the Germans. As such, the Benelux Union came into being as a customs union on January 1st, 1948. Testimony to this political calculation lies in the fact that the Second Chamber (the Parliament) of the Netherlands was nearly unanimous in its decision to transfer powers to supranationalist institutions in 1948. Moreover, pursuant to the EU itself, the Dutch insisted on a directly elected EP as early as 1964. Belgium and Luxembourg, meanwhile, are 47  presently home to many of the institutions of the EU itself. In Luxembourg, the entire city quarter of Kirkberg is comprised of EU institutions.  48  In Belgium, Brussels is the capital  of the EU. In an affirmation of his country's Euro-enthusiasm, former Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans is on record stating that, "...the best Belgian policy is (a) European..." policy. 49  Finally, the Benelux nations lie at the 'centre' of the Union. Historically, geographically, economically, and in terms of entry date to the EU, the Benelux nations are (and have been) at the centre of the Union. In addition to the above reasons, therefore, the Benelux nations are member states with a significant degree of cultural and 'institutional' familiarity with the Union.  Leonard, 2. And John F i t z m a u r i c e , "Luxembourg," i n Lodge, ed., D i r e c t E l e c t i o n s t o the European Parliament, 1984. 178-180. 1,0  Rudy B. Andeweg and Galen A. Irwin, Dutch Government and P o l i t i c s (London: Macmillan, 1993), 222. 4 7  4 8  S t a f f o f t h e F r a n k f u r t e r Allecremeine Zeituncf. 78.  La B e l g i q u e e t l a Development de l a Communaute Europeenne (1982), 13. 4 9  26  D . Germany  Like the Benelux nations, Germany falls into both the 'centre' and 'political' dimensions, lending to pro-integrationist sentiment. Germany sits at the centre of Europe. Without its leadership and consent, it is doubtful that integration would ever have even been considered. Recently for instance, in late August / early September, 1994, the German position at the centre of the Union was accentuated by the Europe of "concentric circles" proposal.  50  Within two days of each other, both the German Christian Democratic  parliamentary group and Eduard Bahadur, the French Prime Minister, forwarded plans for an inner core of member states to advance with integration, leaving the rest of the states to follow at their leisure. According to the two countries, the "inner core" of member states would consist of Germany, France, and the Benelux nations. This core would pursue common defence and foreign policies, common laws, a single currency, and pooled sovereignty. Despite the fact that the French and German governments claimed 51  that their proposals were not "official", the British government took them seriously enough to issue a counter-vision of Europe. Thus, on September 7th, Prime Minister John Major outlined a vision of Europe whereby countries could choose to participate in some of the inner core's shared policies, but need not necessarily participate in all of them. This proposal has been called 'Europe a la carte', where a country can pick and choose individual items from the menu of integration, rather than having to 'eat the entire meal'.  The Economist (10-16 September, 5 1  Ibid. 27  1994),  21.  The merits of each vision aside, this exchange illustrated the German government's place at the centre of the Union's decision-making process. It also illustrates that the country's ability to set the Union's agenda has and continues to benefit its view of integration. Germany does not feel that its sovereignty is being wrestled from it. Rather, Germany knows that integration can only proceed in the same manner as it always has — with its own consent. The political motivation that has led Germany to favour integration is born out of its experiences both during and after World War II. For Germany, the EU has been a means of rehabilitating itself in the wake of the wartime atrocities committed by it under the auspices of the Nazi regime. A firm commitment to supranationalism has served the 52  dual function of proving to its neighbours that it will not repeat its recent history, and of 53  providing a means of silencing any potential nationalists on its own domestic front.  54  In return for such benefits received, Germany has played the role of the Union's "paymaster", bearing the brunt of much of the regional infrastructure integration 55  programmes. While it has been hypothesized that Germany may tire of this role as it pays for the amalgamation of the former D.D.R., this prediction has as yet failed to come to 56  Stephen George, P o l i t i c s and P o l i c y i n t h e European Community (Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1991), 68. 5 2  Eva K o l i n s k y , "The Euro-Germans: N a t i o n a l I d e n t i t y and European I n t e g r a t i o n i n Germany," i n J o l y o n Howorth and M a i r i Maclean, eds., Europeans on Europe (London: Macmillan, 1992), 173. 5 3  5 4  The Economist (10-16 September,  5 5  L a f f a n , 183. And George, 79. And K o l i n s k y , 174.  5 6  Leonard, 213. And Greven, 94. 28  1994), 22.  fruition. The primary reason for this failure is that the unified Germany has re-ignited fears of a chauvinistic and nationalist Germany. As a result, Germany still finds it politically important to emphasise its commitment to supranationalism. Reassuring its neighbors of this commitment at a meeting of the Western European Union in March 1990, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher stated, with reference to unification, that, "...we Germans do not want to go it alone or to follow a separate path. We want to take a European path...."  57  E. France  France has reason to be both pro and anti-integrationist. On the 'pro' side, France sits at the centre of the Union. On the 'anti' side, France can count itself as one of Europe's two great powers.  France's pro-integrationist sentiment can be explained by its  undisputed place at the 'centre' of Europe. The strength of the 'centre' dimension in France, and its ability to shed light on the country's tradition of pro-integrationism, lies in its double-edged appeal to the country. On the one hand, it appeals to the country's suprantional tradition, and on the other, it appeals to the country's nationalist disposition. France's Jean Monnet was the principal architect and first President of the ECSC.  58  Originally designed as an economic means to a peaceful post-war Europe  between France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux nations, the ECSC ultimately developed into the EU. Moreover, former (French) Commission President Jacques  5 7  The I r i s h Times  5 8  Leonard, 3, 4.  (24 A p r i l  1990), 5. Quoted i n L a f f a n ,  184.  29  Delors has been widely credited with personally forging the current increased integration of Europe. By their integrationist activism, both Monnet and Delors reassured the country that integration can benefit France. As with Germany above, France's place at the centre of the Union and the impact that it can have on the development of the Union, continues to be felt in EU politics. The Europe of 'concentric circles' proposal demonstrated to the French public that the country's place at the heart of the Union will continue to ensure that the pace of integration is set according to French standards. France's place at the centre of Europe, thus, has brought integration into a favourable light amongst that portion of the population that has favoured the 'internationalist' vision of Jean Monnet. Sitting at the centre of Europe has also given reason to the 'Gaullist' side of France to favour integration. While integrationist developments since Maastricht may have muted this source of approval, sitting at the centre of Europe has at times given the Gaullists reason to be pro-integrationist. For Gaullists, France's place at the centre of Europe has given it the opportunity to reassert its place in the world through the Union. Sitting at the centre has allowed the country to carve out a political leadership role in Europe that has outweighed its economic power. From this position, Gaullists have also seen the Union 59  as a way of gaining independence from the United States in the post-war era. Acknowledging that it could not break its strategic dependence on the U.S. alone, France has pursued the goal of greater foreign policy independence from within the context of the  R a i n e r Riemenschneider, "The Two Souls o f Marianne: N a t i o n a l S o v e r e i g n t y versus S u p r a n a t i o n a l i t y i n Europe," i n Howorth and Maclean, eds., 156. 30  Union.  60  The strength of French pro-integrationist opinion, therefore, has been rooted in the country's place the 'centre' of Europe. The ability to mold the Union's agenda from the centre has been viewed by both the advocates of Monnet and de Gaulle as advantageous to their respective visions of Europe and France. The paradox of this may be that the Gaullist source of pro-integration can also been as the source of anti-integrationism. Once France's central position in the Union has not been seen to advance the national interest of the country, the Gaullist brand of integrationism has fed into the great power dimension that is anti-integrationist. Depending upon the degree of integrationism being espoused, therefore, the balance of opinion in France could feasibly shift either for, or against integration.  F. Denmark and the United Kingdom Denmark and the United Kingdom are the only two states in the EU that do not fall into any of the pro-integrationist dimensions. Denmark and the U.K. stand distinct from the rest of the member-states, all of which have at least one reason to join the Union. Neither Denmark nor the U.K. has any significant reason for joining the EU other than the economic benefits accrued from free trade. Economically, neither Denmark nor the U.K. is poor enough to qualify for the infrastructure transfer investments received by the Mediterranean countries and Ireland, precluding the economic incentive for being pro-integration. Politically, both Denmark and  George, 98.  31  the U.K. have long-standing traditions of democracy, thus having no need to rely on the EU as a democratic anchor in the same way that it is relied upon by the Meditteranean states. With regards to World War II, the experiences of both Denmark and the U.K. engendered political responses that varied greatly from those of the rest of Europe. Like the rest of the continent, Denmark was conquered and occupied during the war by Nazi Germany. Following the war, however, the Danes did not seek to restrain Germany, as did the Benelux nations and France, by co-opting it under the supranationalist umbrella of the ECSC.  Rather, Denmark sought to protect its national interest by  withdrawing from the affairs of Europe and strengthening its ties with the rest of Scandinavia. Neutralist sentiments led Denmark to pursue the (ultimately doomed) idea of the Scandinavian Defence Pact in 1949. To this day, moreover, Denmark remains a mere 61  observer in the Western European Union (WEU), an association born in 1948 and comprised of both foreign and defence ministers from 10 EU and NATO states. Thus, while it would be far from true to say that Denmark is isolationist, it is notable that the country did not choose to negotiate closer ties with its southern neighbours immediately following the war. Unlike most of Europe, the United Kingdom was not conquered by the Germans during the war. As a result, the British national identity was not discredited by the war; rather, it was strengthened. The British felt little political need to rehabilitate or safeguard their national interest (through Europe) following the war. In fact, if Britain could be said  N e i l E l d e r , "Denmark," i n J u l i e t Lodge, ed. , D i r e c t E l e c t i o n s t o t h e European Parliament 1984 (London: Macmillan, 1986), 74. 32  to have finished the war with strengthened ties towards any other states, they were nonEuropean: the English-speaking Commonwealth and the United States. As such, there has 62  been no political reason for the U.K. to harbour any great amount of pro-integrationist sentiment. Furthermore, the peripheral positioning of both Denmark and the U.K to the EU's decision-making process has given rise to much anti-EU feeling in both countries. The peripheral position of Denmark feeds the resentment that the country has for the remoteness of the EU institutions. Chief among the Danish objections to the Union, for instance, is the non-participatory manner in which the EU is governed from Brussels, "known in Community jargon as the democratic deficit."  63  (The democratic deficit is a  normative term which has been used to describe the closed and technocratic style of EU decision making. ) While it is true that there have been democratic advancements over 64  recent years in the governing style of the Union, the relative powerlessness of the 65  °  c  George, 99.  Sven Papcke, "Who Needs European I d e n t i t y ? " i n B r i a n Nelson, David Roberts, and Walter V e i t , eds., The Idea o f Europe: Problems o f N a t i o n a l and T r a n s n a t i o n a l I d e n t i t y (New York, Oxford: Berg, 1992), 66. 6 3  The s t r o n g d e c i s i o n making powers of n o n - p a r t i c i p a t o r y bodies such as t h e C o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s , t h e Commission, and t h e European Court o f J u s t i c e have a l l been c i t e d as l e a d i n g causes of t h e EU's democratic d e f i c i t ( B r i g i t t e Boyce, "The Democratic D e f i c i t o f t h e European Community," P a r l i a m e n t a r y A f f a i r s . 46 (October 1993), 458). 6 4  The i n t r o d u c t i o n of EP d i r e c t e l e c t i o n s i n 1979 was applauded by many o b s e r v e r s f o r i n f u s i n g t h e EU w i t h a degree o f democratic a c c o u n t a b i l i t y (R.K. Carty, "Towards a European P o l i t i c s : t h e Lessons of t h e European P a r l i a m e n t E l e c t i o n i n I r e l a n d , " J o u r n a l of European I n t e g r a t i o n , (4:2), 239). 6 5  33  European Parliament continues to gnaw at a public that is already exceedingly suspicious of the EU and elitist politics. The country's post-materialist political cleavage adds further fuel to this suspicion of Brussels. Post-materialism is a term used to describe sources of political conflict that are not rooted in traditional class cleavage politics. Some of the valence points that define 66  67  post-materialism are environmental awareness, gender politics, and an opposition to the monopoly of public policies by bureaucracies and heavily centralised non-participatory government.  68  Thus, the combination of Denmark's post-materialism and of being on the periphery helps explain the degree of Danish anti-integrationism. It is worth noting that postmaterialism, and the suspicion of remote political decision-making that goes with it, has found a relatively attentive audience in the Nordic countries.  69  It is reasonable to  hypothesise, therefore, that Sweden and Finland may develop a similar brand of antiintegrationism.  See The S i l e n t R e v o l u t i o n (pp. 262-291) f o r an overview of t h e p o s t - m a t e r i a l i s t phenomenon. [Ronald I n g e l h a r t , The S i l e n t R e v o l u t i o n , ( P r i n c e t o n , New J e r s e y : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1977) ] . F o r a d i s c u s s i o n of how contemporary p o l i t i c a l cleavages are i n c r e a s i n g l y d e f i n e d by valence i s s u e s , r a t h e r than t r a d i t i o n a l ' s p a t i a l p o l i t i e s ' , see Donald Stokes, "Valence P o l i t i c s , " i n Dennis Kavanagh, ed., E l e c t o r a l P o l i t i c s (Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s , 1992), 141-164. 6 7  Oddbjorn Knutsen, "The M a t e r i a l i s t / P o s t M a t e r i a l i s t Value Dimension as a P a r t y Cleavage i n t h e Nordic C o u n t r i e s , " West European P o l i t i c s 13 ( A p r i l 1990), 261. And I n g e l h a r t , The S i l e n t R e v o l u t i o n . 3-19. 6 8  6 9  Knutsen, 2 61. 34  The location of the U.K. on the periphery can also provide an explanation for its anti-integration sentiment. Frustration at being on the periphery of the Union had already developed in the U.K. by the time that it joined the Community in 1973. This was the result of the fact that it's first two applications to join the Community were vetoed by then French President Charles de Gaulle. This experience did little to encourage British trust in the 70  Community's institutional culture. When the U.K. finally did join, the feeling was that the style of governance in the Community had already been formed, without any British input.  71  Changing the status quo policies and responsibilities of the members, in fact, became a hallmark of British Euro-policy in the mid 1980's. Here, the U.K. lobbied to change British budgetary contributions, CAP , and regional aid. 72  Membership in an 'institutional-cultural extra-European' region is a further source of anti-integrationism in Denmark and the U.K.. Denmark is part of the Nordic region, and until Sweden and Finland joined the EU on January 1st, 1995, had traditionally been the only Nordic member of the Union. In this capacity, Denmark has been reluctant to lose its Nordic distinctiveness. The anti-EU parties have thus done well in elections and referenda 73  by arguing that greater integration would erode the integrity of the country's 'Nordic' political culture. These parties have also garnered support with warnings that greater  Ingelhart 71  and R e i f , 4.  L a f f a n , 192.  One B r i t i s h news magazine has r e f e r r e d t o CAP i n p a s s i n g as "...a system almost as d i s t o r t e d as t h e communist system o f s t a t e farms, f i x e d p r i c e s , and so on.... (The Economist (20 August 1994), 42.) 7 2  11  7 3  Ingelhart  and R e i f , 9. And L a f f a n , 196. 35  integration would lead to German domination of Danish employment policies , that 74  Denmark would become entangled in EU defence responsibilities, and that low EU 75  environmental standards would erode the gains that Denmark had made in combatting environmental hazards.  76  The 'institutional-cultural extra-European' region to which the U.K. belongs is the former Dominions of the British Commonwealth. This part of the British national identity has had visible effects on Britain's perception of the EU and, accordingly, its treatment of the EU's members. The country has had, for instance, stronger economic ties with AngloAmerica historically than with Europe. Other ties include a seemingly biased disposition 77  towards the former Dominions in international affairs. Spain, for instance, was disillusioned recently when British public opinion sided with Canada in the Spanish-Canadian fishing disputes over the Grand Banks. This dissatisfaction was then heightened when the British 78  government refused to join the EU in punitive action against Canada for what the Canadians freely admitted was their violation of the law of the seas; that is, their seizure of Spanish fishing boats in international waters. Less quantifiable is that these Anglo ties have fostered a British 'phobia' of things European, such as the predominant use of French as  N e i l E l d e r , "Denmark," i n J u l i e t Lodge, ed., D i r e c t E l e c t i o n s t o t h e European Parliament 1984 (London: Macmillan, 1986), 76. 7 5  I b i d . , 74.  A l a s t a i r H. Thomas, "Denmark," i n Lodge, ed., The 1989 E l e c t i o n o f t h e European Parliament. 54. 7 6  7 7  7 8  George, 99. F i n a n c i a l Times 11 J u l y 1995, 12. 36  a language of the Union.  79  Finally, the U.K.'s anti-integrationist sentiment is also partly attributable to the fact that the country is a 'great power'. As such, erosions on national sovereignty and independence are politically salient in Britain. The British view of the nation is similar to de Gaulle's 'motors of history' theory. The underpinnings of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's Bruges Speech in 1989 represented Britain's reluctance to cede its sovereignty. Among the main points in the speech were a call to reform CAP, to promote free trade (not only within the EU, but also within the rest of the world), to deregulate economies, and to proceed with intergovernmentalism. Intergovernmentalism is similar in meaning to de 80  Gaulle's TEurope des Patries'. The theory advocates cooperation in the EU, but limits it to the consensus of the Union's separate governments, as opposed to supranational federalist obligations. In advocating governmental cooperation without ceding national sovereignty, intergovernmentalism stands, therefore, as the British alternative to a federal Europe.  Leonard, 229. N i g e l Ashford, "The P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s , i n Stephen George, ed., B r i t a i n and the European Community (Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s , 1992), 125. 8 0  1 1  37  G . Ranking the Member States  The results of these pro and anti-integration hypotheses, and how the countries are ranked can be seen in Table 2. The majority of the states fall into country clusters. Most of the Mediterranean states are clustered together, along with Ireland, with a score of +1. Italy stands as the most pro-integration with a score of +3. The Benelux nations and Germany share similar pro-integrationist scores of +2. France is the only country that sits on the cusp with a score of zero.  Denmark and the United Kingdom are  conspicuous in the Union by their markedly negative scores. Table 2. Combined Pro and Anti-Integration Ranking of Member States  Member State  Pro-Integration (+)  Anti-Integration (-)  Combined Total  Italy  +3  0  +3  Belgium  +2  0  +2  Germany  +2  0  +2  Luxembourg  +2  0  +2  Netherlands  +2  0  +2  Greece  +2  -1  +1  Portugal  +2  -1  +1  Spain  +2  -1  +1  Ireland  +2  -1  +1  France  +1  -1  0  Denmark  0  -2  -2  United Kingdom  0  -3  -3  38  II. P U B L I C O P I N I O N A N D E L E C T I O N S  In order to judge whether or not our hypotheses regarding the dependent variable are correct, we will examine cross-national survey data from the Eurobarometer public opinion polls, as well as European Parliament election results. Two Eurobarometer questions have been used to measure opinion on integration. Question 1 is a snapshot of public opinion from 1987 and 1988. Data from question 2 exists for the period from 81  1978 to 1993, and can therefore be used as longitudinal evidence. The longitudinal evidence from question 2 is featured in Charts 1 and 2 below. The question is a direct survey of public opinion on the unification of Western Europe: "In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If for, are you very much for this, or only to some extent? If against, are you only to some extent against, or very much against?"  82  The responses to this question from 1978 to  1993, together with the longitudinal national and EU averages, can be seen in Appendix A, Tables 1.1 to 1.13. The broad wording of the question allows us to measure public opinion on the various European integration efforts that have taken place throughout this time period. Opinion on both the Single Europe Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992), for instance, can be assessed by the general tone of the question. The "EU average opinion" favours European integration in both questions, with a majority or a plurality favouring integration in each question. The f i r s t q u e s t i o n measures a c o u n t r y ' s w i l l i n g n e s s t o i n t e g r a t e t h e EU beyond t h e common market: Are you i n f a v o u r o f , "going f u r t h e r than t h e s i n g l e market?" (Eurobarometer, 29 (June 1988), T a b l e A15) The n a t i o n a l and EU averages of t h e response t o t h i s q u e s t i o n can be seen i n Appendix A, T a b l e 2 ) . 81  8 2  Eurobarometer  (December 1993), Table B4. 39  C o m b i n e d Anti-integrationist Sentiment (1978-1993; except as noted) 40°/  ol  35% 1 V e r  30% 25% 1  s u 20% \ s 15% E U 5%fl 0%  D  UK  N  Gr  ir  Ge  ED  40  EU  Chart 1  B  j>;ii»>  C o m b i n e d Anti-integrationist Sentiment (1992 & 1993)  V e r s u s  E U  41  Evidence from the European Parliament elections shows a similar pro-integration trend. The greater majority of the parties have run on pro-integrationist platforms. In fact the favourable consensus around European integration has all but removed the issue from the election campaigns. The broad and favourable consensus in the public and between 83  most of the parties over integration causes one to consider how we are to achieve the aim of this thesis. The purpose of this thesis is to measure the degrees of "difference" between the member-states over integration, not the degrees of similarity -- or consensus — between the states over integration. As pro-integrationism seems to be the consensus, measuring pro-integrationist sentiment, would not, therefore, be the best means of illustrating our goal. On the contrary, the better means of depicting the "differences" between the states is by measuring the degrees of anti-integrationism in the member-states. Anti-integrationism illustrates the degree to which each state is different from the EU consensus, and therein offers a better means of judging the differences between the states. Accordingly, we have taken samples of anti-integrationist sentiment from public opinion polls, and have compiled the electoral data on political parties that have run in European Parliament elections with anti-integrationism as part of their electoral platforms.  I t has been s a i d i n f a c t t h a t a t t h e time o f EP e l e c t i o n s , t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s have continued t o a c t , " . . . a c t o r s o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e n a t i o n a l p a r t y systems." (Michael Th. Greven, " P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s Between n a t i o n a l I d e n t i t y and E u r o f i c a t i o n , " i n Nelson, Roberts and V e i t , eds., 83.) For a c r i t i c a l assessment of t h e r o l e o f p a r t i e s i n t h e d e m o c r a t i s a t i o n of t h e European Union see Vernon Bogdanor, " D i r e c t E l e c t i o n s , R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Democracy, and European i n t e g r a t i o n , " E l e c t o r a l S t u d i e s 8 (December 1989), 208; and Cees Van Der E i j k and Mark N. F r a n k l i n , "European Community P o l i t i c s and E l e c t o r a l R e p r e s e n t a t i o n : Evidence from t h e 1989 European E l e c t i o n s Study," European J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l Research, 19 (1991), 105. 42  Chart 1 illustrates a cross-national pattern of anti-integrationist sentiment in the EU over a 15 year span. Chart 2 is based on the same data, but focused on 1992 and 1993. The benefit of Chart 1 is that longitudinal evidence can not be easily swayed by trends, and can thereby paint a clear and sober picture of the question under consideration. Chart 2 is by no means meant to overshadow Chart 1. Having the data from 1992 and 1993 (the postMaastricht years) available, however, may prove useful given the added currency of the topic to the European public in those years. As predicted, the United Kingdom and Denmark are the most anti-integrationist states in the Union. As seen from the raw data that are illustrated in Chart 1, Denmark has 24% points more people against integration than the EU average. The U.K. has the next highest percentage, with almost 10% points more than the average against integration. Excepting the Netherlands, which is only 2% points above the average, the rest of the member states are either average or below average. The only surprise in the public opinion data is that Denmark has a higher degree of anti-integrationism than does the United Kingdom. In light of Denmark's score of -2 in Table 2, compared to the U.K.'s score of -3, we had hypothesized that there would be more anti-integrationism in the U.K. than in Denmark. The public opinion poll data does not, however, corroborate this prediction. It appears, therefore, that while Denmark has less reason to be against integration than the U.K., its reasons are more broadly felt in the Danish public. Denmark's peripheral locality and Scandinavian distinctiveness have engendered a greater degree of anti-integrationist sentiment than had been forecasted, demonstrating that Table 2 should only be used as a crude model for ranking.  43  It appears then that, generally speaking, the public opinion data taken from over 15 years corroborates our hypotheses on why there are varying degrees of pro and antiintegrationist sentiment in the European Union. Italy clearly has the most reason to favour integration; Denmark and the U.K., the least. According to our research model, this pattern of public opinion should now be shown as reflected in the member states' EP party systems. The anti-integrationist parties and their vote share can be seen in Table 3, Antiintegrationism in E P Elections.  Secondary sources have been used for determining whether  or not a party is anti-integrationist. (Please see Appendix B). There are anti-integrationist parties in 11 of the member states. The two states with the most significant amount of antiintegrationist vote share, France and Denmark, are set out in bold and are accompanied by a brief explanatory analysis in the text. An analysis of the British party system also appears in the text. Summaries of party systems in other states with comparatively low antiintegrationist vote shares can be seen in the Appendix.  44  Table 3. Anti-integrationism in E P Elections  Member State & Parties Year & (Total Vote) % Vote:'79* ' 8 4 ~  '89  '94  Belgium Volksunie  6.0  8.5  5.4  4.4  Vlaams Blok  0.7  1.3  4.1  7.8  Front Nationale  NA  NA  NA  2.9  (Total Vote)  (6.7)  (9.8)  (9.5)  (15.1)  People's Movement  21.0  20.8  18.9  10.3  June Movement  NA  NA  NA  15.2  (Total Vote)  (21.0)  (20.8)  (18.9)  (25.5)  National Front  1.3  10.95  11.73  10.5  Communists  20.5  11.20  7.71  6.9  Other Europe  NA  NA  NA  12.3  (Total Vote)  (21.8)  (22.15)  (19.44)  (29.7)  Republicans  NA  NA  7.1  3.9  Free Citizens Alliance  NA  NA  NA  1.1  (Total Vote)  (NA)  (NA)  (7.1)  (5.0)  Communists (KKE)  12.84  11.64  14.30  6.3  Left Wing Resistance  NA  NA  NA  5.7  POLA  NA  NA  NA  8.5  (Total Vote)  (12.84)  (11.64)  (14.30)  (20.5)  Denmark  France  Germany  Greece  45  Ireland Workers' Party  3.3  4.3  7.5  5.4  (Total vote)  (3.3)  (4.3)  (7.5)  (5.4)  Ital. Soc. Move. (MSI)  5.4  6.5  5.5  12.5  (Total Vote)  (5.4)  (6.5)  (5.5)  (12.5)  NA  NA  10.4  10.9  Calvinist Coalition  3.3  5.2  5.9  7.8  Centre Party  NA  NA  NA  1.0  Rad. Soc. &Commun.  NA  NA •  NA  1.8  G.P.A. (Rad.Soc, Comm, Pacif., Greens)  5.0  5.6  7.0  NA  (Total Vote)  (8.3)  (10.8)  (12.9)  (10.6)  Unit. Dem. Coal.  -  11.51  14.40  11.2  (Total Vote)  -  (11.51)  (14.40)  (11.2)  Hard Bat. (HB)  -  1.88  1.72  2.8  (Total Vote)  -  (1.88)  (1.72)  (2.8)  -  -  -  -  Italy  Luxembourg Greens Netherlands  Portugal  Spain  United Kingdom -  (Note: *: 1981 tor Greece. World Events. 1979 - 1994)  iy»6 tor Spain and PortugalHSource: Keesing's Record o  We will begin our analysis with an examination of the French party system. We had hypothesised that France was on the cusp of the integrationist debate, scoring a zero in our 46  ranking system. The longitudinal public opinion data in Chart 1 shows France as being a state that falls into the pro-integrationist camp. Chart 2, however, demonstrates a recent trend towards anti-integrationism. Contrary to our expectations, the French party system does not sit on the cusp between pro and anti-integrationism. In comparison to the other states, the French party system appears to have had a significant anti-integrationist element throughout most of the EP elections. Accordingly, we will discuss the nuances of the French case, and its implications for our original assessment of France within the integration debate. Next, we will discuss the party system of the United Kingdom. It will be seen that contrary to both our hypothesis and the public opinion poll data, the U.K. does not have any antiintegrationist parties. In order to understand why this is the case, we will discuss the impact of electoral systems as an intervening variable in politics, and in specific regard to their impact on the party system of the United Kingdom. Finally, a comparison of the British electoral system with the electoral systems of France and Denmark will offer a more thorough understanding of the British case.  A. France  Significant anti-integrationist party results in France were not predicted in our discussion of France. The public opinion data, furthermore, only showed above average antiintegrationist in 1992 and 1993. Since 1979, however, France has been registering a significant amount of votes for anti-integrationist parties; anywhere between 19% and 30% of the national total. Until 1994, these anti-integration votes were cast primarily  47  for parties on the left and right fringes of the political spectrum, leaving the main parties to concentrate on national politics. The 1989 EP election typified this phenomenon. Because this election followed closely on the heels of the 1988 Presidential election, which had returned the Socialist's Francois Mitterrand to power, the main issue of the 1989 election was not European integration. Rather, the main issue in that election became the question of who would lead the recently defeated right wing list. Once this issue was resolved, the Socialists, Centrists, 84  and Gaullists turned to their respective European platforms, "...condemned to differentiate themselves on what was in fact almost a common programme."  85  In 1994, however, this pattern of activity changed. This election followed shortly after the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty and shortly before pending intergovernmental conferences that would discuss the growing powers of the Union. This rise is reflected in 86  Chart 2, which shows that anti-integrationist sentiment was double (20%) in 1992 and 1993 of what it was (10%) over the 15 years shown in Chart 1. Regardless of the exact cause, for the first time, a party of the 'conventional' right, Viscomte de Villiers' Other Europe Party, ran on an anti-integrationist platform. The advent of a relatively mainstream antiintegrationist party seems to indicate that the delicate balance struck over integration in France has leaned over to the anti-integrationists.  Jean & Monica C h a r i o t , "France," E l e c t o r a l S t u d i e s 8:3 (1989), 246. 8 4  8 5  I b i d . , 248.  A l a i n Guyomarch, "The European Dynamics o f E v o l v i n g P a r t y Competition i n France," P a r l i a m e n t a r y A f f a i r s (January 1995), 105. 8 6  48  As was related earlier, France was the birthplace of not only Monnet and his vision of a 'United States of Europe', but also of de Gaulle and his anti-integrationist vision of a TEurope des Patries'. This anti-integrationist voice had been relatively silent in France 87  until President Mitterrand called for a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty following its rejection by Denmark. The French referendum passed with just 51% 'for' Maastricht and 88  49% 'against' Maastricht. On the 'No' side was a conglomeration of the far right, the far left, UDF sceptics, and the Gaullist and Socialist sceptics. LePen of the far right National Front condemned Maastricht as national treason, and the Communists condemned it as a Europe of the bankers. Of particular interest, however, were the mainstream dissenters. Both Charles 89  Pasqua (former Minister of the Interior) and Philippe Seguin (former Chirac Minister) represented the RPR's sceptics.  90  Seguin attacked the legitimacy of the European  Parliament, insisting that, "...democracy is inseparable from national sovereignty...."  91  Echoing de Gaulle's belief that nations are the, "...motors of history...," Seguin and Pasqua 92  °'  Mayne, 13.  Byron C r i d d l e , "The French Referendum on t h e M a a s t r i c h t T r e a t y September 1992," Parliamentary A f f a i r s 46:2 (1993), 228, 230. 8 8  8 9  I b i d . , 233.  9 0  I b i d . , 231.  91  I b i d . , 234.  P e t e r Fysh, (1993), 405. 9 2  "Gaul1ism  Today," P a r l i a m e n t a r y A f f a i r s 46:3 49  brought a strong 'des Patries' line of argument into the debate. This anti-integrationist 93  sentiment, thus seems to have come about as a result of the fact that Maastricht was perceived by some as pushing integration beyond the desirable end. The recent election of Gaullist candidate Mr. Jacques Chirac as President of France in 1995 has only fueled speculation over French anti-integrationism. Since assuming the Presidency, Mr. Chirac has continued to bring France's former Euro-enthusiasm into doubt on at least two occasions. One of these was the Cannes Summit, where Mr. Chirac played host to the member states at the end of France's six month term as President of the Council of Ministers. Rather than playing the courteous host, Mr. Chirac took the opportunity to make blunt and undiplomatic comments about Greece's foreign policy in the Balkans and towards Turkey. Mr. Chirac went on to praise the leadership of Prime Minister John Major, a figure known as a somewhat undependable 'European' when compared to other continental leaders. These comments made by Mr. Chirac have been taken by observers 94  as an indication that the French President does not place European unity on the same scale of importance as did his predecessors. France's reluctance to implement the Schengen Treaty in tandem with the other parties to the treaty - Germany and the Benelux nations - is the other event that has 95  caused doubt about France's present commitment to integration. The Schengen Treaty removes all internal frontier controls between the treaty members, while tightening external  I t estimated t h a t 2/3 o f RPR's v o t e r s voted a g a i n s t t h e M a a s t r i c h t t r e a t y i n t h e referendum ( I b i d . , 405, 406). 9 3  9 4  9 5  F i n a n c i a l Times  (1-2 J u l y 1995), 2.  Ibid. 50  controls with respect to non-members. After a preliminary trial period, France has refused to join the treaty until the end of the year, "...reveal(ing) the tension between the Euroenthusiasts and the Euro-sceptics in the Gaullist French government."  96  Having settled on the cause of France's unexpected party results, it is now necessary to examine the methodological questions that these results pose. France's party results force us to reconsider not only where France falls in regard to integration, but also the general premise that there should be a correlation between public opinion data and EP electoral results — a critical assumption for our thesis. There are a number of possible explanations for this anomolous relationship between public opinion and party results. One explanation might be that the Euro-barometer surveys used to measure public opinion are simply inaccurate and have failed to register French anti-integrationist sentiment. If this is the case, it is fair to doubt one of the premises of our methodology; that is, that the EP elections reflect in some way a member state's feeling towards European integration. France was hypothesised to sit on the cusp of the integrationist debate. Assuming that the recent opinion polls of 1992 and 1993 are not being skewed by an aberration, it seems that the country's hitherto pro-integrationism has now receded and that antiintegrationism has come to the fore. The cooperation of the loosely defined Gaullist 'camp' in France was tentative at best. In the wake of the Maastricht Treaty and its implications for integration, it seems that this 'camp' has defected from nominal integrationism, and has gone to the anti-integrationist side. Whether this will necessitate a reconfiguring of France  9 6  Ibid. 51  in our general hypothesis, however, is another question. At this juncture, it is too soon to judge if France will remain on the anti-integrationist side. Claiming that France's (antiintegrationist) 'great power' dimension has permanently outweighed France's historical place at the (pro-integrationist) 'centre' of Europe would be premature at this stage.  B. The United Kingdom There is overwhelming evidence, seen in both the public opinion polls and the political parties, of a considerable amount of anti-integrationist sentiment in the United Kingdom. Despite its feeling on integrationism, however, there are no anti-integrationist parties in the British EP elections. In order to understand the lack of outright anti-integrationist parties in the U.K., we will survey where exactly the British political parties stand on integration. This brief survey of the parties will then be followed by a discussion of the intervening variable that is being forwarded as the cause of the British party results: the country's First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system. The effect of the U.K.'s electoral system on its party system will be illustrated by comparing the British case to the electoral systems of both Denmark and France. Britain's major political parties have been internally divided over the question of European integration since the question entered political discourse. Considerable internal divisions over integration have precluded the parties from ever being able to take strong and permanent stands on Europe. The Labour Party, for instance, has at times been the party 97  of euro-scepticism, and at other times it has been the party of euro-enthusiasm. The  9 7  A s h f o r d , 119. 52  scepticism has been evident at various times over the past two decades. In 1975, for instance, the Wilson government put the U.K.'s membership to the test with a national referendum. The referendum was designed to forge unity on the question of integration in both the electorate, and within the Labour Party itself. As it was, however, the referendum's approval of membership did little to heal the rift in the party over integration. Throughout the 1980's, the party continued to change its stance on integration, sceptic in the early '80's, and resting most recently on the pro-integration side. The rift over integration in the party roughly parallels the different ideological camps in the party. On the far left of the party has been a group firmly opposed to the EU. On internal European matters, this group has seen the Union as a militaristic and capitalist block. On external affairs, the far left has accused the Union as being too firmly allied with the United States. In sum, the far left has viewed Union membership as a hurdle to the goal of establishing a socialist state in the United Kingdom.  98  At the opposite of the  spectrum in the Labour Party, the far right has firmly supported membership. These enthusiasts have viewed Europe not as a hurdle, but as the means to achieving their social democratic goals for Britain. In terms of international relations, the farrightof the party has seen the internationalist aspect of the EU as a positive force in world affairs, rather than as a negative or belligerent one. Finally, there have been those in the centre of the party 99  who have viewed membership unenthusiastically, but have generally supported it for what they perceive as electoral reasons.  y s  9 9  Ibid.,  143, 144.  Ibid. 53  The most recent stand of the Labour Party on the EU has been pro-integration. The present consensus on Europe has come out of a resolution of both the 'international' and 'domestic' questions. The end of the Cold War has brought the debate over where the EU should stand in international affairs to an end. While on the 'domestic' front, the party has come to realise that many of its social democratic goals for Britain can be realised through the EU, rather than despite the EU. Whether this stance will continue if the party enters government is unknown. It is possible that for electoral reasons, the Labour Party has become enthusiastic about Europe. In presenting a relatively clear picture of its Euro-policy to the public, the party has sought to cast itself as an alternative to the Conservatives - a party which has found the integration debate to be a source of great embarrassment. The reluctance of the Conservative Party to establish a strong anti-integrationist platform has been striking. The Conservatives have, after all, seen as much antiintegrationist rhetoric in their ranks as any other seemingly anti-integrationist party in Europe. Euro-scepticism has been rife in the party ever since the introduction of the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty onto the EU political agenda.  100  Despite this, the party  leadership has yet to endorse an encompassing anti-integrationist platform. The Conservative's reluctance to confront its anti-integrationist wing has, however, threatened to outwardly divide the party. Prime Minister John Major has faced repeated attempts by his party's Euro-sceptics to bring the government down over integration. The most recent example of such an attempt took place in June and July of 1995. After  David Baker, Andrew Gamble and Steve Ludlam, "1846... 1906... 1996? C o n s e r v a t i v e S p l i t s and European I n t e g r a t i o n , " P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y 64:4 (1993), 420. 54  countless episodes of infighting between the Euro-sceptics and the Euro-enthusiasts, Mr. Major called an election for the leadership of the party, challenging the sceptics to either unseat him as leader (and Prime Minister), or failing that, to submit to his stewardship of the party. Mr. Major ended up winning the vote against Mr. John Redwood, a member of cabinet who broke ranks against the Prime Minister. The results had 218 MP's voting for Mr. Major, 89 voting for Mr. Redwood, 8 abstentions and 12 spoilt papers. In all, therefore, there were 89 votes against Mr. Major. The 89 votes against Mr. Major perhaps represent, at a minimum, 89 Conservative MPs as being against a single European currency, as well as a host of other EU institutions and ideas. Mr. Tony Blair, leader of the Labour Party, echoed the view of many observers when he commented on the effects of the election, stating that, "...far from unifying the Tory party, it is clear that we now have two separate parties."  101  The Independent  (5 J u l y 1995), 2. 55  (i) Electoral Systems In order to understand why there is no outwardly anti-integrationist party in Britain it is important to remember that the face of a party system is not determined by public opinion alone.  Rather, the ability of party systems to articulate public opinion is  determined in large part by "...(an) intervening set of institutional variables...."  102  A  country's electoral system is one of the institutional variables that intervenes in this fashion between public opinion and party system.  103  Depending on its character, an  electoral system can either facilitate or hinder the reflection and articulation of public opinion in a party system. The manner in which votes are counted affects how many votes are needed in order to both govern and receive representation in parliament. The political effect of this on a party will vary in accordance with the size of the party. For example, if a party typically receives at least 35% of the vote, the electoral system will most likely not impact whether or not the party is represented in parliament. Rather, the electoral system will affect whether or not the party can govern alone with a majority, or in a coalition with other  R u s s e l l J . Dalton e t a l . , E l e c t o r a l Change i n Advanced I n d u s t r i a l Democracies ( P r i n c e t o n , New J e r s e y : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1984), 465. Charles Hauss and David Rayside, "The Development of New P a r t i e s i n Western Democracies S i n c e 1945," i n L o u i s M e i s e l and Joseph Cooper, eds., P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s : Development and Decay (Beverly H i l l s , Ca.: Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1978). Both c i t e d by Dalton i n "The Dynamics o f P a r t y System Change," i n I n g e l h a r t and R e i f , eds., 225. W i  Maurice Duverger, L ' I n f l u e n c e des Systemes E l e c t o r a u x s u r l a V i e P o l i t i g u e ( P a r i s : Armand Coleman, 1954). C i t e d i n Andrew Reeve & A l a n Ware, E l e c t o r a l Systems: A Comparative and T h e o r e t i c a l I n t r o d u c t i o n (London & New York: Routledge, 1992), 8. 1 0 3  56  parties. In the case of a small party, however, that might typically receive anywhere from 3 % to 2 0 % of the vote, the electoral system decides whether or not the party will receive any representation in parliament at all. It is from the above described effect that Maurice Duverger devised the 104  "mechanical effect" theory. Briefly, Duverger's theory posits that a single-member-plurality (SMP) (or first-past-the-post -- FTP) electoral system forces parties to coalesce into a twoparty system in order to compete for representation. Given that the SMP system awards a seat to the candidate with the largest number of votes (a plurality), leaving the others unrepresented, it is only logical that otherwise distinct parties would unite. On the other hand, proportional representation (PR) electoral systems are said to spawn multiparty party systems. PR formulae attempt to fit the percentage of votes cast for a party to a proportionate number of seats in the parliament. As a result, the need for parties to coalesce is much less than in a SMP system.  In order to prevent excessive party  fragmentation, however, PR formulae usually establish a minimum number of votes needed in order to receive representation. It is upon this threshold of representation that lie the fortunes of smaller parties. This thesis will measure electoral systems in the manner employed by Arend Lijphart; that is, by their effective threshold, hereafter ET (ET = 50% / [M+1] + 50% / 2M (where M = Magnitude, the number of seats representing a constituency, or riding).  105  1 0 4  The ET is  Ibid.  L i j p h a r t , E l e c t o r a l Systems and P a r t y Systems, 29. I f a l e g a l t h r e s h o l d e x i s t s , i t s f i g u r e w i l l be used i n p l a c e o f t h e ET c a l c u l a t i o n . 1 0 5  57  the approximate percentage of national votes needed in order for a party to be guaranteed fair representation in the legislature. Fair representation is generally defined as being the 106  halfway point between "being guaranteed" and "not being guaranteed" representation in a Legislative Assembly.  107  Whereas a legal threshold is the de jure minimum popular vote  needed for representation, the ET is the defacto minimum needed. If a party fails to reach the ET mark it might still gain seats, but it will be under represented compared to its percentage of the popular vote. The ET for the European Parliamentary electoral systems can be seen below in Table 4.  108  1 0 7  I b i d . , 29.  F o r m a j o r i t y and p l u r a l i t y systems, L i j p h a r t ' s ET formula produces a f i g u r e o f 50%. L i j p h a r t admits t h a t t h i s i s o b v i o u s l y t h e upper t h r e s h o l d above which v i c t o r y i s guaranteed, and not t h e h a l f way p o i n t between 'being guaranteed' and 'not b e i n g guaranteed' r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( I b i d , 28). In o r d e r t o c o r r e c t t h i s f o r m u l a i c flaw, L i j p h a r t assumes t h a t w i t h f o u r o r f i v e c a n d i d a t e s , t h e lower t h r e s h o l d of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s 20% t o 25%. A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e approximate h a l f way p o i n t f o r p l u r a l i t y and m a j o r i t y systems (with M=l), the ET, i s estimated a t 35%. The o n l y problem with L i j p h a r t ' s formula f o r t h e m a j o r i t y and p l u r a l i t y e l e c t o r a l systems l i e s i n h i s assumption t h a t t h e r e are a t l e a s t f o u r or f i v e p a r t i e s worth accounting f o r . Thus, when c a l c u l a t i n g t h e ET f o r m a j o r i t y and p l u r a l i t y e l e c t o r a l systems, we w i l l not make t h i s assumption. Rather, we w i l l i n c l u d e o n l y those p a r t i e s t h a t have r e c e i v e d , by our c a l c u l a t i o n s , a t l e a s t 5% of the popular vote. Expressed mathematically, t h e m a j o r i t y and p l u r a l i t y e l e c t o r a l systems w i l l be measured by: ET = (100% / # o f P a r t i e s > 5% pop.vote) +.5[50% - (100% / # o f P a r t i e s > 5% pop. v o t e ) ] . 1 0 8  58  Table 4. Effective Threshold (ET) of Electoral Systems  Member State  # of elections: year  ET  Belgium  3: '79 - '89  5.9  1: '94  5.7  Denmark  4: '79 - '94  4.7  France  4: '79 - '94  5.0  Germany  4: '79 - '94  5.0  Greece  3: '81 - '89  3.0  1: '94  2.9  Ireland  4: '79 - '94  17.2  Italy  3: '79 - '89  0.9  1: '94  0.85  Luxembourg  4: '79 - '94  11.3  Netherlands  4: '79 - '94  4.0  Portugal  2: '87, '89  3.0  1: '94  0.85  2: '87, '89  1.2  1: '94  1.15  3: '79, '84, '94  41.5  Spain  United Kingdom  1: '89 37.5 (Source: Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems, 22, 31, 33-35, 44. Post-1990, Keesing's Record of World Events; except U.K.: calculated by author: ET = (100% / # of parties > 5%pop. vote) + .5[50% - (100% / # of parties > 5%pop. vote)]. (ii) Electoral Systems: The United Kingdom Compared to Denmark and France  The data indicate that the U.K.'s ET for the '94, '84, and '79 elections was 41.5%, and for the '89 election was 37.5%. The effect of the British ET on the country's party 59  system is illustrated by comparing the British electoral system to the Danish and French electoral systems. The United Kingdom, Denmark, and France are similar to each other on the question of European integration. The three member states have the least reason to be pro-integrationist in the Union (as illustrated in Table 2), and they each have significant portions of public opinion that is anti-integrationist. One might expect that the similarities between the countries would also be reflected in their party systems. The British party system, however, is not similar to the party systems of Denmark and France. The dissimilarity between the British party systems and those of Denmark and France seem in part due to the British electoral system. Denmark and France have electoral systems that give anti-integrationist parties a realistic chance for representation, and therein offer an incentive for the parties to campaign. The Danish ET is 4.7%, a figure well below the estimated (and actual) anti-integrationist vote share in Denmark. As such, Danish antiintegrationists stand to win seats when they campaign in European Parliament elections. With its high ET, the same chance to win seats does not apply to British anti-integrationists. A further illustration of the effects of the British high ET can be found by examining the electoral system used in France. Like the U.K., France employs a version of the SMP electoral system for national elections. Under the national system, a party must win at lest 35% of the vote in its constituency in order to gain a seat. The effect of this system in both France and the U.K. is to penalize those parties whose votes either do not reach 35% in one constituency, and/or are spread thinly throughout many constituencies. France, however, changes its electoral system for the EP elections, lowering the ET from 35% to 5%. Without a lower ET, French anti-integrationist parties would receive substantially lower  60  representation. De Villiers' party, for instance, might have received only one seat in the French EP delegation in 1994. At the departmental (local) level, de Villiers' list polled between 7.04% and 34.74%. The high vote count of 34.74% was an exception; the next highest department was 17.14%. In a system with an ET of 35%, therefore, de Villiers 109  may have won only one seat. With the lower ET, however, de Villiers' party was able to conglomerate its total popular vote and was consequently rewarded with 13 seats - 15% of France's EP delegation. The electoral environment in the U.K. is such that it has discouraged any potential Euro-party from running. The Alliance in '84, followed by the Greens in '89 each received 18.51% and 14.52% of the vote respectively. Neither party, however, won a plurality in any constituency, leaving both parties with 0 seats. The Scottish National Party (SNP), on the other hand, won 3.2% of the vote in '94 and gained 2 seats. This disparity in representation stems from the fact that the SNP's vote is concentrated in remote regions such as the Highlands and Islands of Scotland, while the support of the Greens and the Alliance was spread throughout the country. Thus, given the fate of the Greens and the Alliance, if an anti-integrationist party were to run in the UK and receive 12.3% of the vote spread throughout the country, it would receive no seats. When compared to the fact that de Villiers won 13 seats with 12.3% of the vote, one can see the significant effect of the British electoral system on the country's EP party system. Undoubtedly, if the United Kingdom were to change its distinct electoral system to the low ET continental format, this new electoral environment would encourage anti-integrationist  Le Monde (14 June 1994), 9. 61  parties to run for election. Moreover, given the significant size of anti-integrationist sentiment in the British electorate, the result would probably be the success of a number of anti-integrationist parties. This would, in turn, result in the addition of yet another country to the outwardly anti-integrationist camp currently occupied by Denmark and France.  62  III. CAPACITY FOR ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST POLITICAL PARTIES  The discussion thus far has been focused on public opinion and the vote share of antiintegrationist political parties. The relationship between these two sets of data and the general hypotheses, illustrated by Figures 2 and 3, has helped to explain why some states favour integration less than others. The French case has been discussed in light of recent political developments.  The British exception to this correlation has been  explained as the result of that country's electoral system. Having discussed the member states and European integration over the past fifteen years, we will now examine the potential capacity of the member states to develop anti-integrationist parties in the future. In order to assess the potential of the states' to develop anti-integrationist parties, we will make use of a formula designed to measure the gap between anti-integrationist public opinion and anti-integrationist vote share. The formula is designed to measure the amount of people who polled anti-integrationist, but did not vote anti-integrationist. The product of the formula will be defined as the "percentage of mobilisation capacity". The "percentage of mobilisation capacity" figure will be calculated as: 100% - (% vote share / % poll share). The "percentage of mobilisation capacity" figure will be higher when the number of people who polled anti-integrationist, but did not vote for an anti-integrationist party, is greater. A "percentage of mobilisation capacity" figure, for instance, will be 75% if only 25% of those who 'polled' anti-integrationist actually ended up 'voting' antiintegrationist. Similarly, a "percentage of mobilisation capacity" will be 0% if all of those who polled anti-integrationist also voted anti-integrationist. If, therefore, state 'A' has a  63  high "percentage of mobilisation capacity" figure, then we will deduce that there is a probability that state 'A' has the potential to develop anti-integrationist parties. The deduction is based on the relatively logical premiss that those who 'poll' as anti-integrationist are more likely to vote anti-integrationist in the future than those who do not poll as antiintegrationist. One danger of using the "percentage of mobilisation capacity" figure is that it might distort our picture of the actual size of the electoral phenomena that is being discussed. A "percentage of mobilisation capacity" of 100%, for instance, seems to threaten an antiintegrationist electoral earthquake. It may be, however, that the figure of 100% represents a small fraction of the actual electorate, and that, therefore, a wave of anti-integrationist parties is not necessarily on the horizon. In order to address this danger, we will calculate the actual size (out of the entire population) of those who polled anti-integrationist, but did not vote anti-integrationist. The product of this calculation will be called the "real number" of potential anti-integrationist voters. The "real number" will be calculated with the following formula: - (% poll share - % vote share) - . Keeping the "real number" figure in view as we look at the "percentage of mobilisation capacity" figure will aid us in keeping the later figure in perspective, and therein discourage any rash conclusions about the future of anti-integrationist parties. There are at least two other potential problems involved in using the "percentage of mobilisation capacity" figure. The first potential problem with the figure is that by using the term "mobilisation capacity", we are casting the electorate in a presumptuous manner. The term "mobilisation capacity" seems to assume that having the electorate vote a certain way  64  is simply a matter of better organising the political parties to mobilise them. The electorate's decision to vote for a certain party, however, is more complicated than the term "mobilisation capacity" implies. A variety of reasons, that have little or nothing to do with the parties themselves, may inform the decision making of the electorate . The personality of the leaders, political events abroad, and even election day weather can all affect how the electorate votes. To assume, therefore, that there is a portion of the electorate that is waiting to be mobilised to vote in a certain manner runs the risk of ignoring the complex set of variables that combine to make voters cast their ballots. The second problem with the "percentage of mobilisation capacity" figure is that it assumes that European integration is the issue around which voting turns for the portion of the electorate that claims to be anti-integrationist in public opinion polls. Public opinion polls are useful as a general guide to how the public feels about select issues. In using our the polls, however, we should not lose sight of the fact that European integration is only one issue of many that is factored into the voting decisions of the electorate. While a voter may be against integration, there may be other issues about which the voter feels stronger. Despite being against integration, therefore, a voter may vote for a pro-integrationist party as the result of some other unknown political issue. Bearing these potential weaknesses in mind, the "percentage of mobilisation capacity" figure, combined with the "real number" figure, is a useful means of estimating which member states have the potential to develop anti-integrationist parties. It is reasonable to assume that the portion of the public that registers as anti-integrationist in public opinion polls is more likely to vote for an anti-integrationist party than those who register as pro-  65  integrationist in the same poll. This reasonable assumption, in turn, can help us to determine which countries have the potential to develop anti-integrationist parties in the future. Table 5 below lists the "percentage of mobilisation capacity" and "real number" figures for the member states. The states are listed in order, from high to low mobilisation capacity scores, with a dotted line separating those states with negative scores from the rest. Table 5. Variation of Mobilisation Capacity of Anti-integrationist Vote Share in the Member States, 1979-1994  Member State  Avg. Antiintegration poll (%)  Avg. Antiintegration vote (%)  "% of mobilisation capacity"*  "real number" ^  United Kingdom  22  0  100 %  22%  Spain  7  2.13  69.6%  4.87%  Ireland  13  5.13  60.6%  7.87%  Germany  13  6.05  53.5%  6.95%  Luxembourg  14  7.1  49.0%  6.9%  Denmark  37  21.55  41.8%  15.45%  Netherlands  15  10.66  29.0%  4.34%  Belgium  10  10.28  -2.8%  0.28%  Greece  13  14.82  -14.0%  1.82%  Italy  6  7.48  -24.0%  1.48%  Portugal  6  12.37  -106.0%  6.37%  France 10 23.27 -132.7% 13.27% *: 100% - (% vote share / % poll share). - (% poll share - % vote share) - J  66  A. Potential Opportunities and Limits for Anti-integrationists: The United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Spain, Denmark  Table 5 identifies both 'opportunities' and 'limits' for anti-integrationist parties in upcoming EP elections. The 'opportunities' are identified by measuring the percentage of those who polled anti-integrationist, but did not vote anti-integrationist, illustrated in Table 5 by the "percentage of mobilisation capacity" column. The 'limits' for antiintegrationist parties can be seen by measuring the actual size of the population segment identified in the "percentage of mobilisation capacity" column, as illustrated in the "real number" column. The "real number" data indicates that the potential anti-integrationist voters are in fact a relatively small part of the entire population. In 7 out of 12 states, the figures reveal that anywhere from 29% to 100% of antiintegrationists not being mobilised to vote in the manner that one might expect. In the U.K., where potential anti-integrationists do not have the opportunity to vote for a likeminded party, we have attributed this situation to the electoral system. In the other 6 states, the situation is not, however, so easily explained. This state of affairs raises the question: why are Euro-sceptics reluctant to vote antiintegrationist? While the answer to this question may be said to constitute a thesis in its own right, one might briefly consider one possible explanation. As can be seen in the Appendix, the platforms of anti-integrationist parties are not solely devoted to European issues. More often than not, xenophobia and anti-democratic rhetoric accompany the nonfederalist policies of anti-integrationist parties. To vote for an anti-integrationist party, therefore, is not just to support de Gaulle's vision of Europe. Voting anti-integrationist is to vote for parties that associate themselves with fierce nationalism and, as in the case of 67  Germany, with a political tradition that is tied to the legacy of Nazi Europe. It is possible, therefore, that anti-integrationists are reluctant to vote 'with their feet' because they are reluctant to support the non-EU policies of anti-integrationist parties. It is not unreasonable to postulate that if there were an anti-integrationist party that sat in the political centre on non-EU policies, it would receive the support of these potential anti-integrationist voters. In other words, there appears to be a 'centrist / anti-integrationist' market share of voters who are waiting for a palatable anti-integrationist option in the European Parliamentary elections. While it may be true that there is a vacuum of 'palatable' anti-integrationist parties, the size of this vacuum should not be overestimated. The "real number" data illustrates that these potential voters constitute a relatively small segment of the total voting population; anywhere from 4.34% to 22% of the entire population in the states where they exist. Were it not for the electoral system, the most opportunity for anti-integrationist parties would seem to be in the United Kingdom, where potential anti-integrationist voters constitute a 22% voting block. Likewise, Ireland and Luxembourg, with potentially anti-integrationist voting blocks of 7.87% and 6.9% respectively, would also seem to be countries with potential market share for anti-integrationist parties were it not for their restrictive electoral systems (see Table 4). Countries that have more accesible electoral systems, and that have relatively large potentially anti-integrationist voting blocks, however, are Denmark with a "real number" of 15.45%, Germany with 6.95 %, and finally Spain and the Netherlands with just under 5% each. The data demonstrate that Spain, Ireland, Germany and Luxembourg each have the  68  potential to spawn anti-integrationist parties in the future. This potentiality can be explained by the fact that each country has its own conceivable grievance point with the Union, be it the result of lying on the periphery of Europe (as in the cases of Ireland and Spain), or of serving as the EU's overburdened paymaster (as in the case of Germany). While in Luxembourg, there has been a growing resentment against the foreigners that work at the EU institutions based in the country. A possible reason that these voters have not yet voted for anti-integrationist parties may be that the non-EU-related elements of the platforms of these parties preclude their being considered a choice. We might expect, therefore, if the present anti-integrationist parties were to drop the non-EU elements of their platforms and provided that the electoral systems did not present an insurmountable burden, there might be growth in anti-integrationist voting in Spain, Ireland, Germany and Luxembourg. The high percentage of anti-integrationist vote share that has potential to be mobilised in Denmark comes as a surprise. The Danish figure is unexpected due to the already high degree of anti-integrationist voting in the country. The Danish case, however, may be similar to that of the other states insofar as that it can be explained by the 'non-EU' elements of the present anti-integrationist parties. Neither the People's Movement Against the EU nor the June Movement are outgrowths of centre-right parties; rather, they both spring from the ranks of Social Democrats. As was outlined in the main text, many of the appeals against integration have been made on the basis that integration threatens to erode Denmark's Nordic (and for the most part Social Democratic) political distinctiveness. Much of the campaigning of the anti-integrationists, therefore, has done little to address the  69  concerns of centre-right - the Thatcherite 'free traders' of Denmark. Therefore, while no hard data is being presented to subtantiate this, it would seem logical to conclude that there may be an unenfranchised block of centre-right anti-integrationists in the country. The reason that the centre-right has not mobilised its own anti-integrationist party may also be related to non-EU elements of the Danish integration debate. The centre-right was excluded from effective power in Denmark until 1982. The free trade elements of integration, therefore made the EU something of a political ally during this period of the left's power. In addition to free trade, the right has also been in favour of integration on military matters, in contradiction to the left. While components of the right may be opposed to the finer details of integration, membership in the EU has offered a respite from an otherwise long battle against the left in Denmark, and was thus the lesser of two evils for the centre-right. The confluence of these events — the centre left bias of present antiintegrationists and the utility of the EU in fighting the left at home - may be an explanation for the high percentage of unmobilised anti-integrationists in Denmark.  B. Potential Threats for Anti-integrationists: Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal, France  The states with negative "percentage of mobilisation capacity" data may indicate that the political markets in these states are flooded with anti-integrationist parties. One might hypothesize, therefore, that the parties in these states stand the chance of a declining vote share. Just as in section A above, however, the "real number" data show that the percentage of voters constituting this segment is in fact quite small - anywhere from 0.28% in Belgium to 13.27% in France. 70  The fact that anti-integrationist vote share in Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and France outweighs anti-integrationist polling may also be explained by non-EU related platform items. It may be the case that this segment of pro-integrationist voters are voting for anti-integrationist parties because of the parties' strong ties to other non-EU issues, rather than because of any hostility to integrationism. This point has already been argued in Chapter II with regard to France, and can be applied to Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Greece as well. The domestic issues causing this phenomenon in these countries might include: in Belgium, the domestic federalist debate between the Waloons and Flemish; in Italy, the North-South schism; and in Portugal and Greece, lingering protests against the manner in which their countries have progressed towards liberal democracy. Moreover, if voters in these countries are voting anti-integrationist for non-EU reasons, the anti-integrationist parties benefiting from these votes may have cause for concern. One of two developments could adversely affect the fortunes of anti-integrationist parties in these member states. The first development that could adversly affect these parties is if they were to alter their non-EU platforms. A change in the non-EU segment of the platform might lead to a loss of support from a portion of their supporters; namely, that portion that votes for the parties for non-EU related reasons. The second development that may deplete these parties of their votes might be the appearance of other parties that stand for the same non-EU issues. In either scenario, voters might very well abandon their present voting habits, and anti-integrationist vote share in these countries would decline.  71  C . The General Variation of Mobilisation Capacity of Anti-integrationist Vote Share  There is a relatively large variation of mobilisation capacity of anti-integrationist vote share between the member states. The United Kingdom has the greatest capacity for mobilisation, with 22% of its population polling as anti-integrationist, and none having the chance to vote anti-integrationist. After the U.K., the potential for the development of anti-integrationist parties seems the greatest in Spain, Ireland, Germany, Denmark, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. These countries each have a substantial group of anti-integrationists who are not yet voting for anti-integrationist parties. The actual size of these groups, however, in light of the total population of each country, merits mention. After Denmark, positioned at the high point of about 15% of the population, the sizes of the groups in each country begin to decline.  Ireland, Germany, and  Luxembourg each have about 7% of their respective populations that poll anti-integrationist, but do not vote anti-integrationist.  In other words, while anti-integrationist  parties may grow in the future, they will probably not grow to any great extent. The United Kingdom, therefore, stands as the exceptional case in Table 5; it has both the highest "percentage of mobilisation capacity" figure and the highest "real number" figure. Table 5, therefore, confirms a pattern that has already been established in the main body of this thesis — that the U.K. is an exception to the general pattern of Euro-politics. The data in this section, therefore, offers another illustration of the fact that a large segment of the British public is being kept from voting for the Euro-policy of their choice.  72  IV. Concluding Remarks In this these we have set out to explain why some member states of the European Union are less favourable towards European integration than others. The general points of the integration debate have been defined by looking at the rift that existed between Jean Monnet and Charles de Gaulle over the future of Europe. Monnet's vision of a 'United States of Europe' was that of a continent with strong supranational institutions and with a centralised federal government.  de Gaulle's vision of a 'Europe des Patries',  meanwhile, was that of a Europe where nation-states would continue to be the driving force of the continent and where the institutions of the EU would be devoid of any federalist structure. Of the fifteen states of the EU, we limited our examination to the 'established twelve members'. Three dimensions were used to explain pro-integrationism; and three dimensions were used to explain anti-integrationism. It was hypothesised that the degree of prointegration can be explained by 'economies', 'polities', and whether or not a state was at the 'centre' of Europe. The strength of anti-integrationism, meanwhile, was hypothesised to be explained by whether or not a state has been a member of an 'institutional-cultural extraEuropean region', by whether or not a state is a 'great power', and by whether or not a state stands at the 'periphery' of Europe. The 'centre-periphery' dimension was the only dimension that was used to explain both pro and anti-integrationism. Where the states fell in relation to these different dimensions was illustrated by Figures 2 and 3, and summarised by a crude ranking system in Table 2. The accuracy of our hypotheses was tested with the aid of public opinion polls and  73  European Parliamentary election results. In order for our hypotheses to be credible, we had hoped that there would be a general correltation between the rough 'integrationist' ranking of the member states in Table 2 and the public opinion and European Parliamentary election results. If a state was cast as anti-integrationist, for instance, it was expected that there would higher degrees of anti-integrationism in the polling results, and greater electoral results for anti-integrationist parties in the EP elections. A (non-statistical) general pattern of correlation was found in 11 of the 12 states. The greatest exception to this pattern was the United Kingdom. The British electoral system was singled out as the intervening variable in the case of the U.K., preventing public opinion from being reflected in the party system. The full effect of the British electoral system was measured by comparing it to the French and Danish electoral systems, both of which have a much less exclusive impact on their respective party systems. Following the discussion of public opinion, party systems, and electoral systems, we focused on the question of where there is potential for anti-integrationist parties to grow in the future. A "percentage of mobilisation capacity" figure was calculated for each of the member states. The "percentage of mobilisation capacity" figure measured the percentage of those who polled anti-integrationist, but did not vote anti-integrationist. A "real number" figure was calculated to accompany the "percentage of mobilisation capacity" figure. The "real number" figure measured the actual difference between the polling results and the electoral results, allowing us to keep a perspective on how the large the number of voters was that were being represented by the "percentage of mobilisation capacity" figure. Two hypotheses were discussed to explain the size of the "percentage of mobilisation  74  capacity" figures. If anti-integrationism was greater in the public opinion polls than it was in the election results, we hypothesised that there might be room for anti-integrationists political parties to grow. This was the case in the United Kingdom, Spain, Ireland, Germany, Denmark, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. If anti-integrationism was less in the public opinion polls than it was in the election results, we hypothesised that the antiintegrationist parties may be in danger of losing vote share. Anti-integrationist parties in France, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Belgium fell into this category. Both sets of differences — whether anti-integrationism in the polls was greater than or less than the antiintegrationist electoral results — were explained as the possible result of the non-EU elements in the platforms of the anti-integrationist parties. Depending on the case, it was hypothesised that the non-EU elements of anti-integrationist parties' platforms had attracted otherwise pro-integrationist supporters and/or repelled anti-integrationists that may have otherwise voted anti-integrationist. Finally, the "percentage of mobilisation capacity" figure and the "real number" figure offered an alternative means of testing our research model. In general, the combined figures showed a correlation between public opinion polls and election results that was consistent with the our original hypotheses about which states tend more towards antiintegrationism than others. The figures also corroborated our discussion of the United Kingdom. The "percentage of mobilisation capacity" and "real number" figures both showed that there is considerable potential for an anti-integrationist party in the U.K. The data, therefore, contribute to the claim that an intervening variable is preventing the British European Parliament party system from reflecting public opinion. A rough prediction of  75  how anti-integrationism may unfold in the future for the 12 member states is a fitting conclusion for a discussion of how these states stand in relation to European integration. As of this past January 1st, however, the European Union is no longer limited to the traditional 12 states of the EU. 1995 has seen the entry of three new member states into the European Union: Austria, Finland and Sweden. Having found our general hypotheses about why some states favour integration less than others generally useful, we can now offer a reasonable prediction of where these new member states may fall on the integration debate. None of the three new member states have 'economic' reason to be pro-integrationist, and only Austria is at 'centre' of Europe. An argument might be made that Finland and Austria stand to benefit from membership 'politically'. Both countries' foreign policies were substantially influenced during the Cold War by the Soviet Union. With the fall of the U.S.S.R., Austria and Finland can now consolidate their positions by quickly joining the EU, a firmly ensconced family of western and liberal democratic nations. Sweden, on the other hand, does not appear to have any political reason to join the EU, and thereby falls into the same category as the United Kingdom and Denmark - a member without any reason to join the EU other than to enjoy the benefits of belonging to the free trade zone. With regards to antiintegrationism, moreover, both Sweden and Finland are on the 'periphery' of Europe, and are members of the Nordic 'cultural-institutional extra-European' region. Therefore, in so far as it falls only into the anti-integrationist dimensions, it appears that Sweden may develop an internal debate over European integration that is similar in degrees to the debates in the United Kingdom and Denmark. Finland, meanwhile, may sit on the cusp of  76  the debate with its 'political' reason to favour integration, and its 'peripheral' reason to be against integration. Austria, finally, may come to be the most pro-integrationist out of the new members, as it is at the 'centre' of Europe and has 'political' reasons to favour integration.  It may transpire, therefore, that as the Union expands geographically, some of its  new members may not necessarily share the euro-enthusiasm that most of the 12 established states have had. These speculations about how the integration debate may unfold in the EU's new member states are based on the results of our research model. In conclusion, we have found that the general hypotheses offered in Chapter I have been supported by the public opinion polling data and election results from the European Parliament elections. The British exception to this pattern has been found to be the result of an intervening variable ~ the country's electoral system - and has therein not been problematic for the general soundness of the hypotheses. The findings of this thesis have allowed us to come to two general conclusions. The first conclusion is that electoral systems can have a significant impact on the reflection and articulation of public opinion in party systems. Electoral systems are one of the means of organising democratic government. When the means of organising democratic government begins to impede democratic representation, it may give cause for observers and reformers of government to re-examine the utility of that means. The second and final conclusion is that history, economics, geography, and politics, as detailed in our six dimensions, explain why some member states favour integration less than others. Understanding, therefore, that a state's consensus, or division, over European integration is the product of deep seeded,  77  historical phenomena should encourage observers of European integration to temper their enthusiasm for theories claiming that the future of the European Union will be an ever closer and deeper Union.  78  Selected Bibliography Andeweg, Rudy B. and Galen A. Irwin. Dutch Government and Politics. London: Macmillan, 1993. Ashford, Nigel. "The Political Parties." In Britain and the European Community, ed. Stephen George. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Baker, David, Andrew Gamble and Steve Ludlam. "1846...1906...1996? Conservative Splits and European Integration." Political Quarterly. 64:4 (1993): 420-434. Bogdanor, Vernon. 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"To be or not to be within the European Community: the party debate and democratic consolidation in Greece." In Securing Democracy, ed. Geoffrey Pridham. London and New York: Routledge, 1990.  82  Wijkman, Per Magnus. "Patterns of Production and Trade." In The Dynamics of European Integration, ed. William Wallace. London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1989.  83  Appendix A. Table 1  National Attitudes Towards the Unification of Western Europe: "In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If F O R , are you very much for this, or only to some extent? If A G A I N S T , are you only to some extent against or very much?" (Source for Tables 3.1 - 3.13: Compiled by author from Eurobarometer. Trends: 1974-1993 (December 1993), Table B4) Table 1.1 Belgium '78  '79  '80  '81  '82  '83  '84  '85  '86  '87  27 42 4 2 25  25 45 6 2 23  23 44 7 2 26  23 43 6 3 27  19 46 8 2 26  25 45 . 7 2 22  25 49 8 2 17  25 57 5 2 13  28 49 7 2 15  31 47 6 1 16  Table 1.1 cont. Belgium '88  '89  '90  '91  '92  '93  Avg.  EUAvg.  %Diff.  For very much For to some extent Against to s. extent Against very much N o reply  25 53 7 2 14  24 54 6 2 13  26 56 7 3 9  26 56 9 2 9  21 55 13 3 9  20 57 14 3 8  26 53 8 2 17  31 45 9 4 13  -16 + 18 -11 -50 +30  '78  '79  '80  '81  '82  '83  '84  '85  '86  '87  37 46 7 3 7  36 48 7 3 8  32 46 7 4 10  29 48 9 6 8  26 50 9 5 11  31 43 10 6 12  30 52 7 3 9  32 47 8 5 11  33 45 10 5 9  34 45 8 4 10  Table 1.2 cont. Netherlands '88  '89  '90  '91  '92  '93  Avg.  EUAvg.  For very much For to some extent Against to s. extent Against very much N o reply  25 52 11 4 8  25 53 11 4 8  24 53 13 5 6  22 53 14 6 6  21 54 14 6 6  29 49 10 5 9  31 45 9 4 13  For very much For to some extent Against to s. extent Against very much N o reply  Table 1.2 Netherlands  For very much For to some extent Against to s. extent Against very much N o reply  27 52 9 4 9  84  %Diff. -6 +8 + 11 +25 +44  Table 1.3 Luxembourg '78  '79  '80  '81  '82  '83  '84  '85  '86  '87  For very much 31 For to some extent 43 Against to s. extent 13 Against very much 5 No reply 8  48 41 6 2 4  47 39 8 3 5  45 40 9 2 5  39 42 7 3 11  43 36 9 3 10  44 39 8 3 8  49 33 8 3 8  47 36 7 4 8  42 38 8 3 10  Table 1.3 cont. Luxembourg '88 '89  '90  '91  '92  '93  Avg.  EUAvg.  For very much For to some extent Against to s. extent Against very much No reply  %Diff.  33 44 10 3 10  25 47 15 3 11  32 42 12 4 11  27 46 14 5 10  29 47 13 4 7  28 45 16 6 7  38 41 10 4 8  31 45 9 4 13  '78  '79  '80  '81  '82  '83  '84  '85  '86  '87  For very much 32 For to some extent 51 Against to s. extent 4 Against very much 1 No reply 12  40 47 4 1 10  37 44 5 1 12  38 44 7 3 9  30 47 6 2 16  36 45 5 2 14  30 49 5 1 10  36 49 4 1 11  37 50 4. 1 10  44 42 4 1 10  '88  '89  '90  '91  '92  '93  Avg.  EUAvg.  For very much 35 For to some extent 52 Against to s. extent 4 Against very much 1 No reply 8  40 48 4 1 8  45 43 4 1 8  43 46 4 1 7  35 48 •7 3 7  35 50 6 2 8  37 47 5 1 10  31 45 9 4 13  Table 1.4 Italy  Table 1.4 cont. Italy  85  +23 -10 + 11 0 -38  %Difl + 19 +6 -44 -75 -23  Table 1.5 Greece  '80  '81  '82  '83  '84  '85  '86  '87  '88  '89  33 26 12 11 18  33 30 10 11 18  33 28 9 7 24  36 30 6 6 24  30 33 10 8 20  31 27 12 7 24  37 27 13 4 21  36 31 12 6 17  39 33 8 4 18  46 32 5 2 14  Table 1.5 cont. Greece '90  '91  '92  '93  Avg.  EUAvg.  %DifT.  53 For very much For to some extent 28 Against to s. extent 5 Against very much 3 No reply 12  45 36 6 3 11  45 38 7 4 13  45 37 6 4 9  34 27 8 5 15  31 45 9 4 13  + 10 -40 -11 +25 + 15  '85  '86  '87  '88  '89  '90  '91  '92  '93  44 For very much For to some extent 23 Against to s. extent 4 Against very much 2 No reply 28  40 37 4 1 20  42 32 3 2 22  36 40 5 3 18  33 43 2 2 20  40 44 4 2 12  43 41 4 2 11  32 45 8 4 12  31 47 8 3 13  For very much For to some extent Against to s. extent Against very much No reply  Table 1.6 Spain  Table 1.6 Spain For very much For to some extent Against to s. extent Against very much No reply  Avg.  EUAvg.  %Diff.  38 39 5 2 17  31 45 9 4 13  +23 -13 -44 -50 +31  86  Table 1.7 Portugal  '85  '86  '87  '88  '89  '90  '91  '92  .'93  For very much 28 For to some extent 28 Against to s. extent 4 Against very much 3 No reply 37  47 25 5 4 20  48 22 4 2 25  39 32 4 3 24  47 22 3 1 27  52 28 4 2 15  55 29 3 1 13  51 29 6 2 12  44 33 8 3 13  Table 1.7 cont. Portugal Avg.  For very much 46 28 For to some extent Against to s. extent 5 Against very much 2 21 No reply Table 1.8 Ireland  EUAvg.  %Diff.  31 45 9 4 13  +48 -38 -44 -50 + 162  '78  '79  '80  '81  '82  '83  '84  '85  '86  '87  For very much 24 For to some extent 45 Against to s. extent 7 Against very much 3 No reply 21  22 44 9 4 22  19 40 10 5 27  21 40 13 7 20  16 41 12 5 27  19 40 8 4 30  18 42 9 5 28  36 39 10 5 25  21 43 10 4 23  24 38 9 4 26  Table 1.8 cont. Ireland '88  '89  '90  '91  '92  '93  Avg.  EUAvg.  For very much 23 For to some extent 47 Against to s. extent 9 Against very much 4 No reply 18  29 42 5 1 22  38 41 5 2 15  43 36 6 3 13  35 42 7 3 13  31 46 8 3 14  26 42 9 4 22  31 45 9 4 13  87  %Diff. -16  -7  0 0 +69  Table 1.9 Germany  '78  '79  '80  '81  '82  '83  '84  '85  '86  '87  37 For very much For to some extent 41 Against to s. extent 4 Against very much 1 No reply 17  37 45 6 1 11  37 42 7 2 13  35 38 10 3 15  31 44 9 4 13  35 46 6 2 13  32 45 10 3 12  35 41 10 3 12  42 40 7 2 10  33 43 10 3 11  Table 1.9 cont. Germany '88  '89  '90  '91  '92  '93  Avg.  EUAvg.  %Diff.  27 47 12 4 11  32 44 11 4 10  37 44 9 2 8  34 46 10 2 8  26 45 16 8 6  24 48 15 7 7  33 44 10 3 11  31 45 9 4 13  +6 -2 + 11 -25 -15  '78  '79  '80  '81  '82  '83  '84  '85  '86  '87  For very much 28 For to some extent 52 Against to s. extent 5 Against very much 2 No reply 13  25 49 8 3 17  18 54 9 2 17  21 55 8 2 15  26 54 8 2 11  27 50 6 2 16  29 50 6 1 11  33 52 6 1 9  34 51 6 1 9  37 48 5 2 10  Table 1.10 cont. France '88  '89  '90  '91  '92  '93  Avg.  EUAvg.  %Diff.  For very much 32 For to some extent 54 Against to s. extent 6 Against very much 2 No reply 7  30 53 7 2 9  26 55 9 3 9  24 55 8 3 10  22 51 15 6 8  20 53 15 5 9  27 52 8 2 11  31 45 9 4 13  -13 + 16 -11 -50 -15  For very much For to some extent Against to s. extent Against very much No reply Table 1.10 France  88  Table 1.11 United Kingdom '78 For very much For to some extent Against to s. extent Against very much No reply  22 41 12 10 15  '79  '80  '81  '82  '83  '84  '85  '86  '87  21 41 15 7 18  22 39 15 9 15  19 40 14 12 17  19 40 17 9 16  25 41 12 5 18  21 45 14 6 16  27 41 12 6 16  24 44 12 6 15  27 44 17 10 14  '90  '91  '92  '93  Avg.  El  %DifT.  -26 -4 + 55 + 100 +8  Table 1.11 cont. United Kingdom '89 '88 18 43 17 10 14  24 45 12 5 14  27 46 11 6 12  27 44 13 7 10  19 43 17 10 11  18 43 19 11 10  23 43 14 8 14  31 45 9 4 13  '78  '79  '80  '81  '82  '83  '84  '85  '86  '87  15 33 17 15 20  14 34 18 17 18  14 29 19 18 21  15 31 19 18 19  13 29 21 19 20  12 30 20 21 19  10 28 22 22 20  11 25 20 26 19  14 '33 18 21 15  13 31 21 24 12  Table 1.12 cont. Denmark '88  '89  '90  '91  '92  '93  Avg.  EUAvg.  %DifT.  For very much For to some extent Against to s. extent Against very much No reply  20 35 17 15 12  24 40 18 12 6  22 44 20 10 • 5  26 38 18 15 , 3  24 41 19 15 3  16 34 19 18 14  31 45 9 4 13  -48 -24 + 111 +350 +8  For very much For to some extent Against to s. extent Against very much No reply  Table 1.12 Denmark  For very much For to some extent Against to s. extent Against very much No reply  12 35 22 24 7  89  Table 1.13 European U n i o n Average '78 '79 '80 For very much For to some extent Against to s. extent Against very much N o reply  30 45 8 3 14  30 • 45 7 4 14  28 45 9 4 15  Table 1.13 cont. European Union Average '90 '88 '89 For very much For to some extent Against to s. extent Against very much N o reply  29 47 9 4 12  32 46 8 3 12  35 46 8 3 9  '81  '82  '83  '84  '85  '86  '87  29 43 10 5 14  26 45 10 5 15  30 45 8 3 15  28 47 9 4 14  33 44 8 3 14  35 43 7 3 13  36 42 7 3 13  '91  '92  '93  Avg.  34 47 9 3 9  28 46 12 6 8  26 48 13 6 9  31 45 9 4 13  90  Appendix A. Table 2 National Attitudes Towards "Going further than the Single Common Market." (% Average of Autumn 1987 and Spring 1988.) Table 1 Member States and % Diff. from EU Average. Yes (%Diff.)  . No (%Diff.)  DK (%Diff.)  Belgium  56 ( +30)  19 > ( -37)  26 ( +8)  Netherlands  44 ( +2)  38 ;( +27)  20 ( -17)  Luxembourg  40 ( -7)  29 :( -3)  45 ( +88)  Italy  75 ( +74)  H (; -63)  15 (-38)  Greece  49 ( + 14)  17 ;-43) (  35 ( +45)  Spain  39 ( -9)  23 [( -23)  38 ( +58)  Portugal  45 ( +5)  18 ;-67) (  38 ( +58)  Ireland  31 ( -28)  29 :< -3)  41 ( +71)  Germany  45 ( +5)  28 :( -7)  28 ( + 16)  France  47 ( +9)  33 1 (  United Kingdom  26 ( -40)  53 [| +77)  21 (-13)  Denmark  15 ( -65)  65 |[+117)  20 ( -16)  EU  43  30  24  +) 10  21 (-13)  (Source: Compiled by author from Eurobarometer 29 (June 1988), Table A15)  91  Appendix B.l Anti-integrationist Parties: the Mediterranean and Ireland  By all accounts, the main parties of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland have all 110  treated the EP elections as opportunities to boost their own domestic bargaining power. Rather than focusing on European issues, the parties have devoted their energies to issues which might attract the attention of the voters to the national arena.  111  In Italy, for instance, the 1989 EP campaign was dominated by the resignation of the Christian Democratic Prime Minister, De Mita. Similarly, the most recent Italian EP 112  election was treated as an extension of the national political arena, with observers keen to see if Forza Italia's new hold on power would receive a second boost. "The election was not about Europe, but who governs Italy."  113  Likewise, in Ireland, the EP elections have been dominated by national issues, their results being interpreted with an eye to their domestic repercussions. As a recent Irish government White Paper on the Maastricht Treaty attests, regardless of which party has been in power, "...successive Irish Governments have favored the progressive evolution of the European Community into a European Union." Starting with silence on the topic in 114  K e v i n F e a t h e r s t o n e and Susannah Verney, "Greece," i n Lodge, ed., The 1989 E l e c t i o n o f t h e European P a r l i a m e n t . 90. 110  P h i l i p D a n i e l s , " I t a l y , " i n Lodge, ed. , The 1989 of t h e European P a r l i a m e n t . 176. 111  Election  Oskar Niedermeyer, "The 1989 European E l e c t i o n s : Campaigns and R e s u l t s , " European J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c a l R e s e a r c h 19:1 (1991), 7. 112  113  F i n a n c i a l Times (14 June 1994), 11.  "White Paper:" T r e a t y on European Union ( D u b l i n : Government o f I r e l a n d S t a t i o n a r y O f f i c e , 1992), 18. C i t e d by G r e e r , 205. 114  92  the 1979 EP elections, there has yet to be a clear anti-integrationist choice for the voter 115  among the major parties. The 1989 election was particularly strident in this pattern, as a national election was called for on the same day. The Fianna Fail Haughey government called the national election at a time when its popularity in the opinion polls had out paced its seat strength in the Dail, making the EP election little more than a side show. The 116  results of the most recent election, moreover, have not been examined as an indicator of the public's EU opinion. Rather, the Greens' victory in Dublin has been taken as a sign that the government must review its urban property tax and domestic environmental policies.  117  The exceptions to this consensus in the Meditteranean states and Ireland have consisted of those parties which sit on the extremities of the political spectrum. In Italy, for example, the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI) has historically been opposed to further integration. The MSI, along with France's National Front, has been a member of 118  the European Right party group in the EP. As can be seen in Table 3, however, the MSI's attempts to break the EU consensus in Italian politics has never met with great success. In Portugal, the far-left United Democratic Coalition (CDU), made up of the Stalinist Portuguese Communist Party and one far-left Green, "has been generally hostile to further  R.K. C a r t y , "Towards a European P o l i t i c s : The Lessons o f the European Parliament E l e c t i o n i n I r e l a n d , " J o u r n a l o f European I n t e g r a t i o n 4:2 (1981), 238. 1 1 5  M i c h a e l G a l l a g h e r , " I r e l a n d , " i n Lodge, ed. , The 1989 E l e c t i o n t o t h e European Parliament. 151. 1 1 6  1 1 7  F i n a n c i a l Times  1 1 8  Jacobs,  (14 June 1994), 9.  C o r b e t t , and Shackleton, 58. 93  European integration." However, as we have seen is the case with the MSI, the CDU has 119  not earned enough votes in the EP elections for it to be considered significant. In Spain, resistance to the EU has come from Harri Batasuna (HB), the rightist political wing of the Basque terrorist group ETA.  120  Like the CDU and the MSI, the vote count of HB has also  been relatively insignificant. In Greece, the KKE, on the extreme left, and the recently introduced POLA, on the extreme right, have run against integration, but have yet to have fail to register any great victories at the polls. Finally, in Ireland, the one anti-integrationist party, the far left Irish Workers' Party, has failed to make itself a very significant party. 121  Appendix B.2 Anti-integrationist Parties: Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg  The  results found for Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (the Benelux  countries) are similar enough so that they too may be discussed as a region. It should come as no great surprise that there are no significant anti-integrationist parties in the Benelux nations. If the great majority of the parties mention the EU at all in their campaigns, it is only to confirm their support for the idea of integration. In the Netherlands, for instance, the CDA, the WD, the PvdA all advocate greater powers for the EP, though the first two have also traditionally emphasized greater defense  119  I b i d , 76.  R i c h a r d G i l l e s p i e , "Regime C o n s o l i d a t i o n i n Spain: P a r t y , S t a t e , and S o c i e t y , " i n Geoffrey Pridham, ed. S e c u r i n g Democracy (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 123. 120  121  Jacobs,  C o r b e t t , and Shackleton, 76. 94  cooperation as well.  122  In Luxembourg, meanwhile, if debate arises over the EU, it is not  around the pros and cons of a United States of Europe, but around which party is better equipped to deliver an integrated EU to the country.  123  The exception to this trend,  however, appears to be the small parties in the three states. Though observers believe that the surge in rightist support has other roots, the far right (the Vlaams Blok - VB, the Volksunie - VU, and the Front Nationale - FN) in Belgium has campaigned on anti-Maastricht platform. Likewise in the Netherlands, some 124  small parties have made resistance to the EU part of their platforms. The fundamentalist 125  Calvinist parties advocate depriving the EP of its powers, for fear of being dominated by a Catholic and humanist Europe. The nationalist Centre Party opposes the EU for fears of immigration and the loss of sovereignty. While on the far left, radical Socialists and Communists exhort the EP as a false democratic veil behind which lurks a Europe dominated by capital and industry. In Luxembourg, the only party that has mounted any opposition to integration has been the Green Party. The Green Party in Luxembourg has been sceptical about the environmental merits of closer integration, fearing that a Europe of bankers would erode the gains that the environmental concerns have made in the country.  Isaac L i p s c h i t s , "The Netherlands," i n J u l i e t Lodge, ed., D i r e c t E l e c t i o n s t o t h e European Parliament 1984 (London: Macmillan, 1986), 218. 1 2 2  John F i t z m a u r i c e , "Luxembourg," i n Lodge, ed. , D i r e c t E l e c t i o n s t o t h e European Parliament, 1984, 183. 1 2 3  124  F i n a n c i a l Times  1 2 5  I b i d . , 219,  (14 June 1994), 10,  95  Appendix B.3 Anti-integrationist Parties: Germany Anti-integrationism has been avowed only be a very small minority of parties in Germany. In Germany in 1989, for instance, if the EU was mentioned at all in the campaign, it was so that each party could emphasize how its credentials would better facilitate a proper EU environmental policy.  126  With exception of the far right wing Republican Party and a uniquely anti-Maastricht party (the Free Citizens Alliance), the consensus pattern continued in Germany for the 1994 election. This most recent election was used as a dry run for the federal elections that followed in October. Thus, the election results were examined for their impact on the coming national election, rather than for any hint of what that they might hold for the future of the EU.  127  As can be seen in Table 3, moreover, the parties that have tried to break the  EU consensus in Germany have had little success.  Eva K o l i n s k y , "The F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f Germany," i n Lodge, ed., The 1989 E l e c t i o n of t h e European P a r l i a m e n t , 71, 72 1 2 6  1 2 7  F i n a n c i a l Times (14 June 1994) , 10, 96  

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