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Preventive strikes on Nuclear facilities: an analytical framework Herbst, Ludmila Barbara 1995

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PREVENTIVE STRIKES ON NUCLEAR FACILITIES: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK by LUDMILA BARBARA HERBST B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1994  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Political Science) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA July 1995 ©Ludmila Barbara Herbst, 1995  In presenting this  thesis in partial  fulfilment  of  the  requirements  for  an advanced  degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for department  or  by  his  scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of  or  her  representatives.  It  is  understood  that  copying  my or  publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  Department of  Poll-Heal Science  The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  Date  DE-6 (2/88)  AllCjUSt I)  IMS'  ABSTRACT Preventive  strikes  on nuclear  facilities  have been considered i n  perhaps ten cases since World War II. The continued proliferation of nuclear  weapons means that there remains a variety of potential targets for  preventive strikes, including countries such as Iran and Libya, launched by countries like the United States and Israel; this paper explores whether such military action against new weapons programs i s i n fact probable. The answer to this question i s pursued through a comparison of the past cases where preventive strikes were under discussion. common features, but eight factors tend  A l l share certain  to distinguish instances where  preventive strikes were carried out from the majority i n which they were rejected.  Significant  support  and l i t t l e  preventive strikes were engaged i n .  protest were expected  when  In turn, the prospect of operational  success, defined i n terms of destroying a l l relevant nuclear f a c i l i t i e s i n the target, was predictably worst where military action was not carried out. The degree and immediacy of threat were also depicted as more pronounced i n the case of realized preventive strikes. kind  are malleable;  Of course, perceptions of this  additional factors came into  play.  States which  launched  preventive strikes had few other options for dealing with the  unwanted  proliferator,  and had the opportunity to destroy i t s nuclear  f a c i l i t i e s while they were s t i l l under construction (or, for other reasons, not i n operation).  With their eye on these kinds of factors, countries  seemed to be deterred  from undertaking  military  blatantly infringe upon international law. inclined  action when i t would  Furthermore, states were less  to act when faced with military retaliation by the target, and  when, correspondingly, domestic public opinion promised to be unfavorable. Using  this  list  of criteria  for guidance, i t w i l l  be concluded  preventive strikes are unlikely to occur i n the near future.  that  TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract  i i  Table of Contents  i i i  List of Tables  iv  Chapter One  An Introduction to Preventive Strikes Preventive Strikes i n Theory  1 3  Chapter Two  Chelyabinsk to Yongbyon The United States vs. the Soviet Union: 1945-1954 The United States (and the Soviet Union) vs. China: 1963-1965 Egypt vs. Israel: 1960-1967 Israel vs. Iraq: 1981 Iraq vs. Iran: 1984-1988 The United States, India and Israel vs. Pakistan: 1979-1988 The United States/United Nations vs. Iraq: 1991 The United States and South Korea vs. North Korea: 1990-1994  8 8  Chapter Three  Chapter Four  11 14 16 18 19 22 24  Decision-Making Criteria i n Preventive Strikes General Characteristics of Proposed Strikes Differentiating Characteristics: Factors Distinguishing Realized Strikes Friends and Detractors Likelihood of Operational Success Threat Perceptions One Option among Many? "Hot" Facilities International Law Military Retaliation Domestic Public Opinion Summary  26 26  Conclusions Preventive Strikes: Inefficient and Implausible  79 84  Endnotes  29 29 36 42 52 59 63 67 72 75  86  Bibliography  103  - iii -  LIST OF TABLES  Table 1  How the Ten Realized/Proposed Strike Plans met the Suggested Criteria for Engagement  - iv -  76  CHAPTER ONE: AN INTRODUCTION TO PREVENTIVE STRIKES  The Osiraq.  names are exotic but otherwise unremarkable: Lanzhou, Yongbyon, Every name, however, i s or was attached to a nuclear power station,  enrichment nuclear  f a c i l i t y or reprocessing plant with some role in an emergent  weapons program.  Each of these installations,  in turn, faced  destruction by a foreign power before a nuclear threat could materialize. Preventive strikes against nuclear f a c i l i t i e s seem the stuff of f i c tion; this image may explain their limited role in nuclear literature. cast  of  characters  The  i s dominated by daring pilots and sinister national  leaders; the plot i s murky, climaxing in an aerial raid or descending to an anti-climax where military action i s rejected.  Nevertheless, preventive  strikes are very much part of reality and, as such, deserve serious attention.  Since the Allies attacked German and Japanese nuclear f a c i l i t i e s  during World War  II,"'" three  Best documented was  (sets of) preventive strikes have occurred.  the Israeli raid on  Iraq's Osiraq reactor in 1981.  However, Iraq i t s e l f repeatedly struck Iran's construction site at Bushehral  Bandahr, and  again faced an assault on i t s own  during and after the 1991 Gulf War.  nuclear installations  The United States, Egypt, Israel, India  and South Korea have each considered other targets as well: proposed victims were the Soviet Union, China, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea.  With this  in mind, the prospect of new strike plans cannot immediately be excluded. This study establishes a framework within which to examine the probab i l i t y of preventive strikes against fledgling proliferators in the future. Of great importance to this framework i s the colorful past sketched out above.  The historical synthesis and analysis attempted in this thesis are  distinctive, for the past i s rarely probed in the preventive strike context. Scholars like Leonard S. Spector, Herbert Kcosney and Steve Weissman, and - 1 -  Randall L. Schweller distinguish themselves simply by discussing, within a single work, two or three of the ten past strike proposals at more than sentence-length,  with the cases s t i l l  treated independently.  This study  therefore brings together information mentioned, but no further analyzed, by a range of disparate sources. compare the circumstances those  prevalent  Building on available data, the thesis w i l l  surrounding  when governments  each realized preventive strike to  decided  against  such  direct action.  Similarities between a l l cases should highlight the general characteristics of scenarios where strike planning can be expected at a l l .  Differences w i l l  suggest which factors promote, and which ones discourage, the actual resort to preventive  strikes  as  a policy instrument.  In fact, eight central  criteria for engagement w i l l emerge. The framework set out w i l l then be applied to the cases of contemporary proliferators and their potential attackers, to assess the likelihood-of any future round of preventive strikes. This assessment i s important; preventive strikes can have wide repercussions.  Whether effective or not, military action intended to slow or stop a  nuclear weapons program might be environmentally damaging, or prompt military retaliation that could embroil entire regions in conflict.  It could also  spur new efforts at nuclear proliferation by a defiant victim or i t s a l l i e s . Conversely,  i f successful in destroying a state's nuclear potential, a  preventive strike would deny a region the deterrence benefits of prolifera2 tion  that are championed by realist scholars like Kenneth Waltz.  This  school's opponents too would feel the effects of military action, but as advocates of non-proliferation might well be pleased instead of disappointed by an attacker's triumph. resources  which new  Both sides would have to admit, however, that  proliferators  had  devoted  ultimately, and unfortunately, been wasted.  to nuclear programs had  In sum, a high probability of  preventive strikes tiay give pause to the proliferator and force other states - 2 -  to re-examine whether or how non-proliferation goals should be advanced.  PREVENTIVE STRIKES IN THEORY Before further pursuit of the topic, the "preventive strike" concept must be defined.  In this thesis, such a strike involves military action by  one or more states for the purpose of destroying supposed nuclear weapons f a c i l i t i e s i n a suspected nuclear proliferator.  The overall goal of these  actions i s to prevent the achievement of a credible nuclear capability by a country which i s not yet a nuclear power; to use the Clinton Administration's terminology, this means that the target does not yet possess several 3 deliverable weapons. is  important  Although the distinction is not always clear-cut, i t  to point out  that this study does not focus on preventive  strikes as the term i s more widely employed, to label unprovoked f i r s t strikes against existing but vulnerable nuclear arsenals.  In this thesis,  preventive  and  counter-proliferation i s  central;  research  production  f a c i l i t i e s , rather than airfields and silos, are key strike targets. The definition of preventive strikes used here requires four qualifications.  First, discussion w i l l be confined to attacks considered by states.  Non-state actors have also targeted nuclear installations: local Shi'ites reportedly attempted to sabotage the Osiraq reactor in January and April 1980, and the African National Congress struck South Africa's Koeberg nucle4  ar  power station in December 1982.  However, such attacks would need  separate investigation, because terrorist groups and states calculate different odds.  For example, terrorists may count on anonymity or, i f publicity-  seeking, on physical concealment, to protect them from retaliation for an attack; unless confident of engaging in a covert raid, a state must rely on having a poorly armed or isolated target for the same reassurance.  Independ-  ently, the range of targets for non-state groups appears to be much larger - 3 -  as well.  Electricite de France's efforts to protect i t s SuperPhenix fast  breeder reactor from terrorists in the late 1970s suggest that more than new nuclear proliferators  are at risk.  The aims of non-state groups may  be  manifold, having less to do with nuclear weapons than with environmental or anti-governmental neighbors'  protest.  nuclear  Of course, states too may  facilities  for  reasons  other  on occasion attack than  their  weapons  potential; these cases must be weeded out. Second, then, a preventive strike must be both deliberate and specifically directed against weaponization.  Excluded from consideration in this  study, as a result, i s a September 30, 1980 incident where two Iranian F-4 Phanterns fired their rockets and guns at the Tuwaitha Atomic Centre in Iraq, damaging Osiraq's  water cooling system and storage f a c i l i t i e s .  Iranian  President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr backed eye-witness reports that the raid had only been an afterthought on the part of the pilots; they were returning from a raid on a nearby Iraqi power plant and may not have even realized that their second target was facility.^  a nuclear, much less a prospective weapons,  Another attack that f a i l s to qualify as a preventive strike was  North Korean commandos' botched raid on South Korea's Wolsong nuclear power plant in August 1983.  The plant i t s e l f was apparently unrelated to weapons  development; US pressure had dissuaded South Korea from weapons efforts by the late 1970s, arguably North Korea may  lessening those particular  North Korean fears.  have actually been aiming for a nuclear accident to turn  public opinion against the American nuclear presence in the South. A third concern pertains to the extent of a preventive strike.  In this  thesis, such a strike targets only nuclear f a c i l i t i e s , in order to prevent weaponization.  In contrast, a preventive war involves a wider attack on a 7  rival's "overall military power."  However, the concepts overlap.  Preven-  tive strikes may be part of any conflict, including preventive war, as long - 4 -  as nuclear installations are singled out not to i n f l i c t economic or environmental damage, but to destroy an emergent weapons program. Both preventive strikes and preventive war are, furthermore, casting." or  "motivated by long-term fore-  They each "take advantage of a closing window of opportunity  prevent the opening of a window of vulnerability," and are thus intend8  ed to stop "attackers' security from being compromised at some later date." The fourth issue to consider i n defining a preventive strike, correspondingly, i s timing. is  On the one hand, the victim of a pre-emptive attack  assumed to be on the verge of aggression.  Its nuclear f a c i l i t i e s may  remain on the l i s t of targets; regular (and, as far as General Curtis LeMay was concerned, pre-emptive) US war plans i n 1955, for example, devoted 9  twenty-five nuclear weapons to Soviet atomic energy installations.  Still,  a pre-emptive strike's priority i s to destroy deployed weapons ready for use against foreign s o i l .  On the other hand, a preventive strike takes place  while the targeted state poses no immediate nuclear threat. The variety of preventive  strikes  with  which  this  thesis does not deal may again be  intended to remove existing, exposed weapons, but not because the target was known  to have  addresses  plans  for war; as indicated earlier, preventive action  dangers feared to emerge i n the long term.  For their part, the  preventive strikes discussed i n this thesis take an even longer-term perspective,  singling  out research and production f a c i l i t i e s  after  a first  nuclear test."^  before or shortly  Their natural boundary, i n fact, i s the  proposed target's deployment of deliverable nuclear weapons i n significant quantities; an attack on the sites where weapons had been developed and built would then be too late.-  This was the case when Iraq fired three Scud  missiles at Israel's Dimona complex, where two hundred nuclear weapons may have already been assembled, i n February  1991.  The Iraqi action was not  intended as a preventive strike according to this study's definition, and, - 5-  incidentally, would not have succeeded as one in practice: Scuds are not accurate enough to target a reactor containment vessel, and each one landed harmlessly in the Negev Desert."^ States deciding whether to engage in a military operation which meets preventive strike criteria face an array of costs and benefits, both practical and principled.  In theory, preventive strikes have numerous disadvan-  tages.  National leaders know that military action w i l l put combatants at  risk.  At the same time, setting off an explosive charge near nuclear  material may endanger foreign technicians and even local residents.  The con-  comitant challenge to nuclear taboos and threat of popular disapproval may be forbidding. must confront  Furthermore, governments contemplating a preventive strike the possibility that the victim w i l l retaliate militarily.  The victim's a l l i e s and sympathizers may do likewise; economic or diplomatic sanctions are also hazards, with some degree of international disapprobation being likely in view of the fact that preventive strikes generally violate international law. own  Finally, of course, the strike i t s e l f may  f a i l on i t s  terms, and, instead of hampering or stopping proliferation, provide the  angered target with an incentive to accelerate i t s nuclear program. A state must weigh related costs against a range of benefits before making i t s decision in favor or against military action.  If the target i s  particularly hostile, eliminating i t s nuclear weapons program might be seen as a means of self-preservation. Less urgent but s t i l l welcome i s the opportunity to undermine the attacked proliferator's threat to or prior dominance of the regional balance of power, both military and p o l i t i c a l , through a successful strike which advertised the attacker's own military might. Concurrently, the attacker might safeguard nuclear  monopoly,  while  other  development could be deterred.  the prestige accompanying a regional  neighbors  considering  nuclear  weapons  The cause of non-proliferation advanced, the  - 6 -  aggressor government might even win domestic or international applause. Each of these benefits and costs i s not applicable or of interest to a l l states.  Some governments can foresee greater benefits stemming from a  preventive strike i n terms of state survival, and fewer costs with respect to retaliation or domestic protest.  For others, the situation i s reversed.  A review of the empirical evidence, i n the form of past cases where preventive strikes were discussed, may suggest which combination  of factors i s  most inimical, and which combination most conducive, to military action. This review w i l l be undertaken i n the next two chapters.  First, ten  cases i n which preventive strikes are known to have been considered w i l l be described; aside from Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq, few have received consistent scholarly attention.  Second, the similarities and differences among  these cases w i l l be drawn out. will  The most important product of this analysis  be a l i s t of eight factors distinctive of past resorts to military  action; governments have preferred to act under a special set of conditions. The preventive strikes that have occurred were expected to be widely condoned, even legal, actions which would destroy cold f a c i l i t i e s in a menacing new proliferator. furthermore,  Neither military reprisal nor a domestic outcry were,  supposed to mar the operational success achieved here after a  range of non-violent strategies had already been attempted or discounted. Guided by this suggested  checklist, predictions about the likelihood of  future preventive strikes w i l l be ventured i n the concluding chapter.  - 7 -  CHAPTER TWO: CHELYABINSK TO YONGBYON  Ten preventive strikes are known to have been pondered or attempted over the past f i f t y years, and w i l l be examined in this chapter.  These  cases involve American planning against the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, Iraq and, in collaboration with Seoul, North Korea; Israeli designs against Iraq and  Pakistan;  periodic Indian resolve to attack the again exposed  Pakistan; Egyptian threats against Israel; and Iraqi raids on Iran. In reality, of course, more than ten sets of strike plans have likely been formulated.  Unfortunately, the public record i s not extensive enough  to be sure of otherwise not implausible scenarios such as China or Pakistan plotting against India, suspicious neighbors eyeing a confrontation with a proliferating South Africa, or machinations by both Argentina and against the other.  Brazil  Selectivity also has a part in limiting the number of  cases to be explored here, for additional, recorded discussions appear to have been confined to the level of idle threat. Osiraq  raid  and  before Mordeehai Vanunu had  In this vein, after the  confirmed Israel's nuclear  status, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi pronounced an attack on Dimona to be legitimate; he suggested that his ambassador to Jordan smuggle a Syrian rocket within range of the Israeli f a c i l i t y .  However, the idea was rather fan-  tastic; Saddam Hussein reportedly told Qaddafi that he would restrict Iraqi 12 support  to a feasible plan, which was not forthcoming.  This chapter w i l l  thus chronicle only the apparently more serious threats since 1945, about which information was available in newspaper reports and country studies. THE UNITED STATES vs. Notorious war.  THE SOVIET UNION: 1945-1954  during this period was American contemplation  Nuclear-capable or not,  of preventive  the Soviet Union's relative military - 8 -  and  political  power was  supposedly  rising, and Cold War  episodes such as the  Berlin Crisis seemed to indicate i t s willingness to use this power in an aggressive or provocative fashion.  After some debate, of course, President  Harry Truman formally set aside preventive (although not preemptive) war in 1950's NSC-68, and Dwight D. Eisenhower did the same in 1954's NSC-5440; both documents concluded that "the United States and i t s allies must reject 13 the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war." est,  Of inter-  however, i s that a preventive strike to be directed specifically at  Soviet nuclear f a c i l i t i e s at times figured in American strategic discussion. In 1942,  the Soviet government decided to pursue a uranium bomb, and  work on nuclear weapons more generally intensified after American nuclear prowess was demonstrated in August 1945.  A site for large-scale plutonium  production was chosen in 1946, near Chelyabinsk in the Ural Mountains; the nuclear-  complex  there  eventually  included  plutonium-separation plant, Chelyabinsk-65.  several  reactors  and  a  Design work on nuclear weapons 14  took place at the same time near what i s now Nizhniy-Novgorod. As i t s own actions demonstrated, the Soviet Union was certainly worried about the prospect of a preventive strike against such f a c i l i t i e s .  In build-  ing nuclear installations, for example, Stalin sought both to conceal their location and  to harden them in case of a bombing raid by American B-29s.  (These precautions  were also hoped to come in useful should a nuclear  accident or explosion occur; i t could be better concealed or Some of Chelyabinsk-65  was  contained.)  allegedly built up to forty metres below the  surface of Lake Irtyash, and parts of the f a c i l i t y were covered by "steelreinforced concrete roofs" up  to seven metres thick.  apparently the only indication of i t s existence.  A smokestack was  Similar precautions were  taken at a second set of f a c i l i t i e s in Siberia, near Zhelenogorsk, where an estimated 65,000 prisoners and 100,000 soldiers buried - 9 -  plutonium-producing  reactors "deep underground."  Soviet unease persisted until at least 1951;  the government became concerned about the Americans finding Chelyabinsk-65 (and presumably making worrisome use of this information) by tracing the radioactive waste that had surfaced i n the Arctic Ocean back to the Techa River into which i t had been dumped. Indeed, the US government eventually 16 did locate the nuclear complex through techniques developed at Hanford. Actual American mention of a preventive strike (as opposed to preventive war) was made by General Leslie R. Groves, who had headed the Manhattan Project and became the military's liaison with the Atomic Energy Commission. "if  The September 22, 1945 New York Times described him as saying that the Soviets control of atomic weapons, the  United States should consider a preventive attack against Soviet atomic 17 research  facilities."  Referring to the need to retain a US nuclear  monopoly at a November 1945 press conference, Groves added, "We may never get another chance.  We must make the most of this one."  Likewise, a  January 1946 memorandum to Congress expressed his desire to launch a nuclear attack against "aggressor nations" on the verge of their own nuclear capabil18 ity.  Although not surprisingly in ah era of anti-communist bluster,  American civilians also joined the fray.  V i r g i l Jordan, the president of  the National Industrial Conference Board, spoke i n February 1946 about how the  United  States  should advance  "world disarmament"  and,  implicitly,  prevent other countries from arming themselves with nuclear weapons at a l l . [L]et us make, keep, and improve our atomic bombs...and l e t us suspend them in principle over every place in the world, where we have any reason to suspect evasion or conspiracy against this purpose; and l e t us drop them in f^(jt promptly and without compunction whenever i t i s defied. Ultimately, however, Soviet "defiance" of US non-proliferation (i.e., horizontal proliferation) goals was  not met with military action; no strike  plans may have ever been formulated, in spite of US rhetoric. - 10 -  The Soviet  Union tested i t s f i r s t nuclear device on August 29, 1949, and by 1953, when i t exploded a thermonuclear bomb, NSC  140/1  warned that i t had "over one  thousand bombers capable of delivering at least 120 atomic bombs to American 20 targets."  The tune for a preventive strike had passed.  THE UNITED STATES (AND THE SOVIET UNION) vs.  CHINA: 1963-1965  Ironically, the next case where a preventive strike was  entertained  rested on cooperation between the United States and the country that was earlier to have been i t s target, the Soviet Union.  The new  target  was  Mainland China; already fearing American nuclear attack, China decided to 21 join the nuclear club in January 1955. occurred  with Soviet aid.  China's early weapons development  On October 15, 1957  the two countries signed  their New Defense Technical Accord, where the Soviets committed themselves to providing a prototype atomic bomb. Soviet technicians did, in fact, then help China to construct a gaseous diffusion plant at Lanzhou, and to design a plutonium-producing reactor for the Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex in the 22 Gobi Desert. promises continued  Although Nikita Khrushchev reneged on more substantial  and  Soviet  with  specialists  were withdrawn by  i t s nuclear program and  uranium bomb on October 16,  August  1960,  successfully tested an  China  enriched  1964.  The strongest reaction to China's weapons goals appeared to come from the United States; Chinese o f f i c i a l s may have considered the possibility of 23 an American preventive raid as early as 1955.  President John F. Kennedy  was particularly anxious to stop the Chinese nuclear program, with preventive strikes being one option that he raised. Speaking on January 22,  1963  at a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), Kennedy hinted at his 24 "willingness  to  consider  p o l i t i c a l l y dangerous moves against China." - 11 Plainer indications of his state of mind emerged as the Administration  prepared for talks with the Soviet Union on the Partial Test Ban Treaty in July 1963.  Briefing books proposed "radical prevent the further  proliferation of nuclear capabilities," including the "Soviet, or possibly 25 joint US-USSR, use of military force" against China. US  Kennedy duly assured  Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, on his way to meet Khrushchev, that he  "could go as far as he wished in exploring the possibility of a SovietAmerican understanding with regard to China."  On July 15, he sent further  instructions to Harriman, by then in Moscow. This time, Kennedy said, "You should try to e l i c i t Khrushchev's view of means of limiting or preventing Chinese nuclear development and his willingness either to take Soviet action or to accept US action aimed in this direction." How far planning for a preventive strike advanced i s unclear.  Harriman  did speak to Khrushchev about the Chinese nuclear program, but was apparently  rebuffed.  Certainly when Harriman asked whether the Soviets could  "deliver" Chinese agreement to the test ban "That's  your problem."  The  treaty, Khrushchev replied,  Soviet leader ignored  Harriman's 27  question: "Suppose their rockets are targeted against you?"  follow-up  Indeed, what  exactly US leaders themselves envisioned in terms of a preventive strike i s open to debate; likewise uncertain i s whether a preferred scheme would have been implemented, for Strategic Air Command (SAC) was sure to protest the oft-mentioned  cooperative  high-level o f f i c i a l  aerial  raid.  In  this  respect,  one  "former  in the Kennedy Administration"  revealed  that i t had  pondered having "a Soviet and an American bomber f l y over the f a c i l i t i e s at Lop  Nor,  with each dropping a bomb, only one of which would be set to go  28 off."  American journalists and academics made suggestions other than a  joint  nuclear  circles. him  strike  which may  also have been canvassed in government  One idea was to entrust Chiang Kai-shek with the operation, giving  some American B-52s for the - purpose; 12 another was  to have National-  i s t saboteurs attack Mainland f a c i l i t i e s from the ground. Calls Johnson. issue  and,  29  for a preventive strike persisted under President Lyndon B. On  September 15, 1964,  according  Johnson and his advisers discussed the  to Special Assistant for National Security Affairs  McGeorge Bundy, came to the following conclusions: (1) We are not in favor of unprovoked unilateral US military action against Chinese nuclear installations at this time...If for other reasons we should find ourselves in military h o s t i l i ties at any level with the Chinese Communists, we would expect to give very close attention to the possibility of an appropriate military action against Chinese nuclear f a c i l i t i e s . (2) We believe that there are many possibilities for joint action with the Soviet Government even a possible agreement to cooperate in preventive military action. We therefore agreed that i t would be most desirable for the Secretary of State to explore this matter very privately with Ambassador Dobrynin Although  Khrushchev's overthrow and  the accession of an unfamiliar  Soviet leadership dampened enthusiasm for cooperative action, a preventive strike was  not yet ruled out completely.  Perhaps somewhat capriciously, L.  Mendel Rivers, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, responded 31 to  the Chinese nuclear test by urging a US a i r strike.  1964,  Johnson himself nominated former Under-Secretary  Gilpatric to head a panel  On November 1, of Defense Roswell  investigating American options for countering  nuclear proliferation; those options included a "surgical strike" against 32 China. Later that month, a Department of Defense Working Group concluded that there might be a "defensible case" for attacking Chinese "nuclear pro33 duction" f a c i l i t i e s during the Vietnam War. refrained from taking action.  In the end, however, Johnson  China proceeded to test the 1450-kilometre  Dongfeng-2 missile, equipped with a twenty kiloton warhead, in October 1966; by 1968, the year in which i t tested a thermonuclear device, i t had B-6 Hong 34 bombers each able to carry a one megaton bomb over 6400 kilometres. China remained in danger during this time, but now from a pre-emptive or more widely defined preventive Soviet strike on i t s •constructed arsenal. - 13 -  In 1968 and 1969, the Soviets raised the possibility of destroying assembled Chinese weapons with  their European a l l i e s and, allegedly, even with US  President Richard Nixon.  However, the United States was no longer i n favor;  finally ready to act militarily, the Soviets were refused outside support.  EGYPT vs. ISRAEL: 1960-1967 More rarely mentioned, at least outside work on Arab-Israeli relations, i s the military threat posed to Israeli nuclear f a c i l i t i e s by Egypt during the 1960s. Egyptian  This obscurity may partly be attributed to the likelihood that  threats were not made with particular conviction.  S t i l l , the  frequency with which they were repeated means that they cannot be ignored: a preventive strike was clearly on the mind of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. France secretly agreed in 1956 to build Israel's nuclear complex at Dimona.  An American U-2 spy plane noticed a reactor done at the site i n  December 1960, prompting Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to t e l l the Knesset that a twenty-four megawatt (MW) reactor was being constructed there.  He  denied press reports citing American and British intelligence sources, who claimed that Israel's aim was to develop nuclear weapons and that i t could 35 do so within five years.  Instead, he insisted that Dimona was needed to  train Israeli scientists i n agricultural, medical, and other peaceful uses of nuclear technology.  Of course, his denials were not entirely credible.  Ben-Gurion had earlier maintained  that Dimona was a textile plant, while  Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres asserted even i n 1963 that i t housed a 36 water desalination project which would "turn the Negev into a garden." That Israel would then seek to conceal weaponization was no surprise. When charges against Israel surfaced, Nasser turned his thoughts to a preventive strike.  Early i n 1961, he arranged a meeting of the Arab Adviso-  ry Commission of Military Affairs, and apparently demanded that the Arab - 14 -  chiefs of staff involved plan a military attack on Dimona.  Work i n this  forum was not long pursued, presumably because of discouraging technical deficiencies and in-fighting among member regimes, but the Arab press had by then  seized upon the preventive strike option.  Even journalist Muhamed  Hassenin Heykal, one of Nasser's chief confidants, raised the possibility of 33 military action against Dimona i n 1965. public with his reflections.  In December 1960, he declared, "[we) cannot  permit Israel to manufacture an atom bomb. attack."  Nasser himself periodically went  It i s inevitable that we should  Similarly, he announced in February 1966 that " i f Israel produces  the atomic bomb  [t]he Arab states would have to take immediate action and 39  liquidate everything that w i l l enable Israel to produce the atom bomb." By some accounts, only quick Israeli action foiled an Egyptian preventive strike.  One explanation of the Egyptian military build-up prior to the  1967 Six-Day War posits the elimination of Israeli nuclear installations as 40 one  of i t s goals.  However, this study assumes that i t was Nasser who  finally decided against a preventive strike.  Israeli nuclear development  did not figure at a l l i n Egyptian propaganda by May 1967, perhaps indicating that Nasser had earlier concluded his deliberations and was not interested in prolonging  the issue.  After a l l , he had already linked a preventive  strike to distant or unattainable prerequisites such as "meaningful Arab unity."  Otherwise, a relationship between Egyptian hostility toward Israel  and Israeli nuclear goals might have been emphasized to win Nasser sympathy 41 from Western non-proliferation advocates as well as from fellow Arabs. In any event, Dimona remained untouched.  Israel may have been able to  consider brandishing, i f not using, deliverable nuclear weapons during the Yom Kippur War i n 1973; certainly by 1976, the CIA believed that Israel had 42 15 size "developed ten to twenty bombs of-the used at Hiroshima."  Of course,  Israel did not make i t s nuclear progress public, and an Arab opponent may  have f e l t justified in describing any proposed military attack on Dimona as a preventive strike until Mordechai Vanunu's 1987 revelations.  ISRAEL vs.  IRAQ:  1981  Egypt's proposed target did not shy away from i t s own preventive strike l i t t l e more than a decade later.  Israel's concern in this respect was not  43 Egypt but Iraq.  An early cause for alarm was Iraqi interest in a five hun-  dred megawatt gas-graphite reactor from France, with which Iraq had signed a nuclear cooperation plutonium production  agreement in 1974.  The strength of this reactor was  (perhaps enough for eight bombs annually) instead of  electrical output, which was o i l - r i c h Iraq's dubious public rationale for nu44 clear development. model had  France pointed out that production of the gas-graphite  been discontinued, and  offered Iraq a US-designed pressurized  water reactor, which produced electricity using uranium enriched only to between two and three percent, far below weapons-grade.  Iraq refused this . . 45  model, and instead chose France's own, forty to seventy megawatt Osiris. Renamed Osiraq for i t s recipient, this material testing reactor was normally used in building power reactors; Iraq had no such industry.  Research  aside, Osiraq's attraction seemed i t s ability to produce perhaps ten kilograms of plutonium yearly i f i t s core were fitted with a blanket of natural or depleted uranium. uranium in 1980  Notably,  and 1981,  Iraq purchased around 250 tons of natural  and placed an order for depleted uranium-metal  46 fuel pins.  At the same time, i t refused France's offer of a new type of  fuel for the reactor; although less costly, "Caramel" was enriched only to between seven and ten percent.  Osiraq's original requirement, the f i r s t  shipment of which arrived in late June- 1980, was weapons-grade, enriched to ninety-two or ninety-three percent. With the seventy kilograms that France - 16 had  promised to supply,  Iraq was  f e l t able to produce "at least three"  nuclear bombs even i f i t s longer-term plutonium extraction option failed. Indications of Iraq's weapons aims mounted. The country purchased a complex consisting of three hot c e l l laboratories, in which plutonium could be reprocessed on a small scale. for  This Italian f a c i l i t y could serve as a model  a larger reprocessing plant; i t was otherwise far beyond Iraq's needs  and research capabilities.  Iraq also began negotiating in 1981 for another  source of plutonium to reprocess: a forty megawatt Italian heavy water reac48 out of place in i t s modest energy program.  tor  Duly unconvincing  was  Iraq's March 1980 pronouncement that i t "strongly opposefd] the introduction 49 of  nuclear weapons in the area."  Israeli analysts looked instead to a  more ominous statement made by Saddam Hussein in September 1975:  "[Franco-  Iraqi nuclear cooperation] was the f i r s t actual step in the production of an Arab atomic weapon, despite the fact that the declared purpose for the establishment of [Osiraq] is not the production of atomic weapons."^^ Israeli plans to destroy Osiraq emerged in November 1979 General strike  Staff,  under Commander-in-Chief Raphael Eytan.  option reached  Menachim  Begin  the  already  Cabinet  favored  The  in late October 1980;  military  action, and  within the preventive  Prime Minister i t won  Cabinet  51 approval.  After several postponements, the raid was set for June 7, 1981,  and from an operational standpoint was an immense success. F-16  fighter-bombers,  pound  MK.84 iron  escorted by  bombs on  six F-15  Osiraq.  The  Eight Israeli  Eagles, dropped sixteen 2000 damage prompted reports that  saboteurs had worked on the ground as well: in the space of eighty seconds, the  reactor dome collapsed, i t s foundations  toppled, water flooded the  f a c i l i t y , and electrical and control systems were disabled. A second French reactor at the site, the smaller Isis, was also shaken, and although the nearby hot cells and an older Soviet reactor escaped damage, Italian and 52 French offices were swept by f i r e . Triumphant, a l l the Israeli planes - 17 -  returned home safely within three hours of their departure.  IRAQ vs. IRAN: 1984-1988 The victim of a preventive strike in 1981, Iraq was soon to launch i t s own  raids on i t s eastern neighbor.  under  the  Shah, with work on  extraction and Centre.  weapons design  Iran's nuclear weapons program began  laser-based  uranium enrichment, plutonium  occurring at the Teheran Nuclear Research  Despite national o i l resources, the Atomic Energy Organization of  Iran (AEOI) also planned for at least twenty nuclear power stations to be in 53 operation  by  1992.  Work on nuclear weapons stopped briefly after the  accession of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who preferred more spiritual endeavors; however, the continuation of the Iran-Iraq War, which had started in September 1981, nuclear  option.  apparently persuaded his government to reconsider i t s In  1984,  a new  nuclear research centre was  opened in  Isfahan, and at Bushehr, construction resumed on two 1200 MW power reactors which would, i t was believed, eventually yield "significant quantities" of 54 plutonium for reprocessing.  West Germany, Spain and Argentina were each  approached with contracts to complete Bushehr after President A l i Khameini's February 1987  speech to the AEOI: "Regarding atomic energy, we need i t  now...Our nation has always been threatened from outside. do  to face this danger i s to l e t our  ourselves.Later  The least we can  enemies know that we can defend  that year, British television also reported that Iran  had sought enriched uranium from Sudanese dealers; although unconfirmed and possibly falsified, the report may have increased neighbors' anxiety. Iranian weapons efforts did not go unnoticed, accordingly, in Iraq.  In  fact, that country launched at least seven aerial raids on Bushehr in March 1984,  February and  March 1985,  attack, on July 19, 1988,  November 1987  and  July 1988.  The  last  occurred the day after a UN ceasefire had been - 18 -  agreed to by Iraq, although fighting was s t i l l in progress.  Of course, to  what extent Bushehr was targeted specifically because of i t s nuclear weapons potential i s not entirely clear.  Iran and Iraq routinely attacked each  other's electrical generating stations and o i l refineries; in this category of wartime economic targets, Bushehr may have been especially attrac58 tive because Iran had spent over one b i l l i o n dollars in i t s development. However, a "prominent c i v i l i a n defense adviser to the Iraqi government," interviewed i n October 1989, suggested classified  as preventive  strikes:  that Iraqi attacks could indeed be  "misgivings"  about  Iranian  nuclear  intentions were what had motivated Iraq to act, using the "cover of war" to 59 do so. THE UNITED STATES, INDIA AND ISRAEL vs. PAKISTAN: 1979-1988 Compared to the Iranian case, the Pakistani one i s complicated.  No  less than three countries have, at separate times, contemplated a preventive strike on Pakistani nuclear f a c i l i t i e s , and at least one has sought outside help in accomplishing i t s mission. Pakistan f i r s t became interested i n nuclear weapons under Zulfikar A l i Bhutto, who i n 1965 declared, "If India builds the bomb, we w i l l eat grass or leaves, even go hungry.  But we w i l l get one of our own.' ^ He further |f  pronounced the need for a Pakistani "nuclear deterrent" i n his 1969 book, The Myth of Independence.^ his  nuclear  As president in January 1972, Bhutto confirmed  desires while addressing  the scientific elite assembled at  Multan, and practical measures were soon taken. on  Negotiations began in 1973  the purchase of a French f a c i l i t y able to reprocess 150 kilograms of  plutonium  annually; i t had no obvious role i n Pakistan's nuclear energy  62 program.  Reportedly, ground was also broken i n late 1974 on the "New  Labs"; this smaller f a c i l i t y was supposedly - 19 -  capable of separating enough  plutonium for between two and four nuclear weapons yearly, and the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) director-general admitted 1981  that plutonium  may  in October  have been diverted for separation there from the 63  Karachi Nuclear Power Project.  Shepherded by Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, who  had gained experience at the Urenco enrichment project in the Netherlands, Pakistan ventured into uranium enrichment as well; construction began on a large enrichment f a c i l i t y at Kahuta in 1978.  Also commencing in October of 64  that year were reports that Pakistan was preparing a nuclear test site. Rather surprisingly, the f i r s t country publicly rumoured to have considered a preventive strike in face of this evidence was the United States. The August 12, 1979 New York Times reported the formation of an interagency task force under State Department o f f i c i a l Gerard C. Smith.  The group was  allegedly weighing a variety of options for constraining Pakistani nuclear development; one  such option was  enrichment equipment at Kahuta. bility  was  The US government denied that this possi-  under consideration, but Pakistan took the threat seriously  enough to complain defenses.^  a covert, paramilitary raid to destroy  to the American ambassador and  to improve Kahuta's  Adding weight to what was perhaps an otherwise dubious scenario  were more general suggestions  that US "institutions" or the "West" would 66  later go on to encourage a proxy raid on Pakistan by India.  Of course, i f  kindled at a l l , o f f i c i a l US interest would have waned once the Soviet Union had invaded Pakistan's neighbor, Afghanistan. A second and more persistent set of allegations centered on India. Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai (1977-1979) later claimed to have told Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq that India would attack his nuclear installa67 tions in case of a Pakistani nuclear test.  The Washington Post further  reported in December 1982 that, according to American intelligence sources, - 20 a preventive strike against Kahuta and the New Labs had been planned and  proposed to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her military earlier that year. India maintained i t s innocence, with the Indian ambassador to Washington dismissing rumours of an impending raid as a "figment of the imagination," Zia  but  told journalists that his government "naturally ha[d] a concern" about  the possibility of Indian attack.^  Proposals for military action may have  resurfaced i n 1984, the year i n which Indian authors themselves had earlier predicted that the strike would occur; ABC News alleged that Mrs. Gandhi was 69 again being pressured to attack Kahuta.  Finally, September 1985 witnessed  the rise of Pakistani fears that an Indian preventive strike plan, postponed 70 because of Mrs. Gandhi's death, was about to be reactivated. That preventive strikes were seriously considered i s supported by the emphasis put on prohibiting them as a bilateral confidence-building measure. In December 1985, Zia and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi verbally agreed not  to attack each other's  furthermore,  nuclear installations.  December  1988,  a written agreement against preventive strikes was signed by  Gandhi and Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. "refrain  In  from  undertaking,  encouraging,  Each side must now  or participating  indirectly  or  directly in any action aimed at causing the destruction[of] or damage to any 71 [nuclear] installations or f a c i l i t i e s i n the other country." Incredibly, however, Pakistan's nuclear program remained in jeopardy. The country eyeing the preventive strike option in 1988 was Israel, perhaps for  the third time on i t s own part.  The Observer reported i n March that  Israeli o f f i c i a l s had asked Indian diplomats in Paris about the possibility of  using refuelling f a c i l i t i e s at Jamnagar, an Indian Air Force base near  the Indo-Pakistani frontier,  to stage an attack on Kahuta.  After India  refused, Israel urged an Indian raid with Israeli-supplied "advanced high 72 explosive bombs."  Several meetings were held, but India again declined.  - 21 -had assembled three nuclear bombs by Indeed, the CIA suggested that Pakistan  some time in 1988.  The country has since affirmed i t s nuclear status, and 73  i t has the aircraft to deliver a nuclear weapon to India, at least.  THE UNITED STATES/UNITED NATIONS vs.  IRAQ:  1991  While Pakistan had a series of escapes, Iraq was not so fortunate when i t attempted to rebuild i t s nuclear weapons program.  Israel's bombing of  Osiraq had not deterred Saddam Hussein from nuclear development.  He called  on June 21, 1981 for Arabs "in one way or another to obtain a nuclear bomb," and in 1982,  his military was already interested in the 33.9 kilograms of 74  plutonium centered  offered by on  uranium  electromagnetic  Italian  smugglers.  Iraq's  subsequent  enrichment, through calutron, gas  isotope separation  (EMIS) programs.  efforts  centrifuge, and  Although  the  full  extent of Iraqi advances had not become known before Operation Desert Storm, the March 28, 1990 arrest of five people attempting to smuggle forty krytons (nuclear triggers) to Iraq through Heathrow was highly publicized. Preventive strikes were part of the Gulf War.Of course, the declared priority of Operation Desert Storm was removing Iraqi troops from Kuwait, which they had occupied and annexed in August 1990;  an Iraqi withdrawal  before the January 15, 1991 deadline would have presumably l e f t i t s nuclear 75 facilities  intact.  Nevertheless,  through the autumn of 1990. preventive  strike  after  the  nuclear  issue gained stature  Iraq i t s e l f had suspected Israel of planning a  August 1988,  which unusually quick and public "76  Israeli denials suggested was not the case;  i t was,  States that assumed this kind of belligerent posture.  instead, the United At  Thanksgiving,  President George Bush told US forces in Saudi Arabia, "Every day that passes brings Saddam Hussein weapons arsenal." 77 to their mission.  one  step closer to realizing his goal of a nuclear  Iraqi nuclear development gave a "real sense of urgency" - 22 -proceeded accordingly, with Bush beMilitary planning  coming more blunt in his January 16, 1991  address. "We are determined to 78  knock out Saddam Hussein s nuclear potential>" he said. 1  Iraqi nuclear installations were high-priority targets during the war, although  attacks on nuclear, chemical and missile development f a c i l i t i e s 79  constituted only five percent of Coalition sorties. war  Three days after the  began, US briefings pronounced Iraqi nuclear f a c i l i t i e s to have been  "gravely damaged," and by January 23, Iraq's two reactors (at the old Osiraq 80 site) were supposedly "inoperative." Tarmiya, the uranium extraction and  Indeed, the enrichment f a c i l i t y at yellowcake production  facilities  at  Qa'im, and the Taji military factory were a l l eventually bombed. Also targeted was  Al Atheer, later revealed to be the "Iraqi equivalent of the Los 81  Alamos National Laboratory," although only the cafeteria was actually h i t . Reflecting  the strength of nuclear-related concerns,  Resolution  687  then called on  Iraq to allow UN  UN Security Council  inspectors to investi-  gate i t s nuclear f a c i l i t i e s ; a f u l l disclosure and repudiation of nuclear weapons activities was demanded again in August 1991's Resolution 707. Post-war inspections by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) found the Iraqi nuclear program to have been much larger than suspected.  The IAEA and  UNSCOM were entrusted with the "destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of Iraq's nuclear capabilities," and nuclear installations which survived the war, such as Al Atheer, were dynamited or f i l l e d with con82 crete.  Although under duress, Iraqi engineers participated in these opera-  tions; intended to f u l f i l l a ceasefire agreement, the actions were not preventive strikes.  Noteworthy, however, i s that in March 1992, US o f f i c i a l s  proposed explicitly military action against nuclear f a c i l i t i e s in view of Iraqi obstructionism.  On January 17, 1993,  forty-five US cruise missiles  - 23 - where White House spokesman Marlin were used against a Zaarfarniya factory, 83 Fitzwater claimed that Iraq was storing nuclear components.  THE UNITED STATES/SOUTH KOREA vs.  NORTH KOREA: 1990-1994  The United States and i t s likely strike partner, South Korea, exercised more restraint in dealing with North Korea's nuclear program.  Apparently,  President Kim II Sung launched Northern weapons efforts in the late 1970s. Between 1980 and 1987, North Korea built a thirty megawatt research reactor, of a gas-graphite variety able to produce between seven and eight kilograms of plutonium annually, at Yongbyon. American satellite photographs taken in late 1988 and early 1989 subsequently indicated that a plutonium extraction plant, in addition to a new reactor which would operate at between f i f t y and 84 two  hundred  megawatts, was  perhaps being  built  at  the  site.  Also  highlighting North Korea's weapons goals was the country's resistance to a thorough IAEA inspection of i t s nuclear f a c i l i t i e s , and i t s March 12, 1993 announcement of plans to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  Although  Kim  II Sung was  s t i l l claiming in April 1994  that his  country had only peaceful intentions, he was not believed; remembered were North Korea's hints late in 1990 that " i t might...have to develop certain 85 weapons which i t had once relied on i t s allies to provide." Suggestions that a preventive strike on Northern nuclear f a c i l i t i e s was under consideration emerged in both South Korea and the United States; collaboration seemed understood.  In 1991, South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong  Ku twice made reference to the possibility of an "Entebbe-style" raid on the North,  presumably thinking not of Entebbe but rather of Osiraq.  A US  State Department source echoed the message in November 1991: "(if North 87 Korea] missed Desert Storm, this i s a chance to catch a rerun." later, on November 10, 1993, South Korean President Kim Yong Sam  Two years repeated  that "North Korea's nuclear development should be stopped by a l l means." This statement came only days after reports that the Pentagon was readying 88 24 plans to destroy Yongbyon in a cruise missile strike. Finally, new addi-  tions to the "Team Spirit" exercises conducted by the United States and i t s South Korean ally i n 1993 were an American B-1B bomber and F-117 Stealth fighter; this deployment may have been "a signal to the North that the nucle89 ar complex i n Yongbyon...could be reached i n minutes i f necessary."  Of  course, no preventive strike has taken place to date, and the Los Angeles Times reported i n March 1994 that Washington had, i n fact, decided against 90 the option.  Both the Clinton Administration and South Korean government  have taken pains to point out, however,, that North Korea i s not yet a nuclear power, and they have even begun to downplay earlier contentions that the country had assembled one or two nuclear weapons.  In the eyes of Washington 91 and Seoul, a preventive strike.may, by definition, s t i l l be feasible. In sum, ten preventive strike proposals, both famous and relatively obscure,  have been outlined.  As noted  earlier,  this l i s t may not be  exhaustive, but additional scenarios were not raised, much less confirmed, by either the general or country-specific sources consulted for this study. At any rate, a comparison among known cases remains to be made; this task w i l l be undertaken i n the next chapter.  - 25 -  CHAPTER THREE: DECISION-MAKING CRITERIA IN PREVENTIVE STRIKES  Ten instances have been described where preventive strikes came under consideration.  This chapter w i l l analyze the factors apparently involved i n  deciding whether to use this particular option, attempting to confine i t s e l f to tangible decision-making criteria which may mediate vaguer and relatively elusive background  conditions like personality and leadership style.  A  brief examination of five commonalities among the ten cases (i.e., factors which, judging by past experience, have tended to inspire any discussion of the preventive strike option at all) w i l l be succeeded by a review of differences  among them.  Eight major criteria w i l l emerge to distinguish the 92  attacks which did occur from those which remained in the planning stage.  GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPOSED STRIKES The  seven strike plans which were rejected had certain features in  common with the three which were carried out; these characteristics set a l l ten  apart from cases where preventive strikes were not considered to be an  option.  The United States did not look at Chinese weaponization, for  example, i n the same way  that i t saw  an always  secure British nuclear  program, despite the fact that no military action came to be taken i n either instance. actual  Of course, the five characteristics shared by both potential and  preventive strikes  combination.  will  not  seem particularly  unusual, even in  With more pairs of countries than are known to have been  proposed attackers and targets f i t t i n g the mold, i t again appears probable that military action has been discussed more widely than the public record would show. The f i r s t characteristic shared by the potential targets of preventive strikes was that, armed with nuclear weapons, they were each viewed as some - 26 -  kind of threat to the prospective aggressor. intensity.  The  This threat clearly varied in  danger from the proposed target may  have been to the  attacker's actual survival; this degree of perceived threat w i l l later be important in distinguishing realized strike plans.  The danger may also have  been restricted to the attacker's successful pursuit of foreign policy goals such as non-proliferation or enhanced national prestige. cases,  Still,  in a l l  the fates of target and aggressor were somehow intertwined, with  nuclear development by the former seen to affect the latter unfavorably. Second, each pair of attackers and targets recently had been, was or appeared  soon  likely  to  be,  fighting  unrelated to nuclear development.  a conventional  war  for reasons  An already tense climate (often but not  necessarily fostered by an enduring rivalry) with strong military overtones made such development seem more ominous, and military attacks on r i v a l nuclear f a c i l i t i e s the obvious means of addressing the consequent fears. In the mid- to late 1940s, a hot war between the United States and the supposedly  expansionist Soviet Union was  Commerce Henry Wallace  thus  thought  to be  wrote in July 1946  imminent; Secretary of that "we  are preparing  93 ourselves to win the war which  we regard as inevitable."  In turn, the  United States (with South Korea) battled two of i t s later proposed targets, China and North Korea, during the Korean War; war with China loomed again during the Taiwan Straits Crises of 1954 and 1958.  By the time that Egypt,  for i t s part, was contemplating a preventive strike against Israel, i t had fought  two wars against the country,  in 1948  and 1956.  Following this  pattern, Israel struck an Iraq which had been i t s opponent in three m i l i tary conflicts, in 1948,  1967  and 1973.  Facing Pakistan, India was also  plagued by the remembrance of three past wars, in 1948, addition to militarized disputes like their 1984 Glacier.  1965 and 1971, in  clash over the Siachen  During the 1980s, similarly, Iran was the victim of a series of - 27 -  preventive strikes by  i t s wartime opponent, Iraq, while the latter  was  engaged in war with an US-led coalition when i t s own nuclear f a c i l i t i e s were attacked in 1991.  There are only two exceptions: neither Israel nor the  United States had fought or was otherwise poised to fight Pakistan. A third characteristic generally shared by prospective attackers was that they considered their targets to be somewhat "alien," perhaps aggravating  the sense of threat and loosening psychological prohibitions against  attack.  An ideological barrier separated the United States from the Soviets  and Chinese, and continued to divide North Korea from both the South and i t s American patron in the 1990s. cases.  Israel was  Religion may  have been a factor in other  pitted against a Muslim Egypt, and, with the United  States, against the Muslim Iraq and Pakistan.  Likewise, the secular, Sunni-  dominated government of Saddam Hussein confronted a Shi'ite fundamentalist Iran, while the Hindu-Muslim divide followed the Indo-Pakistani border. Albeit uncomfortable,  fourthly, most states considering a preventive  strike enjoyed a technological edge on their potential or actual target; the exception was action  Egypt when i t faced Israel.  seem feasible, although  This military superiority made  not equally so in a l l cases.  nuclear advantage on the side of the attacker may  A related  also have provided an  added incentive to eliminate a rival program which could endanger a distinctive status.  It was  a nuclear United States which planned raids on the  Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, 1991 Iraq and North Korea; a nuclear Israel which  confronted  1981  Iraq  and  Pakistan;  and  a  nuclear  India which  considered striking Pakistan, again, in the early 1980s. A fifth  similarity  linking  the cases where preventive strikes were  pondered was that countries other than the potential attacker opposed weaponization by i t s target. brought states together.  Nuclear non-proliferation was a general goal that A sense of personal threat or alliance loyalty - 28 -  likely inspired a degree of reassuring unity around the chief actor as well. However, these are rather vague generalities.  Of greater concern are the  differences that separate the three cases in which preventive strikes took place from those where the idea was never translated into reality.  It i s  these eight differentiating characteristics that w i l l be examined next.  DIFFERENTIATING CHARACTERISTICS: FACTORS DISTINGUISHING REALIZED STRIKES In this discussion of factors common only to realized strike proposals, one qualification must immediately be noted.  Eight criteria for launching a  preventive strike w i l l be gleaned from the ensuing analysis.  With very few  exceptions, the criteria are met by actualized military operations alone, and are satisfied by a l l three of these cases.  On the other hand, not every  factor which forms part of this pattern need be decisive.  The fact that the  three (sets of) preventive strikes coincide i n so many particulars which are absent from remaining cases may, to some extent, be fortuitous; the evidence available i s too limited to isolate sufficient from necessary or even from mere supplementary  conditions for military action.  What may safely be said  is that a preventive strike i s l i k e l i e s t in a scenario where more of the differentiating criteria to be raised here are satisfied.  Their order of  importance w i l l be speculated on in the course of this chapter.  I. Friends and Detractors Certainly  an  important  factor  underpinning  decision-making  in the  preventive strike context seems to involve the balance of support which a potential attacker could expect.  In no case, of course, has a potential  attacker been completely alone in desiring an end to i t s proposed target's fledgling nuclear arsenal; no nuclear weapons acquisition earns more than scattered praise.  However, countries which specifically saw a larger number - 29 -  of influential fellows to be on their own side than on their target's were the ones more inclined  to implement their strike plans.  Because other  states saw nuclear proliferation by the target to be unusually troubling, each country which used i t s military option was less deterred by the threat of  diplomatic, economic or even military  retaliation from the victim's  a l l i e s or the international community as a whole. As part of the most extensively documented case, Israeli appraisals of potential  sympathizers in 1981  provide the basis for comparison.  Israel  knew, in fact, that a range of states would be pleased by an end to the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.  Perhaps most significantly, the Israeli  government expected a favorable response to the Osiraq raid, or at worst neutrality, from the United States.  On November 13, 1980, Begin was alleged-  ly promised by President Jimmy Carter that Israeli fears would be raised 94 with the incoming Reagan Administration. have known of, and Nuclear  Regulatory  acquiesced  The American government may even  to, the Israeli raid in advance: the US  Commission told Israeli experts in October 1980 of the  likelihood that a nuclear plant of Osiraq's size would be destroyed by the 95 type of bombs later used. publicly  criticized  Ultimately, of course, the American government  the attack, but  there was  no question of abandoning  Israel to i t s opponents: President Ronald Reagan "affirmed" the countries' "strong  and  deeply  rooted relationship"  to the Israeli ambassador, and 96 •  helped to block UN sanctions against Israel. France too  was  probably  counted on  for quiet sympathy.  Although  complacent about Osiraq in public, a French government reluctant to aid weapons development had already been suspected, with Libya and the CIA, of complicity in an April 6, 1979 bombing at La Seyne-sur-Mer, where Osiraq's 97 core was being prepared for shipment. Openly opposed to nuclear prolifera- 30 tion even while desirous of cultivating Arab business, the newly elected  Frangois Mitterrand was hoped to be particularly understanding.  To preserve  his support, Israel took pains not to endanger French technicians at Osiraq; i t chose Sunday, when they were expected not to be working, for the raid. There was  even a (doubtful) report that the one French technician killed  during the attack was an agent of the SDECE, planting a homing device for 98 Israeli bombs; i f true, Israel would have been sure of French backing. Privately, French o f f i c i a l s did express relief after the raid, and took the opportunity to announce more rigorous safeguards, sketched out beforehand in 99 a secret review, on future nuclear sales. Less promisingly, Deputy Israeli Prime Minister Yigael Yidan f e l t that an Israeli attack could "lead Arab states to a general reconciliation.""'"^ On  balance,  perfunctory. in  however, Israel  guessed  that  Islamic disapproval  would be  Israeli Military Intelligence Director Yehoshua Saguy declared  the autumn of 1980  that a nuclear Iraq would be a "threat to a l l the  states in the region, including Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.""'"^"'" In tacit agreement, the Saudi government demanded French- assurances in 1978  that  Osiraq would not serve weapons goals, and speaking privately after the raid, 102 Saudi  King Khaled "expressed  satisfaction."  In turn, Israeli Foreign  Minister Yigal Alon claimed during a March 1977 discussion with his French counterpart to have "information" that Osiraq was well.  of concern to Syria as  Syria too urged the French government not to provide Iraq with highly  enriched uranium, and a defensive Mossad may have suspected Syrian involvement in mg  the July 14, 1980 murder of Yahya el-Meshad, a nuclear expert work103  for the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.  For his part, Egyptian  President Anwar Sadat told his Camp David partner, Begin, only three days before the raid that he considered Saddam Hussein "even more vicious than Qaddafi," and an Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman afterwards claimed that - 31 104 "seme Egyptian o f f i c i a l s have expressed quiet satisfaction." Finally,  engaged in a war with Iraq and, under the Shah, f a i r l y close to Israel, Iran was not expected to object to a raid; Israeli o f f i c i a l s had inquired rather confidently about Iranian sentiments toward the Iraqi nuclear program as early as February 1977."'"^  Although Iran was wary of condoning preventive  strikes when i t had i t s own nuclear goals, both the Shah and the Khomeini government complained about Iraqi intentions for Osiraq to France and Italy, 106 and Iraq openly blamed Iran for sponsoring the Israeli raid. Alternately, at the time of Iraqi attacks on Bushehr, i t was Iran that had  few  friends.  A United  States wounded by  the hostage c r i s i s would  certainly not come to Iran's defense; i t s eventual favorite in the IranIraq War was Iraq, with which diplomatic relations were reopened in November 1984.  Iraq was probably further comforted by US willingness to defend Saudi  and Kuwaiti attack.  tankers carrying Iraqi o i l in 1987,  even as Bushehr was under  It faced the prospect of criticism only from, peripheral states,  such as Syria, which had not been alienated by Khomeini's fundamentalism but which were also presumably concerned enough about the Iran-Iraq War as a whole to worry much about i t s relatively minor preventive strike component. Although a r t i f i c i a l l y inflated by disapproval for Iraq's violation of Kuwaiti sovereignty, another imbalance in favor of countries contemplating preventive strike occurred in January 1991.  a  Iraq was isolated international-  ly through sanctions imposed by no less encompassing a body than the UN; although Arab publics demurred, even their governments showed l i t t l e sympathy for the widely mistrusted Saddam Hussein.  Indeed, Saudi, Egyptian and  Syrian troops joined the Coalition side, with their contributions adding to those of the thirty-one other states from around the world which provided 107 some kind of assistance.  Angry protest was expected and heard only from  states and bodies such as Jordan, Yemen and the PLO. The preventive strikes that were rejected would have faced s t i f f e r oppo- 32 -  sition.  For example, risking a new European war by attacking Soviet nuclear 108  f a c i l i t i e s would have outraged US a l l i e s .  France, i n particular, was  also inclined to be conciliatory toward Mainland China at the time of new American strike considerations. Diplomatic relations were re-established i n January 1964, and French  Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville was  insisting by October 1965 that "[w]hat i s needed i s solutions reached through 109 agreement, or at least resulting from some modus vivendi." An outright military response to an American attack on China, in addition to the further protest expected from a l l i e s like a Japan increasingly interested i n Chinese trade, even seemed possible from the Soviet Union. Admittedly,  the CIA had reported i n April 1961 that Sino-Soviet divisions  were deep, and i n January 1963 that "for most practical purposes, a 'split' has already occurred.""'""'"'"  1  Hawks i n the US Navy and Air Force thus contended  that Moscow would avoid military confrontation with the United States, as i t had done over Cuba and Vietnam, i f the preventive strike was clearly limited to the nuclear program which i t had lobbied since 1958 to stop."'""'""'" On the other hand, some ambiguity remained. discuss  other  "Socialist  Khrushchev openly forbad Harriman to  countries" with him, and Chinese Premier Chou  En-lai asserted i n October 1963 that the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance was " s t i l l very much alive."  There  were even reports of Chinese scientists continuing to work at the Soviets' 112 Joint Nuclear Research Institute i n Dubna as late as January 1964.  In  addition, Sino-Soviet relations appeared to improve with Khrushchev's downfall.  Moscow turned i t s attention to German nuclear access, and pointedly 113  refrained from c r i t i c i z i n g China on disarmament issues until 1966. The prospect of external condemnation probably impeded Nasser as well. France had recently plotted against Egypt during the Suez Crisis, and was - 33 supportive enough of Israeli weaponization to provide help in weapons design  114 and manufacture. tion.  It was  therefore likely to condemn Dimona's destruc-  In turn, although the United States was upset by Israel's concealment  of i t s nuclear efforts from the Eisenhower Administration and demanded that 115 Dimona be subject to outside inspection,  i t could not condone an Egyptian  attack on a Western, democratic bulwark in the Middle East. A raid on Pakistan would also have triggered protest.  Simplest  may  have been an American preventive strike in 1979: European states were becoming wary of selling Pakistan nuclear technology, and relief would obviously have been f e l t by India and Israel.  The situation for these states,  however, was more complex during their own planning process, for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Pakistan's corner.  in December 1979  brought the United States into  Although viewed with l i t t l e real "affection," Zia was  offered 3.2 b i l l i o n dollars in US aid in 1981; Pakistan was duly exempted from the Symington-Glenn Amendment to the US Foreign Assistance Act, which 116 proscribed aid to producers of unsafeguarded nuclear material. By 1985, Pakistan was in fact the fourth largest recipient of American security assis117 tance,  and the United States seemed prohibitively reconciled to Pakistani  weaponization. George Crist,  The commander-in-chief of the US Central Command, General said in 1987  that Pakistani nuclear weapons "would present  quite a great deal more deterrence to the Soviets should they decide to move through Pakistan."  More solidly, a nuclear Pakistan was hoped to counter 118  India's challenge to American military dominance in the Indian Ocean. The Chinese reaction to any of the three proposed strikes premised to be negative as well, certainly in diplomatic terms.  China was a major back-  er of Pakistani nuclear weapons development, which was valued as a means of balancing against that of the countries' joint r i v a l , India (and thus more than the program of an occasional customer like Iraq). may  Chinese scientists  34 there even have worked at Kahuta, -and were allegations in 1983  that  China was providing Pakistan with information on weapons design. The states 119 further concluded an agreement on nuclear cooperation i n September 1986. Additional disapproval for a preventive strike against Pakistan would surely have come from other Muslim states. had  said  that Pakistani weaponization  After a l l , Zulfikar A l i Bhutto  would be a victory  for "Islamic  120 civilization."  In this respect, India was particularly worried about  cooperating with an Israel already disliked by Muslim states, and may have rejected  Israeli  strike  proposals  in 1988  partly in order to preserve 121  friendly relations with the wider Middle East. Finally, an attack on North Korean f a c i l i t i e s was again sure to inspire criticism.  Of course, the country was not popular, especially with acces-  sible neighbors like Japan.  Former allies too were cooling toward the Kim  II Sung regime; doubts even arose as to whether Russia would aid the North, as pledged in their 1961 treaty of mutual assistance, should war be provoked 122 by either side in Korea.  However, despite also demanding hard currency  for exports to the North and increasing ties with Seoul, Beijing remained protective. North  Pleased to retain a socialist buffer while assuming the bulk of  Korean trade, China seemed confident that Northern nuclear weapons  would not be directed against i t .  Accordingly, Chinese Prime Minister L i  Peng could t e l l UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in December 1993 that "China favorjed] a proper settlement of the issue through dialogues and 123 consultations, instead of imposing pressure and sanctions." The Chinese government further announced that i t s own 1961 security pact with North Korea would (only) be honored "in the event of an unprovoked attack on her 124 ally."  Perhaps as the last  straw, even a once-likely partner in an  American-led strike, South Korea, softened i t s position; President Kim Young Sam began to suggest that, in the interests of drawing the North out of i t s - 35 125 self-imposed isolation, coercive measures should be avoided.  Some note must also be taken of the various international playing fields  on  which teammates and  opponents were lining  up;  the strategic  environment in which preventive strike deliberations took place may have affected their outcome.  In 1981, neither superpower was an Iraqi champion.  The Soviets were even suspected of backing a Syrian plot to assassinate e l Meshad, while the United States was s t i l l only thinking about replacing Iran 126 with Iraq as i t s regional bastion against Soviet influence.  Washington  had, however, made up i t s mind in time for Iraqi raids on Bushehr. in  turn, the  Cold War  was  By 1991,  over, and Soviet Union joined in anti-Iraqi  sanctions by cutting off arms supplies. More generally, the end of the Soviet veto in the UN may  have freed members to engage in cooperative opera-  tions at a time that extended deterrence against such legalized attacks, certainly on  the level of a nuclear retaliatory threat, was  prevail  in reality.  colored  rejected preventive strikes against one-time Soviet ally  strategic  imperatives  As  has been discussed, Cold War  unlikely to  dictated caution  as  well  tensions instead China;  against Pakistan,  the  neighbor of Afghanistan and enemy of Soviet-backed India. II. The Likelihood of Operational Success A second factor in determining whether a state engaged in a preventive strike was disabling facilities.  the assumed probability of i t s success, measured in terms of or destroying a l l the targeted proliferator's nuclear weapons Greater  perceived  difficulty  surrounding  the  operation's  practical details has in the past meant that i t would not be attempted.  In  rejected strike plans, the f a c i l i t i e s to have been h i t seemed disconcertingly numerous, concealed or impenetrable by conventional means. When Israel attacked Osiraq, the only supposed Iraq nuclear weapons site, i t could be f a i r l y certain of accomplishing i t s mission. - 36 -  On June 2,  1980, Israel received i t s f i r s t shipment of US F-16s, in which Israeli m i l i tary planners had greater faith than the Skyhawks and Phantoms original127 ly contemplated for the raid. tions  for the  operation  Duly equipped, Israel took i t s prepara-  very  seriously, examining  the  failed American  assault on Teheran for lessons applicable to i t s own circumstances;  repeated  practice attacks were then undertaken on a mock-up of Osiraq in the Sinai 128 Desert. Indeed, Israeli training priorities had already shifted after 1973 from dogfights and a i r defense to various sorts of "attack missions," 129 the success of which had been manifest at Entebbe in 1976. Training aside, the Israeli assault force s t i l l faced the risk of being intercepted on i t s way to or from Osiraq, which was nearly one thousand kilometres into Arab territory. despite acute  sensitivity  However, Israeli planners seemed confident,  to the possibility of a pilot being  captured,  because Saudi AWACS were hoped to be concentrating on developments in the 130 Iran-Iraq War. considered  Destroying Osiraq i t s e l f , once at the target, was rightly  feasible.  Iraqi defenses at the site were known to Israeli  o f f i c i a l s , as Military Intelligence Director Saguy revealed in late 1980; by May  1981,  Israel was  undoubtedly aware that Iraq had cannon and various 131  surface-to-air missiles around the reactor. plan called for an attack around 18:30  As a precaution, the Israeli  Iraqi time, when Israeli planes could  approach from the sun; as had been forecast, anti-aircraft f i r e began only 132 after the raid's completion. where they should be directed.  Israel also knew what weapons to use and It may have seen US or Iranian reconnais-  sance photographs of the site; destroying the reactor was then entrusted to dependable target point bombs, which US scientists had confirmed would be effective.  Each bomb was in fact presumed capable of penetrating up to 3.6 133 metres of concrete, more than adequate for Osiraq. - 37 - strikes were presumably viewed with The other two sets of preventive  seme optimism by decision-makers as well.  Apparently  the only significant  (non-research) foundation for a nuclear weapons program to have emerged in Iran, Bushehr was  "lightly defended" and easily accessible to Iraqi MIGs.  Furthermore, the Iranian Air Force was aircraft and  spare parts, so was  suffering from a shortage of both  unlikely to intercept attacking Iraqi  134 planes.  In 1991,  Iraqi f a c i l i t i e s ,  the United States was even better equipped to destroy  calling into service i t s own  Tomahawk cruise missiles,  precision-guided munitions, and Stealth F-117 fighter-bomber.  Early attacks  on a i r defense control centers and radars were also supposed to allow unimpeded access to Iraqi sites.  Of course, failure was l i k e l i e r than at Osiraq  and Bushehr insofar as the United States could have anticipated i t s i n a b i l i ty to destroy a l l Iraqi f a c i l i t i e s ; the Osiraq raid was known to have pushed 135 Iraq to disperse i t s nuclear installations and put some underground.  On  the other hand, Desert Storm was a special case, considering that the Coalition expected, at some point, to emerge victorious from what would anyway be a full-scale war: Bush proclaimed on February 1, 1991, "Achieving our goals 136 w i l l require sacrifice and time, but we w i l l prevail." party,  the  As the victorious  Coalition could plan on forcing Iraq to dismantle  facilities  which had escaped damage during the preventive strike portion of the war. Although i t i s impossible to be certain of what exactly other decisionmakers knew of their proposed targets and, regardless, of how confident they felt,  i t i s likely that most were considerably less sure of operational  success.  Characteristically, the very number and location of Soviet nuclear  f a c i l i t i e s were closely-guarded names or postal codes. was from  still  secrets; sites were at best known by code-  Indeed, a 1959 US treatise on Soviet atomic energy  speculating on whether a nuclear complex in the Chelyabinsk area, 137  which foreigners were barred, even existed. The considerable - 38 efforts made to harden reactors also suggested that had the US government in  fact located Soviet f a c i l i t i e s ,  i t would have had to reconcile i t s e l f to  using nuclear weapons in order to have a reasonable chance of destroying them.  Advanced conventional weapons available by the early 1980s may  have been able to penetrate more than ten metres of concrete; was  not  Chelyabinsk-65  topped by seven metres of reinforced concrete, and a lake, thirty years 138  earlier.  However, the US nuclear option too may have been impracticable,  even i f Truman had not said of the atomic bomb (although not of the ardent in 1948 that "Jtjhis isn't a military weapon," never to be used except 139 in response to Soviet attack. The United States possessed only two atomic bombs in December 1945, when Groves was championing the preventive 140 strike option, nine in July 1946, and thirteen in July 1947. American ... 141 SAC)  delivery systems s t i l l had limited range and r e l i a b i l i t y as well. Similar  problems  against China.  Had  dogged  American  scrutiny of a preventive  strike  the United States been able to rely on Soviet assis-  tance, i t could have used detailed Soviet information about the location and configuration of Chinese nuclear f a c i l i t i e s .  Alone, i t had to depend on U-2 142  spy planes, which flew over China from bases in Taiwan.  How close these  planes got to the Lanzhou gaseous diffusion plant, for example, which was to be  instrumental  in producing  China's f i r s t nuclear devices, i s unclear.  After a l l , Chinese leaders had chosen the site partly because of i t s remoteness,  and  i t was  only the October 1964 nuclear test, which used enriched  uranium instead of the expected plutonium, that convinced Western skeptics 143 of  Lanzhou's existence.  Of course, US ignorance, and the Kennedy and  Johnson Administrations' own recognition of i t , cannot be overplayed.  Secre-  tary of State Dean Rusk knew enough to predict only two weeks before the Chinese nuclear test that one was imminent, although the newly erected blast tower on which this prediction was  based was  unusually easy for U-2s  to  - 39 spot; the United States also knew of the plutonium reactors at Paotow, in  Inner  Mongolia.  144  Still,  an  undetermined number of Chinese nuclear  f a c i l i t i e s were likely presumed to have been hidden underground and,  as  145 reports said, scattered "throughout" the country. In order at least to destroy proven nuclear installations, the United States had three options.  One was conventional bombing, but this alterna-  tive does not seem to have been mentioned often. may  In theory, nuclear weapons  have been a preferred choice because of their superior ability to pene-  trate hardened f a c i l i t i e s and to compensate for possible targeting inaccuracies: at least for missile attacks, i t was the mid-1970s before the United States f e l t that any less than two or three, ten megaton weapons (or their equivalent) would have even a f i f t y percent chance of disabling a nuclear 146 reactor.  Encouragement for US nuclear use lay in China's supposed inabil147  lty to shoot down B-52s, and certainly missiles.  Although not expressly  in nuclear terms, the National Review thus claimed in January 1965 to have been "assured by an unimpeachable, fully qualified source within our military command structure that, from a military-technological standpoint, the mission of destroying the present Chinese nuclear capability a) i s entirely 148 feasible and b) would not entail major damage."  However, the nuclear  option rnay not have counted in reality; perhaps i t would have been contemplated only had the Chinese threat to the United States been strong, which was not the case.  It may be no accident that nuclear use has apparently not  been discussed for a preventive strike since then; at work i s a nuclear taboo which has now moved the Pentagon openly to dismiss the "employment of 149 nuclear weapons for counter-proliferation purposes."  If this dismissal  were already implicit in 1963-65, American decision-makers would have had no viable strike options l e f t : their third alternative, a ground attack, would have been d i f f i c u l t to carry out. The Lanzhou complex could be accessed - 40 only by two highways on which t r a f f i c was screened, while a variety of  "diversionary tracks" led the unsuspecting into the surrounding desert."^ Operational problems marred other proposed strikes as well. conventional  forces were simply  Egypt's  unable to destroy Dimona when military  action was discussed; Nasser himself noted that a strike had to be postponed 151 untxl Arab militaries were stronger.  Furthermore, although Egypt may not  have known this, approaching and destroying Dimona would not have been an easy task for a sophisticated a i r force.  Israel was predictably conscious  of Dimona's security: in 1967, even a stray Israeli fighter was shot down in the vicinity.  In addition, plutonium reprocessing at the site was done in a 152  secret f a c i l i t y , up to six stories underground. India, by contrast, was equipped to act against Pakistan, as were the United States and Israel with Indian cooperation. a  range of  revealed  obstacles  that  by  in doing  December 1982,  Croatale surface-to-air missiles.  so  effectively. Kahuta was  However, a l l again faced American  surrounded by  intelligence French-made  Further complicating an a i r strike was  the fact that part of the centrifuge f a c i l i t y may have been placed underground, while was  (Indian) intelligence about the plant's exact configuration 153 supposedly patchy. On the ground, additionally, Kahuta was ringed  with security forces diligent enough to have assaulted a sightseeing French 154 ambassador. Jr.'s 1979  Also noteworthy here was  US Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel  warning that even destroying Kahuta would not stop Pakistani  weaponization; as in other states where nuclear f a c i l i t i e s could have been 155 concealed, operational success needed to be more widely defined.  After  a l l , Pakistan would retain an ability to produce plutonium in c i v i l i a n - o r i ented or perhaps undisclosed reactors; there were reports too of enrichment f a c i l i t i e s being hidden underground. "*"~^ In this vein, Pakistan seemed suspiciously wary of the 1988 agreement against preventive strikes: the involved - 41 exchange of information on the "latitude and longitude of...nuclear instal-  lations and  f a c i l i t i e s , " as well as notification "whenever new  facilities 157  JwereJbuilt," was seen to bring the risk of divulging "nuclear secrets." Comparable uncertainty clouded the prospects of a successful strike on North Korea.  It was  " d i f f i c u l t to believe that the somewhat paranoid North  hajd] not taken the obvious precaution of keeping a large part of i t s nuclear program hidden," especially after (but surely also before) the more open 158 Iraq and  South Africa had proved i t could be done.  Duly worrying were  1991 reports from defectors that secret Northern f a c i l i t i e s had been built underground; o f f i c i a l s  in the Bush entourage on a January 1992  v i s i t to  South Korea actually complained that they would need a "mandate to roam North Korea's heavily guarded military sites at w i l l " to know exactly what 159 they were dealing with. Furthermore, even destroying the North's seven known nuclear sites might have been costly for an attacker; Yongbyon's anti160 aircraft defenses, for example, were improved by The  pattern,  1993.  then, seems to be that easier, conventional  held greater appeal for decision-makers.  The Osiraq raid was  simple to accomplish, at one extreme, and i t was  operations relatively  carried out; at the other  extreme, a US strike on the Soviet Union posed operational (among other) problems, and i t was not. ing one.  An outside observer may assess d i f f i c u l t y to be high when govern-  ments, sensing ties.  However, this variable i s likely not the decid-  an  urgent  need to strike, downplay risks and  uncertain-  Another necessary factor to consider i s thus the degree of threat  f e l t by the states which contemplated preventive strikes. III. Threat Perceptions: Degree and Proximity i n Time and Space The best starting-point here i s , once more, 1981 which was  Israel, the country  most vocal about i t s motives for engaging in a preventive strike.  In fact, Israel professed certainty that i t s choice was one between "bombing - 42 -  and being bombed."  Although a l l potential attackers f e l t somewhat uneasy  when confronted by nuclear proliferation and, indeed, even threatened i n terms of status and other foreign policy goals, no other state expressed such dramatic concerns.  Certainly for those which decided against military  action, a status quo altered only by the addition of nuclear weapons was not alarmingly unacceptable.  In cases where preventive strikes were rejected,  the nuclear threat was not seen to be immediate, geographically close, or ultimately directed against wavering attackers' own territory. However, numerous statements were attributed to Saddam Hussein which suggested that his eventual goal was the destruction of Israel; although not unusual rhetoric, i t was apparently enough to frighten those Israelis who, like  Begin, were constantly watching  Hitler.  for the emergence of a new Adolf  The Iraqi leader declared in 1978 that the "essence of the Iraqi  regime's stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict i s principled and immovable on a 162 total rejection of any p o l i t i c a l solution."  The October 28, 1978 edition  of the Ba'athist newspaper, al-Jumhuriya, added, "We must combat Zionism 16" 3 with the o i l weapon, with our armies and in any manner possible."  Even  worse, discussing in August 1980 whether to punish states which moved their embassies to Jerusalem, Saddam Hussein said, " A better decision would be to destroy Tel Aviv with bombs. But we have to use the weapons available until 164 i t i s actually possible to respond to the enemy with bombs." Especially after i t s sluggish reaction in 1973, Israel was prepared to take such rhetoric at face value; Saddam;Hussein was seen capable of acting on his threats.  Iraq had refused even to join fellow Arabs in armistice  negotiations with Israel after their repeated wars.  In September 1980,  furthermore, i t had shown i t s e l f ready to launch an "unprovoked attack" on a neighbor, in this case Iran."*"*^ More personally, the so-called "Butcher of Baghdad" fared badly in an April 1981 Israeli intelligence report. - 43 -  With  regard to an Iraqi nuclear arsenal, the paper said that "considerations of conscience and morality would not stop Saddam Hussein from using i t .. .Ji]f in his estimate  the use of atomic weapons would give him the chance to  strike Israel, and gain for himself at the same time a leadership position 166 in the Arab world."  As w i l l be seen i n the next section of the chapter,  Israeli analysts also dismissed leader's instincts  the efficacy of appealing  to the Iraqi  for survival, by threatening retaliation for a future  Iraqi nuclear attack.  Begin ended up by counting on a new Holocaust once 167  Iraq acquired nuclear weapons i n perhaps as l i t t l e as two to four years. His statement to the Israeli Cabinet on October 28, 1980, was illustrative: A great clock i s hanging over our heads, and i t i s ticking. Somewhere on the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates, there are men plotting to annihilate us, and they are preparing means for implementing their criminal design...Saddam Hussein i s a bloodthirsty tyrant who seized power by k i l l i n g his best friends with his own hands. He will-^jigt hesitate to employ weapons of mass destruction against us. Begin  pursued this  Holocaust  theme at his post-strike press conference.  "Another  would have happened i n the history of the Jewish people," he  proclaimed,  speaking of the future had Osiraq not been destroyed.  "Never  . .,,169 again, never again! Stakes i n the other actualized strikes also seemed high.  For their  part, Iraq and Iran were embroiled i n a bloody war, with Iran i t s e l f ready to violate international conventions on chemical weapons use and Red Cross access to prisoners of war for i t s own advantage.  Saddam Hussein may have  therefore been worried by the prospect of another  Iranian weapon of mass  destruction likely, on precedent, to be used i n practice.  At least i n Octo-  ber 1988, then-Iranian speaker and commander-in-chief Hashemi Rafsanjani was actually saying that "|w]ith regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons training, i t was made very clear during the war that these 170 weapons are very decisive." Although an Iranian nuclear arsenal would - 44 -  not be built until well in the future, the Iran-Iraq War had already lasted four years by the time of Iraq's f i r s t attack on i t s neighbor's reactor. Coalition views of Iraq in 1990 and 1991 are better documented; along familiar  lines,  Iraq was  portrayed  as exceptionally hostile toward the  United States and i t s a l l i e s .  Although Iraqi chemical delivery capabilities  remained  a  dubious,  at  best,  Hussein's April 2, 1990  sign of what was  to come seemed Saddam  remark that he had the binary chemical weapons "to  cause f i r e to devour half of the Zionist entity."  The second part of his  statement, which limited Iraqi chemical weapons use to a situation where the "Zionist entity, which has atomic bombs, dared attack Iraq," was consistent171 ly downplayed.  After a l l , an i n i t i a l l y unprovoked Iraq had used chemical  weapons against Iran perhaps 195 times since 1983, and, as in the March 1988 172 attack on Halabja, against i t s own Kurdish population.  Speaking for the  US State Department, Margaret Tutwiler thus called the apparent Iraqi threat 173 "inflammatory, irresponsible, and outrageous." The Iraqi past was linked explicitly to the nuclear issue.  Addressing  US troops on the subject of Saddam Hussein in November 1990, Bush declared, "No one knows precisely when this dictator may acquire atomic weapons or who they may  be aimed at down the road.. .But we do know this for sure: He has 174  never possessed  a weapon he has not used."  The possibility of Iraq's  somehow targeting the United States was raised as well, an uneasy complement to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft's  pre-war warning that Iraq 175  might be mere months from a crude nuclear device. "longest-range  b a l l i s t i c missile" could only travel eight hundred of the  nine thousand kilometres although  In reality, Iraq's  this was  separating the country  enough to target other US  from the United States,  a l l i e s and neighboring o i l  producers, and predictions of imminent Iraqi weaponization were alarmist. - 45 of - the fears expressed were genuinely This i s not to say, however, that none  f e l t by the US government as well as a duly galvanized US public: Coalition troops  received vaccinations  in case that Iraq chose to use  biological  weapons, a mere rung below the nuclear option, against them. Threat perceptions in other cases where preventive strikes were under consideration seemed more restrained.  Of course, late 1945 found agreement  among "most American policy advisers and military planners... that Soviet aggression  and  intransigence... [were] the  most serious  threat  to Ameri-  177 can  and world security."  version of U.S.  Senator James D. Eastland uttered an extreme  fears in December 1945:  "Russia i s a predatory aggressor  nation, she follows the same fateful road of conquest and aggres178 sion with which Adolf Hitler set the world on f i r e . " Soviet 1949,  nuclear  weapon was  clearly unwelcome.  In this context, a  President Truman noted in  "I know the Russians would use i t on us i f they had i t , " while Senator  Brian McMahon argued in 1947  that a Soviet rejection of international con179  trols on atomic energy should be interpreted as an "act of aggression." However, antipathy  did not prevent the Soviet nuclear  threat from  appearing distant in both time and place; technological assessments tempered US worries somewhat during this period.  Most important to the chief preven-  tive strike proponent, General Groves, may  have been his estimate that the  Soviets were s t i l l between fifteen and twenty years away from a nuclear capability.  Testifying' before Congress in October 1945,  Groves asserted that  they had  only low-grade uranium sources which they were unable to refine.  At least without information gained through espionage, another problem attendant upon the Soviets' alleged lack of trained engineers and scientists was 180 simply to build nuclear plants. Groves' estimates reflected an army position accepted over that of skeptical scientists by Truman, who a t t r i 181 buted nuclear success to the unique "American system of enterprise."  The  - 46 other services making up the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were more realis-  t i c , but also composed enough to predict in 1948 that i t could be as late as 1960 before Soviet leaders had the requisite confidence in the size of their 182 arsenal to attack the United States.  Minimal US a i r defense preparations  until the early 1950s suggested, as well, that the American government was hoping for a substantial period of time to elapse before long-range delivery systems for Soviet nuclear devices were built in large numbers. Twenty years later, American views of a nuclear China were similarly controlled.  Admittedly, Kennedy believed that a Chinese nuclear test might  be the pivotal moment of the 1960s, and that "relatively small forces i n 183 hands of people like  CHICOMS could  be very dangerous  to us a l l . "  Kennedy's concerns reflected those of Khrushchev, who found China's notorious dismissal of nuclear weapons as "paper tigers" to be reckless. larly  Particu-  troubling here was Mao Tse-tung's April 1960 "Long Live Leninism!"  editorial, which promised that "[o]n the debris of a dead imperialism, the victorious  people  would  create  with  extreme  rapidity  thousands of times higher than the capitalist system." poised, m  a  civilization  A nuclear war seemed 184  Chinese eyes, to bring a "truly beautiful future."  A less  dramatic fear than nuclear use was that a nuclear-backed China would be emboldened to replay or even to exceed the Soviet "expansionism" of the late 1940s.  In 1962, Kennedy thus remarked, "These Chinese are tough...It isn't  just what they say about us but what they say about the Russians. They are in the Stalinist phase, believe in class war and the use of force, and seem 185 prepared to sacrifice 300 million people i f necessary to dominate Asia." As Kennedy intimated, however, any danger was largely confined to Asia and the American role in the regional balance of power; Chinese distance and philosophy  alike made any threat indirect.  Despite some discussion of  Chinese weapons being smuggled into foreign ports on junks, l i t t l e danger - 47 faced a United States to which Chinese diplomats had made "friendly  gestures" i n 1961 and 1962.  186  Indeed, a CIA report i n late July 1963 noted  that the "Chinese have thus far shown marked respect for US power, and we do 187 not  expect them to change this basic attitude."  concurred.  The American military  In his August 1963 Senate testimony, General Maxwell D. Taylor  claimed that Khrushchev and Kennedy had exaggerated Chinese rashness; there 188 was actually a "pretty hardheaded group of Chinese in Peking."  The NSC  therefore envisioned that at most, a China backed by nuclear weapons would constrain US freedom of action against North Vietnam and eventually pressure for an American retreat eastward. Furthermore, just how much of a Chinese nuclear threat would emerge to US a l l i e s within Asia, like Thailand and Japan, was open to debate.  The CIA  noted that the Chinese "over the past few years, i n spite of their war-like 190 oratory, have followed a generally cautious policy." Internal problems were the supposed priority, and drove Chinese restraint toward both India 191 and Taiwan.  Chinese rhetoric i t s e l f softened after the country's nucle-  ar test, with Chou En-lai stressing that "at no time and i n no circumstances 192 w i l l China be the f i r s t to use nuclear weapons."  Reacting on October 18,  1964 to the Chinese test, President Johnson thus told the American public that "[i]ts military significance should not be over-estimated.... there i s no 193  reason to fear that it will lead to immediate clangers of war."  In addi-  tion, echoing Groves' earlier relief at the apparent time which would elapse before a Soviet arsenal was even built, Johnson emphasized that "[mjany years and great efforts separate the testing of a f i r s t nuclear device from having 194 a stockpile of reliable weapons with an effective delivery system." Whether Egypt saw Israel as the same kind of threat that Israel later perceived a nuclear Iraq i s even -more 48 -dubious.  Although the Arab League's  Secretary-General cautioned i n December 1965 that Israel could make use of a 195 nuclear arsenal i n a future Arab-Israeli war, Nasser was reluctant to be-  lieve that Israel was in the process of developing one.  When media reports  about Dimona surfaced in late 1960, Nasser suggested that Western states had concocted  the story, pretending that Israel could develop nuclear weapons  which would be given to i t ready-made. itself,  Alternately, he hinted that Israel  in an effort to intimidate Egypt, was  responsible for misleading  196 press reports.  In either case, when asked whether Dimona was being used  to produce nuclear weapons, he replied as late as July 1964 that "according to  the information we have got, I think i t i s not."  Citing other Arab  sources, his friend Heykal added two months later that nuclear status was 197 "simply outside Israel's present capabilities."  Therefore, while Israel  was viewed as an expansionist state with which Egypt might again go to war, Nasser f e l t that he had the luxury of time to deal with the nuclear issue. The case of Pakistan i s again more complex, for three countries were independently  assessing Pakistani intentions toward them.  that, a former ally  in SEATO and  CENTO, Pakistan was  belligerent designs toward the United States.  Most evident i s  not seen to have  The Carter Administration was  instead taking a principled stand on the importance of nuclear non-proliferation.  To the extent that i t had more practical concerns, they were with  ensuring the stability nuclear  of a physically distant South Asia, where Pakistani  development would invite  Chinese,  Soviet and  Indian  responses;  indeed, a State Department o f f i c i a l warned in 1979, "If I had to guess which two countries were most likely to fight a nuclear war before the end of the 198 would be India and Pakistan."  Whether for humanitarian or  strategic reasons, the United States thus had to be alert, but i t s own territory was 1980,  safe.  Then-presidential candidate Reagan went further in January  the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan fresh in his mind.  "Right  now  there's an immediate crisis And a c r i s i s so great that very frankly I have to wonder why there's so much concern with r[Pakistani weaponizationJ.-i " 199 - 49 -  Conversely,  neighboring  India could have been at direct risk from  Pakistani nuclear weapons carried on F-16s, Q-5  Fantans, or Mirages.  However, bilateral relations showed periodic improvement while a preventive strike  was  being  considered.  Zia proposed a non-aggression  pact in  September 1981 and again in June 1982.  By early 1984, the joint commission  established  meeting regularly, and US  claimed  to consider  that India was  the  pact was  sources  reluctant to engage in military action when such  201 talks were ongoing. al Cooperation  was  Furthermore, the South Asian Association for Regionformed in December 1985;  this ushered  in a period of  apparent Pakistani contrition, gratifying to India, for i t s own role in past 202 South Asian conflicts.  Also in 1985,  Zia traveled to New  Delhi for  discussions on normalizing relations and settling border disputes over the Siachen Glacier.  Of course, India and Pakistan were at best in a state of  "cold peace," but the regular relaxation in tensions may have made Pakistani nuclear weapons seem more an irritating damper on India s conventional and 203 1  global power than a pressing security threat. Likewise, Israel's view of Pakistan was  suspicious but not panicked.  Israel feared the possibility of nuclear technology flowing from Pakistan to more proximate Israeli enemies, since Zia had announced in 1986,  "When we  acquire  i t with  the  technology,  the  entire Islamic world w i l l possess  204 us." in  In fact, Zulfikar Bhutto had reportedly established ties with Libya 1973,  which provided Pakistan with uranium and funds for enrichment.  Financing for Kahuta also came from Saudi Arabia, which in March 1988 purchased nuclear-capable metres).  CSS-2 missiles (with a range of 2000-2700 kilo-  Pakistan extended nuclear cooperation to Iran as well. An o f f i -  c i a l agreement was signed in 1987, and uranium enrichment expert Abdul Qadir 205 - 50 Khan supposedly toured Bushehr in February 1986 and January 1987.  Again,  however, the scenario differed from that in which Israel portrayed i t s e l f in  1981.  Pakistan i t s e l f did not threaten Israel directly, and US intelligence  sources  even questioned  Pakistan's willingness to share nuclear secrets, 206  certainly with more probable aggressors such as Libya, in practice. The same qualified fears characterized relations between North Korea and the states considering a preventive strike.  The Koreas signed an Agree-  ment on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Cooperation and Exchange on December 13, 1991,  presumably providing some reassurance of Northern  peaceableness.  Even after North Korea defied the subsequent Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the prospect of i t s using nuclear weapons in an aggressive fashion was deemed unlikely. Dick  Cheney claimed  Although US Secretary of Defense  Korea to be where the  "risk of no-warning attack"  against the United States or an a l l y was the most pronounced, he assumed 207 that risk to be low.  South Korean experts largely agreed that regime  survival was the North's priority, even under the eccentric Kim II Sung; at most, a North backed by i t s new arsenal was expected to demand US force re208 ductions or to urge reunification on Northern terms.  More important but  less threatening per se was that North Korea stepped into the role of China in the 1960s, when Kennedy worried that i t would serve as the model for 209 fifteen to twenty new proliferators by 1975.  North Korean nuclear devel-  opment provided an incentive for Southern and Japanese weaponization, while the North might eventually export nuclear technology to the Middle East. A pattern in terms of threat perceptions thus seems to exist.  Every  state which considered preventive strikes thought that i t s territory, status or  other  stopped.  interests  would be safer i f the budding proliferator could be  Publicly, however, i t was the Israeli government that had the most  to fear, complaining  in 1981 that sixty thousand Israelis would be killed 210  51 Aviv. should an Iraqi nuclear bomb h i t -Tel strike against this backdrop.  It carried out a preventive  Ten years later, US o f f i c i a l s claimed that  they feared both for their a l l i e s and Iraq too may  (dubiously)  for their own country;  have earlier contemplated Iranian nuclear weapons use against  i t s territory.  The other cases, in which no preventive strike occurred,  seemed brushed aside as less dangerous; a nuclear-tinged status quo was not intolerable.  Either the nuclear threat was relatively distant in time or  place, or that threat was directed only to prestige, regional influence or the non-proliferation regime as a whole. On the other hand, l i t t l e more can be  said from an objective standpoint of the threat posed by 1981 and  Iraq, as well as  1991  1980s Iran; i t i s only natural that governments which  actually decide to engage in a preventive strike, for whatever reason, would seek sympathy by playing up a danger perhaps known to be moderate, at most. Certainly, then, threat perceptions  alone cannot be relied on to explain  decision-makers' acceptance or rejection of the preventive strike option.  TV. An Option among Many? Military action, even i f feasible and directed against a deservingly hostile target, i s s t i l l unlikely to be a f i r s t resort. Although varying in intensity,  the  risks  involved  remain significant.  decision-makers' calculations w i l l  A  fourth factor in  thus probably be whether less extreme  options can instead be exploited to deal with nuclear proliferation's perceived dangers.  Such options may include diplomacy, "bribes" of convention-  al military aid, punitive sanctions or sabotage to stop a nuclear arsenal from being built, in addition to export controls and multilateral agreements like the NPT.  However, while the latter restrictions have increasingly come  to the fore, in no case have they been relied upon alone; enforcement has been notoriously lax and/or selective even as more suppliers and importers have emerged to be monitored.  Other options could be improved defenses and  retaliatory capabilities to counter future arsenals in r i v a l states. - 52 -  According to Israeli leaders i n 1981, a l l non-violent and even clandestine alternatives had failed or otherwise been ruled out before the raid on Osiraq took place.  Although the UN Security Council claimed to be uncon-  211 vinced,  Israel f e l t that i t had undertaken major diplomatic efforts to  block Iraqi weaponization. pressed for assurances  Notably, the French government was repeatedly  that Osiraq would not be used for weapons develop212  ment, but o f f i c i a l l y downplayed Israeli concerns.  Israel believed that  France, as well as fellow supplier Italy, had l i t t l e interest in being seen to offend Iraq. The latter provided twenty percent of French and thirty per213 cent of Italian o i l , while France produced one quarter of Iraq's weapons. When threatened with reduced deliveries of American enriched uranium for i t s own nuclear plants, France did push Iraq toward accepting weaker fuel for Osiraq, but even then i t did not push too hard: Saddam Hussein easily prevailed i n July 1979 by vowing to seek other fuel sources i f France reneged 214 on i t s original promises.  Ultimately, even new Foreign Minister Claude  Cheysson announced on May 26, 1981, that France would meet obligations undertaken by the previous regime, reportedly increasing Begin's determination to 215 carry out the preventive strike. Israel  had made other  extreme course of action.  diplomatic overtures before accepting  In particular, the government had expressed i t s  concerns about Iraq to the United States since early 1976. avenue too proved  this  However, this  disappointing, as had an August 1980 approach to West  216 Germany.  In September 1980, US Defense Secretary Harold Brown informed  Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir that the United States had few means of influencing Iraq.  Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig also allegedly  told Begin early i n 1981 that American efforts to persuade France and Italy - 53 217 not to cooperate with Iraq i n nuclear fields had simply been "in vain." Of course, a preventive strike was not the only alternative to diploma-  cy.  Also pursued, without much effect, were terrorist tactics in Europe and  proxy military action i n Iraq.  Israel may have been involved in the April  1979 bombing at La Seyne-sur-Mer, and was suspected in the el-Meshad murder. Given similar attempts to derail the Egyptian missile program in the early 1960s, even l i k e l i e r was Israeli complicity i n a campaign of bombings and 218 threats against European firms involved in Iraqi nuclear development. another move intended unsuccessfully,  In  to keep i t s own involvement covert, Israel tried,  to goad Iran into doing i t s dirty work: on September 28,  1980, Israeli Military Intelligence Director Saguy said publicly, "If I were an  Iranian, I too would be worried,  knowing that Iraq w i l l unquestion219  ably be a nuclear power at the end of the 1980s." Another Israeli option was to do nothing, and l e t Osiraq be built.  How-  ever, Israel did not trust the IAEA with preventing Iraqi weaponization from the basis of a peaceful nuclear program.  The blanket fitted around Osiraq's  core were the plutonium route to have been pursued would not have been v i s i 220 ble to inspectors.  In fact, Israel f e l t that those inspectors, already  chosen at Iraqi discretion, could not even detect a diversion i n Osiraq's highly enriched 1981,  fuel.  Although an IAEA inspection proceeded i n January  Iraq had indicated i n November 1980 that the ongoing Iran-Iraq War  made such v i s i t s too dangerous.  French technicians who might help the IAEA  to notice a diversion of fuel were also largely withdrawn in October 1980 a troubling precedent, despite their February 1981 return, for an Israeli Atomic Energy Commission sure that "there i s no effective method for detecting  violations other than round-the-clock, continuous on-the-spot con221 trol." Simply signing the NPT, which Iraq had done in October 1969, was supposed not to count in an "area characterized by the repeated violation of 222 international obligations."  Several years later, an Iraq again escaping  - 54 IAEA censure for i t s revived nuclear program probably had similar worries  about leaving the agency to look after and constrain Iran. Passively accepting Iraqi weaponization, finally, was out of the question for Israel; hawks were adamant that mutual (nuclear) deterrence would, not hold in the Middle East.  This view was plain at an October 14,  meeting of select Israeli Cabinet  ministers and advisers.  1980  Deputy Prime  Minister Simha Ehrlich said, "I do not believe in a Mideastern 'balance of terror' similar to that prevailing between the two global blocs...if the Iraqis  get  nuclear  weapons,  they  are  quite  capable  of  using  them."  Commander-in-chief Eytan agreed: "A nuclear balance implies accepting that Israel w i l l not continue to exist.  The Arabs are more capable than we of 223  paying a heavy price, and i t w i l l therefore be impossible to deter them." Technology aggravated cultural prejudice, for Israel was seen as too dependent on a soft, physically concentrated,  aircraft-based delivery force to  have a second-strike capability; Israeli missiles, likewise, were not in 224 hardened silos. Again important here are the threat perceptions previously outlined. In this vein, neither Iraq in the mid-1980s nor Coalition forces in 1991 f e l t that relying on deterrence was  logic was an option: the targeted proliferator  seen to be blindly hostile enough to use the nuclear weapons that i t  built.  Unfortunately,  renounce i t s nuclear  neither Iran nor 1991  Iraq could be counted on to  option voluntarily, particularly when i t would be 225  retained by rivals like Israel.  The diplomatic or economic pressure need-  ed at least to nudge potential targets toward such a renunciation, furthermore, could not even be attempted when (otherwise motivated) military action was already in progress and had severed peaceful ties. On the other hand, options seemed to remain open wherever preventive strikes were rejected. Soviet  nuclear  When the United States was contemplating  facilities,  55 for -example, proposals  to eliminate  raids on nuclear  weapons themselves were s t i l l under consideration. called  The Baruch Plan, which  for an International Atomic Energy Authority to "acquire complete  control over raw materials and atomic plants throughout the world," reached the UN only in June 1946.  Soviet acceptance of the American nuclear monopo-  ly envisioned until the plan's final stage was unlikely, as the US government knew, but more optimistic o f f i c i a l s could at least take comfort in Stalin's December 1945  agreement to a UN  "Atomic Energy Commission that  226 would recommend a system of control."  The Americans could and did pursue  more concrete alternatives as well, including the seizure of German uranium and  a  joint Anglo-American buy-up of world uranium stocks before Moscow 227  could gain access.  After the Soviet nuclear test, in turn, a United  States backed by technology control measures sought refuge in quantitative superiority and the hydrogen bomb.  Believing that his country was  "cer-  tainly in the lead," even General Groves could feel that a viable US option 228 in 1949 was reconciliation to an apparently containable Soviet challenge. In dealing with China, the United States looked instead to the Partial Test Ban Treaty.  Although the link with non-proliferation was tenuous and  his motives arguably wider, Kennedy said in January 1963 that China was "a . . 229 principal driving force" behind the treaty. It was suggested, rather vaguely and implausibly, that once the treaty was concluded, world opinion would prevail upon an isolated China to forgo nuclear testing, or that the Soviets could exploit some yet-unsevered means of extorting Chinese signature.  In either case, China would have been bound not to carry out the 230  above-ground test which i t eventually did conduct in October 1964.  Speak-  ing after the treaty was i n i t i a l l e d on July 25, 1963, Kennedy thus called i t 231 a "shaft of light into the darkness." During the Johnson Administration,  the United  States also began to  - 56 think of living with Chinese nuclear weapons - even without the cultural and  trade contacts that would later be embraced to defuse the threat i t s e l f . September  1967,  proposals  for an  Defense  Secretary  Robert  McNamara was  supporting  By JCS  anti-ballistic missile system behind which the United  States could, in practice, shelter from China - i f not from the Soviet Union in the thicker version originally planned and preferred. envisioned deterrence  Johnson himself  as well as defense, stressing in 1964 that " i f and  when the Chinese Communists develop  nuclear weapons systems, free-world 232  nuclear strength w i l l continue to be enormously greater."  China could  not have failed to notice the US ability to retaliate for any nuclear use. The range of alternatives to a preventive strike was even wider in the other instances where military action was rejected. If Israel was not dissuaded from nuclear development by  the threat of preventive war,  wanted a superpower security guarantee to deter Israeli nuclear use. New  York Times suggested  that in December 1965,  1966 233  Defense Minister Andrei Grechko.  The  assistance had, in fact,  been promised by a visiting Soviet marshal; "certain nuclear were also reported in February  Egypt  guarantees"  to have been made by Deputy Soviet Another option for Egypt was to deter  Israeli nuclear attack by acquiring unconventional (as well as more conventional) weapons of i t s own with which to threaten retaliation. Nasser thus declared in 1961 that i f Israel went nuclear, "we w i l l secure atomic weapons at any cost," and asked for Soviet and Chinese help in developing a nuclear 234 arsenal.  A  related  possibility was  a chemical deterrent. Egypt was  already using chemical weapons in North Yemen by 1967, and Egyptian Minister of War  General Abdal Ranny Gamassy specified in 1976 that "Egypt has  the  capability of retaliating to an Israeli nuclear blow by making use of these 235 weapons."  At least m  the 1970s, finally, Egypt looked at additional  options to block an Israeli arsenal from even being built; i t pressed Israel - 57 to sign the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state and to support Egypt's  pericolic UN resolutions for a regional nuclear-weapons-free-zone. Some choices also remained for slowing Pakistani weaponization.  The US  task force considering the issue (before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led Pakistani weaponization to be conveniently overlooked) saw at least two avenues other than a preventive strike.  A "carrot" could be offered in the  form of conventional arms to make a Pakistani nuclear deterrent seem extraneous.  The "stick" consisted of threats to limit private US investment  and stop international lending institutions from dealing with Pakistan i f i t continued United  i t s nuclear efforts.  States  Such economic sanctions were urged on the  by India, and would have reinforced Carter's April 1979  announcement of a forty million dollar cut i n economic subsidies for the 237 year.  Furthermore, the United States was working through diplomatic chan-  nels, with almost weekly supplications for countries playing some role i n 238 Pakistani  nuclear development to curtail technological exports.  The  Carter Administration may have been buoyed to an extent by i t s successful efforts  i n France, which was convinced  Pakistani reprocessing project i n 1978.  to end i t s involvement with a Of course, the United States would  ultimately have less success, but by then i t was also less interested. India too s t i l l appeared to have some leeway.  One alternative, also  available to Israel and the United States, was terrorism: i n early 1981, telephone threats and bombings targeted Swiss and German firms which provided components for Kahuta and Pakistani reprocessing f a c i l i t i e s .  Claiming  responsibility for this effective campaign of intimidation was the "Group for Non-Proliferation for South Asia," but suspected culprits included India 239 as well as the CIA and Mossad.  Another Indian option was to build a  nuclear deterrent should a Pakistani bomb emerge. Minister Charan Singh said in 1979,  In this regard, Prime  "We do not want to join the race to make  - 58 a bomb, but i f Pakistan sticks to i t-s plans to assemble a bomb, we w i l l  perhaps have to reconsider the whole question." Gandhi remarked in July 1981  Similarly, although Mrs.  that she did "not believe in the theory of  deterrence," her government oversaw a new design program and the opening of additional  reactors and  plutonium  extraction f a c i l i t i e s  in the  early  241 1980s.  Just before the last rumoured Indian strike plan, in August 1985,  India also began operating a new plutonium-producing reactor at Dhruva; two months earlier,  Rajiv  Gandhi had  suggested  that India was already in 242  possession of the components needed to build nuclear weapons. Finally, a combination of negotiation and threat was the alternative to a preventive strike against North Korea.  US and South Korean efforts, accom-  panied by promises of economic aid, were aimed at persuading the North to recommit i t s e l f to the NFT and IAEA safeguards.  Another possibility was con-  tinued reliance on deterrence, which had apparently worked against a conventional Northern threat since 1953.  Speaking i n July 1993, Clinton was thus  careful to point out, "When you examine the nature of the American security commitment  i t i s pointless for them to try to develop nuclear weapons, 243  because i f they ever use them i t would be the end of their country." The pattern here i s again not unexpected.  If i t s statements were sin-  cere, the Israeli government believed that i t s options for dealing with Iraq had been exhausted; a preventive strike was i t s only recourse.  Because a  strong sense of threat also undermined the deterrence option in the. Bushehr and Gulf War cases, while warfare cut diplomatic or economic means of i n f l u ence, options were similarly limited. was  However, cases where military action  rejected apparently l e f t room for negotiation, deterrence and milder  forms of coercion. Preventive strikes could remain an untapped last resort. V . "Hot" F a c i l i t i e s Of course, preventive strikes themselves are not a l l alike. - 59 -  Specifical-  ly, military action against an operating nuclear f a c i l i t y i s the last of last resorts.  An attack, even with conventional weapons, against a hot  reactor i s dangerous: "[a] high explosive bomb, when used against a nuclear target, would acquire  some of  the radioactive attributes of a  nuclear  244 bomb."  The risk i s highest in the case of a nuclear power station, where  more radioactive material i s present, but a direct hit on any reactor poses problems.  Destruction of the reactor containment vessel could lead to an  explosion of steam, which would carry radioactive material from the reactor into the atmosphere and over hundreds or perhaps thousands of square kilometres. turn,  Destruction of the reactor's cooling system or control room, in  might  cause  a  melt-down involving another escape of radiation.  Assuming adverse weather patterns, a large explosion at a major reactor could lead to damage greater than that resulting from the Chernobyl explo245 sion in 1986. strikes  In general, then, i t seems significant that preventive  have apparently  been carried out only against cold  facilities;  rejected attacks would have instead targeted operating f a c i l i t i e s . The Osiraq raid provides a useful case in point.  Although twelve kilo-  grams of reactor fuel were present at Osiraq ("stored for safekeeping" since September 1980 in Transit Channel 2 of the reactor), the fuel was not yet in use.  However, Saddam Hussein was pressing for Osiraq to be operational by  July 14, 1981,  Iraq's Revolution Day; France agreed in May 1981 to dispatch  additional workers, and Israel predicted that the reactor would become hot 246 either in July or September.  Stressing that this was a central concern,  i t s o f f i c i a l post-raid statement said that an operating reactor would have been off-limits: "In such conditions, no Israeli government could have decided to blow i t up. the  city  This would have caused a huge wave of radioactivity over  of Baghdad and  i t s innocent citizens would have been harmed."  - 60 -southeast of Baghdad, and "no proper Osiraq was only about twenty kilometres  emergency organization" for dealing with nuclear accidents existed. The  247  honesty of Israeli statements, and thus the real importance of  whether targeted  f a c i l i t i e s posed contamination risks i n this and other  cases, were questioned at the time.  A Congressional Research Service report  on the Osiraq raid declared that " i t would be most unlikely for an attack with  conventional  bombs upon the reactor when operating  to have caused  lethal exposures to radioactivity i n Baghdad, although sane people at the reactor site might receive some exposure." Secretary-General  A commission appointed by the UN  reached the same conclusion.  However, perhaps sensitive  to the fact that damage would vary according to which part of the reactor 248 was hit, i t did point out that Israeli concerns were "not unrealistic." In fact, the specter of thousands dead allegedly crossed Haig's mind even when the reactor was cold: his f i r s t worry upon hearing of the raid was about radioactive contamination,  and whether the United States could send  humanitarian relief to Iraqi victims.  Science aside, nuclear forces inspire  suspicion and fear, and Begin was warned by advisers in March 1980 that any 249 perceived risk would draw criticism. tion  for an Israeli  attack  Perhaps more practically, condemna-  on a hot reactor could have been expected  regardless of the damage caused within Iraq; such an attack might have set a 250 dangerous precedent for future Soviet strikes on NATO. Iraq also attacked Iranian reactors, eighteen kilometres southwest of Bushehr, when they were not operational.  Indeed, when work was abandoned at  the site i n 1979, the reactors were only sixty and seventy-five percent finished respectively, and no nuclear fuel was present i n 1984, when Iraqi 251 raids  began.  However, confident  that Iraq would take fewer liber-  ties with such fuel i n the area, the Iranian government decided at least to move some nuclear material to Bushehr i n February 1987; after a series of - 61 Iraqi attacks i n November, i t promptly (but inaccurately) complained that  another Chernobyl  had been unleashed.  252  Iraq i t s e l f seemed reluctant to  target nuclear f a c i l i t i e s which were actually in operation, warning in May 1987 that raids on "nuclear installations,  11  even with conventional weapons,  were "tantamount to the use of radiological weapons because of the release 253 of radioactive materials that could result therefrom." Strangely  less  clear  i s whether the  Operation Desert Storm were operational. research  two  reactors attacked during  Presumably they too were not: as  reactors, both were supposed to be shut down regularly even i f  impending war had not made this a sensible precaution. reactor was  far smaller than Osiraq, where US agencies had discounted the  potential for contamination in 1981. than  In any case, each  The Soviet IRT-2000 generated "no more  two megawatts," while Isis was only an "experimental prototype."  radiation was,  No 254  in fact, found to have escaped when they were attacked.  At the very least, in this regard, the Coalition was careful not to damage containment vessels; relatively accurate Tomahawk missiles were employed to 255 ensure that only the control building would actually be h i t . Whether Soviet or Chinese nuclear f a c i l i t i e s were operational at the time of a preventive strike would not have mattered as much, considering that nuclear weapons were already the likely means of destroying them. S t i l l , those f a c i l i t i e s did or were supposed to become hot while preventive strikes were being decided against.  The Soviets' f i r s t nuclear reactor may  have been built by 1946, and the plutonium-producing became operational in June 1948.  reactor at Chelyabinsk  Iri turn, a Beijing reactor had operated  since September 1958; more importantly, US intelligence estimates in December 1960 speculated (erroneously) that the " f i r s t Chinese production reactor 256 could attain c r i t i c a l i t y in late 1961."  Perhaps partly in response to  fears of radiation, as well as of direct casualties, even the militant - 62 National Review suggested that a warning be given to China two or three  hours before any preventive strike to allow for evacuation of the area. Although there  i s no  specific evidence of concern in the  relevant  governments, other cases of rejected military action likewise involved operating f a c i l i t i e s .  Egypt would have faced the threat of radioactive contamin-  ation in destroying Dimona: construction on the reactor finished in December 258 1963.  More recently, fear likely surrounded the bombing of North Korea's  Yongbyon reactor, which i s ninety-six kilometres  from Pyongyang and began  259 operating in 1987.  The apparent exception here i s Pakistan, which was  not attacked despite the absence of reactors, hot or cold, on the target list.  However, a reprocessing plant was on that l i s t , and the bombing of  such a plant could also "release radioactivity of an order of magnitude larger than the Chernobyl disaster." this extreme an impact, the New  Although presumably too small to have  Labs in Rawalpindi, near Islamabad, were  expected to begin reprocessing plutonium at any time i n December 1982, when Indian  strike  plans  were made public.  The  facility  actually became 260  operational in 1984, probably affecting Israeli planning as well. In sum,  the preventive  geted reactors  strikes undertaken by  known to be cold; the same can  Coalition attacks in 1991.  Israel and  Iraq tar-  effectively be  said of  In every other case where a preventive strike  was contemplated, the relevant nuclear f a c i l i t i e s were already hot or due to come into operation.  In these cases, military action was not taken.  VT. International Law The preventive could  order  of  past  strike met  approximate  sections  other  legal  has  in  addition  requirements  to  been random, for how  criteria helped to determine how  Because violating international law may sanctions,  not  the  for the  justified  closely i t of  force.  yield practical results, such as  more dependably negative - 63 -  use  well a  world opinion,  countries likely consider the prospect in their deliberations. the weight of legal factors in this calculus may  Of course,  vary with the extent of  expected support on bodies such as the UN Security Council, which in practice determine whether violators of international law w i l l be punished. It must f i r s t be pointed out that, as isolated acts, preventive strikes have traditionally been deemed i l l e g a l .  Anticipatory self-defense may be an  inherent right subsumed under the UN Charter's Article 51, but i t i s limited  to a necessity  that i s "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of 261  means, and no moment for deliberation."  Preventive  strikes against a  possibly remote nuclear option do not meet this rigorous standard. Anthony D'Amato counters that preventive strikes may s t i l l f a l l within the bounds of Article 2(4), which prohibits the "threat or use of force against the t e r r i torial integrity or p o l i t i c a l independence of any  state, or in any other  manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."  A preventive  strike neither removes territory from the target nor decreases i t s government's "authority vis-a-vis other sovereign governments." is consistent with Article 11's goal of "disarmament and aments," and may  In addition, i t regulation of arm262  serve humanity by lessening the threat of nuclear  war."  For the moment, however, the preventive strike concept remains shady. On the other hand, the situation may change when preventive strikes are put in context; under specific conditions, a potential attacker may  decide  that action would not be blatantly i l l e g a l , or, more rarely, not i l l e g a l at all.  First, the state contemplating a preventive strike may  on nuance.  rest i t s case  Military action which i s effective, responds to a strong sense  of threat, appears to be a last resort, and only i n f l i c t s damage proportionate to i t s objective (in this case not trading the health of thousands for a building) should be nearer to the requirements of the customary international law that surrounds Article 51, as well as to i t s roots in a "just - 64 -  war"  tradition  which upholds restraint, proportionality and  discrimina-  263 tion. tive  Second, an attacker may strike  general,  targets  claim outright legality when the preven-  a wartime opponent; action  ongoing military operations  appeal to Article 51.  then f i t s  within more  instead of requiring an independent  "By way of illustration, international law permits  the bombing of a non-nuclear electric generating  plant of a hostile and  belligerent power inasmuch as such a plant may be helpful in the waging of 264 war."  The  advantage of  three one  (sets of) preventive strikes which have occurred took  or  both of  these  legal  justifications;  the  rejected  strikes, by and large, could not. For  i t s part,  Israel chose to  emphasize  the  relationship between  Article 51 and an efficient, responsibly limited attack launched only after other options to address the supposedly grave Iraqi threat had been exhausted.  At his June 9, 1981 press conference, Begin thus stated the Israeli  case: "Ours i s a just cause."  The raid was an act of "supreme, legitimate,  265 self-defense."  Begin's message was  repeated on  July  13  to Robert  MacFarlane, one of Haig's advisers: "I studied law...including international law.  I know very well what i s self-defense. 266  clearer and more decisive." tion 487  I know of no self-defense  Admittedly, with UN Security. Council Resolu-  calling the Osiraq raid a "clear violation of the Charter of the 267  United Nations and  the norms of international conduct,"  Israel did not  succeed in gaining legal approval, but i t s persistence suggested that i t had a more hopeful view of i t s chances before the strike was undertaken. Notably, justified preventive  Israel has  been  a peacetime raid;  the  the  only  other  strikes did so during war.  state two  for which circumstances  countries  which engaged in  Of course, some Israeli proponents  - 65 - did as well: Israel and argue that, s t r i c t l y speaking, Israel s t i l l in a declared state of war in 1981.  Iraq were  However, "jb]f far more importance  than a 'state of war  as a legal concept or theory i s a state of war as a  1  268 factual condition," and the countries had not met in battle since 1973. Genuine wartime justification f e l l  to Iraq when i t attacked reactors in  Iran, with which i t was involved in a de facto as well as de jure conflict at  the time.  Remembering that Iran had escaped condemnation for i t s own  attack on Osiraq in 1980, Iraqi leaders worried about the legality of strik269 ing  Iranian reactors might well have looked to this war-related logic.  Perhaps Egyptian  or  South Korean leaders  thinking of  attacking either  Israeli or North Korean f a c i l i t i e s reasoned along similar lines, although their cases would again have relied, more dubiously, on de jure conflict. Preventive  strikes against Iraq during Operation  Desert  Storm were  under the same legal rubric as those against Bushehr, with the added benefit that war i t s e l f was legally sanctioned. of November 29,  1990,  UN Security Council Resolution 678  authorized Coalition members to use " a l l necessary 270  means to restore peace and security in the area."  Of course, the resolu-  tion did not explicitly c a l l for Iraq's nuclear f a c i l i t i e s to be destroyed, but a preventive strike could have been interpreted as part of a general quest for stability.  In a more familiar sense, i t could have been disguised  as  military operations, particularly under the assump-  part of  overall  tion that Iraqi nuclear weapons would have otherwise been produced and used offensively before a longer war had ended. The  other  cases,  where preventive  engaged in, lacked this legal veneer. instead,  a  strikes were considered  but  not  Without an ongoing war but with,  limited nuclear threat whose attempted elimination would be  characterized  by  inefficacy,  haste  and  large-scale damage,  preventive  strikes against the Soviet Union, China, or Pakistan would have been exposed as unquestionably i l l e g a l .  Indeed, the United States, which might have been  - 66 -aware of how d i f f i c u l t gaining legal party to each strike, became especially  approval for offensive military operations could be.  During the Cuban Mis-.  s i l e Crisis, Kennedy's self-defense groundwork for obstructing or destroying shipments of Soviet b a l l i s t i c missiles - a far more immediate danger than a nuclear plant - faltered.  A report for the US Attorney-General  said that i t  was  "clear that preventive action would not ordinarily be lawful to prevent  the  maintenance of missile bases or other armaments in the absence of  evidence that their actual use for an aggressive attack was imminent," and 271 Kennedy went on never to mention Article 51. In the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, strikes may,  legal calculations about preventive  of course, be somewhat altered. A joint communique agreed upon  in January 1992  by states on the post-Cold War Security Council pronounced  the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to be a "threat to international peace and security."  This language recalls Chapter VII of the UN  Charter, which permits the use of force in response to such a threat under 272 Security Council supervision.  Cooperative preventive strikes, legalized  under UN auspices, may be a new trend about which past experience gives few clues. 1991  However, actual cooperation against nuclear proliferation during the  Gulf War  only occurred  when states were provoked by Iraqi policies  unrelated to i t s nuclear program.  This precedent suggests that independent  military action, and the attendant gamble with i l l e g a l i t y , w i l l continue to dominate future preventive strike consideration. VII. Military Retaliation Thus far, discussed reactions to preventive strikes have been from countries other  than the target.  Clearly, states considering a  preventive  strike have f e l t more confident knowing that significant powers or the international  community as  a whole would not be forceful, legally  justified  opponents. A more direct concern for decision-makers, however, would have - 67 -  been the expected reaction from the target i t s e l f , and specifically whether, after i t had failed (or i n addition to i t s having succeeded) in raising an international  outcry through  diplomatic or economic pressure/ i t would  retaliate militarily for the preventive strike. The answer in the cases where preventive strikes were carried out was a cautious "no."  Of course, Israeli leaders did consider the possibility of  an Iraqi reprisal attack i f Iraq was not too "shamefaced" to admit that the 273 Osiraq raid had even occurred.  There was some question whether Iraq  might back out from the Iran-Iraq War and, with Arabs united behind i t s own 190,000-strong army, declare war on Israel.  The Israeli Air Force also made  plans should Iraq strike back, more modestly, at certain targets within the 274 country.  Begin seemed ready to take the risk of either: speaking to his  Cabinet on October 28, 1980, he affirmed, "Even i f the enemy attempts' a m i l i tary response, i t w i l l be immeasurably less severe than the terrible danger 275 in store for Israel should nuclear weapons f a l l into the enemy's hands." On the other hand, these brave words were easier to utter knowing that a large-scale retaliatory attack was improbable.  Meeting earlier in October  1980 with his advisers, Begin determined that i t was an "opportune moment" to strike Iraq because i t s military was preoccupied with and "weakened" by a 276 surprisingly resilient Iran.  Furthermore, the Israeli government count-  ed on blocking the avenue of Iraqi attack that was the least unlikely.  Soon  after the Israeli preventive strike, Begin apparently told King Hussein that his consent to an Iraqi assault (presumably, to make Jordanian consent meaningful, a ground assault) would imperil Jordan's future.  Jordan heeded the  warning, allegedly rejecting suggestions for a "reprisal raid" to be staged 277 from Jordanian territory, and Iraq ultimately launched no military reply to the Israeli attack. Iraqi Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi merely stated 278 68 that "military action cannot be excluded as part of the Arab response."  Iraq i t s e l f was  also f a i r l y secure, in terms of a retaliatory danger  distinct from the ongoing Iran-Iraq war, when i t attacked Bushehr; i t was unlikely to sustain additional damage.  Iran was already expending i t s f u l l  efforts, including terrorist sponsorship, in winning the bilateral conflict; replying to yet another any  dramatic  new  Iraqi attack on i t s territory could not be done in  fashion or with much greater intensity.  The same logic  likely applied to a preventive strike against Iraq, against which a war was already  being  fought  in 1991.  The  United States may  have counted on  retaliation being subsumed by regular fighting with Iraq's (dubiously armed and qualified) military; Iraq was mistakenly expected to be fighting at i t s full  capacity, in order  chemical  weapons use  was  to win, still  from the start.  Escalation to Iraqi  possible as the result of a preventive  strike, but had already been threatened and avoided by Iraq in reaction to 279 the commencement of Desert Storm as a whole. In contrast to the  circumstances  surrounding  actualized preventive  strikes, a US raid on Soviet nuclear f a c i l i t i e s would have been m i l i t a r i l y dangerous for the United States and i t s a l l i e s .  When Groves f i r s t proposed  a preventive strike late in the summer of 1945,  the Red Army boasted over  eleven million troops who  could march westward in retaliation.  demobilization proceeded, i t was  Although  s t i l l estimated that the "Soviets could  mobilize 10.5 million men in thirty days, thus enabling them to occupy West280 em  Europe in a matter of weeks."  In fact, even i f the United States was  willing to incorporate preventive strikes into a wider preventive war where nuclear weapons were used extensively, Moscow would remain able to r e t a l i ate.  The Harmon Committee reviewing American plans for nuclear war con-  cluded in May 1949 that Soviet capabilities to occupy Western Europe and the 281  Middle East "would not be seriously impaired" by SAC.  Certainly by 1953,  as well, retaliation for a (belated) - 69 American raid could be inflicted on the  United States i t s e l f , by nuclear-capable Soviet bombers or submarines.  282  A US attack on Chinese nuclear f a c i l i t i e s may have been somewhat safer in  terms of military retaliation by the target, but far from risk-free.  Only seven months after the f i r s t Chinese nuclear test, a twenty kiloton bomb was dropped from a Chinese airplane: Mao was moving fast toward his goal of six nuclear weapons, which he f e l t were enough to ward off attack by either superpower, and which presumably could be used to retaliate for a mis283 timed preventive strike.  Even before such a strike was by definition  f u t i l e , however, China could turn to other means of retaliation.  As Chou  En-lai asked in May 1966, "If you can come from the sky, why can't we fight 284 back on the ground?"  Although domestic economic setbacks and the denial  of Soviet aid had weakened the Chinese military, an open threat conveyed through France in 1966 was that China would directly join the war i n Vietnam 285 should Chinese targets be attacked.  China might also have struck US  forces in nearby Korea, Japan or Taiwan. Likewise, Egypt had to be wary of Israeli military retaliation.  Israel  had escaped defeat by several Arab armies in 1948, and pushed far into Egypt in 1956: i t was clearly strong enough to reply to an Egyptian preventive  1  strike. French  Reports further emerged i n January 1965 that Israel was to purchase medium-range  ballistic  missiles,  which  could  strike  Egyptian  286 targets.  In addition, although Nasser disputed Israeli nuclear advance-  ments, Israel was said i n 1963 to have conducted an underground nuclear test in the Negev; the prospect of Israeli nuclear retaliation for an Egyptian attack that came too late, as well as a plain conventional response, may 287 have at least crossed the minds of Nasser's advisers. In  turn, while the United States and Israel were f a i r l y safe from  - 70 not - be said of India. Pakistani retaliation, the same could  Of course, the  Indian military i s and was considerably larger than that of Pakistan, which  in theory made i t capable of deterring or easily rebuffing a Pakistani retaliatory offensive.  In the mid-1980s, India had just over double the military  manpower, and nearly triple the combat air-power. of  the  Indian  military was  garrisoned  Bangladesh, making i t s advantage on  near the  On the other hand, much borders of  China  and  the Pakistani frontier more slight;  there might be the "semblance of numerical equality" in a brief military con288 flict.  More plausible and more worrying than the prospect of provoking  conventional  war,  however, was  nuclear f a c i l i t i e s near Bombay.  a Pakistani retaliatory attack on  Indian  Pakistan had F-16s, which were used, in a  modified form, against Osiraq; the American aid package in 1981 provided for the sale of forty of these airplanes, and the f i r s t ones arrived in December 289 1982.  It was reportedly in large part this threat of reprisal which con290  vinced the Gandhis against engaging in a preventive strike. some concern may  Finally, of  have been CIA estimates, at least by the time that Israel  approached India about a cooperative  strike in 1988,  that Pakistan  had  already assembled three nuclear weapons. Khan and Zia had previously hinted 291 at  similar capabilities,  which have since been openly admitted.  A  mistimed preventive strike which provoked the same kind of Pakistani attack that i t was intended to avert in the future would scarcely be appealing. Perhaps even more disturbing was North Korea's potential reaction to an attack on i t s own nuclear installations.  The Northern army was already the  sixth largest in the world by the late 1970s, with 995,000 troops in 1991 to 292 compare with the South's 655,000. lose a new lives;  war,  but the cost of fighting one was predicted to be 300,000  "unlike Iraq, 293  ciously."  An impoverished North would eventually  [North Korea had] the proven ability to fight tena-  An additional worry, certainly before the South's April  acquisition of 192  - 71 -was Patriot missiles,  1994  that North Korea possessed the  Scud-B; this missile had a range of between 280 and  300 kilometres  and,  possibly, a chemical warhead. No-Dong missile in May strike  1993;  The country also tested the  even without i t , however, North Korea could  perhaps four Southern nuclear  feared, devastate  Seoul,  960-kilometre  power stations and,  as the South  which i s only twenty-five kilometres from the  294 border.  A final problem, again, was timing: Clinton was told by the CIA  late in 1993 that in a l l probability North Korea had already assembled one 295 or two nuclear weapons, which could be used in response to a US raid.  At  any rate, the North was unlikely to l e t preventive strikes go unanswered, although i t too might have been somewhat constrained by fears of prolonged conflict.  In November 1993,  North Korean Vice-Marshal Kim Kwang-chin an296  nounced, "Answering dialogue with dialogue, war with war, i s our stand." Once more, a pattern can be discerned.  Preventive strikes occurred  against states unable or unlikely to react militarily; victims were already fighting another war or concentrating simply on gaining an advantage in the broader, part. ed  otherwise  justified, conflict of which preventive strikes were a  Preventive strikes were rejected against countries which were expect-  to reply with  conventional or chemical warfare, or which, thanks to  ambiguity about their nuclear progress, could undertake nuclear retaliation. VTII. Danestic Public Opinion Together, the seven factors noted above helped to shape how a preventive strike would be seen by the citizens of states considering i t as an option.  Certainly in countries whose leaders were democratically elected,  such as the United States and Israel, domestic public opinion was an important factor in i t s own  right for governments to weigh when balancing the  costs and benefits of military action.  Generally speaking, the preventive  strikes that were engaged in could have been counted on not to alienate domestic support;  perhaps, more actively, they were hoped to bolster i t - 72 -  instead.  What this effectively means i s that less costly operations against  seemingly greater threats were again the ones l i k e l i e s t to be carried out. Information on how governments assessed or manipulated domestic public opinion i s not available in a l l cases; Israel,  the  Iraqi  raids on  the proposed Egyptian attack on  Iran, and the three planned strikes against  Pakistan w i l l , accordingly, not be discussed in further detail. some evidence  i s present for the Osiraq raid.  However,  The Israeli government was  confident of popular support; the attack may have even been timed for effect before June 30, 1981 general elections, in which Begin had previously been unsure of victory.  Pre-raid polls showed his Likud Party "neck and neck"  with Labor, and some predicted defeat; he may  have f e l t that a success-  f u l , high-profile attack undertaken against an external enemy would boost his popularity among Israelis forever alert to threats and accustomed to 297 self-help methods. This would have been an accurate prediction, for Likud 298 had gained an edge of between twelve and fourteen seats by mid-June. Public opinion about another preventive strike, in the form of the 1991 Gulf War,  was also expected to be favorable; the nuclear issue won o f f i c i a l  attention only after a public outcry, although at least partly because US leaders had already chosen to demonize Saddam Hussein.  A poll in the autumn  of 1990 showed that fifty-nine percent of Americans believed nuclear non-pro299 liferation to be a "very important" foreign policy objective.  A poll re-  leased on November 20 then revealed fifty-four percent to feel that preventing Iraq from developing nuclear weapons was an "adequate reason to fight" more so than on behalf of Kuwait or to secure the o i l supply.  This result  allegedly moved Bush to insert passages about potential Iraqi weaponization into prepared Thanksgiving s p e e c h e s . A January 1991 poll further showed sixty-three percent  of the electorate to be in favor of war; 301 greater casualties were predicted that support decreased. - 73 -  i t was when  In this vein, the A-nerican public had far less sympathy with the idea of preventive action when significant costs and a (subjectively more) limited threat were involved.  Average citizens, here allowed to express their  views, tend to accept "really bold action" only with the promise of "pain302 less victory" or in response to "great anger or great fright."  The wari-  ness that otherwise prevails was evident when a preventive strike on Soviet nuclear f a c i l i t i e s was under consideration, with morality and perhaps common sense allowed to come to the fore. American nuclear use was  Interestingly, the involved prospect of  not at issue: most respondents to a November 1947  poll agreed that the United States could strike f i r s t , i f necessary, against 303 (unspecified) enemies. test in 1949  However, in a context where the Soviet nuclear  excited l i t t l e public interest, much less fear, and where  Soviet conventional  retaliation for a preventive  likely, Truman concluded in September 1950, sion or preventive war.  "We  strike would have been do no believe in aggres-  Such a war i s the weapon of dictators, not of free 304  democratic countries like the United States."  It seems reasonable  to  surmise that similar background conditions would also have dictated public caution about an American preventive strike on China in the 1960s. Tnese  sentiments  were  apparently  carried  forward  to  the  1990s.  Singapore's Lee Kwan Yew believed that the US government extrapolated from the negative public reaction to American losses in Somalia; these losses would have been dwarfed by those incurred had North Korea launched a major retaliatory attack on the South. Nobody believes that an American government that could not sustain i t s mission in Somalia because of an ambush and one television snippet of a dead American pulled through the streets in Mogadishu could contemplate a strike on ^Q£th Korean nuclear f a c i l i t i e s like the Israeli strike on Iraq. With respect to South Korea, in turn, the defense minister who spoke openly about a preventive strike against the North in 1991, regardless of the low - 74 -  level of nuclear threat but high retaliatory risk, was forced to resign; 306 popular disapproval had been strong.  A similar fate could be expected  for the government which actually put such rhetoric into action. SUMMARY This chapter,  then, has identified major similarities and differences  among the ten known preventive military plans  strike proposals. Compared have been US  against the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan and Iraq; joint  US-South Korean designs on North Korea; Egyptian threats against Israel; planned Indian raids on Pakistan; Israeli schemes against both Pakistan and Iraq; and Iraqi raids on Iran.  Five general characteristics spanned a l l  cases, and appear to be useful indications of when military action against a new  proliferator's  Discussion  i n each  nuclear  facilities  i s likely  to be  considered.  instance  took place  i n countries which viewed the  prospective target as some kind of threat, although one of varying severity. This unease and willingness to address i t by military means were usually increased by a recent, contemporary or looming wartime context, and a sense of the target's ideological or religious aloofness.  Every attacker but  Egypt also had the technological lead to see a proactive, military role as feasible, while a l l could be assured that they were not alone in wishing to end nuclear proliferation. Conditions otherwise differed, however, i n the three preventive strikes which were actually carried out.  Eight factors have emerged i n this study  to distinguish instances where military action occurred from those where i t was rejected; these suggested criteria tabular  form on the following page.  for engagement are presented i n  Actualized preventive strikes were  those where greater support on the side of the target was not expected to outweigh a non-proliferation consensus; neighbors and particularly super- 75 -  - 76 -  powers,  in a  favorable  international  context,  would not  object  to a  counter-proliferation raid in a strenuous fashion. The attacker could thus derive comfort from the presence of significant friends and/or few potential detractors. predicted  Where attempted,  the  preventive strike i t s e l f was further  to have a good chance of destroying a l l the nuclear weapons  facilities  (ideally few and unconcealed) in the new  conventional bombing; operational success was  proliferator through  likely and, with only cold  facilities  targeted, no risk of radioactive contamination  incurred.  Of course, even with such assurances, prospective attackers did  not act lightly. military  options  They s t i l l had  was  otherwise  preferred to strike only when other,  been exhausted or discredited, and  non-  confined their  responses to a nuclear threat that was considered especially strong, as well as relatively proximate in time and place.  Either on the basis of such  factors or in the context of an ongoing hot war, the operation also had to appear closer to legality; only in one case was a preventive strike risked without  a de  facto conflict already raging.  Finally, the likelihood of  military retaliation (or wartime escalation) by the target was deemed to be low and,  at least i f important  for electoral purposes, domestic public  opinion was hoped to be favorable. Voters were suitably r i l e d but premised that a preventive strike would bring minimal retaliatory (or other) costs. Almost invariably, cases were sharply divided with respect to these factors; the Osiraq, Bushehr and Desert Storm raids consistently f u l f i l l e d criteria which the seven rejected operations failed.  As mentioned earlier,  however, some of the eight differentiating characteristics outlined may less important when every reinforcement  be  than others: the fact that certain criteria were satisfied  past  preventive  strike  for decision-makers  occurred  may  have merely  provided  or been the result of chance.  It seems  possible that, for example, a potential attacker would be prepared to risk - 77 -  sane degree of international disapprobation or conventional military retaliation by  the target for the sake of destroying a greatly feared nuclear  program, especially failed.  once other options for eliminating that program had  In this regard, the s t r i c t l y necessary conditions for deciding on  military action may  well be limited to .three factors: a high degree of  perceived threat, a lack of other options, and a strong probability of operational success. be  overlooked,  military  The absence of other factors can in exigent circumstances but without  action would be  each of three mentioned above being present, a pointless risk.  By extension, with three  criteria that must be satisfied, none of them i s sufficient; certainly, as well, the fulfillment of more cannot but provide additional encouragement for decision-makers. These rather contorted qualifications can be simplified to provide a reliable  formula  for prediction.  A future scenario which meets every  criterion highlighted in this study i s one where a preventive strike i s virtually  assured.  Conversely,  a  scenario which  fails  one  or  two,  particularly i f among the three emphasized above, i s less likely to involve military action.  These broad guidelines w i l l be put to use in the next  chapter, to assess the probability of preventive strikes occurring against contemporary proliferators.  - 78 -  CHAPTER POUR: CONCLUSIONS  Preventive strikes are not simply of historical interest; Israel and the United States, at least, are both potential actors. raid and  until 1985,  the  After the Osiraq  Israeli government regularly proclaimed  itself  ready to stop any perceived enemy from acquiring nuclear weapons "with a l l 307 the means at it's disposal."  More recently, Israel purchased F-15Es  "specifically for a long-range disarming strike," and "senior o f f i c i a l s have warned that Israel would have to 'consider an attack  1  i f any country in the  region gets 'close to achieving a nuclear capability' and p o l i t i c a l means of 308 preventing i t f a i l . "  After the 1991 Gulf War, in turn, Bush told the De-  fense Department "to develop new ants, own  capabilities to defend against prolifer-  including capabilities for pre-emptive military action."  Nuclear Counter-Proliferation Initiative  Clinton's  in December 1993  was  duly 309  feared to be (or praised for being) oriented toward preventive strikes. More widely,  unofficial  "rogues" such as  proposals  Iran, which has,  remain  for military  action  against  accordingly, gone on to choose a  new  reactor site near the Caspian Sea (despite the earthquake threat) instead of 310 one more accessible from Iraq or the Persian Gulf.  S t i l l to be explored,  then, i s the question of whether military action i s actually probable. The proliferation risks to be examined here are Libya, Iraq, Iran and Syria: a l l , perhaps to be joined by countries like Algeria in the future, are potential targets of an American or Israeli preventive strike.  Nuclear  weapons development by any  Israeli  of these states would upset US  and  decision-makers; US Secretary of State Warren Christopher's branding of Iran as an "international outlaw" for i t s terrorist connections f i t s a l l of them 311 to some extent. tanced  79 -proliferator i s psychologically disFurthermore, -each  from prospective attackers like the United  States and  Israel  by  religion, and a l l but Iran have been involved with one in a militarized dispute or war.  In addition, both the United States and Israel could be  confident of technological superiority over any target (certainly in terms of an existing nuclear arsenal), and of widespread support proliferation goals (although  for the  that preventive strikes would be intended  non-  to advance  in practice, independent action might undermine the idea of a  multilateral regime).  It i s safe to assume that military action against  each of the four proliferators mentioned will be up for o f f i c i a l discussion. However, the four cases' fulfillment of the criteria previously met by realized strike plans i s mixed. and  In terms of the balance of support, Libya  Iraq remain almost friendless, but Iran and Syria do not.  China has.  allegedly helped Iran with EMIS and calutron technology; i t would likely be 312 displeased and obstructive on other issues were i t s handiwork destroyed. In  a  similar vein,  military  action against  Syria would be  generally  unpopular, especially while the very Middle Eastern peace settlement that is hoped to entrench Syrian goodwill i s being pursued. the  target, NATO allies  Finally, regardless of  have decided not to back "any military action" 313  unless i t i s "an unambiguous case of self-defense" or under UN auspices. Second, the likelihood of operational success, at least with respect to finding a l l relevant f a c i l i t i e s in the suspect proliferators, i s small. United  States may  be  improving conventional,  The  "deep-earth penetrators" to  destroy known f a c i l i t i e s , but after the shock of finding much of the Iraqi nuclear program l e f t intact in 1991 despite heavy bombing of the country, potential attackers w i l l probably not take success for granted: nearly three years after the Gulf War, radiation-detecting helicopters were s t i l l search314 ing for some of Iraq's more than twenty rumoured nuclear sites. regard, i t may  In this  be increasingly d i f f i c u l t to determine when f a c i l i t i e s will  80 - do not risk become hot, and thus to plan raids-which  contamination.  Fortunately, the degree of threat to prospective attackers from the four budding proliferators i s generally not high.  Although  Israel has  complained about a supposed Iranian menace, Iran and Syria are both seen (presumably even by the Israelis) to have become more pragmatic; there i s no sign that either would use nuclear weapons offensively.  For i t s part, Iraq  has shown i t s e l f responsible enough not to engage i n a vindictive terrorist spree, while the US raid on Tripoli i n April 1986 had a restraining effect on Qaddafi, who then concluded a peace agreement with Chad and vowed to decrease backing for terrorist groups.  Qaddafi apparently does not counte-  nance unprovoked nuclear use either, saying i n 1987, "We undertake not to drop the atomic bomb on any state around us... However, i f someone i s going to threaten our existence and independence  then we should drop i t on them.  315 This i s an essential defensive weapon." statements, foreign decision-makers ferators  1  Even i f not reassured by these  may find the remoteness of these p r o l i -  arsenals i n terms of time and (especially for Atiericans) geographi-  cal distance more comforting.  Currently, Libya's only reactor operates at  between two and ten megawatts, and would take ten years to produce enough 316 plutonium for a nuclear weapon.  In addition, none of the four prolifera-  tors yet has the means to deliver an eventual device to the United States. This point suggests the possibility of options other than a preventive strike being used to deal with emergent nuclear arsenals. fect,  Although imper-  the Missile Technology Control Regime may be an example of multi-  lateral technical restraints able at least to slow Third World states' acquisition of delivery systems; other potential delivery systems, including sub317 marines, admittedly remain to be addressed.  Diplomatic pressure by indi-  vidual countries could also supplement the monitoring and export controls of the IAEA and Nuclear Suppliers Group, to which more attention can be devoted with  - 81 the removal of Cold War blinkers.  In the category of unilateral  action, the American refusal to educate Libyans in nuclear science during the 1980s already aggravated Libya's scientific backwardness, while in a bilateral framework, the United States was successful in pressing India and 318 Argentina to cancel nuclear deals with Iran in 1991 and 1992.  Likewise,  either multi- or unilateral sanctions could be placed or, in the Iraqi case, continued,  on new  proliferators, while a "scaled-down Star Wars" program  might be directed by one or more countries against extreme states which sup319 posedly cannot be deterred.  A final, more direct but again non-military,  option which remains available i s sabotage.  This alternative may even have  gained popularity: a mysterious explosion destroyed an Iraqi military plant in  August  1989,  construction  at  a fire  allegedly swept the Libyan chemical  Rabta in March 1990,  and 320  plant under  biological weapons equipment  ordered by Iran was targeted in 1992-93. Especially with these non-military avenues open and no wars ongoing, a new  preventive strike outside UN supervision would be criticized for i t s  illegality;  this may  effectively condemn any military action in the near  future, for Gulf War cooperation in the United Nations occurred only under a special  (or unique) set of circumstances.  retaliation  by  targeted  states  seems  Perhaps even worse, military probable.  Syrian  retaliatory  capabilities include chemical weapons, Scuds, and SS-21 missiles which could certainly hit the neighboring  Israel; even Iraq may 321  hundred Scuds, wielded by a trimmer military.  s t i l l have up to two  In turn, spurred on by his  government's possession of chemical weapons, possibly three hundred Scuds, and now the No-Dong missile (which can reach Israeli territory), Iranian Air Force Commander Brigadier-General "any may  Mansur Sattari has openly declared that 322  adventurism by Israel against Iran 'would cost i t dearly.'"  Iran  - 82 - from Kazakhstan with which i t could also have several nuclear warheads  retaliate  (assuming  that  i t knew how  to f i r e  the sophisticated Soviet  models)  for what  a  misinformed  attacker  had  considered  a  preventive  323 strike.  Libya seems the most vulnerable target: i t s response to the US  bombing raid in 1986 was limited to funding terrorist operations, which may provide a reassuring precedent for attackers. On this basis, public approval within the United States or Israel for a relatively costless preventive strike might well be forthcoming, particularly against a demonized leader. Although Libya and perhaps Iraq come closest, then, none of the p r o l i ferators mentioned here meets a l l the criteria satisfied by past preventive strikes.  Notably absent are an overpowering sense of threat (or at least  strong public statements about such a threat), and confidence in operational success; present, instead, i s a seemingly wide range of alternatives for slowing  or  countering proliferation.  As a result, a preventive strike  against one of the four Middle Eastern proliferators now seems improbable. Nuclear proliferation in the former Soviet Union, i f undertaken despite new NFT commitments by Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, raises rather different questions.  It has been argued that Russia might launch a preventive 324  strike against a proliferating Ukraine,  but a cultural and p o l i t i c a l  affinity absent in other cases where such strikes were considered exists here.  The case i s further disqualified from the preventive strike category  defined in this study because an attack would target existing missiles, with which Ukraine could retaliate, known to be l e f t over from the Cold War. i t s part, although now States  to  For  apparently cooperating with Russia and the United  eliminate i t s portion of the Soviet arsenal, Kazakhstan had  announced i n May  1992 that i t would undertake i t s own nuclear research at  325 Semipalatinsk.  Even i f the country were to revive these plans, however,  i t would not seem obviously threatening - assuming i t was l e f t alone.  At  the same time, the weapons remaining on i t s territory could make i t danger- 83 ous i f provoked, again making a preventive strike belated and unattractive.  PREVENTIVE STRIKES: INEFFICIENT AND IMPLAUSIBLE Preventive strikes have occurred in the past only under an unusual set of circumstances, and this pattern i s likely to hold in the future. Of the ten cases where preventive strikes against nuclear f a c i l i t i e s are known to have been pondered, only one took place in peacetime, and just three were carried out in a l l .  Considering the requirements  that may have to be met,  this limited use of the military option i s unsurprising.  Past preventive  strikes  legal  have  been  restricted,  efficient  conventional force as a last resort.  and  (almost)  uses  of  Mild reactions have been sought at  home, in the target, and worldwide, while the prospect of removing a greatly feared threat has had to compensate for remaining risks. What has not yet been considered i s whether preventive strikes are, purely from an anti-proliferation standpoint, a good idea. encouraged?  Evidently, Israel acted in 1981  Should they be  at l i t t l e cost.  Punishment  came only in the form of a delayed F-16 shipment, a stalled US reactor deal and uranium transfer, and the removal of IAEA status, with an annual 100,000 dollars in technical aid, for three years.  The largest financial cost was 326  Israel's eight million dollars in operational expenses. also minimal.  The  What the strike  yielded,  however, was  Iraqi nuclear program was  not  stopped,  but merely slowed by perhaps three or four years, while Iraqi  scientists were encouraged to display their ingenuity in developing three, hidden nuclear programs at once - even as their country remained within the 327 constraints of the NPT/IAEA regime.  Saddam Hussein stayed in power, and  the raid may have given him another grudge to nurse when deciding whether or not to use his new program for offensive ends. attacks on Bushehr failed  In a similar vein, Iraq's  to prevent Iran from seeking nuclear weapons,  while the 1991 Gulf War has not removed the fund of technological knowledge that Iraq would need to re-start i t s own nuclear program. - 84 -  Estimates suggest  that an Iraqi arsenal could s t i l l emerge within three to six years after the 328 l i f t i n g of UN sanctions, barring "constant foreign inspections." Perhaps this record of preventive strikes, however well-executed and operationally successful, failing to do more than impair nuclear development now also weighs on decision-makers who contemplate military action, unless that impairment  i s counted on to last long enough for a dramatic softening  or socialization of the target's leadership.  Even in circumstances where a  preventive strike would be likely judging by historical patterns, independent of any learning process, wary governments may hold back. possible  ninth  previous eight.  decision-making  S t i l l , this  factor does not overcome or distort the  Even the known likelihood of an Iraqi nuclear revival was  not of great concern to Begin, who said i n 1981 that merely deferring Iraqi weaponization,  through  a  comprehensive  strike,  would at least  save  a  generation; he further expected his successors to follow the precedent of 329 attack that he had set. Conversely, the US government was not buoyed by indications i n the early 1960s that China would be too impoverished to 330 rebuild i t s nuclear program after a preventive strike.  The eight factors  outlined in this thesis w i l l thus probably retain both their importance to the decision-maker and their predictive value for the observer.  - 85 -  ENDNOTES "*"Mark Walker, German National Socialism and the quest for nuclear power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 119; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York, Random House, 1988), 22-23. Although there was no proof of a major German nuclear weapons project, the Allies launched bomber and commando attacks on a Norwegian heavy water plant. Barry R. Schneider also mentions US attacks on Japanese nuclear laboratories; see "Nuclear Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation: Policy Issues and Debates," International Studies Review 38 (October 1994): 226. Also of note i s that Schneider uses the term "pre-emptive counter-proliferation measure" in place of "preventive strike." 2 Kenneth Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better," Adelphi Papers, no. 171 (Autumn 1981). 3 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "North Korea's Nuclear Challenge," Korea and World Affairs 18, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 37. 4 Herbert Krosney and Steve Weissman, The Islamic Bomb (New York: Times Books, 1981), 254; Shlomo Nakdimon, First Strike (New York: Summit Books, 1987), 180, describes another Shi'ite plan to assassinate Osiraq technicians; "South African Reactor Damaged by Four Explosions," The Washington Post, 20 December 1982. ^Uri Bar-Joseph, Michael Handel, and Alios Perlmutter, Two Minutes over Baghdad (London: Vallentine, Mitchell and Co., Ltd., 1982), 78; Krosney and Weissman, 3, 5; Nakdimon, 155, notes two other Iranian raids. ^Joseph A. Yager, "South Korea," in Non-Proliferation: The why and the wherefore, ed. Jozef Goldblat (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), 200; Leonard Spector, with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 125, 347. Mitchell Reiss says the North might well have considered a preventive strike had Southern development continued; see Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 101. 7 Bernard Brodie, Strategy i n the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 227. 8 Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War," World Politics 44 (January 1992): 236, 247. 9 . . . Scott Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 23. "^Yair Evron, "The Arab Position in the Nuclear Field: A Study of Policies up to 1967," Cooperation and Conflict 8, no. 1 (1973): 25. "'""'"Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War," International Security 16, no. 2 (Fall 1991), 35; Spector and Smith, 132; Paul F. Power, "The Baghdad Raid: retrospect and prospect," Third World Quarterly 8, no. 3 (July 1986): 855. 12 Shyam Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals i n the Middle East (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), 64; George Russell, "Attack - and Fallout," Time, 22 - 86 -  June 1981, 27; Nakdimon, 309. 13 Schweller, 261; Bundy, Danger and Survival, 251-253; Russell D. Buhite and Wm. Christopher Hamel, "War for Peace: The Question of an American Preventive War against the Soviet Union, 1945-1955," Diplomatic History 14, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 381. 14 Steven J. Zaloga, Target America: The Soviet Union and the Strategic Arms Race, 1945-1964 (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1993), 29, 50. I b i d . , 50; Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives i n Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), 17; David Holloway, "How the Bomb Saved Soviet Physics," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50, no. 6 (November/December 1994); Mike Moore, "First, Puzzlement; Then Action," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 49, no. 2 (March 1993); Mike Edwards, "Lethal Legacy," National Geographic 186, no. 2 (August 1994): 92-92. 15  "^Zaloga, 50-52; Professor Michael D. Wallace, suggestions to the author, 19 July 1995, explains that the US eventually found the Chelyabinsk f a c i l i t y in this fashion. "^Buhite and Hamel, 374. This i s actually put more vaguely i n "Keep Bomb Secret, Gen. Groves Urges," New York Times, 22 September 1945. 18 New York Times, 8 November 1945, quoted i n Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 124, 112. 19 Nikolai V. Sivachev and Nikolai N. Yakovlev, Russia and the United States, trans. Olga Adler Titelbaum (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 221. Buhite, 384. 20  21 John Wilson Lewis and Xue L i t a i , China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). 22 . Ibid. 23  I b i d . , 40.  24 William C. Foster, quoted in Gordon H. Chang, "JFK, China, and the Bomb," The Journal of American History 74, no. 4 (March 1988): 1294. 25 Defense Department, "Harriman Trip to Moscow - Briefing Book, Vol. II," 6/20/63, quoted i n Ibid., 1301. 26 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n Company, 1965), 825; Kennedy to Harriman, 15 July 1963, cable, quoted in Chang, 1300. 27 "Soviets Balked U.S. on Peking A-Bomb," New York Times, 2 October 1964; Schlesinger, 908. Chang, 1304. 28  - 87 -  29  Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 390; Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb (New York, London, Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965); 124. 30 Bundy Memorandum for the Record, 15 September 1964, McGeorge Bundy Memoranda to the President, vol. VI, 7/1-9/30/64, quoted in Chang, 1308. 31 Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy Toward Communist China 1949-1969 (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972), 223. 32 Gerald Segal, The Great Power Triangle (London and Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1982), 127. 33 Schurmann, 514. 34 S c i l l a McLean, How Nuclear Weapons Decisions are Made (Houndmills and London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1986), 199; Schurmann, 515. 35 Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter, 33. "^Yoel Cohen, Nuclear Ambiguity: The Vanunu Affair (London: SinclairStevenson, 1992), 19. 37 Perlmutter, "The Israeli Raid on Osiraq: A New Proliferation Landscape," Strategic Review 10, no. 1 (Winter 1982): 13. 38 Evron, "Arab Position," 22. 39 The Jewish Observer and Middle East Review December 1960, 3-4, quoted i n Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the. 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 66; Evron, "Arab Position," 24; Hedrick Smith, "Warning on Bomb Given by Nasser," New York Times, 21 February 1966, 8. 40 Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter, 31. 41 Evron, "Arab Position," 23, 26; Hedrick Smith, 8. 42 Charles C. Flowerree, "Current Chemical Weapons Proliferation," i n Chemical Weapons and Missile Proliferation, ed. Trevor Findlay (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991): 9. 43 . . . . There i s one indication, however, of Israeli concern; Major General Ariel Sharon said in 1975, "If we discover the Egyptians to be working on nuclear weapons of their own, we'll have no choice but to wipe them out." See Steven J. Rosen, "Nuclearization and Stability in the Middle East," i n Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries, ed. Onkar Marwah and Ann Schulz (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), 174-175. 44 Nakdimon, 50-53; Feldman, "The Bombing of Osiraq - Revisited," International Security 7, no. 2 (Fall 1982): 115. 45 Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter, 57; Nakdimon, 55, 70; Power, 851, insists that Osiraq was to operate at 40, not 70, MW. 46 Spector and Smith, 187; Feldman, "Bombing," 115-116; Nakdimon, 69. - 88 -  47  Feldman, "Bombing," 117; Nakdimon, 63, 75, says Caramel was 20-25 percent enriched uranium instead. Using the uranium for bombs would have been d i f f i c u l t , because fuel rods were irradiated by France to impede handling. 48  Spector and Smith, 187; Nakdimon, 64; Feldman, "Bombing," 118; Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals, 76. 49 Iraqi spokesman quoted, without further reference, i n Nakdimon, 115. 50  A1-Usbu Al-Arabi (Lebanon), 8 September 1975, quoted i n Ibid., 59.  I b i d . , 109, 163. 52 Ibid., 219-220; Robert A. Friedlander, "The Armageddon Factor: Terrorism and Israel's Nuclear Option," i n Security or Armageddon: Israel's Nuclear Strategy, ed. Louis Rene Beres (Lexington and Toronto: Lexington Books, 1986), 153; Kenneth R. Timmerman, The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq (Boston, New York, London: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991), 101; Frank Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 1989), 89. 53 Nakdimon, 85; Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals, 83. 54 Spector and Smith, 383. 55 David Segal, "Atomic Ayatollahs," The Washington Post, 12 April 1987, quoted in Ibid., 209; Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals, 83. "^Krosney, Deadly Business: Legal Deals and Outlaw Weapons (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1993), 189; this report may have been planted. 57 Barnaby, 125; Spector and Smith, 375. Ibid., 209. 51  59 , Ibid. T  60 Krosney and Weissman, 161. 61 Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 174, quoted i n Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984), 73. 62 Ibid., 74; David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "Pakistan's Bomb: Out of the Closet," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 48, no. 6 (July/August 1992). 63 Reiss, 237; Krosney and Weissman, 214-215. 64 Ibid., 213; Spector and Smith, 77. 65 Richard Burt, "U.S. Will Press Pakistan to Halt A-Arms Project," New York Times, 12 August 1979, 1; Krosney and Weissman, 192. Wallace, 19 July 1995, suggests that the news report may have been a convenient leak which i n reality did not amount to much. The case i s considered here because of i t s reappearance in Krosney and Weissman, i t s reflection i n the sources below, - 89 -  and the fact that Carter did not appear to have much to gain by a deliberate leak of false information - the hostage c r i s i s was not yet in progress. ^Akhtar A l i makes a distinction between the US "institutions" which allegedly encouraged Indian action and US decision-makers, but considers both important components of the American government; see Pakistan's Nuclear Dilemma (Karachi: Economist Research Unit, 1984), 89. For his part, Qnkar Marwah adds that "senior Indian government o f f i c i a l s " claimed to have been approached "by the West" to strike Kahuta after Israel's raid on Osiraq; he does not specify whether American or (more probably) Israeli diplomats were involved. See "The Non-Proliferation Policies of Non-Nuclear Weapon States," in Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Security, ed. David B. Dewitt (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987), 117. ^Reiss, 242. 68 Milton R. Benjamin, "India Said to Eye Raid on Pakistani A-Plants," The Washington Post, 20 December 1982, 1, 11. 69 Dan Oberdorfer, "U.S. Sees India-Pakistan Rifts Not as Signals of Imminent War," The Washington Post, 15 September 1984; Ravi Rikhye, The Fourth Round: IndQ-Pak War 1984 (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1982). 70 Spector and Smith, 66. 71 Ibid., 67; Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle Eastern Arms Race (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), 111, quoted in Gerald M. Steinberg, "Non-Proliferation: Time for Regional Approaches?," Orbis 38, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 416. 72 Bhatia, "Israelis plot A-plant raid on Pakistan," The Observer, 27 March 1988; Cohen, 15; the New Labs may also have been a target. 73 Bhatia, "Israelis plot." 74 Nakdimon, 307; Spector and Smith, 188. 75 Bundy, "Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf," Foreign Affairs 70, no. 4 (Fall 1991): 90; Michael Mandelbaum, "Lessons of the Next Nuclear War," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 35. 76 Israel i t s e l f sent word to Iraq that no preventive strike was under consideration, and there seems nothing to substantiate Iraqi suspicions that Israeli strike plans were, i n fact, being made. Therefore, the case is not explored here. Lester H. Brune, America and the Iraqi Crisis, 1990-1992 (Claremont, California: Regina Books, 1993), 33; Dilip Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War (London: Harper Collins, 1992), 67; Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (London: Routledge, 1994), 200. 77 Krosney, 222. 78 Jean Edward Smith, George Bush's War (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1992), 250. 79 Austin Bay and James F. Dunnigan, From Shield to Storm (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1992), 155. They say the five percent - 90 -  includes missions against "Scuds," but the figure would be too low i f they counted attacks on launchers, especially after Israel was h i t . 80 "The Month i n Review," Current History, 90, no. 551 (March 1991): 140; Freedman and Karsh, 25. 81 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Iraq: The Threat from the Northern Gulf (Boulder, San Francisco, London: Westview Press, 1994), 272; David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "It's A l l over at Al Atheer," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 48, no. 6 (July/August 1992): 8. 82 UN Security Council Resolution 687, quoted i n Shireen T. Hunter, "Two Years After the Gulf War," Security Dialogue 24, no. 1 (1993): 26. 83 Cordesman, 163, 169. 84 Spector and Smith, 121, 128; Andrew Mack, "Security and the Korean Peninsula in the 1990s," i n Asian Flashpoint: Security and the Korean Peninsula, ed. Andrew Mack (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1993): 3; Paul Bracken, "Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea," Survival 35, no. 3 (Autumn 1993): 139. 85 "North Korea, Fighting Inspection, Renounces Nuclear Arms Treaty," New York Times, 13 March 1993; Choung-Il Chee, "Rethinking about South Korea's Security i n Face of North Korea's Nuclear Capability," Korea and World Affairs 18, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 305; Bruce Cumings, "Spring Thaw for Korea's Cold War?," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists' 48, no. 3 (April 1992): 305. 86 Kyongsoo Lho, "Writing the Final Chapter: Inter-Korean Rivalry in the 1990s," i n Asian Flashpoint, 154-155; Mack, 10. ^Cumings, 16. 88 Lee Se-wan, "South Korea: South Korea Prepares for Any Eventuality with North," Reuters 10 November 1993, quoted i n Mack, 8. 89 "North Korea," A4. 90 Schneider, 227. 91 Rubinstein, 37. 92 Schneider, 225, agrees with several of these "conditions." 93 MccGwire, 15. 94 Feldman, "Bombing," 131; Nakdimon, 173, 235. 95 Power, 853. 96 New York Times, 11 June 1981, quoted in Perlmutter, 41. 97 98Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter, 70. Nakdimon, 200; Timmerman, 101. - 91 -  99 Krosney and Weissman, 16; Jed C. Snyder, "The Road to Osiraq: Baghdad's Quest for the Bomb," Middle East Journal 37, no. 4 (Autumn 1983): 584; Roger F. Pajak, "Nuclear Status and Policies of Middle East Countries," International Affairs 59, no. 4 (Autumn 1983): 600; Russell, 27. ^Nakdimon, 160. 101 , ., , Ibid., 156. T  c c  102 Krosney and Weissman, 236; Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter, 117. 103 Ibid., 73; Nakdimon, 78; Krosney and Weissman, 236; Power, 854. 104 Russell, 27; Nakdimon, 25. 1 0 5  I b i d . , 73.  "'"^Ibid., 306; Krosney and Weissman, 236. "'"^^Freedman and Karsh, 6. 108 Daniel Yergin points out that France was not even willing to consider i t s traditional Russian ally as i t s l i k e l i e s t new enemy; i t may not have been convinced to do so until 1948. See Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 395. 109 Lewis A. Frank, "Nuclear Weapons Development i n China," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 22, no. 1 (January 1966): 13; Schlesinger, 904; Halperin, 126. James Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment: China Policy," i n Kennedy's Quest for Victory, ed. Thomas G. Pearson (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989): 182; CIA, "Sino-Soviet Relations at a New Crisis," memorandum, 14 January 1963, quoted i n Chang, 1292. Schurmann, 398, 450. ni  112 "Soviets Balked"; A.H.S. Candlin, "The Chinese Nuclear Threat," The Army Quarterly 92, no. 1 (April 1966): 57; Segal, 124, 183; New York Times, 10 October 1963, quoted i n Alice Langley Hsieh, "The Sino-Soviet nuclear dialogue: 1963," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 8, no. 1 (June 1964): 103. See also George H. Quester, "The American Attitude," in Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, ed. Morton H. Halperin (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The MIT Press, 1967), 259. 113 Segal, 125. 114 Spector and Smith, 152; Mark Gaffney, Dimona: The Third Temple?, (Battleboro, Vermont: Amana Books, 1989): 163. 115 Cohen, 18; Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter, 34. "^Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan's Security under Zia, 1977-1988 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 104; Spector and Smith, 92. 117  Wirsing, 82. - 92 -  118 Hearings Before the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 100th Congress, 1st session, March 1987, 342, quoted i n Brahma Chellaney, "South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power," International Security 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 49. 119 Ibid., 50; Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, 101. 120  Chellaney, 59.  121 Bhatia, "Israelis plot." 122 Choung-Il Chee, 308, describes the Japanese position as more firmly anti-North Korean than does Rubinstein, 30; Spector and Smith, 132. 123 New York Times, 27 December 1993, analyzed i n Rubinstein, 32. 124 Ibid., 32. 125 Ibid., 26; Bracken, 151. 126 Krosney and Weissman, 236; Power, 854. 127 Nakdimon, 123, differs from Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter. 128 Krosney and Weissman, 9; Nakdimon, 117. 129 Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter 106-107. 130 Barnaby, 90; Nakdimon, 213; Timmerman, 100. Nakdimon, 117, 190. 132 Timmerman, 101; Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter, 99. 133 Ibid., 102; Spector and Smith, 188; A l i , 89; Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter, 126; Bennett Ramberg, The Destruction of Nuclear Energy Facilities i n War, (Lexington and Toronto: Lexington Books, 1980), 66. 134 Krosney, 188; Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter, 124. 135 Barnaby, 95; Cordesman, 265; David Dorn casts some doubts, "Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: A Case Study," i n Multilateral Verification and the Post-Gulf Environment: Learning from the UNSCCM Experience, ed. Steven Mataija and Marshall Beier (Toronto: CSIS, York University, 1992), 105. 136 International Herald Tribune, 2 February 1991, quoted i n Hiro, 319. 137 Zaloga, 50-54; Arnold Kramish, Atomic Energy i n the Soviet Union (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), 121; however, see note 66. 138 Ramberg, The Destruction, 66; Zaloga, 52. 139 Schweller, 261. 140 Buhite and Hamel, 383. 131  - 93 -  141  Herken, 295-296.  142 Richard Fieldhouse does note even here that duplicate sites i n locations to which the Soviets had (presumably) not had access were built by the end of the 1960s. See "China's Mixed Signals on Nuclear Weapons," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 47, no. 4 (May 1991): 40; Robert Guillain, "Ten Years of Secrecy," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 21, no. 2 (February 1965): 24. 143 Candlm, 57; Frank, 14; Lewis and Xue, 115. 144 "Should We Bomb Red China's Bomb?," National Review, 12 January 1965, 9; William L. Ryan and Sam Summerlin, The China Cloud: America's Tragic Blunder and China's Rise to Nuclear Power (Boston and London: L i t t l e , Brown and Company, 1968), 185. 145 Candlin, 58; Lewis and Xue, 115. 146 Ramberg, The Destruction, 63. 147 Schurmann, 450; "Should We Bomb?," 9. Ibid. 149 Harold Muller and Reiss, "Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine in Old Bottles," The Washington Quarterly 18, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 145. 150 S. Devkinandon, How China May Use the Atom Bomb (Delhi: New Century Books, 1974), 199. "*"^Evron, "Arab Position," 23; Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter, 62. 152 Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals, 35, 40; Bundy notes the f i r s t public mention of Israeli reprocessing was not until 1977, Danger and Survival, 506. 153 Krosney and Weissman, 192; Rikhye, 35. 154 Krosney and Weissman, 193. ~*~^Burt, 1; see the conclusion for another interpretation of Hummel's remark. 156 Rikhye, 35; Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development (London, New York, Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987), 208; Spector and Smith, 68. 157  Chellaney, 70.  158  Mack, 18.  159 Bracken, 152; Cumings, 17. 160 Edward W. Desmond, "Plutonium Puzzle," Time, 11 October 1993, 34. 161 162  Friedlander, "Armageddon Factor," 155. Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter, 55. - 94 -  ^Nakdimon ,97. 164 "Voice of the Masses" (Baghdad) on FBIS 21 August 1980, quoted in Uri Shoham, "The Israeli Aerial Raid upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor and the Right of Self-Defense," Military Law Review 109 (Summer 1985): 208. Perlmutter, 40; Shoham, 206. "^Krosney and Weissman, 19-20. 167 Nakdimon, 108; Shoham, 210. 168 Nakdimon, 163, had access as Begin's former media adviser. 169 Ibid., 240. 170 FBIS 19 October 1988, Near East and South Asia, quoted in Cordesman, 97; Spector and Smith, 211. Hiro, 73. 172 Spector and Smith, 189. 173 New York Times, 3 April 1990, quoted i n Jean Edward Smith, 47. How inherently irresponsible Saddam Hussein actually seemed i n American eyes i s , of course, open to question. A senatorial delegation went to Iraq later i n April, and leader Robert Dole said "there might be a chance to bring this guy around." Bernard Reich, "The United States in the Middle East," Current History 90, no. 549 (January 1991): 7. 174 New York Times 23 November 1990, quoted in Jean Edward Smith, 211. 175 Ibid., 211; Christopher Layne, "Why the Gulf War was not in the National Interest," Atlantic Monthly 268, no. 1 (July 1991): 65. 1*7 6 Lisbeth Gronlund, Lora Lumpe, and David C. Wright, "Third World Missiles Fall Short," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 48, no. 2 (March 1992): 31; Layne, 65. 177 Buhite and Hamel, 370. 178 Sivachev and Yakovlev, 217. 179 Schweller, 261; MccGwire, 17. 1 on  Herken, 111; "Keep Bomb Secret," 3.  181 Bundy, Danger and Survival, 174; Yergin, 136. 182 The army, s t i l l dissenting, put the figure at ten years from a Soviet nuclear test expected between 1949 and 1952; the rest of the JCS said seven to eight years instead. See Herken, 233. 183 Kennedy to Harriman, 15 July 1963, cable, quoted in Chang, 1300, 1293; Fetzer, 180. - 95 -  184  Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 274; Drew Middleton, The Duel of the Giants: China and Russia i n Asia (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), 44; "Long Live Leninism," quoted i n Hsieh, 101. 185 Fetzer, 182; Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 665. 186  "Should We Bomb?," 9; Schurmann, 388; Chang, 1309.  187 CIA, "Possibilities of Greater Militancy by Chinese Communists," 31 July 1963, quoted i n Ibid. 188 Committee on Foreign Relations, "Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," 15 August 1963, quoted i n Ibid. 189 Ibid., 1290. Schurmann, 451, notes more dramatically that Kennedy believed " a l l of Southeast Asia would f a l l " to a nuclear China. 190 "Possibilities of Greater Militancy," quoted i n Chang, 1309. 191 Hsieh, 102; Fetzer, 183. 192 Halperin, 91. 193 Ibid., 88, emphasis added. 194 Ibid. 195,. Gaffney, 64. CfZ  1 96  Evron, "Arab Position," 21.  I-  197 The Observer, 5 July 1964, and Mid-East Mirror, 5 September 1964, quoted i n Ibid., 30-31. 198  B u r t , 1.  199 Krosney and Weissman, 321. Barnaby, 116. 201 Benjamin, 11; Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, 50. 2  0  2  r T  •  Q [r  Wirsing, 85. 203 Chellaney, 49; Spector and Smith, 95; Kapur, 230. 204 Cohen, 14. 205 Joseph V.R. Micallef, "A nuclear bomb for Libya?," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 37, no. 7 (August/September 1981): 15; Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals, 97; Gronlund, Lumpe, and Wright, 35; Cohen, 14; Cordesman, 107; Janne E. Nolan and Albert D. Wheelon, "Third World B a l l i s t i c Missiles," - 96 1990): Scientific American 263, No. 2 (August 36.  206 Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, 77. 207 Spector and Smith, 136. 208 Ibid., 136; Rubinstein, 27. Claiming instead that the consensus was on nuclear North Korea's irrationality i s David C. Kang, "Preventive War and North Korea," Security Studies 4, no. 2 (Winter 1994/1995): 375. 209 Schlesinger, 897; Cumings, 21; Mandelbaum, 33. 210 Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter, 162. 211 Nakdimon, 274; Friedlander, "Might Can Also Be Right: The Israeli Nuclear Reactor Bombing and International Law," Chitty's Law Journal 28 (December 1981): 354. 212 Snyder, 581; Shoham, 214; Nakdimon, 57, 76, 100. 213 Krosney and Weissman, 12, 265; Bar-Joseph, Handel and Perlmutter, 89. 214 Nakdimon, 73, 75, 102. 215 Ibid., 146. 2 1 6  I b i d . , 60, 203.  I b i d . , 149, 186. 218 Snyder, 579-580; Krosney and Weissman, 244-247; Bar-Joseph, Handel and Perlmutter, 77. 219 Snyder, 581; Krosney and Weissman, 5. Again, Iran did not appear to bomb Osiraq intentionally; Iranian attack did not, at any rate, result in Osiraq's destruction. Feldman, "Bombing," 119. 221 Shoham, 212; Nakdimon, 168; Barnaby, 94; Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter, 101; Government of Israel, "The Iraqi Nuclear Threat - Why Israel Had to Act" (Jerusalem: 1981), 19, quoted i n Feldman, "Bombing," 120. 222 2 1 7  220  "Iraqi Nuclear Threat," 44, quoted i n Snyder, 582. 223  Nakdimon, 160-161.  Pajak, 599; Feldman, "Bombing," 124. 225 Michael Sterner, "Navigating the Gulf," Foreign Policy, no. 81 (Winter 1990/1991): 51. 224  226  Y e r g i n , 149, 238.  227 Zaloga, 45. - 97 -  228  Ibid., 79; Joseph I. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula (Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n Company, 1970), 75. 229 Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1981), 181. 230 Sorenson, 736; Chang, 1294. Hopes of Soviet success were slim, of course, since Moscow retained few peaceful avenues for exercising i n f l u ence. China i t s e l f called the test ban treaty a "big fraud." 231 Schlesinger, 910. 232 Segal, 132; Schurmann, 519; Halperin, 87. 233 Evron, "Arab Position," 20; Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter, 31. 234 Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals, 48; Evron, "Arab Position," 20; Hedrick Smith, 8. 235 Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence, 69. 236 Ibid., 67; Friedlander, "Armageddon Factor," 152. 237 Burt, 1; Krosney and Weissman, 45; Spector and Smith, 77. 238 . . Benjamin, 11. 239 Krosney and Weissman, 296-300. 240 Spector and Smith, 65. 241 Ibid.; Krosney and Weissman, 309. 242 Spector and Smith, 66. 243 New York Times, 18 July 1993, quoted i n Rubinstein, 33, emphasis added. 244 Chester L. Cooper, "Nuclear Hostages," Foreign Policy, no. 32 (Fall 1978): 131. 245 Spector and Smith, 131; see also Conrad V. Chester and Rowena 0. Chester, " C i v i l Defense Implications of the U.S. Nuclear Power Industry During a Large Nuclear War in the Year 2000," Nuclear Technology 31 (December 1976); Wallace, 19 July 1995. 246 Nakdimon, 182; Snyder, 580; Krosney and Weissman, 289. 247 Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter, 142; "Iraqi Nuclear Threat," quoted in Snyder, 584. 248 Albert Carnesdale, "June 7 in Baghdad," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 37, no. 7 (August/September 1981): 12; Snyder, 585; Nakdimon, 256. D  - 98 -  249 *Ibid., 228, 114. 250 Wallace, 19 July 1995, says that several US generals told him NATO would lose out should a precedent be set for attacking hot reactors. 251 Cordesman, 103; Spector and Smith, 209. 252 Ibid.; Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals, 82. 253 "U.N. Envoy Urges Mid-East Nuclear-Free Zone," Baghdad INA, 1252 GMT, 4 June 1987, quoted in Spector and Smith, 382. 254 Hiro, 408; Nakdimon, 44. 255  Wallace, 19 July  1995.  256 Kramish, 121; Zaloga, 51; Lewis and Xue, 257  109.  "Should We Bomb?," 9.  Gaffney, 60; Power, 847. 259 Rubinstein, 23. 260 MixLler and Reiss, 146; Benjamin, 1; Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals, 69. ^^W. Thomas Mallison and Sally V. Mallison, "The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981, upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or SelfDefense?," Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 15, no. 3 (Summer 1982): 422. 262 Anthony D'Amato, "Israel's Air Strike upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor," The American Journal of International Law 77 (July 1983): 584587. 263 Mallison and Mallison, 419. 264 Arthur J. Goldberg, quoted in Nakdimon, 256; Ramberg says that wartime attacks even on f a c i l i t i e s containing "dangerous forces" but with military value are excused by rudimentary environmental law; see The Destruction of Nuclear Energy Facilities in War: A Proposal for Legal Restraint (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1978). 258  2  265  Nakdimon, 239; The Times, 10 June 1981, quoted in Istvan Pogany, "The destruction of Osirak: a legal perspective," The World Today 37, no. 11 (November 1981): 414. 2  ^Nakdimon, 275.  267 447-448 UN Security Council Resolution 487, quoted in Mallison and Mallison, 268 Ibid., 433. - 99 -  269  Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter, 12. Hunter, 26.  271 D'Amato, 588; Nakdimon, 275; Pogany, 416. Some international lawyers did feel that the U.S. bombing of missile sites would be justified, however; see Mallison and Mallispn, 423. 272 Walter L. Kirchner and Joseph F. Pilat, "The Technological Promise of Counterproliferation," The Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 164. 273 Nakdimon, 215. 274 Ibid., 117, 159, 160; Bar-Joseph, Handel, and Perlmutter, 53. 275 Nakdimon, 164. I b i d . , 159. 2 7 6  277 Ibid., 304. 278 Jerusalem Post, 22 June 1981, quoted i n Feldman, "Bombing," 139. 279 Of course, Iraqi chemical production may have deterred Israel from an independent preventive strike. See Barnaby, 78; John K. Cooley, "Pre-war Gulf Diplomacy," Survival 33, no. 2 (March/April 1991): 126. 280 Zaloga, 30; Sivachev and Yakovlev, 230; Buhite and Hamel, 370. Sagan, 18. 282 Buhite and Hamel, 384. 283 Harry G. Gelber, "Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Policy," i n The Superpowers i n a Multinuclear World, ed. Geoffrey Kemp, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, and Uri Ra'anan (Lexington, Toronto, London: Lexington Books, 1974), 75; Segal, 129. 284 Schurmann, 513. See also Lewis and Xue, 216. 285 Hsieh, 114; Schurmann, 515. ^^^Gaffney, 65. 287 Cohen, 4; Evron, "Arab Position," 25. Wirsing, 89. 289 Rikhye, 52; Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, 90. 290 291 Benjamin, 1; Bhatia, "Israelis plot." Ibid.; Spector and Smith, 96-97. 288  - 100 -  292  Bracken, 143; Byung-joon Ann, "Arms Control and Confidence-buildxng on the Korean Peninsula," in Asian Flashpoint, 105; Reiss, 99-102. 293 Mack, 18; Cumings, 22. 294 Spector and Smith, 130, 132; Choung-Il Chee, 304; Rubinstein, 24. Major c i v i l i a n casualties were feared should North Korea attack Seoul from the a i r or ground; Professor Brian L. Job's suggestions to the author, 11 July 1995. 295 Ibid., 33. 296 BBC SWB-Asia Pacific, 4 November 1993, quoted in Mack, 8. 297 Snyder, 583; Schweller, 265-266; Nakdimon, 327. 298 Ibid., 316. 299 John E. Rielly, "Public Opinion: The Pulse of the 1990s," Foreign Policy, no. 82 (Spring 1992): 95. 3 0 0  H i r o , 247,  250.  301 Freedman and Karsh, 18. 302  Schweller, 241; Brodie, 239. Herken, 311.  304 Brodie, 239; Address to the Nation, 1 September 1950, quoted in Robert Tucker, The Just War (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1960), 15. 305 Fareed Zakaria, "A Conversation with Lee Kwan Yew," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994): 124. Lho, 154. 307 Feldman, "Bombing," 122. 308 Shahram Chubin, "Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons?," Survival 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 92-93. 309 Schneider, 225; Muller and Reiss, 143. 310 Mandelbaum, 35-37; Seth Cropsey, "The Only Credible Deterrent," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994): 16; J.D. Crouch, "Clinton's 'Slow Boat to Korea,'" Comparative Strategy 14 (January-March 1995): 42. 311 Elaine Sciolino, "Taking on Iran and Iraq, but Separately," New York Times, 11 April 1993; Schneider, for example, adds Algeria to the l i s t of potential proliferators considered here. 312 313 Krosney, 249; Brune, 149. Muller and Reiss, - 149. - 101 -  314  Cordesman, 175; Chubin, 96; Kirchner and Pilat, 162.  315 "Al-Qadhafi Lectures University Students," FBIS - Near East and South Asia," 26 June 1987, quoted in Spector and Smith, 178, emphasis added. 316" Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals, 70; Micallef, 14; Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma, 25. 317 Charles A. Meconis and Michael D. 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