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Bridgepoint Market : an application of No Net Loss Brownlee, David C. 1992

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BRIDGEPOINT MARKET: AN APPLICATION OF NO NET LOSS by DAVID C. BROWNLEE B.A. Geography  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS (PLANNING) in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES SCHOOL OF COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING  We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA APRIL 1992 ©DavidC.Brownle,192  In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  (Signature)  Department of School of Community and Regional Planning The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date 13 April 1992  DE-6 (2/88)  ABSTRACT  This thesis undertakes an examination and assessment of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans application of No Net Loss of Fish Habitat at the Bridgepoint Market Development in Richmond, British Columbia. Of specific interest is the process through which No Net Loss was applied.  The approach used in this study is essentially empirical, drawing upon more than 120 documents, supplemented by interviews with ten individuals having direct knowledge of the case. Using this information, a detailed descriptive account is provided of what occurred and in what context, who was involved, and what the major outcomes were.  An analytical framework based on Fisher and Ury's theory of Principled Negotiation is developed and used as a standard against which to assess the Bridgepoint case. Based on this assessment it was concluded that although progress was made in achieving a number of significant agreements over the four year exchange, it was also apparent that these outcomes were, for the most part, derived through concessions to positional bargaining rather than through the employment of principles which have been shown to improve the likelihood of reaching a fair, equitable, and efficient agreement.  Three key recommendations were made in the thesis. The first, is that the four principles of separating the people from the problem, inventing options for mutual gain, insisting on objective criteria, and focusing on interests not positions, should be employed in most negotiations over the application of No Net Loss of fish habitat. Second, consideration should be given to building into the No Net Loss process, provisions to allow for qualified third party intervention to assist in the negotiations. Third, DFO's hierarchy of preferences for evaluating development applications should be replaced with a non-hierarchical system that permits rejection of proposals at an early stage in the process.  iii  TABLE OF CONTENTS  ABSTRACT ^ TABLE OF CONTENTS ^ LIST OF TABLES ^ LIST OF FIGURES ^ ACKNOWLEDGEMENT^ DEDICATION ^ CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION ^ 1.1 OBJECTIVE AND PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS ^ 1.2 METHODOLOGY ^ 1.3 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS ^ 1.4 THESIS ORGANIZATION ^ CHAPTER TWO THE IMPORTANCE OF WETLAND HABITAT IN THE FRASER: ECOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS ^ 2.1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER ^ 2.2 THE FRASER RIVER AND ITS ESTUARY: PHYSICAL ASPECTS ^ 2.3 THE FRASER RIVER AND ITS ESTUARY: LIVING SYSTEMS ^ 2.3.1 Usage by Fish Species ^ 2.3.2 Usage by Bird Species ^ 2.3.3 Usage by Other Species ^ 2.3.4 Species Interactions ^ 2.4 HUMAN INTERACTION WITH THE ESTUARY^ 2.4.1 Usage by Humans ^ 2.4.2 Pressures Imposed by Humans^ 2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ^ CHAPTER THREE LEGAL AND JURISDICTIONAL ASPECTS AFFECTING FISH HABITAT MANAGEMENT AT BRIDGEPOINT ^ 3.1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER ^ 3.2 THE BROADER JURISDICTIONAL ASPECTS ^ 3.2.1 Constitutional Considerations ^ 3.2.2 Key Agencies and their Acts^ Federal Jurisdiction ^ The Harbour Commissions ^ Environment Canada ^ Department of Fisheries and Oceans^ Provincial Jurisdiction ^ B.C. Ministry of Environment ^ Municipal Government ^ 3.3 THE DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS' NO NET LOSS PRINCIPLE ^ 3.3.1 The Evolution of No Net Loss Within DFO ^ 3.3.2 No Net Loss Within the Context of DFO's Fish Habitat Management Policy ^ Procedural Steps to Achieving No Net Loss ^ Hierarchy of Preferences ^ 3.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ^  iii vi vii viii ix 1 2 3 4 5  8 8 9 11 12 14 15 15 16 16 19 23  26 26 26 26 29 29 29 30 34 35 36 37 38 38 44 45 48 51  iv  CHAPTER FOUR THEORY - DEVELOPMENT OF AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ^ 52  4.1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER^ 52 4.2 RATIONALIZING THE NEGOTIATION BASED APPROACH AS A BASIS FOR ANALYSIS ^ 52 4.3 PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION (NEGOTIATING ON THE MERITS) ^ 54 4.3.1 Separate the People from the Problem^ 55 4.3.2 Focus on Interests, not Positions ^ 57 4.3.3 Invent Options for Mutual Gain ^ 59 4.3.4 Insist on Using Objective Criteria ^ 62 4.4 RATIONALE FOR APPLYING PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION AS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ^ 64 4.4.1 Utilization of Widely Accepted Concepts ^ 64 4.4.2 The Method Permits the Substitution of Specific Techniques ^ 66 4.4.3 The Method is Transferable to a Wide Variety of Situations ^ 67 4.4.4 The Method has Been Widely Reviewed / It Offers a Prescriptive Approach ^ 67 4.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE APPROACH ^ 67 4.6 A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF THE BRIDGEPOINT CASE STUDY ^ 69 4.6.1 Separating the People from the Problem ^ 69 4.6.2 Focusing on Interests not Positions^ 70 4.6.3 Inventing Options for Mutual Gain ^ 70 4.6.4 Insisting on Objective Criteria ^ 70 4.7 THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS TO PLANNING THEORY ^ 71 4.7.1 General Observations on Planning Theory ^ 71 4.7.2 Linking the Case Study to Planning Theory^ 75 4.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ^ 76  CHAPTER FIVE NO NET LOSS AT BRIDGEPOINT CASE STUDY EXAMINATION ^  78 5.1 PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER ^ 78 5.2 FEATURES AND FACETS OF THE BRIDGEPOINT MARKET DEVELOPMENT ^ 81 5.2.1 Land Use Issues ^ 81 5.2.2 Environmental Issues ^ 82 Marsh and Mudflat Related Issues ^ 83 Zooplankton and Benthic Organisms ^ 86 Fish ^ 87 Birds and Wildlife ^ 87 Species Relationships ^ 90 5.2.3 Participant Involvement and Jurisdictional Issues ^ 90 5.2.4 Economic and Social Issues ^ 96 5.3 A CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF EVENTS ^ 97 5.3.1 1977-1983 ^ 98 5.3.2 1984 ^ 99 5.3.3 1985 ^ 109 5.3.4 1986 ^ 115 5.3.5 1987-1989 ^ 116 5.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ^ 116  CHAPTER SIX BRIDGEPOINT NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS ^  118 6.1 PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER ^ 118 6.2 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ^ 118 6.2.1 The Relative Importance of Bridgepoint ^ 118 Intrinsic Importance ^ 118 Broader Outcomes of the Case ^ 119 6.2.2 The Role of Negotiation at Bridgepoint ^ 120 6.2.3 Summary of Observations ^ 126 6.3 CASE STUDY ANALYSIS ^ 127 6.3.1 Focus on Interests not Positions ^ 127 The Proponent -- Bridgepoint Harbour Market Corporation and Their Consultants ^ 127 The North Fraser Harbour Commission (NFHC) ^ 129 The Department of Fisheries and Oceans ^ 131 The Other Environmental Agencies Involved ^ 132 Focus on Interests not Positions -- Summary and Conclusions ^ 133 6.3.2 Separate the People from the Problem ^ 138 Issues Related to Communication Concerns and Understanding Perceptions ^ 139 Reconciling Positions ^ 140 The Role of Emotions in the Negotiations ^ 142 Informing the Parties and Access to Relevant Information ^ 143 Separating the People from the Problem -- Summary and Conclusions ^ 145 6.3.3 Inventing Options for Mutual Gain ^ 148 Generating and Choosing Between Alternative Solutions ^ 149 Mutually Beneficial Solutions and Compromised Positions ^ 151 Facilitating Other Parties in Making their Decisions ^ 154 Inventing Options for Mutual Gain -- Summary and Conclusions ^ 155 6.3.4 Insist on Using Objective Criteria ^ 157 The Development and Application of Objective Criteria ^ 157 Fair Process at Bridgepoint ^ 158 Insist on Using Objective Criteria -- Summary and Conclusions ^ 160 6.4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ^ 161 6.4.1 Focus on Interests not Positions ^ 164 6.4.2 Separate the People from the Problem ^ 165 6.4.3 Inventing Options for Mutual Gain ^ 168 6.4.4 Insisting on Objective Criteria ^ 168 6.4.5 Conclusions and Recommendations Summary^ 171  CHAPTER SEVEN BRIDGEPOINT: THESIS OVERVIEW ^  173  BIBLIOGRAPHY REFERENCES CITED ^ INTERVIEW CONTACTS ^  178 184  APPENDICES APPENDIX ONE: BRIDGEPOINT PHOTOGRAPHS ^ APPENDIX TWO: GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ^ APPENDIX THREE: SUBMISSION FOR ETHICAL REVIEW ^ CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL ^  185 190 193 194  vi  LIST OF TABLES CHAPTER TWO TABLE 2.1 Major Habitat Zones in the Fraser ^  13  CHAPTER FOUR TABLE 4.1 The Principled Negotiation Method ^ TABLE 4.2 "Ideas on Improving Negotiation" ^  56 65  CHAPTER FIVE TABLE 5.1 Species List of Fish Sampled at the Proposed Bridgeport Harbour Market Study Site: April and May, 1984 ^ TABLE 5.2 Species of Birds and Animals Observed During April and May 1984 at the Bridgeport Harbour Market Study Site ^ TABLE 5.3 Groups/Agencies Known to Have Been Involved With the Bridgepoint Development Process ^ TABLE 5.4 Principal Agencies Involved With The Bridgepoint Development Process ^  88 89 92 94  CHAPTER SIX TABLE 6.1 Negotiation Roles in the Bridgepoint Development ^ TABLE 6.2 Selected Chronology of Events Related to the Bridgepoint Development ^ TABLE 6.3a Interests of the Main Negotiating Parties ^ TABLE 6.3b Interests of the Main Negotiating Parties ^ TABLE 6.4 Analytical Summary ^  122 122 134 135 163  LIST OF FIGURES CHAPTER TWO FIGURE 2.1 Fraser River Delta Simplified Food Web ^  17  CHAPTER THREE FIGURE 3.1 Environment Canada's Referral System ^ FIGURE 3.2 Policy Chart for Fish Habitat Management in 1983 ^ FIGURE 3.3 Policy Framework for Fish Habitat Management as of 1986 ^ FIGURE 3.4 Procedural Steps to Achieving No Net Loss ^ FIGURE 3.5 Reaches for the North Fraser Harbour ^  33 42 43 46 50  CHAPTER FOUR FIGURE 4.1 Circle Chart -- The Four Basic Steps in Inventing Options ^  60  CHAPTER FIVE FIGURE 5.1 Bridgeport Harbour Market Development Site and Mitchell Island Marsh Site ^ 79 FIGURE 5.2 Location of Proposed Bridgeport Harbour Market ^ 80 FIGURE 5.3 Foreshore Vegetation Communities at the Bridgeport Harbour Market Site ^ 84 FIGURE 5.4 Bridgepoint Site Plan Map (1988) ^ 85 FIGURE 5.5 A Simplified Food Web in the Fraser River Delta ^ 91  viii  ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  A good many people gave freely of their time and advice to help bring this project to fruition. I am especially grateful to Tony Dorcey, my primary academic advisor, for his insightful comments and probing criticism which helped to keep this project on track.  The invaluable contribution of an objective perspective, and an endless supply of moral support are but two of the many ways that Marga Betz, my external advisor, helped to make this project doable.  Anne Brown, my close personal friend and confidant, always found both the time and the patience to listen to yet another rendition of my work. A more steadfast supporter I doubt I could find anywhere.  To each of you I am indebted for helping me along this portion of my journey through life.  ix  DEDICATION  This Thesis is dedicated to my parents. Such a small return for the patience, support, and love you've given me over the years.  BRIDGEPOINT MARKET: AN APPLICATION OF NO NET LOSS CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION In the final report of the Commission on Pacific Fisheries Policy in 1982 a recommendation made to the effect that the Department of Fisheries and Oceans' habitat policy should "ensure that the total fish production capacity in the region will not be diminished as a result of industrial and other activities that impinge upon fish habitat" (Pearse, 1982:24). It was further recommended that "identifiable and measurable harm to fish habitat should be tolerated for any particular development only if the damage is fully compensated through expanded fish production capacity elsewhere"  (Pearse, 1982:24). Within the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) these recommendations were viewed as an embodiment of the No Net Loss Principle toward which the agency had been working (DFO, 1983a:1).  Over the ensuing four years DFO continued to refine and develop its Fish Habitat policy incorporating No Net Loss (NNL) as one of its fundamental cornerstones. In April 1983 a workshop was undertaken with the specific objective of developing "a common understanding and consistent application of the concept of NNL and to clearly enunciate the implications of adopting a NNL Policy" (DFO, 1983b:3). Two years later in 1985, DFO released a "proposed policy and procedures" paper with No Net Loss (NNL) as the suggested objective of the habitat policy.  In conjunction with these developments Fisheries began applying No Net Loss to all waterfront development proposals under their jurisdiction within the lower Fraser River region on British Columbia's west coast. One of the first and largest of these projects to that time was the Bridgepoint Market Development in Richmond, British Columbia.  2 From a policy perspective Bridgepoint was instrumental in contributing to, and altering, the role played by No Net Loss in DFO's national Fish Habitat Policy. From a procedural perspective Bridgepoint established much of the ground work necessary for actually applying the policy to specific developments. From both these perspectives Bridgepoint is of historical significance in terms of the management of Canada's natural fish habitat resources. These perspectives also provide a measure of justification for the examination and assessment of Bridgepoint as a case study for this thesis.  1.1 OBJECTIVE AND PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS Given the apparent importance of the Bridgepoint Development to DFO's Fish Habitat Policy the principal objective of this thesis is to undertake, in a planning process context, an examination and assessment of the Bridgepoint Development as an application of No Net Loss. The purpose of this objective is two fold: the first is to examine issues of process in applying No Net Loss. For example; how No Net Loss was applied and in what context, who was involved, what were the results, and how might the process have been improved. The second purpose, is to document key aspects of the Bridgepoint development for their importance to the evolution of DFO's Fish Habitat Policy and the management of a valuable natural resource.  From the start of this project it was apparent that fulfilling the principal objective of this thesis would require that three sub-objectives also be met. The first of these sub-objectives relates to the context within which No Net Loss was, and is, applied. Of specific interest are the ecological/environmental, socio-economic, legal and jurisdictional issues that may impinge on the management of the fish habitat resource and No Net Loss. This necessary background serves not only to establish the context within which NNL was applied at Bridgepoint, but also to strengthen the appreciation for the complexity of the issues that were dealt with by the parties involved.  The second sub-objective is associated with the intent of this research to provide an assessment of the Bridgepoint case in terms of the process that participants went through. A proper assessment  3 requires that a suitable analytical framework be developed and applied to the case. Ideally, the framework should provide an objective standard against which the case study can be compared so that conclusions may be drawn from the case and prescriptions for improvement made.  In order to achieve this second sub-objective, and to fill in some of the process details such as who was involved, how No Net Loss was applied, and what the results were, the significant aspects of the Bridgepoint case study would have to be detailed. This is the third sub-objective of the thesis.  The orientation of this thesis towards the primary objective and the three sub-objectives is essentially reflected in both the methodology used in the research and the organization of this document.  1.2 METHODOLOGY Involving both interviews with representatives from the key agencies involved, and reviews of the available documentation related to the Bridgepoint Development, the approach used for this thesis is essentially empirical.  Twelve formal interviews were held with ten different individuals, most of whom had either been personally involved in the process at one point or another, or had direct knowledge of the case. The questions posed in each of these interviews were drawn from the analytical framework developed in Chapter Four of the thesis. The analytical framework itself, and a list of the questions expected to be asked of the interviewees, were submitted for ethical review by the University of British Columbia's Behavioral Sciences Screening Committee. A copy of the committee's Certificate of Approval appears in the Appendices.  In total 128 individual documents related to the Bridgepoint project, DFO's Fish Habitat Policy and/or fish habitat management, were reviewed for this thesis. Of these documents, approximately 80% were specific to the Bridgepoint case. Documents collected and reviewed came  4 from a wide variety of sources and include; reports, memoranda, letters, meeting minutes, newspaper articles, workshop proceedings, legal documents, maps, North Fraser Harbour Commission (NFHC) site advertisements, and City of Richmond Council minutes. For working purposes these documents were sorted in chronological order and sourced to provide background on the chronological sequence of events, and to yield some indication of what information each of the parties had. For reasons of confidentiality, the specific details of this work are not included in this document and are mentioned here only to provide some background on the process used to aid in the analysis. Representatives from a number of agencies involved were fundamental in providing access to much of the material reviewed for this thesis.  Information from both the interviews, and the available documentation, were used to assess the case study in terms of the analytical framework.  1.3 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS The negotiations over the application of No Net Loss at Bridgepoint took place primarily over a four year span from 1984 to 1988. During this period there were literally dozens of meetings, telephone conversations, letters, and memoranda being exchanged between the various parties involved -- each of which contributed to the negotiation process. By shear volume alone, a detailed examination of the technical aspects of each of these interactions lies well beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, the focus of this research on process allows it to draw upon this material for the more macro aspects in order to arrive at an understanding of what occurred and how, who was involved, and what the results were. Since it is not the intent of this research to find fault with any one individual or group, but rather to seek out ways in which the process of applying No Net Loss might be improved, this lack of technical detail becomes largely insignificant.  Somewhat more limiting is the fact that this research undertakes an examination of a single, albeit significant, empirical case from which conclusions are drawn and recommendations are made for future applications of No Net Loss. Indeed, the focus is even narrower than this;  5 concentrating primarily on the involvement of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DF0), and the North Fraser Harbour Commission (NFHC) in the application. But far from being a straight forward application of a well established policy, the Bridgepoint Market proposal came about at a crucial time in the development of DFO's Fish Habitat Policy. Many matters relating to the socio-economic implications of applying No Net Loss, inter-agency legal and jurisdictional overlaps, and especially the implications of physically applying No Net Loss to the environment and the ecology of the area, were yet to be determined in any practical substantive manner when the Bridgepoint issue was first examined by the reviewing agencies. Each of these aspects added their own dimensions to an already complex case with many players, and volumes of documents from a number of different sources -- not all of which were readily accessible.  Both the complexity of this case, and its potential wealth for what it could reveal about the application of No Net Loss, played a role in the decision to concentrate on the Bridgepoint case to the exclusion of all others. Attempting to focus on more than this case would have, in the opinion of this researcher, resulted in an unacceptable dilution of both the significance of Bridgepoint and the richness that the case offers to an understanding of the application of No Net Loss. Consequently, no apologies are offered for this limitation in the scope of the study -- only a deceivingly simple suggestion that another individual might consider using this research to undertake a comparative analysis with the results of a separate application of No Net Loss.  1.4 THESIS ORGANIZATION Excluding this introductory chapter, this thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter Two, entitled "The Importance of Wetland Habitat in the Fraser: Ecological and Economic Considerations", is the first of two chapters designed to provide a measure of background on the broader regional issues affecting the application of No Net Loss at Bridgepoint and elsewhere in the Estuary. In Section 2.3 of this chapter, the role played by wetland marsh habitats in the regional ecology is explored, while Section 2.4 examines the various pressures and economic considerations which accompany the human interaction with these natural habitats.  6  Chapter Three, "Legal and Jurisdictional Aspects Affecting Fish Habitat Management at Bridgepoint", again focuses on the broader issues involved in the application of No Net Loss. In  this chapter the legal and jurisdictional framework which guides and controls the management of fish habitat is explored through the agencies represented at Bridgepoint. Section 3.2 substantively begins the chapter by exploring both the broader constitutionally-based division of powers which underlie the seven main governing agencies involved in the Bridgepoint case, and a number of the relevant Acts that they administer.  Section 3.3 takes a more focused look at the Department of Fisheries and Oceans' No Net Loss Principle within the context of their policy for the management of fish habitat. Both the policy prescribed procedural steps to achieving No Net Loss, and the "hierarchy of preferences" used by DFO for evaluating project proposals affecting fish habitat, are described.  As outlined above, both Chapters Two and Three contribute to the fulfillment of the first subobjective described earlier.  Chapter Four, entitled "Theory: Development of an Analytical Framework" serves two important functions. The first part of the chapter draws upon a number of literary materials to develop an analytical framework with which to assess the Bridgepoint case. The various strengths and weaknesses of the selected approach are also outlined in the discussion. The second part of the chapter discusses the relationship of the analytical framework, and this thesis, to planning theory in general. This chapter thus provides the means through which the second sub-objective of providing an assessment of the Bridgepoint case in a planning context is achieved.  Primarily descriptive in nature, Chapter Five, "No Net Loss at Bridgepoint: Case Study Examination", works toward the thesis' third sub-objective to outline many of the process related  details of the case. Issues of land use, environmental, jurisdictional, economic, and social aspects  7 specific to the site are thus the focus of Section 5.2. This section also details who was involved and what roles they played in the case. Section 5.3 narrows the focus somewhat, providing a chronological overview of the significant events related to the case, and places many of these events in context with the development of DFO's Fish Habitat Policy.  Drawing upon much of the groundwork established in previous chapters, Chapter Six "Bridgepoint Negotiation Analysis" represents the detailed analysis and assessment of the Bridgepoint case. In  this, the Chapter is wholly oriented to fulfilling a significant portion of the primary objective of the thesis. The Chapter consists of three main sections. Section 6.2 offers a number of general observations about the case and its importance. Section 6.3 undertakes the structured analysis by applying the analytical framework to the case. The final Section, 6.4, draws upon the many observations made in the previous two sections to formulate a number of conclusions about the application of No Net Loss at Bridgepoint and to offer several recommendations about how the process could be improved.  The last chapter of this thesis "Bridgepoint: Thesis Overview" provides a retrospective overview of the different components of the thesis and raises a number implications about future applications of No Net Loss based on the observations of the Bridgepoint Market case.  CHAPTER TWO THE IMPORTANCE OF WETLAND HABITAT IN THE FRASER: ECOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS The white man must treat the beasts of this land as his brothers. I am a savage and I do not understand any other way. I have seen a thousand rotting buffalo on the prairies, left by the white man who shot them from a passing train. I am a savage and I do not understand how the smoking iron horse can be more important than the buffalo that we kill only to stay alive. What is man without the beasts? If all the beasts were gone, man would die from great loneliness of spirit, for whatever happens to the beast also happens to the man. All things are connected. Whatever befalls the earth befalls the sons of the earth.  [Excerpt from a letter to the president of the United States, written by Chief Seathl of the Duwamish tribe in the state of Washington (1855). (Childerhose and Trim, 1981:158)]  2.1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER As explained in Chapter One, this is the first of two chapters which provide contextual background information on issues affecting the management of the fish habitat resource and the application of No Net Loss in the Fraser Estuary. As its title suggests, this chapter focuses on two aspects; ecological and economic considerations.  In order to appreciate the necessity of managing the fish habitat resources in the Fraser Estuary, some discussion is required on why these areas are important, what role they play in the region's ecological and economic schemes, and what pressures they are being subjected to by direct and indirect human use. To this end, this chapter is divided into three parts. Section 2.2 draws upon a range of literature to explore some of the physical characteristics of the Lower Fraser which collectively provide the underlying support structure for the various habitats of the Lower Fraser.  Next, Section 2.3 explores aspects of the living natural systems which have evolved to take advantage of the unique physical conditions of the region. Various sources of literature are drawn upon to develop a sense of the variety and quantities of birds, fish, and other animals which inhabit or make use of the Estuary. The interaction between these species and the connections to the wetland marshes is made through a discussion on food chains and food webs attributed to the region.  a Section 2.4 focuses on the human interactions with the Estuary, discussing the human use of the area over time as well as its significance to our economy. The discussion concludes with an examination of the various pressures that human interaction with the region have placed on the marsh habitats.  Although this chapter is designed to have a broad focus, an understanding of some of these basics provides some insights as to the issues considered by the environmental agencies responsible for the management of the fish habitat resources in the Lower Fraser. It is of some interest that virtually all of the key issues discussed here arose in one form or another in the negotiations over the application of No Net Loss at the Bridgepoint Market site.  2.2 THE FRASER RIVER AND ITS ESTUARY: PHYSICAL ASPECTS Reaching 1378 kilometres (km) into the heart of British Columbia, the Fraser River drains some 233,000 square kilometres (sq km) of the Province's coastal ranges and lower Fraser Valley plains (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:6) (Fox and Nowlan, 1978:5). As the beneficiary of a generous portion of the precipitation from the westerly airflow off the Pacific Ocean, runoff from the Fraser's catchment results in an average discharge of about 3475 cubic metres per second (ems). In springtime this discharge increases substantially with the thawing of the accumulated snowfalls within the Fraser's basin. Kennett and McPhee (1988:6) report that flows of up to 15000 cubic metres per second (cms) have been recorded on the Fraser during this period.  On its journey, the waters of the Fraser acquire a substantial sediment load of clays, sands, silts, stone fragments, and pebbles. Over a years time some 20 million metric tonnes of material are moved by the Fraser's currents (Ward, 1980)(Kennett and McPhee, 1988:6). As the River's velocity diminishes upon crossing the near level plains of the lower Fraser Valley, many of the heavier particles tend to settle out. The lighter particles of sand and silt, still buoyed by the river's currents, are carried further downstream where they contribute about 2.5 metres (m) a year to the Fraser delta's westward march (Ward, 1980). This continual deposition of sediments  10  over the past 8000 years is responsible for the formation of the Fraser Delta which now extends about 26km beyond New Westminster into the Strait of Georgia (Ward, 1980).  While these facts and figures are of both geomorphological and climatological interest, they also reveal much about the underlying physical support structure that has created a habitable environment in the Fraser River Estuary. The productivity and diversity of the estuary's plants and organisms, for example, owes much to the region's moderate climate and long growing season (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:6). Similarly, the relatively high oxygen content of the River's waters, a result of the Fraser's whitewater journey through the mountains and the currents and eddies along its route, adds to the diversity by creating conditions amenable to fish and aquatic plants. Productivity is further enhanced by the continual deposition of both organic and inorganic nutrients carried downstream by the river.  Changes in the Fraser's rate of flow over time have a direct and significant affect on the salinity of the River's lower reaches. Under low flow conditions salt water from the Strait of Georgia is able to move upstream against the river's current in response to tidal movements. In the main arm of the Fraser, salt water has been recorded as far upstream as Annacis Island (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:6). When the Fraser's flow rates are high, however, the salt wedge is pushed back so that it barely enters the River's mouth. Plants and organisms unable to adapt to these changes in salinity are effectively excluded from these areas. Much of the zonation of plant and, to a lesser extent, animal species in the lower reaches of the Fraser Estuary are a direct result of this relationship. The main types of habitat zones in the Estuary, several of which reflect the differences in salinity by the plant species which grow there, are discussed in Section 2.3.  The River's rate of flow also influences the size of particulates which are allowed to drop out of suspension. As suggested earlier, lower flows allow the finer sediments to settle out of suspension. As a result, the composition and texture of soils, both under and along the river, can  11 be significantly affected as flow conditions change. Ultimately, this factor also has an impact on the types of plant species which can populate a particular site.  Collectively, these physical attributes provide the underlying support network upon which the living systems of the Fraser River and its Estuary depend for their survival. Changes in any of these attributes, whether naturally induced or man-made, can have far reaching repercussions for the region's plant and animal species -- repercussions which must be taken into account when attempting to manage the Fraser's habitats.  2.3 THE FRASER RIVER AND IT ESTUARY: LIVING SYSTEMS A fundamental feature of the Fraser River and its Estuary is the dynamic nature of its physical components which vary over both time and space. The underlying importance of this fact is reflected in the temporal and spatial variations of the living systems which use and inhabit the area. Habitats created at one location along the river may be fundamentally different from those created further downstream as a result of a change in even one of the underlying physical attributes. Changes in salinity, for example, can have a dramatic effect upon the variety of plant species which can inhabit a specific location. Similarly, plants and organisms which find a particular site well suited to their survival needs at one point in time, may eventually die out as physical parameters change and other species, more tolerant to the new conditions, move in.  The Fraser River Estuary Study (1976) showed that ten major habitat zones could be distinguished in the region; sandflats, mudflats, eelgrass beds, slat marsh, bulrush marsh, cattail/sedge marsh, freshwater marsh, riparian, bogs, and agricultural lands (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:10). Each of these zones represents a different response to the combination of physical components and subsequent successional adjustments at those locations. Each one also indicates a different ability to support other organisms. The Salt Marsh zone, for example, is capable of supporting salmon, shorebirds, and raptors. The predominant vegetation species in this zone are Saltwort, Saltgrass, and Arrowgrass. The Freshwater Marsh, on the other hand,  12 exhibits a habitat capability not only for salmon, raptors and shorebirds, but also for waterfowl, mink, beaver, muskrats and otters. The Freshwater Marsh's dominant vegetation species also differ from those of the Salt Marsh, with Cattails, Sedges and Bulrush species prevailing in this zone (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:10). [For other comparisons refer to Table 2.11.  Largely a reflection of the subtle changes in the physical conditions prevalents in the area, the diversity of these habitats, is a significant factor contributing to the astounding variety of animal and fish species that are drawn to the estuary. As the next few pages will show, the equally astounding numbers of birds and animals supported provides ready testament to the productivity capabilities of these habitats.  2.3.1 Usage by Fish Species Of the reported 80 species of fish using the estuary, 27 species are found in both the lower reaches of the Fraser, and its tidal flats (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:7). Contained in these numbers are seven anadromous species including five species of salmon (Coho, Chinook, Pink, Sockeye, Chum), and two species of searun trout (Steelhead and Cutthroat) (DFO, undated-a:3-7). According to Fox and Nowlan, the Fraser's salmon run is one of the largest in the world (1978:8). Kennett and McPhee (1988:7) state that over a ten year period between 1977 and 1987 an average of four million adult salmon per year have returned to the Fraser to complete the final leg of their lifecycle migration. As did the generations of salmon which preceded them, each of the migrants attempts to return to its original spawning grounds. For some of these salmon their journey will take them more than a thousand miles upstream from the Fraser's mouth to lay their eggs and die. The progeny of these spawners -- up to a billion fry -- will begin the cycle anew in the following year, making their way downstream to the estuary and eventually out to sea (DFO, 1989a).  13  TABLE 2.1 MAJOR HABITAT ZONES IN THE FRASER (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:10) Major Zones  Dominant Vegetation  Flooding  Habitat Capability  Location  Sandflats  Benthic algae  Permanent - daily  Mudflats  Benthic algae  Permanent - daily  Eelgrass Beds  Eelgrass  Permanent  Salt Marsh  Saltwort, Saltgrass, Arrowgrass Bulrushes  Frequent - daily  Seals, Shellfish, Crabs, Shrimp, Salmon, Shorebirds Salmon, Seals, Crabs, Shrimp, Shorebirds Salmon, Herring, Crabs, Waterfowl, Raptors Salmon, Raptors, Shorebirds  Sturgeon & Roberts Banks, Boundary Bay, Semiahmoo Bay Sturgeon & Roberts Banks, Boundary Bay, Semiahmoo Bay Tsawwassen Causeway, Roberts Bank, Boundary, Semiahmoo & Mud Bay Boundary Bay, Mud Bay  Salmon, Waterfowl Shorebirds, Raptors Salmon, Waterfowl, owl, Shorebirds, Raptors Salmon, Waterfowl, Shorebirds, Raptors, Muskrats, Otter, Mink, Beaver Waterfowl, Otter, Mink, Muskrats, Beaver, Songbirds Waterfowl, Raptors Shorebirds, Otters Muskrats, Mink, Beaver, Bear, Deer, Coyotes Waterfowl, Shorebirds  Near dykes  Bulrush Marsh Cattail/Sedge Marsh Freshwater Marsh  Cattail, Sedge Cattail, Sedge, Bulrush  Frequent - daily Frequent Frequent  Riparian  Wet meadows, Tree/shrub  Frequent  Bogs  Spagnum, Labrador Tea  Frequent - occasional  Agricultural Lands  Crops  Seasonal  Source: Fraser River Estuary Study (1978).  Near dykes Further into river  Deas Island, Ladner Marsh Islands, Tilbury Slough Burns Bog, Douglas Island, Surrey Bend, Derby Reach Farmland in Delta & Richmond  14 Although the exact nature of the Estuary's contribution to the salmon is still being studied, it is apparent that juvenile salmon make extensive use of these areas for feeding, avoiding predators, rearing, and as a transitional zone where they can undergo the physiological changes that will allow them to leave the fresh waters of the Fraser and enter the salt waters of the Pacific. The returning adults, on the other hand, spend little time in the estuary before moving up the Fraser River.  2.3.2 Usage by Bird Species In addition to supporting a vast number and variety of fish, the Fraser Estuary also provides temporary refuge to a large number of migratory birds. Indeed, the region is a major staging area on the Pacific flyway with birds from three continents known to use the Fraser Estuary.  During the migration season it is estimated that five million shorebirds, two million ducks, and thousands of other species pass through the Lower Fraser Valley region (Fox and Nowlan, 1978:9), (Halladay and Harris, 1972), (DFO, 1982:8). The estuary itself receives more than one million migratory birds (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:8), (Dorcey, Hall, Levy, Yesaki, 1983:31) representing about 310 species (Butler and Campbell, 1987).  About 27 species of birds remain in the area over the winter (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:8 citing Leach, 1982). Included in these are more than 200,000 ducks, 20,000 snow geese (Dorcey, Hall, Levy, Yesaki, 1983:31), and 1,000,000 shorebirds (Fox and Nowlan, 1978:9) As one might expect, the region also attracts a number of predatory bird species including hawks, eagles, and falcons.  Although the usage of habitat varies between species, it can be generally said that the area is used by the birds for resting, feeding, hiding, breeding and nesting. The abundance and diversity of bird species make this region one of North America's most important bird habitats.  15 2.3.3 Usage by Other Species In addition to the much more celebrated fish and bird species mentioned earlier, the area also supports numerous species of invertebrates, mammals, amphibians, and reptiles. In all, more than 300 taxonomic groups of invertebrates alone are reported to be present in the Estuary (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:8).  A partial listing of other animals attracted to the various habitats of the estuary and/or the Lower Fraser Valley includes the following: muskrats, beaver, mink, otters, a host of rodent species, bear, deer, coyotes, raccoons, foxes, skunks, killer whales, seals, "11 species of amphibians and  five species of reptiles" (Butler and Campbell, 1987) (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:9) (DFO, 1982:8).  2.3.4 Species Interactions The previous paragraphs have shown that the Fraser Estuary and the lower Fraser valley support a vast array of flora and fauna. A fundamental point to understanding the interconnectedness of these organisms, and the implications for managing fish habitats, is the simple fact that none of these species exists in isolation. To better illustrate this observation, some basic concepts of ecology theory are useful.  In most ecosystems, two food chain types, the grazing food chain and the detritus food chain, predominate (Miller, 1979:65). In grazing food chain relationships plants are eaten by organisms known as herbivores, which themselves become the food for carnivores. In detritus food chain relationships, decomposers such as invertebrates, bacteria, and fungi, play a much larger role than the herbivores in the food chain. These microconsumers effectively convert the dead plant and animal tissues into nutrients which can then be used by other organisms.  Relationships in estuarine ecosystems, such as the Fraser's Estuary, are predominantly detritus based (Seliskar and Gallagher, 1983:44), (Dorcey, Hall, Levy, Yesaki, 1983:19), (Ward, 1980),  16 resulting in food chains which are similar to the basic model described by Dorcey et al. for the Tilbury Slough: sunlight- > plants- > detritus- > detritivores- > carnivores  (Dorcey, Hall, Levy, Yesaki, 1983:19). When this base model is expanded to include species interactions, as in Butler and Campbell's simplified food web of the Fraser Delta shown in Figure 2.1, the beginnings of an understanding of complexity and interconnectedness of the area's natural inhabitants is revealed. While the relationships portrayed by the food web diagram are vastly simplified from the reality, the model none-the-less serves to highlight the role of the various species in the predator-prey relationships between species utilizing the Fraser's estuary.  The relationships and productivity of the region are all the more interesting when viewed with an appreciation of the fact that "only about 10 percent of the chemical energy available at one trophic level gets transferred and stored in usable form in the bodies of the organisms at the next trophic level" (Miller, 1979:65). As suggested earlier, the shear numbers and variety of species making  use of the habitats in the Estuary provide a strong indication of the region's productivity. In fact, "some estuaries are twice as productive ecosystems as the richest farmland" (Ward, 1980).  What should be clear from the above discussion, is that management of fish habitats in the Fraser Estuary is an action which carries with it a good many implications for the ecology of the region.  2.4 HUMAN INTERACTION WITH THE ESTUARY 2.4.1 Usage by Humans Human use of the Fraser Estuary and its abundant resources dates back centuries to the Native Indians who first made the area their home (Ward, 1980). Of particular interest to the Natives were the Fraser's tremendous salmon runs. The importance of the salmon to the coastal Natives  17  FIGURE 2.1 FRASER RIVER DELTA SIMPLIFIED FOOD WEB (Butler and Campbell, 1987:12)  Riverine Nrients Phytoplank ton  Estuarin Plants  Detritus Flyingr^Terrestrial Insects^Insects  yarm  crop)  Bacteria  /  Swallows^Teal Rails^Mallards Blackbirds^Shoveler  r garbage)  etc.^Gadwall  Zooplank ton  Wigeon  clams  Geese etc.  ► 011gochaetee-÷ShrImp---• Annelids^  Crabs--P Glaucous-^Bald Eagle  s  winged Gull  etc.^culpins  Northwestern  \ .., . Eulachon  Crow  .,.1?Herring etc.  Scaup Scoters  Shorebirds  Flounder Salmon Cod  Peregrine  Harbour Seal  Terns^ Loons  Otter  Bonaparte^Grebes  Sea Lion  Mew Gull^Murrelet etc^  Killer Whale  etc.  Great Blue if eron  (Townsend's vole)  1 CZ  is evident in that much of their ancient culture was centred around these fish. Even today, the food fishery still supplies a significant portion of the B.C. coastal Native's diet.  The arrival of European immigrants to the region placed new demands on the resources of the Fraser and its Estuary. The first commercial exports of salmon were made from the Hudson's Bay Company Post near Langley in the 1830's with Asia and Hawaii among the destinations for the salt-cured fish. With the introduction of the soldered tin can, the first cannery on the Fraser began production in 1870. Over the years this industry developed to the point whereby in 1986, the Fraser River estuary contributed over 224 million dollars (wholesale) worth of fish products to the world's markets -- a total of 30 percent of the Province's total fish production (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:12 citing the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Fisheries Production Statistics of B.C.).  Of growing importance is the recreational fishing industry that is developing in the Straight of Georgia. According to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) this fishery alone was worth about 90 million dollars in 1986 (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:13). The capital investment in equipment to support the recreational fishery is believed to be approximately the same as that needed to support the commercial fishery (Pearse, 1982:189). Pearse (ibid:189) reports that in 1979 the capital value of the Strait of Georgia sport fishery exceeded 600 million dollars.  Coinciding with the beginnings of the commercial fishery in the early 1800's, farmers began to dike and farm regions of the estuary. Many of these areas have since been displaced in favor of residential, commercial, and industrial developments. Not long after farmers began to work the delta, manufacturing industries and commercial ventures were attracted to the area because of the ready access to river transportation. River transportation has since become an important component of the province's economy with the three active harbours -- the Fraser River Harbour, the North Fraser Harbour, and Roberts Bank Superport -- collectively adding more than 5 billion dollars of revenue to it each year (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:15). The North Arm of the Fraser  19 currently supports shallow draft coastal shipping, and log transportation. Its banks are heavily used for storing the logs which supply the many pulp, paper, and sawmills along the Fraser. The Main Arm of the Fraser River is used both by deep draft vessels making their way to ports near New Westminster, and by coastal shipping vessels.  The population supporting all of this activity currently numbers almost one and a half million individuals and is steadily growing. Reflecting as much the degree of utility as the degree of dependency, Kennett and McPhee (1988:11) suggest that the entirety of this population is, "one way or another, touched by the estuary". It should be acknowledged that the reverse is also true.  2.4.2 Pressures Imposed by Humans It is clear, even from the limited examination offered to this point, that British Columbia has benefited greatly from the resources of the Fraser River Estuary. However, the accumulation of human activities over the past 150 years have taken a toll on the region's natural habitats, and particularly its wetland habitats -- a toll which has remained largely unaccounted for by our economic systems. Examples of these impacts are readily apparent.  The diking and draining that was begun by the first farmers in the area was eventually extended in order to control flooding and to create more developable land. Extending from the Chilliwack area to the coast, the process of diking these regions has eliminated much of the original riparian vegetation which formerly lined its shoreline. Along the foreshore areas of the City of Richmond, for example, only about 30% of the original marshes have not been physically detached from the Fraser by dikes (DFO, 1989a). For the estuary as a whole it is estimated that half of wetland habitats which were present in the estuary have been lost in the years since 1880 (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:10). In quantitative terms, a 1983 estimate by Seliskar and Gallagher (1983:46) placed the amount of remaining marsh at 3563 hectares (8801 acres).  9  0  One of the immediate impacts to be incurred as a result of the diking was the removal of most of the larger trees and plants which bordered the river and the coastline. Leaf litter from this macrophytic vegetation, an important source of food and nutrients for the marsh inhabitants, was effectively lost. Studies by Levy and Northcote in 1981 concluded that since 'juvenile salmon use the entire length of tidal channels ... diking even a portion of a marsh area can significantly reduce the estuary's capacity as a rearing ground" (Seliskar and Gallagher, 1983:50-51).  Although most of the diking in the estuary has already taken place, habitat losses still occur as a result of a number of other factors. Chief among these are pressures to develop waterfront areas. Mills along the river, for example, attempt to keep up to a 3 month supply of logs in storage areas along the waterfront, particularly during spring freshet when transporting logs against the currents is more difficult. According to the Fraser Estuary Management Program (FREMP) some 970 hectares (2397 acres) were being utilized as log storage areas in 1987. These sites were primarily in the Pitt River, the North Arm, and part of the Main Arm (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:14 citing Fremp Log Management Activity Program 1987). Recognition of the damage that grounding storage logs can do to shoreline habitats have prompted the placement of protective pilings which keep the stored logs moored away from the shoreline.  In recent years, municipalities, such as Richmond, have attempted to restrict industrial usage of their waterfronts to specific areas thereby opening the remaining areas to recreational, commercial, and residential uses. The increased demand for waterfront development accompanying the region's rapid population growth has resulted in greater incursion of the remaining waterfront habitats. At the Federal level, one of the key attempts to control this incursion is the Department of Fisheries and Ocean's habitat management policy -- a policy which incorporates as one of its cornerstones, the concept of No Net Loss of fish habitat.  21 If we consider diking and waterfront developments as activities which impose direct losses on the natural habitats in the Fraser River Estuary, other activities such as waste disposal and dredging can be viewed as imposing indirect losses on these environmentally sensitive areas.  With regard to waste disposal, three sewage treatment plants are situated in the Fraser Estuary; the Lulu Island plant, the Annacis Island plant, and the Iona Island plant. At present, all of these plants are strictly primary level treatment facilities. In some of the older sections of the municipalities which use these facilities, storm sewers are tied directly into the sanitary sewer lines leading to the treatment plants. As a result, particularly heavy rainfalls can force the overburdened treatment plants to discharge the combined sewage/storm water without any treatment whatsoever. In total, about 2% of the plant's total inflow passes to the receiving waters in this way each year. In addition, more than 200 storm sewers discharge "directly into the [Fraser] river without receiving any form of treatment" (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:23). Storm water discharges from municipalities are known to contain "pathogenic organisms, suspended solids, nitrogen, oil and grease, aluminum, iron, copper, lead, zinc, and toxic organic compounds"  (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:23).  Adding to these discharges are industrial effluents from over 100 point sources -- half of which discharge into the Fraser's North Arm (Kennett and McPhee, 1988:22). Chemical agents such as "oil, grease, phenols, pesticides, chlorophenols, and metals" have all been detected in these outfalls.  Leachates from landfill sites, along with agricultural runoffs of fertilizers and pesticides, are also adding to the Fraser's chemical mix. The implications for the marsh ecosystems that are the recipients of these chemicals has been succinctly spelled out by Anne Moody of AIM Ecological Consultants Ltd.: The high annual productivity of intertidal marshes makes them a vital component of many food webs since all parts of the plants may be consumed by small mammals and waterfowl. As the plants decay during the fall and winter, the resulting detritus is consumed by bacteria, invertebrates and fish. Mercury and lead can accumulate in plant tissues and enter the food chain. Cadmium, copper and zinc may be toxic to the plants and can be passed on to other organisms. The fate of organic pollutants such as PCB and PCP within the vegetation is poorly known. Heavy metals such as mercury have an affinity for organic particulates, so in many instances the organic  99  detritus becomes enriched with metals as it is washed around in the estuary or when it lies on contaminated substrates. (FREMP, 1988:60).  Accumulations of metals such as zinc, copper, iron, and lead have been found in benthic organisms and sediments in each of the Lower Fraser's Arms. Although mostly in low concentration levels, both organic and inorganic compounds have been detected in areas such as Roberts Bank and Sturgeon Bank.  The second activity that imposes indirect losses on natural habitats is that of dredging. Dredging of wharf areas, log ponds, and river channels are essential activities on the Fraser if transportation channels are to be maintained. Collectively, almost 2,000,000 cubic metres of material are removed from the North and Main Arms of the river each year. Two concerns arise from the dredging activity in relation to habitats: the resuspension of toxic sediments into the river flow, and the smothering of benthic organisms as resuspended materials settle.  According to Pearse, the damage to habitat caused by activities such as those mentioned here have "undoubtedly reduced the potential productive capacity of the environment" (Pearse, 1982:13). Commenting further on the implications for the fisheries specifically, he writes: "While overfishing is now the main constraint on stock recovery, if the habitat is degraded any rebuilding of the stocks will quickly press on its reduced carry capacity" (Pearse, 1982:14).  One perspective on why we use our estuarine resources the way that we do has been offered by Fox and Nowlan (1978) who write: Several characteristics of estuarine resources severely limit the capability of the market system to allocate these resources wisely. First, estuarine waters, fisheries wildlife and some land resources tend to be treated as common property. No single organization or individual "owns" the resource so that it is subject to use by more than one user. One use may have effects on other uses - as when a toxic discharge adversely affects fishery uses.... Second, for some economic activities based upon the use of estuarine resource, economics of scale are so great that it is uneconomic to have a number of competitive enterprises. For example, it would be highly inefficient to have competitive navigation channels, sewage facilities, water services and similar utilities. These are therefore  23 referred to as natural monopolies. If the prices placed on their services are to reflect society's values and if they are to meet acceptable standards of service, some substitute for the market must be found to establish prices and regulate their performances. Third, some of the goods and services - the benefits - provided by estuarine resources are not priced by the market or else it is generally accepted that the market price does not adequately reflect their social value. ... Fourth, closely related to the third point above, the development and use of estuarine resources may have social and economic repercussions that are not reflected in the immediate value of the resource product. (Fox and Nowlan, 1978:29-31) [The above  quotes are excerpts from the complete text.] Fox and Nowlan go on to explain that, unless great care is taken, the resource allocation decisions that are made by the governing political systems are subject to political expediency rather than a consideration of the public's long term interests. When such decisions are made, Fox and Nowlan suggest, they may serve to increase the pressures brought to bear by a market system that is itself "motivated by short term profit" (Fox and Nowlan, 1978:31). At least in part, such situations arise as a result of the considerable degree of uncertainty over future events. In any case, the fact that many of these allocation decisions are irreversible suggests that additional care is warranted.  Even when such efforts are made however, there are no guarantees that they will achieve the intended objectives when full economic pressures are brought into play. Seliskar and Gallagher (1983:57) write: Perhaps the most powerful tool to have recently received widespread acceptance in solving problems relating to tidal marsh use is the mitigation procedure. Although the price of rehabilitating wetlands degraded in a previous era or converting upland to marsh is high, the economic value of being able to destroy certain wetland sites during estuarine resource development is immense, and high mitigation cost can usually be ..astified economically. [Emphasis added.]  2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS This chapter began with an examination of the physical characteristics which collectively provide the underlying support structure for the various habitats of the Fraser River Estuary system. Some discussion was provided on the temporal and spatial variations in the physical features of the region which give rise to similar variations in the plant and animal species inhabiting the area.  94  Next, Section 2.3 explored the living natural systems, and the links between their component species, which have evolved to take advantage of the unique physical conditions of the region. Detritus food chain and food web diagrams were used to convey the interconnectedness of the inhabitants to the estuarine and lateral marshes of the Fraser -- considerations which, it was suggested, must be taken into account in the management of the fish habitat resource.  Section 2.4 showed that the intensity of land and natural resource use in the area has increased considerably since the 1800's. Contemporary use of the area for commercial and recreational fishing, transportation, shipping, and log storage activities, was shown to contribute substantial revenues to the regional and provincial economies. The discussion also showed that, although largely unacknowledged by our economic system, the intense usage of the area's resources has, and is resulting in a significant degradation of the Estuary's habitat. A number of sources were cited which showed that direct losses of habitat in the Estuary have resulted from activities such as diking, land development, and log storage activities, while indirect losses are attributed to activities such dredging, sewage disposal, and stormwater discharges.  The discussion went on to consider four characteristics ascribed to estuarine resources by Fox and Nowlan that, in their view, restrict the wise allocation of these resources. The characteristics are generalized as follows: • these resources are treated as common property; . very large economies of scale exist for some activities that make use of the resources; • the resources are undervalued by the market system; . social and economic repercussions are not reflected in the valuation of the products from these resources. Finally, the points were made that both the political system, and the economic system are working against efforts to preserve habitat or mitigate against habitat loss -- issues which have a direct impact on any application of No Net Loss in the Fraser Estuary.  25 Several conclusions are evident from the materials reviewed in this chapter. First, the productivity and diversity of the resources offered by the Fraser River-Estuary system are important to large numbers of wildlife, many of which range far beyond what we consider to be its normal boundaries in our day to day use of the area. Second, contemporary use by humans has introduced a number of variables which are vastly in excess of the region's natural capabilities of recovery and resulting in significant habitat loss and degradation of the Fraser's living systems. Third, given the interconnections between species it must be concluded that these damages have already had, and will continue to have, widespread repercussions for the natural living systems dependent on the area's resources. Fourth, these repercussions include humans -- that which was true 137 years ago, remains true today; "All things are connected".  These conclusions not only provide a basis justifying the management of the fish habitat resources in the region, but also serve to raise awareness of the ecological and economic implications for doing so.  In the next chapter, background is provided on the legal and jurisdictional framework within which fish habitats are managed in Canada.  26  CHAPTER THREE LEGAL AND JURISDICTIONAL ASPECTS AFFECTING FISH HABITAT MANAGEMENT AT BRIDGEPOINT  3.1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER Phase Two of the Fraser River Estuary Study reports that more than seventy federal, provincial, regional and local government agencies and public institutions operate within the Fraser Estuary (Alexander, 1982:2). The document also states that, "most of these groups derive their mandate,  task or responsibilities through either some ownership interest in land in and around the estuary, or from a legislative power derived from the British North America Act" (Alexander, 1982:2). Because of their interests, many of these groups have a potential influence over the management of habitat in the Estuary. Although a detailed listing of the roles played by each of these groups is beyond the scope and intent of this thesis, an examination of the broader jurisdictional aspects underlying the key agencies involved in the Bridgepoint Market proposal provides a useful background to understanding their involvement in the case. To this end, Section 3.2 begins with an overview of the Constitutional basis for the division of powers between the different levels of government, then discusses the broader jurisdictional responsibilities of the parent bodies whose subordinate agencies were involved in the Bridgepoint Market Development. More specific interests held by each of the branch agencies involved in the case are discussed in subsequent chapters.  Section 3.3 focuses specifically on the Department of Fisheries and Oceans' (DFO) No Net Loss Principle and its role in the Department's Fish Habitat Management Policy. This discussion is intended to provide some background on the emergence of the No Net Loss Principle within the agency, the Department's procedural steps for applying No Net Loss, and their 'hierarchy of preferences' for evaluating proposals involving potential alterations of fish habitat.  3.2 THE BROADER JURISDICTIONAL ASPECTS 3.2.1 Constitutional Considerations For the purposes of this discussion the roots of the system of governance, and hence the authority  27 underlying most of the agencies involved in managing the Fraser Estuary, can be traced to Canada's British North American (BNA) Act 1867, or as it is now called the Constitution Act 1867. Briefly stated, this Act established the fundamental division of rights and responsibilities between the Federal Government and the four Provincial Governments of the time. Under the BNA arrangement the Federal Government's rights and responsibilities were set out in Section 91 •  of the Act, while Section 92 established the responsibilities and privileges of the Provincial Governments.  An appreciation of how the rights and responsibilities assigned under the Constitution Act have resulted in the current system of governance is gained with an understanding of three specific points. The first is that the rights assigned to one of the two levels of government, Provincial or Federal, are exclusive of those assigned to its counter-part. Thus, neither level has jurisdiction in an aspect for which the rights were assigned to the other level of Government. The second point is that, under the Constitution Act, the two levels of Government are prohibited from transferring their constitutionally assigned authority to the other level of Government. In effect, each side is tied to its assigned rights and responsibilities. Each level is, however, permitted to delegate its authority to "a subordinate body" -- this is the third point (Ince, 1984a:23). An example where this third point has occurred, and one with relevance to the management of fish habitat, is the delegation of a large portion of the Provincial Government's authority to regulate land use to its Municipal Governments.  While the basic tenets of this arrangement remain in effect today, both the size and nature of government have since become much more complicated. Mirroring these changes, our socioeconomic and institutional systems have taken on complexities of their own, largely in response to increases in population and economic development.  Meeting the challenges posed by these changes has resulted in a patchwork of amending formulas to the Constitution Act, and the evolution of an expansive and complex network of governing  28 agencies -- each of which administers some aspect of the constitutional responsibilities which were initially assigned to their respective parent legislatures.  In this development, however, it has become increasingly evident that, despite the exclusive nature of the rights and responsibilities assigned by the Constitution Act, the general terminology used in the Act's provisions have allowed for considerable overlap between the two primary levels of Government. Ince (1984a:20) writes: ... the actual division of powers created by the Constitution Act, 1867 is done in very general terms, so that precise definition of federal and provincial authority is very difficult. The wide powers given both levels of government often cause legislative overlapping, whereby both levels have authority to legislate with regard to a particular problem. This tendency to overlapping is increased when the issue being legislated, such as the environment, is extensive in scope.  This perception is also reflected in a statement by Dorcey (1986:43); "nowhere in the coastal zone upland, foreshore, subtidal, land or water - is there clear undisputed basis for one government to be the sole authority".  Within the Fraser Estuary these characteristics are also evident. Alexander (1982:3) comments: ... ownership of land adjacent to and under the waters of the estuary is partly in the Crown in the right of the Parliament of Canada, partly in the Crown in the right of British Columbia, and some is privately owned. Legislative power over these lands does not follow the same division as ownership. The legislative control over the estuary is divided amongst all levels of government.  What becomes apparent from this discussion is that the management of a natural resource such as fish habitat, requires the involvement and cooperation of a great many agencies -- each of which hold different interests with regard to the resource.  From this perspective, the Bridgepoint case is a classic illustration of many of the points raised here. As subsequent chapters will show, a number of government agencies were involved in the case, each bringing different interests and jurisdictional responsibilities to the negotiations. The main parent agencies represented at Bridgepoint included the Harbour Commissions (through the North Fraser Harbour Commission), Environment Canada (through the Canadian Wildlife Service,  29 the Environmental Protection Branch, and the Inland Waters Directorate), the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the British Columbia Ministry of Environment (through the B.C. Fish and Wildlife Management Branch), and local government (through the Municipality of Richmond).  In the next section the broader jurisdictional responsibilities of the parent bodies whose subordinate agencies were involved in the Bridgepoint Market Development are discussed.  3.2.2 Key Agencies and their Acts Federal Jurisdiction Three of the key agencies with representatives involved at Bridgepoint were Federal Government agencies: the Harbour Commissions, Environment Canada, and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). Their participation at Bridgepoint was, perhaps, to be expected, as Alexander (1982:3) and Duncan (1990) have indicated that these three stand out as the major Federal players with regard to environment and habitat issues in the Fraser.  The following paragraphs outline the main jurisdictional aspects and relevant Acts administered by these agencies and their subordinates. The Harbour Commissions Based on the Federal Government's constitutional rights over navigation and shipping, the Harbour Commissions Act provides the enabling legislation for the Harbour Commissions (Alexander, 1982:7). Under this Act the Harbour Commissions have a mandate to administer all federally owned lands and waters in their respective harbours, as well as those portions of the Estuary deemed by the Federal Parliament to be within the harbour limits (Alexander, 1982:6-7).  The Harbour Commissions' authority is generally described in Section 9 of the Harbour Commissions Act. As cited by Alexander (1982:7), the Section states:  30 Subject to this Act, a Commission shall regulate and control the use and development of all land, buildings, and other property within the limits of the harbour, and all docks, wharves, and equipment erected or used in conjunction therewith.  Alexander (1982:7) reports that as a result of agreements reached with the British Columbia Ministry of Lands Parks and Housing, the North Fraser Harbour Commission (NFHC) "has a lease on all of the Crown Provincial foreshore in the North Arm". The agreement also provides the  NFHC with powers of disposition over these lands -- powers which are normally superfluous to the regulatory authority assigned in the Harbour Commissions Act. Given the Bridgepoint Market's location on the North Arm of the Fraser River, this point provides some background into the NFHC's ownership rights.  The Harbour Commissions Act also provides the Commissions with the ability to make bylaws within their respective jurisdictions. Of particular interest to the management of fish habitat is their ability to enact bylaws regarding "the regulation or prohibition of construction .. excavation, removal or deposit of materials" (Alexander, 1982:8). These bylaws are, however, subject to the  approval of the Minister of Transport whose department administers the Navigable Waters Protection Act -- an Act to which the Harbour Commissions are explicitly subject (Alexander, 1982:8). Transport Canada's specific role with regard to fish habitat is essentially incidental to its primary mandate of shipping and navigation concerns. The North Fraser Harbour Commission's (NFHC) jurisdiction covers a geographic area 18 miles in length within the jurisdictional Municipalities of Richmond, New Westminster, Burnaby, and Vancouver (NFHC, The Working River, nd:9). According to the NFHC's (nd:9) brochure The Working River, "The harbour is bounded by the Strait of Georgia to the west, at the jurisdictional boundary of the Port of Vancouver, and to the east by the jurisdictional boundary of Fraser Port". Environment Canada Environment Canada (formerly known as The Department of Environment) was first established in 1971 by the legislation of the Government Organization Act (Ince, 1984a:61; also Alexander, 1982:8). Ince (1984a:61) describes the Minister of the Environment's authority as follows:  31 ... the Minister of Environment has jurisdiction with respect to the preservation and enhancement of the quality of the natural environment, including water, air and soil quality, renewable resources, meteorology, and the coordination of the policies and programs of the government of Canada respecting the preservation and enhancement of the quality of the natural environment.  Alexander (1982:8) notes that this jurisdiction is restricted to those environmental aspects "specifically not assigned to other ministries". This proviso dramatically restricts Environment  Canada's direct role in managing the fisheries or fish habitat -- aspects expressly assigned to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). Through an agreement with DFO, however, the Environmental Protection Service of Environment Canada has also be provided with the jurisdiction to enforce Section 36.3 of the Fisheries Act (Ince 1984a:137). This Section regulates against the deposition of substances harmful to fish into fish bearing waters (RSC, 1985:s36.3).  Other Acts administered by Environment Canada, and having a potential impact on the management of fish habitat, include the Migratory Birds Convention Act, the Canada Water Act, the Clean Air Act, Environmental Contaminants Act, and the Ocean Dumping Control Act. The last three of these Acts, and portions of the Canada Water Act have recently been rolled into a single Act, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA, 1988), (Duncan, 1990). While each of these additional Acts have components which could affect the management of fish habitat and may have been considered at Bridgepoint, they did not play a significant role in the case.  From the Bridgepoint perspective, one particularly important function performed by Environment Canada was the administration of a referral system through its Environmental Protection Service (EPS). This referral system was designed to "ensure that project proponents [were] made aware of their responsibilities under Federal environmental legislation and informed of conflicts with such legislation that [arose] from their proposals" (FRES 1982:20). The referral system was generally  applied to project proposals within the Fraser River Estuary Study (FRES) area, and to the area under Environment Canada's Pacific Region administrative jurisdiction. Referrals to the system came from a variety of sources including; the Canadian Coastguard (Ministry of Transport), Public Works Canada, the Fraser River and North Fraser River Harbour Commissions, the Canadian  39 National Railway, Federal and Provincial government bodies, private companies and the general public. (FRES, 1982: 19-20).  At the time that the Bridgepoint project was put forward, the administrators of the referral system were using the land use designations assigned by the Area Designation Task Force under FRES (1981/1982) to make an initial determination of each project under review. Referrals would then be made where a proposed land use differed from the designated use, or "in cases where the land [had] not been designated for use, especially if these lands were perceived to be sensitive to the type of development being proposed" (FRES, 1982:18). It was under this latter category that the  Bridgepoint proposal was referred to the EPS by the Environment Canada's Canadian Wildlife Service in November, 1984 (DFO, Nov 28, 1984; also Tretheway Jan 22, 1991).  Routinely, once an application was received by the EPS coordinator, Federal and Provincial agencies expected to have an interest in the proposal would be contacted for comments. If the project was then judged to have significant environmental impacts, the coordinator would forward the findings to the Regional Screening and Coordinating Committee (RSCC) -- a committee with representatives from all the Federal environmental agencies (FRES, 1982:22). The RSCC would then decide if more study was necessary and if so, either set up a Task Force to do this, or "in the case of a Federally-initiated project, ... recommend to the originator that the project be referred to the Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Office for formal review under EARP" (FRES,  1982:22). With this latter option, the referral system operated as the initial screening step prior to the Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP).  Figure 3.1 shows Environment Canada's entire referral system in more detail. In the diagram the RSCC's role appears under the heading "significant impact" -- a point which reflects how the potential impacts of the Bridgepoint proposal were viewed given that the case was referred to the RSCC, and that an RSCC Task Force subsequently formed.  33  FIGURE 3.1 ENVIRONMENT CANADA'S REFERRAL SYSTEM  Project Originator  (McDougall, 1982:19)  Project l Referred  Fish and Wildlife Branch. L.M.  Coordinator Referral 6 Liaison (Initiator)  Indian and Northern Affairs Canada  Referral Distribution • Discretionary^Discretionary  B. C. Ministry of Environment Assess. 6 Plan. Division  Discretionaly (CNR Projects Only)  Discretionary (All Projects)  B. C. Forest Service  Energy,Mines and^I... Petroleum Resources  --1 1  I  B. C. Fish and Wildlife  F  Can. Wildlife Serv. Env. Canada  B. C.110E Water Mgmt. Branch B. C. Parks Br. and Outdoor Recreation Div.  frd  Arl  B. C. Lands Branch  Inland Waters Dir. Env. Canada Atmos. Env. Serv. Env. Canada  0 z en 06— 1 Lands Dir. , Env. Canada  B. C. Heritage Fo Cons. Branch  Env. Prot. Serv. Env. Canada  Agri. Land Commission Coordinator Referral Liaison  Minor or Moderate Impact  Fisheries and Oceans Canada  •  Conflicts Non-Existent or Resolve  Significant Impact  No Further Study RSCC  Major Federal Project _1EARP)  1^  Furthe r Study Needed Coordinator Referral and Liaison  Response to Project Originator  1  Respon e to Project Originator  b  ask Force  FEARO  Re rt  Pant 1  RSCC Approval  Panel Report  Response to Project Originator  Federal Minister of Environment  34 The established procedure for an RSCC Task Force was that the Task Force members, after reviewing the case, would bring the recommendations from their respective agencies to the Task Force chairman who would write a report incorporating all the agencies' comments, and recommendations. In this way each of the agencies' interests would be expressed and incorporated into the final recommendations to the RSCC. In the case of Bridgepoint a variation on this latter procedure was apparently made. The details of this aspect are discussed in subsequent chapters.  It should be noted that many of the coordinating functions formerly handled under Environment Canada's referral system in the Fraser Estuary are now dealt with under the Fraser River Estuary Management Program (FREMP). FREMP was established in 1985, just after the first reviews of the Bridgepoint proposal had begun (Tretheway Jan 22, 1991). Department of Fisheries and Oceans Since its inception, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) has undergone a number of organizational changes. The current arrangement of the agency was formed in 1979 under the Government Organization Act (Pearse, 1982:30; also Ince, 1984a:64). The Department's constitutional basis stems from the Federal Government's rights over 'seacoast and inland fisheries' (Ince, 1984a:64). Through Supreme Court rulings it has been established that these rights include the protection of fish habitat (Pearse, 1982:23). The key piece of Federal legislation that embodies these rights, and which is administered predominantly by DFO, is the Canada Fisheries Act.  The Inquiry on Federal Water Policy (1985) states that the Fisheries Act has three mechanisms through which it can protect fish habitat: First, it empowers the Minister of Fisheries to require anyone who builds an obstruction in a water way to build either a fishway around it or a hatchery to compensate for damaged stocks. Second, it prohibits anyone from disturbing fish habitat except with the Minister's approval.  35 Third, it makes it an offense to deposit any "deleterious substance" of any type in water frequented by fish.  (Pearse, Bertrand, and MacLaren, 1985:67). Under Section 37.1 of the Fisheries Act, the Minister also has the right to review the plans and specifications for any special projects prior to any work being done (RSC, 1985). When legislative authority is required to force compliance with an application of the No Net Loss Principle, it is typically one of these three points which provide the basis for enforcement.  The No Net Loss Principle itself is not a statutory requirement, hence the reliance upon the provisions within the Fisheries Act. A more detailed discussion on the No Net Loss Principle and its application are provided in Section 3.3 of this chapter.  Given that virtually all coastal waterfront developments are subject to these regulations, the Fisheries Act is potentially the most important and powerful pieces of legislation for managing the fish habitat resource. One of the fundamental criticisms of the Act, however, is that it is predominantly 'reactive' by nature. In other words, some damage must be incurred before any charges can be laid.  One final point is that DFO shares the administration of some of sections of the Fisheries Act with Environment Canada's Environmental Protection Service, and British Columbia's Ministry of Environment. Provincial Jurisdiction The Province's jurisdiction with regard to managing the fish habitat resource is drawn from four constitutional rights and responsibilities under Section 92 of the Constitution Act 1867. The first three of these are "the management and sale of public lands belonging to the Province" (RSC. 1867 s92(5)), all aspects involving "municipal institutions" (RSC. 1867 s92(8)), and property rights (RSC. 1867 s92(13)). The fourth responsibility is essentially a catch-all provision assigning "all matters of a merely local or private nature" (RSC. 1867 s92(16)) to the Province. Ince (1984b:7-8)  36 suggests that it is the latter two of these provisions which are at the heart of the Provincial legislature's extensive control over land use within Provincial borders.  With the exception of those instances where one level of Government acts on the behalf of the other level by agreement, all Provincial legislation involving fish habitat is rooted in one or more of the rights and responsibilities mentioned above. Translating these responsibilities into an institutional perspective within the Fraser Estuary, Alexander (1982:3) notes that "the British Columbia Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing, and three regional districts and eleven of their member municipalities, are the major provincial actors in the making of decisions regarding land and water use". The major Provincial bodies represented in the Bridgepoint Market case were; the  British Columbia Ministry of Environment (through the British Columbia Fish and Wildlife Management Branch), and Municipal Government (through the Municipality of Richmond). B.C. Ministry of Environment British Columbia's Ministry of Environment administers two Acts which, according to Kennett and McPhee (1988:20), were "designed to protect fish and wildlife habitat". The Acts are the B.C. Wildlife Act, and the Fisheries Act.  The B.C. Wildlife Act provides the Fish and Wildlife Branch of the Ministry with a mandate to "act in the interests of wildlife conservation" (Duncan, 1990). Reflecting the 'local' nature of  Provincial legislation, this Act is primarily directed toward the conservation of non-migratory species. As discussed previously, a number of local animal and bird species are known to inhabit or frequent the waterfront habitats.  As mentioned earlier, the Ministry also shares the administration of a portion of the Canada Fisheries Act with Environment Canada and DFO. Its specific responsibilities involve the management of non-migratory species of fish such as Char and Trout. Representatives from the B.C. Fish and Wildlife Management Branch indicated that their interests in the non-anadromous  37 fish species frequenting the site were a significant reason for the Agency's involvement in Bridgepoint (L. Duncan, 1990). Municipal Government Regulated by the Municipal Act, Municipalities in British Columbia are responsible for much of the control over land use within their boundaries -- a power delegated to them by the Provincial legislature. Key aspects of the Municipalities' authority over land use are the provisions in the Act, regarding each community's Official Community Plan (OCP) and zoning for the use of land.  The OCP is the mechanism which establishes the guiding policies to be followed by the respective Municipality. Aspects such as the type of development, the amount of open space, policies for the conservation of natural and environmentally sensitive areas, and the intent to cooperate with specific agencies in managing the foreshore, are all within the realm of possible OCP policies.  Zoning by-laws are the primary means through which Municipalities enforce regulations over aspects such as the type, size, location, and use of land and developments.  Together, these two aspects provide local Government considerable control over the use to which land is placed. With regard to Bridgepoint, the Municipality of Richmond's formal role in dealing with the proposal was to approve or reject the proponent's application for rezoning the site. The application was made to rezone the site from "Industrial" uses to an appropriate zoning designation that would allow for the commercially oriented activities on the site's uplands, and the marina and pub activities on the site's foreshore. Eventually these were given the designations of "Automobile Oriented Commercial" and "Marina Districts 1 and 2". Aspects such as land use in the surrounding area, potential traffic congestion and environmental impacts from the development, were all considered by Richmond Council during this process.  38 The specific interests of the representative agencies involved in Bridgepoint are detailed in subsequent chapters. The next section examines the No Net Loss Principle, and its role in DFO's Fish Habitat Policy.  3.3 THE DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS' NO NET LOSS PRINCIPLE 3.3.1 The Evolution of The No Net Loss Principle Within DFO When fish habitat is lost or threatened, the fish stocks and species which depend upon it for food, protection and reproduction are similarly lost or threatened. In short, if habitat goes, so eventually do the fish ....  (British Columbia Wildlife Federation as quoted in Pearse, 1982:19). By the late 1970's and the early 1980's the cumulative impacts upon fish habitat resulting from activities such as diking in the Fraser Estuary, logging in the mountain watersheds, hydro-electric projects, agricultural practices, and a host of other upstream activities along the Fraser River, gave rise to concerns and fears such as those voiced in the British Columbia Wildlife Federation's statement. With the realization of a rapid increase in human impacts on fish habitat, and the potential for further damage to Canada's most valuable coastal fisheries, the Federal Parliament moved to strengthening the habitat protection provisions of the Fisheries Act in 1972 and again in 1977 (DFO, 1982:2). According to Pearse, the amendments to strengthen the Section dealing with the protection of habitat from alteration or destruction (RSC, 1985:s35(1)), and the Section to prevent the deposit of "deleterious substances" (RSC, 1985:s36(3)), were "vigorously opposed" by industry and the B.C. Provincial Government alike (Pearse, 1982:27). At the root of the opposition were concerns that the breadth of these provisions would be detrimental to development and the economy.  In 1977, a joint Federal-Provincial study was begun with the purpose of developing a comprehensive management plan for the Fraser Estuary. The intent of the study was to "provide a way to guide future changes in the estuary so that it is preserved and protected as a natural resource while continuing to serve as a vital economic resource" (Canada and British Columbia:2).  39 According to a presentation given by Bird (DFO) at the No Net Loss Workshop in 1983, "the concept of No Net Loss was spawned in 1977 in response to a requirement of the first Fraser River Estuary Management Plan report" (DFO, 1983b:3). Asked to report on their policies and practices  in the Estuary, Fisheries officials concluded that "in recognition of the past and present level of habitat loss and degradation, ... no further loss should be incurred" (DFO, 1983b:3).  By 1981, both economic and natural conditions in the Pacific coastal fisheries were "at a crisis point" (Pearse, 1982:vii), prompting the Governor General in Council of Canada to appoint Dr.  Peter Pearse as sole Commissioner to undertake The Commission on Pacific Fisheries Policy. Included in the Commission's Terms of Reference was a mandate to "inquire and report upon ... the provisions for conservation, management, protection and development of the fish resources, including the protection of their tidal and non-tidal habitat..." (Pearse, 1982:267). In the Pearse  Commission's final report, Turning The Tide: A New Policy For Canada's Pacific Fisheries, Pearse devotes an entire chapter to habitat management in which he makes 23 habitat related recommendations. Three of these recommendations are of particular relevance to the Bridgepoint Development, and thus, central to this thesis.  The first of Pearse's recommendations was for the Government of British Columbia and the Government of Canada to conduct a "comprehensive inventory of fish habitats in freshwater streams and estuaries in British Columbia" (Pearse, 1982:23). The inventory was seen by Pearse as a first  step to collecting the essential information needed to achieve a better understanding of the impacts of future developments and policies. This information would thus serve as a basis for proper management and planning of the resource. Although Delaney reported in 1983 that several government agencies had conducted their own aquatic inventories in the Fraser Estuary, "the status of inventory [was, to that point,] inadequate and confusing" (DFO, 1983b:13).  Communication and interactions between agencies were identified as the key problems. DFO attempted to address these problems by coordinating the inventory taking efforts of different agencies (DFO, 1983b:13) through a formalized process. Reflecting to some degree this inter-  40 agency cooperation, a shoreline inventory of the North Arm of the Fraser River was completed in September of 1986 as a result of agreements between the North Fraser Harbour Commission and The Department of Fisheries and Oceans. This event took place midway into the Bridgepoint Development (1984-1988).  The second of Pearse's recommendations with relevance to No Net Loss was that the Department's policy should "ensure that the total fish production capacity in the region will not be diminished as a result of industrial and other activities that impinge upon fish habitat" (Pearse,  1982:24). It is this recommendation which is considered to incorporate the "No Net Loss" Principle (DFO, 1983a:1). By 1984, all projects in the Fraser were subject to the No Net Loss Principle -- Bridgepoint being one of the first applications.  The third recommendation of note here was that DFO "should adopt an explicit policy for assessing proposed developments that threaten fish habitat and for determining compensation where required..."  (Pearse, 1982:25). Pearse's intent was that the compensation policy was to ensure "that all feasible measures will be taken to avail or minimize damage to fish habitat; only if these cannot fully preserve its productive capacity should compensation be considered" (Pearse, 1982:24). As will be  shown in subsequent chapters, the Bridgepoint Development established precedence with regard to the details of compensation.  In the years following the Pearse report the Department of Fisheries and Oceans began formulating a national policy for the management of fish habitat. As part of this process a "No Net Loss Workshop" was held in April 1983, followed by the release of a discussion paper entitled  Toward A Fish Habitat Management Policy For The Department Of Fisheries And Oceans later that same year. In 1985 a proposed policy paper was released (DFO, 1986a:9). During the course of these events, No Net Loss underwent a series of metamorphoses which transformed it conceptually from being a goal in itself and contributing to the objective of "conservation, restoration, and development of fish habitat" (DFO, 1983c:10), to being a guiding principle for a  4-1  conservation goal in support of an overall objective of "net gain of productive capacity for fisheries resources" (DFO, 1986a:15) The change in the role played by No Net Loss in DFO's evolving  Habitat Policy from 1983 to 1986 is evident in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. Figure 3.2 shows No Net Loss as a working principle in support of the agency's overall objective. Figure 3.3 shows the current Policy with No Net Loss as a 'guiding principle' in support of the Fish Habitat Conservation goal. The changes which took place over the three year interval, were mainly the result of the feedback from the workshops and discussion papers, and DFO's experiences in applying the concept to that point.  During this process a number of issues and concerns became evident, some of which remain unresolved. One issue, for example, arose over habitat compensation when more than one controlling agency was involved. The dispute, as reported to the No Net Loss Workshop by Jim Walker of the B.C. Ministry of Environment, occurred between B.C. Hydro (the proponent), the B.C. Ministry of Environment (as controllers of the water rights), and DFO (as habitat managers). In the dispute, the following question was raised: "Should federal Fisheries be compensated for the maximum capability of the Nechako to produce salmon and the Water Management Branch compensated for the maximum potential for withdrawals for domestic purposes when those two objectives may be at least conflicting or even mutually exclusive?" (DFO, 1983b:10). Clearly, the  issue of compensation was raising a number of questions with regard to its practical application.  Another concern was the uncertainty over the valuation of habitat from an economics perspective. Intangible attributes, such as the indirect contribution that the fisheries makes to the maintenance of traditional Native life-styles, still pose significant challenges for the economists. (DFO, 1983b:24).  42  FIGURE 3.2 POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR FISH HABITAT MANAGEMENT IN 1983 (DFO, 1983c:10)  MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITIES Management of fisheries and^___* administration of habitat provisions of Fisheries Act  OVERALL GOVERNMENT TARGETS  OBJECTIVE  Maintenance and development of Canada's fisheries resource and improved economic and social benefits to Canadians  CONSERVATION, RESTORATION AND DEVELOPMENT OP FISH HABITAT  WORKING PRINCIPLE NO NET LOSS OF PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OP HABITATS  Goal 1 FISH HABITAT CONSERVATION  Goal 2 FISH HABITAT RESTORATION  Goal 3 FISH HABITAT DEVELOPMENT  FISH HABITAT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 1. Protection 2. Cooperative Resource Planning 3. Public Consultation 4, Public Information and Community Involvement 5.\ Restoration 6. Development 7. Research  GUIDE TO APPLICATION  OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVING FISH HABITAT MANAGEMENT 1. Socio-Economic Considerations 2. Paying the Costs of Fish Habitat Assessment Studies 3. Cash as Compensation for predicted Habitat Loss 4. Fish Habitat Authorization Systems 5. Increasing private Sector participation 6. Improved Financing of Fish Habitat Initiatives 7. Establishing Pish Habitat Sanctuaries  43  FIGURE 3.3 POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR FISH HABITAT MANAGEMENT AS OF 1986 (DFO, 1986a:15)  OBJECTIVE NET GAIN OF PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY FOR FISHERIES RESOURCES  Goal I  Goal 2  FISH HABITAT CONSERVATION  FISH HABITAT RESTORATION  Goal  3  F HABITAT DEVELOPMENT  GUIDING PRINCIPLE NO NET LOSS OF PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF HABITATS  I INTEGRATED PLANNING FOR FISH HABITAT MANAGEMENT I IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES I. Protection and Compliance 2. Integrated 'Resource Planning 3. Research 4. Public Consultation  I  5. 6. 7. 8.  Public Information & Education Cooperative Action Improvement Monitoring  PROCEDURES TO APPLY THE NO NET LOSS GUIDING PRINCIPLE  44 A final issue to be considered here, although the documentation shows that there were many other issues raised, was a concern over what constitutes 'fish habitat'. In his presentation to the No Net Loss Workshop in 1983, Dr. Ian Birtwell made the following remarks: The definition [of fish habitat] demands that we know what fish habitat is. Numerous battles in court would indicate that we are far from knowing how fish depend on their habitat in a quantitative way. The definition also implies, but does not state, that water is fish habitat. I consider that not naming water as habitat is a serious omission in the legislation. Just as the air we breathe is part of our habitat, so is the water which fish "breath" part of theirs, and contamination of either medium is degradation of habitat.  (DFO, 1983b:20). From these few examples it is clear that the function of No Net Loss within DFO's habitat policy was far from being a straight forward development. Biological uncertainties, socioeconomic uncertainties, and jurisdictional uncertainties were each present in the making of the No Net Loss Guiding Principle as it appears in DFO's Fish Habitat Management Policy (1986). As the Bridgepoint case study examination will show, many of these uncertainties were also reflected at the policy application level.  3.3.2 No Net Loss Within the Context of DFO's Fish Habitat Management Policy The "Policy Framework For Fish Habitat Management" that appears in Figure 3.3 shows the three approaches, or goals, through which DFO hopes to achieve its long term objective of Net Gain of productive capacity for fisheries resources. As stated in its 1986 Fish Habitat Policy the three goals are; "the active conservation of the current productive capacity of habitats, the restoration of damaged fish habitats, and the development of habitats" (DFO, 1986a:12). The first of these three  goals, conservation of fish habitat, is guided by the principle of No Net Loss. DFO's Habitat Policy document defines the No Net Loss Principle as follows: A working principle by which the department strives to balance unavoidable habitat losses with habitat replacement on a project - by - project basis so that further reductions to Canada's fisheries resources due to habitat loss or damage may be prevented.  (DFO, 1986a:30). Implicit in this definition is the Pearse Commission's notion of compensation for loss which the Policy document states includes natural habitat replacement, productivity increases of existing  45 habitat, and artificial methods of maintaining fish production (DFO, 1986a:29). Under the definition, compensation takes effect where mitigation fails to maintain adequate habitats for the fisheries. Mitigation is defined as those "actions taken during the planning, design, construction and operation of works and undertakings to alleviate potential adverse effects on the productive capacity of fish habitat" (DFO, 1986a:30).  It is clear from this series of definitions that the No Net Loss Principle has implications to all phases of new developments, from their earliest inception to well into their operational phases. These definitions also underscore the important limitation mentioned earlier that the No Net Loss Principle is not a statutory requirement. It is only after habitat has been damaged that charges can be brought to bear using the habitat sections of the Fisheries Act, its parent legislation. Enforcement is, therefore, reactionary. This aspect is also reflected in the procedural steps for applying the No Net Loss Principle which shows that the laying of charges is literally the case of last resort. In most instances, five steps precede such enforcement actions. Procedural Steps to Achieving No Net Loss Figure 3.4 shows DFO's conceptual diagram of the procedural steps to achieving No Net Loss. In the idealized case, the first step would involve notifying both the public, and agencies having a potential interest in the proposal at hand. Any information received at this stage contributes to DFO's second step -- examination.  As the Figure 3.4 shows, during the initial stages of the examination step, an assessment is made of the impacts which may arise out of the development. Potential impacts involving both chemical and physical disruption may be assessed depending on the circumstances. In the latter portions of the examination step, alternative sites, mitigation options and compensation options are reviewed. Collectively, these options are referred to by DFO as a "hierarchy of preferences" (DFO, 1986a:26). The hierarchy of preferences represents the heart of the No Net Loss application and will be discussed in greater detail later in this section.  46  FIGURE 3.4 PROCEDURAL STEPS TO ACHIEVING NO NET LOSS (DFO, 1986a:27)  STEP 1  NOTIFICATION BY PROPONENT AND GOVERNMENTAL SOURCES  INFORMATION RECEIVED ON PROJECT  ASSESS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON FISHERIES AND HABITAT  ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (IF REQUIRED) (SECTION 33.1 1 I)  STEP II  EXAMINATION BY FISHERIES & OCEANS, OFTEN IN CONSULTATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES  ASSESS ALTERNATIVE SITING OR OTHER OPTIONS AND DISCUSS WITH PROPONENT  ASSESS MITIGATION OPTIONS  ASSESS COMPENSATION OPTIONS (if compensation determined feasible)  MAJOR POTENTIAL IMPACT  STEP DI  CONSULTATION  Sin) W DECISION  STEP V AUDIT' STEP VI  ENFORCEMENT  . 'CONSULT WITH 'PUBLIC,: TROPONENT AND OTHER: GOVERNMENT AGENCIES  MINOR POTENTIAL IMPACT  CONSULT WITH PROPONENT AND INTERESTED PARTIES  47  The third procedural step to achieve No Net Loss is public consultation. At the disci-etion of the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans', major or controversial issues will be open for public review either through established processes such as Environment Canada's Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) or through an independent review process funded by the Federal Government or jointly funded with the Provincial Government. Issues of a lesser magnitude are generally handled with only the proponent and those parties having an immediate interest in the issue.  The fourth step involves the decisions made by DFO. Taking into account all of the information gathered, including the consultations with the public, DFO makes a determination of the potential net loss of productive habitat. If net loss is anticipated, DFO assesses the adequacy of the proponent's plans to mitigate and compensate. Under DFO's habitat policy, compensation options for chemical hazards are not permitted (DFO, 1986a:28). On the basis of these assessments either DFO or the Minister will make one of three recommendations: to permit the proposal to proceed as proposed (no harm expected to the productive capacity of fish habitat); to permit the proposal to proceed with fixed conditions,... or to reject the proposal (potential losses to the fisheries judged unacceptable).  (DFO, 1986a:28). The fifth step is the audit, or monitoring stage of the No Net Loss procedural steps. A commitment to conduct studies to monitor the results of compensation and mitigative actions may be required of proponents before any approvals are given by DFO. The results of such studies then become the basis for modifications, or adjustments to the development, or mitigation activities. In addition to these activities, DFO may also conduct "project - related evaluations and effects monitoring" on its own (DFO, 1986a:24).  48 As mentioned previously, the final step in the procedure to achieve No Net Loss, is enforcement. Where necessary, prosecutions would generally be carried out under the Canada Fisheries Act. All of the previous procedural steps ultimately rely upon the enforcement capabilities offered under the Act for compliance. Hierarchy of Preferences Under the procedural steps for achieving No Net Loss the task of assessing proposals that have the potential to place habitat in jeopardy is conducted using the "hierarchy of preferences" mentioned earlier. The hierarchy consists of four sequential steps: prevention, mitigation, compensation, and rejection.  Prevention, the first step in the hierarchy, is also DFO's first priority in assessing proposals. In  an effort to prevent both direct and indirect loss or damage to productive habitat requests are made to the proponents during initial planning stages that the project be relocated or redesigned. Should these alternatives prove to be impractical because of physical or operational reasons DFO's second priority, mitigation, comes into effect.  The mitigation step of the hierarchy attempts to place conditions on the project's planning design and construction, its operations, or its nature, in order that loss of productive habitat is avoided. The addition of pollution control equipment, protective booms, rehabilitation of water quality, or revisions to operational schedules, constitute potential examples of mitigating activities. The type of mitigation will depend upon the specifics of the site and the nature of the proposal being assessed.  According to DFO's Habitat Policy the Department's third priority, that of compensation, is to be considered only after the avenues of prevention and mitigation have been exhausted. In such cases, and where the decision is likely to be one of proceeding with a project despite imminent habitat loss, compensation will be required by the Department. According to the Department's  49 Policy, the first preference for compensation is for on-site, or near-by replacement of productive habitat. Failing this, off-site locations would then be considered. (DFO, 1986a:26).  The North Fraser Harbour Environmental Plan (1988), which was jointly developed by the North Fraser Harbour Commission (NFHC) and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), has subsequently refined the replacement of lost habitat in the Fraser's North Arm with a "hierarchy of preferred compensatory options" (DFO and NFHC, 1988:11). Under the agreement the  replacement of lost habitat in the Harbour's jurisdiction is subject to the following hierarchy of replacement terms: 1)  "like" habitat on-site;  2)  "equally productive" habitat on-site;  3)  "like" habitat off-site but within the same reach;  4)  "equally productive" habitat off-site but within the same reach;  5)^"like" or "equally productive" habitat outside of the impacted reach.  (DFO and NFHC, 1988:11).  Figure 3.5 shows the reaches for the North Fraser Harbour. The rationale for defining the reaches was to functionally recognize the physical variations which take place along the length of the North Arm. This is particularly important in areas affected by tidal action. Ideally, habitat replacements would remain within the same reach as the original habitat to ensure similar environmental conditions.  The fourth and final step in the 'hierarchy of preferences' calls for the rejection of the proposal. As the hierarchy suggests, this step is taken after the options for prevention, mitigation, and compensation have been fully assessed. Typically, some element of risk and or ecological uncertainty will remain with the proposal forcing its rejection by DFO officials.  50  FIGURE 3.5 REACHES FOR THE NORTH FRASER HARBOUR (DFO and NFHC, 1988:25)  51  3.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION This chapter has detailed two important aspects which contribute to a background understanding of the basis for, and the implications of, the application of No Net Loss at Bridgepoint. The first aspect was the jurisdictional framework behind the key agencies represented at Bridgepoint. The second aspect was the policy framework through which No Net Loss is applied.  Reflecting these aspects the chapter was divided into two parts. Section 3.2 first examined the broader Constitutionally-based division of powers underlying the agencies represented at Bridgepoint. The discussion on jurisdictional mandates and relevant Acts administered, included the following agencies: the Fraser's Harbour Commissions, Environment Canada, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the B.C. Ministry of Environment, Municipal government.  After discussing the development of the No Net Loss Principle and its subsequent emergence into DFO's national Habitat Policy, Section 3.3 then examined DFO's six procedural steps for achieving No Net Loss and the four hierarchical steps for assessing projects -- prevention, mitigation, compensation, and rejection. It was stated that, collectively, these steps form the  working heart of DFO's approach to the application of No Net Loss.  To this point, this thesis has outlined the importance of the coastal wetland habitat, and examined the jurisdictional and procedural aspects involved in the application No Net Loss at Bridgepoint. The next chapter develops an analytical framework through which the specifics of the case may be evaluated.  52  CHAPTER FOUR THEORY -- DEVELOPMENT OF AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ... many planners overlook one basic fact of life in planning: it is not about the designing of a better world from scratch. It can hardly ever be compared to building a new house. Rather, it is coordinating what is going to happen anyway, as I do in decisions about paint work and whether to call the plumber. It is making things happen without designing them from scratch, and often without carrying out the work involved oneself. Its essence lies in improving what is being done, and in this sense, of course, a better world is being sought. But this is done indirectly.  (Faludi, 1987:2).  4.1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER In many ways the quotation by Faludi is an appropriate characterization of this chapter, and to this thesis as a whole. In describing planning as an activity that strives to improve what is being done, the statement says much about one of the fundamental objectives of this document with its evaluative orientation. The intent here is not to begin from scratch, but to look at what is being done and consider how the process might be improved. In undertaking this task, this chapter draws upon the work of others to establish a basis for an evaluative framework against which to assess the Bridgepoint Development as an application of No Net Loss.  The chapter begins with a brief statement on this writer's reasons for choosing a negotiation based approach for an evaluative framework. Next, a detailed description is given of the theoretical basis from which the analytical framework was developed. Specifically, the discussion details Fisher and Ury's general theory of negotiation known as "Principled Negotiation". The rationale for selecting this particular method, along with an accounting of the apparent limitations of the approach, follows this discussion. The chapter concludes with an outline of the analytical framework itself, and a discussion of the relationship of this thesis to planning theory in general.  4.2 RATIONALIZING THE NEGOTIATION BASED APPROACH AS A BASIS FOR ANALYSIS For a variety of reasons the selection of a particular analytical framework to apply to the Bridgepoint case study was more difficult than the selection of the type of approach to be taken.  53 Questions such as 'how much marsh is required to support x number of fish?', or 'precisely how successful a replacement marsh will be in compensating for one that is removed?', tend to define the limits of the biological and ecological knowledge of the officials who work with these habitats on a daily basis. These are critical questions if one is attempting to gain some appreciation of how successful projects such as Bridgepoint really are. Yet decisions about the management of these • habitats must still be made even without the answers to such questions. Any attempt to assess the success or failure of an application of No Net Loss on this basis would be, at best, limited. Hence, another approach was needed.  Having ruled out a biological/ecological approach, the selection of a negotiation-based approach was made founded on an appreciation of two important aspects. First, that there exists a growing movement away from authoritarian management of natural resources, particularly where issues of common public concern are present. In large extent this is due to a growing desire on the part of the general public to be included in the decision making process. Lilley (1988:2) writes: In recent years, the public have become more aware of, and involved in, resource management matters and there has been a rapid democratization of decision making. In matters related to "public goods," such as preservation of heritage resources, protection of environmental quality and quality of life preservation of species or habitats, and management of public lands, the public, as individuals or as groups, now want a direct influence on decisions that affect them.  The second point is that settling difficult natural resource issues through the courts can be risky. Outcomes are rarely, if ever, completely predictable. By resorting to the courts the parties involved must effectively turn over their ability to choose what the final agreement will be -- an aspect which many negotiating parties would prefer to avoid.  From both of these perspectives, the negotiation-based approach becomes the operational keyword. Because of the above arguments, analysis on this basis makes sense. Choosing the particular negotiation method for an analytic framework , however, was somewhat more difficult owing to the relative recency of the approach in resource management issues. The method selected for this research, Principled Negotiation, is described below. In order that some of the  54 reasons for choosing the method might be better appreciated, the rationale for the choice appears after the description of the method.  4.3 PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION (NEGOTIATING ON THE MERITS) The technique of Principled Negotiation was developed at the Harvard Negotiation Project by Roger Fisher and William Ury as a general theory of negotiation. In developing their arguments, Fisher and Ury postulated that three basic criteria could be used as standards against which to judge any method of negotiation: First, they suggest that "it should produce a wise agreement if agreement is possible"; second, "it should be efficient"; third "it should improve or at least not damage the relationship between the parties" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:4). Fisher and Ury (ibid:4)  define a wise agreement as "... one which meets the legitimate interests of each side to the extent possible, resolves conflicting interests fairly, is durable, and takes community interests into account".  Fisher and Ury argue that positional bargaining, "the most common form of negotiation", fails to meet these criteria (Fisher and Ury, 1981:4). The tendency to lock oneself into a position, they argue, results in energies becoming focused on defensive strategies rather than concentrating on resolving the substantive issues in the dispute. The result is a process that is for all intents, inefficient. Agreements which are made under these conditions may simply be the result of "a mechanical splitting of the difference between the final positions rather than a solution carefully created to meet the legitimate interests of the parties" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:5) with the strong  probability of generating unwise agreements. Finally, Fisher and Ury contend that positional bargaining pits the opposing sides against each other in "a contest of wills" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:6) where giving in or making concessions may result, not only in bad feelings, but may also place ongoing relationships at risk.  In contrast, the Principled Negotiation method was specifically designed to meet the three basic criteria of "producing a wise agreement, efficiently and amicably" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:4). The  55 method, which appears in their book Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (1981), consists of the four fundamental elements shown in Table 4.1.  While it is not the intent of this thesis to describe in minute detail the Principled Negotiation method, some discussion of the basics of the method is essential to the analytical framework developed later in the chapter.  4.3.1 Separate the People from the Problem In any negotiation, both relationship interests (the way we deal with others), and substantive interests (the problems we are negotiating about), will exist. Fisher and Ury examine this distinction and suggest that in many negotiations "the parties' relationship tends to become entangled with their discussions of substance" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:20). They argue that when  this occurs under positional bargaining, substantive interests and relationship interests are inexorably bartered off against each other. The alternative approach offered by the Principled Negotiation method is to negotiate on the merits of substantive interests and relationship interests separately. The 'people problems' which do arise should thus be dealt with directly, but independently from the substantive issues at hand.  Based on their research, Fisher and Ury have concluded that the majority of the people problems that occur during negotiations fall into one of three groups: perception, emotion, or communication. Perception issues are concerned with the differences that may exist between the way one side sees the situation as opposed to how the other side sees it. Fisher and Ury write; "Each side in a negotiation may see only the merits of its case, and only the faults of the other side's" (Fisher and  Ury, 1981:23). Developing an appreciation of the other side's perceptions, and the force of their convictions are essential first steps to influencing, or revising, both the other side's views and your own. Techniques for dealing with these concerns include; bringing perceptions out into the open for discussion, ensuring that the other side is an active participant in the process, and allowing the other individual "to reconcile the stand he takes ... with his principles and with his past words and  56  TABLE 4.1  (THE PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION METHOD) .  o Separate the PEOPLE from the Problem  o Focus on INTERESTS, Not Positions  o Invent OPTIONS for Mutual Gain  o Insist on Using Objective CRITERIA  SOURCE: Fisher, R. and W. Ury. 1981. Getting To Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In.  57 deeds" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:29). This last point is important in alleviating the appearance that  one side has had to back down.  Issues of emotion understandably arise when participants enter into negotiations where the outcomes are perceived to have considerable importance. Tensions, fear, and anger may be brought to the negotiations by either side. Techniques proposed by Fisher and Ury for dealing with such emotions include; making feelings explicit, providing opportunities for both sides to express their feelings in a controlled manner, and using symbolic gestures (for example: expressing honest sympathetic understanding to the other side's concerns).  Succinctly stated by the authors; "without communication there is no negotiation" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:33). Fisher and Ury point out that even when negotiations do take place, the communications can be impaired by misunderstandings, failure to talk to the other side in a manner that can be clearly understood, and the failure to hear and what is being said by the other side (Fisher and Ury, 1981:33-34). The following techniques are offered by the authors as aids to overcoming such problems: the use of active listening, bringing into the open the aspects that each side sees differently then working with the other side to devise joint solutions, openly discussing what the impacts are from your side's perspective, and speaking for a purpose; "know what you want to communicate or find out, and know what purpose this information will serve"  (Fisher and Ury, 1981:37).  4.3.2 Focus on Interests, not Positions This second principle in the Principled Negotiation method is concerned with interests and their reconciliation. By Fisher and Ury's definition, interests are the "needs, desires, concerns, and fears" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:42) held by each side in a negotiation. These interests are described  as the motivational forces behind many actions taken. The justification for concentrating on interests instead of positions is two fold. First, most interests can usually be satisfied by more than one solution, thereby offering a better chance of reaching a solution acceptable to both sides.  58 Second, in many situations the two sides will have a number of interests in common. Other interests may also exist that are complementary to those held by your own group. Therefore resolving one set of these interests may also work to resolve its complement. Collectively, these shared and complementary interests provide opportunities for joint resolution of each side's concerns and could ultimately lead to an agreement. However, the caveat noted by the authors in this regard, is that in order to act on such interests one must first be able to identify both your own interests, and the interests of your counterpart.  The methodology proposed by Fisher and Ury to identify interests first examines the positions taken by the one side and attempts to understand why that party decided on these particular actions. Similarly, attempts should be made to understand why alternative decisions were not made. In the course of these examinations it should be acknowledged that multiple interests will exist on each side. Apart from explaining some of the anomalies which might be evident, this fact may also offer additional opportunities for negotiating. Knowing that several of the members of the other side hold interests which are not being expressed at the table, for example, might be cause for offering an option which addresses these interests and were not previously discussed.  The inclusion of basic human needs in the assessment of interests is also stressed by Fisher and Ury. Their importance is underscored by the authors who consider these needs to be "the most powerful interests" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:49) Proper attention to needs such as "security, economic well being, recognition, and a sense of belonging" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:50), it is  suggested, will likely facilitate the formulation of an agreement and reduce the likelihood of a breakdown after the agreement is made.  Once the various interests have been identified, the authors suggest that each of these be assessed from the other side's perspective in terms of the consequences of agreeing or disagreeing with the options that you are offering to them. The insights provided by these examinations should assist  59 in forming a basis for meaningful discussions about each side's interests as well as permit an attack on the problem rather than on positions -- the key objective of focusing on interests.  4.3.3 Invent Options for Mutual Gain By Fisher and Ury's account, the purpose of inventing options for mutual gain is to broaden the number of options available to both sides. By doing so, it is anticipated that the chances of deriving a mutually acceptable solution will be significantly improved. In spite of that apparently obvious and natural approach, four aspects of human behavior will often create barriers to the process of inventing options. As listed by Fisher and Ury, they involve: making judgements too early; looking for a solitary solution; assuming that the range of options is fixed, and; an assumption that you are working to solve only your problem -- not theirs. The authors have educed four broad approaches designed to overcome these obstacles: separate inventing from deciding; broadening the options; looking for mutual gains, and; making their decision easy (Fisher and Ury, 1981:62).  Separating the action of inventing options from the action of deciding on options is intended to overcome inhibitions to creative thinking. The approach is ostensibly characterized by techniques such as brainstorming. Participants in a brainstorming session initially generate ideas under the rule that criticism of any of these ideas is not allowed. Later in the session, this collection of ideas is refined by the group and the best options are selected. The act of generating ideas is thus effectively separated from the act of deciding amongst them.  The discussion under broadening the options revolves around the generation of different ways of looking at the problem in order to gain new insights and to further expand on the options available. To illustrate the underlying concept offered here, two of the techniques suggested by the authors are examined. The first technique analytically separates the process of inventing options into four phases, each characterizing a different way of thinking about the problem (refer to the Circle Chart diagram in Figure 4.1). By working through each of the four phases, ideas will  60  FIGURE 4.1: THE FOUR BASIC STEPS IN INVENTING OPTIONS WHAT IS WRONG  WHAT MIGHT BE DONE  IN THEORY^Step II. Analysis Diagnose the problem: Sort symptoms into categories. Suggest causes. Observe what is lacking. Note barriers to resolving the problem.  Step I. Problem What's wrong? What are current symptoms? What are disliked facts contrasted with a preferred situation?  Step III. Approaches What are possible strategies or prescriptions? What are some theorectical cures? Generate broad ideas about what might be done.  Step IV. Action Ideas What might be done? What specific steps might be taken to deal with the problem?  IN THE REAL WORLD  ADAPTED FROM: Fisher, R. and W. Ury. 1981. Getting To Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Givingin., P. 70.  61 be generated which will often themselves become the seed for even more ideas. It is suggested that a portion of the chart could also be used in reverse. Starting with the action ideas phase, and working backwards, would permit an examination of the "theoretical approach" behind the ideas (Fisher and Ury, 1981:71).  The second technique involves an examination of the problem from the perspective of how other disciplines or professions might look at, and approach, the situation. A banker, for example, might look at a situation with an eye to the return on the investment, whereas an economist might examine the multiplier impacts on the community. Viewing the issue from each expert's perspective offers a different way of understanding the problem, and correspondingly, different potential solutions.  `Looking for mutual gains' is the third approach designed to surmount the obstacles to inventing options. To illustrate the incentive for inventing options, Fisher and Ury make the following statement: "even apart from a shared interest in averting joint loss, there almost always exists the possibility of joint gains" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:73). As discussed earlier, the first step is to  identify the interests involved. Those which appear to be held in common, represent opportunities. By stressing these shared interests in the negotiation you effectively put them to work.  Differences between interests, too, can provide opportunities for mutual gains. As the authors point out -- most bargains are possible precisely because "each side wants different things" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:76). Searching for ways by which the two sides can utilize the differences to the greatest advantage becomes the objective. Payments tied to performance, and compensation for risks taken, provide examples where different interests are "dovetailed" to achieve mutually acceptable solutions. As a corollary statement on matching complementary interests, Fisher and Ury write: "look for items that are of low cost to you and high benefit to them, and vice versa" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:79).  E2 The last of the four approaches designed to facilitate the invention of options is 'to make their decision easy'. At issue here are actions which you can take to assist the other side in making the decision that will satisfy both their interests, and your own. The first step is to, once again, consider the issue from their side -- both for its merits and its pitfalls. If an option can be found that has the potential of meeting the interests of both sides, then the next step is to search out the means to make their decision to accept the offer an easy one. One possibility is to provide the opposite side's representative with material or arguments that "she will need to persuade others to  go along" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:80). Another possibility is to formulate an agreement that would be easy for the other side to implement. Aspects which would assist in this endeavor include; making the solutions "right in terms of being fair, legal, honorable, and so forth" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:81), and, where possible, relating the option to precedent. Building on precedent can be an important standard from which the other side can measure the fairness of an option.  4.3.4 Insist on Using Objective Criteria More than any of the other main components of the Principled Negotiation method, the strategy of insisting on objective criteria attempts to deal with situations where the interests of each side simply conflict. In such instances, the Principled Negotiation method advises that the parties turn to objective criteria against which options, procedures, and eventually agreements, can be measured.  In discussing objective criteria, the authors differentiate between fair standards and fair procedures. Their suggestion is that fair standards are utilized in dealing with issues of substance, while fair procedures should be sought when dealing with conflicts of will.  Fisher and Ury justify this approach on a number of bases. Their first argument is that using objective criteria removes the pressures which are generally imposed by a contest of wills. Neither side is forced to back down from a positional stance, as would be the case in such a contest. A second argument is that agreements based on objective criteria are more resistant to  63 attacks, increasingly so if based on precedent. Further, such agreements are likely to be more stable over the long run with proponents tending to adhere to the terms of the agreement. On the basis of such arguments, the authors conclude that, overall, most agreements reached using objective criteria will have been efficient, reached on amicable terms, and, by the definition cited earlier, wise. A caveat to this latter point is that "ideally, ... objective criteria should be not only independent of will but also both legitimate and practical" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:89).  Examples of fair standards which might be used under different circumstances include market value, precedent, professional standards, and reciprocity. (Fisher and Ury, 1981:89). The authors cite an eloquent example of a fair procedure where one child divides a piece of cake, and the second child chooses. Both parties are compelled to concede that the procedure is fair.  Fisher and Ury suggest that through activities such as asking the other side what criteria they used in reaching their decisions, or offering suggestions for objective criteria of your own, a positional stance over issues will be transformed into "a joint search for objective criteria" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:91). In undertaking this search, however, both sides must be willing to give consideration to standards other than the ones that their side has proposed. In this regard, the key point is that "one standard of legitimacy does not preclude the existence of others" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:93). Criteria that your side feels are fair may not appear so to the other side and each side must maintain an openness to other viewpoints for the process to operate effectively.  The final point on the use of objective criteria is that you should yield only to principle " never ... to pressure" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:95). In situations where pressure tactics are being used the  response called for under the Principled Negotiation method is to "invite [the other side] to state their reasoning, suggest objective criteria [that] you think apply, and refuse to budge except on this basis" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:94-95). Should the other side refuse to justify their stance, then  some degree of re-evaluation is advised. One activity would be to re-examine the other side's offer to ensure that some crucial set of criteria hasn't been overlooked that would justify their position.  64  Failing this, their offer should be evaluated against your "best alternative to a negotiated agreement" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:137). Making yourself aware of the consequences of rejecting  their terms will subsequently allow a rational decision to be made between the remaining alternatives.  The key elements of Fisher and Ury's method are summarized in a table produced for the American Bar Association Journal (Sept. 1983: 1222). The table entitled "Ideas on Improving Negotiation" is reproduced in Table 4.2.  4.4 RATIONALE FOR APPLYING PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION AS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK Prior to selecting the Principled Negotiation method, a number of other works were examined as potential frameworks for this analysis of the Bridgepoint Development. They include Nierenberg's "Need Theory of Negotiation" (1968), Raiffa's The Art and Science of Negotiation (1982), Strauss'  Social Order Theory of Negotiation (1984), and Lilley's "Principles for Alternative Conflict Resolution" (1988). The selection of the Principled Negotiation method for this analysis was based  on five aspects which are not to be found collectively in any one of these approaches: the method utilizes many widely accepted concepts related to or developed for negotiation; it permits the substitution of specific techniques to match a given situation without sacrificing the overall objectives; the approach is transferable to a wide variety of situations; the method has been reviewed and used by people around the world; the method is prescriptive -- not simply descriptive. Each of the five aspects is spelled out in greater detail over the following paragraphs.  4.4.1 Utilization of Widely Accepted Concepts According to Fisher and Ury their method represents a conscious attempt to organize and apply concepts which they characterize as "common sense and common experience". While this characterization may well be valid in a broad sense, a case can be made to suggest, however, that it understates the strength and flexibility of the method.  TABLE 4.2  ^  65  IDEAS ON IMPROVING NEGOTIATION Many people consider negotiating like putting on their clothes: no need for theory, just do it. But in negotiation, theory does help. Distinctions can make it easier to understand what is going on. Rules of thumb can provide guidance for most cases. Here are some examples:  people issues  1. Distinguish between:  ^  substantive issues  perception, emotion, ^  specifications, terms, price  understanding, trust Rules of thumb: Deal with both sets of issues concurrently, but separately. Do not try to  improve a relationship by making concessions or try to obtain concessions by threatening a relationship. 2. Distinguish between:  positions^  interests  what the parties state^  their real concerns  they will or won't do Rules of thumb: Arguing about positions tends to lock people in. Ignore positions except as evidence of underlying interests. Talk about interests. 3. Distinguish between:  inventing options^  making decisions  Rules of thumb: First generate many possible ways of reconciling interests; decide later. 4. Distinguish between:  talking about what  ^  the parties ought to do  ^  talking about what the parties will do  Rules of thumb: Insist on talking about what the parties ought to do. Seek agreement on appropriate principles for resolving that question. 5. Distinguish between:  developing the best alternative^  negotiating first -  to a negotiated agreement^  then exploring other  - then negotiating^  options only if necessary  Rules of thumb: Before sitting down to negotiate, know realistically the best thing you can do if you decide to walk away. SOURCE: Fisher, R. 1983. 'What About Negotiation As A Specialty?' in American Bar Association Journal, Sept, Vol. 69. P. 1222.  66 The overview of Fisher and Ury's method provided earlier in this chapter, shows that each of the method's four fundamental elements - separating the people from the problem, focusing on interests not positions, inventing options for mutual gain and, insisting on objective criteria - incorporates a  considerable body of existing knowledge and research. The brainstorming technique described in the discussion on 'inventing options for mutual gain', for example, had been developed and refined by psychologists well before the Principled Negotiation method was formulated (refer to Wexley and Yukl, 1977:133 for a discussion of the brainstorming technique).  Similarly, Fisher and Ury draw upon previously developed theoretical knowledge in formulating many of their ideas. One example is evident in their reference to the role of needs as motivational factors in the discussion of 'focusing on needs rather than positions'. The importance of human needs as motivational forces is clearly reflected in work undertaken by Maslow (1954) while developing his theory of a Hierarchy of Needs (see Wexley and Yukl, 1977:77-79, or Weiten, 1983). [Although the hierarchical ordering proposed by Maslow's theory has not been borne out by subsequent research, the motivational role of human needs remains an important and widely accepted concept.]. An early attempt to bridge between Maslow's work on the motivational role of basic human needs and negotiation strategies is evident in Nierenberg's postulate of a Need Theory of Negotiation (1968).  4.4.2 The Method Permits the Substitution of Specific Techniques Flexibility is inherent in the method largely because of its ability to permit the substitution of one technique in place of another in response to a specific situation while, at the same time, remaining true to the principles involved. Selecting the circle chart technique over a brainstorming session, for example, may be an arbitrary choice providing that the underlying principle of inventing options for mutual gain is adhered to. Whichever is chosen the overall objective of producing wise agreements, efficiently and amicably is maintained.  67 4.4.3 The Method is Transferable to a Wide Variety of Situations Flexibility is also evident in that the method is readily transferable to other situations. As mentioned earlier, the method was designed as a general theory in order to apply "across the  board" (Fisher, 1983b:67). This endows the method with the capacity of adjusting to a wide number of situations.  4.4.4 The Method has Been Widely Reviewed / It Offers a Prescriptive Approach Since its release in 1981, Getting to Yes has sold more than a million copies world wide, and as such has been reviewed by a great many individuals. Although the specifics of the Principled Negotiation method are being refined on an ongoing basis (refer to Raiffa 1982, Fisher 1983a & 1985, Fisher and Brown 1988), the fundamental concepts developed in Getting to Yes are still being used by practitioners and theoreticians alike (see Dorcey 1986 & 1988, Lilley 1988). The continued reference to Principled Negotiation strongly suggests the merit of applying the method in natural resource negotiations. What gives the method additional appeal as an analytical framework for this study is its prescriptive orientation. Rather than simply identifying problem areas in a negotiation, the method also points out the ways in which these shortcomings might be overcome.  4.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE APPROACH Just as the Principled Negotiation method incorporates a number of traits that this researcher considers to be strengths, the method also incorporates a number of traits that can be considered limitations. Whether these traits can be deemed to be liabilities will depend upon the circumstances under which they become a problem. For the purposes of this thesis they are raised merely as points to be aware of.  The first, and perhaps most fundamental limitation, is that accepting the method implies an acceptance of the argument that the four fundamental elements of the method will collectively lead to agreements that are efficiently reached, amicable, and wise. Hence, accepting the methodology  68 implies accepting these criteria, yet little is said as to exactly what proportions each of these four elements must be present to meet the criteria that Fisher and Ury spell out. It seems unlikely that one would ever find a negotiation where all four of the fundamental elements are achieved totally. Hence, this begs the question, 'at what point can we state that a principled negotiation has occurred?' Without further clarification, this remains purely and simply a judgement call.  In their book Getting Together, Fisher and Brown (1988) describe Principled Negotiation as a method that focuses "on the negotiation of particular transactions" (1988:xiii). This is the second limitation of the method. The limitation exists in that the method may fail to examine the more global considerations which may indirectly, but no less importantly, impinge upon the negotiations or its outcomes.  A third limitation is suggested by Fisher in his 1985 article entitled "Beyond Yes". Fisher comments that "Getting to Yes probably overstates the case against positional bargaining. The New York Stock Exchange demonstrates that thousands of transactions a day can successfully be concluded without discussing interests and with little concern for ongoing relationships" (Fisher,  1985:68). Clearly, these comments emphasize the need for sensibility to the needs of a given situation as to whether or not the Principled Negotiation method should be engaged. Applying the method to every transaction at the Stock Exchange, for example, would likely bring the system to a grinding halt.  Closely related to the last point, the fourth limitation arises from the fact that the Principled Negotiation method was advanced as a "general theory" (Fisher, 1985:69). Drawing on analogy, Fisher writes: "A physicist advancing hypotheses about a general theory of matter does not deny differences among the elements. Like such a physicist, we have been looking for common concepts and a common structure that apply across the board" (ibid:69). The implication is simply that every  contingency may not fall within the purview of the Principle Negotiation method.  69 The final limitation to be discussed here arises out of a criticism which has been repeatedly directed at the method as described in Getting to Yes: "the discussion of power falls short of what is needed" (Fisher, 1985:69). While this shortcoming is not anticipated to have an impact on the  analytical use to which this method is being put in this thesis, it is noted that Fisher has attempted to address the concern in a 1983 article entitled "Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence" (Fisher, 1983a:149-166).  4.6 A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF THE BRIDGEPOINT CASE STUDY Using the Principled Negotiation method as a theoretical base, an analytical framework was developed with which to assess the Bridgepoint case study. The framework, shown below, is divided into four parts -- one for each of the fundamental elements of the Principled Negotiation method. Under each part is a list of questions which reflects the relevant aspects of that particular element. Each of the questions, or indicators, thus attempts to discover information about the case which relates directly back to the fundamental elements of the Principled Negotiation method. In the analysis that appears in Chapter Six, these indicators are used to assess the process of applying No Net Loss in the Bridgepoint case.  4.6.1 Separating the People from the Problem Fisher and Ury's discussion of this principle focuses on separating relationship issues from substantive issues. The authors suggested that when people problems arise they typically fall into one of three groups; perception, emotion, and communication. The questions posed here attempt to use these Categories as indicators to gauge how effectively the process in the Bridgepoint case was able to deal with the individual merits of the substantive issues, as opposed to the relationship issues. Were there failings in communicating concerns, or difficulties understanding the other party's perceptions? Were the different parties allowed to reconcile their positions? Did emotions play a part in the negotiations, and if so how were these concerns dealt with?  70 Were all parties equally well informed, and did they have access to all the relevant information?  4.6.2 Focusing on Interests not Positions The Principled Negotiation method requires that negotiators look beyond positional stances, to concentrate on the interests of all involved. The analytical questions posed here attempt to determine if each group's interests were identified, and if the process was able to reconcile these interests to the satisfaction of all concerned. Were the interests of all parties considered in the process, and how were these interests relayed? Was the process able to reconcile each group's interests?  4.6.3 Inventing Options for Mutual Gain The third element of the Principled Negotiation method concentrates on the development of mutually beneficial alternatives. The method suggests that the act of inventing alternatives be separated from the act of deciding amongst them, and that techniques should be employed to expand the pie before it is divided. It also suggests that alternatives be sought which would be of benefit to all parties, and that actions should be taken to make the other parties' decisions easy. The questions posed attempt to address these aspects in order to determine if this application of the No Net Loss policy had sufficient latitude to provide for mutually beneficial alternatives. How were alternative solutions generated, and how did you choose between them? Were specific attempts made to find solutions which would benefit all the parties, or were the solutions largely compromises between the various positions? Were actions taken to facilitate the other parties in making their decisions?  4.6.4 Insisting on Objective Criteria Through this last principle, the Principled Negotiation method attempts to ensure that agreements reached were based on fair standards -- both on issues of substance, and on issues of process. The questions posed will attempt to determine if objective standards were used and, if so, how they were applied.  71 Were the criteria used to achieve "No Net Loss" of habitat at Bridgepoint developed fairly, and how were they applied? Was the process used in achieving a "No Net Loss" of habitat fair?  4.7 THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS TO PLANNING THEORY It is appropriate at this point to briefly discuss the relationship of the analytical approach, and this thesis, to planning theory in general. While the following discussion is not intended to be a full treatise on planning theory, several points are raised which hopefully cast this work into its proper perspective within the planning realm. Before commenting on the case study itself, this section makes a number of general observational comments about planning theory, planning process, and planning practice.  4.7.1 General Observations on Planning Theory Alexander (1986) raises two crucial points with regard to planning theory, the first is that "there is no 'general theory of planning"' (ibid:8). The second point is that "there is no single agreed upon definition of planning theory, nor is there any consensus on what it includes" (ibid:4). Taken  together these two points would understandably cause even the most ardent of believers to take a second look for 'the emperor's clothes'. What is revealed in this case, however, is the eclectic nature of a discipline which draws upon concepts from many fields.  With regard to the first point, Friedmann (1987) suggests four traditions through which the many contributions to planning theory can be classified -- social reform, policy analysis, social learning, and social mobilization. According to Friedmann the four traditions represent the predominant planning streams which have evolved since the late 1700's. In general terms the social reform tradition focuses on the guidance of society through institutionalized planning processes and controls. The policy analysis tradition, on the other hand, focuses primarily upon decision, placing a heavy reliance on scientific and technical analysis to assess potential action alternatives. The social learning tradition concentrates on active learning, or "learning by doing" (Friedmann, 1987:13), with particular leanings toward "task-oriented action groups" (ibid:185). Finally, the  79 social mobilization tradition -- finding its roots in the writings of Marx, Fourier, Owen, Mao TseTung, and the like -- focuses upon the liberation of the working class and other oppressed groups.  Friedmann makes the suggestion that the inherent fallacies in each of these traditions, combined with the contradictions increasingly evident within the capitalist system, provides an opportunity for radical planning as an emerging stream within the discipline. The orientation of the radical approach is towards the "self-empowerment" (Friedmann, 1987:14) of groups, communities, and regions so that they become more politically active and independent. (Self-empowerment here is seen as a mediated process based upon the concepts of social learning, making use of dialogue and mutual learning.)  The common thread between each of Friedmann's streams is the link between knowledge and action -- a link which is central to the planning discipline. Although the second point discussed earlier stated that there is no single agreed upon definition of planning theory, definitions such as the two appearing below also reflect this link between knowledge and action. ... planning is the deliberate social or organizational activity of developing an optimal strategy of future action to achieve a desired set of goals, for solving novel problems in complex contexts, and attended by the power and intention to commit resources and to act as necessary to implement the chosen strategy.  (Alexander, 1986:43). Planning attempts to link scientific and technical knowledge to actions in the public domain; to processes of societal guidance; to processes of social transformation.  (modified from Friedmann, 1987:38). The planner's interest in the link between knowledge and action implies an underlying fundamental interest in 'process'. As a consequence, aspects such as what is being planned, how it is being done, what practical alternatives exist, how the plans are to be implemented, and who is involved, become primary concerns in any planning issue -- the evaluation undertaken in this thesis being no exception.  73 Because of the range and variety of situations in which planning takes place, an equally varied range of planning models have been developed -- each emphasizing a slightly different aspect of the process involved in linking knowledge to action. Some perspectives on the nature of the different planning models in use have been discussed by Alexander (1986:66) who discerns three classes of models; substantive models, instrumental models, and contextual models. The substantive classification, which includes the areas of environmental and resources planning, social and economic planning, and physical planning, places emphasis on the sectoral-functional areas and the substantive content of planning activities. According to Alexander, this focus strongly reflects the organization of our social institutions.  Instrumental models focus on the different tools and techniques which may be used to achieve the objectives of a given plan. Regulatory planning (which relies on the power to regulate), allocative planning (which emphasizes the power to allocate resources), and indicative planning (which uses the power of persuasion), represent three of the models which Alexander places under the Instrumental category.  The final group of models in Alexander's classification scheme, are the contextual models. Alexander states that this grouping "relates different types of planning to different socio-political contexts and ideologies" (Alexander, 1986:66). Some of the types of planning that Alexander  includes under this category are advocacy planning, comprehensive planning, social planning, bureaucratic planning and radical planning (Alexander, 1986:78-79).  In spite of the diversity of the planning models in use, Alexander (1986) suggests that a number of planning process components are common to most of them. The major components, he suggests, would include the following: an initial diagnosis of the problem at hand; the articulation of an objective or goal for the process; prediction and projection of future events "in order to estimate demand for facilities and services, and to assess our capacity to meet projected needs"  (Alexander, 1986:48); the design of a number of alternative approaches for reaching the objective;  74 testing of the alternatives for consistency, and practical constraints; an evaluation of those alternatives not already eliminated as impractical; and finally, implementation of the plan. At each stage of this sequence, feedback loops may exist with the other components allowing successive reiterations to occur.  Just as there may be variation in the models and techniques employed in bridging the gap between knowledge and action from one situation to another, the roles that planners undertake in any planning process will also vary -- in part due to the subtle differences between the situations, in part dependent upon the position being filled by the planner. Key roles that planners have been known to work under include those of technicians, administrators, mobilizers, mediators, advocates, and "guerrillas" (Alexander, 1986: 80-83). One point which cannot be separated from the notion of role playing, and one which may seem superficially obvious but remains never-theless an important facet of planning and the planning process, is the simple fact that whichever role is undertaken, the planner brings his or her own personal biases, beliefs and skills to the practice. These facts, as much as anything else, will affect the outcome of any plan's implementation.  The planning function is essentially prescriptive by nature. Alexander's outline of the planning process implicitly shows this trait in the evaluation of alternative approaches for reaching an objective. It should be noted, however, that prescription does not necessarily imply making a decision. In fact, the final selection amongst proposed alternatives is usually left to others.  One final overall observation is that the theoretical framework, the definitions of planning, the range of models in use and the different situations in which they are applied, and the roles played by planners, portray not only the "historical and political-economic" (Forester, 1989:11) basis of planning, but also show the heavy and fundamental reliance of planning on communication. It is perhaps this singular reality which is the basis for a growing interest in the application of negotiation theory as a mechanism for linking knowledge to action.  75  4.7.2 Linking the Case Study to Planning Theory In an earlier chapter it was stated that this thesis undertakes to evaluate the Bridgepoint development as an application of DFO's principle of No Net Loss of fish habitat. From both an operational and organizational standpoint, the thesis parallels a process described by Alexander (1986:8): The descriptive aspect of planning theory and its findings ("this is how it is") has to pass through an evaluative filter ("I think it's fine" or "I think it's terrible") to arrive at normative prescriptions ("this is how it ought to be") of how planning is to be done.  Reflecting the first part of the process described by Alexander, the initial chapters of this document provide both descriptive and contextual background information on the origins and legal context of No Net Loss, the ecological and historic attributes and considerations of the Bridgepoint site, and the economic and social implications of the development.  The "evaluative filter" described by Alexander is also paralleled in the thesis in that the theoretical foundations of Principled Negotiation initially advanced by Fisher and Ury (1981) are used both to inform the analysis and to outline a standard against which the process used in the Bridgepoint case may be compared.  Rounding off the similarities with Alexander's process, normative prescriptions are also made in this document. These prescriptions are based in large part upon the prescriptive orientation of the four principles outlined in the Principled Negotiation theory. If followed, the principles suggest that any agreements negotiated will be more likely to have been efficiently reached, be long lived, and either maintain or improve the relationships of the parties involved.  In the larger sense, the issues at Bridgepoint can be classified as resource allocation / policy making activities having implications for the area's ecology, economy, and community makeup. The selection of a negotiation based evaluative framework is arguably a logical choice given, as later chapters will show, the extent of bargaining and negotiation that resulted from the conflict  76 over the site's use. From Alexander's perspective, the selection would probably be categorized primarily as an application of an instrumental model because of the Principled Negotiation's emphasis on the use of a range of tools and techniques to achieve the objectives.  Although a complete genealogy of the Principled Negotiation theory would be required to properly classify the approach under Friedmann's traditions -- a task that goes well beyond the scope of this research -- the strong connections with decision making and decision theory would suggest a probable link between the Principled Negotiation methodology and what Friedmann refers to as the policy analysis tradition.  With regard to the evaluation and the normative prescriptions presented in this research, the intent is not to supplant existing decision making mechanisms used by government, but rather, to show by example how these activities might be supplemented to achieve wise and efficient resolutions that still allow relations to continue. The vision of planning presented here is therefore one which is described by Forester (1989:182) as "an image of planning as a negotiation process".  4.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS A corollary statement about this chapter is that it attempts to describe and rationalize the methodology used to analyze and assess the Bridgepoint Development as an application of No Net Loss. The chapter began with the suggestion that gaps in both the biological and ecological knowledge about critical aspects of fish habitat would impose severe limitations as to what one would be able to conclude in regard to the success or failure of the Bridgepoint case study using these perspectives. It was suggested that a negotiation-based approach would be justified as an appropriate means of assessing the case in view of the increasing demands for more public input into natural resources decision making processes, and the apparent movement by government agencies away from litigation proceedings.  77 The method selected as a theoretical base, Fisher and Ury's 'Principled Negotiation', was described and evaluated for appropriateness. Of fundamental importance were three basic criteria which the authors state act as standards for judging any method of negotiation, including their own. To reiterate, any method of negotiation should; "produce a wise agreement if agreement is possible", "be efficient", and "improve or at least not damage the relationship between the parties"  (Fisher and Ury, 1981:4). The Principled Negotiation method, which was designed to meet these criteria, was shown to consist of four basic elements: separating the people from the problem, focusing on interests not positions, inventing options for mutual gain and, insisting on objective criteria.  This writer's perspectives on both the strengths and limitations of the approach were also discussed. An appreciation of these aspects is important since the analytical framework, being based on the theory, likely incorporates many of these same characteristics.  The chapter also outlined the analytical framework that is used to assess the Bridgepoint development. The framework as developed consists of four parts, one for each of the fundamental principles in the parent theory -- Principled Negotiation. The questions in each of the parts were designed to act as indicators to determine the degree to which any of the four principles were achieved in the case study. The answers to these questions will be drawn from documents produced over the course of events and through interviews with a number of the key participants in the case. These results will be considered in relation to the three criteria posed by Fisher and Ury. The final section of this chapter examined the relationship of this research and the case study, to planning theory in general.  As a prelude to the actual analysis, historical details of the Bridgepoint development are outlined in the next chapter.  7g  CHAPTER FIVE NO NET LOSS AT BRIDGEPOINT CASE STUDY EXAMINATION  5.1 PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER The Bridgepoint Market project began in 1983 as a proposal to construct a waterfront complex containing a market, retail shops, several restaurants, a hotel, office space, and a marina on a 5.95 hectare (14.71 acre)(Richmond Planning Department. 1984:1) site in Richmond, B.C. adjacent to the North Arm cf the Fraser River (refer to Figures 5.1 & 5.2). Because the site contained several areas of riverine marsh, mudflats, and riparian vegetation which would be impacted by the development, and would therefore affect the wildlife and fish that rely upon those habitats, environmental approvals were required prior to the project proceeding. Final approval of the project was only made possible after mitigation efforts were made and a compensation package was negotiated.  The timing of the project was coincidental to a key step in the development of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans' (DFO) evolving policy for the management of fish habitat. This step was the incorporation and application of No Net Loss of fish habitat -- first as a policy in its own right, and subsequently as a guiding principle contributing to an overall goal of Net Gain of fish habitat. No Net Loss thus became an important aspect of the project's review and the subsequent negotiations which took place, with many of the concerns that were raised by the agencies involved focusing on this issue.  Section 5.2 of this chapter thus begins to explore the Bridgepoint Harbour Market Development through a series of discussions on land use, environmental, jurisdictional, economic, and social issues that were specific to the site, and to the proposal. Narrowing the focus even more, Section 5.3 of this chapter provides a chronological overview of significant events affecting, or relating to, the application of No Net Loss of fish habitat to the Bridgepoint Harbour Market Development proposal.  79  80  81  5.2 FEATURES AND FACETS OF THE BRIDGEPOINT MARKET DEVELOPMENT 5.2.1 Land Use Issues In December of 1978, the North Fraser Harbour Commission (NFHC) acquired title to the Bridgepoint site under a long term lease from B.C. Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing (B.C. Ministry of the Attorney General, Land Titles Office, 1978). As recorded in the 1982 Area Designation Task Force (ADTF) report to the Fraser River Estuary Planning Committee, the NFHC's intent was to "preserve this last major parcel of land in the area for a water-oriented  industry(s)" (ADTF, 1982:246). As a financially self supporting operation, the NFHC was also interested in generating a long term source of income from the property (Pers. Comm. G. Colquhoun Dec. 11, 1990). Consequently, the site was advertised by the NFHC for water-related development proposals under a sub-lease term of up to 60 years.  In the NFHC's advertisement, the Bridgepoint site was portrayed as a consolidation of three vacant upland lots and two foreshore water lots lying in an area zoned by the Municipality of Richmond as a "general manufacturing district" (NFHC 1981/1982?). Their advertisement stated that this designation permitted activities such as "heavy industry, agriculture, auto towing and  storage" (NFHC 1981/1982?). With a dredgate disposal site and an active construction aggregates business to the west of Bridgepoint, a CPR V & LI branch rail line running along the property's southern edge, and a number of light industrial businesses and warehouses to the east, the site's zoning designation was reflective of the surrounding land uses. Indeed, the B.C. Ministry of Fish and Wildlife characterized the immediate area as "a very heavily industrialized segment of the [Fraser River's] North Arm" (ADTF, 1982. 243). The land use zoning was also consistent with the former uses of the site which had been the location of a sawmill operation and foreshore log storage since 1927 (Williams, Villamere and Smith. 1984:33 citing Vladimir Playsic Group. 1984). Much of this background was raised by proponents of the Bridgepoint Development who, several years later, found themselves in a standoff with the government environmental agencies who initially felt that the project should not proceed because of the anticipated impacts on the wetland habitat, the fish and the wildlife.  82  In its 1981/1982 review of land use for the Fraser River Estuary Study, the Area Designation Task Force (ADTF) attempted to come to a consensus on a designation for the future uses of the Bridgepoint site. As a member of the Task Force, and as the lease holder of the property, the NFHC argued that the site should be designated for water-oriented industrial use, citing both the former activities on the property and the Municipality's existing zoning (ADTF 1982:246). For their part the forest industry participants to the ADTF review, cited the historic use of the foreshore area for log storage and the limited availability of similar storage areas along the North Arm as justification for a log storage designation (ADTF 1982:243). Apparently unswayed by these arguments the government environmental agencies involved (the Richmond Health Department - Municipality of Richmond, the B.C. Ministry of Environment - Fish and Wildlife Branch, Environment Canada - Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS), and DFO) took issue with the NFHC and the participating wood-related businesses over the future uses of the site. Concerned with the fate of the remnant habitat on the site these agencies argued that at least part, if not all, of the foreshore should be designated as conservation (ADTF 1982:243-246).  The consequence of the participating ADTF agencies' inability to come to an agreement was that the designation was "unresolved" (ADTF 1982:246) and the property was labelled "undetermined use". Today there is a general consensus among the agency representatives interviewed for this  thesis that the 'undetermined use' designation was a contributing factor to the difficulties at Bridgepoint. From the NFHC's perspective, the designation signalled the beginning of the Bridgepoint proposal since, in their view, the 'undetermined use' rating did not prevent development from proceeding (G. Colquhoun, Pers. Comm. 1990).  5.2.2 Environmental Issues Although the earlier chapter on 'The Importance of Wetland Habitats' has discussed the role of wetland habitats for their overall contribution to wildlife and fish -- issues which the environmental agencies reviewing the Bridgepoint proposal would have considered in their  83 assessment -- the characteristics particular to the site help to provide necessary background to the more specific concerns that the government's environmental agencies had with the proposal. In this context, several aspects will be discussed here. Marsh and Mudflat Related Issues Between April 17 and May 22, 1984 field studies were conducted by the proponent's consultants at the Bridgepoint site to determine the potential environmental impacts and concerns which would be linked to the development (Williams, Villamere and Smith, 1984:7). Completed in July 1984 their final report, An Environmental Assessment of the Proposed Bridgepoint Harbour Market Foreshore Development, was effectively rejected by the environmental agencies as "inadequate" (Richmond Health Dept., Oct 9 1984:2). Commenting on the assessment, a 1984  report by the Richmond Health Department (Oct 9 1984:2) stated that the reviewing agencies were particularly concerned with the in-river marina portion of the project, and suggested that the environmental report "understated the ecological importance of the mud/sand flat area that [would] have to be dredged". While mindful of its apparent shortcomings, portions of the environmental  assessment report do provide a 'snapshot' of the site's environmental characteristics and functional role prior to the development.  The proponent's report shows that three species of marsh vegetation were dominant along the site's foreshore; soft-stem bulrush (Scirpus validus), Lyngbye's sedge (Carex lyngbyei), and cattail (Typha latifolia) (Williams, Villamere and Smith, 1984:11). The latter of these was found mainly in the shallow waters of the slough at the site's western edge, while the former two species were observed both inside and outside the slough area. Both the bulrush and the sedge have been identified by Butler and Campbell (1987:29) as being amongst the most important food items for waterfowl such as the Green-winged Teal (Anas crecca carolinensis), and the Mallard (Anas platyrhynchos) -- bird species commonly observed at Bridgepoint. Figure 5.3 shows the proponent's representation of the foreshore vegetation prior to development. For comparison, Figure 5.4 shows the proposed development site plan which was submitted to the Richmond  84  •• 85 FIGURE 5_4: BRIDGEPOINT SITE PLAN MAP (1 968)  Q t11._^h. 4  -g i o 6.^= 1... .--^c 0 0 0 a^0 m to oi k a5 ^ E 5^ 8 2 t ti. •  w  e  ^  ‘ Es S ' aa e E oa-00 e 3 1-3 i It^  Es. 1C3  , C. r  ( )  4)  8 cL  m amo otab_o  ,  1^=I^t^I  86 Planning Department in 1988. While Fisheries and Oceans' were reportedly dissatisfied with the diagram shown in Figure 5.3 (Pers. Comm. G. Williams Jan. 15, 1991), suggesting that more vegetation coverage existed in the central and western areas of the site, it never-the-less provides a general indication of where the dominant species of marsh existed.  The environmental impact assessment states that the marsh development along the eastern portion of the foreshore was being restricted because of scouring from log booms stored there. The report also states that a channel had been eroded through the slough at the western portion of the site as a result of the sand storage dewatering pipe which drained into it. Sand and silt were apparently deposited into the slough "during heavy rainfalls or during storage of large volumes of  fresh dredgate material" at the sand storage site (Williams, Villamere and Smith, 1984:11). [Photographs 4 and 5 in the appendices show the marsh at the western edge as it currently exists. The drainage channel referred to in the environmental assessment report is clearly visible in Photograph 5].  Altogether, marsh vegetation originally covered about 1.5 hectares (3.7 acres) along the foreshore (Williams, Villamere and Smith, 1984:32) -- a fact of some significance in view of a 1986 report that estimated the total marsh area between the bifurcation of the North Arm of the Fraser (just to the west of Bridgepoint) and New Westminster to be only 10.4 hectares (25.8 acres) (Williams, 1986:13). The entire intertidal area at Bridgepoint was reported by DFO to be approximately 4 hectares (10 acres) (ADTF, 1982:244) much of which consisted of sand and mudflats according to the proponent's environmental report (Williams, Villamere and Smith, 1984:32). As the next few paragraphs will show, both the sand and the mudflat areas of the Bridgepoint site provided important habitats for creatures both large and small. Zooplankton and Benthic Organisms Field studies conducted at Bridgepoint as part of the environmental impact assessment examined both the presence and abundance of zooplankton and benthic organisms along the foreshore. Six  87 varieties of zooplankton were found in the samples; the most numerous of these being Harpacticoid copepods (Williams, Villamere and Smith, 1984:21-22). Of the benthic organisms, six varieties were identified, the most prominent being oligochaetes and nematodes (Williams, Villamere and Smith, 1984:21-23). The significance of these organisms is effectively summarized in the environmental assessment report which states: "the benthic and zooplankton data ... show that potential food organisms for juvenile salmon exist at the study site, and several of these organisms were also found in stomachs of fish captured at the site" (Williams, Villamere and Smith,  1984:29). From a fisheries perspective it is clear that fish species were utilizing the site for at least part of their life cycle. Fish Table 5.1 shows that seven species of fish were discovered in the field samples taken at the Bridgepoint site between April and May of 1984. Conversations with L. Duncan (Pers. Comm., Feb 7, 1991) of the Fish and Wildlife Branch - B.C. Ministry of Environment, indicate that both Rainbow trout and Cutthroat trout (Salmo clarki) are also known to inhabit that part of the river. With more than 30 species of fish known to utilize the North Arm (Williams, Villamere and Smith, 1984:5 citing Northcote et al. 1978) it is likely that other fish species beyond those observed in the field study would also have made direct use of the site at various times. Additionally, detrital outflow from the site would have provided at least a limited benefit to downstream organisms. Birds and Wildlife In five days of observations, the field study biologists recorded 15 species of birds and 1 animal at the site. Table 5.2 shows the record of observations during the 1984 field study. Mallard ducks and a variety of shorebirds were reported in the largest numbers. As mentioned earlier, Mallards are known to utilize marshes for feeding. Shorebirds such as the Killdeer (Charadrius vociferus), and Sandpipers (genus Calidris) frequent mud and sandflats for feeding purposes (Butler and Campbell, 1987:38-40). The solitary Great Blue Heron (Ardea herodias) observed at the site  88  TABLE 5.1: Species list of fish sampled at the proposed Bridgeport Harbour Market study site, April and May, 1984  common name^  scientific name  chinook salmon^  Oncorhynchus tshawytstha  chum salmon^  O. keta  pink salmon^  acoutuwha  threespine stickleback^Gasterosteus aculeatus peamouth chub^  Etychocheilus oregonensis  starry flounder^  Platichthys stellatus  prickly sculpin^  Cottus asper  SOURCE: Williams G., J. Villamere and G. Smith. 1984. An Environmental Assessment Of The Proposed Bridgeport Harbour Market Foreshore Development, Richmond, B.C. p. 20.  89  TABLE 5.2: Species of Birds and Animals Observed During April and May, 1984, at the Bridgeport Harbour Market Study Site.. Date^Number^Common name^ Scientific name  April 17^1^muskrat^ 4^common snipe^  Ondatra zibethica  capeilaaanago  2^Canada goose^ Branta canadensis  April 18^40^mallard^  Anas platyrhynchos  1^ring-necked pheasant^Phasianus colchicus 1^red-winged blackbird^Agelaius pboenicevs 1^great blue heron^Ardea herodias robin^  Turdus migratorius  killdeer^  Charadrius vociferus  chickadee^  Parus sp.  unidentified sparrow  April 25^50^mallards^ 40^killdeer^  Anas platyrhynchos Charadrius vociferus  4^Brewer's blackbird^Eupta l gusc_y_ano_ceph&s a 4^red-winged blackbird^Agelaius phoeniceus 1^great blue heron^Ardea herodias 6^common merganser^Mergus merganser 2^common snipe^  Capeliagainago  numerous unidentified gulls  May 7^40^unidentified shorebirds (sandpipers) 1^great blue heron^Ardea herodias 1^unidentified hawk May 22^1^ring-necked pheasant^Phasianus colchicus 6^mallard^ AnaspJalytlaynchos ^ 1 great blue heron^Ardea herodias SOURCE: Williams G., J. Villamere and G. Smith. 1984. An Environmental Assessment Of The U • • • • -d^• • - • • i ■- • • •r ^- • v • • II" I ; I 11 1 • p. 14. -  -  -  ,  90 would likely have been feeding on the Starry Flounder (Platichthys stellatus) and Prickly Scu1pin (Cottus asper) (Butler and Campbell, 1987:26-27) -- fish species observed in the field study and known to be in the Heron's diet. The other species of birds would have been making similar use of the habitat provided by the marsh, sand and mudflats at the site. Species Relationships As will be recalled, an earlier chapter entitled 'The Importance Of Wetland Habitat In The Fraser' discussed the detrital-based nature of estuarine food chains in the Fraser delta, and showed a simplified food web diagram said to be representative of the area. The preceding paragraphs have pointed to at least some of the interconnections between the organisms and habitat observed at the Bridgepoint site. Many other connections can be found simply by comparing the lists of organisms observed in the proponent's field study and the simplified food web diagram which has been reproduced for a second time in Figure 5.5. The broader characteristics ascribed to the Fraser Delta in Chapter Two appear to be closely reflected even in a site specific case such as Bridgepoint.  From an environmental perspective it is clear that in proposals such as that for the Bridgepoint site, the issue is not simply the removal of a set quantity of marsh vegetation or mudflat, but instead involves the potential disruption to a highly interconnected natural infrastructure -concerns which, while mindful of their respective agency's mandates and specific responsibilities, the environmental agencies reviewing the Bridgepoint proposal were well aware.  5.2.3 Participant Involvement and Jurisdictional Issues A review of the available reports, letters, and memorandums covering the period between March 1982 and May 1989 show that more than 17 groups were involved in the Bridgepoint process at one time or another. Table 5.3 shows that these groups included private business, Municipal, Provincial, and Federal level government agencies. Where known, the table also provides some indication of the roles played by each group.  91  FIGURE 5.5:  A SIMPLIFIED FOOD WEB IN THE FRASER RIVER DELTA  Riverine  3  N trients  ♦  Phytoplank ton  Es uarin Plants  Detritus Flying^Terrestrial Insects^Insects  7./ey•rm crop.) Bacteria  Swallows^Teal  Rails^Mallards (garbage)  Blackbirds^Shoveler etc.^Gadwall  Zooplankton  itrh  Wigeonl  clams  Geese etc.  Crabs ---+ Glaucouswinged Gull  Annelids  Northwestern  tc. ItScuipins  Crow  Eulachon Herring etc. Scaup Scoters  Shorebirds  Flounder Salmon Cod  Peregrine  Harbour Seal  Terns^ Loons  Otter  Bonaparte^Grebes  Sea Llon  Mew Gull^Murrelet etc^  Killer Whale  etc.  Great Blue Heron  (Tow/mind's Vole)  Bald Eagle  92  TABLE 5.3: Groups/Agencies Known to Have Been Involved with the Bridgepoint Development Process. B.C. Ministry of Environment - Fish & Wildlife Management [RSCC participant] B.C. Ministry of Municipal Affairs - Development Services Branch [approval for new zoning category] Bridgepoint Developments Ltd [Playsic/Park Georgia - developers] Bridgeport Harbour Market Corporation [Playsic/First City - developers] Department of Fisheries & Oceans (DFO) - Head Office - Ottawa DFO - Federal Minister of Fisheries & Oceans DFO - Habitat Management Unit ( Fraser River, NBC, & Yukon Div.)[RSCC participant] Environment Canada - Environmental Protection Service [RSCC participant] Environment Canada - Canadian Wildlife Service [RSCC participant] Environment Canada - Inland Waters Directorate [RSCC participant] First City Development Corporation [development partner] Fraser River Pile and Dredge Ltd [contractor] G. Williams & Associates [environmental consultant] Hatfield Consultants [environmental consultants] North Fraser Harbour Commission [head leaseholder/manager] Michael Geller & Associates Limited [urban development consultant - Development Manager Bridgeport Harbour Market Corporation] Moodie Consultants Ltd. [?] Park Georgia Realty [development partner] Public Works Canada [initial site environmental screening] Richmond Clerks Department [application processing] Richmond Council [municipal development application review/approval] Richmond Health & Environment Committee [dept. project review committee] Richmond Health Department [dept. project review/RSCC participant] Richmond Planning and Development Services Committee [dept. project review committee] Richmond Planning Department [dept. project review] Transport Canada Coast Guard [NWPA approval] Vladimir Playsic Group (a.k.a. Play Development Corporation) [architects/developer] SOURCE: This listing is based upon a review of just under 100 documents directly, or indirectly, related to the Bridgepoint Market Development, and on interviews with 10 representatives of agencies/departments involved in the process.  93  Negotiations related to the application of No Net Loss were primarily conducted between the groups listed in Table 5.4. The groups listed in the table under 'Regulatory Agencies Perspective' were all participants in the Regional Screening and Coordinating Committee (RSCC) Task Force review under Environment Canada's referral system which was described in the chapter on legal and jurisdictional issues.  In 1984, field studies conducted by the proponent found several species of salmon in the waters at the Bridgepoint site (refer to Table 5.1). The presence of salmon and its supporting habitat at the site provided the basis for the Habitat Management Branch of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) to exercise its jurisdiction under the habitat provisions of the Fisheries Act.  Sharing a joint jurisdiction in the region with DFO, the Fish and Wildlife Branch of the B.C. Ministry of Environment also had concerns for the habitat at the site (Pers. Comm. L. Duncan, Feb 7, 1991). Both Rainbow Trout and Cutthroat Trout (Salmo clarki), species for which the Branch has a managerial responsibility, were known to inhabit the area in the vicinity of the Bridgepoint site (Pers. Comm. L. Duncan, Feb 7, 1991). In spite of the limited research time frame, both species were observed at Bridgepoint during the field studies.  For similar reasons, the Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS) became involved because the site was being used by a resource (specifically, waterfowl) for which they were responsible (Pers. Comm. D. Tretheway, Jan 22, 1991). The Inland Waters Directorate's (IWD) primary concern with the project involved the NFHC's compensation plan. Solid encroachments such as that proposed at Mitchell Island were not supported by the Directorate because of the cumulative effects that these structures have on water levels in river channels (IWD, March 22, 1985).  94  TABLE 5.4: Principal Agencies Involved with the Bridgepoint Development Process.  PROPONENT'S PERSPECTIVE Bridgepoint Developments Ltd. (Vladimir Playsic Group/Park Georgia Realty) Bridgeport Harbour Market Corporation (Vladimir Playsic Group/First City Development) G. Williams & Associates Ltd. Hatfield Consultants Ltd. North Fraser Harbour Commission Vladimir Playsic Group (a.k.a. Play Development Corporation)  REGULATORY AGENCIES PERSPECTIVE B.C. Ministry of Environment - Fish & Wildlife Management Branch Department of Fisheries and Oceans - Habitat Management Unit - (Fraser River, NBC, & Yukon Div.) Environment Canada - Environmental Protection Service Environment Canada - Canadian Wildlife Service Environment Canada - Inland Waters Directorate Municipality of Richmond Health Department  95 In addition to its jurisdictional responsibilities for pollution control, the Environmental Protection Service (EPS) was, at that time, responsible for coordination and liaison between the various interested government agencies. The EPS also provided comments and recommendations pertaining to their jurisdiction regarding the proponent's application under the Navigable Waters Protection Act (NWPA). While the NWPA is a jurisdictional responsibility of the Coast Guard (Transport Canada), interdepartmental channels apparently provide avenues for other agencies to review and comment on such applications.  The Municipality of Richmond had both land use and health related jurisdictional responsibilities at Bridgepoint. Their land use jurisdiction was based on their power to zone as provided through the  Municipal Act. Zoning became an issue as the development proposal for  the site required the introduction of four new Harbour Market District zones covering both the uplands and the water surfaces of the site. Subsequent designation of the site as a mandatory development permit area allowed the Municipality greater control over siting, and design aspects of the development. Apprised by the Health Department of the resistance of the other environmental agencies to development at the site, considerable discussion arose within the Municipality over the issue of incorporating external agencies' concerns into the Municipality's decision to allow or deny the rezoning application.  Municipal level health related responsibilities had at least two components; the first being the health aspects of the types of businesses going into the market (food handling/restaurants, etc.), the second being the broader natural environment impacts involved (pollution, destruction of environmentally sensitive areas, etc.). Authority to administer these aspects are drawn from both the  Municipal Act, and the Health Act. As an observing participant to the RSCC  Task Force, the Health Department was in a position to provide input to both the Task Force of the Municipality's perspective, and to the Richmond Council on the concerns expressed by the Task Force.  96 Finally, the North Fraser Harbour Commission (NFHC) held both jurisdictional and ownership (as the head lease holder) responsibilities at the site. As the administrators of the property, the Commission's mandate under the Harbour Commissions Act provided it with the authority to "regulate and control the use and development" (Ince, 1984:61) under its jurisdiction. One of the  NFHC's fundamental bargaining positions during the ongoing negotiations was that it had the right to develop the site.  5.2.4 Economic and Social Issues  A letter from the Bridgeport Harbour Market Corporation to the NFHC in 1984 quotes Public Works Canada as follows: the Municipality will see economic benefit from the increased taxes and both retail and tourism activity; the project will also provide a stimulus to upgrade an older area in the municipality; the general public will benefit from the development of open space near the shoreline and environmental awareness could result in a positive long-term environmental gain particularly if [increased] by a nature interpretation use.  (Bridgeport Harbour Market Corporation 1984, citing Public Works Canada, June 1983). Both economic and social implications are evident in the statement. More specific details on the potential magnitude of the impacts are provided by press reports which appeared when phase one of the project was nearing its completion, and again with the opening of the Market in May 1989. The Vancouver Sun (Aug. 16, 1989:D1), and The Richmond Times (Sept. 20, 1988:1), for example, reported that cost estimates for the project's first phase, which included the marina, the market and several restaurants, was on the order of 20 million dollars. The second phase of the project (as yet incomplete), was to include a 140 room hotel, (Vancouver Sun, Aug. 16, 1989:D1), and an oriental treasure vessel housing more restaurants and a gift shop (The Richmond Review, Feb. 26, 1989:1). The total cost of both phases was estimated at 100 million dollars (Vancouver Sun, Dec 2, 1989:np). As reported in one local paper, project proponents estimated that once the development was completed the project would generate about 1600 jobs (The Richmond Times Sept. 16, 1988:2). Placed within the context of the weakened economic conditions of the day and the effects of the 1981/82 recession still being felt, the project represented a potentially important economic contribution to the region.  97  While a large portion of the construction costs described above can be broadly ascribed to the cost of doing business, venture capital if you will, the costs associated with the mitigation and compensation required by the environmental agencies were somewhat more controversial at the time. An article in The Richmond Times (September 20, 1988:1) entitled "Habitat Policy Costly  Process - Nearly Cripples Project" cited expenses of $750,000 for replacing the habitat lost at Bridgepoint. The article was pointedly critical of both the NFHC and DFO for developing a 2 to 1 replacement policy as compensation for lost marsh at Bridgepoint because of the extra costs that this placed on developers. Contrary to the estimate, reported by The Richmond Times, the environmental consultant for the NFHC estimated the costs to be in the area of a more conservative $400,000 - 500,000 (Pers. Comm. G. Williams Jan. 15, 1991).  5.3 A CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF EVENTS To this point this chapter has provided a broad background on what the Bridgepoint proposal was about. It has outlined a number of the key issues in the cases including land use concerns, ecological aspects, agency involvement and jurisdictional interests, as well as economic and social considerations of the project. This section places these and other significant events affecting, or related to, the Department of Fisheries and Ocean's (DFO's) application of No Net Loss of fish habitat at the Bridgepoint Market Development into a chronological context in order fill in some of the details of the case and to provide links to some of the events which, strictly speaking, occurred outside the case but were is some way related to the results of the case. The chronology thus includes events affecting the process of negotiations over the Bridgepoint proposal, as well as specific events in the evolution of No Net Loss within DFO.  The material presented in this section is based upon written correspondence between and within the various organizations involved, reports produced by the proponent's consultants and the various government agencies, interviews with representatives from several of the key agencies  9R involved in the negotiations, newspaper articles, Municipal Council minutes, and public advertisements.  5.3.1 1977-1983 According to a presentation given by T. Bird to the 1983 No Net Loss Workshop, the concept of No Net Loss was first discussed within DFO in 1977 "in response to a requirement of the first Fraser River Estuary Management Plan report" (DFO, 1983:3). After reviewing the status of the  remaining marsh areas in the Estuary, the agencies involved in phase one of the Fraser River Estuary Study (FRES, 1978) concluded that "no further net loss of wetlands [should occur] in the Estuary" (FRES Phase 2, 1982:24).  With this premise an inter-agency Area Designation Task Force (ADTF) was struck in support of FRES with the objective of identifying where disagreement existed amongst the various regulatory agencies and land holder interests over the usage of specific waterfront properties. Where possible, the ADTF was to agree to and apply site-specific designations for each property's future use. As previously discussed, in their review of the Bridgepoint site, the Task Force agencies became polarized and could not come to agreement over its future uses. After much heated debate and no solution at hand the site was given an undetermined use designation in their 1982 final report.  In the mean time, DFO was working toward the development of a new habitat management policy. As part of this process, DFO held a workshop in June 1981 to discuss the ramifications of adopting a No Net Loss objective for their habitat policy. Two years later in January 1983, DFO released a discussion paper entitled Toward a Fish Habitat Management Policy For The Department Of Fisheries And Oceans (Draft 4) in which No Net Loss was the stated objective of the Policy. In April 1983 a second No Net Loss workshop was held to garner response to the concept and again consider its implications.  99 About this time, the Vladimir Playsic Group entered into a 57 year lease agreement with the NFHC over the Bridgepoint site. The NFHC's advertisement shows that when the property was put up for lease it was the NFHC's intention that the tenants "enhance the dyke and shoreline adjacent to the existing slough area ... [and] construct and maintain a modest public viewing platform in this area" (NFHC, 1981/82?:4).  By June of 1983, Public Works Canada had conducted an initial environmental screening of the site for the NFHC, and by September clearing and preloading of the upland portion of the property had apparently begun (Richmond Health Department, 1983). At the end of 1983 the NFHC retained Hatfield Consultants Ltd. as the environmental consultants for the project, and an application for rezoning the site from "General Manufacturing to an appropriate zone to be determined" had been submitted to the Municipality of Richmond (Richmond Clerk's Department,  1984).  5.3.2 1984 In the first part of 1984 the Richmond Health Department and the Richmond Planning Department became involved in the review of the rezoning application for the Bridgepoint site. The Health Department submitted a report to the Planning Department outlining a number of concerns including the preservation of trees along the waterfront dike, the provision of contingencies to protect the western marsh from spills, and concerns related to the anticipated impacts from increased aircraft noise given the site's proximity to the Vancouver Airport's proposed new parallel runway. In addition, the Department's report made the following statement: "the effectiveness of compensation measures such as creating habitat elsewhere (i.e. marsh replanting, etc.) is relatively unproven" (Richmond Health Dept. Feb. 13, 1984:1). The statement  clearly indicates that, from their perspective, some doubts yet remained about the success  technique.  of the  100 From DFO's perspective, their formal involvement with the Bridgepoint proposal began on March 28, 1984 when the first meeting between the developer's agents and the government environmental agencies took place and the proposal concept was presented. The meeting, which included a site visit, was attended by representatives from the NFHC, Hatfield Consultants Ltd.(HCL), the Vladimir Playsic Group, DFO, the Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS), the Environmental Protection Service (EPS), and the B.C. Fish & Wildlife Branch (Williams, Villamere, Smith 1984:6). The proposal put to the agencies included a waterfront marina and observation pier to be located in the eastern and central foreshore areas respectively, a festival market/entertainment/retail complex with restaurants, a pub, and cinemas in the upland area, and a hotel to be situated on pilings directly overtop a portion of the Duck Island slough in the western portion of the site.  Environmental agencies attending the meeting stated that a formal review of the proposal would require an environmental study to be undertaken. According to DFO's documents, the proponent's representatives were advised that the project could be rejected because of the perceived habitat value of the site. DFO records further state that the consultant was advised to focus on mitigation and compensation alternatives rather than the value of the site's habitat (DFO, March 7, 1985:1). The documents also indicate that DFO was under the impression that they would be contacted to formulate the terms of reference for the environmental study required for the review (DFO, March 7, 1985:1). Instead, the terms of reference for the study were worked out between the NFHC and their consultants, Hatfield Consultants Ltd. (Williams, Villamere, Smith 1984:6), apparently without consultation with the environmental agencies. The study proposal completed by the Hatfield group was submitted to the NFHC in early April, 1984.  The NFHC's perspective on the events of the initial March 28, 1984 inter-agency meeting are apparent in correspondence to DFO a year later in March 1985 when the issue was again raised. In their letter, NFHC representative indicated that although the environmental agencies had stated that there was little point in conducting involved fisheries or wildlife studies on the site,  101 DFO representatives had also suggested that the perceived significance of the area might be refuted through field studies (NFHC, March 7, 1985:2). Apparently based in part on this perception, and also because of a lack of existing site specific environmental data for the Bridgepoint site, the NFHC requested that its consultants undertake the environmental field studies. Subsequently, the field studies were conducted between April 17 and May 22, 1984 (Williams, Villamere, Smith 1984:7) and the final report was submitted to DFO in August later that year.  While the environmental field studies were under way, considerably more contact took place between the Municipality of Richmond and the proponent's urban development consultant. Representatives from Richmond's Health Department, having been asked to review and comment on the proposal by the NFHC in May 1984, produced a summary of the environmental considerations and concerns of the Department by late June, 1984.  When subsequently contacted by Richmond Health Department in mid June 1984, both the B.C. Fish and Wildlife Branch, and the Environmental Protection Service (EPS) indicated that they had not had any further input on the project to that point. Neither agency had been provided the minutes from the initial March 28, 1984 meeting, nor any details on the proposal which incorporated plans for mitigation/compensation.  The 1984 report completed by Hatfield Consultants Ltd. entitled: An Environmental Assessment Of The Proposed Bridgeport Harbour Market Foreshore Development placed much of its focus on a descriptive account of the field study observations at the site. Indeed, much of the detailed listings of plant, animal, and fish species illustrated in Section 5.2 of this chapter were from the results of these field studies. The report also contains, however, a discussion on the relative importance of the site's marsh habitat. Citing a number of inhibiting factors to the habitat's productive capacity -- including foreshore log scouring, collecting log debris, and the discharges from the storm sewer and sand dewatering pipes which lead into the site's western marsh -- the authors' of the report  102 concluded that the site's fish and waterfowl habitat was "moderately important" (Williams, Villamere, Smith 1984:33). This conclusion was strongly contested by DFO representatives and the other environmental agencies. As relayed by the Richmond Health Department to Richmond Council, the inter-agency group reviewing the report felt that "the proponent, through his consultant, [had] understated the ecological importance of the mud/ sand flat area" (Richmond Health  Dept. Oct. 9, 1984:1).  Another interesting aspect of the report is its orientation to No Net Loss. The North Fraser Harbour Commission (NFHC), as a participant to the FRES process described earlier, and as a supporter of the general principle of No Net Loss, at the time encouraged the consultants and the developer to incorporate the principle into the project proposal. According to the assessment report, however, DFO had not yet issued formal guidelines for applying the concept, so the consultants adopted criteria used by the CN Rail Twin Tracking Steering Committee involved in an Environmental Assessment Review (EARP) over an independent project in B.C.'s coastal ranges (Williams, Villamere, Smith 1984:32). Hence, the perspective taken by the Bridgepoint consultants was as follows: The 'no net loss' criteria most appropriate to the proposed Bridgeport Harbour Market development is: "Encroachments which cause the loss of significant habitat required to maintain present fish production capacity based on the (collective) professional judgement and recommendations of the TWG [Technical Working Group], will be compensated for by the creation of habitat equivalent in productive capacity on a river system basis."  (Williams, Villamere, Smith 1984:32). With this apparent guidance, the authors of the Bridgepoint environmental assessment concluded that "several mitigation and or compensation alternatives could be carried out to ensure that no net loss of fish habitat would result from the developments" (Williams, Villamere, Smith 1984:33).  Mitigative actions described in their report included; the relocation of the hotel from the western marsh area, the removal of log booms from the foreshore, and timing the construction to avoid salmon migration periods. The compensation alternatives included the enhancement of the site's western marsh area, and the removal/relocation of the stormwater and sand storage dewatering pipes from the slough. As proposed, all of the compensation would have remained on-site.  103  In Richmond, the Municipal Council reviewed the rezoning application for the site on July 23, 1984. The application was left somewhat vague in that the request was to rezone from industrial to a zoning category that would allow for the kinds of uses anticipated for the site, but which did not yet exist in Richmond. Eventually, two 'Marina District' categories were created with the approval of the B.C. Ministry of Municipal Affairs. After reviewing both the positive and negative impacts of the two options proposed by Municipal staff to either retain the site for industrial uses, or to "allow a specialized multiuse development" on the site, Richmond Council chose to give approval in principle for the multi-use concept (Richmond Clerk's Dept. July 24, 1984). The developer was, however, requested to submit detailed studies on the impacts to the area's traffic patterns, and an environmental impact study related to the project's impacts on the foreshore before a final decision on the rezoning would be given.  By late September, 1984 the reviewing agencies (i.e. EPS, CWS, DFO, B.C. Fish & Wildlife Branch) submitted detailed comments on the environmental assessment report to the Vladimir Playsic Group as attachments to a letter from DFO. As described earlier, the agencies' general consensus was that the proposal significantly underestimated the anticipated impacts on the site's habitat. Because of this underestimation the agencies felt that efforts to mitigate would, of consequence, be "inadequate" (DFO September 27, 1984:1). The interpretation of No Net Loss described in the report was also challenged by DFO staff who stated that "compensation to replace lost productive capacity should only be considered as a last resort once all mitigation alternatives are exhausted" (DFO September 27, 1984:1). Because of the perceived biological importance of the  site, the proponents were encouraged to "consider alternatives to the proposal which would avoid foreshore filling and dredging of these productive fish and wildlife habitat areas" (DFO September  27, 1984:1).  Citing its mandate to manage the North Fraser Harbour in a detailed letter to DFO, the NFHC declared its endorsement of the development of both the upland and foreshore areas for the uses  104 proposed in the project (NFHC, October 5, 1984:1). The letter went on to state that in addition to being "unequivocally supported by the North Fraser Harbour Commission" the proposal had also "received Approval-in-Principle from Richmond Municipal Council (NFHC October 5, 1984:1). The  relocation of the hotel away from the western slough and marsh was cited as a "significant design change" to accommodate both mitigative efforts, and further, to provide for "a meaningful compensation program of marsh enhancement" (NFHC October 5, 1984:2). It was further stressed  that the comprehensive nature of the facility, incorporating both private commercial and public uses, placed restrictions on where the components could be located on-site. Finally, the NFHC stated that it had been involved in the development of a foreshore improvement program, and that the NFHC "was committed to working with [DFO] to develop a responsible plan for the future of the river" (NFHC October 5, 1984:3). The Bridgepoint project, it was suggested "must be considered in light of [the NFHC's] previous accomplishments, as well as a longer term strategy for the future of the river" (NFHC October 5, 1984:3).  On October 16, 1984 a closed meeting between representatives from DFO, the NFHC and Hatfield Consultants Ltd. was held, allowing a number of issues and concerns of each of the parties to be discussed. At the meeting, the NFHC expressed its desire to have open water in the site's east side. DFO, again citing the high biological value of the site, urged the proponents to look for an alternative location for the development. In response, the NFHC informed DFO that Bridgepoint was the only viable location for such a development and several reasons were apparently explained (DFO November 28, 1984). In addition to other aspects being discussed, DFO was asked to put its position on the proposal in writing along with comments on No Net Loss as they pertained to the development.  By late October/early November 1984, with the construction deadline that would allow the facility to be opened in time for Expo 86 quickly approaching, the proponents, their urban development consultants, and the NFHC made appeals to Richmond's Municipal Council and to DFO to speed  105 the separate approval processes along. Richmond's Council was asked to allow the proposal to proceed to the required public hearing phase (The Richmond Review, October 28, 1984:1).  A second site visit was held on November 2nd, 1984 with representatives from the NFHC, DFO, CWS, the Richmond Health Department, Hatfield Consultants Ltd., and the B.C. Fish and Wildlife Branch attending. Memoranda from the Richmond Health Department (November 2, 1984) indicate that although communications were perceived to be improving, mitigation and compensation were still disputed issues. As a result, DFO informed the proponents during the meeting that they were not prepared to extend approval-in-principle to the project as proposed (DFO, November 28, 1984:1). However, aspects relating to compensation requirements were discussed and both parties reportedly came away from the meeting with commitments to assess compensation possibilities (DFO, March 7, 1985:3).  In a letter to the NFHC on November 28, 1984, DFO fulfilled an earlier request to document the Department's position and provide relevant comments on No Net Loss. The document states that DFO's position had, to that point, not changed from its refusal to extend approval-in-principle to the project because of the sensitive nature of the site's habitat and the perceived shortcomings in the mitigation and compensation aspects of the proposal. Drawing on DFO's report Toward A Fish Habitat Management Policy, the report's author detailed each of the four steps for assessing development proposals: prevention, mitigation, compensation, and rejection. In essence, DFO's stated position was that before any approvals could be given, mitigation efforts would have to be strengthened.  Enhancement of the existing marsh at the site's western edge was ruled out as a compensation option by DFO, and off-site compensation, it was pointed out, would have to be done either in adjacent or nearby sites because of the limited amount of productive habitat in that part of the river. The NFHC was also informed that the proposal had now been registered with the Regional  106 Screening and Coordinating Committee (RSCC), the Federal Government's formal inter-agency review body.  Having had, by this time, some practical experience with the problems of applying No Net Loss to several development applications in B.C., a number of concerns were raised internally by DFO staff in late November/early December, 1984. A consistent theme was that the main objective of the proposed policy for the management of fish habitat should be upgraded to that of a 'net gain' policy (DFO, December 6, 1984:1; DFO, November 26, 1984:1; DFO, November 28, 1984:1) with No Net Loss operating in support of this goal. A second concern in common was based on the difficulty in discerning what the proposed policy meant by 'productive capacity', and about the lack of guidance as to its measurement. A third concern was raised over the hierarchical four step assessment process (prevention, mitigation, compensation, rejection). In some cases, it was suggested, the first two assessment steps have been given only rudimentary attention as proponents attempted to look toward compensation for solutions. The Bridgepoint Development was cited as a case which generally conformed to this description in that, even though the proponent generally followed the "intent" of No Net Loss, the proponents quickly moved to the compensation solutions after offering what were considered only modest mitigation measures and then declaring that the site was the only viable location for the type of development being proposed (DFO, December 6, 1984:3). A more equitable solution suggested by DFO staff was to link the four assessment steps to a red, yellow, green coding system to guide developers to where development proposals could proceed with fewest restrictions (DFO, December 6, 1984:3). [The essence of this idea has since been implemented in the Fraser's North Arm through an agreement between DFO and the NFHC (refer to DFO and NFHC, September 1988).]  In mid December 1984, a short list of 8 potential off-site compensation opportunities had been identified after investigations along the North Fraser. With this list, potential compensation options were broadened out from the initial on-site proposals. Potential sites were toured later in the month by representatives from Hatfield consultants and RSCC members.  107  A letter from the Bridgeport Harbour Market Corporation to the NFHC in December 1984, reaffirmed their position that the Bridgepoint site was the only viable location for the type of development proposed. The four mitigation measures put forward by DFO in their November 28th letter were discussed, and some concessions were proposed through reductions in "foreshore fill and pile supported structures over intertidal marsh areas", and reductions in "the size and alignment of the marina" (Bridgeport Harbour Market Corporation, December 13, 1984:1). Other  mitigation aspects such as reductions in dredging in the eastern portion of the site were rejected by the Corporation because of marina/vessel draft requirements. Another concern from their perspective was that millions of dollars would being placed at risk if the mudflats were allowed to remain adjacent to the development (Bridgeport Harbour Market Corporation, December 13, 1984:1). A number of potential benefits mentioned in the Section 5.2 of this chapter were raised (i.e. job creation, financial injection, and upgrading of the area) along with a listing of the mitigative activities already taken or proposed (i.e. relocating the hotel, minimizing the amount of dredging, etc.). It was suggested that if these efforts were deemed insufficient, the Corporation expected the NFHC "to reach agreement with Fisheries on other off-site compensation opportunities" (Bridgeport Harbour Market Corporation, December 13, 1984:2).  On December 17 1984, the NFHC forwarded a revised plan to DFO incorporating, "as much as possible" the suggestions in Fisheries' November 28th letter (NFHC, December 17, 1984:1). The  Commission's letter stated that further reductions to the proposed dredging or other modifications would "make the project unrealizable" (NFHC, December 17, 1984:1).  Included with the NFHC letter was the listing of potential off-site compensation opportunities and a reaffirmation of the Commission's commitment to replacing lost habitat through off-site compensation measures. Having given these assurances, the NFHC requested that DFO proceed quickly so that the environmental approvals would coincide with the resolution of the Municipality of Richmond's mandatory Development Permit application (NFHC, December 17, 1984:2).  108  On the same day of the NFHC's letter to DFO, a public hearing on the proposal and the proponent's application for rezoning from industrial to Harbour Market Districts 1 through 4. At the hearings submissions were made by DFO, the NFHC, the Bridgeport Harbour Market Corporation's Development Manager, and a couple of private citizens. The minutes from the council meeting show a number of concerns on DFO's part. The economic conditions of the day, and the attendant possibility that "the project might not be carried through to its conclusion because of market conditions", leaving behind a damaged habitat was a fundamental concern from DFO's  perspective. A second concern is evident in the minutes reflected as a request for more information, or at least a clarification of the proponent's position on exactly what impact the current revision of the proposal would have on the habitat (Richmond Clerk's Department, December 20, 1984:157).  Specific aspects of the proposal concerning DFO were stated at the hearing to be the marina, the observation pier, and the boat docks. The upland portion of the proposal, however, did not constitute a concern from their perspective. Finally, DFO's position, as given to Council, was that it would not accept clean-up of other sites as a substitute for mitigation or compensation measures (Richmond Clerk's Department, December 20, 1984:158).  In their submission, the NFHC told Richmond Council of their belief that the lost habitat could be replaced at another location. The project's design had been altered to preserve about 50% of the mudflat and marsh along the foreshore (Richmond Clerk's Department, December 20, 1984:159). Because of the potential economic and social benefits of the project, the NFHC stated that it would provide other sites controlled by the Commission for habitat replacement subject to DFO's consideration. The NFHC also stated that they had been involved in a foreshore improvement program on the Fraser's North Arm in which they hoped DFO would become involved.  109 The Bridgeport Harbour Market Corporation's submission to Council made two key points. The first was that the project's success was "very much dependent on the inter-relationships between a variety of different elements, which may or may not be viable on their own, but which in combination  [were] supremely important to this development" (Richmond Clerk's Department, December 20, 1984:160). The point apparently being that the upland portion of the project and the foreshore portions of the project were, from a feasibility perspective, interdependent. The Corporation's second point was that while Council's approval for the rezoning application would not "confer automatic authority to proceed", it would be of benefit in receiving approvals from the other  reviewing government's agencies (Richmond Clerk's Department, December 20, 1984:160).  After consideration of the arguments presented, as well as additional consultations with DFO representatives to confirm that Council's decision would not erode DFO's position in the negotiations, Richmond Council gave their approval in principle to the project and processed the Bridgeport Harbour Market Corporation's rezoning application through three readings of the proposed bylaw 4389 on December 20, 1984 (Richmond Clerk's Department, December 20, 1984:1).  5.3.3 1985 In the first two months of 1985, several meetings were held between DFO, the NFHC, and the consultants. Five potential compensation sites were toured by the agencies for their suitability. Coincidental to these developments, DFO held another No Net Loss workshop at the beginning of February 1985. Although the discussions were generally oriented toward the national application of No Net Loss, a number of issues having a potential bearing on the Bridgepoint proposal were discussed. Two of these issues included the questions of over-compensating to reflect the risks/uncertainties of a particular situation, and secondly, the question of what stage compensation should occur in relation to the beginning of project construction. A consensus among the participants was reached that risk and uncertainty should be reflected in the compensation multipliers selected, and that although specific circumstances may allow compensation to occur at  110 almost any stage of a development, compensation plans should be agreed to before construction was undertaken (DFO, February 5, 1985:2).  By the mid to latter part of February 1985 DFO had made a decision on replacement ratios that would be required of the proponents as compensation for lost habitat. By February 22, 1985, both the consultants and the NFHC were advised that compensation for lost marsh habitat would be two times the marsh area lost, while compensation for lost mudflat habitat would be the same area as mudflat destroyed (DFO, March 7, 1985:3). In addition, the NFHC was informed that monitoring of any replacement habitat would he required in the compensation proposal.  On February 22, 1985 Vladimir Playsic representing the Vladimir Playsic Group wrote to the Federal Minister responsible for the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Although the contents of this letter were not made available for this thesis, and DFO's Habitat Management Branch staff in New Westminster have stated that they did not receive any written Ministerial correspondence on the Bridgepoint file (Pers. Comm. B. Clark, January 29, 1991), a detailed chronology of events showing DFO's involvement in the case between March 28, 1984 and February 22, 1985 was prepared on March 7, 1985 in response to the Playsic Group's letter, tangibly indicating at least some degree of involvement by the Minister's office.  On March 7, 1985, the NFHC chronicled its own perspective on the history of negotiations over the Bridgepoint site, including the ADTF 'undetermined use' classification, in a lengthy response to the DFO/RSCC letter of late February 1985 which set out DFO's position on compensation requirements. The NFHC's letter outlined the successive changes made to the original proposal in the effort to achieve a mutually acceptable design. While conceding the importance of Duck Island slough ( the slough in the western area of the site), particularly for waterfowl, the NFHC questioned the requirement to compensate for the site's mudflat losses when an apparent abundance of mudflat existed along the river (NFHC, March 7, 1985:3). The letter states; "... I have difficulty in accepting the fact that compensation for mudflat must involve mudflat creation,  111 because at low tide there is considerable mudflat along the entire lower Fraser and the total food producing capacity of this habitat would, I suspect, more than adequately cover the fish food requirements" (NFHC, March 7, 1985:4). The final portion of the letter outlines a 'conceptual'  compensation plan offered to DFO and the RSCC for their review. In brief, the three main elements of the plan were as follows; replacement of lost intertidal marsh in proportions of 2 to 1 at the Mitchell Island site using existing plants at Bridgepoint as donor stock; establishment of a 5 year monitoring program involving both DFO and the NFHC; finally, as compensation for lost mudflat, and the undertaking of "a joint management program ... to increase the overall productive capability of the North  Arm." (NFHC, March 7, 1985:5). The proposed program would involve the undertaking of a detailed habitat inventory of the North Arm, the establishment of a marsh/foreshore clean-up program, and "measures to avoid habitat degradation" in the future (NFHC, March 7, 1985:5).  A meeting was subsequently held between DFO and the NFHC to discuss the compensation proposal further and a follow-up letter from DFO's Area Manager to the NFHC on March 25th indicates that the compensation proposal, while still not DFO's preferred alternative, represented a step forward (DFO, March 25, 1985:1). In view of the NFHC's compensation proposal, DFO's Area Manager, on behalf of the Department, gave a conditional approval in principle to the proposal. The conditions set down included requests for detailed information on scheduling, procedures, and specifications of a number of activities related to the compensation proposal, and extension of the monitoring program to include "upgrading and remedial work should the works prove unsuccessful during the specified 5-year program" (DFO, March 25, 1985:2), and further  information on the NFHC's proposal for cleaning up the river, including the restoration and protection of existing sites.  On the same day as DFO's offer of conditional approval in principle, the Richmond Municipal Council gave final approval and adoption of Bylaw 4389, allowing the rezoning of the Bridgepoint  112 site from industrial to four Harbour Market District zones. Council's approval was not, however, without some reservations. A local newspaper article commenting on the Council meeting showed that, in spite of the pressure to push the application through the Municipal approval process, some of the Aldermen felt that the project could not be completed in time to benefit from Expo 86. One Alderman also suggested that approval should be withheld until better assurances for the •  protection of the area's marshes were obtained (The Richmond Review, March 27, 1985:1).  In June 1985, the compensation proposal report entitled Outline of Habitat Compensation For Proposed Bridgeport Harbour Market Development, Richmond, B.C. was completed for the NFHC by Hatfield Consultants Limited (HCL). In essence the report outlines a proposal for the compensation of marsh and mudflat habitat losses that were expected to result from the proposed development at the Bridgepoint site. The compensation proposal was structured specifically to fulfill the conditions set out by DFO's conditional approval-in-principle of March 25, 1985. The report states that filling for the hotel, and dredging for the marina and the observation pier, were expected to result in the elimination of .77 hectares (1.9 acres) of intertidal marsh and 2.70 hectares (6.68 acres) of mudflat (Hatfield Consultants Ltd., June 1985:1).  Under the NFHC's proposal, marsh habitat at the Bridgepoint site would be compensated by developing a 1.54 hectare (3.8 acre) intertidal marsh at a foreshore property owned by the NFHC on Mitchell Island, approximately 2.7 km upstream from Bridgepoint (Hatfield Consultants Ltd. June 1985:4) [refer to Compensation Site Map in Figure 5.1]. Both the fill material and the donor plants were to be taken from the Bridgepoint site and used at the Mitchell Island site to develop the new marsh (Hatfield Consultants Ltd., June 1985:6 and 11). As part of the marsh compensation package, a five year monitoring program was proposed that would be "developed in cooperation with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans" (Hatfield Consultants Ltd., June 1985:14). During the first two years, it was proposed, vegetation productivity would be monitored, while the last three years of the program would concentrate on benthic productivity (Hatfield Consultants Ltd., June 1985:13). The proposal also made provisions in the event that  113 transplanted marsh plants failed to take hold. Under these circumstances, the NFHC would be responsible for replanting the site. The proposal also stated that certain protection measures were to be installed at the Mitchell Island site to prevent erosion by boat generated waves and river currents. These measures included a 120 metre extension of an upstream storm sewer outlet, the installation of a protective log boom at the site's outer perimeter, placement of rip rap downstream of the site, and the construction of a sloped area of fill extending into the river specifically to reduce current erosion (Hatfield Consultants Ltd., June 1985:8). Again the NFHC was to be responsible for the maintenance of the structures.  The 2 to 1 marsh replacement ratio required by DFO, and agreed to by the NFHC, was justified in the report for the following reasons: new marshes initially have lower productivity and it will require several years for the marsh to reach maturity; this type of habitat development has only been attempted in the lower Fraser on a small scale and with varying success; and the [original] marsh area at the Bridgeport Harbour Market site had the potential to expand in size.  (Hatfield Consultants Ltd., June 1985:4). To compensate for the anticipated loss of 2.70 hectares ( 6.68 acres) of mudflat at Bridgepoint, the NFHC proposed a program of log and debris cleanup or protection measures along specific sites on the North Arm of the Fraser River (Hatfield Consultants Ltd., June 1985:1). Two sites were specifically mentioned; Wood Island Slough -- a 1.13 hectare (2.8 acre) site located 5 km downstream of Bridgepoint, and the Genstar Riverine Marsh -- a .22 hectare (.54 acre) site about 1 km downstream from Bridgepoint. At both locations the proposed cleanup was to involve the removal of beached logs and wood debris from the intertidal marshes and the possible installation of shear booms to protect the sites from further damage (Hatfield Consultants Ltd., June 1985:16). Through special agreement with DFO, cleanup of these marsh areas were valued as being worth twice the area of mudflat lost, hence the total area cleaned up being 1.35 hectares (3.34 acres) was worth 2.71 hectares (6.68 acres) -- slightly more than the area of mudflat expected to be lost at the Bridgepoint site.  114  On July 24, 1985, having reviewed the NFHC's proposal for compensation, the Director General of the Department of Fisheries and Ocean's (DFO) granted approval to the compensation proposal subject to modifications to three aspects of the plan. Modifications to the proposed protection measures involved the replacement of the rip rap by a 10:1 slope on the fill material designed to prevent river current erosion. In addition, prevention of boat wave erosion was to be enhanced by extending the shear boom to the shoreline upstream of the new marsh site. Further, the proposed monitoring of the site's physical aspects was to be expanded from 2 years to 5 years, with the NFHC being responsible for any remedial measures required over the full monitoring period. (DFO, July 24, 1985:1-2). The second modification was a requirement for the proponent to fund the monitoring over 3 years, and for monitoring to include several more specific attributes of the marsh's productivity (i.e. growing density, stalk height, etc.). The third requirement was related to the shear boom at the Genstar Riverine Marsh which the NFHC proposal indicated would be installed "if practical" (Hatfield Consultants Ltd., June 1985:17). DFO approval of the plan made this structure a mandatory requirement.  In closing, DFO's approval letter suggested that the NFHC and DFO should work together "to  initiate a more detailed environmental plan for the area of the Fraser River under [NFHC] jurisdiction" (DFO, July 24, 1985:2). The willingness of both sides to do this eventually resulted in a 'Memorandum of Understanding' drawn up between DFO and the NFHC. The formal agreement, entitled An Environmental Management Plan For The North Fraser Harbour, was finalized by September 7, 1988.  Having received approval from DFO, the proponents submitted their application for a development permit to Richmond Council on August 8, 1985 and on September 25, 1985 a special press conference was set up at the offices of the NFHC to formally announce the project's beginning and the expectations for its opening in time for Expo 86. Covering the story, The Richmond Review (September 25, 1985:3) reported that at that point, Play Development and First City Development  115 were joint partners in the development. Expectations were that preloading of the upland portion of the site was to begin two days later and construction was to commence by November 1985.  Meanwhile, the evolution of DFO's habitat policy continued and on October 4, 1985, a draft report entitled A Net Gain Policy For Fish Habitat Management In Canada was completed. The transition of No Net Loss from a primary policy objective to that of a working principle contributing towards the broader goal of Net Gain of fish habitat was well under way.  5.3.4 1986 In mid January 1986 the NFHC submitted their modifications to the compensation proposal to DFO, formally meeting the approval conditions stated in DFO's letter of July 24, 1984. Later that year the NFHC released a report entitled North Fraser Harbour Shoreline Habitat Inventory (Williams, September 1986). Written by G. Williams and Associates for the NFHC, the report introduces and applies the red, yellow and green habitat classification scheme similar to that discussed within DFO. The redirection of efforts towards this report also indicates that the momentum behind the Bridgepoint proposal at that time had temporarily faltered.  By October 1986, DFO had finalized its changes to their habitat policy and officially released its Policy For The Management Of Fish Habitat making Net Gain of fish habitat the policy's primary objective, and the conservation, restoration, and development of fish habitat its supporting goals. No Net Loss was now considered to be a "guiding principle ... fundamental to the conservation goal" (DFO, October 1986:14).  In spite of the optimistic projections by the proponents, the Bridgepoint Development was not completed in time for Expo 86 as financing the project proved to be a limiting factor. By early December 1986 First City Development, one of its backers, had pulled out of the venture to be replaced initially by two other firms -- Park Georgia Investments, and Praxis (The Richmond  116  Review?, December 3, 1986:np). Praxis later withdrew from the project leaving Park Georgia Investments and Play Developments as partners in the development.  5.3.5 1987-1989 Articles in The Richmond Review on June 17, 1987 and December 13, 1987 showed that the project's construction start date had been rescheduled several times because of financing difficulties from mid summer 1986, to August of 1987, and finally to March of 1988 (The  Richmond Review June 17, 1987:1 and December 13, 1987:1). By late 1987, the project had reemerged under a new name -- The -Bridgepoint Harbour Market. Construction plans were finally put into motion and the compensation work at Mitchell Island was scheduled to be completed by the end of March 1988.  It was also during this period that the different cost estimates referred to earlier appeared in The  Richmond Times (September 20, 1988:1). The Richmond Times article also reported that compensation costs incurred were fundamental considerations in the Play Development's decision to sell out to Park Georgia Investments -- a transaction which apparently occurred in September 1988 (The Richmond Times, September 16, 1988:2 and September 20, 1988:1).  With the development's construction having been completed, and the fish habitat compensation in place, the Bridgepoint Harbour Market officially opened on May 24, 1989.  5.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS In his book Bargaining In The Governance Of Pacific Coastal Resources: Research And Reform, Dorcey (1986) describes three characteristics of coastal resources which pose challenges to their governance: increasing demands placed upon coastal resources as a result of population and economic growth; increasing complexity in the institutional and socioeconomic systems which are superimposed over already complex physical-chemical-biological systems; a growing awareness "of the uncertain knowledge of the systems involved" (Dorcey, 1986:37).  117  Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of this chapter have shown that all three of the characteristics described by Dorcey were evident at Bridgepoint. The historic conflict between the NFHC and DFO over the site's use designation and the polarized perspectives that carried into the proponent's multi-use proposal for the site reflect the increasing demands placed upon the land and fish habitat resources in the Fraser Estuary. Similarly, the food web diagram in Figure 5.4 and the field data produced for the Environmental Impact Assessment provide strong indications of the intricate and complex nature of the physical-chemical-biological systems at the site. A complexity which was mirrored, and compounded by the complexity of the overlying institutional and socioeconomic systems evident in the number of agencies having jurisdictional involvement in the case, as well as through the pressures imposed to meet the Expo 86 construction deadline, the potential creation of some 1600 jobs, and the promise of injecting millions of dollars into a weakened economy.  The third characteristic described by Dorcey, that of uncertain knowledge, was reflected in several aspects of the case. The Richmond Health Department's initial comments as to the unproven nature of the habitat replacement technique, by implication, reflects an uncertainty in our ability to manipulate the natural conditions required to make such a project a success. Institutional uncertainties were apparent in DFO staff's concerns regarding the specifics of applying No Net Loss and how 'productive capacity' should be measured. In the former aspect the uncertainty is one of how to apply institutionally developed policies, in the latter aspect the uncertainty is one of how to institutionally represent what we perceive to be occurring in the natural systems. A final example of uncertain knowledge is evident in the proponent's uncertainty regarding what needed to be done to reach an agreement yet still retain an economically viable and institutionally acceptable project.  The role and extensive use of negotiation in dealing with these challenges is evident throughout most of the chronological overview presented in this chapter. Assessing these negotiations and their contribution to the application of No Net Loss at Bridgepoint is the focus of the next chapter.  118  CHAPTER SIX BRIDGEPOINT NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS  6.1 PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER In this chapter the analytical framework which was outlined in Chapter Four, is applied to the Bridgepoint Harbour Market Development. The chapter is divided into three parts with Section 6.2 detailing a number of general observations that provide a degree of context to the structured analysis which appears in Section 6.3. The final section draws a number of conclusions and makes a number of recommendations based on the analysis in Sections 6.2 and 6.3.  6.2 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 6.2.1 The Relative Importance of Bridgepoint Looking back on the events surrounding the Bridgepoint case it is apparent that Bridgepoint was important both for the intrinsic values of the site, and for the outcomes which have their origins in the negotiations. Intrinsic Importance Some of the intrinsic values of the site, as revealed in the documentation and the interviews held with key participants to the case, include the following:  . The biological diversity of both flora and fauna afforded by the physical features at the site.  The size and location of the habitat considered in the context within an area that was, and remains, the focus of considerable conservation efforts and which has had much of the original marsh habitat removed as a result  of development activity.  119 The site's inherent potential (i.e. its potential for further habitat growth, its potential for enhancing and revitalizing an older region of Richmond, or its potential for generating steady revenues if developed).  While conceding the fact that some of the points listed here might have been disputed by some of the participants to the Bridgepoint negotiations, possibly even being considered as mutually exclusive, their importance as considered in the context of this thesis is not diminished. Broader Outcomes of the Case Bridgepoint is also important for outcomes which reached beyond the immediate scope of the negotiations over the site. Some of the more significant of these outcomes are outlined below:  Bridgepoint made both direct and indirect contributions to the development and refinement of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans' (DFO's) national habitat policy. Documentation shows that some of the problems applying No Net Loss using the steps for assessing proposals (particularly the tendency for proponents to jump toward compensation) were cited and considered by DFO staff in their discussions of the habitat policy and the role of No Net Loss within it (DFO, December 6, 1984:1-3). Any applications of No Net Loss in the Fraser Estuary at the time were important since much of the national habitat policy was developed largely using coastal British Columbia as its testing grounds. As one of the first applications, Bridgepoint can thus be considered as a stepping stone in the evolution of DFO's habitat policy.  The Bridgepoint negotiations resulted in an agreement between DFO and the North Fraser Harbour Commission (NFHC) entitled the North Fraser Harbour Environmental Management Plan (DFO and NFHC, September 1988). This agreement endeavored to correct a number of weaknesses (many of which were  120 made visible through Bridgepoint) in the application of the national habitat policy and its project evaluation process. A key component of this agreement utilized a red/yellow/green color coding system to indicate which sites along the North Arm of the Fraser River could be developed and what degree of mitigation and compensation efforts might be anticipated in developing a particular property. The success of this agreement has now made it a model which is being considered for use in other Harbour jurisdictions.  Bridgepoint also resulted in a detailed inventory of habitat types being conducted along the foreshore of the North Ann of the Fraser. The results of the inventory appear in the document produced by G.L. Williams and Associates for the NFHC entitled the North Fraser Harbour Shoreline Habitat Inventory_ (Williams, September 1986). This document served to fill a significant gap in the available information about the remaining habitat along the Fraser's North Arm.  A significant contribution of the Bridgepoint negotiations was a strengthened appreciation of the "relative value" (DFO, 1989:3) of habitats in the estuary and the formulation of a set of compensation ratios which attempted to take these valuations into account during the proposal's evaluation. The Bridgepoint negotiations forced consideration of the relative values of existing and transplanted marsh habitat, mudflat and sand habitat, and degraded marsh habitat once cleaned up and protected.  6.2.2 The Role of Negotiation at Bridgepoint As implied in a number of the points raised in the previous paragraphs, negotiation played an important role in reaching an agreement over development of the Bridgepoint site.  121 To deal with the development proposal, the Regional Screening and Coordinating Committee (RSCC) -- a standing committee composed of representatives from all of the federal environmental agencies -- established a task force to review the proposal and gather information about the case. The task force had representatives from the Environmental Protection Service (EPS), the Inland Waters Directorate (IWD), the Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS), the B.C. Ministry of Environment (BCMOE), and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). In addition, the task force also received input from the Environmental Health Department of the Municipality of Richmond. As holders of the most relevant legislation pertaining to the case, DFO representatives served as the lead agency and chaired the task force.  In reviewing the case, the RSCC Task Force dealt mainly with the North Fraser Harbour Commission (NFHC) as the head leaseholder and port managers, Hatfield Consultants Ltd. and later G.L. Williams and Associates as and the environmental consultants for both the NFHC and the proponent, and with Bridgepoint Developments Ltd. which was backed by the Vladimir Playsic Group and Park Georgia Realty as developers and proponents (note that in the early stages the development group was named the Bridgeport Harbour Market Corp. and was backed by the Vladimir Playsic Group and First City Development). Table 6.1 outlines the roles and relationships of these key agencies.  Interviews with representatives for the Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS) indicated that under the RSCC review process, the RSCC standing committee was the normal decision making body with the authority to negotiate terms for agreements (Tretheway, Jan 22, 1991). Decisions made by the RSCC standing committee would routinely have been based upon a report and recommendations put together by the RSCC Task Force. CWS representatives also noted, however, that this process was "not cast in stone" (Tretheway, Jan 22, 1991) and that any of the agencies with serious concerns about a project in light of their legislated mandates would have been within their legal rights to intercede in the process. In the case of Bridgepoint, negotiations involved a mixture of these approaches with the RSCC Task Force members reviewing the  122  TABLE 6.1: NEGOTIATION ROLES IN THE BRIDGEPOINT DEVELOPMENT NFHC  RSCC TASKFORCE^RSCC MAIN BODY  . as head lease holder . as port manager . as Jurisdictionally responsible agency  . DFO as Lead Agency^. as standing . CWS as member^committee of . IWD as member^representatives . EPS as member^from all the . BCMOE as member^federal environmental . Richmond Health ^agencies Dept. as^ . as decision makers contributor but not as member  G. WILLIAMS & ASSOC./  HATFIELD CONSULTANTS . as environmental consultants . as fact finders  V. PLAVSIC GROUP/  PARK GEORGIA REALTY . as proponents and developers  Based on Interviews and Available Documentation  TABLE 6.2: SELECTED CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATED TO THE BRIDGEPOINT DEVELOPMENT Dec 22 1978 Mar^1982 Jun^\ 1983 Mar 28 '1984 Dec 23 1984  NFHC acquires registered title to the site. The ADTF Report is released. 6th draft of DFO's Habitat Policy is released. Initial Bridgepoint site meeting takes place. Richmond Council gives approval-in-principle.  Feb 22 1985 Feb 26 1985 Mar 26 1985 Mar 25 1985 Jul 24 1985  Developer writes to DFO Minister. DFO Habitat Policy now incorporates Net Gain. Richmond gives final approval for rezoning. DFO gives conditional approval-in-principle. DFO gives final approval subject to modifications to the compensation package.  Jan 13 1986 Oct^1986  NFHC submits modified compensation package. DFO's Policy For The Management Of Fish Habitat is officially released. Newspaper article: dredging to start in Jan 88 Bridgepoint Market officially opens.  Dec 13 1987 May 25 1989  123 proposals put forward by the proponent, as well as being actively involved in site selection for compensation efforts later on. Much of the detailed negotiation however, as evidenced by the available documentation and interviews, occurred between DFO representatives, the NFHC and their consultants, and the project proponents. In fact, conditional project approval was initially sent to the NFHC by DFO's Area Manager for the Fraser River, Northern B.C. and Yukon Division (DFO, March 25, 1985), and subsequently by DFO's Director General of Fisheries Pacific Region (July 24, 1985) rather than from the RSCC standing committee.  In separate interviews, representatives from DFO, G.L. Williams and Associates, and the NFHC each indicated that negotiations played an important role in the Bridgepoint case. Representatives of the latter of these agencies went so far as to state that, from their perspective, "it was all negotiation" (Colquhoun, Dec 11, 1990).  Using classifications described by Dorcey and Riek (1987:20-21) Bridgepoint can be categorized as a dispute involving both multiple use (i.e. habitat vs land development) and rights (i.e. proprietary and jurisdictional rights) as opposed to being solely a project level dispute. The Bridgepoint negotiations resulted in both substantive agreements over the site's disposition, and procedural agreements on dealing with future development proposals in the North Arm vis-a-vis the North Fraser Harbour Environmental Management Plan (1988).  The available information sources also reveal much about how the Bridgepoint negotiations were conducted. From the initial meeting between the NFHC, proponents and the environmental agencies, in March of 1984, to the opening of the Market in May of 1989, negotiations were conducted through informal on-site and off-site meetings, telephone conversations, memoranda, letters, and -- in a limited way-- through both the local newspaper and the formal political forum provided by Richmond Council's public hearings. Many of the key issues, interests, and concerns raised will be discussed in the next section.  124 From the detailed chronology of events presented in Chapter Five some simple observations about the process can be made. To aid in this discussion Table 6.2 outlines a number of the key events concerning Bridgepoint.  One observation is that at the time DFO first became involved with Bridgepoint in March 1984, No Net Loss was the overall objective of DFO's still evolving habitat policy. The organization was in the early stages of applying the habitat policy and No Net Loss to all development projects in the Fraser Estuary, with Bridgepoint being one of the earliest and one of the largest applications. The lack of any definitive plan for applying No Net Loss at the project level, coupled with the fact that many details were left to be worked out by staff, meant that a number of uncertainties existed at the beginning of the negotiations. Some of these uncertainties included the determination of relative habitat values, compensation ratios for lost habitat, and details on measuring marsh productive capacity.  A second observation, is that both the NFHC and DFO had been through a difficult and heated debate, without resolution, over the designation and future uses of the Bridgepoint site under the ADTF review just two years prior to the Bridgepoint meeting. This event effectively preconditioned both sides for a polarized debate over the site and its potential uses.  A third observation that can be made from Table 6.2 is that from the point when DFO staff first became involved with the development proposal in March 1984 to the date when the agency provided its first conditional approval in March 1985, one year had passed -- almost to the day. From the point when the NFHC submitted its final compensation package modifications to DFO in January 1986, to the point when dredging was to begin in January of 1988, two years had passed. Delays in this latter period were apparently a result of financing difficulties rather than delays in obtaining approvals from the environmental agencies.  12 5  A final observation is that, with the developer's February 1985 letter to the Minister responsible for Fisheries and Oceans, a political component existed to the case. Although DFO's New Westminster staff have indicated that no written Ministerial instructions or orders concerning the case appear in their files concerning Bridgepoint, it is interesting to note that in the July 24th letter from DFO's director general to the NFHC issuing the final conditional approval for the project, ministerial correspondence to Ottawa is listed amongst those individuals and agencies to receive copies of the document. In addition, at least one other document was produced by DFO staff in March 1985 as a result of the proponent's letter to the Minister. This document, as described earlier, detailed at length DFO's involvement in the case from the date of the initial onsite meeting to the date of the proponent's letter to the Minister.  While the exact impact of the political component on the Bridgepoint negotiations is not clear from the available documentation, examination of a number of documents just prior to the proponent's February 23, 1985 letter to the Minister indicate that both sides had progressed to a point where potential compensation sites in locations other than the Bridgepoint site were actively being examined. In January 1985, DFO and the RSCC task force had made visits to five potential compensation sites proposed by the NFHC and gave their preference to three of these (DFO, March 7 1985:3). In addition, between January and February 1985, DFO had worked out a preliminary range for the compensation ratios required as replacement of lost marsh and mudflat and had conveyed these to the NFHC (ibid:3). In the period just prior to February 22, 1985 DFO was reportedly waiting for the compensation plans to come from the NFHC (ibid:3). These activities would appear to indicate that significant progress was being made just prior to the proponent's February 22, 1985 letter to the Minister of Fisheries. From this basis, while again acknowledging that the exact role and nature of the political presence cannot be conclusively determined from the available documentation, it seems likely that an agreement would have soon been achieved between the parties given the stage they were at just prior to February 22, 1985 -irrespective of any political component.  12 6  From the date of the proponent's letter to the Minister, to the date of DFO's first letter of conditional approval just over one month had passed. It is also noted that in a June 11, 1985 letter from DFO (:1) to Hatfield Consultants DFO was prepared to accept "restoration and protection works as compensation" for losses at the Bridgepoint site -- actions not normally  acceptable by Fisheries. The political role in either of these actions/decisions is again not indicated in the available documentation. As such, they are stated here as general observations and points of speculation.  6.2.3 Summary of Observations This section discussed four general observations related to the Bridgepoint Development. These observations were;  . that Bridgepoint was important both for the intrinsic values of the site, and for a number of outcomes that extended beyond the confines of the negotiations over the site;  that DFO's habitat policy was still evolving at the time that the agency became involved in Bridgepoint and that both the NFHC and DFO were preconditioned as a result of the ADTF results over the Bridgepoint site;  . that delays to achieve environmental approvals appear to have taken less time than the time needed to secure financing the project; and  . that a political component was evident in the Bridgepoint Development -- although the available documentation does not indicate what impacts this component had on the overall outcome of the negotiations.  127 The next section undertakes a more structured analysis of the negotiations by applying the analytical framework to the case.  6.3 CASE STUDY ANALYSIS This section undertakes a detailed analysis of the Bridgepoint negotiations utilizing the analytical framework developed from Fisher and Ury's theory of Principled Negotiations. Consistent with the analytical chapter's description of the framework, the section has been composed with four main subsections: Focus On Interests Not Positions, Separating The People From The Problem, Inventing Options For Mutual Gain, and lastly, Insisting On Objective Criteria.  6.3.1 Focus on Interests not Positions Under the analytical framework outlined in Chapter Four, three indicators were drawn from Fisher and Ury's work to aid in a determination of whether the process at the Bridgepoint negotiations focused on the interests involved, or instead, on the positions being stated. The indicators were designed to examine if the interests of all the parties were considered in the process, how these interests were relayed to the other parties, and whether the process was able to accommodate the parties' interests.  Detailed examination of the available information on Bridgepoint indicates that both positional bargaining and bartering were prominent, even acknowledged, aspects of the Bridgepoint negotiations -- particularly in the first stage of the process. The following paragraphs attempt to validate this statement by example, and to state the implications for the three indicators. Examples of positional arguments and concerns are stated for each of the main negotiating parties involved and followed by a summary of the implications to the indicators. The Proponent -- Bridgeport Harbour Market Corporation and their Consultants From the environmental agencies' perspective one of the more controversial positions taken by the proponents and their consultants was their initial characterization of the site's habitat as  198  "moderately important" (Williams, Villamere, Smith, 1984:33) in their environmental report.  Given the environmental agencies' unquestioning and unanimous view that the site contained very important habitat that played a valuable role in the region's ecosystem, the proponent's valuation virtually guaranteed confrontation between the parties over the use of the site's foreshore area.  Concerns over the relative value of the site's habitat, particularly its mudflats, arose again in December 1984 when the proponent wrote the following statement to the NFHC: "Neither we, nor our financial partner, can risk the investment of millions of dollars in a waterfront project which essentially looks out over mudflats, with the related odour problems" (Bridgeport Harbour Market  Corp., December 13, 1984:1). Irrespective of whether this position is to be viewed solely as a genuine concern for the security of an investment, or instead as an attempt to discount the ecological value of the site, the proponent's statement has the effect of trading off the natural features of the site against the economic costs of the development. The position is, once again, confrontational.  Another position maintained by the proponent was that the viability of the project was in large measure dependent upon the links between the upland portions of the project (the market, restaurants, public space, etc.) and the waterfront portions of the project (the observation pier, marina, treasure vessel, etc.). This argument was also extended to the placement of the various components in the development. In conveying this position to DFO, the NFHC wrote; "The overall proposed development is a comprehensively planned facility which integrates and links a number of public and private commercial uses. As such, there are many restrictions from a design point of view which impact on the location of the various components of the development." (NFHC, Oct. 5, 1984:2).  When DFO suggested that the proponent consider looking at other possible locations for their development if they could not meet all of the required mitigative measures, the proponent wrote to the NFHC "there is no other site in Richmond suitable for this type and size of development"  129 (Bridgeport Harbour Market Corp. December 13, 1984:1). This statement clearly signified a positional stance and a bottom line on the part of the proponent. The North Fraser Harbour Commission (NFHC) As detailed in Chapter Five, a consistent position put forward by the NFHC throughout the Bridgepoint negotiations referred to the dispute over the site's use designation during the FRES study. NFHC representatives included the following paragraph in their March 7, 1985 letter to DFO: The "undetermined use" rating given the property during the Fraser River Estuary Study occurred because no agreement could be reached between the NFHC and the environmental agencies and is not a result of recognition by all parties involved that the area should be closed to foreshore development.  (NFHC, March 7, 1985). From the NFHC's perspective, the ADTF designation did not preclude development of the Bridgepoint site.  The NFHC also expressed its opinion that it held both ownership and jurisdictional rights over the site which therefore allowed the Commission to develop the property. The NFHC's March 7, 1985 letter to DFO clearly expresses their position with regard to ownership rights and their belief in their right to develop the site. The NFHC representatives wrote: The NFHC, as you know, participated in the Fraser River Estuary Study and acknowledges the fact that environmental conflicts exist in developing the property, but at the same time, the NFHC strongly believes that it, as the current owner of the property, has the right to develop the property.  (NFHC, March 7, 1985). Similarly, the NFHC's position with regard to their jurisdictional authority and the development of the site is evident in their October 5, 1984 letter to DFO. The letter states: We are the federal agency responsible for the management of the North Fraser Harbour, and as such, endorse the development of these uplands and foreshore fronting the Marpole Basin for the uses stated in the development plan.  (NFHC, October 5, 1984).  130 While unwavering in the belief in their rights to develop the Bridgepoint site, the NFHC's participation in the FRES process also provided the Commission with an awareness of the need to embody the concept of No Net Loss in their plans for the development of the harbour. The NFHC's position at Bridgepoint in this regard was to encourage the developer of the site to incorporate No Net Loss into the development plan (Colquhoun, December 11, 1990). The NFHC also manifestly expressed its commitment to compensate for lost fish and wildlife habitat resulting from the development of the site to both DFO (NFHC, December 17, 1984), and Richmond's Council (Nov. 5, 1984). The commitment to Richmond Council was detailed in the following statement: As chairman, I wish to go on record to state our total commitment to provide whatever environmental compensation measures that may be required pursuant to the no net loss implementation principle of the Federal Fisheries Act, and the other relevant Federal and Provincial Acts and regulations as a result of this project.  (NFHC, December 17, 1984:2). The October 5, 1984 letter by the NFHC to DFO expressed two additional positions of note here. The first is a strongly worded statement of support for the project, and one which was unquestionably designed to place pressure on DFO. NFHC representatives wrote: You are, therefore, being asked to deal with a joint public/private development proposal that is unequivocally supported by the North Fraser Harbour Commission, and one that has received Approval-in-Principle from the Richmond Municipal Council, particularly in light of the recreational opportunities for the public.  (NFHC, October 5, 1984:1). The second statement reveals an attempt by the NFHC to link both past and future initiatives by the Commission to the Bridgepoint site: Over the past 3 years, the North Fraser Harbour Commission has made significant improvements to two developing marshes located downstream from the [Bridgepoint] site. As well, the Commission has initiated a "Foreshore Improvement" program which will in time involve all of its lessees. ... While recognizing its distinct mandate, the Commissioners and staff of the Commission are committed to working with your officials to develop a responsible plan for the future of the river. I would suggest that the review of this particular project must be considered in light of our previous accomplishments, as well as a longer term strategy for the future of the river.  (NFHC, October 5, 1984:1). Having by late December 1984 made as many concessions as they believed could be made while still maintaining the viability of the project, the NFHC reiterated and affirmed the proponent's  131 position that no further mitigation efforts could be made. The NFHC's letter to DFO states their position as follows: Firstly, I must advise that we have looked at other possible sites and support the developer in stating that there is no other suitable site for this type of development. Secondly, the present plan represents the final layout and, as much as is possible, incorporates the comments of your last letter. Any further modifications or reduction of the foreshore components of the project would make the project unrealizable for the reasons outlined by the developer in his letter.  (NFHC, December 17, 1984). The Department of Fisheries and Oceans Throughout the Bridgepoint negotiations DFO staff maintained the position that the Bridgepoint foreshore contained sensitive fish habitat, considered to be of "very high value" (DFO, March 7, 1985:1) (DFO Chronology of Events). As mentioned earlier, this valuation differed from that suggested by the proponents. This difference was undoubtedly a contributing factor to DFO's conclusion that the proponent's Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) "greatly underestimate[d] the impact of the proposal" (DFO, March 7, 1985:1).  By late November 1984, a number of mitigation proposals had been put forward by the proponent. From DFO's standpoint, however, these proposals did not go far enough. DFO outlined their position to that time in a detailed letter dated November 28, 1984 to the NFHC. The letter attempted to clarify the intent of the four step procedure for assessing proposals (prevention, mitigation, compensation, and rejection) in conjunction with the No Net Loss working principle . The letter also included the following description of the on-site mitigation efforts which DFO felt were required at the site. As discussed on site, it is our position that further mitigation and if necessary compensation is required before we can grant the proposal approval in principal (sic). Such mitigation must include; 1) the reduction of foreshore fill and pile supported structures over intertidal marsh areas, 2) the reduction of the size or re-alignment of the marina such that marsh areas are minimally encroached upon, 3) the relocation or elimination of the public pier, and 4) the reductions of dredging such that the disturbance to marsh areas are minimized.  (DFO, Nov 28, 1984:2)  Two additional positions put forward by DFO appear in the minutes of the December 17, 1984 Richmond Council public hearings. The first was an expression of concern that the habitat  132 initiatives be completed in a manner unaffected by local economic conditions that would otherwise likely impact on the completion of the development. The position is described in the minutes from the hearings as follows: Of particular concern was the possibility that the project might not be carried through to its conclusion because of market conditions, after the works affecting the habitat are in place. (Richmond Council Minutes, December 17, 1984:157).  The second position, was a response to a proposal by the NFHC that selected sites along the North Arm could be cleaned up by removing debris along the foreshore in place of certain mitigation initiatives. DFO's position as relayed in the minutes from the public hearing is as follows: The Department does not accept "clean-up" of an area in place of mitigation measures, and [DFO's representative] feels that the consultant's proposal is not adequate at this point, and perhaps something more creative can be designed in terms of a new marsh, which can be protected in one location, in perpetuity.  (Richmond Council Minutes, December 17, 1984:158). The Other Environmental Agencies Involved During the FRES study the environmental agencies were unified in the position that the site contained valuable fish and wildlife habitat, and that a portion, or possibly all, of the site should have been designated and set aside as conservation (ADTF, March 1982). This position was little changed as the agencies began their review of the Bridgepoint proposal. That the concerns of the environmental agencies with regard to the Bridgepoint proposal were similar to those held by DFO, was pointed out in an interview with a representative from the Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS) (Tretheway, Jan 22, 1991).  With regard to the proponent's Environmental Impact Assessment, a report to Council by the Richmond Health Department dated October 9, 1984 outlines the environmental agencies' position. The report states: [The environmental agencies] feel the proponent, through his consultant, had understated the ecological importance of the mud/sand flat area, one part of which will have to be dredged and another part filled. (Richmond Health Dept., Oct. 9, 1984:1) In this, the environmental agencies appear to have been united.  133 Focus on Interests not Positions -- Summary and Conclusions From the examples cited here, it is clear that bargaining and bartering were both prominent and pervasive aspects of the Bridgepoint process. It is also apparent that, in the first stage of the negotiations, the main negotiating parties directed a considerable amount of time and effort toward stating their respective positions rather than focusing on interests. Indeed, both DFO (November 28, 1984) and the NFHC (March 7, 1985) produced letters specifically designed to state their respective positions and respond to comments and demands from their counterparts. Both of these letters were notably drawn up after the October 16, 1984 meeting which is the only clear indication in the available documentation of a direct, albeit temporary, focus on the parties' interests. Summary notes of the meeting prepared by the NFHC state the following: Each party recognizes the interests of the other. The area is considered very important to fisheries as fish [habitat]; yet to the developer the proposed dredging (i.e. removal of mud) is essential to the overall viability of the marketplace proposed on the adjacent uplands. The N.F.H.C.'s interest in the entire project is to see this upland site "face the water" and to be an access point for the public. (NFHC, October 25, 1984:2)  The difference between the perspectives (i.e. positions versus interests) is simply explained by Fisher and Ury (1981:42). They write; "your position is something you have decided upon. Your interests are what caused you to decide." The link between stated positions and the underlying  interests is clear. Similarly, the positions stated during the Bridgepoint negotiations, combined with information provided by the interviewees, provide some insight as to the main interests held by the negotiating parties at Bridgepoint. A list of the interests that can be identified or inferred is shown in Tables 6.3a and 6.3b. Even from this limited listing, it is apparent that both shared and compatible interests existed, particularly between the NFHC and DFO, which might have been explored to achieve a solution at an early stage in the process. The available documentation, however, fails to indicate that any sustained effort was made to deliberately consider whether these shared, compatible, or differing interests might have been explored to advantage in the first stage of the process. In fact, the examples cited instead appear to indicate an adherence to positional bargaining at that point. The conclusion which must therefore be made about the first  134  TABLE 6.3a: INTERESTS OF THE MAIN NEGOTIATING PARTIES NORTH FRASER HARBOUR COMMISSION (NFHC) INTERESTS • To generate a long term stable source of income for the commission. • To preserve the water orientation of the site. • To develop a plan for managing the development along North Arm and improve the condition of the foreshore. • To incorporate no net loss in their management program for the river. • To create a showpiece for their harbour. • To develop an improved working relationship with the environmental agencies. • To uphold its jurisdictional mandate and responsibilities to manage the North Fraser Harbour. • Ownership interests as the head lease holders and administrators of the Bridgepoint site. PROPONENT'S INTERESTS • To develop a viable multi-purpose facility including a marina, waterfront restaurants, festival-type market place and hotel at Bridgepoint. • The original intent was to complete the project in time for Expo 86. • For a variety of reasons the proponent wanted to keep costs and time factors within workable limits.  135  TABLE 6.3b: INTERESTS OF THE MAIN NEGOTIATING PARTIES DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS (DFO) INTERESTS • A jurisdictional mandate and responsibilities to manage fish habitat. • To ensure that habitat replacement, mitigation compensation efforts were not sacrificed to the economic fortunes of a particular project (i.e. if a project fails or is left incomplete the habitat efforts should be unimpaired). • DFO's interests for protecting and preserving habitat are long term, therefore they had an interest in ensuring that long term managment provisions for compensation sites be in place. • To protect existing fish habitat particularly in critical regions (i.e. where little habitat remains and in locations where such habitat is important for migrating salmon - Bridgepoint was considered to be one of these important sites as little habitat remains in that portion of the North Arm). • To refine and apply the still evolving habitat policy to projects in the estuary. OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCIES' INTERESTS • A range of jurisdictional mandates and responsibilities related to the protection of the fish, wildlife, and environmental connections to the site. • Interests in ensuring that compensation and mitigation efforts were successful over the long term. • In addition to the above two interests, the Municipality of Richmond held specific interests related to the site's design, and the economic/traffic/health impacts of the proposal.  136 stage of the process is that the fixation on positions preempted the deliberate consideration of the interests of the parties involved. In accordance with this first conclusion, the second conclusion which must be made is that the parties' various interests were only relayed in any consistent sense in that they were linked to the positional arguments.  Drawing conclusions with regard to the second stage of the process when the parties began making significant progress toward generating agreements, is not as clear cut. After months of frustration over unwavering positional stances, representatives from both DFO and the NFHC realized that significant progress was not being made and began taking another look at the issues. Although agreements were subsequently made which suggest that various interests were being taken into account in the second stage of the process (i.e. a proposal to develop a management plan for the harbour, agreements on off-site compensation, development of a monitoring period to be undertaken by the NFHC and to include any remedial work necessary, etc.) there is again little, if any, evidence in the available information to suggest that these events came about through a deliberate evaluation of the interests involved. Interviews with both DFO and NFHC representatives suggest, rather, that these agreements were more a product of concessions to positions taken. DFO, for example conceded to allowing habitat cleanup and restoration work to count for credit for lost mudflat area. The NFHC on the other hand, conceded that off-site compensation was required when previously they felt that all the compensation work could be done on-site.  Conclusions drawn here would have to concede that interests were being considered -- but largely through concessions on positions. Positional stances were also used to relay the respective interests instead of a undertaking a deliberate focus on interests in and of themselves.  With regard to the reconciliation or accommodation of interests in the process, the negotiating parties' initial focus on positions lends strong support to the general characterization of the first stage of the negotiations as a period when interests were not being accommodated in the proposals  137 for agreement. Characterization of the second stage, however, is again not as straight forward. An objective assessment of the interests ascribe'd to DFO and the NFHC in Tables 6.3a and 6.3b would conclude that virtually all of these agencies' interests were accommodated, at least to some degree. For at least two of the other groups, the proponent and the Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS), this was apparently not the case.  The proponent's complaints that the high costs involved in compensation came close to crippling the Bridgepoint development (The Richmond Times, Sept. 20, 1988:1) clearly indicate a level of dissatisfaction with the process and the degree to which his financial interests were met.  Representatives from the CWS also qualified the degree to which their interests were accommodated in the final agreements raising two points of concern. The first concern was related to the real life difficulty of trying to reproduce what nature does so well. By way of example, it was noted that a transplant site near Campbell River has, after six years, yet to attain the same level of productivity as that maintained by a nearby control marsh (Tretheway, Jan 22, 1991). From this perspective, transplanted habitat with its reduced productivity would have impacts on the area's ecology which extend temporally into the medium term and potentially into the long term. Given the CWS mandate, this would be an obvious point of concern.  The second concern raised by the CWS was of a more immediate nature, and echoes a similar concern noted by one of DFO's representatives. At issue was the loss of habitat at the compensation site itself. In the case of the Mitchell Island compensation site, an existing fringe marsh and adjacent mudflat area were effectively replaced by the new marsh transplants from the Bridgepoint site. No accounting of this additional loss was ever made in the compensation.  On both of the issues raised by the CWS, the final agreement apparently failed to fully accommodate the CWS interests. While acknowledging that multi-party agreements which fully satisfy the interests of all the parties are probably the exception, the conclusion in the case of  138 Bridgepoint must still be that not all of the interests presented were fully accommodated through the process. Certainly in the first stage of the process few attempts were made to reconcile the various interests involved. The degree to which the interests were reconciled in the second stage clearly depends on which party is asked. The NFHC, for example, appears to have satisfied most of their interests in the exchange. The proponent, on the other hand, apparently had severe •  reservations about the costs imposed by the habitat policy. In short, the success of the reconciliation of interests at Bridgepoint was mixed.  To reiterate, the evidence suggests that the primary means of conveying interests at Bridgepoint was through positional bargaining. The prominence of positional arguments also suggests that, at least in the first stage of the negotiations, greater consideration was given to positions rather than interests. In the first stage of the negotiations, few attempts were made to reconcile interests in the negotiations. Opinions on the degree to which these interests were accommodated in the second stage, while significantly improved, evidently varies between the parties involved.  6.3.2 Separate the People from the Problem The analysis under this principle is intended to focus on the human elements integral to negotiation. With this intent, the indicators developed as part of the analytical framework are used to probe into four areas of the Bridgepoint negotiations to determine; whether problems in communicating concerns or understanding perceptions existed in the negotiations; whether the negotiating parties were able to save face by reconciling their positions with past actions; whether emotions played a role in the exchange, and if so how this was dealt with; and finally, whether the parties were provided access to all the relevant information.  Each of these four aspects are examined below.  139 Issues Related to Communication Concerns and Understanding Perceptions One of the more significant misunderstandings in the Bridgepoint negotiations arose over what was actually required of the proponents in assessing the environmental impacts of the project. The misunderstanding appears to have occurred at the initial meeting between the environmental agencies and the proponent on March 28, 1984. The critical event is characterized by the NFHC in a letter to DFO in which they wrote the following: During the [March 28, 1984] meeting, the environmental agencies made it clear that elaborate fisheries/wildlife baseline studies were unwarranted, but they suggested that some [short]-term field work could be useful if only to provide "ammunition" to refute the perceived importance of the area. (NFHC, March 7, 1985:2).  As will be recalled from an earlier discussion, the consultant's valuation of the site as "moderately important" was vigorously challenged by the environmental agencies.  DFO's perception of what was said at the March 28, 1984 meeting is recorded in an internal DFO memorandum of March 7, 1985. The abbreviated notes record the following: Consultant advised that area is of high value to fisheries resource, and could result in project rejection based on on-site values. Compensation is discussed and consultant is advised not to attempt to study "relative value" of area but rather concentrate on mitigation/compensation alternatives. Consultant to contact DFO to agree on terms of reference.  (DFO, 1985:1) Clearly some problems existed between what was said and intended, and what was understood.  Interestingly, in the period immediately following the March 1984 meeting the consultants began work on the EIA without discussing the terms of reference with DFO. According to DFO's own chronology of their involvement in the case, neither the consultants nor the proponent contacted the agency between March 28 and August 8, 1984 to discuss the terms of reference for the EIA (DFO, March 7, 1985:1). One result was that from DFO's perspective, the final EIA report was "inadequate and biased in favour of the development" (DFO, 1989:2). Up to the date of the  interviews conducted for this thesis, both sides still dispute what was said and intended at the March 28, 1984 meeting with regard to this issue.  140  The first indications that both sides were willing to work around this particular dispute appears in the October 5, 1984 NFHC letter to DFO cited earlier. We agree with your suggestion that rather than debate our respective views of the relative importance of the site in its current condition, in terms of fish habitat and productivity we should focus our attention on identifying mitigation and compensation measures which will reduce or negate the impact of this development on the area  (NFHC, October 5, 1984:2). Differences in perception are also evident in the previously discussed issue of the site's use. The environmental agencies' perception of the foreshore as a "very important" area of functioning habitat for fish and birds, was diametrically opposed to the proponent's perception of the odour laden mudflats which potentially placed the multi-million dollar venture at risk (Bridgeport Harbour Market Corp., December 13, 1984:1). On this issue the two sides were effectively worlds apart.  Another issue of note involves both the strong desire on the part of both the NFHC and the proponent to compensate for habitat losses. Their unwavering assurances to Richmond Council and DFO that lost habitats would be fully reproduced elsewhere, reflects something of a different perception of the ability to reconstruct natural habitat than that expressed by CWS representatives (recall the CWS comments noted earlier on the slow development of the Campbell River replacement habitat).  In both of the last two examples, differences in perceptions existed which appear to have persisted in at least some degree through to today. Reconciling Positions Whether by deliberate intent or simply an unplanned consequence of other decisions, a series of staff and negotiation role changes appears to have replaced much of the need to reconcile the positions of the key parties involved at Bridgepoint. The NFHC, for example, made a key change in negotiation roles midway into the process by shifting many of the negotiating responsibilities  141 from one of their contract agents to an aquatic biologist working with their environmental consultants. By doing so, the Commission resolved two pending problems. The first problem was a growing number of professional and personality differences between DFO staff on one side, the NFHC's contract representative and the consultant's engineering staff on the other side. The second problem was an apparent impasse in which the two sides became entrenched in their positions and little real progress was being made.  Roles also varied to some extent amongst DFO staff during the negotiations with different players being involved at different periods. Over the course of the Bridgepoint negotiations, there were at least three different Ministers responsible for the Department of Fisheries and Oceans -- each one representing a different style of management and direction for the Department as a whole. At the hands-on level, there are indications from the interviewees that personality conflicts between DFO staff, the NFHC's representative, and the proponent resulted in at least some role changes in the earlier stages of the negotiations.  Another action taken by DFO and the environmental agencies involved which had the result of buffering the need to reconcile positions was that a number of critical decisions were made at a higher level. The most prominent examples of this are the two letters of conditional approval in principle, both of which originated with management at a level apart from the level of negotiations.  Aside from the actions cited above, the available documentation fails to show any deliberate actions by any of the parties to facilitate or accommodate the reconciliation of another party's positions with their past actions and statements. Although the existence of such actions is not entirely ruled out by the documentation, the employment of other mechanisms such as the adjustment of staff roles in the negotiations and the displacement of decision making on critical issues likely precluded many circumstances where reconciliation might have been employed.  142 The Role of Emotions in the Negotiations A number of emotional issues were evident in the Bridgepoint negotiations -- although the perception of the overall importance of these issues varies between participants. A further complication is that a temporal aspect is also evident in the negotiations with the earlier stage showing more problems involving emotional issues than are evident in the latter portion of the discussions. Certainly there were a number of significant catalysts on both sides which likely contributed to the heightened emotional states of the participants. On the environmental agencies' side, a significant factor was the knowledge that few marsh habitat areas remained in a critical reach of the Fraser's North Arm. On the proponent's side financing pressures, compounded initially by the fast approaching target deadline of Expo 86, both contributed significantly to the proponent's emotional sensitivities in the negotiations. As a result, a number of heated exchanges occurred between DFO staff and the proponent over the course of the negotiations, resulting in a degree of animosity between several of the participants involved (Runyan, August 12, 1990, and Langer, November 27, 1990). The proponent reportedly felt that DFO's demands were too great and inflexible (Runyan, August 12, 1990). The proponent's letter to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans was likely an attempt to work around these apparent obstacles.  Personality conflicts also existed between DFO staff and the project's environmental consultants in the early stage of the negotiations. From DFO's perspective the consultants were approaching the project solely from an engineering viewpoint, paying little attention to the issue of habitat protection and the ecological/biological aspects involved. The lack of communication such as occurred over setting the terms of reference for the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), no doubt contributed to the difficulties initially faced by the two sides.  Personality conflicts were also reported between the NFHC's representative and DFO staff in the first half of the negotiations. Fisher and Ury (1981:21) note in their book Getting To Yes:  Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, that positional bargaining works to trade off the negotiator's interests in substance against his interests in a good relationship. The tactic of  143 trading off the ongoing relationship and the substantive issue at hand are clearly evident in the previously cited October 5, 1984 letter from the NFHC representative to DFO. The author states;  I would suggest that the review of this particular project must be considered in light of our previous accomplishments as well as a longer term strategy for the future of the river. (NFHC, October 5, 1984:3) Many of the phrases used in this particular document were interpreted by DFO, and acknowledged by current NFHC staff, as attempts to apply pressure on DFO (Langer, November 27, 1990 and Colquhoun, December 11, 1990). Such tactics likely did little to enhance a sense of cooperation between the two parties.  Clearly a number of emotional issues arose over the Bridgepoint development. Interestingly, many of these issues were, to some extent, resolved by assigning a more prominent role in the negotiations to G.L. Williams -- an aquatic biologist who was initially employed by the NFHC's environmental consultants, Hatfield Consultants Ltd. Williams eventually took on much of the dialogue between DFO, the environmental agencies and the proponent. His role could effectively be categorized as a facilitator and an information gatherer and probably came close to being a third party intervener as can be found in the case. Although not all of the emotional issues were resolved with this change, it is noteworthy that subsequent relations between the parties began to improve. Informing the Parties and Access to Relevant Information As a general statement on the negotiations, the available information shows that the key parties were not equally well informed about the relevant issues involved, and particularly about the application of No Net Loss. During interviews for this thesis, a NFHC representative stated that although the Commission knew that they wanted to incorporate No Net Loss into the Bridgepoint development, at the time they did not have any idea of how to go about doing so (Colquhoun, December 11, 1990). As a result they hired Hatfield Consultants Ltd. as their environmental consultants to work with both the NFHC and the proponent. By not discussing the terms of reference for the EIA with DFO, however, the proponent and their consultant's failed to take  144 advantage of DFO's expertise to raise their own level of knowledge about what was required for Fisheries and Oceans to be able to properly assess the proposal.  Another observation is that there appears to have been a preference on the part of the NFHC representative involved to deal solely with DFO until a compensation package had been worked out. In a NFHC summary of an October 16, 1984 meeting between DFO representatives, the NFHC, Hatfield Consultants Ltd., and the proponent's agent, the following statement is made as if it were an agreed to fact: With the exception of immediate staff superiors, the details of the proposed mitigation and compensation measures will be treated in confidence until a mutually agreed to package is prepared (NFHC, October 16, 1984:2).  DFO staff rejected this suggestion stating that the other environmental agencies would also have to be included in the process. Had the NFHC's suggestion been carried out, the effect would have been to restrict both the access and level of input to the process by the other environmental agencies.  Difficulties in accessing pertinent information by the parties involved can be discerned from a number of incidents. One of these is evident in the December 1984 public hearings held by Richmond Council. During the meeting, DFO's representative indicated that some ambiguity existed over the expected impact of the project. Because of this, as recorded in the meeting minutes, DFO representatives expressed a desire "to see a definite package outlining just how much of the habitat [would] be replaced, and what [would] be lost on the River" (Richmond Council  Minutes, December 17, 1984:157). Documentation shows that new conceptual plans were submitted to DFO by the NFHC on December 17, 1984, and again on March 7, 1985. Further, interviews with representatives from the NFHC, DFO and the CWS each indicated that the site plans were changed or modified many times over the course of the negotiations -- often without consultation with the environmental agencies or, for that matter, with the NFHC. It is likely that making so many changes to these plans actually worked against the project's progress by leaving the reviewing agencies not only with an unending series of "new" projects to review, but also with  145 an apparent uncertainty as to what the true impacts would be. Placed in the larger context, DFO's Pacific Region Habitat Division receives between 10,000 and 20,000 development referrals each year (Delaney, September 21, 1990). Reiterations of the Bridgepoint plans would have certainly placed an additional burden on DFO's staff.  A second incident of note is apparent in the after-the-fact commentary by the proponent in a local newspaper. The article, which was cited in Chapter Five, showed that there were differences between the NFHC and the proponent in the cost estimates of the habitat compensation for Bridgepoint. A third estimate of approximately $500,000 was provided by the project's environmental consultant who also pointed out that these costs were probably much lower than would have been the case if the dredged material had been dumped at sea (Williams, January 15, 1991).  From the examples provided here, it is clear that there were a number of areas in which the parties were not equally well informed, or that access to all the relevant information could have been improved -- particularly in the earlier period of the negotiations. From a point of analysis, focusing on these aspects of the negotiation would likely have improved the process. Separating the People from the Problem -- Summary and Conclusions This section has attempted to examine the Bridgepoint case in terms of Fisher and Ury's principle of "separating the people from the problem". Four broad indicators were used in the analysis to gain some insights about the case in terms of this principle. The indicators explored the following aspects of the case: failings in communicating concerns, and difficulties understanding the perceptions of other participants; whether the parties were able to reconcile their positions with their past actions and statements; . the role of emotions in the negotiations and how these were dealt with, and finally;  146 . whether all the parties were equally well informed and had access to all the relevant information. With regard to the first of these four indicators, a number of examples were cited which show that difficulties were experienced in communicating concerns and understanding other parties' perceptions -- particularly in the first half of the process. The misunderstandings over what was said and intended at the initial March 28, 1984 meeting, and the noted lack of discussion between the NFHC and DFO over the terms of reference for the Environmental Impact Assessment, both showed how communications between the individuals involved had failed. During the interviews, interviewees gave strong indications that such problems went beyond simple technical aspects of communication and were instead significantly rooted in the personalities and positional stances of the individuals involved.  Difficulty in understanding the other parties' perceptions were indicated by two examples in the analysis. The first issue involved a difference of opinion over the valuation of site's habitat between the proponent's consultant and the environmental agencies. Extremes of opinion were evident on both sides, with the proponent arguing the incompatibility of an odour laden mudflat and the proposed foreshore development, and some of the environmental agencies stating that no development should have occurred on the foreshore because of its perceived value. To some degree, the differences of opinion in this issue appear to remain even today. The relative value of the mudflats themselves, however, was largely resolved when an inventory of the quantity of mudflat in the North Arm was conducted in the latter stage of the process.  Perceptual differences were also evident with regard to the degree to which people can reconstruct nature through compensation efforts. The NFHC's repeated commitments to compensation for habitat losses stand in contrast to the CWS citations of the Campbell River project which had after six years failed to reach the same level of production of the control site.  Accommodation of other parties' positions with their past actions and statements was not a noted facet of the Bridgepoint negotiations. The analysis suggested that much of the utility of such  147 actions was effectively removed by mechanisms such as changes in personnel, or in the changes in the roles played in the negotiations, and by displacement of key decisions to individuals at levels removed from the day to day operations at hand.  It was suggested that over the course of the project a number of catalysts, including monetary considerations, the Expo 86 deadline and a vastly diminished inventory of suitable habitat remaining in the vicinity of the site, each served to increase the pressures on the individuals involved. The outward expression of these pressures resulted in a number of heated exchanges -particularly between DFO staff and the proponent. In the first stages of the negotiations, a case book example of what Fisher and Ury describe as a tradeoff of relationship interests against substantive interests was evident wherein the acting agent for the NFHC suggested to DFO that the project should be considered from the perspective of their previous accomplishments and in view of their other proposed actions in the North Arm -- an approach which was met with some indignation by DFO staff. The discussion on emotions also noted that the situation was complicated by professional and personality differences which existed between DFO staff and the proponent's consultants. Significantly, many of the problems cited were either resolved or worked around in the later stages of the project when much of the coordinating, and negotiation efforts were assigned to an aquatic biologist working for the NFHC and the proponent.  On the last of the four indicators, the analysis concluded that the key parties were not equally well informed about a number of the relevant issues involved -- particularly in the early stage of the negotiations. The NFHC's acknowledgment of their unfamiliarity with how No Net Loss could be incorporated into their plans for the River clearly showed the position that the agency was in at the beginning of the project. The failure of the proponent and their consultants to discuss the terms of reference for the EIA with DFO served to inhibit the understanding of what was required by the reviewing agencies and, from DFO's perspective, contributed to a biased view of the site's valuation.  148 The analysis also noted an example from the documentation where the NFHC's agent suggested that the review of the compensation package should be restricted to only DFO until the details were worked out. The proposal to exclude access to the other environmental agencies was rejected by DFO staff who felt that all the agencies should be involved.  An example where problems accessing information actually took place was evident in DFO's December 1984 request for a definitive package from the proponent outlining exactly how much habitat was expected to be removed from the site. This situation was no doubt aided by the number of different plans which were produced by the proponent, each one of which posing new concerns for the reviewing agencies to consider, and often without consultation before hand.  Taken collectively the four indicators used in this analysis show that the Bridgepoint negotiations experienced significant difficulty in separating the people problems from the substantive problems at hand -- particularly in the earlier stages of the process. During this period there were failures in communication between the parties, difficulties in understanding the other parties' perceptions, difficulties in accessing relevant information, and no apparent efforts to facilitate the reconciliation of positions.  Although a number of these problems persisted throughout the entire negotiating process, the latter stages of the negotiations, by all indications, saw significant improvements. Communications were noted to have improved between the parties and personality and professional differences were effectively set aside by changes in personnel and negotiating roles -notably the expanded role of an aquatic biologist on the NFHC's consulting staff.  6.3.3 Inventing Options for Mutual Gain The focus of this portion of the analysis is on Fisher and Ury's principle of inventing options for mutual gain. As explained earlier, the intent of this principle is to explore ways in which the options to the problem at hand can be broadened to the benefit of both sides before a commitment  149 is given to a particular solution. To explore this aspect in terms of the Bridgepoint case study, the theory chapter laid out three indicators with which to assess the negotiations. To reiterate, the relevant indicators were as follows: How were alternative solutions generated, and how did you choose between them? Were specific attempts made to find solutions which would benefit all the parties, or were the solutions largely compromises between the various positions? Were actions taken to facilitate the other parties in making their decisions? Generating and Choosing Between Alternative Solutions Because of limited staff numbers and the large volume of development applications being processed by each of the environmental agencies, the usual procedure was that the development applicants bore most of the responsibility for generating alternative solutions for a given project. This was generally true of the Bridgepoint development with the added component that the NFHC, although not a true partner in the project, held an interest in seeing the project developed and therefore participated in generating alternative solutions.  As will be recalled from the discussion in Chapter Five, the proponent and the NFHC were directed through DFO's application review process. It was during this period that the most significant alternatives were generated. Initially, the environmental agencies asked the proponent/NFHC to consider alternative sites for the project instead of the Bridgepoint location. After examining a number of other locations, both the proponent and the NFHC concluded that this was a unique project with special requirements that could not be met at any other location in the harbour (Bridgeport Harbour Market Corp. December 13, 1984:1).  By late November 1984, while still suggesting that an alternative site was preferred, DFO informed the proponent and the NFHC of the minimum mitigation measures required on the site for the proposal to be considered (refer to the mitigation measures listed in the case study chapter). With DFO's letter, the project effectively moved into the mitigation stage of DFO's review process. Subsequently, the proponent produced a number of modifications to the original  150 plan -- some of which were reportedly made without consultation with either the NFHC or DFO (Colquhoun, December 11, 1990). Each new modification was subject to review by each of the reviewing environmental agencies according to their own mandates and criteria, with their suggestions and recommendations being forwarded to the RSCC Task Force chair (DFO). While this series of iterations was under way, preliminary work was being undertaken in December 1984 to identify possible locations for off-site compensation to replace the habitat lost on-site. After conducting an inventory of the harbour, some 17 sites had been identified by mid December, with 8 of these short-listed for further review (Bridgeport Harbour Market Corp. December 13, 1984:2). The RSCC Task Force members played an important role in reviewing these sites with the Harbour Commission and their consultants.  By March 7, 1985, both the proponent and the NFHC felt that the project proposal had, in their view, incorporated as many of the concerns of the environmental agencies as possible "without destroying the original development concept" (NFHC:3). Their letter of the same date, formally  states their shift in emphasis from further mitigation efforts to compensation for the anticipated habitat losses. Requesting an initial response from DFO, the letter also proposed an overall compensation plan. Consisting of three main components, the plan proposed that the Mitchell Island site be used for compensation and that the Bridgepoint site supply the donor plant stock; that a joint DFO NFHC five year monitoring program be established to ensure the compensation site's success; and that as compensation for the lost mudflat area, a joint DFO NFHC management program be established for the Harbour. The proposed management program would include the undertaking of a detailed habitat inventory to identify foreshore areas requiring protection from development, measures to prevent habitat degradation within the harbour in the future, and a more active cleanup program along the North Arm's foreshore (NFHC, March 7, 1985:5-6).  From the perspective of this analysis, what is important about the sequence of events outlined above is that the generation of alternative solutions appears to be more closely related to the  151 activity of bartering than to a systematic and deliberate search for alternatives. In effect, one side makes a proposal and the other side either accepts, rejects, or suggests a counter proposal possibly incorporating portions of the original proposal but never-the-less starting another round of the process. There is virtually no indication of a consistent and focused inter-agency attempt to separate inventing from deciding as described by Fisher and Ury (1981:62) (i.e. brainstorming, game simulation, etc.).  The process detailed above does show limited application of 'broadening the options' before deciding. The generation of the 17 potential off-site compensation sites that were subsequently short-listed to 8 options, certainly reflects something of the theory. It is interesting to note, however, that even in this case the attempt to broaden the options did not occur until the original proposal to provide all the compensation on-site was rejected by DFO and the environmental agencies.  One other aspect of generating solutions that is not readily apparent in the process as outlined above, was a tendency to search for precedence in order to refine the details of a solution once the general aspects were agreed to. A key example, and one which will be discussed in more detail in relation to objective criteria, was the use of the Campbell River data to derive the 2 for 1 marsh habitat compensation ratio. Mutually Beneficial Solutions and Compromised Positions As with many of the other issues discussed to this point, the attempts to find solutions beneficial to all parties appears to have been more pronounced in the latter stages of the negotiations than in the earlier stages. Even then, many of the solutions were largely compromises according to NFHC staff (Colquhoun, December 11, 1990).  An example where compromise was incorporated into the final compensation package can be found in DFO's acceptance of "restoration and protection works ... as compensation for lost mudflat" at  152 Bridgepoint (DFO, July 24, 1985:2). During the December 17, 1984 public hearings, DFO informed Richmond Council that area 'clean-up' was not acceptable to the Department as an alternative to mitigation measures (Council Minutes, December 17, 1985:158). Just over 7 months later in the letter of conditional approval DFO officials accepted the NFHC clean-up proposal stating that "it was in the best interests of the resource to compensate by restoring areas that had been degraded" (DFO, July 24, 1985:2). As part of the compromise DFO also required that a  shear boom be installed at the Genstar riverine marsh clean-up site similar to the one the NFHC had proposed for the Wood Island Slough site.  Another compromise is apparent in the agreement over the monitoring of the replacement habitat at the Mitchell Island site. The NFHC's initial proposal of March 7, 1985 called for the NFHC and DFO to work jointly a marsh monitoring program of up to 5 years (NFHC:5). Their plan also called for a 2 year monitoring of the site's physical aspects. The monitoring issue had been raised previously by DFO but no details had been worked out. In the final agreement, DFO settled on a 3 year -- proponent funded -- marsh monitoring program and a 5 year physical monitoring program of the site.  The two examples above show both compromise and fine tuning of positions and proposals offered in the final agreements. Other compromise examples can be found in the case study chapter.  With the gradual movement away from strictly positional stances in the latter stages of the negotiations more consideration appears to have been given to finding solutions which would benefit both sides in the negotiations. One attempt was a joint search by DFO staff and the NFHC's environmental consultant to find a suitable model for the relative values of the different habitat types found on the site. The researchers located a model that had been used in Oregon for over 10 years to evaluate habitats, and modified it for application on the Fraser. According to the NFHC's consultant, in the end DFO's staff disagreed with the format of the new model and  153 eventually rejected in favour of the present system of compensation ratios (Williams, January 15, 1991).  Irrespective of the success or failure, the search for a workable model of relative habitat values shows at least some attempt to find mutually beneficial solutions to the problem at hand. Although not directly related to this issue, it is noteworthy that the example also reveals that the No Net Loss application was truly in its infancy -- with many aspects not fully worked out and no procedures in place for actually applying, in a detailed way, what the policy had spelled out in much broader terms.  A second example where the two sides sought a mutually beneficial solution can be found in the development of the North Fraser Harbour Environmental Management Plan (1988). While the plan was not in the strictest sense part of the Bridgepoint development, the Bridgepoint negotiations were the initiating catalyst to the mutually beneficial memorandum of understanding between DFO and the NFHC. The intent is described in the plan as follows: The purpose of this memorandum is to describe an environmental management plan for the North Fraser Harbour intended to facilitate a pro-active approach toward port development and environmental management by: (a)  establishing a shoreline rating or classification system to assist port administrators and habitat managers in maintaining an economically and environmentally viable harbour;  (b)  developing a more detailed project review and assessment process, which will be integrated with existing Fraser River Estuary Management Program (FREMP) coordinated project review procedures;  (c)  creating a habitat compensation banking system to facilitate compensation for industrial, port, commercial, or recreational developments where on-site mitigation or compensation would be impractical or inadequate and where off. site compensation would be considered acceptable;  (d)  establishing a cooperative management program designed to make fish management and fish habitat concerns an integral component of Harbour operations and development planning processes.  (DFO and NFHC, September 1988:4)  154 This agreement proved beneficial to both parties in that, at a minimum, the plan helped to; provide a resolution to the Bridgepoint proposal; it helped to avoid another similar problem from arising by pre-designating sites for development potential and the degree of mitigation efforts required; it incorporated a habitat banking system eliminating future location problems for replacement habitat, and; it allowed the two agencies to maintain and exercise their mandates while establishing a basis for a continuing working relationship.  Both of the above examples occurred in the latter half of the negotiations, once again lending support to the argument that greater consideration of the other side's needs appears to have occurred in that half of the negotiations than in the earlier half. Facilitating Other Parties in Making their Decisions The last issue to be examined under the principle of inventing options for mutual gain, was whether any of the parties took specific actions to facilitate the other parties in making their decisions.  According to the theory described in Getting To Yes, a number of actions can be taken to assist the other side in making favourable choices. Some examples of such actions include analyzing the other side's perceived choices and devising new more favourable options that will change their decisions, or creating an agreement that is easily implemented (Fisher and Ury, 1981:79-83).  None of the documentation researched for this thesis show any indication that these, or any other similar actions were taken by the participating parties with an intent to facilitate the decisions of another party. Similarly, none of the interviews provided any indication of such actions having occurred.  155 Indeed, the most prominent attempt by one party to directly influence another party's decisions during the negotiations was the previously discussed incident when the NFHC's representative tried to pressure DFO agents into viewing the Bridgepoint development "in light of various other matters of mutual concern relating to the river" (NFHC, October 5, 1984:2). That incident was  perceived more as an attempt to force a decision preferable to the NFHC than one attempting to facilitate a favourable choice from amongst the available options. Inventing Options for Mutual Gain -- Summary and Conclusions This section used three indicators to determine if options were invented for mutual gain during the Bridgepoint negotiations. Generally, these indicators examined how alternative solutions were generated and how the solutions were selected, whether there were overt attempts to generate mutually beneficial solutions, and finally, whether specific actions were made by any party to facilitate the decisions made by another party.  Working through the description of the No Net Loss project evaluation process as applied to Bridgepoint, the first indicator showed that different solutions were generated at different stages of the evaluation process. It also showed that, as with other unrelated proposals, the development applicants bore most of the responsibility for generating alternative solutions. The examination also noted that not all of modifications to the proposals were made in consultation with either the NFHC, or DFO. The solutions generated were subsequently evaluated by each of the reviewing agencies and changes or modifications were requested essentially through a process of bartering between the agencies.  No consistent and focused attempts to separate the act of inventing solutions from the act of deciding were apparent in either the documentation or the interview responses. In the later half of the negotiations, however, there were indications of attempts to broadening the options before deciding. Examples cited in support of this latter issue included the listing of the 17 potential offsite compensation sites and the proposal for a comprehensive management program (i.e. the  156 detailed habitat inventory, prevention of further habitat degradation in the harbour, and the development of a clean-up program for the North Arm).  The specific focus on generating mutually beneficial solutions showed that many of the solutions were largely compromises between positions. Examples such as the issue of accepting clean-up as compensation for lost mudflat, and the length of the marsh and physical monitoring programs, were cited as instances where compromise appeared prominent. In comparison to the first half of the negotiations, however, more efforts were made in the second half to produce solutions which would be beneficial to both sides. Two examples were cited in support of this contention. The first was the joint research by DFO staff and the NFHC's environmental consultant to modify and apply an Oregon model for comparing the relative values of the different habitat types to the Fraser region. The second example was the development of the North Fraser Harbour Environmental Management Plan (1988) which was shown to yield a number of beneficial results to both DFO and the NFHC.  The final indicator focused specifically on attempts by the participants to facilitate other parties in making their decisions. Although the possibility that such activities did occur, there was no indication in either the available documentation or the interview responses that it did. The strongest indication of an attempt to directly influence another party's decision was the NFHC representative's attempt to tie the decision over the Bridgepoint development to other issues on the River.  Collectively, the three indicators failed to show any indication that the parties involved in the Bridgepoint negotiations deliberately attempted to invent options for mutual gain in the first half of the negotiations. During the second half of the negotiations there were at least some attempts to broaden the options and seek solutions which would provide benefits to both sides and it is likely that these actions played an important role in resolving the Bridgepoint issue.  157 6.3.4 Insist on Using Objective Criteria Fisher and Ury's final principle, "insist on using objective criteria" is the focus of this part of the analysis. Reflecting much of the core of the Getting To Yes foundations, Fisher and Ury describe the approach as a commitment "to reaching a solution based on principle, not pressure" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:86). According to the authors, this objective is achieved by taking objective standards into account in the proposed agreements. Objective criteria as considered by Fisher and Ury includes both fair standards and fair procedures. From this basis, the two questions posed in Chapter Four on theory were intended to provide some indication of whether the issues of fair standards and fair procedures were addressed in the Bridgepoint negotiations. Once again, the two indicator questions outlined in the theory chapter examined: whether the criteria used to achieve No Net Loss of habitat at Bridgepoint were developed and applied fairly, and; whether the process used in achieving No Net Loss at Bridgepoint was fair. The Development and Application of Objective Criteria As characterized in the previous discussions, the initial stages of the Bridgepoint negotiations were predominantly positional in nature and largely void of consideration toward objective standards. During later discussions, however, objective standards were used in at least two significant instances to assist the progress of the negotiations. The first of these was the development and application of the habitat compensation ratio.  As will be recalled from the case study examination, lost marsh habitat was replaced at a ratio of 2 to 1. The ratio was based on observations of the productivity of marsh plantings at the Campbell River, British Columbia site. According to DFO staff, the Campbell River data suggested that reaching full productivity in the replacement marsh would require between 8 and 10 years of growth (Langer, November 27, 1990). To reach full productivity in 4 years the Campbell River data suggested that twice as much replacement marsh would be required. Hence, the 2:1 compensation ratio for lost marsh habitat was applied to the Bridgepoint development (Langer, November 27, 1990).  158  The case study chapter outlined the justifications described by the NFHC for adopting the ratio at Bridgepoint. The NFHC's own research found that in California ratios were as high as 7 and 10 to 1 (Colquhoun, December 11. 1990). Although the compensation marsh still posed a possible risk for the NFHC since they were responsible for any remedial measures if the transplants did not take, the 2:1 ratio was accepted by the NFHC as a fair standard -- particularly in light of the ratios used elsewhere. Agreement was not initially reached on the issue of compensation for lost mudflat as the NFHC raised concerns as to the need for compensation of mudflat in the area.  DFO's request was that lost mudflat be replaced on a 1:1 basis. The NFHC conducted an inventory on the North Arm and determined that 50% of the 8.75 km shoreline study area consisted of mudflat or natural intertidal areas. Since the amount of mudflat was evidently not a limiting factor with regard to fish food requirements in the area (NFHC March 7, 1985:4), the NFHC questioned DFO's request for 1:1 replacement of the lost mudflat. This appeal to the objective measures provided by the NFHC's inventory eventually allowed DFO to accept part of the NFHC's alternative proposal whereby clean-up and protection measures at several sites in the North Arm were credited as compensation for lost mudflat.  These examples show that in the latter half of the negotiations attempts were made to utilize objective standards as a means of resolving specific issues. Fair Process at Bridgepoint The last issue to be addressed in this analysis is whether fair processes were used in applying No Net Loss to the Bridgepoint development. On this issue a number of viewpoints were expressed. One of the more interesting of these comes from DFO staff. During 1984 No Net Loss was being proposed as the "cornerstone" of the Habitat Policy (DFO, December 6, 1984:1). Having gained by December of 1984 a considerable degree of experience with how proponents, both at Bridgepoint and elsewhere, were reacting to the application of No Net Loss DFO staff at the operations level  159 suggested that the habitat policy should concentrate on Net Gain of fish habitat, with No Net Loss supporting that objective. One of their strongest concerns focused specifically on the four level assessment process. From their observations they concluded that "many parties ignore or provide window dressing to 1) prevention and 2) mitigation and immediately resort to compensation" (DFO,  December 6, 1984:2). Reflecting what had happened in the negotiations to that point, Bridgepoint was cited as a case in point.  Interestingly, the North Fraser Harbour Environmental Management Plan was, in part, an attempt to compensate for some of the perceived weaknesses in the application of No Net Loss in the Harbour.  By implication, this example strongly suggests that DFO operational staff increasingly saw the application process as inequitable to at least some degree, and biased in favour of the developer. The hierarchical application of the review served both to prolong the process and to make rejection, the fourth level of the review, difficult to impose after going through the first three levels. On the positive side, DFO's own 1989 evaluation of the case stated that Bridgepoint resulted in a "better definition of the process for negotiating NNL" (DFO, 1989:3).  From the perspective of the NFHC and their consultant G.L. Williams and Associates, the actual process was basically fair (Colquhoun, December 11, 1990 and Williams, December 14, 1991). Of particular note was the fact that the RSCC Task Force 'listened' to the arguments presented and this, it was felt, made a difference (December 14, 1991). Both the NFHC representative and Williams also suggested that what allowed the process to work at Bridgepoint was the fact that DFO could count on the NFHC being around in the long term to deal with any required remedial measures necessary. Specific concerns raised with the process were that it was very drawn out, and that firmer -- scientifically based -- evaluative criteria would have improved the biological justification of the compensation efforts.  160 Although the focus of this thesis is oriented towards the No Net Loss negotiations between the NFHC and DFO, some impressions of the developer's perspective about the fairness of the process can be inferred from the available documentation. In their December 1984 letter to the NFHC the developer, being concerned about delays, comments that "it is absolutely essential that decisions be made timely since otherwise, the future of this project could be seriously jeopardized" (Bridgeport  Harbour Market Corp., December 13, 1984:2). Perceived delays in the review process were a continuing concern with the developer -- and one which was apparently expressed in his February 1985 letter to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. DFO operational staff, placed on the defensive, argued that the project review had not delayed the project but rather the schedule was very tight given the Expo 86 construction deadline. DFO staff further stated that because of that schedule the project had been given a high priority (DFO, March 7, 1985:3-4).  DFO staff also had to respond to a suggestion that the "goal posts" were moving (DFO, March 7, 1985:3). From their perspective, this was not the case. Instead, they stated, the proponent had been informed that if the project went ahead "mitigation at the site would be inadequate and required off-site compensation would be expensive" (DFO, March 7, 1985:3).  One other commentary on the developer's perspective of the process is apparent in The Richmond Times article "Habitat Policy Costly Process: Nearly Cripples Project" (The Richmond Times, September 20, 1988). Citing the high cost of compensation, and the burden of the 2:1 replacement ratio, Playsic told the Times that the policy was "asking too much of developers".  Collectively, these examples show at least some degree of dissatisfaction with the process by the proponent. Insist on Using Objective Criteria -- Summary and Conclusions On the issue of objective standards, the analysis found little evidence of any reliance on such standards in the first stages of the negotiations. The latter stages, however, showed at least some  161 examples where objective standards were used (i.e. compensation ratios, mudflat inventory of the North Arm). Judging by the acceptance of the final agreement between the NFHC and DFO, it is likely that the use of these standards contributed greatly to the outcome.  Analysis on the question of fair process at Bridgepoint showed that a multitude of viewpoints exist on this issue. The concerns raised by DFO staff about the No Net Loss project evaluation process, and the development of the North Fraser Harbour Environmental Management Plan suggest that, at least in this instance, the application of No Net Loss as prescribed by the Habitat Policy was not perceived by DFO staff at the level of operations as equitable largely because of the inability to reject the proposal outright.  From the NFHC's perspective the process was fair, but drawn out and somewhat lacking in scientific rigor with regard to some of the standards applied.  Finally, from the proponent's perspective, the high costs of compensation, the burden of the 2:1 compensation ratio, and the perceived series of delays, placed the No Net Loss policy beyond what developers could afford.  Collectively, the results on the question of fair process are mixed. Between the two main negotiating parties, the NFHC and DFO, many issues and problems with the application of No Net Loss appear to have been resolved to their mutual satisfaction in the final agreements. Recognizing the limitations imposed by the Fisheries legislation and the No Net Loss policy, the question of how much latitude either side actually had in seeking out alternative and more equitable solutions would likely have to be considered had they ventured much beyond the processes they were working with.  6.4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS In the discussion on theory in Chapter Four , Fisher and Ury's three basic criteria for judging any  162 method of negotiation were outlined. The criteria stated that the method of negotiation "should produce a wise agreement, ... it should be efficient", ... and "it should improve or at least not damage the relationship between the parties" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:4). Viewed from this perspective, this  chapter's discussion regarding the final negotiated agreements for Bridgepoint strongly suggests that a wise and durable agreement was reached in this case. Allowing for some difference of opinion amongst the various parties involved, the agreements could be said to have improved the relationships between them. Where Bridgepoint appears to have fallen short is over the issue of efficiency.  Some insights as to the strengths and weaknesses of the Bridgepoint negotiations were made apparent in this Chapter's assessment of the case from the perspective of the four principles of Fisher and Ury's Principled Negotiation method -- a method which attempts to fulfill the three criteria stated above. In this section, the many observations made in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 are distilled into a number of key points from which recommendations pertaining to future No Net Loss negotiations are made.  For the discussion which follows, a visual interpretation of the results of the case study analysis is provided in Table 6.4. Each bar in the Table shows the degree to which the intent of each of Fisher and Ury's four principles were reflected in the Bridgepoint negotiations. Shaded cells left of centre indicate that the respective principle was only weakly reflected, or non-existent in the negotiations. Shadings to the right of centre indicated that aspects of the principle were either evident or very strongly reflected in the negotiations. Shadings in the centre of the bar indicate mixed observations.  A notable feature of the Table is the shift over time toward an overall improvement in the latter stages of the negotiations. In a broad sense this shift appears to reflect a movement towards a more 'principled' negotiating approach, as defined by Fisher and Ury. Considering the latter stages of the negotiations when the interests of the various parties were considered to at least  ^ ^ ^  163  ^.  ^  I) c) U  U  C.) ,•F•i (1.)^(1) 1,11  Q.) ;-4  .u'v  0  Q) 0  0  cr) U U 0 :14 •.  a,  c.) 0^(3.) .r4 :19  1.) 0 •  (/)  C.)^C.) (1.)^(1)  a,  0.  (i) U ct U co  +9 79 4  +.) a)  cd  +-) Q •  (1) "Z:1 Cd C.)  C.)  4—.  0 C.) C.) -t) ^c•..1  ^ete  0  4-4^(1)  U 4 +.)  O  U 0  (/)  tzt ccS  a) -0  164 some extent, and when attempts were made to search for solutions with mutual gains, this could be argued to be generally true. The detailed analysis reveals, however, that these events have come about primarily as a result of a negotiation process which more closely resembled a bartering exchange than an attempt to adhere to the principles prescribed by the Principled Negotiation method. From this perspective, the key conclusions drawn from this thesis' application of Fisher and Ury's four principles are examined in turn.  6.4.1 Focus on Interests not Positions As reflected in Table 6.4, the analysis showed that in the early stages of the Bridgepoint negotiations there is little evidence of any consistent attempts by the negotiating parties involved to focus on interests as a means of finding solutions to the problems at hand. Rather, this period in the negotiations was characterized in the analysis as being highly positional in nature, and reminiscent of bartering in practice. The latter stages, while much improved with many interests incorporated into the final agreements, failed to indicate that these results were anything more than the result of concessions to the bartering process. Some reservations had also been raised by the CWS representatives and the proponent as to whether their interests were fully accommodated in the process. Certainly this can be said to have been the case with regard to the public's interests, which were only directly considered through the Municipality of Richmond's public review process for the proponent's rezoning application. These mixed observations in the analysis are thus reflected in the relevant second bar in Table 6.4.  The analysis strongly suggests that a focused joint examination of each party's interests in the early stages of the negotiations would have improved both the efficiency and the quality of the negotiations. By identifying both shared and compatible interests from a listing such as the ones presented in Tables 6.3a and 6.3b, a good deal of the positional posturing could have been avoided as alternative solutions and considerations would have become evident at an earlier stage. By way of example, early identification of DFO's interest in ensuring that long term management provisions be in place, independent of the prevailing economic conditions, would have indicated the  165 need for the NFHC's strengthened and continued role in any agreement to be reached. Similarly, recognition of the NFHC's interest in developing a management plan for the North Arm, incorporating the application of No Net Loss, along with the recognition that the NFHC representatives had very few ideas on how to go about this in the early stages of the negotiations, would have suggested the possibility. of joint workshops to explore how a management plan could function. Workshops would have also served to allow the parties to focus on generating solutions, rather than developing positional arguments. In this context, Bridgepoint might well have been suggested as a first application for their ideas.  In effect, what is being recommended here is that the various interests of the parties involved should have been made explicit so that they could have been more directly explored for alternative solutions and approaches to the problems at hand. Had this been done, the quality of the negotiations would have been improved by focusing directly on the interests involved and the motivations behind them, rather than on the smoke and mirrors of each side's positional stance. The process could also have been made more efficient by providing all the parties with a clearer understanding of the various needs which had to be accommodated in the final agreements. This would have had the effect of making the search for potential solutions more direct and comprehensive from the start.  6.4.2 Separate the People from the Problem As reflected in Table 6.4, the analysis indicates that Fisher and Ury's principle of separating the people from the problem was not strongly evident in the early stages of the Bridgepoint negotiation process. The analysis showed that during these early stages the process suffered significantly from misunderstandings between the parties, failures to communicate over critical issues, differences in how well the parties were informed, and eruptions of human emotions accentuated by a range of catalysts, including construction deadlines for Expo 86, and the virtual elimination of most of the foreshore marsh habitat in the immediate vicinity.  166 Table 6.4 also indicates that, in the latter stages of the negotiations, actions which showed the intent of separating the people from the problem were much more prevalent than in the first part of the negotiations. Some of the activities which served to improve the situation included: stronger commitments to keeping all the parties informed; deliberate attempts to mediate exchanges between the environmental agencies and the proponent; and changes in personnel and/or their roles in the exchange. Two important changes in the participant's roles involved: a much stronger presence of the NFHC Port Manager, who was willing to take a new look at the issue; and the assignment of a more significant role in the negotiations to an Aquatic Biologist working with both the NFHC and the proponent.  When examined from Fisher and Ury's perspective, each of the people problems identified in the first stage of the negotiations fell within the three basic categories described in their book Getting To Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. The three basic categories describe were: "perception, emotion, and communication" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:22). As general prescriptions for  such problems Fisher and Ury wrote the following: Where perceptions are inaccurate, you can look for ways to educate. If emotions run high, you can find ways for each person involved to let off steam. Where misunderstanding exists, you can work to improve communication.  (Fisher and Ury, 1981:22). In the case of Bridgepoint there are examples in the negotiations where such actions were employed. The November 28, 1984 letter from DFO to the NFHC clarifying the No Net Loss project evaluation process and its intent provides a clear example of an attempt to overcome misperceptions through education. Similarly, both sides eventually took significant steps to improve communications by strengthening the working relationships between the parties. Finally, the joint search by the NFHC and the RSCC Task Force for suitable off-site compensation areas not only provides an example of broadening the options, but also of the improved communications in the latter stages of the process. Each of these actions no doubt served to overcome the people problems which plagued the negotiations.  167 Had measures similar to those mentioned above been made in the initial stages of the negotiations, the entire process would have functioned with much less difficulty. An argument for this statement is that both the communication and education aspects of the process would have been better served had the minutes of the initial March 28, 1984 meeting been circulated soon after the meeting. Accompanying the minutes with detailed information on exactly what No Net Loss entailed and how the evaluation process was anticipated to operate would have further strengthened the process by providing all the parties with an equal understanding of what was involved. Given the newness of the No Net Loss Policy, the misunderstandings and misinterpretations of what was required should have been anticipated. In Fisher and Ury's words, the operational phrase is "prevention works best" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:38).  Among Fisher and Ury's recommendations for coming to grips with perceptual differences, is the idea of considering the issues from "their shoes" (Fisher and Ury, 1981:23). A recommendation that would have allowed both sides to do this would have been for the proponent to present the environmental agencies with all of the parameters that they were dealing with and then ask the agencies how they would design the foreshore portions of the project. In addition to forcing the proponent to consider fully all of the parameters involved with the project, at least from their perspective, the results of this interaction would have provided some insights as to how the proponents perceived the project and what their considerations were. DFO representatives have indicated that since the Bridgepoint project, their staff have designed at least one foreshore compensation site for a proponent (Langer, 1990).  Another approach would have been for the proponent to consider and show the environmental agencies how their design was consistent with the No Net Loss Principle and/or precedents established by applications of No Net Loss in other parts of the world. Such an examination would have shown the proponent how the project's design might have been altered to make it more acceptable to the environmental agencies.  168 6.4.3 Inventing Options for Mutual Gain Table 6.4 shows that the analysis found very little evidence of any concerted effort to invent options for mutual gain in the first portion of the Bridgeport negotiations. The analysis once again found that solutions generated during this period were more the products of a bartering process than of a deliberate and systematic search for an optimal solution to the problems at hand. No evidence of any joint efforts to separate inventing from deciding, as through brainstorming or game simulations, was found. The one clear action where one side deliberately attempted to influence the decision of the other was amazingly similar to what Fisher and Ury describe as an attempt to trade off substantive interests against relationship interests -- an action characteristic of positional bargaining.  The latter stages of the negotiations showed much stronger indications of Fisher and Ury's principle of inventing options for mutual gain. It was during this period, for example, that the parties attempted to broaden the options available for compensation sites by developing a list of eighteen candidate sites. Two of the parties also undertook a joint search for suitable habitat evaluation models which might have been applied to the Fraser's North Arm. Additionally, the first steps toward the development of the North Fraser Environmental Management Plan were made by the NFHC and DFO during this period.  Although it is unlikely that any of the examples from the latter stages could have been started in the earlier stages of the negotiations, searching for mutually beneficial solutions at an earlier period in the negotiations would have been a vast improvement over the confrontational nature of positional bargaining which was prominent from the beginning. All of the parties would have benefited had they jointly `scoped' the issue out prior to any work being done.  6.4.4 Insisting on Objective Criteria The analysis examined the Bridgepoint case on the basis of both fair standards and fair procedures, reflecting the divisions used in Fisher and Ury's Principled Negotiation theory.  169 During the initial stage of the negotiations only a limited reliance on objective standards was evident as the arguments tended to be largely positional in nature. On the issue of fair process, the analysis noted that by early December 1984, DFO's 'front lines' staff were voicing concerns over the No Net Loss evaluation process. The hierarchical nature of the process, it was stated, allowed proponents to "ignore or provide window dressing to prevention and mitigation then immediately resort to compensation" (DFO, December 6, 1984:2). From the memoranda produced  in December 1984, it is clear that DFO staff felt that the process provided the developers with an unfair advantage in the negotiation process.  The post December 1984 indicator in Table 6.4 reflects the stronger reliance on objective criteria by the parties that is apparent in the analysis. Issues of fair standards were addressed in the search for acceptable habitat compensation ratios, and in the discussions over the necessity of compensation for lost mudflat. Analysis on the issue of fair processes on the other hand, revealed a greater variation in the views held by the various parties involved. In their own analysis of the Bridgepoint case, DFO staff felt that Bridgepoint helped to provide a better definition of the process -- a function no doubt strengthened with the development of the North Fraser Harbour Environmental Management Plan. For their part, NFHC staff were appreciative of the willingness of the RSCC Task Force members to listen to concerns raised over the course of the negotiations. Less positive perspectives were evident, however, in the proponent's comments to the local press over the costs imposed by the compensation requirements of the habitat policy. Concerns were also voiced by Canadian Wildlife representatives on the environmental impacts left unaccounted for in the process. Table 6.4 acknowledges these variations by indicating lightly shaded tones around the solid marker.  While there remains uncertainty about every detail which was discussed over the course of the Bridgepoint negotiations, from this researcher's perspective, it would be fair to suggest that a discussion of fair standards which could have been applied to the problems involved did not occur in the early stages of the negotiations. One indication of this is that the need to develop a  1  70  compensation formula for lost habitat was not definitively raised until the meeting of November 30, 1984. If this example was typical of the eients of the initial stages of the negotiations, then the parties involved could have used their time more efficiently by jointly identifying the substantive issues involved and then discussing possible standards which could be practically applied.  With regard to the issue of fair procedures, this analysis would be remiss if attention was not given to the issue of the hierarchical project evaluation procedure. The concerns raised by DFO staff about this procedure, and the development of the North Fraser Harbour Environmental Management Plan (1988) to avoid similar problems in the future, provide strong arguments for DFO to reassess their approach. The likelihood that a developer will simply drop a project after having gone through an evaluation procedure which first tells him to look for another location, then asks for a design that incorporates mitigation, and later adds compensation requirements to the plan, only to have the proposal rejected in the end, becomes quite unlikely. The process seems geared to generate confrontation. In contrast, the merit of the Environmental Management Plan is that it provides potential developers with some indication of what they would be getting into should they attempt to develop a particular site -- before they become too deeply involved. This plan evolved as an agreement between two key governing agencies responsible for the North Fraser Harbour. Where such agreements have not yet been worked out, an alternative approach would be for Fisheries to evaluate new proposals on a point system which considers the degree to which mitigation and compensation efforts are incorporated in the design and weights these aspects by the environmental sensitivity of the site. The results of this evaluation would permit the reviewing body to reject a proposal from the start -- something which is evidently difficult under the current process. Another benefit would be that proponents with projects not meeting requirements for approval would be able to determine from the reviewing agencies' recommendations which aspects of the proposal would have to be improved, or in fact if further work was worth the effort and costs. At a minimum such a process would help to eliminate accusations that 'the goal posts are moving'.  1  71  Whether or not such an alternative is employed, the experiences at Bridgepoint strongly point to the need to rethink the evaluation procedures employed.  6.4.5 Conclusions and Recommendations Summary In this section a number of specific conclusions and recommendations have been made about the application of No Net Loss at Bridgepoint based on the analysis provided in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 of this chapter. The discussion began by assessing the Bridgepoint negotiations against Fisher and Ury's three criteria of what any negotiation method should do. The analysis indicated that, against these standards, the full potential of the Bridgepoint negotiations was only partially reached. In support of this premise, and to provide specific examples on how the negotiations should have been improved, a synthesis of the analysis under each of the four principles was made.  The synthesis provided in this section supports the contention that the Bridgepoint negotiations would have benefited by applying the principles of Fisher and Ury's Principled Negotiations method.  The specific recommendations made, such as having Fisheries evaluate new proposals on a point system rather than the hierarchical approach now in use and the development of workshops to discuss individual projects in terms of what No Net Loss implies to its design, are based on observations of weaknesses evident in the process as applied at Bridgepoint. The intent in offering these specific recommendations is to show that other practical alternatives exist, and to affirm the considerable degree of flexibility afforded by the Principled Negotiation method in achieving solutions to a problem. As such these recommendations should be viewed as catalysts to further discussions about resolving the weakness of the No Net Loss process.  1 79  In the concluding chapter an overview of the material covered in this thesis is provided together with a number of comments on the implications of the Bridgepoint analysis for future applications of No Net Loss and the management of the fish habitat resource.  173  CHAPTER SEVEN BRIDGEPOINT: THESIS OVERVIEW  The main objective of this thesis was to examine and assess the Bridgepoint Market Development in Richmond, British Columbia as an application of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans' principle of No Net Loss. As a planning thesis, the specific focus of this research was on the process aspects of the case.  After reviewing a number of different potential approaches, Fisher ana Ury's Principled Negotiation Theory was selected as a basis for developing an analytical framework with which to assess the Bridgepoint case study. The assessment was essentially empirical, relying upon an extensive range of documentation, supplemented by interviews with ten individuals, to provide information about the case.  The thesis was laid out in five major chapters. Chapter Two, "The Importance of Wetland Habitat in the Fraser: Ecological and Economic Considerations", and Chapter Three, "Legal and Jurisdictional Issues Affecting Fish Habitat Management at Bridgepoint", provided background information necessary to an understanding of some of the key issues which arose in the Bridgepoint negotiations.  Chapter Four, "Theory: Development of an Analytical Framework", outlined the theoretical basis for the analytical framework used to assess the Bridgepoint case. The fundamental principles, Separate the People From the Problem, Focus on Interest, Not Positions, Invent Options for Mutual Gain, and Insist on Using Objective Criteria, as outlined in Fisher and Ury's book Getting To Yes (1981), were discussed in detail and an analytical framework was developed on this basis. Concluding the Chapter, this researcher's perspectives on the relationship of this research to Planning Theory were stated.  174  Chapter Five, "No Net Loss at Bridgepoint: Case Study Examination", outlined the events which took place in connection with the Bridgepoint Market Development. Included in the discussion was a listing of the key parties involved and the roles that they played, specific issues which arose in the negotiations, and a chronological overview of the events.  Chapter Six, "Bridgepoint Negotiation Analysis", applied the analytical framework developed in Chapter Four to the Bridgepoint case in order to provide some insights on the strengths and weaknesses of the negotiation process. In the Chapter a number of observations, conclusions, and recommendations were made based on the analysis. Some of the more prominent ones are listed below.  One easily made conclusion was that negotiation was an integral part of the application of No Net Loss at Bridgepoint. This conclusion is supported not only by documentation, but also through interviews with several of the participants to the negotiations.  The Bridgepoint case was shown to have made a number of important contributions to DFO's Fish Habitat Policy and its application. Direct contributions include a refinement of the process of applying No Net Loss, and the development of compensation ratios for different habitat types. Other important products which have evolved from the Bridgepoint negotiations include the Environmental Management Plan For The North Fraser Harbour (1988), and the North Fraser Harbour Shoreline Habitat Inventory (1986). Each of these aspects adds to the significance of the Bridgepoint case.  The analysis showed that over the four year period from 1984 to 1988, a number of improvements in the negotiation process occurred. One particular improvement commented on by participants from both sides, was the stronger hands-on involvement of the NFHC's Port Manager midway into the negotiations. His involvement provided an opportunity to take another look at the case. A second improvement of note, was the more prominent role assigned to an aquatic  175 biologist working for the NFHC and the proponent. This individual's function included aspects such as fact finding and mediation. His role was the closest approximation to a third party intervention that appears in the Bridgepoint case. That this function contributed to the resolution of many aspects of the case, provides a strong basis for the inclusion of qualified third party intervention to be built into DFO's process for applying No Net Loss.  While acknowledging these more positive aspects of the Bridgepoint negotiations, the analysis also indicated, that the negotiation process was more reflective of positional bargaining and bartering than of an application of the kind of principles which have been shown to make negotiations work well (i.e. Fisher and Ury's four principles). For example, the analysis on the principle of Focusing on Interests Not Positions showed that in the first stages of the negotiations a considerable amount  of time and effort was spent by the opposing sides on stating their respective positions. The principle suggests that their concerns would have been better served by exploring for shared or compatible interests which might have lead to solutions to the problems at hand. Many of the interests in the case were conveyed through the various bargaining positions, rather than a specific focusing on them. Even in the latter stages, when progress was being made toward agreements, the evidence failed to indicate that these agreements were anything more than products of concessions to the positions taken.  Analysis on the principle of Separating the People From the Problem revealed a number of significant problems in the process at Bridgepoint. Included in these problems were; failures to communicate key aspects of the case in the early stages of the negotiations - notably a lack of communication over the terms of reference for the site's environmental study; difficulties in understanding the other side's perceptions -- particularly over the issue of habitat values versus the economic success of the project; and, attempts to trade off relationship interests against substantive interest by tying the decision over Bridgepoint to other issues on the River. The analysis also showed that at various times it was apparent that the parties were not equally well  176 informed. An example presented was DFO's request of the NFHC during the Richmond Council's public hearings in December 1984, as to how much habitat was expected to be lost.  Regarding the principle of Inventing Options for Mutual Gain, the analysis showed that in the first stages of the negotiations, there were few attempts to joint problem solve, or employ techniques that would separate the invention of ideas from the act of deciding between them. The most notable attempt to facilitate the decisions of another party occurred over the issue of viewing Bridgepoint in light of the other issues on the Fraser.  On the fourth principle, Insisting on Objective Criteria, the analysis found that only in the latter stages of the negotiations was any evidence of a reliance on objective standards apparent. Two examples provided, were the use of compensation results from Campbell River to develop compensation ratios for Bridgepoint, and the taking of an inventory on the quantity of mudflat remaining along the Fraser's North Arm to show whether there was in fact a need to compensate for losses of this type of habitat. On the issue of fair process the analysis showed multiple viewpoints existed among the participants. Notably, DFO staff voiced general concerns over the evaluation process, suggesting that it was biased in favour of the developers. The NFHC representatives, on the other hand, felt that the process as applied to Bridgepoint was fair but quite drawn out. The proponent publicly voiced concerns over the costs involved in the compensation requirements, and over the delays the process had caused.  A general conclusion based on the Bridgepoint analysis is that significant improvements in the process of applying No Net Loss would have been realized by employing the principles indicated by the Principled Negotiation method. In making this recommendation, it is noted that support for the broader application of negotiation techniques in resolving environmental conservation and economic development disputes has been similarly voiced by The Report of the British Columbia Task Force on Environment and Economy (1989:32). The role of negotiation and mediation in reaching consensus over such disputes is explored in even greater detail in the report by The  177 British Columbia Round Table on the Environment and the Economy (1991) entitled Reaching Agreement: Consensus Processes in British Columbia.  One final point evident from the Bridgepoint analysis was that DFO's hierarchical four step approach for evaluating projects - i.e. prevention, mitigation, compensation and rejection - is geared for confrontation. The farther along a proponent is in the process, the less likely he will be to simply drop a project. The suggestion was made that a preferred approach would be to implement a system which provided for a qualified rejection from the start, in order to reduce the potential for conflict.  In conclusion, the examination and analysis of the Bridgepoint Market Development as an application of No Net Loss, has provided a number of insights as to how the process would be improved through an adherence to the four basic principles for negotiation; i.e. Separating the People from the Problem, Focusing on Interests, not Positions, Inventing Options for Mutual Gain, and Insisting on Using Objective Criteria. Arguably, the strengthening of this key component of  the Department of Fisheries and Oceans' Policy for the Management of Fish Habitat would also serve to strengthen the national objectives for managing the resource.  178  BIBLIOGRAPHY REFERENCES CITED Alexander, E. 1986. Approaches To Planning: Introducing Current Planning Theories, Concepts, and Issues. Alexander, L.J. 1982. Fraser River Estuary Study: Legal Provisions For Linked Management. Area Designation Task Force (A.D.T.F.) to the Fraser River Estuary Study Planning Committee. May, 1981. First Draft Report. Area Designation Task Force. March 1982. Report of the Area Designation Task Force to the Fraser River Estuary Planning Committee. B.C. Ministry of the Attorney General, Land Titles Office. December 22, 1978. Certificate of Indefeasible Title. Beal, K.L. 1980. "Territorial Sea Fisheries Management and Estuarine Dependence" in Estuarine Perspectives. Bridgeport Harbour Market Corporation. December 13, 1984. Letter to the North Fraser Harbour Commission. British Columbia Round Table On The Environment and the Economy. 1991. Reaching Agreement: Volume 1, Consensus Processes in British Columbia. British Columbia Task Force On Environment and Economy. 1989. Sustaining the Living Land. Butler, R.W. and R.W. Campbell. 1987. The Birds of the Fraser River Delta: Population, Ecology and International Significance. Canadian Wildlife Service Occasional Paper #65. Canada and British Columbia. 1982. A Living River By the Door: A Proposed Management Program For The Fraser River Estuary. Childerhose, R.J. and Trim, M. 1981. Pacific Salmon. Clark B., DFO, Habitat Management Branch, New Westminster. Personal communication, January 29, 1991 Colquhoun G., Port Manager, North Fraser Harbour Commission. Personal communication, December 11, 1990. Conlin, K. Habitat Protection Branch, DFO. June 9, 1990. Personal Communication. Delaney, P. Senior Program Biologist, Habitat Management Division, Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Personal Communication Sept 21, 1990. Delaney, P. Senior Program Biologist, Habitat Management Division, Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Personal Communication August 20, 1990. DFO. undated:a. The Incredible Salmonids. Brochure.  179 DFO. undated:b. The Life Cycle of Pacific Salmon. Information papers. DFO. 1982. "Division Manages to Protect Habitat," in Fish Habitat Monitor. September, 1982, Vol. 1, No. 1. DFO. 1982. Fish Habitat: The Foundation of Canada's Fisheries. DFO. 1983a. "Pearse Supports Habitat Initiatives," in Fish Habitat Monitor. January, 1983, Vol.1, No. 2. DFO. 1983b. Proceedings Of The No Net Loss Workshop. (Delta River Inn, Richmond, B.C. April 7-8). DFO. 1983c. Toward A Fish Habitat Management Policy For The Department Of Fisheries and Oceans. DFO. September 27, 1984. Letter to the Vladimir Playsic Group. DFO. November 26, 1984. Internal Memorandum. DFO. November 28, 1984. Letter to the North Fraser Harbour Commission (NFHC). DFO. November 28, 1984. Internal Memorandum. DFO. December 6, 1984. Internal Memorandum. DFO. 1985. Proposed Policy and Procedures for Fish Habitat Management:27. DFO. February 5, 1985. Minutes from the No Net Loss Workshop. DFO. March 7, 1985. Internal memorandum. DFO. March 25, 1985. Letter to the NFHC. DFO. June 11, 1985. Letter to Hatfield Consultants Ltd. DFO. July 24, 1985. Director General's letter to the NFHC. DFO. October 1986. Policy For The Management Of Fish Habitat. Official policy release. DFO. 1986a. Policy For The Management Of Fish Habitat. DFO. 1986b. Summary: Fish Habitat Management Policy. DFO. 1989a. Habitat Forever. (Video) DFO. 1989. Pacific Region - No Net Loss Examples Report. Unpublished. DFO and NFHC. September 1988. An Environmental Management Plan For The North Fraser Harbour. DFO and NFHC. 1988. North Fraser Harbour Environmental Management Plan. Dorcey, A. 1986. Bargaining in the Governance of Pacific Coastal Resources: Research and Reform.  180 Dorcey, A. 1988. Negotiation in the Integration of Environmental and Economic Assessment For Sustainable Development. Dorcey, A. and C. Riek. March 1987. Negotiation-Based Approaches to the Settlement of Environmental Disputes in Canada. Dorcey A., K.J. Hall, D.A. Levy, I. Yesaki. 1983. Estuarine Habitat Management: A Prospectus for Tilbury Slough. Duncan, A. 1990. "Environmental Legislation". Presentation for the North Fraser Harbour Commission's Harbour Keeping Workshop. June 8, 1990. Dunn, M.W. 1978. Fraser River Estuary Study: Constitutional and Legislative Frameworks. Faludi, A. 1987. A Decision-centred View of Environmental Planning. Fisher, R. 1983a. "Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence" in American Behavioral Scientist. Vol. 27 No. 2. November/December. pp. 149-166. Fisher, R. 1983b. "What about Negotiation as a Specialty?" in American Bar Association Journal. September, Volume 69. pp. 1221-1224. Fisher, R. January 1985. "Beyond Yes" in the Negotiation Journal. pp. 67-70. Fisher, R. 1986. Negotiation. Fisher, R. and S. Brown. 1988. Getting Together: Building a Relationship That Gets to Yes. Fisher, R. and W. Ury. 1981. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. Forester, J. 1989. Planning In The Face Of Power. Fox, I.K. and J.P. Nowlan. 1978. The Management of Estuarine Resources in Canada. Document produced for the Canadian Environmental Advisory Council. Fraser River Estuary Study (FRES), Phase 2. 1982. A Living River By The Door. Fraser River Estuary Study, Phase II. 1982. Referrals Systems Presently Used In The Fraser River Estuary Study Core Area. FREMP. 1988. Summary of Monitoring and Research Activities and Proceedings - Fraser River Estuary Workshop on Monitoring and Research. Friedmann, J. 1987. Planning in the Public Domain: From Knowledge to Action. G.L. Williams & Associates. September, 1986. North Fraser Harbour Shoreline Habitat Inventory. Document prepared for the NFHC and DFO. Halladay, D.R. and R.D. Harris. 1972. A Commitment to the Future: A Proposal for the Protection and Management of the Fraser Wetlands. Hatfield Consultants Ltd. June 1985. Outline of Habitat Compensation For Proposed Bridgeport Harbour Market Development, Richmond, B.C. (Report prepared for the NFHC.  181 Ince, J. 1984a. Environmental Law: British Columbia Handbook, 1984. Ince, J. 1984b. Land Use Law. Inland Waters Directorate (IWD). March 22, 1985. Letter to the RSCC Task Force Chairman. Kennett, K. and M.W. McPhee. 1988. The Fraser River Estuary: An Overview of Changing Conditions. Lambertsen, G.K. 1987. A Guide To The Coordinated Project Review Process. A Fraser River Estuary Management Program (FREMP) document. Langer, 0. 1984. Letter to the North Fraser Harbour Commission. Langer, 0. Habitat Management Division, Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Personal Communication Nov 27, 1990. Lilley, J. 1988. Resolving Conflict: A Case Study. Miller, G.T. 1979. Living in the Environment. Nierenberg, G.I. 1968. The Art of Negotiations: Psychological Strategies For Gaining Advantageous Bargains. North Fraser Harbour Commission (NFHC). Document undated: 1981/82?. "Prime Richmond Waterfront: Lease & Develop". (Advertisement). NFHC. Document undated. Port of North Fraser: The Working River. (Brochure). NFHC. October 5, 1984. Letter to DFO. NFHC. October 25, 1984. "Summary of Meeting Of October 16, 1984 Concerning The Proposed Bridgeport Harbour Market Foreshore Development." NFHC. December 17, 1984. Letter to DFO. NFHC. March 7, 1985. Letter to DFO. Pearse, P. 1982. Turning the Tide: A New Policy For Canada's Pacific Fisheries. Pearse P.H., F. Bertrand, J.W. MacLaren. 1985. Currents of Change: Inquiry on Federal Water Policy. Raiffa, H. 1982. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Richmond Clerk's Department. July 24, 1984. Memorandum to the Director of Planning. Richmond Clerk's Department. December 20, 1984. Minutes from the Council meeting of December 20, 1984. Richmond Council Minutes. December 17, 1984. Minutes of the Public Hearing. Richmond Health Department. Sept. 13, 1983. Letter to Environment Canada, Environmental Protection Service.  182 Richmond Health Department. Oct. 9 1984. Bridgeport Harbour Market Proposal, Rezoning Application and Environmental Impacts. (Report attached to Oct 23, 1984 Staff Report to Planning Committee). Richmond Health Department, November 2, 1984. Internal memorandum. Richmond Planning Department. Oct. 23, 1984. Staff Report to Planning Committee. RSBC. 1979. Municipal Act. R.S.B.C., Chapter 290 (Consolidated to February 29, 1988). RSC. 1867. British North America Act. RSC. 1982. Constitution Act. RSC. 1985. Canada Fisheries Act. Chapter F-14. RSC. 1988. Canadian Environmental Protection Act. Chapter 22. Runyan, C. Environmental Control Officer, Municipality of Richmond. Personal Communication Aug 12, 1990. Seliskar, D.M., and J.L. Gallagher. 1983. The Ecology of Tidal Marshes of the Pacific Northwest Coast: A Community Profile. Simenstad C.A., K.L. Fresh, and E.O. Salo. 1982. "The Role of Puget Sound and Washington Coastal Estuaries in the Life History of Pacific Salmon: An Unappreciated Function", in Estuarine Comparisons. Strauss, A. 1984. Negotiations: Varieties, Contexts, Processes, and Social Order. The Richmond Review. Oct. 28, 1984. "Public Hearing Now In December: Slow Planning Delays Market": 1. The Richmond Review. Feb. 26, 1989. "Harbour Market Hopes To Be People Place.":1. The Richmond Review. March 27, 1985. "Harbor Market Called Pipe Dream":1. The Richmond Review. June 17, 1987. "Harbour Market On - Again":1. The Richmond Review. December 13, 1987. "Harbour Market Back On Stream":1. The Richmond Times. Sept. 16, 1988. "Memorandum of Understanding.":2. The Richmond Times. Sept. 20, 1988. "Habitat Policy Costly Process.":1. Tretheway, D. Canadian Wildlife Service, Environment Canada. (Personal communication, Jan 22, 1991). Vancouver Sun. Aug. 16, 1989. "Richmond Market Looks Like A Hit.":D1. Vancouver Sun. Dec 2, 1989. "Farmer's Market Gets 'Almanac' Clock":?. Ward, P. 1980. Explore the Fraser Estuary! A document produced for the Lands Directorate of Environment Canada. Weiten, W. 1983. Psychology Applied to Modern Life. pp. 61-63.  183 Wexley, K. and G. Yukl. 1977. Organizational Behavior and Personnel Psychology. Williams G., Aquatic Ecologist, Gary Williams and .eksociates. Personal communication, Jan 15, 1991. Williams G., J. Villamere and G. Smith. 1984. An Environmental Assessment of the Proposed Bridgepoint Harbour Market Foreshore Development.  184  INTERVIEW CONTACTS 1. Ian Chang, Community Planner, Municipality of Richmond. 2. Craig Runyan, Environmental Control Officer, Municipality of Richmond. 3. Alex Jamieson, Special Projects Planner, Municipality of Richmond. 4. Peter Delaney, Senior Program Biologist, Habitat Management Division, Department of Fisheries and Oceans. ^ • 5. Otto Langer, Habitat Management Division, Department of Fisheries and Oceans. 6. Ken Bennett, Public Health Inspector, Municipality of Richmond. 7. George Colquhoun, Port Manager, North Fraser Harbour Commission. 10. Gary Williams, Aquatic Ecologist, G.L. Williams & Associates. 11. Don Tretheway, Canadian Wildlife Service, Environment Canada. 12. Linda Duncan, B.C. Fish and Wildlife Management Branch.  185  APPENDICES  APPENDIX ONE BRIDGEPOINT PHOTOGRAPHS  186  PHOTO 1: BRIDGEPOINT MARKET 'S MAIN BUILOtNG  187  PHOTO 2: THIS VIEW SHOWS THE MAIN MARKET BUILDING, AND THE WATERFRONT MARINA.  PHOTO 3: A CLOSE UP VIEW SHOWING THE REMAINING MARSH SITUATED BEHIND THE MARINA'S OBSERVATION PIER,  188  PHOTO 4: LOOKING INTO THE FRONT OF THE PRESERVED MARSH AT HIGH TIDE.  _^  •^7^  PHOTO 5: LOOKING  ovro THE PRESERVED MARSH AT LOW TIDE.  r  189  PHOTO a: A PORTION OF THE  ^  THE WATERFRONT  PUB / RESTAURANT.  PHOTO 7: LOG STORAGE ON THE OUTSIDE EDGE OF THE MARSH.  190  APPENDIX TWO GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS  191  APPENDIX TWO: GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ANADROMOUS:^"Fish that migrate from freshwater to the sea" (Ince, 1984a:64). CEPA:^ COMPENSATION FOR LOSS:  The Canadian Environmental Protection Act.  ^  includes natural habitat replacement, productivity increases of existing habitat, and artificial methods of maintaining fish production (DFO, 1986a:29).  CWS:^  Canadian Wildlife Service (Environment Canada).  DELETERIOUS SUBSTANCE:  (partial definition) "any substance that, if added to any water, would degrade or alter or form part of a process of degrading or alteration of the quality of that water so that it is rendered or is likely to be rendered deleterious to fish or fish habitat or to the use by man of fish that frequent that water ..." (RSC, Fisheries Act, 1985:s34(1)).  DEPOSIT:  "any discharging, spraying, releasing, spilling, leaking, seeping, pouring, emitting, emptying, throwing, dumping or placing" (RSC, Fisheries Act, 1985:s34(1)).  DFO:^  The Federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans.  ECOSYSTEM:  "A community of living things interacting with one another and with their physical environment ... an ecosystem always has two manor parts or components: nonliving and living. The nonliving, or abiotic, part includes an outside energy source (usually the sun), various physical factors such as wind and heat, and all of the chemicals essential for life. The living, or biotic, portion of an ecosystem can be divided into food producers (plants) and food consumers. Consumers are usually further divided into macroconsumers (animals) and decomposers, or microconsumers, (chiefly bacteria and fungi)" (Miller, 1979:43).  FISH:  "includes shellfish, crustaceans, marine animals and the eggs, spawn, spat and juvenile stages of fish, shellfish, crustaceans and marine animals" (RSC, Fisheries Act, 1985:s2).  FISH HABITAT:  "spawning grounds and nursery, rearing, food supply and migration areas on which fish depend directly or indirectly in order to carry out their life processes" (RSC, Fisheries Act,  1985:s34(1)).  FOOD CHAIN:  "sequence of transfers of energy in the form of food from organisms in one trophic level to those in another when one organism eats or decomposes another" (Miller, 1979:A10).  FOOD WEB:^  "complex, interlocking series of food chains" (Miller,  1979:A10).  FRES:^  Fraser River Estuary Study.  192  MITIGATION:  ^  "actions taken during the planning, design, construction and operation of works and undertakings to alleviate potential adverse effects on the productive capacity of fish habitat"  (DFO, 1986a:30).  NFHC:^  The North Fraser Harbour Commission.  NET GAIN:^  "An increase in habitats for selected fisheries brought about by determined government and public efforts to conserve, restore and develop habitats". (DFO. 1985. Proposed Policy and Procedures for Fish Habitat Management:27).  NO NET LOSS PRINCIPLE: ^"A working principle by which the department strives to balance unavoidable habitat losses with habitat replacement on a project - by - project basis so that further reductions to Canada's fisheries resources due to habitat loss or damage may be prevented" (DFO, 1986a:30).  PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY: ^"The quantity of fish that is normally produced by unimpaired habitats under natural conditions." (DFO. 1985. Proposed  Policy and Procedures for Fish Habitat Management:27).  RSCC:^  Regional Screening and Coordinating Committee.  RIPARIAN VEGETATION:  "the trees and shrubs growing along the bank of a natural watercourse or at the edge of a lake or a tidewater" (Dorcey,  Hall, Levy, and Yesaki. 1983:52).  TROPHIC LEVEL:  "level where energy in the form of food is transferred from one organism to another in a food chain or food web" (Miller,  1979:A18).  193  APPENDIX THREE SUBMISSION FOR ETHICAL REVIEW  CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL  194 The University of British Columbia ^B90-310 Office of Research Services  BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES SCREENING COMMITTEE FOR RESEARCH AND OTHER STUDIES INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS CERTIFICATE^of  APPROVAL  INVESTIGATOR: Dorsey, T. UBC DEPT:^Comm/Regional Planning INSTITUTION:^Private Offices TITLE:^The Brid9epoint Development - An application of no net loss in the Fraser Estuary NUMBER:^B90-310 CO-INVEST:^Brownlee, D. APPROVED:^  OCT 2 6 1920  The protocol describing the above-named project has been reviewed by the Committee and the experimental procedures were found to be acceptable on ethical grounds for research involving human subjects.  THIS CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL IS VALID FOR THREE YEARS FROM THE ABOVE APPROVAL DATE PROVIDED THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES  


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