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Sovreignty, autonomy, and international environmental interdependence Krueger, Jonathan Patrick 1992

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SOVEREIGNTY, AUTONOMY, AND INTERNATIONALENVIRONMENTAL INTERDEPENDENCEbyJONATHAN PATRICK KRUEGERB.A., The University of British Columbia, 1991A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES(Department of Political Science)We accept this thesis as conformingto 1f\reuirea standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIASeptember 1992Jonathan Patrick Krueger, 1992In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make Jtfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.Department of Political ScienceThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate Occtber 8, 1992DE-6 (2/88)iiABSTRACTThe discipline of international relations employs twoconcepts - sovereignty and interdependence- as fundamental tounderstanding the current international system. The meaning ofboth sovereignty and interdependence, and their relation to eachother, however, causes considerable confusion among scholars andother observers. An international system based on thesovereignty of its actors seems incompatible with the growth ofinternational interdependencies. In particular, some observersargue that sovereignty is ‘modified’ or ‘undermined’ by theexistence of international environmental interdependence, or thatsovereignty is a barrier to the effective management of thisinterdependence. The suggested solution is to move to a post-sovereign international governing arrangement.In international relations, sovereignty may be bestunderstood as constitutional independence, the fundamentalcriterion required for a territorially based entity (a state) tobecome a member in the international community. That is, to beconsidered sovereign, a state’s constitution must not be part ofa larger constitutional arrangement. Sovereignty should not beconfused with autonomy, or freedom of action in the internationalsystem. While states are extremely protective of theirsovereignty, both in rhetoric and in practice, they are willingto sacrifice various measures of autonomy through bindinginternational agreements (such as the Montreal Protocol) toachieve goals which are important to them, or are consideredgreater global goals (such as environmental protection), whichcould not be achieved by unilateral action.iiiThe proposition that the sovereignty of the state isundermined or modified by international environmentalinterdependence, or is a barrier to the effective management ofthat interdependence, suffers from two defects: first, a failureto distinguish between sovereignty and autonomy; and second, afailure to identify precisely and accurately the impacts ofenvironmental interdependencies. Despite the fact that manyinternational environmental problems (such as air pollution,depletion of the ozone layer, and climate change) are global inscope, and that their solutions require internationalcooperation, the arguments about the current plight of thesovereignty of the state made by many observers are unwarranted.The existence of international environmental interdependence andthe conclusion of international environmental agreements does notweaken, modify, or make obsolete the sovereignty of the state.Nor is sovereignty a barrier to obtaining multilateralregulation. Since state sovereignty is not at risk, and sincesolutions to serious global environmental problems are possiblethrough the restriction of state autonomy, the prescription for apost-sovereign international governing arrangement due tointernational environmental interdependence is unfounded.Sovereignty remains, currently and for the foreseeablefuture, the central concept around which the international systemis organized. Furthermore, it is not the barrier to cooperationthat some observers would have us believe. Perhaps a clearerunderstanding of these concepts would not only enlightenobservers and statespeople, but lead to improved, and moreivexpeditious, cooperation on environmental issues of globalimportance.VCONTENTSABSTRACT iiACKNOWLEDGEMENT viChapter1. INTRODUCTION: THE SOURCE OF THE CONFUSION 12. CLARIFYING THE CONFUSION: DISTINGUISHING BETWEENSOVEREIGNTY AND AUTONOMY 7Sovereignty 7Autonomy 13Interdependence 153. THE MANIFEST CONFUSION: SOVEREIGNTY, AUTONOMY, ANDINTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL INTERDEPENDENCE 204. SUBSTANTIATING THE DISTINCTION: EVIDENCE OFRESTRICTED AUTONOMY AND CONTINUED SOVEREIGNTY INRHETORIC AND IN PRACTICE 32Do as We Do, Not as We Say 34What to Do? Case One: The Partial Test BanTreaty (1963) 38Case Two: The ECE Convention on Long RangeTransboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) and theProtocols on SO2 and NOx (1979, 1985, 1988) .. 40Case Three: The Montreal Protocol and theLondon Amendments (1987, 1990) 445. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE 1992 UNCED: THE FUTURE OFINTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 496. CONCLUSIONS 59NOTES 65BIBLIOGRAPHY 80viACKNOWLEDGEMENTAfter twelve months of study there are more than a fewpeople to whom I am grateful for various forms of support. Myfirst thanks go to all those, too many in name, who challengedand encouraged me in various ways throughout the year to pursuethe many interesting and important avenues of inquiry that ourdiscipline offers. For comments on this paper, I’d like to thankProfessors Bob Jackson, Brian Job, and especially Don Munton.Responsibility for the content and any errors therein, of course,remains with the author. My deepest gratitude is reserved for mymother and father, whose support and encouragement provided thefoundation for any of the accomplishments which I realized thisyear.1CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION: THE SOURCE OF THE CONFUSIONTwo of the most fundamental concepts to the study ofinternational relations are ‘sovereignty’ and ‘interdependence’.Many observers currently argue that the sovereignty of the stateis undermined by the interdependence of the modern world and thatit is a barrier to effective management of globalinterdependencies. International environmental problems, inparticular, are sometimes seen as textbook examples ofinterdependencies which challenge the notion of statesovereignty. What exactly the ‘interdependent’ nature ofinternational and transboundary environmental problems refers to,and how this affects ‘sovereignty’, is less clear than it mayappear on the surface however.Neither term, unfortunately, lends itself easily to cleardefinition and both are the source of much confusion andcontroversy within the discipline. This is truer than ever inthe 1990s when the pace of change and the sheer volume oftransactions between states has created new challenges for theterms sovereignty and interdependence. Furthermore, manyobservers are often less than precise in their usage of‘sovereignty’ and ‘interdependence’, not to mention that, forreasons which will be discussed later, states are particularlyquick to guard their interests by encapsulating them in thesacrosanct language of ‘sovereignty’. It is appropriate, then,to undertake a critical examination of these fundamental conceptsof international relations, and their interaction, at a time whennew and important phenomena— such as international environmental2interdependence - appear to challenge traditionalinterpretations.The current awareness of international environmentalproblems, when viewed against the history of the nation-state, isquite a recent phenomenon. Many observers argue that thetransboundary, or international, character of these problems(such as acid precipitation, atmospheric pollution, depletion ofthe ozone layer, and climate change) is partially orfundamentally at odds with the concept of the ‘sovereign’ nation—state. The conclusion of this argument is that in a worlddivided into sovereign states which co-exist with thefundamentally global nature of environmental interdependence,sovereignty not only is undermined by these interdependencies,but is a barrier to their effective management. It is prudent toask, however, if these propositions are sound individually, andmore importantly, to determine if they are together defensibleexplanations of the current state of modern internationalenvironmental relations. Do global problems such as depletion ofthe ozone layer undermine the sovereignty of the state? Whatevidence is there to support the assertion that sovereignty mustbe modified because it is (presumably) a barrier to internationalcooperation?It could be argued that it is not in fact the sovereignty ofthe state that is at risk. When the international communityconfronts the issues of atmospheric pollution and internationalenvironmental degradation, and recognizes the need formultilateral solutions, however, a key feature of the sovereignstate is greatly affected. It is the freedom of action, or3autonomy that states have in the international system that isreduced. This may seem as so much hair-splitting betweendefinitions to some, but such is not the case. It isparticularly important to be precise when dealing with themeaning of such fundamental concepts to the study ofinternational relations as sovereignty and interdependence andtheir relationship to important global environmental problems.As Robert Keohane has argued, “[though] definitions are notinteresting in themselves.. .they may.. .lead to the identificationof more or less tractable problems.”l The confusion resultingfrom the misconception of equating the loss of state autonomywith a loss of state sovereignty can only lead to inaccurateassumptions and unwarranted prescriptions.For example, there are some observers who argue that thesovereign nation-state system (that is, a system based on thesovereignty of its individual actors) is undermined byinternational environmental problems and thus must proceed tosome other form of international political organization. Such anassertion is quite simply misleading. As this paper intends toshow, the sovereignty of the nation-state is not undermined byinternational environmental degradation or the attempts toaddress these problems effectively, nor is sovereignty aninsurmountable barrier to cooperation. The call for a change inthe structure of the international system is thereforeinappropriately based upon an inaccurate assumption.Furthermore, it is not at all assured that any other type ofuniversal political order would be able to deal effectively withthese problems.24It is also inappropriate, it will be argued, to accept someform of pure neo-realist thought which asserts that sovereignstates will not seek to cooperate on mutual regulation to achieve“low” political goals such as international environmentalprotection.3 States can and do seek to cooperate to achieve suchgoals. Nor is it necessary to ‘reify’ sovereignty as anahistorical reality which exists independently of human actionand history when asserting the continued sovereignty of states.4As Robert Jackson has argued, “[s]overeign statehood. ..is onlyone of several kinds of international status which have existedhistorically. Today [however] it is virtually the only kind.”5Similarly, another scholar has noted that “[t]here is nothingsanctified about the idea of sovereignty. The world has got alongwithout it in times past, and in theory it could do so again.”6What an examination of the attempts by states to regulateinternational environmental problems reveals is that sovereigntyremains, currently and for the foreseeable future, the centralconcept around which the international system is organized.Equally important, evidence also shows that solutions to theseinternational environmental problems are within reach of a systemof ‘sovereign’ states, as their sovereignty is not undermined bythe problems, nor is it a barrier to solutions. State autonomy,on the other hand, is reduced- usually through bindinginternational agreements - when solutions to global environmentalproblems are sought and enacted. As one observer has stated, “itis no longer accurate to conceptualize states as having theirtraditional degree of autonomy” as they are willing to “tradeoff”autonomy to achieve other goals.7 The result, in turn, of this5restriction of autonomy could be at the least, effectivesolutions to some global problems such as the environment, or, atmost, higher levels of international governance. Thus, ifstudents of international relations are going to analyze,usefully, the way the international community deals with thesevery serious problems, more discriminating observations will berequired.It is the purpose of this paper to show that in meeting thechallenge of international environmental interdependence, it isthe autonomy of the state that is sacrificed and not what isbroadly (mis)termed ‘sovereignty’. The distinction is importantbecause while states hold sovereignty as inviolable, especiallyin rhetoric, these same states have always and more easilyaccepted limitations on their autonomy. This observation remainstrue in the case of international environmental interdependence.As a result, the argument, whether made by states or by analysts,that sovereignty is undermined by environmental interdependenceand is a barrier to its effective management is inaccurate.The first section of the paper will develop definitions ofsovereignty, autonomy, and interdependence to provide somedistinctions and a useful basis for discussion of this issue.The second section will discuss the confusion between sovereigntyand autonomy as it manifests itself in some of the currentinternational relations and environment literature, and show whyit is in fact autonomy, not sovereignty, that is at issue. Thethird section will consider both state rhetoric with regards tothe impact of environmental interdependencies on theirsovereignty and autonomy, and also state practice as they have6sought to manage these important problems. The discussion ofstate practice will be in the form of an examination of threeselected case studies in environmental regulation to determine ifthere is any empirical substantiation for the claim that statesare willing to trade off autonomy through multilateral regulationto achieve international environmental protection. The lastsection will consider the most recent international effort atmanaging an environmental problem: the Framework Climate ChangeConvention of 1992. on the strength of this case and theprevious case studies of chapter four, it will be concluded thatthe future of international environmental protection is hopefulas sovereign states continue to sacrifice autonomy in variousmeasures through international regulation.7CHAPTER 2CLARIFYING THE CONFUSION: DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTYAND AUTONOMYThe concept of sovereignty is generally regarded as the coreor constitutive organizing principle of the internationalsystem.8 There is hardly unanimity about what sovereigntyactually means, however, and thus Stephen Krasner for one arguesthat “sovereignty.. .has lost meaning and analytic relevance”.9If the thesis of this paper is going to be proven correct andsignificant, then clear definitions and explanations— the taskof academic students of international relations — is also thetask of this chapter.SovereigntyThe conventional interpretation of sovereignty, that made byF.H. Hinsley and many others, argues that the term sovereigntyoriginally and for a long time “expressed the idea that there isa final and absolute authority in the political community”.lOApplied to the problems which arise in the relations betweenpolitical communities, however, sovereignty expresses theantithesis of this argument. That is, the principle that outsidea given political community, or state, no supreme authorityexists.ll Indeed, it was suggested as early as 1577 by JeanBodin in his Six livres de la Republique that there are both‘internal’ and ‘external’ aspects to sovereignty, though theexternal aspect became important only after the rise of thenation-state in the 16th and 17th centuries when it became vitalto examine the relationship between states and sovereigns.128Any first year student of international politics will recitethat the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 formally acknowledged thebasic principles that underlie the relations between all statesto this day, the most important of which is sovereignty.13 Thekey corollaries of the sovereignty of states in the internationalsystem are clear: firstly, that subnational units have no legalstanding abroad; secondly, that no state has the right tointerfere in the domestic affairs of another state; and thirdly,that all states are formally equal.14What is the fundamental feature of the sovereign state thatgives it its sovereignty? In the modern international system,that feature is constitutional independence. As C.A.W. Manningand Alan James have argued, a state is sovereign if itsconstitution is not part of a larger constitutionalarrangement.15 Sovereignty, or constitutional independence, isthe fundamental prerequisite to obtaining the power ofindependent decision, and thus becoming a member in theinternational community. While a state’s status as sovereign ornon—sovereign depends on its constitutional situation, a statemust also meet the factual requirements of statehood, the mostimportant of which is territoriality (systematic administrativecontrol over people living within a well-defined territory) .16Once a territorial entity has achieved constitutionalindependence, the political act of recognition by like entitiesacknowledges that a new sovereign state has entered the communityof nations and that recognizing states are ready to enter intorelations with the recognized state. The process of recognizingentities as sovereign is not automatic, however; states followH Co P3 CD N-‘itCoCDH’CDP3H’j1<qH-0H-0P3‘QH-CoCoI-hP3b0C)CDH-itH‘t3p3I-hCl)II—C)II00CDMJ0iP30‘z3.QCl)C)CDit<P3H-CoCDititCDHCD0bP3‘—aCDP3CDCDCDitçt10itCoH-CDH-P30‘ciitfriMIIp33<0ititI-Ienit(1)CoH-<itCD<CDCDI-I(12CDCoCDH-<itH-CDP3CDNCDCDJ11CDH’o‘<CD0II(I)Coit-P3P3NisiCDp3<CDCDitHitP3itCDititi[‘3itCDH-CoH-H-itHH0H-H-H-ititC)p3IIiQCoitH-Cl)CD‘-‘‘ciH-CD‘QitCoCo0‘<‘-<HCDCD0itCDO0H-0C)t5H-LitoH-0I—’itito-CoC)‘-QH-P3p3CI)H-M(DrtH-PH-‘<siCDcoqCDrCoHP3:-LQfrCoC)CDP3itC)H<1H-3C)CDitsiP3JO<H-DCDH-P3CDC)Cop3H-0CoCDP3CDp3HCDH-C)IItTCDCDHP3H-CDCo.Q-p3-CoC)‘1CD3D’H‘-<CD<CD0C)itH-itCDNCDitCo0CD0oCD0ititCD‘<HHP3MHIII-i‘ciP3H-C)itoitCDCD0H-H-CDCDH-CDCDCDCDCDCDH-itHitCoCDP3P3CoitH-C)it<CoitMCoC)itJCD0p.CDP3‘dCDCoCofrtiCDit0CDH0H-CD0L.QCDItTCDCoP3t-i’dC)O0I-hYCDCDp.HO3H-OC)0CoH-H-CDH-C)I-iit0H0PH•P3N1)o‘-<H-C)CDF—’M‘cioP3<CDHICDHp.CDQCDCoH-H’CDitCDCDI-H-I-ICDCoCD‘tiitH-P3‘<OH-CDititCoitH•HctMH-H-H-CDH’HHo-CoCDCDCoH-P3I,.<CoCDH-OCDC)C)0HCoH-itH-oHHitCDoH-o00itC)0C)‘P3H’o-.0‘-<CoitCDP30M—itP3o-0CoHCDjCoCDCDCoH0H’I-hitCDCoP3P3HOCo•H-C)-P3bitCDitôH-CDitititHCDDH-3CDCDP30H-H-P3CoH-‘-<CDI-iititCDCOCoH-I10p‘0Co3HCoH-itp.-.CDP3‘-<CDitCDP3CoH-CDNitP3PHitCDliti.QC)Y’ititCDIlIiitH’CDCoooP3CDCD3itCoH-I-I-CDCDOitCoH-<pt5‘-ICoH-CDH-p.1<H-CoCDito-ito-IICoCDCo—’Co1CoCDHCD<b‘<‘rjCoCooHHNsiH-itititH-CDCD-HCD‘Qit0OitC)P3‘ci‘1HCDCDfrCDp3CoitCoC).CoIICoC)CoCDsiitH-0II)CD(I)CDrt-CDCDctitCDCl)CD0CoH-0IIsi0b0QH-CoP3p)IIsiCoC)0HCoP3<0Co‘Oitit•C)QitP3HCDC)C)CDi-HitCDH-HCl)HP3C)siCDC)•CoitCDCDCDCojP3P3CojCoCDH-CDHCooH’3H-Mp.P3IICDI-ICDitFciC)H-CDit—iCDitCoOCoCD03P-H-0QCDit‘-PCoCoP3CDCoCDH-H,0H-CDitCD3CoCoHP3CoCl)‘-Qitp.H-3Cop.ititHCoH-3CDCDII0itH-P3I-isi‘.<JH-H-NitP3CoHCD30itCDP3Co00P3itH’P3CD‘-<31<CoII-hCDp.CDCoitt,3itCoCDCoCDH-,HQCDp1itCDcip1HCDH-itCoH-H it‘QCoc-i-iiCl)..P1OP1ciCo‘<HCD0IIciCDCDH-IIH-HCDitiH-JitLQCl)‘-ciiiiII LI:‘-ciIIH-IiitCDH-CoCDCoP1Ii P1it0H-0OIlb’)itt3HCoCDCDI-’-p1Co‘-ciH-Hpiiitci CDH-P1CoititititCoH-itit0P1CDCDP1OHL)(I)H CDH-P1itciH-CDCo0CD‘Io:iCoH•itCDH-CoC)ciitoCoP1CDb•‘iti-cP1CDC)CoH-H-P1C)ciCl)P1CD•-‘-ci-‘t3H-HP1IICl)b0CoH)H-oCDciHCl)0HciCoitit0CDiiP1Cl)HCD CoH-C)Co‘•C5CD0-C)H-H-CDCoCoH)IlH)LIH-CDCDCDi-cH-CDitH-P1Co‘t5CDH-Coi—cCoP1it CDII CDCD0Hi-hoCDCoP10ot3IIo0Co-l-0 HP1CDP1itQitbCDH-Cl)HitoCD‘<ci-.CDCoitcioI’)itCDH)(nCDP1itII itCDC) 0CDCD0iiI—’I--cciitCDitHciitI—’CDH-CDP10C)ititjitCoCDciHi—cP1‘-ci0CDCo•‘H)I--cCDci0H-CDHitCl)H-ititCDH-H-i—c0C)jP1FcjHi--cH ci CD CD ci CD C) CD H- C!) itititCDH it0H-oCl)Cl)H)H-itP1H-CD‘—‘0CD:iP1Cob-,H-0CoCl)0CDH-0ci—1CDitC)HCDCDciH-C)P1Cl)0CDH0H-itH-0CD H-.I—c,-<CD0-‘.ciCD‘-Cl)jIlCD CoH-H-Coi-cit0H-CD0H-,Cl)C)H-CoHci00ciciciciP1CDCDCDHciFII‘t3ciiCDCDCDH-SH-CDbitci‘-Qcici‘-ciCDCDCoitiitCDP1it‘-<C)C)Co•CDo0bH-ciCoC)‘-ci‘--a‘-cH-itLQH-Cl)itCoCD•H-CoCDitH-Co-CDCY—CoH-CDP1C)‘-citCDoCl)CDH)itp1P1CoCoC)CDopC)HciCDciCDCDitCoCDCDçH-ciCoititi--cH-CDLIH-‘-<bitCDitp1oCoIlH-CDC)Cl)0C) oH-Cl)CDitCoitH-HCDitH-i-h-0H ‘P1H-HCDH-CDH-oci0p1it5HP1t3P1H0H‘-ciH‘-cii-hC)) 0 ci CD I-’l CD H LQ it ‘-ci Co it CD Co I—c 0 P1 C) 0 Co it H-it ci it H 0 P1 H 0 Co H- it H 0 H- C) i-c CD Ci) ci H it Cl) HC):J3Cl)QcOP1IPIIPICoCoitoHCoH-CociititCoCl)CDH-00i-hit‘-ciociCoCoP)H-jitcitrp)itH-’z50H-HOCDCoOitIl‘dCoP1H-itCDP1HOC)HtIlP1H-P1CoitH)’tlitCD-H-IlciititC)OIlIH-ciPIciP1IIciHditCDC)it,ritiiititCDci.CD COCDCDM0IICoCDciI—hCD:3I--cH-OCDP1C)IIH-I-h::5itCDCoO)itCoitC)H-’OOitCoOH)0itCo:D-H--cPlOitP1plititH-ColtCDitHCDciCDitCDH-Ilit’-Q0CoH-P1P1CoOHciCoit00cip1p1ci1YitHP1H-OCDitCoitl—HciciitP1IIitOH-0CD0HP1::HitH-HitCDOititCo•C!)[‘-3CD(A)C)H-CoCooCDit0ciciP1ciciCoCDP1itCDP1it‘dCoci‘1HH-CD•CoCDciitsHciciititCDoH-P1P1ciHCDP1CDH-Cl)ciitHP1it‘-ciP1IIH-IIitH-H-ciP1‘<CoI.‘Cl)Hit--CDitIIH-CDitH-0P1CDjitH0CoIICDSH-IlCoit‘-H-P1JCDçitCD0H-P1P10CoHH-Cl)-‘CDH-H0H-Coit‘-C5CDCoCoHciP1‘--ciCDC)itCo-‘-0ititCDCDitCDCoci_‘-QitHH-CD°0oitCoCDP1I-’CDH-‘-ciitCDHCoH-CDcip)it::sciitP1H--P10H-CDCoiciP1CDP10H-HIII-hCoP111power.26 Such an interpretation, however, is a grossmisunderstanding of the absoluteness of sovereignty. Beingsovereign has never meant being above all rules of behaviour; itis not a question of sheer power.27Sovereignty as an absolute condition means that it does notexist in degrees. Indeed, it would seem difficult to attempt tounderstand sovereignty in relative terms. How would one measurewhether state X is more or less sovereign than state Y? And howcan this then be posited as the constitutive organizing principleof the international system when one is constantly re-evaluatingthe degree to which certain units are or are not sovereign? Itcertainly seems much more reasonable, and it has also been thepractice of states in international relations, to viewsovereignty in the international system as an absolute conditionwhich derives from the constitutional independence of itsunits.28 As will be noted below, however, there is nothinginconsistent with asserting absolute sovereignty while being opento the normal pressures and opportunities of international life.The third and last characteristic of sovereignty is that itis a unitary condition. When properly understood asconstitutional independence, the basic qualification formembership in the international community, it becomes clear thatsovereignty is all of a piece. As James argues:The control of both internal and external policy,therefore, flows from the same source: constitutionalindependence, or sovereignty. By virtue of thiscondition a state can decide what to do in respect ofmatters which take place within its own frontiers justas it can decide what line to take regarding eventswhich occur beyond them. . . Thus the internal andexternal aspects of sovereignty are inextricably boundup with each other. The one goes along with the other,12and the absence of one means that the other is absenttoo. 29The unitary characteristic of sovereignty clarifies the moreconventional definitions of sovereignty discussed above whichdifferentiated between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ sovereignty.The definitions of internal and external sovereignty, thedifferences between them, and the confusion they engender bysuggesting that sovereignty has two separate meanings, seem lessrelevant when the internal and external aspects of the nation-state are understood to stem from a single condition. Internaland external sovereignty are simply two sides of the coin that isconstitutional independence.Two brief examples will serve to substantiate the case forsovereignty as constitutional independence. A first example, thetransformation of the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu from nonsovereign territorial entities (British protectorates) intosovereign states, is used by James to demonstrate the importanceof constitutional independence. What transformed these islandsfrom non-sovereign entities - part of the British constitutionalset-up - to ones possessing sovereignty was a change in theirconstitutional situation. That is, their constitution becameindependent from that of the United Kingdom. The result is thatthe Solomon Islands and Tuvalu acquired the essential featureneeded for acceptance into the international community -sovereignty. Their new sovereign status was recognized by otherstates and so these new states took their place on theinternational stage, with all of its derivative opportunities andresponsibilities:[I]n international relations [as well as in domesticpolicies] it is now up to both states to decide what13they wish to do. That is not to say that they, anymore than any other, have legal freedom to do whatthey like. They have obligations under internationallaw, just as they have rights, and they may add to bothby treaty. But decisions regarding their internationalsituation are now theirs alone.30A second example which supports this definition is that ofsovereignty for Quebec. Although it is clear to most that asovereign Quebec may not be the most autonomous state in terms ofeconomics or security, it is also clear that the sovereigntysought by separatists is defined in terms of constitutionalindependence from Canada. Such independence would then assureQuebec the status of a sovereign state. Nothing less thanconstitutional independence would qualify Quebec as a sovereignstate.31 Recognition by others of Quebec’s new status wouldclear the way for its participation in the internationalcommunity as a sovereign member.AutonomyThe sovereign state, as indicated above, is not isolated.It is open to the pressures and opportunities of internationallife. It seeks to achieve various goals such as wealth,security, and more recently, international environmentalprotection. If sovereignty is the fundamental pre-condition fora state to obtain the power of independent decision in theinternational community, and thus membership, then autonomy isthe condition which represents the ability, or freedom of action,that states have in the international system to carry outobjectives. Several observers of international relations, suchas Oran Young, and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, haveacknowledged this principle.32 Richard Cooper in his 196814examination of economic interdependence among the Atlanticcommunity argued that:National autonomy, as used here to mean the ability toframe and carry out objectives of domestic. . .policywhich may diverge widely from those of other countries,should not be confused with the notion of sovereignty,which represents the formal ability of countries.. .tomake their own decisions - and to renounce decisionspreviously made - but not necessarily to achieve theirobjectives.33In addition to widening Cooper’s definition of autonomy toinclude the ability to carry out objectives of external as wellas domestic policies, K.J Hoisti notes that while sovereigntyprovides the legal basis for autonomy, sovereignty does notreduce the constraints that operate on states as they seek tosecure or maximize their goals.34 Indeed, as Hoisti argues, “itappears that other values.. .cannot be maximized or achievedexcept by voluntarily relinquishing complete freedom ofaction”.35 This does not mean completely relinquishingautonomy, but relinquishing some of that total freedom of action.In contrast, the principle of sovereignty cannot be undermined byanything that is external to the state, except the voluntary orforceful subjugation to another state’s constitution which wouldeffectively result in that state ceasing to exist. The‘survival’ rate for states in this respect, however, has beenextremely high since 1945.36Sovereignty is a qualitative concept; it is either presentor absent. Autonomy, on the other hand, is not a matter ofstatus, but of abilities or freedoms. It can be present ingreater or lesser quantities, and be sacrificed, eroded,enhanced, or exercised without detriment to sovereignty.Autonomy is a quantitative concept.15InterdependenceMany observers contend that the dynamics of theinternational system are not the same as they were in 1648 oreven 1968, largely due to the relatively recent rise of economic,social, and environmental interdependencies which, in turn,resulted from the development of transportation andcommunications technology and the ‘internationalization’ of manyspheres of human interaction. It is also generally consideredthat the level of interdependence in the international system hasincreased, especially since 1945.37 The result, they argue, isthat the principle of sovereignty is at odds with the reality ofinterdependence in the modern world.Interdependence as a concept refers to “the extent to whichevents occurring in any given part or within any given componentunit of a world system affect (either physically or perceptually)events taking place in each of the other parts or component unitsof the system”.38 The conceptual inverse of interdependence iseffective autonomy, not sovereignty.39 A non-interdependentstate system, for example, could still be based on thesovereignty of its units, the actions of these units would simplyhave little effect on the others. As the level of interdependence grows, the level of effective autonomy, or freedom ofaction, may be, and is often, reduced.40 This is particularlytrue, as will be discussed in chapters four and five, ofinternational environmental interdependence. Autonomy can bereduced by interdependence in three ways. First, aninterdependent relationship which limits the choice of actionswhich a state can take reduces autonomy; second, autonomy can bereduced voluntarily when a state signs a binding multilateral16agreement which explicitly limits certain acitivities; andthirdly, it can be reduced by a state ceding to another body(such as a UN organization) the freedom to monitor and enforcecompliance with multilateral agreements. The existence ofenvironmental interdependence has led to the first two kinds ofautonomy restriction thus far (see p. 19 and chapters four andfive)Also worthy of note is that, as a quantitative concept,autonomy can be enhanced as well as reduced. This is especiallytrue in a case where a multilateral agreement is signedpreventing certain activities. While the freedom to undertakecertain activities (eg. pollution emission) has been restricted,it could also be argued that the result of restricting autonomyin this area enhances the autonomy of a state in another area(eg. the greater goal of environmental protection). For example,an environmental agreement which stops or reduces the harmfulemissions coming from another state increases the ability, orautonomy, of the recipient state to protect its environment.41Regrettably, the significant effect of interdependence onautonomy is not always clearly stated, and often overlooked.Many observers, cited in chapter three, mistake the effect thatinterdependence has on state autonomy for an effect that it doesnot have on state sovereignty. As Oran Young notes:The conceptual implications of the state—centric worldview often obscure discussions of interdependencies inworld systems. bove all, the formal independence andequality implied in the doctrine of sovereignty tend tobecome confused with effective autonomy. And since itis difficult to square the constraints placed on statesby the operation of systemic interdependencies with theimagery of state sovereignty, limitations on autonomyin interdependent world systems are often simply17ignored in rhetorical affirmations of the formal prerogatives of sovereign states.42For international relations, global environmental issues -such as depletion of the ozone layer and climate change forexample - present classic cases of interdependence. That is, theactions of one state (such as the production and consumption ofCFC5) affect many, or all, other states in the system (throughdepletion of the ozone layer), just as that state is affected bythe actions of the others (the degree of the depletion isexacerbated by the wide-spread use of CFCs by other states). Theriveting feature of environmental interdependence is that thereis virtually no way to avoid the impacts of these actions becausethey affect the fundamental environment upon which all statesdepend.43 In one sense, then, the relationship between humanbeings and the environment is one of dependence. On a globalscale, humanity is completely dependent upon the environment tosustain life. There are no viable alternatives.44 Therelationship between states with respect to global environmentalproblems, though, is not only a classic case of interdependence,but also an especially serious one involving, arguably, thecontinuation of life on earth as we know it.What needs to be understood is that sovereignty and autonomyare conceptually different, and that interdependence,environmental or otherwise, does not affect state sovereignty.As Alan James argues:No matter how far this process [of interdependence] hasgone, it cannot by itself have any influence upon astate’s constitutional independence, or sovereignty.It may be of vast significance for a state’s politicallife and future, in that the state may be much morerestricted than hitherto - although it may also onaccount of the same process be much better off. But18interdependence cannot infiltrate a state’ssovereignty. . .45To argue that interdependence modifies or undermines theprinciple of sovereignty is to commit what is termed a ‘categorymistake’. As Robert Jackson has understood, “constitutionalindependence differs categorically from physical separation [as]colonial status is not the same as economic dependency.Sovereign states are legally but not necessarily physicallyinsular and today most of them are.. .interdependent”.46 That is,in an interdependent international system, a physical conditioncannot affect a legal status. The discipline of internationalrelations is particularly vulnerable to the problem of categorymistakes, due to the wide range of sub—fields- and theirsubsequent vocabularies and conceptualizations- which itincorporates; it should, therefore, be especially aware ofinviting such conceptual confusion.47 Unfortunately, this is notalways the case, as will be demonstrated in chapter three.Others have been forthright in their condemnation of makingsuch ‘category mistakes’ with regard to sovereignty andinterdependence. Dennis Kavanagh, for example, states that:[Miuch of the discussion about the decline or loss ofsovereignty is ill-informed and highly speculative...Discussions of such features as the interdependence ofstates, the growth of international actors like multinational corporations, and the crude projection ofrecent socio-economic trends all too easily elide intoa statement of the erosion of a carelessly or illdefined concept of sovereignty.48Kavanagh goes on to note, however, that “the autonomy ofgovernments has been limited”.49 Such a limitation or erosion ofautonomy as a result of interdependencies would entail limitingthe actual freedom of action that states have on a given issue;with regards to the environment, the concept of autonomy is made19somewhat more complicated. After all, effective autonomy iseasier to maintain when the boundaries of states markqualitative shifts in the nature of human activity than in thosewhere effective boundaries vary and there are intrusions ofexternal influences”.50 Environmental problems, of course, areof the latter type, as the by-product of human activity -pollution- fails to respect state boundaries and ‘intrudes’ onothers. As a result, environmental interdependence poses a majorchallenge to maintaining effective state autonomy.On the other hand, an elimination of sovereignty (as it is acondition either held or not held absolutely) at theinternational level would mean the incorporation of previouslysovereign states into a wider, and likely global, constitutionalarrangement. Only the elimination of the independent authorityof the state to make decisions (or the principle that there is adecision-making authority higher than the state) can eliminate asovereign state. Such an elimination of sovereign status cannotbe accomplished by the mere existence of interdependence.Later chapters will give evidence that states can in factcooperate to manage global environmental interdependencies, asthese interdependencies are serious concerns. What is actuallytaking place is an erosion of the autonomy of virtually all thestates in the world by the placing of constraints on theirfreedom of action (usually through treaties such as the MontrealProtocol) .51 The immediate concern, however, is to substantiatethe claim that some scholars are guilty of confusing theseissues.20CHAPTER 3THE MANIFEST CONFUSION: SOVEREIGNTY, AUTONOMY, AND INTERNATIONALENVIRONMENTAL INTERDEPENDENCEThe preceeding chapter sought to clarify the concepts ofautonomy and sovereignty and show that though related, they aredistinct conceptually as well as distinct in practice.Additionally, interdependence was argued to be a challenge tostate autonomy, though it does not affect state sovereignty.Unfortunately, this distinction is either lost upon, orpurposefully overlooked by, many of the current observers of theinternational system when the problem of internationalenvironmental degradation is discussed. Many, first of all,fail to distinguish between autonomy and sovereignty. Second,they fail to identify explicitly the impacts of internationalenvironmental interdependence on the state. They fail to showthat sovereignty is affected.Consider, for example, the work of Jessica Tuchman Mathews.In her 1989 Foreign Affairs article on “Redefining Security” andin the (edited) 1991 volume, Preserving the Global Environment,Mathews is guilty of the conceptual confusion made by severalobservers.52 She argues that the post-postwar era ischaracterized by, inter alia, “diverse invasions of sovereignty”,and that:The nature of national sovereignty is changing. Theglobal environmental trends.. .all pose potentiallyserious losses to national economies, are immune tosolution by one or a few countries, and rendergeographic borders irrelevant. By definition, then,they pose a major challenge to national sovereignty.53Similarly, David Newsom asserts that “because the solutions tothe problems of the environment must be global, they will present21an unprecedented challenge to concepts of nationalsovereignty” .54Consider also the argument of Marvin Soroos. He begins bystating that “pollution is a problem that must be dealt withinternationally because air currents and river systems carryingharmful substances move unimpeded across international frontiersfrom one country to another”. He then jumps to the conclusion,however, that “states will not be willing to compromise theirsovereignty to the degree necessary” to deal with this type ofproblem.55 This analysis is echoed in the authoritative andpopular World Commission on Environment and Development report(WCED), Our Common Future. In their report, the WCED arguesthat:the idea of national sovereignty has beenfundamentally modified by the fact of interdependencein the realm of economics, environment, and security...The nation-state is insufficient to deal with threatsto shared ecosystems.56All of these critics share one of two similar problematicpropositions. Firstly, there is the argument of Mathews andNewsom, and also that of the WCED, that in an environmentallyinterdependent world the concept of sovereignty is challenged,and perhaps made obsolete altogether. Secondly, there is theproposition of Soroos and the WCED that sovereignty is a barrierto, or at least insufficient to manage, solutions to theseproblems, presumably because it minimizes or prevents theeffective multilateral cooperation needed to achieve solutions.If either of these propositions were true, then the prescriptionfor a post-sovereign system (likely one which is organized arounda single global authority), implied by these arguments and22discussed at length by Richard Falk in his important book, ThisEndangered Planet, would be warranted.57 As Stephen Krasner hasnoted, “the alternative to sovereignty is either a world in whichthere are no clear boundaries [eg. an empire] or a world in whichthere is no final authority within a given territory [eg. afeudal system]”.58 However, if global environmental problems areshown not to be antithetical to the concept of sovereignty andsovereign states can deal effectively with these problems, thenboth the premise and prescription of such critics are unfounded.Consider first the proposition that sovereignty is changedor modified due to global environmental interdependencies. It iscertainly true that the interdependent nature of manyenvironmental problems will affect states, though it is not clearthat it is the sovereignty of the state that is affected.Depletion of the ozone layer, for example, will affect virtuallyall states (although in varying degrees), since all states existbelow it.59 However, to assert that sovereignty is undermined asa result of this interdependence is to misunderstand the natureof sovereignty when it is properly understood as constitutionalindependence. It is categorically impossible for a physicalreality to affect a state’s (legal) sovereign status. In otherwords, sovereignty cannot be challenged, undermined, or modifiedby the mere existence of pollution that does not respectborders.60 This does not mean that the problems of transboundaryair pollution or depletion of ozone layer are not importantconcerns for the state, for they certainly are. As a result,states seek solutions to deal with international environmentaldegradation.23The second proposition, though, is just as problematic.Because environmental problems, and therefore the solutionsthereto, are international in character, it is argued that statesovereignty is somehow a barrier to obtaining these solutions.Depletion of the ozone layer, for example, is a problem which isbeyond the capability of any individual state to solve, forunless many or all states cease producing and consuming CFCs andhalons, the ozone layer will continue to be destroyed by thesechemicals regardless of what country they came from. However, aswill be shown in chapter four, states are willing to takecooperative action as it is not sovereignty, but autonomy whichmust be restricted through multilateral regulation to achieveenvironmental protection. As states choose to involve themselvesin agreements to solve international environmental problems andimpose mutual restrictions on state behaviour, they choose totrade off autonomy, or freedom of action, to achieve the goal ofenvironmental protection.The state, as the supreme constitutionally independentauthority, agrees to a course of action which impinges on itsactivities and on the activities of all other states involvingthemselves in the solution. The evidence presented below (seechapter four), for example, supports the argument that the state,while continuing to have the formal ability to choose freely(such as to continue policies of CFC use or to sign aninternational environmental agreement) has exchanged or limitedthe actual ability to carry out policies (such as the productionor consumption of CFCs) for a goal that is important to it, or isconsidered a greater global goal (protection of the ozone layer),24that is not achievable in any other way. Sovereignty is not abarrier to this process. The state remains constitutionallyindependent after the agreement, though its freedom to carry outactivities (its autonomy) has been restricted.Both the assertions that sovereignty is undermined by globalenvironmental problems and that it is a barrier to their solution- and the prescriptions that the world must therefore move beyondthe sovereign state system are flawed because theymisunderstand the nature of sovereignty and fail to recognizeautonomy as the condition at stake, a condition which states willwillingly, although perhaps grudgingly, restrict to achieveinternational environmental regulation. Though it is invoked byboth observers and state leaders - for different reasons - asbeing at stake (see below), sovereignty is not undermined byenvironmental interdependence, nor is it a barrier to cooperativeinternational action to manage that interdependence.Other analysts are also guilty of confusing the sovereignty-autonomy issue, usually because of an ill-formed definition ofsovereignty, or because it is not defined clearly at all.61Mathews attempts to correct this oversight by arguing that ‘bydefinition, global environmental trends pose a major challenge tonational sovereignty’. What is being defined as ‘nationalsovereignty’, however, is not that which states considersovereignty to be, that is, the fundamental property needed by aterritorial entity to join a community of other sovereign states- constitutional independence. Mathews’ unclear definition ofnational sovereignty apparently includes the environmental trendsthat pose losses to economies, are immune to unilateral25solutions, and render geographic borders ‘irrelevant’. As shownin chapter two, sovereignty is not understood by any of thesecriteria. National sovereignty, defined as constitutionalindependence which is the formal ability to make (authoritative)decisions and the essential criteria for membership in theinternational community, is not challenged by the economic andother difficulties resulting from environmental change, nor doesit preclude solutions by more than one country. Geographicborders, furthermore, are ‘irrelevant’ only to the pollution andnot to the possible ways of finding cooperative solutions, whichMathews would, correctly, like to encourage. The confusion ofmany of these observers “lies in identifying the sovereignty ofstates with their ability to do as they wish”.62National autonomy, on the other hand, defined as the abilityto carry out various objectives, is at stake in the solutionsneeded for economic problems and environmental protection.Many of these problems require states to sacrifice, to greater orlesser degrees, their ability to carry on certain activities.Unfortunately, it would seem that Mathews’ ‘post-postwar era’ isalso characterized by ‘diverse definitions of sovereignty’, mostof which misrepresent the fundamental character of sovereigntyand ignore the important role of autonomy.Additionally, the suggestion by the WCED that the state isno longer able to deal effectively with these internationalenvironmental problems is written in the context of calling for‘joint management’ of these problems (presumably by states!) .63This contradiction serves to confuse the issue further. One isleft with the impression that it is the inherent quality of26sovereignty which precludes effective action. Sovereignty hasnot clearly been defined, yet is suggested to preclude effectiveaction and cooperation on the environment. More accurately, itis the purely autonomous nation-state (the state that desires andis able to carry out its objectives without being influenced byor needing to involve itself with others), not the sovereignnation-state, which is likely to be a barrier to dealing withthese problems. Such a high degree of autonomy, as discussed inchapter two, is unlikely to exist in the interdependentinternational system of the 1990s. Global environmentalinterdependence, in particular, makes it extremely difficult tomaintain complete and effective autonomy.It is also worthy of note that many of those who argue thatsovereignty is reduced or challenged by internationalenvironmental problems also argue that ‘national security’ mustbe reformulated or redefined in this era of environmentalinterdependence.64 There seems to be something strangelyinconsistent about simultaneously arguing the reduction orrestriction of sovereignty due to environmental problems and fora newly defined notion of ‘national security’ that encompassesresource and environmental threats. Perhaps this confusionresults, again, from a broad and undefined use of ‘sovereignty’.How easily does the diminuation or extermination of statesovereignty co-exist with a new national security mindset? Moreimportantly, however, is this ‘new thinking’ going to result insuccessful management of these international problems?65These inconsistencies are not only representative of theconfusion over the nature of sovereignty, interdependence, and27autonomy, but are unlikely to prove useful in the successfulresolution of these problems. Being clear about the nature ofboth state sovereignty and state autonomy, however, andunderstanding that autonomy can be and is sacrificed to achieveother goals, will be a more fruitful way to approach the issue ofinternational environmental interdependence. Since the argumentfor drastic change to the sovereignty of states in theinternational system is based on a faulty premise- thatsovereignty is undermined by environmental interdependencies oris a barrier to their management- then effort would be betterspent on further examination and explication of how solutions canbe improved or expedited given existing conditions. That is,sovereign states are willing to sacrifice some of that autonomyto “deal” with the threats to the international environment; theyhave shown, not surprisingly, no interest in establishing a non-state system and bringing an end to sovereign statehood.Not all observers of international relations and globalenvironmental problems are as comfortable as those cited aboveabout stating the degree to which the sovereignty of the state ismodified by these global problems. Though the differentiationbetween sovereignty and autonomy is still not always madeexplicit, an attentive reading of their discussion suggests asimilar interpretation to the one which is made in this paper.Lynton Caidwell has written extensively on internationalenvironmental issues since 1972, including his widely read andcited book, International Environmental Diplomacy. Caidwellargues that the “defacto sovereignty of the ‘sovereign nationalstate’ is being modified”.66 He seems uncomfortable with his28definition of sovereignty as he refers to the defacto sovereigntyof the state, as if de facto sovereignty is somehow differentfrom sovereignty simply stated.67 This uncertain use ofsovereignty could be improved by making the definition ofsovereignty clear and explicit, while differentiating it fromautonomy. Such a distinction would add greater clarity and forceto Caldwell’s arguments. Unfortunately, other than the passagesabove, Caidwell does not address this issue directly.Another passage is more instructive in its analysis aboutthe differences between sovereignty and freedom of action:Rhetorical assertions of national sovereignty continueto be heard, but the imperatives of geophysical hazardsto all nations are pushing their governments towardmodification of their asserted freedom to act as theyplease in relation to.. .the environment.68Here, Caldwell distinguishes between the assertion of nationalsovereignty (the importance of the “rhetorical” aspect will beaddressed below) and the states’ “freedom to act”, or autonomy.Secondly, Caldwell also argues that international environmentalproblems (“geophysical hazards to all nations”) will lead statesto modify or restrict their autonomy. For example, states maysign treaties to manage depletion of the ozone layer whichrestrict their ability to produce or consume CFCs. Thesenations, it will be argued, remain as sovereign as they werebefore they signed the Montreal Protocol. It is clear, though,that CaidweiPs discussion of the issues is not the same as thosewho argued without qualification that sovereignty andinternational environmental problems are not compatible.Another example of an observer who treads lightly whendiscussing sovereignty and the environment is Maurice Strong, who29was Secretary—General of the landmark Stockholm conference andthe recent UNCED in Rio. It would appear that Strong is lessconvinced than some of those quoted above about the demise ofsovereignty due to the rise of global environmental problems.It is worth quoting him at length. Strong’s perceptive argumentis that:[Tihe development of new international machinery todeal with the complex problems of an increasinglyinter-dependent technological civilization will notcome about through the surrender of sovereignty bynational governments but only by the purposefulexercise of that sovereignty. It is only when nationsfind themselves incapable of exercising theirsovereignty effectively or advantageously on aunilateral basis that they will agree- reluctantly -to exercise it collectively by agreement with othernations. It is seldom that nations enter intoarrangements which restrict their ability to exercisetheir sovereignty until circumstances compel them to doso.69This argument for ‘merged sovereignty’, as Strong terms it,is instructive for several reasons. Firstly, Strong correctlynotes that solutions will not come about through the surrender ofsovereignty, because nations will seldom enter into arrangementswhich restrict their sovereignty. Secondly, and this isimportant for purposes of this paper, it is more than plausiblethat Strong, by suggesting his idea of a collectively exercisedor ‘merged’ sovereignty, understands that what is involved is therestriction of autonomy and not the demise of sovereignty.Indeed, Lynton Caldwell believes that “Strong hasinterpreted.. .sovereignty in a positive and innovative manner.”70Given Strong’s position as the chair of two important worldconferences on the environment, and his experience in trying toachieve solutions and gain cooperation from so many separatestates, perhaps it is not surprising that he assumes the30continued existence of sovereignty. In fact, he explicitlyargues that “there is no need for a renunciation of, or awholesale retreat from, this principle [of sovereignty]”.71 Hecertainly recognizes how states react when faced with situationsthat are seen, whether by would-be patriots or by critics likeMathews and the WCED, to involve a loss of national sovereignty.Sovereignty cannot be ‘sacrificed’, for good or for ill, and thusthe state will balk at any agreement or compromise. If, however,the nature of the problems and their solutions can be suggested,by diplomats such as Strong, to involve an ‘exercise’ ofsovereignty, then the state may be more willing to acceptagreements.Astute observers of international relations, nevertheless,are responsible for clear definitions and explanations of certainphenomena, so dodging diplomatic dialogue should not be allowedto obscure the issues. The problem is that ‘merged sovereignty’is an analytically vague, if not inaccurate, usage. Thoughcreative, Strong’s argument would be clarified and strengthenedby explicitly stating that it is the autonomy of the sovereignstate which needs to be ‘exercised’, or restricted.While Strong would clearly like to initiate and encouragecooperation, and likely to have states accept restrictions ontheir behaviour (their autonomy), he has political reasons formaking the notion of ‘exercised sovereignty’ sell in the worldcommunity. As will be discussed in greater detail in thefollowing chapter, the term sovereignty has high emotive contentand is often used by states simply as a semantic weapon tooppose a given issue or situation.72 Strong is attempting,31though in a constructive manner, to use the rhetorical appeal ofsovereignty in another manner. If sovereignty has negative‘defensive’ connotations, perhaps it has positive practical usesas well, which could be used to further international cooperationon multilateral environmental regulation. It may be asserted,however, that a clearer statement about the important differencesbetween sovereignty and autonomy, and the impact ofinterdependence on autonomy, would allow the arguments and debateabout the ‘modification of sovereignty’ and the ‘barrier ofsovereignty’ to be superceded by more constructive work on theactual creation and implementation of international environmentalregulation.32CHAPTER 4SUBSTANTIATING THE DISTINCTION: EVIDENCE OF RESTRICTED AUTONOMYAND CONTINUED SOVEREIGNTY IN RHETORIC AND IN PRACTICEThe preceeding discussion has sought to clarify theimportant distinction between the concepts of sovereignty andautonomy, and show that the current debate over internationalenvironmental problems often confuses the issue by arguing thatstate sovereignty must be modified or sacrificed in the face ofthese global problems. The fundamental point is thatsovereignty, or the constitutional independence of states, is notreduced, changed, or made obsolete by the existence of globalenvironmental problems. Nor do the solutions to these problems -as they are currently being enacted - impinge upon thesovereignty of the state, or need somehow to surmount sovereigntyto be achieved. The autonomy of the state, however, or thefreedom of action that any state has, is restricted by themeasures which states are taking to tackle global environmentalproblems. States are willing to trade off measures of thisautonomy to achieve the desired solutions. The invocation ofsovereignty as a barrier to, or victim of, solutions toenvironmental problems is a misuse of the term on the part ofsome observers.The purpose of this section of the paper is to examine theempirical evidence for the existence of solutions tointernational environmental problems which have restricted theautonomy of states while leaving their sovereignty intact. Thediscussion will be in two parts: first, a brief discussion ofsovereignty as a term which states continue to use in theirrhetoric to either support or oppose certain policies or33political positions and/or to reaffirm their constitutionalindependence. That is, what are states saying about the impactof global interdependencies on their sovereignty and on theirautonomy?Second, three case studies in international environmentalregulation will be examined to determine if there is evidence tosupport the propositions of this paper. That is, what havestates done about managing environmental interdependence, and howdo these actions affect their sovereignty and autonomy? Theseactions, of course, may or may not be consistent with what stateshave said about sovereignty, autonomy, and the environment.The cases — the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the EuropeanConvention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) of1979 and its Protocols of 1985 and 1988, and the MontrealProtocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer of 1987 andits subsequent amendments - are a sampling of multilateralagreements which span thirty years of international environmentalregulation. Though others could be chosen (such as the 1989Basle Convention on Hazardous Waste), these cases clearlydemonstrate the degree to which environmental issues have grownin importance since 1963, as well as the degree to which stateshave increased their commitment to managing environmentalproblems through greater restrictions of their autonomy. Thatis, these case studies are illustrations of state autonomy beingreduced - as a result of environmental interdependencies-through the voluntary acceptance of restrictions on certainactivities.34Do as We Do, Not as We Say?As pointed out by Lynton Caidwell (see p. 28), “rhetoricalassertions of sovereignty continue to be heard”. Similarly, OranYoung noted that limitations on autonomy are often “simplyignored in rhetorical affirmations of the formal prerogatives ofsovereign states”. It certainly is not surprising thatsovereignty should continually be used as a rallying cry. It isso emotive a term, on account of its ability to appeal to andmuster nationalist sentiment, that it naturally finds adefinitive place in international rhetoric: “on no account mustthe sovereignty of the state be infringed’ is a theme which inpolitical circles, only the foolhardy would oppose”.73 Longpracticed and formally encapsulated in the 1934 “Convention onthe Rights and Duties of States” of the League of Nations, thestatus of sovereignty is proclaimed such that “[nb state has theright to intervene in the internal or external affairs ofanother” .74Indeed, the history of state rhetoric, even, if notespecially, within international organizations, is understandablyfull of examples of similarly ‘protective’ sentiments. Both the1962 and 1973 U.N. Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty OverNatural Resources declare the “right of peoples and nations topermanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources”, withthe provision that sovereignty is exercised “in the interest oftheir national development and of the well—being of the people ofthe State concerned”.75 Perhaps the use of the word ‘permanent’is not insignificant here. Even the Stockholm Declaration of the1972 Conference and the more recent Rio Declaration of the UnitedNations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED),35despite encouraging environmental responsibility, acknowledgethat “States have, in accordance with the Charter of the UnitedNations and the principles of international law, the sovereignright to exploit their own resources”.76What do states say about autonomy? Current trends suggestthat states guard less jealously - both in rhetoric and inpractice — their political independence and freedom of action, orautonomy. For example, the absolutist nature of statedeclarations with regards to how much freedom of action can besacrificed, though cloaked carefully in the rhetoric of‘sovereignty’, has moderated to some degree recently. TheAmazonian states, heavily implicated in several globalenvironmental problems (such as deforestation, loss ofbiodiversity, and release of C02 leading to global warming), area case in point.In 1978, article IV of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperationdeclared: “The exclusive use and utilization of natural resourceswithin their respective territories is a right inherent in thesovereignty of each state.. .“.77 Article IX stated thatparticipation and cooperation with international agencies wouldtake place “whensoever they deem it necessary and convenient”.State ‘sovereignty’ was clearly strongly guarded in thedeclarations of these governments. However, the acceptance ofrestricted autonomy, though not explicitly stated, can be read inmore recent statements from the same group of states. The May1989 Declaration of Brazilia declared that:The Ministers endorse the principle that each State hasthe sovereign right to administer freely its naturalresources. This does not, however, exclude the needfor international cooperation at the subregional,36regional, and world levels; rather, it reinforces it.78This position was supported by the Manaus Declaration a fewweeks later. After reaffirming sovereign rights over naturalresources, it stated that:In the exercise of our sovereign responsibility todefine the best ways of using and conserving thiswealth and in addition to our national efforts and tothe cooperation among our countries, we express ourwillingness to accept cooperation from countries inother regions of the world, as well as frominternational organizations .79Neither of these recent declarations, not surprisingly,accept any diminuation of sovereignty. The possibility ofrestricting autonomy - through enhanced cooperation with otherstates or international organizations, perhaps resulting in thesigning of binding multilateral agreements and protocols- isimplied, however. Not only was this possibility not evenconsidered in 1978, these declarations reflect the understandingthat the exercise of autonomy, whether in cooperation with otherstates or international organizations, is based in thesovereignty which they continue to declare. Additionally,Principle 2 of both the Stockholm Declaration and the RioDeclaration charge states with the responsibility to “ensure thatactivities within their jurisdiction or control do not causedamage to the environment of other states or areas beyond thelimits of national jurisdiction”.80 Clearly, such a directivecould only be met by a state restricting its freedom of action-its autonomy — in relevant activities, such as eliminating CFCproduction and consumption or curtailing C02 emissions.State rhetoric, as expected, sends mixed signals. Sincesovereignty is a sacred property for the state, it allows them todisguise their ‘dislike’ for a particular policy or regulation by37terming it an ‘infringement of sovereignty’. Should a state seeka goal which requires the cooperation of other states, therhetoric may be more accomodating. Examples of both were notedabove, though neither should disguise what is taking place withregards to environmental interdependence; that is, the acceptanceof the possibility of restricting autonomy. States areinterested, of course, in the preservation of their sovereignstatus, as they are beneficiaries of the international system.The result, Oran Young argues, is that in a situation where arising level of interdependence increases the probability oftransformation in that system, states will contribute to thedevelopment of mechanisms designed to manage the rise of thoseinterdependencies.81 That is to say, the dynamics of increasinginterdependence (see p.15-19 above) will lead states to managethose interdependencies (eg. create regulations to manageenvironmental interdependence) if they suggest the possibility ofa change in the international system (whereas those cited inchapter three argued that a change is taking place or must takeplace). Thus, we should not be surprised if states become moreflexible in areas of potential cooperation and mutually agreedregulation. Their constitutional independence, however, remainsintact even if they are willing to accept restrictions throughthe development of certain mechanisms (such as binding protocols)on their freedom of action - on their autonomy.The key question still remains, however. Have statesaccepted actual restraints on autonomy, or created mechanisms tomanage the rise of international environmental interdependence,that do not undermine their sovereignty? Has the nature and38scope of these commitments, furthermore, changed as globalenvironmental problems become increasingly important? Three casestudies will be considered below.What to Do? Case 1: The Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963)The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963 would seem atfirst glance, and is usually interpreted as, an arms controltreaty, not an environmental treaty. It prohibited “any nuclearweapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion. . . in theatmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; orunderwater, including territorial waters or high seas” as well asexplosions “in any other environment if such explosion causesradioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limitsof the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosionis conducted.”82 The agreement was initially signed only by theUnited States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. By 1987there were 116 adherents. There were, of course, severalimportant exceptions. France and China never signed and did notadhere to the treaty until after they had conducted moreatmospheric nuclear tests.It has been argued that the main goal and benefit of thePTBT was to stop the pollution of the atmosphere with radioactivedebris and subsequent nuclear fallout, and not to make a greatcontribution to slowing the nuclear arms race. Thus, it isconsidered by some to be the first global agreement to protectthe environment and human health.83 There are two main reasonsfor regarding the PTBT as an environmental agreement more thanan arms-control agreement. Firstly, it had little negative39effect on the arms race. The number of nuclear weapons testsconducted after 1963 actually increased, with the only differencebeing that the tests were underground and of limited allowableyield.84 It is clear that the ability to move the testsunderground was an important factor in even getting the Treaty toa working stage in the first place, let alone having it signed bythe superpowers. Furthermore, it has been argued that with thefears of the public about atmospheric radiation relieved due tothe achievement of a partial ban, the political momentum for acomprehensive ban, which has yet to be achieved, was diffused.85Secondly, the PTBT may be conceived as a globalenvironmental agreement because that was in fact a majorobjective of the Treaty. The preamble seeks “to put an end tothe contamination of man’s environment by radioactivesubstances”, though it was also the cross-border diffusion ofradioactive debris that was explicitly prohibited (see art. 1,para. 1(b) cited above).86 The Treaty did result in greatlydecreased levels of atmospheric fallout from the peak year of1963, and then in even further decreases after France and Chinaceased atmospheric testing in 1974 and 1980 respectively (withoutjoining the PTBT) .87 However, it has been argued that the PTBTwas explicitly based on the notion of sovereignty; it allowedstates to test as they liked, so long as the impact was confinedto state territory.88The first somewhat indirect attempt at a globalenvironmental agreement may be seen as a significant beginningfor environmental protection, but one which resulted only in apartial restriction of state autonomy. Radioactive material in40the atmosphere as a result of nuclear weapons tests has decreaseddramatically since 1963, yet the ability of states to move thetests underground only resulted in a partial diminishment oftheir freedom to test. As an arms contol agreement, then, it wasmilitarily insignificant.Sovereignty, on the other hand, is not implicated in astate’s freedom and ability to conduct nuclear weapons tests.While state rhetoric may insist upon weapons testing as a‘sovereign prerogative’, the still sovereign state can decide tocease testing and thus restrict its autonomy (as many have done).Nevertheless, the PTBT was a considerable milestone for states toaccept constraints on their behaviour, however limited, forpurposes of global environmental protection.Case 2: The ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary AirPollution (LRTAP) and the Protocols on S02 and NOx(1979, 1985, 1988)In 1979, thirty-one European states, the United States, andCanada, signed the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary AirPollution (LRTAP) under the auspices of the U.N. EconomicCommission for Europe (ECE). The initial Convention was a weakdocument in terms of reductions of emissions on the part ofmember states. Article 2 charged parties to “endeavour to limitand, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent airpollution including long-range transboundary air pollution”.89The Convention was not only the first multilateral treaty todirectly address the atmosphere as an environmental problem, itprovided the framework which would allow for the negotiation ofsubsequent protocols and exchange of information. There were41articles on research and development (art. 7), exchange ofinformation (art. 8), and development of the cooperativeprogramme for the monitoring and evaluation of the long-range airpollutants in Europe (art. 9).90 These requirements are notinsignificant in light of the fact that they were adopted at atime of government reluctance and scientific uncertainty aboutthe effects of air pollution (primarily sulfur dioxide andnitrogen oxide) such that no more than six of the thirty-threegovernments believed that acid rain was even a serious problemwhen the Convention was signed.91To date there have been three protocols signed, though thereis only useful data on progress under the first two. The third,concerning ‘volatile organic compounds’, was only signed in 1991.The 1985 Helsinki Protocol on sulfur dioxide emissions, whichmandated a thirty percent reduction (from 1980 levels) by eachstate by 1993, was signed by nineteen key states with theexceptions of the U.K., Poland, and U.S.92 Additionally, theProtocol required that each party “...provide annually to theExecutive Body its levels of national annual sulphur emissions,and the basis upon which they have been calculated”.93 Thus, theparties to the Protocol mutually undertook thirty percentreductions to emit S02- a restriction on their autonomy to emitunlimited S02 - in order to reduce the effects of acidprecipitation on the environment.The degree of compliance to this Protocol is mixed.Evidence indicates that some states are reducing in excess ofthat required and that some non-signatories (eg. the U.K.) arereaching nearly thirty percent reductions anyway.94 Thus, it42would seem that some reduction would have taken place in theabsence of the Protocol, though it is likely that its existence,even for those who did not sign, was influential on some of thekey states. Environmentally, the Protocol kept acid rain damagefrom continuing on at its current pace, though damage continueddue in large part to nitrogen oxides (NOx).Three years later, a second protocol designed to deal withthe NOx problem was implemented. Twenty-seven states signed theSofia Protocol which calls for a freeze on national NOx emissionsat 1987 levels by 1995.95 Due to some innovations which allowfor amending the requirements, however, states could quickly moveto steeper reductions. As stated in art. 2, para. 3(a):The Parties shall, as a second step, commencenegotiations, no later than six months after the dateof entry into force of the present Protocol £14February 1991], on further steps to reduce nationalannual emissions of nitrogen oxides or transboundaryfluxes of such emissions, taking into account the bestavailable scientific and technological developments,internationally accepted critical loads and otherelements resulting from the work programme [onresearch) undertaken under article 6.96While negotiations on actual reductions have only recently begun,it is of note that twelve countries pledged in 1987 to animmediate thirty percent reduction.97 Lastly, it is worth notingthat a mandatory financing program for the Cooperative Programmefor Monitoring and Evaluation of the LRTAP in Europe (EMEP) wasreached in 1984. Mandatory contributions (made in currency or inkind) are made on an annual basis by all participating partieswithin the geographical scope of EMEP to support the workprogramme.98 The Protocol places approximately 57% of thefinancial burden on the four largest European states (the USSR,France, Germany, and the U.K.) .9943What assessment can be made about the LRTAP and itsProtocols or any restrictions on state autonomy that itrepresents? Firstly, in terms of the LRTAP Convention itself,the degree to which most of the states originally involved havesubstantially reduced a number of emissions, which in 1979 mostdid not perceive as a problem, must be considered a significantstep forward. It is clearly a case of states restricting,through the mechanism of the multilateral protocol, theirautonomy to emit unlimited amounts of certain chemicals.100Furthermore, in the purely environmental sense, though theproblem is still there, it is less severe than had there been noconvention.Secondly, the LRTAP has created a forum in which states canpursue further agreements cooperatively. This is shown by thethree protocols which have resulted, and by the degree to whichstates have become enmeshed in cooperative efforts on informationexchange, financing, and actual reductions in emissions, all ofwhich represent restrictions on their autonomy which did notexist prior to 1979. Without the Convention, solutions totransboundary air pollution problems would likely have beenpiece-meal; with the Convention, mutual regulation and a sharedresponsibility for the environment have become the foundation forcontinued action.1O1 The saga of atmospheric pollution in Europecarries on, but •on the basis of existing evidence it may beconcluded that states have agreed to restrictions on theirautonomy in principle and have restricted in practice theirfreedom to emit unlimited amounts of S02 and NOx. Futhermore, itseems clear that the ECE states will further restrict autonomy as44the process of negotiation and regulation continues. A secondS02 Protocol (the first Protocol is set to lapse in 1993) iscurrently being negotiated.102The sovereignty of the states concerned, however, has notbeen endangered by this process. Each participant still retainsits constitutional independence, and thus can decide whether ornot to participate. Each Protocol, in fact, allows for thewithdrawal of participation in the programme “at any time withinfive years from the date on which the present Convention has comeinto force with respect to a Contracting Party.. .“.103The legally binding nature of the Protocols does not effect theconstitutional position of the participating states; the autonomywhich they have restricted is based in the sovereignty which theypossess.Case 3: The Montreal ProtocOl and the London Amendments(1987, 1990)By far the most comprehensive example to date, both in termsof the number of states involved and the number of activitiesrestricted, of sovereign states willingly accepting restrictionson autonomy to achieve global environmental protection has beenthe Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.Truly a global problem that has elicited an internationalresponse, depletion of stratospheric ozone, caused by the releaseof CFCs and halons used in many industries (such asrefrigeration and electrical cleaning), does not recognize thestate from which the damaging chemicals came. The response ofthe international community has been the Montreal Protocol andits London Amendments, now ratified by seventy-seven countries45(with the lone significant holdout, India, signing on in April1992) representing over 99% of the production and 90% of theconsumption of ozone—depleting chemicals.104The amended Protocol mandates three significant limitationson signatories’ autonomy. First, an entire class of ozone-depleting chemicals (greater than the fifty percent stipulated bythe original Protocol) must be eliminated by the year 2000 (and2010 for developing countries) .105 Second, the developingcountries, who were given preferential treatment in the Protocol(such as continued specified levels of CFC consumption until2010) due to their demand for recognition of their lower levelsof development, will be financed by the developed countries intheir search to provide alternative, more environmentally sounddevelopment for their burgeoning populations.106 Lastly, articleIV of the amended Protocol stipulates that:As of 1 January 1990, each Party shall ban the importof the controlled substances.. .from any State not partyto this Protocol.[and]As of 1 January 1993, each Party shall ban the exportof any controlled sustances. . .to any State not party tothis Protocol.107Additionally, signatories are prohibited “from providing newsubsidies, aid, credits, guarantees or insurance programs” tonon-participants.108These three major features of the Protocol make it asignificant example of the fact that states are willing to tradeoff freedom of action, or autonomy, to gain global environmentalbenefits. The elimination of so many ozone-depleting substanceswas prompted by the detection of an enlarged ozone hole over theAntarctic and increased scientific information about the46destructive nature of CFCs. The flexibility built-in to theaccord allowed for the adjustment of targets to account for newdiscoveries. The moderate restriction of autonomy in the 1987Protocol (fifty percent reductions) was increased to a stringentrestriction of autonomy (one—hundred percent reductions) in 1990.The decision to fund the developing states in theirundertaking of the requirements of the Protocol is also a uniquecommitment on the part of developed nations. The fund,administered by the World Bank, was set initially at $240 millionand was key to gaining the participation of such major developingcountries as China and, now, India.109 By 1992, the interim fundhad committed $33 million to projects in Mexico, Malaysia, Egypt,Thailand, the Phillipines, and for 20 other countries to developformal timetables for phasing out CFCs.110 This is anunprecedented step in international environmental regulation, onewhich clearly involves a new and different sort of restriction onthe autonomy of developed state signatories.111Lastly, the requirements of article IV on trade incontrolled substances clearly restricts the actions that statescan take when dealing with others who are not party to theProtocol, all in the cause of managing the problem of ozone layerdepletion.112 Furthermore, there is evidence that the potentialtrade restrictions are having the desired effect of encouragingstates to join the Protocol, or at a minimum, to comply with itsreduction requirements. 113It is clear that the restrictions on state autonomy in theMontreal Protocol are the broadest to date of any internationalenvironmental agreement in terms of the range of activities which47are curtailed or regulated with regard to CFCs. Not only areenvironmental (production and consumption) regulationsestablished, but financial and trade commitments are establishedas well. Moreover, the restrictions are likely to be tightenedup as the signatories expedite the phase—out schedule, add newsubstances to be controlled, and develop a mechanism to sanctionthose who are not complying with the Protocol. Currently, theLondon Amendments only contain an interim noncompliance procedurewhich stipulates that “all parties ultimately decide how tosanction noncompliance”.114 Given the measures taken to date,however, it is conceivable that a stricter trade sanctionmechanism could be enacted for noncompliance, thus furthering thedegree to which states have traded off their autonomy to achievethe goal of broad multilateral compliance with the Protocol. So,as the Parties meet for the fourth time - November 1992 inCopenhagen- the topics of non-compliance, as well as the need toexpedite the phaseout schedule and add new chemicals to thecontrolled substances list, will be the subjects of the nextchapter written in the history of international action to preventfurther depletion to the ozone layer.115 The development of theMontreal Protocol has been called “a valuable legal precedent”,“a landmark achievement”, and “a true landmark in internationalenvironmental law” with good reason.116The discussion of the Montreal Protocol, the mostcomprehensive of global environmental agreements, shows thatsovereign states are willing to sacrifice their autonomy andfreedom of action to achieve environmental goals.117 Assuggested by the analysis of this paper, and noted by other48observers, “a world government is not necessary to deal withglobal problems”.118 In tackling the problem of ozone depletion,states have not only foregone the continued production andconsumption of certain chemicals, they have agreed to imposetrade restrictions on substances or products that in any wayinvolve the controlled substances and (developed countries) haveagreed to the transfer of technology and financing to achieve thecooperation of the developing countries in this matter. Thereis, moreover, a good chance that a trade sanction mechanism willbe enacted to punish those who are not complying with the termsof the Protocol.At the same time, while collectively restricting theirfreedom of action in this area, the states involved havecertainly retained their constitutional independence, orsovereignty. Not only can a Party withdraw from the Protocol(art. 19), but the “top down” approach of the Protocol, whichmandates goals and deadlines but allows states to decide on theirown policies and regulations to meet their obligations,encourages participation by states that might otherwise regardthe Protocol as too great a threat to their autonomy.119 Anysuch threat could be targetted rhetorically by opponents as anencroachment on ‘sovereignty’, thus ‘justifying’ nonparticipation. As it developed, however, the Protocol set therequired goals needed for effective action while also preservingstate freedom of decision on how those restrictions (on itsautonomy) would be achieved. Autonomy is restricted; sovereigntyremains intact.49CHAPTER 5CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE 1992 UNCED: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONALENVIRONMENTAL REGULAT ION?The preceeding chapter has sought to detail the evidencesupporting the argument that, despite the assertions made by someobservers about the ‘barrier’ of sovereignty and the rhetoricalinvocation by states of sovereignty as a ‘permanent right’,states are willing to sacrifice autonomy to achieve goals ofenvironmental protection through international regulation whileretaining their sovereignty, or constitutional independence.Though the PTBT, the LRTAP Protocols, and the amended MontrealProtocol are all cases of states restricting their autonomythrough multilateral regulation for the goal of environmentalprotection, it is prudent to ask whether these precedents suggestthat states will continue to trade off autonomy on other globalenvironmental issues in the future. Most prominent of theseproblems is climate change, or global warming.Similar to depletion of the ozone layer, climate change is aglobal phenomenon which will affect all states regardless oftheir location and regardless of how much or how little they havecontributed to the problem.120 The earth’s climate system is acomplex, interconnected system, which makes definite predictionsof the magnitude of global warming difficult.121 While thedegree to which climate change will impact upon states is stilluncertain, it is clear that all nations are affected by theearth’s climate system and that broad international cooperationwill be needed to mitigate global climate change.122 However,unlike the ozone problem, the anthropogenic sources of climatechange (greenhouse gas emissions) are many and varied. Carbon50dioxide is considered the main culprit in causing climate change,though methane, CFCs, ozone, and NOx are also contributingfactors. As a result, any international agreement to curtailgreenhouse gas emissions is bound to be more complex, and likelymore difficult to reach, than previous environmental agreements.Scientific evidence and concensus, important to theachievement of both the LRTAP and Montreal Protocols, is growinghowever, and support for a ‘middle ground’ has solidified.123Even with regards to the primary disagreement in the sciencesurrounding global warming - the magnitude and timing of futurewarming- there is substantial consensus. Most importantly, thepredicted range of warming of 1.5 to 4.5 .0 is accepted by mostclimate experts.124 Though most critics correctly argue that‘doomsday’ predictions about the end of life on earth are thusinaccurate, it is crucial to note that the minimum change will bean increase of no less than 1.5 ,C. At a minimum, then, theearth will become, by the middle of the next century, warmer thanit has been in 10,000 years.125That some uncertainty remains in the science of globalwarming weakens the case for immediate mandatory greenhouse gasemission reductions, though not substantially. Given that theuncertainty ranges from a modest, though noticeable 1.5 °C to ahefty, if not catastrophic 4.5 .0, the need for internationalaction has become widely accepted (see below). Arguably, withouta global agreement on greenhouse gas reductions no state cananticipate any continued stability in the climate and itscapacity for adaptation could be overwhelmed by continued, orunexpectedly rapid, warming.12651The international community has responded to this new globalthreat only recently, with the science of climate change leadingthe way. The first World Climate Conference was held in 1979,but there was little international publicity or interest. Eventhe scientific community was only beginning to understand whatthe earth’s climate system involved. By 1988, however, climatechange had become the pressing and important global environmentalissue for scientists and policy-makers alike, since protection ofthe ozone layer had moved to a state of iniplementation.127 Thenewly created Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)held its first meeting in November of 1988. The United NationsEnvironment Programme (UNEP) and the World MeteorologicalOrganization (W1”IO), which were instrumental in the creation ofthe IPCC, are leading players in the forging of an internationalconcensus on the need to act to mitigate the effects of climatechange and they assist in organizing many conferences and forumsfor discussion of the subject.Formal intergovernmental negotiations on a frameworkconvention on climate change did not begin until after the SecondWorld Climate Conference (SWCC) in November of 1990. ThatConference considered the IPCC report (in three parts) which hasformed the basis for much of the discussion which has followedsince (with some minor modifications resulting from new data andnew methodology) .128 While the scientists of the IPCC were ofthe opinion that C02 emissions should be immediately stabilized,with a reduction of twenty percent achieved by 2005, theMinisterial Declaration of the SWCC eschewed binding reductionsor timetables for the statement that:52We stress, as a first step, the need to stabilise,while ensuring sustainable development of the worldeconomy, emissions of greenhouse gases not covered bythe Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete theOzone Layer.129The governments involved did call for negotiations on a frameworkconvention on climate change to “begin without delay”, a feataccomplished three months later.130The question facing the international community was whetherthe negotiations would lead to a convention which establishedtargets and timetables immediately, or, in the spirit of theLRTAP Convention and the Vienna Convention, a frameworkconvention upon which to build binding protocols afterwards.With the goal of the negotiators to design a document to besigned at the United Nations Conference on Environment andDevelopment (UNCED) in June of 1992, meetings began in February1991 in Chantilly, Virginia, under the auspices of theIntergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC).Generally, the states involved in the negotiations tookpredictable positions. The U.S., the world’s largest source ofanthropogenic C02 emissions, opposed targets and timetables(which would restrict autonomy significantly). Other OECDcountries favoured commitments, at the least, to stabilize C02emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000. The developedcountries split among those demanding substantial financialassistance from the west (led by China and India), the smallisland states seeking an insurance fund for damages (due toflooding), and a third group led by Saudi Arabia who opposedlimiting emissions.131 The result of these negotiations, theU.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, which encompassed53elements of most of these positions, was signed by 154 states atthe Rio UNCED in June, 1992.132The Framework Convention contains several features whichbegin to limit states’ autonomy for the purpose of mitigatingglobal climate change. Firstly, the developed states commit toadopting “national policies and take corresponding measures onthe mitigation of climate change, by limiting... anthropogenicemissions of greenhouse gases and protecting andenhancing. . . greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs” with the “aim ofreturning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels theseanthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhousegases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol”.133 Essentially,states promise to make greenhouse gas reductions, but no exacttargets or timetables are enforced.Secondly, the developed countries “shall provide new andadditional financial resources [including transfer of technology]to meet the agreed full costs incurred by the developing countryParties”.134 The Montreal Protocol clearly served as animportant precedent in this respect, as it was the firstinternational environmental agreement to incorporate such aconcession.Thirdly, in addition to the above requirement of providingfinancial resources to developing countries, the Conventionstates that:The extent to which developing country Parties willeffectively implement their commitments under theConvention will depend on the effective implementationby developed country Parties of their commitments underthe Convention related to financial resources andtransfer of technology and will take fully into accountthat economic and social development and poverty54eradication are the first and overriding priorities ofthe developing country Parties.135In this agreement, the success of the developing countries’commitments is placed squarely on the shoulders of the developedstates, a feature not contained even in the amended MontrealProtocol.Lastly, the Parties agree to further research andobservation (art. 5), education, training, and public awareness(art. 6), and the creation of two subsidiary bodies forscientific and technological advice (art. 9) and implementation(art. 10). With these provisions, the groundwork is laid for thefuture negotiation and implementation of protocols requiringgreater multilateral action.Despite the fact that many environmentalists, and somepolicy-makers, feel that the Framework Convention does little toachieve its objective of mitigating global warming, viewed in thecontext of other multilateral environmental agreements theConvention follows the pattern of calling for internationalcooperation on research and providing assistance to developingcountries before binding states to greater restrictions of theirautonomy through mandatory emission reductions. As otherobservers have noted, “historically, such agreements have beenthe first step toward major international action.”136The fact that the Convention stipulates no mandatory targetsor deadlines for achieving emission reductions is the subject ofthe greatest criticism.137 Specifically, the position of theUnited States is singled out as the reason why no suchrequirements are contained in the agreement. However, the U.S.may come close to stabilizing its C02 emissions at 1990 levels by55the year 2000 - the general target of most of the signatories tothe Convention- due to domestic measures.138 Washington’srefusal to sign an agreement with greater reductions at thisparticular time must be regarded in the light of their domesticactivities and of the Convention in general. It is the firstglobal treaty aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, andthough weaker than the Montreal Protocol, it is stronger than theMontreal Protocol’s predecessor, the 1985 Vienna Convention.139As the experience of the LRTAP Protocols shows, the lack ofcommitment of one or more states to an otherwise widely agreedrequirement does not necessarily void the usefulness of theagreement.The Convention stipulates several requirements thatrepresent restrictions on state autonomy that did not exist priorto the signing of the agreement. As noted above, for example,participants have enmeshed themselves in requirements toundertake research and public awareness and developed states haveagain taken on financial and technology transferresponsibilities, with the added burden that the fulfillment ofthe developing countries’ commitments depends on the “effectiveimplementation” of these responsibilities. Even during theUNCED, many states announced plans for beginning the fulfillmentof their financial responsibilities to a total of two billiondollars (which, added to other funding, reaches slightly morethan half the amount needed for all the environmental initiativesagreed to at Rio) .140 These are commitments with clearopportunity costs for other government programs, such as deficitreduction, which reduce a state’s autonomy.56A preliminary assessment of the Climate Change Conventionleads to the conclusion that although the Convention does notformally restrict states’ autonomy to emit greenhose gases, somecountries clearly feel a commitment to the as yet unwrittenregime of ‘emission reductions’. State autonomy is moreexplicitly reduced by the Convention in other areas, however. Itrepresents for developed states in particular another level ofrequirements in the transfer of financial resources andcommitments to undertake more research, public awareness, andinternational scrutiny of national policies.141 Such commitmentsdenote the acceptance of restrictions placed on their freedom ofaction, or autonomy. Moreover, given the history of othermultilateral environmental agreements such as the LRTAP Protocolsand the Montreal Protocol, it is quite likely that the ClimateConvention will lead to further protocols, and more substantialrestrictions on autonomy, in the future. These questions, aswell as the question of implementation and compliance (or noncompliance), have been relegated to discussion at the firstmeeting of the Parties which is tentatively scheduled forOctober, 1992.142The sovereignty of the states who have signed the treaty -an unprecedented percentage of the total number of states in theworld - remains unaffected by their decision to undertake theinitial requirements of the Convention. As with previousmultilateral environmental agreements, signature to theConvention does not alter the constitutionally independent statusof the states involved. The sovereign states who decided to signan agreement to restrict some of their freedom of action in the57cause of mitigating global climate change remain free to towithdraw from the treaty or to fulfill their obligations.Parties may withdraw from the Convention “at any time after threeyears from the date on which the Convention has entered intoforce for [that] Party... “.143 Fulfilling their obligations, onthe other hand, represents restrictions on their autonomy but inno way affects their sovereign status.It is also of note that international concensus is growingon another important issue related to climate change which couldspeed the movement towards greater restrictions through a firstprotocol. As noted above, the scientific basis for the existenceand possible magnitude of climate change has gained widespreadinternational acceptance. Scientific concensus was important inthe development of both the LRTAP Protocols and the amendedMontreal Protocol. Such concensus may be necessary, but is notsufficient for the development of a substantial multilateralagreement. Also needed is a concensus on the technical andeconomic feasibility of making significant reductions (or, in thecase of the Montreal Protocol, eliminations) of certain chemicalsor gases. Such concensus, which proved important again for boththe LRTAP and Montreal Protocols, is only beginning to emerge onthe issue of climate change.Though the debate on C02 emissions is often framed in termsof ‘environment versus economy (or jobs) ‘, many analyses of C02reduction programs suggest that reductions in carbon dioxideemissions are both technically feasible and cost—effective.144Indeed, it has been suggested that one the lessons to be learned58from the Montreal Protocol is that it is often a misconception toregard environmental goals as invariably competitive with thosethat are regarded as essentially economic.145 Additionalprogress towards a more restricting climate change protocol mayalso stem from the fact that leading industrial countries such asJapan are looking to profit economically from the development andsale of ‘clean’ technology.146 Thus, the combined weight ofscientific evidence, economic feasibility, and economic incentivemay lead quickly to the development of a protocol which restrictsmore substantially, through mandatory emission targets anddeadlines, participating states’ autonomy.On the basis of existing evidence it is possible to concludethat the future of international environmental regulation will,if the climate change agreement is any indication, proceed in asimilar manner to some past environmental agreements. That is,states can tackle and begin to solve problems of internationalenvironmental degredation through the mechanism of themultilateral agreement. Such agreements allow sovereign statesto achieve solutions through mutual restrictions on certainactivities (such as the emission of sulfur dioxide or carbondioxide). These agreements do not, however, change, modify, orreduce the sovereignty of those states. Sovereign states choseto restrict their autonomy to manage cases of internationalenvironmental interdependence.59CHAPTER 6CONCLUS IONSOne purpose of this thesis has been to show, with referenceto problems of international environmental interdependence, thesubstantive difference between the concepts of sovereignty andautonomy. In international relations, the best understanding ofsovereignty is the constitutional independence of a territorialentity, for that is the fundamental criterion which must besatisfied before such an entity can be recognized as a sovereignmember of the international community. State autonomy, on theother hand, is the freedom of action that a state has to carryout activities, both domestically and externally. Despite thearguments about the current plight of the sovereignty of thestate made by many observers of global environmental problems,neither the existence of international environmentalinterdependence nor the conclusion of international environmentalagreements weakens, modifies, or makes obsolete theconstitutional independence of states in the internationalsystem. 147 Sovereignty, per Se, is also not a barrier toobtaining those agreements.While state sovereignty is absolute in its character - thatis, it is either present or absent- state autonomy can exist ingreater or lesser amounts. As F.H. Hinsley has understood:[lit is wrong to conclude that because the state hasexperienced a decline in its international freedom ofaction, sovereignty is no longer compatible with thestate’s international position.. .To argue in this wayis to associate the attribute of sovereignty with thepossession by the state of freedom to act as itchooses.. .14860The case studies in chapters four and five document increasinglyrestricted state autonomy due to the development of multilateralagreements, indicating that states can remain sovereign and stillwork to manage global environmental problems. It would seemclear then, as K.J. Holsti has argued, that one long-range trendin the global system is in the direction of autonomy erosion.149On the other hand, as noted in chapter two, this analysis alsosuggests that with regards to environmental interdependence, arestriction of autonomy in one area may enhance autonomy inanother. The restriction of the autonomy of the ECE states toemit unlimited 502 and NOx, for example, reduces the impacts ofenvironmental interdependence and thus increases the ability ofeach ECE state to protect its own environment.Furthermore, it would seem that as Maurice Strong, MarvinSoroos, and others concede, states will continue to be the keyactors in efforts to address any global problem.150 There may benothing inherently sacrosanct about the concept of sovereignty,but the world will likely remain organized on this principle “fora very long time”.151 This is also true of the internationalenvironmental order, as Levy, Keohane, and Haas note, where“sovereignty remains the legal cornerstone and where states are,if anything, reinforced in their legal authority to makedecisions for the environment”.152It would be useful if the distinctions presented here wererecognized by those observers of international environmentalrelations who argue that sovereignty is problematic. Some,such as David Newsom and Jessica Tuchman Mathews, propose thatsovereignty is ‘challenged’ and ‘modified’ by the existence of61international environmental interdependence. Such a prepositionis flawed because the dynamics of interdependence affect not thefundamental constitutional and legal position of a state, namelysovereignty, but the freedom of action, or autonomy, that a statepossesses.Other observers, such as Marvin Soroos and the WCED, arguethat sovereignty is a barrier to solving environmental problems,presumably because states will not compromise ‘sovereignty’ tothe degree necessary to achieve solutions through multilateralregulation. This assertion suffers from an ill-defined use ofsovereignty and a failure to recognize that it is in factautonomy which is, and must be, compromised by sovereign statesto achieve environmental protection. The case studies in chapterfour clearly illustrate the development of increasinglyrestrictive multilateral agreements to manage environmentalinterdependencies. State sovereignty is not the barrier toenvironmental cooperation and action that some observers wouldhave us believe.153The discussion at the beginning of chapter four suggests,not surprisingly, that sovereignty will remain a core feature ofstate rhetoric. Nevertheless, while sovereignty (defined asconstitutional independence) will not be easily given up, inrhetoric or in practice, some states may be formallyacknowledging - in statements accepting the need for greatermultilateral cooperation - the need to restrict autonomy toachieve environmental goals. If this cooperation results in theactual restriction of state autonomy through, for example,environmental regulation for the goal of environmental protection62(as is argued in chapters four and five), then the status ofsovereignty as the legal basis for restricting autonomy clearlyremains unaffected.The arguments about sovereignty being undermined by globalenvironmental interdependencies, or being a barrier to theirmanagement, should be seen in their proper light as inaccurateand misleading. Resultingly, the conclusion that the world mustmove beyond sovereignty as the organizing principle ofinternational society is unwarranted. Clearer conceptualthinking and analysis is needed in the academic study of globalenvironmental problems and international relations. The analysispresented here about the nature of sovereignty, autonomy, andinterdependence would also suggest several implications for theenvironmental policy debates.It might be noted that there is a ‘strange bedfellows’phenomenon occurring within these debates. Both environmentalistsand states agree that sovereignty is at stake in the quest toprotect the environment. They disagree, however, on the role ofsovereignty in achieving that goal. Many environmentalists saythat sovereignty is an obstruction and must be removed. States,on the other hand, will not relinquish sovereignty and will use‘inviolability of sovereignty’ as a rhetorical device tolegitimate rejecting a policy or regulation- which does notinvolve their constitutional independence- that they simplyoppose. State practice, however, suggests that restriction ofautonomy through multilateral regulation is how sovereign statesachieve environmental protection. Two relevant observationsfollow.63First, in the debate over international environmentalregulation, the political rhetoric of states must be defused.States should not cloak themselves in the rhetoric of sovereigntywhen faced with regulations that affect their autonomy but do notundermine their constitutional independence, and admit that theydislike a proposed policy or regulation. Unfortunately,sovereignty remains such a powerful political term that stateswill likely continue to resort to it over whatever objections aremade about its accurate use.Second, there is a relevant observation for those seekingenvironmental protection. Given the attachment of states tosovereignty, both in rhetoric and in practice, the argument thatsovereignty is a barrier and therefore must be disposed of isplaying into the hands of those who are opposed to environmentalregulation in any form. Not only is that argument unwarrantedfrom an analytical point of view, but critics of sovereignty willbe labelled as ‘opponents of the state’. Their arguments aboutthe conflicting relationship between sovereignty andenvironmental interdependence will be used as a reason forinaction, and their efforts to protect the environment will bedismissed. Their own argument works against the goal they seek.Global environmental problems are too serious to bedisregarded in this manner. A discussion based on the analysisof this paper centering on how solutions to environmentalproblems could be achieved and facilitated through interstatecooperation on environmental regulation would be more productivethan a divisive dialogue between environmentalists and thoseopposed to environmental regulation over the status of64sovereignty. A clearer understanding of the concepts presentedin this thesis, in other words, would not only enlightenobservers and officials, but lead to improved, and moreexpeditious, cooperation on environmental issues of globalimportance.-‘oF--3CDoHcy’QØ----)I(J2c3-‘t11O1CDdCOfl-...frhH--hrt’t1<:(jI1\)o()rtO(DloI-(DtzJQ.OO0OD-CDH-0N•rt<,IoOHOH<frOrOrH1CDHD)c-ttjIllo,cx’cJ),oOCrtSOCD3(DIH-(I))H-O’-3rt0CDH-pIHCDdCI)H0lCDcort0iiQH-(DI1o••Oçt<OOIctHH-(DCDOH-Hct(-.)NctOoI00:I-hONP’”l<-oDCD0H-1P0P)’oH-I1rt,‘tJ-çtCX)0OHCD•wo<(-t-Cl)c-riF1Oi0c3H-Ja0F-’••°HCDpHHcurtH0HI_H0HI<(Dd(Dt-lC)p)H‘.QCDjH-‘rj0HOHH-“o)I<HmHp,O%C1)HH-HH.H-00H0-H0Oc-qCDcioOct0‘-h•sFDCD0pO-actHs—HipjH-W0nH-0Q0N“00OHftO0<FftCDPIL-1Co(DH-H‘<<OHjft(DCo:j-(DO,Oo0i,HCo‘I_hi)HtHH.H0HcoHCDçiC)dDOcoP)ç.oCDhCDOftQCDH•0CtftçtHH-0pp,rtftz1HctHOOOOjctMHH-0.CDOOoDNH’CO(çtH(D(DrH-’0H-L.D1IIj$DH-CDftH-PCD(DC°COHH.0M<::y.OctcnftP)()H-0H-ftOThPJa0<Cl)H:P)0H-°a..-iiF-°0CDP)cn,dcoctrjHM CDp1-‘--HHOD)H(DH--Cf—Oft<OOFeP1oiç0cnH-P)H-Cl)OOp1<0CDQOp1HHO)1cHftftH0r<.H-HftCDc-tftOHP)i-OOftH<P’ftftctfr$D)<COQ4’..M(DOH-F’H-ftH.0H(D(l)0Cs)CDCD1QrtH-”CD0H-oocoCD Cl)OHQftftoCOhp<oCDH-OH)F— HOçiCl)LhI0tjct(DhhjC/)•CD0P10ftOH-H(DW0°H-ftft siiH-(D0çthIH-’ftOHH(DH-HQ.1CDCtNp,C°o(D1II_I-IçirtH-H-C/)PI<(D.Q.ctE1jCDP1H-3t0“CDcobt10ocoCOftP1<CDctCofl(D0ftCD0•ftHOCDC1(DCDct0H-<H-(D0OftOP%H1HH--t005MOM0ftII1Dt3fti--oç).ft)Hi(D(D0Q-o‘Ot5P1<P1HH1H-iH-HOftp1siH-0S—CDftOftOoP)CO0H-ftF-.—ftCD05H-CoP)i0Li’P1H-H-H0t3ftftft’rjOH-plCDFC30HHH-IIH0COOH-ft1i-OftftFdftøH-H-H-ftOJb.rtOOft0p1H-P1C)COH-P1P1ftP)rtN(DOMP1P1H-CnHP1O(DOP1ip1HHH(000ftiH‘<H<IIi-h1HH’‘-<ft.C01hhHH-ft0 PlO (oftHQft CD II P10ftOH-op)P1CDH—f-I)ft 1FH-OftCOOP1fti-IHftOCDHH0)-Cl)HftDHftOD——ft H-0—ICl)ID..LJID00 ‘-3 Cl)(-3-IH H H (I) CD 1< (iia,Ci2’HCtCDoçuoCDCDH-: HH,,CDH-H-p.)Ctc-trti-CDCtH-ciH-H-CDCDWO1HiCDCDCDH-IH-çCDp,CDHi‘ZjH _coçtt’(lQH-t CDCt1p)p.)CD CDHctCD N H H CtHZF—oI1CDOOF-H-H-Q(OPPI1CDNCDCDMOPOP)—]CDciO•HH0QH-ctCoH-(DCt‘dCtLQH-CDCDCfl)1P)P)OP)CI)CDCDH-PCDH-OCOCDD)Si’CtCDcti.QIQQc-tOQQctrjCDH-D)H-H-CDctH-CDoJCDOCiCDIH-NHO0p)(I)OH-0Ct—Ctt1.QCDCD°H-(tP)0 COOH-Ctl-liH-.DCo0CDCDHQct0H-0•OOO1HiCOH1Hr-t”CDCDH-0<I0,CDH-0Ctrt’t5OF-pCtHiCD:JHHQHP)HCt0rt:jPOHHDCtOP.)I-4—iHiOCtH-CDOOCD0t(A.)IICOCtH-CDCtCOciH-HCt0COCDCt3Ctcx,JHCDpCtCOHctCDH-1i01:s’<MciCDCDHP.)COH-OCD1’<COOHOICoCDCODHCtOOiH0H-Hç1CDCtHCD0CtHiHtY’HP.)cia)CD’QCDLHHCDtH’CDCDCOCDHO0t3OCDMCDp.)COOCtp,CtHCtCDQCDCDH-HCOH-p.)CDOH.HO01H0CDc3HP)HCOH-COPNbCD).QflCDi’.Q0COCtH-Ct1CD<NCDH.CDiH-COOpCDCDciCtHH-H-H-OHHCDk<CtCOCDHCtp.)CDN(OYI1Hc-CDH-H-CtHiCDOLQp)CDiCDCtNCtHLJ-Q.P.)CDp.)HLQH.çtCDH-O0CtCDCtpH-Oç1CD‘<CtCDCtCt--O-ctCDHiCOp.)H-P.)(DCDCtCOOHCtCDCOciH-’tOciOCOOH-<OHCtCtOH°CDCDH-<iP.)(DH-HCtOcIHCDH-CDiCOCDCDH-Ct<O<P.)ciIiCO%CDHp°COOH-NQPCt<0HCtCDCDCDQCOH-COHCOHF—P.)OOCDHOOP.)OH-H-’.ççt-...CDCtpiCOIip.)CtC,)<CtH0CDoHfTh0H1H<CO0COCtCDOCtCD)H-c)CtMOCtCtCtCtCDtH-0OHCDH-CDCD—QCD‘rjHOCOP.)CDP.)..03H-CDHCtbH..pHH-CD(CtCDCtCDH-<HP.)CtH-CtCOCtCtCD0CD-tHi‘QC’1HCO0ciCD0O<ciCtCOOCOciHOCtH-P.)CtHiCtP.)OhhO-O0HtCt0CDCtO’TJP.)0‘<CtciP.)ciP.)H-p)OcjOH-CtCDHIP)CtOCtCDCDCOCDHCtQCtCDCDC1)CDCDHHiHP.)HOH4H-pZ5H0CDQOCOCDciCDp.CtHCDP.)QHCtCDOCDCtCDCOH-CDH-HCOCOOCDHICtIoHOcoCOOdciHp.)CpCDP.)CtciQHCt..3QHH-HP)pjCDCOCDCtIOCDH-C0HIHICDH-H-HCtCOCtCOCtCtH-CtCt<HIHurjp)rjICDIt-0Ctp.)H-CtHCD<<COP)IOCOH.CDCtOIlCDbcoH-Dt5P.)P)COCD..DCtCtCDIOCtCtHIIHciP)CDOCtp.)Ct—P.)P.)CDCDQJDP)H-CDCDP.)CDIokCtH(D‘OCD•COILQCDCDHHP.CtHIHiliHId)CtCtP.)(DCtHCDp)OCtOH-1O p) HM0 0 H CDd)CtCD<CD P.)OHCO1OO•... CD H H :IP)cHCO HH (iiI- H-CO H-CO Ct CD P.) H ci CD Ct p.) CO H Ct H- CO H CD CO CD Ct CD HI-sc-ICDCD COtIjr%.)Ft5HIH ••HQ10 CDCDHHCDCOCOCOHICtCtQ-CD P.)HICt‘-DH—.10 p.) H p.)ci HP.)Ct CDHOCDCtOHHiCOCtd0)Ft5CD1DXCt•CDP)O HCDHciH-PCOHHCtHCtH1COHH-HIciCtCDHCOHP)COCtHH1c:OoH-Ct.cDMs.pH-H•H-SCD0COH Lci0PCt0H-HCDCOCtCDHCO“COHH.‘CtOCOOOCDCDHiHCOCDHiCtH::3PjjCtCOCD0 I-hHCtCDCOH-i)CtCDCt.QCtDCDYP’CDHHCtCt CDCflF<pCi)Ctp)Cl)Hp.)COCtCOCtH-P.)OCDOCt1COCOOCO01Cti<P)CDCO<COCtCOCO-CDHCtCtdPp)CtHCtCD<p.)•COCOO-’CtCDCDCOCDPi.COCOCDH-CDZp.)H-itC.HCtCt.CtDCD..P.)CDCDHFtShj—)H,r,CO<H- COH—P)COCDcDO$2-‘1.c,)c_oP.)ciCnCDCDCDHCOCDCD-,H-COp.)iQHH-.—COCt01<p.)CtZCO•CDjcL:H,-i-<—OH•LiCtiH-W‘.Q-P.)HCOCDHIHOCtOCDbi$2H0,-p.)‘S.’CtCOHHtIOHHF-’coCDH-OFCtcCtH-SH-0OCOCD••HHI $2 CD CD $2 CD Ct (I) ft P.) Ct CD67presupposes the existence of sovereign states to whichinternational law can be applied.19 James, 18. Elsewhere, despite differences over the exactcharacter of sovereignty, Hinsley responds to this question in asimilar manner to James by stating that sovereignty is theessential criteria for membership in the international community:“the quality of sovereignty in the individual state will continueto be an essential qualification, in law as in practice, formembership in the international community”. See F.H. Hinsley,“The Concept of Sovereignty and the Relations Between States,” inIn Defense of Sovereignty, ed. W.J. Stankiewicz (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1969), 287.20 This discussion is based on James, esp. 37—59.21 Jadkson, 35. He rounds out this list of ‘rules’ withjurisdiction, making and honouring of treaties, diplomacyconducted in accordance with accepted practices, and, morebroadly, a framework of international law. Perhaps it should beexplicitly stated that one of the problems with the traditionalinterpretations of sovereignty is exactly this: that thecorollaries of sovereign status are confused with the actualcharacter of sovereignty itself. As is argued below, thecharacter of sovereignty is distinct from the attributes thatflow from it.22 Keohane 385. For similar judgements, see Jackson, 3; and C.H.Mcllwain, Constitutionalism and the Changing World (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1939), 30.23 James, 40.24 Alan James, “Comment on J.D.B. Miller,” Review ofInternational Studies 12 (1986) : 91—93.25 This is a similar metaphor to the one used by James, 47.26 See, for example, Jacques Maritain, “The Concept ofSovereignty,” in Stankiewicz, ed., 41-64.27 Keohane, 385.28 Some observers equate sovereignty with ‘independence’;however, are states independent if they are independent from eachother legally or if they independent from the effects of eachother’s actions? Or both? The difficulty involved in answeringsuch questions shows the problems of a definition of sovereigntywhich involves elements of relativity. This is one problem inequating sovereignty with ‘political independence’. James arguesthat sovereignty understood as ‘political independence’ (asopposed to constitutional independence) is conceptually fuzzybecause it involves elements of both ‘freedom’ and ‘success’.That is, one state may have more ‘freedom’ than another if it issomewhat self—sufficient and unencumbered by relationships andlinks with other states (it is autonomous and noninterdependent); however its policies may be ‘unsuccessful’ bymaking little impression on the world or by failing to achieve0:C)CtOW. 1c_CDCD•CDct IIp)it%HHH03CoØ(1)P)°HfrcH-itCDHrtF-C)HçtH-F--s-CDP)0<oMCDH(12itb0rt0H-H-CDHr5MiH-sitCDCDftp)••..COOftitH-3OCDi-1’<<P)CO<CPit-çtHtJ•i<H,ftrDP-0rH-plHCDciHiQQH-hCD0P’‘H-I-H3it5)zCDc-tHCDHF-aHHIIitH<HHCOr1rnCDitL.•..p)p)OP-:ct2O-‘Co<ci,vg)itI-’CD(D-j-,2dcit3Cl)CD-3CD0Cl)CDCoi-HCDC)HCDHp)CDçtHctr’Jp)‘H-.O‘MCDp—p)CDP)çt—MH-H--HQCDOOC)CDCOP)‘OH-OH-CH-)0Co)0COi-CDitIirt<C12I-CDCD(12(12f-•CDCDOc-tO,—.,3IICD‘C)H-H$iitH-H-ZH-itCDCoHP)çip)’<b3ititCDitOCoOO’<CoJP)it0CD)p)-)<H-Op)CtHC1)CoC)11CD.-mHHI-Ip)CDpCOp)’<coCD(fl’1’.•(I)HHCDCDCDQ-‘---H-y’—p‘QQ3OCocift-itCDH-’<it’.(DCDc3d<pjH-PP)CDCDct’1(0OIQCofThCo0PCOitCDF-1OItCI)H-0HHH-0CDCD12pciitIIO•C)‘0CDip)OOHHCDCDCDH-CoitCD(D,OOH-H‘15 I°,-H-CDp)CDP)<.Q(12QP)HCDH t50CDHk<y(12p)CDMoIH-CD0H-CD-Qit‘Q(DP)‘1‘CD0p)CDCOCOH-0Cl)ciH-HOiQCD0C)CDH-1H-H-H-t5CDitCDit-P)CDC)’1H-HCDoP’OH-p)C)H-H-I1‘1OP)O’QititOitHçD(I)5itt-H-HO(l)’-<OH-CDit’.Coit’1’H-,Cl)P)CD Co L.)—1 ( H H(A)(A)(31 O0HHCOCl)ititH-H__I_0-o-CD S P3 (I) H (1) H 0 II H H p3 HH-(3)it CD II cihjCD°CD C) H- COO—ciCoCOCD 0pjol) HCoCD II ‘.O I-bCD CoCD—1oCD•CD H 0CD itP-I C) (OftCot5H-CDOCoL)itLH(3)0(3)H-CD5t\)HCDitOitH-2jCoitCDOH-(DHP)’101<C)CDCD(0’.CDP)H-p3C)it3WH-0ciO’1P)O’1itHopo itOP’OO•H0CoCoP)CDCDMCD0itF()tYp)H-,,bCHC)CDSC_)op’’<a0-’CD’S=Sd-:::si—iLJ•:iH-°H,O$CDit01‘1k<O•CD—i-‘H-•2:itCDCD CJQCD<M200‘1HQI-F--l•.itFrJitQCoCDCDCDX’1C)’1••ociH-2HCD‘1-pjCD0CDøIQIciCD°CDO1HH-F—C)itC)’.HCD‘CD-“HH1’ilØC)HO•IOaCOOHOM-itbC)-S‘-IOCDCOH-OM.C)S..it(A)OitH-CDC)C0iLQ5’dOOitCOO0OdCoO0ObCD$p)ditCDCDp)I1CoL-J-CC4CO05itOCDC)CDPJHHCDCoCDp3P3CD0‘1C)(Dci(iCoCDC)SSP3CD5itft’3H-H.,CoitCDCDS12H-p3P)CDiti(0CoHCoCoSCo-itsci‘.‘.0j<CDOH‘1r1Co(D50ciC)(DCot%-)Uias.DftP)OHI-h’1CDCoCO••‘dCDCDMHoCojitCoCDp3it’10CDitOP)itpjitCoIICDH-itCoCDciCo.CD(OHHCDCDCDPit1HCDgCD’H-Co‘1Coit’CT)CDCotCDOP-ICociHP3CDCDitHCDCop30itHOH<CDitciCoCD’.CDCDH-CDCoCoitCD’1’1CDp,Hitci’1HH-CDCDP)CDCOOCDCDCDCOHHCoCDIrJit5p31.QP3CDC)OHiitCDit<CDiQ0H-0‘1CDCoO’<HCDH-P)IHHititSft’1COHCDCDCoP)CDP3HCDCD..CoH-1b’30S(1)C)cLCDit(iH-’1CDCCDI-•-H3CoHi<H-CDit<o’1ici•.ijCD ‘1itHgOoCnCDCDH-0 Oi-ciCDQH-CDitCDHC4itCoCDHrj‘1cip)I-<k<p)CDCDCDSjCDHitctciCDciP)itCDCOH-0QHiOCDP).,itl3CDCD0ciC)ititHHH-CDCDCo0CJH-jCDittY’cILCDCoIciCDCDj-ciCoCDCD-HHCDd’1pC‘1COitHciodCDciIitci,CDHCD(A)CDCDP)itoCD’1•CDciCDCoHHCDHt’.Mt31.CDit0I<P)H-CDOOitCoC)H-H0(1)0P3H-P)bH-P)itititCD•ciHCoHCDC)CoCoP)CoO° a69which is more uncertain about the premise that the level ofinterdependence is rising, see Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis ofInternational Relations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968);and R. Rosecrance, et al., “Whither Interdependence?”International Organization 31, no.3 (Summer 1977) : 425-471.38 Young, 726.39 Young, 726.40 Keohane and Nye also acknowledge that “interdependencerestricts autonomy”; see their Power and Interdependence, 9.41 There is also an ‘opportunity benefit’ which results frombeing able to channel more resources - which are no longer neededbecause there is mutual restriction of autonomy by states whocontribute to the problem - into other areas. For example, theCanadian government can spend less money on cleaning up the GreatLakes if the United States is spending money on clean up as well.This is a further example of autonomy enhancement. For reasonsof scope and space, however, the analysis of this paper willconfine itself to how autonomy has been reduced throughmultilateral environmental agreements.42 Young, 727 (emphasis added)43 While it is true that some states may have superior abilitiesto deal with the impacts of climate change, for instance, thisdoes not mean that they escape the effects of climate changealtogether. Richer states may be able to afford ‘technicalfixes’ that others cannot (see for example, Frederick S. Myers,“A Technical Fix for the Greenhouse,” Science 256 (22 May 1992)1144.). Similarly, while some states are more directly dependenton the environment than others, a high level of interdependencewould suggest that burdens placed on some (eg. the potential forserious repercussions in the agriculturally based developingworld) will effect in other ways (eg. through economic problemsor political instability) those who can cope with the directresults of the environmental problem. In the climate changescenario, all of this is contingent on the extent to whichclimate change is or is not going to be a serious problem. Onlythe young science of climatology will be able to assist us here;see chapter five below. On other issues, however, such asdepletion of the ozone layer, greater levels of perceived threatled to international action; see chapter four below.44 Some bilateral environmental situations are also termed casesof dependence; that is, one country can be said to be‘environmentally dependent’ on another. The Canadian-Americanrelationship with regards to water quality and acidprecipitation, for example, has been described as one of“environmental dependence” (with the degree of damage to Canadabeing ‘dependent’ on their larger neighbour’s S02 emissions).See Donald Munton and Geoffrey Castle, “Air, Water and PoliticalFire: Development of a North American Environmental Regime,” inCanadian Foreign Policy and International Economic Regimes, eds.ijP)MOi(31‘01Ii(-JI01M01(iiIt-’’dI01(SI01i—iQ.cotr00cxt--Io—Iooi(DcICDMIfrf,r-sH-ø00P)—Ja-,rtP)(D(D01OHcoMCDc110IJIH)IP)CDiM,MI-’-M)COOH.HP)‘QP)t1H-IH-Q-tjIQ.,coIp’I<(D’riI-ctcct--—ctP)0Ii0IOlOP)‘<piP)ICDCDlH-00P)cooCH’<HP)CDç5P)M•.ooOri-QP)coH-‘<ti,‘<rtIMMIMCDH<OM[‘0‘t3-0COCD0rbCDCO0P)H-3CoP)0IH<CO<CO(,)COi)C)jd-ñHCDH()1Ct0COiH—H-.CDIH-ctct•cD(D::y!rCO•0P)COP)0a-,piCDCDCOP)HIIHcyH.H-P)lCDMIic-I-0COI’dLQo.QP)HH1I0Hct•-J:jOCOHCDHH[’)°tirta(1H-Q40IMOCDH[‘0COCDCDP)c-tCDCDc-I-•0-otiIcDFgp)CDCDCD—i::5HL4)‘<CDCOHQMCOCO‘tiçtc-I-COCOCDc-I-MHMH<HCO“oH-CD‘-<CDCDpijH-oIiOG0CD0j9)00<MH--pc-I-IiCD1HHMP)H-H-0’‘MCD‘<Cl)HIP)CDCOC/c1H-H00p)IOCD’tiHHM:H-•.o<-HCOP)P)IiCDotiCDH’-P) HIOCDtiH-co0CDCDH-CDP)JCDH0HItiCDH-piCDHt’i0IOrtP)P)H-0CtçH0P)(DCD°—JP)HQ.0HCOMMCD0H°CDHMCOCDO0CD10HP)CDCOHOH[’JcoH-H-Co0MMit-’-HCDQL-1MdCA)CDLII[-h°C’Jc-I-OHH-oMP)0(DCO(iiCDH-Cl)0—J0—.jCDOCDMCDH-CH-COHCD.-‘—LQCH-jI-0H<Cl)CSi-<iCDc-.CDjP)jotiH-CDC)oc-I-StMH-P)P)“CDMcooCD°MCDCo-jc-I0•P)0P)0ti<:Iic-M•.CDct0-1P)’0H°0P)CDMCDH•Cl)‘0C0‘tICDpi(JECDoMCZHCD:DH-CO•M-JQ..CDOP)COCDCDc-tco0H3rjCDci-J0CO-‘-O‘-D3rI-doH‘tJi‘—HCD-aoCOP)CD00iHp)0C/)CD‘<CD0•.HtiI-”H•HOQc-I-ct1CDCDCDHP)CDCDCDHciMcc0HCl-’M0P)CDCO HCDtJ-Jc-t-COCDIit\tQH-CDCDIc-I-0PJCDCO0•P)’<01°CDcoc-IMCDHHCOHCDç-ICD000‘<H00-CDHCDHCO00CDH-c-trn—[CDx,0t-ñCD‘IrtMHOcHCD-LH’<CO‘C11D0CDH-01Cl’c-I-•iiCflIrj0piP)H-COHc-I-ILHCOH-H-IiLY0(D0CO-,0Cl)lo‘OH-Coc-1-p)oHtiCDP)HHIii0[‘00CDP)CDICDa’oH-cy’,H-liH-c-IIQMQ.IH-H-‘.oCOH—iH-P)HHM0IICDCD3IcO’P)c-I-CD.I.Qc-to—p)CDct‘—Qctp)CO‘<H,•tic-I-P-liiHCOlli••HCD’-<-c-I-’<citi7160 As was communicated in another metaphor:An island’s accessibility from a nearby continent mayso improve that we may tend to forget that it is anylonger an island. Reaching it by subway, or by railacross a bridge, we may mistake it for a part of themainland. But its technical insularity will remainunimpaired , not being a matter of relative practicalinaccessibility. Though linked with the mainland by abridge, an island it still will be.See C.A.W. Manning, The Nature of International Society, 166. Itmight be added that pollution reaching the island’s shores fromthe mainland does not undermine its status as an island either.61 See, for example, P.C. Mayer—Tasch, “InternationalEnvironmental Policy as a Challenge to the National State,” Ambio15, no.4 (1986) : 240—243. See also, Ruth Lapidoth, “Sovereigntyin Transition,” Journal of International Affairs 45, no.2 (Winter1992) : 325—346.62 Waltz, 95.63 WCED, Our Common Future, 301.64 The most obvious example is Jessica T. Mathews, “RedefiningSecurity”. Others have made similar claims; see for exampleBruce Byers, “Ecoregions, State Sovereignty, and Conflict,”Bulletin of Peace Proposals 22, no.1 (1991) : 65-76; and NormanMyers, “Environmental Security,” Foreign Policy 74 (1989): 23—41.65 For a reasoned response to ‘redefined’ national security, seeDaniel Deudney, “The Case Against Linking EnvironmentalDegradation and National Security,” Millenium 19, no.3 (1990):461—476.66 Lynton K. Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, 2nded. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 311; Lynton K.Caldwell, “International Responses to Environmental Issues:Retrospect and Prospect,” International Studies Notes 116, no.1,(Winter 1991) : 3.67 The implicit ‘other’ in Caldwell’s statement here is likely dejure sovereignty. However, if the features of sovereignty asconstitutional independence are recalled, sovereignty is notdivisible in this manner. An alternate, and perhaps moreplausible explanation, would distinguish between sovereignty andautonomy.68 Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, 311.69 Quoted in Caldwell, 68.70 Caldwell, 60.71 Maurice F. Strong, “ECO ‘92: Critical Challenges and GlobalSolutions,” Journal of International Affairs 44, no.2, (Winter1991) : 287—300.J-_J(A)t\)cici)piCDCDCl)Cl)..—I-I--‘cxHIi p) r1 Ci) 0 0 H 0 CD I-< 0 ti 0 0 II H CD I- Cl) H ct II CD Cri Cl) H H (71HcxCiIcxrtC/-0ccx-.jjj--O’010)I1CDC1IH-U)p)Y0I.N.)HQI—I1-.-i‘.,oCDCDrtIi(t0lH0D0CDP)0HICOctCDIL-1CtCDH<IH-HOCflciCDIP)H-I.CD0..NMtiCDOIP)P)0ti•.iorII-oi—-pQI0titiut1P)opiItiIIH)HIEIH-HIprti<‘<r—-CDH-”IH--CD(-t-doII:ijCDIH-•Hr1IpcoI-°‘<I0p)CDrjp,Hi1sCDHIj®CD(i)HI-<CDctICDI<‘CDHHC)0C)(ii‘H000c-0-HHCDIrtp)Cl)H.ctI1CDJCDH-HN0oICDi-h..‘CDjCDHJl)‘-<rtIiH-:CDI0OH-P)H0<rp1p,P)-P.’011HICDHHHc’’-Ii—iCD5P)ICD•.H0Hp)HcoCDH-•CDtiIp)IQCDL0I0ticjiitiCDH-i—i0L-IHp.’tiH-CQc-i...CDIxPNH-bi-c-tHtiirJCDCDi--0ti—CD0•0çt0CD..0<ci“tiflcn-$1HHH-CDCDCD1iH-tiCDH-()pP.’tiHcnC”)CDCD0°°-tiH10ip)ti01P)p.’H-H-OH-HMOCD0CDtiCDi-ñPict00H-ct)O)IiiCDCDHODD’CDCDCDHC)I-CD-CDH-I”)cotiIi-0P.’HPCDHCDp)Cl)•ctcnçi.’-a0HHcy’OCiH-CDt-iC°-CD’CDp.’(-’)HCDCDCDH-CDP)CDCuD-c-I-c-I-HCctcoH-ti‘-a-<CDHCD00;zH0C’)CDW-CDCn00ICDp)CDp)frf.-tiCDHtiç-tIic-I-c)HP.’:iH-<iH0Cl)—.CDcoHCDc-0Hp.’p)C,00p.—JO:3’P.’c-I-tyc).’C).’<1•‘)IHtiHtip.’LQc-I-0p)tict,0-CDUj?H-‘-dC5H-I•CDp)0HH-CDtiCDOH-00HP).CD0c-I-H0‘d-tiøii-H‘-Q:H-0p)c-t-CDcoctH-I0OI<°<°0HH-..F-30:c-I-0•LIP)P.’0Hp.’CD(J)HH-<-c-i-C)CDH0•t\)C)HLI0CDCDH--CDHCl)c-I-H-F-1i:.o-iHIHtiHccoCuH-l0p.’H-CioI<p.’•Q”P.’p.’QHH-p)P)P)ttiCDIctp,’(l)CDIOHIi-••0J:J—1HIQco<CuctCD-nCDcta)ItXJIs..CDctcH.F3iti‘CDHICDCDtiH-P)b•tic-tCD1’<-QIiIbcoCD0CuH-CD0HtiCI)Qc-HojctcuIct-a.CuH-iCiictH-H-P.’CDI—hiCuJlctctCflP.’CDCDctP.’H-C)00t5P.’CDIC).CDctIHCDCD’-<.HHiOCl)(iiHti—iH--tid°CD H C))-‘I-I 0CD I-ti0 OCDI-h ct HCDrI CDH ctP.’CDc-tP.’ c-I-H 0Iii—t-,CDCD fr-I0 0 CD0CD CiCDp.’N)—i (71‘-°CDCD—Jtico(A)0•rI-CiH-c-I-•0HHci00 0CD P)CDctCDCD Fit-IH0CD C’JCDCt.’HrICD’-<Ii CD0HCDcttiCD ti C))Of-I-H-çtCDp)CI)CDHOti•0tCD%._c-I- H-00‘-CDti::sCDrtP.’HctoCr20CDIi H-ctCDCOCDH coH•Q rIco C)) ci c-I H- CD 0 i-h CI) rI p.’ c-I- CD H c-n I:-’ CD P.’ CD 0 i-h—1t\)7386 PTBT, 2 I.L.M. 889, Preamble and art. 1, para 1(b). Vayrynen,18.87 Schmalberger, 14. The news is not all good however. TheInternational Commission to Investigate the Health andEnvironmental Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Production recentlyreleased a report which estimates that nuclear weapons testing bythe U.S., U.S.S.R., the U.K., France, and China will eventuallylead to around 2 million extra cancer deaths. See MatthiasFinger, “The Military, the Nation State and the Environment,” TheEcologist 21, no.5 (Sept—Oct. 1991) : 220—225. Additionally,there are the ‘domestic’ problems which may result from theroutine venting of radioactive gases, the risks of groundwatercontamination, and the geological stresses which could lead toeven greater releases of radioactive material. See Gareth Porterand Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics (Boulder:Westview Press, 1991), 112.88 Vayrynen, 18.89 “Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution” (1979,hereafted cited as LRTAP Convention) 18 I.L.M. 1442, art. 2.90 LRTAP Convention, articles as cited in text. See also Amy A.Fraenkel, “The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary AirPollution: Meeting the Challenge of International Cooperation,”Harvard International Law Journal 30, no.2 (Spring 1989): 447-476; and C. Ian Jackson, “A Tenth Anniversary Review of the ECEConvention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution,”International Environmental Affairs 2, no.3 (Summer 1990) : 217—226.91 See Arne Tollan, “The Convention on Long-Range TransboundaryAir Pollution,” Journal of World Trade Law 19 (Nov—Dec 1985)621; and Marc Levy, “European Acid Rain: The Power of ToteboardDiplomacy,” unpublished paper (Harvard University, 1991), 10.92 “Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range TransboundaryAir Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or TheirTransboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent” (1985, hereaftercited as Helsinki Protocol) 27 I.L.M. 698, art. 2.93 Helsinki Protocol, art. 4.94 See Levy, esp. 26-33; and Fraenkel, 471.95 “Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range TransboundaryAir Pollution Concerning the Control of Emission of NitrogenOxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes” (1988, hereafter cited asSofia Protocol) 28 I.L.M. 212, art. 2, para. 1.96 Sofia Protocol, art. 2, para. 3(a).97 Levy, 33—39. Those twelve countries were Austria, Belgium,Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein,Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.7498 “Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range TransboundaryAir Pollution on Long—term financing of the Cooperative Programmefor monitoring and evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission ofAir Pollutants in Europe (EMEP)” (1984, hereafter cited as EMEPProtocol) 24 I.L.M. 484, art. 3, paras. 1, 2, 4.99 EMEP Protocol, Annex.100 There is also a wider question here of ‘regimeeffectiveness’; that is, to what degree did which states makereductions and commitments resulting from the influence of theprotocols or the wider ‘air pollution regime’? Theseconsiderations are beyond the scope of the paper, but arediscussed especially by Levy; see his article cited above, n.91.See also Porter and Brown, esp. 71-74.101 Tollan, 621.102 Telephone interview with Environment Canada official, 30 June1992.103 LRTAP Convention, art. 17. See also EMEP Protocol, art.11; Helsinki Protocol, art. 12; Sofia Protocol, art. 16.104 “Early end predicted for ozone-reducing CFCs,” Globe andMail, 29 February 1992; Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown, “Building aMonitoring and Compliance Regime Under the Montreal Protocol,”Yale Journal of International Law 16 (1991) : 519-570; “India MayNeed Over $2 Billion to Develop CFC Alternatives,” EnvironmentNews Service (Daily) 3, no.52 (17 March 1992)105 The London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol stipulatephaseout by 2000 for CFCs 11, 12, 113, 114, 115, Halons 1211,1301, 2402, and ten other fully halogenated CFCs, carbontetrachioride, and methyl chloroform (2005) . Many of thesecompounds were not even covered in the initial Protocol. See“Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the MontrealProtocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,” U.N.Environment Programme (U.N. Doc. UP/OzL.Pro.2/3 (1990)), Annex I,art. 2, paras. 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, and 2E; hereafted cited as LondonAmendments. Many developed nations, including Canada and theU.S., have unilaterally adjusted their phaseout deadlines to 1996and 1995 respectively.106 London Amendments, Annex II, art. 10; Annex IV, app. IV. Seealso, Armin Rosencrariz and Antony Scott, “Bringing the DevelopingWorld on Board,” Environmental Policy and Law 20, no.6 (1990):201—203.107 See London Amendments, Annex II, art. 4, para. 1 and 2.108 See 1987 Final Act of “Montreal Protocol on Substances thatDeplete the Ozone Layer,” 26 I.L.M. 1541, art. 4, para. 3 and 6;and London Amendments, Annex II, art. 4, para. 3.109 See Rosencranz and Scott, 202.F1 ‘.0Xi1OCnHO-dH)H-Y(DL\)00N)Ji)0HIIH(D(DH•0CDa,ctDH-i-zj•p30Ct01(DHP)I1OP3H1.0%H(DH‘•H-hbP3000rt(D1:rt•.Pg(D0ci(DP)P)1jbH.N5I1‘Lict(Dft•H-•‘-rP)HOHHHHP3H-‘-xj‘Isc,‘.øft’l(j‘.o(Drt($)3•(DM0P3(D(DdCfl‘.H-0D)•HP3ftC!)ftwH-MH)‘HLQc,)jcLQ1.o(DYH(J1F-1cx(D’.o%ZICDcyd-:c,(‘)CDP)(!)frfHP)ciP3CDH-CDc!)Hi•CDHQftH(DOHN)IflCI)H-IH(I)ftHftH.0 iH0CDI1ICDQ-H-MP3ciCDP)P3P)H(C!(D(f)H-[-t)ftjN)CDMOCDp,PH00CDMHE(DLxi’.0’.CDftN)-ciy•P3(I)ctH-P3MH-UiHCDQ)CDtyczc-t-o)<ciMHcoOftP3CDCDMCDP3gCDSHCD’<cjO2Ps 1.QP3HCDH1.0H-CDD)<2°cD°I’(D‘CD2°I-iciPJCI)0—H‘.(DMH0Ui0CD0CI)—ftP)CDHP)(DCC!F1ft-‘.0i10H-()CDQ’-Qft.HJCl)ci (I) ft C!) H P3 H CD rJ ci ft ci II CD ‘-a 0 I- 0 ft 0 0 C) H CD H H P3 C!) ci) ft CD P-I M ft H 0 H 1.0 1.0 N)UIHCQICi(DHt’1H-F1P)OMOIOCDM‘-<o’OCDCO—JMciOOIciCoCD0OMftMCDP3‘oCD‘S’0MlP)5’jCDHOP3IHCI)(1)Hft(DH0HM0H-O’.CDo’.‘.00içtHCDoL’-O)HCJ).(Dci0•‘°tyUJCDCOCD(DcQ(DM-P)•pj(b(D0c-t-P3oQUHft0OCDMo0D-fl<H-,)Mft0°’.OCDMM)(DC1ftHHftO0P3pH-<(s)ftH)oI11tJIoMItir°QMCD0H(DCDc-t0p,CDoH-PloHH::Q‘-EoHCl)‘-<ftCDCD0H0J(DH3’M(-)jCDi-HCDH0Ci)0<0H’.ftftCD0H-..CD<H-0M-NOCD:C/)H0Nco‘.00pi<<HODIZ0CD0cCD%IP3HMc••Iftci($)0c,)(D••LIciftf..L1iii.jW<C!)LQMCD<CD•ciP3MH-0’.wMCDCDI0Cl)CDIH-:i’N)OP)ICJ)‘-aH-U1cn0aICftiOcIoQ.‘-<ftHCDftH-Ici0ii-CD(DC!)ISMOIMHOLL.4MIIP31<CDIoH-Cl)COOP)ICDP3P)ICD0ftP3’CDCOc1It1HHICo<0<HOOHHHciHHHHHH0hftOiH-C!)CDOH-Cl)I1(’)H-i0CDP3CDP3CDiCDb(DH”’1H-‘.0UiHHC!)H-HN)HH.ft<c5-tCn.l‘<PaftP3iCip,CDft00hhCl)CDCDM0HHHt‘.OCDH-fttçCl)CDN)CD——P3•OHP31<(i-ICDci 0H-OCDjftH (DOHP)Co-1CDHMcI)1.QCDCDCDH--ft(DP3oHH)Cl)C)0P3-H-CDXCl)H-ft 0<ftIIH-N1<MCD-•.o‘-acDCDCDftft HciP3ft ciP3P)1P3HP3(i)IHCl).’HP)HIHIci(oF1bOHIP3I-IftbCoN)OftHIHICDCOCD<C!)IMft(l)CDb--.1p)(I)U)HIP33Ift0CDIIH-CDCD0CoftHI<H(D’<P3oMM(DI’H-ciHP)ftftir CDH-CDCDHilOH-(1)‘.OCDtsI—.CDcift.0‘.cftONft‘.oCD”CDCDHci•.OM(J1CDMCDo MH CDIQCDMoODN3N)QftCI)CDN 0.coCOCDCDH-CDIQ)ft00IHi10CDP)ftP31(1‘<MCDciCDciMco‘.::h.i-<IP3C)H-0hiICDCDIH0 CoIHH-IftIc1u13ftIoM<Hci0O’zjIHMHP)lo,s_‘<It5P3O<CDHOOCDIH”H-IftftP30OCDcoIIIHi-.Ici—.1C-fl76122 Porter and Brown, 92. See also, Wirth and Lashof, 305.123 Richard A. Kerr, “Greenhouse Science Survives Sceptics,”Science 256 (22 May 1992) : 1138. For a dissenting view about thestate of greenhouse science and the generally anticipatednegative impacts, see Jesse H. Ausubel, “A Second Look at theImpacts of Climate Change,” American Scientist 79 (May/June1991) : 210—221. Ausubel argues for an “image” of climate changethat takes greater account of the human capacity for sociallearning and adaptation. His main concern seems to be, however,not that climate change may negatively affect millions ofpeoples’ quality of life (especially in poor countries), but thatwe (presumably the rich developed states) may “misplace” somequite large investments.124 Bette Hileman, “Web of Interactions Makes It Difficult toUntangle Global Warming Data,” Chemical and Engineering News (27April 1992): 10. A recent meeting of the IPCC (January 1992 inChina) reinforced this conclusion; see EPA Regional ClimateChange News 2, no.1 (4 March 1992). For work that incorporatesthe IPCC update and analyzes the implications of the newscenarios, see T.M.L Wigley and S.C.B. Raper, “Implications forclimate and sea level of revised IPCC emissions scenarios,”Nature 357 (28 May 1992) : 293—300. They conclude, briefly, thatalthough global-mean temperature and sea level change projectionsare reduced from the 1990 IPCC conclusions, these rates are stillfour to five times those that have occured over the past centuryand are certain to present a considerable challenge to humanity.125 Hileman, 11.126 Porter and Brown, 92; Wirth and Lashof, 306. Such anobservation also speaks to Ausubel’s sceptical argument as notedabove, n.123.127 Caldwell, International Environmental Policy, 267.128 The 1990 IPCC Report (presented at the SWCC) is divided intothree parts as follows: (1) an executive summary of two pages;(2) a policy—makers summary of approximately 20 pages; and(3) full Working Group reports of more than 300 pages. See “NoAgreement on C02 Reductions,” Environmental Policy and Law 20,no.6 (1990) : 196. The full report of Working Group III (ResponseStrategies Working Group - RSWG), with a policy-makers summary,can be found in the UNEP and WMO published volume Climate Change:The IPCC Response Strategies (Washington, D.C.: Island Press,1991). For work incorporating the new data and methodology, seethe paper by Wigley and Raper cited above, n.124.129 “No Agreement on C02 Reductions”, 196. “Second World ClimateConference: Ministerial Declaration,” art. 11, reprinted inEnvironmental Policy and Law 20, no.6 (1990) : 220—232.130 The call for negotiations is found in art. 28 of theMinisterial Declaration cited above, n.129.131 EPA Regional Climate Change News 2, no.1 (4 March 1992).77132 See Bette Hileman, “Earth Summit Concludes With Agenda forAction, but Little Funding,” Chemical and Engineering News (6July 1992): 7-17. The text of the U.N. Framework Convention onClimate Change, hereafter cited as Framework Convention onClimate Change, is Annex I of U.N Document A/AC.237!18(PartII) /Add.1.133 Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 4, para. 2(a)and (b).134 Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 4, para. 3.135 Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 4, parä. 7.136 Edward S. Rubin, et al., “Realistic Mitigation Options forGlobal Warming,” Science 257 (July 1992): 148.137 See, for example, “Canada urged to stay on target,” The Globeand Mail, 9 May 1992, A8. Not all of the scientific community,at least, is troubled by the achievement of ‘only’ a frameworkconvention. Nature, as a journal, has advocated the frameworkagreement approach partly so as to avoid the inevitabledisappointment that would result from a failed protocol, partlydue to the recognition that the precedent of a frameworkconvention followed by more binding protocols has provedpossible, and partly because the best strategies have not yetbeen fully examined and are not likely even possible at thisstage. This should not, however, be construed as beingsupportive of the approach that climate change is not a problem;the journal also explicity emphasized that global warming isalready a serious problem and presents a “threat to the continuedhabitation of the surface of the earth by people”. See “Dangersof disappointment at Rio,” Nature 357 (28 May 1992): 265—266.138 Those domestic programs are the National Energy Strategy, the1991 Transportation Act, the Clean Air Act of 1990, and the EPA’svoluntary ‘Green Lights’ program. See Bette Hileman, “C02Emission Reductions: US Programs to Yield Big Cuts by 2000,”Chemical and Engineering News (4 May 1992): 4-5.139 “C02 Emissions Reductions: Global Pact Calls for NonbindingCuts,” Chemical and Engineering News (18 May 1992): 4.Nevertheless, critics contend that the Climate Convention shouldhave been much stronger that the Vienna Convention because thescience of global warming is more mature than the science ofozone depletion was in 1985.140 France committed $100 million annually; Japan committed $1.4billion annually to all development assistance; and the U.S. willgive $25 million directly for climate change initiatives. See“Rio Earth Summit: Meeting Ends With Hope, Disappointment,”Chemical and Engineering News (22 June 1992): 4. Canada hascommitted to contributing to the trust fund for climate toenhance observing systems in developing countries, as well as toassisting at least two developing countries to develop emissionsinventories in 1993; exact totals are not yet available. See78“Climate Change Convention: Canada Proposes a ‘Quick-Start’Agenda”, Canadian Government Document of the UNCED, 8 June 1992.141 The requirements (of all Parties) to develop, update,publish, and report national inventories of anthropogenic sourcesand removals by sinks of greenhouse gases and to formulate,implement, and publish national (and/or regional) programmescontaining measures to mitigate climate change are found in art.4, para. 1(a) and (b) of Framework Convention on Climate Change.142 Such a meeting would be under the auspices of theIntergovernmental Negotiating Committee which designed theFramework Convention; see “Climate Change Convention: CanadaProposes a ‘Quick-Start’ Agenda”, Canadian Government Document ofthe UNCED, 8 June 1992. The implementation section (in onesentence) is art. 13 of Framework Convention on Climate Change.143 Framework Covention on Climate Change, art. 25.144 See, for example, Porter and Brown, 93; and Rubin et al.,148. For a more general discussion about the cost—effectivenessof pollution prevention, see Donella H. Meadows et al., Beyondthe Limits, esp. 96-87.145 Lynton K. Caidwell, Between Two Worlds: Science, theEnvironmental Movement, and Policy Choice (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1990), 83.146 Frederick S. Myers, “Japan Bids for Global Leadership inClean Industry,” Science 256 (22 May 1992): 1144—1145.147 It might be argued that the development of the EC is clearlyan example of the demise or reduction of individual nations’sovereignty within a larger constitutional arrangement. Whilethe EC certainly is evidence of ‘merging’, at least in as far asit is a process of economic integration, it is less than clearthat it represents the demise of sovereignty in Europe. Withrespect to environmental policy within the EC, for example,political power remains in the hands of its members. It has beensuggested that sovereignty “remains a powerful force in Europeanpolitics.” (See Michael G. Huelshoff and Thomas Pfeiffer,“Environmental Policy in the EC: neo-functionalist sovereigntytransfer or neo-realist gate-keeping?” International Journal(Winter 1992) : 136-158.) The Treaty of Maastricht, toted as thebeginning of political integration in Europe which couldconceivably evolve into a situation where the sovereign status ofindividual European states becomes questionable, has beenseriously setback. Denmark has already refused ratification, andwithout ratification by all EC states, the Treaty is technicallyvoid. (“Danish rejection of union jolts EC,” Globe and Mail, 4June 1992, Al; “Denmark’s Signals: A ‘No’ to Europe Points UpAnxieties on Sovereignty,” New York Times, 4 June 1992, A6;“Mutiny rocks the EC ship of state,” Financial Post, 8 June 1992,43.) Even in that part of the world where integration isproceeding most substantially, then, there are still seriousreservations about sacrificing sovereignty and theconstitutionally independent prerogative of freedom of decision.79148 Hinsley, Sovereignty, 226.149 Holsti, 97.150 Soroos, 352; Caldwell, 82. See also, Oran Young, “GlobalEnvironmental Change and International Governance,” Millennium19, no.3 (1990) : 337—346; and Robert W. Hahn and Kenneth R.Richards, “The Internationalization of Environmental Regulation,”Harvard International Law Journal 30, no.2 (Spring 1989): 421-446. That the state remains the key actor in the internationalsystem is more generally, of course, a core realist assumption.In addition to those listed above, it is also accepted by manyliberals. See, for example, Zacher, 61151 James, 278. Others sharing this view are Holsti, 59; Krasner,90; and Beverly Crawford, “Towards a Theory of Progress inInternational Relations,” in Adler and Crawford, eds., 449.152 Marc A. Levy, Robert 0. Keohane, and Peter M. Haas,“Institutions for the Earth: Promoting InternationalEnvironmental Protection,” Environment 34, no.4 (May 1992): 12-36.153 Levy, Keohane, and Haas come to a similar conclusion, albeitvia a different route; that is, their discussion focuses on therole of international institutions in promoting internationalenvironmental protection by states. 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