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Setting the parameters for social movements : students, workers, and the South Korean development model Trimble, Sheena Tiami 1991

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SETTING THE PARAMETERS FOR SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:STUDENTS, WORKERS, AND THE SOUTH KOREAN DEVELOPMENT MODELbySHEENA TIAMI TRIMBLEB.A., The University of Alberta, 1989A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESDEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCEWe accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIADecember 1991© Sheena Tiami Trimble, 1991In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature)Department of Political ScienceThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate December 31, 1991DE-6 (2/88)ABSTRACTThis thesis attempts to explain social movements--why the occur and why they assume their specificcharacters--in terms of the way a society is structured. Using premises drawn from theoretical literature onlate capitalism and contemporary social movements, one is directed to look for contradictions in sociopoliticalstructures for the source of conflict and social movements. When social groups experience these they mayengage in collective action or protest movements. It is possible, however, that they may not be fully awareof these contradictions or strongly motivated by them. "Dominant" social groups may take steps to ensurethat conflict does not emerge by masking disparities or by suppressing defiant groups.Where the state intervenes heavily in society and economy, as in late capitalist societies, uniquecontradictions are created which may inspire social conflict. However, the state is also in a unique positionto "legitimate" its intervention and the existing sociopolitical configuration. The state will be most concernedwith preventing movements that pose the greatest threat to the prevailing social structure. Socialcontradictions and the efforts of dominant groups and state to temper their impact produce a series ofinducements and constraints to collective action.Although South Korea is not in the stage of late capitalism, parallels exist and it is possible to usethis theoretical framework to explain the difference between the student and labour movements in thatcountry. The features of the Korean model of development--an interventionist developmental state, anemphasis on economic development and neglect of social and political, nurturing of monopoly capital, popularexclusion from the policy-making process and fast-paced industrialization--produce a particular set ofmotivations and barriers to collective action. Because workers and students do not experience these in thesame way, their respective social movements differ in shape and level of activity.Workers are essential to the development process and thus are subject to more constraints to protestiiactivity in the form of developmental rhetoric and even outright repression. State and business expendgreater efforts to ensure that they are 'incorporated' into the model. University students are particularly well-placed to see the contradictions of the model and are less inclined to accept state attempts to legitimize itscharacter. Because students are not as essential to the development process, they are not faced with thesame repressive measures. Nevertheless, their ability to influence the middle and working classes forcesthe state to respond to their protest. Students are not as regimented in their time and environment asindustrial workers which affords them more space for protest activity. Middle class sympathy for their causehas also helped to shield them from the state's negative sanctions.As the Korean development model has undergone restructuring since the mid-1980s, the student andlabour movements have adapted accordingly. Workers have grown in power, while political reform hasundercut the students' protest platform. Yet many of the former structures remain intact; they wereremodelled just enough to accommodate growing pluralism in society. The future of these two movementsremains in question as they await further reform or government retrenchment.iiiTABLE OF CONTENTSAbstract ^  iiINTRODUCTION ^  1ChapterI. KOREAN CULTURE, HISTORY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS^  5II. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS THEORY AND SOUTH KOREA  13III. THE KOREAN DEVELOPMENT MODEL ^  25IV. WORKERS AND STUDENTS IN SOUTH KOREAN DEVELOPMENT ^  34The Labour MovementThe Student MovementV. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE MODEL^  64CONCLUSION ^  78Bibliography  82Appendix ^  91iv1INTRODUCTION South Korea' has received considerable attention as a country that has moved from the ranks ofthe lesser developed to the newly industrialized. While the bulk of academic attention has focused on Korea'seconomic development, the attention of the news media has been captured by its volatile political situation.At the centre of this political drama, one finds social movements taking their opposition to the ruling regimeand the economic establishment into the streets. This is the 'flip side' of the Korean miracle, a side thatdeserves at least as much attention as GNP growth statistics. Korea's economic success and its popularprotest are not distinct phenomena like two separate dramas playing on the same stage. They are two partsof the same play and thus cannot be viewed in isolation.Social movements are an important part of every sociopolitical system. Like a mirror, they providea reverse image of society, reflecting back all of its contradictions and incongruities. They demand areassessment of existing institutions, but they also suggest alternative ways of "constituting" society?Established structures and social movements are intimately bound together. Alain Touraine provides asuccinct summation of this relationship: "[A social movement] is born and dies with the society of which itis part."' Sociopolitical structures provide the context for social movements or set the parameters in whichthey act. Every society contains certain contradictions which give rise to social conflict and socialmovements!'It makes sense then to look to the intersection of social movements and social structures for'South Korea or the Republic of Korea will simply be referred to as Korea throughout much of this paper.'Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge, England: Polity, 1984).3Alain Touraine, The Voice and the Eve: An Analysis of Social Movements (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press,1981), p. 95.`Giddens, p. 198.2explanations of why movements occur and why they take the shape that they do. This thesis attempts toexplain the difference between the student and labour movements in South Korea with reference to thestructures and conditions created in the process of three decades of intense economic development (1961-1991). The 'Korean development model' comprises certain features which generate inducements andconstraints for protest movements. Because workers and students do not experience these in the same way,their respective movements differ in level of mobilization.Korean students have figured prominently in sociopolitical protest for decades. They inherit a traditionof dissent from students during the Japanese occupation and even as early as the Yi (Choson) Dynasty(1392-1910). One would expect workers to be equally active as they have carried the burden of Korea'sintense economic development. Traditional Marxist analysis and the development experience of othercapitalist countries, such as Britain and the United States, reinforce this assumption. Nevertheless, there hasbeen a marked difference in the level of labour and student mobilization, at least until the mid-1980s. 5 Upuntil that time, worker protest tended to be more sporadic and less militant. In spite of the concerted effortsof student activists and a small core of militant workers, these two movements seldom achieved solidarity ofsocial action.Exploring the reasons for the dissimilarity in the level of activity of the labour and student movementsraises a fundamental question--not "how" movements succeed, but "why" they develop in the first place.'The first chapter of this thesis looks at a number of possible explanations for the unique qualities of theseOne frequently encounters references to a relatively quiescent labour force in the literature on Korea's political economy. Seefor example Jang Jip Choi, Labour and the Authoritarian State: Labour Unions in South Korean Manufacturing Industries, 1961-1980 (Seoul: Korea University Press, 1989), p.3; and Hagen Koo, "From Farm to Factory: Proletarianization in Korea," AmericanSociological Review 55 (October 1990):678.'Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society (Philadelphia: TempleUniversity Press, 1987), p.8.3two movements. In the literature on South Korea, one often encounters references to cultural-historicallegacies as determinants of contemporary patterns of protest. Chapter two discusses explanations drawnfrom general theories of social movements such as the relative deprivation and resource mobilization theories.The literature on late capitalism and new social movements theory seems to have the strongest explanatorypower for South Korea's social movements. Although this literature is generally applied to developedcapitalist societies, it is useful because it points to the particular pattern of Korean development as a sourceof social movements. By placing the student and labour movements in this context, one is able to understandwhy certain cultural legacies prevail, why social groups have uneven access to resources and why relativedeprivation does not always translate into collective action.Chapter three outlines the central characteristics of the Korean development model. Socialmovements in South Korea are a product of a modernization process that has emphasized the economicdimension while leaving the political and social lagging behind. The features of the model which haverelevance for the two movements in question include: a strong "developmental" state which is insulated frompopular demands; a close connection between politics and economics, with economic development servingto legitimize successive authoritarian regimes; nurturing of monopoly capital as the vehicle by which economicdevelopment might be achieved; and intense, rapid industrialization with growth rather than equity as themeasure of successful development.'In chapter four, the labour and student movements are analyzed in turn to show how they have'For further information on these points see: ChalmersJohnson, "Political Institutions and Economic Performance:The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan," in The Political Economy of New Asian Industrialism, ed. Fredric C.Deyo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 136-164. For information on the insulation of the Korean state see: LymHyun-Chin and Paek Woon-Seon, "State Autonomy in Modern Korea: Instrumental Possibilities and Structural Limits," KoreaJournal 27 (November 1987). Hooshang Amirahmadi discusses the emphasis on growth in "Development Paradigms at theCrossroad in the South Korean Experience," Journal of Contemporary Asia 19 (No. 2, 1989):169-70, 173. The literature on theKorean political economy is vast and these articles represent only a few of those that describe the characteristics listed above.A more extensive treatment of this subject along with references to other material in this area can be found in chapter three.4developed in the face of the constraints and inducements which emanate from the Korean pattern ofdevelopment. The fifth and final chapter of this thesis discusses the transformation of the Korean model inrecent years and the attendant changes in the shape of the two movements in question.5I. KOREAN CULTURE, HISTORY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS In searching for answers as to why students have been more active than workers in sociopoliticalprotest in South Korea, one frequently encounters references to the influence of cultural- historical factors.Many commentators on the student movement draw attention to the parallels between contemporary studentprotest and remonstrance of the throne by Confucian scholars in Yi Dynasty Korea.' By so doing theysuggest, at least implicitly, that student activism is a cultural inheritance. Through protest activity studentsare either consciously or unconsciously fulfilling a traditional role which Michael Kalton refers to as "theconscience of society". 9Certainly similarities exist, but can one ascribe student activism to the resilience of a traditional role?Incredible transformations have taken place in the past few centuries. What do contemporary students havein common with Yi dynasty Confucian students? In modern Korea just as in traditional, higher educationrepresents a ticket to a position within established institutions. However, traditional students remonstratedwhen the dominant order was threatened whereas contemporary student protest, for the most part, challengesthe legitimacy of existing institutions--particularly the political. 10The Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) introduced this dimension of student protest--the rejection8The following excerpt is an example of this:"Students, as the nascent literati, were often the watchdogs of political morality. Student demonstrations, against what theyregarded as undue Buddhist influence or unorthodox Confucian behaviour, may be traced to the fifteenth century and were sporadicthereafter. Students today regard themselves as the political conscience of the country, although on occasion that role is disputedby elements of society at large." David I. Steinberg, The Republic of Korea: Economic Transformation and Social Change  (Boulder,Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), p.79.See also: Paul Ensor, "The Echoes of Confucianism in Student Extremism,"  Far Eastern Economic Review, January 15, 1987,pp. 35-6; and Gregory Henderson, The Politics of the Vortex  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 199-201.9Michael Kalton, "Korean Modernity: Change and Continuity," in Korea Briefing, 1990,  ed. Chong-Sik Lee (Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress, 1991), p. 122."For examples of the cause of traditional student demonstrations see Steinberg, p. 31; Henderson, pp. 200-201; James Palais,Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), chap. 6; and Ki-baik Lee, A New History ofKorea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 261-62.6of the existing political and social configuration. A significant number of Korean students pursued highereducation as a means of finding a place within the colonial order. Some succeeded but, for the most part,opportunities were few and social mobility was blocked by Japanese who filled the upper levels ofgovernment, bureaucracy and business." Out of frustration at this lack of opportunity, fervent nationalismor perhaps a change of consciousness in the process of receiving an education, students became asignificant force in the nationalist movement. 12One can detect a legacy from traditional Korea and the Japanese colonial period in contemporarystudent protest, but legacies are not equivalent to motivating factors. As Peter A. Gourevitch notes, sinceevery culture contains a number of "diverse" and even contradictory elements, it is more useful to look forcurrent circumstances which enhance specific cultural-historical characteristics. 13 Using culture as a blanketexplanation for rapid economic development or the extent of student militancy fails to capture the complexrelationship between modernity and tradition. Korean students are not simply acting out a cultural-historical"Henderson shows that in 1936, Japanese filled 80 percent of high level bureaucratic positions in Korea, 60 percent of intermediateand 50 percent of clerical positions (p. 106). Ogle cites similar figures for 1943, with Japanese filling 95.4, 86.1 and 6.24 percentof high, intermediate and low positions respectively. Daniel Sungil Juhn, "Entrepreneurship in an Underdeveloped Economy: theCase of Korea, 1890-1940" (Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, George Washington University, 1965), p.176 cited by George E. Ogle,"Labour Unions in Rapid Economic Development: Case of the Republic of Korea in the 1960's," (Ph.D dissertation, University ofWisconsin, 1973), p. 37. Bruce Cumings outlines the opportunities for Korean entrepreneurs in The Origins of the Korean War:Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 17-19. Seealso Ki-baik Lee, pp. 324-27.12Many Korean students went to Japan to receive higher education where the academic environment was not as restricted as itwas in at home. They were introduced to schools of political thought which inspired rebellion against Japanese rule such asdemocratic liberalism, the rights of self determination and socialism. Henderson, p. 91. See also Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics ofKorean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 98-99; Kenneth M. Wells, "Background to the March FirstMovement: Koreans in Japan, 1905-1919," Korean Studies 13 (1989):3-21; and Michael E. Robinson, Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925  (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988), pp. 109-111. In February 1919, Korean students inJapan issued the Tokyo Korean Students Declaration of Independence. For details of student involvement in the March FirstMovement see Robinson, p. 66; Chong-Sik Lee, Korean Nationalism, chap. 7 and Ki-baik Lee, p. 342."Peter A. Gourevitch, "The Pacific Rim: Current Debates," in The Pacific Region: Challenges to Policy and Theory,  ed. Peter A.Gourevitch, in The Annals, vol. 55 (Newbury Park, CA.: Sage Publications, Sept. 1989), p.12. See also Steve Chan, "Puff, theMagic Dragons: Reflections on the Political Economy of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan," Journal of Developing Societies 4(1988):217.7legacy; they are denouncing contemporary social and political realities. These reinforce the traditional roleof students as activists. It is important to look at the ways in which the structures created by Korea's modelof development provide cause and space for student militancy.Cultural-historical explanations of the level of labour activism are not as common in view of the factthat parallels between modern industrial workers and some traditional counterpart are not as easily drawn.However, like the peasants, workers do act as the economic backbone of the prevailing socioeconomicstructure. While their labour is indispensable to the survival of that system, their social status does not reflecttheir importance. Unlike the socially privileged students, whose protest and moral indignation is acceptedas a right of position, those at the lower end of the Confucian hierarchy are more subject to the dictates ofobedience and submission.Does the peasant condition have relevance for labour activism or the lack thereof? One doesencounter references to the consequences of Confucian hierarchy and authoritarianism in the literature onthe labour movement. The majority of industrial workers are of peasant stock, and thus peasant attitudeshave been carried into the industrial workplace. Nevertheless, Gourevitch's warning can also be applied toSouth Korea's labour movement. Cultural traditions have complex ramifications which are mitigated byintermediate factors like development models. Traditional peasant conservatism was also complemented bya willingness to rebel when reality did not correspond with the idealized Confucian order. 14 Furthermore,the degree of lower class incorporation into the Confucian order itself is open to question. 15 It is difficult toattribute 'harmonious' labour relations to a cultural propensity to submit to the rigors of life at the bottom ofthe social hierarchy."Quee-Young Kim, "Korea's Confucian Heritage and Social Change," Journal of Developing Societies 4 (1988):26. The TonghakRebellion is one of the most well-documented examples of this. See Ki-baik Lee, pp. 284-89.I5See Robinson, p. 17; and Cumings, Korean War, p. 10.8The industrial working class is not a product of Yi Dynasty Korea, but has its origins in the period ofJapanese colonial rule. Initially, Korea served as a supplier of foodstuffs and raw materials. 16 After Japaninvaded Manchuria in 1931, Korean industry experienced a substantial expansion in order to meet thedemands of the Japanese war effort. The percentage of Korea's gross commodity product devoted tomanufacturing went from 17.7 in 1925 to 39 in 1939. 17 Manufacturing experienced an average annualgrowth rate of 10 percent from 1910 to 1945. 18 Japanese zaibatsu controlled the lion's share of the largermanufacturing firms, but Korean entrepreneurs headed a significant number of smaller firms, mostly in themanufacture of textiles. 19 Of greatest interest for the purposes of this paper is the expansion of the workingclass. The number of industrial workers went from 212,459 in 1938 to 421,229 in 1944. 20Just as do the students, Korea's working class carries forth a legacy of anti-establishment protestfrom the colonial period. Under the Japanese, one did not find workers labouring dutifully out of a culturalpropensity to submit to authority. Industrial relations were marked by conflict; disputes were militant andwidespread, at least until repression drove the labour movement underground?' Could it be otherwise whenthose relations were a microcosm of the whole colonial experience with Japanese at the top and Koreanson the bottom?22 Labour struggle became another component of the broader national struggle. It was' 6Ki-baik Lee, pp. 349-50."Ibid., p. 351."Edward Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modernization of Korea (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, HarvardUniversity, 1980), p. 75."Ki-baik Lee, p. 354; and Ogle, "Labour," pp. 20-24.°Shannon McCune, Korea's Heritage (Tokyo: Rutland, 1956), p. 225, cited by Ogle, "Labour," p.20. See also Mason et al., p. 78.21See Ogle, "Labour," p. 30, Table 7.See Leroy P. Jones and II Sakong, Government, Business, and Entrepreneurship: The Korean Case (Cambridge: Council on EastAsian Studies, Harvard University, 1980), pp. 25-26 for details.9radicalized by a strong influence from the left, which in the process of trying to discredit, the Japanese madeseem more attractive and heroic. 23 The number of work stoppages and labour disputes and the consequentrepression of workers under Japanese rule introduced a pattern of worker protest that is an important partof Korea's labour history.24Another important shaping experience for the labour and student movements occurred during thedecade immediately following liberation in 1945. These years witnessed the Soviet and U.S. occupation ofseparate halves of the peninsula and the subsequent creation of two autonomous states, the election of theFirst Republic in the South in 1948 with Syngman Rhee as president and the Korean war from 1950-1953.American forces did not arrive to occupy the southern half of the peninsula until three weeks after theJapanese had surrendered on August 15, 1945. During the interim, "people's committees" were establishedby moderate leftist forces. Shortly before the Americans arrived, members of the people's committeesdeclared the establishment of the "Korean People's Republic". Instead of working with these organizations,the Americans nurtured conservative groups and paved the way for Syngman Rhee to rise to power?'Rhee's rise and the early rejection by the Americans of those whom Ogle refers to as "moderates" contributedto a fall-out between radical and conservative groups. This even led to guerilla activity on the part of leftistforces in a number of regions of South Korea?' The outbreak of the Korean war gave further justificationto Rhee to eliminate the 'communist threat' which essentially meant anyone left of his ultra-conservative23George E. Ogle, South Korea: Dissent Within the Economic Miracle (London: Zed Books, Ltd. 1990), p. 5.24In Dissent Ogle notes that cooptation was another feature of labour relations under Japan (p. 6).25For details see Henderson, chap. 5; Cumings, Korean War, chap. 5; and Ogle "Labour," pp. 38-45.260ne of the most serious incidents occurred in 1948 when an army regiment sent to crush guerilla activity on Cheju Island mutiniedand began the Yeosu-Sunchon Rebellion. See Sungjoo Han, The Failure of Democracy in South Korea (Berkeley, University ofCalifornia Press, 1974), p. 15-16; and Henderson, pp. 162-63.10Liberal party!'All of this had major consequences for the student and labour movements which had been influencedstrongly by the left. At the time of liberation, groups of workers took control of factories in order to keep themrunning and to guard against looting!' The unions they formed were affiliated with the people's committeesand eventually a quasi-national union, the Chun Pyong (General Council of Korean Trade Unions), wascreated. In 1946, it claimed 553,408 members!' Chun Pyong constantly found itself at loggerheads withthe American Military Government in Korea (AMGIK) which it refused to accept as having legitimateauthority?' In 1946, it was behind a general strike which was eventually quashed by the AMGIK. 31 Itcontinued to operate but at much reduced capacity due to legal restrictions and was finally outlawed by theRhee government in 1949. In its stead, the Rhee regime fostered a right-wing labour group known as theNo Chong (Federation of Korean Trade Unions)?'Youth organizations experienced a similar fate. Students had been very active in the creation of thepeople's committees throughout the Korean countryside. 'Radical' student organizations also were met withsuspicion by the AMGIK and repression by the Rhee government. During the Korean war, the most militantnThis included Cho Pong-am and his Progressive Party. Cho was eventually executed for "espionage activities" in 1959. Han,pp. 79-87. See also Henderson, p. 215.'Martin Hart-Landsberg, "South Korea: Looking at the Left," Monthly Review 41 (July-August 1989)58; and Cumings, Korean Warp. 76-78.29For more information see Walden Bello and Stephanie Rosenfeld, Dragons in Distress: Asia's Miracle Economies in Crisis  (SanFrancisco: The Institute of Food and Development Policy, 1990), p.30; and Ogle, 'Labour," pp. 46-47."Ogle, Dissent, p. 9; and Amy Rauenhorst, "Industrial Relations in Korea: The Backdrop to the Current Drama," Comparative LawJournal 11 (Spring 1990):321-22.31 For details see Ogle, "Labour," pp. 48-50, 55."Ogle, Dissent, p. 12.11either fled to the North or were executed by the Rhee government." More moderate activists were forcedto make a choice between supporting the Rhee regime or being "branded" as communists like their moremilitant counterparts 34 After the war there was little room for student mobilization outside of the governmentcreated student and youth organizations: the National Youth Corps and the Korean Student Corps forNational Defence. Some small leftist cells remained but their latitude for activity was extremely small."In spite of concerted efforts to mobilize students in support of the government, studentdemonstrations against state corruption and election fraud became the catalyst for the fall of the Rhee regimein April 1960.36 Yet, as Martin Hart-Landsberg notes, this was a different breed of student activism than thatwhich had existed prior to the Korean war n Leftist elements had lost much of their influence; those cellsthat remained did not take an active part until Rhee was out of office." The new guard of student activistswere fed on the principles of liberal democracy and the free market. They demonstrated against the Rheeregime because it did not reflect the principles which it supposedly espoused.From 1960 on, the students began to tread an increasingly more radical path which took them backagain to the left." The workers did not experience the same progression. Although one cannot deny earlierefforts, their radicalization was delayed until the 1980s. Labour did not participate in the initial demonstrations33See Henderson pp. 167-69 for details of trials."Sungjoo Han, Failure, p. 195.36Ibid., pp. 198-200.36See John Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial (Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press, 1968), pp. 67-70 and Quee-Young Kim, The Fallof Syr-man Rhee, Korea Research Monograph 7 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1983)."Hart-Landsberg, "Looking at the Left," p. 60."Sungjoo Han, Failure, p. 200.39Hak-Kyu Sohn chronicles the radicalization of the opposition movement, including the students during the 1960s and 1970s inAuthoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea (London: Routledge, 1989). See pp. 182-83 for a summary.12against the Rhee government but after student demonstrators were shot they too joined the call for a clean-upof the government'. Under the Chang Myon administration, labour disputes multiplied exponentially as didstudent activism:" Nevertheless, the two movements did not continue on the same path.It is difficult to make a definite connection between traditional Confucian culture, labour and studentmilitancy during the Japanese colonial period or the suppression of the left following liberation and the shapeof contemporary labour and student movements without considering the ways in which the Koreandevelopment model has reinforced and rejected various legacies. Chapter three will discuss aspects of theKorean model of development that might have caused the two movements to diverge. The next chapter looksat the general literature on social movements to create a theoretical framework for the differing levels ofstudent and worker mobilization during Korea's rapid development.°Ogle, Dissent, p. 13 and "Labour," p. 73."The number of unions expanded by 200 and union membership increased by almost 30,000 members. Haptonq yon'qam, 1961,pp. 280, 282, cited by Sungjoo Han, Failure, p. 198. Ogle shows an even greater increase: 500 new unions and 50,000 newmembers. United States Department of State, Foreign Service Dispatch, No. 388 (Seoul: February 28, 1961), p. 10, cited by"Labour," p. 73. See also Jon Huer, Marching Orders: The Role of the Military in South Korea's "Economic Miracle," 1961-1971 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), pp. 20, 34.13II. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS THEORY AND SOUTH KOREA An alternative to looking for explanations of student and labour mobilization within specific historical-cultural legacies is to turn to the general theoretical literature on social movements. There are a number ofbroad approaches to the study of social movements. This chapter will focus on a few that seem to havesome relevance for South Korea.One approach which is often referred to as the social "breakdown" theory focuses on conflict thatoccurs within a society as the result of change. One of the most well know works in this area is that of NeilSmelser, A Theory of Collective Behaviour; Chalmers Johnson adopts a comparable argument in his bookRevolutionary Change  4 2 In brief, this approach sees society as an integrated whole which, when faced withendogenous or exogenous change, may have difficulty maintaining social integration and experience"structural strain" or "disequilibrium". 43 Those groups of individuals that are not integrated may develop an"alternative ideology" or "generalized belief" which suggests an extra-system means of solving their lack ofintegration." Failure of existing institutions to meet this critical juncture through reform or "conservativechange" may result in "revolutionary change".45 Applied to South Korea, this theory would suggest thatsocial movements are a result of 'disequilibrating' change that has occurred in the process of development.While this seems to be in keeping with the central arguments of this paper, there are a number of reasonswhy it is rejected in favour of other theories.42Smelser outlines a step-by-step process by which social movements develop which he refers to it as the "value added" scheme.According to this paradigm, the "determinants of collective behaviour" are: (1) "structural conduciveness", (2) "structural strain",(3) "spread of a generalized belief", (4) "precipitating factors", (5) "mobilization of participants for action", and (6) "operation of socialcontrol." Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective Behaviour (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1963), pp. 15-17.43Smelser, p. 15 and Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2d ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), pp. 60, 66."Johnson, Change, pp. 85-87 and Smelser, p. 17.45Johnson, Change, pp. 60, 93-94. See also Smelser, p.17.14This approach has received some criticism for its depiction of social movements as a "pathological","non-rational" phenomenon, rather than an integral part of any social system, as is change itself.46 It is notsimply change or development that produces social movements, but the manner in which developmentoccurs. In fact, they are often the result of dissatisfaction with the way society is put together rather than theway it breaks down. Breakdown theories also fail to provide an adequate explanation as to why structuralstrain or social disequilibrium would operate on students and workers differently. Why would students bemore likely to mobilize in response to change than workers? Arguing that workers are better integrated intothe social structure means little if one does not consider how that 'integration' is achieved. Do the workersnot experience the upheaval of development to the extent that they would look for some alternative meansof finding social "equilibrium"? Breakdown theories are inadequate because they fail to consider thepossibility that social movements are not simply an outgrowth of change, but a response to existing socialstructures. They do not explain the ways in which the consequences of change would differ for certaingroups.A related theory for explaining the development of social movements is that which is referred to asrelative deprivation (RDT).47 It attributes the cause of social mobilization to the disparity that a mobilizedgroup sees between itself and other groups. While this approach makes intuitive sense, it suffers from oversimplification. In the Korean case, it does not seem to hold much explanatory power. Although Koreanworkers are aware of their unfavourable position in comparison to the business class, their sense of*this criticism is particularly applicable to Smelser's work. See Melucci, Nomads, p.21; Alberto Melucci, "The Symbolic Challengeof Contemporary Movements," Social Research 52 (Winter 1985):790; Alan Scott, Ideology and the New Social Movements (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 45; and Jean L. Cohen, "Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and ContemporarySocial Movements," Social Research 52 (Winter 1985):672. See also Jan Pakulski, Social Movements: The Politics of Moral Protest (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1991), pp. 4-8 for a good summary and critique of this approach.47See Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) for one of the most well known versions ofthis theory.15deprivation has not been translated into a high level of worker collective action. According to Gurney andTierney this is one of the major weaknesses of the relative deprivation theory." Experiencing relativedeprivation and mobilizing for collective action are two different things. So it is with Korean workers; theirfeelings of deprivation are not automatically turned into protest activity. The RDT does not explain how theeffects of relative deprivation might be modified. It does not indicate the source of deprivation, or explain thefailure to engage in collective action even in the presence of relative deprivation.One might also question what the relative deprivation theory has to say about student activism. Manystudent activists are from middle class families and hence economic deprivation is not a primary motivationfor their dissent." It is possible, however, to suggest that students are experiencing deprivation ofopportunity. This may occur on two fronts: the failure of society to provide university students with the kindof employment opportunities that their education has prepared them for and/or the failure of politicalinstitutions to reflect the principles which students have been taught or offer them adequate opportunity forparticipation. This kind of deprivation involves more than simply looking at students vis-a-vis other groupsand brings us back to the cause of these feelings of deprivation.A third approach to the study of social movements, one which arose as a critique of breakdown anddeprivation theories, is that referred to as the resource mobilization theory (RMT). Inspired by MancurOlson's, The Logic of Collective Action,  this approach sees social movements as purposive, rational"Joan Neff Gurney and Kathleen J. Tierney, "Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A Critical Look at Twenty Years ofTheory and Research: The Sociological Quarterly 23 (Winter 1982):36-7. For more variegated analyses of lower class collectiveaction see Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward  Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York:Pantheon Books, 1977), and Barrington Moore Jr.,  Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt  (White Plains, N.Y.: M.E.Sharpe, 1978)."Angus Deming, Peter Leyden and David Bank, "From Street War to Non-Activism," Newsweek January 22, 1990, p. 9; and CliveHamilton and Richard Tanter, "The Antinomies of Success in South Korea," Journal of International Affairs 41 (Summer-Fall1987):73.1 6mobilization on the part of social actors." According to RMT, change and grievances are an integral partof any social system. 51 What determines mobilization is not the existence of these conditions but the abilityto acquire and mobilize resources for the purpose of social movement activity. According to Mayer N. Zaldand John D McCarthy:The resource mobilization approach emphasizes both societal support and constraint ofsocial movement phenomena. It examines the variety of resources that must be mobilized,the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements on thirdparties for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control and incorporatemovements."Thus sociopolitical mobilization can be explained by the ability to mobilize resources, not onlyphysical/economic, but also support from other groups including institutionalized political actors and thegeneral population."Can one use this paradigm to explain the varying levels of student and worker activism? Has thestudent movement been more active because students are in a better socioeconomic position, because theyare able to rally more political and popular support? University students are generally from bettersocioeconomic backgrounds than the workers but this does not necessarily afford them fungible resourcesthat can be used for protest activity. Other opposition groups--the Christian churches, journalists, academicsand the opposition parties--have expressed sympathy for the students' cause, as has the general public, butoften that support has been more passive than active. They give moral support rather than providing tangible50Cohen, pp. 674-5. See also Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,1973), p. 102 and Scott, p. 115.51 Harold R. Kerbo, "Movements of Crisis and Movements of Affluence: A Critique of Deprivation and Resource MobilizationTheories,' Journal of Conflict Resolution  26 (December 1982):648; Melucci, Nomads, p. 33; and Cohen, p. 675.52Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy, The Dynamics of Social Movements  (Cambridge: Winthrop, 1979), p. 1. For variationsof this theory see Oberschall, and Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978).53Tilly, chaps. 3 and 4.17resources. Other groups have not always been as willing or perhaps as able to make the sacrifice that thestudents have. The middle class, for example, has been reluctant to back the students except when reallypressed and outraged as in 1987.54Is it simply the case that workers are less active because they do not have the same access toresources? All of the above mentioned opposition groups including the students have expressed theirsympathy and solidarity with the workers. Furthermore, the workers have resources that are not availableto the students. The withdrawal of their labour through disputes and strikes is far more disruptive to thesystem than student demonstrations. Students rely on the support of others and their ability to disrupt othersto make their action effective. If one considers the "tactics used by authorities to control or incorporatemovements", it may well be that students are more active than workers simply because they are not subjectto as much control and repression.While the RMT does raise some valid points, its explanation begins in the middle of the developmentof a social movement. It is almost a truism that Korean students are able to mobilize because they haveeasier access to resources, receive more support and face less constraint. The real issue is why this is thecase. Furthermore, the RMT does not tell us why workers and students would want to mobilize resourcesin the cause of a social movement in the first place.The foregoing discussion of historical-cultural legacies and social movements theory make somepertinent points regarding the development of social movements in South Korea. Yet, they are only able tocomplete part of the puzzle of why social movements occur and why different social groups may be moreprone to movement activity. The literature on new social movements and advanced capitalism direct our54Young Whan Kihl, "South Korea's Search For A New Order," in  Political Change in South Korea,  eds. Ilpyong J. Kim and YoungWhan Kihl (New York: The Korean PWPA, 1988), p. 11; Tun-jen Cheng, "Is the Dog Barking? The Middle Class and DemocraticMovements in the East Asian NIC's:  International Studies Notes  15 (Winter 1990):10-16; and Vincent S.R. Brandt, "South KoreanSociety: in Korea Briefing, 1990,  pp. 92-93.18attention to structural conditions which reinforce certain cultural legacies, contribute to relative deprivation andmake resources more available to some groups than others. These theories force us to look not atdevelopment itself but the structures created in the process of development. In so doing they provide a morecomplete picture of why social movements occur in general and why the Korean development model wouldhave a different impact on students versus workers.According to Anthony Giddens, conflicts emerge at the site of "primary contradictions" in a society:"Conflicts and contradictions tend to coincide because contradiction expresses the main 'fault lines' in thestructural constitution of societal systems." 55 In their work on advanced capitalism and contemporary socialmovements, Claus Offe and Jurgen Habermas present some hypotheses which help to make sense of theKorean model of development and the social conflicts that emerge or fail to emerge from it. It is possible toapply some of the ideas from this literature to South Korea even though it is not yet at the stage of advancedcapitalism. According to Offe and Habermas, the late capitalist state finds it increasingly necessary tointervene in economy and society in order to correct the "dysfunctions" of the market 5 6 They outline thereasons why and ways in which state intervention occurs.The capitalist state has a self interest in perpetuating a mode of production upon whose revenuesit has come to depend for survival." State intervention is undertaken to compensate for market deficiencies55Giddens, p.198. For Giddens, [t]he primary contradiction of the capitalist (nation-) state is to be found in the mode in which a'private' sphere of 'civil society' is created by but separate from and in tension with the 'public' sphere of the state (p.197)."56Jurgen Habermas, "Some Conditions for Revolutionizing Late Capitalist Societies [1968],"  Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory 15 (1991):36, and Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), p. 16.57Claus Offe and Volker Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State," in Classes, Power and Conflict: Classical and ContemporaryDebates, eds. Anthony Giddens and David Held (London: MacMillan Press, 1982), p.250.19which may precipitate system crisis. 58 State measures are not meant to usurp the market, but to shore itup.59 These measures include welfare and full employment policies aimed at securing mass loyalty andminimizing social conflict 60 According to Offe, the primary reason for the provision of welfare services isnot to meet the concomitant need, but to fortify capitalism. 61 Habermas emphasizes the importance of thesepolicies in serving to legitimate, not only state intervention, but the social division of labour. 62 This form oflegitimation replaces the liberal capitalist ideology of unfettered opportunity for all. ° As a result of stateintervention, areas of life and conflict formerly considered socioeconomic become politicized 64 The stateis credited with more responsibility for the health of the economy and for the creation or alleviation of socialinjustice.With some modification, these premises can be applied to South Korea. The features of the SouthKorean developmental state will be dealt with in more detail in later chapters; the following serves as an ofoutline certain characteristics that effect social movements. Although the South Korean state does notintervene for the same reasons or in the same manner as the advanced capitalist states, a number of58Claus Offe, "Political Authority and Class Structure," in Critical Sociology, ed. Paul Connerton (New York: Penguin Books, 1978),p. 413; and Jurgen Habermas, "Problems of Legitimation in Late Capitalism," in  Critical Sociology,  pp. 365, 367. Habermas outlinessome of the ways in which the state intervenes "to correct the market mechanism with regard to its dysfunctional side effects,...:(1) creating supra-national economic blocks, (2) increasing state consumption, (3) political channelling of capital, and (4) meetingthe material and social costs (p. 367)."590ffe and Ronge, pp. 252-54.60Habermas, "Legitimation," p. 368, "Some Conditions," p. 36-7; and Jurgen Habermas, Toward A Rational Society: Student Protest, Science and Politics (London: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 108.610ffe, Welfare State, p. 144.62Habermas, "Legitimation," p. 367 and "Conditions," p. 41.63Habermas, Rational Society, p. 102."Offe, Welfare State, p. 143. See also Alain Touraine, The Voice and the Eye, pp. 106-7, and Return of the Actor: Social Theoryin Post-Industrial Society (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 68-70.20parallels can be drawn. The Korean state attempts to remedy the shortcomings of the market by takingcharge of the direction of development. In late capitalist societies, the state intervenes to bolster that whichalready exists while the South Korean state has intervened to realize its vision of the economic system. Inboth cases, links are forged between polity and economy; in Korea, these links were consciously establishedfrom the outset. Although the colonial inheritance of a strong bureaucracy and police force, and a relativelyweak indigenous bourgeoisie placed the Korean state in an autonomous position it has also grown dependenton market revenue .65 The capital demands of the heavy and chemical industry drive in the 1970s boundthe success of regime even more closely with that of big business. President Chun Doo Hwan discoveredthis when his regime attempted to rationalize the activities of Korea's conglomerates (chaebo0 in the early1980s. The state could not afford, politically or economically, to allow many of these giants to sink. 66 ThePark and Chun regimes also depended on 'successful' economic development to bolster their fragilelegitimacy. Intervention creates responsibilities that decrease state autonomy. Because an interventioniststate's fortunes become so entwined with those of the economy that it seeks to bolster, the health of thateconomy assumes importance for the legitimacy of the regime itself. As a consequence, conflict thatthreatens the economic system becomes politically significant.According to Offe, attention will be directed to those conflicts which are most system threatening. 67Welfare policies are instituted because a quiescent labour force is essential to the well-being of a capitaliststate .68 In Korea, welfare policies did not receive much attention until the Roh Tae Woo government65See Cumings, Korean War, pp. 151-69.66Stephan Haggard and Chung-In Moon, "Institutions and Economic Policy: Theory and a Korean Case Study," World Politics(January 1990):227-28.670ffe, "Political Authority," p. 415-16.68Habermas, Rational Society, pp. 102, 108.21assumed power in 1987.69 In their stead, the state has avoided conflict and legitimized its interventionistrole through the rhetoric of the communist threat, drawing upon the patriotic sentiments of its population topropel economic development. When this has failed, Korea's developmental regimes have resorted torepression. John Lie provides a succinct analysis of these methods:Park's strategy [and Chun's as well] to maintain power was to develop and consolidate therepressive state apparatus on the one hand and to pursue economic growth on the other,using the rhetoric of anti-communism with the stick of repression and the rhetoric ofeconomic nationalism with the carrot of economic growth. ThBecause the workers are such key players in the development process, it is towards them that much of therhetoric and repression is directed. While the regime would ideally like all the members of society to supportits agenda, the withdrawal of student support is not as threatening to the well-being of the political andeconomic system. Nevertheless, student discontent must be contained so it does not claim the sentimentsof the majority of students or spill-over into other sectors of society.The Korean state takes more preemptive action against and has greater capacity to control the labourmovement. This is consistent with the pattern of social conflict that Offe sees developing in late capitalistsocieties:The needs with the greatest conflict potential are those on the periphery of the area of stateintervention. They are far from the central conflicts being kept in a state of latency andtherefore they are not seen as having priority among dangers to be warded off. 71Because labour protest is a central conflict, the state takes care to ensure that it will not erupt. The KoreanIn 1973 for example, only 0.97 percent of GNP was spent on social services. Bruce Cumings, The Origins and Developmentof the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences," in The Political Economyof New Asian Industrialism, p. 74."John Lie, "Democratization and Its Discontents: Origins of the Present Crisis in South Korea," Monthly Review, 42 (February1991):39.71This is Habermas's interpretation of Offe in Rational Society, p. 108.22state does this through cooptation of labour organizations and heavy handed controls. The studentmovement is not a central conflict and thus faces a different set of inducements and constraints. Aocordirgto Habermas, "[t]he legitimation propositions of the system of dominance do not seem to be convincing tothis group..."72 Offe notes that "...the most likely actors [in social movements] are those who have theeasiest cognitive access to the particular nature of systemic irrationalities or those who are the most likelyvictims of cumulative deprivation."73 This is in accord with the observations of others writing on advancedcapitalist societies and contemporary social movements. Alberto Melucci suggests that those who experiencethe contradictory pulls of a society's opportunities and constraints most intensely will be the most inclined toparticipate in social movements/4 He gives the example of students in Western 'post-industrial' countries.Their education prepares them for prominent positions within established institutions, but political, social andeconomic realities may mean that a place does not really exist for them. 75 Yet as Giddens notes, theexistence of societal contradictions is not in itself a sufficient cause of social movements:If contradiction does not inevitably breed conflict, it is because the conditions under whichactors not only are aware of their interests but are both able and motivated to act on themare widely variable. 76Social groups may be prevented from engaging in collective action by a lack of awareness of their situationor constraints placed on them by "dominant groups in society" and "state agencies".""Habermas, "Conditions," p. 43. In Rational Society, he notes that "Active students, who relatively frequently are in the socialsciences and humanities, tend to be immune to technocratic consciousness because, although for varying motives, their primaryexperience in their own intellectual work in neither case accord with basic technocratic assumptions (p. 121).""Claus Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics," Social Research 52 (Winter 1985):850.7'Melucci, Nomads, p.47.p. 54."Giddens, p. 198."Ibid., p. 318.23In South Korea contradictions emerge from a development process which features intense, rapidindustrialization coupled with heavy state intervention. Economic development proceeds apace while politicaland social modernization lag. The state has built a strong partnership with business in order to achieve itsdevelopmental goals. Popular groups have been virtually excluded from the policy-making process.Concerns for social equity have been sacrificed to the demands of growth.How does the impact of this model differ for the student and labour movements? In light of thetheoretical material discussed above, one should look at the contradictions experienced by students andworkers for motivations to engage in collective action. While students may benefit from development in someways, they also experience the negative effects of an over-emphasis on technical education, acutecompetition for employment and the lack of political openness and social equity. Students face thecontradiction of expanded opportunity through education but lack of fulfilment of that opportunity upongraduation due to economic and social realities. Workers also experience the contradictions of rapid andintense development--they see the fruits of progress, but are conscious of the fact that they are not theprimary recipients of those fruits. Still they do not match the students in protest activity.The following chapters examine the circumstances that cause the student and labour movements todiffer in spite of the fact that both groups seem to have cause for dissent. Because workers are central tothe development model, one would expect them to face greater constraints to collective action. If Koreanstate and business are in a position to help prevent contradictions from turning into labour conflict, workersmay not be fully aware of their interests. Students occupy a different place in the development process.They contribute less to its success and have less power to cause it to fail. As a result, they should not faceas much repression as workers. It is also important to consider the conditions that may make students moreaware of the contradictions inherent in the development model and less inclined to accept state attempts to24legitimize its character. With changes in the model, one would expect to see changes in these two socialmovements. The emergence of a more pluralist society and political reforms in 1987 should have beenaccompanied an evolution of these two movements. The next few chapters attempt to confirm thesehypotheses by analysing the Korean development model and its impact on students and workers. hpresenting a structural argument such as this, one should not forget that social conflict does not arise in adeterministic sort of way. Social configurations have attendant contradictions to which groups and individualsin society respond. The nature and volume of the response is determined as much by the actors as the fieldor parameters in which they act. Although the present argument may concentrate on the field, this is notintended to undervalue the 'people dynamics' that lead to collective action. As Giddens notes, structures arecreated by social action stretched over time and space!' As such they can be modified by social action,but they "limit that range of options open" to social actors!' Ultimately, it is the Korean students andworkers who choose to organize or not given the structural conditions that they are faced with. It is with thisset of conditions and how students and workers respond to them that the remainder of this thesis isconcerned.78Giddens, p. xxi, 170-171. See also Timothy Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,"American Political Science Review  85 (March 1991):94.79Giddens, p. 177.25III. THE KOREAN DEVELOPMENT MODEL South Korea is one of those countries to which Gerschenkron's famous thesis of "economicbackwardness" or late development can be applied. 80 The task of 'catching up' often requires greaterconcentrations of capital and resources than can be provided by the fledgling private sectors of lesserdeveloped countries. In this situation, it is not uncommon for the state to step in where the market fails. Thisis true of South Korea; the state has taken it upon itself to create conditions in which rapid industrializationcan occur. The Korean model of development, however, did not simply originate from the circumstances of"economic backwardness". It is also a response to some specifically Korean conditions.Under Rhee, economic policy was interventionist but not in the same manner as that of the post-1961developmental regimes. The Rhee government tried to build up industry through import substitution, but stateeconomic policy was characterized by ad hoc measures that were inflationary, haphazard in application,heavily dependent on foreign aid and riven with corruption!' Under the tutelage of U.S. advisers, thebureaucracy developed the Five Year Economic Reconstruction Plan (1953/4-1957-59), but the Korean statedid not acquire its developmental character until after 1961. ° Because the Rhee regime was driven moreby political than economic rationale this plan was implemented in a less than efficient, rational manner. °American aid formed the bulk of industrial capital and this was channelled into industries that80A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 19. Seealso Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 8-10,13.81According to Mason et aL, between 1953 and 1960, "... over 70 percent of imports were financed by foreign grants..." From 1953to 1962, aid was the equivalent of 8 percent of GNP (pp. 93, 185). Amsden puts the figure at 15 percent of average annual GNPfrom 1953 through 1958 (p. 39). See also Clive Hamilton, Capitalist Industrialization in South Korea  (Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress, 1986), pp. 32-35.82Susan A. McManus, "'The Three 'Es' of Economic Development and the Hardest is Equity: Thirty Years of Development Planningin the Republic of Korea (I)," Korea Journal 30 (August 1990):5.83Huer, p.161; and Jones and Sakong, pp. 41-3.26produced consumer goods such as food processing and textiles. The developmental effect of these policieswas mitigated by the corruption and rent-seeking behaviour of politicians, businessmen and state officials."It was this conduct that brought the students out onto the streets in April 1960. Following the resignation ofSyngman Rhee, students continued to demand that the corrupt be disciplined. The Chang Myongovernment's attempts to meet these demands yet maintain the confidence of business and bureaucracy wasone of the factors that contributed to its instability and ineffectiveness!'Park's junta justified its 1961 coup by citing the deficiencies, real or imagined, of the civiliangovernment in providing the political stability necessary for national security. For military personnel, who hadbeen taught to view anything that veered to the left as a communist threat, the increasing influence ofprogressive groups in Korean polity and society was cause for concern!' Activist students intended to meetwith North Korean students the same month as the coup."' Of additional concern was the fact that NorthKorean development had outpaced that of the South following the Korean war!"While the junta's early rhetoric focused on safeguarding South Korea from the communist threat, itwas not long before security was wedded with economics and industrial development rose to centre stage."Hamilton, pp. 32-3."Mason et al., p. 45. See also Sungjoo Han, Failure, chap. 7; and Henderson, pp. 177-82.86Sohn, Authoritarianism, p. 19.87Martin Hart-Landsberg, "South Korea: The Miracle Rejected," Critical Sociology 15 (Fall 1988):35. See also Henderson, pp. 179-80; and Sungjoo Han, Failure, pp. 200-205.88Amsden, p. 40; and Russell Mardon, "The State and Industrial Transformation in the Republic of Korea," Journal of Social Politicaland Economic Studies 15 (Winter 1990):460-61.27In 1963, Park made the following statement:Economic resurgence is an integral part of a nationalistic vision of a more independent Koreato come--more independent of the United States aid and control and, as an economicallystronger and independent entity, more able to deal with North Korea?'Within a few short years of the 1961 coup, the Park regime established or reinforced the structures that wereto become the foundation of the Korean model for almost three decades. Changes have occurred, with theYushin constitution and under the rule of Chun Doo Hwan, but the fundamentals that were established thenhave remained?' These structures establish the parameters in which the labour and student movementsact. They will be outlined briefly in the following paragraphs.One of the main features of the Korean model of development is a 'strong' or authoritarian state thatmakes economic development one of its primary goals. Chalmers Johnson refers to the South Korean stateas a "'hard' developmental state"?' Bruce Cumings calls it a "bureaucratic authoritarian industrializingregime" (BAIR).92 Whatever the appellation, the essentials are the same. Because development is definedas a national rather than a regime goal, it can be used to legitimize state intervention and the authoritariancharacter of the regime. The Korean state uses economic planning to project the desired shape of theeconomy. These plans would be useless without certain perquisites to ensure private sector compliance, fordespite intervention, initiative remains in the private sector?' The most important tool that the Korean statehas at its disposal is the control of access to credit. In 1961, all commercial banks were nationalized under°Park Chung Hee, The Country, the Revolution and I (Seoul, 1963), pp. 19-20, cited by Mason et aL, p. 46.9nitially the Chun junta gave lip service to creating a welfare state, but it soon became clear that such policies would be difficultto establish given the power of the chaebol. See Haggard and Moon, p. 219.91Johnson, "Political Institutions," p. 138.92"These states are ubiquitous in the economy and society: penetrating, comprehensive, highly articulated, and relativelyautonomous of particular groups and classes.' Cumings, "Origins and Development," p. 71.wFor more information on Korea's economic plans, see McManus, "The Three 'E's of Economic Development, (I & II)."28under the "Illicit Accumulation of Wealth Law". In order to gain access to credit, firms must align themselveswith state economic policies that have been geared to export-led growth since the mid-1960s." For thosewho have acquiesced, the benefits have not been insignificant. Not only do they obtain credit at fire-saleinterest rates, they are also eligible for tax exemptions, tariff protection and import privileges.95 Accordingto the Korean Productivity Centre, without these types of subsidies, many of Korea's leading exports "wouldhave been produced at a loss" in the 19605. 96 It should be made clear that these were not merely hand-outs, but were conditional upon proof of a firms's ability to export?' Therein lies the developmental natureof the post-1961 Korean state. The Rhee regime gave similar concessions to business, but these favourswere often based on political rather than economic criteria. ° Under Park and Chun economics gained moreimportance although it by no means eclipsed politics. It was necessary to display the capacity to perform inaddition to supporting government policy.State concessions to business amounted to the nurturing of monopoly/oligopoly capital. Under theIllicit Accumulation Law, a number of major businessmen were arrested but released on the condition thatthey relinquish their shares in commercial banks and cooperate in government economic plans 9 9 This hasled to a rather incestuous relationship between government and big business, compounded by the fact that94Amsden, p. 68.For more information on the state's tools of intervention see Mardon; Bello and Rosenfeld, pp. 51-4; and Amsden, chap. 3."Quoted in Gilbert Brown, Korean Pricing Policies and Economic Development in the 1960s (Baltimore: John Hopkins UniversityPress, 1973), p. 170, cited by Michelle Gittleman, "The South Korean Export Miracle: Comparative Advantage or GovernmentCreation? Lessons for Latin America: Journal of International Affairs 42 (Fall 1988), p. 19497M. Shahid Alam, "The South Korean 'Miracle': Examining the Mix of Government and Markets," Journal of Developing Areas  23(January 1989):236.98HamiIton, Industrialization, pp. 32-33.99mardon notes that those arrested included the heads of Lucky-Gold Star, Samsung and Ssangyong, companies which continueto place in the ranks of Korea's largest conglomerates (p. 474-5). See also Minho Kuk, "The Government Role in the Making ofthe Chaebol in the Industrial Development of South Korea," Asian Perspective 12 (Spring-Summer 1988):113.29actual family, marriage, school and regional ties do exist between the two. 4° One result of this relationshiphas been the growth of huge conglomerates that are marked by their "degree of diversification andconcentration". 101 In 1975, the ten largest chaebol accounted for 7 percent of GNP; by 1985, this had risento 11.5 percent. 102 Their share of total exports went from 12.4 percent in 1975 to over 50 percent in 1985;in 1987, they represented 72 percent of total sales."' Firms that are unwilling or unable to keep up withstate initiatives have been left behind. The politically unwilling have been dropped completely. 104Because the state initially had the upper hand, Jones and Sakong refer to its relationship withbusiness as "Korea Inc." with government as the senior and the chaebol as the junior partner. 105 Theextent to which the government has come to rely on the chaebol in more recent years was revealed whenthe Chun government tried to rationalize the operations of these corporations in its economic stabilizationpolicy. 106 Although the high debt-equity ratio of the chaebol make them vulnerable to the discontinuationof government support, the Korean state is also vulnerable by association. 107 This is due to the large shareof these conglomerates in the Korean economy and the fact that the Bank of Korea is ultimately responsibleK°Lim and Paek, p. 26 and Yun-Han Chu, "State Structure and Economic Adjustment of the East Asian Newly IndustrializingCountries," International Organization 43 (Autumn 1989):664.' °'Amsden, p. 116.1°2Hak Kyu Sohn, "Current State of Inequality by Indices," Shin Donq-A (February 1987), pp. 427-454, cited by Soong N. Sohng,"The South Korean Model for Industrialization: Theory and Reality," Asian Profile 17 (December 1989):517.p. 516 and Bello and Rosenfeld, p. 63. See also Minho Kuk p. 122 for sales and employment figures of the chaebol andAmsden, chap. 5, for a detailed account of the chaebol.104Mardon relates the cases of bankruptcy of the Yulsan Corp. in 1979 and Kukje I.C.C. in 1985. These companies both beganto show sympathy for opposition parties and found the credit rug pulled out from under them (p. 476-77).106Jones and Sakong, pp. 67, 69.1061-laggard and Moon, p. 221, 228; and Amsden, pp. 132-36.107The debt ratio of the top 50 chaebol was 506.1 percent in 1985. Minho Kuk, p. 125.30for their debt. By 1983, 48 percent of outstanding bank credits were held by the top chaebol.48 Althoughthe state may have started out in the dominant position, by the 1980s many Koreans felt that "[i]t had becomea captive of the chaebol." Unquestionably the chaebol had increased in power since 1961. This processwas facilitated by the capital and resource demands of the heavy and chemical industry drive in the1970s. 11° What has developed is a partnership from which neither party can easily extricate itself andwhere the lines of the senior-junior relationship have become blurred.Another important feature of the Korean development model is the speed with which industrializationhas taken place. The Korean economy has experienced impressive growth as measured by GNP, GNP percapita, and the share of exports and manufacturing."' Equally impressive is the rate of sectoraladjustment--the move from light to heavy industry, and from heavy to high tech."' As Russell Mardonnotes, private initiative alone cannot account for the speed and direction of these shifts."' All of thisredounded to the benefit of the chaebol who were the most well-placed to take advantage of new sectoralinitiatives. There have been new entries and some shift in the ranks of the leading conglomerates, but it is10BFar Eastern Economic Review, December 12, 1985, pp. 71-75, cited by Hang Yul Rhee, "The Economic Problems of the KoreanPolitical Economy," in Political Change in South Korea, p.206. Soong N. Sohng also cites similar figures for 1986 (p. 517).109Bello and Rosenfeld, p. 47.no ........,we p. 60, and Amsden, p. 131."'GNP increased from $3 bn in 1965 to $63 bn in 1981. Sung Yeung Kwak, "The Economic Development of the Republic ofKorea, 1965-1981," in Models of Development: A Comparative Study of Economic Growth in South Korea and Taiwan.  ed.Lawrence J. Lau (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1990),p. 65. In 1961, GNP per capita was between $80 and $100; by 1989, it was$4000. Manwoo Lee The Odyssey of Korean Democracy, 1987-1990 (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 2. Between 1962 and 1987,the Korean economy experienced an average annual growth rate of 8.4 percent. Rhee, p. 189.12In 1960, heavy and chemical industry accounted for 30.0 percent of total manufacturing output, 40.5 percent in 1971, 50.7percent in 1977 and 61.9 percent in 1984. The share of light industry decreased from 70.0 percent in 1960 to 59.5 percent in 1971,49.3 percent in 1977 and 38.1 percent in 1984. Amsden, p. 58, Table 3.3; and Tibor Scitovsky, "Economic Development in Taiwanand South Korea, 1965-1981," in Models of Development p. 173, Table 4.5.13Mardon, p. 473.31surprising to see the resilience of several major groups like Samsung, Lucky-Gold Star and Ssangyong. 114A final aspect of the Korean model of development that has special relevance for social movementsis the exclusion of popular groups from the policy-making process. This reflected President Park's aversionto politics and that legacy has been carried on by successive regimes. The year following the resignationof the Rhee government was marked by an unprecedented amount of activity on the part of political parties,student groups and labour unions. The volatility of the situation was one of the major justifications for the1961 military coup. Once in control of the reigns of power, Park dismissed the National Assembly andbanned all existing political parties and labour unions. In a bid to make itself legitimate by taking on the formof a civilian government, the junta relaxed its control somewhat and elections were held in 1963. For mostof the 1960s, intermediate associations like political parties and labour unions were able to act with somedegree of freedom, but the political noose was eventually tightened again. In 1972, the Yushin (Revitalizing)constitution was promulgated and Park's power became nearly absolute. The national assembly wasemasculated and the activities of intermediate associations, and "extra-institutional" opposition groups safelycurtailed. 115 After 1981, the Chun government tried to distance itself from this blatantly authoritarian period,but the controls remained intact. The Chun regime merely gave them a different shape.The insulation of the Korean state was achieved by a variety of institutional means, and then outrightrepression when these failed. The national assembly was structured in such a way that ruling partydominance was assured and it acted as a rubber stamp for cabinet decisions." 6 The bureaucracy became14See Minho Kuk, pp. 112, 114, 116-17.115David Apter and Nagayo Sawa use this term in Against the State: Politics and Social Protest in Japan  (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1984)."'Choi, p. 219.32the vehicle by which government policy was formulated and achieved, not the ruling party."' While thebureaucracy was unfettered by the whims of ruling and opposition politicians, the President and those closeto him exercised a good deal of direct authority over the various departments. Key ministries such as theMinistry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Economic Planning Board were headedby politicians who were close to the president."' All of this served to create an economic policy apparatusthat responded expeditiously and efficiently to direction from the top, but which was shielded from popularinfluence. Given the presence of ex-military personnel in government and bureaucracy, this structure is notsurprising."' Chung-in Moon provides a useful, if somewhat innocuous characterization of the Koreanstate:While executive dominance minimized bureaucratic infighting and ensured consistent andcoherent policies, political capacity to insulate economic decision making from contendingsocial pressures produced efficient policy outcomes and effective implementation. mWhere institutional mechanisms failed to achieve the desired degree of exclusion, both the Park andChun regimes resorted to other measures. Recalcitrant oppositionists were arrested and harassed; thosewho were more pliable were bought-off. 121 Behind all of this was the back-up of the military itself, amassive police force and a formidable security organization--the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (Agencyfor National Security Planning under Chun). The KCIA/ANSP received a dubious reputation for its ability toinfiltrate opposition parties, labour unions, and student organizations, reveal their activities to the police and117 Bae-Ho Han, The Role of the State in Development: The Korean Case," China Report 22 (July-September 1986):298. UnderPresident Chun, the ruling party had somewhat more power."'Johnson, "Political Institutions," p. 154."'See Huer, pp. 66-71, 82-84.120Chung-in Moon, "Beyond Statism: Rethinking the Political Economy of Growth in South Korea,"  International Studies Notes 15(Winter 1990):24.121 13ae-Ho Han, p. 301.33intimidate their members.Although the authoritarian nature of the Korean developmental state seems obvious, its chiefengineers would deny that it was detrimental to the Korean people. Undoubtedly, the shape of the Koreanstate can be attributed, at least in part, to the concern for self-preservation of those in power. Theircommitment to the goal of national development was not, however, without substance. In their eyes,development began with economics from which all good things would follow in time--national security, materialwell-being and even democracy. Until some indeterminate level of economic development was achieved,political control was justified. The problem of this 'temporary' disassociation of politics and economics wasthat success came to be gauged in terms of growth not equity. 122The lack of political and social development led significant portions of the Korean public to doubt thesincerity of the regimes' commitment to true development. With few institutional channels through which toarticulate these concerns many turned to extra-institutional methods. The state's obstinate refusal to respondto popular initiatives eventually created such a wellspring of discontent that it could no longer be controlled.This is the subject of the final chapter--the breakdown of the Korean model in the mid-1980s. The nextchapter will discuss some reasons why the model described above has had a different impact upon studentand workers.' Clive Hamilton, "Class, State and Industrialization in South Korea," I.D.S. Bulletin 15 (April 1984):41.34IV. WORKERS AND STUDENTS IN SOUTH KOREAN DEVELOPMENTThe Labour MovementIt would be a mistake to create the impression that economic development was simply a facade tolegitimate a series of authoritarian regimes in South Korea. These regimes are deserving of titles likecapitalist developmental state and BAIR because economic development became an important goal in itself,not simply a means of achieving legitimacy or even national security. This goal influenced state labour policybut so did the fact that these regimes were authoritarian and hence lacking in a strong popular mandate. AsStephen Haggard notes, "labour controls in Korea had political roots..."; they were not simply a means ofmaintaining national comparative advantage.'"The South Korean military saw the corrupt politics of the Rhee regime and the turmoil following itsfall as anathema to security and development. The 1961 coup was executed with these problems in mind.As one of the most efficient and modern sectors of society, the military often attempts to rationalize othersectors of society in its own image. 124 Given the record of other developed countries, the Park regime didnot see organized labour as an obstacle to its developmental goals but as a possible ally. Ogle cites a 1966Office of Labour Affairs report that notes the positive correlation between the level of development and theextent of labour organization in Japan and Germany.'" The Park regime was concerned with the characterof organized labour and saw a need to advance 'cooperative' labour-management relations.Immediately following the May 1961 coup, all existing unions were "deregistered" and strikes were''Stephan Haggard, 'The East Asian NICs in Comparative Perspective: in The Pacific Region: Challenges to Policy and Theory,p. 136.124According to Choi, this was the case in Korea (p. 210).1250ffice of Labour Affairs, Labour and the Five Year Plan, 1967-1971  (Seoul, 1966), cited by Ogle, Dissent, p. 15.35banned. 126 In time, the Park regime showed that its purpose was to purge labour organizations of theirundesirable traits rather than eliminate them completely. These traits included their corruption andpoliticization under the Rhee regime and their radical drift under Chang Myon. 127 Unlike Rhee, Park didnot want unions to serve merely as a "political tool"; he was also concerned with their economicpossibilities. 128 That the regime saw a need for labour organization is reflected in the protection of therights of workers--to organize, bargain collectively, and participate in collective action--in the labour laws. Yetthe qualification of these rights indicates the government's desire to focus the efforts of workers on the goalof national development, limit their grievances to those of an economic nature and keep them out ofpolitics. 129 South Korean labour laws also reflect a conviction that the protection of worker rights was oneof the necessary trappings of modernity.In 1946, the AMGIK set out the basic rights of workers which were incorporated into law in 1953 bythe Rhee government. This law consisted of the Trade Union Act, the Labour Disputes Adjustment Act, theLabour Relations Commission Act and the Labour Standards Act." ° Although these various acts havebeen revised over the course of time, they still remain as the basic tenets of Korea's labour law. However,the existence of labour laws and their actual observance are two quite different things. Rauenhorst notesthat "...these statutes have generally been ignored, suspended or abused by government and management'Fredric C. Deyo, "State and Labour: Modes of Political Exclusion in East Asian Development," in The Political Economy of NewAsian Industrialism, p. 185.127Choi, pp. 84, 147, 201. One of the amendments to the labour law following the coup was the stipulation that unions could notgive monetary support to political parties (p. 84).I28Rauenhorst, pp. 329-30.'Choi, p. 84; Ogle, Dissent, p. 63 and "Labour," p. 290-1.I36For details, see Rauenhorst, pp. 324-28; and Tony Michell, From a Developing to a Newly Industrializing Country: The Republicof Korea, 1961-82 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1988), pp. 111-12.36actions."13 ' Labour legislation had little meaning under Rhee once the influence of the left was eliminatedand the No Chong was incorporated as an arm of the Liberal Party.Under Park, workers faced the obstacle of mandatory cool-down periods before strike action couldbe taken and the probability of the dispute being submitted to government intermediaries for bindingarbitration. Nevertheless, the 1960s are generally acknowledged as a relatively open period in the historyof the Korean labour movement. 132 This should not be interpreted as a willingness on the part of the Parkregime to tolerate labour dissent. Much of the labour peace in the 1960s was due to the lack of testing ofthe boundaries of labour laws on the part of workers. When that test came, the laws were amended andrepression escalated.In 1969, the Provisional Exceptional Law Concerning Labour Unions and the Settlement of LabourDisputes in Foreign Invested Firms was promulgated when strikes in foreign firms threatened to sour Korea'sinvestment "climate". 133 These restrictions were extended to all unions under the provisions of the 1971Special Measures Law which gave the President extraordinary 'emergency' powers to delimit acceptablepopular activity. When the Yushin constitution was established in 1972, the suppression of worker collectiveaction became permanent. 134 Workers continued under these restrictive conditions until Park's death in1979. In 1980, before Chun Doo Hwan's military coup and the return of oppression, labour disputes eruptedacross the country and the number unions increased dramatically.' 35The labour laws established by the Chun administration were even more confining than those under131 11auenhorst, p. 324.' 32Choi, pp. 89, 257; and Ogle, "Labour," p. 218.' 33Choi, p. 86-87 and Ogle, "Labour," p. 101."Choi, p. 88.' 35See Appendix A, Table 1.37Park. There were a number of reason for this. The blight of the Kwangju massacre left the regime with avery fragile base of legitimacy."' Dissident groups--workers, students, Christian churches--had grown inpower and consciousness since 1961. The chaebol had also increased in size and economic might. Korea'srecessed economy demanded immediate attention. In an effort to give the regime more room for manoeuvre,unions were "purged" and the labour laws amended."' Under the revised labour legislation, third partieswere prohibited from participating in dispute mediation. This was aimed at excluding church labour groupssuch as the Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) and the Catholic Youth Workers (JOC), but it also effectivelyemasculated the Federation of Korean Trade Union (FKTU), and its affiliated industrial unions."' Accordingto Jeong Taik Lee, "the new labour control system in 1980 was strong enough to contain resistance by theworkers from 1981 to 1983.'11 " After 1983, worker grievances and their capacity to do something aboutthem intensified to the point where even the authoritarian Chun regime struggled to contain labour discontent.The manner in which labour laws were administrated says much about the ambition of Park and Chunto push rapid industrialization in spite of its sociopolitical costs. It became apparent, especially in the 1970sand 1980s, that these regime were inclined to apply labour law when it worked to the benefit of managementand the state, not when it could be used for the realization of worker goals. Choi cites figures which show136In May 1980, citizens of the city of Kwangju came out on the streets to protest Chun's manoeuvres against the civiliangovernment. Troops were sent in to put down this uprising and estimates of the numbers of civilians killed range from 200 to 2000.For details see Donald N. Clark, ed., The Kwangju Uprising: Shadows Over the Regime in South Korea  (Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress, 1988)."'Michael Launius, "The State and Industrial Labour,"  Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars  16 (October-December 1984):6. Seealso, Jeong Taik Lee, *Dynamics of Labour Control and Labour Protest in the Process of Export-Oriented Industrialization in SouthKorea," Asian Perspective 12 (Spring-Summer 1988):150."8Launius, p. 7 and Rauenhorst, p. 334.139Jeong Taik Lee, p. 153.38that 96 percent of firms inspected in 1971 failed to meet the requirements of the Labour Standards Law.' 4°In 1980, the number was 92.6 percent.'" When a dispute occurred it was submitted for binding arbitrationby labour committees that generally favoured management over workers. 142 If a dispute escalated to astrike, the police would often stand by and allow management hired thugs to beat workers and then arrestlabour activists."3Government and business attitudes toward labour unions illustrate their skewed interpretation oflabour rights. Although the right to organize has been secured by law since 1953, this has often meant littlein the face of state-management measures to control unions. In the eyes of Korea's developmental regimeslabour should organize for the purpose of contributing to economic development. The mediation ofgrievances should be limited to those of an economic nature, and workers would be willing to accept less thanthe optimum in wages and working conditions as a sacrifice for national development. This had led to whatJang Jip Choi refers to as "state-sponsored corporatism" whereby unions are organized from the top downunder the tutelage of state bodies.'" The election of the leadership of the FKTU and its affiliated industrialunions has occurred under the 'watchful eye' of state security agencies. At the enterprise level, managementexpends similar efforts to ensure that local unions will be headed by malleable persons.' 45This brings us to another feature of the Korean model of development which has a significant impact140The Administration of Labour Affairs,  Nodonqhaenachonq 10 nyonsa  [10 Year History of Labour Administration] (Seoul: The ALA,1973), p. 78, cited by Choi, p. 231.141ALA, Oepmuhyonhwanq (August 1980), p.70, cited by Choi, p. 231.' 42See Rauenhorst, p. 327."'See Ogle's account of the 'breaking' of the union at Wonpoong Textile Co. in 1982. Dissent, pp. 105-6.'"Choi, p. 32, 312-15. See also Launius, p. 5."'Ogle, Dissent, p. 77.39on the labour movement--the state-conglomerate alliance. As noted earlier this relationship has becomeparticularly close as a result of the Park regime's ability to undercut business power through the IllicitAccumulation of Wealth Law. Once this was accomplished, Park used the 'carrot' of credit to create apartnership with business in the pursuit of goals outlined by a series of five-years economic plans. Businessmay have had some qualms about the partnership initially, but it soon became clear that the benefits weremore that compensatory. Losing entrepreneurial latitude in return for a much reduced risk seemed well worthit to those who were willing to go along with government policy.This arrangement was much different from that which Park, and later Chun, tried to forge with labour.The business-state relationship was more representative of true corporatism. Business participated in thecreation and implementation of economic plans and received all sorts of concessions in return forcooperation. Labour, on the other hand, was excluded from participating through anything other thangovernment dominated channels. m6 This represented 'incorporation' rather than corporatism. Korea'sindustrializing regimes were concerned with achieving rapid and efficient development for which labourcooperation was a vital ingredient. Because of the need to survive and the competition in a large surpluslabour market, at least until the 1970s, it did not take many carrots to get labour to participate. 147 With theleft eliminated or discredited labour had little power to strike a more equitable bargain.Undoubtedly there were those in the Office of Labour Affairs, the ministry of labour under Chun, whohad sympathy for and saw it as their duty to advance the interests of workers. This ministry has little capacityto do so however, as labour policy was largely determined by more powerful ministries such as the EPB, MCI,and KCIA where labour was considered as only one small element in the whole economic and political"thoi, pp. 247, 252."'Low levels of investment in agriculture and low food prices drove many off the farms into the city creating a ready pool ofworkers. Koo, pp. 675-6; and Choi, pp. 48-49.40scheme.' Workers were promised a higher standard of living and one cannot deny that this wasdelivered. Increased productivity soon brought material rewards to workers as well as business. Consideringthe low starting base of the economy in 1961, it is not surprising that the worker expectation threshold roseslowly before the signs of growing prosperity, at least for the business class, became more apparent.'"There were two aspects of government-business cooperation that worked to the detriment of labourinterests. The first was a laxity in applying the law in favour of the workers, ie. allowing management to actwith relative freedom. The second, darker aspect was the state's participation in the repression of theworkers. Management was allowed to manipulate unions in order to try to make them into companydominated organizations by bribing, firing and intimidating labour activists.'" Another option was topreemptively organize a union of management sympathizers (the law decreed that only on union was allowedin an enterprise). When these measures failed, management resorted to violence, pitting privileged workersagainst the underprivileged or hiring thugs. 151 As noted earlier, the state was well aware of thesemeasures. Police would often stand by and watch the thugs do their work, then go in and arrest protestingworkers.'"The greatest example of regime-chaebo/complicity has been the willingness of the state to use policeand military against workers when management failed to keep control. There are a number of examples ofthis; one of the most famous is the Y.H. Textile Co. Incident. A number of female employees held a sit-in"Choi, p. 223.149In 1960, GNP per capita was $94. Steinberg, p 123.uthoi, p. 95.151 Ibid., p. 95.152During a dispute at Dongil Textile Co. in the 1970s, female workers called upon police to prevent their male colleagues fromattacking them. Their pleas were ignored. "A Call to Support the Dong-Il Textile Workers, 17 May 1978, compiler unknown, citedby Sohn, pp. 136-37.41demonstration to protest lay-offs and working conditions. When they moved their demonstration to oppositionparty headquarters, 1000 riot police were sent in to break the strike. Several of the workers were beaten bypolice and one woman died."' Similar dramas were played out throughout the 1970s and 1980s--the strikeat Hyundai Shipyard in 1974, Sabuk mines in 1980 and Daewoo Apparel in 1985. Several major disputesoccurred in larger firms--owned by the chaebol--where more workers were concentrated in a workplace.These same firms had more power to mount a counter-offensive against workers. 154Another factor that is introduced when a state assumes a developmental role is the possibility ofusing its control of public information in the cause of development."' Where the media and the educationalsystem toil under state restrictions as they do in South Korea, the state has more latitude to propagate adevelopmental ideology. This is precisely what occurred under Park and Chun. The Park junta justified itscoup in the interests of safeguarding South Korea from communist expansion. This rhetoric was soonfollowed by the tie between development and security. With the tragedy of the Korean war only eight yearsdistant, this discourse stuck a responsive chord in the Korean public. The workers were not immune and withother perspectives silenced, they too responded to the call for national sacrifice in the cause of developmentand security.Workers were not, however, completely swept up by this kind of propaganda. Korean workers arewell educated with many of them having received some secondary education."' They were exposed toliberal democratic ideals even in the 1960s, if not more revolutionary ideologies. Many were aware of the151aunius, p. 7. See also Choi, pp. 287-92.154Choi, p. 96, 98.' 55See Huer, pp. 92-93 for examples.' 56Choi, p. 72, 176; and Ogle, "Labour," p. 143. In 1946, 7.4 percent of Korean workers had received secondary education. By1983, the number had risen to 50 percent. Amsden, p. 222.42incongruities and inequalities in the development model. Yet their ability to criticize it and organize forcollective action has been curtailed by the superior position of business and the willingness of 'Korea Inc.'to resort to the suppression of labour dissent. Workers have been sincerely concerned about the possibilityof military action on the part of North Korea. This has helped deter them from more militant unionism, at leastuntil the mid-1980s. Until then, they focused their demands on wages and working conditions and did notquestion the wisdom of the capitalist development model. 157 What they sought was a 'kinder, gentler'capitalism that was more responsive to labour interests and more equitable in its distribution. Over time, theability of workers to press their demands has been enhanced and, in the past four years many workers havedrifted toward a more militant ideology.In the seventies, as workers became more conscious of socioeconomic contradictions and moreskilful in pressing their demands, they were faced with more state-sponsored rhetoric and repression. Thesemeasures sowed the seeds of a growing politicization of the labour movement. Chun's heightenedsuppression of worker dissent did much to promote the maturation of these seeds. As Ogle notes, by the1980s activist workers realized that responsibility for the mistreatment of labour could not be imputed tobusiness alone. 158 The change in worker consciousness in the 1970s was due in part to the efforts ofChristian-labour groups such as the Urban Industrial Mission and the Catholic Youth Workers. 159 The ChunTae II incident in 1970 also helped to turn the attention of students to the plight of the workers. m Theybegan to contribute their energy to the labour movement by drawing attention to worker grievances in student''Choi, p. 109, 111.'Ogle, p. 158.' 59For more information on these groups see Rauenhorst, pp. 336-9; Ogle, Dissent, pp. 86-89; and Choi, pp. 76-78.160Chun Tae H was a garment worker in the Peace Market area of Seoul wherein 27,000 workers, mostly young women, labouredin appalling conditions. In 1970, Chun Tae H self immolated in a desperate act of protest against the conditions that these andother Korean workers were forced to endure. See Sohn, pp. 34-35.43protests, teaching workers at night schools or even taking jobs in factories. These efforts contributed to abreakdown in the efficacy of the state's development ideology. Launius illustrates this by citing the commentsof one union activist:as workers 'witnessed the rapid industrial development of the nation during the 1970s, theirendurance came to an end. A quiet change of opinion spread among labourers: poverty isnot our destiny and society should be held responsible for it.... Over the last decade,industries were one-sidedly encouraged with various administrative favours by thegovernment while labourers were forced to reserve the right for the economic developmentof the nation: 16 'The Chun and Park regimes tried to counter this growing consciousness with a mix of rhetoric andrepression. An illustrative example of the efforts at manufacturing a supportive worker mentality is theFactory Saemaul Movement. The movement's rallying cry was to: "Treat employees like family: do factorywork like...[yourj family business." 162 Factory Saemaul tried to draw on the Confucian loyalty to family toinspire workers to forget their grievances and continue to sacrifice for national development in spite of itsunequal endowments. 163 This movement had little legitimacy given the fact that the management-labourrelationship was more akin to a master-servant than a father-son relationship.' m The expectations of loyaltywere far more one-sided than those of the traditional father-son relationship. Factory Saemaul representeda "deliberate state policy" to replicate traditional culture, but it was a cultural archetype modified by the state'sdevelopment goals. 165 Employers have also tried to increase worker loyalty through the provision of'Noma Times, April 30, 1980, p. 3, cited by Launius, p. 8. See also Jeong Taik Lee, p. 144.'Park Chung Hee, Saemaul: Korea's New Community Movement (Seoul: Korea Textbook Co., 1979), pp. 210-16, cited by KyuhanBae, "Labour Strategy for Industrialization in Soufi^Ja," Pacific Affairs 62 (Fall 1989):361.' 63Kyuhan Bae, p. 361 and Choi, p. 182."'You Jong-II, "Capital-Labour Relations of the Newly Industrializing Regime in South Korea: Past, Present and Future,"unpublished paper, April 1989, p. 12, cited by Bello and Rosenfeld, p. 33. See also Ogle, "Labour," p. 265-66.' Choi, pp. 182, 195.44"paternalistic perks". 166 While these have helped, many workers feel that business should not feel somagnanimous about giving workers that which is their due--a more equal share of production returns.Chun's purification camps were a more malignant mutation of the Factory Saemaul Movement.Dropping all of the subtlety of cultural manipulation, worker activists were sent to camps where methodsreminiscent of the Gulag were used to purge them of their oppositionist tendencies. Similar methods wereused under Park by the KCIA, but not in such a structured fashion. The stories of those who returned fromthese camps probably did more to advance the cause of the labour movement than to divert it from itspath. 167 Chun tried to use the labour-management councils to inspire voluntary cooperation. The 1980amendments to labour legislation required that all companies employing over 100 workers should establishsuch a council. It soon became clear that they were just another arena where management could dominateworkers:68Income distribution acts as both an inducement and a constraint to labour protest. By citing relativelyequitable distribution the state tries to create the image that Korea's pattern of development has benefitedthe majority of its citizens: 69 The fact that state agencies are often the source of these statistics might not,in itself, lead one to question their veracity. The problem is that most of these statistics fail to report the fullearnings of the richest and the poorest of income groups. "Profits from real estate speculation and the curbmarket" are not fully represented by income distribution figures: 7° Single person and non-farm rural166Amsden, p. 210. She is referring to conditions at POSCO, a public enterprise, but Samsung is an example of a privatecorporation which does the same thing.1670g1e, Dissent, p. 99.'Mark Clifford, "Labour's Political Future," FEER, August 27, 1987, p. 22.' 69See Sung Yeung Kwak, The Economy of South Korea, 1980-1987," in Models of Development, p. 233 for income distributionstatistics.10Launius, p. 8.45households are excluded from the data. 171 Even if one accepts these distortions, Korean industrial workersattain their reported earning level by working the longest hours of countries surveyed by the ILO in 1980 and1986. 1 " Nominal wages increases of 26.4 percent between 1966 and 1979 are representative ofinflationary growth; the other side of this it the rapid increase in the cost of living.'" Workers' real wagesactually fell by 5 percent in the early 1980'5. 14 Furthermore, the growth rate of labour productivityconsistently outpaced wage increases until the mid 1980s. 1" Tax burdens were not carried equally by allincome groups; corporate taxes fell from 5.4 percent in 1971 to 3.6 percent in 1980.' 76 According toAmsden, managers make over three times as much as production workers.' 77 These statistics give onlya very narrow picture of what inequality means for Korean workers. As Paul Streeten points out:Inequality of income distribution touches only a small portion of the vast multidimensionalproblem of inequality. There is inequality of assets, of access to earning opportunities, ofsatisfaction from work, of recognition, of ability to enjoy consumption, of power, ofparticipation in decision-making. The call for greater equality, for a genuine community ofequals cannot be answered simply by measures that reduce the Gini coefficient or any othersimple measure of inequality.'"With this perspective, statistics that seem to indicate a relatively equal distribution of income in South Koreadissolve into so much state and academic rhetoric."'See Rhee, p.195 and Amsden, pp. 16-17, note 11.Incited by Launius, p. 8 and Bello and Rosenfeld, p. 24.I Kwak, "Development," p. 81; Launius, p. 10 and Choi, pp. 302-3, tables 41, 42.utumings, "Origins and Development," p. 80.' ThSee Sohn, Authoritarianism, p. 234, note 81."Choi, p. 269 and Mardon, p. 481."'Amsden, p. 229-30."Paul Streeten, "Some Problems in the Use and Transfer of an Intellectual Technology," Paper presented at a conference inBellario, Italy, on the financing of social science research and development, February 12-16, 1974, cited by Rhee, p. 189.46Government and business efforts to promote tranquil labour relations have been aided by the rapidpace of industrialization in South Korea. The expansion of industry and inter-industry sectoral shifts haveoccurred swiftly. In the space of two decades, Korea went from an economy where manufacturing accountedfor 13.4 percent of GNP in 1966, to 33.4 percent in 1985. 19 During that same period, the share of lightmanufacturing fell from 59.5 percent of total manufacturing output in 1971 to 38.1 percent in 1984. 180 Theshare of heavy and chemical industries increased from 40.5 to 61.9 percent between 1971 and 1984. 181The number of "wage workers" increased from 2.4 million in 1963 to 8.1 million in 1985. 182 This meant anumber of things for the Korean labour movement. In the 1960s much of the labour force was comprisedof first generation industrial workers to whom collective action was a new concept. ms Although labour lawswere less restrictive in the 1960s, workers did not have the experience to use legal protection to their benefit.As Koo notes, unlike many European countries, Korea lacked a strong artisan heritage that would help giveworkers a sense of collective identity in the factory setting.'m They came as rural migrants who had knownonly farm life prior to their "proletarianization".As workers became more aware of their rights and their exploitation in the 1970s, they were facedwith other obstacles to collective action. The state measures outlined above were only one part of this. Lightmanufacturing, the sector first emphasized in Korea's industrialization drive, employed a large number offemale workers. These young women had the greatest cause for dispute, but the least power to articulate179Koo, "Farm to Factory," p. 672.18°Amsden, p. 58.181 md."2Koo, "Farm to Factory," p. 672.' 83Choi, p. 89.184Koo, "Farm to Factory," p. 677.47their grievances. 25 According to Deyo, the impotency of female manufacturing workers was due to their"low skill levels, low wages, employment insecurity, lack of career mobility, high levels of turnover and lackof attachment to work groups or firms." 186 With the heavy and chemical industry drive in the 1970s, skilledpositions increased to the point where there was even a shortage of qualified workers. The skill requirementsof these jobs meant that wages were higher and turn-over rates lower. The majority of heavy manufacturingworkers were men who had greater capacity to challenge management and government given their high skilland wage levels, relative job security and support from working class communities. 187 Even though theshare of light manufacturing decreased, it still remained as an important part of the economy. Korea's rapidindustrialization and simultaneous commitment to different industrial sectors created a "proletarian population[with] greater heterogeneity and internal status differentiation than its European counterparts...." mEmployers exploited this heterogeneity, turning white collar workers against blue, male against female andso on. 189In spite of the odds, female industrial workers became "the torchbearers of the labour movement"in the 1970s. 19° One of the best examples of their courage is their effort to establish an autonomous unionat Dongil Trading Co. in 1972. 191 The company-sympathetic union was dominated by male workers in'Female workers generally receive lower wages (44.5% of male wages in 1980), work longer hours (241/mo. versus 231/mo.),and labour in worse conditions than their male counterparts. Amsden, p. 204 and Rauenhorst, p. 332. Choi describes theconditions at Bando Trading Co. in the 1970s (p. 125).'Fredric C. Deyo, Beneath the Miracle: Labour Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1989), pp. 8, 174.18 7 Ibid., pp. 196-206.188Koo, "Farm to Factory," p. 674.189Jeong Taik Lee, p. 142; and Choi, p. 95.9°Rauenhorst, p. 333."'For a detailed account, see Choi, pp. 136-39; Ogle, Dissent, pp. 84-86 and Sohn pp. 136-40.48supervisory positions. Yet the woman workers managed to get one of their number elected as the first femalepresident of a union in Korea. They met with incredible opposition from their male colleagues, managementand police. They faced dismissal, harassment, bribery and beatings. For some time these women wouldnot yield, but the forces united against them proved to be too much and the union was once again cooptedby the company. Nevertheless, this is just one illustration of the efforts of women to protect their jobs andtheir rights. They may not have been motivated by radical ideologies, but they were progressive in that theychose to oppose the unfairness inherent in the development model and the traditional culture.Given the conditions cited by Deyo which rendered female labourers relatively powerless, their protestwas not as system-threatening and more easily contained than that of heavy industry workers. Yet theseworkers also began to discover the fragility of their position in the late 1970s and early 1980s. With highinflation rates in the late 1970s and the stabilization measures undertaken by the Chun regime, workersexperienced a drop in real income and many firms were delinquent in the payment of wages.'" Economicinstability and the spread of discontent in the labour force pressed the state to respond. According to JeongTaik Lee, "limited options for accommodation of interest of the working class predisposed the state to fall backmore upon coercive measures for labour repression."'" This was only a stop-gap measure as discontentboiled beneath the surface and workers began to identify more closely with those in other industries despitestate and management efforts to the contrary.The Korean formula for a quiescent labour force was rhetoric plus repression plus the rapid rate ofdevelopment. This prescription was derived from a development model which featured state intervention, aclose government-business relationship and rapid industrialization driven by growth concerns rather than192Deyo, "State and Labour," p. 196.neong Taik Lee, p. 151.49equity. South Korea's developmental regimes tried to manipulate traditional culture in order to command theloyalty and sacrifice of workers. They were aided in this goal by a real fear of communist North Korea andthe fact that the speed of development kept workers disoriented for a number of years. When the rhetoricfailed and workers demanded some substance in terms of wages, conditions and job security, state andmanagement resorted to repression. The ultimate failure of this formula was clearly revealed by the explosionof labour unrest in 1987.The Student Movement In light of the theoretical material discussed in chapter two, one would expect students to be moreinclined to protest than workers because: (1) They do not play a central role in the development process andtherefore are not faced with the same measures of cooptation and coercion; and (2) They are better placedto see the contradictions in the existing social configuration and are not as susceptible to the legitimationideologies of the political system. The withdrawal of student support will not significantly disrupt therealization of developmental goals unless: (1) They are able to inspire discontent with established structuresamong the middle and working classes; or (2) Student alienation becomes so extensive that there is difficultyfinding recruits to fill white collar, managerial and technical positions. If this occurs, the student movementwill demand more attention from the state than one would expect for a 'peripheral' conflict.Although only a minority of Korean university students consistently participate in protest activity, theirinfluence is far greater than their numbers. The student movement has been able to extend beyond thebounds of the university by linking up with the labour movement and other opposition groups. It has alsodone much to make the public aware of the disparity between economic and political development. In fact,50the student movement has been able to set the pace for other movements. 194 The economic establishmentand civil service have not yet experienced any real difficulty in finding recruits among university graduates,even the activists may finally compromise in order to find employment. Nevertheless, a significant numberof former student activists continue to challenge the regime--actively by becoming opposition politicians orforming dissident organizations, or passively by withholding their political allegiance from the ruling regimeand its economic policies. While this latent dissent may not offer a direct challenge to established structures,it exists as a reserve force that may be pressed into action by some compelling issue.If student protest was isolated to university campuses, by issue and location, then perhaps it wouldreceive less attention from the public and the state. However, as student activists have demonstrated theircapacity to extend beyond these bounds, they have presented a real threat to prevailing structures. Korea'sdevelopmental regimes have responded with measures similar to those used to suppress the labourmovement. Since the development model has different implications for these two movements, thesemeasures have not had the same effect. Even when the Park and Chun regimes succeeded in containingstudent demonstrations within the physical boundaries of the campus, the focus of student dissent hascontinued to be much broader. Therein lies its insurrectionary potential. Unlike workers whose grievanceshave, for the most part, been confined to labour issues, students have focused on the political failings ofKorea's path of development. An uneven development pattern has created space for student dissent.Students are placed in a position to see the contradictions of the Korean model more clearly thanare many other groups in Korean society. They recognize the fact that the state plays a major role in thecreation of those contradictions with its emphasis on industrialization and neglect of political development andsocial equity. Their education, formal and informal, provides them with the ideological tools to counter state194Sohn, Authoritarianism, p. 116; and Manwoo Lee, p. 7.51rhetoric which attempts to justify and legitimate this model. 195 This is only one of the reasons why thestudent movement is more active than the labour movement. Students do not have to overcome theformidable state-business alliance in order to engage in collective action. Furthermore the pace ofdevelopment has not been as disorienting or divisive to the student movement. Although students facerepression, it is not as extensive or as effective as that which the workers face.The measures used by Park and Chun against the students were not unlike those used againstworkers. They ran the whole gamut from appeals for patriotic support to attack by tear gas squads.Nevertheless, one can detect a greater reluctance to use violence and a tendency toward restraint whendealing with students. Park wavered between restrictive Presidential Emergency Measure's andconciliation. 196 When students organized demonstrations against the Yushin constitution in October 1973,the government responded by arresting and expelling hundreds. 197 In an effort to appear as the benevolentdictator, Park released and reinstated many of these students a short time later. m The desired effect wasnot achieved. Students continued to oppose the regime even though the conditions of PEM's 1 and 2 madeit difficult to muster massive demonstrations. With the failure of conciliation, Park continued to dispensePEM's as occasion warranted. The disruptive capacity of the students is demonstrated by the fact that PEM4 was specifically designed to emasculate a student organization--the National Federation of DemocraticYouth and Students.'"195Habermas, "Conditions," p. 121.'Sohn, Authoritarianism, p. 65.197Ibid., p. 66."elbid., p. 67.199/bid., p. 70. See also Young Whan Kihl, Politics and Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in Contest (Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress, 1984), p. 63.52The suppression of student activists became particularly pressing given their proclivity to unite withother dissident organizations and their attention to the plight of workers (this was sparked by the Chun TaeII suicide). Students began, more and more, to see democracy in terms of social justice. m They alsobegan to turn to literature from the left in their search for how this might be achieved. Liberal democraticinstitutions seemed powerless in the face of an authoritarian regime like Park's. The influence of this kindof thinking increased steadily throughout the seventies, but it might have remained moderate if not for Chun'spolitical manoeuvres and the brutal suppression of the Kwangju Uprising. Nineteen-eighty has been referredto as "the last year of political romanticism" for students. 201 Activists lost their remaining faith in the powerof liberal philosophy and began to cleave to more radical formulas for the realization of social justice.Given the bloody inauguration of the Chun administration, students distrusted any efforts atconciliation from the outset. It appears that the regime failed to fully appreciate the extent of their alienation.When it became clear that repression was not working, Chun tried to win the students through moderationin the form of the 1984 Campus Autonomy Policy. Under this policy, 350 student activists were released fromprison and 1,363 expelled students were allowed to return to their universities 2 02 The police and ANSPpresence on campus was greatly reduced and student government was allowed to operate freely. Contraryto plan, the voice of moderation did not prevail on campus. Militant students were able to use the newopenness to strengthen their position and fan the flames of opposition to the regime. m Within a fewmSohn, Authoritarianism, pp. 38, 109-10, 171, 182-83.a"Pharis Harvey, a panel discussant on "Soldiers and Students in South Korea: Patterns of Politicization and Confrontation," at1986 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 30 August 1986, cited by Wonmo Dong,"University Students in South Korean Politics: Patterns of Radicalization in the 1980s," Journal of International Affairs  40 (Winter-Spring 1987):245.2°2Dong, "University Students," p. 241.203 /bid., and Manwoo Lee p. 9.53months, the Chun regime returned to the 'rod of repression' by sending security agents and police back ontocampuses to break dissident organizations. The number of expulsions and arrests mounted. By 1986, over85 percent of political prisoners were students and between 1980 and 1987 1,579 students wereexpelled 204 Following the Asian games in 1986, 8,000 riot police mounted a four day seige against studentactivists at Konkuk University. The incident ended with the arrest of 1,525 students. 205The government's incomplete authority over the campus environment has hindered efforts tosuppress the student movement. Although Korea's national universities have been referred to as"government agencies" because their presidents are appointed by the Ministry of Education and they dependon the state for funding, even these campuses have not been able to erase student autonomy. 206 This isdue to the nature of the university experience as much as anything else. University studies do not make thesame demands on time, or regiment students in the same way as industrial labour does workers. In spiteof the fact that many of Korea's universities are heavily dependent on the state, they are not committed tothe model of development in the same manner as the chaebol. They take their mandate to educate seriously.University administrations have not formed a partnership with the state comparable to that between theregime and conglomerates. Moreover, many of Korea's major universities, Yonsei, Korea, Hanyang andSogang to name just a few, are private universities. Their administrations are not as easily cowed bygovernment decrees.'"The state does try to exercise control over university administrations, but many administrators and2°4Myung Hyun Cho, "The New Student Movement in Korea: Emerging Patterns of Ideological Orientation in the 1980's," KoreaObserver 20 (September 1989)97; and C.I. Eugene Kim, "South Korea in 1986: Preparing for a Power Transition," Asian Surve y27 (January 1987):68.205C.I. Eugene Kim, "1986," p. 68.2°6W.W. Boyer and N.E. Boyer, "Democratization of South Korea's National Universities," Korean Studies 15 (1991):85-86.207Dong, "University Students," p. 243.54faculty maintain a somewhat guarded support of the students. They have been reluctant to cooperate withstate efforts to combat the movement. In 1975, the presidents of Korea and Sogang universities resignedto denounce the state's heavy-handed measures 2 08 Chun also had some difficulty in getting universityadministrators to implement his policies. m In 1985 the president of Seoul National University was firedwhen he refused to expel students who had participated in the occupation of the U.S. Information ServicesLibrary in 1985.2" In spite of the emphasis on economic 'modernization', universities retain a broadervision of their purpose than to simply turn out technocrats and engineers in pursuit of this narrow goal.University professors are potential allies in anti-government remonstrance. Among them are someof the regime's greatest partisans and most ardent critics. Those who have supported the Park and Chunadministrations have often been attached to government funded research institutes which dispense the kindof technocratic expertise that is the foundation of Korea's development model. The critics have been moreconcerned with democracy, equity and social justice--not at some distant future time but in Korea's presentcircumstances.Professors have also suffered for their convictions by losing their jobs and even throughimprisonment. Although they have tended to be more patient and less idealistic than their students, theircensure of the regime has bolstered the student movement.2°BSohn, Authoritarianism, p. 223, note 130 and p. 83.2139Dong, "University Students," p. 243.210C.I. Eugene Kim, "South Korea in 1985: An Eventful Year Amidst Uncertainty," Asian Survey 26 (January 1986):71.55In 1986, over two hundred professors signed a declaration which included the following statement:The harder the political oppression, the more furious the protest movements of students.We do not accept the political, tactical measures which excessively blame radical actions ofour students without analysing in depth the reasons for their radicalism. We believe that,in reality, the renewal of our society is the best remedy for the radicalism?"Over the years, dissident professors, and other intellectuals have served as ideological gurus for the studentmovement. In the late 1970s and 1980s students turned to more radical alternatives which went beyond thecritique offered by these dissidents. Hein Kim relates the story of "a professor highly regarded for his leftistsympathies a decade ago now finds himself branded as a 'neo-conservative' by his graduate students." 212Even when the support of faculty and administrators has not been forthcoming, the fact that students are notas circumscribed as workers by the demands of development has made it more difficult for them to berepressed.Student government is another area in which the government has been unable to make lasting in-roads. Although radicals may have been effectively barred from holding positions at certain periods of time,they have created their own parallel organizations underground. The strength of this underground activitywas demonstrated in 1984 with the Campus Autonomy Policy. Within a very short time of the policy beinginaugurated, student government and study circles were controlled by "activists"? 13 They established theNational Federation of Student Associations (Chonhaknyon) in 1985 with the Sanmintu (Struggle Committeefor the Liberation of the Masses, the Attainment of Democracy and the Unification of the Nation) as its radical211" Uri ui tuisuil tasi hanpon palkinda," ("We Declare Once Again"), English translation from "Japan Emergency Christian ConferenceOn Korean Problems," Korea Communique/Bulletin,  no. 26 (July 1986), cited by Dong, "University Students," p. 251.212Hein Kim, "Campus Radicals Face the Ideological Gap," FEER, September 8, 1988, p. 92.213Dong, "University Students," p. 241.56"political arm".214 It is a credit to the resilience of student collective action that, when the government triedto eliminate this organization, two more militant underground organizations: the Chamintu (Committee for theAnti-U.S. Struggle for Independence and the Anti-Fascist Struggle for Democracy) and the Minmintu (StruggleCommittee Against Imperialism, the Military and Fascism and for the Nation and Democracy) rose up in itsstead 2 15The grassroots of student organization are study circles. Circles are a ubiquitous phenomenon onuniversity campuses and they feature everything from calligraphy to hang gliding. They provide one of themain social outlets for students and also lend their organizational resources to the student movement. Anumber of underground circles exist for the sole purpose of studying insurgent literature and initiating anti-government protest. They have developed sophisticated tactics to "indoctrinate" new members.m Seniormembers target new students from their home provinces and expose them to alternative ideologies. This isparticularly effective as these students are experiencing the disorienting effects of life away from home andthey trust someone who is from their area. 217 The small size of circles, their number and the difficulty ofdistinguishing between the moderate and the militant makes the suppression of anti-government organizationsa formidable task.In contrast to the workers who have been bombarded with developmental rhetoric and have not hadas ready access to alternative ideologies, students have benefited from access to ideological tools that canbe used against the regime. What was unavailable through Korea's universities became available from2uDong outlines three central objectives of Sanmintu: (1) "promotion of labour student solidarity", (2) "political action against theChun regime", (3) "measured direct actions and assaults on some visible symbolic targets of American and other foreign investmentinterest in Korea." "University Students," pp. 243-44.2151bid., p. 247 and Cho, pp. 101-2.216Pyon Chun Sop, "Student Dissent Drifts Towards Extremism," FEER, July 9, 1987, p. 36.217See Hein Kim, "Campus Radicals," p. 92.57students going abroad to study. Frustration with government intransigence and the failure of democraticliberalism to stand up in the face of authoritarianism have led many students to seek solutions in more radicalsociopolitical thought, including dependency theory, international structuralist theories, the writings of theFrankfurt school and Marxist-Leninism. 218 The works of Kim II Sung have even found their way into SouthKorea's underground study circles. The influence of this literature cannot be ignored. Ahn cites a survey thatreveals the extent to which this "extra-curricular reading" has shaped the political attitudes of universitystudents.m While moderate ideologies claimed the sentiments of the majority of students to the end ofthe 1970s, the Kwangju incident did more to advance the spread of leftist thought than uninterruptedbroadcasts from North Korea could have accomplished in a decade. Those students who continued to cleaveto moderate views could find little to defend such a stand and thus their influence was weakened.Concern for human rights, democracy, and social equity have been consistent features of the studentmovement, but as Sohn notes, "the openness of [these] concepts" has led to a "blurring" of liberal andsocialist theories 2 20 The sway of leftist theories is evident in the rhetoric of the Sanmintu, Chamintu, andMinmintu—their names alone are a testimony of this. Words like fascist, neo-colonialist, imperialist, and anti-people (minjung) became common fare in student condemnations of the Park and especially Chun regimes.Despite familiar government attempts to discredit the movement by raising the spectre of the North Koreanthreat, student access to ideological alternatives remained as a formidable tool to counter regime rhetoric.As long as only a minority of students, who could be marginalized effectively, adhered to leftistmlan Buruma, "Right This Way for the Demonstration of the Day," FEER January 14, 1987, p. 96 and "Campus Radicals," p. 91.219Ahn Chung-Si, "Political Culture and Political Socialization of the Post-War Generation in South Korea," Korea Journal (May1988):18. This survey, which was administered by a Seoul National University campus paper in August 1985, indicated the sourcesthat influence student thinking: "1) extra curricula reading of booklets (43.5%), 2) discussions with peer groups (26.8%), 3) throughparents (10.3%), 4) religion (9.3%), 5) professors (2.6%) and 6) mass media (2.2%)."22°Sohn, Authoritarianism, p. 172.58ideologies they would not cause much concern. What Park and Chun did not fully realize was that repressionwas not the most effective means of ensuring that this would be the case. In fact it helped to reconfirm theneed for an extra-institutional opposition. Although only 5-8 percent of students are activists and 1-2 percentextremists, their influence on the thoughts of their fellow students surpasses their numbers. 221 Accordingto a 1982 survey cited by Ahn, 80.8 percent of students see communism as unrealistic but containing positiveaspects.222 This indicates that Korea's university students have the ability to see things in terms other thanblack and white; it is not simply a matter of choosing between an authoritarian capitalist regime andcommunism. Given the government propensity to use violence, students, and the public, have been willingto tolerate extreme action and ideologies on the part of radicals. Moderate students have even swelled theranks of the activists on occasions when the actions of the government have been particularly vexatious.Another noteworthy feature of the student movement is the high profile of students from eliteuniversities. Parallels with history notwithstanding, this is significant for a number of reasons. 223 It indicatesthat the nascent middle class objects to Korea's model; dissent is not merely a function of deprivation.Graduates from elite universities generally do not experience difficulty in finding a place within establishedinstitutions, if they are willing to forsake their radical ways (unless they have been blacklisted, jailed, orexpelled). Nevertheless, their discontent with the model is not completely erased once they receive their firstpay cheque. As students, they protest because they see the disparity between political and economicdevelopment. In the 1970s, this was made all the more apparent because they were able to contrast it with22' Hein Kim cites figures of 1 to 8 percent for radicals and 4 to 5 percent for "active sympathizers". "Still on the Streets," FEER,June 2, 1988, p. 36. John McBeth says that 5 percent of students are activists and 1 to 2 percent are pro-communist. "The ShortMarch from Moderation to Radicalism," FEER, January 15, 1987, p. 31.222Koh Young-bok, "Consciousness and Thought of Korean University Students," Contemporary Society (Spring 1982):31-35, citedby Ahn, p. 11.2See Ensor "Echoes of Confucianism," p. 35.59the ideals of liberal democracy that they were being taught by their professors. When they began to doubtthe power of this school of thought, they began to measure Korea against more revolutionary ideologies.These students protest, not only because they witness the abysmal lack of fit between the ideal andthe real, but also because they are barred from extensive participation in the political system. Even thoughthe Korean education system gives strong emphasis to humanities and social sciences, these graduates, justlike their technical counterparts, are expected to find employment within the economic establishment or abureaucracy with a strong technocratic mind set. In other words, the pattern of development narrows theirrange of career choices and does not allow them to achieve the status that they feel they have becomequalified for. This is particularly galling when graduates from military academies fill prominent positions.Students question the rationale of social and political institutions that teach them a democratic-egalitarian ideal and yet impede the actualization of that ideal. Surveys show that Korean university studentsare willing to accept status differentiation if it has been achieved through hard work and ability, on the basisof equal opportunity.224 As Korean society is presently constituted, they see the achievement of status andpower as a function of connections not merit and they resent the need to conform in order to rise withinexisting structures. Most graduates comply because they feel they have no choice. A minority refuse, buttheir lives are spent on the margins, unable to find employment commensurate with their educationalachievements.Korea's developmental regimes have not necessarily been aided by the pace of industrialization inthe suppression of the student movement. Although universities have felt the effects of rapid economicdevelopment in an increase in the number of students and the expansion of science and commerce faculties,22`Richard W. Wilson, "Wellsprings of Discontent: Sources of Dissent in South Korean Student Values: Asian Survey 28 (October1988):1072-3.60it has not had as disruptive an impact on student organization as it has had on labour. 23 The socialscience faculties are still the largest and these students are the most inclined to protest. 226 The studentmovement has experienced more continuity and fewer divisions.The Park and Chun regimes tried to starve the movement by disconnecting it from the generalstudent body and society as a whole. A number of methods were employed to this end: painting protestorsas pro-communist ideological extremists, using more overt forms of repression--expulsion from university,arrest, imprisonment and police beatings, and blacklisting them so they could not return to university studiesor find anything but menial employment. These measures had an effect, but it was not always that whichthe government desired. The students gained a good deal of sympathy for their sacrifice. After all, theyalmost always focused on national rather than student issues. This gave them an advantage over workerswho tended to highlight labour specific grievances. The sincerity of the student concern with the lack ofpolitical development and social equity struck a respondent chord with the general public even though thisdid not always translate into open support. Those students who could not return to mainstream society afterbeing blacklisted became part of a growing counter-culture of dissent. 227 As the numbers of these politicallyostracized dissidents has increased, so has the sophistication of their tactics and their ideological critique.Students have proven their ability to form ties with other protest groups in spite of preventativegovernment efforts. They have always been conspicuous members of national opposition organizations--theNational Congress for the Restoration of Democracy in the 1970s and the People's Coalition for Democracy225In 1960, there were 101,000 post secondary students. This number increased to 238,000 in 1975 and 1,260,000 in 1985.Steinberg, p. 81, Table 7.1. By 1984, 27 percent of students were enrolled in the social sciences, 21.3 percent in engineering,12.5 percent in linguistics and literature 11.1 percent in education and 9.4 percent in natural sciences, arts, medical sciences,agriculture and humanities. Social Indicators in Korea, 1985,  cited by D.S. MacDonald, The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 87-88. See also p. 91.226See Sohn, Authoritarianism, pp. 35, 65 for examples of protest activity of students in the social sciences.21/Hein Kim, "Campus Radicals," p. 91. See also Lie, p. 43.61and Reunification in the 1980s. In these organizations, they have laboured with dissident religious groups,intellectuals, journalists, opposition politicians and even workers. Student initiatives to unite and rally workershave caused the government particular alarm. Students began by expressing sympathy for workers in theirdemonstrations; later they went to work in factories. If discovered, they were immediately dismissed andpossibly faced more severe action. In 1985, 321 "disguised" workers were fired. 228 Between January andMay 1986, 350 were fired.229 An anti-government rally held in Inchon in 1986 featured the combinedprotest of large numbers of students and workers and demonstrated the success of these efforts in spite ofgovernment suppression.m All of this was very disturbing for Korea's developmental regimes; they wereunable to contain the student movement within safe bounds.It is not only the government that has hindered the full blossoming of a student-labour coalition.There are a number of obstacles to overcome including the traditional low regard of labour. This continuesto manifest itself in the 'low' language that managers and white collar workers--even newly recruited universitygraduates--use when speaking to older, blue collar workers 2 31 These attitudes have made workerssuspicious of activist students, as have their radical ideologies. Until the mid-1980s, only a small core ofmilitant workers were willing to move as far left as the radical students. Nonetheless, bonds have developedand the regime has not been able to reverse the process. Because workers were more easily controlled thanstudents, much of the initiative for this 'united front' has come from the student movement. Since 1987,workers have become a more active party in anti-establish protest and it increasingly bears the imprint of their228Dong, "University Students," p. 249.228 Ibid.23°Ibid., p. 250.23' Mark Clifford, "Drudges with Grudges," FEER June 1, 1989, p. 37.62interests.The student movement is often described as having become ritualized. m This reflects regimeefforts to contain it and student recognition that the cost of going beyond the parameters set can be verygreat (expulsion, arrest, beating, blacklisting and sometimes even death). At times they have been contentto protest within the bounds of the university--they are still visible and their rejection of authoritariandevelopmental regimes remains apparent. 2" Like water lapping on a rock, they have hoped to wear downregime intransigence and popular apathy through daily demonstrations. There have been many times whenmilitant students have burst beyond these bounds, in 1980 and 1987 for example. This potential makes thestudent movement a force that must be dealt with.Summary The fact that the Korean development model has not had the same effect on the labour and studentmovements explains much of their variation in level of activity. Students have had more ideological toolsavailable to explain the contradictions of a model that emphasizes economics and neglects political and socialdevelopment. This has also given them more defence against regime developmental rhetoric. Students arealso not as easily repressed because they have more autonomy in the organization of their activity and time.They are not faced with the same formidable coalition of government and business. They even receiveguarded support from administrators and professors. Moreover, the pace of development has not had thesame disruptive effect on student organization as it has on labour. The first generation of industrial workerswere pulled from their farms with little experience in collective action. Rapid development created aheterogenous work force that could be manipulated by business and the state. While the numbers ofJohn McBeth, "Radicals: Seen Through A Screen Darkly," FEER. September 8, 1988, p. 71.233Buruma, "Right This Way," p. 36.63students have increased dramatically, they have experienced more continuity in organization. When Koreanyouth enter into university, they are incorporated into organizations such as study circles that are student-controlled whereas workers enter factories and labour organizations that are dominated by management withstate back-up. 2  In sum, these two groups face a different set of inducements and constraints as a resultof their different positions in the development process.''`Although student protest is sometimes described as a generational challenge, this does not explain why young workers of thesame generation do not match the students in activism. Braungart cites "different social and cultural positions" as the source ofdissimilar mobilization patterns within the same generation. Richard G. Braungart, "Historical Generations and Youth Movements:A Theoretical Perspective," in Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change, vol. 6, eds., Richard E. Ratcliff and LouisKriesberg (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, 1984), p. 118. In Korea, these different social positions are a consequence, at leastin part, of the model of development. See Braungart, pp. 115-19.64V. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE MODELAs the 1980s progressed, the stress on the foundations of the Korean development model becameincreasing evident. Inducements and constraints to worker and student collective action changed as themodel evolved. The consequences of rapid development were manifest in high inflation rates, elusivecomparative advantage and rising expectations for more equal distribution of the fruits of development. Thegovernment-business relationship began to show signs of strain and the authoritarian state faced thechallenge of popular groups demanding democratization. The legacy of Kwangju refused to die; in spite ofa good economic record, the Chun regime could not shake its image as a bloody dictatorship. The studentsassumed the major responsibility for defying the regime and, as indicated in the last chapter, they refusedto be swayed by either propitiation or repression.Another notable feature of the 1980s was the growing force of labour dissent. Male heavy industryworkers began to take up the torch from their light industry female colleagues. Heavy industry workers, manyof whom were employed by chaebol, were once pacified by their relatively privileged position. m The Chunregime's stabilization measures proved that even the formerly privileged were not immune to the demandsof growth-first political economics. As a result of stabilization measures that included chaebol mergers, realwages fell and many lost their jobs.mThese problems were compounded by the fact that South Korea was having difficulty developing acomparative advantage in these industries 2 37 Much of the growth that had occurred was due togovernment subsidies and protection. When the Chun regime tried to rationalize chaebol activity, some ofOgle, Dissent, p. 111. Clifford discusses the change in attitude of shipyard workers in the 1980s. "Drudges,' p. 37.236Cumings, "Origins and Development," p. 80. See also Haggard and Moon, p. 223.237Cumings, "Origins and Development: p. 79.65these subsidies were retracted. The government had to backtrack when it became clear that it did not havethe latitude to discipline these conglomerates with impunity."' Yet, it could not continue to subsidize themat the same inflationary levels as the Park regime. It was apparent that the government-business relationshiphad changed. These were not the same firms that had been manipulated into supporting Park's developmentobjectives in 1961. They had grown far beyond that, to the extent that it was questionable whether the statewas still firmly leading development.Stabilization measures may have helped to put the Korean economy back on track, but they alsoincreased the autonomy of business. The privatization of Korea's commercial banks made it easier forbusinesses to obtain credit without first having to meet all of the regime's specifications. Nevertheless, theBank of Korea and Ministry of Finance still set the standard for commercial banks. Real financial autonomycame from income obtained by speculating in real estate and the curb market."'It became evident, not only to the state, but to the public as well, that Korea Inc. had entered a newphase. The rhetoric of 'all for development and development for all' fell flat in the face of giant conglomeratesthat were obviously more concerned with their own financial aggrandizement than that of the nation. Asworker consciousness evolved, they chafed at the lopsided nature of national sacrifice. In their eyes, theydid all the sacrificing, while business did all the developing. Workers denounced the conspicuousconsumption of the business class and its intimate relationship with government. Their anger was alsoincreasingly directed toward that state as they realized its role in facilitating their exploitation.This change in labour consciousness was aided by the activity of other dissident groups, particularlythe students, among industrial workers. Militant workers realized that directing their demands toward238Haggard and Moon, p. 221.238Bello and Rosenfeld, p. 69; Haggard and Moon, p. 228; and Hamilton, Industrialization, pp. 47-48.66management was futile when their position was a consequence of the whole political and economicsystem 240 The irony is that when the workers became more politicized and directed their protest towardthe state, it no longer had a strong capacity to discipline business. Two and a half decades of support hadundercut its autonomy. 241 This is not to say that the state lost its leverage completely but that businessdeveloped considerable leverage of its own.The 1985 National Assembly elections gave the opposition movement a great boost. In spite ofmanipulation on the part of the ruling regime, opposition parties were able to capture 116 of 276 seats. Theruling Democratic Justice Party won only 35.3 percent of the popular vote' Gerrymandering of theAssembly meant that this did not translate into opposition seats; nonetheless, it was a significant 'victory'.The democracy movement began to coalesce around the issue of amending the constitution to allow for directelection of the president. The ruling party favoured a parliamentary system. Chun tried to counter thegrowing power of the democracy movement by entering into constitutional talks with opposition parties.Political restrictions placed the major opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung on the side-lines, but they managed to exert their influence through the back door. Much to their chagrin the nominalhead of the New Korea Democratic Party, Lee Minwoo, did not prove to be as pliable as they had assumed.In December 1986, he proposed a package of compromise with the ruling DJP.243 This set off a drive tooust him and put Kim Young Sam at the head of the party. In the end, Kim Young Sam established a newparty. In spite of these disruptions, the opposition parties managed to participate with the National Coalition2400gle, Dissent, p. 158.241 Rhys Jenkins, "The Political Economy of Industrialization: A Comparison of Latin American and East Asian Newly IndustrializingCountries," Development and Change  22 (April 19911:224.242See Hong Nack Kim and Sunki Choe, "Urbanization and Voting Patterns in South Korean Parliamentary Elections," in PoliticalChange, p. 165, Table 8.24See Manwoo Lee, pp. 23-26.67for a Democratic Constitution in a petition drive in support of direct presidential elections.In April 1987, President Chun announced that constitutional talks would be suspended because ofthe difficulty of working with a divided opposition party. This threw fuel on the flames of popular resentment.The initiative for the constitutional drive moved from the hands of the opposition parties to extra-institutionalgroups. Student activists, who realized that their progressive radicalization had isolated them from themainstream of the movement, moderated their demands in order to create a united front against theregime?` The deaths of two students at the hands of police and Chun's naming a former general who hadbeen involved in the 1980 coup, Roh Tae Woo, as his successor acted as catalysts to ignite the latentdiscontent among the middle class. They came out on the streets to cheer on demonstrators?3 On June26, students from 69 of 114 colleges and university participated in a nation-wide peace march which involvedover 200,000 citizens. 246When the extent of popular alienation became clear, repression ceased to be a viable option.According to Manwoo Lee, the military refused to participate in action against the Korean public. 247 Rohdecided on a 'grand compromise' which came in the form of an eight-point democratization plan announcedon June 29, 1987. This included many of the demands of the democracy movement: direct presidentialelections, the release of political prisoners, and the lifting of restrictions on freedoms of speech andassembly. 248 A presidential election was held in December 1987. Roh emerged as the victor after the244Wonmo Dong, "Student Activism and the Presidential Politics of 1987," in Political Change, p. 175.245Sungjoo Han, "South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratization," Asian Survey 28 (January 1988)54.24Dong, "Student Activism," p. 178.247Manwoo Lee, p. 39.248For details see Democratic Justice Party, Prosperity, vol. 6, July 1987 cited by Manwoo Lee, appendix 1, pp. 145-48 and Kihl,"South Korea's Search," pp. 3-21.68major opposition party failed to unite around a single leader who had a broad constituency. Neither of theKims seemed to fit the bill. 249 The real victory came in April 1988 when opposition parties claimed amajority of seats in the National Assembly, even though the DJP ruled by a plurality. 2wRoh's democratization package represented a serious modification of the development model.Korea's strong developmental state was significantly weakened. By strengthening civil liberties and liftingrestrictions on the freedom of the press, new channels were opened to the public to influence policy making.With the revision of election law, political candidates became more responsible to their constituents. Theycould not simply rely on gerrymandering to ensure their seats. Formerly, there were two seats in eachconstituency and the ruling party would usually win the second if not the first. In 1987 single member districtsmade the election more competitive. In order to win and maintain seats, assemblymen of all stripes had tobecome politicians. As their constituents entreated them to champion local interests, they pressured thebureaucracy to deliver.With an opposition majority in the assembly, the civil service lost its former autonomy. Powerhouseministries like the MOF, MCI and EPB could not act with the same freedom, safely shielded from thedemands of the public. Other ministries, such as the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Labour, whoseconcerns had been placed as a low priority, developed more clout in the determination of policy. Signs ofthis came as early as March 1987, when the MOA helped push through an extensive farm debt relief programin spite of the resistance of the EPB and MOF 2 51 At the end of the year, a similar scenario was playedout with grain prices. The MOF and the EPB favoured a 7-8 percent increase, but a more generous 14mManwoo Lee, pp. 46-65.2*The opposition parties won 169 seats while the DJ^only 125. See Manwoo Lee, p. 103, and Steinberg, p. 67.251 1-laggard and Moon, p. 232.69percent increase was implemented. Roh favoured the more popular option. 252 The Korean governmentcould no longer tread the path of growth first, ignoring equity until some undetermined time. The Rohadministration felt a need to respond to this; the 1988 minimum wage law is another example.'" Welfarepolicies acquired more importance in a more open political environment. 254 The Roh regime has turnedto these to legitimize its continued intervention in the economy as the security threat has lost some of itsutility.What has all of this meant for Korea's social movements? Roh's democratization plan was a politicalmove which failed to address many of the demands of workers. What it did do was signal a break inrepression. Workers took advantage of the new spirit of liberalism to press their demands. Between thesummer of 1987 and the end of 1989, over 7,100 labour disputes occurred. 255 By the summer of 1988,there were 2,799 new unions, with 586,167 new members. 256 A two month strike by 20,000 shipyardworkers at Hyundai Heavy Industries in the fall of 1987 is one example of the magnitude of labour protestduring this period. While workers initially made their traditional demands for higher wages, better conditionsand more freedom of organization, it was not long before their protest assumed a political tone. 2" StrikingDaewoo workers denounced company contributions to Roh's 1987 presidential campaign.38 Thefoundation for this politicization had been laid in the 1970s. For some years, it was only the most militant252Mark Clifford, "A Man for Most Seasons," FEER, December 3, 1987, p. 96.255See Mark Clifford, "The Price of Democracy," FEER, January 28, 1988, p. 60.254Mark Clifford, "Whose in Charge Here?" FEER, November 23, 1988, p. 84.255Bello and Rosenfeld, p. 41; and Mark Clifford, "Fi, of Democracy," FEER August 20, 1987, p. 53.2550gle, Dissent, p. 115.257Clifford, "Drudges," p. 36.258Mark Clifford "Spring Offensive Launched," FEER, April 28, 1988, p. 67.70workers who concentrated on the connection between their immediate conditions and the interplay of politicaland economic structures. In the early 1980s 'political' unionism began to gain more adherents. When thedam broke loose in 1987, a political critique was soon wedded with traditional grievances.In keeping with political reform, the government made it clear that it would no longer intervene indisputes on the side of management." The government amended the labour law in October of 1987 asa sign of its commitment to the foster more equitable labour-management relations. Although the law is "stillvery restrictive", it opened the possibility for workers to take control of the union movement.' Manyworker-controlled unions have become part of what has been referred to as the minjung or democratic unionmovement.261 These local unions have united to form the Federation of Democratic Labour Unions, anational organization intended to provide an alternative to the FKTU, which is deeply compromised by its pastrelationship with the government. 262In spite of a more relaxed political atmosphere, workers have struggled to establish autonomousunions. Although responses have varied, business has not welcomed these unions with open arms."Employers have resorted to their familiar tactics of trying to coopt workers or beat them into submission.Samsung tried to set up "paper unions" in order to combat the growing power of workers." Rather than259Haggard and Moon, p. 234; and Clifford, "Price of Democracy," 1987, p. 53.269Bret Billet, "South Korea at the Crossroads: An Evolving Democracy or Authoritarianism Revisited?" Asian Survey 30 (March1990):306. Although compulsory arbitration was eliminated, unions are still barred from "political involvement". A cool-off periodand advance notice of a strike are still required under the new labour law. See Haggard and Moon, p. 234; Clifford, "The Priceof Democracy," 1988, p. 61 and "Spring Offensive," p. 66.26' See John McBeth, "Labour Rocks the Boat," FEER, January 1989, p. 65; and Brandt, p. 89.262Billet, p. 306; Mark Clifford, "Labour Strikes Out," FEER, August 27, 1987, pp. 15-16; and Clifford, "The Price of Democracy,"1988, p. 60.263See Ogle, Dissent , chap. 6 for a description of how various businesses have responded to the upsurge in union activity since1987.264Mark Clifford, 'Samsung Under Seige," FEER , December 15, 1988, p. 104.71meet worker demands for autonomous unions, it shut down its shipyard temporarily in 1987. 265 Whatchanged, at least for a short time, was the government's proclivity to stand behind these measures.Bello and Rosenfeld give an illustrative account of attempts by workers at Hyundai Heavy Industriesto establish an independent union. They faced bribery, threats, and beatings by kusadae but persevered.The final defeat came in March 1989 when, in an abrupt about face, the government sent in 14,000 riot policeby land, sea and air to break a major strike. As these authors note: "After a few months of trying to projectthe image of being a neutral arbitrator between capital and labour, the Korean state reverted to its traditionalrole of being the ultimate defender of the chaebol."266As workers have become more politicized, they have increasingly found common cause with thestudents. The student movement has also undergone a major metamorphosis as a result of democratization.In contrast to the labour movement, which was given a major boost by the reforms, the student movementexperienced a challenge to its unity and legitimacy as an anti-government force. Roh's reforms managedto accomplish what years of repression had failed to do--isolate the militant. Although non-activist studentsand many members of society had been dismayed by the movement's radical drift, they tolerated it andempathised because of the activists' commitment and willingness to suffer at the hands of the state. Whenthe government demonstrated a capacity to compromise, those of more moderate opinions felt that continuedextremism would be counter productive. Students have always focused on the lack of progress towarddemocracy. They claim that political authoritarianism contributes to the exploitative nature of economicdevelopment. When it appeared that the regime was finally making a sincere effort at political modernization,students lost their former constituency among the more moderate citizens. Radical influence with the public265Clifford, "Spring Offensive," p. 68.266Bello and Rosenfeld, pp. 41-42.72and on university campuses waned. Demonstrations decreased in size and the number of arrestsmounted 267 Students were no longer protected by public sympathy.Moderate students who focused on university issues were able to defeat candidates fielded by theChondaehyop (National Association of Representatives of University Students) in the November 1989 studentgovernment elections.'" Chondaehyop's sending a student to Pyongyang in June 1989 alarmed citizenswho were willing to tolerate a little pro-North Korea rhetoric in the heat of battle, but felt it was going to farin a climate of reform. One should not leave the impression that student radicals have lost all influence.Following the Roh regime's return to traditional methods of repression in 1989, these activists have onceagain demonstrated their ability to sway the movement and rally support for their stand. Furthermore, theincreasing unemployment of university graduates helps replenish the reservoir of discontent. In 1989,approximately 40.1 percent of university graduates were unemployed.'"Roh's reforms inspired renewed hope among the Korean population that democracy could beachieved. Yet, as Bruce Cumings points out, it is still the state in "negotiation" with military and businesselites that controls the democratization process27° This has been clearly demonstrated by governmentretrenchment in the last two years. The Hyundai incident cited above is just one example of a return to the267In "Labour Strikes, Student Protests Continue Unabated in Korean Cities," Asian Bulletin 15 (June 1990)25, one findsdescriptions of demonstrations of 200 to 500 students in 1989. According to Amnesty International, between 1980 and 1988, 1.61people per day were 'detained for political activity". This number increased to 2.13 in 1988 and 5.26 in 1989. The majority of thosearrested were students and workers. Thomas Philip, "South Korea: Return to Repressive Force and Torture?" AmnestyInternational Bulletin  17 (April 1990):22.268According to Brandt, "Chondaehyop candidates were defeated at nearly half the universities, including ... SNU (p. 93)." See alsoDeming, Leyden and Bank, p. 9; and Dong, "Student Radicals," pp. 180-81.269Estimated from Shin Kyung-Mi, "Korea's Fabulous Fabs," Business Korea Electronics,  October, 1988, p. 22, cited by Bello andRosenfeld, p. 170."'Bruce Cumings, "The Abortive Abertura: South Korea in Light of Latin American Experience," New Left Review  173 (January-February 1989):32.73suppression of the labour movement. Perhaps the changes were only superficial; between 1987 and 1989,600 leaders of democratic unions were imprisoned. 271 There was, however, a short hiatus in the overtoppression characteristic of the Chun regime. When it appeared that things were going too far too fast, Rohpulled back the reigns and returned to the familiar platform of popular movements threatening nationalsecurity and economic development. In January 1990, the radical Korean Trade Union Congress(Chonnohyop) was banned because "it [was] leading to a vicious conflict with an ideology of class strugglefor the liberation of labour."272 Clearly the communist threat has not lost its utility in the eyes of the regimein spite of its international decline. North Korean intransigence in the face of glastnost and perestroika lendthis rhetoric some credibility with the South Korean public.During the first two years of labour unrest, South Korea lost several millions of dollars in exportrevenue.273 The strength of the world economy in 1987 and 1988 allowed it to weather this storm and stillachieve relatively high rates of growth. 274 An economic downturn in 1989 may have been one of the factorsthat lowered the government's tolerance of labour dissene m Two years of wage increases in the doubledigits threatened Korea's comparative advantage in several industries. 276 Rather than look for ways to2710gle, Dissent, p. 149.272Quoted in David Easter, "South Korea Blames Labour for Economic Woes," Guardian (New York), April 4, 1990, p. 17, cited byBello and Rosenfeld, p. 45.273By mid-August 1987, it was estimated that labour disputes cost $74.7 mn in lost exports. Clifford, "Labour Strikes," p. 14. Seealso "Labour Disputes Hit South Korean Exports: FEER April 13, 1989, p.67.274Low oil prices and favourable exchange rates facilitated growth in spite of labour disputes. South Korea experienced 13.0percent GNP growth in 1987, 12.4 percent in 1988, but only 6.7 percent in 1989. Bon-Ho Koo, "The Korean Economy: StructuralAdjustment for Future Growth," in Korea Briefing, 1990, p. 57.275In 1988, South Korea had a trade surplus of $11.6 bn; this went down to $4.6 bn in 1989. Manwoo Lee, p. 137. 1989 alsomarked a $1.9 bn balance of payments deficit. Mark Clifford, "Rising Expectations," FEER March 14, 1991, p. 53.27WVages increased 18.6 percent in the final quarter of 1987, 19.6 percent in 1988, 23.0 percent in 1989 and 17 percent in 1990.Bon-Ho Koo, p. 60 and Clifford, "Expectations," p. 53.74improve productivity, a number of businesses moved part of their operations to countries where wages werecheaper. According to Bello and Rosenfeld:This hemorrhage of productive capital is likely to render even more tenuous the link betweenconglomerate prosperity and domestic welfare, further eroding the legitimacy of the chaebol-dominated model of growth. 277For the time being, the Roh regime is trying to renew the confidence of capital by offering it subsidiesand support reminiscent of past developmental regimes. The difference is that labour is not willing toshoulder a disproportionate share of the burden as it did before. The labour movement is still experiencingdifficulty in uniting and it is battling a well-entrenched foe, but it will not return to its former quiescent place,nor does the Roh regime have the same power to force it there. 278 In spite of the control that it stillexercises, the 1987 reforms have placed new constraints on the state and given the public more power. TheKorean state must now walk a tight-rope between public demands for redistribution and business demandsfor investment. The government-business partnership is not the united front that it once was. This is asmuch a function of reforms as it is of the chaebas increased capacity to go their own way. The Korean statestill has tools to use against the chaebol as demonstrated by the way that it disciplined Hyundai in 19912 79The question is whether these will be used in favour of the public or simply to bring business back in line withstate developmental agendas.Although the student movement went through a slump following political reform, it has revived as theRoh regime has proven itself deserving of censure. The nadir of the movement came in May 1989 when six27713ello and Rosenfeld, p. 171.27BLie, p. 48. Since 1987, white collar workers have also participated in labour disputes. Even foreign banks have not escapedlabour unrest. Mark Clifford "Labour's Love Lost,' FEER May 4, 1989, p. 68.'Nark Clifford, "Keeping Up the Good Work," FEER October 17, 1991, p. 124.75policemen died in a fire set by militant students at Dongeui University in Pusan. 28° This coupled with themovement's professed sympathy for North Korea diminished its reputation as a righteous opponent ofauthoritarianism. Many felt that students had gone too far in their ideology and their tolerance of violentmethods. In 1990, student activists regained some of their influence as politicians demonstrated the limitsof their commitment to reform. In January 1990, when two of Korea's three major opposition partiesannounced their intention to merge with the Democratic Justice Party to form the Democratic Liberal Party,students were incensed. They could not understand such a betrayal, especially on the part of Kim YoungSam. With all but one political party discredited, the indispensable role of the extra-institutional opposition,including the student movement, was reconfirmed. Demonstrations increased, as did popular support. Onthe day of the actual merger, May 9, 1990, 98,000 people participated in anti-DLP rallies. 281 When astudent was beaten to death by police in the spring of 1991, the upsurge of protest activity approached 1987levels.82 The Roh regime was able to pacify the general public by apologizing and firing the interiorminister.283 These incidents renewed the progressive radicalization of the student movement.A disturbing element of recent student protest has been the number of self immolations. Thisinspired the famous dissident poet, Kim Chi Ha, to exhort students to: "Give up your sickening politics ofnecrophilia."284 One cannot help but wonder if there is more to this kind of protest than remonstrance of28°Shim Jae Hoon, "Critical Choice," FEER May 18, 1989, pp. 12-13.281 1 ,864 People Held at Anti-DLP Protests," The Korea Times, May 11, 1990, p. 3. See also Young Whan Kihl, "South Korea in1990: Diplomatic Activism and A Partisan Quagmire," Asian Survey 31 (January 1991):67.28230,000 citizens, mostly students and workers attended a funeral procession for this student on May 14, 1991. Shim Jae Hoon,"Containing the Flames," FEER, May 23, 1991, p. 10.28'Shim Jae Hoon, "Smoke Without Fire," FEER, May 30, 1991, p. 31. See also Shim Jae Hoon, "Sacrificial Offerings," FEER,May 30, 1991, p. 13.284Quoted in Shim Jae Hoon, "Smoke," p. 31.76the ruling regime. It seems that the line between discontent with the sociopolitical situation and personalanomie has become blurred. Whatever the case, the student movement is far from spent and will prove tobe a significant actor as long as the government provides it with cause for protest. 285 It is the perversebehaviour of the regime that makes the movement acceptable in any way to more moderate public opinion.An important feature of recent protest has been the extent of student-labour cooperation. Two years ofrelative openness allowed the labour movement time to move towards the students ideologically.Nevertheless, it is sometimes difficult to bridge the gap between student concerns like reunification andlabour's focus on economic issues.286The 1987 reforms marked a major milestone in the Korean development process. With electionreform and the expansion of civil liberties, political development was given long overdue attention. The policy-making process became more open to the public than it had ever been in the history of the Republic ofKorea. The last two years have proven, however, that it is not easy for the state to disengage from a modelthat it has been dedicated to for two and a half decades. The Korean state still expects to achieve high levelsof economic growth. With a newly empowered public demanding more equitable distribution, this is not aneasy goal to reach. Popular opinion can no longer be sacrificed on the alter of economic efficiency. On theother hand, the state cannot simply drop its obligations to business as the well being of the two have becomeso closely entwined.The Roh regime found itself walking a tight-rope after unleashing popular forces that have provendifficult to control. These are the facts of life in the ranks of the not so newly industrializing. The problemof how to maintain the confidence of business and the support of the public is a familiar one to developed285See Shim Jae Hoon "Radical Resurgence," FEER April 27, 1989, p. 10.286Lie, p. 50.77countries. Unwilling to sacrifice growth to meet public demands for social justice, the Roh regime has triedto retrace its steps and return to the simple formula of national security and growth oriented economicdevelopment. This formula is not able to gain the same mileage in a more pluralist society as it did in the1960s and 1970s. It is true that government, military and business elites still remain in the driver's seat. Themajority of the South Korean public is quite conservative and seldom willing to take the same risks as militantstudents and workers. Now that ordinary citizens are finally able to articulate their interests in relativefreedom they will try to direct the path of development in their favour. For the most part, they will be contentto do so from the back seat but, if the government turns around completely, extra-institutional movementslike the students and workers will increase their influence.These alterations in the development model have allowed workers more room for protest. The labourmovement can no longer be carefully contained as it was in past decades. Worker consciousness has risenand political reforms have made it more difficult for management and government to resort to repression.Workers have also tried to take advantage of cracks in the government-business alliance. The labourmovement is still struggling for independence, but it has developed more power to pursue worker interests.The student movement lost some momentum with the 1987 reforms. As the regime made an attempt atpolitical modernization, the movement's major raison d'etre was undermined. Students were no longerfortified by public support. As the Roh regime has waffled on its commitment to reform, these twomovements have remained in a state of flux. A fully independent labour movement has not been established,nor has the student movement lost its ability to act as an influential opposition movement. While some ofthe former structures of the Korean model have been changed, many remain intact and Korea's socialmovements have adapted accordingly.78CONCLUSION South Korea has experienced amazing growth over the past three decades--so the economicstatistics indicate. In contrast to the vibrant economy, political development has lagged. From 1961 to 1987,Korea's 'modernization' drive was headed by what Bruce Cumings refers to as bureaucratic authoritarianindustrializing regimes. Economic development was a priority for these states which allied themselves withbusiness and shielded policy-making from the public in order to achieve their goal. These regimes soughtlegitimacy through a carefully controlled election process, state-sponsored intermediate groups and theconnection between industrialization and national security.Korea's state-led, fast-paced development model has had important consequences for socialmovements in that country. The model creates issues to which movements respond and also helps definethe parameters in which they act. While it is important to remember that people create social movements,it is also necessary to understand the context of their action. This thesis places South Korea's socialmovements in the context of the structures created by the model of development. Although workers havebeen at the centre of the model, the labour movement did not approach the same level of mobilization as thestudents until the mid-1980s. The varying demands of the development process on these two groups helpto explain the divergence of their respective movements.There are a number of theories of social movements that can be applied to South Korea. Some lookto cultural-historical explanations, others to relative deprivation, access to resources or structural conditions.This thesis favours a structural argument that focuses on the field in which social movements operate.Literature on late capitalism and contemporary social movements have some utility for Korea. This literaturehelps to explain why the state might intervene in the economy, its concern with conflicts that are system-threatening and its need to legitimate its intervention and the political economic structure. It also suggests79that societal contradictions will not have the same impact on all social groups. While these factors may notcompletely account for the difference between labour and student movements in Korea, they do point in theright direction.Korea's industrializing regimes have been committed to economic development for a number ofreasons--a desire to 'catch up', an obsession with national security, and the need for self-preservation.Economic development has also been used to justify the state's authoritarian character. Rather than usingredistributive policies to legitimate its intervention and the social division of labour, the Korean state hasresorted to patriotic appeals and outright repression when these failed. Korea's strategic conditions and acolonial legacy of an "over-developed state" have made these methods possible. 287 Korea's developmentalregimes have been able to insulate major policy-making bodies from popular pressures. They have alsoforged a formidable alliance with business. These conditions, coupled with the rapid rate of industrializationhave had important consequences for the student and labour movements. They help to explain why somecultural legacies are more enduring than others, why relative deprivation does not translate into collectiveaction and why social groups have unequal access to resources.The role of the state in development has made a number of things possible. Korea's industrializingregimes have been able to create a national rhetoric in support of development. When this has failed, theywere not averse to using force to fortify business against labour. Unlike developed countries with 'weaker'states, which are more subject to the demands of public opinion, South Korean governments have not turnedto redistributive techniques as a means of engendering public support for the model until more recently.Because of their importance to the success of the model, workers have faced the full gamut of rhetoric andrepression. The disorienting pace of development has also contributed to their difficulty in organizing a287Choi, p. 196.80powerful, united movement.Students have not been as susceptible to the rhetoric, nor have they been as easily repressed. Thedevelopment model does not make the same demands on them, nor does it compromise their autonomy inthe same way. Their education, both formal and informal, provides them with ideological alternatives toregime rationale. It raises their awareness of the lack of political modernization and the consequences ofthat. For years, Korean universities have been preaching the gospel of liberal democracy, but as far as thestudents could see, this doctrine had failed to win any converts among state, military and business elites.A significant number of students began to question the power of the message itself and have turned to otherschools of thought, which include socialism and even Kim II Sung's juche philosophy.Students are not as easily contained because they have more autonomy on campus than workersdo in the factory. They are not subject to the same regimentation as industrial workers. Furthermore,although university administrations are dependent on the state, they are not as well incorporated into thedevelopment model as business. They do not receive such an array of perquisites in return for cooperation.Students are better able to protest as a result of the 'space' that these conditions afford them.After 1987, these two movements began to resemble one another more in militancy and activity. Achange occurred in the inducements and constraints to collective action. The costs of protest were loweredfor labour in a more open political climate. Workers have grown in their capacity to challenge employers andthe state. They recognize that government and business elites share responsibility for their exploitation.Workers have developed the same doubts as students regarding the regime's "legitimacy propositions". Themovement has been strengthened as privileged workers have also come to realize that their position is notassured. In contrast the student movement was temporarily weakened as a result of political reforms.Radical activists lost credibility in the face of government compromise. For years, the lack of democracy was81their major platform. Once the Roh regime demonstrated a willingness to open up the political processstudents lost control of that platform. As the state has returned to coercive methods, the student movementhas been revived. Until the government proves that it is firmly committed to democracy, the extra-institutionalopposition will still be able to draw on popular discontent. In 1987, the development model was only shakenby reforms, not destroyed. It is still evolving and the direction of that evolution will depend upon thewillingness of elites to move forward towards greater democratization and the patience of the public in waitingfor this to happen. As the structures of the Korean development model evolve, so will social movements inresponse to these new parameters.82BIBLIOGRAPHYAhn, Chung-Si. "Political Culture and Political Socialization of the Post-War Generation in South Korea."Korea Journal 28 (May 1988):4-20Alam, M. Shahid. "The South Korean 'Miracle': Examining the Mix of Government and Markets." Journal ofDeveloping Areas 23 (January 1989):233-258.Amirahmadi, Hooshang. "Development Paradigms at the Crossroad in the South Korean Experience." 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