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Federal choice of policy instruments in the Canada green plan Albert, Karin H. 1992

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FEDERAL CHOICE OF POLICY INSTRUMENTSIN THE CANADA GREEN PLANbyKARIN HELGA ALBERTB.A. The University of British Columbia, 1990A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTERS OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESDepartment of Political ScienceWe accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAOctober 1992© Karin Helga Albert, 1992In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature) Department of ^'(-z-6( /14_,^//LeThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate^/ DE-6 (2/88)ABSTRACTThe Green Plan, Canada's six year environmental agenda, has now guided Canadianenvironmental policy for over a year and a half. In that time span, a large number ofenvironmental initiatives have been announced under the Green Plan, and an even largernumber are still promised. However, not every initiative contributes equally to preventing orabating pollution. The extent to which an initiative contributes directly to an improvement inenvironmental quality depends on the level of coercion of the policy instrument it employs.Initiatives which involve relatively coercive policy instruments, in particular regulatory action,are more likely to achieve their goal in the immediate future than initiatives which relylargely on persuasion such as guidelines and public education.The classification of the policy instruments in the Green Plan reveals a strongpreference on the part of the federal government for non-coercive over coercive instruments.Only 13 per cent of the Green Plan initiatives involve regulatory action. The majorityinvolve increasing capacity which means that the initiatives centre around research, studies,monitoring and plan development.The Fraser River Action Plan, a Green Plan initiative announced in June 1991, reflectsthe same federal preference for capacity increasing instruments as the larger Green Plan.Several variables help to explain this preference: constitutional constraints, pressure fromother levels of government, opposition from industry, and environmental interest grouppressure.Both the events leading up to the Green Plan and the implementation of the FraserRiver Action Plan, suggest that the strongest motivating factor for the choice of policyinstruments is the concern to avoid blame from the interests affected by a particular initiative.In practice, this means that the federal government is reluctant to make use of its regulatoryauthority to impose clean-up costs on the polluting industry. It also avoids to interfere withprovincial jurisdiction over natural resources. In order to avoid blame from environmentalgroups and the public, who demand tighter pollution controls, the government relies onsymbolic actions. Symbolic actions enable the government to show its concern but postponepollution abatement to a later date.Federal reluctance to make use of its full constitutional authority in the area ofenvironmental policy making combined with the large budget cuts the Green Plan has seenduring its relatively short period of existence, belies the federal commitment to protecting theenvironment.CONTENTSABSTRACT^ iiTABLE OF CONTENTS^ ivLIST OF TABLES viACKNOWLEDGEMENTS^ viiCHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL APPROACHES^ 61. Cost Efficiency^ 72. Vote Maximization 93. Level of Coercion 114. Distribution of Power in Society^ 135. Blame Avoidance^ 156. Symbolic Actions 177. Choice of Policy Instruments in Environ-^19mental PolicymakingCHAPTER III: THE CANADA GREEN PLAN AND THE CHOICEOF POLICY INSTRUMENTS^ 221. Policy Instruments in the Green Plan^232. Cabinet Opposition^ 283. Opposition from Industry 304. Pressure from Environmental Groups^325. Provincial Resistance to Federal 35Interference6. Conclusion^ 36CHAPTER IV: CASE STUDY:THE FRASER RIVER ACTION PLAN^391. Genesis of the Fraser River Action Plan 401.1 Fraser Basin Management Start-up^43Committee1.2 Fraser Basin Management Program^442. Fraser River Action Plan Initiatives 452.1 Fraser River Estuary Management Program^452.2 Demonstration Watersheds^ 48- iv -2.3 Burrard Inlet Environmental Action Plan^492.4 Pollution Abatement^ 532.5 Water/Environmental Quality Management^562.6 Enforcement 582.7 Fish Habitat Management and Restoration^612.8 Wildlife Habitat Restoration^632.9 Improved Science Base 652.10 Participation by First Nations 653. The Question of Instrument Choice^674. Constitutional Constraints^ 694.1 Federal Jurisdiction over Water 704.2 B.C. Environmental Legislation^745. Environmental Interest Group Pressure 766. Opposition from Industry^ 807. Considerations of Costs 828. Pressure from other Levels of Government^859. Principles, Principles, Principles^89CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION^ 931. Success of the Green Plan^ 95BIBLIOGRAPHY^ 98APPENDICES: 1051. Methodology^ 1062. Classification of Policy Instruments in theCanada Green Plan 1093. List of Ministers of Environment under theMulroney government^ 1394. List of people interviewed 140LIST OF TABLESI. Types of Policy Instruments in the Green Plan^24II. Initiatives under the Fraser River Action Plan 67ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSI would like to thank Professor George Hoberg for his encouragement, great sense ofhumour and constructive criticisms without which I would certainly not have finished as earlyas I did. Thanks also go to Professor Maureen Reed, my second reader, for her helpfulcomments on my thesis and to my fellow graduate students Lawrence Hansen, StephenPhillips and Tobias Theiler for their help and great company during our long coffee anddinner breaks. I am also greatly indebted to my close friend Raymond Li for being sounderstanding and putting up with my crankiness and bad moods during the last few stressfulweeks of writing on my thesis. Most of all, I like to express my gratitude to my parents forencouraging me to continue my studies and for mailing me applestrudels, smoked salmon orbright colourful socks to cheer me up during those rough times. Finally, I thank God forblessing me with wonderful parents and friends and giving me the opportunity to study andlearn.INTRODUCTION The first six years of the Mulroney government, from 1984 to 1990, were meagreyears for Environment Canada (DOE). Suzanne Blais-Grenier, the first Minister of theEnvironment, cut $34 million and 300 jobs from the department. The Canadian WildlifeService suffered the most from this with a reduction of 25 per cent of its annual budget.' In1985/86, as a result of widespread dissatisfaction among Canadians with how the governmenthandled environmental issues, DOE was subjected to a program review under the NielsenTask Force.2 The study recommended that there be a stronger commitment by the federalgovernment to environmental issues and a larger role for DOE in addressing these issues.3A follow-up study was more explicit. It recommended that "the department must be in aposition to steer the federal government away from its current expensive, reactive andcorrective approach toward a more effective anticipatory and preventive one." 4 To accom-plish this, the department should be given a greater role in horizontal and nationalcoordination of federal environmental quality responsibilities. In response to these recomm-endations, Mulroney appointed a new Environment Minister, Tom McMillan. However, thisaction was not accompanied by an increase in funds or more power in cabinet for DOE. 5But McMillan accomplished a lot with very little. He engineered the Canadian EnvironmentalBruce Doern, "Johnny-Green-Latelies: The Mulroney Environmental Record," Frances Abele, ed. How OttawaSpends (Ottawa Carleton University Press, 1992), p.357.2 Task Force on Program Review, Improved Program Review: Environment  (Ottawa: Minister of Supply andServices, 1986).Ibid., p.11.4 Task Force on Program Review, Improved Program Delivery, Environmental Quality Strategic Review (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1986), p.4.5 Bruce Doem, supra note 1, p.159.Protection Act (CEPA), which gives the DOE greater regulatory authority and supported theestablishment of a new national park on South Moresby Island. In 1987, international eventsgave environment issues renewed prominence. The Brundtland Commission on Environmentand Development published its report, Our Common Future. It popularized the concept ofsustainable development which advocates a reconciliation between economy and environment.Canada responded by creating the National Round Table on the Environment and theEconomy. Brian Mulroney appointed its 25 members and opened the first meeting with aspeech on sustainable development in Canada.6In part triggered by the Brundtland report, in part by opinion polls which showedpublic concern for the environment was on the rise again, Mulroney promised a majorenvironmental program in the 1988 election campaign. In anticipation of this promise, DOEprepared a package of proposals. With the appointment of Lucien Bouchard as EnvironmentMinister, the proposals were worked into a comprehensive environmental action plan, thepredecessor to the Green Plan.Albeit a weakened version of the initial DOE document, the Green Plan was to set theTories' environmental record straight. It received $3 billion in funds to implement environ-mental initiatives over the following five years.' The opening statement by the PrimeMinister to the Green Plan declares the great promise the Plan holds for all Canadians:As Canadians we are the trustees of a unique, beautiful, and productive northernland... The challenge we now face is to build upon our economic strengths in harmonywith our environment, the basis of our health and prosperity. Every Canadian has a6 Linda Starke, Signs of Hope (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) p.151-2.Two months later, funding for the Green Plan was stretched out over six years instead of five. See WilliamWalker, "$3 billion green plan must be stretched," Toronto Star, February 27, 1991, A20.-2-role to play in achieving this goal of sustainable development... The Green Planexpresses the government's commitment to work with Canadians to manage theirnatural resources prudently and to encourage sensitive environmental decisionmaldng. 8The Green Plan lists over "100 important and well-funded initiatives over the next fiveyears."' Their implementation is to bring Canada closer towards its goal of achieving sus-tainable development.Since most of the initiatives promised in the Green Plan have not been implementedyet, it is too early for an assessment of the overall success of the Plan in achieving thisambitious goal. Furthermore, it is difficult to evaluate to what extent sustainable developmentis realized because of the broadness of the term. The concept of sustainable development hasbeen espoused by different groups to justify widely diverging courses of action. To avoidconfusion, this paper evaluates the Green Plan simply in terms of its ability to protect theenvironment or improve environmental quality, 10 the most essential steps in achievingsustainable development. This will be done by examining the policy instruments the GreenPlan proposes to use in the implementation of the various initiatives.Policy instruments can be categorized according to the level of coercion they involve.Typically, the most coercive instruments, such as regulations, are also the most effective inprotecting the environment, preventing or abating pollution, because they force a change in8 Government of Canada,  Canada's Green Plan (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1990), p.xi.9 Ibid, path.io An improvement in environmental quality is achieved through pollution prevention or abatement. Thedesirable level of environmental quality depends on the designated use of a given resource.-3-behaviour on the part of the polluter." Non-coercive instruments, such as public educationor studies, on the other hand, are the least likely to produce rapid changes. They are impor-tant in that they raise public awareness and increase our understanding of pollution problemsbut they alone do not clean-up the environment.This paper identifies the types of policy instruments preferred by the federal govern-ment in the implementation of the Green Plan and examines which variables have had abearing on this preference. Hence, the two central questions addressed in this paper are:What policy instruments are preferred by the federal government? What determined thechoice of policy instruments?In pursuit of an answer to the second question, chapter II provides an overview of themain theories on instrument choice and discusses their relevancy with respect to the environ-mental policy field. The theories' explanation for the government's instrument choice rangefrom considerations of the effectiveness of the instrument to the government's preoccupationwith blame avoidance. The discussion of the theories generates four propositions on whatdetermines the choice of instruments in the making of environmental policy.In chapter III, the Green Plan instruments are assigned to seven different categories,ranked according to the level of coercion they involve. The categories are regulation,expenditure, guidelines, capacity increasing, agreements, public education and public11 Market-based incentives to pollution control will not be dealt with in this paper. But they can be consideredcoercive policy instruments because government intervention is needed in order to set and collect taxes on the useof common property resources or distribute quotas or permits in the case of emission or effluent trading. Using themarket to protect common property resources also does not eliminate the need for monitoring, inspections, andenforcement. The considerable opposition by Canadian industry to the inclusion of so-called green taxes in the GreenPlan reveals that market-based incentives are also considered to be highly interventionist by the private sector. Theadvantage of market-based incentives is that pollution control is achieved at a lower aggregate cost than is possiblewith the traditional command and control approach to regulation.-4-participation. The results of this categorization make it possible to identify the types ofinstruments favoured by the federal government. The remainder of the chapter discusses thedevelopment of the Green Plan up to its release in December 1990 and examines whatvariables determined the federal government's choice of policy instruments. This is donewith the help of the four propositions arrived at in chapter II.The four propositions are also applied in chapter IV, in a case study on the FraserRiver Action Plan, one of the first initiatives announced under the Green Plan. That chapterprovides a closer analysis of what motivates the federal government to choose certaininstruments and avoid others. The following five variables are examined: constitutionalconstraints, environmental interest group activity, opposition from industry, the influence ofother levels of government, and considerations of cost.The final chapter analyzes the results obtained from the studies of instrument choicefor the Green Plan and the Fraser River Action Plan. This leads to an evaluation of thefederal government's commitment to environmental protection and the likely success of theGreen Plan in helping Canada move closer towards the ideal of sustainable development.CHAPTER IITHEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE CHOICE OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS There is no controversy over the fact that in most situations policymakers will have avariety of policy instruments from which to choose in order to reach a specific objective.However, instrument choice is never a neutral exercise allowing policymakers to select instru-ments at will without consideration of the political consequences. Moreover, in most cases,no clear division can be made between means and ends, instruments and policy objectives.'The instruments shape the policy process and affect the final outcome. They are often objectof much controversy because by determining which instrument will be used to implement aparticular policy, the policymaker decides who will bear the costs of the policy. The groupsaffected by a particular policy may attempt to influence the government's instrument choice.What ultimately motivates policymakers to prefer one policy instrument over another in agiven situation is the question policy instrument theorists try to answer. Explanations rangefrom considerations of effectiveness and cost-efficiency to credit claiming and blameavoidance.In what follows, I will summarize the arguments of the main policy instrumenttheories and discuss their relevance to instrument choice in the area of environmental policymaking in Canada.For a more detailed discussion of the link between means and ends, see M.J. Trebilcock, D.G. Hartle, R.S.Richard, and D.N. Dewees, The Choice of Governing Instrument (Ottawa; Minister of Supply and Services Canada,1982) p. 24-25; G. Bruce Doern and Richard W. Phidd, Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: Methuen, 1983) p.111.-6-1. COST-EFFICIENCYAccording to the economist Gary Becker, the government will attempt to reach itsobjectives at the lowest possible cost. He compares instrument choice in a political demo-cracy to choices made by firms in a free market economy. In both cases efficiency is themost important criterion:In an ideally competitive free enterprise system, only the most efficient firms survive;for example, if the level of a firm's costs were independent of output and varied fromfirm to firm, only the firm with the lowest costs would survive. Similarly, in an idealdemocracy only the most efficient parties would survive;... 2The "most efficient party", according to Becker, is the party which can provide the policiesdemanded at least cost. He defines costs as administrative transaction costs, that is, monito-ring and enforcement costs for the government and compliance costs for the private sector.Becker does concede that neither the free market system nor the political system is free fromimperfections. The greatest sources of distortion in the political system are inadequatelyinformed voters and the large scale of political organizations.Nevertheless, in a later article, Becker maintains that, in spite of these imperfections,the political system favours the selection of the most cost-efficient instrument available by thedecision makers.3 The reason he gives for this is that the effects of policies can in the longrun not be hidden from the voters:I prefer instead to assume that voters have unbiased expectations, at least of policiesthat have persisted. They may overestimate the dead weight loss from some policiesand underestimate it from others, but on the average they have a correct perception.. . 42 Gary Becker, "Competition and Democracy," Journal of Law and Economics, 1958, p. 107.3 Gary Becker, "Comment," Journal of Law and Economics,  1976, p.245.4 Ibid, p.246. Also quoted in Trebilcock et al, supra note 1, p. 22.-7-It follows that, in fact, the policy instruments chosen will tend to be the most efficientavailable.This theory is clearly inadequate to describe instrument choice in environmental policymaking because, first of all, the majority of voters are not familiar with the efficiency of theirgovernment's policy choices and do not make this their major concern when they go to thepolls to vote a party in or out. 5Secondly, the theory ignores that in choosing a policy instrument, the politician has totake into account the distribution of costs and benefits which does not make all alternativesequally acceptable in a given situation. The selection of the policy instrument is often ashotly debated as the actual policy goal. This is particularly true in the field of environmentalpolicy making. Generally, everyone can agree that we need to take action to protect theenvironment; the conflict is over who will bear the costs of pollution control or abatement.Regulatory action shifts the costs to the private sector while the costs of government clean-upprograms are born by the taxpayer. The government is unlikely to choose one over the otherbased on a simple evaluation of the cost-efficiency of the instrument. Rather, it will have toconsider a number of variables and political pressures which may render the most cost-efficient instrument politically unpalatable.5 In his theory on collective action Olson states that the information costs are too high for the rational voterto try and get informed on a wide range of issues. See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action  (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University press, 1965).82. VOTE MAXIMIZATIONIn their book, The Choice of Governing Instrument,  M.J. Trebilcock et al stronglycriticize Becker's theory for failing to distinguish between means and ends. What Beckerconsiders to be policy objectives or ends such as reducing unemployment, reducing poverty orincreasing economic growth, Trebilcock et al would call "means to more final objectives". Amore final objective, or rather the final objective, is the politician's concern to stay in poweror to gain an election. In Trebilcock et al's words, a policy isnot and end in itself, but a means to achieving some more ultimate end. In ouranalysis, more ultimate ends of these stated 'ends' would relate to the interest ofpoliticians in securing their election or re-election....Thus both the determination ofpolicy 'objectives', in the conventional sense, and the determination of the means bywhich those objectives are to be pursued [can] be weighed against the calculus of howthey serve the end of enhancing the prospects of the election or re-election by thepolitical decision makers. 6One of the most important considerations when trying to enhance their prospect of election orre-election is the impact a certain policy instrument will have on the voters. In any electiontwo types of voters can be identified, those already committed to one political party (theinframarginal voters) and those who are still uncommitted or have only a weak commitmentto a party (the marginal voters). As long as parties do not adopt any extreme platforms, theycan ignore the ridings in which the majority of voters is already committed to them. Thus,party competition will be largely concentrated on those ridings in which there is a majority ofrelatively uncommitted voters. Trebilcock et al call these ridings 'marginal ridings' and goeson to say that voters in marginal ridings will behave rationally and "select from among the6 M.J. Trebilcock et al, supra note 1, p.24.9competing parties that party whose policies will maximize their utility."'The consequence of this for politicians is that they will favour instruments which"concentrate benefits of policies on marginal voters and do not disperse those benefits overinframarginal voters who are either so committed to the party or so alienated from it that thebenefits would have no effect on voting behaviour."' Rational behaviour also dictates thatpoliticians will favour instruments which impose the costs of policies on committed voters, sothat the choice of instrument does not affect voting behaviour. 9While this theory is very plausible, it ignores a number of other factors, such as partyideology and the distribution of power in society, which shape instrument choice but notnecessarily in a way as to maximize votes. In addition, Trebilcock et al's theory does nothave any predictive value. It is difficult to determine whether policies which benefit themarginal voter will actually induce him or her to vote for the politician claiming credit forthese policies. Furthermore, a large number of environmental problems affect the country asa whole and their resolution does not allow the government to confer benefits to specificridings. Examples of this are car emission controls, limits on SO 2 emissions, or newpackaging regulations. In the environmental policy field, costs are usually concentrated (ifthe polluter has to pay for the pollution abatement) and benefits dispersed (everyone enjoyscleaner air or water), that is to say, it is in general difficult to confer benefits to a small group7 Ibid. p.28Ibid, p.29.9 Ibid.- 10 -of marginal voters. 10 Nevertheless, politicians are open to electoral incentives even if theseare not exclusively provided by voters in marginal ridings.3. LEVEL OF COERCIONQuite a different approach to the choice of policy instruments has been taken by BruceDoern and V. Seymour Wilson. In their book Issues in Canadian Public Policy,  they identifyseveral classes of instruments available to governments and place them on a continuum oflow to high coercion. The most coercive policy instrument is public enterprise followed byregulation, expenditure and exhortation or persuasion. Their hypothesis is thatpoliticians (especially the collective cabinet) have a strong tendency to respond topolicy issues (any issue) by moving successively from the least coercive governinginstruments to the most coercive. Thus they tend to respond first in the least coercivefashion by creating a study or by creating a new or reorganized unit of government, ormerely by uttering a broad statement of intent... [At] the coercive end of the governingcontinuum would be direct regulation in which the sanctions or threat of sanctionswould have to be directly applied.'Doern and Wilson go on to explain that the above tendency is reinforced by the politicalstructure of a federal state because "the least coercive instrument can also be utilized withgreater constitutional ease and certainty...The more one moves into outright regulatory areas,the more one requires greater constitutional precision and clarity.'This argument has important implications for environmental policy making. Since the1° This distribution of costs and benefits is typical of common property resources such as air and water.Everyone benefits from an improvement in their quality. Improvement in the environmental quality of land, on theother hand, can be used to confer benefits to a relatively small group of voters or to specific ridings. Examples arethe creation of national historic sites or regional parks.11 G. Bruce Doern and V. Seymour Wilson, eds., Issues in Canadian Public Policy  (Toronto, 1974) p.339.12 Ibid.,pp. 339-340.Canadian constitution does not specifically deal with environmental protection, the two levelsof government have had to derive their authority in that area from other fields of jurisdiction.As a result, federal and provincial powers with respect to the environment are not clearlydefined and overlap in a number of cases. In order to avoid intergovernmental conflict, onewould expect that governments will prefer policy instruments which involve a low level ofcoercion. However, non-coercive instruments are unlikely to further strong advances in thearea of environmental protection. This conclusion is supported by Doern and Phidd whopoint out that the likelihood that specific policy objectives will be achieved decreases with thelevel of coercion. Thus, "acts of persuasion are not a reliable way to ensure that publicpolicy goals are achieved in the long run, since several main ideas compete for attention andsince human beings respond to other instruments and incentives as well."'The following example serves to illustrate this point. The government can try topersuade its citizens through a public information campaign to recycle but the short-termresults are likely to be unimpressive. It is much more probable that people will take thegovernment's advise to heart if recycled material is regularly collected from their homes andif, at the same time, they are allowed only one garbage can per household and are charged foreach additional can.In their publication Canadian Public Policy, Doern and Phidd point out some flaws ofthe above hypothesis. The most important one, in the context of this paper, is the connectionbetween the coerciveness of a particular policy instrument and its effectiveness. It does notneed to be true that the most coercive policy instrument, regulation, is also the most effective:13 G. Bruce Doern and Richard W. Phidd, supra note 1, p.317 -318.- 12 -"Regulation can be promulgated and announced to satisfy [...] reformers in a symbolic waywithout unduly harming the more cohesive producer groups who will be given elaborateprocedural protections and who can afford to participate in them."' In the area of environ-mental policy making where regulations often involve the setting of standards or emissionreduction targets, the effectiveness of regulations depends on the regulatory agency's abilityor commitment to enforce regulations.4. DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IN SOCIETYIn his review of the policy instrument literature, Kenneth Woodside advances a similarcriticism of the Doern and Wilson hypothesis. He points out that policy instruments cannotbe neatly arranged along a continuum of differing levels of coercion, but that "each policyinstrument can be used in a wide range of ways that involve differing degrees of coercion."'This is undoubtedly the case, but, given that it is nearly impossible to measure the preciselevel of coercion of each policy instrument when examining a large number of differentinstruments, generalizations have to be made. Hence, the following discussion will be basedon the assumption that regulation and persuasion can always be found at opposing ends of thecoercion continuum. When examining specific policy issues, a more thorough analysis ofeach policy instrument may be necessary.A second important point Woodside raises in his criticism of the theories discussed14 Ibid., p. 129. See also Douglas Hartle, Public Policy Decision Making and Regulation (Montreal: Institutefor Research on Public Policy, 1979) p.67.15 Kenneth Woodside, "Policy Instruments and the Study of Public Policy," Canadian Journal of Public Policy,Vol. 19, No.4, December 1986, p.788.- 13 -above is that governments do not always attempt to avoid employing coercive instruments butthat at times, they will choose to take a hard line from the start. °According to Woodside, one of the most important factors which determine a government'sresponse is the political power or influence of the group at which a policy is aimed:"...governments generally are much more careful and respectful in their dealing with bigbusiness than they are when pressed to respond to the needs or demands of less powerfulgroups."' Consequently, one would expect governments to turn more quickly to morecoercive policy instruments when aiming to influence the behaviour of a relatively powerlessgroup than when the target is politically powerful.The implications of this argument for environmental policy making are that thegovernment will be reluctant to use coercive instruments in its dealings with pollutingindustry because industry wields significant political power, especially compared to thegeneral public, but also to environmental interest groups!'Finally, Woodside argues that in many situations the choice of policy instrumentsavailable to the government is, in fact, very limited. Constitutional constraints, legal limits ininstrument choice specified for departments and agencies, past choices, ideological trends andbudgetary constraints are all factors which restrict the range of policy instruments available tothe decision maker. But by considering those constraints alone, we can still not answer whatmotivates politicians to choose a particular policy instrument over another from among the16 Ibid., p. 186.17 Ibid., p. 186. Also see Leo Panitch ed. The Canadian State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).18 The forestry and pulp and paper industries alone had more than 80 registered lobbyists in 1990. See AnneMcllroy, "A toothless tiger?" Ottawa Citizen, Oct. 15, 1990, Al2.- 14 -choices available.5. BLAME AVOIDANCEAlthough Kent Weaver's theory on blame avoidance and credit claiming refers to thechoice of the policies themselves, it equally applies to the choice of the policy instruments.According to Weaver's theory, "politicians are motivated primarily by the desire to avoidblame for unpopular actions rather than by seeking credit for popular ones." 19 The under-lying assumption of this argument is that policymakers seek to maximize their prospects forre-election, reappointment or advancement. In this respect, Weaver's theory coincides withTrebilcock et al's theory of vote maximization. However, the two theories differ in theirexplanation of how policymakers will go about improving their prospects for reelection.Trebilcock et al theorized that politicians would attempt to maximize the benefits which go tomarginal voters in marginal ridings, in other words, they would attempt to claim credit foractions which benefit marginal voters. Weaver disagrees with that argument:Pursuit of a constituency benefit maximizing, credit claiming strategy is rational onlyif constituents respond symmetrically to gains and losses...But there is substantialevidence that this is not so. Persons who are suffering losses are more likely to noticethe loss, to feel aggrieved and to act on that grievance, than gainers are to act on thebasis of their improved state.'The implication of this to a policymaker who seeks to maximize votes is that concentratedlosses to a particular group of voters should be avoided even in cases where they do notoutweigh the benefits to another group of voters; it is enough that the losses are substantial.19 Kent Weaver, "The Politics of Blame Avoidance," Journal of Public Policy  6:371-398.2° Ibid., p.373.- 15 -Politicians must, therefore, be at least as concerned to avoid blame for losses they impose ona constituency as they are to claim credit for benefits they have granted?'Weaver identifies three different situations in which blame avoidance behaviour ismost likely to occur. First, as mentioned above, the policymaker will try to avoid blame insituations where bringing benefits to one part of his or her constituency requires imposingcosts on another segment. If the policymaker does take action, he or she risks alienating thelosers, who are more likely to remember that loss and possibly punish him or her for it in thenext elections. "So long as losses (and thus potential blame) are not drastically outweighed byother group's gains, we would expect policymakers to focus on gaining credit only afterattempting to minimize losses - and therefore blame." nAnother situation leading to blame avoidance would be when all policy alternativesimpose significant costs on at least some of the policymakers constituents. In such a situationno credit can be obtained and the policymaker can only hope to minimize blame by choosingthe least costly alternative.Finally, blame avoidance will occur in situations where constituency opinion isoverwhelmingly in support of a single side of an issue. If the policymaker wants to avoidblame, he or she has no option but to act in accordance with constituency opinion whether ornot he or she actually agrees with it.In the environmental policy field all of the above situations in which blame avoidanceis likely can occur. The first situation is the most common. Improving environmental quality21 Ibid., p.372.22 Ibid., p. 379.- 16 -will typically involve concentrated costs and diffused benefits (as in the case of effluent andemission regulations).When it comes to the selection of policy instruments in such "blame-generatingsituations", policymakers will prefer instruments which do not commit them to any actionwhich could alienate a particular group of voters - in the environmental policy field this groupwould be the polluters. Since the costs of regulatory action incurred by the parties affectedcan be significant, regulation is the most unpopular tool for blame avoiders. Less coercivepolicy instruments such as public education programs, studies or research do not impose costson any particular group but only give out benefits in the form of new jobs or programs andresearch grants. One can therefore expect policymakers to prefer non-coercive over coerciveinstruments in blame generating situations.6. SYMBOLIC ACTIONKent Weaver identifies eight strategies employed by politicians to avoid blame Z3 Allof the strategies can be applied to the environmental policy field. However, one techniquenot identified by Weaver, but used very often, is symbolic action. A symbolic action orpolicy does not directly contribute to the resolution of a problem but is announced bypoliticians in order to express concern and to be seen doing something. Symbolic actionsinclude making speeches, holding conferences and meetings, studying the problem, creating anew organization or reorganizing an existing one. These are of course not necessarily onlysymbolic actions, in fact, the above actions are fundamental to the democratic process and23 Ibid., p.385.- 17 -may represent a sincere first step to dealing with a problem. On the other hand, the aboveactions may be designed to delay dealing with a problem right away. In that case, theirpurpose is above all to "placate those with concerns that, for any number of valid or invalidreasons, are simply ranked at the lower end of the government's priority list. " 2A The needfor placating concerned voters arises out of the concern to avoid blame for inaction. If voterscan be fooled into believing that something is actually being done to address their concerns,the politician will not be blamed for ignoring a problem.Opinions on voters' ability to recognize symbolic policies diverge. The argumentsused here are based on Mancur Olson's theory of collective action which states that informa-tion costs for voters are too high making it in fact rational for voters to remain relativelyuninformed.25Voter ignorance gives a very important role to interest groups. Since the reason forexistence of some environmental interest groups is to research and criticise governmentperformance, they are in a better position to distinguish symbol from substance. Theinformation gained by environmental interest groups is passed on to the public in condensedform, reducing the public's information costs. Voters who are concerned about environmentalissues will often take their cues from environmental interest groups. Hence symbolic policiesmight be exposed by interest group activity. One would therefore expect politicians to be lesslikely to engage in symbolic actions in areas where interest group activity is intense. MurrayEdelman supports this view. According to his conclusions on the use of symbolic legislation,Doem and Phidd, supra note 1, p.318.Mancur Olson, supra note 5. See Daniel A. Farber, "Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law" Journalof Law, Economics, and Organization, March 1992, on voters ability to recognize symbolic legislation.- 18 -administration has been effective and regulations have been enforced in cases where organ-ized interest groups have applied pressure on the government. 267. THE CHOICE OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTALPOLICY MAKINGEven though all of the above theories contribute to a better understanding of themotivations behind policy instrument choice, they are not equally useful in describing andpredicting instrument choice in environmental policy making. The discussion of instrumentchoice by the federal government in the Canada Green Plan will be based largely onWeaver's theory of blame avoidance and the theories on symbolic action. Doem andWilson's concept of coerciveness will be used in the classification of the instruments. Thelevel of coercion will serve to describe the effectiveness of a particular policy instrument. Itwill be assumed that the most coercive instrument in environmental policy making, regulation,is also the most effective. 27 That is, regulation is most likely to result in a change ofbehaviour in the immediate future because non-compliance is penalized. Instruments whichrely on persuasion are often used in parallel with regulations. By themselves, however, non-coercive instruments are not very likely to produce the desired change in behaviour, especial-ly not in cases where fundamental changes are required. If changes are achieved through'6 Murray Edelman, Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964) p.41.27 This assumption is supported by Bruce Doem and Richard Phidd, supra note 13. It is also based on aperception of human nature which sees individuals as resisting to rapid changes in behaviour or lifestyle unless theybelieve this change to be in their immediate self-interest. Environmental quality is in everyone's long-term interest,but economic development which benefits people in the short-term, even if at the expense of environmental quality,is generally given priority. Often only major environmental crises bring concerns about environmental quality tothe top of the priority list.- 19 -non-coercive instruments, then most likely only over an extended period of time, the length ofwhich is impossible to predict. If an improvement in environmental quality requires changingingrained habits such as driving a car to work, it may take more than a decade before peoplechange their behaviour if the government solely relies on public education.The assumption that regulatory action is the most effective instrument in protecting theenvironment has its exceptions, for, just like any other policy instrument, regulation can be ofa symbolic nature. However, those cases do not weaken but rather strengthen the argumentthat the federal government is taking very few actions which contribute directly to theimprovement of environmental quality, because, if we include the possibility that some of theregulations are only symbolic, we are left with even fewer action forcing policy instruments.This theoretical overview generates four propositions about instrument choice. First,the federal government will be reluctant to use highly coercive policy instruments inimplementing environmental policies because of the pattern of interests affected: the costs ofhighly coercive instruments, such as emission standards or outright bans on certain productsare concentrated and borne by the polluter, whereas the benefits are diffused in that theyaccrue to the general public. Costs are therefore highly visible to the parties affected whoare, as a result, likely to organize and oppose very coercive instruments.'Second, the government will prefer non-coercive policy instruments over no action atall because it wants to avoid being blamed for ignoring a problem.'8 Pollution control costs may eventually be passed on to the consumer through an increase in the prices of theproducts produced by the regulated industry. But regulation nevertheless hurts industry since higher prices candecrease its international competitiveness. A third party, who in certain cases is also affected by strong pollutioncontrol regulations is labour. Industries may try to recover lost revenue as a result of pollution abatement costs bycutting back jobs. As a consequence, labour tends to oppose stricter pollution control for existing industries.- 20 -Third, non-coercive policy instruments will especially dominate in areas where there isno significant pressure from environmental interest groups on the government. Environmentalinterest groups have an important role in monitoring government action and informing thevoter. If their influence on voters is perceived to be strong by the government, the lattermight be convinced that too weak a response to the problem at hand will negatively affect itspopularity in the next elections. Hence, environmental groups must succeed in convincing thegovernment that the credit to be claimed from enacting stricter pollution control regulationsby far outweigh the political costs of imposing such regulations on industry (and thatinsufficient or symbolic action will generate an unacceptable level of blame).Fourth, the government may be constrained in its choice of instruments by factorswhich have little to do with the groups affected. Weaver calls these political systemconstraints and they include constitutional provisions and federal-provincial conflict. 29In the following two chapters, I will describe the federal government's use of policyinstruments in the environmental policy field and examine the degree to which each of theabove factors may have influenced the final choice of instruments.Chapter III looks at the entire federal Green Plan and examines with what frequency eachparticular instrument is to be used in the implementation of the Plan. This will be followedby a discussion of the factors which have influenced the pattern observed. Chapter IVprovides a closer analysis of federal use of policy instruments through a case study of theFraser River Action Plan, one of the initiatives announced under the Green Plan.29 Kent Weaver, The Politics of Industrial Change (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1985) p.77 -82.- 21 -CHAPTER IIITHE CANADA GREEN PLAN AND THE CHOICE OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS After over a year of deliberations within the federal Cabinet, a $8 million publicinformation and consultation process,' one glossy discussion paper and a summary reportprinted on heavy recycled paper, the Canada Green Plan was finally released on Decem-ber 11, 1990. 2 It is Canada's first comprehensive environmental action plan and is to guideCanadian environmental policy over the next six years. It has received considerable interna-tional recognition and praise, but domestic responses have been mixed. Environmental groupshave complained about a lack of specific commitments, standards and regulations, too littledetail on funding, and the absence of an environmental bill of rights. 3 Business groups fearthat they might have to bear huge clean-up costs in the future even though the greatly feared"green taxes" and tough pollution control laws were not part of the final Green Plan.'Overall, the Green Plan is a document which avoids creating enemies among polluters but atthe same time attempts to satisfy public demands for a cleaner environment largely throughsymbolic action. A look at the policy instruments to be employed in the implementation ofthe 248 Green Plan initiatives reveals a great deal about the federal government's commit-ment to environmental protection. 51 Ross Howard, "Ottawa to pay $1 million to promote Green Plan," Globe and Mail, Oct. 12, 1990, A5.2 Environment Canada, A Framework for Discussion on the Environment, A report on the Green PlanConsultations.3 William Walker, "Ottawa's green plan called 'empty shell'," Toronto Star, Dec 12, 1990, A10.4 John Geddes, "Not so Green: Business to escape big environmental bill in the $3B patch-up," The Financial Post, Dec. 11, 1990.5 The Green Plan is usually said to contain about 120 initiatives. However, those would be described moreaccurately as problem areas in which action is promised. The actual number of different programs or projects is 248.- 22 -In what follows, I will discuss the types of policy instruments in the Green Plan anddescribe the considerations and political pressures which motivated the federal government toavoid the use of instruments such as green taxes and legislative action.1. POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY MAKINGIn order to be able to make generalizations about the policy instruments in the GreenPlan, I categorized all Green Plan initiatives according to the policy instruments they employ(see appendix 2). Seven categories were identified, each involving a different level ofcoercion: regulation, expenditure, guidelines, capacity increasing, agreements, public informa-tion and public participation (see table I below).Regulation is the most coercive instrument6 since it outlaws certain actions andrequires the polluter to comply with specific performance or emission standards; in the caseof non-compliance, the polluter is punished as provided under the law. The main instrumentscan be broken down further into subcategories. Enforcement is included in the first categorybecause it is an essential component of any regulation. Regulations which are not enforcedare not coercive and have only symbolic value.While far less coercive than regulation, expenditure contains a minor element ofcoercion, since it prescribes a specific action to be taken, even though it does not put theburden of the cost on any one party. Instead, the costs are diffused; they are covered throughgovernment spending (or more precisely by the public through general taxes). All the other6 In the policy instrument literature, the most coercive and interventionist instrument identified is publicenterprise. It is not included here, because there has never been a case in which the government has decided tonationalize an industry or purchase shares of a private company in order to protect the environment.- 23 -TABLE I. POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN THE GREEN PLAN(in decreasing order of coercion)1.^Regulationa. new regulatory authorityb. regulatory actionsc. proposed regulationsd. enforcement2.^Expenditurea. spending on clean-up, restoring habitatb. acquisition/creation of natural sites, parks, protected areasc. foreign aid3. Guidelines, codes of practice4. Increasing capacitya. new research facilitiesb. new institutions or organizationsc. technology development/demonstration projectsd. spending on science, research, studiese. detection, classification, monitoringf. plan development, negotiationsg. enhance management, administrative capabilitiesh. conferences5.^Agreementsa. intergovernmental, no action specifiedb. international, no action specifiedc. international, general commitment6.^Public information/education7.^Increasing public participation (consultations, increase funding of ENGOs)categories also involve some level of government spending. What distinguishes this categoryis that the funds are specifically allocated to clean-up or environmental enhancement projectssuch as the creation of national parks or the clean-up of abandoned contaminated sites.Guidelines or codes of practice do not involve a high level of coercion on the part of- 24 -the government because, unlike regulations, they are not enforceable. They lay out norms orstandards which the government would like individuals or companies to follow and hence relyon persuasion rather than coercion to achieve the desired results. Their significance lies inthe fact that they provide the government and individuals or companies with a standard bywhich their behaviour or performance can be measured.Initiatives under the capacity increasing category do not lead directly to an increase inenvironmental quality because they do not prevent, reduce, or clean-up pollution. Instead,they contribute to a better understanding of the problems created by pollution and thusincrease the capability of the actors concerned to deal with the problem (this is particularlytrue of subcategories a, d and e). Sometimes, they represent a first step in the long process ofaddressing an environmental problem (subcategories b, c, f, g and h). In the long run, theyall may lead to further initiatives which will actually improve environmental quality, but thatis by no means guaranteed. They may also be followed by further capability increasinginitiatives if the government is trying to delay action.Comparable to "increasing capacity" in the level of coercion they involve, arecategories five, six, and seven, agreements, public information and public participation. Thetypes of agreements included in category five enable the government to show concern andexpress a general commitment to dealing with a problem. Agreements which outline aparticular course of action are not included in this category because they can be assigned toany of the other categories depending on the type of action specified. Initiatives which relylargely on public information are aimed at increasing public awareness and possibly changingpublic behaviour to decrease its impact on the environment. Increasing public participation- 25 -includes initiatives such as the public consultation process leading up to the Green Plan.They enable the public to express its opinion on certain environmental issues. To whatdegree this will influence government action depends on the strength of the other interests orstakeholders involved.The above three categories do not contribute directly to an improvement in environ-mental quality. This is not to say that they are not important because initiatives which fallunder these categories are fundamental to the functioning of a democratic system and willhopefully, in the future, lead to greater demand from the electorate for action on theenvironment. However, these types of instruments, just like increasing capability, are all non-coercive policy instruments in that they do not stipulate any specific action to be taken and donot impose costs on a concentrated group. That also means that the government can notexercise any control over what the outcome of its initiatives are. Public education may makethe public less wasteful and further research may provide an impetus for more regulatoryaction, but those outcomes are uncertain.Hence, only the first two categories, regulation and expenditure, promise to result inan improvement in environmental quality within a specified period of time: new regulationsor better enforcement require polluters to stop or abate pollution, and initiatives underexpenditure entail clean-up or environmental enhancement programs funded by the federalgovernment.As the tables on pages 137 and 138 of appendix 2 show, regulation and expendituremake up about one fifth of all Green Plan initiatives. However, saying that one fifth of theGreen Plan initiatives will directly contribute to increasing environmental quality may be- 26 -overly optimistic. Whether or not regulations will be effective depends on whether or notthey are enforced. The creation of new regulatory authority does not guarantee that it will beused to tighten pollution control. Finally, spending on clean-up may, in certain cases be toolow to make a significant difference or, even more frequently, as in the case of the GreenPlan, spending initiatives renew commitments to already existing programs, so that actiontowards improving environmental quality is actually not increased (unless funding for theprograms is increased).'By far the most commonly used policy instruments for both the Green Plan and theprogress report initiatives (initiatives announced after the first one and a half years of theGreen Plan's existence) are capacity increasing instruments. This dominance of non-coerciveinstruments puts into question the likely effectiveness of the Green Plan in producing signifi-cant changes. In order to understand why the Green Plan relies largely on non-coerciveinstruments to deal with environmental problems, the political pressures faced byEnvironment Canada in the drafting of the plan have to be examined. These are oppositionfrom other federal ministers, the industry lobby, environmental interest group activity andprovincial opposition. The above factors will be discussed with reference to the fourpropositions about instrument choice listed in Chapter II.' Examples of previously existing programs which were included in the Green Plan are the EnvironmentalPartners Fund, the Environmental Choice Program, assistance for resource evaluations of designated rivers,contributions to the World Wildlife Fund and sponsorship of the Globe Environmental Conferences in Vancouver.- 27 -2. CABINET OPPOSITION TO THE GREEN PLANThe federal cabinet gave Environment Minister Lucien Bouchard the approval todevelop a five year environmental agenda in August 1989. The agenda was to be presentedto the public in February 1989, together with the federal budget. However, by that time, theproposed plan had still not received full cabinet approval. The reason for this is twofold.First, other ministers were concerned that the plan would interfere with the policies andprograms of their own departments since it proposed making environmental considerationsmandatory in all cabinet policy decisions. Second, the cabinet was unwilling to agree to anextra few billion dollars to Environment Canada at a time when all other departments wererequired to cut back spending.' The biggest opponents of the plan were the Ministers ofIndustry, International Trade, Treasury Board and Finance. 9 Opposition to the plan was alsostrong among bureaucrats in other federal departments, who feared a "power grab" byEnvironment Canada.In an effort to overcome internal resistance to his environmental agenda, LucienBouchard changed tactics and went from closed departmental deliberations to an open publicconsultation process.° His hope was to generate enough public support to pressure cabinetto approve his scheme. However, the discussion paper designed to guide the cross-countryconsultation process had already been weakened compared to the initial 200-page version put8 G.Bruce Doem, "Johnny-Green-Latelies: The Mulroney Environmental Record," How Ottawa spends: ThePolitics of Competitiveness, Frances Abele, ed. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992) p.368.9 Ross Howard, "Federal environment plan bogs down," Globe and Mail, Feb. 2, 1990, Al, A3.1° Craig McInnes, "Plan may be delayed until fall, Bouchard says," Globe and Mail, Feb. 9, 1990, A2.- 28 -together by Environment Canada."In late May, just a few days before the public consultations began, Bouchard resignedas federal Minister of the Environment in protest over issues related to the proposedconstitutional amendments. Treasury Board president Robert de Cotret, who was appointed asBouchard's successor, took over the supervision of the public consultation process.The public consultation process allowed industry, environmental, and consumer groupsto voice their opinions about what should be included in the Green plan and what should beexcluded. Considering the widely diverging interests of these groups, it could not have comeas a surprise that no consensus was reached.'Consequently, it is questionable whether the public consultations had the desired effecton cabinet. The consultations certainly did not stop cabinet from cutting the budget of theGreen Plan from the originally promised $5 billion over five years to $3 billion over six yearsand from rejecting granting Environment Canada greater authority within the government. °Furthermore, when the Green Plan was finally released, no money had been approvedby cabinet for specific Green Plan initiatives. Instead, Environment Canada is required toseek cabinet approval for the funding of each individual program before it can be announced,and all areas of spending face annual review by the government. This leaves cabinet with thepower to oversee spending for environmental clean-up programs and research projects.Finally, more than half of the $3 billion in Green Plan money was assigned todepartments other than Environment Canada. This was heavily criticized as "Mr. de Cotret'sII Ann Malroy, "Ottawa Green Plan Raises Doubts," Vancouver Sun, April 17, 1990, B7.12 Dennis Bueckert, "Green Plan sparks ideas," Vancouver Sun, August 14, 1990, A5.13 Ross Howard, "Release of the Green Plan delayed by cabinet," Globe and Mail, Nov. 30, 1990, A3.- 29 -gift to other cabinet ministers in exchange for their agreeing to finally release the long-delayed plan." 14What effect have all these concessions to cabinet had on the selection of policyinstruments? Generally, cabinet ministers opposed those instruments which would interferemost with their departments' mandates. The Ministers of International Trade, Industry, andEnergy, Mines and Resources, for example, were opposed to "green taxes" and stricterenvironmental standards which could hurt the international competitiveness of business andindustry. 15 Most cabinet ministers were opposed to regulation which would have requiredthem to consider the environmental impact of their programs and projects. ° Hence,Environment Canada was forced to either exclude or weaken the regulatory actions initiallyproposed in the Green Plan.3. OPPOSITION FROM INDUSTRYOpposition from cabinet ministers responsible for different aspects of trade andcommerce was no doubt influenced by the interests of the groups they represented. Industryand business groups lobbied very strongly against certain Green Plan proposals, in particulartaxes on fossil fuels and tough pollution control laws!' According to Francois Bregha,policy director at the Rawson Academy, an environmental consulting group, the fact that theeconomy went into a recession just a few months prior to the release of the Green Plan14 Ross Howard, "Green Plan open to abuse, critics charge," Globe and Mail, December 13, 1990, A7.15 Dennis Bueckert, "Bouchard denies cabinet opposition," Ottawa Citizen, Feb. 1, 1990, p.4.16 Ross Howard, supra note 13.17 John Geddes, supra note 4.- 30 -helped the fight of industry against tougher environmental laws. He pointed out that theGreen Plan does not include many initiatives which will cost the private sector money. 18One of the most active industry lobbyists was the Canadian Petroleum Association(CPA). It released a response to the Green Plan in July 1990 which deals with a large varietyof environmental issues, including waste management, water, environmental emergencies andwildlife protection. 19 One of its main concerns was that the federal government consultwith the private sector before making any binding commitments to international agreementsand accords, such as the Nitrogen Oxides Protocol, which might require industry to complywith unrealistic reductions schedules and hurt its international competitiveness.A second concern related to the cost of environmental initiatives. According to DougBruchet, an environmental consultant for CPA, the costs should be borne by the public. In anarticle in the Calgary Sun, he was quoted as having said: "We do not support a tax at thewell-head which will only affect the oil and gas industry. We think it should be broad-basedbecause protecting the environment is everybody's concern."" Such a "broad-based" taxwould be applied at the consumer level and aimed at encouraging environmentally friendlybehaviour and consumption. The CPA document also warned that "costly unilateral Canadianaction could lead to the needless dislocation of industries, with no significant improvement inenvironmental quality. "2' The federal government was sensitive to the pressure fromindustry, and some key proposals opposed by the private sector were not included in the final18 Ibid.19 Frank Dabbs, "CPA environment paper is benchmark for industry," Financial Post, July 31, 1990, p.21.20 Dann Rogers, "Costs of cleaning up," Calgary Sun, July 31, 1990.21 Quoted in Frank Dabbs, supra note 19.- 31 -Green Plan. These were the so-called "green taxes," including the proposed tax on fossilfuels, and stricter enforcement measures....there is a scarcity of stern measures against potential and actual polluters thatmakes the Green Plan seem unnecessarily weak - a reflection, perhaps, of the cabinet'spro-business orientation.'Even though green taxes were not included because of too much opposition from theprivate sector, the federal government is currently studying the use of economic instrumentsto encourage environmental protection, this time in consultation with industry. For thispurpose, a discussion paper on economic instruments was released in June 1992.3. PRESSURE FORM ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPSEven though environmental groups were given an opportunity to present their viewsduring the public consultation process, the final Green Plan fell far short of their expectations.Environmental groups urged the government to "reorient its tax regime to discourage pollutingindustries, divert federal funds into non-polluting energy development, and institute a get-tough program of enforcement."' They also lobbied for an environmental bill of rights andspecific sums for specific programs. None of these demands were realized in the Green Plan;instead, environmental groups got a document of "fuzzy declarations of good intentions.'The objectives set are for the most part very general and allocations have only been made forvery broad categories of initiatives.n Jeffrey Simpson, "The Green Plan is high on good intentions, low on specific commitments," Globe and Mail,December 12, 1990, A20.23 Ross Howard, "Green Plan recommendations delivered," Globe and Mail, August 24, 1990, A4.'A Jeffrey Simpson, supra note 22.- 32 -Why did environmental groups not achieve what they wanted? One possibleexplanation is that they did not have enough credibility because the public they were claimingto represent was in fact not very concerned about the environment. Evidence on the public'sconcern about the environment is inconclusive. A poll conducted by Environics ResearchGroup Ltd. in the fall of 1990 showed that nearly three-quarters of Canadians approved ofsome form of green taxes. 25 Another poll conducted by the same company shows that whileCanadians believed action on the environment was important, eight out of ten thought that thegovernment was unable to deal with environmental problems. 26These two polls would suggest that government action on the environment was bothdesired and needed. However, a Globe and Mail - CBC News poll taken at approximatelythe same time showed that only 7 per cent of the respondents considered the environmentCanada's most important problem, significantly less than the percentage whose major concernwas the economy and the proposed goods and services tax. Only a year earlier, environ-mental problems had been ranked at the top of the list by 17 per cent of the respondents?'This significant downward trend was also reflected in polls taken in February and July andmay have indicated to the government that economic interests deserve a higher priority thanenvironmental interests.A second explanation as to why environmental groups did not succeed in making theGreen Plan stronger is simply the constellation of power in cabinet discussed above. The firstReported in Martin Mittelstaedt, "Groups sought tree, were 'given seedling," Globe and Mail, December 12,1990, A6.Anne Mcllroy, "Is Canada a dirty word?" Montreal Gazette, October 15, 1990, A8.Hugh Winsor, "Green concerns pale," Globe and Mail, October 30, 1990, A7.- 33 -draft of the Green Plan presented by Environment Canada to cabinet included a significantnumber of actions demanded by environmental groups. They proposed a review of everyactivity of the federal government: the national harmonization of environmental standards,new regulations, stricter enforcement actions, the use of market based instruments to reflectthe environmental costs of products, higher prices for fossil fuels and the development ofalternative sources of energy. That the draft was substantially changed and weakened bycabinet members was less influenced by a lack of pressure from environmental groups thanby the refusal of a number of cabinet ministers to allow the new Green Plan to giveEnvironment Canada new powers to interfere with the programs of their departments. Thisview is supported by Kai Millyard, of environmental group Friends of the Earth, in hisassessment of the influence of environmental groups and the public on the Green Plan:...the public consultations won't have much influence on what cabinet decidesin the end. What really counts is the debates and machinations within cabinet. 28Environment Canada does not have enough influence in cabinet to push anything pastthe central departments whose main concern is the economy and who therefore represent theinterests of the private sector which was essentially opposed to the type of initiatives favouredby the environmental interest groups.What the public got in the end was largely symbolic action - studies, research andprograms to show concern for the environment but no bold step towards sustainabledevelopment.Reported in Dennis Bueckert, supra note 11.- 34 -4. PROVINCIAL RESISTANCE TO FEDERAL INTERFERENCEThe provinces sided with industry in their opposition to the Green Plan. Especiallyamong the resource dependent provinces opposition was high. They were concerned thatOttawa might override provincial jurisdiction over environmental matters and seize controlover environmental management. This would equal control over resource development andby extension, significant control over the provincial economies. The Green Plan wascompared to the National Energy Program (NEP) in that its effects would be similar: "amassive siphoning of wealth to Ottawa, investment and economic growth grinding to a halt inresource-producing regions and a sharp rise in unemployment.""Provincial and territorial energy ministers complained in a joint statement from theirannual meeting in Winnipeg that the federal government was developing its environmentalaction plan without consulting them. They demanded a joint decisionmaking process andexpressed concern about the proposed tax on fossil fuels and the proposed federal environ-mental assessment regulations. The ministers demanded that provincial environmentalassessment replace federal assessment for projects where federal and provincial jurisdictionsoverlap.30 The strongest opposition to a tax on fossil fuels came from Alberta, because asthe province with the highest per capita consumption of fossil fuels, it would suffer the mostfrom such a tax. The Alberta Conservative caucus chairman threatened that if a carbon taxwas included in the Green Plan, the entire Alberta caucus would vote against it. 31While the provinces were worried about federal encroachment on their regulatory29 ^the green tiger," Alberta Report, February 19, 1990, p. 16.30 John Fox, "Green plan leaves us out, provinces say," Financial Post, August 29, 1990, p.4.31 "Riding the green tiger," supra note 29, p.16.- 35 -powers with respect to natural resources,32 no opposition was voiced to any of the proposedspending initiatives. In fact, it seems that federal spending can never be high enough. InAugust 1990, the B.C. government demanded twice as much money as Ottawa offered on anew reforestation agreement arguing that it was not getting its share of federal funds forreforestation purposes. 33 Federal spending, generally, does not interfere with provincialjurisdiction and is therefore seen as a welcome source of funds.The final text of the Green Plan must have been a pleasant surprise to the provinces.It does not include any green taxes, and it also responds to provincial fears of federalinterference in provincial jurisdiction by its emphasis, repeated throughout the document, onfederal commitment to work in partnership with the provinces. In addition, the final text doesnot commit the provinces to any federal programs, that is, no federal-provincial agreementshave been signed to implement the Green Plan.34 This is an invitation to provincialdemands that every initiative be subject to consultations and negotiations with the provincesaffected by it. In short, provincial pressures on the federal government have significantlycontributed to an overall non-coercive and conciliatory Green Plan.5.^CONCLUSIONThe above discussion shows that for the most part, the political pressures onEnvironment Canada (and the federal government in general) worked against a highly32 Ken MacQueen, "De Cotret warned to respect environmental jurisdiction," Ottawa Citizen, November 30,1990, A5." Anne Fletcher, "B.C. rejects offer on reforestation," Financial Post, August 23, 1990,p.4.Ross Howard, supra note 13.- 36 -coercive environmental agenda. Influential cabinet ministers, the private sector and theprovinces were opposed to strong regulatory action and an expansion of the authority ofEnvironment Canada. The only groups in favour of more coercive policy instruments wereenvironmental groups, who did not have the same political weight as the other three groups ofactors, especially since the level of public support for new environmental regulations wasinconclusive.The propositions discussed in chapter II have been confirmed by the Green Planexperience. The federal government did not use highly coercive instruments because theparties who would have had to bear the costs were well organized and effectively opposedregulatory action. The government did not yield to environmental interest group pressurebecause public support was inconclusive and the credit to be claimed for getting tough withpolluters did not seem to outweigh the blame the government feared to generate from theprivate sector. In that situation, non-coercive instruments which do not force any specificaction and therefore do not create political enemies were, from a political perspective, thewiser choice.While the incentives to satisfy environmental groups and the public were not strongenough to risk offending industry, public concern for the environment could not be ignoredentirely - especially since Prime Minister Mulroney had promised to take steps towardsachieving sustainable development. The way to pacify the public was through symbolicaction. The government needed to be seen doing something. The promise of numerousstudies and research was one way to do this, spending on clean-up programs another,repackaging old programs yet another. None of these types of initiatives impose new costs on- 37 -concentrated groups. The repackaging of old initiatives is particularly interesting. ManyGreen Plan initiatives have in fact been identified as already existing programs whose fundingis to be renewed under the Green Plan. Announcing old initiatives as new ones is apolitically safe thing to do, since once programs have been in place for a while, controversyover them has usually died down. In addition, there are no new costs for anyone associatedwith an already existing program and polluters are usually more concerned about new andunpredictable costs.Finally, since funding for each initiative has to be approved by cabinet, the public willbe reminded of the federal government's commitment to the environment through regularspending announcements under the Green Plan. In short, in implementing the Green Plan, thegovernment is avoiding blame where it can and claiming credit where it is politically the leastrisky.A similar pattern of behaviour can also be observed at the level of the individualGreen Plan initiative. The next chapter will deal with federal blame avoidance in the case ofthe Fraser River Action Plan.CHAPTER IVCASE STUDY: THE FRASER RIVER ACTION PLAN One of the environmental problem areas identified in the Green Plan is the FraserRiver Basin. The federal government promised to develop a sustainable management plan forthe Fraser River and Burrard Inlet together with the B.C. provincial government, communitiesand industry. On June 1, 1991, the federal government committed $100 million to the FraserRiver Action Plan. The Action Plan is composed of eleven distinct initiatives which, as Ihave done with the entire Green Plan, can be categorized according to the policy instrumentsto be used to implement the initiatives.Regulation is the policy instrument most likely to achieve the stated objectives. Fromthe perspective of the federal government it is also a relatively cheap policy instrumentbecause direct clean-up costs have to be paid by the polluters. These qualities would seem tomake regulation a preferred policy instrument by the federal government However, theFraser River Action Plan does not bear this out. For the most part, the initiatives under theAction Plan make use of "capacity increasing" policy instruments, that is to say, they involvethe identification of environmental problems, monitoring, research, and demonstrationprojects. A second important characteristic of the initiatives is that they are non-confron-tational. That is, the federal government clearly avoids taking any action which couldinterfere with provincial or municipal jurisdiction. Federal activity is largely restricted tostrengthening already existing federal programs or providing research and planning support toprovincial and municipal programs. The Action Plan does not propose any new regulations orstandards to protect the environmental quality of the Fraser River basin and if such- 39 -regulations are to be developed - as might be the case under the Burrard Inlet EnvironmentalAction Plan - they will be developed in close cooperation with the province and themunicipalities.In its preference of non-coercive policy instruments, the Fraser River Action Plan issimilar to the entire Green Plan which, as demonstrated in chapter III, favours capacityincreasing policy instruments over regulatory action. Because of this similarity to the overallGreen Plan, the Fraser River Action Plan provides a good case study which can shed somelight on what determines the federal government's choice of policy instruments.In what is to follow, I will discuss the events leading up to the announcement of theFraser River Action Plan, discuss each of the initiatives separately, and finally examine thefactors which may have influenced the choice of initiatives and policy instruments. In orderto be able to offer an explanation as to why certain policy instruments were chosen overothers, I will look at constitutional constraints, budgetary constraints, and the federalgovernment's incentives to avoid blame in response to political pressures from environmentalgroups, industry and other levels of government.1. GENESIS OF THE FRASER RIVER ACTION PLANThe federal government's commitment to target the Fraser River for action wasprompted by pressure from a number of concerned MPs from Quesnel, Prince George and theLower Mainland.' Their concern was raised by an article on the Fraser River whichTelephone interviews with officials from the Department of Fisheries and Ocean and Tom Siddon's minister'soffice, August, 1992.- 40 -appeared in the Nov/Dec 1988 issue of Equinox.' Tom Siddon, then Minister of Fisheriesand Oceans and MP for Vancouver South, brought the pollution problems in the Fraser to theattention of the B.C. conservative caucus. The B.C. caucus approved of the idea of a basin-wide environmental action plan and in September 1989, a proposal was submitted to thefederal cabinet to fund a basin-wide management plan under the Green Plan. The Departmentof Fisheries and Oceans and Environment Canada strongly supported the proposal and gainedthe support of a number of Fraser River communities. On March 2, 1990, representativesfrom 16 different municipalities or communities along the Fraser River held a meeting inRichmond chaired by Vancouver Mayor Gordon Campbell. The objective of the meeting wasto develop recommendations to senior levels of government to address their concerns and toimprove the quality of the Fraser. The Mayors present at the meeting agreed that there was aneed for an integrated approach to the management of the entire river basin. They called fora Three Point Action Plan:1. A detailed water quality study from the source of the Fraser to the sea2. The commitment of all sixty agencies involved in the Fraser - government,industries, and communities - to reverse the trend of deterioration, andrehabilitate the river through the creation of the Fraser River Management Plan3. The promotion of public awareness of the river as an enormous as set. 3Nine months later, on November 30, 1990, ten representatives of the Fraser CitiesCoalition met with federal and provincial Ministers of Environment to suggest an actionprogram for the Fraser. The federal Minister of the Environment, Robert de Cotret,2 Mark Hume, "Embattled Giant - Pollution threatens to destroy British Columbia's mighty Fraser River,"Equinox, Nov/Dec 1988.3 "Fraser Basin Action Program: Proposal for discussion," paper prepared for discussion at the Fraser CitiesCoalition Meeting, Vancouver, January 11, 1991.- 41 -committed to including initiatives on the Fraser River in the Green Plan and the provincialMinister of Environment, John Reynolds, announced that the Province would participate inthe implementation of the plan and would match federal funding.'This was the first time since a management plan for the Fraser River had beenproposed that the province showed any interest in participating. The reason for the lateprovincial involvement was the low priority the Vander Zalm government gave to theenvironment.5Shortly after the release of the Green Plan, on January 11, 1991, the Fraser CitiesCoalition met for a second time and the mayors specified the goals and objectives of the"Fraser Basin Action Program". A discussion paper was drawn up which identified severalareas requiring attention: water quality, habitat management, pollution sources, control ofwater uses and adjacent land use, enforcement, public participation, and research. Thediscussion paper stated the need for cooperation among the Environment Ministries, theDepartment of Fisheries and Oceans, regional districts, and municipalities since none of theseagencies can delegate their legislated responsibilities to the organization developing andimplementing the Fraser River Management Plan. However, the paper also emphasized thatlocal governments should not lose jurisdiction over matters currently under their control andthat the key to the future management structure would be an effective mechanism for localand regional participation. 6The federal government accepted most of the principles laid out in the discussionIbid., p2.5 Ibid., p.14.6 Ibid., p.8.- 42 -paper of the Fraser Cities Coalition; "building partnerships" with the province, themunicipalities, and all other stakeholders was one of the major components of the FraserRiver Action Plan announced on June 1, 1991.On October 19, 1991, the federal government released the "Fraser River SustainableDevelopment Program - A Preview", which gives a more detailed description of theobjectives of the Fraser River Action Plan.' Its budget is $100 million, covering the periodfrom 1991 to 1997 and is divided equally between Environment Canada and the Departmentof Fisheries and Oceans.' The Action Plan is to be governed by three basic principles:1) sustainable development2) cooperation with the provincial and municipal governments, the private sector andenvironmental groups3) making the polluter pay for the costs of clean-up and control.1.1 FRASER BASIN MANAGEMENT PROGRAM START -UP COMMITTEEThe first step in the development of a sustainable management program for the FraserRiver basin was the establishment of the Fraser Basin Management Start-up Committee onAugust 2, 1991. The membership of the committee included representatives from the threelevels of government, the aboriginal community, environmental groups, industry and thepublic. The committee was formed under the Fraser River Action Plan and its mandate wasto provide advice on the development of a comprehensive management program. In order to' Government of Canada, The Fraser River Sustainable Development Plan - A Preview, Draft, October 19, 1991,p.2.Environment Canada and Fisheries and Oceans. Fraser River Action Plan 1991-92 Progress Report,  p.9.- 43 -gain input from the public, the committee held a number of public meetings in Prince George,Kamloops, Chilliwack, Richmond, North Vancouver, and Vancouver. The outcome of thesemeetings contributed to the drafting of the federal/provincial/municipal agreement establi-shing the Fraser Basin Management Program in April 1992.1.2 FRASER BASIN MANAGEMENT PROGRAMThe Fraser Basin Management Program is governed by a 19 member managementboard which was selected in August 1992.9 The board consists of three representatives eachfrom the federal, provincial and local governments, and nine other members representingaboriginal peoples, industry, labour and the general public. During the consultations of theStart-Up Committee, it was formally decided that the management board would also include arepresentative from an environmental organization. 10 To the great disappointment of manyenvironmental groups, this decision has been ignored. This means that environmental groupsare excluded from the decision making process and will have no input on how the FraserBasin Management Board will allocate its funds.The purpose of the Fraser Basin Management Program is to provide for sustainabledevelopment in the Fraser basin through the coordination and integration of activities,management practices, and decision making processes of all three levels of government."9 Government of Canada, Province of British Columbia, Union of B.C. Municipalities, News Release, "FraserBasin Management Agreement Announced," Vancouver, May 26, 1992.1° Interview with a Start-Up Committee member, July, 1992.11 Government of Canada, Government of the Province of B.C., Fraser Municipalities and Regional Districts,Agreement Respecting the Fraser Basin Management Program, March 30, 1992.The definition of sustainable development given in the agreement is that used by the Brundtland Commission.- 44 -The Fraser River Action Plan is only one component of the Fraser Basin ManagementProgram; the Fraser River Estuary Management program (FREMP), a 1985 federal-provincialagreement to protect the quality of the Fraser estuary's natural environment, and severalprovincial and municipal initiatives such as sewage treatment upgrading,12 integratedresource management, solid waste management, air emissions control, groundwater qualitymonitoring and control, and elimination of toxic substances from pulp and paper mills will allbe coordinated through the Fraser Basin Management Program.2. THE FRASER RIVER ACTION PLAN INITIATIVES Besides the Fraser Basin Management Board, ten other initiatives receive fundingunder the Fraser River Action Plan. Some of them will be coordinated through the FraserBasin Management Board, others will remain within the control of either Environment Canadaor the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Few of the initiatives announced under FRAP areentirely new; the majority are based on existing federal programs that will be renewed orexpanded.2.1 FRASER RIVER ESTUARY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMThe Fraser River Estuary Management Program (FREMP) can in many ways be seenas a predecessor to the Fraser River Action Plan and has been used as a model for the FraserBasin Management Board. It was established by a federal-provincial agreement in October12 The Province of B.C. has paid for half of the pre-construction costs to convert the Lulu and Annacis Islandsewage treatment plants from primary to secondary treatment. But the province has not offered any constructionmoney to date.- 45 -1985 and involves Environment Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the B.C. Ministry ofEnvironment, the North Fraser Harbour Commission, and the Fraser River HarbourCommission.FREMP established seven work groups to review activities in port and industrialmanagement, navigation and dredging, log management, waste management, water quality,recreation, habitat and environmental emergencies. Each of the work groups wrote a reportand, based on their findings, recommended specific actions. The sections of the reportsdealing specifically with how to improve environmental protection of the estuary made anumber of important recommendations. These included the establishment of basicenvironmental standards to be applied to the construction of new industry, the revision ofcurrent Fisheries and Oceans Dredging Guidelines to include more detailed environmentalguidelines for dredging approval procedures and operational methods, the implementation ofindustrial and commercial sewer use control, the upgrading of the Annacis and Lulu Islandsewage treatment plants, the revision of all pollution control objectives, and the identificationof areas where enforcement and abatement may be needed!' The habitat work groupconcluded that "existing environmental legislation is not adequate to protect and conserve allimportant habitat for fish and wildlife in the Fraser River estuary.[...] The establishment of aformal policy would improve the agencies' abilities to protect wildlife habitat.'" Most ofthe recommendations made by FREMP have yet to be implemented.13 Government of Canada and Province of British Columbia, Summary of Activity Programs and ProposedFramework for Action, Fraser River Estuary Management Program, February, 1992, pp.6-14.14 Ibid., p.16.- 46 -FREMP is also known for the establishment of the Coordinated Project ReviewProcess. Under this process all development projects proposed in the estuary are referred toone central office which coordinates the environmental review among the relevant regulatoryagencies. This process avoids the duplication of reviews by several agencies and ensures thatthe companies seeking development approval fulfil all regulatory requirements as establishedby the different government agencies.FREMP was renewed for another three years at the same time that the Fraser RiverAction Plan was announced and will receive additional federal funding through the GreenPlan, as well as from the other partners to the agreement. Under the renewed agreement, theGreater Vancouver Regional District is joining the five original signatories. In the next threeyears the emphasis will be on "developing closer involvement with municipalities, industries,estuary users and the public to refine and implement various plans and technicalrecommendations of the activity programs of FREMP."'FREMP has been criticized for covering too limited an area. It excludes the Strait ofGeorgia into which the Fraser River empties and does not look at the upland areas but stopsat the dykes. In the North-West it goes no further than Mission, ignoring how upstreamactivity affects the estuary. The program has also been attacked for its failure to include non-governmental representatives on its board. The Fraser Basin Management Program is designedto remedy these two problems; it will consider the entire drainage area of the Fraser Riverand its management board includes representatives from industry and the public (but similarlyto FREMP it excludes environmental groups).15 Ibid., p.27.- 47 -Since it has largely a coordinating and advisory function, FREMP employsexclusively capacity-increasing policy instruments, such as classification, monitoring, research,and plan development. FREMP can recommend that government agencies take regulatoryaction but it has no regulatory or enforcement powers itself. The decision to employ morecoercive policy instruments and to enforce environmental requirements of specific projectstherefore rests with the individual government agencies. Overall, FREMP has been successfulas a bureaucracy but not in furthering pollution abatement. An assessment of FREMP todate, made by the Technical Advisory Committee to the GVRD, statesWhile the FREMP program had been successful in fostering communication and co-operation amongst agencies, its efforts to achieve advances in waste managementand improvements in environmental conditions have largely been frustrated througha lack of available resources and funds. 162.2 DEMONSTRATION WATERSHEDSWhen the Fraser River Action Plan was first announced $11 million was allocated tothe development of demonstration projects which would apply the principles of sustainabledevelopment, and to information and education programs such as state of the environmentreports for the basin and GIS (geographic information system) mapping and aerial and land-use surveys. The purpose of the demonstration watersheds is to provide working examples ofsustainable resource management within the Fraser basin. The lessons learned are expected toprovide ideas and guidelines for the management of the entire Fraser basin. The first yearprogress report announced that the first demonstration watershed will be established in 1992-16 Greater Vancouver Regional District, Burrard Inlet Environmental Improvements, Draft Action Plan, January,1990, p.68.- 48 -93. Even though initiated by Environment Canada and Fisheries and Oceans, this program isbeing developed in cooperation with other federal departments and provincial environmentand resource management ministries.The demonstration watersheds have two functions; to help develop new technologyand expertise in the area of sustainable resource management and at the same time educateusers of the Fraser on the knowledge/expertise gained. Hence, the policy instruments used inthis initiative, fall under increasing capacity and public education, both instruments whichinvolve very little coercion on the part of the federal government.2.3 THE BURRARD INLET ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION PLANThe federal government committed $1.8 million to the Burrard Inlet EnvironmentalAction Plan, a project with the objective of cleaning up and controlling pollution in theBurrard Inlet. Four other agencies are involved in the project: the Department of Fisheriesand Oceans, the British Columbia Ministry of Environment, the Vancouver Port Corporation,and the Greater Vancouver Sewerage and Drainage District. All five agencies, including thefederal government, will contribute $400,000 to the program over the next five years. Thissum does not include the investments made by each agency for specific commitments.The Burrard Inlet Environmental Action Plan is based on the recommendations madein a draft action plan released by the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) in January1990. The draft action plan was triggered by findings by the federal government that thequality of bottom sediment in the Burrard Inlet is degraded and that there is a moderate tohigh prevalence of precancerous lesions and tumours in bottom fish. In the draft action plan,- 49 -the GVRD pointed out the need for cooperation among all three levels of government sincethe mandate to protect the environment rests with the federal and provincial governments.One of the key recommendations made in the report is the need to upgrade Vancouver'ssewage treatment plants from primary to secondary treatment. But it would cost over $40million just to upgrade the Lions Gate treatment plant which discharges effluents into theBurrard Inlet. In addition, the annual operating costs of the upgraded plant would increase byover $2 million!' To date both the federal and provincial governments have assigned thehighest priority for sewage treatment upgrading to the Annacis and Lulu Island plants whichrelease discharges into the Fraser River!'The draft action plan also emphasized the importance of identifying and controllingthe environmental impact of non-point sources, now largely unregulated!' The GVRD andindustry have developed 'best management practices'(BMPs) for industrial and port activities,but BMPs are not enforceable. For certain practices, bylaws have been passed by the GVRDbased on the BMPs. The Vancouver sewer bylaw and the bylaw on photofinishing practices,for example, are both based on the text of previously existing BMPs.The BMP Action Team, established under the BIEAP, is currently reviewing existingBMPs to identify if there are any holes in the guidelines. But there is no plan to developnew regulations, since this is left up to the individual governmental agencies. The BPMAction Team hopes that compliance with existing BPMs can be increased by better informing17 Ibid., p.58.18 In 1990, B.C. Environment Minister John Reynolds ordered the regional district to have secondary treatmentby 1993, but the deadline was subsequently extended to 1995 for Lulu and 1997for Annacis. Neither the federal nor the provincial government have offered to contribute to the construction costs.19 Burrard Inlet Environmental Improvements, supra note 16, p.14.- 50 -the affected parties of what these codes of practices are, because in many cases, individuals orcompanies are not even aware that they exist." The Burrard Inlet Draft Action Plan is lesshopeful that compliance can be reached by simply increasing efforts at informing the public:"...for BPMs to be fully effective, legislation and/or bylaws must be implemented to make therecommended practices enforceable." 21In addition, the draft action plan recommended that some legislation (such as theCanada Shipping Act to regulate sewage discharges from vessels) would need to beamended.' But, for the most part,existing legislation provides the power to control almost every contaminant sourceto the Burrard Inlet. However, for a variety of reasons, including limited staff andfunds, the agencies have focused on regulating and enforcing standards for a limitednumber of sources considered a priority; sources considered to have a lower priorityare largely unregulated at this time.'The writers of the draft action plan were confident that most of its recommendationscould be successfully implemented; the only major stumbling block identified was a lack ofavailable resources and funds. The budget of the Burrard Inlet Environmental Action Plandemonstrates the force of this constraint. $2 million over five years will only allow the mostrudimentary clean-up actions to be carried out; the upgrading of the Lions Gate treatmentplant seems out of reach because of the costs involved. Success of the Burrard InletEnvironmental Action Plan then, depends largely on voluntary compliance of pollutingindustries with "best management practices."2° Interview with the director of the BMP Action Team, September 8, 1992.21 Burrard Inlet Environmental Improvements, supra note 16, p.63.22 Ibid., p.23.23 Ibid, p.12.- 51 -Progress to date includes the establishment of the Burrard Inlet Environmental ActionPlan (BIEAP) office in downtown Vancouver's and the identification of four main areas ofconcern:1) objectives and standards2) operations and enforcement3) remediation4) land/water use planningUnder each of the above categories several projects have been initiated. Under objectives andstandards, DOE and DFO are responsible for the dioxin monitoring program and DOE alsoparticipates in research on biomedical indicators of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH)in fish. Under operations and enforcement, DOE is conducting an enforcement capabilitystudy and is participating in reviews of existing enforcement programs and emergencyresponse procedures. Under remediation, the federal government has assumed almost noresponsibilities apart from DOE participation in a review of the referral of on-shore contami-nated sites. DFO, together with the Vancouver Port Corporation initiated a habitat mappingproject under the fourth area of concern, land/water use planning.The projects in which DOE and DFO are involved are without exception aimed atincreasing capacity. The only project which may lead to the tightening of existing codes ofpractice is being undertaken by the Best Management Practices Action Team, which includesparticipants from all parties to the BIEAP. The Action Team reviewed all codes andguidelines in 1991 and in the next year will identify the gaps, and recommend theThe office was found to make communication between the different agencies very cumbersome and as a resultwas closed down again, only a few months after it had opened.- 52 -development of new codes where necessary. 25 However, whether or not new codes ofpractice will decrease water pollution significantly depends on the voluntary compliance ofthe parties affected.2.4 POLLUTION ABATEMENTA third component of the Fraser River Action Plan is a pollution abatement programto be implemented by Environment Canada. The two key targets announced in October of1991 were:to reduce by 30 per cent, in the first five years, the discharge of harmful industrialpollutants into the waters of the Basin and to virtually eliminate, by the year 2000, therelease of toxic substances in the basin. The substances in question are itemized inthe Priority Substances List, published and regularly updated by Environment Canadaunder the Canadian Environmental Protection Act. 26Even though this seems to be a serious commitment to pollution abatement, there is to dateno clear strategy on how the reductions are to be achieved?'Environment Canada and the B.C. Ministry of Environment have assigned priority tofive classes of contaminants entering the Fraser River: industrial discharges, urban andagricultural runoff, air pollution, ground water, and waste site identification and clean-up.In the case of industrial discharges, clean-up will be concentrated in the heavilyindustrialized parts of the lower Fraser and on pulp and paper plants, sawmills and otherforest industry facilities in the basin. To reduce pollution from urban and agricultural runoff,the federal government proposes the assembly of a more complete data base on the type andBurrard Inlet Environmental Action Program, Annual Report 1991/92,  June 1992.The Fraser River Sustainable Development Program - A Preview,  supra note 7, p.8.27 Interview with an Environment Canada official, August 12, 1992.- 53 -volume of contaminants in the Fraser, setting priorities for reducing specific contaminants,regulatory or other measures to reduce pollution loads, evaluation of the effectiveness of thecontrol measures, monitoring and surveillance of compliance and evaluation of theeffectiveness of regulation. The problem of air pollution is to be attacked by compiling aninventory of emission sources for major industrial sectors in the Fraser Basin, assessing theeffectiveness of current air pollution control technology, and establishing a monitoringnetwork to trace the source and destination of airborne pollution. Under the ground waterprogram, an inventory of ground waters close to pollution sources and in risk ofcontamination will be made. The fifth category of sources of contaminants, waste sites, willhave to be identified and cleaned up. Where possible, the clean-up of contaminated wastesites will be the responsibility of the offending party. Where the responsible party cannot beidentified, the Orphan Site Fund, established previously under a nationwide program, will beused as a source of funds for the clean-up.Of the above five classes of contaminants, so far action has only been taken to addressurban runoff. In September of 1992, Environment Canada expects to award a contract to anenvironmental consultant company to develop a methodology to measure the contaminantloadings of effluents from sewage treatment plants and combined sewer overflows 2 8 Hence,the only step that has been taken to date will initiate another monitoring program. Whetherthe monitoring program is really needed before any pollution abatement action is initiated isdoubtful. It might just be a way to delay immediate response to well-known problems since' The GVRD estimates that combined sewers (which carry sewage and stormwater) in Vancouver, NewWestminster, and Burnaby overflow about 62 billion litres of mixed sewage and rainfall runoff each year, enoughto fill B.C. Place Stadium over 30 times.- 54 -it will not contribute significantly to already existing data. In the development of its LiquidWaste Management Plan, the GVRD has estimated the volume of untreated sewage enteringlower Mainland waters every year. It also established the Combined Sewer Overflow andUrban Runoff Committee which researched existing data on the pollution arising fromcombined sewer overflows and urban runoff, and has evaluated alternatives for reducingcontaminant discharges to local receiving waters.' Environment Canada's monitoringprogram can contribute to determining the exact impact of sewage treatment plant effluents,combined sewer overflows and urban runoff, but such a program should not be used to delayaction. Current data which rates 14 out of 21 water bodies in the region either "fair" or"poor"3° should be strong enough to prompt action. Already back in 1988, Ken Hall, withthe Westwater Research Centre, stated that the existing knowledge of water quality in theFraser was sufficient to warrant clean-up actions to address specific problems. 31 At thattime, the number of scientific reports on the quality of the Fraser, written since 1950, alreadyamounted to about 650. Since then the GVRD, and the provincial and federal ministries ofEnvironment have commissioned numerous more studies on water quality, sewage effluents,and other sources of contaminants.It is difficult to judge whether or not this time further studies will result in action.According to an Environment Canada official, once the monitoring program has established29 Hew D. McConnell, "Planning for Metropolitan Liquid Waste Management in the GVRD: An InnovativeApproach Towards Sustainable Development," in Anthony Dorcey, ed. Perspectives on Sustainable Development in Water Management (Vancouver: Westwater Research Centre, 1991) p.274.' Quoted in Greater Vancouver Regional District, Liquid Waste Management Plan, 1988. These ratings meanthat at times,water quality is not high enough to support uses such as bathing, crop irrigation, and habitat for fish.31 Quoted in Mark Hume, supra note 2, p.71.- 55 -the severity of the problem, contaminants loadings (as opposed to total flow) will be reducedeither by revising existing codes of practice or guidelines, or by encouraging the developmentof new technologies. Neither one of these action involves a high degree of coercion.The first mechanism for reducing contaminants is currently in the review stage of theprocess. New regulations are not anticipated but the existing codes of practice of theprovince and the federal government might be revised. The second mechanism, developmentof new technologies, is funded in part by the Environmental Technology Program, anotherGreen Plan initiative announced October 7, 1991. Under this program industries can applyfor federal funds to develop and demonstrate commercially viable environmentaltechnologies.32The initiatives announced under the pollution abatement program so far fall under onemajor instrument category: increasing capacity. Even if codes of practices are reviewed at alater date, polluters may not have to pay for clean-up costs as announced in the statement ofprinciples of the Fraser River Action Plan (see page 43) because, as mentioned above, codesof practice can not be legally enforced.2.5 WATER/ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENTTo manage the environmental quality of the Fraser River, the federal government hasannounced several actions. Firstly, existing water quality objectives for the lower part of thebasin are to be reviewed and followed by the development of scientific information forenvironmental quality objectives throughout the basin. If necessary, new objectives will be32 Environment Canada Press Release, "$100 million Green Plan Initiative Technology for EnvironmentalSolutions Unveiled," October 7, 1991.- 56 -developed and negotiated with stakeholders. Secondly, present water quality of the river areto be assessed and the effectiveness of the current regulatory program will be evaluated.Thirdly, the program will fund scientific research into the effects of certain pollutants onwater quality, fish productivity, etc. The research will also be directed towards finding bettermeasurements of environmental quality. Finally, enforcement is to be strengthened in orderto increase the compliance with requirements under the Fisheries Act and the CanadianEnvironmental Protection Act.The above actions are taken in cooperation with the province. The development ofwater quality objectives from Moose Lake to Kanaka Creek is being undertaken by theprovince and setting up monitoring programs of the objectives are also the responsibility ofthe province. Water quality objectives vary from one body of water to the next. They areformulated based on the major water uses identified for the water body. For example, waterquality objectives for water bodies which support valuable resources or provide drinkingwater are set so as to avoid degradation. "For other bodies, objectives are set to protect themost sensitive designated use, which may allow some degradation...or it may require someenhancement action."33 These objectives are not enforceable as environmental standards;their purpose is to provide a monitoring standard by which water quality is measured. Theyalso act as guidelines for the issuing of waste management permits, water licences orpesticide use permits by the provincial Ministry of Environment.The federal government can review the water quality objectives of the province but33 Harriet I. Rueggeberg and Anthony H. J. Dorcey, "Governance of Aquatic Resources in the Fraser RiverBasin," Anthony H.J. Dorcey, ed. Water in Sustainable Development: Exploring Our Common Future in the FraserRiver Basin. (Vancouver: Westwater Research Centre, 1991) p.214.- 57 -does not develop its own. Instead, the federal government monitors the environmental qualityof various media, such as biota and sediment quality. At the present time, EnvironmentCanada is supporting the development of ecosystem objectives. Some of the municipalities inthe Fraser River Basin have already started work in that area; however, the ecosystemobjectives still have to be defined. Environment Canada is also assessing how theenvironmental quality of the basin has changed over time.The actual role of Environment Canada in the water/environmental quality initiative isa support role. According to one Environment Canada official, the federal government is notundertaking any abatement measures, nor funding changes in industry or helping in any clean-up actions. Rather, funding is going into identifying where problems are, providing supportto the province and the municipalities in developing guidelines, and monitoring environmentalquality.34 Judging by how the funds are allocated, the policy instruments used by thefederal government in the environmental/water quality area concentrate on research andmonitoring. Actions which aim directly at increasing environmental quality are beingundertaken by the province and, to a degree, the municipalities.2.6 ENFORCEMENTIn its first announcement of the Fraser River Action Plan, the federal governmentearmarked $10.6 million to contribute towards stricter enforcement of environmentalregulations. 35 Under this initiative, a team of technical experts and habitat officers will bem Telephone interview with an official from the water quality branch of Environment Canada, August 1992." It should be noted that initial allocations of funds may have changed since part of FRAP is now coordinatedthrough FBMP.- 58 -selected with the mandate to enforce the habitat provisions of the Fisheries Act. By early1992, three new environmental inspectors were hired and the capability of the laboratory ofEnvironment Canada was increased to support sampling requirements. The goal announced inthe first year progress report is to carry out 300 inspections annually and achieve at least 90per cent compliance with the Fisheries Act effluent regulations and CEPA by 1997. 36Besides the increase in staff (which is not only to enforce initiatives under the FraserRiver Action Plan but also other Green Plan initiatives), a separate enforcement branch hasbeen set up. This means that enforcement activities, such as inspections and the issuance ofwarnings and fines, are now carried out by different officials than activities which promotecompliance, such as communication and consultation with the regulated industry.A further effect the Green Plan initiatives have had on the enforcement andcompliance branch of Environment Canada is that there is a renewed commitment to developcloser ties with the provincial counterparts and portion out enforcement activities to ensurethat there is no duplication and that all affected parties are undergoing regular inspections.The latter is more of a concern since there are generally not enough enforcement officers.'Federal enforcement teams enforce the regulations under the Fisheries Act and under CEPA.Currently, Environment Canada carries out about 80 inspections per quarter which have beenscheduled and planned. 38 In addition to the scheduled inspections, the department carriesout a number of non-scheduled inspections which follow up on complaints.Stricter enforcement has also been promised under the Burrard Inlet Environmental36 Fraser River Action Plan, 1991-92 Progress Report,  supra note 8, p.20.' Telephone interview with an official from the Enforcement Branch at Environment Canada, August 1992.38 Ibid.- 59 -Action Plan. However, the time schedule of when this is to be achieved does not show anysense of urgency. The BIEAP Annual Report lists the objectives to be reached in the next fiveyears. Improvements to enforcement programs will not be completed until 1996."The enforcement program is potentially the most important initiative under the FraserRiver Action Plan because in most cases the existing regulations under CEPA and theFisheries Act are strong enough to halt environmental degradation of the Fraser River.However, the level of coercion of enforcement actions varies considerably depending onwhether or not compliance with existing regulations is actually achieved. Only very strictenforcement actions will result in compliance and thus ensure that a certain level ofenvironmental quality is maintained.It is impossible to predict with what rigidity enforcement measures will be carried outin the next few years and if they will indeed contribute to slowing pollution of the Fraser.However, the past record of DOE and DFO enforcement activities may lead one to besceptical of major improvements. In the past, the "official enforcement policy [has been] toseek compliance from polluters and to proceed with charges only as a last desperate act."'And according to one Fisheries and Oceans official, charges laid under the Fisheries Act inthe last ten years can be "counted up on one finger." Enforcement typically involvesnegotiation with industries and efforts at pollution abatement are largely voluntary.With respect to effluents from the Vancouver sewage treatment plants, enforcementactions have been equally lenient. The federal Fisheries Act allows the federal government to" Annual Report 1991/92, supra note 25, p.15.4° Mark Hume, supra note 2, p.72.- 60 -prosecute sewage plants legally if they are found to be in violation of the Act. Effluent limitsfrom Annacis and Lulu Island sewage treatment plants are set by provincial pollution permits.The province carries out monthly toxicity tests of the effluents from the two plants (this testsets lower standards than the federal Fisheries Act). According to GVRD documents, theAnnacis plant failed the test nine months out of twelve in 1991, and the Lulu plant failedeleven months out of twelve 4 1 This is not only a recent occurrence, "the Annacis Islandand Lulu Island wastewater treatment plants have not complied with the provincial wastemanagement permits, and the federal Fisheries Act, for many years. The key violation iseffluent toxicity. "422.7 FISH HABITAT MANAGEMENT PLANNING AND RESTORATIONIn order to restore the productivity of the Fraser to historic levels, the federalgovernment has announced a number of initiatives: the development of habitat managementplans for the river's 16 watershed areas, the restoration of degraded habitats, additionalenumeration of fish production, research to establish baselines and better understanding ofhabitat impacts and habitat capacity, and stricter enforcement of habitat provisions of theFisheries Act.43Efforts to restore fish habitat are not new but will build on existing programs such asthe Policy for the Management of Fish Habitat (1985) and the Salmonid EnhancementProgram (1977). By early 1992, thirteen of the sixteen fish habitat management areas41 Glenn Bohn, "The cost of cleaning-up," Vancouver Sun, Saturday, August 15, 1992, B1, B12.42 GVRD document quoted in Glenn Bohn, supra note 41.43 Fisheries and Oceans. "Backgrounder on Habitat Restoration," May 31, 1991.- 61 -(HMAs) have been identified and the next step will be to develop habitat management plansfor those areas. Planning is under way in five habitat management areas: Stuart/Takla,Quesnel, Thompson/Nicola, North Thompson, and South Thompson/Shuswap.Closely related to the fish habitat restoration program is the salmon rehabilitationprogram which has as its objective to double sockeye salmon stocks within 20 years. Stockrebuilding efforts will also be undertaken with regard to other species of salmon inhabitingthe Fraser River system. Specific targets for chinook, coho, pink, and chum salmon, as wellas steelhead will still have to be identified. In 1991-92, a number of research projectsidentifying the rearing capacity of lakes or studying the behaviour of migrating adult salmonhave been carried out. The research is to help in the formulation of future stock rebuildingstrategies.According to one fisheries official no new projects are being undertaken as a result ofFRAP.' The above initiatives are all existing programs. The ones which fall under the fishhabitat management planning and restoration programs utilize mostly capacity increasinginstruments such as plan development and research but the restoration of degraded habitatinvolves expenditure, and habitat enforcement falls under regulatory actions.Of the above, only stricter habitat enforcement measures, if carried out, involve a highlevel of coercion. However, recent events do not indicate that monitoring and enforcementmeasures have improved since the announcement of the initiative fifteen months ago. OnMonday, August 25, 1992, angry fishers complained about the failure of expected numbers ofsockeye to reach their spawning grounds as a result of overfishing. They accused Fisheries" Interview with a government official from Fisheries and Oceans, September 1992.- 62 -Minister John Crosbie and his staff for failing to monitor the activity of native Indian fishers.While it is unclear whether or not the loss in sockeye runs is due to overfishing by aboriginalfishers, the incident puts into question the capability of the fisheries department to effectivelymonitor fishers' activity and enforce catch quotas. 45Nevertheless, the enforcement program may still improve. According to one fisheriesofficial, four new habitat enforcement officers are to be hired with FRAP funding. Progressin that area, however, is slow. Fifteen months after the announcement of FRAP, the jobdescriptions still remain to be written.2.8 WILDLIFE HABITAT RESTORATIONThe wildlife habitat component of the Fraser Basin Action Plan is to complementexisting initiatives such as the North American Waterfowl Management Plan, the WildlifePolicy for Canada, and the Federal Policy on Wetlands Conservation and on EndangeredSpecies. The agency responsible for wildlife habitat restoration is the Canadian WildlifeService, a branch of Environment Canada. It is focusing on three major projects: estuary andland conservation, interior wetland conservation, and forest ecosystem diversity.According to the First Year Progress Report, the goal of the estuary and landconservation program is to "protect and enhance biodiversity in upland ecosystems and instaging and wintering migratory bird habitats in the Lower Fraser.' The principal activityin the past year has been the Greenfields Project under which agreements were reached withas Scott Simpson, "Fishers protest over lost salmon opportunities," Vancouver Sun, August 25, 1992, B1."  Fraser River Action Plan 1991-92 Progress Report, supra note 8.- 63 -local farmers to plant winter cover and lure crops on close to 1200 hectares of farmland inDelta and Surrey in order to improve food and habitat conditions for wintering waterfowl inthe Fraser River's estuary. This project has been in place since August 1990 and is beingcontinued under the Fraser River Action Plan. Funding for the seeds comes from theCanadian Wildlife Service while the farmers are absorbing the costs of planting and raisingthe crops. The project was initiated by UBC soil scientists and Ducks Unlimited.An interior wetlands conservation program was started in 1991. In the first year, acost-shared agreement between Environment Canada and Ducks Unlimited was developedwith the goal to provide a coordinator for the program. In addition, a demonstration projectto restore a drained wetland on Monte Creek was completed with the help of DucksUnlimited, the Nature Trust of B.C., and the provincial Ministry of Environment, Lands andParks.The third component of the wildlife habitat restoration initiative, the forest ecosystemdiversity program, is still in the consultation stage. Its objective is to improve forestmanagement programs that benefit biodiversity, wildlife and threatened ecosystems. To dateforest ecosystems and diversity data have been catalogued and the development of combinedmodel forests/demonstration watersheds has been discussed.The policy instrument used to implement the Greenfields project is categorized asexpenditure and will contribute directly to protecting the environment. The other twocomponents of the wildlife habitat restoration initiative are still in the planning stage, but willeventually involve expenditure and public education.For a representative of the environmental organization Friends of Boundary Bay,64progress is too slow. 47 He complained that funds should be going into buying land forconservation purposes rather than demonstration projects or the expansion of the facilities ofthe Canadian Wildlife Service." He also would have liked to see a federal wetland lawpassed which would provide groups with legal means to protect habitat. None of his concernshave been addressed by the wetland habitat restoration initiative.2.9 IMPROVED SCIENTIFIC BASEResearch projects which will measure the effects of human activity in the Fraser RiverBasin on the natural environment received are also part of FRAP. Water quality studies areunder way, as well as several research programs to provide managers within the DFO withthe data required to restore and enhance the fisheries resource. Also, monitoring sites fortemperature, salinity and productivity of plankton and chlorophyll have been established. Inthe Stuart/Takla region, research on the effects of logging on sockeye salmon production isbeing undertaken. This research and monitoring initiative solely relies on capabilityincreasing instruments.2.10 PARTICIPATION BY FIRST NATIONSOne initiative not mentioned when the Fraser River Action Plan was first announced,but included in the First Year Progress Report, is the participation of First Nations in habitatrestoration and resource management. In the first year of the Fraser River Action Plan native47 Interview with a member of Friends of Boundary Bay, September 10, 1992.48 Under the Canadian Wildlife Act, CWS has the authority to acquire land as wildlife areas for the purposeof protecting migratory birds. See Harriet I. Rueggeberg and Anthony H. J. Dorcey, supra note 33, p.222.- 65 -groups participated in a number of DFO projects such as building fish ladders, conductinghabitat inventories, constructing trails, building side channels and cleaning up streams 4 9$16 million of the $50 million allotted to the DFO is going towards aboriginal programs s°A large amount of the money is going into setting up a new fisheries administration for thenative fisheries which has nothing to do with improving the environmental quality of theFraser River. Funds allocated to DFO by FRAP have been significantly reduced as a result ofthe diversion of funds to native programs. DFO was to receive $6 million in FRAP fundingfor 1992, this sum was reduced by the Treasury Board to $5 million. Of the $5 million, $2million went into funding the native programs. Originally, natives in the Fraser basin wereasking for a separate Treasury Board submission. This was not granted, instead funds werediverted from FRAP. These programs are now being acclaimed as part of the effort toachieve sustainable development in the Fraser River Basin since they will increase nativeparticipation in resource managements 'The policy instruments used in this initiative are capacity increasing (creation of neworganizations), public participation, and expenditure (in as far as natives are working onclean-up and habitat restoration programs)." First Year Progress Report, supra note 8, p.24.so ^interview.51 Interview with an official from Tom Siddon's Minister's office.- 66 -3. THE QUESTION OF INSTRUMENT CHOICE A close examination of the Fraser River Action Plan shows that the policy instrumentsto be used to implement the initiatives almost exclusively involve a very low level ofcoercion. The majority of the initiatives centre around the identification of problems,research, classification, and monitoring (see table II below).At the same time, none of the initiatives are being carried out by the federalgovernment alone. Typically, they involve cooperation with the province and themunicipalities. The large cooperative effort is carried out in the name of sustainabledevelopment which, as specified in the Fraser Basin Management Agreement, must reflectTABLE II. INITIATIVES UNDER THE FRASER RIVER ACTION PLANpolicy instrumentsFraser Basin Management Board^4b, 4f, 4g, 6, 71. Fraser River Estuary Management Program^4b, 4d, 4g, 4f2. Watershed Demonstration Projects 4c, 63. Burrard Inlet Environmental Action Plan^3, 4b, 4d, 4f, 64. Pollution Abatement:Industrial Discharges^ 4dUrban and Agricultural Runoff^4d, 4eAir Pollution 4d, 4eGround water 4d, 4eWaste Site Identification and Clean-up^4e,5. Water/Environmental Quality Management 4d, 4e6. Enforcement^ 4f, ld7. Salmon Habitat Restoration and Rehabilitation^2a, 4d, ld8. Wildlife Habitat Restoration^ 2a, 4d, 69. Improved Science Base 4d10.Participation by First Nations 2a, 4b, 7policy instrument^1^2^3^4^5^6^7occurrence^2^3^1^26^4^2- 67 -broad-based public involvement, the diversity of the natural resource system, the broad rangeof social, economic and environmental values in the Fraser Basin and the need for improvedinstitutional relationships. So far the Fraser Basin Management Program has concentrated onimproving institutional relationships. The federal government will spend a minimum of$200,000 a year to create a new bureaucracy, the Fraser Basin Management Board. Withinthe cooperative programs under the Fraser River Action Plan, the federal government plays asupport role, leaving actions aimed directly at improving environmental quality (such aspollution abatement measures and sewage treatment plant upgrading) up to the provinces andthe municipalities. The rather passive role of the federal government reflects a very timidinterpretation of its constitutional powers with respect to water. The only initiatives whichrequire the federal departments to take a more active role are the salmon rehabilitation, fishand wildlife habitat restoration, and enforcement initiatives. However, all four initiativesbuild to a large extent on programs which have been in existence for a number of years suchas the Salmonid Enhancement Program established in 1977 and the Greenfields Projectinitiated in 1990.Of the ten initiatives, only the water quality initiative and the Burrard InletEnvironmental Action Plan consider the possibility of new regulations. But even in those twoinitiatives, non-enforceable best management practices, guidelines or water quality objectivesare preferred over regulations. Defining these is left up to the province; the federalgovernment is only involved in the review process. In short, the federal government isincreasing its research efforts and establishing new bureaucracies such as FBMB and BIEAP,all in the name of sustainable development. Money is going into creating more "process"- 68 -rather than action aimed directly at improving environmental quality.There are several variables which explain why the federal government has chosenrelatively non-coercive policy instruments over coercive ones and why it seems to be avoidingregulatory action altogether. These variables, to be discussed below, are political systemconstraints such as constitutional provisions and the interests of other levels of government,and incentives to avoid blame or claim credit provided by pressure from environmentalinterest groups and industry.4. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS Provincial and federal jurisdiction over water is outlined in the BNA Act of 1867 andthe Constitution Act of 1982. The power over water resources lies with the provincesbecause the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement vests control or ownership of most bodiesof water in the provinces. Provincial ownership of water provides the provinces withconsiderable legislative power, based on exclusive provincial jurisdiction over property andcivil rights (section 92(13)), local works and undertakings (section 92(10)), and themanagement and sale of public lands (section 92(5)). Generally, the provinces are concernedwith pollution through statutes dealing with the regulation of industries, the issue of permitsspecifying allowable discharges and the administration of prohibitions and penalties. 52However, specific heads of federal power in the constitution may interfere with or limitprovincial jurisdiction over water.52 Barry J. Barton, Robert T. Franson, Andrew Thompson, A Contract for Pollution Control  (Vancouver:Westwater Research Centre, 1984) p.15.- 69 -Most significant are sections 91(10) and 91(12) of the BNA Act. Section 91(10) givesthe federal government exclusive legislative authority over navigation and by extension, overthe regulation of navigable waters. Based on the interpretation of the courts of this section,the federal government has been able to require the provinces to seek its approval for anyprovincial project affecting the navigability of water ways such as large scale dams. 53Section 91(12) gives the federal government jurisdiction over sea coast and inlandfisheries. Since fish are affected by most water pollution, this section provides the federalgovernment with a legal basis to regulate water pollution. It also provides the federalgovernment with the authority to review water projects which could negatively affect fishhabitat, fish stocks or any other aspect of fish life. Without any question, section 91(12)gives the federal government the most extensive powers to control and regulate water quality.In addition to section 91, the federal residual power to legislate for the "peace, orderand good government of Canada" may justify federal intervention in cases of "nationalemergency," or at times, in cases of merely "national concern". Largely because of theabsence of any clear legal authority, the federal government has used this section verysparingly to justify involvement with respect to water. 544.1 FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER WATERThe various activities taking place in the Fraser River Basin are regulated throughlegislation, agreements, or policies of nine different provincial ministries and seven differentss D.R. Percy, "Federal/Provincial Jurisdictional Issues," in Harriet Rueggeberg and Andrew R. Thompson,Water Law and Policy Issues in Canada (Vancouver: Westwater Research Centre,1984), p.84.sa Ibid.- 70 -federal departments and agencies. It is beyond the scope of this study to describe the entiregovernance system.55 Instead, I will only discuss the most important pieces of legislationand administrative structures which give the federal government a role to play in controllingand regulating the pollution of the Fraser River.The federal government has asserted its constitutional powers over water through the1970 Fisheries Act, the 1970 Canada Water Act 56, and most recently, the 1988 CanadaEnvironmental Protection Act. All three pieces of legislation give the federal governmentconsiderable authority to regulate water pollution and/or the sources of contaminants. Thetwo most important pieces of legislation, the Fisheries Act and the Canadian EnvironmentalProtection Act (CEPA), enable the federal government to require the clean-up of the FraserRiver, in the case of the Fisheries Act without having to negotiate an agreement with theprovince. However, a federal regulation under CEPA may be replaced by an equivalentprovincial or territorial regulation if the two levels of government enter into an equivalencyagreement.THE FISHERIES ACTBy giving it the authority to control fishing and fish stocks, the Fisheries Act is thefederal government's main instrument for managing fish. Because it is also responsible forthe protection of fish habitat, the federal government has a say in any activity that may" For a detailed discussion of the entire governance system see Rueggeberg and Dorcey, supra note 33.56 The Canada Water Act authorizes the federal government to enter into agreement with the provinces in orderto conduct research and water inventories, formulate comprehensive plans and execute research projects relating towater quality. The Act has never been used to justify unilateral federal action.- 71 -adversely affect areas frequented by fish, such as spawning beds. In the last two decades theFisheries Act has become the basis for federal involvement in water pollution control and themanagement of fisheries habitat in the Fraser. The Fisheries Act prohibits the discharge ofany substances hazardous to fish. It also authorizes the federal government to set effluentregulations and exempt sources from the prohibition if covered by regulations. 57 Underseparate arrangements with seven of the provinces, administration and enforcement of theFisheries Act in inland waters has been delegated to the provinces. In the case of BritishColumbia, the federal government retains full control over salmon in inland waters, while theprovincial government manages other inland fisheries through regulations approved under theFisheries Act.58With respect to the Fraser River, the federal government's authority means that it canrestrict the discharge of pollutants in areas of the Fraser where strong scientific evidenceexists that water quality is at a level where it endangers fish stocks. The worst area in termsof water quality in the Fraser is the North Arm, into which a large number of effluents aredischarged but where the water flow is relatively low. Some of the toxic contaminantsidentified are chlorophenols, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and dioxins. 59 The BurrardInlet, which is technically not part of the Fraser River Basin but has also been targeted by theFraser River Action Plan, is in even worse condition. In 1988, Darcy Goyette, seniorbiologist of the marine programs arm of Environment Canada, found precancerous liver57 Kathryn Harrison, "Federalism, Environmental Protection, and Blame Avoidance," paper prepared for deliveryat the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Kingston, June, 1991, p.11.58 Harriet I. Rueggeberg and Anthony H. J. Dorcey, supra note 33, p.204.59 Kristall Kennett and Michael McPhee, The Fraser River Estuary: An Overview of Changing Conditions(Fraser River Estuary Management Program, 1988), p.24.- 72 -lesions and tumours in nearly three-quarters of the sole he examined from the Port MoodyArm of the Inlet.6° He linked the bottom dwellers' lesions to their contact with polycyclicaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). Other chemicals such as tributylin, oil, sewage, and humanwastes contribute to the pollution of the Inlet. Sewer outflows are one of the main sources ofpollutants. Under the Fisheries Act, the federal government has the authority to requiresewage treatment plants to be upgraded to secondary treatment to reduce pollution from theplants' effluents.THE CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACTThe most recent addition to the federal government's tool kit, the 1988 CanadianEnvironmental Protection Act, is the strongest assertion of federal authority in the area ofenvironmental protection. Part II of the act contains the most important provisions withrespect to ensuring water quality. It provides the federal government with the authority toregulate existing chemical substances, as well as the entry of new chemicals into Canadiancommerce. The onus is on manufacturers and importers of chemical substances to prove theirsafety to human health and the environment. All existing chemicals known to be dangerousto human health or the environment are included either on the Domestic Substances List orthe Non-Domestic Substances List. Existing chemicals which still need to be assessed fortheir potential toxicity are listed on the Priority Substances List. Effluents from pulp millsusing bleaching, for example, were on the Priority Substances List for 1991-92. Two majorpulp mill bleaching agents, dioxins and furans were regulated under CEPA in May, 1992 and60 Burrard Inlet Environmental Improvements, supra note 16, p.6.- 73 -will have to be virtually eliminated from pulp mill effluents by 1994. This regulation affectsall pulp mills along the Fraser River.°4.2 B.C. ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION As mentioned above, provincial jurisdiction over water is based on provincial controland ownership of most natural resources, including water. The most important piece of B.C.legislation with respect to water pollution is the Waste Management Act. Section 3(1.1)makes it an offense to discharge into the environment any waste produced by the operation ofan industry, trade or business (this includes municipalities) or any other prescribed activityunless authorized by a permit, approval, order or regulation. Waste or discharges not coveredby a permit are allowed if they are not introduced "into the environment in such a manner orquantity as to cause pollution." 62 Permits are issued by Regional Waste Managers and canbe repealed to the Director of Waste Management. Municipalities may not have to apply forpermits if they prepare a waste management plan and submit it to the Minister for approval.If the plan is approved, the municipality may discharge wastes as specified in the plan.Hence, the main tool of the Ministry of the Environment to control pollution isthrough the issuing and upgrading of permits for waste discharges. Companies with permitshave to regularly submit monitoring data to the province for review. The federal governmentcan ask to review these permits, but that is seldom done, leaving the province with significant61 Dioxins have shown up in fish in concentrations requiring closure of fisheries and the issuing of healthadvisors.62 B.C. Waste Management Act, Section 3 (2). See also Barton et al., supra note 52.- 74 -discretion in that area.' For non-permitted discharges which are causing pollution, the B.C.Ministry of Environment can issue pollution abatement orders which require the offender tostop polluting. In the case of the Burrard Inlet and the Fraser River Estuary, however, mostindustrial discharges are currently permitted, and therefore pollution abatement orders arerarely ever issued.As demonstrated in the preceding discussion, the authority to control water pollution isdivided between the provincial and federal government. Nevertheless, the Fisheries Actprovides the federal government with considerable authority over water since it can regulateany substance found harmful to fish.As a result federal officers can deal with a case of pollution with few formalconstraints in their decision making. They may accept the situation, negotiate for animprovement, make orders, or simply prosecute. The steps that they may take are notlimited by the issuance of a provincial permit. In practice federal officers have asubstantial input into the decision making which leads to a provincial permit beingissued, and therefore rarely threaten to prosecute a discharge which is keeping withinthe terms of a provincial permit.'The question therefore is why, within the cooperative effort of the Fraser River Action Plan,the federal government has concentrated on research projects which involve monitoring,classification and the collection of data, rather than on the review of existing legislation andcodes of practice which may lead to regulatory action. The latter type of research is beinglargely undertaken by the province. The only potentially "threatening" action undertaken bythe federal government is a review of existing enforcement practices. However, nothing sofar indicates that the polluter will indeed be made to pay for clean up costs.63 Telephone interview with an official from the enforcement branch of Environment Canada, August 1992." Barry J. Barton, supra note 52, p.19-20.- 75 -Since federal powers with respect to water pollution are broad, the focus of the FraserRiver Action Plan on non-coercive policy instruments and on cooperation with the provincesand municipalities cannot be attributed to constitutional constraints. Instead, the federalgovernment's reluctance to get involved in any regulatory or clean-up actions is based on itspreoccupation with blame avoidance and credit claiming. 65 Pressure from environmentalinterest groups, industry, and other levels of government all have shaped the federalgovernment's perception of the blame or credit generating potential of the various initiatives.In the end, it chose to concentrate its efforts on initiatives which will generate the least blamebut at the same time also allow it to claim some credit.5. ENVIRONMENTAL INTEREST GROUP PRESSURE The strength of environmental interest groups lies in their ability to convincegovernments that they will be blamed by the voter for inaction on particular environmentalissues. Voter dissatisfaction with the government's commitment to environmental protection,however, has to be perceived by the government to be strong enough to actually make voterschange their party allegiance. If the government fears that may be the case, it will have anincentive to either strengthen its commitment to environmental protection or take symbolicaction with the objective to convince the public of its concern for the environment. The latterresponse may be preferred in cases where other interests oppose a strong federal commitmentto the environment. The Fraser River Action Plan represents such a case.Gardner identified more than 30 environmental groups in the Fraser River Basin65 see Kathryn Harrison, supra note 57.- 76 -whose activities relate directly to the environmental protection of the basin. 66 A number ofthese organizations have a long history of involvement in issues affecting the Fraser River.The following are just a few examples of the attempts by some of these groups to drawattention to the pollution of the Fraser.In 1981, Will Paulik, founder of the Fraser River Coalition, laid charges against bothRichmond Landfill Ltd. and the Fraser River Harbour Commission for discharging effluentsharmful to fish into the Fraser. In both cases he won a conviction under the Fisheries Act. 67In June 1985, Concerned Citizen Against Raw Sewage Dumping appealed to federal fisheriesMinister John Fraser to prohibit the dumping of raw sewage into the Fraser while the GreaterVancouver regional district engineers cut a sewer line to make way for a ramp on AnnacisIsland Bridge." In 1989, the Musqueam Indian Band charged the Iona Sewage TreatmentPlant for damaging fish stocks. In January 1991, the Fraser River Coalition sought a courtorder to force an environmental assessment of the plan by the National Metal Corporation tobuild a deep sea dock on valuable marshland in Richmond. DFO had given the companyapproval to build the dock. 69Besides these law suits, organizations such as Friends of Boundary Bay, Fraser forLife and the Wreck Beach Conservation Society have lobbied the provincial and federalgovernments for years to increase the protection of wildlife and fish habitat and to clean up66 Julia E. Gardner, "Environmental Non-Government Organizations and Management of Water Resources inthe Fraser River Basin," Anthoney H. J. Dorcey, ed. Water in Sustainable Development  (Vancouver: WestwaterResearch Centre, 1991).Mark Hume, supra note 2, p.72.Patti Flather, "Fraser gets Fraser plea," Vancouver Sun, June 10, 1985.Glenn Bohn, "Fisheries allowed destruction of marsh habitat, coalition claims," Vancouver Sun, Jan. 4, 1991,676869B3.- 77 -the river.It is difficult to evaluate the extent to which environmental group activity influencedlocal Members of Parliament to press for federal funds to clean up the Fraser. No oneparticular event can be identified as having caused the change of heart. But environmentalgroup activity did ensure that decisions affecting the environmental quality of the Fraser didnot go unnoticed. Environmentalists from the Fraser River Coalition and the Wreck BeachConservation Society have ensured that the Fraser remained on the agenda of Vancouver citycouncil and provincial cabinet meetings.Nevertheless, governmental response was slow in coming. The Fraser River EstuaryStudy identified significant degradation of the River back in 1978 and called for a coordinatedriver management plan involving all three levels of government." The provincial, federaland regional response came seven years later with the creation of a new agency in 1985, theFraser River Estuary Management Program, designed to do more research on the problem andmake recommendations. Few of these recommendations have been implemented so far.What prompted the latest governmental initiative has not been attributed to pressurefrom environmental groups but to an article about the Fraser which appeared in Equinox in1988. This article is usually being cited as having raised the concern of local MPs who thenbrought the issues up in the provincial conservative caucus meeting!'According to environmentalist and member of the Fraser Basin Management Start-UpCommittee, Will Paulik, the pressure placed by interest groups on the federal government to70 Suzanne Fournier, "Fraser management plan urged," The Province, October 55, 1978, p.l.71 Interviews with officials from Fisheries and Oceans and Tom Siddon's minister's office.- 78 -get involved in establishing a management plan for the entire Fraser River was notsignificant. Anthony H.J. Dorcey draws the same conclusion:...while non-governmental organizations have participated in a wide variety of publicconsultation exercises related to the federal and provincial initiatives, none has yetfocused on the Fraser River Basin [as a whole].72Rather, interest groups have concentrated on specific issues such as sewage treatment,protection of wildlife and fish habitat and effluents from pulp and paper industries.Even though environmental groups did not pressure for an environmental action planfor the entire basin, FRAP can be seen as an attempt by the federal government to address asmany different environmental concerns as possible. By espousing the conveniently "fuzzy"concept of sustainable development, and supporting the Fraser Basin Management Board incoordinating activities throughout the basin, the federal government can claim to be dealingwith everyone's concerns.But comments from various environmental groups in the Fraser basin reveal that theyare not convinced that their concerns are in fact being addressed by the federal initiatives.A member of the Wreck Beach Conservation Society, who has been lobbying for theprotection of the Fraser since 1974, says that FRAP is "preordained to failure" since theFraser Basin Management Board, which will coordinate a large number of FRAP initiatives,does not have a representative from the environmental organizations on the board. Instead,the board represents private interest lobby groups such as dairy, grazing, silvicultural andforestry interests. As a consequence, it is unlikely that the Fraser Basin ManagementProgram will succeed in "making the polluter pay."72 Anthony H.J. Dorcey, "Sustaining the Greater Fraser River Basin," Anthony H.J. Dorcey, ed. Water inSustainable Development (Vancouver: Westwater Research centre, 1991) p.278.- 79 -Other environmentalists are equally disenchanted with FRAP. They despair when theyreceive yet another proposal for research on the Fraser by the federal government."However, the general public who does not know how many years the federal government hasalready spent "studying" the Fraser River and who the people on the board are, may be moreeasily impressed by spending announcements made under FRAP and the positive First YearProgress Report.6. OPPOSITION FROM INDUSTRY'One would assume that the industries along the Fraser River which discharge effluentsinto the stream are strongly opposed to new regulations which would require them to reducethe contaminant loading of the effluents. However, since no new regulations have beenannounced under the Fraser River Action Plan, industries in the Fraser River basin have notseen any need to mobilize. The perception of a representative of the Council of ForestIndustries (COFI) was that the Fraser River Action Plan was mostly a research program sinceCOFI had received a number of research proposals. 75 Pulp mills in particular are muchmore concerned about the new regulations controlling dioxins and furans than any initiativeannounced under the Fraser River Action Plan.Even research projects which may lead to a strengthening of enforcement actions, havenot raised any particular concern among the affected parties. The reason for this is the way73 Interview with a member of the T. Buck Suzuki Environmental Foundation, September 11, 1992.74 This section is based largely on telephone interviews with an official from Fisheries and Oceans, a memberof the Fraser River Coalition, and a representative of COFI.75 Telephone interview with a representative of the Council of Forest Industries, September 10, 1992.- 80 -enforcement is currently handled. Enforcement rarely ever results in fines and almost neverin prosecutions. Only the most flagrant violations are prosecuted. Generally, compliancewith existing regulations are sought through negotiations with industries and the enforcementprogram relies on voluntary efforts on the part of the polluter to comply with the regulations.Since there is so much flexibility in the enforcement program, most industries have not feltany great economic impact from the existing regulations.76Furthermore, industry has been part of the consultations leading up to theestablishment of the Fraser Basin Management Board and has a representative on the Board.This assures industry some influence over the nature of specific projects and over how fundswill be allocated.Federal reluctance to regulate industry more or tighten up enforcement can beattributed not to actual but to anticipated opposition by industry. To refer back to the theoriesdiscussed in chapter one, the government is reluctant to regulate industry in order to avoid ablame generating situation. If the polluter is indeed made to pay, as the first press release ofthe Fraser River Action Plan indicated, industry would certainly blame the federal governmentfor increased operating costs, losses in profit and possible layoffs. Rising concerns of votersabout the health of the Canadian economy also make the federal government reluctant to usethe regulatory tool. It does not want to be accused of crippling the economy throughstringent regulatory action. To avoid this situation, the federal government prefers to leaveregulatory action up to the provinces.76 Telephone interview with an official from Fisheries and Oceans, September 15, 1992.- 81 -7. CONSIDERATIONS OF COSTS INVOLVED IN CLEAN-UP PROJECTS In addition to regulations that force private polluters to clean up, the government itselfcan commit funding to specific activities that improve environmental quality. In chapter two,these types of clean up or enhancement programs were classified under expenditure. TheFraser River Action Plan includes three major expenditure programs, the salmon rehabilitationprogram and the fish and wildlife habitat restoration programs. However, the first twoprograms are not new initiatives, but rather a continuation (and renewed funding) of programswhich have been in existence since the 1970s. Their continuation can be ascribed to boththeir success and bureaucratic resistance to change. The Salmonid Enhancement Program(SEP) for example has been renewed every five years since its creation in 1977; the last timeit was renewed was in 1987. At that time it received a total of $208 million for the followingfive years. That means, its renewal was expected again in 1992 with or without the GreenPlan. Some of the wildlife habitat enhancement programs are relatively new, such as theGreenfields project but even that program was initiated before Green Plan funding wassecured. In the case of the Greenfields project, however, funds have been increased as aresult of FRAP. SEP, on the other hand, has not received any additional funding and will notbe expanded to include any new projects. 77 It is unclear whether or not the other clean-upor restoration programs continued under FRAP have received additional funding.To date, the federal government has not committed any monies to new large scaleclean-up or environmental restoration programs. The main reason for this is that they maysimply be too expensive.77 Interview with a Fisheries and Oceans official, September, 1992.- 82 -One illustration of that involves the upgrading of the Vancouver sewage system.Vancouver's sewage system is one of the major sources of environmentally damagingeffluents to the Fraser River and Burrard Inlet. Vancouver's main sewage treatment plants,Lions Gate, Annacis Island, Lulu Island and Iona Island, are all primary treatment plants.78Upgrading these plants to secondary or even tertiary treatment would significantly reducewater pollution in the Fraser River and the Burrard Inlet. However, the costs involved in sucha project are phenomenal. In 1988, the GVRD estimated that it would cost $425 million in1987 dollars to upgrade the four plants and the annual operating costs would be $25 millionhigher.' The Green Plan has done nothing to resolve this funding problem.A second major source of pollution is combined sewer overflows during periods ofheavy rain. This occurs because most areas in Vancouver have a combined sewage system,that is, sewage and storm water are collected in the same pipes. During periods of heavyrain, the combined sewers become overloaded and spill a mixture of untreated sewage andrainfall runoff into English Bay, Vancouver Harbour, False Creek and parts of the FraserRiver. Combined sewers in Vancouver, New Westminster, and Burnaby overflow about 62billion litres of mixed sewage and rainfall runoff each year. Approximately 80 per cent ofthe overflows occur during the winter months. 8° This problem could be solved byconstructing separate pipe systems for sewage and rainfall runoff. In that case, all sewage78 Primary treatment removes suspended particles from the waste stream before the remaining fluid is dischargedto the water. Only about 60% of suspended particles can be removed by this process. Most other Fraser Rivercommunities have at least secondary treatment which reduces the nutrient and chemical loadings from the flow fromthe primary plant.79 Greater Vancouver Liquid Waster Management Plan, supra note 30, p.14.80 Ibid., p.11.- 83 -would be treated, while all rainfall runoff discharges to the nearest body of water would gountreated." This project is under way in Vancouver. At the present rate of construction,however, the project will not be completed until about seventy years from now. A secondsolution would be to build storage tanks in which the overflow could be collected duringperiods of heavy rain and slowly released to the combined sewers and from there to thesewage treatment plant once the rain has passed. Building enough storage tanks inVancouver, New Westminster and Burnaby to reduce the combined sewer overflow by 50 percent would cost about $430 million according to an 1988 estimate. 82 Again, the FraserRiver Action Plan has simply not addressed this problem.By contributing financially to the upgrading of the sewage system, the federalgovernment could achieve significant improvements in the water quality of the Fraser River.That it does not get involved in upgrading the Greater Vancouver sewerage system can beascribed not only to the phenomenal costs involved in that particular project but also theexpectations it might raise in other municipalities. As one Environment Canada official putit: "If the federal government put funds towards upgrading the Vancouver sewerage system, anumber of other major Canadian cities would demand the same money go towards upgradingtheir sewerage systems. That would simply be too costly!'As a result of these constraints, the federal government spending on the Fraser riverunder the Green Plan is allocated largely to "capacity enhancing" projects, such as the81 Discharging runoff untreated into the Fraser is not an environmentally sound solution to the sewage overflowproblem since runoff carries considerable amounts of contaminants from the street surface to receiving waters.82 Greater Vancouver Liquid Waste Management Plan, supra note 30, p.16." Telephone interview with an official from the water quality management branch of Environment Canada,August 20, 1992.- 84 -demonstration watersheds and the various research projects, rather than on activities whichdirectly improve environmental quality.8. PRESSURE FROM OTHER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT While certain expenditure programs may not have been undertaken simply because ofthe costs involved, the federal government might have shied away from regulatory actionbecause of opposition from the province and local governments.Local governments would certainly welcome federal funds for the upgrading of theirsewage system but they are concerned that instead of funds they will receive orders from thesenior levels of government. In their own words, they are "concerned about the devolution or'downloading' of federal and provincial programs to municipalities without consultation,funding, enabling legislation or protection from liability." ' Fraser basin municipalities putpressure on the two senior levels of government not to make the Fraser Basin ManagementBoard an exercise in "downloading" but to create a "consensual federation between thefederal, provincial and local governments.' Local control over the program is to besecured through the creation of regional or subregional management boards. Moreover, theUnion of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM) briefing paper on the FBMB expresses theview that "participation in the program will provide tangible environmental benefits in its ownright and may lead the way to new powers for local governments that wish them." 86 More" Union of British Columbia Municipalities, Local Government and the Fraser Basin Management Program,A Briefing Paper, January, 1992, p.13.' Ibid.86 ^p.15.- 85 -specifically, these new powers should include statutory powers to support municipalinitiatives. UBCM's policy paper, Local Governments and the Constitution, goes so far as tocall for the recognition of local rights in the federal constitution and the inclusion of a 'LocalGovernment Bill of Rights' in the B.C. Constitution Act. The briefing paper also quotes apublication by the City of Vancouver, Towards a New Generation of Government, which callsfor a new Bill of Rights for community governments:Local decisions should be made locally by local people...It is now time for theGovernment of British Columbia to make a serious commitment to empower localgovernments to manage our communities in accord with local priorities andconcerns, to provide municipalities with the resources we need to controldevelopment and protect the quality of life in our communities... We wantsustainable economic growth with sound environmental controls to protect ourchildren's futures. 87While B.C. municipalities do not expect to receive enabling legislation through theFraser River Basin Management Program, they do view it as an opportunity to improvecommunication with senior governments and as a forum to lobby for new powers which theysee as a prerequisite for sustainability.This focus on local control leaves a support role for the senior levels of government.The consensual approach of FBMB precludes highly coercive action on the part of the federalgovernment without consultation with local and provincial partners. In fact, coercive actionwould almost certainly be viewed as "downloading" of federal responsibility.This lobbying of local governments against "downloading" can explain why the federalgovernment has been reluctant to use its authority to enforce existing regulations to requirethe GVRD to shoulder the costs of upgrading the Vancouver sewage system. Such unilateral87 City of Vancouver, Towards a New Generation of Government, September, 1991, quoted in LocalGovernment and the Fraser Basin Management Program, supra note 84, p.16.- 86 -regulatory action on the part of the federal government would most certainly encounter strongresistance from the GVRD and the GVS&DD (Greater Vancouver Sewerage and DrainageDistrict) which is currently working on phase II of its Waste Management Plan. Moreover,several federal agencies participated on advisory committees during the development of theGVRD's Liquid Waste Management Plan (LWMP). These advisory committees also includedrepresentatives from the provincial government, the municipalities, public interest groups,consultants, and industry." As a result of its participation in this cooperative planningeffort, the federal government has indirectly agreed not to enforce federal regulations whichcould be applied to effluents from sewage treatment plants to suit the GVRD's LWMP. Sincethe LWMP is limited by tight municipal budgets, it is doubtful that rapid progress can bemade to decrease plant effluents. Deadlines to upgrade the Annacis and Lulu Island plants tosecondary treatment have been moved back twice. The current deadlines are set for 1997 and1995 respectively."In short, pressure from the Fraser basin municipalities not only contributed to gettingthe federal government involved but also shaped the involvement. The federal governmentseems to content itself with a support role in the implementation of the Fraser River ActionPlan and the Fraser Basin Management Program. It is expected that the chairperson of theFraser Basin Management Board, Anthony Dorcey, will promote this role. He emphasizedthe need for local empowerment in his conclusion to the study on sustainable development inthe Fraser River Basin, undertaken for the province of British Columbia. In his opinion, one88 Greater Vancouver Liquid Waste Management Plan, supra note 30, p.3." Glenn Bohn, supra note 41.- 87 -of the lessons to be learned from FREMP is that in setting up the Fraser River BasinManagement Program, locally elected representatives should be more involved in thedecisionmaking, planning and implementation process.'While local governments are concerned with gaining more influence and power, theprovincial government is concerned with losing power. The province would interpret strongregulatory action by the federal government as an attempt by the latter to expand itsjurisdiction in the environmental policy field, and, as a consequence, interfere with provincialcontrol over natural resources. The province's concern is not that federal regulation is tooweak to protect the environment but rather that it is too strong, hurting the competitiveness ofB.C. industry.According to an official from Tom Siddon's Minister's office, the negotiations overFRAP between the federal and provincial government proceeded in great harmony. It wasaccepted from the start that each government would not interfere with the other's jurisdiction.Initial talks were conducted when the Social Credit party was still in office in B.C. But thenew provincial government under the NDP apparently also did not fear a federal "power grab"disguised under FRAP but agreed to the structure and appointment of the Fraser BasinManagement Board.This harmony between federal and provincial governments seems surprising since mostother policy fields are dominated by federal-provincial conflict. The explanation lies in thenature of the policy field. As pointed out in chapter II, environmental policy is characterizedby diffuse benefits and concentrated costs. The benefits of improvements in environmental9° Anthony H.J. Dorcey, "Sustaining the Greater Fraser River Basin," supra note 72, p.278.- 88 -quality accrue to the public at large, while the costs have to be borne by a concentrated groupof polluters. The latter, because of their size will be well informed and organized and usethis advantage to lobby against environmental protection.' Therefore, the distribution ofcosts and benefits in the environmental policy field in general, and clean-up of the FraserRiver in particular, provide a strong incentive for blame avoidance, achieved through the useof non-coercive policy instruments. Hence, the weak federal role in the Fraser River ActionPlan can be attributed more to a federal preoccupation with blame avoidance than to pressurefrom the province.929.^PRINCIPLES, PRINCIPLES, PRINCIPLES It is too early to comment on the success of the Fraser River Action Plan. Directaction to clean-up the Fraser may still be taken by the federal government as a result ofrecommendations by the Fraser Basin Management Board. It is possible, however, toevaluate whether or not the federal government is living up to the principles which were toguide the Fraser River Action Plan (see page 43). The first principle, achieving sustainabledevelopment, has been used to justify a number of actions which do not contribute directly toprotecting the environment or improving environmental quality which is what sustainabledevelopment should be all about. The second principle, cooperation with the province,municipalities and environmental groups, has only been achieved partly, since environmentalgroups have been excluded from the planning and decision making functions carried out by91 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973).92 See Kathryn Harrison, supra note 57.- 89 -the Fraser Basin Management Board. The third principle, making the polluter pay, has so farnot been addressed in any serious way and may be difficult to implement with private sectorinterests well represented on the Fraser Basin Management Board. The lack of commitmentto these three principles, in particular the last one, is evidenced by the government's choice ofpolicy instruments in the implementation of the Fraser River Action Plan. This choice can beexplained by examining the four propositions discussed in chapter II.First, it was argued that the government will be reluctant to use highly coercivepolicy instruments because of the patterns of interests involved in environmental policymaking. The Fraser River Action Plan is an example of federal preoccupation with thepotential political costs of its choice of policy instruments. The federal government haschosen not to use highly coercive policy instruments in the implementation of the variousinitiatives under the Action Plan in order to avoid the electoral retributions from those hardesthit by such a choice, the polluters.Second, it was expected that the government would prefer non-coercive instrumentsover no action at all because it wants to avoid being blamed for ignoring a problem. TheFraser River Action Plan is rich in symbolic initiatives which involve a low level of coercionand do not contribute directly to improving environmental quality in the Fraser basin. Verytelling is the attempt by the federal government to claim credit for already existing programsby repackaging them and presenting them to the public as FRAP initiatives.Third, non-coercive policy instruments were expected to dominate especially in areaswhere there is no significant pressure from environmental interest groups on the government.Environmental groups have been demanding the clean-up of the Fraser River for years and- 90 -have been active in lobbying all three levels of government. That the response they finallygot lacks teeth may be due to the government's perception that they could be satisfied with abasin-wide environmental action plan. Environmental groups were in fact hopeful about thenew action plan because they expected that their involvement in the Fraser Basin Manage-ment Start-Up Committee would result in representation on the Board, a development whichwould have given them formal access and input to the planning and implementation ofprojects initiated by the board. After they found out that all their nominees had been rejectedleaving them without representation, criticisms of FRAP have become stronger. But environ-mental groups have so far not communicated their disappointment with FRAP to the public.Neither the Vancouver Sun, nor the Province have published any articles dealing with thisissue. Even the British Columbia Environmental Network (BCEN) September newsletter onlyincludes a brief article listing the names of the new Board members. The lack ofenvironmental representation is downplayed. The article simply states that criticism had beenexpressed regarding this but that environmentalists were hopeful that they would be able toparticipate at the regional level. This rather fatalistic attitude will not help environmentalinterest groups to discredit FRAP. So far the $100 million program has gained the federalgovernment only credit from the public.Fourth, the choice of policy instruments of the federal government can be shaped bypolitical system constraints. The main political system constraints examined in the context ofFRAP were constitutional constraints and the interests of provincial and municipalgovernments. Federal choice of weak policy instruments is not a result of constitutionalconstraints, since the Fisheries Act gives the federal government sufficient authority to require- 91 -the clean-up of the Fraser. On the other hand, the active role municipalities played inconvincing the federal government to commit Green Plan monies to a sustainable develop-ment program for the Fraser certainly shaped the form this commitment took. The languageused in the Fraser River Action Plan Progress Report with its emphasis on partnership andconsensus strongly resembles that of the discussion paper produced by UBCM.The reason that local and provincial governments were able to protect their interestsmay also be due to the fact that their interests coincide with those of the private sector whichthe federal government so far has not crossed.The case of the Fraser River Action Plan reflects what the entire Green Plan suggests:the strength of any initiative by the federal government to protect the environment is likely tobe subject to considerations of the political costs involved. The choice of policy instrumentsis restricted by the government's concern not to create enemies amongst the polluters. Hence,capacity increasing instruments, will, in all likelihood, remain the government's favouritesamongst the range of instruments available. Research, classification, monitoring and plandevelopment do not offend any party; they do not threaten the jurisdiction of the province, donot place a financial burden on local governments, impose no new costs on industry andpacify the public who thinks something is happening.CONCLUSION The purpose of this paper was to explain what determines the choice of policyinstruments of the Canadian federal government in the environmental policy field. The mostprominent policy instrument theories were discussed in order to find an answer to thatquestion. Some of the arguments advanced by the different theorists were found to beirrelevant to environmental policy making, others led to the formulation of four generalpropositions about instrument choice:1) the government will be reluctant to use highly coercive instruments in implementingenvironmental policies because of the pattern of interests affected.2) the government will prefer non-coercive instruments over no action at all in order toavoid blame for ignoring a problem3) non-coercive policy instruments will especially dominate in issue areas where there isno significant pressure from environmental interest groups on the government.4) the government may be constrained in its choice of policy instruments by the politicalsystem itself.'The chapter on instrument theories was followed by an analysis of instrument choicein the Canada Green Plan and the Fraser River Action Plan. To enable me to make generali-zations about the government's instrument preference, all initiatives in the Green Plan werecategorized according to the policy instruments they employ. The resulting seven broad cate-gories were formed on the basis of the level of coercion the policy instruments involve. Theseven categories are, from high to low coercion: regulation, expenditure, guidelines, capacityincreasing, agreements, public information and increasing public participation. It was foundthat both the Green Plan document and the Green Plan initiatives announced in the first 18months strongly favoured capacity increasing instruments. The Fraser River Action Plan1 These propositions relate specifically to instrument choice in environmental policy making and do not claimto be equally applicable to other areas of public policy.- 93 -followed the same pattern.After the initial classification of policy instruments in both the chapters on the GreenPlan and the Fraser River Action Plan, the variables which influenced instrument choice werediscussed. They differed slightly in the two cases but included: constitutional constraints,internal cabinet opposition, pressures form the provinces, environmental interest groupactivity, opposition from industry and considerations of costs.In both cases, the interests of the opponents to highly coercive instruments won overthe interests of the advocates. This was attributed to the federal government's preoccupationwith blame avoidance. As suggested by propositions 1, 2, and 3, the federal government isprimarily guided by its concern to avoid blame (or electoral retribution) in its choice ofinstruments. It is likely that, in most cases, industry is able to put more pressure on thegovernment than environmental groups because it is better organized and has larger financialresources. Putting the burden of clean-up costs on industry, by passing new action forcingregulations, is therefore politically more risky than disappointing environmental groups,especially when the latter cannot claim to be backed by strong public opinion on the issuesthey are fighting for. As proposition 3 suggests, the government will only listen to environ-mental groups if it perceives that the blame generated from not addressing environmentalproblems will be greater than the blame generated from the industries to be regulated.In most cases, environmental policy making affords little opportunity to claim credit.Nevertheless, the Green Plan and the Fraser River Action Plan were both also meant togenerate credit for the federal government. This was to be achieved by announcing a largenumber of initiatives which show the government's concern but do not actually contribute to- 94 -an improvement in environmental quality and sustainable development. These types ofsymbolic actions generally make use of capacity increasing instruments, such as the creationof new offices and institutions, or the appointment of committees. But even regulations canbe symbolic if they include escape clauses for the regulated industry or if they are in facthardly ever enforced.Another "safe" way to claim credit without at the same time creating enemies, is therepackaging of already existing programs and projects. A large proportion of the initiativesannounced under the Green Plan and the Fraser River Action Plan are in fact existingprograms which are being renewed or continued. Even highly interventionist programs whichhave existed for some time will generate less blame from the regulated industries than newregulations, because, in most cases, industries have already adapted to the requirements of theexisting regulations.SUCCESS OF THE GREEN PLAN AND THE FRASER RIVER ACTION PLAN 2In light of the foregoing discussion, there is little hope that the Green Plan will resultin a significant improvement in environmental quality or achieve its objective of sustainabledevelopment, as defined at the outset of the document.Sustainable development is described...as activity in which the environment is fullyincorporated into the economic decision-making process as a forethought, not an after-thought. It holds that resources must be treated on the basis of their future, as wellas their present, value. That approach offers genuine hope of economic developmentwithout environmental decline. 32 Success in this case does not equal "political success" or the extent to which the Green Plan has contributedto improving the popularity of the government in power.3 Government of Canada, Canada's Green Plan (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1990) p.4.- 95 -The type of Green Plan initiatives give little indication that the federal government is puttingenvironmental concerns first, much less incorporating them into its economic decision-making. Cabinet refused to allow the DOE a role in the horizontal and national coordinationof responsibilities which relate to environmental quality. The first draft of the Green Planhad proposed to make environmental considerations mandatory in all cabinet decisions. Butthe majority of cabinet ministers were opposed to an environmental action plan which wouldinterfere with the policies and programs of their departments. However, achievement ofsustainable development requires, as Brian Mulroney himself stated, a complete change inlifestyle.' It will be difficult and certainly take a long time to produce such changes withinitiatives which rely largely on non-coercive policy instruments. Certainly, studies, research,and public information all have an important role to play in increasing environmentalawareness and providing the necessary information to make environmentally sound decisions.But they will produce changes only very slowly and should not replace more coerciveinstruments in areas where the environmental problems are well known and the major sourcesof pollution have been identified, as in the case of the Fraser River.That achieving sustainable development is not a priority of the federal government isalso reflected in the budgetary cuts of the Green Plan. It was initially to receive $5 billion infunding.5 By the time it was released, this sum had been reduced to $3 billion. On February27, 1991, an announcement was made to stretch the budget over six years instead of five, andin February, 1992, Finance Minister Mazankowski announced that the Green Plan budget wasCraig McInnes, "'We are all responsible' for environment, PM says," Globe and Mail, April 10, 1990, All.5 Anne Mcllroy, "Federal ecology plan about to be unveiled," Vancouver Sun, Dec. 8, 1990.- 96 -to be cut by a further $75 million in each of the next two fiscal years.'The Fraser River Action Plan has also been subject to budgetary cuts. $16 million ofthe $100 million budget were diverted to programs not initially announced under the FraserRiver Action Plan and whose supporters had, in fact, sought their own funding from theTreasury Board.As Stephen Hazell, executive director of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee,expressed it so carefully, "[these actions] raise some concerns. There have been some goodannouncements under the Green Plan, but after all these changes, one wonders about the over-all government commitment to the 'thing."'6 William Walker, "Ottawa's 'Green Plan' handed another setback," Toronto Star, Feb. 26, 1992, Al2.7 Ibid.- 97 -BIBLIOGRAPHYBOOKS AND JOURNAL ARTICLESBarrons, J.B. Water Resource Planning in the Fraser River Basin: An Assessment of the Principles in Practice. M.S. Thesis, School of Community and Regional Planning,University of British Columbia, 1989.Barton, Barry J., Robert T. Franson, Andrew R. Thompson. A Contract Model for Pollution Control. Vancouver: Westwater Research Centre, 1984.Becker, Gary. "Competition and Democracy." Journal of Law and Economics, 1958."Comment." Journal of Law and Economics, 1976."Canada's Green Plan: Blueprint for a Healthy Environment," Environment, Vol. 33, No.4,May 1991.Doern, G. Bruce. "Johnny-Green-Latelies: The Mulroney Environmental Record." 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Globe and Mail, December, 8, 1990."Green Plan hasn't made clean sweep." Calgary Herald, December 11, 1991, A13."Is Canada a dirty word?" Montreal Gazette, October 15, 1990, A8."Ottawa Green Plan raises doubts." Vancouver Sun, April 17, 1990, B7.McInnes, Craig. "Big lifestyle changes foreseen as Ottawa fights global warming." Globe and- 103 -Mail, October, 26, 1989."Plan may be delayed until fall, Bouchard says." Globe and Mail, February 9, 1990,A2."'We are all responsible' for environment, PM says."Globe  and Mail, April 10, 1990,All.MacQueen, Ken. "De Cotret warned to respect environmental jurisdiction." Ottawa Citizen,November 30, 1990, A5.Mittelstaedt, Martin. "Groups sought tree, were given seedling." Globe and Mail,December 12, 1990, A6.Munro, Harold. "Fraser Plan a disaster expert says." Vancouver Sun, Monday, June 3, 1991,Bi.Bob Papoe. "Price tag of $71 billion put on new Green Plan." Toronto Star, May 8, 1992, Bl,B6."Riding the green tiger." Alberta Report, February 19, 1990.Rogers, Dann. "Costs of cleaning up." Calgary Sun, July 31, 1990.Simpson, Jeffrey. "The Green Plan is high on good intentions, low on specific commitments."Globe and Mail, December 12, 1990, A20.Truscott, Brian. "River Trap Funding Drying Up." Vancouver Courier, July 28, 1991, p.1,2.Walker, Bill. "Tory Pals got contracts worth $400,000: NDP." Montreal Gazette, May 18,1991, A9.Walker, William. "Green Plan sinks in 'bottomless abyss." Toronto Star, June 6, 1991, A23."Ottawa's green plan called 'empty shell." Toronto Star, December 12, 1990, A10."Ottawa's 'Green Plan' handed another setback." Toronto Star, February 26, 1992,Al2."Year-old Green Plan Tory Sham critics say." Toronto Star, December 11, 1991, Al,A28.Winsor, Hugh. "Green concerns pale." Globe and Mail, October 30, 1990, A7.- 104 -APPENDICESAPPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGYOBJECTIVEThe following table categorizes the Green Plan initiatives and the initiatives announcedin the first 1 1/2 years according to the policy instruments to be employed in theirimplementation. The purpose of this categorization exercise is to find out which types ofpolicy instruments are most commonly used and which ones the government uses onlysparingly.METHODOLOGYThe total number of initiatives announced under the Green Plan is usually quoted asbeing about 120. This total refers to the separate areas in which action is promised, however,often several different actions have been announced within each area. Since each of theseactions may require the use of a different policy instrument, I have counted each actionannounced under one heading as a separate initiative, so that the total number of Green Planinitiatives comes to 248. The Green Plan highlights each of these initiatives by a symbol.There are seven different symbols, identified on page 26, which categorize the initiatives. Myown categorization of the initiatives does not coincide with that of the Green Plan since Ihave used different criteria to distinguish the initiatives.I have categorized the 248 initiatives according to the policy instruments to be used ontheir implementation. I have identified seven major categories of policy instruments:regulation, expenditure, guidelines, increasing capacity, agreements, public education andincreasing public participation. All of the Green Plan initiatives fall into one of these- 106 -categories. Within four of the categories, several subheadings are identified. I have notattempted to also categorize the initiatives, as announced in the Green Plan, under any of thesubheadings since the wording is often too vague to allow me to make such smalldistinctions. Only the initiatives on which action has been announced after the first one and ahalf years of the Green Plan's release have been categorized under the subheadings. Thereason for this is that the announcement specifies the policy instruments to be used moreexplicitly, allowing for a more precise categorization. The sources used to categorize theinitiatives announced in the first one and a half years are press releases from EnvironmentCanada and the First Year Progress Report.Frequently, as the implementation of a Green Plan initiative is announced, it actuallyentails several different initiatives. One example illustrates this. On page 1, the originalGreen Plan initiative "Native Pepole and Environmental Contaminants" actually involves twoseparate actions, each of which will employ a different policy instrument. It is important tokeep this in mind because it means that the total number of initiatives announced after thefirst one and a half years cannot be subtracted from the total number of Green Plan initiatives(248) in order to calculate how many initiatives are left to be implemented. Hence, when allGreen Plan initiatives have been implemented (or at least announced) after six years, thetotal number of initiatives announced will exceed the total number of original Green Planinitiatives. This does not mean that more has been done than has been promised under theGreen Plan, it just means that initiatives have been further defined and broken down intoseparate actions when they were finally announced.The table of initiatives and policy instruments is self-explanatory. Original Green Plan- 107 -initiatives are typed in capital letters while announcements after the first 1 1/2 years areindented and immediately follow the related Green Plan initiative. For easy reference, thetable has the same structure and headings as the original Green Plan.EVALUATIONAdded together, categories three, four, five, six and seven make up about 76 per centor four-fifths of all the Green Plan initiatives. The remaining two categories, regulation andexpenditure, make up 22 per cent, or one fifth. It is only these which promise to result in animprovement of environmental quality: new regulations or better enforcement requirepolluters to stop or abate pollution, and initiatives under expenditure entail clean-up orenvironmental enhancement programs funded by the federal government. However, sayingthat one fifth of the Green Plan initiatives will directly contribute to increasing environmentalquality is probably overly optimistic. Whether or not regulations will be effective depends onwhether or not they are enforced. The creation of new regulatory authority does notguarantee that it will be used to tighten pollution control. Finally, spending on clean-up maybe too low to make a significant difference or, even more frequently, spending initiativesrenew commitments to already existing programs, so that action towards improvingenvironmental quality is actually not increased.APPENDIX 2:^CLASSIFICATION OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN CANADA'S GREEN PLANI. LIFE'S THREE ESSENTIALS - CLEAN AIR, WATER AND LANDTotal budgetary commitment: $850 millionINITIATIVE^ POLICY INSTRUMENTGREEN PLAN 1st 1 1/2 years^Green Plan1st 1 1/2 yearsA. OUR HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENTDRINKING WATER SAFETY ACT^ 1EFFECTS OF AIR ON HEALTH 4WASTE MANAGEMENT AND HEALTH^ 4NATIVE PEOPLE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINANTS^ 4March 11, 1991 - $275 million over the next six years forthe Drinking Safety Program for Natives: water testing,water monitoring,training for band staff- $250 million to accelerate the establishment and improvementof water and sewage services on reserves^ 2 a.- $25 million for water quality monitoring and training in watertreatment on reserves^ 4 e.NORTHERN AND ARCTIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT^ 4April 29, 1991REGISTRY OF HEALTH EFFECTS IN HOT SPOTS 4RADIATION^ 4HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT INFORMATION AND AWARENESS PROGRAM^ 6- 109 -CLEARINGHOUSE ON HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT INFORMATION^ 6FITNESS AND ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM^ 6B. ACTION TO PROTECT AND RESTORE OUR WATERDRINKING WATER SAFETY ACT - see section I A. aboveACTION ON GROUNDWATER^ 4INDIAN HEALTH AND WATER - see section I A. aboveSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE FRASER RIVER BASINJune 1, 1991 - Fraser River Action Plan - $100 millionto clean up Fraser river- formation of committee todevelop sustainable management plan for the Fraser- $11 million to encourage the application of sustainabledevelopment through demonstration projects- $4 million towards the Burrard Inlet Environmental Action PlanDOUBLE FISH POPULATIONS IN THE RIVER- $30.1 million towards restoring habitat and salmon populations- $14 million for research on the effects of water qualityand river flows on fish productionMONITORING, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT MEASURES- $2.5 million for sustainable development strategies- $10.6 million to improve compliance with environmentalregulations through enhanced enforcement- $9.5 million to identify and reduce contaminantsentering the Fraser River from industrial and domesticsources- $18.3 million to identify toxins in the basin and sourcesof contaminationJune 24, 1991 - An agreement is signed between federal,B.C. governments and local agencies to work togetherto protect the environmental quality of Burrard Inlet4 b.4 c.4 f.2 a.4 d.4 f.1 d.4 e.4 e.5 a.- 110 -COORDINATE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE PROGRAMMay 26, 1992 - The Fraser Basin Management Program Agreementbetween the federal, provincial and local governments is announced.The program includes the $100 million Fraser River Action Plan andprovincial initiatives. A 19 member management board is to beestablished to develop and coordinate the Fraser Basin ManagementProgram. 4 f.4TARGETING THE ATLANTIC HARBOURS AND COASTS^ 4POLLUTION PREVENTION IN THE GREAT LAKES AND ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN^ 4March 5, 1991 - $25 million to preventpollution in Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River:- strategy development to spell out targets, schedules and actionsneeded to achieve major reductions of toxic substance contamination 4 f.- demonstration - money to assist industry to introduce provenpollution prevention technologies^ 4 c.- education and awareness^ 6Oct 1, 1991 - U.S./Canada binational Great Lakes/St.LawrenceRiver Pollution Prevention Symposium^ 4 h.Feb 14, 1992 - $16.6 million to the National Research Instituteto upgrade laboratories and carry out research in ecologicalhazard assessments and Great Lakes pollutionMay 29, 1992 - The federal and Ontario governments andbig three automakers announced an agreement to voluntarilyreduce the use, generation and release of toxic substancesin the manufacturing of automobilesGREAT LAKES POLLUTION PREVENTION CENTREMay 11, 1992 - Great Lakes Pollution Prevention Centre atSarnia is officially opened. The centre will promote publiceducation on pollution prevention issues and facilitateinformation exchange4 d.36April 2 ,1992 - Canada and U.S. establish air monitoring siteson the Great Lakes to monitor and sample toxic substances foundin the air and precipitation, contributing to the pollution ofthe Great Lakes basin 4 d. THREE YEAR IMPACT STUDY OF DEVELOPMENT IN ATHABASCA RIVER BASINSept 27, 1991 - the Canada-Alberta-NWT Northern Rivers StudyAgreement is signed 4 d.4JOINT STUDY IN RED RIVER AND ASSINBOINE RIVER BASINS^ 4NATIONAL CONFERENCE TO PROMOTE WISER WATER USE^ 4July 2, 1991 - Contract between Environment Canada andRockCliffe Research and Technology Inc. to manage marketingand commercialization of new technologies developed atEnvironment Canada's Wastewter Technology CentreIMPROVED REGULATIONS UNDER CEPA TO PROHIBIT OCEAN DUMPINGNov 7, 1991 - $10 million Ocean Dumping Control Action Plan- new controls on waste disposal at sea and scientificefforts to protect the marine environment- improved regulation under CEPA to strengthen controls tosafeguard the marine environment- general commitment to phase out the ocean disposal of industrialwastes by December 1995AUGMENT SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH NEW REGULATIONSNov 7, 1991 - improve Environment Canada's capacity toenforce permit conditionsNATIONAL RESEARCH AND INFORMATION PROGRAMNov 7, 1991 - public information and research to reducepersistent plastics in the coastal watersPROTECTION OF MARINE ENVIRONMENT CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAWMay 1991 - Intergovernmental meeting of experts developedaction plan on land-based sources of marine pollution4 c.4 d.1 c.1 c.1 a.64 f.- 112 -DESIGNATION OF MARINE PROTECTED AREAS^ 2C. KEEPING TOXICS OUT OF OUR ENVIRONMENTASSESSMENT OF TOXIC CHEMICALS BY 1994^ 4Feb 24,^1992 - $ 95 million to keep toxins out of theenvironment- National Pollution Release Inventory to identify sources ofpollutants form industry- scientific assessments to be acceleratedDec 16, 91 - New federal regulations proposed to requirenotification of exports of toxic substances441e.d.c.FEDERAL REGULATIONS FOR THE CONTROL OF EMISSIONS OF DIOXINS AND FURANS 1Dec 4, 1991 - Pulp and Paper Regulatory Package containing newregulations under CEPA and amendments to regulations under theFisheries Act: regulations of dioxins , furans, and organochlorine 1 c- $55.7 million allocated to improve enforcement ofenvironmental protection regulations including the newpulp and paper package 1 d.CONTROL OPTIONS REPORTS FOR MAJOR SOURCES TO BE RELEASED 1994 6CONTROL OPTIONS REPORTS FOR TOXIC PRIORITY SUBSTANCES WILL BE RELEASED 1994 6EVERY FIVE YEARS REVIEW AND UPDATE REGULATIONS ON TOXIC SUBSTANCES 4DEVELOP A NATIONAL DATA BASE FOR HAZARDOUS POLLUTANTS 4FEB 24, 1992 - a National Pollutants Release Inventory will beestablished 4 e.NATIONAL DATA BASE BY 1996 TO IDENTIFY RISKS PRESENTED TO FISHERIES 4ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY NETWORK BY 1992 4Feb 10, 1992 - $14 million to create the National ToxicologyNetwork which will support scientists conducting toxicology- 113 -research at Canadian Universities^ 4 d.ESTABLISH A NATIONAL REGULATORY REGIME FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRYPUBLISH NATIONAL STANDARDS AND CODES OF PRACTICE TO REGULATE RELEASE OFGENETICALLY ENGINEERED ORGANISMSREGULATIONS TO BE DEVELOPED UNDER CEPA BY 1992 REQUIRING NOTIFICATIONOF NEW PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGYD. SMOG IS A VISIBLE THREATINTERIM EMISSION TARGETS FOR NO and VOCs EMISSIONSXDec 6, 1991 - $30 million program to combat smog in Canada:5federal-provincial management plan, negotiations with provinceswhere smog is a major problem to commence January 1992- development of new regulations 1 c.- research program 4 d.- negotiation of bilateral agreements with provinces toset emission reduction targets 5 a.- public awareness campaign 6BY 1993, PROVIDE PUBLIC ADVISORS IN MAJOR URBAN AREAS 6BY 1994, ADOPT PACKAGE OF TIGHTER EMISSION STANDARDS FOR NEW MOTOR VEHICLES 1Feb 20 , 1992 - Federal government agreement with theauto industry to establish more stringent passenger carexhaust emission controls 1 c.BY 1995, ADOPT ALL FEDERAL ACTIONS CALLED FOR IN FED./ PROV. AGREEMENTS 1BY 1995, CONSENSUS ON EMISSION TARGETS TO ACHIEVE OZONE AIR QUALITY STANDARDS 1INCORPORATE EMISSION TRADING PROGRAMS INTO FED-PROV AGREEMENTS 1INCREASE MONITORING OF NOR , VOCs, AND GROUND-LEVEL OZONE 4Dec 6,^1991 - research and monitoring (see above)- 114 -BY 1995, NATIONAL MONITORING NETWORK TO MEASURE OZONE LEVELS^ 4BY 1995, DETERMINE FINAL EMISSION TARGETS TO DEAL WITH SMOG 1CONCLUDE INTERNATIONAL PROTOCOL ON VOC EMISSIONS WITHIN ECE^ 5Nov 19, 1991 - Canada signed international protocol onVOC emissions - calls for a 30 per cent reduction in FraserValley and Windsor-Quebec corridor and a national freeze at1988 levels by 1999.^ 5 c.E. CUTTING WASTES IN HALFBY 1993, ESTABLISH STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS TO REDUCE WASTE FROMPACKAGING MATERIALSNov 6, 1991 - $25 million Federal Waste Reduction Planreleased:- implementation of the National Packaging Protocol in partnershipwith provincial governments, industry and environmental groups^3- creation of the first coordinated national inventory and profileof hazardous and non-hazardous wastes^ 4 e.- issuance of regulations under CEPA to ensure sound management ofhazardous waste exports and imports 1 c.- regulations and guidelines for the safe storage of PCBs, andother dangerous substances^ 1 c.BY 1994, FOR OTHER COMPONENTS FOR WASTE STREAM, DEVELOP NATIONAL STANDARDSSUPPORT TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS AIMED AT WASTE REDUCTION(see section VI - D)MAKE NATIONAL WASTE EXCHANGE PROGRAM SELF-SUFFICIENT BY THE YEAR 2000Nov 6, 1991 - expansion of the National Waste Exchange ProgramPROVIDE INFORMATION TO INDIVIDUALS AND BUSINESSNov 6, 1991 - public information campaignESTABLISH AN OFFICE OF WASTE MANAGEMENT TO COORDINATE FEDERAL PROGRAMSNov 6, 1991 - establishment of the Office of Waste ManagementREDUCE WASTER FROM FEDERAL OPERATIONS BY 50 PER CENT BY THE YEAR 2000Nov 6, 1991 - cooperate with other federal departments to4 c.64 b.- 115 -achieve a 50 per cent reduction^ 2 a.SUPPORT COMMUNITY ACTION THROUGH THE EXPANSION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PARTNERS FUND(June 6, 1991 - section VI)BY 1992, DEVELOP A COMPUTERIZED TRACKING SYSTEM TO MONITOR THEMOVEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTES IN AND OUT OF CANADAJune 15, 1992 - proposed domestic regulation to implementthe provisions of the Basel Convention on the control ofTransboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal- tracking system for hazardous wastes- prevention of illegal traffic in hazardous wastes1 b.4 e.4 e.4BY 1996, DESTROY ALL PCBs UNDER FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND ESTABLISHMOBILE INCINERATORS^ 2BY 1996, COMPLETE REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE SAFE MANAGEMENTOF HAZARDOUS WASTE STREAMS^ 1SUPPORT TECHNOLOGY AIMED AT REDUCING, RECYCLING, RE -USING HAZARDOUS WASTES^4(section VI - D)Feb 14, 1992 - $5.6 million to the Wastewater Technology Centrein Burlington to develop state of the art technologies forwastewater treatment, waste management, and reduction andpollution prevention technology^ 4 d.BY 1991, AGREEMENT WITH PROVINCES ON CLEANING UP CONTAMINATED SITES1991 - Federal govt signs agreements with seven provinces tocommit $230 million for clean-up of contaminated "orphan"sitesand development and demonstration of new remedial technologiesCLEAN UP 30 HIGH-RISK CONTAMINATED HAZARDOUS WASTES SITES BY 1995Aug 21, 1991 - $22 million over four years to complete Co-operativeSiting Process, begun in 1988 for siting facility to manage low-level radioactive wastesSUPPORT NEW TECHNOLOGY FOR SITE CLEAN-UP4 c.4 f.- 116 -II.SUSTAINING OUR RENEWABLE RESOURCES Total budgetary commitment: $350 millionINITIATIVE^ POLICY INSTRUMENTA.SUSTAINABLE FOREST DEVELOPMENTDEMONSTRATION PROJECTS AS MODELS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTSept 25, 1991 - $100 million six-year Partners inSustainable Development Program was announced:- $54 million for the selection of model forest sites in eachof the major forest regions of the country, as working modelsof sustainable development 4 c.4FORESTS DAMAGED BY INSECTS AND DISEASE^ 4- $13 million for improved monitoring and information systems^4 e.R&D OF IMPROVED PRODUCTS AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE PROCESSESIN THE FOREST SECTOR^ 4- $33 million for specific research initiatives^ 4 d.RELEASE OF A REPORT TO PARLIAMENT ON THE STATE OF CANADIAN FORESTS^ 6April 9, 1991 - House of Commons first annual report  The State of Forestry in Canada - first national account of forest activity^6EXPAND DATA ON FOREST CONSERVATION^ 4ESTABLISH A NATIONAL FOREST SEED AND GENE BANK^ 4SUPPORT THE IDENTIFICATION AND COMPLETION OF A NATIONAL NETWORK OF ECOLOGY RESERVES 2ACCELERATE THE CREATION OF COMPUTER-AIDED MANAGEMENT TOOLSRESEARCH INTO CLIMATE CHANGE, BIODIVERSITY, ACID RAIN AND FIRE MANAGEMENTSUPPORT THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON FORESTS- 117 -B.ACHIEVING SUSTAINABILITY IN AGRICULTUREPROMOTING SOIL CONSERVATION - EASTERN CANADA SOIL CONSERVATION CENTRE^4PROVIDING A CLEAN WATER SUPPLY^ 4INTEGRATING AGRICULTURE AND WILDLIFE^ 4MANAGING WASTE AND POLLUTION^ 4Jan 15, 1992 - $170 million to expand efforts at makingCanada's agri-food industry more environmentally sustainable.^4 f.- $128 million to be spent through cost-shared Green Planagreements to be negotiated with provinces and territories 5 a.PROTECTING GENETIC RESOURCES^ 4Jan 15, 1992 - $22 million towards protecting our geneticresources and developing alternative pest management strategies^4 f.CLIMATE CHANGE AND AGRICULTURE 4Jan 15, 1992 - $20 million for research to help agriculturerespond to the increase in greenhouse gases^ 4 c.- research into alternative renewable energy resources such asethanol^ 4 d.Dec 1990 - Federal Pesticide Review Team issued itsfinal report outlining a proposal for a revisedregulatory systemC. SUSTAINABLE FISHERIESSUSTAINABILITY1991 - Consultations with public and private sector recreationalfisheries stakeholders have been conducted and a national actionplan for Sustainable Recreational Fisheries developedENFORCEMENTJan 17, 1991 - New amendments to Fisheries Act became Law- increase penalties for fish habitat offensesCOMPLIANCE POLICY4 f.4 f.1 b.- 118 -PARTNERSHIP WITH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS^ 4POLLUTION PREVENTION - ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF TOXIC CHEMICALS^ 4UPDATE POLLUTION PREVENTION REGULATIONS CONTAINED IN FISHERIES ACT^ 1Dec 4, 1991^ 1 c.NET GAIN OF THE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF FISH HABITAT^ 1INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS FOR VARIOUS FISHERIES N/CSUSTAINABLE PRACTICES IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT^ 4BY 1991, DEVELOP AN ACTION PLAN TO IMPLEMENT THE RECREATIONAL FISHERIES POLICY^4COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF AQUACULTURE STRATEGY^ N/CINTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO MONITOR DRIFTNET OPERATIONS^ 5Sept 1991 - Canada signed Protocol II of the WellingtonConvention which supports ban on driftnet fishing for allspecies in the south Pacific.^ 5 c.DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE FISHING METHODS^ 4INTERNATIONAL SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES STRATEGY 5Canada, U.S.S.R, Japan and US agreed to terminate high-seas salmonfishing in north Pacific - agreement to be ratified spring 1992^5 c.CONTROLLING LANDBASED SOURCES OF OCEAN POLLUTION^ 5STRENGTHENING THE LONDON DUMPING CONVENTION 5(NOV. 1, 1991)^ 5 c.ESTABLISH A GLOBAL OCEAN OBSERVING SYSTEM^ 4- 119 -III.OUR SPECIAL SPACES AND SPECIES Total budgetary commitment: $175 millionINITIATIVE^ POLICY INSTRUMENTA. PROTECTING UNIQUE ECOLOGICAL AREASESTABLISH AT LEAST FIVE NEW NATIONAL PARKS BY 1996^ 2NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS FOR THE REMAINING 13 PARKS REQUIRED TO COMPLETETHE TERRESTRIAL SYSTEM BY 2000Negotiations taking place over creation of new national parks:Banks Island, N.W.T.; Churchill, Manitoba; Torngat Mountains andMealy Mountains, Labrador; Bluenose Lake, N.W.T.; Wager Bay, N.W.T.;East Arm of Great Slave Lake, North Baffin island, and Old CrowFlats, Yukon. 4 f.4April 23, 1992 - Land set aside for a new national parkto be created on northern Baffin Island by 1996^ 2 b.ESTABLISH THREE NEW NATIONAL MARINE PARKS BY 1996 2ESTABLISH AN ADDITIONAL THREE MARINE PARKS BY 2000^ 2PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN RESOURCE EVALUATIONS AND MONITORING OF DESIGNATED RIVERS^4Joint action in undertaking studies, plans, resource evaluationand monitoring of 21 rivers in nine provinces and territoriesto be added to the Canadian Heritage River System.^ 4 e.EXPAND FOREST FIRE PROTECTION^ 2DEVELOP AN ENHANCED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM^ 4Management planning under way for Saguenay and South Morsby^4 f.SUPPORT STAFF TRAINING IN NATURAL RESOURCE PROTECTION^ 4Training initiatives and three ecosystem studies to enhance- 120 -management and protection of national park resources^ 4 g.PARKS AS MODELS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT^ 4June 4, 1992 - $20 million to improve access for disabledvisitors at national parks and historic sites^ 2 b.Program of prescribed burns in four national parksto enhance regeneration of natural species 2 b.ADOPT THE FEDERAL POLICY ON WETLAND CONSERVATION IN 1991^ 1March 9, 1992 - Federal Policy on Wetland Conservationcommits the federal government to sustaining and improvingwetlands through its programs and land management practices^1 b.B. SUSTAINING CANADA'S WEALTH OF WILDLIFESTRENGTHEN WILDLIFE RESEARCH PROGRAMS^ 4WILDLIFE RESEARCH NETWORK AT CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES^ 4WILDLIFE HEALTH NETWORK AT CANADIAN VETERINARY COLLEGES 4NEW LABORATORY FACILITIES TO SUPPORT TOXICOLOGY RESEARCH^ 4Feb 14, 1992 - $ 5.5 million to the National Wildlife ResearchCentre to fund research to trace the presence of organic and metalcontamination and their effects on wildlife^ 4 d.RECOVERY PROGRAMS FOR 11 AT-RISK MIGRATORY BIRD SPECIES^ 4RENEW CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD WILDLIFE FUND^ 2INCREASE PARTICIPATION OF UNIVERSITIES AND ENGOs^ 7BY 1993, ENSURE RECOVERY PROGRAMS FOR ALL THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES^4NETWORK OF ENFORCEMENT COORDINATORS FOR THE MIGRATORY BIRD CONVENTION ACT 4- 121 -BY 1992„ DEVELOP A COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT REGIME WITH NATIVE COMMUNITIES^4BY 1994, ESTABLISH AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM OF NON-GAME BIRD STUDIES^ 4REDUCE POACHING AND ILLEGAL TRADE^ 1Nov 7, 1991 - Wild Animal and Plant Protection Act toprevent illegal trade in wildlife - $12.3 million^ 1 b.STRENGTHEN WILDLIFE LAW ENFORCEMENT^ 1Wild Animal and Plant Protection Act (see above)BY 1992, INITIATE AN INTEGRATED FORESTRY AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION PROGRAM^4Nov 29, 1991 - $34.9 million National Wildlife Strategyto protect wildlife diversity, conserve wildlife habitat,and safeguard healthy ecosystemsInitiatives:- enhance wildlife research^ 4 d.- implement Federal Policy on Wetland Conservation (see III - A)ESTABLISH THE PACIFIC COAST JOINT VENTURE^ N/C- Pacific Coast Joint Venture N/C- develop a federal policy on endangered species^ 4 f.ESTABLISH A NATIONAL WILDLIFE HABITAT NETWORK 4ENCOURAGE FARMERS TO PRESERVE WILDLIFE HABITAT SUCH AS WETLANDS ON THEIR LANDS (see III-A)March 9, 1992 - Federal Policy on Wetland Conservationcommits the federal government to sustaining and improvingwetlands through its programs and land management practices^(see III-A)C. BUILDING UPON OUR HISTORICAL HERITAGECOMMEMORATE SEVEN KEY HISTORIC THEMES BY 1996 AND AN ADDITIONAL EIGHT BY 2000^2- Acquisition of the Bar U Ranch and Ryan Premises is being finalized 2 b.- Put Manoir Papineau National Historic Site under EnvironmentCanada's Park Service^ 2 b.Management Planning under way for Grosse-Ile National Historic Sitein Ontario and McLean Mill National Historic Site in B.C.^4 f.- 122 -Dec 18, 1991 - $2.7 million - Federal/provincial agreement givesEnvironment Canada the authority to develop a national historicsite at Red Bay, Labrador.^ 2 b.Dec 18, 1991 - $3.15 million to develop a national historic siteat Bonavista, Newfoundland.^ 2 b.PROVIDE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS FORNATIONALLY IMPORTANT HISTORIC SITES 2Assist Gardenton Museum Board with the purchase ofKorol Homestead in Manitoba.^ 2 b.EXPAND THE PROTECTION OF ARTIFACTS AND HISTORIC OBJECTS^not an environmentalMeasures are being undertaken to improve the management^initiativeof artifacts and historic objectsDEVELOP THE NATION'S ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORIC RESOURCE^not an environmentalCONSERVATION CAPABILITIES^ initiativeSUPPORTING STAFF TRAINING IN HISTORICAL RESOURCE PROTECTIONTraining Strategy is being developed to improve cultural^not an environmentalresource management practices^ initiativeIV. CANADA'S UNIQUE STEWARDSHIP: THE ARCTIC Total budgetary commitment: $100 millionInitiative^ Policy Instrument A. PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF OUR NORTHLANDRESEARCH ON SOURCES, SINKS, PATHWAYS AND TRENDS OF CONTAMINANTSApril 29, 1991 - $100 million Arctic Environment Strategy- identify, reduce and eliminate chemical contaminants^4 e.- a plan to clean up unsafe, hazardous and unsightly waste^4 f.- 123 -- a program to improve management and protection of northern waters- plan to work with territorial and community governmentsDEVELOP STRATEGIES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF CONTAMINANT EMISSIONS44g.f.THROUGH LRTAP OF THE UN ECE 5ARCTIC ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STRATEGYJune 1991 - Ministerial meeting in Finland of all circumpolar states5- Arctic Environment Protection Strategy 5 c.CLEAN UP ALL KNOWN HAZARDOUS WASTES ON CROWN LANDS IN THE NORTH 2CLEAN UP ALL HAZARDOUS WASTES AT ABANDONED MILITARY SITES 2CLEAN UP ALL ABANDONED DEW LINE SITES ACROSS THE NORTH 2CLEAN UP OF NON-HAZARDOUS WASTES NEAR COMMUNITIES 2DEVELOP A NETWORK OF WATER QUALITY STATIONS THROUGHOUT THE NORTH 4MODERNIZE NETWORK OF WATER QUANTITY MONITORING STATIONS 4INCREASE ANALYTICAL AND INTERPRETATION PROGRAMS 4DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION BASES 6ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 6TRAINING FOR CONSERVATION AREA MANAGEMENT AND ECOTOURISM 4DEVELOPMENT AND INTRODUCTION OF APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY 4V.GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITYTotal budgetary commitment: $575 millionInitiative^ Policy InstrumentA. GLOBAL WARMINGREGULATION OF MINIMUM ENERGY EFFICIENCY LEVELS IN EQUIPMENTOct 29, 1991 - Energy Efficiency Act^ 1 b.LABELLING OF PRODUCTS TO CONVEY INFORMATION ON ENERGY USEOct 29, 1991 - Energy Efficiency Act 6COLLECTION OF STATISTICS ON ENERGY USEOct 29, 1991 - Energy Efficiency Act^ 4 e.MINIMUM ENERGY EFFICIENCY STANDARDS IN BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENTNov 22, 1991 - Revision of 1983 federal Measures for Energyconservation in New Buildings, updating of the R-200 housingconstruction standards, Building, Research and Developmentand Technology Transfer initiative^ 1 b.BY 1992, ENERGUIDE LABELLING FOR HOME APPLIANCESOct 29, 1991 and Feb 7, 1992^ 6FEDERAL MEASURES FOR ENERGY CONSERVATION IN NEW BUILDINGSNov 22, 1991 - see above 1 b.DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR ENERGY-EFFICIENT BUILDINGSFUEL EFFICIENCY TARGETS FOR NEW VEHICLESDec 4, 1991DEVELOP STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING CO 2Dec 4, 1991164161414- 125 -DEVELOP EDUCATIONAL PACKAGES FOR FLEET MANAGERS AND DRIVERS^ 6Dec 4, 1991ESTABLISH A NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL TO ESTABLISH ENERGY EFFICIENCY TARGETS^4TRAIN AND CERTIFY ENERGY EFFICIENCY MANAGERS IN INDUSTRIAL FIRMS^ 4DEVELOPMENT AND MARKET PENETRATION OF ALTERNATIVE TRANSPORTATION FUELS^4Dec 4, 1991 - announcement by the Ministry of Energy, MinesResources^ 4 c.RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES^ 4COST-SHARED MARKET ASSESSMENTS OF NON-FOSSIL ENERGY SOURCES 4DEMONSTRATION OF ADVANCED ENERGY SYSTEMS^ 4AGREEMENTS WITH MAJOR ENERGY-USING ORGANIZATIONS ON PERFORMANCE^ 4ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORTS TO PARLIAMENT ON MEETING ENERGY EFFICIENCY OBJECTIVES^6INFORMATION ON CANADIAN ENERGY CONSUMPTION TO THE PUBLIC^ 6PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGN^ 6LIMITING GREENHOUSE GASES THROUGH TREE PLANTING^ 21991 - National Community Tree Planting Foundationestablished^ 2 a.LIMITING GREENHOUSE GASES IN AGRICULTURE^ 6DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE USE OF ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS^ 6June 1992^ 6INQUIRY INTO THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF ELECTRICAL GENERATION OPTIONS^4BY 1994, ADOPT GUIDELINES TO CONSIDER EFFECTS ON CLIMATE OF MAJOR PROJECTS^3- 126 -BY 1996, ASSESS SOCIO-ECONOMIC REPERCUSSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON SEVERALRIVER BASINS^ 4Jan 27, 1992 - $85 million science program to reduce theuncertainties surrounding global warming in Canada.^ 4 d.BY 1996, ASSESS POLICY CHANGES NEEDED TO DEAL WITH RISING SEA LEVELS^ 4BY 1991, ANNUAL REPORTS ON THE STATE OF THE CANADIAN CLIMATE^ 6BY 1996, A CLIMATE CHANGE DETECTION NETWORK^ 4Jan 7, 1992^ 4 d.BY 1992, A NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR OCEAN RESEARCH RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE^4Jan 7, 1992 4 d.PURSUE AN INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE^ 5June 1992 - UNCED conference - international agreement on globalwarming^ 5 b.ENHANCED COOPERATION ON INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE^ 4ADDRESS THE CONCERNS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES^ 2committed $1 million at Second World Climate Conference^2 c.BILATERAL DIPLOMACY TO ENCOURAGE OTHER COUNTRIES TO ABIDE BY INTERNATIONALAGREEMENTS^ 5SEEK INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGIES THAT REDUCEGREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS^ 5B. OZONE DEPLETION: ACCELERATING CONTROL MEASURESFEDERAL PROGRAM TO PROMOTE THE RECOVERY OF OZONE DEPLETING SUBSTANCESAug 25, 1991 - $25 million for Canada's fight againstozone depletion- $9.2 million - regulations, recycling and recovery of ozonedepleting substances 2 a.- 127 -Nov 16, 1991 - Amendments to Ozone Depleting Regulations #3proposed in Canada Gazette, Part I^ 1 b.ESTABLISH AN ARCTIC OBSERVATORY FOR RESEARCH AND MONITORINGAug 25, 1991- $15.8 million - verifying effectiveness - establishmentof a High Arctic Ozone Observatory at Eureka, NWT - monitoringand analysis, research 44 a.BY 1992, AUGMENT THE CANADIAN OZONE MONITORING PROGRAMFeb 14, 1992 - 25.8 million towards upgrading the TorontoAtmospheric Environment Service laboratory 4 d.4March 11, 1992 - "Ozone Watch", a new program to report on thestate of the ozone layer over Canada^ 6BY 1993, PROVIDE WARNINGS OF ULTRAVIOLET RADIATION LEVELSMay 27, 1992 - the UV Advisory Program is unveiled. It is toprovide the public with daily updates on the expected UV strength(UV Advisory and Ozone Watch programs fall under the $25 millionozone initiative)BY 1993, PARTICIPATE IN INTERNATIONAL JOINT RESEARCH PROGRAMS^ 4C. ACID RAIN: BUILDING ON SUCCESSRE-NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS WITH EASTERN PROVINCES TO CAP SO 2 EMISSIONS IN 1991^1BY 1994, AGREEMENTS WITH ALL PROVINCES TO CAP SO 2 EMISSIONSSept 23, 1991 - $30 million towards Canada's acid rain controlprogram - to cap SO 2 emissions and to verify Canadian and USactions called for in the Canada/US Air Quality Accord14 e.BEGINNING IN 1991, PROVIDE PROGRESS REPORTS ON ACID RAIN CONTROL PROGRAMMarch 1992 - First Progress report on Canadian Acid Rain ControlProgram released 66EXAMINE FEASIBILITY OF USING EMISSION TRADING AS MEANS OF CONTROL^ 466- 128 -CONCLUDE A TRANSBOUNDARY AIR QUALITY AGREEMENT WITH THE US^ 5March 13, 1991 - Canada/ US Accord on Air Quality signed tocontrol transboundary air pollution^ 5 c.BY 1992, PRESS FOR RENEGOTIATION OF THE HELSINKI PROTOCOL UNDER THE UN ECE^5DETERMINE EXTENT OF LAKE AND RIVER RECOVERY FROM ACID RAIN DAMAGE^ 4BY 1994, REPORT ON THE CAUSES OF FOREST DECLINE^ 6BY 1994, REPORT ON HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS OF ACID RAIN RELATED POLLUTANTS^6D. ACCELERATING INTERNATIONAL PROGRESS ON THE ENVIRONMENTINCREASE FUNDING OF KEY INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTIONSUNCED National Secretariat established - Canada contributed$4.75 million to support preparations for conferenceSUPPORT CANADIAN YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS IN PARTICIPATION TO UN CONFERENCEJune 26, 1991 - $1.7 million allocated for the support of theCanadian Youth Secretariat on Environment and Development2 c.727ESTABLISH A NATIONAL SECRETARIAT TO ASSIST PARTICIPATION OF CANADIANSIN THE CONFERENCE^ 4PROVIDE FUNDING TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR STUDIES NEEDED TO DEFINE ISSUES^4DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS TO TRANSFER CANADIAN EXPERTISE TO OTHER COUNTRIES 4CONTINUE TO SPONSOR THE GLOBE ENVIRONMENTAL CONFERENCES IN VANCOUVER^ 6March 1992 - Globe 92 Conference^ 6STRENGTHEN BILATERAL COOPERATIONNov 19, 1991 - Canada signed international protocol calling fora 30% reduction of VOC emissions by 1991 in areas whereground-level ozone is high^ 5 c.- 129 -Feb 1, 1991 - Canada-France Memorandum of Understanding signedpromoting cooperation on various environmental issues^ 5 b.VI. ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE DECISION-MAKING Total budgetary commitment: $500 millionInitiative^ Policy InstrumentA. PARTNERSHIPS EQUAL SOLUTIONSASSIST INDIAN COMMUNITIES TO DEVELOP ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION PLANS^ 7SUPPORT THE CREATION OF AN ABORIGINAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTATION MECHANISM^7INCREASE IN THE CLASS GRANT FUND^ 7Additional funding to Canada's ENGOs through increase inClass Grant Fund^ 7INCREASE IN ANNUAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO CEN^ 7additional funding to CEN - announcements to be made in 1992^7BY 1991, ESTABLISH ANNUAL CONFERENCES TO CONSULT BUSINESS AND LABOUR ONENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES^ 7Oct 1991 - Business Connexion^ 7BY 1991, FUNDING TO ENVIRONMENTAL FORA INVOLVING MULTI-STAKEHOLDER DISCUSSIONS^7BY 1991, SUPPORT TO FACILITATE PERSONNEL EXCHANGES BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTCANADA AND NGOs^ 4EXTEND THE PARTNERS FUND PROGRAM^ 7June 6, 1991 - Expansion of the Environmental Partners Fund program'seligibility criteria to include projects that broaden publicenvironmental awareness and knowledge. More than $4.9 milliongranted to 130 community based organizations across the country^7- 130 -Nov 14, 1991 - An additional $20 million in funding to theEnvironmental Partners Fund, mandate extended until 1997(fund now a total commitment of $70 million)^ 7STRENGTHEN THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM^ 6Aug 26, 1991 - $2 million public awareness campaign to promotethe Environmental Choice Program^ 6Feb 7, 1992 - New Environmental Choice certification criteria forfive large appliances made public. The guidelines are tocomplement Energy, Mines and Resources' Energuide program byidentifying the top ranking energy-saving devices.^ 6EXPAND ENVIRONMENT WEEK^ 6Nov 14, 1991 - $7.5 million over six years to non-profitcommunity organizations to organize activities duringEnvironment Week 6BY 1991, ESTABLISH A CANADIAN YOUTH ADVISORY COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENT ANDDEVELOPMENT^ 6ESTABLISH A CANADIAN YOUTH SECRETARIAT ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENTJune 26, 1991 - see section V - D.ORGANIZE A NATIONAL YOUTH CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT TO PRECEDETHE BRAZIL CONFERENCE^ 7IMPROVE THE CONSULTATION PROCESS TO INVOLVE AS MANY CANADIANS AS POSSIBLE^7Environment Canada produces an Environment Consultations Calendar^7B. ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATIONRELEASE THE SECOND NATIONAL STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT REPORT IN 1991April 9, 1992 - The second national State of theEnvironment Report is released^ 6- $40 million to fund the Environmental Information initiative^6- 131 -(the money will go towards a number of information initiativessee below)BY 1992, PROVIDE AN ANNUAL STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT POLICY STATEMENTBY 1993, ESTABLISH A LONG-TERM STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT MONITORING ANDASSESSMENT CAPABILITYApril 9, 1991 - see aboveMAY 1991, HOST AN INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATIONMay 1991 - Canada hosts an international forum on environmentalinformation for the 21st century4 e.4646IMPLEMENT PILOT ACCOUNTS FOR TWO NATURAL RESOURCES^ 4BY 1993, DRAFT AN ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING FRAMEWORK 6April 9, 1992 - see above^ 6DEVELOP A PRELIMINARY NATIONAL SET OF ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS^ 6April 16, 1991 - Release of a preliminary report on a nationalset of environmental indicators^ 6BY 1993, DEVELOP AND RELEASE A COMPREHENSIVE SET OF INDICATORS TOMEASURE CANADA'S PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING OUR ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS^ 6BY 1994, ESTABLISH COMPUTER SERVICES AND A NATIONAL NETWORK TO SUPPORTINDICATOR DEVELOPMENTBY 1994, ESTABLISH A NATIONAL STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT REPORTING ORGANIZATIONApril 9, 1992 - see aboveC. ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZENSHIPCAMPAIGNS TO ENHANCE ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESSJan 28, 1991 - Federal participation in the City of Montreal'sParc des Iles Project, to convert Biosphere into an environmentaland water interpretation centre^ 6- 132 -DEVELOPMENT OF LEARNING MATERIALS AND PROGRAMS^ 6DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIALIZED CAMPAIGNS^ 6EXCHANGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LEARNING RESOURCES^ 6IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION AND TRAINING PLANS^ 4SUPPORT FOR PARTNERSHIP ACTIVITIES TO ENHANCE GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS^6D. SUPPORTING NEW SCIENCECONTINUE FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE GLOBAL CHANGE PROGRAMDec 6, 1991 - $4.5 million for the Global Change Program -nation wide research into all aspects of global changeFUND SCHOLARSHIPS, PROFESSIONAL CHAIRS AND UNIVERSITY GRANTS IN THEENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCESSept 29, 1991 - $50 million program for research and trainingin environmental studiesREVITALIZE FEDERAL RESEARCH FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT1992 - Commitment to revitalize research facilities and equipmentand augment scientific staff over next five years:- Feb 14, 1992 - $2.3 million to the National Hydrology ResearchInstitute to construct a new laboratory and acquire equipmentto measure contaminants in surface and groundwater systems.- Feb 14, 1992 - $10.2 million to the River Road TechnologyCentre to acquire instrumentation for the development of newair pollution technologies- Feb 14, 1992 - $1.9 million to the Archaeological ResearchCentre in Ottawa for a new imaging laboratory and recordingsystem to develop accurate maps and images of marinearchaeological sites4 d.4 d.4 d.4 d.4 d.4 d.- 133 -- Feb 14, 1992 - $5.7 million to the Centre Saint-Laurentto fund a new laboratory and field equipment to trace thequantity of toxic chemicals from industryDURING 1991, AUGMENT THE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMOct 7, 1991 - $100 million Technology for Environmental Solutionsinitiative to foster creation of partnerships and attract fundingfrom the private sector,includes:- $18 million Technology Transfer Program to assist Canadianfirms to locate, assess, transfer and promote environmentaltechnologiesLAUNCH AN ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION PROGRAMOct 7, 1991 - $80 million Environmental TechnologyCommercialization Program to develop and commercializetechnologies to prevent and clean up pollutionESTABLISH A FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY NETWORKOct 7, 1991 - $2 million to establish and EnvironmentalTechnology Network among existing federal, provincial anduniversity centres of environmental technologyIN 1991, INTRODUCE AN ENVIRONMENTAL INNOVATION PROGRAMNov 25, 1991 - $20 million to illicit innovative researchand development proposals from Canadian industry, universities,native groups, NG0s, and individuals4 d.44 c4 c.44 c.44 e.44 d.E. LEGISLATIVE, REGULATORY AND MARKET TOOLS FOR CHANGEENHANCE ONGOING ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS^ 1Dec 4, 1991 - $55.7 million to enhance enforcement ofenvironmental regulations^ 1 d.WORK IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE PROVINCES IN ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES^5RECRUIT NATIVE PEOPLE FOR ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS^not an environmental initiative- 134 -ENFORCE THE MIGRATORY BIRDS CONVENTION ACT^ 1IMPROVE LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES IN CANADA'S NATIONAL PARKS^ 1Dec 4, 1991 - $55.7 million to enhance enforcement of environ-mental regulations^ 1 d.PROGRAM TO SUPPORT RESEARCH INTO THE USE OF ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS 4EARLY 1991, RELEASE A DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE USE OF ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTSMay 21, 1992 - A discussion paper on the use of economicinstruments to pursue environmental protection is releasedand a public consultation process is announced (see section IV)VII.STARTING IN OUR OWN HOUSE: FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP Total budgetary commitment: $275 millionInitiative^ Policy InstrumentFUNDING FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT PROCESS^ 2PARTICIPANT FUNDING PROGRAM^ 7Nov 15, 1991 - $8.5 million initiative to assist publicparticipation in review of projects subject to environmentalassessment by a panel 7EXISTING POLICY AND PROGRAM REVIEW^ 4CODE OF ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP 2Nov 22, 1991 - Federal Building Initiative to addressfinancial and non-financial barriers to energy efficientinvestments in federal departments (also see section V - A.)June 5, 1992 - The federal government will adopt a Code of Environ-mental Stewardship. The code promotes good environmental practicesin all government operations and requires all agencies to incorporateenvironmental considerations into their operations and practices^3- 135 -POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING^ 4VIII. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Total budgetary commitment: $175 millionInitiative^ Policy Instrument DEFINE ROLE OF ARMED FORCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCIES^ 4SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE^ 4CONSULTATIONS WITH THE MARINE INDUSTRY^ 7RE-ASSESSMENT OF COMPENSATION LEVELS FOR MARINE POLLUTION INCIDENTS^ N/CIMPROVE MARINE SPILL CONTINGENCY PLANNING^ 4June 26, 1991 - $100 million Marine Environmental EmergenciesResponse Strategy to protect Canada's oceans, coastlines andinland waters from oil and chemical spills^ 4 f.NEW TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR RESPONSE PERSONNEL 4Nov 5, 1991 - $25 million Hazardous Spills Prevention andResponse Program^ 2 a.PROMOTE MEASURES TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO NON -MARINE SPILLS^ 6IMPROVE SPILL RESPONSE TRAINING AND DECISION-MAKING^ 4RESEARCH INTO REPERCUSSIONS OF OIL AND CHEMICAL SPILLS 4BY 1996, INSTALMENT OF FOUR DOPPLER RADAR FACILITIES^ 4May 17, 1991 - Installation of a Doppler weather radar in Edmonton^4 a.SUPPORT SCIENTIFIC EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF SEVERE WEATHER^4Dec 5, 1991 - $40 million initiative to upgrade natural hazard- 136 -and warning systems as well as extreme weather facilities^4 d.UPGRADE EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION CAPABILITIES^ 4TYPES OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS USED: ^ number of initiativesprogress report(first 1 1/2 years) Green Plan1. Regulation^ 22^33a. creation of new regulatory authority^1b. regulatory actions^ 8c. regulations proposed 9d. enforcement^ 42. Expenditure 16^23a. spending on clean-up/restoring habitat^6b. acquisition/creation of natl. sites/parks^8protected areasc. foreign aid^ 23. Guidelines/codes of practice^ 3^24. Increasing Capacity^ 76 119a. creation of new research facilities^2b. new institutions or organizations 2c. technology development (incl. demo projects)^11d. spending on science and other research^26e. setting guidelines, detection, monitoring,classification of environmental problems^15f. plan development, negotiations^ 17g. enhance mgmt, admin capabilities 2h. conferences^ 1- 137 -5. Agreements^ 12^15a. intergovernmental agreements, no actionspecifiedb. international agreement, no actionspecifiedc. international agreement, general commitment3276. Public education^ 22^397. Increase public participation (consultations,increase funding of ENGOs)^ 8^13Non-classifiable (N/C) 1 4TOTAL^ 159^248Distribution (1st 1 1/2 years):1^2^3^4^5^6^722^16^3^76^12^22^814% 10%^2% 48%^7% 14%^5%coercive vs non-coercive instruments24% : 76%regulation vs other14% : 86%Distribution (Green Plan initiatives):1^2^3^4^5^6^7^coercive vs non-coercive instruments21% : 76%33^23^2^119 15^39^13regulation vs other13%^9%^1% 48%^6% 16% 5%^13% : 85%- 138 -APPENDIX 3:^FEDERAL MINISTERS OF THE ENVIRONMENTUNDER THE MULRONEY GOVERNMENTstarting date of term in office:Suzanne Blais-Grenier:^September 1984Tom McMillan:^August 1985Lucien Bouchard: January 1989Robert de Cotret:^September 1990Jean Charest: April 1991APPENDIX 4:^INTERVIEWSMEMBERS OF THE FRASER BASIN MANAGEMENT BOARD:Susan Anderson, B.C. Federation of LabourAnthoney H. J. Dorcey, ChairpersonChief Peter Quaw, Lheit-Lit'en NationGOVERNMENT OFFICIALS:Allan Borham, Fraser Basin Management ProgramLee Coonfer, Tom Siddons's Minister's officeTeresa Duynstee, Coordinator, Greenfields ProjectFred Fraser, Fisheries and OceansPrad Kahry, B.C. Ministry of Environment, Lands and ParksBruce Kay, Environment Canada, EnforcementOtto Langer, Fisheries and OceansHew McConnell, Engineer, GVRDJames Jordan, BIEAP, director of the BMP Action TeamMartin Pomeroy, Environment Canada, Pollution AbatementGordon Rose, Engineer, GVRDTony Shebbeare, Council of Forest Industries, Member of Start-up CommitteeLess Swain, B.C. Ministry of Environment, Lands and ParksTaina Tuonimin, Environment Canada, Water Quality- 140 -ENVIRONMENTAL INTEREST GROUP REPRESENTATIVES:Mae Burrows, T. Buck Suzuki Environmental FoundationEvelyn Feller, Fraser River CoalitionMartin Keely, Friends of Boundary BayAnne Murray, Boundary Bay Conservation CommitteeWill Paulik, Fraser River Coalition, Member of the Start-up CommitteeJudy Williams, Wreck Beach Conservation SocietyRick Zammuto, Canoe/Robson Environmental CoalitionOTHER:Ken Hall, Westwater Research Centre


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