UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Liu Binyan's odyssey : intellectuals and the state in the PRC Zhu, Caixia 1993

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-ubc_1993_fall_zhu_caixia.pdf [ 2.42MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0086330.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0086330-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0086330-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0086330-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0086330-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0086330-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0086330-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0086330-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0086330.ris

Full Text

LIU BINYAN'S ODYSSEY:INTELLECTUALS AND THE STATE IN THE PRCbyCAIXIA ZHUB.A., Peking University, 1982M.A., Tufts University, 1989A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES(Department of Political Science)We accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAOctober 1993© Caixia ZhuIn presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, 1 agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(SignaDepartment of Political ScienceThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate September 21, 1993DE-6 (2/88)AbstractThe complex relationship between Chinese intellectuals and theParty-state has been an important aspect of China's politics since1949. This paper deals with the intellectual-state relationship ingeneral and with the life of Liu Binyan--a prominent Chineseintellectual--in particular.The paper explains how cultural traditions drew Chineseintellectuals into the nation's politics and how the intellectuals'self-image affected both their attitudes and behaviour toward thestate and society, as well as their fate in the Chinese polityafter 1949. The objective of the paper is, from this perspective,to provide a better understanding of the intellectuals' politicalposition in China today.The methodology of the paper is to approach the topic from ahistorical perspective. The paper suggests that Chineseintellectuals, as a social group, have been recognized as an eliteclass since ancient times and are an integral part of the PRCpolitical establishment. Their attitudes toward the state, thesociety and social masses have been consistently characterized bypatriotism, patronage and paternalism. The paper argues that,considering their close attachment to political power and deepinvolvement in political affairs, Chinese intellectuals are largelyresponsible for their destiny.The paper observes that, through the analysis of Liu'siiexperience, Chinese intellectuals have frequently faced a dilemmaby playing a dual-role: as a spokesperson for both the regime, andfor the people. A dilemma that Chinese intellectuals have yet toresolve. In the last chapter, while pointing out changes in China'seconomic infrastructure and its impact on the on-goingintellectual-state relationship, the author concludes that thepresent pattern of the intellectual-state relationship willcontinue.0iiiTABLE OF CONTENTSAbstractTable of Contents^ ivINTRODUCTION 1Chapter One^Chinese Intellectuals and the State:The Pattern^ 4Features of Chinese Political System^5Party Policies toward Intellectualssince 1949 7Chinese Intellectuals as a Social Group:Role Issue^ 12Chapter Two^Liu Binyan's Odyssey^ 18"Join the Revolution" 19The Writer and His Writings^ 221) "Delving into life" 232) A spokesman for the people 28Liu Binyan and Hu Yaobang 32"The Second Kind of Loyalty"^ 41Chapter Three Conclusion^ 51Changes in Chinese Political-EconomicStructure 52Chinese Intellectuals in the 1990s^54Bibliography^ 60ivNaturally those Americans interested in China are likely tosympathize with China's intellectuals, not her commissars.Lest we pose the issue in terms even more simplistic thanusual, however, we should note certain background factors thatmay give the edge to the commissars.----John King FairbanklINTRODUCTIONAs one may be aware, the term "intellectual" (zhishi fenzi) israther ambiguous in China. According to the most recent definitionin Chinese text books, intellectuals are defined as "mentalworkers" who have obtained post-secondary education, and havespecial training in the fields of science and liberal arts. Inshort, intellectuals are the people whose work directly involvesindependent mental activities. This definition covers a wide rangeof personnel: from teachers, professors, engineers, writers,journalists, artists, doctors, lawyers, and social workers, tothose who work in various levels of government, in areas ofeconomy, science, technology, education, military services and so1 John K. Fairbank, China Watch (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 208.1on. During the founding years of the PRC,2 there were over twomillion intellectuals in China. This number had increased about tentimes by 1990.3 Intellectuals occupy less than two per cent of thetotal population in China. This paper deals with the intellectual-state relationship in general, and with a prominent intellectual--Liu Binyan--in particular.The complex relationship between Chinese intellectuals and theParty-state has been an important aspect of China's politics since1949. Stories about the misfortunes of many famous Chineseintellectuals in the political vicissitudes of the PRC era are wellknown. In more than forty years of PRC political history,intellectuals have seemed unavoidably to be the targets in everymajor political movement: the "anti-rightist movement" in 1957, the"Cultural Revolution" between 1966 and 1976, the campaigns against"Bourgeois Liberalization" in 1981 and against "SpiritualPollution" in 1983--as shown in Liu Binyan's experience. Thesephenomena have attracted much academic attention among both Chineseand Western scholars. A general consensus among scholars seem to bethat the PRC political system is the major contribution to themisfortunes of Chinese intellectuals.It is not the intention of this paper to analyze the nature ofthe political system in China after 1949. The state-intellectual2 From 1949 to 1956, when the regime was concentrating on"socialist transformation".3 Liu Hongxia and Liu Guitian, ed., Zhongguo Zhishi Fenzi Wenti [The Issue of Chinese Intellectuals] (Liaoning UniversityPublishing House, 1987), p. 17.2relationship is like a coin--it has two sides. On the one side isthe Party-State, on the other, the intellectuals as a social group.This paper intends to address the other side of the coin--theintellectuals' side, their outlooks about politics, their valuesystem, self conceptions, and attitudes about their relationship tothe Party-state.The thesis of this paper suggests that, as a social group,Chinese intellectuals are part of the establishment in the PRC.They have helped to build the existing system. Considering theirclose attachment to and deep involvement in Party politics in thelast forty-odd years, Chinese intellectuals have to accept the factthat they are responsible for their own destiny. In this context,this paper intends to explain how cultural traditions drew Chineseintellectuals into the nation's politics and how the intellectuals'self-image affected both their attitudes and behaviour toward thestate and society, as well as their fate in the Chinese polityafter 1949.The methodology of the paper is to view the topic from ahistorical perspective even though the subject focuses oncontemporary Chinese politics. The goal of the paper is to providea better understanding of the intellectuals' political position inChina today.The paper is divided into three parts: Chapter one is a briefoverview of the relationship between the state and intellectualsfrom a historical perspective. It attempts to demonstrate how thepattern of the intellectuals-state relationship which, shaped3through Chinese history, continued and developed in the PRC era.Chapter two is an examination of the life and experience of LiuBinyan. The purpose of this chapter is to reveal how anintellectual like Liu became deeply involved and enmeshed in Partypolitics. The story, of course, serves to clarify the biggerpicture which the paper intends to unveil: facets of intellectual-state relationship under the leadership of the Communist Party ofChina (CPC). Chapter three is a summary of my own observations onthe issue.CHAPTER ONE: CHINESE INTELLECTUALS AND THE STATE: THE PATTERNIn the last forty-odd years, Chinese intellectuals have beeninvolved in a relationship with the state in a fashion which can becalled "neo-traditionalist". By "neo-traditionalism" I mean thecontinuation and development of traditional values, held by Chineseintellectual elite for over two thousand years, into a newenvironment of Party domination. In retrospect, Chineseintellectuals' general attitudes to the regime and the socialmasses can be characterized by "patriotism", "patronage" and"paternalism", as suggested by Timothy Cheek.4 Patriotism wasdemonstrated by loyalty to the Party; patronage was practised inthe name of higher-lower level (shang xia ji) relationships;4 Timothy Cheek, "From Priests to Professionals: Intellectualsand State under the CCP", Jeffery N. Wasserstrom & Elizabeth J.Perry, eds. Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China: Learning from 1989 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 124-145.4paternalism was evinced in assuming the role of spokesman forcommon people and the conscience of society. The characteristics ofthese attitudes were reflected in the intellectuals' closeattachment to and direct participation in politics.Features of Chinese Political SystemProbing into Chinese history, we find that the intellectual-state relationship is deeply rooted in Chinese tradition and itspolitical culture. The combination of Confucianism and centralismnot only provided the moral and political basis for the formationof such a relationship, but also continued to foster and guide therelationship throughout Chinese history.In his book, History and Thought (Lishi yu Sixiang), aselection of his essays between the 1950s and the 1970s, ProfessorYu Yinshi observes that, from a historical perspective, centralismand monarchy were the foundation and nature of the Chinesepolitical and social structures, in which Confucianism played thedeepest and the most fundamental role.5 "All share the same masterunder the sky" (tianxia gong zhu); and "the monarch rules wholeunder the sky" (jun lin tianxia). This highly centralized governingsystem was first established in the Qin Dynasty (221 B.C.) and hasdominated China since.This centralized system reflected a number of significant5 Yu Yingshi, Lishi yu Sixiang [History and Thought] (Taipei:Lianjing Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 275-282.5characteristics of Chinese politics. First of all, under suchcircumstances, a patriarchal political structure was fostered anddeveloped. This established the relationship between the ruler andthe ruled for more than two thousand years of Chinese history. Itsystemized Chinese bureaucratism through the concept, "The noblemonarch and his humble subjects." (zun jun bei chen). The directresult was the paternalistic feature in political and socialrelationships, which was best expressed as the three cardinalguides (san gang) on social behaviour: "The ruler guides hissubjects, father guides his son, and husband guides his wife".A second major feature of the traditional system was thepoliticalization of morality. This meant that political rules andconduct became moral standards for guiding people's behaviour. Thisresulted in the integration of political orthodoxy and socialmorality. In this context, "loyalty to the emperor" (zhong jun),for example, was equated with loyalty to the country. Confucianismnot only provided the guideposts for correct behaviour in politics,but also the justification for political power and control.Thirdly, education was used to serve the purposes of thepolitical establishment. To achieve this goal, personal fame andprosperity were added as major stimulator. In this context, it wassocially recognized that "A good scholar will make an official"(xue er you ze shi); and "Those who work with their brains rule andthose who work with their brawn are ruled" (lao xin zhe zhi ren,lao ii zhe zhi yu ren). These were the core values of Confucianeducation. To be an official enabled a man to enjoy both wealth and6prestige. As a result, the "political vocation" became the mostattractive choice to educated people. Politics became an eliteaffair in China. Since the Song Dynasty, most of the educated "wereclosely bound to state service" through the system of civil serviceexamination, "which functioned both to certify their elite statusand to recruit them into bureaucratic office." Naturally enough,political advancement became the personal ambition and goal in lifefor many educated people.It is not difficult to conclude from the brief descriptionabove that the relationship between Chinese intellectuals and thestate was the direct by-product of China's political culture andtradition. Chinese intellectuals today are heirs of the traditionsof Confucianism. The very nature of the Chinese political systemand Confucian education had a significant impact on shaping bothintellectuals' political outlooks and their self-images. The desirefor political participation and for serving the countryconsequently drew Chinese intellectuals to state politics.Party Policies toward Intellectuals since 1949To a great degree, the PRC political system has been acombination of Confucianism and one-party (the CPC) dominance,characterized by highly authoritarian power and a paternalistic6 Merle Goldman and Timothy Cheek, "Introduction: UncertainChange", in Merle Goldman, ed. with Timothy Cheek and Carol LeeHamrin, China's Intellectuals and the State: In Search of a NewRelationshiD (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1987), pp. 1-2.7structure. The Communist Party of China, with its elitist nature,continued to provide channels for intellectuals' politicalparticipation. Holding a Party membership card, for example, notonly meant that one had identified his/her ideals with the Party's,but also meant better job opportunities, faster promotions, betterhousing, prestige and other benefits. Indeed, many high-levelintellectuals (gaoji zhishi fenzi) have also become high-rankingofficials (gaoji ganbu). Even though "most of the PRC's high-levelintellectuals . . . do not directly staff the Party and governmentbureaucracy," they are, as Merle Goldman and Cheek observe, ". .part of the official establishment, since virtually allinstitutions in which they work are controlled by the government."'The "fenpei" (job allocation) system has given the statemonopolistic control over meaningful job opportunities forintellectuals. In addition, the "danwei" (work unit) held sway overan intellectual's life by dispensing his/her salary, housing,health care, children's schooling, travel, and job transfers.At the same time, the Party imposed on the intellectuals anexclusive ideological loyalty and conformity. Within the frameworkof Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought and the Party'sorganizational control, there was little room for alternative viewsand values. The persistence of the "two-line struggle" within theParty has also made factionalism one of the distinctive features of7 Merle Goldman and Timothy Cheek, "Introduction: UncertainChange", in Merle Goldman, ed., China's Intellectuals and the State: In Search of a New Relationship, p. 2.8the PRC politics. All relationships were developed along verticalrather than horizontal dimensions. As a result, patronage hasbecome a distinctive feature in such relationships.In reviewing the Party policies toward intellectuals in thePRC at a meeting with overseas Chinese scientists in October, 1984,Deng Xiaoping expressed the view that ". . . The issue of Chineseintellectuals is a special one. We still have not solved itproperly up to now." 9 In general, the regime has been ambivalenttoward this group. The problem focused around the difficulty of ininspiring and utilizing intellectuals for the state's own agendaswithout risking the danger of losing control. The government isstill, today, facing this contradiction and dilemma.In describing the intellectuals' social status in a classstructure, Mao Zedong declared: "With the skin gone, what can thehair adhere to?" (pi zhi bu cun, mao jiang yan fu). The Party'sgeneral policies toward the intellectuals has been a reflection ofMao's words. Intellectuals, according to classic Marxist-Leninisttheory, are a stratum, not a class. As a stratum, ". . . they bearno distinct relationship to the forces of production but attachthemselves promiscuously to groups that do. In generalintellectuals are spokesmen for whatever the ruling class of aparticular society may be."98 Quoted in Liu Hongxia and Liu Guitian, ed., The Issue of Chinese Intellectuals, p. 5.9 Peter R. Moody, Jr., Chinese Politics after Mao: Developmentand Liberalization, 1976 to 1983 (New York: Praeger Publishers,9After 1949, the government's primary concern regarding theissue of the intellectuals was to remould the old generation ofintellectuals and to train and bring up a new generation of"proletarian" intellectuals. The Party's general policy towardintellectuals was designed "to unite, to educate and to remould."In practice, this policy, "has oscillated between repression andrelative relaxation."1° Thus, through different periods of PRCpolitical history, the intellectuals' political status has beencharacterized by periods of inclusion in and exclusion frompolitical life.During the founding years of the PRC, the government, based onMarxist concepts, realized that education, as part of thesuperstructure and the realm of ideology, served the economicinfrastructure. Accordingly, Mao asserted that ". . theintellectuals will accomplish nothing if they fail to integratethemselves with the workers and peasants. ”11 Knowledge, Maopointed out, could not be monopolized by a privileged class ofmental workers. To prevent this from occurring, he emphasized theremolding, rather than rejecting, of the old-style intellectuals.The objective was to use intellectuals' knowledge in the process of1983), p. 84.10 Merle Goldman and Timothy Cheek, "introduction: UncertainChange", in Merle Goldman, ed. China's Intellectuals and the State: In Search of a New Relationship, p. 13.11 Mao Zedong, "The May Fourth Movement" (May, 1939), in theSelected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2 (Peking: Foreign LanguagesPress, 1967), p. 238.10socialist construction while transforming intellectuals into a"proletarian" team through "thought reform". In practice, however,the Party remained distrustful and suspicious of the views andparticipation of intellectuals.After the "anti-rightist" movement and through the 1960s, theimage of intellectuals in Chinese society gradually deterioratedthrough the practice of the Party's policy toward intellectuals. InMao's last years, intellectuals were held to be inveterate carriersof bourgeois vices who, in the absence of full-scale proletariandictatorship, would come to hold dominant power in the state.With Deng Xiaoping's return to power in 1978, the state beganto readjust its policy towards the intellectuals. The leadershipevolved a more tolerant view of intellectuals. As part of thereform policy announced by the government in late 1978, the regimeadopted a more pragmatic approach to the intellectual issue.12 Therole of intellectuals in the Four Modernizations has been from timeto time strongly emphasized. Intellectuals were once againrecognized as components of the working class (gongren jieji).13At the same time, however, the Deng leadership has beencontinuously committed to the one-party system, with itsconcomitant restrictions, controls and limitations. As a result,12 This pragmatic approach adopted by the Party was consistentwith the Party's general approach to the reform. It can be bestcharacterized by Deng Xiaoping's metaphor, "No matter whether it isa white cat or black one, it is a good cat as long as it catchesmice." (baimao heimao, hui zhua laoshu jiu shi haomao).13 It was later Premier Zhou Enlai who first, in 1956,proclaimed that the intellectuals were part of working class.1 1periodic repression of intellectuals has continued into the 1980s.Chinese Intellectuals as a Social Group: The Role IssueIn comparing American students with Chinese students, John K.Fairbanks remarked:. • . China's small elite [group] of students are not simplecounterparts of American students. On the contrary, they seethemselves as inheritors of the ancient tradition ofgovernment by scholars. As potential officials they arecustodians of the nation's welfare, circumstantially requiredeven if by default to assume a political posture. . • . Theirconcerns and ours can hardly be identical."This observation well captured the attitudes of PRC intellectualstoward themselves.As a social group, Chinese intellectuals do not fit theWestern concept of group politics. This is because Chineseintellectuals have never been able to form unified and independentgroup interests in the arena of Chinese politics. Historically, ithas been the fact that, from dynastic times, Chinese intellectualshad never been a class, but a special stratum in the society. As aspecial stratum, intellectuals were the main recruiting pool ofChina's ruling class and the reserve force of bureaucrats. In ahighly class-structured society such as China's, they werefrequently identified as part of the elite class and of thebureaucratic establishment. So were their interests.After 1949, Chinese intellectuals suffered from what Cheek" John King Fairbanks, China Watch, p. 209.12calls "organizational" weakness. Under the strict Party leadership,it was almost impossible for intellectuals to form any kind ofWestern-style interest group. Party interests were above all! Underthis circumstance, Chinese intellectuals generally functioned asindividuals in PRC politics rather than as a group. Besides theexistence of traditional linkages such as lineage, classmates,patrons, factions etc., there were few established horizontalconnections, and no unified voice for intellectuals in Chinesepolitical affairs.However, it should not be construed that Chinese intellectualsdo not have their own outlooks on politics, their own value systemsand their own self concepts. On the contrary, the Confucianheritage, which emphasizes personal performance and moralcommitment, has created a strong self image for Chineseintellectuals and has deeply influenced their political behaviour.They were eager to play a role in the political drama. Theyexpected to be continuously recognized as both "teacher" (ren shi)and "official" (guang li).More specifically, Chinese intellectuals have maintainedconsistent attitudes toward the state, the society and themselves.These attitudes can be summarized as patriotism, patronage andpaternalism, as suggested by Cheek:Intellectual attitudes toward the state have beencharacterized by fierce patriotism; their behaviour withsuperiors, peers and subordinates reflects an acceptance ofpatronage, and their self-expressions reflect a profound13elitism and sense of paternalism.lsFirst, let us look at patriotism. This has always involved theissue of loyalty in the context of PRC politics. According to theConfucian tradition, loyalty to the country, to the monarch, to thepeople, and to the system, were the basic moral and politicalrequirements for those who intended to pursue a political vocation.Loyalty was also an important criterion in judging anintellectual's social and political behaviour. In the PRC era, theCPC Central Committee imposed an absolute ideological loyalty onthe intellectuals (as well as the whole population), under whichalternative opinions were forbidden. For intellectuals, their rolewas to act as the Party's ideological spokesmen explaining andsupporting regime policies.But what should the intellectual do when his loyaltyconflicted with his conscience, or when his different loyaltiesconflicted with each other? Such questions challenged Chineseintellectuals from time to time after 1949. Often, the solution wassimply to withdraw temporarily from politics.ls This had historicalprecedents, the best example of which was Qu Yuan (343-289 B.C.),a brilliant literati, who, unappreciated by his prince, languished1sTimothy Cheek, "From Priests to Professionals: Intellectualsand the State under the CCP", J. Wasserstrom & E. Perry, eds.,Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China: Learningfrom 1989, p. 127.16 Perry Link gives this phenomenon a term, "the withdrawalsyndrome". See his article, "Intellectuals and Cultural Policyafter Mao", in A. Doak Barnett & Ralph N. Clough, eds., ModernizingChina: Post-Mao Reform and Development (Boulder: Westview Press,1986), pp. 82-83.14in exile until his death. Nonetheless he remained a cultural herobecause of his loyalty to the ideal of patriotic service.In the PRC, there has really not been much opportunity forintellectuals to withdraw from politics. Nonetheless, the"withdrawal syndrome" continued to exist after 1949. Facing thepressure of the Party "ultra-left line"--especially during the"anti-rightist campaign" and the Cultural Revolution--someintellectuals chose to withdraw from public life. Some writers, forexample, either ceased to write for a while, waiting for betteropportunities, or tried to write as little as possible in order toavoid any possible attack. This phenomenon was not uncommon in the1980s during the "anti-spiritual pollution" and "anti-bourgeoisieliberalization" movements.Some intellectuals, however, followed a different path. Theyviewed loyalty in different terms. These people were what Carol LeeHamrin classifies as "critical intellectuals" who were "lobbyingfor change."17 To them loyalty to the Party did not mean totalsubmission; it also meant to be critical. Such behaviour not onlydemanded courage, but also an inner moral balance. This is what LiuBinyan meant by "the second kind of loyalty" (di er zhongzhongcheng), 18 which we will examine in more detail later.17 Carol Lee Hamrin, "Conclusion: New Trend under Deng Xiaopingand His Successors", Merle Goldman ed., with Timothy Cheek andCarol Lee Hamrin, China's Intellectuals and the State: In Search of a New Relationship, p. 276. The term is also used by Cheek andGoldman. See the book indicated above.' The term "di er zhong zhongcheng" was translated in LiuBinyan's autobiography as "the another kind of loyalty". In other15Secondly, patronage has played an important role in theintellectual-state relationship. It frequently functioned under theguise of higher-lower level relationships (shangxia ji guanxi). InLiu Binyan's case, for instance, Hu Yaobang was his old chief andpatron. Under patronage, any relationship becomes an unwrittenagreement. For Chinese intellectuals who were involved in suchrelationships, their fate seemed predetermined, either for betteror for worse. There is no doubt that patronage, in PRC politicallife, has provided benefits and protection for intellectuals fromtheir patrons. But, at the same time, it has also predictablyplaced intellectuals in a very dependent and vulnerable positionwhenever a political crisis occurred. Political autonomy can hardlysurvive in this context. To intellectuals, moralistic appeals topolitical superiors are more common than horizontal cooperationamong the intellectuals themselves, not to mention alliances withother social groups.The third major characteristic of the intellectuals' outlook--paternalism--is a combination of unabashed intellectual elitism anda paternalistic attitude toward the social masses. The distinctivefeature of this paternalism on the intellectuals' behaviour was theheavy sense of mission (shiming gan) to society in general and tothe masses in particular. An old motto of Chinese intellectualssince ancient times was ". . Every one has a share ofresponsibility for the fate of his country." (guojia xingwang, pifuyouze). Traditionally, an intellectual was expected to take theplaces, it was translated as "the higher kind of loyalty".16world's well-being as his own responsibility. In the famous wordsof Fan Zhongyan (A.D. 989-1052), an intellectual should ". . . Bethe first in the world to worry about the world, and the last inthe world to take part in its pleasures." (xian tianxia zhi you eryou, hou tianxia zhi le er le) 19Here let us single out writers as a example since it is veryrelevant to the paper. The link between literature and politics isage-old in China. Chinese writers are fully aware that every pieceof their work embodies moral and political power: u . . . literarycultivation qualifies and enables one to rule, or at least toadvise a ruler."2° As Perry Link notes, this cultural traditionstill "sheds an important light on the behaviour of intellectuals"in China today. He suggests:Chinese intellectuals today . . . assume that power andmorality inherent in the Chinese written language; that it istheir duty, as intellectuals, to speak from their conscienceson important questions facing the country; that leaders of thestate ought to heed and respect them . . . 21As we shall see, this bears directly on Liu Binyan's case.In general, the pattern of the relationship between Chineseintellectuals and the state in the PRC is characterized by the19 Fan Zhongyan, "Qiuyanglouji", Guwen Guanzhi, vol. 9. Quotedin A. Doak Barnett and Ralph N. Clough, eds., Modernizing China: Post-Mao Reform and Development, p. 82.20 Perry Link, "Intellectuals and Cultural Policy after Mao",in A. Doak Barnett and Ralph N. Clough, eds., Modernizing China: Post-Mao Reform and Development, p. 82.21 Ibid., p. 83.17Party's tight control and the intellectuals' deep involvement inthe political activities. While assuming the role as the spokesmenof the people on social and political issues, Chinese intellectualscould hardly maintain their own professional autonomy and politicalindependence. They found that they were frequently in a dilemma bybeing both the spokesmen of the regime and the conscience of thecommon people. Their political activities have frequently anddirectly been interwoven with political struggles at the highestlevels. They are deeply involved in politics along with thedevelopment of Chinese political events. As a result of their closeattachments to political power, and to their patrons, theintellectuals' status became both dependent and vulnerable.Consequently, in the past forty years, their fate has frequentlybeen determined by the political events with, for many, tragicresults.CHAPTER TWO: LIU BINYAN'S ODYSSEYThis chapter is about a Chinese who is known world-wide by hiswritings. He is a journalist, writer, a Party veteran, a high-levelintellectual and a senior cadre. In both his intellectual andpolitical life, he has enjoyed wide public recognition but has alsobeen the target of major political campaigns in the PRC. He wastwice expelled from the Party. He and his wife now live in theUnited States. His name is Liu Binyan.To many, Liu Binyan is a hero, his fate a tragedy of Chinese18politics. There are, however, some issues which remain to beexamined. Is Liu Binyan an independent thinker? What or whomprecisely, were Liu's targets? What was he arguing for and against?To what extent does Liu see the entire system as being at fault? Asa reporter and writer, what is it that makes Liu so popular anddifferent from other Chinese intellectuals? Finally, How does Liu'scase fit into the jigsaw of the intellectual-state relationship inthe PRC?"Joining the Revolution"Liu Binyan, born in 1925 in Changchun, Jilin Province, wasfrom a peasant family. His grandparents migrated from ShandongProvince to Northeast China (Dongbei) in the early twentiethcentury. Liu's father was a self-taught Russian interpreter. Hismother was a housewife. The family lived in an unstable financialcondition because of Liu's father's frequent unemployment.Of the four children in the family, Liu was his parents'favourite. His father taught him Russian and encouraged him to bea "prodigy". Young Liu Binyan was a shy, bright child, who did verywell in school. His dream was to be a "great writer," a"journalist," and be "famous". In 1939, before he was fourteen, Liuwrote a short story entitled "Mother's heart" (Muxin) whichappeared in a local newspaper, Da Bei Xin Bao (Great NorthernDaily). A short story contest was organized by the paper and Liuwon third prize. Liu himself considers that it was his first19published work.Liu grew up in the years of the Japanese occupation of thethree provinces of Northeast China which became 'Manchukuo'(Manzhouguo). The Japanese occupiers practised colonial policies inthe schools, as well as the occupied areas. Students were providedwith Japanese textbooks, disciplined according to Japanese customsand had to learn to speak Japanese. When he was fifteen, Liudecided to go to Beijing and join his married sister, who nowresided there. He wanted to continue his high school education andto become an actor, a writer or, "a famous reporter. "22 He alsowanted to take part in the Anti-Japanese War.Liu did not finish high school, for financial reasons. In1943, he "joined the revolution". He moved to Tianjin from Beijingand became an underground worker for the Communist Party of China.In 1944 he became a Party member. "Why didn't I choose to join theGuomingdang (Nationalists) rather than the CPC at that time?" Liumuses in his autobiography: "In the early forties, we did notthink that the image of the Guomingdang was so much different fromthe Communists'," he recalls. It was certainly not because theCommunists represented the interests of the poor; there were manyyoung people, from wealthy families as well, who turned to the CPC.Liu explains:. . one of the most important reasons was the glamour ofMarxism for the youth. The sorrows of the Chinese people wereso deep, and the desire to change the conditions of slavery22 Liu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Loyalty (B, Memoir by China's Foremost Journalist), trans. Zhu Hong (New York: Pantheon Books,1990) p. 13.20was so strong among Chinese people that the more radical anidea was, the more attractive it seemed to the young people.In contrast, the Nationalist government could not offer sucha program or slogans.23Liu Binyan believed that the hope for China's future lay insocialism and the leadership of the CPC.To him, "joining the revolution" also had much to do with hisown self-fulfilment as a youth. To a great degree, Liu admits, "Ijoined the revolution mainly to liberate myself; to realizemyself." Liu could not precisely describe what this "self" meant atthe time, but ". . . from my teens until the age of thirty, I hadthe conviction that . . . someday I would be somebody. "" From thenon, Liu Binyan would start pursuing these convictions.From 1948 to 1951 Liu Binyan was employed as a high schoolteacher in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, while at the same timeworking for the Chinese Youth League at the provincial level. Hebecame a journalist in 1951 and was transferred to Beijing to writefor the China Youth News (Zhongguo Qingnian Bao), the officialpublication of the China New Democratic Youth League (which waslater to become the Chinese Communist Youth League).The period of 1951 to 1957 was the heyday of Liu Binyan'scareer. During this period, the CPC sought to bring abouttremendous changes in Chinese society. As a part of theestablishment, Liu received his rewards. He visited the formerSoviet Union and Eastern European countries as a member of various23 Liu Binyan, Liu Binyan Zizhuan [Liu Binyan Autobiography](Taipei: Shibao Culture Publishing Company, Ltd. 1989), p. 20.24 Ibid., p. 16.21delegations and was gradually promoted to higher positions. By1957, the year his career came to a halt, he was the secretary ofthe Party committee and a member of the editorial board of theChina Youth News. His cadre rank was "level thirteen", the enteringlevel to high-ranking status.25 He was also officially recognizedas a "high-level" intellectual.The Writer and His WritingsLiu Binyan prefers to be considered a journalist rather thana writer. "What I write is not fiction, nor are they reports. Wecall them 'baogao wenxue'(reportage literature), 1126 which hedefines as follows:Reportage literature is a species of marginal literature thatis intermediate between journalism and literature, science andliterature, and politics and literature. From the point ofview of form, it offers much more freedom, its structure doesnot have to be so compact and well-organized, and it canencompass a rather free blend of factual events, fictionalimages, and thought.27Since the publication of "People or Monsters?" in 1979, Liu's namehas been closely linked with his reportage literature in China. It25 There are 24 ranks in the Chinese cadre system; the lowerthe figure, the higher the rank. Cadres, from the 13th level down,are recognized as "high ranking cadres".26 Translations of the term, "Baogao wenxue", vary in English.In some places it is called "reportage fiction", and in others itis called "fictionalized reportage". Here I use the more common andmore direct translation from Chinese, "reportage literature".27 Liu Binyan, "Luzi hai keyi kuan yixie" (The road can bewider), quoted in Michael Duke, Blooming and Contending: Chinese Literature in the Post-Mao Era (Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress, 1985), p. 118.22100 1-IaFullbrook, Kate.Added: 860923 Checked by: 14oc86ram700 10IaFullbrook, Edward.Added: 940131 Checked by: 5fe94nmfNumber: H105016117Number: H109127639 CA A6955363 Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre : the remaking of atwentieth-century legend / by Kate Fullbrook and EdwardFullbrook. / Fullbrook, Kate. New York : HarvesterWheatsheaf, 1993.ISBN: 0745006868Status: Received November 17, 1993ITEMS:No. 1 - 18203374;CA New: A6955363 Dept: A Dest: mnIn-process key: A6955363brought him both fame and his ultimate fate. In retrospect, Liu'swriting career in China can easily be divided into two periods: thefirst period from 1951 to 1957, the second from 1979 to 1987. Inbetween, Liu did not have any publication. It was a twenty-two yearperiod of blank pages for this writer.1) "Delving into life"Glancing at Liu's writings, it is not difficult to see thatone of his most consistent aims in both literature and journalismhas been to "delve into life"(ganyu shenghuo), which means that,rather than glossing over life (fenshi shenghuo), writers andjournalists should instead ". . . reveal the contradictions whichreflect the deeper layer of social character, II 28 report reality andexpose the "dark side". Since the beginning of his career, "delvinginto life" has been Liu's motto, guiding his writings both in the1950s and in the 1980s. Liu argues that "Literature is responsiblefor offering a real picture of social life to the people."29 Inthis context, he declares that art is not for art's sake; art isfor politics' sake.During the first period of his career, Liu's most influential28 Liu Binyan Yanlun Ji [The Selection of Liu Binyan'sSpeeches] (Hong Kong: Xiangjiang Publishing Company, 1988), vol. 2,p. 87.29 Liu Binyan, Liu Binyan Baogao Wenxue Xuan [The SelectedWorks of Liu Binyan's Reportage Literature] (Beijing: BeijingPublishing House, 1981), p. 19.23works--for which he paid a heavy price in the following twodecades--were "On the Bridge Construction Site" (Zai QiaoliangGongdi Shang), "The Inside Story of This Newspaper" (Ben Bao NeibuXiaoxi), and its sequel. These three special reports, all firstpublished in the magazine People's Literature," were based on truestories and were the result of Liu's interviews and on-the-spotobservations."On the Bridge Construction Site" is a story based on anaccident which took place at the construction site of the firstrailway bridge to be built across the Yellow River in GansuProvince. In the narrative, the author makes a comparison betweentwo different types of personality, Zeng Gang's--a young engineerand a supervisor who was devoted to his work with creativity andefficiency, and Luo Lizheng's--the captain of the constructionteam. Luo was conservative, selfish, and inefficient in carryingout his responsibilities. When the annual flood arrived earlierthan expected in the autumn of 1954, Luo did nothing, simplywaiting for orders from above. As a result, one of the bridgesupports was washed away and the country suffered a substantialeconomic loss. Zeng, by contrast, who was working at anotherconstruction site, had wasted no time and had taken preventivemeasures. The bridge support at his site was saved. In the end,however, Luo was the person rewarded for "following theleadership," whereas Zeng was demoted for breach of Party"These three reports were published independently in separateissues of the People's Literature: No. 4, No. 6, and No. 10, 1956.24discipline and was reassigned to work in a cement factory."The Inside Story of This Newspaper" is a story which tookplace in a local newspaper-editing office. The protagonist is HuangJiaying, a young female reporter, who finds herself facing adifficult choice between conforming with Party directives andreporting the actual situation in a coal mine. Huang, at the time,has just applied for membership in the Party. Thus, her decisionsare critical. The story ends at the point where the Party membersare still deliberating the pros and cons of Huang's case.In these three reports, Liu's main target is the bureaucraticmind set. He criticizes conservative practices and the inadequaciesof leadership which work against creativity and the speeding up ofsocialist construction. He infers that there is a widening gapbetween the Party cadres and the masses. In "The Inside Story", theauthor also touches on the issue of freedom of the press andpresents his case for speaking up for the truth.In 1957, these special reports were considered evidence ofLiu's anti-Party and anti-socialist stand. He was labelled a"rightist" and expelled from the Party. He was then "sent down" tovarious localities in the countryside for "labor reform". In 1961,he was allowed to return to work for his old newspaper as aresearcher-translator. Following the outbreak of the CulturalRevolution, he was again "sent down" to attend a "May SeventhCadres' School". For twenty-two years, Liu lost the right to write.He was finally rehabilitated in 1979 and assigned to work as ajournalist with the People's Daily. In that same year, he published25"People or Monsters?".31"People or Monsters?" can be viewed as a milestone of thesecond period of Liu Binyan's writing career. It was a specialinvestigative report on Wang Shouxin's massive corruption in BinCounty, Heilongjiang Province, during the years of the CulturalRevolution. Wang, daughter of a horse trader, a former housewifewith little formal education, was the manager of the tiny BinCounty Coal Company employing "a few dozen workers." Yet it wasthis woman (a "heroine" of her time) who emerged as an active rebelin a county-based factional group entitled "Smash-the-Black-NestCombat Force" at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Sheobtained her Party membership through her close personal connectionwith Commissar Yang, who was head of the Bin County Party Committeeat the time. She used the organs of the "dictatorship of theproletariat" to set up her own little empire within the coalcompany, where she practised dictatorship, bribery, "banqueting,and drinking--and pilfering, grabbing, embezzling, andappropriating."32 This woman established her own "intelligencenetwork," used the Communist Party as "her Party" and practised"all-out dictatorship" in her territory.31 First published in the People's Literature, No. 9, 1979. TheEnglish version is translated by James V. Feinerman with PerryLink. See, Perry Link, ed., People or Monsters? And Other Stories and Reportage from China after Mao (Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress, 1983)31 Liu Binyan, "People or Monsters?", Perry Link, ed. Peopleor Monsters?, p. 43.26In his account, the author coolly analyzes the basic socialconditions that allowed Wang's corruption to grow and develop. Hepoints out that permissiveness towards Wang Shouxin's criminalactivities was caused by "the general decline in socialmorality."33 At the end of the piece, the author warns that:• . . Wang Shouxins of all shapes and sizes, in all corners ofthe land, are still in place, continuing to gnaw away atsocialism, continuing to tear at the fabric of the Party, andcontinuing to evade punishment by the dictatorship of theproletariat • . . . People, be on guard! It is still too earlyto be celebrating victories . . 34"People or Monsters?" is a merciless and direct refutationof the Cultural Revolution and its aims. When the outragesperpetrated during those years were documented and published,readers everywhere in China immediately recognized in them,something of their own communities. It is no wonder that thepublication of "People or Monsters?" was immediately hailed byhundreds and thousands of readers. Overnight Liu Binyan became ahero in the eyes of many Chinese readers.The success of "People or Monsters?" is, not insignificantly,also attributed to its right timing, when the literary thaw was atits peak in China. 1979 was the year immediately following theThird Plenum of the CPC's Central Committee. Rehabilitations wereunder way. The Party's policies actually encouraged exposure of thewrong-doings of the Gang of Four and the variegated ills of asociety resulting from the Cultural Revolution.33 Liu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Loyalty, p. 51.34 Ibid., p. 68.27The period 1979 to 1985 was Liu's most fruitful as a writerand reporter. Following the publication of "People or Monsters?" in1979, Liu wrote more special reports and articles. Many of thesewere published in important newspapers and literary magazines suchas the People's Daily and People's Literature, and some of hisworks (e.g., People or Monsters?) appeared in various collectionsof his works. "People or Monsters?" received the 1977-1980 NationalExcellent Reportage Award. In addition, two other of his reportsalso received similar awards, presented by the Chinese Writers'Association.352) A spokesman for the peopleAs a reporter, Liu Binyan held to his belief in journalismfor the people, with a paternalistic sense of responsibility towardthe interests of the common people. "Our readers need literaturewith many different themes and styles," Liu argued. "But theyespecially need writers who will serve as spokesmen for thepeople."36 He strongly maintained that writers should listen to thevoice of the people. On November 9, 1979, at the Fourth Congress ofChinese Literature and Art Workers in Beijing, Liu Binyan gave hisfamous speech, "Listen Carefully to the Voice of the People". In35 The other two reports are: "Yige Ren he Tade Yingzi" ["TheMan and His Shadow"], October, No.6, 1980; "Jiannan de Qifei" ["TheDifficult Taking Off"], the People's Daily, Jan. 3, 1981.36 Liu Binyan, "Listen Carefully to the Voice of the People",Perry Link, ed. People or Monsters?, P. 9.28this speech, he urged writers to "answer the questions raised bythe people." He stated that "In the court of history, we have noright to take a seat in the audience." The responsibilities ofliterary and art workers are to ". . help our readers tounderstand our society more profoundly and accurately, and helpthem to rise in the struggle for complete realization of the greathistorical task of the Four Modernizations!"37 On the publicationof his collection of speeches and lectures, Liu claims:If there is any value to the collection, it is becausewhat I have said is nothing but the truth, which hasaccumulated for so long in many Chinese hearts, but has neverbeen expressed. I have said it for them.38Liu's works are the reflection of this compelling sense of socialobligation and commitment. He acts as the Chinese social conscienceto justify the rights and identify the wrongs of society. He seeksto expose problems which harm the people's wellbeing, jeopardizereform, and damage the Party and socialism. In Liu's writings onecan see the continuation of the idea of people (renmin)--for whom,and to whom, the social conscience or patriotic intellectual mustspeak.In her article about Liu Binyan, American writer Hualing Nienotices that, in Liu's writings, there is rarely any description ofnature, but a burning sense of mission to society. At the Sino-American writers' conference, held in Los Angeles in 1982, both theAmerican poet Allen Ginsberg, and Liu Binyan gave speeches. Nie37 Liu Binyan, "Listen Carefully to the Voice of the People",Perry Link, ed., People or Monsters?, p. 10.38 Liu Binyan Yanlun Ji, vol. 2. On the back cover of the book.29compares the two men: "Their speeches formed a sharp contrast, .. Allen is a lonely soul in the piping times of peace, whereasBinyan is a spokesman for his people's fortune."" One writer atthe same meeting commented that Liu Binyan seemed always to have"an expression of concern about the country and the people on hisface. ,,40Some Western literary critics rate the value of Liu's reportsmore or less as "a sociological study" rather than literature."For example, in "People or Monsters?", Liu puts himself forth as"an independent social institution'!" and acts as a "socialistscout" motivated by his mission and responsibility. The text goeson in great detail to describe the process by which the new "socialbourgeoisie"--as exemplified by Wang Shouxin--forms itself withenough cohesion to survive. "By the conventional standards ofliterature criticism, 'People or Monsters?' is by no means amasterpiece," says Leo Ou-fan Lee. "The proper gauge of its valuelies not only in the truthfulness of its content but also in" Hualin Nie, "Liu Binyan--Wo de Pengyou" ["Liu Binyan--MyFriend"], Liu Binyan, "Renxue Bushi Yanzhi": Liu Binyan BaogaoWenxue Jinxuan ["It Is Not Rouge but Human Blood": The SelectedWorks of Liu Binyan] (Taipei: Renjian Publishing House, 1987), p.305." Ibid., p. 307.41 i.e. Leo Ou-fan Lee, Michael Duke, and Rudolf G. Wagner.Also see Rudolf G. Wagner's article, " The Chinese Writer in HisOwn Mirror: Writer, State, and Society--The Literary Evidence", inMerle Goldman, ed., China's Intellectuals and the State (Cambridge,Mass.: 1987).42 Rudolf G. Wagner, "The Chinese Writer in His Own Mirror:Writer, State, and Society--the Literary Evidence", Merle Goldman,ed., China's Intellectuals and the State, p. 215.30audience impact. t43Liu's power lies in his honesty and courage. He is seen as onewho dares to write (ta gan xie) about the corruption of some Partycadres; to write those bitter stories of old "rightists", theirmisfortunes then and their continued mistreatment long after theCultural Revolution. In a word, he dares to reveal the other sideof the truth--the problems and ills in socialist practice--the"dark side" of Chinese society. He criticizes the corruption of theParty cadres, the abuses of bureaucratic power, and social bias andsentiments regarding previous "rightists" and intellectuals.In the West, Liu is regarded as one of "the most outspoken anddaring characters" among the intellectuals of his time;" "a manof great integrity and one of the leading voices of socialconscience on the post-Mao literary scene."'" In China, he won thetrust and respect of his audience through his works. He became aspokesperson for justice. Hundreds and thousands of letters pouredin, and his home was frequently visited by people who needed avoice. Liu himself travelled constantly, digging here andinvestigating there to expose and write about the wrong-doings ofParty cadres and disclose the true life of the common people.43 Leo Ou-fan Lee, "Introduction" to Perry Link, ed., Peopleor Monsters?, p. xv.44 Rudulf G. Wagner, "Foreword", for Yang Zhongmei, Hu Yaobang: a Chinese Biography, trans. William A. Wycoff (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1988), p. xvi.45 Leo Ou-fan Lee, "Introduction", in Perry Link, ed., People or Monsters?, p. ix.31However, there was a limit. How much could Liu Binyan do, and beallowed to do? In addition, how could his dual roles, as aninvestigative journalist and as an establishment intellectual forthe existing regime, be reconciled? To what extent could he act asboth the conscience of the people and as a spokesperson for Partypolicies? This was the dilemma. A dilemma that Liu never did solve.Liu Binyan and Hu YaobangLiu Binyan's relationship with Hu Yaobang--the formerSecretary General of the All-China Youth League (CYL) and the CPCCentral Committee--constitutes a classic example of the restraintsimposed on a reporter working under Party dominance. As a Partymember, Liu was required to act in full compliance with Partypolicies. As a reporter, the limitations on his investigativepowers can best be understood in PRC politics of patronage andfactionalism.In his autobiography, Liu Binyan uses a separate chapterentitled "Hu Yaobang and I", in which he recalls his thirty-oddyears relationship with Hu Yaobang, and explains the connections inthe events of 1987 which determined their mutual fate. Therelationship of these two men touches upon one of the mostimportant aspects of the intellectual-state relationship--patronage. It is clear that Hu was Liu's political patron.Hu Yaobang was ten years older than Liu Binyan. The Liu-Hurelationship began a year after Liu Binyan was assigned the job in32China's Youth News in 1951, when Hu Yaobang became the head of theCYL Committee. Describing his relationship with Hu Yaobang, Liuadmits that Hu Yaobang "always intervened at critical moments" ofhis career."In 1957, Liu was labelled a "rightist" and expelled from theParty. Hu tried to save him but was not successful because MaoZedong, the Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, "had written averdict" on the case.47 Hu, however, interviewed Liu, along withsome other "rightists" of the Youth League Central "who were Partyveterans," in February 1958 when Liu was about to be "sent down" tothe countryside. "He [Hu] met us in the old manner . . andaddressed us as 'comrade'," Liu recalls. "He made us feel that hedid not regard us as anti-Communists." Hu's attitude gave Liu somehope for the future.Hu himself was removed from the position of Secretary- Generalof the CYL at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. One of hisalleged crimes was "protecting the arch-rightist Liu Binyan in1957." And Liu, only three months after the removal of his"rightist cap", was once again designated the people's enemy. Huand Liu were both sent to the same May Seventh Cadres' School in46 Liu Binyan, A higher kind of Loyalty, p. 237.47 Mao Zedong, after reading Liu's article entitled "ShanghaiLost in Thought" published in May 12, 1955, commented that"Evidently, some people are interested not in solving problems, butin stirring up confusion." Liu regards these words from Mao asdetermining his fate in 1957. See, Liu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Loyalty, p. 77.33Henan Province to be reformed through labour." Although they metalmost daily, they no longer had control even over their own lives.After the Cultural Revolution, Hu Yaobang was returned topower, and in 1978 became head of the Organizational Department ofthe CPC Central Committee, devoted to the rehabilitation of cadresand intellectuals who had been mistreated in the 1950s and duringthe Cultural Revolution. Liu petitioned Hu to consider his case.The year 1979 was apparently an important year to Liu, because ".. . fate again linked me with Hu Yaobang."" During this year, onHu's directive to the China Youth News, Liu's "rightist" label wasremoved. He was assigned as a reporter for the People's Daily, themain mouthpiece of the Party. He could now write and publish onceagain.From 1978 on, China entered the reform period. Hu Yaobang wasconsidered "the leader of the active reform group. "" He alsogained a reputation as a spokesman and protector of theintellectuals. Around himself Hu gathered "new personalities" fromamong the writers, journalists, and young leading cadres. LiuBinyan was part of this important recruitment pool in the area ofjournalism. Thus, Liu became directly involved in the politicalstruggle during the reform period. By joining the alliance ofreformers he had again become part of the political game.The relationship between patron and client usually works as a" Liu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Loyalty, pp. 240-241." Ibid., p. 242." Yang Zhongmei, Hu Yaobang: A Chinese Biography, p. 156.34unwritten agreement. A patron issues instructions, manipulates thesituation and functions as a protecting umbrella. For the client,it is important to understand instructions fully and do one's bestwithin one's limits. The nature of the relationship is usuallymanipulative and complex; and sometimes dangerously vulnerable andtemporary especially when the political climate fluctuates.In the Liu-Hu relationship, Liu was the actor, and Hu thedirector. Hu offered his support and protection, and Liu devotedhis heart and soul to writing his reports. Such a patronagerelationship was not without limitations, however. The degree towhich Hu could protect Liu in his stated opinions and amount ofprestige Liu could expect from Hu mainly depended on the politicalclimate and the security of Hu's position at the top. In thiscontext, it was necessary that Liu act according to Hu's wishes, inorder to retain Hu's support and protection.The relationship was intimate yet subtle, profound yetcautious. Both men took a lot of precautions. In appearance, therelationship was a straight forward comrade-type one between aleader at the top and a comrade at a lower level. Liu would mailbooks which he had enjoyed to Hu to read and his new publicationsto Hu for comment. Hu would read them and give his comments toother people, to be delivered to Liu. Although according to Liu, hebasically had no contact with Hu, Hu managed to read all Liu'spublished works .51After the Third Plenum of the CPC's Eleventh CentralLiu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Loyalty, p. 248.35Committee, Hu Yaobang became the head of the Propaganda Departmentof the CPC's Central Committee in December 1978, and was regardedas "the standard-bearer for the reform movement, second only toDeng Xiaoping. "52 During this period, art and literature in Chinawere blooming. Liu directly benefitted from the Party's morerelaxed policy on literature and the press and enjoyed the freedomto expose "dark sides". Liu had said that "1978 to 1980 were goldenyears for the People's Daily."52 It was a fruitful period for himas well. He published his explosive piece "People or Monsters?" andother reports and speeches, and was elected to the board of theChinese Writers' Association.For a period of time, many people wondered how it was thatalmost all of the "expository" reports came from the pen of LiuBinyan. As everybody knows in China, information, especially thatwhich is critical, is so tightly sealed and controlled that to digit out is as difficult as climbing up to heaven. Then how was LiuBinyan able to tap all these resources? The answer is simple: Liu'sweapon was his ID card, which proclaimed him to be a "specialjournalist" of the People's Daily. There were only two of thesecards, which were issued by the Director of the PropagandaDepartment of the CPC's Central Committee. With this card, one cango anywhere within China's borders, search any archive, read anyconfidential document, and attend, as a non-voting delegate, anymeeting held by the Party committee at city, provincial, or52 Liu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Loyalty, p. 142.52 Ibid., p. 155.36ministry levels." Apparently Liu received solid support from Huduring this period. At a regular working meeting of the PropagandaDepartment in 1980, when Liu's name was singled out and criticizedby someone at the provincial level, Hu Yaobang immediately gave Liuhis protection: "I know of Liu Binyan. In 1957, when he waslabelled a rightist, I had my reservations. Last year, I gave myfull support to his rehabilitation. Of course he has his faults."55On another occasion, Hu said, "I don't see much wrong with Liu. Isupported him twenty-two years ago, as I do now. If he has hisfaults, they are certainly no greater than those of you who areattacking him."" Hu's protection certainly gave Liu incomparableprestige and opportunities to continue to do his job.While giving his support, however, Hu Yaobang had his owndoubts and concerns about Liu Binyan. To Hu, Liu's main problem washis "pride"--he was "overconfident" about himself. "He is so stuck-up," Hu commented when reviewing Liu's situation in 1958." To Hu,Liu seemed to be easily carried away, both verbally and in writing.Hu thought that Liu was sometimes "careless" and "overreacting" inhis reports. In his letter dated July 6, 1982, to two deputy heads54 Hu Ping and Zhang Shengyou, Liu Binyan: Ouan ping Zhe Ke Xin[Liu Binyan: Because of the Conscience] (Hong Kong: Baixing WenhuaShiye Company, Ltd. 1989), p. 85. We don't know the exact time whenLiu had his special ID card and for how long he had it. Theinformation is not available.55 Liu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Royalty, p. 142." Ibid., p. 143." Ibid., p. 240.37of the Department of Propaganda--the president of the Federation ofArt and Literature, Zhou Yang, and the head of the People's Daily,Hu Jiwei, Hu wrote:• . . we are steadfast in our policy of righting the wrongs ofthe Cultural Revolution. In this respect, nobody can outdo theCentral Committee. But it all depends on how you go about it.One cannot afford to be careless. I feel some of our comradeshave not grasped all sides of the issue or are, frankly,overconfident."Hu's words were apparently both a warning and a guideline to bothLiu Binyan and the Chinese news media.Hu was troubled and annoyed by Liu's behaviour. The reformprogram was encountering difficulties. From time to time Hu cameunder fire from a group of "old men" in the Party, who saw him as"the protective screen for all 'liberal elements'."" In late 1984,on top of the campaign "against spiritual pollution", the Party'srectification program was launched. Hu was alert and cautious. Atthis time Liu Binyan's report, "The Rights and Wrongs of Thirty-Eight Years" ("Sanshiba Nian Shi yu fei"), was published in thePeople's Daily. " It was about abuse of power by a housing bureauin Xian, Shaanxi Province. The report was highly controversial. HuYaobang was quite upset, because of rumours that Liu had been sentby Hu to make this report and that the Party leadership of Xian andShaanxi Province might be toppled. Hu made a public comment at themeeting of the editorial staff of the People's Daily: "Liu Binyan" Liu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Loyalty, p. 244." Ibid., p. 242." The People's Daily, August 25, 1984.38has not drawn a lesson from 1957. He had better give up reportingand keep to creative writing. "61 Hu's statement was actually apersonal warning to Liu that if he kept offending people in highplaces, he would not only stir up trouble for Hu, but would alsoinevitably harm himself.Liu and Hu had different opinions on what constituted freedomof the press. In 1985, shortly after the Fourth Writers' Congress,Hu stated that ". . . Freedom of creativity is not the same thingas freedom to publish" and that ". . . Journalism cannot enjoy thesame kind of liberty as creative writing."62 On February 8, 1985,at a meeting of the CPC's Central Committee Secretariat, Hu Yaobanggave his long controversial speech "On the Party's JournalismWork". Once again Hu emphasized that ". . . the Party's journalismis the Party's mouthpiece." Journalism's nature and functions were"very different" from those of literature and art. The task ofjournalism should be to "promptly and accurately spread to thewhole country and the whole world the ideas of the Party andgovernment . . ."63 Liu was shocked by Huls comments. His immediateresponse was ". . what was there for me to do?" He was afraidthat he would no longer be allowed to publish his reports in thePeople's Daily. 6461 Liu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Loyalty, pp. 187-188.62 Ibid., p. 192.63 China: PRC National Affairs, Hu Yaobang on Journalism, 'Spiritual Pollution', K1, K2, K6." Liu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Loyalty, pp. 192-193.39Apparently Liu did not know his boss well enough. Liu thoughtthen and thinks still that Hu Yaobang "is a most determined andcourageous reformer."" But he forgot that Hu had been a "littlered devil" in the Long March, was educated in Yanan in the 1930s,was appointed by Mao to be the head of the CYL in 1952, and hadpromoted 'Uncle Lei Feng' (Lei Feng shushu)66 among Chinese youthin the early 1960s. He also forgot that the campaigns against"bourgeois liberation" in 1981 and against "spiritual pollution" in1983 had both been under Hu's leadership. It was true that Hu hadmore tolerance, and was more relaxed toward intellectuals andcriticism from the Party leaders. However, this did not mean thatHu, as a reform leader, had no limitation for intellectuals'behaviour and limitation on his own conduct.In early January 1987, Hu Yaobang was requested by theStanding Committee of the CPC's Central Committee to resign fromhis position. Liu admits in his autobiography, that one of thefactors that led to Hu's downfall was his support and sympathy forhim. ". . . Hu's enemies (mine, too) regarded Hu as my boss behindthe scenes, and . . . all the offenses heaped on my head were alsoheld against him."67 Hu Yaobang died two years later. A lmostat the same time the attention of the Central Committee was65 Liu Binyan, Liu Binyan Zizuan [Liu Binyan's Autobiography],p. 353." Lei Feng was a PLA soldier, whose motto was to be "arustless screw in the Communist Party's machine". Lei Feng died in1962 as the result of an accident, at the age of 22.67 Liu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Loyalty, p. 249.40directed toward Liu Binyan. It was now his turn. The ax fell whilehe was on a holiday trip with his wife to Hainan Island. Theresolution of the Secretariat of the Central Committee stated, "OnJanuary 5, 1987, the Secretariat of the Central Committee decidedto expel Liu Binyan from the Communist Party; the decision will becarried out by the Party branch in the People's Daily."" This newsitem was not publicized until about three weeks later. Consideringthe terms of their relationship, Liu's dismissal from the Partyafter Hu's downfall was not a surprise. There is no doubt that Liuhad been caught up in the factional struggle within the CPC'sCentral Committeebetween reformers and the "old men"."The Second Kind of Loyalty"In early 1985, Liu Binyan published his investigative report,"The Second Kind of Loyalty". This is another of Liu's influentialand controversial works after the publication of "People orMonsters" in 1979. In this report, Liu writes about two men: ChenShizhong, a university teacher from Harbin, and Ni Yuxian, a low-ranking library staff member of the Shanghai Institute ofOceanography. Neither of these men had Party membership.Chen had studied in the Soviet Union and had returned to Chinain 1960. He was an orphan and full of gratitude to the Party andChairman Mao for giving him education opportunities. Holding on tohis own strong belief that the CPC should adjust both its domestic" Liu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Loyalty, p. 258.41and foreign policies and maintain relations with the CommunistParty of the Soviet Union, he repeatedly wrote admonitory lettersto Mao Zedong. He also wrote one letter to Khrushchev and tried tohand it, in person, to the Soviet Embassy in Beijing. He wasstopped by a guard at the entrance gate and was immediately putinto prison and branded a "traitor" to his country. He wassentenced to eight years in jail and deprived of his rights as acitizen for two years. While in prison, he continued to writearticles and letters--literally hundreds of thousands of words--ofadmonition to the Party and Mao, making strong criticisms of "thecult of Mao"."The other man, Ni, was a PLA soldier in 1962 when he wrote aletter to Mao to report peasants' plight as a result of the "GreatLeap Forward" and three years of natural disasters. For this he wasdemobilized from military service. Then, in 1975, during theCultural Revolution, Ni wrote letters criticizing ZhangChungiao's" theory of "The All-Round Dictatorship of theProletariat" and sent copies both to Mao and to Red Flag, theofficial journal of the CPC Central Committee. This time he wasthrown into jail and was kept there until the Cultural Revolutionended.The basic theme of "The Second Kind of Loyalty" is summed upat the end of his article:" Liu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Loyalty, pp. 193-196." Zhang Chungiao was a leading figure of the CulturalRevolution and a member of the Gang of Four.42There are different kinds of loyalty, as there aredifferent kinds of beauty. One kind of loyalty stressesmeekness, modesty, submissiveness, deference; an individualmight have to make some personal sacrifices to maintain thiskind of loyalty, but he is safe, his path will be smooth,disaster will not strike him. And because of the approval ofhis superiors, he usually makes his way upwards.The second kind of loyalty, the kind exhibited by ChenShizhong and Ni Yuxian, does not invite approval. Even untilrecently, the followers of the second kind of loyalty haveoften had to pay the price of freedom, happiness, or even lifeitself for their kind of loyalty.For the past years, the first kind of loyalty has beencarefully fostered, and has brought forth abundant fruit; inthe fields of our political life, by contrast, the second kindof loyalty struggles on the poorest soil; the fact that it has71survived at all is a miracle . . . .Here the author confronts his readers with the question of whichkind of loyalty is most in demand in China. The kind Lei Fengpursued, a submissive and ignorant loyalty, obedient to each andevery word from the Party? or the kind Chen Shizhong and Ni Yuxianpractised, trying to warn the Party "You are sick!" while heartilybelieving "Long Live Communism"?72The issue Liu raised in the article was not new. Many peoplein China shared the same feelings as Liu did at the time. It wasLiu, however, who courageously posed this issue in writing duringn Liu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Loyalty, p. 197. In thearticle, Liu also points out "a third kind of loyalty, an extensionof the first." He asserts that ". . . Believers in this loyaltypretend modesty and do not commit themselves and seek to put theresponsibility elsewhere. The general rule guiding their behaviouris to be on the watch for changes of wind and to always be ready toshift allegiance. This kind of loyalty is even more attractivethan the first kind of blind obedience, but the fruit it bears isbitter, sometimes even poisonous. . . " Ibid., pp. 197-198.72 Liu Binyan, Liu Binyan Zixuan Ji [The Self-Selected Worksof Liu Binyan], pp. 125-126. Liu describes Chen and Ni in hiswriting as "Lei Feng with shackles". Ibid., p. 137.43a time when the Party's rectification program was still going on.His motivation was obvious: to establish a new type of model forthe reform period in China.Excerpts from "The Second Kind of Loyalty" began appearingunofficially in newspapers and magazines throughout the country inFebruary 1985, and the article itself was published in the firstedition of Kaituo (Pioneers)73 in March of the same year. Thispublication immediately caused a great controversy. The mainaccusation against Liu came from the Shanghai Institute ofOceanography, which contended that Liu was misleading readers by"making a hero of a scoundrel" and also that the story was filledwith "factual errors".m Pressure also came from the PoliticalBureau of the Party's Central Committee. As a consequence, "TheSecond Kind of Loyalty" was banned from public circulation and itssequel, entitled "An Unfinished Burial" (Wei Wancheng de Maizang),was withheld from publication.mThis was not the end of the matter. One of Liu's two heroes,Ni Yuxian, obtained an American visa in Shanghai on January 16,1986, slipped out of the country and arrived in New York two daysm Kaituo (Pioneers) was founded under the auspice of theWorker's Daily in March, 1985, and folded after only two editions.The issue of Kaituo containing "A Second Kind of Loyalty" waswithdrawn from circulation.m Liu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Loyalty, p. 201.m "An Unfinished Burial" was first planned to be publishedsometime in 1985, and did not get published until October 1986.See, the People's Literature, No. 10, 1986.44later. Within hours of his arrival, Ni became involved with ChinaSpring, the American-based publication which has been denounced bythe Chinese government. Ni also applied for political refugeestatus 76Needless to say, Ni Yuxian's defection put Liu Binyan in adifficult and embarrassing position. In his article, Ni had beendescribed as a man who put principle above politics and was loyalto his country, willing to sacrifice himself--to go to jail,perhaps even to die--for the good of China. Yet Ni's behaviour inthe United States seemed only to confirm the allegations againstboth Ni and Liu. In these circumstances, Liu published a statementin March 1986, some six weeks after Ni's arrival in New York,dissociating himself from the man he had made a hero. He insistedthat his relationship with Ni was only the relationship between awriter and his subject and that Ni had no right to speak out on hisbehalf."On the whole, "The Second Kind of Loyalty" can be viewed as aself-portrait of its author. The qualities demonstrated by hisheroes--daring to speak out, unconditional loyalty to the Party andMao, and holding principles above all--seemed to be ones he himselfmaintained and pursued. In this sense, the article can also beenm In April 1987, Ni Yuxian was granted political refugeestatus. A year later, his wife and two children joined him in theUnited States." Liu did not record this episode in his autobiography. Formore detail, see "Epilogue", pp. 391-398, in Anne F. Thurston, AChinese Odyssey: The Life and Times of a Chinese Dissident, whichis a biography of Ni Yuxian.45looked upon as Liu's manifesto.Liu was, like many other typical Chinese intellectuals, a"Party intellectual".m This means that he not only held a Partymembership card, but also that he was part of the officialestablishment. His profession being journalism, Liu became a member(and the vice-chairman from 1985) of the board of directors and thesecretariat of the Chinese Writers' Association. As a "Partyintellectual", Liu could hardly avoid the role of statefunctionary. Liu himself admits that ". . . The Chinese politicalstructure had transformed reporters into officials who simplyworked on specific subjects, handed out in accordance with Partyneed and Party ideology."" In this sense, he was required to usehis pen as a tool and to play the required role.As part of the establishment, Liu was unavoidably moulded bythe system. He consistently and spontaneously identified himselfwith the Party line. He has always claimed to be a believer inMarxism, a claim he has not altered even after taking up residencein the United States. Liu also considered himself as a fullsupporter of the reform. The American author Harold Isaacs had aninterview with Liu Binyan in 1980. According to Isaacs, Liu at thetime was ". . . An exuberant, self-assured man in his late fif-ties," who held a very optimistic view about the Chinese politicalm Timothy Cheek, "Habits of the Heart", in Shao-chuan Leng,ed., Change in China (University Press of America, 1989), p. 129." Liu Binyan, A Higher Kind of Loyalty, p. 163.46situation. In Liu's words, "It is a golden time for newsmen inChina now!"" In Liu's opinion, "all my writings were about theproblems that the Party itself was seeking to tackle."81 Forexample, in the 1950s, when the Party called for criticism from thepublic as part of the "Hundred Flowers" campaign, Liu'scontribution was "On the Bridge Construction Site", criticizingbureaucratism. In the post-1976 period, when the Party set uppolicies to correct wrongs done in the Cultural Revolution, Liupublished his special report, "People or Monsters?"One should also not ignore the fact that, even though Liu'smain emphasis in his writings is on the "dark side" and on beingcritical of the negative aspects of the system, he also wrote aboutthe bright side: "good people and good deeds" (haoren haoshi). Whenthe CPC's Central Committee in the early 1980s proclaimed Zhu Boru,a military officer, as a national model, Liu accordingly wrote twospecial reports on Zhu, highly praising his dedication to helpingpeople." He also wrote pieces such as "The Difficult Departure"(Jiannan de qifei) to applaud and support the reform policy.To a great extent, Liu Binyan is a traditional Chineseintellectual. He deeply believes in such values as loyalty, a clear" Harold R. Isaacs, Re-Encounters in China: Notes of a Journeyin a Time Capsule (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1985), pp.176-179.81 Liu Binyan, A High Kind of Loyalty, p. 258.82 Two reports are: "Because I Love" (Yinwei wo ai) and "AllDepends on the Conscience" (Quan ping zhe ke xin). They arecollected in Liu's book, Yinwei Wo Ai [Because I Love] (Beijing:Workers' Publishing House, 1984).47conscience, and the idea that literature should serve politics. Helooked for moral solutions which rely on a change of heart withinofficialdom, spurred on by reformers acting as the "conscience" ofthe Party. As an investigative reporter during the reform period,Liu acted as a "scout" for the reform Party leadership to keep itinformed and maintain its honesty and cleanliness. He maintainedthat a gradual reform of the social system, rather than fundamentalchange, seemed to be the only viable alternative to thedeterioration of the society. He also believed that such reformcould only be carried out "from the top down." Liu never didchallenge the one-party system--its legitimacy, its functions, andits nature. He realized that the Party was ailing, but he honestlybelieved that it would cure itself. As Merle Goldman comments, heexemplifies ". . . in his words and actions the tradition of thecourageous literati . . . who criticized China's political leaderswhen they did not live up to their ideals."" Up to the lastminute, as a Party member, Liu still regarded himself as a fullsupporter of the line laid down by the Third Plenary Session of theEleventh Party Central Committee and of the reform. His break withthe Party was by no means a conscious decision initiated byhimself. He never considered himself a dissident--against thesystem. Instead, he insisted in vain that whatever he had done wasin the best interests of the people, the Party and the country. Inother words, he considered that he was loyal to the people, the" Merle Goldman, "Foreword", Liu Binyan, China's Crisis, China's Hope, trans. Howard Goldblatt (Cambridge, Mass: HarvardUniversity Press, 1990), pp. vii-viii.48Party, and the system.Liu's views have greatly changed since he arrived in theUnited States in March 1988. As Goldman observes:He [Liu] has moved away from the traditional Chinese relianceon ideology as a means of persuading the leadership torestrain its political power toward increasing stress onpolitical institutions, an independent judiciary, and freedomof the press to protect society from the abuses of politicalpower."This shift of emphasis has been gradual, much influenced by westernideas. Doubtless, his past experience at the hands of a Party-government has contributed to the shift.After June Fourth, 1989, Liu Binyan has become a leader ofthe overseas Chinese democratic movement." He has travelledextensively giving speeches in which he analyses China's politicalsituation. Between 1988 and 1990, Liu lectured at more than fortyuniversities and colleges in North America. At the same time, hepublished three books in English: one his autobiography, and theother two collections of his speeches and lectures in NorthAmerica."Even though he ultimately became disgusted with the Communist" Merle Goldman, "Foreword", Liu Binyan, China's Crisis, China's Hope, p. ix.85 Liu is an executive member of the Chinese Human Rights andDemocracy Foundation, which was founded in March 1990 in the UnitedStates." The three books are: 1) "Telling the World": What happenedin China and Why, trans. Henry L. Epstein (New York: PantheonBooks, 1989); 2) China's Crisis, China's Hope, trans. HowardGoldblatt (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); 3) AHigher Kind of Loyalty (A Memoir by China's Foremost Journalist).49Party of China, Liu Binyan claims that he still believes inMarxism. This is fully understandable for a person who has devotedhis life to the doctrine. His self-image and personal faith havebeen built upon Marxism, as well as his reputation and fame. Torepudiate the faith he has held for so long would be likerepudiating himself and rejecting what he had done and attempted todo in the past.Liu Binyan remains respected by his many readers for his workas a journalist and an investigative reporter and for his honestyand integrity as a powerful critic of the "dark side" of thesystem, and for his courage in exposing current social evils asbest he could under various prevailing political situations. Thereis no clear consensus, however, about Liu as a writer or as aleader of the democratic movement. As Liu himself acknowledges,"For a long time I have been a controversial man. I am afraid thatthere will probably be no consensus about me in the futureeither."' His judgment on life he expresses in his wish that theinscription on his tombstone will read, "Here lies a man who daredto tell the truth.""To a great extent, Liu Binyan's fate is the epitome of theintellectual-state relationship in the era of the People's Republicof China. Liu's life strikingly reflects China's Party politics ingeneral, and her policy towards the intellectuals in particular.87 Liu Binyan Yanlun Ji, vol. 2. On the back cover of the book." Anne F. Thurston, A Chinese Odyssey, p. 398.50While realizing that Liu Binyan is a tragic figure, tossed about bythe vicissitudes of PRC politics, we also must recognize that Liu,as a Chinese intellectual, was part of the political establishment.He helped to build and supported the very system that ultimatelyrejected him. In this context, Liu's story reflects the pattern ofChinese intellectuals central to political power. Their deepattachment to political patrons is one of their major problems, forit means that they have lost their independent status and areunable to defend themselves. It is not surprising that they can bepulled into the political trap whenever a political crisis occurs,and become victims on the political battlefield.CHAPTER III: CONCLUSION.Liu Binyan is now starting a new chapter of his life in theUnited States. But, as far as the intellectual-state relationshipis concerned, one cannot help but wonder whether Liu-type storieswill be repeated in China's future political life. Regarding thecontinuing relationship between Chinese intellectuals and thestate, there are some crucial variables to be identified: 1) Thenature of change in the Chinese political-economic structure; 2)the readiness of the intellectuals to re-assess and modify theirattitudes towards state politics, social masses, and themselves.Are Chinese intellectuals fully prepared to change theirtraditional role? The process of increasing specialization andprofessionalization among intellectuals may provide the answer to51this question.Changes in China's political-economic structure.As far as China's political structure is concerned, the one-party system has shown no sign of resignation. Evidence for thiswas the Fourteenth CPC's Congress and the Eighth National People'sCongress which ended early in 1993. In the meantime, two newdevelopments which will certainly affect the intellectual-staterelationship have emerged. The first is a modification in theParty's policies regarding intellectuals. In spite of thecontinuing existence of systematic control over intellectualactivities, beginning with the CPC's Third Plenum in late 1978 andespecially in recent years, Party policies regarding intellectualshave become much more relaxed. In order to bring intellectuals'enthusiasm and creativity into full play, the government's generalpolicy toward intellectuals has changed from "to unite, to educateand to remould" in the 1950s to "treat them equally withoutdiscrimination in political activities; give them a free hand intheir work; and take care of their livelihood" in the 1980s."The regime repeatedly emphasizes the importance of knowledgeand the intellectuals' roles in the Four Modernizations. In variouslevels of promotions, for instance, education instead of "the timeof joining the revolution" (canjia geming) has now become one of" Liu Hongxia and Liu Guitian, ed. Zhonqguo Zhishi Fenzi Wenti [The Issue of Chinese Intellectuals], p. 102.52the important criteria. College education or its equivalents aregenerally required even for lower positions such as factorymanagers and county commissioners. At the national level, manyhigh-level intellectuals have been placed in important positions indifferent government bodies. Apparently, knowledge has once againbecome an important asset for those who look for politicalvocations. In the meantime, institutions and work units are takingsteps to adjust long overdue problems for intellectuals such ashousing and salaries.To overseas students--one of China's major personnel resourcesfor economic reform--the government's policies in recent years havecombined "patriotism" propaganda with increasing flexibility andgenerosity. While using the concept of "motherland" to attractoverseas Chinese students back to the homeland to "serve thecountry," the policies include promising "free in and out of thecountry," welcoming both temporary and permanent returningstudents, letting them freely choose work units and localities,helping them solve problems of husband-wife geographic separation,offering them attractive positions with adequate salaries, housing,and so on. In accordance with these policies, the State EducationCommission, commencing a couple of years ago, has sent recruitingteams to North American and European countries armed with a varietyof incentives. Some provinces and cities such as Guangdong,Jiangsu, Shanghai and Guangzhou, have sent their own teams withpackages offering work in China.The second development--intellectuals' autonomy--can be53considered a direct by-product of the economic reform. With thedramatic expanding of the economy starting in the beginning of the1990s, especially after Deng Xiaoping's speech on his visit tosouth China in March 1992, government policies have shownincreasing flexibility in developing an economic infrastructure.Local economic entities have been given unprecedented autonomy andrights since the founding of the People's Republic of China. Theformer situation wherein all institutions were virtually controlledby the state is changing. This is good news for some businesses andenterprises and bad news for others. In order to survivecompetition, many factories, businesses and township industries arenow endeavouring to attract educated personnel by offeringcompetitive and prestigious packages including salaries, positionsand housing.In this economic process, intellectuals are subsequentlygaining more opportunities and autonomy in a number of areas, suchas employment, promotions, and income, which were formerlymonopolized by the state. In recent years, many intellectuals havegiven up traditional "iron rice bowls" and engaged in business (xiahai). Some have started their own enterprise and some have foundbetter-paid jobs in foreign-owned companies, joint ventureenterprises, or wherever a better offer could be found.Chinese Intellectuals in the 1990sThe 1990s, in some aspects, mark a new era for Chinese54intellectuals. This is a direct result of the changes--somefundamental--in China's economic infrastructure. First of all, theintellectuals are, in many areas, gaining unprecedented autonomy asnoted in the above. They are the direct beneficiaries of theeconomic reform. These reforms have not only brought prosperity forsome intellectuals, but also new alternatives for many. Chineseintellectuals, for the first time in the PRC, can now choose theirpreferred occupation if they wish to do so. This autonomy issignificant, for it means that the fabric of the organizational-control network--job allocation, work units, salaries, promotionsand so on--imposed by the regime for the last forty years has begunto tear apart." Apparently, Chinese intellectuals, although stillunder the Party leadership, now have more leeway to make their owndecisions.Further, the 1990s is expected to be a decade in which Chineseintellectuals will make great strides in becoming moreprofessionalized. This process actually started when the economicreform commenced in late 1978, but only recently has it begun topick up momentum. Private law firms, medical practices andcounselling services now exist side by side with privatebusinesses. A professional class is rising, even though the numberis still very small. At the Eighth National People's Congress heldin late March and early April, 1993, a significant and fundamentalamendment was enacted in the Constitution. The law now decrees that" This does not include medical care, pension and to a greatdegree, housing, which are still controlled by the state.55China is to move "from the socialist planned economy to thesocialist market economy." There is no doubt that the continuingeconomic reform will have a profound impact on the state-intellectual relationship.Needless to say, Chinese intellectuals heartily welcome thesechanges in the social-economic area. With the Party's pronouncementon the importance of the intellectuals' role in the nation'smodernizations, they are experiencing more self-respect than at anytime since the foundation of the PRC. However, as far as Partyideology is concerned, the situation has changed very little.Notwithstanding the evidence of increased freedom forintellectuals, it would be a fallacy to conclude that the Party isrelinquishing its control altogether. While acknowledging theimportance of the role of the intellectuals in economic reform, theParty still holds a tight control in matters of ideology. In recentyears, the government has not only launched the nationwidepatriotism education program, but also called back "Comrade LeiFeng" as the model of the reform. Very recently, the news mediahave organized a public review on the movie, "Jiang Zhuying", basedon the true story of an intellectual who devoted his energy andlife to his career and died from cancer a few years ago. Jiang isregarded as an "excellent intellectual" and an "excellentCommunist." It is apparent that the Party wants to establish Jiangas a model for Chinese intellectuals. It is still a fact that theParty has very little tolerance for the behaviour of "the secondkind of loyalty".56Regarding their relationship to the state, Chineseintellectuals seem to need more time to adjust. The old patternbasically remains unchanged. Chinese intellectuals, self-consciously, are still far from ready to alter their attitudesregarding themselves, the state and the social masses. To somedegree, the economic reform, by emphasizing the importance ofknowledge and the role of intellectuals in Modernizations, hascontributed to the re-emergence of their elitist self-image.It is true that the Tiananmen Incident in June 4, 1989resulted in a great alienation of many Chinese intellectuals fromParty politics. And yet the "political vocation" continues toattract many intellectuals (now from the younger generation) towork for the government. Traditional ethics and culture composed ofprofound elitism, self pride and a sense of superiority over themasses, still continue to dominate intellectuals' social behaviour.The centuries-long integration of knowledge and bureaucraticpolitics is re-enforced through the Party's promotion policy. Theintellectuals are still central to state power.Chinese scholars in recent years have increasingly turnedtheir attention toward studies of the intellectuals. One majortopic is about the fate of intellectuals in the PRC era. It is notdifficult to discover, from some of these studies that, among theintellectuals, the attitudes toward the state and to themselvesbasically have not changed. Ironically enough, it is exactly thosewho loudly promote the democratization of the Chinese politicalsystem who also strongly advocate "elite politics" in China. They57argue that Chinese intellectuals should "strengthen" (clianghua) thesense of political participation and actively take officialpositions so that they can more directly intervene in nationalpolitics and accelerate the "democratic" progress in China."The position of Chinese intellectuals in the contemporaryChinese polity remains ambiguous and controversial. The ambiguityand controversy, as Hamrin points out, ". . . can be seen in theirclaim to speak on behalf of the people and to be responsible to thepeople," while explicitly holding "the Party accountable to ahigher, universal moral criterion." Thus, "they implicitly justifya special role" for themselves "as mediators between the topruler(s) and society, acting as the conscience of the sovereign andeducators of the people."" But the past experience of theintellectual-state relationship in the PRC has shown that such arole of "mediator" can hardly survive. Liu Binyan's case is anexample. One could be either a spokesman for the regime or for thepeople, but not both.Under the Party leadership, politics remains an elite affairin China today. As an elite group, Chinese intellectuals are stillcommitted to participation in the state politics. On theintellectuals' side, the relationship is still characterized bypatriotism, patronage and paternalism; by the intellectuals' deepinvolvement in politics, their close attachment to their political91 Chen An, "Wei jingying minzhu bianhu" ("Advocating for elitedemocracy"), China Spring, July 1991, vol. 98, pp. 52-62." Carol Lee Hamrin, "Conclusion", Merle Goldman, ed., China's Intellectuals and the State, pp. 288-289.58patrons and their identification with ruling classes; and by theirdeeply-rooted elite consciousness and lack of independence inpolitical affairs. It is likely that, given these conditions, LiuBinyan-type stories will be repeated in the ongoing politicaldrama.It is peacetime now between Chinese intellectuals and thestate. Will future Chinese politics be dominated by the alliancebetween the state and professionalism--technocracy? Will theprocess of intellectuals becoming professionals ultimatelyundermine the concept of 'intellectual' which has persisted for solong in China? Or, in other words, will the formation of aprofessional class- -a middle class- -eventually replace an ambiguousintellectual group--"a special stratum"? In this context, both thefuture relationship between Chinese intellectuals and the state andthe future of China's economic reform are at the cross-road. Thedirection taken remains to be seen.59BIBLIOGRAPHYBarnett, Doak A. & Clough, Ralph N. eds. Modernizing China: Post-Mao Reform and Development. Boulder & London: WestviewPress, 1986.Blecher, Marc.^China: Politics,^Economics and Society--Iconoclasm and Innovation in a Revolutionary Socialist Country. London: Frances Pinter (Publishers), Boulder: LynneRienner Publishers, Inc. 1986.Chang, Hao, Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Orderand Meaning (1890-1911). Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1987.Duke, Michael S. Blooming and Contending: Chinese Literature inthe Post-Mao Era. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.Fairbank, John King. China Watch. Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1987.Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan, Wang Ruowang Yanlun Zhaibian [TheSpeech Collection of Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan and Wang Ruowang].Hong Kong: Shuguang Books, 1988.Goldman, Merle, China's Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent.Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.. Ed. with Timothy Cheek and Carol Lee Hamrin. China's Intellectuals and the State: In Search of a NewRelationship.Cambridge: The Council on East AsianStudies/Harvard University, 1987Goodman, David S.G., ed. Groups and Politics in the People'sRepublic of China. University College Cardiff Press, 1984.Grieder, Jerome B. Intellectuals and the State in Modern China: A Narrative History. New York: The Free Press, a division ofMacmillan Publishing Co., Inc. 1981.Hamrin,^Carol^Lee,^and Cheek,^Timothy,^eds.^China's Establishment Intellectuals. New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.1986.Haraszti, Miklos. The Velvet Prison: Artists under StateSocialism. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1987.Hicks, George, ed. The Broken Mirror: China after Tiananmen.Longman Group UK Limited, Westgate House, 1990.Hu, Ping, and Zhang, Shengyou, Liu Binyan: Ouan Ping Zhe Ke Xin[Liu Binyan: Because of the Conscience]. Hong Kong: Baixing60Wenhua Shiye Company, Ltd. 1989.Huang, Dazhi. Zhonqguo Xin Xieshi Zhuyi Wenyi Pinglun Xuan--LiuBinyan jiqi Zuopin [The Selected Literary Criticism fromChinese Neo-Realism School--Liu Binyan and His Works]. HongKong: Bowen Books Co. 1980.Isaacs, Harold R. Re-Encounters in China: Notes of a Journey ina Time Capsule. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1985.Jin, Chunming. Jianguo hou de Sanshisan Nian [Thirty Three Yearsafter the Foundation of the People's Republic of China].Shanghai: People's Publishing House, 1987.Jin, Yaoji. Zhongguo Minzhu zhi Kunqjing yu Fazhan [The Problemsand Development of China's Democracy]. Taipei: Times CulturePublishers, Ltd. 1984.Li, Yi. Zhishi Fenzi yu Zhongsuo [Intellectuals and China]. HongKong: 1983.Link, Perry. ed. People or Monsters?: And Other Stories andReportage from China after Mao. Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 1983.Liu, Binyan. China's Crisis, China's Hope. Translated by HowardGoldblatt. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,1990.. Gaosu Ni Yige Mimi [Telling You a Secrete]. Beijing:Writer's Publishing House, 1986.^ . A Higher Kind of Loyalty (ik Memoir by China's Foremost Journalist). Translated by Zhu Hong. New York: Pantheon Books,1990.^ . Jiannan de Oifei [A Difficult Taking off]. Changsha:Hunan Publishing House, 1982.^ . Liu Bunyan Baogao Wenxue Xuan [The Selected Works ofLiu Binyan's Reportage Literature]. Beijing: BeijingPublishing House, 1981.. Liu Binyan Zizuan [Liu Binyan Autobiography]. Taipei:Shibao Culture Publishing Company, Ltd. 1989.^ . "Renxue Bushi Yanzhi"--Liu Binyan Baogao WenxueJingxuan ["It Is Not Rouge but Human Blood": The SelectedWorks of Liu Binyan's Reports]. Taipei: Renjian PublishingHouse, 1987.. Wode Riji [My Diaries]. Changsha: Hunan People'sPublishing House, 1986.61. Yinwei Wo Al [Because I Love]. Beijing: Worker's Publishing House, 1984..^Zai Oiaoliang Gongdi Shang^[On the BridgeHouse, 1956.World": What Epstein. NewConstruction Site]. Beijing: Writers Publishing^ • With Ruan Ming and Xu Gang. "Telling theHappened in China and Why. Translated by Henry L.York: Pantheon Books, 1989.Liu Binyan Yanlun Ji [The Selection of Liu Binyan's Speeches],vol. 2. Hong Kong: Xiangjiang Publishing Company, 1988.Liu, Hongxia, and Liu, Guitian, ed. Zhonqguo Zhishi Fenzi Wenti [The Issue of Chinese Intellectuals]. Liaoning UniversityPublishing House, 1987.Liu, Qingfeng. "Shilun Wenge qian Zhongguo Zhishi Fenzi DaodeYongqi de Lunsang" ["On the decay of moral courage of ChineseIntellectuals before the Cultural Revolution"), Zhishi Fenzi [The Chinese Intellectual]. Winter: 1990.Moody, Peter R., Jr. Chinese Politics after Mao: Development and Liberalization, 1976 to 1983. New York: PraegerPublishers, 1983.Pye, Lucian W. The Dynamics of Chinese Politics. Cambridge,Mass.: Oelgeschager, Gull & Hain, 1981.^. The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, TheUniversity of Michigan, 1988.Thurston, Anne F. A Chinese Odyssey: The Life and Times of aChinese Dissident. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991.Townsend, James R. & Womack, Brantly. Politics in China (Thirdedition). Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1986.Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. & Perry, Elizabeth J., eds. PopularProtest & Political Culture in Modern China: Learning from1989. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.Yang, Zhongmei, Hu Yaobang: A Chinese Biography. Translated byWilliam A. Wycoff. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc. 1988.Yu, Yingshi. Lishi yu Sixianq [History and Thought]. Taipei:Lianjing Publishing Company, 1976.62

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
http://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0086330/manifest

Comment

Related Items