UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Nel Noddings' Caring : a critical analysis Sowerby, Eileen Margaret 1993

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata


831-ubc_1993_fall_sowerby_eileen.pdf [ 3.16MB ]
JSON: 831-1.0086303.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0086303-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0086303-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0086303-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0086303-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0086303-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0086303-source.json
Full Text

Full Text

NEL NODDINGS' CARING: A CRITICAL ANALYSISBYEileen Margaret SOWERBYM.B., CH.B., Liverpool University, 1969B.A., University of British Columbia, 1988A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESDepartment of PhilosophyWe accept this thesis as conformingTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAAugust 1993© Eileen Margaret Sowerby, 1993In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature) Department of k \-\\\--T=IS O Q WiThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, Canada\?,■6, oviDateDE-6 (2/88)ABSTRACTIn this thesis I will provide a critique of the positivecontributions and limitations of Nel Noddings' ethics ofcaring. My thesis is that although the ethics of caringapproach has an important contribution to make in ethics, inNoddings' version it is limited by its inability to accountfor the possibility of moral relations with strangers.Noddings' ethics of caring, I shall suggest, suffers, not onlyfrom an inability to account for ethics in the public domain,but also from an unavoidable potential for a reduction tocaring for only one other "cared-for". That it does not appearto be vulnerable to the latter problem in Noddings'explication is because, I suggest, she is relying implicitlyon an abstracted though still personal "ethical ideal". Anexposition of this ethical ideal will suggest how caring canbe legitimately enlarged, not only to a larger private domain,but also to the public, or non-intimate, domain to produce amore adequate ethics.Nodding's ethics of caring is described in her bookCaring A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Igive a summary of this book in Chapter One, relying heavily onquotations from Noddings herself.In the following two chapters I focus on criticisms ofNoddings' ethics. They tend to fall into two main groups:criticisms about her claim that her ethics is an alternativeto mainstream ethics while lacking any universalizationcomponent; and, secondly, the inability of her ethics toiiaccount for ethical relations with the non-intimate, i.e. inthe public domain.In Chapter Four I focus on a criticism, not discussed inthe literature to date, that there is an inherent risk ofshrinkage to the dyad in her ethics. By closer examination ofthe ethical ideal I show how Noddings' ethics of caring can beenlarged into the public domain. In Chapter Five I describe amoral dilemma which demonstrate how the use of this newethical ideal produces a more adequate ethics of caring.Finally, in Chapter Six, I contrast the roots ofNoddings' ethics with mainstream ethics to emphasize theradical departure of Noddings' ethics from mainstream ethics,and I mention briefly the important problem of autonomy of thecaring agent which is not addressed by Noddings.iiiTABLE OF CONTENTSABSTRACT^ iiACKNOWLEDGEMENTS^ viINTRODUCTION^  1CHAPTER ONE: NEL NODDINGS' CARING^  5The Caring Relationship  6Reciprocity^  8The Ethical Ideal^ 10Caring and Education 13CHAPTER TWO: AN ALTERNATIVE ETHICS 7^ 15General Reviews of Caring^ 15Two Major Concerns with Noddings' Ethics^ 17Feminine and Feminist^ 18Dominion and Caring 21Universalization and Care^ 24CHAPTER THREE: AN ADEQUATE ETHICS 7^ 29The Starving Children in Africa 30Caring About Nature^ 35Caring for Principles 39ivCHAPTER FOUR: A SHRINKING ETHICS^ 47The Stray Cat Dilemma^ 48Lifeboat Ethics^ 52My Ethical Ideal 56CHAPTER FIVE: A PUBLIC RELATIONAL ETHICS^ 61The Public Domain^ 62The Moral Dilemma and Ethics^ 65The Politician's Dilemma 66CHAPTER SIX: OTHER PROBLEMS^ 72Ethical Roots^ 72Autonomy 75CONCLUDING REMARKS^ 78WORKS CITED^ 80ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSI thank Susan Wendell for reading this thesis and for hercomments and editing at a time when she was on a sabbaticalleave. I thank Leonard Angel who, more than anyone I know,epitomizes the caring philosopher.viINTRODUCTIONIt is Noddings' contention that the feminine side inethics has been ignored in favour of an ethics based on"justification, fairness and equity". It is time, shesuggests, to redress the balance (1984,1). The latter ethics,one of principle and rule, is the mainstream, traditional andmasculine ethics and it is characterised by impartiality: itis the ethics of the public domain. It is the ethics of Kantand Mill, amongst many others, and it has been powerfullyreflected in our social systems, both academic and political.How is Noddings' ethics different? The main difference -that the basis of her ethics is found in relation (discussedin Chapter Six) - is paramount to an understanding of howradical a departure from traditional ethics Noddings' proposalis. When she says that the caring relation is ethically basicthis is in marked contrast to the individual, rational,impartial adult agent standing alone, that is usually found inmainstream ethics.In the first chapter I summarize her ethics. I wish tomake three points about this chapter. First, to repeat, theethical root of Noddings' ethics is one of relation, and shesays that the caring relation is ethically basic (1984, 3).Her view of basic reality is one of relatedness (1984, 133)and she locates "the very wellspring of ethical behavior inhuman affective response" (1984, 3).Second, Noddings uses the word "reciprocity" in aspecially defined way. It does not mean, as it usually does,1"mutual action, principle or practice of give-and-take".Noddings uses the word specifically to express the cared-for'sresponse within the caring relation by growing and becoming"more fully himself" (1984, 73). Reciprocity is necessary inmaintaining the caring relation.The traditional ethicist may be tempted to ask abstractquestions about this caring relation. For instance, can I carefor someone who is unconscious? Can I care for someone who isabsent? However, and perhaps fortunately, Noddings resiststhis type of hypothetical questioning - she refers to it asgame playing (1984, 105). Her ethics is a concrete one: itexists only in each specific caring relation. Hence, she wouldclaim, one cannot say in the abstract whether one can care foran unconscious person, because, according to her, too manyquestions arise, especially concerning reciprocity, that canonly be answered in the concrete, or actual, situation. (Seealso Chapter Five of this thesis and her stance on abortion"in general" in Chapter One.) Her ethics is radicallycontextual: whether one's actions are right or wrong can onlybe decided by an examination of one's personal experience andhistory in relation to the choice now.The third point concerns Noddings' use of the word"engrossment". When the "one-caring" is engrossed in the"cared-for" there is a motivational shift to a receptive mode,the characteristic mode of consciousness in caring (1984, 33-34). The fear that feminists have concerning this mode ofconsciousness (because of the threat to the agent's autonomy -especially for a female in this society) is not addressed by2Noddings in her book.Chapter Two addresses her claim that her ethics is analternative to the masculine and traditional ethics. Thisbrings in feminist concerns about Noddings' ethical frameworkand the difficulty with having a, so-called, "alternativeethics" that has no universalization component.The third chapter addresses concerns about the adequacyof Noddings' ethics to non-intimates, concentrating on herreference to starving children in Africa, and, continuing todiscuss questions of adequacy concerning other species,nature, and ideas and principles. Several suggested solutionsto the inadequacy are examined.In Chapter Four I focus on a criticism of Noddings'position, not dealt with by her critics to date, to the effectthat her ethics cannot adequately account for relationsamongst a circle of intimates. That this does not seem to befeared by Noddings and is not mentioned by her critics is, Isuggest, because of an unexplicated, and mostly unaware,underlying reliance on an abstracted personal "ethical ideal"that reaches out continually to enlarge her ethics. Bybringing this to our attention and using it more adequately,we can see how her ethics may be enlarged into the fullness ofthe private domain and to the public realm as well.In Chapter Five, using the moral dilemma, I show howNoddings' ethics may conflict with an apparent need to useethical principles in the public domain. By bringing in a moreadequate ethical ideal I suggest how the conflict may bealleviated.3In Chapter Six I discuss other problems - particularlythe recurring one of autonomy which is not addressed byNoddings.4ONENEL NODDINGS' CARINGNoddings begins her book by stating that:Ethics, the philosophical study of morality,has concentrated for the most part on moralreasoning. (1984,1)After asking "What does it mean to be moral?", traditionalmoral investigation immediately jumps to a discussion of moraljudgment and moral reasoning. Noddings' suggestion is thatthis - a rational-cognitive approach - is neither the only,nor the best, starting point, to answer the question posedabove. As she puts it:[For, not only do we] miss sharing theheuristic processes [,but] when we approachmoral matters through the study of moralreasoning, we are led quite naturally tosuppose that ethics is necessarily a subjectthat must be cast in the language ofprinciple and demonstration. (1984, 8)Noddings claims that approaching ethics in this manner, thatis, through principles and proposition, is the way of thefather, arising out of masculine experience. The result is anethics of principle which she rejects on the grounds that itis:ambiguous and unstable. Wherever there is aprinciple, there is implied its exceptionand, too often, principles function toseparate us from each other. We may becomedangerously self-righteous when we perceiveourselves as holding a precious principlenot held by the other. The other may then bedevalued and treated "differently". (1984,5)5The ethical view expressed by Noddings is a feminine one.Of it she writes:This does not imply that all women willaccept it or that men will reject it. It isfeminine in the deep classical sense -rooted in receptivity, relatedness, andresponsiveness. It does not imply eitherthat logic is to be discarded or that logicis alien to women. It represents analternative to present views, one thatbegins with the moral attitude or longingfor goodness and not with moral reasoning.(1984, 2)Her feminine view is expressed mainly by women who tend not toapproach moral problems formally. Instead, they attempt toplace themselves:as nearly as possible in concrete situationsand assuming personal responsibility for thechoices to be made. They define themselvesin terms of caring and work their waythrough moral problems from the position ofone-caring. (1984, 8)This approach to moral problems was researched by CarolGilligan (1982), an early collaborator of Lawrence Kohlberg(1987). (The latter's well-known stages in moral developmentare described, by Noddings, as "a hierarchical description ofmoral reasoning" {1984, 96}).THE CARING RELATIONSHIPThe universally accessible foundation of an ethicalresponse is, for Noddings, caring and the memory of beingcared for. She writes:[This caring] attitude which expresses ourearliest memories of being cared for and ourgrowing store of memories of both caring andbeing cared for, is universally accessible.(1984, 5)6Relation, for Noddings, is "ontologically basic" (1984,3). This simply means that a person acknowledges that "humanencounter and affective response as a basic fact of humanexistence" (1984, 4). She also sees the "caring relation [asbeing] ethically basic" (1984, 3). This is an important pointto note since it contrasts with other kinds of ethics wherealoneness and emptiness are at the heart of existence. Anexample of the latter kind is the existentialist view of JeanPaul Sartre "whose ontology posits a lonely emptiness tryingto actualize itself" (Noddings 1984, 133). The affect whichaccompanies this view is the realization of one's loneliness.This makes anguish the basic human affect, whereas "our view,rooted as it is in relation, identifies joy as the basic humanaffect" (Noddings 1984, 6).There are two parties to the caring relationship: thefirst member is the "one-caring"; the second, the "cared-for"(1984, 4). Though Noddings consistently addresses the"one-caring" as "she", and the "cared-for" as "he", she saysthis is to maintain balance and to avoid confusion. However,she believes that, in the basic caring relation, the sex ofeach party is irrelevant (1984, 4). Moreover, she says that,though females may have easier and more direct access tocaring "through biologically facilitative factors" (1984,130), because of both males' and females' personal histories,we all have access to caring and memories of caring.In the kind of caring relationship described by Noddings,both parties contribute to the relation. As she puts it:my caring must be somehow completed in the7other if the relation is to be described ascaring.^(1984, 4).Inmost of Noddings' examples of caring relations, the partiesare of unequal power: mother/child, teacher/student. Rarelyare they equal parties, such as two, equally powerful, adults.RECIPROCITYNoddings states that "possibly the most important problemthat we shall discuss" (1984, 4) is the reciprocity of therelationship which anchors caring in the concrete, and,moreover, in the personal. For her, reciprocity means that thecared-for receives the caring from the one-caring and respondsto it, not necessarily by gratitude or by directacknowledgement, but:either in direct response to the one-caringor in spontaneous delight and happy growthbefore her eyes that the caring has beenreceived. The caring is completed when thecared-for receives the caring. (1984, 181)Because of reciprocity, the cared-for uniquely contributes to,and completes, the caring relationship. Thus, in Noddings'ethics, a caring relationship is restricted to beings who canrespond to the one-caring in the required way. However, shedistinguishes between the one-caring caring for, in thereciprocal caring relationship, and, another type of caring,caring about, which happens when we care about many livingentities, inanimate things, and ideas. Noddings maintains that"caring about" does not constitute the ethical caringrelationship, because there is no reciprocity.Since the caring relationship is always personal,8extension of relationships takes place through directacquaintance. There is no public domain as such, and therecannot be one, to Noddings' ethics. Her ethics is extendedthrough concentric circles and chains of relatedness.However, though the more formal "chains of caring" (1984,47) may link unknown individuals to those who are already inthe inner circles (future sons-in-law and future studentsbeing examples of such extensions), one's "obligation can onlyarise on encounter" (1984, 152). So, although a person cannotengage in an ethics of caring in such instances, on thegrounds that one cannot care for the human being not yet met,one can still care about him or her. But Noddings brushesaside "caring about" as too easy. She says:I can "care about" the starving children inCambodia, send five dollars to hungerrelief, and feel somewhat satisfied. I donot even know if my money went for food, forguns, or a new Cadillac for some politician.This is a poor second-cousin to caring."Caring about" always involves a certainbenign neglect. . . . So the one-caringacknowledges her finitude with both sadnessand relief. (1984, 112)Noddings' ethics does pose difficulties when trying to answermoral questions involving the public domain, the starvingpeople in the Third World, strangers, non-human sentientbeings, the environment, and, our obligation to unborngenerations. However, it does add an interesting andenlightening perspective to the problem of abortion:Operating under the guidance of an ethics ofcaring we are not likely to find abortion ingeneral either right or wrong. We shall haveto inquire into individual cases . . . It isnot a question of when life begins but ofwhen relation begins. (1984, 87 and 88)9THE ETHICAL IDEALWhat does it mean to be moral? What does it mean to meetthe other morally? The structure of Noddings' answer is basedon natural caring, "the relation in which we respond asone-caring out of love or natural inclination" (1984, 5). Shegets to ethical caring, the relation in which we do meet theother morally, from natural caring by desire. We consciouslyor unconsciously perceive the human condition of naturalcaring as "good". As she puts it:It is that condition towards which we longand strive, and it is our longing for caringto be in that special relation - thatprovides the motivation for us to be moral.We want to be moral in order to remain inthe caring relation and to enhance the idealof ourselves as one-caring. (1984, 5)One important point to grasp is that, for Noddings, ethicalcaring is not superior to natural caring. Rather, because theformer is built on the latter, it is dependent on it.A commitment to care is the guide to an ethical ideal;this ideal Noddings describes as:[the] realistic picture of ourselves asone-caring that guides us as we strive tomeet the other morally. (1984, 5)Of this ethical ideal, Noddings says that it is both:constrained and attainable. It is limited bywhat we have already done and by what we arecapable of, and it does not idealize theimpossible so that we may escape into idealabstraction. (1984, 80)The virtue described by the ethical ideal (Noddings talksabout not letting "virtue" dissipate into abstract "virtues")is built up in the caring relation: "It reaches out to the10other and grows in response to the other" (1984, 81). Clearly,it is not the virtue of the solitary holy man.In the ethical caring relation, I move out of my personalframe of reference into the other's: "I try to apprehend thereality of the other" (1984, 14). As part of thisself-displacement, my "attention [and] mental engrossment ison the cared-for not on [my]self" (1984, 24). For an observer,then, caring is acting, not by fixed rule, but by affectionand regard.One of the distinctions which Noddings makes has to dowith differentiating between the physical self and the ethicalself (1984, 14-5). A sense of my physical self is whatprovides me with the knowledge of what it is that gives mepleasure and pain. This cognition precedes my caring forothers. The ethical self, which is an active relation betweenmy actual self and a vision of my ideal self as one-caring andcared-for, is, says Noddings:born of the fundamental recognition ofrelatedness; that which connects menaturally to the other, reconnects methrough the other to myself. As I care forothers and am cared for by them, I becomeable to care for myself. (1984, 49)Thus, ontologically, ethical caring for others is prior toethical caring for one-self. But Noddings does not discuss howthis eventuates in our present society. That is, she does notaddress the possible difficulties of self-actualization,particularly for women, in our society.Noddings calls caring "essentially nonrational" in thatit requires a "constitutive engrossment and displacement of1 1motivation" (1984, 25). The self is no longer formulatingrules, but this does not mean that caring is an arbitrary andcapricious behaviour. Rather, her suggestion reflects anEmersonian-type inconsistency:[It is] a broad and loosely defined ethicthat molds itself in situations and has aproper regard for human affections,weaknesses and anxieties. . . . [i]t allowsfor situations and conditions in whichjudgment (in the impersonal, logical sense)may properly be put aside in favor of faithand commitment. (1984, 25)In a natural caring relation the moral "I must" arises in thefollowing situation:When I recognize that my response willeither enhance or diminish my ethical ideal• • • I am obliged . . . to accept theinitial "I must" when it occurs and even tofetch it out of recalcitrant slumber when itfails to awake spontaneously. The source ofmy obligation is the value I place on therelatedness of caring. (1984, 83-84)Sometimes it is difficult to decide for certain whether thecaring response is natural or ethical.Noddings places an ethical ideal above principle as aguide to moral action, because of the problem she perceives asassociated with the "universifiability" of moral principles.(She seems to use "universifiability" as meaning"universalizability".)"Universifiability" is defined, by Noddings, thus:If I am obligated to do X under certainconditions, then under sufficiently similarconditions you also are obligated to do X.(1984, 84)Though "universifiable" principles may guide us inabstract moral thinking, they yield "no real guidance for12moral conduct in concrete situations" (1984, 85). Noddingsclaims that this is because, in trying to identify the"sameness" of various concrete predicaments,we often lose the very qualities or factorsthat gave rise to the moral question in thesituation. (1984, 85)Because each person brings a different history, project,aspirations, and ideals to the moral problem, what may beright for one may be wrong for another. But Noddings does notsee this as:cast[ing] us into relativism, because theideal contains at its heart a component thatis universal: Maintenance of the caringrelation. (1984, 85)CARING AND EDUCATIONAs an educator, Noddings is particularly involved, andinterested, in how to educate people to be ethical, althoughshe stresses that "we all bear a responsibility for theethical perfection of others" (1984, 171). She rejects thejargon of "stages" of moral development and, for reasonsalready stated, does not dwell on moral reasoning. But thisdoes not mean that she dismisses thinking and reasoning fromethical conduct. As she puts it:It is a matter of emphasis and of origin .. . I put my best thinking at the service ofthe ethical affect. (1984, 171)The one-caring has one great aim which is:to preserve and enhance caring in herselfand in others with whom she comes intocontact. This quite naturally becomes the13first aim of parenting and of education.(1984, 172)Not surprisingly, Noddings recommends that the public schoolsystem be redesigned so that caring has a chance to beinitiated "in the one-caring and completed in the cared-for"(1984, 182). She discusses how schools and teachers cannurture the ethical ideal through dialogue, practice, andconfirmation. And, she makes specific, practical suggestions,including: smaller schools; removal of junior high schools;external examiners for grading all work; and, career educatorsteaching the same group of students for three years and thenspending a fourth year in administrative work or study. Someof her suggestions, like students having the same teacher forseveral years, are being implemented in the Year 2,000 Programin British Columbia's public schools.Regarding the interpretation of rules, as they apply tothe public school system, Noddings' position is that theyshould be interpreted as guidelines towards desirablebehaviour. Hence, the student's aim is to respect law andorder, since they contribute towards a maintenance of caring.However, she believes that we must unceasingly work atcritically evaluating laws and rules that "will allow us tosort ethically among them" (1984, 201).14TWOAN ALTERNATIVE ETHICS ?In the eighteenth century, David Hume (1984, 263)proclaimed it to be a false hypothesis that reason was thesole source of morals. In this century, Rodger Beehler saidthat "caring about others is integral to 'the moral point ofview'" (1978, 155). Annette Baier (1985b) attempted to attach"caring" to the picture of the fully autonomous andindependent adult with some success, while Agnes Heller statedthat care for other human beings is "the universal orientativeprinciple of morals" (1990, 41). However, caring is usuallyconsidered, in philosophical circles, to be a feeling, and, assuch, to be subjective, relative, often capricious, anddifficult to discuss rationally and objectively.The publication of Nel Noddings' book, in 1984, heraldeda change in the status quo. Yet it received scant attentionuntil very recently when, perhaps due to the growing interestin feminist theory, the subject of caring in general is beingaddressed. Alison Jaggar puts it thus: "writing on theso-called ethics of care has become a small industry withinacademia" (1991, 83).GENERAL REVIEWS OF CARINGNodding's book, inasmuch as it deals with such aseemingly subjective topic, makes criticising it difficult.This is particularly so, in that she does not claim to prove15anything about moral knowledge or truth (Noddings 1984, 3).And, as pointed out by Rosalind Ladd (1985, 356), such anethics, in that it disclaims any status as a theory, isdifficult to assess.Notwithstanding these obstacles, Noddings does claim afeminine-based ethics of caring to be an alternative to thetraditional and masculine ethics which is founded onprinciple. This is an important claim. What makes evaluatingit carefully a matter of some urgency is that the world ispresently plagued with interpersonal and internationalconflicts where, as Noddings says, violent deeds are oftendone in the name of "principle" (1984, 1).The reviewers of Noddings' book generally agree that sheopens up an important and timely topic in prescriptive ethicaltheory and practice, and, that she brings a thought-provokingand neglected part of our ethical make-up to our attention.Some of the critics who have viewed Noddings' work in thislight include Judith Andre (1986), Sarah Lucia Hoagland(1991), Alison Jaggar (1991), H.J. John (1984), Rosalind Ladd(1985), and Sheila Mullett (1987). Andrea Boyea suggests thatcaring has been "invisible" as a morality, and that itslegitimacy as a source of moral knowing has been suppressed(1991, 335).Given that the final chapter of Noddings' book is aboutmoral education - a topic of particular interest to her, giventhat she is an educator - it has been suggested by Ladd (1985,456) that this might have been the whole point of the book. Ifthis is true, it does not lessen the book's importance, since16the study of moral education, like that of caring, has beenneglected in traditional ethics. (In a lecture given December5, 1991, at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, which thewriter attended, Noddings informed her audience that she wasin the process of writing a book on how to educate for caringin the public school system.)On the issue of moral education, Noddings' reviewersproffer differing views. Her ideas about caring in educationare considered to be "salutary" (Andre 1986, 90);"challenging" (Goldstein 1989, 48); and "well argued"(Rendleman 1986, 149). But Ladd finds them somewhat "innocuous[and] romantic in tone" (1985, 356). And, Isa Aron (1988,132-133) thinks that they could result in profound andfar-reaching changes, but that her avoidance of rules inschools is unrealistic.TWO MAJOR CONCERNS WITH NODDINGS' ETHICS OF CARINGCriticisms of Noddings' ethics fall into two maincategories which are inter-connected. The first includesconcerns about the claim that her ethics of care is analternative to the traditional and masculine view. Is it analternative, and, what does this mean? The second centresaround Noddings' rejection of involvement with the distantstranger (her example has to do with starving children inAfrica) and the uneasiness produced in readers by herrejection. Can this part of her ethics be improved, in thesense of dealt with more adequately? Both sets of concernsinvolve the more basic problem of Noddings' proclaimed lack of17universalism in her ethics.Relative to the first of these two concerns, theobjection given by her reviewers is that, if her proposalconstitutes an alternative ethics, then it should have auniversalizable component to cover all aspects of the morallife. (It will be recalled that universalizability is acomponent of mainstream or traditional ethics.) Regarding thesecond concern, some principle is required to deal with thestranger or non-intimate, and this means that someuniversalizable, or abstract, concept is necessary.Feminist theorists have focussed particularly on thefirst concern, which centres around Noddings' claim to have analternative ethics to the traditional one. It will be thisissue which will concern me in the remainder of this chapter.The second concern will be addressed in the third chapter.FEMININE AND FEMINISTSarah Hoagland challenges the idea of basing an ethics onthe feminine in our society, or, as she calls it, on the"masculine model of the feminine" (1991, 247). Her point isthat, since the feminine is born of the masculinist framework,Noddings' work, at a deep level, does not represent any change(presumably, change to the status quo). Furthermore, in thatNoddings is still working within the paradigm of a masculinesociety, her ethics condones and continues the oppression ofthe female.Noddings does not mention the word "feminism" in her 1984book. In one recent article, she talks about using a18"feminine-feminist" perspective (1987b, 177). In another, inreference to discussing her rejection of impartiality in herethics, she had this to say about Jaggar's objection to heruse of "feminine" rather than "feminist":She is right to object (and I wish I hadnever used the word), but the idea was topoint to a difference in experience, not toa biological difference. (1990, 31)Yet, for Noddings, caring is clearly a feminine ethics (seeSusan Sherwin 1992, 42-3) which is presented as an alternativeto a masculine ethics (Noddings 1984, 2). That it may be bornof oppression, and exists in oppression, is irrelevant toNoddings' thesis here, for she is deliberately apolitical. Shegives the approach of the mother whose sphere is a personalone. Yet, she sees no reason why men should not embrace italso (see Noddings 1984, 2). Her aim is to achieve "anultimate transcendence of the masculine and feminine in moralmatters" (Noddings 1984, 6).How will this transcendence take place? Noddings gives noplan. Whether one should work, as Noddings does, inside thedominant male paradigm, or challenge it more basically, asHoagland suggests we should, remains to be seen.Hoagland's criticism is a feminist one, where feministethics is born of a refusal to endure sexist environments(Claudia Card 1991, 4). Furthermore, because of challenges tothe dominant power structure, some philosophers (SeylaBenhabib 1986, 405; Roger King 1991, 82; Susan Sherwin 1992,49; and others) consider that feminist ethics is inextricablybound up with the political.19Hoagland criticizes Noddings' ethics of lacking apolitical or public aspect, indeed of "a withdrawal from thepublic domain" (1991, 260). Moreover, she says her criticismis a lesbian criticism: caring cannot beinsular and it cannot ignore the politicalreality, material conditions, and socialstructures of the world. (1991, 260)Can an alternative ethics ignore the public domain? As earliermentioned, Hoagland's position is that Noddings' ethics isonly an alternative inside men's traditional ethics, with thelatter being the political and powerful one. As such, it willbe allowed by man to co-exist as a part of our moral practice.But it is overwhelmingly female and dependent on the male andhis mainstream ethics for its agency. While Hoagland chargesNoddings' "one-caring" with withdrawing from the publicdomain, she also does not believe that the present masculinepublic domain, relying on principles, is a better one in whichto solve ethical problems. Rather, both demonstrate a "lack ofexperience in the world" (Hoagland 1991, 260).For an ethics of caring to be morally successful inreplacing traditional ethics, it must, according to Hoagland,deal with what is foreign: that is, it must deal with theproximate and distant stranger. It must consider analyses ofoppression, and acknowledge the duality of self as bothrelated and separate. It must also have a vision of change.Hoagland writes:Further, as long as we exist within acontext of oppression, an ethics relevant tous must function under oppression. (1991,261)Hoagland suggests that what is needed is the caring of amazons20- one that will challenge the inequities resulting from the"values of the fathers" (1991, 260-1). Her reference to"amazons" is, presumably, a semi-mythical one comparable toHobbes' and Rousseau's references to man in a "state ofnature". How much this helps us deal with the "stranger"problem remains to be explored.DOMINION AND CARINGAndrea Boyea's (1991) feminist criticism of Noddings'caring is concerned with a more basic level of concepts:namely, with language and naming. Boyea (1991, 336) claimsthat, through the work of Gilligan and Noddings, an ethics ofcaring, which has been a source of morality for longer than weknow, has finally been named. This enables the traditionalethics to be seen for what it is. And what it is, according toBoyea, is an ethics of domination.Boyea believes that many societies have cast legitimateethical being in male terms and in male experience: these havebeen the dominant voice in ethical thought. In naming what wasunnamed, that is to say, in naming the ethics of caring, weprovide new metaphors, new "existential primaries", forunderstanding human ethical response, which broaden the rangeof moral consideration (Boyea 1991, 336). The two metaphors ofdominion and caring "are each a source of ethical vision andgive form to two divergent moral realities" (Boyea 1991, 335).Boyea would generally accept that Noddings' ethics ofcaring is an alternative to the traditional one. It is analternative in the sense that it is not in opposition to21traditional ethics, but rather its equal. (I discuss later thesense in which she would not see it as an alternative.)In clarifying an ethics of caring, Noddings, according toBoyea, demonstrated the gendered aspects of morality andsharpened awareness of the gendered aspects of traditionalethics. (See also Benhabib 1986.) However, once it is namedand explicated in theory (as Noddings has done with caring),once it is called into being, there arises the problem ofwhere to place it amidst what is already visible (Boyea 1991,339). To co-opt the language of caring, to use it within thedominant ethics, or, to show where the dominant ethics alreadyincludes it, is to fail to recognize its claim - its "genderresonance", as Boyea calls it (1991, 339).Boyea emphasizes that the ethics of dominion and ofcaring are not opposites. She sees them as diverging from acommon human base of bonding and receptivity. There is atension between them because of different experientialpremises or "metaphors" and because different priorities andmovement of affect are set (1991, 341). But both have equalstatus as a source of ethical ideals and response.Nevertheless, Boyea does not see them as fully separate:caring "fills in", both in the public and private sectors, tomake a more complete picture of the ethical self (1991, 341).It is in this sense that Boyea would not accept Noddings'ethics as an alternative: that is, as an either/or choice.Rather, she takes it to be an equal status 'enlarger' of bothmen's and women's ethical repertoires. Boyea reiterates thatcaring and dominion each contribute to our ethical vision, and22cautions that each, alone, or taken to excess, has inherentdangers (1991, 343). In naming dominion she hopes to balance"the centring power of the father with the nurturing power ofthe mother" and hopes for "creative dialogue" between men andwomen (1991, 343). What she does not consider is what wouldprevent this from disintegrating into an hierarchical paradigm(losing track of the supposedly equally powerful paradigms).Julie Duff's (1991, 344-347) reply to Boyea is to ask fora definition and explanation of "dominion" and "existentialprimaries". And, she raises the question of whether there areonly two kinds of ethical thought. Further, Duff suspects thatBoyea's argument is an essentialist one (i.e. that sexdetermines an essential or given nature); a state of affairswhich makes it contestable (see also Code 1991, 18). She askswhether caring, taken to its extreme, is still caring or adistortion of the theory. And, importantly, in my opinion, shestresses that:[T]he adequacy of an ethic of care as amoral theory must also be evaluated separate[sic] from its connection to gender. (Duff1991, 347).This statement invites comparison with Hoagland's claim to theeffect that Noddings' ethics develops the masculine model ofthe feminine. Duff believes that we need to take seriously thequestion of care's existence in oppression and subordination.But she does not comment on whether she thinks Boyea obscuresor clarifies an ethics of care by opening up so manyquestions.Although Hoagland hints that Caring is insular, neither23she, Boyea, nor Duff, discusses the problem of shrinkage inNoddings' personal ethics. This is my major concern, relativeto Noddings' ethics of care, and I address it in Chapter Four.In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine thecriticisms made by Charles Love and Sheila Mullett.UNIVERSALIZATION AND CAREStarting from a traditional position, Love (1986) makesa radical criticism of Noddings' ethics. Because the "caring"way of making decisions is not universalizable, it is not seenas "morally legitimate" by those who "look for the universalin the particular case", says Love (1986, 73). Therefore, heclaims, its ethical status is unwarranted.Two arguments are given by Love as to why the "ethics ofcaring" is not really an ethics at all: the "definitionalargument, and the "subjectivity" argument.Love's first objection is that a moral decision issubject to moral judgment, which necessarily involvesuniversalization: that is, it involves the inter-changeabilityof individuals in similar situations (1986, 74). His second isthat, since the one-caring resolves moral quandaries herself,the "so-called ethic of caring must be sunk in a radicalindividualistic subjectivity" (1986, 75). He asks: "Can anethic permit everything?" (1986, 75).Love anticipates and replies to two of the objectionswhich could be levelled against the "definitional" argument.One is that Noddings could reply that, since the definitiondoes not reflect the experience of women, it should be changed24(1986, 75). He suggests that this rebuttal is based on a"different language" appeal which is probably insufficient tosupport a "legislated" change in our use of moral words (1986,79).The other is that Noddings could remind objectors thatshe actually claims that a fundamental universality isnecessary in her ethics to escape relativism, and that she, infact, has one: the caring attitude, caring and commitment,which form "the universal heart of the ethic" (Noddings 1984,5). Love's rebuttal is that, since Noddings says that it is anattitude, not a principle, it is non-rational: it is right orwrong depending on its roots in caring, not dependent on itsoutcome (Noddings 1984, 5). This explanation, in turn, permitsLove (1986, 76) to argue that it differs in kind from the"universalization" characteristic of traditional ethics.Love (1986, 76) believes that both Gilligan and Noddingsassert the primacy of individual decisions over generalprinciples, and thus that this type of ethics is stillpersonal. Love compares the type of decision-making which heassociates with the ethical views of Gilligan and Noddings,with two traditional forms of ethical reason: utilitarianismand Kantianism. In the former, the individual qua individualis transcended and decisions are made on the total"utilities". In the Kantian model, the individual, thoughcentral, decides using an abstract formula or principle.Central to both forms of ethical reasoning is the idea ofimpartiality. He notes that this, the moral point of view, mayeven amount to an attack on our very selves. As he puts it, an25attack on the "very organization of our personalities" (1986,78).Then, he makes a radical suggestion aimed at meeting the"definitional" objection: namely that the moral point of viewcould be seen as "a point of view rather than the point ofview when it comes to the decision-making crunch" (Love 1986,79). Thus, a moral decision, being another point of view, isnot paramount and may be overridden when our very personhoodis at stake:Thus, for an ethic of caring, ourconnections to others, our standing as 'one-caring' to a 'cared-for', can takeprecedence over the conclusions of a pieceof moral reasoning. (1986, 79)But how does one meet the "subjectivity" objection? Howdoes one avoid radical subjectivity? For, with acceptance ofsubjectivity, Love points out that we could not criticize aperson whose projects were monstrous (he mentions Hitler). Buthe goes on to suggest that, because we all share certainexperiences (such as caring), these become central in theorganization of ourselves. So, with the rising acceptance ofour feminine side, this could end the "kind of denial of selfthat put[s] caring in a position inferior to justice" (Love1986, 80).Love's position can be summed up thus. He does not acceptthe ethics of caring as an ethics, because it is grounded inthe personal. Its lack of universalizability is fatal to itsstatus as an ethics. Hence, not being an ethics, it cannot bean alternative to any ethics - let alone traditional ethics.26Relative to the "definitional" argument, Noddings' (1986,84ff) rebuttal is framed around the following three pointswhich I think are important ones. One: the universalizabilityrequirement has always been questioned, has always haddissenters, and has only become a central tenet in ethics inthe last few hundred years. Two: the "power to name" is anenormous one. It is held by those we recognize as"authorities". Feminists are aware of this situation and muchresearch is going on into it (see Boyea's remarks citedabove). Three: if something more compelling grounds the moral,then it must be something that the moral grows out of.Otherwise, if there is no grounding in the caring attitude,other positions "beyond morality" could be used to justifyhorrendous activity (Noddings' examples are Abraham agreeingto kill his innocent son Isaac because God ordered him to{Noddings 1984, 43} and Nietzsche's war and enslavement{Noddings 1986, 85}).Apropos of the "subjectivity" argument, Noddings (1986,87) reiterates that a person practising an ethics of caring isnot independent of others. Instead, the moral agent is bound"inextricably to others". Thus, her ethics is both situationaland relational. The one who decides is a relationally-definedentity, not an isolated one. She makes the important pointthat it is not a denial of self that has made caring inferiorto justice, but a denial of relation.Can anything be said, then, about the requirements neededin an alternative to traditional ethics? Sheila Mullett, inher review of Noddings' 1984 book, gives a brief outline of27what she thinks are these general requirements. She suggeststhat the alternative ethics must be:a robust, enriched description of forms andvarieties of goodness, the virtues necessaryto achieve them and their role in thecreation and recreation of human community.(1987, 493)It is Mullett's contention that Noddings starts off in theright direction, but that she lacks the "equipment" tocontinue.Notwithstanding the vagueness of Mullett's statements Iagree with her that Noddings starts off in the rightdirection. Furthermore, I think that the "equipment" needed toproduce a new ethics may come through ongoing criticism ofsuch a proclaimed alternative ethics as Noddings'.In fact, some of the "equipment" has already beenmentioned briefly in this chapter. This includes: examininghow an ethics of caring has arisen; what is its significancein, and to, a context of oppression; acquiring anunderstanding of gendered roles; and, finding out how the newethics forces a re-examination and re-evaluation oftraditional ethics. More will come to light in the nextchapter when criticisms of, and suggested solutions to, thesecond major concern with Noddings' ethics of caring areexamined.28THREEAN ADEQUATE ETHICS ?The second major concern which reviewers have aboutNoddings' ethics of caring pertains to the latter's statingthat, generally, we are not obliged to care, that is, tosummon the "I must":if there is no possibility of completion inthe other. I am not obliged to care forstarving children in Africa because there isno way for this caring to be completed inthe other unless I abandon the caring towhich I am obligated. (Noddings 1984, 86;italics added)As reported in the first chapter, Noddings differentiatesbetween caring for and caring about; the latter being a "poorsecond-cousin" to caring in her view, since it always involves"a certain benign neglect". (The reader will recall fromChapter One that she gives, as an example of "caring about",my sending five dollars to famine relief in the Third World.To do so makes me feel "somewhat satisfied" {Noddings 1984,112} even though I have no way of ascertaining whether or notthe money will go to my chosen charity.)Concern for the inadequacy of Noddings' ethics in dealingwith the distant stranger also brings in two other relatedworries. One: the possibility of her ethics being inadequatebecause it does not deal with other species and with nature ingeneral. Two: the possibility of inadequacy because her ethicseschews principles. (This connects with the "universalization"29discussions undertaken in Chapter Two.) I begin by discussingconcerns with Noddings' specific example of starving childrenin Africa.THE STARVING CHILDREN IN AFRICASeveral philosophers are concerned with how Noddingsdeals - or, rather, does not deal - with the "stranger".Andre says that the grounding of caring in personalrelationships, and their centrality as an ethical ideal whichexcludes any compelling concern for those one does notphysically encounter, is "chillingly parochial" (1986, 90).Ladd (1985, 355-6) thinks that Noddings' central notionof caring is not an adequate explanation or prescription tocover the whole range of real-life situations in the modernworld. She speculates whether Kant's philosophy, whichstipulates that we must act ethically towards others whetheror not we have a natural inclination to do so, might not bemore genuinely caring when dealing with those to whom Noddingsclaims we have no obligation.Hoagland (1991, 260), too, is concerned with the adequacyof Noddings' ethics, given that it ignores both distant andproximate strangers. She remarks that this lack of concern isespecially pertinent to people in the Third World because weare responsible, to varying degrees, for the conditions thatproduce starving children there. (Presumably because of armsdealers and the First World's economic insistence on cashcropping in the Third World inter alia.) She refers to ClaudiaCard's (1990, 102-5) article in which the latter states that,30since technology has made it possible to affect people wenever meet, but are connected to "by relations of cause andeffect" (Card 1990, 105), we need an ethics that will dealwith this connection. Hoagland concludes that an ethics mustprovide for the possibility of ethical behaviour in relationto what is foreign. Yet, she says, and here she agrees withNoddings, that the ethicist should not appeal "to principlesto solve these problems" (Hoagland 1991, 260).Isa Aron (1988, 129-132) discusses the same problem inmore detail. Referring to Noddings' Third World example sheasks:Is there no ethical imperative to make theworld a better place, even if one does nothappen to be in relationship [intimate ordirect] with those who are suffering?(1988, 129)Giving the example of living in a middle class suburb whichhas no park benches and, therefore, no homeless people, shequeries whether this means that "I have no obligation to helpthe homeless who sleep on benches in other parts of the city?"(1988, 129). (It should be noted that, for Aron, "inrelationship" means "intimate or direct relationship". Thisbegs the question of an adequate relational ethics, relativeto strangers. In Chapter Four, I show that a relational ethicscan include a relationship with, and a caring for,non-intimates or strangers.)Aron discusses Noddings' answer to the problem of thedistant stranger in need: namely, that a cry for help isresponded to at the first circle of caring that is able tohear it. It is obligatory then to respond when the one-caring31hears the cry: "Only a chain of trust links me to the far awayother" (Noddings 1984, 153). Quite understandably, Aron bringsup the obvious rejoinder that not everyone is operating underan ethics of caring (1988, 130). (So, presumably, some criesfor help may never be heard.) Also, very rarely do those whohelp the homeless, or work towards the prevention of nuclearwar, do it because the moral imperative has impinged upon themin the way Noddings describes and demands. She goes on toargue that Noddings does, in fact, use principles in some ofthe examples that she gives (besides the basic one of heruniversalization of the natural attitude of caring that Imentioned in the second chapter) and that principles, as"formal, abstract, and simplified generalizations of thecaring response", (1988, 131-2) are critically important insocial situations. They serve as a reminder and have a(psychological) "mildly coercive power" to the one-caring.Aron suggests a partnership of the morality of principleswith the ethics of caring. An important point to note is thatthe partners are not equal, in that the former should alwaysdefer to the latter. Furthermore, if principles conflict, the"ethical ideal" should be brought in to decide between them(1988, 132).Barbara Arnstine (1988, 137-8) asks for clarification ofthe connection between social responsibility and caring.Referring to Aron's park bench example, she reiterates thereason given by Noddings for not becoming involved with thosefar away: that I cannot complete the caring unless I abandonmy previous caring obligations. This means, according to32Arnstine, that it would be immoral to abandon thoseimmediately in my care to help those far away. By giving thisas a reason, Arnstine claims that Noddings is using anabstracted "either/or" solution to explain "obligation", whenshe (Noddings) consistently emphasizes the need for details indetermining the moral grounds for caring (1988, 137).Arnstine states that Aron reduces the problem of socialresponsibility to a conflict between moral principles andcaring. Then, she creates a false distinction between her ownand Noddings' position by "discovering" moral principles inthe latter's examples to resolve the conflict. But in sodoing, Aron is using language to abstract and recast Noddings'moral problems,thereby changing the meanings. Arnstinesuggests that we abandon an "either/or" distinction betweenprinciples and caring. Instead, we should return to a concernfor the development of a social conscience, which is needed tosupport the ethical ideal of caring. In focusing our attentionon relationships a la Noddings, we can see how economic andsocio-political circumstances impede our development as caringpersons. She finishes with the somewhat vague statement thata "new social order" may be needed to sustain an ethics ofcaring (1988, 138).Deane Curtin (1991, 66) is also concerned with the lackof an ethics of caring for the stranger or non-intimate.Regarding the homeless, she suggests that an ethics of carethat is not politicized (for example, Noddings') risks being"localized in scope". Thus, it could be taken to mean that oneshould not care for the homeless unless one's son or daughter33happened to be homeless.In her 1990 article, Noddings, in reference to herrejection of impartiality, reiterates that we need toestablish "chains of concrete connection". Understandably, itis not possible to care meaningfully for everyone, but weshould:behave politically in ways likely toestablish structures that will supportconcrete caring relations. (Noddings 1990,32).This seems to be an interesting addition to the position shetakes in her 1984 book.Noddings' claim to the effect that the finite abilitiesof the one-caring confine her to caring relationships in herimmediate vicinity may often be reasonable, but I think thatthey (the finite abilities) may also be used as an excuse.What is it that gives the one-caring any impetus to enlarge,from even one all-engrossing caring relationship, to more? AsAron has noted, a person's concern for larger moral problems(like the homeless and nuclear war) usually does not stem fromdirect "impingement" on the person qua one-caring. But Arondoes not discuss what actual "impingements" should beacknowledged and become cared-fors, if I already have onecared-for that is, to me, completely engrossing? I discussthis issue further in the fourth chapter.For now, I want to examine another concern with Noddings'ethics: namely, the criticism levelled against her ethics'dealings, or lack of dealings, with other species, exceptperhaps for certain chosen ones - some cats for example. Here,34though Noddings claims she has an ethical responsibilitytowards all cats because of her relationship with her pet andsays (of her pet) "Puffy is a responsive cared-for", Puffy hasno intellectual or spiritual growth for Noddings to nurture,and her response is a restricted feline one. The question ofwhether the caring relationship could be completed by a catseems to be left open by Noddings (1984, 156 and 181).Notwithstanding this, the reason one cannot have a caringrelationship generally with other species is not the over-riding obligation to one's personal cared-for(s), but ratherthat the caring relationship cannot be completed, and so itcannot become an ethical one because there is no possibilityof reciprocity.This lack of a voice for caring in the domain of otherspecies, and for nature in general, is particularly disturbingto environmental ethicists such as Deane Curtin (1991) andRoger J.H. King (1991).CARING ABOUT NATURECurtin (1991, 66-8) attempts to combine caring fordistant strangers with caring for nature in her discussion ofthe Chipko movement (where women in a village in India huggedtrees to save them from being logged). She states:[I]n the mosaic of problems that constitutewomen's oppression in a particular context,no complete account can be given that doesnot make reference to the connection betweenwomen and the environment. (Curtin 1991,85)Curtin's suggestion is that an ethics of care must be35politicized; that caring for can still be contextualized(remain with the concrete other), yet be expanded throughfeminist political insights. She thinks that caring about isviable as a generalized form of care that may have specificrecipients (for example, caring about the women in the Chipkomovement). And, it may lead to the kind of actions that bringa deep relatedness which can be described as a caring for:"caring for particular persons in the context of theirhistories" (Curtin 1991, 67).Also discussed by Curtin is Noddings' demand forreciprocity, which precludes a politicized version of caringfor community development or for (most) non-human animals,because reciprocity is either "inappropriate or impossible"(Curtin 1991, 67). She states that many of the specialinterests of ecofeminists are precisely those wherereciprocity cannot be expected, for instance, working torelieve the oppressive consequences for certain women's livesbecause of the destruction of their immediate environment (thewomen in Dalit village, India, for example). She asks: "Is itreally caring for if something is expected in return? Whatwould be appropriate in return?" (1991, 68).I believe that Curtin may have misunderstood Noddings'ethics of caring in two ways. The first is in thinking that itis the lack of politicization per se - what Curtin calls thelocalization - of caring that prevents us from becominginvolved with the non-intimate, whether in one's own town orin India. According to Noddings, it is the impossibility ofpractically caring for the non-intimate and the ensuing36neglect of our immediate relationship(s) that prevents thiswider involvement.Curtin may have also misunderstood Noddings' concept ofreciprocity, when she asks if it is really caring for ifsomething is expected in return. This is because reciprocityis, for Noddings, not a form of "contract" or "repayment", butrather a relationship where engrossment is a necessarycondition. The one-caring is engrossed in the cared-for, wherejoy, on being aware of the growth of the cared for, is thebasic affect. The cared-for must recognize the one-caring(Noddings 1984, 78) in order to constitute the relation, buthe is "free to be more fully himself in the caring relation"(Noddings 1984, 73). (Although Card {1990, 106} questionswhether Noddings' "reciprocity" should not, less misleadingly,be called "complementarity" when dealing with equals, mycriticism remains.)Hence, concerning the environment, it is the lack ofengrossment - the key term in Noddings' reciprocity - that isthe main reason for the impossibility of there being an ethicsof caring towards the environment: there is no concrete"cared-for" who can respond in the required and very specificway that Noddings demands.Nevertheless, Curtin reveals something important, andthat is the lack of an ethical voice of caring for theenvironment. Although to some extent it may be answered in theone-caring working politically on behalf of the environment(see Noddings 1990, 30, mentioned in the previous section),and even if nature could reciprocate in the required way, one37suspects that there would always be the immediate obligationto one's intimate(s) to over-ride any caring for theenvironment. Curtin's conclusion is that ecofeminism, with itspoliticized feminist ethics of care, is needed consciously to"expand the circle of caring for" (Curtin 1991, 71).I will now discuss King's (1991) views on caring andnature. His concerns are mainly about the defects in theecofeminists' essentialist (see Chapter Two) and conceptualist("that normative force emerges from the personal narrative oflived experience" {King 1991, 85}) positions, but he doesbriefly refer to Noddings.As part of his discussion regarding the inadequacy ofboth essentialist and conceptualist "strands" of ecofeminismin expressing an ethics of care, King (1991, 78-87) comes tothe conclusion that, in drawing on a language of care andrelationship (that is, in actual concrete relations with non-human nature), conceptualism holds more promise. But, if it isto have moral significance for ecofeminism, it needs to beshown how nature itself can benefit from human caring.Referring to Noddings, King stresses that it is not thatnature must reciprocate or acknowledge the care that we extendto it. Rather, there should be some practical implication fornature of our caring (1991, 85).For King, moral principles are not the way to expand theboundaries of morality beyond beings that are like us - thatis, beyond the anthropocentric view. He admits that theconceptualist strategy does help avoid the oppressivehuman/non-human dualism, but that our imagination needs to be38educated to:a "loving perception" of the nonhuman worldas a member of the moral community ofdifference and an object of care. (1991,87)How this is to be achieved is not discussed by King in hisarticle.CARING FOR PRINCIPLESNoddings eschews principles in her ethics on the groundsthat their history is suspect: evil deeds are often done inthe name of "principle" (Noddings 1984, 1). Thus, she fearsthat an introduction of abstract principles, or of auniversalization criterion, will destroy the relational basisand personal nature of a caring ethics. Yet it is difficult inreal life to remain true and committed to Noddings' demand,since this disavowal of principles, and hence of any abstractcriteria in her ethics confines it to the immediate andpersonal: it localizes it, as Curtin would say.Although I think this does not deny Noddings' ethics thestatus of being an ethics, there is, besides the question ofadequacy, the danger of abusing or ignoring such a narrowlydefined ethics by confining it to the private or domesticsphere, while the traditional and masculine-derived publicethics is retained in a mainly masculine-led public sphere.(Hoagland et al.)The majority of Noddings' critics claim that, if herethics is to be adequate, it needs more empowerment. That is,it needs to enlarge its sphere. If not principles, then at39least some kind of abstract component or idea is usuallyneeded to accomplish this.There have been many criticisms of the ethics of caringin general. Most centre around Gilligan's findings and claims;some, however, also refer to Noddings' ethics. Andrew Mason(1990), Bill Puka (1991), Daniel Putnam (1991), and RobinDillon (1992) discuss ethics of caring in their articles.Their main concern is with the question how to enlarge anethics of caring by seeking some kind of reconciliationbetween caring and principles (such as justice, rights, andrespect). Mason and Puka address themselves to Gilligan'sviews, not to Noddings', but they do make some comments aboutcaring that have implications for the latter's position(especially in view of her 1990 article).Mason's (1990, 175-177) article is political. He claimsthat a libertarian perspective is not compatible with agenuine concern for those incapable of taking care ofthemselves, because it is not just. He suggests that genuineparticipation in democratic decision making could be, andperhaps is, an indispensable part of exercising concern forother community members. Hence, an integration of rights andcare would produce, "broadly speaking", a socialistperspective. This, if necessary, could be legislated (intaxation laws, for example) to force "some people to helpothers" (1990, 177).Puka (1991, 205-207) calls for a "savings approach" inethics in general, in order to avoid premature acceptance, ordismissal, of alternative moral views "in their theoretical40infancy" (1991, 201). (This is something which would, perhaps,tend to soften the adversarial approach used by somephilosophers {See Moulton 1983, 153}.) He suggests, with his"care as liberation" hypothesis (car-lib) (1991, 201), thatcare and justice be seen as "different kinds of psychologicaland ethical phenomena" that do not necessarily interfere withor complement one another (1991, 205). Yet, he faultsGilligan's concept of "mature care" for its lack of "politicalsensibility or institutional focus" (1991, 207). It is notclear, in Puka's article, how care will be "saved". And, itsbeing "saved" at the expense of being co-opted under theauspices of politics or principles remains a risk. That issomething which would be anathema to Noddings.Daniel Putnam's (1991, 232-234) aim is to tie caring andrelational ethics into virtue theory. He discusses caring froman appraisal of the works of Baier, Gilligan (1982), andNoddings (1984). His claim is that, for relational ethics tobe an "historical corrective" in philosophy, it must have astandard image of the individual by which to correct that past(1991, 231). (I return to this issue in Chapter Four.)Regarding Noddings' position, he questions where theimpetus to commit ourselves to a caring attitude is, when sherejects any universal foundation for this ideal (1991, 231).Even if we reflect on our past caring, why should we commitourselves to respond to others in this way? In his view,Noddings must be using some "metaphysical concept of theindividual" (1991, 232). This ethical ideal would supersedethe natural. It is tied to a common human potential, and that41is where we get our virtues in particular situations. Putnamsees caring as virtuous for the following reasons: itincreases our repertoire for ethical acts; it increases theindividual's potential; and it liberates the agent toparticipate fully in the practice.Inasmuch as he is using words and concepts fromtraditional ethics, and in that he is approaching caring fromthat ethical basis, Putnam is not addressing Noddings' "caringas relation being basic". Rather, he begins his ethicalcriticism of Noddings from a basis of the individual asseparate. And, to quote Noddings:[it is] this difference in language anddirection of reference that forms thedifference between an ethic of caring and anethic of principle. (1984, 45)Putnam states: "it is precisely a universal concept of aperson that makes caring a rational way to act" (1991,234).So, although his concept of the individual as separate mightalign itself with Baier's views (as an ethical scholar fromthe traditional school), it is a misconstrual of Noddings'individual. It is precisely the relational foundation of herethics ("relation [is] ontologically basic" {1984, 4}) that isthe source of the concept of the individual in Noddings'ethics. As she puts it:My very individuality is defined in a set ofrelations. This is my basic reality. (1984,51). (See also Carter 1992, 101.)Furthermore, as well as being essentially relational,Noddings' caring is essentially non-rational, because itrequires a "constitutive engrossment and displacement of42motivation" (Noddings 1984, 25).Putnam also claims that Noddings defines the essence ofa person as empathic. But Nodding does not say this in Caring.What she does suggest is essentialism; she talks about awoman's "natural inclination to mother a newborn" (1984, 128).However, it is of interest to note that she disclaimsessentialism in her 1990 (25-6) article.Putnam (1991, 235-238) also discusses the importantsituation where the urge to care is diminished (for variousspecific reasons), and contrasts a Kantian perspective on thissituation with Noddings'. In both cases, he claims, theinternally imposed Kantian duty and the obligation:to accept, and even call forth, the feeling"I must" [of Noddings, achieve the sameresult because] their will recognizes andacts upon the inherent goodness in the act.(1991, 236)For Noddings, the "I must" always takes place in a personalcontext where there is a potential for a caring relationship,and it is never an abstract futuristic proposal. Indeed,according to Noddings, one cannot, and should never, judge thecaring relation by any abstract principle, as Kant would do.Ladd makes the point that Kant's and Noddings' attitudestowards the stranger are very different. While ethics towardsthe stranger is the paradigm situation for Kant, it does notexist in Noddings' ethics (1985, 355-6).Putnam suggests that virtue theory, which now shouldinclude caring as a virtue, is advantageous to traditionalethics because it brings the aesthetic back into the moralsphere. Caring, and relational ethics in general, are a43"corrective" to complete the picture of the "harmonious andintegrated individual." According to him, Noddings et al areproposing that:the beauty of a well-rounded human characteris intimately tied to the quality of ethicaldecisions such a person makes. (Putnam1991, 237-8)I suspect that Putnam's suggestions may exemplify theco-option that feminists feared (Hoagland, for example).Indeed, the power of Noddings' views in Caring risks beingsubmerged in Putnam's ideal ethics. It is doubtful thatNoddings would ever agree to such a marriage - let alone sosoon after the birth of her ethics - since she envisages an"ultimate transcendence of the masculine and feminine in moralmatters" (Noddings 1984, 6). (Dillon refers to Baier'sproposal for a marriage between "the old male and the newlyarticulated female . . . moral wisdom" {1992, 105).)Dillon's (1992, 107-122) attempt at "conjugal bonding"is, perhaps, more subtle than Putnam's. She suggests thewedding of respect and care, two "apparently dissimilar modes"(1992, 105-6). Inspired by Kant, Dillon's proposal is that weview caring for a person as a way of respecting her or him. Inthis model, care becomes a kind of respect owed to allpersons. As part of her complicated "care respect" model, shesuggests that there is a variety of respect called"recognition respect", where one respects a person simplybecause he/she is a person (1992, 112).Respect for persons, in Dillon's model, involves takingaccount of our "connectedness,^interdependence and44distinctness." She claims that her "care respect" for personsis a suitable anchor for a more integrative and "cooperative"theory (1992, 116). Respect for personhood is not for someabstracted generic personhood, but for the individual andconcrete me, which, according to Dillon, "comparesinterestingly" with Noddings' account of caring (1992, 117).Dillon also states that her conception of "care respect"grounds the intrinsic moral worth in the human "me-ness." Itinvolves simultaneously viewing the person in the abstract(the person in the individual) and the specific, concreteindividual "me" (the individual in the person). The abstractestablishes commonality in all persons; the concrete, therichness of distinguishing details (1992, 118-9). The mostpowerful aspect of "care respect" is the ability to maintainwhat Dillon calls a "constructive tension" (1992, 122) betweenthe value of a person as an individual among others, and thevalue of the individual as special. (Boyea {1991, 341}, andCarter {1992, 106} also talk about there being a "tension"between traditional ethics and an ethic of caring.)It is difficult to imagine the implementation of "carerespect" without a great deal of re-education, intuition andfaith. So, although Dillon's hypothesis might have someapplication for caring relationships between equals (whichNoddings hardly discusses), it is difficult to apply it to theprototype of Noddings' caring relationship (which is themother and child relationship). This prototype epitomizesnatural caring upon which ethical caring is dependent(Noddings 1984, 79-80). (I criticise Noddings' concept of45"natural" caring in Chapter Six.)In this chapter, I have examined complaints about theinadequacy of Noddings' ethics in dealing with thenon-intimate (whether human or non-human). As demonstratedabove, the solutions proffered by various critics tend toinvolve some kind of a "merger" of Noddings' ethics withtraditional ethics.In the next chapter I will try to show that no merger orsynthesis of caring and justice values is possible without are-examination of the limitation of Noddings' position. Hercritics have been trying to enlarge the domain of her ethicsfrom the private to the public, yet they have all assumed thestability, or more or less adequacy, of the ethics of caringin the private domain. But, as I shall try to show, Noddings'ethics has an unavoidable potential for shrinkage from theprivacy of a circle of intimates to the minimal inter-relational privacy of the dyad or couple.Unless Noddings' ethics can be enlarged from the intimatedyad to at least a circle of intimates, no further enlargementis possible, and so this problem, ignored by Noddings' criticsto date, must be dealt with prior to a full discussion ofsynthesis, mergers, or enlargement.46FOURA SHRINKING ETHICSIn previous chapters, I examined the two major criticismslevelled against Noddings' ethics of caring by her reviewers.Both objections are connected to a more general problem, whichis that her ethics lacks a basis for universalization. I amparticularly concerned with what I consider to be a specificfault of Noddings' ethics of caring which need not,necessarily, be a fault of an ethics of caring otherwise. Thisis the problem of shrinkage.In Chapter Three, I discussed Putnam's query, why weshould commit ourselves to caring. By way of replying to him,I pointed out that he may have been missing Noddings' point(of relation being basic to her ethics), by beginning hisethical appraisal from the point of view of an individualadult who had not had his/her ethical roots anchored firmlyenough in caring.But Putnam's question leads me to ask another ofNoddings' ethics. If I accept her claim to the effect that theimpetus to care comes from my natural caring, where does theimpetus to enlarge my caring domain come from? When it ispossible for me to fill my "firmament" (Noddings' {1984, 32 &74} terminology) with only one cared-for, why should I enlargemy ethics of caring to care for even one other person,particularly since there is the concomitant risk ofneglecting, possibly even failing to fulfil, my immediate47caring obligation to my original one cared-for if I do so?Should I, and if so why should I, commit myself to care formore than one person?For Noddings the immediate obligation of the one-caringto the cared-for is "first and unending" (Noddings 1984, 17).It is also absolute. She says that there are two criteriawhich govern our obligation in caring relations:[T]he existence of or potential for presentrelation, and the dynamic potential forgrowth in relation, including the potentialfor increased reciprocity and, perhaps,mutuality. The first criterion establishesan absolute obligation and the second servesto put our obligations into an order ofpriority. (Noddings 1984, 86; italicsadded)But what is the criterion for adequacy in the primary caringrelation? When have I devoted enough time to my sole cared-forthat I can involve myself in other caring relations? Howshould I measure out my "caring" time?To illustrate my concern, I will make use of Noddings'stray cat dilemma.THE STRAY CAT DILEMMAA stray cat appears at Noddings' door. She asks herselfwhether she ought to receive this cat. She answers thisquestion thus:If I have pleasant memories of caring forcats and having them respond to me, I cannotethically drive a needy one away from myback door. A chain has been forged. Astranger-cat comes tome formally related tomy pet. I have committed myself to respondto this creature. (Noddings 1984, 156)48Before describing the dilemma, I want to mention a criticismconcerning Noddings and cats. There are cat-lovers and noncat-lovers in the world. Noddings clearly falls into theformer category, and she refers to cats several times in herbook (1984, 13, 24, 90-92, 126, 155-7). At times she risksmawkishness (see 1984, 52-3, for two other examples). As Andre(1986, 90) pointed out, there are instances where Noddings'words are inappropriate. One such occasion has to do with hersaying that she has incurred an obligation to her own cat:"Puffy is a responsive cared-for" (Noddings 1984, 156).Her love of cats explains why Noddings allows theseanimals, and not others, to enter into her caring domain aspets, and her dislike of rats, for example, explains herrefusal to regard any of the latter as potential members (see1984, 156-7). By allowing for a caring relationship with anycat (because she has happy memories of past relationships withthem), but eschewing any possibility of the same thinghappening with rats, Noddings is being egocentric andarbitrarily anthropomorphic: she is making an overly personaland socially-conditioned generalization about the limits ofher caring ethics. Her ethics seems to me to be too rigidlycircumscribed by one's personal past experiences.Furthermore, I am suspicious of an ethics where I mayincur a moral obligation to any strange cat that approachesme, yet have no such moral obligation to distant humanstrangers who are starving, and, who, due to circumstancesbeyond their control, cannot actually approach me for help.It is because Noddings has prior personal experience of49caring for cats that she claims to have an obligation to anystray cat that appears at her door: her population ofcared-fors has extended to include that species. But what ifI have had no past personal caring experiences with cats, andthe hapless cat arrives at my doorstep, not at Noddings'? Or,what if I have had past experiences with caring for pet rats,and a stray rat appears at Noddings' door, not mine? (In thesecond of these two situations, the poor rat would be the oneto lose out, since Noddings informs her readers that, not onlywould she refuse to enter into a relation with it, she would"shoot it cleanly if the opportunity arose" {1984, 157}). Or,what if a member of an extra-terrestrial species shows up atNoddings' door? And what if this non-humanoid "E.T." looksmore like a rat than a cat?The caring relationships, in Noddings' ethics, seem to berigidly and permanently set. It would seem, then, that thepotential for Noddings to have a caring relationship with arat-like creature is non-existent on the grounds that hercaring lines or limits have already been laid down. However,the fact that her ethics allows me to have a caringrelationship with a rat, if my past experiences dictate it(for there is no universalization in her ethics), does nothingto help the animal who has the misfortune to arrive at the"wrong" doorstep.Fortunately, our past experiences of natural caring forand by other humans is universal. Hence, the potential existsfor a relationship to develop as a result of a humanapproaching closely enough to us. This state of affairs partly50explains Noddings' dread and fear of the proximate stranger,since it creates the kinds of conditions under which anethical engagement on my part might be required (1984, 47,85).Returning to the stray cat dilemma, suppose I am acat-lover. Why should I open my door and take on anotherobligation, when my firmament is filled by one caring relationalready? Since Noddings' obligation is geographicallylocalized to the extreme, personal contact being necessary,perhaps I could avoid opening my front door and so not incurthis obligation. I may be legitimately busy, sick, or just"doing a Descartes". (Noddings {1984, 125-6} refers toDescartes' almost life-long habit of remaining in bed,thinking and writing, till noon.) Alternatively, I may believethat people often put stray cats on cat-lovers' doorsteps, andI do not wish to be taken advantage of in this manner.The above are only a few of the many rationalizationswhich could be proffered as an explanation of why I will notplace myself in the position of risking incurring a newobligation. But, surely, the best rationalization has to dowith the neglect that I fear will happen vis-à-vis my originalcaring relation. This is where there is an inherent tendencyto shrinkage in Noddings' ethics. The tendency is for theperson to be inwardly-oriented rather than outward-looking.That is, her ethics inclines one to concentrate on one'snuclear circle rather than to look outwards and thereby riskmore caring involvements. I think that this tendency suggestsa "lifeboat" attitude in Noddings' ethics, which makes itimpossible ultimately to account for any enlargement of caring51from the dyad or couple.LIFEBOAT ETHICSThe phrase "lifeboat ethics" comes from Garett Hardin(1971, 279-291). It is, in my view, an apt metaphor to use,because it describes the localization aspect and the dread andfear of the proximate stranger, which are important parts ofNoddings' ethics. I see it as a metaphor for the family whichconsists of two people (the one-caring and the cared-for)stranded in a lifeboat of caring. They have no moralobligation to actively search for other drowning humans, butthey dread the obligation that will be incurred if a drowningstranger reaches out to touch their lifeboat. Since there isonly a limited amount of caring to go around, some uglydecisions may have to be made by the one-caring in thelifeboat about whether she extends a helping hand to adrowning stranger who reaches out his hand to touch thelifeboat. In real life, do we, and should we, constantly fearthe hand that reaches out to clasp ours because we think thatour "caring" is already being accounted for, and, therefore,that we do not have any spare "caring" to go around?Noddings' position - uncomfortably, for some - addressesour fears at a subjective level. There is the question of thefulfilment of our primary caring relationship(s). This caneasily become the fear that our caring, as the ones-caring, isnot adequate. In her 1989 article, She quotes Jean Paul Sartreon the "present paradox of ethics":[I]f I am absorbed in treating a few chosen52people as absolute ends, for example, mywife, my son . . . if I am bent uponfulfilling my duties towards them, I shallspend my life doing so; I shall be led topass over in silence the injustice of theage, the class struggle, colonialism.(Noddings 1989, 101)In the cited passage, Sartre is expressing the fear that thework entailed in family relations is never finished. Appliedto Noddings' ethics, this means that the one-caring neverfulfils the caring obligation, since it is open-ended andongoing.Noddings does not discuss this fear, which is especiallylikely to occur in women who, as the main care-givers in oursociety, are often insufficiently autonomous and unable tostand back far enough from a specific caring relationship tobreathe in a little liberating objectivity. Lack of femaleautonomy, leading to self-sacrifice (see Bonnie Strickling,1988), seems to be due largely to socially imposed genderdifferences affecting how one is raised. Here there is ameeting of psychological and ethical issues (see NancyChodorow, 1978, and Dorothy Dinnerstein, 1977). It seems thatif a sense of autonomy (including feelings of self-esteem,self-worth, ability to make choices freely) has not beenadequately developed in the care-giver, the latter risks beingoverwhelmed by the needs and demands of others, and thuspsychological survival may depend on not allowing many othersinto one's circle of cared-fors. (I discuss the problem ofautonomy further in Chapter Six.)Given that it is difficult to decide how to limitincurring too many obligations at any given point in time,53this can become a fear of the proximate stranger. Noddings'position of this issue is the following:Our obligation is limited and delimited byrelation. We are never free in the humandomain, to abandon our preparedness to care;but, practically, if we are meeting those inour inner circles adequately as ones-caringand receiving those linked to our innercircles by formal chains of relation, weshall limit calls upon our obligation quitenaturally. (1984, 86)In actual practice, I fail to see how her ethics allows us tolimit "calls upon our obligation" to our family "naturally"because I do, to varying extents, have to choose myobligations. Perhaps my gaze would have to be permanentlydirected inwards, rather than outwards, so as to focus on the"inner circles" and, thereby, avoid incurring more caringrelations. That, in turn, leads to the risk of practising a"lifeboat" ethics.Noddings offers one possible solution to how one selectsone's cared-fors. I will discuss it by using the stray catexample.Suppose that I am a cat-lover and that I open my door.What if the stray cat is not there because it has fallen offthe step and I hear it meowing somewhere in the garden? Or,what if it is injured and cannot reach my door but lies in thegutter in my street which is full of non cat-lovers except forme? Or, what if I see it in a nearby street where it might beon its way to my doorstep? Or, perhaps, I may visit the catshelter, where stray cats are always to be found in need of ahome? How should I limit my obligations in such instances?Noddings' reply is that my obligations are limited54through physical (in the sense of "geographic") parameters.But the point is that I can easily change my physicalmovements to avoid approaching the stray. Similarly, I couldcontinue to avoid other (potential) obligations simply bychanging my physical peregrinations. Thus, I could cross thestreet and avoid the beggar, live in the suburbs and avoidcoming into contact with the homeless sleeping on citybenches, and so on. Since there are numerous ways to avoid myincurring further caring obligations, it could be thatNoddings is actually legitimizing my excuses by stressing thelocalization aspect of caring and one's obligation to one'soriginal caring commitment. In an age of hyper-mobility, andwith the global repercussions attached to many of ourlocalized activities, Noddings' exposition of ethical caringhardly seems to be an adequate solution.I suspect that many, perhaps most, of us do not assesspotential caring confrontations/situations in the manner thatNoddings suggests we should: that is, on a geographic basis.Her point, to the effect that a caring ethics is an activitywhich starts at home, is well made. Nevertheless, I thinkthat, in actuality, we decide whether to engage in caringrelations, or simply to care, based on something deeper andmore abstract than localization.It is my ethical ideal of myself as a caring person thatis working when I cross the street to help an injured personor an injured cat or bird; when I involve myself in work forthe homeless in other parts of town; when I work for nucleardisarmament (Aron 1988, 130); when I go "out of my way" to55rescue a child from drowning (c.f. Singer's {1979, 168}example); or, when I inform the clerk in the super-market thata stranger has left his/her lights on in the parking lot. Itis this awareness of, and subconscious referral to, one'sethical ideal that prevents the ethical shrinkage thatNoddings' ethics condones, if not encourages.A closer examination of my own ethical ideal will help todemonstrate how it does so.MY ETHICAL IDEALNoddings main points, relative to her extensivediscussions of the "ethical ideal" in caring, were summarizedin the first chapter. The reader will recall that she buildsup the ethical ideal from the natural caring relation, andthat she sees the ethical ideal as realistically attainable.My goal, in this section, is to examine the ethical ideal froma more personal perspective. When I think of myself as acaring person, what does this entail for me?In the previous section I gave, as one of my examples ofpractical applications of the caring ethical stance, myinforming the super-market clerk about a car whose lights wereleft on. If someone were to ask me why I was undertaking thisaction, I might reply that it is a case of (anticipated)reciprocity: my doing this for someone would lead me to hopethat someone would do the same for me if the need shouldarise. This answer could be considered a version of the GoldenRule. But, there is also another reason that I might give aswell, if I think about the matter more closely. While engaged56in this undertaking, I have, in the back of my mind, an imageof myself as a caring person. I think of myself as one whoobviously cares about a person who is a complete stranger tome. Perhaps this is "stroking" my caring ideal, but the pointis that, in so doing, I am re-energizing my ideal of myself asa caring person in my own mind, and (perhaps) in the mind ofthe super-market clerk. No other "thank you" is necessary. Theinternal "boost" to my ethical caring ideal suffices for me.(It may be countered that, on a deeper level, it is really myideal of myself as a good person that I am envisaging. Be thatas it may, being a "good" person entails my being a "caring"person, by description.)Unlike Noddings, then, I see my own ethical caring idealas something never actually reached: it is an abstracted idealthat I continually reach for, but never attain. This state ofaffairs does not necessarily lead to a Sartrean burden ofduty, because a robust sense of my autonomy prevents this fromhappening (see Mullett 1987, 493, cited in Chapter Two). Myvision of myself, as a truly caring person, is rather like aPlatonic Form of myself as a perfect caring creature. To putthis another way, by trying to attain my own ethical caringideal, I remain with the concrete and personal me yetconstantly strive towards the ideal, and necessarily abstract,caring me.My own ethical caring ideal includes more than theNoddings-defined "caring for" type of relationship. Itincludes "caring about", care-taking, as well as "caring for".Of necessity, there is always some kind of relation present,57out of which grows my caring, but it is not as rigidly and asconcretely defined as Noddings'. Instead, it has beenabstracted. Thus, my personal ethics includes caring about andcaring for: other humans; other living creatures; nature ingeneral; ideas; and objects. Admittedly, my caring activitywould, in numerous cases, be better described as "caringabout" Yet, as suggested by Curtin (1991, 66-7, cited inChapter Three), some instances could lead to a Noddings typeof "caring for", if there is the potential for reciprocity tooccur. Nevertheless, I would not exclude my caring ethics frominvolving non-human creatures, nature in general, or ideas andthings, just because of a lack of reciprocity, becausereciprocal instances constitute only one aspect of my ethicalideal of caring.One of Noddings' fears is that "caring about" often meansineffectualness. If it does, then it is surely a personalproblem. Yet, by excluding "caring about" from her ethics ofcaring, Noddings is prematurely dismissing it - to thedetriment of all concerned. Furthermore, she is narrowing down"caring" unnecessarily, and, making unnatural and arbitraryanthropocentric cut-offs to our ethical boundaries.In contrast to Noddings, I see the ideal of myself ascaring as being the impetus to instigate new caringrelationships of many kinds: concretely, caring is produced inrelation, abstracted, it is what motivates forming newrelations. Thus, when I work to prevent nuclear war, or crossthe street to help any kind of injured being, or work to helpthe homeless in my city, or pick up litter from public areas,58I can be doing all these activities from an ethical "I must"which forms a part of my striving to become the caring personof my ethical ideal.Noddings is (rightly, in my opinion) wary of applyingprinciples to ethical systems. But I did not use any principleto formulate the notion of the "complete ethical caringperson" outlined above. Rather, this was achieved by using theidea of a caring ideal.By restricting caring to the (mostly human-to-human)reciprocated relationships, Noddings unnecessarily excludes usfrom whatever else it means to be a "caring person". It limitsour ethical activity, a situation which is ultimately to ourown, and to our planet's, detriment. (See Jonathan Schell1982, 174-5.)In Chapter Three, I introduced Puka's call for a "savingsapproach" which would have as its goal not prematurelydismissing (or accepting) alternative moral views while stillin their infancies. The proposal just outlined may beperceived as just such a "savings approach" for caring: itsolves the problem of shrinkage in Noddings' ethics whileleaving open the possibility that certain principles can stillserve, but in the capacity of "tools" or "expressions" of thecaring ideal. Furthermore, it permits enlarging an ethics ofcaring without, at the same time, diluting it toineffectualness (which is what Noddings fears), because caringstill remains an ethical activity which is personally,socially, and politically useful. Moreover, it provides thebasis for a multiplicity of "cared-fors", which was the59immediate problem to be solved, as well as for an enlargementof the ethical domain from the private to the public. Finally,my proposal could have far reaching effects, since it helps to"open up" the concept of ethical caring.Having shown one possible path for saving a caring ethicsfrom dyadic reduction, we have the basis on which the caringethics can also function within the public realm. Now I wantto examine in more detail this functioning, in relation to ajustice and rights tradition. Stated in more general terms, Iwill be assessing a caring ethics as it applies in the publicdomain.60FIVEA PUBLIC RELATIONAL ETHICSAs discussed earlier, Noddings is wary of the use ofprinciples in ethics. (Jean Grimshaw {1991, 494} states thatNoddings argues "that a morality based on rules or principlesis in itself inadequate.") In her book, she does notcompletely eschew using rules or principles, but rather places"an ethical ideal above principle as a guide to moral action"(Noddings 1984, 84). Her concern is that uncaring acts may bejustified by an appeal to "principle" (1984, 1-20). Twostriking examples, given by Noddings, of principlesover-riding caring, concern the stories of Abraham (who wasprepared to kill his young son because God had ordered him to{Noddings 1984, 43-4 and 97-8}) and Manlius. Manlius was aRoman commander who:laid down harsh laws for the conduct of hislegions. One of the first to disobey a ruleabout leaving camp to engage in individualcombat was his own son. In compliance withthe rules, Manlius ordered the execution ofhis own son. (Noddings 1984, 44)Manlius' dilemma is a paradigm situation of a caring ethicsconflicting with an ethics of principle (with the principlesof justice and fairness in this particular instance). But howoften does such a conflict, involving as it does such a starkchoice between caring and justice, actually arise? Usually,principles are related to a "public" ethics. Admittedly, it isquestionable whether there should be a strict separation of61public and private domains in ethics. (Code 1991, 194,243, and279, criticizes the resulting genderized dichotomy.)Nevertheless, there are two obvious realms associated withethical dealings: the intimate, and the non-intimate(stranger) domains. In this chapter, I will use the word"public" to address the latter domain.THE PUBLIC DOMAINNoddings' ethics is a personal one. By her owndefinition, it is impossible that there can be any publicdomain to her ethics. This is because her caring ethics isborn of direct intimate relation. Without this direct personalcontact, there can be no place (no location) for her ethics.However, situations do arise in the public domain which callfor ethical consideration where an intimate caringrelationship would be impossible or inappropriate. Forexample, this can, and does, happen in many workplacesituations, especially those involving persons in positions ofpower. Mainstream ethics uses principles of justice and rightsto deal with these sorts of ethical problems. (Some may evenwant to argue that such principles were, in fact, developed todeal with these instances.) So, for Noddings to ignore thepublic realm leads one to question the adequacy of her ethics.It is not enough to say that such hierarchicallyproduced, and (often) power-over situations, should not arise.Their impact may, on occasions, be somewhat reduced (as willbe demonstrated below), but these situations are, at thepresent time, very common in the public domain. Examples62include the politician who represents thousands or millions ofcitizens, and the business person who has power over the jobsof hundreds of workers. How, then, does the caring politicianor the caring business person function in these non-intimatesituations?Noddings' ethics is of little help in formulating ananswer to this question. She comes closest to discussingcaring in the public domain in her discussion of caring in theteaching profession (it will be recalled that Noddings is,herself, an educator). But, even in this instance, Noddings(1984, 175 et passim) argues for the teacher being one-caring.The teacher is potentially (and, ideally, actually) in acaring relationship with all her students.It is interesting to note that, when any public decisionsregarding students' performances have to be made, Noddings(1984, 195ff) suggests "outside" appraisal: she proposes thatstrangers mark her students' exams, for example. She alsosuggests that supervisory, disciplinary, and administrative,work should be rotated amongst all the teachers. Presumably,these suggestions are made because, in the public world (ofwhich the public school system is a part), principles ofdispassion (objectivity) and fairness have to come in in someway. But, by making these suggestions, Noddings is tacitlyadmitting that the one-caring cannot, and should not, attemptto be fair, because she must always put the interests of herindividual cared-for first.In a democratic society such as ours, elected politiciansrepresent anywhere from hundreds to millions of people,63thereby making it out of the question for them to have acaring relation with each one of their constituents, and(Noddings') circles of caring are quickly increased toimperceptibility. How, then, does a caring politician functionin a democratic society? (Or, how does an ethically caringperson function in the public realm?)This is a question Noddings' relational ethics is unableto answer. According to Noddings' ethics of caring, thepolitician cannot, and should not, attempt to be ethicallycaring in a public situation. Simply put, there is nopossibility of reciprocation and, in any case, attempting thiswould mean neglecting the politician's original cared-fors.Yet, has the politician any option in her public life, otherthan to appeal to an ethics involving some kind of principles,when she has to make public ethico-political decisions?Perhaps the principles of justice, fairness and rights couldbe perceived as tools which the person makes use of to dealequitably and ethically with the non-intimates. Our use oflaws, in this society, is one such tool.This possibility, although worthy of further study, doesnot address the issue of what happens when a conflict existsbetween the private and the public domain. How can conflictsbetween public roles and intimate relationships be ethicallyresolved? This is a question Noddings' relationship ethics isunable to answer. Yet, is it so rare for a Manlius-typedilemma to occur that it can be safely ignored, or, does anethics of intimate caring conflict often enough withprinciples in the public domain as to require detailed64examination of these situations?Our experience points to there being enough actualinstances of such conflicts happening to warrant furtherexamination, and I will be making use of one such plausiblemoral dilemma in my discussion. Before doing so, however, Iwant to briefly discuss the use of moral dilemmas in ethics.THE MORAL DILEMMA AND ETHICSGilligan (1982) has been instrumental in highlighting theinadequacies of the practical use of moral dilemmas. (Shecriticized Kohlberg's use of six dilemmas in his assessment ofthe moral development of children.) More recently, feministshave objected to the use of moral dilemmas in ethics,primarily because of their inherent dichotomous construction(see Code 1991, 28-31). Notwithstanding the inevitableconcerns over data interpretation, there is also the moregeneral concern that, without contextualization of moraldilemmas (without fleshing them out), their meaning andrelevance are of questionable importance. Furthermore,attempts at abstraction (in the name of objectivity) to pindown the moral story to a stark, bare-boned, binary, choice,risk the production of such counter-intuitive examples as the"fat man in the cave" dilemma of Kai Nielsen (1989, 132). (Afat man is stuck in the only entrance to a cave. The tide iscoming in, and the rest of the group is still inside thecave.)Noddings is critical of the way moral dilemmas arepresented in the philosophical and psychological literature.65She also questions the analysis of such dilemmas as an aidtowards ethical behaviour in real life. She writes:Our real moral problems do not appearclearly constrained and decked out like somany textbook problems in algebra -problemsin which, also, we are deliberately set freefrom actual conditions. (Noddings 1984,105)Then, and somewhat enigmatically, she adds:Having registered our objection, however,let us agree, somewhat reluctantly, to playthe game. Does everyone understand that itis a game? The perpetual confusion of gameswith real life tempts us to give up on gamesentirely. (Noddings 1984, 105-6)(This statement is reminiscent of Baier's {1985a, 54}admonishment of prisoners' dilemma game-playing byphilosophers.)Nevertheless, moral dilemmas do occur and are quitecommon in everyday life. Gilligan (1982, 3) discusses thereal-life choices that her pregnant subjects have to makeregarding whether or not to have an abortion, to mention onlyone common case. There are many real dilemmas involvingbiomedical, political, social, and economic choices. I willnow consider a moral dilemma where there is an apparent clashbetween caring and principles.THE POLITICIAN'S DILEMMAThe majority of a politician's constituents inform herthat they want her to introduce a private member's billbanning clear-cutting of primary growth forest in theirdistrict. The politician has been assured by her colleaguesthey they would support her bill were she to table it.66However, when the owner of the local pulp-mill hears aboutthis forthcoming presentation, she informs the politicianthat, if the bill is passed, she will be forced to shut downher mill. One of the workers at the mill is the politician'sbrother. He has three young children and his salary is hisonly source of income. What should the politician do?If she follows Noddings' ethics, she will put her brotherand his family first, for her brother is already in the circleof her cared-fors. Thus she will refuse to introduce thisbill, and her brother will keep his job. Yet, as ademocratically elected representative, surely she should carryout the will of the majority of her constituents, should shenot? (We will assume that the politician cannot get out ofthis dilemma by pleading conflict-of-interest. Indeed, undera strict construal of Noddings' ethics of caring, such a plea,being utility or deontology based, is inadmissible.)Given that she must make a choice, it would seem that,prima facie, a relational ethics of caring conflicts withprinciples of fairness and justice to her constituents. Hencethe dilemma: does the caring politician help her brother, ordoes she follow her public mandate?Noddings' choice is obvious: as the one-caring, myethical duty is always first to my cared-fors. Hence, as thecaring politician, I must put my brother before the(non-intimate) constituents, and, therefore, refuse tointroduce this bill. Noddings might even re-enforce herposition by disclaiming any ethical obligation to futuregenerations (in this instance, caring for the primary-growth67forests on their behalf). This is because, according toNoddings, we can have concerns about future generations, butnot ethical obligations to them, for the latter only arise inintimate encounters. (This would also mean the politicianwould have no ethical obligation to her non-intimateconstituents.)Her justification, in this regard, is partly thefollowing:we cannot be certain about consequences.What is likely today may not be likely yearshence; what is waste today may be a resourcetomorrow. . . .[P]ossible consequences ofour acts . . . do not entirely determine theethical goodness of our acts. (Noddings,1984, 152)Alternatively, a principle of utilitarian ethics would seem tojustify putting the considerations of the majority of thepolitician's constituents before the few hundred who will losetheir jobs. According to this ethical stance, the politicianshould table the bill.Another alternative, in formulating a solution to thisdilemma, would be to make use of a Kantian moral imperative:The politician is a democratically-elected representative ofthe people. As such, she has promised to uphold the majoritywishes. If she is to keep her promise, then it is her duty tointroduce this bill.These alternatives place primacy in principles to resolvethe politician's dilemma. But, can principles find expressionwithin a vocabulary which places primacy in the notion of thecaring person? If I were to refer to my ethical ideal ofmyself as a caring person (as developed in the previous68chapter), could this be of help in resolving this particularproblem?Under the ethical ideal of self stance, the politiciancould "consult" her own ethical ideal, and ask herself: "Whatshould I do as an ethical caring person in this specificsituation?" Admittedly, there is a real risk of watering down"caring" to abstracted generalizations and impotence, asNoddings fears, for, in what practical and meaningful way canthe politician be said to care for all her constituents?Nevertheless, I believe that the politician coulddemonstrate that she is caring for the wishes of the majorityof her constituents, caring for the forests, caring for futuregenerations, and/or caring for the democratic process, bytabling the bill in question. All of these caring concernscould go into her consideration of herself as a person tryingto live up to her ethical ideal. Furthermore, she could alsoexpress caring for/to her brother and his children. One of theadvantages of Noddings' ethics is that caring relationshipsare concretized: they already exist and are "on view", as itwere. Hence, the politician could help her brother outfinancially, she could help care for his children, she couldhelp him find another job, and so on. In a concrete andintimate caring ethics, such as Noddings', close familiaritywith the situation enlarges the one-caring's options.Looking at a more general picture, concerns about powerdynamics in public roles (because of the concomitant authoritychallenges and risk of abuse in hierarchical situations) couldbe addressed. The caring person may fear that power corrupts69care. Therefore, one possible contribution an ethics of caringcould make is to suggest some political directions. Perhaps apolitician's individual power could, and should, be lessenedby extending the democratic process directly to theconstituents. It would then be the constituents themselves whoare empowered to make public decisions affecting them.To achieve this goal, Robert Paul Wolff (1970) suggestssome kind of device attached to one's television set whichcould register each citizen's choice when political collectivedecisions need to be made (although the risk of process abusebecause of lobbying and biased information may be moredifficult to control). Another way (admittedly expensive)would be to call for binding referenda, as the CanadianGovernment did in 1992, when it asked Canadians to vote onconstitutional changes.In summary, although the strict separation of our ethicallife into public and private realms is somewhat contentious(and, indeed, may encourage the conflict of caring withprinciples, in complex ways), occasions do arise when choicesbetween the two have to be made. In the politician's brothervs. constituents dilemma, I retained the primacy of "caring"in the making of the politician's decision, but it can beargued that I am really using a principle, and that it is aprinciple of caring! Be that as it may, my goal is to keepcaring as central in my ethical repertoire; whenever a choiceis made, caring should over-ride other principles. Hence Iremain striving towards the ideal of myself as a caringperson, first and foremost. Principles such as justice, rights70and fairness, do come in, but they function as tools in thehands of the caring person.71SIXOTHER PROBLEMSWe have seen how the problem of shrinkage can beaddressed through the ethical ideal of the caring person, andhow a relational ethics can be enlarged thereby to the publicdomain. I now want to mention briefly two final concerns:first, I wish to examine the roots of two ethical systems(traditional and Noddings' relation ethics), to emphasize thatNoddings' ethics gives a better account of the origins ofethical sentiments and moral people than traditional ethics;second, I want to outline my concern with the autonomy of thecaring person - a concern which is not addressed by Noddings.ETHICAL ROOTSTraditional ethical theories have tended to see theethical person as an already defined, discrete, andindependent adult devoid of a childhood. Noddings' work isseminal, in that she proposes a fundamental change in this,one of our basic concepts in ethical theory. She argues thatrelation is basic to her ethics, and thus, that relation isbasic to the formation of the individual as a moral person. AsCarter so aptly puts it:[Noddings] concludes, I think rightly, thatwe are basically related rather than alone,and as a result fundamentally caring ratherthan alienated and fearful. (1992, 101)The person is born into relationship, and he or she becomes72the individual he or she is through relationship. PauloFreire, the Brazilian educator, states:It is not the "I think" that constitutes the"we think" but the "we think" that makes itpossible for me to think. (1985, 100)In contrast, two metaphors can be of use in demonstratinghow traditional ethical theories construe the formation of themoral individual. The first comes from the Greek myth aboutAthena, chief of the three virgin goddessess, and theembodiment of wisdom, reason, and purity.She was the daughter of Zeus alone. Nomother bore her. Full-grown and in fullarmor, she sprang from his head. (Hamilton1940, 29)The second comes from Thomas Hobbes:Let us consider men . . . as if but even nowsprung out of the earth, and suddenly, likemushrooms come to full maturity, without allkind of engagement to each other. (Benhabib1986, 409-410)Benhabib (1986, 408) says that this state-of-nature metaphorof Hobbes, this vision of men as mushrooms, "is an ultimatepicture of autonomy." Though she may be conflating autonomywith independence (see below), her point is that we inheritcertain "philosophical prejudices", and one of these is thatmen are originally autonomous and independent.Metaphors like these, together with other philosophicalideas such as the Aristotelian concept of the woman as areceptacle (see Mahowald {1978, 62}, Vetterling-Braggin {1982,35), and Gould {1976}), have done much to down-play therelational roots, and aspects, of what it means to be human.In my view, this is why, prior to the publication of Noddings'73book, ethicists such as Singer (1979, Chapter 10), Baier(1985b), Heller (1990), Von Wright (1963), and Putnam (1991),have had difficulty trying to pin fundamental attitudes,dispositions and (even more difficult) sentiments onto analready independent, rationally-oriented, self-interested,adult man.I do not think that it can be done: one cannot get to anethics of caring, symbolized by the truly caring andinterdependent person, starting from a rational,self-interested, and independent person. Most personsconcerned with ethical development will agree that sentimentsfit in "somewhere"; that is to say, that natural, in the senseof both "biological" and "normal" (see below), tendencies ordispositions to goodness are necessary in order to form thehigher virtues (usually very early on). For example, referringto compassion, Immanuel Kant says:this feeling, though painful, is one of theimpulses placed in us by nature foreffecting what the representation of dutymight not accomplish by itself. (1983, 457)Yet, I think Kant may be conflating the two meanings of"natural" and, hence, missing the importance of the study ofnatural tendencies in ethical theorizing. "Natural" may mean"biological, instinctive, automatic, innate". If we have suchtendencies we can never know them because, in attempting toknow them, one alters them. (Alasdair C. Maclntyre {1984, 161}says: "Man who has nothing but a biological nature is acreature of whom we know nothing"). "Natural" may also mean"normal, common or usual", and such "natural" tendencies are74the result of social development. Again, when Noddings talksabout natural caring being automatic to mothers (1984, 79), Ithink that she is confusing the normal or usual ability thatfemales have to mother (which is socially conditioned) withsome innate ability to mother of which we have no proof.Indeed, from Harlow's studies of primates, and frompsychological examination of adults abused as children, wehave contrary evidence that there is no such innate ability inhumans.AUTONOMYThe risk of abuse and/or the instilling of guilt incaring relatioonships may be more likely to occur inmale-female relationships in a male-dominated society such asours (see Miller 1986). Noddings' ethics, being a feminineethics, may be particularly prone to this problem (BarbaraHouston 1987, 352-3). Feminists, especially, are aware of, andconcerned about, these possible manifestations (see Benhabib1986, 418; Code 1991, 208; Curtin 1991, 66; Hoagland 1991,250-2; and, Mullett 1987, 493).As the success of Gloria Steinem's recent book (1992)demonstrates, a presently "popular" stance consists in puttingthe problem down to a lack of female autonomy and/orindependence, and then attempting to change this situation byempowering women. Notwithstanding its widespread appeal, thissolution may risk throwing out the baby caring in the abusivebathwater.However, the problem of autonomy of the caring person is,75I believe, a recurring one in any ethics where relationshiphas primacy. How autonomy eventuates is not completelyunderstood, yet the problem needs to be addressed.The interrelational aspect of autonomy with dependence iscomplex. Evelyn Fox Keller (1985), one of the thinkers whomade an excellent attempt at discussing the ontology ofautonomy, has this to say about the issue:[At one end of the spectrum, autonomy]connotes a radical independence from others,mapping closely onto an interpretation ofobjectivity that implies a reductivedisjunction of subject from object. . . .[T]he tendency to confuse autonomy withseparation and independence from others isitself part of what we need to explain.(Keller 1985, 97)Keller goes on to develop a concept of a dynamic autonomywhich:leaves unchallenged a "potential space"between self and other [which] allows thetemporary suspension of boundaries between"me" and "not-me" required for all empathicexperience. (1985, 99)I share Keller's concerns with the term "autonomy": it needsa more carefully-worded definition. Given its importance, theissue of autonomy needs to be extensively explored anddiscussed from both psychological, and philosophical,perspectives. This cannot be done within the scope of thispaper. But there is no reason why "autonomy" cannot beencompassed in an ethics of caring. In fact, I think that itis necessary that it be included, in order to prevent the riskof abuse and/or guilt in caring relationships.Noddings does not address the issue of autonomy in her76book. In particular, she does not deal with the ramificationsof its absence, something which is a constant risk in anycaring ethics.Given the present socio-political milieu, it is difficultto be a caring person and also to develop one's autonomy. Thismay be why women, who are usually perceived as being thecarers in our society, complain more than men about their lackof autonomy. (See Tormey {1976, 206}.) Bonnelle LewisStrickling (1988) makes the point that for genuineself-abnegation, there must first be a self to abnegate. Thisproblem, which Keller is aware of, seems not to be adequatelyaddressed in mainstream philosophical treatises on autonomy(see Blum {1976, 222-243}).Notwithstanding the difficulty associated with developingone's autonomy in our society, some people (women and men) dobecome autonomous and caring persons. How autonomy and careare nurtured is an important topic which, as alreadymentioned, needs a full inquiry of its own.77CONCLUDING REMARKSAs discussed in Chapters Three and Four, initial attemptsto marry caring and justice can be illuminated by anexamination of the demands of any ethics which avoidsreduction to the dyad. Noddings' original goal is to transcendthe male/female split, which is the justice/caring split.Presumably such a transcendence implies some kind ofsynthesis.I have suggested using a "savings approach" withNoddings' ethics: one that would unite an augmented "caring"with justice, by compassion (in the sense of "feeling with"),through the ethical ideal (that is, the ideal of the caringperson).For an ethics that relies so heavily on one's owndevelopment of attitudes and feelings, it is essential thatthe family be one in which caring dispositions are nurtured.Sadly, in our society, there are far too many dysfunctionalfamilies. Thus, there is a need for external-to-the-family"safety nets" for those who do not have the advantage ofgrowing up in a caring home environment. This is one of thereasons why Noddings' work on moral education in the publicschool system needs to be taken very seriously, and I shareher views regarding the importance of education. (In threerecently published articles {1987a, 1987b, 1989} Noddingsdiscusses how to educate for caring in our society.) There arealso some social activities, in particular conflict resolutiontechniques and dealing with aggression, that may be easier to78learn at school.It is to be hoped that the dialogue begun by Noddings inCaring will continue, and that it will receive the attentionit deserves (see Aron 1988, 126-7). Noddings has publiclyadmitted (at her lecture of December 5,1991, which the writerattended) to desiring to make several changes in her book,were she to re-write it. I would encourage her to undertakethis project which would generate some revisions, and(perhaps) the enlargement, of her ethical theory. For, asNoddings says:One must meet the other in caring. From thisrequirement there is no escape for the onewho would be moral. (1984, 201)79WORKS CITEDANDRE, Judith.^1986.^"Review of Caring."^TeachingPhilosophy 9.1:89-90.ARNSTINE, Barbara. 1988. "The Pernicious Nature ofEither/Or." Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education44: 136-139.ARON, Isa.^1988.^"Caring and Principles-Opponents orPartners?" Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education 44:126-135.BAIER, Annette C. 1985a. "What do Women Want in a MoralTheory?" Nous 19: 53-63.- - -. 1985b. Postures of the Mind. Minneapolis: Universityof Minnesota Press.BEEHLER, Rodger. 1978. Moral Life. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.BENHABIB, Seyla. 1986. "The Generalized and the ConcreteOther: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and FeministTheory." Praxis International 54.2: 402-424.BLUM, Larry, et al.^1976.^"Altruism and Oppression inWomen." Women and Philosophy: Towards a Theory ofLiberation. Eds.Carol C. Gould and Marx W. Wartofsky.New York: Putnam's Sons. 222-243.BOYEA, Andrea. 1991. "Existential Primaries, Metaphors forEthics: Dominion and Caring." Proceedings of thePhilosophy of Education 47: 335-343.CARD, Claudia. 1990. "Caring and Evil." Hypatia 5.1: 101-108.- - -. editor. 1991. Feminist Ethics. Laurence: UniversityPress of Kansas.CARTER, Robert E. 1992. Becoming Bamboo. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.CHODOROW, Nancy.^1972.^The Reproduction of Mothering.Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender. Berkeley:University of California Press.CODE, Lorraine. 1991. What Can She Know? Feminist Theory andthe Construction of Knowledge. Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press.CURTIN, Deane. 1991. "Towards an Ecological Ethics of Care."Hypatia 6.1: 60-73.80DILLON, Robin S.^1992.^"Respect and Care: Toward MoralIntegration." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22.1: 105-131.DINNERSTEIN, Dorothy. 1977. The Mermaid and the Minotaur.New York: Harper & Row.DUFF, Julie. 1991. "Obscuring or Clarifying an Ethics ofCare?" Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education 47:344-347.FREIRE, Paulo. 1985. Politics of Education. Trans. DonaldoMacedo. New York: Bergin & Garvey.GILLIGAN, Carol. 1982. In A Different Voice. Cambridge:Harvard University Press.GOLDSTEIN, Beth L. 1989. "Review of Caring". ContemporaryEducation 61.1: 48.GOULD, Carol C., and Marx W. Wartofsky. 1976. Women andPhilosophy: Towards a Theory of Liberation. New York:Putnam's Sons.GRIMSHAW, Jean. 1991. "Feminist Ethics." A Companion toEthics. Ed. Peter Singer. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.491-499.HAMILTON, Edith. 1940. Mythology. Boston: Mentor.HARDIN, Garett. 1971 . "The Case Against Helping the Poor."Moral Problems. Ed. James Rachels. New York: Harper &Row. 279-291.HELLER, Agnes. 1990. A Philosophy of Morals. Oxford: BasilBlackwell.HOAGLAND, Sarah Lucia . 1991. "Some Thoughts about Caring."Feminist Ethics. Ed. Claudia Card. Lawrence: UniversityPress of Kansas. 246-263.HOUSTON, Barbara. 1987. "Rescuing Womanly Virtues: SomeDangers of Moral Reclamation." Science, Morality andFeminist Theory. Eds. Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielsen.(Supplementary Vol. 13 to Canadian Journal of Philosophy)Calgary: University of Calgary Press.HUME, David. 1948. Moral and Political Philosophy. NewYork: Hafner Press.JAGGAR, Alison. 1991. "Feminist Ethics." Feminist Ethics.Ed. Claudia Card. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.78-104.JOHN, H. J. 1984. "Review of Caring." Choice 22.3: 438-439.81KANT, Immanuel. 1983. Ethical Philosophy. Trans. James W.Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co.KELLER, Evelyn Fox. 1985. Reflections on Gender and Science.New Haven: Yale University Press.KING, Roger J.H. 1991. "Caring about Nature: Feminist Ethicsand the Environment." Hypatia 6.1: 75-89.KOHLBERG, Lawrence. 1987. Child Psychology and ChildhoodEducation. New York: Longman Inc.LADD, Rosalind Ekman. 1985. "Review of Caring." CanadianPhilosophical Review 5: 354-356.LOVE, Charles E. Jr. 1986. "Universalization, Projects, andthe New Feminine Ethics." Proceedings of the Philosophyof Education 42: 73-81.MACINTYRE, Alasdair C. 1984. After Virtue: A Study in MoralTheory. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.Second Edition.MAHOWALD, Mary Briody. 1978. Philosophy of Woman: Classicalto Current Concepts. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub.Co.MASON, Andrew.^1990.^"Gilligan's Conception of MoralMaturity." Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour20.2: 167-179.MILLER, Jean Baker. 1986. Towards A New Psychology of Women.Boston: Beacon Press. Second Edition.MOULTON, Janice.^1983.^"A Paradigm of Philosophy: TheAdversary Method." Discovering Reality. Eds. SandraHarding and Merrill B. Hintikka Kluwer. Boston: ReidelPublication. 149-162.MULLETT, Sheila.^1987.^"Review of Caring."^Queen'sQuarterly 94: 492-3.NIELSEN, Kai. 1990. Ethics Without God. Buffalo: PrometheusBooks. Revised Edition.NODDINGS. Nel. 1984. Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethicsand Moral Education. Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.- - -. 1986. "Doubts about Radical Proposals on Caring."Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education 42: 83-86.- -^1987a. "Creating Rivals and Making Ennemies." Journalof Thought 22.4: 23-31.82- -^1987b. "Do We Want to Produce Good People?" Journalof Moral Education 16.3: 177-188.- - -. 1989. "Educating Moral People." Who Cares? Ed. MaryM. Brabeck. New York: Praegar. 216-232.- - -. 1990. "Feminist Fears in Ethics." Journal of SocialPhilosophy XXI 2,3: 25-33.PUKA, Bill. 1991. "The Science of Caring." Hypatia 6.2:200-210.PUTNAM, Daniel. 1991. "Relational Ethics and Virtue Theory."Metaphilosophy 22.3: 231-238.RENDLEMAN, Nancy. 1986. "Review of Caring." PersonalistForum 2.2: 145-150.SCHELL, Jonathan. 1982. The Fate of the Earth. New York:Knopf.SHERWIN, Susan.^1992.^No Longer Patient. Philadelphia:Temple University Press.SINGER, Peter. 1979. Practical Ethics. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.STEINEM, Gloria.^1992.^Revolution From Within. Boston:Little Brown.STRICKLING, Bonnelle Lewis.^1988.^"Self-Abnegation."Feminist Perspectives: Philosophical Essays on Method andMorals. Eds. Lorraine Code, Sheila Mullett and ChristineOverall. Toronto: University of Toronto. 190-200.TORMEY, Judith. 1976. "Exploitation, Oppression and Self-Sacrifice." Women And Philosophy: Towards a Theory ofLiberation. Eds. Carol C. Gould and Marx W. Wartofsky.New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 204-221.VETTERLING-BRAGGIN, Mary. 1982. "Feminity", "Masculinity" &"Androgyny": A Modern Philosophical Discussion. Totowa:Littlefield Adams.VON WRIGHT, George Henrick. 1963. The Varieties of Goodness.London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.WOLFF, Robert Paul. 1970. In Defense of Anarchy. New York:Harper and Row.83


Citation Scheme:


Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics



Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            async >
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:


Related Items