UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Neighbourhood disaster planning Lacasse, Andrea Lynne 1992

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-ubc_1992_spring_lacasse_andrea.pdf [ 5.26MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0086467.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0086467-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0086467-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0086467-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0086467-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0086467-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0086467-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0086467-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0086467.ris

Full Text

NEIGHBOURHOOD DISASTER PLANNINGbyANDREA LYNNE LACASSEB.A., University of Victoria, 1979A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THEREQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESCommunity and Regional PlanningWe accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA30 April 1992© Andrea Lynne LaCasse, 1992In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature) Department of 3eilL6CL^6}R/in,L1/iti_^697,51/01 P/CA/1/0/-)The University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDateDE-6 (2/88)ABSTRACTResearch indicates the need for emergency personnel to concentrate theirefforts on preparedness and mitigation, as opposed to short-term recovery needs.This pro-active approach would necessitate such tasks as building communityparticipation into plans, concentrating on process planning to encourage creative andinnovative thought, simplifying the disaster plan through the use of an all-hazard, all-phase framework, and raising the profile and status of the emergency profession.One of the major problems in the disaster planning field has been the failureto involve community in the planning process. Disaster plans primarily deal with thephysical/technical side of the disaster response, but it has been shown that hostilityand aggression is likely to arise when community involvement in the response andrecovery phases is neglected.In the mid-1980's, the United States began the task of setting upneighbourhood disaster response teams to teach communities self-reliance in theevent of a disaster. In Canada, the first case of a neighbourhood-level plan wasinitiated in June 1990 in the community of Burkeville, City of Richmond, BritishColumbia. This thesis documents Burkeville's disaster planning experience. Througha detailed examination of a 'bottom-up' planning process, we can learn about thepositive and negative attributes of this model over traditional 'top-down' planningapproaches. This thesis links theoretical propositions and research with theneighbourhood disaster planning process in Burkeville, to contribute suggestions forpractice.One highlight of the Burkeville experience has been the indication thatitneighbourhood disaster plans depend on a top-down push from government toencourage and support community actions, and a bottom-up drive by the communityto take on emergency planning and preparedness responsibilities. Secondly,emergency personnel must move away from producing highly detailed, voluminousplans and focus on process planning. Thirdly, neighbourhood disaster plans will needto concentrate on volunteer management issues; how to motivate individuals to getinvolved in emergency planning and preparedness, how to keep them involved, andwhat planning processes techniques are more effective to use at the community/neighbourhood level.It is hoped that the information gleaned from this thesis (theory, research, casestudy) will assist public and private organizations in developing strategies and planswhich take into account community actions and practical realities. As the need fortrained community involvement becomes more apparent from each disasterexperience, the need for techniques to develop an effective community responsebecomes a pressing priority matter. This thesis provides an insight into a communitydisaster planning process, to help motivate emergency personnel and local citizens tobegin the task of disaster preparedness and mitigation in their community.iiiTABLE OF CONTENTSAbstract ^  iiAcknowledgements ^  vii1. Introduction  12. Planning Theories and Principles to Guide the Development of aNeighbourhood-Level Disaster Response Plan ^  32.1. J. Friedmann's Theory of Social Transformation ^ 42.2. Principles of Public Participation and Citizen Empowerment^ 52.2.1. Public Participation  52.2.2. Citizen Empowerment ^  72.2.3. Networking ^  82.3. Community Development Principles  92.4. Disaster Planning Theory and Principles  112.4.1. Theory  112.4.2. Principles ^  122.5. The Principles of Process Planning ^  152.6. Summary^  173. Disaster Planning Literature Review  183.1. Emergency Planning Perspectives ^  193.1.1. Professionalism  193.1.2. Lack of 'Community' Participation ^  193.1.3. Process Planning Versus Plan-Production ^ 213.1.4. The All-Hazard, All-Phase Approach  243.1.5. Public Versus Private Interests  273.1.6. Individuals in Perspective ^  283.2. Government Perspectives ^  293.2.1. Government Funding  293.2.2. Resources  313.2.3. Getting on the Political Agenda ^  323.2.4. Provincial and Municipal Legislation  343.2.5. Planning versus the Plan  373.2.6. Public versus Private Rights  393.2.7. Other Important Issues ^  393.3. Community Perspectives  413.3.1. The Role of the Community in a Disaster ^ 413.3.2. Why is Community Involvement So Important? ^ 423.3.2.1. Communities Must be Prepared for the FirstSeventy-Two Hours. ^  433.3.2.2. Local Governments Do Not Have TheResources To Cope  43iv3.3.2.3. Basic Rescue And Response Teams EmergeNaturally In The Field ^  443.3.2.4. The Emergency Response Is Related To theSocial/Demographic CharacteristicsOf The Community  463.3.2.5. Community Participation Can Shorten TheRecovery Period ^  473.3.2.6. Personal Responsibility  493.3.3. Community involvement issues  503.3.3.1^Motivation  503.3.3.2^Perceptions of Mastery^  513.3.3.3.^Priorities ^  523.3.3.4. Lack of Legitimacy  523.3.3.5. Scarcity of Leadership Skills ^ 533.3.3.6. Emergency Planning Lacks A 'Community'Process ^  543.3.3.7. Vulnerability Issue Remains Unchanged ^ 543.3.3.8. Inadequate Disaster Relief ^ 553.3.3.9. Lack of Awareness  563.4. Summary^  564. A Neighbourhood Disaster Plan: The Burkeville Emergency Response Team(B.E.R.T.), Richmond, British Columbia ^  584.1. Burkeville, Richmond - Background Information ^ 594.2. Strategies/Planning Assumptions  614.2.1. Goals ^  624.2.2. Objectives  624.3. Process (The Seven Magic Steps) ^  634.4. Project Development - A Diary of Events ^  654.5. Project Details ^  754.5.1. Professionalism  754.5.2. External Support ^  774.5.3. Community Skills/Training ^  784.5.4. The Plan  804.6. Future Directions  814.6.1. Richmond ^  814.6.2. Burkeville/Hamilton^  834.7. Summary^  845. An Analysis  875.1. Introduction  875.2. The Relationship Between Theory, Research, and The Case Study .^875.2.1. Principles of Public Participation/Citizen Empowerment ..^885.2.2. Community Development Principles ^ 925.2.3. Disaster Planning Theory and Principles  935.2.4. Process Planning ^  985.3. Positive and Negative Attributes of The Burkeville NeighbourhoodvDisaster Planning Process ^  1015.3.1. Positive Attributes  1025.3.2. Negative Attributes  1035.4. Summary 1056. Conclusion ^  107Bibliography  109AppendicesAppendix A - Cities Adopting Good Emergency Practices (Based on370 Respondents) ^  117Appendix B - Hazard Assessment (Burkeville) ^  118Appendix C - Questionnaire - City of Richmond  119Appendix D - Future Goals (August 1990) - Burkeville ^ 121Appendix E - General Emergency Procedures for All Task Groups(Burkeville Emergency Plan) ^  123Appendix F - Medical/First Aid Team (Burkeville Emergency Plan) ^ 124viACKNOWLEDGEMENTSDesigning and implementing the first neighbourhood-level disaster plan inCanada was a golden opportunity to learn about the realities of disaster managementon a small-scale planning level. It was a wonderful experience, but the pilot projectwould not have been possible without the help of others. Many individualscontributed their skills and resources to the project (often on a volunteer basis), butin particular I would like to thank the following:Mr. Don Maclver, Emergency Co-ordinator, Richmond, for hiring and keeping me ontrack with his ideas, knowledge, and sense of humour.The Community of Burkeville, Richmond, for their willingness to participate, andtheir enthusiasm.Ms. Lynne Heddy, Richmond Red Cross, for her volunteer efforts, and herenthusiastic promotion of Burkeville's neighbourhood disaster plan.Mr. Don McComb, Richmond ESS Director, who has done a tremendous job withRichmond's disaster volunteers, including the Burkeville team.Mr. Bob Gordon, Richmond Fire Trainer, for his volunteer efforts in setting up alight search and rescue course for Burkeville.Dr. Henry Hightower, University of British Columbia, for his confidence, and hisvalued support and advice.Professor Peter Boothroyd, University of British Columbia, for his poignantcomments, and laughing at all my jokes.Frances LaCasse, my mother, who assisted with my children during the first year atschool.And, lastly, my friend David Cowan, who was there to assist and pick up the pieceswhen the going got tough.vii1. INTRODUCTIONDisaster planning, with the exception of planning for war, took root in Canadain the 1950's. Over the past forty years disaster planning has struggled to move froman occupational status into a profession. With a growing awareness that localgovernments (the focal point of disaster planning) do not have the resources andskills to cope with a large-scale disaster, emergency departments are beginning toseek community input into disaster plans. Much of their efforts have concentrated oneducating and informing the public on disaster preparedness strategies to reduce theloss of life and property.In the mid-1980's the United States (in particular, California) took the conceptof community involvement several steps further by introducing the idea ofneighbourhood disaster response teams. Through training and education,neighbourhoods can be taught to be self-sufficient for a minimum of three dayswithout having to depend on local government resources or other emergency responseorganizations which would be overwhelmed with requests for assistance. In Canada,the first case of a neighbourhood-level disaster response capacity was developed inthe community of Burkeville, City of Richmond, in June 1990.The thesis first provides an overview of theory and empirical research relevantto emergency planning and community participation in order to put the need forcitizen involvement into perspective, and to suggest ways to avoid the pitfalls typicallyassociated with 'para-military top-down' plans. As indicated in Chapter 2, there islittle theory to guide a 'bottom-up' approach to neighbourhood-level disaster planning.The empirical research outlined in Chapter 3 is also limited and piecemeal which12adds to the difficulty of designing an effective disaster planning process which takesinto account citizens behaviour following a disaster. The detailed presentation of theBurkeville disaster planning experience in Chapter 4 suggests one solution to aid localgovernments in disaster planning and response, and provides a planning guide foraction. There are no known critiques of neighbourhood disaster plans in NorthAmerica. We need to know more about the potential community's have in assistinggovernments prepare for disasters, and what strategies best suit the needs ofcommunity members.Chapter 5 analyzes the relationships between theory, research and the casestudy. The thesis concludes by summarizing the implications of neighbourhooddisaster plans in the realm of disaster planning, with some suggestions for furtherstudy.32. PLANNING 111EORIES AND PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE litt, DEVELOPMENTOF A NEIGHBOURHOOD-LEVEL DISASTER RESPONSE PLANAs indicated in the Introductory Chapter, there are no existing detaileddescriptions or critiques of neighbourhood disaster planning processes. In order todevelop community participation strategies, we need to look at the trends emerging inthe field of disaster management. Unfortunately, the written material on the subjectof disaster planning theory is negligible. To assist with the task of building ourknowledge base to produce better plans, a search was undertaken under the guise ofgeneral planning theory and principles, outlining those theorems believed to berelevant to guide a bottom-up planning process.The trend in planning is toward greater public participation in areas whichhave in the past been exclusively the government's domain. There is a growingrealization that public involvement has many advantages which can outweigh theapparent disadvantages perceived by government (the latter defines the bottom-linefor citizen involvement in public decision-making). Disaster planning is one areawhere the need for public input and involvement is crucial to the 'success' of adisaster response. In order to build community input into disaster plans, we need togather knowledge about 'bottom-up' processes to encourage, motivate, and gaincommitment from citizens to take on a personal disaster responsibility.This chapter outlines the theories and principles which shed some light oncommunity empowerment and community development trends. As the last section ondisaster planning theory/principles suggests, we need to move away from a traditionaldisaster planning framework (standard operating procedures) into designing creative4planning processes which include both the organization and the individual.2.1. J. FRIEDMANN'S THEORY OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONAs the complexity of our world increases, planning has been relied on as ameans to simplify and direct that change. Planning theory acts to condense the worldaround us to a manageable level to bring about positive change.John Friedmann (1987) discusses historical changes in planning, and classifiesthese changes into four traditions of planning theory - social reform, policy analysis,social learning, and social mobilization. The 1980's reflected an inability of pasttheories to bring about real change, consequently Friedmann added a fifth dimension,Social Transformation. He believes that our present crisis, unmet challenges, existsbecause knowledge and action have come apart. He sees three major problem areaswhich have given rise to this crisis:1. The crisis of knowing.2. The crisis of the accelerated pace of historical events.3.^The crisis of the unprecedented nature of events we face.Friedmann suggests that the accelerated flow of events has risen to the point whereour understanding of the world is actually decreasing. His solution is salvation by re-centering political power in civil society, through a re-structured household economy.Friedmann does not delve into the mechanics of Transformation Theory otherthan to suggest that access to power is through selective de-linking, collective self-empowerment, and self-reliance, starting with the single household. Small actiongroups can play a decisive role by taking over `left-over' areas which pose no threat tothe basic configuration of power. If public opinion is considered a threat to the5present power structure and status quo, it is unlikely that any real power to thepeople will be given: as Friedmann suggests, individuals/families/groups will have tobe satisfied with the left-over' areas for the time-being.2.2. PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND CITIZENEMPOWERMENT2.2.1. Public ParticipationPublic participation has been broadly defined to include "all persons, groups,and/or organizations that have a 'perceived' stake in the results of a decision,excluding government and corporations" (Gardner, 1991).Over the past 20 years, a growing number of public participation groups haveemerged on the scene. Despite their proliferation, there has been very little writtenabout the impact of these groups on the social/political milieu (Nerfin, 1987:1).Public pressure appears to be mounting to give citizens a greater voice in what hashistorically been government 'business', and this pressure is unlikely to abate. Peopleare demanding greater participation in decisions directly affecting the quality of theirlives and their environment, along with a growing unwillingness to let outside actionsdetract from that quality (Lang and Armour, 1980:301).Why public involvement? A government (US) manual on risk communicationentitled "Improving Dialogue with Communities", suggests that public participation isnecessary for the following reasons (Hance, et al., 1988:32):1. People are entitled to be involved in issues that directly affect them.2. Involvement in the process leads to a greater understanding, and more6appropriate actions by the community (to a particular risk).3. The input of those who live with the risk everyday and are familiar with theirown needs can lead to better policy decisions and solutions.4. Co-operation between agencies and citizens can increase that agency'scredibility .5. Community outrage is reduced.Other advantages include (Gardner, 1991):6. Re-distribution of public power and enhancement of the democratic process.7. Greater accountability for decisions.8. Better decisions (by working toward equitable solutions).9. Eradication of bias and social injustice.10. Increased individual and community satisfaction.11.^Seeking technical inputs and value preferences for decision-making.Sally Lerner (1986:55-60) states that there are three corrective functions ofvolunteer groups in relation to the dominant societal institutions :1. Prophetic Function - Their role is to correct conditions, policies, and practicesin business and government that are hazardous, de-personalizing, or unjust.2. Supplemental Function - Volunteer organizations aid or replace governmentagencies in providing services.3.^Modelling Function - volunteer groups are sources of organization experimentand innovation.For volunteer groups to survive (short and long-term), P. Pross (1986:8) statesthat three things must be offered to its members; social rewards (ie. friendships),psychic rewards, and the belief that individuals can 'make a difference' .In terms of assessing citizen group effectiveness, there is very little theory orpractical application to draw from. In addition, the limited evaluation methodologiesundertaken by institutions cannot be easily or effectively transferred to non-governmental organizations due to their differences in purpose, goals, process anddesired outcome (Gardner, 1991). A second problem associated with evaluationmethodologies are their inherent lack of `testability'; there is no scale to measurewhat is acceptable - all decisions (on a criteria by criteria basis) rest with the7evaluating agency. The subjective nature of this evaluation can be easily mismanagedif in the hands of a manipulative agency. One example is the Ministry ofEnvironment's new approach to 'public consultation'. Their approach is designed toenhance their public image, reduce conflict, reduce time, make implementation easier,and be pro-active (Gardner, 1991) - any process used to achieve these results couldbe construed as 'effective' whether or not it is a fair process. Joan Vance (1990:70)points out that "because there are no right answers in inherently subjective decisions,numerous outcomes are both possible and legitimate. While the source of conflictcan appear to be over fact, it is usually a difference in beliefs and values". Theoutcome depends on who is doing the assessment, and for what purpose.In North America, governments define the 'bottom-line' for citizen involvementin public decision-making; the result is often minimal participation from the public.12.2. Citizen EmpowermentJohn Forester (1989) redefines the concept of planning in terms ofcommunicative action. He argues that information is a complex source of power, andit is the lack of information exchanges on all sides which represents the criticalproblem for decision-making. Information is a source of power because it enables theparticipation of citizens and avoids legitimizing the capitalist structure. In reality, thepublic has limited access to information, and public participation is reactive ratherthan proactive. As Forester points out, the power and ability to act and invest in thissociety are unequally distributed and those inequalities provide and shape the contextin which planners, public administrators, and decision-makers more generally work8and act. He believes that planners must assess encompassing power structures andrecognize how their own actions can either work to discourage or encourage citizenorganization.Many non-governmental organizations believe that true citizen/publicinvolvement only comes with the sharing of power and direct input into the decision-making process. Sherry Arnstein's ladder of citizen empowerment ranges frommanipulation to citizen control (1969:216-224). She believes that citizen power indetermining a plan or program only begins at the partnership level. A secondviewpoint held by Joan Vance recognizes citizen control as the pinnacle of citizenparticipation (1990:68-72).2.23. NetworkingNetworking focuses primarily on communication. It is defined by Webster'sdictionary as "the exchange of information or services among individuals, groups, andorganizations". Nerfin (1987:380) believes that networking is invaluable in the life ofa volunteer group: "being multidimensional, they stimulate imagination andinnovation. They foster solidarity and a sense of belonging. They expand the sphereof freedom and autonomy". The importance of networking cannot be under-estimated. Networking can occur on different geographic levels, between movementsof a similar nature, and/or between groups of a different type. For all linkages,networking has the advantage that it can (Gardner, 1990):1. Increase efficiency by sharing information and other resources.2. Respond to a crisis more quickly by mobilizing information, resources, andsupport.93. Increase the range of contacts and entry points into decision-making.4. Experience a sense of community support.5. Train and share leadership.6. Increase political clout through greater numbers and effective integration ofrelated interests.7.^Provide support for grass-roots conservation efforts on a small scale.Despite the obvious advantages of networking, Stuart Langton (1984:133)points out that unfortunately, "in everyday practice, agencies do not seek each otherout for the purposes of resource exchange; each agency sees itself as independent ofall others, depending only on its own subsidized resources...and nurturing the fantasythat there must or should exist the quantity and quality of resources that could ensurea safe and goal-fulfilling life".2.3. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLESCommunity development is a bottom-up development strategy where localcitizens take charge of their future. This practice has been undertaken primarily foreconomic reasons where traditional top-down recovery methods fail to produce thedesired results. In some cases, communities have incorporated a social reformelement in their short and long-term goals. One example is New Dawn, a non-profitcorporation in Cape Breton which combines business with social and cultural activitiesto contribute to community development (MacLeod, 1986:20). On a grander scale,Mondragon, Spain, is virtually a regional co-operative where the entire population issustained socially, culturally, and economically from the 'cradle to the grave'. Co-operative enterprises are the most common form of community development projects.In North America, the modern economy operates as if there were no law of10entropy (M'Gonigle and Michael, 1986:301). Economic inequalities are present, andthe disparity gap is widening despite the injection of government funds into specificareas of the economy. During the mid-1970's, the 'Small is Beautiful' school ofthought was born - its basic message was that an imbalance existed which was one ofover-centralization. Their solution was decentralization, to explore ways to developlocal economies and technologies that use local resources on a sustainable basis(M'Gonigle and Michael, 1986:301). A more recent proposal to bring society intobalance was put forward by Weaver in his political strategy for regional development(in Hill, 1989:50):"A political strategy...amounts to mobilizing local labour power to createself-reliant economic well-being, typically in marginalized peripherallocations. Starting with use-value production for the individual andliving group, it provides a mechanism for promoting wider forms ofpetty commodity production and exchange".North American governments have begun jumping on the communitydevelopment bandwagon, by providing initiatives to local areas to improve theireconomic/employment base. Neighbourhoods, localities, and/or regions are given agreater capacity to determine their own economic destiny (Economic Council ofCanada, 1990:18):"We [The Economic Council of Canada] therefore support thecommunity economic development approach, with the caveat that itcannot be a panacea for the problems of every community faced witheconomic diversity. At the same time we stress the importance ofapplying public sector assistance in ways that do not stifle theenthusiasm and innovativeness of local development organizations.Arrangements should be as flexible and as unbureaucratic as possible".The emphasis is on the economic side of community recovery, but theEconomic Council supports the notion that community-based projects are moresensitive to local needs. It is the direct application of planning with people, as11opposed to for. The community development approach may be the only plausiblealternative when top-down plans fail.2.4. DISASTER PLANNING THEORY AND PRINCIPLES2.4.1. TheoryLittle theory has emerged, despite four decades of research. Though there hasbeen "some attempt to render the findings of separate disaster studies into formalpropositions, the study of disasters has yet to turn the corner and move into a phaseof systematic, consciously undertaken tests of theory" (Stallings, 1987:1). We needtheory "simply to provide a way to organize one's data", ... [but] "it has been used adhoc to organize and inform descriptive findings" (Stallings, 1987:17-19). Quarantelli(1978:7) stated that both empirical and theoretical research was desperately needed,and there was almost a total absence of simple descriptive accounts of disasters. Heemphasized the need for model building and comprehension of inter-organizationalrelationships.Robert Stallings (1987:1-2), in his attempt to advance sociological theoryconstruction of disaster behaviour, focused on the single hypothesis that "as normaldaily interaction between organizations increases, the problem of co-ordination in adisaster decreases". This hypothesis had been accepted as a fact although it hadnever been tested. Stallings believed that this hypothesis (and others) may defytesting in the conventional sense. One reason given is pre-impact data cannot becollected in advance. A second reason is the tenuous fit between theory and disaster12studies:"...Those components of the theory so used stand out, while othercomponents that either do not fit or are irrelevant to the case underexamination are ignored. This selectivity in the use of theory is oftenoverlooked because interest lies not in explicating theory, but inunderstanding the case itself. Over time the repeated use of the sametheory in the same way creates the illusion that it has somehow been`tested' in the several instances of its application. If one's goal is tounderstand human behaviour in disasters, this is acceptable. If one'sgoal is to construct theory, this is unacceptable " (Stallings, 1987:20).During the 1970's, research shifted away from individual behaviour in crisis,with organization and community responses to social disruption coming to dominatedisaster research (Quarantelli, 1978:4).2.4.2. PrinciplesLouise Comfort (1988:5) characterizes emergency environments as havingthree conditions - uncertainty, interaction, and complexity. Through design, shepostulates we can simplify complexity to bring about action. She states that there isno known equation for 'uncertainty' in public management, though it is a fundamentalconcept. We need to design plans which help mitigate the effects of uncertainty -Comfort recommends incorporating the following into emergency plans:1. Creativity.2. Involvement of the organization and the individual.3. Cumulative effects.4. Feedback.5.^A time factor.Comfort maintains that common sense must be incorporated into the process. Oneexample is the 'call for assistance' policy as a standard operating agreement betweendepartments - emergency personnel now realize that they need to check on those13places they had not heard from.Our ability to act depends on three things - the decision-making process, thepriority setting given to the situation, and our ability to manage information (Comfort,1988:24)).The Decision-Making ProcessResearch tells us that standard operating procedures are inadequate tools tocope with out-of-ordinary events. There is also the charge that rational planning mayactually inhibit a problem-solving process in dynamic, uncertain conditions (Comfort,1988:345). No theory per se has emerged from these findings, but two trends havesurfaced:^1.^Herbert Simon's "The Structure of Ill-Structured Problems" (the transformationof one large problem into sets of smaller well-structured problems):a. Define the goal or desired outcome(s).b. Decompose the larger problem into smaller segments.c. Evaluate actions taken in separate segments against the overall goal.2.^a. Identify the commonality of function between two or more subjects.b. Those actions that function effectively stay.In the absence of time (and information), the 'quick and dirty' approach canenable one to get started; that is, what to put emphasis on, what to do, what to letslide by (Hightower, 1989). If the outcome is a process for problem solving (asopposed to a plan), there is opportunity for modification as new information becomesavailable.14Priority SettingPriority setting is very important in a fuzzy, ill-structured environment, for allemergency phases (Comfort, 1988:17). The setting of priorities cannot take placewithout a clear understanding of hazards (and their secondary effects), and aconsensus among those who are in a position to make decisions. One must first beable to 'see' a risk before any action becomes possible. Sociologists who have studiedrisk perception in depth cannot agree which of two theories best fits reality (Stallings,1987:49): the first, Social Factist Theory, states that social forces are "thingsthemselves" with properties which can be measured (though only partially orimperfectly glimpsed by participants); the second tradition, Social Definitions, statesthat the only 'real' thing about social forces is the mental picture people have of them(i.e. subjective phenomena).Even when the risks are known it is difficult to achieve consensus:"People are rarely aware of all the alternatives open to them...Theydiffer greatly in the way they judge the consequences of particularactions even on the rare occasions when the physical outcomes areknown accurately. The comparison of many different consequences is ahighly complex operation [even] for a decision-maker" (Perry, 1983:67).Management of InformationManagement of information and the ability to communicate effectively in adisaster situation is critical. The communication component is known to be theweakest link in the system, and it is usually the first thing to break down in a disaster.The focus of any planning task group should be on communication/information needs.15The Natural Hazards Observer (1986) took a look at the effectiveness of theU.S. national earthquake hazard reduction programmes over the previous ten years -what they found was the programmes probably prevented things from getting worse,but the greatest need was not for new knowledge or engineering methods, but formore effective implementation of the capabilities they already had.2.5. THE PRINCIPLES OF PROCESS PLANNINGP. Boothroyd (1989) defines planning as a process by which an individual,group, organization, or community decides where it wants to go (goals), and how it isgoing to get there (objectives). P Hall (1980:1) believes planning can be separatedinto two distinct processes:1. A set of processes whereby decision-makers engage in logical foresight beforecommitting themselves. These include problem definition, problem analysis,goal and objective setting, forecasting, problem projection, design of alternativesolutions, decision-processes, implementation processes, monitoring, control,and updating.2. Processes which result in a physical plan.Planning comes before action, and evaluation comes after (Boothroyd, 1989:1).P. Boothroyd states that planning produces three outputs - action which leads tochange, written plans, and feelings and ideas. Action is the most important output.B. Hance, et al. (1988:12), contends that process is (almost) everything:Everyone - academic experts, practitioners, and citizen leaders - agreesthat the process by which agencies make decisions is crucial...In moststories that involved citizen action to a government proposal, theopposition was not only to the action, but also to the manner in whichthe agency proceeded towards that action".Uncertainties pervade the decision-making process. James March describes16the decision-making process as 'The Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice'(In Petak, 1989:4):1. Information is always imperfect.2. Time is always inadequate, so we deal with the most burning issues.3.^Not everyone values the issues, problems, and solutions equally.Herbert Simon's 'Theory of Bounded Rationality' conveys asimilar meaning:"Cognitive limitations of the decision maker force him to construct asimplified model of the world to deal with it. The key principle ofbounded rationality is the notion of `satisficing' where an organismstrives to obtain some satisfaction, though not necessarily maximal, levelof achievement" (Slovic, et al., 1974 in Perry, 1983:67).What is needed is "a model which demystifies planning and brings it undercommunity control while increasing the communities effectiveness in defining andreaching goals" (Boothroyd, 1989:2). Planning skills are also needed to cope withincreasing change, complexity, and conflict. These skills cannot be taught by usingdetailed sector-specific substantive planning recipes especially at the non-professionallevel. We also need to know how to use people's ideas and feelings. Unfortunately,there is little in the academic literature to assist with this task.Peter Boothroyd (1989) believes that community leaders, staff, and advisorsare hungry for planning process concepts and techniques to help them plan. Basedon his experience working with communities, Boothroyd designed a planning processwhich can guide even the most inexperienced through difficult problem-solvingsituations (see Section 4.3 for detail). The first step in any planning project is to finda comfortable, effective process which can be assimilated by all participants.172.6. SUMMARYThis chapter indicates our limited knowledge surrounding citizen participationprocesses, despite the fact that these groups have proliferated in number over thepast two decades. Acceptance of citizen involvement in 'government business',particularly in the decision-making process, has been slow to materialize, but it isgaining momentum.When the delegation of power and responsibility from government to localcitizens becomes possible, there may be a need to aid these groups/individuals in theinitial start-up phase. We have yet to understand what motivates individuals to getinvolved, and how community project's survive the long-term. Good process planningtechniques are believed to be crucial to community participation, that is to set goalsappropriate to community needs, and to act on people's feelings, ideas and beliefs. Itis difficult to teach communities to help plan for themselves when leaders, and otherprofessionals, struggle with similar problems due to the lack of planning expertise.This problem is exacerbated in disaster planning where the issues of uncertainty,complexity, and interaction pervade all phases of disaster planning and management.A second primary source of information to understand the disasterenvironment is research. Chapter Three outlines the effectiveness of disastermanagement as it presently stands and provides some suggestions for futurestrategies.183. DISASTER PLANNING LITERATURE REVIEWThe purpose of the literature review is to discern what obstacles remain asbarriers to effective emergency management, and what potential steps can lead toequitable solutions. We need to know what factors motivate governments andcommunities to move toward good emergency practices, and what those practices are.Though the process will likely differ between governmental and non-governmentalorganizations due to their differences in purpose, goals, and desired outcome, bothstakeholders will be faced by obstacles generic to the disaster planning field. Thereare some obstacles which specifically relate to government, while others are primarilya concern of communities. For this reason, the literature review has been divided upinto three sections - Emergency Management Perspectives, Government Perspectives,and Community Perspectives.It is suggested that we have the physical/technical knowledge to markedlyimprove our disaster response capacity, but we need to improve our understanding ofsocial and political behaviours. In 1987 the United States (U.S.) governmentendorsed the International Decade for Natural Hazard Reduction, and established theU.S. Decade for Natural Hazard Reduction the following year (Natural HazardsResearch Applications Information Center, 1989). From experience, the U.S.government discovered that "...we have enough knowledge already, if properlyapplied, to reduce both human and property losses substantially...Progress in scientificand technical understanding of natural hazards as well as techniques to mitigate theireffects, has led to the [Decade]". William Petak (1984:291), on natural hazardmitigation in the U.S., found that "the major obstacles to hazard mitigation in the19U.S. have been far less of a technical or legal character, and far more of a social,political, economic or administrative nature". The information presented in thisChapter focuses on the latter.3.1. EMERGENCY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES3.1.1. ProfessionalismThe emergency management field is in the process of evolving from the statusof an occupation to a profession, but it has been slow to materialize (Waugh,1990:230; Perry, 1983; Drabek, 1991:23). Without professional accreditation,emergency management is the 'Rodney Dangerfield' of government priorities..."it justdon't get no respect" (Feigenbaum, and Ford, 1984:1). A few results are:1. Hazard officials often devote only part-time to hazard mitigation (Cigler,1988:42).2. Hazard officials are a diverse group (different educational backgrounds/different occupations).3. Lack of financial support.4. Limited training.5. Lack of legislation to enforce emergency planning.6. No sense of responsibility or accountability by the people in the system(Varnes, 1984:6).3.1.2. Lack of 'Community' ParticipationCommunity, for the purpose of this thesis, is defined as the intermediate stagebetween individuals and families on the one hand, and society on the other (Melnyk,1985:135).20One of the more controversial issues in planning surrounds the lack ofcommunity participation in governmental planning processes. Disaster planning is noexception. Despite having a great potential to assist in a disaster, the private sector isa neglected resource. Potential community resources include volunteer organizations,private business/industry, local emergency organizations (amateur radio operators,Church groups), and dedicated individuals. Even well-established volunteeremergency organizations tend to work within their own disaster mandate (SalvationArmy, Red Cross).The patterns of interaction between the public and private sector range fromlaissez-faire to promotion, encouragement, co-operation, inducement, and regulation(Ruchelman, 1988:54). At a basic participatory level, public input is needed forcompliance with warnings, evacuations, and survival measures. One of the manylessons learned from the Edmonton Tornado (1987) was the need to educate thepublic about self-help actions to take in different kinds of emergencies (Wilson inLaughy, 1989:17).Most citizens accept emergency management as an appropriate function ofgovernment which is detrimental to personal preparedness (Drabek, 1991:22).Research has found that community resistance to emergency planning can beovercome if someone in authority takes initiative, usually the mayor (Scanlon,1991:79). Disaster planners must realize the potential of public demands to raise thepriority [and consciousness] of disaster preparedness in their jurisdiction (Laughy,1989:14).Hazard mitigation is a two-way street - before an individual will take any typeof adjustment to an environmental threat s/he must be aware of its existence and21believe that it poses some level of real danger; however, there is no consensus aboutthe degree of importance or urgency to the situation (Perry, 1983). Emergencyplanners need to promote awareness and encourage individuals in self-help activities,which in turn can raise the profile of disaster planning.A study of 42 emergency managers in six cities and counties in WashingtonState revealed the belief that "community information hotlines, neighbourhoodnetworks, and citizen education and training had some benefit but [required} a greatdeal of effort" (Kartez, and Kelly, 1988:134-135). The study findings suggest thatmanagers judge the prospects of adoption along the lines of least resistance, theirroutine experience, and that of colleagues.3.13. Process Planning Versus Plan-ProductionProcess planning is a guide to decision-making. A well planned process leavesone with the means to do the right thing at the right time (FEMA, 1981:3). Theoutput of a planning process is a 'plan', or a written document of decisions. A majorcriticism of emergency officials has been the emphasis on the plan, and almost totalneglect of process. Disaster research tells us that standard administrative practicesand planning alone are inadequate in a disaster (Comfort, 1988:4). Though writtenplans are valuable for training and familiarizing new participants with their duties,there is a need to move away from writing plans in isolation:"Paper plans, prepared by civil preparedness directors/co-ordinatorsalone, with little participation by local operating departments, are oflittle value because they are not used. A written plan does notguarantee that actual operations will be effective but the process ofplanning which leads to the development of a written plan is extremely22valuable [from] spent time determining what forces will do what, andhow operations will be co-ordinated" (FEMA, 1982:1)."We need to move away from the technical aspects of a plan - it doesnot matter how well structured they are, if people do not acknowledgethem, they are ineffectual" (source unknown)."Realistic planning requires that plans be adjusted to people, and notthat people be adjusted to plans" (Quarantelli in Laughy, 1989:28)."Resist the temptation to make written plans highly detailed because: 1.It is impossible to plan for every contingency; 2. Situations changeconstantly and specific details become out of date; 3. The presence oftoo many details gives the impression that everything is of equalimportance; 4. A complex detailed plan is intimidating to potentialusers and tends to be ignored" (Kreps, 1991:36)."The command and control model is not appropriate for emergencymanagement...timely co-ordination is more important than hierarchicalauthority" (Kreps, 1991:44).Despite recommendations to shift from plan-production into process planning,few individuals are aware of the techniques of conducting effective planningprocesses. Organizations must contend with the lack of planning expertise withinlocal and support agencies, the lack of formal training in planning among emergencymanagers, and the fact that planners basically deal with general planning issues, notemergency planning (Daines, 1991:174). Unfortunately, a good planning process stilldoes not guarantee that there will be an improvement in preparedness.J. Scanlon (1991) gives a rare glimpse into an emergency planning process butthe article does not suggest what techniques are appropriate. Scanlon recommendsthe following process:231. Hazard assessment.2. Community Assessment of attitudes and needs.3. Planning within government.4. Networking to evaluate resources.5. Disaster education.- take advantage of the existing structures (e.g. Block Watch,and the fact that 80-90% of victims are rescued by citizens.6. Develop the plan (may be the least important part of the process).7. Test/Update the plan.The traditional `para-military' model of emergency plans (Standard OperatingProcedures) has an impact on slowing the adoption of innovative approaches.Predictable problems in a disaster situation have a habit of remaining unresolved.For example (Kartez, 1988:1):1. Emergency officials continue to be surprised at the number and diversity ofresponders (ie. convergency problems).2. There is an inability to find and use special resources (equipment/skills).3. Unplanned media relations continue to lead to confusion and conflict.4. There is ambiguity of authority and co-ordination.Some cities in the U.S. adopt good emergency practices, even without disasterexperience (Kartez, 1988:1). Some examples are*:1. Neighbourhood self-help programmes.2. Training personnel to organize citizen volunteers (e.g., volunteer receptioncentres - City of Oakland).3. Better public information dissemination capabilities (e.g., phone banks, mediainformation centres).4. Specific strategies (e.g., training for evacuation warnings, aiding special-needspopulations).* See Appendix A for further information.The City of Corpus Christi, Texas (1988), incorporates many good emergencypractices in their disaster plan. For example, the plan formally adopts Ham/CB radiooperators in its communication network. In British Columbia, the ProvincialEmergency Program provides no training or funding for amateur radio operatorsthough the Province depends on them (Anderson, et al., 1990:18). This is a common24problem in North America - even the most effective communication networks do notavail themselves of the resources offered by the voluntary and private sectors (Kartez,and Kelly, 1988:144). The Corpus Christi plan includes an unusual proviso whichcondones personal judgment as a legitimate tour de force:"Nothing in this plan shall preclude the exercise of good judgment onthe part of agencies and personnel responding to a disaster. Deviationfrom prescribed procedures is authorized when, in the opinion of thosein charge, it becomes necessary" (June 1988).City employees whose presence is required must make preparations ahead of time tosafeguard their property and instruct their families. Drills, exercises and simulateddisasters are 'a must'.The content of training and exercising can play a significant role in improvedpreparedness, particularly when a large number and variety of governmentdepartments, and other organizations, participate (Kartez, and Lindell, 1990:27).Research has found that the lack of disaster experience is an impediment, but it is notas great as previously thought; the payoff is also greater when a face-to-face learningprocess is in place (Kartez, and Lindell, 1990:29). A comparative study of emergencyresponses undertaken at two aviation disasters, Gander (1985) and San Diego (1985),found that Gander responders 'did a much better job'. Gander conducted better pre-disaster preparedness planning, and completed an exercise simulation only twenty-seven days prior to the incident (Scanlon, and Sylves, 1990:110-124).3.1.4. The All-Hazard, All-Phase ApproachThe all-hazard planning approach to emergency management treats man-25caused disasters under the same planning guidelines as natural disasters. Thisapproach also considers no separation in the plan between different disaster types.The all-hazard approach can effectively reduce voluminous plans to a manageablelevel; more importantly, research has found that there is no significant conceptual reason for treating man-made or natural hazards as fundamentally different (Perry,1983:18). The advantages of an all-hazard approach over agent-specific plans are asfollows (Drabek, 1991:21: Kreps, 1991:40):1. The management needs and problems are similar.2. The approach avoids duplication of efforts and resources if done on a hazard-by-hazard basis.3.^Research into civil defense programmes in the 1960's and 1970's found thatappeals made to local co-ordinators on the basis of an all-hazard approachwere more likely to be acted upon than others.However, generic planning may not meet the needs of every jurisdiction, especially atthe local level (Dairies, 1991:168). Certainly for localities faced with reoccurringdisasters, it would be common sense to plan for specific outcomes.A second trend in the 1980's is an all-phase approach to emergencymanagement - mitigation, preparedness, impact, response, and recovery. For allphases, five resources need to be co-ordinated (Gillespie, 1991:63-66): 1.Information; 2. People lending or exchanging personnel (essential aspect of co-ordination); 3. Money (grants made from higher to lower levels); 4. Physical space;5. Equipment.In the early 1980's, the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)developed a strategy called Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM), aprototype for an all-phase approach. The idea was to develop a capacity to handleall phases of activity (mitigation through recovery) by identifying common functions in26all disasters for all phases (Perry, and Mushkatel, 1986:130). In 1984 FEMAintroduced the Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS), animplementation strategy for CEM. The most important component of CEM was tobe a community focus, the latter being directly impacted by a disaster (Perry,1983:18).Despite the growing recognition that an all-phase approach is warranted, mostfunds continue to be directed toward the post-impact disaster phases (Perry, 1983:4;Perry, and Mushkatel, 1986:132). Mitigation and preparedness activities canpotentially reduce the social and economic costs of a disaster, but there are noguarantees (Waugh, 1990:230). Governments are unlikely to invest taxpayer's moneywithout justification, and governments and populations tend to avoid investments intodisaster prevention until it is clearly shown that a large investment will pay offsubstantially in the future. Unfortunately, poor recovery planning is characteristic ofNorth America (Daines, 1991:182). Even communities who have experiencedfrequent disasters do not necessarily give more attention to mitigation andpreparedness (Rubin, 1991:257).The all-hazard, all-phase approach is composed of generic tasks and roles.The common denominators are - a warning system, evacuation procedures, shelteringand welfare, medical care/morgues, search and rescue, and security/protection ofproperty [communication is also an important consideration which needs to bementioned] (Perry, 1991:218).273.1.5. Public Versus Private InterestsWilliam Petak (1989:4) believes that we must consider all facets of an issuewhich will lead to better decisions. These facets he calls STAPLE - Social, Technical,Administrative, Political, Legislative, and Economic. The neglect of the socialcomponent has compromised the goal of an effective emergency response. The factis emergency planners need the approval of the public (Rubin, 1991:234):1. Politicians will not jeopardize votes unless the public demands it.2. Emergency officials have few police powers to enforce public commitment, ormunicipal initiative.3. The bundle of rights accruing to land is very powerful (and much of it is in thehands of the private sector).4. There is no consensus between stakeholders - very few community leaders areable to combine their foresight about the future with the ability to assesscommunity values and provide effective leadership.Petak (1984:289/290) suggests that we must address problem perceptions -what we are trying to solve, who has the authority to determine its importance, isagreement possible, and what social, economic, and environmental impacts willresult?: "If we do not know what problems we are trying to solve it is unlikely thatthe policies we adopt will be much importance in reducing natural hazard losses".One example is the emphasis on physical/technical measures to prevent chronicflooding problems rather than the possibility of relocation. Solutions often treat thesymptom not the cause, and rarely reduce the vulnerability factor.North Americans have an institutionalized safety net to draw from which is amajor deterrent to preparedness and mitigation: a social welfare net to catch thecasualties, insurance policies to cover damages, and disaster relief funds to draw from(though they are never sufficient to cover everyone's needs). Self-interest is a28powerful force in determining a course of action. In disaster situations, everyone paysfor losses in one form or another - apparently indirect costs are easier to accept andadminister than direct expenditures to disaster preparedness and mitigation. LosAngeles has the most successful hazard reduction program in North America due tothree factors (Vames, 1984:3):1. A solid base of technical information.2. An able and concerned government.3. Citizen recognition of need.3.1.6. Individuals in PerspectiveSocial scientists have been accumulating research material on human behaviourin disasters since the 1950's, but their results and recommendations have been largelyignored. How emergency personnel view the public is often reflected in their plans,with an overemphasis on crowd control measures and property protection; thesepractices continue despite evidence which has found that people do not panic in acrisis, and looting is rare. Recent sociological research suggests that the generalpublic plays a major role in assisting their community, and it is detrimental to thecommunity's recovery to inhibit this response. Unfortunately most governmentstudies of community recovery have dealt with economic issues (LaPlante, 1988:223),and there is little information to draw upon concerning the ability communitiespossess to respond effectively to a disaster.293.2. GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVESAn effective emergency programme hinges on the co-operative and co-ordinated efforts between all levels of government, with the primary co-ordinationpoint at the municipal level. Some important reasons for choosing a municipal-levelco-ordination point are:1. People who make plans should be responsible for their implementation.2. The municipality has the material resources which need to be co-ordinated andmobilized during a disaster.3. The municipality has the potential manpower for action.4. Decisions made closer to the level of actual operations are more effective thanthose made at distant levels (Comfort).5.^Planning is done on a small-scale where information is more readily available.In order to develop an emergency capacity, local governments must have thefollowing in place: Federal/ Provincial resources, a reliance on local rather thanexternal resources, a technical/administrative sophistication, and horizontal/verticalgovernment relationships (Rubin, 1991:235; Waugh, 1990:223). The following sectionsoutline major obstacles governments must overcome to effectively manage thedisaster environment.3.2.1. Government FundingThe rate of disaster occurrence is not increasing but the potential is. Increasedvulnerability is due to three factors: population concentrations (increased densities),populations moving to hazard-prone areas, and rapid growth among some of the mostvulnerable groups in society - elderly, disabled, minorities, poor (Anderson, andMattingly, 1991:311). The social and economic costs can be debilitating. In the Loma30Prieta earthquake (1989), the City of Oakland alone incurred $1.2 billion dollars indamages (Henry Renteria, Emergency Services Manager, City of Oakland).Funding for mitigation and preparedness is an obvious necessity, but themajority of funds are directed toward the recovery phase. Governments needtaxpayer's approval, and taxpayers already believe that they are paying for protectionthrough private insurance policies. Local actions are shaped by what resources areavailable, which tend to be limited given the low priority of disaster planning on thepolitical agenda. Local governments are the focal point of emergency planning, butthey are less resource rich than their counterparts (Perry, 1983:8). Governmentfunding is most often after the fact, usually covering short-term needs only. In theUnited States reliance on Federal government for assistance has increased greatlysince 1953 but little has been done to change local vulnerabilities (Mileti, et al.,1975:142).Disaster aid has created an unreal expectation on the part of the localgovernment. There is at least some expectation of post-disaster funding, but this hasnot necessarily been the case. In the history of the United States, 41% of States andlocalities were denied a Presidential Disaster Declaration (Settle, 1990:33-55):"It remains unclear to many states and local officials, as well as citizensin general, what the decisive factors are in obtaining federal disaster aid(or obtain enough aid)... Maintaining this ill-defined dependency on theFederal government in time of disaster is a high-stakes gamble state andlocal governments may lose".Even after a Presidential Declaration, communities may still have difficultyobtaining funding, particularly to cover long-term needs (Drabek, 1991:24). In onesituation in Salt Lake City (mid-1980's), emergency managers reduced flood damageto buildings by sandbagging city streets to channel the water overflow away from the31downtown area. Unfortunately, they were severely criticized for reducing damage tolevels where it would not justify low interest Federal business loans for recovery(Waugh, 1990:231).3.2.2. ResourcesAt the local planning level, skills and material resources are abundant, butlocal governments lack the ability to collect, co-ordinate, and train resources both inthe pre- and post-disaster phases. The inability of most local governments to tap intothe private sector for goods, services, and manpower prior to a disaster reduces theeffectiveness of recovery.In 1983 FEMA defined the use of volunteers as one of nine policy issues ofinterest (Drabek, 1991:24). Yet, five years later, private sector resources were stillbeing underutilized. For example, during Hurricane Hugo (1989) and Loma Prietaearthquake (1989), FEMA, the State, and American Red Cross had inadequatenumbers of trained volunteers to cover the disaster response activities, and theseorganizations were not trained to deal with ethnic minorities (U.S. GeneralAccounting Office, 1991:40-41).In some cases in the U.S. (primarily California) neighbourhood disasterresponse teams have been set up. The City of Oakland developed a neighbourhooddisaster response program called Citizens of Oakland Respond to Emergencies(C.O.R.E.). Since its conception five years ago, 20% of the population has beentrained to respond to a disaster. Despite possessing a volunteer disaster responsecapability, this resource was not utilized during the urban fires in 1991. In this32situation, the Mayor of Oakland was quoted as saying, "We don't need volunteers, weneed professionals" (Ester O'Donald, Volunteer Services Co-ordinator, Santa CruzCounty Office of Emergency Services).A survey of 400 U.S. municipalities with disaster experience (1986) revealedthat the most frequent demands of emergency operations were to work not only withneighbouring units of government, but also the resource providers from the voluntarysector (Kartez, 1988:3/4). However, the least widely adopted practices were thosewhich dealt with autonomous citizen activities and behaviour during a disaster (SeeAppendix A).3.2.3. Getting on the Political AgendaEmergency planning needs to be higher on the political agenda (Anderson, etal, 1990:21). Local governments are the crucial element in the formulation andimplementation of emergency management policy, but the latter has been assigned avery low priority (Perry, and Mushkatel, 1986:136). Unfortunately, there have beenfew examinations of how risks actually appear on the political agenda:"A critical question of risk control* is what risks will the governmentdeal with first. Scientists are the key actors setting priorities, butfollowing that, regulatory agencies are more influenced by lawsuits anddaily press. The Conservation Foundation found that agenda settingwas not thoroughly rational...as science provides no means of comparingand ranking essentially incommensurate types of risk" (TheConservation Foundation, 1985).* Risk control is defined as the amalgamation of priority setting, riskassessment, and risk management.For local governments to act they must be aware the threat exists and consider33it important, believe that the threat is susceptible to management, and develop or bepresented with a politically and economically feasible policy that can be implemented(Perry, and Mushkatel, 1986:137). One U.S. study conducted in 956 flood-proneareas found that only 17% of community officials thought that flooding was a problem(Cigler, and Burby, 1990). Given the reality of ambiguous goals and limited power toco-ordinators, the result is often minimum participation from key departments(Kartez, 1988:9). Disaster planning can also run counter to established communityvalues, for example, with the community opposed to funding costly mitigation works(Perry, 1983:116).Research tells us that the key to effective planning is the active support of theMayor or Chief Executive Officer:"Policy implementation will always falter unless a highly committed andmotivated core of public officials diligently pursue implementation.Absent these personnel, the perceived intractability of the problem andlack of visible political rewards for supporting seismic safety, makeseismic safety a policy area prone to unsuccessful or incompleteimplementation" (Wyner, 1984:267).In the City of Oakland, department heads must complete an acceptable emergencyplan before s/he will get a raise or promotion (Henry Renteria, Emergency ServicesManager, City of Oakland).J. Scanlon (1990:165-179) studied 19 of Canada's emergencies/disasters to testthe assumption that the active involvement of a top official is crucial to thedevelopment of an effective local emergency plan. His findings indicated that whilethe Mayor's involvement is crucial to planning, that involvement is likely to stem fromdisaster experience, training, education, and sometimes outside forces, i.e. Provincialinducements. The research team observed that local planning requires outside34pressures because local authorities are too involved in day-to-day responsibilities toworry about planning for emergencies - pressure must come from a higher authority.Support and commitment from top-elected officials can bring legitimacy andprestige to emergency departments and volunteer organizations. The result is a`multiplier' effect where an organization has a greater ability to attract personnel,influence legislation, wield informal power in the community, and ensure adequatenumbers of clients, customers, donors, and/or investors (Wright, 1978:200).3.2.4. Provincial and Municipal LegislationMurray Stewart, Ex-Director, Provincial Emergency Program (PEP), called thelack of modern legislation the largest single deterrent to emergency preparedness(Emergency Preparedness Digest, 1989). At the Provincial level, the Acts which applyare the Emergency Program Act (EPA), B.C. Regulation 456/59 and 666/76, as wellas Sec. 20 of the Municipal Act in British Columbia. Regional Districts are under theresponsibility of the Provincial Government; in the case of the Lower Mainland,municipal mayors make up the Greater Vancouver Regional District Board providinga connection between emergency planning at the local and regional level. TheEmergency Program Act was established in 1951 and covers both civil defense andenemy action. Though serious attempts have been made to update the EmergencyProgram Act, no changes have been made to date. The Province has been designatedtwo main roles in a disaster (Laughy, 1989:8):1. To provide an emergency response in a disaster and declare an area a DisasterZone.2. To assist municipalities develop their emergency plans, and act as a35co-ordinating body.In reality, the Provincial level of assistance is limited to training and funding. Theoperational responsibility for emergency preparedness and response lies withmunicipal government, but municipalities are not eligible for a Provincial grantwithout an emergency plan.Under the EPA, the responsibilities of the various actors have not been clearlylaid out (Staples, 1989):1. Police - Regulations do not specifically state what the police will do in adisaster. Their responsibilities are outlined in the Police Act, i.e. toprotect people and property.2. Fire - The only authority to order an evacuation is the FireCommissioner, and this responsibility cannot be delegated. The FireCommissioner is 'supposed' to prepare a comprehensive plan for firefighting and fire prevention in the event of an emergency. Mutual aidagreements have been developed to assist other jurisdictions in need.3. Minister of Municipal Affairs - Responsibilities include emergencylegislation, action to re-establish civil government in municipalities andemergency housing construction programmes (Reg.92/66).4. Civil Defense Control Committee - Representatives from eachmunicipality and rural areas are in charge. This responsibility may bedelegated under Sec. 6 to a Civil Defense Officer (i.e. usually theemergency co-ordinator) or municipal council provided it does notunduly interfere in the exercising by a municipal council of its powers(the term 'unduly' has yet to be defined).5. Lieutenant Governor in Council - Sec. 4 gives the Lieutenant Governorthe power to authorize acts and make regulations s/he considersnecessary. Emergency is not defined in the Act itself, only in B.C.Regulation 666/76.6. Municipal Council - Council can declare an emergency and exercise thepowers necessary by adopting a bylaw (vote of two-thirds councilmembers) under Sec. 290 of the Municipal Act. This procedure wouldtake a minimum of 24 hours to adopt. Control would last until it wassuperseded by a proclamation under the E.P.A.The lack of clearly defined emergency roles and responsibilities under current36legislation adds to the disorganization on top of the technical difficulties of organizingan effective response. Local governments are authorized to undertake emergencyplanning but there is no legislation to enforce this course of action. For thosemunicipalities engaged in emergency planning in Canada and the United States, theyhave no specific authority to enter into agreements with other government agencies,and there are no practical means of ensuring a certain standard of preparedness (U.S.General Accounting Office, 1991:5). Municipalities are assisted by Federal andProvincial departments (primarily in grants and training), but the level of assistance isinadequate, and there is no assurance that after a disaster, outside help will beimmediate or relevant.Liability can be a motivating factor - once it was safe to advise municipalitiesthat no action meant no liability, but this is no longer a certainty (Staples, 1989).However, local governments would not be negligent if they were able to prove "soundeconomic reasons" for the level of resources allocated to this activity (Staples, 1989).Municipalities are better off legally and financially if they proceed under the E.P.A. -the EPA will waive liability if a Civil Defense Committee has been established underSec. 5, or the Lieutenant Governor in Council declares an emergency under Sec.11(2). In the United States (as well as Canada), full discretion is given to Stateauthorities to begin and end an emergency (Feigenbaum, and Ford, 1984:2).Emergency legislation in the U.S. has clearer guidelines than its Canadiancounterpart - for example, local plans are dictated by FEMA/State guidelines in termsof established rules and procedures (Daines, 1991:169). State emergency planningdepartments often create, co-ordinate, and implement city/county disaster plans,which exempt the latter from personal liability (Feigenbaum, and Ford, 1984:3). U.S.37legislation states that there is a duty to provide information essential to a reasonedchoice among alternatives (Covello, et al., 1987:23). The accident at Three MileIsland lead to a recommendation to require the establishment of safety versus costtrade-offs and explain them to the public (Covello, et al., 1987).3.2.5. Planning versus the PlanAs noted earlier, the planning process is far more important in developinggood planning practices than Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's). TheInternational City Management Association (ICMA) found that 80% of Americancities adopted formal disaster plans, but plans were often found to be inadequate in adisaster (Kartez, and Lindell, 1987:486/490):"What is puzzling is that after years of research on organizationalbehaviour in emergencies, local government continues to be surprisedwhen standard procedures in their lengthy detailed plans are irrelevant"(Hoetmer, Study Director, 1983).The study concluded that process-oriented planning activities (multidisciplinarysimulations and task forces) are more effective than technical activities (SOP's).Louise Comfort (1985:156) suggests that the way governments run their day-to-day affairs has a negative impact on how emergency management is delivered:"The [government] system tends to inhibit co-operative interactionbetween multiple components and bureaucracy, designed to operateunder routine conditions, becomes mired in human error. There is alsoa question of power rather than effective performance, authority ratherthan creative solutions, administrative status rather than competentservice, which characterizes government hierarchy."In the U.S., blame for standardized rather than adaptive thinking is often laid onplans written to comply with Federal/State funding requirements (Kartez, 1988:7). In38Canada, the Collegeville Plan (the city-prototype disaster planning model) does notinclude the planning department as a resource for emergency co-ordinators (Laughy,1989:22).The U.S. General Accounting Office (1991:23) examined Federal, State, andlocal emergency management activities in four states. One discovery was those stateswho placed an emphasis on disaster preparedness programmes had few co-ordinatingproblems during the initial response phase. The study also found that there are nomeans of ensuring that remedial action be taken after an exercise. Specifically,problems which arose during exercise simulations re-occurred in the Hurricane Hugoand Loma Prieta disasters.A second study of 400 U.S. municipalities recommended that localgovernments concentrate on the following processes (Kartez, and Lindell, 1990:5):1. Pay more attention to community and organizational behaviour,especially convergence.2. Develop a mutual aid plan in the pre-disaster phase which focuses onresponse-generated demands, not agency-generated.3.^Develop a shared schema (through frequent participation).Few training or exercise requirements are built into plans. Kartez (1985)suggests that their omission is due to a time factor, cost, a public participationrequirement, and "they sometimes embarrass department heads" (in Anderson, et al.,1990:23). Training is usually for in-house/first responders and rarely others. Trainingand exercises are very effective means of gaining disaster experience without havingto go through the real event.393.2.6. Public versus Private RightsIn North America, the private rights of individuals and property owners arepowerful. Governments face difficulties in their ability to enforce actions related tomitigation and preparedness measures particularly with regard to private property.There is also a question whether an agency has the legal authority to take action,particularly in regulating the personal habits of people (The ConservationFoundation, 1985:18)."Legislation everywhere has difficulty in deciding how far an individualshould be responsible for his own action and how far an individualshould be protected from his and other's risk taking" (Singleton,1987:173).3.2.7. Other Important IssuesLouise Comfort (1985) states that all levels of government play a crucial rolein public safety but all levels are faced with inadequate understanding of risk, and thecomplexity of co-ordinating hazard mitigation on top of all their other tasks. Comfortadds the following to her list of obstacles government must overcome:1. Organization fragmentation. The policy of decentralizing power toaccomplish goals creates communication problems as bureaucrats tendto avoid communicating with their counterparts.2. People assume that decision-makers will act rationally when faced withhazard information but decision-makers are often affected by non-rational factors.3. Planning and technical staff are rarely trained to deal with risk.4. Attitudes of staff and elected officials have important bearings on safetypolicies.405. The technical and scientific complexity of hazards.6. The operational rules of administration agencies which neglect riskmitigation. The planning staff in Alaska was quoted as saying, "Wehave never denied anybody anything because they were in a high-riskarea."7. Prediction problems - techniques are not well developed.Other Obstacles:8. Preparedness is in part dependent on the ability to do routine tasks andstandardize decision-making procedures. Few organizations areprepared to deal with non-routine questions (Mileti, et al., 1975:22).9. The bureaucratic structure also affects organizational mobility.Bureaucrats most often need official instruction before proceeding(Mileti, et al., 1975:53).10. Questions on who should be involved in the decision-making process asthere is unequal political and economic power among interested andaffected parties (Beatley, 1988).11. The critical question of 'how safe is safe enough' or 'how fair is safeenough' (Rayner, 1987:208).12. Large institutions are prudent and cautious (Singleton, 1987:180).13. Inadequate risk theory and safety theory (Singleton, 1987:173).14. Trade-offs are essential to assess and control risks. Often trade-offs canreverse the nature of a threat which may result in a more serious threat(The Conservation Foundation, 1985:2).413.3. COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES33.1. The Role Of The Community In A DisasterAn important and productive strategy for emergency officials to take is viewthe private sector as a potential resource. The public can help out in five ways:1. Pre-set agreements with the private sector for material resources,including donations.2. Household preparation for an emergency/disaster to mitigate social andfinancial costs.3. Provide manpower for the recovery phase of a disaster.4. Support government action (Turner, et al.:1986:147).5.^Identify and priorize community concerns (Perry, 1983:12).Emergency officials need to take steps to incorporate 'community' into theirplanning process. The private sector can be integrated into the process in two ways;as untrained post-disaster volunteers where local governments must deal with theissue of convergence, or as trained pre-disaster volunteers to augment agencyresources (Kartez, and Kelly, 1988:132-133). Involvement with the community canrange from informational/educational exchanges (e.g. compliance with warnings/evacuations), to participation in selected operational duties (Emergency SocialServices teams, amateur radio operators), to independent citizen cadres(neighbourhood disaster response teams).The 'community' component has, for the most part, been ignored. In thoseinstances where members of the private sector have been invited to participate onemergency planning task forces, the choice of individual often depends on what well-established community business or organization s/he represents. To compound theproblem, the present system can only accommodate an extremely small number of42community representatives. These factors make it extremely difficult for the averagebut motivated citizen to get involved.In some cases where tradition indicates that disaster will strike in the future,community disaster 'subcultures' have emerged (Hannigan, and Kueneman, 1978:130-133). These are 'bottom-up' community disaster teams which are frequently formedwithout encouragement, acceptability, or full recognition on the part of society.Community-based disaster teams become salient when hazards transcend the ability ofgovernment to contain or limit their destructive capabilities. Development of disastersubcultures are facilitated by:1. Repetitive disaster impacts.2. A disaster agent which regularly allows a period of forewarning.3.^Existence of consequential damage which is salient to various membersof the community.A case study of flood emergencies in Canada found that growth in disastermitigation efforts at the government level weakens individual interest in flood-relatedmatters (Hannigan, and Kueneman, 1978:144). This trend was less evident in ruralareas (e.g., in Manitoba where flood mitigation efforts have not prevented annualflooding problems). A survey of 1450 adults in the Los Angeles County found that inthe absence of an obvious severe threat, sustained collective action will not takeplace, especially without leadership and resources (Turner, et al., 1986:248).3.3.2. Why Is Community Involvement So Important?Public involvement is a necessity. There are some things only citizens canmanage in a disaster. The six points listed below are indicative of the importance of43community involvement.3.3.2.1. Communities must be prepared for the first seventy-two hoursBuilding codes and zoning laws help decrease the potential risks from hazards,but these mitigation techniques have their limitations. Research has shown that anindividual's chance of avoiding injury and property damage are highly correlated withhis/her level of preparedness (Davis, 1989:8). In a major earthquake, seismically-engineered buildings are built to remain structurally intact, but will sustain heavy non-structural damage. In this situation, personal preparedness becomes very important,that is, knowing what to do to survive (Ang, 1989:37-39). If trapped, the first 72hours are critical for victim survival; after this time the death rate rises exponentially.A study of human behaviour in Japan (Niigata earthquake) revealed that itwas "absolutely imperative" that all family members arrange among themselves aplace to evacuate (Takuma, 1978:163): 1. People who wait at home for a familymember may lose the chance to escape; 2. The person whose family has evacuatedexperiences high levels of anxiety and confusion.3.3.2.2. Local governments do not have the resources to cope with a city-widedisasterPost-disaster studies reveal that individuals, neighbourhoods, and communitiescan be expected to be on their own for a minimum of three days. Joanne Nigg(1986) calls the gap between the impact of a disaster and the mobilization of44traditional resources, the 'organizational lag'. Nigg's research was based on a 1450interviews of adult residents living in the Los Angeles County (1977) - her keyobservation was organizations take longer to react to new information and eventsthan do individuals and families (Turner, Nigg, and Paz, 1986:11). The lag time isdifferent for different organizations and problems.Organizations are at a disadvantage in a disaster - victims can look around, seewhat has to be done, and do it. Communication and transportation problems do notallow organizations to do the same. In Peru, Community-Based Organizations(CBO's) were found to respond more quickly and effectively than governmentagencies because they were able to avoid bureaucratic delays and corruption(Maskrey, 1989:84).Mobilizing resources quickly is a difficult hurdle to overcome, even when well-prepared. In Salt Lake City in 1983, a serious flooding problem created a situationwhere a large, organized labour force was needed within the hour. There was nopublic or semi-public organization capable of meeting this requirement. Fortunately,the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS) was able to mobilize onethousand volunteers within the hour. Unlike local government, LDS was a highlyorganized structure which remained in place in emergency and non-emergencysituations (Fisher, 1985:56-59).3.3.2.3. Basic rescue and response teams emerge naturally in the fieldIn the immediate aftermath of a disaster, citizens will begin searching forfamily members and friends, then take protective steps (e.g. evacuation, search for45assistance). This will occur naturally if outside help is unavailable (Raphael, 1986:72).Once help is given to family members, friends, and neighbours, other victims can betended to (Mileti, et al., 1975:64; Form, and Nosow, 1958:65). The family unit isconsidered the basic rescue group within the community:"Its internal organization is such that the obligations of the members toone another are clearly defined. Its integration into the neighbourhoodmakes it an ideal unit because its members are usually identified withthe neighbourhood, and because they know the physical layout of thehomes and the area" (Form, and Nosow, 1958:35).The family unit retains its importance throughout a disaster - it is the majorresource victims turn to for help (Mileti, et al., 1975:69). However, a study of civilianprisoners incarcerated in Japanese camps during WWII concluded that "it is not livingin family units which gave a better chance for survival, but the ability to engage in acaring relationship with others" (Clason, 1983:43).Individuals draw from their own familiar procedural patterns to carry out theirnew roles (Forrest, 1978:116), and tend to model their behaviour in harmony of whothey are - e.g. man, husband, father, policeman (Form, and Nosow, 1958:24).Behavioral roles are primarily dependent on sex, age, family role, neighbourhood role,and occupational role (Form, and Nosow, 1958:28). Research indicates that effectivefunctioning in a disaster requires reciprocal fulfilment of expected behaviour betweencitizens and organizations and men and women (Form, and Nosow, 1958:16). Mentend to take on physical tasks; women, supportive. In the immediate aftermath aeuphoria affects the entire population, known as the "therapeutic communityresponse". The psychological and social stresses of a disaster lead to a therapeuticsocial system which helps to compensate for the sorrow and stress felt by communitymembers (Perry, 1983:94-95). Quarantelli and Dynes call it a short-lived46phenomenon (in Perry, 1983).Shock, inactivity and panic are uncommon responses (many researchersconsider them rare) (Perry, 1983: Perry, 1991). Psychological stresses appear but theydo not affect an individual's ability to get on with helping themselves and others.Trained emergency personnel will not abandon their roles as previously thought, butthose individuals who do not have an official disaster role will aid their family, friendsand neighbours first, then return to their job.Study after study on human behaviour indicates that people will do the rightthing in a crisis, but it can be done more effectively if pre-thought, pre-planned andpre-associated.3.3.2.4. The emergency response is related to the social/demographiccharacteristics of the communityA considerable amount of research has been compiled on evacuationbehaviour. In the immediate aftermath, the primary motivating force of individuals isto ascertain the whereabouts of other family members and ensure their safety:"Families try to be together during a disaster; this can be even more of a prioritythan confirmation of the warning or taking protective action (Raphael, 1986:47). Thiswas evident in the Mt. St. Helens volcanic disaster - unless all family members areaccounted for, families were slow to undertake any protective action (Quarantelli,1960 in Perry, and Greene, 1983:66). Two factors influence citizen compliance withwarnings and evacuation (Raphael, 1986:125): 1. Warnings must be authoritative,specific and frequent; 2. Families must be able to support each other's decisions.47Citizen participation in the pre-disaster phase helps to ensure that a warning iseffectively communicated to the public. A study of minority citizens in disasters by R.Perry and A. Mushkatel (1986:93) found that the reasons for evacuating differedamong ethnic groups:1. Black populations - warnings from friends and/or relatives was thesecond most frequently mentioned compliance reason.2. White populations - watching friends and neighbours leave was the mostimportant reason.3.^Mexican- Americans - warnings from friends and/or relatives was themost important reason to evacuate.Citizen involvement is also necessary for the operation of emergency shelters.Without volunteers, shelter operations (e.g. feeding, clothing, lodging) would beunmanageable.An effective emergency response depends on the ability to reach all segmentsof society impacted by a disaster. Some segments of the population are difficult toreach - ethnic minorities, poor, handicapped (Perry, and Mushkatel, 1986:150). Localcitizens are more aware of special needs individuals in their neighbourhood and are ina better position to provide assistance. One of the major problems in the WhittierNarrows earthquake, California (1987), was the inability of emergency personnel tocommunicate to victims in a language other than English.3.3.2.5. Community participation can shorten the recovery periodThe raison d'etre of an effective emergency response is to get the communityback on its feet as quickly as possible. Despite objectives to alleviate human sufferingand social dislocation, disaster planning tends to focus exclusively on the48physical/technical side of rescue and rehabilitation (Form, and Nosow, 1958:242).When organizations are unable to integrate 'community' into their organization (andvice versa), hostility and aggression can arise which may persist throughout all thedisaster phases, and prolong the disaster itself:"Whether a community has a plan or not, there are certain socialmechanisms constantly operating that enable people to meet many typesof daily crises. Spontaneous or carefully contrived plans, which do nottake into account knowledge of communities and how they function,may needlessly prolong human suffering (Form, and Nosow, 1958).Individuals respond immediately to disasters by initiating rescue and care tovictims. External organizations may come in conflict by disrupting the alreadyestablished self-help pattern in the field. The more similar the background ofcommunity members and external agencies, the less likely hostility and aggression willmaterialize (Form, and Nosow, 1958:19). Community rescue operations are essentialin assisting individuals gain mastery over the disaster and their lives, and restore asense of control over what is uncontrollable (Raphael, 1986:25/93). One of the side-effects of a disaster is social change. Disasters can pull communities together, butmore often the opposite results: high divorce rates, disruption of families, increasedviolence, economic change, and so on (Raphael, 1986:170). This problem arises whencommunity involvement in the response and recovery phases is neglected, andindividuals have no control over their present or future situation. The problemworsens with a major relocation of the population, with a "resulting loss of communityspirit" as in the case of Buffalo Creek, West Virginia, 1972, and Darwin, Australia,1974 (Raphael, 1986:118).An excellent study on volunteer behaviour and organizational response todisaster was undertaken by Form and Nosow (1957) following the 1953 tornado at49Beecher, Michigan State. In this unique situation, State police and firemen joined inthe rescue activity performed by the residents of the area. Both groups were viewedpositively by citizens as they symbolized the community's own rescue efforts. TheSalvation Army also gained a "soaring reputation" in the rehabilitation phase for"helping without asking questions"; the absence of red tape combined with theorganization's familiarity with the community (unlike the National Red Cross) made ita key resource people turned to.To assist in the recovery phase, people need to be given a specific role in adisaster, and repeated training in various aspects of emergency response to developreflex reactions (Takuma, 1978:170). The dividends could be substantial. In the poorregions of Peru, the community-based disaster teams had accomplished the followingwithin a two year period (Maskrey, 1989:56):1. A substantial strengthening and centralization of community organization.2. An improved capacity for negotiating with government.3. Implementation of a large number of local mitigation measures.4. Local control over mitigation projects.5.^An investment of significant government resources (short and long-term).3.3.2.6. Personal responsibilityCosts often accrue to society, not just individuals (Cigler, 1988:44). Thoughindividuals tend to look to government for solutions, inevitably some of theresponsibility must be shifted onto the shoulders of the community. Homepreparedness measures and family plans are known to substantially reduce humanand property losses. Research has shown that if citizens know about specificprotective measures, they will use them (Perry, and Mushkatel, 1986:175). Other50studies indicate that risks under individual control are accepted more readily thanthose under government control, and voluntary risks are accepted more readily thanthose imposed (Hance, et al., 1988:6).Public education can produce both positive and negative results. Claire Rubin(1985) in her study of the community recovery process found that community-baseddemands, when leadership, resources, and knowledge are present, can lead to betteremergency plans. She cites the example of Marin County, California, where residentspay high taxes and expect high performance from their public officials: after the 1983disaster the community pressured the County not only for recovery actions butimproved emergency preparedness. In other situations in California, potential victimshave joined in collective action to block mitigation/preparedness measures whichwould have reduced their exposure to risk of injury and death in the case of a severeearthquake (Turner et al., 1986:241).3.3.3. Community Involvement Issues3.3.3.1 MotivationA study of risk assessment in Texas found that newcomers tended to evacuaterather than those who had been there a few years. The study findings concluded thatthough past experience with disasters seems persuasive, people seem more inclined toclean up than prepare (Doornkamp, 1985:5): "there appears to be a psychologicalgap between being aware of a hazard and doing something about it".Some researchers suggest that procrastination, not denial, is the most common51reason why precautions have not been taken (Davis, 1989:14). Other researcherssuggest that most people have a sense of "personal invulnerability" which is reflectedin a general community consensus (Raphael, 1986:30), and even a tendency to denythe existence of danger altogether (Mikami, 1985:118). Still others cite the factors ofage, income, and deep-rooted habits as barriers to involvement (Boschi, 1986:60;Perry, 1983:82).A study of preparedness levels in Southern California found a low level ofpreparedness despite the fact that 90% of all seismic activity in the U.S. occurs inCalifornia (500 tremors a year strong enough to be felt) (Davis, 1989:8). Perry andMushkatel (1986) in their study of minority citizens in disasters found that only onequarter of whites, blacks, and Mexican-Americans chose to volunteer for a disaster-related activity in the pre-disaster phase. They conclude that "as expected, mostcitizens would not choose to do volunteer work in an emergency capacity". Given thegeneral apathy the public has for any volunteer activity, a twenty-five percentparticipation rate could be construed as high. One highlight of the study found thatthe white population primarily volunteered on task forces and advisory committees asthe latter had definite parameters and completion times.3.3.3.2 Perceptions of masteryA significant reason for public apathy and/or denial of hazards is the perceivedinability to 'control the uncontrollable':"When people believe that a hazard is beyond the control of man'stechnology, they seem to ignore the threat and are reticent to adoptplanning measures to protect themselves" (Perry, 1983:85).52A study of earthquake prediction and behaviour in California determined that"the emotional variable of earthquake fear has a stronger effect than the cognitivevariable of earthquake awareness in determining who takes warnings seriously andwho expects a damaging earthquake in the immediate future" (Turner, et al.,1986:174-189). However, heightening awareness and stimulating fear only motivatespeople to take a few precautions. More significant results are produced when peopleare shown that something can be done which will credibly enhance their chances forsurvival, and by involving them in the community and in social exchanges about thethreat.3.3.3.3. PrioritiesIn a survey of public issues in Southern California, residents gave earthquakesa seventh place rating (Davis, 1989:14) - in order of priority, the issues coveredcrime, smog, traffic, housing costs, drug and alcohol abuse, overcrowding,earthquakes, and Aids. Disaster preparedness must also compete with the lifestylesof individuals and families.3.33.4. Lack of legitimacyEmergency officials need to legitimize volunteer emergency organizations.These groups are unlikely to acquire support and assistance without recognition fromtraditional emergency organizations:"By recognizing and legitimating emergent groups, disaster personnel53can encourage other emergency organizations to accept these groups,thus integrating the emergent groups into the ongoing emergencysystem. This in turn can facilitate making available the needed`environmental inputs' for the emergent groups and enhance theireffectiveness...In the past emergent groups have been relativelyuntapped as a resource: by employing and understanding the emergentprocess, these groups can become more effective agents in disasterrelief and recovery" (Forrest, 1978:124).Support can work both ways - credible volunteer organizations can be effectiveadvocates for raising a disaster consciousness, and the profile and status of emergencyplanning.3.3.3.5. Scarcity of leadership skillsLeadership skills are at a premium during a disaster. As one source suggests,"handling people in emergency management need not be so difficult. All you need isinexhaustible patience, unfailing insight, unshakable nervous stability, an unbreakablewill, decisive judgment, infrangible physique, irrepressible spirits, and an awful lot ofexperience" (D. Maclver, Emergency Co-ordinator, City of Richmond).There is no time to train individuals to fit leadership positions in a crisissituation; these skills must be developed beforehand (Forrest, 1978:117). It isimportant that the leader be accepted and trusted by the local community.Lamentably, there are few training resources available in Canada to aid emergencyprofessionals, and even fewer for nonprofessionals.54333.6. Emergency planning lacks a 'community' processThere are cases in the U.S. (particularly California) where local governmentshave designed and implemented community-based plans to supplement theiremergency programmes. In California, the community-based disaster programmesemerged from a similar mold. Unfortunately, very little is known about bottom-upplanning processes - in particular, what works and what does not. A single prototypemodel may not necessarily fulfil a community's needs.It has been suggested that rational and effective policy at the macro-level maybe reversed at the community/individual level (LaPlante, 1988:232). Kartez andLindell (1990:10) found that individuals were far more influenced by concreteinformation than abstract, especially when interacting with other groups and officials.T.R. Forrest (1978:113) noted that emergent groups illustrate 'structural elasticity':when group size increases explicit rules and regulations are developed to standardizebehaviour; when size decreases, there is little need for rigorous reliance onstandardized behaviour, though certain operational procedures may still be carriedout.3.3.3.7. Vulnerability issue remains unchangedEven the best-laid plans rarely begin to address the vulnerability issue. Insome disaster-prone areas, mitigation efforts have proven more harmful than if noeffort had been made, for they can lull people into a false sense of security (this isparticularly notable in flood-prone areas). Relocation has taken place on occasion,55but the motivating factor appears to be one of economics, rather than socialobligation. Even after the most severe disasters, people will return to their homes torebuild their lives. Relocation is a socially unpopular move, and a decision torelocate will depend on whether acceptable alternatives exist.3.33.8. Inadequate disaster reliefFrom the community's perspective, much of the responsibility for short andlong-term recovery rests on the shoulders of its citizens. The lack of knowledge,experience, and long-term support can be a serious handicap. Community membersare most vulnerable in the long-term recovery phase once the short-lived euphoria ofthe 'therapeutic community' has died away. Long-term mental health consequenceshave resulted from disasters particularly when a large number of deaths haveoccurred, affecting non-victims as well as victims (LaPlante, 1988:225).Volunteer groups who emerge in the preparedness phase, are unlikely to holdmore than one earthquake session (only 7% of such groups in S. California sustainedinterest for several months - exceptions were the Mormon Church and the BoyScouts) (Turner, et al., 1986:234). Local organizations have a great potential to helpcommunities during the long-term recovery phase when traditional emergencyresource organizations have disappeared. With no arrangements to assist individualsthrough the bureaucratic tangle of red tape, the recovery period may be unnecessarilylengthened. This is especially poignant for the community, for the equitableallocation of disaster relief is not a policy consideration - "neither all communities norall disaster victims within one community share equally in available recovery56assistance" (LaPlante, 1988:226-229).3.33.9. Lack of awarenessThe Emergency Preparedness Digest (1989) polled 2,006 Canadians inDecember of 1988 on the role of Emergency Preparedness Canada. Thequestionnaire revealed that 78% of the respondents indicated that they did not getenough information on emergency preparedness. Out of 14 organizations to call inan emergency, the Police Department was at the head of the list, followed by the FireDepartment (few individuals were aware of the earthquake information on page 27 ofthe telephone book). Though the vast majority knows how to prepare themselvesprior to a disaster (primarily in the home), "it is doubtful whether the majority havetaken the necessary steps".3.4. SUMMARYDisaster research is limited in its depth and scope. The piecemealundertakings of research make it difficult to build a comprehensive picture of disasterplanning and management, as a guide to future developments and strategies. Moreoften than not, research will indicate what does not work, rather than offer alternativeand creative solutions.Governments face a number of obstacles which can potentially retard thedevelopment of local disaster capabilities. Although many of the obstacles discussedin this Chapter are important factors to disaster planning and preparedness, the57literature suggests that above all else, emergency personnel need to place anemphasis on process planning over written plans, and adopt practices which take intoaccount community participation. The private sector is capable of launching aninformal disaster response but it can be done more effectively if pre-thought and pre-planned. Community rescue operations are crucial in regaining a sense of masteryover the disaster. Community rescue operations may be the only means of avoidingnegative social change through the loss of 'community spirit'. Once motivated toaccept a disaster preparedness responsibility, citizens can act as advocates to bringlegitimacy and prestige to disaster planning, potentially increasing the resourcesavailable to that organization.Leadership is very important to implement and sustain disaster planning andpreparedness. Active involvement by the Mayor and other top officials is crucial, butcommunities also need leaders to spearhead a 'bottom-up' disaster planning process.Leaders who are respected and trusted by the community can be very effectivemotivators - this may be the only solution without the backing of legislation to enforceactions related to mitigation and preparedness. Governments need to assistcommunities to accept a greater personal responsibility for home and communitypreparedness, as was the case in Burkeville, Richmond.584. A NEIGHBOURHOOD DISASTER PLAN: THE BURKEVILLE EMERGENCYRESPONSE TEAM (B.E.R.T.), RICHMOND,BRITISH COLUMBIAAn innovative strategy in the mid-1980's was the development ofneighbourhood-level disaster response teams in the United States. Neighbourhooddisaster plans in California and Washington State base their approach along theguidelines of Neighbourhood Crime Watch. Neighbourhoods are organized into blockareas of 25 to 50 homes - volunteers organize with Block Captains and report theirneighbourhood needs to Area Captains. In a disaster situation, residents areresponsible for communications, damage assessment and recovery, first aid andmedical treatment, safety and security, light search and rescue, sheltering, and specialneeds individuals. Emergency teams are expected to run their own planning process,"as people are generally more motivated to carry out their own ideas, not [others]"(Sunnyvale Neighbourhoods Actively Prepare [SNAP]- Emergency Manual). Localgovernments assist neighbourhoods with training and education.In Canada, the first case of a neighbourhood-level disaster planning processplan was initiated in Burkeville, City of Richmond. At the time of writing this thesis,other neighbourhood disaster plans have been recently initiated (City of Richmond,North Vancouver). Burkeville is the focus of this Chapter, to describe in detail aunique bottom-up disaster planning approach. It is hoped that the informationgained from their experience is insightful, pointing to new ways of introducingcommunity involvement into the disaster planning process.The writer was directly involved in the process as Plan Co-ordinator. In theinitial planning phases, the writer was unfamiliar with other neighbourhood disaster59plans in the United States; as a consequence, the pilot project differs from itsAmerican counterpart. As far as the writer is aware, there are no academicexaminations or critiques of neighbourhood-level disaster plans in North America.4.1 BURKEVILLE, RICHMOND - BACKGROUND INFORMATIONThe City of Richmond has a population of approximately 130,000 and employsa full-time Emergency Co-ordinator. Burkeville is a small residential community(approximately 850 individuals) located on Sea Island, adjoining the VancouverInternational Airport. Sea Island is connected to Vancouver and Richmond via threeaccess bridges.The West Coast is the most seismically active area in Canada, but the soilconditions in Richmond suggest that the latter is one of the most-at-riskmunicipalities. Burkeville is particularly vulnerable due to its potential isolation frommunicipal services if the three access bridges become impassable. Burkeville waschosen due to its potential isolation, its strong Community Association to spearheadthe project, its well-defined borders, and its relatively homogeneous population. Asecond pilot project was considered for the Hamilton Road area located on the eastborder of Richmond straddling the Fraser River (Map, p.60). This area was selectedas a challenge to project implementation. It also has the potential to be isolated in adisaster, but differs in its mix of new and old homes, its poorly-defined border, a largeethnic population, and no community association to guide the pilot project. If bothprojects proved successful, neighbourhood preparedness would be considered forimplementation city-wide.BurktoIlle)Ri chmond60BURICEVT1 1 J  AND HAMILTON, CITY OF RICHMOND61In November 1989, the Sea Island Association invited Richmond's EmergencyCo-ordinator to give a talk on home preparedness. Individuals from Burkevilleapproached the Emergency Co-ordinator inquiring whether there was more theycould do as a community. The project was initiated in June 1990, with one hundredpercent backing from the Sea Island Association. The Loma Prieta earthquake inOctober 1989 was believed to be instrumental in raising the consciousness and priorityof community preparedness issues in Richmond. Burkeville was deeply concerned fortheir children in the event of a disaster for they were bused to schools in Richmond.With the exception of Menoah Steves School, there were no school disaster plans inplace to co-ordinate with home preparedness plans.4.2. STRATEGIES/PLANNING ASSUMPTIONSThe aim of the pilot project was to prepare individuals to be self-sufficient fora minimum of three days without having to depend on the assistance of city personneland other emergency volunteer organizations who would be overwhelmed withrequests for assistance.Although the planning focus was on earthquake preparedness, the end-product was a generic disaster response plan. The potential primary and secondaryeffects of earthquakes were believed to cover many potential hazards faced by thecommunity, and represented the 'worst-case' scenario to prepare communities for anyeventuality. The planning process concentrated on two areas of disaster management- personal/home preparedness, and community preparedness. It was important tocover home preparedness measures as research has shown that the latter can62significantly reduce the loss of life and property. Community preparedness focusedon Reception Centre Management and Light Search and Rescue.Burkeville was expected to co-ordinate their activities with other organizationson Sea Island, particularly the Vancouver International Airport (Main and SouthTerminals). It was estimated that a disaster at rush hour could leave 30,000 peoplestranded on Sea Island. It was imperative that resources be shared due to the lack ofretail outlets on Sea Island.4.2.1. GoalsCity Emergency Program goals were to assist Burkeville achieve self-sufficiencyfor a minimum of three days, and use the worst-case scenario as a planning guide.Burkeville' goals (in order of priority) were three-fold: 1. To save lives and tend tothe injured; 2. To reunite families; 3. To shelter, feed and clothe individuals whoare unable to help themselves. The establishment and priorization of goals was animportant step in the process. Without a clear purpose individuals could be easilyoverwhelmed by the number of tasks to be undertaken. During the initial planningphase, activities were chosen based on their relative importance to the overall goals.4.2.2. ObjectivesThe Burkeville disaster team did not set out the objectives, but consented totheir implementation. The process had to be streamlined to complete the projectwithin the three-month deadline. The objectives were as follows:631. To educate all community members on hazards, home preparedness,and disaster management. Educational tools included brochures, videos,and guest speakers.2. To train the community in emergency response. The essence of thedisaster plan was a 'first come - first serve' approach. Volunteers wouldhave to improvise in the implementation stage until a sufficient numberof volunteers could be recruited (for more detail see Section 4.8).3. To recruit volunteers.4. To delegate co-ordinators (and alternates) and assign duties.5. To inventory community skills and material resources. Two strategieswere employed; a household questionnaire, and an inventory ofcommunity supplies and equipment. At last count 65% of thequestionnaires had been returned.6. To develop a simple, flexible plan, and test it. For more detail onBurkeville's emergency plan, see Section 4.5.4.)4.3. PROCESS (THE SEVEN MAGIC STEPS)The goal was to find a process comfortable for the Plan Co-ordinator and thecommunity. The process chosen was designed by Professor Peter Boothroyd, Schoolof Community and Regional Planning, University of British Columbia. His studentsaffectionately refer to the process as 'The Seven Magic Steps' due to its remarkabletenacity to fit any planning situation with ease.The Seven Magic Steps may not be a panacea for all planning projects, but itcan be used regardless of substance or process planned, or intended audience.Unfortunately, process planning is a relatively new phase in disaster management,with the result that most co-ordinators must field their own processes. The sevensteps are outlined below (Boothroyd, 1989:21):641. Planning TASK Definition- what matter does the group agree to plan (or problem to solve) - how, bywhom, when and where?2. Personal GOALS Identification- what would all process participants like to achieve in terms of the matter thegroup has agreed to plan?3. SITUATION Appraisal- what are the significant characteristics of the systems which have to bemanaged or taken into account in order for participants to move towards theirgoals? What opportunities and constraints do these systems present?4. Generation of Action POSSIBILITIES- what possibilities for action will bring the participants toward at least somepersonal goals?5. Packaging of Possibilities as OPTIONS- what categories do the possibilities fall into, which possibilities are contingenton which, and therefore, what are the mutually exclusive packages ofpossibilities, or "options"?6. ASSESSMENT of Options- what are the pros and cons of each option given all participants goals andvalues - not just the goals they started planning from - and given present andfuture resources and constraints presented by the systems to be managed?7.^DECISION Making- which is the best option given substantive criteria and political processestablished for decision?Side Step: Continuous PROCESS EVALUATION at each planning step andreiteration of steps as judged necessary (in view of the discoveries or frustrations atthis step, is it desirable to revert to a previous planning step?)This process was utilized by the Plan Co-ordinator to set the framework forthe Burkeville disaster plan. Burkeville's process was designed to answer thequestion, 'what knowledge, skills, equipment, and experience does the communityneed to be self-sufficient during a disaster'? The 'outcome' was fixed, but the stepsleading to the outcome were open to community discussion. The intended purpose ofthe Seven Magic Steps is a sequential planning guide where the outcome is largely65unknown and/or undecided. The project deadline was instrumental in the decision tomodify this process, including the exclusion of step five.The Seven Magic steps proved useful during the emergency task formulationphase where team members participated in defining each emergency task, its role andresponsibilities. The process was generally applied in circumstances where the issueswere complex and detailed, with too many avenues to explore. Despite its apparentsimplicity, the Seven Magic Steps was not fully embraced by the community. Manyindividuals intuitively knew what they wanted to do, and felt that too much time wasspent on planning process without getting further ahead in their plan. On their own,the community would unlikely initiate a similar process planning activity, at least on aformal basis.4.4. PROJECT DEVELOPMENT - A DIARY OF EVENTSThe pilot project was initiated in June 1990, but by August it was obvious thatthree month deadline was insufficient for project completion. The project wasabsorbed under a Directed Study Course (School of Community and RegionalPlanning, University of British Columbia) which carried the pilot project on a part-time basis until May 1991. The Plan Co-ordinator was hired in the summer of 1991to continue to develop the neighbourhood disaster planning pilot project.During the first summer, meetings were frequent, (approximately one every 1.5weeks) to compensate for the lack of time. The first month focused on educationalmatters; emergency plans, hazards faced by the community (See Appendix B),earthquakes (geofacts and predictions), home preparedness measures, and goals and66strategies of a neighbourhood disaster plan. Discussions proceeded from the generalto the specific. Approximately 35 to 40 individuals attended the meetings in June.The household questionnaire was undertaken at the earliest opportunity. Thethree month completion deadline necessitated a quick submission and response toassess the community resource base. The first page of the questionnaire gatheredhousehold information (this page was designed to be removed and stored as a hardcopy). The second and third pages collected information on personal skills, supplies,and equipment. Questionnaires were delivered door-to-door in June by localresidents. Steps were taken by the Plan Co-ordinator to inform Sea Island aboutBurkeville's intention to develop a neighbourhood disaster response capability.By the second month, attendance had dropped by half. Discussions centredaround generic tasks associated with a disaster response, and the management of anemergency Reception Centre. Much of the previous month's material had to berepeated due to sporadic attendance from participants.Hand-delivered pamphlets informed the community of upcoming events. Thelocal Sea Island Times was an ideal newsletter for disseminating information (it iswell-read by Burkeville residents), but it was not available in the months of July andAugust. Information was posted on three bulletin boards in the community.By mid-July the questionnaires were filtering back. It was obvious from theinitial responses that specific questions had to be revised: for example, when askedabout occupation (to assess individual skills), answers were often vague - "I work atthe airport". In the category for pets, individuals would frequently write their namebut not the type. Submitting one questionnaire per household created problems; itwas impossible to tell which individual in the household possessed what skill. The67questionnaire would be redrafted numerous times before eventual use in theHamilton Road community (See Appendix C). During July, Burkeville undertook aresource inventory of the buildings in their community.By August an agreement had been reached with St. John Ambulance(Vancouver) to hold disaster-related first aid training courses in Burkeville. Threetraining sessions were set for October and November, at less than half the regularcost. Two Registration and Inquiry training sessions were also slated for October(these months best fit within the schedule of community events). The community wasoffered a choice of sessions to attend - this was to encourage greater participationdue to the relative importance of these courses to the overall goals.The last community meeting of the summer established a framework foremergency tasks. Participants were asked to think about their personal goals for theproject, and take on a specific emergency task/responsibility. For those interested involunteering on a regular basis, a meeting was held August 15 to decide on futurestrategies and activities (See Appendix D for details). Many individuals were onholiday in August, and only four team members were able to attend.September to May 1992 were difficult months to keep the process going. Thepilot project ran on a part-time basis during the school year, competing with othercommunity/school functions. Telephone calls were made to anyone who indicated aninterest in volunteering on their questionnaire (approximately 25% of the respondentsdid not wish to participate). The results of the telephone blitz were not as successfulas anticipated:681. Personal Services Meeting - Five individuals were expected, two attended.- Discussions were based on the role of this team in a disaster.- One individual agreed to head up this team.2. Food Services Meeting - Five individuals attended, one with food serviceexperience.- The individual with catering experience agreed to head up this team.- A second catering company in Burkeville would not join B.E.R.T. dueto a personal conflict with a team member.- roles, responsibilities, and strategies were discussed.3. First Aid Team - Out of 14 medical professionals living in Burkeville, nocommitment was given to meet and plan strategies. Shift-work added tothe difficulty of co-ordinating meeting times.4. Communications Team - No meetings were held.- The two ham radio operators living in Burkeville were not interestedin pre-planning activities.- Communication with CB radio operators was a one-way transmission.5. Light Search and Rescue Team - No meetings were held.- Leadership for this task was passed on to one individual.- The meeting was postponed until approval was received from theRichmond Fire Department to train volunteers.6. Reception Centre Management - No volunteers.7. Lodging Team - No volunteers, with the exception of a Pet Management Co-ordinator.8. Registration and Inquiry Team -- Eleven volunteers attended the introductory meeting September 18sponsored by the Red Cross.- Thirteen volunteers were trained in October.Poor attendance plagued every planning session. Four individuals turned outto hear the Emergency Co-ordinator's home preparedness talk in October. Two outof three first aid training sessions were cancelled due to low enrolment. Familiaritywith the community suggests that the following may have had an impact:1. Too much too fast overwhelms and causes withdrawal.2. People believe that action not talk produces results (B.E.R.T. was verytask-oriented throughout the process).3.^There were not enough personal rewards or community recognition to69sustain motivation.4. Individuals were reluctant to take on emergency-related responsibilitieswithout the necessary training.5. Individuals were more comfortable with small tasks they could do attheir leisure. Being part of a team was more responsibility than theycould manage.6. Local community activities were in full force, siphoning off potentialvolunteers.7. Meetings with the Plan Co-ordinator were tedious events to be avoidedunless absolutely necessary.Steps were taken to modify the process to encourage higher participation ratesand better fit the communities needs. The following group recommendations wereput into effect:1. Only one meeting per month (no meeting in December).- a special emergency event (e.g. training) would replace the monthly meeting.2. We would emphasize tasks which produced tangible results, and move awayfrom process discussions.3. We would continue to advise the community of our efforts but would stopreaching out for more volunteers.4. The Emergency Co-ordinator would look into ways to bring in Municipalsupport.5. The Plan Co-ordinator would alternate or supplement meetings with guestspeakers, and videos.6. Meetings would be held in private homes rather than the Sea Island Hall.Twelve individuals from Burkeville were trained in emergency first aid, thirteenin Registration and Inquiry. Two Richmond school principals and several individualsfrom the Vancouver International Airport attended the Registration and Inquirysession. Red Cross stated that it was the largest attendance from one communityever. Red Cross has the unenviable task of forming volunteers throughout the Cityinto teams; Burkeville was fortunate to have an established team.November 7 at the Sea Island Association Annual General Meeting, theMayor, City Administrator, City Emergency Co-ordinator and Burkeville Plan Co-ordinator commended Burkeville on their emergency planning efforts. City70Emergency Program donated a fire-proof box to secure database information andother important supplies. On December 16, the Mayor donated a Medical and aReception Centre kit to the community (valued at $2,000). Burkeville was offered theuse of the bomb shelter at the designated Reception Centre (R.C.A. Forum) to storetheir equipment and supplies.There were no meetings in December but activities continued. The BurkevilleCo-ordinator met with the Brighouse School Principal and Parent Association todiscuss a disaster plan for the school. Concern for the children played an importantrole in the community's decision to undertake a neighbourhood disaster plan. Upuntil September 1991, school-age children had to be bused to Richmond (the SeaIsland Elementary School now administers grades one to three). Parents wereanxious that they would not be able to contact their children after a disaster. Thethree daycares in Burkeville were invited to participate in the planning process - onlyone staff member attended. The responsibility for assisting the daycares wasdelegated to the Personal Services Co-ordinator.January was a busy month. Members of the community went door-to-doorcollecting questionnaires. A community disaster action plan was established andprinted in the February issue of the Sea Island Times. A volunteer communicationnetwork was set up to relay information from B.E.R.T. to the community. Thenetwork proved invaluable - there were many situations which could not wait for themonthly publication of the local newsletter. The first draft of the emergency plan wasdistributed to six team members who attended the January meeting. Copies weremade available to other team members.By January, an agreement had been reached between City Emergency Program71and Burkeville to hold a one-day open house in March on community and personal/home preparedness (a quiet time for community events). The aim was hands-onexposure to preparedness measures; members of the Burkeville disaster planningteam were aware that pamphlets and preparedness talks had little effect on changingthe behaviour pattern of individuals to begin home preparedness. B.E.R.T. would beresponsible for the physical/social preparations for the open house, the CityEmergency Co-ordinator, for invitations to emergency organizations.The heavy snows over Christmas and New Year produced positive results forthe team's disaster planning efforts. Meals-on-Wheels was unable to deliver food toSea Island and B.E.R.T. was concerned for those unable to acquire food and otherbasic supplies. B.E.R.T. contacted Meals-on-Wheels to volunteer their help to deliverfood, but were refused the recipient's names; Meals-on-Wheels indicated that it wasa policy matter not to divulge the names of their clients. Team members compiled alist of potential names using the database information and their own knowledge of thecommunity, and went door-to-door taking requests for supplies.An informal meeting took place in January between the Plan Co-ordinator anda doctor residing in Burkeville. Fortuitously, the latter was an emergency specialistwho was extremely enthusiastic about the project, but would be unable to participateuntil summer graduation. After graduation, he agreed to head up the Medical/FirstAid team for B.E.R.T..A third drive to collect questionnaires was set for February. Thequestionnaires had to be cross-referenced beforehand to ensure that future effortswould not be duplicated. A few individuals complained on the previous drive thattheir questionnaires had been already been submitted.72By February, conflict between four team members was beginning to erode theprocess. Three members felt one individual was taking on too much responsibility,leaving the less interesting jobs for others. However, it was apparent to the Plan Co-ordinator that these members were reluctant to volunteer for tasks, regardless of whatwas involved.Seven members attended a one-day training course on Reception Centremanagement sponsored by the Provincial Emergency Social Services. The workshopwas free to any member of Burkeville who wished to attend due to the community'srecognition as an ESS Team. Only one workshop a year is available to communitiesin B.C., despite the obvious importance of emergency Reception Centres to theoverall disaster response. The topics covered were:1. The different levels and functions of government in the emergency hierarchy.2. Agreements in place between the Ministry of Social Services and otherorganizations.3.^Table Top Exercises (the focus).- Typical problems with reception centre management.- Learning to deal with more than one reception centre.The February meeting dealt with two major issues - good group process andthe upcoming open house in March. Group process discussions centred around thetheme of teamwork, particularly problem-solving as an essential part of the process.Problems not openly discussed early in the process would be difficult to resolve at alater date. Any group process must be intrinsically rewarding to all team members ifit is to be successful.The open house on March 3 was not as well-attended as expected(approximately 350 people turned out), but its success was three-fold: 1. For someemergency organizations (Hi-Hope Kennels, Diefenbaker School, Beaver Lumber) it73was their first invitation to a community event in Richmond, giving participants anopportunity to meet and exchange information; 2. It boosted the profile of aneighbourhood-level disaster planning approach; 3. It boosted the morale ofB.E.R.T., through social exchanges and local media coverage. Attendance from thecommunity of Burkeville might have been higher if it had not snowed and theadvertising had gone into the Sea Island Times as planned. Display booths weremanned by the following organizations:1. Richmond Fire Department- displays included how to turn off a gas valve, smoke detectors,and fire extinguishers- a tour of the fire truck2. Permits and Licences Branch, City of Richmond- basic safety in home construction3. Red Cross, Richmond and Vancouver- sign-up for Registration and Inquiry, first aid, and otheremergency-related training, first aid kit display- a tour of the Red Cross Emergency Communications Van4. St. John Ambulance, Vancouver- sign-up for first aid courses, sale of first aid kits5. School preparedness booth (Diefenbaker School, Menoah Steves)- signage, school questionnaires, school emergency supplies,`designer' raingear recycled from plastic bags6. Ham radio operators- equipment was set up to transmit around the world7. Hi-Hope Kennels- information on pet preparedness8. Beaver Lumber- how to secure a hot water tank- sale of supplies to begin home preparedness9. City Emergency Programs, Richmond- brochures, videos10. B.E.R.T.- neighbourhood preparedness, water sales, emergency pack display- babysitting provided by volunteersThe meeting in March created a greater rift between four team members. Themeeting time coincided with an important School Board meeting. Burkeville'smeeting was cancelled by Burkeville's Co-ordinator, but team members were not74informed of that decision.No meeting took place in April due to the activities planned for EmergencyPreparedness Week. Red Cross and City Emergency Programs held a ReceptionCentre exercise on April 24 at a local high school. The exercise focused onRegistration and Inquiry skills using students as 'victims'. Seven B.E.R.T. teammembers who attended the session assisted with lodging, personal services, specialneeds individuals, feeding, and communication tasks.By May the conflict between four team members was irreparable. The endresult was three members quitting the team. The use of the database was alsocreating problems - the Database Co-ordinator was unable to search and listinformation when requested, frustrating team member's efforts. One such requestoriginated from a team member who resigned.The Light Search and Rescue course was approved by the Fire Department inMay. It was advertised for July 6, but rescheduled for August. On May 24, theProvincial Emergency Social Services held a one-day workshop on the PersonalServices role in a disaster. Unfortunately, participants were given three days noticeprior to the event, and only the Plan Co-ordinator was able to attend. This was thefirst time in British Columbia Personal Services training has been made available tovolunteers. It suited Burkeville's needs perfectly. Volunteers were not expected tocounsel individuals, but to encourage them to talk about their experience and assistthem with their basic needs. In-depth counselling does not begin until thecommunity's basic needs have been met (it is assumed that external assistance wouldbe in place by that time). Copies of the Personal Services manual were madeavailable to team members.75The community was advised of summer events through a hand-delivered flyer.The June meeting began with a retrospective of past events, with an emphasis onapplauding Burkeville's efforts. Seven team members and three guests attended:1. City Emergency Co-ordinator, Richmond- To praise efforts and instill enthusiasm.2. Emergency Social Services Director, Richmond- To assure the community of a continued commitment to ESS activities,including neighbourhood-level disaster plans.- To applaud Burkeville's efforts.3.^Emergency Financial Co-ordinator, Ministry of Social Services, Richmond- To explain private contracts to acquire goods and services.- To guarantee payment of disaster bills provided a paper trail is kept.- To approve the amendment of forms to suit Burkeville's needs.Attendance in July and August was low, but this was anticipated:1. Most individuals take holidays in the summer.2. Schools are out.3. People want to spend more leisure time with their families in the fair weather.4. Many individuals in Burkeville are active volunteers in community activitiesthroughout the school year, and desire a break in the summer (the SeaIsland Association does not meet in the summer)5.^It followed the pattern of attendance from the previous summer.The Light Search and Rescue course was held August 24 at the No.1 Fire Hallin Richmond. Thirteen originally signed up for July, nine attended in August.4.5. PROJECT DETAILS4.5.1. ProfessionalismThe personal goal of the Plan Co-ordinator was to make the process simple,informal, and interesting. Burkeville is an extremely active community and theneighbourhood preparedness project had to compete with many other high priority76projects. Regretfully, the community was unable to set their own pace for projectevolvement due to the three month deadline. Volunteer commitment is difficult tomaintain at the best of times, but it is increasingly difficult in open-ended projectssuch as disaster planning. Team members would attend events when no otheractivities coincided with meeting times. Emergency preparedness was important, butnot urgent relative to other needs and commitments.Team members were familiar with each other and had worked together onother projects. In some cases, conflict was unavoidable in a close, informal setting.Teamwork is (almost) everything to the disaster planning process, but it can bedifficult to maintain. The concept itself may be alien to many individuals whose rolesand responsibilities either as professionals or members of organizations are clearlylaid out, and tend to be acted upon individually.Team members were reluctant to take on leadership roles, particularly withoutexperience or training. In the Burkeville Disaster Plan the title of Manager wasstruck-out and replaced with Co-ordinator. The team was advised on many occasionsthat everyone has an equal share of responsibility to assist team members with theiremergency task, but leadership problems persisted throughout the first year.The community expressed deep concern about the use of information collectedthrough the questionnaires. Some individuals were reluctant to mention the details ofspecial needs individuals in the household; a few individuals believed that thequestionnaire could be construed as carte blanche consent to use their supplies andequipment in a disaster. Many expressed concern about confidentiality ofinformation, particularly in terms of who would be given access to that information.The delivery of questionnaires was undertaken by local residents (accompanied by an77official letter from Emergency Programs) to reassure Burkeville that this was acommunity-run project, and that the information would be kept in the community andused for disaster planning purposes only.4.5.2. External SupportDuring the first six month period, team members believed that they weregetting little support from the City, with the exception of City Emergency Program.A new Mayor and Council, and a new Emergency Social Services Director have gonea long way to smooth ruffled feathers. Active involvement by the Mayor, a memberof the Richmond Council delegated the task of emergency preparedness, and the ESSDirector, has given the project credibility, recognition, and the badly needed boost ofsupport; the fact that these individuals take their emergency responsibilities seriouslyhas helped raise the profile of neighbourhood disaster planning with other emergencyorganizations. The Richmond ESS Team is a potential resource for Burkeville foreducation and training purposes. Burkeville can also tap into training provided by theProvincial ESS organization.Red Cross fully endorsed Burkeville's pilot project from the very beginning.Training in Registration and Inquiry permitted participants to take other emergency-related training through Red Cross (free admission). As the project grew, moreresources became available to Burkeville. B.E.R.T. was invited by the Richmond FireDepartment to participate in the public safety displays at the Salmon Festival heldJuly 1. Recognition from the emergency planning profession came with an invitationto speak at the Fourth Annual Emergency Planning Conference in Vancouver on78Burkeville's behalf (October 1991).4.5.3. Community Skills/TrainingTraining is a key ingredient in building team confidence, motivation andcommitment, but training requires recognition and support from all levels ofgovernment and private organizations involved in emergency management. Fewemergency-related training courses are available to the average citizen, with theexception of Registration and Inquiry and first aid/CPR training. For an individual orcommunity to access training, a prerequisite is to become a member of an establishedorganization such as Red Cross or ESS. In Burkeville's case, membership was gainedthrough both organizations.Recognition from the City was instrumental in gaining endorsement from theRichmond Fire Department to undertake a Light Search and Rescue course forBurkeville volunteers. This course is believed to be the first of its kind in Canada.The four hour course covered personal safety, protective clothing, danger spots,building collapse, area assessment, public utilities damage, and equipment/supplies.Mother's for Help Everyone Learn Preparedness (H.E.L.P.) in Washington State hasbeen trying since 1985 to gain consent from their Fire Department and EmergencyServices to train volunteers in Light Search and Rescue.Burkeville's disaster response pivots around Light Search and Rescue andReception Centre management activities. Training was not available to cover allaspects of Reception Centre management. The Provincial government sponsors anannual one-day workshop on Reception Centre activities (the content varies from79year to year) but it is too little, too late. A resource alternative is the RichmondEmergency Social Services organization which has the expertise and experience tobecome Burkeville's mentors, but this resource was not available to B.E.R.T. duringits first year of operation. The emergency specialist heading the Medical/First Aidteam was sent to Arnprior, Ontario, for one week of specialized training. He was theonly member of B.E.R.T. to access the Federal training programme.The ESS programme is currently being rejuvenated under a new ESSDirector's guidance. In a meeting September 1990 entitled 'Renewing the Spirit',Richmond's ESS Team (including team members from Burkeville and Hamilton)gathered to set goals and re-establish the team approach. The focus was to developindividual skills, and increase the understanding of procedures and processes. It wasagreed that the Richmond ESS team would develop strategies to incorporateneighbourhood disaster teams into their programme, and school emergencypreparedness plans.If Burkeville is a 'typical' community, then community members possesstremendous skills and potential to develop a self-help disaster programme InBurkeville's case, the success of the programme was not dependent on the number orquality of skills in the community, but on the level of motivation and commitment.Recruiting volunteers and keeping them involved were the two most difficult tasks inthe process. Effective volunteer management deserves more recognition than it hasreceived; it needs to be part of the development goals of any community project.804.5.4. The PlanBurkeville's disaster plan was designed to be simple and flexible. It is aguideline only, designed as a reference guide to assist team members preparestrategies for a disaster response. In order to accomplish the tasks set out in theplan, team members must have a clear understanding of the emergency response.The plan is a working document as opposed to a finished product; blank pages werepurposely left to take notes and jot down ideas.The plan was set out in the following manner1. Flow chart outlining the emergency hierarchy in British Columbia.2. Flow chart outlining the Emergency Control Group, Richmond.3. Burkeville's Emergency Co-ordinator Volunteer List.4. Richmond's Emergency Contact List.5. General Emergency Procedures for all Emergency Task Groups (Burkeville)- one page (see Appendix E)6. Emergency Tasks and Responsibilities*-tasks include Leader, Rescue Operations, Manager - Reception Centre,Medical/First Aid, Registration and Inquiry, lodging, Feeding,Communications, Personal Services, Emergency Supplies.a. Task description and responsibilities - one pageb. Pre-planning tasks - one pagec. Forms, logs, status cards relevant to each task activity.* See Appendix F (Medical/First Aid) for details.7. Reference materials to assist task groups plan strategies.8. Overview of Burkeville's disaster planning process.9. Evacuation Considerations - one page10. Maps.It is Burkeville's responsibility to develop and implement their emergencyresponse plan. The plan can be activated at any emergency level. In someemergency situations, B.E.R.T. may be called upon to assist the City of Richmond,the Vancouver International Airport, or other emergency response organizations. Itis up to the discretion of the community when to activate their plan. B.E.R.T. is81expected to work with other emergency personnel once the latter has beenestablished on Sea Island. Plan implementation covers the period of impact until adecision is reached between B.E.R.T., the community, and the City of Richmond toterminate the emergency.4.6. FUTURE DIRECTIONS4.6.1. RichmondThe City of Richmond has experienced a significant population growth overthe past decade. This growth has lead to a change in family makeup, increased ethnicdiversity, and a growing recognition from local government that neighbourhood and/orcommunity activity centres can be powerful instruments in combating the social ills ofa growing city (Staff Position Paper, April 1990). Most community services inRichmond are focused at the municipal and community level, with only minimumservice given to local neighbourhoods.The Staff Position Paper (April, 1990) recommended to Council that thecommunity centre act as a major focal point for the delivery of community services tothat area, through a series of associated neighbourhood facilities. The philosophybehind this approach is the expansion of a facility beyond its purely recreational roleinto the provision of social, educational, and other community services. The idea is tomove is away from the regional delivery of services into providing greater access tolocal facilities, with the responsibility of management delegated down to theneighbourhood-level. The concept of a neighbourhood disaster plan in the role of a82community service fits neatly into this new philosophy.During the fall of 1991, the Richmond Department of Community andGovernment Relations was established. This department is an umbrella organizationfor four departments - Community Development (community programmes andvolunteer management), Economic Development, the Richmond Foundation (privatefunding for community projects), and City Emergency Program. It is too early toperceive the direct connections between departments, but the potential exists tobetter co-ordinate community services by reducing the overlap in the areas ofplanning and development. The Department's direct ties to senior officials has theadvantage of raising the political consciousness and voice of emergency planning.Council's mandate for City Emergency Program includes full endorsement ofneighbourhood-level disaster plans.A second direction contemplated by Richmond's ESS Director is thedevelopment of an Emergency Reception Centre Programme. The objective is tobuild volunteer Reception Centre Teams by recruiting school principals, civicmaintenance personnel, and surrounding neighbourhoods in each of the 22 designatedReception Centres in the City.Menoah Steves and Diefenbaker School (Richmond) are prototype models forschool disaster planning and preparedness in the Lower Mainland. Including theestablishment of emergency procedures and supplies and equipment for the twoschools, Diefenbaker School can pride itself on the formation of a Disaster PlanningCommittee consisting of twenty-seven parents. Both schools have been instrumentalin disseminating a major earthquake awareness programme in Richmond, by bringingtheir disaster preparedness programmes to the attention of the School Board, parents83and students. Through the initial efforts of one highly motivated individual (theprincipal of Menoah Steves), every school in Richmond has been integrated into anearthquake preparedness programme4.6.2. Burkeville/HamiltonBurkeville has not advanced its disaster planning mandate since September1991. The two meetings with the ESS Director in the Fall were poorly attended.B.E.R.T. lost their Co-ordinator in October when she moved to another city.The ESS Director is not concerned with Burkeville's lack of activity. Theyhave accomplished a great deal within a one year period and the community may besatisfied to withdraw from the project into other activities for the time-being. TheESS Director would like to hold four mini-exercises (table top) to round-off thecommunity's training in disaster preparedness. At the time of writing this thesis, theSea Island Association was taking steps to integrate Burkeville's disaster planningprocess under the umbrella of the Association. B.E.R.T. would be responsible for theplanning and implementation of the plan, but would report its activities to the SeaIsland Association on a regular basis to keep the project active.Contact with the Hamilton Road community was established in the Spring of1991. Richmond's Emergency Co-ordinator was advised that Hamilton would not beable to begin a neighbourhood disaster programme at that time due to communityconcern with the Persian Gulf war. Contact was re-established in May 1991. TheCity Emergency Co-ordinator, Plan Co-ordinator, and Burkeville Co-ordinator wereinvited to talk to the newly-formed community association about emergency84preparedness and neighbourhood disaster plans. Members of the Association wereinterested in the project, but wanted to postpone the project until September. TheAssociation had recently committed themselves to oversee the development of acommunity centre and a new school building. A compromise was reached with a fewmembers to continue contact with the Plan Co-ordinator during the summer months.The responsibility for their neighbourhood disaster plan was turned over to theEmergency Social Services Director in September 1991.The Hamilton community began working with the Parent ESS team in the fall,and are proceeding slowly with their disaster planning process. Contact was madewith the R.C.M.P. to assimilate disaster planning into the Neighbourhood WatchProgramme A household questionnaire has been distributed through the HamiltonSchool. The community has requested that a local disaster exercise be held toencourage individuals in Hamilton to participate in the neighbourhood disasterplanning process.4.7. SUMMARYIt was inevitable that the Burkeville pilot project would experience somedifficulties during the course of its development. Both the community and CityEmergency Program Co-ordinators were on a learning curve while establishing aframework for neighbourhood disaster plans and community participation.During this process we have gained some insights into a community-baseddisaster planning process. Whether these insights are unique to Burkeville isimpossible to judge without a comparative study of other neighbourhood disaster85planning projects. In summary, below is a list of points believed to be salient to thesuccess of a 'bottom-up' disaster planning process based on the observations inBurkeville:o Disasters must be salient to community members before any action can takeplace. In Burkeville's case the Loma Prieta earthquake (1989) coupled withearthquake preparedness talks by the Emergency Co-ordinator raised theconsciousness and priority of preparedness measures.o Concern for the children plays an important motivational role for communitymembers. A school disaster preparedness programme can assist in motivatingparents to carry out home preparedness measures.o The process must be simple and flexible, and fit the community's needs. Theprocess needs a schedule which does not compete with other communityactivities (In Burkeville, the summer months were difficult times to generateinterest).o Different community disaster planning processes will likely result from variouscommunity efforts. In the case of Hamilton Road, a Neighbourhood Watchprogramme took precedence over disaster preparedness. In this situationdisaster planning will be amalgamated under the umbrella of NeighbourhoodWatch, to provide a single framework for personal safety and preparedness.o Community disaster plans must be built on an element of personalpreparedness (especially home and family preparedness plans) to ensure that aminimal standard of safety is achieved.o Networking with emergency organizations can multiply the level of resourcesavailable to the community in the pre- and post-disaster phases.o The greatest level of community involvement in training occurred in thoseinstances where emergency personnel came into the community.o Leadership in the community is very important but a programme will notsucceed in the long-run if dominated by a few highly motivated individuals.Communities may have to be taught the basics of teamwork to grasp itsimportance to disaster management.o For best results, a neighbourhood-level disaster programme may have to besheltered under an established community programme such as a communityassociation.86o In B.E.R.T.'s case, greater recognition from the Mayor and Council at theonset of the pilot project could have raised the level of motivation andcommitment from the community: more resources could have been madeavailable when enthusiasm for the project was running high.o Community members possess the skills necessary to mount an effectiveemergency response, but success depends on motivation, commitment, andtraining. Burkeville responded quickly to the needs of those communitymembers who were isolated during heavy winter snows.o Pamphlets and other written material had little effect on changing thebehavioural patterns of community members. In Burkeville's case, teammembers wanted hands-on demonstrations to show what can be done tosafeguard their home and family, and involve the community in socialexchanges about the threat.o Female volunteers far outnumbered the male. The male population needs tobe aware of the roles they can play in a disaster and be encouraged toparticipate. Teenagers should also be encouraged to participate.o Neighbourhood disaster plans need long-term support and commitment fromlocal government to sustain activity. Including training and education, localgovernments can provide the 'psychic reward' needed to maintain the life of avolunteer organization.875. AN ANALYSIS5.1. INTRODUCTIONThe purpose of this section is not to provide empirically proven answers froma one-case examination, but to contribute suggestions for practice, by analyzing therelationships between the case study, theory, and empirical research. Through adetailed examination of a 'bottom-up' planning process, we can learn about thepositive and negative attributes of this model over the traditional 'top-down' plans,and its potential for management through local governance (community and localgovernment).5.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEORY, RESEARCH, AND THE CASESTUDYThe profile of the emergency planning profession in the government hierarchyis low, and emergency planning departments often work in isolation from the day-to-day business of government. These factors may allow emergency personnel greaterfreedom and flexibility in programme initiatives, provided that the demands of thedepartment do not exceed the government's ability or willingness to pay; in this fieldit is possible for public involvement to expand, and there is a great potential forinnovation and creativity to take root.Disaster planning, including neighbourhood disaster plans, may be one of the`left-over' areas described by Friedmann (1987), which does not compromise or88threaten the status quo. Disaster planning can be a symbiotic partnership of mutualbenefit: neighbourhoods can control those areas of disaster management beyond thegrasp of government, and governments can focus on the overall disaster response(physical and technical matters). The introduction of the neighbourhood disaster plancan be construed as milestone in the level of community involvement sought bygovernment. It is a dramatic shift away from public compliance measures into co-operative efforts. The programme marks the growing recognition that the emergencyresponsibility must be shared. In Burkeville's case it took an Emergency Co-ordinatorwith a vision, an enthusiastic ESS Director, and an involved Mayor and Council. Asresearch indicates, community resistance to emergency planning can be overcome ifsomeone in authority takes charge.Judging from Burkeville's experience, the programme can be one of fiscalresponsibility. With minimum staff and funding and the help of trained citizens, localgovernments have the potential to substantially reduce the loss of life and property,and dependence on external assistance.5.2.1. Principles of Public Participation/Citizen EmpowermentThe Burkeville pilot project is not a true 'bottom-up' approach to disastermanagement as was the case for Mothers for H.E.L.P. in Washington State. InBurkeville's case, the initiative was spawned by the City Emergency Co-ordinator, andthe project grew under the guidance of the City's Emergency Program Plan Co-ordinator. Both emergency personnel were directly involved throughout B.E.R.T.'sprogramme encouraging citizen organization. It is questionable whether Burkeville's89neighbourhood disaster plan would have evolved without government assistance.Research tells us that community disaster subcultures emerge when there arerepetitive disaster impacts, a period of forewarning, and the existence ofconsequential damage which is salient to the community These factors were notpresent in Richmond to trigger disaster planning subcultures. For some teammembers in Burkeville, disaster salience was achieved through the efforts of themedia and Richmond's Emergency Co-ordinator following the Loma Prietaearthquake in California in 1989.Direct government involvement may not be critical to the initiation of avolunteer disaster planning project - as in the case of Mother's For H.E.L.P. - but it islikely crucial to the long-term survival. This group eventually won the recognition ofgovernment, a fact which undoubtedly helped this organization survive and grow overthe past six years. Though Burkeville has been assisted from the very beginning, it ishoped that Burkeville has or will soon reach the point where the disaster planningproject is run by community members, with minimal assistance from outside sources.Emergency planning may be one of those situations where citizen control is nota plausible alternative. The Burkeville pilot project is a volunteer-run organizationattempting to gain self-reliance in a disaster situation. Without the co-operative andco-ordinated efforts of all stakeholders, it is unlikely that the neighbourhood-levelapproach could attain any real depth of mastery without the necessary training andeducation. Without legitimation from government and private emergency-responseorganizations, it is doubtful that any neighbourhood project could entice the level orskill of membership it needs to run a disaster planning programme effectively.Conversely, top-down emergency plans need community involvement. Local90governments are becoming more sophisticated in their disaster plans, but have yet toturn toward trained community responses (with the exception of ESS organizations).Community/personal preparedness can reduce an area's 'vulnerability' by preparing itscitizens to be an asset rather than a liability.Outside organizations can help neighbourhood disaster teams by offering socialrewards (friendships between the community and those organizations involved inemergency planning and response), psychic rewards (appreciation for their efforts),and by instilling a belief in team members that their efforts can 'make a difference'(through networking, training, and shared exercises). Emergency planning, unlikemany volunteer projects, does not culminate in a substantive reward (e.g. a decision,funding, equipment, etc.). Emergency planning is an open-ended process, intangibleand subjective, leaving doubts about the potential effectiveness of one's capabilities,strategies, and efforts. Numerous outcomes are both possible and legitimate. Thereis no way to test the 'success' of a neighbourhood disaster planning process, butinvolvement in desk-top and simulated exercises can assist communities prepareeffective strategies, and provide feedback for their efforts.Leadership has been shown to be crucial to the survival of a neighbourhooddisaster planning project, particularly leadership which includes an active andconcerned Mayor and Council. In Burkeville's case, active involvement from theMayor, a council member delegated the responsibility of emergency preparedness,high-profile emergency organizations (e.g. Red Cross, City Emergency Program,Richmond Fire Department), and media attention has played a big role in keepingthe process alive. In one situation, the Mayor of Richmond sent out personalizedletters to thank all volunteers who participated in a Reception Centre exercise.91Leadership in the community is also important - in Burkeville's case, commitmentfrom fourteen medical professionals residing in Burkeville was not gained until anemergency specialist agree to head up the Medical/First Aid team.Communities do not have to fulfil the same planning/preparednessrequirements set out in Burkeville. As indicated in the Literature Review, the publicsector can help out in a variety of ways. The community itself must decide on its owngoals and objectives. It is conceivable that some communities may wish to pursue aless rigorous approach. Efforts could concentrate on home/personal preparednessmeasures, which could significantly reduce human and property losses. In the case ofthe Hamilton Road area, other community projects have taken precedence overdisaster planning. In order to fit disaster planning on their agenda, the programme isto be assimilated under Neighbourhood Watch. The Richmond Royal CanadianMounted Police are enthused with the idea of a joint venture to promote publicsafety. In this case, there is a greater potential to draw more volunteers and achievelong-term survival (only 7% of American volunteer groups sustained interest inemergency preparedness for several months). Neighbourhood Watch is a highlyorganized structure which can hold an emergency control group in place in both anemergency and non-emergency situation. In Burkeville's case, the shift ofresponsibility for neighbourhood disaster planning onto the shoulders of the SeaIsland Association may be what the project needs to regain momentum.B.E.R.T. can be described as a source of organizational experiment andinnovation, but its purpose is 'supplemental', to aid or replace government agencies inproviding services. In a real disaster situation, Burkeville will ultimately have todepend on external support in the disaster recovery phase (one example is long-term92counselling). When this assistance is offered, it is hoped that B.E.R.T. will havesufficient confidence from mastery over their crisis that they can direct this assistancein positive ways. The success of a neighbourhood disaster plan depends on both a`bottom-up' drive from the community to take on an emergency preparednessresponsibility, and a 'top-down' push from government to encourage and support theiractions. There is no agency with the legal authority to enforce citizen action towarda minimum level of disaster preparedness in the home.5.2.2. Community Development PrinciplesThe move from (over)centralization into decentralization has evolved from thefailure of top-down plans to resolve social and economic ills. The Burkeville pilotproject is one example of the trend toward decentralization. The assumption is thatcommunity-based projects are more sensitive to local needs - i.e., communities are ina better position to decide what those needs are. Bureaucracies, including emergencyplanning departments, are encumbered by organizational fragmentation wherebureaucrats tend to avoid communicating with their counterparts, and organizationalmobility, where bureaucrats most often need official instruction before proceeding.The Meals-on-Wheels incident described in Section 4 is one example of the inabilityof a bureaucracy to adapt to new conditions on short-notice. Enthusiasm andinnovativeness should have a better opportunity to flourish in community-run projects.As discussed in Section 1, the Economic Council of Canada recognizes theimportance of these characteristics to the survival of local enterprise - theyrecommend that assistance to local enterprise be as flexible and as unbureaucratic as93possible.Burkeville was reminded on numerous occasions that imagination andcreativity were the qualities most sought after in emergency management. It isinconceivable that any emergency team is going to be fully prepared for what liesahead. Out-of-ordinary events are going to require unusual, perhaps extraordinarystrategies. Enthusiasm, a belief in one's ability, and a caring community environmentcan overcome tremendous obstacles. This is particularly poignant when theresponsibility for one's own life, and the lives of friends and family, rest on theshoulders of the individual.Mastery over neighbourhood disaster planning may encourage greaterparticipation in other self-help projects. Once a community has developed skills inself-management, there is no reason why the skills and experience gained in thedisaster planning process cannot lead to greater levels of community participation inother government-run projects. Provided local governments are cognizant of thepotential communities have in assisting or running local programmes, delegation ofpower becomes possible, even encouraged. The City of Richmond is moving in thisdirection by suggesting that the management of community services be delegateddown to the neighbourhood-level. The services themselves will be established throughlocal community need. It is plausible that neighbourhood disaster plans may becomepart of this overall programme.5.2.3. Disaster Planning Theory and PrinciplesAs indicated in Section 1, general theory provides few guidelines for planners94to meet challenges and bring about positive change. Emergency planning theory andprinciples offers even less for emergency personnel. Emergency officials are rarelyfrom a planning background. With little disaster experience, emergency officials inthe Lower Mainland look south for information. The recent disasters in Californiahave provided research material on disaster management but the information doesnot paint a true picture of the disaster response. It is reasonable to assume that theinformation which would 'embarrass the department heads' would be suppressed.There is also a problem of research fragmentation as different academic departmentsand professions work on isolated studies, often on one small aspect of the wholeexperience. As Robert Stallings indicated, there has been some attempt to render thefindings of separate studies into formal propositions but these studies are rare. Asub-objective of this thesis was to consolidate the piecemeal undertakings of researchinto a digestible form to enable emergency personnel, officials, and the private sectorto increase their understanding of state-of-the-art emergency management practices tomove toward more realistic plans.Networking is invaluable to the survival of public participation groups, but it isparticularly meaningful in the emergency planning field (regardless of the planningscale). For Burkeville, it was important to establish links with City EmergencyProgram, Richmond ESS, Red Cross, and other emergency organizations, forinformation, training, education, and legitimization. It was hoped that a strong linkcould be forged between B.E.R.T. and Mother's For H.E.L.P. in Washington for theexchange of information. Unfortunately, no response was received after threeattempts. In B.E.R.T.'s case, developing contacts with emergency personnel andvolunteer organizations was a slow process, but other neighbourhood projects can95now benefit from their efforts.The focus in research away from individuals in a crisis/disaster to organization(primarily government) and community responses is a positive shift. An increasedunderstanding of community behaviour in disaster can assist emergency personnel toamend plans which account for community action. As research shows, appropriatecommunity responses are not only beneficial to the whole emergency response, butare crucial to community recovery. A successful disaster response is the fulfilment ofexpected behaviours on both the part of organizations and individuals. The more weunderstand the community behaviours following a disaster, the closer ourplans/strategies can emulate reality.In theory, planning seeks to simplify the world around us to bring aboutchange. It is therefore natural to regard planning as the rightful passage to managethe emergency environment. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case. Few individualspossess the skills to mount an effective emergency planning process. Withoutplanning skills it is almost impossible to develop neighbourhood-level disasterresponse teams which survive the long-term. The latter need a firm grasp on processplanning (especially group maintenance issues), as well as task responsibilities. Theneighbourhood disaster plans in California rely on government-produced manuals toset up disaster teams. This is not necessarily a 'bad' approach, but it should beaccompanied by training in developing individual and team planning skills. We donot want to promote 'standardized' behaviour, but to encourage people to think aboutpossible alternatives in order to make the best decisions possible, both in the shortand long-term: "a person trained in the creative process has a greater chance ofdeveloping worthwhile innovations than a person without such specialized training"96(Don Maclver, Emergency Co-ordinator, Richmond). Research is desperately neededon effective planning processes to use at the community-level, in order to teachcommunities how to plan for themselves.Comfort suggests that our ability to act depends on three things - the decision-making process, the priority setting, and the ability to manage information - but weare constrained by conditions of uncertainty and complexity. If the proposition thatrational planning inhibits problem-solving in dynamic, uncertain conditions is correct,`rational planning' could be totally inappropriate at the community level. In adisaster, citizens, friends, and neighbours see what has to be done and respond. Theirprocess is informal, subjective, often based on individual plays. The idea thatvolunteers work as a team in the pre-planning phase to complete one priorized taskafter another may be detrimental to 'bottom-up' processes. People choose activitieswhich best suit their skills and preferences regardless of the priority ranking oftasks/goals. As research indicates, individuals draw on their own procedural patternsto carry out their new roles. One cannot force volunteers to act in a certain manner -good leaders will work on individual strengths to build team spirit. Emergencyplanning has the capacity to offer a wide range of possible actions/strategies. Leaderscan encourage individuals to pursue the 'more important' tasks, but a great deal offlexibility in the system is warranted to allow for individual creativity. Once anindividual has completed a task to his/her satisfaction, s/he may be more motivated topursue other, perhaps more challenging, tasks. A neighbourhood disaster team needsto open up a multitude of options to encourage full participation. In Burkeville's casea rigid framework was placed on the pilot project to comply with the three-monthdeadline. When the deadline was removed, members were offered a full range of97options to pursue.Governments are constrained by a multitude of obstacles in disastermanagement. These obstacles are: the lack of professionalism, public versus privateinterests, funding, resources, getting on the political agenda, inadequate legislation,lack of community participation, and an emphasis on plan-production rather thanprocess planning. However, it is possible to identify those relationships with the mostfar-reaching effects: for example, efforts spent on community involvement couldassist local governments with resource/funding problems, communities could becomeadvocates for raising the political consciousness of disaster preparedness, privateinterests could shift into public concerns, and emergency planning could gain therecognition and credibility it needs (a multiplier effect).The ability to manage and communicate information is particularly relevant toneighbourhood disaster teams. Until an organization is able to communicate in aneffective and professional manner (internally and externally), it is unlikely that a teamspirit will develop. Without a team approach, members become locked in powerstruggles. Communications between team members and emergency organizations inRichmond was almost non-existent during the first year of operation despiteencouragement from the Plan Co-ordinator to develop contacts. B.E.R.T.experienced communication difficulties internally when insufficient attention was paidto individual concerns; as Pross suggests, in order for volunteer groups to survive,individual members must feel that they can make a difference.As long as individuals are moving toward goal accomplishment, any pathleading toward that goal should be acceptable. Emergency planning is an open-endedprocess, offering much flexibility in time and effort spent in the pre-planning phase.98We need to take advantage of this fact. Burkeville took approximately one year todefine their emergency plan. The Provincial ESS organization suggests that one anda half years is the minimum time to develop an effective emergency response team.It should be up to team members to decide what that pace should be, and how thedisaster planning process should proceed.5.2.4. Process PlanningDisaster plans are ineffectual unless those who have a role in the disasterresponse are included in the disaster planning process. A team-work approach isneeded between all emergency-response organizations to decide who will do what,and how operations will be co-ordinated. Unless individuals are able to walk throughthe process together, they are unlikely to accept ownership. Without ownership bycritical segments of society, efforts are needlessly wasted; in the case of the MexicoCity earthquake (1985), "the lack of pre-established plans lead to fruitless waste of agreat amount of man-hours and economic resources" (Hartman, 1986:172).Municipalities do have the resources to significantly increase the effectivenessof a disaster response, the major exception being local government's inability to tapinto the private sector for goods, services, and manpower prior to a disaster. Processplanning may be the only means to rectify this failing. The ICMA article (1991) onemergency management stresses the importance of including measures to satisfycommunity need. A second study revealed that emergency co-ordinators see thevalue of including the private sector in their emergency plans, but are reticent to doso because of the perceived workload. It would be an obvious benefit if99neighbourhoods could run their own emergency planning programmes with minimumsupervision.It is not enough to suggest models for process planning, we have to use themeffectively. There is little in the academic literature to assist with our task. ProfessorBoothroyd (1989) believes that community leaders, etc. are hungry for processplanning concepts. This was indicated at the Emergency Preparedness Conference(October 1991) from participant feedback. The Burkeville presentation was the onlytalk which offered a glimpse into planning ideas and concepts for project initiation.Individuals are aware of what has to be done (the end product) but few are aware ofthe techniques for getting there.Peter Boothroyd's 'Seven Magic Steps' was the planning process used to definethe task, the steps leading up to task accomplishment, and the long-term goals. Itwas not rigidly applied throughout the process due to the community's need to runtheir meetings in a style which is both comfortable and familiar The Seven MagicSteps did provide a smooth transition from a blank slate to a programme outline.For the most part activities were chosen due to their relative importance to the goalsand objectives outlined in the original task framework. Burkeville was assisted by thePlan Co-ordinator in the planning phase, but the responsibility for developingstrategies rested solely on the shoulders of team members.Burkeville's disaster plan follows the framework used in process planning. Itwas designed to be simple and flexible, a complete reversal from highly detailedmanuals citing Standard Operating Procedures. It enforces the reality of having toprepare in the pre-disaster phase as team members are given a bare minimum of pre-and post-disaster information in the plan itself. The Burkeville plan was a deliberate100attempt to avoid the pitfalls typically associated with traditional, top-down emergencyplans. The plan does not make any distinction between disaster types, and it can beactivated at any emergency level (an all-hazard approach). There was no attempt toseparate planning strategies into distinct emergency phases (with the exception ofplanning versus implementation responsibilities). Though there are noticeablereferences to Burkeville and Sea Island, the plan can be easily modified to fit anycommunity's needs. The City of Richmond is now in the process of making thenecessary changes for use in other neighbourhoods. It is believed that the BurkevillePlan is of value to any emergency planning group as a prototype model to new andinnovative ways of adopting process strategies. It is also useful for training andfamiliarizing participants with emergency duties.Plan exercises are an important part of any disaster planning process. Theyare the 'Side-Step' of the Seven Magic Steps; that is, they represent processevaluation. In most emergency planning situations, including Burkeville, planexercises tend to be the last step in the planning process. Burkeville has yet toundertake a table-top/simulated exercise, though four mini-exercises have been slatedby the Richmond ESS Director. In hindsight, plan exercises should be an integralpart of any process to stimulate team members to higher levels of motivation andcommitment; plan exercises could also provide feedback for past efforts. It isinteresting to note that the Hamilton Road community has requested that a simulatedexercise be initially undertaken in their community to encourage participation in theneighbourhood disaster planning project.The most difficult problems associated with any volunteer project are gettingindividuals involved, and keeping them involved. A disaster planning project has the101potential to strengthen community roots by bringing together individuals of all ages,gender and ability. Disaster planning is also capable of competing with othercommunity activities as it can offer many interesting avenues to explore. Oneproblem apparently lies with shifting the emergency responsibility onto the shouldersof the team and/or the individual. The literature is full of material expounding theneed for greater public involvement to improve local government response andrecovery, but there is little information on what strategies work to promote fullcommunity participation. We need to provide incentives to help overcome the`procrastination' factor. Even the Red Cross, with its extensive campaigns andcanvassing, is only able to attract 3% of the population to donate blood.5.3. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF 1HE BURKEVILLENEIGHBOURHOOD DISASTER PLANNING PROCESSBurkeville's experience with disaster planning may be unique. The HamiltonRoad area pilot project is taking a different approach by assimilating disasterplanning into a Neighbourhood Watch framework. Most of the tasks andresponsibilities associated with an emergency response will be similar, but theirprocesses will differ. It is too early to state how successful the approaches will be intheir respective communities, but it is possible to list the pros and cons of theneighbourhood-level approach from the information gleaned from Burkeville's efforts(not given in any order of priority).1025.3.1. Positive Attributes1. Burkeville's disaster plan emphasizes 'community' in community disasterplanning. The programme allows the average but motivated citizen to easilyassimilate into the process.2. It allows for public input to produce better emergency plans.3. It raises the profile and priority of disaster preparedness in their jurisdiction.4. It can be managed with relative ease and minimal cost to local government.5. It encourages team members to plan strategies which are relevant tocommunity needs.6. It has the potential to reduce the burden on government emergency responseservices.7. It is an indication that people are willing to take on more personalresponsibility for emergency preparedness, and opens people's minds to thefact that government will not always be there.8. Government funds and resources are shifting away from the post-impact phaseinto preparedness and mitigation.9. The programme encourages co-operative and co-ordinative efforts between alllevels of government and the private sector. The Mayor's involvement was avaluable contribution to the programme10. It encourages a reliance on local rather than external resources.11. Planning is done on a small scale where decisions are easier to implement.People are familiar with the physical layout and special needs individuals in thecommunity, and are better able to respond to the priorities of the disaster.12. As volunteer disaster workers under the Provincial Emergency Social Services,individuals are exempt from personal liability.13. Burkeville does not need to wait until a disaster is officially declared to initiatea disaster response.14. The project encourages full participation from individuals of all ages, genderand ability.15.^It demonstrates that ordinary citizens can be an invaluable resource.10316. It brings individuals together through a common bond to provide security forfamily and friends.17. It educates people to believe in themselves, and develops confidence to takegreater control over their lives.18. It has the potential to structure community empowerment over other aspectsof their lives.19. It has motivated other communities to do emergency plans.20. It de-bureaucratizes the traditional emergency planning structure bypersonalizing it - the people are the primary resource, not the tools, and theirideas and beliefs are an integral part of the process.21. It trains individuals to cope effectively with a disaster.22. The training the community receives will be an asset anywhere.23. When individuals take ownership of a plan through design and implementation,they are more committed to the process and the project has a better chance ofsuccess.24. Burkeville is in a better position to get things done, without the problems ofgovernment red-tape and jurisdictional dysfunction.25. Burkeville has been an advocate to get hazard mitigation higher on thepolitical agenda.26. Individuals living in the community can add greater credibility to a communityproject than someone working from the outside.27. Planners themselves can learn more about public participation strategies andcommunity goals.28.^Neighbourhood disaster planning can be interesting and fun, facets too oftenignored in project planning.5.3.2. Negative Attributes1.^Individuals are untrained in process planning techniques, and often emphasizetask-oriented strategies which can be detrimental to process (desk-top/simulated exercises can encourage process planning activities).1042. The all-hazard, all-phase approach may not cover the needs of everyjurisdiction (Burkeville's process did not include long-term recovery, though itis important).3. People are generally unaware of effective techniques for volunteermanagement. The City of Richmond is taking steps to rectify this in theircreation of a Community Development Department (community programmesand volunteer management).4. Training was slow to materialize. Reception Centre training needs to beextensively developed.5. Concern over confidentiality of information affected the quantity and quality ofinformation submitted by Burkeville residents.6. Team members were very reluctant to take on leadership roles.7. Motivation and commitment are difficult to maintain (for all volunteerorganizations).8. Disaster planning must successfully compete with other community events.This may be difficult to maintain in the long-run.9. The initial time constraints did not allow the community much flexibility in theprogramme design.10. Inconsistent attendance at meeting tended to lose the continuity of the process.A fall programme would have best suited the community's timetable.11. The work is undertaken through volunteer efforts, which may work against theproject in the long-run.12. Information and resources needed to train the community and assist withplanning are extremely limited.13. People cannot be taught leadership - it must emerge through experience. Afew leaders in Burkeville have emerged, but not enough to cover all theemergency tasks.14. Burkeville was fortunate to have well-defined community boundaries. In othersituations it may be very difficult to delineate a 'neighbourhood' disasterplanning boundary using either physical and/or social criteria.15. A single neighbourhood-level disaster planning model may not work in areaswith a large ethnic population (different beliefs, different cultures).16.^It is a difficult task to wean the community off the Plan Co-ordinator. It is105also difficult to tell when this is necessary, or if it should be done at all. Theproject may only work under a local government umbrella.17. Outside help from well-established emergency organizations depends on thegood-will of those organizations.18. Female volunteers far outnumber the male, despite the fact that the malepopulation was fully encouraged to participate. A few observations during theBurkeville process suggest that women plan, men react.19. Local governments do not have the resources to assist communities/neighbourhoods on an continuous basis.20. Community disaster planning is not an issue which most of society feels deeplyabout. This adds to the difficulty of getting it on the agenda.5.4. SUMMARYThe neighbourhood-level disaster planning concept follows the recent trends ingeneral planning theory and principles - i.e., public participation, citizenempowerment, community development principles, networking - and fits neatly intostat-of-the-art strategies and management techniques for disaster planning suggestedin the Disaster Planning Literature Review Chapter.It is believed that neighbourhood-level planning requires local governmentinvolvement to survive, and local governments need an educated and trained public toovercome problems which have plagued past disaster responses. At minimum, localgovernments can offer social/psychic rewards, and recruit other emergencyorganizations (ESS teams, Red Cross, etc.) to assist with training and education.Communities need planning skills for long-term project survival, with a particularemphasis on process planning and group maintenance issues. Once a community hasdeveloped skills in short and long-term planning (through a team-approach),106neighbourhood disaster teams can run their programmes with minimum assistancefrom local government. Once the disaster planning framework has been establishedfor one neighbourhood disaster team, other neighbourhoods can readily assimilateinto a similar process. Communities themselves can decide how far they want to taketheir disaster planning responsibilities.Burkeville can be applauded for their efforts in changing the perception ofwhat communities and individuals can do in the complex and uncertain world ofdisaster management. They have gained a growing reputation and recognition in thelocal field of emergency planning, and have incited other local groups to participate inneighbourhood disaster planning. Despite the lack of disaster experience, Burkevillewas willing to take on a disaster planning responsibility. Burkeville has shown thatneighbourhood disaster plans can compete successfully with community projects, andother major events in society. It is suggested that concern for family members,particularly the children, has played a decisive role in project initiation. Burkeville'srecent break with emergency planning is likely the threshold for communityattentiveness to this type of volunteer work. The basic plan has been set up to allowthe community to work on their own. Annual or bi-annual meetings may be all that isnecessary to keep their neighbourhood disaster plan on track, and this is currentlybeing pursued by the Sea Island Association.Neighbourhood-level disaster plans, the pinnacle of citizen involvement indisaster planning, may only be feasible in those 'most-at-risk' communities where themajority of the population is aware of a specific hazard(s), and recognizes the need toreduce their vulnerability. It will take strong leadership and motivation from both thegovernment and community sectors to begin disaster planning in their community,1076. CONCLUSIONIt is believed that the neighbourhood-level disaster planning approach is thewave of the future for disaster management. In North America, local governmentsare coming to the realization that a disaster response, without the assistance oftrained volunteers and without a productive strategy for private sector resources, cansignificantly reduce the effectiveness of response and community recovery.Communities are coming to the realization that during the critical period of disasterresponse, government assistance will not always be available. The United Statesbegan a programme of setting up neighbourhood disaster response teams in the mid-1980's. In Canada the first neighbourhood-level disaster response capability wasinitiated in 1990 in Richmond, British Columbia.If the trend to develop a neighbourhood-level capacity is to continue, we needto know more about this approach to assist local governments and communities intheir goal toward self-reliance and mastery over 'the uncontrollable'. It is hoped thatthe detailed description of Burkeville's experience will assist others to move toward agreater level of community involvement in local government disaster plans, and planswhich better emulate reality.A one-case examination of a neighbourhood disaster plan, plus the dataoriginating from this thesis, is obviously inadequate to resolve all the problems genericto the field of disaster planning, but the thesis provides a starting point for futurestudy and experiment. Areas which might be considered for further research are asfollows:108o What motivates individuals in the private sector to take on an emergencyresponsibility (home and/or community preparedness).o What factors lead to long-term community commitment to disaster planningand preparedness (public and private sectors).o What process planning techniques and strategies can be readily assimilated atthe community-level.o How can we manage volunteers more effectively, and ensure project survival.o How much control should citizen disaster cadres have in both the pre-planningand implementation phases.o What responsibilities should governments have in the formation ofneighbourhood disaster teams.o What techniques can we use to enhance creativity, innovativeness, and ateamwork approach at the community level.o What factors and techniques can be utilized to involve the community in socialexchanges about a hazard.o How do we develop leadership skills at the community-level.o How do we define 'neighbourhoods' for the purpose of setting upneighbourhood disaster response teams.Lastly,o More research and theory is needed in the field of disaster planning andmanagement. If greater community involvement in the planning andimplementation phases is the goal, research into community behaviours indisaster and community recovery will be necessary.109BIBLIOGRAPHYAnderson, P. et al. July 1990. Hazard Management Planning in B.C.: Issues andChallenges. University of British Columbia: Centre for Human Settlements.Anderson, W.A., and S. Mattingly. 1991. "Future Directions." In T.E. Drabek and G.J.Hoetmer (eds.). 1991:311-334.Ang, Alfred H.S. 1989. "Consideration of Building Safety in Disaster Prevention." InF.E. Winslow (ed.). Summer 1989:37-39.Arnstein, Sherry R. 1969. "Ladder of Citizen Participation". In Journal of AmericanInstitute of Planners. July 1969:216-224.Beatley Tom. 1988. "Ethical Dilemmas in Hazard Management." Natural HazardsObserver, Vol. XII, No.5, May 1988:1-3.Blakely, E.J. 1989. Planning Local Economic Development. California: SagePublications Inc.Boothroyd, Peter. 1989. Notes and Exercises for Peter Boothroyd's Portion of theBand Planning Course. Saskatchewan Indian Federated College. August 15-17, 1989.Boothroyd, Peter. 1989. Developing Community Planning Skills: Applications of aRecursive Seven-Step Model. Presented to Planning Education: An InternationalConference in Celebration of the Royal Town Planning Institute's 75th Anniversary.Birmingham Polytechnic, U.K. September 12-15, 1989.Boothroyd, Peter, and M. Eberle. August 1990. Healthy Communities: What areThey, How Are They Made?. Vancouver: Centre for Human Settlements.Boschi, Enzo. 1986. "Planning and Management for the Prevention and Mitigation ofEarthquake Disasters." In Organizing Committee of the International Seminar onRegional Development Planning for Disaster Prevention. September 1986:59-68.Cigler, B.A. 1988. "Current Policy Issues in Mitigation." In L.K. Comfort (ed.). 1988:39-52.Cigler, BA, and R.J. Burby. 1990. "Local Flood Hazard Management: Lessons fromNational Research." In R.T. Sylves and W.L. Waugh, Jr. (eds.). 1990:59-74.City of Corpus Christi Emergency Management Plan. June 14, 1988.Clason, Christine. 1983. "The Family as a Life-Safer in Disaster." In InternationalJournal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters. Vol. 1, No. 1. March 1983:43-62.110Comfort, L.K. (ed.). 1988. Managing Disaster - Strategies and Policy Perspectives.London: Duke University Press.Comfort, L.K. 1988. "Designing Policy for Action: The Emergency ManagementSystem." In L.K. Comfort (ed.). 1988:3-21.Comfort, L.K. 1988. "Synthesis in Disaster Management: Linking Reason With ActionLearning Systems." In L.K. Comfort (ed.). 1988:344-349.Comfort, L.K. 1985. "Integrating Organizational Action in Emergency Management."In Public Administration Review, Special Issue, 1985:155-164.Comfort, L.K., and A.G. Cahill. 1988. "Increasing Problem-Solving Capacity BetweenOrganizations: The Role of Information in Managing the May 31, 1985, TornadoDisaster in Western Pennsylvania." In L.K. Comfort (ed.). 1988:180-198.The Conservation Foundation. 1885. Risk Assessment and Risk Control. An IssueReport. Washington, D.C.Covello, W.T., J. Mumpower, S. Spicker, and P. Stallen (eds.). 1987. The Social andCultural Construction of Risk. Boston: D. Redel Publishing Co.Daines, G.E. 1991. "Planning, Training, and Exercising." In T.E. Drabek and G.J.Hoetmer (eds.). 1991:161-200.Davis, Mathew S. 1989. "Living Along the Fault Line: An Update on EarthquakeAwareness and Preparedness in Southern California." In F.E. Winslow (ed.). Summer1989:8-14.Doornkamp, John C. 1985. "The Earth Sciences and Planning in the Third World." InGerald Dix (ed.). 1985. Liverpool Planning Manual 2/Series. Great Britian: LiverpoolUniversity Press.Drabek, T.E. 1991. "Evolution of Emergency Management." In T.E. Drabek and G.J.Hoetmer (eds.). 1991:3-29.Drabek, T.E., and G.J. Hoetmer (eds.). 1991. Emergency Management: Principles andPractice for Local Government. Washington, D.C.: International City ManagementAssociation (ICMA).Dynes, R.R. 1978. "Interorganizational Relations in Communities Under Stress." InE.L. Quarantelli (ed.) 1978:50-63.Economic Council of Canada. 1990. From the Bottom-up - The CommunityEconomic-Development Approach. Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada.Emergency Preparedness Digest. April/June 1989.111Federal Emergency Management Agency. July 1981. Disaster Operations - AHandbook for Local Governments. Washington, D.C.: FEMA.Federal Emergency Management Agency. April 1982. Local Government EmergencyPlanning. Washington, D.C.: FEMA.Feigenbaum, ED., and M.L. Ford. 1984. Emergency Management in the UnitedStates. Lexington, Kentucky: The Council of State Governments.Fisher, A. A. 1985. "Volunteer Labor, Utah, the L.D.S. Church, and the Floods of1983: A Case Study." In International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters.Vol. 3, No.3. November 1985:53-74.Form, W.H., and Sigmund Nosow. 1958. Community in Disaster. New York: Harperand Brothers Publishers.Forester, John. 1989. Planning in the Face of Power. Los Angeles, California:University of California Press.Forrest, T.R. 1978. "Group Emergence in Disasters." In E.L. Quarantelli (ed.). 1978:105-125.Friedmann, John. 1987. Planning in the Public Domain: From Knowledge to Action.New Jersey: Princeton University Press.Gardner, Julia. Spring 1991. Citizens in Environmental Planning and Management.School of Community and Regional Planning, University of British Columbia.Gillespie, D.F. 1991. "Co-ordinating Community Resources". In T.E. Drabek and G.J.Hoetmer (eds.). 1991:55-78.Hall, Peter. 1980. Great Planning Disasters. London, England: Butler and TannerLtd.Hance, B.J., Caron Chess, and P.M. Sandman. January 1988. Improving Dialogue With Communities: A Risk Communication Manual for Government. New Brunswick,New Jersey: New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.Hannigan, J.A., and R.M. Kueneman. 1978. "Anticipating Flood Emergencies - ACase Study of a Canadian Disaster Subculture." In E.L. Quarantelli (ed.). 1978: 129-146.Hartman, R.E. 1986. "Planning and Management on Regional Development for thePrevention from Earthquake disaster in Mexico." Reorganizing Committee of theInternational Seminar on Regional Development Planning for Disaster Prevention.September 1986:157-178.112Hill, J. H. 1989. A Community Base for Northern Development. Master of ArtsThesis Dissertation. University of British Columbia, School of Community andRegional Planning.Hoetmer, G. J. 1991. "Introduction." In T.E. Drabek and G.J. Hoetmer (eds.). 1991:xvii - xxxiv.Kartez, J.D, and W.J. Kelley. 1988. "Research-Based Disaster Planning: Conditions forImplementation." In L.K. Comfort (ed.). 1988:126-146.Kartez, J.D., and M.K. Lindell. 1990. "Adaptive Planning for Community DisasterResponse." In R.T. Sylves, and W.L. Waugh, Jr. (eds.). 1990:5-33.Kartez, J.D., and M.K. Lindell. 1987. "Planning for Uncertainty - The Case of LocalDisaster Planning." In American Planning Association Journal. Autumn 1987:487-498.Kartez, J.D. July/August 1988. "Emergency Planning: An Adaptive Approach." InBaseline Data Report. Vol. 20, No. 5. Washington, D.C.: International CityManagement Association.Kreps, G.A. 1991. "Organizing for Emergency Management." In T.E. Drabek and G.J.Hoetmer (eds.). 1991:30-54.Lang, Reg and Audrey Armour. 1980. Environmental Planning Resourcebook.Environment Canada Lands Directorate.Langton, Stuart. 1984. "Networking and the Environmental Movement" in Langton, S.(ed.). 1894. Environmental Leadership. Toronto: Lexington Books:129 -137.LaPlante, J.M. 1988. "Recovery Following Disaster: Policy Issues and Dimensions." InL.K. Comfort (ed.). 1988:217-235.Laughy, L.R. 1989. Disaster Planning Theory. Master of Arts Thesis Dissertation.University of British Columbia, School of Community and Regional Planning.Lerner, Sally C. 1986. "Environmental Constituency - Building Local Initiatives andVolunteer Stewardship." In Alternatives. Vol. 13, No. 3, September/October 1986:55-60.MacLeod, Greg. 1986. New Age Business - Community Corporations That Work.Ottawa: Canadian Council on Social Development.Maskrey, Andrew. 1989. Disaster Mitigation - A Community Based Approach.Oxford: Oxfam.Melnyk, George. 1985. The Search for Community - From Utopia to a Co-operativeSociety. Montreal: Black Rose Books.113M'Gonigle, R. Michael. 1986. "The Tribune and the Tribe: Toward a Natural Law ofthe Market/Legal State" in Ecology Law Quarterly. Vol. 13, No. 2, 1986:233-310.Mikami, Shunji. 1985. "Human Response to Disasters." In International Journal ofMass Emergencies and Disasters. Vol. 3, No. 1. August 1985:107-132.Mileti, D.S., T.E. Drabek, and J.E. Haas. 1975. Human Systems in Extreme Environments: A Sociological Perspective. Monograph No. 21. University ofColorado: Institute of Behavioral Science.Mitchell, J.T. 1988. "The Impact of Stress on Emergency Service Personnel: PolicyIssues in Emergency Response." In L.K. Comfort (ed.). 1988:199-214.The Natural Hazards Observer. 1986. Colorado: Natural Hazards Research andApplications Information Centre.The Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center. March 1989.Report on the Colorado Workshop on Hazard Mitigation in the 1990's - Toward theUnited States Decade for Natural Hazard Reduction. DNDR 1.Nerfin, Marc. 1987. "Neither Prince Nor Merchant: Citizen - An Introduction to theThird System". In Development Dialogue: Vol.1.Organizing Committee of the International Seminar on Regional DevelopmentPlanning for Disaster Planning. September 1986. Planning for Crisis Relief - Towards Comprehensive Resource Management and Planning for Natural Disaster Prevention.Vol.2. United Nations Centre for Regional Development.Pavlak, T.J. 1988. "Structuring Problems for Policy Action." In L.K. Comfort (ed.).1988:22-36.Perry, R. W. 1983. Comprehensive Emergency Management: Evacuating ThreatenedPopulations. Arizona State University: Centre for Public Affairs.Perry, R.W. 1991. "Managing Disaster Response Operations." In T.E. Drabek andG.J. Hoetmer (eds.). 1991:201-223.Perry, R.W., and M.R. Greene. 1983. Citizen Response to Volcanic Eruptions: TheCase of Mt. St. Helens. New York: Irvington Publishers, Inc.Perry, R.W., and A.H. Mushkatel. 1986. Minority Citizens in Disasters. Athens,Georgia: University of Georgia Press.Petak, William. 1989. "Disaster Planning: Getting on the Agenda." In F.E. Winslow(ed.). Summer 1989:4-7.Petak, William. 1984. "Natural Hazard Mitigation: Professionalization of the Policy114Making Process." In International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, Vol.2,No.2. August 1984:285-302.Pross, A. Paul. 1986. Group Politics and Public Policy. Toronto: Oxford UniversityPress.Quarantelli, E.L. 1978. Disasters - Theory and Research. Beverly Hills, California:Sage Publications Inc.Quarantelli, E.L. 1978. "Some Basic Themes in Sociological Studies of Disasters." InE.L. Quarantelli (ed.). 1978:1-16.Raphael, Beverly. 1986. When Disaster Strikes - How Individuals and CommunitiesCope With Catastrophe. New York: Basic Books, Inc.Rayner, Steve. 1987. "Learning From the Blind Men and the Elephant, or Seeing theWhole Thing in Risk Management." In V. Covello, et al. (eds.), Uncertainty in RiskAssessment, Risk Management and Decision Making. New York: Plenum Press:207-212.Rubin, C.B. 1991. "Recovery from Disaster." In T.E. Drabek and G.J. Hoetmer (eds.).1991:224-262.Rubin, C.B. 1985. "The Community Recovery Process in the United States After aMajor Natural Disaster." In International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters.Vol.3, No. 2. August 1985:9-48.Ruchelman, L.I. 1988. "Natural Hazard Mitigation and Development: An Explorationof the Roles of the Public and Private Sectors." In L.K. Comfort (ed.). 1988:53 -66.Scanlon, T.J. 1991. "Reaching Out - Getting the Community Involved inPreparedness." In T.E. Drabek and G.J. Hoetmer (eds.). 1991:79-100.Scanlon, T.J. 1990. "Political Leadership and Canadian Emergency Planning: TheRole of the Mayor." In R.T. Sylves, and W.L. Waugh, Jr. (eds.). 1990:165-184.Scanlon, T.J., and R.T. Sylves. 1990. "Conflict and Co-ordination in Responding toAviation Disaster: The San Diego and Gander Experiences Compared." In R.T.Sylves, and W.L. Waugh, Jr. (eds.). 1990:109-132.Settle, A.K. 1990. "Disaster Assistance - Securing Presidential Declarations." In R.T.Sylves, and W.L. Waugh, Jr. (eds.). 1990:33-58.Singleton, W.T. "Risk Handling By Institutions". In Singleton, W.T. and J. Hoyden(eds.). 1987. Risk and Decisions. Toronto: John Wiley and Sons:173-180.Stallings, Robert A. December 1987. Post Impact Field Studies of Disasters and115Sociological Theory Construction. Working Paper No. 60. University of SouthernCalifornia: School of Public Administration and Department of Sociology.Stallings, R.A., and C.B. Schepart. 1990. "Contrasting Local Government Responsesto a Tornado Disaster in Two Communities." In R.T. Sylves, and W.L. Waugh, Jr.(eds.). 1990:75-90.Staples, L.P.D. March 1989. Planning For Disaster: Responsibilities and Liabilities ofLocal Government. A Continuing Education presentation on Emergency Planning forMunicipalities.Stewart, Murray C. 1989. "Emergency Preparedness in B.C. - A Time of NecessaryChange." In Emergency Preparedness Digest. Ottawa: Emergency PreparednessCanada.Sylves, R.T., and W.L. Waugh. 1990. Cities and Disasters - North American Studies inEmergency Management. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher.Takuma, T. 1978. 1978. "Human Behavior in the Event of Earthquakes." In E.L.Quarantelli (ed.). 1978:159-146.Turner, R.H., J.M. Nigg, and D.H. Paz. 1986. Waiting For Disaster - EarthquakeWatch in California. Los Angeles, California: University of California Press.United States General Accounting Office. March 1991. Disaster Assistance - Federal,State, and Local Responses to Natural Disasters Need Improvement. GAO.RCED:91-43.Vance, Joan E. 1990. Tree Planting: A Guide to Public Involvement in ForestStewardship. Vancouver: B.C. Public Interest Advocacy Centre.Varnes, David J. 1984. Landslide Hazard Zonation: A Review of Principles and Practice. France: United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization.Waugh, W.L. 1990. "Emergency Management and State and Local Capacity." In R.T.Sylves, and W.L. Waugh, Jr. (eds.). 1990:221-238.Waugh, W.L. 1988. "Current Policy and Implementation Issues in DisasterPreparedness." In L.K. Comfort (ed.). 1988:111-125.Waugh, W.L., and R.J. Hy (eds.). 1990. Handbook of Emergency Management: Programs and Policies Dealing With Major Hazards and Disasters. New York:Greenwood Press.Wenger, D.E. 1978. "Community Response to Disaster: Functional and StructuralAlterations." In E.L. Quarantelli (ed.). 1978:17-48.116Winslow, F.E. (ed.). 1989. "Earthquake Disaster Management: A Symposium". InUrban Resources. Vol.5. No.4. Summer 1989.Wright, J.E. 1978. "Organizational Prestige and Task Saliency in Disaster." In E.L.Quarantelli (ed.). 1978:199-213.Wyner, A.J. 1984. "Earthquakes and Public Policy Implementation in California." InInternational Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, Vol.2, No.2. August 1984.117APPENDIX ACities Adopting Good Emergency Practices (Based on 370 Respondents)Good Practices^ Adoption (%)Establish emergency equipment rate and use^ 49agreements with contractors/industryEstablish communication link to a major area 56radio/TV station, such as protected phonelines or dedicated radio channelInstall rotary phone connections and establish^ 40staff procedures to operate a citizen emergencyinformation phone bank (other than 911)Train citizen members of Block Watch or other^ 49neighbourhood-based groups for emergenciesEstablish agreements with RACES, CB, or other 78radio amateurs for assisting city staff in anemergency or warning situationEstablish a media information centre^ 90Designate and train city staff to take 39responsibility for organizing untrained citizenvolunteers who may show up in a major emergencyEstablish a procedure with hospital and^ 86ambulance managers for co-ordinating thereception of casualtiesEstablish open purchase orders or other means^ 70for city departments to make and documentemergency expendituresDevelop specific methods and staff trained to^ 71make public evacuation warningsDesignate vehicles and drivers to carry transit 65dependent and mobility-impaired personsDesignate voluntary group responsible for^ 83housing citizens temporarily evacuatedEstablish an incident command system 95APPENDIX BHAZARD ASSESSMENT(BURKEVILLE)118Types- plane crash^ - fire (conflagration)- flood - hazardous goods accident- earthquake - weatherMajor Effects- deaths^ - injuries- trapped persons^- damage to property- fires (explosions) - floodsand fire hazards - loss of communication- evacuation of people^- separation of families- dangers to public - disruption to transportationhealth^ routes- isolation - loss of equipmentNeeds- fire fighting/rescueequipment- medical supplies- food (cooking utilities)- home supplies- registration andinquiry- animal lock-up- Personal Services- call-out procedure- trained day-care staff- evacuation procedures- leadership- Reception Centre(and supplies)- body recovery andidentification- shelter- water (important)- communications- clothing/bedding- transportation- outside contacts- financing- building assessment- know school plans forrelease of children- volunteers- billeting procedureAPPENDIX CQUESTIONNAIRE - CITY OF RICHMONDNEIGHBOURHOOD REGISTRATION FORMHOUSEHOLD INFORMATIONADDRESS: ^  PHONE.^SURNAME:^  FIRST NAME(S):^WORK ADDRESS:  BUS. PHONE.SURNAME:^  FIRST NAME(S)•^WORK ADDRESS:  BUS. PHONE.ADDITIONAL ADULT RESIDENTS:^-119Name:^ Work Address:^ Bus. Phone:NUMBER OF:INFANTS (under 6)^CHILDREN (6 -12)^TEENAGERS (13 -19)^In case of an emergency, please notify: (Someone OUTSIDE the Lower Mainland)NAME:^ADDRESS:  PHONE: (^) Do you or any members of your household have special needs?: (for example - sight or hearingproblems, medical concerns, language difficulties)f SPECIAL SKILLS: •YES PEMERGENCY EQUIPMENT: YESClerical Personal ComputerAccounting First Aid Supplies■Teaching/Training Medical Equipment (Specify)Supervisory ExperienceShelter ManagementFood Preparation Bulk Water - Quantity gals.Cleaning Professional Fire ExtinguisherRegistration & Inquiry TentFirst Aid - Date: Camp Stove/Charcoal Grill/FuelCPR Certificate - Date: CamperPersonal Assistant to Elderly/Disabled MotorbikeMedical Professional (Specify) 4-Wheel Drive VehicleBoatLanguages Spoken: (Specify) Ham RadioCB RadioWalkie TalkieCarphoneCounselling Portable RadioPersonal Services Work ToolsChildcare Portable GeneratorSearch & Rescue: Wilderness Heavy Equipment (Specify)Search & Rescue: UrbanFire FightingCarpentry Chain SawElectrical Water PumpHeavy Equipment Operation LanternPlumbing LadderConstruction RopesBuilding Inspection MISC.WarehousingTruck DrivingIM,Other Emergency Related Skills:/ N.^120INVENTORY OF COMMUNITY RESOURCES121APPENDIX DFUTURE GOALS (AUGUST 1990) - BURKEVILLEInventory1. Collect the questionnaires.2. Have the questionnaires updated at regular intervals.3. Ensure that the date on the questionnaires is complete and accurate(especially the emergency contact name - the location of the latter should beoutside the Lower Mainland).4. Delegate the task of compiling inventories to one individual.5. Ensure that each emergency task group knows what their resources are via thedatabase.6. Ensure that all task groups are given a copy of their resources, but only whenrequested.7. Inventory the special needs individuals. Each task group will have to decide ifthis information is necessary for their mini-plan.8. Inventory new people moving into the community. Contact the WelcomeWagon and United Realty to discuss the possibility of introducing the projectthrough these organizations.9. Lobby 'good corporate citizens' and the community but know what your needsare first.10. Consider the possibility of a 'resource and supply' co-ordinator to oversee theneeds of the disaster response.Training1.^Train as many community members as possible:a. First Aid/CPR- St. John Ambulance- Red Cross (free)b. Registration and Inquiry- Red Cross (free)c. Reception Centre Management- training unavailable at this timed. Light Search and Rescue- training unavailable at this time2.^Assign the task of organizing training sessions to one or more individuals whowill work with the Plan Co-ordinator and Emergency Co-ordinator.3.^Train daycare staff on emergency procedures in a disaster. This task has beenassigned to the Personal Services Co-ordinator.122Education of Burkeville1. Once task leaders and task volunteers have set their goals and strategies foreach task, the information must be made available to all group members.2. Advise the community of B.E.R.T.'s activities. Send out an update in themonthly publication of the Sea Island Times.3. Inform the community who are the contact people for the Burkeville disasterplanning process.4. Keep the project alive:a. Guest Lecturers.b. Video nights (especially on those topics which affect all task groups).c. Media coverage.d. Keep in touch with the Plan and Emergency Co-ordinator.e. Make questionnaires, booklets, pamphlets available.f. Organize a tour of the Reception Centre (R.C.A. Forum).5.^The strength of the plan lies with home preparedness. We need to:a. Send out a home preparedness checklist.b. Ask the Emergency Co-ordinator to give a talk on home preparedness.c. Have a 'hands-on' workshop to demonstrate home preparedness measures.d. Delegate specific educational tasks to individuals.e. Run the 'Surviving the Big One' video.Education of Others:1. Advise the Sea Island Elementary School of your plans. Encourage staff toattend Burkeville's disaster planning meetings.2. Encourage schools in Richmond to develop an earthquake preparedness plan.3.^Compile a list of contacts on Sea Island.123APPENDIX EGENERAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR ALL TASK GROUPS(BURKEVILLE EMERGENCY PLAN)1. Check the safety of your family and home.2. Proceed to the R.C.A. Forum - take your emergency supply kit with you.3. Assess the safety of the building prior to entry; if necessary find an alternatelocation (post a sign in the buildings indicating where the new ReceptionCentre is located).4. Set up an Emergency Operations Centre and Reception Centre stations. PostReception Centre signs (located in your Reception Centre kit).5. List your task volunteers present - assign duties.6. Ensure that volunteers wear identifiable markings (should be fluorescent).7. Put volunteers on shift work to prevent 'burn-out' - the recommendedscheduling is 12 hour shifts (if you cannot replace volunteers, make them takerests). Watch for stress - refer individuals to Personal Services.8. Hold operational updates every one to two hours initially.9. Keep a log of everything that has transpired - maintain a record of allborrowed/purchased supplies and equipment (label them).10. Debrief your volunteers at the end of each shift and update incomingvolunteers.11.^Prepare a summary report for the Leader - Emergency Operations.124APPENDIX FMEDICAL/FIRST AID TEAM(BURKEVILLE EMERGENCY PLAN)IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGYTASK DESCRIPTION:To treat the sick and injured.RESPONSIBILITIES:1. Report to Manager - Reception Centre2. Administer physical/psychological first aid to victims.3. Record all injuries, deaths, and treatments administered.4. Tag the injured with their name, address, and treatment administered - thiscould be done with a magic marker or stick on labels on the arm.5. Evacuate the seriously injured - contact Co-ordinator of Communications forassistance - you must record when and where they have been transferred to.6. Isolate the deceased - set up a temporary morgue.7.^Send medical/first aid volunteers out with Rescue teams when requested.PRE-PLANNING STRATEGY1. Recruit volunteers to assist with Medical/First Aid tasks - identify individualswho have first aid, CPR, and medical training.2. Meet periodically with your task group to set goals and brainstorm ideas - it isyour responsibility to set up and facilitate your task meetings.3. Set up first aid training for the community - contacts: St. John Ambulance;Richmond Red Cross; ESS Director, Richmond.4. Prepare a strategy for responding to a disaster - attach it to the plan.5. Prepare a medical/first aid kit.6. Keep a list of your supplies/volunteers in the plan.7. Identify individuals who have special needs - encourage those on specialmedication to maintain a two-week supply.8. Contact the Vancouver International Airport to set up a mutual aidagreement. Contact: Safety and Protective Services Department.9. Contact the Director of Continuing Care to assist your team with thepreparation of a medical/first aid strategy to cope with mass casualties.10. Be familiar with the concepts of psychological first aid.

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
http://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0086467/manifest

Comment

Related Items