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Local control over local resources habitat management in the Fraser Estuary Jamieson, Marion Lea 1991

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Local ControlOver Local Resources:Habitat ManagementIn The Fraser EstuarybyMarion Lea JamiesonBA. University of British Columbia, 1989A Thesis Submitted In Partial Fulfillment OfThe Requirements For The Degree OfMasters Of ArtsinThe Faculty of Graduate Studies(School Of Community and Regional Planning)We accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardThe University of British ColumbiaDecember 1991In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.Department of Community and Regional PlanningThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDateDE-6 (2/88)ABSTRACTThis thesis approaches the issue of local control over localresources from the perspective of municipal and regionalgovernment involvement in habitat conservation. Using the FraserRiver estuary as a case study area, the expanding role of localgovernments is described in order to examine the relationshipbetween local and senior levels of government. The objective isto assess whether redistributing power between these levels ofgovernment would improve habitat management in the estuary.Improved habitat management is defined as a more democraticprocess of allocating costs and benefits associated with habitatconservation. Conventional administrative decision-making tendsto exclude perspectives which are in conflict with maintenance ofthe existing distribution of costs and benefits. Two perspectiveswhich have difficulty having their concerns addressed byadministrations are the conservation and community perspectives,even though issues of conservation and community are at centre ofpublic concern.An expanded political framework for examining resource planningand management issues is needed, as the spectrum of politicalissues that frames policy debates is too limited to encompass theconcerns that contemporary policy-makers must address. The mostpractical mechanisms for encouraging the introduction of newiiideas and innovations to the policy-making arena are existinginstitutional designs for communication among differingperspectives.The Fraser River Estuary Management Program (FREMP) is onemechanism with the potential to act as a conduit for new ideas.It is explored from the perspective of local governmentinvolvement in its habitat management activities. FREMP is partof the complex web of institutional arrangements for habitatmanagement in the Fraser estuary. These arrangements aredescribed with a focus on the role of local governments.The case study indicates that a process of developing an expandedframework for decision-making appears to be taking place in theestuary, reflecting the growing importance of both localgovernment involvement and habitat conservation. Local councilsare demanding more powerful enabling legislation in order toaddress local environmnetal concerns, and these demands raisethe issue of the optimal balance of power between local andsenior levels of government. In light of the pivotal role thatboth municipal and regional governments can play in conservingand protecting resources through land-use regulation andplanning, this thesis concludes that enhanced local governmentpowers would facilitate the protection and enhancement ofconservation values in the estuary.iiiTABLE OF CONTENTSABSTRACT^  (ii)^LIST OF FIGURES^  (vii)ABBREVIATIONS (viii)1. INTRODUCTION^ 11.1.^Objectives^ 21.2.^Assumptions 31.3.^Research Questions^  101.4.^Scope^  121.5.^Definitions^  141.6.^Method  191.6.1.^Literature Review^ 201.6.2.^Case^Study^ 211.6.3.^Procedure 222. THE STATE AND THE LOCAL COMMUNITY^ 262.1.^The Conventional Political Spectrum^ 272.1.1.^Authoritarianism^ 292.1.2.^Laissez Faire Liberalism^ 302.1.3.^The^Political^Centre 312.2.^Redesigning The Political Spectrum ^ 332.2.1.^Economic Restructuring^ 332.2.2.^Political^Restructuring 362.2.3.^Institutional^Restructuring^ 382.2.4.^The Public Sphere and Discursive Designs ^ 422.3.^An Alternative Political Spectrum^ 482.3.1.^Human/Non-Human Communities Axis^ 50iv^2.3.2.^Institutional Designs in a New Framework ^ 532.4.^Summary^ 593. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND HABITAT CONSERVATION IN THE FRASERESTUARY 663.1.^Formal Institutional Arrangements^ 683.1.1.^Federal Authority^ 693.1.1.1.^Fisheries 703.1.1.2.^Wildlife^ 733.1.2.^Provincial Authority^ 753.1.3.^Joint Federal/Provincial Authority ^ 783.1.4.^Local Authority^ 803.2.^Informal Institutional Arrangements^ 903.3.^Interest Groups^ 923.4.^A Management System for the Estuary^ 933.4.1.^The Fraser River Estuary Study 943.4.1.1. FRES and Habitat Management^ 1023.4.1.2. FRES and Area Designations  1053.4.2.^FRES Review / FREMP Implementation^ 1113.4.3.^Fraser River Estuary Management Program ^ 1143.4.3.1. FREMP and Habitat Management^ 1223.4.3.2. FREMP and Area Designations^ 1283.4.3.3. Statements of Intent^ 1323.5.^Summary^  1374. PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT OF LOCAL RESOURCES^ 1484.1.^Institutional Arrangements for Habitat ^ 1514.2.^The Changing Administrative Framework^ 1604.2.1.^FRES/FREMP as Formal Arrangement^ 161V4.2.2.^FRES/FREMP as Informal Arrangement^ 1654.2.2.1. As a Mediating Forum^ 1674.2.2.2. As A Participative Design^ 173^4.3.^Municipalities and Area Designations  1774.4.^Conclusions^  1794.5.^Recommendations  185BIBLIOGRAPHY 192APPENDIX A (Area Designation Review) ^  196APPENDIX B (List of Interviews) 203v iLIST OF FIGURESFigure 1. The Convention Political Spectrum^ 28Figure 2. An Alternative Political Framework 51Figure 3. Discursive Designs in an Alternative Framework^ 58Figure 4. The FRES/FREMP Management Area^ 96Figure 5. The Organization of FREMP 116Figure 6. FRES/FREMP with an Environmental Focus^ 167Figure 7. FRES/FREMP Integrating Environment and Community^ 169Figure 8. Local Government^in an Alternative Framework^ 185viiLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS NFHC^- North Fraser Harbour CommissionFRHC^- Fraser River Harbour CommissionDFO^- Department of Fisheries and OceansDOE^- Department Of The EnvironmentCWS^- Canadian Wildlife ServiceCEPA^- Canadian Environmental Protection ActEARP^- Environmental Assessment and Review ProcessMOE^- Ministry Of the EnvironmentWMA^- Wildlife Management AreasCWA^- Critical Wildlife AreasGVRD^- Greater Vancouver Regional DistrictALR^- Agricultural Land ReserveDARD^- Dewdney -Allouette Regional DistrictCFVRD^- Central Fraser Valley Regional DistrictORP^- Official Regional PlanLRP^- Liveable Region PlanPPAC^- Public Participation Advisory CommitteeADTF^- Area Designation Task ForceHAWG^- Habitat Activity Work GroupFRES^- Fraser River Estuary StudyFREMP^- Fraser River Estuary Management ProgramTAC^- Technical Advisory CommitteeHMAP^- Habitat Management Activity ProgramOCP^- Official Community PlanFBCN^- Federation of B.C. NaturalistsviiiCHAPTER ONE^INTRODUCTIONThe idea for this study grew out of research into sport fisheriesin the Fraser River Basin done for Westwater Research Centre in1989-90. That research indicated that there was muchdissatisfaction with the centralized, hierarchical tradition offisheries management in the Basin and that local communitiescould do a better job of managing local fisheries. The questionof local control over resources is an interesting but verycomplex one and best narrowed down to manageable proportions.Looking at local control over resources from the perspective ofmunicipalities is one way to avoid many of the conceptualproblems associated with local control issues, such as having todefine who is a part of the community and who should represent itin negotiations with the state. As the focus of interest in thisthesis is resource management rather than community socialdevelopment, this thesis uses existing community-level systems ofsocial organization, municipalities, in order to explore localcommunity control over local resources. To further simplify avery complex issue, habitat management was chosen as onefunction of fisheries management that lends itself to localcontrol.11.1.^OBJECTIVESThe objective of this thesis is to study the relationshipbetween local and senior levels of government by exploring theresearch question: What is the role of local government in localresource use decision-making? This exploration will also suggestwhere opportunities exist for a redistribution of power in favourof greater local autonomy. In a representative democracy,distributional issues are decided by those with access todecision-making. This study will show how the relationshipbetween local and senior governments limits representation oflocal interests in resource decision-making. It will then assessin what ways this situation has changed in recent years, analysethe reasons for this change and suggest what the implications ofthese changes are for resource planning in general.This exploration of the relationship between local and seniorlevels of government will provide information about the rightsand duties of territorial political jurisdictions with regard tothe larger society and the nature of a democratic relationshipbetween larger and smaller social units. While this thesis looksat these relationships in terms of local municipalities andfederal/provincial government agencies, the same approach couldbe used to clarify other jurisdictional relationships, such asnational rights and responsibilities in the global context.2This study will also suggest what possibilities exist forsignificant social change at the state as well as at the locallevel. Disenchantment with the nation-state is a globalphenomenon, and everywhere national sub-units are demandinggreater autonomy. In Canada this dynamic is expressed by Quebec'sdemand for sovereignty, and in the Lower Mainland by Vancouver'sdemand for a Municipal Charter of Rights. While there is growingsupport for decentralized control over resources and growingdistrust of centralized senior governments, there is ampleevidence that greater local control over resources could resultin the abuse of environmental values. Many local councils in theestuary have supported developments that degraded environmentallysensitive areas. This thesis examines how the relationshipbetween local and senior governments could be restructured toprevent the lack of representation and accountability that canoccur through senior bureaucratic management while providingequity and oversight in the planning and management of localresources.1.2.^ASSUMPTIONSWhile the focus on enhanced local authority in this studyreflects global demands for greater local autonomy, the resourcesmanagement focus comes from evidence that resource-use issues are3of growing public concern. Conflicts between conservationists andresource developers cause social cleavages within and among humancommunities, and are evidence that community groups are no longerwilling to leave local resource management to experts andoutsiders.Conventional administrative approaches appear to be limited intheir ability to address or resolve these cleavages. Paehlke andTorgerson (1990) suggest that because conventional resourceadministration is founded on the development side of theideological confrontation, it can only propose solutions that arecontained within that ideology. In company with many otherthinkers such as Daly and Cobb (1989), Milbrath(1989), Cotgrove(1982), Riddell (1981) and O'Riordan (1981), they assume that thecapacity of resource administrations to address publicdissatisfaction with environmental policy is limited by theobsolete and inappropriate paradigm on which administrativeassumptions and practices are based.This thesis assumes that before any substantial changes can takeplace in resource management that will allow issues such asincreased community autonomy or enhanced environmentalconservation to be successfully addressed there must be a changein the way these issues are discussed. The authors listed abovehave offered new approaches to resolving resource decision-makingand management issues that could not be implemented within the4existing administrative perspective. The assumptions and biasesthat shape conventional administration are based on a particularideology which is in turn shaped by the spectrum of possiblepolitical choices. In Chapter Two it is argued that thelimitations of the conventional political spectrum discouragerepresentation of critical interests and block effective resourcemanagement.The approach taken in this thesis to the conventional politicalframework and the administrative paradigm that it shapes isinfluenced by the work of Friedmann (1987) who argues that alldecision-making is linked to one or another of the majortheoretical traditions, and that the concept of a value-neutralexpert is itself a particular theoretical tradition. Politicalideology influences all aspects of decision-making in the publicdomain so that policies, programs and planning process areinformed by the political ideologies of those who participate intheir design and implementation. Thus it is not possible todiscuss administrative reforms without looking at theirideological basis.If all actions are founded in a political ideology this suggeststhat as long as one is clear about one's ideology, allperspectives are equally acceptable for those working in thepublic domain. In the struggle of conflicting opinions, the mostappropriate perspective will succeed. In the area of resource5management, such a pluralist approach gives equal weight to thosewho would seek to resolve issues of resource conservation withoutrecourse to inefficient, time-consuming mechanisms of democraticdecision-making. In debates about the best way to ensure thatconservation values will be protected, writers such as Hardin(1977) and Ophuls (1977) suggest that democratic processes cannotbe relied upon to protect ecological systems. This thesis assumesthat because several thousand years of experimentation havefailed to produce a better concept of governance than democracy,it is a process of decision-making worth preserving andenhancing. This study will explore the ways in which that systemof human organization can best be applied to issues of resourceconservation, especially wildlife habitat.There are those who would argue that the pursuit of enhanceddemocratic resource management gives greater emphasis toprocesses of human decision-making which reflect human ratherthan ecosystem needs. There is no way around the fact that insocial decision-making mechanisms, ecosystems must berepresented by humans, and the challenge is to find ways toenhance the representation of those who support the protection ofecosystems. This thesis assumes that ecosystems will be betterrepresented by human beings in a more democratic decision-makingstructure. This thesis also assumes that there is a need toprotect and enhance community as well as conservation valuesbecause one set of values interacts with and cannot be considered6separately from the other. A more precise definition of democracyis attempted in a later section of this chapter.The connection between conservation and community values will bediscussed in Chapter Two, and will be further clarified byexamining the potential for greater community control of localresources. Using the role of local governments in habitatconservation in the Fraser estuary as a case study, this thesiswill show the interaction and interconnection of conservation andcommunity values.If successfully addressing environmental problems requiresgreater democracy in decision-making than is currently thepractice, the solution to environmental problems also involves anongoing, evolutionary process of social change. This change maytake place slowly when pressures for representation of excludedinterests are strongly opposed by a firmly entrenched elite, orit may be accelerated by situations or events that challenge theposition of powerful interests. In the past few decades,widespread environmental degradation and resulting demands forenvironmental conservation have been the catalyst for challengesto existing power relations:The existing distribution of power is maintained because thoseinvolved in decision-making limit the input of ideas, concernsand issues that emerge from conflicting perspectives thus7excluding them as much as possible from participating. Therationale for the exclusion of conflicting perspectives is basedon the general acceptance within that arena of a particularframework for political discussion. Issues outside this frameworkare not considered for the political agenda or included in thedecision-making process. An important part of political power isthe capacity to control issues that reach the political agenda bylimiting the framework within which ideas can be presented.Political change is a process that begins with a re-framing ofthe issues that can be considered for the political agenda.For much of the history of contemporary Western society,environmental issues have not been included on the politicalagenda. It is only in recent decades that the inescapable factsof ecosystem degradation have forced decision-makers to considerenvironmental concerns. Another issue that has been excluded fromthe political agenda is the issue of community rights. Thoughstate and individual rights are established under existinglegislative provisions, the idea of community rights has beenexcluded from consideration within the conventional politicalframework. The next chapter describes how the political contextfor discussion has limited input from local government andconservation interests and how re-framing the political agendawould allow better representation of these interests.Another important assumption of this thesis is that there must be8mechanisms by which new ideas can not only emerge but interactwith the existing power structure to effect desired socialchanges. Institutional designs for communication between thosehaving different perspectives are an existing example of suchmechanisms. These may include participatory planning, regulatorynegotiation, environmental mediation and forms of public inquiry.This thesis does not assume that such mechanisms as participativedesigns are sufficient to ensure environmental conservationunsupported by a radical transformation of goals and prioritiesat all social levels. It does not endorse the concept ofessentially equal interest groups competing for the attention ofa benign and impartial system of government. On the contrary,this study is influenced by the work of Paehlke and Torgerson whosuggest that senior government administration is itself aninterest group which resists the efforts of outside interests toshare in its decision-making power.The focus on participative designs stems not so much frominterest in their potential as agents of positive social changeas from the fact that they appear to be one of the few avenueswithin the existing institutional structure that can be used totransform it. There must be some point at which social changecan begin, If transformation can be instigated by using andexpanding existing democratic mechanisms so much the better. Analternative method of transforming the power structure, and onethat is used where democratic processes are absent is that of9resorting to military strategies.The next chapter suggests that significant social changes willcome about through the gradual strengthening of a new politicaldimension which emphasizes community and conservation values. Atthe poles of this new political dimension are human and non-humancommunities and the conflicts and interactions between thesepolarities are the new framework within which contemporarypolitical discussion is being shaped. These issues do not replacebut augment conventional political issues so that the range ofissues is expanded. This thesis uses local government andhabitat management as a vehicle for a study of the conflicts andinteractions of human and non-human communities on the newpolitical agenda that is increasingly influencing resourceplanning and management.1.3.^RESEARCH QUESTIONSThe following primary research question is used in achieving theobjectives of this thesis in accordance with the above rationale:What is the current role of local governments in resourceuse decision-making?1 0Exploration of this question will indicate whether communitieshave been excluded from decision-making by the state and how thishas affected the allocation of resources and the costs andbenefits of their uses. It will examine changes in therelationship between local communities and the state which mightindicate that the conventional political framework is expandingto include issues of human and non-human communities. It willalso indicate opportunities for a redistribution of power betweenlocal communities and the state that would strengthen communityand conservation values. A subsidiary question that follows fromthis is:How could^the relationship^between local and seniorgovernments be changed to allow local management of localresources?If management of local resources would benefit from greater localpowers, this question explores how this change could come about.The concept of institutional designs for the participation ofalternative perspectives comes into focus here. Their capacityfor either maintaining the existing distribution of power orencouraging needed changes leads to a final subsidiary question:3.^Will the inclusion of local governments in resource usedecision-making lead to the inclusion of other excludedinterests?This question will relate the findings of the case study to theissues and concerns described in Chapter Two by examining whetherchanges in the relations between local and senior governmentindicate a fundamental paradigm shift, or whether they arerelatively minor structural changes. If local governments gaingreater control over local resources while other interests suchas Native communities and environmental groups continue to beexcluded from decision-making, it can be concluded that thechanges necessary for full representation of critical interestshave not yet come about.1.4.^SCOPEThere are several important areas of discussion that touch on theconcerns of this thesis but cannot be given the attention thanthey deserve. In Chapter Two a brief survey of the majorpolitical traditions is presented to clarify the concepts andassumptions of this thesis and to act as a background fordiscussion of new ideological conflicts that are taking place inresource planning and management. This survey of the majortraditions is too short to indicate the variety of possiblepositions within each tradition or to fully consider alternativedescriptions of the political spectrum. Some may feel a shortsurvey is unjustifiably reductionist, while others might agree12that a brief description of the ideological context for thisthesis is warranted. The description given in Chapter Two of analternative political framework is correspondingly simplified,and neglects a number of possible issues such as the role ofpolitical parties in a new political dimension.Also outside the scope of this thesis is a clear vision ofsocial change. While one of the underlying assumptions is thatsignificant social change is ultimately required for anygovernment administration to successfully address environmentalissues, this thesis provides only a rough outline of thedirection of needed reforms. This thesis will isolate what maybe the beginning of significant changes in governmentadministration toward including previously excluded interests andsuggest ways in which those changes could be encouraged, but doesnot attempt to suggest broad social reforms.The issue of participation in the administration of the state bypreviously excluded community groups other than local governmentsis not discussed at length. It is assumed that enhancedconservation and democracy go hand-in-hand. Greaterrepresentation of municipalities in resource use decision-makingis seen as only a first step in extending that representation toother types of communities and groups. The issue of Nativecommunity representation in estuary decision-making is similarlyneglected, though it is recognized that this is an area of study13demanding attention.A full description of the Fraser River Estuary and its human andnon-human communities is not provided here though it isunderstood that no part of a complex ecosystem can be adequatelyperceived in isolation from its bio-physical, social, economicand institutional context. This study focuses on municipalinvolvement in habitat management, fully appreciating that thisrepresents only a small corner of the big picture. The wealth ofbio-physical data associated with habitat protection isintroduced only where needed to allow an understanding of thehabitat issues involved. Social and economic systems areconsidered in this study only to the extent necessary tounderstand one sub-system of the network of institutionalarrangements in the estuary.1.5.^DEFINITIONSThe first term that demands definition in this^study is"democracy": a value-laden word with a host of conflictinginterpretations and the potential for eliciting strong emotionalresponses. Milbrath (1989) gives the following definition ofdemocracy which has been found useful for this study:14"The essence of democracy is the provision of someregularized societal procedure for consulting the peopleabout the policies and the future direction their societyshould take. This consultation should control futurepolicies...rather than be merely advisory. Typically,democrats also believe that each person's views should countequally in this consultation. If the consultation is to bemeaningful, the people must have access to relevantinformation and must be able to speak their minds..." 2A term that is as value and emotion laden as "democracy" is theterm "the state". Where possible, this study avoids the use ofthe term altogether and substitutes "senior levels of government"to differentiate between federal/provincial jurisdictions andlocal jurisdictions. "Local government" refers to municipalitiesand regional districts, but does not include regional offices offederal or provincial agencies.Local government is treated as both part of and separate from thestate apparatus. This duality arises because local governmentsplay the role of both interest groups and governing bodies in theCanadian constitutional context. The role of local governments isonly part of the confusion surrounding the term "the state". Isthe state identical with the nation or a separate entity withinit? When Daly and Cobb (1989) use the term "nation-state", theywant to suggests that the interests of the state and the people1 5within it are identical. This is a different connotation thanPaehlke and Torgerson's (1990) "administrative state" which is anelite group with interests quite separate from those of thepeople. They want to suggest that the state has managed to usurppower from within and resists attempts to overthrow it in thename of democracy.Both perspectives would agree that while in theory the statecould be a democratic instrument, in practice it is used in theinterests of an undemocratic elite. While Daly and Cobb tracethat elite to transnational corporations, Paehlke and Torgersonlook at the power of state administrators themselves and howthey benefit from undemocratic practices. Though the power ofglobal corporations is a background context for the relationshipbetween the state and its sub-units, this thesis uses Paehlke andTorgerson's definition of the state as a centralized,hierarchical, administrative^form^that^dominates advanced3industrial society.^This is an oversimplification, especiallyin Canada where the provinces are like smaller states that sharewith the national level.This does not suggest that the state is an homogenous entitywithout differing perspectives among the various agencies,departments and individuals within it. It does suggest that thestate exhibits certain characteristics and an overall form thatwork toward the maintenance of existing power relations. This16emphasis means that differences and conflicts within the statewill be touched on in this study only where such differences arerelevant to its relationship with local communities.Another term requiring an explanation is "community". Part of thedefinition of community used here emerges from defining thestate, for communities are those social units that do not havethe powers of the state. For the purposes of this study localgovernments are considered to be representative of localcommunities, though they are and are not part of the stateapparatus. The interests of the state are often contrasted withthe interests of "the people", meaning people as individuals orin groups without legislative power. Municipal governments inB.C. fall somewhere between "the people" and "the state", havingbeen delegated power by the province, and in that way being partof the state, but retaining that power only at the discretion ofthe province. In most dealings with the state, local governmentshave powers similar to interest groups rather than as a thirdlevel of government.A clearer definition of local communities is not attempted inthis thesis because it is one of the objectives of this study tocome closer to such a definition. The municipality is substitutedas a useful but by no means flawless version of the localcommunity. This substitution is justified from the perspective ofPaehlke and Torgerson who argue that municipalities are one of17several marginalized social sub-units which have beensubordinated to the state, and are largely excluded fromdecision-making. Thus municipalities can be defined as localcommunities rather than as part of the apparatus of the state.Furthermore, municipalities can be considered to berepresentative of local interests as municipal electionsintroduce an accountability that is otherwise lacking in manyalternative definitions of community.A definition of "sustainable development", though central toquestions of conservation and community, is not attempted hereand the term is used only where agencies themselves use it todescribe their activities. Though not defined, the concept ofsustainable development forms a background context for thisstudy. As democratic resource management involves opening up theprocess to interests that have hitherto been excluded, adequaterepresentation of alternative interests will begin a process ofchange. This process will introduce such concepts as sustainabledevelopment where they were not previously expressed. The task ofthis thesis is not to define the substance of alternatives but tosuggest how existing mechanisms can be used to encourage theconsideration of new ideas.Another problem word is "environment" as in "environmentalproblems". The concept of the environment suggests that it issomething that surrounds an object that is the main focus of18attention, in this case human beings. It implies that the naturalworld is something external to human systems rather than thebasis for human life. Torgerson ('90) sums up his discomfort withthe word:"...even to speak of environmental problems might riskobscuring their character; one must recognize that therelevant problem-complex is ecological. To speak ofenvironmental problems fosters the connotation that theproblems can readily be made manageable; it divertsattention from the need for comprehensive, integrated designbased upon sound ecological principles." 4Despite the shortcomings of the word, this thesis sometimes uses"the environment" to refer to natural ecological systems becauseit is the word commonly used to express concern aboutdysfunctional interactions between human and non-human systemsand a vaguely defined but strongly felt human desire for ahealthier relationship.1.6.^METHODThe selection of a philosophical framework for this thesis wasinfluenced in equal part by the characteristics of the case19study, and by the lure of ideas that appear particularly relevantin the context of current events. These ideas will be discussedat some length in the next chapter, but in general, they have todo with demands for local autonomy at a period in history whenthe nation-state is in crisis in many areas of the world, andwhen there is evidence of significant environmental degradation.Increasing local autonomy entails issues of democracy andredistribution of power which are at the centre of both politicaland planning theories. Ideas for preventing environmentalcatastrophe come from every point on the ideological spectrum,but only those that are based on the assumption of democraticprocesses are addressed here.1.6.1. Literature ReviewThe philosophical context chosen for this thesis involves adiscussion of the rights and duties of the state with regard toits social sub-units. This discussion includes a brief survey ofthe major political traditions and their approaches to questionsof environmental conservation and community autonomy. This surveyis designed to show the inadequacy of the conventional politicalspectrum for addressing critical contemporary issues. It alsoserves to locate conventional state administration on thepolitical spectrum as an expert instrumental-analytic exercisewhose goal is the maintenance of the present organization ofpublic and private power. 5 The review offers a critique of20conventional administration and suggests an alternativeperspective that supports principles of enhanced conservation andcommunity autonomy. The discussion then moves on to mechanismsfor participatory democratic decision-making and touches on ideasabout the appropriate mix of senior and local government powersand responsibilities.This discussion provides a framework for analysing habitatmanagement in the Fraser River estuary that can assess therelationship between local government and the state in terms ofopportunities for enhancing conservation and community values.1.6.2. Case StudyMost of the documentation for the case study has come from FraserRiver Estuary Study (FRES) and Fraser River Estuary ManagementProgram ( FREMP) reports. Other secondary sources have includedlocal government documents, academic studies, periodicals andinterest group newsletters. As the FRES/FREMP area designationprocess has provided opportunities for significant involvement oflocal governments in resource use decision-making, it is examinedin more detail. It has been studied to indicate how local andsenior government agencies have approached habitat conservationdesignations which have been the focus of conflicting interestsin the estuary. This process has also been studied for evidenceof power struggles between local and senior agencies and how21,these have been resolved. The FRES/FREMP process is used in thisstudy as an example of an institutional design to encouragecommunication among alternative perspectives, and its success inthis capacity is assessed.1.6.3.^ProcedureThe first stage of this thesis, based entirely on secondarysources, builds a framework for examining local involvement inresource use planning and management and applied it to the casestudy area. The case study is designed to explore howadministrative decision-making in the estuary has evolved inresponse to pressures from excluded interests. It was alsodesigned to indicate how the organization of power andresponsibility in the estuary would need to change further forenhanced representation by local governments and othermarginalized interest groups.The^case^study^briefly^describes^formal^and informalinstitutional arrangements in the estuary focusing on therelationship between senior and municipal/regional levels ofgovernment and the role of interest groups. It then gives anoverview of the development of FRES/FREMP with an emphasis on themunicipal role in the conservation component of the areadesignation process. The case study traces the growth of localinvolvement in estuarine conservation from an initial reluctance22to be constrained by environmental regulation to the presentsituation where in some cases local governments are taking aleadership role.Interviews with officials involved in FRES/FREMP, localgovernments, and interested NGO's were also carried out inaccordance with the framework set up in the first stage. Theseinterviews have been based on questions that arose where eventswere undocumented or existing documents were unclear. Appendix"B" lists the names and positions of those interviewed. There wasno attempt to set up a survey - type questionnaire to obtain auniform set of responses. Instead, specific questions weredirected toward those who would be most likely to have therelevant information. In some cases the same question was put toresource managers at different levels of government in order tocompare responses.Analysis of the case study assesses local governmentparticipation in resource use planning and management and therelationship between local and senior levels of government. Thestudy ends with a list of recommendations that would contributetoward enhanced local control over local resources in the Fraserestuary. Suggestions are also made for designing a process insimilar situations where there are important conservation values,overlapping local and extra-local jurisdictions and conflictingneeds and demands.23The study is divided into four parts: Chapter One has been anintroductory chapter that describes the goals and objectives ofthis thesis and how these will be pursued; Chapter Two provides aphilosophical context for exploring these objectives and aframework for carrying out the case study; Chapter Three looks atlocal government involvement in habitat conservation in theFraser River estuary and the progress of this involvement overthe last fifteen years; Chapter Four analyses the case study andoffers some conclusions and recommendations based on thesefindings .24END NOTES:1. Smith, Charlie, "People^Of^Influence",^in Vancouver Magazine, Vol. 24, No. 12, Dec. 1991, p. 48, 60, 64.2. Milbrath, Lester,^1989, Envisioning a Sustainable Society: Learning Our Way Out, Albany: State University of New YorkPress,^P. 140.3. Paehlke, Robert^and Douglas Torgerson, 1990, Managing Leviathan; Environmental Politics and the Administrative State, Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, p 1.4. Ibid., p. 146.5.^Ibid., p. 1, p. 99.25CHAPTER TWO^THE STATE AND THE LOCAL COMMUNITYThe scope and gravity of environmental problems suggests the needfor significant changes in the way these problems are addressed.At the same time, public demands for greater representation andaccountability in resource use decision-making mean that theresolution of environmental problems entails enhanced democraticprocesses. With these assumptions as its basis, the generalobjective of this thesis is to study the relationship betweenlocal and senior levels of government in the area of resourceplanning and management.The next chapter presents a case study in which local communitieshave increasingly participated in resource decision-making andwill contribute toward clarifying the relationship not onlybetween local communities and the state but between allterritorial jurisdictions and the larger society. Thisinformation will suggest whether and to what degree a local orsenior government has the right to decide how the resources of aregion or community will be used. It will also indicate to whatextent municipal governments are part of the apparatus of thestate, and to what extent they represent the interests of localcommunities. If municipalities in the case study area representthe interests of the local community, and if enhancedrepresentation of local governments in resource planning isactually taking place, it can be concluded that this development26represents enhanced democratic decision-making.In this chapter an analytical framework is developed to study therelationship between local and senior levels of government basedon ideas that offer a useful approach for examining the researchquestion. This approach is strongly influenced by the assumptionthat planning cannot be considered separately from politicaltraditions. Thus this analytical framework begins by describingthe political spectrum that has given rise to conventionalresource planning, then describes the elements of an alternativepolitical framework that would provide the foundation foraddressing two major issues in resource planning; communityautonomy and environmental conservation.2.1.^THE CONVENTIONAL POLITICAL SPECTRUMContemporary Western political philosophy focuses on the debatebetween the rights of individuals in conflict with the rights ofthe state. 1 Attempts to reframe this debate to include otherpolitical issues such as the rights of local communities, or therights of species other than human beings are ongoing but meetwith resistance, and the conventional political spectrum hascontinued to be defined in terms of the polarities of theindividual and the state. Before moving on to consider27alternative political dimensions that would include issues suchas community and environmental rights, the conventionalpolitical spectrum is discussed in more detail to show itslimitations for addressing these issues.The conventional spectrum of Western political thinking isdirected toward defining the limits of state power in ademocratic society and the point in the abuse of state power atwhich the individual has the right to refuse to obey the state. 2At the polarities of this political spectrum the rights of eitherthe state or the individual are absolute. Supporters of absoluterights for the state believe the best government is one in whicha ruler or ruling elite makes rational decisions in the bestinterests of a wilful, appetitive population. Plato and Hobbesare intellectual milestones in this authoritarian tradition.Supporters of absolute rights for individuals believe the bestform of government is one in which citizens make decisionsentirely in their own interests. Locke and Mill have contributedmuch to this liberal tradition. Figure 1 shows this framing ofthe political spectrum. 2Figure 1Absolute Authority^ Absolute FreedomState^ Individual28The following discussion explores the potential for the variouspositions on the conventional political framework to addressissues of community and conservation.2.1.1^AuthoritarianismOn the side of^absolute authority,^there is^an uneasypartnership of political conservatives of the extreme right andpolitical radicals of the extreme left. They agree on the needfor a strong centralized government that can make enlighteneddecisions in favour of environmental protection and prevent adepletion of resources that will cause the impoverishment of all. 3As strengthening existing centres of power eliminates issues ofcommunity autonomy, this perspective does not address growingcitizen dissatisfaction with centralized authority. The radicalleft of the authoritarian tradition does, however offer a usefulcritique of capitalism that is helpful in understanding itscontradictions.This tradition argues that a state created to protect privateproperty can never be a responsible steward of national or localresources. As the state was formed to protect property rights, itfollows that the state's first responsibility is to protect4these rights and sustain conditions of accumulation.^Itassumes that the state will sacrifice environmental protectionfor the accumulation of capital and the interests of property. It29is a useful critique for understanding the source of apparentcontradictions in government policy regarding such activities ashabitat protection. Without an appreciation for competinginterests and the primacy of profit considerations, governmentalactions appear irrational. The Marxist critique suggests thathabitat cannot be expected to be adequately protected by a statethat will trade off resource degradation for capitalaccumulation. It also provides an explanation for the apparentmismanagement of habitat by state administrations: in the face ofpressures from forestry or other sectors, the state allowshabitat to be sacrificed in favour of interests which favoureconomic growth and support the capitalist state.At the opposite pole of the conventional political spectrum aretheories that support the freedom of individuals to allocateresources according to decisions made in the market place.2.1.2.^Laissez Faire LiberalismThis perspective assumes that the state should not interfere inthe allocation of resources but that there should be completefreedom for manufacturers and traders to make these decisionsaccording to signals from the market. It is based on the beliefthat a completely free market makes the greatest contribution to5the public interest.^Like authoritarianism, this perspectiveis fundamentally undemocratic, though for opposite reasons. While30authoritarianism seeks to limit the participation of citizens ingovernment, extreme liberalism seeks to limit government itself,and substitute the marketplace as an allocative mechanism. As anindividualistic perspective, it does not encompass the concept ofpeople in communities as an allocative unit.The market does not offer mechanisms for environmentalprotection because it is often to the advantage of an individualentrepreneur to destroy the resource, take the profits and investthem in something which provides larger profits than could bemade from using the resource responsibly. 6Resource degradationis economically feasible when "the immediate profits obtained byexpending a surplus exceed the present value of revenues thatcould be obtained in perpetuity by conserving it." 72.1.3. The Political CentreAt the political centre are those theories that seek to balancethe power of the state with the power of individual citizens, andit is here that there are the greatest pressures for democraticresource decision-making. The assumptions behind the centristposition are that the state is a relatively benign actor thatunderstands the rationality of protecting resources and isresponsive to pluralistic political pressures. With selectedreforms of procedures and programmes, the state would be capableof resolving environmental problems created through lack of31administrative oversight or other technical administrativefailings. In addition, with sufficient freedom of expression,adequate communication and the opportunity for varying ideologiesto be heard, it would be possible to have a fair and equitabledistribution of resources. 8Many working from this perspective in resource planning,however, become aware that effective communication oradministrative fine tuning does not redress the fundamentaleconomic and social imbalances that create problems for thepowerless. Many planners working directly with disadvantagedcommunities become convinced that a restructuring of power isnecessary to allow the equal representation of poor and non-poor9alike in the decision-making process. Planners working topreserve eco-systems recognize that environmental priorities mustreplace economic ones if ongoing degradation of resources is tobe prevented. They acknowledge that pluralist approaches havenot overcome the tendency for planning practice to maintain thestatus quo and suggest that a planner should be a "...facilitatorof social change through the support by the planner of socialgroups whose interests have previously been excluded from theplanning process." 10This perspective suggests that an important role of planning isto design mechanisms that will discourage undemocratic eliteswithin bureaucratic systems and encourage the representation of32weaker social forces. This thesis looks at two social forces thatare poorly represented in the conventional political spectrumbecause the paradigm that defines the political agenda does notinclude them. As the conventional paradigm is defined in terms ofstate and individual rights, the rights of communities and therights of eco - systems are not contained within it and do nottherefore appear or the agenda. As the interests of naturalsystems are represented in human decision-making by environmentalgroups, greater representation by these groups is critical toresource conservation.2.2.^REDESIGNING THE POLITICAL SPECTRUMThe following section describes the elements of an emergingparadigm within which institutional mechanisms for betterrepresentation of excluded interests could be designed.2.2.1.^Economic RestructuringDaly and Cobb offer a critique of the dominant paradigm thatshapes economic and social life in Western societies and suggestan alternative vision based on "economics for community". Thisinvolves the development and recovery of self-reliant politicalcommunities that can resist the forces of the global market33economy and pursue an independent course of environmentallysensitive economic policies.An environmentally sensitive economy must have a proper scalerelative to the ecosystem on which it depends. 11Pressures oneconomies to expand beyond the carrying capacity of theirecosystems are created through participation in the globaleconomy which demands a constant expansion of scale and acontinuing increase in resource exploitation. Daly and Cobbbelieve that the nation state is often the only level ofcommunity strong enough to resist the interests of transnationalcorporations or other nations. They suggest that "...nations area desirable form of community and in many instances today, theonly ones that have the power to assert themselves effectivelyagainst anticommunitarian forces." 12They argue that many ofthe tools for resisting transnational pressures are already inexistence as the state offers institutions of community that canprotect and enforce ,, ...standards regarding wages, welfare,population control, environmental protection andconservation". 13The new economic paradigm assumes that there can be no effectivenational economy if people cannot meet their essential needs, andthat a national economy for community will be a relativelyself-sufficient economy. With the mobility of capital and therise of "cosmopolitan money managers and transnational34corporations, which...no longer see the national community astheir context", capital has escaped from responsibility to anycommunity and is accountable to none. This lack ofaccountability creates a situation where nations not only havelittle control over the actions of corporations, but are likelyto be forced to absorb their costs while not sharing in theirbenefits. 14 With national economic autonomy the state can setits own priorities in terms of democratic values and adjust itseconomic activities to conform to natural carrying capacity inorder to protect environmental values.As most nation-states are too large and centralized,"...decentralization of the national economy should accompanynationalization in relation to the global economy." 15 Inaddition to economic de-centralization, Daly and Cobb suggestpolitical decentralization that will reduce the alienation ofcitizens from the voting process. Political decentralizationwould create a national community of communities, where localdecisions would become more significant, and whererepresentatives chosen at lower levels would participate inimportant national decision-making. Though they call for thedecentralisation of state power, they recognize the dangers forpolitical minorities in local communities. The state shouldbecome more decentralised with respect to economic issues, as” ...a political community cannot be healthy unless it canexercise significant measure of control over its economic life"35At the same time the state should maintain its present degree ofcentralization with respect to civil and human rights. 162.2.2.^Political RestructuringFriedmann takes up where Daly and Cobb leave off by describingthe evolution of self-reliant political communities. He toooffers a vision of " collective self-reliance in development andthe recovery of political community." 17 To achieve this vision,Friedmann suggests that there must be a progressive de-linkingfrom both the global and national capitalist economies. Selfreliance begins with the empowerment of individuals in householdsand spreads to urban communes 18 , to the metropolis and finallyto a federation of metropolitan assemblies. This de-linking musttake the form of "collective self-production", or a recoveredsense of the wholeness of life. 19Progressive independence from the global economy and the creationof a bottom-up form of governance demands a shift in politicalthinking which is a more radical version of that suggested byDaly and Cobb. Dempsey describes this shift as the understandingthat "Each higher society is a subsidiary, that is, designed tobe of help to the lesser societies beneath it. It is not theother way around: the persons who comprise the more fundamentalsocieties are not means to serve the societies. Nor are closelyknit natural communities such as municipalities to be used asmeans by the larger but more remote organizations like the36regional or provincial government (our 'states') or the nationalstate." 20 This echoes Catholic teaching in which^it isconsidered a^grave injustice for "...a larger and higherorganization to arrogate to itself functions which can beperformed efficiently by smaller and lower bodies." 21This tradition of bottom-up governance is founded on a belief inthe capacity of ordinary people to regulate their behaviour andmake collective decisions. Support for this tradition was low inWestern societies as long as there was a high degree ofprosperity. Ordinary people were willing to concentrate onraising families, enriching themselves, and consuming theresources produced with the assistance of the state. But poverty,discrimination against minorities and environmental issues haveencouraged a growing number of people to question the authorityof the state and its promise to provide a rational course ofaction. Friedmann argues that ordinary people in industrializedcapitalist states are no longer willing to be ruled by state andcorporate power and are demanding a devolution of that power sothat they can rule themselves. 22He goes on to say that the state responds to these demands "...inthe accustomed way: with the mailed fist of repression and thevelvet glove of social planning." 23 Planners who serve thestate or corporate capital contribute to the continuation ofoppressive relations of power. Only by organizing people to actcollectively on their own behalf can planners help to bring about37a devolution of state and corporate authority.2.2.3.^Institutional RestructuringDaly and Cobb's case in support of community economic autonomyand Friedmann's argument for the recovery of political communitysupport the assumption of the need for a fundamental re-thinkingof the conventional administrative paradigm. They agree that therecovery of political community through a devolution of statepower and bottom-up governance based on a self-reliant system ofcommunities are necessary components of a restructured societywhere community and environmental values can be protected andenhanced. In different ways, they seek to promote these valuesthrough independent communities: Daly and Cobb through self-reliant national communities and Friedmann through autonomouslocal communities. But they offer opposing views of the role ofthe state in promoting these values: Daly and Cobb believe thestate is the most effective level of government for protectingand enhancing environment and community, while Friedmann believesit is the worst. 24Irving Fox provides the institutional mechanisms for promotingthese values, while at the same time offering suggestions for areconciliation of state and local community powers. He arguesthat democratic processes that reflect public preferences andpriorities are preferable to alternative methods of resource usedecision-making. He describes the two major alternatives to38democratic processes as the scientific and the market methods ofresource allocation which correspond to the authoritarian andlaissez-faire poles of the political spectrum described above.Faith in science and technology to allocate resources is riskybecause of the enormous complexity of natural systems, andbecause technological advances have not been able to prevent adecline in resources. The invisible hand of the market is also anunreliable mechanism for allocating resources according to thepreferences of the people affected due to such factors as naturalmonopolies, externalities, and impacts upon future generations.For both publicly and privately owned resources, Fox suggeststhat there is the need for a framework for decision-making thatwill reflect a democratic balancing of public preferences abouthow resources should be used. 25"Since a very large proportion of resource use andmanagement activities require some degree of collectivedecision-making, the development of procedures, processes,and entities through which these decisions are madeconstitutes the major challenge in the management and use ofnatural resources." 26As the effects of one's actions upon others are more noticeablein small communities, Fox argues that decentralization ofdecision-making to the local community level is "...conducive tothe effective implementation of practices that serve the commongood..". Local ownership and control of private resourcedevelopment and use organizations is preferable to absentee39ownership as local organizations are influenced by the socialconcerns of the community. As people of a region are directlyaffected by the way the resources of a region are managed, Foxsuggests that planning and management of natural resources shouldbe the primary responsibility of the regional rather than federalor provincial jurisdictions. Smaller units of government are moredemocratic in that they reflect public preferences moreaccurately.Regional control over local resources would be restrained byfederal or provincial authority where there were significantconsequences for people outside the region. Such countervailinginfluences would limit uses contrary to the overall publicinterest. "This formulation departs from the presentinstitutional structure by envisioning a major role for regionaljurisdictions." 27In order to realize this proposed institutional structure, itwould first be necessary for the provincial government toestablish the roles and responsibilities of regionaljurisdictions and its own policies and activities. An importantresponsibility of the provincial government is to developacceptable standards for use and management in each resourcecategory so that these can be applied by users. Regionaldistricts would be responsible for enforcing those standards andthe province would act on appeals of actions by regional40districts.The province would also establish a uniform system of resourcedata collection, prepare coordinated plans for resource use thattranscend regional boundaries, identify transboundary effects ofregional programs and regulate regional actions accordingly. Theprovincial government would make specialists available to assistregional districts and undertake a strong research program.Regional districts would prepare annual reports on the state ofregional resources, and the province would consolidate these intoan overall provincial report.In addition to planning and implementing resource managementprograms and policies, regional districts would regulate the useof privately owned agricultural, forest and wild lands in theinterests of long term sustainability of those resources. Theplanning and management of each regional district would be theresponsibility of Resource Management and Use Councils whichwould represent the values of regional residents. These councilswould develop integrated resource management plans subject topublic review and criticism.These proposals for institutional reform would work towardrealizing the goals of economic and political restructuringenvisioned by Daly and Cobb and Freidmann. They would alsoprovide a mechanism by which the state could work with local41communities to bring about these goals. In Fox's proposal thestate would neither be the instigating instrument of communitydevelopment nor the enemy of local autonomy, but one of threecountervailing forces in a decentralized version of federalism.Greater local control over resources does not overcome theproblem of implementing policies decided upon by electedrepresentatives, even local ones. Due to the complexity ofresource management issues, program design tends to be heavilyinfluenced by the bureaucracy necessary for implementation.Professional and bureaucratic values influence the range ofoptions considered and the design of programs implemented.Processes must be used that will reflect public preferences inthe light of carefully evaluated options. Paehlke and Torgersondescribe the world of public interest groups, citizens'committees and movements that promote interests not encompassedby government programs and policies as the "public sphere". Thefollowing section describes this sphere and mechanisms formediation between this area of public life and the implementationof bureaucratic resource management.2.2.4. The Public Sphere and Discursive DesignsThe concept of the public sphere is implicit in many theories ofsocial change and it refers to the idea of an autonomous publicforum, separate from and confronting the state, which willcounterbalance pressures from capital and the market. 28 Paehlke42and Torgerson argue that an active, critical public sphere, whichhas existed in varying degrees of strength since Plato's time, isonce again emerging as a potent political reality. Citizens inWestern societies, faced by unprecedented environmental threatsare forming a more or less cohesive network of organizationssharing a broad focus. 29The contemporary public sphere has developed in opposition to apolitical tradition that accepts the actions of stateadministrations, believing them to be generally in the publicinterest. It also opposes administrations which assume that aconsensus of opinion exists on environmental issues - a consensusthat coincides with the views of administrators. Social changesof the last half of this century have produced a public spherecapable of challenging these assumptions and of monitoring,criticising and influencing state administrations. Demands foropenness and participation continue to pressure the state tolisten and respond to excluded interests. In most cases, thestate has responded by attempting to contain these pressuresthrough accommodation or obstruction. 30The problem for any level of resource management is the mediationof bureaucratic implementation and public concerns and demands.At a local level, this mediation can be more democratic becausethere is a greater likelihood that a wider range of preferenceswill be reflected due to the smaller numbers involved. But43processes for input from the public sphere must be developed. Foxsuggests that these processes would include methods for selectingrepresentatives of different values to participate inidentification of alternatives and negotiation of agreements andthe means of supplying these representatives with the informationthey require. These representatives would make up a regionalResource Management and Use Council of ten members withstaggered terms of office. These members would be appointed by acourt magistrate from nominations put forward by groups andindividuals in the public sphere. Where Native people areresidents of a district, at least two should serve as Councilmembers. Qualified professionals would serve as a staff toprovide the Council with technical support and informationrequired for planning.Regional resource use planning would begin with a number ofsingle use plans for each use of the resources involved thenformulate a number of alternative integrated resource managementplans reflecting different value priorities. These would besubject to public review and criticism, then the Council wouldprepare a biophysical, economic and social evaluation of eachalternative integrated plan. After a second public review theCouncil would agree on one or more plans to recommend to theregional board. The regional board would review the Councilrecommendations and decide upon a plan to be implemented.The public review and criticism components of regional planning44are what Dryzek calls "discursive designs" or decision-makingfora that "embody principles of free discourse among equals". 31The potential for discursive designs to encourage democraticresource planning lies in their relationship to the publicsphere. They can act as building blocks of the public sphere andat the same time offer greater representation of interests otherthan capital and the market in the administration of the state.As a link between an active, critical public sphere and thestate, discursive designs may introduce new ideas andinnovations and new ways of defining environmental problems. Anymechanism that introduces ideas other than those which providethe rationale for conventional administration has the inherentpotential to redefine problems outside the conventionalframework. 32 In this sense, discursive^designs have thepotential to act as effective mechanisms for social change.Paehlke and Torgerson's critique of state administrationexplains how discursive designs could act to break down therationale for conventional administration that serves theinterests of market and capital and marginalizes other interests.They describe the tendency of large bureaucratic publicorganizations to develop patterns of mutually supportiverelationships with private bureaucracies, thus shutting out otherparticipants in the decision-making process. Through this mutualsupport the interests of public bureaucracies and largecorporations have become interwoven, and a rationale for the45continuation of the institutional structures that promote thisarrangement has become an integral part of administrativethinking.Compounding the state's support for economic growth thatbenefits capitalism at the expense of the environment is itstendency to maintain a closed policy process. Marginalizedinterests cannot gain access to the decision-making arena soestablished biases are protected from conflicting views. Ideasthat conflict with these administrative concepts, such as thoseproposed by the environmental movement, are eliminated beforethey can affect the decision-making process. It is thusimpossible for the state to deal effectively with environmentalproblems which it has promoted and in which it participates. 33This argument suggests that the administration of the state isbased on false assumptions and misinformation and is protectedfrom attacks by objective external interests. It suggests thatonce the opportunity arises for the irrational basis ofconventional administration to be openly, publicly andextensively questioned, its internal organization will crumbleaided by the loss of external support. The potential fordiscursive designs is described by Bartlett as their capacity to34act as a "worm in the brain" of conventional administration byproviding a point of intersection between the emerging vigourouspublic sphere and the capitalist state.46Another approach to institutional designs is what O'Riordancalls^"environmental^designs".^These^involve^creativeparticipatory effort based on cooperative trust among theparties involved, and utilize experience and experimentation. Theeducative and consciousness raising value of the collectivedecision-making experience is more important that the final35outcome.^It is^a continuing^process of environmentaleducation in which people pool their individual talents tocollectively shape a better way of life for themselves. Theactual design process is means-oriented and is an open-endedmechanism for developing political awareness among people whohave been consistently discouraged from expressing their needs.The process redresses social and economic imbalances bycultivating a radical self-awareness in presently powerlesscitizens. This type of design "...is as much a matter ofpolitical reform as it is the shaping of a better quality of36life."^The hope is that such participatory designs asworkshops, task forces and community demonstration projects willraise political consciousness from personal problems toneighbourhood issues, to the community at large and beyond. Thisprocess breaks the political alienation which has led to the37present conflict-ri-den society and confrontational politics.Supporters of discursive or participative designs as mechanismsfor social change acknowledge that there are also serious47shortcomings to the concept, as the existing power structure isnot without protective measures. New ideas and innovations thatemerge through participative designs can be rendered harmlessthrough the complexities of bureaucratic process and theirproponents co-opted through promises of sharing in administrativepower. In this way, participative designs can serve as a "worm inthe brain" of the public sphere, which eats away at initiativesthat threaten the existing relations of power.Whether they function to maintain or transform existing relationsof power, it is clear that institutional designs will be limitedwithin the context of the conventional political spectrum. Apolitical spectrum formed by a tension between the rights of theindividual and of the state does not include issues to do witheco-systems or local communities. As these issues are at thecentre of concerns in the public sphere, the following sectiondescribes a political spectrum that would include community andecological values as equal partners with state and individualrights in political debate.2.3.^AN ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL SPECTRUMOne suggestion for a new political spectrum comes from Milbrathwho describes the need for a new political axis on which to48locate debate about the relationship between humans andnature. 38He suggests that this new political axis wouldbisect the horizontal political spectrum with a vertical axis ofcommunity and environment. There would thus be an intersectionbetween these concerns and issues of the individual and thestate. This thesis will vary Milbrath's concept by suggestingthat the two axis do not intersect as they exist on separatedimensions. Otherwise, those at the mid point of theenvironment/community axis would share the concerns of those onthe mid-point of the state/market axis.Like the state/market axis, the environment/community axis is acontinuum which moves from an extreme pole of support for theabsolute rights of the natural environment through a balancebetween environmental and human community rights to the oppositepole of absolute rights for human communities. Another way oflooking at this continuum is to see it in terms of allocation offinite resources. At the extreme of the environment pole arethose who believe that all resources should be allocated to non-human communities, and that human communities should limit theirconsumption of resources to the barest necessities. At theextreme of the communities pole are those who believe that allresources needed by human communities should be allocated tothem, and that non-human communities will be allocated whateveris left.In order to understand the implications of the environment/49community axis more clearly, both poles will be considered ascommunities, one human and the other non-human. This frames theessence of the debate both within the environmental and the back-to-community movements, the members of which differ in terms ofwillingness to curtail the activities of human communities inorder to protect non-human communities. To be sure, there are awide range of other issues which divide environmentalists andcommunity developers into various camps, just as the state/individual debate includes a variety of topics. But for thepurposes of this thesis, their major distinguishing feature canbe reduced to differences concerning the rights of humans or non-humans to consume finite resources. Figure 2 shows this four-poled alternative to conventional political debate.The following section examines points on the human/non-human axisin the same way as the state/market axis.2.3.1.^The Human/Non -Human Communities AxisAt the extreme of the environmental or non-human community pole,are those who believe that human communities are a cancerousgrowth on the body of the earth which is crowding out healthynatural communities. As the Ehrlichs put it, " No geologicalevent in a billion years...has posed a threat to terrestrial life39comparable to that of human overpopulation."^This perspectivewould prefer that human communities die out than50scarcer communities of other species. The rights of many non-human communities take precedence over the rights of humancommunities because the former have been pressured to the extentthat many are threatened with extinction. This pole believes thathuman communities have usurped control over the earth'sresources, and have denied them to other species. The only way toredress this historic and ongoing imbalance is to make the needsof non-human communities a priority, and to withdraw most rightsof human communities to consume the earth's resources further.At the opposite pole are those for whom the needs of theirparticular community are paramount, and who do not feel theyshould be expected to sacrifice their community goals and thelifestyle to which they are accustomed in order to preserve non-human communities. This perspective emerges in conflicts betweencommunities based on a single resource extractive industry andenvironmentalists lobbying for ecosystem preservation. An examplein the British Columbia context is the community of Port Albernion Vancouver Island, which feels threatened by demands for theprotection of old-growth forests in several watersheds.At the centre of this continuum is a perspective which seeks tobalance the rights of human and non-human communities. Itsproponents believe that there is a proper scale for humanactivity which will allow natural communities to exist side-by-side with human communities. Differences arise as to how proper51Figure 2EnvironmentState MarketCommunityA New Political Axis5-,scale is to be determined. On the human community side of thiscontinuum, natural communities are to be protected within thelimits determined by the economy; on the natural community side,the size of the economy is determined by assessing the carryingcapacity of natural communities to withstand the impacts of humanactivity. There is a great deal of room for controversy at thecentre of these poles, as an attempt to balance human and non-human activity is a new departure in human social organization.With the addition of the human/non-human rights dimension, thepolitical framework includes both issues of the state vs. theindividual as well as issues of human vs. non-human communities,and recognizes that public concerns are a combination of bothpolitical dimensions. Thus the state/individual axis is notreplaced by the human/non-human axis, but intersected by it sothat the framework for public discussion expands along a verticalas well as a horizontal dimension.2.3.2. Institutional Designs in a New Political FrameworkThis framework for public discussion includes the full range ofissues that are addressed in the public sphere, or that publicspace within which groups and individuals meet to examine"...their relationships with one another and the wider relationsof power in which they are located." 4052Located in and helping to constitute the public sphere areparticipative designs, or institutions embodying free discourseamong individuals. Dryzek isolates three categories of thesedesigns in descending order of communicative purity and ascendingorder of influence in administrative decision-making. The firstcategory includes social movements such as feminism, peace,radical ecology and Green politics which though highly principledin their internal and external relationships, remain on thefringes of political life. The second category includes publicinquiries into the social and environmental impacts ofdevelopment, which, though a small category in terms of thenumbers of these inquiries, has the potential to be the mostsignificant. The third category, consisting of such exercises asenvironmental mediation, regulatory negotiation and alternativedispute resolution, is more closely tied to state and capital. 41These categories bear an inverse relationship to Lisa Peattie'sthree levels of advocacy planning. The first level is theclassical version that effects change through a more inclusivelypluralistic political process which incorporates the interests ofa broad social spectrum. The second, activist perspective workstoward the growth of radical consciousness and organizationalcompetence in the constituency. The third and most radical viewsees fundamental political change in social power relations asnecessary. 4253These categories suggest that there are different types ofparticipative designs and that each type would occupy a specificlocation on the human/non-human axis. For instance, at theextremes of each pole are the new social movements that comeunder Dryzek's first category, such as Earth First! at the non-human communities pole and "share" groups at the humancommunities pole. "Share" groups refer to those organizationscreated in the forest sector to oppose environmentalists' effortsto protect old growth forests. They are called "share" groupsbecause they suggest that logging can share the forests withrecreational and preservation interests. Midway between the polesand the centre are public inquiries with either a socio-economicor biophysical systems focus which provide opportunities forthose who are unwilling to enter into direct communication withthe state and the market to aggregate and express their concerns.The centre of the human/non-human axis is the location of thethird category, where environmental mediation, regulatorynegotiation and alternative dispute resolution can act asdiscursive designs that link input from human and non-humancommunities to the concerns of the state and the market.This approach to participative or discursive designs recognizesdifferent approaches to environmentalism or communitydevelopment and allows them to be expressed as complementaryrather than antagonistic influences. It recognizes that differenttypes of groups have different contributions to make to the54process of policy development. The first level, made up ofradical members of social movements in local communities, are notinvolved in direct interaction with the state and capital, andexpress their concerns in the context of their local communitygroups. This helps to mitigate against the cooptation of the mostactive sources of input to the public sphere by state orcorporate manipulation. The second level is made up of those whowork toward organizational competence in their constituency.These would be active in public inquiries into the social orenvironmental impacts of development. The third level is made upof mainstream activists who are more comfortable dealing withstate and market work in the negotiation and mediation types ofdiscursive designs, which gives them more direct access togovernment and industry and involvement in the content of publicpolicy.How these three types of discursive designs are linked willdetermine whether the interests and concerns of the public spherecan be effectively communicated to the state/market axis. Theconcerns of social movements in local communities are aggregatedand communicated to the second level, which in turn communicatesthem to the third level of mediation with state and corporateinterests. This suggests the need for a representative systemthat can aggregate preferences and select issues that can be usedto successfully challenge the existing political agenda.55A system of representation would remain democratic and effectivein aggregating concerns from its active and autonomous elementsif it is a bottom-up system of representation. It would maintaina flow of pertinent information from the more radical advocatesof human and non-human community rights if the principles ofbottom-up governance presented earlier in this chapter areobserved. To reiterate, these principles were: each highersociety is a subsidiary to the lesser societies beneath it;smaller communities are not to be used as means by the largerbut more remote organizations; and a larger and higherorganization may not arrogate to itself functions which can beperformed efficiently by a smaller and lower organization.In other words, the existing direction of information flow mustbe reversed, so that information from the state/market axis isnot communicated to the mediation level of the public sphere, andfrom there to community organizers and finally to communitysocial movements. Instead, the concerns of the second level arebased on those of community movements, and the concerns of thethird level are those brought to the mediation level by communityorganizers.To incorporate Fox's proposals for institutional reform into aconcept of discursive designs based on bottom-up governance, itis necessary to clarify the relationship between the ResourceManagement and Use Councils and the public sphere. If the56legislative changes to create regional governments and regionalResource-Use councils suggested by Fox were to be implemented,the appointment of representatives to these Councils by thecourts would maintain control by the state and encourage top-downrepresentation in regional government. A more democraticarrangement would be for the individuals and groups in the publicsphere to elect representatives of regional councils withguarantees of representation by First Nations.The role of municipalities in regional government is notdiscussed by Fox, but it could be assumed that the same system ofcountervailing powers as that suggested to govern therelationship between regional and senior governments would beextended to the municipal government level. The provincialgovernment would develop province wide standards for sustainableuse of resources in cooperation with the regions which would beenforced through regional plans. These regional plans would bedeveloped as described above in consultation with municipalitiesand other bodies representing community interests. It would seempractical to include municipalities as Regional Council membersalong with First Nations and other regional interests.A discussion of discursive designs and how they interact with thestate/market axis should not ignore the political parties ofright and left which are participative designs which have beendeveloped for that axis. These designs influence policy through57Figure 3/ , N N\Public \\Sphere \ \7//// Public// Sphere///c4CD\ /\\\ Public\\ Sphere\\//Public /Sphere////....--...,NNDiscursive Designs in an Alternative FrameworkSselected representatives who communicate state/market preferencesof their constituents. These preferences in turn are translatedinto agency programs which are mediated with concerns from thehuman/non-human communities axis at the negotiating level.Figure 3 shows the distribution of discursive designs on thehuman/non-human axis as well as of political parties on thestate/market axis and the relationship between them. Socialmovements at the poles are only partly in and partly out of thepublic sphere as they represent closed organizations that developconsistent interests and demands which are brought to the publicsphere but are limited in their willingness to compromise withother interests.^With more powerful enabling legislation,regional and local governments could mediate between thestandards and guidelines enforced by the state and the concernsof the public sphere. Political parties of the left and rightwould act to aggregate state/market preferences, and electedofficials representing these parties would negotiate with localgovernments.2.4. SUMMARYThis chapter has described the conventional view of the politicalspectrum as one dominated by issues of the rights of the state asopposed to the rights of individuals in the market. Though issuesof community and environment are at the centre of public concern,59they are^not satisfactorily addressed by the conventionalparadigm because they are not included in it. Because they arenot addressed by the paradigm, those concerned with issues ofenvironment and community have difficulty ensuring that theirconcerns are translated into policy and implemented in practice.Proposals for mechanisms to bring about social change througheconomic, political and institutional reforms were examined, withparticular attention to greater local control over localresources through expanded regional and municipal governmentpowers. The role of institutional designs in communicatingbetween the public sphere and the state was discussed. It wasargued that successful participative designs alone could notbring about changes in power relationships that favourstate/market concerns but would work toward re-framing politicaldebate to accord with the concerns of the public sphere. A newpolitical axis was proposed that would augment the conventionalhorizontal political axis of state/market issues withenvironmental and community issues. It was suggested that the twopoles of this axis are distinguished by a commitment to theallocation of resources to either human or non-human communitiesand it is thus referred to as the human/non-human axis..As the human/non-human axis is under-represented in policy-making, and as the issues represented on this axis are central tothe concerns of the public sphere, it was suggested that60discursive designs can act to aggregate the concerns of thepublic sphere an communicate them to the state/market axis.Discursive designs should be located on the human/non-human axisaccording to the willingness of different groups to participatein the process of policy making. A bottom-up system ofrepresentation was suggested that would ensure the autonomy ofthe grass-roots, where issues of environment and community aremost immediate and particular to local needs. As communityactivists would not interact directly with state and corporateinterests, they would be protected from co-optation by state andcorporate power. The centre of the human/non-human communitiesaxis would be the location of regional Resource Management andUse Councils, including municipalities and First Nations. Theywould be involved in discursive designs which would mediatebetween the concerns of the human/non-human communities axis andthe state. All concerns of the public sphere would be addressedin such a multi-dimensional political context. Different levelsof discursive designs to ensure representation of communityinterests would contribute toward the development of an activeautonomous public sphere that could successfully challengeconventional resource planning.This model will be compared to the existing situation in theFraser River estuary to test both the idealized model and itscounterpart in present practice. The location of municipalitiesand other forms of local government in this new political61framework and their relationship to institutional designs forparticipation in the administration of the state will be exploredin the following chapter. It describes the role of municipalitiesin habitat conservation in the Fraser River estuary.62END NOTES1. D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy, (Revised),London: MacMillan, 1976, p. 123.2. Ibid., p. 123.3. Garrett Hardin and John Baden, eds., Managing the Commons,1977, W.H.Freeman and Co., pp. 26-294. Patricia Marchak, Niel Guppy, John McMullan, eds.,  UncommonProperty: The Fishing and Fish Processing Industries in British Columbia, Methuen, 1987, p. 13.5. Raphael, op. cit., p. 128.6. Fife, Daniel, "Killing the Goose", in Managing the Commons,pp. 77-79.7. Clark, Colin,^"The Economics^of Overexploitation" inManaging The Commons, pp. 83-93.8. Davidoff, Paul, "Advocacy and^Pluralism in Planning",Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Vol. 31, Nov.1965 pp. 282-285.9. Heskin, Allan David, "Crisis and Response: A HistoricalPerspective^on^Advocacy^Planning",  American PlanningAssociation Journal, January, 1980, p. 60.10. Cenzatti, Marco, "Marxism and Planning Theory", in PlanningIn The^PUblic Domain, by John Friedmann, Oxford andPrinceton: Princeton University Press, 1987, p. 440.11. Daly, Herman and John Cobb, For The Common Good, Boston:Beacon Press, 1989, p. 143.12. Ibid., p. 9.13. Ibid., p. 235.14. Ibid., pp. 173, 214, 234.15. Ibid., p. 174.16. Ibid., pp. 174-5, 177.17.^Friedmann, op.cit., p. 10.6318. Ibid., p. 363.19. Ibid., pp. 354, 363-370.20. Dempsey, Bernard W., The Functional Economy, EaglewoodCliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1958, p. 281.21. Pope Pius XI, 1931, Quadragesimo Anno.22. Friedmann, op. cit.,pp. 8,10-11.23. Ibid., p. 8.24. Friedmann, op. cit., p. 374; Daly and Cobb,  op. cit., p. 9.25. Fox, Irving, J., "Institutional Design for the Management ofthe Natural Resources of the Fraser River Basin", inPerspectives on Sustainable Development in Water Management,A. J. Dorcey, ed., Westwater Research Centre, University ofBritish Columbia, 1991, pp. 289-290.26. Ibid., p. 291.27. Ibid., p. 295.28. Dryzek, John, "Designs for Environmental Discourse" inManaging^Leviathan:^Environmental^Politics^and^theAdministrative State, Robert Paehlke and Douglas Torgerson,eds., Peterborough, Ont. and Lewiston, N.Y.: BroadviewPress, 1990, pp. 106-107.29. Torgerson, Douglas, "Limits of the Administrative Mind" inManaging Leviathan, p. 142.30.^Ibid., p. 148.31. Dryzek, op. cit., p. 10232. Torgerson, op. cit., P. 142-145.33. Paehlke,^Robert^and Douglas Torgerson, "EnvironmentalAdministration", in Managing Leviathan, pp. 12-13.34. Bartlett, Robert,"Ecological Reason in Administration", inManaging Leviathan, p. 82.35. O'Riordan, T.,  Environmentalism, Pion Limited, 1981, p. v.36. Ibid., p. 261-263.37.^Ibid., p. 261-263.6438. Milbrath, Lester^W.,^1989,^Envisioning a Sustainable Society: Learning Our Way^Out,^Albany,^N.Y.: Stateuniversity of New York Press, p. 132.39. Ehrlich, Anne and Paul Ehrlich, Population, Resources and Environment, San Francisco:W. H. Freeman and Sons, 1972, p.1.40. Dryzek, op. cit., p. 106.41. Ibid., pp. 102-104.42. Peattie, Lisa, cited in Friedmann, Planning in the Public Domain, p. 440.65CHAPTER THREE^LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND HABITAT CONSERVATIONIN THE FRASER RIVER ESTUARYThe general objective of this thesis is to study the relationshipbetween local communities and the state by exploring the researchquestion: What is the role of local government^in local resourceuse^decision making? Chapter^Two^discussed proposals^forinstitutional reforms to^address environmental problems facingcontemporary Western societies, and decentralization of controlover resources to the local level was a recurring theme. It wassuggested that countervailing influences could be created thatwould encourage resource conservation through greater localcontrol, while avoiding resource uses contrary to the publicinterest. It was further suggested that existing participativedesigns such as environmnetal mediation and negotiation forumsand public inquiries are the best mechanisms for bringing aboutnot only the institutional changes necessary for enhanced localcontrol but the paradigm changes necessary to understandenvironmental issues more clearly.While the main research question seeks to define the existingrelationship between local government and the state, the aim ofthe subsidiary research questions is to examine the potential forthat relationship to change through the use of discursive designsinitiated by both the state and local communities. Localgovernment is one of many interests that are excluded from key66decision-making by the existing power structure, and by exploringwhether and how power can be extended to one excluded group, thisstudy will suggest whether and how this can be done for otherdisadvantaged interests. It will also provide a greaterunderstanding of the rights and duties of smaller territorialpolitical jurisdictions in relation to the larger society.These objectives will be pursued in this chapter through a casestudy of habitat management in the Fraser River estuary. The casestudy will examine the involvement of local governments in thehabitat management activities of an institutional arrangementdesigned to reconcile economic and ecological needs in theestuary, the Fraser River Estuary Management Program. Changes inthe role of local governments in habitat management will bedocumented and the implications of these changes for the successof this institutional design as an avenue of reform will beassessed.The case study describes habitat management as an institutionalsub-system in the Fraser River estuary. This concept has beenborrowed from Sproule-Jones ('80) who argues that societalcontrol over an activity like habitat conservation is effectedlargely through an institutional sub-system, or instruments ofgovernment such as laws, regulations, taxes, subsidies, andagencies. 1 It is called a system to suggest the complexinteraction of a wide diversity of interests through which it67operates. 2This case study looks at the formal arrangements of the habitatmanagement sub-system in some detail, then examines the workingsof the informal and interest group arrangements in terms of aformal institutional design, the Fraser River Estuary ManagementProgram (FREMP). It describes FREMP as a management system thathas arisen in response to the jurisdictional overlap betweensenior governments and acts as a forum for the exchange of ideasamong agency personnel. The role of municipalities in oneactivity of the management system, habitat conservation, isexamined. An important aspect of habitat conservation has beenthe designation of conservation areas, which has been the primaryfocus of the area designation process in the estuary. Thisprocess will be discussed in detail in this chapter. The casestudy traces the evolution of enhanced participation of localgovernments in this process and the growing appreciation ofconservation values among all levels of government involved inthe estuary.3.1.^FORMAL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ESTUARYFormal arrangements include legislation^designed to managehabitat enacted by federal, provincial and local governments and68implemented by agencies which have been established or reshapedto take specific actions, such as issuing regulations. Alsoincluded in the formal arrangements are taxes and subsidies whichencourage habitat protection and enhancement. This sectionreviews the major legislative authority and supportingadministrative structures that exist for habitat management inthe Lower Fraser. These are described in terms of the existinggovernment legislation of federal, provincial, jointfederal/provincial and local authorities.3.1.1. Federal AuthorityThe British North America Act gave the federal government powerover seacoast and inland fisheries, migratory waterfowl,shipping, navigation, harbours, defence, international relationsand communications and ownership of the bed and foreshore of sixharbours on the B.C. Coast. The federal government thus owns thebed of the Fraser River estuary from Tilbury Island to KanakaCreek as well as the Pitt River to its exit from Pitt Lake. Whilethe federal government owns Sea Island, The Fraser River HarbourCommission (FRHC) and North Fraser Harbour Commission (NFHC) canaffect foreshore use through their control of navigation and3shipping. The federal Harbour Commissions administer the landsand waters owned by the federal Crown, that area of the estuarydesignated to be within the harbour limit, and all provincialCrown foreshore. If the Harbour Commission requires more estuary69land for navigation and shipping, it can gain property rightsover an area as well as regulate matters in that area. In otherwords, the Harbour Commissions may expropriate and develop anyproperty owned by Canada, the province or a municipality "in thelimits of the harbour or in the immediate vicinity thereof."4The Harbours Commissions are accountable to the Ministry ofTransportation.The Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) is administeredby Environment Canada and is intended to be used in theformulation of comprehensive environmental pollution control andabatement plans. A contravention of the Act is subject to5prosecution under the criminal code. All federal projects aresubject to the Environmental Assessment and Review Process(EARP). Other federal powers stem from its right to legislate inthe interests of "peace, order and good government". 63.1.1.1. FisheriesFederal authority over fisheries rests with one section of theFisheries Act, which is administered by the Department ofFisheries and Oceans (DFO) and prohibits the discharge ofsubstances deleterious to fish into waterbodies. The habitatprotection provisions of the Act provide authority to protectagainst developments which are likely to result in harmfulalteration, disruption or destruction of fish habitats. The70Department of the Environment (DOE) administers the water qualityprovisions of the Act. The Fisheries Act and its habitatprotection provision are the backbone of habitat protectionlegislation used in the estuary. It may be used to stopactivities that have not been properly reviewed, or that are notin compliance with the Act. The basic policy of the DFO for themanagement of fish habitat is that no loss of productive fishhabitats will be condoned. To prevent further reductions in fishresources, the DFO has implemented objectives to obtain a netgain in the productive capacity of habitats. To meet thisobjective, it has established a principle of "no net loss", whichstipulates that habitat lost as a result of development must bereplaced. Restoration of previously degraded areas is an integralpart of their habitat preservation policy. 7In order to achieve no net loss, DFO has established a hierarchyof preferences through its shoreline habitat inventory map. Thismap has identified habitat according to productivity: red areasare highly productive habitat where no development may bepermitted; yellow areas are moderately productive habitats wheredevelopment is subject to mitigation or compensation; green areasare low productivity habitats where development is permittedsubject to mitigation requirements.In yellow areas, where habitat is put at risk through potentialdevelopment, the proponent is encouraged to redesign the site,71select an alternate site or mitigate potential damage. Thefollowing principles are adhered to by DFO for fish habitat:replacement should be like-for-like, that is marsh for marsh ormudflat for mudflat; habitat should be replaced near the site ofimpact, unless off-site replacement would increase productivecapacity. For marsh habitat the ratio is 2:1 because of the timerequired for productive marshland to establish itself and therisk involved, and the mudflat and riparian habitat ratio is 1:1.In 1988 the NFHC agreed to develop a joint North Fraser HarbourEnvironmental Management Plan in conjunction with the DFO. Thecatalyst for development of the plan came from the DFO whichdemanded that the Harbour Commission clean up the entire harbour.Instead, the NFHC negotiated agreement for a management planwhich could establish priorities by which the NFHC would addressharbour clean-up. Because the DFO was very cautious in itsapproach to coming to agreement on a management plan, the processtook three years. 8The four components of the plan are: ahabitat inventory and shoreline classification system, based onthat developed under the DFO's policy for management of fishhabitat; project review and assessment procedures, again usingDFO policy guidelines; a habitat compensation banking system,whereby habitat is accumulated against future losses; and acooperative management program with harbour industry and users toimprove shoreline habitats. 972Of the users affected by the plan it has been most strongly feltby the forest industry which estimates that overall log storagein the estuary has been reduced by 5-8%. For some individualfirms, the loss of log storage is up to 20% of their formerareas. 10Other industries have found the requirements of theplan less onerous, as improved industrial practice can protecthabitat without costs to the firms involved. 113.1.1.2. WildlifeEnvironment Canada is the federal ministry responsible for themanagement and protection of marine mammals and migratory birdsthroughout the study area. Harbour seals and killer whales areprotected under the Fisheries Act. The Canadian WildlifeService(CWS) is responsible for migratory birds in the study areaunder the Migratory Birds Convention Act and the Canada Wildlife Act. The role of the Migratory Birds Branch of the CanadianWildlife Service is to "...keep Canada fit for birds to livein... (by)... managing the migratory bird resource for themaximum benefit of existing and future generations of Canadiansand other people having a common interest in the welfare of thebirds." 12The objectives of the Migratory Birds Branch pertain also to thehabitat base for the wildlife resource. The provincial goal ofthe Fish and Wildlife Branch is, "To provide sustained benefits73for the people of British Columbia through the management andprotection of the fish and wildlife resources." 13 The Branchrecognizes that only 20-30% of original wetlands habitat existsin the Fraser estuary and that the remainder is vital to themaintenance of current fish and wildlife populations. TheBranch's estuarine management policy is that pristine estuarineenvironments, where they exist, should be preserved intact andthat the status quo should be maintained in all estuaries subjectto industrial use, and any options for habitat rehabilitationshould be pursued. 14Though compensation for fish habitat tends to serve wildlifeneeds as well, the CWS requires that one-half of any importantwildlife habitat that is at risk should be retained in itsnatural state and placed into secure tenure for conservation.Under this policy, no net loss or full protection of habitat isimpossible. Habitat banking is also practised as a way ofcreating and saving new habitats in the estuary for the purposeof future habitat compensation needs.It is suggested that theestablishment of a formal policy and comprehensive inventory ofcompensation projects would improve the agencies' ability toprotect wildlife habitat. 15 Federal government lands such asthe Reifel Bird Sanctuary were purchased by CWS which enjoys allthe rights of a private landowner in the management of this land.These federal lands are supplemented by a provincial wildlifesanctuary on an adjacent tract of Roberts Bank.743.1.2.^Provincial AuthorityThe provincial government owns all natural resources within theprovince - lands, minerals, water and wildlife. In the estuary,the Provincial government owns most of the foreshore with theexception of Sturgeon Bank, the remaining bed of the Fraser,almost all the North Arm and the Main Arm west of Tilbury.16They are significant minority holders of adjacent uplands aswell, especially in Boundary Bay and Roberts Bank. 17Provincially^there^are^two^types of habitat protectiondesignations, Wildlife Management Areas and Map Reserves. Twotypes of Management Areas are provided for under the Wildlife Act, and managed by the Ministry of the Environment (MOE):Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) and Critical Wildlife Areas(CWAs). The latter are designated from Crown Land for protectionof threatened or endangered species. Both WMAs and CWAs may beacquired through purchase, lease, donation, expropriation or landtransfer. Map Reserves are administered by the Land Branch of theMinistry of Crown Lands under authority of the Land Act. Effortsare being made to transfer these lands from other ministries tothe MOE through section 101 of the Land Act. This would allowthese areas to be designated as WMA's. The ultimate aim of landacquisition programs under the MOE is to create WildlifeManagement Areas, but to date only 6% of existing habitat in theFraser estuary is secured.75Many provincial agencies exercise influence over land use on andadjacent to the foreshore, especially the Land Management andWater Investigations Branch of the MOE, the Ministry ofMunicipal Affairs, the Agricultural Land Commission and theMinistry of Highways. The Land Management Branch is responsiblefor the establishment of ecological and other reserves on Crownland.Provincial lands are of three types: Crown Reserves, GreenbeltLands and consignments from other provincial authorities. Crownreserves may be Orders-In-Council, which are the strongest formof tenure, map reserves or notations of interest. Order-In-Council reserves restrict the conditions of use to specificagencies or purposes, or place administrative controls on use.The most important of these is OIC 908 which requires that everyproposed development on the foreshore and land outside thedyking system of Sturgeon and Roberts Banks and Boundary andSemiahmoo Bays be subject to a mandatory environmental impactassessment. Neither of the other two types of tenure confersmanagement authority but they are often used to effect short-termprotection pending more detailed studies.The Greenbelt Act provides for regulation and management oflands purchased at the request of various provincial and localgovernment agencies and is administered by the Ministry of CrownLands. It provides for the setting aside of crown land or the76acquisition of private lands to control land use according to therequirements of the municipalities for green and open space. TheGreenbelt Act exempts designated lands from the provisions ofother acts except the Ecological Reserves Act, the Environmental Land Use Act and the Waste Management Act. Marshlands may beconsigned for management to the Fish and Wildlife Branch by otherprovincial authorities such as the Ministry of Highways or theB.C. Land Commission. The Fish and Wildlife Branch within theprovincial MOE has responsibility for all wildlife other thanmigratory birds. 18 The Environmental Management Act empowersthe Minister of the Environment to manage, protect and enhancethe environment. While this Act does not provide for acquisitionand protection of habitat, it does allow for the preparation ofenvironmental management plans for specific areas. 19There are several mandatory provincial review processes. The LandDisposition Referral Procedure applies to all B.C. Crown Land andis used to review applications for new and replacement landtenures as well as proposals for reserves, designations andnotations under the Land Act. The Energy Project Review Processencompasses energy, economic, social, land use, resource andenvironmental issues. A floodplain review process exists underthe Water Act which applies to applications to flood Crown Land.The Major Project Review Process was established to reviewprojects not examined under the existing review process. TheFraser River Estuary Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines77implement Order-in-Council 908/77 which applies to all proposeddevelopments outside the dykes in Sturgeon and Roberts Banks andin Boundary and Semiahmoo Bays. The MOE reviews proposalsinvolving the use of pesticides or the dumping of wastes.3.1.3. Joint Federal/Provincial AuthorityNowhere in the estuary is there a clear basis for one governmentto be the sole authority and all levels of government can beinvolved in decisions. The province has jurisdiction over themanagement and sale of all resources where its ownership rightsare recognized, but where these ownership rights overlap withthe other jurisdiction, there must be compromise andcooperation. 20 The two senior governments exercise considerablecontrol over the foreshore outside the dykes in the Fraser Riverestuary because most of this land is Crown owned. The Federal andProvincial governments share ownership of the bed of the mainchannel of the Fraser River.The federal and provincial governments are roughly equal in theircontrol of the Fraser River estuary as both have substantialpowers stemming from their ownership and jurisdictional rights,and neither has clear dominance in the estuary as a whole, thougheither one may have clear rights in any particular issue.However, there are legal provisions that weigh the balance ofpower in favour of the federal government so that in cases of78conflict legislative power is given to the federal government. 21Where there is divided jurisdiction over a group of legislativematters, the two governments may cooperate by entering into afederal/provincial agreement.Both governments work cooperatively to prevent alienation ofprime habitat through agreements to jointly acquire and managelands. Critical habitat areas in the Fraser River estuary havebeen acquired through direct land purchases, land titletransfers, or receiving control over land management. As largeland purchases are expensive, they have usually been undertakenjointly by several agencies and organizations through cooperativeconservation programs. Riparian habitat has been set aside forprotection in the joint federal/provincial River Dyking Program.They also work cooperatively on habitat enhancement andrestoration projects to improve the productive capacity of theestuary's natural habitat. Enhancement involves improving thequality, productivity and associated public benefits of naturalareas. Restoration involves restoring or artificially improvingdegraded environments.In the Fraser River estuary, cooperation has been achieved amongthe federal, provincial and regional actors involved. Thoseinvolved in decisions regarding land and water use in the estuaryinclude the GVRD, the British Columbia Ministry of Lands, Parks79and Housing, the Department of Transport, the two HarbourCommissions and the DFO. The major agencies involved in licensingand regulation of discharges into the water and water use in theestuary are the MOE, its federal counterparts DOE and DFO, andthe GVRD. 22 This cooperation between provincial and federalagencies was motivated by the complex array of legislation andinstitutions that had evolved. More than a hundred governmentaland non-governmental organizations were involved in governance ofthe estuary but there was no formal mechanism through which thenumerous agencies could coordinate their efforts. Before amanagement plan was developed the existing institutionalarrangements were found to have gaps and inconsistencies amongpolicies and to be increasingly unable to resolve the growingconflicts between competing interests. The search for a moreeffective management system for the Fraser River estuary will bediscussed after a description of the enabling legislation thatshapes the relationship between municipalities and senior levelsof government, followed by a brief description of the informalinstitutional arrangements and interest groups involved in theestuary.3.1.4. Local AuthorityThough the primary responsibility for land use planning in theestuary lies with the province, it has delegated most of itsresponsibility, along with zoning powers, to the individual80municipalities. As creatures of the province, municipalities arein a relatively weak position in conflicts with the provincial orfederal governments in the estuary. 23 They own littlewaterfront land so their control of uses of the foreshore andadjacent upland is largely exercised through land-use zoning,subdivision controls and provision of roads and services. 24Industries own most of the privately held land adjacent to theforeshore, especially wood converting industries.Under the Municipal Act municipalities control land use inuplands behind the dykes, but Section 716 of the Act includes thepower to zone the surface of the water as well as land. Whilethis power would be dislodged by the paramount jurisdiction ofthe federal government over shipping and navigation in theestuary, the GVRD and its member municipalities feel thatsection 716 should operate within the harbour, in matters notdirectly affecting shipping and navigation. The HarbourCommissions refuse to recognize zoning at the municipal levelwhich would affect any Harbour Commission jurisdiction on land orwater. Municipal and regional governments in the estuary have notattempted to enforce by-laws or zoning regulations within harbourlimits, and the Harbour Commission has tended to adhere to areadesignations under the official regional plan and by-laws ofmunicipalities that front the harbour. Their mandate, however,has been to develop these lands and waters according to theconcept of the highest and best use in economic terms, which is81sometimes in conflict with local designations.Because control of land use on foreshore in the estuary islargely split between the federal and provincial governmentsthrough the Harbour Commissions and the MOE, municipalities havetended to consider that the use of these foreshore lands isoutside their control. 25 As the authority of municipalities andregional districts has been delegated by the province it is alimited jurisdiction over designated areas. They can controlcoastal land and waters within these designated areas throughzoning, but final authority rests with senior governmentsthrough the precedence of their enabling legislation.The Ministry of Municipal Affairs is responsible for the properadministration of the  Municipal Act, which delegates authorityto local governments in a number of areas. The provision in theAct that allows designation of areas for "protection of thenatural environment" is Sections 945-(4)(a), which also providesfor the creation of guidelines for this protection. Though thissection protects fragile habitat from construction orsubdivision, it is not effective in preventing other uses such astree-cutting or land fills. 26 In addition to zoning andsubdivision controls, the Act empowers local governments tomaintain, construct and repair dykes and drainage works for floodprotection. 27 Local governments can affect agriculturalactivities in the estuary area through the Agricultural Land82Commission Act which involves them in the Agricultural LandReserve (ALR) process. Application for exclusion from the ALR maybe made by individual property owners, municipalities or regionaldistricts or may be ordered by Cabinet. The Soil Conservation Act enables local authorities to issue permits for removal ordisposition of soil from an ALR.The Waste Management Act administered by the MOE plays asignificant role in the relationship between municipalities andthe province, especially in the area of habitat management. ThisAct takes precedence over other provincial Acts if there is aconflict between them. Thus municipalities and regional districtscan not impose stricter guidelines, controls, or more restrictivepermits than those granted under this Act. 28Municipalities and regional governments have other tools withwhich they can enforce their zoning regulations, such as supplyof utilities, services and road access. 29 Land purchased forthe purpose of municipal or regional parks is one way that localgovernments can contribute toward habitat conservation throughland acquisition. In the past, municipalities have been reluctantto use their powers of conservation or to restrict development onprivate lands outside the dykes, though they have favoured parkzoning for many publicly-owned foreshore lands. 30 During thelate '70's when senior government environmental agencies wereattempting to conserve sensitive or productive habitat in the83estuary, they complained that municipalities made no attempt toreserve waterfront lands for water-using industries, or "...todevelop policies to preserve areas of the waterfront withspecific aesthetic or ecological attributes such as Surrey Bendor Burnaby's Big Bend." 31The role of municipalities in protecting habitat in the estuaryhas changed over the past decade. Many municipal councils in themid-70's were very development oriented and considered federaland provincial regulations to be impediments to growth. Sincethat time there has been a change in municipal attitudes and agreening of local politics. In the early '70's Burnaby wentthrough a comprehensive public review of land use in its Big Bendarea, which was zoned for heavy industrial use. The Big BendDevelopment Plan changed the area to a mix of open space,residential, conservation, agricultural and some industrialzones. 32Burnaby has also undertaken an ambitious plan toacquire green space for conservation and recreation and nowoffers public access to 50% of their foreshores in the FraserEstuary and Burrard Inlet. 33Other municipalities such as Surrey have managed to protect largeportions of environmentally sensitive areas through decades ofthoughtful land use. The habitat that has survived in Surrey isa result of a municipal history of conservation rather than arecent "greening" of the local council. It has recently been84recommended that Surrey's Big Bend be conserved to protectsensitive habitat, and though the municipality would encourage aconservation designation for the area, it does not have the taxbase for funding acquisitions that Burnaby has. While Burnabymade the bulk of its green space acquisitions during a period ofrelatively low land prices, Surrey is presently facing steepprices for valuable foreshore. Like Burnaby, the municipality hastaken a proactive approach to environmental planning, and hasdeveloped a land inventory for environmentally sensitive areaswhich is a model of its kind. 34An example that illustrates a change in municipal attitude isthe history of the Spetifore lands in Delta. In the early 70'sthe municipality of Delta wanted to develop the lands, and theprovincial government wanted to prevent that development. Inrecent years the positions had become reversed, and the newmunicipal council was trying to protect the Spetifore lands fromdevelopment encouraged by the province. The "greening" ofRichmond City Council is indicated by a recent Round Table on theEnvironment held by the Mayor of Richmond and amendments to theOCP that create guidelines for use in environmentally sensitiveareas. Richmond also has an acquisition plan to rescue propertieswith important conservation, recreation or aesthetic values. 35One reason for the change in attitudes has to do with a change inforeshore use^in the^Lower Mainland^from industrial to85residential and service industry uses. This is reflected inamendments to OCPs which are changing river uses from industrialto residential. Municipalities used to think of the Fraser Riveras a back door where industry would be far from residentialzoning. With increasing population pressures they have realizedthe value of the waterfront for residential development and theyare changing the river to their front door. There areorganizational changes in municipal departments which reflectthese changes in attitude toward green space. Many municipalitiesincluding Burnaby, Surrey, Delta and Vancouver have hiredenvironmental planners and are creating conservation guidelinesunder section 945 of the Municipal Act. 36Changes in attitude of regional governments in the estuaryreflect municipal changes. Three regional governments border onthe estuary; the GVRD, the Dewdney Allouette Regional District(DARD) and the Central Fraser Valley Regional District (CFVRD).There was an Official Regional Plan (ORP) developed by the GVRDin 1966 to propose principles for orderly growth throughout theLower Fraser Valley including control of urban expansion and arecreation and park plan. The other regional districts did nothave well-defined land use policies and adopted the ORP for theGVRD to guide development in their own regions. 37The ORP sought to redirect growth away from farm and flood-plainareas and "Preserve environmental quality and natural assets"86through land area designations and natural assets policies. Mapsidentified these features including significant fish, bird andwildlife habitat. Its policies were to be incorporated into OCP'sand used by senior government agencies in management practices.Though the floodplain placed natural restrictions on industrialdevelopment along much of their foreshore, criticism of the ORPby senior agencies in the late 70's suggested that industrialareas were allocated along much of the waterfront regardless ofphysical and servicing constraints. GVRD policy with regard toindustrial expansion has changed since the time that the regionalplan was in place. Expected industrial demands have notmaterialized and the value of estuarine ecosystems has becomerecognized. 38In 1975, the GVRD proposed a Liveable Region Program (LRP) whichwas designed to channel rapidly increasing population pressuresto appropriate areas of the region through consultation betweenlocal and senior levels of government. It argued that themunicipalities bore the brunt of rapid population growth as theyhad to pay for it and cope with it. The program stressed regionalgrowth sharing and management, regional town centres, regionaltransportation policies and an Open Space Conservancy Program to39provide the context for regional conservation efforts. Thecentral purpose of the ORP and LRP was to create "Cities in a Seaof Green,,. 4087Though the goals of the LRP are much the same today, the means ofrealizing them have changed since many regional planning powerswere retracted by the provincial government in 1983. The GVRDworks to develop cooperation among the municipalities in suchareas as regional conservation of greenspace. Municipalities areasked to incorporate the concepts of the LRP into their OCP's.The LRP is also used as a framework for intermunicipal andintergovernmental actions and regional discussion of issues. 41A document called "Creating Our Future" has updated the LRP andidentified initiatives for realizing some of its Open SpaceConservancy objectives. The Green Zone initiative is meant toflesh out the environmental conservation concepts of thatdocument and to design a process for protecting important greenspace and containing regional expansion. The GVRD has done astudy of environmentally sensitive lands, and will invitemunicipalities to use this survey in protecting green space. 42Despite their weak legislative position, the Greater VancouverRegional District (GVRD) and its eleven member municipalities areincreasingly becoming major provincial actors in decisionsregarding land and water use in the estuary along with senior43government agencies. Senior government environmental agenciesare becoming increasingly aware of the contribution that localgovernments can make to conservation efforts in the estuary.Several suggestions have emerged from these agencies that would88enhance^the^involvement^of local governments in habitatmanagement activities. One report recommended that environmentallegislation reflect planning for habitat protection andconservation and gave local property tax incentives to protect44valuable habitat as an example of such legislation.^Suchlegislation would give greater^local^control^over localresources within guidelines set by the federal and provincialgovernments. Amendments to the Municipal Act that would requireshoreline plans like those demanded by the U.S.  Coastal Zone Management Act would also encourage greater local government45responsibility for habitat conservation.Local governments would need resources in order to be able tocarry out additional management functions such as shorelinemanagement plans. Surrey has anticipated this sort of change bydeveloping the Surrey Bend By-Law which must meet federal andprovincial regulations and therefore is eligible for federal andprovincial financial assistance. Local governments appreciatefederal and provincial assistance with habitat management andwould not be capable of implementing all habitat managementfunctions on their own. For instance in Coquitlam, the DFO isasking for regulation of a massive residential development onthe Westwood Plateau to protect salmon streams. Local plannersappreciate the knowledge, ability and enforcement capability thatDFO brings to this area because they don't have it themselves.Municipalities could develop the capacity to take on more habitat89management functions if they were to build up their own staffthrough development services taxes or planning grants from theMinistry of Municipal Affairs. It would be possible to arrive atan efficient division of labour where the DFO would concentrateon high priority streams and give responsibility for smallerstreams to local jurisdictions. 46Though the DFO cannot legally delegate authority for implementingor enforcing its policies to regional or local governments, inpractice this delegation already takes place. For instance in theSurrey example above, the DFO gave the municipality guidelineswith respect to development, but was unable to provide the humanresources to police the implementation and enforcement of thoseguidelines. The rapid rate of urban development makes thatmunicipality a "black hole" in terms of consuming the attentionof DFO personnel. Due to staff shortages, there is an informalagreement that policing of DFO guidelines is the municipality'sresponsibility, but if the DFO finds a lack of compliance in arandom audit, the municipality will be held responsible. 473.2. INFORMAL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTSThe enabling legislation of the important agencies does not givea full picture of the framework of authority and activity in theestuary. Agencies interpret and use their powers through non-legislative instruments or informal arrangements which make up90their long-term existence as well as their day-to-day functions.48 Informal or customary arrangements exist for the sharing ofresponsibilities where there is the possibility of more than oneagency or level of government taking action on an issue. 49Systems that facilitate the assembly, storage, development andexchange of information are an example of informal institutionalarrangements that are used to implement the agencies' legislatedmandates. Referral systems are procedures that governmentagencies use to inform each other of proposed developmentactivities, exchange information, resolve conflicts, coordinateactivities and arrive at decisions. 50December 29, 1991Plans and programs that are developed to implement the legislatedmandates of agencies and agreements can also be considered asinformal institutional arrangements. For instance the NFHC hasdeveloped an environmental management plan with a formalcomponent outlining the agreed upon responsibilities of theagencies involved, and a more informal component of cooperationamong three levels of government, agencies and harbour users. 51FREMP is an example of a formal institutional arrangementdesigned to resolve overlapping mandates of senior governments,while the programs plans and processes developed within FREMP areinformal institutional arrangements.913.3.^INTEREST GROUPSThe last component of the habitat management sub-system is madeup of interest groups. There are a wide range of organizationsrepresenting a diversity of interests in habitat enhancement andprotection in the estuary. Aside from provincial and federalagencies, boards and commissions, and in addition to electedmunicipal councils and appointed bodies, there are a multitude ofcivic groups and organizations. These include regional specialinterest groups representing social, environmental, economic,recreational and education interests; business, industry andunions located in the estuary; educational institutions andlibraries; and the mass media.Though local governments appear in formal institutionalarrangements which provide enabling legislation for agencies atdifferent levels of government, and in informal arrangementssuch as discretionary referral processes and senior agencyprograms, they are also interest groups in that they are oftenmarginal powers in these arrangements.While the emphasis of this case study is on local municipalities,the concerns of other human communities in the estuary should benoted. Like municipalities, First Nations also play a role asinterest groups in the estuary, though they are demanding to beconsidered as partners in Confederation. Indian Bands are92concerned about the loss of traditional fishing grounds, 52andthe degradation of archaeological sites along the lower Fraser53estuary.^Concerns are expressed that Indian Reserve landmight be designated for habitat protection and that they will beobliged to assume a disproportionate share of the cost of54environmental preservation.3.4.^A MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR THE ESTUARYThe impetus for a management system in the estuary came from anumber of different sources. There were some eco-initiatives inthe mid 1970's in the US, such as the National Environmental Protection Act, which influenced Canada and B.C., and resulted inthe Environment and Land Use Commission, ALR's, and environmentalreview legislation. There was a great deal of economic growth atthe time, and in the Fraser estuary three major projects werebeing proposed at the same time: the Vancouver InternationalAirport expansion, the Roberts Bank Coal Port development andtraining walls for shipping. Pressures to develop the economicpotential of the estuary with resulting ecological impacts led todemands from environmentalists to protect these ecosystems. 55Public perception was of a lack of coordinated review orunderstanding of the estuary-wide implications of these projects.93Development of a management system responded to concern "...as tothe means by which continuing urban and industrial expansion inthe metropolitan Vancouver region could be reconciled with theneed to sustain the environmental integrity of the Fraserestuary." The overall goal was to balance the needs of theeconomy with the protection of the natural ecosystems of theFraser estuary. 56A management system was also undertakenbecause existing informal arrangements for management were poorlyunderstood, undocumented and contributed to a sense of confusionand exasperation on the part of the public, special interestgroups, developers and agencies alike. Concern was expressedabout the complexity, effectiveness and accountability of theexisting system, with an extensive and incomprehensible web ofinformal arrangements used to implement formal statutoryprovisions. The implementation of a management system was to makethe process more structured, understandable, open andaccountable. The first stage in the development of a managementsystem was a study undertaken to gather information about theestuary, identify major problems and define the scope of amanagement plan. 573.4.1.^The Fraser River Estuary StudyThe purpose of the Fraser River Estuary Study (FRES) was to"...develop a management plan which recognized the importance ofthe estuary both for human activities such as urban-industrial94and port development, and for the preservation of ecologicalintegrity". 58The study area included the land and wateroutside of the dykes and upland areas within 1000 metres of thedykes from Kanaka Creek and the outlet of Pitt Lake in the east,the estuary drop-off in the west, Point Grey in the north and theInternational Boundary to the south including Boundary andSemiahmoo Bays. Figure 4 shows the FRES core study area. Thestudy was divided into two phases: phase I which produced aninventory of existing conditions and trends; and phase II whichwas concerned with the preparation of a management program. 59The FRES I Steering Committee formed four work groups to carryout their objectives, with technical staff from federal,provincial and regional levels of government. Liaison withmunicipalities was obtained through membership on the Land-Useand Transportation Work Group by the Chairman of the TechnicalPlanning committee of the GVRD. When it became clear that amanagement plan for the estuary would have to address how muchand where future urban development would occur, the SteeringCommittee expanded its membership to include a representative ofregional development from the GVRD. 60Recognizing that FRES should explore a wider range of issues andconcerns than those represented by the Work Group participants,the Committee arranged a series of workshops which invited96participation from the Steering Committee, Work Groups, publicand business groups and municipal staffs and councils. 61Amongthe specific proposals that emerged form these workshops was asuggestion that municipal elected and appointed bodies should becontacted and asked for input into the management program on anongoing basis. 62The Steering Committee deliberated on these consultations and thefindings of the four work groups and assessed their implicationsfor the development of a management plan. The organizationalconcept proposed by FRES I was comprised of three inter-actinggroups; a constituency comprising all government agencies andnon-governmental groups that would meet or exchange views andparticipate in task groups; a policy group comprising keyagencies which would develop initiatives resolve conflicts andmake recommendations to the political level; and an estuarycouncil which would be a small political group bearing ultimateresponsibility and accountability. The next step proposed by theSteering Committee in the development of this management plan wasto organize dialogue on the proposed policy guidelines,organizational suggestions and work group findings of FRES I.FRES II would establish the main framework for the managementplan leading to a Federal/Provincial agreement to begin planimplementation. 63Though the proposals made in FRES I were strongly influenced by97an external consultant with significant experience in regionalplanning and government, they were not considered politicallyviable. 64The mandate given to FRES II was to look at lessradical organizational options so the outcome of the second phasewas a proposed system that "... erodes as little as possible theexisting agency functions...". 65The rationale for retainingthe existing power structure in the estuary was that such asystem could be put in place quickly, and implementedimmediately. Agreements on criteria and policy changes could takeplace in the future once commitment to the management plan wasmade by both senior governments. This would allow agreement andnegotiation with respect to the policies or criteria with whichdecisions are made, without overstepping the discretion of theagencies.FRES II did not examine the potential for greater localrepresentation as its priority was getting a process underwaythat would meet with minimum resistance. Any attempt to providefor greater representation or authority by local governmentswould have interfered with the momentum necessary to getcommitment from senior governments and agencies. The architectsof FRES II were anxious to get on to the next step which was tonarrow the options for the agreements and to analyse the policiesof the major agencies. 66FRES I proposals recognized the need for leadership in decision-98making and accountability in a management system for the estuary. 67FRES II did not pursue these proposals because an enhancedbureaucratic organization was felt to be more feasible than thecreation of a new governing body for the estuary. In the FRES IIproposals, political leadership and accountability remained withthe Federal and Provincial Ministers of the Environment.The FRES I Steering Committee was renamed the Planning Committeein FRES II and changed from being dominated by environmentalagencies to^include a diversity of agency interests. 68 Therewas a series of technical reports produced during this secondphase containing proposals and background data on managementsystems, information^systems,^area^designations, referralsystems, legal provisions, organizational options and publicinvolvement. The report on legal provisions for a managementsystem suggested that it must be constrained by "...statutoryprovisions which allow the major agencies involved to coordinatetheir regulatory functions, share decision-making processes andadopt uniform policies for planning and management". 69A comprehensive survey of the policies controlling land and wateruse in the estuary was also done during FRES II in order todocument the informal inter-agency arrangements that haddeveloped to overcome the more obvious clashes in mandatescreated under the formal institutional arrangements. 70 Theresults of the survey found a need to "...clarify and make betterknown the several referral processes that exist. As a first step99in this clarification an inventory of existing referral processeswas proposed. 71All agency personnel were sent a questionnaire asking them to"...elaborate on their respective management responsibilities inthe estuary, describe their enabling legislation and designate acontact point for further inquiries." It was discovered thatinformation systems in the estuary were "...useful to individualsor groups that are fairly familiar with the various managementresponsibilities of agencies managing the estuary. Theseindividuals or groups can be called informed interests." For thegeneral public, the existing contact and referral services werehard to use because there was no single source where currentinformation about all proposed projects could be obtained.Some referrals were mandatory or formal arrangements and somewere discretionary or informal arrangements. Regional governmentsand municipalities were included in both mandatory anddiscretionary referrals. It was mandatory that developmentproposals to do with ALR's be referred to both regional districtsand municipalities, and that municipalities be involved in  LandTitle Act referrals. There were discretionary referrals of ORPamendments to other regional districts, and subdivision andzoning applications were sent to regional districts and othermunicipalities at the discretion of the municipality. PollutionControl permit referrals to regional districts were discretionary100as were Water Act approvals referrals to municipalities. Onlywhere the Agricultural Land Commission and the Land Title Act required referrals was it mandatory for provincial and federalagencies to give development information to local governments.There was no mandated information flow among local governments,which could allow them to pool and coordinate their activities asthere was among senior governments and agencies. 72The conclusion of the referral systems report was that thereshould be "...an enhanced referral system (which) would strive toupgrade the quality of information used in making projectreviews, and coordinate and streamline the process of interagencyconsultation." It was suggested that the problem at the heart ofthe referral and information systems were the lack of estuary-wide goals, problems relating to accuracy and comprehensivenessof information and problems relating to inefficiency of theexisting process. The solution proposed for these problems was todevelop a system that generated fast and efficient flows of goodinformation. 73The reports on legal constraints and existing referral systems inthe estuary appear to have been major factors in the decision atthe end of FRES II to develop a "linked management system" forthe estuary. In contrast to FRES I recommendations, changes werenot designed to provide more effective political leadership butwere limited to "tuning up" the existing system. 741013.4.1.1. FRES and Habitat ManagementAs FRES I was undertaken to provide guidelines for management ofthe estuary, it involved determining which parts of the estuarywere best suited for the preservation of fish, fowl and wildlifehabitats. A Habitat Work Group was formed with the overallobjective of describing the fish, wildlife and habitatcharacteristics of the estuary, and to document present use andproductivity. "The work group was also required to identify andmake recommendations concerning opportunities for maintenance,75restoration and enhancement of habitat."^The members of thework group represented the DFO and Environment Canada federallyand the provincial MOE. There were no representatives of localgovernment or other interest groups. 76The Habitat^Work Group^report began with a geographicaldescription of the estuary study area, continued with anevaluative statement on fish and wildlife habitat, and maderecommendations on what must be done to preserve these resources. 77It stressed the loss of original estuarine wetlands and the greatuncertainty that existed regarding the ability of remainingwetlands to support and maintain fish and wildlife populations.It reported that over 70% of riparian habitat and 50% of thedelta had been drained, built on, dredged or otherwise altered.Dyking and filling of shallow wetlands had reduced their areathreefold, while undyked areas were used for log boom storage.102Suction dredging of the river bottom caused mortality of salmonand improper disposal of dredgate reduced productive marshland.River banking riprap and port development had resulted in majorhabitat loss and natural estuarine communities were threatened bythe continued expansion of economic activities which competed forresources necessary for their survival.The report went on to describe threats to remaining habitat inthe estuary from human activities including logging, agriculture,industry and urban development. These activities contaminatefresh water from industrial effluent, agricultural runoff andsilt deposits from mines, housing developments, roadconstruction, and agriculture. Log booms reduce marsh viabilityby shading or crushing plants and shipping wears away shorelinesthrough the erosion action of waves. Leachates from hog fuelstorage sites along the banks of the estuary are highly toxic toaquatic life. 78This damage, along with dams and diversions,has resulted in major losses of habitat not only in the estuaryitself, but in rivers and streams feeding into it. 79The Work Group report defined three options for habitatmanagement: habitat protection, which involves the preservationof valuable pristine areas from alteration or degradation;habitat restoration, which is a process of restoring degradedhabitat to a near-natural or improved condition; and habitatenhancement, which involves improving the quality productivity103and associated benefits of natural or pristine areas."Considering both the degree of alteration that has taken placein the study area and the present state of knowledge of estuarineecosystems, options for habitat enhancement are extremelylimited." 80To encourage habitat protection, the report made recommendationsin three management areas: land planning processes, maintenanceof water quality and acquisition and designation of importanthabitat areas. The most important recommendation made in land usewas that the management plan for the estuary be administered byneutral, unbiased agencies such as the DOE and the MOE ratherthan agencies who are development proponents such as theNational Harbours Board, Transport Canada and the FRHC and NFHC.A similar recommendation was made for water quality maintenance,with the suggestion that the DOE and MOE be the lead agencies inthe development and enforcement of water quality objectives inthe estuary. As there were a number of important marshes inprivate tenure, it was recommended that private lands outside thedykes on Sturgeon Island Roberts Bank and Boundary Bay may bepurchased cooperatively by the federal and provincial Crown.Other areas were to be purchased by the provincial Crown andconsigned to what was then the Ministry of Recreation andConservation for management. 81 The report of the Habitat Workgroup early in FRES I helped to enhance recognition of the extentof wetlands habitats that had already been lost, with the result104that large blocks of remaining wetlands were given conservationstatus. 823.4.1.2. FRES and Area DesignationsOne of the most serious challenges in managing the resources ofthe Fraser River estuary is the problem of accommodatingindustrial, port, commercial and residential development in anarea of high fish and wildlife productivity. The problem isaggravated by the multitude of agencies responsible forallocating and managing these resources. The area designationprocess was designed to tackle the problem of designatingforeshore uses in this large urban estuary.The process involves assigning a category of appropriate use tospecific reaches in the estuary. Each designation represents aconsensus among estuary managers on different uses for each area.It provides a practical means of guiding activities based on theestuary's natural attributes and its suitability for humanactivities and helps to reduce uncertainty in the siting of newdevelopments. The process is essentially one of bargaining andnegotiation aided by information generated by the work groups. 83One of the major accomplishments of the area designation processwas the development of an Area Designation Map which divided theforeshore into 85 management units. It was recognized that the105complexity of the process demanded a step-by-step approach, sothe identification of interests in the estuary was done in thecore area, or the area outside the dykes first, then it wasassumed these would be linked to uplands areas at a future time. 84It was acknowledged that the orientation to the core area did notreflect the uplands designation as they existed in otheradministrative mechanisms such as Official Regional Plans.The Area Designation Map was based on available informationabout the best uses of the estuary considering its naturalcharacteristics and suitability for human activities. There were15 members of the Area Designation Task Force (ADTF)representing five provincial and six federal agencies, threeregional governments and one public interest group. The reportwas reviewed by another thirteen non-governmental agencies andnine local governments. 85 Area Designation categories included:conservation, recreation/park, log storage, small craft moorage,industry and port/terminal. One of the concerns of the ADTF wasno net loss of wetland habitat, and a bio-physical sub-committee was created to deal with this concern. 86The ADTF attempted to come up with a set of criteria that couldbe consistently applied to all future uses of management units inthe estuary. The conservation use criteria were that "no furthernet loss of wetlands in the estuary region should be permitted tooccur and "only those land and resource uses which are compatible106with continued ecosystem viability should be encouraged." Throughsurveys, FRES II had identified existing habitat as well as areassuitable for rehabilitation, and this information served as therationale for designating conservation areas. The ADTF Reportincluded a table showing permitted uses in the estuary whichindicated that a wide range of uses was considered acceptable inconservation areas and only the most destructive, such as debrisdisposal, were subject to review. For instance, the table showsthat dredging or training works would be a permitted use in aconservation area. 87Through a series of extensive meetings which concentrated on thepractical management situation, agreement was reached on usagefor 60 of the 85 management units. Most of these units werealready developed and the agencies agreed to continue existinguses. For the remaining 25 units, most of which were undeveloped,the contrasting ideologies of the environmental agencies and landand harbour authorities were initially a great impediment toreaching agreements. The economic development agencies wereconcerned that too much area would be locked into conservationdesignations, and the conservation agencies were concerned thatthe estuary would be irreversibly altered by development. 88A chart showing the changes in designations from the first to thesecond draft of the ADTF Report suggests, however, that one setof interests were compromised more than the other. While only two107management units were changed^from "undetermined^use" toconservation, nine were changed from "undetermined use" to port,industrial or commercial uses^and two^were changed fromconservation to commercial use. 89 Differences over theremaining 25 units were characterized as "bulldozers vs. fins andfeathers" conflicts, 90 and in order to get on with otheraspects of the management system they were categorized as"undetermined use" until such time as agreements could bereached. 91A list of general principles and policies was accepted by theADTF in order to minimize problems between competing interests.Among these was the need to ensure long-term compatibilitybetween foreshore designations and upland plans. This principlewould require that future amendments to either upland plans orforeshore designations consider and reflect "upland, foreshoreand estuarine values of the Fraser River estuary area" andinvolved the understanding that future and ongoing consultationwith upland and riparian interests would take place. The overallintent was that where obvious conflicts exist, use and managementof the core area should be compatible with the prior uplandplans. Conversely, future upland plans should be compatible withlong term management plans of the core area. 92Several management units where agreement had not been reached ondesignations were reviewed by the task force and the record ofcomments about the "undetermined use" designations is of interest108to this^study as it demonstrates the interaction betweenmunicipal regional and senior governments, industry and publicenvironmental groups (as represented by the Federation of B.C.Naturalists). Appendix A describes management area reviews withlocal government input and habitat conservation designations.Of the ten cases reviewed which included local governmentcomments on undetermined use categories where conservation was anissue, local governments, including regional districts andmunicipalities, recommended against conservation designationseight times and for conservation designations twice. Seniorlevels of government supported conservation designationseighteen times and recommended against conservation designationsseven times. Of these, five recommendations against conservationdesignations were made by the Harbour Commissions. Thisinformation suggests that at the time, the environment ministriesof the senior levels of government were a much greater force forconservation than the local government agencies. This is a roughmeasure, and in some cases it is difficult to conclude from therecord of the review what the desires of different interestswere. But it is an indication of the approach of the differentagencies and levels of government with regard to conservationdesignations.In many cases there were different designations desired withinthe management units and agreement was impossible because the109units were too large and could incorporate several designations.For instance, in Management Unit 11-22 on Annacis Island thetotal area was zoned industrial-heavy manufacturing. The areaalso contained intertidal sand/mud flats, marshes, and riparianshrubs, all considered to be highly productive fish and wildlifehabitat. Delta wanted the western tip of Annacis Island outsidethe dyke to be protected from industrial encroachment while therest remained industrial. Comments were also solicited on thefirst draft area designation map. Some criticisms noted the lackof ecological criteria for establishing designations andsuggested that the map was designed to meet industrial ratherthan wildlife requirements. The need for linkages betweenforeshore and upland designations was observed as was the needfor mechanisms to implement the designations. 93In other cases, agreement on an area designation was obstructedby long standing issues and conflicts between the agencies over aparticular area. Where there were political issues involved itwas also beyond the power of the ADTF to reach agreement and theunits were called "undetermined use " areas. The GVRD was notconsidered to be a positive force in the area designationprocess. It felt the process threatened its LRP, and finallyopted out of the process altogether. Municipal responses to areadesignations at the early stage were mixed. Some municipalitieswere more conservation oriented than others, while others, suchas Richmond had development oriented councils and conservation110oriented planners. 94As a next step in the area designation process, the ADTFrecommended that: designations be considered within activityprograms; designations be considered within the context of anarea plan; a committee of relevant management agencies beestablished to discuss future plans; and concerned agencies andinterests be involved in ongoing consultation to look at longrange goals and developments in the area. 953.4.2.^FRES Review / FREMP Implementation StrategyAlthough the FRES II recommendations had been widely reviewed andthere had been significant public consultation, it was decidedthat a Federal/Provincial Review Committee should be establishedto comment further on proposals for an implementation strategyfor the management plan. All three regional districts and twelvemunicipalities were included in this review which took place in1983-84. The review committee recommended some refinements of themanagement program proposed at the end of FRES II which weredeveloped according to agency and public review and responded toa climate of economic restraint. 96Among these refinements wasa clarification by the review of the role of regional andmunicipal governments in the estuary. 97All three components of the implementation strategy concerned111local government and habitat protection interests. The first wasa series of goals and policies which defined the key issues inthe estuary as port-industrial development and transportation,water quality, habitat management and recreation. The second wasa Management Committee which would serve as a forum forconsideration of issues affecting the estuary. This Committeewould ensure that the goals and policies of estuary managementwere achieved, and would include agencies, municipalities, Indianbands and regional districts. The third component includedspecific activity programs to address estuary-wide activitiessuch as habitat management, which would be undertaken by workgroups comprised of responsible organizations and coordinated bythe Management Committee. 98This proposed management system put responsibility for leadershipin the Executive of the Management Committee which would consistof the federal DOE and DFO, the provincial MOE and the twoHarbour Commissions. The participation of regional districts,municipalities and Indian bands was limited to membership on theManagement Committee which would meet twice a year. 99Operational program implementation tasks were delegated to smallwork groups consisting of agency and user group representatives.An appropriate agency would be designated to chair each workgroup and ensure the completion of the task. In response todemands for public consultation, various public interests were to112be given an opportunity to participate in work groups where theyhad a specific contribution to make. The activity programs woulddevelop terms of reference and begin drafting their plansconcurrently with work on drafting area plans. These area planswould be revised according to the results of activity plans, thenarea designations would be based on their final results. 100Activity programs such as Habitat Management would developstrategic objectives which could then be linked with those ofother activities through the area planning process to develop aintegrated management^program. Activity^Programs were thestrategic plans for each activity and area plans were the meansfor applying their findings at the operational level. The areadesignation process was to resolve conflicts and establish aframework for future area plans. The objectives for habitatmanagement were generally^to^improve^habitat protection,restoration, enhancement and research and to avoid losses ofhabitat. It was suggested that work group membership wouldinclude DFO, DOE and MOE, "regional districts, municipalities andother support agencies or user interests as needed."It was noted that implementation of the Management Program wouldrequire the cooperation and support of upland owners andmanagers and that this cooperation was particularly crucial inrelation to area planning and area designation as localgovernment is responsible for deciding on and governing the useof privately owned upland. 1011133.4.3.^The Fraser River Estuary Management ProgramIn late 1985 the FREMP agreement was signed and the managementprogram has since served as a forum for integrated managementamong the agencies involved in the estuary. Initially,Environment Canada, DFO, FRHC, NFHC and MOE each contribute$50,000 per year for its operation. FREMP is a co - operativeapproach to resource management designed to address and resolveconflicts among activities in the estuary and provide commongoals and objectives. Its overall goal is "to provide the meansfor accommodating a growing population and economy, whilemaintaining the quality and productivity of the Fraser estuary'snatural environment." 102The original management program was composed of a ManagementCommittee, Activity Programs, a Coordinated Review Process, andan Area Designation Process. The Management Committee Executivewas comprised of senior officials from the five signatoryagencies and was responsible for the overall administration ofFREMP. The Management Committee at large consisted ofrepresentatives from municipalities, regional governments, otherfederal and provincial government agencies and several Nativebands. 103 Figure 5 shows this FREMP structure.Processes that coordinate decisions on specific project proposalsand the designation of uses permitted in certain areas of the114FIGURE 5FREMP COMMITTEEMANAGEMENT COMMITTEEMANAGEMENT EXECUTIVESTANDING COMMITTEES41. Standing Committee on the FraserRiver Estuary Water Quality Plan4Environmental Review CommitteeACTIVITY PROGRAM COMMITTEESLog ManagementWaste Management41Emergency ManagementHiHabitat ManagementRecreation ManagementA Port and Industrial-DevelopmentANavigation and Dredging41Dyking and DrainageII S.estuary are central to FREMP. 104 The FREMP Coordinated ProjectReview Process was established to ensure that all developmentproposals within FREMP boundaries are subject to review. Theprocess requires that the developer submit an application to oneof three lead agencies: the Fraser River Harbour Commission, theNorth Fraser Harbour Commission or the Ministry of Crown Lands.From there it is sent to the relevant review agencies, themunicipality concerned and opened for public review. AnEnvironmental Review Committee made up of representatives fromEnvironment Canada, MOE and DFO review comments from thereferrals, advise the Lead Agency of their concerns and determineif further environmental review is required. A more intensivereview involves an environmental impact assessment from theproponent. Projects which come under an established reviewprocess are referred to their respective review agencies. 105Criticism of environmental review processes focuses on the lackof public involvement and the inadequate involvement of municipallevels of government. A FREMP report suggested that the responseof municipalities to all development proposals within the FREMPboundaries should be obtained and that these responses should begiven serious consideration and weight. 106 Earlier in thedevelopment of a management system, there had been efforts tomake FREMP a body involving local decision-makers inco -management and local authority, but this role has been116circumscribed due to funding constraints and the resistance ofsome government representatives. 107FREMP is an institutional design that brings together manydifferent public and private stakeholders to develop consensus,and resolve conflicts in numerous decision-making arenas. Overthe years, there has been a change in attitude among the agencypersonnel who have been working together in management of theestuary for over a decade. As a forum for the exchange of ideasamong agency personnel it has led to a better understanding ofeach other's concerns and has allowed for the development oftrust among them. 108 Its fundamental weakness is the lack ofstrong political leadership or accountability from any level ofgovernment. Though the goals and objectives of the managementsystem have been approved by the federal and provincialministers, their involvement has been minimal.As primarily coordinating institutions, FRES and FREMP have beensuccessful in bringing greater order to management processes inthe estuary through the linked management system. The estuarymanagement institution is an open system in that it is able todeal with issues that are external to the immediate managementsystem. An example of this is initiatives for progressivelylinking upland activities to the management system through thearea designation process. The advantage of this openness is thatpolicy initiatives from elsewhere can be used to benefit the117estuary, such as the federal EARP for development projects or theCanadian Environmental Protection Act. The disadvantage of aprimarily coordinating management system are that needed policiesdon't get introduced when a management institution depends on thelegislative or policy initiatives of its participatingorganizations.The system has been severely constrained by the politicalcontext, the institutional design and lack of resources.Compounding these problems, however, are other weaknesses such asthe lack of socioeconomic analysis compared to biophysicalanalysis of the estuary. And despite the emphasis on biophysicalanalysis, there is continuing uncertainty about environmentalconditions and the response of the estuarine ecosystem tointerventions. Economic incentives such as fines for violationsof habitat protection have not been used to support resourcemanagement objectives and prosecutions are infrequent.Overall, public involvement is constrained by the lack of109resources and conservative policy. Considerable expectationsfor participation of interest groups were raised during the highprofile and well organized Public Involvement Program in FRES II,but this expectation has only been partially addressed in theimplementation of a management program. Unfortunately forinterest groups it was left up to the discretion of theManagement Committee to work out details for effective118involvement. As this has been a weak structure, and as there hasbeen no mandated public involvement component or funds to supportparticipation, options for organizing communication andcoordinating involvement^with^interest^groups^have beenneglected in favour of other priorities.The GVRD was a weak player in the first FREMP structure and themunicipalities within the GVRD have been concerned about bearingthe costs of unrealistic pollution abatement or habitatprotection programs. They have felt at a disadvantage in estuarymanagement because of their ineffectual position as members atlarge of the Management Committee. In the newly restructuredFREMP, the GVRD is a full paying member and a member of theExecutive of the Management Committee. Municipalities will bemembers of the Implementation Advisory Committee instead ofmembers at large of the Management Committee, but will still meetonly once or twice a year. Municipalities will also be members ofthe Water and Land Use and Water Quality and Waste ManagementCommittees and sub-committees. They will be involved innegotiating Statements of Intent, or agreements on areadesignations, with FREMP and can communicate concerns to theManagement Committee through the GVRD's Technical AdvisoryCommittee (TAC). There will be annual conferences to which allmunicipalities will be invited along with members of the public.110119Though the municipalities have more informal involvement in FREMPthan before, their response to restructuring has not been111positive.^They are very nervous about not having more formalrepresentation and are concerned about having the old ManagementCommittee replaced with the GVRD TAC. When asked if they felt theGVRD represented them, the response of some members of TACreflected a certain amount of distrust. 112In addition, thereare concerns among planning staff that TAC members themselveshave a technical orientation, and do not adequately addressecological issues. These factors create concerns amongmunicipalities^that^the^new^structure^weakens^their113representation in FREMP.FREMP has not wanted to involve local politicians and prefers towork with local government staff. Continuity in FREMP has provento be an important factor in reaching agreements and localpoliticians are on different term lengths of one, two or threeyears. 114Though politicians are not active in FREMP, politicalaccountability is still achieved as staff members take allproposals through their respective city councils forapproval. 115Still other changes will need to be made in order for FREMP tosuccessfully address equity issues in the estuary. For instance,if municipal needs for increased residential growth conflict withsenior government needs to generate revenue through industrial120activity, how should these conflicts be resolved? Changes ineconomic pressures have been so significant that some of the moreindustrially-oriented agencies are worried about the preservationof land necessary for water-oriented industries. Land is beingconverted to residential uses at an increasing rate and someagencies are banking land in the estuary against futureindustrial growth. The increased value of estuary foreshore hasled to many forest industry companies selling lands near urbancentres for a large profit, and looking for alternative spaceelsewhere which may be undeveloped, pristine habitat. Landfarther away from cities is cheaper but has higher habitatvalues. For instance, municipalities like Maple Ridge and PittMeadows are attracting these industries and while many localresidents want them for additional municipal revenues, there areprotests about the loss of conservation values. 116FREMP has tried to set up a mechanism for discussion andresolution of these kinds of issues, and to some extent it hasbeen successful. But there has been no benefit/cost analysis ofremaining habitat or industrial land in the estuary. There arethe building blocks for such an assessment in the form of mapsshowing habitat classifications. These maps used the NFHC andDFO's classification system developed for the North Arm which arebased on the productivity of habitat. Now the task is tointegrate these land maps with the work group reports on suchactivities such as industry and logging on an estuary-wide basis.121The difficulty is in making the kinds of trade-offs that arenecessary without a regional government approach. For instance,since Vancouver's population is rapidly increasing, should allwaterfront activities be designated as recreational so that allindustry must move to Surrey? On an estuary basis it is necessaryto consider what Surrey would be giving up to accommodateVancouver. In the absence of regional planning powers, it hasbeen considered more expedient to begin by developing areamanagement plans for controversial reaches of the river. 1173.4.3.1. FREMP and Habitat ManagementSeveral FREMP initiatives are designed to manage and protecthabitat including the area designation process, the coordinatedreview process and the habitat management activity program. Thearea designation process has been the focal point of enhancedmunicipal participation in habitat management in the estuary, andit will be looked at in greater detail below. The coordinatedreview process coordinates all levels of project review from thereferral to environmental impact assessment. Largely as a resultof these initiatives, some habitat loss through development hasbeen slowed because environmental considerations are beingincluded as part of the design and implementation of projects.The Habitat Management Activity Program (HMAP) was established bythe Management Committee Executive to develop guidelines for122managing habitat and to review and analyse habitat activities inthe estuary. The Habitat Activity Work Group (HAWG) chose tofocus on two specific activities: to inventory and classifyhabitat according to its relative value for fish and wildlifeproductivity to assist in directing development in the estuary;and to provide an expert Habitat Activity Workshop to providerecommendations on future habitat research and management. 118The HAWG report described the basis for its activities:"The concept of sustainable development implies the need tomaintain the productive capacity of the ecological systemthat makes the Fraser River estuary all important to fishand wildlife resources and their consumptive and non-consumptive use. Toward that end it is essential thatattributes of the physical and biological components of thesystem, as well as their interrelationships, are adequatelyunderstood. That understanding in turn allows for the designof measures necessary to safeguard the protection of theecosystem and defines the limits to development." 119The report provides an overview of institutional means such aslegislation, policies and guidelines that enable participants towork toward habitat management objectives and lists achievementstoward those objectives. Significant shortfalls in achievingthose objectives are also listed as well as recommendations fromworkshop participants. 120The HAWG report identified issues ofconcern and made conclusions and recommendations in five areasof discussion: habitat protection and conservation; restoration123and enhancement; management plans and programs; public awareness;and expert habitat workshops.In its review of habitat protection and conservation, HAWGconcludes that application of the DFO's "No Net Loss FishManagement Policy" has substantially improved protection andconservation of habitat. This general approach to determiningproductivity is now being implemented throughout the estuary. 121Application of the federal EARP has also helped in theenvironmental review of federal projects. However, HAWGconcludes that existing legislation is not adequate to protectand conserve all important habitat for fish and wildlife in theestuary. "Acquisition of key habitat areas, an important elementin habitat conservation, has been limited in extent and manycritical habitat areas remain unsecured." 122A good example of this concern is the Surrey Big Bend area whicha recent environmental study funded jointly by the municipalityand FREMP recommends should be entirely conserved. Though it ismade up of more and less sensitive areas, the less sensitiveareas are needed as buffers to protect the more sensitive areas.It is presently zoned for industrial use, and there areresidential development proposals for the area as well. Localgovernment planners are concerned about the implementation ofconservation; how agreement can be reached on a change of use andhow present owners could be compensated for a conservation124designation. The municipality is in no position to acquire thelands itself, but would need generous funding support fromsenior and regional agencies. 123A number of successful habitat restoration and enhancementprojects have been undertaken in the estuary, but an overall planor strategy is needed to guide future projects. HAWG suggeststhat a Habitat Management Plan must be proactive, estuary-wideand based on a complete inventory and classification of habitat;it must establish linkages with other programs and planningefforts which affect habitats in the estuary; it must tie intoregional and municipal land-use and the need for natural openareas, wetlands, parks and agricultural lands which serve asvaluable habitat; it must provide for a net gain in habitat overtime; and it must be linked to basin-wide planning.Habitat management plans and programs such as habitatclassification, habitat inventory and the area designationprocess provide the means for development based on soundenvironmental principles, but they have not been adopted by allparticipants in FREMP. Adequate funding and resource commitmentsfrom participating agencies at all levels of government areneeded for the proper implementation of habitat plans andprograms. "Habitat management on lands not controlled by thewildlife agencies is largely a reaction to specific developmentprojects, or it involves land acquisitions based on the best125existing opportunities. The existing FREMP boundaries assigned tothe estuary result in incomplete links in the management ofaquatic and terrestrial habitats." 124The result of these weaknesses in habitat management is thatfield-level managers continue to experience resistance tohabitat protection. A DFO biologist suggested that nothing shortof strong intervention at the political level will introduce thechanges necessary within the institutional structure that canallow the implementation of progressive policy-making. Thoughappropriate guidelines have been agreed to by agencies such asthe DFO and NFHC, they have not become common practice in theday-to-day activities of the estuary. DFO managers are stillpresented with "outrageous proposals" from municipalities, theNFHC, and private developers. It was suggested that the problemlies with "dinosaurs" that are entrenched in the agencies of allthree levels of government and are resistant to changes inconventional administrative approaches. 125 A municipal plannersuggested that though FREMP has been successful in coordinatingthe DFO's conservation guidelines to protect marsh habitat, ithas not been able to protect shoreline vegetation. There is noapplicable federal or provincial authority over shorelinevegetation in municipal jurisdictions, or appropriate provisionsin the Municipal Act.  126Some feel the problem of entrenched perspectives can begin to be126addressed through better communication of policies and guidelinesthat support habitat conservation. The limited availability ofarea designation maps means they are not readily available forreference by agency or private developers. They are expensive toproduce, and due to limited financial resources are available forinspection in only three central locations. Communication amongagencies is further limited by outdated technology. There is noelectronic mail system or information available in computer diskformat, and all agencies, developers and public interest groupsmust review documents in the form of hard copy obtained from theagencies involved. 127 Others feel no amount of information willdeter insensitive development if the habitat management systemdepends on the good will of developers. Though the information isreadily available through the FREMP office, agencies andindividuals ignore the guidelines^because^there^are notsufficient disincentives to abide by them. 128In response to demands for public consultation in estuarymanagement, HAWG included a representative of the Fraser RiverCoalition and held a FREMP Habitat Workshop. The workshopbrought together twenty-three individuals from governmentagencies, universities, consulting firms and public groups toidentify and discuss perceived deficiencies in habitat research.Several recommendations made by workshop participants pertain tothe involvement of municipalities in habitat management. Withregard to the GVRD Open Space Policy, it was suggested that the127need for natural open areas, parks and agricultural land toserve as bird habitat should be tied into regional municipalplanning. Concern was expressed about the protection, restorationand creation of upland habitat, especially for bird use.It was suggested that the environmental and social goals andobjectives of human communities occupying the watershed need tobe identified and characterized. Opportunities for publicparticipation in the various environmental review processes mustbe improved, and an annual public meeting should be held todiscuss habitat issues and concerns. It was suggested that apublic interpretive resource facility would offer accessibleinformation on the estuary. 1293.4.3.2. FREMP and Area DesignationsFRES II emphasised that the key to integrated management in theestuary is the linking of foreshore and upland planningactivities. In the last few years this linking has been easierbecause there is more give and take between local and seniorlevels of government. Municipalities are more aware of habitatconcerns and convinced that the DFOs "no net loss" policy will bepursued aggressively. Though municipalities want more control inthe estuary, they are aware of where their powers end.Nevertheless, municipalities often zone right into the river,128because they see it as an extension of the uplands, while FREMPconsiders the uplands as an extension of the river and tries toget agreement on area designations accordingly. Though thesedifferences in perception have resulted in some conflicts, onthe whole the designations desired by the upland and foreshorejurisdictions have been fairly compatible. A habitatclassification map made in conjunction with work grouprecommendations will help^with^the^final^resolution ofdifferences in remaining designations. 130The greater involvement of municipalities in the review andrefinement of the 1982 Area Designation Map introduced enhancedaccountability into estuary decision-making in that localgovernment staff cannot enter into agreements without officialdirection. The intention is for the municipalities and agenciesto incorporate the designations into their respective OfficialCommunity Plans (0CP's) and decision-making processes. 131Forinstance, in reaching agreement for an Area Management Plan forthe North Arm, there will need to be consensus among all themunicipalities along the North Arm, and they will all need theapproval of their local councils before signing an agreement sothat the new designations can be incorporated into theirOCP's. 132This process has been established in concert withindividual municipalities, port and land authorities andenvironmental agencies. 133129In addition to the greater involvement of municipalities in areadesignations and area management plans, the current processconsiders compatible multiple use designations in order toresolve problems that arise from single use designations. Thesolution has been to designate a primary and a secondary usewithin undetermined use areas where one use will not interferewith another. For instance, an area may have a primarydesignation for conservation with secondary designations forrecreation and log storage as long as the secondary designationsdo not interfere with marsh growth in the conservation area. Theuse of multiple designations has significantly reduced conflictsamong resource users.Another initiative that has reduced conflicts and made agenciesmore willing to make commitments to area designations has been aprocess for reviewing designations when requested by agencies.Commitments have also been easier to obtain with adjustments tomanagement unit boundaries and revisions of some categories.Because of the growth of commercial and residential developmentalong the shoreline, a new category, termed "water - orientedcommercial and residential development", has been devised and theprevious small-craft moorage designation has been dropped. Animproved information base has resulted from the inventory of fishand wildlife habitat rated according to its productivity whichhas been valuable in identifying areas for conservationdesignations. Municipalities^which^have^prepared Official130Community Plans and Area Plans for the foreshore come to thenegotiating table better equipped to state their positions.Despite the^success of^the area^designation process infacilitating agreements among the agencies and in acting as amechanism for enhanced conservation of habitat, efforts toupgrade the environmental components of estuary management aregenerally an uphill battle. Plans and programs such as the areadesignation process are considered by many to be inadequatelyfunded, lacking in time commitments from agency personnel, aninsufficient priority within agency programs and not fullyaccepted and supported by all participants in FREMP. In addition,the 1990 FREMP habitat report suggests that these tools are apiece-meal approach to habitat management and should be augmentedby a comprehensive estuary habitat management plan. Existinghabitat management activities are restrictive in scope because ofthe arbitrary boundaries of FREMP, and the link between aquaticand terrestrial ecosystems in the estuary is weak. Many suggestthat it would be better if FREMP had ecological rather thanpolitical boundaries; for instance, Pitt Lake and the rest of theSerpentine and Nikomekl Rivers should be part of a FREMPwatershed. The environmental rationale for some municipal zoningis considered by some to be questionable and conservationdesignations needed to make existing zoning categories standardand consistent across the estuary.131Local planners feel the extension of FREMP into the uplandecosystem would be an intrusion into municipal jurisdictions. Forinstance, if FREMP were to extend its management of the Fraserestuary ecosystem into Burnaby, it would encompass the BrunetteRiver and tributaries as well as Burnaby and Deer Lakes. Burnabyfeels it has taken a proactive position in environmental planningand conservation, and would not welcome formal institutionalarrangements involving senior government agencies. 134 As FREMPis without formal powers, municipalities are in a betterposition to implement and enforce conservation policies. 1353.4.3.3. Statements of IntentIn order^to strengthen^the linkage^between aquatic andterrestrial ecosystems in the estuary, it has also been suggestedthat consideration be given to strengthening the relationship andcoordinating the planning between FREMP and municipalities onwater oriented developments. 136 In accordance with thisrecommendation, area designations are being implemented on amunicipality by municipality basis so that fewer agencies aredirectly involved and there is more flexibility in the process.It also allows for a greater chance of success in implementingthe designations because the scale is manageable. The involvementof local governments ensures that foreshore^uses will becompatible with^upland zoning and official community plandesignations. The municipalities are being involved in more132formal commitments to the area designations in agreements called"Statements of Intent", which are being used to negotiate areadesignations for each municipality.While not legal contracts, these statements give the agreementsgreater substance and recognition and give the agencies greatercertainty in managing the foreshore uses of the estuary. Theycommit the signatories to a series of steps in implementing thearea designations. The parties to the Statement of Intentgenerally include the municipality, environment agencies, andport and land authorities. The FREMP Coordinator gives thefollowing description of these agreements:"The process involves a series of meetings chaired by theFREMP Coordinator at which each representative bringsinformation and concerns to the table. Air photographs,inventory maps, official community plans and other reportsare used as resource material. Each Statement of Intentincludes two schedules: schedule one which includes allareas for which there is agreement on designations; andschedule two which includes all those areas for which thereis no consensus. The Statement of Intent also includes aprocedure for revising area designations should it berequested by a party to the agreement. The parties arerequired to negotiate area designation in schedule twowithin a given time period in order to reach consensus andmove them to schedule one. The Statement of Intent commits133the parties to following the area designations in theirdecision-making and administrative practices." 137Prior to adoption a public review is conducted of the proposeddesignations. 138Draft Statements of Intent with two municipalities, Burnaby andRichmond, have now been formulated. The Burnaby agreement hasbeen submitted to public review, and the Richmond agreement needsonly one more signature to be "signed off". Agreements withthese municipalities have been developed before others because:these municipalities responded first to an invitation by FREMP toparticipate; due to a limited staff, it is necessary to priorizenegotiations; and as Richmond has more shoreline in the estuarythat any other municipality it was considered a priority. 139 Itwas hoped that the Statements of Intent process would have beenable to arrive area designations sooner than it has, which is whythe process has not yet been undertaken with a majormunicipality like Vancouver. The intention was to have theprocess completed by the end of the last FREMP agreement in 1990,but it took a long time even to agree to undertake the processitself. 140Though the area designation map is not a long range plan, thelong term goal is that foreshore uses will be compatible with andinfluential on upland zoning and Official Community Plandesignations. In negotiations with Burnaby, consensus was easy to134achieve, and^foreshore classification^was often based onmunicipal zoning because the foreshore had area designationsbased on habitat protection in place since 1972. 141 Where thereare no prior conservation designations, municipalities have beenwilling to adjust upland zoning in accordance with thedesignations suggested by shoreline habitat classifications. Forinstance, Richmond will propose an amendment to their OCP tochange an area zoned for urban waterfront development to aconservation designation, based on the foreshore habitatclassification. There are just two areas that continue to be"undetermined uses" in Richmond where agreement could not bereached between the municipality and the NFHC or the FRHC. 142Negotiations are underway with Delta and are about to begin withSurrey, now that the Surrey Big Bend Study has been completed.FREMP has been waiting for the results of this study to approachSurrey as it is a highly controversial area, and it was felt thata habitat inventory and classification would aid in reachingagreement on designations. As the study suggests that the entirearea should be conserved, this presents a problem for localplanners, because as one planner said, "you can't just paint anarea green on a map and leave it at that". It is difficult to getlocal agreement on the implementation of conservationdesignations through amendments to OCP's and zoning by-laws inareas where there are high water-use industrial and residentialvalues.135Surrey's Big Bend promises to be difficult to designate as theFRHC has done an earlier study identifying the port anddevelopment values in the area, and recommended that it be setaside for port and water-based industrial uses. Evidence offaith in the area designation process for resolving theseconflicting uses is not apparent in Surrey. Though the Statementof Intent process has not yet been suggested to local planners,there is a feeling that FREMP's role as a negotiating forum islimited. Though the program has had a useful function incommunicating DFO's habitat classification guidelines to agenciesand interests in the estuary, local planners feel they do betterto negotiate directly with important agencies to achieve localobjectives. The real problem municipal planners face is, once aconservation designation is agreed upon, how to get the landsinto public hands. 143Overall, however, the area designation process and Statements ofIntent have contributed toward the slow change from the initialdeadlock to focusing on areas of agreement, then graduallyturning attention to areas of disagreement and working towardthose resolutions. 144One way that municipal involvement hasaffected the overall approach to the habitat planning in theestuary is that the Statement of Intent process will be part ofthe development of overall area plans. Though the original ideawas to come up with area designation with each municipality, thenincorporate these into an overall area plan, some felt this was136an inappropriate approach. They felt the Statements of Intentshould be used to arrive at broader goals that could be used tocome to agreement on individual area designations. This issimilar to the process used within municipalities, where goalsare defined by the OCP, then zoning designations are used tosupport those goals. 145The Statements^of Intent have been an example of a newrelationship between local and senior levels of government. Thekey to this new approach to area designations is that alljurisdictions at three levels of government participate in theformulation of policy, and as a result all are willing to acceptand implement the outcome. 146 For instance, when municipalitiescooperate in providing information about FREMP guidelines todevelopers, there are fewer problems with developmentapplications. With better communication, implementation of theseagreements would be more likely. Many municipalities such asSurrey have a backlog of over 1500 development permitapplications, and if they had a succinct brochure explainingFREMP development guidelines the process would be streamlined. 1473.5.^SUMMARYThe above^case study has examined the habitat managementsub - system in the Fraser River estuary and the role of localgovernments in habitat conservation decision-making. This study137has described the institutional context for habitat conservationand the weak jurisdictional position of local governments. It hasdescribed the development of a management system that wasdesigned to integrate economic and environmental planning as wellas to encourage the exchange of information among the many actorsin the estuary. It has shown the evolution of increased municipaland regional involvement in habitat conservation planning throughlocal initiatives and the area designation process of FRES andthen FREMP. The present process for achieving cooperation betweenmunicipal and senior governments in habitat conservation is the"Statements of Intent", which are designed to better coordinateforeshore and upland planning in general and conservationplanning in particular.This case study is the portrayal of an ongoing process whichbegins at a point of significant departure for habitat managementin the estuary, the decision to work toward integration ofenvironment and economy in the FRES I agreement, to the present.In the process of working toward this integration, it has beenrecognized that local governments have a significant role to playin the planning and management of local resources. There areimportant challenges ahead for habitat management within thismanagement system, including ongoing negotiations with themunicipalities over area designations. 148 The next chapteranalyses the case study in order to clarify the relationship oflocal and senior governments in habitat management and suggest138how that relationship could be changed to permit more effectiveconservation. It will also assess the FRES/FREMP process as aninstitutional design for balancing human and non-human needs inthe estuary.139END NOTES 1. Sproule-Jones, Mark and Kenneth G. Peterson, "PollutionControl in the Lower Fraser: Who's In Charge?" in TheUncertain Future of the Lower Fraser, Westwater ResearchCentre, U.B.C. Press, 1976, pp. 151-2.2. Fox, Irving, "The Problem in Perspective" in The Uncertain Future of the Lower Fraser, p. 16.3. FRES I,^Proposals for the Development of an Estuary Management Plan: Summary Report of the Steering Committee,August, 1978, p. 28.4. FRES II, Legal Provisions for Linked Management, prepared byL. John Alexander, Surrey, B.C., March 1982, p. 8.5. FREMP, Report of the Habitat Activity Work Group  (Draft),Dec. 1990, p. 96. Dorcey, Anthony, Perspectives on Sustainable Development in Water Management: Towards Agreement in the Fraser River Basin, Westwater Research Centre, University of BritishColumbia, p. 14.7. FRES I, Habitat, Report of the Habitat Work Group, Victoria,B.C., August, 1978, p. 26.8. George^Calquhoun,^Port^Manager,^NFHC,^personalcommunication, Dec. 6, 1991.9. DFO and NFHC, North Fraser Harbour Environmental Management Plan, Sept. 1988, pp. 5-7, 9, 12.10. George Calquhoun, NFHC, personal communication, Dec. 6, 1991.11. Gary Williams, Aquatic Ecologist, NFHC, from "Overview ofthe^North^Fraser^Environmental^Management^Plan" apresentation to "Managing Ourselves for a BetterEnvironment", the NFHC Harbour Keeping Workshop, June 8.1990.12. FRES I, op. cit., p. 28.14013. Ibid., p. 29.14. Ibid., p. 30.15. FREMP, Report of the Habitat Activity Work Group, December,1990, pp. 24-7, 33.16. FRES I,  Summary: Proposals for the Development of an EstauryManagement Plan, Victoria, B.C., Aug. 1978, p. 60.17. Ibid., p. 28.18. FRES I, Habitat, pp. 33-34.19. FREMP, Habitat Activity Work Group Report, p. 11.20. Dorcey, Anthony, Sustainable Development of the Fraser River Estuary: Success Amidst Failure, report prepared for theCoastal Resource management Group, OECD, March, 1990, pp.14-15.21. FRES II, Legal Provisions for Linked management, p. 1.22. Ibid.,^p. 3.23. Dorcey, Sustainable Development of the Fraser River Estuary,p. 15.24. FRES I,  Summary, P. 28.25.^Ibid., p. 60.26. Alex Jamieson, Richmond planner, personal communication,Dec. 9, 1991.27. FRES II, Constitutional And Legislative Frameworks, preparedfor Steering Committee by Michael Dunn, August, 1978.28. Fres II, Legal Provisions for Linked Management, p. 12.29. Ibid., p. 16.30. FRES I, Summary, pp. 60-1.31. Ibid., p. 61.32. Peter Bloxham, Burnaby planner, personal communication, Dec.9, 1991.33. Peter Bloxham, Dec. 9, 1991.14134. Franklin Wiles, Surrey planner, personal communication, Dec.10,^1991.35. Alex Jamieson, Richmond planner, personal communication,Dec. 9, 1991.36. Mike McPhee, FREMP Secretariat, personal communication July23, 1991.37. FRES II, Legal Provisions for Linked Management, pp. 16-17.38. FRES I, Summary p. 61.39. GVRD, Liveable Region Program, March 1975.40. GVRD Development Services, Challenges for a Contemporary Statement of the Liveable Region Strategy, prepared byTechnical Advisory committee, Sept. 1987, pp. 41-43.41. Ibid., p. 58.42. Nancy^Knight,^Development^Services,^GVRD,^personalcommunication, Dec. 12, 1991.43. FRES II, Legal Provisions for Linked Management, p. 3.44. FREMP, Habitat Activity Work Group Report, p. 31.45. Mike McPhee, personal communication, July, 1991.46. Mike McPhee, July, 1991.47. Bruce Clark, Habitat Biologist, DFO, personal communication,Dec. 6, 1991.48. Fres II, Constitutional and Legislative Frameworks, p. 39.49. Sproule-Jones and Peterson, "Who's In Charge", in TheUncertain Future of the Lower Fraser, p. 152.50. FRES II, Information Systems Report, prepared by Gary Reithfor the Information Systems Sub-Committee, March, 1982,p.10.51. DFO and NFHC, Environmental Management Plan, pp. 26-27.52. FREMP, Habitat Activity Work Group Report, p. 37.53. Ibid., p. 28.54. FRES I, Summary, p. 13.14255. Mike McPhee, personal communication, July 23, 1991.56. FRES I, Summary, p. xv.57. FRES I, Key Findings and Recommendations,^Summary ofProposals for the Development of an Estuary Management Plan,August 1978, p.1.58. Ibid., p. 5.59. FRES II, Information Systems Report, p.60. FRES I, Summary, pp. 11-12.61. Ibid., p. 131.62. FRES II, Results of Public Involvement, prepared by CathyHarvey and Kaye Melliship, March 1982, p. 42.63. FRES I, Key Findings and Recommendations , p. 5.64. Dorcey, Sustainable Development of the Fraser River Estuary,p. 36.65. FRES II, Legal Provisions for Linked Management, p. 36.66. Ibid., pp. 35-36.67. Dorcey, Sustainable Development, p.18.68. Ibid., pp. 18-19.69. FRES II, Legal Provisions for Linked Management, p. 2.70. FRES I, Summary, p. 59.71. FRES II, Information Systems Report, p. 3.72. Ibid., p. 21.73. Ibid., p. 40.74. Dorcey, Sustainable Development, p. 23.75. FRES I, Habitat, p. 1.76. Ibid., pp. 1-11.77. Ibid., p. 3.78. Ibid., p.9, 31-33.14379. DFO, Canada's Policy for Recreational Fisheries,^'86,Ottawa, P. 480. FRES I, Habitat, p. 122.81. Ibid., P. 124.82. Dorcey, Sustainable Development, p. 28.83. McPhee, Michael, W., "Implementing Area Designations in theFraser River Estuary", in Coastal Zone '89.84. FRES II, Report of the Area Designation Task Force, Vol. I,March 1982, p. 2.85. Dorcey, Sustainable Development, P. 33.86. FRES II, Area Designation Task Force Report, pp. 7-8.87. Ibid., P. 27.88. McPhee, Michael W., "Cooperation in Estuary Management" inCoastal Zone '87: Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium on Coastal and Ocean Management, Orville T. Maggoon et al eds.,Published by the American Society of Engineers, p. 84889. FRES II, Area Designation Task Force Report, pp. 19-20.90. McPhee, Coastal Zone '87, p. 847.91. FRES II, Area Designation Task Force Report, Map 2.92. Ibid., pp. 17, 29.93. FRES II, Results of Public Involvement, p. 39.94. Mike Romain, past chair of ADTF, presently with DFO,personal communication, Dec. 12, 1991.95. FRES II, Area Designation Report, p. 163.96. FREMP Review Committee, An Implementation Strategy for the Fraser River Estuary Management Program, prepared by J.O'Riordan and J. Wiebe, May, 1984, p.97.^Ibid., p. 2.98. Ibid., pp. i-i.99. Dorcey, Sustainable Development, p. 23.144100. FREMP Review Committee, Implementation Strategy, pp. 11, 28.101. Ibid., pp. 27, 29-30, 38.102. FREMP information sheet.103. FREMP, The Fraser River Estuary: An Overview of Changing Conditions, prepared by Kristal Kennett and Mike McPhee,Sept. 1988, p. 27.104. Dorcey, Sustainable Development, p. 33.105. FREMP, Habitat Activity Work Group Report, pp. 12-19.106. Ibid., p. 32.107. Mike Stringer, Director, Environmental Services, GVRD, andformerly representing BC Waste Management in FREMP, personalcommunication, Oct., 1989.108. FREMP, Overview of Changing Conditions, p. 27.109. Dorcey, Sustainable Development, p. 39-40.110. Mike McPhee, FREMP Secretariat, personal communication,Dec. 6, 1991.111. Mike McPhee, personal communication, July, '91.112. Mike McPhee, personal communication, Dec. 6, 1991.113. Alex Jamieson, personal communication, Dec. 9, 1991.114. Mike McPhee, personal communication, July, 1991.115. Peter Bloxham, personal communication, Dec. 9, 1991.116. Mike McPhee, personal communication, July, 1991.117. Mike McPhee, July, 1991.118. FREMP, Habitat Activity Work Group Report, p. 4.119. Ibid., p. 1.120. Ibid., p. 5.121. Dorcey, Sustainable Development, pp. 28-9.122. FREMP, Habitat Activity Work Group Report, pp i-iii.145123. Franklin Wiles, Surrey planner, personal communication, Dec.19, 1991.124. FREMP, Habitat Activity Work Group Report, pp. ii - iv.125. Bruce Clark, Habitat Biologist, DFO, personal communication,Dec. 6, 1991.126. Alex Jamieson, personal communication, Dec. 9, 1991.127. Bruce Clark, personal communication, Dec. 6, 1991.128. Mike Romain, personal communication, Dec. 12, 1991.129. FREMP, Habitat Activity Work Group Report, pp. iv.130. Mike McPhee, personal communication, July 1991.131. FREMP, Overview of Changing Conditions, p. 27.132. Mike McPhee, personal communication, July, 1991.133. FREMP, "Closer To A Living River" (no date).134. Peter Bloxham, persoanl communication, Dec. 9, 1991.135. Franklin Wiles, personal communication, Dec. 19, 1991.136. FREMP, Habitat Activity Work Group Report, pp. 54 - 5.137. McPhee, Coastal Zone '89, pp. 4209 - 10.138. FREMP,  Habitat Activity Work Group Report, p. 50.139. Mike McPhee, personal communication, Dec. 6, 1991.140. George^Calquhoun,^Port^Manager,^NFHC,^personalcommunication, Dec. 6, 1991.141. Peter Bloxham, Burnaby planner, personal communication, Dec,9, 1991.142. Alex Jamieson, Richmond Planner, personal communication,Dec. 9, 1991.143. Franklin Wiles, personal communication, Dec. 19, 1991.144. Dorcey, Sustainable Development, pp. 33-34.145. Mike McPhee, personal communication, Dec. 6, 1991.146146. Peter Bloxham, personal communication, Dec. 9, 1991.147. Mike McPhee, personal communication, July, 1991.148. FREMP, Overview of Changing Conditions, p. 27.147CHAPTER FOUR^PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT OF LOCAL RESOURCESUsing the relationship between local and senior governments as afocus, the previous chapter has looked at one aspect of resourceplanning: habitat management. Local governments are an example ofinterests that were previously excluded from decision-making,and the process by which their participation in habitatmanagement has progressively increased in the Fraser Riverestuary has been examined. The objective of the case study was toexamine the rights and duties of local governments in relation tothe larger society with regard to conservation.Having described the role of local communities in habitatconservation, this chapter analyses the case study according tothe philosophical framework built in Chapter Two. In thatchapter it was established that if democratic resource planningis a social goal, there must be significant changes in therepresentation of human as well as non-human interests that arenot generally included in the planning process. Localcommunities have been used as an example of one of theseinterests. Their enhanced representation would require arestructuring of power relations in the administration of thestate. It was suggested that a strong public sphere is the keyto ensuring that both human and non-human concerns reach thepublic agenda and that the distribution of power could bealtered through enhanced representation of these concerns. It was148further suggested^that discursive^designs such as publicinquiries are a practical mechanism for building an active,critical public sphere and for communicating its various concernsto state administrators.The case study has provided information about the role of oneinstitutional design, the FRES/FREMP process. This chapter willassess how successful this process has been in enhancingcommunity and environmental values in the Fraser River estuary.The process will be used as an example of the question of whetherinstitutional communicative designs are a "worm in the brain" 1of conventional administration or of the public sphere. In otherwords, has FRES/FREMP acted as a mechanism for cooptation orchange?In chapter Two a it was proposed that there should be threelevels of^participation system^for interested groups andindividuals involved in habitat conservation issues. Thesedifferent levels of participation would be achieved throughthree types of participative designs at various locations on thehuman/non-human axis. This chapter will analyse FRES/FREMP'sposition in terms of these three levels of participative designs,to assess whether it is effective in carrying out the purpose forwhich it was designed.This analysis will also comment on whether the evolution of149greater participation by local communities in local resourcedecision-making in the estuary has contributed to bottom-upgovernance. The discussion in Chapter Two suggested that bottom-up governance is a necessary component of a restructured societywhere community and environmental values can be protected andenhanced.The analysis will also indicate the appropriate role ofmunicipalities and regional districts in a new politicalframework. It will suggest how they are presently interactingwith the state/market axis, how this relationship is changing,and where local governments are located in an expanded politicalspectrum.This chapter begins with an assessment of the institutionalarrangements in the case study area and their formal, informaland interest group components. As an example of an institutionalarrangement for senior government co-operation in the estuary,FRES/FREMP will be assessed both as a formal arrangement and asan institutional design or forum for the exchange of ideas. Thechapter then examines the role of municipalities in habitatmanagement and the process of designating habitat conservationareas. In conclusion, recommendations are suggested concerningregional and municipal involvement in resource conservation andmanagement and concerning opportunities for further study in thisand related areas.1504.1.^INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR HABITAT MANAGEMENTThe constitutional division of powers has determined the shapeof the formal institutional arrangements in the estuary andwithout changes to the Canadian constitution, opportunities forenhanced local control over local resources are limited. Localgovernments in the estuary are demanding that their role shouldbe "reviewed and reconsidered" during the current constitutionaldebate so that municipalities are recognized "...as more than theafterthoughts of the province".Municipalities argue that the existing power structure wasreasonable at the time of the original division of powers betweenCanada and the provinces but no longer reflects contemporarypatterns of economic development and concentrations ofpopulation. When the Canadian Constitution was written, only 3%of all Canadians lived in cities, while in 1991, 70% of BritishColumbians live in cities, and the population of GreaterVancouver is larger than that of six of the ten Canadianprovinces. 2They are demanding that local governments be empowered to managetheir communities in accordance with local priorities andconcerns. This empowerment would include recognition in federallegislation, provincial constitutional legislation that includes151a "Local Government Bill of Rights", enabling legislation thatwould give municipalities the ability to mange their own affairs,and allocation of revenue sources for local governments. 3A proposal for greater local government powers that would allowconservation and protection of local resources was made in astudy undertaken by Westwater Research Centre in 1976. Itsuggested that the most important actors in pollution control arethe GVRD and local municipalities as they could control pointsource pollution if they had the power and the resources. As theyare also the weakest players in the estuary they are the leastable to implement their by-laws. "The structure of institutionalarrangements for pollution control is hence weakest at its mostcritical stage - that is the disposing of toxic wastes in theirleast harmful way at the source." 4The study went on the suggest that the best way to protect theFraser estuary ecosystem would be through strengthening thecapability of the regional districts to complement the work ofother agencies. As problems in the estuary were most serious inthe tributaries and streams of the Greater Vancouver region, amore elaborate institutional mechanism was suggested for the GVRDthan for the other two districts. It was proposed that anEnvironmental Protection Committee of the Board of the GVRD beestablished with a secretariat to carry out its responsibilitiesfunded by revenues from a charge on effluent discharged into the1525Lower Fraser. Since that study was done the GVRD has had itsplanning powers diminished rather than increased andmunicipalities have been frustrated in their attempts to expresscommunity desires for local environmental regulations andcontrols on development. 6Though it is important to recognize the potential benefits ofenhanced local powers in habitat management, it is also importantto recognize that federal and provincial environmental agencieshave been able to use their legislative clout to protectestuarine habitat from ill-conceived economic developmentprojects supported by local communities. As the description offederal and provincial powers in Chapter Three clearly shows,senior government agencies have developed comprehensive formalinstitutional arrangements for protecting and conserving habitat.The habitat management institutional sub-system would beweakened, to the detriment of non-human communities in theestuary, by any diminishing of senior environmental agency powersin favour of increasing local government powers.On the other hand, there is little evidence to show that a strongnational or provincial role in protecting habitat can be reliedon. The project presently posing the greatest threat to essentialmarshland habitat in the estuary is Transport Canada's proposalfor a third runway at the Vancouver International Airport.Planners in environmentally progressive municipalities would153argue that though senior environmental agencies have extensiveconservation powers, the "greening" of senior governments hasbeen a relatively recent phenomenon. They would suggest that itis municipalities that have led the way in conserving sensitiveareas of the estuary, for which senior governments are now takingthe credit. 7A debate over the relative merits of local as opposed to seniorgovernment control over resources could bring in facts to showthat all three levels of government have the capacity to protector exploit natural resources. While local government is moreaccessible to conservation interests, it can be intolerant ofpolitical minorities and economically opportunistic. While seniorgovernments have the power and in some cases the will to protectconservation values, will and power can be subordinated to otherpriorities. This suggests that no level of government can beentirely trusted to protect environmental or democratic values.If the goal is to strengthen the habitat management sub-system'scapacity for conserving habitat, the solution would appear to liein Irving Fox's proposal for countervailing forces in adecentralized version of federalism. Enhanced regional powerswould be checked by provincial and federal guidelines enforceableunder senior government Acts. As was suggested in Chapter Two,the decentralization of control over resources would be extendedto the municipal level, where local councils would be enabled to154zone for environmental protection, and implement taxation to fundenvironmental initiatives. The principles of bottom-up governancewould ensure that a decentralized institutional structure wouldnot revert to centralization of power. While local communitiescan be a source of conservation pressures and offer anappropriate scale for environmental regulation, seniorgovernments can offer oversight through broader legislation andthe enforcement of guidelines.Not only would greater local powers allow for more effectiveregional and local planning based on eco-system priorities, asthe Westwater study has shown, but they would enhance therepresentation of those most affected by habitat managementdecisions. Local governments are not empowered to make regionalplans that would allow habitat planning on an eco-system basis,and communities in the estuary are only weakly represented in theformal institutional arrangements of the habitat management sub-system. That system would be strengthened by enhanced regionaland local planning powers, but creation of those powers woulddepend on legislative initiatives by the province that wouldchange the fundamental constitutional relationship.At the present time there is no indication that such changes arebeing considered, though as one senior government officialremarked, if it has become possible settle land claims, it wouldalso be possible to deal with the need for regional government.155He described the idea of regional government as a motherhoodissue; it is not possible to disagree with it as the benefits areself-evident. Despite its motherhood status, the concept ofregional government would meet with stiff opposition. Someresistance would come from agencies such as Transport Canadawhich have development proposals in the estuary that are clearlybeneficial to non-regional interests. 8Resistance would alsocome from municipalities that feel they are successfullyaddressing their own conservation issues and would not be helped9by the complications of yet another level of government. TheGVRD is not seeking additional powers, but is comfortable with arole as coordinator of municipal and senior governmentinitiatives. 10While actualization of the regional government concept woulddepend on special provincial legislation, opportunities exist ininformal institutional arrangements for greater representation oflocal interests. One interesting informal development in therelationship between local and senior levels of government is ade facto delegation of implementation and enforcement authorityfrom senior government agencies to municipalities in the estuary.In the Surrey example described in Chapter Three, the DFO doesnot have the resources to carry out enforcement of its "no netloss" policies, and leaves that part of its mandate up to themunicipality. This is an informal arrangement which is anillustration of the countervailing powers described by Irving156Fox. The senior government agency has drawn up guidelinesaccording to its legislative mandate, and communicated these tothe local level. The municipalities are charged with implementingthose guidelines in terms of zoning and by-laws, and the DFO willonly step in if it perceives that the delegation of its power isbeing abused. In the present institutional structure, such ahighly workable and practical arrangement is probably illegal inthat senior governments are not allowed to delegate their powersto local governments, and municipalities are not generallyallowed to use their zoning powers for reasons of environmentalconservation. This example does, however, point to the ways inwhich informal arrangements can be struck that address needs thatcannot be provided for under formal arrangements.In their role as interest groups, it has been difficult for localgovernments to make a significant contribution^to habitatmanagement in the estuary. In recent developments, localgovernments are refusing to act as interest groups and areexpressing local and regional goals as a third level ofgovernment. By using their zoning powers to demand that theirobjectives be respected, the municipalities and regionaldistricts have increasingly gained recognition as key actors inthe estuary. In the case of municipal involvement in habitatmanagement, the process of arriving at conservation designationsrequired their participation, and the powers delegated to them bythe province ensured that their concerns were addressed.157This would suggest that input from interest groups in the estuaryis only considered in the habitat management sub-system if thegroup itself has the power to force this consideration.Commercial interests in the estuary have been automaticallyincluded because of their economic power and the generalacceptance of their role in a management system dominated by aneconomic growth paradigm. As long as the political agenda islimited to economic distribution issues between individuals andthe state, interest group representation of points along thehuman/non-human political axis will be weak. The conservationefforts that have been undertaken in the estuary have not beendesigned to serve those non-human communities that could beconsidered as disenfranchised interest groups. Instead it isemphasized that habitat protection, rehabilitation andenhancement serves the sustainable economic development of humanbeings. The power of environmental protection agencies in theestuary stems from the economic threat posed by the destructionof non-human communities.Greater representation of other interest groups in the estuarymay similarly arise not from recognition of the need fordemocratic resource planning and management, but from the growingpower of certain groups to force their demands. The increasingpolitical clout of Native people throughout Canada and theprovince will undoubtably force the habitat management sub-systemto address their concerns in the estuary. Municipalities have158struggled with senior government environmental agencies to ensurethat conservation designation would not be allowed to interferewith their economic development and have in many cases managed toavoid these designations. Native communities are concerned thatthe responsibility for habitat conservation will be shifted on tothem as they own large amounts of undeveloped lands. In theabsence of a meaningful public participation process forconservation designations and habitat management generally, theinterests of stakeholders in the estuary will be addressed inproportion to their political or economic power, rather than inproportion to social or ecological costs and benefits for theestuary as a whole. In other words, without mechanisms for equalrepresentation of all stakeholders, the costs and benefits ofhabitat conservation will be unfairly distributed.This assessment of the formal, informal and interest groupcomponents of the habitat management institutional sub-systemsuggests that it is possible for disadvantaged interests to gainaccess to state decision-making fora. Two groups that could besaid to represent points on the human/non-human axis,environmental agencies and municipalities, have increased theircapacity to express their concerns, though it must be noted thatthese interests were already included within the state apparatus.Their enhanced representation will, however, strengthenenvironment and community interests in state decision-making, andmay offer opportunities for other interest groups along the159human/non-human axis to be heard in future.4.2.^THE CHANGING ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORKRepresentation of interests is important in habitat managementbecause some uses of the estuary are incompatible with others.For instance log storage may destroy productive marshes andrecreation may interfere with waterfowl nesting sites. Anevaluation of the institutional arrangements should considerwhether there are acceptable procedures for resolving conflictinginterests, how well they work and what interests or groups are11excluded.^Efforts to conserve habitat should reflect whatsociety wants, but some would like to protect all existinghabitat as conservation designations while others would like touse every available piece of land to promote economicdevelopment. Democratic institutional arrangements will weighthese differences fairly.This section looks at the FRES/FREMP process from a number ofdifferent perspectives. The first perspective looks at theprocess as a formal institutional arrangement or managementsystem that carries out the overlapping legislative mandates ofthe federal and provincial governments. The second perspectivelooks at the process as a communicative forum or discursivedesign. This design has two functions; that of a mediator betweenstate/market and human/non-human interests; and as a link160between state/market interests and the public sphere. The processhas been well able to carry out the first function, but is notdesigned to carry out the second.4.2.1. FRES/FREMP as a Formal Institutional ArrangementThe FRES I Habitat Report recommended that a management plan forthe estuary be administered by neutral, unbiased agencies such asthe federal and provincial environment ministries rather thanagencies that are development proponents such as the NationalHarbours Board, Transport Canada and the Harbour Commissions.This is only one of the idealistic suggestions that came out ofFRES I, an endeavour that sought to enhance representation of thecommunity/environment political axis through more authority forlocal governments and environmental agencies.The other important recommendation from FRES I was theestablishment of an estuary council which would have strengthenedthe municipal role in estuary management by including one or moremembers representing the municipal-regional level. Not only wouldthe estuary council been more accountable to local communities,it would have required greater political accountability andresponsibility from all levels of government. It was consideredappropriate that the estuary council be a political body asresource allocation decisions rest on social value judgements.As the estuary council would have increased the representation of161local communities, it might have facilitated agreements on areadesignations sooner and conserved more productive habitat.It was decided at the outset of FRES II not to attempt anysubstantive change of the existing institutional arrangements.While FRES I recommended the creation of an estuary council thisrecommendation was rejected and^the^linking^of existingmanagement systems was chosen instead. There is no documentationof the decision to go with a linked management system and it canonly be assumed that powerful agencies in the estuary were notwilling to see changes to the existing relationships. Though itwould be impossible to revise formal institutional powers in theestuary without the constitutional revisions that municipalitiesare currently demanding, there was the opportunity at the end ofFRES I to include local governments as key agencies in adecision-making process that could have been achieved withoutmajor constitutional changes.The decision to go with a linked management system maintained theexclusion of interests not already present and limited therepresentation of local governments. As creatures of theprovince, their authority is delegated, and they were thus notconsidered eligible to participate in FRES/FREMP as key agencies.This decision to exclude local governments and others groupsoutside the existing power structure was rationalized in a reportcalled Legal Provisions for Linked Management. It argued that inorder to link the agencies' tasks and adopt uniform policies, the162decision -makers must have the capacity to make agreements: "...hemust have given him the discretion to make such agreements or tooperate under policies adopted, and he must have the legalability to delegate any of his decisions that he has purported togive away." 12 The adoption of this criteria for a linkedmanagement system effectively limited the participation of localgovernments in estuary resource use decisions. From a municipalperspective, the choice of linked management and the status quowas more about protecting turf and agency powers than aboutaccountability. 13The rationale for the linked management alternative was that itwould allow agreement and negotiation with respect to thepolicies or criteria with which decisions are made, withoutoverstepping the discretion of the agencies by makingpredetermined decisions. The proponents argued that the legal andconstitutional provisions that limit the participation ofexcluded interests in state decision-making are meant to ensurethat power is not delegated without political accountability. Butthe accountability that those constitutional powers were meant toensure has never materialized in the Fraser estuary. Theinvolvement of senior government ministers has been negligible,leaving final authority to bureaucrats with no responsibility tothe electorate. In terms of accountability, greater municipalinvolvement would increase political responsibility in estuarinedecision-making as they are representatives of elected councils.163Senior government agencies in FREMP are also theoreticallypolitically accountable, but actual accountability continues toevade the management program. As one senior government officialdescribed it, "there has still been no hard nosed commitment toFREMP at the political level". 14 Lack of commitment andinvolvement from politicians means accountability to electedofficials is poor and responsiveness to public demands isreduced. The result is that bureaucratic decision-making cancontinue to be based on an entrenched administrative paradigm,and implementation of innovative policies can be slowed orresisted. At a time when public concern for habitat protection ishigh, the insulation of FREMP from the political process resultsin reduced support for habitat conservation policies.The legislated power structure on which the linked managementsystem was based is remarkable for the limited powers given tolocal and regional governments. Though the designers of FREMPacknowledged that all levels of government should be involved inthe management program, municipal governments were given interestgroup rather than key agency status as members of the ManagementCommittee. A management system was chosen that "... erodes aslittle as possible the existing agency functions..." 15 ratherthan one that allowed the best representation of existinginterests in the estuary. The FRES/ FREMP process attempted toget the commitment of local governments within the existing powerstructure, but the difficulty of determining area designations164illustrated the need for greater local^representation andconsultation. This representation and consultation has beenpursued within the informal institutional arrangements of theFRES/FREMP process.4.2.2.^FRES/FREMP as an Informal Institutional ArrangementTo assess the role of FRES/FREMP as an informal institutionalarrangement, it is necessary to return to the model of discursivedesigns developed in Chapter Two. It was suggested that there arethree levels of communicative designs which address the changingneeds of social groups at different distances from the state/market axis. The FRES/FREMP system, over its fifteen yearprocess of development, has been designed to be a mediation andnegotiation forum for integrating state/market and environmentalneeds. In its earlier forms it was located at the centre of theintersection of the state/market axis, but toward theenvironmental pole^of the^human/non-human axis. Figure 6illustrates this position of FRES/FREMP.As the members of this forum attempted to achieve its mandate,they became aware that local communities were an aspect of thisintegration that could not be ignored or addressed once seniorgovernment agencies had resolved their differences. As localgovernments have been increasingly brought into the process ofdecision-making, especially conservation designations, the165position of this communicative design has been shifting downwardtoward the community pole. Ideally this shift will continue sothat FREMP can act to encourage the integration of environmentaland community values. Figure 7 shows the location of FREMP in thecontext of enhanced local responsibility for conservation oflocal resources.If it is assumed that different types of designs are appropriatefor different types of interests, it is inappropriate tocriticize the FRES/FREMP process for not including positionstoward the poles of the human/non-human axis. It is properly aforum for mediation and negotiation between interests on thehuman/non-human axis and the state/market axis. The weakness ofthis forum is its weak links with new social movements on thesepoles, so that there is a poor flow of information from thoseworking directly with environment and community concerns. Thesection below assesses FRES/FREMP as an institutional design formediation between interests of the two axes.4.2.2.1 FRES/FREMP as a Mediating ForumOne of the major achievements of FRES/FREMP has been recognitionof the importance of the estuary for non -human as well as humancommunities. The goal of a management system for the estuary wasthe integration of economic and ecological values long before the167iN n-Hu anCom unitiesFigure 6FRES/FREMP as an institutional designwith a non-human communities focusIG,IgN 11-HumanCommunitiesBio-physicalPublicInquiriesPolitical PartiOf LeftFRESFREMPolitical PartiesOf Rightri)Socio-economicPUblicInquiriesHumanComMunitiesFigure 7FRES/FREMP as an institutional designintegrating human and non-human communities1 (,) 3 (xterm "sustainable development" had been coined by the BrundtlandCommission. As the Habitat Activity Work Group Report stated:"The concept of sustainable development implies the need tomaintain the productive capacity of the ecological systemthat makes the Fraser River estuary all important to fishand wildlife resources and their consumptive and non-consumptive use. Toward that end it is essential thatattributes of the physical and biological components of thesystem, as well as their interrelationships, are adequatelyunderstood. That understanding in turn allows for the designof measures necessary to safeguard the protection of theecosystem and defines the limits to development." 16This^statement^assumes:^the^productive capacity of theecological system is the basis for economic capacity; theeconomic value of non-consumptive as well as consumptive uses;and limits to the scale of an economic system based on theecological carrying capacity of the resources. FRES/FREMP'scontribution to preserving productive habitat in the estuary isundeniable, and without a management system, habitat loss wouldhave continued at a much faster rate.The system is increasingly recognizing the importance of localcommunities in habitat protection and attempts are underway toinclude them directly in decision-making. The next step inincreasing awareness of the role of local communities in habitat169conservation is attention to socio-economic as well asbiophysical research and information. While FREMP habitatmanagement goals reflect concern with the preservation of theecological basis for human economies, issues of equity, fairnessand distribution of the costs and benefits of conservation mustalso be considered. 17No amount of expansion or refinement of the present process willaid habitat conservation efforts, however, if development-oriented agencies do not support it. Habitat management plans andprograms have not been adopted by all participants in FREMP andadequate funding and resource commitments from participatingagencies have not been forthcoming. 18The management system asan institutional design is constrained by power relationships inthe estuary, and the resource development orientation that hasshaped the design continues to strongly influence habitatconservation decisions. With little political or electoralaccountability, the management system is relatively immune fromincreasing public awareness of and support for environmentalissues. It is the system's capacity to act as a forum for theexchange of ideas that offers the best potential for changes inthe distribution of power in the estuary.The exchange of ideas within FRES/FREMP has two forms: projectreviews which are either mandated or discretionary; and theinformal communication that takes place among agency personnel.170Improvements in the referral system have made it easier formunicipalities to participate in some areas of management in theestuary. In the area designation process, agreements have beenfacilitated by easy municipal access to the habitat inventory andclassification map. Conflicts among agencies and levels ofgovernment have been reduced by reforms of the permitting processwhich weed out many developments potentially harmful toproductive habitat and simplify the referral system.Though reforms of the referral system have made information moreaccessible to those inside and outside FREMP, the system isdesigned to serve formal institutional arrangements. It acts toconsolidate existing agency power by limiting access toinformation by certain agencies and interest groups. As the FRESII study found, not only were many agencies not included in thereferrals process, but the system was so informal that agencypersonnel often passed on many referrals entirely at their owndiscretion.The FRES II information systems report looked at theirshortcomings as a technical problem and suggested that if thereferral system were streamlined, those without access toinformation would benefit. The reforms suggested would, however,ensure that projects that were potentially harmful to fish andwildlife and their habitat were referred to environmentalagencies.171In addition to improved information flows, opportunities forpersonal communication among agency personnel is an informalaspect of FRES/FREMP that has been instrumental in helping toreach agreements among them. Reduction of conflicts betweenagencies has been aided by the continuity of personnel in theFRES/FREMP process and the benefits of personal rather thanlegislative relationships among agencies. It has been said thatthis continuity has been largely responsible for the successes ofthe management system especially in achieving area designationagreements. As a forum for the exchange of ideas among agencypersonnel, FRES/FREMP has led to a better understanding ofdifferent agency concerns and has allowed for the development oftrust among them. 19 The successes of the FRES/FREMP processhave resulted from improving what Paehlke and Torgerson wouldcall "communicative rationality".Any mechanism that attempts to encourage the communication amonginterests faces the dilemma posed by the designers of FREMP:inclusion of all interests in all decisions would be extremelyinefficient in terms of time and resources; alternatively,failure to consult all affected parties would lead to thealienation of deserving interests and poor management decisions.The approach adopted by FREMP was that of a simple yet organizedprogram for increasing coordination through the use of existingresources. This was in part a response to pressures from thosewho felt the proposals from FRES II were too complex and172duplicated existing management activities, and in part to a lackof financial support for a more comprehensive structure. 20There can be no doubt that the FRES/FREMP process has helped toslow habitat loss in the Fraser estuary, and on that basisalone, it can be counted a success. It was not designed toaddress equity issues in the estuary, and has not been successfulin that area. As a mediation and negotiation forum, it has beenan innovative approach to resolving the formal and informalinstitutional challenges of managing estuarine habitat.4.2.2.2. FRES/FREMP as a Participative DesignThough the FRES/FREMP process has functioned as a forum formediation and negotiation among agency personnel, it has beenhampered in its capacity to develop links between the internalbureaucracy and external social movements. FRES/FREMP has been aclosed design in that both formal and informal institutionalarrangements have acted to exclude interest groups that are notalready represented. Though it has been a forum that "embodiesprincipals of free discourse among equals", it has not acted as alink between the public sphere and the state. Such a functionwould require direct links with new social movements that canintroduce ideas other than those which provide the rationale forconventional administration. It was argued in Chapter Two thatthe introduction of new ideas has the potential to redefine173problems outside the conventional framework and to act as acatalyst for social change.The model of discursive designs developed in Chapter Two,suggests that FREMP is too closely tied to state and marketforces to act as a direct link with these new ideas andmovements. This linking would best be made by independent publicinquiries designed to gather information and aggregate interestsfrom social movements. These are the second level of discursivedesigns which can act as a conduit for a flow of information fromthe poles of the human/non-human axis to the centre.There are indications that those working with FREMP are aware ofthe need for mechanisms to encourage a flow of information fromthe public sphere. The Habitat Work Group has suggested bettercoordination between local and senior levels of government andpublic participation in habitat management. One suggestion thatwould facilitate the communication of environmental and socialgoals and objectives of human communities occupying the watershedis the proposal for a public interpretive resource facility thatwould offer accessible information and regular meetings abouthabitat management in the estuary. Such a facility would serve toreverse the one-way flow of information from government to thepublic with regard to habitat conservation issues. 21 Ifdeveloped, such a facility could serve as the basis for publicinquiries into habitat management and act as a participative174design linking the negotiating activities of FREMP with thepublic sphere.There are other indications that there is the potential for FREMPto contribute toward the development of participative designs tocreate links with social movements. Its management principlesrecognize the importance of the estuary as an environmental aswell as economic resource, and encourage compatibility betweenupland and foreshore uses, thus offering the opportunity forexpression of concerns from the human/non-human political axis.These principles also encourage broad consultation between allparticipating agencies and public consultation.One final consideration is the question of whether FREMP is a"worm in the brain" 22 of conventional administration or of thepublic sphere. It is a successful experiment in gainingcooperation among differing agency perspectives, but there isalso the possibility that it is improving the capacity of anundemocratic system to maintain itself. It assisted seniorgovernment agencies to agree among themselves, but localgovernments were left out of those agreements until theircooperation was vital. It can only be assumed that the samedynamics will apply to other public interests. If they alreadyhave enough power to force the senior government agencies torecognize their goals and objectives, they will be invited tocontribute in shaping the future of the estuary. If they are an175unorganized or otherwise powerless interest, the decision-makingforum will not seek to include them. The nature of FREMP as acommunicative forum will be further revealed as Nativecommunities in the estuary press for recognition of their goalsand objectives. Will they, like the municipalities, have to waitfor the tide of events to turn in their favour before FREMP willfind meaningful mechanisms for agreement such as the "Statementsof Intent"?It must be concluded that as long as power flows from seniorlevels of government to smaller social units, there will be thetendency for larger units to assume decision-makingresponsibility on the basis of its own interpretation of thepublic interest. Without reforms that enable smaller social unitsto be responsible for such functions as implementation andenforcement of conservation measures, these units will strugglewith one another to avoid the costs and reap the benefits ofhabitat conservation. Thus an institutional design like FREMPwill co-opt those units that become powerful enough to becomeinfluential if it reflects the interests of larger units ratherthan local concerns. Only when smaller social units are not usedto serve the ends of larger organizations can there be a flow ofinformation from the periphery to the centre which accuratelyreflects local needs and demands.The next section looks at the process by which local governments176have used the powers delegated by them from the province toenhance their representation in the habitat management sub-system.4.3. MUNICIPALITIES AND AREA DESIGNATIONSThe area designation process identified interests in the corearea first, assuming these would be linked to uplands areas at afuture time. 23This approach to area designations is at thecentre of the conflict between local and senior levels ofgovernment: do the senior agencies conform to municipal zoningand area planning, or do the municipalities respond to areadesignations arrived at without their equal input?Since the area designation review it has become more importantthat local governments have demanded and achieved a significantrole in habitat management under FREMP. Public awareness ofenvironmental issues has changed and in several of themunicipalities in the FREMP area, development-oriented councilshave been replaced by environmentally sensitive councils. Localelections in many municipalities have become a contest betweenlocal parties that support environmental conservation and thosethat support community economic development. In that sense, thehuman/non-human axis is most strongly represented at the localgovernment level. Therefore, the more political representationthat local governments have in the management system, the more177environment and community issues will be introduced into publicdiscussion.As a design within a design, the area designation process hasperhaps been most successful in achieving coordination betweenthe goals and objectives of foreshore and upland jurisdictions.The process of working together on the area designation mapimproved working relationships among local and senior agenciesand managers and the tangible result showed them that it waspossible to work cooperatively and achieve conservation goals. 24It has also acted to revise the policy-making process asdemonstrated by the changed approach to local involvement inarea planning. FREMP had initially sought agreement on areadesignations which would be used to build area plans, butconsultation with local governments led to using the sameapproach that communities use in developing zoning designations.The broad social goals of the community are agreed upon, thenspecific uses are designed to achieve those goals.These changes to the area designation process are in accordancewith Torgerson's (1990) description of the development of ademocratic alternative to conventional administration. Enhanceddemocracy opens up the administrative world to the influence ofinterests which have generally been excluded or marginalized. Thelimitations of conventional administration become apparentthrough "...piecemeal^initiatives which...anticipate broader178innovations and a more sweeping redefinition of the problem." 25Analysis of the case study involving area designations in theFraser estuary would suggest that the problems are beingredefined, and that the flexible design of the process forreaching agreement on designations has contributed to thatredefinition.4.^CONCLUSIONAnalysis of the case study has provided support^for thesuggestion that planning and management of natural resourcesshould be the responsibility of local and regional as well asfederal and provincial jurisdictions. Regional control over localresources guided by federal or provincial authority where therewere significant consequences for people outside the region wouldprotect and enhance conservation and community values whilelimiting uses contrary to the overall public interest. It hassupported the suggestion that bottom-up governance is animportant component of local control over local resources, andthat smaller units of government more accurately reflect localneeds and public preferences.The Canadian^constitution has^shaped formal institutionalarrangements, so changes in jurisdictional relationships oragency mandates within the management system will depend onconstitutional review and reform. Reform that would allow local179control over local resources would include regional resourceplanning and management powers and reforms of the Municipal Actto enable local governments to implement conservation measures.In the absence of these reforms, political accountability andconservation efforts can be improved through a larger role forelected municipal councils in the estuary area.The reforms of informal arrangements that have resulted from theFRES/FREMP process have been beneficial for the habitatmanagement system as it was one of the weaker systems in theestuary, compared to port and industrial development systems.Better information and a more structured referral system thanexisted before a management system was put in place haveincreased local community participation and improved habitatmanagement decisions. Despite these changes, informalinstitutional arrangements do not encourage the representation ofless organized groups. This thesis concludes that FREMP is actingas an effective mediator among established interests in theestuary, but is an ineffective link with the public sphere andlocal community needs. The model for three levels of discursivedesigns developed in Chapter Two suggests that FREMP is effectiveas a mediation and negotiation design, and should not be expectedto aggregate the interests of local community groups andcommunicate these to the state/market axis. The aggregation ofcommunity interests is best left to participative designscreated at the local community level that may or may not have180government support. Local community interests can then becommunicated to public inquiries which will bring these intereststo the mediation and negotiation level, of which FREMP is anexample.The FREMP area designation process reveals that upland interestsmust be recognized and accommodated, and local communities mustbe involved in the process as a third level of government.Increasing frustration with existing FREMP boundaries emphasizesthe need for a coordinated upland approach to conservation thatcould work with FREMP as equal partners in the planning andmanagement of resources in the estuary. Without a consciouseffort to develop public involvement with the habitat managementsystem, however, powerless interests will continue to be excludedand potentially vital interests ignored.The area designation process has enhanced local communityrepresentation in senior levels of government and contributedtoward enhanced democracy in conservation designation decision-making. But the process has not included equity considerationsor found mechanisms for balancing the needs of one communitywith the needs of another community, the estuary, the province orthe nation. In the absence of mechanisms to ensure balancedparticipation by all groups and communities in the estuary, thosewithout adequate power to defend their interests will findthemselves disadvantaged in the present management system.181In response to the research question, "what is the present roleof local government in resource use decision-making?" that roleis circumscribed by an elaborate constitutional context that doesnot provide resource use decision-making powers for localcommunities. It is a system that encourages a functional ratherthan a territorial approach to resolving conflicting interests,in which a number of agencies representing different interestscompete with each other. Local territorial units are outside thatfunctional concept, and have little power in the face of anational and provincial definition of community.The role of local communities in resource planning is, however,being reconsidered in light of better understanding of ecosysteminteractions, and the role of human communities in the managementof natural communities. It is increasingly recognized that anecosystem such as the Fraser River estuary cannot be approachedas a biophysical unit any more than it can be approached purelyas an economic unit. It was the integration of these twoperspectives that was the impetus for developing a managementsystem, but^the missing^elements in that integration ofenvironmental and economic issues were local communities.The realization of the goals of the Fraser estuary managementsystem entails an understanding that the local government roleis to act as a link not only between upland and foreshore, butbetween the economy and the environment. It is at the local levelthat social units are small enough to design effective, site-182specific controls on degradation of resources. For instance,small streams and tributaries can be better protected throughzoning designations than through broad national or provincialpolicies. This is not to say that broad policies are unnecessaryfor issues that have transboundary effects. For instance, thefederal government must be involved in issues concerningmigratory birds as it is the only level that can negotiateinternational agreements.Local governments will be enabled to act as links between humanand non-human communities through the efforts of those with thepower to make the necessary structural changes. Those effortswill be influenced by new ideas about the nature of the politicalspectrum and an appreciation of changed public attitudes towardpolitical issues. Restructuring the political agenda can beencouraged by discursive designs that act as a mechanism forbuilding an active, critical public sphere. In many ways,FRES/FREMP has acted as an effective design within the habitatmanagement system. Communication among local and seniorgovernment representatives has allowed community perspectives tobe introduced and environmental perspectives to be strengthened.While a restructured political agenda would give moreconsideration to community issues, ideally municipalities wouldpreserve their position as territorial representatives. Thus thepoint at which local governments interact with the state is thepoint where issues of economic distribution intersect with the183Figure 8Non-HumanCommunitieBio-physicalPublicInquiriesLocalGovernments7:11"7:31• ...I0.04 Political Partie olitical PartiesOf Left Of RightSocio-economicInquiriesHumanCommunitiesLocal Government in an Alternative Frameworkizqhuman/non-human axis. As has been suggested, it is in localgovernment politics that the human/non-human polarities are mostclearly articulated. Figure 8 shows the position of localgovernments in an expanded political framework with three levelsof participatory designs. The diagram shows local governments asone component of these designs with an interest area leaningtoward the human communities side of the human/non-human axis.This case study indicates that a fundamental rethinking of theframework for political discussion is taking place. Thisrethinking has been necessary for the inclusion of environmentalissues on the political agenda, and the introduction ofenvironmental issues has led to the consideration of communityissues. Just as economic issues cannot be addressed withoutconsidering the relationship between the individual and thestate, so environmental issues cannot be addressed withoutconsidering the relationship between human and non-humancommunities. While the former entails a macro approach that canaddress national markets, the latter entails a micro approach tospecific interactions between human communities and theirecological context.4.5.^RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LOCAL CONTROL OF LOCAL RESOURCESThe conclusions drawn from^analysis^of^local government185involvement in habitat management in the Fraser River estuarylead to the following recommendations. As both the literaturereview and case study indicate that a redistribution of powerfrom the senior to the local government level would not onlyresult in better conservation, but would ensure a more democraticallocation of its costs and benefits:1. In order to enhance local powers, the province shouldempower the regions to plan and implement resourcemanagement programs and policies and to regulate the use ofprivately-owned agricultural, forest and wild lands in theinterests of long term sustainability of those resources.The province should empower municipal governments toimplement specific initiatives to address local problemsthat cause major cumulative environmental impacts. By-lawsto protect the urban forests, conservation property taxincentives and regional transportation planning authorityare a few of the many ways that local governmentempowerment would enhance conservation values.2. In order to ensure coordination with larger publicinterests, local empowerment should take place within theconstraints of an expanded federalism. The relationshipbetween local, regional, provincial and national governmentsshould be so designed that they will have a countervailinginfluence upon one another. Senior governments shoulddevelop resource use standards in consultation with smaller186social units that can be applied and implemented at alllevels of government.3. In the Fraser estuary, coordination between regionalenvironmental planning and senior government standards wouldentail an expansion of the existing area designation processto include coordination of both regional and municipalenvironmental plans with the existing land inventory,classifications and designations.4. Though senior government ministries have demonstrated theircommitment to the FREMP process as a whole through adoubling of their contributions, commitment to democraticconservation would be indicated through larger budgets forhabitat management and public involvement programs in theestuary.5. In order to ensure that links between conservation, localcommunities and senior government agencies are strengthened,the existing management system should strengthen localcommunity and environmental representation to make it moreeffective. The newly structured Management Committee shouldensure that local representatives are more directly involvedin governance. In addition the Management Committee shouldbe more representative of and accountable to the newImplementation Advisory Committee. All work groups shouldinclude local government and public interest grouprepresentatives.^In^order^to^build^bottom-uprepresentation, these interest group representatives should187be nominated from the public sphere through intermediatelevel discursive designs.6.^In order for the public to aggregate and communicate itsinterests to^the Implementation Advisory Committee, afacility where public meetings on habitat protection issuescan take place should be provided jointly by regional andsenior governments. Such a facility could serve as the basisfor a discursive design that would link the concerns of thepublic sphere to FREMP.How could the successes of the Fraser estuary habitat managementsystem be translated into a similar estuarine context withforeshore/upland conflicts and three different levels ofgovernment involved, while avoiding the problems that have slowedthe FRES/FREMP process? Evidence from the case study suggeststhat if a management system were to be put in place in a similarsituation it would be wise to include local governments as keyactors early on in the process. In the Fraser estuary case, thiswould have speeded up the process of reaching agreements on areadesignations, as upland issues and concerns would have beenbetter integrated into proposed area designations during the FRESII exercise. Senior government agencies under a federal system ofgovernance similar to Canada's might use the Fraser estuaryexperience as evidence that conformity to their constitutionalmandates will speed acceptance of a management system amongdevelopment-oriented agencies, but slow implementation of188projects such as area designations and programs such as habitatmanagement. A similar situation might also be aided byencouraging local community groups to form independent discursivedesigns to aggregate their concerns. This study also suggeststhat habitat management sub-systems would benefit from strongerlinks to public inquiries so that local community concerns can becommunicated to the mediating and negotiating level.The goal of this study was to assess whether redistributing powerbetween local and senior levels of governmnet would allow a moredemocratic allocation of the costs and benefits associated withhabitat conservation. Conclusions drawn from a review of theliterature and the case study indicate that such aredistribution of power would encourage not only a moredemocracatic allocation of costs^and^benefits,^but moreeffective conservation of habitat as well.189END NOTES1. Bartlett, Robert "Ecological Reason in Administration", inManaging Leviathan, Paehlke and Torgerson, eds.,Peterborough, Ont. and Lewiston, N.Y.: Broadview Press,1990, P. 82.2. The Vancouver Courier, "Council Wants Rights Update", Wed.Sept. 4, pp. 1-2.3. Mayor Gordon Campbell, City of Vancouver, Towards a NewGeneration of Government, Sept. 1991, pp. 6-12.4. Sproule-Jones, Mark and Kenneth G. Peterson, "PollutionControl in the Lower Fraser: Who's In Charge?" in The Uncertain Future of the Lower Fraser, Westwater ResearchCentre, University of British Columbia Press, 1976, p. 163.5.^Ibid., pp. 187-8.6. Mayor^Gordon^Campbell,^Towards a New Generation ofGovernment, p. 8.7. Franklin Wiles, Surrey planner, personal communication, Dec.10, 1991.8. Mike Romain, past chair of ADTF, presently with DFO,personal communication, Dec. 12, 1991.9. Franklin Wiles, personal communication, Dec. 10, 1991.10. Ken Cameron,^Director of^Development Services, GVRD,personal communication, Dec. 16, 1991.11. Sproule-Jones and Peterson, The Uncertain Future of the Lower Fraser, pp. 153-155.12. FRES II, Legal Provisions for Linked Management, prepared byJohn Alexander, March, 1982, p. 22..13. Mayor^Gordon^Campbell,^Towards a New Generation ofGovernment, p. 5.14. Mike Romain, personal communication, Dec. 12, 1991.15. Fres II, Legal Provisions for Linked Management, p. 36.16. FREMP, Report of the Habitat Activity Work Group, Dec.1990, p. 1.19017. Dorcey, Anthony, Sustainable Development of the Fraser River Estuary: Success Amidst Failure, report prepared for theCoastal Resource management Group, OECD, March, 1990, p. 24.18. FREMP, Habitat Activity Work Group Report, pp. ii-iii.19. FREMP, The Fraser River Estuary: An Overview of ChangingConditions, prepared by Kristal Kennett and Mike McPhee,Sept, 1988, p. 27.20. FREMP Review Committee, An Implementation Strategy for the Fraser River^Estuary Management Plan, prepared by J.O'Riordan and J. Wiebe, May, 1984, p. 8.21. FREMP, Habitat Activity Work Group Report, p. 11.22. Bartlett, Robert "Ecological Reason in Administration", p. 82.23. FRES II, Report of the Area Designation Task Force, Vol. I,March 1982, p. 2.24. McPhee, Michael W., "Cooperation in Estuary Management" inCoastal Zone '87: Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium on Coastal and Ocean management, Orville T. Maggoon et al eds.,Published by the American Society of Engineers, p. 847-8..25. Douglas^Torgerson,^"Obsolete^Leviathan"^in Managing Leviathan, Paehlke and Torgerson, eds., Broadview PressLtd., 1990. p. 28.191BIBLIOGRAPHYTHEORY REVIEWBurke, R. and J. Heaney, Collective Decision Making in Water Resource Planning, Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books,1975.Cotgrove, Stephen, Catastrophe or Cornucopia, Chichester, NewYork, Brisbane, Toronto, Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 1982.Daly,Herman and John Cobb, For the Common Good; Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the Environment and a Sustainable Future, Boston, Beacon Press, 1989Friedmann, John, Planning in the Public^Domain, PrincetonUniversity Press, 1987Hardin, G. and J. Baden,  Managing the Commons„ W.H. Freeman andCo., 1977.Marchak P., N. Guppy and J. McMullen, eds., Uncommon Property: The Fishing and Fish Processing Industries in British Columbia,Methuen, 1987.McCay, B. and J. Acheson, The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources, University of ArizonaPress, 1987.Milbrath, Lester, Envisioning a Sustainable Society, Albany:State of New York Press, 1989.O'Riordan, T., Environmentalism, London: Pion Ltd., 1981.Paehlke, Robert and Douglas Torgerson, eds., Managing Leviathan: Environmental Politics and the Administrative State,Peterborough, Ont. and Lewiston, N.Y.: Broadview Press, 1990.Pinkerton, Evelyn, Cooperative Management of Local Fisheries,Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989.Raphael, D.D., Problems^of^Political^Philosophy, London:MacMillan, 1976.CASE STUDY DOCUMENTATION:Academic StudiesDorcey, A. ed.,  Perspectives on Sustainable Development in Water 192Management: Towards Agreement in^the Fraser^River Basin,Westwater Research Centre, University of British Columbia, 1991Dorcey, A., Sustainable Development of the Fraser River Estuary: Success Amidst Failure, report prepared for OECD conference, Mar.1990.Dorcey, A., The Uncertain Future of the Lower Fraser, Vancouver:University of British Columbia Press, 1976Dorcey, A., Setting Ecological^Research^Priorities^for Management: The Art of the Impossible in the Fraser Estuary,Westwater Research Centre, University of British Columbia, 1981Dorcey, A., K. Hall, D. Levy, I. Yesaki, Estuarine Habitat Management, A Prospectus for Tilbury Slough, Westwater ResearchCentre, University of British Columbia, 1983.Fox, I., and J Nowland, The Management of Estuarine Resources in Canada, C.E.A.C. Report, 1978.McPhee M.," Implementing Area Designations in the Fraser RiverEstuary", in Coastal Zone 1989, Proceedings of the SixthSymposium on Coastal and Ocean Management, Vol. II, 1989.Sandborn, Calvin, "Municipal Land Use Planning and Access toMunicipal Information", in Law Reform for Sustainable Development in British Columbia, 1990.Sproule-Jones, Mark H., The Real World of Pollution Control,Westwater Research Centre, University of British Columbia, 1981.Wolfe, L.D.S., M. McPhee and J. Wiebe, "Methods of AchievingCooperation in Estuary Management: The Fraser River Estuary Case"in Coastal Zone 1987, Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium on Coastal and Ocean Management, Vol. I, 1987.Government PublicationsMayor Gordon^Campbell, City^of Vancouver, Towards a NewGeneration of Government, Sept.1991.FRES I, Constitutional and Legislative Frameworks, prepared forthe Steering Committee by Michael Dunn, August, 1978.FRES I, Habitat, Report of the Habitat Work Group, Victoria,B.C., August, 1978.FRES I, Key Findings and Recommendations: Proposals for the Development of an Estaury Management Plan, prepared by JohnO'Riordan, Harry Lash and Mary Rawson, Victoria, B.C., August,1978.193FRES I, Summary: Proposals for the Development of an EstauryManagement Plan, prepared by John O'Riordan, Harry Lash and MaryRawson, Victoria, B.C. August, 1978.FRES II, A Living River By The Door: A Proposed Management Program for the Fraser River Estuary, March 1982.FRES II, A Living River By The Door: A Public Review Workbook on the Proposed Management Program for the Fraser River Estuary,November 1982.FRES II, Organizational Options for a Linked Management Systemin the Fraser River Estuary, prepared by Larry Wolfe, March,1982.FRES II,  Legal Provisions for Linked Management, prepared byL.John Alexander, March 1982.FRES II, A Linked Management System, prepared by Larry Wolfe,March, 1982.FRES II, The Results of Public Involvement, prepared by CathyHarvey and Kaye Melliship, March, 1982.FRES II,  Report of the Area Designation Task Force, Vol. I, March1982.FRES,  Report of the Area Designation Task Force, Vol. II, March1982.FRES II, Referral Systems Presently Used in the Fraser River Estuary Study Core Area, prepared by Richard D. McDougall, March1982.FRES II, The Information Systems Report, prepared by Gary Reith,Mar. 1982.FREMP Review Committee,  An Implementation Strategy for the Fraser River Estuary Management Program, prepared by John O'Riordan andJohn Wiebe, May, 1984.FREMP, Agency Guide, 1987.FREMP, "Closer to a Living River", information sheet.FREMP, The Fraser River Estuary: An^Overview of ChangingConditions, prepared by Kristall Kennett and Mike McPhee, Sept.1988.FREMP, Report of the Habitat Activity Work Group, December 1990.194GVRD, Technical Advisory Committee, Challenges for a ContemporaryStatement of the Livable Region Strategy, Sept. 1987.GVRD, The Liveable Region Strategy, 1976.MOE, Fraser Valley Sub Regional Plan, May 1987.Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Review of the Official Regional Plan, Lower Mainland, B.C., December, 1977.NDP Fraser River Task Force, The Fraser: A River Under Seige, Nov. 1990.NFHC, North^Fraser Harbour^Environmental Management Plan,September, 1988.Province of BC,  Municipal Act, Nov. 3, 1989.195APPENDIX "A" LOCAL GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN TASK FORCE REVIEWThe following is a synopsis of the record of comments in the AreaDesignation Task Force Report (March '82) from agencies involvedin the review of selected management units. Only the review ofthose management units that include conservation designations andlocal government are included here.Management Unit 1-7:The concern was that agriculture or urban development would havea negative impact on fish and wildlife. Both the FBCN and the MOEagreed that an upland management group be established to addressthe impact of urban and agricultural development on fish andwildlife habitat, and the Task Force recommended that such amanagement program be established for Mud Bay area.Management Unit 1-8:Same concerns as above where FBCN and ADTF concerned abouteffects of upland development (especially drainage from Burns Bogand reactivation of Boundary Bay Airport) on habitat in BoundaryBay, and another management program for that area suggested.Management Unit 11-4:Industrial designations conflict with regional and provincialpolicy. The GVRD considered the industrial designation too largein relation to the ORP and the ALR and wanted consideration ofits Open Space philosophy with regard to access to the dykes. Atthe same time, the municipality of Delta was interested inencouraging water oriented industry in this unit. The ADTF196Review agreed that the foreshore use should conform with the ORPindustrial designation.Management Unit 111-5:Designations conflict with municipal planning. The CFVRD wasconcerned that the designations were not in conformity withLangley's Industrial Park and plans for a future bridge crossing.The ADTF recommended that further consultation with the^cfvrdwould ensure compatibility with upland designations and plans.Management Unit V-7:Issue is extent of preservation and development. The GVRD saidthe industrial designation was too large, and the ADTF said wooddebris from on the foreshore would adversely affect productiveforeshore marsh.Management Unit V-12:Wood debris accumulation in Wood Island Slough limits biologicalproductivity. The GVRD asked if the area designations shouldpermit/encourage all industrial uses on Iona Island. The FBCNsuggested that the whole of the north foreshore of Sea Island bedesignated recreation and conservation. Again the ADTF suggestedthere should be compatibility between foreshore designations andupland plans.Recommendations were made by the ADTF for the undetermined useareas, which included area plans and foreshore/upland managementcommittees for four management units. The following issues andconcerns were reported which indicate the position of localgovernment with respect to the area designation process.197Management Unit 11-13:Conservation^vs.^industry.^The^GVRD^complained that aconservation designation fell within an ORP industrialdesignation. Without a statement of the relationship between theORP and area designations, the GVRD would not comment on theappropriateness of the designation. The FBCN supported theconservation designation of remnant marshes. The MOE consideredenvironmentally sensitive industry to be acceptable.Management Unit 11-22:An interesting^area. In^1953 Annacis Island Estates wasestablished and in 1956 there was an agreement between the Dukeof Westminster, the Federal Crown, the Corporation of Delta andthe Fraser River Harbour Commission that Annacis Island would bedeveloped as an industrial estate and that the by - laws to achievethis objective would be passed by Delta City Council. The totalarea is zoned industrial-heavy manufacturing. The area alsocontains intertidal sand/mud flats, marshes, and riparian shrubs,all considered to be highly productive fish and wildlife habitat.Delta wanted the western tip of Annacis Island outside the dyketo be protected from industrial encroachment. It also suggestedthat Patrick Island be developed industrially inside the dyke fornon-water oriented industry, contingent on compensation made inupgrading foreshore areas.Management Unit 11-26:Port/terminal vs. conservation designations. The Municipality ofRichmond felt the existing port designation had implications for198the character of East Richmond that were too large to allow thedesignation to stand. It said that uplands adjacent to theundetermined use area were bog forests which might be lost. Itcalled for a thorough environmental impact study and that thearea should remain an undetermined use until this was done. TheFRHC said that the site was now in the preparation stages for thedeep sea dock facility and that they would not consider any otherdesignations for this land. The ADTF supported Richmond's demandfor an environmental impact study and suggested that mitigationand compensation plans be developed and approved. It furthersuggested that the future plans and goals of Richmond beconsidered, and that consultation among concerned agencies beestablished.Management Unit 11-31:The Municipality of Richmond was uncertain as to the best use forGarry Point, and it was suggested that the designation wouldinvolve more consultation with the municipality.Management Unit 111-8:Industry vs. conservation. The DARD said the regional plan forthis area is industry, recognizing the existing industrial parkon the upland. The ADTF pointed out that there had been a greatdeal of unauthorized filling and that no control over types orquantities of fill has occurred. The DARD appeared to object tothis statement and said the basis for this statement was unclear.ADTF recommended that a committee be established comprised ofupland and foreshore management to discuss plans for both water-199oriented industry and habitat values.Management Unit III-10:Industry or port/terminal vs. conservation. The DARD concern wasthat part of the area was the subject of an ALR appeal to removeit for industrial use. It was also concerned that the areadesignation for this unit did not reflect a park proposal in PittMeadows. The ADTF said the area designated undetermined washighly productive habitat but that accumulated wood debris waslimiting its productivity. The MOE-F&W said the area had avariety of habitat types, but the back-up lands are zonedindustrial in the ORP, and log-storage leases were continuousthroughout the unit. They recommended a conservation designationuntil an area plan was formed.Management Unit IV-4:Industry or small craft moorage vs. conservation: The GVRD saidthe upland area is industrial in ORP. The ADTF said theforeshore marshes and offshore areas were highly productivehabitat, but that wood waste debris is a problem. The plans ofthe city of Port Coquitlam for the area were to encourage waterdependent industry on the abutting upland, and they would like tosee the city's designation taken into account. The ADTF suggesteda committee be established to discuss future plans for bothwater-oriented industry and habitat values in the area. An areaplan be done as a possible approach.200Management Unit V-2:Industry vs. conservation. GVRD; the area is currently designatedto support log booms and other uses shouldn't interfere withalready incumbent industrial water-front areas. Poplar Island isnot undetermined use in terms of regional policy( it isdesignated for log storage) and much of the shoreline is takenup with log storage leases. MOE-F&W said that Poplar Islandrepresents one of the few, if only areas of undyked Fraser Riverfloodplain in the North Arm and supports a deciduous forest ofblack cottonwood with a dense underbrush of salmonberry and othershrubs. It is the best example of this type of forest downstreamfrom Port Mann. Herons and Canada Geese nest on the island andthe marshes and shallow water provide habitat for anadromous andresident fish. It recommended that the area should be designatedconservation and as it is privately owned, the land should beacquired for public use. Western Forest Products had planned touse the uplands for log handling, and the City of New Westminsterhad passed a resolution to accommodate those plans.Management Unit V-3:Whether to allow upgrading of upland for water-orientedindustry. GVRD; the upland area is industrial in the ORP.Burnaby: the area is fully developed industrially. FBCN; marshyareas should be considered. ADTF; upgrading would alienateforeshore habitat. DFO; conservation is essential for downstreammigratory juvenile salmon. Such a designation would not be inconflict with the ORP or Burnaby's industrial zoning upland if201it is limited to the foreshore. Also existing industry is non-water oriented, thus precluding any industrial use of theforeshore. MOE-F&W; integrity of marshes must be maintained. Mostof area upstream is developed which places even more importanceon retention of this area. It is also waterfowl habitat.Management Unit VI-3:(Roberts Bank) Port/Terminal or conservation. ADTF; important forrearing and feeding of fish and as migratory bird habitat. Delta;while port designation is acknowledged at terminal site,conservation must be provided for along both sides of thecauseway. ADTF recommended that it remain undetermined until acareful assessment of present activities done, and overallport/terminal activity plan developed and research ofdevelopment and conservation values is done.202APPENDIX "B" LIST OF INTERVIEWS(In order of appearance in text)George Calquhoun, Port Manager, NFHCAlex Jamieson, Richmond Municipal PlannerPeter Bloxham, Burnaby Municipal PlannerFranklin Wiles, Surrey Municipal PlannerMike McPhee, FREMP SecretariatNancy Knight, Development Services, GVRDBruce Clark, Habitat Biologist, DFOMike Romain, Informatics, DFO, (past chair ADTF)Mike Stringer, Director, Environmental Services, GVRDKen Cameron, Director, Development Services, GVRD

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