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Relationship of the Ālaya-Vijñāna to theories of the unconscious in depth psychology Hollander, Francesca Jacoba 1992

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RELATIONSHIP OF THE ALAYA-VIJNANA TO THEORIES OF THE UNCONSCIOUSIN DEPTH PSYCHOLOGYBYFRANCESCA JACOBA HOLLANDERB.A., The University of British Columbia, 1986A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESDepartment of Religious StudiesAccepted as conforming to thestandard required for theDegree of Master of ArtsTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAApril, 1992© Francesca Jacoba Hollander, 1992In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature)Department of Religious Studies  The University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate 	 Oct.14/92DE-6 (2/88)i iAbstractThe álaya-vijñañan has been the subject of much scholarly researchand has frequently been described as a type of subliminal orunconscious level of mental processing. Although several attemptshave been made to make a systematic comparison between theálaya-vijña n of Yogácára Vijñaptimátratá and the psychologicalunconscious in Depth psychology, there is a tradition of errorsexemplified by articles exclusively from the psychoanalyticperspective that ignore the cognitive unconscious. While thesecomparisons reveal Freud's claim that there are unconsciousmental processes is supported by recent work, there is, however,no need to identify concepts of the unconscious withpsychoanalysis and part of the purpose of this paper is toseparate the unconscious from its Freudian connection. This isnot done in the spirit of dismissing or discreditingpsychoanalytic theory, it is done in the interest of conceptualclarity.In chapter one I outline the psychoanalytic theory of theunconscious in Depth Psychology. In chapter two I discuss thecognitive unconscious and present empirical evidence fromresearch studies done on unconscious mental processing whichsupports the claim that there are unconscious mental processesand that these unconscious mental processes are in no way relatedto Freudian theory of the unconscious. Chapter three compares thepsychoanalytic unconscious with the cognitive unconscious on thebasis of repression, recoverability of unconscious contents,iiiinaccessibility, and the effect of unconscious influences.Chapter four and five briefly discusses the development ofYogácára Vijñaptimátratá, its founders, main texts, and keyconcepts. Chapter six comparesálaya-vijñañan with theories of theunconscious in the area of repression, recoverability ofunconscious contents, inaccessibility and the effect ofunconscious influences. Finally, chapter seven discusses thepsychological transformation inálaya-v jñañan theory.ivTABLE OF CONTENTSAbstract 	  iiIntroduction 	  11. Theories of the Unconscious in Depth Psychology . .  	 41.1. Psychoanalytic Theories of the Unconscious .  	 51.1.1. Descriptive Unconscious 	  101.1.2. Dynamic Unconscious 	  101.1.3. Systematic Unconscious 	  111.1.4. Personal Unconscious 	  121.1.5. Collective Unconscious 	  172. Theories of the unconscious in Cognitive Psychology 	 182.1. Unconscious Influences of Unattended Inputs 	 212.2. Empirical Evidence 	  212.2.1. Subliminal perception/Subception . . 	 232.2.2. Information-Processing Paradigm of theunconscious 	  252.2.3. Recovery Paradigm of the unconscious• 292.2.4. Dissociation Paradigm of the	unconscious   292.2.5. Implicit Memory 	  302.2.6. Implicit/Explicit Memory Distinction▪322.2.7. Implicit Knowledge as basis of theunconscious 	  343. Psychoanalytic unconscious vs cognitive unconscious 	 373.1. Repression 	  393.2. Recoverability 	  403.3. Inaccessibility 	  433.4. Unconscious Influences 	  444. Development of Yoglcara: History and Texts 	  465. Yogacgra Tradition 	  495.1. Ontology 	  495.2. Alaya-viSriana 	  515.2.1. Definition 	  525.2.2. Structures of consciousness 	  535.2.3. Function 	  545.3. Eightfold Proof of Xlaya-vijfigna 	  56	5.3.1. Summary Verse   575.3.2. Impossibility of Appropriating aPhysical Form 	  575.3.3. Impossibility of Origination andSimultaneous Functioning of the Sense-Consciousnesses 	  585.3.4. The Impossibility of Clear MentalConsciousness 	  605.3.6. Impossibility of Action 	  615.3.7. Impossibility of Physical Experience 	 635.3.8. Impossibility of Mindless Attainments 	 645.3.9. Impossibility of Death 	  646. Ilaya-vijnna & theories of the unconscious 	  656.1. Repression 	  66V6.2. Recoverability 	  686.3. Inaccessibility 	  696.4. Unconscious Influences 	  697. Conclusion 	  70	7.1. Psychological Transformation   71NOTES 73 BIBLIOGRAPHY 	  92APPENDIX: The Eightfold Proof of the Ilaya-vigana 	  1191IntroductionScientific psychology began as the study of consciousness.Wundt, 1 Titchener, 2 and James 3 who founded the earliestpsychological laboratories generally assumed that the mind 4 wasable to observe its own inner workings. For this reason theyrelied on the method of introspection, 5 by which trainedobservers attempted to analyze their perceptions, memories andthoughts, and reduce them to elementary sensations, images, andfeelings. But observations in both the laboratory and clinicsuggested that mental activity was not limited to consciousexperience. For example, Helmholte concluded that consciousperception was the product of unconscious inferences, i.e.,rather than simply reading off percepts from the world ofexternal stimulation, we unconsciously draw on our past knowledgein order to effect accurate interpretations of what we perceive.The experience of one's past perception is unconsciously added toone's present reaction to stimulus. All this changed with SigmundFreud whose theoretical contribution did not for one momentassume we could escape the impact of the unconscious in ourmental lives. For Freud, some thoughts, feelings, and fantasieswere not only unattended, they were selectively avoided---aprocess he called repression. Freudian theories of theunconscious emphasized the existence and influence of personalinternal events that were not attended or noticed. Cognitivetheories of the unconscious, as presented in cognitivepsychology, have examined the impact of external events that are2not attended or noticed. Although what is emphasized isdifferent, both traditions assert that conscious experience issubject to unconscious influences. 8The Yogacarins too had a special interest in the studyconsciousness. They sought to understand the relationship betweenmental processes and their religious implications. Anunderstanding of the nature of mental activity, conscious andunconscious, is central to Yogacara soteriology. The goal ofspiritual practice was to weaken and finally eliminate the usualpatterns of experiencing the world filtered through the fivesenses and the idea-creating intellect. The structures ofconsciousness were the paramount object of study for the earlyYogacarin philosophers. Mind capable of knowing its ownprocesses, of understanding the nature of mental constructionsthrough the language developed in a given culture and through theinterdependency between mind and its objects became the subjectof vigorous study and controversy.In the course of their analysis of consciousness theYogacarins developed a theoretical interpretation of mentalprocessing which included an "underlying consciousness" similarto the "unconscious" in the psychological sense. This "underlyingconsciousness" called the alaya-vijnana, is considered to be thelatent substructure of all mental activity.Although there has been a growing interest in thecomparative study of the alaya-vijnana of VijnaptimatrataYogacara (Yamada 1955; Osaki 1986; Cernovsky 1988; Waldron 1988)3and the unconscious in Depth psychology, most of these articlesare written only from a psychoanalytic perspective becauseFreud's theorizing about the unconscious has been accepted as theonly interpretation of unconscious mental processing in Buddhiststudies. Because both Yogacara Vijnaptimatrata 9 theory andpsychology offer insights into the workings of unconscious mentalstructures and processes, this paper will compare the alaya-vijnana with theories of the unconscious in Depth psychology andcognitive psychology in the areas of repression, recoverabilityof unconscious contents and processes, inaccessibility, and theeffect of unconscious influences.41. Theories of the Unconscious in Depth PsychologyIn this chapter I will examine the psychoanalytic theory ofthe unconscious in Depth Psychology focusing on repression,recoverability of unconscious contents, inaccessibility, and theeffect of unconscious influences."Depth Psychology " w is a term used to describe anypsychology that postulates dynamic psychic mental activities thatare "unconscious" and attempts to understand and to work with theunconscious mind. This definition applies to the psychologicalmovement from Mesmer to Freud and onward, includespsychoanalysis, Jungian analysis, and hypnosis. Eugen Bleuler(1857-1939) was credited with having coined the term`Tiefenspychologie' (Depth psychology) which was popular at thetime when psychoanalysis was equated with the psychology of theunconscious.In the middle of the nineteenth century artists andphilosophers had developed a concept of the unconscious mindwhich played an important part in shaping Freud's ideas on thesubject, and historians of psychology have recognized the debtwhich psychoanalysis owes to European Romanticism." By the1900's Europeans had come to ascribe the following four separatefunctions to the unconscious: (1) the function of recordingmemories and registering perceptions which often escape consciousattention; (2) the dissolutive function, as evidenced by hypnoticbehaviours and the multiple or split personalities ofschizophrenic patients; (3) the creative function of innovative5or inspirational thinking; and (4) the mythopoetic function offabricating inner romances, fantasies, or dreams which givepsychic life a kind of autonomous reality apart from events thattranspire in the physical universe." But Freud's ambitions werescientific rather than literary, and his concept of mind was alsoinfluenced by a commitment to scientific materialism. As far ashe was concerned mental events were dictated by physicalprocesses, and he believed that psychological function wasrigidly determined by natural laws. Freud saw human beings asdescendants from primitive ancestors, and that they had inheritedinstinctive impulses which had to be restrained in order to meetthe demands of civilized coexistence. It was in this context thatFreud began to visualize the unconscious as a custodialinstitution, a mental storehouse in which disruptive instinctscould be confined and silenced.1.1. Psychoanalytic Theories of the UnconsciousFreud's initial discovery of a level of mentation, which isnot accessible to immediate awareness, but which has observableeffects on behaviour and on experience, rests on this dynamicconcept; it antedates, his first use of the word, "psycho-analysis" in 1896. His innovation is a good example of whatThomas Kuhn has described as the development of a new paradigm."It stood in contrast to the view of his first collaborator,Joseph Breuer, who theorized that there was a simple absence ofcommunication between what he called a "hypnoid" mental state and6waking consciousness. He assumed that in such a hypnoid mentalstate, a real trauma had occurred and had been "forgotten."Freud tried to allow a more physiological theory to existside by side with his new model until "observation showed mealways and only one thing. "la 	 became convinced that the"splitting off" of mental contents was deeply motivated in hiscases of hysteria and was not simply an absence of communicationbetween mental states. He concluded that the inaccessibility ofsome mental contents resulted from the development of some ill-defined "energies" designed to keep them out of awareness.Freud formulated two major theories of the unconscious. Thefirst was presented in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), andthe second in the Ego and the Id (1923). An earlier formulationof the unconscious, predating that of The Interpretation of Dreams, can be traced through A Proiect for a ScientificPsychology (1895) and The Origins of Psychoanalysis (1887-1902). 15In his first formulation of the unconscious, Freud attemptedto explain cognition without awareness by his reference to alayer of mental contents close to consciousness. The latentunconscious, according to Freud, incorporated those mentalcontents which could temporarily disappear from consciousness butwere essentially accessible. Freud supported this assumption withclinical observations such as the unexpected emergence ofsolutions to mathematical problems during sleep, the posthypnoticperformance of suggested acts, and similar incidents. By7distinguishing latent contents (accessible to consciousness) fromrepressed contents (inaccessible to consciousness), it waspossible for Freud to make a parallel assumption of layering thepsyche into the repressed-unconscious, the latent-unconscious(preconscious), and consciousness. This division was underlinedby the fact that in each instance a censor existed whichseparated the different areas. 16 Freud conceived the termunconscious as covering an entire system."In Freud's second formulation of the unconscious hediscontinued equating the repressed and the unconscious 18 and inThe Ego and the Id, Freud took into consideration the totality ofthe individual, breaking away from his personalistic approach. Hethen split the conscious, unconscious, and preconscious into asecond tripartite division of the Ego, Id, and Superego. Now, theinterplay between these three --- Ego, Id, and Superego --- drewhis major interest. In the id, Freud recognized an area which wasmore encompassing than the unconscious and contained drives whichdid not need to be repressed. Everything which he had formerlyassumed to be characteristic of the unconscious was equally validfor the id. The id opened a vista of the impersonal phylogeneticbackground of the psyche. It represented the "dark, inacessiblepart of our personality." 19 Because of this inherentinaccessibility, Freud saw the id as an area which was open tosomatic influences.His impulse to substitute the term "id" where "unconscious"had formerly been used came from the discovery that the superego8contained an unconscious part of the ego which had not beenrepressed. The superego, although not repressed, was the cause ofall repression activity. Equating the unconscious and therepressed was no longer possible. The superego, that unconsciouspart of the ego, was important to Freud because essentialfunctions of the individual --- such as questions of conscienceor morality --- originated in the unconscious or operated out ofthe unconscious. With the conception of the superego Freud took adecisive step from considering the libidinous object to anappraisal of the subject. Freud saw the superego mainly as anaggressive and self-destructive power which in its role ofintrojecting parental authority included all the aggressionaccumulated since the days of the first progenitor.Together with the discovery of the unconscious part of theego went a clearer understanding of the (pre)conscious part, the`reality-ego'. Freud conceded to the ego the tasks of the realityprinciple, of control and repression. This hypothesis was furtherconfirmed by the discovery of the roots of the ego in the deeplayers of the id. Freud determined that the (pre)conscious ego"is that part of the id which has been modified by the directinfluence of the external world" 20 and has become the organizingcentre. After Freud had allotted the moral function to thesuperego and separated it from the total ego, the ego in thenarrower sense retained the vital functions of reality testingand of protecting the individual from internal as well asexternal dangers. Since the ego was also assigned the agencies of9thinking, reasoning, and prudence, 21 this made it a "slave tothree masters," protecting the individual "from the externalworld, from the libido of the id, and from the severity of thesuperego." 22 Thus, the ego was confined and oppressed to such adegree that it also became "the actual seat of anxiety." 23 Inpsychotherapy, therefore, Freud assigned major importance to theego, mainly in the adjustment to reality and control of thedrives. He expressed this view in the sentence "Where id was,there ego shall be. “24In these two formulations of the unconscious, mentalprocesses are divided structurally in terms of whether they areinvolved with instinctual gratification (id), reality monitoring(ego), morality (superego),or, mental processes available toconsciousness, ranging from complete unavailability(unconscious), potential availability (preconscious), andcomplete availability (conscious).Despite the major role played by the unconscious inpsychoanalysis what Freud actually meant by the term was veryconfusing. For example, he used the term 'unconscious' (dasUnbewusste) in at three acknowledged senses --- the"descriptive,” "dynamic," and "systematic". 25 Based on his workin mythology and religion, Carl Jung further confused the issueby using the "personal" and "collective" unconscious. Therefore,in the next section I will review of each of these senses inorder to illustrate the many definitions used for the termunconscious.101.1.1. Descriptive UnconsciousFreud signified all mental contents and processes that are notat any given moment in consciousness as the descriptiveunconscious. The descriptive unconscious divides mental contentsand processes into two subsets, those that are in awareness atany given time (the conscious) and those that are not (theunconscious). The unconscious in this sense has been supported byresearch done in cognitive psychology.1.1.2. Dynamic UnconsciousThe dynamic unconscious, also termed, "the unconsciousproper" or simply "the unconscious," results from a distinctionFreud makes between "two kinds of unconscious." One was definedin more dispositional terms as mental contents that are capableof becoming conscious; that is unconscious mental contents thatcan become a part of consciousness and the other with which thisis difficult or impossible. He called the unconscious which isonly latent, and becomes easily conscious, the Ipreconscious' 26and retained the term 'unconscious' for the "other". 77 Thisrepresents a further division of the descriptive unconscious intotwo complementary subsets, the preconscious and the unconsciousproper (or dynamic unconscious). The unconscious proper (ordynamic unconscious) becomes the "inaccessible, "n whichcorresponds to the cognitive psychological usage, 29 thepreconscious corresponding to "accessible" mental contents.The dynamic unconscious is defined by Freud not only asinaccessible but also as that which is repressed from11consciousness." This twofold definition of the unconsciousproper as the inaccessible, and the repressed---would not beproblematic if the two definitions amounted to the same thing orif one necessarily implied the other. Given that repressionproduces inaccessibility, does the converse follow that allinaccessible mental contents are inaccessible by virtue of beingrepressed? And if not, how should one designate such inaccessiblemental contents? They are not "preconscious," but if they are notunconscious in the sense of being repressed then in what senseare they unconscious? The question of the unconscious (theinaccessible) should not be entangled with any theory about whythings are unconscious (such as repression). It is possible tobelieve in the existence of the unconscious, even of an active,intrusive, and, therefore, "dynamic" unconscious, withoutnecessarily supporting the proposition that repression accountsfor all or even some of the unconscious. Freud only developed onetheory of the unconscious.1.1.3. Systematic UnconsciousFreud's third sense of the unconscious, the systematic sense(later redesignated as the id), refers not to a gradation ofconsciousness---though it is unconscious but to a hypothesizedsystem (structure, organization) of the mind that, in contrast toa conscious-preconscious system later designated the ego, isexclusively hedonistic ("it obeys the pleasure principle") andprimitive cognitively (it operates according it "primary processfunctioning"). It is in this sense that "the laws of unconscious12activity differ...from the conscious." But since the systematicunconscious was abolished by Freud in The Ego and the Id andincorporated into his "structural model of mind" as the id, theformula must be revised to indicate that the laws of the iddiffer from those of the ego (the pleasure principle and primaryprocess functioning versus the reality principle and secondaryprocess functioning). This point is underscored because bothadvocates and critics of the unconscious, frequently make themistake of assuming that for the "psychoanalytic" unconscious tobe demonstrated, it must be shown that unconscious processesfollow different rules than conscious ones.The unconscious was replaced by Freud in 1923, becoming theid. The descriptive unconscious, that is, the accessible but notaccessed, requiring no empirical proof, and is in many casesdistinguished from the unconscious proper by Freud'sredesignation of it as the preconscious. What remained then wasthe unconscious proper (or "dynamic unconscious") which is theinaccessible. Inaccessibility may or may not be due torepression, though it should be emphasized that the inaccessiblemay be dynamic in the sense of being active or influential inshaping ongoing behaviour.1.1.4. Personal UnconsciousIn contrast to Freud, Jung's" work on the unconsciousfocused on the totality of conscious and unconscious processes.He used the terms "unity" and "totality" or "wholeness" for thefirst time in 1913, and he understood his "total reaction" as13a developmental process which comprised all aspects of theindividual. From then on, he was consistently occupied with theidea of a "total personality." Because this totality includedconscious as well as unconscious contents, everything dependedupon establishing a productive relationship between the ego andthe unconscious. The mediation of the opposites of conscious andunconscious was the prerequisite for "individuation," that"process of differentiation having for its goal the developmentof the individual personality." 36 This always included thecomplementation of the ego-personality by the counterfunction,"the greater personality"---a process which Jung exalted in theconcept of self-realization. 37Conscious and unconscious were not necessarily inconflicting opposition, which was predominantly Freud's view.Jung's psychology placed more emphasis on an attitude open towardthe interplay between consciousness and the unconscious.Jung's theory of the unconscious included: (1) conscious orego; (2) the personal unconscious; and (3) the collectiveunconscious.(1) Conscious or EgoLike Freud, Jung attributed the power of self-preservationto the ego, protecting the individual, but, unlike Freud he didnot see it as the seat of anxiety. Jung's concept of the egodiffered from Freud's due to its unique connection withconsciousness. Jung recognized in the ego the point of referenceof all conscious actions. In this context he saw a further14confirmation of the structure of the ego as a complex;consequently, the ego was not only the centre of the field ofconsciousness, but also "the subject of all conscious actions ofthe individual.""In contrast to Freud, who recognized in the superego anunconscious part of the ego, Jung always maintained that"consciousness...seems to be the necessary precondition for theego";" however, "without the ego, consciousness isunthinkable" 40 is not equally valid. Only through consciousnessdid the ego possess that quality which always stimulated thecomparison with the luminous body of the sun. With this facultythe ego became the opposite of the unconscious, the agency whichwas able to decide conflicts and assume decisions andresponsibilities.Even though an individual's personality was reflected in theego, the quality of consciousness was not equivalent to that ofthe personality as a whole. Jung's ideas of the ego as a "centrewhich is conscious of something" neither coincided with Freud's(pre)conscious ego nor with his superego. What Freud attributedto the superego appeared to Jung much more like the image of arepresentative of the collective consciousness, of the"conventional morality, the creation of curmudgeonly praeceptoresmundi." 41 As opposed to Freud's assumption of a basicallyunconscious origin of the superego (by introjection of moralrules and paternal authority), Jung saw in the superego aconscious acquisition which reflected the moral rules inherent in15conventional society. What Jung missed in the concept of thesuperego was the presence of an intellectual authority tochallenge the individual.Jung's all-inclusive point of view was also evident in hisconcept of the ego. He saw the ego as the result of adevelopmental process in which the individual gradually grew froma state of complete dependence on the background of the psyche toconstancy and continuity. For him, this process was theexpression of something greater in the individual which tended toconcentrate the initially uncentered realm of the psyche into avirtual focusing-point.(2) Personal UnconsciousHow does Jung's concept of the personal unconscious comparewith Freud's idea of the unconscious? Freud distinguished betweenthe purely descriptive concept of the latent unconscious, whichis separated from consciousness only by an insignificant censor,and the so-called dynamic unconscious, that is, the repressedcontents. The latent unconscious largely coincided with the"fringe of consciousness," which is close to consciousness. Therepressed in Freud's and in Jung's psychology conformed only inpart, since as far as Freud was concerned, the unconsciousconstituted an essentially different agency from the(pre)conscious. It obeyed other laws (free floating energy,mobility of cathexis, mechanisms of dissociation between affectand idea) as well as different motives (pleasure principle).16The role of consciousness remained shadow-like to Freud. Hemaintained the position of reducing consciousness to a mereprocess of observation---both of internal and external events. Inaddition, he conceived this "superficial part of the psychicapparatus"---as a "highly fugitive state," which does "not leavebehind any permanent change...but expire(s), as it were, in thephenomenon of becoming conscious. " 42 He asserted thatconsciousness and memory were on the whole mutually exclusive";there was a complementary relationship between consciousness andtraces of excitation."'" In the process of perception the memorytrace was to have slipped into the preconscious and from therebecame accessible to ego and consciousness. This meant only thefunction of becoming conscious was dependent on the preconsciousand reserved for the presconscious ego. Freud concluded from thisthat bringing to consciousness was the same as bringing topreconscious awareness." In contrast, Jung could not see a basicdifference between the two spheres of consciousness and thepersonal unconscious, that is, the repressed. Both spheres---consciousness as well as the personal unconscious---presentedfeelings, images, ideas, and thoughts. Jung considered the"invention of consciousness as the most precious fruit of thetree of knowledge,""Jung divides the concept of the unconscious in two parts,the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious.'" In hisexplorations of the unconscious Jung was concerned with the roleof consciousness, which he frequently refers to as the conscious.17He maintained that there is a relationship or a dissociation ofthe conscious and the unconscious. The unconscious may appear tobe complementary to the conscious, filling out or completing whatis found lacking there. In the case of dissociation theunconscious is exaggeratedly opposed to the contents of theconscious, but the functional relationship of the unconsciousprocesses to consciousness is described as compensatory, sinceexperience shows that we may bring to the surface the subliminalmaterial that is constellated by the conscious situation, i.e.,all those contents which would not be missing from the picture ifeverything were conscious. The compensatory function of theunconscious becomes more obvious the more one-sided the consciousattitude is; pathology furnishes numerous examples of this. 47Thiscompensatory function of the unconscious to the conscious is thecornerstone of Jung's psychology as a basis for psychotherapy.Unlike Freud's psychoanalysis, which seeks to retrieverepressions from the unconscious, Jung's approach to theunconscious makes possible the inclusion by the conscious of manyimages and emotions that have never previously been experiencedconsciously.1.1.5. Collective UnconsciousAs a result of Jung's studies on the psychology of religionand mythology, he was not satisfied with limiting unconsciousmotivation to infantile, sexual, or personal drives. He did notagree with reducing unconscious motives to wish andwishfulfillment. His work on primordial images and his18observation of their often overpowering numinosity andsuprapersonal meaning led Jung to discover that individualconsciousness was not without predetermining factors. Thesepredetermining factors he found in the idea of the collectiveunconscious, whose contents are inherited and essentiallyuniversal. It is a "store house....of accumulatedexperiences, "° and its contents, the archetypes, "deposits ofthe constantly repeated experiences" of mankind. 49 Unlike Freud,to whom the unconscious consisted essentially of repressedinfantile sexual wishes, 5° Jung saw in it also "a collectivepsychic disposition, creative in character." The collectiveunconscious was an objective fact, always existent and formingthe constantly vital background of psychic events. The term"collective unconscious" appeared for the first time in 1917 as adescription of the universal and ubiquitous deep layer of thepsyche."While the images of the personal unconscious representedreflections of personal experiences, the forms of the collectiveunconscious were of an impersonal nature." Jung called thecomponents of the collective unconscious archetypes. Jungdescribed these archetypes as primordial images that are the mostfundamental ingredients of the psyche. They are the forms thatunderlie everything that we perceive, imagine, and think.2. Theories of the unconscious in Cognitive PsychologyA familiar theme in cognitive psychology has been thatpsychoanalytic conceptions of the unconscious lacked empirical19evidence. Cognitive psychologists have usually gone beyondempirical skepticism and suggested that even the concept ofunconscious cognition has no place in psychology. This view,which partially explains the omission of the topic of theunconscious from the research literature, and even the omissionof the word unconscious from the vocabularies of manypsychologists --- was prevalent in the 1950s, when empiricalresearch, 54 ultimately subsided without any convincing evidencefor psychoanalytic-inspired conceptions of unconscious influenceson perception.Erdelyi (1974) initiated a second attempt" by making astrong case for theoretical connections between cognitivepsychology and psychoanalytic conceptions of unconsciouscognition. Although this research has remained active, it has notproduced widely accepted evidence for psychoanalyticinterpretations of unconscious influences on perception.But after years of neglect, suspicion, and frustration,unconscious processes have now become an accepted topic forresearch in cognitive psychology. So-called subliminal perceptionhas a new lease on life, and cognitive neuropsychologists offer acompelling view of unconscious memory. Social and nonsocialpsychologists have documented the role of unconscious processesin learning and judgment, and explorations of intuition andinsight raise again the idea of unconscious thought. Thesedevelopments within the cognitive unconscious (Kihlstrom, 1987),a term introduced by Paul Rozin (1976), have set the stage for a20revival of interest in unconscious emotional and motivationalprocesses as well. This attention to the trilogy of mind(Hilgard, 1980) gives a new interpretation of the psychologicalunconscious (Kihlstrom, 1990).Interest in unconscious mental life, or informationprocessing outside of conscious awareness owes its revival towork done by cognitive neuropsychologists with patients sufferingfrom various forms of the amnesic syndrome. The recognition thatneurological patients suffering from the amnesic syndrome showthe persisting effects of past events that they cannot remember --- what Schacter (1987) has called implicit memory --- has madeit possible to use concepts such as awareness and consciousnessand to accept the idea of unconscious influence on experience,thought and action.This research has provided empirical results that meritdescription in terms of unconscious cognition. These results comefrom experiments that use indirect tests for immediate or long-term residues of barely perceptible or attended but forgottenevents. These well established phenomena are limited torelatively minor cognitive feats. Although unconscious cognitionis now solidly established in empirical research, it appears tobe very different than the unconscious portrayed inpsychoanalytic theory. The unconscious in this sense containsimplicit/tacit knowledge (Polyani, 1958; Schacter, McAndrews, andMoscovitch, 1988) which an individual has accumulated over a life21time. Even though this knowledge is unconscious and may beaccessed indirectly it still influences thoughts and behavior.With this theoretical perspective in mind, I shall give abrief history of the research done on unconscious cognition andthen turn to specific experimental studies done by cognitiveneuropsychologists that illustrate the cognitive unconscious atwork.2.1. Unconscious Influences of Unattended InputsMost of the behavioral phenomena that have been linked tothe unconscious have well-established interpretations that makeno reference to consciousnes. As an everyday example, considerthe highly practiced actions of driving a car. These actions,which are performed without apparent mental effort and oftenwithout ability to remember what one has done, are described bysome as being done unconsciously. Others prefer to describe suchactions without reference to unconscious cognition, as beinghabitual or automatic, or as procedural knowledge. Similarly,some describe the partial monitoring that occurs for backgroundconversations in a crowded room as unconscious, whereas cognitivepsychologists would refer to it as preattentive. In the next fewsections I will describe some of the research that will convincethose who currently avoid speaking of unconscious cognition thatthis manner of speech can now be used quite respectably.222.2. Empirical EvidenceThe most general meaning of unconscious is "unaware of."There are two different senses of "unaware of" that appear incognitive psychological research and theory.If consciousness is interpreted as the selective aspect ofattention, then one is unconscious or unaware of stimuli thatimpinge on receptors but fall outside of selective attention. Ifconsciousness if interpreted as the ability to report experiencevalidly, then one is unconscious or unaware of the occurrence,causes, or other attributes of events or actions when one cannotreport those properties validly. Unlike the attentionless sense,this one presumes a) a language-using organism, b) a self-describing (reflexive) ability, and c) the existence of a validreference decribing one's experience. As a consequence moststudies of this sense of unconscious cognition involve failuresto remember events that are known to have been attended. Themajor research questions associated with this verballyunreportable sense of unconscious cognition is, how are cognitionand action influenced by failures to remember experienced-but-unrecollected events? Do unconscious ideas, impulses, andemotions dtermine and drive our conscious thoughts, perceptions,and behaviour? Or, as Greenwald (1992) puts the questions, "Howsmart is unconscious cognition?" Freud believed in the smart viewof the unconscious. He used an 'iceberg' model of mind, in thatonly a small portion of the mind lay above the surface,23conscious, while the vast majority of mental processes take placebelow the surface, unconscious.However, believers in a smart unconscious agree that theunconscious does not always do what is best. In fact, believersin a smart unconscious full embrace the idea that these processesthat lie below the surface of awareness often lead people toreact inappropriately.2.2.1. Subliminal perception/SubceptionMany laypersons persisted in the belief that the unconsciousis smart enough to interpret messages and to control behaviour.One radio station launched a subliminal campaign againsttelevision by broadcasting slurs such as "TV's a bore." Somedepartment stores played subliminal anti-shoplifting messages("If you steal, you'll get caught") over public address systems(Wortman & Loftus, 1992). Responses to these subliminal messageswere called subliminal perception or "subception" (Lazarus &McClegry, 1951). The authors interpreted their results as provingthat stimuli exposed so briefly that subjects cannot notice themmay still be processed outside conscious awareness and that theirsubjects had been able to discriminate stimuli without beingaware of having any relevant knowledge. This early research onsubception was criticized in a number of influential articles byEriksen and his associates (Dulany & Eriksen, 1959; Eriksen,1956, 1960, 1962) on both methodological and theoretical grounds.Their arguments discouraged further research on subliminalperception for many years. Then, in the 1970s, came a new look at24the New Look (Erdelyi, 1974); Greenward (1992) calls it "New Look2." At that point, a cognitive revolution in the form of theinformation-processing approach to thinking about the mind hadtaken firm hold. The computer was now the favored model of thehuman mind, and with the computer metaphor came a bevy oftheoretical constructs that "can close to constitutingrediscoveries of basic Freudian notions." (Erdelyi, 1985, p. 59).The goal of New Look 2 was to draw connections between Freud andthe cognitive psychology that had emerged in the late 1950s and1960s (Erdelyi, 1974). The new cognition was described in termsof filtering and selectivity, rather than censorship. Proponentsof the new cognition talked of executive processes; Freud hadtalked of the ego. Suddenly the very idea of unconsciousprocesses was not only noncontroversial but was an "obvious andfundamental feature of human information-processing" (Erdelyi,1985, p. 59). This introduction of new terms to talk about oldideas, the New Look 2 people argued, was not due to misgivingsabout the concept of the unconscious but to a disinclinations tobe associated with the excess baggage that accompanies the ideaof a psychoanalytic unconscious. In spite of the accomplishmentsof New Look 2, the unconscious continued to be regardedskeptically by many cognitive psychologists. Matthew Erdelyi(1992) argues that New Look was more than just the study of theunconscious. The lack of consensus on where the division betweenconscious and unconscious processes lies in the major stumblingblock. To accept the most strict criterion of what is unconscious25apparently relegates the unconscious to unreliability andinsignificance. Erdelyi points out the paralyzing effect of thislack of a clear conception of the unconscious has had empiricalprogress.2.2.2. Information-Processing Paradigm of theunconsciousAnd so the problem returned in a new theoretical contextinvolving an information-processing paradigm (Atkinson &Shiffrin, 1968; Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963; Kahneman, 1973; Posner,1987; Posner & Synder, 1975). The classic information-processingconcept of human cognition modeled after the computer, includes aset of structures for storing information, as well as a set ofprocesses by which information is transferred from one structureto another. The cognitive unconscious in this approachcharacterized by a computational view (sometimes referred to asthe "computer metaphor) of mental processing, which seesmentation as the manipulation of an internal representation("mental model") of an external domain. In this model,information from the environment, is transduced into a pattern ofneural impulses by the sensory receptors, and is briefly held inthe sensory registers, one for each modality. Information in thesensory registers is then analyzed by processes known as featuredetection and pattern recognition. By means of attention,information that has been identified as meaningful and relevantto current goals is then transferred to a structure known asprimary or short-term memory where it is subject to further26analysis. At this stage perceptual information is combined withinformation retrieved from secondary or long-term memory.Primary memory, which has an extremely limited capacity toprocess information, is considered the staging area of thecognitive system, where processes such as judgment, inference,and problem-solving take place. Information resides in primarymemory only so long as it is rehearsed. On the basis of ananalysis of the meaning of the stimulus input, some response isgenerated; and finally, a trace of the event is permanentlyencoded in secondary memory.The term "unconscious," in this approach describes thoseproducts of the perceptual system that go unattended orunrehearsed, and those memories that are lost from primary memorythrough decay or displacement before they can be encoded insecondary memory. In a more substantial sense, consciousness canbe identified either with attention and rehearsal, or with thecognitive staging area that holds those percepts, memories, andactions to which attention is being directed. Thus, unconsciousmental life is identified with early preattentive perceptualprocesses such as feature detection and pattern recognition; orwith those latent memory traces that have not been retrieved fromsecondary storage and transferred to primary memory. Theimplication of this view is that unattended percepts andunretrieved memories make no contact with higher mentalprocesses. Therefore, the classic information-processing model,by regarding attention and rehearsal as prerequisites for27cognitive analysis of the stimulus, and by implicitly identifyingconsciousness with higher mental processes, leaves little or noroom for the psychological unconscious.A major place for unconscious mental structures andprocesses has been created by a variant of information-processingtheory known as connectionism or parallel distributed processing(PDP). In PDP models the conceptual analog for the humaninformation-processing system is provided by the brain itself,and the synaptic connections among neurons, rather than themicrochips of the high-speed computers. PDP models posit theexistence of a large number of processing units, each devoted toa specific task. Each unit, when activated, excites and inhibitsothers along a network of associative links. This pattern ofmutual influence continues until the entire system relaxes to asteady state of activation that represents the information beingprocesses.It is assumed in PDP models that information about an objector event is distributed widely across the processing system,rather than localized in any particular unit. The activation ofindividual processing units can vary continuously as opposed todiscretely. For these reasons, it is not necessary for an objectto be fully represented in consciousness before information aboutit can influence experience, thought, and action. Traditionalinformation-processing theories tend to assume that variousperceptual-cognitive functions are bound together in a unitaryprocessing system operating under a single set of rules and under28the control of a central executive. By contrast, PDP modelsassume the various systems (such as supporting perception andlanguage, for example) operate independently and under differentrules. Only some modules are assumed to be accessible toawareness and subject to voluntary control. PDP models alsoabandon the traditional assumption that information is processedin a sequence of stages. Parallel processing permits a largenumber of activated units to influence each other at anyparticular moment, so that information can be analyzed veryrapidly. Both the number of simultaneously active processingunits and the speed at which they pass information amongthemselves may exceed the span of conscious awareness.PDP models of information processing assert thatconsciousness is a matter of time rather than activation. Byvirtue of massive parallelism, processing systems tend to reach asteady state very rapidly, within about a half-second. At thispoint of relaxation the information represented by the steadystate becomes accessible to phenomenal awareness. Information mayreach consciousness if the relaxation process is slowed by virtueof ambiguity in the stimulus pattern; in this case, the contentsof consciousness will shift back and forth between alternativerepresentations. The implication of the PDP framework is thatconscious processing is slow and sequential. In contrast tomulti-store information-processing theories that restrict thecognitive unconscious to elementary sensory-perceptualoperations, PDP models seem to consider almost all information29processing, including the higher mental functions involved inlanguage, memory, and thought, to be unconscious. This modelappears to support the notion that the cognitive unconsciousencompasses a large part of mental life.2.2.3. Recovery Paradigm of the unconsciousThe recovery paradigm of the unconscious 56 is realized whena subject who cannot access some information at a certain timemanages to access it at a subsequent time. The subject recoversinto consciousness information that s/he could not recallinitially. This information had to come from somewhere---anavailable but inaccessible, unconscious region of mind. Theavailability of the inaccessible material is revealed by itseventual recovery into consciousness. The unconscious is notdefined in its 'own terms' but rather with reference toconsciousness/awareness. The logic of this paradigm isstraightforward; if in the absence of further externalinformation the recovered information, especially if it involvesepisodic memories, must have come from some unconscious buffer.2.2.4. Dissociation Paradigm of the unconsciousIn the dissociation paradigm57 of the unconscious,`unconscious mentation' is defined in terms of observeddiscrepancies in accessibility to consciousness, and thusillustrates the relational nature of the constructs ofconsciousness and unconsciousness. The unconscious is definedrelative to the conscious and not in its own terms. If the amountof information that is available is greater than the information30that is accessible to consciousness, then the inaccessible butavailable information is unconscious. In this paradigm of theunconscious, 'unconscious mentation' is defined in terms ofobserved discrepancies in accessibility to consciousness, andtherefore illustrates the relational nature of the constructs ofconsciousness and unconsciousness. The activity of consciousnessis shown to affect the information accessible to itself---onecausal property of consciousness."2.2.5. Implicit MemoryBecause preconscious processing appears to be mediated bythe activation of relevant mental representations already storedin memory, the question is raised whether analogous effects maybe observed in memory itself. Just as there are tangible effectson experience, thought, and action of stimuli that cannot beconsciously perceived, so there may be similar effects of eventsthat cannot be consciously remembered. One such effect wasobserved in an experiment by Nelson (1978) in relearning. Thesubjects were asked to memorize a list of paired associatesconsisting of a number and a word arbitrarily linked together.Four weeks later they were given tests of cued recall andrecognition for these items. When forgotten pairs were presentedalong with entirely new pairs on a second set of learning trials,previously seen items that were not consciously recognized had anadvantage measured in performance on subsequent learning andmemory tasks.31Some of the most dramatic examples of nonconscious memoryappear in cases of the amnesic syndrome, which results frombilateral damage to the medial temporal lobe" anddiencephalon. 6° Patients suffering from this disorder exhibitgross anterograde amnesia, meaning that they cannot rememberevents that occurred since the onset of the brain damage; otherintellectual functions remain relatively intact. Although it wasoriginally thought that amnesic patients were unable to encodetraces of new experience, it now appears that their memorydeficit is much more selective. For example, amnesic patientscan learn new cognitive and motor skills, as well as newvocabulary items and other factual information; however, theyappear unable to remember the episodes in which they acquiredthis knowledge (Graf, 1984; Cohen & Squire, 1980). In otherwords, the amnesic syndrome appears to impair the encoding of newepisodic memories, while sparing procedural knowledge andsemantic memory. 61Recent research evidence suggests that some aspects ofepisodic memory are preserved in these patients (Schacter & Graf,1986). For example, a case in which subjects were asked to studya list of familiar word and are asked to recall the words shortlythereafter. Compared to the performance of intact subjects,amnesic patients show gross impairments in memory. Differentresults are obtained when the subjects are asked to identifybriefly presented words or to complete a word stem or otherfragment with a meaningful word. Intact subjects show superior32performance on trials where the correct response is a word thathad appeared on the previously studied list, compared to trialswhere the correct response is an entirely new word. Thisadvantage of old over new items reflects a sort of priming effectof the previous learning experience. However, amnesic subjectsalso show normal levels of priming, despite the fact that theycannot remember the words they studied. In addition Schacter andhis colleagues provided amnesic patients with obscure factualinformation in a question and answer format. On later testtrials, the patients were able to correctly answer questions onthe material, but could not remember the circumstances underwhich they had acquired the information - a phenomenon know assource amnesia (Schacter, 1986; Schacter et. al., 1984). Patientsremember the content of a prior event but not its source. Whatthey commonly do under a task demanding identification of thesource is to make up a source which they quickly believe to bereal.2.2.6. Implicit/Explicit Memory DistinctionPriming and source amnesia show that task performance may beaffected by residual memories of prior experiences, even thoughthose experiences are not accessible to conscious recall. On thebasis of these results, Schacter and others have drawn adistinction between explicit and implicit memory (Schacter &Graf, 1986). Explicit memory requires conscious recollection of aprevious episode, whereas implicit memory is revealed by a changein task performance that is attributable to information acquired33during such an episode. Milner, Corkin, and Teuber (1968)demonstrated many years ago that the well-known amnesic patientH.M. could acquire gradually across trials and sessions variousperceptual and motor skills, even though he lacked any explicitmemory for the episodes in which he acquired the skills. Similarexamples of intact skill learning despite impaired explicitmemory have been since reported by many others (e.g, Brooks &Braddeley, 1976; Cohen & Squire, 1980; Kinsbourne & Wood, 1975;Moscovitch, 1982). Along these same lines, Glisky, Schacter &Tulving (1986a,b) were able to show that, with months ofpractice, amnesic patients could acquire and retain complexknowledge and skills needed to program and interact with amicrocomputer even though, when queried at the beginning of alearning session, some of these patients consistently failed toremember explicitly that they had ever worked on a microcomputer.Literature from both patient and nonpatient populationsindicates that people can display implicit memory without havingany conscious recollection of the experiential basis of theeffect. Implicit memory effects are conceptually similar tosubliminal perception effects, in that both reveal the impact onexperience, thought, and action of events that are not accessible to conscious awareness. The two effects should be distinguished.In contrast to subliminal perception, the events contributing toimplicit memory effects were clearly detectable by the subject,attention was devoted to them, and they were represented inphenomenal awareness at the time they occurred.342.2.7. Implicit Knowledge as basis of the unconsciousThese research studies on implicit memory represent examplesof preserved implicit knowledge in neuropsychological syndromes.Schacter, McAndrews, and Moscovitch (1988) were able to pullevidence from a number of neuropsychological syndromes that werecharacterized by a common feature: it provides compellingevidence for the existence of implicit knowledge despitepatients' serious deficits on standard tests of explicitknowledge. These researchers refer to implicit knowledge as knowledge that is expressed in performance without subjects' phenomenal awareness that they possess it. We sometimes use thephrase 'failure to gain access to consciousness' to describethose situations in which implicit knowledge is expressed in theabsence of explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge refers toexpressed knowledge that subjects are phenomenally aware thatthey possess. Although the exact definition and assessment ofimplicit knowledge differs in the various clinical andexperimental situations that we consider, the emphasis in allcases is on a patient's lack of reflective awareness of knowledgethat is revealed in task performance. Schacter goes on andasserts that, 'no claim is being made that performance of a taskthat taps implicit knowledge is any less "conscious" thanperformance of a tasks that taps explicit knowledge....what isnot conscious in certain cases, however is the knowledge that isexpressed in task performance. It is the knowledge expressed intask performance, rather than the carrying out of the task itself35that one would want to characterize as implicit or perhaps"unconscious" 62'. Polanyi (1958) calls this "tacit knowledge" --knowledge not normally present in our conscious experience, notbecause it is repressed, but because it is implicit and notspelled out, accessible through the Recovery Paradigm andDissociation Paradigm, revealed indirectly as shown bydissociation and recovery theory. This knowledge is a passive body of knowledge (versus dynamic) and is not a function of unconscious processing.In the syndrome of prosopagnosia, 63 patients report nofamiliarity with the faces of family,relatives, and friends.However, research reported by Bauer (1984) and also by Tranel &Damasio (1985), using psychophysiological indices, hasestablished that prosopagnosic patients possess some implicitknowledge of facial familiarity. For example, Tranel & Damasio(1985), found that a severely prosopagnosic patient showed largerskin conductance response to familiar faces, even though none ofthe faces seemed familiar to the patient. In a series of studiesthat have used more analytical behavioral techniques, de Haan,Young, and Newcombe (1987; Young & de Hann, 1988) have reporteddata that support and extend the psychophysiological findings.One of their patients was entirely unable to distinguishexplicitly between familiar and unfamiliar faces. On a matchingtask that required same-different judgments about twosimultaneously exposed faces, this patient, like controlsubjects, was faster to respond when a judgment was made about36familiar than unfamiliar faces, thereby demonstrating some accessto facial familiarity information. In addition, the patient wassubject to interference from familiar faces-even though he didnot recognize them explicitly-on a Stroop-like naming task, m andalso showed priming effects that required implicit though notexplicit access to facial familiarity information.Implicit knowledge as the basis of the unconsciouschallenges the traditional Freudian notion of the unconscious inthe following areas: a) it is a passive body of knowledge (versusdynamic); b) not a function of unconscious processing; c) notnormally present in our conscious experience not because it isrepressed; d) over rides reasoning; and e) is accessedindirectly.The results of these and other experiments, lead to ataxonomy of nonconscious mental structures and processesrepresenting the domain of the cognitive unconscious (Kihlstrom,1984). Consciousness is not to be identified with any particularperceptual-cognitive functions such as discriminative response tostimulation, perception, memory, or the higher mental processesinvolved in judgement or problem-solving. All of these functionscan take place outside of phenomenal awareness. Ratherconsciousness is an experiential quality that may accompany anyof these functions. The fact of conscious awareness may haveparticular consequences for psychological function---it seemsnecessary for voluntary control, for example, as well as for37communicating one's mental states to others. But it is notnecessary for complex psychological functioning.3. Psychoanalytic unconscious vs cognitive unconsciousIn this chapter I will compare unconscious mental processesemerging from cognitive psychology and to the psychoanalyticunconscious in Depth Psychology. This comparison will reveal thatFreud's claim that there are unconscious mental processes issupported by recent work (Eagle, 1987; Erdelyi, 1985; Wegman,1985 etc.), there are important differences between his conceptof the dynamic unconscious and the cognitive unconscious. Thesedifferences have to do with the role of repression,recoverability of unconscious contents and processes,inaccessibility, and unconscious influences.The tendency to study the interaction of cognitive anddynamic processes in the unconscious was preceded by thedevelopment of two discrete research traditions in the late 19thand 20th century. One tradition, associated with Helmholtz(1867), Wundt (1832-1929), et. al., was experimentally oriented,and regarded the unconscious as an essentially rationalphenomenon implicated in audio-visual perception. The othertradition, associated with Freud (1856), Prince (1929/1970),Janet, (1959-1947) etc., was clinical in outlook, and viewed theunconscious as the repository of irrational, instinctual impulsesthat are ego-alien, or split off from the rest of the consciouspersonality.38Psychoanalysis explicates psychological disturbances bymeans of dynamic hypotheses relating current difficulties toantecedent conditions and causes, (i.e. to disturbances inpsychosexual development), which give rise to the intrapsychicprocesses that cause (and express) anomalies in the individual'sexperience of himself/herself and others in the world. To accountfor the empirical uniformities that crop up repeatedly intreatment, psychoanalysis was obliged to posit some model ofmental and developmental processes. Psychoanalysis arose as avariety of abnormal psychology, and it is within this frameworkthat the dynamic unconscious first captured attention.By contrast the cognitive unconscious is designed to explainhow cognitive and sensory inputs are processed in order to rendera more or less accurate picture of external reality. While Freudwas impressed with the irrationality of the unconscious, hiscolleagues in experimental psychophysics were interestedexclusively in its silent, inarticulate reasonings. 65Perhaps the most obvious difference between the psychoanalyticunconscious and cognitive unconscious is suggested by the term"dynamic unconscious" in the psychoanalytic literature." TheFreudian "dynamic unconscious" consists mainly of id impulses, inFreud's words, "a cauldron full of seething excitations" 67 whoseprimary nature is to strive for immediate gratification,independent of consequences of reality. Freud did not considerthe possibility that cognition and thought could have their ownstructure and development, independent of instinctual drive. In39Freudian theory of unconscious mental processes always revealtheir links to derive gratification and are characterized byprimary processes such as irrationality, illogicality,displacement, etc.Another important set of differences between thepsychoanalytic and cognitive unconscious has to do with theformer's emphasis on repression and recoverability. What preventsfull expression in consciousness of instinctual wishes is theprocess of repression, which is itself unconscious. The "dynamicunconscious" is a repository of repressed contents. It isfurther claimed that when this active process is removed (i.e.through the therapeutic process), the unconscious contents arerecoverable and are consciously experienced exactly as thosecontents would have been experienced had not the process ofrepression prevented it. 683.1. RepressionThe psychoanalytic account of repression assumes thatcognizant unconscious agency, aware of ego-threatening memories,prevents those memories from being consciously retrieved andthereby causing distress.In the psychoanalytic theory of repression, rather thanbeing deactivated, instinctual impulses continue to press fordirect expression in behaviour and experience and find indirectexpression in symptoms, dreams, etc., and if one includessublimation, in all behaviour. The essence of repression is notthat information is not processed, but that information that is40processed is not experienced in conscious awareness and notintegrated into one's self-organization.What is not clear in the comparison between cognitivepsychology and repression is what role cognitive psychologyshould play in psychopathology. In the context of Freudiantheory, the relationship between instinctual impulses and theconsequent importance of drive discharge (Freud, 1923,1926), onecan understand that repression would be seen as the primarypathogen of neurosis. But why should "deactivation," beassociated with psychopathology?Reformulations of repression in terms of cognitive theoryoften omit the properties essential to repression. They also donot make clear, on theoretical grounds, the connection betweenthe stipulated cognitive processes (e.g. defensive exclusion,lack of full processing) deemed to be analogous to repression andthe development and maintenance of pathology. Furthermore, ofcritical psychoanalytic concern is not so much informationprocessing, but the fate of the information processed, the extentto which the information is integrated into the individual'sself-organization and the processes underlying the degree ofsuccess or failure in accomplishing such integration. And whatabout implicit knowledge and repression? So far, cognitivepsychology has little to say regarding these issues.3.2. RecoverabilityThe concept of repression in the "dynamic unconscious" (as arepository of repressed contents) claims that unconscious41contents are recoverable in conscious experience. Here theemphasis is on contents and unconscious representations. Incontrast to this view, the processes emphasized in cognitivepsychology are generally not recoverable in conscious experience.Recoverability may be a function of the contrast between thepsychoanalytic emphasis on contents (i.e. unconscious contentsthat were once conscious) and the emphasis of cognitivepsychology processes. One tends to consciously experiencecontents rather than the processes leading to these contents(Nisbett and Wilson, 1977a). The processes emphasized incognitive psychology are generally not recoverable, i.e."unconscious inferences," and not expected to be directlyrepresented in conscious experience. While they can be describedas if they were available to awareness and while they are"reflected" in perceptual and cognitive products, these processesare simply not phenomenally present in conscious experience. Inpsychoanalytic theory, too, while repressed unconscious contentsare held to be recoverable in consciousness, the process ofrepression is not recoverable in conscious experience (Mullane,1983).A central assumption contained in the psychoanalytic idea ofrepression and recoverability is "identity assumption" (Marcel1983a,b). The assumption is made that a particular unconsciouscontent that is now experienced consciously is identical to theunconscious content that was repressed. The notion of the"timelessness of the unconscious" supports the idea that42unconscious material (e.g. impulses or a painful childhoodexperience) emerges in consciousness, following the lifting ofrepression, is identical to the earlier unconscious material(e.g. impulses or a painful childhood experience) renderedunconscious by repression. Marcel (1983a,b) points out the"identity assumption" has also characterized conceptions ofperception and memory (i.e. a percept was viewed as a copy of aphysical object), was a record of an event that, when recoveredthrough recall, produced the record.In contrast, the contemporary constructivist view to the"identity assumption," argues that consciousness and thephenomenal experiences that comprise it are constructions. Aperception is not a copy or replica of physical reality, but aconstructive process that "attempt(s) to make sense of as muchdata as possible..." (Marcel, 1983b). Freud (1937) himselfrecognized that memories are generally constructions reflectingone's current state at least as much as the purported event.However, Freud did extend this insight to unconscious wishes,ideas, and impulses. For these categories, Freud adhered to the"identity assumption," as if unconscious wishes, ideas, andimpulses were wholly formed and following the removal of therepression barrier, made their appearance in consciousness, inunaltered form. Mandler (1983) and Marcel (1983b) suggest thatconscious experiences are constructions that depend on theparticular unconscious and preconscious schemata that have beenactivated. In this theory the relationship between the43unconscious and conscious, the unconscious (and preconscious) isnot a storehouse of wishes and impulses waiting to becomeconscious, but a mental structure of features, schemata, etc.,that are drawn upon by, but not identical to, consciousexperience.The "identity assumption" makes it appearance when Freuddiscusses the "dynamic unconscious" and the role of repression.Through these concepts Freud is attempting to explain phenomenain which an impulse etc., experienced at one time was thenbanished from consciousness but seemed to continue to influenceexperience and behaviour (e.g. symptoms). That is, in some waythe person continues to behave as if s/he harbours the banishedimpulse. It is easy to understand why Freud thought of therepressed impulse, etc. as continuing to exist in its originalform in the unconscious.One may conclude that although recoverability may or may notbe a real difference between the psychoanalytic and the cognitiveunconscious, its importance is diminished when one rejects the"identity assumption." Making the unconscious is never a matterof direct recoverability.3.3. InaccessibilityIn Freud's distinction between two kinds unconscious, onewhich is latent and easily recoverable into consciousness, calledthe preconscious and the other in which recoverability isdifficult or not available he called the dynamic unconscious. Thedynamic unconscious then becomes the "inaccessible" (Freud, 1917,44p.93), and links up with the cognitive psychology usage (Tulvingand Pearlstone, 1966), 69 and the preconscious corresponding to"accessible" information and the unconscious to the "availablebut inaccessible." In the preconscious there is some degree ofaccessibility. But one should distinguish between two differenttypes of inaccessibility in the unconscious as conceived bysomeone like Chomsky, 70and the Freudian unconscious. Chomsky,when talking about the unconscious mental structures whichpredispose one to speak creatively, hear and understand sentenceswhich one has never heard before, would say that the structurewhich allowed one to do this was radically inaccessible toconsciousness and could not be retrieved. But not because it isrepressed.3.4. Unconscious InfluencesCan techniques that rely on unconscious processes be used tomake me act in ways that are counter to my own purposes? Thispragmatic question one may ask seems to have little to do withproblems of definition, thresholds, or experimental design---problems that have occupied cognitive psychologists. As noted inthe research done by Jacoby et al (1992), Bowers (1984) andothers, unconscious influences are very common. People sometimesconsciously plan and then act, but more often behavior isinfluenced by unconscious processes; that is, people act andthen, if called upon, make their excuses.The importance of unconscious perception, as distinct fromunconscious drives and motives is that perceptions can occur45without noticing and what is noticed need not be comprehended orunderstood. According to this view, determinants of thought andaction that are not noticed or appreciated as such constituteunconscious influences (Bowers, 1984) is consistent with thepsychoanalytic notion of unconscious influence which is largelyintrapsychic (the repressed unconscious) but is also consistentwith contemporary social cognition accounts which emphasize howexternal conditions exercise unconscious influence over thoughtand behaviour (e.g. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Nisbett & Wilson1977a, 1977b).In summary, the concept of the unconscious presented bycognitive psychology, refers to unconscious processes, whoseproducts are accessible to reflection, but which are not inthemselves perceived by the subject. On the other hand, thecognitive unconscious also refers to processes where both theprocess and the product are unconscious, albeit withoutnecessarily being repressed. Here an individual knows something,but without knowing that s/he knows it (i.e. Polanyi's 'tacitknowledge'). Finally, both process and product are unconscious,the difference being that: what is cognized here are notperceptual data or logical transformations, but data about one'sown or another's intrapsychic processes. Research in cognitivepsychology supports the theory that an individual is assaulted bymore sensory information s/he can consciously assimilate. WhatFreud presents us with and what cognitive psychology has46inherited from Freud is his belief that there are unconscious aspects of consciousness.The point is that contemporary research on unconsciousmental life is dismissed on the grounds that Freud had said itall before and that experimental work is trival or merely a glosson the clinical insights of psychoanalysis. To the contrary, itis important to recognize that much of this research would neverhave been done had Freud never lived.More importantly the psychological unconscious documented bylatter-day scientific psychology is very different from whatFreud and his psychoanalytic collegues had in mind. Theirunconscious seethed with lust and anger; it was hallucinatory,primitive, and irrational. The unconscious of contemporarypsychology is kinder and gentler than that.4. Development of YoOdIra: History and TextsThe origins of the Yo41-ca-a tradition in India are mostlylost to us. The few pieces of available scriptural evidence areso problematic that it is difficult to formulate any definitehistorical conclusions. In this chapter I will give a historicaloverview of the development of the Yo45cgra. In order to do thisI shall designate four phases of the YogScgra tradition and willprovide the major texts available for each.Yoggcgran is considered one of the four great traditions ofIndian Buddhism (along with the sarvgstivgaa, sautrahtika, andM.idhyamika). The founder of the tradition was Maitreyangtha, 72followed by Asanga, 73 who systematized Yogacil .a, and by Asanga's47younger brother and disciple Vasubandhu who completed the systemand developed its philosophical views. The particular doctrinalstance of this school is suggested by its alternate name,Vilifgnavgda, or the "Doctrine" (vlda) that all phenomenalexistence is fabricated by vijnana.The first phase can be characterized as the pre-systematicphase and includes some scattered mentions of key Yo4icara themesin scriptural texts known as sUtras, 75 supposedly containing thewords of the Buddha, which span a period from the second to thefourth centuries AD. The key theme here is that the universe intoto is a mental phenomenon, that the only thing which actuallyexists is mind. 76 The earliest surviving version of this themeoccurs in a scriptural text originally composed in Sanskrit butnow extant only in Chinese translation dated to 179 AD.Thereafter, the assertion that everything is mind occurs notinfrequently in scriptural texts, until the explicit uses of itin the Sacred Text Which Reveals What is Hidden(Samdhinirmocanasiitra) 77 from the fourth century A.D. 78The second phase may be called the early systematic phaseand is preserved in the text entitled States of Spiritual Practice (Yogacii-abhiimi) and what is known, following the Tibetantradition, as the 'five books of Maitreya'. There are four majorworks representing the early systematic phase of Indian Yogacara:The Stages of Spiritual Practice (Yoqaca-rabhumi), The Ornament of the Sacred Texts of the Great Vehicle (Mati-a-Yinasarglaykara), TheDiscrimination Between Middle and Extremes (Madhy -intavibhiga) and48The Discrimination Between Things and Reality(Dharmadharmaeivibhgga).The first, Stages of Spiritual Practice (Yoggcgrabhai), isa large work, partially extant in Sanskrit and entirely extant inboth Tibetan and Chinese; 79it is attributed by both the Buddhisttraditions and by Western scholarship, to Asanga. Thisattribution is not unproblematic; it is probable that the Stages is, as Lambert Schmithausen suggested, a scholastic compilationrather than a work of a single author, since it seems to showinternal evidence of growth and change. w The Samahitabhrimi ofthe "Basic Section" in the Yoggcgrabhrimi represents the startingpoint ofIlaya-vijn; rna theory. 81The last three works mentioned differ from the Stages inthat they all consist of verses together with a prose commentaryor commentaries. The verses alone, in all three cases, areattributed by the Tibetan tradition to the semi-mythical figureof Maitreya.The third phase or 'classical' phase in the development ofthe YocAcIra tradition produced an integrated systematicsoteriology epitomized by the works of Asanga and Vasubandhu.The textual sources for the study of this phase are:Asanga's Compendium of the Great Vehicle (Mahayanasamgraha)" andthe Summary of Metaphysics (Abhidharmasamuccaya)," as well aswhich parts of the Stages of Spiritual Practice can be attributedto him. From Vasubandhu we have a commentary to Asariga'sCompendium, and three short works: the Treatise of Twenty Verses 49(Vimgatik5-vijriaptiml.tratSsiddhi)," the Treatise of ThirtyVerses (Trimgikl-vijiTaptimatrat5siddhi)" and the Treatise of Three Aspects (Trisvabh-ivanirdesa)." The Vimgatikl-k5rika- (withVimgatiki-vrtti) and the Trimgiki-kariki together make up theVijiiaptmatrata-siddhi," "Establishing That There is Vijil'apti-Only."The fourth and final phase of Yogacara consists of thecommentarial phase. All the texts mentioned attracted theattention of later commentators, such as Dharmapila, Sthiramatiand Asvabh-iva, who developed and added new philosophicalemphases. Notably there are Sthiramati's commentaries to Asanga'sSummary of Abhidharma and Vasubandhu's Thirty Verses andAsvabhlva's commentaries to The Ornament of the Sacred Texts of the Great Vehicle and to Asariga's Compendium of the GreatVehicle.5. YogIca-ra Tradition5.1. OntologyThe basic ontological position of the Yog -gca-i'ins of theclassical period is that there is nothing but mind (cittamitra).Many ways of making this assertion are found in the scripturaltexts of Asariga and Vasubandhu who sought to show that what weconventionally take as existing does not really exits, and thatit is precisely this mis-perception that perpetuates our patternsof unwanted behaviour and inhibits us from the liberation to beexperienced in breaking free from these unwanted patterns.Vasubandhu makes a clear statement of this position at the50beginning of his Twenty Verses." He says that the entire cosmos,standardly divided into three 'aspects' (trisvabhgva) by Buddhistcosmologists, is nothing but 'representation' (vigiapti). It is atechnical term which refers to all mental events with intentionalobjects, all mental events wherein something is 'represented' orcommunicated to the experiencer. This means that, for example,all events of sense-perception are necessarily also instances of`representation'. The meaning of vijriapti is derived directlyfrom designating Ix' to be ly', as when the Dependent(paratantra) is mistaken and then clung to in its Imaginary(parikalpita) aspect in the Buddhist 'three' aspect theory(trisvabhava). Both Asanga and Vasubandhu seem to be focusing onthe activity of taking one thing as another, or in anepistemological context, the process of concept formation. Ifconsciousness is conceived exclusively on an intentional model,involving the idea that to be conscious is always to be consciousof something, it would seem that all mental events will have tobe understood as instances of 'representation' since all of themhave intentional objects and all of them 'represent' something tothe experiencer.The Yoggcgrins recognized that experience has three aspects(trisvabtiva)." Vasubandhu defines them as:The three aspects are the imagined, the relative, andthe perfected. This is said to be the profound thing whichwise men know.That which appears is the relative because its occursin dependence upon conditions. The way in which it appearsis the imagined because it is simply imagination.51The eternal non-existence of the mode of appearance ofwhat appears should be understood as the perfected aspect;this is because it does not change. 91The three aspects are the `imagined' (parikalpita), 92 the`dependent' (paratantra), 93 and the `perfected' (parinispanna). 94These are not ontologically distinct. The importance of the threeaspect theory is evident, since two of these aspects, the"dependent" one (paratantra) and the "imaginary" one(parikalpita) constitute the empirical and the third one, the"perfected" aspect (parinispanna), is the Absolute reality. Inthe Mahiyghasamgraha, AsaAga sets forth the view that theimagined and the perfected are two aspects of the dependentnature; the dependent nature appears as the imagined nature bydint of a false imagination and as the perfected nature when thefalse imagination is removed. In summary, the consciousness thatarises in each moment with the image of an object is of dependentnature because its origination is dependent on the impressions ofexperiences preserved in the alaya-vijrigna.5.2. Ilaya-vilrianaThe 5laya-viirTina theory may be understood as an attempt tosystematize an image of seed and growth. The image of seed andgrowth was used in Buddhism before the period of classicalYogacWra and was prominent in the works of the Sautrantikatheorists. 95 In this image each action deposits `seeds' (bijas)in the continuum of caused momentary events which comprises the`person' who performed the action, and these seeds may have noimmediate effects upon the continuum. Only later will they52`mature' and bear fruit, which means that only later will theyhave specifiable effects upon the future of that continuumwherein they were originally planted. The Sautrantika theorists,who first made use of the seed-image, did not provide asystematic answer to such questions as: where are the seedslocated while they are ripening? Real seeds require some basis,some earth in which to grow. Can the seed-image be extended thisway, and if it can what sort of basis is intended? The systematicanswers were provided by the Yogacarins who stated that there issuch a basis and it is called the Ilaya-vijnana, 96 eachindividual having their own Ilaya-vijrilna.5.2.1. DefinitionThe VijiiaptimItratI-trimgikg describes the Ilaya-vigiina asfollows:"The first (transformation is Ilaya-vijiigna, or vigaka(distinctly matured) or sarvabijaka (possessed of allseeds)". 97In this remark three characteristics of this vijnana aredistinguished,that is, Ilaya-vijnana as the self-characteristic,vipaka as the effect-characteristic, and sarvabijaka as thecause-characteristic.Alaya-vijiiina has been rendered with a number of differentnames: mind-basis-of-all, store consciousness, foundationconsciousness, grunderkennen (Frauwaller), connaissance-receptacle (Lamotte), or connaissance-trgfonds (Levi), etc. Theword Ilaya-vijrigna is from the Sanskrit verb all - meaning tocling to, adhere to, alight one, or be hidden in. The nominal53-form of alaya can mean a firm or fundamental base, and byextension is used to refer to a dwelling or home."5.2.2. Structures of consciousnessThe YoffacIrins explicated an "ontological-psychological"model for outlining the evolution of consciousness. Consciousness(viirigna) impelled by former deeds,"evolves in eight forms: inaddition to the traditional six kindsm of vifrignas, i.e. thefive sense-perceptions and non-sensory cognition (mano-vijnana), 101 there are two more or less unconscious forms, theseventh is the manas 102 and the eighth is termed the Ilaya-vijnana. The former is a continuous, subtle notion or feeling ofII , whereas the latter, may be characterized as the container orstore-house of latent residues or impressions of previous actionand mind processes or as following the usual Tibetan translationIkun gzi rnam par ses pa' ("Fundamental mind,""Grunderkennen"). 103 The eighth vijiiiha according to theYog5cTrins is the "underlying consciousness" of all mentalactivity. It is distinguished from the other seven vijilinaswhich are said to be the antecedents of mental processing or"mind as it comes forth or manifests itself in a (cognitive) act"(pravrtti-vijAina). If the activity of manas is partiallyconscious and partially unconscious as indicated, then theactivity of the eighth vijiiina is totally unconscious.The YogIc'grins were specialists in the practice of meditativetrance, and as a result of this practice they felt that the sixstructures did not exhaust the full range of mental activity: it54could not account for some of the "special" or "altered"statee4 of cognition they had experienced in meditation. Theypointed out, that there must be some additional mode of mentalactivity to account for the continuity of the individualpersonality through periods when the first six structures areinoperative.“6 To solve this problem they proposed the additionof two further structures: manas and the Ilaya-vijrigna.5.2.3. FunctionThe Ilaya-vijrigna is functionally defined as the activity ofvifrigha that maintains certain types of behaviour andperceptions. It is metaphorically called the receptacle forKarma l°6 because it is the result (vipaka) m of past karma inthe form of "impressions" (vasani) or habits, which conditionfuture karmas as "seeds" (bijas) or stimuli. 108 While the alaya-vijriina is latent, the six kinds of vijnanas and the manas are inmanifest activity and are thus called the "consciousness inaction" (pravrtti-vijillna). The alaya-vijaina and pravctti-vijriana are dependent on each other: the latter is produced fromthe seed (bija) preserved in the former and leaves, in turn, itsimpression on the former. Thus the "modification" (parinaina), or"change" of vijnana takes place in two ways: (1) a seed (bija)planted by the "consciousness in action" (pravrtti-vijrigna)becomes ripe in the Ilaya-vijnana; and (2) the "consciousness inaction" arises from the seed. The term "paringma" was first usedin this context by Vasubandhu, but the theory of the mutual55dependence of the glaya-vijnana and the pravrtti-vijnana wasformulated by Asanga in the Mahlygna-samgraha.The glaya-vijnana forms a "stream" of successive moments, asone vijligna is replaced by another vijrigna in the next momentthat continues to flow until the bijas planted in it arecompletely destroyed. In each moment there arises the pravrtti-.4-vijnana, and so forth until a conceptualization is formed. Anindividual is a "stream of these consciousnesses" (cittasantana)and empirical reality is only the projections that appear in the"stream of consciousnesses."Since this consciousness continues (pratisamdadhlti) andsince it appropriates to itself (upldgdati) the body (kgya), itis called the appropriating consciousness (gdgnavigigna). Becausethe seeds (bija) of all the dharmas lie therein (aliyate), it iscalled the receptacle-consciousness (glaya-vijrigna). It is theretribution (viPlka) of actions laid down in past lives(purvajanman), it is also call retribution-consciousness(viplkaphalavijilina). The theory of Ilaya-viltigna suggeststhat an individual's actions sow seeds in the individual's glaya-vijnana; these seeds in turn produce or are perhapspredispositions, character traits, future possibilities ofaction. They are located in the "glaya-vijrigna and will mature andhave their effects upon the functions and activities of theindividual in the future. The Ilaya-viirigha is clearly alsorelated to the 'three' aspect theory (trisvabhiva) mentionedearlier. Essentially it is the cause of the relative aspect of56experience, since it is only in virtue of the seeds andtendencies accumulated in the a laya-viSrlina that consciousexperience can occur at all. mIt is also the cause of theimagined and perfected aspects of experience, since these differone from another only in the mode under which they operate. The. 	 ..4,-alaya-vljnana is not only important because of its role in thedynamics of unconscious mental functioning, mbut also because itis an anticipation of the theory of the unconscious in Depthpsychology...A.—5.3. Eightfold Proof of Alaya-vijnanaAs a criticism against the Hindu orthodox systems, the earlyBuddhist schools maintained the doctrine of no-5tman (an-Stman)or no-soul system which tried to deny the eternal unchanging soulas such. 112 The Buddhists maintained a soul is nothing but"stream of consciousness" (cittasantana). This model ofpersonality was primarily perceptual in nature, the underlyingassumption being the momentary character of consciousness. Butthe stream had another property: it could only sustain one typeof consciousness at one time, although the past moments ofconsciousness made up the basis for subsequent moments ofperceptions, which was the principal function of consciousness.The problem arose in three specific areas: moments ofunconsciousness, the time between death and rebirth, and theproblems of karmic maturation. Yog;carins, therefore, felt itnecessary to postulate "the underlying consciousness" (alaya-vijnna), which supports the sense consciousness, the mental base57which supports all the seeds (sarvabijakacitta), and the"-appropriating consciousness (adana-vijnana) which is the elementresponsible for the transfer of potentialities from one existenceto the next (continuity of personality). 113The Ilaya-vijiigna is employed by the Yoggcgi .ins in thesecontexts to show its indispensability by moulding them intoproofs of its existence. 114 This proof is found in both Asanga'sYogacarIbhiamin5 and in Sthiramati's commentary to Asahga'sAbhidharmasamuccaya (Summary to Metaphysics) . 116 Each argumenthas the form of a negative conditional: without the dlaya-vilhanacertain phenomena cannot be explained or cannot occur, phenomenawhich do occur and which thus require an explanation. Notpostulating the element entails certain undesirable consequences(dosa), and therefore the element must be postulated. Thepsychological implication here is that the "ilaya-vijrina may bethe root or matrix of all conscious acts. n75.3.1. Summary VerseThe eightfold proof begins with a summary verse (uddgna),proceeds with a brief statement of each of the eight argumentsand then gives a detailed presentation of each argument.5.3.2. Impossibility of Appropriating a Physical FormThe 'appropriation' of the physical form by theconsciousness is dependent on the existence of the Wlaya-viirigna.This first proof explains the 'appropriation' or taking on aphysical body and the need to postulate the'llaya-vijrigna inorder to explain this process. According to Buddhist theories58about death and rebirth, every person undergoes more than onelife and therefore possesses more than one physical body overtime. That is the individual does not cease to exit when thephysical body dies. Although this position is modified inBuddhism because of idiosyncratic non-substantialist theoriesabout what an individual is, it is still necessary for Buddhisttheories to provide some account of how new bodies are`appropriated' at the beginning of new lives. And the first proof.4.-states that without the Ilaya-vijnana no such account can begiven.5.3.3. Impossibility of Origination and SimultaneousFunctioning of the Sense-ConsciousnessesThis proof stresses that without the Ilaya-vijrigna noexplanation for both 1), the simultaneous functioning of morethan one sense-organ, and 2), the initial moment of consciousnesscan be given.This argument underscores the Buddhist theory of causationwhich says that for each and every moment of consciousness theremust be an immediately (temporally) preceding and (qualitatively)similar condition for its occurrence. The radically discontinuousmodel of the functioning of consciousness given by the VaibhIsikatheoreticians, 118 for example, required that for each moment of,say, visual consciousness there be an immediately precedingmoment of visual consciousness, and so for all the other kinds of-sense-consciousness. This model, according to the Yogacarins,will not explain the first moment of a particular kind of sense-59consciousness in a particular continuum i.e., where is theimmediately preceding and similar condition for the occurrence ofvisual consciousness in the mind of an individual whose eyes havebeen closed for hours? Nor will it explain, they say, thesimultaneous functioning of several different sense-consciousnesses, as when we see, hear, touch and smell an objectMIMIas at the same time. The YogacarArm ins say the Ilaya-vi]nana willprovide such an explanation since it can act as the immediatelypreceding and similar condition for every moment ofconsciousness.In this second proof the llaya-vijnna is being used as aprinciple of continuity, an explanatory category to account forphenomena difficult to explain on the model of radicalimpermanence and discontinuity evidenced by both Thergvgda andVaibahlsika Buddhists.This proof does not however, prove the existence of the7ilaya-vijnana but rather the fact that several vijnanas can arisesimultaneously. 119 Sthiramati say in his Commentary to theThirty Verses:...When there is a condition for the arising of asingle wave in a great flood of water only a singlewave occurs; and when there is a condition for theoccurrence of two or three or many waves, then just somany occur. [In such a case) it is not that the greatflood of water streaming along ceases to exist; it issimply that there is no sense in designating it assuch. Similarly, when there is a condition for theoccurrence of a single [sense]-consciousness basedupone and located in the Ilaya-vijiiina----which is likea flood of water---then only the visual consciousnessfunctions [for example]. But if there is a conditionfor the arising of two or three [sense)-60consciousnesses, then as many as five may function atthe same time. 1205.3.4. The Impossibility of Clear Mental ConsciousnessThe third proof approaches the problem of the simultaneousfunctioning of different consciousnesses, concentrating on theoperations of the intellectual consciousness (mano-vijAgna). Themano-vi3nana requires the Zlaya-vi3nana to store the seeds(bijas). This proof does not support the existence of the glaya-"-vi3nana but rather the fact that several vi3nanas can arisesimultaneously.5.3.5. The Impossibility of Mutual SeedingThis proof is not concerned with the somatic aspect of.A.,-alaya-vijnana but with its function as the Seed (bija) ofordinary forms of mind, based on the argument that the lattercannot be one another's Seed.The fourth proof is as follows: There would [absurdly] be noseeds of virtue or non-virtue, etc. if there were no ilaya-vijrigna. There is no indefiniteness [in the pervasion] becauseonly the alaya-vi3nana is the place where all latent impressionsare gathered 121 ."So the type of mental latency that Both Freud and Jungenvisions is something resulting from past actions andexperiences which remain latent but possess potential causalefficacy until conditions are conducive to their becomingconscious. This is very similar to the basic bija theory inthe Yogaeira texts. For the YogEcIrins the bijas themselvesrepresent the latent potential for producing more Dharmas,mental factors. "122615.3.6. Impossibility of ActionThe term 'action' (karma) here refers to the structures ofmental action, given the ontological presuppositions of the.. ..Yogacara, is the only kind of action there is. It is explained by.,...the Sanskrit term vi]napti which refers to all mental eventswith intentional objects, all mental events wherein something is....,`represented' to the experiencer. Vijnapti is a term used torefer to the processes of the mental life in their entirety. Whatthere is in the world, in this theory, is consciousnessrepresenting itself to itself; the various ways in which theserepresentations appear (as subject or as object) account for thefact that we ordinarily think of ourselves as perceiving subjectsseeing objects external to us. This subject-object structure isfundamental to experience and is further sub-divided in thisargument into four aspects, i.e., the inanimate, the animate, theexperience of self as subject and operations of cognition. Thefirst two sub-divisions are equivalent to the object aspect ofthe standard subject/object division of experience, and thelatter two are equivalent to the subject aspect.The key point in this fifth proof is that this fourfoldstructure of experience of continually present; it makes no senseto split up and attribute it separately to each sense-consciousness, as would have to be done if theilaya-vijiiina isdenied and it is asserted that the sense-consciousness cannotoperate simultaneously. The Yog-icgrins argued that the only wayin which this continuing fourfold structure of all experience can62adequately be explained is to say that it is located in thev-alaya-vljnana.The four combined vi - riaptis ("representations ofconsciousness") are: a) The bhajana-vijripti ("world asrepresentations of consciousness"). This is the appearance of thecontingent, outer world. b) The 'igraya-vijiTapti ("substratum as arepresentation of consciousness"). This is the appearance of themoving world---the material reality of the living being---the sixsenses ayatanas) and their bases. c) The aham iti vilriapti ("self-awareness as a representation of consciousness"). This isthe introspective, continually operating thought "I am." d) Thevisava-vijNpti ("objects as a representation of consciousness").This is the appearance of shapes, sounds, etc. Since one noticesthat at one and the same time, the external and internal appear,that there is self-grasping and that there is grasping at one orother of the six sense-objects, many consciousnesses do indeedoccur simultaneously.Why are these four vigraptis called karman ("actions")? Thisfourfold structure of all experiences is continually present;What there is in the world, is consciousness representing itselfto itself; the various ways in which these representations appeari.e. as subject, as object etc., account for the fact that weordinarily think of ourselves as perceiving subjects seeingobjects external to us from the point of view of agent (kartr).The subject-object structure is further subdivided in this proofinto four aspects, i.e., the inanimate, the animate, the63experience of self as subject and the operations of cognition.The essential point made in this fifth proof is that these fourvijiTaptis are continually present; that is without the glaya-vijrigha these four are impossible. They are possible if oneaccepts the glaya. This is because a) the vijriapti that is theexternal and internal appearance, i.e. the appearance of objectand sentient being is the Slaya; b) the vijitapti that is theappearance of a self is klista-manas; and c) the appearances asobjects are the set of six, for, as it is said [in the Trimi-ikg]Third are those [six entering consciousnesses] that observethe six objects. u3As it makes no sense to split up and attribute its separately toeach sense-consciousness, as would be done without the Ilaya-vifriEna and it is further asserted that the sense-consciousnessescannot operate simultaneously. The only way in which thesecontinuing four vilriaptis can adequately be explained is to saythat it is located in the -ilaya-vilrigna.5.3.7. Impossibility of Physical ExperienceThe sixth proof is as follows: here the argument focuses onphysical experience stressing that the uniformity of anindividual's conscious state of mind at any given time(concentrated, pondering, etc.) cannot explain the variety ofphysical experience undergone by that same individual. The Ulaya-vija is postulated for that purpose, since only the Slaya-vijnana can hold the 'seeds' (bijas) of various and mutuallyincompatible qualities at one and the same time.645.3.8. Impossibility of Mindless AttainmentsTwo kinds of concentration which are unconscious(nirodhasarapatti, asamjnisamapatti) really need some level ofoperating vigigna in order to return to the physical form, sinceits maintenance is dependent on all the aggregates (skandhas)being present. This consciousness can be subliminal, but it mustbe present. Here the Yogacarins opted for a redefinition of theattainment of cessation, a redefinition which is prepared toallow that this altered state of consciousness is mindless(acitta or acittaka), but not that it is without consciousness(viSrigna). Yet they recognize that the attainment of cessationmust be without consciousness if what is meant by 'consciousness'is intentional consciousness, consciousness of something by oneor more of the sense organs. For the canonical definitions of theattainment of cessation, there is not intentional mental eventsin this condition. Consequently, there must be consciousness of asort in this condition, and that this consciousness is the'alaya-vijngna.5.3.9. Impossibility of DeathThe question is asked: which consciousness is separated fromthe body at death?Finally, because the function of the alaya-vijriana is toappropriate the physical form whether in the case of the senseconsciousnesses or at the time of birth, the individual cannotdie until the Ilaya-vigana abandons the physical frame. It isunder this biological aspect that alaya-vijrigna appears to have65come to be introduced into the context of death. 124 For death and- 	 ."--rebirth, the alaya-vijnana is, therefore, the deciding factor...,..-6. Alaya-vijnana & theories of the unconsciousAlthough has been a growing interest in the comparative..4,-study of Ilaya-vijnana of vijiiaptimatrati- Yoggegra and theunconscious in Depth psychology (Yamada 1955; Osaki 1986;Cernovsky 1988; Waldron 1988), these articles are written from aan exclusively psychoanalytic orientation of the unconscious andhave not examined, nor introduced the cognitive unconscious toBuddhist scholarship.Research on the unconscious was initiated by psychoanalysisand until the 1950s unconscious processes were investigatedalmost exclusively within the psychoanalytical framework. Theevidence collected within this framework was consideredambiguous mainly because the methodology used was incompatiblewith methodology in empirical research. As a result cognitivepsychologists viewed any research investigating unconsciousmental processes with suspicion until the development of theinformation-processing paradigm of unconscious mental processing.This paradigm not only provided support that mental processing isunconscious but much of what we process takes place outside ofour awareness.The studies discussed (Bowers, 1984; Schacter, 1984,1985,1986,1987a,1987b,1988, 1989 etc.) demonstrated that cognitiveprocesses inaccessible to conscious experience play an importantrole and supports the notion that unconscious perception, as66distinct from unconscious drives and motives, can occur withoutnoticing and what is noticed need not be comprehended orunderstood. Research on implicit memory have shown preserved`implicit knowledge' (Schacter, McAndres, and Moscovitch, 1988)in neuropsychological syndromes. Implicit knowledge is defined asa passive body of knowledge, not present in our consciousexperience, not because of repression, but because it isimplicit, and is revealed indirectly. Images, schemata, andworking models of oneself and others generally form thebackground of our interactions and experiences, rather than beingthemselves focal and explicit. They are what Polyani (1964) calls"tacit knowledge." This challenges some of the essentialassumptions of the psychoanalytic unconscious, (i.e. repression,dynamic unconscious, recoverability and inaccessibility etc.).Both the Ilaya-vijrigna and theories of the unconscious areconcerned with mental processes that take place outside ofconscious awareness and extent to which these unconscious mentalprocesses affect the individual's perception of reality. However,the idea of an unconscious grounded in pathology can bechallenged by the research done in cognitive psychology(Erdelyi,1974,1979,1986; Schacter, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987a,1987b, 1989; Marcel 1983a,1983b,1988). We do not therefore, haveto accept the Freudian definition of the unconscious.6.1. RepressionIn psychoanalytic theory repression (verdrangung) referredto the simple notion that some distressing wish, idea, or memory67was forced out or blocked of consciousness. Freud said that "thetheory of repression is the cornerstone on which whole structureof psychoanalysis rests" 125 Denying the existence of thesecontents keeps them in a state of unconsciousness. That whichcould not come into consciousness because of repression wasconsidered part of the "dynamic unconscious" and that which wastemporarily unconscious could easily become conscious wasconsidered part of the "preconscious," which was descriptivelyunconscious, but systematically conscious. Freud always equatedthe repressed with an idea which had been forced into theunconscious and was separated from all other experiences. Jung,in contrast to Freud, regarded the human personality as atotality, with an interaction of the individual parts. Theprinciple point with which Jung could not agree was Freud'stracing repression back to instinctual wishes and impulses.A simpler account of repression uses empirically establishedphenomena of implicit memory as the basis for understandingapparent instances of recovery of repressed memories (Greenwald,1992). Explanations of implicit memory assume that memory tracesof an attended event are often preserved despite inability torecall the event. Because these unconscious traces influenceconscious experience they can provide a basis for recovering theotherwise unretrievable event. This implicity-becomes-explicitmemory account is far simpler in its theoretical interpretationthan the psychoanalytic account which requires a sophisticatedlycognizant unconscious.68Translating the notion of repression into informationprocessing terms, repression is viewed as the failure to processinformation, or, "defensive exclusion. 026 Repression has beenredefined as the defensive exclusion of external and internalinput "together with the thoughts and feelings to which suchinflows give rise... u127 In cognitive terms the system thusdeactivated is said to be repressed, or, the effects ofrepression are regarded as being due to certain information ofsignificance to the individual being systematically excluded fromfurther processing.6.2. RecoverabilityWhat Freud claimed and what the theory of repression claimsis that unconscious contents are recoverable in consciousexperience. In contrast, the unconscious mental processesemphasized in cognitive psychology are not recoverable inconscious experience. For example, "unconscious inferences" arenot expected, through any means, to be directly represented inconscious experience. While they can be described as if they wereavailable to awareness, and while they are reflected inperceptual and cognitive products, these processes are notphenomenally present in conscious experience.The difference in recoverability is a function of thecontrast between the psychoanalytic emphasis on contents and theemphasis of cognitive psychology on processes. As Nisbett andWilson (1977) have stated, one tends to consciously experiencecontents rather than the processes leading to these contents. The69processes do not appear to be readily accessible to consciousexperience.6.3. InaccessibilityUsing the seed metaphor (bija) theory, one of thecharacteristics of the Ilaya-vijri5na is be a 'conditional'consciousness. Furnished with all the seeds (sarvabijakavipakavijrilna), seeds (bijas) are continuously being placed inthe alaya-vijnana through the individuals actions, and being"momentary, simultaneous, proceeding continuously, determinant,dependent on conditions, and completed by their own fruit."' nThese qualities emphasize the passive, storing function of theIlaya-vijrigna. The YogEcgrins consider the seeds (bijas) to bethe potential for certain conditions to occur. In this view theseeds of Ilaya-vijiigna would to be inaccessible to consciousexperience, however, as Vasubandhu elaborates, saying that theseeds (bijas) are "individually determined", and come to`maturation' when in a given time and place the seeds encountertheir proper conditions and that each 'fruit' is only born from aseed (bija) that is proper to it. 1296.4. Unconscious InfluencesDeterminants of thought and action that are not noticed orappreciated as such constitute unconscious influences (Bowers,1984). According to this view, the alaya-vijnana as a type ofvigigna, is the support of mental factors, pure and defiled alikebut not as its cause.'" Each act leaves a mental impression(v5sanl) which discharges its energy or "seed" (bija) as a future70evolution (parinEma) in the consciousness series. PariOama refersto changes in the consciousness-series that manifest as things or....-selves because of the powers of the alaya-vijnana, manas, andpravrtti-vijaina in the subjective side of conscious process. Theseed (bija) of any given act remains dormant in the unconsciousstore-house (glaya-vijAgna) after the act has been committed.Later, the seed (bija) will mature as retribution (vipaka) orcompensation derived from the previous act which left a mentalimpression (vasanI).Early Yoggegra accounted for the continuity of the "seeds"(bijas) of retribution, memory, etc., after normal functioning ofconsciousness has temporarily ceased (trance, meditation, andunconscious dreamless sleep etc.), by resorting to the notion ofthe ilaya-vijnana, metaphorically, the uninterrupted series oflatent "seeds" that influence behaviour and perception. Thisseries of unconscious moments continues to function in amomentary but steady stream throughout states of unconsciousness.7. ConclusionIn Buddhism, the mode of operation that determines behaviourand perception is termed "conditioning" (pratitya-samutpNda). 131This "conditioning" is an ongoing process in a world viewed inYoglcara as impermanent and not self-existent. To understand thesystem of consciousness requires analysing the process ofconditioning that determines how various structures ofconsciousness function. In psychology this approach has beencompared with cognitive theories of emotions. 132 Once the system71is understood, one is able to change perceptual patterns thatcontribute to habitual behaviour. The function of consciousnessis to condition, to be a conditioner or conditioning power, to beaffecting or constructing things. From the religious perspectiveof Yog5c5ra, the retributive structure of consciousness is mainlyan ethical domain and is regarded as the fundamental function ofall conscious activity. This underlying structure is to beinvestigated until a cessation of its activity occurs inmeditation, or a transformation (ggraya-paravrtti)• m7.1. Psychological TransformationThe Yogacarins contribution to Buddhism can be seen in theiremphasis on the psychological aspects of delusion and liberation.This liberation is outlined in the theory of fundamentaltransformation (Agraya-parivrtti/paegvrtti) which describes thepsychological transformation that spiritual practice brings to anindividual. This theory is one of the most important teachings ofYoda-clra Buddhism.The first occurrence of term Igraya-parivrtti lm in Buddhistliteraturem is tied to sexual conversion in the context ofproblems relating to vinaya. m In this early and peculiar form,the doctrine of sexual conversion usually involved thetransformation of a woman to a man following her disenchantmentwith the nature of womanhood. This transformation is oftenbrought about through a 'statement of truth' (satyavacana), insome cases being really an exclamation concerning the nature ofthe Buddha. The possibility is also maintained for the72transformation of a man into a woman and of an eunuch into aman. 137Yogacgra in general is concerned with the -Alaya-vijnana andits transformation. In the Yog-dcara-bhiami-sastra the Ilaya-vijiiina is uprooted immediately after the Igraya-paravrtti. TheIgraya-paravrtti is the transformation or revolution of the basicstructure of consciousness; it is the conversion of the Ilaya-viSrigna which stores all seeds (sarvabijaka).The study of the alaya-vijriana and theories of theunconscious in Depth psychology and cognitive psychology supportthe notion that mental processing takes place outside ofawareness. We can understand unconscious influences largely interms of how they shape unconscious perception and thought.Behaviour can be a function of the person's phenomenal field butthe phenomenal field itself is a product of more mental activity,as well as more sensitivity to environmental events, than one isable to notice or report. An interest in the unconscious need notbe restricted to the Freudian Psychoanalytic unconscious of`primitive drives.'73NOTES1. Wundt, Wilhelm Max (1832-1920) - The `father' of experimentalpsychology. The basic premise in Wundtian psychology is thatthe only certain reality is immediate experience. Proceedingfrom this premise, Wundt had accepted the following goals forall science: the construction of explanations of experienceand the development of techniques for objectifying experience.Wundt's psychology rose and fell with the late 19th centuryneo-idealism. His core emphasis on volition and apperceptioncomes straight from earlier German idealist philosophy. SeeA.L. Blumenthal, "A reappraisal of Wilhelm Wundht," AmericanPsychologist, 30 (1975): 1081-1088.2. Titchener, Edward Bradford (1867-1927). Studied philosophy atoxford and took his doctorate under Wilhelm Wundt at Leipzig.his own work was mainly on sensation and attention. ForTitchener, a psychological system was useful primarily as aframework on which experimental research could be mounted. Hewas a structuralist because he felt that the first goal ofpsychology was the analysis of mind into elementary units ofsensations (or attributes of sensations), the structuralarrangement of which could then be used to account for higher-order processes such as emotion, will, and attention. Thisgoal in turn heavily influenced Titchener's choice ofmethodology, in particular the use of controlled introspectionin which trained observers reported the elements of theirconscious awareness in response to controlled stimuli. SeeRyan D. Tweney, "Programmatic Research in ExperimentalPsychology: E.B. Titchener's laboratory investigations, 1891-1927." in Psychology in the Twentieth Century Thought andSociety. Ed. Mitchel G. Ash. New York: Cambridge UniversityPress (19870 p. 35-52 and Titchener, E.B. "The Schema ofIntrospection." The American Journal of Psychology. 23:4 (1912) p. 485-508.3. 	 James, William (1842-1910) An American scholar who's work,Principles of Psychology (1890) is probably the best knownbook in all psychology.The book took 12 years to write butestablished James as the foremost psychologist of the day.The opening pages plunged into the recurrent Jamesian themesof individuality, choice, and purpose. See Miranda Shaw(1987) "Williams James and Yogacara Philosophy: a comparativeinquiry." also D.C. Mathur (1978) "The Historical Buddha(Gotama), Hume, and James on the self: comparisons andevaluations." See Eugene I. Taylor (1978) "Psychology ofReligion and Asian Studies: the William James Legacy."744. Because of the inability to say what mind is, manyphilosophers prefer to speak not of minds as such but simplyof mental facts, mental states, mental properties, mentalacts, mental processes, mental events etc. We can indicateroughly what we mean by each of these terms by indicating theexpressions we use to report such things. Thus, to take thelast mentioned, mental events, the most important of all forthe mind-body problem, we may say that it refers to the classof events we report when we say such things as "A name justcame to me,' "I just had the thought that ," "I have justdecided that....," "I feel sick," "My foot hurts," etc. Theseare all reports of mental events. What leads us to call theevents mental is that they are made immediately, without anysort of inference. The most that can be said about reports ofmental events is that the person reporting need not do so onthe basis of perceptions via his/her five senses or on thebasis of inferences from such perceptions; the mere occurrenceof the event ipso facto puts the person to whom it occurred ina position to report it. This is sometimes expressed bysaying that the person has "privileged access" to theseevents. The term 'mind' perhaps does not matter much forexperimental psychology now since it is no longer regarded asco-existence with 'the conscious mind'. The mind-body problem,mental-physical dichotomy is increasingly being supplanted bythe idea that there are numerous levels of description; eachof the terms 'psychological', theuropsychological', and`neurophysiological', cover such levels. (Wilkes 1988).5. Looking into one's own mind. 	 Used as a psychologicaltechnique it has great dangers of misinterpretation, eventhought introspections may seem to provide the most directknowledge of ourselves that we have. It has, however, becomeclear that very little that goes on in the brain associatedwith the mind is accessible to conscious introspection, and weregard the mind as a much broader concept than awareness,consciousness, or what is known by introspection. Gregory.R.L. Oxford Companion to Mind. Nisbett & Wilson (1977) arguedthat people have no privileged introspective access to theirbehaviour. See Nisbett & Wilson (1977, 1977a, 1977b).6. 	 Helmholtz, Hermann Ludwig Ferdinand Von (1821-94). Founder ofthe science of perceptual physiology. Perceptions are`unconscious inferences.' This challenged the prevailing viewthat responsibility, just blame and praise, depend onconsciously held reasons and motivations. Sigmund Freud'snotion of an active unconscious mind is a rather differentidea, though equally shocking to the Victorians. For Helmholtzit was simply that most of what goes on in the nervous systemis not represented in consciousness. Helmholtz made threemajor contributions. First, he indicated that Kant'sphilosophical dicta did not have absolute validity: it wasindeed possible to illuminate aspects of human mental75functioning in an empirical fashion. Second, Helmholtzcleared places for molecular forms of analysis (the speed ofan impulse travelling along a nerve fibre) as well as molarinvestigations (the ways in which complex spatial arrays areseen under both normal and distorted conditions). Finally, bystressing the perceiving subject's contribution to perception,Helmholtz became an early contributor to the ideology ofcognitive science.7. Freud, Sigmund (1856-1939) Freud's method of treatment inpsychoanalysis identified resistances as a form of protectionfrom pain, and repression as the way of eliminating that painfrom conscious awareness. Repression became the fundamentalprinciple of psychoanalysis. Repressed material was uncoveredthrough free association and dream analysis in a long,intensive course of therapy lasting months or years. Freud'stheories and methods have been criticized on several grounds:(1) unsystematic and uncontrolled data collection andinterpretation; (2) overemphasis on biological forces,particularly sex, as the primary influence on personalitydevelopment; and (3) a deterministic view of the influence ofpast behaviour.8. See Kenneth S. Bowers (1984) "Being unconsciously Influencedand Informed." pp. 244-246 in The Unconscious Reconsidered.Term coined by Bowers to denote the unconscious asunappreciated or uncomprehended influences. Determinants ofthought and behaviour are not necessarily as self-evident toconsciousness or introspection as they are influential, suchdeterminants can be perceived without being noticed, ornoticed without being appreciated as influential. In eithercase, people's thoughts and actions are determined by factorsoutside awareness.9. Spongberg, (1979) .p.171 - There are two forms of the term,vijnapti-matra and vijnaptimatrata. The -ta ending in thesecond form corresponds to our suffix -ness. The first form isthe adjective form as in the statement: "Everything is nothingbut vijnapti" or "vijnapti-only." The addition of the suffixin the second turns the qualification into an abstract noun,as in the phrase, "the doctrine of mere vijnapti" or"vijnapti-only-ness." In contrast to the Cittamatrata(thought-only-ness) doctrine of earlier Yogacarins. Thisdoctrine focuses on the nature of the state of liberation,whereas vijnaptimatrata attempts to explain the nature of thestate of bondage.10. Some authors equate depth psychology with psychoanalysis. Thekey point in the notion of "depth" is that of surfaceappearance in contrast with what lies "within" or "beneath."One of the main methods of investigation has been the76therapeutic interview. Under this heading may be included notonly psychoanalysis as practised by Freud and his followers,but also the methods of treatment adopted by those whodeviated to a greater or lesser extent from the originalFreudian Tradition, e.g. C.G. Jung (1875-1961), A. Alder(1870-1937), Karen Horney (1885-1952), and Melanie Klein(1882-1960). Woolger, R.J. (1988), p.352; Ellenberger, H.(1970), pp.489-500, 695; Klein, D.B. (1977), pp.177-78; 215-216.11. Hampshire, S. (1983). p.102.	 "Notions of the UnconsciousMind." in States of Mind.12. See Ellenberger's account of the history of the dynamicpsychiatry, entitled, "The Discover of the Unconscious,"(1970). Ellenberger's study demonstrates that the European"discovery" of the unconscious can be fully understood onlywithin the larger contexts of European social and intellectualhistory. And various strands of European cultural thoughtprovided the presuppositions upon which individuals such asFreud and Jung set about interpreting the "facts" of theunconscious. Ellenberger also points outs that debates amongContinental psychologists concerning which of these functionsbest defines the unconscious have never been resolvablethrough normal scientific procedures.13. Kuhn, T, (1962) p.43.14. Freud, (1914), "The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement."15. Perry & Laurence, (1984).16. As early as 1900 Freud wrote:"Thus there are two kinds of unconscious, which have not yetbeen distinguished by psychologists. Both of them areunconscious in the sense used by psychology; but in our senseone of them, which we tern the Ucs., is also inadmissible toconsciousness, while we term the Pcs. because its excitations---after observing certain rules, it is true, and perhaps onlyafter passing a fresh censorship, though nonetheless withoutregard to the Ucs.,---are able to reach consciousness." Freudin Interpretation of Dreams. (1900), pp.614-15.17. "the single acts forming part of it [being] unconscious."Freud from "A Note on the Unconscious in the Psycho-Analysis"(1912), p.266.18. Freud, The Ego and the Id (1923), pp.15-17.19. Freud, "New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis" (1933),p.73.7720. Freud, "Ego and Id," p.25.21. Freud, "Ego and Id," p.2622. Freud, "Ego and Id," p.56.23. Freud, "Ego and Id," p.57.24. Freud, "New Lectures," p.80.25. Freud, "A Note on the unconscious in psychoanalysis." (1912);"The Unconscious." (1915b); "The Ego and the Id". (1923); "NewIntroductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis" (1933).26. Freud saw the preconscious at this stage as a sort of bufferzone between the unconscious and the conscious system.27. Freud, 	 (1933), 	 p.71. 	 New Introductory Lectures onPsychoanalysis.28. Freud, (1917), p.93. A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis.29. Tulving, E., and Pearlstone, Z. (1966) "Availability versusaccessibility of information in memory for words." Journal ofVerbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour. 5, 381-391.30. Freud, (1912b), p.264. A Note on the Unconscious inPsychoanalysis.31. Freud, (1912b), p.266. A Note on the Unconscious inPsychoanalysis.32. First proposed by Freud in The Ego and the Id. (1923) andlater recapitulated, with minor modifications, in NewIntroductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. (1933).33. Jung, Carl Gustave (1875-1961). The theme which unifies thelarge number of writings that Jung subsequently published isIndividuation. 	 Jung conceived of Individuation as beingdirected towards the achievement of Psychic wholeness asintegration, and in characterizing this developmental journeyhe used illustrations from alchemy, mythology, literature, andWestern and Eastern religions, as well as his own clinicalfindings.34. Jung, "General Aspects of Psychoanalysis." (1913), p.241.35. Jung, "The Transcendent Function" (1916/1958), p.89.36. Jung, "Psychological Types." (1921), p.4487837. Jung, "The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious."(1916/1928). p.136.38. Jung, "Psychological Types," (1921). p.425.39. Jung, "Spirit and Life," (1926). p.323.40. Jung, "Spirit and Life," (1926). p.323.41. Jung, "Sigmund Freud in His Historical Setting."	 (1932),p.35.42. Freud, (1920), "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," p.25.43. Freud, (1900), The Interpretation of Dreams, p.615.44. Freud, "Ego and Id," p.20.45. Jung, "The Meaning of Psychology for Modern Man." (1933),p.140.46. Jung, Psychological Types. Complete Works 6 (1921), p.485. Wecan distinguish a personal unconscious, comprising all theacquisitions of personal life, everything forgotten,repressed, subliminally perceived, thought, felt. But, inaddition to these personal unconscious contents, there areother contents which do not originate in personal acquisitionsbut in the inherited possibility of psychic functioning ingeneral, i.e., in the inherited structure of the brain. Theseare the mythological associations, the motifs and images thatcan spring up anew anytime anywhere, independently ofhistorical tradition or migration.47. Jung, Psychological Types. (1921), p.485.48. Jung, "On the nature of the Psyche." CW 8 (1946).49. Archetypes - The original pattern or model, from which allother things of the same kind are made.50. Freud, "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality." (1905).51. Jung, "Yoga and the West" (1936), p.537.52. Jung, "On the Psychology of the Unconscious,"	 CW 7(1917/1916/1943) p.95 -"The collective unconscious, being therepository of man's experience and at the same time the priorcondition of this experience, is an image of the world whichhas taken aeons to form."7953. Jung, "On the Psychology of the Unconscious." CW 7(1917/1926/1943) p.77. Jung intended "impersonal" 2to meanforms not individually experienced. "Whereas the memory-imagesof the personal unconscious are, as it were, filled out,because they are images personally experienced by theindividual, the archetypes of the collective unconscious arenot filled out because they are forms not personallyexperienced."54. The 'New Look' starting with Bruner & Postman, 1947.55. Erdelyi, M.H. (1974) Hence `New Look 2'.56. Erdelyi, (1985).57. Erdelyi, (1985). pp. 75-105 (1985). Contrast this paradigm toP. Janet's (1889) psychological descriptions of dissociation,who viewed unconscious influences as abnormal andpathological. See Bowers & Meichenbaum (1984) for full detailsof Janet's dissociation theory of the unconscious.58. Marcel (1988)59. The surface of the cerebral hemispheres is divided into fivelobes: frontal, parietal, temporal, and occipital.60. Diencephalon- ("interbrain)" is a subdivision of the forebrainwhose principal structures are the Thalamus and Hypothalamus.Carlson, (1981). p.111, 116.61. Episodic memory is autobiographical in character, and containsmore less explicit reference to the self as the agent orexperiencer of some event, and the unique environmental andorganismic context in which that event occurred; semanticmemory. is the "mental lexicon" of abstract knowledge, storedwithout reference to the circumstances in which it wasacquired. The contents of memory are classified intodeclarative knowledge structures that represent theindividual's fund of general and specific factual information,and the procedural knowledge repertoire of skills, rules, andstrategies that operate on declarative knowledge in the courseof perception, memory, thought, and action. Declarativeknowledge can be classified as either episodic or semantic innature. Kihlstrom, (1987). p. 1446.62. Schacter, Daniel L., Mary Pat McAndrews, and Morris Mosovitch."Access to Consciousness: Dissociations in neuropsychologicalsyndromes." Thought Without Language. (Ed.) L. Weiskrantz.Oxford: Clarendon Press. (1988).8063. Prosopagnosia - people this disorder cannot recognize faces,however familiar---even their own faces in a mirror.Prosopagnosics presumably are not conscious of a thought`that's John' when shown a photograph; yet they may reactstrongly to it if, John is a close friend who has recentlydied. So at some unconscious level, we have to assume,recognition is achieved. Wilkes, (1988). p.37.64 Stroop effect named for the psychologist J. Ridley Stroop, whosystematically demonstrated it in 1935. In Stroop's (1935)original experiment he showed people a list of color namesthat were printed in color in ink. Each color name was printedin a color different from the color it named, e.e. the wordred might be printed in blue ink and the word blue in greenink. Seventy college students had to read a second listprinted in black ink. Stroop found little difference in thereading times for the two lists. Apparently, the studentscould largely ignore ink color while reading. A second groupof 100 students named the colors of the inks that the colorwords were printed in and also named the colors of a list ofcolor patches. Stroop found that students required an averageof 110 seconds to identify the ink colors on the word list.Students could not avoid reading the words when they tried toname their ink colors, and the conflict between the name andthe ink color slowed down their responses. The conflict arisesbecause the person tries to say aloud the name of the inkcolor, there are two color names in consciousness. One is theink color, which is the correct response. The other is theword that is automatically read. If the person does not haveto make a verbal responses but, rather, indicates in someother way what color the ink is, the interference is greatlyreduced. Glass & Holyoak, (1986), p.70-71.65. Wundt, (1862). p.438; cited in von Hartmann, (1931). p.39.66. Eagle, (1987). pp.161-189. The psychoanalytic "dynamicunconscious" is, above all, an unconscious of aims, motives,and drives, in contrast to a cognitive unconscious ofnonconscious mental processes.67. Freud, (1933). p.133 "New Introductory lectures in psycho-analysis."68. Freud, "The Unconscious." (1915). p.168 We know for certainthat they have abundant point of contact with conscious mentalprocesses; with the help of a certain amount of work they canbe transformed into, or replaced by, conscious mentalprocesses, and all the categories which we employ to describeconscious mental acts, such as ideas, purposes, resolutionsand so on, can be applied to them. Indeed we are obliged tosay of some of these latent states that the only respect in81which they differ from conscious ones is precisely in theabsence of consciousness.69. Tulving & Pearlston, (1966). "Availability VersusAccessibility of Information in Memory of Words." According tothis study intact memory traces of many words not recalledunder the non-cued recall conditions were available in thememory storage, but not accessible for retrieval. According toan information processing model of memory then forgettingoccurs not because information in storage is destroyed, butbecause learned material becomes "inaccessible." This paper isconcerned with a conceptual and experimental analysis of non-recall of learned items in terms of such a distinction betweenavailability and accessibility. It describes an experimentwhose primary purpose was to explore the hypothesis that asubstantial part of non-recall of familiar words under typicalexperimental conditions is attributable to inaccessibility ofotherwise intact memory traces.70. Chomsky, Avram (1928- ) Professor of Modern Languages andLinguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Hisbook "Syntactic Structures" was the first to outline andjustify a generative conception of language.71. The term Yog-gd'Ara means 'practitioner of spiritualdiscipline'. It was used to describe a definite school withwell defined philosophical positions by Vasubandhu in theAbhidharmakog-abh4ya (for example at AkBh 197.5, when anopinion on a scriptural text which describes three kinds ofriipa is attributed to the YoOciiins) and thus had becomeestablished as a school-name by the fourth century AD at thelatest, and probably much earlier than that. Alternative namesfor this school are vij?ianavada (consciousness doctrine),vigiaptimatrati ([the doctrine that] there is nothing butrepresentation) and cittamItratl ([the doctrine that ] thereis nothing but mind).72. Maitreya (c.350-430) - The reputed historical teacher ofAsahga. The name also refers to Asafiga's tutelary deity, LordMaitreya, who represents the Buddha's aspect as "love"(maitri). Willis, (1979) p. 183. The standard Buddhistaccounts of Asahga's life from both the Tibetan and Chinesetraditions make much of Asahga's encounters with Maitreya. TheTibetan tradition attributes five books to Maitreya, makingAsahga merely the recipient and transcriber of these works.The question of Maitreya's historicity has provoked a greatdeal of debate since the beginning of the twentieth centurysee Willis [1979:53 Note 42].73. The date of Asahga is problematic. Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu tells us that Asahga was Vasubandhu's eldestbrother (Takakusu [1904:273-274], and that Asahga was82instrumental in converting his younger brother to the Mah niygna(Takakusu [1904:-290-292]). Xuanzang's account of his travelsin India repeats many of these motifs and adds specifics as tothe texts received by Asanga from the celestial bodhisattvaMaitreya (Beal [1981:1.226-227]). Similar details are given byTibetan historians. Following the unanimous witness of thetraditions, Asanga was an elder brother of Vasubandhu; that hewas born towards the end of the fourth century AD in Gandhara;that he entered, the Buddhist samgha as a young man, possiblywithin the Mahigh-saka school, see Willis [1979;5ff]; that helater became enamoured of the emerging doctrines that we nowcall Yoggcira or VijriaptimatratI"; that he composed a number ofseminal treatises in this area and that he died around themiddle of the fifth century AD. (Griffiths, Paul J.[1986:175]).74. Vijnana - Vi[apart] jnana [knowledge;insight] - generally inBuddhist scholarship this term has been translated as`consciousness' but Brian Galloway (1980) argues that vijrignadoes not correspond to consciousness but perception becausevijilina is what happens when there is a sense organ, a senseobject, no obstruction between them, and a mind that functionsproperly;it is naked, unadorned, apprehension of eachstimulus; it grasps the mere object or the object alone.Vij'gna therefore does not correspond to the English word,"consciousness", which always involves an idea of selfhood,but to perception. I use the traditional translation ofvigigna as consciousness.75. Sara is a Sanskrit term meaning "a thread". It is also usedto refer to a short, aphoristic sentence and, collectively, towork consisting of such sentences (i.e., canonical texts) asopposed to "65-stras (scholastic treatises). See Eliade, (1987)pp.183-84. Sara76. Griffiths, (1986). p. 173 The usual version of this inSanskrit is cittamfftram idam yad idam traidhatukam.77. Samdhinirmocana Sara unfolds (nirmocana) the "intentions"(samdhi) of the Buddha that was hidden in the doctrine ofvoidness (i.e., Sutra on the Explanation of the ProfoundMysteries).78. The most important passages of the SamdhinirmocanasEtra can befound in Lamotte's edition [1935:90-91]. Compare May[1971:279ff] for a discussion of a relevant passage in theSamadhirajamitra. Matilal [1974] has some illuminatingcomments to make on these passages and provides an (English)translation of the relevant passages from the Samdhinirmocana.8379. The YBH was originally written or complied in Sanskrit andappears to have five major parts. The first of these parts,called Bahubhumikavastu, is the "Basic Section", approximatelyequal in length to the other four parts, and is itselfsubdivided into 17 sections, corresponding to the 17 stages ofthe practice of a Bodhisattva according to the Yogacgra school(Griffiths,[1986:191 .792]). YBH represents the "Sastra ortreatise tradition. Sastra is a Sanskrit term meaning, first,"precept, command, rule"; hence a treatise in which preceptson a particular topic have been collected. (Eliade,[1987:80-81]).80. See Schmithausen's study [1969]: Schmithausen thinks of theYBH as an Iallmahlich gewachsenes Schulwerk' [1969:812].81. See Lambert Schmithausen Alaya-vijnana: On the Origin and theEarly Development of a Central Concept of Yogacara Philosophy.(1987). There is no explicit explanations of its literalmeaning in the Yogac5rabhUmi but only an implicit one whichis, however, hardly original. 	 The oldest availableexplanation, at least the oldest explicit explanation israther the one that is found in the Samdhinirmocanasara.Other important early sources explaining the term alaya-vijiiana are : Abhidharmasutra, Mahayanasamgraha, andVasubandhu'sKarmasiddhi,Pratitya-Samutpadavyakhya(Pratitya-Samutpadadivibhanganirdesa) and Pancaskandhaprakarana. Theexplanations diverge due to doctrinal developments, but alsoto the very ambiguity of the word Ialaya'.82. Mahayana-samgraha [samgraha=Compendium] i.e., Compendium ofthe Mahayana.83. A short, tersely phrased text by Asanga.84. Vasubandhu's 20-verse text together with his own prosecommentary (VVr). See Levi [1925].85. Vasubandhu's work in 30 verses expounding the key tenets ofYogacara ontology and psychology. This work survives in itsoriginal Sanskrit, together with Sthiramati's commentary(TBH). See Levi [1925].86. Vasubandhu's short verse-text expounding the Yogacgrin three-aspect theory. See the edition/translation by Tola andDragonetti [1983].87. Sources for the ViSriaptirratrat-i-siddhi are:Louis 	 de 	 la 	 Vallee 	 Pouss in , 	 "Vasubandhu,Vimgakakrikaprakarana: Traite des vingt glokas, avec lecommentaire de l'auteur," Museon (New Series) 13 (1912): 53-90). [Romanized Tibetan text of VV, with French translation.]84Sylvain Levi, Vijnaptimarat5siddhi: Deux trates deVasubandhu, Vimsatika et TriirgikA, Bibliotheque de l'Ecole deHautes Etudes (sciences historiques et philologiques)fascicule 245 (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honore Champion,1925. [Sanskrit text of VK, VV, TK, and TB (Sthiramati'scommentary on Tk).]Sylvain Levi, Mate-riaux pour l'etude de systemeViiiiaptimitra,Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes (scienceshistoriques et philologiques) fascicule 260 (Paris: LibrairieAncienne Honore Champion, 1932). [Includes Sanskritemendations and French translation for Levi 1925.]Clarence H. Hamilton, Wei Shih Er Shih Lun: The Treatise inTwenty Stanzas on Representation-only, by Vasubandhu (Translated from the Chinese Version of Hsuan Tsang, TripitakaMaster of the T'ang Dynasty), American Oriental Series, 13 (NewHaven: American Oriental Society, 1938). [Hsuan-tsang'sChinese text of VV with English translation.]Sitamsu Sekhar Bagchi, "Vijnaptimatrat5siddhi,"Nava-Nalanda-Mahavihara Research Publication. 1 (1957):367-389 (+ Sanskritpages 1-12). [Sanskrit text of VK-VV Levi 1925 withoutemendations), with English translation of VK-VV embedded inBagchi's interpretation.]Wing-tsit Chan, "The Thirty Verses on the Mind-only Doctrine,"in Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore eds., ASource Book in Indian Philosophy. (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1957), pp.333-337. [English translation ofTk from Hsuan-tsang's Chinese version, along with (pp.328-333)a partial reprint of Hamilton 1938.]Thomas A. Kochumuttom, A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: ANew Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhuthe Yogacerin. (Delhi: Montilal Banarsidass, 1982). [IncludesEnglish translations of Vk-VV and TK. Kochumuttom seems tohave depended entirely for the Sanskrit text of VK, VV, TK,and TB on an extremely unreliable edition; SvamiMahesvarananda, Acgrya Vasubandhu pranita / viiriaptimatratesiddhih / pancasatika / savrittika trimgatik5 kNrik8 /acarlya _sthiramati pranitam trimgika bhasyanca [sic!](V1ranasi: Gitadharma kgryalaya, 1962). Some of the newdepartures in Kochumuttom's translation seem to be based onMahegvarZnanda's misprints. The misprint on Mahesvarananda'stitle page has apparently misled Kochumuttom into consistentlycalling Tk the "Trimgatikg."]Stefan Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu: The Buddhist Psychological Doctor, Religion of Asia Series, 4 (Delhi:Motilal Banarsidas, 1984). [Includes English translations ofVadavidhi, Pancaskandhaprakarana 9PSP, Karmasiddhi-prakarana9KSP), Vk-VV, TK, Madhyantavibhagabhasy (MVB), andTrisvabhavanirdega (TSN), and reprints Sanskrit editions ofVV, TK, MVB, and TSN.] Hall, (1986).88. See (Hall, 1986; Pruden, 1988).8589. Griffiths, (1986). p. 175-76 The text of V and VVr 1-2, readsas follows (the verses of V are translated in upper case andthe prose commentary of VVr is translated in lower case): `Inthe [doctrine of] the Great Vehicle the three-realmed [cosmos]is established to be nothing but representation, for a sacredtext says: `0 Sons of the Conqueror, this three-realmed[cosmos] is nothing but mind.' The terms `mind', `mentalconsciousness' and `representation' are synonyms [so any ofthem could have been used in the sacred text quoted]. The term`mind' [in the sacred text quoted] refers also to what isassociated with mind. The term `nothing but'[in the sacredtext quoted] indicates the denial of external objects. THIS[THREE-REALMED COSMOS] IS NOTHING BUT REPRESENTATION BECAUSEOF THE APPEARANCE OF NON-EXISTENT OBJECTS; IN JUST THE SAMEWAY A MAN WITH FAULTY VISION SEES SUCH THINGS AS UNREAL HAIRSAND MOONS. (1) Here it is asked: IF REPRESENTATIONS AREWITHOUT [CORRESPONDING] EXTERNAL OBJECTS THEN THERE COULD BENO: (i) LIMITATION [OF THEIR APPEARANCE] TO [ONE] PLACE ANDTIME; (ii) NON-LIMITATION [OF THEIR APPEARANCE]TO [ONE] MENTALCONTINUUM; (iii) PERFORMANCE OF FUNCTION. (2) What does thismean? If representations of things such as physical form occurwithout external objects consisting in physical form, then[such representations] do not occur because of [the presenceof] external objects consisting in physical form. [If this isso then the following questions arise]: (i) Why do [suchrepresentations]arise in a particular place and not justanywhere?(ii) Why do [such representations] arise in thatplace at a particular time and not at just any time? (iii) Whydo [such representations] arise in the continua of all thosewho are in a particular place at a particular time, and notjust in one (as is the case, for example, for the appearanceof such things as hairs in the continua of those with facultyvision, such [such thing do not appear in the continua] ofothers)? (iv) Why do such things as hairs and insects seen bythose with faulty vision not perform the functions of [real]hairs and so forth? For it isn't the case that other things[i.e., real hairs and so forth] do not perform [their properfunctions]. Also, things seen in a dream---for example food,drink, clothing, poison, weapons---do not perform their properfunctions(viz., of being eaten and so forth), whereas other[real instances] of such things do perform [their properfunctions]. The same is true, for example, of an unreal city,such as that in which the Gandharvas live: this doe notperform the functions of a city, whereas other [real cities]do perform [such functions]. So, if there are not externalobjects [corresponding to representations] it would not beproper to assert (i) limitation to [a single] time and place;(ii) non-limitation to [a single] continuum; and (iii)performance of [the appropriate] function.'8690. The Sanskrit term trisvablava is more often translated 'threenatures'. We are dealing here with a set of categoriesdesigned to explain how consciousness functions, the threemodes under which it operates. This is in part anepistemological notion and in part a descriptive-phenomenological notion.91. Tola & Dragonetti, [1983:249] Kalpitah paratantra caparinispanna eva ca / trayah savbhava dhirgrigm gambhiramjrieyam isyate // yat khygti paratantro'sau yatha khyati sakalpitah / pratyayadhinavrttivat kalpanamatrabhavatah//tasyakhyatur yathakhyanam ya sadavidyamanata / iffeyah saparinispannah savabhavo'nanyathltvatah // TSN 1-3.92 The imagined aspect is the form under which the dependentnature (paratantra) manifests itself, appears. Effectively thedependent nature is the whole of the representations etc.originated by the vasanas' "reactualization," the totality ofthe unreal mental creations which constitute it. Conceived inthis way, the dependent nature necessarily presents itselfalways with duality, i.e. composed by a subject who knowsopposed to an object which is known. This imagined aspectreceives the name of "imagined," because it is a mere unrealmental creation, since not true reality corresponds to thesubject and to the object, which compose it, since they havenot a counterpart, real, external to mind, independent fromit. (Tola & Dragonetti, 1983).93. The dependent nature is what appears and it is so called,because it exists depending on causes. The causes on which thedependent nature "depends" are the vasanas. Any idea,cognition, etc., which is produced in the mind, leaves in the"sub-consciousness" a vasana. These vasanas are something likea weak reproduction or copy of the representations,ideas,cognitions etc., which left them. These vasanas remain in the"subconsciousness" in a latent form, until certain conditions,they "reactualize" themselves, they pass into theconsciousness, producing new conscious representations etc.,similar to those by which the vasanas were left or related tothem in some way. The dependent nature "depends" on thesevasanas in the sense that, if there are vasanas, there isdependent nature, if there are no vasanas, there is nodependent nature. (Tola & Dragonetti, 1983).94. The word parinispanna, used by the original, literally means"developed", "perfect", "real", "existent" (Monier-Williams,Dict.sub voce). I have translated it by "perfected" but it isusually translated as "absolute." (Tola & Dragonetti, 1983).95. See Jaini, (1959b).8796. Asanga, in the first chapter of his Compendium of the GreatVehicle (Mahaygnasamgraha), describes the alaya-vijiigna insuch terms. See notably MS 1.2-3 and MSBh and MSU: Lamotte[1934:-1755-176]; Nagao [1982:10,111-116]. MS 1.14 and MSBhand MSU: [Lamotte 1934:221-225]; Nagao [1982:22-23,133-135].KSP 33: Lamotte [1935b:198-199,247-249]. TBh ad T 2cd: Levi[1925:18.22-19.2). This TBh passage reads: "HERE THEMATURATION [OF ACTION] IS THAT CONSCIOUSNESS WHICH IS CALLED`STORE': IT HOLDS ALL SEEDS" (2cd)...here the term `store' isused because [the store-consciousness] acts as a receptaclefor the seeds of all defiled things. `Receptacle' and `store'are synonymous. Alternately, the term `store' [in theexpression `store-consciousness'] means: (i) that consideredas effect, all things are stored in or dependent upon that;(ii) considered as cause it is stored in or dependent upon allthings 	The term 'maturation' is used because [the store-consciousness] has the quality of effecting the maturation ofgood and bad actions in all cosmic spheres, destinies, wombsand births [viz., in every possible kind of rebirth]. Theterms 'holds all seeds' is used because [the store-consciousness] possesses the quality of being the basis forthe seeds of all things." (tatrilay5khyam vijnanam vilSakahsarvabijakam /	 tatra sarvasaytklegikadharmabijasthanatvadalaya / 	 sth'inam iti pary5yau / atha viliyanteupanibadhyante'smin sarvadharmlh karyabhavena / tad VAliyateupanibadhyate kIra9abhgvena sarvadhramesv ity alaydh /sarvadhatugatiyonijatisukusalakusalakarmavipakatvadvipakah/ sarvadharmabljasfayatvat sarvabijakam/) . (Griffiths, 1986).97. See Anacker, (1984).98. Earlier, certain Buddhist schools had already introduced intotheir psychology certain elements which resembled thereceptacle consciousness; let me mention the "member-of-existence 	 consciousness" 	 (bhavlfigavifria-na)	 of 	 theTamraparniya, the "root-consciousness" (mulavijfigna) to theMahl's5Mghikas and the "element which last until the end ofSamsara" (Isaigarikaskandha) of the Mahigasakas. But it is tothe Sautrantikas and not to the Vijlignavadins that the honouraccrues of having first systematized the psychology ofretribution-consciousness. Lamotte, (1988). English trans. ofKarmasiddhiprakarana. p.30.99. Buddhists term this a `Karma'.100. See Spongberg, (1979) p.52.101. Mano-vijrigna - "mental" awareness as superior to the fivekinds of "sensorial" awareness.	 This technical termdesignates the centre of perception and apprehension, secondof the seven faculties deriving from the Ilaya-vijnna.88102. Manas - Manas means mind,. a thing or entity, and so it mayappear to us. The Yogacarins gloss it as mana (reflectivecogitation, thinking) and it like the other vijnanas should beunderstood as an activity. There is some debate over whethermanana in text of this verse (Trimika II) means (cogitation,reflection) or Manyana (conceit in the sense of vain imaginingand pride). Both would fall within the activity of manas inany case. Manas is responsible for our awareness of thesubject-object dichotomy; in the unpurified state, as klista-manas) defiled mind, it is the ego-postulating function.103. Frauwallner ,(1969). 328:352: 386f Die Philosphie des Buddhismus.104. Kihlstrom, John F. 1984, p.150-55 - Under some circumstanceswe experience profound alterations in the monitoring and/orcontrolling functions of consciousness. Practising ameditative discipline such as Yoga or Zen, falling asleep, andbecoming hypnotized all seem to lead to such alterations; sodo certain syndromes of psychopathology such as acuteschizophrenia.105. See Schmithausen (1987) In the Samahitabhiimi - the Iklayaconcept is used to explain exit from the attainment ofcessation (nirodhasamapatti). This is a condition in whichmind and its concomitants have altogether ceased to function,as also have the six sensory vijirgnas. The possibility ofleaving such a condition is explained by the continuedpresence of the ilaya.106. Karma - From the Sanskrit verb root kr, "to do or make"; thenoun means "action." In Buddhism, the term refers especiallyto the law of cause and effect, i.e., to the principle thatevery action produces some result.107. Vipgka - The "maturation" cause, the form of causation properto the individual karma (viplka-hetu) or the "effects" orfruition from individual karma as resulting through theviplka-form of causation (vipaka-phala).108. The term bija and vasanl are usually interpreted as synonymsfor the power (vasa) or energy (sakti) of the mind.	 Initself, blja or NAsan'a is nominally existent - that is, it isa term used as a metaphor to describe 'the process ofconceetual and attitudinal changes.' See Jaini, "TheSautrantika Theory." pp.242-44 (1959).109. See Karmasiddhiprakarana. (1988) by Etienne Lamotte Englishtrans. by Leo M. Pruden. pp.66-67.89110. This relationship of cause and effect is clearly stated in TSN(Trisvabhavanirdesa) 6: tad dhetuphalabhavena cittam dvividhamisyate / yad alayakhyavijnanam pravrtty-akhyam ca saptadha //Tola and Dragonetti [1983:249].111. Schmithausen, [1987:21,31(2.13.3));[1976:237] "The objectivecontents of this alaya-vijnana consists [sic] of a mentalimage of the whole world and is determined by the former goodand bad deeds (karman) of the respective living being. Thus,the whole world, especially the outer world, is only asubjective mental production of each being." "That for theYogacarins even this manifold universe of fluctuating mentalfactors is only an imperfect or preliminary level of reality.In the mystical intuition one can become aware of a deeperreality constituted by the so-called ISuchness' or 'TrueEssence.' A further implied property of the'glaya is it beingsubtle (suksma) or subliminal.112. See Radhakrshnan & Moore. (1957), pp.88-89. "That Self (Atman)is not this, it is not [this] (neti, neti). It is unseizable,for it cannot be seized; indestructible, for it cannot bedestroyed; unattached, for it does not attach itself; isunbound, does not tremble, is not injured..." (BrhadaranyakaUpanisad (IV.v.15). Radhafrishnan's translation read, "Thatself is (to be described as) not this, not this." In otherwords, the Atman is there described by negatives---in terms ofwhat it is not.113. See Schmithausen, (1987). p.3114. See Sparham, (1992) Chapter five "Proofs of the Zlaya-viirigha," How does one prove the existence of the Alaya-viinha? From believable scriptural authority (agama) andthrough reasoning (yukti).115. See McDermott, (1973) p.169 - Asanga's 'definition' of alaya-vijiigha. i.e., it is said to be autonomous, enduring,non-defined, in close relationship with the samklesika dharmaswhich perfume it, that to which manas is attached, and that inwhich all the seeds (bTjas) of the six pravrttivijgdhas areretained and kept from perishing. The btjas are appropriatedfrom Sauteghtika sources and modified by the YogSc&rins. Thesextet of vijgarias consisting of the five outer perceptionsplus manovijggha is inadequate to account for the seemingcontinuity of experience.116. The version in the YBh, extant only in Tibetan, may be foundin PSems-Tsam Z12b1-4a4. The version in the ASBh, extant inthe original Sanskrit, may be found in Tatia [1976:11.15-13.20]. See also McDermott [1973]. The standard study inJapanese is Hakamaya [1978].90117. See Waldron, 1988. pp. 124-25 - What this means is thatconscious acts are based on or originate in the 5laya-vigilnaand the unconscious. MSg.I.8 states that "this mind (citta)furnished with all the seeds gives birth to the (manas) andthe [sense-) cognitions."118. The VibhEsa masters, or Vaibhrsikas, continuators of theSarv5stivddins.119. Schmithausen, (1987). p.195.120. Levi [1925:33.26-34.1]121. Wilson, (1984). p.449 "Alayavijnana exists because if it didnot, there would be no seeds of virtue and so forth in thecontinuums of sentient beings."122. Waldron, (1988). pp. 116-117123. Sparham, (1992). pp.153-54.124. Schmithausen, (1987). p.40 "Alaya-vigigna."125. Freud, The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement S.E.(1914).Cited in Grunbaum, Adolf. The Foundations of Psychoanalysis:A Philosophic Critique. University of California Press,Berkeley: 1984.126. Peterfreund, (1971); Erdelyi & Goldberg, (1979); Bowlby,(1980, 1981).127. Bowlby, (1980). p.65.128. Lamotte, p. 38; Nagao, p.55129. MSgBh. T.31.329b19-c12.bh.155a7-155b8. Lamotte. 40130. See Waldron, 1988, p. 122.MSg. 1.1 MSgU.T. 31.383a4-15.0238b8-239a6. Lamotte, p.12.131. Pratitya-samutpgda has been reinterpreted throughout thehistory of Buddhist thought. One of the quintessentialdoctrines of Buddhist philosophy, the term is a descriptivephrase which characterizes the type of origin or "arising"(utpada) which occurs "together with" (sam) or is occasionedby (i.e., is dependent upon) the occasion of some otherphenomenon. Willis (1979)132. Fenner, (1987), pp.217-227. Fenner compares Buddhist theoriesof emotions with cognitive theories of emotions in psychologybased on the theories of Albert Ellis and Richard Lazarus.91133. According to Param5rtha in his Chuan shih lun. See Paul,(1984), pp. 97-98.134. See Davidson. (1985) p. 174. The term lgraya was widely usedto denote the physical form. Transformation (root verb-parivrt) was the verb noun which usually denoted the change ofsex (yyanjana-parivrtti) when such a verb was needed. Davidsonconcedes that the term asrayap5rivrtti as applied to sexchange did not occur either before of after the composition ofthe Mahayanasutralamkarabhasya. See also Sakuma (1990) p. 168-who states that the earliest usage of the term 2grayaparivrttiin the sexual sense can be found in the Viniscayasamgrahani ofthe YogacIrabhrimi.Paravrtti means to reverse directions, to go in the oppositedirection; asraya-paravrtti is "the fundamental change inmental attitude which is taught as necessary to knowledge ofthe true doctrine." See Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, p.320: paravrtta. In Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p.591, paravrtti is defined as "turningback or round, returning, revolving, change, interchange,exchange."135. See Sakuma (1990) p.168136. Vinaya - text recording the rules and regulations for Buddhistmonks.137. See Davidson (1985) p.172-17392BIBLIOGRAPHYPrimary Sources:Madhyghta-vibhgga-bh';sya, by Vasubandhu; verses by Asanga. Ed. byNagao Gadjin. 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This text alsorepresent that section of the YoggcNrabhUmi callVinigcayasamgrahani. The Tibetan translations of both theAbhidharmasamuccaYabhasya and the YogIcIrabhilmi are close toidentical and Sthiramati, refers explicitly to theVini5ayasamgrahapi in his text. I have used the Tibetan andJapanese translation of this passage give by Hakamaya [1978] andGriffiths [1986].The eightfold proof begins with a summary verse (uddina),proceeds with a brief statement of each of the eight argumentsand then gives a detailed presentation of each argument.Summary Verseuplttam `adi spaOatvam bijam karma na yujyate /Kayiko'nubhavo'citte sam5patti cyutis tathg//Introduction..".-astabhir Ikgrair glaya-vipnanasyg'stitg pratyetavyg/tadyathlintarenllaya-vijnanam(1) Isray8p5d5n2sambhavatari(2) adi-pravrtty-asapbhavatah(3) spasta-pravrtty-asambhavato(4) bijatvasambhavatah(5) karmasavbhavatall(6) kgyikInubhavasambhavato(7) 'cittaka-samgpatty-asambhavato(8) vijngna-cyuty-asambhavata ca//translation:One should understand (pratyetavyg) the existence of (astitg) theglaya-viPgna in eight ways (astabhir akarair). That is(tadyathI): if there were no glaya-vigana (antarenalgyavijlignam)the following eight well-known facts would become impossible (nayujyate):(1) There would be no appropriation of a [physical] basis.(2) There would be no [Emergence of] an initial (adi) [functionof consciousness].(3) There would be no [Emergence of] clarity (spastatva).(4) There would be no condition of being a "seed" (bija).(5) There would be no action (karman).(6) There would be no corporeal experience (kSyiko'nubhavah).(7) There would be no [Two kinds] of mindless meditativeabsorption (acitte samTpatti).(8) There would be no [consciousness that] passes away (cyuti).120Proofs one (upatta), six (kgyiko'nubhavah), seven (acittesamgpatti), and eight (cyuti) are all concerned with the somaticaspect of alaya-viiriana: its function of appropriating the bodyat the moment of conception; of keeping it appropriated, as awhole and throughout life i.e., even in unconscious absorption;of making its presence in the body felt by corporeal sensationseven in the absence of tactile sense-perception; and of graduallyabandoning the body at death.This introduction lists each of the eight arguments which will beclarified by the following detailed presentations.1) The Impossibility of Appropriating a Physical Formkena klranenlgrayopadinam yujyate? aha / pgicabhih kgranaih /tathIhi /translation:By what reason [if there were no Ilaya-vilriana], is it impossible(na yujyate) to take a [physical] basis (ãgrayopadanam)? Here wesay (answer) (aha): due to the following five reasons (paricabhihkgranaih).i) -alayavijrignam PUrvasamskgrahetukam/caksuradipravrttivipianam punar vartamgnapratyayahetukam/yathoktam "indriya-visaya-manaskgra-vasad vijrignanam pravrttirbhavati"ti vistarena/ idam prathamam laranam//translation:while the Ilaya-vijiigna is caused (hetukam) by previous formativeforces (purva-samskara) while the sense consciousnesses arisefrom present formations, "the arising cognition (pravrtti-vijnina), as it is said [in a sutra] in detail (iti vistarena)"as follows: By the power of (vasad) a sense organ (indriya); asense object (visaya), and attention (manasMara), cognition, (theactivities (pravrttih) of (vijnana) comes into being (bhavati).The six sense consciousnesses occur on the basis of cognition.This (idam) is the first reason (prathamam karanam).(ii) api ca kusalakusalah sad vijnana-kaya upalabhyante/idamdvitiyam karanam//translation:Moreover (api ca) the set of six [sense] perceptions (sadvijMna-klya) are experienced (upalabhyante) as virtuous (kusala)or non-virtuous (aku5a1a). This is the second reason (dvitiyamk-granam).121-(iii) api ca sanngin viviana-kayinam sg- 15tir nopalabhyate yi'vygkrta-vipIka-samgrhita sygt/idai trtiyam kgranam//translation:Further (api ca), as for the set of six categories of [sense]perceptions (sannam vijriana-kgySriap), something which is included(samgrhitg) in the maturation of what is neutral [i.e. neithervirtuous nor non-virtuous] (avyakrta-vipaka) is not experienced.idam trtiyam karanam/ This is the third reason (trtiyam kaYanam).(iv)api ca pratiniyatIgraygh sad vilriina-k5yal pravartante, tatrayena yena*rayena yad vijn6ham pravartate tad eva ten4attam syadavagistasyanupattateti na yujyate, upattatapi na yujyatevigignavirahitatayg/ idam caturtham kgranam//translation:Moreover (api ca), the set of six [sense] perceptions (sadvijnina-kgyAh) function (pravartante) with the definite(pravartate) physical bases (6grayah), (tatra yena yenasrayenayad vijagham pravartate) [i.e. sight operates only in the eyes,hearing in the ears, etc.]. And it is not proper to say (nayujyate) either (i) that a particular sense-perceptionsappropriates only that physical basis (tatra yena yengsrayena yadvijnanam pravartate tad eva tenoplttam) in virtue of which itfunctions and that there might be no appropriation of theremainder (avasista); or (ii) that there might be appropriationin the absence of consciousness (vijii5na-virahita)lidamcaturtham karanam/ This is the fourth reason.(v) api ca punali punar ggrayasyopgdgnadosah prasajyate / tahghicaksurvigignam ekada pravartate ekadg na pravartate evamavagistani / idam pancamam kgranam /translation:Furthermore (api ca) it would be reduced to absurdity(prasajyate) [if those set of six take the body] there would bethe flaw (dosah) that [in one life] a body would be taken manytimes (punah punar agrayasya-upgdgna). This is so because(tathahi) the eye perception (caksur-viirignam) sometimes arises(ekada pravartate) and sometimes does not arise (ekadg napravartate).idam pAcamam kgranam /This is the fifth reason.iti pirrvakarmapravarttamgna pratya[ya]-hetuto'pikugallkugalato'pi taj-j5ty-anupalambhato'pi pratiniyatagrayato'pipunah-punar-upgdana-dosato'pi na yujyate//translation:122Thus (iti), [if there were to be no alaya-viji4na one would haveto assert that the set of six takes the body. And since, thereare the following five causes why this is impossible];1) By reason of (hetutah) previous action (piirva-karma) andpresent conditions (pravarttamana pratxaya). [Eyeperceptions and the other pravrtti-vijnana arise from theconditions at hand].2) [The set of six consciousness are seen to be] virtuous andnon-virtuous (kugala-akugala tah-api).3) Also none [of six consciousness] is seen (taj-jatyanupalambhato'pi (anupalambhata-api) to be a sort whichwould be categorized as being a maturation which is not asubject of moralizing (kugala-aksalatah-api).4) Also [the set of six consciousness operate on] strictlydefined substrata (pratiniyata-Esrayatah-api)5) 	 There is the fault that again and again one would take abody (punah-punar-upldlnadosato'pi).This first proof is divided into five sub-sections. Section (i)points out that a categorization of the causes of thepravrttivijitanani can be given by listing present or precedingevents, and that this leaves no place for causation by long pastevents. It is the alaya which provides for and accounts for thesecond kind of causation. Section (ii) and (iii) state afundamental presupposition of Buddhist theories about karma andcausation: that the causal principle which brings about thematuration of karmic effect is in itself neutral. The six`functioning consciousnesses' are not neutral but originate inexperience which has both affective and moral tone. The argumentgoes that the alaya must be postulated in order to allow for thematuration of karmic effect which in itself has no moral tone.Sub-section (iv) points out that the appropriation of a newphysical body at the moment of a new birth would not be possiblewithout a vipakavijtana, a 'maturation consciousness' which canonly be the alaya. This because the other six consciousnessescannot appropriate the physical body as a whole since each ofthem has its own specific physical basis or locus (i.e. visualconsciousness is located in or based on the eye and so forth).Each one of the six pravrttiviiMnani therefore appropriates onlyits own specific physical basis. Something more is required toappropriate the whole of the physical body at once, and this,according to the proof, can only be the alaya.2) 	 Impossibility of Origination and Simultaneous Functioning ofthe Sense-consciousnessKena karanenadipravrttisambhavo na yujyate/ sa cet	 vadedyady alayavijAanam asti tena dvayoh vijaanayoh yugapat pravrttirbhavisyati/ sa idam syad vacaniyah/adosa eva bhaVan dosasamfili/tattiahi bhavaty eva dvayor vijnanayor yugapat pravrttih/ tatkasya hetoh/ tatha by ekatyasya yugapad drastukamasya yavad123viiriatukamasligditaitaretaravijAWnanapravrttir na yujyate/ tath-ahitatra manaskaro'pi nirvitista indriyam api visayo'pi//translation:By what reason (kena kgrena) a very first activity of[consciousness] (adi-pravrtti) is impossible /sambhavah-na-yujyate)? sa cet kascid vaded yaky alaya-vijilanam asti tenadvayoh vijAinayoh yugapat pavrttir bhavisyati / If one personsays (sa ced kascid vaded) "if there is an alaya-vijnana (yadyalaya-vijfignam asti) then (tena) two consciousness (dvayohviiRanayoh) will come into being (pravrttir bhavisyati)simultaneously (yugapat) [in response] we would should say to himas follows (sa idam syad vacaniyah):"you are imagining a fault (dosa-samjni) wherein no fault at all(adosa eva bhavan)." This is because (tathahi) there is indeed(bhavaty eva) the simultaneous operation (yugapat pravrttih) oftwo consciousness (dvayor vijftanayor). And why is this so? (tatkasya hetoh). Because (tathahi the alternate (itaretara) activityof consciousness from the beginning (adita) would be impossible(vijrigna-pravrttir no yujyate) for a person simultaneouslywanting to see (ekatyasya yugapad drastu kamasya), and so forth,up to wanting to mentally conscious of something (yavad vijfiatu-kamasya) [if there were no alaya-vijnana]. This is because(tathghi) in such a case (tatra) the mental attitudes(manaskgro'pi), sense-faculties (indriyam) and also the objects(visayo'pi) [which cause active-consciousness (pravrtti-vijngna)have no special factor (nirvisista) [which would cause one set ofcauses to bring about one particular result].If there can only be one samanantarapratyaya in any one continuumat any one time, then, without the Ilaya there can only be onekind of consciousness in any one continuum at any one time. Thealaya can act as samanantarapratyaya for all the various sense-consciousnesses at once and therefore allow for both theirsimultaneous functioning in a single mind and for the firstmoment of a particular kind of consciousness in a given mind. Thepoint about the non-distinctness of attention (manaskara), sense-organ (indriya) and sense-object (visaya) merely suggests thatthe body of necessary and sufficient conditions for theoccurrence of any instant of sense-consciousness (which is simplyequivalent to attention, sense-organ and sense-object) issimultaneously present for all of the varied sense-consciousnesses. There is therefore no reason why they should notoperate simultaneously.3) The Impossibility of Clear Mental Consciousnesskena kgEapengstyam yugapad viiligna-pravrttau mano-vijriinasyacaksur-adi-vijMna-sahlnucarasy spastatvam na sambhavati /tathahi yasmin samayeititam anubhiltam vivyam samanusmaratitasmin samaye'vispasto mano-vijnana-pracaro bhavati na to tatha124vartamlna-visayo manah-pracgro'vispasto bhavati / ato'pi yugapatpravrttir va yujyate'vispastatvam va mano-vijnanasya//translation:By what reason (kena kgrena) the mano-vijAgha, which isaccompanied by (sahanucarasya) the eye-consciousness, etc.(caksur-adi-vijngna), would not operate more clearly (i.e.,perceives clearly) (spasttatvam na sambhavati) if [these twoconsciousness did not occur simultaneously (asatyam yugapadvijligna-pravyttyam)? Why is this so (tathghi)? While (yasminsamaye-tasmin samaye) the function of the mano-vijnIna (mano-vijnana-pracarah) recollection an object (visayam samanusmarati)experienced previously (stitam anubhutam) by sense-consciousnessis not so clear (avipasta), the function of mano-vijngha (manah-pracarah) toward the present object (vartamana-visayah) is notunclear (na to tatha avipasto bhavati) [as in the former case].Therefore, (ato'pi) it is possible to maintain (yujyate) bothsimultaneous activity (yugapatpravrittih) unclarity(avipastatvam) of the mano-vijngna (mano-viOgnasya).4) Impossibility of Mutual SeedingKena kgra9ena gjatvam na sambhavati saTingm vijnanakayanamanyonyam/ tathahi kugallnantaram akugalam utpadyateakugalanantaram kugalam tadubhaygnantaram aDrakrtamhinadhltukgnantaram madhyadhltukam madhyadhatukInatarampramitadhItukam evam prapItadhatukgnataram ylvad dhinadhatukamsIsravgnantaram anIsravam angsrav -inantaraT sIsravamlaukikgnantaram lokottaram lokottargnantaram laukikam/ na catesam tathg bijatvam yujyate/ dirghakIlasamucchinnipi ca samtatiscirena kllena pravartate tasmgd api na yujyate //translation:By what reason (kena kgrena) the set of six consciousness (sannamvijngna-kayanam) are not (na samvhavati) a seed-state (bijatvam)for each other (anyonyam)? Since (tathghi) non-virtues (akusala)come about (utpadyate) after (anantaram) virtues (kugala),virtues come about after non-virtues and [state of mind] that arenot a subject of moralizing (avyakrta) come about after both ofthese (tad-ubhaya),likewise, since [states of mind] the finerealm (pranta-dhatuka) come about after those in the bad realm(hina-dhatuka), [states of mind] in the fine realm come aboutafter those in the middle realm (madhya-dhatuka), and so on downto [states of mind] in the bad realm come about after those inthe fine realm; and since contaminated (slsrava) [states of mind]come about after uncontaminated (anasrava) ones, transcendental(lokottara) [states of mind] come about after worldly (laukika)ones and worldly [states of mind] come about aftertranscendental ones it is impossible (na yujyate) for these to beseed-states (tesam tatha bijatvam). Also (tasmld api), it is125impossible (na yujyate) [for the set of six consciousness to bethe location of seeds] because a [mental] continuum (samtati)that has been severed, even for an extended period (dirgha-kala-samucchina-api ca), comes forth after a long period of time(cirena kalena pravartate).The idea that the six sense-consciousness can mutually 'see' oneanother is a Sautrantika view. It is rejected in favour of theidea that the'glaya acts as the receptacle for all `seeds'---future possibilities of action and sensation---even when theseeds have incompatible qualities.5) The Impossibility of ActionKena karapengsatyam yugapad vijnanapravrttau karma na sambhavati/ tathghi samgsatas caturvidham karma/ bhajanavigraptir5gruaviiiraptir aham iti viMptir visayavijriaptis ceti/ etaviplaptaya4 ksane ksane yugapat pravartaming upalabhyante/ nacaikasya vijftnasyalksmin ksane idam evam-rripam vyatibhinnamkarma yujyate//translation:By what reason (kena karanena) an action does not occur (karma nasambhavati), if a number of consciousness could not functionsimultaneously (asatyam yugapad vijiranapravrttau)? This is, inbrief (samasatah) because action is fourfold (tathahicaturvidhamkarama):a) Perception of environment (bhajanavijriapti).b) Perception of basis, i.e. the physical body of oneself andothers (5grayavijitapti).c) Perception of thinking "I" (ahamitivijnapti).d) Perception of objects (visayavij/rapti).These [four kinds of] appearance or knowledge (eta vijiraptayah)are experienced (upalabhyante) as functioning conjointly (yugaptapravarta-mana) in every moment (ksane ksane):thus it is not possible (na ca - yujyate) that action (karma)analyzed in the [fourfold] manner (idam evam-rupam vyatibhinnam)should be attributed to a .tingle [sense]-consciousness in asingle moment (ekasya vijnana-ekasmin ksane).Here the term pratibhasa is used instead of vijiiapti and the fourcategories are artha (for bhajana), sattva (for 7A'raya), atma(for aham) and vijriaptit (for visaya). Despite the differences interminology, the general point remains the same that is allexperience in every moment, according to the Yoggcara, has thesestructures.1266) The Impossibility of Physical ExperienceKena kgraneng-saty_glaya-vijrigne kgyiko'nubhavo (kgyikolnubhavah)na yujyate / tathahyekayasya yonigo va'yonigo va cintayatova'nuvitarkayato va samlhita-cetaso va'samghita-cetaso ye kgyekgylnubhavg utpadyant'neka-vidha bahu-ngna-prakgras to nabhaveyur upalabhyante ca / tasmgd apy asty glaya-vijrignam //translation:Were there to be no glaya-vijnana (asaty glaya-vijAgna), why canthere be no (kena karanena-na yujyate) bodily experience(kayiko'nubhavah)? This is so because (tathahy), for one who isthinking (cintayat) or engaged in mental analysis (anuvitarkayat)correctly (yonigah) or incorrectly (ayonigah); for one whose mindis concentrated (samahita-cetas) or unconcentrated (asamahita-cetas)_[for all these] those manifold (anekavidha) and variegated(bahunangprakgrgh) [if there were no glaya-vijiigna],these bodilyexperiences do not occur. They are, howev2E, experiential fact.Therefore (tasmgd apy) there is Ilaya-vijnana-vijrignam).7) The Impossibility of Mindless AttainmentsKena klrapengsaty g"laya-vijiine'cittg sailpattir na sambhavati /tathl. hy 	 asamjrii-samapannasya vg nirodha-samapannasya va virrignameva kaygd apakr1ntam syat / nghapakrantam tatah kgla-kriyaivabhavet / yathoktam bhagavatg---vijngnam cgsya kgygd apakrgntambhavatiti//translation:For what reason (kena Kargpena) there can be no (na sambhavati)mindless attainment (acitta samapattih) if there is so because(tathahy), [if there were no glaya-vijrigna], there would be the[absurd] consequence that the consciousness (vijtana) of one whohas attained either Absorption into the state of an unconsciousbeing (asamjni-samapanna) or Absorption into cessation (nirodha-samapanna) would have departed from that person's body(kyadapakrantam syat). If it did not depart (nanaprakrantam),then (tatah) he simply dies (kala-kriyaivabhavet).8) The Impossibility of DeathKena kgrapengsaty glaya-vijrigne cyutir (cyuti) api na yujyate /tathlhi cyavamgnasya vijrianam iirdhava-deham (urdhva-deha) vagiti-kurvan vijahgti, adho-deham (adho-deha) vg / na ca mano-vijnanam kadacin na pravartate / ato'py 'glaya-viihgnasyaivadehopgdgnakasy vigamld deha-sitatg (deha-sitata) upa[la]bhyatedehipratisamvedang (dehapratisamvedana) ca / na to mano-vijrignasya (mano-vijngna) // ato' pi na yujyate//127translation:If there were no alaya-vijnana (asaty alaya vijnane), why can(kena kgra9ena) death (cyuti) not occur (na yujyate)? This isbecause (tathahi), the consciousness of one who is dying(cyavamgnasya vijhgnam) abandons (vijahati), growing cold (sitikurvakurvan) either from the top of the body (urdhvr-deha) or thebottom of the body (adho-deha). But there is never a time ( na-kadacin) when the mano-virigna is not functioning (manovijngnam-na pravartate). So it is because of (ato'py) the departure of theXlaya-viAgna (glaya-vijilignasya-vigamad), which acts asappropriate of the body (deha-upadanakasya), that the coldness ofthe body (deha-"gitatg) and lack of sensation (deha-apratisamvedana) are experienced (upabhyate). It is not becauseof the departure of mano-vi/rigna (na to mano-vijrignasya).Therefore (ato'pi) [death] also cannot occur (na yujate) [withoutthe Ilaya-vigigna].The metaphor of the body cooling at the moment of death eitherfrom the top down or from the bottom up relates to the Buddhistideas about the future destiny of the dying person. The personwill go either 'upwards', to one of the heavenly realms, or`downwards', to one of the hells, depending on spiritualcondition and the weight and flavour of their accumulated karma.In the former case, the person dies from the feet upwards as theIlaya-vijtIna ascends through the top of the head on its way torebirth in a higher cosmic realm; in the latter, the person diesfrom the head downwards. The point of this eighth proof is todemonstrate that 1) death is defined as the departure ofconsciousness from the body. 2) all the i)ossible types ofconsciousness with the exception of the alaya-viiii5na arestraightforwardly intentional; i.e., they have distinct objectsand definite modes of functioning. 3) a full explanation of theprocess of death requires the postulation of a type ofconsciousness that is not intentional. 4) death can only beexplained by postulating the existence of the alaya-vijAgna.

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